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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Clipping of article "The Kennedy Murder and the Secret Services of the USA"

FROM: WE/4/INT Arthur P. Iorio

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 26 March 1964

Oswald case (from Rachms)

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI Staff Birch O'Neil ~~Room 2B03~~			
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14.			
15.			18

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached article, which may be of interest to you, appeared in the 7 March issue of the Italian Communist Party weekly Rinascita. The writer, Gianfranco Corsini, has been on and off US correspondent for the Italian Communist press.

Note that in the section pencilled in red rumors are referred which suggest that ~~that~~ it was the Agency to organize the murder of President Kennedy.

Clipping not retained

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Box 8

13-00000

SX-25605

1 June 1964

(S) Discussion between member SR Division and COS Helsinki concerning timetable of OSWALD's stay in ~~[illegible]~~ Helsinki

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to reach the Soviet consulate;

[illegible] Soviet consulate probably [illegible] time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed. Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
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ISO/DCU		CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE IDEN (11)	
		NFD (8)	
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Document Number 716-838

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS RELEASED DOC # -340

RECORD COPY

1 Jun 64

201-289248

Box 8

~~SECRET~~

1 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

1. At 0900 this morning I talked with Frank Friberg recently returned COS Helsinki re Warren Commission inquiry concerning the timetable of Oswald's stay in Finland in October 1959, including his contact with the Soviet Consulate there. (Copy of the Commission letter of 25 May 64 and State Cable of 22 May 64 attached.)

2. Friberg gave me the following information:

a. It takes 25 minutes to drive from the airport to downtown Helsinki;

b. By taxi, it would take no more than 5 minutes to reach the Soviet consulate;

c. The Soviet consulate probably closed at 1300 hours local time on Saturdays in 1959;

d. Passenger lists (manifests) at the U.S. Consulate in Helsinki are retained for six months only and then are destroyed. Mr. Robert Fulton (CIA) was U.S. consular official there at the time.

e. A copy of State's cable inquiry would go to the Helsinki Station and they would assist in preparation of a reply.

3. Mr. Friberg agreed that it would be worthwhile to cable the Station concerning points not covered by State in their inquiry. He suggested changes incorporated into the cable sent to Helsinki.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/R

Document Number 780-340

For FOIA Review on JUN 1976

SAME AS 716-838

~~SECRET~~

See Sanitized File H
Number 335
For sterile copy [illegible]

SECRET

YM7-27221

9 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Discussion with Warren Commission Staff Member

REFERENCE: Letter from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the President's Commission, to Mr. Richard Helms dated 3 July 1964

> O SR/CI discussion with SLAWSON 9 July on questions of Soviet policy towards Russian wives of Americans and visa procedures.

1. With the approval of C/SR and the DDP, I met with Mr. W. David Slawson of the staff of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy at 1400 hours on this date in the Commission's offices at 200 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss apparent inconsistencies in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of State which were called to our attention in a letter from the General Counsel of the Commission to Mr. Helms, dated 3 July 1964.

2. By way of introduction, Mr. Slawson said that in the portion of the Commission's report that he was writing, he would have to deal with the question of whether or not the OSWALDs' departure from the USSR - and the circumstances (i.e. timing) of that departure - were unusual or suspicious in any way. He expressed his belief that they probably were not and cited Soviet relaxation in such matters in the post-Stalin era. However, he wanted to be sure in his own mind that our information was not in conflict with that which the Commission had received from State since all of that information would remain in the records of the Commission.

3. After stating my belief that there was no real disagreement or inconsistency between the information from CIA and that from State, I expressed the view that the matter resolved itself into three questions:

/a. Do the Soviet

Document Number 767-864
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

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iat.

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201-289248

a. Do the Soviet authorities normally permit Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the homelands of their spouses?

b. Do they normally permit such Soviet citizens to accompany (i.e. depart simultaneously with) their spouses from the Soviet Union?

c. How long does it take such Soviet citizens to get Soviet exit visas for such a purpose (time lapse from application to granting of visas)?

4. Concerning the first two questions (3a and 3b above) I pointed out that we had addressed ourselves mainly to the question of Soviet citizens being allowed to accompany their spouses abroad while State dealt only with the larger question of Soviets married to foreigners being allowed to emigrate without reference to whether or not they left simultaneously with or at another time from their spouses. Mr. Slawson commented that this explanation was most helpful and he reread what both we and State had said in that light.

5. By way of further explanation, I said that the statements in paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 concerning Soviets being permitted to accompany their foreign spouses abroad were based on a review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans. In only four of these cases did a Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her foreign husband; in 14 of the cases the foreign spouse departed alone; and in the remaining seven cases insufficient details are known to permit us to categorize them. I added that although State's information began by citing the issuance of 724 quota and non-quota immigrant visas by the American Embassy in Moscow during the period FY 1954 to December 1963, it did not indicate how many of these visas were for Soviet citizens who had married U.S. nationals. Actually State provided detailed information for only sixteen cases and did not indicate in many of these whether or not the Soviet was permitted to accompany the foreign spouse.

/6. In response to

~~SECRET~~

6. In response to a question from Mr. Slawson I stated that most of the 26 cases upon which we based our statements involved foreign students, exchange teachers and other relatively transient persons, and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear little similarity to the OSWALD case in that none involved a defector who married prior to repatriating. I noted that paragraph 6 of our 6 April 1964 memorandum to the Commission had pointed this out. Mr. Slawson indicated that he was now satisfied on this matter.

7. Concerning the length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process exit visas for Soviet citizens married to foreign nationals (question 3c above), I stated that, in my opinion, the information provided by State (in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter) substantially corresponded to the views expressed in paragraphs 6 and 7 of our memorandum to the Commission dated 6 April 1964. Mr. Slawson asked if it would be possible to elaborate paragraph 7 of our memorandum of 6 April by providing a statistical breakdown of the cases on which our statements were based. I indicated that this could be done.

8. At this point Mr. Slawson stated that as a result of our discussion he felt that the question of possible inconsistencies had been resolved. However, he asked that we send a brief written reply to the Commission's letter of 3 July 1964 embodying the substance of what I had said concerning the basis for statements included in our 6 April 1964 memorandum. [This would include the gist of the draft reply to the Commission which I showed to C/SR on 8 July plus an elaboration of our statements concerning Soviet visa applications.]

9. Mr. Slawson indicated that he would be sending parts of his report dealing with the Soviet intelligence services to CIA for checking as to their accuracy. He did not say when this would occur.

10. After concluding the meeting with Mr. Slawson, I read Volume 52 of the transcript of testimony before the Commission. This included the reinterview of Marina OSWALD.

Lee H. Wigren
C/SR/CI/Research

SECRET

201-289248

① Do Sovs normally permit Sov. citizens married to forn natls to emigrate from SU to homeland of spouse?

- State says yes – cites 724 visa applications (probably minority are spouses; majority relatives etc)
- We cite absence of law; do not say

② Do Sovs normally permit Sov. cits married to forn natls to accompany (ie depart simultaneously w.) spouses from SU to homelands of spouses

- State does not say
- We cite evidence that they do not

③ How long does it take Sov cits to get Sov exit visas to emigrate to homelands of forn spouses?

- Our #7 and [illegible] State's info in cases in which it knows agree

Notes made by L Hood in discussion with Mr David Slawson of the Commission on 19.1.64
201-289248

Att 1 to XAA2-27221

CS COPY

①

- Our reply addressed to legality & [illegible] of Sov cits accompanying (i.e. departing simultaneously with) foreign spouses out of SU.

Based on review of 26 cases (10 US) in order to find [illegible] married Sov cits in SU

- Sov wife left SU in company of husband — 4
  - 1 case of [illegible]
  - 2 cases of [illegible]
  - 1 case [illegible], Sov [illegible]
- For. husband (wife) [illegible] left SU alone — 14
- Sequence not known ———— 7

② Info in our #7 re [illegible] of time taken by Sov authorities to process visa applics of Sov spouses of fn natls substantially agrees w State's info on time taken by Sovs to process visa applics of Sov wives of U.S. cits (14) [illegible] out of 29 pages

Gist of State's info

- info concerning length of time taken by Sov authorities to process visa applications of Sov wives of Am cits in SU -
- info in response to request for names of all Sov wives of U S cits who received in last 10 yrs exit visas to leave SU & length of time between dates of application ~~[illegible]~~ approval by Sov authorities

---

① 724 immigrant visas issued by Amembassy from [illegible] 54 - Dec 63

[illegible] down

- non-quota visas for spouses & children of Am cits
- quota visas for spouses & children of legally admitted aliens in US.

② Dates of application for Sov exit visas known (or deduced) in 14 of these cases. Named.
[10 days - 14 yrs]

③ Presumption that all these were processed [illegible]

- 10 days to 14 yrs
- can't tell how [illegible] accurate [illegible] period is out of SU
- we had [illegible] US [illegible]

Memo of 3 Jul, 64

- Info obtained from 2nd enclosure to State's letter of 29 Jan 64 seems inconsistent w. comments made in para 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 64.

201-289248

9 July 64

Analysis of 26 Cases cited to Warren Comm
in a) discussion w/ David Slawson (see
memo for record, 9 July 64 paras 5,6,7

b) Memo for Mr. Rankin from Richard Helms
dated 23 Jul 64, paras 2 + 3

	CASE	SOV CIT	CONCURRENT TRAVEL	TIME TO PROCESS VISA
1.	American woman who met and married Soviet citizen in USSR	X	na	na
2.	American student	✓	X	?
3.	American clergyman	✓	X	?
4.	American tourist	?	X	
5.	American student or tourist		X	
6.	American correspondent	✓	X	?
7.	Italian student	?	X	
8.	Italian student	?	X	
9.	Italian student	?	X	
10.	Iranian returnee	?	X	
11.	West German student	✓	X	long
12.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
13.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
14.	Swedish businessman	✓	X	months
15.	Swedish student	✓	X	months
16.	American teacher	?	?	?
17.	Americanbusinessman	✓	?	?
18.	Frenchman on trip to USSR; student?	?	?	?
19.	Chilean residing and working Moscow	?	?	?
20.	Italian student	?	?	?
21.	Finnish student	?	?	
22.	Apparently Greek; details unknown	?	?	
23.	American tourist (unbalanced, Russian-born father under FBI survey)	✓	✓	6 months
24.	Italian communist journalist	✓	✓	
25.	Swedish student	✓	?	
26.	American businessman	✓	✓	few months

JC

TOTAL CASES: 26

FOREIGNER LEFT USSR WITHOUT SOVIET SPOUSE

Known: STERN-ZASLATSKIY Arlene
U.S. KIRSCH Leonard
OLSEN Clark
NELSON Phillip
HEGARTY Thomas
TUCKER Robert
Italian BASSANI Luciano
CELATI Amilcare
BELLINZONA Giovanni
Iranian YEVNIKH Stepan G.
W. German BETTIN Arnulf
Swedish JOHANSSON Kurt
NORDENSTAM Gunnar
LUNDAHL Hugo
THELIN Nils

NOT KNOWN WHETHER THEY LEFT USSR TOGETHER

US LEHRMAN Edgar
PENDILL C. Grant
Israeli (AEFRAPPE)
Chilean CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro
Italian GRIECO Ruggiero
Finnish LAVIKKALA Asser
Greek? LYMBOURIDES Achillefs

SOVIET SPOUSE ACCOMPANIED FOREIGNER

US PACKLER Allen David
Italian SCOGNAMIGLIO Mario
Swedish KRONSJO Tom
US SANDOR John (but note that he wanted to take her out with him prior to their marriage, since she was still technically married to someone else, but Soviets refused exit visa, and he had to return later to marry her and then await granting of exit visa in order to bring her out.)

JC

NAME	OUT	TIME LAPSE BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND ARRIVAL/EXIT OF SOVIET SPOUSE
Stern-Zaslavskiy	no	not as of three years after marriage
Kirsch	yes	9 mo.
Olsen	yes	under 5 mo.
Nielson	yes	6-7 mo.
Hegarty	no	not as of 4 months after marriage
Tucker	yes	10 years
Sassani	no	not as of 3 months after marriage
Celati	no	
Bellinzona	yes	11 mo.
Yevnikh	?	
Bettin	yes	at least a year
Johansson	yes	9 mo. Visa took either 6 weeks or 7 months.
Nurdenstam	yes	7 mo. or more
Lundahl	no	not as of 3 months after marriage
Thelin	yes	11 mo. or more
Lehrman	?	
Pendill	yes	
(Frenchman)	yes	married 1959 or 60; out as of 21 May 1962.
Cruz Ocampo	no	not as of 3½ years after marriage
Grieco	?	
Lavikkala	yes	
Lymbourides	?	
Packler	yes	13 mo. Visa took 6 months.
Scognamiglio	yes	9 mo.
Kronsjo	yes	married prior July 1962. Applied for Norwegian visas for period 7 July - 20 August 1962. To go from there to Sweden permanently. Supposedly did.
Sandor	yes	5 mo.

TIME FOR SOVIET SPOUSE TO GET VISA

Known:	Packler	6 mo.
	Scognamiglio	9 mo.
	Sandor	5 mo.
	Johansson	7 mo. or about 6 weeks
Implied:	Kirsch	not over 9 mo.
	Olsen	" " 4-5 mo.
	Nielson	" " 6-7 mo.
	Bellinzona	" " 11 mo.
	Tucker	ten years
	Bettin	at least a year
	Nurdenstam	7 mo. or more
	Thelin	11 mo. or more

JC

In three cases there was a lapse of several months between application and issuance of the Soviet exit visa (five months in one case, six in the second, and nine in the third). In another case the western husband was reluctant to leave the USSR without his Soviet wife. He did so some six months after the wedding only because the Soviet authorities told him that her exit application could not be processed until he had left. The visa was issued only about six weeks after his departure, but it may have been applied for when they were married or at any time during the next six months.

In four other cases it is possible to infer approximate time limits for the granting of an exit visa. One was granted within four to five months, the second within six to seven months, the third within nine months, and the fourth within eleven months. In three additional cases visa issuance took a minimum of seven, eleven, and twelve months respectively.

JC

CASE	MARRIAGE DATE	EXIT VISA APPLICATION	ARRIVED IN WEST
STERN-ZASLAVSKII Arlene	26 Aug 61	Soon after	Never
KIRSCH Leonard	latter May 61		US – Feb 62
OLSEN Clark	30 Jan 60		US – 21 May 60
NIELSON Philip	Feb or Mar 62		Paris – Sept 62
HEGARTY Thomas	28 May 59		not out yet Sept 59
TUCKER Robert	1943		US 1953
BASSANI Luciano	10 May 61	immediately	not out yet Aug 61
CELATI Amilcare			expected June 62
BELLINZONA Giovanni	Aug 61		Italy – July 62
YEVNIKH			
BETTIN Arnulf	July 61	immediately	not out yet spring/62
JOHANSSON Kurt	9 July 61	" or Jan 62	Sweden – April 62 visa mid-Feb
NURDENSTAM Gunnar	Aug 61 or prior		Sweden – Mar 62 visa Feb 62
LUNDAHL Hugo	21 Dec 61		not yet out Mar 62
THELIN Nils	mid-61 or prior	immediately	Sweden – spring 62?
LEHRMAN Edgar	28 Mar 63	immediately	
PENDILL C. Grant	mid 50's or prior		US – mid 50's
[illegible] Frenchman	1959 or 60		France – as of 21/May 62
CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro	early 1947	mid-47	not yet out Aug 51
GRIECO Ruggiero			
LAVIKKALA Asser	fall 59 or prior		Finland - ?
LYMBOURIDES Achillefs			
C – PACKLER Allen	17 Feb 62	Aug 62?	Italy – March 63
SCOGNAMIOLIO Mario	Aug 60	Dec 60	Italy – 6 May 61
? C – KRONSJØ Tom	prior Jul 62		Norway – 7 Jul 62?
C – SANDOR John	2 Nov 57	immediately	US– 31 Mar 58

C = [illegible]

TOTAL CASES: 26

8 July 64

FOREIGNER LEFT USSR WITHOUT SOVIET SPOUSE

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LEHRMAN Edgar	28 Mar 63	immediately	
PENDILL C. Grant	mid 50's or prior		US - mid 50's
XXXXXXXX Frenchman	1959 or 60		France - as of 21/ May 62
CRUZ OCAMPO Alvaro	early 1947	mid-47	not yet out Aug 51
GRIECO Ruggiero			
LAVIKKALA Asser	fall 59 or prior		Finland - ?
LYMBOURIDES Achillefs			
C — PACHLER Allen	17 Feb 62	Aug 62?	Italy - March 63
SCOGNAMIGLIO Mario	Aug 60	Dec 60	Italy - 6 May 61
?C — KRONSJØ Tom	prior Jul 62		Norway - 7 Jul 62?
C — SANDOR John	2 Nov 57	immediately	US - 31 Mar 58

C = [illegible]

1. Paragraph 6 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964 was a response to question #3 of your memorandum of 12 March 1964 entitled: Questions Posed by State Department Files. That question read as follows:

> "At the time that L.H. OSWALD and M. OSWALD left Russia for the United States was it legal and normal under Soviet law and practice for a Russian national married to an American to be able to accompany him back to his homeland? Was the rapidity with which L. H. OSWALD was able to accomplish this and Marina's return in any way unusual?"

2. Our reply addressed itself to the legality and normality of Soviet citizens accompanying (i.e.: departing simultaneously with) foreign spouses out of the USSR. It was based on a review of 26 cases, of which 10 involved Americans, in which foreign nationals married Soviet citizens in the USSR. In only four of these 26 cases, did the Soviet wife leave the Soviet Union in the company of her husband. In one of these four cases, an Italian Communist

/ Party member married

Party member married in the USSR and by prevailing upon the Italian Embassy to hold up Italian visas for Soviet seamen, was able to arrange for his wife to accompany him to Italy. In two more of the cases, an American met his future wife on a visit to the USSR, married her on a subsequent trip, and brought her back to the U.S. No details are available on the fourth case, which involved a Swedish student who married a Soviet student and apparently brought her out with him.

3. In 14 of the remaining cases, a foreign husband (in one case a wife) departed alone. In another case the wife preceded her husband because he had been jailed a month or two previously for violation of travel regulations and in 7 additional cases the sequence is not known.

4. The information in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter regarding length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process visa applications of Soviet wives of American citizens substantially corresponds with the conclusions which we expressed in paragraph 7 of our memorandum of 6 April 1964. The material from Mr. Meeker provides useful additional data

/regarding Soviet visas

regarding Soviet visa processing, and does not materially alter the conclusions stated in paragraph 6 of our memorandum. We feel that any apparent inconsistencies may stem from the different approaches to the problem by the State Department and this Agency.

ee -
For inclusion
th Oswald
otes — re
rugners
urging Sovs.

DBA-76999, 9 July 64, p. 4

On 28 May 64 Philip R. NIELSEN remitted $275.
to Boris KUNGUROV 63 Lomonosovskiy Prospekt, Apt 283, Moscow 1311) through Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago.

A gov't agency conducting security investigation advised in April 62 that Philip R. NIELSEN, a US citizen, wanted marry Tamara Stepanovna KUNGUROVA, who may be connected with Sov intell or may have been utilized by Sov intell."

Immigration & Naturalization Service, NY, advised on 17 Dec 62 that Philip Robert NEILSEN [sic] and Tamara Stepanovna NEILSEN arrived in NYC 17 Dec 62 and planned live Winnetka, Ill.

DBA-79641, 22 July 64

FBI agents interviewed Tamara 31 Jan 63. She said had married Philip in Moscow, entered US Dec 62. Her brother Boris KUNGUROV — born 1936 — employed Moscow as translat. Tamara became naturalized US citizen on 27 Feb 64.

Material on
marriages of Sov.
to Westerners.
Used in preparing
reply to memo
re apparent in-
consistencies be-
tween CIA & State.

1. On 9 July 1964 Mr. W. David Slawson and a representative of CIA discussed the question of apparent inconsistencies in material provided the Commission by CIA and by the Department of State. At that time the question was resolved to Mr. Slawson's satisfaction, and it was agreed that CIA would furnish a statistical breakdown of the cases on which CIA based the statements in paragraph 7 of its memorandum of 6 April 1964.

2. Paragraph 7 of the 6 April memorandum addressed itself to the legality and normality of Soviet citizens departing the USSR simultaneously with their foreign spouses. Statements were based on a review of 26 cases (ten involving Americans) in which foreign nationals married Soviet citizens in the USSR. In only three of these 26 cases did the Soviet wife leave the USSR in the company of her husband. In two of the cases an American met his future wife on a visit to the Soviet Union, married her on a subsequent trip, and brought her back to the U.S. No details are available on the third case, which involved a Swedish student who married a Soviet student and apparently brought her out with him. In

parted alone. In one more of the 23, the wife preceded her husband because he had been jailed a month or two previously for violation of travel regulations, and in the seven other cases the sequence is not known.

3. The information in the third enclosure to Mr. Meeker's letter regarding length of time taken by Soviet authorities to process visa applications of Soviet wives of American citizens substantially corresponds with the conclusions which we expressed in paragraph 7 of the our 6 April memorandum. In eleven of the 26 cases, this time period is known fairly definitely or can be inferred. In three cases it took from five to nine months. Inferring in the other eight cases, three ~~took~~ received their [illegible] about six months, two more were issued in not more than nine to eleven months, and three ~~took~~ required a minimum of seven to twelve months. Apparent inconsistencies between these statistics and those provided by the State Department undoubtedly arise from a difference in approach by the State Department and CIA.

In three cases there was a lapse of several months between application and issuance of the Soviet exit visa (five months in one case, six in the second, and nine in the third). In another case the Western husband was reluctant to leave the USSR without his Soviet wife. He did so some six months after the wedding only because the Soviet authorities told him that her exit application could not be processed until he had left. The visa was issued only about six weeks after his departure, but it may have been applied for when they were married or at any time during the next six months.

In four other cases it is possible to infer approximate time limits for the granting of an exit visa. One was granted within four to five months, the second within six to seven months, the third within nine months, and the fourth within eleven months. In three additional cases visa issuance took a minimum of seven, eleven, and twelve months respectively.

Miscellaneous notes on Sovs married to foreigners

Arlene F ZASLAVSKIY has Sov husband; has hired Prof Harold BERMAN to plead case & get him out of USSR. (2 Oct 62) [redacted]

Leonard KIRSCH's Sov wife Yelena KNYAZKINA has arrived in USA. 2.10.62

Joseph A. FONDEM, resident of former Brit Cameroons. Came to USSR 24.12.60. Has been visiting AmEmb re continuing his studies in U.S. Married to Sov girl. Claims she ostracized by family & friends — she, he, & baby son have to scrounge housing in Moscow by ~~letting~~ renting people's extra rooms (at 30-40 rubles per month) which illegal. Claims his plight shared by a number of other African students married to Sov girls. Sov authorities compound problem by not letting wives leave country. Embassy rates FONDEM as questionable and opportunistic. AmEmb Moscow Despatch A-308, 31.8.62.

Edgar LEHRMAN, aged 36, US exchange stu at Moscow U.; prof of lit at Emory Univ, Atlanta, Ga. To be married tomorrow to Miss Ruth MAKAROVA, 24-yr old hist of art student at Moscow Univ. Today they submitted a certificate of

? ⊕ Moscow or Finary?

sanity for her to marriage bureau ofcls. Proofs of sanity had been demanded by Sov authorities. LEHRMAN would not confirm story - no comment for reporter; but university⊕ sources said the couple was told no wedding till she got certif of sanity. Emb officials said they had never heard of such a reqmt. Moscow AP, 3/27. What year?

Lee Harvey OSWALD. Abstract: DBA-20883, 201-289248 30.8.62

Nils THELIN. Swedish exchange student of 1960-61 program. Has not yet been able to bring out Russian wife, which may explain his "pro-Sov friendliness" at present. TICRYSTAL-1 contact rpt 10 Apr 62. Nils is one of the three in that year's group (14) who married Sov gals. Nils was acq. of AEGRISTLE-1 & wife Rimma KRAVTSOVA, who married in Lgrad July 61.

Kurt JOHANSSON, Swedish exchange student married Tamara SEREBRENNIKOVA, who was TASS journalist. AEPROMISE (201-274504) "Married July 61; finally united in Sweden in April 62 "after various difficulties". He the third of the Swed-Sov scholarship students to marry Sov gal; the other 2 were able to bring their wives home

3/

Tamara insisted on church wedding as well as registration.

recently. She hopes "take up her work again" when Swedish good enough. He was recruited by us. Station suspects RIS involvement in this marriage. She supposedly daughter of purged Sov ofcr, Komsomol member (or party), impt job in TASS. See more info in He- OSSA 11545 15.6.62: Her close friends & family were on her side about wanting marry foreigner, but casual acquaintances gave her hard time. Sov police "surprisingly nice to her", she said. Husband had not had too much difficulty getting her out: she got out faster than the other 2 - one took 4 mo, one not out yet. He considers her processing time 1½ mo. altho they married last July. Her processing could not begin until he ready to leave USSR, so he left Jan 62 when scholarship ended. Her proc then began, & he was told "mid-Feb that he could come get her. Illness delayed. She carries "lifetime Sov external passport." They have called at Sov Emb re "possibility of returning to USSR." Told that he could go as tourist any time but that it would take c 4 mo to process for her to enter USSR w/ plans to leave

4/

again. ———

Gunnar NORDENSTAM. One of the 4 1960-61 Swed exchange students. Married Natalya Korshinskaya, Inturist guide in Leningrad. He left Lgrad Aug 61, home to Gothenburg. As of spring 62, wife not yet out. (Acc to press acct, tho, she got out c. April. See her 201 under Nordenstam. Another ref says she got visa Feb 62 and joined him in March.

John SANDOR 201- ~~276469~~ 201207, American of Hung extraction. Lawyer born 1914. First wife killed in train wreck during WW II. July 1956 he was in Moscow as memb of tourist group from Natl Editorial Assoc. Love at first sight w/ Viktoriya Ivanovna KOCHUROVA 201-276469, Inturist interpreter/guide at Hotel Moskva. Proposed same day, she accepted next day tho still married to Sov husband BLINKOV Aron Moseyevich (sic). JS's visa ran out before they could marry. [Gap in story]. She

5/

DOB
29.12.26.

divorced from BLINKOV May 57. Viktoriya still Intourist at Moskva July 57. Married JS 2 Nov 57. Lived (she or they?) at Hotel National till departure from USSR.

JS had appar tried to get Sov visa for 6 mo ~~not~~ before returning to USSR Nov 57. Sov govt gave JS permission to stay USSR till her exit permit recd. They arrived NY 31.3.58

Sept 59 SR/3/PP interested in using JS for contacting Sov tourists – but never did. Not approved? She had numerous relatives in USSR as of 1961.

Asser or Touko LAVIKALA. Finnish law student. To USSR on exch Oct 58 for 58-59 year. Married Sov girl at unknown date. Afterwards KGB informed him he must work for them or no exit visa for her. He finally signed but told VALINK when got home.

Allen David PACKLER U.S. citizen; married Lilya LYOVINA (see Bio card for 201 #).

LUNDAHL : Married ZELENKOVA 201-332736.

Achilles LYMBOURIDES Married Aelita Borisovna DYOMINA or DEMINA in Aug 59. 201-312213.

SCOGNAMIGLIO was ~~practically~~ excluded from PCI b/c he "made so much difficulty about getting his wife out" of USSR. Sovs made much diffic about her exit visa - maybe just for effect, since she admittedly KGB while at Lgrad Univ.

Colyn CRANE-ROBINSON, 26-yr old Brit scientist from Manchester, has been studying in USSR, Leningrad. Was to marry 24-yr old Irina Mikhailovna RUSANOVA on 23 June (year?) at Palace o. Marriages, but his living permit expired 22.6. ~~and they~~ He requested extension but the authorities "simply said it was unfortunate" that his time had expired & were afraid they could

7/

~~[illegible]~~

not make exception "for this sort ~~[illegible]~~ of thing." Asked him to leave, so crash packing + out that night on BALTIKA. Ofcls supposedly told him no reason believe he wouldn't get visa to return. Colyn said he had been told that "if someone married a Soviet girl she would be able to leave the country."

Alvaro OCAMPO, son of Chilean ~~Cuban~~ Amb to USSR, married Sov Lidiya LIESSINA (chambermaid in Braz Amb's residence [and hence KGB]) in 1947 when he 23 yrs old. Mid-47 father transferred. Sovs refused allow girl leave, despite Chilean severance of diplo rels w/ USSR in Nov 47. Chil Amb stayed in Mosc till Sept 49 (as private cit?), in futile attempt to change Sov Gov position. Alvaro stayed on, working at Argentine Emb. Matter unsuccessfully introduced at UNGA Paris 1948. Latest (State knows is remark in Aug 61 personal letter from FSO in Moscow to friend in USSR Desk Wash, saying

8/

Alvaro still in Moscow married to Lidiya.

AEMYRIAD/1 married Ol'ga KASMIN, geology student. When they engaged, she called to dean's ofc + interviewed by 2 KGBniks who said she would never be allowed to leave + marry him unless she accepted rcrtmt – which she supposedly would not do.

FOLDERS NOT CHECKED :

Italians
US 1961-62
Americans
LUNDAHL Lidiya nee ZELENKOVA 201-352736

See 201-234750 on Tamara S.KUNGUROVA.

On his second trip to the USSR in January 1959, Philip Robert NIELSON, REDSKIN agent, was given an INTURIST interpreter/guide named Tamara Stepanovna KUNGUROVA. A romance developed between them and NIELSON became determined to marry her, which he finally did in the spring of 1962. His family did everything in their power to discourage this romance and John Haines of the State Deptartment received letter from NIELSON's father re affair. Not seeking help but advice on what to do.

NIELSON later received letter from his father in fall 1960 giving in details the contents of a conversation father had had with John Hanes of State.
Hanes stated that:

a. All American-Soviet marriages had turned out to be unsuccessful.

b. The Soviets never let one of their nationals out of the country under such circumstances unless the person had been recruited as a spy.

c. The Soviets will probably not given NIELSON a visa (he tried unsuccessfully all summer and fall 1960 and in 1961 to get Sov visa).

With regard to the marriage of a Soviet to a foreigner, Nora KORZHENKO (who married a British diplomat in the 1940's) has this to say: "Most of the women who have married foreigners must have agreed at one time or another to carry out some sort of spy work for the Soviets. Otherwise, they would not have been given permission to marry foreigners, for even the marriage certificate has to be issued by the secret police." Nora, herself, was recruited by State Security through coercion and only allowed to leave the country by agreeing to work for ~~Soviet~~ State Security. This she never did ~~so~~ because, once out of the country, she broke completely with the Soviets and it is presumed that she has furnished information on that organization to the British Services. (see "I Spied for Stalin", by Nora Murray).

Petr DERYABIN, State Security officer who defected in 1954, has this to say about the Soviet women who have contact with or who marry foreigners: Soviet women associating with foreign men will be recruited by State Security when the association is first begun, or after it has developed, or when plans for marriage have been made. " Even if only 5% of these women are 100% loyal State Security workers, and the others work less loyally, it is still considered a worthwhile operation. No woman known to be anti-Soviet would ever be given a visa to leave the country, even if she were married to an ambassador. The Soviets instruct all persons in this category to make remarks against the Soviet Union when abroad, but these remarks are not to be too strong, nor are they made for publication'by press or radio."

In the early 1960's, when anyoung American was thinking of marrying an INTURIST guide, his father contacts a knowledgeable official of the State Department who made the following remarks:

1. All American-Soviet marriages had turned out to be unsuccessful
2. The Soviets never let one of their natioanls out of the country under such circumstances (marriage to a foreigner) unless the person had been recruited is a spy.

It is believed that the Counterintelligence Directorate, (Kontrrazvedyvatelnoye upravleniye-KRU), of the KGB initiates operations against foreigners inside the USSR. When the operation leads outside the USSR into foreign countries, i.e., when the probable recruitments have been achieved, and the persons in question leave the USSR, the operation is then turned over to the Foreign Intelligence Directorate (Inostrannoye upravleniye-INU) ~~who~~ which continues the operation until such time as it is terminated.

35

John SANDOR - Met and proposed to Viktoriya KOCH[illegible]OVA in 1956, but had to leave USSR before they could get married. Returned in 1957 and married her Nov. Arrived together in US in March 1958.

Folder "Americans"

✓ STERN Arlene. Never got Sov husband out.
LEHRMAN Edgar Married March 62
PENDILL ? Grant. Married in ______ . Wife
to US mid-50's. Also [illegible] 201-28946 :
✓ KIRSCH Leonard. Yelena KHYAZKINA. He alone. ~~Together~~
MELSON Philip. Married ~~[illegible]~~
Intur guide Tamara KHABUROVA spring 62.
✓ OLSEN Clark. Lyudmila [illegible] 59. [illegible] married
March 61 she residing w/ parents Moscow.
He left alone.
✓ HEGARTY Thos. J. 28 May 57 married Lyubov
IVANOVA. He ret US alone 1.8.59.

Sally

26 July 1963

Soviet women married to other nationals

	BORISOVA, Natalya (201-311072)	- married to Italian Scognamiglia whom she left. Living with another Italian, ACONE--
	LYOVINA, Lilya	- married to Allen David PACKLER, U.S. citizen. She has 201 file. See SR/6/Bio card for number.
✓	ZELENKOVA,	- married to LUNDAHL. 201-332736
✓	LNU, Natalya	- married Gunnar NORDENSTAM from Bothenburg. Now living in Jutteborg.
✓	SEREBRENNIKOVA, Tamara	- Married AEPROMISE/1 - SEE SR/2
	SMOLOVA, Tamara	- Leningrad Univ. born ca. 1936-37. Former INTURIST guide. My records do not indicate to whom she is married.

Louise

LIMBOURIDI, Aelita Borisovna nee DYOMINA aka DEMINA	- Born ~~[illegible]~~ Yalta , 29 May 1934. Married to Achilleфs LIMBOURIDES in August 1959. 201-312213.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

K. Dummy 12-62

M. Paul Hartman
CI/R&A
x6748
30 September 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-4524

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

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DIRECTOR

C/CI

[illegible], C/EE3, C/WE2, VR, FILE

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CITE DIR

N, FRAN, BRLN, COPE INFO GMNY
E, PARI, STOC, munc, HAGU, BRUS

AT/KUDESK/TPMURILLO/ CATI3A

1. REQUEST TRACES JOACHIM JOESTEN DPOB 29 JUL 07 COLOGNE.

ITER ENTIRE ADULT CAREER AND AUTHOR CA 30 BOOKS AND NUMEROUS

SPAPER ARTICLES. POST WWII WORKS VERY ANTI-KUBARK. LAST

OK TITLE - OSWALD: ASSASSIN OR FALL GUY? HAS WRITTEN UNDER

UE NAME AND UNDER PSEUDONYMS: FRANZ VON NESSELRODE; H.F.

LIKIN; WALTER KELL; PAUL DELATHUIS.

2. ACCORDING CAPTURED GESTAPO DOCS HE JOINED GERM CP ON

AY 32 AND HAD MEMBERSHIP NO. 532315. OWNED LENDING LIBRARY

LN AND SOME TIME AFTER MAY 32 WENT USSR WHERE REMAINED UNTIL

33. DURING ABSENCE HIS LIBRARY MANAGED BY FIANCEE ANNA

CHINSKY. LAST RESIDENCE GERMANY BRLN LUETZOWSTRASSE 40

BEI HESS.

Document Number 888-906

for FOIA Review on JUL 1976

CONTINUED........

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

12-62

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☐ INDEX
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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR [redacted]
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INFO :

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TO INFO CITE DIR

3. IN MAY 33 FLED TO FRANCE. WAS IN COPE 36-37 BUT EXPELLED (OR LEFT) BECAUSE HIS ANTI-DANISH GOVT WRITINGS. LEFT DENMARK FOR FRANCE VIA ICELAND. IN 40 IN SWEDEN, MARRIED MAY NILSSON. CAME US VIA USSR IN 41 AND NATURALIZED CITIZEN SINCE 48

4. WOULD APPRECIATE AS FULL A CHECK AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING LOCAL SERVICES AND AVAILABLE OVERT LOCAL PRE-WWII REFERENCES (PRESS, BOOKS, ETC.) ON JOESTEN AND FIANCEE.

5. FOR BRLN: PLS ALSO CHECK BDC AND REQUEST PHOTOSTATS ANY DOCS. CAN ADDRESS AND NAME HESS BE CHECKED? ANY CHANCE LOCATE FIANCEE?

6. ALL ADDRESSEES PLS HANDLE REQUEST URGENTLY AS MATTER ALSO OF INTEREST TO WARREN COMMISSION. CABLE SUMMARY RESULTS AND POUCH DETAILS INCLUDING ALL COPIES AVAILABLE JOESTEN PRE WWII WRITINGS.

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~~SECR~~

INDEX

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PAGE THREE

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[illegible] INFO PARAS 1 THROUGH 3 ABOVE IN PUBLIC DOMAIN, BUT [illegible] INTEREST THIS TIME SENSITIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EE/C
C/WE/1
C/WE/3

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RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7					
RID/201	DW-6					
RID/MIS	GT-6					
RID/INDEX	DT-5					

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: DEDKOV,

GIVEN NAMES: Roman Fedorovich or Vilasa Nikolaevna

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*): Poss. at Sov. Emb. in New Delhi, Ind.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
			USSR	Minsk USSR

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

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2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

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Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

~~2.~~ One Roman Fedorovich DEDKOV, born 28 March 1927 in Ariansk, USSR, and his wife Vilasa Nikolayevna DEDKOV, born 31 December 1930 in Minsk, USSR, ~~applied for~~ were listed as applicants for entry visas to India sometime prior to April 1962. DEDKOV, who was issued Soviet passport number 207461 on 17 September 1960, was scheduled to arrive in New Delhi for two years as an English language teacher at the Soviet Embassy. It is not known ~~whether or not~~ IF DEDKOV actually arrived in New Delhi.

Not sent because it shows liaison to Indians, a orig "Name List" not classified.

SCW
10 Aug '964

INDIA 1 00

DEDKOV, Roman Fedorovich

Subj scheduled to arrive New Delhi for two years as an English teacher at the Soviet Embassy; Ppt 207461 iss 17 Sept 60 (Hqs Comment: Subj is presumed to have arr sometime after Sept 60). NBDA-8509, 24 Apr 62

40-8-5

RI Files

Wife: Vilasa Nikolayevna (DPOB: 31 Dec 1930; Minsk)

DPOB: 28 Mar 1927; Ariansk

201-756978

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3. Chief, FE 5 D 31 07			WEC	
4. Chief, NE 6 D 31 07				
5. Chief, WE 4 B 44 05	30 DEC 1964			
6. Chief, WH 3 B 44 03	30 Dec	30		
7.				
8. DDP 3 C 20 16		31 DEC 1964		For Signature and Release
9.				
10.				
11. CI/R&A 2 C 17		29 JAN 1965		
12.				
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TO

Chiefs of all Stations

INFO.

FROM

Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT

0 Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

Document Number 988-927 BD

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FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

201-259245

~~100-300-12~~

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1	C/WE/BC
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1	C/WH/3
1	C/WH/4
1	C/WH/5
1	WH/COPS
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DDIP 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5105BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

CORRES RELATING TO THIS / INCLUDING NAVY's OK OF 27 June 68 TO RELEASE / FILED IN MAIN OSWALD FILE

Document Number 1042-947c

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

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Signature Recommended:

/s/ [illegible]

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2 [illegible] 1968
Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)

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21 MAY 1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and served there until August 1965. He was variously described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache. During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S. Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico City.

201-

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR. Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa request. We have no information which indicates any relationship between these individuals other than for the purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned to the consular section and was a second secretary. It appeared that he was tasked with following the activities of the Central American communist parties and left-wing groups, and he met often with members of these groups, reportedly providing them with funds and technical guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in September 1971. Our information indicated that he was not due to leave for another three to four months, and at the time of his departure, there was some speculation that the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that he was known to Lyalin.

100 - 2 - 95

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XAF-09222
21 MAY 82
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While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in Mexico. He has been described as being without morals, education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action) (Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED



DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

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100-2-95

~~U K S E C R E T~~

6/705

10 May 1982

Dear David,

VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV

1. Please refer to our conversation of 6 May. KOSTIKOV, born 17 March 1933, Moscow, was posted to Beirut in 1978 as 1st Secretary and may still be there. He is identified KGB and served in Mexico City from 1961-71. There is a reference to him on page 307 of BARRON's KGB which suggests that he may have been Department V. We do not appear to have asked LYALIN about him, and are now doing so.

2. We also note that EPSTEIN in "Legend" claims that according to a CIA telecheck KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey OSWALD's KGB case officer in Mexico City. According to BARRON (page 335) OSWALD was in Mexico between September and November 1963 and was seeking to obtain a Soviet visa. There was certainly a KGB interest in OSWALD, although according to NOSENKO this was defensive.

3. The reason for our current interest in KOSTIKOV will be obvious. As you are aware, our Embassy in Beirut, in common with other Western Missions, has been subject to threats and violence in recent months, and in view of earlier hostile attentions from the KGB, we have been reviewing our records of KGB staff in the area who might have been involved in promoting strong-arm tactics.

4. We would be grateful for your views as to whether the KGB are likely to be behind any of the recent incidents (possibly through the Syrians) and for any information on KOSTIKOV and his activities in Mexico and in Beirut. In particular, what are your comments on the OSWALD story; can you confirm that KOSTIKOV is still in Beirut; is there anyone else in Beirut or Damascus whose trace record suggests an Active Measures role, or worse?

5. We should be grateful for an early reply and as I said on 6 May will treat anything you can tell us on a strictly Service to Service basis.

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Yours ever

100-2-95

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pp A C M de Vere

~~201-289248~~

XAF-09218

58-5-3

Mr David Blee

10 MAY 82

~~U K S E C R E T~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
E/BC
4C 20 Hqs

EXTENSION: 1413 7220

NO.

DATE: 3 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/R+A				This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on ________ from MI- 5 in Washington. Another copy is being held in E/BC. Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison. Processing by IP is to be determined by ________. Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO. NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976. RBH
2. Hausman	4 APR 1978			
3. Russ Holmes				
4. 3D57				
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OP-187

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Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2. I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

D H Jones
for G M L Blackburne-Kan

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

...PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE USA 9c

EUGENE O'NEILL PLAYWRIGHTS

EUGENE O'NEILL PLAYWRIGHTS

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL STA. MAR 15 1978

M. Waller

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

REGISTERED
NO. 257254

201-289248

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814

MARCH 15, 1978

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR,

i WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER i ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 i WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175 i HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF U.S.S.R. SAY WHAT DID YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, i SAID i HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, i SAID HIS NAME START ON "O" HIS NAME WAS PUBLISHED ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID IT EASY TO FIND.

i DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN BRITISH
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND BRITISH
IMMIGRATION, iASKING YOUR EMBASSY TO
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND i ASK YOUR
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD my RECORD OF
JULY 18, 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE i ENCLOSE HIS COPY LETTER TO [illegible]
ALSO i ENCLOSE YOU COPY LETTER i SENT
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE APPRECIATED
my INCOMING MAIL IS CONTROL BY THE
F.B.I. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL i SEND
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME F.B.I. SUPPRESS
my INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME BY DRUG

RESPECTFULLY YOURS
Sergyj Czornij

U.S. PASSPORT No. D027000

February [illegible]

copy 10
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

This is retyped letter from hand written

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan) Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Csornonoh
U.S. Passport 00027000

U.S House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornonoh
3/15/78

COPY TO CITY HALL
CITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager do or use certain people to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. - colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak. In this letter I ask you to give restrain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy midnight June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Sergyj Czornon

Legal Center For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 • SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March 3, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Leslie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney

LK:ab



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1106 11st 95814
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
Mr. James Callaghan
OFFICE OF MINISTRY
London England
LONDON ENGLAND

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Document Number 127-987
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

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TO
Chiefs, Certain Stations and Bases

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT
Warren Commission Report: Article on the Investigation Conducted by District Attorney Garrison

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We are forwarding herewith a reprint of the article "A Reporter At Large: Garrison", published in THE NEW YORKER, 13 July, 1968. It was written by Edward Jay Epstein, himself author of a book, ("Inquest"), critical of the Warren Commission Report.

2. The wide-spread campaign of adverse criticism of the U.S., most recently again provoked by the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy, appears to have revived foreign interest in the assassination of his brother, the late President Kennedy, too. The forthcoming trial of Sirhan, accused of the murder of Senator Kennedy, can be expected to cause a new wave of criticism and suspicion against the United States, claiming once more the existence of a sinister "political murder conspiracy". We are sending you the attached article--based either on first-hand observation by the author or on other, identified sources--since it deals with the continuing investigation, conducted by District Attorney Garrison of New Orleans, La. That investigation tends to keep alive speculations about the death of President Kennedy, an alleged "conspiracy", and about the possible involvement of Federal agencies, notably the FBI and CIA.

3. The article is not meant for reprinting in any media. It is forwarded primarily for your information and for the information of all Station personnel concerned. If the Garrison investigation should be cited in your area in the context of renewed anti-U.S. attacks, you may use the article to brief interested contacts, especially government and other political leaders, and to demonstrate to assets (which you may assign to counter such attacks) that there is no hard evidence of any such conspiracy. In this context, assets may have to explain to their audiences certain basic facts about the U.S. judicial system, its separation of state and federal courts and the fact that judges and district attorneys in the states are usually elected, not appointed: consequently, D.A. Garrison can continue in office as long as his constituents re-elect him. Even if your assets have to discuss this in order to refute--or at least weaken--anti-U.S. propaganda of sufficiently serious impact, any personal attacks upon Garrison (or any other public personality in the U.S.) must be strictly avoided.

Document Number 1127-987
for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

Brian K. Slaght
BRIAN K. SLAGHT

Attachment: 1 unclassified article, per para 1

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Far East Division	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE 20 Nov. 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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2. CI/RA				
3. Mr. Dooley			O	for file
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14.				
15.				201-289248

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

~~26 Nov. 68~~

FROM: CI/RA/RS 2B23

EXTENSION:

NO. XAAZ-35926

DATE 26 NOV 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. IP/AN			(c)
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. IP/EDI		05 May 75	Cf
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. IP/Files			
10. IP/RMS		20 MAY 1975	
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1/ Please assign XAAZ # and classify to 201-289248

Date: ~~2~~ 26 NOV 68

Subject:
Correspondence between CIA and ASIO.
Re: ~~[illegible]~~ release of information by Warren Commission.

([illegible])

Document Number 1128-988 for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

DDP/P 24635

Executive Registry
68-5160/1

20 NOV 1968

XAAZ-
35926

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Letter for Director from Sir Charles Spry (ASIO)

1. Attached is a sealed letter from Sir Charles Spry, Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief of Station, Melbourne), and a suggested reply for your signature.

2. Sir Charles' letter to you recommends against declassification of the Warren Commission document CD-971, which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone calls to the Canberra Embassy before and after the assassination of President Kennedy.

3. I consider the points made by Sir Charles in his letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the declassification of CD-971 in the foreseeable future. CI Staff concurs with this recommendation.

Document Number 1128-988

for FOIA Review on SEP 1976

Nelson
William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

K

IP/EBI		TOPIC PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/FIS		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/PI		FILE	
ISG/CCU		[illegible] NO. (2, 3, 4)	
		SIGNAT REST. CODE	
		CABLE ICN (11)	
		[illegible] (8)	
IP/FILES		FOR FILING	

Attachments, 5
- A. Letter from Sir Charles Spry
- B. Letter Replying to Sir Charles Spry
- C. FAMA 5898, subject: Declassification of Warren Commission Document CD-971
- D. Copy of CD-971
- E. FAMW 3636, subject: Request for Release of Warren Commission Document

cc: DDCI

DDP/FE/PMI/AN:Amos Taylor, Jr1:arc (19 November 1968)
Distribution

Orig & 1 - Addressee	1 - C/CI Staff
1 - DDCI	1 - CFE
2 - DDP	1 - CFE/PMI
1 - ADDP	1 - CFE/PMI/AN

RECORD COPY

[illegible] 1
[illegible] automatic
[illegible], and
declassification

26 Nov 68

201-289248

SECRET

SECRET

68-5160/a

RD/P 8-4635/1

26 NOV 1968

FILE

Sir Charles C. F. Spry
Director General
Australian Security Intelligence Organization
G. P. O. Box 5165BB
Melbourne

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.

Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
Orig - Addee
2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
2 - DDP

cc: DDCI

1 - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - PMI
1 - PMI/AN

Signature Recommended:

Deputy Director for Plans

[illegible] 1968
Date

DDP/FE/PMI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)
5681

201-289248

~~S E C R E~~ T

99
IMS/FABOSS

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , , ,

STAFF

99 99
ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE,
DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

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96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 COPE 94608

19-6

S E C R E T 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF

19-6
CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

99 99 99 99
FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

14-6 14-6
2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLE STATING "NO TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)). UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION CANNOT MAKE A CASE AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL 14-6 WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE CHIEFS.
14-6 24

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4. FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

DO NOT DESTROY
CROSS FILE COPY FOR:
201-0289248

~~S E C R E~~ T

14/121

~~SECRET~~

```
*********************************************************************************************
*   OPERATOR : SEEGER, EDWA    BADGE:    KT283             DATE    : 14 SEP 93   *
*   OFFICE   : IMS/FABOSS      PHONE:    047552            TIME    : 15:24       *
*   ROOM     : GC520HB         PRINTER: TO19               PAGE    : 001         *
*   REQUESTER: HM877                                                             *
*   DSN: SPET 21162       DOC DATE: 20 NOV 91    MHF#: 91-6320813                *
**********************************  COMET  ******************************************
```

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: SE/USSR/IO-3 (752) INFO: C/ORMS, DOMDS, LIMITO, ODPD, SEDORECORD, FILE, DDO-2, SE/RR-3 (9/W)

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91 6320813 ASR PAGE 001 IN 6320813
TOR: 201455Z NOV 91 SPET 21162

~~SECRET~~ 201454Z NOV 91 STAFF

CITE ST PETERSBURG 21162

TO: MOSCOW INFO DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT SE/USSR/IO INFO SE/RR

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER

SUBJECT: KGB OFFICIAL NIKONOV

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE.

2. DURING THE WEEK OF 3-9 NOVEMBER 1991, U.S. PROFESSOR E.B. ((SMITH)), HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH "SLAVA" ((NIKONOV)), WHO IS A LONGTIME FRI?ND AND NOW DEPUTY TO KGB DIRECTOR ((BAKATIN)). THE PROFESSOR HAS KNOWN NIKONOV WELL SINCE 1976. HE CURRENTLY IS INSTRUCTING ON A FULBRIGHT GRANT AT ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY UNTIL 22 DECEMBER 1991. SEE PARA 7 FOR BIO ON THE PROFESSOR. DCOB STEVEN R. HEIBERG HAS BEFRIENDED THE PROFESSOR, WHO WAS DINNER GUEST AT HEIBERG'S HOME ON 10 NOVEMBER AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFO ON NIKONOV AND HIS NEW KGB JOB.

3. NIKONOV IS THE GRANDSON OF FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV. THE U.S. PROFESSOR TAUGHT NIKONOV IN 1976 AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY WHILE A FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR. NIKONOV WAS REGARDED AS EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT AND CAPABLE BUT GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS AN IDEOLOGICAL HARDLINER. THE PROFESSOR BELIEVED THAT HE WAS LIKELY TO BE A RISING STAR IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDED HIM FOR AN IREX-SPONSORED VISIT TO THE U.S. AS EXPECTED, NIKONOV'S VIEWS AND RHETORIC MODERATED VERY VISIBLY AFTER HIS FIRST DIRECT EXPOSURE TO ?HE U.S. HE HAS HAD AT LEAST ONE ADDITIONAL IREX-SPONSORED TRIP TO THE U.S. AND HAS SPENT PERIODS OF TIME AS A PERSONAL GUEST AT THE HOME OF THE U.S. PROFESSOR IN MARYLAND.

4. NIKONOV CAME TO WORK IN HIS POSITION AT THE KGB AS A RESULT OF BEING A CLOSE FRIEND OF BAKATIN. DURING THE AUGUST 1991 COUP ATTEMPT NIKONOV SAID THAT HE REFUSED TO FOLLOW HIS BOSS'S ORDER TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECLARED STATE OF EMERGENCY. HE WAS DISMISSED BY HIS BOSS (NFI) FROM THIS POSITION AND CALLED BAKATIN TO SEEK ADVICE. BAKATIN SAID HE WAS ALSO OPPOSING THE COUP AND WOULD LOOK OUT FOR NIKONOV ONCE ORDER WAS RESTORED. SOON AFTER THE COUP BAKATIN CALLED HIM TO ASK THAT HE ASSIST WITH RESTRUCTURING THE KGB. AFTER IT WAS AGREED THAT NIKONOV COULD DECLINE TO ACCEPT TWO-STAR MILITARY KGB RANK AND WORK IN THE JOB FOR AN EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN COMPENSATION PACKAGE, HE CAME TO THE KGB AS BAKATIN'S DEPUTY. NIKONOV SAID HIS FRIENDS WERE DELIGHTED THAT HE HAD DECLINED THE KGB COMMISSION.

5. NIKONOV'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT FROM BAKATIN WAS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE KGB-CIA LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS NOW COME INTO BEING. IN PREPARATION FOR ONE POSSIBLE QUESTION

S~~ECRE~~T

WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED, NIKONOV PERSONALLY REVIEWED KGB FILES TO DETERMINE IF LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)) HAD BEEN A KGB AGENT. HE REVIEWED FIVE THICK VOLUMES OF FILES ON OSWALD. NIKONOV IS NOW CONFIDENT THAT OSWALD WAS AT NO TIME AN AGENT CONTROLLED BY THE KGB. FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF OSWALD IN THE FILES HE DOUBTED THAT ANYONE COULD CONTROL OSWALD, BUT NOTED THAT THE KBG WATCHED HIM CLOSELY AND CONSTANTLY WHILE HE WAS IN THE USSR. HE COMMENTED THAT OSWALD HAD A STORMY RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SOVIET WIFE, WHO RODE HIM INCESSANTLY. THE FILE ALSO REFLECTED THAT OSWALD WAS A POOR SHOT WHEN HE TRIED TARGET FIRING IN THE USSR.

6. IN PREPARATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SWEDISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, NIKONOV PERSONALLY PERFORMED AN INQUIRY FOR BAKATIN INTO THE FATE OF SWEDISH DIPLOMAT RAOUL ((WALLENBERG)). THERE IS STILL PRESSURE FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE TO HAVE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE WALLENBERG FAMILY. NIKONOV WAS AMAZED TO FIND OUT THAT THE KGB HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISH WHETHER WALLENBERG HAD DIED AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS ABLE TO FIND PARTIAL EVIDENCE FROM FOURTEEN DIFFERENT SOURCES (NFI). NIKONOV NOW BELIEVES, BUT FOUND NO CONCLUSIVE PROOF, THAT WALLENBERG WAS EXECUTED LATE IN 1947. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT WALLENBERG WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING CONTACTS WITH OTHERS WHO WERE ACCUSED OF PROVIDING FALSE DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY DOCUMENTS TO OTHERS BEYOND JEWS SAVED FROM THE HOLOCAUST. AMONG THESE WERE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS WHO WERE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE. THERE WAS NO PROOF OF WALLENBERG'S GUILT IN ANY OF THESE CHARGES.

7. FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR WHO IS NIKONOV'S FORMER PROFESSOR AND FRIEND IS:
NAME: E.B. ((SMITH))
DOB: C.1920
CIT: USA
OCC: PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, RETIRED
LOC: RESIDES NEAR ANNAPOLIS, MD
OTHER: FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR FOR WINTER 1991 TERM IN ST PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY, USSR; TWO PREVIOUS FULBRIGHT ASSIGNMENTS IN MOSCOW AND SEVERAL IN PRC AND GERMANY; HOSTS FORMER STUDENTS FROM USSR AND PRC ON U.S. VISITS

THERE ARE NO BASE TRACES ON SMITH. HE SERVED IN THE MILITARY AND IS VERY WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE VOLUNTEERED INFO ON NIKONOV AND OTHER USSR, PRC AND GERMAN CONTACTS TO HEIBERG AND CAN PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE BIO AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON THEM.

074-005-011, 201-0005925 ***

8. FILE: DEFER. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

END OF DOCUMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

~~RECORDS OFFICER STAMP~~

: DIRECTOR

: MELBOURNE

: C/WH 4

: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE

Signed:

R.O. #1 - Unit CI/R&A

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

2 DEC 63 IN 71187

S E C R E T 020422Z

DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)

~~RYBAT~~ GPFLOOR

REF DIR 85690 *

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL N.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, HERMAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 1949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 HOLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE DEROG ON ABOVE.

C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

201-289248

D: 2000-5-41

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TRACE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE REP CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with the Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

Document Number ________ for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                                201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN           TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST             OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM              RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                              30 NOV 70          00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) OI [MHFIXTURE] personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

15 November 1974

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

7 Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: | EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files CC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date) retained at __________ desk.
14.				
15.				

FORM 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

7. A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its ✓ alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL A CHINA SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0238859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0098		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1108/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905340			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1108/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0837855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/495		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-PAO	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2995/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0054759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2835/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2873/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CHMD	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763916			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /975/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013951			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/	-	18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0747442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/	A	02FEB08				0151320			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2835/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KU		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		09OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0349628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB38	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313810			CHIN	DENM	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0144010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

14-00000

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)* 29

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth* 11

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). 24 + 29

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. 29

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel* 11

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

SECRET

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

SECRET

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62 -

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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Special Af SAA

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARBON-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
REFERENCES : A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962 no reference to [illegible]
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962 no reference to [illegible]
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962 no, ref to [illegible]
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962 no ref to [illegible]
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964 no ref to [illegible]

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARBON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~1~~ - RI Chrono
1 - 201 file (O/COS)
1 - COS Chrono

DATE TYPED 19 March 64	DATE DISPATCHED APR 2 1964
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-14781
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
COS	Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp	251

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		D002244
ESEC	[illegible] 64	DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
COS/JMWAVE	30/3/64	Andrew K. Reuteman ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 was handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1. When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attachment B to UFGA-14781

Identities - 1 - The Miami News

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor

5 - The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:
- 3 - Chief, SAS
- 1 - RI Chrono
- 1 - AMCARBON-1 201
- 1 - COS Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D002244

SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

3P

From: BOGOTA
Report No: TLB-1624
Local File No:

No. of Pages: Two
No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: George S. Vincent/maf
Approved By: G S Vincent

Distribution:

By copy to:
- Washington - 2
- Guatemala City - 1
- Quito - 1
- Guayaquil - 1
- Havana - 1
- Caracas - 1
- Maracaibo - 1
- Files - 2

Orally to:

Source Cryptonym: See below
References: None

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

The information in this report was obtained from a local detective who works for the National Police. An informant of the Police in Paris provided a report to the latter concerning activities of the Colombian delegation, and he added names of delegates of certain other countries. This informant is studying in Paris and he accompanied the delegates to Berlin. It is likely that the interested stations have this information, but it is thought it might serve to confirm, or possibly add a bit to, the material already on hand.

50-77991

Gonzalez

IR COPY

Classification CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

38

FORM NO. 51-90
FEB 1949

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Delegates to Youth Festival in Berlin

Report No: TLB - 1634

Date of Information: August-September 1951

Place Acquired: Colombia, Bogotá

Date Acquired: January 1952

Evaluation: C - 2

Date of Report: 29 January 1952

Source: Local Detective

1. Source reports that an informant in Paris has submitted information to the local Police concerning delegates of certain other countries to the III Festival Mundial de la Juventud held in Berlin in August and September 1951. These names together with the comments of the informant are included in the following paragraphs.

2. The delegation of Guatemala consisted of the following:

Edelberto TORRES Rivas, Novena Ave. S. No. 110
Octavio REYES Ortiz, 17 C. O. No. 78
Hugo Hubo BARRIOS Klee, 12 Calle Oriente No. 58
José Victor GONZALEZ, 2 Ave. Sur No. 11

in addition to these four names were Humberto ALVARADO and Elena CHAVEZ (TUG-1351)

3. The following is a list of the Venezuelan delegates:

Juvenal HERRERA, estudiante de derecho
Francisco MIERES, peligroso
Cordova ARMANDO, estudiante de derecho in Cumaná
Nicolas CURIEL Acosta, escritor de teatro
Juan Pedro ROJAS, pintor
Yolanda Steffens de ROJAS, casada con el anterior

4. The Ecuadoran delegates are as follows:

Enrique GIL Gilbert, escritor
Enrique QUINTERO
Patricio CUEVAS, estudiante de medicina en Praga

5. The delegation of Cuba consisted of the following:

Nicolas GUILLEN, poeta y escritor
Santiago GRAJALES, obrero
Antonio NUNEZ-Jimenez, (profesor) de Pedagogía y "responsable de la delegación de Cuba". Es peligroso y cuando hubo necesidad de retratarlo en París no se dejó.
Francisco GARCIA Benitez, comerciante de Holguín
José CANETTI, comerciante en Santiago de Cuba

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

8

FORM NO. FEB 1949 51-58

SECURITY INFORMATION

02316

SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UMWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleutorio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organized in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized -- Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things -- moral backing and money; he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organize a revolutionary movement.

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4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him -- would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1983
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

VIA: A I R (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HDCA-1382

1P

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 June 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by Edward P. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican post office building.

D. Pawley

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in paragraph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY Wm. in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

D. Republic

Edward F. Stoneset
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

CS COPY

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

12 June 58

201-77378

D00708

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

02680

~~SECRET~~
~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department [redacted] 'DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                        201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26       POB GERM, BERLIN       TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                  OCC PHARMACIST         OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53 OCC CODE CHEM          RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                       30 NOV 70        00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

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Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL. BY: 007622

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL. BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6		
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4		

FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE

ACTION DESK:
1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

```
FOI A CHINA                                      SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
      201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
      03 OCT  1973
                NAME                  TYPE    DOB      BIRTHPLACE                   OCC.  CIT.     201     OI-1  OI-2  ACT.  LOC.  INT.
                                      NAME  DA/MO/YR   CTRY  CITY                                                  CTRY  CTRY  CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/9030/               17JUL14   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?  0165401              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/                                                       DIPT         0230859              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/         A     24JAN11                                             0178653              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038               90        CHIN,AMOY                    BUSP  CCOM?  0043751              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU MEI                               04JAN19   CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.                CHIN?  0234629              CHIN  CUBA
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690               21OCT08   CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH         CNAT   0179620              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001         A     12NOV22   CHIN, HUNAN                        CNAT   0069786              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-TAO                               18MAR45   CHIN                         DIPT  CCOM   0905390              CHIN  MALT
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1                C41       CHIN, CANTON                 ENGR  CNAT   0832855              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1897               02SEP26   CHIN, LIAONING PRO                 CHIN?  0130415              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/499                12JAN18   CHIN, FUKIEN                       CCOM?  0091803              CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-YI                                09JUN99   CHIN, CANTON                 PROF  CHIN?  0040288              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU-SAN                          A     19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV               CNAT?  0052638              CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930               02JUL30   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.        ARMY  CNAT   0328328              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122               19        CHIN,HUAN TANG TS                  CHIN?  0124438              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2                 NOV30     HK                           TSEA  CNAT   0797335              CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797         A     C1RC22    CHIN,PEILIU                        CHIN?  0200223              CHIN
CHEN, SHU FEN                          R                                                         0988577              CHIN  ETHI
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/               08JUL14   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?  0179621              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74               10        CHIN,FUKIEN                        CHIN?  0044759              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7                23FEB07   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                    CCOM?  0073195              CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2895/8133               05MAY18   CHIN,FOOCHOW                       CHIN?  0179622              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HUA                                30MAR26                                DIPT  CCOM   0223161              CHIN  CEY
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/9030/           A     06FEB16   CHIN, HOPEI                  DIPT  CNAT   0239156              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710               27NOV23   CHIN,FANG CHENG              PROF  CHIN?  0179623              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LAN                          R               CHIN                               CCOM   0221972              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009               C1RC21    CHIN                         DIPT  CHIN?  0223162              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/               25NOV20   CHIN,PENGSHUN                      CHIN?  0179624              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010                01JUL29   CHIN, KIANGSU                MILA  CCOM   0858450              CHIN  LAOS
CHEN, SHU-MIN                          A     20SEP20   CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU         CNAT   0096947              CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/               15APR30   CHIN,CHENGHAI                CHMO  CHIN?  0179625              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/               19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.              CNAT?  0052638              CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2899/2773/         A     10DEC26   CHIN,KWANGTUNG                     CHIN?  0005119              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091                27JAN25   CHIN, FUKIEN PROV                  CHIN?  0103289              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/                21DEC37   CHIN, SHANGHAI               GEOL  CHIN?  0763816              CHIN  BURM
CHEN, SHU TEH /875/                    V     27MAR20   CHIN, CHANG SHU                           0013991              CHIN
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639               C1RC75    CHIN,HANG CHOW                     CHIN?  0153929              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/               18MAR17   CHIN                         FIN   CCOM   0767442              CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/         A     02FEB06                                             0151329              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2695/1031                11NOV06   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                    CCOM?  0093196              CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN                          V     05APR17   CHIN,PEIPING                       CHIN?  0107336              CHIN  CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/               15JUN06   CHIN,FANG CHEN KW                  CHIN?  0179626              CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/               07OCT30   CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN   ARMY  CNAT   0343528              CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-YU                                 17FEB39   CHIN, CHEKIANG               INT   CCOM   0313610              CHIN  DENK
CHEN, SHU-YU                                 21APR21   CHIN, SHANGHAI                     CHIN?  0044010              CHIN
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/          V     04SEP28   CHIN, SZECHWAN                     CHIN?  0144750              CHIN  TAIW

                                                 SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY                               PAGE  150
                                                 E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

CSHB ~~43-1-1~~ 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Oct 62

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, WHD
INFO. Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT Contact Report/LITAMIL-9
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/2/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 21849	31 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 330173

03628

[illegible] July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE [illegible]

FROM : Lawrence [illegible]

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 17 July 1963

1. An unexpected meeting was held with LITAMIL-9 at 2106 hours 17 July -- Barker had a scheduled meeting with AMSAIL-1 at the corner of Ejercity Nacional and Melchor Ocampo at 2100 hours but A-1 was not in place at 2103 when B made his second pass -- B then stopped by the corner of Gutenberg and Thiers, where there is a pay phone -- to make a call to A-1 -- but as B's car pulled up LITAMIL-9 stepped out of the bushes and said, in English, "Here I am." L-9 got in the car and EHL drove away -- the mystery was clarified then. L-9 explained that he had called B's home about 2030 hours and spoken with B's wife who said B was out and would probably be back in about half an hour -- L was on his way to phone again (from the pay phone at Gutenberg & Thiers -- usual pick up point) when he saw Barker pass by -- later spotted the car pull up to the corner -- he assumed by this time that Barker had spoken with his, B's wife, and received the word that L was looking for him that night -- thus a coincidence. L explained his presence in the area (partly true) by saying he was casing for better pick up points -- no mention was made of another scheduled meeting (with A-1). EHL drove out the Queretaro highway to the vicinity of the Dawn Motel where the meeting was held. L-9 was dropped off at 2325 hours.

2. L revealed again his concern about security since the new ambassador and cultural counselor are such sharp people, hence much more dangerous. The elements of a complete clandestine communications system were explained to L -- regular, scheduled and non-scheduled; recontact and warning -- and some progress was made in working out the details.

3. L reported that he is going to Tampico to inaugurate an exhibit of Cuban engravings, [illegible] in connection with the [illegible] Escuela de Comercio, Avenida [illegible] No. [illegible], on the night of 20 July. L will leave about 19 July -- return about 21 July. [illegible] Jose [illegible] -- Cuban Consulate [illegible] -- and will last about two weeks.

4. He reported the following additional developments:

(a) A big celebration of the 26th of July [illegible] will be held in [illegible], suburb of Tampico. This celebration -- sponsored by the [illegible] Jose Marti -- will take place in the salon of the Cerveceria [illegible] Corona (Brewery). The principal speaker will be Hector PICO [illegible]. The event will take place at [illegible].

L-9 suggested we might want to have a photographer there and might want to drop a stink bomb or two.

(b) [illegible] DE LA [illegible], who was introduced to Jacqueline KENNEDY during the President's trip to Mexico, is a supporter of [illegible] CASTRO and who apparently [illegible] the interest of Mrs. Kennedy, has been invited "to make an exhibition" in the United States and is planning to go there. L had no further details.

Attach to HMMA 21849 CS COPY

201-329609

She was introduced to the First Lady by (fnu) BARRIOS. Sa[illegible] (phonetic).

(c) [illegible], the new Cultural Counselor, told L that [illegible] (phon), Cuban Ambassador in Moscow is going to be recalled soon because he has done much harm there to Cuban-Soviet relations.

(d) APARICIO also reported that the magazine [illegible] in Cuba is having serious trouble obtaining newsprint.

(e) APARICIO said that when he was in Prague he had trouble with the climate -- asked to be sent to some other European country -- was surprised at the suddenness of his transfer to Mexico.

(f) (In response to a question as to who should be the man we might most easily recruit among the Embassy staff) L said he has doubts about JORRIN's loyalty to the Castro regime. Believes JORRIN might be recruitable but wouldn't dare do it himself (I assured L we would never ask him to undertake such a risky venture). JORRIN goes window shopping along San Juan de Letran often -- might be approachable there.

(g) Only two Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's residence on Bastille Day (14 July) -- Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas and L. Each went separately but L returned in the Ambassador's car. The Amb was clearly impressed with L's standing with the French -- L is a close friend of the French Military Attache to whom he introduced the Amb -- and the Amb kept L by his side during the celebration -- L speaks good French. At this affair, [illegible] of the Soviet Embassy spoke in a superficial manner of international politics and it became clear that the Cuban Amb is a partisan of the Soviets in the dispute with the Chinese. [illegible] remarked that he would be leaving soon but would be replaced with "another young man, just as sharp as I am." [illegible] and the Amb agreed that current American policy for Latin America is designed to give the impression that such governments as the one in Argentina represent a democratic advance when in fact they are fronting for the military.

(h) An Ecuadorean youth named Ulises ESTRELLA was in the Embassy on 17 July -- spoke with APARICIO. He represents a group of pro-Castro writers in Ecuador and is trying to go to Cuba -- will probably get there. He has a [illegible] mustache and beard -- brought a book as a gift for APARICIO.

(i) APARICIO is busy working on the forthcoming Congress of Architects which is to take place in Havana. He is dealing [illegible] with a man named YANEZ on this matter. [illegible] says that the US Government has been [illegible] lots of pressure to have the seat of the congress [illegible] some other country -- without success. A check for [illegible] dollars, representing inscription fees paid by Mexican delegates to the congress, has been sent to Havana.

(j) [illegible] in the Embassy seems unduly upset by the restrictions on dollar currency transactions with Cuba.

(k) L turned over to B (for return) a handbill put out by the Escuela Normal Rural de Santa Teresa Coahuila, dated 10 June 1963, explaining that schools invitation to Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1958-1963 graduating class. Copy attached.

(l) L turned over a pornographic cartoon (for return) distributed by pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy not attached.

(m) Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa CALDERON has a sister residing in Reynosa, Tamps, married to an American of Mexican descent. Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon -- or her mother may make the trip -- details not clear.

5. L-9 reports that he is very well "in" with the new ambassador who seems to respect him highly and to admire him for his contacts. He is also getting along very nicely with his new boss, APARICIO. His information gathering method is still to keep his eyes and ears open and ask no questions -- thus he often gets only fragments -- while questions or discreet elicitation might fill in detail he is extremely wary lest he arouse any suspicion.

6. While he suggested we might want to toss a few stink bombs at the engraving exhibit on the 20th in Tampico and the subsequent celebration of the 26th in Ciudad Madero -- he was also concerned lest any disruption might get him in trouble since he is the principal organizer of both affairs -- felt that the Mexican Government might think the disruption was engineered by the Castro Cubans, themselves, to throw suspicion on the anti-Castroites.

7. L-9 is really worried about his security and it will be up to us to take every practical precaution to protect him. He loves to talk -- quite a conversationalist -- and needs constant encouragement and shoring-up. He is inclined to pat himself on the back quite often and wait for a further pat from his case officer (which B is always quick to add). This characteristic comes out in his conversation when he stops and says, "I did very well there, didn't I?" or "That was a good idea I had, wasn't it?" or "I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever, don't you?"

8. For the present it has been decided to keep holding meetings in B's car -- always at night. The pick up point has been abandoned in favor of a mobile pick up -- L will start at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo at the prescribed hour and move slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg -- then, without tarrying, will work his way back down the opposite side of the street to Melchor Ocampo -- B will cruise by in his car and make the pick up while L is walking. Other commo details will be worked out at the next meeting.

Laurence F.

201-329609

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

27 MAY 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/S-HB

ATTENTION : Mr. Joseph E. Murphy, Jr. G G 14

SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
#789 656

03
08

1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966 wherein you requested a Covert Security Approval to permit Subject's use as First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/JBGREED.

02
02

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(IOS)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

0458

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

4/PN

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

SECRET

27 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive Officer
Project HBILKA/JBGREED
03 02 02

SUBJECT : PUGH, Robert West
#789 656
08

1. Reference is made to your request dated 4 January 1966 for a Covert Security Approval to permit Subject's use as a First Officer in the Far East under Project HBILKA/JBGREED. Concurrent with issuance of the approval, the following is offered for your information.

2. Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However, Subject's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with Subject on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military on October 1964.

3. Additionally, it was developed that Subject's brother 06 Bartholomew, aka: Bart PUGH, was the Subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of Subject's brother. Subject's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

see 00
#45

SECRET

information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between Subject and his brother.

4. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

James P. O'Connell
for Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

cc: DD/S

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO 13-6 02
Chief of Station, Taipei --- ATTN: Chief, HBILKA

INFO

FROM
Chief, Far East

SUBJECT 02
IDEN -- HBILKA/KUSODA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. A Covert Security Approval was granted IDEN on 27 May 1966 however the following information is forwarded for your information.

Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.

Additionally, it was developed that IDEN's brother Bartholomew, aka: Bart, 06 was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. IDEN's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between IDEN and his brother.

2. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

HUGH C. PARDEE

Attachment:
IDEN (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS DESTROY AFTER USE

DOC# 04589

14-00000

1. A Covert Security Approval was granted IDEN on 27 May 1966 however the following information is forwarded for your information.

Investigation has recently been completed with generally favorable results. However IDEN's military file indicated that he had been found unfit for duty due to excessive drinking, and had been allowed to retire in the best interests of the Navy. His Navy record stated that this drinking problem adversely affected his judgment, reliability, and personal behavior. This weakness had been discussed to no avail with IDEN on several occasions. It should be noted that domestic inquiries developed no indication of over-indulgence since his departure from the military in October 1964.

Additionally, it was developed that IDEN's brother Bartholomew, aka: Bart, 06 was the subject of an FBI investigation in 1941, which was conducted to resolve allegations regarding the loyalty of IDEN's brother. IDEN's brother was determined to have been associated with known Communists and was active in Communist matters in the Los, Angeles, California area during this period of time. However, it was noted that these activities had caused a break with this individual and his family, who were not in sympathy with his viewpoints and activities. There was no information developed during the course of this investigation which indicated any association between IDEN and his brother.

2. Dissemination of the above information should be limited to Staff and Project Officials on a strict "need to know" basis.

HUGH C. PARDEE

Attachment:
IDEN (u/s/c)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressees

[illegible] DCI 70-1[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	22 FCTS- 8572	14 JUL 1966 13 July 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER

Distribution:
1 - OS/ID/1
1 - ID/S-EB

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
ID/S-EB	murphy J.E.MURPHY	ms	6862

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OS/ID/1	7/13/66	
28 FE/TSCH		
FE/SECUR	13 JUL 1966	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/FE	14 July 66	WE Colby WILLIAM E. COLBY

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

3/17

14-00000

RYBAT

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
[FCTS]-8572
22

IDENTITY SHEET

03

IDEN ---------------------------- [MR. ROBERT WEST PUGH]

SECRET RYBAT

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

2/pJ

14-00000

2 - 10/4/66

108 Chung Shan Road, North, 2nd Section
Taipei, Taiwan

REC'D WAS OCT 4 1966

PND-DP-66/4427 27 September 1966

03
[Mr. R. W. Pugh]
[Taipei, Taiwan] 13-6

03
Dear [Mr. Pugh:]

This letter will confirm acceptance of your resignation effective 27 September 1966 at the close of business.

A final pay check representing any unpaid salary due you less any debits you may have on the Company books will be forwarded to your bank:

Bank of America
[4th Street 08
Santa Rosa,] California.

You have given us your forwarding address as:

[756 Baird Road 08
Santa Rosa], California
U. S. A.

We thank you for your past service and wish you success in the future.

Sincerely yours,

David R. Traylor
Director of Personnel

L/cc: Paymaster
C&C
Assistant for Personnel via MCDR, President

03
[Mr. R. W. Pugh] F/O T.C, EOD 8 February 1966

03
[Mr. Pugh] resigned effective 27 September 1966 cob. He indicated to us that he wished to quit flying and go home.

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS
DESTROY AFTER USE

7/PV

14-00000

A

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA XXXXXXXXXX OS/ID/1	FROM: (Division) DD/S-HB (Case officer) J.M.Clark (Extension) 6862	
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) 03 [Pugh, Robert West]		NAME SHOWN IS X TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT
CI/OA NO. 08 [789656]	201 NO. 08 [789 656]	PROJECT 02 [JB]GREED
DATE OF BIRTH Unknown	PLACE OF BIRTH Unknown	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject has resigned his employment with 02 [HB]ILKA.

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS DESTROY AFTER USE

201- 789656

DATE 6 Oct 66	SIGNATURE for Jack M. Clark

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

4591

5/PJ

14-00000

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 4 January 1966

TO:	☐	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☒	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DD/S-HB

SUBJECT: *(True name)* 03 [PUGH, Robert West]

PROJECT: 02 [JB]GREED

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-[789 08 656]

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Far East (General)

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

First Officer, 02 [HB]ILKA.

Dhv

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
JOSEPH E. MURPHY	6862	

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

11507

MICROFICHE REPRODUCTIONS DESTROY AFTER USE

4/N

— Mrs Egerter —

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE 29. 7. 68

SUBJECT OSWALD — Nosenko

FILE NUMBER

1. On 26 July Mr. Rocca, C/CI/R&A, called to my attention an aspect of Nosenko's information which must be thoroughly examined when we attempt to assess analyze Nosenko's story about the OSWALD case. Rocca has been reading all the latest from N re OSWALD and it is his impression there are not only gaps in the info from the standpoint that N should know more but also some aspects which don't ring true.

2. Recently Rocca received from the [British] information about the activities of ×RIMA SHURAKOVA who has been in the UK [in touch with a British controlled source (a gov't clerk) judged]

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

FORM 1.62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

525-126

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

[to be reliable] It is ROCCA's impression (I have not examined this case thoroughly) that the Soviets have contrived to try to make SHURAKOVA look (clean, i.e., that she has not had a KGB role and is only an Intourist interpreter – to support N's thesis. This is questionable on its surface. At any rate the [controlled British] source and SHURAKOVA visited Mme Tussaud's wax works museum where SHURAKOVA had a visible reaction when seeing OSWALD display, although this visit was entirely innocent on the part of the source [—] [British], i.e., it was not done deliberately. SHURAKOVA's reaction indicated suspicion that this was a provocation

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT Liaison/UNION
Report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal

ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨ ABSTRACT
▨ MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: DIR 39176, 1 February 1962

1. As stated in reference, attached for passage to UNION are two copies of a report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echasabal; the original of this report was given to UNION/11 on 6 February 1962.

2. The last paragraph of attachment contains our request for the results of the debriefing of Subject.

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment:
Report (2 cc u.s.c.)

Distribution:
3 - Paris

D4170

DATE TYPED
7 Feb 1962

DATE DI
12

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-32716

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-244918

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 - WE/3 w/att
1 - RI w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST
WE/3	Anne Silbert	nes

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

5 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : M. de Vosjoli

SUBJECT : Report on Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal

Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal was born in Cuba on 17 August 1913. He has a master's degree in agriculture, professedly has no religion but is a Mason. RODRIGUEZ is married to Edith JONES, who was born in Cuba on 10 March 1917; she is, however, of Haitian origin, being the daughter of a former Haitian Ambassador to Belgium, and she is a devout Episcopalian. The couple is known to have three children: a son who was last reported to be in Havana, Cuba; a daughter married to a man of German birth who was employed in the Castro land-reform organization until his departure for Germany in December 1961; and a son, Antonio RODRIGUEZ Jones, born 24 August 1943 at Havana, who was studying at the Ecole Francaise Internationale in Washington, D.C. in 1961. This son has been reported to be anti-U.S. and to have requested permission of his father to go to Cuba or to another "socialist" country to continue his education.

Antonio RODRIGUEZ Jones resided in Washington, D.C. with Yvonne JONES, his aunt and sister of the wife of Antonio RODRIGUEZ Echazabal. Miss JONES was born 10 April 1910 at Antwerp, Belgium; she was unmarri and was a secretary at the Pan American Health Organization. She became a U.S. citizen in 1959. Since the Castro regime has come to power, Miss JONES is said to have spoken quite openly for Castro and against the U.S. Government.

RODRIGUEZ lived in Haiti for about eighteen years prior to the commencement of his diplomatic career, having been barred by the Batist government from returning to Cuba. He became a Haitian citizen and was the owner of a Port-au-Prince meat market called "El Oso Blanco". Whe Castro assumed power in Cuba, RODRIGUEZ took over the Cuban Embass in Port-au-Prince in January 1959 after the Batista-appointed officials had fled to the Dominican Republic. Soon thereafter he was named Ambassado to Haiti.

Following his appointment to the diplomatic post, RODRIGUEZ continu to maintain contact with persons in opposition to President Duvalier of Hai

Citizen of Cuba ~ NOV 1937

[illegible]

In late July 1959, Haiti was invaded by a small group of Cubans, supposedly as a prelude to an invasion of the neighboring Dominican Republic. The incursion was successfully repelled by the Haitian Government, which publicly charged RODRIGUEZ with complicity in the raid. RODRIGUEZ ther closed the Cuban Embassy and returned to Cuba after selling his private property in Haiti.

While RODRIGUEZ was still in Haiti, two attempts were made on his life. He accused the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic and, indirectly, the Haitian Government of complicity in those attacks.

In November 1959, RODRIGUEZ went to Guatemala as Cuban Ambassado There, he appears to have associated freely with pro-Communist groups. I March 1960, he was requested by the Guatemalan Government to leave the country on the ground that he was engaging in activities inimical to the best interests of Guatemala.

In November 1960, RODRIGUEZ reported to Karachi, Pakistan, as Cub Ambassador. His wife accompanied him there and served as his chief secretary. During the initial months of his tour there, his closest relation in the diplomatic colony were with officials of the Belgian Embassy, presumably as a result of the fact that Belgium had represented Cuba when there was no Cuban representative in Karachi. During 1961, however, his social contacts were almost exclusively with Soviet, satellite and Chinese Communist diplomatic personnel.

In late 1961, when RODRIGUEZ apparently had decided to defect, he confided to an acquaintance in the diplomatic colony that he was finished with politics and wanted to devote the rest of his life to agriculture. He ho at the time to go to the Dominican Republic or to another, unspecified Sout American nation. At the time of his departure from Karachi by air for Germany in early 1962, RODRIGUEZ reportedly made only a very limited statement at the airport regarding his defection. The event apparently received very little, if any, press notice in Pakistan.

Insufficient information exists at present to permit a determination as the genuineness of RODRIGUEZ's disaffection with the Castro regime. Fo reasons which have not as yet been fully reported, the Department of State denied a visa to RODRIGUEZ, apparently after he had made the decision t resign his post in Pakistan. We understand, however, that, following his

[redacted]

√

Citizen of Cuba
[illegible]

arrival in France in January 1962, he received permission from French authorities to travel to and reside in Martinique. It appears that he left France on 31 January 1962 en route to Martinique.

This service would appreciate having the results of any debriefing of RODRIGUEZ by French authorities, with particular reference to the reasons for his resignation and his plans for the future.

HMYA – 1975 thru
2006 complete

HMYA 2006 repeated

NO HMYA 2007

HMYA – 2008 –
2022 Complete

NO HMYA 2023

Incoming Monterey

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

HMYA – 2024 –
2025

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMYA-01935	050-004-131	06/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LETTER BY CAMILO CHAVEZ					
HMYA-01936	201-0177684	06/09/63			AO	IP
	LIDATE OPERATIONAL FILE					
HMYA-01937	050-124-003	12/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF A CRAC ADVERTISEMENT					
HMYA-01938	050-126-004	10/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 121 DATED 29 JUL 63					
HMYA-01939	050-124-003	12/09/63			IN	C/WH/3
	LIGAFF-1/TRANSMITTAL OF AN ANTI-CRAC ARTICLE					
HMYA-01940	050-004-121	12/09/63			IN	IP
	LUIS LAURO ESCAMILLA MARTINEZ					
HMYA-01941	050-004-131	12/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE					
HMYA-01942	201-0025485	23/09/63			AC	WH3/RE
	REDCAP/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPING					
HMYA-01943	050-009-005	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	TRANSMITTAL OF PRI YOUTH LEAFLET					
HMYA-01944	050-006-027/03	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	PROJECT LIRULE/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JUN-10 SEP 63					
HMYA-01945	201-0319623	23/09/63			AO	WH/REG
	KAPOK RECD 26 SEP 63					
HMYA-01946	050-126-004	23/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 112 DATED 12 AUG 63					
HMYA-01947	050-004-122	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	INTERVIEW WITH AURELIA CAMPOS MORALES					
HMYA-01948	050-004-122	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPH-MARTA MALDONADO					
HMYA-01949	050-500	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	PHOTO IDENTIFICATION					
HMYA-01950	201-0065845	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ACTS OF EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL DURING PERIOD 10-13 SEP 63					
HMYA-01951	201-0181033)06	26/09/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ATTEMPT TO RECURIT (FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)06					
HMYA-01952	201-0733542	02/10/63			AO	C/WH/2
	SUBJ OF REFERENCE A					
HMYA-01953	201-0181033	02/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	PRETEXT INVESTIGATION AT HOME OF SUBJ OF HMYA-1957					
HMYA-01954	050-004-131	02/10/63			IN	IP
	MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPON-DENCE					
HMYA-01955	201-0065845	03/10/63			AC	C/WH/3
	ACTS OF EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL					
HMYA-01956	201-0181033)06	03/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	(FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)06					
HMYA-01957	DEFERRED	03/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 123 DATED 26 AUG 63					
HMYA-01958	050-500	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	COL. SALVADOR BRAVO DE LA TORRE					
HMYA-01959	050-009-005	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N.L.					
HMYA-01960	201-0283602	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIPAIL/REQUEST FOR CONTRACT AMENDMENT-KENNETH Q. FRISHMUTH					
HMYA-01961	201-0319623	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIPAIL-10/MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS					
HMYA-01962	201-0054922	04/10/63			IN	C/WH/3
	LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS					
HMYA-01963	DEFERRED	04/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIGAFF/ANTI-COMMIE PROP					

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S-E-C-R-E-T 16/06/77

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMYA-01964	050-004-104	03/10/63			AC	IP
	PCM ACTIVITIES IN MAZATLAN, SINALOA					
HMYA-01965	050-006-110/03	07/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS					
HMYA-01966	050-004-102	08/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	FORWARDING OF LETTERS OF STATE COMMITTEES OF THE PCM					
HMYA-01967	050-004-102	08/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	BIO DATA/NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCM					
HMYA-01968	DEFERRED	09/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ZREAGER PROSPECTS					
HMYA-01969	050-004-117	09/10/63			AO	C/WH/3
	LIBIGHT/LIHUD-IDEN CARD OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL					

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                                                        S-E-C-R-E-T                     16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01964                050-004-104      03/10/63                                               AC   IP
                PCM ACTIVITIES IN MAZATLAN, SINALOA
HMYA-01965                050-006-110/03   07/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIVACATE/1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01966                050-004-102      08/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                FORWARDING OF LETTERS OF STATE COMMITTEES OF THE PCM
HMYA-01967                050-004-102      08/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                BIO DATA/NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCM
HMYA-01968                DEFERRED         09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                ZREAGER PROSPECTS
HMYA-01969                050-004-117      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIBIGHT/LIMUD-IDEN CARD OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL
HMYA-01970                050-009-012      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIBIGHT/LIMUD-CARLOS FERNANDEZ B.
HMYA-01971                050-006-088/03   09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                RECONTACT INSTRUCTIONS/LIVAGUE/1
HMYA-01972                201-0733542      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                DOLORES SOTELO VASQUEZ
HMYA-01973                201-0043504      09/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                PROJECT LIRABBIT/MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS FOR LITANG
HMYA-01974                201-0057721      11/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                GREGORIO RODRIGUEZ RETA
HMYA-01975                050-006-026/03   24/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIRABBIT PROJECT/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 01 JUL THROUGH 30 SEP 63
HMYA-01976                050-500          15/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                IDEN OF PHOTOS
HMYA-01977                050-004-102      16/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                BIO DATA ON CERTAIN PCM LEADERS
HMYA-01978                201-0054922      16/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                DIZTAG/LIVACATE-1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01979                201-0319623      18/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIPAIL/10-TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ PART II
HMYA-01980                050-006-004      18/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL SECURITY/LCFLUTTER
HMYA-01981                050-006-013      25/10/63                                               IN   WH/REG
                RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01982                050-009-013      24/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                EDUARDO L. SUAREZ GALINDO
HMYA-01983                050-009-006      24/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                JMPIPER/DYVOUR NAME CHECK ON LUIS G. OLLOUI GUERRA
HMYA-01984                050-124-022/03   25/10/63                                               AC   WH3/ME
                KAPOK RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01985                050-009-013      24/10/63                                               AC   C/WH/3
                KURIOT/CCI AND MLN MBRSHIP CARDS
HMYA-01986                050-126-006      25/10/63                                               AC   WH/REG
                KAPOK RECD 04 NOV 63
HMYA-01987                201-0080638      24/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                ADDRESSES IN MEXICO CITY
HMYA-01988                037-500          25/10/63                                               IN   IP
                LIGAFF/LETTER FROM HONDURAS
HMYA-01989                201-0065845      25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                SUBJ. OF 201-65845
HMYA-01990                201-0355219      25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                LIGAFF-2/TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ-PART 11
HMYA-01991                050-126-003      25/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N. L.
HMYA-01992                DEFERRED         25/10/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                KUHOLF/BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 124 DATED 9 SEP 63
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01993                050-004-110      30/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                FORWARDING OF PHOTO
HMYA-01994                DEFERRED         01/11/63                                               AO   C/WH/3
                KUWOLF/ZRBUILD-LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS ARTICLES
HMYA-01995                050-004-033      31/10/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CCI IN MATAMOROS DE LA LAGUNA, COAHUILA
HMYA-01996                050-004-131      01/11/63                                               IN   C/WH/3
                MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
HMYA-01997                201-0068545      01/11/63                                               AO   IP
                LIGAFF-1/ANTI-COMMIE PROPAGANDA
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                                                                                    IN    C/WH/3
                         LIGAFF/POLITICAL ACTION IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N. L.
HMYA-01992                     DEFERRED           25/10/63                           AO    C/WH/3
                         KUWOLF/BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE ISSUE 124 DATED 9 SEP 63

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                                                     S-E-C-R-E-T                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE        FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF    CODE ROUTING
HMYA-01993                050-004-110      30/10/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         FORWARDING OF PHOTO
HMYA-01994                DEFERRED         01/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         KUWOLF/ZRBUILD-LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS ARTICLES
HMYA-01995                050-004-033      31/10/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE CCI IN MATAMOROS DE LA LAGUNA, COAHUILA
HMYA-01996                050-004-131      01/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         MHBORIC/FORWARDING OF DISSIDENT CORRESPONDENCE
HMYA-01997                201-0068545      01/11/63                                          AO   IP
                         LIGAFF-1/ANTI-COMMIE PROPAGANDA
HMYA-01998                201-0054922      01/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         DIZTAG/LIVAGATE-1 OPERATIONS
HMYA-01999                201-0293411      01/11/63                                          AO   WH3/ME
                         LIVALVE/1 TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY F-201-0274028
HMYA-02000                DEFERRED         01/10/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LIVACATE-1-FORWARDING OF REPORT RE LEADERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY
HMYA-02001                201-0733542      01/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LETTER CONCERNING SUBJ OF REF
HMYA-02002                201-0058638      05/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         FERNANDO GARZA YOBA AND JOSE ANGEL SANCHEZ PEREZ
HMYA-02003                050-006-083/03   06/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LIPAIL/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JUL-30 SEP 63
HMYA-02004                050-006-070/03   06/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LIP/PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 AUG-31 OCT 63
HMYA-02005                050-124-022/03   06/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         PROGRESS RPT 1 JUL TO 30 SEP 63
HMYA-02006                200-006-055      06/11/63                                          AO   DESTROY
                         COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST
HMYA-02007                [AQUATIC]        19/11/63                                          AO   TSD
                         SENT TO TSD
HMYA-02008                201-0322364      07/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LITRAMP/TRAVEL OF LITRAMP/6 TO SAN SALVADOR
HMYA-02009                050-004-134      08/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         PHOTO IDEN
HMYA-02010                050-006-110/03   08/11/63                                          AO   IP/FI
                         KUTUBE/LIVACATE PROJECT OUTLINE WAS RYBAT
HMYA-02011                050-004-109      08/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA/RAILROAD WORKERS
HMYA-02012                050-006-013      08/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         ANASTASIO DE LA GARZA AKA RANDEL E. FITZPATRICK
HMYA-02013                050-126-003      08/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPING
HMYA-02014                201-0725286      08/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LIGAFF-3/OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES
HMYA-02015                201-0293411      13/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         LIVALVE/1-PRQ PART 1
HMYA-02016                050-006-042/05   14/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         LIMUD/LIBIGHT-REVIEW OF OPERATIONS IN MONTERREY
HMYA-02017                [AQUATIC]        21/11/63                                          AO   TSD
                         SENT TO TSD
HMYA-02018                050-006-042/05   14/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         LIMUD/TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMYA-02019                050-006-042/05   14/11/63                                          IN   C/WH/3
                         LIBIGHT/LIMUD-TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMYA-02020                050-126-003      18/11/63                                          AO   C/WH/3
                         KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPINGS
HMYA-02021                200-006-055      18/11/63                                          AO   DESTROY
                         COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST

PAGE   18020                                         S-E-C-R-E-T                  EZ IMPDET CL BY 011981
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                           050-126-003          18/11/63                                                            AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF NEWS CLIPPINGS
HMYA-02021                 200-006-055          18/11/63                                                            AO   DESTROY
                    COMMUNICATIONS WA    LIST
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)       FCN                  DATE          FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF              CODE ROUTING
HMYA-02022                 050-009-005          18/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    POLITICAL ACTS IN SABINAS HIDALGO, N.L.
HMYA-02023                 050-006-110/03       19/11/63                                                        AO   WH/REG
                    RECD 26 NOV 63 LIVACATE
HMYA-02024                 050-004-104          20/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    PEDRO SAENZ FLORES
HMYA-02025                 050-124-000          20/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    LIGAFF/1 POLITICAL ACTION
HMYA-02026                 050-004-104          20/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    REDCAP/LIVACATE-1 OPERATIONAL
HMYA-02027                 201-0181033)06       20/11/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                 06(FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA OTONES)
HMYA-02028                 050-009-005          20/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    LIGAFF/1-MOVIMIENTO CIVICO SOCIAL MEXI
HMYA-02029                 050-006-042/05       22/11/63                                                        IN   C/WH/3
                    LIBIGHT/LIMUD-LETTER TO RODOLFO DE LEON GARZA
HMYA-02030                 050-126-003          02/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF/TRANSMITTAL OF MAGAZINE ARTICLE
HMYA-02031                 050-126-004          05/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF/LIGAFF-3 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPING
HMYA-02032                 050-004-029          05/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF/LIGAFF-1 TRANSMITTAL OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPING
HMYA-02033                 050-006-013          05/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    ANASTASIO DE LA GARZA AKA RANDEL E. FITZPATRICK
HMYA-02034                 050-006-083/03        /12/63                                                         AC   C/WH/3
                    LIPAIL-5/ STUDENT ELECTIONS AT THE MED. SCHOOL AT THE UNIV OF NUEVO LEON
HMYA-02035                 201-0328380           /12/63                                                         AO   C/WH/3
                    EDUARDO ROGELIO BLACKALLER VILLARREAL
HMYA-02036                 050-006-042/05       06/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    LIBIGHT/LIMUD-TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER WRITTEN BY LUIS MACIAS
HMYA-02037                 201-0325046           /12/63                                                         AO   C/WH/3
                    KUWOLF/LIGAFF STUDENT ELECTIONS AT THE UNIV OF NUEVO LEON
HMYA-02038                 201-0065845          06/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    EDELMIRO MALDONADO LEAL
HMYA-02039                 050-008-008          06/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    MNTY-0773
HMYA-02040                 201-0325046          06/12/63                                                        AO   WH/REG
                    KAPOK RECD 10 DEC 63 LIGAFF-3
HMYA-02041                 050-004-131          06/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    MHBORIC/DISSIDENT ACT-LETTER FROM TERESO GONZALEZ
HMYA-02042                 050-006-042          11/12/63                                                        AO   IP
                    LIBIGHT/LIMUD-VICTOR CANAVATI SAMUR
HMYA-02043                 050-004-029          11/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    LIBIGHT/LIMUD-PROPAGANDA OFFER TO THE IICMR
HMYA-02044                 050-004-124          11/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    LIBIGHT/LIMUD TRAVEL OF DAVID MARTELL MENDEZ TO CZECH
HMYA-02045                 050-009-001          13/12/63                                                        AC   C/WH/3
                    /DR./ JULIAN GASCON MERCADO, GOVERNOR-ELECT OF NAYARIT
HMYA-02046                 200-009-037          13/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    CARLOS AMADOR
HMYA-02047                 201-0733542          13/12/63                                                        AC   WH3/ME
                    KAPOK RECD 23 DEC 63
HMYA-02048                 050-002-004          13/12/63                                                        AO   IP
                    ENRIQUE PINTO GARCIA WAS KAPOK
HMYA-02049                 201-0062864          13/12/63                                                        AO   IP/FI
                    CAMILO CHAVEZ MELGOZA WAS KAPOK
HMYA-02050                 201-0092501          18/12/63                                                        AO   C/WH/3
                    LUIS G. OLLOQUI GUERRA
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                        REDTOP BEDOX ADMIN OFFICIAL POLISH PRESENCE, MEXICO
HMMS-08523           02 201-0231000     09/06/75                                          AO   IP/CRU
                        CKTOP - PHOTO OF S  ET OFFICIAL
HMMS-08778                201-0729530 08  22/09/76                                        AO   LA/COG
                        SLCAPRICE/1
                         01
HMMT-00003                           08   04/02/58                                        IN
HMMT-00253                201-0012846     06/06/58                                        AO   IP
                        WALLACE C. RIKON
HMMT-00407                201-0012846 08  03/09/58                                        AO   IP
                        WALLACE C. RIKON
HMMT-01729                050-500         07/12/60                                        IN
HMMT-01985                019-005-001     19/04/61                       6+50-5-16        IN
HMMT-02116                201-0229407     21/07/61                                        AO   IP
                        SIMON D. CLACKETT-CONTRACT AND PAYROLL DATA
HMMT-02156             06 201-0290116 00  08/08/61                                        AO   DESTROY
                        YOLANDA D. GARCIA
HMMT-02914                201-0117968     17/07/62                                        AO   IP/FI
                        SALARY INCREASE CAROL K. ZINSMEISTER WAS RYBAT
HMMT-02946                201-0314933     31/07/62                                        AO   IP
                        LIBELT-1-TRANSFER OF FIELD SALARY PAYMENTS TO HQRS
HMMT-03035                050-006-037/03  07/09/62                                        AO   IP
                        MONIES RECEIVED FROM RIS OPERATIONS LIJENNET-T
HMMT-03106                050-004-134     28/09/62                                        IN   WH/3
                        LIHUFF/2, LIST OF MEXICAN COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS
HMMT-03126            02  050-008-016     05/10/62                                        AC   IP
                        DIARIO OFICIAL, DIPLOMATIC LIST
HMMT-03128                050-500         05/10/62                                        IN   WH3/ME
                        RYBAT RECD 10 OCT 62
HMMT-03981                201-0765711 08  16/08/63                                        AO   IP
                    06  JOSEPH B. GARCIA
HMMT-04085                201-0314933     10/10/63                                        AO   IP
                        LIBELT/1-62 COVERT TAXES
HMMT-04368                201-0765711 08  13/02/64                                        AO   IP
                    06  JOSEPH B. GARCIA
HMMT-04676                201-0204876     29/06/64                                        IN   IP
                        EMILIO LUIS RIERA
HMMT-04763                RYBAT           28/07/64                                        AO   C/SR
                        RECD 05 AUG 64 08
HMMT-04809                201-0765711     17/08/64                                        AO   IP
                        MR. JOSEPH B. GARCIA 06
HMMT-04949                DEFERRED        08/10/64                                        AO   WH/REG
                        KAPOK RECD 19 OCT 64
HMMT-04982                201-0765711 08  27/11/64                                        AO   IP
                        MR. JOSEPH B. GARCIA 06
HMMT-05143                RYBAT           /01/65                                          AO   C/SR
                        RECD 19 JAN 65
HMMT-05564                200-009-051     01/07/65                                        AO   WH/C/E
                        TRANSMITTAL OF PASSENGER MANIFESTS WAS 200-008-064
HMMT-05897                200-002-061     26/10/65                                        AO   INT/IE
                        PBBAND BRIEFS
HMMT-06092                201-0292287     29/12/65                                        AO   C/WH/1
                        JUAN BARBARA 201-292287
HMMT-06277                201-0351547     10/02/66                                        AO   WH/C/E
                        TYPIC/LICOMET/TRANSMITTAL OF PERSONALITY DATA
HMMT-06310                019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                        AO   WH/C/C
                        AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMT-06311                019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                        AO   WH/C/C
                        AMROD WAS 201-020481
PAGE  116796                                        S-E-C-R-E-T                E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
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                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                         22/06/78
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN             DATE        FSN            SECONDARY/DOC REF    CODE ROUTING
HMMT-06312                019-124-032/03  23/02/66                                        AO   WH/C/C
                        AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMT-06347                050-002-004     03/03/66                                        AO   C/WH/1
                        NAME TRACE REQUEST-FRANK KENNEDY, ETC
HMMT-06470                050-009-006     07/04/66                                        AO   IP
                        TRANSCRIPTION OF PCM/PPS MEETING ON 20 MARCH 1966 MARKING THE CLOSING OF WEEK OF SOLIDARITY
                        WITH VIETNAM
HMMT-06479                201-0792623     12/04/66                                        AO   WH/REG
                        KAPOK RECD 18 APR 66 LIRAVINE-3
HMMT-06591                050-004-110     04/05/66                                        AO   WH/REG
                        NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF DEMOCRATIC STUDENTS 26-29 APRIL 1966
HMMT-06710                050-006-075/04  26/05/66                                        AO   C/WH/1
                        TYPIC/LIRING/LIENVOY/TRANSMITTAL OF TRAFFIC
HMMT-06736                050-005-008     26/05/66                                        IN   IP
                        TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT-REORGANIZATION OF SECURITY OF DFS SECURITY SQUAD
HMMT-06763                050-006-075/04  02/06/66                                        AO   C/WH/1
                        TRANSMITTAL OF TRAFFIC
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN              DATE        FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
  HMMA-47499            200-008-095      26/04/78                                              AC   CH/E/B
                   VISIT OF PRC WOM 08 BASKETBALL TEAM TO MEXICO
  HMMA-47509            201-09351        15/05/78                                              AO   MGSB/M
                   MOC AMENDMENT - KDGLUE-28 /201-0935184 08
  HMMA-48461            050-005-098 01    /  /                                                 AO
  HMMS-02409            201-0054506      31/05/62                                              AO   IP
                   KUCAGE/TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER FROM CHARLES F. GUYMERS TO FIDEL VELAZQUEZ SANCHEZ
  HMMS-02588            201-0320783      25/09/62                                              AO   EE/G
                   MARGITTA GERTRUDE MC CANNEL
  HMMS-02593                              /  /                                                 AO
  HMMS-02846            019-124-032/03   14/03/63                                              AO   WH/C/C
                   AMROD WAS 201-020481                       08
  HMMS-02919            201-0005373 08   17/05/63                                              AO   IP/FI
              02   DIZTAG/ADMIN TIMOTHY W HOLLEBERT-1962 TAXES WAS 201-005373
  HMMS-03034            200-009-042      31/07/63                                              AO   IP
                   PBRUMEN/JMGIN/MACHINE RUN LISTINGS
  HMMS-03109            201-0303452      19/09/63                                              AO   WH3/ME
                   LEO C. REDLICH   08
✓ HMMS-03380            201-0765711      02/03/64                                              AO   IP
              06   JOSEPH B. GARCIA
✓ HMMS-03467            200-124-118/02   29/04/64                                              AO   CA/B4
                   DTDORIC/SUPPORT-ZRFANON
✓ HMMS-03682            050-006-003      24/08/64                                              IN   IP
                   ANTONIO ANTENCIA PUADO
  HMMS-03733            RYBAT             /09/64                                               AO   WH/1
                   RECD 29 SEP 64
✓ HMMS-03734 LHO        201-0289248      25/09/64                                              AO   IP/CRU
                   TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPHS
✓ HMMS-03789            201-0102716      29/10/64                                              AO   IP
                   LIONHEART
✓ HMMS-03790            201-0736813      29/10/64                                              AO   WH/1
                   LIFTER/9
  HMMS-03791            201-0007132 08   29/10/64                                              AO   IP
                   DAVIS ALFARO SIQUEIROS
✓ HMMS-03819            201-0351546      09/11/64                                              AO   IP
                   UNDELIVERED LETTER TO ADOLPH BERNARD HORN
✓ HMMS-03843            201-0139367      25/11/64                                              AO   IP/FI
                   BERNARDO REYES WAS 201-139637
✓ HMMS-03848 LHO        201-0289248      02/12/64                                              AO   IP/CRU
                   WARREN COMMISSION REPORT FORWARDS ONE SET OF THE HEARING TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS OF
                   COMISSION RPT
  HMMS-03898            DEFERRED         07/01/65                                              AO   IP
                   LCHARVESTODENVY CORRESPONDENCE ON CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO
  HMMS-04066            050-006-018      01/04/65                                              AO   IP
                   AQUATIC/DIZTAG INTERFERENCE WITH LIHABIT COVER-AGE OF THE DIZTAG EMBASSY 02
  HMMS-04268         02 050-006-018      12/08/65                                              AO   IP
                   AQUATIC/REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES
  HMMS-04348            019-124-032/03   05/10/65                                              AO   WH/C/C
                   AMROD WAS 201-020481
  HMMS-05639            050-120-019      06/11/67                                              AO.  C/WH/1
                   JOURNALIST /IDENTITY/ OF POSSIBLE INTEREST
  HMMS-05786            201-0289248      23/01/68                                              AO   IP/CRU
                   NO SUBSTANCE TO NORTONS STATEMENTS THAT HE CIA AGENT WHO KNEW OSWALD
  HMMS-05964            050-500          06/05/68                                              AO   IP
                   RYBAT LETTER FOR COS
  HMMS-06064            050-009-012      29/07/68                                              AO   IP
                   REPORTING OF CUBAN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO
  HMMS-06632            050-002-010      25/11/69                                              AO   IP
                   NEW FILE NUMBER
  PAGE  116795                                         S-E-C-R-E-T                  E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
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                                                       S-E-C-R-E-T                      22/06/78
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN              DATE        FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
22 HMMS-06743        02 050-008-003      10/03/70                                              AO   IP
                   REDTOP BEDOX ADMIN OFFICIAL POLISH PRESENCE, MEXICO
22 HMMS-08523           201-0231000      09/06/75                                              AO   IP/CRU
                   OKTOP - PHOTO OF SOVIET OFFICIAL
22 HMMS-08778           201-0729530 08   22/09/76                                              AO   LA/COG
                   SLCAPRICE/1
22 HMMT-00003        01          08      04/02/58                                              IN
22 HMMT-00253           201-0012846      06/06/58                                              AO   IP
                   WALLACE C. RIKON
22 HMMT-00407           201-0012846 08   03/09/58                                              AO   IP
                   WALLACE C. RIKON
22 HMMT-01729           050-500          07/12/60                                              IN
   HMMT-01985           019-005-001 08   19/04/61                     6*50-5-16                IN
   HMMT-02116           201-0229407      21/07/61                                              AO   IP
                   SIMON D. CLACKETT-CONTRACT AND PAYROLL DATA
   HMMT-02156                        08
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~~[illegible]~~

08 SEP 1978

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. *(Filled in by IP/CFS)*

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

FROM: SODERQUIST BARBARA
C/CI
EXT. 1839

KC-660
2D39
TUBE CU6

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE NO.

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/CFS DT-6			SKB
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/CFS DT-6			
4				
5				

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/CFS. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. Indicate source of reference:

☒ *Document reference from IP/MI.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/MI.*

SUBJECT *(must be furnished)*
DISPATCHES REQUESTED BY HSCA RE MEXICO STATION ACTIVITIES

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST *(To be completed by IP/CFS)*
DEFERRED ?	HMMA-22511	19 NOV 63	CONTACT AREA DESK
19-124-32/3	HMMA-22515	21 NOV 63	~~FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO~~
60 23 6-57/ THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD	HMMA-22517	21 NOV 63	Div PAC/COB Ext. 1591
201-735188 RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	HMMA-22518	26 NOV 63	Rm 3D02 Date 15/4/75
201-760850 RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	HMMA-22304	18 OCT 63	
50-4-110	HMMA-22293	15 OCT 63	RECORD COPY DESTROYED
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22303	23 OCT 63	TSD MATERIAL
CA 201-328029	HMMA-22442	07 NOV 63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
50-6-55/4	HMMA-22444	04 NOV 63	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22451	14 NOV 63	TSD MATERIAL
RYBAT ?	HMMA-22469	08 NOV 63	CONTACT AREA DESK
AQUATIC = ?	HMMA-22512	27 NOV 63	TSD MATERIAL
TSD ?	HMMA-22434		RECORD COPY DESTROYED

UPN

FORM 1870 USE PREVIOUS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 062147

(38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

07 SEP 178

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/CFS)	**DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST**
FROM: SODERQUIST BARBARA KC-660 C/CI 2D39 EXT. 1839 TUBE CU6 SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981	DATE OF REQUEST
	BRANCH / ROOM NO. / PHONE NO.

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/CFS DT-6			ABS
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/CFS DT-6			
4				
5				

SUBJECT (must be furnished) DISPATCHES REQUESTED BY HSCA RE MEXICO STATION ACTIVITIES

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/CFS. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. Indicate source of reference:

☒ *Document reference from IP/MI.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/MI.*

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/CFS)
201-302219	HMMW-12020	~~31~~ 18 OCT 63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓ PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-68248	HMMW-12029	31 OCT 63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓ PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-352469	HMMW-12032	05 NOV 63	SEE REVERSE SIDE ✓
ACA 30-6-42/4	HMMW-12035	31 OCT 63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
100-5-1	HMMW-12046	31 OCT 63	Charged to you 30/8/78 DOUBT = ASSINATIONS
201-85613	HMMW-12080	12 NOV 63	RECORD COPY ATTACHED ✓
201-726479	HMMW-12084	07 NOV 63	PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY [illegible] /CRU If Further Search Desired
201-285441	HMMW-12087	12 NOV 63	[illegible]
19-124-27/3	HMMW-12100	12 NOV 63	LACO/CI 1325
201-270072	HMMW-12121	18 NOV 63	3E/19 28/3/7[illegible] [illegible] IP/CRS Bay 3
ACA 201-329667	HMMW-12134	29 NOV 63	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
ACA (74)23 120-150	HMMW-12139	03 APR 64	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
19-124-27/3	HMMW-12142	21 NOV 63	
			[illegible]
ATTENTION REQUESTER: This form and [illegible] returned to [illegible] for index correction.			LACO/CI 1325
			3E/19 Date 28/3/78

VN

14-00000

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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN              DATE       FSN                              CODE ROUT
HMMW-11958               050-009-011/02   04/10/63                                    AC   WH3/ME
                LILINK/CONTRACT WITH LILINK-2
HMMW-11959               050-00[illegible]3/03   03/10/63                              AO   WH3 ME
                OPERATIONAL/PROJECT LIBELER/RENEWAL
HMMW-11960               201-0250458      03/10/63                                    AO   IP
                TRANSMITTAL OF MEMO RE RAFAEL SOMARRIBAGUE.AKA /2[illegible]
HMMW-11961               201-0052514      03/10/63                                    AO   IP
                BENJAMIN, ROBERT SPEARS, SUBJ OF HMMW-117[illegible]
HMMW-11962               050-006-084/01   18/10/63                                    AC   WH3 ME
                LITABBY/PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-11963               028-006-033/03   09/10/63                                    AO   WH3 ME
                TRANSMITTAL OF CONTACT REPORT
HMMW-11964               201-0730509      27/09/63                                    AO   EE
                TRACE REPLY-FRANTISEK HETZL /201-730509/
HMMW-11966               050-500          09/10/63                                    AO   IP
                PAN AMERICAN CONGRESS OF PHARMACY AND BIOCHEMISTR
HMMW-11968               201-0734817      03/10/63                                    AO   EE A
                DALET/OPERATIONAL-JAMES BOLIN SETTLE /20[illegible]
HMMW-11969               201-0728291      16/10/63                                    A    EE
                BEDOX/BEVISION/BECOMPLEX
HMMW-11970               074-006-519/03   10/10/63                                    AO   SP
                OPERATIONAL/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEMESQUITE
HMMW-11971               019-120-011      10/10/63                                    AO   SAS/E
                OPERATIONAL/TYPIC-RECRUITMENT-PITCH LETTERS TO PBRUMEN EF TARGETS
HMMW-11972               019-124-032/03   02/10/63                                    AO   WH/C/
                AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMW-11973               200-006-099      10/10/63                                    AO   CA/B4
                TRANSMITTAL OF PUBLICATIONS
HMMW-11974               201-0350663      09/10/63                                    AO   WH3/M
                LISICLE-1-REQUEST FOR PRQ, PART II
HMMW-11976               201-0264860      04/10/63                                    AO   WH3/M
                AMPALP-1
HMMW-11977               201-0735850      03/10/63                                    AO   IP
                LCIMPROVE/ODEARL INTERVIEW REPORT
HMMW-11978               201-0324376      04/10/63                                    AO   WH3 M
                LIMOTOR-22
HMMW-11979               201-0218343      04/10/63                                    AO   WH3/M
                LIEBONY-1
HMMW-11980               201-0292287      10/10/63                                    AO   IP
                JUAN CARLOS BARBARA
HMMW-11981               201-0356072      10/10/63                                    AO   WH3/M
                LICAMEO-2
HMMW-11983               201-0051203      09/10/63                                    AO   IP
                LCIMPROVE/LINILE
HMMW-11985               201-0733588      10/10/63                                    AO   IP
                TRACE REPLY-FRANTISEK VECL /201-733588/
HMMW-11986               019-124-032/03   08/10/63                                    AO   WH/C
                AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMW-11987               201-0000107      11/10/63                                    AO   IP
                ALEJO PELYPENKO, AKA FATHER ALEKSEI PELYPENKO-COLONEL NIKOLAI ORLOV /ORLOFF-COLONEL
                MIGUEL ORLOV-VICTOR VORONOVICH-OSIP KUZNIR
HMMW-11988               201-0329609      17/10/63                                    AO   WH3/
                PBRUMEN/OA FOR LITAMIL-9
HMMW-11990               050-006-004      10/10/63                                    AO   IP
                INTERCEPTED LETTER/ ZARATE, MANUEL /AQUINO/
HMMW-11991               201-0734811      10/10/63                                    AO   C/WH
                SUBJ OF REF:
HMMW-11992               050-004-020      11/10/63                                    AO   IP
                AMERICANS IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY
PAGE   18370                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                  E2 IMPDET CL BY 01198
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                                                   S-E-C-R-E-T                     16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN              DATE       FSN            SECONDARY/DOC REF     CODE ROUT
HMMW-11993               050-004-117      10/10/63                                        AO   IP
                LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
HMMW-11994               050-006-003      18/10/63                                        AO   WH3
                SUBJECT OF HMMA-21998
HMMW-11995               201-0349952      16/10/63                                        AO   WH3
                AMTRAIL-2
HMMW-11996               201-0728291      17/10/63                                        AO   IP
                BEDOX/BEVISION/OPERATIONAL/HARRY ATTIAS
HMMW-11998               201-0353896      10/10/63                                        AO   IP
                MANUEL PEREZ HERNANDEZ
HMMW-11999               020-126-020/03   10/10/63                                        AO   EE/
                DIGLAD MAILING LIST
HMMW-12000               050-126-005      10/10/63                                        AO   IP
                KUNGLE/FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
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14-00000

Return to LA/MOSB/M

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                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN             DATE       FSN                   SECONDARY/DOC REF      CODE
HMMW-11993                050-004-117     10/10/63                                               AO
                    LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
HMMW-11994                050-006-003     18/10/63                                               AO
                    SUBJECT OF HMMA-21998
HMMW-11995                201-0349952     16/10/63                                               AO
                    AMTRAIL-2
HMMW-11996             02 201-0728291     17/10/63                                               AO
                  ( )BEDOX/REVISION/OPERATIONAL/HARRY ATTIAS
HMMW-11998              02201-0353896     10/10/63                                               AO
                    MANUEL PEREZ HERNANDEZ
HMMW-11999             02 020-126-020/03  10/10/63                                               AO
                  (D)GLAD MAILING LIST
HMMW-12000                050-126-005     10/10/63                                               AO
                    KUWOLF/FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
HMMW-12001                050-004-124     ~~16/10/63~~                                           A
                    FOREIGN ADDRESS LIST OF THE PCV
HMMW-12003                050-126-005     17/10/63                                               AO
                    KUWOLF/FORWARDING HONG KONG PAPER ARTICLE CHINESE REFUSE MEXICANS EXIT
HMMW-12004                201-0737652     17/10/63                                               AO
                    DTDORIC/ZRSIGN/SUBJ OF ATTACHMENT
HMMW-12005                050-500         17/10/63                                               AO
                    PHOTO OF REFERENCE
HMMW-12006                201-0229407     17/10/63                                               AO
                    SIMON D. CLACKETT
HMMW-12007                201-0062864     17/10/63                                               AO
                    TARGET STUDY ON CAMILO CHAVEZ Y MELGOZA
HMMW-12008                050-006-095/01  24/10/63                                               AO
                    LIRICE/PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-12009                201-0322753     31/10/63                                               AO
"  -12010           TRANSMITTAL OF BACKGROUND INFO RE DR. RENE VALLEJO ORTIZ
HMMW-12011                201-0726477     17/10/63                                               AO
                    SUBJ OF REF.
HMMW-12012                201-0277475     24/10/63                                               AO
                    DMLET/OPERATIONAL-TRACE REPLY-NIKOLA ZIC /201-277475/
HMMW-12013             23(060)-120-019    24/10/63                                               AO
                 02( )BEDOX/OPERATIONS-TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTO ALBUMS
HMMW-12014                050-126-036/03  16/10/63                                               AO
                    DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/MEXICAN PROGRAM-MING
HMMW-12015          WAS 200-124-087/02
HMMW-12016             23(060)-120-019    24/10/63                                               AO
                  [ ]BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-TRANSMITTAL OF THE 62 AND 63 WARSAW PHONE DIRECTORY
HMMW-12017                201-(0734817)06 24/10/63                                               AO
                    DMLET/OPERATIONAL-NOTIFICATION OF POA
HMMW-12018                201-0735943     24/10/63                                               AO
                 02( )DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL-TRACES-BOHUMIL, OFFICIAL CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY
HMMW-12019                201-0735104     31/10/63                                               AC
                    LCHARVEST-PERSONAL INFO DATA SHEETS
HMMW-12020                201-0302219     31/10/63                                               AO
                    REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE-GEORGIY IVANOVICH ZUBKOV /201-302219/
HMMW-12021                019-126-015     25/10/63                                               AO
                    PBRUMEN-KUCAGE/REQUEST FOR COPIES OF VISITE CUBA
HMMW-12022                201-0087222     24/10/63                                               AO
                    REDCAP/LCIMPROVE
HMMW-12023                201-0150616   02 31/10/63                                              AO
                    01 OCT 63 MEETING WITH (ST)SNAB-1
HMMW-12024                201-0187772     31/10/63                                               AO
                    61 COVERT INCOME TAX RETURN-HOWARD O. MOSCHIANO
HMMW-12025                201-0737639     12/11/63                                               AO
                    IDENTITY A
PAGE   18369                                        S-E-C-R-E-T                      E2 IMPDET CL BY 01
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                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                      16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN             DATE       FSN                   SECONDARY/DOC REF      CODE R
HMMW-12026                050-006-042/01  31/10/63                                               AO
                    LIBIGHT/PROJECT EXTENSION
HMMW-12027                                31/10/63                                               AO
                    LIENVOY-8
HMMW-12028                201-0280295     05/11/63                                               AO
                    PRIMO MIRAGLIA SANMARTIN
HMMW-12029                201-0068248     31/10/63                                               AO
                    VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ GARVIN
HMMW-12030                201-0352654     31/10/63                                               AO
                    SUBJ OF HMMA-20824
HMMW-12032                201-0352469     05/11/63
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         . 61 COVERT INCOME TAX RETURN-HOWARD O. MOSCHIANO
 HMMW-12025          201-0[illegible]639      12/11/63                                      AO   WH3 M
                IDENTITY A
 PAGE  18369                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981
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                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                   16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE      FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTI
 HMMW-12026             050-006-042/01   31/10/63                                             AO   WH3 M
                LIBIGHT/PROJECT EXTENSION
 HMMW-12027                              31/10/63                                             AO   WH3 M
                LIENVOY-8
 HMMW-12028             201-0280295      05/11/63                                             AO   WH3 M
                PRIMO MIRAGLIA SANMARTIN
 HMMW-12029             201-0068248      31/10/63                                             AO   IP
                VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ GARVIN
 HMMW-12030             201-0352654      31/10/63                                             AO   WH3/M
 Hmmw-12031     SUBJ OF HMMA-20824
 HMMW-12032             201-0352469      05/11/63                                             AO   SP/CI
                REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE-LIFEAT COVERAGE OF AEGENERATE/2
 HMMW-12033             200-124-093/03   31/10/63                                             AO   IP
 Hmmw-12034     DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL WSFLUFFER/NAME TRACE
 HMMW-12035             050-006-042/04   31/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/
                TYPIC/CLARA PORSET DE GUERRERO
 HMMW-12036             201-0355341      31/10/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                LISIREN-4, PRQ 11
 HMMW-12037             201-0028795      05/11/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                LCIMPROVE
 HMMW-12038             201-0732662      05/11/63                                             AO   IP
                VICTOR MANUEL GARCIA RODRUGUEZ
 HMMW-12039             050-126-004      05/11/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                KUWOLF-FORWARDING GUIDANCE MATERIAL
 HMMW-12041             201-0084438      07/11/63                                             AO   IP
                MIGUEL PENALOZA
 HMMW-12042             201-0733542      05/11/63                                             AO   IP
                ANALYSIS ON MARIA DOLORES SOTELO
 HMMW-12043             201-0327270      07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                PBRUMEN-TRANSMITTAL OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION RPT ON AMSUPER-1
 HMMW-12044             050-126-023/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LILISP-M PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12045             050-124-021/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                LITEAR PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12046         02  100-005-001      31/10/63                                             AO   DC/CI
                (Z)ZRTAFFY/UNKNOWN SUBJ IN MEXICO WAS TS-187398-A
 HMMW-12049             201-0733764      07/11/63                                             AO   IP
                (D)DIZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL-TRACE REPLY VLADIMIR PLESINGER /201-733764/
 HMMW-12050     02      050-126-036/03   22/11/63                                             AO   WH/1
                DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/DTGODOWNY MEXICAN PROGRAM
                WAS 200-124-087/03
 HMMW-12051             019-120-032      07/11/63                                             AO   SAS/E
                TRAVEL CONTROLS ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM PBRUMEN
 HMMW-12052             019-124-027/02   31/10/63                                             AO   SAS/
                RYBAT RECD 01 NOV 63
 HMMW-12053             050-126-032/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/M
                LIFIZZ PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12054             050-126-030/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LIERECT PROJECT EXTENSION
 HMMW-12055             050-126-028/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LIMIX PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12056             050-124-024/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LICHEW PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12057             050-124-020/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LULISP-C PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12058             050-126-027/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LIETHIC PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64
 HMMW-12059             050-126-025/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3/
                LILISP-X PROJ RENEWAL FOR FY 64
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                                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                   16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE      FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUT
 HMMW-12060             050-126-022/01   07/11/63                                             AO   WH3
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	LIETHIC PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64		JAO	WH3/ME
HMMW-12059	050-126-025/01	07/11/63	AO	WH3/ME
	LILISP-X PROJ REN L FOR FY 64			

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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTING
HMMW-12060	050-126-022/01	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LILISP-E PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64					
HMMW-12061	050-124-023/01	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LICOAX PROJECT RENEWAL FOR FY 64					
HMMW-12062	201-0121192	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
HMMW-12063	201-0209362	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
HMMW-12064	201-0288248	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
HMMW-12065	201-0119523	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 04 NOV 63					
HMMW-12066	201-0243573	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIMOTOR-14					
HMMW-12067	201-0215763	07/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIMOTOR-10					
HMMW-12068	201-0079171	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
HMMW-12069	201-0287020	06/11/63			AO	IP
	WAS RYBAT LIMOTOR-19 WAS 201-243573					
HMMW-12070	201-0119964	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
HMMW-12071	201-0080156	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
HMMW-12072 02	201-0150616	07/11/63			AO	IP
Hmmw-12073	(S)SNAB-1 MEETING ON 17 OCT 63					
HMMW-12074	201-0262509	06/11/63			AO	IP
	LIEMBRACE-9 WAS RYBAT					
HMMW-12075	201-0184105	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 07 NOV 63					
HMMW-12076	201-0734728	20/09/63			AO	IP
02	(D)ZTAG/BELARMINO CASTELLANOS RUISECO					
HMMW-12077	201-0239820	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 14 NOV 63					
HMMW-12078	201-0293411	04/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	RYBAT RECD 08 NOV 63					
HMMW-12079	201-0243573	06/11/63			AO	IP
	LIMOTOR-14					
HMMW-12080	201-0085613	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIEMPTY-LOUISE J. MACRINO /PS/					
HMMW-12081	201-0017895	12/11/63			AC	WH3/ME
	KUWOLF/ OPERATIONAL STATUS OF PROJECTS ON PRINCIPAL AGENTS					
HMMW-12082	050-006-031/01	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	PROJ LIONHEART					
HMMW-12083 02	201-0150616	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	(S)SNAB-1					
HMMW-12084	201-0726479	07/11/63			AO	EE/C
	ZDENEK VOREL					
HMMW-12085	050-008-008	21/11/63			AO	IP
	FILE CHECK RESULTS					
HMMW-12086 02	200-124-090/07	08/11/63			AO	CA/B3
	(J)LACEPOD/VISIT OF MEXICAN EDUCATORS TO U.S.					
HMMW-12087	201-0285441	12/11/63			AO	EE/C
02	(D)ZTAG/OPERATIONAL-JIRI SVESTKA /201-385441/					
HMMW-12088	050-008-038/02	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	TERMINATION OF LIFTER-4 AND LIFTER-7 RAISE FOR LIFTER-1					
HMMW-12089	201-0735945	12/11/63			AO	WH3/ME
	LIEMBRACE-11					

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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2) FCN DATE FSN SECONDARY/DOC REF CODE ROUTING

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                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                            16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE        FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12090                201-0736860      12/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LICUFF-1
HMMW-12091                019-126-015      12/11/63                                                  AO   SAS/ES
                    PBRUMEN/AMBASE/USE OF CRYPTONYMS
HMMW-12092                201-0735061      12/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    AMSAIL-4
HMMW-12093                201-0136898      12/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                    ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMW-12094                201-0278577      14/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE/LITARDY
HMMW-12097                201-01105        07/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    RYBAT RECD 15 NOV 63
HMMW-12098                201-0725181      14/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                    LETTER TO AMTAX-1 TO BE MAILED FROM MEXICO CITY
HMMW-12099                201-0042557      04/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    SUBJ OF REFERENCE
HMMW-12100                019-124-027/03,  12/11/63                                                  AO   SAS/SO
                    RYBAT RECD 14 NOV 63
HMMW-12101                201-0298685      14/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE/LISTEED
HMMW-12102                201-0739020      14/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    PBRUMEN/LICULT-1
HMMW-12103                201-0051203      14/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE/AEPETPSL/LINILE
HMMW-12104                201-0263152      21/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LITENCH-1
HMMW-12105                201-0351546      21/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LICADRE-1
HMMW-12106                201-0347429      19/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LISIREN-3
HMMW-12107                050-006-075/01   19/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LIENVOY PROJECT EXPIRATION
HMMW-12108                201-0183946      14/11/63                                                  AO   DESTROY
                    JIM WILKE WORKING WITH LAZARO GARDENAS IN MEXICO ON HIS PHD, THESIS
HMMW-12110                201-0108887      21/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                    FRANCISCO AMADO GRANADOS /XPACOX/
HMMW-12111                201-0076231      21/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LIMULUS /FORMERLY LIBETHENITE-1/
HMMW-12112                201-0288949      14/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    RYBAT RECD 18 NOV 63
HMMW-12113                201-0397138      19/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE/LICANNY-1
HMMW-12114                201-0347429      19/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LISIREN-3
HMMW-12115                201-0117742      21/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LIFEUD-29
HMMW-12116                201-0064252      26/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                    ALEJO MENDEZ GARCIA
HMMW-12117                201-0355258      21/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE
HMMW-12118                201-0740227      13/12/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LCIMPROVE/ASSIGNMENT OF CRYPTONYM
HMMW-12119                201-0737472      19/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    PBRUMEN/LICRICK-1
HMMW-12121                201-0270072      18/11/63                                                  AO   EE/C
                    KAPOK RECD 18 NOV 63
HMMW-12123                201-0735598      21/11/63                                                  AO   IP
                    TRACE REPLY-KAREL SCHOLZ

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12095 & 12096 not available

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                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                            16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE        FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12124                050-002-006      03/12/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    SMOTH ACTS. IN ME.I.
HMMW-12125                050-006-099/01   03/12/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LILINK PROJECT
HMMW-12126                050-004-122      22/11/63                                                  IN   IP
                    MEXICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR TRAINING
HMMW-12127                201-0736202      22/11/63                                                  AO   WH3/ME
                    LICWAVE-1
[illegible]
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                    TRACE REPLY-[illegible]
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                                                 S-E-C-R-E-T                         16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN             DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12124                  050-002-006     03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    SMOTH ACTS. IN MEXI.
HMMW-12125                  050-006-099/01  03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    LILINK PROJECT
HMMW-12126                  050-004-122     22/11/63                                               IN   IP
                    MEXICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR TRAINING
HMMW-12127                  201-0736282     22/11/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    LICRAVE-1
HMMW-12128                  201-0077790     21/11/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    LCHARVEST/AMCHEETAH 201-77790
HMMW-12129                  201-0269885     21/11/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
HMMW-12130                  201-0257216     22/11/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    KUWOLF/AMPACA-1
HMMW-12131                  050-006-055/01  29/11/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
HMMW-12132          LIMOTOR PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-12134                  201-0329667     29/11/63                                               IN   IP
                    VLADIMIR DAFCIK ET AL
HMMW-12135                  201-0728291     21/11/63                                               AO   IP
                    TRACE RESPONSE
HMMW-12136                  200-120-033/03  03/12/63                                               AO   EE/EXT
                    OPERATIONAL/NYXIS/OKROW-ZODIAC PROCESSING OF ODACID TRAVEL INFO
HMMW-12137                  200-124-073/03  21/11/63                                               AO   CA/B5
                    DTDORIC/HBEPITOME/WSACROBAT/ZRAFRAID LITERACY SEMINAR
HMMW-12138                  021-120-012     03/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    PBRUMEN-POSS OPERATIONAL LEAD
HMMW-12139                  074-120-150     03/04/64                                               IN   SR/CI
                    KGB RECRUITMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW
HMMW-12140                  201-0269885     29/11/63                                               AO   C/WH/5
                  # CONTACT WITH ALAGORA-2              HMMW-12141?        R
HMMW-12142                  019-124-027/03  21/11/63                                               AO   SAS/SO
                    RYBAT RECD 29 NOV 63
HMMW-12143                  201-0739082     03/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/
HMMW-12144                  019-120-011     27/11/63                                               AC   SAS/CI
                    MAILING OF RECRUITMENT PITCH LETTERS TO CUBAN CP TARGETS
HMMW-12145                  050-500         03/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    INTERCEPTED LETTERS
HMMW-12146                  201-0138898     03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN
HMMW-12147                  201-0285165     03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    PBRUMEN/AMSAIL-1
HMMW-12148                  201-0737472     03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    PBRUMEN/LICRICK-1
HMMW-12149                  201-0729524     06/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    LCIMPROVE/LAROB/VALENTIN V. BAKULIN
HMMW-12150                  201-0732662     06/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    VICTOR MANUEL GARCIA RODRIGUEZ
HMMW-12151                  050-126-004     03/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    KUWOLF/LCHARVEST PROPAGANDA MATERIAL ON CHICOM TRADE
HMMW-12152                  201-0059151     06/12/63                                               AO   IP
                    ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF ARMS FOR LAZARO CARDENAS
HMMW-12153                  201-0736813     06/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    LICHARD-1
HMMW-12154                  050-124-026/01  10/12/63                                               AO   WH3/ME
                    LITAINT PROJECT
HMMW-12155                  019-124-027/02  27/11/63                                               AO   SAS/SO
                    RYBAT RECD 27 NOV 63
HMMW-12156                  201-0000229     20/12/63                                               AC   SR/CI/
                    OPERATIONAL/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEPETREL VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO
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                                                 S-E-C-R-E-T                         16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN             DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12159                  201-0234286     06/12/63                                               AO   WH3/
                    ACCOUNT OF [illegible] MEETING WITH [illegible]
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PAGE  18365    OPERATIONAL/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/[illegible] VICENTE [illegible]
                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                    E2 IMPDET CL BY 011921

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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN            DATE        FSN         SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
HMMW-12159              201-0234286    06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONAL MEETING WITH LIESCENT IN NYC 11 OCT 63
HMMW-12160              019-006-086/03 13/12/63                                         AO   SAS/ES
                  DEGRIP SOURCES
HMMW-12161              201-0727876    03/01/64                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  PBRUMEN/LICARD-1
HMMW-12162              050-006-099/01 06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LILINK PROJECT APPROVAL
HMMW-12163              050-006-093/01 06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LIHALO PROJECT
HMMW-12164              050-006-089/01 06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LITALUS PROJECT
HMMW-12165              201-0226902    06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LILINK-2
HMMW-12166              201-0278577    06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LCIMPROVE/LITARDY-1 /OVERLAND/
HMMW-12167              050-300-004    06/12/63                                         AC   IP
                  COVERAGE OF BOSCH SUITE AT MARIA ISABEL HOTEL, MEXICO CITY WAS RYBAT
                  WAS 035-124-021/03
HMMW-12168              050-124-025/01 06/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  KUWOLF/LINOODLE PROJECT RENEWAL
HMMW-12169              050-006-004    17/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES AT HDQTRS.
HMMW-12170              050-006-099/01 13/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING WITH LILINK-7
HMMW-12171              201-0278577    27/12/63                                         IN   WH3/ME
                  LCIMPROVE/LITARDY-1
HMMW-12172              201-0104794    13/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  CARLOS ENRIQUE POLANCO
HMMW-12173              201-0329618    10/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/LITAMIL-13
HMMW-12174              201-0238870    13/12/63                                         AC   IP
                  MEXICAN GOVT OFFICIALSX ASSOC. WITH ILLICIT TRAFFICKING
HMMW-12175              201-0739020    10/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  PBRUMEN/LICULT-1
HMMW-12176              050-008-000    10/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  REDSKIN/BOLSHOI BALLET
HMMW-12177              201-0233955    13/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  ANTONIO MORIN RODRIGUEZ
HMMW-12178              050-004-122    27/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMMW-12180              050-006-111/01 31/12/63                                         AO   WH3/ME
                  LCIMPROVE/DOUBLE AGENT PROJECT
HMMW-12181              201-0725845    27/12/63                                         AO   WH7TE
                  ECHAWK-1
HMMW-12182              050-004-122    20/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  MEXICANS ATTENDING THE MOSCOW UNIV.
HMMW-12183              020-126-021/03 13/12/63                                         AO   EE/C
                  MAILING OF LEAFLETS
HMMW-12184              200-124-072/03 17/12/63                                         AO   CA/B5
                  DTDORIC HBEPITOME/REPORT ON ZRAFRAID CONGRESS
HMMW-12185              060-120-019    13/12/63                                         AO   SB/P
                  W.RSAW TELEPHONE DIRECTORY /VOLS I II AND III/. WAS 063-120-019
HMMW-12186              201-0084438    17/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  MIGUEL PENALOZA
HMMW-12187              050-004-122    13/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE
HMMW-12188              201-0143076    17/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  REDCAP/VLADIMIR I. ANDREYEV
PAGE   18364                              S-E-C-R-E-T                    E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)    FCN            DATE        FSN         SECONDARY/DOC REF        CODE ROUTING
[illegible]             201-0242728    17/12/63                                         AO   IP
                  REDCAP/GEORGIY A. SHCHUCHKIN
[illegible]             [illegible]    [illegible]                                      IN   IP
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                                                         S-E-C-R-E-T                                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)       FCN            DATE         FSN                     SECONDARY/DOC REF           CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22285                 050-006-101/03  11/10/63                                                     IN   C/WH/1
                     ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS, 17 SEP-11 OCT 63 WAS 201-275992
HMMA-22286                 200-009-042     11/10/63                                                     AO   SAS/ES
                     CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22287                 050-004-117     11/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT
HMMA-22288                 050-006-105/03  11/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     CONTACT REPORTS--MEETINGS WITH LITAMIL-9 01
HMMA-22289                 050-006-099/02  18/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     LILINK/CONTRACT WITH LILINK-2
HMMA-22290                 201-0736781     15/10/63                                                     AC   FE/CH
                     LCHARVEST/OPERATIONAL--SUBJ OF REF A%S REPORT OF CONTACT WITH LIANG SSU-CH%ENG
HMMA-22291                 050-126-023/03  14/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     KUWOLF-LILISP M
HMMA-22292                 050-124-021/03  14/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     LITEAR STATUS REPORT FOR AUG-SEP 63
HMMA-22293                 050-004-110     15/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     BOOK ON PENETRATION OF MEXICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM BY COMMIES
HMMA-22294                 201-0178122      /  /                                                        AO
HMMA-22295              02 201-0294839     18/10/63                                                     AO   EE/C
                     DI TAG/OPERATIONAL--PCS DEPARTURE OF ZBYNEK SAMONIL /201-294839/
HMMA-22296                 201-0152528      /  /                                                        AO
HMMA-22297                 076-005-027     18/10/63                                                     AO   IP
                     DMLET/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF YUGO NATIONALS C-050-008-016
HMMA-22298                 201-0277475     18/10/63                                                     AO   EE/YA/
                     DMLET/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORT OF NIKOLA ZIC
HMMA-22299                 050-009-012     15/10/63                                                     AO   IP
                     CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22300                 201-0218126     15/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     PLANS OF JUANA CASTRO RUZ TO LEAVE CUBA BECAUSE OF THREATS AGAINST HER LIFE BY FIDEL CASTRO
HMMA-22301                 200-009-037     15/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     FOREIGN TECHNICIANS WORKING IN CUBA
HMMA-22302                 050-124-028/04   /  /                                                        AO
HMMA-22303                 AQUATIC         23/10/63                                                     AO   TSD
                     SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22304                 201-0760850     18/10/63                                                     AO   IP
                     FORWARDING OF LETTERS REGARDING TRAVEL OF NICARAGUAN COMMUNISTS TO THE BLOC AREA
                     WAS 053-004-121
HMMA-22305              23 FID             23/10/63                                                     AO   FI/D
                     SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22306              23 074-006-319     17/10/63                                                     AO   SR/CI/
                     RYBAT RECD 22 OCT 63
HMMA-22307                 050-006-018     18/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     OPERATIONAL MONTHLY REPORT-1-30 SEP 63
HMMA-22308              23 053-004-121     18/10/63                                                     AC   C/WH/3
                     LICENTO-1/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TRAVEL OF NICARAGUANS AND COSTA RICANS TO THE BLOC AREA
HMMA-22309                 019-124-032/03  18/10/63                                                     AO   WH/C/C
                     AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22310                 050-126-026/03  17/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     PRI YOUTH GROUP CHARGE
HMMA-22311                 050-124-025/02  17/10/63                                                     AO   IP
                     KUWOLF/LIGAFF
HMMA-22312                 201-0069101     18/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     REQUEST FOR PHOTOS OF PANAMANIAN COMMIE IN MEXICO CITY
HMMA-22313                 050-126-026/03  17/10/63                                                     AO   C/WH/3
                     LIEVICT STATUS REPORT FOR MAY AND JUN 63
HMMA-22314                 201-0150616     17/10/63                                                     AC   C/WH/3
                     (ST)SNAB-1 VISIT TO MEXI CITY 5-13 OCT 63
                      02
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                                                         S-E-C-R-E-T                                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)       FCN            DATE         FSN                     SECONDARY/DOC REF           CODE ROUTIN
HMMA-22315                 AQUATIC         23/10/63                                                     AO   TSD
                     SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22316                 RYBAT        01 18/10/63                                                     AO   C/WE
                     RECD 22 OCT 63 KEYWAY/SMOTH WH/REG
HMMA-22317                 201-0350663     18/10/63                                                     AO   WH/REG
                     KAPOK RECD 28 OCT 63 LISIBLE-1
                                                                                                        AO   FE/C
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Return to LA/MGS

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                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN            DATE       FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22315               AQUATIC        23/10/63                                              AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22316               RYBAT        01 18/10/63                                             AO   C/WE
                  RECD 22 OCT 63 KEYWAY/SMOTH WH/REG
HMMA-22317               201-0350663    18/10/63                                              AO   WH/REG
                  KAPOK RECD 28 OCT 63 LISICLE-1
HMMA-22318               200-008-005    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/C
               02 DIZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--TRAVEL OF CZECH NATLS
HMMA-22319               201-0204656    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/C
               02 DIZTAG/ZPDOAC/OPERATIONAL--RETURN OF EMIL HRADECKY /201-204656/
HMMA-22320               201-0294839    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/C
                  PCS DEPARTURE OF ZBYNEK SAMONIL /201-294839/
HMMA-22321               201-0283512    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/C
               02 DIZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--RETURNAOF LUDVIK HUBENY /201-283512/
HMMA-22322               201-0730509    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/C
               02 DIZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--FRANTISEK HETZL /201-730509/
HMMA-22323               050-008-003    22/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
               02 BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--FNU SZAPINSKI AKA CZAPINSKI
HMMA-22324               201-0059400    22/10/63                                              AO   EE/P
               02 BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--ADAM SCHAFF /201-59400/
HMMA-22325               024-008-015    22/10/63                                              IN   C/WH/3
                  LCHARVEST/OPERATIONAL-THE SMUGGLING OF CHINESE COMMIE MONEY INTO ECUADOR
HMMA-22326               201-0735346 02 22/10/63                                              AO   FE/CH
                  LCHARVEST/THE STGOAL-1 OPERATION
HMMA-22327               201-0285165.   18/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-ATTEMPTED RECRUITMENT OF DR. ARSENIO MINSAL MARROQUIN
HMMA-22328               201-0737472    18/10/63                                              IN   IP
                  PBRUMEN-DEBRIEFING OF JUAN ANTINIO CANCELA GOMEZ
                  C-201-0327270
HMMA-22329               050-126-026/03 02 21/10/63                                           AO   C/WH/3
                  LIQUIFIER LETTER TO KM ASKING
HMMA-22330               050-126-026/03 21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  LIEVICT-STATUS RPT FOR JUL AND AUG 63
HMMA-22331               201-0264860    21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  AMPALP-1
HMMA-22332               200-009-037    21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  JMGIN-CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACT-CENTRAL AMERICA
HMMA-22333               050-124-025/03 21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  LINOODLE PROGRESS RPT, SEP 63
HMMA-22334               050-126-028/03 21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  PROGRESS RPT FOR PROJ LIMIX FOR SEP 63
HMMA-22335               035-004-121    21/10/63                                              IN   C/WH/3
                  POSSIBLE TRAVEL OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS ABROAD
HMMA-22336               201-0042557    21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA
HMMA-22337               DEFERRED       21/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF MEXICAN COMMUNISTS
HMMA-22338               FID            29/10/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22339               FID            29/10/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22340               DEFERRED       22/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  OVERTAXING OF STATION TRAVEL CONTROL FACILITIES
HMMA-22341               201-0736282    22/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  OPERATIONAL/LCIMPROVE/ASSESSMENT OF AUGUSTIN GUTIERREZ FERNANDEZ
HMMA-22342               019-124-032/03 25/10/63                                              AO   WH/C/C
                  AMMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22343               019-124-032/03 23/10/63                                              AO   WH/C/C
                  AMROD WAS 201-020481
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                                                    S-E-C-R-E-T                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)     FCN            DATE       FSN             SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22344               FID            29/10/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22345               201-0136898    22/10/63                                              AO   IP
                  ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMA-22346               050-124-028/04 22/10/63                                              AO   C/WH/3
                  LIHUFF/XESPEJO MAGAZINEX
HMMA-22347               201-0737472    22/10/63                                              IN   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-JUAN ANTONIO CANDELA GOMEZ
                                                                                              IN   C/WH/3
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                                                              S-E-C-R-E-T                      16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN            DATE        FSN                  SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22344                FID            29/10/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22345                201-0136898    22/10/63                                                    AO   IP
                  ARTEMUS J. STEIZER
HMMA-22346                050-124-028/04 22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  LIHUFF/%ESPEJO MAGAZINE%
HMMA-22347                201-0737472    22/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-JUAN ANTONIO CANDELA GOMEZ
HMMA-22348                201-0732862    22/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  PBRUMEN-MANUEL ARIAS BANA
HMMA-22349                050-124-025/03 22/10/63                                                    AO   WH3/ME
                  REPORT ON CUBA BY VISITING FRENCH PRIEST
HMMA-22350                FID            29/10/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22351                FID            29/10/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22352                DEFERRED       22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  LA VOZ DE MEXICO, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE MEXICAN COMMIE PARTY
HMMA-22353                DEFERRED       22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  SOURCE OF HMM-7666
HMMA-22354                201-0293411    22/10/63                                                    AO   WH3/ME
                  LIVALVE-1 PLANNED PITCHES TO COMMUNISTS IN MEX CITY
HMMA-22355                201-0240270  02 22/10/63                                                   AO   C/WH/3
                  PROPOSED TRANSFER OF (C)SCO-26 TO MEXICO
HMMA-22356                201-0282533    22/10/63                                                    AC   C/WH/3
                  LIPIETY PROJ-TERMINATION OF LIEPIETY-1
HMMA-22357                201-0282533    22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  LIPIETY PROJECT-AGENT SERVICE RECORD ON LIPIETY-1
HMMA-22358                201-0729530    22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22359                050-009-012    22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC
HMMA-22360                056-300-001    22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  ABEL BERNAL AYARZA
HMMA-22361                201-0290894    22/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  LITAMIL-3
HMMA-22362                201-0252871    22/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  ALFONSO LOPEZ MICHELSEN
HMMA-22363                FID            30/10/63                                                    AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22364                201-0185345    23/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  JOSE RAMON GRULLON MARTINEZ
HMMA-22365                050-006-091/03 25/10/63                                                    AO   IP/FI
                  LITEMPO/PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING MEXICAN TRAN-SIT VISAS FOR CUBANS
                  WAS KAPOK
HMMA-22366                050-006-091/03 24/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  LITEMPO/OPERATINAL REPORT 01 AUG-30 SEP 63
HMMA-22367            23 (076)-005-027   25/10/63                                                    IN   IP
                  DMLET/OPERATIONS-PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS
                  C-050-008-016
HMMA-22368                200-009-042    24/10/63                                                    AO   SAS/ES
                  CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22369                [AQUATIC]      29/10/63                                                    AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22370                050-006-055/01 23/09/63 ✓                                                  AO   C/WH/3
                  FURTHER LIFE OF THE LIMOTOR PROJECT
HMMA-22371                201-0256202    24/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  SONS OF VINCENT HALLINAN, AMERICAN COMMUNIST

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                                                              S-E-C-R-E-T                      16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN            DATE        FSN                  SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22372                [AQUATIC]      30/10/63                                                    AO   TSD
                  SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22373        02      050-008-003    25/10/63                                                    IN   EE/P
                  [BE]DOX/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF POLISH NATLS
HMMA-22374            23 (037)-500       24/10/63                                                    AO   C/WH/3
                  JORGE ANIBAL REGAZZOLI
HMMA-22375                050-004-134    24/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
                  TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
                          201-0329618    25/10/63                                                    IN   C/WH/3
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN              DATE        FSN               SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22372                  AQUATIC          30/10/63                                             AO   TSD
                      SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22373                  050-008-003      25/10/63                                             IN   [illegible]
              02 [BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORTS OF POLISH NATLS
HMMA-22374               23(037)-500         24/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      JORGE ANIBAL REGAZZOLI
HMMA-22375                  050-004-134      24/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      TRANSMITTAL OF INTERCEPTED LETTER
HMMA-22376                  201-0329618      25/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      TRANSMITTAL OF PRQ PART I-CELESTIN PAUL CHEREL
HMMA-22377                  201-0329618      25/10/63                                             AO   WH/REG
                      KAPOK RECD 30 OCT 63 LITAMIL-13
HMMA-22378                  050-009-012      25/10/63                                             AO   IP
                      CUBAN EMB. TRAFFIC WAS 019-120-032
HMMA-22379                  201-0729530      25/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22380                  200-009-042      25/10/63                                             AO   SAS/ES
                      TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL REPORTS
HMMA-22381                  DEFERRED         25/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      SOVIET AND CHINESE FOODSTUFFS IN CUBA
HMMA-22382                  201-0052514      25/10/63                                             IN   IP
                      ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN
HMMA-22383                  050-126-022704   25/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22384                  201-0029486      25/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      ZRNICK/COMMIESX CORRESPONDENCE
HMMA-22385                  050-006-091/03   25/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      OPERATIONAL/LITEMPO-2 REQUEST FOR DATA ON TERRORISTS TRANSITING MEXICO
HMMA-22386                  201-0217272      25/10/63                                             IN   WH3/ME
                      TRANSMITTAL PRQ PART 1-TULIO PRIETO RUIZ C-201-0738618
HMMA-22387                  050-006-074/01   25/10/63                                             AO   WH/REG
                      KAPOK RECD 30 OCT 63 LIEMPTY
HMMA-22388                  201-0031548      25/10/63                                             AO   EE/EXT
                      RYBAT RECD 05 NOV 63 OKROW/OKASSAY
HMMA-22389                  201-0349577      25/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/5
                      MANUEL DE NEGRI-YBERRI
HMMA-22390                  RYBAT            25/10/63                                             AO   WH/REG
                      RECD 29 OCT 63 ZRTAFFY
HMMA-22391                  201-0069296      31/10/63                                             AC   EE/C
              02 [DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL JAROSLAV KUCHVALEK
HMMA-22392                  200-120-033/03   31/10/63                                             AO   EE/EXT
                      ZODIAC PROCESSING OF TRAVEL INFO
HMMA-22393                  050-126-036/03   28/10/63                                             AO   WH/1
                      DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL QKOPERA/DTGODOWN/MEXICAN PROGRAM
                      WAS 200-124-087/03
HMMA-22394                  FID              05/11/63                                             AO   FI/D
                      SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22395                  050-124-023/03   28/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      LICOAX PROGRESS REPORT, SEP 63
HMMA-22396                  AQUATIC          05/11/63                                             AO   TSD
                      SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22397                  050-500          29/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      ROBERT KAFFKE
HMMA-22398                  050-009-005      29/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT /MLN/ REQUEST FOR HQS INDEX CARDS
HMMA-22399                  050-126-023/03   30/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      LILISP M STATUS REPORT FOR SEP 63
HMMA-22400                  076-005-027      31/10/63                                             AO   IF
                      DMLET/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS
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                                                              S-E-C-R-E-T                         16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)        FCN              DATE        FSN               SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22401                  201-0739082      31/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      ARRIVAL OF ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/
HMMA-22402                  200-008-005      31/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
              02 [DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORT OF CZECH NATIONAL
HMMA-22403                  050-006-058/03   30/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      LIMOTOR PROGRESS REPORT JAN-JUL 63
HMMA-22404                  050-124-021/03   30/10/63                                             IN   C/WH/3
                      LITEAR-POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT PITCH TO LITEAR-1 BY POLISH IS
HMMA-22405                  050-006-004      31/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      OPERATIONAL--CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES
HMMA-22406                  201-0155748      30/10/63                                             AO   C/WH/3
                      ALBERTO GROUX
                                             05/11/63                                             AO   TSD
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                [illegible] STATUS REPORT FOR SEP 63
HMMA-22400                076-005-027       31/10/63                                                        AO    IP
                DMLET/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--PASSPORTS OF YUGOSLAV NATIONALS
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN               DATE          FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTING
HMMA-22401                201-0739082       31/10/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                ARRIVAL OF ALEXANDER MAKOWSKI /201-739082/
HMMA-22402                200-008-005       31/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
           02   DIZTAG/OPERATIONAL-PASSPORT OF CZECH NATIONAL
HMMA-22403                050-006-055/03    30/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                LIMOTOR PROGRESS REPORT JAN-JUL 63
HMMA-22404                050-124-021/03    30/10/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                LITEAR-POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT PITCH TO LITEAR-1 BY POLISH IS
HMMA-22405                050-006-004       31/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL--CONSOLIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF 201 FILES
HMMA-22406                201-0155748       30/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                ALBERTO GROUX
HMMA-22407                AQUATIC           05/11/63                                                 AO   TSD
                SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22408                019-124-032/03    31/10/63                                                 AO   WH/C/C
                AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22409                019-124-032/03    31/10/63                                                 AO   WH/C/C
                AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22410                019-124-032/03    31/10/63                                                 AO   WH/C/C
                AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22411                200-006-033/03    31/10/63                                                 AO   EE/EXT
                NYXIS REPORT-JUL-OCT 63
HMMA-22412                AQUATIC           06/11/63                                                 AO   TSD
                SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22413                201-0329404       31/10/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                JOAQUIN BLANCO PEREZ AND AMSTY-3
HMMA-22414                201-0327270       31/10/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO
HMMA-22415                050-126-022/04    31/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                ARTICLE FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22416                201-0285165       31/10/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                PBRUMEN-CARLOS ALBERTO FERNANDEZ TRUJILLO
HMMA-22417                201-0735285       31/10/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                FRANCISCO REFUGIO PEREZ MORON
HMMA-22418                FID               06/11/63                                                 AO   FI/D
                SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22419                050-009-012       01/11/63                                                 AO   SAS/ES
                CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC
HMMA-22420                201-0729530       01/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22421                201-0269885 01    01/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL/ALAGORA-2/PRQ PART 11
HMMA-22422                050-005-021       07/11/63                                                 IN   IP
                ZDENKO DZERMANOVIC
HMMA-22423                050-006-035/03    07/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                MONTHLY REPORT ON CZECH EMBASSY AND TRADE MISSION IN MEX
HMMA-22424                FID               06/11/63                                                 AO   FI/D
                SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22425                AQUATIC           19/11/63                                                 AO   TSD
                SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22426                036-004-001       04/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                MAIL INTERCEPTS ON HAITIAN COMMIES
HMMA-22427                200-008-005       04/11/63                                                 IN   SR/O/W
                REDCAP/LCIMPROVE DMITRIY TRYZNA
HMMA-22428                050-004-124       04/11/63                                                 AO   C/WH/3
                PRENSA LATINA AS A LETTER DROP FOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM HAVANA
HMMA-22429                201-0736813       04/11/63                                                 IN   C/WH/3
                LICHARD-1/RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE
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DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN               DATE          FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTIN
                                                                                                     AO   C/WH/3
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[illegible]
HMMA-22428                050-004-124    04/11/63                                                          AO   C/WH/3
                PRENSA LATINA AS A LETTER DROP FOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM HAVANA
HMMA-22429                201-073681     04/11/63                                                          IN   C/WH/3
                LICHARD-1/RECRUIT.  NT AND DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE
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                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                  16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN            DATE       FSN                SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROUTIN
HMMA-22430                200-009-042    07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                TRAVELLERS FROM CUBA
HMMA-22431                200-008-005    07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                TRANSMITTAL OF COPIES OF SOVIET PASSPORTS
HMMA-22432                065-002-011/05 04/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                JOSE JIMENEZ ALCORTA
HMMA-22433                AQUATIC        14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
AMMA-22434      SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22435                201-0736336    05/11/63                                                AO   IP
                DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL-WSFLUFFE/NAME TRACE
HMMA-22436                050-006-113/01 09/12/63                                                AO   WH3/ME
                FORWARDING OF PROJECT OUTLINE WAS KAPOK
HMMA-22437                050-006-091/03 07/11/63                                                AO   IP/FI
                RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LITEMPO WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22438                DEFERRED       05/11/63                                                AO   C/WA/3
                OPERATIONAL/LIHACK EXPLANATION OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
HMMA-22439                201-0352654    05/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                WILLIAM SANFORD MILLER
HMMA-22440                201-0324376    05/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL/LIMOTOR/FJDUST/LCFLUTTER OF LIMOTOR-22
HMMA-22441                050-006-072/03 07/11/63                                                IN   WH3/ME
                RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LIEMBRACE
HMMA-22442                201-0328029    07/11/63                                                AC   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL/LCIMPROVE/LIPLUG 2 AND 1
HMMA-22443                FID            13/11/63                                                AO   FI/D
                SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22444                050-006-055/04 04/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL/LIMOTOR-TRANSMITTAL OF ANTIBETANCOURT LEAFLET
HMMA-22445                201-0132327    05/11/63                                                AC   C/WH/3
                REQUEST FOR ASSESSMENTS OF LITALUSES 1 AND 2
HMMA-22446                201-0062864    05/11/63                                                IN   C/WH/3
                TARGET ANALYSIS ON CAMILO CHAVEZ MELGOZA
HMMA-22447                200-009-042    07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                CUBAN TRAVEL/CUBANA PASSENGER MANIFESTS
HMMA-22448                050-126-022/04 06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22449                201-0118406    07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                LIENVOY-8 C-78604 OA 17 OCT 59
HMMA-22450                010-120-023/01 06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                MR. T. /TED/ H. MCLENDON
HMMA-22451                AQUATIC        14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
                SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22452                050-006-075/04 07/11/63                                                AO   WH3/ME
                RYBAT RECD 12 NOV 63 LIENVOY
HMMA-22453                019-124-032/05 07/11/63                                                AO   WH/C/C
                AMROD WAS 201-020601
HMMA-22454                AQUATIC        14/11/63                                                AO   TSD
                SENT TO TSD
HMMA-22455                050-006-075/04 06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                OPERATIONAL/TRANSMITTAL OF LIENVOY TRANSCRIPT
HMMA-22456                050-126-022/03 06/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                LILISP E.-PROGRESS REPORT FOR SEP-OCT 63
HMMA-22457                050-006-105/03 06/11/63                                                AO   WH/1
                CUBAN IDENTIFICATION OF KUBARK AGENT WAS 201-329609
HMMA-22458                050-006-004    07/11/63                                                AO   C/WH/3
                H. W. TOTTEN
HMMA-22459                050-008-016    08/11/63                                                IN   EE/YA
                DMLET/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--ROUND-UP REPORT ON TITO VISIT TO MEXICO
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HMMA-22459 050-008-016 08/11/63 IN EE/YA

DMLET/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--ROUND-UP REPORT ON TITO VISIT TO MEXICO

DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)	FCN	DATE	FSN	SECONDARY/DOC REF	CODE	ROUTIN
HMMA-22460	02 201-0285162	08/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	BEDOX/OPERTNL-EUGENIUSZ SPYRA					
HMMA-22461	FID	15/11/63			AO	FI/D
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22462	050-009-012	06/11/63			AO	IP
	TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT					
HMMA-22463	201-0785205	08/11/63			AO	IP
	JMGIN/ENRIQUE PERALTA, DOMINICAN WAS 200-009-042					
HMMA-22464	200-009-042	08/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	PBRUMEN-TRAVEL OF DOMINICANS TO CUBA -					
HMMA-22465	019-124-032/03	07/11/63			AO	WH/C/C
	AMROD WAS 201-020481					
HMMA-22466	FID	15/11/63			AO	FI/D
	SENT TO FI/D					
HMMA-22467	DEFERRED	07/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	REQUEST FOR HDQS INDEX CARDS-ODENVY REPORTS					
HMMA-22468	200-006-055	08/11/63			AO	DESTRO
	COMMUNICATIONS WATCH LIST					
HMMA-22469	RYBAT	08/11/63			AO	OS/FS
	RECD 18 NOV 63					
HMMA-22470	AQUATIC	15/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22471	050-006-061/03	08/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	OPERATIONAL/LIHACK-TRANSMITTAL OF ACTIVATOR					
HMMA-22472	02 201-0123353	14/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	DIZTAG/LIENVOY/OPERATIONAL--PARVAN TCHERNEV					
HMMA-22473	050-126-022/04	12/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS					
HMMA-22474	201-0811688	14/11/63			AO	EE/P
	02 BEDOX/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--BOLESLAW JELEN					
HMMA-22475	200-008-005	14/11/63			AO	EE/YA
	TRAVEL OF YUGO NATLS					
HMMA-22476	02 200-008-005	14/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	ZODIAC/BEDOX/OPERATIONAL-TRAVEL OF POLISH NATIONALS					
HMMA-22477	201-0273735	12/11/63			IN	SAS/ES
	CONTACT WITH ROBERTO SALAS, CUBAN PHOTOGRAPHER					
HMMA-22478	201-0740220	13/11/63			AO	IP
	DR. JULIAN GASCON MERCADO, GOVERNOR-ELECT OF NAYARIT					
HMMA-22479	201-0728291	14/11/63			IN	C/WH/3
	STATUS RPT ON INVESTIGATION OF RYSZARD LICHOCKI					
HMMA-22480	AQUATIC	19/11/63			AO	TSD
	SENT TO TSD					
HMMA-22481	106-009-008	14/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	MOVIMIENTO PRO INDEPENDENCIA DE PUERTO RICO					
HMMA-22482	050-006-018	14/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	OPERATIONAL MONTHLY REPORT-1-31 OCT 63					
HMMA-22483	050-004-020	14/11/63			IN	IP
	GEORGE NATHANSON/					
HMMA-22484	200-009-037	14/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	H.W. TOTTEN /201-					
HMMA-22485	019-126-015	13/11/63			AO	C/WH/3
	RESPONSE TO REF.					
HMMA-22486	050-004-104	13/11/63			AC	C/WH/3
	COLORADO RIVER SALINITY ISSUE					
HMMA-22487	02 060-006-056/03	21/11/63			AC	IP/FI
	BEDOX/OKROW-WOODROW D. GABBOTT-REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE WAS 200-120-033/03					
HMMA-22488	201-0739850	13/11/63			AO	WH/REC
	KAPOK RECD 19 NOV 63					

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                                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                      16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE ROU
 HMMA-22489                050-006-088/03   14/11/63                                             IN   C/
                      REPORT ON VISIT OF LIVAGUE/1 TO MEXICO CITY 30 OCT-9 NOV 63
 HMMA-22490                050-124-028/04   14/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      REVIEW OF BOOK ENTITLED XEL CAPITAL MONOPOLISTA Y LA ECONOMIA DE MEXICOX
 HMMA-22491                050-002-004      14/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      USAGE OF TERMS BY EMB. RELATING TO COMMIE AND SOCIALIST GROUPS IN MEX.
 HMMA-22492                FID              21/11/63                                             AO   FI/
                      SENT TO FI/D
 HMMA-22493                AQUATIC          21/11/63                                             AO   TSD
                      SENT TO TSD
 HMMA-22494                FID              21/11/63                                             AO   FI/
                      SENT TO FI/D
 HMMA-22495                201-0150616      15/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      (S)SNAB-1/COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE TERMINATION BY STATION SAN FRANCISCO
 HMMA-22496          02    201-0042557      15/11/63                                             IN   C/
                      JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA/ FORWARDING OF COPIES OF DOCUMENTS FROM GOVT FILE
 HMMA-22497                201-0739953      14/11/63                                             IN   C/
                      CARLOS MATIAS SAENZ FERRETO/FORWARDING OF DOCS FROM DEPT OF IMMIGRATION FILE
 HMMA-22498                200-005-038      14/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      ZRKNICK/PERSONS REGISTERED AT THE HOTEL CONGRESO, MEXICO CITY DURING PERIOD 16-25 OCT
                      63
 HMMA-22499                AQUATIC          21/11/63                                             AO   TS
                      SENT TO TSD
 HMMA-22500                DEFERRED         15/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      STATION REPORTING-LANGUAGE OF REPORTS
 HMMA-22501                FID              21/11/63                                             AO   FI
                      SENT TO FI/D
 HMMA-22503                019-006-086/03   15/11/63                                             IN   SAS
                      CONTACT REPORTS-MEETINGS WITH DEGRIP
 HMMA-22504                050-006-091/04   06/12/63                                             AO   C/
                      TRANSMITTAL OF STATEMENTS SIGNED BY GENARO DEL BUSTO HERNANDEZ AND AUGUSTO PINEDA GONZ
 HMMA-22505                201-0727876      15/11/63                                             IN   C/
                      PBRUMEN-JUAN FRANCISCO GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ
 HMMA-22506                050-006-105/03   15/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      CONTACT REPORT-MEETINGS WITH(LITAMIL-9)   01
 HMMA-22507                050-009-012      15/11/63                                             AO   WHS
                      RYBAT RECD 19 NOV 63
 HMMA-22508                201-0729530      15/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
 HMMA-22509                036-004-001      18/11/63                                             IN   C/
                      MAIL INTERCEPTS ON HAITIAN COMMIES
 HMMA-22511                DEFERRED         19/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      GRACIELA PEREZ DEL VALLE DE AVILA, VISA APPLICANT
 HMMA-22512                AQUATIC          27/11/63                                             AO   TS
                      SENT TO TSD
 HMMA-22513                AQUATIC          02/12/63                                             AO   C/T
                      SENT TO C/TSD
 HMMA-22514                DEFERRED         21/11/63                                             AO   WH/
                      KAPOK RECD 27 NOV 63
 HMMA-22515                019-124-032/03   21/11/63                                             AO   WH/
                      AMROD WAS 201-020481
 HMMA-22516                050-006-084/03   25/11/63                                             AO   C/
                      LITABBY PROGRESS RPT-AUG-OCT 63
 HMMA-22517                060-006-056/01 02 21/11/63                                            AO   WH
                      KAPOK RECD 26 NOV 63 (BESMOOTH
 HMMA-22518                201-0735188      26/11/63                                             AO   EE/
                   02 (D)ZTAG/ZODIAC/OPERATIONAL--ARRIVAL OF JOSEF PLUHAR
 HMMA-22519                201-0304989      26/11/63                                             AC   IP
                      BEDOX/OPERATIONAL--ODACID CABLE MISSENT TO POLISH EMBASSY
 PAGE    19348        02                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 011
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                                                          S-E-C-R-E-T                      16/06/77
 DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)      FCN              DATE       FSN              SECONDARY/DOC REF         CODE RO
 HMMA-22520                201-0103968      29/11/63
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                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                 16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE       FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUTI
HMMA-22520             201-[illegible]3948      29/11/63                                              AO   EE/P
                  CZESLAW SLO[illegible]IEWICZ /201-103948/
HMMA-22521             201-0291531      21/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN U.S. RESIDENTS AND CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL
HMMA-22522             201-0290885      21/11/63                                              AO   C/WH/
                  AMELBOW/1
HMMA-22523             201-0356959      21/11/63                                              IN   C/WH/
                  PBRUMEN/JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA
HMMA-22524             DEFERRED         22/11/63                                              AO   C/WH/
                  FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXI
HMMA-22525             FID              02/12/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22526             FID              02/12/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22527             AQUATIC          02/12/63                                              AO   C/TS
                  SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22528             050-009-012      22/11/63                                              AO   C/WH.
                  CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC
HMMA-22529             201-0067016      22/11/63                                              AO   C/WH/
                  DRA. ESTHER CHAPA TIJERINA
HMMA-22530             201-0029486      22/11/63                                              IN   IP
                  COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION PROGRAM ADDITIONAL INFO ON ANTONIO MORIN RODRIGUEZ AND ALEJO
                  MENDEZ GARCIA
HMMA-22531             AQUATIC          02/12/63                                              AO   C/TS
                  SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22532             201-0042557      22/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  JUDITH FERRETO SEGURA
HMMA-22533             201-0289248      22/11/63                                              AO   CI/R/
                  RYBAT OSWALD WAS 201-287248
HMMA-22534             DEFERRED         26/11/63                                              AO   C/WH.
                  COLOR PLATES REQUESTED IN REF
HMMA-22535             AQUATIC          03/12/63                                              AO   C/TS
                  SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22536             201-0282533      22/10/63                                              AC   C/WH.
                  LIPIETY PROJ-TERMINATION OF LIEPIETY-1 WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22537             050-004-124      26/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  OPERATIONAL/LIMUD INTERCEPTED CORRESPONDENCE
HMMA-22538             200-009-042      27/11/63                                              AO   C/WH.
                  CUBAN TRAVEL
HMMA-22539             201-0279366      29/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  ENRIQUE LUMEN-RODRIGUEZ
HMMA-22540             201-0263152      29/11/63                                              AO   C/WH.
                  LITENCH-1
HMMA-22541             AQUATIC          04/12/63                                              AO   C/TS
                  SENT TO C/TSD
HMMA-22542             050-009-012      29/11/63                                              AO   IP
                  CUBAN EMBASSY TRAFFIC WAS RYBAT
HMMA-22543             200-009-042      29/11/63                                              AO   C/WH.
                  TRANSMITTAL OF CUBAN DIPL TRAVEL RPTS
HMMA-22544             201-0729530      29/11/63                                              AO   IP
                  OSCAR CONCEPCION MENDOZA
HMMA-22545             201-0289248      29/11/63                                              AO   CI/R/
                  TRANSMITTAL OF TAPES
HMMA-22546             050-126-022/04   29/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  MATERIAL FOR PRESS COMMENTS
HMMA-22547             035-500          29/11/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  TRAVEL OF FERNANDO MORENO TO PARIS
HMMA-22548             200-004-208      29/11/63                                              IN   C/WH
                  VISIT OF WORLD PEACE COUNCIL DELEGATES TO MEXI
PAGE   19347                                      S-E-C-R-E-T                     E2 IMPDET CL BY 01198
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                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T                 .16/06/77
DOC REF/SECONDARY(2)   FCN              DATE       FSN          SECONDARY/DOC REF          CODE ROUT
HMMA-22549             FID              04/12/63                                              AO   FI/D
                  SENT TO FI/D
HMMA-22550             050-124-028/01   02/12/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  OPERATIONAL/KUWOLF/LIHUFF
HMMA-22551             201-0269885      02/12/63                                              IN   C/WH
                  MANOEL PIO CORREIA JUNIOR
HMMA-22552          23 053-126-023/03   05/12/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  FLN GUERRILLAS
HMMA-22553             019-124-032/03   05/12/63                                              AO   WH/C
                  AMROD WAS 201-020481
HMMA-22554             201-0033012   02 05/12/63                                       02     AO   C/WH
                  AGENT SERVICE RECORDS FOR LEFTERS 4 AND 7. MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENTS FOR LEFTER
HMMA-22554/01          201-0275186      05/12/63                                              AO   C/WH
                  LIFTER-7
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DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION
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x NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, DO/I

INFO.

FROM Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT WOMUSE
"Peace" Demonstrations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIRECTOR 39871

1. Enclosed for Headquarters information are copies of literature mailed by the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP) to its members (attachments 1, 2 and 3) concerning "Negotiation Now!"

2. Also enclosed as of possible interest are copies of CAIP materials (attachments 3, 4 and 5) concerning its 40th Annual Conference, scheduled for October 27 - 29, the theme of which is "Selective Conscientious Objection in an Age of Conflict." The conference is to be held at Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, 2935 Upton Street N.W., Washington, D. C.

3. The above items were received by Oliver H. CORBUSTON who had joined the CAIP for cover purposes in the course of a previous assignment. Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded in response to reference.

Oliver H. Corbuston
Oliver H. CORBUSTON

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
3 - Chief, DO/I w/atts
1 - Chief, DO w/o att

7147

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 13/8/76

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 13/8/76
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UWCA-3510
CS COPY

DATE 11 OCT 1967
11 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL
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HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Sov Bloc Div; Chief, Far East Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMUSE/ICG

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT
RYBAT MHPASHA REDTOP - Beheiren and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
TOKYO 7263

As noted in reference, forwarded herewith is a copy of the subject memorandum. Please note that the information in the memorandum Paragraph B. 4. b) is particularly sensitive and should only be given properly restricted dissemination.

Mark J. Lidgerwool
Mark J. LIDGERWOOL

ATTACHMENT
Memo dtd 27 Nov 67

Distribution
~~2~~ - C/SB Div w/1 cy attach
1 - C/FE w/1 cy attach
1 - C/WOMUSE/ICG w/1 attach

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Conducted On 6-10-76
E2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

CS COPY

8603

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FJTA-53626

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
DEC 6 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
UNKNOWN

27 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: BEHEIREN and the Four U.S. Navy Deserters

A. Origin and Development of BEHEIREN.

1. Founding: BEHEIREN (Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee) was organized in April 1965, nominally as a politically independent group of intellectuals and cultured persons whose purpose was "to help restore peace in Vietnam." Actually, it is a loosely organized group of ex-JCP members, progressive intellectuals, leftist cultured persons, and leftwing students - banded together in the name of opposition to the Vietnam war by two common denominators, dedicated anti-Americanism and refusal to be dominated or controlled by the orthodox Japan Communist Party.

2. Hard-Core Secretariat: The real force behind the organization of BEHEIREN, right from the beginning to the present, has been a brilliant Communist named YOSHIKAWA Yuichi, whose conspiratorial organizational skills have been perhaps the most indispensible ingredients in BEHEIREN's development. YOSHIKAWA was expelled from Tokyo University for his role as a ZENGAKUREN leader in the 1960 U.S./Japan Security Treaty riots. He then went into fulltime JCP mass movement professional work, becoming the Secretariat official in charge of international relations for the Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA broke with the JCP in late 1964, following the rupture in relations between the JCP and CPSU in May that year. The inspiration for BEHEIREN springs in large measure from YOSHIKAWA's personal desire to use his organizational talents in countering the JCP and its Japan Peace Committee. YOSHIKAWA, in addition to being a well qualified English linguist himself, years ago surrounded himself with a small following of similarly qualified lieutenants, whom he brought along into BEHEIREN to give him the necessary depth and experience to run this new organization. YOSHIKAWA functions as BEHEIREN's Secretary General.

3. Respectable Intellectual Front: Following fundamental Communist principles for mass movement work (better than the JCP itself follows these tenets), the ex-JCP organizers of BEHEIREN kept themselves in the background and lined up a number of prominent Japanese progressive intellectuals and leftist cultured persons to front for BEHEIREN. The choice of ODA Makoto, ex-Fulbrighter and popular young novelist, to be the chief front man - Chairman - was an extremely lucky stroke for BEHEIREN. ODA has taken to this grand-standing, front work like a duck to water. It has given him a chance to give unbridled vent to his own latent anti-American feelings, puffed him up to the extent that he has been dubbed "the emperor" by other BEHEIREN activists, and given him at long last an ideological mission to pursue. YOSHIKAWA has performed magnificently in feeding ODA's ego needs and in infusing and indoctrinating ODA so that his words and actions take on sufficiently virulent anti-American overtones. ODA has served another vital function for BEHEIREN by recruiting a sizeable number of fellow intellectuals to join the ranks of BEHEIREN activists. (Attachment 1 is a listing of a number of those Japanese who have been identified as active BEHEIREN supporters or sympathizers.)

4. Organizational Development: In its 2 1/2 year history, BEHEIREN has not appreciably changed its organizational format, although it has moved its office three times and modified its name even oftener. BEHEIREN is not a "mass organization", because it has had no sizeable popular backing to the present time. Its hard core, secretariat organization is run by YOSHIKAWA and his lieutenants. Its public image, intellectual front is led by ODA, and given body by a score of like-minded intellectual friends of ODA and YOSHIKAWA, who form the loose body of BEHEIREN's activist leadership. Under this BEHEIREN leadership superstructure lies a paltry base of only several hundred BEHEIREN "rank-and-file" supporters, mostly young Japanese students. Organizationally, BEHEIREN has no formal membership system, so its base of supporters is fluid and not precisely measurable. However, the base support for BEHEIREN has definitely been on the upswing during 1967, and made such notable strides during the past summer that JCP Headquarters officials finally felt constrained to note with concern that BEHEIREN was beginning to drain off a growing number of progressive youth who otherwise would have been absorbed into the JCP's own youth movement. BEHEIREN leaders have tried to help this growth along by setting up a youth section, calling it "Young BEHEIREN." BEHEIREN's imaginative actions and publicity-conscious programs have been responsible for its recent growth, and this period of growth seems to be now on

the verge of really picking up speed and momentum. As a result of its role in the case of the four deserting sailors, BEHEIREN has reaped bountiful publicity, has succeeded in touching a delicate Japanese public nerve of sympathy and pacifism, opening a floodgate of support for BEHEIREN from all over Japan. When this case fades from the limelight, it is still most likely that a fair percentage of current wave of popular support for BEHEIREN will solidify into permanent mass backing, giving BEHEIREN, for the first time, a meaningful base to support its future activities.

5. Activities and Accomplishments: BEHEIREN has engaged in a number of propaganda actions, and participated in international anti-Vietnam War activities. It has tried to cooperate with certain front activities in Japan controlled by the JCP, most notably the Japan Committee to Investigate War Crimes in Vietnam activities, which culminated in the Tokyo Court of last August, but has been soundly and rudely rebuffed by the JCP. In spite of this, BEHEIREN has churned along at its own pace, with a continuing series of anti-Vietnam war actions, most of them related in some way to the American pacifist movement. In this regard, BEHEIREN has succeeded in cornering a virtual monopoly on Japanese contacts with the U.S. pacifist movements, and has effectually capitalized on this to promote its own action program. The case of the four deserting sailors, while an apparent lucky windfall for BEHEIREN, only points up the fact that BEHEIREN, through past organizational work and promotional activities, was "johnny-on-the-spot", ready and capable (unique in Japan in this regard) to take the ball and run with it. BEHEIREN ran all the way in this case and scored its most notable success since it was organized. (Attachment 2 is a listing of BEHEIREN's more notable activities since its founding. Attachment 3 is a partial listing of American and other foreign persons known to have been in contact with or cooperated with BEHEIREN.)

B. The Case of the Four Sailor Deserters and BEHEIREN.

1. How It Started: The consensus of all available overt media material, with no recorded dissent, indicates that the four sailors voluntarily left their ship, went AWOL, and ended up wallowing around Tokyo's hippie-land. Precisely what personal grievances prompted the four to embark on this mis-adventure is not yet known. But, up to this point, the four could fairly be categorized as misguided youngsters, gone astray in a foreign land, and due to get slapped back in line with traditional Navy justice when they finally decided to stop the fun and go back to the ship. So far, this made their cases far from unique.

2. How It Became an Incident: But instead of returning to their ship of their own volition or being apprehended by the Shore Patrol, the four made contact with BEHEIREN leaders. Again, press reports indicate that this was just a coincidence, that there was no pre-planning by the four to contact BEHEIREN. There are no available overt nor covert reports that indicate otherwise. But, once the BEHEIREN people made contact, they recognized the potential immediately and moved fast for the kill. (Attachment 4 is a Yomiuri Newspaper clipping, 22 November 1967, that is both a representative and comprehensive account of this phase of the case. Even if this article should contain some minor inaccuracies, the basic line seems factual and has not been challenged elsewhere.)

3. BEHEIREN Takes Over: When the four made contact with BEHEIREN, it suddenly became an entirely different ballgame. BEHEIREN had everything needed to capitalize on this: veteran activist leaders who are experienced enough to recognize the windfall that had come their way; an apparatus that could provide hiding places for the four; long standing liaison contacts with Soviet Embassy officials for use in planning exit from Japan; solid contacts with reliable American pacifists with whom the bona fides of the four sailors could be checked; money and organization to capitalize on the propaganda potential (such as preparing a movie film for the initial BEHEIREN press conference announcing the desertion, prepared more likely than not by BEHEIREN stalwart KUBO Keinosuke, an independent film producer); and English speaking activists capable of sympathizing, encouraging, soothing, or agitating the four young sailors, so that there would be no turning back.

4. The BEHEIREN Apparatus At Work: While many of the small pieces of this puzzle, which would put the whole case in proper detailed chronological order and eliminate speculation on minor points, are still missing, enough is known now, through overt and covert sources, that the picture of BEHEIREN's adept handling of this case shines through clearly. The following elements, all part of the BEHEIREN apparatus, make up the bulk of the picture:

a) Hide-out: When BEHEIREN got hold of the four on about 26 October, they had to be hiden out for the approximate two week period until their exit from Japan could be arranged. This presented BEHEIREN no great logistical problem. A number of the BEHEIREN activist leaders have homes well suited to harboring fugitives. For example, BEHEIREN activist leader FUKASAKU Mitsusada has a villa hidden away in Chigasaki, which was used on the night of 12 September for a meeting of about 20 top BEHEIREN leaders, and which would be highly suitable for hiding the four deserters. Other private-dwellings, belonging to BEHEIREN leaders and loyal supporters, are scattered throughout both the Kanto and Kansai areas.

b) BEHEIREN/Soviet Liaison: BEHEIREN Secretary General YOSHIKAWA has maintained periodic contact with Soviet Embassy officials for years. BEHEIREN Chairman ODA has met Soviet Peace Committee officials in Moscow. The exact means of how this liaison was accomplished in this case is precisely known from a covert phone tap on the Soviet Embassy's line. A full transcript is available of two phone calls made on 30 October, first by Brian Victoria to Chief Press Attache Nikolay V. Vasilyevich, and second by YOSHIKAWA to First Secretary Sergey D. Anisimov, urgently requesting a private meeting later that day to discuss "an extremely important, extremely delicate matter", without doubt the case of the four sailors.

c) BEHEIREN/U.S. Pacifist Liaison: BEHEIREN contacted Dartmouth University professor Ernest P. Young, who flew to Japan on 8 November, apparently helped BEHEIREN leaders check out the bona fides of the deserters, and returned to the U.S. on 11 November. (Attachment 5 is the translation of a Sankei Shimbun article, dated 21 November, reporting an interview with Young, giving his version of his role in this case.)

5. Escape to Moscow: The four deserters turned up in moscow on 20 November. The press has speculated widely and unanimously that the four left Japan on the Soviet passenger ship Baikal on 11 November. Again, there is no dissenting opinion, overt nor covert. The only mystery concerning this final phase of the Japanese portion of this case concerns the mechanics of how the four boarded the Baikal and who assisted in this maneauver. But with the sailing of the Baikal from Yokohama, BEHEIREN completed its most highly successful and beautifully executed activity in its 2 1/2 year history. Not only did BEHEIREN smear the American Government's image in Japan, not only did BEHEIREN gain a vast amount of priceless publicity that will swell the ranks of its supporters and be invaluable in future activities, but BEHEIREN doubtlessly even made a profit, financially, on this low budget operation - donations are still pouring into BEHEIREN Headquarters from all over Japan to "help and protect U.S. deserters".

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Attachment No. 1

Japanese Who Have Been Identified as Active BEHEIREN Supporters or Sympathizers

1. YOSHIKAWA Yuichi (BEHEIREN Secretary General) - former JCP member.
2. ODA Makoto (BEHEIREN Chairman) - popular novelist.
3. KAIKO Ken - Akutagawa prize winning novelist.
4. KUBO Keinosuke - film producer and director.
5. TSURUMI Shunsuke - Doshisha University professor.
6. TSURUMI Kazuko - sister of Shunsuke (their father is the late philosopher, Yusuke).
7. FURUYAMA Yozo - high school teacher.
8. MUTO Ichiyo - ex-JCP (tried to travel to U.S. to represent BEHEIREN at October 21 demonstrations this year, but was denied a visa to enter the U.S.)
9. YAMADA Atsushi - ex-JCP.
10. FUKUDA Yoshiyuki - playwriter.
11. TOMINAGA Ichiro - cartoonist.
12. FUKASAKU Mitsusada - professor.
13. AWAZU Kiyoshi - graphic designer.
14. TAKADO Kaname - Christian leader.
15. YOSHIDA Kiju - film director.
16. UMIHARA Shun - writer.
17. HASHIMOTO Mineo - Buddhist priest.
18. HOTTA Yoshie - novelist.
19. GOTO Hiroyuki - scientist.
20. KUWABARA Takeo - professor at Kyoto University.

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21. SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu - Assistant professor at Tokyo University.

22. HIDAKA Rokuro - professor at Tokyo University.

23. IIDA Momo - writer.

24. TSURUMI Yoshiyuki - employed at International House in Tokyo.

25. TERAI Minako

26. ANAI Fumihiko

27. NASU Masanao

28. MATSUMOTO Ichiju

29. FUKUTOMI Setsuo

30. KURIHARA Yukio

31. etc: ANDO Jimbei, CHIBA Mido, EGAWA Taku, FUJII Nittatsu, HANIYU Ichiro, HOSHINO Yasusaburo, ICHII Saburo, IKEYAMA Juro, ISHIDA Takeshi, KANAI Yoshiko, KASAI Seiichi, KATAGIRI Yuzuru, KATO Shuichi, KAZAMA Michitaro, MATSUURA Sozo, KIDOKORO Masao, KITAKOJI Satoshi, KOBAYASHI Shoichiro, KOMATSU Sakyo, KOBAYASHI Tomi, KUNO Osamu (Shu), KURODA Hidetoshi, MARUYAMA Masao, MIDORIKAWA Toru, MIZUSAWA Yana, MORITAKI Ichiro, MUCHAKU Seikyo, MURAMATSU Hiro, NISHIO Noboru, NOMURA Koichi, OGOSHI Teruo, OTSUKOTSU Yoshiko, SERIZAWA Tae, SHIRAI Shimpei, SHINMURA Takeshi, SHISHIDO Hiroshi, SUGIURA Mitsuo, SUGIYAMA Tatsumaru, SUZUKI Masahira, TAKEUCHI Yoshitomo, WADA Nagahisa, YAMADA Munemitsu, YAMADA Toshio, YAMAGUCHI Kosaku, YAMANISHI Eiichi, YASUDA Takeshi, YOSHINO Genzaburo, YOSHIWARA Koichiro, OKAMOTO Taro, MATSUMOTO Seicho, EI Rokusuke, IZUMI Taku, AWAYA Noriko, KATO Yoshiro, SHIROYAMA Saburo, TAKAHASHI Taketomo, ODAGIRI Hideo, OKUMA Minoru, SANO Kenji, SUZUKI Michihiko, KUBATA Manya, SHINOHARA Seiei, MARUYAMA Kunio,

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TSURUSHIMA Sotsurei, MURO Kenji, KONAKA Yotaro, SAKAMOTO Yoshikazu, SAITO Masahiko, etc.

COMMENT: Although not recorded here, many of the above persons are ex-JCP members.

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Attachment No. 2

Some BEHEIREN Activities and Accomplishments

1. Regular once-per-month demonstrations at a public park in Tokyo, consisting of anti-American speeches and followed by street marches.

2. An all night TV "teach-in" with BEHEIREN activist leaders, along with special guest, U. S. pacifist Carl Oglesby (Chairman of the Students for a Democratic Society.)

3. A full page advertisement in the New York Times (16 November 1965), followed by another full page ad in the Washington Post (3 April 1967), appealing to Americans to stop the war in Vietnam.

4. A "Meet in Conference of Two Nations for Peace in Vietnam," held in Tokyo in August 1966, and attended by BEHEIREN activists and seven U.S. pacifist leaders (including Dave Dellinger), and observers from France, England, Canada, the USSR, Pakistan, and Mongolia.

5. A mass meeting in Tokyo in October 1966, guest speakers of which were French pacifists, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.

6. Nationwide tours of Japan for lectures and peace rallies for such anti-Vietnam war pacifists as Professor Howard Zinn and the late A. J. Muste of the United States, Claude Bourdet of France, and Thich Nhat Hanh of South Vietnam.

7. A mass meeting in Tokyo in January 1967, sponsored by BEHEIREN and featuring U.S. folk singer and pacifist Joan Baez.

8. A continuing program of direct distribution of pamphlets to U.S. troops stationed in Japan, and those coming to Japan on warships, and for rest or hospitalization from Vietnam.

9. Participation by two BEHEIREN activist leaders (Kyoto University professor KUWABARA Takeo and International House staffer TSURUMI Yoshikyuki, taking advantage of a trip to the U.S. to attend a non-political Japan-America Congress on Cultural Problems) in anti-Vietnam war speech rallies and demonstrations at Dartmouth University in early May 1967, followed by an unsuccessful attempt to invite Cassius Clay to visit Japan on behalf of BEHEIREN.

10. Continuing efforts to bring to Japan for a nationwide

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speech tour on behalf of BEHEIREN, Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, an effort that has not yet reached fruition but is still pending.

11. Participation in the Stockholm July 1967 "World Conference on Vietnam," by sending two BEHEIREN activist leaders as delegates.

12. Cooperation with the U.S. Quakers, pacifists, and Earle Reynolds in sending the yacht "Phoenix" with medical aid, first to Haiphong, then on a second trip in the Fall of 1967, seeking but failing to find landfall to deliver medical aid to either North or South Vietnam.

13. Attempted, but failed due to inability to obtain U.S. visa, to send a BEHEIREN activist leader (MUTO Ichiyo) to the U.S. to participate in the 21 October 1967 anti-Vietnam War demonstrations.

14. Currently carrying out a fund raising campaign to send an aid ship to North Vietnam. In this, and other activities, BEHEIREN leaders are maintaining ever closer liaison contact with their counterparts abroad, such as the French "Comite' Vietnam National." In an effort to generate public support for this aid ship fund raising campaign, BEHEIREN succeeded in issuing a public appeal, under the endorsing signatures of Tokyo Governor MINOBE Ryokichi and Yokohama Mayor ASUKATA Ichio, as well as the usual intellectuals supporting BEHEIREN.

15. In October 1967, BEHEIREN solicited approval to hold anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, expecting to be denied and then intending to make this denial a court test case. Instead, BEHEIREN was given this permission, and conducted two orderly and well-publicized demonstrations in front of the American Embassy, garnering a larger public turn out of participants than in any previous BEHEIREN-sponsored demonstration.

16. Assisted and abetted the defection to the USSR of four American sailors from the U.S. Navy carrier Intrepid. Following this success, BEHEIREN's most effective activity to date, BEHEIREN leaders are organizing a permanent "underground railway" of Japanese intellectuals who will volunteer their homes as possible "way stops" for hiding future U.S. military deserters that BEHEIREN now hopes to induce.

Comment: For other details, see Tokyo intelligence reporting:
FJT-11547, 31 May 1966
FJT-12046, 14 October 1966
FJT-12680, 10 May 1967
FJT-12851, 5 July 1967
FJT-13081, 8 September 1967
FJT-13154, 27 September 1967
FJT-13303, 22 November 1967
Also, CSS-6790, 11 July 1967

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ATTACHMENT 3

Partial Listing of American and Other Foreign Persons Known to Have Been in Contact with or Cooperated with BEHEIREN.

A. Americans.

1. Staughton Lynd (ex-Yale professor)
2. Norman Mailer (novelist)
3. Dave Dellinger (Editor of Liberation)
4. Howard Zinn (Boston U. professor)
5. Donald Keyes (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy)
6. David McReynolds (Chairman, War Resisters' League)
7. A. J. Muste (now deceased)
8. Karl Meyer
9. William Davidson
10. Bradford Lyttle
11. Charlotte Thurber
12. (Miss) Quentin Bassett (Students for a Democratic Society)
13. Murray Levin (Boston U. professor)
14. Robert Ockene (Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam)
15. Carl Oglesby (Chairman, Students for a Democratic Society)
16. Barbara Deming (Associate editor of Liberation)
17. Joan Baez (folk singer)

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18. Ira Morris (Paris expatriate)

19. Otto Naisan (phonetic, New York City peace activist)

20. Barbara and Earle Reynolds (divorced but separately active long-time residents in Japan)

21. William R. Christensen (an American pacifist drifter, who gave BEHEIREN its first experience in the summer of 1966 in exploiting for propaganda in Japan, and then in arranging the onward journey of an American who wanted to defect to the USSR)

22. Brian Victoria (head-shaved pacifist and "converted" Buddhist priest, known to be in regular contact with the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo)

23. Mr. Willowby (fnu, phonetic, "chief of the Quaker Peace Action movement in the U.S")

24. An unidentified American of Japanese descent, from Hawaii, who is currently a student at Waseda University.

25. Kosaku Yamaguchi (reportedly born in U.S., present citizenship status unclear) (formerly was a professor at Momoyama University in Osaka, but has been teaching at the University of California in Berkeley for some time)

B. Other Foreigners.

1. Mikhail Kotov, USSR (Soviet Peace Committee)

2. Claude Bourdet, France (French Committee to Support the Vietnamese People)

3. Peggy Duff, Great Britain (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)

4. James Endicott, Canada (World Peace Council)

5. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Pakistan

6. Gabita Muslepov, USSR

7. Mrs. Erdenebat Ojon, Mongolia

8. Konstantin Shugnov, USSR

9. Francis Marcel Kahn, France (Comite' Vietnam National)

10. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, France

11. Thich Nhat Hanh, South Vietnam

COMMENT: This is not, by any means, a complete listing, nor does it necessarily list BEHEIREN's most important activist contacts abroad. But this list is representative in showing the breadth of BEHEIREN liaison abroad, particularly with the American "new left".

ATTACHMENT 4

THE YOMIURI 22 Nov 67 Wednesda

4 US Deserters Possibly Left Japan Aboard Baikal

YUICHI YOSHIKAWA, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), tells a press conference Tuesday that the four deserters of the US warship Intrepid hoped to stay in Japan but the Beheiren could not help them to do so.

The four deserters from the US aircraft carrier Intrepid who made a dramatic television appearance Monday in Moscow are believed to have left Japan irregularly by the Soviet liner Baikal which left Yokohama on November 11 for the Far East Soviet port of Nakhodka.

Sources in the Metropolitan Police Department said Tuesday that the four Americans could have boarded the ship by a special gangway for Soviet Government officials.

Japanese watchmen were on guard at another gangway for ordinary passengers when 222 listed passengers, including eight Americans, boarded the liner before it departed Yokohama at 11.50 am, November 11.

The watchmen told police that they did not see any person who was not on the passenger list board the ship through the ordinary gangway.

It was learned that 17 officials of the Soviet Embassy and trade mission in Tokyo and scores of visitors boarded the Baikal through the special gangway.

The police sources said that it was "quite possible" that the Soviet authorities in Tokyo arranged the deserters' exit.

Beheiren Pledge

Yuichi Yoshikawa, secretary-general of the Japan Peace-For-Vietnam Committee (Beheiren), told a press conference Tuesday that the committee could not disclose how the four Americans left because it had promised not to do so.

He neither affirmed nor denied the report that the Americans left Japan by the Baikal on November 11.

It was the Beheiren which announced for the first time the desertion of the four crew members of the Intrepid to protest against the Vietnam war, at a press conference held November 13 in Tokyo.

Yoshikawa said that the deserters first wanted to live peacefully in Japan and asked the Beheiren to find them jobs in which they could utilize their English proficiency.

The Beheiren told them that they could not live in Japan without being found by the Japanese police or US military authorities sooner or later, Yoshikawa said.

Lived Like Hippies

Hiromi Naito, 20, a painter of Tokyo, told The Yomiuri Shimbun that he and his friend, Sansei Yamao, a hippie poet and member of the Beheiren, acted as go-betweens for the deserters and the Beheiren.

Naito said he met two of the four deserters—Airman Dick D. Bailey, 19, and Airman Mike A. Lindner, 19—at a hippie hangout in Shinjuku around October 20.

He said both Americans wore leather jackets and other informal clothing which they said they borrowed from their Japanese hippie friends hanging around the Shinjuku area.

Bailey and Lindner and the other two—Airman John M. Barilla, 20, and Airman Apprentice Craig W. Anderson, 20—went around in pairs, Naito said.

Naito said he let Bailey and Lindner stay overnight at his house in Hayamiyacho, Nerima-ku, from October 24 to 25.

Not Worried

When he first met the deserters, they were practically penniless but appeared quite unconcerned, Naito said.

He said the deserters apparently enjoyed hippie life, living on cheap Japanese food and drink such as udon (noodles) and shochu.

He said the four Americans wanted to live in Japan, and if possible in Tokyo.

Naito and his friend Yamao decided to ask the help of the Beheiren and delivered the four men to the Beheiren around November 26.

Naito said he believed that all the four Americans were not communists and that they had no interest in communist ideology.

He said the four must have decided to go to some neutral country via the Soviet Union after they learned that they could not live in Japan.

A spokesman for the Justice Ministry said Tuesday that there was nothing legally wrong in the four Americans leaving Japan because the administrative agreement in the Japan-US Security Treaty guarantees US military personnel the right to come, to stay in or leave Japan.

He said he understood that the four Americans were technically still enlisted US military personnel.

Furthermore, if their exit took place on November 11, it was before the US authorities made an official request to the Japanese police to search for them, he added.

He also said there were no Japanese laws allowing charges to be preferred against the Beheiren officials and other Japanese people who "protected" the Americans in Japan and helped their departure to the Soviet Union.

SANKEI (Full) November 21, 1967

Prof. YOUNG Says Four American Deserter Seamen Not in Japan Any More

Went to Tokyo and Tried to Dissuade Them; Probably Escaped from Japan on the 12th or the 13th

(New York, November 20, Correspondent Tadashi ONODERA) Professor Ernest P. YOUNG of Dartmouth College in the U.S., consented to an interview with this reporter on the question of the four American seamen who deserted from the U.S. aircraft carrier Intrepid. At the interview held on the 19th, Professor YOUNG clarified that the Peace for Vietnam Association (Beheiren, with Makoto ODA acting as its representative) contacted an anti-war organization in the U.S., and at this, Professor YOUNG hurriedly visited Tokyo, and meeting the four seamen in a room in an apartment house in Tokyo on the 9th and 10th, tried to persuade them to return. In regard to the present whereabouts of these four seamen, he made the noteworthy statement that "those four were still in Japan, up until the night of the 11th, when I left Japan, but they are probably no longer in Japan now."

Families Perplexed

The questions and answers exchanged with Professor YOUNG are as follows:

-- Why did you go to Japan?

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Professor: Beheiren contacted David DERKINGER, a pacifist activist in the U.S., asking him to "send someone to Japan to hear the stories of the four seamen and announce them in the U.S." I have been in Japan twice, and I also once served as special assistant to Ambassador REISCHAUER. During that time, I became friends with Beheiren representative ODA and other intellectuals in Japan. It was for these reasons that I was given this assignment. I personally have never participated actively in the anti-Vietnam war movement so far.

-- When did you arrive in Japan, and where did you meet the four seamen?

Professor: I arrived in Haneda on November 8, and met the four seamen on the 9th and the 10th. The place of interview was in an apartment house in Tokyo, but I cannot say at this time where that apartment house was and who owned it. However, on both days, I talked fully with these four seamen, for more than three hours on each occasion (according to an investigation made by the public security authorities, Professor YOUNG arrived in Japan toward the evening of the 8th, and stayed at Hotel Tanakanwa in Shiba, Minato-ku, until the morning of the 11th).

-- What were the motives for these four seamen's desertion?

Professor: The desertion was completely the decision of these four persons. It seems that the four seamen decided not to return to the ship, when the Intrepid entered Yokosuka Port on October 17, and they were permitted to go ashore for rest for one week. My impression on meeting these four seamen was that they were definitely not deserting for the purpose of self-advertisement or that they were giving false reasons. I am convinced that they deserted really out of doubt about the Vietnam war.

-- What were the movements of the four after they deserted?

Professor: On the night of the 23rd, two days before the Intrepid was due to sail, the four went to Shinjuku, and told the people whom they met at a bar they happened to visit, that "we are fed up with war." The Japanese who heard them sympathized with them, and at one time, the four lived with some hippies (according to this paper's investigations, they include Mr. K., a student of Tokyo University's Liberal Arts Department, and vanguard artist A., who gather at Fugetsudo in Shinjuku.) Finally, they were taken to Beheiren by a student who spoke English (according to this paper's investigation, this was Mr. S., a Waseda University student). After that, they were hidden by Beheiren. I cannot say where they were hidden.

-- Were the four firmly determined to desert?

Professor: My purpose in visiting Japan was to dissuade the four. I explained to them what the results of their desertion would be. I even told them that they would never again be permitted to stand on American soil, their fatherland. At the time I met them, it was still at a stage where they would only receive light punishment, if they reported back immediately, saying that they "had missed their ship." However, their determination was firm, and my persuasion had no effects.

-- The four seamen's desertion was announced in the form of a press interview given by Beheiren. Were there no facts of their having been forced to desert, during that period?

Professor: I ascertained that point, too. However, they firmly denied any fact of their having been forced, saying that they had voluntarily consulted Beheiren as to whether they should publicly announce their intention to desert, and if so, in what form this should be made.

-- Where are the four seamen now, and where are they planning to go?

Professor: I am certain that the four of them were still in Japan, up until the 11th, the day I left for home. However, they already knew fully well that it was not possible for them to obtain asylum in Japan. They even said that "we will probably have to go to some third nation, which is neutral." (The public security authorities judge that the four seamen left Japan immediately after Mr. YOUNG's persuasion, and consider that they probably were smuggled out of Japan after the 10th, and before the evening of the 13th, when Beheiren announced their desertion at a press conference. However, Mr. YOUNG says that the four seamen were in Japan up until the night of the 11th. Therefore, the possibility is strong that they were smuggled out of Japan by ship, between the night of the 11th and the evening of the 13th.)

-- The films showing the four seamen were shown publicly in the U.S., too. What were the reactions in the U.S.?

Professor: When the films were publicly shown, there was big excitement, with rows and rows of television and press cameramen. I thought I would be exposed to persistent questioning by the FBI and the CIA, after I returned home, but so far, I have only been questioned once by the Navy's Intelligence Section, about the circumstances. It seems that American authorities concerned do not want to make too big a fuss over the matter.

-- What do the parents think of this action taken by their sons?

Professor: A certain television station asked the mother of one of the four men about her son's life. This mother was completely perplexed, saying: "My son is a most average American youth. His school records were quite ordinary, and he liked sports, just like any other student. I cannot understand why he acted in such a way."

KH

SECRET

Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Durant

Recruited: March 1955 as member Station unilateral surveillance team.
OA - 28 Feb 1955.

1 Oct 55: Converted to Contract status w/annual salary $3600.

Late:1956: P/A in charge of surveillance team & also was in charge of photo surveillance of the Soviet Mission, including processing the film. LIEMPTY was crypt for the support team targetted against the Soviet Embassy. Under LIEMPTY, the 3 basehouse were encrypted:

See next page

LIMITED - basehouse across street from Soviet Embassy.
LILYRIC - basehouse across the street from Soviet Embassy.
LICALLA - basehouse from which pictures taken from garden area of Soviet Embassy.

Note: photo of man alleged to be OSWALD was taken from the LIMITED basehouse.

12 Dec 58: ALVAREZ married LIEMPTY-19 (Hester ROOS, who assisted him during the next 10 years as a part-time support asset as P/A for the LIEMPTY activity, surveillance & photo coverage of the Soviet target (1958-1968.

In Oct 1962: In order provide maximum compartmentation between the various basehouses, Oliver G. SCANTLING was inserted as the cutout to the LIMITED basehouse and its basehouse keepers (LIEMPTY-6 & 8), replacing ALVAREZ. ALVAREZ continued as cutout for the LIENTRAP (roving van), LICALLA and LILYRIC. This gave ALVAREZ more time to process raw photo take.
This continued from October 1962 until 1 Sept 1964 when ALVAREZ assumed cutout responsibility for LIMITED basehouse - again.

In 1969: ALVAREZ separated from LIEMPTY-19 and a messy divorce suit followed. In Dec 1969, he was put on half pay & had his ops duties suspended due his full-time involvement in legal matters re the divorce. On 26 June 7 he & LI-19 signed quit claims & secrecy agreements. ALVAREZ paid $10,000 as termination bonus
Last Station contact with ALVAREZ was May 71 when ALVAREZ received the last of his termination bonuses.

In 1963 when OSWALD allegedly visited the Soviet Embassy, 05941 SCANTLING was the P/A for the LIMITED basehouse and LIEMPTY-6 (Jorge Barcello VILLAGRAn Alvarez) was the photo tech who took the pictures.

SECRET

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LIEMPTY-6 was recruited in June 1954 as member of physical surveillance team. In Dec. 1955, he and his wife occupied the LIMITED basehouse. He took pictures for 13 years & was terminated 31 May 1968, signed quit claim & secrecy agreement which was witnessed by ~~SER~~ ALVAREZ.

ALVAREZ ~~was~~ presumably was the individual who developed the photos which LIEMPTY-6 took, as well as the photo tech coverage of the other 2 basehouses.

SCANTLING's true name is Juan N. FRAIS-RAMIREZ. (Contract agent)

Soviet Embassy Coverage:

Project LIEMPTY concerned primarily with photo coverage of the Soviet installation. Active from mid-1955 through 30 June 1972. It supported 2 of the original 3 basehouses at termination in 1972 which were:

LIMITED had been terminated.

LICALLA (activated in 1957 to provide photo coverage the rear (garden, parking lot area) of the Sov. Embassy.

LILYRIC (activated 1956 to provide photo coverage of the front entrance of the Soviet Emb. Terminat 30 June 1972.

LIMITED (activiated in 1955 to provide photo coverage of the front entrance of the Sov. Emb. Terminate 31 May 1968.

SECRET

30-2

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 161827Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 125981

CONF: SA/DDO INFO: FILE EUR8, IP/DMS, LA8, OLC, DDO4, DDO/DO, DDO/SRO,

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: P

15-15 15-1

TO: [LISBON], INFO [LONDON], MEXICO CITY. Y

RYBAT WNINTEL RNVIEW Y

1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. Y

2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES. Y

3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

DO NOT REPRODUCE
RETURN TO CIA

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 06494

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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12598]

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DISSEM BY:

4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT 28 [STATIONS] ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY. Y

5. 28 [STATIONS] EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING 27 [STATION OFFICERS] IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR 11 [COVER] CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT. ■ H

ORIG: O/SA/DO/O {SOVERN}; COORD: OLC {CUMMINS}, DC/LA {LAUDER}, C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB {~~[illegible]~~ HAWKINS}, DC/EUR/BC {~~[illegible]~~ JAMES}, C/EUR/IB 03 {BERGER}; AUTH: SA/DO/O 03 {KATROSH}; REL: DC/EUR {ESTES}.

DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: MASOVERN
UNIT: O/SA/DO/O
EXT: 1542

C/LA/STAFF B-106 [illegible]

OLC - [illegible]

DC/EUR/BC

DC/LA/N

DC/EUR — RELEASING OFFICER

C/EUR/IB

C/LA/~~ME~~ GSB — COORDINATING OFFICERS

for SA/DO/O — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION — REPRODU[illegible]N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]BITED — E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

1-C

3 July '74

MEMO FOR FILE

SUBJECT C : OTS (late TSD) and Jim McCord's Cuban Activities

1. Ben Colling phoned to say that one of the fellows in jail is still around, and after he got out he inquired around and got no indication that McCord was ever involved. None of the other OTS people have any recollection of McCord's involvement.

2. I said that I was sure that the man who was rolled up might not have any idea of McCord's involvement, if indeed he was involved. If McCord's involvelement was merely headquarters planning and no releasing operation was ever undertaken his role might never surface. However, we had been told that planning did involve TSD people at the time, along with Security. For instance, I knew that the Security man with TSD at the time had a job of hand-holding with the families of the three men; there may be some TSD record of that which would lead to someone who would know.

3. Colling was pulled out of a staff meeting to talk to me and said he would call back later.

SDB

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6574

S-E-C-R-E-T

20 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Summary of 02 [ST]ESCALADE - Audio Operation Against the New China News Agency in Havana

1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apartments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the concurrence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, an Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November 1959.

2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and were used for conferences. At that time 03 [Bryan Mills] FE Division case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving the operation. He managed to lease an apartment directly over the NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space.

3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he, together with the technicians, installed a probe microphone and tape recorder in the apartment obtained by 03 [Mills] over the NCNA office. About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left in the wall and plastered over.

6592

3/90

4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was obtained. Mrs. Lennox was told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic surveillance purposes.

5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was, therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apartment over the NCNA office.

6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At 1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.

7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban authorities. His wife has been released and is still in Havana. Neet was released 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she is being debriefed. The three TSD technicians remain in confinement. They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox. Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated the morning of 15 September. At that time Christ did not appear

to have been maltreated.

8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA office and completing the installation of the equipment. The press article adds that the key to Mrs. Lennox's apartment was found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the men by alias and have not identified them as Government or Agency employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied any knowledge as to why he was being held.) The sub-lease for the apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-behind agent with the original lease being in the name of [Mills] the FE Division Case Officer.

03

9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told they were in custody.

10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists under very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing card requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned, efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view

1/90

of the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.

11. A cleared and witting law firm in New York has been briefed by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situation so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms in Cuba which are associated with them.

12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in Japan. 13-3 His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their intentions and course of action.

13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A conference with the two wives was held in TSD on 19 September to go over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals are released to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly well.

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, WH

Distribution:
DCI - 2
DDCI - 1
DD/P - 1
COPS - 1
WH - 3
~~PE~~ - 1
OS - 1
CI - 1

20 September 1966

02

MEMORANDUM RE STESCALADE

There is a folder of sensitive non-CS/record material pertaining to this operation, retired under Black Tape wrapping, Job #67-86/78, restricted to Offices of DCI, DDCI, DDP, C/WH, C/WH/PL, C/WH/C, C/CI, C/TSD, Director of Security and General Counsel. China Operations is not cited as an originator, addressee, or info recipient of any of this sensitive material.

WH/RMO

V viau
7384

SECRET

06593

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Att C

RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2

CHART OR MAP REFERENCE:

Sectional aeronautical charts as required.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander.

1. SITUATION:

Daniel L. Carswell (Alias), Eustace H. Danbrunt (Alias) and Edmund R. Taransky (Alias) are TSD Staff Employees who were apprehended by Cuban authorities in September 1960 and who are now serving ten year sentences. Efforts are being made to secure their release. Since their release may occur without advance notice and at a variety of places, ie. Havana, Miami, Mexico City, Switzerland, Brazil, etc., it is imperative that a contingency plan be formulated to insure the secure reception of these employees.

The controlling factor in all phases of the release procedure is that these employees were in Cuba under alias and that during the entire period since their capture their aliases and cover stories apparently have been maintained. Therefore it is essential that these aliases be maintained until such time as the employees have returned to Agency control and then have these alias identities disappear as quickly as possible.

For planning purposes the release points will be Havana, Mexico City or "other areas".

2. MISSION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group provide black air transportation from port of entry CONUS to the designated safe area.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Black air transport will be provided under this plan at the request of TSD, COS Mexico, or Operational Support Division/OS/DDS depending on the release point and port of entry.

6594

B. Request for black transport should include:

1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN 62-2 be implemented.

2. Port of entry.

3. Date, local time, and airfield desired for pick up.

4. Desired destination.

5. Other requirements, ie., stretchers or bunks in the event subjects are hospital cases.

6. Name, organization and telephone number of requesting party.

7. Name and telephone number of KUBARK contacts at loading and off-loading points.

C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the responsibility of activating this plan:

1. Major Richard I. Skinner, AC/ASD/DD/P
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JE 3-1409
Office Phone: Sterile Numbers ME 8-6285, EX 3-8515
Extensions 6862, 7654, 7367
Red Line 1358

2. Mr. Robert Marrero
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JA 4-3598
Office Phone: Same as 1.

3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662737
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631590

4. Major Kenneth R. Burton, Ops Officer, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Home Phone: 662454
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631213

D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and crew in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is herein defined as capability to position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 hours.

E. Assuming the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico City, Det. 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from most probable ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Force Base.

03

RICHARD I. SKINNER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI Staff
3 - OS
3 - OP
3 - MS
3 - C/FE
3 - C/TSD
3 - CCG
3 - TFW
3 - C/WH
3 - DPD/DDR

1/90

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET-RYBAT

ORIG : William Johnson
UNIT : CI/OPS/FE
EXT : 6918
DATE : 26 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SYDNEY INFO CANBERRA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CI

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/FE 6, VR

Nov 25 21 41 z63

DEFERRED SECT.

ROUTINE

~~[illegible]~~ OP IM

TO SYDNEY INFO CANBERRA CITE DIR 85059

RYBAT KUDESK [illegible] OP IM

1. REFERENCE ALUSNA CANBERRA CABLE CHQ-015* OF 24 NOVEMBER WHICH DOWNGRADED TO SECRET.

2. CABLE DETAILS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION INCLUDING VERBATIM TEXT REMARKS POSSIBLE CONNECTION SOVIET GOVERNMENT WITH ASSASSINATION.

3. CABLE DETAILS TELEPHONE CALL OF 15 OCTOBER 1962.

4. CABLE PLANS ANY ODYOKE[1] OR LIAISON CONTACT WITH POLISH DRIVER AND RESULTS SUCH CONTACT. NOTE NSCID-5 ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY THIS ACTIVITY TO KUBARK.[2]

5. ALL ASPECTS ASSASSINATION HAVE HIGHEST INVESTIGATIVE AND OPERATIONAL PRIORITY.

C/S COMMENT: *Asst. ALUSNA received telephone call on 23 November from person claiming to be Polish driver of Russian vehicle. Information touched on several areas including possible Soviet connection supplying money to individual in U.S. to assassinate President, possible Soviet implication in U.S.S. Thresher incident, etc.

08953

C/FE . J. Roman

Tover

ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

Chief FE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

3
[R. [illegible] COLEMAN] RC
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 1963 R

13-6-18-3

13-17
[illegible]
13-9
[illegible]

[illegible] 29 z

DESENSITIZEN
R ROUTING

[illegible], FI, RI/AN, FE 6, RF 2

22
TO [OKIE]
INFO 22 [RKDO]
CITE DIR 61320

AQUATIC 2 [LEGROUP]

13-9
REF [RKOO] 6707 (IN 97957)*

PERMISSION GRANTED TRAIN 2 [LE]GROUP-1 AND ISSUE SYSTEM AS REQUESTED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD COMMENT: *Request permission train 2 [LE]GROUP-1 SW Match #23289 and Developer #22689. He to train [LE]GROUP-6 2 to use match.

Coordinated by phone with:

FE/JKO: R. Chin, x5357
FE/TBLB: Mr. John Kennedy, x5934

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SEYMOUR RUSSELL
CHIEF, TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CHARLES J. RYAN
AC/TSD/DA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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6961

24 SECRET

ROUTING			
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: CA/O 4

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 122222Z

WAVE INFO DIR MEXI CITE PACY 1245 13 NOV 63 IN 59319

DIDURIC TPRANSACK

1. THE FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE ORGANIZACIONES DE PERIODISTAS PROFESIONALES (FIOPP) IS HOLDING ITS SECOND REGIONAL SEMINAR IN MEXICO CITY 18-29 NOV. FIOPP IS A KUBARK INFLUENCED ORGANIZATION. CONTACT IS MAINTAINED WITH ITS INTERAMERICAN REP IN PANAMA AND ITS COCHAIRMAN IN WASHINGTON, BOTH OF WHOM ARE COVERT ASSOCIATES.

2. ATTENDING THE MEXI SEMINAR FROM THE COLEGIO NACIONAL DE PERIODISTAS DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (IN EXILE) ARE:

A. GUILLERMO GENER RODRIGUEZ
VICE DECANO DEL CNP
SOUTH BAY SHORE DRIVE, MIAMI, FLA

B. SALVADOR DIAZ VERSON
VICE DECANO DEL CNP
6770 S.W. 21 ST, MIAMI, FLA

C. FRANCISCO GOMEZ HECTOR
DIPUTADO DE LA JUNTA DE GOBIERNO

SECRET

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6968

3302 COLLINS AVE, MIAMI BEACH, FLA

D. MARIO BARRERA

DECANO DEL CNP

967 S.W. 5 ST, MIAMI, FLA.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON ABOVE. OF SPECIFIC INTEREST IS INFO BEARING ON PARTICIPANTS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AT SEMINAR.

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

001(S)3,244,087

MLA 30372

27 November 1962

Subject: Reported Use of Yacht Potomac by Alpha 66

1. On 20 Nov 62 LAFO received an unsolicited telephone call on the listed telephone number. The caller wanted to advise that there was reportedly in the harbor at Long Beach a vessel, formerly used by the late Theodore Roosevelt, called the Potomac. This vessel, according to the informant, was being used by the Alpha 66 organization. She was believed taking on a cargo of weapons crated as Argentine beef, and destined to leave soon for Seattle. He added that a Wes Davis had just signed on as an engineer, and there was another character named Cliff Roberts on board. Both were described as bearded adventurers.

2. The caller refused to identify himself, claiming that he did not know whether contact with the Agency would be approved by his employer, and further did not know whether or not the information was valid or of interest.

LCDR L. Lessing - Long Beach, C

3. In response to a call to the Intelligence Officer, USCG, it was learned that there is a vessel, the Potomac, formerly one of the 155' USCG cutters. For some time it had been used by the late F. D. Roosevelt as the presidential yacht. Later it had been disposed of to the Maryland (State) Fish and Game Commission, and more recently it had been acquired by the Hydra-Capital, Inc., 410 West Coast Highway, Newport Beach, California (OR 5-1549).

4. USCG advised further that an investigator for the Los Angeles County Prosecutor, D. L. Wheeler, had accepted an assignment (taking leave of absence to do so) to bring the Potomac from the Barbados to California. The plan, supposedly, was to make her a floating museum of some sort. On his arrival in Barbados, Wheeler is reported to have found the craft in foul shape, with only a single engine operative. He refused the job and returned to Los Angeles. The craft later, however, did turn up in San Diego in October and was later observed tied up in Cerritos Channel; Los Angeles harbor area; and subsequently, she was moved back to San Diego, where it is presently in a shipyard. She has since been painted, and appears to be undergoing some modifications to her hull.

US Dept of Justice - Fed. Bldg - L.A. Cal

05

5. The unidentified informant (paragraphs 1 and 2), subsequently identified as Asst. US Attorney Bill Spivak was re-contacted by telephone. It was suggested to him that in the event any more information concerning the Potomac and the likelihood of her use in any foreign activity came his way, we would appreciate another call. On this occasion Spivak volunteered the statement that it was his understanding that the Cliff Roberts he had referred to previously had come from Barbados with the vessel. This was Spivak's first reference to Barbados.

05 05

6. The above is for your information only. The sketchiness of the material presented LAFO as well as the circumstances of its origin militate against its credibility. As a consequence, no follow-up is anticipated unless requested.

- end -

TFW - 30 Nov 62
MLS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

WH-765

006920

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PDA(S) 3235549
BNY 45002

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division DATE: 31 August 1962
ATTN : Support Branch

FROM : Chief, New York Office

06
SUBJECT: Robert Pratchett/Cuban Counterrevolutionary Group, Alpha-66

1. We came in contact with a new source who will be a continuing one, known as Robert A. Pratchett, a US citizen with 27 years experience in Cuba who is currently in direct contact with a Cuban counterrevolutionary group in the US known as Alpha-66, and who is also in contact with anti-Castro Cubans working in Havana. He will give us more detailed information during the coming weeks, and represent to us the ambitions, operations and proposed sabotage activities of Alpha-66 so that they can either be controlled, encouraged or discouraged, as the case may be from the viewpoint of those interested in Cuban action groups.

2. Bio data on Prachett, for any prior clearance or interest in him, based on what he may present to us for consideration, is as follows:

08
Date & Place of Birth - 31 Oct 1918, Havana, Cuba (US citizen by birth)

08
Education - University of Pennsylvania, 1940

08
Employment - 1961 - Present H. H. Pike Co., New York and Havana
1958 - 1960 Brando and Co., Havana
1946 - 1958 Paramount Pictures International, Havana
1941 - 1945 US Army (Rank of Major)

08
Present Address - 35 Walton Ave., New Providence, New Jersey

3. Prachett, who appears to be a mature and loyal US citizen, is interested in being of the best possible service to the US Government in a non-pay status, in assisting where he can in terms of his detailed knowledge of Cubans, Cuba, and the Spanish language, which he speaks perfectly. Other than observing the plans of the Alpha-66 group as a potentially successful sabotage group, he is not affiliated with any counterrevolutionary group, but is now in business for himself as a private investor in a firm he owns and operates, called 08 PREFIXT Business Forms Inc., 60 East 42nd St., New York. He indicated that Alpha-66 plans were to blow all the power plants in Cuba.

fil'd
TFW 10 Sept 62

JAY B. L. REEVES

FLDaniels:ad

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WH 265

07427

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET SENSITIVE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN: Support Branch (Crowley)
FROM : Chief, Minneapolis Office

DATE: 31 August 1962

SUBJECT: Cuban Refugee Group

06

1. Enclosed are three names provided by [George Hauer] of Cleveland, Ohio. These apparently are the leaders of the Cuban group which you and I have discussed in some detail. For the record, [Hauer] got in touch with me because we had some rather extensive debriefing sessions in 1959, and apparently he prefers to continue that relationship for the present. Headquarters' records will show, however, that he was interviewed by Gene Rittenburg in September 1960.

2. The Cubans listed on the enclosure are the leaders of a small group which is shuttling back and forth to Cuba for the purpose of establishing reception groups, taking in medical supplies, ammunition and weapons, and to bring out other Cubans who wish to leave the country. As you know from our discussions, they are seeking help in the form of supplies, etc. [Hauer] understands that no help will be given without some measure of control by our Agency, and he agreed to provide the names for Agency consideration. The third man on the list is in Cuba at the present time. [Hauer] 06 specifically requested that we treat any on-the-street investigation with great care.

3. Please expedite any checking you might do and give me your expression of interest as soon as possible. [Hauer] 06 is not an exceptionally patient man, and I certainly expect to receive an inquiry from him in the near future. I believe he is genuinely motivated and quite capable, and in his [present position of recruiting executive personnel for Ernst & Ernst] he could be quite useful to the Agency.
06

Vernon R. Sando
VERNON R. SANDO

t-TFW
10/9/62

VRSando/jr

Enclosure

WH 829

SECRET SENSITIVE

05896

~~SECRET~~ / ~~SENSITIVE~~

1. Ernesto Rodriguez y Moreno
   Cities Service Station
   Marathon Shores, Florida

   Age 35, married, three children, owner of gas station.

2. Laureano Batista
   157 S. E. 12th Street
   Miami, Florida

   Son of prominent and reputable Havana banker, Augustin Batista

3. Victor Paneque

   Age 42. Former July 20th Commander.
   Presently in Cuba.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~SECRET~~ ~~SENSITIVE~~ WH 829

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

21 Jun 56

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

NO. FUSA-3202

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FE	20 Jun		
2. VN/PE/[redacted]			
3. VN/FI			
4. CF6/4/VN			
5. [redacted]			
6. FE/4/CB4			
7. Mr. Dacious			
8.			
9. FE/E/UN	OCT 27 1958		
10. "FOR USE OF RI ONLY" Do not write below this line			
11.			
12. RI/AN		11/18	
13.			
14. RITY 1930			
15. RI/FI - 1409 L			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

AXELRAD, EDOUARD

VN/FE [illegible]

Spain [illegible]

Chin [illegible]

English [illegible] (F)

Barb: This is the thing I gave you on [illegible] this [illegible] & it some how landed in [illegible]'s box — Suggest you discuss with them & do check on him to send info ~~CONFERRED~~ to [illegible].

6-C [illegible] A. English.

[illegible]

	201	136285	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX X	

DATE

9 JUL 1956

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

07483

[illegible] IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD

VIA AIR

SECRET

FEB 4 1962

To: Chief of Station, Phnom Penh

Info: Chief, FE

From: Chief of Station, Viet Nam

JUA

Subject:
General: Operational/FE [illegible]
Specific: Information concerning Iden A

ACTION REQUIRED: None

In answer to request of Gregory O. SAMMAN, the following is a composite of information from RUSSELL F. ELLIS (TOPPER) (IDEN B) and VERGIL N. [illegible] (IDEN C) concerning Iden A.

1. Description of subject: between 35 and 40 years old, about 6 feet tall, rather bald, small moustache, very strong and vigorous, fine white teeth, Jewish. Speaks quite good English. He is married and has one 9 or 10-year old daughter. He has a sister in New York who is a naturalized American citizen. [redacted] says subject speaks well, loves fine music, has an impressive library, reads continuously and paints very well.

2. Early during the war he was deported as a Jew to a German concentration camp (tattooed prisoner's identification number on right fore-arm—9774), where he spent several horrible years and survived only by luck. Since 1945 he has spent most of his time in Indochina and was apparently in intelligence or related fields most of the time. TOPPER reports that the first [illegible] rep in Hanoi 1950-51 was sucked in by an offer from subject to mount combined operations and was shortly afterwards declared persona non grata by the French.

3. Subject took part as a civilian in the Atlanta Operation, and, according to one report, went in with vast sums of money to make propaganda, buy off the opposition, etc. THEMIS-1 (Iden D) and [illegible] (Iden E) considered Iden A's accomplishment in Central Viet Nam among the few notable achievements in that area, particularly in respect to his contribution to the Vietnamese pacification program which he coordinated throughout the course of Operation Atlanta.

4. Subject is an old friend of Col. Jean Carbonel, former chief of [illegible]. He was for a time (June-August 1955) in the National Security Division, during which time he proposed to VILLIERS joint operations—pool resources and experience (similar to Hanoi proposal, above) but VILLIERS refused, considered proposal provocation maneuver.

5. March-April 1956 subject approached Station and USMCID for military support for program to support nucleus of a people's militia (garde civile) in the Nha Trang area. Information and correspondence on this proposal will be sent upon request.

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SECRET

6. In February-March 1955, subject was sent by the French on a special mission to Poland and East Germany to attend a conference.

7. Subject claims that while working for TRIM he organized an operation for [illegible], who later asked that he be removed from Saigon. Subject stated that [illegible] wanted to get rid of him for "political" reasons—approximately 15 December 1955.

8. At present Subject is Administrator Adjoint to French High Commissioner at Phnom Penh, as of 26 December 1955. He frequently travels to Saigon, was seen here last 17 May.

[illegible] L. [illegible]

Enclosures
    Items, two

20 June 1956

Distribution
    Orig & 2: Addressee
    1: Chief, FE
    4: Station files

SECRET

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201-136765

14-00000

SECRET [illegible]

Identities

Item A - [illegible]

Item B - [illegible]

Item C - [illegible]

Item D - [illegible]

Item E - [illegible]

SECRET

201-126765

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FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

5P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Agreed Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIR-14742

1. INTRODUCTION. As a follow up to reference, Maj. Watlington arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an opportunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes, the local ACSI representative, arrangements were made for a lengthy session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a JMWAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington, Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B. WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN. The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are covered in the following paragraph.

2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1963. conversations with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording were discussed.

a. Opa Locka Refugee Referral Procedures. Maj. Watlington made the point that in accordance with the agreements which had been reached between ACSI and KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals from Opa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to mount OB collection operations. Maj. Watlington underscored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter to run other than OB collection operations. At the same time if any of their operations produced intelligence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence would be reported via existing ACSI reports channels. REUTEMAN indicated that JMWAVE acknowledged the validity of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore willing to cooperate fully in this regard. On the other hand, we believed that it was essential that certain

CS [illegible] 19-2-12
JOB # 68-87/14
Box: / Fold: 2

19-2-12

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Chief, TFW

INDEX X

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-2-4

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 JULY 1962	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4322

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-2-4

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safeguards be built into any Opa Locka referral in order that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication of effort and/or wire crossing. This concept was readily accepted by Maj. Watlington. It did not, however, strike a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrangements, REUTEMAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register a list of agent requirements with Opa Locka and that this list could then be used as a basis upon which refugee screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col. Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka through which the referral system could be managed. In this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail identified an individual whom he considered to be primarily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this individual to be referred to Lt. Col. Causes' covert unit. At the same time Col. Kail would make arrangements to pass to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this information KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review revealed that the individual was not of operational interest to JMWAVE and his primary access was not in fields other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Maj. Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and stated that he would be prepared to discuss it further once he had an opportunity to personally review the functioning of the Opa Locka center.

201-281313 FR RE use by another U.S. Agency June 61

13 b. Antonio *CUESTA Valle. Born 13 June 1926. Lt.Col. Causes asked if we could clarify the current status of our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring a bell with any of the JMWAVE representatives, Lt. Col. Causes was asked for further details. This produced the statement that ACSI was interested in Cuesta and wanted to use him in an infiltration operation. ACSI had allegedly previously traced Cuesta with Station JMWAVE and had received the reply that KUBARK had been in touch with the individual but had terminated him because he was unreliable. In view of this response Lt. Col. Causes wanted to know whether we would recommend the reuse of Cuesta by ACSI. We responded to this by stating that we would review our files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes within the next few days.

201-268277 FR RE use by another U.S. Agency June 61

c. Laureano *BATISTA Falla. Born 1 May 1935. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we still retained an operational interest in Batista. If we did not ACSI was interested in using this individual in an infiltration operation and as a result wanted JMWAVE's opinion as to Batista's capability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes that we would check our files and would forward a written reply relative to Batista within a matter of a few days.

201-[illegible] FR RE use by another U.S. Agency June 61

d. Antonio *ORDONEZ Hernandez. Born 24 August 1918. Lt. Col. Causes asked if we were currently in touch with Ordonez. As this name rang a bell with REUTEMAN we re-24 sponded by stating that subject was of interest to us. In this connection we indicated we were willing to reexamine 24 our relationship with Ordonez in order to determine his full potential or capability, and if his capability was greater in the OB field than in fields which were of interest to us, we would certainly consider relinquishing our interest.

24

Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that he had established his equity in Ordonez through the name trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, therefore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.

e. Third Country Diplomats. REUTEMAN asked the ACSI representatives whether they were currently in touch with any third country diplomats. Maj. Watlington stated that ACSI had previously tried to harness the capabilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan and Canadian diplomatic pouches. 24 Coordination of these activities with KUBARK had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use of these facilities. As a result Maj. Watlington stated that at the present time ACSI was not in touch with any third country diplomats. On the other hand, ACSI was interested in pursuing the third country diplomatic channel as a means of establishing communications with inside assets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use the facilities of the Spanish, Uruguayan 24 or Canadian pouches. It was indicated that KUBARK understood Lt. Col. Causes' reaction; however, the KUBARK position was based on sound security principles and could not be altered. The additional explanations which were made relative to the security implications which were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and how misuse could affect long standing government to government or service to service agreements between ODYOKE and free world countries did not make any impact on Lt. Col. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to interpret KUBARK's refusal to allow him to use certain 24 diplomatic pouch channels as a clear indication that one of KUBARK's primary responsibilities in the Miami area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity. Once this attitude was identified no further attempts were made to persuade Lt. Col. Causes that our actions had been taken in the best interests of the intelligence community.

f. Maritime Infiltration of ACSI Agents. A discussion of those support services which KUBARK might render to ACSI operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes was still interested in having JMWAVE infiltrate two of his agents into PBRUMEN. In this connection the point was made by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they would prefer that JMWAVE assume responsibility for the agents in the Miami area and then deliver them through a secure mechanism to Havana. If this were not possible ACSI would reluctantly accept infiltration of their agents into any point in PBRUMEN. Lt. Col. Causes was told in very precise terms that JMWAVE would not undertake to infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiltration of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUMEN. The point was made that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to understand that our maritime capabilities were limited and we were currently committed to the full exploitation of these assets for at least six weeks in advance. As a result any operational plan which he might submit to us should be keyed to the assumption that approximately six to eight weeks would pass before we could realistically consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes agreed to project his operational plans within this frame of reference.

g. Documentation. A discussion of the documentation problem relative to agent infiltrations revealed that at the moment ACSI did not have any documentation problems which they felt warranted discussion at this session.

h. Coordination Forms. The discussion of operational coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for JMWAVE to coordinate locally those operational proposals which might be received from Lt. Col. Causes. Once this coordination was effected and if there were disagreement, then the operation could be referred to the Washington headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE. Maj. Watlington stated that the forms for effecting coordination in accordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. Watlington suggested that we not initiate the coordination mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.

i. W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in PBRUMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes was interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. In view of this he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess, polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought were suitable W/T candidates. It was indicated that we were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases and would render whatever support was required. This then resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed, polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we would be glad to monitor such transmissions if we were told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit C/W messages for ACSI agents. Here again, we stated that we would favorably consider any requests for C/W transmissions providing that we knew the content of the message, the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the agent's location and equipment which he might be using. Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on us in the near future for support in the W/T field.

j. Secret Writing. A discussion of S/W techniques revealed that if a request for the issuance of S/W were received from their Miami representative it would be reviewed, and if ACSI approved the operation KUBARK would be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local coordination that the operation in question required the use of S/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be effected with ACSI. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK Washington would cable to JMWAVE the number of the system which was to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the system to the ACSI representative in Miami.

3. COMMENT. At the conclusion of the above discussion arrangements were made for lunch, but Lt. Col. Causes chose not to participate in the luncheon session. During the luncheon conversation Maj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington

indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place at the end of September 1962. At the end of the luncheon session arrangements were made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a tour of Opa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions were to be held with Maj. Watlington particularly in regard to the development of procedures for referral of agents to ACSI from the Opa Locka flow.

4. OPA LOCKA. Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they had an interview with Col. Kail, the tenor of which was, on the part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI representative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared according to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and the ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question. In addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal might be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative being present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given. Col. Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to eliminate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious thought.

5. AGREEMENT. When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to Lt. Col. Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI representatives said that they believed that, for the time being, it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As Lt. Col. Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was agreed to as a stopgap measure.

END OF DISPATCH

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

19-2-12

4 4 C

NO-173-65

Chief, Contact Division — 5 May 1965
Att'n : NonSov Bloc Area

Chief, New Orleans Office

The Information Council of the Americas, 620 Gravier Street,
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

Ref. : NO-152-65, Support Branch (Richardson) memo of 20 April 1965, NO-161-65

~~S-5093~~ A-135263

1. The Information Council of the Americas (INCA) of 620 Gravier Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, was recently opened as a source of foreign intelligence information on the radio broadcasting industry in Latin America. The current program of INCA is primarily concerned with the dissemination of taped recordings of anti-Communist material, called Truth Tapes, to certain radio broadcasting stations in Latin America and North America for use as a weapon against Communist penetration in the Americas. Its headquarters are located at 620 Gravier Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130. You will find the names of its officers, directors, and consultants given on the enclosed letterhead of the organization.

A121440

2. We have been in recent contact with Edward Scannell Butler, Executive Vice President and Staff Director, and have received his assurances of whole-hearted cooperation in our agency's mission. [Yesterday we examined all of the files of correspondence between Mr. Butler and personnel of various radio stations in 16 Latin American countries.] In order to build up a market for the Truth Tapes program in Latin America, Mr. Butler first obtained from the appropriate consul in New Orleans a list of the radio stations in operation in his country. He next wrote the administrative personnel of these stations about the anti-Communist purpose of INCA and offered to supply each station with Truth Tapes. Those stations requesting them were then provided with a series of the tapes. One or two years later, Mr. Butler sent the participating station a questionnaire designed to elicit information about audience response to the Truth Tapes program. Copies of the first questionnaire and of a revised one are attached for your information. Judging by the responses we read, the INCA correspondence files will provide a limited amount of information, dated 1964 and 1965, on the identification of radio stations in Latin America which are broadcasting Truth Tapes, their addresses, the names of key personnel, the identification of stations not responding to the INCA offer, sizes of audiences, and their responses. In the case of Uruguay, the exchange of correspondence between Mr. Butler and Dr. Martin Miqueo-Narancio contained information about the political orientation of key radio personnel in Montevideo /NO-10671/. This example, however, is an exception, since the files contain virtually no detailed political information of significance.

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3. Mr. Butler mentioned yesterday that, inasmuch as he was again revising the questionnaire, he would welcome our suggestions about additional topics. We suggested questions designed to elicit technical information about the station and its equipment, such as descriptions (manufacturer, type, model) of transmitter, receiver, antenna type and power, frequencies and frequency range, reliability of equipment, normal and emergency power sources, remote pick-up arrangements, etc. We stressed of course that none of these topics should be introduced into the questionnaire unless Mr. Butler was convinced of their suitability for his immediate purpose as well as for the long-term propaganda aim of his organization. He stated that our suggestions were entirely proper and, in his opinion, were reasonable requests that would not arouse the station manager's curiosity. We pointed out to Mr. Butler that, while information about key personnel and their political orientation, about the station's administrative policies, etc., was of prime importance to us, these subjects obviously could not be introduced into the questionnaire. He agreed that it would be better to elicit such information in another manner, as he had done with OS Dr. Miqueo-Narancio, but because of his very heavy responsibilities, he did not have time to develop similar sources of information in each of the other 15 countries.

4. It occurs to us that you or a possible consumer could assist us by suggesting other appropriate topics for Mr. Butler's consideration in the revision of the questionnaire. We shall appreciate whatever help you can give us in this regard.

5. In the meantime, as soon as all of Mr. Butler's current correspondence has been properly filed, we expect to extract the appropriate information from the folders and to present the material in a series of 00-B reports.

LLOYD A. RAY

DABrandao/gn

Enclosures

cc: Services Branch

☐ ☐ SE ONLY ☐ ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Current Address of Maurice Halperin

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Chief, Contact Division (Support) Stuntz	2268	WH 729
		DATE 31 DEC 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. TFW/Registry Mrs. Krages GE 2702				I am sending this to the following: 1) TFW 2) SR/CI 3) CI/LN 4) Security Mayo Stuntz
2. Sam Halpern, Ex off - TFW GE 2708	4 Jan	4	SH	
3. TFW/CI/Harm				
4.				
5. C/Contact Division (Support) Stuntz				file this Cover sheet file in WH 729. Stunt
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				WH-729

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

#09254

14-00000

SECRET

00A(S)3,246,933

WSYRO-8060

27 December 1962

Preston E. James
342 Huntington B Crouse Hall
Syracuse University,
Syracuse, N.Y.

Subject: Current Address of Maurice Halperin

1. A source of this office has just advised us that he received a Christmas card (1962) from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as: "Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba." The only message on the card was one of Christmas greetings. Halperin and our source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards. This is the first one Halperin has sent with a Cuban address on it. The last time that our source saw Halperin was in Moscow when he (the former) was visiting in the USSR during August-September 1961 as part of an official US delegation.

2. In view of Halperin's past activities and associations, we are making this information known to you. Our source comments that Halperin always seems to show up wherever there is some sort of activity going on.

-end-

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[illegible]

WH-729

14P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

TO Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE akr

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Review and Analysis of AMFAUNA Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

FILMED [redacted]

Action Required:

1. Traces on AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, identified in Attachment E. POAs on AMFAUNAs 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19.

2. Ascertain whether AMFAUNA-3 is of operational interest to ODIBEX (see paragraph 15b).

3. Forward evaluations of documentary intelligence provided by AMFAUNA-4 (see paragraph 56).

Summary

4. AMFAUNA-1 is a Cuban national who was recruited and trained in the United States and returned legally to Cuba in March 1961 to serve as resident agent in Havana. Since then he has built a net of over twenty sub-agents and has sent back 140 S/W messages, from which upwards of fifty intelligence disseminations have been made. He is highly motivated for his work and under effective control by JMWAVE. The quality of his production is, for the most part, very good and improving, although he is at times distracted by an understandable interest in para-military operations. Operationally he is very skillful; however, he has been known to take unnecessary risks. There is no reason to think that he is under hostile control nor that the operation is likely in the future to be turned against us. There is, however, the real risk that he may one day fall into a G-2 trap baited with the Escambray guerrillas. If so, this will be due to the fact that contact with the guerrillas was his first assignment and, although he has been re-directed to intelligence collection, he sometimes seems to feel that he has failed in his primary mission. This, plus the fact that he evidently believes that the end is now very close, is apt to make him vulnerable to an appeal from the "heroes of the Escambray". 24 24

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Present Status of the Operation - Modus Operandi:

5. There is considerable evidence that AMFAUNA-1 is extraordinarily

Attachments: A-D, Incl NSM
Charts A,B,C,D h/w N.S.M. attached
Attch. E - Identities ~~USC~~ (AMFAUNAs 2-23)
Attch. F - Identities ~~USC~~
Att 1, 2 + 3 NA
att. 4 NSM
att 5 + 6 H/W

Distribution:
3-Headquarters
[redacted]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO attached

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T

DATE TYPED 11 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED JUL 23 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-4703

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-291230 19-6-50/3

#8904

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skillful in the practice of security. He has built a false identity which he uses wherever possible in his operational contacts, he is usually selective and cautious in his choice of collaborators, he takes pains to check on the security of his sub-agents, and he uses a system of cutouts for much of his work.

6. Some of AMFAUNA-1's older collaborators know him by ~~true~~ name, but wherever possible he introduces himself to new contacts by the name of ("Julio" "ROJO") 07 Evidently he is now living the part of (Julio ROJO) 07 to such an extent that he has in effect a double identity. In one of his S/W messages he asked that the widow of AMCUSP-1 be warned not to reveal that ("Julio") is in Cuba. Since AMFAUNA-1 is in Cuba legally, and all his family 07 and friends know it, this can only mean that she should not reveal that AMFAUNA-1 and ("Julio ROJO") are 07 identical.

201-291230 pseudonymn used by sub. of 201

7. In recruiting sub-agents, AMFAUNA-1 relies primarily on his own judgment and intuition. If he approves of a person, he will recruit him. However, he has shown himself to be very cautious in granting his approval. He has reported two persons whom he does not completely trust because, while otherwise well qualified, they drink too much and are indiscreet. For two other examples, AMBOA-1 and LITAU-5 approached him separately and revealed their relationship with KUBARK, hoping to collaborate with him; AMFAUNA-1 treated them both with reserve while he checked them out with JMWAVE. He has submitted 04 the names of other contacts for checking. In the case of AMFAUNA-4, whom he recruited without prior checking because time did not permit it, he put his misgivings in writing: "Right away AMFAUNA-1 arranged for a personal interview, taking utmost precautions, since we have had sad previous experiences with members of CASTRO's armed forces."

8. Once he has recruited a sub-agent, AMFAUNA-1 manages to keep an independent eye on the former's security. On more than one occasion he has reported that one of his sub-agents is under G-2 surveillance, and that for the time being he is staying away from him.

9. In general AMFAUNA-1 seems to trust in the efficiency of his security precautions. On 25 February 1962 he reported that Identity 11 had been caught, but that he was in no danger because he had been compartmented from her. 04 This 04 compartmentation is achieved by the use of (five) 04 cutouts: AMFAUNA-2, AMFAUNA-3, AMFAUNA-4, 04 AMBOA-1, and AMFAUNA-5, who maintain contact for AMFAUNA-1 with most if not all of his sub-agents. Chart A, which shows AMFAUNA-1 in direct contact with AMFAUNAs 7 through 13, may be in error on this point. It would be more in keeping with AMFAUNA-1's known modus operandi for him to have cutouts between himself and these sub-agents. If there is a cutout or cutouts here, their identity is not yet known. There may also be an unreported cutout between AMFAUNA-1 and AMFAUNA-4.

10. Except for AMFAUNA-4, all the above-mentioned cutouts are women. Two of his support agents, including his mail drop, are also women. AMFAUNA-1 has not been explicit on this point, but it is believed that he shares his favors between them. If so, he has the best of cover for his relations with them. It also clarifies the otherwise puzzling picture of a legal resident of Cuba sleeping in a different bed each night. This practice must certainly reduce the possibility that the G-2 will pick him up for routine questioning.

Communications:

11. The bulk of AMFAUNA-1's communications come via S/W. His messages to JMWAVE are sent to accommodation addresses serviced by AMPAN-2 and AMCUTLER-1. JMWAVE's messages to him are addressed to AMFAUNA-14. AMFAUNA-1 can also use (diplomatic couriers) for sending documents and other material unsuitable for S/W. He has 24 a personal contact with two of the officers (of the Spanish Embassy), 24 who either bring it to the JMWAVE area and mail it to AMCUTLER-1, or carry it 15-2

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second via AMFAUNA-14.

12. The courier system can also work in the other direction. AMFAUNA-1 has been supplied with S/W materials for his own use by way of the (Spanish Embassy,) and for the use of AMRIPE-1 and AMRAVEL-1 by way of the (Argentine Embassy) 24

13. A third communications 01 channel 08 exists in the weekly telephone conversations (between) AMCUTLER-1 (and his wife) AMFAUNA-2. 01 It is useful for passing signals already prearranged by S/W, and for confirming that AMFAUNA-1 is still at liberty. If he is ever arrested, the news will probably come first by this means.

Finances:

14. Expenses of the operation are $300 per month. The money is given monthly to Identity-3 or Identity-4 in the JMWAVE area. Identity-3, upon receipt of the dollars, notifies Identity-1 in Havana who in turn pays Cuban pesos to AMFAUNA-1. Identity-4 follows the same procedure with Identity-2. AMFAUNA-1 confirms receipt of this money by S/W.

Sub-agents:

15. Following is a description of the sub-agents in the AMFAUNA net, including AMCOG-2 and AMBOA-1 who, although they have their own independent connections to JMWAVE, have to some extent joined forces with AMFAUNA-1. For the identities of AMFAUNAs 2 through 23, see Attachment E, forwarded under separate cover.

a. 01 AMFAUNA-2: AMFAUNA-1's sister-in-law, she formerly served as his contact to members of his net (in asylum in the 08 various embassies) and now serves as his cutout to at least the following:

(1) AMCOG-2: She first appears in AMFAUNA-1's correspondence in his S/W message No. 14 dated 19 May 1961, where he mentions that she was his link to a radio station operated by the (Rescate) 29 organization. Nothing ever came of this proposed communications channel, but AMCOG-2 remained in contact with AMFAUNA-1, helping him arrange asylum for burned agents and passing some of his communications (to diplomatic couriers.) 24 AMFAUNA-1 reported on 9 July 1961, in his S/W message No. 21, that AMCOG-2 knew him only by his alias (Julio ROJO.) 07 In his message No. 118, dated June 1962, he reported that AMFAUNA-15 had accidentally blown his true name to AMCOG-2. For a further discussion of AMCOG-2, and her relation to the security of AMFAUNA-1 see paragraph 56 below.

(2) 01 AMFAUNA-14: She is the secretary of 01 (AMCOG-2,) with whom she has done clandestine work. She now serves AMFAUNA-1 as an accommodation address and as a source of information. Message No. 112 dated 18 April 1962 included the name of a Communist nurse who has allegedly come to the United States with the mission of infiltrating a counter-revolutionary group. AMFAUNA-14 obtained this information from a doctor (in a Havana clinic.) 08 She also is AMFAUNA-1's (link to the Dutch diplomatic pouch.) 24

(3) AMFAUNA-15: She is a relative of 01 (AMFAUNA-14) and a friend of AMCOG-2. She is also the wife of AMFAUNA-17 and a friend of AMFAUNA-16 who is now 08 (imprisoned on the Isle of Pines) and sends her

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b. AMFAUNA-3: AMFAUNA-1's first mention of her is in his S/W message No. 127 dated 4 May 1962. She has provided information on military hospitals, 56 and has a trusted contact (Identity 7) in the G-2. 24 She also was AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-12, who was a Havana 08 contact of the guerrilla leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ. 24 In early June 1962 she was approached by Identity-8 who claimed to be the new contact to the RAMIREZ organization. (See also paragraph 58 below.) On 15 March 1962 AMFAUNA-3 was traced by ODIBEX who proposed to use her in their Operation CASINO. A negative trace reply was given at that time. Headquarters is requested to ascertain whether ODIBEX has a valid prior claim on this agent.

c. AMFAUNA-4: 01 He is a high-ranking Cuban Army officer who has provided AMFAUNA-1 with documentary information which ought to be of some value, although JMWAVE has not yet seen it, it having gone to Headquarters via Madrid through the channel described in paragraph 11 above. 52 He also claims to be receiving information from Identity-9 and Identity-10. AMFAUNA-1 was introduced to AMFAUNA-4 by AMCOG-2 who in turn was introduced to him by Identity-13. 01 For a further discussion of this matter, see paragraph 56 below.

d. AMBOA-1: The origin of AMFAUNA-1's contact with this agent, who has also been recruited independently by JMWAVE, is uncertain. He first mentioned her in October 1961 as his cutout to Identity-14, a Cubana Airlines pilot 08 who had formerly been a contact of AMCUSP-1 and who subsequently defected. AMFAUNA-1's last mention of her was on 15 November when he reported that she had given him a map showing artillery installations on the south coast of Las Villas. It is possible that AMFAUNA-1 has broken contact with her, but since he has not reported having done so it is considered more likely that she remains his cutout to two Cubana Airlines 08 pilots who are known to be still reporting:

(1) AMFAUNA-18: He was recruited in March 1962, and has provided AMFAUNA-1 with passenger lists 24 and the location of artillery emplacements which 24 he has spotted from his aircraft. 24 It is not known how AMFAUNA-1 first met AMFAUNA-18, and it is possible that AMFAUNA-1 meets directly with him. It is only surmised that AMBOA-1 is his cutout to him.

(2) AMFAUNA-19: He was recruited at the same time as AMFAUNA-18. Although AMFAUNA-1 did not explicitly say so, it can be inferred that he and AMFAUNA-18 are witting of each other's recruitment.

e. AMFAUNA-5: AMFAUNA-1 first reported her as an agent in September 1961. 56 She is the sister-in-law of AMFAUNA-23, 01 a former naval officer who had been an agent of AMFAUNA-1 as early as July 1961 but had been caught and imprisoned for trying to leave Cuba illegally. 24 She has been the source of information on Cuban airfields, and is the cutout to a group of people employed at Rancho Boyeros Airport. 24 It is believed that the identities of all these people have not yet been reported, but they seem to be effective. On 29 May 1962 AMFAUNA-1 reported the arrival of an undocumented Soviet plane 24 at Rancho Boyeros, and forwarded the passenger list which he said one of his agents had obtained clandestinely. Following are the persons with whom AMFAUNA-5 is known to be in contact.

(1) AMFAUNA-20, 01 her husband. AMFAUNA-1 has written that he has broken personal contact with this man.

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(2) AMPAN 12: A former chief engineer of the Office of Airports 08 he was recruited by Havana Station in 1960, and has been corresponding with JMWAVE by S/W.

(3) AMFAUNA-21: A chief inspector of mechanics 08 for Cubana Airlines. He has stated his willingness to sabotage air traffic 24 but his precise contribution to AMFAUNA-1's operations is not known.

(4) AMFAUNA-22: A chief of electrical instruments 08 for Cubana Airlines. Nothing more is known about this man.

(5) AMFAUNA-23: Brother-in-law of AMFAUNA-5. 01

f. AMFAUNA-6: A support agent. AMFAUNA-1 has written that she has no access to information of interest, but is an intelligent and brave female whom he uses for cover and to secure overt information.

g. AMFAUNA-7: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his brother AMCUTLER-1. 01 He works closely with AMFAUNA-8 and formerly was AMFAUNA-1's cutout to the Uruguayan Embassy. 24

h. AMFAUNA-8: An old friend of AMFAUNA-1 and his brother AMCUTLER-1. 01 He has a contact in the Interior Ministry 08 and works closely with AMFAUNA-7.

i. AMFAUNA-9: A former sales manager 08 for a coffee firm, 08 he secures information of general interest from coffee buyers 08 travelling throughout Cuba.

j. AMFAUNA-10: 10 A widow of a bank employee, she has contacts in Santiago de Cuba and in the Cuban Navy and G-2. 24 She is also related to the son of Fidel CASTRO and has provided information on the son's 24 whereabouts and indoctrination.

k. AMFAUNA-11: An employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 08 and the wife of a Communist member of the Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN), 08 she has reported political intelligence. In March 1962 AMFAUNA-1 reported that she was under surveillance and that he was therefore avoiding her.

l. AMFAUNA-12: He obtains information from contacts within the Cuban Petroleum Institute (ICP). 08

m. AMFAUNA-13: An insurance 08 company employee with contacts in the Cuban Government, he has reported information on G-2 activities in Cuba and the United States.

Background and Motivation:

16. AMFAUNA-1 is a 39-year-old 08 Cuban male, born in Cuba of Spanish parents. He has tried his hand at various kinds of work, including the import business, journalism (he was once editor of Diario de la Marina) and insurance. 08 He has also ventured into politics, having been a candidate of the Autentico Party in 1958. 08 During the Spanish Civil War he was a member of the Falanje Espanola, 24 and during World War II, until the entry of the United States, he was an agent of the German Intelligence Service. 24 The JMWAVE case officer who trained AMFAUNA-1 in tradecraft in March 1961 (see UFGA-1247 of 10 April 1961) observed that he already had a grounding in clandestine techniques. The case officer also characterized AMFAUNA-1 as " a pleasant, intelligent fellow" and "the most astute member of the team" comprising himself, AMCUS-1 01 and AMCUTLER-1. 01

children, all still in Cuba (as of March 1961) 09 However, it is noted that the two children have different matronymics, that neither of them is his wife's last name, and that all three dependents have different addresses. It is assumed that this is his third wife. Since AMFAUNA-1 has never mentioned her in any of his S/W correspondence, it is also assumed that she has gone the way of her two predecessors.

18. AMCUTLER-1, 01 who was questioned on this point, said that his brother is living in Guanabacoa with his present wife, that he has been married only once before, 10 and has only one child from the first marriage. This information is not considered definitive, because the last point is directly contradicted by AMFAUNA-1's PRQ Part I which he wrote himself, but it is included here for what it may be worth. AMCUTLER-1 01 added that his brother has no sexual relations with his sub-agents except what is considered normal and acceptable by Cuban standards.

19. The elements of AMFAUNA-1's motivation, then, include an adventurous spirit and a taste for clandestine work. Although "anti-Communism" may be an overworked expression, it would seem to apply in the case of AMFAUNA-1, if his former membership in the Falange 29 and the German Intelligence Service can be taken as indicators. Also included should be the loss of a freight forwarding business which started out promisingly in 1959 but folded up after a year 06 of CASTRO's revolutionary government. Finally, although these factors did not yet exist in January 1961 when he was recruited, AMFAUNA-1 is certainly affected now by the death of AMCUSP-1 01 and the imprisonment of his father. 06

Control

20. It is evident from his S/W messages that AMFAUNA-1 derives great personal satisfaction from his work against the CASTRO regime. His connection with KUBARK provides him with the means to do this work. This is believed to be a strong element of control. There have been many opportunities to test this control, by ordering AMFAUNA-1 to do something or to desist from doing something else, and the control is believed to be effective.

Previous History of the Operation - January to May 1961:

21. AMFAUNA-1 was engaged in some form of clandestine work against the CASTRO regime as early as December 1960. 09 As with so much else in this operation, details are lacking, but it is known that he already had an understanding with Identity-29 whom he had known for twenty years. 06 In December 1960, Identity-29 introduced AMFAUNA-1 to Identity-27, an MAR coordinator from Matanzas, who had been introduced to Identity-29 by one of the members of her group, Identity-28. Identity-27 in turn brought in Identity-26, a fellow MAR coordinator. 06

22. In January 01 1961, AMFAUNA-1 01 came legally to the United States together with AMCUSP-1 and AMCUTLER-1 and looked up their old friend AMJAG-4, who at that time was heavily engaged in work with the resistance groups. AMJAG-4 introduced them to a JMWAVE case officer who instructed them to return to Cuba, to form contacts with as many resistance groups as possible, and to report their progress through AMRUNG-1 who was JMWAVE's principal agent in the paramilitary field. Also in the JMWAVE area at this time were Identity-19 and Identity-23 whom they met and with whom they were later to work.

09 23. AMFAUNA-1, AMCUTLER-1, 01 and AMCUSP-1 01 returned to 10 Cuba in January 1961. They dispatched Identity-16 to the Escambray, Identity-17 to Sancti Spiritus, 10 Identity-18 to Trinidad, 11 and Identity-37 to Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Santiago de Cuba. 10 An unidentified courier was put into touch with the guerrilla leader Identity-15, and AMCUSP-1 01 and AMCUTLER-1 01 went to Cienfuegos with Identity-19 to make contacts with insurgent groups there.

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time, as did AMRUNG-1. 01

25. 01 To support the activities of AMFAUNA-1, AMCUTLER-1, 01 and AMCUSP-1, it was agreed that JMWAVE would deposit $1,000 monthly into the local bank account of AMCUSP-1 and the latter would provide the equivalent in Cuban pesos from his 01 own resources inside Cuba.

26. AMCUSP-1 01 and AMCUTLER-1 01 continued to busy themselves with preparations for supporting the April invasion. They contacted Identity-21 who, at their request, provided cover as travelling drug 08 salesmen for Identity-19 and also for Identity-20 who was intended to be a radio operator for Identity-23. Although AMFAUNA-1 knew all these people, he was compartmented from these 01 operations to some extent, so that after the arrest of AMCUSP-1 and the escape of AMCUTLER-1 he had some difficulty in reestablishing contact with them.

27. 01 AMCUTLER-1 01 and AMFAUNA-1, working together, held meetings with Identity-33, a Cuban Army officer stationed at the San Antonio de 10 los Banos base, and discussed plans for supporting the invasion. AMFAUNA-1 also contacted Identity-35, the commanding officer of the 08 San Julian base, and arranged for its surrender, using Identity-34, head of the OA in Pinar del Rio, 08 as a cutout. He had another agent on the base, Identity 36, and had already recruited AMFAUNA-11, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 08

28. On 18 March 1961, 09 AMCUSP-1 01 and AMRUNG-1 01 were arrested by the G-2 while holding a clandestine meeting. At first this was not regarded as too serious a matter. The G-2 had broken into the meeting only after having been alerted by the suspicious behavior of a woman lookout, and it was believed that they had no real evidence. 01 AMCUTLER-1 came to the JMWAVE area on 09 3 April 1961 and returned 01 again to Cuba on 10 April, 09 still optimistic that AMCUSP-1 and AMRUNG-1 would either be released or could be helped to escape. 01 However, one 01 of the other prisoners apparently 09 confessed and implicated AMCUSP-1 and AMRUNG-1, 01 who were executed on 20 April. With the wave of arrests accompanying the April 17 invasion, AMCUTLER-1 took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy and AMFAUNA-1 went temporarily 01 into hiding. 11

29. On 27 April 1961 AMFAUNA-1 resumed operations by sending Identities 24, 25, 26 and 27 to collect order of battle information in Matanzas. Identities 26 and 27 returned to Havana to report. Identity-25 remained in Matanzas, and Identity-24 was caught by the G-2.

30. In May 1961, Identity-30 informed AMFAUNA-1 that some kind of conspiratorial activity was going on in the home of AMCOG-2. He arranged to meet her through Identity-30 whom he thereafter used as a cutout to her.

31. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart B. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and execution:

   (1) AMCUSP-1 01
   (2) AMRUNG-1 01

b. By arrest and detention:

   (1) Identity-24
   (2) Identity-28

c. By asylum or escape to the U.S.:

   (1) AMCUTLER-1 01
   (2) Identity-23

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-4703

Previous History of the Operation - June to November 1961:

32. In the period beginning June 1961, AMFAUNA-1 first began making regular use of AMFAUNA-2. 01 He needed contact with his collaborators 01 who were in asylum in various Western 01 embassies, and with AMFAUNA-2 openly visiting her husband AMCUTLER-1 she 06 was a natural choice for the job. 06 With the departure of Identities 29 and 30, AMFAUNA-1 began using AMFAUNA-2 as cutout to AMCOG-2 who was useful to him for her ability to obtain 01 the help of diplomatic 24 couriers. In August 1961 he used this channel to send out some order of battle information obtained by Identity-21.

33. Identity-21 continued to help Identities 19 and 20 until they took asylum in the Argentine Embassy. 08 He also served as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-50 who was a close friend of the insurgent leader 08, 06 Oswaldo RAMIREZ. For cutouts to Identity-21, AMFAUNA-1 first used Identity-51 and then AMFAUNA-8. AMFAUNA-8 also served as cutout to Identity-45 about whom nothing more is known than his name. 06

34. AMFAUNA-1 developed another contact to Oswaldo RAMIREZ during this period in 08 the person of Identity-52, a close relative of RAMIREZ 08 and a former lieutenant in the Rebel Army. Identity-52 met AMFAUNA-1 and Identity-21 on 27 October 1961, and then remained in touch through Identity-51. A few weeks later Identity-52 was arrested.

35. At some time during the period June to November 1961, AMFAUNA-1 began collaborating with AMBOA-1. The origin of this collaboration is not known, but it appears that the initiative was taken by AMBOA-1. AMFAUNA-1 reported that she had revealed to him the fact that she has a channel of S/W communication to KUBARK, and that she had claimed to be a friend of the widow of AMCUSP-1. 01 AMFAUNA-1 asked JMWAVE to confirm her bona fides, and this was done. AMBOA-1 06 then began working as AMFAUNA-1's cutout to Identity-14, a Cubana Airlines pilot who in 08 turn was receiving information from Identity 40, an employee of Cubana. At some time prior to November 1961, Identity-40 was fired from her job and held for interrogation by the G-2.

36. During the same period AMFAUNA-1 added the following new agents:

a. AMFAUNA-23 (for description see paragraph 15e5 above).

b. AMFAUNA-5 (for description see paragraph 15e above).

c. Identity-41, a person who allegedly was collaborating with several other clandestine groups. He had two sub-agents in the Ministry of Public Works, 06 Identities 42 and 43. No production has been attributable to these people.

08

d. Identity-46, a clerk in the Ministry of Communications who allegedly was able to obtain the text of cables between Cuba 11 and Czechoslovakia. Nothing ever came 24 of this contact.

e. Identity-47, a secretary to the Chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. 08 AMFAUNA-1 obtained some order of battle information from her, apparently on an unwitting basis. In August 1961 he reported that he was dropping her because she was a strong Communist and had given him information which he considered of doubtful reliability.

08

f. Identity-48, a foreman on the Havana docks who provided some order of battle information.

g. Identity-49, Chief of Maritime Police in Cienfuegos. 08 Although his recruitment was reported, AMFAUNA-1 never mentioned him again.

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and AMFAUNA-1 hid him in Havana until he was able to get asylum for him in the Ecuadorian Embassy. 06

38. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart C. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity 19 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the Argentine Embassy) 06

(2) Identity 20 (subsequently escaped and took asylum in the Argentine Embassy) 06

(3) Identity 40 (interrogated by G-2, but the duration of her detention is not known).

(4) Identity 52.

b. By asylum:

(1) Identity 21

(2) Identity 37.

Previous History of the Operation - December 1961 to April 1962:

39. During the period from December 1961 to April 1962, AMFAUNA-1 continued to use AMFAUNA-2 01 as a cutout to AMCOG-2. The latter was 24 given a lead in March 1962 from Identity-13, one of her diplomatic contacts, to a disaffected Cuban Army officer, AMFAUNA-4. 01 She turned this lead over to AMFAUNA-1, and the latter held his first meeting with AMFAUNA-4 01 in AMFAUNA-2's automobile.

40. AMFAUNA-2 01 was also used as alternate cutout to Identity-11, a woman with contacts in the Cuban Navy. 08 The other alternate cutout was AMFAUNA-8. Identity-11 was arrested in February 1962. 09 According to AMFAUNA-1's account of the incident in his message No. 89 of 25 February 1962, Identity-11 had been meeting a member of Fidel 24 CASTRO's bodyguard. AMFAUNA-1 had warned her not to trust the man, but she met him again on the following day and was caught with him. AMFAUNA-1 commented that some of his other agents were not compartmented from her, and he had ordered them to go into hiding. He did not identify these other agents. Presumably they included AMFAUNA-2 01 and AMFAUNA-8.

41. AMFAUNA-3 was recruited during 08 this period and used as a cutout to Identity-12, 06 the Havana representative of the insurgent leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ. According to an official announcement by the Cuban Government, RAMIREZ was killed in action on 09 16 April 1962. Other sources have contradicted this report, 08 and the matter still remains in some doubt. However, according to information obtained by AMFAUNA-1, Identity-12 was arrested in his home in Havana in late April. For a further discussion of the possible security implications of this connection, see paragraph 59 below.

42. Identity-51, who during the period June 24 to November 1961, had been serving as a link to the Oswaldo RAMIREZ group, now established a contact with Identity-54, a resident of Cienfuegos who claimed to be a disillusioned counter-revolutionary. As a 10 cutout to Identity-54, she used Identity-53. As far as the records show, no results were ever obtained from this connection.

06 43. Identity-14 defected during this period, as did Identity-57, another Cubana Airlines pilot whom AMFAUNA-1 had recruited and was

paragraph 15e above, AMFAUNA-1 seems to have an excellent network within Cuban aviation, 08 but how it works remains a matter for conjecture. It is supposed that AMBOA-1 is handling the two new pilots. 08

44. AMFAUNA-21 and AMFAUNA-22, both employees at Rancho Boyeros 08 Airport, first made their appearance during this period, and AMPAN-12 (who has and continues to use his own S/W communications to JMWAVE) found his way into the AMFAUNA operation. All three are known to AMFAUNA-5, and it is believed that she is probably the cutout to them.

45. Identity-55 and Identity-56 were mentioned briefly as active during the period from December 1961 to April 1962. The former had been a contact of AMRUNG-1 and seems to have gone into hiding; in any case, nothing more has been reported on him. The latter was an agent of AMFAUNA-1 in Santiago de Cuba; 10 in January 1962 he was in hiding and awaiting a chance to go into asylum.

46. AMFAUNA-11 remained active during this period, and AMFAUNA-9, 10, and 12 were added to the operation. For descriptions of these agents, see paragraph 15 above.

47. This phase of the AMFAUNA operation is diagrammed in Chart D. The following people participating in this phase were separated from the operation by known causes:

a. By arrest and detention:

(1) Identity-11

(2) Identity-12.

b. By asylum or defection:

(1) Identity-14

(2) Identity-55

(3) Identity-56

(4) Identity-57.

Production:

48. JMWAVE records do not show the total number of AMFAUNA reports disseminated since January 1961. The figure is at least fifty, and is believed to be nearer one hundred, if the present frequency of dissemination can be a criterion. In content they have leaned heavily toward the activities of insurgent groups, militia movements, location of artillery, and aviation matters. There has been a more recent tendency toward political and economic information, which is being encouraged by JMWAVE. Evaluations of his production are lacking.

Security Analysis:

49. The possibility that AMFAUNA-1 is a double agent is considered remote. His successful LCFLUTTER, the fact (or what is believed to be the fact) that his close friend and fellow agent AMCUSP-1 was executed, and AMFAUNA-1's own character and background, all 10 argue against the proposition that he was originally dispatched by the G-2. However, it must be admitted that the LCFLUTTER can be beaten. Also that there is no proof, other than the fact that AMCUSP-1's wife is in the JMWAVE area and behaving like a widow, that AMCUSP-1 was really executed. There is documentary evidence, in the form of a letter written by a fellow prisoner to AMCUSP-1's widow, that he was held in prison in March and April 1961. However, the person who identified and buried the body was AMFAUNA-1's father, who was subsequently 06

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50. Similarly, all that is known about AMFAUNA-1's background comes from AMFAUNA-1's own statements embodied in his PRQ Part I. No confirmation of this information has ever been obtained. From this point of view there is no guarantee that AMFAUNA-1 is what he claims to be. For all the proof to the contrary available to JMWAVE, he could as easily have been a Spanish Communist as a member of the Spanish Falange. 29

51. These points are listed for the sake of completeness, but little importance is attached to them. The known fact that QUANTUM-51 and QUANTUM-52 consider AMFAUNA-1 reliable suggests that he at least was not a Spanish Communist. And an unusually extensive independent view has been obtained of AMFAUNA-1's operations through the reports and debriefings of eight of his agents who have either escaped to or are in communication with the United States. The defection of Identity-14, and the escape and debriefings of Identity-19, Identity-23, Identity-26, and Identity-29, have all confirmed parts of AMFAUNA-1's story. Finally, AMCOG-3 has reported by S/W that AMCOG-2 is in contact with AMFAUNA-1, and AMFAUNA-2's telephone conversations with AMCUTLER-1 provide a continuing check on the safety and whereabouts of AMFAUNA-1. 01

52. For the same reasons, the possibility is heavily discounted that AMFAUNA-1 has been caught and doubled by the G-2 since his arrival in Cuba. Additional indications that all is still well are the fact that he never omits the safety signal that was given him for use in his S/W, that his operational activities are consistent with his character and background, and that the reporting of his agents is consistent with their access to information.

53. Whether AMFAUNA-1 is now in danger of being detected, and whether the G-2 could double him if they do catch him, are two questions remaining to be considered. Taking the second question first, it is believed that the chances of the G-2 running a successful CI operation against KUBARK through AMFAUNA-1 are extremely slim. To be sure, the G-2 has certain weapons that they could use against AMFAUNA-1. His father is already in prison, serving a fifteen-year sentence, and his mother and two children are still in Cuba as potential hostages. 06 It is also conceivable that the G-2 could use AMFAUNA-1's own interest in paramilitary operations as a lever by persuading him that KUBARK, by neglecting to support the insurgent leader Oswaldo RAMIREZ, was responsible for the latter's death and has demonstrated its indifference to the fate of the Cuban people. This would all take time, however, because AMFAUNA-1's reaction to arrest, at least initially, would probably be an attempt to emulate his two heroes, AMCUSP-1 and AMRUNG-1. 01 In the time that it would take the G-2 to break down this resistance, AMCUTLER-1 would almost certainly have learned, either through his phone conversations with AMFAUNA-2 or by the interruption of the same, that something is wrong with AMFAUNA-1.

54. The risks that AMFAUNA-1 is now running are believed to be considerable. For one thing, at least ten persons with varying degrees of knowledge of his clandestine operations, have been held temporarily or permanently by the G-2, which is believed to be increasing in competence as a security force. For another, AMFAUNA-1 takes unnecessary chances, as by interrogating a new and untested agent (AMFAUNA-4) in the personal automobile of his sister-in-law, or by personally trying to penetrate a restricted area. And for a third, he has some contacts which can be dangerous to him.

55. AMCOG-2 knows too much about AMFAUNA-1 for the latter's good. It is believed that AMFAUNA-1 himself is aware that this is a potentially serious security weakness, because he took the trouble to report it (see paragraph 15a1 above). The AMCOG operation is itself a fairly complex one, and will be analyzed in a separate dispatch. The aspects of it which bear on the AMFAUNA operation are that AMCOG-2 and her brother AMCOG-3 are close relatives of a very prominent anti-Communist Cuban politician, 06 and that they are widely known, both in Cuba and in

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prosecution for acts against it, is a matter for wonder. It has been rumored that the old 10 politician has a blackmail hold over Fidel CASTRO by virtue of his possession of very damaging information about CASTRO. There may be some substance to this rumor. As a young student, CASTRO is believed to have committed criminal acts, and the old politician 08 would have been in the best possible position at the time to obtain proof of them. This might well explain why the family enjoys immunity today.

56. It would seem, though, that an alert and competent security service, which the G-2 shows signs of becoming, if it is enjoined from arresting and prosecuting an espionage suspect, would at least try to control and monitor his operations by penetrating them. It is therefore a cause for speculation that, in February 1962, an important officer of the Cuban Army (AMFAUNA-4) 08 allegedly desirous of defecting, was introduced by Identity-13 to AMCOG-2, and a matter for deep concern that AMCOG-2 passed the lead along to AMFAUNA-1 who accepted it without any prior checking and actually held his first meeting with the would-be defector in an automobile traceable to AMFAUNA-2. Since then, it has been observed that reports and sub-sources offered by AMFAUNA-4 are absorbing an increasing amount of AMFAUNA-1's time. The military manuals and documents turned over by AMFAUNA-4, and sent to Headquarters via the 01 QUANTUMs and the Madrid Station 15 have not yet been seen by JMWAVE, so it is not yet known whether AMFAUNA-4's production can be given a sufficiently high evaluation to allay the doubts raised by the manner of his recruitment. Headquarters is asked to advise on this as soon as possible, and to provide traces on AMFAUNA-4.

57. The other potentially dangerous contacts are, as might be expected, in the field of para-military activities. In November 1961, 08 AMFAUNA-1 was in touch with Identity-52, a nephew of Oswaldo RAMIREZ, through Identity-51, a resident of Cienfuegos 10 Identity-52 was arrested late in the year. 24 AMFAUNA-1 then developed another contact to the Oswaldo RAMIREZ group through Identity-12, RAMIREZ's Havana 08 representative, whose cutout to AMFAUNA-1 was AMFAUNA-3, a woman from 10 Sancti Spiritus now resident in Havana. Identity-12 was arrested in 08 April presumably as an aftermath of the 16 April battle in which RAMIREZ was reportedly killed.

58. In late May or early June 1962, Identity-8, a person from Sancti Spiritus known to AMFAUNA-3, called on her in the company of a certain Ricardo *IZQUIERDO 06 who claimed to 06 have had a meeting on 28 May near Trinidad with one Comandante Fidel *HERNANDEZ Perez who gave 06 IZQUIERDO a letter for delivery to Identity-12. Unable to find Identity-12 because of the latter's arrest, 06 IZQUIERDO approached Identity-8 who introduced him to AMFAUNA-3 to whom he handed over the letter. The letter reads as follows:

"Dear Brother-in-Arms:

"I greet you and officially report to you, as our representative to the Military Junta of the FND, the sad news of the death of our commander-in-chief, Oswaldo RAMIREZ, on 16 April last at 9 a.m. He fell in battle together with other brothers. The certificate to this effect, containing the testimony of Captain BORGE, chief of the personal guard, and of other members of his escort, is in my possession, and I will hand it over to you or to anyone designated by the Military Junta of the FND.

"The disorganization caused by the above-mentioned events prevented our reporting this news to you right away, and only now have we been able to make contact with the bearer, a man who has been working for some time as messenger and enjoying the complete confidence of Oswaldo RAMIREZ and of ourselves in particular.

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who will occupy the position of supreme commander of our liberation army. Whether it be one supreme chief or a joint command must be decided by you.

"Although the National Liberation Army has continued working and acting according to the norms laid down by you and by our late chief, you will understand the urgency of this interview which the bearer will tell you how to arrange. In anticipation of your decisions I sign myself respectfully,

06

Capt. Julio E. "CARRETERO"

59. As mentioned in paragraph 15b above, ODIBEX has some kind of interest in AMFAUNA-3, and it may be that their files contain intelligible answers to some of the questions raised by this development. For instance:

a. Why did the RAMIREZ organization not know of the arrest of Identity-12, one of its own members, which had occurred at least a month previously?

b. If the RAMIREZ organization was so poorly informed about Identity-12, how did they know about AMFAUNA-3, and why did they think she would be the appropriate person to give the letter to?

c. Given the disorganization complained of by the writer of the letter, and the fact that all meetings must have been arranged and held under clandestine conditions, how to account for the fact that in the maximum of six days between 28 May and 3 June when AMFAUNA-1 reported the developments by S/W, something like the following sequence of events must have taken place:

(1) IZQUIERDO 06 meets HERNANDEZ 06 near Trinidad in Las Villas Province, and receives the letter.

(2) IZQUIERDO 06 travels to Havana and tries to locate Identity-12.

(3) IZQUIERDO 06 is informed that Identity-12 has been arrested.

(4) IZQUIERDO 06 returns to Las Villas, reports that the letter cannot be delivered to Identity-12, and is told that AMFAUNA-3 should be given the letter.

(5) IZQUIERDO 06 goes to Sancti Spiritus and locates Identity-8 who is a personal friend of AMFAUNA-3 and can introduce him to her, and who providentially is able to vouch for the authenticity of CARRETERO's 06 signature on the letter.

(6) IZQUIERDO 06 and Identity-8 go to Havana and give the letter to AMFAUNA-3.

Future Plans

60. It is difficult if not impossible to give an operation of this complexity the support and direction it needs, when the only communication with the principal agent is by secret writing. There is never enough room in an S/W message for both the positive intelligence reporting and the supporting operational details, and it is the latter that suffer. S/W communication also inevitably involves a time lag which, in the case of this operation, has sometimes run as high as three weeks because of the frequent absences from town of AMCUTLER-1

61. As a first step toward speeding up communications, it is planned to find another accommodation address in the JMWAVE area for AMFAUNA-1's use which can be expected to function without the delays that have been experienced recently. Because of the importance and urgency of some of AMFAUNA-1's intelligence reports, consideration is also being given to assigning a radio operator to him, probably AMGLEN-9 who is awaiting only his signal plan to become active and who will probably not be needed in the AMWPEN net as originally planned.

62. AMFAUNA-1 will be instructed to break off contact with AMCOG-2, and to cease interesting himself in the affairs of the Escambray. As for AMFAUNA-4, it is feared that AMFAUNA-1 is already so deeply involved with him that, if he was not a bona fide defector, the damage has already been done. Nevertheless, AMFAUNA-1 will be warned of the potentialities of this situation so that he can be prepared to go into hiding if it should develop badly. Specific military requirements will be sent to AMFAUNA-1 for AMFAUNA-4 to help in establishing his value as a source. Also for the improvement of the security of the operation, AMFAUNA-1 will be told to stop taking personal and unnecessary risks such as his penetration of a restricted beach.

63. For the continued improvement of production, political and economic requirements will be sent to him. AMFAUNA-1 is very responsive to requirements, and has already developed sources and informants in the political and economic areas in response to instructions from JMWAVE. It is believed that an increased output of higher-priority intelligence can be expected from this operation.

END OF DISPATCH

CONTACT [illegible]

[redacted]

2. Maria del Carmen *TRUEBA y de la Campa SEX F
DOB born 8 August 1929, Guanabacoa, Havana
Resides Calle 24 #105, Apt. 2, Miramar, Havana

06.08

3. Hortensia *ORIZONDO Meneses
DOB born 11 April 1924, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba SEX F
Resides Avenida 26 #1108, Apt. 2, Nuevo Vedado, Havana, Cuba

4. Gabino *GONZALEZ Agudin aka "Felipe"
DOB born 27 January 1931, Chambas, Camaguey, Cuba
Resides 354 Chorruca St., Cerro, Havana, Cuba

5. Ofelia *PEREZ Arce SEX F

[redacted]

6 Esperanza *MANRESA Duarte
DOB born 27 February 1939
Resides 155 Encarnacion St., Apt. 1, Santo Suarez, [redacted]

7. Raul *GRANADOS

8. Conrado *SALMO del Castillo aka "Nene"

9. Pepe *EMBAS
Former sales manager for Regil Coffee

10. Yolanda *PRADA Gutierrez
DOB born 2 September 1935, Santiago, Cuba
Resides 951 41st St., Apt. 1, Alturas del Vedado, Havana, Cuba

11. Zoraida *MARTINEZ Cabal
DOB born 24 January 1938, Havana, Cuba
Resides 145 Entrada St. Apt. 4, Casino Deportivo, Havana, Cuba

12. Secundino *CARRERA Sanchez
DOB born 21 May 1925
Resides 611 Colcuria, Santos Suarez, Havana, Cuba

13. Jose Diego *TATO Rey aka "Juanito"
DOB born 12 April 1923, Havana, Cuba

14. Beatriz *PEREZ aka "Betty" SEX F
Resides Calle 8 #120, Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana

15. Elvira *BIOSCA SEX F

16. Miguel *ORTOLL

17. Mauricio *MARTINEZ Lopez aka "Gustavo"
DOB born 4 September 193

18. Camilo *MARTINEZ Bazuero aka "Anselmo"
DOB born 28 April 1928, Havana

19. Jorge *MARTINEZ Cabo aka "Eduardo"
DOB born 16 April 1939
Resides 533 10th St., Apt. 7, Vedado, Havana

20. Francisco *PEREZ Arce

21. Jesus *DIAZ

22. Jose Antonio *DIAZ

23. (Capt.) Manuel *PEREZ Arce

24. Jose AGUIRRECHO [illegible]
~~[illegible]~~
Manuel, 24 May 32, resides
[illegible] 303, Apt 1, Ayes[illegible]
[illegible] Havana

25. Aurelio VASQUEZ Castro
25 June 1919 Havana

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Separate Cover
Attachment E to UFGA-4703
to Chief, TFW

All cards → CIT: CUBA
CONTACT Sub of 201-291230

[redacted]

2. Maria del Carmen *TRUEBA y de la Campa SEX F
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[redacted]

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13. Jose Diego *TATO Rey aka "Juanito"
DOB born 12 April 1923, Havana, Cuba

14. Beatriz *PEREZ aka "Betty" SEX: F
Resides Calle 8 #120, Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana

15. Elvira *BIOSCA SEX: F

16. Miguel *ORTOLL

17. Mauricio *MARTINEZ Lopez aka "Gustavo"
DOB born 4 September 1933

18. Camilo *MARTINEZ Bazuero aka "Anselmo"

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Identity 2	Father of Berta SAMPEDRO, Havana [redacted]
Identity 3	Ramon LAVIN, 4283 E. Flagl [redacted]
Identity 4	Berta SAMPEDRO, 4284 NE 5th St., Apt. 204, Miami
Identity 5	Frank PAEZ (born 4 October 1910, Havana) Resides 1742 SW 1st Ave., Miami, Fla.
Identity 6	Margarita de ARMAS (born 7 December 1908, Havana) Resides 736 Calatrava Ave., Coral Gables, Fla. (201-324124)
Identity 7	"Pancho" VILLA
Identity 8	Ruben DIAZ, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba
Identity 9	Tomas OROPESA, employee of Ministry of Education, Havana
Identity 10	(Lt.) Rolando P. DOBOUE Vidaud (born 30 September 1929, Oriente, Cuba)
Identity 11	Maria Luisa JAIMERENA Lastre (born 21 June 1931, Bahia Honda, Pinar del Rio Cuba) Resides 501 27th Ave., Apt. 8, Vedado, Havana, Cuba.
Identity 12	Luis RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez aka Andres FUENTE
Identity 13	(Dr.) Tomas QUESADA, Liberian Consul, Havana
Identity 14	Electo REYES de Leon (born 14 May 1932, Santiago de Cuba) Former Flight Captain of Cubana Airlines who defected in Nassau, 8 March 1962.
Identity 15	(Comandante) Evelio DUQUE
Identity 16	Sergio MILIAN
Identity 17	Antonio GARCIA
Identity 18	Adalio PEREZ
Identity 19	Miguel PENTON Alfonso aka "Ramon"
Identity 20	(fnu) REYES
Identity 21	Miguel Angel RIVAS Pam (born 13 December 1922, Las Villas, Cuba)
Identity 22	Fernando DEBENE, resident of Cienfuegos, Cuba
Identity 23	Manolo [illegible]
Identity 24	"Hugo"
Identity 25	"Anibal"
Identity 26	Jose AGUIRRECHU Pacheco aka "Gustavo"
Identity 27	Candida MURGA Cristo (201-30[illegible]) aka "Diana"
Identity 28	Camilo NAVAS, Havana merchant
Identity 29	Alfredo FORMOSO Prieto (born 18 May 192[illegible], Coruna, Cuba)

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CONTACT sub of 201-291230

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Page [illegible] of Separate Cover
Attachment F to UFGA-4703
to Chief, TFW

Identity 30 Elsa de FORMOSO Sex: F

Identity 31 Luis de ARMAS (DOB born 11 July 1910)

Identity 32 Sex: F "Cecilia" (sister-in-law of Luis de ARMAS), resides Calle 24 #705, Miramar, Havana, Cuba.

Identity 33 (Capt.) Oscar LEON Delgado aka "Lopez"

Identity 34 Raul GARCIA

Identity 35 (Capt.) Roger [illegible]

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Identity 36 [illegible]iano MAYIT

Identity 37 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] MAYEDA

Identity 38 [illegible] LOP, Havana.

Identity 39 John BENNETT (born [illegible] DOB) [illegible] 33 S.E. 8th St., Miami, Fla.

Identity 40 Sex: F alias "Sara". True name similar to AMLOBE-3 (201-308475) and probably identical

Identity 41 [illegible] "MORESO" [illegible]

Identity 42 [illegible] [illegible], employee [illegible] Ministry of Public Works, Havana

Identity 43 Quintin [illegible], employee [illegible] Ministry [illegible] Public Works, Havana

Identity 44 [illegible]

Identity 45 Jose [illegible]

Identity 46 Josefina [illegible]

Identity 47 Gladys [illegible]

Identity 48 Jorge [illegible]

Identity 49 [illegible] MORLJON

Identity 50 Rigoberto [illegible], [illegible] Trinidad, Cuba

Identity 51 Josefina ROSQUETE [illegible] (DOB born 13 January 193[illegible], Cienfuegos, Cuba [illegible] resident [illegible] Cienfuegos [illegible]

Identity 52 Eloy MOREL [illegible] "Francisco"

Identity 53 "Hilda"

Identity 54 Domingo [illegible] resident [illegible] Cienfuegos [illegible]

Identity 55 Aurelio VIGIL Delgado

Identity 56 Alonso GOMEZ Castillo

Identity 57 Jesus MILLARES Nunez, Chief Pilot for Cubana Airlines, now defected.

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SOURCE: [Israeli Liaison]

~~6th August, 1961~~

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REPORT No. 6-1053

Subject: International Institute for Peace.

In a circular letter dated VIENNA, 15th February, 1961, addressed to [MAKI leaders in ISRAEL], the following Latin American public figures were listed as signatories of the appeal to convene the Latin-American Conference for National Sovereignty Economic Emancipation and Peace in MEXICO in March 1961:

24

Omit

ARGENTINA:

Prof. ALFREDO L. PALACIOS, MP, former Federal Senator, former Rector of La Plata National University, former diplomat, member of the Executive of the Argentine Socialist Party.
Dr. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ, former Vice-President of ARGENTINA.
Dr. SANTIAGO H. DEL CASTILLO, former Governor of CORDOBA, Former Vice-Presidential candidate from the People's Radical Civic Union.
Prof. CARLOS SANCHEZ VIAMONTE, professor for international law, former MP.
Dr. JULIO E. ACOSTA, MP.
Miss NELIDA BAIGORRIA, MP.
Dr. CARLOS ALBERTO BECERRA, MP.
Dr. JUAN CARLOS ESPINA MP.
Mr. HORACIO LUELMO, MP.
Mr. ATILIO MARCHINI, MP.
Dr. AUGUSTIN RODRIGUEZ ARAYA, MP., President of the Civic Union Party.
Dr. EDUARDO ROSENKRANTZ, MP.
Dr. RAMON A. MUNIZ, General Secretary of the Argentine Socialist Party.
Mr. RODOLFO GHIOLDI, member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party.
Prof. BERNARDO CANAL FEIJOO, writer, former Dean of the La Plata Faculty of Letters.
Mr. EZEQUIEL MARTINEZ ESTRADA, writer.
Dr. MOISES POLACK, Honorary Professor at the La Plata National University, member of the Executive Committee of the Buenos Aires Medical Faculty.

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Mr. GUILLERMO ESTEVEZ BOERO, President of the Argentine University Federation.
Mr. AUGUSTIN CUEVAS, MP.
Mr. C. DE SIMONE, Secretary of the Central Committee of Socialist youth.
Mr. MIGUEL ANGEL ASTURIAS, writer.
Dr. EDUARDO ALEMAN, lawyer, President of the Argentine Peace Council.
Mr. BERNARDO KLEINER, member of the High Council of the Buenos Aires National University.

BRAZIL.

MPs: SERGIO MAGALHAES, President of the Chamber Deputies. BARBOSA LIMA SOBRINHO, GABRIEL PASSOS, JOSUE DE CASTRO, SALVADOR LOSACCO, LICIO HAUER, JOSE JOFFILY, ARTUR VIRBILIO, BOCAIUVA CONHA, FERNANDO SANT ANA, VASCOCELOS TORRES, ELOI DUTRA, JACOB FRANTZ, CLIDENOR FREITAS, ALMINO ALFONSO, CELSO BRANT, FRANCISCO JULIAO, SINVAL GUAZZELI and CANDIDO NORBERTO.

SENATORS: FREITAS CAVALCANTE, HERNAI MAIU (Minas Serais), PAULO VIANA (Pernambuca).

JORGE AMADO, writer.
OLIVEIRAS GUANAIS, President of the National Union of Students.
TAXSAN DE CASTRO, Vice-President of the Brazilian Union of Secondary School Students.
AMILTON GOMES, President of the Paraiba Union of Students.
BENEDITO CORQUEIRA, President of the Metalwokers' Union(Ric
CANEDO LOPES, President of the National Air Transport Union
BAYARD BOITEUX, President of the National Teachers' Union.

CHILE

SALVADOR ALLENDE, former candidate for the President of the Republic and Socialsit Party Senator
HERMES AHUMADA, Radical Party MP.
ALFREDO DE AMESTI, retired colonel, former President of the Peace Movement.
Prof. ALBERTO BALTRA, former Minister for the Interior, lawyer and Professor at the University of Chile.
ELENA CAFFARENA, lawyer, member of the Council for the Defence of Children.
ARMANDO CARVAJAL, Director and founder of the Symphony Orchestra.

CRISTIAN CADEMAARTORI, businessman.
GUILLERMO DEL PEDREGAL, former Minister of the Interior.
JOSE FONDEA, National Democratic Party MP.
EDUARDO HAMUY, Director of the Institute for Sociology of the Chilean University.
GUILLERMO IZQUIERDO ARAYA, National Democratic Party Senator.
ANIBAL JARA, journalist, former Ambassador to the United States
PABLO NERUDA, poet.
SERGIO RECABARREN, lawyer, former Minister of the Interior

COLOMBIA

Dr. JORGE PERIGU CARDENAS
JUAN DE LA CRUZ VARELA, MP.
ALFONSO BARBERENA, MP.
JORGE ZALAMEA, writer.
GILBERTO VIEIRA, Secretary of the Colombian Communist Part
HERNANDO CARAVITO NUNOZ, lawyer, Member of the Cundinamarc Assembly.
ANIANO INGLESIAS, Director of the Barranquilla Extra
NAZARETH CRUZ, leader of a women's organisation.
VENTURA PUENTE VANEGAS, from the Colombian trade union movement.
TANCREDO HERRAN, leader of the Bogota industrial zone.
HENRY PATINO, member of Tolima Assembly
EDUARDO ELINAS M., leader of a student organisation.
MARIO ALCALA, of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement.
YIRA CASTRO DE CEPEDA, leader of a student organisation.
ALICIA GUERRERO, Union of Democratic Women.
JOSE MARIA VARVAS, Committee for Oil Nationalisation
RICARDO SAMPER, journalist.
ARMANDO SUESCUN, Secretary of the Colombian Socialist Party.

CUBA

Cap. EMILIO ARAGONES, national coordinator of the 26 July Movement.
Dr. MARTHA FRAYDE, Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of the Peoples.
Dr. CLEMENTE INCLAN, Rector of Havana University.
Dr. ENRIQUE GIMENEZ, President of the Board of Governors of Havana University.
Mr. ENRIQUE GONZALEZ MANTICI, Director of the National Symphony Orchestra.

./.

Dr. VICENTINA ANTUNA, General Director of Culture.
Dr. JOSE SANTIAGO CUBAS, Procurator of the Supreme Court of Justice.
DR. JUAN MARINELLO, President of the Popular Socialist Party.
Dr. EDUARDO CORONA, lawyer, diplomat.
Dr. ISABEL MONAL, Director of the Cuban National Theatre.
Commander OSCAR FERNANDEZ MEL, President of the National Doctor's Association.
Mr. BALDOMERO ALVAREZ RIOS, Dean of the National Journalists' School.
Commander Dr. HUMBERTO CASTELLO, General Secretary of the "Directorio Revolucionario 13 de marzo".
Mr. NICOLAS GUILLEN, poet.
Commander ROLANDO BUBELA, President of the Students' Federation.
Mr. GIRALDO MAZOLA, director of the Cuban Institute for Friendship between the Peoples.
Commander GULLERMO JIMENEZ, director of the newspaper "Combate".
Dr. CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, University Professor, director of the journal "Hoy"
Mr. MARIO KUCHILAN, director of the journal "Prensa Libre".
Mr. CARLOS FANQUI, director of the journal "Revolucion"
Mr. ALFREDO CUEVARA, director of the Cuban Institute of Art and the Film Industry.
Dr. ELIAS ENTRALGO, President of the Cuban UNESCO Commissi
Mr. ENRIQUE DE LA OSA, director of the journal "Bohemia".
Mr. ERNESTO VERA, director of the journal "La Calle".
Mrs. VILMA ESPIN, Federation of Cuban Women.
Dr. OFELIA DOMINGUEZ, Cuban United Nations Association.

HONDURAS

JULIO C. RIVERA, workers' leader.
OSCAR F. ALFARENGO, Member of the University Reform Front.
MIGUEL YANES RIOS, student leader.
SANTIAGO FERNANDEZ TOFFE, theatre director.
JUDITH SALGADO, Committee for Solidarity with Cuba.
ALFREDO HOFFMAN, leader of the Radio Workers' Union.
LETICIA RAUDALES, member of the Liberal Youth Association.
HECTOR I. GUTTIERREZ, general secretary of the Organisatio Committee of the Honduran Democratic Youth.
LISANDRO GALVEZ, former rector of the National Autonomous University.
ANIBAL DELGADO FIALLO, General Secretary of the University Reform Front.

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MEXICO

IGNACIO ACOSTA, University graduate.
FRANCISCO ARGUELLO, Member of the Federal Parliament.
ALONSO AGUILAR, Professor of the National School of Economics.
ANABELA AGUIRRE, anthropologist.
BERTHA ARENAL, Professor at the National School of Odontology.
SOL ARGUEDAS, journalist.
RAMON BARBOSA C., Member of the Federal Parliament.
ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ, Magistrate at the District Federal High Court of Justice.
ANGEL BALTAZAR BARAJAS, President of the Michoacan University Professors' Federation.
RAFAEL BANALES, General Secretary of the Kleinenmar Rolling Mill Workers' Union.
RAMIRO BERMUDES ALEGRIA, member of theboard of Governors of Lower California University.
CLEMENTINA BATALLA DE BASSOLS, University graduate.
NARCISO BASSOLS BATALLA, Chemical engineer.
ALFONSO BARRAZA, SANTOS BARCENAS engineer.
ROGELIO BLANCO DESDER, FERNANDO BENITEZ, writer and journalist.
CELERINO CANO, teacher, FERNANDO CARMONA, University graduate, EMILIO CARBALLIDO, dramtist,
CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS, engineer, AURELIANO GABALLERO C and LEANDRO CASTILLO V., members of the Federal Parliament

PERU

OSCAR AGUIRRE, MP.,
ABUNDIO ARAUZO, MP.,
FELIZ ARIAS SHEREIBER, university leader.
JACINTE CACERES PILARES, MP.,
SXITE COELLO JARA, Senator, specialist for penl law.
LUIS CERENADO VIGIL, MP.
CARLOS MALPICA, MP.,
FERNANDO MANRIQUE, MP, President of the Jose Carlos Mariategui Institute.
ERNESTO MORE, writer, MP., President of the Peruvian Peace Movement.
EFRAIN RUIZ CARO, MP., journalist.
TAMAYO PEZUA, MP.,
WILBERT SALAS, MP.

./.

PUERTO RICO

L. O'NILL, President of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.
J. SANTOS RIVERA, President of the Puerto Rican Communist Party F.U.P.I. (the University Federation for Independence
R. MEDINA RAMIREZ, United Patriotic Association.
EVARISTO RIBERA CHEVREMONT, poet.
OSVALDO AGUERO, director of the "Godazos" radio programme and coordinator of the Cuban 26 July Movement in PUERTO RICO.
JULIO DE SANTIAGO, former President, Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.
LORENZO PINEIRO RIVERA, lawyer, President of the Society of Friends of Cuba in Puerto Rico.
GABRIEL VINCENTRE MAURA, Secretary for foreign relations of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement.
WILLIAM CORDOVA CHIRINO, director of the radio programme "Native Industries" and of the "El Informador" radio journal.
NORMAN PIETRI, former President, University Indppendence Federation.

SALVADOR

ROBERTO CARIAS DELGADO, General Secretary of the April and May Revolutionary Party.
MARIO SALAZAR VALIENTE, Secretary of the Relations Committee of the April and May Revolutionary Party.
GENERAL ASSOCIATION of University Students of Salvador.

18 January 1952 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York

SENSITIVE
Secret-Security Information

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES(TRAVIS)WA 8622
THIS IS SENSITIVE
THIS IS NEW CASE 9145. REFERENCE MADE TO XXXX LEA'S CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH TRAVIS AND ROSE REGARDING THE OPC REQUEST FOR CONTACT WITH THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA. AS ROSE INDICATED, HE WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, 23 JANUARY, XND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET WITH THE APPROPRIATE PERSON OR PERSONS IN RIA TO DISCUSS A COVER CASE. ROSE HAS ADVISED THAT BOTH LEO CHERNE AND CARL HOVGARD HAVE BEEN GIVEN COVERT OPERATIONAL CLEARANCES. FOLLOWING IS THE BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE. THERE IS A MAN BY THE NAME OF WILLIAM J. ACON, PRESENTLY WORKING FOR ECA IN WASHINGTON WHO IS GOING TO RESIGN FROM ECA AND COME WITH CIA, AND WILL GO OVERSEAS FOR OPC. HE IS GOING TO LEAVE ECA SOMETIME AROUND THE END OF THIS MONTH, AND MUST HAVE SOME EXPLANATION AS TO THE REASON FOR HIS RESIGNATION. THEREFORE, OPC WISHES TO XXXXXX LOCATE SOME FIRM WHICH WILL BE WILLING TO BACKSTOP XXX ACON'S RESIGNATION, IN THE FORM OF SUPPOSEDLY HIRING ACON. ACON HAS BEEN A RESEARCH ANALYST ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN ITALY, AND IT IS FELT THAT. PERHAPS, EMPLOYMENT WITH RIA WOULD BE A LOGICAL XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXREASON TO GIVE FOR RESIGNING FROM ECA. THE RIA COVER WILL NOT BE UTILIZED FOR ACON'S COVER OVERSEAS. ABOUT ALL THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED OF RIA WOULD BE TO ACKNOWLEDGE,

SENSITIVE*SECRET*SECURITY INFORMATION

07433

SECRET

SENSITIVE

JAN 18 4 22 PM '52

VSECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR TRAVIS FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 0392

CASE 9145.

THIS IS SENSITIVE. RE W-8622 RPT W-8622. LEO CHERNE RPT LEO CHERNE IS THE MAN. WE HAVE SET UP AN APPOINTMENT FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY AT 3:30 RPT 3:30 PM SO ROSE RPR ROSE BETTER BE HERE IN THIS OFFICE BY 2:30 RPT 2:30 PM.

PLEASE CONFIRM.

GR-62

Rose advised 1/18
will be there at 2:30
on 23 Jan.

✓

07434

✓

14-00000

21 January 1952 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret-Security Information-Sensitive

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES (TRAVIS)WA 8651

THIS IS SENSITIVE. RE CASE 9145 AND UR NY 0392. ROSE ADVISES T. J HE WILL BE IN YOUR OFFICE BY 2:30 PM on WEDNESDAY, 22xx 23 JANUARY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION-SENSITIVE

07435

WILLIAM JACOB ACH

Background Information:

Born April 6, 1921 in Amsterdam, Netherlands
Single
American citizen

Education: Amsterdam High School - Amsterdam, Netherlands
St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri - ASTP 6/43-2/44
Georgetown Foreign Service School - 2 yrs. 6/47-8/48
University of Chicago - M.A. in International Economic Relations in 1951

Languages: German, Dutch, French and Italian

M.A. Thesis: "Post-war Economic Recovery in the Netherlands and The Marshall Plan". (received honors)

Employment Record:

June 1950 - present International Economist, GS-7, in European Program Division of ECA. Mainly concerned with Italian and Trieste economic affairs. Analyzed economic and financial position of Italy in light of ECA aid program, and handled administration of the aid program itself. Also prepared two, three and four year forecasts designed to show expected economic trends and developments in Italy. These were included in the ECA congressional presentations.

Oct. 47 - June '48 Research analyst in Historical Division of Department of the Army. Engaged in selection of and formulation of reports on German documents which shed light on the West Europe campaign.

Oct. 46 - Feb. 47 Archivist in Office of Military Government for Germany, Department of the Army. Served as chief of the Documents Library, collected reports, dispatches, cables, etc and developed an index system.

Jan. 45 - Aug 45 Assistant to Food and Agriculture Officer with Military Gov't Section of Hq. Twelfth Army Group. Duties consisted mainly of availability and requirements studies connected with food needs of the German population

Address:
3000 Porter St., NW
Washington, D.C.
Woodley 9730

07436

SECRET

SENSITIVE

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR TRAVIS FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 0470

THIS IS SENSITIVE.

CASE 9145.

THE MEETING TODAY WITH CHERNE RPT CHERNE WAS COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL.

WHEN HE GETS BACK TO WASHINGTON, ROSE IS GOING TO SUBMIT TO US THROUGH YOU ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ACON RPT ACON WHICH WE WILL TURN OVER TO CHERNE.

WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT WHEN ACON MAKES HIS PITCH AT ECA RPT ECA AND TELLS THEM THAT HE IS BEING OFFERED A JOB WITH THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA THAT HE STRESS THE NAME OF LEO CHERNE WHO ACTUALLY WILL BE THE ONLY PERSON WHO WILL BE ABLE TO BACK UP THIS STORY.

✓

Discussed with Rose. He will
furnish data to us.
Copy sent to Rose

07437

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

25 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Backstopping of Cover by the Research Institute of America

1. Pursuant to conversations between Mr. Rose and Mr. Engels of CIA/opc and Mr. Travis of 00/Contacts, an appointment was made for Mr. Rose to see Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Secretary of the Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City, to explore the willingness of Mr. Cherne to backstop the cover story of a proposed agent in training. The appointment was made, and kept, for Wednesday morning, 23 January 1952 in New York City in the presence of Mr. Clark of the New York branch of the Contacts Division.

2. The proposed story of the agent in question, who had been employed on the economic research side of ECA specializing in Italy, was that he wished to resign from ECA and take up an offer to be extended to him in civilian employment. Since the Research Institute of America seemed to fit in naturally with his background and activities in ECA, Mr. Cherne was asked:

a. If he would backstop the agent's story that he was quitting ECA to take employment with the Research Institute of America during his three months period of training with CIA, and

b. Whether he would in fact employ the agent and send him as a representative of the Institute to Italy at the conclusion of his period of training.

Mr. Cherne replied that unfortunately the latter was impossible inasmuch as his company did not send personnel overseas in any capacity. As regards the immediate backstopping of the agent's story, however, Mr. Cherne said that he would be happy to oblige for a period of training only, to wit, three months, after which other cover would have to be sought. Mr. Cherne requested that he be furnished at an early date with more complete information as to what was to be expected of him in his role as a backstop and further stated that he would like to meet the agent personally as soon as could be arranged. This has been communicated to Mr. Engels, the case officer, who will oblige at the earliest opportunity.

3. This case

SECRET

07438

3. This case may be referred to for further discussion and/or information as Case Number C/101.

EDWARD A. ROSE
OD/OP

OD/OP/EAR/rs
25 Jan 52

Distribution:
OD/OP (Rose): orig
Contacts
Division/OO : 1
WE-4 (Engels): 1
OD/OP : 2
SD/RE : 2

SECRET
Security Information

7 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Edward A. Rose

SUBJECT: Cover Story for Research Institute of America

Quote

1. Mr. Acon, who has his MA in International Economic Relations from the University of Chicago, has been working for ECA. He has been hired by the Research Institute of America to do economic research and writing for their weekly newsletter on economic subjects having to do with Western Europe. (Mr. Acon knows Dutch, German, French and Italian.) It could be admitted that he would like eventually to do such writing abroad, but has not yet found a way.

2. His hiring may be delayed for some time. Mr. Leo Cherne will be informed when the story is to be used. By that time, Mr. Acon will have called on Mr. Cherne.

DANIEL J. WHEALTON
WE-4

DJW/atp

07439

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET
Security Information

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WE-4 X3863

NO.

DATE 7 Feb 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. OD/OP Mr. Rose	1704 L	Feb 7 1952	Feb 8 1952		Bob — Would you please see that the New York Office gets this to pass on to LC as verbally arranged. C/10 Case 9145
2. OO/CO Mr Travis.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. ✓					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—01155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

07440

SECRET

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SENSITIVE

Chief, New York Office 13 February 1952

Chief, Contact Division

Case 9145

1. When Rose of OPC was in New York on 23 January 1952 to discuss cover with Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Secy. of the Research Institute of America, Mr. Cherne requested additional information as to what was to be expected of him in his role as a backstop to the cover being established for the OPC man. The following information has been forwarded by OPC, and is quoted below. Mr. Rose requests that you pass this information on to Mr. Cherne.

   a. "Mr. Acon, who has his MA in International Economic Relations from the University of Chicago, has been working for ECA. He has been hired by the Research Institute of America to do economic research and writing for their weekly newsletter on economic subjects having to do with Western Europe. (Mr. Acon knows Dutch, German, French and Italian.) It could be admitted that he would like eventually to do such writing abroad, but has not yet found a way.

   b. "His hiring may be delayed for some time. Mr. Leo Cherne will be informed when the story is to be used. By that time, Mr. Acon will have called on Mr. Cherne."

2. We are closing this case. Should further action be required, we will reopen.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

RSTravis/lmp

SENSITIVE

07440

SECRET

SECRET OO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SPECIAL SERVICES (TRAVIS) FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION -- CITE NY 2315

JUN 2 12 51 PM '52

CASE 9145.

1. WILL YOU TELL ROSE RPT ROSE THAT THE APPOINTMENT WITH LEO CHERNE RPT LEO CHERNE HAS BEEN SET UP FOR WEDNESDAY, 4 RPT 4 JUNE AT 11:30 RPT 11.30 A.M.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM.✓

GR-58

3 June Rose advised - he will make appointment

SECRET

07441

3 June 1952

x

Washington

R. S. Travis 2268

New York

Secret-Security Information

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SPECIAL SERVICES(TRAVIS)W 1301

CASE 9145 AND UR NY 2315. ROSE ADVISES THAT HE WILL KEEP APPOINTMENT WITH CHERNE AS SET-UP IN YOUR XXXXXXX MESSAGE.

SECRET

07442

SECRET
Security Information

Chief, Contact Division, 00 **19 May 1952**

Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

Appointment with William A. BARRON, John E. TOULMIN and Leo CHERNE

References: CS-1512 and CS-1337

1. This will confirm Mr. Rose's verbal request that the Contact Division/OO ask its Boston field office to arrange appointments for Mr. Edward Rose of Cover Division, PLANS/OSO, to see Mr. William A. Barron, Chairman of the Board, Gillette Safety Razor Company, and Mr. John E. Toulmin, Senior Vice President of the First National Bank of Boston, at their convenience on Wednesday May 21, 1952. The purpose of the visit is to explore the willingness of these gentlemen to act as ostensible donors of funds to support a current operation.

2. This will also confirm Mr. Rose's request that the New York City field office of the Contact Division/OO arrange an appointment for Mr. Rose to see Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America at Mr. Cherne's convenience on Thursday May 22, 1952. Mr. Cherne, who has for some time been backstopping the activities of an agent in this country, has apparently expressed willingness to provide cover for this agent abroad. The purpose of the interview is to discuss more fully Mr. Cherne's proposal. Cover Division would be happy to have an OO field office representative present to insure continuity.

[illegible]
1145

3. As a result of the above requests, Mr. Barron found to his regret that he was unable to cooperate with the Agency at the present time. Mr. Toulmin, on the other hand, was most cooperative. Mr. Cherne, unfortunately, was out of town. The New York field office has been asked to try to arrange a meeting with Mr. Cherne, as outlined above, for Wednesday afternoon, June 4, 1952.

✓

SECRET
Security Information

07443

✓

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Information

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CS-1337 (Rose)

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO

DATE: 6 June 1952

FROM : Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

SUBJECT: Field Trip to Interview Leo CHERNE

Reference: CS-1337

Case 9145

1. On Wednesday, June 4, 1952, an interview was arranged by the Contact Division, OO, for Mr. Rose of the Cover Division, PLANS/OSO with Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America. The meeting was held at 11:30 a.m. in Mr. Cherne's office at 292 Madison Avenue, New York City, and Mr. Rose was accompanied by Mr. Clark of the New York field office of Contact Division, OO.

2. Mr. Cherne, who is currently backstopping an operation within the United States, had expressed the wish to be provided with some form of letter indicating that the Agency was requesting his cooperation, and the purpose of the interview was to inform Mr. Cherne that this was against Agency policy.

3. This information was accordingly conveyed by Mr. Clark and Mr. Rose to Mr. Cherne who accepted it with good grace. In reply to a question by Mr. Rose he indicated that this refusal would in no way mitigate his desire to be of service to the Agency.

SECRET
Security Information

07444

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Files DATE: 4 MARCH 1954

FROM : Coleman

SUBJECT: Case ~~[illegible]~~ 9145

On 3 March Ormond requested that a meeting be set up for him with Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America. Ormond said that he would not need more than a half an hour. Called Connor who had Bob McCann set up meeting with Cherne for Monday(8th March) at 3:00 p.m. Ormond will go to the New York Office at 2:15 on Monday to meet McCann and take off for the meeting. This meeting was requested as a Cat III, and McCann will have to bow out after introduction. Ormond is happy, New York is happy.

✓

07445

COLEMAN
SUPPORT
2268
4 MARCH 1954

SECRET

NEW YORK

W

ROUTINE

TO LEA FOR CONNOR FROM ASHCRAFT BY SUPPORT (COLEMAN)

do

CASE [illegible] 9145. RE CONNOR/COLEMAN TELECONS OF 3 MARCH. ORMOND WILL BE IN YOUR OFFICE AT 2:15, MONDAY THE 8TH OF MARCH PRIOR TO THE CAT XXX APPOINTMENT YOU HAVE ARRANGED FOR HIM WITH LEO CHERNE. THANKS.

SECRET

07446

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNM

CS-1337 (Ormond)

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO

DATE: 4 March 1954

FROM : Chief, FI/Plans/Cover Division

SUBJECT: Requested meeting with Leo Cherne
OO/C Case 9145

1. On 3 March 1954, Mr. Coleman of your office was requested by Mr. Ormond to arrange a Category III meeting for him with Leo Cherne of Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City. The identity of an agent and the area in which he will be stationed will be discussed. On the same date Mr. Coleman informed that the appointment had been made for 3:00 PM on 8 March 1954. Ormond was requested to arrive at the New York OO/C office between 2:00 - 2:15 PM to meet Bob McCann who will accompany him to Cherne's office and make the introduction.

2. Cover Division appreciates the assistance rendered by your office. Mr. Ormond will follow the above instructions.

07447

SECRET

17 March 1954
CS-1337 (Ormond)

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM : Chief, FI/Plans/Cover Division

SUBJECT : OO/C case 9145

1. On 8 March 1954, pursuant to arrangements that had been made by your office, Bob McCann of your New York office introduced Mr. Ormond to Mr. Leo Cherne of the Research Institute of America, 292 Madison Avenue, New York City. As a Category III interview had been requested, Mr. McCann departed soon after the introduction was made.

2. We would like to inform you that Mr. Cherne was cordial and agreed to cooperate with the Agency as requested.

3. On 15 March 1954, Mr. Ormond again met with Mr. Cherne in his office at New York City to discuss further the operational matter. You were previously informed of Ormond's appointment on 15 March 1954 and while in New York on that day, he visited your New York office.

4. Your assistance in this matter is indeed appreciated by Cover Division.

file

07448

COLEMAN
SUPPORT
2268
23 March 1954

SECRET

NEW YORK

W

ROUTINE

FOR CONNOR
TO LEA/FROM ASHCRAFT BY SUPPORT(COLEMAN) 06 2499

CASE 9145. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, OLIVER ORMOND WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON 23 MARCH FOR A 10:30 A.M. MEETING WITH [illegible] LEO CHERNE. HE WILL COME TO THE NEW YORK OFFICE ABOUT 1 P.M. FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELIVERING A CHECK 24 TO AMOS 06 BELDEN INRE CASE 8417.

✓

SECRET

SECRET

07449

✓

17 Jan 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York SECRET

CONNOR FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 8244

CASE 9145 REOPENED. RAY MILLARD HAS REQUESTED THAT YOU TRY TO ~~XXX~~ SET UP APPOINTMENT FOR HIM WITH LEO CHERNE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE FOR SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO SEE CHERNE ABOUT ~~XXX~~ EXTENDING COVER ARRANGEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL PERIOD OF TIME. REQUEST THAT THIS APPOINTMENT BE COORDINATED WITH ONE REQUESTED FOR MILLARD UNDER CASE 18945(COLEMAN). THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

✓

07450

SEC SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 1191

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

RAY MILLARD X RAY MILLARD HAS APPOINTMENT WITH LEO CHERNE X LEO CHERNE ON THURSDAY, 26 X 26 JANUARY AT 2 PM X 2 PM. CHERNE'S ADDRESS IS 292 X 292 MADISON AVE.

APPOINTMENT UNDER CASE 18945 X 18945 IS FOR SAME DAY AT 3 PM X 3 PM.

SUGGEST RAY MILLARD DROP BY THIS OFFICE AT 1:30 PM ON 26 X 26 JANUARY X AT 1:30 PM ON 26 JANUARY, BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH CHERNE.

PLEASE CONFIRM.

✓

20 Jan
Millard advised
and will make appt
& contact office

07451

20 January 56

Washington

R. S. Travis 2268

SECRET

New York

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 8456

CASES 9145 AND 18945. REUR ED NYCR 1191. MILLARD WILL MAKE APPOINTMENTS AS SET UP BY YOU. HE WILL CHECK INTO THE OFFICE BY 1:00 PM ON THE 26TH. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

07452

SEC SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 1351

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

MILLARD HAD SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH LEO CHERNE WHO AGREED TO PROPOSITION

MILLARD WILL DRAFT A LETTER FOR CHERNE WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO [illegible].

JAN 28 3 45 PM '58

07453

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard) 9145-RST
2 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

1. On 26 January 1956, Mr. Millard of this office, together with Mr. Robert McCann, New York OO/C Office, interviewed Mr. Leo Cherne of the above captioned organization.

2. The results of this meeting were extremely satisfactory for our purposes and we are deeply appreciative of Mr. McCann's assistance in this matter.

3. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Fred R. Youngblood
for John [illegible] Southard
Chief, CCB/NC

✓

07454

DRAFT

Dear ______________:

I am happy to know that you are agreeable to assisting on a continuing basis as set out in your recent communication. However, this letter is being prepared to formalize our understanding and to make it a matter of record.

Effective April 1, 1956, you are appointed a Research Consultant for a period of two years with an annual salary of $5,000.00.

07455

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard)
2 February 1956

NUGGET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert McCann
New York OO/C Office

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

1. Attached is a suggested draft of the proposed Letter of Understanding between Mr. Cherne and his special employee.

2. In addition to the two paragraphs set out in the draft, it is suggested that Mr. Cherne also include either: (a) a brief general statement of the duties and responsibilities or (b) a statement indicating that the employee will continue the agreed-upon functions.

3. Another paragraph might be inserted with reference to the employee's past satisfactory performance.

4. For Mr. Cherne's information, the employee has had another article published in the New Leader 06 which was issued on 23 January 1956, under the title "Poujadists". 06

5. We appreciate your and Mr. Cherne's courtesy and cooperation in this matter.

Raymond [illegible]. Millard
Central Cover Branch
Non-Official Cover

Attachment
As stated above

REM:dmw
cc: CS-1337

✓

SECRET

07456

✓

SECRET

CS-1337 (Millard)
2 February 1956 9145-RST

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT : Research Institute of America

This is confirm the verbal concurrence given to Mr. Millard on 2 February 1956 by Mr. Travis for the hand-carry of the original of the attached memorandum to Mr. Robert McCann, New York OO/C Office.

Fred R. Youngblood
for John G. Southard
Chief, SCB/NC

Attachment
As stated above

✓

07457

15 Feb 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York SECRET

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)W 9709

CASE 9145. MILLARD WONDERS IF YOU HAVE HAD ANY SUCCESS IN OBTAIN CHERNE'S SIGNATURE ON THE LETTER FORWARDED TO YOU IN DRAFT FORM ON 2 FEB? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS. THANKS.

SECRET

07458

SECRET

SEC

UA CITE NYOR 1685

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145.

CHERNE HAS WRITTEN AND DISPATCHED THE LETTER.

WE HAVE COPY OF THE LETTER HERE, WHICH APPROXIMATES PROPOSED DRAFT BY MILLARD.

FEB 16 3 54 PM '56

✓

17 Feb 56
Millard advised
pw

07459

2 March 56

Washington

New York

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 0350

CASE 9145. [illegible] MILLARE ADVISES THAT COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CHERNE WAS SENT TO HEADQUARTERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO. LETTER WAS NOT RECEIVED. YOUR NYOR 1685 INDICATED THAT YOU HAD COPY, BUT NO RECORD HERE OF [illegible] A COPY EVER COMING TO HEADQUARTERS. WILL YOU PLEASE FORWARD COPY. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

07460

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Travis)

DATE: 5 March 1956

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Case 9145 PST
WA 0350

1. We mistakenly advised Mr. Raymond Millard, last week, that we had forwarded to your division a copy of the letter which Leo Cherne had dispatched to Mr. [redacted]. As you pointed out in your WA 0350 we merely advised you that we had a copy and did not forward it to Headquarters.

2. Attached you will find a replica of the letter written by Mr. Cherne.

MAR 7 10 05 AM '56
CONTACT DIVISION

Charles A. Lea

RW
R.W.McCann:cr
Attachment

7 Mar 56
letter fwd to Millard.

✓

07461

14-00000

R I of America
Research Institute

CS-1337. Case 9145

— Mc Cann

Cherne is aware that our boy is writing for a magazine named Sam Reporter of New Leader ______. However the editor of this magazine is going to the area where our man is located, but is not witting.

✓ Leo may know editor and ~~[illegible]~~ boy is going to tell Editor that he does some works

✓

for Leo and other.

In the event that the Editor knows Leo, and should see Leo and mentions ~~the~~ agent and the writing relationship, Cherne is not to identify the agent with CIA 24

Boy will send in report of his conversation with Editor so ~~that~~ if necessary, Leo Cherne can be advised of it

✓

✓

14-00000

14 Sept ~~XX~~ ~~4XX~~ 56 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret

MCCANN FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS) WA 8598

CASE 9145. RAY MILLARD HAS REQUESTED THAT YOU ~~XXX~~ PASS SOME INFORMATION ON TO LEO CHERNE. ~~XXXXXXX~~ YOU KNOW, AS DOES CHERNE, THAT ~~XXXX~~ OUR MAN WHO IS DOING WORK FOR LEO, HAS ALSO BEEN WRITING FOR THE "NEW LEADER", AS WELL AS ~~XXXXX~~ DOING OTHER JOBS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EDITOR OF THE "NEW LEADER", S. LEVITAS, IS GOING TO TAKE A TRIP TO THE AREA WHERE OUR BOY IS LOCATED, AND WILL SEE HIM. WHEN OUR BOY SEES LEVITAS, HE IS GOING TO TELL HIM THAT HE DOES SOME WORK FOR LEO CHERNE, AND OTHERS, BESIDES SUBMITTING ARTICLES FOR THE "NEW LEADER". HE WILL NOT OF COURSE, IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH THE AGENCY. LEVITAS IS UNWITTING OF ANY AGENCY RELATIONSHIP, AND IT IS DESIRED THAT IT BE KEPT THIS WAY. ON THE OFF CHANCE THAT CHERNE MAY KNOW LEVITAS, AND ~~X~~ ON THE FURTHER CHANCE THAT UPON HIS RETURN TO THE US, LEVITAS MAY SEE CHERNE AND TELL HIM THAT HE RAN INTO OUR ~~BOYXX~~ WHO INDICATED THAT HE WAS DOING SOME WORK FOR CHERNE, WILL YOU TELL CHERNE as soon as possible, THAT LEVITAS IS NOT WITTING OF THE FACT THAT THE ~~XXXX~~ BOY IS CONNECTED WITH THE AGENCY, AND THAT HE SHOULD NOT INDICATE TO LEVITAS ~~XXXX~~ OR ASSUME THAT LEVITAS KNOWS, ~~O~~ THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP. THANKS VERY MUCH.

✓ SECRET

07462

✓

SECRET

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 4854

SEP 20 1 36 PM '56

SUPPORT FROM MCCANN

CASE 9145 X 9145

1. ON 19 X 19 SEPTEMBER WE ADVISED LEO CHERNE X LEO CHERNE OF THE CONTENTS OF YOUR WA-8598 X 8598. CHERNE, AS IT TURNED OUT, KNOWS S. LEVITAS X S. LEVITAS AND CONSIDERS HIM TO BE A VERY HIGH-TYPE, PATRIOTIC INDIVIDUAL.

2. WE EXPLAINED TO CHERNE THAT LEVITAS WOULD NO X NO DOUBT SEE OUR MAN ABROAD AND CAUTIONED CHERNE THAT HE SHOULD NOT X NOT ASSUME THAT LEVITAS KEW OF ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAN INVOLVED AND THE AGENCY. CHERNE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD IN NO X NO WAY INDICATE THAT SUCH A RELATIONSHIP EXISTED.

3. RAY MILLARD X RAY MILLARD WAS INFORMED DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK THAT CHERNE HAD BEEN SO ADVISED.

SECRET

20/1724Z

✓

File [illegible]

07463

✓

PRIORITY SECRET SENSITIVE

PP ESE
DE ESG 81
P 151341Z
GR180
BT
TVAVN
46473/23
46473/23

PRIORITY

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 6845

FEB 15 8 56 AM '57

THIS IS SENSITIVE

CASE 9145 X 9145

THIS IS IN REFERENCE TO A REQUEST MILLARD X MILLARD OF COVER DIV. MADE TO LEA X LEA IN WRITING CONCERNING THE FEAR OF OUR AGENT IN PARIS THAT HIS COVER MAY HAVE BEEN BLOWN BY HIS 24 SISTER, MEETING MR. 06 JOSEPH ARDLEIGH X JOSEPH 06 ARDLEIGH OF THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE AND TELLING HIM THAT HER 04 BROTHER WAS IN PARIS WORKING FOR SAID INSTITUTE.

CHERNE X CHERNE WAS APPRAISED OF THE SITUATION ON 14 X 14 FEBRUARY AND HE REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING:

07464

1. PLEASE ADVISE HIM OF THE NAME OF THE 08 SISTER WHO MET MR. 06 ARDLEIGH. (WE ASSUME FROM THE GIST OF HIS QUESTION THAT HE WANTS TO BE ABSOLUTELY SURE 0824 WHICH AGENT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT)

2. HE REQUESTS THAT 06 JOSEPH ARDLEIGH BE MADE WITTING OF THE OPERATION FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

WE WILL SEND BIO X BIO DATA ON 06 ARDLEIGH AS SOON AS CHERNE MAKES IT AVAILABLE TO US.

PLEASE SEND US THE NAME OF THE 08 SISTER SO THAT WE CAN MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO CHERNE.

15/13477 ✓

15 Feb
Copy fwd to
Mulland

Mulland advised and will get sister's name. He also wants biog data on Ardleigh 06

RITY

SECRET

SENSITIVE

SECRET

Case 9K15

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 6870

SUPPORT FROM MAJOR

REF. NYOR 6845 X 6845

FEB 18 11 18 AM '57

THE FOLLOWING IS THE BIO. X BIO INFORMATION ON 06 JOSEPH D. ARDLEIGH X 06 JOSEPH D. ARDLEIGH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 08 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., 08 589 X 539 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

HE WAS BORN 08 24 MAY 1914 X 08 24 MAY 1914 AT 08 SCRANTON, PENN.
HIS PRESENT HOME ADDRESS IS 08 ALDEN ROAD, GREENWICH, CONN.
HE WAS PREVIOUSLY CONNECTED WITH THE LAW FIRM OF 08 MILBANK, TWEED, HOPE AND WEBB OF NEW YORK, THE 08 HOOVER COMPANY OF 08 NORTH CANTON, OHIO, HAD HIS OWN BUSINESS WHICH WAS KNOWN AS 08 SALES METHODS INC., ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NEW YORK.
HE JOINED 08 THE RESEARCH INST. 1939 X 1939.

PLEASE ASSIGN CASE NUMBER TO THESE EFFORTS.

✓

07465

✓

14-00000

20 Feb 57 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York **14330** Secret

FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA

CASE 9145. REUR NYOR 6845. MILLARD ADVISES THAT THE NAME OF THE SISTER WHO MET MR. ARDLEIGH IS MRS. HELEN B. BLODGETT(MRS. EMMONS). BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON ARDLEIGH RECEIVED AND MILLARD IS INITIATING SECURITY CLEARANCE ON HIM. WE WILL ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED.

FEB 20 3 55 PM '57

✓ SECRET

07466

7 August 1957 x

Washington R. S. Travis 2268

New York Secret

CONDOR FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 21187

RE CLOSED CASE 9145. MILLARD OF COVER HAS REQUESTED THAT WE TRY TO DETERMINE WHEN LEO CHERNE WILL RETURN TO NYC. IT APPEARS THAT OUR BOY, [illegible] FOR WHOM CHERNE IS PROVIDING COVER, IS BACK IN THE STATES ON LEAVE, AND WHEN HE TRIED TO CONTACT CHERNE, FOUND THAT HE WAS OUT OF TOWN. WILL YOU PLEASE SEE IF YOU CAN FIND OUT DESIRED INFORMATION. THANKS.

24

AUG 8 8 59 AM '57

SECRET

07467

SEC

SECRET

WA CITE NYOR 9236

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM DAME

AUG 13 10 29 AM '57

CLOSED CASE 9145 X 9145
REUR WA 21187 X 21187

1. MISS KREUGER X KREUGER, LEO CHERNE'S X LEO CHERNE'S SECRETARY, ADVISES HE IS EXPECTED BACK IN NYC 19 X 19 AUGUST, EXACT HOUR UNKNOWN X UNKNOWN.

2. ANYTHING FURTHER?

13 Aug 57
Millard advised. He will advise if action

✓

SECRET

07468

19 August 1957 x

Washington

R. S. Travis 2268

New York

Secret

DAME FROM SUPPORT(TRAVIS)WA 21593

CASE 9145(CLOSED). REUR NYOR 9236 AND LEO CHERNE. XXXXXX AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER TO BE DONE. THANKS FOR YOUR ANSWER.

AUG 19 [illegible] PM '57

SECRET

07469

14-00000

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

3263

INDIVIDUAL	DATE	ACTION
Fred Engel	26 Dec.	~~Fred~~ Engel came up at Rose's suggestion to discuss a need for cover. Engel has a man, now working for ECA who is coming with OPC at the end of January. Engel desires an interim back-stop which the ECA man can give to ECA as a reason for his leaving ECA. Engel desires some organization which will be used as the new employer of the ECA man, and which will be willing to acknowledge, if necessary, that they have hired the man. OPC is working on a permanent cover to send the man to Italy on a research program, but must await clearance on the outfit. The latter is believed to be the National Planning Association. Engel is submitting biographic data ~~[illegible]~~ on the ECA man so that the organization who will backstop the man will have full knowledge of the man. Rose has assigned case # C101 to this case
Rose	10 Jan	Rose brought biographic on Engel's man. Rose indicated he may want to go to NY to contact a firm re the cover. Travis raised the question as to whether or not the NY field office could make preliminary inquiry. Rose will advise. He wants to see Research Inst. of Amer. RW
	11 Feb	Close case
Holley	17 Mar	Holley requests that we make an appointment for Leon with Cherne for 18 or 19 March. ~~Capt.~~ Leon will approach Cherne without CIA representative
Clarke (NY)	17 Mar ✓	Clarke advises that Leon should call direct to Cherne as the latter is expecting the call to come through that way. Leon can use Clark's name if necessary. Holley notified but she doesn't like it. She will call back. Clark will call Cherne and tell him to expect call. Clark advises Leon will be in Wash until [illegible] ex-1188. 03 advised.

07470 ✓

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Inforr

Office Memorandum • UNI

TO : Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM : Chief, Cover Division, PLANS/OSO

SUBJECT: Appointment with William A. BARRON, 06 and Leo CHERNE

Case 10336

Reference: CS-1512 and CS-1337

Case 4195

1. This will confirm Mr. Rose's 03 verbal request that Contact Division/OO ask its Boston field office to arrange appointments for Mr. Edward Rose 03 of Cover Division, PLAN to see Mr. William A. Barron, 06 Chairman of the Board, Gillette Safety Razor Company, 08 and Mr. John [illegible] Toulmin, 06 Senior Vice President of the First National Bank of Boston, 08 at their convenience on Wednesday May 21, 1952. The purpose of the visit is to explore the willingness of these gentlemen to act as ostensible donors of funds to support a current operation.

Case 10336

2. This will also confirm Mr. Rose's 03 request that the New York City field office of the Contact Division/OO arrange an appointment for Mr. Rose 03 to see Mr. Leo Cherne, President of the Research Institute of America at Mr. Cherne's convenience on Thursday May 22, 1952. Mr. Cherne, who has for some time been backstopping the activities of an agent 08 in this country, has apparently expressed willingness to provide cover 24 for this agent abroad. 08 The purpose of the interview is to discuss more fully Mr. Cherne's proposal. Cover Division would be happy to have an OO field office representative present to insure continuity.

Case 4145

3. As a result of the above requests, Mr. Barron 06 found to his regret that he was unable to cooperate with the Agency at the present time. Mr. Toulmin, 06 on the other hand, was most cooperative. Mr. Cherne, unfortunately, was out of town. The New York field office has been asked to try to arrange a meeting with Mr. Cherne, as outlined above, for Wednesday afternoon, June 4, 1952.

SECRET
Security Information

07471

(W[illegible]LED IN) 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1 to 4. Of possible interest to you

— file [illegible] dispatch

7528

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/DO/I B-1			17 Oct	
2.				
3. ~~FT~~				
4. MR. OBER - CI OP/DO				
5. MR. TOTH - DO/I/B1 - IHG				
6.				
7. Shirley				
8.				
9.				
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17.				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 11 Oct 67

DOCUMENT NUMBER UWCA 03510

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

C/DO/I

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
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	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, DO/I

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT
WOMUSE
"Peace" Demonstrations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIRECTOR 39871

1. Enclosed for Headquarters information are copies of literature mailed by the Catholic Association for International Peace (CAIP) to its members (attachments 1, 2 and 3) concerning "Negotiation Now!"

2. Also enclosed as of possible interest are copies of CAIP materials (attachments 3, 4 and 5) concerning its 40th Annual Conference, scheduled for October 27 - 29, the theme of which is "Selective Conscientious Objection in an Age of Conflict." The conference is to be held at Dunbarton College of Holy Cross, 2935 Upton Street N.W., Washington, D. C.

3. The above items were received by Oliver H. CORBUSTON who had joined the CAIP for cover purposes in the course of a previous assignment. Attachments 1, 2 and 3 are forwarded in response to reference.

Oliver H. Corbuston
Oliver H. CORBUSTON

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
3 - Chief, DO/I w/atts
1 - Chief, DO w/o att

1528

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UWCA-3510

CS COPY

DATE
14 OCT 1967
11 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
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22

VIA Specify Air or Sea Pouch

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 14 May 1955

TO Chief, FEA 12-22

FROM Senior Representative, (New Delhi)

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/INTEL
SPECIFIC (PA)FLIPPER - Transmittal of Reports
02

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of THERIAULT reports and notes as listed below. Not included are carbon copies of the initial report (plans undated) and the report covering the period 28 December - 14 January as the third copy was not made.

2. THERIAULT requested that, if possible, a set of his report be made available to him on his return to facilitate preparation of a master report on overall findings and impressions.

Thomas V. LUND

Enclosures Under separate cover
(Pouched 7 May 1955)

14 Jan - 23 Jan
25 Jan - 30 Jan
30 Jan - 8 Feb
9 Feb - 17Feb
18 Feb (1 pp)
20 Feb - 4 Mar
4 - 7 Mar
8 Mar - 16 Mar
18 Mar - 30 Mar
Interview with U.S. [illegible]
8 Apr - 12 Apr
Notebook

02

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CS Classification: [illegible] NE
JOB # [illegible] 5/59
Box: 5 Folder # 3

Distribution:
Orig & 4 - Hqs
2 - Files
9 May 55

[redacted]

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SIGNATURE CARD REPRODUCED

8915

SECRET

14 May 1955

02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: (PA)[illegible]

SUBJECT: Preliminary Debriefing of Anita THERIAULT

TIME: 13 May 1955, 2030-2130.

1. Prior to my departure for New York to handle the preliminary debriefing of THERIAULT, I discussed the following subjects with CNEA-5:

1) In view of the fact that THERIAULT's expenses on her recent trip to India have been greater than was anticipated, $1,000 additional funds have or are to be shortly deposited to her bank. This will be done by sterile check. It is to be accounted for under the terms of the original contract.

2) CNEA-5 suggested that I take her reports up with me for possible annotation and expansion. /Upon examination on 14 May, this appears unfeasible in view of the fact that there are CIA commo indicators and RI symbols attached directly to the reports./

3) CNEA-5 suggested that I pursue with THERIAULT the possibility of developing an interest in Krishna Menon, utilizing a cleared publisher who could request Menon to write a book. This approach to be based on Menon's acute susceptability to flattery.

4) CNEA-5 suggested that THERIAULT be asked to review the areas of her influence in order to lay the groundwork for an official invitation to visit this country being extended to the Prime Minister in the future. He suggested Sen. George and Chester Bowles as possible points of departure.

5) THERIAULT is to be informed that her reports have been of immeasurable assistance to the Ambassador and to the U.S. Government vis-a-vis policy planning for India.

6) THERIAULT is to be asked to come to Washington for a day or so in the very near future for further debriefing. This is to be arranged at her convenience.

7) In view of the fact that THERIAULT has been unwitting of the Agency's role in sponsoring her trip, I suggested that I now make her witting in terms of the security involved. It seemed advisable to me since it is likely that there will be future contacts with THERIAULT. CNEA-5 agreed to this.

8) THERIAULT is to be advised that she is at liberty to discuss any and all aspects of her trip with anybody with the exception of the Agency's role in sponsoring it.

02

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

9) In view of the vast amount of work that must be done, I suggested that I plan to spend two days - 16 and 17 May - if it becomes necessary. On previous trips to discuss THERIAULT's mission with her, I found that she frequently had other commitments which made it difficult to cover adequately the material which I had amassed. If this is the case on this trip, I should prefer not to press her. One day's latitude seems the better part of wisdom. CNEA-5 agreed. We shall see, however.

10) In the event that it becomes necessary to reach me, I suggest that my wife be asked to get in touch with me, 08 (JAckson 7-7018) and that I be asked simply to call my office. I will then call on the sterile phone. For the record, my telephone number in New York is (TELHAM 8-2530) 08

Bertram Cooper

Bertram Cooper

03

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

22

[redacted]

General Comments.

4P duplicate

1. I have now talked with many Ford Foundation people and many TCM people. Am impressed by their quality. They are working hard and are doing it in a self-effacing manner. I have not heard one criticism of them from anybody. There are a few duds, of cour I have not yet met them. They are here "to help India carry out her projects and her ideas" as one put it. And they seem to do not only democratically but with a very real warmth and sympathy -- yet they stay quietly in the background and take none of the credit. But I feel more strongly each week I am here that the work is solid and is having tremendously good effect in relieving tension and hostility between the two countries. The results of the actual work are apparent now and hope has recently increased among Indians; also their self-confidence. When confidence increases, sensitiveness decreases, of course.

2. From all I have picked up, the feeling is widespread that Ambassador Allen did a good job out here. As one put it, "he was exactly right for the period he was here; just as Bowles was right for the special problems of his two years." Both Indian and Americans highly praise both men.

3. We have a prize in Evelyn Hersey and somebody should thank God every night that she is here. She and Dr. and Mrs. Wiser are the most beloved Americans in north India, certainly. Evelyn Hersey is known throughout India. She was Social Welfare attache at the Embassy beginning I think in 1943. The only one attached to any embassy anywhere, I understand. Her work was to interpret the social changes taking place in India; to become aware of the needs and problems and how these needs and problems were being met; and to offer her services and her experience whenever or wherever it was asked for. When the administration changed, she was dismissed by Republicans on the grounds that this was a new idea; nobody else had ever done such a thing, that is no other foreign service and so why should the U.S.A. At Mr. Allen's urgent insistence, she was sent back, this time under the aegis of TCM. She is, however, doing the same job. Her influence is very wide; she is admired and loved by literally thousands of Indians from the high echelons down to the sweepers and other harijans. She is called on for service in numerous fields and by very high officials. She works behind the scenes and feels that her work would be ruined were she given credit for what she has actually done. She is vivid and full of life and one would hardly call her self effacing; and yet her work is done almost anonymously. I have been around her enough to see how wide her circle of Indian friends is; and how constantly and continuously they stream through her house. She goes all ove India. Has travelled much more than 100 thousand miles. She say in recent months she has felt absolutely no antagonism toward her as an American. She is shrewd, has sharp eyes and ears; is knowledgeable politically; is nobody's fool; is strongly anti-communist; is warmhearted and intellectually flexible. One of the best minds I have run into since coming out.

4. I wish we had five times the people in TCM. They carefully avoid politics. I think it is wise. And they are doing a [illegible]

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AD #1
(-BDA-180)

AH (NODF) 1865
22

General Comments. (continued.)

5. A very good project has recently been launched. It is called The Delhi Training and Orientation Centre for Foreign Technicians in India. This is the second time it has been held, I think. It begins today, Jan. 24. Continues for two weeks. (The first one worked out a fine short bibliography on India; and a little brochure on "Foods available in North India.) This second course covers the Indian village, with visits out to villages; Indian art, architecture, dance; Indian history; religion; Islam in India; other religions and philosophies; Indian family life and customs; health problems and resources; educational problems; urban problems; rural unemployment and aid; the role of foreign aid in India; discussion of the Five Year Plan.

It is the kind of briefing that every foreigner [illegible] coming to India, should have. It is open to all of them. We were invited simply as guests and shall attend many of the meetings. Films are shown; trips to art galleries and museums, etc. Miss Hersey has had much to do with this; also Dr. Douglas Ensminger. And probably others, too. Indians will do most of the briefing.

6. I shall write later about the Five Year Plan. Am still studying it. Shall have a number of interviews with the planners, or with a few of them. Shall also go out on several of the projects. This seems important to me for social changes and how they are made, broad politics. The political picture can certainly not be understood if the cultural and social pictures are not studied and analysed carefully.

We are enclosing a few excerpts of speeches made by Mr. Nehru, Mr. Menon, and Mr. Dhebar this past week at the Congress Party big gathering.

AH(NODA) 1865
22

Odds and Ends of Information:
(OSD)

1. My Fish told me that the Communists are organising the domestic workers of New Delhi . Last week there was a meeting of ayahs at India Gate called together for this purpose. The week before the bearers (or the sweepers) were called together. The Communists are going about it in a shrewd way; making very reasonable demands, such as a half day off each week, a rise of perhaps 4 or 5 rupees a month in wages. A Communist in every home will really be something.

He says there is little activity of Congress party or Socialist party among labor groups. The work is being done by Communists. They, somehow, have the money to do the organisational work while there is little money among regular workers due to weakness of industry, small number and low wages of the workers. He is troubled over lack of activity among the democratic groups in labor circles. Says he has been here only 3 months and cannot as yet see the picture clearly.

2. The State Dept.'s coldness about permitting families to visit the airmen in China gave the U. S. a very bad press out here. It was very clever strategy on the part of China; it was bad strategy on our part to appear callous to the feelings of the families. Family affection runs deep out here. It is another one of our many small blunders which somehow loom so large when viewed by the hundreds of millions out here. If, somehow, everybody could count up to ten before speaking, and think not how China is going to take it but how the entire area of Asia will react. Those families could have been told quietly and personally that if they wanted to go they would not be protected by an American passport; they could even have been secretly urged not to go; but the blatant press release. . . . Forgive my editorialising, I am sure I am not supposed to do it; but one is very close here to the mind and heart of Asia and cannot help being aware of these reactions of the people. Anyone who loves the U. S. cannot help but wish that our spokesmen would speak more softly and more tactfully. A braggart or bully is disliked by all human beings. To have strength is fine; to brandish that strength offends.

3. The Times of India (Jan. 25) has excellent editorial on the new socialistic society goal as outlined by Nehru and Congress Party leaders. "Does Avadi mark a revolutionary shift in Congress policy . . . . All that it meant was an acknowledgment of the increasingly important role of the public sector in the national economy -- a role that was already defined with greater precision in the industrial policy resolution. There was nothing to indicate that there would be any new encroachment on the sphere reserved to private enterprise, and the fears expressed outside the Congress on that score were, therefore, unjustified. Neither was there any justification for the apprehension that the new objective meant a radical departure from the Sarvodaya ideal. . . . What mattered really was not the label that was given the new creed -- but the extent to which in actual practice it would help in the production of greater wealth and in its more equitable distribution. . . . What was significant . . . was that it should ~~have been [illegible] at this stage~~

MINIATURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

Odds and ends of information (cont.)

Att (NCDA) 1865
22

have been compelled at this stage to seek a more popular label for its economic and social policies. . . . If this commitment is to be more than a design to steal the opponents' electoral thunder, the Congress Governments at the Centre and in the States have immediately to set about the task of translating the new principles into policies. . . . The only way to make the policy of Congress Governments accord with Congress principles is self criticism and yet there ~~xxx~~ were responsible Congressmen at Avadi who saw danger even in the condemnation of malpractices by Congressmen. . . . . The road to full employment -- for which the Congress has for the first time laid down a time-limit -- is by no means easy. It demands a complete renovation of life in the countryside on the one hand and speedy industrialisation making the country as self-sufficient as possible on the other. (etc.)

Digest of DJ
~~[illegible]~~ Mr. Deshmukh's speech on Jan. 24th.

He spoke of the unsuitability of totalitarianism in the democratic Republic of India and the inadequacy of capitalism, stating that there was left only a Socialistic approach open to the country.

He states that the acceptance of the Socialistic society as ideal meant the nationalisation of institutions that could be immediately nationalised with advantage. The presumption in so doing, said Mr. Deshmukh, was that Socialised production would be more profitable. He, however, cautioned that if experience belied that view, the step might have to be retraced.

He stated that a Socialistic ideal which received the support of the people could achieve the two objectives of increasing national income and enhancing individual dividend.

He stated that India had established economic stability though at a rather low level of prosperity during the first Plan period. He said the credit for the achievement went not merely to economic management and planning but included other factors, among them, assistance from friendly nations. The United States, he said, had contributed the largest share of foreign aid.

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Anecdote.

Miss Sindi and Mr. Madan (private secretary of Mrs. Gandhi's and reception clerk at Prime Minister's House) over a cosy cup of tea in their quarters told us the following story:

While in China, at first big banquet given them, Mr. Nehru and his daughter (and others) were served tiny baby live mice dipped in honey. Mrs. Gandhi (his daughter) was so shocked that she shuddered at the sight and turned away. None of them could eat the delicacy. It was not ever served again to them while they were in China.

MESSAGE FORM
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UNIT: CICP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

SECRET

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TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
Book

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RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

1560

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CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

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LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~EK~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY ~~AT~~ IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS
WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

DDP Richard Ober by direction/SH

for C/NE Ober

ECI/OP/DO

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f.l.c.

[redacted]

Attached hereto is a copy of a rundown of the [A] case prepared in SR/3/FI on 18 April 1960 for discussions with the [24 British.] [redacted] will use this paper as a basis for his discussions and will attempt to obtain [24 British] consent to joint further development of [redacted]. His discussions should begin sometime after 19 April.

[redacted] did not bring the A. case up with the [24 British] as he felt the climate was not right at the time.

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12. The second incident involved a rather unstable American woman correspondent Subject had met in Brussels. He had become friendly with her there and had revealed to her his anti-Soviet sympathies. Her association with Subject in Brussels was well known to some other Americans, including the person who had introduced Subject to us. Sometime after Subject's return home we learned that this woman was also to be stationed in Moscow. Knowing that she would want to get in touch with Subject, we wrote him that she was coming and advised him to avoid her. Before he had received our letter she had arrived in Moscow and had already visited him. She told him that her friend, the man who had introduced us to Subject, had told her under no circumstances to phone or visit Subject. (The man who had warned her had feared that she would cause Subject to become suspect to the Soviet security authorities.) This incident upset [redacted] equilibrium, as he wrote to us, and although he said that he had taken notice of our questions to him, he did not reply to our second letter.

Richard Ober
CIOP/DC
6537
19 April 1968

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99

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIR 92664

1. LNERGO HAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED ASSASSIN AS JAMES EARL RAY, BORN 10 MARCH 1928 IN ILLINOIS; HEIGHT ~~XXXXXX~~ FIVE FEET TEN INCHES; WEIGHT 163-174 POUNDS; BLUE EYES;

09331

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BROWN HAIR. SMALL SCAR ON CENTER OF FOREHEAD AND SCAR ON PALM OF RIGHT HAND. IN ADDITION TO ALIASES CITED REF HAS ALSO USED NAMES JAMES McBRIDE, JAMES WALTON, W.C. HERRON, AND JAMES O'CONNER. SERVED IN U.S. ARMY FROM FEBRUARY 1946 TO DECEMBER 1948; DISCHARGED AS INEPT AND UNABLE TO ADJUST. ONCE CONFINED TO MENTAL HOSPITAL. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS BAKER, LABORER, AND "COLOR MATCHER". A DRIFTER WITH LONG CRIMINAL RECORD FOR BURGLARY, ARMED ROBBERY, AND FORGERY. HAS BEEN MISSING FROM MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY SINCE 23 APRIL 1967. CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. PHOTOS OF RAY (LABELED GALT PRIOR TO IDENTIFICATION) BEING POUCHED FOR [LIAISON.] 24

END OF MESSAGE

DDP Richard Ober by direction

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

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OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

22 3P

FROM: San Jose, Costa Rica

REPORT NO. HRS-906

REPORT MADE BY: Stefan R. Lebenow/stl

NO. PAGES: 2

REPORT APPROVED BY: Stefan R. Lebenow

NO. ENCLOSURES: See below

DATE OF REPORT: 1 February 1956

REFERENCES:

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SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS

16-2 16-3 16-26

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2 copies to Washington.

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FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY:

22

[illegible]-906

SUBJECT: Guatemalan Exile Activities

14 January 1956

17 January 1956

(10

PLACE ACQUIRED: Costa Rican, San Jose)

1 February 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT
High level Central American exile (F). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

07

On 14 January 1956 Col. Carlos PAZ Tejada, under the alias (H. Palmares) wrote to Col. Francisco COSENZA Galvez in Costa Rica from San Salvador. The letter was addressed to the accommodation address "Justo GARCIA, Apartado 2692, San Jose," which is used by COSENZA, and is ~~currently~~ translated as follows: 08

"Although I have wanted very much to answer your letter of 7 December 1955 ~~very much~~, many things have obstructed it and so time has slipped by against my wish, so that I have been able to write you only today.

"In spite of the latest news with which you must be familiar ~~with~~, I think that what happened is nothing but an incident, natural to the trade. I really believe that the ~~crazy one~~ with whom we were dealing was trying to negotiate and participate in the winnings which there would be without much risk on his part.1 If the business failed for one reason or another, it does not signify anything more than a loss of time and some short-range hopes, but not in an important manner.2 Far from that. Something positive is being accomplished within a general line of forcing Maria Dolores to act in a manner which is good for us.3 I hope to continue in the activity and I have exactly the patience of a spider repairing its net ~~in~~ wait for a fly to fall into it.

"With relation to what you transcribed from Dona Ticha,4 that is due to the fact that the fat one5 who was formerly so close to me, has ~~[illegible]~~ from me and has dedicated himself to the task of defaming me because he was unable to get something he wanted from me. Since he has nothing else to say, he says that I have very strange relations or that I belong to the comrades.6 As you will understand, this is nothing more than a disloyal ~~means~~ in which he is an expert. The friend7 who recently arrived from El Indiote8 can increase your information concerning this. I have already written to the good friend of 'mi morena'9 so that he may explain if there is an opportunity. Although she is already ~~really suffering a strong reduction in~~ her actions and I do not think she will recuperate. Change

"I have strengthened the connections with Roque10 and other friends of the

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22
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'finca mi morena'. I think that, depending on how things appear, we should activate our requests and also contemplate new solutions to the large problem. I am writing today to the farm[11] to maintain a continuity of action and to see if the prevailing circumstances can be taken advantage of and given a purpose.

"I consider it extremely important that we maintain ourselves in closer correspondence than up to now. I understand that it is I who have failed to answer you, but I hope that the explanation of the events are sufficient. Failing to do so would be to fail to show interest and would even result in everything becoming cold and paralysed for who knows how long.

"The big car[12] wrote me very affectionately. I think that the problems that they cause each other are completely negative and that they cause us to deviate from the only road which should be followed."

SOURCE COMMENTS: NIEDERHEITMANN

1. (Col.) Ernesto [redacted]

2. A reference to the planned revolt which was discovered and destroyed by the Guatemalan Government in December 1955.

3. A code name for Guatemalan President Carlos CASTILLO Armas.

4. Augusto CHARNAUD MacDonald.

5. (Major) Marco Antonio FRANCO Chacon. According to Humberto GONZALEZ Juarez, there was a disagreement between FRANCO and PAZ Tejada, which resulted in FRANCO' ~~advising~~ telling CHARNAUD of PAZ' dealings with [redacted] NIEDERHEITMANN

6. The Communists.

7. Humberto GONZALEZ Juarez.

8. El Salvador.

9. Mexico.

10. (Col.) Adolfo GARCIA Montenegro.

11. Guatemala.

12. Juan Jose AREVALO.

SECRET

Sn. Salvador, 12 de Ene

querido Pedrito: ~~NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM~~ 3R HRS

Aunque ha sido mucho mi deseo dirigirte la para dar respuesta a la tuya del 7 de dic. ppdo., me ha (ido) ido dificultando y poco a poco pasando el tiempo, lo que hace que contra mi voluntad, hasta hoy [illegible] dirigirte estas líneas.

A pesar de las últimas noticias que habrás [illegible]do, yo creo que lo sucedido no pasa de ser un incidente [illegible]tural en el oficio. En realidad yo creo que el loco con quien tratamos, estaba tratando de regresar y participar en las [illegible] que hubieran sin mucho arriesgar de su parte. Así lo [illegible] desde el principio y por eso traté de obtener el máximo posible de compromiso de su parte. Si el negocio falló por [illegible] por b. razones no es una pérdida más que de tiempo y [illegible] [illegible]nas esperanzas a corto plazo pero en forma alguna algo tras[illegible]dental. Lejos de eso algo positivo se está obteniendo dentro de[illegible] lineamiento general de hacer a María Dolores actuar en la forma que nos conviene. Tenemos esperanzas de continuar en la ac[illegible]vidad y estoy pacientemente con la paciencia de la araña, remendando la red en espera de que la moscota caiga pronto en ella.

Con relación a lo que me transcribes de doña Ticha, [illegible] diré que eso se debe a que el gordito aquel que antes estaba [illegible] junto a mí, por no obtener de mí algo, se volvió furioso y [illegible] dedicado a la noble tarea de difamarme, especialmente, ya que no puede decir otra cosa, que tengo muy estrechas relaciones [illegible] pertenezco a los camarás. Como tú comprenderás, esto no es [illegible] un medio desleal, aunque él en esto es experto. El [illegible] que hace poco llegó de por el Salvador, te podrá

200-4-123 212



Elvira Pacheco

Elvira Pacheco

VIA AIR MAIL

Sr. Don
Justo Garcia
Apartado Postal 2692,
San José,
Costa Rica, A. C.

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[illegible], y [illegible]. y [illegible]
[illegible] reacciones y no creo que [illegible]

He fortalecido los contactos de [illegible]
[illegible] Creo que, seguir [illegible] y
[illegible] gestiones e incluso contemplar nuevas [illegible]
[illegible] grande. Hoy mismo estoy comenzando [illegible]
[illegible] la continuidad de acción y [illegible]
[illegible] y esperar las circunstancias [illegible]

Considero sumamente importante [illegible]
[illegible] en correspondencia más [illegible]
[illegible] que yo [illegible]
para capear que la explicación y [illegible]
[illegible] de [illegible], será [illegible]
[illegible] se [illegible] y se [illegible]
[illegible] tiempos.

El [illegible] grande [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] negativos y [illegible]

[illegible] BEST OBTAINABLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T

COUNTRY: USSR

SUBJECT: Oleg E Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student/ Unexpected Return to the USSR/His Possible Susceptibility to Coercion/ Incident with Academician [illegible] Sadov

REPORT NO. 00-A-3,203,015

DATE DISTR. 4 December 1961

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES [illegible]

(NY-52511)

C/S Mogan 5

Source: [Prof. Charles Gilbert Overberger Polytechnic Inst. of Brooklyn]

DATE OF INFO. 20 Nov 61 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [illegible]/27 Sep - 23 Oct 61

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, head of the chemistry department of a large US technical institute.

During the period 27 Sep to 23 Oct 61, Oleg E Pirogov, Soviet Exchange Student under [illegible] Agreement, was under the supervision of [himself and] members of his staff.

1. Oleg Nikolayevich Pirogov came to do post-doctorate research work in the Department of Chemistry under the supervision of [myself and] my associates* on 27 Sep 61. He came pursuant to the [illegible] exchange agreement and it was intended that he would remain here for a period of three or four months. He had been here less than a month when his sudden and unexplained departure occurred on 23 Oct 61. Prior to coming here, he had been a Scientific Associate of the Institute of Chemical Physics, of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

2. We were very much disturbed by Pirogov's sudden departure because we feared that the whole exchange program might have been jeopardized. So, on 27 Oct 61, we sent a cable, to Professor Nikolay Nikolayevich Semenov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who is the head of the Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow, where Pirogov had worked. Semenov replied to this cable with a cable which we received 11 Nov 61. It was very conciliatory. It stressed that Pirogov came back for family reasons. "We are extremely sorry," it said, "and will write a letter with details later." However, no such letter has arrived to date, 20 Nov 61.

3. Another cable was sent by the National Academy of Sciences, 6 Nov 61 to Mr Mstislav Vsevolodovich Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, on this subject, but no reply has been received, so far as I know.

4. As far as I am concerned, I am sure that [illegible] that Pirogov's wife and family made him return to the USSR is not the reason for his departure.

5. I think his departure [illegible], [illegible] is a [illegible] to being [illegible]. Or it may have been a combination of two or three [illegible] which brought about his recall.

6. Pirogov fitted in very well here. He is a very personable fellow. We gave him the title of Visiting Scientist. He seemed to work with [illegible]

* [Prof. Herman Mark + Murray Goodman]

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students about four or five years after receiving their Ph D. When he arrived, he spoke very little English but was learning fast. He had a room in a dormitory over at the Long Island College, where we employed our fliers. He made many friends. He is married and has a wife and two children who remained in Moscow. One of his parents came from the Ukraine, I believe. The F A S has all the details. "They are paying the freight."

7. He was favorably impressed with Pirogov's ability and regard him as a capable research worker. He is well informed in the limited area in which he has been working. He mixed well with the other students. He was not pretentious. He did not seem to hide anything. On the subject of knowledge, for example, he did not pretend that the USSR's is up to ours in the US. He was not proselytizing for the Soviet system. It seemed to me that he was the sort of man who might have been converted to the US way of doing things, if he was not careful. It may be that the people to whom he reported in the Council of the Soviet Delegation to the UN at Park Avenue and 68th Street, New York City, may have reached the same conclusion. Or his departure may have been brought about for other reasons, for example, by his brush with Leonid Ivanovich Sedov, academician and president of the International Astronautical Society and Chairman of the Soviet Interplanetary Commission.

8. Dr Sedov* was visiting our institution and one of us thought it would be a good idea for Pirogov to meet Sedov. This was brought about at a reception where he was introduced as "Pirogov of Moscow." They shook hands and Pirogov said something in English like, "pleased to meet you." Sedov said something to him in a very sharp tone in Russian and later, in the elevator, drew him aside and lectured him in a very stern voice. I was present and observed that Pirogov grew pale. Later, he became very nervous and went to the UN Delegation Headquarters on Park Avenue and 68th Street. I understand that they laughed at his apprehensions and told him not to worry. However, from then on he became more nervous. Evidently, he said, had indicated that he was talking too much. He was afraid he had given away some important information.

9. This was a lot of baloney because we already know what they are doing. He certainly had no reason to feel he was disclosing more than he should. He only disclosed what was necessary to do the work planned for him in the problem assigned under the exchange agreement. It would have been impossible for him to carry out his assignment without making the disclosures that he made. You just cannot work on such a project without being communicative. Just the same Pirogov became very apprehensive and said he might be recalled. "They will reprimand me anyway. They think I have talked too much about what we are doing in the Institute of Chemical Physics." Pirogov had taken the position that it was not wrong for him to talk about his work at this Institute in the USSR, which is the one headed by Semenov, incidentally. Pirogov maintained that an exchange project cannot be all take and no give. There is supposed to be an exchange of information.

10. Another thing that contributed to Pirogov's apprehensions was the fact that he had not heard from his wife or family for several weeks. He was greatly concerned about this. However, I believe he did have a letter from his wife just before he left.

11. My own feeling is that his popularity worked against him. The suspicious people in the UN Delegation office did not like the idea of his becoming a part of the community here. The students liked him and he went to dinners with them. When some of my students were celebrating receiving their degrees, Pirogov joined the party and after dinner he came along with the rest of them to have a brandy at my house. He obviously acted like a human being.

12. In my opinion, Pirogov's superiors made a serious mistake in not appreciating what a good propaganda agent he was for their system, even though he was not afraid to admit that the Soviet system is not perfect and that there

8090

in a housing shortage, for example. They thought he talked too much and was too friendly. He did not keep his mouth shut and he did not act like a boor. I am sure they concluded that he was susceptible to conversion. I thought so myself.

13. So I suspect that Pirogov dug his own hole. He had to report to the Council of the [illegible] Delegation every week and, in the process, his general attitude got across to them. He talked too much. His conversation with [illegible] was an example.

14. Again, what he was working on here was very close to what he had been working on under [illegible] and the Council may have jumped to the conclusion that he was telling us all that he knew.

15. The problem on which he worked here was the copolymerization of dienes and alpha-olefins using a transition metal catalyst system. For example, one of the copolymerizations on which he worked involved the diene, butadiene, and the alpha olefin, propylene.

16. He was known to many of the staff and was intimate with ten or fifteen students here but was probably most intimate with the man with whom he shared a laboratory. This was an Italian, named Dr Basilio [illegible]. They appeared to be good friends.

17. I do not think that Pirogov was the victim of an informer. I have wondered about this a lot but I do not think this is what happened. I think, as I said before, that he dug his own hole. Incidentally, we were most anxious to keep this incident out of the papers and there was no leak. Had there been an informer, this might not have been the case.

-end-

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KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO,

NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS,

PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE,

RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO,

SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO,

STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

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0932

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82351	VALDES Cardenas, Jesus A.	99799	275603
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	CID Colon, Dimas		275954
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	LACEDONIA, Julio		276246
82461	TETZELI, Ludvik	100303	276401
82597	CUBILL Mesa, Diez Jose	100310	276402
82946	TAQUECHEL [illegible], Enrique Jose	100339	276406
82830	FUENTESy Sanchez, Jacinto Luis	100330	276407
83061	MARTINEZy Leon, Pedro	100345	276410
82815	RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, Manuel	100322	276420
82894	WILKINSON, Robert J.	100331	276774
	[illegible], Leroy		276776
	SALCEDO, Camilo		276777
	WILLIS, Frederick Thompson		276778
	ABILA, Andrew William	100325	276841
	CONTRERAS Crisafo, Tomas Emilo		276843
82856	JULIENy [illegible], Carlos Pedro Damiano	100329	276847
83060	ACOSTA, Robert	100344	276853
	ARCHIBOLD, David		276854
	CHRISTIE Randle		276855
91656	GUTIERREZ Falla, Laureano	112666	275856
	ROMERO, Charris Francisco		276859
	CHRISTENSON, Vernon J.		277084
	[illegible], George G.		277085
82953	OLIVEROy Riopa II, Miguel Angel	100337	277088
82947	TRUJOL Gimeno, Miguel Guillermo	100333	277092

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/S/ A. J. Amori

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TO
Chief, WH/Cuba

INFO
COS, JMWAVE Chief, DOD

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMCLOCK/1
Transmittal of Contact Reports for First Two Meetings with AMCLOCK/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346, et seq.

1. Transmitted herewith are one copy for each addressee of the contact reports prepared by Peter J. DI GERVENO concerning his first two meetings with AMCLOCK/1. Report #1, New York Memorandum (NYM)-2233, deals with a meeting held 26 September 1967; Report #2, NYM-2234, deals with a meeting held 27 September.

2. IDENTITY Sheets for each of the two reports follow under separate cover enclosure to this dispatch.

3. Contact reports of later meetings will follow by dispatch.

Howard G. FIGALAN

ATTACHMENTS:
1-Contact Reports as stated para 1, h/w
2-IDENTITY Sheets as stated para 2, USC

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/WH/Cuba, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
2-COS, JMWAVE, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
1-DOD, w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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13 October 1967

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9318

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S E C R E T

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CONTACT REPORT NO. 1

8 October 1967

NYM-2233

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

FROM: Peter DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1, 26 September 1967

REFERENCES: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346 and 3352

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File
(Original via ELMARD)

Introduction

445-5542 [redacted]

1. AMCLOCK/1 arrived in New York on 19 September 1967. He had been given instructions to call a JMWAVE operational number (Iden A) next time he was out in a friendly country in order to receive contact instructions. When he failed to call soon after his arrival it was decided to try to establish visual contact with him at HTBASTE, (Commodore Hotel [illegible]) same as was done successfully in 1966, to move him to call for contact instructions. For that purpose DI GERVENO was taken to HTBASTE on 21 September carrying a match folder from (Iden B) with his alias, (Iden C, → DAVID CORBIN) and room number. The plan was to make sure AMCLOCK/1 recognized DI GERVENO, who also met him in 1966, and to pass the match folder to AMCLOCK/1 only if this could be done securely. DI GERVENO was able to make definite visual contact on four different occasions: once at (Iden D) (GENERAL ASSEMBLY [illegible] [illegible] Nations) twice at (Iden E) and a fourth time on the corridor between (Iden D) and (Iden F) (DELEGATES LOUNGE, UNITED NATIONS). AMCLOCK/1 quickly recognized DI GERVENO and tried to keep himself available for a possible contact. However this was not possible and the contacts on 21 September were limited to visual recognition only. (SECRETARIAT BUILDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS)

2. During this time the operational number of the Beekman site (Iden G) (8-4655) was also manned in case AMCLOCK/1 had retained this number and attempted to call DI GERVENO there instead of JMWAVE, but he failed to call either place for contact instructions. It was then decided to attempt to contact the agent again on 26 September at HTBASTE. While attempts were being made to locate AMCLOCK/1 the case officer surveilled the building where AMCLOCK/1 is staying (Iden H) (EMBASSY HOUSE EAST, 310 E 47th STREET) and saw him go in by himself at 1310 hours to leave his briefcase. At 1330 hours, AMCLOCK/1 left the building alone to go for lunch and DI GERVENO followed him. AMCLOCK/1 recognized the case officer and after exchanging safety signals DI GERVENO passed the match folder to the agent while both were waiting on a crowded street corner for the red light to change, at which time AMCLOCK/1 told DI GERVENO that he had no way to contact him and would see him after lunch.

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Operational Chronology

3. On 26 September AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1500 to 1830 at Iden B. AMCLOCK/1 appeared to be in good health and rested and in high spirits. He was very glad to see DI GERVENO again and to be able to discuss things openly. He criticized bitterly the living conditions in PBRUMEN but does not seem to be affected by it or by the fact that he had to live under a regime he obviously hates. In fact, he seemed quite sure of himself and plans to return to PBRUMEN at the end of the HTBASTE session. He is scheduled to remain in New York until December 1967 but may return to PBRUMEN before then for a short visit to look after his ailing mother and his wife, who had a baby girl two weeks prior to his departure. This may have influenced AMCLOCK/1 not to think about a possible defection at this time, which came as a surprise to the case officer who expected the agent to have second thoughts about return to PBRUMEN where he is not happy.

4. AMCLOCK/1 explained that he could not make contact as instructed because he had destroyed the phone number and both accommodation addresses we had given him for him to report from inside PBRUMEN. He destroyed them in the toilet at the airport upon his arrival in PBRUMEN in late December 1966 after observing a number of uniformed individuals at the airport which he considered to be suspicious, although they had nothing to do with AMCLOCK/1. This may have been a convenient excuse for his failure to make contact as instructed but DI GERVENO did not press the issue. Instead he was given the operational numbers of the Beekman site and of the Base in New York (Iden I) and told he could always call there if he could not locate DI GERVENO at Iden B. He was also given the JMWAVE number for emergency contact. AMCLOCK/1 said he tried to make contact by calling Iden J to inquire about MIDDAUGH in true name, but after much probing he was told that MIDDAUGH was in Washington and was given a phone number for him to call direct. AMCLOCK/1 was planning to call Washington at a later day if he had not been contacted.

986
2948

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

5. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he has had no security problems and has not been molested inside of PBRUMEN. He was treated "royally" by the AMTHUG regime in early 1967 and everybody seemed pleased to see him back. Apparently his return surprised some individuals who privately thought he would defect rather than return to PBRUMEN to live. During this time he enjoyed special privileges and received frequent invitations to official functions with foreign diplomats. However, by mid 1967 the special privileges and invitations were gradually suspended for no apparent reason. (For example, he was no longer allowed to take his private car to a government garage for repairs and he had to arrange for the maintenance of his house, which was given to him and kept up by the government at first). AMCLOCK/1 believes that this was due to his being under "observation" while going through a reorientation period after his long stay abroad. There is nothing to indicate that AMCLOCK/1 is not trusted or accepted by other government officials. The fact that he was sent out again is a strong

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indication that he enjoys a favorable position in the AMTHUG regime. He hopes that in 1968 he will be assigned to another permanent post abroad.

6. In reference to his wife AMCLOCK/1 stated that he is now convinced that she is totally against the AMTHUG regime. After their marriage in late 1966 he was not sure of her true political ideology but during the past year he has been able to confirm her disagreement on a number of occasions. He feels confident that she would follow him in any movement against the regime, such as defection, but has not told her about his work for WOFACT. GONZALO DIAZ DIAZ

ROBE
RODRIGUE

ALBERTO BOZA HIDALGO-GATO

7. Regarding the trip to New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that with them came Iden K, a known intelligence type, and four other individuals not known to him but believed to be intelligence types. Later AMCLOCK/1 identified these individuals as Idens L, M, N and O. In answer to specific questions AMCLOCK/1 said that the crate they brought contained only a vase for Iden P. AMCLOCK/1 is not aware if any weapons or special instructions have been sent to Iden P in connection with racial disturbances in WOLADY. The routine instructions given to Iden P were to oppose LNHARP actions in HTBASTE whenever possible and to try to bring all debatable matters to HTBASTE, where they have better support.

JOAQUIN
CAMILO
GARCIA
ALONSO

CUBAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

CUBAN MISS
TO THE UNITE
NATIO

8. AMCLOCK/1 was not seen going in or out of the room and the meeting was conducted without interruption under most secure conditions. DI GERVENO established immediate rapport with AMCLOCK/1 and their relations remained most cordial throughout the meeting. Only DI GERVENO and AMCLOCK/1 were present.

Finances

9. DI GERVENO was careful not to mention salary payments to AMCLOCK/1 who is not aware of his salary increase to $1,000 a month effective 1 January 1966. However, he requested $500 to buy books and baby items for his daughter. DI GERVENO told him that he would bring him the money in their next meeting. All payments to AMCLOCK/1 will be T/A'd to JMWAVE together with the agent's signed receipts.

Intelligence Production

10. Although most of the meeting was used to discuss operational matters, AMCLOCK/1 reported disseminable information on the following requirements given in DIRECTOR 37960.

a. Present attitude of the PBRUMEN government towards the United States; expectation of a military attack on PBRUMEN supported by the United States; formal military training being given to all PBRUMEN army officials (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3382)

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AFRO-ASIAN-LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION - AALAPSO

LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO)

b. PBRUMEN views regarding Idens Q and R (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3390)

c. Replacement of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the USSR and PBRUMEN views regarding the Soviet Ambassador to PBRUMEN (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3392).

d. Main objectives of the Foreign Policy of the AMTHUG regime (being disseminated).

Future Plans

11. The next meeting was scheduled for the following day, 27 September, for lunch at the Beekman site.

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Identities to NYM-2233

Iden A - 445-5547

Iden B - Commodore Hotel, Room 1263

Iden C - David Cordova

Iden D - General Assembly of the United Nations

Iden E - Delegates Lounge, United Nations

Iden F - Secretariat building of the United Nations

Iden G - 688-4683

Iden H - Embassy House, 310 East 47th Street)

Iden I - 986-2948

Iden J - U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Iden K - Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato

Iden L - Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso

Iden M - Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz

Iden N - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Iden O - "Papo", a courier to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations

Iden P - Cuban Mission to the United Nations

Iden Q - Afro-Asian- Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization - AALAPSO

Iden R - Latin American Solidarity Organization - LASO

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Identities to UNDA 2234

Iden A - United Nations, Committee II

Iden B - Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244)

Iden C - Raul ROA

Iden D - Jose FERNANDEZ Cossio, Director of International Organisms in the Foreign Ministry

Iden E - Americo CRUZ, Cuban Ambassador to Canada

Iden F - Bank of Foreign Commerce

Iden G - Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio

Iden H - Foreign Relations Committee of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party

Iden I - Isidro ROSALES (201-335336)

Iden J - Antonio CARRILLO (201-349956)

Iden K - Gabriel MOLINA (201-817838)

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CONTACT REPORT NO. 2

9 October 1967

NYM-2234

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

FROM: Peter J. DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1, 27 September 1967

REFS: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3362 and 3359; DIRECTOR 37254 and 37960

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File
(Original via ELMARD)

Operational Chronology

1. On 27 September 1967 AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1130 to 1530 for lunch at the Beekman site. The agent was not seen entering or leaving the site and he stayed out of sight when food was brought up from the restaurant downstairs. The meeting was conducted under secure conditions and without interruptions. Only AMCLOCK/1 and DI GERVENO were present at the meeting.

Jesus Jimenez Escobar (201-749244)

United Nations, Committee II

Raul Roa

2. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he had been assigned to work in Iden A with Iden B, same as last year. A few days before his departure from PBRUMEN, Iden C told AMCLOCK/1 to watch out for Iden B who is a member of the intelligence service and will be reporting on AMCLOCK/1. The implication was that AMCLOCK/1 was still under observation by the AMTHUG regime and Iden C actually told him to bend backwards in every way possible to prove himself while in New York. AMCLOCK/1 explained that this meant to live a model life while abroad and to perform extra work whenever required, without complaining. AMCLOCK/1 believes that Iden B is being trained to take over AMCLOCK/1's position as an expert in economics for the AMTHUG regime. If this is the case, this may be the last time AMCLOCK/1 is sent to Iden A. Still, under much probing, AMCLOCK/1 could not come out with any clear indication that he was suspected or was falling out of grace with the AMTHUG regime. Although the agent has a tendency to emphasize his "delicate" position, the case officer believes that he is not mistrusted and still enjoys a favorable position in the government, although probably considered too bourgeois to be completely integrated with their communist philosophy.

3. Regarding the recent changes made in PBRUMEN diplomatic personnel abroad, AMCLOCK/1 was not aware of any security shake up taking place in the Foreign Ministry. He regarded these changes as a routine matter in accordance with their policy to bring back to PBRUMEN for a reorientation tour all those diplomats stationed abroad for three consecutive years or more. AMCLOCK/1 actually

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appeared not to be aware of any major purge and not to be concerned about it. However, if this is true the chances for AMCLOCK/1 to be reassigned abroad in the near future appear doubtful at this time.

4. When DI GERVENO asked AMCLOCK/1 about his work and how the recent changes may affect him, the agent then reported the following information about his position in the Foreign Ministry. After his return in late December 1966 he was given four months vacation, during which time he went by the ministry from time to time but had no job assigned to him. He used most of this time for a honeymoon and to relocate in his new home furnished by the PBRUMEN government. In the spring of 1967 Iden C considered him actively as a substitute for Iden D whom Iden C does not like. However, the job did not materialize because Iden C's plans to send Iden D as Ambassador to Canada were not accepted by Iden E whom Iden C was going to send as Ambassador to Switzerland. At that time AMCLOCK/1 was also considered for a position in Iden F which was the position the PBRUMEN President wanted him to take, but AMCLOCK/1 avoided the position although it implied frequent travels abroad. The reason AMCLOCK/1 gave for not taking the position at Iden F was that he did not want to break away from his diplomatic career and felt he would be better protected among his friends in the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, after his vacation AMCLOCK/1 want back to work in the Foreign Ministry but without any specific duties. He is actually doing odd jobs for Iden C, like economic studies. In mid 1967 AMCLOCK/1 and Iden G were proposed by Iden C and accepted by Iden H as members of a four-man committee (the other two members have not been selected yet) which is to be created in the Foreign Ministry to make specific area studies and recommendations to Iden H. Since both AMCLOCK/1 and Iden G have been assigned to the HTBASTE session, it is concluded that the creation of said "Advisory Committee" is not contemplated until early 1968. According to AMCLOCK /1 the creation of this "Advisory Committee" has been discussed at the highest levels only and it may have some influence in the policy making decisions of Iden H, which is the main body that dictates present PBRUMEN foreign policy.

JOSE FERNANDEZ COSSIO, DIRECTOR OF INTER-NATIONAL ORGANISMS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

BANK OF FOREIGN COMMERCE

FERNANDO ALVAREZ TABIO

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

[illegible]

5. It may be well to record here that we should take with a grain of salt the selection of AMCLOCK/1 to such a sensitive source of information as an "Advisory Committee" to Iden H would be. The agent may be trying to build up his importance to us. It is of interest to note that in the past year that AMCLOCK/1 has been residing inside of PBRUMEN he has made no clear effort to obtain and develop new sources of information and to bring out with him intelligence of particular interest to us. For example, he has no information on the specific requirements we gave him in 1966 prior to his return to PBRUMEN and when asked to identify his main sources of information he said they were his contacts in the Foreign Ministry and Idens I, J, and K who

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ISIDRO ROSALES (201-335336)

ANTONIO CARRILLO (201-349456)

GABRIEL MOLD (201-817355)

DESENS

are old friends of AMCLOCK/1. Iden K is also a cousin of AMCLOCK/1's wife. (AMCLOCK/1 is a difficult individual to debrief on hard intelligence.)

6. Regarding internal security in the PBRUMEN mission in New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that the entire third floor of the mission is used only by members of the intelligence service. Not even the Ambassador is allowed in that area. Besides Iden B, AMCLOCK/1 correctly identified the known members of the intelligence service permanently assigned to the PBRUMEN mission.

Finances

7. AMCLOCK/1 was given $500 he requested from his escrow account and signed a receipt for this amount, which will be T/A'd to JMWAVE.

8. During the meeting AMCLOCK/1 was debriefed on the following information which was disseminated as indicated:

a. Changes of PBRUMEN diplomats abroad; expected internal reorganization in the PBRUMEN Foreign Ministry (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3373)

b. Advisory Committee on PBRUMEN Foreign Policy (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3376)

c. Informal message sent to PBRUMEN Prime Minister by Mexican President (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3375)

d. Appointment of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the Congo (Brazzaville) (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3374)

Future Plans

9. Next meeting is tentatively scheduled for 29 September between 1300 and 1400 hours. With the assignment of AMCLOCK/1 to Iden A his free time will be more restricted from now on for future meetings. However, the agent agreed to contact DI GERVENO as often as possible.

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5. WH/C/RR		6 Nov		
WH/COG/CICS E. Scoggin	1B1			
7. [redacted]				
8. [redacted]				
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3.		21 Nov 1967	22 Nov 1967	
4.				
5. WH/C/RR		6 NOV		
6. WH/COG/CICS E. Scoggin	1P7			
7. [illegible]				
8. [illegible]				
9. CI/D/AN		20 OCT 1967		
10.				
11. [illegible]				
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TO
Chief, SAS

INFO.
Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Station, WAVE; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/(LITAMIL-9)01

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PERUMEN

Attached, for addresses, are copies of Subject contact reports dated 11 May, 14 May, and 15 May 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachement:
As stated above

Distribution:
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att
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Subject: LITAMIL-9

10P

P-

On the night of 10 May 63, I met LITAMIL-9 at the usual rendezvous point and we droe to outlying district of city where debriefing took place. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED.

Time: 2130-2245.

01

(LITAMIL-9) reported as follows:

1. Manuel VEGA Perez, 201-334253 Cuban G-2 Mexico, told (L-9) that he had been with Dolores DE LA MORA Caneda and that DE LA MORA asked for (L-9). L-9, of course, will take advantage of VEGA remark to make con- with DE LA MORA. (L-9) commented that fact VEGA was with DE LA MORA is interesting. It will be recalled that "Conchit a" FERNANDEZ told (L-9) to be careful with DE LA MORA Because she is a contact of CLERGE Fabra, Cuban G-2 type.

2. (L-9) reported that on 9 May 63, while near the Cine Diana at ~~XXEX~~ 10:30, he saw Ramon SINOBAS Casado 7725 201-334249 waiting for someone. SINOBAS saw (L-9) and waved at him. (This was KUBARK meeting) (L-9) commented that SINOBAS was definitely waiting to make a contact with someone.

3. Francisco MAIZ Alberdi, Sparish/Cuban, who formerly tended the gate at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, returned to Mexico on 10 May 63, this time assigned to the Embassy as "Auxiliar de Segunda Clase". (LIFIRE Airlists show MAIZ and his wife returned via Cubana on 10 May 63). (L-9) said that MAIZ' wife is suffering from cancer, that she was operated on in Habana but there is no hope.

4. (L-9) reported that on 9 May 63, Ramon SINOBAS Casado, 7752 201-334249 Cuban Charge, met with students (about 6) from Chapingo. The meeting took place at 1700 at the Embassy.

5. Fco. MAIZ told (L-9) that ~~EXXXX~~ Hector GALLO Portieles, 7422 201-306051 Cuban Charge in Bolivia, went back to Habana recently for what he thought was short stay , i.e. two weeks but he is still there. GALLO was assigned to study "instruccion politica y revolucionaria"

201-332665

6. MAIZ also told (L-9) that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, 201-332665 formerly in Mexico reportedly received a scholarship. It is not known what kind for where.

7. MAIZ told (L-9) that Heberto JORRIN was expected to return to Mexico on 13 May 63. MAIZ said that Antonio GARCIA Lara was expected to return to Mexico shortly.

SECRET

P-6079

5/N

SECRET

8. (L-8) said that he had the duty (security) all day Saturday, 11 May 63. (L-9) said that Jose LLAGOSTERA is taking the day off and will not return until about 2200 this evening. I told (L-9) to report any similar info particularly re Armando SARDINAS and others who live at the Embassy.

9. MAIZ told (L-9) that Eusebio AZCUE was expected back in a week or so. MAIZ said that his wife would return after him. He added that Sra de AZCUE is anxious to return to Mexico.

10. (L-9) finally identified Jose FERNANDEZ Roa as the person who is working with Buenaventura REYES Acosta and Ramon SIMORES. (L-7 reported this previously) (L-9) said he asked FERNANDEZ if he was related to the Foreign Minister and FERNANDEZ didn't say yes or no. (L-9) believes that he might be because he doesn't seem very sharp and yet he's hanging around with SINOBAS and BUENAVENTURA. FERNANDEZ told (L-7) who asked him about his relationship with ROA, that if he was related to ROA it was a distant relationship.

11. Coty SOLORZANO, sister in law of Gral. Lazaro CARDENAS is scheduled to leave for Habana on 13 May 63.

12. L-9 said he attend a meeting at the Academia Mexicana de Derecho Internacional on 8 May 63 and the Mexican Amb to Israel spoke re non- intervention and autodeterminacion. (L-9) said the speech was typical of Mexican govt policy re Cuba.

13. (L-9) said that he saw Rafael PEDROSA Perez and Antonio ARRUZA Mon at the Embassy on 9 May 63. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ They were in session with Ramon SINORAS. PEDROSA, the mulatto type, told L-9 at the inaugural session of the Microondas Seminar that "it was necessary for him to make a lot of contacts in Mexico". It was he who also told (L-9) that he was in contact with Raul ROA, i.e. "Estoy en contact con ROA". (L-9) said that on 9 May at the Embassy, PEDROZA was sick, i.e. pale green, bad breath etc. L told (L-9) to make contact with PEDROZA and ARRUZA if possible and size them up. He said it would be difficult because he has no reason to see them. He merely attended the inaugural session of the Seminar. (L-9), however, did identify both men from LIERODE "take" which I showed him on this date.

15/N

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FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

(L-9) said that [illegible] on 8 May 63, through [illegible] INTO visa assistance [illegible] Embassy on 9 May 6 3. MORIN, according to (L-9), [illegible] in Habana until recently. She is living at (L-9)'s brother's [illegible]. (L-9) suggested that a ltr be written to her asking her to come [illegible] Embassy at which time the CO could interview her. He said that MORIN was told at the Embassy that it would take about a month to get clearance etc, that she had to be investigated. (L-9) pointed out that Embassy request she report for interview would appear to her as past this investigation.

15. (L-9) brought a contract to the meeting re his brother's company and (Nestlé.) He pointed out that the contact was signed on 7 Mar 63 and he left for Habana on 4 March. Because he was not present his name did not appear in the [illegible] contract and he was unhappy that this had to be. L-9, however, diplomatically and politely pointed out that he want to bring this to my attention to show that this had been a sacrifice on his part, i.e. his travel to Habana on our behalf. I asked L-9 whether this meant anything to him in dollars and xcents and he said it did not. He said the only thing was that if his name appeared as the Administratorof the Company when the contract was signed with (Nestle) it would give him a feeling of accomplishment and security re his future relationship with the company.

16. (L-9) identified the following from LIERODE photos [illegible]

Emigdio VEGA 201
Antonio ARRUZA Mon 201
Rafael PEDROZA Perez 201

17. L-7 reported that the Gabino FERNANDEZ who was invited to and attended the Cuban Embassy coctail on 19 Apr 63, is married to a Cuban woman and has been to Cuba several times. L-9 said that [illegible] FERNANDEZ has a home near Acapulco, where Eusebio AZCUE has stayed on occasions.

SECRET FILE: LIEMBIL-9

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM [illegible] SUBMITTED

10/13



Sabado de guardia todo el
día. El Domingo con Sinobas
a las 13 p.m. "Los Vive-
ros" Coyoacan.

Jorrín probablemente
llega lunes 13

Ascue

Embajador

Ros-Embajada

Caty Solórzano lunes 13
a La Habana.

Llegan Miercoles familia
Gomes Abascal etc.

Miercoles 8 Academia Mex.
de Derecho Internacional

→

[illegible] IS BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

Embajada americana Jueves 9
Srta. Morin, solicitó visa.

M. Dolores de la Mora-Vega

Sinobas, Jueves a las 10.30
a.m. junto cine Diana

Llegó Maíz hoy Viernes 10.
adscripto a la Emb. Mex.
auxiliar de segunda clase.

Sinobas, Jueves a las 5 p.m
recibió estudiantes Chapingo.

Gallo, estudiando en Habana
"instrucción política y revolucionaria". creyó que
estaría en Cuba solo 15 día

Rogelio. becado 8

→

FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

Subject: (LITAMIL-9)

On 13 May 63, I met (LITAMIL-9) at the usual rendezvous point and we drove to outlying district of the town where we held meeting. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 2230-2330.

(LITAMIL-9) provided the following information:

comments on Emma Farias

1. Francisco MAIZ A., told (L-9) that Emma FARIAS, former upstairs maid at the Cuban Embassy, and now employed by the PORTUONDOS in Oriente (Amb Jose PORTUONDO) is being returned to Mexico as a security risk. She is expected to arrive from one day to the next. According to MAIZ, FARIAS was "sacking in" with anybody who came along, and has even become friendly with counter-revs. In view of the above, FARIAS is being "bounced". MAIZ said the Cubans plan to conduct a full body search of FARIAS when she leaves Cuba, i.e. ~~HHHHHHHHH~~ "en cueros". (L-9) pointed out that FARIAS is a Mexican and if it true what MAIZ reporting about body search et al it would be good for PP play in Mexico.

2. (L-9) reported that Andres ARMONA is in Jamaica. 201-333036

3. Jose FERNANDEZ Roa, newly arrived Cuban dip, told (L-9) that he came to Mexico in 1959 with a group of young people as an "official". FERNANDEZ said that Amb MASSIP was in Mexico at that time. (L-7) reported that this is FERNANDEZ first overseas post.

4. Roberto JORRIN is expected to return on 14 May 63.

5. (L-9) reported that Ovidio SAMA, the Vice Consul in Veracruz, is quite sick with "turistas", i.e. amoebas. He apparently has had this problem in Cuba.

6. Ramon SINOBAS, Cuban Charge, told (L-9) that his baby would be about a week old when the new Ambassador arrived and that this would be fine because he wanted to return to Cuba and see his father who has returned to Habana from Paris (Ramon SINOBAS del Olmo). SINOBAS' wife gave birth to baby boy.

7. Manuel VEGA Perez told (L-9) that the new Amb Joaquin HERNANDEZ de Armas "llegara a mas tardar en diez dias".

SECRET

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

14-00000

SECRET 201-

8. On 13 May 63, Serafin DUNIN, Soviet Counselor, drove (L-9) to the Cuban Embassy from Coyoacan. DUNIN, who in L-9's opinion is extremely "sharp", "realistic" and "talented" told (L-9) the following:

a. The Cuban Rev is now consolidated as the recent trip of Fidel CASTRO to Moscow proves. DUNIN said that CASTRO's absence from Cuba did not affect the regime, that things went on the same in his absence etc. DUNIN, however, said that this does not mean that Cuba does not need CASTRO. He said that Cuba is not like the Soviet Union where the loss of KRUSCHEV would not affect the regime. Cubaneeds CASTRO and he must be protected to avoid an assassination attempt etc.

b. (L-9) asked ~~XXXXXXX~~ DUNIN about the "tapado" and DUNIN answered that at this time, in his opinion, not even the President LOPEZ M., knows who is going to be the candidate.

c. DUNIN stated that a revolution in Mexico similar to that in Cuba would be very difficult. He attributed this to the fact that the masses in Mexico ~~XXX~~ do not ~~XXX~~ have the "debida preparacion politica" required for such a revolution. He said that it will take one or two generations before Mexico is ready for such a revolution.

HM 731

HM 731 2

201-334089 201-334089

9. L-9 said that Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, Cuban Consul, is expected back on 17 May 63.

10. L-9 said that while he was in Habana he asked that 5 copies of Bohemia be sent to the Embassy. He said that 10 copies are arriving each week since his return to Mexico. He said very little propaganda is coming.

11. L-9 said that he saw Rafael PEDROSA and Antonio ARRUZA at the Embassy but he did not have a chance to talk with them. He said they quickly slipped into SINORAS ' office.

CKS

FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SECRET

of 5

FILE: L(TAMIL-9)

5/n

Emma, ciudadana mexicana. (doméstica de Portuondo)

Armona, en Tampico

Roa, vino como Oficial en época de Massip

----

mañana Martes 14 llega Jorrín

----

probablemente en un mes Sinobas coincidirá en Habana con su padre procedente de Paris

----

Vega, "De Armas llegará a más tardar en diez días"

CTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

Dunin. "La Revolución está tan consolidada, que la momentanea ausencia de Fiddel, no ha trastornado la buena marcha de las cosas en Cuba" Esto no quiere decir que Fidel no séa indispensable.

Dunin." Yo creo que en este momento ni el mismo Presidente sabe quien va a ser el candidato"
(elecciones en México)

Dunin. "Difícil en México una revolución estilo Cuba, no existe para ello en la masa la debida preparación política" e[illegible]o requiere por lo menos una o dos generaciones...

CARD SUBMITTED

14-00000

Subject: (LITAMIL-9)

On 14 May 63, I met (LITAMIL-9) at usual rendezvous point and we drove to outlying area to hold meeting. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 2200-2300

(LITAMIL-9) provided the following info:

1. L-9 had dinner at the Embassy on 14 May and he identified Emigdio VEGA Calero as a TDYer.

Re: info on CARSALENDI MAY63

2. L-9 said that Emmanuel CARBALLO told him that "Chiquis" SARSANEDI (sic) employed by the Casa de las Americas is coming to Mexico soon for a couple of weeks. SARSALENDI, fnu, Subject's father lives in Mexico and according to CARBALLO, was disappointed that his daughter was not going to stay in Mexico. Subject's mother is living in Miami.

2 MAY 63

201-354433

201-2752/61

~~to Cuba~~

3. (L-9) reported that Seydou DIALLO, Guinean Amb/arrived on Cubana on 14 May 63 and he saw to it that DIALLO had no problems at the airport. DIALLO is the Guinean Amb to the U.N. also. DIALLO told (L-9) that Carlos LECHUGA Hevia, Cuban Amb to the U.N. was highly respected by all members of the U.N., including the U.S. He said that LECHUGA knew how to handle himself in the very complicated U.N. maneuvers. DIALLO said that Raul [illegible] and LECHUGA make a good team. (L-9) said that DIALLO is very much pro-CASTRO and undoubtedly a member of the pro-CASTRO U.N. clique. DIALLO told (L-9) that he has known Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano for many years.

201-262166

(COMMENT BY SEYDOU DIALLO, GUINEAN AMB to UN, [illegible] MAY 63)

201-239

729

4. (L-9) identified the following LIHRODE photos:

Identified by photo MAY 63

Marcial MARTINEZ (COLORED) - L-9 said he saw MARTINEZ in Havana recently.

Rafael PEDROSA Arandia - TDYer for conference on microwaves.

L-9 also identified Jose FERNANDEZ Ros in LIFIRE photo at Sov Embassy press "fiesta" recently. MAY 63

5. (L-9) said that Manuel VEGA Perez told Rafael PEDROSA Arandia and Antonio ARRUZA Mon that he should not leave any docs or papers at their hotel room. In fact, both men left immediately to get papers from their ~~XXXX~~ room. (L-9) believes they are staying at the Hotel Agnes.

SECRET

FILE: (LITAMIL-9) 6

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM ASSEMBLAGE CARD SUBMITTED

13/R

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2 21 PM '64
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

RID/AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SAS/ESC		10 April 64		DRC
2. WH/SA/OPS Maloney		10 APR 1964		
3. SA/MOB/FI			8 April 64	
4. WH/SA/Int PRD I				
5.			23 SEP	
6.				
7. SA/CI SAS/SO/HH			20 Apr 64	
8. WH/SA/Security			22 April	
9. /SO/			23 April	CB
10. SAS/MOB/KOP RA	APR 1964		3 SEP 1964	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy Detached of [Alvin V. Burt]

← Req. ODV approval-temp. clearance?

For background of 201 # see UFGA 3413, 17/3/64

MICROFILMED
APR 9 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

7-8: Regarding both AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 are U.S. citizens & newspaper reporters. Believe they are social contacts of KEDMAN. Got some type of clearance would seem appropriate here. Since they are U.S. citizens believe that a CSA is called for. Note, however, [Burt] 106 has not been security cleared. I've asked WAVE for biographic data in order to initiate a clearance request.

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-746416

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 2 Apr 1964

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 14781

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

ISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 9 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Chief of Station, JMWAVE AK

TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARBON-1

201-746416

QUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
REFERENCES : A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARBON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations, and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC att'd in RID/AN
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

INDEX X

201-746416

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
19 March 64	APR 2 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14781
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

GROUP 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

during

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

9933

64 416

ecember 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 as handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 ade the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 n order that there be a backup contact, in the event that MCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as EUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN greed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 osted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the otel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced MCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 2 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with MCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the ature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the eriod December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1. When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

64

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promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA.

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

201-356702

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

No

c. In WAVE 8904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

201-746416

8-B THE MIAMI HERALD Friday, March 6, 1964

Latin Youth Group in Chile Organized by a Cuban Red

By DON BOHNING

Of Our Latin America Staff

A small, but significant Communist-dominated, Cuban-inspired Latin youth group convenes Monday in Santiago, Chile.

About 400 representatives of Latin American youth organizations, for the most part Communist oriented, are expected to attend the second Latin American Youth Congress.

It has an interesting anatomy. And whether by design or accident, both its timing and locale have political significance.

Chile is one of five Latin countries which still maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba. It also is considered the one most likely to vote itself Communist.

Presidential elections will be held in September, a leading contender is Salvador Allende, candidate of the Communist controlled Popular Action Front (FRAP). Allende lost by 35,000 votes in 1958 to outgoing president Jorge Alessandri.

A provincial election to name a national deputy will be held next week, a day after the Youth Congress closes. Outcome of the election may provide an indication of which way the country will go in September.

Principal organizer of the Youth Congress is a 35-to-40 year old Cuban Communist named Joaquin Mas Martinez. A U.S. official describes him as "one of the brainiest" of the Castro followers.

Mas stepped in last fall when the Congress, originally scheduled for July of 1963, faltered. Cuban exile groups claim he gets his instructions for the Congress directly from Moscow.

Mas, a former president of the School of Social Science at the University of Havana and now vice president of the University Student Federation, arrived in Chile in September.

He quickly organized the International Preparation Committee for the Congress. National preparation groups began to sprout up in other Latin countries at the same time.

Chilean authorities ordered him expelled several times as a "foreign agent." Each time Communist and Socialist party officials intervened in his behalf.

Mas left Chile Nov. 20 for Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela where he conferred with other Communist leaders, then went on to Prague and Moscow.

He returned to Santiago Dec. 26. He was met at the country. This time Chilean interior minister Dr. Sotero del Rio intervened and Mas come back."

But for Mas, the Congress may not have come off.

It is an outgrowth of the first Lation American Youth Congress held in Cuba in 1960. It was there the "Cuba Si, Yankee no" theme was

News Analysis

A January, 1963, preparatory meeting for the Second Congress nearly fizzled when the Cuban delegation was detained in Mexico on its way to Santiago. The Panamanian representative flew from Santiago to Mexico to confer with the Cubans, then returned to Chile and the meeting resumed. The July date was set, an agenda agreed on and the theme "Fight of the Young for Peace" was adopted.

In March, however, another "international" preparation meeting was held in Cuba, attended only by Cuban youth representatives. Theme for the Congress was changed to read "For the Liberation of Latin America" and it took on a more "anti-imperialist" tone.

Nothing more was heard until mid-summer with little interest apparently being generated among Latin youth groups. The Congress was rescheduled for August and again didn't take place.

To salvage lost prestige, it was announced in late August the Congress would be held in Santiago "in consideration of numerous petitions."

Since its inception, Cuban exile organizations in Miami have waged a heated propaganda campaign against the Congress.

A letter from a top Soviet youth official to Aldo Alvarez, leader of the Cuban National Preparation Committee for the Congress, was reproduced and circulated by the exiles. In it, specific instructions for organizing the Congress are outlined.

Exile groups have promised to send representatives to Santiago when the Congress convenes to "denounce the Communist effort to brainwash the youth of Latin America."

MIAMI HERALD
6 March 1964

2 Apr
201-746

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attac B to UFGA-14781

1P

Identities - 1 - The Miami News 29

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children 29

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor 08

5 - The LEDA 24

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
		ABSTRACT
		INDEX

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02 April

SCA ~~B~~ 2 to UFGA 14781
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201-74641

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY El Salvador

SUBJECT Report on Conditions of the Country Submitted by a Special Representative of the Cuban National Revolutionary Council

REPORT NO. 00-A-3228565

DATE DISTR. 28 June 1962

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES (MIMI-4417)
C/S Rodriguez 05

DATE OF INFO. 7 Jun 62

PLACE & DATE ACQ. San Salvador - 2 May 62

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION Source: [Dr. Jose Julio FERNANDEZ Gutierrez] 08

SOURCE: Cuban national exiled in the US.

Source is [a lawyer who returned recently from a trip to the Central American countries as special representative of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.]

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

attached

[~~On File in the CIA Library~~ is a copy of a report in Spanish by Jose Julio Fernandez Gutierrez to Antonio de Varona. This report, written on 2 May 62, is a full report to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba regarding general conditions in El Salvador and specifically dealing with Cubans in that country. The author of the report was sent to El Salvador for this particular purpose and spent 45 days in El Salvador and other Central American countries. Classified: CONFIDENTIAL.]

-end-

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#09583

2/PV

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Task Force W

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/CYROSE/AMCUTLER
AMCUTLER-1 Progress Report for November and December 1962.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information.

Reference: UFGA-6637, dated 23 November 1962.

Developments:

1. AMCUTLER-1's efforts during the reporting period were directed toward: (a) supporting the AMFAUNA operation; and (b) developing new KUTUBE operations.

2. In support of the AMFAUNA operation, he has been investigating AMFAUNA-4, for which purpose he has interviewed seven Masons in Miami who presumably should have known AMFAUNA-4 but did not, and two individuals in New York who did know him. (See UFGA-7118.)

3. AMCUTLER-1 has also reported a potential courier channel to AMFAUNA-1, using:

Gonzalo ABELEM Martin
Brazilian citizen
Born ca. 1915
Residence: 3 N.E. Biscayne Blvd, Miami, Fla.
Occupation: Employee of Brazilian Consulate

and his brother

Manuel ABELEM Martin
Brazilian citizen
Born ca. 1909
Residence: Havana, Cuba
Occupation: Officer of Brazilian Embassy, Havana

Once a month a pouch passes between the Brazilian Consulate in Miami and the Embassy in Havana, and AMCUTLER-1 has made use of it to send letters for posting in Havana to AMCUTLER-2. The two ABELEM brothers are personal friends of AMCUTLER-1 and AMCUTLER-2, but AMCUTLER-1 does not

(Continued)

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 Jan. 63	JAN 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-7171

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-74/3

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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09593

believe that they would yet be willing to carry or send any obvious espionage material. He does believe that they would be willing to carry canned good to AMCUTLER-2, and this is being explored, with the idea of concealing money, maps, etc. in the tin cans.

4. For the purpose of trying to develop new KUTUBE operations, AMCUTLER-1 has been following up leads given him by his case officer. He has interviewed

Carlos Manuel *CACERES-Blay
Former manager Motel Las Cuevas, Trinidad
Residence 1122 S.W. 16th Ave., Miami, Fla.

CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865

from whom he obtained two intelligence reports; and

Evelio *CRUZ
Born Candelaria, Cuba
Residence 1545 S.W. 6th St., Apt. 4, Miami, Fla.

from whom he obtained operational information on the Esquivel Caves, Soroa Zone, termino municipal of Candelaria, Pinar del Rio. CRUZ passed AMCUTLER-1 to

Luis *HERNANDEZ aka "El Terrible"
Residence 665 N.E. 24th St., Apt. 8, Miami, Fla.

who gave additional information on the caves which, he said, are the property of his brother-in-law

CIT: Cuba

Dionisio *UGARTE
Sixto *UGARTE } Cuba

RE. INFO. ON SUB'S PROPERTY IN CUBA

and

Anita *ERRASTE Betancourt - Δ CANDELARIA, PINAR del Rio, Cuba

who still lives in the area.

5. AMCUTLER-1 reported that his friend "Pepe" GONZALEZ, whose brother-in-law now resident in Spain is a son of

Dr. Carlos *PEDEMONTE
Head of Cartographic Office of INRA
Sub's son is contact of Sub. of 201-293865

has received word that PEDEMONTE is looking for a way to leave Cuba. AMCUTLER-1 is trying to develop additional information on PEDEMONTE's situation from GONZALEZ. Other than press clippings, the only JMWAVE trace on PEDEMONTE is contained in HKH-02664 of 15 April 1960.

6. On 22 December 1962 AMCUTLER-1 reported that he had been invited by one

"Chique" *MONTES CIT: Cuba
Cuban citizen
Resident Puerto Rico

CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865
1 JAN 63

to join a maritime expedition aimed against tanker traffic on the south coast of Cuba, with the further objective of seizing a Cuban frigate with the cooperation of its captain. Details were sent to Headquarters in WAVE-2749 of 22 December, in the hope that it might be possible to make a tentative identification of the naval officer involved.

7. On 25 December 1962 AMCUTLER-1 reported that he had been informed the day before by

Pedro Luis *DIAZ Lanz CIT: Cuba
CONTACT Sub. of 201-293865

that two individuals named

23 RS

ARCHIVES CARD REPRODUCTIONS

201-342588 (?) 6 FR CIT. Cuba Reinaldo *LOPEZ Lima 201-342588

and

201-288950 (?) 6 FR CIT. Cuba Enrique *CEIJAS 201-288950

had just approached him with the offer to sell him some weapons allegedly belonging to KUBARK which were stored on an unidentified key and valued at several thousand dollars. LOPEZ and CEIJAS told 6 DIAZ that an armed raid on the key would have to be simulated so that suspicion would not fall on them, and that the raid would have to be pulled off on either the night of 25 December or 31 December, when one or the other of the men would be on guard duty at the key. 6 DIAZ had turned down the offer. JMWAVE file checks showed that the two men were indeed of interest to KUBARK, and that AMTABBY Underwater Demolition Team was possibly involved. Appropriate defensive measures were immediately taken.

Sub. of 201-293565 with offer to sell him weapons belonging to U.S. Gov. Agency.

Production:

8. The following reports were disseminated during the period:

UFG-1955	"Reaction to Current Crisis within Cuba"
UFG-2098	"Possible Military Use of Caves near Trinidad, Las Villas"
UFG-2143	"Identification of Two Caves near Trinidad, Las Villas Which Could be Used for Military Purposes"
UFGT-2823	"Passenger Manifests for Flights to & From Cuba".

Costs:

9. The following expenses were incurred during the period on behalf of the operation:

Two months' salary	$500.00
Use of POV	30.00
Meeting expenses	16.22
	$546.22

Future Plans

10. No change.

END OF DISPATCH

4/mc

Hqs 19 P.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE QER

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
Debriefing of AMFAUNA-14

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

1. Following are the results of the debriefing of AMFAUNA-14 in the JMWAVE area from 22 November to 2 December 1963.

2. AMFAUNA-14 did not leave her apartment all day Sunday, 6 Oct. On Monday, 7 October, she went to work as usual. When she arrived, she found a letter waiting for her which had been forwarded to her office from her accommodation address; it was in AMFAUNA-1's handwriting and contained nothing of any interest, so she was sure there was a secret writing message on it.

3. At 1255 hours two men arrived at the office, one about 45 years old and short, who from his appearance might have been a bus driver, and the other a very young dark-skinned man. They walked into the office vestibule and told the guard that they wanted to see AMFAUNA-14. The guard came into the office to give AMFAUNA-14 the message, and the two men followed right behind. They told AMFAUNA-14 that she had to come with them to identify an arrested person. AMFAUNA-14 said that she would have to ask her supervisor for permission to leave, because it was not yet closing time. She turned to go back into the office, and the two men followed her in. The supervisor told her that it would be all right for her to go, but said that she should check in by phone if there were any difficulty. AMFAUNA-14's father and uncle, both of whom work in the same office, asked whether they could come with her. The men said no, because she would be coming right back; they said they were taking her to "G-2" headquarters in La Vibora.

Continued..............

POUCH [illegible] VIOLATION
NO FIELD [illegible]

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INDEX-X

19-6-50/3

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DATE TYPED
9 Dec 1963

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DEC 11

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n/19-5-1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-12894

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-50/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

09748

4. AMFAUNA-14 tried to dispose of the letter she had just received from AMFAUNA-1 by leaving it on the desk of a fellow employee together with some potatoes and a carrot for cover, but the men would not let her. She did, however, manage to destroy a page from her notebook containing telephone numbers.

5. At the DSE headquarters in Villa Maristas, AMFAUNA-14 was turned over to a militiawoman who had her strip and performed a body search on her. She was fingerprinted and photographed and her biographic data were taken down, after which she was locked in a cell which had an adjoining private bath. Nothing else of importance happened for the rest of the day.

6. During her four-day detention period, AMFAUNA-14 was handled by the following DSE officers: CIT. CUBA DOB. C1918 ECC. IS AGENT SUBJ INTERROGATOR HABANA, CUBA

201-312[illegible]

(a) Francisco ABAD: AMFAUNA-14 believes that this is his real name. He did not introduce himself, but she saw the name on her release papers which he signed. He was born about 1918 and is about 5'4" tall, weighs about 160 pounds, and has a fat build, aquiline nose, greenish eyes, dark skin, grey-brown wavy hair, rough laborer's hands, and two teeth missing from the lower jaw. He smokes both cigars and cigarettes, his manner was soft and kindly, and AMFAUNA-14 believes he is probably poorly educated. He is married, but AMFAUNA-14 did not learn whether he has children or what his address is. He wears civilia clothes and drives a black 1956 Pontiac with a grey roof. Discussing this man later in the AMCOG household, AMFAUNA-14 was told by Pedro CARRILLO (who is a brother of Justo CARRILLO) that Pedro knows ABAD. According to Pedro, ABAD is part Jewish and an old Communist who worked in the Havana underground on behalf of Fidel CASTRO during the Batista period. Pedro CARRILLO thinks that ABAD may now have some regrets about the course he has taken.

(b) "Carlos" aka "Samuel": AMFAUNA-14 does not know his true name. He was born about 1942 or perhaps a little earlier. He is about 5'6" tall, weighs about 150 pounds, and has a muscular build, drooping eyelids, light olive skin, wavy chestnut hair with a widows peak. He is a nervous pacer, and walks with his head bent forward and tilted slightly to one side. An expression which he frequently used was "O.K." pronounced "OKAH" with the accent on the first syllable. He told AMFAUNA-14 that he had been a student in the Commercial School of Havana, that he had worked clandestinely under the Batista regime, had been arrested by Col. Esteban VENTURA Novo, had been released due to the influence of his father, and had gotten out of the country with the aid of the Mexican Ambassador to Cuba, coming then to the United States. He drives a 1959 black and white Chevrolet Corvair, wears civilian clothes, and carries a pistol, sometimes a .45 and sometimes a .38. AMFAUNA-14 believes him to be a 100% Communist. She thinks he may have been somewhat better trained than Francisco ABAD and may have been somewhat superior in rank, although this was never clearly evident. There seemed to be a little professional jealousy between the two men. If she told one man something which she had been unable to remember for the other, the second would show signs of jealousy or resentment. "Carlos" subsequently told AMFAUNA-14 to phone 61-4319 and ask for "Samuel" when she wanted to reach him. She phoned him at this number about ten times in all. The phone was always answered by the same woman, except for once when a boy answered and then called for his mother to come and take the phone. AMFAUNA-14 would ask for "Samuel" and the woman would invariably reply that he was not there. AMFAUNA-14 would then ask the woman to take a message for him to please call "Dolores." The woman would always reply "Yes, Comrade." Discussing this person later within the AMCOG household, AMFAUNA-14 was told by Israel PADILLA that he thought "Carlos" was Samuel RODILES. CIT: CUBA TO 201

06 RE INFO PROVIDED BY [illegible] SUBJ.

Comment: The physical description of "Carlos" does not match that of Samuel RODILES Plana. Telephone number 61-4319 is listed in the 1962 Havana telephone directory to one Maria Antonia CARCANO Araujo, Artes 47, Casablanca, Havana. WAVE traces on this

SEX-F CIT: CUBA SUBJ IS A POSSIBLE PHONE CONTACT FOR DSE IN HAVANA

FORM 8-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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name include HCSA-09896 of 23 April 1963 showing that one Maria CARCANO Arujo (born 7 December 1935) travelled to Chile in March and April 1963 on a diplomatic passport. An AMOT report of 27 September 1962 mentions one Antonia CARCANO Araujo as a communist in charge of vigilance, and living at 47 Artes St., Casablanca. There also appears to be a Maria ARAUJO (born about 1902) who is an old-time Communist living at Artes 47. AMFAUNA-1 has been given the names of several former residents of this neighborhood in hopes of finding a relative of the CARCANO or ARAUJO families whose physical description matches that of "Carlos." AMFAUNA-1 has also interviewed Col. VENTURA in the WAVE area. VENTURA remembers case similar to that of "Carlos" but does not remember the boy's name. He says that he seems to remember that the boy's father was connected with one Jose LOPEZ Villaboy (on whom WAVE has numerous traces) and that he was assisted in getting to Mexico by a Mexican diplomat named "Benjamin." CIT: CUBA OCC: F. I. AGENT DOB: c/1939 WAS SEEN AT DSE HEADQUARTERS

(c) Fnu lnu: This man appeared a few times during AMFAUNA-14's interrogation. She never heard his name at this time, but later saw him on television interrogating AMSIGH-2 and he was identified then as Jose Antonio *FERNANDEZ Menert. She does not believe that this is his true name, because it is her understanding that DSE officers use aliases in their public appearances. He is about 5'11" tall, slender, with darkish skin and black hair combed straight back. He has very large green cold eyes. He was born about 1939 and appears to be uneducated, with a cynical and vulgar manner. He wears civilian clothes IN HAVANA

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7. At about 1600 or 1700 hours on Tuesday, 8 October, AMFAUNA-14 was brought into ABAD's office for her first interview. ABAD began by asking if she knew why she was there. AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had no idea. ABAD observed that that was strange, because he had judged her to be an able and intelligent woman. CIT: CUBA LOVER OF 201-332675

201

8. Honestly believing that she might have been denounced by the jealous wife of her lover, Manuel *COMPANIONI, AMFAUNA-14 suggested that it might be a personal matter. X CIT: CUBA AKA LUIS NEGRET (A) EL NEGRO DOB: c1923 AKA LUIS NEGRE CO. [illegible] CUBA

201

9. ABAD said that it was not. He then asked her if she knew one Luis Braulio *VILLAR Negret. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not. ABAD said that this was strange, because VILLAR Negret knew her. He asked if she knew one Angel *BRINGAS. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did. ABAD asked why, if she knew BRINGAS, she would deny knowing his cousin NEGRET.
A textile factory near Calle 100 in Marianao RE. INFO ON SUBJ PROVIDED BY 201-332675

10. AMFAUNA-14 said that she knew the man as Luis *NEGRET and had not recognized the name VILLAR Negret. (SUBJ. INFORMED ON ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES TO CUBAN I.S.

11. ABAD told AMFAUNA-14 that NEGRET was then under detention and had implicated AMFAUNA-14 in his confession. ABAD wanted to know what AMFAUNA-14's connection with NEGRET had been. AMFAUNA-14 said that NEGRET had been in her house once, and once in her mother's.

12. At this point in the interrogation, ABAD was called away and AMFAUNA-14 was returned to her cell. Two hours later the interrogation was resumed.

13. ABAD picked up where he had left off, and asked AMFAUNA-14 what connection she had had with Angel BRINGAS. AMFAUNA-14 said that she had known BRINGAS no better than she had known NEGRET. ABAD said that she was lying and urged that she cooperate. AMFAUNA-14 promised that she would cooperate. ABAD said that NEGRET had told the DSE that AMFAUNA-14 had had sexual relations with BRINGAS, and AMFAUNA-14 denied the allegation.

14. The interrogation was again interrupted, and AMFAUNA-14 was returned to her cell. When she returned to the interrogation room, she saw that ABAD had an envelope containing what she recognized to be papers taken from her apartment, including airline passenger manifests, deciphering material, instructions for using the deciphering material, and insurance policies and personal papers belonging to AMFAUNA-1. AMFAUNA-14 now realized that it was time for her to pretend to

cooperate with the DSE, as AMFAUNA-1 had briefed her to do in such a situation.

15. ABAD began by telling her that she was in a very serious situation, because he knew that she had had very close connections with a KUBARK agent. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-1 was identical with "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 said that AMFAUNA-1 had been known as "Julio." ABAD then wanted to know whether NEGRET had been working with "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 denied this. ABAD asked whether NEGRET had known "Julio." AMFAUNA-14 denied this too, but volunteered the information that "Julio" had provided NEGRET with mail facilities, and that AMFAUNA-14 had been the cutout between them. Did NEGRET know of "Julio's" existence, ABAD wanted to know. AMFAUNA-14 said that he did not, that she had brought NEGRET mail and money which she had gotten from "Julio," and had picked mail up from him and delivered it to "Julio," but that NEGRET had never known "Julio's" identity.

16. The truth about AMFAUNA-14's relations with NEGRET and BRINGAS, according to her statements to her KUBARK case officer in November 1963 in the JMWAVE area, is as follows:

(a) In about mid-1962, AMCOG-2 asked AMFAUNA-14 to serve as cutout between herself and an unidentified agent, and AMFAUNA-14 agreed. AMFAUNA-14 was driven to the meeting site, which was on the sidewalk in front of a textile factory near Calle 100 in Marianao, by AMCOG-2's chauffeur, a Spaniard named "Segundo." This agent introduced himself to AMFAUNA-14 only as "El *NEGRO", and AMFAUNA-14 described herself to him as an employee of an unidentified embassy. For contact purposes, "El Negro" gave her the telephone number 29-4900 or 20-4900.

(b) Later, when AMFAUNA-14 began to trust "El Negro" more, she gave him the telephone number of her mother. She learned that "El Negro's" true name was Luis Braulio VILLAR Negret, and that he lived in a small room in the rear of the textile factory. The telephone number which he had given her was always answered by a woman whose name she learned to be "Maximina."

(c) VILLAR Negret was born about 1928, and was about 5'11" tall with broad shoulders and a strong build. He had black wavy hair, brown eyes, an olive skin, and a face marked by acne. AMFAUNA-14 never learned anything about his family directly from him, but DSE officers told her that he was married with one child, and that his parents lived on a farm in Pinar del Rio Province. SUBJ. IS INVOLVED IN RECEIVING INFC. FROM 201-297645

(d) VILLAR Negret was a member of the Accion Revolucionaria Democratica, which AMFAUNA-14 understands to be a successor organization to the AAA of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. He had formerly belonged to an action component of this organization, but more recently had devoted himself to intelligence collection. AMFAUNA-14 brought him instructions and money from AMCOG-2, and picked up his intelligence 201-277646 reports which she delivered to AMCOG-2. She understands that AMCOG-2 sent these reports via diplomatic channels to Frank PAEZ in Miami, FLA, USA who in turn delivered them to an individual identified only as "El Guajiro Bermudez." 201-298633 The last contact which AMFAUNA-14 had had with "El Negro" was in mid September 1963 when he passed her a report which he said concerned a missile base, HAVANA, CUBA and a book on Communist infiltration in Colombia. RECIEVED INFC. FROM 201-344346 C/T: CUBA

201-224340

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(e) Once when "El Negro" was sick, he sent his cousin to meet with AMFAUNA-14. This cousin was Angel *BRINGAS, an employee of an X-ray equipment company at 23rd and O, La Rampa, Vedado, telephone 70-5570. On various other subsequent occasions, BRINGAS filled in for "El Negro." RE. INFC. ON SUBJ. PROVIDED BY 201-322675

(f) According to what the DSE officers told her, "El Negro" was arrested about 1 October and was to be shot. AMFAUNA-14 asked her DSE interrogators whether it would not be possible to reindoctrinate "El Negro" instead of shoot him, but they told her that it was not worth the trouble because "El Negro" was a person of low morals who

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be shown to Angel BRINGAS when and if he is caught.

(g) On 12 or 13 October 1963, after AMFAUNA-14 had been released, she was telephoned at her place of employment by Angel BRINGAS who told her guardedly that "El Negro" had been arrested and said that he would like to send a female cousin of his to talk to AMFAUNA-14. A meeting was arranged in the home of AMFAUNA-14's mother. The female cousin, whose name was "Gladys", told AMFAUNA-14 that BRINGAS had gone into hiding and wondered whether "the family with which she worked" (the AMCOGS) could help him get into asylum. AMFAUNA-14 said that she doubted this. "Gladys" told AMFAUNA-14 that, in case it were possible to do anything for BRINGAS, she should telephone "Gladys" with an innocent message. It was understood that a meeting would take place at 1800 hours on the same day of the telephone call at the Ten Cent Store 23rd between 10th and 12th in Vedado. AMFAUNA-14 does not remember Gladys' telephone number which was left with her mother.

(h) In spite of what AMFAUNA-14 told the DSE, AMFAUNA-1 had had nothing to do with NEGRET. AMFAUNA-14 had told this story to protect AMCOG-2. NEGRET had known that AMCOG-2 was involved, and had once had a meeting with her in her home. Nevertheless, AMFAUNA-14 briefed AMCOG-2 on the cover story which she had told the DSE and told her that, in case she were ever arrested and questioned, she should admit having talked to NEGRET in her home, but deny having been involved in the communications channel or knowing anything about it.

Station Comment: Luis Braulio VILLAR Negret appears to be identical with Luis *NEGRE Villar (born 4 November 1930 in Consolacion del Sur, Pinar del Rio), who is carded as ACSI source No. 492 and appears in AMBUD correspondence as National Coordinator of the Accion Revolucionaria Democratica. "El Guajiro Bermudez" appears to be identical with Gerardo Jose *QUESADA Vasquez (201-292022) (born 9 May 1919, Pinar del Rio), President and founder of Accion Revolucionaria Democratica and ACSI source No. 138. There are no Station traces on Angel BRINGAS. The 1962 Havana telephone directory has no listing under 20-4900. CUBA 20-4900 is listed to Rafael *LAMATUT, Ave. 39 #4117, Marianao; JMWAVE has no traces on him. There is no listing under 70-5570. However, under 70-5579 there is the Cubana de Rayos X y Foto, S.A., Calle 23 #72, La Rampa.)

CIT: CUBA RE. INFO. PROVIDED BY 201-332675

17. ABAD appeared to be particularly interested in how NEGRET and "Julio" obtained their funds, and kept returning to this subject during the interrogation.

18. ABAD then addressed himself to the contents of the envelope and a suitcase found in AMFAUNA-14's apartment. He commented that all these things appeared to belong to AMFAUNA-1 and his son, and asked how they happened to be there. AMFAUNA-14 replied that AMFAUNA-1 and his son, together with AMFAUNA-3, had been hiding for a few days in her apartment because their usual hiding place had become unavailable.

19. ABAD wanted to know how and when AMFAUNA-14 had first met AMFAUNA-1. AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had met AMFAUNA-1 in about February 1962, that AMFAUNA-1 had regularly parked his car in a lot near her office and that they had seen each other on the street frequently, that AMFAUNA-1 had finally spoken to her, and that a friendship had developed which finally turned into a love affair. (Comment: This was a lie told to conceal the fact that it had been AMCUTLER-2 who had introduced them.) She said that AMFAUNA-1 had been her lover until about July 1962 when she broke up with him because he was too busy with clandestine work to pay the proper amount of attention to her.

20. ABAD asked what part AMFAUNA-14 had played in AMFAUNA-1's clandestine activities. AMFAUNA-14 replied that AMFAUNA-1 would sometimes telephone her late at night to invite her to go out for a ride, and she would then find that AMFAUNA-1 was going out to have agent meetings and wanted her along for cover. ABAD asked whom AMFAUNA-1 had been meeting. AMFAUNA-14 mentioned a person known as "Gustavo" and

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gave the physical description of AMFAUNA-24, whom she knew to be safely out of Cuba. (She never knew AMFAUNA-24's true name.) She also mentioned Manolo *VILLAMANAN, the true name of AMFAUNA-13 (whom she had known only as AMFAUNA-1's business partner but when she thought she could safely mention now that he was out of Cuba.) For good measure she added a notional name and physical description.

21. Referring back to AMFAUNA-1's automobile, ABAD asked what kind of a car he had driven. AMFAUNA-14 replied that it was a gray Chevrolet Impala. She repeated that AMFAUNA-1 had formerly parked it near her office, but said that she had not seen it recently. ABAD asked where AMFAUNA-1's red car was, and she said she did not know. He asked what the license number on this car was, and she said she did not know. He never asked anything about the third car which AMFAUNA-1 had obtained.

22. ABAD commented that the DSE had observed AMFAUNA-1 in his automobile in the Havana dock area on 1 January 1963, having a meeting with another person. (AMFAUNA-14 recalls that this other person was AMFAUNA-24, and that he and AMFUANA-1 had rendezvoused in the dock area after an attempt to pick up AMFAUNA-1's radio.

23. With reference to the KUBARK agent known as "Julio", whom they had recently identified with AMFAUNA-1, ABAD said that he knew that "Julio" had left Cuba in October 1962 and believed that he had gone to Europe, but he said he did not know whether "Julio" had gone clandestinely or legally.

24. AMFAUNA-14 was asked about AMFAUNA-1's subsources in other provinces, but she said she knew nothing about them. ABAD said he was sure that AMFAUNA-1 had a good source on the Isle of Pines. Whose war name might be "Raul". ABAD also mentioned the name of a person who had been shot about two weeks previously and who he believed had been working with AMFAUNA-1. (AMFAUNA-14 does not remember the name of this person.)

25. ABAD asked if AMFAUNA-1's son had helped him in this clandestine work. AMFAUNA-14 replied that the son had been with AMFAUNA-1 frequently, but that she thought it was only because he was helping AMFAUNA-1 with his business and that the son probably had had nothing to do with clandestine work.

26. ABAD again turned to the envelope of papers found in AMFAUNA-14's apartment, and said he could see she was not cooperating with him. She was not volunteering information, he said, but waiting to be asked questions. ABAD said he was sure that there was much that AMFAUNA-14 could tell him spontaneously, and he intimated that there might be a chance for her to rehabilitate herself.

27. ABAD asked her where the passenger lists came from. AMFAUNA-14 replied that they had been left in her apartment by AMFAUNA-1, who intended to instruct her later by SW what to do with them. She said that AMFAUNA-1 had trained her in this system, and had left her his materials, so that he could use her as a stop-gap communications link while he was trying to reorganize his net.

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28. ABAD told her that this was plainly not true, because some of the lists were dated later than AMFAUNA-1's departure date. He said he supposed they had been brought to AMFAUNA-14's apartment by AMCUTLER-2, who had been observed coming there on 5 October with Lolin *CORREOSO. (This was true, according to AMFAUNA-14. AMCUTLER-2 and Lolin CORREOSO had brought the passenger manifests to AMFAUNA-14's house at about 1630 or 1700 hours on 5 October, and had stayed about fifteen minutes. AT 1400 hours that same day, AMFAUNA-14 had had a meeting with AMFAUNA-39, the first in two weeks, initiated by AMFAUNA-39 by means of a telephone call to AMFAUNA-1's mother who was serving as cutout between them. AMFAUNA-39 had called the meeting to ask whether she had received any instructions from AMFAUNA-1 as to how to act in case of an internal uprising, which a number of people in Cuba seemed to be expecting about that time as a result of the destruction caused by Hurricane Flora.

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(The DSE interrogators never at any time mentioned AMFAUNA-39, or asked her about this earlier meeting, so AMFAUNA-14 concludes that she had not been under intensive surveillance that day; either AMCUTLER-2 had been under surveillance on 5 October, or she herself had been under some kind of periodic spot check.)

29. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 how she had become acquainted with AMCUTLER-2, and AMFAUNA-14 replied that she had met AMCUTLER-2 through AMFAUNA-15, the wife of a cousin of AMFAUNA-14 who is a prisoner on the Isle of Pines.

30. ABAD then asked AMFAUNA-14 where her SW materials were, which surprised AMFAUNA-14 because she had thought they had been found during her house search and were part of the incriminating envelope which ABAD was holding. AMFAUNA-14 told ABAD where to look for the materials, and he sent somebody to get them.

31. ABAD wanted to know how AMFAUNA-1 and AMFAUNA-3 had gotten out of Cuba. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know. She said she understood they were to get their instruction on the street once they had left her apartment.

32. ABAD abruptly asked AMFAUNA-14 whether she knew anybody in Luyano. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not. ABAD then produced a photograph of AMFAUNA-14 together with AMFAUNA-1 and AMWEE-2 and told her that she had been in AMWEE-2's home in Luyano with AMFAUNA-1 on Saturday, 7 September He asked AMFAUNA-14 whether AMWEE-2 were employed in an embassy. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know but that she thought so. She said she knew AMWEE-2 to be a personal friend of AMFAUNA-1, and thought that he might occasionally have helped AMFAUNA-1 with his mail. (It was true that AMFAUNA-14 had gone to AMWEE-2's house on 7 September with AMFAUNA-1. Later the same day AMFAUNA-1 took her to Miramar to introduce her to AMFAUNA-39. Because the DSE never expressed any interest in AMFAUNA-39, AMFAUNA-14 concluded that they had not observed this meeting, and that therefore it had been AMWEE-2 who had been under surveillance on 7 September and not herself or AMFAUNA-1. She also concluded that the DSE had been inefficient in not transferring their surveillance to herself and AMFAUNA-1.)

33. ABAD again changed the subject suddenly. "Where is the radio?" he asked. "Could AMWEE-2 have it?" AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know anything about a radio. "Where is the camera?" asked ABAD. AMFAUNA-14 admitted having seen AMFAUNA-1 with a Minox camera, but said she did not know what AMFAUNA-1 had done with it. She said she had hoped that AMFAUNA-1 would leave it with her, and pretended to be hurt that he had not done so. ABAD asked her whether she had ever seen one like it in the AMCOG house, and AMFAUNA-14 said that she had. Throughout the interrogation, ABAD kept reverting to the subject of the camera and the radio.

34. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 what her connection was with the AMCOG family. She replied that her grandmother was the cousin of AMCOG-3's mother. ABAD said that the whole family had been under observation for a long time, and mentioned an organization (name not remembered by AMFAUNA-14) which AMCOG-2 had worked with during the Batista era. What, he wanted to know, was AMCOG-3 doing. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not think he was doing anything clandestine. ABAD replied that the DSE was positive that AMCOG-3 was doing secret work. AMFAUNA-14 said that the DSE should not delude itself, that the entire family was too selfish to engage in anything of the kind.

35. ABAD asked what the diplomatic visitors to the AMCOG household talk about. AMFAUNA-14 said that they never talk politics. ABAD asked about the attitude of "the Doctor" (AMCOG-3's uncle), and AMFAUNA-14 said that he was waiting for the situation to settle.

36. "What about AMFAUNA-3?" asked ABAD. "Did she work with AMFAUNA-1?" AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not, but that she sometimes gave him information. ABAD wanted to know whether AMFAUNA-3 had been working with some one in Florida. AMFAUNA-14 answered that AMFAUNA-3

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had been involved somehow with her sister who lives in Florida. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-14 had been a good friend of AMFAUNA-3, and she said that she had been. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-14 had ever heard AMFAUNA-3 speak about the Escambray insurgents. AMFAUNA-14 said that she had not. ABAD asked whether AMFAUNA-3 had had contacts with any embassy people, for example the Spanish Embassy. AMFAUNA-14 said that she did not know of any such contacts.

37. "How about AMCUTLER-2?" asked ABAD. "We know that she spends a lot of time there." AMFAUNA-14 said she did not know.

38. ABAD asked AMFAUNA-14 if she were a revolutionary. AMFAUNA-14 said that she was not, but that neither was she against the revolution. She said that she had joined the militia early in the revolution, but had soon dropped out because there were some things about the revolution which she did not understand. For instance, she could not understand why there should be so many shortages and rationing, whereas before the revolution there had been plenty. ABAD explained that the shortages were the result of the imperialist blockade of Cuba. AMFAUNA-14 said that she could understand this, but that it did not explain why there should be a shortage of coffee when Cuba grew its own. ABAD said that coffee was in short supply because Cuba was sending coffee to the Soviet Union in gratitude for Soviet assistance in overcoming shortages caused by the imperialist blockade. AMFAUNA-14 replied that this was very logical now that it had been explained to her, and said she wondered why the revolutionary government did not publicly say so in order to put an end to public grumbling on the subject.

39. Early in the morning of 9 October, ABAD produced the letter which AMFAUNA-14 received from AMFAUNA-1 on 7 October and held up the letter to the light, examining it carefully for traces of SW. AMFAUNA-14's developer pills were brought, and she was told to develop the letter, which she did in the presence of ABAD, "Carlos," and a third man whom she was unable to get a good look at. All were very surprised and disappointed when no secret writing appeared. They kept asking her if she were sure she was doing it right, and began intimating that she was deceiving them. (Station Comment: It is indeed surprising that no secret writing appeared, because this letter was almost undoubtedly the one containing SW message no. 1 to AMFAUNA-14.)

40. AMFAUNA-14 also explained the use of her carbons. The only accommodation address she gave away was AMFAUNA-1's JMWAVE area post office box. She deliberately protected the Rosa JUSTIZ address (the home of AMPAN-2), not knowing whether this was a real or a fictitious person.
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41. "Carlos" and ABAD now invited AMFAUNA-14 to work with them. She replied that she might be willing to do so, but first wanted to know what work would be expected of her. For instance, she said, she would not inform on people in her office. They told her that this would not be asked of her, because that sort of work is done by the Defense Committees. Her work, they said, would be much more important, namely maintaining a link between themselves and KUBARK. She said that would be all right, but she was afraid that it would not last long because KUBARK would probably put her on ice as soon as they learned that she had been arrested. They told her not to worry about that.

42. "Carlos" and ABAD suggested to her that AMFAUNA-1 had briefed her to agree to cooperate with them. She denied this, claiming that she had not really wanted to work with AMFAUNA-1 at all, but had merely let herself be imposed on for old times sake. They asked whether they could trust her. She said she thought so, and asked whether she could trust them to keep their promises. They assured her that she could, and said she would be released the following day.

43. In the morning of 10 October, after being told that she was to be released, AMFAUNA-14 was moved to a smaller cell without a bath. She sent for ABAD and complained that he had double-crossed her. He told

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her that he was going to keep his word and release her, but that her original cell was needed for some new prisoners who were expected. He said that the DSE had received advance word that a boatload of refugees were going to try to leave Cuba that night. Many of them were women, and one of these was pregnant, so he wanted the larger cell with bath for them.

44. ABAD always treated AMFAUNA-14 kindly and considerately. When she had a headache, he ordered aspirin for her. He saw to it that she received soft drinks when she wanted them, and he seemed to be honestly distressed whenever she wept. AMFAUNA-14 believes that it had been the DSE's intention from the very beginning to recruit her, because she doubts that all DSE prisoners are treated as well.

45. The first SW message which AMFAUNA-14 wrote while under DSE control was dated 10 October, the day of her release. The DSE officers asked her what her control signal was, and she replied that it was a rubric, but also included her true control signal. She deliberately numbered her first controlled SW message no. 2, to conceal the fact that she had already written several messages containing intelligence reports.

46. In all she wrote three SW messages under control. She was obliged to write each one in duplicate, one of which was mailed and the other given to the DSE for study. One day "Carlos" came to her very angrily, said he doubted that her carbons were anything more than ordinary paper because he had been unable to develop anything that she had written, and threatened her with rearrest. AMFAUNA-14 told him that she did not know anything about it, but that if by chance he had tried to develop the letters she had written with the pills he had taken from her, it would not work. This surprised "Carlos," and AMFAUNA-14 explained that there were two different SW systems, one for outgoing mail and the other for incoming. "Carlos" then asked her if there were any significance to the size of envelope used, or to the way the letter paper was folded. AMFAUNA-14 said she did not think so. AMFAUNA-14 feels that "Carlos" and ABAD never completely believed that she had an SW system, because none of the letters which she received disclosed SW when developed, and none of the letters which she wrote showed any traces of SW when held up to glancing light.

47. "Carlos" was the DSE officer who maintained contact with AMFAUNA-14 after her release. For two or three weeks he saw her every day at her apartment, sometimes for only twenty minutes, and sometimes staying for several hours, frequently late at night. Occasionally he called her at her office. Finally AMFAUNA-14 told him that she had to get up early in the morning to go to work, and asked him to visit her early in the evening, which he agreed to do. At the time of the intercepted AMGLOSSY landing in Pinar del Rio, "Carlos" did not visit AMFAUNA-14 for five days. When he finally returned, he was dirty, sweaty and tired. He dictated an SW letter he wanted AMFAUNA-14 to send to KUBARK, and while she was writing it he fell asleep.

48. AMFAUNA-14 had to prepare written reports for him, which she signed with the pseudonym "Dolores." He told her never to call him at DSE headquarters, because he was never there. Once he brought her a book on Marxism to read, and promised to take her someday to visit a collective farm in Pinar del Rio Province.

49. Despite his occasional efforts to get her to pick up the threads of the AMFAUNA net, AMFAUNA-14 believes that the primary target she was intended to work against was the AMCOG household. From remarks made by both ABAD and "Carlos", she deduced that they already had an informer in the house, but that they were not satisfied with his production. Toward the end of her period of DSE-controlled activity, she felt that the DSE was becoming relatively less interested in AMFAUNA-1 and his net, and more in the AMCOG household.

50. They asked her about one Vicente LAGO, who is a regular guest at the AMCOG house and who seems to be particularly interesting to them.

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14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-12894

201-297537

They also wanted to know what diplomats visit the AMCOGs. When she mentioned the Liberian Consul (Tomas *QUESADA), they exclaimed and said they were very interested in him, and asked whether she could arrange invitations to his house. Other diplomatic personnel AMFAUNA-14 mentioned as visitors to the AMCOG house who were Wanda *FOSCHINI (the wife of an Italian diplomat), Marie *BOISSEVAIN (the wife of the Dutch Ambassador), Brasilian Ambassador Luis *BASTIAN Pinto, a female secretary of the United Arab Republic Embassy, and wife of a former Japanese Ambassador. Fortunately, during the four weeks following AMFAUNA-14's release from DSE custody, no diplomats visited the AMCOG house. Card For file

RE visits to 201-294718 household

Sex F
citizen
A Cuba

51. With the knowledge and encouragement of the DSE, AMFAUNA-14 visited the AMCOG house nearly every day. Her first visit took place at noon on 11 October and she stayed until about 1800 hours, during which time she told AMCOG-3 the entire story. He listened and took a few notes, but kept most of the story in his memory. He encouraged and calmed AMFAUNA-14, told her to follow DSE instructions to the letter, and assured her that KUBARK would send her instructions.

01 52. AMFAUNA-14's immediate preoccupations were AMCUTLER-2 and AMWEE-2 (whom she knew to be blown to the DSE as KUBARK agents), AMFAUNA-39 (who was not yet identified but had her telephone number and might call her at any moment with damaging results to himself), and the possible arrival of SW messages from KUBARK naming other agent personnel.

53. On 11 October, the day after her release, AMFAUNA-14 sent a ~~message to AMCUTLER-2 via AMFAUNA-15 and the mother of Manolo VILLAMANAN~~ warning her that she had been arrested. She also asked AMCOG-2 to send a warning to AMWEE-2.

Re: Contact w/ 201-297045 pertaining to 201-331164 being identified by DSE

Sex F
A Cuba

54. On 13 or 14 October, AMCOG-2 went to the home of Albertina O'FARRILL where she met Wanda *FOSCHINI whom she asked merely to warn AMWEE-2 that the DSE had AMWEE-2 identified. Two or three days later, Wanda FOSCHINI reported back to AMCOG-2 that AMWEE-2 evidently was not taking the warning seriously. By this time, however, AMFAUNA-14 was sure that AMWEE-2 knew that something was wrong, because he had telephoned AMFAUNA-1's mother asking for "Soledad" and had been told that "Soledad" was unknown. (Regarding Albertina *O'FARRILL'S knowledge of these developments, AMFAUNA-14 believes that she probably knew nothing more than that AMFAUNA-14 had been arrested and then released.)

Re: knowledge of

citizen?
Sex F
A Cuba
01 201-332675

55. On 13 October AMFAUNA-14 sent a warning telephone call to AMFAUNA-39. She dialled 20-6192 and told the woman who answered "Please tell Manolo that Soledad called and that he should not telephone me because I am going to be out of Havana and will call him when I return." AMFAUNA-14 is not sure now whether AMCOG-3, whom she consulted on the best way to do this, had noted the telephone number.

cit: cuba A cuba Close acquaintance 201-332675

06 56. Another person to whom AMFAUNA-14 sent a warning was her lover Manuel *COMPANIONI whose warname is "Alejandro." Unbeknownst to AMCOG-3, she sent a message to COMPANIONI via AMCOG-3's chauffeur telling him to stay away from her but asking him to telephone her occasionally.

Re: 201-332675 being arrested and released

57. On 20 October when she arrived home from work, AMFAUNA-14 found "Carlos" waiting downstairs for her. Trying to divert his attention from the mail box, she invited him to come right in, but he asked her why she did not open her mail box first. She did so and found two letters from AMFAUNA-1, dated 19 and 25 September. They both contained veiled references to names like "Carmina" (AMCUTLER-2), "Edgardo," (AMFAUNA-27), "El Grande" (AMFAUNA-25), and "Igor" (AMWEE-2). One of them instructed AMFAUNA-14 to have "Carmina" introduce her to "Edgardo" and the other intimated that "Igor" had something for her.

58. "Carlos" ordered her to develop these letters, and she did so. No secret writing appeared, which did not surprise AMFAUNA-14 because the letters themselves contained instructions for her, but it did

13/10

surprise "Carlos" who again began to accuse AMFAUNA-14 of double-crossing him. AMFAUNA-14 explained the absence of SW by saying that KUBARK was probably testing its communications channels and waiting for things to quiet down before sending messages.

01

59. "Carlos" then told AMFAUNA-14 to get in touch with AMWEE-2 and get the package which he was holding for her. She telephoned 01 AMWEE-2 from her office and said she wanted to see him. 01 AMWEE-2 agreed to a meeting, but stipulated that it be after 1700 hours and in his office. AMFAUNA-14 reported this conversation to "Carlos" who told her to proceed with the meeting.

01

01 60. AMWEE-2 took AMFAUNA-14 into a small room, where she quickly explained the situation (she felt she should not spend much time in AMWEE-2's office because she was afraid the DSE had her under surveillance; this was confirmed later 01 when "Carlos" asked her casually how much time she had spent in AMWEE-2's office, apparently trying to catch her out in a lie). AMWEE-2 seemed surprised and worried, and told her to take care of herself. 01 She told AMWEE-2 that the reason the DSE had wanted her to meet with him was to pick up a package which they believed he was holding for her. 01 AMWEE-2 replied that he was no longer in a position to receive or send packages, because the diplomat with whom he had been cooperating had been declared persona non grata.

61. "Carlos" also told AMFAUNA-14 to contact AMCUTLER-2 to arrange the introduction to "Edgardo." AMFAUNA-14 telephoned AMCUTLER-2's number, expecting to be told that AMCUTLER-2 was not there, and was very surprised when AMCUTLER-2 herself came to the telephone. AMFAUNA-14 told AMCUTLER-2 that she wanted to see her, but AMCUTLER-2 said she had a bad case of asthma and could not see anybody. AMFAUNA-14 reported this conversation to "Carlos."

Re: contact(s) 201-330675

62. ~~AMFAUNA-14 decided that AMCUTLER-2 had either not received or~~ had not understood the warning message sent to her, so she sent AMCUTLER-2 two more oral messages via AMFAUNA-15 and one via Lolita FORMOSO explicitly advising her to hide or take asylum.

20 01 06

63. "Carlos" continued to press AMFAUNA-14 to see AMCUTLER-2, and AMCUTLER-2 showed no signs of heeding AMFAUNA-14's warnings. AMFAUNA-14 therefore sent one more message, this time a written one, via Lolita 06 FORMOSO saying that she really must see AMCUTLER-2 in the latter's home for the purpose of coordinating cover stories. AMCUTLER-2 then paid a visit to the home of Lolita FORMOSO to pass the message that she agreed to the meeting. 06

64. On 3 November, with the knowledge of "Carlos," AMFAUNA-14 went to AMCUTLER-2's house. "Carlos" briefed her to obtain an introduction to "Edgardo", to find out where AMCUTLER-2's coffee shops were located, and to find out whether AMCUTLER-1 was a close friend of Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo.

65. AMCUTLER-2 told AMFAUNA-14 to tell ~~the DSE that AMCUTLER-1 was not a close friend of GUTIERREZ Menoyo. She said to add that she was very angry with AMCUTLER-1 and thinking of divorcing him.~~

Subject(s) conversation between

(201-332664 and 201-332…)

66. AMFAUNA-14 and AMCUTLER-2 devised the following cover stories for the protection of the source of the airline passenger manifests (AMFAUNA-18, whom AMFAUNA-14 does not know) and of "Edgardo" (AMFAUNA-27, whom AMFAUNA-14 does not know):

(a) Before leaving Cuba, AMFAUNA-1 had asked AMCUTLER-2 to look out for his mother, and to pass on to AMFAUNA-14 anything that might come addressed to "Betty." One day a colored woman called at AMCUTLER-2's coffee shop on Calle San Rafael with a package addressed to "Betty". The coffee shop employees had thought that the package was intended for an employee whose name is "Ketti" and had given it to her, but she said it was not hers, and there matters rested until one day when AMCUTLER-2 visited the coffee shop and was told about the incident. She told her employees that she knew who the package was intended for, and took it away with her.

12/R

(b) AMCUTLER-2 had received a letter from AMFAUNA-1 dated 18 October saying that she would receive a visit from a person known to her who would introduce himself as "Edgardo", and asking her to introduce "Edgardo" to AMFAUNA-14. This person has not yet arrived, and AMCUTLER-2 does not know who he is.

67. AMCUTLER-2 agreed to stick to these stories in case she is interrogated, and to brief "Ketti" to support the coffee shop story. She also told AMFAUNA-14 she had decided to go into hiding immediately. AMFAUNA-14 asked her not to do it so soon after her visit, but AMCUTLER-2 said that AMFAUNA-14 should provide her with cover by telling the DSE that AMCUTLER-2 had spoken of taking a holiday at Varadero.

68. Making her report to "Carlos" after this meeting, AMFAUNA-14 told these cover stories as though they had just been revealed to her by AMCUTLER-2.

69. A fourth letter arrived from AMFAUNA-1, consisting of two pages of overt text. AMFAUNA-14 was sure that it contained SW because of the banalities in the cover letter. Before turning it over to "Carlos" she took it to AMCOG-3 who had somebody make a literal copy of it and then destroyed the original. AMFAUNA-14 turned the copy over to "Carlos" who had her develop it, and was again disappointed and angry when no SW showed up. (Station comment: this letter had contained SW number groups for OWVL reception.)

70. On or about 10 November 1963, AMFAUNA-14 prepared a written report for the DSE on the visitors to the AMCOG household. This report was actually dictated by AMCOG-3 to AMFAUNA-14 who took it down on the typewriter. She then made a handwritten copy of the report to turn in to the DSE, keeping the typewritten copy for self-briefing. She brought the typewritten copy out with her. Following is a literal translation:

201 a. Dr. Ernesto *MARTI and his wife Lolita: I do not know them very well. All I can say about them is what I have heard, that they are old friends of the family, and that the doctor took a trip to Mexico with AMCOG-3's uncle after the latter's election.

201-215656

b. Sr. Pedro *CARRILLO and his wife Margot: He is a brother of Justo *CARRILLO and has been a friend of the family for a long time. They sympathize with the Revolution in some aspects, but their daughter (who I think is engaged to the son of AMCOG-2) left Cuba for exile, and this caused them to change. I do not know why their daughter had to take asylum.

c. Dr. Oscar *PINA and his wife Margarita: Within the family she has the nickname "Petite." He is a judge. Until very recently he was neutral, but now it seems that they have loaded him with work and he is in a very bad mood because I believe he has the work of eight cases. She does not sympathize much with the Revolution. They have no children, but almost all of her family is abroad which I think is her principal reason for being discontented.

201 d. Sra. Nenita de *CARAMES: She is the wife of fnu CARAMES, the former Chief of Police of Havana. She has a daughter by him whom she brings to lunch every Sunday, and she is also caring for a son of CARAMES who is insane and in an asylum. I do not believe that at the moment she is on good terms with her husband who is abroad, and therefore she is neither against nor in favor. Actually I believe she is afraid that the situation will change and her husband will return.

201 e. Sr. Fernando *STEFFANI: An elderly gentleman who is the father of an intimate friend of AMCOG-2, who out of pity has given him a standing invitation for every Sunday. To be sure, the poor fellow is rather tiresome.

f. Elsa DIAZ Biart: Her family has been friendly with the AMCOG family for many years. They were school friends. She has a sister abroad and a brother who is in prison. Her father and mother seldom come to the house. A sister of hers is a doctor of some farm. All she does is obtain medicines for the prisoners, thereby causing a lot of trouble for AMCOG-2, AMCOG-3 and the old man.

g. Joaquin SANCHEZ and his wife Sara: According to what I have heard, he is a travelling salesman for some laboratory. His wife is the sister of the wife of the old man's two nephews, Pancho and AMCOG-3 (sic). I have also heard that she is always trying to get medicine for her son who, from what I have heard, is abnormal.

h. Dr. Maria Dolores SANCHEZ Pessino: She lost both her father and mother when she was thirteen years old, and the AMCOG family took her in as an adopted daughter. The old man paid for her education. She is like a daughter to him, and like a sister to the nephew and niece. She works in the emergency hospital. She is not openly opposed to the regime, but nevertheless the separation from her brother and her relatives has greatly affected her.

no 201

i. Dr. Vicente LAGO and his wife Maria Julia: His brother Roberto LAGO, who died some years ago, was Pola's first husband. They have two sons abroad. From what I have heard, he devotes himself exclusively to his profession, and it is she who is most upset by the separation from her children.

j. Mercedes VALDES Chacon: A case very similar to that of STEFFANI, except that she is a woman who is a very good friend of AMCOG-2's husband, and is in the same situation with her relatives abroad. She is just one more of the many refugees in search of warmth and friendship, with no friends left in Cuba.

no 201

k. Julio BRAVO: A long-time friend of Pancho, all his family is abroad. He is another case of warmth and friendship, he uses the swimming pool a lot, he is alone, I have even seen him cutting trees with AMCOG-3, a typical case of an unhappy man, in the afternoons he plays chess with the old man, and I have never heard him say anything bad about anybody, not even about the situation, the only thing - as is natural - he misses his daughters and his wife.

no 201

l. Raquel CASAGRAN: The widow of the Director of Culture in the Grau Government, Jesus CASAGRAN, and sister of Raul LAZARO who was military aide to both Grau and Prio. She is very highly regarded by the family. I have never heard her express herself in any way against the Government; I would call her neutral.

201

m. Olga CRECENTE: Former wife of Jose Maria de la Aguilera, she comes to the house with her two daughters and hermother who is a cousin of Sra. Paulina. AMCOG-2 helped her a lot in hiding her husband during the Batista tyranny. I have also heard that AMCOG-3 helped her with her divorce. Apparently she does not sympathize with the Revolution, although I believe that it is out of spite against her husband. Her mother's name is Leopoldina SANCHEZ Vda. de Crecente, and her nickname is Nonga.

no 201 201-337203 201-293448

n. Hilda FEO: Cousinof Armando FEO who is a close friend of Frank PAEZ and of Jose AGUERO the husband of Polita. She is another case of family warmth, because after all her family had left she came to the house in search of friendship. She has wanted to leave Cuba many times, but was never able to. This is her principal obsession and that of her mother as well. She has been coming to the house a lot for the past three years, and has become a very good friend of the family. Although in reality it was her cousin who was a better friend

AMCOG family for many years. They were school friends. She has a sister abroad and a brother who is in prison. Her father and mother seldom come to the house. A sister of hers is a doctor of some farm. All she does is obtain medicines for the prisoners, thereby causing a lot of trouble for AMCOG-2, AMCOG-3 and the old man.

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o. Rosendo *GACIO and Sra. Leopoldina *NUNEZ: This couple has two children who are really hers from her first marriage, Manolito and Lourdes. He has a cleaning shop in Havana, and I know that she has known Pola well for many years because she was her guitar teacher.

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before she married J. AGUERO. Politically speaking, she follows the Grau line. She is more or less neutral, and devotes herself to her teaching work. He devotes himself exclusively to his work.

p. Manuel *COMPANIONI and his wife Alicia: They have been acquaintances of AMCOG-2 and AMCOG-3 for many years, although it was not a close friendship, rather a friendship of Montmartre, Tropicana, etc. A daughter of theirs is abroad. He too was a very good friend of Armando FEO who used to be a friend of the family, and now in the course of time they have become closer friends of the family. In other words it is another case of friendship caused by being abandoned by others. He has a small deodorant factory in the same house where they live. They both have their mothers here.

q. Jack F *CONNILL and his wife Marina: His mother has been a very good friend of the family for many years, and she was a school friend of the two nieces of the old man. This couple have always been friends of the family, the more so now that so many of their friends have left Cuba.

71. AMFAUNA-14 turned this report over to "Carlos" on 11 or 12 November. At this meeting he asked her to try to make contact with AMFAUNA-3's brother who he said had been transferred to a hospital in Las Villas. AMFAUNA-14 said she would try, but thought it would be difficult. This was the last time she saw "Carlos." He telephoned her again on 16 November to ask what was new, and this was their last telephone contact.

72. When AMFAUNA-14 arrived at AMCOG-3's house at about 2000 hours on 15 November 1963 for the regular Friday night supper, he took her aside and said he wanted to speak to her privately later. At about 2330 hours she went to his room. There he told her that he had received orders that she was to leave Cuba the following week. He said that precise instructions were to come on 16 and 17 November, so he made a lunch date with her for Sunday noon at his house.

73. AMFAUNA-14 was frightened by this. She did not sleep well Friday or Saturday nights, and spent Saturday in her home.

74. Sunday afternoon in AMCOG-3's house, AMCOG-3 told her that she was to leave the following day. She said that she did not want to. AMCOG-3 responded that this was an order. He said that the DSE would probably arrest her again soon, and for her own safety and that of others she must leave. He added that there were others who were to leave too, whose departure had been made conditional upon her own.

75. AMFAUNA-14 asked whether AMCUTLER-2 were one of these other people who were to leave too, and AMCOG-3 replied that she was. AMFAUNA-14 told him that she thought AMCUTLER-2 would not agree to leave. AMCOG-3 said that he thought she would because the orders had been couched in very strong terms.

76. He then showed her the instructions, both for herself and for AMCUTLER-2. He had her type her instructions on a piece of paper, and then memorize them.

77. Then AMCOG-3 gave AMFAUNA-14 the following verbal messages to deliver when she reached JMWAVE:

(a) A colonel fnu LANDEIRA, a tank expert who had been in the Cuban Army under GRAU and PRIO, is a prisoner on a farm in Havana Province. He is given three days off per week to go home. His wife knows in advance when he will be coming out. AMCOG-3 does not know the wife, but has indirect contact to her. AMCOG-3 says the man is honest and intelligent and a real soldier, and if we want him out AMCOG-3 can arrange it.

(b) As of about 1800 hours on 17 November, a young man who had infiltrated into Cuba and had been hiding at the home of Israel PADILLA,

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had been moved to a new hiding place. AMCOG-3 was considering trying to help the young man into asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy through a certain "Pepin" whose identity is not known to AMFAUNA-14 but who she thinks is an Uruguayan attache.

06

(c) AMCOG-3 is out of one-time pads and needs a resupply.

(d) It is very possible that AMCOG-3 may be able to obtain and forward a copy of AMFAUNA-14 DSE dossier.

78. On Monday morning, 18 November, AMFAUNA-14 dressed as she had been instructed, and stuffed a pair of slacks and sneakers into the straw handbag which she had been told to carry. At 1300 hours she left her office and proceeded on foot to the corner of Atares and Arango in Reparto Luyano, arriving there at 1400 hours. Here she exceeded her instructions, waiting for AMCUTLER-2 not five minutes but fifteen. She then walked very slowly toward Calzada Luyano, hoping that AMCUTLER-2 might overtake her. This consumed another ten minutes, and by the time she reached the Calzada Luyano it was too late for her to walk the remainder of the distance, so she took a taxi.

79. AMFAUNA-14 discharged the taxi one block before theParque de la Virgen del Camino and walked the rest of the way. She went to the shrine where she prayed for a few minutes, and then sat on a bench from which she could see the whole park.

80. At 1510 hours a 1954 Buick taxi arrived at the park. The driver stayed in the car, and two men - a colored man and a fair-haired man - got out and walked around for about ten minutes. Finally they approached her and gave the challenge, to which she gave the correct response. One of the men then said simply "Follow me". They took her back to the taxi and put her in the back seat with one of the men, the other two riding in front.

81. They headed out of the city. When the reached the Carretera de Varadero, one of the men asked her politely if she would mind keeping her eyes directed down toward the floor and not look out the window. She rode this way for about two hours. By then it was dark, and she was told she could look up again. She took advantage of the opportunity to change into her slacks and sneakers.

82. Finally the car stopped, and she and her two escorts got out. They walked a long time. At one point, whistle signals were exchanged with someone in the darkness, and two other men appeared, one of whom was AMWEE-2. AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 greeted each other politely, but pretended not to know each other. 01

83. They did a lot more walking and joined up with another man, who turned out to be the radio man. He had a lot of equipment with him, and AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 helped to carry it.

01

84. They now reached the mangrove and began to walk through water. At one point their guide became briefly lost, but found his way again almost immediately. When they came to the open water, one of the guides went forward and signalled. The boat came in in response to the signal. AMFAUNA-14, AMWEE-2, and the radio man walked out into knee-deep water and climbed into the boat, which already had a crew of two.

85. The boat proceeded out to an unidentified key. The crew concealed it in the mangrove, cleverly lacing and tying branches together over it to form a camouflage cover. There they went to sleep.

86. The following day, 19 November, was spent at this spot. A radio message was received during the day. At night the boat put out for Cayo Megano. The waves were enormous, and AMFAUNA-14 was terribly seasick. The boat remained at the rendezvous point until 1045 hours, with AMFAUNA-14 pleading for the crew to return to land, saying she would rather be shot than remain so seasick. Finally the crew did put back, saying that the ship probably would not come because the sea was

5/PU

87. Wednesday, 20 November, was spent on the same key. A very long radio message was received during the day. AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2 both helped the radio man to decipher it, and their combined efforts took about three hours. Then they put out again for the Cayo Megano rendezvous point. By this time their drinking water was all gone. The boat was overloaded, so much of the food and equipment was left behind on the key. Again no ship appeared. This time, instead of returning to their original hiding place, the crew took the boat to Cayo Mosquito.

88. Here they spent the remainder of the night, and all of Thursday, 21 November. Their water was gone, there was very little food left, and there was only enough gasoline left for one more one-way trip out to the rendezvous point. At 1400 hours on 21 November another radio message was received. With the combined efforts of the radio man, AMFAUNA-14 and AMWEE-2, it took between two and three hours to decipher it. Everybody was very optimistic; they were all sure that they would be picked up that night.

89. Promptly at 2300 hours the ship was seen approaching. The boat put out immediately, and its passengers were taken aboard the ship. AMFAUNA-14 was taken into the sick bay where she was given a pill, a little water, and somewhat later some warm broth.

90. From the moment she stepped into the boat on 18 November, until she was hauled out by the armpits on 21 November, AMFAUNA-14 never left the boat. Her side and legs were bruised from the pounding of the waves against the boat. A little blood vessel in her right eye was broken by a twig snapping in her face as she walked through the mangrove. This was treated by the ship's doctor.

91. AMFAUNA-14 says that the AMHICK team performed very well. The pickup in the park was done excellently. The slight delay while they looked her over, she says, was due to the fact that the men had expected another woman to be with her, and they were waiting a few minutes in case the other woman should show up. The AMHICK team said that they had also been briefed that she would be wearing her hair in a bun. She had not been briefed accordingly, and she was wearing her hair down her back in a pony tail. This discrepancy did not cause any confusion, because every other item of the visual recognition signals tallied perfectly, and the AMHICK team were well briefed on all of them.

92. AMFAUNA-14 was impressed by the precise timing of the team's movements, by the fact that everybody was where he was supposed to be at the time indicated. She expressed admiration for their seamanship, and their ability to pick out one spot of mangrove from another in the pitch darkness.

93. She says that, during these trying days, the team members were always in calm control of the situation, and never failing in their courtesy to her.

94. Regarding AMCUTLER-2, AMFAUNA-14 is sure that the exfiltration instructions reached her. They were taken, she said, by Lolita FORMOSO who had been standing by for them from Friday to Sunday. What Lolita did with them, AMFAUNA-14 does not know. She knows that we had suggested that Lolita take them to AMFAUNA-1's mother, but she also knows that we had indicated to AMCOG-3 that AMFAUNA-1's mother might be under surveillance, so she thinks Lolita might have taken them directly to AMCUTLER-2. In any case, she knows that messages sent previously by AMCOG-3 to AMCUTLER-2 reached the latter, and she sees no reason to assume that these instructions did not.

95. It does not surprise AMFAUNA-14 that AMCUTLER-2 did not follow the orders. AMCUTLER-2, she says, plays her own game with little consideration for others. Between the time that AMFAUNA-1 left Cuba on 11 September, and the time that AMFAUNA-14 was arrested on 7 October, AMCUTLER-2 had visited AMFAUNA-14's apartment twice. On both occasions,

2/N

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-12894

AMFAUNA-14 had asked her to remove the suitcase that AMFAUNA-1 had left behind, but on both occasions AMCUTLER-2 had found some excuse not to do so. When AMFAUNA-14 visited AMCUTLER-2 in her home in Guanabacoa on 3 November for the purpose of coordinating their cover stories, AMCUTLER-2 did not seem very interested in coordinating stories or anything else. AMFAUNA-14 believes that AMCUTLER-2 may be working for ~~the Second Front of~~ the Second Front of the Escambray, because her very close friend Lolin *CORREOSO is the fiancee of Hipolito *LARRAURI who was a collector for this organization. Among other reasons possibly keeping AMCUTLER-2 in Cuba, AMFAUNA-14 says that AMCUTLER-2's mother is sick with cancer, and there may be something wrong between AMCUTLER-1 and AMCUTLER-2. [illegible] Second Front of the Escambray

96. AMFAUNA-14 also had her reasons for not wanting to leave Cuba. Besides the dangers of the trip, she would be leaving her mother and father in a dangerous position, because the DSE had forced her to sign a confession implicating them. While she appears to be trying not to be overly critical of AMCUTLER-2, she has commented that AMCUTLER-2 knows far more members of the AMFAUNA net than she herself does, so that the reasons requiring the exfiltration of AMFAUNA-14 should be even more compelling for AMCUTLER-2.

End of Dispatch

SECRET

CSCI - 3/764141
2 MARCH 61

TO: Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General
USAF
Attention: Mr. Gilbert R. Levy

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECTS: LING Lindsey
WEINER Heinz Theodor

1. Reference is made to the telephone request dated 24 February 1961, of Major Malone for information concerning Lindsey LING and Heinz Theodor WEINER. The files contain the following information concerning the subjects of your request.

2. According to information from an official Portuguese service LING was contacted in late August 1960 in Santa Maria, the Azores, by Eloy GUTIERREZ Manoyo, a Cuban National, and Rafal /probably Rafael/ HERNANDEZ, a Cuban diplomat. In 1958 and 1959, GUTIERREZ was reliably reported, by other sources, to have been a military supporter of Fidel CASTRO's revolution and to be employed by CASTRO possibly as a G-2 agent. In August 1959 he had infiltrated the ranks of certain anti-CASTRO conspirators and delivered the leaders up to the Cuban Government.

3. The Portuguese service further reported in September 1960 that Lindsey LING, aka LING Lind Sey, was the manager of a Chinese restaurant located at rua Valaverde 9, Madrid, Spain, and that the restaurant was owned by a second (unidentified) Chinese, who was also supplying clothing to the United States personnel at the Lajes Base in the Azores. Theodor Heinz WIENER, who had represented the clothing firm in the Azores, was reportedly arrested there in December 1958 on a suspicion of espionage, and was, as of September 1960, reportedly in Bermuda, where LING was planning to go to investigate setting up another restaurant.

4. The files contain no further information concerning Subjects than that which is already believed to be contained in your files.

CSCI-3/764,141

SECRET

RID/CE: JWE/BQ/jrg (29-2-7/2)
Based on: OFPW-29605, 13 Jan. 61
LISB-1827 (IN 12873), 15 Sept. 60

#0975

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

14 Jul 61

DATE OF INFO. June 1961 and Earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --; June 1961

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, residing in the US.

Source is a personal and political friend of former President Carlos Prio Socarras and held positions of Cabinet rank during Prio's administration. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have been informed by contacts within pro-Fidel Castro groups that Castro agents in the US are attempting to determine whether there are any military training camps [illegible] exact location and [illegible] operation [illegible] determine of [illegible]

2. [illegible] suspected [illegible] being [illegible] Nunez, former aide to the late [illegible] Camilo Cie[illegible] Banos, former employee of the Jose Marti International Airp[illegible] of Rebel Army Captain Angel Banos, who arrived in the US with [illegible] Gutierrez Menoyo, Jesus Dieguez and Eva Gutierrez, not furt[illegible]fied.

-end-

Jud
WH/4/Cuba
FI Branch
CI/Liaison
IS
AR - 14 Jul 61

-C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

WH-304

STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR | FBI | AEC

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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#0980

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RS

1/17

-2-

source: adso — FBI

The attention of our Paris station has been directed to the actual conversations that took place in this Paris meeting, and there remains a possibility that [illegible] obtained. Such additional information will be transmitted to you immediately upon its receipt.

Foster William [illegible]

Sincerely,

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

With reference to your letter of 11 June 1947 requesting information on policy matters discussed by Foster and certain members of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party in Paris, I should like to summarize the action taken by this organization on Foster's trip. All stations on Foster's itinerary were alerted during the British Empire Conference with emphasis placed upon Foster's contacts and the content of his conversations with foreign Communist officials at Paris, Belgrade, and Prague.

The first reaction from Paris reported Foster's meeting with Thorez and Duclos on 7 March and a planned meeting for the next day with other members of the Central Committee (this information was distributed to you in DB-3658 on 4 April 1947). No adequate follow-up on this original report was subsequently produced — a fact to be accounted for primarily by the hesitation of the Surete Nationale, for political reasons, to give Foster's visit adequate investigative attention (as reported to you in DB-4777 of 1 July 1947).

Information on the policy matters discussed at this meeting, however, was included in a report from M.I.6, Section V, in May (copy enclosed herewith). Although the source of this report did not know precisely what happened at this meeting "because great secrecy was observed," he mentioned several specific topics allegedly under discussion. This report was not forwarded to you since it was assumed the report was handed directly to your London representative by the British. 24

24

16

MICROFILMED
MAY 6 - 1955
DATE 8 DEC 1952

ABSTRACT INDEX ☒

X REF FORM FILED IN: 201-3141
201-53438

by hand to Director
1 Aug. 47

1 ENCL.

RI COPY

10446

Pittman

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14-00000

15-4

The attention of our Paris station has been directed to the actual conversations that took place in this Paris meeting, and 24 there remains a possibility that a verification or expansion of the M I.6 report will be obtained. Such additional information will, of course, be transmitted to you immediately upon its receipt.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

2/17

SECRET

COUNTRY : Italy/Yugoslavia/France/Gt.Britain/USA

SUBJECT : William Zebulon FOSTER

ORIGIN : London 15-1

DATE OF INFO : As stated

DATE : May 15, 1947

15-9

"On 15.3.47, our representative in Rome reported that FOSTER had arrived there on 14.3.47. for a stay of a few days.

15-24

"On 1.4.47., we heard from Belgrade that according to local press reports of 25.3.47., FOSTER had left Jugoslavia on 24.3.47. No details were given regarding his destination, but the press report mentioned that he had been accompanied by Tim BUCK, Leader of the Labour Progressive Party of Canada.

15-4

"A report dated 1.4.47 from Paris, stated that after the British Communist Party Congress in London, several important delegates had arrived in Paris among whom were William Z. FOSTER, Tim BUCK, LAHAUT, Chief of the Belgian Communist Party, who had not been in London, and who arrived direct from Brussels, and Harry POLLITT. At the same time several Communist delegates who had been present at the W.I.D.F. Congress in Prague, had also arrived in Paris, including Nina POPOVA, the U.S.S.R. delegate, as well as delegates from Greece, Brazil, Cuba, and the Viet-Nam. Our source, however, does not know names of any except those mentioned.

"Several meetings were held at the Headquarters of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party at 44, rue Le Peletier. At one of these meetings the following were known to have been present:- William FOSTER, Tim BUCK, Dolores IBARRURI, Nina POPOVA, Maurice THOREZ, Andre MARTY, Jacques DUCLOS, CHAUVAIS, CACHIN, BERLIOZ, FRACHON, MONMOUSSEAU, FAJON, Robert PETIT, and also George WILLIAMS & MICHAILOV, Comintern Delegate.

* "John PITTMAN, Paris correspondent of the American 'Daily Worker' had acted as interpreter. Although our source does not know much of what happened at this meeting because great secrecy was observed, he states that the meeting was concerned with uniting of world democratic forces against international reaction. In this connection, the French Communist leaders are said to have very much regretted the difficulty of bringing about the union between the American Federation of Labour, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations in the U.S.A.

ENCL. 1

SECRET

"Jacques DUCLOS made a special report emphasizing that this was one of the most important tasks to be carried out by the Communists within the C.I.O.

"Besides the above, the question of Greece and Turkey was discussed, notably the question of boycotting of war materials sent to those countries.

"Finally, the different speakers spoke of the necessity of defending the U.S.S.R. by all possible means.

"Andre MARTY is said to have specially dealt with the question of labour in the colonies, emphasising the necessity of bringing about unity of action among the blacks, throughout the African Continent, e. g., in French, British and Belgian possessions.

"The above, according to our source, were the principal points which had been studied during the various meetings of Communist chiefs in Paris.

"We understand that all other details about FOSTER's arrival and departure from this country have already been passed to you by M. I. 5."

24

1/N

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

28

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM:	Mexico City	**REPORT NO**	HMM-5348
REPORT MADE BY:	Dolores R. CASSAVETIS:gso	**NO. PAGES:**	1
REPORT APPROVED BY:	Willard C. CURTIS	**NO. ENCLOSURES:**	
DATE OF REPORT:	1[illegible] December 1960	**REFERENCES:**	HMM-5321

DISTRIBUTION:

By copy to:	4-Headquarters 1-EMB, PAO, MA, NA, AA, I&NS 1-LA 3-Files	Headquarters File No. 201- Field File No. P-7035
Orally to: JMPUCK		

SOURCE CRYPTONYM:	LIFEAT	**ID NO.** **KRYPTON:** ☐ YES ☐ NO	**IG NO.**

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS:

SUBJECT : Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez

COMMENTS: Father Manuel PEREZ Alonso, Jesuit and contact of COS, was the source of field comment no. 2. According to Father PEREZ Alonso, CORTES was never a priest but had been a seminarian. Father PEREZ Alonso has been conferring with Archbishop Miguel Dario Miranda, Primate of Mexico, regarding CORTES Hernandez and possible actions against him.

③ 8

16 Dec 60

CS-3/460,758

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-60

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

50-506

09081

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO. HMM-5348

SUBJECT Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez

DATE OF REPORT 16 December 1960

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES HMM-5321

DATE OF INFO. 8 December 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (8 December 1960)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Person with good connections in the Cuban Embassy (B). Appraisal of Content: 2

in MEXICO?

DOB

1. On 8 December 1960 Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez, who represents himself as a priest,[1] told Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, that he had information that "the thing they were working on" had gotten underway and had produced a tremendous reaction in Cuba.[2] He said that a friend, who is Roman Catholic but very liberal, had returned from a visit to Cuba, where he said the Knights of Columbus were pretty well entrenched. For this reason, CORTES said he felt it would be necessary to "take the bull by the horns" and begin things or the Knights of Columbus would gain the advantage.

2. PORTUONDO said that the bombing of the church of Father BOZA in Cuba had definitely been an act of "auto-agression" and was clumsily done. He said a red flag with hammer and sickle was found in the debris. PORTUONDO told CORTES that Carlos OLIVARES, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, had not said anything, but, since he, PORTUONDO, was going to Cuba at the end of December, he believed that OLIVARES would wait until his visit.[3]

3. CORTES said that he would like to go to Cuba and see for himself how things were going.

[illegible]

Field Comments

1. According to an untested source in the Roman Catholic Church, CORTES Hernandez was never a priest. It was previously reported that Atisbos, Mexico City newspaper, had reported that CORTES was a Catholic priest and a member of the Jesuit order until 1950 when he left the order because of his "rebellious and anarchic spirit".

2. It is believed that CORTES Hernandez, who belongs to a schismatic Catholic church, called the Mexican Apostolic Catholic Church, is interested in establishing a schismatic church in Cuba.

3. Source Comment. PORTUONDO's remark about OLIVARES came after he and CORTES had been discussing German Lence, Castrista priest who has been stopped by episcopal sanction from his ministry in Oriente province.

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(3)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

14-00000

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. [illegible] false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba	REPORT NO.	IDM-5348
SUBJECT	Jose Xavier CORTES Hernandez	DATE OF REPORT	16 December 1960
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	IDM-5321

DATE OF INFO. 8 December 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (8 December 1960)

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3. CORTES said that he would like to go to Cuba and see for himself how things were going.

involved in pro Cuba activities

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③

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION

16 Dec 60

Bf SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, VR

S E C R E T 241733Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8124

TYPIC AMTRUNK AMTRUNK

REF WAVE 8123

24 Nov 63 IN 67374

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IDEN A [LUIS 04 (GOICOCHEA)]

IDEB B [ISRAEL 04 (GARCIA)]

IDEN C [CARLOS 04 (DIAGO)]

IDEN D [MANUEL 04 (GARCIA) SUAREZ RPT SUAREZ]

IDEN E [JUAN 04 (NUIRY) SANCHEZ]

S E C R E T

10726

SECRET

34 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR 4

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DDOS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, SAS 12, DD/I, WH 8, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

TDCSDB-3/658,079

SECRET 262309Z NOV 27 0217Z 63 IN 68504

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8188

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMKHAN-2 RECEIVED 251245 LOCAL. REF BARR 1391 (IN). PREVIOUS MENTION OF TANKS WITH TWIN CANNON "NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN" UFG-3950 A-2 FROM EDUARDO PEREZ REPEAT PEREZ DUANEY (PROTECT). RID NO INDEX. FILED 262309Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: SIGHTING OF TANKS WITH TWIN CANNONS IN THE AREA OF HABANA.

DOI: 23 NOV 63. PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (26 NOV 63) UFG 4130

SOURCE: AN EDUCATED CUBAN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN EXTRACTION WHO LIVES IN HABANA, SOURCE HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PERSONEL OBSERVATION. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A MANAGER OF AN AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE IN HABANA.

IN COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

10957

SAS	12							TDCS PRECEDENCE
WH/	8							
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RELEASING:

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 27 NOV 1963 0126Z

BASED ON: UFG-4130 MP/AMKHAN-2

LIAISON:

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SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/658,079
SUBJECT TANKS WITH TWIN CANNON IN THE AREA OF HABANA
DATE DISTR. 27 NOVEMBER 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO. 23 NOVEMBER 1963
REFERENCES IN 68504
PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (26 NOVEMBER 1963)
APPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN EDUCATED CUBAN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN EXTRACTION WHO LIVES IN HAVANA, SOURCE HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. SOURCE'S RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A MANAGER OF AN AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISE IN HABANA.

1. ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963, ABOUT 200 TANKS WERE OBSERVED, APPARENTLY PARTICIPATING IN MANEUVERS, IN AN AREA AT THE INTERSECTION OF VIA MONUMENTAL AND CARRETERA CENTRAL. MANY OF THE TANKS HAD TWIN CANNON MOUNTED AND WERE A TYPE PREVIOUSLY NOT OBSERVED BY THE EYEWITNESS. (FIELD COMMENT: A CUBAN WHO HAS PROFESSIONAL CONTACT WITH RELATIVES OF OFFICIALS IN CUBAN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES AND A VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN WESTERN CUBA, REPORTED THAT ON 23 OCTOBER THE GRENBURG BROUGHT A NUMBER OF ARMORED VEHICLES WHICH WERE CALLED LANZA LLAMAS (FLAME THROWERS) AND WERE A TYPE NOT PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED IN CUBA. THESE TANKS CARRIED TWO CANNON WHICH APPEARED SIMILAR TO THE 152 MM

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[redacted]	OCI	ONE	OCR	OBB	[redacted]	FB

STATE/INR 1C/S TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-61 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ARTILLERY PIECE.)

2. AS OF THAT SAME DATE THERE WAS A LARGE MILITARY CAMP TO THE WEST OF VIA MONUMENTAL JUST BEFORE REACHING THE CARRETERA CENTRAL. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY THE LOMA DE TIERRA MILITARY AREA WHICH HAS RECENTLY SEEN A LARGE INFLUX OF VEHICLES AND MATERIEL).

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMNAVKEYWEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT: 1735 23 NOV WD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

23 Nov 63 IN 67195

S E C R E T 231917Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8097

RYBAT TYPIC AMKHAN-2 COMMO TARROT

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AVENT MSG: "ONE SEVEN X GOOD INTEL THIS WEEK XX KEEP TRYING WITH RIG X KEEP SENDING NAMES FROM DIAZ LIST XX TITO X NEED FULL BIO DATA X ALSO ALL MOVEMENTS PABLO SANDOVAL CRANE AND ESPECIALLY ANY X ANY ARMS SHIPMENTS LATIN AMERRICA XX LUCY X SHE WAS LATE REPORTING CHARTERED FLIGHTS TO ALGERIANX NEED THIS INFO FASTER X FLIGHTS SHOULD CONTINUE THRU DEC SIX THREE X TRY HAVE HER FEED YOU LIST ALL CUBANA PERSONNEL WHO FLY X ALSO NEED HER PROVIDE NEXT FOUR WEEKS ONLY CMA LIST CUBANA CREWS FLYING MEXI X LIST PUBLISHED TWICE MONTHLY AND HAS ABOUT TWO ZERO NAMES XX MIKE X GOOD INTEL X HOPE HE EVENTUALLY AGREES WORK X DO NOT PUSH HIM TOO HARD XX MARIA CHRISTINA X WHAT YOUR EVALUATION HER NOW XX DATA UNDERMINING FRANCO GOVT IMPORTANT HERE X GET MORE DETAILS XX NO INFO HERE IZQUIERDO X WHAT TYPE INFO HE HAVE XX OTHER THAN WHAT APPEARED TWO NOV REVOLUCION ON NEW TELEX INSTALLED CMA CAN YOU PROVIDE ADDITIONAL UNPUBLISHED DATA XX WANT TRANSMIT TO YOU TWICEWEEKLY X ADVISE CONVENIENT TIMES ON TUES OR WED XX IMPORTANT X CHECK CAFETERIA

SECRET

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1/319

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

IN 67195 PAGE 2

DEADDROP AND SEND ME WHATEVER MSG YOU FIND X ALSO LEAVE BLACK BOX THERE X CHECK THIS DROP END EVERY WEEK FOR ANY MSGSNX GRIESSE X ENRIQUE" END AGENT MSG.

4. FOR DIR ONLY: DIAZ IS 05 OSVALDO DIAZ. CENSOR FOR DSE IN AMKHAN-2 OFFICE, TITO IS 05 RESTITUTO ROBAINA HABANA DOCKS STEVEDORE, LUCY IS 05 ESTER ARANGO, MIKE IS 05 MIGUEL MAYOR. MARIA CHRISTINA IS POSTAL CLERK MIN COMMO, IZQUIERDO IS DANIEL IZQUIERDO CABLES AND WIRELESS EMPLOYEE WHO WORKS AND RESIDE BEJUCAL.

SECRET

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (TEMPO FOR SAS SLOTTED AT 2150-26 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

SECRET 270258Z 27 Nov 63 IN 68499

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8201

RYBAT TYPIC COMMO PETCOS AMATHENA

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT: BEGIN AGENT MESSAGE. "TRES SIETE X RECIBIDOS MENSAJES HASTA OCHO CERO X RECLUTE ALFA ORESTE RPT ORESTE TAMAYO RPT TAMAYO CMA ROLANDO RPT ROLANDO REYES RPT REYES CMA MEDARA RPT MEDARA SILVA RPT SILVA YANKEE ROBERTO RPT ROBERTO LEGON RPT LEGON X ESTAMOS INVESTIGANDO ALFA LOS OTROS X RECUERDE SER EXTREMAMENTE CAUTELOSO AL HACER CONTACTO CON CUALQUIER PERSONAL QUE RECOMENDO PARA RECLUTAMIENTO YANKEE QUE HEMOS INVESTIGADO X PORQUE LOS HEMOS INVESTIGADOS NO QUIERE NECESARIAMENTE DECIR QUE ESTEN BIEN POR UTILIZARLOS EN SU RED X CADA RPT CADA AGENTE QUE UTILIZA DEBERIA SER COMPLETAMENTE ENTRENADO ANTES DE DARLE UN ENCARGO OPERACIONAL X CON TODOS LOS AGENTES QUE ESTA RECOMENDAN PARA USO PARECE VAYA ALFA TENER UN MAYOR TRABAJO DE ENTRENAMIENTO X DIGANOS EXACTAMENTE RPT EXACTAMENTE COMO SERA REALIZADO ESTE ENTRENAMIENTO CMA NO SOLMENTE QUIEN IMPARTIRA EL ENTRENAMIENTO PERO TAMBIEN COMO CMA DONDE CMA CUANDO ETC X NO ESTAMOS SEGUROS DEL RENE CON QUIEN ESTA HACIENDO CONTACTO EN VICTORIA X FAVOR MANDE NOMBRE OTRA VEZ X CUALES FUERON SUS RELACIONES ANTERIORES CON RENE X MANDENOS MAS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

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14-00000

DETALLES SOBRE EL X INCLUSIVE OCUPACION ANTERIOR CMA ESCUELAS ASISTIDAS ETC X NO RPT NO EXTENDA MAS SUS REDES HASTA QUE NO TENGA TIEMPO PARA CONSOLIDAR X"

2. ENGLISH TRANSLATION. 37. RECEIVED MESSAGES THROUGH 80. PROCEED TO RECRUIT ORESTE RPT ORESTE TAMAYO RPT TAMAYO CMA ROLANDO RPT ROLANDO REYES RPT REYES AND MEDARA RPT MEDARA SILVA RPT SILVA AND ROBERTO RPT ROBERTO LEGON RPT LEGON. WE ARE INVESTIGATING THE OTHERS. REMEMBER TO BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN MAKING CONTACT WITH ANYONE YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED FOR RECRUITMENT AND WE HAVE INVESTIGATED. BECAUSE WE HAVE CHECKED THEM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THEY ARE ALL RIGHT TO USE IN YOUR NETS. EACH RPT EACH AGENT YOU USE SHOULD BE FULLY TRAINED BEFORE YOU GIVE HIM AN OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT. WITH ALL THE AGENTS YOU ARE RECOMMENDING FOR USE YOU APPEAR TO HAVE A MAJOR TRAINING JOB AHEAD OF YOU. TELL US EXACTLY RPT EXACTLY HOW THIS TRAINING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED CMA NOT ONLY WHO WILL TRAIN THEM BUT ALSO HOW, WHERE, WHEN, ETC. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN OF THE RENE YOU ARE CONTACTING IN VICTORIA. PLEASE SEND THE NAME AGAIN. WHAT WAS YOUR PAST CONNECTION WITH RENE. SEND US MORE DETAILS ON HIM INCLUDING FORMER OCCUPATION, SCHOOLS ATTENDED, ETC. DO NOT RPT NOT EXPAND YOUR NETS ANY FURTHER UNTIL YOU HAVE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE.

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ROUTING

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) : DIRECTOR

OM : C/SAS 5

TION: DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

FO :

S E C R E T 272240Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8225 IN 69411

RYBAT TYPIC AMPANTY FEDGUP COMMO

REFS: A. WAVE 8064 (IN 66850)

B. WAVE 8071 (IN 66867)

C. WAVE 8072 (IN 66868)

D. WAVE 8074 (IN 66883)

E. WAVE 8105 (IN 67242)

F. WAVE 8106 (IN 67216)

G. WAVE 8126 (IN 67381)

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION OF REFS A THRU G.

A. 43. ENTERING DIRECTLY THE PLACE. TEODORO IS IN CHARGE OF THE VIGILANCE OF KARAT ONE. ARLE, WHO IS ANIBAL'S MAN, IS IN CHARGE OF KARAT TWO. DOCTOR JIMENES IS IN CHARGE OF THE INTELLIGENCE FOR KARAT ONE. THIS MAN DR. JIMENES WORKED WITH PANCHO VILLA IN HERE BEFORE. AQUILES.

B. 44. OTTO. THESE ARE DATA ON DAVID'S MAN AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. DATA ON EL BULLDOZER. MIGUEL SUAREZ HERNANDEZ. 30 YEARS OLD. BORN IN 1933. WE DO NOT HAVE THE DAY AND MONTH. SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA. WORKS IN THE WATER SUPPLY LINE OF BOCA DEL GALAFRE. IS MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. LIVES ON THE BEACH OF BOCA DEL GALAFRE. WILL WORK

SECRET

11044

IN RECEPTIONS. DATA ON EL PIRATA. JOSE TEMPRANA CARMONA. ALIAS EL NINO. IS OWNER OF THE 14 FOOT BOAT WITH A 6 HORSE POWER MOTOR WHO WILL WORK IN RECEPTIONS. 53 YEARS OLD. BORN IN BOCA GALAFRE ON 19 MARCH 1909. MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. FISHERMAN. CONTINUES.

C. 45. SON OF ANDRES AND ALTA GRACIA. LIVES IN BOCA DE GALAFRE. THE NAME OF HIS BOAT IS "LA GIVIOTA". DATA ON EL VIGILANTE. THIS MAN GIVES HIS HOUSE TO LOCATE THE RADIO OPERATOR. (also used TORRADO) ROBERTO ROTTADO CACERES. 37 YEARS OLD. BORN ON 19 SEPTEMBER 1926. SON OF HERMINIO AND MARIETA. LIVES ON THE SANTA ROSA FARM ON THE HIGHWAY OF SAN JUAN DEL GALAFRE KILOMETER 9. I WILL LATER SEND THE COORDINATES. IS A TAXI DRIVER. DATA ON EL PATRIOTA. HIS SAFE HOUSE. ESTEBAN SUAREZ ROJAS. 56 YEARS OLD. BORN ON 25 DECEMBER 1907. SON OF PABLO AND ISABELA. MARRIED AND HAS 4 CHILDREN. LIVES IN LA PALMA FARM. CONTINUES.

D. 46. FARMER. I WILL LATER SEND YOU THE EXACT LOCATION BY COORDINATES. SEND SET OF MAPS ON COLIBRI. RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE 82. AQUILES.

E. 47. OTTO. YOU SHOULD WARN SAULO THE GREAT DANGER ARTAGAN IS IN IF HE REVEALS ANYTHING ON THE TYPE OF WORK THAT WAS ENTRUSTED TO HIM IN CUBA. WE WILL NOT USE POSITION COTOPRA AGAIN. WE ARE AWAITING FOR NEWS FROM PANCHO VILLA IF HE HAS RETRIEVED CACHE NORTE THREE. PLACIDO NAMED NORTE FOUR THE CACHE YOU TOLD HIM WAS LOCATED IN FRONT OF SITIO MORALES. THIS HAS BEEN FOUND BY A MINER WHO DELIVERED ALL THE CARGO TO THE MILITIA. I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OK. I HOPE THERE IS NOTHING SERIOUS IN MY GIRL FRIENDS'S LETTER. AURELIO.

F. 48. OTTO. THE INFORMATION IS DATED 11 NOVEMBER. LAST YEAR THEY [illegible] TO CUBA TRAINED DOGS [illegible] A LATIN [illegible] [illegible]. WE [illegible] [illegible] BACK TO THE [illegible]

FACTORY. THERE A PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION WAS GIVEN IN FOLLOWING THE TRAIL AND FINDING A MAN THROUGH OBSTACLES, SUCH AS SUGAR CANE, WEEDS, AND SO ON. THESE ANIMALS ARE NOW IN SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. SOURCE OF INFORMATION, OWNER OF FARM ADJACENT TO THE TOLEDO SUGAR FACTORY. TEODORO INFORMED. REPORTED BY ANTONIO ON 15 NOVEMBER. AQUILES.

C. 50. OTTO. RECEIVED MESSAGE NUMBER 87. AQUILES.

2. WAVE COMMENTS: RE REF. A. KARAT ONE AND TWO REFER TO OPERATION CORAL. NO WAVE TRACES SUBJS REF B. AND REF C. REF E. SAULO REFUGEE IN MEXICO, COTORRA IS COBRA 13 DRP. (also rcvd 73 DRI)

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ROUTING			
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (TEMPO FOR SAS SLOTTED AT 2145-27 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 2823152 28 Nov 63 IN 69428

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8232

RYBAT TYPIC AMKHAN-2 COMMO TARROT

1. FULL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG "ONE EIGHT X WEEKEND INTEL SENT OUTSTANDING X NEED ANY ADDITIONAL ADDRESSES MEXICO BUT ESPECIALLY MIAMI AND US X US XX ROGER WEDNESDAY CONTACTS X STILL WANT SEND TWICE WEEK TO YOU SO ADVISE SECOND DAY AND HOURS STARTING MID-DECEMBER X WE WOULD PREFER SATURDAY OR SUNDAY SKEDS XX ANY ADVANTAGE LUCY BEING REASSIGNED RESERVATION OFFICE X IF NOT HAVE HER TRY STAY SOYERUS XX HAVE ALL NET MEMBERS REPORT MILITARY PREPARATIONS MADE NORTH COAST LAST FIVE DAYS AND POSS LANDING CHINESE TROOPS NORTH COAST PORTS XX REQUEST YOU HAVE GENDRA REPORT ON POSSIBILITIES AND LIKELIHOOD ANYONE PUTTING TAP ON YOUR CIRCUIT TO KEY WEST X ENRIQUE" END AGENT MSG.

05 06

2. FOR DIR ONLY: LUCY IS ESTER ARANGO AND GENDRA IS JUAN GENDRA WESTERN UNION CABLE FOREMENT.

S E C R E T

2/PV

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ROUTING	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

28 Nov 63 IN 69479

SECRET 280109Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8250

PBRUMEN TYPIC AMSHATTER

1. IN S/W MESSAGE WRITTEN 4 NOV POSTMARKED 22 NOV MEXICO AND RECEIVED JMWAVE 27 NOV, AMSTASH-1 SAID HE WAITING OUR EXFILTRATION INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE CAN RECEIVE BY AT-3 ON CYPHER PAD FPSAM. A-1 RECOMMENDED JUAN BAUTISTA (GONZALEZ) FRANCISCO AKA EL GALLEGO LONG TIME MEMBER A-1 NET TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND MONEY. A-1 ASKED THAT PORTION SALARY BEING HELD ESCROW ACCOUNT BE CONVERTED 11,400 PESOS AND SENT CUBA COVER COST FATHER EYE OPERATION AND FAMILY NEEDS BY 15 DEC. A-1 CONCLUDED MESSAGE STATING PREVIOUS INTELL REPORTS SENT PER HIS INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH EMBASSY DURING HIS ABSENCE ON TRIP CAIBARIEN ON OCTOBER EXFIL ATTEMPT.

06

2. JUAN BAUTISTA (GONZALEZ) FRANCISCO NOT SAME JUAN BAUTISTA WHO IMPLICATED AMADDER TEAM.

06

3. NOTE THIS SW LETTER MAILED IN MEXICO. ALSO RECEIVED AT WAVE 27 NOV WERE THREE PLAIN TEXT INFO REPORTS FROM AMSTASH-1 APPARENTLY SENT THROUGH SAME EMBASSY CHANNEL. ALTHOUGH DETAILS THIS CHANNEL NOT REVEALED BY A-1 PRIOR HIS ARREST, RICARDO AND ANGEL BELIEVED CUTOUTS TO [illegible] VINCENTE IN FRENCH EMBASSY. VINCENTE SENDS MATERIALS TO MEXICO WHERE MAILED.

4. STATION DOES NOT INTEND SEND A-1'S PERSONAL FUNDS TO HIM.

2/pr

S E C R E T

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SECRET

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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: C/SAS 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WE 2, VR

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S E C R E T 010042Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8370

1 Dec 63 IN 70957

RYBAT TYPIC AMFAUNA-25

REF DIR 83559

C/S COMMENT: *RE EXFILTRATION OF AMFAUNA-25 FROM CUBA.

1. BELIEVE IT CURRENTLY APPROPRIATE REVIEW AMFAUNA-25 SITUATION WITHIN FRAMEWORK THOSE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE REF FORWARDED. SUGGEST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ARE:

A. WAVE ACTION RESULTED EXFILTRATION AMFAUNA-14 AND THUS DIRECT THREAT SECURITY AMFAUNA-35, AMFAUNA-39, BERNARDO (ALVAREZ) MON AND EDUARDO VEGA HAS BEEN ELIMINATED AS INITIAL DEBRIEFING AMFAUNA-14 REVEALS THESE AGENTS NOT KNOWN DSE. WILL ATTEMPT CONFIRM THIS INITIAL DEBRIEFING CONCLUSION VIA FLUTTER EXAM. IT APPEARS HOWEVER THAT OUR REMEDIAL ACTION HAS NOT ONLY AVERTED POSSIBLE FLAP BUT HAS KEPT VIABLE ASSETS IN PLACE.

B. WAVE ATTEMPTS EXFIL AMCUTLER-2 WERE NOT PRODUCTIVE BECAUSE AMCUTLER-2 REFUSED LEAVE CUBA WHEN WE OFFERED HER THIS OPPORTUNITY. THIS DUE FACT HER MOTHER SERIOUSLY ILL. REMOVAL AMCUTLER-2 FROM CUBA STILL REMAINS PRIORITY TASK AS AMFAUNA-14 DEBRIEFING CONFIRMS WAVE'S PREVIOUS ANALYSIS THAT AMCUTLER-2 IS PRIME CANDIDATE FOR IMMEDIATE ARREST. HER ARREST WOULD LEAD TO ARREST AMFAUNA'S 4, 10, 15, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37 AND 38. WAVE INTENDS MAKE MAXIMUM

11503

SECRET

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EFFORT AVOID THIS TYPE FLAP IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. THIS EFFORT HOWEVER CAN ONLY BE SUCCESSFUL IF WE ACT IN TIMELY AND IMAGINATIVE MANNER. IT WAVE OPINION THIS IS NOT TIME AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS WITH STOICISM BUT IT IS TIME INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS VIA SOUND ACTION. THUS DESPITE AMCUTLER-2 INITIAL REFUSAL LEAVE CUBA PROPOSE CONTINUE ATTEMPTS EXFIL HER ALTHOUGH THIS PROBLEM CURRENTLY COMPLICATED BY FACT WE HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH AMCUTLER-2 AND DO NOT KNOW WHERE SHE LOCATED AS SHE HAS GONE INTO HIDING AND HAS CUT TIES WITH NORMAL COMMO CHANNELS. WAVE TRYING IDENTIFY A-2 HIDING PLACE IN ORDER MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT EXFIL HER BUT THIS TIME CONSUMING FRUSTRATING EFFORT WHICH HOLDS NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. SUGGEST THEREFORE FATE OTHER AMFAUNA ASSETS CANNOT BE ALLOWED DEPEND SOLELY ON THIS SINGLE EFFORT. HAVE THEREFORE REVIEWED EACH AMFAUNA ASSET WHO WOULD BE COMPROMISED BY ARREST AMCUTLER-2 AND HAVE CONSIDERED HOW WE COULD ATTEMPT SAVE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED.

2. WITHIN CONTEXT OVER-ALL REVIEW BELIEVE FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE GERMANE TO AMFAUNA-25 SITUATION.

A. THERE NO DIRECT SECURE COMMO BETWEEN WAVE AND AMFAUNA-25 AT THIS TIME. COMMO LINK WAS AMCUTLER-2 TO AMFAUNA-27 TO AMFAUNA-25. SINCE AMCUTLER-2 OUT OF TOUCH THERE NO REPEAT NO WAY SECURELY FIND OUT DETAILS A-25 CURRENT SITUATION OR FOR A-25 TO COMMUNICATE WITH WAVE.

B. CUBA HAS STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMY AND A-25 EMPLOYED INSURANCE CONTROL OFFICE CUBAN FINANCE MINISTRY THUS HE CAN

TRAVEL ABROAD ONLY ON GOVERNMENT BUSINESS. VIEW GOC HARD CURRENCY SHORTAGE GOC NOT LIKELY LET A-25 TRAVEL ABROAD UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH REQUIRE EXPENDITURE GOC FUNDS. A-25 HAS NO KNOWN RELATIVES OR FRIENDS OUTSIDE CUBA WHO COULD FUND HIS TRAVEL ABROAD THUS IT UNREALISTIC ASSUME A-25 COULD HIMSELF ARRANGE LEGAL DEPARTURE CUBA. A-25 MUST BE HELPED IN ARRANGING LEGAL DEPARTURE AND THIS HELP CAN ONLY COME FROM KUBARK. DO NOT KNOW IF THIS HELP WILL BE EFFECTIVE BUT BELIEVE IT MUST BE OFFERED I.E. WE MUST ATTEMPT ARRANGE EXPENSE PAID INVITATION FOR A-25 VISIT LONDONG DISCUSS CUBAN INSURANCE PROBLEMS WITH MINET CO LONDON. LEAD TIME INVOLVED ARRANGING SUCH TRAVEL QUITE LENGTHY AND IF THIS APPROACH IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IT MUST BE INITIATED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. BELIEVE THIS TRAVEL CAN ONLY BE LAID ON WITH SMOTH KNOWLEDGE AND CONCURRENCE. SEE NO HARM PER SE IN DISCUSSING A-25 EXFIL OP WITH SMOTH. THEY WILL SAY YES OR NO. IF ANSWER IS NO WE HAVE HONESTLY AND IN GOOD CONSCIENCE EXHAUSTED ALL LEGAL MEANS ARRANGE A-25 EXFIL. IF ANSWER IS YES SMOTH WILL HAVE WITTINGLY AGREED ASSIST IN OP AND WILL BE AWARE PITFALLS IF ANY WHICH COULD CREATE EMBARRASSMENT. RE THIS POINT WAVE SEES NO FLAP POTENTIAL IN LEGAL EXFIL.

C. ONCE A-25 ARRIVES LOND HE WOULD BE DEBRIEFED IN DETAIL IN ATTEMPT CLARIFY ISSUES OF HIS BONA FIDES AND INTEL KNOWLEDGEABILITY. THIS EFFORT SHOULD PRODUCE INTERESTING INTEL AS A-25 OBVIOUSLY KNOWLEDGEABLE RE CUBAN FINANCE MINISTRY.

3/PJ

IN MILITIA OFFICER AND CIS COLLABORATOR WHO FURNISHES COVER FOR ONE OR MORE CIS STAFF EMPLOYEES HAVANA AND IS ALSO TARGETTED BY CIS AGAINST BRITISH CANADIAN EMBASSIES HAVANA. THESE FACTORS PLUS A-25 CLOSE ASSOCIATION CHE GUEVARA SHOULD PRODUCE INFO FROM LOND DEBRIEFING WHICH WOULD GIVE KUBARK CURRENT INSIGHT INTO SEVERAL AREAS WHERE TOP LEVEL INTEL LACKING. RECOGNIZING FACT THAT A-25 IS OPPORTUNIST SEE NO REASON BELIEVES HE WOULD NOT FURNISH THIS INFO ONCE HE MADE AWARE OF REALITIES WHICH COULD AFFECT HIS SECURITY IF AMCUTLER-2 ARRESTED.

D. IF A-25 COMES LOND AND AMCUTLER-2 EXFIL ARRANGED PRIOR EXPIRATION A-25'S TRAVEL TIME THEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO KEEPING A-25 IN PLACE IN CUBA IF HE BONA FIDE. BELIEVE THERE NO QUESTION BUT THAT A-25, IF HE KUBARK CONTROLLED AGENT WITH ACCESS COMMO CHANNEL, COULD BE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING ASSET DUE HIS POSITION AND IMPLIED INTEL ACCESS AS OUTLINED PARA 2-C. IN THIS SITUATION TIME EFFORT EXPENDED BRING A-25 LOND WOULD BE SOUND INVESTMENT AS IT SHOULD CLARIFY A-25 BONA FIDES AND IF HE BONA FIDE WOULD ENABLE US SEND TRAINED AGENT BACK TO TARGET AREA WITH COMMO. THERE CURRENTLY NO KNOWN SECURITY FACTORS MITIGATING AGAINST THIS ONCE AMCUTLER-2 OUT OF CUBA.

3. VIEW ABOVE RECOMMEND HQS EXPEDITE POA FOR PETER MINET 06 AND HAVE LOND DISCUSS A-25 TRAVEL TO BRITAIN WITH SMOTH 01 SOONEST. IF THIS DISCUSSION FAVORABLE THEN LOND SHOULD PROCEED RECRUIT MINET 06 AND HAVE HIM ATTEMPT ARRANGE A-25 TRAVEL. WISH REPEAT THAT SPEED IN HANDLING THIS PROPOSAL NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL BUT IS CRITICAL FACTOR ON WHICH SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THIS MANEUVER DEPENDS. PLS ADVISE.

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SECRET

ROUTING
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, RI/AN DUMMY, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 022012Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8395

TYPIC ATHENA PETCOS COMMO

REF: A. WAVE 7580 (IN 61661)

B. WAVE 7581 (IN 61650)

C. WAVE 7793 (IN 64066)

D. WAVE 7860 (IN 64001)

E. WAVE 7861 (IN 64951)

F. WAVE 7964 (IN 65904)

G. WAVE 8116 (IN 67250)

H. WAVE 8117 (IN 67249)

I. WAVE 8118 (IN 67281)

J. WAVE 8134 (IN 67356)

K. WAVE 8140 (IN 67664)

L. WAVE 8262 (IN 69684)

IN 71764

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION OF REFS:

11511

A. 70. RECEIVED MESSAGE 34. RUBEN RECOMMENDS JOSE GONZALEZ CANTO BECAUSE HE WAS A SERGEANT IN THE OLD ARMY AND KNOWS HOW TO HANDLE DIFFERENT WEAPONS AND SOME EXPLOSIVES. RAMON AND MARIO ARE COUSINS. TELL US WHAT PICTURES OF MARIO YOU WANT. THE ONE THAT DOINEADIOS RECOMMENDS FOR INTELLIGENCE IS ORESTE TAMAYO MUNOS.

SECRET

PROFESSOR AT THE SCHOOL OF COMMERCE. I WILL CONTACT RENE THROUGH [illegible]IANO. DOIMEADIOS SAYS THAT CAMAY RECOMENDS FOR INTELLIGENCE. CONTINUES.

B. 71. CONTINUATION. MEDARDO SILVA MARRERO, BORN IN HOLGUIN. [illegible] OCTOBER 1927. LIVES LOS MOSCONES NEIHBORHOOD. SON OF SANTIAGO AND ALTA GRACIA. WORKS IN THE ASPHALT PLANT LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THE HOLGUIN MILITIA AIRPORT.

C. 72. RECEIVED MESSAGE 35. WILL SEND BIO DATA ON RENE BEFORE [illegible] CONTACT WITH HIM. ROBERTO ZAYAS WILL WORK IN THE ACTION CELL. [illegible] THE LOCATION OF THE HOUSE NEAREST THE POINT, IT IS MORE THAN [illegible] THREE KILOMETERS AWAY. THE POINT CAN BE REACHED BY A SECONDARY ROAD. THERE ARE NO PATROLS NOR OBSERVATION POSTS NEAR, THE NEAREST ONE IS 10 [illegible] 10 KILOMETERS. TELL US WHEN YOU CAN HAVE A RE-SUPPLY OPERATION. WE HAVE A FEW SABOTAGE OBJECTIVES, DATA SENT BY MAIL. ON NEXT TRANSMISSION WILL SEND SOME DETAILS OF OBJECTIVES CHOSEN.

D. 73. BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON RENE CRUZ RAMON, BORN IN VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS ON 23 MAY 1928. LIVES IN JULIAN SANTANA 100 WHERE HE HAS HIS OFFICE. IS A PAPERMAKER. SON OF ROBERTO AND MANUELA, MARRIED TO MERCEDES CRUZ VELAZQUEZ. HAS ONE DAUGHTER NAMED ANAUELA RPT ANCU[illegible] (5[illegible]). DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT RUBEN RECOMMEND ROBERTO LEGON PINO FOR ACTION. HE WAS BORN IN HOLGUIN. CONTINUES.

E. 74, CONTINUATION. BORN ON 22 APRIL 1932, LIVES ON [illegible] 12. WORKS IN THE ELECTRIC PLANT OF HOLGUIN. RAPID INVESTIGATION OF THESE PEOPLE IS NECESSARY.

F. 75. AGUILAR HAS RECOMMENDED TO ME FOR ACTION AGENT IN PUERTO

PADRE RAMON DANIEL VALDES LEON NATIVE OF HAVANA. BORN 21 RPT 21 JUNE 1915 RPT 1915. SON OF HERIBERTO AND TERESA. MARRIED TO LINA PACHECO RONDON. LIVES IN BATEY, CHAPARRA REPARTO MIRAMAR, PUERTO PADRE. WORKS AS MALE NURSE THIS MAN CONTROLS LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE ZONE.

G. 76. RECEIVED MESSAGE 36. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT RUBEN RECOMMENDS FOR ACTION ALFREDO DIAZ GONZALEZ (ALO. [illegible]) BORN IN MANZANILLO. BORN ON 17 OCTOBER 1916. SON OF MANUEL AND TOMASA. WORKS AS CHIEF OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT WORKSHOPS OF THE OBRAS PUBLICAS (PUBLIC WORKS). LIVES IN GENERAL FERIA, 193. CONTINUES.

H. 77. CONTINUATION. RUBEN ALSO RECOMMENDS LEONARDO PUPO ROMERO BORN IN HOLGUIN. SON OF FRANCISCO AND MARIA. BORN ON 23 AUGUST 1938. LIVES IN THE EXTENSION OF PERALTA 36, HARLEM SECTION. WORKS ON CARGO SHIPS OF HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION (SIC). I NEED PESOS, TELL US IF YOU CAN MAKE ANOTHER CACHE. WE ARE RECRUITING ACTION PERSONNEL IN HIDDEN PLACES. SENT REPORTS ON TARGETS ON 17 NOVEMBER. CONTINUATION.

I. 78. CONTINUATION. TELL ME WHAT OTHER TYPE OF INFORMATION YOU NEED ON THE TANK PARK I REPORTED. I WILL ORDER AGUILAR TO INVESTIGATE WHO LIVES AT PUNTO TOMATE. THE EXPLOSIVE MATERIAL I WILL USE AS SELECTED TARGETS. THE OTHER MATERIAL WILL BE BURIED. THE SUPPLIES WILL BE CARRIED IN THE TRUCK OF MARIO TORANZO. THE EXPLOSIVES WERE DEPOSITED (SIC) IN THE FARM OF MULET. COORDINATES 584282, MAP SHEET 4975 IV.

J. 79. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT THE TANK PARK REPORTED IN POINT [illegible] 7A MAP SHEET 4978 IV IS SURROUNDED BY BARBED WIRE FENCE. ONLY [illegible] GUARD ARMED WITH A SOVIET PPSH WEAPON. IT IS IN A SENTRY BOX WITH TELEPHONE LOCATED IN FRONT OF THE AGUAS CLARAS AND UNAS HIGHWAYS JUNCTION.

THERE ARE SEVERAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT INSTALLED ON A HILL AT NORTH, NOT BEING A[illegible]

DETERMINE WHAT TYPE. THE AREA OF ALL THE CAMP IS APPROXIMATELY 1 SQUARE KILOMETER, THE AREA OCCUPIED BY THE TANKS IS ABOUT 1200 METERS. [illegible] TANKS SEEM TO BE T-54S.

K. 80. RECEIVED MESSAGE 36. DOIMEADIOS TELLS ME THAT CAMAY RECOMMENDS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE CELL IBRAHIM ROBERTO MAURINO MIRANDA. [illegible] IN MATANZAS, SON OF ROBERTO AND TERESA. BORN ON 16 SEPT 1918. MARRIED TO INES FERIA. HAS TWO CHILDREN, ROBERTO AND INES. THIS MAN WAS CHIEF OF THE RURAL CORPS DURING THE PRIO GOVERNMENT. HE WAS THEN PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR FOR SEARS AND OTHER COMMERCIAL AND BANKING FIRMS. RAPID INVESTIGATION ONE THESE PEOPLE IS NECESSARY.

L. 81. RECEIVED MESSAGE 37. CONTACT IN VICTORIA WOULD BE RENE CRUZ RAMO. RENE HAS BEEN KNOWN TO ME FOR SOME YEARS THROUGH HIS LATE UNCLE FELIPE CRUZ COLON, DELICIA FARM. ALSO RENE WAS INSPECTOR [illegible] MARTIN COMPANY IN PUERTO PADRE. IN VICTORIA RENE WORKS WITH DR. [illegible] LAWYER IN VICTORIA. TRYING TO INVESTIGATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED. [illegible]

YOU CAN PROVIDE SOME MONEY EXPENSES ARE VERY HIGH HERE.

2. STATION COMMENT: PLS INDEX FOR WAVE FILES WITH LEGEND INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOC CONTROLLED AGENT, VALIDITY OF INFORMATION CANNOT BE DETERMINED.".

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

37 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT 2210, 3 DEC DD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 0400122

3 Dec 63 IN 72878

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8452

RYBAT TYPIC AMCLEAN-5 COMMO FATBID

1. FULL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG: "ONE SIX THREE X POUCH ARRIVED NEXT TWO DEC X WILL RETRIEVE SOONEST XX ADVISE IF YOU THINK EMILIO IS WILLING BE EXFILTRATED X HE ONLY LINK IN CHAIN THAT WE KNOW OF BETWEEN YOU AND TONY XX JOSE X WILL PICK UP THINGS FROM MANOLO 06 (DIEGO) NEXT TRIP NEXT X GORDA". END AGENT MSG.

2. FOR DIR ONLY: EMILIO IS 06 (EMILIO CARBO), TONY IS AMCANOE-3, JOSE IS AMRIPE-2 AND MANOLO (DIEGO) 06 IS A RELATIVE OF AMRIPE-1.

S E C R E T

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

3|PJ

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 051553Z

5 DEC 63 IN 7424

MADR INFO DIR MEXI CITE WAVE 8525

KEYWAY PBRUMEN (QUOTA) 01

REF WAVE 8524 IN 74317

IDEN A - ODON (ALVAREZ) DE LA CAMPA

IDEN B - GILBERTO (LIWAY) RODRIGUEZ 06

IDEN C - ALDO (VERA) SERAFIN 06

IDEN D - MANOLO (UZIEL) 06

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

30 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, SAS 8, OL 4, VR

SECRET 262202Z

PRIORITY MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 8671 IN 75337

DYVOUR PERUMEN AMTASE

REF MEXI 7268 (IN 74567)

PLS SHIP REF ENVELOPES DIRECTLY TO WAVE COMMERCIALLY TO FULL ADDRESS: MISS GRACE HOLMES, P. O. BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLA.

06

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *UNABLE SHIP ENVELOPES THRU CLASSIFIED POUCH UNTIL 13 DEC.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

1/pv

1	4
2	5
3	6

DIRECTOR

JMWAVE

WH 8

DOP, CI, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 070030Z

[illegible] INFO DIR CITE WAVE 8642

[illegible] PERUMEN AMSTONE

REF WAVE 8641 (IN 75584)

7 Dec 63 IN 75579

IDEN A MR THEMISTOCLES APOSPOROS 06

B MERIDA (GARCIA) ROSELL 06

S E C R E T

2/PN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, VR

RETURN TO CIA
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S E C R E T 092016Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8724

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY SAGTEL

9 DEC 63 IN 76726

REF WAVE 8694 (IN 76046)

FOLLOWING TRANSLATION REF. 15. RECD MSG NR. 5. START SENDING THINGS VIA ENRIQUE (VICENTE SOCORRAS) AND THE (JAPANESE) EMBASSY. WE EXPECT YOU TO ADVISE WHEN YOU START POUCHING THINGS SO WE CAN WAIT FOR THEM. TODAY RECD THE MAGNUM PISTOLS BUT NO BULLETS. ALSO RECD THE RADIOS. ADVISE THE DISTANCE OVER WHICH YOU CAN HEAR THEM. SEND THE FILTERS FOR PISTOLS SOON. AMTURVY-1.

S E C R E T

06

11

2/IN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 2045, 9 DEC 63)BP

INFO : DDP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 092307Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8740 10 DEC 63 IN 76856

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY-1 COMMO SAGTEL

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT. BEGIN AGENT MSG: "SIETE X RECIBI INCLUSIVE UNO SEIS X BUEN TRABAJO XX TAMBIEN RECIBI SW NUMERO SIES X INFO MAGNIFICO XX TE MANDARE REPUESTOS ATRAVES JUSTO ESTA SEMANA X NO NESECITAS USAR JORGE 06 (GUTIERREZ) AHORA X SW LLAMA 06 (GUTIERREZ MORALES) PREG X QUIZAS PODAMOS USARLO MAS TARDE X TRATARE DE MANDARLE DINERO DE TODOS MODOS PARA EL FUTURO XX BALAS LLEGARAN PRONTO X FILTROS TAMBIEN XX AVISAME SI HAS RECIBIDO MI VALIJA NUMERO UNO CERO ATRAVES HALCON XX BARCO RUSSO KRASNOYE ZNAMYA X KRASNOYE ZNAMYA LLEGARA PRONTO HABANA X MANDA DOTOS DE CARGA CHA DISTINACION YANKEE DESCRIPCIONES DE RUSOS ABORDO QUE DESEMBARCARAN XX AVISA SI CONOCES ALQUIEN QUE TIENE LANCHA CERCA DE BAHIA HONDA XX FRITZ" END AGENT MSG.

2. FOR DIR ONLY: SEVEN. RECEIVED ALL THROUGH ONE SIX. GOOD WORK. ALSO RECEIVED SW NR. INFO WAS GOOD. WILL SEND SPARE PARTS THROUGH ENRIQUE VINCENTE SOCORRAS THIS WEEK. NO NECESSARY USE JORGE 06 (GUTIERREZ) NOW. IS HE NAMED 06 (GUTIERREZ MORALES) PERHAPS WE CAN USE HIM LATER. WILL TRY TO SEND HIM MONEY ANYWAY FOR THE FUTURE. BULLETS WILL ARRIVE SOON. FILTERS TOO. ADVISE IF YOU RECEIVED POUCH NR. ONE ZERO

cf/pv

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

THROUGH AMCLEN-9. RUSSIAN SHIP KRASNOYE ZNAMYA WILL ARRIVE SOON HABANA. SEND INFO ON CARGO AND DESTINATION AND DESCRIPTIONS OF RUSSIAN ON BOARD WHO DISEMBARK. ADVISE IF YOU KNOW SOMEONE WHO OWNS A BOAT NEAR BAHIA HONDA.

S E C R E T

74 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, RI/AN DUMMY, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 102123Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8803

10D[illegible] 7770
08

RYBAT TYPIC AMBANTY FEDGUR COMMO

REF A. WAVE 8699 (IN 76062)

B. WAVE 8700 (IN 76064)

1. FOLL IS TRANSLATION REFS A AND B:

A. 90. OTTO. RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE NUMBER 89. SEND US ON LIBERTAD 12, 6 BOTTLES OF TRINRICON INTRINSIC. THESE ARE CAPSULES OF THE LILLY LABORATORIES TO FIGHT AGAINST PERNICIOUS ANEMIA. AQUILES.

B. 91. OTTO. DOCTOR JIMENES' NAME IS (AURELIO MARTINEZ.) 06 HE IS A PHYSICIST-MATHEMATICIAN. WAS RECRUITED BY IRENE AND WORKS WITH HER. THE DATA ON ADA'S NEPHEW WHO WILL COME OUT ON LIBERTAD 12 IS: JOSE (CAMPOS PEREZ.) 06 SON OF RICARDO AND CELINA. BORN IN HAVANA ON 18 AUGUST 1945. 18 YEARS OF AGE. SINGLE. STUDENT. THE NEW POSITION OF AGUILA IN CAYO LEVISA IS SAFE. WE WAIT FOR YOU. THE BOAT, WHICH IS BIG AND WITH MOTOR, WILL BE HIDDEN IN THE MANGROVES. ALL THE SIGNALS AND HOURS WILL BE THE SAME. AQUILES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2/IN

2. WAVE COMMENTS: REF B AURELIO (MARTINEZ) FERRO 201-280293 IS OLD CONTACT OF AMCLATTER-5. A-5 WILL BE QUERIED ON SUBJ BUT NOT TOLD FOR WHAT REASON. TOMAS RENE (INGUANZO) ORTIZ 201-349154 MENTIONS MARTINEZ IN HIS PRQ PART I, UFGA 7527, 8 FEB 63. REQUEST HQS FORWARD 201-280293 TO JMWAVE. NO WAVE TRACES JOSE (CAMPOS) PEREZ. REQUEST HQS TRACING AND INDEXING.

06 06 06 06

SECRET

1.6

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OC 8, VR

S E C R E T 102340Z

11 DEC 63 IN 77647

DIR CITE WAVE 8825

TYPIC AMTAUP YOACRE COMMO

06

1. REQUEST FOLL PRIORITY POAS. IDEN A CARLOS (EVANS) ROMAN DPOB 18 OCT 26 GUANTANAMO, CUBA. RESIDES CALLE ALFREDO DE ZAYAS 08 54 CAIMANERA WITH FATHER 06 EDUARDO (EVANS) SUBJ SINGLE AND HAS WORKED YOACRE AS OFFICE ASSISTANT FOR PAST 17 YEARS. IDEN B MARIANO 06 VIRGILIO DE LA CARIDAD (RAMIREZ) ALARCON DPOB 26 SEPT 12 CAMAGUEY, CUBA. RESIDES 08 SAN LUIS BELTRAN 66 CAMAGUEY. MARRIED DELFIA (MOLINA) 06 GONZALEZ WITH FOUR CHILDREN. SON MARIANO 06 (RAMIREZ) HERNANDEZ LIVES 347 N.E. 36TH ST, MIAMI. SUBJ FORMER ARMY OFFICER PRIOR 59 AND PRESENTLY WORKS AS CAMAGUEY PUBLIC PROCTOR.

2. NO LOCAL ODENVY TRACES SUBJS. ONLY WAVE TRACES INFO PROVIDED BY AMTAUP-10 WHICH SUMMARIZED PARA 1 ABOVE.

S E C R E T

7/pv

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

43 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SR 7, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 120028Z 12 DEC 0420Z 63 IN 78723

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8923

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMLISP-1 IN SW MSG 317 DTD 10 NOV RECD FROM TRANSLATION 30 NOV 63. INFORMANTS ARE AUDILIO (HERRERA) 06 SURGIDERO DE BATABANO RESIDENT AND FORMER WHOLESALE FRUIT VENDOR, AND EDILIO (GOMEZ) 06 RESIDENT OF FINCA ALGOBIN, BATABANO. BOTH WERE RECRUITED BY (FNU) DE LA TORRE FULL IDEN NOT ESTABLISHED. FIELD COMMENTS ARE FROM AMSUM-4 MONITORING OF CLT. RID. NO INDEX. FILED 12/0028Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: 1. TRAVEL OF SOVIETS FROM BATABANO TO ISLA DE PINOS.

2. CARGO TRAFFIC BETWEEN ISLA DE PINOS AND BATABANAO

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED
ED PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN
MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING
RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING HQ:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

OUNTRY
REPORT NO. TDCS
UBJECT
DATE DISTR.
PRECEDENCE
ATE OF INFO.
REFERENCES IN 78723
LACE & ATE ACQ.
PPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

OURCE

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1963, AT ABOUT 6:00 P.M., TWO TRUCKS, NOT OF U.S. MANUFACTURE, TRANSPORTING A TOTAL OF 24 MEN, WHO APPEARED TO BE SOVIETS, ARRIVED IN BATABANO, HABANA PROVINCE. THE MEN WERE WELL-GROOMED, WORE CLEAN CLOTHES AND WERE CARRYING SUITCASES AND BUNDLES. AT MIDNIGHT THESE INDIVIDUALS BOARDED THE FERRY SAILING FOR ISLA DE PINOS. (FIELD COMMENT: A USALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE ISLA DE TESORO, THE REGULAR FERRY TO ISLA DE PINOS, DEPARTED FROM BATABANO FOR GERONA, ISLA DE PINOS, ON THE NIGHT OF 6 NOVEMBER.)

2. ON 31 OCTOBER AT ABOUT 10:00 P.M., TWO OLIVE GREEN TRAILER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OBI | OO
STATE/DIR

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 78723

PAGE 2

TRUCKS HAULING BOXES ARRIVED AT THE PORT OF BATABANO FROM ISLA DE PINOS.

3. ON 28 OCTOBER AT ABOUT 3:00 P.M., TWO OLIVE GREEN TEN-WHEELED TRUCKS DRIVEN BY MILITIAMEN ARRIVED IN BATABANO AND WERE SHIPPED ABOARD THE ISLA DE PINOS FERRY WHICH LEFT THE SLIP AT 4:00 P.M. THE TRUCKS HAD AN ENCLOSED METAL BODY WITH SMALL SIDE WINDOWS AND EACH TRUCK PULLED A FOUR-WHEELED TRAILER. (FIELD COMMENT: A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT ON 28 OCTOBER ZIL TRUCKS WERE ON BOARD THE ISLA DE TESORO FERRY WHICH SAILED FOR GERONA.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMNAVKEYWEST.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

43 S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: TAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, ~~IW~~, RI/AN, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

S E C R E T 120028Z 12 DEC 04527 63 IN 78734

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

DIR CITE WAVE 8924

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMLISP-1 IN SW MSG 315 DTD 7 NOV 63 RECD FROM TRANSLATION 30 NOV 63. SUBSOURCE IS REBECA (ALBERT) 06 WHOSE FIANCE'S UNCLE, JUAN (FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ) 06 (PER SW 328 DATED 28 NOV), IS A NOTARY WHO RESIDES NEAR TORRENS AND WHO REPORTED OBSERVATIONS OF TRAFFIC. FIELD COMMENT SHOE. RID: INDEX. FILED 120028Z.

REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM CUBA

SUBJ: TRUCK TRAFFIC AND TUBE-LIKE OBJECTS SEEN ENTERING TORRENS BASE

DOI: 9 OCT - 7 NOV 63 PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (30 NOV 63)

UFG-4246

SOURCE: A FORMER CUBAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE

IN COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING INDEX:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

2/PV

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 8134

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. AS OF 7 NOVEMBER 1963, AFTER 10:00 P.M. ALMOST EVERY NIGHT TRUCKS AND TRAILER TRUCKS COVERED WITH CANVAS WERE OBSERVED TRAVELING TOWARD TORRENS, THE FORMER REFORMATORY ON THE WAJAY HIGHWAY SOUTHWEST OF HABANA.

2. ON 11 OCTOBER SIX LARGE TRAILER TRUCKS ENTERED TORRENS AND ON 9 OCTOBER, TEN MORE OF THESE LARGE TRAILER TRUCKS ENTERED THE BASE. AN UNIDENTIFIED DRIVER OF A VEHCILE TRAVELLING BEHIND ONE OF THE TRUCKS REPORTEDLY OBSERVED TUBE-LIKE OBJECTS WHICH PROTRUDED AT LEAST ONE METER BEYOND THE TRUCK BED OF ONE OF THE TRAILERS, WHEN BY CHANCE THE WIND BLEW TO ONE SIDE THE TARPAULIN COVERING THE TRAILER'S CARGO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OSI | OO |

STATE/FBI

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3. FIELD COMMENT: THE TORRENS SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE ASSEMBLY AREA WAS ACTIVE DURING THIS PERIOD, ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

END OF MESSAGE

148 SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 3

INFO : DDP (VR)

S E C R E T 120029Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8926

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

78730
[illegible]

REF UFGA 12673

AMYUM/19 TOLD GUERTLER THAT (QUANTUM/51) WILL BE ASKED CONTACT FOLL AMYUMS IN CUBA AND PASS INSTRUCTIONS FOR RECEIVING SW MSG.

1. MARIA (TERESA (SACRE) ABIRAFHED)- WAVE TRACES IN REF.

2. CARLOS (CURANGA) GARCIA)- WAVE TRACES IN REF.

3. DR FRANCISCO (RENE (DE LA HUERTA) AGUIAR) AGE APPROX 40 YRS BORN HAVA. ACCORDING UFG 256 SUBJ HEADED AMYUM INTEL IN HAVA. NO OTHER WAVE TRACES.

4. (DE LA HUERTA) WILL ACT AS CUTOUT FOR DR MARIO (ENRIQUE (MARTINEZ) DELGADO) BORN 28 SANTO DOMINGO, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. SUBJ WORKS HOSPITAL DE DEMENTES DE MAZORRA. ONLY WAVE TRACES AMHINT/27 CONTACT REPORT 8 AUG 62 SUGGESTING SUBJ BE USED AS CUTOUT IN A/27 OPS.

S E C R E T

6/PV

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

42 SECRET

1		4
2		5
3		6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, ~~FI~~, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, WH 7, AD/CI 2, DD/I, AD/NE, VR.

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TDC:

S E C R E T 120029Z DEC 12 0835Z 63 IN 78746

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR CITE WAVE 8927

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMICE-14, FROM AMTRUNK-7 WITH PARA 1 FROM HUMBERTO 06 (BERGARA), MEMBER OF A DRE-SPONSORED INFILTRATION TEAM, WHO OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM UNIDENTIFIED LOCAL FISHERMEN AND PARA 2 FROM IRENE 06 (MILIAN), THE WIDOW OF JUAN MANUEL 06 (MILIAN), WHO RECEIVED THE INFORMATION IN A CALL FROM MAGDALENA 06 ((MONTESINO)), THE MOTHER OF LAZARO 06 (ORALIO (ALEJANDRO) MONTESINO) PLEASE PROTECT SUBSOURCES.

RID: NO INDEX. FILED 120029Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA

SUBJ: ARRESTS AND MILITIA VIGILANCE IN THE NORTHERN COASTAL AREA OF

IW COMMENT:

[illegible] DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED [illegible] PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS [illegible] [illegible] OUTSIDE THE AGENCY [illegible] [illegible] BY THE ACTION UNIT

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING NO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
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5/R

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SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY		REPORT NO.	TDCS
SUBJECT		DATE DISTR.	
		PRECEDENCE	
DATE OF INFO.		REFERENCES	IN 78746
PLACE & DATE ACQ.			
APPRAISAL		FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. AS OF 5 DECEMBER 1963, THE NORTHERN COASTAL AREA OF MATANZAS PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY THAT IN THE VICINITY OF RIO PALMA (N 23-04, W 80-54), WAS UNDER MILITIA SURVEILLANCE.

2. AS OF 9 DECEMBER, MANY PERSONS HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN MARTI, ITABO, AND MAXIMO GOMEZ, MATANZAS PROVINCE, AND MILITIA WERE ALL ALONG THE COASTLINE IN THIS AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMNAVKEYWEST, USCG (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	DD	
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5 (SAS COPY SLOTTED AT: 2000, 12 DEC BP)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, D/OC 2, VR

S E C R E T 122240Z

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8966 12 Dec 63 IN 79555

RYBAT TYPIC AMTURVY-1 COMMO SAGTEL

1. FOLL WILL BE SENT: BEGIN AGENT MSG: "NUEVE X FRANCISCO X DENTRO POCOS DIAS AVISA SI LANCHAS CLASE KOMAR LLEVAN AHORA COHETES VIVOS X TAMBIEN SI LLEVAN AHORA CLASE PAPA SEIS CARGAS DE PROGUNDIDAD VIVAS YANKEE TORPEDOS VIVOS X QUE TIPO COMBUSTIBLE USAN PAPA SIES PREG X SE ANADA ALGO AL COMBUSTIBLE COMO ADITIVO PARA DARLE MAS POTENCIA PREG X HAZ DIBUJO POR SW DE PERFIL VISTA LATERAL YANKEE VISTA ARRIBA DANDO LOCALIDADES DE TANQUES DE COMBUSTIBLE YANKEE MOTORES XSI PUEDE CMA PIDELE PRESTADO ALFA FRANCISCO MANUEL DE MANTENAMIENTO PARA FOTOGRAFEARLO PEPE X LANCHAS CUBANAS DE PESCAR SAN IGNACIO CMA MARIA ELENA YANKEE LOS ANGELES LLEVABAN ARMAS ALFA LATINA AMERICA X FAVOR DE AVERIGUAR SI ESTOS BARCOS TIENEN RADIO DOMMUNICACIONES XX HOY MANDE DOS CIENTOS DOLLARES ALFA JORGE GUTIERREZ EN CANADA XX FAVOR DE MANDAR ANTECEDENTES DE PEPE YANKEE JUSTO PARA CHEQUIAR ARCHIVOS AQUI X ABRAZOS X FRITZ" END AGENT MSG.

2. FOR DIR ONLY: NINE. AMTURVY-9. WITHIN A FEW DAYS ADVISE IF KOMAR CLASS BOATS NOW CARRY LIVE ROCKETS. ALSO IF P-6 CLASS BOATS CARRY LIVE DEPTH CHARGES AND LIVE TORPEDOES. WHAT TYPE FUEL DO THEY USE. IS ANYTHING ADDED TO THE FUEL FOR MORE POWER. MADE A SKETCH IN

0/12

SECRET

SW OF SIDE AND TOP VIEWS SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF FUEL TANKS AND MOTORS. IF HE ABLE, HAVE AMTURVY-9 LOAN YOU A MAINTENANCE MANUAL FOR PHOTOGRAPHING. LUIS (GONZALEZ.) 06 THE CUBAN FISHING BOATS SAN IGNACIO, MARIA ELENA AND THE LOS ANGELES HAVE BEEN CARRYING ARMS TO LATIN AMERICA. PLS DETERMINE IF THESE BOATS HAVE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS. TODAY WE SENT 200 DOLLARS TO JORGE (GUTIERREZ) 06 IN CANADA. PLS FORWARD FULL BIO DATA ON LUIS (GONZALEZ) 06 AND ENRIQUE (VICENTE SOCORRAS) 06 SO WE CAN CHECK THE FILES HERE.

SECRET

4/1W

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : SAS 8
INFO : DDP, OS 2, VR

SECRET 1388182

DIR CITE WAVE 8985

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

13 Dec 63 IN 79825

TYPIC SECUR

REFS: A. DIR 78641 *
B. UFGT 6718

1. SUBJ WAS GRANTED PCSA PER REF A UNDER NAME (EMMA HARRIS) 06 NEE (DORA BROWN) 06 REF B ADVISED SUBJ NOW KNOWN AS (EMMA HARRIS JOHNSON) 06 PLS ADVISE IF ORIGINAL PCSA STILL VALID.

2. WAVE TRACES ON NEW NAME NEG.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * PCSA GRANTED SUBJS EFFECTIVE 25 OCT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

3|nv

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : SAS 8
INFO : DOP, CI/OA, RI/AN, VR

S E C R E T 132032Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9018

13Dec63 IN 80386

TYPIC AMCOG

1. REQUEST POAS FOLL:

A. DR. FIDENCIO (SANCHEZ) ESCOTO BORN CA 15 CUBA. VETERINARIAN. MARRIED TO LOLINA FEBLES. RESIDES HABANA CALLE 30 NR 304 BETWEEN 25 Y 27 VEDADO. MENTIONED UFG 2873, 3002, 3172, 3332, 3459 AND UFGA 10978.

B. DR. OSCAR (PINA) HERNANDEZ BORN CA 13 CUBA. COURT JUDGE. MARRIED TO PETITE ESNARD. RESIDES HABANA LOPEZ SIERRA BLDG APT 94, VEDADO. MENTIONED UFG 3285 AND UFGA 4989 AND 12039.

C. DR. CARLOS (RUBI) BORN 24 HABANA. DR MEDICINE. U OF HABANA GRAD. MARRIED TO ALICIA CUSCO FORMER TEACHER SACRED HEART. NO CHILDREN. RESIDES CALLE 60 NO 1114 BETWEEN 11 Y 13, MARIANAO. MENTIONED UFG 2817.

12654

D. RAMON IVAN (LEDO) GARVALLO 38 HABANA. SINGLE. FORMER MANAGER MUEBLICENTRO. RESIDES WITH PARENTS JOSE RAMON (LEDO) GONZALEZ AND ADA HILDA GARVALLO 5TH AVE NO 4417 BETWEEN 46 AND 60, MARIANAO.

SECRET

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Copy No.

NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

E. DR. RENE (ZAMORA) CARBONELL BORN CA 20 CUBA L~~O~~AWYER. MARRIED. RESIDES HABANA AQUIAR NO 363. MENTIONED UFG 2671.

F. MANUEL (CAMPANIONI) SOUZA BORN HABANA DATE UNK. PERFUME MFG. FORMERLY EMPLOYED CAPRI, HILTON AND COMMODORE HOTELS, RACE TRACK CASINO AND MONTMARTE NIGHTCLUB. MARRIED TO ALICIA WITH ONE DAUGHTER LIVING MIAMI BEACH. RESIDES CALLE 6 NO 909. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.

G. SECUNDINO (FERNANDEZ) GONZALEZ BORN CA 08 CUBA. FORMER POLICE OFFICER FIRED 10 MAR 52. FARM OWNER. MARRIED TO TERESA (HEVIA) CACHERO. ONE SON BERNARDO (FERNANDEZ) HEVIA BORN 40 HABANA. RESIDE CALLE SEGUNDA NO 269 BETWEEN ALBEAR Y SANTA CATALINA, REPARTO PALATINO, HABANA. MENTIONED UFG 2817 AND 2883.

H. CAPT EDUARDO (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPBELL, BORN CA 15, NEGRO. GENERAL STAFF OFFICER CUBAN ARMY. MARRIED WITH FOUR CHILDREN. FORMER CARPENTRY SHIP OWNER WHO JOINED FIDEL CASTRO IN SIERRA MAESTRE AND REMIANED IN ARMY. RESIDES PAN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN ZABORRA AND RANCHO BOYEROS. AMLINT-1 REPORT DEC 62 LISTS SUBJ IN G-1 GENERAL STAFF. AMOT TRACES REFLECT SUBJ BORN PALMA SORIANO, FOUGHT SIERRA MAESTRE IN COLUMN NO. 3 UNDER ALMEIDA.

2. REQUEST TRACES DSE LT. SEGUNDO (FERRERO) CUEVAS. BORN CUBA DATE NOT GIVEN. FORMERLY MARRIED TO ANA LEDEA. RE-MARRIED JAN 63. NO

CHILDREN. RESIDES CALLE 9 NO 8007 BETWEEN 80 Y 82 MIRAMAR. MARIANAO, HABANA. IDENTIFIED UFG 980. AMCONCERT-1 REPORTS SUBJ COLSE FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO. ALSO SPELLED FERRER.

3. NO LOCAL ODENVY TRACES.

4. INDEX.

SECRET

DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 63

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO : FD 3, DDP, CCS 3, OP 2, VR

22 NOV 63 14 35z

SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 84474

TYPIC/PERS

REF: A. UFGT-4905 (para 4)
B. UFGT-4735
C. DIR 31166

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

04

MR. (FRANK A JOHNSON) CONTRACT EXPIRED 28 OCT 63. ADVISE VIA CABLE ASAP IF [redacted] TO BE RENEWED. ORIGINAL CONTRACT NEGOTIATED AT JMWAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT: Request Headquarters payroll Subject starting with April 63 salary.

Helgesen
C/SAS/Finance

Richard Cummings
FB/CEAS (telecon 21 Nov. 63)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

ORVILLE C. DAWS
C/SAS/PERSONN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

22-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

NPN

11.5.72

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. A. Heine
UNIT : EE/Logistics ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6913 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 21 Nov 63 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : FRANKFURT INFO WAVE

22 Nov 63 19 05z

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : EE 6

INFO : ODP, SAS 8, OP 2, OI 4, VR

SIG CEN

XX ROUTING

TO FRAN INFO WAVE CITE DIR 84538

REF WAVE 7824 (NOT SENT FRAN)

03

1. REF ADVISES HHE MISS JOAN GRASSIE PACKED FRAN 28 AUGUST FOR SHIPMENT WAVE VIA WASHINGTON NOT RECEIVED. GBL NUMBER UNKNOWN BUT ALPHA TRANSPORT FRAN RECEIPT 30890 CITED

2. NO INFO HQ. PLEASE TRACE ADVISE DIR INFO WAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 64295).

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

03
Austin J Thomas
Austin J. Thomas
C/EE/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

[illegible] Mr. Brown (Telecon)
SAS/Log Mr. Tingby (Telecon)
EE/S
COORDINATING OFFICERS
03

03
Charles A. Heine
Charles A. He
C/EE/Log
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

4/PV

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WE/5 S-E-C-R-E-T
6689
22 NOV 63 X 65-120-12

WAVE MADRID 22 Nov 63 21 17z

SIG CEN

WE 6 X

DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

WAVE MADR **84653**

REF A. MADR 9692 (IN 64546)*

B. OSMA-7109, 1 AUG 1957 **

RETURN TO CIA
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HQS REQUEST WELDRAKE'S COMMENTS ON SUBJ OF REF A. PLS INFO MADR. NO TRACES HQS OTHER THAN REF B. RE PARA 4 INTERESTED MADR STATION THINKING RE POSSIBLE UTILIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

06

* REQUESTED URGENT TRACES [illegible] ABEIJON CONDES FORMER LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR OF WELDRAKE, WHO IS IN CONTACT WITH OAS SPAIN AND WHO HAS OFFERED SERVICES TO KUBARK.

** ONLY RECORD OF SUBJ AT HQS AND MADR

Thomas L. Thiele
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

FRED E. HUBBARD
C/WE/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1/P/J

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: R.E. Scott:rg
UNIT: WH/3/Mexico
EXT: 5940
DATE: 22 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-500

SECRET

ROUTING
1		4	
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23 Nov 63 16 33z

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

WAVE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 84879

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7856 (IN 64817)*

1. NO ADDITIONAL TRACES GARCIA. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES VALDES.

2. LEAD SHOULD BE HANDLED BY MEXI PRINCIPAL AGENT ASSET OR MEXI PBRUMEN OPS OFFICER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Ref requested traces AMCONCERT one leads. Suggested WAVE CO make contact in Mexi with (Martha Valdes,) studying in Mexi on World Health Org. scholarship.

06

SAS/EOB Bonis (by phone)

26

D. FITZGERALD
C/SAS

W Hood

J. C. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

J C King

J. C. KING
C/WHD

[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/12

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Copy No. 11847

5909 ☒ NO INDEX
26 NOVEMBER 1963

JMWAVE

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, WH 7, VR

WAVE INFO MEXI 35141

TYPIC UMANCHOR

REF: WAVE 8103 (IN 67254)

ODACID SENT OMV-99 TO HEFINCH MEXI ON 3 SEPT 63 AUTHORIZING VISAS.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT: Ref requested coordination with State regarding expediting U S Visas for wife and daughter of (Alejandro RIOSECO Arencibia) WAVE PM asset. [illegible] 04

WH/3 Reichardt Telecon

SAS/MOB Hicks In draft

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

26-11

COORDINATING OFFICERS

G. A. Ladner

GEORGE A. LADNER, JR
C/SAS/SECURITY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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1/P/

104-10077-10153

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

27 NOV 63 21 50Z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

DEFERRED S/C CEN

X ROUTINE

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, VR, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

TO: MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

CITE DIR 85387

PERUMEN ZRPRIMA

99

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR

ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (FRENCH POUCH)

99

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE

BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP

MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA 99

QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC

HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

99

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

9/17

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : (PAT E. PATTY) 03
UNIT : NE/6/INDIA
EXT : 6207
DATE : 29 NOV 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

24 SECRET

	ROUTING	
1		4
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29 Nov 63 22 21 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

XXX ROUTINE

85387 A

TO : CABLE SECRETARIAT
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : DDP, NE (6, VR)

TO INFO CITE DIR

12-22

PLEASE RELAY DIR 85387 TO (NEW DELHI) FOR INFORMATION.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB/Mr. Roads
(by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

03
NE/OPS/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

03
DC/NE/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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SECRET

4/P

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

SECRET

FILE NO. 200-120-47

CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

22 NOV 63 17 03z

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

[illegible] ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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DATE:
TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE BE ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PBRUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZEPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS [illegible] REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZEPRIMA[1] SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12 62

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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB 03
WE/5 (R C Lockie) 03
C/WE Thomas P. [illegible]
AC/EE 03
C/NE 03
C/WH
C/FE

~~WILLIAM D. O'RYAN~~
~~C/WE~~

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXX~~

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

4/DV

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN

:ROY W. FORSLUND/JWI
:SAS/PERSONNEL
:6376
:4 DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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4 DEC 63 23 48z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

:JMWAVE
M: DIRECTOR
F: SAS 8
: DDP, OP 2, OS 2, VR

WAVE INFO CITE DIR 86868

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE-8461

03

MR. (JOSEPH F. PEARSON) CLEARED FOR TYPE A CONTRACT EMPLOYMENT 4 DEC 63.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: Pls advise re clearance subject ref b

COORD (telecon)
(Philip Warner)/Office of Security
03

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

4-18

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ORVILLE C. DAWSON
C/SAS/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/N

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ROY W. FORSLUND/
SAS/PERSONNEL
6576
5 DECEMBER 63

S E C R E T

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5 DEC 63 22 42z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

JMWAVE

DIRECTOR

SAS 8

DDP, OP 2, OS 2, VR

WAVE INFO CITE DIR 87136

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE-7893

06

MR. GREER P. HANVEY CLEARED PER REF REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 65155)

SAS/COMMENT: Req priority amendment permit use of subj WAVE area as Maritime c/o.

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
AC/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

5-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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Orville C Dawson
ORVILLE C. DAWSON
C/SAS/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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1082 4

Copy No.

(K. C. KIRK) jmp
WH/2/UP 03
6027
5 DEC 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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6 Dec 63 15 50 z

~~SIG CEN~~

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTING

JMWAVE (MONTEVIDEO) 16-24

DIRECTOR

WH 8

DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

TO INFO (MONT) 16-24 CITE DIR

87291

REFS A. DIR 78231*

B. WAVE 8204 (IN 68510)**

C. WAVE 8439 (IN 72764)**

PBRUMEN DYVOUR

IN VIEW CONTINUED OPS INTEREST (URUG DIPS) 24 EXPRESSED REFS B AND C, REQUEST WAVE REPLY REF A. YOUR ANSWER DEEMED NECESSARY FOR PROCESSING POA REQUEST REF C.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested WAVE review entire scope and purpose recruiting (Urug dips) 24 assigned Hava in light of past and anticipated future developments.

**WAVE requested POA on wife of (one dip) 24 and on another (dip) 24 who both represent ops potential.

WH/2/UP

C/WH/2 03

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Bryant,) by Phone

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Monahan), by Phone 03

C/SAS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

9/1/N

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 10835 Copy No.

ORIG: P.A.MACCIO:cmf
UNIT: C/SAS/MOB/FI
EXT: 6957
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 63

12-62

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: [illegible]

IMMEDIATE WAVE

88119

RYBAT TYPIC AMWEE AMFAUNA

REFS A) WAVE 8316 (IN 70529)

B) WAVE 8346 (IN 70905)

C) DIR 87628

D) DIR 87290

E) DIR 87508

F) WAVE 8762 (IN 76933) *

FOR HEUTEMAN

PLEASE BRIEF DAINOLD ON WAVE'S VIEWS RE (AMWEE-1) 01 CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS AT THIS TIME IN LIGHT REF F. IS IT REASONABLE TO ~~[illegible]~~ ASSUME (AMWEE-1) 01 UNDER DSE SURVEILLANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE EXFILTRATION (AMWEE-2) 01 AND AMFAUNA-14? KEYWAY DEEPLY CONCERNED CONTINUED USE (AMWEE-1) 01 FOR CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

END OF MESSAGE

12168

WE/4 (S. Munger) 03 by phone)

WE/5 (T. Bussetti) 03 by phone)

WE/INT

[illegible] AC/SAS

J. A. MALONEY C/SAS/MOB

6/PJ

10-7

S E C R E T

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

12-62

ORIG: LABUZZETTI/pk
UNIT: WE/5
EXT: 8303
DATE: 10 DEC 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO: MADRID JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

10 DEC 63 22 54z

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

INFO WAVE

CITE DIR 88252

AY PBRUMEN (QUOTA) 01

88251 *

IDENTITIES:

A. (ODON ALVAREZ DELALA CAMPA) 06

B. (JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ GALLARRETTA) 06

C. (GILBERTO LIWAY RODRIGUES)(201-328941) 06

D (ROGELIO IGLESIAS PATINO) 06

END OF MESSAGE

*CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE TO THIS CABLE.

1,2180

SAS/EOB Mr. Armstrong (TELECOORD)

SAS/MOB Mr. Maggio (TELECOORD)

C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for C/WE/5 (RC Locke) 03
AUTHENTICATING

7/PJ

S E C R E T

SECRET

EXT : 5254
DATE : 10 DEC. 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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11 DEC 63 20 46z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/[illegible], FI, [illegible], SAS 8, VR

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 88425

KEYWAY NIGALE 01

FOR JENTONS: PER YOUR DISCUSSION HQS, PLANNING HAVE NIGALE/2 01 VISIT YOU 16 TO 19 FEB 1964 PRIOR HIS RETURN BRUS. HQS OFFICER WILL ESCORT. ADVISE IF NOT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WE COMMENT: NIGALE/2, CHIEF NIGALE SERVICE, 01,08 VISITING HQS FEB 1964. NIGALE/2 01 PERSONAL FRIEND JENTONS AND PLAN PERSONAL VISIT JENTONS FOLLOWING HQS TALKS.

12193

C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WE/X
COORDINATING OFFICERS

03
C/WE/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11-12

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

5|N

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS : TRAINING
BRIEFING
TRAVEL PLANS
WITHHELD
DIRECTOR CABLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
COMMENTS : JFK17 : F21 : 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10078-10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jg
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : SAO PAULO RIO DE JANEIRO JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

[illegible] 27z

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO SAOP INFO RIOD WAVE CITE DIR 89299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE

REF: SAOP 4538 (IN 80402)*

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE.

J. C. KING for
C/WH

C/SAS/EOB

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

11206

Date of Report: 04/02/2001

Print One Document with Issues - All Input Fields
Sorted by Issue

Record ID no (104/180): 104-10078-10014 **104 No:** 104-10078-10014 **jfk id no:** 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028 **box number** JFK17

vol folder: F21 **status:** SAN **record number** **meeting date:** 8/25/98

status validation SAN **postpone count:** 9 **first postpone date:**

fed registry notice no: **fed registry date:** **new postpone date:**

Next Doc Issue Date: 12/01/2005

General Comments: SAO PAULO AND RIO de JANEIRO, SAOP; PROTECT (BE) RELEASE (TIDE); OPS DETAIL: LIGHT STATE

ISSUES Subform:

issue: BE DIGRAPH **occur count:** 2 **action** **doc issue date** 12/01/2005
action date: **issue comment:** SEE 104-10017-10041. OTHER DOCS W/LATER DATES.

issue: CABLE PREFIX **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 RELEASE IN DOC COMMENTS

issue: CIA INSTALLATION **occur count:** 5 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 10/2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

issue: OPERATIONAL DETAILS **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

TO : [16-27] [16-20] JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02] TIDE

REF: [21-27] 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING [24] [redacted] WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02] TIDE.

H. E. Copple
J. C. KING
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING

~~SECRET~~

Technical Corrections By NaraID

05-Oct-99

NARA ID	Date Of Change	Meeting Date	Page	Change of Postpnement	Comments
104-10077-10371	11-Dec-98	06-Aug-98	2	12 vice 7	ARRB missed reviewing page 2. One name and 2 digraphs are protected on page 1; 2 names of CIA employees need to be protected and are on the list for protection . See pages 48-49, para 2.a. of ARRB final report for justification.
104-10078-10014	15-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		9 vice 8	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Substitute missed words with "official cover" per page 56, para 3.k. of ARRB Final Report. Also, see 180-10145-10233.
104-10093-10032	05-Oct-99	23-Sep-98		9 vice 11	Document partly illegible; only redactions needed are protection 9 digraphs--root words can be released. Slug line/pseudos are releasable. See 104-10093-10033.
104-10093-10033	14-Dec-98	23-Sep-98		9 vice 8	The document sent to ARRB was partly illegible; the only redactions needed are 9 digraphs. ARRB protected 4 crypts, the root word is now released. 5 more digraphs of this crypt were missed; 4 other authorized postponements are released.
104-10103-10333	02-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		27 vice 25	Additional postponements conform to previous ARRB determinations. Protection of two missed digraphs approved by ARRB elsewhere in this document.
104-10106-10383	08-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	7 vice 6	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination - missed name on cover sheet was protected by ARRB elsewhere on this page.
104-10106-10421	10-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	14 vice 13	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Missed dispatch prefix was protected by ARRB elsewhere in this document.

HRG Record Print　　Printed on: 10/5/1999

ID: 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028
File Title: JFK
Job Num: 80T01357A
Location: HRG
Box Num: JFK17
Vol/Folder: F21

Title: DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.

Title Res: N
Date of Document: 12/14/1963
Status: SAN
From: DIRECTOR
From Res: N
To: JMWAVE
To Res: N
Pages: 1
Orig. Classification: S
Originator: CIA

Last Reviewer:
Review Date:
Exemptions:

1A	1B	1C	2	3	4	5
	X					

Medium: PAPER
Last Inputter: coller
NARA Comments:

Agency Comments: ORIGINALLY UNIT INDEXED

Release: ARRB
Release Date: 25-Aug-1998

Doc Num:		Res:
	DIR 89299	N
	11206	N

Keywords:		Res:
	DIRECTOR CABLE	N
	TRAVEL PLANS	N
	BRIEFING	N
	TRAINING	N
	BETIDE	Y

Duplicate Document Of:

Component Review Info

COMPONENT	DATE TASKED	DATE REVIEWED	RESPONSE	APPEAL DATE	DECISION

Sent to NARA: Y
Agency Name: CIA

HRG Record Print

Printed on: 10/5/1999

Agency Number:	104
Disk Number:	10078
Control Number	10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

84 ~~SECRET~~

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : [16-27] [16-20] ~~JMWAVE~~

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

ROUTING

☒ RID COPY

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02] TIDE

REF: [21-27] 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING [redacted] 24 [redacted]

WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02] TIDE.

J. C. KING for
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

8/17
8/17/98

Date: 07/22/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34

SECRET

12-62
ROUTING

TO : SAO PAULO 16-27 RIO DE JANEIRO 16-20 JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

7 27 z

X ROUTINE

TO SAOP 16-27 INFO RIOD 16-20 WAVE

CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE 02

REF: SAOP 21-27 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION 16-27 ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE. 02

A. E. Apple
J. C. KING for
C/WH

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-4

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : G. A. LADNER, JR.:clh
UNIT : SAS/SECURITY
EXT : 5909
DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : DDP, OS 2, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 89360

TYPIC SECUR

REF: WAVE 8344 (IN 70903)

PCSA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 13 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

06

SAS COMMENT: Requested PCSA/CSA for Frank M. WARREN, Jr., Sea Dade Industries, Miami to backstop WAVE cover corp.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

GEORGE A. LADNE
C/SAS/SECURIT
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

16-3

ICE IS PROHIBITED.

11216

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10079-10391
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : HANDWRITTEN LIST ENTITLED "ASSETS KNOWN".
DATE : 01/01/1900
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : HANDWRITTEN
LIST
ASSETS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/01/97
COMMENTS : JFK18 : F23 : 1997.12.01.17:12:45:216031

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10079-10391

Alvarez 201-119523

June 70
by J Barry
WH-1

Assets known

(1.) LIEMPTY
LICALLA - 1
LILYRIC - 4
LIEMPTY - 4 (Bro in law Gerende)
(All agents)

LIMOUSINE

(2.) LIMESA FI Sweep Op
6 Agents

(3.) LIEMBRACE unilateral surv team
LIEMBRACE 1, 2, 4 & others
LIEMBRACE - 8 → Raymond L. BARCENAS
LIEMPTY - 10 & 12

(4) LIFEAT - knows about op.
A. wife LIEMPTY-19 substitute transcriber.
B. LIFEUD-19 former basehouse keeper in op is Gerendes mother.
c. David M. Wilsted - outside c/o & P/A for project.
d. Sister Gerende ?

(5) Case Officers or NOC
Matthew H. Dingley
Vincent P. RIZZUTO
Bruce H. FERNALD alias "Victor Bellini"
Andrew E. PELLEMENT alias
David M. WILSTED
Raymond L. BARCENAS
~~[illegible]~~

"Bill Wells"
- Nulse Farmer (?)

Andrew R. DOSCHER -

11815

6. LISTERINE (George Wadsworth (T)) who has supplied cover, ghost payrolling, to Gerende over the years to evolve social security payments & income tax payments to GOM.

7. LIRAZOR-1 (Oliver Scantling)

8. LIANVIL-1

9. LIBAND-1 husband of Gerende sister who working against Soviets & quite active (bro in law)
10. Gerende received 5 wks of Hqs Covert trng 1957
11. Supported JMROD operations. - dealt directly with URQUHART.

General Comments

Gerende has worked in almost every phase of the Station's support activity, and even tho in recent years he has been pretty much restricted to LIEMPTY, his knowledge of activities and assets which are still current is considerable.

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

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1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

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c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                              201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN         TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST           OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM            RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                            30 NOV 70          00833555
```

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Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

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ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

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The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

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SECRET

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

? c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

? h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

?? l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

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(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

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(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-_______________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL BY: 007622

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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CL BY: 007622

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The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

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(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



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TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK:
1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
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b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

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8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

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Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

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

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FOI A CHINA                                              SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
      201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
      03 OCT  1973

            NAME                     TYPE  DOB       BIRTHPLACE                      OCC.  CIT.    201     OI-1  OI-2  ACT.  LOC.  INT.
                                     NAME  DA/MO/YR  CTRY  CITY                                                        CTRY  CTRY  CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/             17JUL14   CHIN,KHANGTUNG                        CHIN?   0165401             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/                                                        DIPT          0230059             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/       A     24JAN11                                                 0178653             CHIN
CHEN, SHCU-JEN /6774/1108/0038             90        CHIN,AMOY                       BUSP  CCOM?   0043751             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU MEI                             04JAN19   CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.                   CHIN?   0234629             CHIN  CUBA
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690             21OCT08   CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH            CNAT    0179620             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001       A     12NOV22   CHIN, HUNAN                           CNAT    0069786             CHIN
CHEN, SHCU-TAO                             18MAR45   CHIN                            DIPT  CCOM    0905390             CHIN  HALT
CHIEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1             C41       CHIN, CANTON                    ENGR  CNAT    0812855             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807             02SEP26   CHIN, LIAONING PRO                    CHIN?   0130415             CHIN  TAIW
CHIEN, SHOU-YEI /7115/1109/495             12JAN18   CHIN, FUKIEN                          CCOM?   0091803             CHIN
CHEN, SHOU-YI                              09JUN99   CHIN, CANTON                    PROF  CHIN?   0040208             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU-BAO                        A     19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV                  CNAT?   0052638             CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2895/6930             02JUL30   CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV.           ARMY  CNAT    0328328             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122             19        CHIN,KUAN TANG TS                     CHIN?   0124438             CHIN  HK
CHIEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2              NOV30     HK                              TSEA  CNAT    0797335             CHIN  HK
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797       A     CIRC22    CHIN,PEILIU                           CHIN?   0200223             CHIN
CHEN, SHU FEN                        R                                                             0988577             CHIN  ETHI
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/             08JUL14   CHIN,KHANGTUNG                        CHIN?   0179621             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74             10        CHIN,FUKIEN                           CHIN?   0044759             CHIN
CHIEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7             23FEB07   CHIN, KHANGTUNG                       CCOM?   0023195             CHIN
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2895/8133             05MAY18   CHIN,FOOCHOW                          CHIN?   0179622             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-HUA                              30MAR26                                   DIPT  CCOM    0223161             CHIN  CEY
CHIEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/        A     06FEB16   CHIN, HOPEI                     DIPT  CNAT    0839156             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710             27NOV23   CHIN,FANG CHENG                 PROF  CHIN?   0179623             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LAN                        R               CHIN                                  CCOM    0221972             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009             CIRC21    CHIN                            DIPT  CHIN?   0223162             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/             25NOV20   CHIN,FENGSHUN                         CHIN?   0179624             CHIN  TAIW
CHIEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010             01JUL29   CHIN, KIANGSU                   MILA  CCOM    0858640             CHIN  LAOS
CHEN, SHU-MIN                        A     20SEP20   CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU            CNAT    0096947             CHIN  USA
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/             15APR30   CHIN,CHENGHAI                   CMMO  CHIN?   0179625             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/             19DEC19   CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.                 CNAT?   0052630             CHIN  HWAI
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/       A     10DEC26   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                       CHIN?   0085119             CHIN  TAIW
CHIEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091             27JAN25   CHIN, FUKIEN PROV                     CHIN?   0103209             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/              21DEC                                   GEOL  CHIN?   0763816             CHIN  BUSH
CHEN, SHU TEH /875/                  V     27MAR20   CHIN, CHANG SHU                                 0013991             CHIN
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639             CIRC      CHIN,HANG CHO                         CHIN?   0153929             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/             18MAR     CHIN                            FIN   CCOM    0767462             CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/       A     02FEB0                                                  0151329             CHIN
CHIEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2895/1031             11NOV06   CHIN, KWANGTUNG                       CCOM?   0023196             CHIN
CHIEN, SHU-YIN                       V     05APR17   CHIN,PEIPING                          CHIN?   0107306             CHIN  CHIN  UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/             15JUN06   CHIN,KANG CHEN KW                     CHIN?   0179626             CHIN  CHIN
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/             09OCT30   CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN      ARMY  CNAT    0340528             CHIN  TAIW
CHEN, SHU-YU                               17FEB39   CHIN, CHEKIANG                  INT   CCOM    0313610             CHIN  DENK
CHEN, SHU-YU                               21APR21   CHIN, SHANGHAI                        CHIN?   0044010             CHIN
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/        V     04SEP28   CHIN, SZECHWAN                        CHIN?   0144758             CHIN  TAIW

                                               SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY                             PAGE   150
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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

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Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

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(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

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c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

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Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP/SS).

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3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

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1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

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3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

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4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

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6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

CSI NO. 10-5
SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

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1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material

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the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval. ✓

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also

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be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the ✓ Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

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d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

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f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U.S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign

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intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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NO. 50-10

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RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

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3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
  (a) Members and trainees of ACTION; 99
  (b) Fulbright grantees;
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(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom; ? ?

(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations; ? ?

(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies. ? ?

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;

(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;

(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;

(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand; ? ?

(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;

(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;

(b) CARE employees;

(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;

(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;

(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned; ? ?

(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;

(g) Officials of the Vatican State;

(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;

(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;

(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;

(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;

(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.; ? ?

(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

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5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

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a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION* 99

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.) 99 99 99

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following: 99

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. 99

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of 99 ACTION but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. 99 99

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former 99 members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION 99 service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained. 99 99 99 99 99

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION. 99 99 99

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former 99 ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of 99 ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

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(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students including student artists and student musicians who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

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e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations. 99

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6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies* 99
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*. 99
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff. 99

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions. 99 99

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI. 99

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI. 99

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

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provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

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99 For Germans only! Seamen only

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division. 99 99 99 99

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned. 99

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

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Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.).

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6) 99

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States. 99

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control. 99

b. *CARE Employees* 99

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18) 99

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States. 99

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d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

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counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. 99 The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

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a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

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The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.* 99

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place. 99

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c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community. 99 99

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially 99 those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

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operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below: qq

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, qq university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community qq and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.- qq affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad. DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the qq academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.- qq owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic qq community but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic qq community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

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academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

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9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

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HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125-127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125-127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to update the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128-131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text.
						New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

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53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

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(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

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(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

- (a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;
- (b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;
- (c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-60b(4);
- (d) approve and authenticate contracts;
- (e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

- (a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;
- (b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;
- (c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;
- (d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

- (a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;
- (b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;
- (c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

- (a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

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(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;

(b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. AUTHORITIES

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.

(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.

(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

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b. POLICY

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(1) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(2) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(3) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

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c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. POLICY. Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. PROCEDURES

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

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(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

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c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

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CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

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ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

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2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

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4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

REPRODUCTION

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

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REPRODUCTION

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-__________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ______ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ______ (date) retained at ________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL. BY: 007622

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION

REPRODUCTION

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



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(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM. OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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CL. BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

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(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



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TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE ET-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
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b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field, based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUI A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

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NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/50307/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178655			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU-SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0925390			CHIN	HALT	
CH'EN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0832655			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/435		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091003			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2985/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,KUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124439			CHIN	HK	
CH'EN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2985/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2985/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2985/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2985/8133		05MAY18	CHIN, FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CH'EN, SHU-I /7115/2985/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2985/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHU-LING /7109/2373/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MTEA	CCOM	0858450			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2985/0597/		15APR30	CHIN,SHANGHAI	CRMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2985/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CH'EN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103249			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2985/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763416			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013921			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0547/6639		CIRC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2985/2737/		18MAR17	CHIN	BIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/	A	02FEB06				0191329			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-YAO /7115/2585/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CH'EN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	HK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2985/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KH		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0319628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB33	CHIN, CHEKIANG	DEF	CCOM	0313810			CHIN	PERU	
CHEN, SHU-YU [illegible]		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0144010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

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Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

11

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*
   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.
   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches. 29
   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   11
   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.) 27

11

2. *British Commonwealth*

   29 29 11
   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   29
   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). 29

   11 11
   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. 29
   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

11

4. *Israel*

   11 27
   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.
   b. Military attaches.
   c. Assistant military attaches.
   d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

SECRET

CSHB 70-1-1 ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

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1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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Annex B to Chp III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

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SECRET


1
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```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                               201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN          TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST            OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM             RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                            30 NOV 70            00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

SECRET

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e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

02

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field-master 201 record.

4/PV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : SAS 5*

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, WH 7, RF, VR

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S E C R E T 011753Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6338

1 OCT 63 IN 3033

REF WAVE 5182 (IN 30172) **

MEXI REQUESTING VISA FOR [SILVIA ANNA] ONE OCT. PRIORITY VISA PROCESSING REQUIRES MINIMUM SEVENTY TWO HOURS BEFORE TELEGRAM SENT. IT UNLIKELY THAT CABLE WILL REACH HAVANA BEFORE 4 OCT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR TYPIC USED.

**RYBAT REF.

RS

12960

17 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : CA/O 4 (CA/O COPY SLOTTED AT 1405, 3 OCT, LMG)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, WE 4, WH 7, RF, VR

~~S E C R E T~~ 031610Z

3 OCT 63 IN 32419

PRIORITY DIR INFO PALP CITE MEXI 6385

DTDORIC HBEPITOME

REF MEXI 6384 (in 32461)

IDENS OF REF: A, ALFONSO DIBILDOX, B, CNE, C, FUSA.

06

~~S E C R E T~~

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VBR

1 132

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SR 7, RF, VR

S E C R E T 082315Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6445

LCIMPROVE

[illegible] IN 35[illegible]

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24, 06

1. REQUEST TRACES [AND INITIATION POA ON HECTOR RAFAEL LARA VAZQUEZ] DPOB 6 AUG 19[08 MEXICO CITY. SUBJ RESIDED CHICAGO AREA 1927-[illegible].] FIRST WIFE (NU) U.S. [NATIONAL, HAS FOLL U.S. NATIONAL DAUGHTERS:] 08 MRS. GRADELLE PONZIO [RESIDING 239 FREDERICK LANE, ROSSELLE, INDIANA. 08 PRICILLA LAWOCKI, ALSO IN ROSSELLE. MEXI HAS NO TRACES ANY ABOVE.]

2. 06 [LARA] ADVISED EMB SECURITY OFFICER 24 SEPT THAT WAS AT PARTY WEEK EARLIER WITH 06 [SOV FIRST SEC SERGEY SERGEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV (SUSPECT KGB RESIDENT)], 06 [TASS CORRESPONDENT PIOTR FEDOTOV] AND THIRD SOV (NU). PARTY AT HOME OF 06 [VIRGINIA GOMEZ NIETO,] OTHER PERSON IN ATTENDANCE WAS 06 [GOMEZ BOYFRIEND RICARDO POERY CERVANTES.] (INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ABOVE IS THAT 06 08 [GOMEZ IS SUBJ'S WIFE'S HAIR DRESSER, GOMEZ] INTRODUCED SUBJ TO 06 [POERY] ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. 06 [POERY] IS PROMINENT MEXICAN JOURNALIST OF EXTREME LEFTIST ORIENTATION AND 08 [PRESIDENT OF MEXICAN ACCOSIATION OF JOURNALISTS. COMMON GROUND BETWEEN 06 [POERY] AND 06 [SUBJ] IS THAT LATTER IS SUCCESSFUL 08 [ADVERTISING] SALESMAN AND PUBLICI[illegible] FOR 08 [GARCIA] CHAIN NEWSPAPERS WHICH CONSERVATIVE. IS ALSO MEMBER [illegible] [illegible]STS.)

ASSOCIATION

3. [illegible] TOLD EMB SECURITY OFFICER, AND LATER [illegible], THAT [illegible]

15417

17/pj

REPORTING SOV CONTACT SINCE HE PRO AMERICAN AND DOES NOT WANT JEOPARDIZE HIS PRIVILEGE TRAVEL US., NOR JEOPARDIZE POSITION HIS 08 [DAUGHTERS.] ASKED WHETHER SHOULD CONTINUE SEE SOVS WHO TENTATIVELY INVITED HIM PARTY NEAR FUTURE.

4. NEXI TOLD SUBJ TAKE NO INITIATIVE WITH SOVS BUT FOR PRESENT ACCEPT INVITES, EVINCE INTEREST UR CURIOSITY SOV REALITIES, NOT CHANGE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL STANCE WHICH SUBJ SAYS KNOWN 06 [POERY.]

5. 8 OCT SUBJ REPORTED MET 06 [FEDOTOV] AT JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION MEETING 7 OCT, LATER ENTERTAINED 06 [FEDOTOV], 06 [POERY] AND 06 [illegible] AT DINNER. 06 [FEDOTOV] AGAIN TENDERED TENTATIVE FUTURE INVITE.

6. TOO EARLY SPECIFICALLY DETAIL OBJECTIVE SUBJ UTILIZATION BUT IF POSSIBLE WISH DIRECT [illegible] 24 [ACCESS] [illegible] 06 [FEDOTOV] OF 06 [KONSTANTINOV.] BASIS DESCRIPTION, THIRD MAN AT FIRST PARTY COULD BE [SOV INFO BULLETIN REP SERGEY 06 SEMENOVICH KUKHARENKO.] (ACCORDING LIENVOY INFO, LATTER HAS PECULIAR INDEPENDENT PERSONALITY, FREQUENTLY TALKS DISPARAGINGLY OF SOVAMB, GETS DRUNK OFTEN, IS ON POOR TERMS WITH [illegible] SOVEMB OFFICERS.) IF OP DEVELOPS, NO FUNDING NECESSARY.

SECRET

15417

WN

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 1517582

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

15 Oct 63 IN 40401

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, L[ITAMIL-3] HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH [ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL] MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-[3] SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH [DE SOUZA] REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. [DE SOUZA] DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-[3] AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-[3] DESCRIBES [DE SOUZA] AS "A KEY MAN."

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-[3] TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING [DE SOUZA.]

SECRET

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00053

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

S E C R E T 191917Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

RYBAT PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA BENITO RUIZ GUARDIOLA DOB 19 JAN 1894, LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE OTILIA LOMINCHAR RUIZ, BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. MANAGER NATIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. FOUNDER AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH; RELINQUISHED CERCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. GRANDDAUGHTER WILFRED SIMON LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. GRANDDAUGHTER JENNY LAVIN AND GRANDSON JOHN P. RUIZ LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE CUBAN DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI CITY 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER ASTA, PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION CONTACTS IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPECIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. SAYS HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORGING VISAS. KNOWLEDGABLE BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

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SECRET

12882

3. APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH [illegible] OF HAVANA 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND COMMUNICATE VIA SW. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO NEXT TRACES.

S E C R E T

12882

: DIRECTOR

OM : MEXICO CITY

TION: WH 8

FO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z

23 OCT 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 6620

PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA, CUBAN, DOB 1927, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER, GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH, ADDRESS CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR, HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED FROM MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN AGES 5 AND 7 IN MNTY. SUBJ CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES, WORKS CLOSELY WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY INDUSTRY, ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH CEMENT PROCUREMENT RECENTLY REPORTED BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS GUSTAVO ABASOLO, CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT CUBA ABOUT 1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO BERMUDA, LATER TO MEXICO. EMPLOYED CONTINUOUSLY 22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS, NOW ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO, FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH NETHERLANDS EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGH A-2 GUSTAVO

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14/72

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12716 Copy No.

RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO 06 JOAQUIN MIRABAL, COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

5. ABOVE INFO FROM 06 GUSTAVO ABASOLO, FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST SOJOURN MEXI. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT 63/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS 08 CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712, MARIANAO.

S E C R E T

3/M

12716

NG

2735

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 012356Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6761

PERUMEN

REF: A. MEXI 6620 (IW 45873)
B. DIR 79070

1. FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AS RESULT MEETING WITH AMSEVER-2 OCT 30 AND 1 NOV.

2. SUBJ IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA.

3. ADDITIONAL MOTIVATION BEHIND SUBJ PLAN LEAVE CUBA IS DES BE ABLE HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

4. POUCH COMMO SYSTEM NOW IN EFFECT WORKS AS FOLLOWS. BROTHER GIVES LETTERS TO MISS (FNU) 06 [FRESIAINE] AT 11 [NETHERLANDS] EMBASSY, MEXI. OUTER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR 06 [CORNELIS BJIPOST] 11 [NETHEMBASSY, HAVA. INNER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR SUBJ CARE OF 06 [E. CABANES.] 06 [CABANES] DELIVERS LETTERS TO SUBJ FOR WHOM HE WORKS. SYSTEM WORKS BOTH WAYS.

5. A-2 KNOWS 06 [CABANES,] FORMER OWNER 08 [NUEVA PAPELERA DE PUENTES GRANDES.] IS OLD MAN, SICK, GOING BLIND. BROTHER OF SUBJ SENDS MEDICINES TO 06 [CABANES] THROUGH POUCH. 06 [CABANES] ARRANGED COMMO CHANNEL AS RESULT HIS FORMER DIPLOMATIC CONNECTIONS. A-2 BELIEVES 06 [CABANES] MAY HAVE WORKED FOR 11 [SPANISH] FOREIGN SERVICE IN PAST, WAS ORIGINALLY 11 [SPANISH] CITIZEN.

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13-JD

6. A-2 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED GET WORD TO SUBJ ASAP THAT HE CAN SERVE SELF, CHILDREN, AND DEMOCRATIC CAUSE BEST BY STAYING IN PLACE. LETTER TO INDICATE THAT FINANCIAL AID FOR CHILDREN CAN BE ARRANGED IN MEXICO. THIS FIRST LETTER, OSTENSIBLY FROM BROTHER, BUT ACTUALLY DRAFTED BY A-2, WILL NOT HOLD OUT SPECIFIC AMOUNT AS BAIT BUT WILL SOUND SUBJ OUT ON WILLINGNESS STAY IN PLACE IN RETURN FOR SOLUTION CHILD SUPPORT PROBLEMS AND GOOD CHANCE OF HAVING NAME CLEARED AFTER FALL OF CASTRO REGIME.

7. BELIEVE APPROX TWO THOUSAND PESOS MONTHLY PAYABLE IN MEXICO MIGHT DO THE TRICK. WILL KEEP HQS INFORMED ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

8. PLS POUCH SOONEST COMPLETE PERSONALITY PROFILE ON SUBJ FROM CLOSE FRIEND 06 [MARIO DE LA GUARDIA] OF REF B.

9. INDEX 23 [221-356959.]

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ IS 06 [JORGE ANTONIO ABASCLO GARCIA.]

3/70

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

2d SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1630, 2 NOV 63)BP

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

~~SECRET~~

2 Nov 63 IN 53108

DIR CITE MEXI 6772

KUWOLF LICOAX

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF MEXI 6771 (IN 5[illegible])

05,29

IDEN IS: [CARLOS CRUZ MORALES, PRESIDENTE FEDERACION UNIVERSITARIO DE SOCIADADES ESTUDIANTILES. (FUSA)]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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1/BR

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	COU
063074	530401	1	XX	450	580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	VV	450	551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1	VV	450	600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	SE	450	551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	VV	450	560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	VV	450	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	32	450	560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	XX	450	580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1	62	450	561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	VV	450	581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1	VV	450	570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	64	450	580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
059299	560506	1	46	450	581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	64	450	580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	XX	450	581101	HUTCHISON AUDREY	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	64	450	580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	62	450	580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1	64	450	580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1	XX	450	590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	CC	450	610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1	38	450	590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	64	450	580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	CF	450	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	VV	450	591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	64	450	580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	RR	450	571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1	18	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025129	571014	1	CC	450	610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
061599	571201	1	VV	450	590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	XX	450	581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	48	450	580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	CC	450	580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	VV	450	600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	VV	450	631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1	XX	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	64	450	580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	FF	450	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	64	450	601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055921	581004	1	VV	450	621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	46	450	610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

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SERIAL NO.	ARRIVAL DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
007547	590320	1	VV	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
007143	590510	1	VV	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
022592	590630	1	41	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
063565	590713	1	VV	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
057408	590915	1	CC	450	620705	CARLSON WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
063028	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
019408	591029	1	CC	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1	64	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1	CC	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
054603	600206	1	51	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
031735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
029622	600821	1	51	450	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
013368	601009	1	VV	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
015399	601011	1	CC	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
016245	601016	1	39	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
025629	601113	1	45	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1	CF	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
061877	610702	1	CC	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
012796	610924	1	CC	450	631009	BEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024345	610925	1	RR	450	640915	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1	FF	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041029	MEXICO
017690	620102	1	51	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
016188	620205	1	51	450	640717	GUDNEY CAROLE T	020913	MEXICO
055544	620401	1	CC	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
012741	620623	1	CC	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
000390	620719	1	CC	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
025654	620818	1	CC	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
018687	630303	1	CC	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
019477	630605	1	RR	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
055664	630618	1	FC	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
057746	630619	1	FF	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
013079	630722	1	51	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
009274	630806	1	VV	450	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
037815	630901	1	CC	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
033314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
019704	631213	1	CC	450	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
036069	631226	1	CC	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
061062	640202	1	VV	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
008165	640617	1	CC	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
024345	640824	1	CC	450	650606	PHILLIPS DAVID A	000913	MEXICO

[illegible] yes

029790	520701	1	CC	450	561011	DICKENS CHARLES R		040401	MEXICO
058051	520903	1	CC	450	551115	KING MARY E		030213	MEXICO
060736	521104	1	VV	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S		040318	MEXICO
014561	541006	1	CC	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P		020601	MEXICO
056629	550401	1	CC	450	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M		050001	MEXICO
009409	560109	1	VV	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A		020107	MEXICO
010947	560130	1	CC	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J		020022	MEXICO
061922	560501	1	CC	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL		020601	MEXICO
055495	560601	1	CC	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T	nogales	030104	MEXICO
056282	560701	1	CC	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO		020001	MEXICO
059820	560810	1	VV	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R		050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1	CC	450	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G		010610	MEXICO
063429	570211	1	VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D		060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1	CC	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA		040601	MEXICO
063114	570324	1	CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E		060307	MEXICO
005956	570407	1	FF	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B		050301	MEXICO
014247	571001	1	CC	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L		020024	MEXICO
044512	571101	1	CF	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR		020208	MEXICO
025658	571201	1	CF	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S		020115	MEXICO
010116	580201	1	VV	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G		020120	MEXICO
059127	580206	1	VV	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L		020117	MEXICO
013175	580616	1	CC	450	630619	MISKO GEORGE W		050004	MEXICO
027608	580818	1	FF	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT E		020212	MEXICO
029057	580822	1	CC	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T		020024	MEXICO
060740	580924	1	VV	450	620206	OUDERKIRK RICHARD H		030413	MEXICO
026063	581101	1	CC	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D		020222	MEXICO
005221	590522	1	64	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W		020121	MEXICO
009052	590917	1	VV	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT		051029	MEXICO
018090	590921	1	FF	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES		020001	MEXICO
063811	591004	1	CC	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD		020916	MEXICO
010635	591218	1	VV	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A		011129	MEXICO
032013	600125	1	CC	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN		020207	MEXICO
012270	600129	1	CC	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A		020023	MEXICO
026090	600203	1	51	450	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J	misty	040803	MEXICO
029163	600306	1	CC	450	620601	HAWKINS M C III	monterey	020226	MEXICO
006098	620110	1	CC	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR		020526	MEXICO
011340	620112	1	CF	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN		050519	MEXICO
032013	620501	1	CC	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN		020115	MEXICO
032703	620514	1	FC	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E	monterrey	020908	MEXICO
064518	620708	1	CC	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D		030006	MEXICO

14-00000

SERIAL NO.	ARRIVAL DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
035324	621106	1	CC	450	631214	MAWHINNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
019143	621205	1	FC	450	681027	HENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
035641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I	020609	MEXICO
054841	621209	1	RR	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
019782	630121	1	FR	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040929	MEXICO
058924	630216	1	51	450	680401	JOHNSON PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
059495	630421	1	CC	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020700	MEXICO
037507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
060942	630615	1	CC	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
037004	630629	1	CC	450	650629	SILVERLIEB JOAN G minty	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1	FF	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
038031	630819	1	51	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
027739	630823	1	CC	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
025015	630911	1	FF	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
012037	631031	1	49	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
037954	631207	1	CC	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
027747	640219	1	CC	450	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
038306	640429	1	CC	450	660513	PURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1	RR	450	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
025644	640521	1	CC	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
014680	640715	1	CC	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1	CC	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
033697	640912	1	CC	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
018059	640914	1	RR	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
027605	641012	1	FF	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
019765	641118	1	FC	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
019816	650407	1	CC	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
060953	650501	1	CC	450	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
027646	650605	1	CC	450	670701	PITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
013733	650616	1	RF	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
063982	650708	1	CC	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
056440	650729	1	RR	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
064769	650911	1	FR	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
037764	650913	1	RF	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
025658	650929	1	FF	450	680120	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
056625	651012	1	CC	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1	RR	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
029958	660109	1	VV	450	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
039032	660405	1	RR	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
021352	660504	1	FF	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE I	010425	MEXICO

SUPPORT ASSETS

Unilateral phono taps

1949 - 1961	Charles Anderson III Chief
4/55 - 4/60	**Peggy Maggard** Asst
4/56 - 1/62	Frank Estancona Chief
2/60 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan
9/64 - 12/67	Michael Farmer

49-71 : Outside CO
David WILSTED (ps)
retired in Mexico

Unilateral photo Cubans

6/59 - 4/64	**Robert Zambernardi** (resigned Mexico)
7/59 - 6/62	**Richard Spathar TSD** (retired)

Unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59	Harry T. Mahoney (retired Chicago)
5/57 - 8/64	A. Goodpasture (alternate CO and internal routing)
6/58 - 6/63	Louis D. Puckett (retired)
6/63 - 10/64	Thomas Keenan
65 - 66	William Bright

56 - 68 Outside Agent
Ramon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)

[illegible]

Liaison phone taps

1959 - 1969	Winston Scott (deceased)
1959 - 1960	Alfonso Spera (retired)
1959 - 1960	**Turner Smith** (outside, now retired)
1959 - 1960	John (Training rept resigned)
1960- 1961	John Brady (retired)
1962 - 1968	A. Goodpasture
1961 - 1971	**Charles Flick** (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired)

Liaison - surveillance

Prior 1954	**Robert Melberg** (retired)
3/54 - 4/59	Harry Mahoney (retired)
4/59 - 1961	Thomas Hazlitt
12/62 - 9/67	**Robert Feldmann**

TSD Outside unit

4/58 - 12/63	Glen Widden (retired)
6/59 -4/64	Joseph M. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS
7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)
10/58 - 12/62 Warren Dean (retired)
6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired)
10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVERT ACTION

Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)
12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)
12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)
Chief
9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired)
8/62 - 9/64 Gunnar Beckman Asst
2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired)
9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst
10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C/(retired)
66 - 68 Don Heath
68 - 71 Joseph SmithC(retired in Mexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief
2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart (retired Costa Rica)
4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief
9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider, (retired)
10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay
8/64 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired)
9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo
10/65 - 12/67 Peggy Maggard

SOVIET TARGET
6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired
9/59- 8/65 Herbert Manell Chief
9/59 - 8/65 Barbara Manell
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)
(retired ?)
Outside CO

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS
6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)
6/58 - 6/63 George Misko
6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico)

025790	520701	1	mexi	CC	450	561001	DICKENS CHARLES B	040301	MEXICO
055091	520903	1	mexi	CC Reports	450	551115	KING MARY E	030213	MEXICO
060736	521104	1	"	VV CA	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S	040318	MEXICO
014561	541006	1	"	CC COS Sec	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P	020601	MEXICO
056625	550401	1	"	CC Sov CE	450 Lifeat	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M	050001	MEXICO
009409	560109	1	mnty	VV Co	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A	020107	MEXICO
010947	560130	1	mexi	CC Reports	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J	020022	MEXICO
061922	560501	1	mexi	CC finance	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL	020601	MEXICO
055495	560601	1	Nogales	CC Cos	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T nogales	030104	MEXICO
056292	560701	1	mexi	CC Docs	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO	020001	MEXICO
059820	560810	1	mexi	VV Co Lifeat	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R	050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1	mexi	CC Support	450 outside	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G	010610	MEXICO
063429	570211	1		VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D	060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1	mexi	CC Finance Clk	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA	040601	MEXICO
063114	570324	1		CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E	060307	MEXICO
009556	570407	1	mexi	FF C/files	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B	050301	MEXICO
014247	571001	1	"	CC Commo	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L	020024	MEXICO
064572	571101	1	"	CF "	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR	020208	MEXICO
025658	571201	1	"	CF files	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020115	MEXICO
010116	580201	1	"	VV c/LIENVOY	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G	020120	MEXICO
059127	580206	1	mnty	VV COS	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L	020117	MEXICO
013175	580616	1	mexi	CC translator	450 Sov	630619	MISKO GEORGE W	050004	MEXICO
027608	580818	1	mexi	FF files	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT L	020212	MEXICO
025097	580822	1	mexi	CC files	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T	020024	MEXICO
060740	580924	1	mexi	VV c/P	450	620206	OUDERKIRK RICHARD H	030413	MEXICO
026063	581101	1	"	CC files	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D	020222	MEXICO
005221	590522	1	"	64 finance	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W	020121	MEXICO
009092	590917	1	mexi	VV Sov Co	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT	051029	MEXICO
018090	590921	1	"	FF Commo	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES	020001	MEXICO
063811	591004	1	"	CC "	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD	020916	MEXICO
010625	591218	1	"	VV Sat Co	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A	011129	MEXICO
032013	600125	1	"	CC files	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020207	MEXICO
012270	600129	1	"	CC Reports	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A	020023	MEXICO
026090	600203	1	"	51 Co Lifeat	450 Photos	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J mnty	040803	MEXICO
029163	600306	1	mnty	CC Cos	450	620601	HAWKINS W C III	020226	MEXICO
006098	620110	1	"	CC Cos	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR monterey	020526	MEXICO
011340	620112	1	mexi	CF Sat Co	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN	050519	MEXICO
032013	620501	1	"	CC files	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020115	MEXICO
032703	620514	1	mnty	FC Co/	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E monterry	020908	MEXICO
064518	620708	1	mexi	CC Commo	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D	030008	MEXICO

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
C35324	621106	1 Mex	CC Finance Sec	450	631214	MAWHIKNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
C19143	621205	1 Mex C.	FC COS/Sec	450	681027	RENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
C35641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I Evening! Sov	020609 clk	MEXICO
C54841	621209	1 Mex	RR CO/TSD Support	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
C15782	630121	1 Mex	FR CP	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040929	MEXICO
C58524	630216	1	51 SOV/SAT	450	650401	JOHNSEN PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
C55495	630423	1 Mex	CC CUBA	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020709	MEXICO
C37507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
C60942	630615	1 Mex	CC CP op.	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
C37004	630629	1 merida	CC Sec Mnty	450 merida	650629	SILVERLIEB JOAN G mnty	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1 Mex	FF COMMO	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
C38031	630819	1 Mexi	51 files	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
27739	630823	1 Mexi	CC Commo	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
C25015	630911	1 Mexi	FF Cuba	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
C12037	631031	1 Mexi	49 Cuba	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
C37954	631207	1 Mexi	CC Sec Supt	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
C27747	640219	1 Mexi	CC photo TSD	450 inside	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
C38306	640429	1 Mexi	CC files	450	660513	BURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1 Mexi	RR LILINK	450 outside	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
C25644	640521	1 Mex	CC Sov Sat	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
C14680	640715	1 Mexi	CC files disp	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1 Mexi	CC ~~Support~~	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
C33697	640912	1 Mexi	CC CA Clk	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
C18095	640914	1 Mexi	RR CA CO	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
C27605	641012	1 Mexi	FF ~~Reports~~	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
C19765	641118	1 Mexi	FC [illegible]	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
C19816	650407	1 Mexi	CC Sov CO	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
C60993	650501	1 Mexi	CC Admin	450 finance	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
727646	650605	1 Mexi	CC Sov clk	450	670701	PITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
C13733	650616	1 Mexi	RF file clk	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
C63982	650708	1 "	CC Commo	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
C56440	650729	1 "	RR Sov CO	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
C64769	650911	1 "	FR Commo	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
C37764	650913	1 "	RF file clk	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
C25658	650929	1 "	FF Cuba ops	450	680120	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
C56625	651012	1 "	CC " "	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1 "	RR Cable clk	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
C29958	660109	1 Mexi	VV CA outside	450?	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
C39032	660405	1 "	RR Commo	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
C21352	660504	1 "	FF files	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE I	010425	MEXICO

- NO.	DATE			CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
063074	530401	1	Mexi	XX CP ops	450	580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	"	VV Sov ops	450	551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1		VV Reports	450	600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	Mnty	SE a/a	450	551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	Mexi	VV Sat ops	450	560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	Mexi	VV Support	450 Co	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	Mnty	32 CoS	450	560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	Mexi	XX CA ops	450	580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1		62	450	561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	Mexi	VV CP ops	450	581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1		VV	450	570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	Mexi	64 Sat ops	450	580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
9299	560506	1	Mexi	46 Reports	450	581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	Mexi	64 Sov translator	450	580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	"	XX finance	450	581101	HUTCHISON AUDREY	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	Mexi	64 DCoS	450	580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	"	62 Sn CoS	450	580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1		64	450	580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1		XX	450	590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	Mexi	CC CA ops	450	610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1		38 finance	450	590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	Mexi	64 files	450	580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	Mexi	CF Support	450 liaison photos	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	"	VV Sov Co	450	591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	Mnty	64 CoS	450	580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	Mexi	RR CP	450	571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1		18	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025129	571014	1	Mexi	CC Reports clk	450	610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
1599	571201	1	Mexi	VV Sat ops	450	590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	Mex	XX Sov intelle	450	581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	Mexi	48 Sov intel	450	580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	"	CC files	450	580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	"	VV Reports	450	600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	Mexi	VV TSD outside	450	631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1		XX	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	Mexi	64 CS clk	450	580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	Mexi	FF Support	450 Co	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	Mnty	64 Admin O	450	601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055931	581004	1	Mexi	VV DCOS	450	621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	Mexi	46 finance	450	610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

1950 = 1963 Mexi LIFEAT

[illegible]

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
007547	590320	1 Mexi	VV CA ops	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
007143	590510	1 Mexi	VV Reports	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
022592	590630	1 Mexi	41 TSD inside	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
063565	590713	1 "	VV Sov outside	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
057408	590915	1	CC CA ops	450	620705	CARLSON WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
063038	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
019408	591029	1 Mexi	CC outside	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D w/Spathar	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1 Mexi	64 Sec D/Cos	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1 Mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
054603	600206	1 Mexi	51 Lienvoy	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
031735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
029622	600821	1 Mexi	51 Sov outside	450 Student	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
013368	601009	1 "	VV files	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
019399	601011	1	CC "	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
016245	601016	1 "	39 "	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
029629	601113	1 "	45 "	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1 "	CF finance	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
061877	610702	1 "	CC finance	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
012796	610924	1 "	CC Commo	450	631009	BEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024345	610925	1 Mexi	RR CA + Cuba	450 ops	640315	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1 "	FF TSD outside	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041025	MEXICO
017690	620102	1 "	51 Cuba clk	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
016158	620205	1 Mexi	51 Reports	450	640717	CUDNEY CAROLE T	020513	MEXICO
055544	620401	1 Merida	CC Cuba ops	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
012741	620623	1 Mexi	CC Sov outside	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
000390	620719	1 Mexi	CC C/files	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
025654	620818	1 "	CC CA ops	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
018687	630303	1 "	CC Sec Supp	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
019477	630605	1 Mexi	RR Sov translator	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
055664	630618	1 "	FC DCOS	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
057746	630619	1 "	FF finance	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
013079	630722	1 "	51 "	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
009274	630806	1 "	VV transcriber	450 Sov	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
037815	630901	1 "	CC Cuba/clk	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
033314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
019704	631213	1 Mexi	CC LILINK	450 outside	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
036069	631226	1 Mexi	CC finance	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
061062	640202	1 Mexi	VV C/CA ops	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
008165	640617	1 Mnty	CC COS	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
024345	640824	1 Mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	650606	PHILLIPS DAVID A	000913	MEXICO

Phil yes

This is possibly Dave's integration date for State cover.

S-E-C-R-E-T

20 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Summary of STESCALADE - Audio Operation Against the New China News Agency in Havana

1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apartments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the concurrence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, an Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November 1959.

2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and were used for conferences. At that time Bryan Mills, FE Division case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving the operation. He managed to lease an apartment directly over the NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space.

3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he, together with the technicians, installed a probe microphone and tape recorder in the apartment obtained by Mills over the NCNA office. About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left in the wall and plastered over.

4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was obtained. Mrs. Lennox was told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic surveillance purposes.

5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was, therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apartment over the NCNA office.

6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At 1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.

7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban authorities. His wife has been released and is still in Havana. Neet was released 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she is being debriefed. The three TSD technicians remain in confinement. They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox. Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated the morning of 16 September. At that time Christ did not appear

to have been maltreated.

8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA office and completing the installation of the equipment. The press article adds that the key to Mrs. Lennox's apartment was found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the men by alias and have not identified them as Government or Agency employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied any knowledge as to why he was being held.) The sub-lease for the apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-behind agent with the original lease being in the name of Mills, the FE Division Case Officer.

9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told they were in custody.

10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists under very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing card requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned, efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view

of the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.

11. A cleared and witting law firm in New York has been briefed by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situation so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms in Cuba which are associated with them.

12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in Japan. His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their intentions and course of action.

13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A conference with the two wives was held in TSD on 19 September to go over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals are released to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly well.

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, WH

Distribution:
DCI - 2
DDCI - 1
DD/P - 1
COPS - 1
WH - 3
~~PE~~ - 1
OS - 1
CI - 1

[illegible], DD/P
att

RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2

CHART OR MAP REFERENCE:

Sectional aeronautical charts — As required.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander.

1. SITUATION:

Daniel L. Carswell (Alias), Eustace H. Danbrunt (Alias) and Edward R. Taransky (Alias) are TSD Staff Employees who were apprehended by Cuban authorities in September 1960 and who are now serving ten year sentences. Efforts are being made to secure their release. Since their release may occur without advance notice and at a variety of places, ie. Havana, Miami, Mexico City, Switzerland, Brazil, etc., it is imperative that a contingency plan be formulated to insure the secure reception of these employees.

The controlling factor in all phases of the release procedure is that these employees were in Cuba under alias and that during the entire period since their capture their aliases and cover stories apparently have been maintained. Therefore it is essential that these aliases be maintained until such time as the employees have returned to Agency control and then have these alias identities disappear as quickly as possible.

For planning purposes the release points will be Havana, Mexico City or "other areas".

2. MISSION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group provide black air transportation from port of entry CONUS to the designated safe area.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Black air transport will be provided under this plan at the request of TFW, COS Mexico, or Operational Support Division/OS/DDS depending on the release point and port of entry.

3. Request for black transport should include:

1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2 be implemented.

2. Port of entry.

3. Date, Local time, and airfield desired for pick up.

4. Desired destination.

5. Other requirements, ie., stretchers or bunks in the event subjects are hospital cases.

6. Name, organization and telephone number of requesting party.

7. Name and telephone number of KUBARK contacts at loading and off-loading points.

C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the responsibility of activating this plan:

1. Major Richard I. Skinner, AC/ASD/DD/P
   Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
   Home Phone: JE 3-1409
   Office Phone: Sterile Numbers ME 8-6285, EX 3-8515
   Extensions 6862, 7564, 7367
   Red Line 1058

2. Mr. Robert Marrero
   Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
   Home Phone: JA 4-3598
   Office Phone: Same as 1.

3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander, Det. 1.
   Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
   Home Phone: 662737
   Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631590

4. Major Kenneth R. Burton, Ops Officer, Det. 1.
   Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
   Home Phone: 662464
   Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631213

D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and crew in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is herein defined as capability to position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 hours.

E. Assuming the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico City, Det. 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from most probable ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Force Base.

RICHARD I. SKINNER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI Staff
3 - OS
3 - OP
3 - MS
3 - C/FE
3 - C/TSD
3 - CCG
3 - TFW
3 - C/WH
3 - DPD/DDR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : CCS 3, VR

SECRET 071812Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7292 7 Dec 63 IN 75863

1. MISS NORMA VALVERDE VARIG FLT CANCELLED AT MEXICO CITY.

2. ONWARD TRAVEL VIA AEROLINEAS PANAMA FLT 203 ARRIVING BOGO 0820 ON 8 DEC.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

15045 JM/i

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

6537

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450 9 DEC/LMS)

INFO : DDP, CI/CA, RI/AN, WH 7, CC 8, VR

SECRET C918SSZ

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7330 9 Dec 63 IN 76536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR MARTA (VALDES) 04 HERNANDEZ, SINGLE, D/O LUCAS AND JULIA, 06, 08 DPOB 22 JULY 29, MATANZAS, RESIDING MAZON NUMBER 10 163 HAVANA,

2. (VALDES) 04 EMPLOYED AS STATISTICIAN 08 MINISTRY HEALTH 08 AND WELFARE 09 HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 20 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER ASUSPICES WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. 08

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 140035Z

DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384

14Dec63 IN 80448

KEYWAY PBRUMEN TCRYSTAL

REF DIR 84498 *

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 70, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR TCRYSTAL-1.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : DODS 4

INFO : DODS/L, CI/OPS, EE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 140013Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7383

80439

[illegible]

ØSOLOC VU.RIN BEDOX OKROW

REF MEXI 7218 (IN 77855)

6

1. JERZY PLEBANSKI GOING DALLAS 15 DEC ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GRAVITATIONAL COLLAPSE AND OTHER TOPICS IN RELATIVITY ~~TIC~~ ASTROPHYSICS. SYMPOSIUM UNDER AUSPICES OF SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES OF DALLAS AND MEETINGS TO BE HELD AT STATLER-HILTON. PLEBANSKI PLANS RETURN MEXI 18 DEC. SOURCE: PBSWING.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

24 6

C/S COMMENT: *REVIEW GOBERNACION FILE JERZY PLEBANSKI REVEALS SUBJ GRANTED PERMISSION LEAVE MEXI TO ATTEND CONFERENCES U. S.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

4
RS

15178

14-00000
104-10097-10360 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, C/TSD 3, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 220100Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7006

22 Nov 63 IN 66059

KAPOK PERUMEN

REF A DIR 82999*

B MEXI 6967 (IN 64313)

1. PRQ DATA ON LICRAFT-1 AS FURNISHED BY BROTHER 20 NOV BEING POUCHED.

2. BROTHER FEELS SUBJ WILLING REMAIN INSIDE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. IS SENDING SUBJ ANOTHER LETTER FOR DEFINITE DECISION AND WILL INDICATE INTERESTED PARTY BEHIND AMSEVER--2 WILLING ESTABLISH TWO HUNDRED DOLLAR MONTHLY ESCROW ACCOUNT.

3. CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED USING PRESENT CHANNEL THROUGH 11 NETHEMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. STATION FEELS SUBJ SHOULD BE TRAINED THROUGH THIS CHANNEL ASAP IN SW SYSTEM TO ENHANCE COMMO SECURITY.

4. SUBJ HAS ACCESS TO ALL SIGNIFICANT PLANS ACTIVITIES MINISTRY 08 INDUSTRIES. IS FREQUENTLY CONSULTED BY ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SITS IN ON ALL HIGH LEVEL PLANNING SESSIONS AT MINISTRY. WHILE KNOWN AS NOT FAVORING REGIME, IS CONSIDERED BY GUEVARA AND ASSOCIATES AS HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND CAPABLE ENGINEER WHO WILL NOT HESITATE EVALUATE SOVBLOC MACHINERY AS SUPERIOR TO AVAILABLE WESTERN ITEMS IF THUS CONVINCED.

SECRET

13532 21BR

14-00000

5. KUBARK CONTROL WILL BE COMBINATION FINANCIAL AND ABILITY "CLEAR" SUBJ OF INVOLVEMENT WITH REGIME AFTER CASTRO [illegible]. BROTHER SAYS SUBJ STRONGLY PRO-PBPRIME AND FORESAW ADVENT COMMUNIST REGIME AS EARLY AS 1959 WHEN BROTHER HIMSELF WAS NOT YET CONVINCED CASTRO COMMUNIST.

6. SUBJ LOOKS LIKE EXCELLENT DIRECT LINE INTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SHOULD BE USED ONLY FOR INFO TO WHICH HAS NORMAL ACCESS. BROTHER EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT SUBJ SHOULD NEVER BE USED FOR CONTACT WITH OTHERS INSIDE NO MATTER HOW WELL SUCH PERSONS TRUSTED BY ODYOKE.

123

7. INDEX 201-356[illegible].

SECRET

C/S COMMENTS: [illegible] WHETHER SUBJECT WILL [illegible] PERMISSION, HOW CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED, EXTENT OF KUBARK CONTROL, AND STATEMENT OF INTENDED USE.

13532 (p2)

VBR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
: LIENVOY-8

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the 24 2A (General Staff of the Presidency).] LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's (sharing of the LIENVOY take. 24

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

15469

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12027

DATE
23 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-118406

ORIGINATING

SECRET/KAP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PRQ Part I - (Alfonso Bibildez Torres 06

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is PRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

15694

SECRET/

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

104-10098-10328 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

M : MEXICO CITY
ION: WH 8
O : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, VR

S E C R E T 171636Z

ORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416 17 Dec 63 IN 82479

F DIR 88728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG SVLUCK/1 SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 C BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE LIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

. S/1 REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE NTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT ESS POINT.

. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN S/1. ALL PAYMENTS RE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

. S/1 ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF LIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA. RCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARIL ARTERED. S/1'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE DRESS WHILE MEXI.

. NEXT OP MTG WITH S/1 SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

E C R E T C/S COMMENT: DESIRED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SVLUCK/1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

SECRET

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14659

71PV

17 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/SR 2 (SR NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1125, 20 DEC 63 OJ)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, CDC, VR

S E C R E T 201548Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7458 20 Dec 63 IN 84770

REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF DIR 90368 *

WELCOME **HOS C/O. PLS PROVIDE IDEN AND ETA SO CAN MEET AIRPORT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-507 CABLES.

**STAFFER IDENTIFIED SELF AS RICHAIDSON PHONED MANUILA WHO WAS AWAITING CALL AND WHO CONFIRMED CALL FROM MEXI.

SECRET

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification

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14311

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

SECRET 202235Z

CITE MEXI 7479

CKASSAY LPSHRINK

MEXI 7480 (IN 85185)

6

IDEN IS MR. GEORGE STEERS.

SECRET

20 Dec 63 IN 85191

SECRET

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Copy No.

1

14722

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4 T
2	5
3	6

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DDDS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW, LE 4, WE 4, WH, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 210030Z DEC 21 0147Z 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7489

INTEL TYPIC 02 [DE]IGNET

REF DIR 70123

SUPDATA SOURCE 02 [DE]SIGNET FROM 08 [ITALINA] AND 08 [FRENCH] AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/0035Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

~~IW COMMENT:~~

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED
TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN
MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING
RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IDO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14732 4/80

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 85247

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO1	OO	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

IN COMMENT

NO

TD

MAD

RELEASING

14732

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 85247

PAGE 2

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BUMPER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 800 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

14732

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 3

INFO : [illegible], ADDP, C/[illegible] 4, [illegible], [illegible], C/[illegible]INT, C/IW, C/FE 6, C/SR 5, [illegible] 5, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 210103Z 7492

21 DEC 63 IN 85274

[illegible] WAVE ROME CITE MEXI [illegible]

REF A. DIR 70123*

B. DIR 69575 02

[illegible] KEYWAY PBRUMEN [DE]SIGNET

1. WHILE AWAITING RECEIPT [illegible] 02 [illegible].SNET ALONG LINES

2. FOLL KEYED TO REF B:

PART A:

1. DAY BEFORE HURRICANE CYNTHIA HIT CUBA, BETWEEN 500 AND [illegible] SOVIET TECHS LEFT BY SHIP FROM SANTIAGO DE CUBA. ON 10 NOV APPROX 200 SOVS WERE SEEN WALKING STREETS HAVANA WITH SUITCASES PRIOR DEBARCATION. (SOURCE 05 [REMIGIO NE[illegible]O] DOI: 9 DEC).

2. ALL SOVS APPEAR TO BE TECHS, ALTHO YOUNG. MOST OBSERVED BY 02 [DE]SIGNET HAD NO MILITARY BEARING, IN SLOPPY PHYSICAL SHAPE, HENCE HIS ASSUMPTION THEY CIVILIANS. FRIEND 05 [ERIC BONSIGNEUR, 08 [illegible]MAN] LIVES ON ROAD TO PINAR DEL RIO, TOLD 02 [D/A] "SIX MONTHS AGO THE SOVS DID NOT PERMIT ANYONE TO [illegible] THEIR CAMP NEAR EL [illegible] BUT FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS CUBAN OFFICIALS ENTER IN LARGE [illegible] AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVS HAD BEEN REDUCED BY TWO [illegible]". (SIC). SOV CAMP IN SOROA CLOSED DOWN ABOUT SIX MONTHS [illegible] IT THOUGH THEY HAVE RETURNED. (SOURCE NENITA ROCA,

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SECRET

[illegible]). ORIGINAL CONTINGENT OF SOVS [illegible]
[illegible] ARRIVING WITH FAMILIES. (SOURCE: [ANGEL [illegible]] 06
[illegible] NEVER SEEN IN UNIFORM, ALL WEAR SPORT SHIRTS OF VARIOUS
[illegible], APPARENTLY CUBAN MADE. NO GUAYABERAS, OF COURSE, SINCE
[illegible] SYMBOLIC OF PLAYBOYS. IN A CAFETERIA [B-]2 02 SAT NEXT TO TABLE
[illegible] CHINESE, ONE IN PALE BLUE TUNIC AND OTHER THREE IN
[illegible] SUITS. [B-1] 02 SAW AND HEARD MENTION OF NO OTHER ASIATICS,
[illegible] LITE TYPES.

[illegible]. [B-1] 02 SAW ON 13 DEC TEN TANKS DESCRIBED AS SOVIET TYPE ON
[illegible] FROM MATANZAS TO VARADERO. EACH SIDE THEY HAD 5 LARGE
[illegible] AND ONE SMALLER WHEEL RAISED OFF GROUND. DOUBLE TURRETS,
[illegible] LARGE CANNON. ON 15 DEC SIX MORE SEEN GOING SAME DIRECTION.
[illegible] HE SAW 5 LARGE TRUCKS DRIVEN BY SOVS AND CARRYING FIVE
[illegible] EACH. LATER SAME DAY SAW TEN MORE. ALL GOING FROM RANCHO
[illegible] AREA TOWARDS THE INTERIOR. IN ALL SAW [illegible] 250 DURING
[illegible] VISIT. ALL SOVS IN 22-28 AGE GROUP.

4. SEE TWO, ABOVE.

5. FLOW OF SOVS IS CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS CASTRO GOVT. MANY
[illegible] MANY MORE WILL COME AS NEED ARISES. TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF MAN
[illegible] STREET IS "SOVS HERE TO STAY".

6. NO INFO SOVS IN CUBAN MILITIA UNIFORMS.

[illegible] NO GUARANTEE FROM
[illegible] AGGRESSION, ALSO CASTRO SENSITIVE TO CHARGE HE SOVIET
[illegible], HAS ATTEMPTED PROVE HE INDEPENDENT, CAN VOTE AGAINST USSR
[illegible] NEEDS OF CUBA.
[illegible] THIS [illegible] SHOWS LACK UNDERSTANDING REALITIES CUBAN

4/32

LIFE: NO GOC OFFICIAL OPPOSES FOR FEAR OF OWN LIFE. IN ANY EVENT, OPPOSITION WOULD HAVE NO VALUE OR MEANING. COMMON QUOTE: "FIDEL HACE Y FIDEL DESHACE".

3. SEE ONE, ABOVE.

4. NOT KNOWN, BUT CUBAN POSITION IN DISPUTE VERY INDEPENDANT, UNAFFECTED.

PART C

1. MOST OF THE MILITIA PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ARMY REGULARS PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. UNKNOWN

02

3. [D] W IMPRESSION IS THAT CUBAN ARMY NOW WELL TRAINED AND ORGANIZED.

4. ON TEN DEC. NEAR SOROA, ALL CARS HALTED ON ROAD WHILE CONTINGENT CUBAN TROOPS SURROUNDED A CANE FIELD AND SPRAYED IT WITH GUNFIRE, SEARCHED IT, BUT FOUND NO ONE. TROOPS WELL FED AND SUPPLIED. (SOURCE: 05 [NENITA ROCA], 9 DEC). SOROA APPROX 80 KMS FROM HABANA TOWARDS PINAR DEL RIO.

SECRET

02

C/S COMMENT: [illegible] HIGHLY INTERESTED [D] [illegible] RETURN CUBA AS OBSERVER SINGLETON.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-[illegible]-47

TO : MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF. SAS 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, ~~VR~~, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

27 Nov 63 21 58z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

INFO 15-20 15-13 15-8 15-21 CITE DIR 85387

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PERUMEN (ZR)PRIMA 02

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR 99
ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH) 99

FRAN 7 FROB BONN 5 HAMB BRLN MUNI 5 VIEN ATHE 6
BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP
MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA
QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC
HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE 99

RETURN TO CIA
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8/PN

11/7/18

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. RONIS:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

ROUTING	
1	4
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22 Nov 63 17 03z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85087

02
PBRUMEN (ZR)PRIMA

REF: DIR 22218 *

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF 02 1 (ZR)PRIMA PROGRAM SHOWS THAT 2 KUBARK EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR 2 KUBARK FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S/ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. 2 KUBARK SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

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2/BV

16318

UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR 02 / 1 (ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS /STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO 02 / 1 (ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE ON ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

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2/RV

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	
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TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PAGE THREE

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 6 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PERUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING 04 ZRPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA[1] 02 SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER

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Copy No.

2/pv

16318

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

P A G E   F O U R

TO   INFO   CITE   DIR 85387

SAS/EOB ________
SAS/MOB ________
WE/5 BC Locke
C/WE Thomas F. Thiele
AC/EE ________
C/EE/ ________
C/ ________
C/FE ________

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

[illegible]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.   Copy No.

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 23 Nov 63

ROUTING

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO : [illegible], CI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 2, D/OS 2, /VR

☐ [illegible]

☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

5974

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE DIR-

06, 08

IDEN A RUREK DUDIN 201-83827.

06 08

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE MEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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16349

ORIG: [illegible] AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
4
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6

10 OCT 63 18 53z

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN 72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. 07 DESIGHET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PBRUMEN, WILL RETURN PBRUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PBRUMEN 11 OCT HAS 11 ITAL SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PBRUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PBRUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE 07 DESIGHET PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* 07 DESIGHET will travel PBRUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WE/3
C/WE/4

15344

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

03

ORIG : [STEPHEN I. MUNGER]/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING

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TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WE 2

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

6

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

6

IDEN A [GIULIO MONDELLO], BORN 26 FEB 1917 IN [ITALY] 10, [ITAL] 8 CITIZEN, FORMERLY AGENT IN CUBA FOR [FIAT] 8 AND OWNER TV TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B 6 [NEBIOLO](LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4/JP

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

SLWH W Wood

15345

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : W. ULLERY/blb
UNIT : SAS/IOS
EXT : 7646
DATE : 30 SEPT 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-733547
201-338838

1
2
3

1 Oct 63

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/SAS 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

04

[JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE [ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A.,] 08 OL [redacted] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH [JOSE LUIS (ZALA),] 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *Ref is RYBAT.

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SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
SAS/CI Austin Horn (in draft)
WH/3/MEXI [26 Whitten] (by phone)

03 15348

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

1-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5/ML

03
[illegible]uel Aragon]
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

SECRET

PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO MEXICO CITY

PALP MEXI 74043

02
DYBORIC [LCPIPIT

REF DIR 74642

IDENTITY

IDEN A [ALFONSO 06 DIBILDOX] [08 PRESIDENT CNB]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA ______________________

WH/3/MEXICO ______________________

CABLE [illegible] PLEASE [illegible] ATTACHED CABLE.

See Base for release

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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[illegible] G. GABLE
C/CA/BS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15538

IN44

D. Ronis

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

12-62

ORIG D. RONIS: tw
UNIT SAS/EOB
EXT 6172
DATE 8 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 OCT 63 [illegible] 25z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY:A [ALFREDO DAVINS] 06

IDENTITY B [[illegible] RONIS] 06

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
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J. C. KING
C/WHD

C/WH/3 [illegible] 26

[illegible] A. [illegible] for
C/SAS/EOB

15543

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DW/3

Q.1

ORIG: R. [illegible]/XR
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]
EXT: 4556
DATE: 10 Oct 63

SECRET

201-[illegible]

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO: DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, RF, VR

11 Oct 63 [illegible] 07z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74976

TYPIC AMSOUR

1. LETTER TO AMSOUR-2 BEING POUCHED MEXI BY NON ACCOUNTABLE MANIFEST NO. 577054 FOR MAILING TO SR. JUAN GOMEZ BLANCO 06 IN PERUMEN.

2. REQUEST MEXI MAIL O/A 1 NOVEMBER AND ADVISE HQS ACCORDINGLY.

END OF MESSAGE

for C/SAS/EOB [illegible]
for WH/3/MEXI [illegible]
C/WH/3 [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

10-10

SECRET

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E. A. MAHEL[illegible]
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

15871

4/pv

106/14 OCT 63/CS 03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: JA[illegible] [illegible] - [V. SHERMAN]
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]
EXT: 1[illegible] - [illegible]
DATE: 11 OCT. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF, VR
ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

11 Oct 63 22 11z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND

DIR 75124

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 3460 (IN 38151)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISH EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Cronso.

SAS/EXO [illegible]
03
TSD/CAB [Wally Jones] by phone
03
WE/2 [Jack Delaney] by phone
03
WE/5 [Vaughn Ahlmen] in draft
03
WE/3 [Roger Prein] By phone
WE/BC [illegible] 03 Young (By phone)
EE/G [West Pooher] By phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

03
[Thomas F. Thiele]
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

11-22

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T/RYBAT

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15828

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5601
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
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12 OCT 63

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/FE 6

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

XXX
KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6483 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SSU CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO. LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV

28 BA, MA UNIV PENN

28 MA HARVARD

28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA

RESEARCH (RESEARCH)
31-41 ~~[illegible]~~ FELLOW, ~~[illegible]~~ CHINESE ARCHITEC URE

32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

RESEARCH
41-43 ~~[illegible]~~ FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA

46 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

47 HONORARY PHD YALE: VISITING PROF YALE

50-61 MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV

55-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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15912

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : BERRY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOB
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

56	ASSOC, INSTITUTE CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CPR, PEKING
DEC 58	MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
SEP 58	MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC
APR 59	DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC
OCT 62	VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY
SEP 63	DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [redacted]
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

[redacted]

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

○ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WHO STUDIED UNDER LIANG AT UNIV YALE OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE LIVE OUTSIDE CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG [illegible] CANDIDATE FOR DEBRIEFING OR DEFECTION. DOUBTFUL HIS AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME [illegible] CONTACT BUT IS NOT TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN RESEARCH WORK IN PAST. SANBEKD ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL [illegible] FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2145 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANBEKD. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
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XI FRANK
FE/CIOP
5661
12 OCTOBER 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING
1 4
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DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FIVE

INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SAMSEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)
DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)
CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)
DCFE(C) ✓
C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

RAYFORD [illegible] HERBERT
DC/WHD

William C
CFE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]
FE/CIOP
6738
OCTOBER

SECRET

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-730711

MEXICO CITY

CONF: C/FE 6

INFO: C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO   INFO   CITE DIR 75339

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

IDEN:

Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RICHARD WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

JCPs(C)

C WH/3 [illegible] (by phone)

C WH

William Colby
C, FE

SECRET

15913

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 16 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO 10-120-11

ROUTING			
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16 OCT 63 22 2

TO : RIO DE JANEIRO, MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/FE 6
INFO : DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, CDC, C/WH 5, RF, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY RIOD INFO PRIORITY MEXI CITE DIR 76166

REF: MEXI 6550 (IN 40823)* (NOT SENT RIO)

LCHARVEST KAPOK

1. FOR RIO: SOME MEMBERS OF CHICOM DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ARCHITECTS (UIA) HELD HAVANA 29 SEPT - 3 OCT AFTERWARDS WENT MEXI TO ATTEND UIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ARCHITECTURE. MEXI GROUP NOW SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXI 0100 HOURS 19 OCT FOR RIO. FOLLOWING BIO DATA ON THREE MEMBERS OF GROUP KNOWN TO BE MEXI:

A. YANG TING-PAO 2799 1694 1405, 201-735346; B. 20 AUG 1901, HONAN; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR NPC; MBR ACADEMIA SINICA; VP, UIA.

B. LIANG SZU-CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736781; B. 1901, TOKYO; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR CCP; DEPUTY NPC AND CPPCC; VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY.

C. WU CHING-HSIANG 0702 2529 4382, 201-736317; B. CIRCA 1919, MANCHURIA; FRENCH EDUCATED; CHAIRMAN ARCHITECTURE DEPT TUNG CHI UNIV, SHANGHAI.

2. DURING STAY GROUP MEXI UNILATERAL APPROACHES MADE TO YANG TING-PAO AND LIANG SZU-CHENG FOR PURPOSES OF ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE DEBRIEFING, DEFECTION OR RECRUITMENT IN PLACE. FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH YANG BY FORMER PARTNER IN ARCHITECTURAL FIRM CHINA AND BY MBR U.S. FIRM YANG PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH, YANG ACCEPTED INTERVIEW WITH KUBARK STAFFER WHO USED COVER

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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16074

ORIG : FLANK/HICKEN bjl
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1942

ROUTING			
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TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

RESEARCH SCHOLAR CHINA. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY AND INCLUDED DISCUSSION MAINLAND SITUATION. LIANG APPROACHED BY KUBARK CONTROLLED U.S. SINOLOGIST WHO WAS STUDENT LIANG AT YALE 1947. CONTACT WITH LIANG KNOWN TO OTHER CHICOMS IN DELEGATION, ALTHO LIANG LEFT ALONE WITH OUR MAN FOR HALF HOUR. LIANG ATTITUDE FRIENDLY BUT SEEMED TO FOLLOW PREARRANGED LINE AND LIANG PROFESSED COMPLETE BELIEF CHINESE COMMUNISM. LIANG CLAIMED CONTACT BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN "FRIENDS" CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE BY CHINESE. CONTACTS WITH BOTH LIANG AND YANG LIMITED TO FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS SINCE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSION DID NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE IN EITHER CASE.

3. WU'S BROTHER, U.S, CITIZEN, ARRIVING MEXICO 16 OCTOBER TO TALK WITH WU AND ASK HIM IF WISHES REMAIN IN FREE WORLD.

4. REQUEST RIOD MONITOR ACTIVITIES GROUP BRAZIL AS FEASIBLE AND ATTEMPT DEVELOP FURTHER BIO AND ASSESSMENT DATA IF NATURAL ACCESS TO GROUP CAN BE FOUND. DO NOT RECOMMEND FORCED APPROACH TO ANY OF GROUP, SINCE OUR COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY WEARING THIN AND THERE IS LONG RANGE GOAL OF FUTURE FOLLOW UP THESE CONTACTS WHEN APPROPRIATE ACCESS CAN BE ARRANGED.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Copy No.

ORIG : FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

12-62

ROUTING			
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3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

5. FOR MEX 3I: PLS IDENTIFY OTHER MBRS OF MEXI GROUP ENROUTE RIOD AND FORWARD TO RIOD ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON PURPOSE TRIP TO RIOD. ALSO INFORM RIOD OF RESULTS WU MEETING WITH BROTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

A/DCFE(C) ✓
WH/3
WH/5
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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Polly Pike 03
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

18 OCT 63 15 27z

Mexico City
DIRECTOR
WH 8
OL 4, RF, VR

SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

MEXI INFO 10 [MIDW] CITE DIR 76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*

10 [MIDW] 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

10 [MIDW] ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-M51104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3 26

Telecoord: OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Charles F. Reiner 03
CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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16/02

-63

ORIG : [R. HANSEN]
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6172
DATE : 18 OCT 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 77541

~~S E C R E T~~

18 OCT 63 [illegible] 22 z

TO : MEXICO JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : [illegible]

INFO : [illegible], [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, WH 7, RF, VR

SIG CEN

X

TO MEXI INFO WAVE

76695

TYPIC

REF DIR 76694

05

IDEN IS [MICHEL CHIDIAC, LEBANESE] CHARGE IN HAVANA. SEE MEXI 5954 AND 6008 FOR RECENT TRAVEL.

RETURN TO CIA
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SAS/MOB Sue Darling (in draft)

WH/3/MEXI Reichhardt

WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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S E C R E T

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Copy No.

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

#15408

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

03

L.G. NORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5940
21 Oct 1963

~~S E C R E T~~

MEXICO CITY

21 OCT 63 02

SIG CEN

77180

PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

REF DIR 77179

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. IDEN A: 29 ASH & COMPANY, NEW 08 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

2. IDEN B: 29 OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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26
[illegible]. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.
15494

03
[JANET NIXON] 1d
SAS/EOB
3159
22 OCT 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
~~S E C R E T/RYB~~

X
X

200-120-50

TO: MADRID JMWAVE ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS MEXICO CITY

22Oct63 ... 47z

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, RF, VR

TO IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS HAGU LOND CASB (ROUTINE) RABA OTTA PARI MEXI

WAVE ROME ~~KXXXXXXXX~~

FRAN MILA

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

77347

RYBAT ZRWAGON TECH

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK ~~XXX~~ POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

03 END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

Thomas [illegible]

RICHARD P. HELMS
C/WE/X

EE/G [West Parker] by phone
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/BC/C [R. Joyner] by phone 03
WE/4 [Steve Bunger] by phone 03
WE/3 Mr. [Pierre] pho 03
WE/5 [Vaughn Sherman] by phone 03
WE/3 Mr. [M... gy] pho 03
WE/BC [Joe Lynch] by phone 03
SAS/SOD [Arthur Maloney] by phone 03
Austin Jones by phone
AF/1 [Mr. Charles Baker] by phone

EDWARD A. M'ELLIUS
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

#15498

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

B L. Reichnardt
ACWH/3
[illegible]
30 Oct 63

~~SECRET~~

MEXICO CITY

3100Z 19z

79355

MEXI

RYBAT

1. HDQS HAS INFO TO EFFECT [HILTON 24 HOTELS] INTERNATIONAL SEEKING QUALIFIED PERSON AS PERSONNEL DIRECTOR FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA. ONE GOOD POSSIBILITY WE BE ABLE PLACE [illegible] THAT POSITION

2. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS RE UTILITY THIS COVER IN TERMS TARGET ACCESS AND QUALIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SUITABLE OFFICER TO FILL COVER POSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

CCG/SC - Mr. Strange (phone)

CWH/Pers - Mr. Cashman (phone)

R. HERBERT
[redacted]
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

B. E. REICHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

[illegible]

MEXICO CITY

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

81033

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC AMQUAR MHAPRON

C/S COMMENT: *STATE[illegible] AMQUAR-1 [illegible] FAMILY RESIDENT USA [illegible] MEANS TRANSFERRING THE FILES FROM [illegible] WHERE [illegible] ORIGINALLY APPLIED.

REFS: A. DIR 78270 *

B. DIR 78271

PLS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMQUAR 1 AT REF ADDRESS AND PROVIDE HIM SECURE COMMO CHANNEL FOR ANY MESSAGE HE DESIRES SEND TO HIS HQS CONTACT MATTHEW H. ONTRICH KNOWN TO AMQUAR 1 AS "DAVID SALAS".

"1. BE ASSURED NOTHING WILL BE DONE IN REGARD CONTACTING DAVIES UNTIL CLEARED WITH YOU. REQUEST YOU ALSO DO NOTHING UNTIL COORDINATED WITH US. BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR YOU TRY ARRANGE THREE TO SIX MONTHS LEAVE OF ABSENCE WHICH YOU CAN EXTEND IF NECESSARY.

4

2. HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH [LUIS CASAS CAMPA] WHO SAILING ON CUBAN SHIP. NEXT TIME [LUIS] AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT IN PORT OUTSIDE CUBA DESIRE YOU BE PREPARED TRAVEL TO THAT LOCATION FOR PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIM.

3. PERSON WHO DELIVERS THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO PROVIDE A SECURE COMMO CHANNEL TO MR. DAVID."

END OF MESSAGE 3

C/WH/3 Reichhardt
WH/3/MEXI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EDWARD A. HARELL
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5-B

S-E-C-R-E-T

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3/20

16114

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

R. S. SCOTT
WH/3/MEXICO
3940
6 NOVEMBER 1963

SECRET

TO : MEXICO MERIDA MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: C WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, VR

SIG CEN

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PERUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON MILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PERUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PERUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Ronis (In Draft)

W Ward

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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Reichhardt
B. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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03

[illegible]: L. [illegible]:js
[illegible]: WH/5
[illegible]: [illegible]
DATE: 8 NOV 1963

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO MEXI FOR GERBIN INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. 02 ENINHEEING TOLD 06 BOIZELLE HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO 04 ARI CAMPISTA, 08 PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION, THRU 16-20 RIO 02 TEHOODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER 08 CNTI ELECTIONS. 04 CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OP DETAILS FROM 02 ENINHEEING AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE 02 ENINHEEING OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO 06 HUGO GOMES DA COSTA, 08 OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS, WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF 04 CAMPISTA'S DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. 03 Ozga (in draft)
WH/3/Mexico Reichhardt
WH/CA

W Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15/90

J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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15247

SAS/CI

MEXICO CITY

~~SECRET~~

201 160161

SIG CEN

☒

MEXI

CITE DIR 81778

PBRUMEN

REFS: A. HMMA-22285*

B. DIR 69900**

1. RE PARA THREE B REF A [RAQUEL PEDROSA DE LEYVA] WHO NOW RESIDING MEXI AND FRIEND OF LI[TAMIL 2] FAMILY, VERY PROBABLY WIFE OF [ENIO LEYVA FUENTES] WHO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY LI[TAMILS] AND IMPORTANT RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION TARGET. AMSIP 1 WHO FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MENTIONED PARA ONE REF B, FORMER CLOSE FRIEND OF [LEYVA] DESCRIBES HIM AS NON COMMUNIST AND PROBABLY WILLING COOPERATE WITH ANTI GOC ELEMENTS.

2. REQUEST MEXI EXPLORE POSSIBILITY UTILIZING [PEDROSA] AS LEAD TO [LEYVA].

3. HQS TRACES [PEDROSA] NEGATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SAS Comment: *LI[TAMIL-2] Report
**Re: KYBAT

AC/SAS/CI
SAS/EOB Mr. Bonis (in draft)
WH/3/Mexi

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
AC/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

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15253

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
2 DECEMBER [illegible]

(SEE BELOW)

SECRET

PRIORITY

PRITY ABON BOGO BRIL BUEN YOGU PACY
GORG GUAT GAYA LAPA LIMA
MANA MEXI MRID PRIN QUIT
RECI SAGO SALV SAOP SJOS
SDOM TEGU

CITE DIR 91024

OOLONG

BOOK MESSAGE AMCA NET

WITH CHIEF MISSION AND COS CONCURRENCE, ADDEES MAY OBSERVE SAME OFFICE HOURS AS COVER MISSION. SET SELCAL PLUS MONITOR YOGU CQ/QRA AT 23[illegible]Z. STATIONS WITHOUT SELCAL MONITOR 2300Z CQ. ALL STATIONS WITH RESIDENCE RECEIVERS MONITOR WITHIN CAPABILITY DURING CLOSURE PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

WED - W. Wheeler by phone

D/CO

SECRET

Copy No.

#15729

104-10100-10424

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Samuel Halpern
SAS/EOB
7884
24 Dec. 1963

SECRET

26 Dec 63 16 26z

TO: MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR

6

SIG CEN

X ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 91222

RYBAT TYPIC

FYI: JOURNALIST NAMED FRANK PILGRIM REPRESENTING [redacted] OBSERVER AND [redacted] MANCHESTER GUARDIAN PLANNING ATTEND CUBAN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS 1 JANUARY. PLANS LEAVE CUBA FIRST WEEK OF JAN PROBABLY CUBANA TO MEXICO. SMOTH HAS REQUESTED KUBARK NOT ATTEMPT CONTACT. KUBARK WILL RECEIVE DEBRIEFING RESULTS, IF ANY, FROM SMOTH.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB

SAS/MOB

WH/3/MEXI C

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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Copy No.

#15734

[illegible]
WH/3/CAS
[illegible]
[illegible] 1962

SECRET

ROME PRIORITY

15 [illegible] 63 22 45z

SIG CEN

INFO

TO PRIORITY ROME MEXI, SALV CITE DIR 83692

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE 02 DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO 02 DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts 02 DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3
WE/Italy 03 S. Hunger
WH/3/MEXI
WH/3/CAN

03
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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15722

DN5

104-10101-10109

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
7 DEC 63

19-132-5

MEXICO CITY

DIRECTOR

C/SAS 5

DCI, ADCP, [illegible]

SIG CEN

MEXI

KUBAT TYPIC

86284

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH for G.L.

WH/3/MEXI ✓

C/WH/3 ✓

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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15935

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: J. [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/MOB/PA/PROP
EXT: 6055
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA GUATEMALA JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

2 DEC 63 18 32z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

REF: DIR 86693

86694

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/MOB/PA/PROP

WH/C

WH/3/ccd BUR

C/WH/3

A. A. MALONEY
C/SAS/MOB

S-E-C-R-E-T

OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

15951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible]

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY TOKYO

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : FE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

[illegible] 22/32

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO TOKY CITE DIR

86803

SUGAR [illegible]

REF DIR 86802

1. IDEN A MR. KENICHI WATANABE.

2. IDEN B MR. KENNETH K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6534.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/3/MEXI

FE/JKO

WILLIAM E. COLBY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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15958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

200-124-73/3

ORIG : Manuel Aragon
UNIT : CA/B5
EXT : 5852
DATE : 5 December 1963

☐ INDEX
☒
x

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CA/O 4
INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS 2, [illegible] 2, [illegible]

5 DEC 63 [illegible] 49z

TO PALP INFO MEXI CITE DIR 87036

DTDORIC HBEPITOME

REF: MONT 8437 (IN 72721) RELATED MEXI

1. FOR MEXI: HQS ANS TO REF SAID: A) AGREE MONT THAT CASTRISTA CONTROLLED FEUU UNACCEPTABLE AS HOST FOR COSEC EVENT B) INTENT OF OCT 11 COSEC LETTER WAS TO OPEN POSSIBILITY MOVING EVENT TO NEW BUT NOT YET DETERMINED SITE, C) COSEC LETTER WAS AUTHORIZED BY SEPT SUPERVISION COMMITTEE (SUP COM) MEETING WHICH BLAMED FEUU FOR FAILURE HOLD EVENT AND TOLD COSEC TO SEEK ANOTHER SITE.

2. FOR PALP: FOLL SUMMARIZES HQS UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICAN STUDY SEMINAR (LASS) TACTICS DISCUSSED WITH KORONELOS (IDEN A). FIRST STEP REGARDLESS WHETHER LASS ULTIMATELY HELD IS SEIZING INITIATIVE ON SITE IN ORDER HONOR SUP COM DECISION AND OFFSET POSSIBLE INVITATION FROM UNFRIENDLY SITE. THIS NOW ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN VIEW REF. CNE [illegible] MOST DESIRABLE HOST FROM [illegible] CONTROL AND FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS RESPECT KORONELOS AND AVILA (IDEN B) SHOULD CONTACT [illegible] BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE EUR. BRIEF HIM ON LASS STRATEGY AND GAIN HIS SUPPORT [illegible] CNE OFFER INVITATION ACT AS HOST

3. ASSUMING MEXI INVITE LASS CAN BE HELD IF FOLL CONDITIONS SATISFIED:

A) PARTICIPATION MINIMUM 7 DEMOCRATIC UNIONS WITH CLEAR EVIDENCE ALL [illegible] UNIONS WILL BOYCOTT SEMINAR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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15963

CLASSIFIED

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 87036

B) ENOUGH COORDINATION WITH UFUCH TO AVOID THEIR ACTIVE HOSTILITY LASS AND COSEC AND PREVENT FORCING THEM INTO CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH EXTREMISTS ON OTHER WH ISSUES.

C) LIKELIHOOD THAT LASS CAN BE USEFUL FORUM EXPRESSION DEMOCRATIC VIEWS ON SOCIAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT GROUNDWORK NECESSARY FOR IBC TACTICS.

D) EVENT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH MEXI STATION OPERATIONS.

4. LASS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IF ALL OR ANY PARA 3 CONDITIONS FAIL PERTAIN AND ALSO IF:

A) EARLY EVIDENCE WELL ORGANIZED EXTREMIST COUNTERACTION (POSSIBILITY OF WHICH RAISED BY VEHEMENCE FEOU RESPONSE COSEC LETTER REPORTED IN REF.)

B) PALP HQS JUDGEMENT THAT TIME EFFORT NEEDED SUSTAIN HOLDING EVENT BECOMES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DIVERSION RESOURCES FROM OTHER ELEMENTS HBEPITOME PROGRAM, DEVELOPMENT OF IBC TACTICS, OR HARMFUL KUBARK LAYC COUNTERACTION.

5. IF PARA 4 SITUATION UNFOLDS CNE COULD WITHDRAW INVITATION ON GROUNDS INADEQUATE PARTICIPATION (ASSUMING BOYCOTT) OR CONTINUE AS HOST BUT CITE SUNDRY TECHNICAL REASONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT LASS.

6. FOR PALP: PARA ONE BRIEFING CORDERO WHICH CONTINGENT PALP RECEIPT MEXI COMMENTS, SHOULD INCLUDE CANDID OUTLINE PARA 2-5 THINKING SO THAT CNE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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PAGE THREE

TO

#7036

AGREEMENT ISSUE INVITATION ACT AS HOST INCLUDING AWARENESS OF AND COMMITMENT TO ALL CONTINGENCIES. MOREOVER, CORDERO SHOULD BE ASSURED CONTINUING COSEC SUPPORT LITERACY SEMINAR AND DESIRE HOLDING THAT EVENT AT EARLIEST DATE CONVENIENT TO OUR.

7. FOR MEXI: HQS BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT PARA 3 CONDITIONS CAN BE MET ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT THIS EVENT COULD BE USEFUL. HQS DISPATCH WILL INCLUDE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS LASS STRATEGY. SINCE CORDERO MAY LEAVE EUR SHORTLY REQUEST COMMENTS TO PALP ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway ( )

WH/3/MEX BER (in draft)

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD C. [illegible]
AC/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

ORIG: Manuel Ar[illegible]
UNIT: CA/25
EXT: 5552
DATE: 5 December 1963

SECRET

200-124-73/3

TO: PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CA/O 4
INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 4, WH 7, VR

5 DEC 18 49Z 63

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO PALP INFO MEXI CITE DIR 87037

DTDORIC HEEPTIONE

REF: DIR 87036 *

IDENTITIES

A. DONALD EMMERSON - NORTH AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

B. RAUL AVILA - LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway (in draft)

WH/3/MEX [illegible] (in dr.)

*[illegible] PLEASE REFERENCE ATTACHED CABLE.

[illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY [illegible]

15964

OUTGOING

ROUTING

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE

CARA MANA WAVE LODS
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
BUEN MONT BOGO QUIT
GAYA RIOD SAOP SAGO
LAPA SANJ SDOM

CITE DIR 88205

REFS: A. DIR 83577
B. DIR 83638

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT EXCELLENT EXPLOITATION MOST AREAS HAVING BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THAT HIGH INTEREST CREATED AMONG PEOPLE IS ENCOURAGING AND/OR CAUSING SOME GOVERNMENTS ADOPT STRONGER PRO VENEZUELA POSITION IN OAS. VIEW THIS, SUGGEST ADDEE ACTIVITIES CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) THIS ASPECT, I.E. EFFORTS DEMONSTRATE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS IN FAVOR VENEZUELAN POSITION OF TAKING FIRM STAND AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIZE THAT CURRENT ISSUE BEFORE OAS RAISED BY SISTER REPUBLIC, VICTIM OF SOVIET AND CHICOM SUPPORTED AGGRESSOR; IMPLICATION BEING THAT ODYOKE PLAYING NO MORE THAN SUPPORTING ROLE.

2. CONTINUE USE " NO COEXISTENCE WITH CASTRO" THEME. CONSIDER HAVING LABOR, STUDENT, OTHER ORGS SEND TELEGRAMS TO LOCAL GOVTS AND OAS IN SUPPORT VENEZ POSITION: FOLLOW [illegible] UP BY PUBLICIZING TELEGRAMS IN PRESS. VIA MEDIA SPECULATE WHAT STEPS LOCAL GOVT MIGHT FAVOR IN SUPPORT VENEZ, INCLUDING

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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16006

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 88285

A. BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA BY ALL LA COUNTRIES

B. CURTAILMENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS,

C. ALL POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS BREAK,

D. COOPERATIVE SURVEILLANCE OF OUTBOUND CUBAN CARRIERS.

3. WHERE THERE RELUCTANCE ATTACK CASTRO ON POLITICAL GROUNDS SUGGEST USE PEG THAT CASTRO'S EXPORTING OF REVOLUTION OVERTAKEN BY NEWER EXPORT COMMODITY, NAMELY CRIME. THIS EXEMPLIFIED BY ACTS OF ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, MURDER, KIDNAPING, ETC., AND THAT CUBA TRAINING OF SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES FROM THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE NOTHING MORE THAN SCHOOL FOR CRIME.

4. FOR MONT GUAT BOGO SDOM: ADVISE WHAT ACTION TAKEN PER REFS

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1
C/WH/2
C/WH/3
C/WH/5
C/WH/6
C/WH/7
C/CA/1 (in draft)
SAS/CA

[illegible]

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

MEXI 90012

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

REF A. MEXI 7317 (IN 76917)
B: MEXI 7296 (IN 75860)
C [illegible] 22410, Para 2

1. PER REF A IT LIKELY A MEET WILL BE HELD WITH CUBAN [illegible] IN NEXT WEEKS.

2. HENCE DESIRE LIFEAT COVERAGE ON IDEN [illegible] AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE SINCE HE BELIEVED LOCAL CASE OFFICER.

3. IF NECESSARY TO EFFECT COVERAGE ON IDEN, STATION MAY SUSPEND COVERAGE AMSESS/1 BUT PREFER MAINTAIN BOTH.

4. REQUEST STATION TRACES ONLY ON SUBJECTS REF B AND C. NO HEADQUARTERS RECORD ON EITHER.

5. PLEASE RENEW THE TWO POST BOXES SERVICED BY LIKAYAK/2 IN LOMAS AND MIGUEL SHULTZ.

6. PLEASE HAVE GERENDE OR SCANTLING TRANSLATE AND SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO MANUEL VEGA Y SOCIO, FRANCISCO [illegible] MARQUEZ 160, COLONIA CONDESA D F "RECEIVED YOUR KIND LETTER BUT NO MONEY. SALUDOS. JULIO RODRIGUEZ." RETURN ADDRESSEE TO BE JULIO RODRIGUEZ AT LOMAS BOX.

6

(cont.)

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

16033

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 8[illegible]

7. PLEASE HAVE THIS TELEGRAM SENT 14 OR 16 DEC, EVEN IF MONEY HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB

WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WH

FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S E C R E T

MESSAGE 12-42

ORIG : SEAMPOVICH:mg
UNIT : SR/CI/K
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

O : BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DESTROY
☒ RETURN TO

TO ALL COS, &COB INFO CITE DIR

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB RESIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

6051

ORIG: SKAMPOVICH:mg
UNIT: SR/CI/K
EXT: 6091
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 63

3 SECRET

TO: SEE BELOW

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ROUTING	
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3	6

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

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☒ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

C/SR

C/SR/CI
SR/O/AF
SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
SR/O/FE
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TO : SEE BELOW
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : DDP, DDDS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, VR

17 DEC 63 23 07z

PRIORITY

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TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778

CARA [illegible] WAVE [illegible]
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
MONT BOGO QUIT GAYA
RIOD SAOP SAGO LAPA
SANJ SDOM BUEN

REF: DIR [illegible] *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

K
J. C. KING
C/WHD
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

Mary Parrish
7861
CA/PROP/G
19 Dec 63

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FILE NO.

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19 DEC 63 15 28z

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ROUTINE

SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CA 4, 2, AF 4, EE 4, WE 4,
NE 5, SR

CITE DIR 90168

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S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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RELEASED

ROUTING

INFO CITE DIR 90168

1. REUTERS, UPI, AP REPORT FROM MOSCOW EIGHTEEN DECEMBER THAT APPROX FIVE HUNDRED AFRICAN STUDENTS GATHERED AT GHANA EMBASSY, FOUGHT THEIR WAY PAST POLICE BARRICADES AND MARCHED TO KREMLIN TO PROTEST ALLEGED KILLING GHANA STUDENT ASARO ADDEO. STUDENTS CARRIED PLACARDS "STOP KILLING AFRICANS", SKULL AND CROSSBONES LABELLED "RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP", "FRIENDS TODAY, THE DEVIL TOMORROW" "MOSCOW IS SECOND ALABAMA". STUDENT DELEGATION PRESENTED MEMO TO MINISTRY HIGHER EDUCATION CHARGING "OUR FREEDOM BEING THREATENED HERE BECAUSE STUDENTS ARE BEING BEATEN IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF SOVIET UNION AND ONE WAS KILLED RECENTLY IN KALININ. WE WANT THE POLICE TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION". SOVIET OFFICIALS CLAIM ADDEO DIED OF EXPOSURE WHILE INTOXICATED. STUDENTS BELIEVE HE KILLED BY RUSSIAN BECAUSE HE WANTED MARRY RUSSIAN GIRL.

MD

2. USING WIRE SERVICE, FBIS SOURCES PLAY STUDENT ACTION ALONG LINES:

A. ~~[illegible]~~ INCIDENT IS EVIDENCE OF RACIST ATTITUDES DESPITE SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT [illegible]

MD

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14-00000

[illegible] COMMUNISM MEANS BROTHERHOOD

ALL PEOPLES

B [illegible] DEATH PROBABLY ONLY SPARK SETTING OFF LONG SMOULDERING STUDENT RESENTMENT OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, SEGREGATION, EXPLOITATION FOR PROP PURPOSES

C TIE INCIDENT TO RECENT CONGO EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS AS ANOTHER FACET SOVIET LONG RANGE PLAN TO DUPE, EVEN TAKEOVER, NAIVE AFRICAN STATES BY MEANS OF SUBVERSION, STUDENT INDOCTRINATION AND CONTROL, ECONOMIC AID WITH POLITICAL STRINGS

3. SEE BIWEEKLY GUIDANCE SEVEN HUNDRED NINETEEN FOR FURTHER ACTION AND BACKGROUND. WATCH STUDENT GROUPS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS, ARTICLES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR REPLAY. INTERVIEW COMMUNIST TRAINED STUDENTS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EDUCATORS FOR REACTION.

4. SEND CLIPS HQS

END OF MESSAGE

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TO INFO CITE DIR 90166

Coordinating Officers:

AF/CA Wayne Murphy (in draft)
WE/IBE -
EE/OPS/CA -
NE/OP/PA Walter Harris (phone)
WH/PO/B William Kent (phone)
FE/PO/P John Ishii (phone)
SR/CA Jerry Seit (phone)

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19 Dec 63

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☒ ROUTINE

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

CITE DIR 90383

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF SAMBORA LEGEND COMPLETED AND ALL PERTINENT PAPERS POUCHED TO HQS.

2. SUBJECT HMMW 12212* DIRECTED TO APPLY FOR MEXI VISITORS VISA.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

* Antonio de Jesus (Pineda) Cabrera
201-297754

J. C. KING
C/WH

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DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

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RIOD SAGO SJOS SDOM
TEGU MEXI LAPA SALV
PACY GAYA GORG RECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

BRIL SAOP

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. [illegible] NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE COYOKE CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR RUQSWM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET. ROUTING INDICATOR RUKIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

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OC-S -

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SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

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#913

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

Draft:
30 Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. **SITUATION:**

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:
    a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
    b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
    c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.
    d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
    e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

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on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. **MISSION:**

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. **TASKS:**

A. **Intelligence**/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
    a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
    b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
    c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
    d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
    e. Military and militia order of battle.
    f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
    g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
    h. Economic

B. **Political:**

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

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2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.

4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.

2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.

3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.

2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel an[redacted]ogistics support for any significant internal

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resistance group or uprising.

3. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military
against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be re
to develop the following programs:

A. Intelligence (FI)/ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be
intensified and expanded. The following types of acti
will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally establ
Cubans in Cuba ~~[illegible]~~
Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secu
communications will become more critical as pol
state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts.

~~2~~3. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country
nationals resident in Cuba.

~~3~~4. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers
who have potential access to significant informat
or who can provide significant operational support.

~~4~~5. Expansion of communications intelligence particula
ly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This
is primarily an NSA problem.)

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36 Maintain refugee
7. maximize utilization

B. **Psychological Warfar**

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C. **Paramilitary:**

The program will b

maintaining a minimum

event of a significant

implementation of .

The following prog

1. Maintain the
limited number

[redacted] S
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amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requi ments levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

None

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63
FY - 64

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DRAFT

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakenod.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

B. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. 24 [Liaison] Operations: We will continue to press the 24 [liaison services] who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The 24 [services] most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the 24 [British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli.] Direct approaches to several of these 24 [services] either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the 24 [services] underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other 24 [liaison services] with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the 24 [liaison] problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the 24 [liaison services] to make greater use of their 24 [national] assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the 24 [Vatican.]

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through 24 [liaison services,] we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

13/m

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through 24 [unilateral] operations and where appropriate in conjunction with 24 [liaison services.]

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in 24 [Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada.] No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

3/M

8. **Communications Intelligence:** We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in 10 [Miami] at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. **Communist Party Operations:** A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further exploitation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. **Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations**: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. **Economic Warfare**: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. **Counterintelligence**: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. **Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare**: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. **RECOMMENDED ACTION:**

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

ATT. A - TO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HBRA 9438

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-050539

TO Chief, WHD
INFO Chief, EE

FROM Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

DATE 20 June 1962

SUBJECT ~~BEDOX/Operational~~
SMEDIFY Information Concerning
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☑ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
FYI

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

> Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

> Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Frederick E. Rouzky
FREDERICK E. ROUZKY

Distribution
~~4~~ - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files
201 w/att: WH

REC'D RID/AN 22 Jun 62

19 June 1962/bcj

The attached info was not sent to the FBI because according to RIO/CE 5 Feb '63 & after discussion with Jane Roman & Office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info out of the Agency on subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

(CI/CE) →

C. Hopkins
CI/I/1

ATT. H

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

☐ CONTINUED

COPY

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(b)3(A)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

att. to HBRA 9438

NOFORN / Cont [illegible]

att to HBRA 9438

CS COPY

[illegible]
201-50539

[illegible]

(b)(3)(c)

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

/ - 2 - ....

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

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5

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
S E C R E T

PROPOSED	PROCESSING ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

MDREND

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

3ZULC
Removed from Project AMTRUNK 19-6-84
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3 ~~19-6-84~~, STATE
JOB 68-496/16
Box: 7 Fold: 1 VOLSKY
WASH DC

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 1963	APR 9 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]
S E C R E T

#12922

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

New York Times

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 3:748

[redacted]

[redacted]

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB # 08-496/16
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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

[redacted]

SECRET

2. AMTRUNK/3, a [redacted] year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in [redacted] 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at [redacted] in the [redacted] section [redacted] [redacted]

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his [redacted] and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

SECRET

[redacted]

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ, located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

   a. Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Arzobispo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

   b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next to A/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.

S E C R E T

[redacted]

19 - 6 -

c. Another contact of A/3 is [redacted], age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is [redacted] Havana. He owns a [redacted] shop in the [redacted] section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. [redacted] years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. [redacted], born in Havana. He is a [redacted] who lives and practices [redacted] in Havana. [redacted] has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of [redacted] at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. [redacted] is also a close friend of [redacted]

c. [redacted], age about [redacted], born in Cienfuegos, a former [redacted] as well as the former head of the [redacted] Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. [redacted] has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for [redacted] A/2 has maintained correspondence with [redacted]

d. [redacted], age about [redacted], born in Havana, single. Subject is an [redacted] teacher who runs a small private [redacted] school in [redacted] in Havana. She was A/2's [redacted] and offered support to the underground. [redacted] lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA, age 23-24, born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessar

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

[redacted], age [redacted], married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as [redacted] one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working [redacted] in Oriente Province. He claims [redacted] assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his [redacted] for any length of time and he does not want his [redacted] to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However, he has not seen VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made [redacted]filtration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba[redacted], and has an excellent knowledge of the nort[redacted] area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [redacted] year old fisherman from the [redacted] area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Director of Finance 1212 Key Building			EXTENSION	NO.
				DATE 27 February 1974
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckenridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~[illegible] Wyatt~~				
5. Sandy-Arnadel		- W/file		
6.				
7.				
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11.				
12.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
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14.				
15.				

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

15-2

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

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SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened:	13 July 1965
13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

[redacted] SECRET - SENSITIVE

DRAFT

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.
5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

[redacted] SECRET
SENSITIVE

Drafting
23 Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. **SITUATION:**

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:
    a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
    b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
    c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.
    d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
    e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

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on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
    - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
    - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
    - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
    - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
    - e. Military and militia order of battle.
    - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
    - g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.
    - h. Economic

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

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downgrading and
declassification

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and [illegible]s support for any significant internal

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resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plans against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following programs:

A. ~~Intelligence (CI)~~ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba ~~or in Cuban government posts abroad~~. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts abroad

~~2~~3 Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

~~3~~4 Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information or who can provide significant operational support.

~~4~~5 Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

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declassification

6. Maintain refugee debriefing programs.

7. Maximize utilization of liaison services for above programs.

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
2. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
3. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

The program will be basically for developing and maintaining a minimum stand-by capability for use in the event of a significant up-rising or in the event of implementation of U. S. Military plans.

The following program is considered essential:

1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate limited numbers of personnel and/or limited

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declassification

amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. **SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:**

None

VI. **ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:**

A. Personnel

B. **Estimated Budget**

FY - 63
FY - 64

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[illegible]

ATT. A - To [redacted] 77 SZULC

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HBRA 9438
TO Chief, WHD INFO Chief, EE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-050539
FROM Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro		DATE 20 June 1962
SUBJECT BEDOX/Operational [redacted] Information Concerning Tad SZULC (201-050539)		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☑ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED FYI		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. Attached is a [redacted] report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes [redacted]'s traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

[redacted]BICUSPID from [redacted]BICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: ~~Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil~~)

> Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

[redacted]BICUSPID from [redacted]BICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: ~~Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ~~, Polish diplomat)

> Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

Frederick L. Rouzky
FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment REC'D RID/AN
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files
201 w/att. WH

19 June 1962/bcj

(Rio/CC) → The attached info was not sent to the FBI because according to Rio/CC 5 Feb '63 & after discussion with Jane Roman & office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info out of the Agency on subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

WH/1

ATT. "A"

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(1)3(a)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

att. to IIBRA 9438

NOFORN / [illegible]

att to) IIBRA 9438

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20 JUN 62
201-50539

Source of all this info [illegible]
a Polish [illegible]
[illegible]

(b)(3)(a),

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

/ - 2 - ....

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

- - - - - - - -

DISPATCH

[redacted] SECRET

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

MD RENO

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

SZULC

[illegible] from Project AMTRUNK 19-6-84/3
[illegible]: 19-6-84/3 ~~19-6-84~~ STATE
[illegible] 68-496/16
[illegible] 7 Fold: 1 VOLSKY
WASH, DC

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 1963	APR 8 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFICATION
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AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 31748

[redacted]

14-00000

[redacted]

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

Removed from Project AMTRUNK
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB # 68-496/46
Box: 7 Fold: 1

DESENSITIZED
per CSH-43-43

[redacted]

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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel 08

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. 08 Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in 09 January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

3|PV

[redacted]

08

2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in 08 August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at 08 A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614). 08 08

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

08

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

[redacted]

6/PV

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for 24 the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24 two men will work their way to a 24 farm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. 06 They will 06 make contact with 08 the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon 06 CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo 06 or Havana:

a. 06 Roman HERNANDEZ, 06 who lives a 06 few kilometers away in 08 Sierra del Arzobispo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a 08 butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 08 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If 06 CRUZ is unsuccessful 06 in getting 06 HERNANDEZ' truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next 08 to A/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 08 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. 06 He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte 08 in 1954. He owns a jeep.

S E C R E T

[redacted]

19-6-81

19/PJ

06

c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLE age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, 08 Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

06, 08.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

06, 08

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55 born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. 06 IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine 08 at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN 06

c. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the 08 Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. 06 MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 08 husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.

06 08 08 06

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private 08 tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's 08 English teacher and offered support to the underground. 06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

26/PJ

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA 06 age 23-24 08 born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. 08 She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. 08 She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at 08 Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS 06 age late 30s early 40s 08 married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. 08 He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims 06 VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. 06 VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels 06 VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of 06 VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to 06 VALS in 09 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee. 06

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa 06 age early 40s 08 served in the 08 U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, 08 06 DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. 06 Following the disappearance of 06 Cienfuegos DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said 06 DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military 08 secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. 06 A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually 06 DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention 06 DUARTE as an opportunist.

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

06 08

Lester RODRIGUEZ age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of 08 one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Prearranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his
24 father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his
24 father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

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3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made [redacted]filtration/exfiltration trips to and from Cub[redacted], and has an excellent knowledge of the north[redacted] area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

08 3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 08 year old fisherman from the 08 Cardenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" Garcia Lezcano. 06 Tango is a brother of Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338) 06, 08 whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere. The other contact is the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds). A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name. 08

2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are Antonio 06 Garcia (not related to Tango, above) and Pablo Lopez, both of whom have small farms in the area. 06

3. Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by INRA 06 and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

06

4. City of Cardenas. Contact is Pedro Barbi, owner of the 08 Bate Marino restaurant. Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. 06 Barbi would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.

5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named Carlos 06 Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is 60 06 years old, married, and is a forman 08 of public works in the city. Subject has a son Carlos 06 now in New York City. 06 Pedraza will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.

6. Varadero. "Fifo" 06 Pineiro owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground 06 and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use Barbi or Pedraza 06 for obtaining transportation. 06, 08 06 Pineiro is the brother of the communist Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.

7. Havana

06

a. Adolfina (Suarez) More. Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be 06 used as safehouse keeper. Subject is 08 sister of Rafael (Suarez) More, a Commandante in the Navy who, according to A/27, was at one time chief of naval 08 operations. His present assignment or location is unknown.

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06

b. Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez. 06 Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of A/14's wife. 06 Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under Calixto Garcia, 06 but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of industry in Havana.

06

c. Maria Josefa (Isalgue). Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

06

d. Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre. Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.

06

e. Bebo (Orozco). To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 Orozco was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the 06 Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of Capt. Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping Vargas Gomez 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with Orozco by letter about two months ago. 06

f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

Co-defendant in CUBELA trial - IN prison

g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. " Manuel Avila
6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7. " Pedro Miret
8. Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are

highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez/Menoyo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.

THERE SAME suspicion he was G-2 agent.

3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.

6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.

V. FUTURE PLANS

During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.

VI. COMMITMENTS

1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban

government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batistianos in a post-Castro government.

2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support, and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words, they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.

3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.

Ro!

5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.

Why!

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.

N.B.

19-6-51/1

(GC 67-0040

24 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Estimate of Damage Which Could Accrue to CIA
Miami Through Prosecution of the Rolando
Masferrer Haitian Invasion Group

1. The decision by the Justice Department to seek a Grand Jury indictment against Rolando Masferrer and certain of his associates is a potentially explosive matter which could result in extensive damage to CIA activities in Miami. Recent adverse publicity on the national scene and in the Miami area have added substantially to the already sizeable embarrassment potential. Some of the main sectors of danger to CIA equities are described below.

2. Basic national publicity regarding student and foundation topics have already attracted attention of the local press to the CIA in general. Usually any reference to CIA covert activities leads the press to check files for references to any such activities locally. However, before this action could be taken, the story regarding the Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami broke, and the press immediately concentrated on this topic. The CIA Chief of Station learned through personal press contacts that this was partly a matter of luck and partly because of the friendly and cooperative attitude of these press contacts. Although several editorials highly critical of CIA have been published and the replay of wire service stories has been given much space, as yet there has been no local follow-up aimed at putting CIA or the CIA Station on the spot. However, the situation remains delicate, since, even with much good will, local newsmen cannot afford to let themselves be scooped by outsiders concerning stories in their own back yard.

3. Any new story, such as the 22 February story in *World Journal Tribune* on suspected CIA connection with recruitment of Cuban pilots for the Congo, the possible results of inquiry made on 21 February by three students connected with the University of Miami newspaper *The Hurricane*, or further revelations concerning the Pan American Foundation, could easily trigger publicity with an inevitable focus on the South Campus of the University of Miami and on the Miami Station cover firm.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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declassification

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06,08 4. As has been the case for the past six years, Dr. Henry King Stanford, President and Dr. Eugene Cohen, Vice President and Treasurer of the University of Miami, 29 06,08 have extended their fullest cooperation concerning the Miami Station and overall CIA interests and it is anticipated they will continue to do so. However, we believe there is a practical limit to the amount of pressure they could stand from 24 their trustees and from certain public quarters if there is a flood of publicity regarding CIA activities allegedly centered in or controlled from the Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc., 29 or its accused successor, the Melmar 29 Corporation. If such a situation arises, it is conceivable that Dr. Stanford 06 would feel impelled to take some action aimed at disassociating the University 29 of Miami from any contact 29 with the Melmar Corporation. 29 Since the Melmar Corporation is ostensibly the tenant of the University of Miami although on Federal property, the 29 resulting action might involve a request for the termination of the tenancy agreement.

5. Even if the above circumstances did not exist, we would remain concerned regarding the possible effects of the prosecution of the Masferrer group. Although no Station agents or persons with whom the Miami Station has contractual arrangements are among the persons arrested or those who will be prosecuted, it will be very easy for the defense to drag CIA Miami into the case. The defense has only to obtain testimony (true or perjured) from one of the defendants, or to summon as defense witness one or more disaffected former agents of the CIA Station, in order to begin a chain reaction surfacing much detail and rumor concerning CIA operations against the Cuban target. Given the sizeable reduction of infiltration and Covert Action agents during the past year, a general feeling of frustration and lack of support for Cuban freedom attributed to passive U.S. policy and reduction in CIA support in all sectors, the long standing animosity of certain exile circles against U.S. Government, notably CIA, and the evaluation that CIA now is the most vulnerable of Federal Agencies confronting them, exiles will be tempted to see an attack against CIA as accomplishing several purposes, that is, gaining acquittal, blackening CIA, and exerting pressure on the U.S. Government for a policy change.

KK4

11/RV

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	attachment
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC
Contact Report - IDEN *A

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: See Para 4

1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman, was recommended to JMWAVE and made available by Headquarters. He had been cleared by Headquarters for JMWAVE use under date of 15 December 1962 in DIR-05291.

2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMWAVE by Eli A. SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP office on 27 December 1962. The JMWAVE cover situation was discussed with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested. IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMWAVE cover company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D and IDEN E. Although cleared and witting, these individuals are contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are required, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also permits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He has acted as a spotter for JMWAVE and has recommended several other businessmen who are being used by JMWAVE. He has also made available several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in backstopping cover of JMWAVE operational vessels. It is known that he is used by Headquarters for several JBECHO activities. IDEN A is contacted several times each month by JMWAVE.

ACE Marine Survey
Ceres Enterprises Inc

3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colin R. HOWGRIND as well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAFT and the JMWAVE operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C participates in JMWAVE activities. So far as is known, he knows no other JMWAVE personnel or assets.

4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and that it be made known to JMWAVE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT;
Identities u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
✓3 - C/WH/C w/att
u/s/c

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 May 65	MAY 19 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21422

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

TO: UFGA-21422

IDENTITIES

IDEN A: Alfred J. *Moran

DPOB: Not available

Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana

Bus: 909 South Broad Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

IDEN B: M/V BARB

IDEN C: James Costello

IDEN D: Glenn E. Magnuson

IDEN E: Robert T. Nieset

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File: Kennedy assassination - Garrison

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 20 DEC 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/EURBC	20 Dec 67			OGC 67-2367
2.				
3. Office of General Counsel John Greaney			JG	1-3: Per our conversation — incidentally, Jim still under [24 State] cover with my [08 daughter!] [03 [illegible]]
4.				
5.				SECRET
6.				
7.				Passed oral info to Mr Kossack that FBI was given report in London by [24 MI-5] about Garrison & Russell Foundation, on 2 Jan 1968 J.K.G.
8.				
9.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET

OGC 67-2367

Indept ✓

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney

SUBJECT : James Garrison

1. Per our conversation in the environs of the 15-1 DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station a 24 scrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5, the [British] Security Service,] 24 has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation:

> "Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana
>
> A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way."

2. 24 [MI-5] has also passed this 15-1 information to the Legal 24 Attache (FBI representative) in [London.] I would stress that [MI-5's] source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information.

03

[Philip F. Fendig
AC/EURBC]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

7/ML

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

A. NAME : Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

OFFICE ADDRESS : Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida

MAILING ADDRESS : P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida

LOCATION : Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot

B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and under the control of JMWAVE and certified to do business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a corporation which had been certified to do business in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

The President of the Corporation is Alfred J. Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a very prominent businessman in the New Orleans area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments in a variety of businesses which include many oil interests. He is known to Headquarters representatives particularly in Logistics.

C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily in marine research including the study of marine life and testing of marine equipment. However, its general provisions permit it to perform almost any corporate function.

D. USE : JMWAVE use of the Corporation is to provide cover for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corporation provides status cover and payrolling of the agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area or berthing site from which the vessel operates in the performance of its ostensible business.

24

E. FUNDING : Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at the First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

24

Overt Attribution or Source - [Offshore Navigation Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana]

SECRET

F. TAX STATUS : This is a profit-making corporation and has met Federal and State requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns.

2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes.

3) Florida State Unemployment Tax.

4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return.

5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return.

G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January 1967.

H. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: This cover company should be affected little by a flap. However, because of the berthing location within largely tourist or recreation areas, its commercial activity has been noted.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew.

Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged in the field of marine research, including the study of marine life as well as the testing of marine equipment.

In view of the current limited use of this cover, the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced. However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great import. The major likely "injury" that would be sustained would be the denial of further use of the berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-registering the M/V SONORA.

In order to add depth and lend further substance to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate 24 firm, [Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans,] Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc. and to recognize the latter firm as a client.

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SECRET

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

: Ceres Enterprises, Inc.

DRESS : Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33101

ADDRESS : P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101

: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff

ACILITY: This corporation was established in Florida and certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was established by and is under the control of JMWAVE.

The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W. Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans. In addition he has many other varied interests including investments in oil ventures. He is extremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and social structure.

BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to maintain and operate boats for all types of marine research.

: This corporation provided cover for maritime vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents employed by this corporation.

: Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at The First National Bank of Miami] 24 by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

Overt Attribution or Source -[Peterman & Peterman Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office, Chicago, Illinois] 24

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TAX STATUS : This is a corporation for profit. It has met federal and state tax requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return

2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes

3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes

4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return

5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return

AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very secure during the period of its operation and remained so until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba. This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this corporation and transfer its activities to another entity. This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the damage would be minimal.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966. An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year which will indicate no financial transactions.

Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMWAVE entities. This corporation was established to provide cover for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the past incident the corporation should not be used in the future under its current name. While in use the corporation served very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Seymour R. Bolten 2 E 14	EXTENSION 7520	NO. DATE 19 September 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. John Morrison OGC 7 D 01	9/19/74		
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Attached is an advanced informal copy of our proposed security deletions and revisions of the Hunt galley proof. Please note that this list has not yet been reviewed by Mr. Blee and is, therefore, still subject to change.

2. The DDO panel that reviewed the Hunt manuscript has designated items, numbered 12, 14, 19, 21, 24 and 25, as "hard core," by which we mean that the Agency should insist on their deletion or revision and be prepared to obtain an injunction and engage in litigation should Hunt refuse to cooperate.

Seymour R. Bolten
SAB/DDO

RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

C/O

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Manuscript and Galley Proof of Undercover: Memoirs of an American Agent by E. Howard Hunt

NOTES: A. Pages and lines underlined and appearing at the beginning of the items below refer to the galley proof.

B. Corresponding page and line listings as they appear in the manuscript are provided in brackets at the end of each item.

other members

1. Page 57, line 6 from bottom of page; the name "Henry Pleasants". Mr. Pleasants retired under cover and his past relationship should not be exposed. It is also recommended that efforts be made to have the name "John Richardson" also removed from the same sentence containing Mr. Pleasants' name. (Page 96, line 17.)

2. Page 59, line 38 beginning with "However" and ending on page 60, line 2 with "milieu". Rutherford T. "Pinky" Walsh ~~retired under cover and his CIA relationship should not be~~ exposed. His assignment in Paris under student cover is similarly classified. The description of this activity just a couple of pages before the author gratuitously mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring unilateral operations in France (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.)

"[illegible] [illegible] (D.A.)

CONFIDENTIAL

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3. Page 63, line 21; the name "Frank Holcomb". Mr. Holcomb retired under cover and his past relationship with the CIA should not be exposed. It is additionally recommended that the entire paragraph wherein Mr. Holcomb's name appears (lines 21-24) should be deleted because it acknowledges CIA operations in support of anti-communist political operations in Italy. (page 105, lines 18-21.)

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4. Page 63, line 30 beginning with "By" and ending with "arrangement" on line 33, page 63. It is recommended that this passage be deleted since its inclusion not only is not pertinent to the narrative but it unnecessarily jars 24 liaison with the British and is an implied insult to the French liaison services. (page 106, lines 4-7.) 24

5. Page 66 beginning with "Finis" on line 24 and ending with "world" on line 27. This passage describes a specific CIA operation which resulted in the production and distribution of an animated cartoon based on George Orwell's Animal Farm. (Page 111, lines 6-9.)

6. Page 68, the pseudonym "John F. Rittenhouse" on line 34. The author's original CIA pseudonym was classified, and even though compromised, never appeared in the press and still exists on various currently classified documents. (page 114, line 23.)

7. Page 71, beginning with "Spanish" on line 28 and ending with "America" on line 20, page 72, and including the footnotes on pages 71 and 72. This passage should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in subsidizing, producing and distributing "El Campesino's" book, Life and Death in the USSR. (pages 120 [lines 4-20, including footnote] - 121 [lines 1-16, including footnote.]) 24

8. Page 72 beginning with "Eudocia" on line 21 and ending with "Scribner's" on line 32. This should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in the translation, publishing and distribution of Eudocio Ravines' book, The Yenan Way. It also describes William Buckley's role in that operation as a CIA officer. (Page 121, lines 17-23 and page 122, lines 1-6.) 24

9. Page 73 beginning with "Mexican" on line 5 through "Rivera" on line 8. This should be deleted because it not only describes sources and methods but also identifies a specific CIA operation. (Page 122, lines 19-21 and page 123, line 1.)

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N.A.

10. Page 73 beginning with "Communism" on line 14 and ending with "reputation" on line 15. This passage could serve to identify a former asset in Mexico who is still living. (Page 123, lines 7-8.)

11. Page 73 beginning with "cover" on line 17 through "legend" on line 19. This should be deleted because it identifies a CIA-sponsored cover arrangement in Bangkok. Furthermore, this particular type of cover, the movie industry, has figured in earlier unfavorable publicity to CIA in other Southeast Asian countries and thus serves to further render suspect the use of such cover in still other areas. (Page 123, lines 10-12.) NA

12. Page 73 beginning with "planned" on line 22 through "authentic" on line 5 of page 74 and including the footnote on page 74. This should be deleted because it describes 24 a specific operation involving the forgery of a page of the [Shanghai Post], and also includes descriptions of sources and methods. (Page 123, lines 15-23 and all of page 124 including footnote.)

13. Page 77 beginning with "technical" on line 19 through "station" on line 21. This should be deleted because it describes and authenticates a CIA operation. (Page 131, lines 2-4.)

14. Page 80 beginning with "surreptitious-entry" on line 9 through "Embassy" on line 12, page 82. This should be deleted because it describes a specific, sensitive operation as well as 24 sensitive sources and methods including the [acquisition of code materials]. (Page 136, line 3 through page 139, line 20.)

[illegible]

15. Page 86 beginning with "Greek" on line 18 through "countries" on line 20. This should be deleted because it identifies a specific operation and the foreign assets involved in its support. (Page 147, lines 6-8.)

16. Page 95 beginning with "quasi-military" on line 11 through "East" on line 16. This should be deleted because it describes various cover and support facilities used in Far East Asian countries. (Page 163, lines 6-11.)

17. Page 95 beginning with "Hong Kong" on line 16 through "Branch" on line 19. This should be deleted because it describes an operation conducted [jointly with a liaison 24 service in Hong Kong targetted] against mainland China and as such is not only damaging to current American detente efforts but is particularly menacing to Hong Kong authorities in view of their proximity and susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures. (Page 163, lines 11-14.) NA

substitute "In HK we run no independent operation

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[illegible]

18. Page 99 beginning with "disrupting" on line 5 through "display" on line 27 and including the footnote on page 99. 24 This passage describes specific CIA operations [in Tokyo targetted against China and as such are not only damaging to current detente efforts but are also disruptive to liaison relationships with the Japanese.] (Page 169 line 23 through page 170, line 22, including footnote.)

19. Page 102 beginning with "Despite" on line 6 through "returned" on line 10. This should be deleted because it describes a specific and sensitive CIA operation including [code materials]. (Page 175, lines 10-15.) 24

20. Page 105 beginning with "wiretap" on line 6 through "surreptitious-entry" on line 7. Ought to be deleted since it refers to sensitive Agency sources and methods. (Page 181, lines 2-3.)

21. Page 108 beginning with "tap" on line 17 through "Embassy" on line 7, page 109. This passage deals intermittently with various operational proposals, activities including a recruitment of an identifiable individual, as well as with sensitive methods of operation, e.g., surveillance teams. (Page 187, lines 6-24 through page 188, lines 1-15.)

22. Page 109 beginning with "FBI" on line 21 through "station" on line 26. The "Ramirez" operation. Describes an operation which began with the FBI's spotting of a possible Soviet intelligence agent. Since this information was then turned over to the Agency, a question arises concerning the need to seek the FBI's prior comments. (Page 189, lines 6-11.)

23. Page 111 beginning with "The" on line 22 through "triumvirate" on line 23. It would seem that an effort ought to be made to have this passage deleted or changed since its damage potential to [liaison relationships with the Uruguayan services] is considerable, and it does jeopardize the current careers and livelihoods of the Agency's contacts who are referred to by date and position and thus, are identifiable. (Page 192, lines 21-22.) 24 1958

24. Page 115 beginning with "I" on line 23 through "department" on line 35. This passage should be deleted because it describes Agency methods of operation --- acquisition and passage of information to and from a liaison service --- as well as an overall Agency program of operational activities within Uruguay involving the "[monitoring of forty-two telephone lines]". Page 200, lines 6-18.) 24

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NOT IN PASSAGE

25. Page 116 beginning with "technical" on line 10 through "secrets" on line 29. This passage should be deleted because it describes a sensitive operation conducted (jointly) with a liaison (Uruguayan) service (which involved code materials). (Page 201, lines 12-23 and page 202, lines 1-9.) 24

26. Page 122 beginning with "The" on line 8 through "Djilas" on line 9. This passage should be deleted because it attests to the Agency's subsidization of publication of Djilas' book. In addition an effort ought to be made to have the author remove or appropriately alter the rest of the paragraph wherein he refers to an Agency news service located in "Washington's National Press Building". (Page 211, line 4.)

27. Page 122 beginning with "from" through "Gaines" on line 31. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage in order that they be made aware of its possible interpretations. (Page 212, lines 4-5.)

Let OGC concerned 1964 campaign [illegible]

28. Page 123 beginning with "Soon" on line 12 through "Madrid" on line 35. This passage deals with the author's work on several "Peter Ward" books and, later, his assignment to Madrid. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage. (Page 212, last line through page 213, lines 1-23.)

29. Page 126 beginning with "Chief" on last line through "officers" on page 127, line 5. This passage should be deleted because it specifies the classified activities of a CIA officer, [Roger Goiran. 03, 06 His assignments in Tehran and Brussels], as well as his involvement in the compilation of a classified "encyclopedic study" are unwarranted disclosures of Agency methods. (Page 219, lines 8-13.)

30. Page 130 beginning with "Free" on line 20 through "CIA" on line 21. This phrase should be deleted because it could serve to affect the life of one of the principals of the Free Cuba Committee, [Mrs. Marieda Bourgin] 05, a former witting contact, who is now employed by the State Department. (Page 225, lines 10-11.)

31. Page 150, all of lines 14 through 16. It would appear that this description of the author's contact with Dr. Barney Malloy of CIA is very unfair to the latter. It implies that Hunt had a special relationship with Dr. Malloy and an effort ought to be made by OGC to have the author rewrite this version in order to reflect Dr. Malloy's true role in this affair. Page 260, lines 22-23 through page 261, lines 1-2.)

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32. Page 220, lines 5 through 10. This passage concerning the use of CIA alias documentation by Hunt and others includes loose language which implies that still another set of documents was prepared by the CIA for Hunt's use --- i.e., a set of documents which was not mentioned during the recent Congressional "Watergate hearings". As such this is misleading and could serve to create additional difficulties for the Agency. It is recommended that the OGC make an effort to have the author rewrite this paragraph in order that this potentially damaging language be removed from his manuscript. (Page 387, lines 4-9.)

add "old" + "new" to description of documents

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

RETURN TO [illegible]
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

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3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

C3

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

John D Morrison Jr

JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

1. ASANIS, Gundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6175 03
3. SHERWOOD, John 11997
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay [illegible]
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis NR
8. BROWN, James W. 4747 [illegible]
9. 03 SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amtrill-1 (Crypt) NR Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. 03 BENAS, Alis NR
15. BECHERT, Jerome F. NR – 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7737
19. BECKER, Alexander NR
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe [illegible] K-3097
21. 03 BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John 11997
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6177
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. 03 BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. 5311 ✓
30. CHAS, Peter [illegible]
[redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4294
34. CARTER, William R. [illegible] ✓
35. CROCE, Andrew 4247 ✓
36. FLORES, Thomas J. [illegible]
03 37. DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR ✓
42. DEMMONS, William H. [illegible]
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11537
44. DUBOIS, Rono E. [illegible]
45. EGAN, Frank J. [illegible]
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10012 ✓
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. [illegible]
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R. [illegible] ✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H. [illegible]
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. [illegible]
52. FLICK, Charlos E. [illegible] ✓

03

53. [illegible], John [illegible]
54. [illegible], Frank 7422 ✓
55. [illegible], [illegible] Peter 48-3[illegible]
56. [illegible], Charles [illegible] 3257 03
57. CR[illegible] ✓ Graano, aubra
58. [illegible]COLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162 ✓
60. 03 TISLER, Frantisek 16183 S-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NR
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9928
63. HUNT, E. Howard NR 9 1088
64. None ✓
65. 03 HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HIDALGO, Barney 03
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922
[redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward [illegible] K-21[illegible]
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR 03
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulis NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7420
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
48-336 78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 311[illegible]
79. KAPUSTA, Peter 10778
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR
83. KAPPES, 03 G. [illegible] (George M)
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack 3135
86. KENNEDY, John W. [illegible]
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph [illegible] 9325-10
[redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NR 03
[redacted]
92. 03 LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10566
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. 03 LOPUSZANSKY, Myroslaw 47-[illegible]
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. 03 CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Sergo T-825
101. MARTINEZ, Rubon [illegible]
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25-
104. 03 MARSAK, Frank 2974
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Gorrald J. NR 2

(Joe Latorre) TSD. 6

03

22/NJ

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro [illegible]
108. MORALES David S. 3643

[redacted]

03

110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard NK
111. NASARENKO, Michael NK
112. PIEPER, Harry C. [illegible]
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas NK
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw NK
117. FRANK, Maryado 4221
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos [illegible]
120. None ✓ 03

03

121. RASTENIS, Jonas NK
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 10?27
123. RAUS, Juri [illegible]
124. RIKAND, Enno NK
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) N.R.
126. 03 RATCLIFF, Richard [illegible]
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691

[redacted]

129. 03 REYNOLDS, Robert E. NK

[redacted]

131. 03 RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr 10764

[redacted]

133. 03 SULLIVAN, Dennis B 25-3591

[redacted]

136. STAROSTENKO, Henry NK
137. 03 IMLER, Norman C. 8052
138. SLEEPER, Gordon [illegible]
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. 03 GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. NK
142. SAGER, John 4192 — N-122

[illegible] K-5?11

143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill — 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. NK
145. 03 SOLNZEFF, Henry [illegible]
146. SOLER, Eva Diana NK
147. SATINSKAS, Henry NK
148. STEVENS, George A. [illegible]
149. WALLIN, Jack [illegible]
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

03

TRUE

03

151. AIMAN, James Henry NK 49
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11[illegible]
153. 03 TALLEY, Ulo NK
154. TURK, Leo L. [illegible]

[redacted]

156. 03 THOMAS, Edward [illegible]
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. 03 VINING, James L. 25-557
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald NK
161. HARVEY, William K. [illegible]
162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
163. 03 WILL, Kenneth John [illegible]
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. [illegible]
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-301
166. MERTZ, Richard 2501
167. None ✓
168. 03 ZANKIN, Myroslaw NK
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

02

06

LODYGENSKI, [illegible]
NK-1

9IN

14-00000

ALIAS

R.C. 7427 1. ACKER, Gerald 6815
48-338 2. ADLAND, Glennon Edward (21 Dec 60)
1166 3. AHORN, Paul Rodger
48-335 4. AIVVEY, Matt (21 Dec 60)
K-763 48-338 5. ASHBORNE, Howard Cla (21 Dec 60)
NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis 07
48-338 8. BARNAUD, James Winston (21 Dec 60)
8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-338 13. BELT, William Henry (21 Dec 60)
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
~~[illegible]~~ / RC 1715 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo 07
7717 NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-3017 20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
C-1737 / (N-89) 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
8711 48-338 ~~NR~~ 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
11667 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
2219 ~~NR~~ 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
5871 K ~~[illegible]~~ 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S. 07
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734 / P-120 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8447 NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 5305 NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR [redacted]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton (21 Dec 60)
[illegible] NR 33. CLINE, William David
14337 NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-16560 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul 4447
3037 NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37. (T) DAILEY, James
NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantino
48-338 42. DONAINE, William Henry 12465
[illegible] 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44. 83 DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
RC-11655 NR 45. ENGLSCH, Frank Joseph
.0016 NR 46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
K-[illegible] NR 47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC. 2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-338 51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
15765 / C-[illegible] 52. (T) FLICK, Charles E.

03

NR 53. FORDASCH, John Norman 4-25
74265 54. FROST, Frank 1426
48-338 55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter 45-33
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry 5557
~~[illegible]~~ 57. GENISHAN, Aubrey Lyle 7424
7714 NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-21115 59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos 1416
K ~~[illegible]~~ 60. HABER, Frantisek 16183
5-15476 61. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley 07 4
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph 1
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin 07
11747 66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
9927 67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark 90
NR [redacted]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer K-2156
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
7428 76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-2711) (3161) 78. KACHMAN, Benjamin Franklin 48-3
~~NR~~ 79. KARLQUIST, Paul 07 1007
NR 80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KERCHNER, George Michael 10
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony 1016
8017 86. KINSLOW, John William 07 8097
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph RC-25
NR [redacted]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR [redacted]
10550 92. (T) LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 03 ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest 07 5
~~[illegible]~~ 6570 94. LENART, Charles Edward
NR 95. LOWE, Myron 47-2567
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward 716
NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge. T-8
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben 16764
4593 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAN, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph 25 07

ALIAS 07 7797

107. MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert
3643 108. MIRANDA, Diego S.
NR [redacted]
NR 110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
NR 111. NASH, Mike 07
NR 112. PANOCK, Harry Charles 3-134-633
NR 113. PAPPS, William David 5610
NR 114. PARKER, Carl Frank
NR 115. PASTOR, Nick
NR 116. PAULSON, Marty
NR 117. PEVER, Laura Jean 4021
NR 118. POLACEK, Henry Franklin 4271
NR 119. POLING, Janos
NR 120. RAHILL, Richard Kent
NR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
NR 121. RANALLO, Jonas
122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward 10739
25-157 123. REED, Juri
NR 124. REESE, Eno
NR 125. REEse, Joseph Anthony
NR 126. RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence 13315
~~[illegible]~~ 127. ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.
061 NR [redacted]
NR 129. ROGERS, Robert E. 07
NR [redacted]
N [redacted] NR 131. RCTTUM, Lowell Owen Jr. 11
N [redacted]
NR 133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 25-3541
NR [redacted]
NR [redacted]
NR 136. SEALE, Henry
NR 137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8652
11635 138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMY
NR 139. SHALER, Floyd A.
NR 140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
NR 141. SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
N-122 142. SIMPSON, John 07 DEF. 4192
N XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
45-335 143 SIROTA, Edward G. (PC) K-5371
NR 144. SLATER, Lawrence
NR 145. SNYDER, Gene 13713
NR 146. None
NR 147. SORENSON, Henry
45-335 148. STANDARD, George Adam
NR 149. STATEN, Samuel Addison 07
~~[illegible]~~ 150. ~~XXXXXXX~~, STEPHENS, Marina T. 11184

ALIAS

48-335 151. STEVENS, James Henry
NR 152. None
NR 153. None
NR 154. TANIER, Lester Lewis
NR [redacted]
48-338 156. TOGGITT, Edward J.
NR 157. TORREY, Erasmus
349 158. TRABAN, Gregorio R.
N-113 159. VALCHIN, James Louis
NR 160. VAN CHADDE, Donald
(PC) K-2395 161. WALKER, William 07
N-122 162. WELK, Joseph Reinhol
48-338 163. WIDEGREN, Keith J.
~~K-4466~~ 14856 164. WILLEMS, Brenton Wal
NR 165. WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
NR 166. WOLF, Frederick Morri
NR 167. WONG, Lam
NR 168. ZEAMAN, Myron
NR 169. ZIMMER, Paul R. 07

NR 97 [illegible]

71 PJ

14-00000

ALIAS

R.C. 7427 1. / ACKER, Gerald 6815
48-558 2. / ADLAND, Glennon Edward (210560)
1166 3. / AHORN, Paul Rodger
48-555 4. AIVVEY, Matt (210560)
K-763 48-3785. ASHBORNE, Howard Cla (210560)
NR 6. AUDISTO, Mario
NR 7. BARKER, Algis
48-378 8. BARNAUD, James Winston (210560)
8435-NR 9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
NR 10. BARRETO, John Raymond
13915-NR 11. BAUER, William John
NR 12. BAUGH, William James
48-378 13. BELT, William Henry (210560)
NR 14. BENTON, Alan
NR 15. BERUCK, Karl Donald
14317 NR 16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
P-168 17. BERGSON, William Kinander
7717 / 18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
NR 19. BEST, Alexander
(RC) K-3017 20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
C-1734 / N-89 21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
48-33 22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
1166 23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
2219 24. BRICK, Robert Leo
6871 K 25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
NR 26. BRIGGS, Herb
C-1734 / P-12 27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
8447-NR 28. BRUTON, William Emmott
9181 5305 -NR 29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
-NR 30. CARNEY, Peter
NR [redacted]
48-338 32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton (210560)
NR 33. CLINE, William David
14337-NR 34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
5-165 35. CROWE, Andrew Paul 4447
NR 36. CURBELO, Eduardo
T-421 37. DAILEY, James
NR 38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
7168 39. DELAINE, William Alan
9540 NR 40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
NR 41. DE LONG, Constantino
48-338 42. DONAINE, William Henry 12465
NR 43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
9564 44. [DUBOIS, ⁶Rene E.] ARMY
KC-1165- NR 45. ENGLSON, Frank Joseph
NR 46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
K- NR 47. ELLECOR, William Monroe
NR 48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
NR 49. FARON, Charles Andrew
RC. 2535 NR 50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
5561 48-338 51. FITSANES, Lucian Charles
15765 / C-30 52. [T FLICK, ³Charles E.]

ALIAS

NR 53. FORDASCH, John Norman 4-25
7426 54. FROST, Frank 7426
48-338 55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter 45-33
48-338 56. GENGARO, Charles Henry 3557
7714 57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle 7424
NR 58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
25-211 59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos 1416
K ~~9666~~ 60. HABER, Frantisek 16183
5-154 61. HALE, William Mark
NR 62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley
NR 63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
NR 64. HARRISON, Louise
NR 65. HASKINS, John Martin
11747 66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
9927 67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
NR 68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
NR [redacted]
48-338 70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer K-2156
NR 71. IRVING, Andrew
NR 72. JACOBS, Stephan
NR 73. JAMES, Nicholas
NR 74. JARECKI, Stanley
NR 75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
7428 76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
NR 77. JUDD, Nicholas
(C-2711) (3161) 78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin 48-3
79. KARLQUIST, Paul 106
NR 80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
NR 81. KELLY, Myron
NR 82. KENDALL, Paul
NR 83. KERCHNER, George Michael 1
NR 84. KERKSICK, Walter
NR 85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony 101
807 86. KINSLOW, John William 869
NR 87. KOLA, Walter
NR 88. KOSTIK, Joseph R.C.-25-
NR [redacted]
NR 90. LANSING, John
NR [redacted]
10550 92. (T) [LEE, Watson ⁶Hwa Shen] ARMY
NR 93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest 5
~~6570~~ 94. LENART, Charles Edward
6570 NR 95. LOWE, Myron 47-567
NR 96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
10333 97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
NR 98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph 48-
NR 99. MALABRE, Howland Edward 116
NR 100. MALOKOFF, Serge. T-8
NR 101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben 1626
459 102. MARSAL, Karl
25-557 103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
C-2994 104. MASON, Frank
NR 105. MCADAN, George Thomas
NR 106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald, Joseph -25

3/mc

1. ASANIS, Gundaris [illegible]
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
3. SHERWOOD, John 11097
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay [illegible]
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio NR
8. BROWN, James W. 4742 [illegible]
9. SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amthrill-I (Crypt) NR Julio Kawi Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. BENAS, Alis NR
15. BECERT, Jerome F. NR — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7797
19. BECKER, Alexander NR
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe [illegible] K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John 11097
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. 5366 ✓
30. CHAS, Peter [illegible]
[redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4894
34. CARTER, William R. [illegible] ✓
35. CROCE, Andrew 4647
36. FLORES, Thomas J. [illegible] ✓
37. DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR
42. DEMMONS, William H. [illegible] ✓
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11397
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. [illegible]
45. EGAN, Frank J. [illegible]
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10013 ✓
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr. [illegible]
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R. [illegible] ✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H. [illegible]
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr. [illegible]
52. FLICK, Charles E. [illegible] 765 ✓

53. [illegible], John [illegible] ✓
54. [illegible], Frank 7422 ✓
55. [illegible], Robert Peter 48-33
56. [illegible], Charles [illegible] 3857
57. [illegible] ✓ Greano, Aubrey
58. [illegible]COLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162 ✓
60. TISLER, Frantisek 16183
61. GREENE, Bill NR S-1567
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9808
63. HUNT, E. Howard 9 1088
64. None
65. HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922
[redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward [illegible] K-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulcis NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7428
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
48-336 78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 3111
79. KAPUSTA, Peter 10378
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR
83. KAPPES, G. [illegible] George M
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack [illegible]
86. KENNEDY, John W. [illegible]
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph NR, 25-10
[redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NR
[redacted]
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10580
93. MAYERFEILD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-5
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-835
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben [illegible]
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25-
104. MARSAK, Frank 8-2994
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Corrald J. NR 2

[illegible] Joe Latorre TSD. 60

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro 1771
108. MORALES David S. 3643
[redacted]
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard NK
111. NASARENKO, Michael NK
112. PIEPER, Harry C. 3-1?? - 633
113. PHILLIPS, William D. 2610
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas NK
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw NK
117. FRANK, Maryado 4021
118. MOORE, Robert Butler 4271
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos NK
120. None ✓

121. RASTENIS, Jonas NK
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene 10227
123. RAUS, Juri [illegible]
124. RIKAND, Enno NK
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt) N.R.
126. RATCLIFF, Richard [illegible]
127. REEVES, John M. Jr. 10691
[redacted]
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E. NK
[redacted]
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr. 10764
[redacted]
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B. 25-3591
[redacted]
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry NK
137. IMLER, Norman C. 8055
138. SLEEPER, Gordon 11055
139. None ✓
140. None ✓
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr. NK
142. SAGER, John 4192 — N-122
K.C. K-5571
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill - 48-338
144. SLENYS, Lindas K. NK
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry [illegible]
146. SOLER, Eva Diana NK
147. SATINSKAS, Henry NK
148. STEVENS, George A. 48-331
149. WALLIN, Jack, NK
150. TASHEFF, Mary 11184

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry NK 48
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P. 11[illegible]
153. TALLEY, Ulo NK
154. TURK, Leo L. [illegible]
[redacted]
156. THOMAS, Edward [illegible]
157. None ✓
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry 349
159. VINING, James L. 25-557
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald NK
161. HARVEY, William K. K.C. [illegible]
162. BULIK, Joseph 3714
163. WILL, Kenneth John 48-331
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr. 1485
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss 25-3011
166. MERTZ, Richard 2201
167. None ✓
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw NK
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

LODYGENSKI [illegible]
NK

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

E-2 IMPDET
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3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

C3

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

John D Morrison Jr
JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

c2

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

ORIGINAL

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at [Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

lpN

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would soon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

~~SECRET~~

C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

para 1 declassified by AAL on 19 Sept 78

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

~~SECRET~~

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

~~SECRET~~

3 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security ~~and essential to the furtherance of the~~ national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn 8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn Date
Director of Security

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927 Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male Divorced Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet Caucasian --

~~SECRET~~

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

AKA: Yuri NOSENKO

DPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee SHLIKOV).
1948 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced.
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.

EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:
1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR
1956 - Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~ SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational~~ interest ~~to this Agency.~~ Therefore, it is requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, SR Division	EXTENSION 5777	NO.
		DATE 13 February 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comm
1. DD/OS				TOP SECRET — EYES ONLY BY HAND
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17—Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 5.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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14-00000

folio

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for aslyum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post
2/15/64

See Defector

Solie

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say. I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Wash Post
2/15

~~[illegible]~~

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch YAF

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich (~~[illegible]~~), McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DDC/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/SAB
1	C/SB YAF
2	Cuya
	[illegible]TS
	FILES

~~SECRET~~

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE—These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

SECRET

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

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SECRET

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(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Lit Crim - US v. Leon

FROM: (William H. Godson) 03
CI/R&A/O

EXTENSION: 1592

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/CI/R&A/O	0 2 NOV 1977		NF	
2.				
3. AC/CI/R&A	2 NOV 1977	2 Nov		
4.				
5. C/CI Staff	2 NOV 1977	3 NOV 1977		5-6: This note is pursuant to an discussion of the black notebook several weeks ago. You may wish to talk directly with (Bill Godson 03) who has reviewed the file.
6. OGC - Mr. John Greaney				
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SCC 77-6714
11-4-77

1 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : William H. Godson 03
CI/R&A/O

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin File

1. I have reviewed the material in the Herbert Itkin file which is divided into two main divisions. The first concerns the details of Itkin's use as an unpaid witting informant on matters concerning an attempt by Haitian exiles in 1963 to unseat then President Duvalier. This involved a large number of contacts with Haitian exiles in New York, Washington, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Itkin became a legal advisor for a Haitian Government-In-Exile and put up $15,000 of his "own funds" for this Haitian enterprise. Bernard E. MONCURE (P) a CI Staff staff agent in New York, rode piggy-back on Itkin's contacts with the Haitians to make his own operational contacts within the group. He also provided a small amount of money to them ($4,300) from CIA funds. It would seem from information in the file that there was high-level governmental interest in removing Duvalier from office in 1963. This information is contained in handwritten notes which are paraphrased and indicate high-level interest in the activities of the Haitian exile group. (I suggest that this material be kept in case there are Freedom of Information Act requests on CIA activities involving Haiti in 1962-1963.)

2. The second and bulkier section of material concerns Itkin's efforts to involve MONCURE and CIA in his attempts to secure custody of his wife's children from her second marriage. Itkin had been heavily involved as a lawyer and confidant with Mafia syndicates and labor unions, particularly the teamsters. While doing this he had gained a large amount of information on the Mafia. In March 1963, MONCURE had recruited Itkin for the FBI for domestic issues while maintaining for CIA the use of Itkin for foreign intelligence matters. The FBI and the federal prosecutors in New York starting in 1968 found Itkin to be a very important witness in a series of criminal indictments starting with New York City Water Commissioner Marcus.

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Itkin and his wife had for a long time been struggling to maintain custody over her children from her second marriage. Claiming that she had violated the custody stipulations of a New York court by moving them more than 50 miles from New York without his permission, Frederick Hersh, Mrs. Itkin's former husband, gained custody of the children by means of a ruling from the British court in 1966. Mrs. Itkin began legal procedures in New York to regain the children. As part of their effort they swore affadavits that Mrs. Itkin had taken the children to England at the request of the CIA. Itkin embellished on his CIA record by stating that he had worked for CIA for many years prior to 1963, and insisted that his original contact had been set up between Harold Stassen and Allen Dulles in Philadelphia in the summer of 1954. Most of these assertions were fabrications. MONCURE's CIA relationship was exposed in various legal circles in New York. The Agency wanted to avoid MONCURE's having to contradict Mr. and Mrs. Itkins' affadavits in court. The FBI seemed to have been more interested in protecting Itkin's reputation, as a witness than in protecting MONCURE's reputation for honesty.

3. MONCURE did not appear in court. The Federal authorities eventually placed protection around Itkin and his wife, keeping them on a military reservation, while he appeared as a star witness in numerous Mafia cases which led to covictions.

03

4. One small side issue is worth noting: (Thomas L. Roberts,) who was a (law partner of Itkin) until mid-1961, became a (CIA staff agent under cover in Africa.) 24 The many fraudulent activities of Itkin spread a scintilla of suspicion around 03 (Roberts.) The latter was given a polygraph examination in Frankfurt. He answered questions on his relationship with Itkin including financial and his few contacts with Marcus to the satisfaction of his interrogators.

5. Comments: The thrust of the file is mainly defensive. CIA was reacting to Itkin's tactics to help his wife gain custody over her children. Itkin's numerous trips to England and Europe were made on behalf of the FBI, and they were part of an FBI attempt to gain information on the Mafia. Before the recruitment of Itkin and his utilization by the FBI, CIA did pass to the Attorney General in 1963 information on a Department of Labor official's alleged criminal involvement with the Mafia, which MONCURE had elicited from Itkin. The file also refers to MONCURE's continued contact with one Mafia figure Lenzieri, who was a legal client, as a means of self-protection as Lenzieri represented a channel back to the Mafia

for MONCURE, who was apprehensive of Mafia retaliation because of his involvement with Itkin.

6. I have talked to Will Kerbe who is presently the case officer in contact for MONCURE. He says that MONCURE is in limited law practice and is drawing a pension from the Agency as well as a contract for services connected with Golitsyn. There is probably nothing in the file which could damage MONCURE's security as much of the information regarding his association with Itkin has already been exposed. The most recent information in the file is a January 1975 memorandum for the record from Acting Chief, CI, which states that John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel had learned that Seymour Hersh had learned details of the Itkin-MONCURE relationship. It would appear that Mr. Greaney is the most knowledgeable person in the agency on the legal aspects of the Itkin case and probably maintains his own files.

03

William H. Godson

William H. Godson

CONFIDENTIAL

32814

10 April 1963

Security Division
Federal Aviation Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Charles F. Niles

Subject: **HARVEY, WILLIAM K.**

Dear Sir:

In accordance with existing arrangements made with the Federal Aviation Agency and to confirm our oral notification, it is requested that your files reflect the above-named individual, an employee of this Agency, as having been issued Federal Aviation Agency Credential Number 4883, on 2 January 1963.

In the event of an inquiry, this information may be released to verify the authenticity of this credential.

Nicholas R. Zubon
Chief, Building Security Branch
Office of Security

SECRET

12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION
(See Houma Munitions Bunker - Leased by Subject firm)

ALLEGATION:

GARRISON has charged that the burglary of the Houma munitions bunker was "CIA-inspired." He issued arrest warrants for Gordon NOVEL and Sergio ARCACHA SMITH charging them with the Houma burglary.

SOURCE:

Enclosure 24 of CI/R&A memorandum of 7 August 1967.

CIA CONNECTION:

CIA had no connection with the alleged burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker or any connection with the bunker itself.

However, Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, president of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION, was of contact interest in 1950 for routine exploitation as a foreign intelligence source. The FBI advised they had no objection to the Agency's interrogating Pierre SCHLUMBERGER who was an alien. In 1962 DAYSTROM, INC. was acquired by SCHLUMBERGER, INC. The Agency had a contract with DAYSTROM for an unclassified item [($49,000 contract for the production of Mark II limpet mines);] Agency interest was classified Secret. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. is a Dutch firm controlled by French nationals. After the merger, it was determined that future relationship with DAYSTROM must be governed by Agency policy not to place classified contracts with a foreign firm. In 1963 the same decision was reached concerning Agency contracts with Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. EMR dealt in all phases of telemetry. Contact clearances for other personnel of SCHLUMBERGER are set out below.

24

OS INDICES RESULTS:

The SCHLUMBERGER COMPANY was the subject of a name check in 1947 because of a contact request, and it was determined that there are a number of SCHLUMBERGER corporations in Latin America which are dominated by French nationals. SCHLUMBERGER has a patented operation for an oil well "shooting" service which is subscribed to by various oil companies. The SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION in Houston was controlled by Henri Georges DOLL, a French national. He was of contact interest in 1956 and 1957. His wife is the daughter of Conrad SCHLUMBERGER.

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[In August 1951 the Agency was interested in contacting Professor Edouard POLDINI, a geophysicist and professor at the University of Geneva and formerly an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION in Paris, for operational use. He was to be used as a channel to a Janus KANTAS who could give information about the fate of the previous employees of the Jersey Company in Hungary, the production figures and extent of exploitation of existing oil fields and exploration of new oil fields together with the names of the officials of the Russian Hungarian Company who took over the Jersey Company.]

In March 1953 the SCHLUMBERGER file reflects that an FBI source furnished information that one Maurice Henri MARTIN, employed as an engineer by the SCHLUMBERGER Company, Paris, France, received a letter dated 27 July 1951 at Moscow from one Siegfied Stefanovitch MOROSOFF, asking MARTIN for specialized information concerning geophysics. The letter requested that MARTIN's reply be forwarded to Moscow through an intermediary. From January 1932 until April 1937 MARTIN represented the SCHLUMBERGER Company in Russia as an engineer, and it was thought that the correspondence from MOROSOFF may represent a Soviet attempt to resume contact with MARTIN and develop clandestine relations with him. The FBI conducted an investigation dated June 1953 and determined that Maurice Henri MARTIN resided at Nod Hill, Wilton, Connecticut and was employed by the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Co., Ridgefield, Connecticut. Informants advised that although MARTIN was strongly nationalistic toward France, he gave every indication of being anti-Russian and there was no evidence of CP activities.

When DAYSTROM, INC. merged with SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., research was done on the directors and officers of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. The results are as follows:

OS indices reflect a record on Dillon ANDERSON, a trustee of Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD.) who was also a proposed trustee of "NEW DAYSTROM" when it merged with SCHLUMBERGER. ANDERSON is an attorney from Houston, Texas who was appointed by President EISENHOWER as an advisor to the National Security Council from 1953 until 1956. He was considered for a special clearance in August 1955 but the briefing was not given. He was granted a covert clearance in December 1953 and April 1954 [for use as a covert associate on Project LPFUNNEL.] 08

Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, President and Chief Executive Officer, SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., Houston, Texas, French citizen, was of contact interest in 1950.

Charles C. PARLIN, Director of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., and a member of the law firm of SHEARMEN, STERLING and WRIGHT, Englewood, New Jersey, U. S. citizen, was of contact interest in 1962 but was security disapproved. PARLIN was allegedly the boy friend of Johanna BEKER who was in contact with known Soviet Agents, ROBERT and JACK SOBLE. BEKER advised the FBI in 1957 that she received, paid for and transmitted to Robert SOBLE, OSS information which was given her by two former OSS employees. She also advised the FBI in 1957 that she

2/n

had given a very general outline of her activities to PARLIN and it is reliably reported that PARLIN and HEBER shared a hotel room in Holland in 1957. PARLIN recommended a William Woart LANCASTER for OSS employment. LANCASTER was a member of the same law firm as PARLIN and had a long record of Communist front affiliations. PARLIN in 1956 traveled to Russia as a member of a delegation under the sponsorship of the National Council of Churches. He was also the lawyer for a Swiss armament industrialist who sold arms to the Nazis and the Communist countries since that time.

Clark Drouillard GOODMAN, Vice-President of SCHLUMBERGER, Ltd., Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security disapproved for use by TSD in 1952 and for contact use in 1955 based on his support of Professor Dirk STRUIK, a colleague at MIT, who was indicted on a charge of having been a Communist conspirator and identified as a Communist Party member. In March 1959 the same derogatory information was furnished the Contact Office to be considered in determining any use of GOODMAN. Also, a book written by GOODMAN's wife, May Ellen GOODMAN, was favorably reviewed by the "DAILY WORKER" in 1956.

Jean C. LEGRAND, Vice-President of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut (U. S. citizen, naturalized Houston, Texas 1941) was approved for contact use in May 1957. His file is clear. There is a notation that one Mrs. J. C. LEGRAND, 5319 Mandell Street, Houston, Texas, in November 1944 was President of the Houston Chapter, France Forever, The Fighting French Committee in America.

Everett STRATTON, Sales Manager, Houston Area, SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security approved (CAUTION) for contact use in October 1950. His file is clear.

10

Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, French citizen, archeologist and teacher at the University of Strasbourg, France in 1955, was granted an operational approval for use as a contract agent in Kabul in April 1956 but the clearance was cancelled 20 September 1956. His file is clear. However, in a file on Nicholas KAGAN, French financier, and suspected Soviet agent, which contains a detailed study of the inter-relationships and family connections existing in French firms, information on Daniel SCHLUMBERGER is contained therin. Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, a member of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, was head of the French Archeological Delegation in Afghanistan (1948-1954). An associate of Daniel SCHLUMBERGER was Raoul CURIEL of a wealthy Jewish banking family in Cairo, Egypt. Raoul and his brother, Henri CURIEL had Communist backgrounds and their mother was aunt to George BLAKE English Soviet spy who defected to Russia. BLAKE had lived with the CURIEL's in Cairo. Also Gilbert PONTECORVO, known Communist, was in contact with Eugenio CURIEL, a relative of the CURIEL family involved in the George BLAKE case. Bruno PONTECORVO, Gilbert's brother, and the atomic scientist who defected to Russia in 1950, worked for the Well Surveying Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma, from 1940 to 1942 but it was not known if the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation is in any way connected with the Well Surveying Corporation in Tulsa.

SCHLUMBERGER and Company and another SCHLUMBERGER subsidiary firm, Machine Bull (Competitor of IBM), are connected with Schneider and Company, 42 rue d'Anjou, Paris. Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, manager of Compagnie Internationale de Commerce, represents SCHNEIDER for the USSR and is a Soviet agent. In September 1961, an investigation conducted in France disclosed that "everything that takes place in the Elysee is known in Moscow within 48 hours and the originator of such intelligence is Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL." Machines Bull is controlled by General Electric Company of the U. S. and SCHNEIDER and Company is affiliated with U. S. Westinghouse Corporation under the name SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse.

The Study in KAGAN's file contains the following additional information concerning SCHLUMBERGER and Company:

Maurice and Remi SCHLUMBERGER are affiliated with Lazard Freres and the Worms Bank. Lazard Freres controls SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse and has a New Orleans Branch Office. Closely associated with the SCHLUMBERGER's is Charles DOH. DOH was born at Odessa in 1911 and arrived in the United States in 1937 to join the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation at Houston, Texas. He became a U. S. citizen on 6 September 1950. Charles has a brother, Jean, who was closely associated with Leonard HOUNAU, a suspected Soviet agent. HOUNAU was closely associated with Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, previously mentioned Soviet agent connected with SCHLUMBERGER and Company. Charles DOH was approved for Agency contact use in September 1955 as a member of the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation. His file is clear.

Roger Robert Henri HENQUET, Executive Vice-President, SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation, Houston, Texas, was approved for contact use on a limited basis in October 1950. He had been an employee of OSS from 1943 to 1945; was given American citizenship and the Congressional Medal of Honor for his deeds during World War II.

Arthur Henry FRENTROP, an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut, was of contact interest in June 1956. Information concerning his spouse's critical attitude towards American customs and institutions and the dominant position she exercised over her husband was furnished the contact office.

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FYI

5 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the General Counsel

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Staff

INFO : Mr. Rocca, CI Staff

SUBJECT : 03 Thomas Lee Roberts: The Itkin Case

1. At our meeting on 30 January 1969, certain additional questions were raised relative to the relationship between Roberts 03 and Itkin.

29 First, when did 02 LPGLOBE become aware that Itkin and the Conestoga Group had approached 03 Roberts with a proposal to represent them in Africa? 10 We were advised in 1966 through case officer meetings with Roberts that he had been developing some potential cover company business 03 with interests from the United States and England. We were given the name of the Conestoga Group no later 29 than 27 October 1966. We cannot say that we then knew the individual names of those involved. It was not uncommon for 03 Roberts to have discussions with a number of potential clients; when it became apparent that no real business was forthcoming from this group, our interest ceased.

At the 30 January meeting, we were also asked certain 08 questions about Roberts financial involvement with the law firm he and Itkin has been 03 with prior to Robert's association 03 with the Agency.

2. We can add nothing to 03 Roberts' account of January 1968 reflecting that he entered into an agreement with the firm on 31 May 1961 wherein he was authorized leave of absence from 1 June 1961 to 31 May 1963 drawing $100.00 per week for that period.

03

Eugene Milligan
EUGENE MILLIGAN
Chief, CCS/LPGLOBE
02

OGC 69-0402

4 March 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I showed Mr. George Carey his memorandum of 1955 to the Director referring to T. and H., and said we thought that H. referred to a General Hardin. After considerable speculation Mr. Carey finally placed T. as being Juan Trippe and Hardin as an Air Force General who was being placed with 24 (Pan Am) for operational reasons, primarily technical information collection. Independently Mrs. Lovejoy had checked with Mr. Larocque, and he also recalled General Hardin was a man Mr. Carey was interested in placing with (Pan Am) 24 for operational reasons.

2. The Air Force Register lists a General Thomas O. Hardin, Air Force Major General, who retired in 1955, which would seem to fit in as he is listed as an airline executive. Mr. Carey had no knowledge whatsoever of the Itkin case, and we felt it was out of the question that General Hardin is synonymous with Philip Harbin.

LRH.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

OGC:LRH:bt
1-C/CI/R&A
1-DCS
2-General Counsel chrono
✓subject HERBERT ITKIN

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TO: MELBOURNE, CANBERRA.

SECRET TELEPOUCH

22
DISP NO: FAMW-4125

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973 13-10

TO: CHIEF OF BASE, MELBOURNE
CHIEF OF STATION, CANBERRA 13-4

FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION

SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN

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FYI ONLY:

03 24

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 MR. LESLIE V. JARVIS, ASIO REP IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HQS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFFITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERBERT ITKIN WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FBI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSBY", (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A

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COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.

B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.

C. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS IN USA."

D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUTED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLED BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL (OGC) WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE AFFIDAVITS (ALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN) RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN AND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAYING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

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OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

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INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMATION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.

3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS.

U/S/C VIA POUCH

E2 IMPDET.H

03

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973
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EXT: 5621/9033

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
OGC MR. GREANY (IN DRAFT)
CI MR. ROCCA (IN DRAFT)

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FILE NUMBER 5-2-5/3

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OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

RETURN TO CIA
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SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs. Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January. It was concluded that additional information was required on 03 Thomas L. Roberts and Robert Delson. 03 I contacted the Director of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals and was advised that we could not have the security files but that Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 03 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on Roberts and Delson and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts' affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin. 03

3. On 30 January a 03 meeting was held 02 with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and Eugene Milligan, CCS/LPGLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. Roberts. Mr. 03 Roberts has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 03 August 1961. From March 1964 to November 1964 he spent time in West Africa writing a monograph 24 on West African legal problems. 10 It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 Roberts 03 was assigned for Cover to the Radio Corporation of America 24 legal staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to Dakar.

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4. The facts in the attached chronology 03 are subject to question since they are the result of Roberts own explanation of his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of 03 Roberts affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings 03 Roberts' name into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations. One of the questions to be answered by 02 LPGLOBE personnel is whether or not 03 Roberts reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva, Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of 03 Roberts' having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or what his financial contribution was to the law firm of Itkin, Roberts 08 and Greenbaum.

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution against 03 Roberts for having absconded with funds received from negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to 03 Robert Delson there appear to have been two operational considerations, one having been a request to use him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February 1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO Division advised Security that Delson was not going to be used on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented 03 that there are some rather ominous allegations against members of the firm of Delson, Levin 08 and Gordon, indicating that one member of the firm was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. Delson. 03

John K Greaney
JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

12/PJ

7 March 1966	Roberts 03 received letter from Itkin but his secretary advised that Roberts 03 was on vacation in Austria. Itkin contacted Roberts 03 in Austria 10 and set up meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. 10
15 March 1966	Meeting at Hotel Beau Rivage 08 in Geneva. 10 Present were Itkin and wife 08 Jim Marcus, 06 06 Littman and wife 08 Meeting lasted three days. No projects get off the ground.
Nov 1966	Roberts 03 in New York City, met at Marcus's 06 apartment with Itkin and Marcus's 06 father. Then met Itkin again at a dinner given by Mario Brod. 06
Nov 1967	Roberts 03 again in New York and contacted Itkin. Had lunch with Itkin and Brod. 06 Last time Roberts 03 saw or heard of Itkin until he read in the press about the Marcus 06 scandal.

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03 THOMAS L. ROBERTS

Nov 1949	03 Roberts volunteered his services to 08 Boston FBI; not accepted.
Jan 1950	03 Roberts left United States to study in 10 Paris.
Nov 1950	From Nov. 1950 until Nov. 1955 reported on security matters to the Boston FBI Office, Labor Youth League. 24
Aug 1955	Itkin 08, 03 hired Roberts to work for 08 Delson, Levin & Gordon. 03 Roberts says he was hired to handle 08 maritime matters in litigation.
Nov 1955	03 Roberts moved to New York City.
June 1956	Resumed services of reporting to 24 FBI. Was a paid informant of New York FBI office reporting on the National Lawyers Guild. 24
Fall 1956	03 Roberts and others submitted profit-sharing plan to Delson, Levin & Gordon; not accepted.
Apr 1957	03 Roberts resigned from 08 Delson, Levin & Gordon 08 to form a new firm, Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin. 08 (No mention of financial arrangement of setting up new firm.)
6 Apr 1961	03 Roberts came to Washington and talked with Robert Amory about employment with CIA since Amory had been a former professor of 08 Roberts. 03 Roberts was sent to overt CIA personnel recruiter and filled out an application for employment with CIA.
1 June 1961	03 Roberts took a leave of absence from the firm of 08 Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin which was to last from 1 June 1961 through 31 May 1963. 08 Roberts 03

24/BV

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	was to receive 08 $100 per week from the firm while on the leave of absence. Roberts 03 did receive the following payments: 08 09 Sept 1961 - 08 $200; 09 4 Dec 1961 - $100; 09 10 Jan 1962 - 08 $100; 09 1 June 1962 - $100; 08 09 18 June 1962 - 08 $500. NOTE: Roberts 03 received only $1,000 when he should have received $10,400. 08
12 July 1961	29 FBI advised that 08 Roberts 03 was still reporting to them in New York.
25 July 1961	03 Roberts was given CIA polygraph interview.
Aug 1961	03 Roberts approved by Office of Security for CIA employment as a Staff Agent.
Sept 1961	29 FBI advised they had broken off all contact with Roberts. 03
24 May 1963	03 Roberts wrote letter to 08 firm withdrawing his membership effective 31 May 09 1963.
May 1965	03 Roberts received a check from Itkin for $2,500 but with the stipulation that 03 Roberts send $1,250 to England in order to get the money out of reach of Itkin's first wife.
26 May 1965	03 Roberts arrived in 12-10 Dakar.
16 June 1965	03 Roberts sent $500 to Itkin in England after asking Itkin about a desk and chair to be sent to 03 Roberts in 12-10 Dakar.
10 Nov 1965	03 Roberts forwarded money to Aida Itkin in England.
Jan 1966	Itkin advised 03 Roberts about the formation of 08 Conestoga, Ltd.
Feb 1966	Itkin wrote to 03 Roberts about Senator Lodge.

35/pv

SECRET

OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs. Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January. It was concluded that additional information was required on 03 Thomas L. Roberts and 06 Robert Delson 07 I contacted the Director of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals and was advised that we could not have the security files but that Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on Roberts and 06 Delson and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin. 03

3. On 30 January 03 a meeting was held 02 with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and Eugene Milligan, CCS/LP/GLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. Roberts 03 Mr. 03 Roberts has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. 10 From March 1964 to November 24 1964 he spent time in West Africa writing a monograph on West African legal problems. It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 Roberts 03 was assigned for Cover to the Radio Corporation of America 24 legal staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to Dakar.

12-10

SECRET

14/pv

SECRET

4. The facts in the attached chronology are subject to question since they are the result of 03 (Roberts) own explanation of his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of 03 (Roberts) affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings 03 (Roberts') name into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations. One of the questions to be answered by 02 (LP)GLOBE personnel is whether or not 03 (Roberts) reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva, Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of 03 (Roberts') having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or what his financial contribution was to the (law firm of Itkin, Roberts and Greenbaum.) 08

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution against 03 (Roberts) for having absconded with funds received from negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to 06 (Robert Delson) there appear to have been two operational considerations, one having been a request to use him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February 1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO Division advised Security that 06 (Delson) was not going to be used on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather ominous allegations against members of the firm of (Delson, Levin and Gordon) 08 indicating that one member of the firm was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. (Delson.) 06

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

SECRET

12/pv

0202

OC-III-67-091

Communications

1 FEB 1967

RETURN TO CIA
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

SUBJECT : Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

1. The Office of Communications recently purchased two Collins Radio Company Model TE-216D-16D High Frequency Data Modems at a cost of $20,000 each. These Modems are specially designed equipment and will be used to test the feasibility of transmitting Secure (encrypted) Voice over a narrow band, high frequency, radio circuit. We also intend to determine their suitability for use in high speed data transmission, and tests by our Engineering Staff are scheduled to commence in mid-February.

2. Owing to the fact Modems are very complex in operation requiring special set-up techniques and adjustment, it would be advantageous to have a specialist available to assist our personnel and to assure timely completion of the tests. Accordingly, it is requested that a contract be let with the Collins Radio Company for the services of a Field Service Engineer. It is presently estimated that the services of this Engineer will be required at 24 (Station "D", WTC) for approximately six to eight weeks depending on test results. The exact date on which the Engineer is needed will be determined as preliminary installation of the equipment is completed. For planning purposes, however, we estimate he will be required on or about 6 March 1967.

3. It is understood from discussions with Collins representatives at Newport Beach, California, that engineering services of this type cost approximately $3,000 per month in addition to travel expenses. We recommend that the services of Modem Field Service Engineer, Mr. (Donald Warren Waycott,) 06 be secured, as he has an Agency TOP SECRET clearance effective 19 May 1965.

4. For any additional information, please contact Mr. (Jack W. Andrews) 03 on Extension 2045.

JOHN W. COFFEY
Director of Communications

Attachment:
Request for Procurement Services

3/17

SUBJECT: Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

CONCURRENCE:

(Signed) RICHARD H. LANSDALE
Office of General Counsel

[illegible] 1967
Date

for Harlan A. Westrell
Director of Security

3 FEB 1967
Date

APPROVAL:

/S/ Dow H. Lutscher
for Director of Personnel

8 FEB 1967
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - Director of Security w/o att.
1 - Director of Personnel w/o att.
1 - General Counsel w/o att.

10 o'clock DCI's deadline.

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Talked to Jim Collis, Deputy Chief Ground Photo Services Branch, in the absence of Harry Van Tuyl. There is no photo of the "3 bums in police custody at the scene of the assasination". Without a credit at the bottom of the photo it cannot be obtained from the wire service direct.

Mr Collis called Herb Simmons CRS, Document Services Group could arrange for our man in New York (who has State cover) to put in a request to Newsweek. Mr 99 Simmons said he could not make a request for a domestic photo without the authorization of Dr Proctor but even w/ authorization he does not reccommend this route [as there is no plausible reason for a "State" person to be requesting this photo]. 24

21BR

FILE

10:15 18 June 1974

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte		FILE NUMBER 56840
OFFICE WH	PHONE x7811	RANK OR GRADE GS-14 99
DEPARTURE DATE 30 June 1974	STATUS PCS	COVER STATE INTEGREE
DESTINATION(s) Trinidad		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL yes

AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☐ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D
	X			

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM		YES	NO
TYPE	CIA VON A-Z		
	WHO'S WHO IN CIA		
	HIJACKING NOTICE		
	OTHER		

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	☐ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	☐ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	☐ YES	☐ NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ✓ OTHER
  TRAVELING w/SPOUSE

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

EMERG. DES. - SPOUSE - IF NOT POSSIBLE THEN PARENTS.

DATE BRIEFED 6/18/74 BY V B Judly
SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 11-72 1987 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4-11-48)

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed. The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The owner of the listening post, Mr. [redacted], moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on 12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr. Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case officers.

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office, and Special Agent [redacted] was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent [redacted] plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

1	DDS/IOS
3	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
2	C/CSD
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	C/LAB
1	C/S B
	[illegible]
	A&TS
✓	FILES

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Page Two
#210 838

4. The cover story to be used by Agent [redacted] during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. [redacted]. Mr. [redacted] supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent [redacted] needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation.

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous "radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the recorders on a timely basis.

Ramon R. Hart
Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

llg

SECRET

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03

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office, and Special Agent Harold G. TITTSLER was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent TITTSLER's 03 plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/SSD
	C/SAS
1	C/S Bu
	A&TS
2	FILES

252529

3/JD

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Page Two
#210 838

03

4. The cover story to be used by Agent TITTSLER during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. R. V. Cortlandt HERBST (DI 7-8865). Mr. HERBST supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent TITTSLER needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation.

04

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Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

llg

5/JD

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch DATE: 1 July 1963

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concerning the "new program" for the exiles.

2. Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments.

3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt also said that the house would be retained for several more months and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably be requested for these latter visits also.

info

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/TD
2	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/SAB
1	C/S B
4	Hart
3	C/S B
	A&TS
	FILES

1/JD

SECRET

GROUP 1
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declassification

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Page Two
#210 838

(a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, basement, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder.

(b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored.

5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of a transmitter and a nearby listening post.

6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site 08 through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr. (#57 328), of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee. Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas the fact that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to "bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house. Mr. Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, 10 Pakistan, on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio 10 penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look to 24 forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS, and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

SECRET

8/JD

audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter" to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to contact in TSD to obtain it.

03

7. After checking with Mr. H. T. Bent of the Audio Operations Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after checking through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD, I selected the following:

Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, $1,100 each	$2,200.00
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each	550.00
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., UWB-7, $25 each	50.00
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F $. 54 each	1.08
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30 $1.87 each	1.87
TOTAL	$2,802.95

8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that everything had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any

1/JD

equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88, listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach, who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr. Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.

9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr. Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse, but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee. If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after each day's discussions were completed - no Staff employee would be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be

holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a microphone installation to cover the whole house if possible.

10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to be used to communicate during the installation between the listening post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B" batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4 receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of the DFO agents.

11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver, 2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post, and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.

12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr. Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up. An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because Mr. [03 Thomas] was having foreign visitors in for cocktails [redacted] that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.

1/JD

13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Headquarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been installed in the ceiling over the bar and telephone in the basement of the safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the transmissions satisfactorily in Mr. [Thomas's] basement. The QSC-2 voice-operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse. The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating range is supposed to be approximately one mile.

14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive discussions and to turn it on when they leave.

15. Mr. [Thomas] and his wife have consented to do most of the operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement. With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. [Thomas] is well-known to his friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in his basement would not raise the eyebrows on any of his visitors, some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries - Mr. [Thomas] will be going to [Karachi] under [Department of State] cover.

Ramon R. Hart
Ramon R. Hart

llg

cc: #57 328

6/JD

FILE

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 7 August 1962

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH

ESTABLISHED FOR: (NCL: [illegible]) BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte [illegible]

ATTN: WH/5 Mr. Williams

FILE NO. 5190

REF: Verbal Request for Cover, Form 1322 Dated 31 Jul 62

ID CARD NO. B165617

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8739) 32

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

13608

James H Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 7 August 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH [illegible]

ATTN: [illegible] Mr. Sullivan [illegible]

REF: [illegible] Request for Cover, Form 1322 [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8739)

ESTABLISHED FOR
[illegible]
[illegible] Charlotte Z.

FILE NO. [illegible]

ID CARD NO. [illegible]

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ________

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962.

☐ NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3. (HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

43688

James H. Franklin
/s/ CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-20-48)

FILE NO. [illegible] 067 DATE [illegible] 1961

SYNOPSIS

Live address established at 5611 Jason Street, 10 Cheverly, Maryland, on 17 May 1961. Householder and all adult members of his family were briefed. Householder notified local Post Office (Cheverly) that SUBJECT was residing with him and also requested 10 local Post Office to notify Hyattsville Post Office. Western Union telegram forwarded on 10 18 May 1961 for Gladys G. DAHBRUFF.

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[illegible] 125a REPORT NO.

3/PV

#62 067 23 May 1961

GENERAL

At Cheverly, Maryland:

On 17 May 1961, a live address was established for Gladys G. DANBRUNT at 5611 Jason Street, Cheverly, Maryland, through the cooperation of Dr. Edward A. and Anne B. SALLOCH, householder at that address.

On the same date, Mrs. SALLOCH, her daughter, Patricia, and son, George, were briefed to the effect that they should accept any cables, letters, telegrams or telephone calls for Mrs. DANBRUNT. In the event any inquiries were received concerning Mrs. DANBRUNT, they were to advise that Mrs. DANBRUNT was residing with them but that she was not available at the moment. They were to determine who was calling and the purpose of the call. If the call was from the cable or telegraph office, Mrs. SALLOCH or Patricia was to call back later as Mrs. DANBRUNT and receive the message and request delivery of the written cable or telegram. In the event the inquiry was from any other source, they were to contact the Reporting Agent immediately.

The same individuals were further briefed, in general, as to why Mrs. DANBRUNT was supposedly residing with them and why she was expecting some form of communication. They were informed that Mrs. DANBRUNT was the mother of Eustace H. DANBRUNT, who was being held a prisoner by a foreign government. The mother has sent a cable to her son asking how he is, whether he needs anything, inquiring if there is anything she can do for him, and asking him to please communicate with her. She is now awaiting and expecting some form of reply from him.

On the following day, 18 May 1961, Dr. SALLOCH was contacted. The above information had been related to him by Mrs. SALLOCH at the request of the Reporting Agent. Dr. SALLOCH was requested to notify the Cheverly and the Hyattsville Post Offices that Mrs. DANBRUNT was residing at his home and any mail received for her should be delivered to his address.

On 22 May 1961, Dr. SALLOCH was again contacted and he advised that he had personally called the Postmistress at the Cheverly Post Office regarding delivery of Mrs. DANBRUNT'S mail and had requested

#62 067

her, in turn, to notify the Hyattsville Post Office.

Dr. SALLOOM is a well-known Washington dentist. He maintained an office at 810 "H" Street, N.E. for a number of years until he was drafted into military service. He served in the Army as a dentist and upon his release, as a Lieutenant Colonel, he re-opened his private practice with an office at 1835 "I" Street, N.W. For a number of years he was on the Staff of Georgetown University as an instructor of dentistry in the Georgetown Dental School. He has resided in Cheverly, Maryland for at least the past twenty years, previously at 2816 Laurel Avenue and currently at 5611 Jason Street. His daughter, Patricia, is attending Maryland University. His son, George, is attending St. John's College High School.

Daily contact was maintained with Dr. SALLOOM on 22, 23 and 24 May 1961. As of the latter date, no communication had as yet been received for Mrs. DAHBRUNT.

On 18 May 1961, a Western Union Telegram was sent to Eustace DAHBRUNT, Reclusorio Nacional, Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pinos, Cuba. A copy of this telegram is attached as Exhibit #1.

Attachment:
Exhibit #1 (Western Union Telegram dated 18 May 1961)

JDS:mhm

2 June 61

17|RV

92692

SECRET

ATTN : Chief, Contact Division
Support Branch

23 Dec 1963

CHI-63-1314

Chief, Chicago Field Office

Hargrave Secret Service

[redacted]

1. Al Thompson recently asked me for my opinion of Hargrave Secret Service, 6 West Randolph Street, Chicago, insofar as 24 cover potential is concerned.

2. Chicago Field Office files contain no information on the company. The Chicago telephone directory reflects the company was formed in 1888 and has offices and/or representatives in the principal cities of the world. (See attached Redbook ad). [redacted]

3. Local FBI contacts had no information concerning the company. Albert Johnson, an ex-FBI man who has operated a private detective agency in Chicago for years told me that George E. Hargrave is sole owner and is the son of the founder. Mr. Johnson described Hargrave as a big, 250 pound man who has been married five times. In business, he is the type to put on a big show and is not averse to putting more men than necessary on a job in order to charge his client a higher price and profit accordingly. Mr. Johnson said that, although Hargrave advertises offices throughout the world he doubts that these are any more than investigative correspondents.

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A-92692.

4. A casual inquiry put to Richard Cain, Chief Investigator, Cook County Sheriff's Office, brought forth the comment that Cain distrusts Hargrave. He said he knows him personally and does not regard him as a discreet person.

5. In view of the above, 24 Cover may want to reconsider using Hargrave.

2 copies filed In [redacted]

R.F.B. Lohmann

RFBL/jak

Attachment

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

2/[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 9 Jun 64
TO: ODTR	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING
REMARKS:	

Per our Conversation re Cover Memorandum

2C 43

8

FROM: Cos/ISO		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 FEB 55

GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE #24

SEMINAR ROOM ROSTER

[KALISH] 03 RAN THIS GROUP

BADGE NO.	ROOM D
2411	AFFINITO, Thomas J.
2401	[BANICK, John A.] 03
2402	[BUTENHOFF, Robert L.] 03
2403	[CANTWELL, Robert B.] 03
2404	[CARLSTROM, Tacy A.] 03
2405	[COWEY, Ross E.] 03
2406	[GREENE, Mary S.] 03
2407	[ISENBERG, Don L.] 03
2416	[LINSENMAYER, Neil R.] 03
2417	[LUTZ, Thomas M.] 03
2408	[MASON, Harry E.] 03
2418	[McELFRESH, Elizabeth J.] 03
2409	[NEWELL, Richard D.] 03
2420	[WEIMER, Edwin Q.] 03
2410	[ZROWKA, Peter] 03

BADGE NO.	ROOM F
2412	[BOSTON, M. David] 03
2421	[CHAMBERS, Austin G.] 03
2413	[CHASE, Pamela W.] 03
2422	[DONALDSON, Mary A.] 03
2423	[GEPHART, Cleo L.] 03
2414	[GOERTZ, Margaret G.] 03
2424	[KOLARIK, George T.] 03
2415	[LAYTON, Bobby E.] 03
2425	[KIDWELL, Donald M.] 03
2426	[MARLING, George L.] 03
2427	[MOORE, Davis W.] 03
2428	[MOW, Richard K.] 03
2429	[PLASAN, Charlotte L.] 03
2419	[ROGERS, Lawrence E.] 03
2430	SHINN, Jerry L.
2431	[WEBB, Daniel D.] 03

Reported [[illegible]] 02 referred to in class as a poor covert practice.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION COURSE #24

ROSTER (For Staff Use Only)

Student Name	Grade	Age	Component	Experience
AFFINITO, Thomas J.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
BANICK, John A.	GS-11	41	DDP/TSD/TSL	
BUTENHOFF, Robert L.	GS-15	41	DDP/TSD/R&D/CB	
CANTWELL, Robert B.	GS-13	33	DDI/OSI/LSD	
CARLSTROM, Tacy A.	GS-7	28	OTR/JOTP	
COWEY, Ross E.	GS-7	28	OTR/JOTP	
GREENE, Mary S.	GS-7	27	OTR/JOTP	
ISENBERG, Don L.	GS-12	28	DDP/TSD/BB	
LINSENMAYER, Neil R.	GS-7	24	OTR/JOTP	
LUTZ, Thomas M.	GS-9	28	DDP/CA Staff	
MASON, Harry E.	GS-7	23	OTR/JOTP	
McELFRESH, Elizabeth J.	GS-7	32	OTR/JOTP	*
NEWELL, Richard D.	GS-12	31	OTR/SIC	
WEIMER, Edwin Q.	GS-10	32	DDP/TSD/TA/SAB	
ZROWKA, Peter	GS-9	43	DDP/FE/VCL	* #
BOSTON, M. David	GS-13	38	DDP/TSD/BB	
CHAMBERS, Austin G.	GS-7	29	OTR/JOTP	
CHASE, Pamela W.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
DONALDSON, Mary A.	GS-7	26	OTR/JOTP	
GEPHART, Cleo L.	GS-12	35	DDP/TSD/TSL	
GOERTZ, Margaret G.	GS-5	26	OTR/JOTP	
KOLARIK, George T.	GS-14	44	DDS/OL/PD	
LAYTON, Bobby E.	GS-7	25	OTR/JOTP	
KIDWELL, Donald M.	GS-7	27	NE/AA/Jordan	
MARLING, George L.	GS-11	31	DDP/IO/B6	
MOORE, Davis W.	GS-8	25	OTR/JOTP	
MOW, Richard K.	Capt.	32	DDP/FE/Korea	
PLASAN, Charlotte L.	GS-7	35	DDS/OD/MS	
ROGERS, Lawrence E.	GS-12	37	DDI/OSI/SD	*
SHINN, Jerry L.	GS-10	29	DDP/TSD/R&D/CB	
WEBB, Daniel D.	GS-8	30	DDP/WH/1	

Legend:
# Scheduled for overseas assignment
* Previous overseas assignment

S-E-C-R-E-T

3/DV

43872

DAVID CHRIST

14 August 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Mrs. Christ's Knowledge of the Cuban Operation

The day after her husband's arrest, 16 September 1960, Mrs. Christ and her brother-in-law, Lawrence Christ, were briefed as to the reasons why Mr. Christ was sent to Cuba and provided with an outline of the operation.

Mrs. Christ had very little knowledge of the functions or activities performed by her husband and was not aware of his experience in the audio surveillance field. Therefore, terms such as cover, security and audio surveillance were relatively new to her.

Mrs. Christ was advised that her husband was Chief of the Audio Operations Branch and that this branch services all requests within the organization for the surreptitious installation of microphones and other listening devices. She was told that members of this branch, including her husband, are required to perform dangerous missions on a world wide basis. Mrs. Christ was astonished to learn that her husband's mission in Havana was clandestine and dangerous. She knew that the technicians were requested to place audio surveillance equipment in offices which were scheduled for occupancy by the New Chinese News Agency. Mrs. Christ was told that her husband, two other employees of the organization, a State Department employee and an agent were apprehended by the Cuban G-2. She was told that the State Department employee, (Robert Neet) 06 who was released by the Cuban Government, was actually the (case officer under State Department cover). 4 Although the name of the agent (Nordio) 04 was not mentioned at this time, Mrs. Christ read about him in various newspaper accounts at the time of the trial. Mrs. Christ was also told that the operational knowledge that her husband possesses, if disclosed to the Cubans, would not only cause considerable damage to the United States Government, but would also lead to intensive and probably brutal interrogation of her husband by the Cubans and probably the Russians as well. She was not advised of other operations involving her husband.

Mrs. Christ was given as much information as possible about Mr. Christ's cover story. He was employed by a cover organization, Vachuta Associates, located in New York City and had been provided with alias documentation, such as a driver's license and a social security card. Mrs. Christ understood the reasons for this cover and why it was easier for her husband to pose as a bachelor than to admit the existence of a family. At no time have the movements or activities of the imprisoned technicians, prior to their arrest, been discussed with Mrs. Christ. Mrs. Christ was informed

3/7V

that in the event of danger the technicians planned to escape to an apartment which was occupied by an unwitting State Department secretary.

Since the initial briefing, Mrs. Christ has gradually picked up additional information, mostly from newspaper articles, about the operation and subsequent trial. It is believed that Mrs. Christ has not obtained any substantiative information about the operation other than what is mentioned in this memorandum. At the present time, she does not seem too interested in the operational aspect of the case, nor the reasons for her husband's capture. At the time of the trial, what little publicity appeared in the newspapers had been previously discussed with Mrs. Christ. She knows that the agent ([illegible]) returned to Washington, D.C., but she was instructed not to ask any questions about his release nor his present whereabouts.

Mrs. Christ was informed that Mr. Kessler, who was the Department of State Welfare Officer in Havana at the time of the technicians arrest, had contacted the prisoners shortly after their arrest. She was told that Mr. Kessler was witting of the technicians true identity and was able to verbally transmit brief messages to them from their families. Mrs. Christ sent one message through Kessler to her husband, prior to the severance of diplomatic relations. She was also aware of Kessler's activities in behalf of the technicians and knows that he supplied them with spending money, vitamins, cigars, candy and other items as requested. She was told that Kessler hired Dr. Colomar, a Cuban National, to serve as the technicians attorney. In May 1961, Kessler visited Washington, D.C. on official business and met Mrs. Christ on two occasions in the presence of other Government employees.

Mrs. Christ also knows that Dr. Colomar left Havana with his wife in June 1961 and has been brought to Washington, D.C. for consultation with Government personnel. She has been told that another Cuban attorney was hired by Dr. Colomar to represent the technicians and handle the case when the appeal is heard. It was not intended that Mrs. Christ should know about the Washington attorney, Mr. Murphy, but she appears to be acquainted with the name.

Mrs. Christ has learned from newspaper articles that there are about 20 American prisoners at the Isle of Pines and that conditions at the prison are extremely poor. She also knows that food is brought to the technicians by a Cuban woman whose son occupies a cell with the technicians. She was advised that Dr. Colomar saw the technicians a few days prior to his departure; that they were in good spirits and that Mr. Christ occasionally worked in the prison.

Insofar as knowledge of specific operations originated by the organization to obtain her husband's release, Mrs. Christ now knows of only one direct approach. She was told that the American attorney offered to exchange medical supplies for the freedom of the three technicians and that the offer was never acted upon by the Cubans. She also knows that we have tried several other unsuccessful operations, but she is unaware of any details of these attempts. Mrs. Christ is not aware of the operation now in progress, which contemplates utilizing personnel in Mexico. On several occasions when the organization seriously considered a given operation, Mrs. Christ, by coincidence, has had similar ideas. For example, when Castro proposed exchanging tractors for prisoners, Mrs. Christ continually questioned us as to what action was under way to include the technicians in any exchange. She also had numerous ideas as to how this should be carried out. Yet, she could only be told that the negotiations were being closely monitored and that there would be no interference in behalf of her husband, unless the political climate was favorable.

As the Cuban-American political atmosphere changes and specific acts occur, such as the hi-jacking of U. S. airplanes, Mrs. Christ gets new ideas or approaches regarding the means we might use to obtain the release of her husband. Of course, about the same time, we are usually considering a similar possibility.

Mrs. Christ has been verbally advised of the contents of the messages we have exchanged with the technicians and knows that the Swiss have been unable to visit them. She knows that over 1000 pesos was left by Mr. Coleman with the Swiss and that this amount is being supplemented through Bern. She also knows that we recently cabled the Swiss Embassy in Havana regarding the receipt of packages and that the packages which we sent to the technicians were not received by the Swiss, and therefore, no further packages will be sent.

The operational details which have been discussed with Gen. Taylor but not with Mrs. Christ are of such a nature that little damage would be done if they were inadvertently revealed to Mrs. Christ. The main points which should not be discussed with her are:

1. The name of the Washington attorney handling the case.

2. Details of present or future operations designed to effect the release of the men.

104-10111-10086 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	DATE 27 January 1964
	☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, OHD, DD/S&T	ESTABLISHED FOR CHRIST, David L.
ATTN:	Admin Staff	FILE NO. K-2077
REF:	Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 27 Sept 1963	ID CARD NO. 1452
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED	US Army Element, Joint Operations Group	

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

☒ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CC

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS 1-PSD/OS 1-ADPD/COMPT

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FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

employment as a Type A part time employee. In August 1958 Subject advised that she was divorcing her husband and wished to be reinstated as a regular staff employee. Her reinstatement was approved and in November 1959 she was transferred back to Washington, D.C., PCS. During her employment in Panama 16-7 she was under DAC 32 cover. Back in Washington she was assigned to DDP/WH, Support Staff, Logistics Section.

6. In April 1960 Subject legally resumed her maiden name.

7. In May 1960 Subject was certified to the State Department in connection with ninety day proposed TDY in Havana, Cuba with JMARC; and in October 1960 she was transferred from Havana to Guatemala.

8. In November 1960 Security was advised that according to information from "the Project" (presumably JMARC) Subject had, while in Cuba, allegedly been having affairs "with the three people" who were "incarcerated in the Cuban jail". This allegation very possibly was exaggerated and from information in the file may have been untrue. However, a Security officer on the Project seemed definitely under the impression that she had been having an affair with one of them, i.e.: Dave CHRIST 03 and was of the opinion that her "immoral" behavior was "a probable contributing factor" to then recent arrests of Agency personnel in Cuba. According to another version, apparently hers, she went out one evening with CHRIST and on other occasions had group social contact with him and with two other TSD technicians who arrived in Havana three days before she left to go to the United States on leave. On the Saturday night prior to her departure on Sunday, she and her two roommates, she said, entertained these three men in their apartment.

9. In Guatemala, Subject met and dated a Ronald Stanley DAVIS, an American who was "wanted" by the FBI for car theft and mail fraud. According to Subject she found this out by checking "the files" and reported it to her superiors. Also according to Subject, "It was decided" that there was "no real harm" in continuing her relationship with this individual "as long as I kept on guard"; and she continued to date him until the day he suddenly disappeared from Guatemala City on 24 January 1961. She had, in fact, expected him for dinner the evening of the day he disappeared.

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Addicott, Kenneth K.	11/20/47	
Akins, Richard T.	6/23/49	
Albertsen, Cecil V.	5/5/52	03
Amrine, Horace	6/2/52	
Armsworthy, Frank J.	6/6/53	
Arneson, Paul E.	6/2/48	
Augustine, Reginald C.	8/31/49	03
Aurell, George E.	8/19/47	
Baker, John L.	10/21/48	
Balaze, William L.	5/22/54	03
Baranowski, Peter	12/4/50	
Bennett, Edward	1/5/5	
[illegible], Dudley E.(Lt.Col)	5/[illegible]/5	
Brown, Ralph William	5/21/52	
Birdsall, Paul	2/28/51	
Blackburn, Bruce B.	4/1/48	03
Boswell, Clarence	6/7/51	
Bromell, William	12/17/54	
Bross, John	3/15/51	
Burkett, Harold G.	2/23/54	03
Butz, Newton S.	12/22/47	
Childers, Joe E.(Lt.Col)	12/19/52	
Christ, David	11/24/50	
Coolidge, Francis L.	12/11/50	03
Cunningham, Hugh	7/18/50	
Driscoll, Robert P.	2/12/47	03
Driscoll, Walter (Dr.)	4/20/51	
Erhardt, Walter L.	6/7/50	03
Evans, Bryan (Col.)	11/18/54	
Ferris, Edwin H.(Lt.Col)	2/13/50	
Fox, Ernest F.	2/26/51	03
Fox, William H.	7/30/53	
Funderburk, Thomas	10/29/52	
Garrison, James A.	9/27/51	
Gibbons, Willis (Dr.	9/23/52	
Coiran, Roger	3/2/44	03
Greenway, Gilbert C.	10/13/49	
Hall, Virginia	10/10/51	
Hazell, Hardley	11/7/52	03
Hensel, Karl C.(Capt.)	10/8/53	
Hileman, Elmer R.	6/6/52	03
Hull, Harris B. (Col)	7/18/52	
Hull, Kenneth D. Jr.	2/25/52	03
Johnson, William R.	5/19/49	
Jones, George A. A.(Col)	8/27/52	
JORGENSON, Gordon L.	4/7/54	
Karamessines, Thomas H.	4/19/48	
Kehm, Harold D. (Col)	10/19/54	
King, J. C.	2/26/51	
Knutson, Henry	6/16/53	
Koppes, Lawrence W.(Capt)	2/2/54	
Learned, [illegible]	5/6/54	
Litchfield, Edward	9/29/52	03
McCafferty, George C.	4/4/52	
McClelland, H. M.(Maj.Gen)	5/21/52	
Matt, Charles W.	10/8/51	
Maury, John M.	4/14/48	
Northrop, Johnston K.	6/14/	03
O'Brien, John T.	4/21/5	
Piburn, Edwin A.(Brig.Gen)	11/14/52	
PRESTON, Howard J.	6/3/48	
Rady, George A.	11/22/	
Reidy, Joseph	6/12/52	03
Richardson, John Hammond	10/10/4	
Rider, Donald L.	7/25/5	
Rogers, Luke P.	1/9/5	
Rowland, William F.	4/24/5	
Roosevelt, Archibald	2/15/5	
Robertson, William A.	12/24/	
Rucker, Lucius C	5/20/	03
Scotti, Elio	12/23	
Shannon, L. T.	1/15/4	
Stevens, Lewis E.	7/1/4	03
Stewart, Gordon M.	2/1/4	
Stein, Sidney	10/25/50	03
Sutphen, Preston L., Sr.	8/26/52	
Tansey, Patrick H.(Maj.Gen)	10/18/54	
Torbert, Ralph	8/20/5	03
Tower, Harry N.(Lt.Col)	4/14/52	
Trimble, Carl E.	10/11/51	03
Triplet, William S.(Col)	9/24/5	
Vincent, Chester	4/15/	03
Walker, Fred L. (Col)	1/26/5	
Whitney, Burke	2/13/5	
Williams, Ogden	2/14/	03

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4 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONEIN, LUCIEN

SUBJECT: [redacted], Reassignment

1. It is requested that clearance be granted for the reassignment of [redacted] [redacted], ZRJEWEL Career Agent, to Caracas, Venezuela under AID cover.
16-17 32

2. [redacted]'s security clearance number is 5025.

3. It is planned that [redacted] will depart Headquarters during June, 1965.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Date: 7/12/65

Security Approval has been granted for the use [illegible] by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

2/12/65

SECRET

2/12

TC 5025

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

23 H9 02 A 5 MAR

TO : Central Cover Staff THROUGH: Office of Security SUBJECT: (True Name) CONEIN, Lucien E.	DATE 4 Jan 1965

☐ ENTRY Inclusion of Subject on the Domestic Cover list is requested as noted below. When notified that cover has been established, Subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.

☐ CHANGE Subject is currently included on the Domestic list. For the reason noted below, it is requested that:

☐ This employee be removed from the Domestic Cover list.

☐ The following change be made

Mr. Conein is a recent returnee from Saigon where he was stationed under military cover. He was temporarily scheduled for duty at ISOLATION under [illegible]ATTA, and is now to be located in the Headquarters area for an indefinite period of time. It is requested that he be placed on a Domestic Cover list pending further overseas [illegible]ation.

TYPE COVER		MILITARY		STATE		OTHER GOVT. AGENCY		NONOFFICIAL
USE OF COVER		ALL PURPOSE		OPERATIONAL ONLY				

REQUESTING OFFICE

STAFF OR DIVISION	SIGNATURE AND TITLE	DATE
FE Division	Chester R. [illegible], FE Security Officer	4 January 1965

CENTRAL COVER STAFF APPROVAL	OFFICE OF SECURITY APPROVAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
DATE	DATE 5 January 65

OFFICE OF SECURITY COPY

FORM 3-63 1322 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

/C 5025

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN DUPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : Central Cover Staff
THROUGH: Office of Security
SUBJECT: CONEIN, Lucien E.
(True Name)

[illegible] 4 50 PM [illegible]

DATE: 5 Jan 1965

☐ ENTRY Inclusion of Subject on the Domestic Cover list is requested as noted below. When notified that cover has been established, Subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.

☐ CHANGE Subject is currently included on the Domestic list. For the reason noted below, it is requested that:

☐ This employee be removed from the Domestic Cover list

☐ The following change be made

Mr. Conein is a recent returnee from Saigon where he was stationed under military cover. He was temporarily scheduled for duty at ISOLATION under [illegible], and is now to be located in the Headquarters area for an indefinite period of time. It is requested that he be placed on a Domestic Cover list pending further overseas utilization.

TYPE COVER		MILITARY		STATE		OTHER GOVT. AGENCY		NONOFFICIAL
USE OF COVER		ALL PURPOSE		OPERATIONAL ONLY				

REQUESTING OFFICE

STAFF OR DIVISION	SIGNATURE AND TITLE	DATE
FE Division	Chester R. Houston Chester R. Houston, FE Security Officer	4 January 1965

CENTRAL COVER STAFF APPROVAL	OFFICE OF SECURITY APPROVAL	
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	
DATE	DATE 5 January 65	OFFICE OF SECURITY COPY

FORM 3-58 1322 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 2 October 1963

TO: (Check)

CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION

CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT CAS (P[illegible])

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible] [redacted] L.

FILE NO. [illegible]-7219 [redacted]

ID CARD NO. [redacted]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 28 November 1963
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

32

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FILE

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: [illegible]

ESTABLISHED FOR: [redacted]

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT [illegible]

ATTN:

FILE NO.

REF: [illegible]

ID CARD NO. [redacted]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: [illegible] [redacted]
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-[illegible])

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADED/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
(112-20-41)

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT [illegible]	DATE [illegible]
	ESTABLISHED FOR [illegible]
ATTN: [illegible]	FILE NO. [illegible]
REF: [illegible]	ID CARD NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED [illegible]	

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: [illegible]
(OPMEMO 20-800-4[illegible])

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ____

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3
(HB 20-800-3)

NA ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☒ REMARKS: Cover History: [illegible] - Jul 54 - [illegible]
[illegible] Aug 54 - Feb 57 - [illegible], Overseas;
May 57 - Sept 60 - [illegible] CONUS; Sept 60 - Apr
61 - DAC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 62 - DAC, CONUS;
Jan 62 - Jul 62 - DAC, [illegible].

[illegible] backstop will [illegible]
[illegible] use for [illegible] only. Should
he ever have need to apply for a governmental
position, he will contact this office and will
[illegible] above [illegible]
[illegible].

[illegible] address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FILE

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 8 October 1963

TO: (Check)
X CONTRACT PERSONNEL CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT HAS (Prov.)

ESTABLISHED FOR: CROZIER, Ross L.

ATTN: Mr. Dawson

FILE NO.: E-7210

REF: Resignee Backstop Briefing

ID CARD NO.: [redacted]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: See remarks.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 28 November 1963
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

NA ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

32

X REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - NOC, overseas; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 62 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 62 - Jul 62 - DAC, [illegible].

[illegible] he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore [illegible] information and use CIA from [illegible] [illegible].

Fwdg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

1/PV

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

FIL

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 8 October 1963

TO: (Check)	X	CONTRACT PERSONNEL, CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible]
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT FAS (Prov.)	
ATTN: Mr. Dawson			FILE NO. [illegible]
REF: Resignee Backstop Briefing			ID CARD NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: See Remarks.			

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: RESIGNATION DATE: 20 [illegible]
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

NA ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

NA SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☒ REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - DOC, overseas; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - DAC, Hdqs.

Subject will use above information for backstopping and for commercial use only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore above information and use CIA from Aug 1953 on.

Fwdg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, C

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

FILE

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

		DATE
TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN:		FILE NO.
REF:		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED		

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________________________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CO

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
(13-20-4

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

104-10112-10204

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

2? June 1963

ESTABLISHED FOR: CROZIER, [illegible]

FILE NO: K-[illegible]

ID CARD NO: [illegible]

TO: (Check)		
	X	CONTRACT PERSONNEL CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, WH

ATTN: WH/SA Mr. Wallace

REF: Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 14 May 1963

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-71)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
(15-20-48)

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

24 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IB/3

FROM : A/Chief, SB/2

SUBJECT : CROZIER, R. L.
#112569

This will confirm verbal advice of 23 December 1959 that the writer advised Joseph KING, SO/OTR, that the Office of Security would not favorably entertain a request for the Subject's utilization in a staff capacity at (Isolation) in view of his current non-staff status and cover and security considerations involved in connection with his current assignment in (Mexico) as a Career Agent. It is understood that OTR will advise WH Division that OTR cannot assign the Subject to (Isolation) for security and cover reasons. 01

Ervan E. Kuhnke Jr.
Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

KUHNKE/ewd(12-24-59)
CLOSED

SECRET

1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

6/8
(Date)

TO: Mr Swedeman

BUILDING | ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Subject was scheduled to travel 7 June to (Saigon). 13-2 If he goes Travel arrangements will be made by Major Fullam.

Subject's file reflects that French Intelligence sources in Indo-China sought his service twice in 1945 when he was stationed there.

FROM: Vince

BUILDING | ROOM NO. | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

OVERSEAS PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Conein, Lucien Emile No. 5025

Title and Grade Area Ops Off, Major USA Office & Division FE

Estimated date of travel TDY ☐ PCS ☒

Destination (Saigon) 13-2 Cover for one year

Itinerary True Military

SECURITY FACTORS

Item		Action Initiated	Completed
1. Date of polygraph	14 Sept 53		
2. Clearances:			
☐ CRYPTO			
☐ SI			
☐ Q			
☐ Certification			
☐ Concurrence	– ?	file fwd to RCS	

3. Flags:

4. Other: Subject was scheduled for 7 June checkout. Price indicates that MPD will handle travel and they state there is a strong possibility he will not travel.

Information regarding travel obtained from File

Processing Sheet completed by Luddy Date

IPD /

14-00000

5025

TRAVEL ORDER

26 May 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
[illegible]

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL
[illegible]

Lucien E. CONEIN

NAME
Lucien E CONEIN

OFFICE PHONE
[illegible]

GRADE AND SALARY
[illegible]

TITLE
Area Ops Officer

OFFICIAL STATION
(Saigon Indochina) 13-2

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY
Travel authorized from Washington D. C. to (Saigon, Indochina)
13-2

PURPOSE
For PCS (Subject will be under MAAG cover which only allows subject to remain in (Indochina) one year. His PCS tour will therefore be one year.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)
13-2

Authorized 150 lbs. operational excess baggage

[illegible]

Subject will be (under MAAG cover.)
32

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)
☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
$ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT
7 June 1954

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY
arrival at PCS

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)
Air, rail, sea

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE
☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.
☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)
Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.
03 J Riddle
SIGNATURE

☑ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.
☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.
☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.
☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

Military orders required by MPD: 28 May 54

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.
☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.
☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

FR D E. HOWELL, CAPT., AGC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)
[illegible] FE/CPI
Gordon M. Stewart CPI

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951
(28-4
SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED.
☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951 - 97630

5|PJ

SECRET 5025

TRAVEL ORDER

30 April 1954 CANCELLATION

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. 1-166/54 CE

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL [illegible]

NAME: Lucien E. CONEIN Conein

OFFICE PHONE: [illegible]71

GRADE AND SALARY: Major - [illegible]

TITLE: Intelligence Officer

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to (Frankfurt, Germany) and return to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

This cancels the original order and Amendment # 1 in their entirety.

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

03

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

Noted by MPD: 13 May 54

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

FRED M. STOWELL, CAPT., ACC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

03

(Frank S. Chaplin) [illegible],

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27 OCT 1951 SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (28-48)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 230611

SECRET

3/RJ

6

SECRET

5025

TRAVEL ORDER

5 April 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. CE-166/54, Amend #1

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL [illegible] (4-3215-31-012)

NAME Lucien E. CONEIN	**OFFICE PHONE** 612	**GRADE AND SALARY** Major - USA
TITLE Intelligence Officer	**OFFICIAL STATION** Washington, D. C.	

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to (Frankfurt, Germany) and return to Washington, D. C.

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE:

OBLIGATION REFERENCE No. ____________

PURPOSE

CHARGE TO ALLOTMENT No. ____________

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

AUTHORIZING OFFICER

Inasmuch as only tourist flight accommodations are available to the traveler, excess baggage is authorized up to a total weight allowance for the traveler of 66 lbs.

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ [illegible] additional

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY)

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

03

D Muddiman

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

[illegible]

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

Noted by MPD: 11 May 1954
FRED F. STOWELL, CAPT., AGC

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

63

Frank M. Chapin, SE ADMIN

(DATE) SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-27, 33-28, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (26-46)

SECRET

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 257127

3/PN

14-00000

FILE-8

OVERSEAS PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Conein, Lucien E. No. 5025

Title and Grade Major U.S.A. Office & Division DDP/SE

Estimated date of travel 3 May 64 TDY ☑ PCS ☐

Destination A-G and F-G Cover

Itinerary

SECURITY FACTORS

Item	Action Initiated	Completed
1. Date of polygraph 14 Sept 53		
2. Clearances:	Cancelled	
☐ CRYPTO		
☐ SI		
☐ Q		
☐ Certification		
☐ Concurrence		

3. Flags: None

4. Other:

Information regarding travel obtained from File and Price

Processing Sheet completed by V/S Guddy Date 4/28/64

SECRET

5025

TRAVEL ORDER

13 April 1954

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. SE-166/54	ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL [illegible] ([illegible])	
NAME Lucien E. CONEIN	OFFICE PHONE 671	GRADE AND SALARY Major - USA
TITLE Intelligence Officer	OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	

You are hereby authorized to travel and incur necessary expenses in accordance with Agency Regulations.

ITINERARY

15-20

Washington, D. C. to Athens, Greece to Frankfurt, Germany and return to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE

To confer on operational matters in connection with [illegible].

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

$250.00 advance authorized.

Military cover orders authorized.

32

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

Maximum per diem allowance is authorized in accordance with Agency Regulations. Advance of funds is authorized.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ 1200.00

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 3 May 1954

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY 31 May 1954

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY) [illegible]

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER.

☐ (B) SEVEN CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

Certified a True Copy. Signed copy on file in Central Processing Branch. Reviewed. No change necessary. Amended as indicated.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN ONE YEAR OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

Military orders required by MPD: 15 Apr 54

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL (TYPE)

03

Frank M. Chapin, CH/ADMIN

FRED M. STOWELL, CAPT., AGC

(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

FORM NO. 33-27
OCT 1951

SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 33-[illegible], 33-20, 34-4, 34-4A, 34-5, 36-207 AND 37-60 WHICH MAY NOT BE USED. (28-46)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 257127

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31PD

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

VOUCHERED

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except *6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed.
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Lucien E. CONEIN

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Nov 1919

3. REQUEST NO.: 281-53

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 Oct 195

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment (Key Personnel)
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

RECORDED
CONTROL DESK

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS 12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	TO—
8	Operations Officer (F) 45-1	POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Officer BD-49
9	Major USA	SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Major USA
10	DDP/SE 11 German Mission	ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SE SE/1 - Albanian Branch Office of the Chief
11	Nurnberg Ops. Base Nurnberg, Germany 15-29	HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
12	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds.

Concurrence: ______________
EE Division

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): 03 JOSEPH BURK SE/ADMIN

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): 03 ROBERT BURNS X-3965

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: ______________
Title: ______________

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.	
				CD - FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION
M	W	FROM: 3130 - 55 - 017 TO: 4 - 3200 - 20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): NO

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVE
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS:

Security Approval has been granted for this request
Personnel Security Branch
NOV 9 1953
S

5/N

SECRET

16—67329

CPD August 5, 1947

Chief, Security Branch, OSO

MARCHAND, [illegible] L.
COSKIN, Lucien E.
QUINN, Myrtle V. 06
BEST, David E. >06
HESS, Rudolph W. >06
SIMKOFF, Helena V. >06
MacAULEY, Hugh C.

A review of the subjects' files reflects that they do not meet with the requirements set forth in recent instructions from the Assistant Director for Special Operations.

We request that this office be furnished with two copies of current Personal History Statements of each of the subjects at the earliest date possible in order that appropriate security checks may be initiated.

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, OSO

CI/DV

14-00000
104-10113-10249 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AB Memo No. 9362
12 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Argentina

ATTENTION : Mr. (Robert Fambrini) 03

SUBJECT : Transmittal of (Nicaraguan) 11 Ordinary Passport in Alias for Use by AMTALK-1 - AB Case No. 6937

REFERENCE : WH Memorandum dated 5 April 1963, same subject

1. Transmitted herewith for use 31 as outlined in Reference are the following two documents issued in (alias) for AMTALK-1: (Nicaraguan) 11 Ordinary Passport No. 65701 and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Form I-94 (stapled in the passport, page 9). Also furnished herewith is a travel itinerary on which AMTALK-1 should be briefed before he applies for the Argentine visa in New York.

2. In keeping with arrangements made by TSD/AB, the Medical Office is preparing, for direct delivery to WH/4, the International Vaccination Certificate in alias to be used with the above documents. This certificate should be checked for accuracy as to name, place and date of issue. It is also understood that AMTALK-1 will have received a bona fide smallpox vaccination prior to departing from the U.S.

3. TSD/AB prepared 0 the above (Nicaraguan) 11 passport on the strength of information that (BIOGENESIS) would instruct an Argentine Consular post in the U.S. to place a visa in the passport. The document was prepared in one week from date of request because of operational urgency. The requirement specified use of 10 a (Central American) passport. To avoid placing a long, time-consuming simulated itinerary in the passport, it was given a recent issuance date, which necessitated issuance on the basis of exemplars issued nearly one year earlier (the most recent ones available). This short itinerary also would seem to make application at this time in the U.S. for an Argentine visa somewhat unusual. Since we are now informed that AMTALK-1 is to obtain his Argentine visa without 0 (BIOGENESIS) assistance we wish to make the limitations of the documentation provided for this operation, and agreed to by Mr. (Fambrini), 03 a matter of record. This confirms discussion with Mr. 03 (Fambrini). A telephone check with the Argentine Embassy by WH indicated that a (Nicaraguan) 11 transient in the U.S. can obtain an Argentine visa in this country.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. It is understood that the passport will be needed for about six months, following which it is to be returned to TSD/AB. Should further operational need exist for this document beyond that time, it must be borne in mind that the expiration date is 7 March 1959 and that annual revalidations are needed from that time forward. Any such revalidations would have to be entered by TSD/AB. Also, use of this passport for travel other than that originally intended (direct from U.S. to Argentina and back within six months) will require careful scrutiny by TSD/AB of the situation at the time of the intended future travel.

03 5. In accordance with verbal arrangements between Messrs. ([illegible] 03 and (Phelan) please pass on to TSD/AB details of AMTALE-1's procurement of the Argentine visa and any other travel control events of significance in the use of this passport so that TSD/AB may gain from the experience of this agent in the use of this alias document.

6. Any further questions concerning this case should be referred to the undersigned or to Miss (Tina [illegible]) on extension 8531.

03

(Patrick J. Phelan) 03
TSD/AB

Attachment: 1 Envelope (h/w)
" (Nicaraguan) Passport,
Travel Itinerary

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
✓ 1 - C/CI/AAS (Info)

FEB 12 1 50 PM '58

5/N

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

15 OCT 1954

Chief, Special Security Division

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

16-15, 24

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

RHC

Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
NCD dtd 28 September 1954

HASTY:mjd 14 Oct 1954

CC: FILE
CLOSED

Chief
Chief
Chief
A. Dep.
Ad.& Trng.
Chie SRB
Cover
Chief
Contact Desk
Desk
Desk
Desk
Desk
Desk
Files

19 OCT 1954

SSD - CHIEF

OCT 12 11 53 AM '54

SECRET

[redacted]

March 18,1961

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993~~
~~CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

To: Mr. Jack Kennedy
WH/4/Security

On March 18,1961 I spent hours with Court Wood and we discussed at great length his plans for the future and his participation in the activities of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE. Court seems to be extremely naive concerning my position with the Agency, and he is very open and frank with me in all areas. I am certain that if given enough time I can obtain a great deal of information on the backgrounds and activities of many of his associates.

While visiting his apartment I observed that both Court and his father are interested in a large number of Communist Publications. These included "U.S.S.R.", "The Worker", and many Prop. pamphlets that were obviously published in England. Court is an extreme Leftist in his political views and he believes fanatically in Castro's Cuba.

Mr. Wood mentioned to me that he and several of his friends are making plans to enter Cuba in June; illegally if necessary. He apparently wants to become a teacher for the Castro government and to make his permanent home there. Members of the "26th of July Movement" are in close contact with Court and they are envolved in this proposed move to Cuba. Court does have some money and he seems to be very serious this thing. Within the next few days I hope to be able to get some names and specific facts concerning their plans.

Please include this in my permanent record.

Michael Stratton
WH/4/Security
Ex. 2929

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SR

3/8/61

To: Mr. Jack Kennedy
WH/4/Security

Mr. Kennedy,

Several months ago I wrote you a letter concerning the Pro-Castro sentiments of Court Wood, son of Foster Wood, a local attorney. Since that time I've seen Court only once, on March 3,1961, and he appears to be actively engaged in the organization of a local chapter of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE. Complete with beard, Court has been meeting with"interested groups"and lecturing to students in several eastern cities. He specifically mentioned Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Apparently there are a number of students envolved in this activity; I met David Lacterman NR from George Mason High School in Falls Church, Va.and Walt MacDonwald, a fellow student of Courts, and both are obviously active. NR.

What action, if any, should I take in regard to my relationship with Court and his father?

Please include this statement in my permanent record.

THANK YOU

Michael Stratton
WH/4/Reg.
Ex. 2929

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58

1 Feb 1961

TO: C/EAB/OS
ATTN: Mr. Belt
VIA: WH/4/Security
ATTN: Mr. Kennedy

SUBJ: FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

1. At the request of Mr. Dave Phillips, C/WH/4/Propoganda, I spent the evening of January 6 with Court Wood, a student who has recently returned from a three week stay in Cuba under the sponsorship of the FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE.

2. Court and his father both have voiced very strong Pro-Castro sentiments and are extremely critical of our foreign policy in general.

3. I've been advised by Mr. Phillips to continue my relationship with Mr. Wood and I will keep your office informed of each subsequent visit.

4. This is forwarded to you as a matter of information and to become a permanent part of my security file.

Michael Stratton
WH/4/Registry
Extension 2929

2/1/61
M/R Subject stated this is operational with no specific goal in mind. [Stratton] and Wood went to high school together & although they travel in different circles they on occasion see each other. Wood [illegible] [Stratton] is a CIA employee beginning with the time [Stratton] filed application.

J. Kitteridge

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82

RETYPED FROM UNREADABLE
COPY.

7 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Mr. Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: COURT FOSTER WOOD
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Reference is made to a 25 March 1961 and a 6 July 1961 investigative report on captioned Subject which have previously been furnished to this Agency.

3, 8

[Michael Weimer Stratton, born 21 January 1941, Austin, Texas], who is a current Agency employee, has recently been interviewed concerning his knowledge of Court Foster Wood whom [Stratton] had 3 known since mutual attendance in high school. Attached is a detailed report of the information furnished by [Stratton] concerning his knowledge of Wood. 3

Since [Stratton] 3 personally has sufficient reason to question the activities of Wood and the activities of the associates of Wood, [Stratton] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Wood. 3

It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Wood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Wood with [Michael Weimer Stratton]. 3

The above information is for your use only and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

6
BR

Attachment:
As noted

OS/SRS/BLSolie:ect - 16 October 1961

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17 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT : COURT FOSTER HOOD
[illegible] - CUBA

Reference is made to a 23 March 1961 and a [illegible] 1961 report [illegible] previously [illegible] this Agency.

[illegible]

[illegible] personally [illegible] activities of Hood and the activities of [illegible] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Hood.

It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Hood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Hood with [illegible] Stratton.

The above information is for your use only and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

Attachment:
As noted

OS/SRS/BLSolie:ect - 16 October 1961

REF Reference Use Only
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COPY.

SUBJECT: Court Foster Wood

3

Michael Weimer Stratton has recently advised that Court 3 Foster Wood was a relatively close high school friend of Stratton during mutual attendance at George Mason High School, Falls Church, Virginia, during 1957 to 1959. 3 Stratton described Wood as an average high school student who had no particular problems with the exception that there were domestic difficulties between the father and mother of Wood.

3

Stratton became acquainted with the parents of Wood and made occasional visits to their home during the above period of time. The father of Wood, Foster Wood, is an attorney who was then living in Falls Church. Some time ago the father and mother of Court Wood split up and Court Wood and father moved into an apartment on Columbia Road, Washington, D.C.

3

Stratton advised that after graduation from high school in June 1959 he lost any close contact with Wood who then started to attend George Mason College, where he seemed to have an interest in philosophy. 3 Stratton started to attend a military school and Wood expressed extreme opposition to military schools.

3 3

Stratton married in 1960, which also helped to move Stratton somewhat out of the social circle of Wood. 3 Stratton believed that for approximately a year, during 1959 to 1960, he did not actually see Wood but advised that after this period in which he did not see Wood he has had a number of contacts with Wood, many of which occurred during mutual attendance at the University of Virginia Extension School (night school) in early 1961. On one occasion 3 Stratton attended a party at the apartment occupied by Wood and father at the invitation of Wood, and on this occasion came into contact with the "new set of friends" of Court Wood, whom Stratton 3 described as being "beatnik types." Girls in attendance at the party, according to Stratton, appeared to be of the "street pickup" type.
3

After the above party Wood occasionally telephoned Stratton 3 and about Christmas 1960 Wood called and stated that he was going to Cuba under the auspices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. 3 Stratton called on Wood after the return of Wood from Cuba and at that time Wood lauded Castro very highly. The father of Wood was also present and Stratton 3 obtained the impression that the father was also in sympathy with Castro. 3 Stratton recalled that he again, at a later date, had visited the Wood apartment, this being an occasion when Wood had been visiting somewhere in Falls Church and contacted Stratton to ask Stratton to take Wood home. On this
3 3

18
BR

SECRET

Subject: Court Foster Wood

[illegible] recently [illegible] Falls Church, Virginia [illegible]

3 [illegible]

3 [illegible] Wood [illegible] father [illegible]

[illegible] D. C.

[illegible]

[illegible] Wood [illegible] University of Virginia Extension School (night school) in early 1959, [illegible] party at the apartment occupied by [illegible] on this occasion [illegible] the father of Wood, and on this occasion [illegible] Court Wood, [illegible] "beatnik" types. Girls in attendance at the party, according to Stratton, appeared to be of the "street-pickup" type.

After the above party Wood occasionally telephoned Stratton and about [illegible] 1960 Wood called and stated that he was going to Cuba under the auspices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. 3 Stratton called on Wood after the return of Wood from Cuba and at that time Wood lauded Castro very highly. The father of Wood was also present and Stratton obtained the impression that the father was also in sympathy with Castro. Stratton recalled that he again, at a later date, had visited the Wood apartment, this being an occasion when Wood had been visiting somewhere in Falls Church and contacted Stratton to ask Stratton to this Wood home. On this

3 3

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3

occasion Stratton stayed at the Wood apartment for approximately an hour, and advised that on this occasion he observed some Soviet propaganda pamphlets in the apartment and that these pamphlets had been printed in England. Stratton also observed a number of copies of the "USSR" magazine in the apartment.

3

Stratton also advised that, as previously indicated, he would meet Wood at the University of Virginia Extension School which was conducting night classes at the Washington and Lee High School. Both Wood and 3 Stratton were attending the night classes but were not attending mutual classes. Stratton recalled that on one of the occasions when he had met Wood while attending night classes Wood talked about going to Cuba via Mexico for permanent residence, and made some statement to the effect that he would be willing to renounce his United States citizenship.

Stratton also [illegible] that Americans were afraid of the word "Communist" and were being misled by the newspapers. Wood had complained that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was unable to obtain proper publicity in the United States.

In June 1961 the [illegible] night classes were terminated and Stratton did not recall then seeing Wood again until late August or early September 1961. Wood [illegible] in regard to the purchase of a bicycle [illegible] or through some mutual friends Stratton learned that Wood had married [illegible] in meeting the wife of Wood, and Wood invited Stratton and wife to the Wood apartment for a party and so that he could meet his wife. Stratton 3 and wife, together with Gail and Thomas Varney, Washington Boulevard, Arlington, who had also attended high school with Stratton, the wife of 3 Stratton, and Wood, accompanied Stratton 3 and wife to the above party. The other individuals at the party were of the "beatnik crowd" with several of the men wearing beards, and the girls appearing to be of the "street pick-up" type. In view of this Stratton 3 and wife only remained at the party for a very short time but did meet the wife of Wood. The wife of Wood had been attending Bryn Mawr College and was expecting to attend Bryn Mawr during the school year of 1960-1961. Stratton 3 learned that the [illegible] of the wife of Wood is still [illegible] but that they were [illegible] Wood.

03

[illegible] party, when he attended at the apartment [illegible] Wood and [illegible]

03

[illegible] D. C. [illegible] Baker, who lives in Washington, D. C. and who [illegible]

11
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3

George Mason College with Wood. [Stratton] also recalled that at the first party which he attended and which was at the apartment of Wood and [illegible], David Eastman was also present. [illegible], according to Stratton, attended the George Mason/High School, or graduated from George Mason High School in June 1951.

3

[Stratton] recalled that the first name of the wife of Wood is [illegible] but did not know her maiden name. At the above party Wood indicated that he was moving to Philadelphia so that his wife could continue her college education, but Stratton at the time of the interview did not know whether Wood has actually moved to Philadelphia.

3 3

Wood, during conversation with [Stratton] made the remark to [Stratton] that he, Wood, did not know if his wife was a Communist but she might be. Wood, however, did not [illegible] this [illegible] remark.

3

At the time of the above party [Stratton] understood that Wood was employed as [illegible]. [Stratton] could not recall the [illegible] which the [illegible] party was held [illegible] [illegible] Washington, D.C.

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[illegible] visited [illegible] at the Wood apartment for [illegible] and [illegible] on this occasion he [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] also stated that [illegible] previously indicated he would [illegible] to the University of Virginia [illegible]

In June, 1961 [illegible] Thomas Kearney [illegible] Stratton and wife [illegible] to the party; the [illegible] individuals [illegible] the party were of the [illegible] with several of the men wearing beards, and the girls appearing to be of the [illegible] type. In view of this, Stratton and wife only remained at the party for a very short time but did meet the wife of Wood. The wife had been attending Bryn Mawr College [illegible] during the school year 1960-1961. Stratton believes that the [illegible] of the wife of Wood is still financing the education of the daughter but that they were strongly opposed to the marriage of the daughter to Wood.

In regard to specific associates of Wood, Stratton advised that at the party which he attended at the apartment occupied by Wood and wife there were approximately thirty individuals present, a number of whom he casually met but whose names he did not recall. Stratton did recall that the following individuals were present: "Walt" McDonald, now believed living in Washington, D. C. but who had attended George Mason College with Wood; and "Charlie" [illegible], who lives in Washington, D. C. and who attended

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[illegible] College [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] according to [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] that the [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

6
68

1. Appraisal memo dtd 2/15/61 concerning [Michael Stratton
Limited info in memo concerning Fair Play for Cuba Committee and is
[redacted]
derived from polygraph and FBI
Sum and substance of poly info duplicated elsewhere and
retrieved – copies of pertinent memos appear above (2/1/61;
3/8/61; 3/18/61 and 10/17/61)

2. memo dtd 10/15/61 – Info re FPCC is duplicated in memo of 10/17/61 above

SECRET

13 December 1967

SUBJECT: BATISTA, Laureano
(See also DAVIS, Rudolph Richard)

ALLEGATION:

Rudolph Richard DAVIS, Cuban exile questioned by GARRISON's staff in connection with a training camp for Cubans at Lacombe, Louisiana told the FBI in May 1964 that Laureano BATISTA, sent him 19 men from Miami in response to a request from DAVIS in 1963. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana.

CIA CONNECTION:

Laureano BATISTA, Secretary of Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democratica Cristiano (MDC), Miami, was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 30 December 1959 and an [Operational Approval on 20 February 1960 for use as a PP Agent, Havana, Cuba.] 24

SOURCE:

Memorandum No. 5, Enclosures 3 and 7.

OS INDICES RESULTS:

Subject, a 32 year old Cuban exile, was from a wealthy Cuban family and in Cuba he was a banker. He was granted a POA in December 1959 [and an OA in February 1960 for use as a PP agent in Havana, Cuba.] 24

A copy of a letter in Subject's file dated 22 November 1963 signed by Subject as Secretary for Military Affairs, Executive Committee, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano is addressed to Major General Bela K. KIRALY, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc., and offered the services of the MDC in arranging meetings and discussions with other anti-CASTRO organizations and the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. 24 [The Hungarian Freedom Fighters were Agency sponsored] and Covert Action Staff was interested in information on the MDC before granting approval for contact between the two organizations.

DETAILS:

During an interview with the FBI in October 1963 in New York Rudolph Richard DAVIS advised that in January 1961 he was in New York where he served as coordinator between the MDC and the New York Police Department. DAVIS also said that some nineteen men had been sent from

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3/ML

8.

Miami to New Orleans by Laureano BATISTA in response to a request by DAVIS for men to work in a lumber business with which he was connected in Guatemala. The men stayed at a home near Lacombe, Louisiana. When the FBI seized dynamite and other explosives nearby, the men became disgruntled and were unwilling to proceed to Guatemala. So the lumber company paid their fare back to Miami.

Some of the names of these men were as follows: Victor PANEQUE, Leodorino INTERIAN, Fernando FERNANDEZ, and fnu FORNES.

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LEOB/SRS

SUBJECT: December 1967 RAMPARTS Article Entitled "The CIA's 'Brown and Root Dimensions'"

BROWN and ROOT, Inc. - #405552

The following employees of BROWN and ROOT, Inc. were approved for contact use on the dates indicated:

WHITE, Ross - #405552-A	13 March 1950
TOWNE, Isaac Newton, Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Operations -#405552-B	11 December 1952 and 16 February 1953
WARNER, Merritt Allen, Chief Project Accountant - #405552-C	31 January 1957 and 11 April 1957
MONTGOMERY, Thomas Kenneth - #405552-D	15 February 1957 and 8 May 1957
BRADBERRY, Louis Dell - #405552-E	4 October 1957
WILLIAMS, Bobby Joe #C462165	14 July 1965
WAGNER, Richard Andrew, Civil Engineer - #453108 (A PSCA was issued for contact and assessment but he was not used - had a poor credit reputation)	3 August 1965
RENKES, Elmer Ray - #R464127	6 August 1965
MACKIN, John Gilman, Jr. - #449780	19 July 1966

BROWN FOUNDATION

There is no OS subject file on the BROWN Foundation but a reference file contains a memorandum dated 30 January 1967 to the Deputy Director, Plans

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

from Chief, Central Cover Group concerning the threat of exposure of Agency operations and concludes that the BROWN Foundation of Houston, Texas was one of the most vulnerable to exposure because public records reflect direct ties from Agency funding instruments identified by Congressman PATMAN in 1964 to legitimate foundations and Agency projects they have sponsored.

VERNON FUND - #69000-573

The VERNON Fund (HEMUDWEED) was created by the Agency in June 1958 as an ostensibly private philanthropic foundation legally incorporated under the laws of and with an office in the District of Columbia. It is used as a cover and funding mechanism for Porject DTLAMPREY. The objective of this project is the development of organizational and individual assets capable of strengthening the unity of non-Communist teachers and their organizations throughout the world. These objectives are carried out through the active support by the Agency of the international programs of the National Education Association (FBLINTERN) and the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (JELACEPOD) with which NEA is affiliated. In March 1967 because of exposure of the Vernon Fund in news media, the Board members were contacted advised as follows:

> Each Vernon Fund board member is being advised that he will receive a copy of the NEA and WCOTP letters regarding press allegations; he will acknowledge his membership on the Vernon Fund board if confronted with the fact; he will acknowledge that the Vernon Fund has supported WCOTP and that it made a few small grants to NEA; he will decline any further comment on the origin or operation of the Vernon Fund, on sources of Vernon Fund money, on whether the Vernon Fund received money from the Agency, or any other aspect of the Fund; he will be informed that the Vernon Fund records are not available to the public, short of subpoena; he will be asked to return any files or papers relating to the Vernon Fund; he will be told that Dr. CARR (William George CARR) has not yet had to identify any board members but will probably have to; he will not comment on the creation of the Vernon Fund and how initial contacts were made.

DICK, Albert Blake, III - #C178333 (Vernon Fund Board Member)

Albert Blake DICK, III, President, A. B. DICK Company, Chicago, Illinois, was granted a Covert Security Approval for his witting use in connection with the funding of Project TPFOUMART.

CARR, William George - #410038-B and #116332

William G. CARR was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 22 April 1955 for unwitting use under Project DTPILLAR and on 21 November 1967 he received a Covert Security Approval to permit his use under Project DTLAMPREY in his position as Secretary-General of the World Confederation of Organizations in the Teaching Profession.

REA, Bryce, Jr. - #149438

Bryce REA, Jr., attorney for the Vernon Fund, was granted a Covert Security Clearance for his use on a cleared attorneys' panel on

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15 November 1956 and on 19 September 1958 he received another covert security Clearance to permit his use as a Lessee Cut-Out in the procurement of domestic safehouses.

World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions (Funded by the Vernon Fund)

I In April 1967 a discussion was held between an Agency representative and John THOMPSON and Ray SMYKE of the WCOTP (World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession) concerning future funding for WCOTP. Because of publicity concerning the funding of WCOTP by the Vernon Fund WCOTP leadership promised its membership that no further Vernon Fund money would be accepted until the status of the Vernon Fund was clarified. John THOMPSON felt that the best solution would be a one-time only infusion of money by sterile check into the WCOTP bank account to be backstopped by a letter from the attorney for the Vernon Fund, Bryce REA, who would attribute the money to members of the Vernon Fund Board who anonymously wished to provide WCOTP with sufficient funds to cover expenses until other sources could be found.

In May 1967 John THOMPSON of the WCOTP described to an Agency representative an interview he had with Mike MacMANUS of TIME magazine on 1 May 1967 who wanted to discuss the effects of newspaper publicity on WCOTP operations. MacMANUS was especially interested in any economies forced on WCOTP and a request for proof of the value of WCOTP operations to individual teachers. THOMPSON felt that MacMANUS did not succeed in gaining sufficient additional information from the interview to warrant writing his projected article.

SMYKE, Raymond Joseph - #160031

Raymond Joseph SMYKE was granted a Covert Security Approval on 10 July 1957 for use as a witting employee of Project HTTILACES and on 19 May 1962 he received a Covert Security Approval for his use by Project JELACEFOD as Coordinator for African Activities in Washington, D. C. SMYKE is administrative officer of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

THOMPSON, John

I It was not possible to identify a subject file on John THOMPSON employed by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

CABOT FOUNDATION

OS indices were negative on the CABOT Foundation. (SEE Thomas D. CABOT)

American Friends of the Middle East O #340377 and #65300

American Friends of the Middle East (Project ZRTINDER) was created in May 1951 with the purpose of employing aggressive propaganda to promote the friendship of peoples of the Near and Middle East toward the United States and to combat Communism. It was incorporated as a voluntary, non-profit membership corporation under the laws of New York State. Dorothy THOMPSON, columnist, was selected as Chairman. In early 1967 AFME received a good deal of newspaper publicity concerning its Agency affiliation including articles in the Soviet press, TASS and USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Syria was the only country in which AFME is active that raised the question of the organization's continue d existence in the light of allegations of Agency financial support; although, there were rumblings in Iraq.

San Jacinto Fund

There is no OS subject file on the San Jacinto Fund. The attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations" - stated that RAMPARTS has expressed intense interest in the San Jacinto Fund, and its sources of income in particular, because it funds 5 HBEPITOME activities (youth affairs).

M. D. ANDERSON Foundation

There is no OS subject file on the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation but OS indices reflect a file on the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute.

A study program to determine the effects in diverse Biological Systems resulting from exposure to high intensity coherent radiation was contracted with the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute, University of Texas, Houston, Texas in October 1963 but as of 16 April 1964 there was a hold order against going ahead with the contract because of a question as to why the Agency should bear the whole cost of the contract which was to be for inter-departmental use. In May 1967 a note in the file indicated that M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute will be engaged in classified work for the Agency. There was no record of a clearance issued.

MARSHALL FOUNDATION

See attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations". The MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas is considered one of the most vulnerable to exposure.

A "New York Times" article for 26 February 1967 disclosed that the MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas channeled funds from the Agency to the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University from 1961 to 1963.

(See Douglas B. MARSHALL)

BROWN, George Rufus - #94014

George Rufus BROWN, Executive Vice President of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 23 October 1953 for use as a covert associate in the United States on Project LPCOIN. On 22 April 1965 he was granted a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit contact and assessment of BROWN in connection with his possible use in serving on the Board of Directors for a proprietary being set up to support staff employees working in Udorn, Thailand, Laos and a Covert Security Approval for this use was issued on 18 June 1965. These clearances were cancelled 2 June 1967 as BROWN was not used.

BROWN, Herman - #95239

Herman BROWN, President and Director of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas and President and Trustee of the BROWN Foundation, Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Approval on 3 December 1953 for use as a Covert Associate in the U. S. under Project LPCOIN. This clearance was cancelled 15 February 1966.

CLARK, Ed

Negative

SHIVERS, Allan - #373051

Governor Allan SHIVERS of Texas was on the Advisory Board of FACTS FORUM NEWS in September 1955. He was listed as a trustee of the American Good Government Society in April 1965.

Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, was a signer of a statement appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES for 20 October 1949 sponsored by the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign of the International Rescue Committee. The IRC was described as basically good, humanitarian organization but many individuals of questionable loyalty have been associated with it.

A NEW YORK TIMES clipping for 12 February 1954 stated that Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, said he planned to ask his Legislature to make membership in the Communist Party a death penalty offense. He was quoted as saying "In politics we often speak of bipartisan issues. I can think of nothing that should be more bipartisan than catching a Communist. There can be no valid issue between Americans over Communists. Americans are either pro-Communist or anti-Communist."

No clearance was requested or issued for SHIVERS. His file contains reference cards only.

MOODY, Dan

Negative

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CABOT, Thomas D., Jr. - #430906

Thomas D. CABOT, Jr. was approved for contact use on 17 August 1961. At the time he was Vice President and Director of International Relations Texas Butadiene and Chemical Corporation. He was residing in Lausanne, Switzerland. Contact interest was for briefing him on Agency interests in economic and political developments in various European countries; chemical industrial development, etc. He was the subject of a favorable background investigation in 1952.

CABOT, Thomas Dudley - #87904

Thomas Dudley CABOT was granted a Covert Security Approval for use under Project LPCOIN. On 26 June 1959 he was issued a Covert Security Approval for use with Project UNGLANT. He was to serve as the President or Chairman of an American Committee whose objective was to foster Franco-American relations at the management level. CABOT had been approved for contact use in 1950 and received a clearance for use on the Executive Committee of M.I.T. in April 1954. A continuation of this clearance was granted on 29 October 1958.

SMITH, William A. - #76555

William A. SMITH was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 August 1952 for use as an agent in Latin America under commercial cover. On 14 January 1955 a Covert Security Clearance was issued to SMITH to permit his use as a Covert Associate in the United States under Project LPFUNNEL. At the time he had a number of business interests in Houston, Texas, i.e., William A. SMITH Construction Company, Houston, Texas; Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Citizens State Bank of Houston, etc.

WORTHAM, Gus

Negative

JAWORSKI, Leon - #168199

Leon JAWORSKI was granted a Covert Security Approval on 31 March 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation. His file contains a newspaper clipping from the WASHINGTON STAR for 3 December 1963 which concerns his appointment as special counsel for a Texas State Court of Inquiry into the assassination of President KENNEDY. He had achieved prominence when he was prosecutor at the Nurenburg War Trials. The article also stated that in 1960 JAWORSKI successfully represented Lyndon B. JOHNSON in a court challenge of Mr. JOHNSON's right to have his name appear on the general election ballot in Texas both as a candidate for Vice-President and for reelection to the U. S. Senate. Another item in U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT for 7 July 1964 reported that Houston lawyer, Leon JAWORSKI, who is close to Lyndon JOHNSON was being considered for the job of Attorney General.

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FREEMAN, John Henry - #157181

John Henry FREEMAN was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 June 1957 to permit the utilization of his services under Project LPCOIN. At the time he was a partner in the large and leading law firm of FULBRIGHT, CROOKER, FREEMAN, BATES and JAWORSKI at Houston, Texas and was a trustee of the M. D. ANDERSON Medical Foundation.

COCKRELL, Ernest Dashiell, Jr. - #91571 and #E403051-A

Ernest Dashiell COCKRELL, Jr. was approved for contact use (CAUTION) on 10 June 1953 and was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 4 August 1953 for use in the U. S. under Project QKENCHANT. At the time he was President of two oil companies in Houston, Texas; Oil Production Maintenance, Inc. and Production Maintenance Company.

MARSHALL, Douglas B. - #173597

Douglas B. MARSHALL was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 November 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the CULLEN Foundation. MARSHALL was Vice President of the Quintana Petroleum Corporation of Houston, Texas which is the holding company owned by the Hugh Roy CULLEN family. MARSHALL's wife, Margaret Cullen MARSHALL, is a daughter of Hugh Roy CULLEN.

HOBBY, Oveta Culp - #344001 and #241189

Oveta Culp HOBBY was granted a continuing liaison clearance on 7 April 1953 when she was Director of the Federal Security Agency. A Covert Security Approval was issued 18 July 1961 to permit her use under Project LPCORSET to aid in funding arrangements through the HOBBY Foundation of Houston, Texas of which she is President. On 26 October 1965 a Provisional Security Approval was granted to permit contact, assessment and briefing of Mrs. HOBBY as President of the HOBBY Foundation in connection with her possible utilization on an advisory committee of a broadcasting activity, University of the Air, directed at the students and intellectuals of Cuba. A Covert Security Approval was issued 31 March 1966 primarily to use the prestige of her name and position as cover for WH/Cuba activities and it was not expected that Mrs. HOBBY would take an active day by day role in the activities.

BUTLER, George A.

Negative

HOBBY, William Pettus, Jr. - #425337 and #275074

Oveta Culp HOBBY's son, William Pettus HOBBY, Jr., born 19 January 1932 at Houston, Texas, was security approved for contact use on 23 May 1960. At the time he was Associate Editor of the HOUSTON POST, Houston, Texas. On 29 June 1962 he was granted a Covert Security Approval to permit his witting use under Project CAWAGTAIL which was to be supported by the

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HOBBY Foundation. On 22 October 1965 a PCSA was issued to HOBBY for the same use in WH/Cuba activities as that outlined for his mother. This Provisional clearance was firmed into a Covert Security Approval on 4 February 1966 for the same use.

Sarah K. Hall

Atts:
  Dec 67 RAMPARTS
  Memo dtd 24 Nov 67 (SF-633-67
  Memo dtd 30 Jan 67 to DD/P
  NYT 2/26/67
  NYT 2/19/67

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

SECTION I.

INSTRUCTIONS

Submit in duplicate. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "NA." Write "UNKNOWN" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates.

1. FULL NAME *(last-first-middle)*	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*	4. SOC SEC NO.
Flores, Daniel	09 4 Aug 1935	San Marcos Texas	460-48-6230 30

5. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, widowed, divorced, or annulled)* SPECIFY: Married 10

6. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
"NA"

SECTION II.

SPOUSE

1. NAME OF SPOUSE *(last-first-middle-maiden)*	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH *(spouse)*
Flores, Dorothy Arnett 06	09 31 Jan 1935	Portland, Oregon

4. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE	5. CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE *(If naturalized, indicate date & place of naturalization & certificate no.)*
18 November 1960 Lima, Peru 10	USA

6. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
"NA"

7. OCCUPATION	8. PRESENT EMPLOYER
Legal Secretary	Arnold and Porter 08

9. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State & Zip Code - Country if not U.S.)*
08
1229 19th Street NW, Washington, D.C.

SECTION III. RESIDENCE *(Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city and country)*

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(number, street, city, state, country)* Incl. Apt. #	INCLUSIVE DATES *(month & year)* FROM-	TO-
Guayaquil, Ecuador 10	May 1969	May 1971
Lima, Peru 10	Sept. 1971	Feb. 1974
Vienna, Va 08 8151 Larkin La. ✓	Feb. 1974	

SECTION IV. CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Provide information for all children and dependents)*

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	08 ADDRESS
06 Kendra Flores	Daughter	3 March 1971 ~~Washington, D.c~~.	USA	8151 Larking La ~~Vienna, Va~~.
06 Zola Marie Flores	Daughter	15 March 1974 ~~Washington, D.c~~.	USA	"

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(4)

(4)

SECTION V. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

(1)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* GUERRERO, Richard 06	2. RELATIONSHIP Nephew	3. DATE OF BIRTH UK	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* New Orleans, La
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* USA	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES Ansbach, Germany		
7. EMPLOYED BY U.S. Army	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT Periodic	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT March 1974	

(2)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
7. EMPLOYED BY	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT	

(3)

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*
5. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	6. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
7. EMPLOYED BY	8. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	9. DATE OF LAST CONTACT	

SECTION VI. PERSONAL DECLARATIONS

1. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW *(Other than for minor traffic violation)* SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS		YES *(explain below)*	X	NO
2. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION.		YES *(explain below)*	X	NO

3. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR *(include Room Number and Extension)* Mr. Nestor Sanchez ✓
X-7451 RM 3D30

SECTION VII. PERSONS TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* Same as previous PHS.	2. RELATIONSHIP
3. HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, ZIP Code)*	4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, ZIP Code)*- INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER & EXT.

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(spouse, mother, father ...)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE IDENTIFY THE PERSONS NOT TO BE NOTIFIED AND THE REASON.

SECTION VIII. ADDITIONAL REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

VPV

14-00000

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

1. NAME (*First-middle-last*)
Daniel (nmn) Flores

2. MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
OTHER

3. IF MARRIED 06

NAME OF SPOUSE (*First-middle(maiden)-last*)
Dorothy A. Moran Flores

PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Lima, Peru 10

DATE OF MARRIAGE
18 November 1960

4. RESIDENCE (*Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city & country*)

PRESENT	SINCE (*Date*) August 1961	NUMBER AND STREET 2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 08	CITY AND STATE Washington, D.C. 20008
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE

5. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW (*Other than for minor traffic violation*) SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS ☐ YES (*Explain below*) ☒ NO

6. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION ☐ YES (*Explain below*) ☒ NO

7. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Harry T. Mahoney EXT. 7176 RM. # 3D54

8. ADDITIONAL REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

DATE
29 March 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Daniel Flores

FORM 4-61 444e

(4)

3/DV

SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

1. NAME *(First-middle-last)*
Daniel (nmn) Flores

2. MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
☐ OTHER

3. IF MARRIED
NAME OF SPOUSE *(First-middle(maiden)-last)*
06 Dorothy A. Moran Flores

PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Lima, Peru 10

DATE OF MARRIAGE
18 November 1960

4. RESIDENCE *(Since date of last PHS, if overseas residence indicate only city & country)*

PRESENT	SINCE *(Date)* August 1961	NUMBER AND STREET 08 2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W.	CITY AND STATE Washington, D.C. 20008
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE
FROM	DATE TO DATE	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY AND STATE

5. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW *(Other than for minor traffic violation)* SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS
☐ YES *(Explain below)* ☒ NO

6. SINCE THE DATE OF YOUR LAST PHS, HAVE THERE BEEN ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION
☐ YES *(Explain below)* ☒ NO

7. NAME OF YOUR PRESENT IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
Harry T. Mahoney EXT. 7176 RM. # 3D54

8. ADDITIONAL REMARKS *(Use reverse if necessary)*

RETURN PHS AND ATTACHMENTS
TO HEADQUARTERS

DATE
29 March 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Daniel

FORM 4-61 444e (4)

3/PV

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
American Christian Nationalist Party
American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American Jewish Labor Council
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
American Nationalist Party
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Crusade
American Peace Mobilization
American Poles for Peace
American Polish Labor Council
American Polish League
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
American-Russian Fraternal Society
American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
American Slav Congress
American Women for Peace
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Associated Klans of America
Association of Georgia Klans
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party

Baltimore Forum
Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
Black Dragon Society
Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America

California Emergency Defense Committee
California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
Carpatho-Russian People's Society
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
Cervantes Fraternal Society
China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
Chopin Cultural Center
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
Citizens Protective League
Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
Columbians
Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
Comite Pro Derechos Civiles
(See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
Committee for Nationalist Action
Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
Committee for the Negro in the Arts
Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland
(See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates

Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including:
  Alabama People's Educational Association
  Florida Press and Educational League
  Oklahoma League for Political Education
  People's Educational and Press Association of Texas
  Virginia League for People's Education
Congress Against Discrimination
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Congress of the Unemployed
Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Council of Greek Americans
Council on African Affairs
Croatian Benevolent Fraternity

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Daily Worker Press Club
Daniels Defense Committee
Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)
Dennis Defense Committee
Detroit Youth Assembly

East Bay Peace Committee
Elsinore Progressive League
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War

Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims
Families of the Smith Act Victims
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)
Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society
Florida Press and Educational League (see Communist Political Association)
Frederick Douglass Educational Center
Freedom Stage, Inc.
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union

Garibaldi American Fraternal Society
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Guardian Club

Harlem Trade Union Council
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Heimusha Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hellenic-American Brotherhood
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society — a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Hungarian Brotherhood

Idaho Pension Union
Independent Party (Seattle, Washington)
(See Independent People's Party)
Independent People's Party
(See Independent Party)
Industrial Workers of the World
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Culture Society
Jewish People's Committee
Jewish People's Fraternal Order
Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)
Johnson-Forest Group
(See Johnsonites)
Johnsonites
(See Johnson-Forest Group)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Wedemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)

Labor Council for Negro Rights
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League
League for Common Sense
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)

Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.)
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Michigan Council for Peace
Michigan School of Social Science

Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)
National Committee for Freedom of the Press
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Labor Conference for Peace
National Negro Congress
National Negro Labor Council
Nationalist Action League

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
North Philadelphia Forum
Northwest Japanese Association

Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Oklahoma League for Political Education (see Communist Political Association)
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Palo Alto Peace Club
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peace Information Center
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas (see Communist Political Association)
People's Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington)
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Pittsburgh Arts Club
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee
Polonia Society of the IWO
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC)
(See Comite Pro Derechos Civiles)
Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)

Quad City Committee for Peace
Queensbridge Tenants League

Revolutionary Workers League
Romanian-American Fraternal Society
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Santa Barbara Peace Forum
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian-American Fraternal Society
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto abolished in 1945)
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slavic Council of Southern California
Slovak Workers Society
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
Syracuse Women for Peace

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Trade Union Committee for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Trade Unionists for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council

Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union
Union of American Croatians
Union of New York Veterans
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Defense Council of Southern California
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York (see Civil Rights Congress)
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Virginia League for People's Education (see Communist Political Association)
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)

Yiddisher Kultur Farband
Young Communist League
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In)
September 6, 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

OPSEC/C 08

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): FLORES, Daniel
2. AGE: 26
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 5' 8"
5. WEIGHT: 165 pds.
6. COLOR OF EYES: Brown
7. COLOR OF HAIR: Black
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: Dark
9. TYPE BUILD: Medium
10. SCARS (Type and Location): Right cheek, one-half inch scar; left upper lip, one-quarter inch scar; both received playing football
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None

12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country):
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., #203
Washington 8, D. C. 08

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: 08
2828 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
#203 - Washington 8, D.C.

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 265-8322 08
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: None
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Washington, District of Columbia
17. NICKNAMES: Dan
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
Personal acquaintances - twelve years
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).
NA

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
Any phase of communications; administration; or personnel work.

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $ 4,250.00
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: Immediately

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)
☒ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☒ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.
I would be willing to travel within the United States provided said travel would not involve a permanent move whereby my legal residence would be changed. However, it is my wish to live overseas on a permanent basis.

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58

JOY COONEY

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(4)

3/RV

SECTION III — CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: August 4, 1935 09

2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): 10 San Marcos, Texas

3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): United States of America

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA

6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA

8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

NA

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? NA

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: NA

16. PORT OF ENTRY: NA

17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: NA

18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): NA

19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NA

SECTION IV — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: 08 San Marcos Elementary School

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): 10 San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A.

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): Sept., 1942 - May, 1951

4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: 08 San Marcos High School

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A. 10

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): Sept., 1951 - May, 1955

4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: NA

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):

4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

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SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
NA				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Marine Security Guard School - Henderson Hall				
Hq. Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.	Security Guard Training	9/28/58	10/31/58	(5 wks)

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

Weapons Training in Marine Corps.

Acted as partisan during cold weather training at Bridgeport, California (Pickle Meadows - USMC).

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).*	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT *(with parents, etc.)*	ACADEMIC STUDY *(all levels)*
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X		X		X													X	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

Could act as literal interpreter at almost any level.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

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SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Bolivia	General knowledge	11/13/58 to 1/14/60		X			
Peru	General knowledge	1/14/60 to 11/20/60		X			
Chile		6/16/59 to 6/21/59			X		
Argentina		6/21/59 to 6/30/59			X		
Uruguay		6/30/59 to 7/2/59			X		

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Marine Security Guard - American Embassy - Bolivia and Peru
Vacation - Chile; Argentina; Uruguay; Panama

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

No.(174850 08 (SP-85575)) Passport has been cancelled.

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
45 wpm	None	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (*Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.*).

Thermofax, mimeograph, switchboard

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Football - good
Basketball - fair
Swimming - good
Reading - average
Contract Bridge - very good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

None to my knowledge

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (*Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving*), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

None

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

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SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* NA	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

None

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

None

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Have spoken in my father's church and other churches approximately 150 times. Met and assisted public in Embassies during my tour of duty with the Marine Security Guard.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* From 1949 to 1953	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Hillburn's Drug Store 08
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 10 San Marcos, Texas	
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Drug Store	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR 06 Mr. William Hillburn
6. TITLE OF JOB Fountain attendant	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $100.00 PER month 8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Employee at soda counter	
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To participate in school events (football).	

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

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SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* July 1954-June 1955
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Diamond Grocery Store 08
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* South Guadalupe St. San Marcos, Texas 08
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Grocery Store
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Ignacio Gonzales 06
6. TITLE OF JOB Butcher
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $30.00 PER Week
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Slaughtering and preparing meat for sale as well as actual selling.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To attend college ?

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* May, 1955 - September, 1956
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY San Marcos Baptist Academy 08
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* San Marcos 10 Texas
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Private School
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. John Sparkman 06
6. TITLE OF JOB Painter's Assistant
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 35.00 PER week
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Painted dormitories in the Academy
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To attend school

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* September, 1956 - July, 1957
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Economy Department Stores 08
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* San Marcos 10 Texas
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Clothing Store
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Max Mendlovitz 06
6. TITLE OF JOB Sales Clerk
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 30.00 PER week
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Assisted customers in selecting and buying goods.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING To join the Marine Corps.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* July 26, 1957 - July 25, 1961
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Marine Corps
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Military
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col. John Magruder
6. TITLE OF JOB Marine Corps Museum Attendant
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 180.00 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)* Cpl. (E-4)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

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SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Acted as guide to all visitors entering Museum, explaining Marine Corps history, etc. Also on several occasions acted as interpreter for visiting military personnel from Latin America.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

Discharged

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
July 28, 1961 - August 30, 1961

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
08 Ohio Valley Engineering Company

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
S. Capitol and I Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS
Construction 08

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Mr. L. G. Bruce 06

6. TITLE OF JOB
Laborer

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ 2.17 PER hour

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Handyman for Company

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING
Temporary work while seeking permanent employment.

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3 ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. 7 1/2 years

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☒ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

Honorably discharged from United States Marine Corps.

3/12

SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)*	X	YES NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION IV-A	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (41-65-35-187) 08
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON NA			5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS (#65 - 101 1/2 E. San Antonio St.,) 08 10 (Lockhart,) Texas	

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify):*
HAVE SERVED→			X						None
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
Personnel Administration

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)* 25 July, 1961		4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)* 4 years
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY →	PAST SERVICE 26 July, 1957	CURRENT SERVICE
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION		
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE →	PAST SERVICE Cpl. (E-4)	CURRENT SERVICE
8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)*		
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE 0141 - Chief Clerk	CURRENT SERVICE
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE None	CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

Past Service: Clerk - Maintained personnel service records.
2 years as Security Guard in the American Embassies in La Paz, Bolivia and Lima, Peru.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

X	HONORABLE DISCHARGE		RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
X	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY		RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	OTHER:
	RETIREMENT FOR AGE		RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

X	REGULAR	X	RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)*		OTHER *(Including AUS)*

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS?	X	YES	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.?		YES	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC?		YES
		NO		X	NO		X	NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

	ARMY	X	MARINE CORPS		NATIONAL GUARD		COAST GUARD		NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
	NAVY		AIR FORCE		AIR NAT'L. GUARD		ARMY ROTC		AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE Cpl. (E-4)	6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK May, 1959	7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION January 20, 1962

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY		READY RESERVE		STANDBY *(Active)*	X	STANDBY *(Inactive)*		RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE 0141	10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE None

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

None

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT	X	YES NO	13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT?	X	YES NO	15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY	YEARS 7	MONTHS 7	17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington 25, D.C.

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3/R/

SECTION XI - FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Wife's income

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*
The Bank of California, N.A.	330 S.W. 6th Avenue, Portland, Oregon
Union Trust Company	15 and H Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State)*
General Motors Acceptance Corp.	1310 S.W. Yamhill Street, Portland 5, Oregon
Gulf Oil Corporation	P.O. Box 7245, Atlanta 9, Georgia
Ninde Furniture Company	917 Caroline Steet, Fredericksburg Virginia

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME *(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Maiden)*	*(Last)*
Dorothy	Anne	06 Arnett	Flores

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED

06
Dorothy A. Moran

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE	6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*
November 14, 1960	Lima, Peru 10

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

American Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia 10

8. LIVING		9. DATE OF DEATH	10. CAUSE OF DEATH
X YES	☐ NO		

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)* 08

2828 Connecticut Ave., N.W., #203 Washington 8, D.C.

12. DATE OF BIRTH	13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*	14. CITIZENSHIP
January 31, 1935	Portland, Oregon	United States of Am.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

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SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA

15. PLACE OF ENTRY NA

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] NA

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) NA

19. OCCUPATION Legal Secretary

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) (Boykin and De Francis) 08
Former: Department of State

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
(1000 16th St., N.W., 08 Suite 603) Washington 6, D.C.

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.) None

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN Foreign Service - Jan., 1958 - Oct., 1960; Civil Service - April 1961 - June 1961

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
None				

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) (Jose S.) Flores

2. LIVING X YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED 06
None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)
(501 S. Guadalupe Street, 08 San Marcos) Texas

7. DATE OF BIRTH December 20, 1898

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Mier y Noriega, Nuevo Leon, Mexico

9. CITIZENSHIP USA

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY May 24, 1918

11. PLACE OF ENTRY Unknown

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] Mexican

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED 1957

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Austin, Texas

15. OCCUPATION Baptist Minister

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) Mexican Baptist Church

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED
(501 S. Guadalupe Street, 06 San Marcos) Texas

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To) To my knowledge never served in any military service

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE

20. COUNTRY

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

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SECTION XV **MOTHER** *(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Flores, (Agustina) 06
2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: June 1939
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Unknown
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: None to my knowledge

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: (S. Austin and Lee Streets, 08 San Marcos) Texas
7. DATE OF BIRTH: September 20, 1903
8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Mier y Noriega, Nuevo Leon, Mexico
9. CITIZENSHIP: Mexican
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Unknown
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *[Country(ies)]*: NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*: NA
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)*: NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*: NA
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA
20. COUNTRY: NA
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** *(Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)*

	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	(Patlan, Frances) 06	Sister	U.S. of America	(631 S. River St., 08 Seguin) Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	41
2	(Renteria, Rachel) 06	Sister	U.S. of America	(311 Lambert St., 08 San Antonio) Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	39
3	(Black, Rebecca Mary) 06	Sister	U.S. of America	(501 S. Guadalupe St., 08 San Marcos,) Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	34
4	Flores, (Samuel) 06	Brother	U.S. of America	(Rosemary and Chapman Streets, 08 Seguin) Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	32
5	Flores, (Joe) 06	Brother	U.S. of America	(Route 2, Box 320, San Marcos, 08) Texas	☒ YES ☐ NO	29
6	(Bruce, 06 Esther)	Sister	U.S. of America	(7252 Exmore St., 08 Springfield) Virginia	☒ YES ☐ NO	27
7	Flores, (Eleazar) 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Deceased	☐ YES ☒ NO	7
8	Flores, (Juan) 06	Brother	U.S. of America	Deceased	☐ YES ☒ NO	NA

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SECTION XVII — FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* (Arnett, Carl Raymond) 06	2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	3. DATE OF DEATH	4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Ray

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 08: (4505 Washington St., Milwaukie, 22,) Oregon

7. DATE OF BIRTH January 2, 1909	8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Minot, North Dakota	9. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	11. PLACE OF ENTRY NA	
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *[Country(ies)]* NA	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA	14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)* NA
15. OCCUPATION Warehouse Foreman	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed)* (Rudy Wilhelm Inc.), Portland, Oregon 08	

SECTION XVIII — MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* (Tompkins, Alma Dean) 06	2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	3. DATE OF DEATH	4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: 06 (Alma Dean Arnett)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 08: (13920 S.E. Portland View Place, Portland 36,) Oregon

7. DATE OF BIRTH May 4, 1910	8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* Portland, Oregon	9. CITIZENSHIP U.S. of America
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	11. PLACE OF ENTRY NA	
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *[Country(ies)]* NA	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA	14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)* NA
15. OCCUPATION Homemaker	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed)*	

SECTION XIX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* None to my knowledge	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
5	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

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SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

NA

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
1	Arnett, Raymond Wesley 06	Bro-in-law	24	U.S. of America
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
	U.S. Army Depot, Pueblo, Colorado			
	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
2	Miller, Claude 06	2nd Cousin	Unk	U.S. of America
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
	Air Station, Quantico, Virginia	Aviation - 1st Sgt., USMC		
	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
3				
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State) 08	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. and Mrs. Jose Espinosa 06	S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas 08	San Marcos, Texas 08
Rev. Carlos Paredes 06	First Baptist Church ~~Austin, Texas~~	Austin, Texas
Mr. Thaxter L. Goodell 06	2430 E. St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 08	3742 Jason Avenue, 08 Alexandria, Virginia
Mr. Alfred Beaty 06	Dept. of Agriculture	1711 Massachutes Ave. 08 Washington, D.C.
Cpl. Michael Hennessy 06	The American Embassy, Lima, Peru	172 Bartolome Herrera 08 Miraflores, Lima, Peru

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. Howard Wickland Jr. 06	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Hilltop House 08 Euclid St., Wash., D.C.
Mr. Max Pine 06		3571 Section Road, 08 Cincinnati 36, Ohio
Miss Mary Ann Newman 06	Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.	Allen Lee Hotel, 23rd & 08 E Sts., N.W., Wash., D.C.
Miss Ruth F. Stewart 06		601 Cascade, 08 Boulder, Colorado
Mrs. Bea Lux 06		173 Bartolome Herrera, 08 Miraflores, Lima, Peru

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Miss Nancy Payne 06		402 Hanover St., 08 Fredericksburg, Virginia
Lt. and Mrs. William Faulman 06		c/o Lee Pelts, 08 Route 1, Kennett, Mo.

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SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Spanish Club 10	08 San Marcos High School, San Marcos Texas	Sept., 1954	May 1955
Distributive Education Club 08	San Marcos High School, San Marcos 10 Texas	Sept., 1954	May 1955
Baptist Youth Organization	First Mexican Baptist 08 Church, San Marcos, Tex. 10	Jan., 1957	May 1957

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
08 4736 Kenmore Ave., #201, Alexandria, Virginia	March, 1961	Aug., 1961
08 402 Hanover St., Fredericksburg, Virginia	Dec., 1960	Mar., 1961
08 172 Bartolome Herrera, Miraflores, Lima, Peru	Jan., 1960	Nov., 1960
USIS Building, 3rd & 4th Floors, Calle Potosi, La Paz, Bolivia	Nov., 1958	Jan., 1960
"F" Company, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, Washington 25, D.C.	Sept., 1958	Nov., 1958
Cold Weather Training Battalion, Pickle Meadows, Bridgeport, California	Jan., 1958	Aug., 1958
Marine Corps Base, 29 Palms, California	Dec., 1957	Jan., 1958
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California	July., 1957	Nov., 1957
Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California	Nov., 1957	Dec., 1957
08 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	May 1956	July, 1957
08 Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas	Sept., 1955	May, 1956
08 501 S. Guadalupe St., San Marcos, Texas	1946	Sept., 1955

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐YES ☒NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

I served 4 years in the United States Marine Corps.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

An investigation (I do not know by whom) was conducted prior to my departure for Bolivia where I was attached to the American Embassy. This investigation took place during August and September of 1958.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS **If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.**

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)*: Mrs. Daniel Flores

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*: (2828 Conn. Ave.,08 #203) Washington 8, D.C.

4. HOME PHONE NO.: (265-8322) 08

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
Boykin and De Francis 08
(1000 16th St., Suite 603) Washington 6, D.C.

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT.: 08 (DI 7-5444)

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE. 06
In all cases wife: Relative, Mrs. (Vicente Patlan) (631 S. River St.) 08
10 (Seguin) Texas Telephone (Fr 9-1087) 08

8/m

SECTION XXVI CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES September 8, 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Daniel Flores
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington, District of Columbia	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Nancy Lee Cooley

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

MARITAL STATUS: Item #4, Section XII 06
September 1, 1956 to October 6, 1956. Married to Lt. Col. Joseph G. Moran in Portland, Oregon, by Circuit Court Judge. Used name of Moran until November 14, 1960, when changed to Flores. 06

FATHER-IN-LAW: Item #5, Section XVII
Short name for Raymond

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL: Item #1, Section VI

Argentina	2 July 1959 to 3 July 1959	Travel
Panama	10 November 1958 to 13 November 1958	Travel

SEE ATTACHED SHEET FOR PERTINENT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO STEP-MOTHER.

Signed at Washington, D. C., this 8th day of September, 1961.

Daniel Flores
Daniel Flores

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ATTACHMENT TO FORM NO. 444 - PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Section XV - STEPMOTHER

06

Full name: Concepcion R. Flores
Living: Yes
Other Names She Has Used: None to my knowledge
Current Address: 501 S. Guadalupe Street, San Marcos, Texas
Date of Birth: December 8, 1914 08
Place of Birth: Mexico
Citizenship: Mexican
If Born Outside U.S. - Date of Entry: December 8, 1922
Place of Entry: Unknown
Former Citizenships: None
Occupation: Homemaker and Missionary 08
Present Employer: Mexican Baptist Church, SanMarcos, Texas
Never served in Military or other Government service to my knowledge.

This paper is attached to and hereby made a part of Form No. 444.

Daniel Flores

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3/pd

14-00000
104-10117-10203
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LEOD/SRS

SUBJECT: December 1967 RAMPARTS Article Entitled "The CIA's 'Brown and Root Dimensions'"

BROWN and ROOT, Inc. - #405552

The following employees of BROWN and ROOT, Inc. were approved for contact use on the dates indicated:

WHITE, Ross - #405552-A	13 March 1950
TOWNE, Isaac Newton, Vice-President in Charge of Foreign Operations -#405552-B	11 December 1952 and 16 February 1953
WARNER, Merritt Allen, Chief Project Accountant - #405552-C	31 January 1957 and 11 April 1957
MONTGOMERY, Thomas Kenneth - #405552-D	15 February 1957 and 8 May 1957
BRADBERRY, Louis Bell - #405552-E	4 October 1957
WILLIAMS, Bobby Joe #C462165	14 July 1965
WAGNER, Richard Andrew, Civil Engineer - #453188 (A PSCA was issued for contact and assessment but he was not used - had a poor credit reputation)	3 August 1965
REMKES, Elmer Ray - #E464127	6 August 1965
MACKIN, John Gilman, Jr. - #449780	19 July 1966

BROWN FOUNDATION

There is no OS subject file on the BROWN Foundation but a reference file contains a memorandum dated 30 January 1967 to the Deputy Director, Plans

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

from Chief, Central Cover Group concerning the threat of exposure of Agency operations and concludes that the BROWN Foundation of Houston, Texas was one of the most vulnerable to exposure because public records reflect direct ties from Agency funding instruments identified by Congressman PATMAN in 1964 to legitimate foundations and Agency projects they have sponsored.

VERNON FUND - #69000-573

The VERNON Fund (HBMUDWEED) was created by the Agency in June 1958 as an ostensibly private philanthropic foundation legally incorporated under the laws of and with an office in the District of Columbia. It is used as a cover and funding mechanism for Porject DTLAMPREY. The objective of this project is the development of organizational and individual assets capable of strengthening the unity of non-Communist teachers and their organizations throughout the world. These objectives are carried out through the active support by the Agency of the international programs of the National Education Association (FBLINTERN) and the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession (JBLACEPOD) with which NEA is affiliated. In March 1967 because of exposure of the Vernon Fund in news media, the Board members were contacted advised as follows:

> Each Vernon Fund board member is being advised that he will receive a copy of the NEA and WCOTP letters regarding press allegations; he will acknowledge his membership on the Vernon Fund board if confronted with the fact; he will acknowledge that the Vernon Fund has supported WCOTP and that it made a few small grants to NEA; he will decline any further comment on the origin or operation of the Vernon Fund, on sources of Vernon Fund money, on whether the Vernon Fund received money from the Agency, or any other aspect of the Fund; he will be informed that the Vernon Fund records are not available to the public, short of subpoena; he will be asked to return any files or papers relating to the Vernon Fund; he will be told that Dr. CARR (William George CARR) has not yet had to identify any board members but will probably have to; he will not comment on the creation of the Vernon Fund and how initial contacts were made.

DICK, Albert Blake, III - #C178333 (Vernon Fund Board Member)

Albert Blake DICK, III, President, A. B. DICK Company, Chicago, Illinois, was granted a Covert Security Approval for his witting use in connection with the funding of Project TPTOUMART.

CARR, William George - #410038-B and #116382

William G. CARR was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 22 April 1955 for unwitting use under Project DTPILLAR and on 21 November 1967 he received a Covert Security Approval to permit his use under Project DTLAMPREY in his position as Secretary-General of the World Confederation of Organizations in the Teaching Profession.

REA, Bryce, Jr. - #149438

Bryce REA, Jr., attorney for the Vernon Fund, was granted a Covert Security Clearance for his use on a cleared attorneys' panel on

SECRET

15 November 1956 and on 19 September 1958 he received another covert security Clearance to permit his use as a Lessee Cut-Out in the procurement of domestic safehouses.

World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Professions (Funded by the Vernon Fund)

I In April 1967 a discussion was held between an Agency representative and John THOMPSON and Ray SMYKE of the WCOTP (World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession) concerning future funding for WCOTP. Because of publicity concerning the funding of WCOTP by the Vernon Fund, WCOTP leadership promised its membership that no further Vernon Fund money would be accepted until the status of the Vernon Fund was clarified. John THOMPSON felt that the best solution would be a one-time only infusion of money by sterile check into the WCOTP bank account to be backstopped by a letter from the attorney for the Vernon Fund, Bryce REA, who would attribute the money to members of the Vernon Fund Board who anonymously wished to provide WCOTP with sufficient funds to cover expenses until other sources could be found.

In May 1967 John THOMPSON of the WCOTP described to an Agency representative an interview he had with Mike MacMANUS of TIME magazine on 1 May 1967 who wanted to discuss the effects of newspaper publicity on WCOTP operations. MacMANUS was especially interested in any economies forced on WCOTP and a request for proof of the value of WCOTP operations to individual teachers. THOMPSON felt that MacMANUS did not succeed in gaining sufficient additional information from the interview to warrant writing his projected article.

SMYKE, Raymond Joseph - #160031

Raymond Joseph SMYKE was granted a Covert Security Approval on 18 July 1957 for use as a witting employee of Project HTTILACER and on 19 May 1962 he received a Covert Security Approval for his use by Project JBLACEFOD as Coordinator for African Activities in Washington, D. C. SMYKE is administrative officer of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

THOMPSON, John

I It was not possible to identify a subject file on John THOMPSON employed by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

CABOT FOUNDATION

OS indices were negative on the CABOT Foundation. (SEE Thomas D. CABOT)

American Friends of the Middle East O #340377 and #65300

American Friends of the Middle East (Project EXTINDER) was created in May 1951 with the purpose of employing aggressive propaganda to promote

SECRET

the friendship of peoples of the Near and Middle East toward the United States and to combat Communism. It was incorporated as a voluntary, non-profit membership corporation under the laws of New York State. Dorothy THOMPSON, columnist, was selected as Chairman. In early 1967 AFME received a good deal of newspaper publicity concerning its Agency affiliation including articles in the Soviet press, TASS and USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Syria was the only country in which AFME is active that raised the question of the organization's continued existence in the light of allegations of Agency financial support; although, there were rumblings in Iraq.

San Jacinto Fund

There is no OS subject file on the San Jacinto Fund. The attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations" - stated that RAMPARTS has expressed intense interest in the San Jacinto Fund, and its sources of income in particular, because it funds 5 HBEPITOME activities (youth affairs).

M. D. ANDERSON Foundation

There is no OS subject file on the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation but OS indices reflect a file on the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute.

A study program to determine the effects in diverse Biological Systems resulting from exposure to high intensity coherent radiation was contracted with the M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute, University of Texas, Houston, Texas in October 1963 but as of 16 April 1964 there was a hold order against going ahead with the contract because of a question as to why the Agency should bear the whole cost of the contract which was to be for inter-departmental use. In May 1967 a note in the file indicated that M. D. ANDERSON Hospital and Tumor Institute will be engaged in classified work for the Agency. There was no record of a clearance issued.

MARSHALL FOUNDATION

See attached memorandum dated 30 January 1967 from Chief, Central Cover Group to Deputy Director, Plans - "Threat of Exposure of Agency Operations". The MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas is considered one of the most vulnerable to exposure.

A "New York Times" article for 26 February 1967 disclosed that the MARSHALL Foundation of Houston, Texas channeled funds from the Agency to the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University from 1961 to 1963.

(See Douglas B. MARSHALL)

BROWN, George Rufus - #94214

George Rufus BROWN, Executive Vice President of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 23 October 1953 for use as a covert associate in the United States on Project LPCOIN. On 22 April 1965 he was granted a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit contact and assessment of BROWN in connection with his possible use in serving on the Board of Directors for a proprietary being set up to support staff employees working in Udorn, Thailand, Laos and a Covert Security Approval for this use was issued on 18 June 1965. These clearances were cancelled 2 June 1967 as BROWN was not used.

BROWN, Herman - #95239

Herman BROWN, President and Director of BROWN and ROOT, Inc., Houston, Texas and President and Trustee of the BROWN Foundation, Houston, Texas, was granted a Covert Security Approval on 3 December 1953 for use as a Covert Associate in the U. S. under Project LPCOIN. This clearance was cancelled 15 February 1966.

CLARK, Ed

Negative

SHIVERS, Allan - #373051

Governor Allan SHIVERS of Texas was on the Advisory Board of FACTS FORUM NEWS in September 1955. He was listed as a trustee of the American Good Government Society in April 1965.

Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, was a signer of a statement appearing in the NEW YORK TIMES for 20 October 1949 sponsored by the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign of the International Rescue Committee. The IRC was described as basically good, humanitarian organization but many individuals of questionable loyalty have been associated with it.

A NEW YORK TIMES clipping for 12 February 1954 stated that Allan SHIVERS, Governor of Texas, said he planned to ask his Legislature to make membership in the Communist Party a death penalty offense. He was quoted as saying "In politics we often speak of bipartisan issues. I can think of nothing that should be more bipartisan than catching a Communist. There can be no valid issue between Americans over Communists. Americans are either pro-Communist or anti-Communist."

No clearance was requested or issued for SHIVERS. His file contains reference cards only.

MOODY, Dan

Negative

SECRET

CABOT, Thomas D., Jr. - #430906

Thomas D. CABOT, Jr. was approved for contact use on 17 August 1961. At the time he was Vice President and Director of International Relations Texas Butadiene and Chemical Corporation. He was residing in Lausanne, Switzerland. Contact interest was for briefing him on Agency interests in economic and political developments in various European countries; chemical industrial development, etc. He was the subject of a favorable background investigation in 1952.

CABOT, Thomas Dudley - #87904

Thomas Dudley CABOT was granted a Covert Security Approval for use under Project LPCOIN. On 26 June 1959 he was issued a Covert Security Approval for use with Project UHGLANT. He was to serve as the President or Chairman of an American Committee whose objective was to foster Franco-American relations at the management level. CABOT had been approved for contact use in 1950 and received a clearance for use on the Executive Committee of M.I.T. in April 1954. A continuation of this clearance was granted on 29 October 1958.

SMITH, William A. - #76555

William A. SMITH was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 August 1952 for use as an agent in Latin America under commercial cover. On 14 January 1955 a Covert Security Clearance was issued to SMITH to permit his use as a Covert Associate in the United States under Project LPFUNNEL. At the time he had a number of business interests in Houston, Texas, i. e., William A. SMITH Construction Company, Houston, Texas; Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Citizens State Bank of Houston, etc.

NORTHAM, Gus

Negative

JAWORSKI, Leon - #168199

Leon JAWORSKI was granted a Covert Security Approval on 31 March 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the M. D. ANDERSON Foundation. His file contains a newspaper clipping from the WASHINGTON STAR for 3 December 1963 which concerns his appointment as special counsel for a Texas State Court of Inquiry into the assassination of President KENNEDY. He had achieved prominence when he was prosecutor at the Nuremburg War Trials. The article also stated that in 1960 JAWORSKI successfully represented Lyndon B. JOHNSON in a court challenge of Mr. JOHNSON's right to have his name appear on the general election ballot in Texas both as a candidate for Vice-President and for reelection to the U. S. Senate. Another item in U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT for 7 July 1964 reported that Houston lawyer, Leon JAWORSKI, who is close to Lyndon JOHNSON was being considered for the job of Attorney General.

SECRET

FREEMAN, John Henry - #157181

John Henry FREEMAN was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 June 1957 to permit the utilization of his services under Project LPCOIN. At the time he was a partner in the large and leading law firm of FULBRIGHT, CROOKER, FREEMAN, BATES and JAWORSKI at Houston, Texas and was a trustee of the M. D. ANDERSON Medical Foundation.

COCKRELL, Ernest Dashiell, Jr. - #91571 and #E403051-A

Ernest Dashiell COCKRELL, Jr. was approved for contact use (CAUTION) on 10 June 1953 and was granted a Covert Security Clearance on 4 August 1953 for use in the U. S. under Project QKENCHANT. At the time he was President of two oil companies in Houston, Texas; Oil Production Maintenance, Inc. and Production Maintenance Company.

MARSHALL, Douglas B. - #173597

Douglas B. MARSHALL was granted a Covert Security Approval on 28 November 1958 in order that he could be made witting of Agency interest in the CULLEN Foundation. MARSHALL was Vice President of the Quintana Petroleum Corporation of Houston, Texas which is the holding company owned by the Hugh Roy CULLEN family. MARSHALL's wife, Margaret Cullen MARSHALL, is a daughter of Hugh Roy CULLEN.

HOBBY, Oveta Culp - #344001 and #241189

Oveta Culp HOBBY was granted a continuing liaison clearance on 7 April 1953 when she was Director of the Federal Security Agency. A Covert Security Approval was issued 18 July 1961 to permit her use under Project LPCORSET to aid in funding arrangements through the HOBBY Foundation of Houston, Texas of which she is President. On 26 October 1965 a Provisional Security Approval was granted to permit contact, assessment and briefing of Mrs. HOBBY as President of the HOBBY Foundation in connection with her possible utilization on an advisory committee of a broadcasting activity, University of the Air, directed at the students and intellectuals of Cuba. A Covert Security Approval was issued 31 March 1966 primarily to use the prestige of her name and position as cover for WH/Cuba activities and it was not expected that Mrs. HOBBY would take an active day by day role in the activities.

BUTLER, George A.

Negative

HOBBY, William Pettus, Jr. - #425337 and #275074

Oveta Culp HOBBY's son, William Pettus HOBBY, Jr., born 19 January 1932 at Houston, Texas, was security approved for contact use on 23 May 1960. At the time he was Associate Editor of the HOUSTON POST, Houston, Texas. On 29 June 1962 he was granted a Covert Security Approval to permit his witting use under Project CAWAGTAIL which was to be supported by the

SECRET

HOBBY Foundation. On 22 October 1965 a PCSA was issued to HOBBY for the same use in WH/Cuba activities as that outlined for his mother. This Provisional clearance was firmed into a Covert Security Approval on 4 February 1966 for the same use.

Sarah K. Hall

Atts:
- Dec 67 RAMPARTS
- Memo dtd 24 Nov 67 (SF-633-67
- Memo dtd 30 Jan 67 to DD/P
- NYT 2/26/67
- NYT 2/19/67

SECRET

A

HEADQUARTERS

Photocopy of Unclear Original

FILE WHEN INITIALLED

OS DATE
L.A. DATE 16 Sept 65

TO : Special Agent in Charge, DFO Office of Origin

SUBJECT: Gregory, Peter Paul POS.:
468 572 6U 1D/3/6 32

1. ☐ Use (DODD) credentials, if feasible; however (TTOD) may be used.
32

☐ Of covert interest, conduct investigation according to standard regulations except as noted below.

2. DFO will conduct the following NAC's:

	FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PASS-PORT	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I&N	CSIF	MIL			
SUBJECT	X								X					

3. FIELD

FLD.OFFICE	AREA	BIR	EDUC	EMPL	REF	NEIGH	CRED	POL	OTHER
	NONE								

FILE COPY

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DISTRIBUTION								ATTACHMENTS				
BFO	CFO	DFO	LAFO	MFO	NYFO	SFFO	WFO	X	BIO. DATA	X	CONTROL CARDS	PHS
		✓										

FORM 11-63 1742c USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9-43)

22 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin/Mario Brod et. al.

1. Reference is made to your instructions concerning this case and my attached memorandum concerning research on whether or not Itkin was ever, in fact, utilized by this Agency prior to his contacts with Brod.

2. All available sources in the Agency reflect no record of Itkin or of Philip Harbin, who was allegedly his case officer. Harbin has been checked both as a true name and as an alias. Although the name is not registered in the Agency, this of course does not mean that some Agency representative did not make this up and use it without telling anyone.

3. My visceral reaction is that Itkin is lying about his contacts with Mr. Dulles and Philip Harbin. However, since there appears to be a possibility of an extreme "flap" if Itkin gives the same story to the newspapers that he gave to Mr. Houston, I would recommend that, with the concurrence of Mr. Helms, Mr. Dulles be interviewed and asked if he remembers anything about this case.

4. I also spoke with Harry Mason, x5231, in Finance who handles OS budgetary matters and is a personal acquaintance. Without giving him any names I asked him if it would be possible to track down the receipt that Itkin claims he gave Harbin for the $5000.00. Harry says if the case was handled properly and the account is still outstanding it will be fairly easy to find the receipt. I have done nothing further on this, pending your instructions.

Ward K. Greene

Ward K. Greene
SA/EPD

Attachment

SECRET
EYES ONLY

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22 November 1968

ITKIN, Herbert

Subject States: When he was first admitted to the bar in 1953 he was employed by the firm of Delson, Levin & Gordon in New York City. (Now Delson and Gordon.) Itkin alleges that one partner, Levin, had close ties with Alger Hiss, Cyrus Eaton and other of similar persuasion. Because of the viewpoint of the law firm, Subject states that he began passing information to Senator Joseph McCarthy. However, in the Spring of 1954, Senator McCarthy told Itkin that he was getting into trouble and allegedly reported that he had passed Itkin's reports to CIA. Itkin then states that a meeting was set up for him either in June/July/or August of 1954 with Mr. Allen Dulles. This meeting was at the Bellevue Stratford in Philadelphia. His contact was reportedly a man known as Philip Harbin.

At this time, Itkin says he was able to report on matters affecting U Nu, then the Premier of Burma, the Indonesian Foreign Minister; and the owner or editor of the New Delhi Times. Itkin also claims to have had personal contacts with Luis Gutierrez, Consul General of El Salvador, and with a number of other people who had Guatemalan contacts. Itkin says the only money he received from Harbin was $5,000.00, which was supposed to be repayable and for which he gave a receipt, he believes sometime in 1957. He said the money was not repaid.

Itkin states that he met Mario Brod in 1961 and that Brod was represented to him as a former Colonel in the OSS who had intelligence connections. From then on his contact was Brod and apparently Harbin dropped out of the picture.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

Agency Files reflect:

No record of Herbert Itkin in Office of Security records, other than newspaper clippings.

No record of Herbert Itkin in RI files.

No record of Philip Harbin in Office of Security.

No record of Philip Harbin as a DCS alias.

No record of Philip Harbin in OS pseudo files.

No record of Philip Harbin as either a pseudo or a registered alias in RI/CRYPTO.

No record of Philip Harbin in RI files.

The file of Mario Brod reflects no information concerning his contacts with Herbert Itkin and reflects no information concerning a Philip Harbin.

During Itkin's meeting with Mr. Houston he mentioned that the law firm had a negro lawyer named Thomas L. Roberts, #193026, who had very useful contacts with the United Nations. Itkin stated that Roberts was a very presentable and intelligent negro who left the firm and now had a law practice in Dakar.

The Office of Security file concerning Roberts reflects that:

> 08
>
> Mr. Roberts [is a current employee of this Agency under deep cover in Dakar] In January of 1968 Roberts furnished this Office with an extensive summary of his past association with Herbert Itkin. He also mentioned that he and Itken had associated with Mario Brod at a dinner party in 1965 and had had lunch with Brod in 1967. There is no indication, however, that Roberts is aware of any use of Itken as a CIA informant during the 1950's.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

1/N

JAMES "NOEL" - 12951
Resigned July 68 - GS-16 N.B.
to CAICE

①

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written April 1967 pg 1

TRACY BARNES pg 10, 11, etc

PROTECT chief - Jake (Esterline) pg 12

DROLLER (aka FRANK Bender) says Hunt pg 12

ops re charges of Bender pg 13, 14

Helms not cut in although he was COPS pg 14

KNIGHT - propaganda chief, fall (ED HOBBING) pg 15

fluent Spanish, owned Spanish paper

Ned - (Ernest SPARKS) (per CANGAN) pg 15

PM chief, retired Marine officer

gone to see says Hunt

cowboy but sloppy

[03 Jim Noel], [03 Earl Williamson] wst DCOS of Havana Station pg 17

Rubottom & Wieland exercised influence over J.C. KING pg 18

99

flaps [State cover] pg 20

mentions U-2 project 21, 22

discusses also documentation ET Hamilton etc 23

33R

mentions proposal to assassinate Castro	pg 31
met Gen Cushman with Jake E. discuss Nixon and his [illegible]	31A
Bender held Nixon in low esteem	pg 33
"Jimmy" responsible for procuring infiltration equipment	pg 38
describes office in Coral Gables	pg 39
Douglas GUPTON, bilingual young propaganda officer	pg 39
critical of "Jimmy's" performance confrontation with him.	pg 42
critical of Bender and his view of Cubans	pg 44
secretary - "vague, dreamy eyed spinster"	pg 45
Jack, Station contact confirmed clearance	pg 46
met with cables, etc. - no details	47

pg. 3

~~SECRET~~

27 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT: LOPEZ, Henry P. (201-253203)

REFERENCE: CI/OA Memorandum of 6 June 1968

In response to the referenced memorandum, the following information is provided:

1. Field and Headquarters traces, other than operational material contained in subject's 201 files, are negative. Green List trace request No. 189405 was submitted 26 June 1968.

2. From 1961 until August 1966, subject lived in Mexico City with his wife and two children. While in Mexico City, subject [was ~~an asset of Station~~ Mexico City and] travelled extensively throughout Central and Latin America [~~on WOFIRM sponsored operational activity~~]. In August 1966, subject was obliged to leave Mexico City due to his wife's increasing medical problem in adjusting to the high altitude encountered there. In October 1966, subject established residence in New York City [where his cover employment has been that of legal consultant to WUSALINE, a WOPLAY proprietary company. He has been employed in this capacity up to the present time.] Since 1965, there have been no changes in subject's family status. 08 24 08

03

[Richard F. Long]
E/IB/S

File.
201-253203
[illegible] 25 June 1968

~~SECRET~~

41/98

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 29 Jan. 1965 ew

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 2[illegible]3203 [illegible] LOPEZ, Henry P.

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: (LICOMIC) [redacted] 163 WH/1 (Mexico)

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI [redacted]

OS INDICES RESULTS BY [redacted] (Date) 5 Feb. 1965

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY [redacted] (Date) 15 Feb. 1965

USE OF SUBJECT: [PA Agent] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.) [redacted] [redacted]

CS TRACE RESULTS: RI [redacted] DIVISION [redacted] FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: YES ☐ NO ☐

ATTACHMENTS: PRQ PART I [redacted] PARTIAL BIO [redacted] OTHER

REMARKS: [redacted] [redacted]

Please up-date indices and [illegible] investigation.

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OA [redacted]

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA [redacted]

DATE: 27 APR 1965

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: See attached - 4 Feb 65 [redacted]

☐ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results: [redacted]

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached [illegible] CSC [redacted]

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, [redacted] reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS: (a) FO [illegible] [illegible] cancelled to Mr [Kelly] - 16 Nov 65 26 Apr 65

FBI - [illegible] cancelled to Mr [Kelly] - 16 Nov 65

FEB 8 08 54 '65

C L O S E D

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (9) 2

7/PN

Memo 16 Dec 1962 regarding information furnished by George Winters, # 55769

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Subject advised that Aline MOSBY was a newspaperman in SCHAPIRO's office. MOSBY, during the past year, had been in the hospital on several occasions, and one didn't see too much of her. Subject also advised that MOSBY stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit. Subject stated that one of the reasons MOSBY was in the hospital, on one occasion, was the fact that she had an abortion, according to gossip.

✓ Subject stated that another newspaperwomen in Moscow was Priscilla JOHNSON. Subject advised that JOHNSON had the reputation of being a fairly good reporter and one whom the Soviets kept on a month to month visa basis. Subject indicated that it was highly possible the Soviets had attempted to recruit JOHNSON, as she spent a lot of time with Soviet nationals.

Subject was queried as to whether he had ever made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the Soviet Union, to which he replied that he had not disclosed classified information as such. He stated that his cover, which he had used for the period in between [State Department] assignments, was that he was a [consultant of the AEC, particularly to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee; composed of AEC, CIA, State, NSA, Joint Chiefs, and the Armed Services.] Subject stated that he had indicated to individuals, when questioned, that he had done economic research and analysis in the Soviet field and that he had done this ever since he had first become a [State Department] employee. Subject stated that, among others, he had discussed this with [Ray HUTCHINS, his counterpart in the British Embassy.] 99 24 06108

Subject was asked for his itinerary on his return trip to the United States and who authorized the trip. Subject stated that he had long planned to come home via the Far East, and it was a well publicized plan. He stated that when he left Moscow, he stayed over in Delhi for a week to see if there were any objections from Headquarters as to his itinerary. He stated that when he received no instructions to the contrary, he returned to the United States via his previously announced plans and the differences in fares being borne by him.

Subject departed Moscow 1 September 1960 (1:00 A.M.); went to Tashkent and then to Delhi where he spent one week; Bangkok, 4 days; Saigon, 6 days; Hong Kong, 5 days; Tokyo, 5 days; Hawaii, 5 days; San Francisco, 5 days; Los Angeles, 2 days; Las Vegas, 2 days; Denver, 10 days; arrived Washington 24 October 1960.

Chief, Overseas Branch, Employees Division, SSS
Attention: J. S. Reff
Chief, Special Security Branch

DEC 7 1950

RITTENHOUSE, John F. (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

RECORDED
CONTROL D

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 November 1950 requesting security concurrence in the conversion of the Subject's status from that of OPC Staff Employee to that of OPC Staff Agent. It is contemplated that the Subject will be assigned to Mexico City, Mexico, as GS-13, Intelligence Officer, under deep State cover.

This is to advise that from a security standpoint this office offers no objection to the proposed conversion and assignment of the Subject.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

GEORGE P. LOKER, JR.

JFR:mp
cc: file

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Special Security Branch
Attn: Mr. George P. Loker, Jr.

DATE: 28 November 1950

FROM : Chief, Overseas Branch

SUBJECT: John F. Rittenhouse (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

Concurrence is requested in the conversion of the subject's status from that of OPC Staff Employee to that of OPC Staff Agent. The subject is to be assigned to Mexico Ci[illegible] as a GS-13, Intelligence Officer under Department of State Deep Cover.

It is further requested that the appropriate certification be sent to Mr. Mushey's office in the Department of State.

Joseph S. Reff
JOSEPH S. REFF

No indices that -
[illegible] [illegible] Conf of Cover

[illegible] 1 N [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE, ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : **DCB/CCG**
THROUGH: **SSD/OS**
SUBJECT: **Calvin W. Hicks** (true name)

DATE: **21 September 1960**

ENTRY	CHANGE
Inclusion of subject on the Domestic Cover List is requested for the reason noted below. When notified that cover has been established, subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.	Subject is currently included on the Domestic Cover List. For the reason noted below, it is requested that ☐ this employee be removed from the Domestic Cover List. ☐ the following change be made:

REASON

To provide Subject with an organizational affiliation other than CIA.

COVER (*Complete only for new entries*) 32, 12-33

None 1956-58 (Military Staff agent in Cherat)
1958-60 (DAC in Cherat)

32, 12-33

TYPE SUGGESTED (*Specify whether official or non-official*)	**Official - (DAC)** 32
JUSTIFICATION, IF NON-OFFICIAL COVER SUGGESTED	

Note: Security approved 9/21/60

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION	REQUESTING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE John F. Gardiner Jr. **John F. Gardiner, Jr.**
DATE	TITLE **NE Security Officer**

#13133

FORM 7-58 1332 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

3/12

18 MAY 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Calvin W. Hicks, WH/4
Room 2828 B
Quarters Eye

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : HITCH, Cal William (A)
#43133

1. This memorandum confirms receipt of Mr. Hicks' verbal request on 17 May 1961 for security approval for the issuance of documentation in the captioned alias.

2. This memorandum also 03 confirms the verbal security approval furnished to Mr. Richard Major, TSD/IB, on 17 May 1961 for the issuance of the requested documentation.

3. It is understood that the documentation to be issued will include a D. C. driver's license, a Social Security Card 31 and a AAA Insurance Card. It is also understood that the requested documentation will not be backstopped and will be used only for flash purposes in connection with an operational assignment in Florida. According to Mr. Hicks the alias has been registered with RID/OR.

4. Upon termination of Mr. Hicks assignment the documentation should be returned to TSD/IB.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

CC: TSD/IB

SG
SIKAS/csm (5-18-61)
CLOSED

DDS/I&S
ADDS/I&S
Chief/SSD
Dep Chief
A to Chief
Files PSD

SECRET

2/12

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

43133

FILE

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
[illegible]	RICKS, CALVIN W.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

7. EOD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

RECORDED
CONTROL

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
[illegible] PAKISTAN	[illegible]	[illegible], PAKISTAN	[illegible]

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
[illegible]	$ [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
[illegible]		[illegible]	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$				

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

29 SEP 1960

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

DOB

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Wofile

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

29 September 1960
File No. K-749

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, NE

ATTENTION : Mr. Gardner

SUBJECT : Calvin W. HICKS
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Form 1322, dated 21 September 1960

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Staff Group 32 has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. 363 for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover ~~& Liaison, CCD~~ Branch, CCG

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

V/W

FORM 5-60 1554

SECRET

12637 (9-11)

Background Use
Do Not Reproduce

8 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. (Clay Kallander) 03

THRU : Office of Security/OSD
Attn: Mr. Gikas

Central Cover Staff
Attn: Mr. James Franklin

No security objection
Clf
9 May 63

SUBJECT : Request for Official Documentation

REFERENCE : WAVE 8138 (IN 32980)

31

1. It is requested that a (U. S. Army Investigator Credential) and Civilian Identification Card be issued in alias to the SAS employee identified hereunder.

2. The credential should identify the employee (with the U. S. Army, Joint Operations Group, and the title designation should be INVESTIGATOR.) 32

3. The credential will be utilized generally in the Southeastern part of the United States and possibly in Latin American in pursuit of the mission of SAS. Further the utilization of the credential will be on a controlled basis as directed by the Chief of Station, JMWAVE.

4. The alias set forth in the attached identity sheet has been registered with RI. Pertinent biographic data has been set forth on the Identity sheet.

5. Photographs for the individual were forwarded to TSD on 6 May 1963. Subject's social security number is (055-18-4137) according to the above reference. 08

6. After the credential has been signed it should be forwarded to P. Lawrence, SAS/Security Officer, Room GH-56.

7. Any questions regarding the foregoing matter should be directed to Mr. Lawrence, ext. 5909.

VINCENT J. HEYMAN
Chief, SAS/Support

Clf

Attachment:
a/s
cc: OS/OSD, CCS

O-#65077

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/OSD
C/SRD
C/AB
C/PB
C/SAB
C/SB
7 5/31/V
A&TS
✓ FILES

4/01

IDENTITY SHEET

TRUE Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.

ALIAS ~~Bernard Norman HILLARY~~ 07

DOB: 27 May 1919

HEIGHT: 5'9"

WEIGHT: 165 lbs.

EYES : Brown

HAIR : Black

SOCIAL SEC NO.: 055-18-4137

63

0-65077
C-65077

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP		DATE 9 April 1964
TO: (Check)	X CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, SAS	ESTABLISHED FOR HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN:	Mr. Dawson	FILE NO. K-7412
REF:	Request for Cover, 9 April 1964	ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED	US Army Element, (Joint Operations Group) 32	NA

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

UPN

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CD/ELL CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

15 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION : Mr. Clay Kallender

THROUGH : Mr. Ervan Kuhnke

SUBJECT : HILLARY, Bernard N.

No security objection

16 Aug 62

#65077

1. Reference is made to my memorandum dated 19 June 1962 requesting issuance of alias documentation for the captioned Subject.

2. Returned herewith is the New York State drivers license, the National Rifle Association of America card, and the USF&G card issued by you in consequence of the referenced request. The Social Security card, also issued at that time, is retained.

3. It is requested that the same type documentation, including a Virginia drivers license, be prepared for Subject by you with the ostensible residence of the Subject changed to an Arlington, Virginia address.

JEREMIAH J. MULLANE JR
Chief, WH Security

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/[illegible]D
C/[illegible]D
C/AB
C/PB
C/S[illegible]B
C/SB
A&TS
FILES

PSD #65077

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

104-10120-10301 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DC/PSD

DATE: 2 DEC 1960

FROM : (O'Shea) 03

SUBJECT: Hidalgo, Balmes H. Jr.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. A request for security approval for State certification of Subject has been received from OCL, in connection w/30 days' TDY to San Salvador, effective immediately.

2. Subject's file is non-derog; however, as a former FBI informant State Dept appears to have been reluctant to consider him for (integration) in 1957. (See Col. E's Memo of 21 Feb 1957, in file.)

32

3. Do you wish to check with State prior to OK'ing a certification for this TDY?

(O'Shea) 03

3/PV

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Special Security Branch DATE: 14 December 1950

FROM : Chief, Overseas Branch

SUBJECT: John F. RITTENHOUSE (Pseudo - OPC)
#23500

Re : Clearance dated 7 December 1950

Please cancel your security clearance dated 7 December 1950. The decision has been made that the subject is to be considered a semi-covert employee integrated into the [redacted] He will not be considered deep cover. Subject was integrated into the [redacted] as of 13 December 1950.

Joseph S. Reff
JOSEPH S. REFF

Case closed by memo 12/7/50.

fi/ 10x

SECRET

SECRET

28 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Chief, SB/2 Desk

SUBJECT: COVER, NONOFFICIAL - GENERAL 24
(Proposal for A&E Assessment of Potential
REDSKIN Agent Candidates)
#90682

1. Reference is made to my previous memorandum pertaining to the subject as captioned, ending with the Memorandum for the Record dated 21 February 1961.

2. As indicated in the referenced memorandum, CCG feels that the PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATES 29 (see copy of SR memoran~~dum dated 3 February~~ 1961 and my memorandum dated 21 February 1961) should not be utilized. This decision was made as a result of a conversation between Mr. Howard OSBORNE, Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Mr. Jack SOUTHARD, Chief, CCG/NC.

3. A meeting was called on 27 February 1961 to determine the type of cover organization that should be substituted for this purpose. After considering the matter at length, it was ascertained that the Agency has a cleared employment 24 service in Pittsburgh 10 which could possibly be utilized as an initial A&E assessment. This firm, the EMPLOYMENT SERVICE COMPANY, 29 is located in the Union Trust Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 10 and is managed by 06 Margaret A. KEARNEY (see SSD File 95018). It was agreed that if the EMPLOYERS SERVICE COMPANY 29 could provide the needed cover, two OTR psychologists would be documented in true name with that firm in Pittsburgh 10. CCG (Frank O'MALLEY) will make a trip to Pittsburgh 10 in the next few days to determine whether Miss KEARNEY 06 is amenable to the proposed arrangement. 06 The two psychologists selected were Doctors BRADT and McKEE, on whom credit checks were recently completed with negative results as to Agency employment.

4. It was further ascertained at this time that Mr. Howard OSBORNE desired that all training and assessment of REDSKIN Agents who pass the initial screening be conducted

3/1/61

90682

SECRET

outside the Washington, D. C. area. Most of the training will be conducted in an SR safe house in New York. The SR representative will probably request a safe house in Baltimore for the final assessment and processing of those REDSKIN Agents that are cleared in the initial screening by either BRADT or (McKEE.) 06 It should be noted at this point that SR Division plans to process thirty or thirty-five REDSKIN Agents this year. Time is, of course, of the essence, in view of the fact that these people will have to be assessed, security-cleared, briefed, and trained, and arrangements for grants made before the summer season.

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

KUHNKE/ewd(2-28-61)
PENDING

cc: SSD #95018

1/PJ

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

20 February 1961

21 FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Chief, SB/2 Desk

SUBJECT: COVER, (NONOFFICIAL) - GENERAL 24
(Proposal for A&E Assessment of Potential REDSKIN Agent Candidates)
#90682

1. Reference is made to my previous memorandum pertaining to the proposal to initiate a change of policy with respect to the processing of potential REDSKIN Agents.

2. As will be noted, it was initially recommended that potential REDSKIN Agent candidates be provided with an A&E assessment by OTR prior to disclosure of Agency interest in them and prior to the disclosure of any classified information. This assessment will be conducted utilizing a (nonofficial cover). 24 It was initially suggested that TSD's Psychological Assessment Associates firm now used by Dr. GITTINGER be used for this purpose. If the A&E assessment were favorable, Security would be requested to conduct a full investigation of the Subject and he would be subsequently contacted under alias CIA credentials. At that point, he would be requested to perform a mission for us and would be given requirements for same if he agreed to accept such assignment.

3. Attention is invited to the attached memorandum dated 8 February 1961. A copy of this memorandum was furnished to the writer with the verbal request that credit checks be conducted on all the staff A&E members mentioned. Prior to the initiation of credit checks, it was verbally agreed between the undersigned and Mr. Thomas STRANGE, CCG/NC, that no credit check would be conducted on Jacob GOLDER, in view of the fact that it was known the latter was recently surfaced as an Agency employee. The requested credit checks were completed on or about 16 February 1961 and the results verbally transmitted to Mr. Thomas STRANGE. Documented results are in individual files PSD

4. As of this date, CCG feels that they may have to establish another notional cover for this program. It is understood that this cover will be utilized in addition to utilizing the (Psychological 24 Assessment Associates.) Pending a further request in this matter from CCG, no further action is contemplated.

Attachment:
A&E Memo dated 8 Feb. 1961

KUHNKE/ewd(2-20-61)
CLOSED

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

ATTACHMENT

BRADY, Roger O.	EOD: 12 September 1951 GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency except for 1957-1959, Saipan - Navy Cover * WH/4 Project (3-23 32.
COLDER, Jacob V.	EOD: 3 January 1955 GS-15 Overt employee of the Agency - DAC Cover (overseas use) * WH/4 Project
GOODRICH, David C.	EOD: 9 April 1956 GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency * WH/4 Project
KOEMERL, Alice F.	EOD: 20 October 195[illegible] GS-13 Overt employee of the Agency, 1950 - DAC Cover for three months
03 (LAU, James B.)	EOD: 21 September 1951 GS-15 Covert employee of the Agency 1951-1954 Overt Status with CIA 1954-1955 Army Status Overseas 1955-1957 U.S. (Foreign Service) 32 1957-Present Army Civilian Cover
McKEE, Michael G.	EOD: 25 January 1960 GS-12 Overt employee of the Agency

* Participated in TDYs within the U. S. for WH/4 during 1960. Cover for these trips was provided by the operating division.

4/2V

SECRET

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NAME	PROJECT	FUNCTION
Charles P. DEXTER 03	AEROOT 01 or CAMBARO 01	Case Officer
Bernard EDGECOMB 03	AEROOT 01	Audio Surveillance
John FEILY 03	CAMBARO 01	Photo Instructor
John FIBLE 03	CAMBARO 01	Photo Instructor
George FILL	AEROOT 01	Assessment
Donald GREER 03	AEROOT 01	Commo Officer
John GREGOR 03	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	Log Officer Log Officer
Fred HENDERSON 03	CAMBARO 01	Project Officer
Richard HOLT 03	AEROOT 01	Medical Officer
03 Clarence E. HOWARD	AEROOT 01	Case Officer
Hampton HOWARD 03	AEROOT 01	Firearms Instructor
Herman KIMSEY	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	Documents Instructor Documents Instructor
Aleksi KURGVEL 03 (Contract)	AEROOT 01	Native Consultant
Gulver LADD 03	AEROOT 01 CAMBARO 01	SW Instructor SW Instructor
Demitri LEVITSKY 03 (Contract)	CAMBARO 01	Native Consultant
Arthur LUNDAHL	AEROOT 01	Photography
Edward MALCOMB 03	AEROOT 01	Medical Officer
Edward MASLOWSKY 03	AEROOT 01	Judo Instructor
George MATECKO 03	CAMBARO 01	Airborne Training

7/26/72

34/pl

SECRET

7676

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF SUBJECT	FILE NO.

KEY TO ANALYSIS SYMBOLS*

NI = NOT IDENTICAL
I-ND = IDENTICAL - NOT DEROGATORY
U-ND=UNABLE TO IDENTIFY-NOT DEROGATORY
SA = SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(To be completed by requester)*

	SEARCH NAMES AS WRITTEN		SEARCH OVERT CARDS ONLY
	SEARCH NAME VARIATIONS *(Record known to exist)*		SEARCH COVERT CARDS ONLY
	SRD/CAB ANALYSIS OF FILES		SEARCH SUBJECT CARDS ONLY
	INDICES CHECK ONLY *(Do not pull files)*		SEARCH ALL CARDS

NO.	NAME - LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE *(Type or print)*	SOURCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	RESULTS OVERT	RESULTS COVERT
1	KING MARTIN LUTHER			353062	
2	NOEL-BAKER PHILIP JOHN			356217	
3	PIRE, DOMINIQUE GEORGE				477800
4	PIRE, (REVEREND)				
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

NAMES CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT
			SRD MAIL ROOM		
			DEC 7 4 50 PM '67		

RESULTS CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

REQUESTER *(Name - Component - Extension)*	DATE COMPLETED	APPROVE FOR FILING *(Initials)*

FORM 1-63 745 REPLACES FORMS 745, 1734, AND 1735 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

INDICES SEARCH REQUEST

SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (38-43)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO.	FILE NO.	TYPE	REFERENCE DOCUMENT	PAGE	ANALYSIS* OR CHARGEOUT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CROSS REFERENCE FOR PERS. SD FILES

DURING PROCESSING OR REVIEW, IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT A POSSIBLE OR ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS, OR MAY BE FOUND TO EXIST, BETWEEN OR AMONG THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW:

03 (GERTRUDE L. SCULLY DUFFEY)	#187570	subject
03 (JAMES L. DUFFEY)	#34771	subject's spouse
(TIMOTHY JOSEPH BURKE) 06	SD #19130 S.D #19130	subject's ref.
(STEWART L. BURTON) 06	#49893	subject's ref.
(FRANCIS LEO CARROLL) 06	#58032	subject's nbr.
EDWARD C. FENIMORE	#37774	subject's ref.
(JAMES L. MC LAU) 06	#56172	subject's nbr.
(THOMAS F. MC COY) 06	#6236	subject's ref.
CLARE BOOTH LUCE	#MS-2001-L	subject's ref.

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Do Not Reproduce

7/PJ

DATE	SIGNATURE
8/2/60	FB/

FORM NO. 1 JAN 57 1151 CONFIDENTIAL (4-35)

16 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Physical Security

SUBJECT: Renewals of CIA Building Passes

FILE

It is requested that CIA Building Passes be renewed for the following individuals who are Members or Alternate Members of the Inter-agency Defector Committee:

Army - Mrs. Dorothe K. Matlack, Pass No. 6120

Major Earnest E. Livaditis, Pass No. 6434

NOTE: Please add 1717 H Street Building to above two passes. Also, please add Administration and East Buildings to Pass No. 6434.

Air Force - Major Warren E. Reid, Pass No. 6507

Colonel Jas T. Bull, Pass No. Unknown

63
JOHN E. BOYLE
Deputy/CDC

On 12/27/57 Subject's SO advised that Subject was cleared for access to classified information up to and including Top Secret.

Date 18 DEC 1958

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

OS: MS 4001 OK

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

FILE-d

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME Charles Daniel S		FILE NUMBER 39418
OFFICE WH	PHONE	RANK OR GRADE GS-15
DEPARTURE DATE 29 June 65	STATUS ICS	COVER 32 ~~[illegible]~~ AID
DESTINATION(S) Lima		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

AREA Cuba	COVER	YEARS 61
AREA Venezuela	COVER	YEARS 55 - 58
AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☐ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE - Must Clear.

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	☐ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	☐ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	☐ YES	☐ NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ☐ OTHER

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE BRIEFED 6/25/65

BY ______________________
SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 10-62 1987 (4-11-48)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

VBR

FILE-3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME [illegible]

FILE NUMBER [illegible]

OFFICE WH

PHONE

RANK OR GRADE GS-15

DEPARTURE DATE [illegible]

STATUS [illegible]

COVER [illegible]

NATION(S) [illegible]

DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

AREA Cuba	COVER	YEARS 61
AREA Venezuela	COVER	YEARS 53 - 57
AREA	COVER	YEARS

RECENT TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☐ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE Must Read

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	✓	YES		NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	✓	YES		NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	✓	YES		NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS (met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS (operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS (recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS (charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE (limitations, home address, shop talk)
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT (morals, drinking, representative americans)
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS (overseas briefing, phase out on return)
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE (microphones, shop talk at home hotels, report to security)
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS (adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD (local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)
- ☐ OTHER

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE BRIEFED [illegible]

BY [illegible]
SECURITY OFFICER

JBR

5

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Far East Division
INFO: Chief, WOBONE
FROM: Chief of Station, [Vientiane] 13-7

SUBJECT: RYBAT FJDUST - [CY]FRAIL/1 - Damage Report 03

REFERENCES: 13-7
A. [Vientiane] 6847
B. 13 [Vientiane] 1353
C. 13 [Vientiane] 1563
D. 13 [Vientiane] 0392

[Pritchard, Thomas R.] 03 [Martinez, Armand] 03

1. 03 Station has been advised by [redacted] that [redacted] did marry [CYFRAIL/1, (201-845063)] 23 and they are currently residing in [Pottstown], Pennsylvania. 03 [Martinez] [redacted] also advised that [redacted] hopes to get employment with R.C.A. and be assigned to a classified project in the Caribbean area. [Pritchard] 03

2. It is difficult to ascertain how much, if any, sensitive information [redacted] 03 may have conveyed to [CYFRAIL/1]. However, it has been determined that during the ten and one-half months [redacted] 03 saw [CYFRAIL/1], he introduced her to the following WOFIRM personnel: 03 (a). 03

[illegible], Arnie [redacted] 1
Diane Tenley [redacted] 2
Edward H. J. [redacted] 3
[illegible] [redacted] 4
[illegible] [redacted] 5
[illegible] [redacted] 6
Rutkowski [redacted] 7
Richard Rizzo [redacted] 8
Frank Nagy

9 [redacted] Lawrence [illegible]
10 [redacted] David G. [illegible]
11 [redacted] Terrance Bajour
12 [redacted] Bruce Wilke
13 [redacted] [illegible]
14 [redacted] John R. Mil
15 [redacted] Frank J. Ki

3. The following were identified to her by [redacted] [Pritchard] 03 as having worked upcountry in Laos with him: 03

16 [redacted] Anthony A.
17 [redacted] Michael Shel
18 [redacted] H. Stephens
19 [redacted] [Wilbur Murray Jr.]
20 [redacted] 20. David S. Mor

-continued-

Attachment:
1 - IDEN, USC/TNP

Distribution:
2 - C/FE, w IDEN USC/TNP
1 - C/WOBONE, w IDEN USC/TNP

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CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: 22 [FOVT]-7774

DATE:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

26/80

4. It should be noted that [K] 02 FREAL/1 was surveilled by a Station surveillance team on several occasions and was reported to have visited IDEN A. The organization's [Vientiane] office is currently under investigation by this Station. 13-7 (See 13-7 [Vientiane] 8413, 74[illegible] and 22 [FOV[illegible]] [illegible].)

eon W. Alburdas

DYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO 22 [FOVT]-7774

IDENTITIES

IDEN A - 29 [Investment Overseas Service]

7/920

SECRET

17 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : J. J. MULLANE
Room 2919 Quarters Eye

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 10 October 1961 requesting the cancellation of the following facilities:

48 807 03 Andrew L. JACKOLOW 1 Twin Oaks Drive, Staten Island, N. Y. 08
39 418 David S. MORALES, 227 Laverne Avenue, Long Beach, California 08
57 368 03 Charles A. BERTELLI 1734 Arlington Blvd., Falls Church, Va. 08
190 584 03 Jacob SACKLOVE 6843 Matilija Avenue, Van Nuys, California 08
219 512 03 Harold HAMILTON 1171 Eddy Street, Providence, Rhode Island 08
226 414 03 Bernard Alvin PARKS 91-45 115th Street, Queens, New York 08
229 643 03 Maria Fernandezy SANCHEZ 27 Stebbins Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 08
229 646 03 Carmen Rodriguizy MENDOZA 157 Sheridan Terrace, Ridgewood, N.J. 08
243 855 03 Norman R. HARTHERODT 331 First Street, N. E., Washington, D. C. 08

2. This is to advise that these facilities have been cancelled.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Edward

for VICTOR R. WHITE

RETURN TO CIA
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SECRET

SECRET

03
GRAY, Sara Sioux (Barnes) 0-892 217

~~06~~ 03
GRAY, John Franklin - 0-105943 - Spouse

Subject's spouse is a current GS-9 staff employee who EOD in March 1956. N.D.

06
FENNER, Claude Griffith, Jr. - 0-487150 - SR's son

Subject's SR's son was a summer contract employee at a C Agency facility for 1966. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
FENNER, Claude G. - 0-48247 - SR

Subject's SR is a current GS-10 staff employee who EOD in July 1951. N.D.

MORALES, David Sanchez - O/C - 39418 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-15 staff employee who EOD in 1951. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
POCHER, Charles Hunter - O/C - 44771 - SR

Subject's SR is a current GS-12 staff employee who EOD in April 1951. His file contains an SRS flag sheet dated 6 March 1956. No pertinent derogatory information.

~~06~~ 03
SHIVERS, Forrest - 0-38798 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-15 staff employee who EOD in September 1949. N.D.

~~06~~ 03
VORHIS, Donald George - 0-38713 - supervisor

Subject's supervisor is a current GS-14 staff employee who EOD in September 1949. N.D.

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2[illegible] September 1966 SKH:lls SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET

24 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security

ATTENTION : Support Branch

SUBJECT : MORALES, David S.

1. This will confirm the verbal request to Mr. John Lavery from Mr. J. J. Mullane, Jr. on 13 October 1960 that two backstopped residence addresses be provided for Subject, one in the Washington, D.C. area and one in the Los Angeles area.

2. Mr. Lavery was also requested to backstop the Washington address to the extent that Subject's residence at the address from 5 October 1960 on would be acknowledged. He was to be identified as a recently returned State Department employee who had secured a new position with the Department of the Army, since returning from overseas and resigning from State Department. It was to be indicated that pending determination of the location of his assignment, Subject's family had not joined him in the Washington, D.C. area but were understood to be at the home of his wife's family somewhere in New England. Subject's employer is the U.S. Army Staff Group whose telephone number, left by Subject with the management of his residence for emergency contact, is OX 6-2255. It was explained to Mr. Lavery that this residence and cover was necessary to backstop Subject in the event of inquiry arising out of some private business ventures in which he is currently engaged in the Phoenix, Arizona area.

3. Mr. Lavery was requested to provide a second residence address in the Los Angeles area where Subject's residence from approximately 1 August 1958 to 14 October 1960 could be acknowledged. He was to be identified at this residence as a local representative for a New York City concern, (Bartlett and Rogers), and to have done economic research for them concerned with Latin American trade. Subject was understood to have been moved by his company to the Miami area, leaving Los Angeles on 14 October 1960.

	DDS/I&S
	ADDS/I&S
	Chief/SSD
	Dep Chief
	A to Chief
	Ch. CCR
	Ch. SSD
	Ch. Inv. Br.
✓	Ch. Sup. Br.
	Data IS-
✓	Desk SS-3
	Ad & Trng
	Control Desk
	Files

SECRET

4. Mr. Lavery was advised that for purposes of answering inquiries in Los Angeles, Subject was to be identified as a single individual approximately 35 years old, 6 feet tall, 200 lbs., swarthy complexion, with dark hair and eyes. He is understood to have a good position with his employer, and earning, it is estimated over $10,000 per year.

JOSEPH F. LANGAN
Chief, WH/4/SO

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INTERVIEW PROCESSING SHEET ROUTING

Subject: Morales David S. # 39418

Advice received reveals thatthe subject person is scheduled for overseas travel as indicated below -

Departure Date 28 Nov 55
Title & Grade GS-12 C/[illegible]
Destination 16-17 [Caracas Venez]
Office & Division WH
Cover 99 [State Integree]
Passport Type & No.
Return Date

PRELIMINARY PROCESSING - A reviewof this file and the above information reveals:

☐ No special briefing topics or ☐ See below

☐ No special cover problems or ☐ See below

☐ No special debriefing by other or ☐ Requires debriefings on (as circled) SI Q CRYPT

☐ No special badges or credentials or ☐ See remarks

REMARKS

init 11/53
C 10/55

Date of Polygraph 10/53

INTERVIEW - On the indicated date subject was interviewed on the following points:

1. ✓ Security regulations in general.
2. ✓ Travel Precautions (to carry nothing identifying him with CIA).
3. ✓ Cover Story (nature of cover; adequacyor prior briefing; possibility of inconsistencies; briefing of spouse).
4. ✓ Personal Affairs (proper handling of bank account, credit accounts, forwarding of mail).
5. ✓ Personal Correspondence (no mention of CIA in letters to and from subject).
6. ✓ Personal Conduct (a. general good behavior, b. no black market or currency transactions, c. no undue duriosity in natives in his area, d. no attempts to identify or approach otherCIA personnel in area except for official business and through official channels). ✓
7. ___ Other Travel (only official travel in or through Soviet controlled areas).
8. ___ Other:

ACTION -

☐ Security debriefing by the undersigned completes action necessary in this case.

☐ Subject was referred to the following for the indicated additional briefing:

or

☐ The following were obtained from subject and forwarded appropriately for disposition.

☐ Subject waspermitted to retain the following for turn in at a later date.

X David S. Morales

By: R. [illegible]

Date: 28 Nov 55

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 7 October 1959

TO:
☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: NE/2/Jordan
1205 I x3203

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Robert A. Maheu

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
U.S. and Jordan

FULL DETAILS OF USE
May be employed by the King of Jordan to handle Jordanian public relations in the U. S.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION
Per discussion with Mr. J. O'Connell, sufficient Security Office investigation has already taken place.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS Available at OS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☒	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)* has not been in area
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
James E. Burkart James E. Burkart 03	3203	William R. Freeman Fred [illegible] /OC 03

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

2/1/21 (8)

14-00000
104-10122-10135
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

80 34299

4/4/62

SECRET

66

C Number	Name	Green List Number	201 Number
90330	[illegible] Ravelo, Raul Guillermo	111108	297731
90224	[illegible], Rafael Sotero	111045	297732
90723	LICETI Cruz, Rene	111046	297733
90503	LOPEZ Fernandez, Julio Antonio	111071	297734
90519	MACEO Masque, Antonio	111085	297736
90237	MARTICORENA Castillo, Reynaldo	111030	297737
90518	MINGUEZ Nunez, Orestes	111086	297739
90456	MUJICA Bonis, Arturo	112053	297743
90377	NIETO Planes, Darsicio	111136	297744
90449	OLIVA Cantu, Oscar	111052	297745
90399	OSA Amat, Jorge de la	111112	297746
90515	PEDROSO Amores, Acelo	111089	297748
	PERA Esteranza, Pedro Otoniel	111138	297749
90375	PERDIGON Figarola, Pedro	111140	297750
90396	RICARDO Baras, Jose Manuel	111115	297756
90395	RODRIGUEZ Carreno, Fabio M.	111116	297757
90393	ROMNEY Alvarez, Leslie	111118	297760
90440	CORA Johnson, Ricardo	111064	297762
90523	FIGUEIRAS Leon, Delio	111080	297763
90236	MUNOZ de Juan, Mario	111031	297766
90398	PADRON Gonzalez, Rodolfo Armon	111113	297767
90650	RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, Ismael	112086	297768
91263	ROSELLy Layva, Florentino Orelia	111036	297769
90392	ROUSSEAU Bueno, Santiago	111119	297770
90390	SANCHEZ Rivas, Enriques Reimundo	111121	297771
90455	SUAREZ Hernandez, Roberto Guillermo	112054	297774
90528	TORRES Pacheco, Hector de	111075	297775
90511	VALDES Andino, Pedro Julio	110093	297776
90387	VALDEZ Martnnez, Sergio	111124	297777
90510	VALLE Gutierrez, Jesus del	111094	297778
90608	VARONA Cortinas, Julio Pascual	111146	297779
90509	VEGA Clark, Manuel de la	111095	297780
90831	ACOSTA Suarez, Orlando	112278	297784
91111	ALOMA Sabas, Ernesto Ignacio	112204	297785
90796	ARTECONA, Jose Jr.	112276	298788
91137	BARNET Gil, Enrique Raimundo	112246	297789
90249	BARROSO Palacio, Jorge	111016	297790
91159	BENITEZ Pineda, Andres	112201	297792
91140	CABRERA Rodriguez, Timoteo Amando	112239	297793
91132	CALATAYUD Rivera, Antonio	112229	297795
91117	CARMENDIA Socarras, Rodolfo	112212	297796
91114	CORONA Villar, Ramon	112206	297797
91142	DIAZ Reyes, Mario Rolando	112241	297801
91123	ESPINOSA Navarrete, Ramon	112220	297802
91112	FAJARDO Rojas, Juan	112203	297804
91144	FEIJO Fabregat, Jose Vicent	112243	297805
91110	FERNANDEZ Quirch, Sergio Raul	222[illegible]	[illegible]

04 JUN 1963

CANCELLED
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SECRET

File 24 November 1964

Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Santiago ARGUELLES Izquierdo (AAC-1130) - #244420(C)
Angel Manuel BENITEZ Benitez (AAC-1131) - #744305(C)
Alicio CALAS Roque (AAC-1132) - #737175(C)
Alfredo FERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1133) - #737177(C)
Conrado FERNANDEZ Morales (AAC-1134) - #272300(C)
Felix FUENTES Games (AAC-1135) - #284891(C)
Orlando GARCIA Duarte (AAC-1136) - #218729(C)
Jose Angel GONZALEZ Castro (AAC-1137) - #223976(C)
Guillermo GONZALEZ Lazo (AAC-1138) - #733496(C)
Jose Severino HERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1139) - #283744(C)
Pedro LOPEZ Cristo (AAC-1140) - #284375(C)
Raimundo MARTINEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1141) - #284148(C)
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrete (AAC-1142) - #380858(C)
Alberto PEREZ Martinez (AAC-1143) - #223124(C)
Manuel A. RIVERO Colona (AAC-1144) - #228117(C)
Jorge Delio RODRIGUEZ Triana (AAC-1145) - #744303(C)
Mario Andres ROMERO Arias (AAC-1146) - #277933(C)
Jorge Luis SILVA Del Monte (AAC-1147) - #218751(C)
Juan Cornelio TAMAYO Cordovi (AAC-1148) - #218752(C)

1. On 24 November 1964 Bob Gambino, SOD/SO, called and said that subjects will probably be returning to the U.S. around 30 November 1964.

03

2. On 25 November 1964 Jack Scanlan, SOD/SO, advised that the arrival would be in the first week of December 1964.

03

3. On 30 November 1964 Jack Scanlan advised that all but AAC-1142 and AAC-1143 would be returning on about 5 December 1964 at midnight on an Agency C-118.

03

4. On 1 December 1964 Scanlan advised that subjects (except 1142 and 1143) would probably arrive at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., at about midnight on 5 December 1964 on an Air Force C-118 06 with tail number 3820. He said that Bob Gambino, Arthur Garza 03 William Robertson and Dr. James Fearon, M.D., would also be

06 06

	Dir. Sec.
	Dep. Dir. Sec.
	Executive
	DDS/I&S
	DDS/P&PS
	Ch I Staff
	Ch P Staff
	Ch [illegible]S
	Ch SRS
	Ch AAS
	Ch SSD
	Ch PSD
✓	SSD File

[illegible] # 380858 (C)

aboard. He said that the plane would also have loose cargo as follows: outboard motors, radio beacons, silence weapons, other weapons, commo gear, medical equipment and parachute drop equipment. He also said Gambino may be carrying some TSD material. He stated that James Fitchett, under Air Force 32 cover, would be there to transfer subjects to a C-54 for further travel to Camp Pickett and that Fitchett would meet the Customs and I&NS men at Base Operations.

5. On 2 December 1964 I advised Lawrence Fleishmann, Deputy Commissioner of Customs of the arrival and told him of the type of gear aboard. He said he would have his man meet Fitchett at Base Operations.

6. On 3 December 1964, I advised Frank Braden, I&NS, of the arrival of subjects and the other passengers and that Customs and his man should meet James Fitchett at Base Ops.

/S/

W. M. Knott

OS/AAS/WMK: es 4 Dec 64

File SECRET 24 September 1964

Alien Affairs Officer

Santiago F. ARGUELLES Izquierdo (AAC-1130)
#244429
Angel Manuel BENITEZ Benitez (AAC-1131)
#744375
Alcido CALAS Roque (AAC-1132)
#737475
Alfredo FERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1133)
#737173
Conrado FERNANDEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1134)
#[illegible]
Felix FUENTES Gomez (AAC-1135)
#136692
Orlando GARCIA Puente (AAC-1136)
#231729
Jose Angel GONZALEZ Castro (AAC-1137)
#[illegible]
Guillermo GONZALEZ Lazo (AAC-1138)
#735616
Juan Severino HERNANDEZ Martinez (AAC-1139)
#[illegible]
Pedro LOPEZ Calvo (AAC-1140)
#[illegible]
Raimundo MARTINEZ Gonzalez (AAC-1141)
#[illegible]
Ricardo Anibal MORALES Navarrete (AAC-1142)
#[illegible]
Alberto PEREZ Martinez (AAC-1143)
#123124
Manuel A. RIVERO Colina (AAC-1144)
#[illegible]
Jorge Delio RODRIGUEZ Telena (AAC-1145)
#744351
Mario Andres ROMERO Arias (AAC-1146)
#277933
Jorge Luis SILVA Del Monte (AAC-1147)
#615798
Juan Cornelio TAMAYO Cordovi (AAC-1148)
#215712

REFERENCE: Our letter to I&NS of 25 September 1964 regarding 19 Cubans being sent to the Congo by [illegible].

SECRET

GROUP 1
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1. Bob Gambino, [illegible], and Mr. Braden, I&NS, will fly to Camp Pickett, Va., this morning where Mr. Braden will issue Forms I-512's for the subjects. Braden will also take two Applications, Forms I-131, for two (2) of the nineteen (19) who are permanent residents. The other seventeen (17) are 212(d)(5) refugees.

2. Afterwards Gambino will have TSD put visas on the I-512's.

3. The I-512's and Reentry Permits will be issued as valid for twelve (12) months.

[illegible] L. [illegible]

CI/AAS/[illegible]:ss 26 Sept 64

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security 4 May 1967

SUBJECT : MORGAN, Edward P.

1. I first met Ed Morgan in about 1952 or 1953 through our association with the Society of Former Agents of the FBI. Both Ed and I served on the Executive Committee of the Washington Chapter of that Society in 1953-54 and both Ed and I were interested in having the Ex-Agents National Convention in Washington, D. C. At that time Jim McInerny was President of the Washington Chapter.

2. I went overseas in 1955 and I have seen Ed possibly four or five times since my return in 1957. While I have been active in the Society, Ed Morgan has not been. The last time I saw Morgan was in January 1967 at an Ex-Agents dinner. All of my association with Morgan has been through the Ex-Agents, and I have never been in contact with him socially other than through the Society.

3. The following information is hearsay concerning Ed Morgan. I have reason to believe that all the information is true, but I do not know it on a first hand basis. Ed Morgan served in the Bureau from 1940 to 1947. He is a tall, personable, nice looking individual and in the Bureau he ended up in the Training Division. He used to give lectures to the new Agents classes and the National Academy classes, and through his speaking ability he came to the attention of Director, J. Edgar Hoover. At the end of the war Morgan left the Bureau to enter private law practice.

4. According to rumor, Morgan entered the field of Federal Communications practice. His firm became well known in this field and the firm name is Welch, Mott & Morgan. Rumor is that he obtained TV franchises for a number of oil men in the Middle West, and took his pay in oil leases. He made a great deal of money in a short period of time and is reportedly worth at least a million dollars.

5. At the time of the Korean War, Morgan accepted an appointed position in the Office of Price Stabilization. He headed the investigative and compliance unit of OPS and in this position he hired a number of Ex-Agents. It was in this job that he reportedly ran afoul of the Bureau. Morgan apparently proselyted a great number of Bureau Agents at higher salaries than the Bureau made and this made Director Hoover furious. A few years later a rumor was started that Morgan hoped to replace Hoover; the Director was even more furious. I do not know this for a fact, but it has been speculated that Morgan is persona non grata with the Bureau.

6. Morgan continued active work in the Society of Former Agents between 1955 and 1957. In 1957 he ran for the office of National President of the Society. He was defeated in his bid for this office and was very bitter about his defeat. For the past ten years he has not attended more than two or three local meetings, and he does not participate in Society activities. It was rumored that Morgan blamed his defeat on the Bureau, stating that he was defeated because the Bureau had black-listed him.

7. According to rumor Morgan moves in fairly high circles in the District of Columbia. I believe he belongs to the Touchdown Club and I also believe he belongs to one of the more exclusive country clubs in the area. He drinks, but I have never seen him intoxicated. Other than the items mentioned above, I have never heard anything unfavorable concerning him. There are a number of people in the Agency who knew him and worked with him at the Bureau. I feel certain that (Frank Holmes) 03 would know him fairly well, as well as Bill Harvey, Ron MacMillan, Herman Horton and Glenn Fields. Lyon L. (Slug) Tyler, who has been 24 (utilized by Central Cover) for a number of years, formerly worked for Morgan in his law firm, but broke away from the firm because of some disagreement. Tyler would probably know a great deal concerning Morgan's personal habits. It should be remembered, however, that because Morgan's law practice is primarily an administrative practice before the FCC, most of his business associates would be in the broadcasting and news business.

Charles W. Kane

SECRET

FILE COPY

7 June 1966

SUBJECT: MAHEU, Robert A.

1. Robert A. Maheu, a personnel relations executive and former F.B.I. Agent, has been utilized by the Office of Security on many sensitive assignments since the early fifties. He has also on several occasions been cleared for use by the DD/P in various capacities. He does business as Robert A. Maheu, Associates, and maintains offices in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, California, where he is now residing.

2. It has come to our attention that the Senate Subcommittee investigating wiretapping activities (Long Committee) has expressed considerable interest in Maheu. He has never been asked to perform any technical surveillance on our behalf.

3. The first inkling we had that the Long Committee was interested in Maheu came to our attention through the OGC. Mr. Lawrence Houston advised that Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, had casually mentioned to him that he had been advised by Raymond A. Taggart, an AID employee, that he may be called upon to testify before the Long Committee regarding his activities while employed by Maheu (1954-55).

4. The only significant association the Agency had with Maheu during that period involved the struggle between two Greek industrial giants, Stavros Niarchus and Aristottle Onassis. Maheu had been retained as a trouble shooter for Niarchus. Onassis had just concluded a pact with King Saud which would allow him to control approximately 90 percent of the oil shipments out of Saudi Arabia. In consumating the deal, he allegedly employed every trick in the book. His achievement caused much consternation among the British, German, and American interests. Niarchus also realized as a result of this the balance of power and influence weighed heavily in

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favor of Onassis in their own private battle. It was this mutual concern of the United States and Niarchus that set the stage for a joint venture. Niarchus supplied the money, personnel, and documents; the Agency furnished the communications, courier facilities, and direction in the form of our Commo channel, pouch system, and the NEA Division's expertise and guidance.

5. Spyridon Catapodis, a Greek Broker, who had an ax to grind against Onassis as a result of being manipulated out of a handsome commission he believed due him for his intercession with certain Saudi officials to secure oil rights for Onassis, spearheaded a campaign to publicize Onassis' high-handed methods of operation. This triggered off all sorts of international litigations which erupted into suits and countersuits by all parties concerned. Of particular note was the case of Catapodis vs. Onassis, which suit was filed in New York State. While Niarchus was being examined before trial by Onassis' attorney, he claimed Government privilege in answering certain questions. This tact was challenged by the attorney and pursued to the point that eventually it was recorded in the briefs filed by both the plaintiff and the defendent that CIA was, in fact, the Government agency of interest. Close coordination was maintained during this period with Justice and State. At our request a representative of the U. S. Attorney's Office in New York monitored all of the Hearings. Mr. Houston is intimately familiar with the actions in this case, and copies of his memoranda pertinent to it are contained in his files.

6. The Security file on Subject contains a Covert Security Clearance issued 16 August 1954 at the request of NE/2, Att: William Miller, for Maheu's use on Project TWIXT. Other interested DD/P personnel were identified as William F. Rowland, Acting Chief, NEA Division; George Prussing; Walter Snowden; and Charles Williamson.

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7. Mr. Maheu was contacted to determine whether the Committee had been in touch with him. He stated he was not aware of their interest in him. When the Taggart conversation was mentioned, he promptly replied that it must be the Onassis operation they are looking into. He recalled that he had Onassis' New York office "covered" sometime during the period. John Frank, a

former staff employee, and then a private investigator, was engaged to arrange for the coverage. Maheu could only identify the technician by the name of Leon. Presumably, this coverage was done as a routine technique to keep the Niarchus interests informed on Onassis' movements. This was not initiated at the request of any Agency component so far as our records indicate.

8. Subsequently, Maheu advised he had received a message from one of the Committee's attorneys named Homme who wanted to fly out to talk with him. Maheu fended him off by saying he was tied up for the next several days. He then contacted his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, of Washington, D. C., and it was decided that Morgan would meet him in St. Louis on 24 May for a conference.

9. On Thursday morning, 26 May, Maheu called to advise that he was at the Madison Hotel, Washington, D. C., and was anxious to talk with us. At his request it was arranged to have Colonel Edwards accompany a member of this office to meet with him.

10. Maheu opened the conversation by announcing that he had been selected to be the star performer on a planned TV hearing which is scheduled to open within the next few weeks. He went on to give the basis for this statement in the following detail.

> When he first talked to Ed Morgan of the possibility of his being subpoenaed, Morgan assured him that he had nothing to be concerned about inasmuch as he was a very close friend of Senator Long's personal attorney who had considerable influence upon the Senator. The lawyer resides in St. Louis, and he suggested that they both go out and solicit his assistance. After the presentation of the facts, all three flew to Washington where the lawyer secured an appointment with the Senator. Mr. Bernard Fensterwald was in attendance at the meeting. He identified himself as the Chief Attorney for the Committee. According to Maheu, Fensterwald made it clear that Maheu was their ace in the hole and without him the Hearings would have no appeal. He implied that Maheu's clients and their opposition added

up to a very attractive package. Such headliners as Niarchus, Onassis, Dave McDonald, and Howard Hughes are hard to come by. Fensterwald further referred to Maheu as the type who employed the technique of cutting the Government in just enough on his touchy operations to permit him to hide behind their skirts if he were caught. It is the opinion of the lawyer that, unless the Senator can be convinced to the contrary, he will proceed with plans on schedule.

11. Maheu's most active account and, at this time, almost exclusive client is Howard Hughes. In the past he did considerable work for Dave McDonald, former president of the United Steel Workers. So far as this office knows, the Agency never had any interest in either of these clients. However, it should be noted that the IO Division was granted a Covert Security Approval on 4 June 1959 to approach Maheu and advise him of the Agency's interest in international labor. Maheu claims he never became involved in any "bugging" operation for either of these accounts.

12. It is not believed that Maheu wants or expects us to front for him in the Onassis tap matter. As mentioned previously, to our knowledge this was not Agency sponsored. However, if exploited, it would probably eventually lead to exposing our part in the Onassis/Niarchus feud. As it is a matter of court record, it could not be denied nor buried. Even though the details might be protected by a declaration that it involved classified operational information, it would set up a field day for the press and critics of the Agency.

13. Mr. Maheu is presently furnishing cover for a DODS staff agent in his Washington, D. C., office. In this connection, two of Maheu's employees have been cleared and witting. Other clearance actions noted were: CSA granted FI/Plans, Cover Division on 30 August 1954 for use under LPHIDDEN; CSA issued to NE Division on 7 October 1959 for Maheu's use in the United States and (Jordan) 11 inasmuch as he may be employed by (the King of Jordan) to handle (Jordanian) public relations in the United States. 24
11

4/PV

14. In 1958-59, Maheu was used by the FE Division in two sensitive operations targeted against Sukarno. Mr. Allen Dulles was aware and approved of these operations. Mr. Joseph Smith who was then Chief/PMI, is knowledgeable of the actions.

15. While none of our interests in Maheu relate to wire-tapping, it is evident that the extensive and diversified use of him makes us vulnerable to exploitation should he be interrogated in depth regarding his activities.

16. Mr. Maheu is maintaining a cooperative attitude and has promised to do all in his power to protect the Agency from embarrassment or compromise.

SECRET

66483

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clayton Kallander
226 Westout

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
#66483

1. Returned herewith find alias documentation which was issued by your office to the Subject in accordance with our request on 6 April 1962.

2. The documentation in question is no longer needed and may be destroyed.

3. Please convey my appreciation to those responsible for the expeditious handling of this matter.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

[illegible]/IOS
[illegible]/IOS
[illegible]/IOS

3

Attachments: 10
[California] Driver's License
Social Security Card
Reserve Officer's Association Membership Card
[Traveler's] Auto Insurance ID Card

KUHNKE/mjl
29 June 1962
CLOSED

3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2BR

66483

SECRET

O'Connell, James P.

9 APR 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. [John Swedberg] 03
226 Westout Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : OLDS, James Paul (A)
#66483

1. This will confirm our verbal request of 5 April 1962 that you prepare alias documentation in the alias indicated which will include but not necessarily be limited to the following documents: [California] 10 Driver's License, Social Security card, Reserve Officers Association identity card with the rank of Commander, and an appropriate insurance identity card.

2. You were provided with the Subject's true name, a photograph, and a sample of his signature and you were requested to have such documentation ready for the Subject no later than 1600 hours, 6 April 1962. You were provided with the following physical description: Eyes - Blue; Hair - Brown; Height - 6'3"; Weight - 200 lbs; Complexion - Ruddy; Birth - 19 February 1917, Elmhurst, New York; and you were requested to utilize a non-backstopped, multiple unit address in San Francisco.

3. The documentation in question will be returned to your office when the Subject has no further use for same.

4. Your prompt attention to this matter is sincerely appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

vrj

Victor R. White

/IOS
/IOS
/IOS

mjl

1 Sthfile

KUHNKE/mjl
6 April 1962
CLOSED

3

Fto2: Documentation was rec'd by JOC on 4/6/62

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2/BR

19 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Support Desk

FROM : Robert J. Leonard

SUBJECT : COVERT SITE
Apartment 423
Warwick Apartments
3051 Idaho Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
#156229 A-SB/2

24

GIST:

SB/1 has requested security approval to use the above site to house a contract Agent. Approval recommended.

DETAILS:

1. Mr. Marx Holder requires a place for the use of [illegible] (172341) an Agent of Security Research Staff. He has obtained permission of SAC/WFO and requests SB/2 to grant security approval.

2. Since this site is to be terminated on 1 March 1961 and since SAC/WFO has advised that it is leased in alias no security objection can be ascertained.

ACTION:

Recommend that SB/1 be advised that there is no security objection to the contemplated use of this site.

Cancel

Robert J. Leonard

[illegible]/csm (19 Jan. 1961)
GROUP

172341

14-00000

104-10123-10219

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
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Do Not Reproduce

FILE: O'CONNELL, JAMES P., Jr.

Eyes Only

Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
[illegible] D. WHITE
R. [illegible], Jr.

DD/Security
15-0[illegible]
[illegible] 1965

14-00000

SECRET

DD/S 65-0896

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23 FEB 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Key Assignments
Office of Security

1. This memorandum submits proposed key assignments in the Office of Security for your information and approval; such assignments are contained in paragraph 2.

2. The following key assignments for the Office of Security are proposed for the summer of 1965:

a. Mr. Arthur C. Sheridan, GS-15, Chief, Technical Division, will replace Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. in 13-17 Okinawa as Chief, Far East Regional Security Staff during July 1965.

b. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., GS-15, who is presently attending the Air War College, will replace Mr. Sheridan as Chief, Technical Division during June 1965.

file

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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c. Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., GS-15, will be assigned to a GS-16 position as Chief, Investigations Division upon his return to Headquarters in August 1965. After Mr. O'Connell has had a brief period of orientation in this assignment, I plan to recommend that he be promoted to GS-16.

(SIGNED)
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

The assignments contained in paragraph 2 are approved 26 Feb 65
Date

/s/
L. K. White
Deputy Director for Support

Distribution:
Original - Return to OS
2 - DDS
2 - PersBr.

OS/A&TS/ELHardt/ph (x6200 - 19 Feb 65)

5

SECURITY INDOCTRINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENT
BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM, BYECOM APPROVAL

A special system of security and control, known as the BYEMAN Security and Control System, has been established by the Director of Central Intelligence for the purpose of providing maximum security protection to a number of extremely sensitive intelligence collection projects. Each of these projects requires a separate, special security approval for access. In your official capacity in connection with U. S. Government communication systems you have been granted a BYECOM approval which permits you to perform your official duties as regards BYEMAN projects in general, without regard to the necessary separate special security approvals. Strict adherence to the BYEMAN Control Manual and all supplemental directives must be adhered to in the handling of BYEMAN materials or information. You are requested to read and sign the Secrecy Agreement and Oath.

1. In connection with my indoctrination into the BYEMAN Control System, I acknowledge my full understanding of an agreement with the following provisions:

a. Security restrictions and penalties for violations of the BYEMAN Control System, to which I am subject, are covered under Title 18, Sections 792, 793, 794, 795 and 797, U. S. Code and Section 19 of Public Law 831, Internal Security Act of 1950.

b. It is my responsibility to ascertain that persons with whom I may have reason to discuss materials or sources of BYEMAN activities to any degree have also been properly cleared and designated to receive and discuss BYEMAN information.

c. By reason of my BYEMAN clearance alone I do not have access to all BYEMAN information or materials but only those required on a "MUST KNOW" basis.

d. I will report to the BYEMAN Security Officer immediately any violations of BYEMAN regulations of which I become aware.

e. I will advise the BYEMAN Security Officer of any personal changes in my status or assignment.

f. No change in my assignment will relieve me of my obligation under oath and that the provisions of this oath remain binding at all times.

2. I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means any classified information, intelligence, or knowledge relative to BYEMAN sources except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the BYEMAN Control System Manual or supplemental directives.

WITNESS: O'Connell

SIGNED : Ernest M. Kropff
DATE : 19 June 1963
Ernest M. Kropff

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 2 3

46 SECRET

ACTION: OS 2

INFO : FE 6, OC 8, S/C 2

for: James O'Connell's file

S E C R E T 250227Z

13-27

(SEAC) INFO DIR (SING) CITE (OKIE) 8358

13-28 18-17

(FJDUST) 01

18-27

REF (SEAC) 0613 *

CS INTERCEPTION 25 APR 1963 IN 24859

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

RA

1. CLEANCE STATUS MR. O'CONNELL FORWARDED THRU SPECIAL CLEARANCE CHANNELS TO APPROPRIATE STATIONS.

13-14 13-28 13-13 13-5 13-2 13-25

2. HE VISITING (HONG), (SING), (KUAL), (BANG) (SAIG) (PENH) AND

13-1

(MANI.)

28 APRIL

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 0205, 25 APRIL 63.

15

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

12/PV

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

4 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Honor Recommendation for JAMES W. McCORD, JR.

The attached recommendation for an Honor and Merit Award is forwarded for your information and recommendations concerning any security measures that should be taken in the processing of this award.

ELLIN L. BEATTY
Executive Secretary/HMAB

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - HMAB Case File

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DDS 66.6/052

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in duplicate)

DATE

TO: Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM: (Operating official) Director of Security

Section A Personal Data

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. POSITION TITLE Elec. Engr-Audio Supt.	3. GRADE 15	4. SD SS

5. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Technical Division

6. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)

7. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State) 6801 Floyd Ave., Springfield, Va.	8. OFFICE EXT. (If hqs.) 4192	9. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED U. S. - Birth

10. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Distinction

11. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Sarah Ruth McCord	13. RELATIONSHIP Wife	14. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State) Same as 7	15. HOME PHONE 451-5279

Section B Recommendation for Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard

16. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

Personnel in immediate vicinity or who assisted in act or shared in same hazard:

17. FULL NAME	18. ORGN. TITLE	19. GRADE	20. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in act:

21. FULL NAME	22. TYPE OF AWARD

Conditions under which act was performed:

23. LOCATION	24. INCLUSIVE DATES	25. TIME OF DAY

26. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

Section C Recommendation for Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance

27. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO

28. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Chief, Technical Division, OS

29. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Headquarters

30. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: Supervises the activities of the Technical Division, OS

Personnel who assisted or contributed substantially to the service or performance

31. FULL NAME	32. ORGN. TITLE	33. GRADE	34. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
MARCY, William M.	Elec. Engr.	10	OS/Technical Division
PETIT, Alan F.	Elec. Engr.	13	OS/Technical Division

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in the performance

35. FULL NAME	36. TYPE OF AWARD
MARCY, William M. PETIT, Alan F.	Certificate of Distinction

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED	39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT
	☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Section D Narrative Description

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. *(Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.)* What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation.

40.

From early December 1965 through May 1966, Messrs. James W. McCord, Jr., Alan F. Petit, and William M. Marcy, of the Technical Division, Office of Security, spent many off-duty hours in experimentation with various items of equipment in an effort to improve and strengthen the Agency's Audio-Countermeasures Program. 24 They conceived and developed a unique technique in fluoroscopic scanning which is considered to be a major breakthrough in the detection of clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency. It gives the Agency for 24 the first time the capability to detect hidden technical listening devices, a capability for which the intelligence community has expended large sums of money to develop in a variety of approaches. This technique will not only benefit the security of all Agency installations at home and abroad, but will be of utmost benefit to other agencies in the community. This technique was met with wide acclaim by the intelligence community and the Technical Security Countermeasures Committee.

24

In experimenting with the X-ray in combination with a fluoroscopic screen, these men showed this combination had distinct advantages in terms of time and effort over the considerably more expensive X-ray 24 film and processor. In further refinement of this technique, they designed an innovation in the form of 24 a fluoroscopic cloth which has the distinct advantage of flexibility over the fluorescent screens 24 currently available on the commercial market.

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

41. ENCLOSURES *(List individually)* If orginator is not an eyewitness or does not have personal knowledge of the act or performance, attach affidavits of eyewitness or individuals having personal knowledge of the facts.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

42. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY Ermal P. Geiss	43. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)	44. DATE 7/28/66

Section E Recommendation Forwarded Through Officials Concerned For Their Information

45. Head of SS Career Service (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Acting Director of Security	DATE 7/29/66
46. Deputy Director of Operating Component	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
47. Deputy Director of Career Service	TITLE AND SIGNATURE SIGNED R. L. Bannerman Deputy Director for Support	DATE 3 AUG 1966

6/hJ

SECRET

Section D Continued - James W. McCord, Jr.

To further enhance the use of this equipment, these men developed an inconspicuous, easily transportable package, consisting of two attache cases which hold the X-ray fluoroscopic equipment, wall racks, and motor units. 24 This makes it possible for an audio-countermeasures team to enter offices, residences, and safehouses without undue attention.

These men have shown great ingenuity and resourcefulness in the application and development of this audio-countermeasure technique. Through their further efforts in package design they contributed significantly to the future clandestine use of this technique on a world-wide basis. This technique provides the Agency for the first time a procedure through which large interior wall surfaces, room furnishings, and objects can be rapidly scanned in "real time" in the search for hostile technical penetrations. This capability will significantly enhance the security of all Agency installations.

SECRET

McCORD, James W., Jr.
Civ, CIA
"Jim"
DOB: 26 Jan 24

WIFE: Ruth
CHILDREN: Mike,12;
Anne,10;Nancy,8.

ASSIGNMENTS:
64: CIA, Security Off, Washington
62-63: Dept of Army Civilian,Germany 32, 15-13
53-62: CIA, Security Off, Washington
51-53: Dept of Def, Security Off, San Francisco 32, 16-35
48-51: FBI Agent, California

EDUCATION:
Univ/Texas,46-48,BBA, Bachelor Bus Adm
Lincoln Law Sch, Oakland,Calif,51
ICAF, Assoc Prog,60-62

HOBBIES: Golfing, Scouting Advisory Wrk

PERMANENT ADDRESS:
5701 Floyd Ave
Springfield, Virginia

2/pd

REPORT OF HONOR AWARDS BOARD

(CONVENED PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS R 20-635 AND AFR 20-635)

DATE 2 March 1959

The Honor Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last) McCORD	(First) James	(Middle) Walter	POSITION TITLE Actg.Dep. Chief/[illegible]/OS
PRESENT GRADE GS-14	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Security		STATION Headquarters

BE AWARDED:

Certificate of Merit with Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD
1 July - 25 August 1958

☐ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☒ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

The Honor and Merit Awards Board concludes from the information available to it that the service performed, while of unquestionable value, is not sufficiently outstanding to merit an honor award.

APPROVED	SIGNATURE [illegible] APR 1959
	TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AWARDS BOARD Gordon M. Stewart
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	SIGNATURE /s/ (Rudyard Boulton) 03 05 MAR 1959
DATE	TYPED NAME OF RECORDER (Rudyard Boulton) 03

FORM NO. 382 REPLACES FORM 37-176
1 DEC 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(4)

2/RD

File

SECRET

SO 9-527
21 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Staff, Office of Logistics

FROM : Chief, TSD/Security

SUBJECT : Identi-kit

EB-10772

1. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of an article appearing in the February 1960, issue of "Science and Mechanics" magazine. Page 2 reflects a comment to the effect that the U. S. Intelligence under wrote the development of the Identi-kit to the amount of $87,000.

24

2. TSD/EB under RD—177 and under the EARWORT Program has invested $82,531 into the Identi-kit. Chief Hugh C. McDONALD, who is mentioned in the article, is a cleared TSD consultant. He was initially briefed by Mr. ANDERSON, TSD/EB. The Agency sponsored Mr. McDONALD's visit to Washington and arranged his trip to Honolulu, Hawaii, all in connection with the development of the Identi-kit. The Townsend Corporation, working with McDONALD, has built a number of these kits and will advise the Agency of those sold to foreign powers, etc. Mr. Courtney OWENS, Sales manager of Townsend Engineering Corporation, is a TSD/EB cleared source 24 and understands the Agency's interest in the Kit. Townsend has also opened a school for Identi-kit users. Three persons from TSD have attended this school.

3. The TSD project engineers are very dubious that McDONALD disclosed classified information to unauthorised persons and speak highly of him. They have especially noted his eagerness to assist us on various crash-type projects of an unclassified nature.

4. Therefore, we have no desire to alienate his feelings. Nevertheless, I would suggest that Mr. JONES, during his forthcoming visit to the West Coast, interview Mr. McDONALD to determine, if possible, the reason for inclusion of U. S. Intelligence interest in the attached article, whether or not CIA was mentioned during his interview with the author and to further brief McDONALD if necessary. Furthermore, the Identi-kit is expected to receive considerable publicity as the sales program is stepped up.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to PSD (Attn: Robert SWENDIMAN) to determine whether or not any other components of the Agency are or have used McDONALD (possibly contacts or SSD).

James P. O'CONNOR
Chief, TSD/Security

2pl

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
1 - Phys. Sec. Div. (Survey Br.)
1 - Pers. Sec. Div. (Mr. SWENDIMAN)

3/31/60 - SO/TSD
Office was advised
a OO contact in 1954

SECRET

SECRET

FOR THE RECORD   1 Feb. 1961

FROM: Kammer

SUBJECT: [STRATTON, Michael Weimer] 03
#188074

1. On this date Subject's case was coordinated with Mr. McCORD of SRS in connection with Subject's operational use within the US by WH/4/Propaganda. The implications of a CI operation with the States by this Agency and the possibility Subject might come to the attention of the FBI through association with Court WOOD were discussed.

2. Mr. McCORD expressed the opinion that it is not necessary to advise the FBI of the operation at this time. However, he wishes to review the case in a month. The file of Subject, along with that of the WH man who is supervising the operation (David Atlee PHILLIPS # 40695) will be pended for the attention of Mr. McCORD on 1 March 1961.

For details on this see the file of [Stratton]; 03

2·2·72

SECRET

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2/AV

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In) AUGUST 31, 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) RODRIGUEZ, EMILIO AMERICO
2. AGE 33 YEARS 8 MONTHS
3. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT 5 FT. 10 IN.
5. WEIGHT 150 lbs.
6. COLOR OF EYES BROWN
7. COLOR OF HAIR BLACK
8. TYPE COMPLEXION RUDDY
9. TYPE BUILD MEDIUM
10. SCARS (Type and Location) NONE
11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES NONE
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) 9361 S.W. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A.
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO. 9361 S.W. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A. PHONE: CEdar 5-8341
14. CURRENT PHONE NO. CEdar 5-8341
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT. N.A.
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country) FLORIDA, U.S.A.
17. NICKNAMES NONE
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED EUGENIO GONZALEZ
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES. FROM APRIL 1960 TO PRESENT IN HAVANA, CUBA AND MIAMI, FLA. AS UNDERCOVER NAME
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority). N.A.

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING CONTRACT AGENT
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $ 9,600.00
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT ALREADY SIGNED
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL ☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☒ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable) ☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☒ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify): ☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S. ☒
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA. ADEQUATE PAY AND LIVING CONDITIONS FOR SELF AND FAMILY

R

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH JAN. 27, 1928	2. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)* HAVANA, CUBA	3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* U.S.A.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER *(Specify)*: NATURA.

5. DATE NATURALIZED: DECEMBER 15, 1949

6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: #6799255

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN DIST. OF LOUISIANA

8. ISSUED AT *(City, State, Country)*: NEW ORLEANS, LA.

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: CUBA

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

CUBAN BY BIRTH

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. GIVE PARTICULARS: N.A.

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First Papers, Etc.)*? N.A.

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S. JUNE 6, 1961	16. PORT OF ENTRY MIAMI, FLA.	17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY SWISS PROTECTIVE PASSPORT

18. LAST U.S. VISA *(No., Type, Place of Issue)*: RESIDENT, U.S. EMBASSY IN HAVANA, CUBA

19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NOV. 1942

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: COLEGIO DE LA SALLE

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*: HAVANA, CUBA

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*: Sep. 1934 to Nov. 1942

4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: ALCEE FORTIER HIGH SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*: NEW ORLEANS, LA.

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*: Nov. 1942 to June 1945

4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:

2. ADDRESS *(City, State, Country)*:

3. DATES ATTENDED *(From-and-To)*:

4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS *(Specify)*
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Psychology	Biology Chemistry	1945	1948	B.S.	June 1948	Sem hrs.
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Spanish	Portuguese	1949	1952	M.A.	JUNE 1952	Sem hrs.
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA	Spanish	French	1952	1954	NONE	N.A.	Sem hrs.

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

EL EPITETO EN LAS OBRAS DE BERCEO (DO NOT REMEMBER EXACT TITLE). A DETAILED STUDY OF THE MANY USES OF THE EPITHET IN BERCEO'S WORKS, A 12TH CENTURY WRITER, INCLUDING A CROSS-REFERENCE LISTING OF ALL EPITHETS AS SHOWN IN HIS WRITINGS.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
	N.A.			

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
	N.A.			

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

N.A.

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	X	X	X													X			X
Portuguese				X		X		X											X
French													X	X	X				X
Italian													X	X	X				X

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

FROM 1949 to 1954 STUDIED THE ROMANCE LANGUAGES AT THE GRADUATE LEVEL

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

N.A.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

FAMILIAR WITH SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING TERMINOLOGY IN SPANISH.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
CUBA	HAVANA + VECINITY. POLITICAL ECONOMIC + SOCIAL STRUCTURE. COMMERCE - IMPORTATIONS.	1954-1961	N.A.	☒			☒

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

To work as Assistant District Manager for Century Electric Co., in charge of their HAVANA Office, in HAVANA, Cuba. Later remained in Cuba from March 1960 to June 1961 as Principal Agent for C.I.A.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

Pass. Nº: 1095961 Expired: Sept. 2 1960 (NOT RENEWED)

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm): 50

2. SHORTHAND (wpm): N.A.

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE ~~OR TRAINING~~ (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.). MIMEOGRAPH, ADDING MACHINE, CALCULATOR, DICTATING MACHINE.

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

FISHING, HUNTING, SWIMMING (GOOD UNDERWATER RESISTANCE), PHOTOGRAPHY (BLACK + WHITE AND COLOR), MUSICAL (PLAY SEVERAL INSTRUMENTS BY EAR), FLYING, Bowling, Chess.

Average in ALL OF THE ABOVE.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

TEACHING AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE SECURED AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AND IN FOREIGN TRADE MANAGEMENT RESPECTIVELY. ALSO CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AT THE GRADUATE LEVEL.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

FAMILIAR WITH GENERAL SCIENTIFIC APPARATUS AS MAY BE PRESENT IN A MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORY. Beckman Spectophotometry. (DID ONE half YEAR RESEARCH AT TULANE MEDICAL SCHOOL)

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☒ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

Student Pilot Certificate Nº S-293957

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* 2-18-54	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* N.A.

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

N.A.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

N.A.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

IN COLLEGE AND AS A JUNIOR EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN TRADE

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Phi Sigma Iota, National Honor Society of Romance Languages.

American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese.

Graduate Scholarships offered by the State of Louisiana and Tulane University. (UNDER WHICH I DID FIVE YEARS OF GRADUATE WORK)

HONORARY MENTIONS AND MEDALS.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) *Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.*

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* APRIL/1954 - Oct. 1960		2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY CENTURY ELECTRIC COMPANY	
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 1806 PINE ST., ST. LOUIS, MO., USA.			
4. KIND OF BUSINESS MANUFACTURER OF MOTORS, GENERATORS, ETC.		5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR ARNESTO N. RODRIGUEZ, Dist. Mgr Mr. Charles C. White, Export Manager.	
6. TITLE OF JOB 1 Assitant DISTRICT MANAGER	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,000	PER MONTH (app)	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO PROMOTE AND SERVICE THE SALE OF CENTURY MOTORS, GENERATORS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT IN THE TERRITORY OF CUBA, AND TO COOPERATE IN COLLECTIONS WHEN NECESARY. TO MANAGE THE HAVANA DISTRICT SALES OFFICE IN FULL RESPONSABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE DISTRICT MGR. TO LOOK AFTER THE INTEREST OF CENTURY ELEC. CO. IN CUBA.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING PRESENT CONDITIONS IN CUBA AND ACCEPTANCE of ASSIGNMENTS AS PRINCIPAL AGENT IN CUBA FOR C.I.A.

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) FEB. 1950 - MARCH 1954
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY TULANE UNIVERSITY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) ST. CHARLES ST., NEW ORLEANS, LA., U.S.A.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS COLLEGE
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. John E. Englekirk, Chairman Sp. Dept.
6. TITLE OF JOB Graduate Asst.
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER MONTH (Off.)
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TEACHER OF BEGINNER AND INTERMEDIATED SPANISH IN THE COLLEGE LEVEL. TO ASSIST WITH REGISTRATION AND DEPARTAMENTAL FUNCTIONS.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ACCEPT ABOVE POSITION

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) JUNE 1949 - JUNE 1950
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY BERLITZ SCHOOL OF LANGUAGES
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) INTERNATIONAL TRADE MART, NEW ORLEANS, LA, U.S.A.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS LANGUAGE SCHOOL
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR MR. HALL, DIRECTOR
6. TITLE OF JOB PROFESSOR
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 3.00 PER HR. (Off.)
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO TEACH THE SPANISH LANGUAGE BY THE BERLITZ METHOD.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ACCEPT ABOVE POSITION AND PURSUE AN ADVANCED DEGREE

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) JAN. 1949 - JUNE 1949
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY TULANE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) TULANE AVE., NEW ORLEANS, LA. U.S.A.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS MEDICAL SCHOOL
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Woo
6. TITLE OF JOB Medical Research Technician
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 200.00 PER MONTH
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES IN CHARGE OF SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC ANALYSIS IN THE CARDIO-VASCULAR RESEARCH LABORATORY.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			
6	1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY		
	3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*			
	4. KIND OF BUSINESS	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
	6. TITLE OF JOB	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			
7	1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY		
	3 ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*			
	4. KIND OF BUSINESS	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR		
	6. TITLE OF JOB	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
	9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES			
	10. REASONS FOR LEAVING			

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X — MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)* ☒ YES ☐ NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION 4-F	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. 16-45-28-53
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON DIABETES MELLITUS	5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS Nº 45, Orlean Parish, New Orleans, LA.	

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*:
HAVE SERVED →									
NOW SERVING →									

NA

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)*		4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)*
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE	CURRENT SERVICE	6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE	CURRENT SERVICE	8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)*
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE	CURRENT SERVICE
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE	CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	OTHER:
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

NA

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)* ☐ OTHER *(Including AUS)*

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☒ NO	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L.GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY*(Active)* ☐ STANDBY*(Inactive)* ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

NA

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☒ NO	13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO	15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS NA
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: NA MONTHS: NA.	17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

N.A.

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans	New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.
The Airport Bank of Miami	Miami, FLA., U.S.A.
The Royal Bank of CANADA	HAVANA, CUBA.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY, ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

N.A.

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.
D.H. HOLMES Ltd. (Department Store)	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.
MAISON Blanche (Department Store)	New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

N.A.

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

N.A.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME

(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
PAULINE	JUANITA	ROSS	RODRIGUEZ

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: PAULA (NICKNAME SINCE CHILDHOOD)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: JUNE 10, 1948

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*: New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 300 OAKUM ST. EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

8. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: N.A.

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*: 9361 S.W. 178 St., PERRINE 57, FLA. U.S.A.

12. DATE OF BIRTH: JAN. 2, 1923

13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: BOGALUSA, LA. U.S.A.

14. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
15. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
19. OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE
20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers): N.A.
21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.
22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.): N.A.
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED: N.A.
25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: N.A.

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
EMILIO AMERICO RODRIGUEZ J.R.	SON	SEPT. 18, 1951, New Orleans, LA	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
JOSEPH ROSS RODRIGUEZ	SON	MARCH 1, 1953, New Orleans, La.	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
PATTI MICHELLE RODRIGUEZ	DAUGTHER	OCT. 23, 1954, HAVANA, Cuba	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.
PAUL MARSHALL RODRIGUEZ	SON	NOV. 1, 1957, HAVANA Cuba	U.S.A.	9361 SW. 178 ST. PERRINE 57, FLA.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ⇨ 4

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ⇨ 1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): RODRIGUEZ, ARNESTO NAPOLEON
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: N.A.
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country): The Orleanian Apt. Hotel ST. CHARLES Ave. New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: August 5 1871 ~~Havana, Cuba~~
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): HAVANA, Cuba.
9. CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: Nov. 1962
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New Orleans, La.
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
15. OCCUPATION: RETIRED
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed): ~~SELF EMPLOYED~~ Century Elect. Co.
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED: 1806 PINE ST. ST LOUIS, MO. U.S.A.
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): N.A.
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
20. COUNTRY: N.A.
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: INTELLIGECE AGENT FOR U.S. EMBASSY IN HAVANA CUBA DURING WORLD WAR I, WORLD WAR II, AND RECENT CASTRO REVOLUTION

SECTION XV — MOTHER (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): CASANOVA, EMILIA

2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH: ~~August~~ July 6, 1961

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: ARTERIOSCLEROSIS

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): the [illegible] Apt. Hotel, ST. Charles Ave. New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH: JUNE 5, 1901

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): HAVANA, Cuba

9. CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.– DATE OF ENTRY: Oct. 1, 1950

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New Orleans, LA. U.S.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.

15. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): N.A.

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: N.A.

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To): N.A.

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.

20. COUNTRY: N.A.

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: U.S. (Sp. MAIL) CENSOR IN NEW ORLEANS CENSORSHIP OFFICE DURING WORLD WAR II.

SECTION XVI — BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): RODRIGUEZ, ARNESTO JOSE
2. RELATIONSHIP: BROTHER
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 212 MAPLE Rd., METAIRE, LA. U.S.A.
5. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: 38

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

6
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

7
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

8
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

SECTION XVII

FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): ROSS, SAMUEL SANFORD

2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH: JUNE 30, 1958

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: HEART ATTACK

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: SAM (NIKNAME SINCE CHILDHOOD)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Route 2, Box 500, EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH: JULY 2, 1890

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): MOBILE, ALABAMA, U.S.A.

9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.

15. OCCUPATION: SAWYER

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): R.P. BAER AND Co., EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

SECTION XVIII

MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): BONTA, PATTI JUANITA

2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH: N.A.

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: N.A.

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: N.A.

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Route 2, Box 500, EDENTON, N.C., U.S.A.

7. DATE OF BIRTH: Dec. 21, 1899

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): LAUREL, Miss. U.S.A.

9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.

15. OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): N.A.

SECTION XIX

RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): LOPEZ, ELENA
2. RELATIONSHIP: SISTER IN LAW
3. AGE: 33
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: 212 MAPLE Rd., METAIRE, LA. U.S.A.
5. EMPLOYED BY: BERLITZ SCHOOL OF LANGUAGEZ
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): MEXICAN
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: ONCE YEARLY (4)
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: JUNE 1961

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

Above relative has been a continuous resident in the U.S.A. since 1945 in New Orleans, La.

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ROSS, JOSEPH ALBERT	2. RELATIONSHIP BROTHER IN LAW	3. AGE 40	4. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Route 2, Box 595H, Pensacola, FLA, USA.	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known) MARINE PILOT AND PHOTOGRAPHER INSTRUCTOR PENSACOLA NAVAL AIR STATION		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
A.C. White	N.S.A. WASHINGTON, D.C.	10125 MARKHAM ST. SILVER SPRING, Md.
J.S. McNEELY	U.S.N. USS SARATOGA FPO N.Y. NY. (CVA-60)	1601 ARDEN WAY JACKSONVILLE, FLA.
P.M. ARTHUR	INTELLIGENCE UNK.	DRAWER K FT. AMADOR CANAL ZONE
DOROTHY MANESS JONES	HOUSEWIFE UNK.	210 W. President, Apt. 4 GREENWOOD, Miss.
C. A. ZEHNDER	EBASCO SERVICES N.Y. UNK.	P.O. BOX 285 PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
J. W. BARNES	MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVE UNK.	6938 Colbert St. New Orleans, LA.
L.T. WOLF	EBASCO SERVICES, N.Y. UNK.	420 Park Ave. SWARTHMORE, PA.
J. BRUNO	CIVIL SERVICE UNK.	3310 CASTIGLIONE New Orleans, LA.
DOROTHY BOETTCHER	HOUSEWIFE UNK.	839 PALERMO Ave. CORAL Gables, Miami, FLA
A. TAWATER	UNK.	1211 W. ARKANSAS LANE Rt 2, Box 16, ARLINGTON, TEXAS

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Dr. C. Peebles	TULANE MEDICAL SCHOOL New Orleans, LA.	2207 BROADWAY Ave. New Orleans 18, LA.
D. White	RETIRED CIVIL SERVICE	512 WALNUT St. New Orleans, LA.
C. MACE	TULANE UNIVERSITY SPANISH DEPARMENT	UNK.

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
Phi Sigma Iota	TULANE UNIVERSITY unk.	1951 unk.	Present.
American Ass. of Teachers of Spanish & Portuguese	DE PAUW UNIVERSITY unk.	1952 unk.	Present

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
FOCSA BLDG. APT. 28L, 17 & M St., Vedado, HAVANA Cuba	Oct. 1956	June 1961
FINCA Emilita, Klm 12 Central Highway, SAN FRANCISCO de Paula, Havana Cuba.	April	1954 - Oct. 1956
2D Newcomb Campus, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A.	Aug. 1951	April 1954
510 Walnut St., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Jan. 1950	Aug. 1951
2305 1/2 Almonester Ave., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Oct. 1949	Jan. 1950
510 Walnut St., New Orleans, LA., U.S.A.	Nov. 1942	Oct. 1949

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?	☐	YES
	☒	NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

N.A.

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS?	☐ YES ☒ NO	4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?	N-A
5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS?	☐ YES ☒ NO	6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?	N-A.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

N.A.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940 C.I.A., STATE DEPARTMENT, PAN AMERICAN UNION, CIVIL SERVICE, USIA.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

UNK.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE.	☐ YES ☒ NO	
11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE.	☐ YES ☒ NO	
12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE.	☐ YES ☒ NO	

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* PAULINE JUANITA RODRIGUEZ	2. RELATIONSHIP WIFE
3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* 9361 SW. 178 St. PERRINE 57, FLA.	4. HOME PHONE NO. CEdAR-5-8341
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE N.A.	6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. N.A.

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

N.A.

SECTION XXVI CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES Sept. 5, 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Emilio A. Rodriguez
3. SIGNED AT *(City and State)* MIAMI, FLA.	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Paula R. Rodriguez

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

☆U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1959 O - 492175

SECRET

1. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*) Piccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Dec 1935	3. GRADE GS-12
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (*or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment*) Managua, Nicaragua - State	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Off - #0396	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6576
7. PROPOSED STATION 16-22 32 JMCOBRA	8. PROPOSED POSITION (*Title, Number, Grade*) Ops Off. #1770, GS-12	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Military	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE O/A 11 Oct 68	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

12. COMMENTS

Subject was medically approved for overseas assignment in December 1967. Is returning short of tour for assignment JMCOBRA.

03

13. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Sept 68	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Roy W. Forslund Roy W. Forslund	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3D5319 Hqs.	16. EXTENSION 6576

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

Date. 18 OCT 1968

Security Approval has been granted for the use of Subject as outlined by this request.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

SECRET

, First, Middle) ccolo, Joseph S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH December 1935	3. GRADE GS-11
ICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/WH/1 - (Mexico City) 16-3	5. PRESENT POSITION Operations Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
7. PROPOSED STATION (Managua, Nicaragua) 16-22	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) 0396 Ops.Officer GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION (State Integree) 32	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 27 Jan 1968	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY one

12. COMMENTS

Lateral transfer. Subject will be in Headquarters area o/a 23 January 1968.

Subject will be language tested [illegible]

CSR/C

13. DATE OF REQUEST 20 December 1967	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL John F. Conroy John F. Conroy	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 3 D 5309 HQS	16. EXTENSION 4516

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

03

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

Date 27 Dec 1967

Security Approval has been granted to the use contemplated by this request

[illegible] Personnel Security Division

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 259a 1-66 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

[illegible] June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clay Kall[illegible] 03
Room 22[illegible], [illegible]

VIA : Office of Security/ID
Attn: Mr. [illegible]
Room [illegible]

Central Cover Group
Attn: James Franklin
Room [illegible]

SUBJECT : Request for U. S. Army Credentials 32

REFERENCE : [illegible] dated 22 May 1962

1. The Technical Services Division is requested to prepare back-stopped credentials in alias for the seven individuals who are identified in the attached seven identity sheets.

2. The credentials should identify the individuals with the U. S. Army, Joint Operations Group, and the title designation for all seven individuals should be INVESTIGATOR. 32

3. The credentials will be utilized generally in the South-Eastern part of the United States and possibly in Latin America in pursuit of the mission of Task Force W. Further, the utilization of the credentials will be on a controlled basis as directed by the Chief of Station, JMWAVE.

4. The aliases set forth in the attached identity sheets have been registered with ID. Pertinent biographic data for each individual is also set forth on the identity sheets.

5. Photographs for all seven individuals are being obtained and will be furnished to you as soon as possible.

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
/ID
/OSD
/SRD
/AB
/PB
/SAB
/SB

0/2 CAf

PSD# 214442

SECRET

4/rv

6. When the credentials are prepared and are ready for issuance, they should be sent to Mr. Ed FITZGERALD, Central Cover Group, Room 1-D-[illegible], so that he may sign the name of the commanding officer of the (Joint Operations Group [illegible]) on all seven credentials. After Mr. ([illegible]) signs all the credentials, he should forward them to Mr. [illegible] LAUNER, Security Officer/TFW, Room HI 5602.

7. Any questions regarding the foregoing matter should be directed to Mr. LAUNER on ext. 5907.

[illegible]
Chief of Support
Task Force W

Attachments
7 Identity Sheets

cc [illegible]
[illegible]

3/m

22 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : 201-274330
#214 485

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 January 1965 requesting an appropriate investigation in connection with your Provisional Operational Approval interest only for Subject's use as a PA-PROP Asset in Miami by WH/SA/IOS under Project JMATE.

24

2. A search of our indices was made in the name of the Subject and reflected the attached information.

3. This case is being closed in our office pending further notification from you.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(IOS)

Attachment:
As stated

CLOSED
DALY/vsf
21 January 1965

FILE-d

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME PICCOLO, Joseph Jr.		FILE NUMBER 109709
OFFICE DDP/WH	PHONE	RANK OR GRADE GS-9
DEPARTURE DATE 3/7 1965	STATUS PCS	COVER State 32
DESTINATION(s) Mexico City, Mexico		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED ☐ YES ☐ NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL

AREA Belgium-Brussels	COVER 32 DAC-TDY	YEARS 1964
AREA Mexico City, Mexico	COVER 32 Light State-PCS	YEARS 1959
AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived ☒ YES ☐ NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE

SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE	☒ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER	☒ YES	☐ NO
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING	☐ YES	☐ NO

- ☐ EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- ☐ SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- ☐ TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- ☐ PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- ☐ PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ☐ ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- ☐ HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- ☐ COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- ☐ RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- ☐ OTHER

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE BRIEFED 2/1/65

BY ____________
SECURITY OFFICER

3/12

FORM 10-62 1987 (4-11-48)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

10439

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REASSIGNMENT PROCESSING

1. THIS IS TO RECORD RECEIPT OF, AND WHERE INDICATED, ACTION ON A DOCUMENT WHICH PLACES THIS EMPLOYEE IN THE ASSIGNMENT SPECIFIED		ROUTING
SUBJECT PICCOLO, Joseph (NMN) Jr.		(Kittelle 4)
FILE NO. 109709	ASSIGNMENT Mexico City, Mexico	03

DOCUMENT

	FORM 1152		TRAVEL ORDER
XX	CERTIFICATION REQUEST		RETURNEE LIST
			OVERSEAS PANEL LIST

2. THE FILE HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR INFORMATION, FLAGS, OR OTHER INDICATORS HAVING A BEARING ON THE PROPOSED ACTION. THE VARIOUS ASPECTS CONSIDERED AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE, IF ANY, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

▨	NONE	NOT PERTINENT	OTHER OR COMMENTS
SRS FLAG			
OTHER FLAG			
SUITABILITY INFO		✓	
MEDICAL INFO			
PRIOR PANEL ACTION			
COVER PROBLEMS			
INTEGRATION PROBLEM			

DATE OF LAST POLYGRAPH | NEEDS REPOLYGRAPH ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. ACTION TAKEN 32 / 7 (Kittle) Cert

	REASSIGNMENT ACTION APPROVED
	ACTION WILL BE RECORDED IN ANOTHER DOCUMENT

COMMENTS

4. CASE IS FORWARDED HEREWITH FOR THE FOLLOWING ACTION

DATE 9 AUG 1965

SIGNATURE AND TITLE Kelleher

FORM 10-62 1948 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET

NOTE:
I requested Bob
Leonard to give me a
copy of this memo.
M.K. Holbik
RO/PSD
10/20/60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Support Desk

FROM : Mr. Robert J. Leonard

SUBJECT : TARASOFF, Anna
#131751 B-SB/2

GIST:

A special meeting was convened to consider the problem of the prospective visit of Subject's father to the Russian Embassy to obtain a visa. It was determined that he should not be briefed in advance and that an army cover be provided for Subject.

DETAILS:

1. On 13 October 1960 the undersigned as representative of the Office of Security met with Mr. Birch O'Neal, CI Staff; T.K. Chalmers, CI/Projects; Henry C. Woodward, CCG/DC; C3 Thornton W. Means, OCG/OCB and the Subject to discuss the problem of a prospective trip to the Russian Embassy by the Subject's father for a trip to Russia.

2. Mr. O'Neal had Mrs. TARASOFF recount the details of the situation. She said that several months ago her father ANTHONY ADAMOVIEZ had indicated an interest in attempting to locate his brother and sisters in Russia. He sent correspondence to his home town and received a reply from his sister MARIYA KALNAK, c/o KALINOTSKIY, VZDEN SKIY RAYON, MINSKAYA, U.S.S.R.. She stated that his brother IVANU YULYANOVICHU ADOMOVICHU was also living. This correspondence inspired ADAMOVIEZ with the desire to visit his brother and sister in Russia upon his retirement. ADOMOVICHU, age 66, in good health, recently retired from his job as a laborer with American Steel and Wire Company and is now determined to visit Russia. Subject's mother has no intention of returning to Russia.

3. Mrs. TARASOFF, on her return from a short vacation visit to her husband BORIS D. TARASOFF, an Agency employee on TDY in Mexico, visited her parents in Ohio and was informed

	DDS/I&S
	ADDS/I&S
	Chief/SSD
	Dep Chief
	A to Chief
	Ch. C&R
	Ch. SRD
	Ch. [illegible]
	Ch. Sup. Br.
	Desk IB-
1	Desk SB-
	Ad & Tng
	Control Desk
/	
7	Files PSD

SECRET

of her father's intention to come to Washington to make inquiry at the Russian Embassy in regard to his visit to Russia. Subject's father wished Subject to accompany him but she indicated that as a government employee she did not want to go there.

06 4. Mrs. TARASOFF says that her oldest sister, Mrs. Sherry COMELLA knows of her CIA employment and the necessity not to divulge this information. Subject stated that her father and mother know only that she is a government employee. They are not interested in the Agency or Department where she or her husband is employed. Subject also advised that although her landlady and Sears Roebuck Department Store know her as CIA she is not aware that anyone else knows.

5. Mr. O'Neal asked what could be done about this situation. Mr. Means said that Subject's husband is in
Mexico under light state cover but had previously been 32
backstopped firmly as a contract employee of the Department 32
of State, Escort Branch, Division of Language Services. He
said he would firm up this backstop so that in the event of
inquiry at that Division of State it would be confirmed that 32
he is in Mexico on an assignment. Mr. Woodward stated that 03
he would provide a U.S. Army Translation Unit cover for 32
Mrs. TARASOFF retroactive to her entrance on duty. The undersigned stated that he would conduct expedite credit checks on the Subject and her husband to ascertain whether or not they had been recorded as Agency employees.

6. It was agreed among the conferees that since the father of Subject was unwitting of Subject's CIA employment he would not be specially briefed on what to answer in the event that the question was asked in connection with his VISA application. It was agreed that not knowing the specific Department of Government he would have to consult his daughter and then she could give the cover which had been prepared for her. The undersigned pointed out the possibility that Subject's father might know of Subjects employment but it was agreed that in view of his age and background it was very improbable and that it would be better not to brief him specifically on Subjects employment but to let the question be handled naturally.

SECRET

7. Subsequent to the meeting expedite credit checks on the Subject and her husband revealed no record at either the Credit Bureau or Stone's. It has subsequently been learned that Subject's father had visited the Embassy and had been asked to give a short history and the names of his children. * Subject was listed by her father in her maiden name. Consequently no further difficulty is expected in this matter. The Office of Security is to be kept advised of further developments in this case by T. K. Chalmers, Subject's supervisor.

ACTION:

None. Information only.

Robert J. Leonard
Robert J. Leonard

* Note: The question of Subject and/or her husband's employment did not come up and accordingly was not given to her father or the Russian Embassy -

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REINVESTIGATION ACTION

DATE 9 Sept 1966

SUBJECT TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

FILE NO. 104 887

1. THE FILE OF THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH THE REINVESTIGATION PROGRAM AND NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

	INVESTIGATION WITHIN LAST FIVE YEARS
✓	CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS
	POSSIBLE RETIREMENT OR RESIGNATION
	ON LWOP STATUS
	(Other)

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THIS CASE HAS BEEN PENDED TO 1 Sept 1968.

3. THIS CASE IS TO BE FORWARDED TO THE CHIEF, TRANSACTION REVIEW SECTION, CLEARANCE BRANCH, UPON SUBJECT'S RETURN FROM OVERSEAS OR ANY CHANGE IN CURRENT STATUS.

4. REMARKS

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SIGNATURE FOR C/TRS, CLEARANCE BRANCH
[N. M. Haughey] 03

FORM 3-63 1986d CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-8-13)

c/pd

RF

CONFIDENTIAL

/104111

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Memorandum for the File 13 February 1962

TARASOFF, Boris

03

About two weeks ago Mr. [Sounitza,] OO/C extension 3026, called and said that they needed an interpreter for a Soviet Delegation for one afternoon and Subject had been selected. Mr. [Sounitza] 03 said that Mr. Kuhn had given his approval recently on the Subject.

03

Mr. [Sounitza] said that a new exchange program is now under negotiation.

99 24

Subject will be under [State Department] cover [as a contractor for the language school.]

No security objection was interposed to Subject's use.

R. C. Swendiman

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

104887

TRAVEL ORDER

☒ TDY	EOD	OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.	[illegible] 34-61
☐ PCS			
☐ INVITATIONAL			

NAME: Boris D. Tarasoff (FDD)

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.:

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

OFFICE PHONE: 104887

GRADE: GS-11

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Washington, D.C. to Mexico City and return.

MODE: Air

PURPOSE: TDY Replacement for Station Employee while on home leave.

Area Classified Category A.

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TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN			
			MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)	CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
15 Aug. '60		$	☒	☐		

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

90 days TDY
99
[Light State Cover]

PROCESSING BRANCH
JUL 11 1 58 PM '60

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☒ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED LBS AND MODE	UNACCOMPANIED LBS AND MODE
40 Air	

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☒ YES
☐ NO

ACCOUNTING DUE DATE: Dec. 1960

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: $1400.00 (02)

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.: 34

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.: 1135-5700-3000

DATE: 5 July '60

SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: Charles A. Moore

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	CCI	7/1/60

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: J. C. KING

COMPONENT: Chief, WHD

SIGNATURE:

DATE: 5 July 1960

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH
JUL 11 1 38 PM '60

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: RICHARD HELMS

COMPONENT: Chief, Ops.

SIGNATURE:

DATE: 5 July 1960

FORM 3-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG 6-59

(28-48)

SECRET

VPV

SECRET

TRAVEL BRIEFING SHEET

NAME: TARASOFF, Boris D.		FILE: 104887
OFFICE: FDD/OO	PHONE:	TITLE AND GRADE: GS-11
DEPARTURE DATE: 13 AUG 60	STATUS: (90 DAYS) TDY	COVER: [LT/STATE] 99
DESTINATION: MEXICO CITY	DEPENDENTS BRIEFING:	

PREVIOUS TRAVEL: Area_____ Cover_____ Years_____

Area_____ Cover_____ Years_____

Area_____ Cover_____ Years_____

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Risk of Capture Travel Briefing Category A X B _____ C _____ D _____

CERTIFICATION:

CONCURRENCE:

SPECIAL BRIEFING

SPECIAL CLEARANCES

TYPE:_____ COORDINATED_____

TYPE:_____ COORDINATED_____

TYPE:_____ COORDINATED_____

TYPE:_____ COORDINATED_____

1. Emergency Contacts
2. Knowledge of Security Regulations
3. Travel Precautions
4. Personal Affairs
5. Personal Correspondence
6. Personal Conduct
7. Association with Foreign Nationals
8. Defensive Audio Surveillance
9. Cover
10. Responsibility as American Abroad

OTHER_____

Date Briefed: 7-20-60

SECRET

BY [Thomas] 03
SECURITY OFFICER

2/bv

File

Tarasoff, Boris Dimitri
104887

Mr. Freeman WE, Div. inquired whether SC has any objection to Subject's assignment to [Oslo, Norway] PCS.
14-4

Mr. Freeman was advised that a preliminary review of subject's file indicated no reason why subject should not be processed but because of subject's background the final decision would be made Topside.

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Do Not Reproduce

V/PN

SECRET

28 Ma 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Mr. Boris D. TARASOFF, PCS Security Clearance

1. I have been advised by a representative of the Office of Security that Mr. TARASOFF will be granted security clearance for PCS to Mexico City with the following proviso:

> That WHD is aware of and recognizes in conjunction with his overseas function: Mr. TARASOFF and his family are known to be CIA; and, further, are known by USSR representatives whom he served as interpreter/translator in the U.S. (NOTE: I believe that during the periods of the interp./transl. duties he was given cover [of Dept. of State or U.S. Govt. Contract Employee]. 99

2. I advised that the WHD was aware of the above, [illegible] accepted same, and that the proviso would be brought to attention of C/WH/3.

W. S. RENEHAN
WH/Pers

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Central Cover Staff Nonofficial Cover Branch 1-A-20	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE 26 MAR 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Office of Security (Attn: Mr. Bannerman) G-E-31		2 Apr.	RBB	For your information
2. Bol. Edwards		2 Apr	SE	
3. Mr. White		2 Apr.	V.R.W.	See me. /s/ #49364
4. Mr. Flanigan				Place in Wackenhut file. V.R.W.
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				Wackenhut
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]

25 MAR 1963

CS-2793

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Wackenhut Corporation
3280 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida

1. Mr. Bannerman, Security Office, arranged through Chief, CCS for the writer to meet Mr. George Wackenhut, President of subject, to explore its potential for cover support. At 10:30 a.m., on 14 March 1963, Mr. Wackenhut, Mr. Wes Reynolds, and I met at Mr. Reynold's home, 3809 37th Street, North, Arlington. Mr. Reynolds apparently represents Wackenhut in the Washington area, although I did not gather that the firm is actually operating here at present. Mr. Wackenhut and Mr. Reynolds, both, are ex-FBI agents.

2. Wackenhut started his firm in 1954. In 1961 it was reported to have 1100 employees and anticipated 1961 sales in excess of $5 million. At present it has offices in Miami, Coral Gables, Tampa, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, New York City, Boston, Buffalo, Denver, Los Angeles, San Jose (Calif.), Honolulu, San Juan and Ponce, Puerto Rico. Wackenhut freely states that he trades on the reputation of the FBI by publicizing widely the 21 ex-FBI agents, including two former Assistant Directors of the FBI, in his management.

3. The Operating Divisions of the company and their services are described in a Wackenhut brochure as follows:

Investigative Division
Performs all types of investigations for attorneys, insurance companies, banks and other businesses; sets up internal audit systems to prevent embezzlements, and investigates personal backgrounds of prospective executives, business partners and associates.

Scientific Services Division
Conducts pre and post-employment, pre-promotional and specific lie detector examinations for business and industry; specializes in technical security and investigative techniques, scientific detection devices, and electronic and mechanical security methods and equipment, and performs electronic "sweeps" to counter business espionage through the detection of electronic intrusion attempts.

4/RS

Internal Intelligence Division

Specializes in exposing and controlling inside thefts that may range from employee pilferage, through embezzlement of thousands of dollars, to highly valuable industrial secrets.

Central Clearing Division

Assists personnel and security directors to screen quickly the backgrounds of present and potential employees through the massive files of The Wackenhut Corporation.

Retail Store Protection Division

Increases net profits by reducing inventory shortages through the control of internal and external losses with security programs designed to meet the client's specific needs.

Training Services Division

Provides specialized training programs for security, fire fighting, investigative and other personnel of business organizations and professional groups.

Industrial Security Division

Provides the essential security services that are required by all companies seeking or handling government classified contracts; assists management in disaster and emergency planning.

Fire and Safety Division

Supplies ambulance services, first aid crews, Wackenhut firemen fully trained in the technical field of industrial and municipal fire fighting and equipment, and safety surveys, systems, and educational programs.

Guard Forces Division

Selects, investigates, trains and supervises the uniformed and plain-clothes guards who protect your operations; also provides uniformed receptionists and guardettes; makes physical property surveys to determine security requirements and establishes security systems and controls.

4. Mr. Wackenhut wants to expand abroad, in view of his successful venture into Puerto Rico. However, he has no definite plans as of the present and seemed to be seeking [from CIA covert 24 sponsorship] for entry into areas of interest to us. He is prepared to furnish personnel himself [or to permit integration of 24 Agency nominees.]

5. It is not apparent to me that there is any significant market for Wackenhut's services in foreign countries, except possibly among American businesses with physical plants overseas. The nature of these services, I would presume, would make rather difficult acquisition of the necessary occupational permits in many countries. The potential for clandestine intelligence activities would be too obvious to host governments, and the emphases

2/RS

on former FBI personnel probably would enhance such suspicions, particularly in Latin America where "FBI" means "intelligence" since its WW II activities there.

6. CCS/NC on occasion receives requests for advice to business organizations as to setting up security systems at overseas installations. We recently referred a request of this type, involving a major oil company, to the Physical Security element of the Security Office. Conceivably, the Agency might make some arrangement to advise Wackenhut of such requests, providing our own Security Office is satisfied as to Wackenhut's competence. We 24 could then place an Agency representative, if desired, in the team 24 dispatched overseas by Wackenhut should his company successfully secure the contract.

7. Wackenhut said he would be willing to dispatch teams to set up personal security systems for foreign chiefs of state whom the Agency wants protected. He is amenable, in fact, to any reasonable application of his capabilities to Agency problems. He would be willing to negotiate financing in equitable proportions in the event an overt operation, set up at Agency behest, were not financially self-sustaining.

8. Wackenhut impressed me as a clean-cut, energetic, ambitious young business man who is obviously proud of what appears to be a superior organization of its type. He is interested in profits, but it is my impression he is sincerely eager to do what he can to assist the government and feels that CIA offers one possible opportunity. Incidentally, he appears somewhat younger in person than in the pictures appearing in the promotional material given the writer.

9. Copies of this memorandum are being furnished those Agency components which might have an interest in utilizing subject company. Inquiries may be directed to the writer.

FRED R. YOUNGBLOOD
Chief, CCS/NC

4R8

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SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DATE 26 February 1969

LETTER NO.

TO : Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTN: James W. Franklin

FROM: Christos S. Gikas
Acting Chief, Employee Activity Branch

Please check your records for any cover considerations in connection with the release of a retirement medallion to VITALE, Guy, DDP/WH.

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

No cover objections.

03

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

INFORMATION FOR THE SECURITY FILE

TO : Chief, Personnel Security Division

FROM : Chief, Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: SWENSON, Harold Francis

Date: 1 July 1965

IRD#: 21642

SF #: 73086

CATEGORY A:
1. Foreign relatives residing in foreign countries.
2. Foreign relatives (non-US citizens) residing in the United States.
3. Relatives residing in foreign countries other than U. S. Government connected.

CATEGORY B:
1. Any relatives employed by foreign governments foreign owned firms or foreign intelligence organizations.

CATEGORY C:
1. Foreign social acquaintances residing in foreign countries.
2. Foreign social acquaintances (non-US citizens) residing in the United States.
3. Social acquaintances other than U. S. citizens or Government connected residing in foreign countries.

CATEGORY D:
1. Any acquaintance employed by a foreign government, foreign owned firm or foreign intelligence organization.

CATEGORY E:
1. Close Agency acquaintances.

CATEGORY F:
1. Current roommates.

CATEGORY G:
1. By whom recommended.

CATEGORY	NAME(citizenship)	ADDRESS	EMPLOYMENT	RELATIONSHIP TYPE ASSOCIATION TYPE CONTACT
A	None			
B	None			
C	None			
D	None			
E	Bob Dahlgren	Arlington	CIA/I&R	Friend many years + former supervisor
	Jack Flynn	Bethesda	CIA/WH/C	Friend & current supervisor
	Al Rodriguez	Bethesda	CIA/OTR	Friend & colleague
F	None			

WH/C #65-200
10 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/FI/INT/IE

SUBJECT : Foreign Intelligence Officers in Liaison with CIA in the United States 24

REFERENCES A. Your Memo dated 14 April 1965, Subject as above.
B. SAS Memo #64-96 dated 5 February 1964

1. The following information is submitted per your reference A which has been reported previously in reference B to the Director of Security.

Name: Colonel Carlos LUNA
Position: Argentine representative to the Security Committee of the OAS, Washington, D. C.
Nationality: Argentine
Background: Age, 49. Born Argentina. Wife is Argentine. Senior Colonel in the Argentine Army. Career Army Intelligence officer. Formerly an officer assigned to the Secretaria de Informaciones del Estado (SIDE), the senior Argentine Intelligence Service with which we maintain official liaison. 24 The Argentine service has assigned officers to the OAS Security Committee (at Washington, D. C. at our official request) 24 He replaced Lt. Col. Francisco RAMIREZ and has almost finished his tour here. Estimated time of departure from Washington, D. C. in July 65. He was assigned to the OAS Security Committee by the Argentine Army and the Argentine Intelligence Service (SIDE).
CIA Contacts: Harold F. Swenson, WH/C/SP
Raford W. Herbert, DC/WHD #30061
John Wilson, DC/WH/2 # 104057

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

6/3/

31R/

Frequency of Meetings: Occasional. No more often than once per month as a rule.

Place of Meetings: At homes of above listed officers or at restaurants.

2, The above contact stems from a past association, is only semi-official and in each instance covered by a Memorandum of Record to WH Division.

Harold F. Swenson
WH/C/SP

cc. Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - Chrono

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Mrs. Dorothy Turner
Room 5E03

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations
and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : (SAFLEY, Harold F.)(A)
#73036 07

1. This is to advise that a CIA Identification Card will be issued in the above captioned alias to an employee of TFW. You are requested to establish an indices card in the above alias in order that the Office of Personnel will be in a position to acknowledge any inquiries that might be received concerning the Subject.

2. Upon receipt of any inquiry, you are further requested to promptly acknowledge Agency employment for such individual and then to advise the Chief, Cover Support Section of the Office of Security, extension 6280 or 7380 or in the latters absence, Mr. George Ladner, TFW/Security, extension 6055.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

cc: OO/C

KUHNKE/efb
6 November 1962
PENDING M/R: See TFW memorandum dated 5 November 1962 which was concurred in by Moorhouse of CCS with the understanding that I would advise Mr. Bannerman of the action taken and obtain his approval upon the latters return on or about 9 November 1962. An exception was made in this case to the general rule that CIA identification in alias will not be issued to (State Department) integrees. The exception was granted because of the Subject's position 32 and long experience in matters of this nature and due to the fact that it will be strictly controlled and limited to assignment which will be directly by Mr. Harvey.

Ervan E. Kuhnke, Jr.

SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

73086

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 October 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER 016229	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) SWENSON, Harold F.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH DAY YEAR	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132-1000-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Task Force W Office of the Chief	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE ~~ATTACHE, POL OFF~~ OPS OFF (D BR CH) (D)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0663	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) ~~FSR~~ GS (15)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP ~~04 0~~ 15 (2)	17. SALARY OR RATE ~~12,445~~ $ 15,045

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH, Br. 2, BuenosAires, Argentina, #0084

Date 29 OCT 1962
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

CONCURRENCE: WR
Chief, WH/Personnel

1 cy Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	DATE APPROVED

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Clayton Kallander
226 Westout Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : SWENSON, Harold F.
#73086

1. There is attached hereto TFW/Support memorandum dated 5 November 1962 requesting alias documentation for the Subject in his registered alias.

2. Please note that a backstopped driver's license has been requested for the Subject. The Office of Security will, therefore, initiate action to procure a backstopped alias New York State Driver's License. Please issue the remaining requested documentation directly to TFW/Support.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

Attachment:
As Indicated

cc: TFW/Security

KUHNKE/efb
6 November 1962
PENDING

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	C/SSD
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible] B
	[illegible] B
	AATS
	FILES

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

5 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Technical Services Division
(Authentication Branch)

THRU : OS/SD/2, Mr. Kuhnke

SUBJECT : Request for Alias Documentation
Harold F. SWENSON (T)

1. Attached for your information is a completed form D-104 requesting alias documentation for Subject in his registered alias, Harold Francis SAFLEY.

2. Please handle this request on an expeditious basis since it will be necessary for Mr. SWENSON to make some contacts in the near future.

3. Refer any inquiries to George A. LADNER, Jr., ext. 6055.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

Attachment:
Form D-104

cc: OS/SD/2

8/6/62

SECRET

DOCUMENT REQUEST FORM

Case No.: Requestor: Date Due:

True Name: Harold F. Swenson Extension:

Alias (including middle name): Harold Francis SAFLEY

Address to be used: Washington, D. C.

Height: 6'0" Weight: 185 Hair: Black-Gray Eyes: Hazel
BLOOD TYPE A+

Wears glasses?: No Married? Yes Occupation: Legend: Industrial Relations

Birth date: 28 April 1915 Place: New York, N.Y.

Countries where documentation will be used: U. S. and possibly Latin America

DATA FOR BIRTH CERTIFICATE, AS OF TIME OF BIRTH

Father's name: Mother's maiden name:

POB: POB:

Age: Age:

Occupation: Occupation:

Residence: Doctor's name:

Number of children born to parents prior to this birth:

Documentation requested: Backstopped D. C. driver's license or backstopped *New York State license—whichever is more quickly obtained.

Social security card

Pocket litter to support legend of an Industrial Relations man

*Can use 251 E. 51st St, New York City as address. This is present home of Subject's uncle.

Security clearance: 1. Has New Jersey Driver's license #59586-31566-04155
Expiration Date - October 1965
2. Former D. C. Permit #941947 - now expired

Signature sample in alias:

D-10

Erw;

1
p
5 Nov 62

Geo Lodner called & requested alias CIA credentials

SWENSON

Swenson is a ~~Stat~~
said Swenson is a smooth guy who
himself O.K.

Talked to Harold [illegible] contacted; no
More potentially [illegible] F/ return
[illegible] George
Waits [illegible]
w/ Rob [illegible]
on Thursday

FILE

8-131751

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 18 October 1963

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible]

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) CI

ATTN: [illegible] Support Staff

REF: Resignation Debriefing in Absentia

FILE NO: [illegible]

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: Administrative Support Group, CIA

ID CARD NO: [illegible]

☒ Unblock Records: (OP Memo 20-800-11) Resignation effective 6 September 1963 in Absentia

Effective

☐ N/A Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category. (HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS.

☒ Remarks: Subject to indicate CIA as place of employment for the entire period.

☒ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CSD/OS; 1-PSD/OS

FORM 1551a

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

Headquarters
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Agent in Charge
Washington Field Office

64
SUBJECT : WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph
#35 002 OA/ID/3
23

1. Your office is Office of Origin.

2. Subject is of covert interest. Conduct investigation according to standard regulations except as hereinafter noted.

3. Assignments are as follows:

a. DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE will conduct the following National Agency checks:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PASSPORT	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I&N	MILITARY
	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X

DO NOT CONTACT FBI.

b. WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

At Columbus, Georgia

Informants (if possible)
Employment
Police and Credit

At Washington, D. C.

Police and Credit

4. Special Instructions:

a. Subject has apparently been located as follows:

10
1916-1943: Wilcox, Arizona
1943-1945: U. S. Army
1945-1947: Washington, D. C. (details unknown)

DISTRIBUTION			
	SFO		NFO
	CFO		NYFO
X	DFO		SFFO
		X	WFO
	LAFO		

	ATTACHMENTS
X	BIOG. DATA
X	CONTROL CARDS
	OTHER

FORM 7-60 1073a (9-38-43)

3/Rs

1947-1949: Columbus, Georgia and/or Panama - with NEHI 08
1949-Pres: Mexico

b. Subject gives the following character references:

William C. FRANKLIN, 06 428 E. Preston 10 Street, Baltimore, Md.
T. E. STANLEY, 06 Chairman of the Board, NEHI Corp. 08, Columbus, Ga.

PAUL T. AUDEN

PENDING
BYRNE/rpe
29 Mar. 1962

4/RS

104-10131-10111

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

109301

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
19 April 1965

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ESTABLISHED FOR
[illegible]

ATTN:
Mr. [illegible]

FILE NO.
[illegible]

REF:
[illegible] topping cover

ID CARD NO.
[illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
32
[illegible] Army Element, [illegible]

EMPLOYEE NO.
[illegible]

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records: *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)*

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective ______

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. *(HHB 20-7)*

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. *(HB 20-661-1)*

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. *(R 240-250)*

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. *(R 240-250)*

☒ Remarks: [illegible]

☐ Cover History

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

James H. Franklin
[illegible] MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

14-00000

201-109301-0

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP		DATE 10 September 64
TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	ESTABLISHED FOR [illegible] WILCOTT, James B. Jr.
ATTN: [illegible] Johnson		FILE NO. [illegible]
REF: Form 1322 8 September 64 [illegible]		ID CARD NO. [illegible]
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED 32 US Army Element ([illegible]		EMPLOYEE NO. [illegible]

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ **Block Records:**
(OPMEMO 20-800-33)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______

b. Continuing, effective [illegible]

☒ **Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.**
(HHB 20-7)

☒ **Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.**
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ **Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.**
(R 240-250)

☒ **Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.**
(R 240-250)

☐ **Remarks:**

13-3

☒ **Cover History**
Mar 57-May 60 Hdqs/overt
May 60-Jul 64 DAC & DAFC/Japan

James H. Franklin
AT/R/#1 CHIEF, MILITARY COVER [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
2/RV

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files BLS

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

M. D. Stevens

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downgrading and
declassification

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

DDC c

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

INTEREST

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

STATE INFO

FROM : M. D. Stevens

p. 2

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

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Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

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b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

PAGE 2 of 20
COPY NO.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26                POB GERM, BERLIN          201-0032671*
     CIT GERM                           OCC PHARMACIST            TYPE NAME T
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53          OCC CODE CHEM             OI CODES AA XX
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL             RCD DATE 53
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                          30 NOV 70             00833555
```

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

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ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

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3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e. exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

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Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-____________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split-Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ________ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
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15.				

CL BY: 007622

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ____ BADGE ____ COMPONENT ____ EXT. ____

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

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7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

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

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(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6		
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4		

FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________________ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ____________________ Date: ______________

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ____________________ R.O. No. __________
COMPONENT: ____________________ Date: ______________

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E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: CC7272 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

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15 November 1974

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

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Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

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

FOI A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

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NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY. CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/455		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2895/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2395/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2985/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0046759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2895/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM.	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2985/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179673			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MICA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0076947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHE[illegible]	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052630			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103209			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DE[illegible]	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC[illegible]	CHIN,HANG CHO[illegible]		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2895/2737/		18MAR[illegible]	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/	A	02FEB0[illegible]				0181329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2695/1031		11NOV08	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107336			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,KANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0340528			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313610			CHIN	DENS	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0044010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

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These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

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Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

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1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

(Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP SS).

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3. *Cuba*

Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

b. Military attaches.

c. Assistant military attaches.

d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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35-2

King assassination

ROUTING 2 3 5 6 8 9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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HSCA

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Media ~~HSCA~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
161827Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
125981

CONF: SA/DDO INFO: FILE EUR8, IP/DMS, LA8, ~~OLC~~, DDO4, DDO/DO, DDO/SRO,

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3

TO: LISBON, INFO LONDON, MEXICO CITY. 4

RYBAT WNINTEL RNVIEW 4

① CHR
② file

1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS WHO CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ASSASSINATIONS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING HAS TOLD STATE THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE LEADS IN PORTUGAL, UK AND MEXICO RELATING TO JAMES EARL RAY, CURRENTLY SERVING TIME FOR KING MURDER. THEY BASING THIS INTEREST ON INFORMATION THAT RAY WAS IN LISBON BRIEFLY IN MAY 1968, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS APPREHENSION IN LONDON IN JUNE 1968. 4

2. MR. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR OF COMMITTEE SAYS SELECT COMMITTEE TOLD STATE THAT HE WANTS TO ESTABLISH "CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH APPROPRIATE PORTUGUESE NATIONAL POLICE AND HOPES TO ENLIST THEIR ASSISTANCE INCLUDING ACCESS TO THEIR FILES AND IN LOCATING AND INTERVIEWING POTENTIAL WITNESSES. 4

3. DEPARTMENT HAS SOLICITED EMBASSY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW BLAKEY SHOULD PROCEED. 4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

22228

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING					
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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

12598]

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

4. WISH TO CALL ABOVE TO ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION IN EVENT STATIONS ARE SOLICITED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE. RTACTION IS COOPERATING FULLY WITH BLAKEY AND COMMITTEE INCLUDING ALLOWING THEM ACCESS TO DIRECTORATE RECORDS, AFTER SUITABLE SANITIZATION FOR SOURCES AND METHODS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE COMMITTEE'S EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW POLICE AND WITNESSES AND RESULTING USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED, IF ANY, IS LARGELY OVERT FUNCTION WHICH CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY LEGATTS OR OTHERS WHO WOULD ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO BE PUBLICLY QUOTED OR IDENTIFIED IF NECESSARY. Y

5. STATIONS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE EMBASSY BEST ADVICE IF SOLICITED BUT REQUESTED TO AVOID INVOLVING STATION OFFICERS IN NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THEIR COVER CAPACITIES. IF CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH THAT THIS UNAVOIDABLE, PLEASE ADVISE HQS BY CABLE SO THAT THE MATTER CAN BE APPROPRIATELY HANDLED WITH BLAKEY AND DEPARTMENT. ■ H

ORIG: O/SA/DO/O {SOVERN}; COORD: OLC {CUMMINS}, DC/LA {LAUDER}, C/LA/~~MEX~~ MGSB ~~{[illegible]}~~ {HAWKINS}, DC/EUR/BC ~~{[illegible]}~~ JAMES, C/EUR/IB {BERGER}; AUTH: SA/DO/O {KATROSH}; REL: DC/EUR {ESTES}.

DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: MASOVERN
UNIT: O/SA/DO/O
EXT: 1542

C/LA/STATE B-106 [illegible]

OLC -

DC/EUR/BC

DC/LA/N

C/EUR/IB

C/LA/M~~EX~~ GSB

for SA/DO/O

DC/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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CLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassi-
d when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
RCE C I Staff	CIA CONTROL NO. TS197124
DOC. NO. TS 197124	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 31 May 78
DOC. DATE Feb 68	LOGGED BY Susan Kessler
COPY NO. 02 cy#1 of cy#10	
NUMBER OF PAGES 447	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None	

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED *(OUTSIDE CIA)*
TO		BY *(Signature)*		TO
BY *(Signature)*		WITNESSED BY *(Signature)*		BY *(Signature)*
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE

FORM 8-73 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DOCUMENT TS NO.

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The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

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1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968 CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko."

2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be inaccurate in many important details and to contain the results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.

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The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector

Yuriy I. NOSENKO

February 1968

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Introduction

The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed the distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence information assembled in connection with his case, including the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of KGB operations which he related, the results of file checks of thousands of individuals involved, comparison of his assertions against collateral information from all sources and with counterintelligence records on the KGB and related matters. The examination herein reduces this volume of material to manageable proportions, to essential elements of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his statements with matters of known fact and to permit application of reasonable judgment. Conclusions are drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate of conclusions independently drawn from the examination of each major period in his claimed biography.

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Summary of Case

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A Soviet official approached an American diplomat with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. The diplomat advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation.

Later meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet official identified himself as NOSENKO and stated he was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that the American had previously served in Moscow and erroneously believed that he was the "American Rezident" in Geneva. NOSENKO stated that he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva. He offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. These were the identity of a former American Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB. In reply, the American explained that he was not an intelligence officer, but that he could place NOSENKO in contact with an appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that same day.

That evening NOSENKO was met by a CIA officer and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell

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

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

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the two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he also expressed dissatisfaction with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. With the second meeting on 11 June, his earlier expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations. His knowledgeability was almost exclusively limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR). NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within certain limits to collect information on matters indicated to be of interest to CIA. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow. He promised to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came to the West again.

NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964. Since last meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States. He cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity which he had collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA.

(Summary of Case)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that he had received a cable from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to Moscow to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to the Soviet Union. That night exfiltration plans were implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany where his debriefing was resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected on his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked change in NOSENKO's comportment. While outwardly cooperative during most debriefing sessions, it became increasingly difficult to get him to respond to specific questioning. His free time in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name, and on this basis CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week visit to Hawaii. There his behavior deteriorated still further. He drank heavily and almost constantly; he consorted with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and conspicuously.

(Summary of Case)

During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. This Agency was concerned that his behavior would attract undesirable attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April indicated it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were advised.

On 4 April NOSENKO was driven to a new safehouse in a Washington suburb, and told that this safehouse thenceforward would be his regular place of residence. Since that time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to answer all questions put to him. Because more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous assertions. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the Embassy and its personnel as critical KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's claimed knowledge of the activities of the Embassy Section, of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.

In keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols", most of which concerned the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession", but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct", at the end of the final page. With one exception, he did so calmly and without objections. In one or two instances he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's KGB experience to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal and professional background.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English. Although the interrogations identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts which contained the greatest number of contradictions and discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrepancies could be resolved.

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From his arrival in the United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric observation. A CIA psychiatrist and a CIA psychologist, both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors, monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965 the psychologist for three weeks questioned NOSENKO on his life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined the KGB, in an attempt to identify psychological factors which might underlie NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent accounts. The psychiatrist has continued his periodic observations of NOSENKO to the present time. The psychiatrist and the psychologist concluded independently, on the basis of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable.

(Summary of Case)

NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966. The period since has been devoted to the examination and review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts and other materials, and in the preparation of the present paper.

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS

Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is comprised of his own statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials, and the counterintelligence information he has provided.

NOSENKO's Statements About Himself

In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made numerous statements about himself. More than any other, however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and well-expressed exposition of how he wished CIA to regard him. It is quoted here in its entirety.

> My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life before the death of my father were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-1952. The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the betrayor of the people was Yezhov, the head of the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of Stalin. Soon after Stalin's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people, important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of Stalin and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

The new leaders (Khrushchev and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others). Khrushchev's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry. But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness and death in August 1956.

The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

The split of the international Communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' was immediately dispelled. And what I met in my own work, how which Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my KGB acquaintances think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomol member like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of Stalin and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the Deputy Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy Chief of a department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaires were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from. To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with the KGB officer who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief Directorate, as I learned from my colleagues, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the

CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass from the Second Department and went, in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964

Signed: Yu. NOSENKO

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

[redacted]

The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing

Positive Intelligence Information

At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted that he was acquainted with Ministers of the Soviet Government, who were friends of his father, and he heard what was said in their circles. His debriefing and interrogations did not bear out his assertion that he was informed of the attitudes and aims of the Soviet leaders. His responses to questions about the viability of the then Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge. From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his entire adult life either as a student or as a state security official, and he stressed that since the early 1950's he had had few interests and "no real contacts" outside of the KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics, including various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics, communications, unconventional weapons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development, NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such matters and that his responses reflected only personal opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special knowledge. He explained that he took no part in the substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any connection in the USSR with officials or organizations concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.

NOSENKO's failure to provide any useful positive intelligence information was not unique, although previous KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB officers who defected earlier to Western services provided no significant military, economic or scientific information on the USSR, and the political information provided by a few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal value.

Counterintelligence Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned with KGB operations within the Soviet Union. His information on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of his KGB assignments involved operations against American targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of the Embassy staff in Moscow. From this circumstance he represents himself as an authoritative source on KGB success and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the years 1953-1963.

NOSENKO has described scores of KGB operations mounted against American Embassy personnel during that ten year period. Because of lasting relationships he established with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations against the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in the Embassy Section. NOSENKO has stated that he would know if the facts were otherwise, and he has asserted unequivocally that no American stationed permanently at the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his defection in 1964. NOSENKO named six members of the Embassy staff who rejected KGB recruitment overtures, and all have confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the vulnerability of a significant number of Embassy personnel; in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently withdrawn from Moscow. Physical search has confirmed the information he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance installations in the Embassy.

Among Americans other than Embassy personnel whom NOSENKO described as KGB targets, he provided information leading to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow representative of the 29 American Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), and Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOSENKO's information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated in part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (if not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports of their recruitment. Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided leads to four other American KGB agents, including an officer in an American military intelligence organization, none of whom has yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to be American Intelligence agents.

From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents have been identified. Although investigations are still incomplete, in 39 of these cases the individual's KGB recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the individuals were suspect for other reasons. Among these 68 individuals were a French and a Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, an Austrian and an Indonesian Army Attache, a Director and a Deputy Secretary of the Indian Foreign Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOSENKO's information about the KGB electronic attack on the German Embassy in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical search.

With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are or have been affiliated with Soviet intelligence and security organizations. These included over seven hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the 165 KGB officers he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, over one hundred had been previously reported to be KGB personnel, as reflected in CIA files. NOSENKO's information permitted updating CIA holdings on previously received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization, particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate. He described further refinement of responsibilities, the Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously independent directorates, the creation of new units from elements formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as productive with respect to KGB operational methods and Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these topics.

Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service

All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described are favorable evidence of his bona fides, but they break down into two qualitatively different groups. Operations which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at particular times are described in the following section in connection with an examination of his KGB career. The remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because of) the KGB position he held at the time. Since these are not material to his claimed positions at various times in the KGB, they are summarized in Annex B. (NOSENKO's leads to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group, but for reasons of brevity they are omitted from this paper.)

Among the items of information which NOSENKO provided but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times, there are several which merit special note here. These, which are among the most significant of his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, "the KGB agent in the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL), "SASHA" (the KGB agent in American Military Intelligence), "ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH), Edward SMITH (CIA officer) and the KGB electronic attack on the West German Embassy in Moscow.

"The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)

The first item of information given by NOSENKO upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB agent who was an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive U.S. military installation in the Paris area. The agent had been the source of documentary intelligence which had been

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shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still active, the agent had lost access to classified documents some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the lead as the most important single counterintelligence item that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.

NOSENKO's Information

Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetration of a classified documents vault at an "important American military installation" in the Paris area. Because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation". The installation had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for bringing Top Secret documents in and for taking them out".

There had been six successful entries of the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section technicians travelled TDY to Paris under diplomatic courier cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation. Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instructions to his agent, and the technicians probably never met the American.

Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation, officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief Directorate were used. The Special Section was comprised of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious entries to Western embassies in Moscow. Among these officers were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN, V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV. IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and FOFANOV was later involved.

The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed some radioactive substance, with the help of the American agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was removed, they could pick the lock. They did the same thing [used some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault. Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section technicians had to visit Paris several times. The first time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris Residency couldn't have launched the operation before 1962, because they couldn't do it without the help of Special Section technicians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.

Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the agent used some radioactive substance to determine the combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB study. Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer, who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the case officer for return to the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry.

The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had to pick up the materials, drive some place ("maybe the Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close them again just as they were, and return them to the agent. The KGB could not specify which documents the agent was to bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened shows that they were sealed when they were received from the agent.

Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide on his person. From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone for only 5 or 10 minutes".

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same military post, he had lost access to the classified documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation.

Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO chatted with him. FOFANOV said he "was not doing good" and he "would probably be sitting there until May", but he had hopes "that something might happen".

The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the KGB had for him after he left Paris.

NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at separate times from various members of the Second Chief Directorate Special Section who participated in it, principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has also alleged he learned of the case from IONOV, the Chief of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment: NOSENKO's lead was identified as Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period 1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly Field, Paris. JOHNSON confessed to KGB recruitment of himself and his wife, his recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and the latter's subsequent collaboration with the KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have corroborated JOHNSON's statements.

NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB in Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans, France. With respect to the 1962-1963 surreptitious entires of the courier station vault, however, JOHNSON's admissions coincide with the information provided by NOSENKO, with no significant differences.

"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)

When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case and he was asked to search his recollection for any evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA. NOSENKO knew of none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent, an American known as "SASHA", who was a member of a U.S. military intelligence organization.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO learned of "SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB officer who, while assigned to the First Chief Directorate and working in Berlin, recruited the agent in 1955-1957. "SASHA" who had been recruited by financial inducements, had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings with his KGB handler and he could have been either a civilian or military intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned to the United States "in the 1960's" or "in 1962". "SASHA" was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early 1963.

NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK. GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In 1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treatment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him, would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany "at that time" [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew of "SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.

Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the case with SHALYAPIN "at some time". Pressed to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who could have told him about it because they were likely to know of it though none of them was actually involved in the operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA".

Comment: "SASHA" has not been identified.

William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")

Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more important, KGB agent who was employed in the British Admiralty.

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB has now (in 1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence services' conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or "something like that" in the Admiralty. "He may be an assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the Minister. All papers for the Minister go through him. He's not an intelligence officer. He is meeting with the KGB now." Several KGB officers received the Order of Lenin for their part in the operation, including the London Rezident RODIN. NOSENKO learned of the agent's existence, but not of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second Chief Directorate, V.A. CHURANOV, who had made the recruitment while chief of a section in the British Department.

Comment: GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO's information, on the basis of which the twenty-man list was reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Comment: (Continued) details of NOSENKO's information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed.

VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two KGB officers, one of whom he identified as CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London, first in his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as clerical officer assistant to the Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally, as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was met by KGB officer "KOROVIN" who has been identified as London Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At the time of his arrest in September he had, in preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photographs of classified Admiralty documents.

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KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy

In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the West German Embassy.

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NOSENKO's Information

The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect to the West German Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the West German Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American Ambassador Thompson. The microphones were operative during the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-Ambassador Kroll's dictation of cables, dispatches and

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conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing on the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK, Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the American Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger volume of material addressed to the Third Department, from which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even more successful in monitoring the West German Embassy than it was the American Embassy.

Comment: NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Independent of that information, however, West German authorities learned in 1963 that their technical security officer in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB. They surmised that the recruitment may have taken place as early as 1956. In August 1964 the leader of a technical search team was seriously disabled by mustard gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the KGB. In 1965, finally, another search team completed a "tear down" of the West German Embassy, in the course of which two separate audio systems with 24 microphones were found, as well as 27 microphones in the residence of the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was found indicating that the Embassy had been the target of a sophisticated electronic attack against its cipher machines and its acoustic room.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones were operative in 1959 and his sourcing of his information to the periodic visits of Tatyana GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contradictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the American Section until 1960.

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in Washington "near ciphers".

NOSENKO's Information-1962

"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate, although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment. The KGB approach to "ANDREY" was based on "women and money".

"ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing "materials" and information on ciphers. He promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow. The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in "ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to find the agent. KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV", under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had looked for him a long time. He found where "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY" lived in a place where there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. At first "ANDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered $1,000, the agent accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, due to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that point on he worked well with the KGB. He again provided good information, information considered important by the KGB. When KOVSHUK found him, "ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still working there in 1962.

In reference to his modus operandi for meetings with "ANDREY", KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the FBI. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would sit with him in the car, receive "ANDREY's" information, and given him the money. Then KOVSHUK would get out, and the American would drive on.

The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL [Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. "ANDREY" was the only such witness called, and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as the only person who testified at the trial. During this investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and arrested. "ANDREY" may have feared that RHODES was involved in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as

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RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB, "having little other choice".

KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there must have been one since "ANDREY" was still working with the KGB in 1962.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that "ANDREY" was recruited in "1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".

"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN. After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at the Pentagon, "in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted him in the United States he was nearing the end of his enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office. He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK.

It was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation. "ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death. "ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial.

In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs" [sic, meaning rotors]. Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in the "ANDREY" case: NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with questions to be asked of "ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department, NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been able to read your military codes..." "ANDREY" brought no military code material to the KGB, only State Department material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made.

"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made in the United States until he ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial. Again, after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that "something is going wrong with this operation".

Comment: "ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code machine mechanic while assigned to the office of the U.S. Military Attache in the Embassy in Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954.

NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as substantially correct by admissions of Roy RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH ("ANDREY"). RHODES informed the FBI in a 1963 interview that among other American enlisted personnel of the Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to the KGB. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided

Comment: (Continued)
the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recontacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957, where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962. He identified by photograph all of the KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation.

NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned of the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues.

Edward Ellis SMITH

NOSENKO's Information

In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered: "SMITH? The red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was "RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD").

SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed. These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at the meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further meetings.

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When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance. To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work".

In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played any personal role in the case. He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in so important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach to SMITH.)

GOLITSYN's Information

In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful operations against the Embassy in Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruitment, as was alleged in the study.

Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy Security Officer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB. The first, received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had received three threatening letters. In reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russian maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months.

NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's statement that he reported the blackmail attempt to the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH. If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department as he claims. If he played a role in the SMITH case as well as in the Seventh Department recruitment of BURGI (see p. 115), it remains possible that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in some other KGB capacity. 06

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CHAPTER II

EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent prima facie evidence that NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a bona fide defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes. Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his account of how he functioned in these positions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail.

The following portions of this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims.

Notes for the Reader

In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following:

The examination tests the validity of the presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency, and compatibility with fact and plausibility.

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information. It is not the function of the examination to speculate about possibly credible alternative explanations for the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.

If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following text. Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of their aggregative significance: they will be a matter of comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following each major portion of the examination.

Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions, omissions and the like, are reflected in the text. Where, during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or insight into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively, if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn't say", or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness" and so forth, the reader properly may assume that the matter was covered extensively.

In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given to his final assertion as opposed to earlier contrary claims.

To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative is broken from time to time by a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions, or to what conclusion is drawn.

(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)

Notes for the Reader (Continued)

At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his life. The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.

CHAPTER III

PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY

NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations.

Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account

NOSENKO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine. At the time of his birth, his father, Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September 1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to 1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.

NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to

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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

[redacted]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

[redacted]

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Attendance at the Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)

In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.

In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute, NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant "in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the Navy.

Comment: Soviet students completing their second year of higher institutions are commissioned, but in an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense forces. At that time they receive their voyennyy bilet (military booklet) which reflects their assigned MOS and category (sostav). CIA interrogators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded it may relate in some manner to his claims to subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.

In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign against Marshal Zhukov's associates. NOSENKO recalls neither the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. [The significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contradictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce. See below.]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.

[redacted]

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

[redacted]

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone" and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute from which he was graduated.

In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". [Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of Pillau.] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953, after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB] Chairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining the KGB.

NOSENKO's Information-1964

Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU, and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department. After passing the state examination on the second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information of American naval forces in the Far East. A radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an "apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.

In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested a transfer from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far East. Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took unauthorized leave. (He could not learn what his actual assignment was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk, where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57), a small town "in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.

Comment: Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's interrogators pointed out to him at the time. NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy Kray, a fact known to him from the way his letters were addressed. This is also an error. See below.

In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.

Comment: NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to Rostock he himself had received training in Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz, Comment: (Continued) in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk. In retracting that claim, he explained that he knew his CIA interrogators would not believe that he had successfully refused the assignment in Germany.

In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded as leave, but official business. He afterwards returned to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late 1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer. When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder NOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's leave in January 1953. At the end of January NOSENKO visited the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste for his work. KALOSHIN told him to "look around", and NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working, he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.

Comment: Just before giving this account of his January 1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent January and a part of February at the Kubinka Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two statements.

NOSENKO's Information-1965

Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated to join Naval Intelligence. After passing all of his examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders calling him to active duty. Offered a choice of assignments, NOSENKO chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready to make a man of himself". Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in Primorskiy Kray (sic), NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports Section.

Comment: Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in Primorskiy Kray. Shown contemporary Soviet maps clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray, NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been falsified by his interrogators to confuse him. NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to being stationed in Oregon for an extended period and thinking oneself to be in California.

In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a good job despite rigorous working and living conditions, and during his service there he was commended as an outstanding officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.

In spring, 1951, after about seven months' service, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months for Far East service.

In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his intent to divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary legal papers to Moscow.

NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October or November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that time. An understanding superior, however, arranged for him to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On 2 May

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he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return for reassignment at the end of his leave. NOSENKO was on leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal of the Naval Ministry". [According to his 1962 and 1966 versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]

In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the RU Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Naval espionage school, and to a post in Germany, but he turned them all down. He rejected the opportunity to attend the academy, because he had had almost all of the courses earlier at the Institute of International Relations.

"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan'," NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his divorce from TELEGINA. [According to his 1964 account, NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment, to complete divorce proceedings.]

In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk, in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952. His assignment there was as a political officer, in which capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such subjects as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally to see to their needs. NOSENKO did not care for his assignment in Sovetsk and in December 1952 he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. In January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working for the KGB.

After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several days" at the Hertzen "House of Rest", located 65-70 kilometers from Moscow near Kubinka. There he met his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [In 1964 and 1966 statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January and February.]

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NOSENKO's Information-1966 (April)

At an interview with the military placement commission at the Institute before graduation, NOSENKO indicated that he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization". Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and hereafter referred to as, the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his background and his knowledge of English. Later, however, the chief of the Institute's special section informed NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assignment to the KGB. During the summer of 1950 "while state examinations were underway" [in earlier versions NOSENKO claimed the examinations were over in June], NOSENKO began to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He filled out questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and, in August or September, submitted copies of his diploma. [Note that this version of events omits any reference to delayed graduation caused by his having to take a state examination a second time.] For the next nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called to RU service. [In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he entered the RU in 1949 or 1950.]

On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and the other assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East. On 13 March, on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow City Military Commission and was issued his travel documents, and NOSENKO departed Moscow for his post on 16 or 17 March. At the end of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan' on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. [Note earlier versions in which he was transferred because of illness, and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June 1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.

During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the Bay of Gdansk). Sovetsk was a small village located on the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. [The only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction from Baltiysk. When NOSENKO was shown their locations on contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct, although Primorsk, where NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he was assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he returned to Moscow at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment. Before his departure he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. [In previous versions he claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's service.]

On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a place in the KGB.

From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953 NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA. [NOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated that it was of considerably shorter duration.]

NOSENKO's Information-1966(October)

In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO said that before graduation from the Institute the military placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was told that he was not qualified as a candidate because of mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said he did not mention this rejection earlier, because his interrogators would not have believed that he ever became a KGB officer after once being rejected.

NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied" when he claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950. In fact, he said, he entered the RU in March 1951 and was on active duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.

Comment: This latest assertion discredits almost all of his earlier claims regarding entry into the RU, including the date of his graduation from the Institute, the timing if not the fact of his promotion, the number, sequence, and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his assignment to the Baltic Fleet.

Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which are still unresolved after interrogations over a three-year period, he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in either 1949 or 1950. Before graduation, he (a) was selected for Naval assignment, (b) sought a Naval assignment, or (c) was selected for and rejected by the KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or, immediately following graduation, or three months or nine months later (in the following year), he was called to active Naval service and assigned to the RU. With neither training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to the Far East for nine months or three years; there he participated in agents' operational training, or reports work. In the latter capacity he was or was not involved in RU radio signals intercept operations. He either never served in the Baltic or, if he did, it was for three months or six months, during which he either participated in agent training or was an administrative or political officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen months' RU service.

Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disclaims knowledge of RU organization other than at the posts where he served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the posts' actual locations.

The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelligence staffs. Some thirty GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities at the places and times he claimed.

CHAPTER IV

KGB ENTRY

Comment: Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was accompanied by extraordinary repercussions. The Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and State Security (MGB) merged under the MVD, of which Beriya became Minister. There followed a period of widespread reorganization entailing the transfer or dismissal of many personnel. Beriya's arrest just four months later in June 1953 was followed by another extensive (if bloodless) purge and reorganization, which culminated in the creation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) in March 1954. Vladimir and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr DERYABIN, among others, defected in the wake of these events. From information they provided, as well as from that acquired from other sources, CIA has a substantial amount of information against which NOSENKO's accounts of this period may be weighed.

For the convenience of the reader, the term "KGB" is used hereafter to refer as well to its predecessor organizations in 1953-1954.

In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned that he had joined the MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic statement written immediately after his defection, however, he asserted his KGB service began in 1952, a date he insisted was correct even after reminded he had earlier said 1953. Repeated interrogations produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging from "the beginning of 1952" to April 1953, all of which were accompanied by modified accounts of the circumstances of his entry (as well as of his earlier period of service in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the Institute of International Relations). To the extent to which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953 as the time of his entry to the KGB.

Date of Entry

NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO had just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic, he said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing his processing, he reported for duty in the Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in March 1953, "just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on 5 March 1953.)

Comment: According to KGB defectors, the precise date of entry to the KGB would not likely to be forgotten by a KGB officer. The date is the basis for computing length of service and is a common entry on KGB administrative forms periodically filled out by KGB officers in the course of their service.

According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952", "just after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directorate".

Comment: GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred out of the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

(KGB ENTRY)

In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in which he noted that he entered the KGB in 1952, and in which he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community) which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was confronted with his contradictory claims. In response, NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in August 1952 [by most of his other accounts, NOSENKO returned in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952. By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the Embassy Section for some months against American correspondents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the reorganization" that he assumed responsibility for operations against American Army Attache personnel. [NOSENKO ultimately settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment. See p. 84.]

Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of his earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO asserted that the truth was that his service dated from March 1953, after Stalin's death. He went on to explain that he finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic), "defended his diploma" and then failed one of the four required State examinations. All four examinations, he said, he had to take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949. NOSENKO said that to avoid admitting "this unpleasant thing", he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that to be a fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around again". NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953" or about 15 March 1953.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: NOSENKO's explanation takes no account of the fact that he had already said (in 1962) that he joined the KGB in March 1953.
KGB defectors describe the period immediately following Stalin's death in the KGB as one of extensive reorganization and uncertainty in which new candidates were not being accepted. Other evidence of the improbability of NOSENKO's entering the KGB in March 1953 is discussed below.

NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the date 13-15 March 1953. In 1966, however, in a written statement, he said he entered the KGB on 2 April 1953, but a week later, in another signed statement, he said it was the "middle of March 1953".

In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENKO said he entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledged that he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, when he had said he joined in 1952. Asked by his interrogators why he had lied, NOSENKO said, "There was no sense." He went on to explain that because he was only an average student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950; he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his account by one year, since his interrogators would not have believed that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after an earlier rejection.

The Role of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV

In all of his accounts NOSENKO has attributed to General KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to the KGB. In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to CIA in 1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend of the elder NOSENKO whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the NOSENKO dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("early 1953") was First Deputy to Beriya, the Minister of the then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the General's office. NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless received a week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already arranged for a building pass.

NOSENKO gave a different, somewhat more detailed account in April 1964. In this version, he first met KOBULOV, a friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time posted in Germany, not in Moscow.] According to NOSENKO, KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. "My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the (Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to return to the Baltic." NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms. NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV immediately returned from Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and on "maybe the 10th of March" NOSENKO received a call from KOBULOV's assistant. NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's office, and although he waited two hours to see the General, the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV, however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American Department.

In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder NOSENKO's], KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and to receive necessary forms. NOSENKO stated that he heard nothing further until after Stalin's funeral, when he was summoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to the Second Chief Directorate.

During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship with KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never visited the NOSENKOs.

In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January 1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV were departing to attend Stalin's funeral. On that latter occasion, NOSENKO claimed, KOBULOV promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office and told he was appointed to the KGB.

Comment: General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career security official, but from the immediate postwar period until after Stalin's death he was not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952, he was posted to Germany with the Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the Council of Ministers and latterly to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Until he returned from Germany in March 1953 to assume the position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office in KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.

In light of the foregoing, it is improbable that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO claimed. If KOBULOV ever interceded in NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO would later have been purged after KOBULOV's

Comment: (Continued)
and Beriya's arrest and execution. NOSENKO's eventual retraction of his assertion that his father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment to the KGB.

Eligibility

Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influential was his father's prominent position in the Soviet Government.

Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy to avoid recruiting the children of senior Soviet officials.

NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.

Comment: Other than claiming to have completed an undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, NOSENKO acknowledges that he was no more eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he was at the time of his rejection.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol, and that he had not been recommended for Party membership. He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization.

Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not membership itself, is a requisite for KGB appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time, twenty-five was at that time the maximum age. Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB appointment, he was within six months of being dropped by the Komsomol as well as still unqualified for Party membership. He could not have been secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed on p. 338.

NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.

Comment: According to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.

KGB Processing for Entry

NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary for him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the personnel office (and thus completed no forms provided by them).

Comment: The most important document filled out by prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page personal history questionnaire, Anketa spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB, which was completed in one copy only. Classified even when blank, the form was not permitted to be taken home. KGB defectors have described completion of the form "as an experience not likely to be forgotten". NOSENKO omits in all accounts reference to other documents which are known to have been required in connection with a KGB officer's processing for duty.

NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in connection with processing for KGB entry.

Comment: A medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of a KGB candidate's processing. Former KGB defectors could think of no instance in which the examination could be waived, particularly for a candidate with a recorded history of tuberculosis.

NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office, was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on the pass.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Persons not holding a valid KGB identity document were not permitted entry to or movement in the building without escort. The interviewer's name did appear on the building pass. The interviewer's name was essential to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer had complete responsibility for the visitor's custody while on KGB premises.

Initial Service in KGB (1953)

NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counterintelligence directorate. The designations were later reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's successor.

Comment: Beriya reversed the designations of the First and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953, and they were not changed back until March 1954. NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate was designated either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his entire first year of KGB service.

NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period, but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall anything unusual about it.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: Twice, following Stalin's death in March 1953 and again following Beriya's arrest in June 1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily recalled for revalidation. On both occasions new stamps were placed on the document, lacking which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB installation. KGB defectors state that the events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at the time.

NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon reporting for duty. He had explained that training was unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.

Comment: NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service, by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.

NOSENKO stated that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700 rubles as a case officer, plus secrecy, language and longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant. He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers did not receive the pay for rank.

Comment: KGB officers' rank pay was abolished in September 1952 and not restored until April 1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first year of claimed service in the KGB.

(KGB ENTRY)

NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.

Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time Beriya became Minister in March 1953 until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of promotions has never been established. He has also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952 and in 1954. See p. 351.

NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest, during which reviews numerous negative factors in his background would have come to light. He stated, however, that he could only assume that the important and influential position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.

Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his father had on his KGB service aside from that exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself arrested and executed.

Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service

NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.

(KGB ENTRY)

Comment: The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet security agencies. Preceded by a series of purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably be memorable to a KGB officer serving in Moscow Headquarters at the time.

NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate (subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate) was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Information) Building".

Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI Building" were one and the same. From his statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI (a combined foreign intelligence agency) ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a substantially later time, but one which other KGB officers serving in Moscow in 1953 recalled easily.

NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the Militia was located in 1953-1954.

Comment: According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time would have had frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of the Militia.

KGB Entry: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954 period throw no more light on the actual date of his KGB entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are interrelated.

It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and be vague on what his KGB identification document looked like. Recognizing that administrative regulations and procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he had tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party membership, that he had been previously rejected and all at a time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.

The probability of these events being coincident, however, is remote. On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that he "actually" entered the KGB in March 1953, is no better substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the time he claimed.

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (ca. 1953-June 1955)

NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate) from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets during this period were at first American correspondents residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow. His assignment involving American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered the KGB). His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in June 1955.

NOSENKO has sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activities during this entire period which he characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no consequence". He has repeatedly stated that he "found himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American Embassy Section. Until then, he asserted, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work". (He has variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI 06 case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.)

Operations Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO 06 with SHAPIRO's 06 wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY 06 and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER. 06 For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and 06 06 Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were recruited agents of the KGB.

Comment: 06 SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO. 06 SHAPIRO's KGB agent cryptonym, known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309). The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954 06 identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.

NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" or drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE, 06, 06, 06 SALISBURY and WHITNEY. 06 He met with his agents periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents when there was even a hint that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has described some of these agents in general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

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KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO stated that he was taken directly to the offices of the American Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy 06, 06 GILMORE (as well as ones 06 on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYANKOVA 06 and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY. 06 06 06

06

NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours". 06 He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country". 06 GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953. 06

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he (the subject of the file) is an agent or not". NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on the seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as

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notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember". He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on 06 SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY 06 and the 06 GILMORES and met them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, whom did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, whom he is contacting, etc". He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied:

> 06
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> "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. 06 At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether 06 SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking 06 behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the American Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

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KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said:

> "My first agent 06 was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one." (While reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena S. KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on 06 GILMORE's successor, Richard 06 KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information.) "My second agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving for WHITNEY. 06 Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, 06 charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]."

Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's 06 office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

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NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen. NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddy GILMORE 06	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister- 06 in-law and GILMORE's Russian wife. 06, 11
06 Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver, "SERGEY".
Henry SHAPIRO 06	06 Three agents; SHAPIRO's secretary and his chauffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of 06 SHAPIRO's wife and lived with 06 the SHAPIROS in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and 06 reported on him to NOSENKO; 06 BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's 06 place in Moscow.)
06 Harrison SALISBURY	06 Two agents; SALISBURY's driver, and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral", in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINA". When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the American Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINA", whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel

NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties. (NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about the Embassy Section's targets while he was its deputy chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates. Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, with the work against the service attaches and diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be studied systematically and slowly.)

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and the microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department.

Comment: NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these microphones until he re-entered the Embassy Section in 1960; and that he learned of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

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Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts allegedly failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control. He has also used this explanation to support his assertion that there were no recruitments of American military personnel during this period.

Comment: NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was to control rather than to recruit American military attaches is contradicted by the emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on conducting operations against the United States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance, in this case American officials with access to classified information, who were residing in the Soviet Union.

In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service Attache travel program was the primary means by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelligence information on the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. The prevention or inhibition of this collection activity fell consequently to KGB components concerned with the security of military-industrial installations,

Comment: (Continued)
with transportation facilities, and with the geographic regions to which the Service Attaches travelled. Approval of Service Attache travel itineraries was not within the competence of a case officer within the Embassy Section; the determination would have to have been made by officials concerned with the USSR's military and industrial security and aware of reciprocal privileges being extended to Soviet Service Attaches in the United States, matters involving the GRU as well as the KGB. An Embassy Section case officer would have as a matter of course monitored reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching for personal vulnerabilities among his targets, and assisted local KGB elements in setting up provocations outside of Moscow. NOSENKO, however, has included neither of these latter functions as having been among his responsibilities.

Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel

"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

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-10 April 1964: "I made a mistake [when] I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV.... I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROVs defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

-18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me.... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the Attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months". If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

Agents Reporting on Army Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'.... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this

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network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none was targetted against specific members of the attache office.

Comment: As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and "RAKETA" as agents he used against correspondents and against Army Attache targets, but he never again referred to them and, in describing his own activities, he never indicated how or in what cases they were used.

According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in their offices.

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache 06 Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. 06 Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside".

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira 06 RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

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Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent "SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Army Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV; NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Army Attaches.

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who provided some technical information on the Embassy, but he related him to his second tour in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962 and did not then claim that the electrician was his agent.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the Embassy biographic cards on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

NOSENKO's Targets

Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO orally listed the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."

06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

Comment: In the order as given by NOSENKO, the list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow. It is neither in alphabetical order nor chronological according to date or service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through 06 06 Captains MULE and STROUD 06 to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. 06

06

MICKELSON

NOSENKO correctly identified Earl L. MICKELSON 06 as a 08 colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, 06 and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, 06 NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, 06 whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was 06 his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.

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NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about 06 MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source. 06

06

Comment: MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge. In August 1954 06 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photography south of Kharkov; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released. It is judged that such events, particularly those staged by the KGB, would be known to the KGB case officer responsible for the attache officer concerned.

06

MEARNS

06

06 NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. 06 Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. 06 Besides being told to attempt to over- 06 hear MEARNS' conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects 06 were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.) NOSENKO described 06 06 MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had 06 been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

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06

RICHARDS

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a 08 lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attache 08 in Moscow. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 06 could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA", but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. 06 In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them. 06

06

Comment: RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON 06 and later with MEARNS. 06

06 RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him, an incident which was not recalled by NOSENKO.

For about four months of his Moscow tour, 06 RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During 06 these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. In another context, NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during 1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS 06 or to the 1953-1955 period.

06 RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (the diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's father was a rich jeweler in Moscow at the time of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with

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Comment: (Continued)
06 RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and
news media. NOSENKO did not know of Volodya
who, as RICHARDS' 06 driver, was NOSENKO's agent
by NOSENKO's own account.

06
FELCHLIN

06
08 NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a
lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in 08
Moscow. By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence
the object of special interest, NOSENKO said FELCHLIN served 08
in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until
being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall
the names of any agents specifically targetted against
08 FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid 08
who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO
08 said, the Assistant Army Attaches shared a pool of cars and
drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the
08 precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States
for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind.
NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel
08 FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which
had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.
08 For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photo-
graphs and a report had been written; along with other
08 similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of
08 agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away
for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on
08 FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said
08 then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,
and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO
explained his having but few details concerning this action
by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred
from the American Department to the Seventh Department in
June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.
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Comment: FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache. 08 He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States. During his entire tour in Moscow he was the object of intense KGB surveillance.

08 Shortly after his arrival in September 1953 FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache 08 08 Martin J. MANHOFF and two Air Force Attaches, 08 took a train trip to Siberia, the first trip permitted such Americans in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article falsely 08 alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some "spy documents" on the train. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to 08 his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled neither of these incidents.

In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant 06, 08, 06 Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned 06 YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was 06 08 the Air Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were 06, 06 taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. 06 FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours. 06 Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the American Air 06

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Comment: (Continued) 06
Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared *persona non grata* at the same time. Ambassador Bohlen successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In 06, 06 February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN 06 left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

06
Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and 06 FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip 06 outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from another chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV 06 drove primarily for the Army Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.

06 FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN 06 about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN 06 offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with 06 her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. 06

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Comment: (Continued)
FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew Pearson with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. Pearson printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, 06 the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, 06 waved it in his face, and accused him of being Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.

BENSON 06

08 NOSENKO correctly identified his target John S. BENSON 06 as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not 08 recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but 06 06 said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in 06, 06 10, 09 Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

06 STROUD 06

08 NOSENKO correctly identified William R. STROUD 06 as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. 08 The only agents working against him were the Army Attache drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD's 06 arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE 06, 06 10 in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source. 06

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06 06 06

Comment: STROUD, with BENSON and MULE, was the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona 10 non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 09 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American 06 defector living there. According to NOSENKO, 06 SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer. The visit of ex-FBI agent SISCOE and 08, 06 a military officer to an American defector is judged to be an event in which the KGB would have taken interest and one which the Attache's KGB case officer would find memorable.

MULE 06

06

NOSENKO correctly identified Walter MULE as an 08 Assistant Army Attache and as such said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational 06 approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected. 06 He was only a 08 captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and information from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other Attaches. When MULE received letters 06 from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood 06 that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two 06 children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. 06 Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section), NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room,

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and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE s return. When 06 MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN 06 reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant". BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According 06 to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out.

06

06

Comment: MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to 06 procure documents from the Embassy, and 06 according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts 06 concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices 06 in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not 06 to report the incident. MULE identified 06 SIEGAL/BORODIN by photograph, but was unable to identify NOSENKO.

KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which NOSENKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache targets, is belied by the MULE case. 06

06, 06 06

BENSON, MULE and STROUD Expulsion from the Soviet Union

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets 06, 06 of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being 06 declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Seventh Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE and 06, 06 06 STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. 10 The hotel rooms of BENSON, 06 STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, 06 and it 06 was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, 06 MULE and STROUD from the 06 Soviet Union, and this was done by having 06 the Foreign Ministry declaring each persona non grata.

Comment: The equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE and 06 06 06 STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May, a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Seventh Department. When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Seventh Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO offered no comment.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

CARDELLA 06

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. 06 The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him. 06

Comment: As a member of the Army Attache's staff, 06 CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target. 06 Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964 a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office 06 CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was believed to have been emplaced in 1952. See p. 227.

VAN LAETHEM 06

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08 NOSENKO incorrectly identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM 06 which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, along with other 06 members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO 08 knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)

Comment: 06 VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache 08 but an Assistant Army Attache 08 serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953. When 06 VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953 (when NOSENKO said he entered the KGB), he was succeeded by Walter 06 MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed responsibility. The fact that he was Assistant Army 08 Attache and MULE's 06 predecessor should be known to the responsible KGB case officer, in this case, NOSENKO. As cryptographic security 08 officer and officer in charge of the Embassy 08/06 code room, VAN LAETHEM had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until VAN LAETHEM's departure from 06 Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEM's duties 06 also included responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.

VAN LAETHEM was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955, when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches. Although this visit was only a temporary assignment, it was represented to the Soviets as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army Attache (and thus, presumably NOSENKO's target) because of the sensitive nature of his duties. He was project officer for the entire signals collection program at the Embassy, and he went to Moscow to review the program including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE 06, 06 and STROUD 06 in Stalingrad 10 in May 1955 (while 09 06 VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow). VAN LAETHEM 06 stated that no meeting such as the one NOSENKO described with LARIONOVA ever occurred.

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Additional Reporting

Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p. 37). NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956, by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of [Richard 06 BURGI]. His involvement in the [BURGI] 06 case has been confirmed.

NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), whose true name he claimed not to have known. He dated the recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955. However, NOSENKO also related that "ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that RHODES "had spotted 'ANDREY'". "ANDREY" and RHODES overlapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953. "ANDREY" fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953, and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY" was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security officer, NOSENKO's target [Army Captain Walter MULE]. 06 If NOSENKO served in the Embassy Section during 1953-1955 as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.

American Embassy Section - ca. 1953-June 1955: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he describes as the most sensitive and important section of the Second Chief Directorate. There, after first handling agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,

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he was made the case officer solely responsible for operations against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.

Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache targets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. Although NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to explain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so. Instead, he is positive and insistent that his statements about his targets are a factual and complete account of what was then known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not interested in his targets' vulnerability to recruitment is belied by his own statements as well as by the MULE case, 06 as he himself related it. He is uninformed about both Attache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own account, were his targets and his agents.

Conclusion

NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed. Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953 nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats, NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.

CHAPTER VI

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: NOSENKO's claimed Second Chief Directorate service during 1955-1960, in which he was involved with Seventh Department operations against American and British tourists, coincides with the growth of a substantial American and British Intelligence program aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth of tourism which followed the post-Stalin thaw in the USSR had grown to the point where it could be usefully exploited by CIA. Initially, returning American tourists were debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet Union and particularly with regard to their acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who might be susceptible to eventual recruitment. Gradually, leads were developed to Americans planning to visit the USSR, and from among these, agents were selected, trained in clandestine operational techniques, briefed on intelligence requirements, and instructed how to identify and develop potential agents from among their Soviet contacts. The American agents performed a variety of clandestine tasks including passive assessment of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propaganda activities, and infiltrating equipment, loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing secret writing, all destined for CIA agents in the Soviet Union.

The program reached its height in 1959, by the end of which over one hundred and fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA alone had performed missions in the USSR; by

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: (Continued)
then a substantial number of similar missions had also been launched by American military intelligence organizations and by the British and allied services.

It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture, that as early as 1957 a large number of these agents were coming to the attention of the KGB within the Soviet Union. Few were arrested. Instead, all were surveilled, and some provoked or entrapped, as the Second Chief Directorate and its provincial KGB counterintelligence elements sought to identify the Soviet citizens with whom the American agents were in contact, as well as the agents' specific clandestine tasks. By the summer of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British agent, George BLAKE, complete details of the objectives and methods of CIA and British Intelligence tourist programs, together with a number of case examples.

It is within this context that one must examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in and consequent knowledge of Second Chief Directorate counterintelligence operations against American and British tourists in 1955-1960.

NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department from June 1955 until January 1960. According to him, the Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union, including businessmen, seamen, foreign delegations and some tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by these visitors. He said that by 1958, however, the number of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created. NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became

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responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted against American and British Commonwealth nationals, the other section was charged with all other nationalities.

It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's claims to service in the Seventh Department into two periods. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 until June 1958, during which NOSENKO said he was a case officer handling and recruiting agents of all nationalities and planning and managing other operational activities. The second period covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958, when he claimed to have become Deputy Chief of the newly-created American-British Commonwealth Section, to the beginning of 1960.

NOSENKO described his personal and direct participation in Seventh Department operations during this four and one-half years as including:

-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and targetting them against American tourists. NOSENKO's agentura varied in number from eight to fourteen agents, most of whom were employees of Inturist.

-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners, principally Americans, in the Soviet Union.

-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents to be utilized against foreign homosexual targets. NOSENKO managed the pair from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958 until their retirement in 1962 or 1963.

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-Recruiting and handling Arsene FRIPPEL, the American 08 Express Company representative in Moscow. (NOSENKO continued 06 to meet FRIPPEL even after the latter was transferred from Moscow to New York and after NOSENKO was transferred from the Seventh Department.)

From personal involvement or otherwise NOSENKO claimed that he learned of all the important operations conducted against American tourists during this period of his Seventh Department service.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents

The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning".

As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist. These were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man could approach with questions about somebody or something". NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied. Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately twelve. The substance of NOSENKO's description of his agents is as follows:

Larissa SOBOROVA

An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within Inturist. She reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO when he served as a guide for British subjects BIRSE and LANE in the summer of 1957. During 1957-1959 she was involved and possibly sexually intimate with American travel writer Horace SUTTON. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959, when she married and "retired".

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number of American tourists, including CIA agents, between 1957 and 1959. SUTTON has identified 06 her. In 1959 she was the head of all English-language interpreters at Inturist headquarters in the National Hotel, Moscow.

Vladimir MUROMTSEV

MUROMTSEV, KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV", was recruited by NOSENKO from Inturist in 1955. He was NOSENKO's agent until called into the army in about 1959, when he was sent to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as an interpreter with Syrian students there. During that period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central Asia. When he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the KGB Second Directorate.

Comment: NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958", implying that someone else recruited him and that he thus could not have been NOSENKO's agent in 1955. MUROMTSEV was identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by two CIA sources.

Nikolay ROGOV

ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO", was recruited in 1955. He had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central Inturist office which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Comment: CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV who in 1960 was a senior official at the main Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.

Nataliya SHULGINA

SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY [see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA".

Comment: KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA did not warn him. SHULGINA was for two years the secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow in July 1955. She served as a guide for an American musical troupe's visit in the USSR in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a guide for American tourists in Moscow. According to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of [British MP Tom DRIBERG]. 06 NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans, as well as with [DRIBERG], 06 and of her foreign travel, belies his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-1958 period. Shown her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it. When he was then given her name, he identified her not as his former agent but just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once involved with BELITSKIY.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Tamara KUNGAROVA

KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor 06 John THOMPSON, but there was no attempt to recruit him. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against American tourist and suspect CIA agent Philip NIELSEN 03 (see p.420). KUNGAROVA married NIELSEN and emigrated to 08,03 England, and the KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at 03 the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department.

Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an agent who came to the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department in 1957 or early 1958. If true, he could not have recruited her or have been her case officer in the 1955-1957 period. In describing the 03 NIELSEN case, NOSENKO indicated he himself was not involved and, although he commented on KUNGAROVA's role, he never mentioned that she was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information and she confirmed that she had been 06 intimate with THOMPSON while serving as an Inturist guide, as well as with other Americans. She denied, however, that she had ever collaborated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.

Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO", when NOSENKO recruited him in 1958, was a candidate member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. He spoke Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. He "was used against British and American nationals". DMITRIYEV was also used against communications

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personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned NOSENKO, he was meeting with another KGB case officer. DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a Soviet circus to Japan.

Comment: DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in 1958 is confirmed. From NOSENKO's own statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV's activities, but he was not his case officer.

(Fnu) IVANOV

Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his case officer. IVANOV was later turned over to the British Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that".

Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable with IVANOV.

Marina RYTOVA

RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA", was turned over to NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A. KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. When NOSENKO became her case officer she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. She continued this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where she served as an interpreter in English and Greek. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and once participated in a conversation he had with the Iowa farmer [Roswell] GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's farm in the United States, and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute and while there. RYTOVA was married to a captain or major who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

Comment: RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her biographic data is consistent with the information related by NOSENKO.

Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO

DANKO, KGB cryptonym "OKSANA", worked in the American 29 Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPEL 06 (NOSENKO's agent, see p.137) and later for FRIPPEL's 06 successor, Michael JELISAVCIC. 06 NOSENKO took DANKO over from Seventh Department case officer I.A. KONSTANTINOV in 1955-1957. She was used to report on JELISAVCIC. 06

Comment: DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and 1959, and she was working for the American 29 Express Company office in 1960. 06 FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the Seventh Department.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Soviet Homosexual Agents

The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly involved sexual entrapment. Many of the operations in which he claimed a personal role involved the use of homosexual agents, KGB agents whose homosexuality was exploited against susceptible male targets. While NOSENKO was never their official case officer, in specific recruitment-entrapment operations he worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV", "SIBIRYAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY, used in the compromise of Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the Canadian Ambassador WATKINS). He provided virtually no personality information on them and usually could not recall their true names. Two such homosexuals, however, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were his own agents. 06

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were discharged in 1963 because they had become too well known. He said he met them frequently, and directed them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO claimed he took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 and back again in early 1962 to the Seventh Department.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. To verify this possibility in 1957, a homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time inactive, was summoned by the KGB and, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:

> "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like. I have homosexuals, in particular, one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British... I permitted this pair to work [without specific assignments] on their own. I give them money and tell them to go look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here.' I say: 'Well, let him [do what he wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat].' After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go with him again. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is observed by the KGB. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives and a conversation ensues: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out'..."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

When NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the American Embassy but, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects". VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961. After they were employed once more [against W.E. JOHNSON in 06 January 1962] it was decided that they were "too well known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962 or 1963.

NOSENKO's Soviet Agents: Summary

NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer for two to five years, during which he met each regularly, assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports. With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds. It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing recollection. He knows no more about the three whom he claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he continued to be their case officer for two more years, than he does about the others. In the two instances where his agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, and 06 was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against and 08,03 married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity with the nine agents he named appears to be that which would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact as he claimed.

With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either agent's background. He cannot say where either of them lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he required their services. With the exception of the W.E. 06 JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

YEFREMOV's known activities with respect to Americans took place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-1960. It is probable that NOSENKO's claim that he was their sole case officer during even this relatively brief period is also false. In the period April-November 1959, apparently unknown to NOSENKO, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including three CIA agents) in the Soviet Union. Further, in other contexts NOSENKO has described their involvement with 06 Americans MATLAW (see p.419) and KARLOV in 1959, 06 of which NOSENKO only learned when he retired VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's file in 1962-1963. KARLOV was a Swedish, not an American, citizen.] 06

Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Tourist Section Case Officer

According to NOSENKO, he was among the first case officers to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it was being formed. He took part with other officers in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and generally "getting things going". After several months, he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compromise American student Martin MALIA. 06 NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Professor 06 Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally involved in the attempted recruitment of the German business- 11 06 GEHRCKENS and in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of 06 SUNDAR, a Norwegian 11 journalist. [Both GEHRCKENS 06 and SUNDAR 06 admitted to having been the object of KGB recruitment attempts, the former reluctantly in a private interview, and the latter publicly in the press. It has been possible to question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

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British publisher Sir Allen LANE and the latter's interpreter BIRSE on a tour of Soviet publishing houses. According to NOSENKO, it was for the purpose of observing BIRSE, a suspected British intelligence agent. 08

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Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

06

NOSENKO's Information

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Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in 06 contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations 06 with MALIA. NOSENKO arranged for the Soviet to introduce 06 MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed 06 MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow. NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when 06 the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched 06 the KGB agent and MALIA in homosexual practices. MALIA 06 insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. 06 During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious", 06 and the KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach. 06

06

Comment: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities 06 in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently unusual at the time to be publicized in the Soviet press. On 1955 and 1962 trips he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and he smuggled to the West literature for publishing

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Comment: (Continued) abroad. In December 1963 06 MALIA was the object of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches". 06 MALIA was then in periodic contact with CIA; in the spring of 1963 he denied having had any involvement with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union. 06 MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's allegations.

06

Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06 8 Yale professor. The recruitment was effected on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.

This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the death of NOSENKO's father, was by NOSENKO's later accounts a turning point in his personal and professional life. From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because 06 of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain.

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NOSENKO's Information

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NOSENKO stated that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's 06 anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning 06 BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the 06 material available on BURGI, no other checks were made. 06 The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact 08 that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might eventually work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

06

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO could not recall how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning 06 BURGI. 06 (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that 06 BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make 06 BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the 06 fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was 06 invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did not meet BURGI at this time.

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As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI 06 in the United States. 06 BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next 06 morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover.

In accordance 06 with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not 06 remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO", but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:

> "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed

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> out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students may become future specialists on Russia or may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students can be used by intelligence. They may be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to
> 11 Italy to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and 08 11
> here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about
> 08 the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..."

According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he 06
agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence". (NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement
06 from BURGI but later he could not remember whether it was he or KOZLOV.) BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

06 06

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above
06 BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became 06
his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGI to an old 06

cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From 06 Kiev, BURGI left the Soviet Union without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. BURGI was 06 06 instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first meeting in the New York Public Library.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to 06 the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that 06 BURGI had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but the KGB refrained from establishing contact. The first actual meeting in New York City took place the second or third 06 time BURGI appeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the revolution in Hungary in late [October] 1956, when BURGI refused to collaborate 06 further. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: 06 "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO."

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Comment: In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI, 06 BURGI had recounted how he was compromised and recruited by the KGB while in the USSR in June 1956. His version substantially confirmed that provided eight years later by NOSENKO. 06 BURGI asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account) that the KGB officers knew a good deal more about him than what might have been acquired 06 during BURGI's visit to the USSR, including 06 details of BURGI's close relatives, his work 08 10 with the Russicum in Rome, his earlier travel to Brazil, his military service in Korea, and his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY. 06 On 25 May 1964 BURGI positively identified NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the junior of the two KGB officers who recruited him. The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was "the controlling figure and was in command". 06 The BURGI case is the earliest confirmed instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB operation. See p.39 for comment on the 06 relevance of the BURGI case to the period of NOSENKO's claimed service in the Seventh Department.

06 NOSENKO's claim that BURGI's compromise and recruitment was based only on information routinely acquired from BURGI's visa application 06 and from apparently chance meetings with KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, is contradicted by BURGI's description of the 06 KGB's familiarity with his personal life. NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having personally traced BURGI through First Chief 06 [Foreign Intelligence] Directorate files (the probable repository of information on BURGI 06 which the KGB recruiting officers used). NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures. 06 According to BURGI's statement and NOSENKO's own eventual admission, NOSENKO lied when he

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Comment: (Continued) 06
first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaided. NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims regarding the effect of this case on his career: Contrary to his earlier assertions, he now says it won him neither awards nor promotion.

06

Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 08, 06 to Hamburg shipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS, on the basis 06 of GEHRCKENS' commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsible case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke 08 no German and GEHRCKENS was known to speak 06 English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little". When asked why a German- 08 speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case', and that was all." After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS, NOSENKO saw him 06 several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon GEHRCKENS' return 06 to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

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Comment: GEHRCKENS was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS 06 continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West 11 Germany and was recently reported to have

Comment: (Continued) 08
negotiated a sizable [shipping] contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at the Soviet Trade Mission in [Cologne] has been a GRU officer.
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06 06

Contact with [LANE] and [BIRSE] (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

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The British subject [Sir Allen LANE] travelled in the summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing houses and brought with him as an interpreter [Arthur BIRSE]. 06 The latter was of Russian extraction, having left Petrograd (Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in [British 29 Intelligence] during the Second World War. The case was handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but 06 because of [BIRSE]'s past, "some of our leaders decided that it would be good if one of our workers could approach him, would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help him meet with all sports of people representing our publishing companies. The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this job." Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO 06 06 accompanied [BIRSE] and [LANE] in Moscow and Leningrad during their stay there. The only object was to watch [BIRSE] 06 because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission, and no approach was made or contemplated. NOSENKO explained that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with [BIRSE] and [LANE] made 06 06 it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling to Great Britain in 1957 and in 1958.

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Comment: [LANE] was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's photograph as that of a "Russian official he met in Moscow who was introduced to him as "NIKOLAYEV". [LANE] said that he could remember
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Comment: (Continued)
nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who had opened up considerably towards the end of my visit to Moscow in July 1957".

NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis for KGB interest in BIRSE. 06 Born of Scottish 08 parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSE 10, 06 served with the British Military Mission in 29 Moscow during World War II and was interpreter 06 for Churchill during the latter's meeting 06 with Stalin. He was the official interpreter 08 for the Royal Commission investigating the revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV and his wife, who defected in 1954 in Australia. NOSENKO apparently does not know that BIRSE 06 returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958 and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the Tourist Section) and that in the latter year two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.

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Recruitment of Egil SUNDAR (1957)

NOSENKO's Information

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In 1957 or 1958 a Norwegian journalist, (fnu) SUNDAR, visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, 06 made SUNDAR's acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a rôle. NOSENKO presented himself to SUNDAR, 06 using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told SUNDAR that he 06 could find women for him. A party was arranged with a KGB 06 agent as SUNDAR's date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with the 06 female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and SUNDAR saw one another the next day, 06 06 SUNDAR announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket. NOSENKO

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offered to arrange the sale and took [SUNDAR] to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, 06 NOSENKO asked [SUNDAR] to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia 06 station, [SUNDAR] was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment. There was no further contact with [SUNDAR] after he left the USSR, 06 however, because on his return to [Oslo] he published an 10 article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them".

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Comment: [Egil SUNDAR, a journalist for Aftenposten in Oslo], travelled to the USSR in December 1957 as a member of a press delegation in connection with the opening of a new [SAS] air route to 29 Moscow. 06 [SUNDAR] wrote an article on his return in which he described his arrest for blackmarket activities and his subsequent recruitment; he also reported this to Norwegian authorities. 06 According to [SUNDAR], he was introduced to Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose name he did not know, and was apprehended immediately afterwards. [SUNDAR] has not been 06 interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

Travel to London (1957-1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security officer accompany any such delegation. [NOSENKO elsewhere cited this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was issued]. The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 60 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only KGB security officer which accompanied the group.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO said he was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any member of the delegation.

NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London because it was the alias used earlier with the British subjects BIRSE and LANE. NOSENKO explained this situation as follows: 06 06

> 06 06
> "With BIRSE and LANE I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, again representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people BIRSE and LANE
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went back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question BIRSE especially, as one 06 who used to work in intelligence... BIRSE would 06 say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by BIRSE.' That was 06 why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

Comment: That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is corroborated by British records, according to 11 which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30 October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels on 20 August 1957. His visa application described him as a member of a group invited by the Light Athletics Association to participate in contests in London. He left on 27 August 1957. With the same name and date of birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on 12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all described as boxers. His visa application described him as an "office worker", but on his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as a boxer. He left London on 19 October 1958. On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the attention of any British security service. 29

While these trips are corroborated, they are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have served in the KGB positions he alleges he held at the time.

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Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section

According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorganized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concerned with tourists from the United States and the British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the most important section of the Seventh Department".

06 In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he supervised the sexual entrapment of Virgil KRAFT, 06 although Seventh Department Chief DUBAS made the actual approach. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments -- DREW, LUKIS, WILBY, TAYLOR, and MERTENS. 06 06,06,06,06 NOSENKO stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. 08,06,06 Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL. 29,06 NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959 earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintelligence mission, on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO

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reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of tourists and tourist cover by Western intelligence services. It was from this task that NOSENKO claimed he learned of all the important arrests and recruitments among American tourists as recorded by the KGB at the time.

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Recruitment of [HARRIS] (1958)

NOSENKO's Information

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29,10 NOSENKO in 1958 recruited [Gisella HARRIS], an employee of the [American Express Company in Salt Lake City]. The recruitment was based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen, who told [HARRIS] that he was in trouble 06 with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. [HARRIS] agreed to meet and cooperate with 06 the KGB in [Salt Lake City]. The case was turned over to the 10 First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

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Comment: [HARRIS, a former German citizen], visited the USSR on a tourist visa in 1958. According to statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose of her visit was to contact her former lover, a Soviet soldier who had fathered her child in 11 [Germany] in 1953. She hoped to persuade him to divorce his Soviet wife and marry her. She described her recruitment by two men, one of whom resembled NOSENKO. When shown a photograph in 1964, she tentatively identified NOSENKO as one of the men who recruited her and said that, of the two involved, he "was definitely the man in charge" while the other "was merely present and listened". According 06 to [HARRIS], she has had no further contact with Soviet intelligence.

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Compromise of KRAFT 06

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, with his wife visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer. 06 The KGB learned KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Leningrad, where she was then living, in order to compromise KRAFT. 06 KRAFT and the Soviet 06 woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the 06 room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in a nearby room, supervising the operation. The recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself".) Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT 06 and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet 06 Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came 06 to Moscow in 1963, and afterwards his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good 06 region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Comment: According to the FBI, some time before 1960 06 KRAFT wrote a pamphlet in which he described the KGB approach, omitting reference to his sexual compromise. In a statement given to the FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT, who is an 06

Comment: (Continued) 08,10
Associate Pastor of the Peoples Church in Chicago, stated that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed NOSENKO's information in detail except that he denied having been intimate with the Soviet woman involved. He related that the "Chief" who interviewed him had "several photographs which portrayed him and the female in intimate compromising positions and which appeared to have been taken in her hotel room". KRAFT said 06 that he had told the "Chief" that they could do him no possible harm as "no one would believe that they were valid photographs". KRAFT denied 06 agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any time.

06

Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

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George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, was the responsibility of case officer V.V. IVANOV. By chance, however, DREW became involved with 06 NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not judged qualified.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be 06 compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone 06 recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment 06 because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

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Comment: 06 DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's account of the operation. Re-interviewed by the FBI on 12 May 1964, DREW identified NOSENKO's 06 photograph as that of his interrogator and said that, although NOSENKO was a young man, from the way everyone reacted to him it was clear that he was the man in charge. Another man was present, DREW said. 06

Recruitment of LUKIS (1959) 06

NOSENKO's Information

In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a British subject, (fnu) LUKIS (or LUCAS), in a room of the 06 Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS had been compromised 06 by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently. 06

Comment: 06 LUKIS has not yet been identified by the British services. 29

Recruitment of WILBY (1959) 06

NOSENKO's Information

By himself NOSENKO recruited 06 William Stanley WILBY in a hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro- 06 mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual agents. WILBY is a British citizen and his case was also 06 (like LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN. 06

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Comment: WILBY reported the approach to British authorities in 1959, saying that he was "brought up before SERGEYEV" (an operational alias sometimes used by NOSENKO). He has not been re-interviewed since NOSENKO's information was received.

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Recruitment of TAYLOR (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of British European Airways, whose name 29 NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.

NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the BEA man. That section had asked NOSENKO's section for help. 29

> "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him."

[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.]

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Comment: David TAYLOR confessed homosexual, is described by British services as a neurotic 29 type who had been discharged from the R.A.F. 29 on grounds of mental instability. In 1962 (before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR admitted his recruitment to British authorities, 11 indicating that it took place in August 1959 on the basis of his homosexuality. He reported in 1962 that the recruitment had been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV", and when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly identified NOSENKO as 'Colonel SERGEYEV'," adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back". TAYLOR also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.

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Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

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Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally 06 met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had been 06 the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.) 06 Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. 06 When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. [He did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a physical description.] MERTENS was then brought before 06 NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with

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MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with 06 MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not recall the American's name. In 1964 he stated the name was MARTIN, or MARTINS.

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Comment: In a signed statement given to the FBI on 5 August 1964, MERTENS, an American professor, 06 generally confirmed NOSENKO's account. He names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON" and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be that of a person whom he had met while visiting the Soviet Union in 1959. MERTENS 06 reported one KGB attempt to recontact him after he returned to the United States. In September 1959, according to arrangements made at the time of his recruitment, he received a letter signed "George PETERSON" telling him to be at a rendezvous point in New York. By the time he received the letter, however, the date of the meeting had already passed and so he ignored it. MERTENS claimed 06 that there were no further attempts by the Soviets to contact him.

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Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

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Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground. Although 08 06 BARRETT was not an active homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded after a long period of development in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,

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NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and he has described the occasion in detail. (There was much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and treated them well because they were a big help to him in this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by the Central Committee on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union. 08

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NOSENKO reported that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. The recruitment was carried out by the First (American) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.

Comment: Immediately on his return to the United States in January 1962, BARRETT confessed to the FBI 06 that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of photographs depicting him in a homosexual act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow. He claimed that the photographs had been taken while he was unconscious, after being drugged. BARRETT was 06 contacted once by the KGB in New York City following his admissions to the FBI. He was contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORTSOV of the First Chief Directorate, during later trips to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and 1965 and arrangements were made for meetings in the United States. No Soviets appeared at such scheduled meetings.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

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Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)

NOSENKO's Information

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08 Frederick WILLERFORD, an American Negro, was BARRETT's roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which 06 believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting information on him. Unaware of the interest of the other KGB element, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's 06 acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs to be taken of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06 hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through 06 a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after these compromising photographs had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the Moscow City KGB Directorate's interest in WILLERFORD. 06 NOSENKO's own department and the Moscow City Directorate then made a joint request for operational approval to recruit WILLERFORD, but 06 permission was refused because of the ban on recruitment attempts at the time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD was approached subsequently.
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Comment: WILLERFORD was interviewed by the FBI in July 1964 and "advised emphatically that he had never been compromised by anyone nor did he feel that he ever could be compromised by anyone except through the use of drugs, since he felt that he was 'too smart' and most Soviets that he has ever met are aware of his pro-American sentiments". BARRETT has reported 06 06 that WILLERFORD had visited VOLKOV in his hotel room and was friendly with him. 06 BARRETT said that he had often wondered if WILLERFORD was a 06 homosexual because of his manner and bearing.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Recruitment of FRIPPEL (1959-1963) 06

As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment 29 of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, 06 Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers, even after transferring to the American Department in 1960. 06 FRIPPEL left Moscow in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever claimed to handle, FRIPPEL confessed to his recruitment 06 when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead. 06 Although the FRIPPEL case only started during NOSENKO's first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960), it is described in its entirety through 1963, for the convenience of the reader.

NOSENKO's Information

At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detail including the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room. NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPEL by name the 06 following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:

> "There was another agent, [KGB cryptonym] 'Artur'. He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. 29 06 FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express 29 Company [main office in New York City]. A new

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department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this 06 [FRIPPEL]. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was [FRIPPEL] 06 recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States]. I was interested in him from the point of view of counter-intelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested me. But he didn't know anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether 06 [FRIPPEL] would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied no, that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means.

In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning the [FRIPPEL] 06 case.

NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the 06 [FRIPPEL] recruitment as follows:

"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the [American Express Company] 29 and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and which send tourists to the USSR."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

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Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone. Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.

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NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL until January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where 06 06 they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. 06 Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with 06 FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited", and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment".

As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and 06 restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I 06 met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange meetings with 06 FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, 06 despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something". (In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that GRIBANOV insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)

When NOSENKO began to work in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL 06 06 with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything useful.

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NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after 06 FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during 06 this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as 06 a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL arrived 06 in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled interview; [subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for Khrushchev in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews]. After the interview, he recontacted 06 FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview but did remember that they were "satisfied". Another reason for 06 contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.

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NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists 06 aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted 06 FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group, 06 FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a 06 bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to 06 give NOSENKO some whisky in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while 06 FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)

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When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL 06 reported "nothing of importance", and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative. 29 (NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been 06 assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow. This report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.)

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FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when 06 FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309) in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage dealing with FRIPPEL which appeared in 06 the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN:

> "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... One day, as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHVEDOVA [the fact of] 'ARTUR's' affiliation with American intelligence."

Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably a cleaning woman". [Elsewhere NOSENKO described SHVEDOVA as his own agent working against American Army Attaches, see p. 85.] Asked what connection 06 FRIPPEL had with American intelligence, NOSENKO replied that he could not say. To the inquiry why not, since he was FRIPPEL's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.

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Spencer ROBERTS [whose KGB recruitment is described on p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the

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latter, the Soviet told ROBERTS, was FRIPPEL, whom the KGB suspected of being an American intelligence agent. [NOSENKO reported ROBERTS 06 recruitment but has never indicated awareness of other KGB agents being targetted against FRIPPEL. 06

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FRIPPEL's Information

06 06

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur", was the American 29 Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1958 to 3 January 1961. He was first interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a picture of NOSENKO, FRIPPEL admitted his recruitment by the 06 KGB in 1959. During this and subsequent interviews with 06 the FBI, FRIPPEL has reported in detail on his association 06 with the KGB. FRIPPEL's version coincides with that provided by NOSENKO to a considerable degree, with the following exceptions:

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-FRIPPEL asserts that at the time of his recruitment the KGB wanted only general information on American Embassy officials and American tourists travelling to the Soviet Union under American Express auspices. 08 According to NOSENKO, FRIPPEL was originally 06 recruited to provide information on American intelligence approaches to Soviets in the United States, and he claimed that FRIPPEL was not needed for 06 coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union, since the KGB had already "great success" by other means. NOSENKO stated that later, when he transferred to the American Embassy Section, he took 06 his agent FRIPPEL with him to report on acquaintances among the Embassy employees. NOSENKO and 06 FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when 06 FRIPPEL was queried regarding BOWDEN and WINTERS), 06 FRIPPEL was not so used.

06 -FRIPPEL, while acknowledging that NOSENKO participated in all meetings and on occasion met FRIPPEL 06 alone, stated that CHELNOKOV "was in charge of the entire operation".

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FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met FRIPPEL but once 06 in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

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Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. He freely related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the 06 USSR. His account of FRIPPEL's activities is 06 consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as noted above. 06

Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with OSWALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.

Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

Operational Activities - 1955-1960: Summary

According to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment in the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957 he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists. One of these attempts, that against [Richard BURGI], was the first recruit- 06 ment of the Tourist Section; it won NOSENKO a commendation, brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer. In 1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO's success in the Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him back to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against American Embassy code clerks.

It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO became involved in nine not because they were operations of his section, but because the targets were the victims of homosexual or other entrapment. In addition, three of the fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but by senior Seventh Department officers. According to his own statements, four others were specifically the responsibility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements, including the Foreign Seamen Section ([GEHRCKENS]), Delega- 06 06 06 tions Section [LANE] and [BIRSE]), Commercial Representatives 06 06 Section ([TAYLOR]), and [WILLERFORD] (Moscow City KGB). [FRIPPEL] 06 does not relate clearly to NOSENKO's claimed Seventh Department service. NOSENKO states he was also used as an agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the remaining case, that of [HARRIS], was not necessarily a
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Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements, she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry a Soviet citizen.

While NOSENKO's participation in the attempted recruitment of the targets he describes, even where not confirmed, is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.

Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. The evidence is that he was more active, but not that he had any administrative and supervisory responsibilities.

Knowledge of other Seventh Department American Tourist Operations

NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Department in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In the course of that review he made written notes of the section's operational targets during that period notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319.) NOSENKO could not describe the operations other than to say that he recorded the target's names and such details as he could acquire at the time of his review. Eleven of the operations included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06,06 fnu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, 06 Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA: 06 All were from the period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were identified by the KGB as homosexuals. All of these cases are described in Annex B.

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Comment: NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases, which predated the records he claimed he reviewed, were included in his notes. More important, he never could explain why he was unfamiliar with American tourist cases which occurred at a time when he claimed that he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable of all such cases.

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960

Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services throughout the 1955-1960 period. Information from other sources serves as a basis for judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's Tourist Study

Sometime between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during the period 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO said he assembled this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh Department case officers. NOSENKO recalled only that the study incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the study, any examples included in it, or what the study concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist operations. Nevertheless, based on his research for this study as well as on his general and supervisory responsibilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.

Extent of KGB Knowledge

According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No agents were definitely identified among American tourists, and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception. 06 (McGUIRE, sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists because of their apparent interest in photography, or because they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never established any firm intelligence connection, however, despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka (covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in contact with the suspect tourists. No American tourists were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents, NOSENKO concluded. On related matters, NOSENKO asserted that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department the KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelligence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no documentary information on this topic from any agent source.

American Tourist Agents

The one exception in which an American tourist was observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said, was one whose name he recalled as McGUIRE, and who mailed a 06 letter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's clandestine letter mailing.

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Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward McGOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was in fact detected by the KGB while clandestinely mailing an operational letter in Minsk, but in August 1958.

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There was a Robert Alan McGUIRE who visited the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh Department service, but he was not connected with American Intelligence at the time and he mailed no letter. McGUIRE, however, was a 06 former CIA staff employee. He visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959, during which period he was the target of numerous KGB provocations, including black-market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request for assistance in defecting to the Americans. Also, a customs officer confiscated from 06 McGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language 06 script, and McGUIRE was compelled to sign an acknowledgement of the event, although the reasons were left blank. Interrogation has never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of 06 McGUIRE, but not the background of the case, or the background of McGOWAN's case, but not his name.

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Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6, [George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union. In early June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a nineteen-page document was drawn up which described operational doctrine on tourist operations, including agent spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist season. The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually, communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it came into his possession.

Comment: It is not advanced that NOSENKO should necessarily have known of BLAKE, although his statements on the matter have been ambiguous. Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE was a less important source than the Canadian Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked "Who's BLAKE?"

The significance of BLAKE is that his confession established that the KGB was fully aware of the status and character of American and British Intelligence tourist operations while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh Department. It is judged, by any measure as well as by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB, that the substance of the information if not the document itself would be brought to the attention of a key KGB counterintelligence officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, which NOSENKO claims was himself.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union. The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen KGB operations. Other than to allege that certain KGB officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no information to substantiate his claim that he had any supervisory or administrative responsibilities. The common feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own description of the function of the Seventh Department's Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Commonwealth Section. Most were sexual or other entrapment operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations conducted by KGB elements other than his own section. In short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated in the activities he describes. Although NOSENKO gives a graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence aspects were incidental. Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted against American tourists during the period, nor what was known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British tourist operations.

Conclusion

While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting operations against American and other foreign tourists during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962)

Deputy Chief of the Section

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962. This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counter-intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for recruitment.

The functions of the American Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all information possible on American Embassy employees, and to use this information as a basis for planning and implementing recruitments. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts. The officers also benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, as well as information obtained from telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and homes. Each officer had a limited number of American targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar. Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section special emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence officers in the Embassy and actively developing them, acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks, creating the basis on which they can be recruited".

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited ca. 1953, see p. 33). From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, who remained in the section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until his January 1964 departure in Geneva.

Transfer to the American Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him back to the American Department's American Embassy Section, as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:

> "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department. This [the transfer] was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And there, in the American Department, I must prove myself with new people."

NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target".

Predecessor as Deputy Chief

Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied: "No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security file from KOVSHUK. Various case officers earlier had been responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE, including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October 1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive until March 1960.

On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO had referred to a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department. In February he identified a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department. In June, in listing KGB officers who had received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremembered department" of the Second Chief Directorate.

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On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of all officers who had either joined or departed the American Embassy Section from the time NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American Embassy Section in 1960. NOSENKO listed fourteen officers as having joined the section, and five who had been transferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.

A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September 1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief, [not the others he had identified earlier] had been LANGELLE's case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining the Embassy security file and stated that BAKHVALOV had shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code clerk operations.

Comment: Interrogation has never resolved contradictions between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what functions he assumed from whom when he entered the Section, and his belated assertions that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.

Responsibilities

Shortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said he met with American Department Chief KLYPIN and Embassy Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN

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suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their assistants. NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain sensitive files in the section.

NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:

> "During the entire period in the First [American Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:
>
> -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
>
> -Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
>
> -Case officer for American Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.
>
> -For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the Army, Naval, and Air attaches.

Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally responsible for (as contrasted to supervising) operational activity against Naval and Marine officers of the office of the Naval Attache.

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-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

-I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [American Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.

-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR' [VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, 06 FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively].

06 06

"Throughout this entire period I sat in Room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

Comment: NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of these claimed functions are examined in some detail in the following pages.

Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief of Section

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to and was obliged to keep current on all information relating to the section's activities. On this basis he has assured his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his association with section officers made it certain that there were no such KGB successes even in the periods

1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh Department. His statements on this subject during February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February:

> "As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.
>
> "As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.
>
> 06 06
>
> "There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

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In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK was ill or on leave. NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again when KOVSHUK was ill. He recalled that KOVSHUK was also absent for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that he was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the American Embassy.

NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section. NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences, nor could he remember any of them except GLAZUNOV [whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's"] and the American correspondent STEVENS [about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his activities in 1953-55]. 06

According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American Embassy officers, but the only such Embassy officer he could identify was WINTERS, and he knew of no details about KOVSHUK's relations with him.

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Comment: NOSENKO knows neither that William N. MORELL was identified formally by the Embassy to the Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact), was in personal contact with MORELL.

03

General Supervisory Duties

In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what major duties occupied most of his time, nor which were the most important: He stated that "everything" was important. His subordinates were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible for code clerk operations), [Vladimir] DEMKIN assisted by [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House), [N.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews of the Ambassador's aircraft), [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army Attache personnel), and [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache personnel). Except for "little questions" which the officers decided for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed their activities, discussed with them various aspects of their work, and responded to their questions as required. If he could not answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, or if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO discussed the matter with KOVSHUK. If it was necessary, NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV, and on some occasions, with Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting. He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA (agents working against America House residents), reports which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally. NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percentage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.

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In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction of agents, NOSENKO said he personally managed [PREISFREUND] 06 ("PROKHOR") and [WEISS] ("SARDAR").
06

Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation". Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the American Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks under way, he stated, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No non-Soviet citizen agents were being used in operations against code-room personnel.

According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned to the American Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office. There, all KGB files on American code clerks as well as the files on all agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO was absent on a trip, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures.

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When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO asserted. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a Syrian military officer, Samih WEISS 08,06 (see p. 181), and directed him against the America House. After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted 06 against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. Another such 08,06 agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND, 08,06 who figured in the case of the 08,06 military code clerk James STORSBERG (see p. 166). NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the American code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Comment: Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO retracted his assertion that he read and studied all the files on individual American code clerks, stating instead that he did not study any although he "may have skimmed some". He insisted, however, that in any event he read all the current incoming information on code clerks received from microphones, agents and the like, and routed the reports to the case officer concerned.

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GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960-1961

The most significant collateral information about KGB operations against American code clerks in this period, with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions [on this topic], is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.

GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks in the American Embassy in Moscow." With respect to the priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that: "The task of strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly [in 1960]. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would have known about it.

Preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, GOLITSYN in the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. The code clerk had already provided the KGB with some information and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent. GOLITSYN was told by GRYAZNOV that, if the code clerk's transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki as his agent.

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GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960 that the latter had developed an operation against an Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.

GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, at the time was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN said that the homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and the KGB should find another basis for recruitment. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB would hold in reserve.

While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back to Moscow on the train. KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the case. GOLITSYN reasoned that there would be no reluctance to discuss the case if it had been unsuccessful, and that therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing the code clerk on the train or afterwards.

0806 GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KOVSHUK that the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy.

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X Comment: Two of GOLITSYN's leads may refer to [STORSBERG] 06 06 and [GARLAND] (see below). The other leads, more than one of which may refer to the same individual, have not resulted in an identification of any code clerk target of the KGB.

Operations Against Military Code Clerks

Comment: According to official U.S. Government records, Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center and a single military code clerk (except when two code clerks overlapped during periods of turnover). The military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a cryptographic clearance and was trained to replace the regular military code clerk when the latter was absent.

[James STORSBERG was the only military code clerk] 06,08 assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960 to September 1961, when his successor, 06 [Matthew ZUJUS], arrived. [STORSBERG] 06 himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of 06 [STORSBERG]'s tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the [Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY]. 08,06 [HURLEY] 06 performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the KGB approach to [STORSBERG] 06 and he could be loosely termed a code clerk. (Although NOSENKO has distinguished between [STORSBERG]'s 06 function as "military code clerk" and [HURLEY]'s 06 duties as "military code machine mechanic", he considered both to be within the general category

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Comment: (Continued)
of "military code clerks". NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against 06 HURLEY.) Additionally, HURLEY performed repair 06 work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. 06 HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly 06 before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06 in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS 06 worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in 06 the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.

The significance of the following cases, particularly that of STORSBERG, is the extent 06 to which collateral information corroborates or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, to have supervised all KGB operations against Embassy code clerks, and to have certain knowledge that no Americans in the Embassy were recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in 1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.

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Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG 06

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO first alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an unnamed American military code clerk during his initial meeting with CIA in 1962. He was describing a new technique (which he later claimed to be his own idea) introduced in the 1960-1961 period to overcome the reluctance of Americans in Moscow to develop friendships with Soviet citizens. Beginning in 1960 the KGB instructed "third-national" agents (Germans, Frenchmen, and Finns, for example) to visit the American Club on Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate American enlisted men living there. (GOLITSYN learned of one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN had reported the KGB practise to the Americans, because foreigners no longer were permitted to enter the America House billets freely for dances, movies, and the like at the club there.) NOSENKO had recruited the agent known to GOLITSYN in order to develop an American military code clerk. Without identifying either the foreign agent or the American target, NOSENKO provided further details on the case in subsequent meetings.

Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the American Embassy Section's "number one assignment", and for a year NOSENKO was involved in an operation against such a target almost to the exclusion of all other duties. The case was considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB Chairman SHELEPIN as well as Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV impatiently inquired as to its progress. The target was an American Army sergeant with about 20 years' service 08 who, the KGB learned, wanted to retire and take a position as a code clerk with the State Department. 08 For the purpose of developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who visited the USSR frequently. The "third-national" agent was placed in contact with the American, and they had several drinking bouts together. After about two months, NOSENKO instructed his agent to take the American to the agent's hotel room and introduce him there to a KGB female agent.

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Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photographs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time the agent provided the American with a girl. On the third such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain incriminating photographs. The foreign agent also involved the American in an illicit currency transaction in which the American contributed $300 as his share to finance the purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit: the money was actually furnished by the KGB.

After a year's development, GRIBANOV decided that a recruitment should be attempted, through another foreigner. The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation, and a KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French businessman "Marcel MICHAUD". SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and drank with the American several times, "even at America House". It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment while drunk. After meeting with the American at the club in America House one evening, SKVORTSOV telephoned him and invited him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch girls". When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls had refused to come, but that he could call another girl for the American. The girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964 as Inga VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used for such operations, and she and the American were intimate in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. In an adjacent room were GRIBANOV, NOSENKO, KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical Directorate, who taped the American's conversations. When the American left SKVORTSOV's room at two o'clock in the morning, he was "very tipsy". NOSENKO and another officer intercepted him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent room, and locked the door. NOSENKO himself solicited the American's collaboration with the KGB in exchange for $20,000 in cash (which was offered in two packages of $10 notes) and the promise of additional sums. When the American refused, the KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his plan to transfer to the State Department. They threatened to inform the Embassy that he had collaborated with the KGB, in which case he would get neither the cash nor the job with the State Department. The American was adamant in his refusal, although he was held in the hotel room all night long. At about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers received a telephoned report that the Embassy Marine guard had called America House to advise that the American was needed at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had arrived. The American was then released.

The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the recruitment attempt. Using that circumstance for blackmail rather than the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned another attempt to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.

When the non-Soviet agent used in the first year of developing the American target had come to the attention of GOLITSYN, GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he could use him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad. NOSENKO was on leave at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with another Embassy Section officer. GOLITSYN was told "Don't touch him, he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is discussed below.]

NOSENKO's Information-1964

At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO identified the American military code clerk as "Jim" 06 STORSBERG. The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the case was Johannes PREISFREUND 06 (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR"), a Finn. 11 In repeating the substance of his 1962 account of the KGB recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal role in directing both PREISFREUND and the KGB officer SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD. 06

GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO was not present; he waited outside the room with GRYAZNOV. Neither did NOSENKO recruit 06 PREISFREUND. The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who needed credit for the recruitment" although NOSENKO had initially cultivated the Finn. 11 Under KOVSHUK's orders, NOSENKO served as PREISFREUND's 06 case officer, although KOVSHUK accompanied him to operational meetings with the agent.

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06 PREISFREUND was used in no KGB operation other than in the development of STORSBERG 06. His usefulness declined because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow Finns, 11 of having some relationship with the KGB.

Comment: A report of the 11 Finnish security service advised CIA in December 1960 that PREISFREUND 06 "is a Soviet agent who calls at the America Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an attempt to penetrate Western circles".

After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who had by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and KOVSHUK concluded that PREISFREUND thereby had been identified as a KGB agent to American Intelligence, 06 and that 06 PREISFREUND should not be used again against American Embassy personnel. NOSENKO was told to use the Finn in 11 Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since he knew only Finnish and Russian. 11

NOSENKO's Information-1965

In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO provided some additions as well as further amendments to what he had related earlier about STORSBERG. 06 GRYAZNOV wrote the initial operational plan, which NOSENKO read and approved. The plan called for a detailed study of STORSBERG 06 and the creation of some basis on which to make an operational approach. The case developed slowly in 1960. From 06 a female clerk named YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the 29 Finnish Embassy, PREISFREUND obtained background information 06 06 on STORSBERG, who sometimes visited the sauna in the Finnish 08 Embassy. PREISFREUND was directed to visit America House 06 in order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG, 06 and when he was successful, he managed to lure STORSBERG to his 06 hotel room, where the KGB obtained incriminating photographs 06 of STORSBERG and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. STORSBERG 06 visited 06 PREISFREUND's rooms many times at different hotels in Moscow, but the KGB took incriminating photographs on

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06 06

only two occasions. PREISFREUND introduced STORSBERG to SKVORTSOV, and when they had become acquainted, SKVORTSOV 06 invited STORSBERG to his room at the Leningrad Hotel on a number of occasions, but STORSBERG always refused. On one 06 evening in the middle of 1961, however, STORSBERG accepted 06 SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet non-Soviet girls. NOSENKO was in the hotel and he had made arrangements with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate to call at once if audio coverage of the American Embassy indicated anything which might affect the recruitment attempt.

While NOSENKO waited outside the room, GRIBANOV attempted 06 to recruit STORSBERG on ideological grounds; his proposal was translated by KOVSHUK. 06 STORSBERG, however, must have given SKVORTSOV's hotel room telephone number to someone at the American Embassy, because while GRIBANOV was talking to him someone called SKVORTSOV's room looking for the American. When this happened, either GRYAZNOV or NOSENKO knocked on the door and advised KOVSHUK that the Embassy was searching for STORSBERG. 06 The recruitment attempt was thereupon terminated, unsuccessfully.

NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB file on STORSBERG. 06 [In describing KGB practice, NOSENKO consistently equated custody of a case file with being the responsible case officer.] He had no interest in "earlier reporting", although he had read current materials concerning 06 STORSBERG as they came into the Embassy Section.

Comment: NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted with the substance of the 1962 meeting transcripts in which he claimed to have run the operation, to have been deeply involved in it, and to have personally spoken to STORSBERG 06 during the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO interrupted the reading of the transcript, calling it "nonsense". He said he was drunk at all the 1962 meetings in Geneva and was nervous in the presence of CIA officers. He

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Comment: (Continued)
admitted that he had "painted himself" as being somewhat more active and important than facts justified, but said this reflected only "white lies" which did not affect the otherwise complete accuracy of his story with respect to the position he occupied at the time nor the events which then transpired.

NOSENKO's Information-1966

During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as to the timing and sequence of events in the STORSBERG opera- 06 tion, and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or any other operation he described, stating he could no longer be sure when any particular incident occurred. Questioned 06 again about the STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO insisted that he had directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and that it was his most important case. At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following chronology:

06

January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow. (NOSENKO accepted the actual date as supplied by the interrogator.)

06

Early 1960 or mid-1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. NOSENKO, after retracting his claim he recruited PREISFREUND, said he 06 first met PREISFREUND "a week or so 06 after his recruitment" (which occurred, according to most accounts, in early 1960). In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND 06 first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960".

06

Summer 1960: PREISFREUND first provided a woman to STORSBERG.

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Early 1961: Compromising photographs of STORSBERG 06 and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.

About May. 1961: 06 PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG. 06

June 1961: Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG 06 in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier in the 1966 interrogations NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half 06 before STORSBERG left Moscow". Told 06 that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961, five months 06 before STORSBERG's departure.) 06 STORSBERG reported that the approach was in October 1961. See below.]

06 STORSBERG's Information

06 STORSBERG did not report the KGB recruitment approach until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize his chance for employment with the State Department. He said that he provided no information to the Soviets during or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception of the timing of the recruitment attempt, STORSBERG's 06 account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by NOSENKO, including the roles of PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV, 06 whom he positively identified by their photographs. He was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, or NOSENKO.

06 STORSBERG said that he first became acquainted with 06 PREISFREUND in February or March 1960, he was first intimate with a female procured by PREISFREUND "six months or so" 06

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[e.g., ca. June] after arriving in Moscow, and it was not until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel MICHAUD". 06 STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV, stating variously that he met him through State Department code clerk Joseph MORONE, 06 through friends at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with SKVORTSOV while he, STORSBERG, 06 was serving as bartender in the America Club. During September 1961 STORSBERG was 06 intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.

06

In the middle of October 1961, on the evening of the KGB recruitment attempt, STORSBERG saw SKVORTSOV, MORONE, 06 and an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.

06 06

Comment: STORSBERG could not have met MORONE with SKVORTSOV in October 1961. 06 MORONE was transferred to Lisbon the previous August after he himself was compromised by the KGB. See p. 198. As far as CIA is aware, MORONE has never been 06 questioned regarding his alleged association with SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD or STORSBERG. 06

06 06

While MORONE was dancing with the unknown female, STORSBERG was invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks. STORSBERG 06 and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, and STORSBERG was again 06 intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room. It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV's room on this night when STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB.

06

In a signed statement which he gave a representative of the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on 29 July 1965, 06 STORSBERG gave somewhat different details. According to this account, three or four months after arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met 06 PREISFREUND through friends at the Finnish Embassy. Thereafter PREISFREUND became a frequent visitor to the America Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06 06

occasions STORSBERG was intimate with females in PREISFREUND's hotel rooms. 06 STORSBERG last saw PREISFREUND 06 around the end of September or the beginning of October 1961, when PREISFREUND 06 stopped coming to the America Club. At about that time, he first met SKVORTSOV through MORONE, 06 at the America Club. 06 MORONE left Moscow the previous August.] STORSBERG 06 was not sure of the exact circumstances of his introduction 06 to SKVORTSOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with MORONE. After meeting STORSBERG, 06 SKVORTSOV frequently visited the America Club and actively cultivated STORSBERG's 06 friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit SKVORTSOV's apartment, where STORSBERG was intimate with a 06 Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a second visit to the apartment, about a week after the first, that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to 06 this as well as STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961.

In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August 1965, 06 STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign intelligence agency since his return to the United States, or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelligence agency". He also denied having agreed in any way with 06 PREISFREUND to buy diamonds. 06 STORSBERG's denial with respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited by the KGB after being compromised by PREISFREUND in illicit speculation.]

06 06

PREISFREUND's Information

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CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in July 1965 in Helsinki. [NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would 06 confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.] 06 While PREISFREUND 06 correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and 06 STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even know what the initials "KGB" stood for.

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06 PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he had been involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG and he agreed 06 to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while containing some internal contradictions, only partially coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. [PREISFREUND 06 claimed to be hazy on the date of all events connected with his contacts with the KGB. The dates, however, could be reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events which he said occurred about the time he was recruited or 06 first met STORSBERG or last visited the America House, and so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK, first dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of 1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to PREISFREUND, 06 he was "cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUK. The first time he met either was when he was confronted and recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black-market dealings. [NOSENKO is unaware of that feature of 06 PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's recruitment, 06 he became acquainted with STORSBERG, 06 and in the summer of 1960 on one occasion he lured STORSBERG into intimacy with 06 a female KGB agent (earlier identified by NOSENKO) in his hotel room. He never saw STORSBERG again, nor did he 06 participate in any other KGB operations.

06 Referring to the night STORSBERG was intimate with the female KGB agent in PREISFREUND's hotel room, PREISFREUND 06 06 said he slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and the 06 girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron. He deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in surreptitious photography of STORSBERG and the girl. 06

Comment: NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of 06 STORSBERG and a girl in PREISFREUND's hotel 06 room. He has never said anything to suggest, however, that he ever personally was involved in photographing any of the compromises he claims to have arranged, nor has he ever claimed any competence in clandestine photography.

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06

Before his last meeting with CIA, PREISFREUND mentioned that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family, but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection. He was apprehensive and particularly concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related his role in the STORSBERG case to American Intelligence. 06 During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND 06 asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that if the situation was as he described, it could be quite dangerous for him to return. PREISFREUND stated then that 06 he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.

06

Comment: PREISFREUND did shortly thereafter visit the Soviet Union as he planned, and according to 11 Finnish official travel records returned to 10 Helsinki on 24 July 1965. From his apparent immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that 06 PREISFREUND is to some degree still under KGB control.

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on several occasions in 1960 a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND 08,06 whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960 [GOLITSYN's passport showed that it took place in January 1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in Moscow to request the permission of KOVSHUK to use PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland. 06 11 KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that 06 PREISFREUND "helped in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to arouse American suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK that PREISFREUND had met the target at America Club in

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Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and lured him into intimacy with various female KGB agents. According to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND "had helped to create 06 the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation before the actual approach, which was made by KGB officers. The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUK related 06 to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk or diplomat. (GOLITSYN later expressed his personal belief that the individual probably was unmarried and might have been a "military man".)

06

Comment: If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG, but to some other American code clerk against whom 06 PREISFREUND was used, NOSENKO's claim to have supervised all such code clerk operations is refuted.

06

Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG: Summary and Conclusion

In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that GOLITSYN's lead refers to STORSBERG. 06 The role of PREISFREUND 06 is the key to this determination. While the time of the operation remains in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to be the most plausible because of the circumstances under which he acquired his information. These circumstances--GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow, about the use of PREISFREUND are confirmed by NOSENKO and 06 the date, January 1961, is established by passport information. It follows that the operation against STORSBERG thus 06 would have taken place more than six months prior to the time NOSENKO and STORSBERG claimed. Such a significant inaccuracy 06 by NOSENKO, about an event which he said took place less than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962), undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section and supervisor of code clerk operations.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Attempted Defection of KEYSERS

06

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS served in Moscow from 20 December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy Medical Officer Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain. 06, 08 06 KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY who 06 had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer, 06 KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. 06 KEYSERS was trained also to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the 06 military code room, but he was relieved of this duty in April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, 06 KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors on 16 June 1961.

06 NOSENKO first spoke of what turned out to be the KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962, but without naming the KGB target or identifying him as STORSBERG's replacement. The 06 KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered the American to be a homosexual, he said, and when the KGB found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to the American. NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the airport just before his departure.

06

On 24 January 1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962 description of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's 06 replacement, whom he identified as ZUJUS. 06 Several days later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested an urgent meeting with CIA. At the meeting he announced that he had made a mistake, that STORSBERG's replacement was 06 06 not ZUJUS, but KEYSERS. 06 KEYSERS, 06 not ZUJUS, 06 he said was the homosexual code clerk whom he NOSENKO had personally accosted at the airport.

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NOSENKO's Information

06 06

KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement as military code clerk, and the KGB "sensed at once" that he was a homosexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of everything else. NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for example, chased KEYSERS 06 all over Moscow, attempting (without success) to confront their target in compromising circumstances. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades troupe) came to Moscow, and KEYSERS 06 became involved at America House with some of its male homosexual members. The Embassy Security Officer learned of KEYSERS' activities at about the same time 06 NOSENKO learned of them through a KGB agent. 06 The KGB would have preferred to attempt to recruit KEYSERS, but it learned that he was to be withdrawn from the Soviet Union. The KGB then sent a letter to KEYSERS, 06 at his room in America House, pointing out the trouble he was in, and offering him asylum in the USSR. 06 KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the 06 day of KEYSERS' departure, KGB surveillants reported that he had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in the terminal building found occasion to approach KEYSERS 06 alone. NOSENKO asked if KEYSERS had thought about the offer 06 in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately 06 reported the approach to the officer escorting him.

In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at the time NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the KGB 06 had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the 06 letter inviting him to defect, because no information to this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps in the Embassy.

06

KEYSERS' Information

06

Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS acknowledged to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at America House. He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961, and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe in May. He denied any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner were asleep.

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In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961, KEYSERS 06 related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow. On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache 06 Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred from Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.

Comment: NOSENKO's information generally coincides with that reported by KEYSERS and Embassy officials. 06 However, before the events NOSENKO described, 06 KEYSERS' behavior and reputation had already been discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache, Colonel HOFFMAN, a 06 conversation which HOFFMAN concludes was among those sensitive matters compromised by microphones later discovered in the Army Attache offices. Similarly, Colonel URBAN's conversa- 06 06 tion informing KEYSERS of his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would have learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, 06 that KEYSERS did report the receipt of the defection letter to his superiors.

06 KEYSERS described the Russian who approached him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225 pounds, and having a dark complexion and light hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is several inches taller and not rotund. When 06 KEYSERS was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he did not recognize him.

According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at 06 once" that KEYSERS was a homosexual. He is unaware of certain information relating to 06 KEYSERS' homosexual activities, drinking, and difficulties with his superiors, although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected

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Comment: (Continued) 06 06

with the case could regard KEYSERS as STORSBERG's replacement. 06 KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost a year before STORSBERG's departure, and was 06 assigned to the Air Attache office. ZUJUS, 06 06 STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and 06 worked with STORSBERG about three months before 06 STORSBERG departed Moscow. 06 KEYSERS stated NOSENKO was not the person who approached him at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he was, forgot the name of the single American target whom he ever personally confronted.

Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS 06

In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personally recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS, the 11, 06 "main agent" in a KGB developmental operation against U.S. 06 Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS. 06 ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties 06 of STORSBERG, and he remained there until January 1963. NOSENKO did not recall the ZUJUS case until he was reminded 06 of it by a reference to Samih WEISS which was among his notes which he brought to Geneva. 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 08

NOSENKO recruited WEISS, a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961. 06, 08 WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club, and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the 06 persons he had met there, he was told to develop him, not to pay any attention to anyone else. 06 WEISS and ZUJUS had 06 something in common in that ZUJUS had been stationed in 06 11, 08 Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short distance away. 06 WEISS merely studied and developed ZUJUS 06 during conversations at the America Club. On one occasion, 06 when ZUJUS agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese 11 vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal Residency in Beirut, and WEISS presented it to ZUJUS as a gift from friends. 10

06 06

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06

ZUJUS' case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the 06 "main agent" WEISS, NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities with respect to ZUJUS. 06 NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directorate file on the American, as well as all reports as they came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan, which called for thorough development 06 by WEISS in order to learn everything about him and eventually 06 to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through the Syrian. 08 Progress 06 was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House. Although WEISS and 06 06 ZUJUS became acquainted, they did not become good friends. 06 On the days WEISS planned to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses. This occurred every week or two, depending on WEISS' availability. 06 When they met the day following WEISS' 06 meetings with ZUJUS, 06 06 WEISS would report such things as which Americans were drinking heavily and who at America House was involved with which girls from foreign embassies. Although WEISS visited 06 America House once or twice a month, and drank there with 06 ZUJUS, he reported little of interest.

The KGB learned "something" about 06 ZUJUS' family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall: he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of interest to the KGB about ZUJUS' family background. There 06 was no information on ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, 06 telephone taps or surveillance, and the KGB was unaware of any vices or vulnerabilities which ZUJUS may have had. 06 NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against 06 ZUJUS. The KGB did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS while 06 NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO would certainly learned of it from GRYAZNOV.

"Because no one else knew him", at the American Department's request NOSENKO continued to manage WEISS' contact 06 06 with ZUJUS after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Department in January 1962. In March or April 1962 it was planned 06 that WEISS would invite ZUJUS to a restaurant where he 06 would be introduced to "a friend", but the meeting had not

06

materialized before NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV and left for Geneva. When WEISS 06 returned to Syria in April 1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate: his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.

06 ZUJUS' Information

During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in 06 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that in the summer of 1962 ZUJUS had been intimate with an 06 Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had visited America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. 06 Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, 06 the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport. She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.

Comment: NOSENKO described this incident, but in connection with KGB attempts to entrap Joseph 06 MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962. 06 (See p. 194.) NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962. Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident.

06 Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965, ZUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS. 06 ZUJUS often used her an an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide considerable background information about her.

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Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House. He never related her to ZUJUS. 06

In that same interview with CIA 06 ZUJUS described having met in Moscow a person from Damascus 10 who had been in Beirut, 10 or a person from Beirut 10 who had been in Damascus, 10 he could not recall which. 06 ZUJUS met him while acting as doorman at America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes 06 and ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about. He may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description. 06 ZUJUS did not recall that 11 this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he favored the beverage. 06 ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his father, Matas, 06 is secretary of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic 29 Alliance of America, an emigre organization concerned with the liberation of Lithuania. 11 06 ZUJUS indicated that his father often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.

Comment: Emigre organizations, including the 11 Lithuanian, have been traditional KGB targets and most have been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the elder ZUJUS' 06 emigre activities is almost certainly to have been known to the KGB, making 06 ZUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties.

From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with ZUJUS' 06 father's activities, 06 ZUJUS' intimacy with KGB agent "Lillian" and relationship with KGB agent UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role in the case, if any, was limited to his rela- 06 tionship with WEISS and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory function in the development of ZUJUS. 06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Operations Against State Department Code Clerks

KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as military cryptographers at the Embassy. In several such cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures prominently.

Development of Paul JENNER 06

06

NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER case in a 1964 interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV had travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact with an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled" such an incident which happened in 1960-1961. He explained that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks. According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others. NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as Paul JENNER.

06

NOSENKO's Information

06

A month before JENNER's arrival in Moscow the Embassy Section received a copy of JENNER's anketa (visa application) 06 listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was subsequently found to be a pouch clerk), "the group" decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying 06 JENNER on the train to Moscow to study JENNER's behavior. 06 06 JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age. KOSOLAPOV was to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV's, "SOLISTKA", a Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after it entered the USSR at Vyborg.

(9BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approval of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assigned to Moscow usually only for one year [thus limiting their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signature and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release. There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow. NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and "maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had JENNER's photograph and his 06 name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV on JENNER's train. 06 NOSENKO did not recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train.

NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA". According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on 06 the train with JENNER as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in JENNER's car. 06 06 "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her Moscow telephone number. While in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow. Nothing came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Section later learned the Residency had "more important questions".

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER was not a 08 code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained a target for development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet the couriers. 06 JENNER saw her but did not approach her, turning away. The KGB took no further steps to cultivate 06 JENNER. The KGB "had nothing on JENNER at all except a 06 suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof".

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928] his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photograph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm, who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March 06 1960 [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April. NOSENKO acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki to accompany JENNER back to Moscow in 1960.

06

On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish train manifest showing that Paul JENNER was the single 06 passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960 and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2 April on a train carrying no Americans. Repeating the substance of the KGB operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV's report of the trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled on the same train with JENNER 06 and that the Finnish manifests must be in error. [See accompanying exhibits.]

06

JENNER's Information

06

After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students". The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER 06 in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER 06 was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers

13/BR

to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. "Yuliya" explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight 06 depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male 06 companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's" 06 questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When 06 JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her. She advised JENNER 06 that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone".

06

Comment: As far as CIA is aware, JENNER has never been asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.

06 Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid.

Comment: Although NOSENKO has not identified either of these women as KGB agents, he has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.

EXHIBIT 1 - Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla Vainikkalan

1	Jenner, Paul Francis	arkist.sih	17.07.33	U.S.A:n	U.S.A. - Mosk. /F	
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Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst.
E. Seukkonen

06

31 March 1960

06

NOTE: JENNER single international passenger on train. (Soviet passengers who may have boarded train in USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla Vainikkalan

1	Ferdinand, Klaus Vilhelm	Yliopiston opettaja	10.04.26	Tanskan	Tanska-Afganistan/F	
2	Hourpiliadi, Sofia	konttoristi	20.02.22	Kreikan	Tukholma-Mosk./F	Se asuu
3	Kolossov, Viktor	Sicliin:n virkailija	10.03.27	N.liiton	Hki. - Mosk.	Copv./Mosk.
4	Suomen kansalaiset:			Kotipaikka:		
5	Korhonen, Jouko Aarre Armas V	työmies	16.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	(9pv.viis.
6	Laukkanen, Kirsti Hellin Irene V	konsl.apul	24.07.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-Gorki	(15pv.viis.)
7	Koskenniemi, Tyyne Kyllikki V T.	rouva	03.09.21	"	"	"
8	[illegible], Elli Helena V Vock	"	23.07.22	Lahti		
9	Tiili, Aako Viljam V Vock	opettaja	13.07.28	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15pv.viis.)
10	Tekala, Toivo Erkki V Vock	var.hoit.	27.03.22	"		
11	Utriainen, Erkki Olavi V Vock	kirj.mies	03.08.20	"		
12	Kaspio, Otto Allan V	toimittaja	08.12.17	Helsinki		
13	Kiki-Reinikka, Antti V	liitt.siht.	12.04.28	"		
14	Karukoski, Unto Mattias V	nuor.siht.	13.12.10	Sunila	Hki. - Mosk.	(15pv.viis.)
15	Järvinen, Aarne Juhani V bm	varastomies	27.01.34	Toijala		
16	Sundman, Judith Josefina V	tsto.apul.	03.03.15	Helsinki		
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Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst.
E. Saukkonen

2 April 1960

NOTE: No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.

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TS No. 197124
Copy 1

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Information From Other Sources

I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American 06 named Paul F. JENNER, who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before. SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER 06 but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent from "about 1945 on".

06

Development of JENNER: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's version of the 06 JENNER case in some degree resembles less the facts about JENNER than KGB activities 06 06 directed against John GARLAND (see below), activities which NOSENKO asserts never occurred. 06 GARLAND, not JENNER, 06 travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND not 06 06 JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month". The Helsinki Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about JENNER 06 indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about 06 JENNER, not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki. It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that 06 "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile 06 wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the actions of KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. 06 From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

Development of John GARLAND

06

The GARLAND case is of particular significance to judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim to complete knowledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks. NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with respect to GARLAND, he vehemently asserts no such action was taken. 06

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was 06 GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing doing". Later asked to review the list and supply any additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that 06 the KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against GARLAND, 06 nor could he recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, 06 but he thought he must have read reports concerning him as they came into the Embassy Section. There was no operational plan drawn up 06 for GARLAND because the KGB developed no derogatory information concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned or attempted. NOSENKO could recall no background information concerning GARLAND, 06 such as his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below] of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND back 06 to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and 06 that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to 06 GARLAND. (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve

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in advance any operational travel performed by his subordinate outside of the USSR.) Reminded that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960 (the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with GARLAND), 06 NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV's travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.

06 GARLAND's Information

06 GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the GOLITSYN lead [see below]. In this interview GARLAND denied 06 having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 06 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that 06 GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent". 06 GARLAND, by his own statement, took the train on 16 November 1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as supervisor of the State Department code room 08 in the Embassy.

GOLITSYN's Information

GOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960, reported that "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow. The telegram stated that the responsible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki in alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow. The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the American's compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to the train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow, and he talked with KOSOLAPOV. Later in the summer or fall of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer would have been willing to talk to him about it.

06

Shown GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962, GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV".

Information From Other Sources

KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960. The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. 06 GARLAND, the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.]

06

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND an American who would arrive there on 14 November. 06

06

Development of GARLAND: Summary and Conclusion

06

Whether or not GARLAND was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, 06 GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately reflect) that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki except in connection with JENNER, 06 and his assertion thus cannot be dismissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he confuses the cases of JENNER and GARLAND. 06

06 06

NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks. Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO's 06 claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks.

Top Secret

EXHIBIT 2 - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow



Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla -saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta } Vainikkalan kautta / 196

	Suku- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määrämaa	Osoite Suomessa
1	Mouravieva, Nonna	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Morosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S	F,Kauttakulku
4	Otchagovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Laria	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6	Kolossov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7	Agadjanov, Carnik	"	1922	"	"	-
8	Akolzine, Potr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
06 10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Bruberg, Henry Charles	tsto siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Pantalainen, Aatu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. 8.H.85, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent.	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja,20.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Heikki Juhani Tåm	lainop.kand	21.01.20	"	"	Kivelterink.23.C, Hki.
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Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen
E. Saukkonen

16 November 1960

NOTE: 06 GARLAND and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same train.

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Top Secret

TS No. 197124
Copy 1

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONE

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female Polish UB agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls. He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in Moscow.

In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again, and when the names of code 06 clerk Joseph MORONE and Embassy Marine guard Frank BEGGS 06 were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men involved.

NOSENKO's Information

06

MORONE's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read 06 the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never saw him in person. NOSENKO discussed the MORONE case with 06 KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several KGB agents were employed against MORONE including foreigners as well as Soviet citizens.

06

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. 06 KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE 06 and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information from IVANOVA on MORONE which was interesting or useful.
06

SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited America House and met MORONE, but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled. 06

Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE.
06

In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of America House. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed 06 PREISFREUND (see the STORSBERG 06 case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. 06 The second East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.)

From one of these agents, 06 or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after

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some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the 06 train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and his companion, 06 06 BEGGS, for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's 06 acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse with MORONE during the trip. 06 The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Comment: At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation he was reminded that he was en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960 and did not return to Moscow until mid-December, and that State Department records indicated that MORONE and 06 06 BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived on the following day. NOSENKO responded that instead of having talked to the technician personally, he may have read the technician's

Comment: (Continued)
report and had seen "the film strips" after his return from Cuba. NOSENKO, it will be noted, had said earlier that there was no photographic coverage of MORONE's train compartment.
06

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America 06 06 House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. 06 He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to attempt to recruit MORONE. 06 The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that was definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE out of 06 America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of 06 Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit MORONE. 06

NOSENKO has also explained 06 (to the FBI) that no attempt was made to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

MORONE's Information

Following receipt of information about his compromise, received from a sensitive Polish source, MORONE was first 06 interviewed about the allegation in May 1961. On 19 August 1961 he was transferred from Moscow. In an October 1962 security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with 06 06 Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he 06 had sexual relations with at least two other women while in 06 Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow, 06 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. 06 MORONE has denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

Information From Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE 06 out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE and was 06 intimate with him on the train to Warsaw. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE, 06 but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a 06 suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONE and herself. 06 The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961

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and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. 06 The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE. 06

06 06 The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed that the Polish girl and MORONE were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and 06 that MORONE had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

06 MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was 06 involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by SARWAT EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE 06 confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the 06 introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. 06 MORONE was intimate with one of them in SARWAT's apartment in the spring of 1961. 06 MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro 06 CECCHI, and MORONE had admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the 06 State Department code room, (a restricted area to which CECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that 06 MORONE had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 MORONE denied having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued.

06 The Army code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE 06 was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as "MICHAUD", was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit 06 STORSBERG. (See p. 173.) 06 STORSBERG recalled meeting MICHAUD at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there. In one version of his recruitment STORSBERG said that MORONE was
06 06

in SKVORTSOV's company the night SKVORTSOV lured STORSBERG 06 to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.

Operation Against 06 MORONE: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the 06 MORONE case, the use of the Polish UB female agent. He is apparently unaware of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB), 06 such as MORONE's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS. 06 He errs in relating to MORONE the East German female agent sent to America House: the incident occurred, but later, 06 when MORONE was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself still in the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did 06 not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit MORONE: if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other reasons. KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period between the U-2 incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis (August 1961).

Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the GARLAND 06 case.

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of recruitments among Embassy personnel.

Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks

In connection with his responsibility for directing KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961, NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code clerks who served in Moscow during that period. Their brief treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but NOSENKO's limited comments and the lack of collateral

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information. The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects the KGB's knowledge of each target.

Maurice ZWANG 06

06

NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced 06 ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incriminating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG and 06 refused his sexual advances. In January 1962 (when NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against ZWANG. 06 The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him, and had no information indicating ZWANG was vulnerable.

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Comment: In connection with a State Department security interview conducted after ZWANG returned from 06 Moscow, 06 ZWANG related that in March or April 1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on several occasions but with whom he was not intimate. Although ZWANG denied it, a polygraph 06 examination indicated that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her apartment.

06 ZWANG's maid has been identified as a KGB agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that ZWANG was active in currency 06 speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.

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06

John TAYLOR

06

NOSENKO identified TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was interested in TAYLOR because of his intimacy with his Russian maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people". No attempt was made to recruit TAYLOR because of the lack of compromising photographs of TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by risking a scandal with TAYLOR. 06

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Comment: TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until his departure in early 1961, on one occasion in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that maid had told TAYLOR she was pregnant and TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG did not occur until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, or October 1961, according to STORSBERG. 06

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Frank DAY

06

NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. The KGB knew nothing interesting about him such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities he may have had. No operational measures were taken against him.

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Comment: DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. The two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip. On one occasion they found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and on another an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment. 08, 06

06

Robert DWELLY

Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list in September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY was a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the operational plan against DWELLY nor the identity of any agent who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV. 06 06 06 06

Under interrogation in February 1965, however, NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room". There was a "big hunt" for DWELLY and on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained: there was no approach and no recruitment. 06 06 06 06

NOSENKO later added that "perhaps" GRYAZNOV's homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY in a public toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis that he concluded DWELLY was a homosexual. 06

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Comment: DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk from April 1959 to July 1960. In a Department of State security interview in March 1966 (prompted by NOSENKO's information), he categorically denied being a homosexual. He described two occasions in Moscow when, while walking alone, two men, who by their general appearance and actions made him think they were "queer", were trying to attract his attention. He recalled that, on one of the two occasions, one asked him the way to the toilet.

06

Joseph GAFFEY

06

NOSENKO originally identified GAFFEY as a military enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however, he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO supervised. The KGB attempted to lure GAFFEY into downtown 06 Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her 06 repeated invitations. The KGB was unaware of any vices 06 GAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information regarding him.

06

Comment: GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961. A fellow resident of America House, Fred KADERA, reported during a State Department 06 security interview that GAFFEY had told him 06 that he had been intimate with a girl at America House. 06 GAFFEY told KADERA that he did 06 not know she was Russian until he was walking her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her as such. America House manager Peter BINDER 06 reported rumors in America House that GAFFEY 06

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Comment: (Continued)
was having an affair with IVANOVA in America House. He described GAFFEY as the heaviest 06 drinker in America House and said that occasion- 06 ally GAFFEY could not report to work due to his drinking. In describing the KGB approach made to him in early 1963, BINDER (see p.405) 06 quoted his interrogator as saying that GAFFEY 06 took IVANOVA to BINDER's room in America House, 06 implying that he was intimate with her at that time.

06 GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before the expiration of his tour, because of drunkenness. During a State Department security interview, GAFFEY admitted 06 being intimate with IVANOVA at America House and at her apartment. 06 GAFFEY reported that IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion.

Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section, operations against the American code clerks were the Section's priority task and thus his most important single responsibility as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations. Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially at variance with his account, in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks. Consequently, he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among other Embassy personnel.

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Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer
John ABIDIAN

Comment: John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy Section of the American Department. The State Department replacement for CIA officer Russell LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing deaddrop emergency communications from CIA source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959, and Khrushchev at the end of 1959. These

Comment: (Continued)
duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations. One of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy Section.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.

Duties as a Case Officer

When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN. Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN

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had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA. That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but that unit had no information not included in its original report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but none were ever received. NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments, military service, or foreign service status.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead "to another POPOV". [POPOV, a GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB sources, was apprehended in 1959.]

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy

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was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case. As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports.

In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the operational plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but specified that:

-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes. (According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long afterwards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. "ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the Embassy Section.

-Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

-All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two other KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB agent - whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were involved with ABIDIAN. GROMAKOVA, a language instructor for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He learned nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.

Comment: Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with ABIDIAN until told that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. In actuality ABIDIAN took regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons per week, from shortly after his arrival until his departure from Moscow.

The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in Armenia.]

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly, since it contained the office room number of each American employee. [The Embassy telephone list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.] ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent (identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There was no such sign.] NOSENKO was unable to determine if ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed there. [In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was found in the room occupied in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO recalled no particularly interesting or important information about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since "data of this nature was not operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development".

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made. Such information would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. However, there was no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow".

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With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

Comment: According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his travel plans with Embassy language teacher GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least some occasions used international telephone calls to arrange for accommodations at his destination in Europe. Also, the Foreign Ministry UPDK (which office provides administrative services to foreign diplomats in Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for an exit visa for each departure, could have noted from passport entries the whereabouts of his earlier travel.

ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which provides administrative services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

-Advising the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and any other necessary operational activity.

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-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen, their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. ABIDIAN attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him.

After being told ABIDIAN had attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip.

With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled having been on leave at the time. However, NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN's trip. In 1966, NOSENKO stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave was taken in January, not October.

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Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because there was nothing of interest in the conversations.

At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little about this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.

ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka. He cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet Union. He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several. He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such as a letter. All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing of metka, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed were intercepted. [NOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat, literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of light-sensitive device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had mailed a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic area, probably to Riga, and all were detected by metka, not by ABIDIAN's surveillants. According to NOSENKO, no new agents were discovered, however, since all of the agents to whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the KGB.

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Comment: NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa. No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia and Estonia.

CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. Ultra-violet, chemical and microscopic analyses developed one possible use of a metka like substance. Analysis of an article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction.

NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in Odessa and to his parents in the United States.

> "ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.

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"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret writing specialist). I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."

Comment: ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for him part-time from July 1961 until he left Moscow. Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed 1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.

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Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters were intercepted by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was responsible.

ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960 or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street in Moscow. He provided additional details when questioned again in 1965.

NOSENKO's Information

In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the corner, where he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV, the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance

Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. The post was manned around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected deaddrop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post at the site was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This case file NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh Department.)

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, and periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had already been discontinued without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.

When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:

> "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes', and I cannot say 'no'."

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a full year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN entered the building where the site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later, returning to the Embassy.

The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY in August 1960. CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY walked 03 by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960; on 21 January 1961 MAHONEY briefly entered the 03 building to confirm the site's precise location. If the KGB had surveilled MAHONEY's visits and 03 had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO might be relating those events by mischance in attributing the visit to ABIDIAN. In such a circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN's case officer, would have known that his target visited a site which had been previously noted in connection with the suspicious movements of another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's description of ABIDIAN's route, companion, and sequence of movements is so precise as to refer clearly to ABIDIAN. Lastly, NOSENKO dislcaims any knowledge of MAHONEY or his activities; he 03 asserts that MAHONEY was neither the object of 03 KGB suspicion or concern. For reasons no combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe ABIDIAN's deaddrop site visit although it occurred at a time when NOSENKO was no longer ABIDIAN's case officer and when he was assigned to another Second Chief Directorate department.

If he turned over ABIDIAN's file on 28 December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer, as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received

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Comment: (Continued)
nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site. If he transferred to the Seventh Department two days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and NOSENKO's participation in the W.E. JOHNSON case 06 indicates that he was working against tourists by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited the site as he described nor could he have received thereafter the daily surveillance reports. He could not, of his own knowledge, assert that the surveillance was terminated after three months, since well before the three months' surveillance ended he was abroad in Geneva. Lastly, it cannot be for the reason NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was unsuccessful) that NOSENKO did not mention ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion

If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run the traces himself nor know the results. According to NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of the most important targets of the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio surveillance, and technical aids, with almost absolutely negative results. The results could not have been negative: for NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not informed of the results. In the two instances NOSENKO cited of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ABIDIAN Russian throughout his stay in Moscow, not just "several times". NOSENKO acknowledges

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that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had to been approved by the KGB, and that the responsible case officer would have issued orders for his surveillance outside of Moscow and would have later received reports of the target's activities. NOSENKO acknowledged that he was not so involved, although he belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN made. Lastly, although NOSENKO claims to know, from his Embassy Section assignment, details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop, the event occurred at a time when NOSENKO by his own account could not have been physically present in the Embassy Section.

Conclusion

It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN.

Supervisor of Operations Against American Service Attaches

Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed no personal role in operations against American service attaches. He said only that when he arrived in the section, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval personnel, including the Embassy Marine guards, and when DRANOV was transferred shortly thereafter, his responsibilities were assumed by BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names and functions of American Department personnel, NOSENKO mentioned that Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN was Second Deputy to Department Chief KLYPIN: ALESHIN had the special assignment of coordinating Second Chief Directorate activities against all foreign military intelligence personnel, including service attaches.

In January 1965 NOSENKO claimed for the first time that he had among his other responsibilities as Deputy Chief that of supervising operations against American service attaches, and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how, at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume supervisory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff of the Embassy. NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the case officers for the service attaches referred their questions to him, not to KOVSHUK. These included case officers GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all services. "While he was getting acquainted with the section on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel. This responsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall how long he supervised service attache operations; he later said "several months" and finally "five or six months". Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or duties caused him to be relieved of this function. He said this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and coordinator for Second Directorate operations against military intelligence officers of all nationalities.

Supervisor of Service Attache Operations: Summary and Conclusion

Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been responsible for operations against service attaches and because he was not able, when challenged, to substantiate his claims by providing any details of KGB activities against these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his claimed KGB service is a fiction.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security

As former Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically, NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief Directorate's file on Embassy security.

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO's knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derived both from his general supervisory functions during 1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB file on the Embassy security. He received the file from the Section Chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in January 1960. As was permissible under KGB procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p. 153 for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.] NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28 December 1961, only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (both of whom shared NOSENKO's office and safe) had access to the file.

The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on Chaykovskiy Street. The file contained detailed floor plans and photographs of both buildings.

No operational analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years in the Embassy Section. It was used only for reference purposes, since the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the American security precautions in effect.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors", were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest in these offices. [The secure area barred to unescorted local employees is comprised of the eighth through tenth floors.]

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file, while he was custodian. None of the information was of interest or important or useful enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB agent sources. [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously] that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security Office".]

Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone. NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness and to certify the destruction of classified documents. If NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated it in any context.]

In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents. The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists contain names, apartment numbers and telephone numbers, but omits office room numbers.]

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. None of the technical specifications of the room were known, nor was its location. An unrecalled source reported only that meetings were held in the room, which was in the restricted area.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material during 1960-1961. A charwoman who was an agent of BELOGLAZOV stole a bag of papers from the Naval Attache office. The torn and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the KGB. The charwoman was granted a cash award.

Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code room, or the State Department communications center. In fact, he cannot describe the location of the office of any individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador. When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never read it nor paid any "special attention" to its content in the two years he was file custodian. It is concluded that NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an invention.

Audio Operations Against the American Embassy

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversations. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have attended a meeting at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific microphones hidden in the Embassy. Lastly, NOSENKO claimed he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his former subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in 1962, as the most important he provided CIA.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

NOSENKO's Information

Handling of Monitor Reports

According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports. These included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies), KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB Departments. The reports were produced by the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU). The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN. KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and transcribed the tape recordings. Their reports of the preceding day's product were brought daily by Tatyana GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American Department. (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he received the reports first, at other times that they went first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours returned the reports to the Second Special Department. In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised the source of the information contained: the abstracts were returned to the American Department for the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy.

Location of the Microphones

In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the service attaches and particularly, to conversations held in the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he referred to "points" [microphones] in the office of an unnamed State Department employee, in the Agricultural Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the Embassy code room.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the microphones in the Embassy which were operative in the years 1960-1961. NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department Chief KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section for use against non-Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special Section, but had been told that English linguists were engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be released to PETROV's Second Section. KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of lesser importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, temporarily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of the information obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.

NOSENKO's list showed that microphones were located in the following offices of the noted occupants:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

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NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in the chancery building before the Americans occupied it, but he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulnerable to technical search and discovery.

According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military personnel. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans, as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because of the risk of discovery. For the same reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers. The KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would be a scandal.

Performance Characteristics of the Microphones

According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it because they could not gain access to the inside of the Embassy. Referring to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to work with its product. The microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper". KUZMIN, the KGB officer responsible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in place, about twenty no longer were operative.

In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. NOSENKO learned from DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to monitor conversations in that office. Only very experienced linguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten, fifteen, even twenty times" in order to understand portions of the recording. After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section, on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones' decline. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up only snatches of conversation, and that in a year or two they would be completely inoperative. As a result, GRYAZNOV told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of code clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality of the microphone's signal, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV attributed the diminishing value of the audio operation to the Embassy use of the "room-in-a-room". [NOSENKO said that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in preparation for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber" had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conversations could be held.]

Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the building in 1962. In his first meetings with CIA in Geneva he described how he knew. When it was decided to permit the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a proposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval was held up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations because of the political consequences of discovery. By the time Shelepin approved the proposal two or three months later, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises. The opportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones. Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister Counsellor, the service attaches, and others presently occupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, be moved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neither audio equipment nor the capability of installing any.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production

In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified, GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy personnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out.

In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He said that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke. When one of them was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was advance information obtained of a social affair, for which the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special Department would be asked to pay particular attention. There was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a political officer) office, but no secret information was obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant was obtained except "something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.

In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

"From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

"Also from the microphones in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB.

"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific service attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against service attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

"I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone of any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

"During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

Results of Technical and Physical Search

NOSENKO's information [no action had been taken as a result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was a microphone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964. According to the USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery. [In 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.] The microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the various microphone installations. Fifty microphones were positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were found], although the system apparently was devised for a considerably greater number. The microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions. The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery in 1953.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic. The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation, probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing in 1962.

Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied the north wing, used it as a listening post for monitoring microphones in the chancery. In preparation for American occupancy the main cable from the chancery was concealed and run from the north wing roof to the basement, and presumably from there to a listening post elsewhere. The three coaxial cables may have been either installed at that time or earlier. Their purpose is still unknown, but they may have been a feature of a highly sophisticated electronic attack against the code room, the existence or character of which NOSENKO did not know and need not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in 1965 by CIA that there had been a technical discovery in the north wing, he offered his personal assurances that nothing was installed in the north wing and insisted that whatever was found must be something unrelated to an audio system.

Damage Estimates

With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetration, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col. HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just the conversations held in his office, could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code 06 clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager 06 Peter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and other incidents relating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS 06 from Moscow (homosexuality). [Besides his general duties as Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in the KGB attempts to recruit STORSBERG and KEYSERS. 06 (The KGB attempted later to recruit BINDER, 06 as well.)] In summing up his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised."

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Audio Operations Against American Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims, e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the chancery.

NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones' existence is not proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or even proof that he served in that unit). KGB sources serving elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specificall identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's office.

NOSENKO's acquisition of the list of microphones in "1960-1961" is singular (the more so since he never hinted of the list's existence while describing the microphones in the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired, that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates (GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two years, important ones of which were forwarded to Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such significance that they were the subjects of special reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Yet when challenged he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United

States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB), as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the microphones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained, he asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section. Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery microphones as sources of information on which he relied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel, he again can describe no actual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones (KEYSERS' failure to 06 report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.

Conclusion

From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.

Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications

As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed

AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

he recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority ask in 1960-1961]. He "knew", however, that the Eighth irectorate was reading at least some State Department mbassy traffic.

NOSENKO's Information

At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was reading all the State Department ciphers". He knew this ecause he saw the clear-text messages every day. In a ubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to xplain that while no service attache traffic was being ead, certain State Department codes had been broken. He ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables, t the most, "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961.

The Russian text of those deciphered State Department essages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who sometimes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief irectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the aterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American epartment, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it. ıkolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State epartment messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. He would open he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit LYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the material. This was Eighth irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how EMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were ead aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the osition of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government n political questions and were of no significance to him. nfrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy, nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the rrival of a one-or two-man "commission", to check the work f the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of tate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest

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in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information.

Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means.

NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms.

> "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations]. In the military code room--that was where [James H.] 06 STORSBERG and later [Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we 06 didn't get much. We could hear STORSBERG swearing 06 on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also."

With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by [James H.] McMILLAN [a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948], and by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to

"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Department and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow a single code room was shared by State Department and military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment.]

NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American code clerk brought to the USSR from India" [unidentified, but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communications technician who defected to the USSR sometime between 1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized].

NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting regular reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned that various Embassy officers were less often overheard from KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant information. This development GRYAZNOV and American Department Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room" installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures. [The acoustical room was installed in December 1962.] After his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV told him that the Central Committee was exerting considerable pressure on the KGB Chairman for continuation of the information formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all KGB officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.

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Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications: Summary and Conclusion

From USIB and NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959. "ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953, serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications, and that such information as he provided can not be related to his claim to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.

Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy

As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the identification and development of American Intelligence personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment. The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect

American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA. Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and on some officers who were not.

Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers

Boris KLOSSON 06

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KLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow, for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced 06 David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter mailing. 06 KLOSSON's case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON. 06 He never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in 06 any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of KLOSSON's 06 job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or any other features of his personal life, of his travels inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never read KLOSSON's file.

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Comment: KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no connection with CIA in Moscow.

John ABIDIAN

ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a Department of State security officer during Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE. Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed operational letters and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See p. 206)

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Comment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.

03

Steve WASHENKO

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WASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

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Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as an economic analyst to be assigned to Moscow. He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings. He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment.

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Lewis BOWDEN

BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.

Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.

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Richard FUNKHAUSER

FUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on economic matters. NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB agents working against FUNKHAUSER, nor any information about him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB.

Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.

William HORBALY

HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try to recruit HORBALY.

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Comment: Like WASHENKO, HORBALY was an overt employee and economic analyst of CIA before being appointed to a State Department position in Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact that he had formerly worked for CIA. In January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. While in Moscow HORBALY had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities.

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George WINTERS

WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case (see p.207). KOVSHUK was in personal contact with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.

Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.

CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB

Stanley BROWN

NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list indicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception, but insignificant production.

Comment: Like HORBALY and WASHENKO 03, BROWN was an overt employee of CIA who was transferred to the Department of Agriculture prior to being assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He was engaged in no clandestine activities during his tour. In 1960 he visited Leningrad with WINTERS, whom NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer. BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR in 1961. 24

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William N. MORELL

MORELL was not suspected of being a CIA officer. 06

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Comment: MORELL was an overt employee of CIA who was identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS (see p.430) 06 a KGB officer allegedly commented to STEVENS 06 06 that MORELL openly acknowledged himself to be a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivating MORELL. 06

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Eugene MAHONEY

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NOSENKO identified MAHONEY's name as that of an employee f the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was own of MAHONEY 03 such as his previous career, whether he ew Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where e lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was CIA officer.

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Comment: MAHONEY was a CIA officer who served in Moscow from October 1960 until September 1961 as an 32 assistant General Services Officer. His specific CIA mission was to support communications with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. From the start of his tour he was active in attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. 03 MAHONEY went to the vicinity of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two occasions during November and December 1960,

Comment: (Continued)
and examined the site itself on 21 January 1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour MAHONEY 03 was subjected to intense KGB surveillance. On 25 October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to a barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong 03 suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role as a CIA officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreet.) 03 MAHONEY lived throughout his tour in Moscow in America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents among the local employees. 03 MAHONEY spoke Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees.

Paul GARBLER

GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)

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Comment: The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow, GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952, and he served CIA under Naval cover 32,10 in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the 32,10 cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer. He returned to active duty with the Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposed as a candidate for the position of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official biographic summary, followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p. .) CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed by an article appearing in *Izvestiya* in October 1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage in Sweden.

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy: Summary and Conclusion

With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is most evident in the cases of MORELL and GARBLER. It is a 06 fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents

NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during 1960-1961.

YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he transferred to the American Department (see p. 111). They were used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO described the compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 and knew 06 of his later recruitment in 1961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO does not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 06 in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.]

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06

FRIPPEL

NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the 29 American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Department. (See p. 137.) 06 FRIPPEL was an uncooperative and unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the American Embassy.

DMITRIYEV

NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the 1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. (See p. 107.) He was not used operationally during 1960 or 1961.

Marina RYTOVA

NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used operationally during 1960-1961.

Maya LEVINA

LEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the Embassy used as an informant on her American language students, among whom were a number of code clerks. She provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was she ever used in operations. At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH, and NOSENKO 06 turned her over to another Embassy Section officer. The British Department planned later to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies. [LEVINA was employed at the Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. Cultural 08, 06 Affairs Officer SMITH left Moscow in September 1961, and could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termination. LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout NOSENKO's tour of duty with the Embassy Section.]

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

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PREISFREUND

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Recruited by KOVSHUK, PREISFREUND was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against STORSBERG (see p. 166). He was 06 used in no other operation during 1960-1961.

WEISS 06

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The Syrian Army captain studying in Moscow was first targetted against America House occupants, then used in 06 the development of ZUJUS, STORSBERG's successor. 06 The latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962.

Personal Handler of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion

Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment, none was used operationally during 1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was not fired earlier, as he asserted. 06 PREISFREUND and WEISS 06 are discussed in considerable detail in connection with the KGB operations against 06 STORSBERG and ZUJUS. 06 NOSENKO's claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or did not serve in the Embassy Section.

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Temporary Assignments Abroad

NOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled) and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960 and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments. The significance of his travel is the extent to which it relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed supervisory responsibility.

Planned Travel to the United States

In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated that he had been in the United States. He later amended this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled. He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid being connected to the name NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early account he claimed that the decision to use his true name was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision was made by "the people in charge of such operations". NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee [GNTK], and was to accompany an automotive delegation. The visit, however, was part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO's travel was cancelled.

Comment: The name of NOSENKO appeared along with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)

When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy there for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation as a security officer.

NOSENKO's Information

In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure for Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate decided it was unnecessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Directorate officer accompany the group. Because of the short time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.

NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between Mikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. On arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern Europe and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived in Berlin Guevara was found to have left Berlin for Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.

Comment: Travel records obtained by CIA, which include photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas of NOSENKO's true name service passport and his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO, a "minerals engineer", transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: (Continued)
Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.

NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier, bearing documents of the nature he described as he claimed.

NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising operations during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk 06 MORONE, was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November) in connection with another code clerk target, John GARLAND.
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Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)

In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief Directorate American Department officer to discuss operations with Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American professor Horace G. LUNT.
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NOSENKO's Information

Consultation with the MVR

NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV

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said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had requested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia. American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed NOSENKO to go. NOSENKO was told that he was going for "consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his duties with him. KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed its operations. NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with MVR representatives in Moscow before his departure, and knew nothing about the size or responsibilities of the MVR American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what the MVR's particular problems were.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961 and was met at the airport by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow. The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation, everything, right from letter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria. As far as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom NOSENKO himself described. The American Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demonstrated that it had lost none of its earlier demonstrated efficiency in controlling the activities of resident foreigners and in establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats. There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assignment, and therefore his account is judged to be untrue.

06

Compromise of [LUNT]

06 In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of [LUNT] in graphic terms, including his own personal confrontation of [LUNT]. 06 In his subsequent accounts he had stated 06 that while he never saw [LUNT] personally, he supervised the activities of the MVR officers who dealt with [LUNT]. 06

About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name of [Horace G. LUNT]. 06 NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR officers confirmed that this [LUNT] was a Slavic specialist, 06 NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same [LUNT] who 06 had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a homosexual. (The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of [LUNT]'s homo- 06 sexual activities and the MVR had not known that [LUNT] was 06 a homosexual.)

101BR

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited an American". The three discussed the matter with General DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made for clandestine photography. They then advised YEGOROV, the senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV in Moscow. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involvement in the entrapment of LUNT 06 and NOSENKO's role thereafter was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what to do".

NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two homosexual agents, since "maybe LUNT wouldn't like one of 06 them", and he advised them to weigh the time element in deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view to attempting 06 to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for later blackmail. The MVR American Department Chief and his Tourist Section chief were to attempt the recruitment. NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further assistance.

NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had 06 agreed to meet them again on the following day. NOSENKO later was told that the MVR did not give LUNT arrangements 06 for a contact in the United States because he was expected to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language conference in 1962 or 1963.

06
LUNT's Information

06
LUNT travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there on 9 May 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George Kennan and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route back to the United States. He was given no other tasks.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

06

LUNT stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in LUNT's company, 06 ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian civil police. 06 LUNT corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.

06

Comment: LUNT's account refutes NOSENKO's claims that the MVR had no evidence of LUNT's vulnerability 06 prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in May 1961, and that NOSENKO's personal participation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that LUNT was given no MVR contact in the United States. 06

06

NOSENKO's involvement in the LUNT case is unrelated to the assignment he claims at the time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT case in 06 connection with his Embassy Section duties, it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation.

NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961 (when he claims his operation against STORSBERG 06 was approaching a climax and when his subordinates were apparently planning to exploit 06 KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability) indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow was dispensable. The LUNT case is thus not 06 evidence supporting NOSENKO's claims regarding Embassy Section service in April-May 1961, nor regarding supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations.

Promotion and Transfer to the Seventh Department (January 1962)

NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole American Department. However, according to NOSENKO, the new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior. Under the circumstances, NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO reported that he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section, with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962. NOSENKO asserted his proposal was made and approved by GRIBANOV in September or October 1961. GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for later promoting him to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962.

In view of his impending transfer, starting in December 1961 NOSENKO said he spent several hours each day in the Seventh Department. There he stated he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961, and within the next few days NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.

(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

Comment: NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961. Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Seventh Department. Repeated interrogation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected.

In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Department compromise of W.E. JOHNSON is confirmed), 06 NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)

NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV's candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the American Department is implausible. In contrast to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief of the American Department who had been personally involved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of CIA officers WINTERS and MORELL and the interrogation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more recent attempt to recruit STORSBERG. 06 03 06

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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)

DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January 1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, supervisor of all operations against code clerks and for some months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO's assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral information, he was none of these. Further, while he may have been familiar with the activities of some agents of the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in the manner nor circumstances he claimed.

From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter, of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff, and of the status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL 03 and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND 06 refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned elsewhere. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by the KGB. NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and in error.

Conclusion

NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a supervisor in that section.

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CHAPTER VIII

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 1964)

Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information obtained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, included accurate details of the objectives and targets of those operations, as well as the practices employed for the selection, recruitment, training and briefing of the agents involved. As a probable consequence of reports received from BLAKE as well as by the independent confirmation of tourist agents identified in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all of its resources to counter the threat. The KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the numbers of which were increasing by thousands annually. Evidently uncertain of the success of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Directorate. To that end, selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities in developing tourist agent countermeasures. In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problem, KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American tourist agents who had been identified in just one year in the Soviet Union.

In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962, the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed. By early 1961 the tourist agent program was suspended when technical collection programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary.

The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department counterintelligence operations among American

Comment: (Continued) tourists during this period must be examined in light of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which vantage he asserts he was particularly well informed about KGB operations against American tourists, it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements.

NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department, first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his defection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former functions unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service (sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union, and persons travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere.

In addition to performing supervisory and administrative duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six American tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey OSWALD and of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he travelled on two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department duties.

Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (January - July 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against American (and British and Canadian tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of fifteen subordinate case officers. He had no deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962 to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid-February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. This involved discussions with the Eleventh (Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, as well as with case officers responsible for the investigation of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva, SHAKHOV. NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only part-time and in addition to his other regular duties. He spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB, a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Department in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruitment of FRIPPEL.] 06

NOSENKO's Agents

NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department he brought with him the agents which he had been handling in the American Department Embassy Section.

Arsene FRIPPEL 06

29,06

American Express manager FRIPPEL departed from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer since FRIPPEL had no 06 contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met 06 FRIPPEL twice in the USSR in 1963. According to NOSENKO,

5/BR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB 06 nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the 06 FRIPPEL case.)

06

06

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts 06 he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known 06 to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. [redacted]

06

Johannes PREISFREUND

06

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take 06 PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

06

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175, 06 and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

14/38

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV

According to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual agents in the entrapment of W. E. JOHNSON several days after 06 returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, because they were employed in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the 06 JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NOSENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110 .)

Comment: There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in a KGB entrapment operation directed against American tourist William J. ZUBON in July 06 1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his case officer), an event of which NOSENKO apparently is uninformed.

06

Samih WEISS

After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian 11, 06 military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military 06 code clerk ZUJUS (see p. 161). NOSENKO continued to meet 06 WEISS during the first months of 1962, and in February or March he attempted to have WEISS arrange a social affair 06 with ZUJUS so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first time, NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's successor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section. 06 WEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to Syria. 11

11

Comment: Because of the political climate in Syria, there has been no opportunity to query WEISS regarding NOSENKO's allegations. 06

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Marina RYTOVA

Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964.

NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sustain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department operations.

Operational Activities (January - June 1962)

As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962, NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of W.E. JOHNSON 06 in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his assertion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS. 06

Entrapment of W.E. JOHNSON 06

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first referred to JOHNSON 06 in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, JOHNSON, 06 a young Baptist from California. 08 The KGB was angered that the American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union. Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319) one bearing the name of Everett Wallace [sic] JOHNSON and the 06 date "5 January 1962". Questioned about the note, NOSENKO recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date, and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some sort of developmental operation". 06

NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually 06 remembered that it was something like JOHNSON or JOHNSTON, and 06 06 that he was a Baptist from the California coast. 06 NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he wore no overcoat at the time. 06 JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was discovered to be a homosexual, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. 06 The Second Chief Directorate was not interested in JOHNSON as an agent because he had no access to important information and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

06

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that the KGB decided something had to be done" to prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. 06 "At about the same time" there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to 06 halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR. No recruitment was to be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach 06 to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (NOSENKO said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.

06

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON 06 that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON 06 to visit their hotel room. 06 JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals)." Under the guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB officers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and JOHNSON 06 was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the room where JOHNSON was being held.

06

06 The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO, in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, 06 NOSENKO said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight." Frightened, 06 JOHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the 06 Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO 06 presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be released to the foreign 06 press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later 06 learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his notes paired JOHNSON's 06 name with the date of 5 January 1962, NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime. 06 [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred "immediately after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

06

JOHNSON's Information

According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his 06 visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority in Moscow requesting permission to preach there. He was informed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06 subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activity on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues.29 During his ten-day stay in Moscow JOHNSON wrote and posted letters to some twenty persons outside the USSR.

06 06 JOHNSON reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plainclothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day. JOHNSON, 06 who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor" spoke English poorly, and JOHNSON agreed to visit the doctor's 06 room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon 06 after JOHNSON arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the "student" made homosexual advances. 06 JOHNSON protested and started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06 room where he was confronted with a man who identified himself as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV, "the Chief of Police". 06 After threatening JOHNSON with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" offered to dismiss the matter, provided JOHNSON would sign a 06 commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.

06 On 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs allegedly taken of JOHNSON and the "student" in the hotel room previously. 06

06 Shown photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought VOLKOV to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as the "Police Chief".

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student" YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and was called Georgiy. 06

Although JOHNSON apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. According to NOSENKO's version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival 06 in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was a homosexual, concluded from "two or three" censored letters that he was a threat, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that JOHNSON's homosexuality 06 was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO) 06 before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's 06 ignorance of JOHNSON's preaching (probably the actual cause of KGB concern) is further evidence that NOSENKO did not know the complete background of the KGB operation, and that his role was merely that of playing the "Police Chief".

NOSENKO's participation in this case contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department. (See p. 260.)

06

William Carroll JONES

NOSENKO's Information

06 08

JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 29 or seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian Baptists. He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew President Kennedy. He was the target of Seventh Department case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union 06 in 1962 JONES became involved with a Soviet female. Although she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took control of her relationship 06 with JONES and, on JONES' 06 subsequent trips to the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully sought to obtain incriminating photographs.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, 06 JONES (the sponsor of the annual Presidential 08 "prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed the substance of NOSENKO's information but denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet female. 06 JONES claimed to have made 24 trips to the Soviet Union and to have successfully 08 smuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerous occasions. According to JONES, 06 in 1963 Pravda publicized an incident in which a number of Bibles were confiscated from his luggage. 08

A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by GOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connection 06 with a description of his Bible-smuggling 08 activities.

NOSENKO reported the 06 JONES case in 1962 in Geneva and stated that the Seventh Department case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO's subordinate in the Section. However, NOSENKO's ignorance of JONES' Bible smuggling 06, 08 (the activity which most likely prompted KGB action) and of the fact that JONES' activities 06 had been publicized in the Soviet press, indicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection with the case.

Recruitment of 06 Natalie BIENSTOCK

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB recruited 06 BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to the USSR. The Seventh Department case officers were K.G. KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf of the Leningrad KGB. The latter had become interested in the American tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boy friend in Leningrad. (NOSENKO himself would have attempted the recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for Geneva in April 1962.) During the recruitment, the KGB officers did not disclose their knowledge that she was an American Intelligence agent and that she had been involved

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in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States. The ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB, which concluded that BIENSTOCK was an agent either of CIA 06 or of the FBI. After recruitment, BIENSTOCK was turned 06 over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D (Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence.

06

Comment: BIENSTOCK was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the ballerina's brother in the USSR. BIENSTOCK re- 06 fused, and the letter was delivered by other means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, BIENSTOCK acknowledged 06 in July 1964 that she had been recruited by the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962, and that she had been intimidated by the KGB accusation of her involvement with the ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its knowledge of that involvement.) 06 BIENSTOCK also admitted having contact in the United States through secret writing with KGB officers, until the letters ceased at KGB initiative in late 1962 or early 1963.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)

NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962 as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. In addition to performing that function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and associated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period. Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO contacted CIA.

Purpose of Trip to Geneva

NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed officially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defection in Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union without an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has since stated that he can recall no such order.]

Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case officer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a department. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the trip on the basis that it would last only a month.

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In addition to his general security duties with the delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor, Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).

During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva. He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment, but that [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department, made the selection. The latter department was investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Department Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's assignment. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat", even though he had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy, and the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.

Investigation of SHAKHOV

According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case. He also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.

NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva earlier he was somehow connected with American diplomat [David MARK],

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who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, 06 but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and "not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, [redacted] KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

[redacted]

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

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Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]

KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation

NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G. FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the American Section of TASS and was "a genuine correspondent"; "definitely not an intelligence officer".

Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of the delegates as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO, Georges PAQUES. British Intelligence has reported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the permanent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled

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Comment: (Continued)
a [British] double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time.

Association with Other Soviets

According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the "ANDREY" case: see p. 33 .)

A.K. KISLOV

TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other delegates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women. With reference to the threat posed his security by KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event constituted no threat.

In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.

In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.

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Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. [redacted]

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

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Association with [British] Female Secretary 08

NOSENKO has described his association with a [British] 08 secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had probably believed him to be an intelligence officer.

Comment: According to an [official British] 11 report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the [Foreign Office]. 29

This same incident came to the attention of the [Swiss service], 11 which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties". A [Swiss official] 11 in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent BELITSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He

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learned of the case through his friendship with the chief of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Department, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know the date of recruitment but knew the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the Embassy Section (January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelligence).

The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside the Soviet Union, to learn the channels and means through which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This was the "most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure American Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union. After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him...didn't hold any meetings with him". Nevertheless, he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in somewhat deeper". The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya [disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used. (In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of the agent.)

Comment: According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its operations alone or in conjunction with (never subordinate to) other KGB departments.

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NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTEMOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter-intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Americans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him".

As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who was "called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the same as that of the person whose apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself had an "un-lived-in" look.

When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information, of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB. In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV arranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.

The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add things on his own". For this reason, the KGB limited BELITSKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant.

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Comment: NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA relationship is substantially correct, except for some inaccuracies about the origin of the case. BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio Moscow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry" in a safe apartment.

NOSENKO's version of his role in the case, however, is implausible. He asserts that BELITSKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances among influential officials of the Soviet Government, an agent ostensibly under the control of CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva to resume contact with CIA. The KGB, according to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible case officer nor an officer of the KGB section responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states that the KGB instead detailed a "young and inexperienced" KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even knowledge of operating conditions in Geneva. NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instructed NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unofficially, who had no experience or training in double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the other "inexperienced" KGB officer. NOSENKO can cite no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, although he claims he exchanged messages with Moscow about the case.

ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. He had had continuous service with the Second Chief Directorate at least since 1958, and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's

Comment: (Continued)
involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American Section.

Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation started, did not know the nature of British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB operation, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.

From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory function in the BELITSKIY case.

Contact with CIA

On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer 06 David MARK reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the following day. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told 06 MARK privately that he would like to talk to MARK as soon as 06 possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but "simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an earlier date. 06 MARK advised CIA of the appointment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.

At the 9 June luncheon with 06 MARK, NOSENKO identified himself as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had 06 previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to be an American intelligence officer. NOSENKO said he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. The first item was the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow, who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area. The second item was the identity of a Soviet citizen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been planted on CIA by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed a one-time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.

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MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of 9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union. He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell the two specified items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of becoming an American agent and that after his proposed transaction, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite this assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33) and the KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information about himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

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NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directorate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to more than a score of American citizens who had been compromised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow. Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23) and described a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30). He talked freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delegation. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive KGB operations. He described his education, his service in the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general functions and operating techniques of the various components of the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the approximate dates of his service.

Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communication with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other year. He said he would not consider defecting except in circumstances in which his personal security was endangered, citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the Russian people.

NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were made for him to do so, when he came to the West again. Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain information which he was informed was of interest to CIA.

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Attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNS

Immediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist BRAUNS.

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NOSENKO's Information

BRAUNS was Russian born, and he lived in Leningrad until the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated. 06, 08 He eventually settled in the United States where the First Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, and other instruments". When BRAUNS visited the Soviet 06 Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV to handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take 06 BRAUNS out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. KRUPNOV "couldn't get 06 anywhere" with BRAUNS, 06 and he called on NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured 06 BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from 08 the Soviet Union). 06 BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky", 06 he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment. 06 BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad and again talked to BRAUNS. 06 BRAUNS was so frightened, however, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS was sent on his way. 06

NOSENKO did not know why 06 BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union, nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS 06 met in the USSR.

In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the 06 BRAUNS case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his name.

Comment: NOSENKO did not mention 06 BRAUNS in 1962. 06 BRAUNS arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962, after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva. 06 BRAUNS' version is consistent with the events as related by NOSENKO, although he could not identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other contexts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh

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Comment: (Continued)
Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, both of which were the responsibility of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that [BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen]. 06 [BRAUNS]' plan to visit relatives in Leningrad was information also available to the KGB through his visa application. 06 [BRAUNS] had corresponded for a year before his visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned approach to [BRAUNS] in the hotel. NOSENKO was unaware of these facts. 06, 08

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Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the transfer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims involvement only in the [W.E. JOHNSON] case, his time being spent either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department, over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his functions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season. 06

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In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELITSKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow, immediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, 06 he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man Seventh Department.

Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American Department", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred, as he said, in mid-January 1962, his earlier participation in 06 the JOHNSON compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time 06 for the JOHNSON operation, he could not have played the role he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop, see p. 216). In the period with one exception, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the five operations NOSENKO described as occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission, they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism because of tortuous contradictions. In Geneva he neither directed the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELITSKIY case, as he claimed.

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department (July 1962 - January 1964)

In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO

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was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB position during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO returned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.

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Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO's Information

In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case 06 officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD"). 06 SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel 29,08 agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-language bookstore. 10,08 There was originally some suspicion 06 that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was 06 also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG personnel in New York City. 06 NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 SVENCHANSKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency.

06

SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form.

Top Secret

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When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV accompanied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with 06 SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow (in September 1963 and at the end of 1963).

06

Comment: SVENCHANSKIY, a Russian-born naturalized American citizen, is president of Afton Tours of New York City and the Cross World Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His partner, and the actual operator of Afton 29 Tours, is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one- 06 time "confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. 08,06 Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist 06 sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet espionage date back to the Second World War. His involvement in espionage has been publicized in the press (notably in a 1953 New York Times account of Harry GOLD's 06 allegations). 06 29,10,29,10

Since SOKOLOW manages the Afton Tours 29 office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually is 06 occupied elsewhere with his other firm, he would be unlikely to review and mark suspect visa applications, as NOSENKO alleged. 06 SVENCHANSKIY's background is such as to have prevented his being interviewed on the basis of the information NOSENKO provided.

06 NOSENKO did not refer to his association with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described it only after referring to the written notes he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)

06

Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER

06 On 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of "having connections with the FBI."

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NOSENKO's Information

06

[SLESINGER] came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that 06 [SLESINGER] was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. 06 [SLESINGER] had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning [SLESINGER] planned 06 another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. 06 The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that [SLESINGER] was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on [SLESINGER], 06 and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly 06 with [SLESINGER] while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. 06 [SLESINGER] went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit [SLESINGER], 06 but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. [SLESINGER] had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

06

Comment: [redacted]

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. [Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER], 06 reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa [SLESINGER] was contacted by a 06 Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether [SLESINGER] had "ever been bothered by the FBI." 06

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Comment: (Continued) 06
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in 06 contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case. 06

06
KOTEN's Arrest [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN 06, a guide for 29 Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of 06 Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN 06 was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, [redacted]

NOSENKO's Information

06
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the 06 Communist Party in the United States.

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06

On the eve of KOTEN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's S&T Department that KOTEN was 06 carrying with him the address of relatives of an important S&T agent of the New York residency, and that 06 KOTEN intended to visit the agent's relatives while in the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be repatriated to the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the agent balked, arousing KGB suspicions. When it was 06 found that KOTEN was acquainted with the agent, the 06 KGB concluded that KOTEN "evidently received from American Intelligence an assignment to visit [the agent's relatives]." After KOTEN visited the relatives 06 in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as a suspect American Intelligence agent. KOTEN was en- 06 trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested, although he was released when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested.

06 NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest nor meet KOTEN, although he supervised the arrest from KGB Headquarters.

06

Comment: KOTEN's arrest on charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the New York Times. In an interview with representatives of the Department of State, KOTEN described how he 06 had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28 August 1963, accused of being an American Intelligence agent and interrogated for three days, and held in jail for a month.

06

GRU Agent ~~John~~ SHUBIN

06

The name of John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth were among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva.

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NOSENKO's Information

06 SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. 06 SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN 06 was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was 06 placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance 06 observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent. 06

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name 06 and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according 06 to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN. 06

Comment: [redacted]

06 SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring 06 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

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Arrest of BARGHOORN

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964. NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. (NOSENKO had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself.")

NOSENKO's Information

In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the American Department. After describing the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and they had been observed taking notes. They could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow.

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GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on what other possibilities existed. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Seventh Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time. These included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American target. All information on BARGHOORN was gathered, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special substance which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials", but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06
29 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

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It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.)

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy. While the four -- NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV -- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN. Khrushchev was absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, 06,29 but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN

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had left the American Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on 06 ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to a Militia station where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a document was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Seventh Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the missile documents.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.

After one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB Department of Prosecution so that they could begin legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by that department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

Comment: BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment, arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly precisely with the version provided by NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the second day of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the proceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being "clever and quick-witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The OSWALD CASE

NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.

For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.

The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD.

NOSENKO's Information

Residence in the USSR

Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR.

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Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.

From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.

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NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically instructed local authorities there to take no action concerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter, and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically nil."

Request to Return to the USSR

The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962, by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. No further word on him was received at KGB Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, requesting information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter-intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD. The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the inquiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.

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NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

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Post-Assassination Review of KGB File

NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learning that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. This summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction". GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specific instructions to carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it.

OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

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OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assignments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSWALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particularly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Headquarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him.

The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States.

Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had

Comment: (Continued) earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD.

The CHEREPANOV Papers

Comment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trustworthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten documents which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N. CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy Section and in November 1963 sent them through an intermediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow, and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV.

The significance of the CHEREPANOV incident is twofold. The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Department's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO has offered to substantiate his claim to personal participation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]

NOSENKO's Information

The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.

Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified) problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the American Department, working against State Department personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer for three KGB targets: Richard SNYDER and John McVICKAR, counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTF, secretary to the 06 08 personnel officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him. Because of his service in World War II, for which he received three years' pension credit for each year of military service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for retirement from the KGB.

Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHEREPANOV got a job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.

Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for destruction.

In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about "a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO. MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of (Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent operations against an American. He noted that one of the documents was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV's deputy went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers. The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel assigned to the American Department during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back.

The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's handwriting, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of sight".

An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued, then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, and all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: [redacted] NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Contents of the CHEREPANOV Package

The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost equally between typewritten reports in final form and handwritten draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in Washington] whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August 1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV. (NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted by the KGB, a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various handwritten drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveillance, technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveillance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet citizens. The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment was that WINTERS "had a hostile attitude toward the USSR" and that there "was no basis for recruitment", care should be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity to attempt to recruit him.

NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar with their substance.

Comment: The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE, HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational techniques such as the use of metka.

NOSENKO's Travel Document

When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964 his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document (see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast to search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to Gorkiy during the period immediately before NOSENKO's trip to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that it was "illegal" to have kept the document and to have brought it with him from the Soviet Union. He did it, he said, to show CIA.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Comment: NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention of the document nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher. Whatever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350). When he eventually said in 1966 that he was only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to explain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".

Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number of handwritten notes to which he referred when describing to CIA officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival, however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once, because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought to the United States.

Exhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

FRONT



СССР

КОМИТЕТ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

15 декабря 1963 г.

Командировочное удостоверение № 11933

Выдано подполковнику
Носенко
Юрию Ивановичу
Командированному в УКГБ Горьковской
области
Срок командировки 15 дней
по 30 декабря 1963
Основание: распоряжение нач.
Главного Управления

Действительно по предъявлении удостоверения личности № НК-2517

Начальник Управления
отдела
Комитета Государственной Безопасности
при Совете Министров СССР

Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO
Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya
Oblast'
Length of temporary assignment: 15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department

Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Purpose of Geneva Trip

NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had brought him to Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as "a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he expected to become, he would travel to the West every two or three years.] He had discussed the possibility of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation. [A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department, supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would not have permitted NOSENKO to go.

NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962. He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment (e.g., investigating SHAKHOV or supervising the BELITSKIY operation).

Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would draw an unrelated assignment abroad which would last many weeks if not months. In another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season: he acknowledged that he was expected to attend, but nevertheless went to Geneva.

EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963

REVERSE



1. Командированный не позднее 3-дневного срока по возвращении из командировки обязан представить авансовый отчет об израсходованных в связи с командировкой суммах.
2. При получении проездного билета предъявить в жел.-дор. кассу командировочное удостоверение для наложения компостера.

ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

(указываются даты прибытия и убытия, заверенные подписью и печатью)

Прибыл в г. Горький 16 декабря 1963

Прибыл в г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963

бесплатной квартирой не пользовался!

Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р мил

Убыл из г. Шахунья 17/XII-1963 г.
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

Нач. Шахунского ГОМ
м-р мил

Убыл из г. Горького 17 декабря 1963 г.
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ (ОТДЕЛА)
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Убыл из Москвы „——“ ——————— 195

Прибыл в Москву „——“ ——————— 196 г.

Нач. секретариата

Печать

ФИНО ———————————
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Выдано:

Аванс на расходы по командировке в сумме

Руб. ———————————

Перевозочные требования №№ 005867, 005870

Талоны на плацкарту №№ ———————————

Ст. бухгалтер

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF
TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy
16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye
17 XII 1963 Did not use
free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major________
(Illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major________
(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./_____(Illegible)

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Visits to Legal Residency

As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Residency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an officer in his status [temporary duty assignment which was independent of Residency] should not do so, but his case was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL. Illegals Directorate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently. TSYMBAL's wife once had taught NOSENKO in school, and TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.

Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his "old friend Yuriy GUK", not TSYMBAL. He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.

Availability for Meetings with CIA

In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. He said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February, NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Written Notes

After returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB documents to which he had access, when he could safely do so. He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected items which he had excerpted from various documents to which he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh Department operations. He last had access to this special file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names, he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained in his notes by asking KGB colleagues. For safekeeping, NOSENKO said he kept the notes and documents in a wall safe of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of the Department.

Questioned repeatedly about the KGB operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more.

Comment: NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not explain how he learned of the cases described in the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period not covered by the documents NOSENKO claimed he reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of operations which occurred while he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American-British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknowledges that his access to a personal safe in

Comment: (Continued)
which to keep the notes was just fortuitous, since neither all offices had such safes, nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.

NOSENKO's Defection

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family". He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

-The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access;

-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;

-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;

-The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. [From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. He cited as reasons the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkin himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following

Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans.

On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, (see p.309) which he was told were en route from Washington. He explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.

On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. Semichastnyy had decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning". NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, 06
06 the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
06 of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
06 his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

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tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.

Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE

The KGB agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6 meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.

KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations

The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963. Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:

> "It has been established that the Intelligence organs of the USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels, specifically, in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delegations, in the USSR strive to visit areas and installations to which employees of the Embassy and military attaches have no access, establish contact with Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence information. In this regard, the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line with the preparation and dispatch of such agents, among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American Intelligence organs. These latter agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive activities, a so-called 'Information Center; has been established in the US with the participation of the Department of State. The 'Center' officially advertises that its purpose is to inform intending American tourists to the Soviet Union about the opportunities and restrictions existing there. Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the ideological preparation of American tourists, whom it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet Union and the methods to be used there for propagandizing the American way of life. The 'Center' collects information about the Soviet Union from returning American tourists, including the political attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses, etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.

"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photography, have specific technical training and must look upon their mission as a responsible assignment and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence organs prefer to use persons who have previously visited the USSR and person having relatives there.

"Once selected, the American tourist agent is instructed as to his intelligence assignment and his route, and he is acquainted with the security conditions in the USSR, including passport controls, documentation and customs controls, the hazard of both physical and technical surveillance, as well as the possibility of provocations and compromise making the agent vulnerable to blackmail.

"Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks there are included visual observation and clandestine photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information. For American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless

> of his social status or his personal access to important information, is of interest, because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to American Intelligence.
>
> "American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti-government sentiments, who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments, who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness of security principles, who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good knowledge of foreign languages."

Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the document instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residency abroad

> "to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy intelligence or counterintelligence organs."

Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the Legal Residency

> "to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim, the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; exploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR, with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Headquarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational interest, including the individual's surname, name, patronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the

tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to include where possible among tourists groups agents of the Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their presence and advising how the KGB could contact the agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly, the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible aid, including financial assistance, so that persons favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents among other tourists."

NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurately reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the Seventh Department. In response to questions during his interrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department, during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automobile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multi-national tourist groups." He stated that the Seventh Department received no information during 1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as a cover for espionage. He was aware, he said, from the damage survey conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist operations, a document which had been written in the Seventh Department.

Comment: NOSENKO does not know the content of the document, which he describes as a statistical survey similar to the study he himself drafted in 1959 (see p. 146).

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists: Summary

BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO's statements is that the KGB did not know of the American tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counterintelligence operations during the period.

SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion

According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section in the expectancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he describes four. In this period NOSENKO also was assigned the unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he investigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY. On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first contacted CIA. In July 1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in this position he learned of all KGB operations against American tourists. In this connection he described five operations, as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an American GRU agent, and the investigation and search for a disaffected former KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered notes of KGB operations of which he had learned since his last meeting with CIA in 1962. He also presented at this time a KGB travel document to substantiate his claimed rank of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of a telegram recalling him to Moscow, an event which prompted CIA to accept his immediate defection.

NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh Department is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made regarding his Embassy Section activities. He provides no information sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of his functions does not differ materially from that given in connection with his earlier claimed service in the same section, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents, with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department operations he described. Because of contradictions and the conflicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964 is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly did not supervise the management of the double agent, BELITSKIY.

NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who intended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent resident or former permanent resident of the Soviet Union, all have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh Department may have been responsible. This fact and the anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however, the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the period in the Seventh Department, although they are not persuasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief. A judgment of that latter claim must rest primarily on an appraisal of other aspects of his statements, including those relating to his supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Directorate operations against American and other foreign tourists.

NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieutenant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never promoted beyond the rank of captain.

Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign, particularly American, tourists. A senior Seventh Department officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's preoccupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of the extent of KGB activities in connection with American tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

CHAPTER IX

OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICE

Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chronological fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections. Some can most easily be examined separately, since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category of claims are those he made about his relationship with Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service, and his KGB rank.

Relationship with General GRIBANOV

From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied 06

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GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about DeJean); GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved NOSENKO's operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted. 06 The plan was written by another KGB officer.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subsequently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted. NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to Geneva in 1962 (Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted. NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relationship was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Communist Party Status

In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol members. The significance of NOSENKO's statements about his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.

NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining. He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic. He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without referring the matter to his former Baltic Komsomol unit.

Comment: According to knowledgeable KGB defectors, a member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit is contingent upon the endorsement of the individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance by the KGB Komsomol without referring the matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is impossible".

In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization. He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the Komsomol membership.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the secretary.

NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secretary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he describe his dealings with that official's office.

Comment: The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have occasion to deal with the latter frequently.

NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were ordinarily held yearly.

Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was held in March 1954, entailing considerable work by every Komsomol member and especially by the unit secretaries.

As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: All members paid in the amount of two percent of their monthly salaries.

Comment: Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale in which members earning 500 rubles monthly paid .5 percent, those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid one percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent.

NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 26 years of age, and that he was a member until he became overage in October 1954, and that no special privilege was extended to him.

Comment: According to Komsomol statutes at the time, the maximum age was twenty-five, a fact which would be known by a person who served as a Komsomol secretary at the time. NOSENKO would have thus been excluded from the Komsomol when he became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as he claimed.

The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained the 25 year age limit, but provided for two-year extensions in certain cases. Because of age at the time, and because of his claimed position as Komsomol secretary, the matter would have been of vital interest to NOSENKO if the facts he related were true.

From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because of age, until he was accepted as a candidate member of the Communist Party in January 1956, NOSENKO claimed that he was the only officer in the KGB who was a member of neither organization.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to CIA who claims to have occupied a position of trust and who claims he was not a Party member at the time.

In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and "to improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments. For more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and performed other such tasks. He stated that he applied for Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate member in 1956, and that he was accepted as a full Party member in 1957.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility, and contradiction by independent sources. It is concluded that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member at all, was no longer a member after reaching his twenty-sixth birthday in October 1953. The period in which he had no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh Department assignment. An officer unqualified for Party membership is ineligible for KGB service. Consequently, the evidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party status indicates that he was not serving in the KGB through at least a portion of the 1953-1956 period.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Knowledge of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures

In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had occasion to comment generally on various KGB forms and procedures. Interrogation on these points, however, developed that while he was generally familiar with various aspects unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant. Some of these topics are described on page in connection with his KGB entry, and others which are described below.

KGB Forms

NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal History Statement, including its appearance, the nature of the questions included, and the purpose of the document. However, he maintained that it was required to be completed in two copies, that it could be completed outside of KGB premises, and that it consisted of four to six pages.

Comment: The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page questionnaire. As a sensitive document, it is not taken from KGB premises. Defectors' describe its completion as "an experience not soon to be forgotten". If NOSENKO was a supervisor as he claimed, he would recall the form from reviewing personnel files in which the anketa is a prominent basic document.

NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist Party Questionnaire, (Lichny Listok po Uchetu Kadrov). Shown an exemplar, NOSENKO stated that he had seen it in personnel files, but had never himself filled one out. Asked in whose personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said those of civilians (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed his belief that the KGB did not use the document.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer, and while it is not of critical importance to the KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing KGB personnel files.

NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose was described to him, he gave a superficial description of its content.

Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the form, which he would see on every occasion in which one of his subordinates was promoted or transferred.

NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out only in "1958 or 1957".

Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed on entry on duty with the KGB. In citing 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO is claiming that he completed it only four or five years after entering the KGB.

Visitor's Pass Procedures

NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB visitor's gaining access to a KGB installation, but he maintained that the interviewer's name did not appear on the visitor's pass. (See p. 70.)

Comment: The interviewer's name does appear on the pass, a fact which a senior officer of more than a decade's KGB Headquarters service would recall, since he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors to KGB buildings.

Name Checks of KGB Central Files

NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with his direction of an operation he personally performed the check of the target's name against KGB files. Prominent among these cases were BURGI (see p.115) and ABIDIAN (p.205).

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Comment: NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he performed the name checks he claimed, and his description contained numerous errors of fact. Among these were assertions that the Militia retained court records of all Soviet citizens, and that the First Special Department holds its criminal index separate from political and security card indices. NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the KGB term spetsproverka, meaning a clearance check. Despite NOSENKO's claim that he performed name checks of American Embassy personnel, he pleaded ignorance of any aspect of the files held by the First Chief Directorate, where any KGB record on foreigners is kept.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service.

Awards and Decorations

Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGB service. His assertions are material to any judgment of his general credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to having occupied various KGB positions.

In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate personnel in Moscow.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received first the Order of the Red Star. He confirmed that he received the Order of Lenin, in 1963. [Earlier he had said 1962, "just following visiting Geneva".] He claimed he received the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruitments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments, but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations. [For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326 .] The Order of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it. NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star, he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation accompanied that decoration.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations were of some interest to the interrogators since they might reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged. However, before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO retracted his claim that he received the Order of Lenin, saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would receive the Order of Lenin "for creating the Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in January 1964.

Comment: Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experience and improve the quality of Second Chief Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO reverted to the earlier claim.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received in his KGB career. He replied that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruitment of BURGI [see p.115] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov. 06 GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commendation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something, "perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day, or Army Day". In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received "something" from GRIBANOV, "maybe on the anniversary of the Soviet Army": GRIBANOV's deputy, PERFILYEV, made the presentation at an assembly of officers in the KGB Headquarters auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin

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for "several recruitments, including Americans MERTENS, DREW, FRIPPEL," and three British citizens whose names he could not recall. Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said, "for good work in general". He received in 1961 the Order of the Red Star, he stated, with a group of Second Chief Directorate case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which the officer may retain.

Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this award in December 1962. He said he recalled that the presentation was planned for the KGB Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and not made until the end of the month.

In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and he also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service.

Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that in 1962 he would only have had nine years' service. NOSENKO said that he could not understand why, but he was certain he received the service award after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier retracted claim that he entered the KGB in 1952.) The following day NOSENKO announced that he recalled why he received the medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing KGB officers' time

Comment: (Continued)
in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in 1950, he said, and should have received the medal in 1960, but did not because of some administrative mixup. (See p.56 for NOSENKO's eventual claim that he entered the RU in 1951.)

In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from GRIBANOV for "general good work", and GRIBANOV told him that along with others he would receive the Order of Lenin "for inspiring the Seventh Department" on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary. NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva, he did not actually receive the medal. [NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.]

Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having received a commendation from KGB Chairman Shelepin for his recruitment of the three Americans and three British citizens in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner for these successful recruitments, but he did not receive it, probably because he transferred to the American Embassy Section at that time.

Comment: NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB practice of conferring decorations on KGB anniversary, 20 December. NOSENKO claims he transferred to the Embassy Section in January.

When NOSENKO's claims to various KGB awards was reviewed with him during the October 1966 interrogations, he said that during his KGB service he had received only the Red Army anniversary medal and an award for satisfactory completion of ten years' service, and that he had received no KGB award, decoration, or commendation for his operational work.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Conclusion

NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his claimed operational successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually categoric retractions.

NOSENKO's Sourcing

NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies, contradictions, and retractions. Three of these categories, each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the validity of his sourcing, are personal participation (W.E. 06 JOHNSON, p. 268) cases learned in the course of specific 06 official duties (SHUBIN, p. 296), and information obtained informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, p. 24). The fourth category of sourcing relates to the notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964.

Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at various opportunities in order to bring them to CIA. He kept them in a wall safe in the office which he occupied as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. [In this connection, NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian 11 businessman. NOSENKO said he copied the date for the remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File", which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief. According to NOSENKO, he obtained access to it for various

3/BR

reasons from time to time. The "Special File" contained no true names, however, and NOSENKO said he obtained such true names as were included in his notes by asking various case officers for them. Questioned on case after case which appeared in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written everything he could learn, and could add nothing more.

Conclusion

NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related is not credible.

NOSENKO's KGB Rank

When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO identified himself as a KGB officer holding the rank of major. He said at that time that he had served the requisite time in grade and expected to be promoted shortly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO said that he was a lieutenant colonel. In the course of his career as he initially described it, his military rank promotions had generally parallelled his assumption of successively greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank has evoked a series of inconsistent and contradictory statements leading to his eventual assertion that he had never advanced beyond the rank of captain. The matter of NOSENKO's statements about his rank is significant with respect to his general credibility, to the fact that he brought to Geneva in 1964 a KGB document identifying him as a lieutenant colonel, and to the paradox that as a company grade officer he held supervisory positions in which KGB officers of significantly senior rank were his subordinates.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major, but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.

In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic statement which included the claim that he had been a senior lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic) until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.

In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952] he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after he entered the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service was taken into consideration.

Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically, NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953, in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October [in Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and afterwards was personally congratulated by General GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his earlier promotions.

Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his date of rank, from which he computes his seniority and time in grade towards his next promotion.

In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never been a major nor was he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier. He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956, but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias, with the use of KGB operational documents. He stated that thus he was a senior lieutenant still in 1959, and although GRIBANOV had promised him that he would be promoted directly to major at that time, an administrative error was made in the personnel office, and he was just promoted to captain. Instead of rectifying the mistake, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV persuaded him to remain a captain until (if a major) in 1963 he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. In October 1963, he concluded, he was promoted directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel; he was never a major, and he had served as senior lieutenant from 1953 to 1959, and a captain from 1959 to 1963.

Comment: According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely a captain when he claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, and still a captain for much of the time that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that he was proposed for advancement to captain in 1956, but he stated that he was not promoted because of shortcomings in his work. [He earlier had claimed he was being punished for misuse of operational documents.] In response to his interrogator's question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have been a major because he thought the truth would not have been believed.

In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO alleged that he had been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier claimed 1953], to captain in December 1959 [he could not previously remember the month] and that at the end of 1963 he was recommended for the rank of major. Continuing, NOSENKO said he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel, and the travel order [which he brought to Geneva in 1964] indicating his rank as lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel, that actually he had been but a captain. Asked why he had claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied that he had ever even mentioned his rank to CIA in 1962.

Conclusion

NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in 1964 an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying him as a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments and positions held, and in short, to the totality of his claims regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.

CHAPTER X

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT

Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From the time of his arrival in the United States he has been under psychiatric observation. In addition, he has undergone psychological examination. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were reached independently.

Psychological Examination

In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of psychological tests by the CIA psychologist. After monitoring numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's personality to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his life.

Findings

NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.

(PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT)

Psychiatric Examination

Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the interrogation sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at somewhat less frequent intervals since.

Findings

NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distinguishing fact from fiction.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion

The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are other than willful.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962.

-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

-NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance.

The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector.

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made.

Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent.

The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself.

Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.

It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior

(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)

positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources.

Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.

In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly.

Annex B

Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The cases include, for example, Seventh Department operations of which he said he learned while serving in the American Department, and *vice versa*, as well as operations conducted by KGB elements other than the Second Chief Directorate. Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all of the information NOSENKO provided.

ACTOR/PROCTOR

06

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American known as ACTOR or PROCTOR is a valuable First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to Western Europe and there obtained other documents with which to continue clandestinely to the USSR.

06

Comment: The lead may refer to one Vernon W. PROCTOR who visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963. The investigation is not complete. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes he brought to Geneva in 1964.

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(Annex B)

06

ALBINGER, Donald

NOSENKO's Information

06

ALBINGER, an American citizen born in 1937, visited the USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi because he was believed to be an American Intelligence agent. In Sochi ALBINGER 06 was in touch with a KGB agent, "TRAPEZUND".

By NOSENKO's account, the 06 ALBINGER case was directed by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to the Seventh Department in Moscow.

Comment: According to the FBI, 06 Donald ALBINGER visited the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN), a Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR in the 1920's. OHANNES allegedly offered 06 ALBINGER intelligence-type photos which 06 ALBINGER said he refused to accept.

06

ALLOYAN, Lawrence

NOSENKO's Information

An American of Armenian background, 06 ALLOYAN visited the USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB. He stated to KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language School. The Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV, 06 and the KGB planned to contact him. NOSENKO noted the case 06 when ALLOYAN, a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow through a Seventh Department case officer.

(Annex B)

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965, 06 ALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR in 1963. He stated that he was acquainted with a Hugo 06 VAN KRAKOW who had a son of the same name, but disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an Army captain. 06 ALLOYAN said he had not seen the son for twenty years. The younger VAN 06 KRAKOW was interviewed by the FBI and said that he was discharged from the Army in 1953 as a staff sergeant, and that he was not in contact with ALLOYAN. 06

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

APISSON, Henry 06

NOSENKO's Information

An American citizen of Armenian origin, 06 Henry EPISON (sic) was recruited by the KGB of the Armenian SSR in April 1963, on ideological grounds. The recruitment was believed not to have been firm, however, and the KGB planned to renew it if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964. 06 06 EPISON had access to a military installation in the New York suburbs.

Comment: 06 Henry APISSON, a naturalized American and the owner of a hotel and restaurant near West 10 Point, N.Y., visited the USSR in 1963. In 1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he may have conveyed an impression of willingness to see them if they should later visit West 10 Point. 06 APISSON claimed he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

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06

[ARMSTRONG, Robert]

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

[ARMSTRONG, the American Ambassador's aide], is known by the KGB to be having a homosexual affair with a [code clerk of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE]. 08, 06 ARMSTRONG is a close friend of another homosexual officer of the American Embassy, [Stephen HOFFMAN] (see below).
06

Comment: Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, [ARMSTRONG] 06 acknowledged the truth of the allegations. Before resigning from the Department of State in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow. NOSENKO provided no source for his information regarding [ARMSTRONG], which was a 06 Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO claimed to be serving in the Seventh Department.

06

[BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin]

NOSENKO's Information

06

[BARTHELEMY] twice led American tourist groups to the USSR in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an American Intelligence agent. He was subsequently in contact with one [V.A. LAINE, a Finn] who was a KGB agent.
06, 11

NOSENKO only learned of the [BARTHELEMY] 06 case and of his 06 contact with [LAINE] while visiting the Leningrad KGB in 1963. 06 [BARTHELEMY]'s Seventh Department file indicated that he had been under surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had information he had graduated from an intelligence school.

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(ANNEX B)

06

Comment: BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence connections were assumed to have been compromised during his visits to the USSR. He reported his contacts with LAINE 06 to CIA. BARTHELEMY's name 06 appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA. (See p. 149 .)

06

BERMAN, Harold

NOSENKO's Information

While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union, American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was 06 surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with him".

06 29

Comment: BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system. He has visited the USSR on several occasions for study and research, and he had described several incidents which occurred in Moscow which appear to have been KGB provocations.

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his 06 information on BERMAN, nor did he provide the date he acquired the information.

06

BINDER, Peter

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

The "top sergeant in charge of America House", BINDER, was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House, with whom at various times he had been intimate in his room. He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States. Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photo- 06 graphs of BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.

(Annex B)

06
BINDER, Peter (Continued)

NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer 06 working against BINDER, and the Chief of the American Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.

06
Comment: U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served as manager of the America House from 16 March 1961 to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothesmen, taken to a Militia station, and interrogated on the substance of a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador. The letter alleged that BINDER 06 had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from 25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, that MORELLI had told BINDER she was pregnant 06 and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion, had engaged in blackmarketing, BINDER had 06 told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it, and that 06 BINDER had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and that she and other Soviets should be wary of him. When BINDER denied the allegations and 06 challenged the interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed to go free. 06 BINDER acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she said she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion and made no other demands of BINDER. BINDER
06 06

08, 09

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or July 1962, while BINDER was on leave. 06

Except for dating the recruitment attempt in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary information coincides with BINDER's account. 06 NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to Geneva in 1964 contained all information he was able to discover. NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in 1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06 officers, but he relates his knowledge of the case neither to that period nor to the position he then held.

BROCHES, Adam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR, and he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological grounds.

Comment: 06 BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother, 06 Alexander, was born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that a Seventh Department officer told him in 06 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in 1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might be on an American Intelligence mission to contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet Intelligence superior in Paris. According to GOLITSYN, the KGB placed BROCHES under surveillance 06 and the Chief of the Seventh Department was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what action the KGB should take.

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) 06

Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES said that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 1960, and that on his last trip, in September 1960, he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members of his tour group. 06 BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent. 06 BROCHES said, however, that the allegation might refer to another of his brothers, Ignacy, 06 now dead.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited BROCHES. 06

06

BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter

NOSENKO's Information

06

BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and an employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency" in New York 29 City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds. He left the Four Winds agency and his case is 29 inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own 08 travel bureau. 06 BUNDARIN was handled by Seventh Department case officer V.G. DERA.

06

Comment: BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an emigre and an employee of the Four Winds 29 agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. He left the Four Winds agency 29 in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for 29 Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by 06 the FBI, BUNDARIN denied any connection with Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA members and participate in CP front organization activities.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

CHRISTNER, Robert Charles

NOSENKO's Information

While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of Americans who had visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted 06 that one CHRISTNER had been arrested while touring the Soviet Union by automobile. He did not indicate the source or date of his acquisition of the information.

Comment: As described in press accounts of the period and stated in a KGB document on American tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER 06 was arrested in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage in the summer of 1961. He had a CIA mission at the time, but he reported that he had managed to maintain his tourist cover throughout his intensive interrogations. In the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06

FAIN, Thomas

NOSENKO's Information

06

FAIN, an "American consul" stationed in Yugoslavia, 11 visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that

(Annex B)

06
FAIN, Thomas (Continued)

06 FAIN was a homosexual. There was insufficient time during 06 FAIN's visit to arrange his entrapment.

06 FAIN was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual.

Comment: In a Department of State security interview 06 FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets whom he had met during his five-day visit to Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist. He reported no noteworthy incidents during his later permanent assignment in Moscow.

06
FINK, David

NOSENKO's Information

06
FINK is an American professor from Philadelphia and frequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a female agent. Because of his sister's love affair with a Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he applies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when the Leningrad KGB objected to FINK's being denied a visa: 06 NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time. 08

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964, 06 FINK acknowledged that his sister was trying 08 to marry a Soviet citizen, but that she had been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the purpose. 06 FINK admitted involvement with a female in Leningrad, during his visit to the

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
USSR in 1961, but denied recruitment. FINK 06 asserted that he had visited Europe every summer since 1957 (except in 1959, when he went to Mexico), and that he had only visited the USSR once, in 1961.

06

FISK, Norman

NOSENKO's Information

06

FISK visited the USSR as a tourist in 1959, when he was assessed to be a homosexual. The KGB planned to attempt to recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO 06 noted FISK's name while reviewing files of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV (see p.145) in 1963.

06

Comment: FISK visited the USSR with his wife and parents in 1959. In an interview with the FBI in December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet contacts in the USSR were with Inturist personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO has never explained why he learned of the case only from the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1963, since he claims he was their case officer at the time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in 1959. 06

06

GINSBERG, Michael

NOSENKO's Information

06

A professor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 1957 or 1958, when operational contact was established between him and the KGB.

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8/6R

(Annex B)

Comment: One Professor Michael GINSBERG 06 reported to U.S. officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he had been the target of a Soviet recruitment attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact has been identified by CIA as a KGB officer whom 06 GINSBERG, according to the FBI, has met during subsequent visits to the USSR.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

06
GROVER, Preston

NOSENKO's Information

06
GROVER, currently (in 1964) Associated Press correspondent 08 in Moscow, is a recruited KGB agent handled by the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

06
Comment: Preston GROVER retired in 1965 and now lives in France with his wife. 06 GROVER's wife was born in Russia and apparently emigrated at about the time of the 1917 Revolution. GROVER 06 met her in Moscow, where she was a correspondent for a French newspaper. According to FBI reports, she associated with known Communists in the United States during an earlier assignment here. NOSENKO indicated no source of his information on GROVER. 06

9/BR

(Annex B)

06

HAMZAVI, Charles P.

NOSENKO's Information

06

An American, one Charles KHAMZAI (sic) was the object of considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1 November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to resume this contact in the United States. The Seventh Department action with respect to KHAMZAI was in response 06 to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assistance in developing a contact with him in Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles 06 P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent contact with Soviet officials from 1955, when he immigrated to the United States, until 1963. According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963, when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry official which CIA identifies as KGB officer I.D. BORISOV.

HARMSTONE, Richard

NOSENKO's Information

In 1958 or 1959 the American Department's Embassy Section attempted to recruit HARMSTONE, a Second or Third Secretary 06, 08 at the Embassy. Both male and female agents were used against him, and photographs were obtained of HARMSTONE's 06 homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted, 06 however, HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB. 06 HARMSTONE reported the approach to American officials, but asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.

NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309) in 1964, including the KGB plan of operations against HARMSTONE. 06 NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the plan, which was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him

06

11/5R

(Annex B)

06

HARMSTONE, Richard (Continued)

while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. Because the KGB concluded that HARMSTONE had not reported the homosexual compromise, it was planned to attempt to recruit him again later, when he was transferred elsewhere abroad. If HARMSTONE had reported the homosexual compromise, it would have been monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office. 06 06

06 In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of the HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter had left the Embassy Section. If HARMSTONE had reported his compromise, he surmised, he would have been withdrawn immediately from Moscow, and HARMSTONE did not leave the Soviet Union prematurely. 06 06

06

Comment: Richard C. HARMSTONE, who served in Moscow from October 1957 to October 1959 as Second Secretary, reported to the Embassy Security Officer on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had tried to recruit him after threatening exposure through doctored photographs purporting to show HARMSTONE's homosexual activities. HARMSTONE subsequently identified from a visa application photograph the KGB officer as "KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy colleague WINTERS. HARMSTONE left the Soviet Union six months later, admitted homosexual activities, and resigned from the Department of State. The relevant portions of the CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions with respect to KGB agents with whom he was involved. "KOMAROV" has been identified as KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy Section and the source of what NOSENKO said he learned of the case. 0809 06 06 06 06

14-00000

(Annex B)

HOFFMAN, F. Stephen 06

NOSENKO's Information

08,06 An American Embassy official and a friend of the Ambassador's aide Robert ARMSTRONG (see above), HOFFMAN 06 is known to have engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian in Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is planning to attempt to compromise and recruit HOFFMAN. 06

Comment: Interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, 06 HOFFMAN in a State Department security interview denied homosexual activities. Informed that the results of a polygraph examination indicated he had practiced deception on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the 06 Department of State on 31 July 1964. HOFFMAN 06 asserted that he had no contact with the KGB while assigned in Moscow, an assertion supported by the polygraph examination.

NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the Seventh Department at the time HOFFMAN was 06 the target of the Embassy Section of the American Department.

06

HOWARD, Herbert

NOSENKO's Information

06,08

HOWARD, a USIA employee, was assigned temporarily for four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a 08 publications procurement officer. He was recruited by the KGB. G.I. GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad. 06

12/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: 06 HOWARD denied recruitment in an interview with the FBI, although a polygraph examination indicated he was disturbed on related questions. 06 HOWARD had earlier declared his intention to divorce his American wife and marry a Soviet national. His contract with USIA expired in 29 December 1964 and was not renewed.

NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the Seventh Department at the time HOWARD 06 was a target of the Embassy Section.

06

HUSTON, Hayden Henry

NOSENKO's Information

One 06 HUSTON (fnu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S. Government business from his assignment in Belgrade. In 10 06 Moscow HUSTON was photographed making a blackmarket deal in a taxi, but the KGB did not exploit the incident because 06 HUSTON did not again visit the USSR.

08,06

Comment: USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was interviewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a report that he had been arrested in Yugoslavia in 11 1954 as a result of his sexual activities. 06 HUSTON served in Yugoslavia for eight years- 11 from 1953 until January 1962. During that interview he stated that during his tour in 10 Belgrade he made two trips to the USSR, and he asserted that there were no other incidents in 11 Yugoslavia or elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc which could be used to compromise him. 29 Currently on a USIA assignment in Taiwan, 11 06 HUSTON has not been interviewed with respect to NOSENKO's allegation.

1818R

(Annex B)

JAFFE, Sam 06

NOSENKO's Information

06 JAFFE, an 08 ABC correspondent in Moscow, is an active KGB agent who was cultivated and recruited by V.A. KUSKOV. In 1963, while in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asked American Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent who could be used against a visiting American delegation, and GRYAZNOV suggested JAFFE. 06

Comment: Before NOSENKO's information was received, 06 JAFFE reported his recruitment by one "Slava KISLOV" in October 1962. In a CIA interview 06 in December 1966 JAFFE did not recognize A.K. KISLOV's photograph but identified a photograph of KUSKOV as being the KGB officer who recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled 06 from the USSR in October 1965. As far as CIA is aware, he has not been interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's information.

KANTOR, Marvin

NOSENKO's Information

Melvin (sic) KANTOR, a Harvard student, was recruited on ideological grounds in 1961. His case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

Comment: Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language instructor at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in 1961 he admitted having had contact with Soviet Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in 1959, but asserted that he then had flatly refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence.

7/5R

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had not travelled to the USSR since 1959.
NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought in 1964 to Geneva. NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department in 1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruitment, and does not explain why the KANTOR case was included among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section in 1960-1961.

[KAZAN-KOMAREK] 06

NOSENKO's Information

06
[KOMAREK], an American of Czech descent and somehow connected with a tourist service in the United States, has been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in contact with Western Intelligence and they have been trying to locate him. The Czechs have learned that [KOMAREK] might 06 possibly visit the Soviet Union and have requested [the KGB] that he be arrested on arrival and deported to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have agreed and Inturist is currently attempting to induce [KOMAREK] into visiting the Soviet Union.
06

Comment: The subject of NOSENKO's lead was [Vladimir 06 Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK], a naturalized American citizen and the operator of the [Harvard Travel 29,10 Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusetts]. He has never had any covert relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. In August 1963 the FBI was advised by another source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure [KAZAN- 06 KOMAREK] to the Soviet Union and take him to Czechoslovakia where he would be tried for espionage.

0001648

71BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO's information, which he reported only to the FBI, was substantially accurate. In October 1966, after being warned of the risk by the FBI, KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06 for an Inturist travel agents conference and, en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.

NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in the Seventh Department, had not been established. CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on KAZAN-06 KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's interrogation had been suspended.

06

MATLAW, Ralph

NOSENKO's Information

06

One MATLO (sic) visited the USSR in 1959, and the KGB concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO noted the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.

Comment: The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW. 06 The case is still under investigation. NOSENKO claims to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case officer at the time one of them was in touch 06 with MATLAW in 1959, but learned of the case only later when reviewing those agents' files.

6/BR

(Annex B)

06

NIELSEN, Philip

NOSENKO's Information

06

NIELSEN visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958. Because he made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in Moscow and tried to acquire from them a copy of the Moscow Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was connected with CIA. 06 NIELSEN was kept under surveillance during this and all subsequent trips, but was never observed in other intelligence tasks. On one of his visits to Moscow, NIELSEN 06 fell in love with KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA, and the KGB 06 used her in the development of NIELSEN. 06 For purposes of assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was 06 introduced to NIELSEN in the role of KUNGAROVA's father, but 06 with no positive result. NOSENKO heard later that NIELSEN 06 and KUNGAROVA had married and were living in London. 06, 08

NOSENKO was involved in the determination of NIELSEN's 06 possible intelligence status on his first trip. Besides himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor KOPEYKIN was also involved.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited 06 KUNGAROVA in 1955 and that she was his agent until 1960, and that she was already an agent in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh Department from the British Commonwealth Department.

06

NIELSEN, a CIA agent at the time, visited the Soviet Union in April 1958. One of his tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet telephone book. 06 NIELSEN met KUNGAROVA on a 06 later trip, in January 1959. Despite CIA warnings that he was involved in what appeared to be a KGB operation, NIELSEN returned to see 06 her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met a person representing himself as KUNGAROVA's 06 father. 06 NIELSEN returned to Moscow in 1962, 08, 06 married KUNGAROVA, and they moved to France. KUNGAROVA died in France in 1965. In January

06

201BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
1960, when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge 06 of NIELSEN's meeting with KUNGAROVA's "father", 06 he was not in the Seventh Department, but in the American Embassy Section.

06

NIXON, Dmitriy

NOSENKO's Information

An American tourist, 06 NIXON was recruited by Seventh Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's 06 information, NIXON admitted having been recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He was not contacted by the KGB in the United States, although such arrangements had been made at the time of his recruitment. On a visit to Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection, 06 NIXON was again contacted by the KGB and he agreed to collaborate for fear of reprisals against relatives in the USSR.

06

OMELICH, Paul

NOSENKO's Information

06 OMELICH was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter Olympics at Squaw Valley, California. Although he was not recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later, in Switzerland. 06 When OMELICH visited Moscow in August 1963, Seventh Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV to meet the American.

9/8R

(Annex B)

Comment: In 1963 06 OMELICH reported his earlier contacts with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley. He denied that he had ever met KGB officers later, or that any meeting arrangements were made for Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets".

06

PECHTER, Bernard

NOSENKO's Information

06 PECHTER was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.

Comment: In December 1959, a month after 06 PECHTER's return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he had revealed his homosexual compromise and recruitment by the KGB to a member of his tour group. NOSENKO cited the PECHTER 06 case not from memory, but from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not relate it to his service there in 1959, nor did he indicate the source of his information.

06

PRESSMAN, Aron

NOSENKO's Information

06 Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN visited the USSR in October 1957 with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited at that time by the KGB. The case was afterwards turned over to the First Chief Directorate.

71BR

(Annex B)

Comment: NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to Aron 06 PRESSMAN, a long-time Communist and a friend 06 of Bernard KOTEN (see p.295), whose sister has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945 marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence. 06 PRESSMAN accompanied a delegation of metallurgists from NYU on an exchange visit to the Moscow Mining Institute in 1957; he himself surveyed Soviet language training programs during this visit. He denied any recruitment approach was made to him there or on subsequent trips to the USSR.

06

NOSENKO cited the PRESSMAN case from his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate it to his Seventh Department service nor did he indicate the source of his information.

06

PROCTOR, fnu

See ACTOR. 06

RASK, Walter 06

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

RASK, the president of World Wide Tours, was recruited in the USSR in 1960. He has returned to the USSR several times since. He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having intelligence affiliations. 06 The KGB has received only one open code message from RASK since recruitment. RASK was 06 recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department. On subsequent visits to the USSR he was met by Seventh Department case officers of the American-British Commonwealth Section.

10/8

(Annex B)

06

Comment: [RASK], a former CIA contact who visited the USSR several times, reported the KGB recruitment approach in 1961.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in written notes he brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not relate the case to his 1962-1964 Seventh Department service.

06

[ROBERTS, Spencer]

NOSENKO's Information

06

[ROBERTS] was recruited at the end of 1962 after being compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR. The case was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and [ROBERTS] 06 was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United States. 06 [ROBERTS] confessed his recruitment to the FBI, news of which reached the KGB, and his KGB case officer in the United States was hastily recalled to Moscow.

06

[ROBERTS] was handled by the American Department because he was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow. The case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M. KOVSHUK. NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from B.A. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Department case officer.

06

Comment: [ROBERTS] had been coopted as a CIA representative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State Department officer assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He confessed his recruitment by the KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He was contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in New York in mid-1963. That official apparently suddenly departed the United States in December 1963. NOSENKO did not indicate the original source of his information on [ROBERTS].

06

8/BR

(Annex B)

ROSS, Johanna

06

NOSENKO's Information

The former governess to the American Ambassador's family who now (in 1964) teaches at the American school in Moscow 08 was recruited by the KGB on the basis of sexual involvements. The case was handled by the American Department at the time NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department.

Comment: NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not indicate the source of his information. 06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of her arrest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral behavior with a Soviet citizen. In a May 1965 FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow in September 1963 with the KGB, which stemmed from her continued relationship with the same Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB attempted to recruit her or contact her thereafter.

06

RUFE, John

NOSENKO's Information

06

The KGB discovered that RUFE was a homosexual during his visit to the USSR in 1959. When he returned to the USSR in 1962, he was entrapped and recruited. The case was only of marginal value to the KGB, and it was terminated in 1963.

5/BR

(Annex B)

06

Comment: RUFE, a New York City attorney, has admitted that he had been compromised while visiting the USSR in 1962 and that he was in contact with KGB officers in the United States until November 1963.

06

NOSENKO did not relate the RUFE case specifically to his Seventh Department service when he cited it from writen notes brought to Geneva in 1964, nor did he indicate the source of his information. His notes state that RUFE 06 was recruited on homosexual grounds by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of Leningrad Oblast.

06

SCHWARZENBACH, Collette

06

NOSENKO's Information

SCHWARZENBACH, who was working in Moscow at the time, fell in love with a male KGB agent and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959. The KGB had incriminating photography, but NOSENKO did not believe it was used, the KGB appeal being based solely on her affection for the Soviet people. V.M. MIKHAYLOV of the American Department Embassy Section directed the operation. NOSENKO never read the SCHWARZENBACH file, but he later saw it and the incriminating photographs.

06

06, 08, 09

Comment: SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secretary to Mrs. BOHLEN, the wife of the American Ambassador, and director of the Anglo-American School in Moscow. In 1956 and 1957 she worked for Henry SHAPIRO, United Press correspondent 06, 08 in Moscow (see p. 76). While employed by 06 SHAPIRO she became acquainted with one Viktor I. SERGEYEV, a Soviet publishing functionary.

9.8R

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
In January 1959 she was approached in Riga by a KGB officer who confronted her with incriminating photographs and solicited her cooperation in providing information on the U.S. Embassy. She immediately reported the event to SHAPIRO, 06 who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON, and 06 SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly thereafter in early 1959. She provided details of the KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department Regional Security Officer in Geneva on 4 June 1959.

06 10

NOSENKO did not recall from whom he learned of the SCHWARZENBACH case, which was directed by the American Department Embassy Section while he was assigned to the Seventh Department.

06

SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey

NOSENKO's Information

06 29

In 1955-1957, SEREBRENNIKOV, an employee of the Library of Congress, visited Moscow with a Congressional delegation. 06 SEREBRENNIKOV had a brother who was a Soviet citizen, a doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to the Seventh Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a 06 meeting at which SEREBRENNIKOV would be "felt out" as a prospective collaborator with the KGB. The meeting took place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no opportunity to discuss with SEREBRENNIKOV the possibility 06 of his helping the Soviet Union. SEREBRENNIKOV was in 06 Moscow only for a few days, and there was no opportunity for another meeting. The KGB concluded that SEREBRENNIKOV's 06 suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.

12/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: According to his 1964 interview with the FBI, 06 SEREBRENNIKOV visited the Soviet Union in 1956 in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson. On his last night in Moscow he received in his hotel room a telephone call from a person claiming to be his brother from Sverdlovsk, whom he had not seen since 1918. The "brother" requested a meeting, but SEREBRENNIKOV was 06 convinced from the caller's uneducated speech and other signs that he was not in fact 06 SEREBRENNIKOV's brother, and he refused to see him. 06 SEREBRENNIKOV immediately advised Senator Jackson of the incident, as well as Embassy officials. After SEREBRENNIKOV 06 returned to the United States, the incident was described in an article in Newsweek magazine.

06

SEVERN, Gerald

NOSENKO's Information

06

SEVERN, KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was recruited in Moscow by the Seventh Department in 1958 or 1959 on ideological grounds. He is a valuable all-purpose agent. His case officer was V.M. IVANOV.

06

Comment: SEVERN, a naturalized American citizen whose name originally was Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV, had 06 Russian-born parents. He enjoys special residence arrangements in Moscow, and prior to receipt of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected to be a KGB agent. 06 SEVERN has not visited the United States since 1961, and he has not been interviewed by the FBI.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.

10/BR

(Annex B)

06

SHATTAUER, Sofia Greta

NOSENKO's Information

06

In September 1962 SHATTAUER visited the Soviet Union and was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A. DITYATEV. She had originally been recruited in Poland in 1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB believed her to be known to American Intelligence.

06

Comment: In 1962 an FBI source reported that SHATTAUER stated she was looking forward to her trip to the USSR and "to being away from the imperialist policies of the United States", and that 06 SHATTAUER "appeared enthusiastic about Russian ideology". In July 1964 SHATTAUER admitted to 06 the FBI that she had had intelligence contact with Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that she was recontacted by the KGB in September 1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically met a KGB officer in New York City until May 1964.

NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He did not indicate the source of his information.

06

SOCHUREK, Howard

NOSENKO's Information

08,06

The former Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK, was probably recruited by the KGB and was an agent of Vadim BIRYUKOV. 06 SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in 1962 when Seventh Department surveillance noted his association with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

8/6R

(Annex B)

06

Comment: SOCHUREK who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-1960, reported to the Embassy a number of instances in which Soviet officials attempted to pressure him or in which he was in touch with identified KGB officers. SOCHUREK has 06 named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter who invariably accompanied him while he was stationed in the USSR. NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on SOCHUREK.

06

06

STEVENS, Francis

06

NOSENKO's Information

08

STEVENS, an American correspondent, visited the Soviet Union in 1961 as a tourist. He was the target of American Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed him into accepting recruitment. His KGB cryptonym was 06 "SERGEY". STEVENS, however, described the recruitment attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable summarizing the events described in the letter to the Department of State. The KGB monitored the dictation through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned to resume contact with STEVENS in New York City.

06 08,06

Although a tourist and a correspondent, STEVENS was the concern of the Embassy Section because he was a former member of the Embassy staff.

08

(Annex B)

06

Comment: STEVENS, after his compromise concerned for his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit to Moscow, did deposit with the Embassy a letter to his mother. However, he also gave Ambassador Thompson a written report of the KGB entrapment, immediately after the incident, and he was interviewed about the matter by the Minister Counsellor the following day. Interviewed periodically by the FBI following his return to the United States in 1961, STEVENS 06 has denied any further contact with the KGB.

According to the notes which NOSENKO brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of which he reported the STEVENS 06 case, STEVENS' 06 recruitment was accomplished jointly by the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department and the American Department's Embassy Section.

06

TARASKA, William

NOSENKO's Information

06, 08

TARASKA, a New York City policeman, had been developed by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958. Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising target", the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in attempting to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union in June 1963.

06

Comment: TARASKA, who had visited the Soviet Union in 1958, was recruited by CIA for a mission in 1960. When he returned to the United States he reported that the KGB had attempted to recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned 06 to the USSR in 1963 and later reported to the FBI that the KGB had again attempted to recruit him during that visit.

8/Be

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)
NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information on [TARASKA]. 06

[THOMPSON, John] 06

NOSENKO's Information

American professor [THOMPSON] 06, a specialist in Russian literature or Russian History, became involved with Tamara KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within Inturist. He was intimate with KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken. The KGB did not attempt to recruit him, however, but planned to continue his assessment and establish additional grounds for his recruitment if he returned to the USSR. When he did not return, NOSENKO reviewed [THOMPSON]'s file 06 and recommended that the case be retired to KGB Archives.

Comment: [Dr. John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of History at Indiana University] 06, 08, was interviewed by the FBI in April 1965. He identified KUNGAROVA's photograph as that of his Inturist guide during a trip outside Moscow in 1959, and admitted having been intimate with her. When he returned to Moscow in 1960 he had sought out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had been demoted in Inturist because of her [declared intention to marry an American (see Philip NIELSEN)] 08, 06. [THOMPSON] also visited the 06 Soviet Union in 1964. 06 [THOMPSON] stated that he was unaware of any photographs the KGB might have and that he was never approached by the KGB on either trip.

8/BR

(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued)

KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI in June 1965. She confirmed that she had been intimate with THOMPSON in 1959 but denied that 06 she had been instructed to compromise him.

NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent in 1959, although he has not related that claim to his description of her role in the THOMPSON 06 case.

06

TORREY, Carmen

NOSENKO's Information

06

TORREY who was in love with a Soviet citizen, was recruited by Seventh Department case officers on that basis in 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate, which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as NATO). NOSENKO was in the American Department at the time.

06

Comment: In 1960 it was reported that TORREY planned to defect to the USSR because she was in love with a Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an American. In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB attempts to recruit an American identifiable 06 as TORREY during her October or November 1959 visit to Moscow. 06 TORREY worked for the Pan 29 American Union in 1954-1959, but there is no indication that she was ever employed by the UN or by NATO.

NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on TORREY. 06 In 1959, when GOLITSYN reported the KGB attempted to recruit TORREY, 06 NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Department, not the American Department.

10/BR

(Annex B)

06
TWAROG, Leon

NOSENKO's Information

An American professor of Russian Literature and a fluent Russian speaker, 06 TWAROG visited the Soviet Union in 1962 or 1963. The target of Seventh Department case officer K.G. KRUPNOV, 06 TWAROG was lured into intimacy with a female KGB agent, of which the KGB took incriminating photographs. At one point Seventh Department case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV was placed in direct contact with TWAROG, but no recruitment 06 attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the incriminating photographs were not sufficient to ensure success. The KGB deferred further action pending TWAROG's 06 expected return to the Soviet Union in 1964 or 1965.

Comment: In a 1965 interview with the FBI, 06 TWAROG said he had visited the USSR in 1957, 1960, 1962, and 1964. On his 1962 trip he had met and befriended one Nina S. PETROVA, and on one occasion they attended a party accompanied by friends of hers, a Soviet couple. The man's name was Yevgeniy. 06 TWAROG stated that he was later intimate with PETROVA, but was never confronted by anyone about that fact. In 1964 (after NOSENKO's defection), TWAROG stated, he 06 was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian whom he had met in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected in Sweden in 1955, redefected to the USSR in 1962. According to TWAROG, HAMAN offered 06 $50,000 if TWAROG would provide background 06 summaries of members of his tour group and threatened him with the denial of future entry 06 to the USSR if TWAROG did not comply. TWAROG 06 stated that he refused, and no further pressure was applied.

NOSENKO provided the information on TWAROG 06 from notes, in Geneva in 1964.

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(Annex B)

06

VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich

NOSENKO's Information

06

VOLKOV, construction company employee and an American, was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in the summer of 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to be used in emigre operations.

06

Comment: VOLKOV has been identified as a carpenter living in California who travelled to the Soviet Union in 1962. He is a religious fanatic with a record of many arrests, and he may be mentally disturbed. In an FBI 06 interview VOLKOV denied that he had been recruited by the KGB.

NOSENKO does not indicate the source of his information, which was contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

VOLSKIY, Boris

NOSENKO's Information

08 06

The president of "American Travel Abroad", VOLSKIY was recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on ideological grounds. His mission is to advise the KGB by open code of any tourist whom he suspected of having some connection with American Intelligence.

06

Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIY advised that he travelled annually to the USSR on tourist business and has frequent contacts with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union. He denied having any intelligence contacts, with one possible exception. In about 1962 he was visited in his Moscow hotel room by a

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(Annex B)

Comment: (Continued) 06
person represented to be an Inturist official who solicited VOLSKIY's aid in curtailing foreign tourists' distribution of Bibles and literature in the USSR. VOLSKIY asserted that 06 he was in no position to provide such assistance, and he was not contacted again.

NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964.

06

WALLACE, William

NOSENKO's Information

10 , 06
A student at the University of Vienna, WALLACE was recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet Union in 1961. The Seventh Department made the recruitment, 06 and turned WALLACE over to the First Chief Directorate, which was still managing the case in 1964.

10
Comment: Interviewed in February 1965 in Vienna, 06 WALLACE admitted having been approached by an unidentified Soviet during a visit to the USSR in 1961. He claimed he refused to "help them", and said there had been no further attempts to contact him.

NOSENKO's information is limited to that contained in written notes brought to Geneva in 1964; he has not indicated the source of his information.

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(Annex B)

06, 06

YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn

NOSENKO's Information

06

The YOUNGER couple were identified as American Intelligence agents and arrested and recruited by the KGB while they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they failed to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The case was handled by the American Department while NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO's former subordinate, V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.

06

Comment: The YOUNGERs were on a mission for the U.S. Army at the time of their arrest, and they reported their recruitment immediately upon leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias in 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERs were 06 scheduled to meet with the KGB in Denmark.

NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information which he related to CIA in Geneva in 1962.

06

ZIRING, Stanley

NOSENKO's Information

06

ZIRING, a student who visited the USSR in 1960, was recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in blackmarket dealings.

06

Comment: Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING admitted blackmarketeering but denied recruitment. British authorities concluded that he may have given the impression of willingness to cooperate without realizing the purpose of the Soviet offer. British authorities report no evidence of subsequent contacts between ZIRING and Soviet officials.

06

NOSENKO claims he was in the American Department at the time ZIRING was recruited by the Seventh Department.

06

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201BR

SECRET

AMBIDDY-1

15 June 1964

SYNOPSIS

Per his request, 2nd Lt. Oliverio Antonio TOMEU Vasallo was recontacted on 8 June 64 at his place of residence. He provided additional details on Carlos and Ana Gloria de VARONA, and identified Osiel GONZALEZ and one "COCO" as possible leads to Jose LLANUSA Gobel.

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SECRET

15 June 1964

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Recontact of Oliverio A. TOMEU Vasallo. (201-283206)

1. At 1730 hours, 8 June 64, the undersigned was advised at his residence that a Mr. TOMEU (Subject) had called the security number given him (351-8161) and left the message that he would like to talk again with Paul Stroud (the undersigned) anytime after 1800 hours, 8 June.

2. Upon arriving at TOMEU's apartment (Apt. 303, 1028 Wahler Place SE, High Point Apartment House, Washington, D. C.), 1830 hours, 8 June, TOMEU indicated to his two daughters he would like to have some privacy and they and his wife, Caridad, left the apartment.

3. TOMEU apologized for not having recalled the name "de VARONA" as that of Ana Gloria de VARONA. He reiterated that, while in hiding to escape capture by the Cuban Government subsequent to his infiltration, he knew only the first names of the persons with whom he came in contact, but then added he knew Ana Gloria de VARONA, in whose house he was hiding, because she was the sister of Carlos de VARONA, one of his infiltration team members. (This Carlos de VARONA may be identical with one Carlos Manuel de VARONA Segura, 201-289985; or one Carlos Arturo VARONA Arjona, 201-283209.)

4. On several occasions, according to TOMEU, he was seated at the table in Ana's house with several other people. One of these individuals, known to TOMEU only as "COCO," was described as the secretary to Jose LLANUZA Gobel. There was not, however, any discussions in which TOMEU recalls LLANUZA or his political sympathies having been discussed. According to TOMEU's recollection it was "COCO" who was associated with LLANUZA, and he was not aware of any relationship between Ana and LLANUZA. Although TOMEU had no information as to what finally happened to Carlos de VARONA, his infiltration team mate, he suggested that if Carlos or Ana were available they may be able to identify "COCO" and provide data on his accessability for contact.

5. One Caiol GONZALEZ, former Chief of the Havana Fire Department, was identified by TOMEU as another possible lead

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who would know LLANUZA. TOMEU affirmed Osiel was previously with MENOYO Gutierrez in the Second Front of Escambray. Osiel was under asylum in the Brazilian Embassy (sic, Argentine Embassy?), when TOMEU gained political asylum. When Osiel finally received his safe conduct from the Embassy, he went to Puerto Rico and, TOMEU postulates that Osiel is now again with MENOYO in either the United States or Puerto Rico.

6. Two snap shots (to be returned) were provided by TOMEU of himself and six other individuals who were in asylum at the same time. He identified these, in the photograph in which Monsignor Eduardo BOZA Masvidal is seated, as, from left to right: Manuel VILLAMANAN, Oliverio TOMEU, Nils DIAZ (believed to be in US), Publio RUIZ (US), Jorge Del VALLE (Mex?), and Osiel GONZALEZ (US or Puerto Rico?).

7. Upon completing the debriefing, Stroud and TOMEU "exchanged small talk" for a while until TOMEU finally stated that he still wished there was something more he could do to help free Cuba, and asked "What do you think I should do?" Stroud replied that no person could really make that type of decision for another individual, and countered by asking TOMEU what alternatives he had in mind, other than remaining in the US Army as a career military officer.

8. TOMEU replied that, of course, he was once an agriculturalist, but that there were few job opportunities in which he could apply his past experience. His sister had also asked him if he felt he and his family would want to live with her in Spain or Mexico, but he didn't think too much of this idea. He then stated that he had been asked by Manuel ARTIME to take a job as an instructor. Without indicating any association of even awareness of ARTIME's activities, or of ARTIME's contact with TOMEU (as indicated in TOMEU's 201), TOMEU was asked what he thought of ARTIME's proposition. TOMEU stated that he would no longer follow any man as an individual or as a leader, because a man's ideals, outlook, and objectives change with time. For example, the people of Cuba followed Fidel because of the ideals he advocated. When Fidel took over, his accomplishments gradually became quite different from the ideals he had espoused. TOMEU continued by saying he would "no longer follow a man. One could only trust his ideals or an organization which followed those ideals, since a good organization would be less likely of being controlled by a single man." When asked for an example of the type of organization he had in mind, TOMEU replied he was most favorably inclined towards the ideals and goals of the JURE. (The JURE or JRC is an organization created by Manolo RAY Rivero around a nucleus of former 26 July Movement leaders. See memo and attachment dated 23 July 1963 from John Hugh Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA, Department of State in TOMEU's 201-283206.)

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9. It should, perhaps, be noted here that in an informal exchange with Mrs. Donald WEBSTER, TOMEU's supervisor at the Defense Language Institute, Anacostia Naval Annex, 4 June 64, Mrs. WEBSTER volunteered the information that "all of the other 'Brigade students here' have told me they think very highly of TOMEU, and that he is a very brave man, because he and his family were very wealthy in Cuba and he gave it all up to go into exile and fight the Castro Regime."

WH/SA/SO/HS
C. PAUL PLUMB, JR.

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declassification

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NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

DATE

ESTABLISHED FOR [illegible]

ATTN: Mr. Filer

FILE NO. [illegible]

REF: Pre-employment Cover Briefing

ID CARD NO. [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
32
US Army (Research Translation Group)

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 6 January 1964

☒ NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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13-20-48

UDJ

109709

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 June 1963

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) OS

SUBJECT: PICCOLO, Joseph S.

ATTN: Mr. White

REF: Form 1322 dtd 4 June 63 removing cover

FILE NO. 4455

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: 32 US Army Records Analysis Group

ID CARD NO.

☒ Unblock Records:
(OP Memo 20-800-11)

Effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category.
(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS.

☐ Remarks:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CD/DD CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

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FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

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(13-20-43)

SECRET

104709

28 September 1961
File No. 4455

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Chief, PSD/OS
Attention: Mr. Robert C. Swendiman

SUBJECT : PICCOLO, Joseph S.
GS-7, WH - Cover Debriefing

1. Mr. Piccolo entered on duty with the Agency on 4 February 1957 and will resign on 4 October 1961. During his period of employment he utilized nominal state 32 cover in Mexico from 1 November 1957 to 14 January 1960, and from 15 January 1961 to resignation used nominal Department of the Army cover in Headquarters.

2. Mr. Piccolo was instructed to indicate his employer for the entire period as CIA, 2430 E Street, N. W., Washington 25, D. C.

3. He was further instructed to indicate, whenever necessary, that he travelled, listing various countries en route to and from Mexico, but not reveal the specific location or details of his cover assignment.

4. Mr. Piccolo's forwarding address will be 1636 N.E. 20th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. His new employment is 121st Tactical Fighter Sq., Andrews AFB.

5. The above information is furnished for your guidance and inclusion in the Subject's personnel and security files.

C. T. DOLLAR
03
ROBERT E. YOUNG
Chief, Military Cover Branch, CCG

MCB/CCG/EF:sl
Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - Addressee
    1 - PSD/OS
    1 - WH Division
    1 - File 4455
    1 - MCB
    1 - Chrono

SECRET

2/R

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 15 August 1961

O : Chief, WH

ATTN: Mr. Herbert V. Juul

ESTABLISHED FOR: PICCOLO, Joseph S.

REF : Form 1322, dated 22 June 1961

FILE NO. 1455

OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP UTILIZED: U. S. Army Records Analysis

1. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in Military Cover, CCG.

2. It is requested that CCG be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required.

3. Appropriate action must be taken to ascertain that subject employee is issued an Army W-2 Form for tax purposes.

C. T. DOLLAR

23

ROBERT E. YOUNG
Chief, Military Cover, CCG

FORM 1-61 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (13-20-43)

SECRET

169769

TRAVEL PROCESSING SHEET

SUBJECT Piccolo, Ralph		FILE # 169769
OFFICE WH	TITLE & GRADE Mail Clk - GS-5	
DEPARTURE DATE 14 July 59	STATUS PCS	COVER LT Staff 32
DESTINATION Mexico City Mexico		

A review of SUBJECT'S file reflects: [illegible]

DATE OF POLYGRAPH 5 Feb 57	SPECIAL CLEARANCES None
DATE OF CERTIFICATION	SECURITY FILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]
CONCURRENCE	DATE 6/12/59

SPECIAL BRIEFING:

On 6/12, 1959 SUBJECT was interviewed regarding the following;

1. Knowledge of Security regulations in general.
2. Travel precautions (No CIA identification); emergency contact numbers.
3. Cover story (briefing, nature and adequacy).
4. Dependents Briefing.
5. Personal affairs prior to departure.
6. Personal Correspondence while overseas.
7. Personal Conduct: (10-250 & 20-155).
8. Assignments involving Risk of Capture -- 10-800.
9. Defensive Audio-Surveillance matters.
10. Other:

02

Date Checked out 6/12/59

Interviewed by
Security Officer

SECRET

2/Rs

SECRET

10 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OSD/OS

ATTENTION : Michael Shortley

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera

?4?651 F-SD/1

1. The Subject WHD asset is currently residing in Apt. G-32 at the Summit Hills Apartments, 8500 16th St., 60 Silver Spring, Md., a safehouse procured by the Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics. Ostensible lessee of this Apt. is a local Arlington attorney Roger McK. SHEA, Esq., 24, 66 who has acquired the place for the ostensible purpose of providing quarters for out of town clients, etc. 24

2. On Friday, 7 August 1964 Subject claims to have made a long distance phone call from the telephone at the Apt., 587-8534 to a cousin, Pablo Rodriguez, 2852 (sic) West 20th St., New York, N. Y., telephone number HI 9-1359.

3. It is requested that your office ascertain if this call was actually made on the 7th, including the time at which the call was made. It would be appreciated if you could ascertain if any long distance phone calls were made on 6 August. It is further requested that you attempt to identify the subscriber to the New York number, HI 9-1359. No Pablo Rodriguez is listed in the New York telephone directory, and the address is obviously an incorrect one as street numbers in Manhattan do not go as high as this number.

4. It would be appreciated if results of this inquiry could be communicated to this office by 12 August 1964.

03

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

8/12 Gave to DFO

SECRET

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5/Rs

WASHINGTON

LEAN OFFICE
Take Jorge Washington Park Way
to BPR turnoff.

ES BLDG
1820 N. Ft. Meyer Drive
Roslyn, Va.

- John HART James Phillips 03 7451 or 351
/Ops - (Tom FLORES) Ext. 3481
Off. Phone 638-5074 (Area Code 202)
Home: (469-8049 (Area Code 301)) 08
- Walter CINI (pronounced Chini)
- (Earl WILLIAMSON) 03 Room 3E04
FI - (John SHERWOOD) Tom Hazlett 03
Eco - (Harry MUSTAKUS) Paul Oberst 03

MMO - (Bud STEELY) 03
Ext. 6528 03
(Vincent LAGO) (O/T pads, etc)

- (Alex TEJEDA) 03
Ext. 2922

ncealment - (Lee POOLE) 03
Ext. 2292

WH - William V. BROE
/WH - Jake ESTERLINE (Exec & Personnel)
WH-3 - Larry STERNFIELD
/WH - Dave McLEAN [illegible]
DDP - Desmond FITZGERAL
RECTOR - Dick HELMS

EUR-South - Ed FENNIMORE Room 4B24
R/Cuba - Les RATY (pronounced Reti) X-6313
EUR - Ralph KISLEY 03
Spain - (Steve MONGER) (friend of (Al Sperr) 03

H - Thomas Polgart C/FI
H - ~~[illegible]~~ Donald Marelius WH Executive
H - (George Thompson) 03 (Support Personnel) Orwell X-7678
H - Martin (Personnel - Medical) X-4460

WASHINGTON

06
(A.C WHITE & Dorthy)
(10125 Markham Ave.) 08
(Four Corners)
Silver Spring, Md.
Home: (593-0368) 08 ~~[illegible]~~
Off. Ext. ~~7141~~ Room ~~[illegible]~~ 5614

06
(Ed LAFFIN & Maj-Lis)
(6314 Tulsa Lane*) 08
Bethesda, Md.
Home: (469-6389) 08
Off Ext. ~~6223~~ 7811
*from Belt exit at Old Georgetown Rd

(Clemente HERNANDEZ) 06
American Institute for Free
Labor Development
1925 K St N.W.
Social Projects
Phone: 965-2100 (Area Code 202
635-3172 (Area Code 703

(Sally SWENSON) 06
(3707 Leland St) 08
Chevy Chase, Md.
Phone: (OL-4-5867) 08
c/o Mrs. Robert Phelps

(Fred HENDERSON) 06 X-6523 Room 5C40
(6629 Beacon Lane) 08
Falls Church, Virginia 22043

(Mathew McCULLOUGH) 06 Room ~~[illegible]~~ 3B2607
(10401 Grosvenor Place) 08 Apt. (1322) 08
Rockville, M.D. 20852
Phone: (493-9534) 08 ~~X-7811~~
(351) - 6223
from out Bldg.

15 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Thomas K. Strange

SUBJECT : Peter J. DiGERVINO
# 214 442 CCS # 2285

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 12 June 1967 regarding establishment of non-official cover for Subject's assignment to Madrid, Spain.

15-2 24

2. Security files contain no record of declaration or compromise to foreign Governments or intelligence/security services. There is no indication of security factors which would affect the proposed action.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

REEVES:lst
15 June 1967
Closed

] DDS/IOS
] ADDS/IOS
] SA-DD/IOS
] C/ID
] DC/ID
] C/ID/
] C/OSD
DC/OSD
C/OSD/2 R
] C/SAD
] C/AAS
]
] A&TS
R FILES

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SECRET

C-2285
12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
Investigation and Operational Support

ATTENTION : Mr. Marvin Wehking

SUBJECT : Peter J. DiGervino (p)

24 1. This staff has been requested to establish non-official cover for subject for an assignment to Madrid, Spain 4/15-2 . As an essential factor in considering this proposal, this staff would appreciate being advised whether or not the subject has been voluntarily declared to foreign governments and intelligence/security services or involuntarily exposed to them. Also please advise if any exposure or compromise has been recorded or if there are other security factors present which should be considered in this proposal.

2. Please provide this information by 19 June 1967 .

Thomas K. Strange
THOMAS K. STRANGE
Chief, CCS/NC

SECRET

2|TV

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
WH/ARGENTINA

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. 03 [Lozupone]		13 Oct		Jox	
2. 03 [Barone]		13 Oct		B	
3. SR/10/CE		13 OCT 1958	15 OCT 1958	PVF	3 to 4: Suggest you indicate to Field that these are full Hq. traces.
4. WH/II/Argentina [Lozupone] 03		16 Oct.		Jox	
AC/WH/II		17 Oct		RS	
5. WH/Mail Room		OCT 1958 18		Jfg	
6. RI/D & P		20/10		mbs	16-29 Pls. pouch to [Buenos Aires.]
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RI/AN		28 OCT 1958			°ALFEROV, Ivan Gavrilovich
18. RI/FI					21 OCT 1958

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS NAME	OFFICE	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER NAME	TITLE
[Antonia V. Dvin] 03	SR/10/CE	[RICHARD S. CAMPSON] 03	AC/WH/II

RELEASING OFFICER NAME	TITLE
R.S. J. C. KING	C/WHD

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
	INDEX	201/236701

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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6/AJ

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 22 [illegible] 5097 201-236701
TO Chief of Station, [Buenos Aires] 16-29 INFO		
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		DATE 21 OCT 1958
SUBJECT Operational/REDCAP Ivan Gavrilevich ALFEROV		RE: "201" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your retention		

REFERENCE(S)

[BUEN] 3365 21-29

Attached for your retention is a REDCAP sheet on Ivan Gavrilevich ALFEROV mentioned in reference as requesting an Argentine visa for travel to Buenos Aires for TDY at the Soviet Embassy. The information on this sheet is the result of full headquarters traces.

10 October 1958

OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment - 1 REDCAP sheet w/traces

Distribution
3 - [Buenos Aires] 16-29
3 - WHD (BA Chrono, Mail Room, Subject File)
~~X~~ - RI
1 - ~~SR~~/10/CE

03
WH/II/FI/[JLozupone]/msg

CS COPY

563 MM/LR/LR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [S. VINCENT BARONE] 03
UNIT : WH/II/A 563
EXT : 2359
DATE : 26 SEPTEMBER 1958

TO : [BUENOS AIRES] 16-29
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, SR 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 29 16 21 '58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT77287
77887

TO [BUEN] 16-29 INFO CITE DIR 43097

21-29
RE [BUEN] 3501 (IN 44771) *

NO PRELIM TRACES STOLIAKOV AND ALFIRIEV. ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES WILL BE RUN AND RESULTS FORWARDED.

END OF MESSAGE

01
CS COMMENT: *CONCERNED [BIOGENESIS] TRACES ON STOLYAROV AND ALFIROV.

COORDINATED BY PHONE:
SR/CE/MCINTOSH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CALDWELL KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

03
R. S. SAMPSON
AC/WH/II
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

03

FROM: WH/4/Prop/[redacted]

NO.

DATE 13 January 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/4/CI	1/11		MA	1 to 2: In your dealings with Subject have you ever had any ~~the~~ doubts about his bona fides - or do you have any info which might tend to substantiate this statement. Bill.
2. WH/4/PA				
3.				
4. M. T [illegible] - pls see me				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				File [illegible]
9.				
10.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

Artime

IB MEMO NO. 5269
10 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

ATTENTION : Mr. Lou Napoli

file

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Documentation for use of Manuel Artime y Buesa

REFERENCE : Memo from WH/4, 27 December 1960

1. This is to confirm that the following Cuban documentation was handcarried on 9 January 1961 by Mr. Stanley Shultz as requested in reference:

03

- a. Passport No. 17130
- b. Vigencia (Exit Permit) JL-11041-H
- c. International Certificate of Vaccination

24

2. The Cuban Passport contains a U.S. Non-Immigrant Visa, B-2, issued in Santiago de Cuba on 17 May 1960 ~~and~~ is valid until 17 May 1964. The Miami Admitted Cachet and Arrival-Departure Record I-94 were provided by I&NS and are "backstopped". You will note that I-94 form shows that subject was admitted to the U.S. on 16 June 1960 and has a valid extension of stay until March 15, 1961.

3. It is our understanding that subject will leave the U.S. "black" but will carry the above listed documentation. The documentation should be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed for operational purposes.

03

Charles Yech
CHARLES YECH, JR.
CHIEF, TSD/IB

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee

SECRET

3/90

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

TO: TSD/IB DATE 9 January 1961

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. ________ DATED ________ AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ________

Javier Alvarez de la Torre

a. Cuban Passport #17130
b. Cuban Vigencia (Exit Permit) JL-11041-H
c. Cuban International Certificate of Vaccination

The Cuban Passport contains a U.S. Non-Immigrant Visa, B-2, issued in Santiago de Cuba on 17 May 1960 and is valid until 17 May 1964. [The Miami admitted cachet and arrival departure record I-94 were provided by I&NS and are "backstopped".] You will note that I-94 form shows that subject was admitted to the U.S. on 16 June 1960 and has a valid extension of stay until March 15, 1961. 24

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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____
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-861 SECRET

1/90

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

#3815

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST Nº 108574

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETT. AND IN NORMAL ORDER) 88474
Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. BIRTH DATE
12 June 1941

4. BIRTH PLACE
Havana, Cuba

5. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Residing in Miami, Florida

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

DATE OF REQUEST 30 Jan 61

REQUEST FROM

03 NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER
Margaret Moss

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/4
ROOM, BUILDING 2702 Qtrs E
EXTENSION 8564

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST
X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
___ ADDITIONAL DATA
___ OTHER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT
___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED
Derogatory

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

P O A
EXPEDITE

FEB 13 4 29 PM '61

10. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES
Father-Santiago ALVAREZ
Mother-Lucia FERNANDEZ

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

201 - 291419

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-59 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (08)

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SECRET

#3915

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO:	☒	CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	DATE 30 Jan 61 03
	☐	Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: Margaret Moss WH/4 2702 Qtrs E 8564
SUBJECT: (True name)		Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez	PROJECT JMATE
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES			CI/OA FILE NO.
			RI 201 FILE NO. 291413
			SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO *field investigation*)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE

PM Trainees

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: #108574

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED (*Explanation*)
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (*Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached*)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (*Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached*)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
for Joseph Piccolo	8564	for Jacob D. Esterline

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-291414

(9)

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1/95

Photographs

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-0236701)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
~~RYBAT~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT/REDTOP/DIOGENESIS/AEBOOR - Surveillance Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HABA-20512, dated 25 April 1969

1. Reference dispatch described our efforts against AEBOOR and stated that the next phase would consist of a 24 hour a day surveillance of Subject for a period of about two weeks. The coverage was initiated at 0600 hours on 19 May, and terminated at 1515 hours on 26 May, the day of AEBOOR's departure for home leave.

2. The overall results of the surveillance effort were interesting, and provided us with a great deal of basic data which should prove valuable in future AEBOOR operational planning. Although the period covered must be viewed as somewhat atypical since it covered a time of preparation for home leave, the basic pattern could not have varied greatly from the norm. There was definite evasive action designed to shake surveillance taken by AEBOOR on several occasions; there were repeat visits to several establishments which could easily serve as letter drops or contact points; and there was an interesting contact on 21 May (reported in BUENOS AIRES 3009) with an individual we failed to identify positively.

3. Although the above makes it appear that we are approaching the AEBOOR operation strictly from the CI/CE angle, this is not the case. We are attempting to gather adequate information to give us a clear insight into AEBOOR's activities in order to help us attempt to introduce an access agent into this operation, or to expand direct development of Subject by Station officers.

4. Forwarded under separate cover for Headquarters study are copies of the surveillance reports along with a copy of the AELANYARD transcript for 21 May.

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

SD, 26 JUN. 69

COPY ROUTING
w/h/pr w/att
8 w/o att

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-20657	16 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

DISPATCH

~~SECRE~~T

TO

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

REDTOP/AEXICK/AEBOOR

Operational Possibilities against AEBOOR

Reference: HCSW 7566, 11 February 1969

1. With the departure of AEBOOR and his wife on home leave, we would like to offer a few comments about him for possible future action by the Station when he returns. The impetus for these thoughts was a recent examination of the files of all those Soviets on the priority target list to determine if, perhaps, one of them offers more of a potential for intensive development than another. The purpose of this review was not to discard the agreed-upon target list, since this list is the rationale behind the entire concept of selective targetting; but rather, to attempt a narrowing of the Station's focus on the one particular Soviet who appears to be the best selection for operational development among the priority group. We have looked at such factors as susceptibilities (known or potential), contacts, accessibility, etc. and, for reasons discussed below, feel that AEBOOR may be the best selection for a determined Station effort aimed at his eventual recruitment. Thus, the Station's focus on the other priority Soviets would continue at its present level but at the same time, AEBOOR would be placed "under the microscope" as the object of a more intensive Station effort aimed at gaining multiple access to him.

2. With the imminent departure of BIBANDIT/12 from Buenos Aires and the resulting elimination of our one good contact with AEVULTURE, the choice of AEBOOR became easier to make. His selection, however, was based on several considerations which, from our vantage point, seem to offer the best potential for Station action when he returns to the country.

a. Accessibility: AEBOOR is one of the very few Soviets with whom direct Staffer contact has been made. The social evening spent with him and his wife in January showed excellent promise because it appeared that foundations for rapport and further contact had been laid. We note, however, that there has been no mention of further meetings since the initial one, four and one-half months ago. Due to the elapsed time, we assume that Subject and his wife are not planning to reciprocate the invitation; on the other hand, enough time will have passed since the initial contact for the Station to take the initiative

201 236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABW 11473

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE: 6 June 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-236701

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SB/MC
SB/CI/O
C/WH/4/A
RID

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~~DSS~~ ~~HFO~~
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE		EXT
SB/X/WH		6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/SB/X/WH	6 June 69	
SB/CI/O	6-6	T Cormier
C/WH/4/A	10 JUN	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/4	10 JUN 1969	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-09 (40)

DISPATCH

again and instigate a second meeting soon after Subject returns from home leave. Since there are no other access agents now in touch with Subject, the potential for assessment of our target personality by direct Staffer contact becomes crucial in the selective targotting procedure. Through the advantages of direct assessment, we should be able to make a good judgment concerning the susceptibilities (or lack thereof) of AEBOOR and accordingly, determine the value in pursuing him as a priority target.

b. The impressions of AEBOOR and his wife from the one meeting thusfar seem to offer some possible avenues of approach which the Station may wish to consider in their planning. The wife, in particular, was described as being more relaxed than AEBOOR and through her professed interest in theatre, music, and ballet, it might be possible for Nina T. MARGANDE to exploit this interest and invite her to selected cultural events. If AEBOOR does not share his wife's proclivities for the "arts", then she might appreciate the presence of a female companion who shares her interests. AEBOOR's wife also claimed to like both American songs and dancing. This too, might open the door to some form of imaginative approach built around a future invitation whereby the incipient social relationship of 9 January would be further developed in the depth needed for a thorough assessment of the target. Cultivation of the wife appears to be particularly appropriate because of the apparent conflicts and tensions between her and her husband. The accounts of this relationship from their previous tour in Mexico and also the current transcripts from AELANYARD paint a picture of an irascible and foul-mouthed husband constantly doing battle with a domineering wife. It seems likely that the impression of "sweetness and light" which they generated during their evening with the Station case officers was atypical and manufactured for the benefit of their hosts. This, of course, is natural with most couples who choose not to air their personal differences in public, but from our point of view, this lack of harmony between AEBOOR and his wife offers distinct possibilities for the Station to contact the wife independently and offer her welcome diversions from the regimented and turbulent life with her husband. (We call your attention to the reference since it may provide some useful points in devising an approach to AEBOOR's wife). Their present home leave in the USSR would seem to offer a ready-made situation for renewed contact when they return since natural curiosity about their activities and time spent at home could be sufficient grounds for an invitation either to both or singly to spend an evening together. We offer these thoughts only because they appear to us as good opportunities not only to maintain Staffer contact with a target of priority interest, but to also develop this contact further to the degree of intimacy needed for a recognition and ultimate exploitation of his susceptibilities.

c. Since there are no access agents now in touch with AEBOOR, we suggest, as a supplement to the direct Staffer contact and in order to obtain additional assessments of Subject from other angles, the Station consider "running" a controlled asset into AEBOOR under suitably contrived circumstances. In other words, we would create a relationship where none previously existed. By this device, we are not suggesting a double agent operation in which our agent offers himself for recruitment; on the contrary, the rationale is simply to move a controlled asset into the path of the target and attempt to establish a contact through a common bond of social or business interests. If we agree that AEBOOR can be brought under a more intensive scrutiny than the other Soviets, then this ploy would be a logical step in his development as a recruitment target if additional access to him is non-existent.

14-00000

d. AVDEPTH: The ability to monitor AEBOOR through this technical operation was a key factor in deciding to bring him under closer focus. It should be able to provide the necessary depth to any human assessment of the target and it gives us the singular opportunity to "observe" AEBOOR when he is relaxed at home and not exhibiting the official mannerisms and personality which he must display in public and around his other Soviet colleagues. If we are able to expand the burgeoning Staffer contact with Subject as well as place access agents in touch with him, then his reactions to these contacts can be monitored and our moves against him tailored accordingly.

3. As part of the total effort to build up a large amount of information on the selected target, we are including as an attachment, a copy of the new Personality Characteristic Questionnaire (PCQ) with instructions for its use. By employing it in conjunction with your direct assessment of AEBOOR, we should be able to slowly build up enough information on him so that the indirect psychological assessment technique can also be applied. The PCQ is a new form and less time-consuming than others but we believe it should be an integral part of the entire assessment process focused on a target Soviet and that it can be an invaluable aid in attempting to evaluate the varied impressions of the target which have been obtained from multiple access to him. An initial review of the PCQ may give the impression that many of the questions are irrelevant and have no bearing on the determination of a persons susceptibility to manipulation. The questionnaire should not be perused piecemeal, however, but taken in its entirety since each portion will be interpreted and weighted by the indirect psychological assessment techniques until a very complete impression of the total personality emerges. We encourage the Station to utilize the PCQ and when sufficiently complete, forward it to Headquarters for evaluation.

4. Once again, we wish to emphasize that Headquarters is in a position to offer guidance and support to your efforts, but the direction of the case rests with the Station. The case officer involved is in the best spot to judge the progress of the case and make decisions accordingly. For this reason, we encourage a continuous and candid dialogue, concerning the various aspects of your operations against the selected Soviet targets in order to insure professional development of each case. If our choice of AEBOOR is at variance with your on-the-spot assessment of the priority Soviets, then we would appreciate your appraisal of him as well as any suggestions about a more logical candidate for closer focus.

Philip D. Eiferman

Philip D. EIFERMAN

Attachment:
  As stated H/W

Distribution:
  3-COS

201-236701

14-00000

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5		10	

187

S E C R E T 272000Z MAY 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES/3032 (BUEN) 27 MAY 69 IN 67772

DIRECTOR

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT 26 MAY DEPARTURE FOR USSR OF IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236701) AND WIFE ROSA VIA AEROLINEAS ARGENTINAS 140 TO ROME. LYUDMILA IVANOVNA MAKAROCHKINA, WIFE OF 201-802696, ALSO LEFT SAME FLIGHT.

2. PER BILOCULAR ALFERYEVS WILL TRAVEL ROME TO MOSCOW BY TRAIN. BIBAFFLE AND OTHER SOURCES INDICATE WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES AFTER HOME LEAVE.

3. HAVE NO INFO ON MAKAROCHKINA'S ONWARD TRAVEL FROM ROME NOR ON HER HUSBAND'S PLANS TO JOIN HER. DO NOT KNOW WHETHER DEPARTURE PCS OR HOME LEAVE.

4. FILE 201-236701 AND 201-802696.

S E C R E T

IP

AN RIP
AN X
IY C
FI

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-802696

201-236701
27 May 69

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UNIT: WH/4/A
EXT: 1926
DATE: 27 MAY 1969

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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO .... BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO. WH8 FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB8, EUR6, CI/ICZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 28 17 20Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 06410

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PARIS

REDCOAT BIOGENESIS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3009 (IN 65500)

1. NO TRACES.

2. FILE: 201-236701

END OF MESSAGE

AN	KB
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BN~~	
~~DNO~~	NFD
FI	

WH Comment: Requested traces Phillipe De Seze, French citizen, who is visiting Argentina and is in contact with Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV, known KGB.

AC/WH/4/A

EUR/F

201-236701
28 May 69

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

RAYMOND A. WARREN
C/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/EUR 5, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 231720Z MAY 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3009

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

23 MAY 69 IN 65500

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. REQUEST TRACES INCLUDING LIAISON FRENCH CITIZEN PHILLIPE DE SEZE, DPOB 22 SEPTEMBER 1920, BORDEAUS, PASSPORT 155114. DIRECTOR OF EXPORTACION FRANCAIS VISITING ARGENTINA.

2. BIBAFFLE TEAM SURVEILLING IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, SECOND SECRETARY AND KNOWN KGB, DURING WEEK PRIOR ALFERYEV HOME LEAVE DEPARTURE. ON 21 MAY SPENT SEVERAL HOURS WITH LIMPING MAN WHO OBVIOUSLY NOT ARGENTINE. TWO MET IN EMBASSY, HAD COFFEE IN LOCAL CAFE, VISITED ALFERYEV APARTMENT THEN RETURNED EMBASSY. CHECK OF HOTEL IN WHICH APPEARED MOST LIKELY VISITOR STAYING REVEALED DE SEZE ONLY GUEST WITH LIMP. HAS STAYED HOTEL VARIOUS TIMES INCLUDING PERIOD 3 TO 10 MAY. CURRENT CHECK IN DATE WAS 21 MAY.

3. NO STATION TRACES.

4. INDEX DE SEZE. FILE: 201-236781.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Source: BUENOS AIRES HABA-20528	Date(s) of Intercept: 16/17 April 69
	Rec'd at Prod. Unit: 16 May 69
Reel No.: 5	Processing Completed: 3 June 69
Side(s): 1	Transcriber/Checker: N.V.M.
Readability: Very poor	Translator/Editor: L.T.
	Typist: L.T.

Interesting Tape - deteriorating (apparently) relationship between A & wife. Vasilyev again mediator.

Bill B

TMIG

Xmuy - Pls. file AEB002

~~SECRET~~

A. Ivan (ALFERYEV)

B. Rosa (ALFERYEV)

C. Anatoliy Ilich (VASILYEV)

((Readability is very poor. Music is playing very loudly.))

A., B., and C. continue their conversation. ((Reel 4)) They talk about clothing and dinner jackets. C. says he does not own a dinner jacket, and adds, "But according to regulations, I... By official government regulations, a counselor is provided/allowed ((to have a dinner jacket)). I'll tell you, there are some people who think I don't know this. They keep quiet about it... but I'm embarrassed to say..." B. comments, "You should have one made, and that's all." C. says that when he needed a dinner jacket, he talked to the Ambassador about it. He adds, "Concerning the dinner jacket, he ((the Ambassador)) said, 'Drive over; you have... well, get it from ALFERYEV.' That's an Ambassador!" ((Short portion unreadable.)) B. remarks, "Anatoliy Ilich, he ((probably the Ambassador)) is a strange man."

They continue talking about dinner jackets. A. says that some diplomats at other embassies also do not have dinner jackets. He says to C., "Why don't you asks the French Ambassador if he has a tail coat..." C. comments, "What a comparison!" A. continues, "By the way, they rent ((tail coats))... Ask the French counsel if he owns a dinner jacket..." C. states, "And you go ahead and ask how much they pay an ambassador -- $500, $1,000. I know they get (2G) ((a high salary))." ((Portion unreadable; all talk at once.)) A. says, "He doesn't have one; they rent ((evening clothes.))" C. disagrees, "No, Ivan; you're wrong. That doesn't bother me." A. says, "I realize that." C. explains, "This is a matter of representation ((diplomacy)). If a man has such a difficult, such a difficult... but I know that (XG)." ((Portion unreadable; all talk simultaneously.))

A. insists, "Everybody rents ((evening clothes)); everybody rents." C. exclaims, "But I'm supposed to have it ((a dinner jacket)) according to the regulations. It's written, it's written. Why should I rent it. If you wish, I'll let you read it ((the regulation))."

A. and C. try to convince each other on the pro and con of renting a dinner jacket.

C. expresses his indignation about the situation and tells of his conversation with the Ambassador about a dinner jacket when they were due to attend a function: "I told him... if I find a dinner jacket... So, you will go ((alone)). You have one. But he asked me, 'But why don't you have one?' I said, 'Yuriy Ivanovich, you yourself know why I don't have one.' He shut up..." Later, B. agrees, "You should have your own ((dinner jacket)). C. continues to be resentful, and says, "But the man ((unclear who, possibly the Ambassador)) is jealous, so that, I don't know... "that some sort of (?crooked - krivoy?) counselor will have a dinner jacket. I... ((B. laughs)) I spit on you..." ((probably referring to a supposed critic)). C. adds that he frequently says that "if a dinner jacket is required, I will not go."

The three have a drink. ((short pause)) They discuss music, and talk about an orchestra which they heard on TV. They comment on tickets which they have received for various concerts. ((Readability is very poor; the TV covers their conversation.)) They talk about theatrical artists, the Bolshoi Theatre, and an orchestra. Mention is made of DUNAYEVSKIY, the composer, and various records. ((Loud music covers their conversation.)) They talk about OYSTRAKH and OSTROPOVICH. B. flirts a bit with A. and C. All laugh frequently.

Farther, B. changes the subject and speaks irritably about her work. She asks A., "Was my work at the Embassy normal, was it normal?" A. states, "It was normal." B. retorts, "Oh... it was normal. Yes, ((sarcastically)) it was normal. I did not (3G) normally when I was sitting in (?Pavlovich's?) ((not otherwise identified)) office. (2G). And I'll tell anyone you please that it ((the work)) was not normal." A.'s brief comment is unreadable. B. insists angrily, "I'll say it myself. And I won't ask (XG). I know whom to tell. I'll definitely say it." A. calls her "a fool!" B. rebukes him, "The word 'fool' is always at the tip of your tongue; 'fool,' 'fool.' All evening, all evening." A. states, "That's the first time I said it." B. rants, "So, you said it for the first time! Really? You only said it once?"

C. attempts to sooth B., "Well, Ivan didn't want to say anything bad. I'm sure of that... It isn't that... It concerns some sort of... ((All talk at once -- unreadable)) A. states, "This is none of your business (4G) and I'm not planning to." B. shouts, "Right, so don't put/seat me where you shouldn't -- in the bathroom!" ((figuratively speaking)). C. interrupts, "Rosa, Rosochka, what are you saying!" B. yells, "Well..." C. continues, "Well, Rosa... Roza, sometimes..." B. retorts sarcastically, "It's none of my business -- that's the main thing!" C. says, "Ivan is sometimes incorrect/unjust in his attitude toward you ((plural)) but you ((the informal "ty")) understand how difficult it becomes for married (3G) ((possibly meaning "officials")), Roza. Rozochka, you shouldn't... you should work some more/longer..." A. repeats to B., "It's none of your business." C. adds, "You shouldn't be that way... Later everything will be better." A. remarks, "She's not satisfied..." C. continues, "Because we/you have to maneuvre somehow. Even if we were wrong, even if we were 100% wrong, you still have to wait. For you to see that we are wrong (1-2G). Why is he wrong? Perhaps we are wrong, but there was some sort of precondition/reason for it. It's impossible for us to be wrong. According to his/our character, persuasion, (1G)... desire... Do you understand what happens, Rozochka?" A. states, "Do you understand, when they announce ((unknown what)) to them, they have not deserved that. It's always that way... In order to cast aspersions on someone, it is absolutely necessary (2-3G)..." B. protests, "((Even)) if (?an accusation?) is unjust? All right! ((But if)) something is well done... ((express)) some gratitude, if you please..." C. comments, "Rozochka, don't you see, then the whole thing is that we then (1G)." B. retorts, "At least he could have said that they were (?accusing?) me unjustly. At least he could have said..." C. says, "Roza! But here (2G), do you understand, (XG) no such attention is given. For him here, you understand, ([illegible]G). He is not alone here. A number of people are there, this one and that one ((colloquial: the fifth and the tenth))... And then perhaps someone... especially a wife. That becomes most sensitive/painful. She is sort of the most sincere/frank person. But I wouldn't do it that way. There you are. And she will be correct. However, she did not see the one and the other person ((the fifth and the tenth person))... and immediately did not (2G)... It's good at times. My Lord, Galka does that. At times I feel hurt ((but)) I won't say (2G). I won't begin saying it. Sometimes I feel so hurt that (XG)." B. tells C., "Anatoliy Ilich, when everything will be clean, when everything will be put in order, then I/you/we can talk about gratitude. But now? ... There's chaos all around! And you talk about gratitude... ((She sounds incensed)) Everywhere there is (1G)." C. tries to convince her, "Rosa! You shouldn't talk now. Do you understand? It has to be done gradually. After all, there is some sort of restraint/forbearance; there's a line... you have to (1G). Rosa! How much more/longer will we (1G). After all, we haven't been together merely for one day. Take Ivan. (5G) there are a minimum of 6 to 7 of us men in the Bureau. What I'm saying is that we must respect each other. We think, we discuss. We might make mistakes in something. But, nevertheless, 7 of us men won't be too mistaken as would be someone at (3G). And then, a woman will sometimes not see/understand, Rozochka. (XG). Rosa, you shouldn't insult/hurt us that much. We have nerves and they (XG)." A.'s comment is unreadable. B. tells her husband, "Sit, sit, all right!" C. continues trying to convince B. that she shouldn't insult her husband.

A bit further, B. tells C. irritably, "He piles everything on me. You're blaming me, right?" C. continues telling B. to treat her husband better, and says, "I love my Galka very much, and I see that Ivan loves ((you)). I am firmly convinced of that." B. laughs sarcastically. C. adds, "(XG) that means to indulge ((your husband)). Rosa, how can you do that?" C. continues, "What do you want to do -- do you want to see/think of your husband as a scoundrel?" B. replies, "(2G) in ((his)) attitude toward his wife." C. adds, "Or that I should be a scoundrel? I won't be one. If Galka would throw me out, I wouldn't become a scoundrel any way. I spit on that. No matter what anybody says about me, I won't become a scoundrel any way. And I won't be led by the nose by any Nina MEDVEDEVA." ((Apparently, C. believes that MEDVEDEVA bosses her husband.)) B. remarks, "I'm talking about (This attitude?) toward his wife." C. states, "And I'm saying that they are scoundrels." B. continues, "... personal attitude..."

C. states decisively, "They ((the MEDVEDEVs)) are scoundrels... Ivan, you shouldn't receive ((or, have anything to do with)) them. On the contrary, you should stay farther away from them someplace, as far away as possible." C. continues lecturing B. about changing her attitude toward her husband.

Further, C. tells B. about an incident which occurred where the MEDVEDEVs were involved, saying that the MEDVEDEVs had been given ingredients to make meat pastries (piroshki), and that they had not made the meat pastries but had said that the ingredients had spoiled. He asks B., "How could those people do that? What happened to the ingredients? Roza! You have to answer! Please answer!" B. asks, "I should answer?! Let them answer!" C. says, "Aha... But they don't want to ((answer))." B. asks, "Why should I answer?" C. insists, "Go ahead... answer! What happened to them. How did they..." B. says, "I defend them!" C. continues, "What happened to the ingredients? Please answer. They... someone else, if you please... Why? Did they take them ((drive them)) someplace? They volunteered to make them. What happened ((to the ingredients)). How did they spoil? When did they spoil? What spoiled? And where did they drive to? Answer that question. And (?automatically?) they twisted everything around. Do you know what I'm leading up to? And what happened later?" A.'s comment is unreadable. B. states categorically, "Ivan will twist anything around..." C.'s comment unreadable. B. repeats, "... he'll twist anything..." C. asks, "And then what about (3G)?" A. says, "This is the very best example..." B. asks, "What did you say...?!" A. says something unreadable. B. asks, "Why do you ascribe things to me that I did not say? By the way, your manner has long since been noticed... has long since been noticed..." C. tries to interrupt her, but she continues, "... you can blame a person for something he did not say, and you will keep on insisting that he said that you (3G) me." A.'s remark is unreadable. B. says, "... a good relationship. He ((MEDVEDEV)) has a very fine relationship/attitude toward his wife." Farther, C. asks, "What kind of relationship is that? If I did such a thing, Galka would give me such a lecture... if I permitted such a thing, did such a thing, she would not live with me. She would never permit me to do such a thing -- never would she look ((at me)) if I would be able to do anything so vile." Referring to B.'s statement about the good relationship between the MEDVEDEVs, C. says, "How can you say that, how can you give such an example? ((He mimics B. sarcastically)) 'They have such ((a good relationship)); everything is done by them in a friendly manner.' ((C. says maliciously)) Roza, I despise them..." He continues expressing his indignation. He adds, "They have a foursome; the first are the MEDVEDEVs and then, the TEREKHOVs ((the four are good friends))." C. says that "yesterday I spoke with Galya BOLDINOVA ((probably about the MEDVEDEVs and the foul up on the meat pastries))."

The three of them then calm down, converse quietly, and have a drink. The music covers a part of their conversation. Theylisten to the music and make intermittent comments.

Later, A. begins picking on B. and says to C., "She doesn't think. She has been in a huff all evening. Instead of thinking, she..." C. interrupts, "Vanya, don't talk that way. ((He changes the topic)) Where do you want to go ((take a trip, or drive))? Well, Rozochka..." B. yells, "Well, when I get rid of you...! May I state my conclusion/decision, or not? Will that minute ever arrive, or not?" C. tries to calm her, "Rozochka..." B. continues yelling, "It's absolutely impossible..." C. and B. talk simultaneously -- unreadable. B. then says, "Anatoliy Ilich, that's correct. After you've talked with him, you leave. But for me this goes on with him eternally, from morning to evening, and during the night. It's absolutely frightening!" C. again tries to calm her down. B. goes on, "Why should I wait to say what I want to. I say what I please." C. interrupts, "Roza, Rozochka, Roza! But all of this is..." B. adds, "He has a malicious soul..." C. disagrees, "Nothing of the sort; nothing of the sort! He touched upon ((the subject)), he asked..." B. snaps back, "He touched upon it... so now let him listen to what I'm going to say since he touched upon it. If you object to him ((unclear)), then shut up..." C. again tries, "Roza, may I ask one question?" B. says, "You may..." C. begins, "Please tell me..." B. starts up again, "He poisons everything... because even if he says one thing, he poisons everything." C. states, "Oh no... He (20).

I'll tell ((you)) that the nature of women is to exaggerate at times. And I would say not sometimes, but very often, very often. And why do you... don't you think that you (3G), that he is acting badly toward you? Let him make mistakes..."

C. continues soothing and lecturing B, and tries to convince her that her husband isn't so bad. A. remains silent.

C. changes the subject and suggests that Ivan finish his drink. He talks about food and snacks. C. and A. drink up and leave the room. The radio is on. B. is walking around the room, apparently cleaning up. A bit later, she turns off the radio.

End of Recording

((Transcribers note: Contrary to the Log listing, there is no further recorded conversation, possibly due to faulty recording.))

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT REDTOP/AETARGET
Telephone Tap Operations Against AEBOOR and 201-025485

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As part of our continuing effort to effectively "zero in" on selected FJSTEALER targets, we requested BIOGENESIS to set up telephone taps on phones located in the apartments of AEBOOR and 201-025485. BIOGENESIS complied, and the tap on AEBOOR's line became effective on 18 April. Coverage of 201-025485's line went into effect on 22 April.

2. Although we do not expect this coverage to provide us with dramatic results or some sort of "break through", we hope that it will contribute significantly to our overall coverage of these two targets.

3. Once these operations have been in existence for a reasonable period of time, we will advise Headquarters of the results.

Paul V. LEVERONE

Distribution:
2 - C/SBD
2 - C/WHD

CS COPY FILED IN 201-025485

file 201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HBAA-[illegible]	2 May 1962
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~AEBOOR~~ 201-025485

515 B

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~S E C R E~~ T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO.: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT: RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEBOOR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: BUENOS AIRES-2749 dated 11 April 1969

1. Even though we have maintained AELANYARD for a considerable length of time, we have not been able to establish a pattern of activity for AEBOOR. The cause of this lack is quite simple: AELANYARD has been maintained more or less on a working hour schedule, i.e., from roughly 0800 to 2200 hours with occasional additional night monitoring. Realizing this, we decided to carry out a two week operation whereby we used different equipment. We will cease this phase of the operation since we now have, we believe, sufficient coverage to establish the pattern of activity of AEBOOR.

2. The operation has proved very helpful. We now know that on two occasions AEBOOR did not return home until five or six in the morning. Mrs. AEBOOR on one occasion launched into him demanding to know where he had been, etc. His reply was "I have been working" and nothing more. We forward under separate cover a copy of the pertinent transcript involved in this discussion.

3. Our next step against AEBOOR is to mount via BIBAFFLE a 24 hour surveillance of AEBOOR. It is our present thought to continue this for up to two weeks; however, since as many as 12 officers per day will be needed, the BIBAFFLEs will be hard put to carry it out. Other operations will have to suffer since we are convinced that a well conducted and thorough surveillance could produce

Attachment:
Transcript (u/s/c)

Distribution:
~~3~~ - C/SB (w/att u/s/c) / WH 3 PT W/ATT W/O/ATT
2 - C/WHD (w/att u/s/c)

Continued

3D 7 MAY 69

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HADA-20,812

DATE: 25 April 1969

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-236071

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~S E C R E T/RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20,512

extremely interesting results.

4. We will advise you of our progress.

5. File: 201-236071.

Edwin W Shroyer

Edwin W. SHROYER

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

CASO: RANCO
SUBCASO: MIGUEL
RLL I2
LA 7
FA I3-4-69
OP I2I

Desde las I2.0I hasta I300

12:18 AM 98 Puerta de campanillas. Entra Rosa.
1225 I74. Ivan. Y, muchacha, como termino (ID)?
Rosa. Y, a que hora llegaste vos? Por donde te llevaron los diablos por toda la noche?
Ivan. Toda la noche. A lo de (?? MOGILOV ??)
Rosa. A que hora llegaste?
Ivan. Vino, segun me parece a las 5 (?)
Rosa. Y donde estuviste? A lo de Misha?
Ivan. Trabaje.
Rosa. A lo de Misha, si?
Ivan. No.
((Pausa corta))
Ivan. Y no lo adivinaste. No lo adivinaste,(?muchacha?).
Rosa. Y donde? A lo de Iuri Ivanovich?
Ivan. No lo vas a adivinar lo mismo.
Rosa. Aborto~~s~~ monstruoso.
Ivan. No va~~s~~ a adivinar.
Rosa. Estas parado como un idiota.
Ivan. Lo mismo no adivinaras.
Rosa. Callate la boca. (?Vas a jugar?) conmigo todavia.
((Pausa))
1230 2I3 Persianas bajan.
1240 246. Rosa. Vas a salir ahora, si?
Ivan. (Murmura algo afirmativo.))
Rosa. Y que no me aparezcas hasta las 6. Porque ya no hay nada que hacer. Todo me hiciste al revez. Yo necesito dormir. Que no te llevan los diablos por aqui.
Ivan. ~~Mmmmmx~~ Dormi.
Rosa. Esta claro? Y que no me aparezcas.
Ivan. Que?
Rosa. Todo lo hace al reves. La gente van a acostarse, y eh se levanta. La gente duerme, y el esta paseando. Y porque haces todo al reves?
Ivan. Que dices (2-3D)
Rosa. "Que decis?" Yo te doy "que.decis". Como se indisciplino.
Ivan. Y vos no me vas a persuadir. En esto yo no creo.
Rosa. Ahora se puso histerico.
Ivan. No me persuadiras.
Rosa. A mi me llamaron ayer. Dice; "Uds. no se van de licencia" Yo digo: " Como? Quien le dijo esto? " Ella dice: " MEDVEDE-VA no trabaja (ID)lo conoces? Vos viajas, y ella dice que alla hay NASTENKO, y puede ser que SOKOL ((De SOKOLOVSKI ?) y ALFERIEV. Y ella dice:"Como Alferiev? Alferiev no viaja.
(~~[illegible]~~)
~~[illegible]~~ Ivan. ((Monosilaba))
~~[illegible]~~ Rosa. Y con este aplomo lo dijo: " No, Alferiev no viaja. ((Pausa))
Rosa. Y que me decis?
Ivan. (6D).
Rosa. Correcto. Yo ire. Y a mi me dice. Castigar y listo.
((Siguen hablando de vacaciones, algunos empezaran a

RLL I2
LA 7
FA I3-4-69
OP I2I

PARTE 2

irse de vacaciones en primeros dias de mayo.

271 Salio Ivan
423 Telefono vecinos sin contestar.
800 Portero electrico. Vecinos.
802 Lo mismo.
1605 Se levantan las persianas. Pasos. Puertas internas. Se levanto Rosa.
1930 Puerta campanillas. Entro Ivan.
Conversan corto tiempo. Entre otras cosas Rosa le pregunta si va al cine y si tiene frio. Para primera pregunta no se escucha l respuesta. Para segunda, respuesta negativa. Leen diarios. No Hablan.

Hasta 3125 sin cambios.

FINAL DEL ROLLO .

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 26 PER ______ #

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298

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR AF/AN, WH 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 252234Z APR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2833

DIRECTOR

25 APR 69 IN 44917

REDTOP

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT THAT GENRIKH BORISOVICH MEDVEDEV DEPARTED FOR MOSCOW ON 23 APRIL WITH WIFE NINA AND DAUGHTER MARINA.

2. PCS DEPARTURE ABRUPT, APPARENTLY UNEXPECTED BY MEDVEDEV, SINCE RETURNED FROM HOME LEAVE ONLY LAST SEPTEMBER. CURRENT TRAVEL CERTAINLY NOT RESULT NORMAL ROTATION. FURTHERMORE, BILOCULAR GAVE NONE OF USUAL INDICATIONS FAMILY PREPARING LEAVE. AT 18 APRIL LUNCH WITH BIBANDIT-11, SUBJECT IMPLIED PLANNED TO REMAIN ARGENTINA FOR SOME TIME. WHEN BIBANDIT-11 CALLED TRADE DELEGATION 24 APRIL, WAS TOLD MEDVEDEV HAD LEFT PERMANENTLY. BIBANDIT-9 REPORTS REQUEST FOR PERMISSION DEPART NOT RECEIVED HIS OFFICE UNTIL 23 APRIL. NO REQUEST FOR REENTRY OR SHIPMENT OF HHE INCLUDED.

3. INITIAL ANALYSIS CURRENT AELANYARD TAPES INDICATES DEPARTURE POSSIBLY RESULT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEDVEDEV AND COLLEAGUES, NOTABLY IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236701) AND ANATOLIY ILICH VASILYEV (201-727440) ON OPS OR POLICY MATTERS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

[illegible]

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[illegible] MESSAGE

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INFO

FILE VR.

(INITIALS - SEEN BY)

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 RUESBA 2833 SECRET

REVIEWING AVAILABLE MATERIAL FOR MORE CONCRETE DETAILS AND WILL ADVISE.

4. FILE: 201-313586.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: PATRICIA FLYNN
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 0412 1515
DATE: 21 APRIL 1969

TOTAL COPIES: 22

~~SECRE~~T

1	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	6	[illegible]
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 23 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: SB8 INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

21 20 48 Z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 94535

TO BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEKICK AEBOOR

REFERENCES A: DIRECTOR 93637*

B: BUENOS AIRES 2784 (IN 39529)**

IDENTITY ENCRYPTED AEBOOR WHOSE CORRECT 201 NUMBER IS 201-236701.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/X/WH L.[illegible]
WH/4/AR [illegible]
AC/WH/4 [illegible]

*Encrypted known KGB officer, ALFERYEV.

**Requested clarification of subject's 201 number.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L.[illegible]
SB/XO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 82 PER ______ #

ACTION
SB8
☐ RID COPY

843

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. APR 19 3 19 PM '69

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ACTION COPY BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	
2	CI	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 182150Z APR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2784

18 APR 69 IN 39529

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: DIRECTOR 93637

1. REF INDICATES 201-236701 ENCRYPTED AEBOOR. PRESUME 201-236071 MEANT. IF NOT, PLEASE IDENTIFY FURTHER. ?

2. NO FILE.

S E C R E T

BILL ___

TR3/1 ___

SECRET

14-00000

NO: PATRICIA FLYNN 20
NIT: SB/X/WH
T: 6412 1315
ATE: 16 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

~~SECRET~~

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
26 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: SB 8 FILE, VR. AN/AN, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 23 34z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 93637

BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEKICK

SUBJECT OF 201-236701 ENCRYPTED AEBOOR.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comment: Subject is on the Station's Priority Target List and is the target of a residency audio operation.

C/SB/X/WH L. [redacted]
SB/CI/O F Walters
WH/4/AR Thalter
DC/WH/4 [illegible]

AN MS
~~AD~~
SB/X/WH

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L. [redacted]
SB/XO

17 APR 69
201-236701

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

~~SECRET~~

DATE [illegible]

SR MC

RID CR (I D 15)

REQUEST FOR CODE DESIGNATION

Fill out in duplicate
Hand Carry

1.	REQUEST FOR	☐	PSEUDONYM	☐	ALIAS	☐	CRYPTONYM
	NAME ASSIGNED NEBOOR						
2.	BRANCH [illegible]			CASE OFFICER [illegible]			
	BADGE NUMBER [illegible] 579			HOME PHONE [illegible]			
3.	DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT OR AGENT (what, where, use, etc.) [illegible]						
4.	STATUS	☐	STAFF EMPLOYEE	☐	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	☐	STAFF AGENT
		☐	CONTRACT AGENT	☐	FIELD AGENT	☐	OTHER
5.	TYPE OF ACTIVITY	☐	FI	☐	CI	☐	CA
6.	IS THIS TO BE USED IN CABLE TRAFFIC			☐	YES	☐	NO
7.	LIST ANY PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED PSEUDONYM OR CRYPTONYMS						

THIS PORTION IS DETACHED AND THE ABOVE IS SENT TO CABLE SECRETARIAT ON CRYPTONYMS ONLY THAT WILL HAVE CABLE TRAFFIC

TRUE NAME [illegible]

FILE NUMBER (201, Project, Subject) [illegible]

FORM 3-66 2611 SECRET (11-39)

A. Ivan (ALFERYEV)

B. Rosa (ALFERYEVA)

C. Anatoliy Ilich (VASILYEV)

C. comes in and asks, "You're angry, aren't you?" A. asks, "Why did you come here so late? You don't deny it; there's no (10)?" C. answers something about old/former guests. A. agrees. B. comes into the room and greets C. very graciously, telling him that they have been waiting for him. Everyone talks at once, joking and laughing. A. calls B. "Rozochka."

A short portion of the conversation is unreadable because the record player is on as well as a Spanish-language radio program.

AELANYARD - 16 APRIL 1969

SECRET

Americans then become the topic of conversation. A. says, "They work with anyone, with the good and the bad (s khoroshimi i plokhimi.)" B. states, "It is my impression and opinion that, nevertheless, the Americans somehow understand us better, so to speak. I don't know... what to talk about ((or, what someone is talking about))... A. remarks, "I don't understand yet what you are trying to say -- that they simply... they (1G) us very much. How do they understand ((?us?))?" B. explains, "Well among them there are more such progressives that you find here..." C. asks, "Than in Washington?" B. continues, "... Yes, than in Argentina." C. says, " Ah... you ((informal "ty")) understand, I don't know anything about the USA; I only heard a lot about it. I'm not talking about their popularity right now.. (2G) comrades were there ((?in the USA?)). But apparently there actually is (1G) there, nevertheless, and a healthy (??unusual spirit??). That's how I understood it from my comrades/friends who told me about it and who passed on to me (3G), apparently (XG). But the English have something which is not comprehensible to us. (4G) everything, television sets..." B. adds, "That's how I have even ((?noticed it?))... But there, but there they ((the Americans)) are more... in my opinion, they are closer to us." ((Portion unreadable because all talk at once.)) A. says, "I do not agree with you on one thing ((uses the informal "ty"))." C. says, "Ivan, I wasn't there. I'm only saying..." B. says, "But here, in general, the people are such, ((they're)) stupid. Right here in (?Argentina?), ((there are)) festivities, restaurants, and everything. They have (5G). Right?" ((All speak simultaneously - unreadable.))

A bit later, B. says to C. in an exasperated voice, "He shouldn't be so helpless; he shouldn't be so helpless, Anatoliy Ilich, he shouldn't be. If he broke it, he should fix it. 'If you can't ((fix it)), get a specialist.'" A. tries to fix the record player and, obviously hurt, he complains about his wife and says to her, "Don't be rude/crude." ((A. sounds rather high.)) B. complains, "He can't do a thing, Anatoliy Ilich. I simply can't understand. A man in the house is, after all... If something breaks somewhere, it should be fixed. Just say, 'I'll fix it,' that's all. If you can't fix it, you need a specialist." ((She sounds quite annoyed.)) They discuss the cost of fixing the TV and record player.

B. hasn't calmed down and angrily says to her husband, "Everything is falling apart. But you're living in a government-paid apartment. Everything is falling apart. Look, how can it be that way -- the handle. You can see that the handle is falling off; you should screw it in, if you approach it like a man... Should I be the one to screw things in... everywhere. A handle is falling off there, here a handle fell off. How can it be that way?"

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ S E C R E T
~~RYBAT~~ R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[illegible] FILMED
APR 8 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: HABA-20357, dated 13 March 1969

1. Transmitted under separate cover for your information are copies of the AELANYARD transcripts from 3 February through 20 March 1969. Since Matthew F. CHETUNG worked exclusively on AEDANGLE-2 during this period, the material being forwarded is comprised entirely of Spanish language transcripts processed by BIOGENESIS transcribers. It is probably representative of the product we shall receive from this operation after CHETUNG's departure.

2. Although we have reviewed this material rather carefully, we have found little hard information therein. From the circumstances and the tenor of the conversations, we conclude that the wife of 201-236701 and the wives of 201-087550, 201-820310 and possibly 201-025485 are friends. From the transcript of 28 February we have extracted the information on 201-236701's T.V. repairman and will suggest that the BIBAFFLE team do at least an initial check. Otherwise, we are confronted with tantalizing fragments which appear to be significant but defy any attempt to read meaning into them. The pages are filled with names of individuals that we have not been able to identify, exceptions being those of officials presently or formerly stationed in Argentina. (From experience with BILOCULAR and other BIOGENESIS transcripts, we feel that some of these names escape recognition simply because they are so garbled.)

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Transcripts destroyed January 1970

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

COPY ROUTING
1 PM/[illegible] w/ATT
2 B w/ATT

27 MAR 69

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
IB 201-236701

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20415

DATE
27 March 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER
74-120-321
201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20415

3. In the coming months Buenos Aires Station plans to examine and assess the AELANYARD transcripts with care in an effort to decide whether they truly are worth the great amount of time now devoted to their review by Station officers. It is our present feeling that alternative, hopefully more productive operations against 201-236701 should be considered unless we and/or the BIOGENESIS transcribers develop a greater facility for putting the product into a more meaningful context.

4. We should appreciate receiving any comments or ideas Headquarters may have on the separate cover material.

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

ORIG: C. Thompson:sk
UNIT: TSD/AOB
EXT: 2481
DATE: 10 March 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	PT	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ABSTRACT SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY Re PER ______ # ______

CONF: c/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR , c/WH 8, c/SSS, c/CI, c/FI 2, c/CI/SD

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 16 [illegible] MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 82506

BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDCOAT AETARGET AELANYARD

REF BUENOS AIRES 2437 (IN 02909)

1. FAILURE ANALYSIS UNDERWAY. WILL ADVISE MKCHECK CONCLUSIONS.

2. FILE 4-137-100 AND 4-8-100/1.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Station request analysis of equipment failure.

WH/4/C Mr. Loftus (by phone X6067)

SB/S/PT Mr. Hunt (by phone X6356)

Benjamin M. Collins
TSD/COP

John H. McBee
Norman S. Jackson
C/TSD/AOB

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	F/T	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY: PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/SB 5, C/CI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2

#114

SECRET 072005Z MAR 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2483

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY 7 MAR 69 IN 09480

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP AETARGET AELANYARD

REF: BUENOS AIRES 2437 (IN 03909)

1. ON 5 MARCH GEHRMANN, BISAFFLE 3, BIOGENESIS 14 AND HIS ASSISTAN REPLACED SWA-3A ON REF LINE WITH NEW UNIT, SERIAL G-925, THUS RESTORING AUDIO. DEFECTIVE PREAMP WILL BE POUCHED HQS FOR INSPECTION.

2. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE FORWARD TWO SWA-3A PREAMPS AND ONE UWP-9 POWER SUPPLY FOR STATION STOCK.

3. FILE: 4-137-100 AND 4-8-10/1.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ #

ACTION C/TSD-3 ☐ RID COPY

820

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RE/SD, C/WH-8, C/SB-5, C/FI-2, C/CI,

ITING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	CT	6	
2	WH	7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 272123Z FEB 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 2437

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP AETARGET AELANYARD

27 FEB 69 IN 02909

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 2110 (IN 62639)

B. HABA-20212

1. FOLLOWING HEAVY RAIN, ELECTRICAL STORM ONE AELANYARD LINE NOT OPERATING. CHECK BY GEHRMANN SHOWS PROBLEM IS OUTSIDE LP, PROBABLY ANTOHER FAILURE OF SWA-3A PREAMPLIFIER. BIOGENESIS-14 DUE RETURN FROM VACATION WEEK 3 MARCH AND WE PLAN AGAIN REPLACE DEFECTIVE UNIT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST FINDINGS ON DEFECTIVE UNITS FORWARDED HQS VIA REF B.

3. FILE 4-137-100 AND 4-8-10/1

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK
ALFERYEV Contact with Lev YASHIN (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover for your information is a copy of a BILOCULAR report of 8 January describing a conversation between Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV and Soccer player Lev YASHIN (DPOB; 22 October 1929, Moscow, Passport 331422). YASHIN and the rest of the Moscow Dynamo team had just arrived at Ezeiza Airport on Varig Flight 845 from Rio and were departing for Santiago on SAS Flight 955 after a layover in Argentina of three and one half hours. The team was on a Latin American tour covering Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Close friend of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferyev (201-236701)

NO 201

2. During the conversation KGB officer ALFERYEV and YASHIN, whom we believe is KGB, show that they are fairly close friends. They also mention mutual friends: Ivan Semenovich ARKHIPENKO (201-731434), a suspect KGB officer formerly stationed in Argentina; and Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN, the former Consul/KGB officer in Chile. Close friend of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferyev (201-236701)

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

FEB 17 1969

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

S/C [illegible]
Dated 14 Feb 69

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

1 att (USC)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20258

DATE
5 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-236071~~
201-236701

U R S S
PORTERIA

8 de enero de 1969

L I N E A CS 92
TE 42-8039

3P

CARNETE GR 026

Página 3

(SIGUE)-HE - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-HD - Para este mes va estar seguro - Después el mes que viene nos vamos de vacaciones -
-HE - Así que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-HD - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-HE - Sí / sí -
-HD - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Acá está anotado el número suyo - El suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana este- Llámeme a la tarde / así hablo con el patron -
-HE - Como no - (c)

-HD con la Sra NAUMOV -
-HA - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-HA - Sí -
-HD - Le habla JASHIN / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-HA - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan ALFEREV ¿
-HA - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a NAUMOVA "Mijail Konstantinovich (MAKOV) / por favor llame pido a ALFEREV / lo llama JASHIN desde MOSCU / rapido / rapido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) -----escucho / espere un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por otro número - Porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya viene -
-JA - Yo tengo acá tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse con Ud - Tengo acá 83-5271 -
-HA - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último me pudo comunicar -
-HA -Bueno / mientras llega ALFEREV / quiero preguntar / qué tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frio - Bajo 20 -
-HA - Y nosotros ayer teníamos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos un poco -
-HA - (Se ríe) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos acá de paso en "aeródromo" - Nosotros vamos a Chile -
-HA - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "DINAMO" - Así que viajamos para Chile para jugar -
-HA - Y por qué no vienen acá ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-HA - Que sin verguenzas (se ríe) -
-JA - Ahí está el gato encerrado -
-HA - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - También yo lo oigo bien -
-HA - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-HA - Con la persona que esta de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
-HA - Ivan [illegible] / trabajo acá en la Argentina -
-JA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me encontre con él en MEXICO -
-HA - Que lástima que Uds no vienen- Nosotros los esperamos el año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-HA - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austríacos / pero nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar también en Uruguay -
-HA - Pero es tan cerca -

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1969

SIGUE 3/4

201-238701

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969

LINEA Co 92
T L 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026

Página 4

(SIGUE)-JA- (¿¿ Representantes ¿¿) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la
mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no lo
puedo asegurar -
-NA - Bueno / solo ~~[illegible]~~ como huespides / ya no vamos hablar
del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que una hace una visita de "Sokolniki" a "Arbat" ¿
-NA - Asi es (se rie) --- Porque es "tan cerca" - Escucha /
nosotros tenemos un calor barbaro - Ayer hacía un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor -
Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor -
Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALFERIEV -
-ALFERIEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Lova -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Año Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos
muchachos -
-AL - Le agradezco que no han alvidado al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy
a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tú ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iría
a aerodromo - Yo crei que Uds pasen más tarde -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros Hemos jugado en
Italia dos ---
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) ---- Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por
acá en tránsito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Lova (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile -
Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - Bueno / yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener ocasion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En proximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan c[illegible]
-AL - No creo / demasiado complicado -
-JA - Escucha / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente /
pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo -
-JA - Y quién reemplaza a CHURIN (CHURINE) ¿
-AL - No sabría decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - Está bien - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotros
nos vamos a quedar allí tres semanas -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿
-JA - Sí -

i 1
URSS
PORTERIA 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Ca 92
TL 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026 Página 5

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escuche te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allí con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licencia ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / asi hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Asi es - No nos queda otra Alternativa -
-AL - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compañia "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A la mejor voy a ir hasta allí - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a la mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale la pena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podamos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00
-Zoia° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - Y dónde está paseando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellas fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de poco van a llegar - Yo anoté así que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0592
-Tamara FIODOROV° con Zoia ERMATCHKOV -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ER - Buenas tardes - Escuche yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 26 y yo de 26 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no quieres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia BOLDIKOV quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hables antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depués para mi es igual -
-ER - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / depués vamos a conversar -
-ER - Como no - (u)

14 00

15 00
-HD° con Valia NAUMOV -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le hablo de dirección de noticias (¿¿pro artel ¿¿) canal 13 -
-NA - Espera un momento —— (viene AVIOVSKI) -
-HD - Le hablo de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros quisiéramos hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Es sobre

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT REDTOP AEKICK
ALFERYEV Contact with Lev YASHIN (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover for your information is a copy of a BILOCULAR report of 8 January describing a conversation between Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV and Soccer player Lev YASHIN (DPOB: 22 October 1929, Moscow, Passport 331422). YASHIN and the rest of the Moscow Dynamo team had just arrived at Ezeiza Airport on Varig Flight 845 from Rio and were departing for Santiago on SAS Flight 955 after a layover in Argentina of three and one half hours. The team was on a Latin American tour covering Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador.

2. During the conversation KGB officer ALFERYEV and YASHIN, whom we believe is KGB, show that they are fairly close friends. They also mention mutual friends: Ivan Semenovich ARKHIPENKO (201-731434), a suspect KGB officer formerly stationed in Argentina; and Vitaliy Borisovich [illegible], the former Consul/KGB officer in Chile.

[illegible] T. [illegible]

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-20286	5 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-236971

1 1
U R S S
FORMATA

8 de enero de 1969

LINEA Co 92
P.N. 42-3039

CARATE GR 026

Página 3

(SIGUE) -LE - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-JD - Para este mes va estar seguro - Después el mes que viene
nos vamos de vacaciones -
-LE - Así que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-JD - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-LE - Sí / sí -
-JD - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Acá está anotado el
número suyo - El suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana este-
Llámeme a la tarde / así hablo con el patron -
-LE - Como no - (c)

-JW° con la Sra MALKOV -
-JW - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-NA - Sí -
-JW - Le habla JASHIN / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-NA - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan ALFEREV ¿
-NA - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a
MALKOVA "Mijail Konstantinovich (VOLKOV) / por favor llame
rápido a ALFEREV / lo llama JASHIN desde MOSCU / rápido /
rapido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) -----escuche / espere
un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por
otro número - Porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya
viene -
-JA - Yo tengo acá tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse
con Ud - Tengo acá 33-5271 -
-NA - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último
se pudo comunicar -
-NA - Bueno / mientras llega ALFEREV / quiero preguntar / qué
tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frio - Bajo 20 -
-NA - Y nosotros ayer teníamos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos
un poco -
-NA - (Se ríe) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos acá de paso en "aerodromo" - Nosotros
vamos a Chile -
-NA - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "DINAMO" - Así que
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-NA - Y por qué no vienen acá ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-NA - Que sin verguenzas (se ríe) -
-JA - Ahí está el gato encerrado -
-NA - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - Tambien yo le oigo bien -
-NA - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-NA - Con la persona que esta de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
-NA - Ivan ARJIENKO / trabajo acá en la Argentina -
-JA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me
encontre con él en MEXICO -
-NA - Que lastima que Uds no vienen - Nosotros los esperamos el
año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-NA - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para
terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austriacos / pero
nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar tambien en
Uruguay -
-NA - Pero es tan cerca -

SIGUE 3/4

11
URSS
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969 LINEA Cn 92
TE. 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026 Página 4

(SIGUE)-JA- (44 Representantes 44) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no le puedo asegurar -
-NA - Bueno / solo ~~para~~ como huespides / ya no vamos hablar del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que una hace una visita de "Sokolnika" a "Arbat" ¿
-NA - Asi es (se rie) ---- Porque es "tan cerca" - Escuche / nosotros tenemos un calor barbaro - Ayer hacei un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor - Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor - Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALFERIEV -
-ALFERIEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Leva -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Año Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos muchachos -
-AL - Le agradezco que no han olvidando al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tu ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iría a aerodromo - Yo crei que Uds pasan más tarde -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros hemos jugado en Italia dos ----
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) ---- Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por acá en transito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Leva (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile - Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - B[illegible] yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener ocasion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En próximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan cerca -
-AL - No creo / demasiado complicado -
-JA - Escuche / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente / pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo
-JA - Y quién reemplaza a CHURAIN (CHURAINE) ¿
-AL - No sabría decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - Está bien - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotr nos vamos a quedar allí tres semanas -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA

8 de enero de 1969

L I N E A Co 92
T E 42-8039

CARRETE GR 026

Página 5

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escuche te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allí con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licenica ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / así hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Así es - No nos queda otra Alternativa -
-[illegible] - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compañía "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A la mejor voy a ir hasta allí - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a la mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale la pena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podemos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00 -Zoia° con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - ¿ Dónde está pasando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellos fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de poco van a llegar - Yo anoté acá que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0392
-Tamara FIODOROV° con Zoia [illegible] -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ZR - Buenas tardes - Escucha yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 26 y yo de 26 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no queres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia BOLDINOV quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hablas antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depües para mi es igual -
-ZR - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / después vamos a conversar -
-ZR - Como no - (u)

14 00
15 00
-HD° con Valia NAUMOV -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le hable de dirección de noticias (¿¿pro artel ¿¿) canal 13 -
-NA - Espere un momento ——— (viene [illegible]) -
-HD - Le hable de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros quisiéramos hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Es sobre este viaje a [illegible] - Entonces necesitaría de Uds toda la

[illegible] 8 de enero de 1969 L I [illegible] Co 92

CARRETE GK 026 Página 3

(SIGUE)-LE - Para cuándo calcula / más o menos ¿
-HD - Para este mes va estar seguro - Después el mes que viene nos vamos de vacaciones -
-LE - Así que el mes que viene van de vacaciones ¿
-HD - Sí - Mucho entregamos ya - Se entregaron unos cuantos -
-LE - Sí / sí -
-HD - Por 17 hay / después no hay más - Aquí está anotado el número suyo - El suyo / puede ser que dentro de una semana este- llamemo a la tarde / así hablo con el patron -
-LE - Como no - (c)

-NA con la Srn [illegible] -
-JA - Hablo con la embajada ¿
-NA - Sí -
-JA - Le habla JASHIN / desde Moscu - Buenos días -
-NA - Buenos días -
-JA - Por favor me podría llamar a Ivan [illegible] ¿
-NA - Un momento / ahora voy a preguntar ----- (se oye decir a [illegible] "Mijail Konstantinovich ([illegible]) / por favor llame rápido a [illegible] / lo llama JASHIN desde MOSCU / rápido / rapido / porque tiempo corre ----- aja) ----- noche / espere un momento / ahora él va a bajar - Ud tenía que llamar por otro número - Porque él está en otro número - ahora él ya viene -
-JA - Yo tengo aquí tres números - Me costó mucho para comunicarse con Ud - Tengo aquí 63-5271 -
-NA - No / no / no es ese - Tenía que llamar al 42-1552 -
-JA - No / me dieron solo estos tres números y con el último pe pulo comunicar -
-NA - Bueno / mientras llega [illegible] / quiero preguntar / qué tal está Moscu ¿
-JA - Hace mucho frío - Bajo 20 -
-NA - Y nosotros ayer tenímos 32 -
-JA - Ah que lindo / con que gusto iríamos allí para calentarnos un poco -
-NA - (Se rie) - Ud viene a Buenos Aires -
-JA - No / nosotros estamos aquí de paso en "aerodromo" - Nosotros vamos a Chile -
-NA - A Chile ¿
-JA - Nosotros vamos a tener un torneo / de "[illegible]" - Así que viajamos para Chile para jugar -
-NA - Y por qué no vienen aquí ¿
-JA - Nosotros con mucho gusto / pero no nos dejan -
-NA - Que sin verguenzas (se rie) -
-JA - Allí está el gato encerrado -
-NA - Qué bien que se oye a Ud - Parece que yo estoy en Moscu -
-JA - Tambien yo lo oigo bien -
-NA - Y además qué novedades hay ¿
-JA - Con quién hablo yo ¿
-NA - Con la persona que esta de guardia -
-JA - Mucho gusto - Hace poco yo estuve en Mexico - He visto a muchos muchachos que han trabajado - He visto a Ivan [illegible]
-JA - Ivan [illegible] / trabajo aquí en la Argentina -
-NA - Lo sé / con él yo me encontré varias veces - Hace poco me encontre con él en MEXICO -
-NA - Que lastima que Uds no vienen - Nosotros los esperamos el año pasado -
-JA - Y no sale -
-NA - Y este año ya no vienen ¿
-JA - No creo / porque allí en la Argentina el torneo está para terminar - Ahora allí juegan Hungaros - Austriacos / pero nosotros no participamos - Nuestros van a jugar tambien en Uruguay -
-NA - Pero es tan cerca - SIGUE 3/4

14-00000

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA . 8 de enero de 1969

LINEA Co 92
TE 42-6039

CARRETE GR 026

(SIGUE)-JA- (¿¿ Representantes ¿¿) van a visitar el URUGUAY - A la mejor ellos van hacer una visita a la Argentina - Ahora no le puedo asegurar -
-JA - Bueno / solo ~~para~~ como huespides / ya no vamos hablar del torneo -
-JA - Bueno / es cómo fuera que una hace una visita de "Sokolniks" a "Arbat" ¿
-JA - Asi es (se rie) ---- Porque es "tan cerca" - Escuche / nosotros tenemos un calor tarbaro - Ayer hacai un calor insuportable - Hoy es un poco mejor -
-JA - Está bien / porque hay brisa del viento / no hace calor - Nosotros recien estuvimos en Brasil - Allí si que hace calor - Nosotros llegamos a las siete de la mañana y hacia 29 grados -
-NA - Un momento / ya llegó ALEKSEEV -
-ALEKSEEV con JASHIN (IACHINE)
-AL - Lova -
-JA - Salud Vania (Ivan)
-AL - Buenos días / pero allí es ya noche -
-JA - Cómo -
-AL - Primero "Feliz Año Nuevo" -
-JA - Tambien para ti "Feliz Año Nuevo" - Y te saludan todos muchachos -
-AL - Le agradezco que no han alvidado al viejito -
-JA - Yo pensé que si voy a tener oportunidad de llamarte te voy a llamar -
-AL - De dónde llamas tú ¿
-JA - De "aerodrom" -
-AL - Y adónde van Uds ¿
-JA - A Santiago - Allí tenemos torneo -
-AL - Yo no sabía a qué hora Uds van a pasar / porque yo iria ~~a aeródromo - Yo creí que Uds pasan más tarde~~ -
-JA - Nosotros venimos de Italia - Nosotros hemos jugado en Italia dos ---
-AL - (Lo interrumpe) ---- Yo sabía que Uds se van a pasar por acá en transito / pero no sabía ni qué día ni a qué hora -
-JA - Y bueno -
-AL - Bueno Lova (Leon) te deseo mucha suerte en Chile - Después llamame de Chile - Adónde van Uds después ¿
-JA - Nosotros hacemos Chile / Peru / Colombia / Ecuador -
-AL - Bueno / yo te voy a mandar algo / porque voy a tener ocasion -
-JA - Cuándo ¿
-AL - En proximos días -
-JA - Adónde / a Chile ¿
-AL - Sí -
-JA - Y tú no puedes venir a Chile ¿
-AL - No creo -
-JA - Y tan cerca -
-AL - No creo / demasiado complicado -
-JA - Escucha / yo podría hacerte ahora un pequeño presente / pero tengo todo allí -
-AL - Está bien / gracias -
-JA - Y allí en Chile a quién puedo entregar el obsequio ¿
-AL - Al consul / creo yo
-JA - Y quién reemplaza a CHUBAIN (CHUBINE) ¿
-AL - No [illegible] decirtelo - Vas a entregar al consul -
-JA - [illegible] - Creo que voy a ver a todos - Porque nosotros nos vamos a quedar allí tres semanas -
-AL - Tres semanas se van quedarse en Chile ¿

1 1
U R S S
PORTERIA 8 de enero de 1969 L I N E A Ca 92
T E 42-5039

CARRETE CR 026 Página 5

(SIGUE)-AL - Que bien -
-JA - Escuche te mandan saludos los muchachos desde Mexico -
-AL - Gracias -
-JA - Me encontré allí con todos muchachos -
-AL - Creo que este año nos vamos encontrar en MOSCU -
-JA - Vas a venir de licenica ¿
-AL - Sí / en el mes de junio -
-JA - Bueno / y además qué tal ¿
-AL - Todo está bien / solo no me gusta este clima / hace mucho calor / es sofocante -
-JA - Es como baño turco / asi hay que aprovechar / para poder sudar -
-AL - Asi es - No nos queda otra Alternativa -
-AL - Cuándo sale el avión ¿
-JA - El avión sale dentro de una hora y media dos horas -
-AL - Dentro de dos horas ¿
-JA - Más o menos / porque es un avión de la compania "SAS" y no se por qué viene con retraso - Todavía no llegó -
-AL - A la mejor voy a ir hasta allá - Si es dentro de una hora y media dos horas salen Uds ¿
-JA - Pero es lejo ¿
-AL - Son 40 min -
-JA - Si son 40 min a la mejor llegan en tiempo - Pero vale lapena ¿ Tu lo sabes mejor -
-AL - Vamos a ver si podemos -
-JA - Bueno / saludos y hasta la vista -
-AL - Gracias por haberme llamado y hasta la vista - (u)

13 00 -Zoia°con Valia NAUMOV -
-ZO - Llego Tamara FIODOROV ¿
-NA - Todavía no -
-ZO - Y dónde está paseando tanto tiempo -
-NA - Bueno / ellos fueron al Centro / creo que dentro de poco van a llegar - Yo anoté así que tu llamaste - Cuando ella viene te va a llamar -
-ZO - Gracias - (u)

80-0592
-Tamara FIODOROV°con Zoia ERMATCHKOV -
-FI - Buenas tardes Zoia -
-ER - Buenas tardes - Escuche yo te llamaba por el asunto de la quinta - Tú tienes allí el turno de 19 a 20 y yo de 20 a 2 - Quería preguntarte / no quieres cambiar conmigo ¿
-FI - Me parece que Galia BOLDINOV quería cambiar conmigo - Porque no hables antes con ella para ponerse de acuerdo y depues para mi es igual -
-ER - Yo creo que con ella no habrá problema -
-FI - Bueno / después vamos a conversar -
-ER - Como no - (u)

14 00
15 00 -HD°con Valia NAUMOV -
-HD - Hablo con la embajada Rusa ¿
-NA - Sí -
-HD - Le hablo de dirección de noticias (¿¿pro artel ¿¿) canal 13 -
-NA - Espere un momento ------ (viene AVROVSKI) -
-HD - Le hablo de división noticias del Canal 13 - Nosotros [illegible] hacer una nota / mañana de noticiero - Le sobre

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/Operational Evening with ~~201-236071~~ 201-236701 and Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. After many months of contact and many promises to "get together" some evening, Paul W. LEVERONE received a firm promise from 201-~~236071~~ 236701 that he and his wife would drop by for a drink and a snack on 9 January 1969. The promise became a reality, and the report of the evening's activities is forwarded under separate cover.

2. Although no firm date for a future meeting was set, every effort will be made to continue social development of Subject.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

[illegible]T'D BY RI/AN
28 JAN 69

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach. u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/attach. u/s/c

CS COPY

1 Att (usc)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-20210	16 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ [redacted] 201-236701

~~SECRET~~

1. Subject arrived at 1930 bearing a Russian record as a gift from his wife and a bottle of vodka with a jar of caviar as a gift from himself. He apologized that his wife could not make it that evening because she had to attend a "command performance". Although Subject claims to be under a doctor's care for problems with his stomach and legs (blood pressure problems) and is supposed to avoid use of alcohol for four months, he did accept a drink (Scotch) and then proceeded to chat about various inconsequential topics. At about 2000 MARGANDE dropped in and a general conversation ensued. LEVERONE offered to prepare some Shashlik and Subject stated that it was one of the favorite dishes of his wife. He suggested that perhaps he could pick her up after the "command performance" and bring her to the apartment. This was readily agreed to but since there was an hour and a half remaining before Subject could fetch his wife, we continued with general conversation. The following points concerning Subject's past activity came to light.

a. Subject stated that he had spent some time in Argentina in 1958 and that during this time he had had a chance to travel freely and see something of the country. The people were friendlier, politer and less hurried then. He did not go into detail as to what he was doing in Argentina but it appears to have been an official visit.

b. His "high point" was Mexico and his fondest memories are of his time spent there. He claims that he was able to travel over the entire country and got to know it better than his own. He also had various close friends in the journalistic field including several Americans (sic). In Mexico he was a PRAVDA correspondent.

c. Subject also stated he had been in Ecuador for an unspecified length of time during the month when the annual Indian fiesta is held. He claimed to like the place very much and described at length the Indian practice of selling all their produce at the fair and then spending the money on liquor.

d. When Subject was ready to leave Mexico he applied for a transit visa to the United States. When its issuance was delayed for some time, he asked the American officials concerned if there were

CS COPY

s/c att #1 to HABA-20210 SECRET 201-236701 any specific problems regarding the visa or if it was being withheld simply because he was a Soviet. If the latter were the case, he said he would raise the question with the President of the United States (who was visiting Mexico at the time and was going to hold a press conference). Subject claims that as a result of this threat the visa was issued almost immediately. Due to completely fortuitous circumstances, Subject and three other Soviet correspondents met in New York on the 4th of July. LNERGO allegedly became excited about the presence of four Soviet correspondents in New York at one time and carried on a very tight surveillance which was quite annoying. During this time the notes compiled for books on Latin America were stolen from Subject and as a result his literary ambitions have not been realized.

e. Subject stated that he has a 14-year old son in Moscow and although they miss the boy, there are no adequate schools in Argentina. This is the reason for the separation. In Mexico the Soviet Embassy has provision for the three primary grades. That is where Subject's son started his schooling.

2. At 2130 hours Subject left to pick up his wife saying he would be back in about 40 minutes. This was fine since it gave MARGANDE and LEVERONE time to get everything prepared for the meal. At 2230 hours Subject called to say they were "on the way" and would be over shortly. At 2315 they arrived at LEVERONE's apartment.

3. A general four-way conversation continued during which Subject's and his wife's comments ran as follows:

a. Their son in Moscow is studying English and speaks it rather well. He also keeps fish in a 175-liter fish tank. Subject was unable to recall the sort of fish in question.

b. There was a rather lengthy commentary on the system of sending single people abroad for assignment to embassies. Subject's wife was very surprised that the Americans would send single men and women abroad since this was very "dangerous". She stated that the Soviets occasionally send a single girl to a foreign post but the implication was very strong that she was "well chaperoned".

c. They were both interested in the linguistic abilities of individuals assigned to the American Embassy and stated that the Americans were often sent abroad with virtually no knowledge of the language whereas the Soviets were always well trained. (Subject's wife managed to get this point across in her halting Spanish and with assistance from her husband whom she kept asking for the Spanish equivalent of Russian words.) Subject did state that the Soviet language training system was not the greatest and seemed to give a point to the U.S. system when MARGANDE said that she had learned her Spanish from tapes and instruction.

d. Subject and his wife agreed that Buenos Aires is a large, dirty, indifferent city. They talked with nostalgia about their Moscow apartment which was only a ten-minute drive from lovely forests and streams where "a person could really relax". They mentioned that they had a quinta to which they retired on weekends but that the quinta was noisy and full of mosquitos. (MARGANDE and Subject's wife agreed that Raid and Off were the most important purchases in Buenos Aires in the summertime.)

3. Conversation and listening to music continued until about 0200 hours (with Subject's wife oohing and aahing over American songs and arrangements). The evening was friendly and relaxed and there was no attempt to get into deeper political or ideological discussions since the primary purpose was to establish rapport and pave the way for future meetings.

4. Given below are MARGANDE's and LEVERONE's impressions of Subject and wife:

Subject: Although Subject at times gives the impression of being a rather simple fellow, this effect is created more by his apparent non-aggressive attitude than by actual evaluation of his intelligence. He appears to be au courant of the general situation in Argentina and his assessment of world situations and incidents seems to be quite logical and unbiased. It might even be suggested that Subject is not overly influenced by Soviet official stands concerning certain specific topics. Unlike 201-183943, he does not go about spouting a very obvious party line. Subject presents a pleasant appearance, dresses well (he had on a clean shirt!), and is generally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX an attractive individual with a fairly good sense of humor. He appears to understand a fair amount of English but it is hard to judge his speaking ability since he seems to be reluctant to talk at length in the language. He also appears to know some Georgian. He claims to know the Soviet Union west of the Urals rather well but gives the impression that he has never traveled in the eastern part of the country. From his comments and from observation it can be assumed that he enjoys Mexican and modern American records and perhaps even prefers them to the new, socially conscious Soviet music. His one detracting mannerism is a heavy and constant blink.

Subject's wife: Subject's wife is also attractive and has a warm personality. She dresses well and is interested in theater, music and ballet. She enjoys going to the Colon but thinks the ballet at the Bolshoy is much better. She claims to enjoy dancing and apparently does not drink very much. Her Spanish is halting but adequate to make herself understood.

Their Relationship: Subject and his wife appear to be a couple who, if not in love, have grown used to each other and each other's ways. Despite reports and direct evidence of their squabbling, it would be dangerous to assume that this constitutes a weakness or domestic problem. They appear to rely upon each other and complement each other in social situations to the point where a deeper understanding between them can be assumed. (An interesting occurence was the wife's flat declaration that the Soviet Union was rapidly becoming a matriarchal society. Subject agreed with a smile.) Although Subject does not take open issue with his wife on topics where he may not be in complete accord, he manages to get his point across with a joke and a smile. All in all, Subject and his wife appear to be two that could take part successfully in any social gathering. MARGANDE thinks they are a "fun couple."

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Montevideo

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AELANYARD/Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236071)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It has come to our attention through AELANYARD that Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236071), a known KGB officer, may have traveled to Uruguay during the first days of November. This suspicion is based on the fact that Subject informed his wife he had to take a trip to Uruguay and then was not seen in Buenos Aires on the following Saturday and Sunday, the 2nd and 3rd of November. Although we have been unable to find any record of travel or any request for permission to travel on his part, we cannot discount the possibility of his having traveled under false documentation.

2. Forwarded herewith is a photograph of Subject for your files. Buenos Aires Station will continue to monitor Subject's activities. If it appears that he is planning a trip to Uruguay, Montevideo Station will be notified immediately, and some coordinated action can be taken to try and determine his contacts and activities while he is in Uruguay.

Paul W. LEVERONE

Attachment: photos

Distribution:
2 - COS, Montevideo w/a
✓1 - C, WHD wo/a
1 - C, SBD wo/a

Excluded from [illegible]

CS COPY

201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20,099	DATE 2 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-236071~~ [redacted]

SUMMARY OF AELANYARD TRANSCRIPTS — OCTOBER 1968

(HADA-20084, 27 November 1968)

Subject appears to be quite hen-pecked. His wife constantly mimics him, tells him what to do and how to do it, finds fault with him for no apparent reason. She is over-bearing — doesn't give Subject a chance to answer her rhetorical questions before blasting him with accusations of never listening to her good advice.

On 30 October 1968 Subject mentioned that he would have to be going to Uruguay. There is no verification of his having made the trip.

Entire transcripts and covering dispatch filed in 74-120-221.

~~SECRET~~

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, SR via Chief, WH
RYBAT REDTOP AETARGET TECHS
Assignment of Cryptonym

Reference: HABA 19735, 8 August 1968

In answer to Paragraph 8 of Reference, the cryptonym AELANYARD has been assigned to this operation.

TEUNIS C. PACHATTE

Distribution:
2 - COS, Buenos Aires
1 - COS, Panama City

[illegible]

HAPW 11212 19 August 1968

SECRET 74-120-223

SR/O/PT GLENN HUNT/rho 6587

1 - SR/O/PT
1 - SR/O/WH
1 - TSD/AOB
1 - WH/4AR

C/SR/O/PT

SR/O/WH

TSD/AOB

WH/4/AR

E/ BRENNAN, by phone

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Chief, SR Division
Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

BIDTOP/BIOGENESIS/AKTARGET/AEKICK/TECHS

References: A. HABA-19,706, 7 March 1968

B. BUENOS AIRES 0679, 24 May 1968

C. BUENOS AIRES 0707, 29 May 1968

INTRODUCTION

1. As pointed out in Reference A we had hoped to mount an audio operation against 201-236071's (an identified AEKICK officer) apartment when his predecessor departed PCS. We failed in our initial attempt and had decided to wait until 201-236071 left the city for a vacation or a business trip. On 21 May 1968 we learned (via BILOCULAR) that 201-236071 was seeking a new apartment. BIBAFFLE promptly identified the real estate agent (IDENTITY A) responsible for the apartment and on 22 May enlisted his cooperation.

2. With the aid of IDENTITY A, BIOGENESIS-14 and other BIBAFFLE agents entered the target apartment and undertook a thorough casing and made photographs. After consultation with the Station, a precise technical plan was worked out.

THE OPERATION

3. The apartment is located at IDENTITY B. It consists of a large living room, dining room, den, two bedrooms, one complete bath, a kitchen, and servants quarters. (We forward under separate cover as Attachment A a scale drawing of the apartment.) The monthly rent is 85,000 pesos with a two-year contract. The owner of the apartment is IDENTITY C.

Attachments:
A. Scale drawing, U/S/C
B. Photographs, U/S/C
C. IDENTITIES, U/S/C

(Continued)

Distribution:
③ - C/SR w/atts 2 - C/WH w/att C only 2 - COS, Pacy w/att C only

HABA-19,738

8 August 1968

74-152-221

Having gained assured access, the problem of a suitable LP presented itself. A quick check of the occupants in the same building disclosed that the occupant directly above the target apartment was a military colleague (IDENTITY D) of BIOGENESIS-66 (the BIRAFFLE chief). Contact was established immediately and although IDENTITY D was willing to help, he had already rented the apartment to another and could not renege. He agreed however to hold it one more month and to grant the BIRAFFLE techs access before he turned it over to the new occupant.

4. While still seeking a suitable LP, the BIRAFFLEs went ahead and installed six mikes (two Sennheiser "peter" mikes—2000 OHMs—in each room, thus creating a binoral installation). The holes were drilled from the floor above to the ceiling of the target apartment. Once the installation was completed, the target apartment was entered (201-286071 had not yet moved in) and photographs were taken (we forward them under separate cover as Attachment B).

5. After considerable searching, a suitable LP was located at IDENTITY E which was for rent. After consultation with BIOGENESIS-66, an agreement was reached whereby BIRAFFLE-13 (one of the Station's unilateral assets) would rent the apartment and serve as LP monitor. The apartment was rented by BIRAFFLE-13 on 1 July 1963.

6. The running of the wire from the apartment above the target to the LP was delayed due to BIOGENESIS-14's other priority tasks and by a shortage of suitable cable (we obtained the cable from Headquarters). This final phase of the operation was completed on 7 August 1963. The distance between the target and the LP is 600 feet. The LP will be equipped by three Sony stereo tape recorders provided by Headquarters.

EXPLOITATION

7. We are just now beginning to receive the take from this operation. The tapes come directly to us from the LP and Matthew F. CANTUNO processes them. The Spanish language portion, which we assume will be light, will be processed by BIRAFFLE.

HEADQUARTERS ACTION REQUESTED

8. Please assign a cryptonym to this operation.

[illegible] V. [illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

~~SECRET~~ NO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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ORIG: GLENN HUNT/gmh
UNIT: SB/O/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 15 August 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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CONF: SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, TSDC, RI/AN, 62,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

25z AU 68

CITE DIRECTOR 25510

TO BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1184 (IN 70606)

FYI REF VEHICLE IS 1968 CHEVELLE SEDAN IN HOLD NUMBER 4 UPPER BETWEEN DECK WING. SERIAL NUMBER 1363981125849. CONSIGNOR LUIGI SERRA CO NEW YORK. COLOR UNKNOWN. ONE OTHER CHEVELLE SEDAN ALSO ON BOARD.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH
WH/1 Williams
DC/SB/AO

Calvin H. Smith
for C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 523 COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

ORIG: GLENN HUNT/rbo
UNIT: SB/o/PT
EXT: 6587
DATE: 15 AUGUST 1968

~~SECRET~~

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 32 PER #

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CONF: C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR C/RF/SD, C/WH6, C/TSD3, C/CI, C/FI2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 15 22 Z [illegible] Aug 68 CITE DIRECTOR 25032

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO: PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 1184 (IN 70606)

1. WOACRE ADVISES THEY HAVE JUST RECENTLY COMPLETED SERIES TESTS OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE CAR TRACKING BEACON WITH GENERALLY POOR RESULTS. DEVICES SUITABLE MAINLY FOR CAR LOCATING FOR INVESTIGATIVE PURPOSES AGAINST [illegible] UNSOPHISTICATED TARGETS. DEVICES NOT EFFECTIVE FOR CAR TRACKING. DEVICES NOT TOTALLY CONCEALABLE AND HENCE DETECTABLE THROUGH CURSORY INSPECTION OF VEHICLE. POUCHING COPY OF ONHS 4084 WHICH [illegible] RECENT WOACRE REPLY TO SIMILAR REQUEST FROM HAGUE.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE CAN NOT CONCUR REF PROPOSAL [redacted].

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH

TSD/SDB W. SZUMINSKI, BY PHONE

WH/4 /SC

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

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BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 32 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH6, C/TSD3, DDC, ADDC, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI2,

S E C R E T 142006Z AUG 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 1184

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

14 Aug 68 IN 70606

RYBAT REDTOP TECHS

1. THROUGH BILOCULAR LEARNED VEHICLE DESTINED FOR SUBJECT 201-236[illegible] DUE ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES 18 AUGUST ON MORMACK PRIDE. SHIP DEPARTED NEW YORK 4 AUGUST. REQUEST HQS TRY IDENTIFY MAKE TYPE AND MODEL VEHICLE THROUGH MOORE MCCORMACK. BELIEVE ONLY ONE VEHICLE ABOARD CONSIGNED SUBJECT OR HIS EMBASSY SO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION POSSIBLE. STATION WILL TRY OBTAIN SAME INFORMATION THIS END AND WILL CABLE HQS SOON AS AVAILABLE.

ALEKRYEV, IVAN G. 201

2. REQUEST WOACRE COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY INSTALLING CAR TRACKING BEACON WITH MINIMUM RANGE FOUR CITY BLOCKS. DURING TIME CAR IN CUSTOMS CAN DELAY RELEASE CAR UP TO THREE WEEKS IN ORDER PERMIT WORK. IF FEASIBLE REQUEST WOACRE HQS TECHS TDY FOR INSTALLATION. OPERATION WOULD BE RUN WITH BIOGENESIS.

3. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS PROPOSAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)
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DISSEM BY 28/21 PER

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY.

INFO: FILE, VR. C/WH 6, C/TSD 3, DDP
ADDP CS/DO, C/CI, C/CI/[illegible], C/FI 2, C/FI/INT

S E C R E T 300015Z CITE BUENOS AIRES 0707

30 May 68 IN 21280

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS TECHS

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0679 (IN 18226)

1. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BY BIBAFFLE HAS ACCOMPLISHED FOLLOWING:

A. ACCESS TO TARGET APARTMENT COMPLETLY ARRANGED AND BIBAFFLE WILL HAVE ACCESS UP UNTIL 15 JUNE.

B. APARTMENT DIRECTLY ABOVE RENTED UNTIL 31 MAY BY BIOGENESIS-66 ACQUAINTANCE WHO ALLOWED BIFAFFLERS ENTER AND SURVEY. ORIGINAL PLAN WAS UTILIZE THIS APT AS SITE FROM WHICH TO DRILL AND TO EVENTUALLY RUN WIRES OUT OF THIS APT TO DIST LP. HOWEVER 29 MAY ON THE SITE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THERE NO PRACTICAL WAY RUN WIRES OUT OF THIS APT SINCE ALL OUTSIDE WALLS NEAT AND BARE.

2. VIEW ABOVE, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED BIBAFFLE ATTEMPT RENT APT ABOVE TARGET. WILL UTILIZE THIS AS LP WITH BIBAFFLE MEMBER AS OCCUPANT AND MONITOR.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-236701

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______

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ACTION C/SB 5 ☒ RID COPY

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~~SECRET~~
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/TSD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT, C/CI/RA, CS/DO

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SECRET 232225Z MAY 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 067

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS TECHS

25 MAY 68 IN 18226

m

REF: HABA-19,206, 7 MARCH 1968

1. VIA BILOCULAR WE LEARNED THAT SUBJECT REF IN CONTACT WITH LOCAL REAL ESTATE AGENT IN ATTEMPT RENT NEW APARTMENT. AFTER QUICK CHECK IN WHICH NO DEROG UNCOVERED, BIBAFFLE CONTACTED REAL ESTATE AGENT WHO VERY COOPERATIVE AND NOT ONLY PIN-POINTED APRTMENT BUT ALSO WILLING ARRANGE BIBAFFLE ACCESS.

2. SUBJECT REF EXPECTED SIGN LEASE 27 MAY. PLANS OCCUPY 1 JUNE. BIBAFFLE NOW PLANNING ENTRY AND INSTALLATION MIKES. BIOGENESIS-14, UTILIZING UVH 2A DRILL FURNISHED PER DIRECTOR 00523, WILL MAKE INSTALLATION. BIBAFFLE ALSO WORKING ON LP WITH TWO ADJOINING APTS AS POSSIBILITIES.

3. WILL DISPATCH FULL DETAILS.

SECRET

BT

PRIORITY

[illegible]

SECRET

201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: ~~REDTOP/Transmittal of Soviet Personality Report, Supplement and~~ Characterization on Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REF: BUENOS AIRES 9897, 30 January 68

1. Forwarded herewith is a draft Soviet Personality Report, Supplement, and Characterization on Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701), known KGB officer of the Fifth Department (Latin America), First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), who served as Pravda correspondent in Mexico City from September 1960 to October 1964. Although the draft is not in polished form it is Headquarters feeling that it represents an accurate summary of Subject's 201 file. Headquarters traces were made on Subject's contacts and included in the attached Supplement. The Characterization, prepared in 1964 by Douglas J. FEINGLASS, provides an excellent personality sketch of Subject and family.

2. Throughout his tour in Mexico Subject and family remained apart from the Soviet colony, associating chiefly with the SHUBINs (201-266547). and the SHENGALEVs (201-328294). Subject's ill temper, coarse language, and unfriendly wife won him few friends among his colleagues. (See Characterization) Neither did he have many known contacts among the foreign correspondents' community. Those with whom he did frequently associate were representatives of Prensa Latina (PL) and Siempre. The majority of his time was spent in ~~CP liaison in~~ Mexico, Ecuador, and Cuba. He was also actively involved with various leaders of the Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (MLN) and Central Campesina Independiente (CCI), particularly in the rural areas of Ensenada, Tijuana, and Mexicali. He took these occasions to contact local Russian emigres and, in one instance, to develop a rural recruiter to assess Mexican youths desiring to study in the USSR.

Harriet J. GUILLERMINA

Attachments:
SPR, Supplement, &
Characterization of Subj.

Distribution:
3 - Buenos Aires w/atts
2 Atts -

CS COPY

RIS INPUT NO. 8
201-236701

25 MAR 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABW 11041	DATE 19 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

Distribution:
1 - SB/O/WH w/o att
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1 - WH/4/ARG w/o att
1 - RID w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/WH	Patricia Flynn cp	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/O/WH	19/3/68	
DC/SB/CI/K	21 Mar 68	
C/WH/4/Arg	21 MAR 1968	Chamard

MBH

ABSTRACT
INDEX
SB/ECHO

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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MICROFILMED
MAR 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, SB Division
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
KAPOK/REDTOP/BIOGENESIS
Prospective Audio Installation Against Apartment of Ivan ALFERYEV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. BUENOS AIRES 9864, 25 January 1968

B. BUENOS AIRES 9879, 26 January 1968

1. The Station has long been interested in the fact that but two Soviets reside outside of the Soviet "compounds." In the fall of 1967 we began a unilateral investigation and casing of the apartment then occupied by Viktor FILIPPOV. Our unilateral investigation revealed that the lock on the door of this apartment was a Trabex--a lock which requires at a minimum several hours of picking. Simultaneous to our unilateral investigation we learned of FILIPPOV's planned PCS departure. We also learned that the Soviets intended to keep his apartment and that it was to be occupied by FILIPPOV's replacement. In mid-January we decided to send BIBAFFLE-3 to the apartment building in order to befriend the portero. We had hoped that the portero would be able to furnish us with a key to the apartment. On 25 January we learned that Ivan ALFERYEV was arriving in Buenos Aires on 27 January. Unfortunately time had run out on us. We therefore decided to turn to BIOGENESIS.

2. There were several reasons for this decision. First of all, we do not doubt the operational value of having an audio installation in the apartment of an identified senior KGB officer. However, a unilateral installation is a difficult and at times risky operation. Considering this and matching it against the potential take of the operation we felt that a joint operation would be more practical. Cost also influenced our decision. At the same time our experience with BIOGENESIS in the "Vista" operation showed that BIOGENESIS was perfectly willing to give us and only us the tapes from the audio installation.

(Continued)

74-120-221

Distribution:
(2) - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19 201-236701
19-4-5-5/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HADA-10,206

DATE
7 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
4-2-5/3
201-236071

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET/~~KAPOK~~ | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-19,206

3. As explained in Reference A we briefed BIOGENESIS in the early afternoon of 25 January. BIOGENESIS immediately issued instructions that the portero of the building be approached. This was accomplished successfully in the late afternoon of the same day. Unfortunately the portero did not have a key. The same night a BIOGENESIS team of three (including BIBAFFLE-3 and BIOGENESIS-14) attempted in vain to pick the lock. In the course of this lock-picking exercise BIBAFFLE-3 had to identify BIOGENESIS interest in the apartment to the owner of the neighboring apartment. Fortunately this individual is wealthy and was cooperative.

4. Once we had been forced to temporarily withdraw (ALFERYEV occupied the apartment on 27 January), we obtained through BIOGENESIS the blueprints of the target apartment and the apartments which abutted. A study of those blueprints shows that the apartment belonging to the wealthy cooperative neighbor has a maid's room which shares the wall of the living room of ALFERYEV's apartment. We pointed this out to BIOGENESIS and suggested that they enlist the further cooperation of the owner in order that a microphone could be installed through the common wall. Unfortunately the owner had departed for several weeks leave.

5. The owner should be back in Buenos Aires at this time and we have instructed BIOGENESIS to approach him again and to move on with the operation. We are also presently working on an LP.

6. We shall keep you advised of our progress in this operation.

Edwin W. S

Edwin W. SHROYER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 21

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-23607N

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG. Fra A. Whelan

INFO:

FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, C/IC 2

S E C R E T 011940Z FEB 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 9915 (STOTREST ACTING) BRCN

1 FEB 68 IN 42036

DIRECTOR

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 56231

AN	~~PI~~	SB/C/WH
~~PS~~		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

APPRECIATE FULL SPR ALFERYEV 201-236701 (~~201-236071~~) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE INCLUDING ALL POSSIBLE DETAILS HIS MODUS OPERANDE IN PAST KGB ACTIVITY.

S E C R E T

BT

O/C

AN
AB X
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...
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201-236701
~~201-230071~~
1 Feb 68

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-23607
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Chricker
~~FROM~~
25

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INFO FILE VR WH8, FI, CI, CI/OPS

~~PS~~ ABSTRACT X INDEX

30 JAN 68 IN 40404

S E C R E T 302002Z JAN 68 CITE BUENOS AIRES BUEN 9897 (STOTREST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, MONTEVDIEO, RIO DE JANEIRO

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

NR

REF A BUENOS AIRES (IN 01576) 9548 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES)

B. DIRECTOR 56231

IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-236071) AND WIFE ROZA ARRIVED 27 JANUARY 1968 ABOARD KLM 791. MET AT AIRPORT BY VRAGOV (201-820310) AND YURSHENAS (201-779979). PASSPORT AND PERSONAL PHOTOS OBTAINED.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SK AN 007

SB/X/WH

201-236701
~~201-236071~~
30 Jan 68

CS COPY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
C/S6

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-243346
201-236071

X-REF TO FILE NO 201-104216

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ES B/WH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR. C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2, C/SDO, DDP, ADDP, C/TSD3, C/CI/RA.

1	B/WH	6	
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PRECEDENCE

26 JAN 68 IN 37522

SECRET 252132Z JAN68 CITE BUENOS AIRES 9864 (STOTREST ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

KAPOK REDTOP BIOGENESIS

PRIORITY

REF BUENOS AIRES 9843 (IN 01576)

1. NOTING THAT AFTER VIKTOR FILIPPOV'S (201-243346) 25 DECEMBER 1967 PCS DEPARTURE, SOVS KEPT HIS APARTMENT (WHICH ALONG WITH YURIY CHELPANOV (201-104216) ONLY SOV PRIVATE BILLETS IN BUENOS AIRES) AND THAT FILIPPOV SUSPECT KGB AND REPLACED BY IVAN ALFERYEV (201-236071) WHO KNOWN KGG, WE UNDERTOOK UNILATERAL INVESTIGATION (UTILIZING BIOGENESIS-42 AND BILLABONG-1) OF FILIPPOV APARTMENT AND SURROUNDING AREA WITH INTENTION UNILATERAL PLANT AUDIO DEVICE. INVESTIGATION DISCLOSED APARTMENT TO BE RE-OCCUPIED IN MARCH. WE JUST IN PROCESS OF BRIEFING BIBAFFLE-3 IN ATTEMPT MEET AND INITIATE SLOW DEVELOPMENT OF APARTMENT BLDG PORTERO WHEN WE LEARNED ON 25 JANUARY THAT ALFERYEV DUE ARRIVE BUENOS AIRES 27 JANAURY.

2. ON BASIS OF FOLLOWING WE HAVE OPTED FOR JOINT OP:

A. TIME FACTOR: STATION UNABLE RISK BIBAFFLE-3 OR

C.C. Filed 201-243346
C.C. Filed 201-104216

SECRET

File in 201-236 701

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 9854 SECRET

ANY OTHER SUITABLE ASSET IN QUICK, COLD APPROACH TO PORTERO. IN ORDER GAIN ACCES PRIOR 27 JANUARY QUICK APPROACH ESSENTIAL. BIOGENESIS ON OTHER HAND FULLY EQUIPPED, ABLE BACKSTOP, AND CAPABLE UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE APPROACH.

B. COST: UNILATERAL OP WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE FUNDS-- RENT OF LP, SALARY TO MONITORS, ETC. BIOGENESIS ON OTHER HAND CAN AND PROBABLY WILL RECRUIT NEIGHBOR FOR LP AND UTILIZE BIBAFFLE TEAM MEMBERS AS MONITORS . (AS AN EXAMPLE RECENT SOV QUINTA OP-- SEE BUENOS AIRES 9845 (IN 36039) -- COST LESS THAN U.S. $100.)

C. OPS POTENTIAL: ON SURFACE DO NOT QUESTION BASIC VALUE OF BUG IN APARTMENT OF KGB STAFFER WHO LONG TIME LATIN AMERICAN HAND. HOWEVER BELIEVE TAKE WILL PRODUCE PRIMARILY ASSESSMENT INFO AND RESULTANT TAPES WILL COME DIRECTLY TO STATION FOR STUDY AND EVENTUAL EXPLOITATION.

D. IN ESSENCE WE WILL RECEIVE TAKE WITH MINIMUM COST, NO RISK, AND NO TIE-UP OF OUR MANPOWER.

4. AFTERNOON 25 JANUARY WE BRIEFED BIOGENESIS-49 WHO

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY PER

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 BUENOS AIRES 9664 SECRET

ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPTED OP. HE IMMEDIATELY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS BIBAFFLE-3 THAT PORTERO TO BE HIT AT ONCE AND IF APARTMENT ACCESSIBLE, CASING (WITH PHOTOS) BY TECHNICIAN BIOGENESIS-14 TO TAKE PLACE NIGHT 25 JANUARY. FOLLOWING DAY DECISION AS TO TYPE EQUIPMENT (WE PUSHING FOR MIKE AND WIRE SINCE WE UNDERSTAND HQS ADVISES AGAINST USE FREE RUNNING TRANSMITTER AGAINST SOV TARGETS) WILL BE DECIDED UPON.

5. WE HAVE ALSO BRIEFED BIOGENESIS-49 THAT IF AS RESULT NIGHT 25 JANUARY CASING, OP NOT FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME, WE WILL PURSUE IT FURTHER ONCE ALFERYEV AND FAMILY OUT OF TOWN OR ON LEAVE.

6. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ALFERYEV, IVAN GAVRILOVICH
201-236701
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KGB, FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE.

074-005-102
SX -05555/07
06 SEP 67
P5

711719

R 6710200217

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 236 701

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

HMMA-31217
27 Jan 1967

Sent to IP/ARD/RCU along with voice tape attachment - document will be returned to this file, & attachment retained in IP/ARD/RCU -

11 June 1993

201-236701

IP/AN 2

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-9 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (11/P)

78 0355300 PAGE 001
TOT: 241807Z FEB 78 WASHINGT 177201

S E C R E T
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 241807Z WASHINGTON 177201
TO: LIMA.

FROM: SE/X/LA INFO: SE/OR/X, LA/CPB

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP PDQUICK PDGRAVE

REFS: A. LIMA 37860 0311385

B. LIMA 37858 NO CDS #

C. LIMA 37861 NO CDS #

1. YEMELIN: PARAGRAPHS 1, 2, AND 3 ONLY OF DIRECTOR 0566177 MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

2. ALFERYEV: DIRECTOR 0831024 IS PASSABLE TO LIAISON EXCEPT FOR FYI PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5. PDSTORAGE INFO NOT PASSABLE TO LIAISON. ALFERYEV CAN BE CONSIDERED KNOWN KGB PER DERYABIN'S INFO.

3. KHUDENKO: ALL INFO IN DIRECTOR 0877966 MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

4. FILE: 201-0822406, 201-0236701, 201-0889402. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: SE/X/LA (BREWER 1604); COORD: C/SE/X/LA (PHIPPS), SE/OR/X ???? LA/CPB/P REL C/LA/CPB REID CL BY 029353.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-236701
DO NOT DESTROY

IP/AN

/37/ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FRP: , , , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION: IP/DP-9 (403) INFO: FILE, PF, ODPD-D, (11/W)

---

78 0311372 PAGE 001
TOR: 102138Z FEB 78 LIMA 37858

C O N F I D E N T I A L 102121Z FEB 78 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE LIMA 37858 (KINSMAN ACTING)

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/X/LA INFO LA/CPR; SE/X/SI

SUBJECT: WNINTEL RNMUM CKTOP PDQUICK

REF: DIRECTOR 831024

OTP

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT PORTIONS REF RE IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV MAY BE PASSED LIAISON. LIAISON CARRIES ALFERYEV AS "SUSPECT KGB." WE WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THAT ALFERYEV KGB AND PASS AS MUCH ADDITIONAL INFO AS POSSIBLE.

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E2 IMPDET.

IP/EDI		[illegible]
	✓	ABSTRACT
		FILE X
IP/MB		FILE NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible]
		[illegible] (11)
		[illegible] (8)
[illegible]		[illegible]

RECORD COPY

10 FEB 1978
201-236701

END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	302246Z	DIRECTOR	831025

CONF: SE5 INFO: FILE C/IA, LA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 77
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER sop
0 IP FILES # 111

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/EDI	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP/CR/T		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		EVENT REST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		AID (8)
		FOR FILING
SE/X/LA		

TO: LIMA.Y

CKTOP PDQUICK TRACE REPLY

REF: DIRECTORY 831024

1. IDENTITY IS PDBOOR.Y

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E-2 IMPDET.H

RECORD COPY

30 MAR 76
201-236701

DATE: 29 MARCH 1976
ORIG: DOROTHEA DEVRIES/CP
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 9077

SE/CI/X
SE/X/LA (R. SCHARDT IN DRAFT)
C/LA/NU

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SE/BIO 29 MAR 1976
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0462962

OUTGOING MESSAGE 11-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
SBTAFF	302246Z	DIRECTOR	831024

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE H/A 4, LA 4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 22
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0 RETURN TO PER 501
TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/EDI ~~ABSTRACT~~
INDEX 101
IP/CR/T PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
IP/MD REST. CODE
CYCLE GEN (11)
NO. (8)
FOR FILING
SE/X/LA

TO: LIMA.Y

CKTOP PDQUICK TRACEY REPLY

REF: LIMA 032783 |IN 865283| |*|Y

1. ALFERIEV IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV (201-0236701), IDENTITY, WHO WAS BORN ON 20 JAN 28 IN TULA. HE IS MARRIED TO ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA, BORN ON 20 SEP 34 IN MOSCOW. THEY HAVE ONE SON, VADIM, BORN 24 SEP 55 IN MOSCOW. ALFERYEV SPEAKS EXCELLENT SPANISH AND SOME ENGLISH (DOI: MAR 70).Y

2. ALFERYEV REPORTEDLY WAS TDY IN ARGENTINA DURING AUG 58; SERVED AS PRAVDA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY FROM 13 SEP 60 TO 28 OCT 64 AND WAS SECOND, LATER FIRST SECRETARY, OF THE CULTURAL SECTION OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FROM 27 JAN 68 TO 17 JUL 72. HE VISITED ARGENTINA FROM 21 JUN TO 4 JUL 75. (FYI: ACCORDING TO A DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT, ALFERYEV WAS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE LATIN AMERICA DEPARTMENT WITHIN THE MFA IN DEC 73. END FYI).Y

3. DURING HIS TOURS AND TRAVELS ABROAD, ALFERYEV WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECT KGB OFFICIALS. DERYABIN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: B201-727613

RECORD COPY.

30 MAR 76
201-236701
Alferov

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 048968

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

831034

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IDENTIFIED ALFERYEV IN JUN 65 AS HAVING WORKED AT KGB HQS DURING 52-53. THERE WAS ALSO SOME SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE KGB RESIDENT WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES. ALFERYEV WAS MENTIONED IN APPENDIX D OF JOHN BARRON'S BOOK, "THE KGB". ALFERYEV IS KNOWN KGB.Y

4. FYI: WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES, ALFERYEV WAS THE TARGET OF JOINT AUDIO OPERATION FROM AUG 68 TO SEP 69 AND WAS SUBJECTED TO PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE. THIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH STATION OFFICERS AND THAT HE AND HIS WIFE EXPERIENCED MARITAL DIFFICULTIES MADE HIM A PRIORITY TARGET. END FYI.Y

5. FYI: PER PDSTORAGE (DOI: 64), ALFERYEV IS AN OFFICER OF THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT (LATIN AMERICAN), FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE, KGB, WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE RESIDENTURA IN MEXICO CITY IN 61. SOURCE HAD NO INFORMATION ON SUBJECT'S SPECIFIC DUTIES IN MEXICO. ALFERYEV GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CIRCA 57. HE ENTERED THE KGB INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL IN 58 AND GRADUATED IN 60. SOURCE DOES NOT KNOW SUBJECT'S KGB ASSIGNMENT FOR PERIOD FROM

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0462962

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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0 IP FILES #

831024

HIS GRADUATION IN 60 TO HIS ASSIGNMENT TO MEXICO IN 61. END FYI.Y

6. BASED ON CURRENT SLOT AND POSITION PLUS CAREER PATTERN INCLUDING REPLACEMENT OF ARSENIY F. ORLOV (201-0727613), HQS WILL CARRY ALFERYEV AS SUSPECT KGB RESIDENT IN PERU.Y

7. FILE: 201-0236701 AND 201-00727613. E-2 IMPDET.#

*REQUESTED TRACES ON PCS SOVIET

PARA 6 BY SE/CI/X.

018375

DATE: 29 MARCH 1976
ORIG: DOROTHEA DEVRIES/CF
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 1079

201-236701

SE/CI/X

SE/X/LA R. SCHARDT (IN DRAFT)

J.F. Matthews
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/NW
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/SE/BIO 29 MAR 1976
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0482968

30 March 1976

SUBJECT: Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV
201-0236701

(PDBOOR)

RIS: KNOWN KGB

Suspect KGB Resident
Lima, Peru (DOI: Mar 76)

DPOB: 20 January 1928

CAREER

Sept 58 : Granted one month Argentine visa in Moscow Sept 58. No indication he ever travelled to Argentina.

13 Sept 60 to 24 October 64 : PCS, Mexico City, Mexico as PRAVDA Correspondent.

27 Jan 68 to 17 July 72 : PCS, Buenos Aires, Argentina as Second Secy, then promoted to First Secy, Soviet Embassy, Cultural Section.

May 1975 : Scheduled TDY Argentina. Was TDY Argentina Jun-July 75.

RIS: Known KGB. Per PDSTORAGE, DOI: Sept 64. FCD, Fifth Dept. (Latin America Dept)

Replacement Pattern:

Mexico: ALFERYEV replaced Vasiliy Mikhaylovich CHICHKOV (201-0207254) and was replaced by Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (201-0763035), both known KGB officers.

Argentina: ALFERYEV replaced Viktor Mikhaylovich FILIPPOV (MD 001706) (201-0243346), carried as Suspect KGB Resident in Bs.As. ALFERYEV was replaced by Vasiliy Mikhaylovich MURAVYEV (201-356530 WHOM Hqs believes was KGB Resident (Suspect() during his tour in Bs.As.

Peru: ALFERYEV to replace Arseniy Fedorovich ORLOV (201- 0727613) as Counselor of Embassy, Lima Peru. ORLOV was carried as Suspect KGB Resident in Lima. ALFERYEV will be carried in same capacity as Suspect KGB Resident.

ALFERYEV arrived Lima PCS early March 1976 or late Feb 1976.

SE/CI/X

7-71 MF...

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~~S E C R E T~~

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SE5	FILE VR IP/AN, LA4	1	4
ACTION #		2	5
		3	6

T 776308 EIA847 PAGE 01-01 IN 065283

TOR:220002Z MAR 76 LIMA 32783

SECRET 221943Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LIMA 32783

TO: DIRECTOR.

CKTCP TRACE

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-727613
DO NOT DESTROY

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES IVAN G. ALFERIEV WHO ACCORDING DIPLOMATIC NOTE, ASSUMED DUTIES AS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY ON 23 FEBRUARY 1976.

2. ASSUME SUBJECT REPLACING ARSENIY FEDOROVICH ORLOV (201-0727613), KGB RESIDENT. ON 11 MARCH DULINDEN-1 REPORTED THAT ORLOV RETURNING TO USSR PERMANENTLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201- AND 201-0727613. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

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ACTION UNIT SE5

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE . VR. IP/AN, +14

T 778308 EIA847 PAGE 01-01 IN 865283

TOR:220022Z MAR 76 LIMA 32783

IP/EDR ☒ ABSTRACT
TRAVEL PROGRAM
INDEX
IP/CR/V PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MD
SE/X/LA

S E C R E T 221943Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LIMA 32783

TO: DIRECTOR,

CKTOP TRACE

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES IVAN G. ALFER[illegible]YEV WHO ✓amended (201-236701) O.K. ACCORDING DIPLOMATIC NOTE, ASSUMED DUTIES AS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY ON 23 FEBRUARY 1976.

2. ASSUME SUBJECT REPLACING ARSENIY FEDOROVICH ✓ORLOV O.K. (201-0727613), KGB RESIDENT. ON 11 MARCH DULINDEN-11 REPORTED THAT ORLOV RETURNING TO USSR PERMANENTLY WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

3. FILE: 201- AND 20-0727613. E2 IMPDET

B201-727613

22 MAR 76
201-236701

[illegible] COPY

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 201524Z CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 698800

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE 11/AN, LA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 15
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0 IP FILES # 111

201-0236701
TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES.Y

CKTOP PDQUICK NTTIGER TRACEY

o Trace Reply

[illegible]

REF: BUENOS AIRES 33333 |IN 587924| |*|Y

1. ALFERYEV {201-0236701} {IDEN} IS MARRIED TO ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA/ MUMACOVA BORN 20 SEP 34 IN MOSCOW. THEY HAVE ONE SON, VADIM, BORN 24 SEP 55 IN MOSCOW. ALFERYEV SPEAKS EXCELLENT SPANISH AND SOME ENGLISH {DOI: MAR 70}.Y

2. ALFERYEV REPORTEDLY WAS TDY IN ARGENTINA DURING AUG 58. SERVED AS PRAVDA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY FROM SEP 60 TO OCT 64. WAS SECOND, LATER FIRST SECRETARY, CULTURAL SECTION SOVIET EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES FROM 27 JAN 68 TO 17 JUL 72. DERYABIN DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED ALFERYEV AS HAVING WORKED AT KGB HEADQUARTERS DURING 52/53. DURING HIS MEXICO TOUR HE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECT KGB OFFICERS.Y

3. WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES ALFERYEV WAS THE TARGET OF A JOINT AUDIO OPERATION FROM AUG 68 TO SEP 69. HE WAS SUBJECT TO PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE. THIS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FACT THAT HE WAS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH STATION OFFICERS MADE HIM A PRIORITY TARGET OF THE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

23 May 75
201-236701

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:032884

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF		DIRECTOR	

CONF: INFO: FILE

698800

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

STATION. THERE WAS ALSO SOME SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE KGB RESIDENT WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES.Y

4. FILE REVIEW FAILS TO REVEAL ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF INTEL ACTIVITIES; HOWEVER, BASED ON THE FOREGOING HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE KGB.Y

5. FYI: PER PDSTORAGE INFO DATED SEP 64 ALFERYEV IS A KNOWN KGB OFFICER OF THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT (LATIN AMERICA), FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE. HE GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES CIRCA 57, ENTERED THE KGB SCHOOL IN 58 AND GRADUATED IN 60. END FYI.Y

6. PLEASE ADVISE IF ALFERYEV PCS AT WHICH TIME DETAILED TRACES WILL BE SENT. E-2 IMPDET.#

*REQUEST FOR TRACES ON PCS SOVIET

DATE: 23 MAY 1975
ORIG: DEBBY LEISER/DH
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 9077

AA/SB L. Leiser
SE/CI/X - MIKE BRINDOCK IN DRAFT
C/SE/X/LA - R. FROST IN DRAFT
COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.L. Connolly for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/SE/BIO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 032684

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 231524Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 698801

CONF: SE5 INFO: FILE IP/AN, LA4

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 15

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER SOP

0 IP FILES # :11

201-0236701
TO: PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES.Y

CKTOP NTTIGER TRACEY

Identity to

REF: DIRECTOR 698809 |*|Y

1. IDENTITY IS PDBOOR.Y

2. FILE: 201-0236701. E-2 IMPDET.H

[illegible]	☒	PROCESS PROGRAM
		[illegible]
		INDEX
[illegible]		PREPARE FOR FILMING
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[illegible]		CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

RECORD COPY

23 May 75
201-236701

DATE: 23 MAY 1975
ORIG: DEBBY LEISER/DH
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 9077

for DRConnolly
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

LA/SB-L.Kuser
SE/CI/X (in draft)
SE/X/LA (in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/SE/BIO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 032884

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?-71 MFG. 2/75

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT SES ACTION #	INFO	~~RF~~ FILE VR ip/ad, LA 4	1 2 3		4 5 6

T 035695 EIA949 PAGE 01-01 IN 587924

TOR:221435Z MAY 75 BUEN 33333

S E C R E T 221417Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 33333 (BROWN ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

CKTOP NTTIGER TRACE

1. NTTIGER LIAISON REQUESTS PRIORITY TRACES ON IVAN ALFERYEV, BORN 28 JAN 28, MOSCOW, SON OF GEORGIY ALFERYEV AND DASHA KOZLOVA. MARRIED ROSA KOMAROVA.

STATION TRACES INDICATE ONE IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV 201-0236701) APPLIED FOR PCS VISA ARGENTINA 2 OCT 67 (DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT #19667). WAS SCHEDULED TO BE SECOND SECRETARY, SOVIET EMBASSY, PER HABA-10997, 9 JAN 68, REPLACING V.M. FILIPPOV (201-0243346), KNOWN KGB OFFICER.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

PC

TRAVEL PROGRAM

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

22 May 75

201-236701

DISPATCH

~~S E C R E T~~

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Brasilia

INFO.: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP/PDQUICK/ALAGORA/3-
Traces on Ten Soviets Assigned to Argentina

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HBBA-01823, 22 March 1973

Attached are the traces Station requested for passing to ALAGORA/3.

Serena W. LELINSKI

Attachment: As stated, h/w

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - COS, Brasilia, w/att
- 1 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/att

[illegible] Arg.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-236701

CS COPY FILED IN 201-013483

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 012140

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-0025060
201-0128117 201-0220494
201-0025485 201-0236701
201-0247389 201-0288550
201-0706652 201-0892214

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HBDW-738

DATE: 9 MAY 1973
24 April 1973

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-0013483

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: SB/BIO
OFFICER: Pearl Chinn
TYPIST: db
EXT. 6651

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/SB/BIO		
SB CI X		
WH/4/A		
WH/5		

Distribution:
- 1 - SB/BIO
- 1 - SB/CI/X
- 1 - SB/X/WH
- 1 - SB/MC
- 1 - WH/4/A
- 1 - WH/5
- 10 - IP/FI

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV

Subject has departed PCS ~~prior to April 19~~73.

178272

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

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PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP NTTIGER
Transmittal of Passports and Photos

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 347839

B. BUENOS AIRES 23416

Enclosed are copies of the passports and personal photos of Vasiliy Mikhailovich MURAVYEV (201-256530) and his wife. Subject, his wife and daughter arrived in Buenos Aires on 29 November 1972 to replace Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701). They were met at the airport by Stepan Pavlovich PADAUSIS (201-786652) and Anver Ismaylovich YAKUBOV (201-228494).

Beatrice F. PETRESUK

Attachments:
Herewith As Stated

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SB (w/Atts, h/w)
2 - Chief, WH (W/o Atts)

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201-236701

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-23232	Typed: 18 December 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-256530 201-236701

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ACTION UNIT SB 8

INFO FILE, VR [illegible] WH8 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ACTION NO 207

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CITE BUENOS AIRES 23416

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M

DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDTOP NITIGER

REFS A. BUENOS AIRES 21975 (NOT SENT SANTIAGO) (IN 668034)

B. HABA-19090, 31 JAN 68

C. SAGO-5977, 5 FEB 68

1. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES VASILIY MIKHAILOVICH MURAVYEV, DPOB 31 DEC 1915, USSR, COUNSELOR SOVEMB BUENOS AIRES, DIP. PPT 6368. WIFE LYUDMILA NIKOLAYEVNA, DPOB 7 FEB 1935, USSR, OCCU PROFESSOR, DIP. PPT 6369 AND DAUGHTER OLGA, DPOB 25 NOV 1968, MOSCWO. REFS B AND C INDICATE SUBJ STATIONED PCS SANTIAGO AS OF JAN 68. DEPARTED SANTIAGO 28 JAN 68, POSSIBLY PCS. NO FURTHER TRACES.

2. SUBJ AND FAMILY ARRIVED BUENOS AIRES 29 NOV VIA SWISSAIR 204. BILOCULAR DTD 29 NOV INDICATES SUBJ IS REPLACEMENT FOR IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, WHO HAS NOT REAPPEARED BUENOS AIRES.

3. FILE: 201-356530, 201-236701. E-2, IMPDET.

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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ACTION UNIT SB8

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/ICG, CI/OPS, FI, SB8

ACTION NO. 907

S E C R E T 251719Z JUL 72 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 21975

DIRECTOR.

668034

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIBAFFLES REPORT AEBOOR DEPARTED FOR USSR 17 JULY VIA SWISSAIR 201 TO DAKAR. AT RECENT DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION, TOLD STATION OFFICERS HAD HOPED TO BE LEAVING PCS BUT HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND WILL RETURN ARGENTINA WITH WIFE FOLLOWING HOME LEAVE. PASSPORT CONTAINS REENTRY VISA.

2. FILE: 201-236701. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

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25 Jul 72
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Chief of Station, Buenos Aires X

Via
Chief, SB
Chief, WH
REDTOP
CC CPSU Representative in Buenos Aires

REFS: A. HD-7782, 19 February 1971
B. HABA 22379, 17 September 1971
C. HABA 21382, 18 May 1970

1. Headquarters can provide no additional guidance on CC CPSU Representatives abroad other than that forwarded in Reference A.

2. According to Reference B, the Station has tentatively identified one of the Soviet diplomats in Buenos Aires as the CC CPSU Representative. Since this individual was not named in Reference B, a Headquarters review of the files of Soviets most likely to hold this position has been made and from the information currently available to us, Viktor Grigoryevich CHEKMAZOV (201-128117) appears to be this individual.

3. Although CHEKMAZOV's present andpast duties do not fit all the criteria set forth in Reference A, there are certain indicators that he is the CC CPSU Representative. Little is known of CHEKMAZOV's tour in Cuba, where he was assigned as Second Secretary and Chief of the Consular Section from 1960 to 1963. Prior to that, however, CHEKMAZOV was a Consular Officer in Uruguay from 1954 to 1958. Among his reported duties there, the following could be considered as background leading to his suspected current position:

a) handled emigre and repatriation matters and was involved in activities requiring Spanish, which he and his wife speak reasonably well.

b) believed to be active in the Colony's MESTKOM, (which in general is social rather than political, although the political element is ever-present. The MESTKOM Secretary is usually a Party activist who is responsible for making certain that no possible deviation from the Party line crops up in any MESTKOM discussions or activities.)

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15 OCT 1971

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201-128117
201-236701
201-[illegible]; 201-247500

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201- 236701

C/WH/4

ALFERYEV

c) reportedly became angry with a colleague who refused to prepare a speech commemorating GORKIY's birthday.

e) wife supervised production of the Soviet publication, URSS.

4. In his current position as Counselor of Embassy, CHEKMAZOV enjoys apparent freedom of movement and is sufficiently high-ranking to be the CC CPSU Representative. In addition, no firm identification has ever been made of his affiliation with either the KGB or the GRU. Although the Station reported in BUENOS AIRES - 18575, 29 June 1971, that CHEKMAZOV was believed to be a "likely candidate for new KGB Resident", it would seem from information contained in Headquarters files that he is more likely the CC CPSU Representative. An excerpt from Reference C contains the following indicators:

> During visits to the Soviet "Quinta" almost every week-end, CHEKMAZOV
>
> a) lunched with the Ambassador,
>
> b) spent long periods reading, seated outdoors under the trees and remained generally aloof from other Soviets,
>
> c) was the only Soviet who addressed other Soviets as "Comrade", and
>
> d) his wife was said to treat wives of lower-ranking personnel in a brusk and authoritarian manner.
>
> While the indicators cited above are not conclusive in themselves in establishing that CHEKMAZOV is the CC CPSU Representative, they do point up the possibility that he might be acting in that capacity.

5. We shall be interested to learn the identity of the Station's tentative CC CPSU Representative selection. In addition, from our review of the files mentioned in Paragraph 2, it seems that the most likely candidate for KGB Resident in Buenos Aires is Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701), with either Stepонas Pavlovich PASAUSKIS (201-780882) or Boris Ivanovich BOGAIN (201-847389) as Deputy KGB Resident. We should also like to have the Station's thinking as to the identities of the KGB Resident and his Deputy.

Olivia L. HUMELIS

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PROCESSING ACTION
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TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS
Surveillance of AEBOOR (Alferyev)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Since his move to the Residence/Club in mid-1970, AEBOOR has appeared to withdraw from almost all overt activity. Rarely does he appear on BILOCULAR and his daily routine is a complete mystery. In order to determine his present status, the BIBAFFLEs were directed to run a surveillance on AEBOOR from Monday, 6 September through Tuesday, 14 September 1971. During this period his wife was away on home leave, thus giving him the opportunity to pursue a different life if he were so inclined. His overt subordinate in the cultural field, 201-320310, had left PCS without a replacement. Presumably his cover activities would be multiplied. Despite all this, AEBOOR maintained a spartan routine which left no clue about his present interests, activities, or responsibilities.

Vasgor

2. Most mornings (including Saturday and Sunday), he drove or walked to the Embassy, often buying a paper on the way. Once inside he stayed until about 1300 hours when he returned to the Residence/Club. His lunch break was rarely longer than a half hour. He returned to the Embassy and stayed at least until 2000 hours, sometimes until 2300 hours. Upon leaving, he walked or drove directly to the Residence/Club and never came out again during the night.

3. AEBOOR's only deviations from this schedule were an occasional trip to a neighbourhood shop to buy cold-cuts; one excursion to a leather-goods store to look at suitcases;

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2 - Chief, WH

ALFERYEV

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OCT 19 1971
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	HABA-22432	4 October 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	~~SECRET~~	HABA-22432

one attendance at a MEKNIGHT Embassy function; two trips to Ezeiza airport; and, surprisingly enough, a Sunday afternoon tour with 201-873887 and his wife to take pictures along the river front and drink beer in a Costanera cafe. (During this last excursion, the known KGB officer drove the GRU chauffour and his wife.) The first trip to the airport was made in the company of several other high-ranking Embassy officials to greet an important transiting delegation. (See HABA-22399.) On the second trip AEBOOR was accompanied by 201-128117 (suspect KGB resident) and 201-790164 (chauffeur). On arrival, AEBOOR and his companions went up to the terrace to take photos of the Concorde as it landed for a two-day visit. They were joined by Mr. and Mrs. AELESION and 201-228494. Evidently, the KGB and the GRU groups went separately to photograph the same plane.

4. Twice during the period the BIBAFFLEs felt that AEBOOR might have been checking for surveillance. Otherwise there were no incidents of note. Not once were the BIBAFFLEs approached by local authorities with a request that they identify themselves.

5. In sum, we remain as much in the dark as before about AEBOOR. With every opportunity and reason in the world to lead a hectic pace, he spent the majority of his waking hours within the Embassy. During the days in question he received only one phone call even worth noting, one in connection with the Fischer-Petrosyan chess match scheduled for late September.

Nina T Margande

Nina T. MARGANDE

GROUP 1
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201-236701

Note:

Alferyev is now 1st Sec. This info should be input into machine runs -

SB/C1/X
4 Oct 71

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SECRET 242053Z JUN 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 18529 (Buen)

DIRECTOR

24 JUN IN 364928

REDTOP AEGRIP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

REF BUENOS AIRES 18511 (IN 363761)

1. BIBAFFLE TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT THE HOME LEAVE DEPARTURE OF FIRST SECRETARY IVAN ALFERYEV AND HIS WIFE ROSA ABOARD LUFTHANSA 501 TO DAKAR ON 23 JUNE 1971. ABOARD SAME FLIGHT WAS MILATT SERGEY IVANOVICH SOKOLOVSKIY AND HIS WIFE ALEKSANDRA. ACCORDING TO BIBAFFLE-18 ALL HAVE REENTRY VISAS AND WILL RETURN.

2. FILE: 201-236071 AND 201-025485. GP-1.

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TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
REDTOP BIOGENESIS
Forwarding of Assessment Questionnaires

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: BOOK DISPATCH 7509, 7 July 1970

1. Attachment F to Reference was translated and given to BIBAFFLE transcribers for their use some months ago. Transmitted herewith are copies of the resulting assessment questionnaires on six official Soviets and three local Soviet Cultural Representation Employees. A breakdown on the transcribers and their products is as follows:

BIBAFFLE-30: Assessments on Mikhail Konstantinovich VRAGOV (201-820310); Yelena Fedorovna VRAGOVA; Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701); Roza Alekseyevna ALFERYEVA; and local employees Constantino LOGVINIUK and Luis ORSETTI.

BIBAFFLE-33: Assessment of local employee Esteban SEMENIUK (201-860420).

BIBAFFLE-45: Assessment of VRAGOV and wife; of Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485) and wife Aleksandra Vasilyevna; and of Constantin LOGVINIUK.

2. The material in the questionnaires simply reflects the transcribers' impressions and is not necessarily correct. BIBAFFLE-30 sees ALFERYEV as short and VRAGOV as greying; but ALFERYEV is tall and VRAGOV's hair is still completely sandy.

Attachments:
Questionnaires h/w

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SB (w/atts h/w)
2 - Chief, WH (w/o atts)

201-236701

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-820310 201-236701	HABA-22188	3 June 1971
201-860420 201-025485	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 74-120-111

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-22158

BIBAFFLEs-30 and 45 seem to be talking of different people when they describe the VRAGOVs and Constantino LOGVINIUK. One of BIBAFFLE-45's impressions that we are checking is her statement that the SOKOLOVSKIYs have occasional parties at home with singing and dancing. We have no evidence of such gay get-togethers.

3. As Headquarters is aware, the BIBAFFLE transcribers only process material from special operations such as AEVARIETY, AELANYARD, etc. and cannot furnish assessment on all individuals in whom we have interest. However, we have requested BIOGENESIS to have the BILOCULAR transcribers work with the form.

Nina T. MARGANDE

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Source Babaffle 30 May 1971

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0 ALFERIEV Ivan Gavrilovich.

Apodo: Parece no tener.

Esposa: Rosa Alexeievna.

Hijos: Cree haber escuchado que el matrimonio tiene una hija. Ivan tiene por lo menos un hermano (que tambien puede pertenecer al cuerpo diplomatico).

Puesto que ocupa: agregado cultural.

Lugar donde trabaja: Yo diria-la calle. Oficialmente en la embajada. No tiene horario fijo. Se lo escucho estar en casa a las mas diferentes horas. Sus salidas de la casa se produjeron tambien a horas mas diversas de dia (y de noche).

Lugar donde se aloja: actualmente en la embajada.

Telefonos donde mas comunmente se encuentra: actualmente no hago escucha de los Alferiev.

B. PARTICULARES:

a) Como se lo imagina:
Bajo la mascara de aparente apatia y lentitud- sorprendente agilidad tanto fisica como mental. No es un lindo tipo de hombre. Tampoco tiene una figura Marmoniosa. Sin embargo un tipo que suele gustar a las mujeres. Entrenado para eludir el siguimiento. Muy cauteloso (hasta con su propia mujer). Lo imagino con la estatura mas bien baja que alta. Suele salir y entrar en la casa sin hacer ruido y sin aviso, tanto que ni su mujer se daba cuenta cuando salia o entraba.

b) Referencias al lugar donde nacio: No tengo.

Algun empleo anterior en su propio pais o en el exterior:
Se escuchaba en algunas oportunidades que contaba de su vida de oficial a Rosa. Cree que estuvo con las tropas de ocupación en Europa.

Donde cree o piensa usted que nacio: lo ubico en la Rusia central. Posiblemente Moscu. Tiene (junto con Rosa) un departamento en un suburbio de Moscu que se llama Molodictski Stan. Es una casa de departamentos nueva.

c) Puede Ud. indicar algo sobre la vida hogareña, amistades personales etc. :
Habita, pero no "vive" en casa. La casa no es un hogar para el es solo lugar de estar. Acerca de amistades puede decir solo de los que tenia en tiempos cuando lo escuchaba. En las reuniones, bastante frecuentes, en su casa figuraban siempre mas o menos las mismas personas. Los del grupo de Representación Comercial en primer lugar: Diakov, Pivovarov, Makarotchkin, Boldinov (con sus respectivas esposas), Sokolov-

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eski (y anteriormente antiguo agregado militar), Vasiliev, y el mismo Velski (con quien tenia muy cordiales tratos, como tambien con todo este grupo). Los que no frecuentaban estas reuniones (y esto llama atencion) son: Vragev, los del grupo consular, Sheitaishvili etc. (justamente, al parecer amigos de Vragev).

d) Datos, impresiones y función que desempeña la señora en la comunidad y puesto de trabajo que realiza: Ver Rosa A.

e) Que idiomas habla: habla bien ruso, español bastante regular pero muy lejos de perfecto. En una oportunidad se intercambiaron algunas frases con Rosa en idioma para mi desconocida, que no era ni ruso ni español con seguridad, ni idioma germanica ni eslava ni latina (hungaro?). En una oportunidad se escucho a Ivan (estando el solo) cantar en iddich (lo que, naturalmente no quiere decir que ni que es un judio ni que sabe hablar esta idioma).

2. FUNCION:

a) Este individuo vive dentro de una comunidad pequeña, singular y muy cerrada. Puede usted decir algo sobre su posición dentro de esta comunidad?
Posición sin duda elevada. Evidente respecto de parte de los colegas. Su opinión es buscada y apreciada. Da impresión que su estadia en la Argentina es una etapa transitoria para ocupar un puesto mas elevado. Posiblemente independiente.

b) Pertenece a la embajada.

c) Cual es su función, con quien esta comunicado abierta o encubiertamente.
Questión muy dificil de contestar. Esta extremamente cauto en hablar hasta con su propia mujer. Oficialmente es agregado cultural y se escucha que por lo menos en una pequeña parte desempeña sus funciones especificas: recibimiento (y parte financiera) de delegaciones deportivas y artisticas que vienen en gira de la URSS (tambien lo hace Vragev). Por otro lado, las verdaderas funciones de agregado cultural los desempeña Vragev al parecer por entero (consultas, cursos, pedidos de literatura, "intercambio cultural" etc.) Sin duda Alferiev tiene contactos velados con diferente gente, tanto con residentes rusos, como tambien argentinos. De una de sus conversaciónes se podria sacar conclusión que tenia sus contactos (puede ser que por intermedio de terceras personas) con general Lopez, o por lo menos que este general se encuentra en la esfera de "intereses" de Alferiev. Tambien un tal John se cuenta entre sus amigos. Con frecuencia Alferiev venia a la casa en altas horas de la noche. Tambien se escucho que sale de la zona permitida (sus viajes hace con Mamauta). Al parecer a ambos les interesa la costa mas alla

de Mar del Plata. Se escucho que tiene plata asignada de hacer regalos (pequeños) para mujeres (que mujeres es un misterio). Les regala medias, perfumes y otras chucherias. Los otros datos acerca de sus actividades (muy escasos por cierto) estaban remetidos oportunamente y nó los tengo en mi memoria.

d) Cual es su titulo oficial (y segun el): Nunca hablo de sus titulos.

e) Coincide el tratamiento de sus collegas y relaciones o contactos con su posición ostensible, o se le trata a el con mas o menos respeto que merece de acuerdo a su posición. Coincide plenamente.

3. **FISICA:**

a) Tiene algun rasgo sobresaliente etc.: No, no tiene. Su mujer a veces rie de sus movimientos y posturas torpes (que lo son solo en apariencia). Alferiev tiene exceso de sudor.

b) De comentarios juzga usted que es atractivo, poco o sin atracción.
No es atractivo, pero es simpatico. Gusta a las mujeres. La llegada de el en su casa cuando habia reuniones se festejaba largamente especialmente por las mujeres. Su mujer le quiere y esta celosa de el.

c) Puede dar referencias de sus preferencias para vestirse y cuidado de su persona.
No da mucha importancia ni en vestir ni em cuidado de su persona. Posee escasos trajes y son posiblemente viejos. Se escuchaba que los daban a intervalos mas o menos regulares para limpiar. Utilisaban servicio a domicilio.

4. **EXPRESIVIDAD.**
Se expresa con habilidad. Tambien en castellano por instinto encuentra las expresiones adecuadas. Es persuasivo en alto grado. No tiene visibles modismos o expresiones favoritas. Algunas de sus expresiones estan penetrados de fina ironia, nada de sarcasmo. No se puede hablar de acento propiamente dicho cuando habla castellano. Que es extranjero se nota de lejos. Si, parece tener oido y talento para idiomas.

5. **ATRIBUTOS VOCALES.**
Voz suave, moderada, mas baja que aguda. Es pausada, pero solo ligeramente. Habla con ritmo normal aumentandolo solo cuando esta excitado (que succede muy raras veces) pero casi sin levantar la voz. Su voz puede estar imperiosa (solo en raras ocasiones.) Nada de tartamudear o balbucear.

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6. PSIQUICAS.

No muestra tensión nerviosa de ninguna indole casi nunca. Sabe dominarse muy bien. Es frio y calculador. Nada de tics. Lejos de ser historico. Se enoja en muy raras ocasiones. Demuestra su enojo mas bien con gestos (puertazo) que palabras. No trata despoticamente a nadie. Lejos de ser sumiso, pero es muy paciente.

7. SENTIDO DEL HUMOR.

Bromea no muy a menudo, si lo hace, se nota un fino sentido de humor en sus bromas. No cuenta ninguna clase de cuentos obscenos. No creo que le gusta escuchar procacidades y profanidades. Su mujer lo reta a menudo y muchas veces lo insulta. Su reacción aparente es no prestarke ni menor atención. En mas de un año de escucha no noto en el referencias al sexo.

8. HABITOS, INTERESES Y HOBBYES.

a) Tiene intereses, habitos o manualidades especiales?
No se noto. Al parecer hace palabras cruzadas. Lee revistas y diarios asiduamente. Ve TV.

b) Le agradan bebidas alcoholicas?
Consumo de alcolol es moderado. Vermuth, coñac "Reserva San Juan" y Fernet Branca son las bebidas preferidas. Al parecer no toma vino con las comidas.

c) Tiene inclinación especial hacia el sexo? (quienes)
No muestra aparente inclinación hacia el sexo. Su mujer de vez en cuando le hace escenas de celos. No creo que el sexo lo domina, pero tampoco que no va a correr alguna que otra aventura (nada profundo) si se le presenta oportunidad.
En una oportunidad Rosa le reprocho (haciendo un gran escandalo) porque lo vio besar en la boca a una mujer (tambien de la embajada, no se escucho a quien).

d) Habia referencias a cigarillos en la casa. No tiene tos habitual.

e) Cuales son sus comidas preferidas.
No hay referencias. Mas sobre esto ver Rosa A.

f) Cuales son sus companias preferidas? Se trata con sus colegas y familia? En que grado?
Se menciono ya el grupo de sus amistades dentro de cuerpo diplomatico. Alforiev es un tipo que suele hacer amistades facil. No parece tener amigos intimos. Sus collegas lo quieren y respetan al parecer con sinceridad.

g) Tiene habito de gastar dinero? Se queja (el o su familia) de falta de dinero? Cuales son sus reacciones ante quejas de caracter economico?
No tiene habito de gastar dinero. Todo lo contrario. En esto coincide con Rosa. Es egoista, sin ser mezquino.

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No va a vacilar en robar, si sabe que saldra impune. En una oportunidad se escucho claramente que en una conversación con Rosa que, aprovechando deconocimiento de cambios monetarios, leyes, idioma y restricción de movimientos, por parte de la delegación deportiva de la lucha grecoromana (Mar del Plata) y aprovechando su posición les robaba algunos miseros 3-4 dolares por cabeza. "Y todo esto es para nosotros"-decia Rosa encantada, batiendose las palmas de las manos como una niña.

9. VIDA PROFESIONAL.

a) Es aparentemente satisfecho con su posición. Por otra parte cree que espera un ascenso (posiblemente un traslado en un pais de habla francesa)

b) Cuales son las actitudes expresadas hacia la gente del pais y con quienes se trata.
Desprecia al argentino, hombre criollo y al pais y a sus gobernantes y habitantes. Considera a la Argentina como a un pais riquisimo, de recursos inagotables. Expresa su genuino asombro por el periodo de poca prosperidad y dificultades economicas por las cuales atravieza el pais. Este desprecio no lo muestra frente a los argentinos. Esto de ninguna manera!

c) Que piensa de sus colegas y ellos de el? Como lo valoran profesionalmente.
Nunca se le escucho opinar sobre los otros (es una caracteristica tambien de Rosa). Se nota su enemistad evidente con Vragov. Si hablan con Rosa de el, lo llaman invariablemente "vrag = enemigo". Acerca de como lo valoran los colegas ya di mi opinion.

II. ACCESO:

a) No se ocupa de compras. Raras veces llega a casa trayendo pan o cualquier otra cosa que le encarga su mujer.

b) Maneja auto?
Si, maneja. Al parecer va (por lo menos en tiempos de mi escucha) sin acompañantes ni chofer.

c) Estudia idiomas?
Aparentemente estudia frances, en parte en casa con Rosa. Lo de castellano, lo estudia practicandolo en cualquiera oportunidad que se le presenta hablando con la gente del pais. No se escucho que toma algun curso. Hace palabras cruzadas en castellano, lo que ayuda.

d) Lugares donde va a divertirse (con quien).
Salen con Rosa al cine (siempre barato) o aprovechando entradas libres, con frequencia y bastante regular. Prefieren peliculas nacionales. Visitan bares y confiterias. En algunas

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oportunidades van al Colon (creo que aprovechando invitación). Van solos, acompañados por otros miembros del C.D. y tambien con residentes rusos procomunistas. En este aspecto parece que gozan de entera libertad y se les tiene ilimitada confianza. Entiendo que para el personal sovietico hay un cine en la embajada. Al parecer precisamente alli donde no van.

e) No se escucho nada de medicos.

I2. SALUD.

a) Es enfermo?
En lo patologico es propenso al resfrio y grippe (en forma siempre ligera). Tiene (tenia) furunculosis y al parecer una forma de eczema. Puede ser hipertiroide(por sudor abund.)

b) No se escucharon quejas ni de cansancio ni de fatiga.

I3. CAMBIOS.

No, no se notaron ningunos cambios del animo etc. en ninguna oportunidad. Que los trasladaron del departamento no parecio inmutarlos. Ni hablaron de esto. Todo traslado se produjo en forma sorpresiva.

Source. Bibaffle 30 May 1971

~~SECRET~~

A. ALFERIEVA Rosa Alexeievna

Apodo: desconocido.

Hijos: ver Alferiev Ivan.

Puesto que ocupa: Esposa del agregado cultural.

Lugar donde trabaja: Embajada.

Lugar donde se aloja: Embajada.

Telefonos donde mas comunmente se encuentra: Hace mucho tiempo no hago escucha de los Alferiev. No puedo contestar.

B. PARTICULARES:

I. Personales:

a) Como se la imagina:
La imagino como una trigueña, de estatura mediana, con la figura de pasable a buena. Es una persona perezosa.

b) Referencias al lugar donde nacio. Algun empleo anterior en su propio pais o en exterior. Donde cree o piensa usted que nacio:
No hay referencias en este aspecto. La ubico como nacida en Rusia Central.

c) Puede Ud. indicar algo sobre la vida hogareña, amistades personales etc.
Mala ama de casa y excelente amfitriona. No le gusta cocinar ni mantener el hogar impecablemente limpio. Pocas veces hace comida en casa, generalmente sopas substanciales que sirven a la vez como I y 2 plato. Sus comidas solia hacerse traer de una rotiseria proxima, por lo general pocete al horno. Tambien las provisiones de almacen se hacia mandar ocasionalmente (no siempre). Lo mismo con la tintoreria(venian a retirar prendas.) Pero en esto se terminan sus gastos superfluos. Es egoista y calculadora, busca comprar lo mas barato posible y regatea hasta el ultimo centavo. Ama al dinero.

d) Datos impresiones y funcion que desempeña en la comunidad y puesto de trabajo que realiza.
Despues de mas de un año de escucha queda incognita absoluta. El matrimonio no parece "trabajar" en lo mismo. Tienen funciones muy bien diferentes y no se confian los pormenores de sus respectivas actividades el uno al otro. En la casa simplemente no hablan de asuntos de trabajo.

e) Que idiomas habla:
Ruso-bien. Castellano regular. Para hacerse entender no mas. Lo estudia en la casa. Parece que habla un idioma desconocido por mi (ver Alferiev Ivan).

2. FUNCION

a) Goza de una posicion elevada a causa de su marido y no por

SECRET

meritos propios. Buena anfitriona, querida por sus colegas de mas o menos el mismo rango, probablemente odiada por los de posición subordinada, por que a estos los trata como a perros.

b) pertenece a la embajada.

c) Cual es su función, con quien esta comunicada abierta o encubiertamente?

Ya se dijo de lo cauto que esta este matrimonio. Carezco de datos al respecto. Puedo comunicar mi opinion personal de que "trabaja" mas bien "dentro" de la colonia que "afuera" en contraste con su marido. Posible que desempeña una especie de vigilancia interna y vela por "buenas costumbres" del grupo.

d) Es la esposa del agregado y nada mas.

e) Si, coincide. La tratan con respeto unos y la estiman y quieren otros.

3. FISICA

a) No se menciono rasgos sobresalientes algunos.

b) Los hombres parecen encontrarla "interesante". Dijo ella en una oportunidad no carente de orgullo que tiene una figura buena.

c) No da mucha importancia a la manera de vestir (no tanto como por ejemplo Elena) pero siendo mujer, siempre mas que su marido. Lo mismo al cuidado de su persona no da excesiva importancia. Usa cremas y polvos, pero no se maquilla. Critica el modo de vestir de mujer argentina con cierta ironia y su modo de maquillaje con franco sarcasmo. Prefiere colores oscuros pero no chillones. Para decir al paso, esta sorpresivamente bien informada acerca de vida de la alta sociedad estadounidense (p.ej. Jackeline Kennedy) y de realeza europea y de moda oriente.

4. EXPRESIVIDAD

Se expresa con mucha facilidad y habilidad. Se siente comoda en cualquier ambiente. Favorito modismo de ella es "urod = monstruo, aborton". Parece tener oido para idiomas.

5. ATRIBUTOS VOCALES

La voz de Rosa es un alto. Es moderada a aguda, imperiosa y clara. Habla rapido. Nada de tartamudeos ni balbuceos.

6. PSIQUICAS

Es al extremo celosa. No solo hacia otras mujeres, sino a la poca atención que le presta su marido yal trabajo de el. No es histerica, pero se enoja facilmente. Su enojo pasa rapido. Es buena anfitriona, siempre domina con tacto cualquiera situación embarazosa durante las reuniones. A cada uno siempre tiene lista una palabra adecuada de elogio. Nunca, repito, nunca participa en alguna discusión de otra persona o personas o hechos (me refiero a los de embajada), pero siempre escucha muy atenta las opiniones de otros. Es muy diplomatica

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y muy cauta y tambien muy astuta.
A causa de sus coles parece ser despotica, pero es mas pesesiva. Reta muy a menudo a su marido. En asuntos domesticos dirige la batuta. Pero en cases en que se toma decisión de caracter financiero-familiar y sobre todo en casos que conciernen al trabajo, es el marido quien manda. No es sumisa, discute acaloradamente, pero si su marido decide algo, le bastan 2-3 palabras en el tono tajante para pararla en seco. Entonces le obedece sin chistar siquiera. Respeta en el fondo a su marido, aunque a veces muestra todo lo contrario.

7. SENTIDO DE HUMOR.

Es propensa a hacer bromas, es alegre, especialmente en sociedad. Sus bromas no son finas pero en ninguna manera vulgares. En raras ocasiones manda a su marido a la p. que le parió, pero es en ocasiones cuando sale a la calle vestido,al parecer de ella, inadecuadamente o cuando no cuida de su salud. En querrollas entre los dos (muy frecuentes) raras veces se escuchan obscenidades. Cuando se enoja llama a su marido "aborto~~y~~ monstruoso" o "fascista".

8. HABITOS INTERESES HOBBYES

a) Parece no tener. Ve con regularidad TV.(especialmente las transmisiones de la hora religiosa, esta no la deja pasar).

b) Ya se hablo de esto. Ver Ivan.

c) Tiene inclinación especial hacia el sexo?
No se nota. Es celosa, es todo.

d) Tiene tos. A veces persistente y largo tiempo.

e) No tiene culto al estomago. Una sopa, un asado al horno la satisface.

f) Cuales son sus companias preferi~~/~~das. Se trata con sus colegas y familia.
Con todos los de Representación Comercial mantiene relaciones cordiales sin entrar en intimidad, especialmente con los Diakov, lo~~s~~ mismo se podria decir con respecto~~s~~ a los Vasiliev, de agregado militar y del mismo embajador. En los tratos con los Vragov hay distanciamiento y franco antagonimo, lo mismo que con los amigos de Vragov (consulado, los Sheitaishvilli etc).

g) No, no tiene habito de gastar plata. Tiene habito de guardarle. Esta enferma cuando le falta plata. Una vez casi llero hablando con su marido de una combinación financiera que fracaso. Utilizando su posición de diplomatica hace contrabando-hormiga de perfumes ropa y pieles a URSS. Utiliza servicios de oficiales de la flota pesquera o comercial sovietica que la visitan oportunamente.

9. VIDA PROFESIONAL

SECRET

a) No hay visible desagrado con la posición, mas bien es a su gusto.
b) Al tratarse de criollos su expresion(en conversación con sus connacionales) es "negro y cabecita".
c) Al respecto de sus colegas nunca expresa su opinión. A ella misma la parecen estimar y querer, es popular. Antagonismo con los del grupo Vragov.

II. ACCESO.

a) Todo lo que compra Rosa (como tambien muchos otros de la colonia) lo hace exclusivamente en los negociós judios y no porque los quiere, sino por 2 razones. Generalmente hablan ruso y tienen tradicional comida rusa. Generalmente va sola, a veces acompañada. Los almacenes en Junin, Corrientes y Pueyrredon se mencionan a menudo. Para la ropa, hay una tienda que esta en los suburbios de Gran Buenos Aires. No me acuerdo mas donde es. Parece pertenecer a los ucrainianos. Se escucho varias veces mencionar direcciones de depositos (no propiamente negocios) de Guth y Chavez y Harrods. Al parecer tienen una tienda exclusivamente para su personal en la Rep. Comerc. que se abastece con articulos ya pasados de moda de estos negociós.
b) No tengo referencias de que maneja auto.
c) Estudia español mas bien en forma practica (hablando, leyendo), estudia frances en su casa (a veces con su marido).
d) Ver Alferiev Ivan.
e) -"-"-"

I2. SALUD.

a) Anginas, bronquitis con tos persistente con regular frecuencia.
b) No se queja de fatiga ni da impresión de cansancio.

I3. CAMBIOS

No se ha notado ningun cambio.

I4. OTROS DATOS

Al tratarse de matrimonio mi primera y fuerte impresión fué que se llevan mal, impresión que se desvanecio poco a poco. Creo que es un error considerarlo asi. Rosa es excesivamente celosa, esto explica frecuentes escenas que hace a su marido, por otra parte creo que no le desagrada mayormente los celos de su mujer (vanidad del hombre). Habia escenas de conversación muy tiernas entre ellos. Entonces " el aborto monstruoso" se convertia en "mi abortoncito". Es evidente tambien que Rosa cuida la salud de su marido. En lo financiero parece reinar la mas perfecta armonia entre ambos: todo para la familia.

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DIRECTOR

8 FEB 71 IN 231321

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REF: BUENOS AIRES 7069 (IN 246580)

1. BIBAFFLES REPORT IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV RETURNED BUENOS AIRES 5 FEBRUARY VIA SWISSAIR 200 FROM DAKAR. STATION HAS NO INFO ON PURPOSE OF TDY BUT BELIEVE IT NOT UNLIKELY HE SUMMONED FOR DISCUSSIONS RE AEPARADISE 64 CASE.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

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DIRECTOR

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2. FILE: 201-236721. GP-1.

S E C R E T

LEE.
CON.
CHA.
CLY.
DIA.
KAT.
BOB.
FIL. Alferyev 201
DES.
RET.

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INFO FILE, VR WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

ACTION NO. 978

SECRET 182102Z JAN 71 CITE BUENOS AIRES 7069 BUEN

DIRECTOR

18 JAN 71 246580

REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEKICK

1. BIBAFFLE TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, KNOWN KGB, DEPARTED FOR USSR WITHOUT WIFE 17 JANUARY VIA KLM 792 TO AMSTERDAM. PER BILOCULAR, TRIP IS FOR CONSULTATION.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

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18 Jan 71

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ACTION NO. 203

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S E C R E T 131725Z OCT 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 6154

DIRECTOR

13 Oct 70 IN 183849

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS RETURN FROM HOME LEAVE OF ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA ALFERYEVA, 201-236701, 9 OCT, VIA SWISSAIR 200.

2. FILE: 201-236701. GP-1.

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ACTION UNIT SB8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2, WH8

ACTION NO. 808

S E C R E T 082035Z SEP 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 5793 Buen

DIRECTOR

8 SEP 70 158462

CREDTOP AEKICK BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS TRAVEL FOLLOWING SOVIETS:

A. IVAN ALFERYEV, WHO RETURNED BUENOS AIRES WITHOUT WIFE, 4 SEPT VIA SWISS AIR 200.

B. VADIM CHEKMAZOV, WHO DEPARTED B.A. 5 SEPT VIA AIR FRANCE 082. CHEKMAZOV LEFT, PRESUMABLY ON HOME LEAVE, TO JOIN WIFE WHO PRECEDED HIM WITH SON IN APRIL.

C. YURIY, LYUDMILA, AND ANTON MAMONTOV, WHO DEPARTED B.A. (PRESUMABLY UPON HOME LEAVE) 7 SEPT VIA AIR FRANCE 090.

2. FILE: 201-236701, 201-128117 AND 201-853701. GP-1

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B 201-853701

201-236701
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1 Sep 70

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201-236,701

201-236701

Argentina 01 Sep 70


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
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Alferev Ivan
gavrilovich
Argentina

Предъявитель сего, гражданИН СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

АЛФЕРЬЕВ Иван Гаврилович,

Первый Секретарь Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

отправляется за границу

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на Пять лет

25 мая 1970 г.

йрес

Заведующий Консульским Отделом Посольства СССР Министерства Иностранных Дел СССР в Аргентине

7

Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyen...... de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Ivan ALFERIEV,

Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS

en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Ce passeport est valable pour .... cinq ans ....

25 mai 1970

12

Suppléant du Ministre
ires Etrangères de l'URSS

Pour traduction conforme:
JEFE DE LA SECCION CONSULAR DE LA
EMBAJADA DE LA URSS EN LA
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

26

7

Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

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„.........“.................................19......... г.

М. П.

le „.........“.................................19.........

Подпись / Signature ....

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по „.........“.................................19......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

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„.........“.................................19......... г.

М. П.

le „.........“.................................19.........

Подпись / Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

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

Посольство СССР в Аргентине Консульский отдел

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№ 380268

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Renta 1273

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№..................

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до «......» ....

.... 19........ г.

через любой пограничный пункт

М. П. Подпись

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№..................

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до ....

через любой пограничный

М. П. Подпись

Визы. Visas

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores y Culto

El Titular del presente Pasaporte ingresó al país el día 27 de enero de 1968 Con Pasaporte Diplomático Nº 019467 y Visación Diplomática Nº 186 otorgada por Embajada de la República en U.R.S.S.- el 10 de enero de 1968

Buenos Aires 9 de junio de 1970

12

Emb. Visas

Buenos Aires, 9 de junio de 1970

Se prorroga el período de permanencia en la República establecido en la Visa Argentina estampada en la página 10 del presente pasaporte, hasta el término de la misión del Titular en la República.-

[illegible]
Consejero de Embajada
Jefe de Despacho General
Dirección Nacional de Ceremonial

Emb. Visas

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
y Culto
UNA (1)
Visa para ~~Varias~~ Entradas
a la Republica Argentina

Válida hasta 9 SET 1970

Buenos Aires 9 JUN 1970

[illegible]
Consejero de Embajada
Jefe de Despacho General
Dirección Nacional de Ceremonial

12



Визы. Visas.

No. 24/NE/70

[illegible]OMATIQUE / DIPLOMATIEK / [illegible]

Ivan VIDA Alferiev.

Valable pour / Geldig voor / Valid for : Bruxel[illegible]

Délivré le / [illegible] / Issued on 11-6-1975.

Ce visa est valable pour / Dit visum is geldig voor / This visa is valid deux (2) [illegible] days

[illegible] de la date de la [illegible] / the date of first entry

Première entrée avant / Eerste binnenkomst voor / First entry before 11-7-1975.

[illegible] sauf prorogation par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères / behoudens verlenging door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken / unless extended by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Signature et sceau

De Ambassadeur [illegible]

voor deze

II № 029288

12


8 9 10 11 12
22 23 24 25 26 27 2
СССР
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ

13



Предъявитель сего, гражданка СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

АЛФЕРЬЕВА Роза Алексеевна,

супруга Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

отправляется за границу —

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен на ПЯТЬ ЛЕТ

25 мая 1970 г.

Апрес

Заведующий Консульским
Заместитель Министра
отделом Посольства Иностранных Дел СССР
в Аргентине

13

Traduction.

Le titulaire du présent, citoyen...... de L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Roza ALFERIEVA,

épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger ....

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour ......cinq ans

25 de mai 1970

Adjoint du Ministre
[illegible] Etrangères de l'URSS

Pour traduction conforme:

[illegible] DE LA SECCION CONSULAR DE LA
EMBAJADA DE LA URSS EN LA
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Отметки о продлении паспорта. Renouvellement.

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „..........“..............................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „..........“..............................19..........

„..........“..............................19.......... г.

м. п.

le „..........“..............................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „..........“..............................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „..........“..............................19..........

„..........“..............................19.......... г.

м. п.

le „..........“..............................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

по „..........“..............................19.......... г.

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „..........“..............................19..........

„..........“..............................19.......... г.

м. п.

le „..........“..............................19..........

Подпись
Signature ....

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ КНИ[illegible]

№ 380267

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

по „09“ (девятого) ноября 1970 г.

[illegible] пограничный пункт

13

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№.....................

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до "........"..

....19.......... г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п. *Подпись*

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№.....................

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

до "......"..

....19.......... г.

через любой пограничный пункт

м. п.

Визы. Visas.

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

El Titular del presente Pasaporte ingresó al país el día 27 de enero de 1968 Con Pasaporte Diplomático Nº [illegible] y Visación Diplomática Nº 183 otorgada por Embajada de la República en U.R.S.S. el 12 de enero de 1968

Buenos Aires, [illegible] 1973



Buen. Visas.

Buenos Aires, 9 de junio de 1970.-

Se prorroga el período de permanencia en la República establecido en la Visa Argentina estampada en la página 10 del presente pasaporte, hasta el término de la misión de su esposo en la República

[illegible] JOSE CARBE CEBALLOS
CONSEJERO DE EMBAJADA
JEFE DE DESPACHO GENERAL
DIRECCION NACIONAL DE CEREMONIAL

Buen. Visas.

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto

Visa para una (1) ~~Varias~~ Entradas a la Republica Argentina

Válida hasta: - 9 SET 1970

Buenos Aires - 9 JUN 1970

13

Визы. Visas.

No. 25/NE/70 AN

DIPLOMATIQUE / DIPLOMATISK / DIPLOMATIC

Nora VISA Alfonsieva

Valable pour / Geldig voor / Valid for : Benelux

Délivré le / Afgegeven op / Issued on 11-6-1970.

Ce visa est valable pour / Dit visum is geldig voor / This visa is valid deux (2) [illegible] dagen / days

à partir du / vanaf / from — de la date de la première entrée / de datum van eerste binnenkomst / the date of first entry

pour un/plusieurs voyage(s) / voor een/meerdere reis(zen) / for a single/several journey(s)

Première entrée avant / Eerste binnenkomst voor / First entry before 11-7-1970.

Durée du séjour ininterrompu / Duur onafgebroken verblijf / Duration of uninterrupted stay — [illegible]

sauf dérogation par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères / behoudens ontheffing door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken / unless exceeded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Attention / Opgelet / Attention : Faire estampiller votre passeport à la frontière / Paspoort aan de grens laten afstempelen / Passport to be stamped at the frontier.

Signature et sceau / Handtekening en stempel

De Ambassadeur
Voor deze

Визы. Visas.

Д № 029289

— 14 —

13

SBXWN

Alfeyev V.A.
201-256701



[illegible]

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ ... “ ... 19.. г.

Le délai du présent passport est prolongé jusqu'au „ ... “ ... 19..

„ ... “ ... 19.. г.

„ ... “ ... 19..

Подпись

Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ ... “ ... 19.. г.

Le délai du présent passport est prolongé jusqu'au „ ... “ ... 19..

„ ... “ ... 19.. г.

„ ... “ ... 19..

Подпись

Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

[illegible]

Дипломатическая виза

№ 300[illegible]

Действительна для выезда из СССР

до „09. (девятого)“ [illegible]бря 1970 г.

через пограничный пункт



[illegible]

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ ... “ ... 19.. г.

Le délai du présent passport est prolongé jusqu'au „ ... “ ... 19..

„ ... “ ... 19.. г.

„ ... “ ... 19..

Подпись

Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ ... “ ... 19.. г.

Le délai du présent passport est prolongé jusqu'au „ ... “ ... 19..

„ ... “ ... 19.. г.

„ ... “ ... 19..

Подпись

Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен до „ ... “ ... 19.. г.

Le délai du présent passport est prolongé

[illegible]

Дипломатическая виза

№ 300[illegible]

Действительна для выезда из СССР

до „09. (девятого)“ [illegible]бря 1970 г.

через пограничный пункт



Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ " 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ " 19

М. П. „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ " 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ " 19

М. П. „ " 19

Подпись
Signature

Срок настоящего паспорта продлен

до „ " 19

Le délai du présent passeport est prolongé

jusqu'au „ " 19

М. П. „ " 19

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ ПАСПОРТ

№ 30420

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН [illegible]

по „ 09 " [illegible] 19 [illegible]



Le titulaire du présent, citoyen de l'U.R.S.S.
des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes

Nora ALFERIEVA,

Épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade
de l'URSS en Argentine

AU NOM DE L'UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui prêter aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable [illegible]



Le titulaire du présent, citoyen... de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Nona ALFERIEVA,

Épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour



Le titulaire du présent, citoyen... de l'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Nona ALFERIEVA,

Épouse du Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS en Argentine

se rend à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le passeport est valable pour



[illegible] гражданка СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] Роза Алексеевна,

супруга Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

[illegible] по [illegible]

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен до



[illegible] гражданка СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

[illegible] Роза Алексеевна,

супруга Первого Секретаря Посольства СССР

в Аргентине

[illegible] по [illegible]

ИМЕНЕМ СОЮЗА
СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Министерство Иностранных Дел просит все гражданские и военные власти СССР и Дружественных Государств пропускать беспрепятственно владельца настоящего паспорта и оказывать ему всяческое содействие.

Паспорт действителен до



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 020289

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 039243



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № [illegible]



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № [illegible]



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES
PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № [illegible]

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № [illegible]

14-00000

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3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT SB8

INFO FILE, VR RIAN WH8 E2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 EUR6

ACTION NO. 917

S E C R E T 292111Z JUN 70 CITE BUENOS AIRES 5319 Buen

DIRECTOR ~~DIRECTOR~~

29 Jun 70 113219

REDTOP BIOGENESIS AEKICK Soviet Travel

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS FOLLOWING TRAVEL.

A. IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV AND WIFE ROZA ALEKSEYEVNA DEPARTED FOR USSR, PROBABLY ON HOME LEAVE, 27 JUNE VIA AIR FRANCE 082 TO PARIS.

B. NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH NAUMOV DEPARTED PCS WITH WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA AND DAUGHTERS MARINA AND TATYANA 28 JUNE VIA KLM 792 TO AMSTERDAM.

2. FILE: 201-236701 AND 201-817222. GP-1.

S E C R E T

IP

MICROFILMED
JUL 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN mgc
AB X
~~FN~~
FO N
DI 4/8
DATE HOD
FI

CS COPY
SECRET

B 201-817222

29 June 70
201-236701

From HABA-21382, 18 May 1970, Source: BIOGENESIS

o) ALFERIEV IVAN (1º Secretario - Sección Cultural - K.G.B.) Aparenta ser complaciente con el Embajador y a menudo conversa con él fuera de las horas de las comidas. Habla bastante bien el castellano. Fuma bastante, casi siempre cigarrillos americanos. Bebe bastante aunque sin exceso. Es muy susceptible sobre su rango diplomático. En una oportunidad discutió con el Embajador sobre el significado de la frase "Alferiev - 1º Secretario, pertenece a la Embajada de la URSS", argumentando que él no es "una silla o un mueble". VOLSKI le llamó la atención, dándole a entender que buscara bien el significado de las palabras. Es muy ambicioso. Se mantiene siempre muy alejado de su mujer. En una oportunidad se sentaron juntos a la mesa a almorzar y todos les hicieron bromas por este hecho, lo que significa que es "vox populi", las desavenencias del matrimonio ALFERIEV.

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY SHEET

MAY 1970

A. TARGET IDENTITY: (Name, DPOB, 201#, present job and location)

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (AEBOOR), born 20 January 1928 in Tula, 201-236701
Second Secretary/Cultural Officer at Sovemb. Buenos Aires

B. TARGET BACKGROUND: (Brief resume of background, family members and where located, whether known or suspect RIS, languages.)

Apparently from peasant background.
1958: TDY Argentina (possible. 1960: TDY Havana
1960-1964: Mexico City, PRAVDA rep.
1968- : Buenos Aires, 2nd Sec./Cultural Officer at Sovemb.

Known KGB. Speaks Spanish, English.
Wife: Rosa Alekseyevna (20 Sept. 34 in Moscow), son: Vadim (24 Sept. 55 in Moscow). Wife with him, son in SU.

C. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY: (Short statements on following where applicable: access agents, access informants, residence audio/taps, office audio/taps, physical surveillance, C/O contact, BAB assessment, past recruitment attempts, other. Cite significant documents, starting dates.)

Residence audio: AELANYARD run jointly with BIOGENESIS in August 1968, ALFERYEV moved out unexpectedly into compound for unknown reasons in October 1969. (HABA-20979, 4 Nov 69)
Office ~~xxxx~~ taps: BILOCULAR is joint liaison teletap.
C/O Direct contact: Paul W. LEMERONE, Nina T. MARGANDE (HABA-20210, 16 January 1969).

D. List of Susceptibilities/Vulnerabilities: (List of everything which possibly exploitable by us, and significant steps we have taken to clarify, confirm or refute it. Cite document/source.)

Intense arguments ~~xxxx~~ between ALFERYEV and wife (AELANYARD, BIBAFFLE reports, HABA-20528). Their behaviour in Public is all sweetness and light; she appears almost like a different person. She appears to harbor resentment against him because of his behaviour towards her.
ALFERYEV is very tail-conscious. (HABA-21000, 18 December 1969).
ALFERYEV has on occasion remained out all night, and has claimed to his wife when he comes home that he has been working. (HABA-21000, 18 December 1969). Surveillance on him at night allegedly proved he made clandestine contacts.

~~SECRET~~ X

X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

REDLEG - Bernardo Francisco NORIEGA

1. Headquarters traces are requested on:

NAME	:	Bernardo Francisco NORIEGA
DPOB	:	18 June 1914, Argentina
OCCUPATION	:	Director of Difusora Argentina de Espectáculos y Filmes Artísticos (DAEFA)
PARENTS	:	Bernardo and Agustina nee DEGRADI
WIFE	:	Married, wife's name unknown

2. Station traces show that NORIEGA, apparently a musician by profession, has a long record of association with Communist front groups. He was one of the founding members of the Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinacion Sindical (MUCS) and reportedly a member of the Communist Party of Argentina. He was also formerly the Secretary General of the Argentine Union of Musicians. Specific references include:

a. HAB-03124, 16 October 1961, which describes him as the owner of the building in which the PCA Buenos Aires Central Zone Committee had its Headquarters. (This document also identifies NORIEGA as alias Ken HAMILTON.)

b. HDSA-12041, 27 October 1961, which reports NORIEGA's travel to Cuba at the invitation of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba.

c. BUENOS AIRES-9129, March 1963, which states NORIEGA attended the Rio Congress for Solidarity for Cuba.

File
AEBook

Distribution
3 - Chief, WHD
~~2~~ - Chief, SBD

HABA-21266 20 March 1970

SECRET 201-

~~SECRET~~ HABA-21266

2. HABA-15153, 20 January 1964, which identifies NORIEGA as a member of the Communist faction of the Argentine Musicians' Union.

3. Despite his background, the Station is taking a close look at NORIEGA as a possible unilateral access agent. As a Director of the firm which is currently sponsoring the visit of the Moscow Circus, he is in constant touch with both AEBOOR and 201-821510. He is, in fact, the only consistent overt contact that AEBOOR has maintained since his arrival in Argentina.

4. Please assign a 201.

Elma T. MARGANDE

16 March 1970

AEBOOR TARGETING EXERCISE - 201-236701

GENERAL BACKGROUND:

INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, Suspect Deputy Resident

POSITION: Second Secretary/Cultural

DPOB: 20 January 1928, Tula

FAMILY: Wife - in Buenos Aires
Son (born 1955) - in Moscow

LANGUAGES: Spanish, excellent
English, some

TOURS:

1958: TDY (possible), Argentina
1960: TDY, Havana
1960-64: Mexico, PRAVDA Rep.
1968- : Buenos Aires

RESIDENCE: Private apartment of Embassy Club

PERSONALITY: Reportedly likes modern Mexican & American music.

FEINGLASS - 1964: Peasant background. Vulgar/crude speech, high-pitched reedy voice. Foul vocabulary. Choleric temperment. Rudimentary sense of humor. Easily upset by small things. Impatient, demanding.

AELANYARD - November 1962: Henpecked. Wife always arguing with him.

DIRAFFLEs 5 and 22 : Introvert, clever, cautious, distrustful. Excellent self-control, hides his feelings. Socially, joking, good sense of humor.

WIFE'S PERSONALITY:

FEINGLASS - 1964: She is more intelligent than he. Not attractive. Domineering. Unpleasant with husband. Family of liars.

AELANYARD: She finds fault with her husband for no apparent reason.

LEVERQUE and MARCAUDE - 1962: Warm personality, attractive. Interested in theater/music/ballet.

DIRAFFLEs 5 and 22: In private -- total lack of understanding of her husband. Intolerant/impetuous. Unhappy married life known generally to Soviet community. Socially -- docile, cheerful, lovely disposition.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

January 1962 (In Quito): observed casing a State Dept. building with the Cuban Commercial Attache in Quito. Close contact with Cuban diplomats and local CP leaders.

1963: trip to Ensenada. Contacted rural recruiter to assess Mexican youths desiring to study in USSR.

Mexican tour Involved with leaders of Movimiento Liberacion Nacional (MLN) and Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) in Ensenada, Tijuana, and Mexicali.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
O BIOGENESIS/BIBAFFLE/Information on Various Soviets

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached please find a seven-page report in Spanish composed by members of the BIBAFFLE unit. While the report is not always accurate, it does represent a good effort on the part of the BIBAFFLE team to pull together all available information (telephone taps, surveillance and audio ops) on Soviet personalities.

2. We suggest that you make pertinent extracts from the attachment and include the information in your Headquarters files on individual Soviet personalities.

Edwin W. Shroyer
Edwin W. SHROYER

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment
BIBAFFLE Report h/w

Distribution
3 - Chief, SBD w/att h/w
2 - Chief, WHD w/o att

CS COPY

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
74-120-111

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-21223

CLASSIFICATION

DATE
10 March 1970

HQS FILE NUMBER

Extracted from attachment

Pasa urgente a la Sec. C.E.

25 JAN

Secreto y Confidencial

No. 3459

E: 117/ "Document contains info regarding certain members of Soviet Mission in Argentina"

Personalidades Claves de la Misión Soviética

201-236701

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIEV, Segundo Secretario Cultural. Oficial del Servicio de Inteligencia.

Aunque nominalmente a cargo de la Sección Cultural en Cuiza 2031, de la operación telefónica surge que tiene poco contacto con el público.

2. En Enero recibió una llamada del aeropuerto de Leon YASHIN, miembro del equipo de futbal "Moscow Dynamo" en ruta a un encuentro en Santiago de Chile. YASHIN y ALFERIEV eran obviamente buenos amigos puesto que YASHIN le trajo saludos "de los muchachos en México".

3. Las conversaciones telefónicas de ALFERIEV con su esposa son bruscas. En una ocasión en marzo cuando llamó para avisar a medio día que no iba a casa para comer ella le acusó de estar "ya borracho", lo que estaba confirmado por su conversación vacilante. Una noche le pidió que hiciera té para los VRAGOS (era las 21 horas) y ella de mal humor contestó que estaba para irse a la cama, pero finalmente consintió hacerlo.

4. Aparentemente Rosa ALFERIEV posee un caniche

~~SECRET~~

201-236701

c. ALFERYEV and Roza. He made a point of complaining - several times in the course of the evening, about not being invited to our 4th of July celebrations. We lamely pointed out that the affair was so big that we only invited men - Ambassadors, Milatts, and Comm'l. Chiefs, and besides, the food was lousy. Nevertheless, we assured him he'd be invited the next time. He was suffering his usual case of halitosis, which effectively keeps one at a proper distance. Roza was her charming self, with a sparkle in her flirtatious eyes. She asked us to convey regards to LEVERONE and MARGANDE.

[illegible]

Stephen H. GARSIDE - SOVIET 7 NOVEMBER CELEBRATION
HABA - 21161, 3 FEBRUARY 1970

SECRET 201-236701

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

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TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
BIBAFFLE Assessment of AEBOOR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded as a separate cover attachment is a translation of an assessment of AEBOOR prepared by the BIBAFFLE Soviet Desk Officers, BIBAFFLE-5 and 22. The assessment does not tally completely with our assessment of Subject in some minor points, but it does present another view which should prove of interest to Headquarters analysts.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
U/S/C as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach u/s/c
2 - C/WHD, w/attach u/s/c
[illegible] 13 Jan 70

CS COPY

1att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-21080	18 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701

SPECIAL REPORT

6P

I.- SUBJECT

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIEV was born in Moscow (U.S.S.R.), on the 20th of January 1928, diplomatic passport No. 091.477, married to Rosa Alekseevna ALFERIEVA, born on September 20th, 1934, in Moscow, diplomatic passport No. 019.468. Subject is assigned as 2nd Counsellor of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Buenos Aires. He arrived in this country on the 27th of January 1968, taking up residence on Uruguay 1176, 5th Floor, Apt. "A" in the Federal Capital, Tel. 41-5405, living at said address until de 7th of October 1969 when he moved to live at the Posadas Club (residence for the officers of the soviet representation).

ALFERIEV had been for a short time in Argentina during the month of September 1958; in Havana in September 196[illegible]; in Quito in January and February 1962 and in Tijuana in September 1963. He was representative of PRAVDA in Mexico during 1960 and 1964.

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

In view of the fact that subject lived separetely from the rest of the Embassy personnel, his mission based on information was thus made easier.

It should be pointed out, that during his residence on Uruguay, he was kept under surveillance through a technical penetration carried out by this Section.

As a result of the exploitation of these lines, as well as the Case "ASADO" (summer home) and information from the "LORO" case, certain details concerning his personality, private life and contacts have been ascertained.

Through thorough study of above mentioned sources, it is apparent that the ALFERIEVS have certain differences, during which he is the object of vituperation from his wife Rosa, which Ivan thoroughly ignores to the great exasperation of his wife.

II.- PERSONALITY OF IVAN ALFERIEV

He is an introvert, clever, cautious and distrustful. He knows how to hide his feelings and he has an excellent self-control, showing violent feelings on very rare occasions. (See Section IV).

With relation to his cultural level, nothing much is known, as he has never been heard speaking on themes of general culture. When he speaks at social gatherings he is joking, using double meaning phrases (usually funny)

S/c. att 1 to HABA 01080 CS COPY 201-236701 or he tells jokes. It is as though he were afraid to show that he takes things seriously, as though he were ashamed or frightened.

During the various opportunities when his wife is screaming all sort of impropieties at him he maintains absolute silence, seeming to be concentrating on one fixed idea, and letting all that Rosa says just slide off him.

He has been identified and known to belong to the K.G.B. (Soviet Secret Police). According to a confidential source, he is considered a high official in the embassy and of aboslute trustworthiness by Ambassador Iouro VOLSKI; being respected and feared by the rest of the embassy staff. He speaks perfect spanish.

He is present at all receptions with Iouri VOLSKI and Ivan DIAKOV (ambassador and Chief of the Commercial Representation, respectively), not only in his official position, but also in his private life, having a warm friendship between the three which is quite rare in the embassy circle. During his stay at the summer home, ALFERIEV and his wife occupy the quarters reserved for the ambassador.

III.- PERSONALITY OF ROSA ALFERIEVA

A certain duality of personality is apparent in her behavior. In her married life she shows herself to be intolerant andimpetuous, arriving at absolutellack of control on various occasions, bringing forth continual marital quarrels.

On the contrary, in her social life, she shows herself as a very docile, cheerful woman, being the center of attraction in almost all the gatherings for her "lovely disposition" and gayety, not only among the men but also their wives. (See section I).

Rosa Alekseevna ALFERIEVA is a woman brought up in the typical soviet atmosphere, subjected sice childhood to a rigid political indoctrination in some juvenile organisation and in school. She is not sufficiently intelligent to rid herself, even partially, of what she has been taught. She does not separate her affective life from the obligations that she, presumes, every good communist citizens should have. It seems that she does not realise the importance of her husbands mission. She is not a woman who is attuned to her companion. She is not on the same wave length, she does not understand him. She harbors a concentrated and continuous resentment against him. May be this is due to his ironic,and keen and wounding sense of humour.

With regard to her surroundings, this woman has shown, on various opportunities, to feel antipathy and scorn for Argentina and its people, dueugh probably to its leanings toward democracy, and therefore, contrary to her way of thinking. As she has shown not to possess much imagination, she takes as wonderful that which she has been taught. However, the reason for her poor matrimonial relations remains a mystery. Maybe one of the reason, as stated above is her lack of understanding of her husband, so that one quarrel on top of the other has built a wall which cannot be breached.

In the company of her friends, Rosa has always shown herself to be pleasant, gay and uncomplicated. She has not always masked her marital problems, so that they are not a secret to the rest of the members of the embassy, who nevertheless make believe they know nothig about it, through consideration or whatever other motives they may have. On some occasions VOLSKI has taken the initiative to improve relations between the ALFERIEVS, to no avail.

IV.- MODUS OPERANDI WHICH HAS SHOWN UP FROM SURVEILLANCE

During the shadowing of Ivan ALFERIEV, he has shown himself to be an expert in this matter. He is observant and his movements in the street are carried out carefully and ably- on many opportunities he has shaken off his shadows. He is an excellent driver, and he uses all sorts of ruses to throw off the agents on the job. This is proved below:

Shadowing on 23-5-69:

He drove his car down Cordoba Av., turned on 9 July going towards Cerrito, which was closed off for repairs. In the middle of the street were two signs which read: "DETOUR, USE CENTER LANES". Subject disregarded the signs and continued straight ahead towards Viamonte, where transit was completely cut off, and he had to take 9 July again and comes to the Obelisco.

With this trick, ALFERIEV wanted to learn whether he was being followed.

SHADOWING on 20-5-69:

He went into the Bank of Napoli, approaches the counter, carries on a conversation with an employee, and vanishes without being observed inspite of close vigilance.

- Before going into a building of store, he looks in both directions and searches carefully.

- When he goes in his car, he drives slowly, but every so often, he steps on the gas, and then abruptly reduces speed, doing this various times.

--During all the shadowings carried out, subject always managed to go ahead on the yellow light, leaving his shadow generally facing the red light.

- On various occasions he went up one way streets.

V.- CONTACTS

It was ascertained that ALFERIEV arrived home very late at night and even at dawn, which is quite out of the ordinary with the rest of the diplomatic personnel. (See Annex 2).

This led to the supposition that subject was either leading a licentious life or carrying out clandestine activities. Therefore, a permanent suverveillance was carried out during 24 hours for 20 days on his home, proving that he did in reality come home between 6 and 7 at times.

Fifteen days before his return to the U.S.S.R. for his leave, a surveillance and shadowing service was set up during all 24 hours, proving that subject did make clandestine contacts.

It was under these circumstances that on the 21/5/69, at 1200 hours, a contact was spotted. This occurred once again on the 23/5/69, at which time the "contact" was suspicious of being followed and he pulled quickly out of the area.

On the 18th of August of the present year, when a security agent who was carrying out his duties on the ALFERIEV address (improvement of the P.T.), spotted the above mentioned contact patrolling the zone; with the aid of a Policeman he was detained in order to be identified, his documents are the following:

Names. . . . . Alberto DO EYO
C.I.No. . . . . 5.432.687 Pol. Fed.
Address. . . . . Moldes 742, 7º Fl., Fed. Cap.
Profession. Newspaperman

After investigation was carried out it was established that subjec did not live at said address and that his I.D. was not his.

Continuing the investigation it was learned that at Moldes 1872, 7th floor, a certain Alberto DO EYO did live there, and that he worked at Editorial "ESTAMPA", address Calle Salta 980, Federal Capital, Tel. 23-4052/8958/6166 and also in the firm "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ and CIA", Rivarola 178, Federal Capital, Tel. 45-8811, 46-1334/1666 and 40-1785, which was in the construction and sale of apartments.

When Editorial "ESTAMPA" was visited, it was learned that this firm had gone out of business for some time.

Following investigation, ~~it was learned~~ at the administrative offices of the firm "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ y Cia", Talcahuano 178, 1st Floor, Federal Capital, the agent in charge of the investigation was waited by subject, who turned out to be:

Names	✓Alberto DO EYO [illegible]
C.I. No.	1.024.378 Pol. Fed.
L.E. No.	0.257.963, D.M. 2
Date of Birth	15-10-1913
Son of	Manuel
and	Rosa PAZ
Address	Moldes 1872, 7th Floor, Apt. "B"
Tel.	78-4665
Names of Wife	Eugenia MAGLIOCCA
C.I. No.	2.600.078 Pol. Fed.

SEX: M
DOB: 15 Oct 13
POB: ?
CIT: Argentina
OCC: Business man
PA Argentina, Buenos Aires
P in contact with Ivan J. Alferiev P (201-236701)

Antecedents:

Alberto DO EYO does not have any police nor ideological antecedents. Until the year 1961, he worked at Editorial "ESTAMPA", then at "PETERSEN THIELE CRUZ y Cia".

It should be pointed out that in order to establish his activities and connections with ALFERIEV, starting 22-10-69 a surveillance and shadowing was carried out on subject.

On the other hand, and as a result of the use of the clandestined microphones, it was learned that Ivan ALFERIEV, maintained conversations with a person by the name of MOGUILEVSKY, who was a member of the directive Council of the Metropolitan Federation of Chess and the Argentine Chess Federation.

Investigation carried out on subject determined the following:

Names	Marcelino MOGUILEVSKY [illegible]
C.I. No.	1.429.304 Pol. Fed.
L.E. No.	0.386.446
Son of	David
And	Natalia GOBERNOSER
Date of birth	October 30, 1916
Place of birth	Macachia, La Pampa
Address	Arredondo 2440, 1st Floor, Apt. B
Place of Work (address)	San Blas 2638, Fed. Cap.

Sex: M
DOB: 30 Oct 16
POB: Argentina, Macachia, La Pampa
CIT: Argentina
OCC: Sec. Argentina Chess Fed.

Mr. MOGUILEVSKY occupies the post of Secretary of the Argentine Chess Federation with head quarters in the Sports Confederation Building, address on Viamonte 1360, 6th Floor, Federal Capital.

Beginning October 22nd of this year a surveillance and shadowing service was established to determine his activities and possible contacts with ALFERIEV.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

With reference to the 2nd Councellor of the U.S.S.R., Ivan ALFERIEV, the following conclusions have been reached:

a) He is a diplomatic officer who carries out his professional work efficiently, showing at all times great sagacity when carrying out public contacts and relations, avoiding on various opportunities with ingenuity and ability the shadowing detail assigned to him.

b) With reference to his relations and activities within the Embassy, it is observed that he carries a lot of weight over the rest of the personnel, as he is given deferential attention and respect not only at official but private functions within the circle.

c) He is a person who is always busy, on the go all day and on into the late hours of the night.

d) His married life is not harmonious, due to the character of his wife who is temperamental and impetuous and not tolerant toward subject. It is estimated that these misunderstandings are linked to his activities outsidde of normal working hours, which take him away from home, as well as, the indifference and silence with which her recriminations are received.

e) With reference to his contacts, mentioned in this report, the corresponding investigations are being carried out to determine how far they reach and their importance.

201-236701

DISPATCH

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~~SECRET~~

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TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, WHD; COS, Panama City/MKSPICE

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires 18

SUBJECT
RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS/AEBOOR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. BUENOS AIRES-3801, 2 October 1969

B. BUENOS AIRES-3837, 9 October 1969

1. We have kept you up to date on AEBOOR's sudden move and the subsequent termination of AELANYARD. At the present time, we still do not know whether or not the story of a sudden transfer to Mexico City was in reality the basis for the move or if a compromise of the operation was the actual cause. As we pointed out in our original cable, our immediate thought was that perhaps the AVDOLMAN flap had caused all AEKICK types to "pull in" and that perhaps AEBOOR was simply following orders. Subsequent investigation, however, tended to discredit this thought.

2. The AELANYARD transcripts reveal that AEBOOR did indeed contemplate the move several days before we actually had wind of it. His wife did not like the idea and complained to him about the move. AEBOOR also told his landlord in advance of his move. There is also evidence that AEBOOR was in somewhat regular contact with the Mexican Embassy and although we were not certain, it appeared that he was anxious to learn if his visa had been granted. In any case, on 28 September 1969, AEBOOR and wife checked out of their apartment.

3. Shortly thereafter, we made a physical check of the interior of the apartment. Everything seemed to be in order. There was no evidence whatsoever that the technical end of the operation had been tampered with. As we said before, it functioned up until and after AEBOOR vacated.

Continued. . .

Distribution:
- 3 - C/SBD
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - COS, Panama City/MKSPICE

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABA-20979

DATE
4 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-236701

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20979

4. We have not been able as yet to establish direct social contact with AEBOOR. Both Nina T. MARGANDE and Paul W. LEVERONE (who have legitimate reason to seek him out) have tried, but to date, to no avail. Our hope has been to have AEBOOR actually tell us of his plans - will he indeed be transferred to Mexico? Our original thought was that the Mexico Station could readily determine if he had indeed applied for a visa to that country. As you know, we struck out here also.

5. The fact is that as of this writing, we do not know whether AEBOOR's move was routine and innocent or if indeed there was something sinister involved. If AEBOOR does indeed pick up and move to Mexico, we shall, of course, be somewhat relieved. However, this will not answer categorically the major question - was the operation compromised? It would appear that regardless of what happens to AEBOOR, we shall never know the actual reason for his move. However, for what it is worth, the evidence here does not point toward a compromise.

Edwin W. Shroyer

Edwin W. SHROYER

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT C/SB5

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/WH 8, C/CI, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 711

S E C R E T 091746Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1631

MEXI

9 Oct 69 IN 62331

BUENOS AIRES, INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 3214 (IN 58524)

B. BUENOS ARIES 3837 (IN 62151)

ANSO
PS
ABSTRACT
INDEX
SB/X/WH

1. MEXICO CITY HAS NO INFO RE AEBOOR TRANSFER.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

S E C R E T

9 Oct 69

CS COPY

201-236701

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT c/sas

FILE, VR c/ci/sp, c/wh 8, c/ci, c/ca 2, c/tsd 3, c/ci/ic,

ACTION NO. 686

DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 091420Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3837

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY BUEN

9 Oct 69 IN 62151

RYBAT RECTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS TECHS

ANSD
IS
ABSTRACT
SB/H/10H

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3814 (IN 58524)

1. AEBOOR TURNED OVER KEY TO LANDLORD 7 OCTOBER. ON 8 OCTOBER LANDLORD ACCOMPANIED KANOUSE AND BIBAFFLE-24 TO APARTMENT THEN DISCREETLY WITHDREW DURING INSPECTION. KANOUSE AND BIBAFFLE-24 FOUND NO EVIDENCE AELANYARD INSTALLATION HAD BEEN DISCOVERED.

2. LANDLORD WILL VISIT MHHARSH 9 OCTOBER FOR FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT AND AT KANOUSE REQUEST WILL OFFER APARTMENT FOR RENTAL BY OTHER MHHARSH OFFICIAL.

3. FOR MEXICO. ANY CONFIRMATION ON AEBOOR STORY RE MEXICAN TRANSFER?

4. FILE: 201-236701

S E C R E T

9 Oct 69

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SECRET

201-236701

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT
C/SB5

FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/WH8 C/CI C/FI2 C/TSD 3 C/CA/TC

ACTION NO.
381

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 032201Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3814 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO PANAMA CITY

3 OCT 69 IN 58524

M

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS TECH

(1073470)

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3081 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

1. FOR MEXICO. REF DESCRIBES AEBOOR'S (IDEN) ABRUPT MOVE TO PRIVATE APARTMENT OT EMBASSY CLUB.

2. ON 3 OCTOBER BIBAFFLES INTERVIEWED LANDLORD WHO STATED THAT ON 18 AUGUST AEBOOR SAID PLANNED VACATE APARTMENT IN FIRST DAYS SEPTEMBER BECAUSE OF TRANSFER TO MEXICO. APARTMENT CONTRACT RENEWED IN JUNE WAS NOT FOR YEAR AS STATION HITHERTO ASSUMED BECAUSE OF CON~~CI~~ DI DTION LAST YEAR'S CONTRACT, BUT CONTAINED SIMPLE PROVISION FOR THREE MONTH ADVANCE NOTICE FROM EITHER PARTY. LANDLORD ADDED DID NOT PLAN MAKE ISSUE OF RECEIVING ONLY SIX WEEKS NOTICE. FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT PENDING.

3. STORY MAKES SENSE SINCE BILOCULAR SHOWS FREQUENT AEBOOR CALLS TO MEXICAN EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES BEGINNING 18 SEPTEMBER. IN RETROSPECT NOW CLEAR CONVERSATIONS CONCERNED HIS DIFFICULTIES OBTAINING MEXICAN VISA.

4. ABOVE APPEARS INDICATE AELANYARD NOT COMPRIMISED.

SECRET

14-00000

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3814 SECRET

5. FILE: 201-236781.

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT
SB5

INFO
FILE, VR RI/SD WH8 CI CI/SE2 TSA3

ACTION NO.
582

CI/TC DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 032202Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3815 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD BIOGENESIS

3 Oct 69 IN 58520

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3814 (IN 58524)

1. IDEN IS IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV, PRAVADA CORRESPONDENT MEXICO 1960-64 AND SECOND SECRETARY BUENOS AIRES SINCE JANUARY 1968. KNOWN KGB.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

SECRET

N

2

AEB 202

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT c/SB5

INFO FILE, VR c/WH 8, c/RI/SD, DDP, ADDP, s/c, u/62

ACTION NO. 273

S E C R E T 021845Z OCT 69 CITE BUENOS AIES 3801 (SHROYER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

2 Oct 69 IN 57397

RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD

1. ON 28 SEPT AEBOOR AND WIFE VACATED AELANYARD APT AFTER HAVING PACKED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS. THEY MOVED DIRECTLY TO PSOADAS WHERE THEY PRESENTLY RESIDING. CONTRACT NOT DUE EXPIRE UNTIL JUNE 1970.

file: AEBOOR

2. FIRST INDICATION OF PLANNED MOVE IS FROM TRANSCRIPT 28 SEPT WHICH DUE TO BACKLOG AND WEEKEND NOT PROCESSED UNTIL 30 SEPT. IN THIS AEBOOR AND WIFE ARGUE OVER DICISION TO MOVE OUT. UNFORTUNATELY LANDLORD OUT OF TOWN AND WE DO NOT HAVE YET BENEFIT AEBOOR'S FUTURE DISCUSSION WITH HIM RE REASON FOR MOVING.

3. AT THIS MOMENT WE UNABLE DETERMINE REASON FOR SUDDEN MOVE AND WHILE IT APPEARS COMPROMISE OF OPERATION A LIKELY CAUSE, WE UNABLE MAKE CONCLUSIVE STATEMENT. AUDIO EQUIPMENT FUNCIONING NORMALLY. WE PRESENTLY INCLINED BELIVE AEBOOR MAY HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS MOVE DUE AVDOLMAN FLAP. NOTE AEBOOR AND 201-825485 ONLY TWO WITH

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3801 SECRET

PRIVATE APARTMENTS. ALSO BELIEVE IT SIGNIFICANT THAT AEDOOR DISCUSSED MOVE WITH WIFE. CANNOT RATIONALIZE THIS IF HE INDEED AWARE OF OPERATION.

4. WE CONTINUING INVESTIGATION. WILL FORWARD COMPLETE DETAILS VIA POUCH.

5. FILE: 201-236701.

SECRET

SECRET

5-69 3015 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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OCT 2 11 30 PM '69

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#165

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 30/24 PER RVBAT

ACTION UNIT
C/SAS

ACTION NO.
292

FILE. VR. C/WH8, C/BUSD, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

SERVICE

BUENOS AIRES 3801
STA & NR

02 OCTOBER '69
DATE

57397-A
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

ADD PANAMA CITY AS INFO ADDEE.

SECRET

SECRET

Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Montevideo

Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
AEDTOP BIOGENESIS
Soviet Courier Travel

Reference: MONTEVIDEO 8705

Transmitted herewith for SB Division are copies of the passports of Soviet couriers Viktor Sergeyevich MUNIN and Petr Leontyevich SAMOYLOV (Diplomatic 12303 and 12133 respectively.) These documents were obtained by BIOGENESIS Travel Controls. MUNIN and SAMOYLOV first transited Buenos Aires on 8 September on reference Alitalia flight from Montevideo to Santiago. They did not deplane but delivered four packages to local Soviet Embassy officials who boarded. (BIOGENESIS did not identify the officials.) They retransited Argentina on 15 September via KLM 792 from Santiago to Montevideo and again remained on the plane. Yuriy Yuryevich NOSENKO (201-824296) and Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701) boarded to deliver four packages. (This is perhaps the first time that ALFERYEV, known KGB, has met a courier flight. The explanation for his having done so may rest in the fact that Consul Antanas Ionovich YUREKENAS (201-779979), the suspect KGB officer who usually has this job, suffered a serious heart attack on 19 July and has been confined to his apartment since.)

Nina T. [illegible]

Attachment:
H/W as Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/SBD, w/attach h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/o attach
2 - COS, Montevideo, w/o attach

File in
201-236701

CS COPY FILED IN 200-8-63

HABA-20678

17 September 1968

SECRET

FYN: 4-6-40/2; 201-23670;
WPA: 201-824296; 201-779979 and

ORIG: C. Collyer/Beresford:sak
UNIT: TSD/AOB
EXT: 2481
DATE: 9 Sept 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/TSD 3 INFO FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH 8, C/SB 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 13 54z SEP 69 CITE DIRECTOR

TO BUENOS AIRES INFO PANAMA CITY 36601

RYBAT AQUATIC REDLEG BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF BUENOS AIRES 3615 (IN 37031)

1. REGRET WOACRE UNABLE ESTABLISH CAUSE REF FAILURE. EVIDENCE ON ALL PREVIOUS UNITS INDICATE FAILURES DUE ABNORMAL LINE CONDITION AELANYARD.

2. RECOMMEND BIOGENESIS CHECK LINE SIX TO INSURE IT NOT COMING IN CONTACT WITH AC LINE. ALSO CHECK LINE TO DETERMINE IF ABNORMAL VOLTAGES PRESENT.

3. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Station requested WOACRE comments re failure SWA-3A.

WH/4 Mr. Loftus (by phone X6067)

Quentin C. Johnson
TSD/COP

Norman S. Jackson
C/TSD/AOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION C/TSD 3 ☐ RID COPY

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INFO: FILE, VR, C/RID C/WH 8 C/SB 5 C/CI
313 C/FI 2 DD/P ADDP C/CI/TC

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1	WH	6	
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SECRET 041401Z SEP 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3515

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

4 SEP 69 IN 37021

REFS: A. BUENOS AIRES 3467 (IN 19230)

B. BUENOS AIRES 2087

C. BUENOS AIRES 2483

D. BUENOS AIRES 3442 (IN 16579)

E. DIRECTOR 98984

1. REF A WORK COMPLETED. INSTALLATION REPORT FOLLOWS VIA POUCH.

2. DURING ROUTINE LP INSPECTION MORNING 3 SEPTEMBER FOUND LINE SIX SWA-3A DEAD AGAIN. SAME PROBLEM REPORTED THREE TIMES PREVIOUSLY VIA REFS B, C AND D. PER REF E FIRST TWO FAILURES DETERMINED BY HEADQUARTERS TO BE PROBABLY RESULT ELECTRICAL STORM.

3. SINCE THIS OCCURS ALWAYS ON LINE SIX WITH ONE ADDITIONAL FAILURE ON LINE SEVEN PERHAPS SOME OTHER INFLUENCE PRESENT SUCH AS POSSIBLE LINE SHORT, ETC. CHANGE OF UWTP-9 DID NOT ALTER SITUATION.

4. REQUEST WOACRE COMMENTS.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 BUENOS AIRES 3615 SECRET

5. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ACTION UNIT SB8 | INFO FILE, VR WH8 R/AN CI/C2 CI/CI2 FI

ACTION NO. 142

S E C R E T 252140Z AUG 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3573

25 Aug 69 IN 30527

DIRECTOR

RECTOP BIOGENESIS

1. BIOGENESIS REPORTS ANATOLIY ILICH VASILYEV, HIS WIFE GALINA AND ROZA ALFERYEVA ALL RETURNED BUENOS AIRES FROM HOME LEAVE 22 AUGUST VIA LUFTHANSA 504.

2. SOV PRIEST YEVGENIY STEPANOVICH PARFENYUK DEPARTED FOR USSR 17 AUGUST WITH WIFE/ MARGARITA AND SON VLADIMIR. PHOTOS AND PASSPORTS ~~MARGARITOPOXXIDXKD [illegible] OXDJIXTKXIHD~~ ~~SE~~OBTAINED AND BEING FORWARDED. SINCE CONTAIN NO ARGENTINE REENTRY VISAS DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TRAVEL PCS OR HOME LEAVE.

3. FILE: 201-227440, 201-236701 AND 201-781794.

S E C R E T BEING SERVICED

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/SBS, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 8

ACTION NO. 651

SECRET 121554Z AUG 69 CITE PANAMA CITY 0947

12 Aug 69 IN 21588

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT AQUATIC REDLEG BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3467 (IN 19230)

1. MKSPIEC FORWARDING FOUR EACH ADDITIONAL TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22 POTTED MICROPHONES AND FOUR EACH AGC-2 KEL PREAMP SYSTEMS FOR TEST AND POSSIBLE USE. MKSPICE SUPPLY DOT-3 TRANSFORMERS DEPLETED HOWEVER OUR RECORDS SHOW TWELVE DOT-3'S PREVIOUSLY SHIPPED WHICH SHOULD BE IN BIOGENESIS-14 POSSESSION.

2. FILE 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET RYBAT
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM
TO	Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
INFO.	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
FROM	Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
SUBJECT	RYBAT REDTOP AELANYARD Transmittal of Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HABA-20415, dated 27 March 1969
B. LABW-11445, dated 21 April 1969

1. Forwarded under separate cover are two AELANYARD tapes covering 26, 27 and 28 July 1969. The recording for the 28th runs through the last half of the first tape and all of the second; it involves a conversation between AEBCOK and 201-268170 regarding the former's experiences during his recent home leave. We should very much appreciate having Headquarters' monitors review this conversation of 28 July and forward to Buenos Aires as complete a transcription as possible. Once the transcription is finished the tapes may be destroyed.

2. In reference B Headquarters suggested that samplings of AELANYARD be forwarded tri-annually. Since we have begun forwarding the most interesting AELANYARD tapes for transcription at Headquarters, we assume there is no longer any need to transmit routine samplings of the initial BIOGENESIS product.

Nina T. Margande
Nina T. MARGANDE

Attachments:
2 Tapes U/S/C

SD 21 aug 69

COPY ROUTING
WH/PT
B.

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3 - C/SBD, w/attachs U/S/C
2 - C/WHD, w/o attachs

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CROSS REFERENCE TO 74-120-221	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HABA-20776	DATE 11 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-236701 74-120-221

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ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION NO. 534

DDC, CS/DO, [illegible]

S E C R E T 072300Z AUG 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3467

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

7 AUG [illegible] 13201

RYBAT AQUATIC REDTOP BIOGENESIS AELANYARD

REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 3442 (IN 16579)

B. PANAMA CITY 0818 (IN 11343)

C. BUENOS AIRES 3396 (IN 10364)

1. APPROX 19 AND 20 AUGUST GEHRMANN, BIOGENESIS-14 AND HIS HELPER PLAN ENTER ACCESS APARTMENT ABOVE TARGET TO REPLACE MIKES PER REF B WITH TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22'S AND ENLARGE PINHOLES IF POSSIBLE. HAVE APARTMENT OWNER'S PERMISSION AND HE WILL BE OUT OF TOWN. WILL TEST LINES WITH AND WITHOUT SWA-3A PREAMPS USING AMPEX AND SONY RECORDERS IN LP. (DUE EXCESSIVE FAILURE SWA-3A HERE, PREFER MAKE INSTALLATION WITHOUT PREAMPS IF POSSIBLE.) GEHRMANN WILL MOVE TO LP DURING TESTING PERIOD.

2. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE POUCH SOONEST SIX EACH DOT-3 OR EQUIVALENT TRANSFORMERS AND FOUR ADDITIONAL TWO HUNDRED OHM MM-22 MIKES, POTTED FOR ONE INCH DIAMETER IF POSSIBLE.

3. FILE: 4-137-102/2 AND 74-120-221.

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT:

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 588 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

570

S E C R E T 282006Z JUL 69 CITE BUENOS AIRES 3413

BUEN

DIRECTOR

REDTOP BIOGENESIS

28 Jul 69 IN 11870

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3032 (IN 67772)

1. BIOGENESIS TRAVEL CONTROLS REPORT IVAN GAVRIOLVICH ALFERYEV ARRIVED ARGENTINA ALONE 25 JULY VIA LUFTHANSA 504 FROM DAKAR. DO NOT KNOW WHEN OR IF WIFE ROSA RETURNING.

2. FILE: 201-236701.

SECRET

mb

AN RRP
AR X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~[illegible]~~
HPD
FI

CS COPY

201-236701
28 Jul 69

SECRET

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ACTION C/SB 5 ☐ RID COPY

391

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 8, C/EE, C/CI, C/EUR 5, C/FI 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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S E C R E T 241237Z JUL 69 CITE PRIS 1043 (RILANDER ACTING)
PARI

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP BIOGENESIS

24 Jul 69 IN 09124

REF BUENOS AIRES 3009 (IN 65500)

ABSTRACT

SB/X/E U

1. UNION ADVISES THAT PHILIPPE DE SEZE BORN 22 SEPTEMBER ~~GOWP~~ 1920 AT BORDEAUX IS KNOWN TO HAVE MADE FREQUENT TRIPS TO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DURING 1956-61 PERIOD FOR NORMAL COMMERCIAL PURPOSES.

2. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES.

3. FILE ~~[illegible]~~ 201-236701.

S E C R E T

24 July 69

RS COPY

SECRET 201-236701

3P-

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division
INFO.: Via Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
FROM: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires
SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEKICK/AEBOOR
Operational Possibilities Against FJSTEAL Priority Targets
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 5.
Reference : HABW-11473, dated 5 June 1969

1. The detailed analysis of the Station's operational efforts against some of the priority FJSTEAL targets and the suggestion that perhaps AEBOOR offered the best immediate operational promise and warranted special attention was reviewed and discussed by the interested officers; it should come as no surprise to Headquarters that there is really little divergence of opinion, not only as to the priority target, but also insofar as operational approach and conduct is concerned. We would like to correct the apparent Headquarters impression that the Station was negligent in the follow-up of operational opportunities and was waiting for the FJSTEALers to take the initiative insofar as future contacts were concerned. We believe Station efforts have been as aggressive as possible in the existing operational climate, and if we were remiss, it was in failing to report in detail the various negative results of what we consider normal operational efforts.

2. AEBOOR was selected as one of the priority Station targets for the simple reason that three officers had direct access to him through Identity; once he accepted the invitation to Paul W. LEVERONI's home he was moved up to the top of the priority list since it was hoped that continued and rather frequent contact could be maintained for assessment and operational purposes. Every reasonable effort was made to follow

Attachment
Identity USC

Distribution
3 - Chief, SBD w/att USC
3 - Chief, WHD w/att USC

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: D 74-120-111
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HABA-20693
DATE: 3 July 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-236701

up the first social contact (experience has shown that the FJSTEALers here will not take the initiative and must be actively pursued) but a number of conversations (both face to face and by phone) ended up in the vague promise on the part of Subject that "we must get together soon". In the interim the Station tightened the coverage of AEBOOR by putting AELANYARD on a 24-hour-a-day basis for a little over two weeks and by conducting full coverage surveillance for about one week. Our reasoning behind this acting was as follows: such intensive coverage would possibly permit us to spot a likely place where we could inject an access agent; it would give us a better "feel" of his daily activity; it might uncover one or more of his clandestine contacts. The results of the effort, while far from solving our problems, did give us a wealth of information which should help us in our operational planning once AEBOOR returns to his station.

3. The distaff side of the target was not ignored, and Nina T. MARGANDE managed to spend some time in conversation with AEBOOR's wife during a get-together of Identity on 21 May 1969. As a result of this meeting the groundwork has been laid for a follow-up by MARGANDE; despite the fact that the wife was at first cool and then lukewarm to the idea of getting together for a shopping excursion, we will do everything possible to bring such a meeting about and try have MARGANDE become the wife's "confidante", if this is possible. (In order to permit MARGANDE to pursue this contact in the most natural manner and to give her a chance to meet and assess other FJSTEALer wives, she has also become a member of Identity.)

4. Until his departure for home leave AEBOOR was the primary FJSTEAL target and will continue in this position after his return until we can reach a decision regarding future action. There is one thing that should be kept in mind, however; and that is the fact that all of the FJSTEALers are reserved in their dealings with members of LNPURE. It seems that it is possible to get some of the FJSTEALers to accept an invitation, even to a private home, but to try to develop such a contact into a continuing social relationship is a much harder proposition. Leland C. KROULD's experience with 201-313506 followed this pattern, and despite KROULD's efforts to continue and follow up what seemed to be the beginning of a good relationship, nothing came of the attempt; Stephen M. GARSIDE twice tried to utilize a natural opportunity to get together with 201-820310, only to be put off, as he was in an approach to 201-025485; Paul W. LEVERONE tried on several occasions to arrange a dinner with 201-183943, only to be put off (and this despite the fact that 201-183943 maintains extensive social contacts with non-WOLADY types). 201-025485 has expressed an interest in social contact, and since he is a senior type who should not have to check out and obtain approval for his social activity, we hope that he will not conform as closely to the pattern. This is not the time or place to examine the possible reasons for the FJSTEALer attitude; it is merely mentioned to demonstrate that we are fighting an uphill (although not a hopeless) battle, a battle that we intend to win by fair means or foul.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HABA-23693

5. The value of the PCQ (a copy was forwarded with Reference) in assessment of target individuals is readily apparent, and it is requested that ten English and Spanish language copies be forwarded to the Station for use in our assessment program.

Paul W. Leverone
Paul W. LEVERONE

201-236701

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	3

final

/P

~~SECRET~~

USC Attachment to HABA-20693

IDENTITY: Diplomatic Association

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

S/E Att 1 to HABA 20693

CS COPY

201-236701

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
CI Suspect

FROM:
P Kapusta

EXTENSION:
NO.:
DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/SR/CI/I				If your time permits, this is the second of the two cases I discussed with you (spotted through my AEEXPLORE program). I would be interested in your views as to his possible IS involvement (and whether I may be all wet in feeling he is Soviet dispatched). Do you see an Illegal Support aspects to this case? P Kapusta
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. P Kapusta				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SR/O/AC - 64 - 202
22 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Irving AMRON

1. Subject responded to the AEEXPLORE ad for a position as a Russian language linguist. As was requested of him, he provided the Forms 444, 89, autobiography, and photograph.

2. The undersigned established contact with Subject by phone on 2 September and arrangements were made to interview him on the following day. He was interviewed in the Undersigned's Philadelphia hotel room on 3 September 1964. The undersigned used the Paul Peters alias and DOD cover.

3. The following was obtained from AMRON during the interview:

a. Subject, of Jewish descent, was born in 1917 in the USA. Subject's father, whose original name had been

Philip AMROMIM

came to the USA in 1905/06 at the age of approximately 15. Philip AMROMIM's parents stemmed from the GOMEL area. At the time of his emigration to the USA, he was accompanied by his mother (his father died sometime prior thereto), and by the following brothers and sisters: Lewis, Willy, Abe (who has since died), Moris, Minnie (now married to LAIKEN), Pearl, and Max. All of Subject's father's brothers except for Max, are butchers by occupation, including Subject's father. Max graduated from CCNY and became a structural engineer; he has an office on 43rd Street and his firm is called the Amron Associates.

b. Subject's mother, also of Jewish descent, came to the USA in 1911 (or 1913). Her older sister, Fannie, is married to (fnu) COHEN who is presently retired and living in Florida. Her sister, Ruth, married Max AMRON. Her brother, Hyman HORLIK, who arrived in the USA only in 1922, owns a liquor store in Bayonne, New Jersey. Subject's mother has another sister (nu) who is presently living in Florida. Subject's mother has one brother who is still living in the USSR.

-5

[illegible]

c. At the time of Subject's birth, Subject's father was employed in the Brooklyn shipyards. However, he changed jobs frequently and was subsequently employed on a farm near New Brunswick, then in a shoe factory as a cutter, then as a butcher, and finally became active in a Jewish cooperative organization. As Subject's father became convinced that the future of the Jews was in Russia under Soviet Communism, in 1931 Subject's family left the USA for the USSR for Birobidzhan where Subject's father worked as an agronomist (he had sometime prior thereto graduated from the National Farm School in Bucks County, Pennsylvania).

d. According to Subject, his family returned to the USA in 1933; the motivating reason therefor was the ill health--actually only severe headaches--of Subject's brother, Eugene. Subject alleges that, because they had retained their US citizenship, they experienced no problems either in leaving the USSR or in obtaining permission to return to the USA. Moreover, Subject's father allegedly did not like life in the USSR; however, Subject's mother and sister insisted that they return to the USSR after only a brief stay in the USA.

e. As a result, later in 1933 the entire AMRON family once again returned to the USSR. Again, Subject states that they had no problems in obtaining authorization from the Soviet government for this trip to the USSR. Upon their return to the USSR, they established themselves in Moscow where one Noah LONDON, a friend of the family and a construction engineer, took Subject's father "into his employ". Subject's father worked in this capacity, in the construction industry, from 1933 to 1936. Sometime after the 1936 purges began, Subject's father worked for Komsomolsk, a Moscow "panel board construction" outfit. In 1936 Subject's father also worked for the Paris Commune as a shoemaker. Subject's mother worked during this entire period as chief of a dining establishment in the school of foreign languages in Moscow.

f. Subject began his elementary education at the DeWitt Clinton School in the USA where he studied until 1931; he then studied in the Soviet secondary school in Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, until 1933. In 1933 he again returned for one semester to the Dewitt Clinton School. Later in 1933 and 1934 he attended the Anglo-American School in Moscow where he completed his 8th grade of school. He then continued his studies from 1933 to 1936 in Public School #327 in the 24th Bauman Rayon. In 1936 he entered the Moscow Avtodorozhniy Institut where he studied on the civil engineering faculty, to be a highway engineer. He graduated in 1941 at which time he was sent to assist in the construction of an airdrome in Minsk, later to the Polish station of Janow.

g. In 1937 Subject's mother was dismissed from her position and both she and Subject's father began to feel the pressure of the purges. Subject's father, allegedly by appealing to the then President KALININ, succeeded in again acquiring exit visas for them to the USA. Subject, who admits that he had become a "good Communist" by then had gotton "thoroughly steeped" in the Communist philosophy, elected to remain behind in the USSR. An important consideration, he states, was his desire to complete his education which he was certain he would not be able to do in the USA for economic reasons.

h. According to Subject, his father never lost his American citizenship. Subject's mother, however, in 1936 applied for and obtained Soviet citizenship. According to Subject, he actually acquired Soviet citizenship "by default" although he never applied for this in person; he alleges that although he was 18 years of age at the time, he was "granted" Soviet citizenship by virtue of his mother's application for her own citizenship.

i. Subject remained in Moscow prior to World War II. In April 1940 he married

Nina MOISEYIVA
a bookkeeper by profession,

who was the step-daughter of the well-known Major SEOGOLEV of the "Soviet Proleteriat Regiment". A son was born to them in June 1941. Although at this time Subject was assigned to the construction of aerodromes to support front line troops, he succeeded in pulling strings and in arranging a "TDY trip" to Moscow, ostensibly to visit the Geodetic Institute. Enroute back from Moscow to the front lines, Subject's train got bombed in Brest Litovsk on 22 June 1941 and as a result he was returned to Moscow on the same train via Baranovichi. According to Subject, he was then assigned to the Moscow Military District, to the Otdel Aerodromnoi Sluzhby, where he was placed in charge of a brigade of engineers, technicians and laborers who were engaged in building dummy air sites for camouflage purposes.

j. In August 1941 Subject states that he was permitted to return to school in order to receive his diploma which was granted him in October 1941. He was then assigned to the 22nd Voyenno-Dorozhniy Otryad which was formed in Dmitrov but which was then assigned to Suzdal'. Subject states that he was not inducted into the Soviet military service allegedly because "engineers were needed" and because, as a member of the MVD, this was considered as equivalent to military service. Nonetheless, in response to my query, Subject admitted that this was unusual as his activities were of a kind which were performed by old women particularly since during this period, from October 1941 to September 1942, all able-bodied Soviet males were drafted into the Soviet army. During this period Subject lived in comparative ease, being assigned to Suzdal and Klin, and other towns. According to Subject, he wore an MVD uniform but wore no insignia. He admitted that "favored treatment" was bestowed upon him and his family when the MVD assisted him in evacuating his first wife and son from Moscow in August 1941 to beyond the Urals. (His son by his first wife reportedly died on 11 October 1943 of diabetes.)

k. In September 1942, Subject received an appointment to the Moscow 2nd Military Infantry Institute from which he graduated in June 1943 and upon which he was given the grade of a Jr Lt in the Soviet Infantry. In response to my query, Subject again admitted that this appointment was highly unusual as his background did not lend itself to this, as appointments were made out of the various military branches, and as this implied that, as a foreigner (American), he was fully and completely trusted by the Soviet punitive organs who had cleared him both for this training and the institute and for promotion to officer status in the Soviet Army.

l. Initially he was sent to Alatev on the Volga, then to Orel where he was assigned to the front lines in August 1943. He was given a platoon of infantry troops in the 415th Infantry Division of the Soviet Central Front. However, in October 1943 he was wounded; he was hit in the left forehead by a German bullet. He was operated on in a field hospital and then transferred to a Moscow hospital after he had recovered sufficiently. He was reclassified after his recovery and found suitable to continue in military service with the limitation that he should not serve on the front lines (goden vtoroi stepeni).

m. Because the wound failed to heal completely (he has a very obvious scar, with approximately a 1" depression, on his forehead), he "asked" to be assigned to a warmer climate. The Soviet authorities, he states, complied and in January 1944 dispatched him to Tbilisi where he was placed in a special officer's camp; he was hospitalized again, had osteomyelitis complications, and ultimately discharged from the Soviet military forces. However, Subject provided several contradictory stories as to the date of discharge which at various times he indicated occurred in May 1944, then in July 1944, and even in August 1944. (NOTE: This aspect of Subject's story bothered him as it was obvious to the undersigned that Subject had somewhere become confused in this aspect of his background.)

n. Upon his discharge, he was returned to the Moscow area where he was placed in a rest home (although Subject admitted that there really existed no need for this as he had recovered already prior to his discharge). In continuing his narration, Subject indicated that the rest of his story "sounds very strange and unbelievable" but then averred that it was true. He states that, strange as it appears and despite the shortage of Soviet men at the time (1944) he could not "find" himself a job. He went to the MVD which did offer him a job in Veliki Luki on the highways with the SoyuzDorog-Proyekt ; however, he was not given the job by the officials responsible for this. As a result, he appealed directly to the Minister of the MVD who "tried to intercede" in Subject's behalf. Allegedly after he was given a full physical examination, he was told that he could not be assigned to the highway units for reasons which were not spelled out to Subject.

o. Subject then "sought out" work with the Nauchniy Sovet with no luck. He ultimately obtained a job with the Moscow Sovet in the Moscow Soviet Senior Library (sic). In November 1944, at a salary of 900 rubles, Subject began working in the field of "information on municipal works--highway construction, architecture, sanitation, etc." His immediate supervisor was (fnu) LEBEDEV, the head of information department of the Hydro-Energy Project. Subject admitted, in reply to the undersigned's query, that his work was "unusual" for several reasons. First, he was paid a salary which was unusually high and out of line with his qualifications. Secondly, though paid a salary for a full-time job and position, he actually worked on a part-time basis and was able to come and go almost as he wished. His work also included working on abstracts and translations from English to Russian, primarily in the field of dams, dam construction, and hydraulics.

p. In June 1949 Subject states that he was dismissed from the foregoing position after he was given the explanation that the flow of literature from the USA, which Subject was translating, had decreased. In actual fact, Subject states, he was being "purged" because he was a Jew. He then found a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant where he worked from July 1949 to 23 February 1950. Because he did not like that job, Subject states he wrote to Stalin personally as a result of which, within less than 4 weeks, he was offered 4-5 different jobs. The positions were offered to him by the Moscow Committee of the CP to whom "Stalin had forwarded the letter". In reply to my query, Subject admitted that he was not concerned that, by writing to Stalin, he would come to the attention of the Soviet punitive organs, MVD/MGB, which would undertake to investigate his case. Accordingly, on 1 April 1950 Subject was given a job as an engineer with the Bauman District Road Department where he worked until February 1955.

q. After he lost his job in 1949 with the Moscow Sovet, he states that his relations with his wife went from bad to worse and ultimately cultimated first in a separation and latter in a divorce in 1950. In the meantime, he was already living with

Eugenia VOLSOVA

an empolyee and a teacher of forsenic medicine of the Moscow Medical Institute where she was studying for her PhD and where she was working in a morgue as a pathologist. Subject married her either in 1950 or 1951. However, within less than one month of their marriage, Subject divorced her as he found out that she was a "bad person" and because he "had fallen blindly in love" with her. (NOTE: This aspect of Subject's story disturbed him very much. He was unsure of himself, was vague on dates, details, specifics, names, etc. It was again obvious that Subject was less than frank and open about this aspect of his background. His narration did not sound convincing to Subject himself when he began talking about "falling blindly in Love", etc.) In 1952 he began living with another woman,

Rose MINKINA,

whom he married only in late 1954 when their son was already well on the way. MINKINA's parents and family were very strongly opposed to the marriage because the parents held responsible party positions and because MINKINA's brother held a sensitive position with the Soviet electronics and aviation industries. A son was born to Subject and MINKINA on 5 April 1955.

r. In ca 1954 (dates vague) Subject entered the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and continued his studies for three or more years. Though he registered for the evening sessions, he devoted a good portion of his days to study. As a result, Subject again admitted to the undersigned that he actually was in a unique position of being able to do almost as he "wished and desired" although ostensibly he was a full-time employee of the Bauman District Road Department. While a student at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Subject and his wife began submitting applications for a visa to visit Subject's parents in the USA. In actual fact, Subject states, his real purpose in applying for the visa was to "defect" upon his arrival in the USA. In February 1955 Subject states that he was "fired" from his job with the Bauman District because of "political unreliability". However, Subject admitted to the undersigned that the real reason for dismissal must have been otherwise as, had he actually been dismissed for "political unreliability", he would not have been able to continue his studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

s. Because Subject had communicated to his father, using "hidden phrases" in their letters to each other, about his wish to leave the USSR, Subject's father arrived in the USSR in 1957 in order, Subject states, "to establish at first hand for himself" whether Subject really wished to "defect to the USA". Subject's father remained in the USSR for a total of 10 days. As a result of his father's visit, Subject changed his tactics and began to submit applications for "immigration" to the USA. As earlier, these applications too were rejected; however, Subject states that he continued resubmitting them several times each year.

t. After he left the Bauman District place of employment in February 1955, Subject found work as a "free lance translator for the Moscow Torgovaya Palata. He earned ca 1100 rubles per month translating English language material related to the iron and steel plant which was being designed by the USSR for erection in India. In January 1956 Subject found work as chief of the translations bureau of the Nauchno-Issledovatelniy Institut Ministerstva Mashino-Stroyeniya; his functions consisted primarily of supervising the translation of English language manuals on technical equipment. Again, Subject admitted that his work was "unusual" as, in actual fact, he spent 1-2 days at work, spent the rest of his time at home, and devoted most of his time and energy to the studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. His salary continued at 1100 rubles per month.

u. In August 1958 his work came to an end. Generally he provided a contardictory account in this respect. Initially he stated that the position had been eliminated but then changed this story to state that he resigned in August 1958 as he would have had to begin devoting his full time to the work. In any case, his resignation generally coincided with his completion of studies at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Thereafter, and until his immigration to the USA in 1962, Subject held no full time job. Nonetheless, he states that he succeeded in earning no less than about 1100 rubles per month by working as a free lance translator for the Torgovaya Palata of Moscow. He turned over to the undersigned a sample of his translation efforts--see the attached book. In response to my query, Subject admitted that his work again was of such a nature that he was a free agent, came and went as he pleased, and generally was responsible to no one. Apparently in order to forestall any further discussions in this regard, Subject then stated that "if you are thinking that I could have worked for the KGB at this time, then you are right because I had the time to do anything including engaging in intelligence activities". However, Subject then proceeded to deny that he had then or at any time, had any relationship with the KGB (or its predecessor organizations).

v. In July 1962 Subject's mother and father came to Moscow, this specifically for the purpose of getting Subject to return to the USA. They stayed in Moscow for six weeks during which time the father wrote letters to KHRUSHCHEV, to Nina KHRUSHCHEVA, to ADZHUBEI, to the Supreme Soviet, to the KGB, and to other Soviet establishments in order to get Subject and his son permission for emigration to the USA. (Subject's wife, MINKINA, had died in 1961.) In August 1962, while vacationing in Sochi. Subject was sought out by the local Inturist office and apprised by the local militia office that, "in view of your father's strong appeals", the USSR had granted Subject and his son permission to leave the USSR. Upon his return to Moscow, Subject proceeded to the American Embassy where he was advised that he had not been granted an exit visa by the Soviets. As a result, Subject applied for imigration to the USA twice, once in the capacity of a Soviet citizen using his Soviet passport, and the second time in the capacity of an "American citizen".

w. In September 1962 the application to travel to the USA as an "immigrant" was approved for him and his son. Therefore, without waiting to receive approval to travel under his claim of being an "American citizen", Subject left the USSR and entered the USA on his Soviet passport together with his son on 24 September 1962 via Idlewild. Upon his arrival in the USA, Subject immediately undertook action to have his "American citizenship" restored. This was initially denied as he had admitted that he had voted in the Soviet national elections. However, he then retained an attorney who appealed the case; the original decision was then reversed and both Subject and his son had their US citizenship restored to them in the summer of 1963, the reversal was based on Subject's claim that he had had no choice and was, therefore, compelled to vote in the USSR national elections.

x. Upon his arrival in the USA, Subject immediately applied for a position with the UN, however, he was rejected as he was "stateless" at the time. He then accepted a position with Stelling, Lord-Wood, and Van Suetendals, 36th Street, working on site-planning. His supervisor, one Frank McGovan, then recommended Subject to the

Blauvelt engineering firm for whom he worked from January 1963 through July 1964. In 1964 Subject found work with Harold J. SELDEN, 60 Broad Street, Red Bank, New Jersey, as an engineer working on the planning and designing of sub-divisions, grading, construction developments, etc. His immediate supervisor is the township engineer of Marlboro Township, New Jersey. His present salary is $700.00 per month.

y. In April 1963 Subject married

Bella MINCBERG nee MILSTEIN

a Polish Jew who had come to the USA from Poland in 1949. She has two sons by her previous marriage(s). Subject and his son now live in the home of his present wife.

4. Comments and Assessment:

a. Subject speaks native English and passes for a middle class American. His Russian is likewise native.

b. According to Subject, his objective in life now is to work for the US Government. He states that he has submitted Forms 57 to a number of the US Government agencies (he did not elaborate). In applying for the position under [illegible], Subject asked for $10,000.00 per annum which is his asking price for a position with the US Government.

c. According to Subject, his present position is excellent with great potential for going into partnership as soon as he becomes a licensed engineer. However, he states that he is not interested in making money (despite his request for a $10,000.00 salary) but in "fighting Communism" as an employee of the US Government.

d. Subject admitted that he was a firm and strong believer of Communism which, incidentally, was the reason why he remained behind in the USSR when his parents returned to the USA in 1937. He states that he continued to be a firm believer of Communism until approximately 1958/59 when he became "disenchanted with Communism". Subject denies that he was a member of the Komsomol or that he had to join the Communist Party, this despite the fact that he became an officer of the Soviet Army and despite the fact that he was accepted to study at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Despite his alleged "disenchantment" with Communism, Subject spoke in flattering terms about life in the USSR, about the "democracy", about equal opportunities, about the excellent "educational system", et cetera. Subject admitted that he had led almost a "charming existence" in the USSR and that neither life in the USSR nor the Soviet authorities mistreated him.

e. According to Subject, he was never arrested in the Soviet Union.

f. In reply to my query, Subject indicated that in 1958 the KGB tried to co-opt him into reporting a fellow student at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. However, Subject states that he rejectd the pitch. In reply to various queries which were posed to him about the fellow-student (name allegedly now forgotton), Subject states that he did render an unfavorable report on the person. Despite this, the particular Soviet was ultimately assigned abroad as an interpreter. Subject later heard that the Soviet worked and traveled in both Japan and Italy.

g. In reply to a general query about life in the USSR, Subject indicated that life in the USSR has made him into "an accomplished prevaricator".

h. Subject was less than fluent in relating the story of his life to the undersigned. He made mistakes frequently, he contradicted himself, he altered dates to accommodate other aspects of his activities to correspond with what he had mentioned earlier, etc. Also, Subject repeatedly tried to digress from relating his story into presenting his views of life; it was a chore to keep him on substantive matters relating to his own background.

i. Subject's brother, Eugene, is now employed as an engineer of the Freehall Township, New Jersey. Additionally, he has a private office in Rockland, New Jersey, called the Civil Engineer Associates.

j. Subject's account of how he acquired Soviet citizenship-- see above-- is a very weak item in Subject's story. He will have us believe that he got Soviet citizenship "by default" as a result of his mother's application for Soviet citizenship for herself. He himself admitted to the undersigned that this is illogical as his brother, Eugene, whose status was no different from Subject's, never acquired Soviet citizenship "by default" though Subject did allegedly without any action whatever on his own part. Moreover, Subject admitted that he was legally of age (18) by this time and no longer a dependent as a result of which he would have had to apply for a Soviet passport and for Soviet citizenship of his own free volition rather than through his mother.

k. Subject is aware that the story of his "immigration" to the USA is also weak. He tried to explain this away by stating that he "got out by mistake", that he was permitted to go "to hide the Soviet shame surrounding the Cuban crisis", that "someone had committed an error", etc. He admitted that there exists no other explanation as to why the Soviet government would have permitted him to leave the USSR as, in the eyes of the Soviet government, he was a full fledged and responsible Soviet citizen who had no genuine or legitimate claim to American citizenship. As a result, Subject is unusually sensitive to this topic.

5. CONCLUSION:

a. In the opinion of the undersigned, Subject should not be considered for either AESCREEN or AEEXPLORE despite the fact both his English and Russian are native.

b. On the basis of the interview, the undersigned feels that, Subject is less than frank and that he is prevaricating. Moreover, there exist innumerable items in Subject's tale which are indicative both that he worked as a recruited agent of the KGB (and its predecessor organizations) in the USSR and that he left the USSR only through and with the intercession of the KGB.

6. It should be underscored that because of the unique and sensitive cover used by the undersigned, no attempt was made to resolve the various contradictions, to challenge Subject on any of his statements, or to pursue certain points of their logical conclusion. The foregoing was obtained in the form of an interview and no real attempt could be made, given the cover, to delve more deeply into the suspicious aspects of Subject's background.

Peter P Kapusta

PETER P. KAPUSTA
Chief, SR/O/AC

14-00000

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In): July 5, 1964

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle): AARON IRVING
2. AGE: 46
3. SEX: X MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 6'00"
5. WEIGHT: 195#
6. COLOR OF EYES: blue
7. COLOR OF HAIR: brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: light
9. TYPE BUILD: heavy
10. SCARS (Type and Location): Deep scar (1"x2") on left part of forehead
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country): 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey. Tel:201-222-5592
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 201-222-5592
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: LE2-0700
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): New Jersey
17. NICKNAMES: None
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES. NA
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority). NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
Russian language linguist

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $10,000 annually
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: 2 weeks after

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
X OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (C
X WASHINGTON, D.C. X ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGT
Possibility of schooling for children



FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: Dec.4,1917
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Brooklyn, New York
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U. S. A.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY. While I was living in Moscow, the Russian government considered me as a Russian citizen, even though I had never handed in an application for Soviet citizenship. Due to this, and because I was in a rush to leave the country, I arrived xxxx on a Soviet foreign passport. In the U. S. Embassy in Moscow I filled in simultaneously two applications for entry into the U. S. A. : one as an immigrant and the other as an American citizen. I received a Nonquota K-2(1) visa dated Sptember 10, 1962. After arrival the Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State reinstated my native-born citizenship.
12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS:
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)*: NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: Sept. 26, 1962
16. PORT OF ENTRY: N. Y.
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: U. S. S. R.
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): K-2(1), Moscow, U. S. S. R.
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: Sept. 10, 1962

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☒ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: P. S. 39
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Bronx, N. Y.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1928 to 1932
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: No. 327
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Moscow, U. S. S. R.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1934 to 1936
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: NA
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): NA
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): NA
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM. QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute Moscow, U. S. S. R.	CE		1936	1941	BS	1941	

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Evening University of Marxism-Leninism Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Political Sciences	1952	1954	

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
2nd Moscow Infantry School Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Infantry officer	1942	1943	10

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

NA

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Russian	X	X	X														X		

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN. NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS. I have deep knowledge in the field of information (technical) embracing CE, ME on the basis of twenty years of experience in Russia.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED? X YES ☐ NO

14-00000

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Moscow, U.S.S.R.	Acquainted with town and suburbs as permanent resident	1934 to 1962		X			

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE
Arrived in U.S.S.R. together with parents during crisis and remained to graduate college in 1937. Impossible to leave during WW II and only after seven years of repeated applications was allowed to leave, in 1962.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE IF ISSUED
NA

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING SPEED (words per minute)
10-15

4. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED
GREGG | SPEEDWRITING | STENOTYPE | OTHER (Specify)

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.) calculators

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH
chess - average proficiency.
swimming - for pleasure

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK On the basis of my twenty years of experience I could manage, edit and translate information in the field of CE and ME, published in Russian, or vice versa.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.
NA

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (*Provide License Registry Number, if known*).

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of Issue*) NA	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (*Year of Issue*) NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do NOT submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Poems, Short Stories, Etc.*). Translated "Precast Concrete in the Soviet Union", published by Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1953 (technical).

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

NA

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

NA

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To - By Mo. and Yr.*) January 1953 to present time	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Blauvelt Engineering Co.		
3. ADDRESS (*No., Street, City, State, Country*) 79 Madison Ave., NYC			
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Consulting engineers	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Francis Fuerst		
6. TITLE OF JOB CE	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 550 PER month		8. CLASS. GRADE (*If Federal Service*) NA

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Highway design. Alignment, drainage, sewers, right-of-way, final estimates.

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Improving possibilities of further advancement

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Stelling, Lord-W[illegible]d and Van Suetendale
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) 35 E. 26 St. [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Site planning
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Frank McGowan
6. TITLE OF JOB Jun. CE
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 150 PER week
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service) NA
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Grading, site planning for high schools
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Improving possibilities of further advancement

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 1952 to Sept., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S.S.R. Chaber of Commerce
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Ul. Kuibysheva 6, Moscow, U.S.S.R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Miss Postnova
6. TITLE OF JOB Free-lance translator and editor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Reports for International Congresses, trade publications, manuals, dam projects, road-building and construction machinery manuals, articles on building materials, metallurgy. (Russian to English)
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Repatriation

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 1956 to Sept., 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Foreign Trade Publishing House
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Moscow, U. S. S. R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Medvedyev
6. TITLE OF JOB Free-lance translator and editor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Trade publications, road-building and construction machinery manuals. (Russian to English)
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Repatriation

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Jan., 1956 to Aug., 1958
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Scientific-Research Institute of Construction & Road-Building Machinery
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Frunze Embankment, house No. unknown, Moscow, U.S.S.R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Machinery research and foreign trade
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Ratner
6. TITLE OF JOB Senior engineer
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 130 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Supervision of five translators. Head of translators bureau. Management, editing and translating from Russian to English of construction and road-building machinery manuals, trade publications.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Completion of translations into English

6
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Mar., 1950 to Feb., 1955
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept.
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Spartakovsky Ul. 9, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Road & sewer maintenance
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Artamonov
6. TITLE OF JOB Senior engineer
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 100 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Engineering supervision of repair jobs, surveying, designing of small streets and sewers, planning, contact with factories for paving jobs, estimates.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Reduction of forces

7
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) July 1949 to Feb.,1950
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Highway Construction Dept.
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Warsaw Highway, house No. unknown, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS Manufacture of concrete
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember
6. TITLE OF JOB Laboratory assistant
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 60 PER month
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Laboratory testing of concrete and concrete components.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Reduction of forces

E. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. NA

F. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO
HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X — MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION: NA

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.: NA

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: NA

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS: NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify):
HAVE SERVED →									USSR Army 1941-1944
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION: 1941 to Sept., 1942 - Highway Battalion 1942 to May, 1943-Military school; May, 1943 to Sept., 1944-Active service

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service): 1944

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service): NA

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE: May, 1943 CURRENT SERVICE: NA

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION: 3 years

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE: Jr. Lt. CURRENT SERVICE: NA

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number): NA

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: Jr. Lt. CURRENT SERVICE: NA

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: Highway repair supt. CURRENT SERVICE: NA

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

After graduation was sent to Highway Batallion until Sept., 1942. Then directed to Military Infantry School. Active service until wounded in Oct., 1943. Then in hospitals and reserve until Sept., 1944.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☒ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	OTHER:
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☒ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS NA

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE:

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK:

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION:

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE:

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Nos or Designator) AND TITLE:

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES:

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS:

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS:

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE, YEARS FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS: MONTHS:

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

Section XII

3. Nina Shchegoleyva Moisejeva
4. None
5. Apr. 12, 1940 6. Moscow, USSR
7. 12 Bolshaya Pionerskaya, Moscow, USSR
8. Unknown 9. NA 10. NA
11. Unknown
12. 1915 13. Moscow, USSR 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA

3. Eugenie Volsova
4. None
5. 1950 6. Moscow, USSR
7. Dormitories of Medical College
8. Unknown 9. NA 10. NA
11. Unknown
12. 1924 13. Moscow, USSR 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA
3. Rose Minkina Aaron
4. None
5. 1954 6. Moscow, USSR
7. Station Taininskaya, Pogranichnaya Ul. 9, Moscow Province, USSR
8. Deceased 9. Mar. 24, 1961 10. Blood clot in brain
11. 29 Pyatnitskaya Ul., Moscow, USSR
12. 1924 13. Unknown 14. USSR
14 to 25 - NA

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Monmouth County National Bank	Long Branch, New Jersey

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Eugene Amron	22 Community Drive, West Long Branch, N.J.
Hyman Horlik	114 W. 46 St., Bayonne, N. J.
Abraham H. Waldman	235 Albert Pl., Elberon, N. J.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
June 10, 1950, Moscow, USSR, [illegible] Moiseeva, divorce, incompatibility
Oct. 12, 1954, Moscow, USSR, Eugenie Volsova, divorce, no children

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME *(First)* Bella *(Middle)* *(Maiden)* Milstein *(Last)* Amron

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: Bella Mincberg

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including length of time)* UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: April 24, 1963

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*: Long Branch, N. J.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

8. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*: ~~260 Marshall Court~~ 260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

12. DATE OF BIRTH: 1927

13. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Tomashuv-Maz, Poland

14. CITIZENSHIP: U. S. A.

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY July 15, 1949

15. PLACE OF ENTRY New York

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] Displaced person

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED May 16, 1955

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Freehold, New Jersey

19. OCCUPATION Housewife

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) NA

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) NA

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - by Mo. and Yr.) NA

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN NA

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Bella Amron	wife	[illegible], Poland, 1927	U. S. A.	265 Marshall St. Long Branch, N.J
Michael Amron	son	Moscow, USSR, April 4, 1955	U. S. A.	Same
Joe Mincberg	son	Bielefeld, Germany June 26, 1949	U. S. A.	Same
Steven Mincberg	son	Long Branch, N.J. June 20, 1957	U. S. A.	Same

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 3

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Philip (Pessha) Amron

2. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED ~~None~~ [illegible]

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country) 1412 Ocean Drive, Apt. 11, Miami Beach, Fla.

7. DATE OF BIRTH 1889

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Gomel, Russia

9. CITIZENSHIP U. S. A.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY 1906

11. PLACE OF ENTRY New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)] Russia

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Unknown

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Unknown

15. OCCUPATION Retired

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) Self-employed

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED Holiday Hills, Nolans Drive, Lake Hopatcong, N. J.

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To) NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

20. COUNTRY NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN None

SECTION XV MOTHER

(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
AARON BEATRICE

2. LIVING
X YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH
NA

4. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED
None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country)
1412 Ocean Drive, Apt. 11, Miami Beach, Fla.

7. DATE OF BIRTH
1893

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Shchedrin, Minsk Province, Russia

9. CITIZENSHIP
Stateless

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY
Unknown

11. PLACE OF ENTRY
Unknown

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies))
Unknown

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
NA

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

15. OCCUPATION
Housewife

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if mother is deceased or unemployed)
NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED
NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To)
NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE
NA

20. COUNTRY
NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
AARON EUGENE

2. RELATIONSHIP
brother

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U. S. A.

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
22 Community Drive, West Long Branch, New Jersey

5. LIVING
X YES ☐ NO

6. AGE
40

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

5

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

6

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

7

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

8

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)

5. LIVING
☐ YES ☐ NO

6. AGE

SECTION XVII — FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) MILSTEIN [illegible]	2. LIVING YES ☐ NO ☒	3. DATE OF DEATH 1941	4. CAUSE OF DEATH Heart disease

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 14 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Kosciusko Square 12, Tomashuv-Maz, Poland

7. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Tomashuv-Maz., Poland

9. CITIZENSHIP: Polish

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

15. OCCUPATION: ~~NA~~ Storekeeper

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): ~~NA~~ Self-employed

SECTION XVIII — MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) MILSTEIN MINDL	2. LIVING YES ☐ NO ☒	3. DATE OF DEATH Unknown	4. CAUSE OF DEATH Nazi conc. camp

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Unknown

7. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Tomashuv-Maz., Poland

9. CITIZENSHIP: Polish

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

15. OCCUPATION: NA

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) GORELIK VOLODYA	2. RELATIONSHIP uncle	3. AGE 60
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES Bobruisk, USSR	5. EMPLOYED BY Government	
	6. CITIZENSHIP (Country) USSR	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT Up to 1962 once every 2-3 years	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT September, 1962
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
5	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES	5. EMPLOYED BY	
	6. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

SECTION XX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) | 2. RELATIONSHIP | 3. AGE | 4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) | 6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

2
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) | 2. RELATIONSHIP | 3. AGE | 4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) | 6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

3
1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) | 2. RELATIONSHIP | 3. AGE | 4. CITIZENSHIP
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) | 6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)

SECTION XXI — REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mrs. C. M. Arnold		214 Bay View Ave., Belvedere, Calif.
Lawrence Blum	Dept. of City Planning, NYC	2900 Heath Ave., Bronx 63, N. Y.
Volkoff, Andre	Blauvelt Engineering Co. 79 Madison Ave., NYC	34-25 109th St., Richmond Hills 18, N.Y.
Tenzer, Milton	Fort Monmouth	282 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Stamelman, Laurence C.	404 Broadway Long Branch, N. J.	15 Park Ave., Elberon, N. J.

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Tucker, Jerome	141 Broadway Long Branch, N. J.	241 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Epstein, Stanley	Unknown	23 Maryland Ave., West Long Branch, N. J.
Lawn, Howard	Unknown	274 Lenox Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Scher, J. P.	EAI Eatontown, N. J.	571 Hoey Ave., Long Branch, N. J.
Dingle, John G.	Blauvelt Engineering Co. 79 Madison Ave., NYC	34-25 150th Place Flushing, N. Y.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Teitelbaum, Sidney	Fort Monmouth	9 Marshall Court Long Branch, N. J.
Saxon, Alfred	157 Broad St., Red Bank, N. J.	7 Marshall Court, Long Branch, N. J.
Lehrer, M. S.	Unknown	8 Marshall Court, Long Branch, N. J.

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind (Include membership in or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country) to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
260 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey	April, 1963	present time
31 Cedar Avenue, Long Branch, New Jersey	Sept., 1962	April 1963
47 Novokuznetskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Nov., 1961	Sept., 1962
29 Pyatnitskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	Apr., 1960	Nov., 1961
12 Bolshaya Pionerskaya Ul., Moscow, U. S. S. R.	June, 1946	Apr., 1960

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE [illegible]
NA

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION. NA

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD?
IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Bella Aaron

2. RELATIONSHIP Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* 200 Marshall Court, Long Branch, New Jersey

4. HOME PHONE NO. 201-222-3592

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE NA

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. NA

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION XXVI **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES July 5, 1954	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Long Branch, New Jersey	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Bella

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. Sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Section IX see p.7

From Nov., 1944 to June, 1949 Technical Library of Moscow City Soviet
Ul. Gorky 13, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Library, technical information Mrs. Makalinskaya
Senior Librarian $90 per month
Publication of monthly bulletin in field of municipal works, road and street construction and maintenance. architecture. city planning and other work connected with the municipality. Supervision of twenty free-lance translators and abstractors (English to Russian). Translation and editorial work from English to Russian.
Left due to reduction of forces.

Section XII - 4 Previous marriage to Sol Mincberg, deceased Dec.12, 1953
See additional enclosed sheet to Section XII.

SUPPLEMENT
to
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
of
IRVING AARON

During the years I spent in the Soviet Union I had many friends. Among them were writers, journalists, engineers, doctors and professionals in different fields. It would be very difficult to list all of them. For instance, during the last year I met a new neighbour in the building I moved into. He was a professor in the field of economics. His name was Barsky and he told me many things which I never knew about concerning the economic basis of the Soviet system. He noted that with an industrial labour force exceeding the labour force of the U. S. A. by 100% the productivity of labour and industrial production wasthree times lower.

While studying in high school I became acquainted with a well-known movie producer - Alexander Stolper. He is the brother of one of the students with whom I was freidly in high school. Besides, through a friend in college I met with several writers and journalists such as Dykhovichny, Slobodskoy, and others writing in the field of satire.

People working in classified fields of industry never talk about their work. And even though my relatives through my wife in Russia worked in the fieldof aviation and electronics I did not know anything about their work. I only knew that my wife's brother worked in [illegible], and her brother-in-law worked near Sokol (both in Moscow). Her brother's name is Lev Minkin and her brother-in-law's name is Boris Bershadsky.

During the last years I worked as a translator and met many people who were born in the U. S. A. Among them are Norma Shikman. Paul Shikman, Grace Duetch-Boogay (nee Sgovio) - now in Italy, andmany others.

Section XIX

G.RELIK EUGENE — cousin — 33

Riga, USSR — Government

USSR

Met him in 1960 and 1961 and 1962, during the summer

Met with him the last time in 1962 (summer)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS 201-759831 Irving AMRON

FBI	Unnumbered XXX	July 18, 1963	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	F#105-2862; B#105-100312	2/28/64	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	#105-2862; B#105-100312	5/25/64	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	Sept 10, 1965	Newark, New Jersey	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	July 24, 1969	Washington, D.C.	[redacted]
FBI	Unnumbered	Sept. 19, 1969	New York, N.Y.	[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

June 21, 1964

Box # 1390
Main P. O.
Washington, D. C.
20013

Gentlemen:

In answer to your advertisement in the New York Times of June 21, 1964 for a Russian linguist capable of translating, analyzing and editing publications, as well as interpreting, I am enclosing my resume.

I lived in Russia for over 25 years and graduated college there after the beginning of the German-Russian war. After 7 years of continuous attempts to leave Russia, I was repatriated in September, 1962. I am a native-born citizen of the United States of America.

In Russia I worked as a translator, editor and head of Translator's Bureaus for twenty years. My experience in translating, abstracting and selection of technical articles for publication is significant. My initial salary requirements are $10,000 per year. I would appreciate the opportunity of a personal interview for discussing possibilities which may exist for me in your organization.

Sincerely yours,

Irving Aaron

Irving Aaron

Resume of
IRVING AARON

260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey
Telephone: (201)-222-3592

Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Married, 2 children

Bachelor of Science, 1941
Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

1. Blauvelt Engineering Co., 79 Madison Ave., N. Y. C.
   Highway engineer - January, 1963 to present time.
   Earthwork calculations, alignment computations, drainage computations and design, right-of-way.

2. U. S. S. R. Chamber of Commerce, Moscow. Free-lance technical translator and editor - Russian to English 1952 to 1962. Left due to repatriation.
   Reports for International Congresses, trade publications, manuals, dam construction, road-building and construction machinery.

3. Foreign Trade Publishing House. Free-lance technical translator and editor - Russian to English 1956 to 1962.
   Same as in item 2.

4. Scientific Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery, Moscow. 1956 to 1958.
   Left due to completion of translating jobs.
   Head of Translator's Bureau. Management, editing, translation - Russian to English: construction and road-building machinery manuals, trade publications.

5. Borough Road Repair Department, Moscow.
   Senior engineer 1950 to 1955. Reduction of forces.
   Field work - surveying, estimator.

6. Concrete Plant, Moscow
   Laboratory assistant 1949 to 1950. Reduction of forces.
   Checking quality and composition of concrete.

7. Technical Library of Moscow City Soviet.
   Senior Librarian 1944 to 1949. Reduction of forces.
   Head of Translator's Bureau - English to Russian. Publication of monthly information bulletin.

   Part-time translator - Hydraulic Power Designing Institute (Hydroenergoproject) - English to Russian 1945 to 1952 (abstracting). Russian to English 1952 to 1952 (Reports for International Congresses, dam projects).

   Book translated and published in Moscow in 1958 by Foreign Languages Publishing House: "Precast Concrete in the Soviet Union"

ving Amron
0 Marshall Court
g Branch, New Jersey

NEW YORK N.Y.
P.M.
2 JUL
1964

U.S. AIR MAIL

Air Mail

Box # 1390
Main P. O.
Washington, D. C.
20013

Resume of
IRVING AARON

260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey
Telephone: (201)-222-3592

Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Married, 3 children

Bachelor of Science, 1941
Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

I was born December 4, 1917 in Brooklyn, N. Y. My father, Philip Aaron was successively a farmer, a shoemaker, a butcher and worked in a Jewish cooperative organization. In 1931, at the age of 13, I left for Russia with my parents. My father in Russia worked as an agronomist in Biro-Bidjan. I attended school in Khabarovsk. In January, 1933, our family returned to the U. S. A. due to the illness of my younger brother. In September, 1933 we returned to Russia. My father then worked in construction as a manager, and later worked in a shoe factory as a shoemaker. My mother worked as a manager in a public dining room. I graduated high school in Moscow in 1936 and was accepted as a student in the Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute. In 1937 my parents and brother returned to the U. S. A. I remained in Moscow as I wished to finish my courses in college. I graduated in 1941, after the beginning of war with Germany and was sent as a superintendent to a Highway Bat. In September, 1942 I was sent to Military School in Moscow. After finishing as a Jr. Lt. I was in active duty as a platoon officer. I was wounded Oct. 11, 1943. I was operated upon three times, the last time in April, 1945. After being discharged from the Soviet Army due to combat disability I got a job as a senior librarian in the Technical Library of the Moscow City Soviet. In 1949 due to the small number of publications being received from abroad my position in thelibrary was eliminated. I then got a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant and after a reduction of forces I got a job as a senior engineer in the Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept. At this time I was divorced and re-married. My first wife was a bookkeeper. Her step father was a major in the Soviet Army. He was later killed, in 1942, during WW II. Her maiden name, by her stepfather was Shchegolyeva. My second wife (maiden name - Volsova) was a pathologist. She hid the fact that she could not have children and we were divorced one month after my marriage. In 1952 I met Rose Mirkina. We were officially married only a few months before our son was born. The cause of this delay in our marriage was the fact that I wasborn in the United States. Her brother is an aviation engineer and her brother-in-law works in the field of electronics. Her mother considered that our marriage would harm my wife's relatives. In 1955, after the birth of our son we began handing in applications for an exit visa from the Soviet Government. At first we tried to get out as visitors to my parents. We received our first refusal at the time of the Ungarian Revolt. Up till 1957, when my father came to visit us we continued to hand in applications for an exit visa as visitors. After 1957 we continued to hand in applications approximately every six months to leave the Soviet Union permanently. And we continued to regularly hear refusals. I consider that the aggravations connected with these refusals contributed to the causes of my wife's death in March, 1961. Andonly in July, 1962 my son and I received exit visas. As I mentioned in Form 444 I filled in two different applications. The first answer to the applications I filled out in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow: as an immigrant and as a native-born citizen was a Nonquota immigrant visa. The Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State, after my arrival, restored my native-born citizenship.

In 1955, due to a reduction of forces I lost my staff job in the Bauman Road Repair Dept. At this time I was working as a free-lance translator in the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and as a part-time translator in Hydroenergoproject. Until January of 1956 I worked for these organizations. In 1956 I began working as the Head of the Translators Dept. of the Scientific-Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery. After having finished the translation of all manuals in this field I continued working until I left the Soviet Union as a free-lance translator and editor for the Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Trade Publishing House, the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hydroenergoproject and other organizations requiring translators.

After returning to the U. S. A. I got a job as a civil engineer. At first I worked for Stelling, Lord-Wood and Van Suetendal from Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962 and then from January, 1963 to July, 1964 I worked for Blauvelt Engineering Co. At present I am working for Harold J. Seldin, 60 Broad St., Red Bank, New Jersey. During the last several months I have been working on a free-lance basis with A EREACH Corporation (1634 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.) as an abstractor.

SUPPLEMENT
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY
of
IRVING AARON

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Section XIX

GORELIK EUGENE Riga, USSR USSR	cousin Government Met him in 1960 and 1961 and 1962, during the summer Met with him the last time in 1962 (summer)	33

Resume of
IRVING AARON

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Born December 4, 1917, Brooklyn, N. Y.   Bachelor of Science, 1941
Married, 3 children   Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute

I was born December 4, 1917 in Brooklyn, N. Y. My father, Philip Aaron was successively a farmer, a shoemaker, a butcher and worked in a Jewish cooperative organization. In 1931, at the age of 13, I left for Russia with my parents. My father in Russia worked as an agronomist in Biro-Bidjan. I attended school in Khabarovsk. In January, 1933, our family returned to the U. S. A. due to the illness of my younger brother. In September, 1933 we returned to Russia. My father then worked in construction as a manager, and later worked in a shoe factory as a shoemaker. My mother worked as a manager in a public dining room. I graduated high school in Moscow in 1936 and was accepted as a student in the Moscow Automobile & Highway Institute. In 1937 my parents and brother returned to the U. S. A. I remained in Moscow as I wished to finish my courses in college. I graduated in 1941, after the beginning of war with Germany and was sent as a superintendent to a Highway Bat. In September, 1942 I was sent to Military School in Moscow. After finishing as a Jr. Lt. I was in active duty as a platoon officer. I was wounded Oct. 11, 1943. I was operated upon three times, the last time in April, 1945. After being discharged from the Soviet Army due to combat disability I got a job as a senior librarian in the Technical Library of the Moscow City Soviet. In 1949 due to the small number of publications being received from abroad my position in thelibrary was eliminated. I then got a job as a laboratory assistant in a concrete plant and after a reduction of forces I got a job as a senior engineer in the Bauman Boro Road Repair Dept. At this time I was divorced and re-married. My first wife was a bookkeeper. Her step father was a major in the Soviet Army. He was later killed, in 1942, during WW II. Her maiden name, by her stepfather was Shchegolyeva. My second wife (maiden name - Volsova) was a pathologist. She hid the fact that she could not have children and we were divorced one month after my marriage. In 1952 I met Rose Mirkina. We were officially married only a few months before our son was born. The cause of this delay in our marriage was the fact that I wasborn in the United States. Her brother is an aviation engineer and her brother-in-law works in the field of electronics. Her mother considered that our marriage would harm my wife's relatives. In 1955, after the brith of our son we began handing in applications for an exit visa from the Soviet Government. At first we tried to get out as visitors to my parents. We received our first refusal at the time of the Ungarian Revolt. Up till 1957, when my father came to visit us we continued to hand in applications for an exit visa as visitors. After 1957 we continued to hand in applications approximately every six months to leave the Soviet Union permanently. And we continued to regularly hear refusals. I consider that the aggravations connected with these refusals contributed to the causes of my wife's death in March, 1961. Andonly in July, 1962 my son and I received exit visas. As I mentioned in Form 444 I filled in two different applications. The first answer to the applications I filled out in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow: as an immigrant and as a native-born citizen was a Nonquota immigrant visa. The Board of Appeals of the Dept. of State, after my arrival, restored my native-born citizenship.

In 1955, due to a reduction of forces I lost my staff job in the Bauman Road Repair Dept. At this time I was working as a free-lance translator in the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and as a part-time translator in Hydroenergoproject. Until January of 1956 I worked for these organizations. In 1956 I began working as the Head of the Translators Dept. of the Scientific-Research Institute of Construction and Road-Building Machinery. After having finished the translation of all manuals in this field I continued working until I left the Soviet Union as a free-lance translator and editor for the Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Trade Publishing House, the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hydroenergoproject and other organizations requiring translators.

After returning to the U. S. A. I got a job as a civil engineer. At first I worked for Stelling, Lord-Wood and Van Suetendal from Nov., 1962 to Dec., 1962 and then from January, 1963 to July, 1964 I worked for Blauvelt Engineering Co. XXXX At present I am working for Harold J. Seldin, 60 Broad St., Red Bank, New Jersey. During the last several months I have been working on a free-lance basis with AUERBACH Corporation (1634 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.) as an abstractor.

Irving Aaron

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

Pod [redacted] [redacted]
Arrived in U.S. via [illegible] INS at N.Y.C.
Resident alien 2401 [illegible]
2nd # A12 76 2401 15 [illegible]
BR [illegible] PK
13 July

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Phone [redacted] who will try to get INS file.

phoned Tamara, C/S, who will get State + FBI files.

Need much more on him: Party affiliations, contacts with NKVD/KGB, militia, school of Marxism, etc.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

Per J. Hanrett,
Amos is a Permanent
resident alien. INS
file # A12 762401 at NYC.
INS sponsored
Bra [illegible] OK
13 July

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Phoned Jerry Hanrett who will try to get INS file.

Phoned Marovin, OS, who will get State + FBI files.

Need much more on him: Party affiliations, contacts with KGB, militia, NKVD/school of marxism, etc.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

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	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0—587282

14-00000

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

September 28, 1964

Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Dear

I greatly appreciate the time you spent with me during our interview in Philadelphia. My intentions to work for your organization have not changed. I am very busy at my job at present and cannot, due to this, send you a different copy of my autobiography. I hope that this will not unduly influence the conclusions of your organization relating to my employment.

Yours truly,

Irving Aaron

Irving Aar n

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

LONG BRANCH
SEP 8
N.J.

U.S. POSTAGE

Box 1370
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Irving Amron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

September 28, 1964

Mr. Paul Peters
Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

Dear Mr. Peters:

I greatly appreciate the time you spent with me during our interview in Philadelphia. My intentions to work for your organization have not changed. I am very busy at my job at present and cannot, due to this, send you a different copy of my autobiography. I hope that this will not unduly influence the conclusions of your organization relating to my employment.

Yours truly,

Irving Amron

Irving Amron

Irving Aaron
260 Marshall Court
Long Branch, New Jersey

LONG BRANCH
SEP 8
AM
[illegible]
N.J.

Mr. Paul Peters
Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.
20013

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Washington, D.C.
26 August 1964

Dear Mr. Amron:

I am making reference to your reply to my ad for a position with the U.S. Government as a Russian language linguist.

From 1 to 4 September, I will be in Philadelphia to conduct interviews for the position. I will phone you upon my arrival in Philadelphia to arrange a mutually convenient schedule for an interview with you.

Should you still be interested and if you have not already forwarded the material to me, kindly prepare the forms I forwarded to you some time ago. Also, please bring with you the photograph and the autobiography.

Thank you for your interest in our program.

Cordially,

Administrative Officer

Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D.C. 20013

Washington, D.C.
26 August 1964

Dear Mr. Amron:

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Thank you for your interest in our program.

Cordially,

Paul Peters
Administrative Officer

Box 1390
Main Post Office
Washington, D.C. 20013

14-00000

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SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section | TYPE STATION: IMC | DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME | BRANCH | ROOM NO. | PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. | IDN NO. | 6. SOURCE DOCUMENT | DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION | CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION | CODE

17. OCCUPATION (Clear text) | CODE

18. ACTION DESK | CODE | 19. SECONDARY DESK | CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN- | 201-

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(36)

14-00000

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

Standard Form 89
(Rev. Aug. 1954)
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32

REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME Amron, Irving	2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION	3. IDENTIFICATION NO.
4. HOME ADDRESS (Number, street or R.F.D., city or town, State and ZIP code) 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, New Jersey	5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION	6. DATE OF EXAMINATION 7/4/64

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER	DATE	SIGNATURE	NUMBER OF ATTACHED SHEETS
HAROLD GABEL, M.D.	7/4/64	Harold Gabel	

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Standard Form 89
(Rev. Aug. 1954)
Bureau of the Budget
Circular A-32

89-103

REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY

THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME: Amron, Irving
2. GRADE AND COMPONENT OR POSITION:
3. IDENTIFICATION NO.:
4. HOME ADDRESS (No., street or R.F.D., city or town, State and ZIP code): 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, New Jersey
5. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
6. DATE OF EXAMINATION: 7/4/64
7. SEX: Male
8. RACE: White
9. TOTAL YEARS GOVERNMENT SERVICE: MILITARY 0 CIVILIAN 0
10. AGENCY:
11. ORGANIZATION UNIT:
12. DATE OF BIRTH: Dec 4, 1917
13. PLACE OF BIRTH: Brooklyn, N.Y.
14. NAME, RELATIONSHIP, AND ADDRESS OF NEXT OF KIN: Bella Amron, wife, 260 Marshall Ct, Long Branch, N.J.
15. EXAMINING FACILITY OR EXAMINER, AND ADDRESS: 1348 Norwood Ave. Harold Gebel, M.D. Oakhurst, New Jersey
16. OTHER INFORMATION:
17. STATEMENT OF EXAMINEE'S PRESENT HEALTH IN OWN WORDS (Follow by description of past history, if complaint exists)

I am in excellent health

18. FAMILY HISTORY negative

RELATION	AGE	STATE OF HEALTH	IF DEAD, CAUSE OF DEATH	AGE AT DEATH
FATHER	75	good		
MOTHER	66	good		
SPOUSE	37	good		
BROTHERS AND SISTERS	40	good		
CHILDREN	7	good		
	9	good		
	16	good		

19. HAS ANY BLOOD RELATION (Parent, brother, sister, other) OR HUSBAND OR WIFE

YES	NO	(Check each item)	RELATION(S)
	✓	HAD TUBERCULOSIS	
	✓	HAD SYPHILIS	
	✓	HAD DIABETES	
	✓	HAD CANCER	
	✓	HAD KIDNEY TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD HEART TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD STOMACH TROUBLE	
	✓	HAD RHEUMATISM (ARTHRITIS)	
	✓	HAD ASTHMA, HAY FEVER, HIVES	
	✓	HAD EPILEPSY (Fits)	
	✓	COMMITTED SUICIDE	
	✓	BEEN INSANE	

20. HAVE YOU EVER HAD OR HAVE YOU NOW (Place check at left of each item)

YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)	YES	NO	(Check each item)
	✓	SCARLET FEVER, ERYSIPELAS		✓	GOITER		✓	TUMOR, GROWTH, CYST, CANCER		✓	"TRICK" OR LOCKED KNEE
	✓	DIPHTHERIA		✓	TUBERCULOSIS		✓	RUPTURE		✓	FOOT TROUBLE
	✓	RHEUMATIC FEVER		✓	SOAKING SWEATS (Night sweats)		✓	APPENDICITIS		✓	NEURITIS
	✓	SWOLLEN OR PAINFUL JOINTS		✓	ASTHMA		✓	PILES OR RECTAL DISEASE		✓	PARALYSIS (Inc. infantile)
	✓	MUMPS		✓	SHORTNESS OF BREATH		✓	FREQUENT OR PAINFUL URINATION		✓	EPILEPSY OR FITS
	✓	WHOOPING COUGH		✓	PAIN OR PRESSURE IN CHEST		✓	KIDNEY STONE OR BLOOD IN URINE		✓	CAR, TRAIN, SEA, OR AIR SICKNESS
	✓	FREQUENT OR SEVERE HEADACHE		✓	CHRONIC COUGH		✓	SUGAR OR ALBUMIN IN URINE		✓	FREQUENT TROUBLE SLEEPING
	✓	DIZZINESS OR FAINTING SPELLS		✓	PALPITATION OR POUNDING HEART		✓	BOILS		✓	FREQUENT OR TERRIFYING NIGHTMARES
	✓	EYE TROUBLE		✓	HIGH OR LOW BLOOD PRESSURE		✓	VENEREAL DISEASE		✓	DEPRESSION OR EXCESSIVE WORRY
	✓	EAR, NOSE OR THROAT TROUBLE		✓	CRAMPS IN YOUR LEGS		✓	RECENT GAIN OR LOSS OF WEIGHT		✓	LOSS OF MEMORY OR AMNESIA
	✓	RUNNING EARS		✓	FREQUENT INDIGESTION		✓	ARTHRITIS OR RHEUMATISM		✓	BED WETTING
	✓	CHRONIC OR FREQUENT COLDS		✓	STOMACH, LIVER OR INTESTINAL TROUBLE		✓	BONE, JOINT, OR OTHER DEFORMITY		✓	NERVOUS TROUBLE OF ANY SORT
	✓	SEVERE TOOTH OR GUM TROUBLE		✓	GALL BLADDER TROUBLE OR GALL STONES		✓	LAMENESS		✓	ANY DRUG OR NARCOTIC HABIT
	✓	SINUSITIS		✓	JAUNDICE		✓	LOSS OF ARM, LEG, FINGER, OR TOE		✓	EXCESSIVE DRINKING HABIT
	✓	HAY FEVER		✓	ANY REACTION TO SERUM, DRUG OR MEDICINE		✓	PAINFUL OR "TRICK" SHOULDER OR ELBOW		✓	HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES

21. HAVE YOU EVER (Check each item)

YES	NO		YES	NO	
✓		WORN GLASSES		✓	ATTEMPTED SUICIDE
	✓	WORN AN ARTIFICIAL EYE		✓	BEEN A SLEEP WALKER
	✓	WORN HEARING AIDS		✓	LIVED WITH ANYONE WHO HAD TUBERCULOSIS
	✓	STUTTERED OR STAMMERED		✓	COUGHED UP BLOOD
	✓	WORN A BRACE OR BACK SUPPORT		✓	BLED EXCESSIVELY AFTER INJURY OR TOOTH EXTRACTION

22. FEMALES ONLY: A. HAVE YOU EVER—

YES	NO	
		BEEN PREGNANT
		HAD A VAGINAL DISCHARGE
		BEEN TREATED FOR A FEMALE DISORDER
		HAD PAINFUL MENSTRUATION
		HAD IRREGULAR MENSTRUATION

B. COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING
AGE AT ONSET OF MENSTRUATION
INTERVAL BETWEEN PERIODS
DURATION OF PERIODS
DATE OF LAST PERIOD
QUANTITY ☐ NORMAL ☐ EXCESSIVE ☐ SCANTY

23. HOW MANY JOBS HAVE YOU HAD IN THE PAST THREE YEARS? 3
24. WHAT IS THE LONGEST PERIOD YOU HELD ANY OF THESE JOBS? MONTHS 18
25. WHAT IS YOUR USUAL OCCUPATION? Technical translator
26. ARE YOU (Check one) ☑ RIGHT HANDED ☐ LEFT HANDED

YES	NO	CHECK EACH ITEM YES OR NO. EVERY ITEM CHECKED "YES" MUST BE FULLY EXPLAINED IN BLANK SPACE ON RIGHT	
		27. HAVE YOU BEEN UNABLE TO HOLD A JOB BECAUSE OF:	
	✓	A. SENSITIVITY TO CHEMICALS, DUST, SUNLIGHT, ETC.	
	✓	B. INABILITY TO PERFORM CERTAIN MOTIONS	
	✓	C. INABILITY TO ASSUME CERTAIN POSITIONS	
	✓	D. OTHER MEDICAL REASONS *(If yes, give reasons)*	
	✓	28. HAVE YOU EVER WORKED WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE?	
	✓	29. DID YOU HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH SCHOOL STUDIES OR TEACHERS? *(If yes, give details)*	
	✓	30. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF YOUR HEALTH? *(If yes, state reason and give details)*	
	✓	31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED LIFE INSURANCE? *(If yes, state reason and give details)*	
✓		32. HAVE YOU HAD, OR HAVE YOU BEEN ADVISED TO HAVE ANY OPERATIONS? *(If yes, describe and give age at which occurred)*	Had skull injury during war II, in 1943. Operated in 1944 and 1945 on osteomyelitis. I was 25 years old at time of wound and operation (first) in 1943
	✓	33. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PATIENT (committed or voluntary) IN A MENTAL HOSPITAL OR SANATORIUM? *(If yes, specify when, where, why, and name of doctor, and complete address of hospital or clinic)*	
	✓	34. HAVE YOU EVER HAD ANY ILLNESS OR INJURY OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY NOTED? *(If yes, specify when, where, and give details)*	
	✓	35. HAVE YOU CONSULTED OR BEEN TREATED BY CLINICS, PHYSICIANS, HEALERS, OR OTHER PRACTITIONERS WITHIN THE PAST 5 YEARS? *(If yes, give complete address of doctor, hospital, clinic, and details)*	
	✓	36. HAVE YOU TREATED YOURSELF FOR ILLNESSES OTHER THAN MINOR COLDS? *(If yes, which illnesses)*	
	✓	37. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REJECTED FOR MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? *(If yes, give date and reason for rejection)*	
✓		38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED FROM MILITARY SERVICE BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL, MENTAL, OR OTHER REASONS? *(If yes, give date, reason, and type of discharge; whether honorable, other than honorable, for unfitness or unsuitability)*	Discharged from military service in Soviet Army in 1946 due to combat disability.
	✓	39. HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED, IS THERE PENDING, HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR, OR DO YOU INTEND TO APPLY FOR PENSION OR COMPENSATION FOR EXISTING DISABILITY? *(If yes, specify what kind, granted by whom, and what amount, when, why)*	

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THE FOREGOING INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY ME AND THAT IT IS TRUE AND COMPLETE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
I AUTHORIZE ANY OF THE DOCTORS, HOSPITALS, OR CLINICS MENTIONED ABOVE TO FURNISH THE GOVERNMENT A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF MY MEDICAL RECORD FOR PURPOSES OF PROCESSING MY APPLICATION FOR THIS EMPLOYMENT OR SERVICE.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF EXAMINEE: [illegible], Irving

SIGNATURE:

40. PHYSICIAN'S SUMMARY AND ELABORATION OF ALL PERTINENT DATA *(Physician shall comment on all positive answers in items 11 thru 39)*

In excellent health. He has a past history of skull injury which is non-disabling.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER	DATE	SIGNATURE	NUMBER OF ATTACHED SHEETS
HAROLD GABEL, M.D.	7/4/64	Harold Gabel	

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE ISSUED BY	**PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	THIS DATE (Fill In) July 5, 1964

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle) AARON IRVING	2. AGE 46	3. SEX X MALE FEMALE

4. HEIGHT 6'00"	5. WEIGHT 195#	6. COLOR OF EYES blue	7. COLOR OF HAIR brown	8. TYPE COMPLEXION light	9. TYPE BUILD heavy	

pages 2-13 all deleted.

104-10162-10248

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARAUJO-Bernal, Leopoldo
201-771754

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM: 2 D 11

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 Jul 7		Clifford A. FENTON	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ARAUJO-Bernal, Leopoldo
201-771754

STATE DEPT. DOCUMENTS

(1) DESP# 1056, 2 Apr. 1960
Subj: Medical Assoc. Officers Give Further Indication of Plans of Gov't for Medical Professions

(2) USINT Havana, 25 Oct. 1977 NC 86475
SUBJ. NIV Applications

(3) Am. Emb. Santiago ref. dated 12 Dec. 1960

FBI DOCUMENTS

(1) ~~DBA-26318~~ 25 Oct. 1962, Miami, Florida
Subject: Verisimo Francisco Domingo, Sanchez Barrio; Internal Security - Cuba

(2) ~~DBA-78316~~, 19 May 1961, Miami, Florida
Subject. Foreign Political Matters - Cuba
Status of Cuban Medical Profession
File: MM 105-1747.

LIAISON

(1) Document dated 28 Mayo 1966

(2) Cable, Mexico City 18206 dated 13 Apr. 1971

(3) Cable, Mexico City " (Copy) of above - Destroy

CIA DOCUMENTS

(1) Cable DIRECTOR 205666, dated 24 Apr. 1971
(sanitized copy placed in 201)

(2) WH/Miami cable 13875, 29 Apr. 1971
(sanitized copy placed in 201)

AIR ATTACHE

(1) I.R. 457-54 Air Attache Office Rome, Italy, 8 Apr 1971

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF ~~2~~ 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 102319Z

CITE CIA/DDO

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~~123413~~

CONF: IP/ES INFO: FILE 45N/10, 4, FAY

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 5
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 505
0 ~~201~~-771754/104

TO: PRIORITY DEPT OF STATE INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

SECRET WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CIR-316/03858-77

DONKEY CHIPMUNK

REF: HAVANA 0427 DATED 25 OCTOBER 1977 SUBJECT: NEW APPLICATIONS

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT ☒
INDEX
CODE NO.

1. SUBJECT: ARAUJO BERNAL, LEOPOLDO EDUARDO (U)

DPOB: 9 JUNE 1932, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA

2. (S) SUBJECT HAD BEEN REPORTED AS A MILITANT COMMUNIST SINCE 1935, AND HE HAD BEEN ACTIVE IN MANY COMMUNIST AND LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS. IN FEBRUARY 1961 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE AN INFORMANT OF THE CUBAN G-2 (SECURITY POLICE). THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM A GROUP OF CUBAN REFUGEES, TRAINED IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, WHO HAVE PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION SINCE 1961.

3. CLASSIFIED BY AUTHENTICATING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY PARA: 5B(2). AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.
BASED ON:UFGA 012861 11 JULY 61; UFGA 15378, 5 NOV 64; FILE IN: 201-771754; ORIG: R HARRIS; UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM; EXT: 9461; COORD: LA/COG: H SPEED; REL: C/PCS/LSN; AUTH: C/IP/RB.

10 Nov 1977

DATE: 10 NOV 1977
ORIG: R HARRIS
UNIT: IP/EIS:JE/DM
EXT: 9461

RECORD COPY

316-0385877
201-771754

C/PCS/LSN/D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORD IN DRAFT:
LA/COG: WH SPEED
COORDINATING OFFICERS

A Zeff
for C/IP/RB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 062147

14-00000

SECRET
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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2. DC/WH/C		6 DEC 1971	6	
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4. [illegible]		6 Dec		R
5. [illegible]				
6. VASQUEZ				
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8. DC/WH/1		13 DEC 1971		
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10. Bushnell		14 Dec		JB
11. [illegible]				✓
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14.				
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16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-771754

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 29 Nov 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 03604

73780

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMOT Report on Dr. Leopoldo Araujo Bernal (201-771754)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: WH/MIAMI 13167

Forwarded herewith, as promised in Reference, is a copy of an AMOT report (EE 1970) on Leopoldo Araujo Bernal.

Priscilla J. BRAZLEY

Attachment:
Copy of EE 1970, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/att, herewith - To out Avel
③ - Chief, WHD without att

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA 3604

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
[illegible]
Typed: 22 November 1971

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-771754

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: BETTY VAZQUEZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 6 DEC 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) 4 (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 263775

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 13225 (IN 479676)*

1. WHILE ARAUJO MAY HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH JUSTO CARRILLO'S GROUP IN 1958 SUBSEQUENT INFO WOULD TEND TO INDICATE HE NOW IN SOLID WITH THE CURRENT REGIME. THEREFORE, DO NOT FEEL CHANCE ENCOUNTER BASED ON PRE-REVOLUTION ACQUAINTANCE WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

2. FILE: 201-771754.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Said Araujo had had contact with Justo Carrillo's Montecristis group in December 1958 and suggested Headquarters might want consider sending Carrillo to Mexico City for chance encounter with Araujo to explore depth of his ideological sentiments at this time.

7 Dec 71
201-771754

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, IPLAN

ACTION NO. 624

(4)

S E C R E T 221546Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13167

W.MIAM

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

22 Nov IN 475064

REF: MEXICO CITY 18206 (IN 468629)

1. TRACES ON LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERNAL (201-771754) REQUESTED PARA 3 OF REF AS FOLLOWS: DOB 9 JUNE 1912. AS OF MARCH 69 WAS PRESIDENT OF CUBAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, AND HELD POSITION AT BRAIN FUNCTIONING RESEARCH INSTITUTE. UFGA 2698, 8 FEB 67, LISTED SUBJECT AS SECRETARY OF PAN AMERICAN MEDICAL CONFEDERATION FOR CARIBBEAN ZONE WHO WAS MANIPULATED BY JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY. MEMBER OF CUBAN DELEGATION TO 4TH WORLD CONGRESS ON PSHCYIATRY IN MADRID SEPT 66. ATTENDED VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CONFERENCES IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA PRIOR TO CASTRO REGIME. RECENT TRAVEL: CUBA TO SPAIN TO UNITED KINGDOM JULY 69, RETURNING CUBA AUG 69, PASSPORT EF/69/733.

2. POUCHING COPY OF AMOT REPORT ON SUBJECT DATED OCT 64. SOURCE OF REPORT IS MEDICAL DOCTOR WHO WAS RESIDING MIAMI AT THAT TIME.

3. FILE: 201-771754. GP-1

S E C R E T

ZZ

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11 JAN 1972

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22 Nov 71

201-771754

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ACTION UNIT c/WH8   FILE VR c/ci/ca, c/ci, c/FI2, c/CA3,

ACTION NO. 294

S E C R E T 291622Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13225   WMIM   29 Nov 71 IN 479676

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 235656

RYBAT TYPIC

ABSTRACT X

1. FOR WHATEVER IT IS WORTH [redacted] MET WITH ARAUJO AND OTHER LEADERS OF MONTECRISTI GROUP IN ARAUJO'S HOME LATE DEC 58 WHEN MONTECRISTIS ATTEMPTING MOUNT OP TO TOPPLE BATISTA BEFORE FIDEL COULD. LEADER OF MONTECRISTIS AT THAT TIME WAS FORMER ASSET JUSTO CARRILLO WHO NOW WITH BID SAN SALVADOR. HQS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER HAVING CARRILLO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR "CHANCE ENCOUNTER" WITH ARAUJO TO EXPLORE DEPTH OF HIS IDEOLOGICAL SENTIMENTS AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-771754. GP-1

S E C R E T

29 NOV 1971

201-771754

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[redacted]
[illegible] 666, FI
[illegible] 1819
[illegible] NOVEMBER 1971

SECRET

2-1

48 PER

☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH8 IP/AN, CI/ICG, CI/OPS, FI, CAS, CA/PROP, S

SECRET 27 NOV 71

CITE DIRECTOR 20[illegible]

MEXICO CITY INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 18206 (IN 468629)*

B. WH/MIAMI 13167 (IN 475984)**

1. FOLLOWING AUGMENTS INFO REF B: ARAUJO IS A LONG-TIME COMMUNIST HAVING BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE PARTY IN HIS SCHOOL DAYS. ON STOPOVER IN SANTIAGO IN JUNE 1963 ARAUJO WAS PERSONALLY RECEIVED BY THE THEN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SALVADOR ALLENDE. ARAUJO IS REPORTEDLY A GOOD PERSONAL FRIEND OF FIDEL CASTRO.

2. ARAUJO HAS BEEN MARRIED AT LEAST TWICE. FIRST WIFE CARMEN CARRUANA REPORTEDLY A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER. SECOND WIFE IS ELSA PRADERES, WHO AS OF 1967 WAS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CUBAN PSYCHOLOGISTS. ARAUJO'S DAUGHTER LOIPA ARAUJO PRADERES IS WITH THE CUBAN NATIONAL BALLET AND MARRIED TO A RUSSIAN-BORN BALLET DANCER. SHE IS ALSO A PARTY MEMBER.

3. FILE: 201-771754.

CS COPY

27 Nov 71

201-771754

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Requested traces on Araujo who to attend conference in Mexico City. **Sent trac[redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG [redacted], C/WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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PERAL, Leopoldo DR.

BF

XIX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY

London
27 Jul - 2 Aug 1969

LIST OF MEMBERS AND ASSOCIATES ≠

≠ A supplementary list of late registrants will be available at the Congress.

CANADA (contd)

[illegible] No.

•[illegible], David, Dept. of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary.
[illegible], Jocelyne, Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
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[illegible], Paul D., 400 Walmer Road, Toronto, 10.
[illegible], Denis H., 30 Colborn Street, Guelph, Ontario.
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344 Bloor Street West, Toronto 4, Ontario.
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WONG, Roderick, Dept. of Psychology, University of British Columbia,
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•ZELAZO, Philip R., Dept. of Psychology, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
1485 ZWEIG, Joseph P., Dept. of Psychology, Sir GeorgeWilliams University,
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CEYLON

(•JAYASURIYA, J.E.) University Bungalows, Sanghamitta Hill, Peradeniya.

COLUMBIA

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CUBA

/3F

ACANJO

1261 BERNAL, Valdes Leopoldo De Arango, Havana University, Havana, Cuba.
GUEVARA, Juan Jose, address as above
1279 PUIG, Ernesto Gonzales, " "

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[illegible], Milos, Jilovska 1165, Praha 4, Branik.
[illegible], Eduard, Praha 1, Mala Strana, Ujezd 26.
[illegible], Vaclav, Praha 1, Hradcanske Nam., Institut Psychologie.
•[illegible] Jan, Institute of Physiology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Praha 4-Krc,
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•[illegible]OVA, Olga, Institute of Physiology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Praha
4-Krc, Budejovicka 1083.
[illegible], Ladislav, Dept. of Educational Psychology, Gondova 2, Bratislava.
[illegible], Jaroslav, Vrane nad Vltavou 314.
•HOLAS, Emil, Ministerstvo skolstvi, Mozartova 10, Olomovc.
[illegible], Josef, Pribram VII, Pod Haldou 452.
[illegible], Ondrej, Bratislava, [illegible] 17.
[illegible], Jarmila, Psychology Institute CSAV, Purkynova 2, Praha 1.
[illegible], [illegible], Psychiatric Research Institute, Bohnice Prague 8.
[illegible], Otakar, Belcicka 2826, Praha 4, Sporilov II.
[illegible], Jaroslav, Psychologicky ustav KU, Hradcanske nam 5, Praha,
1-Hradcany.
[illegible], Zdenek, Praha 10, Nam. Kub. revoluce 24.
[illegible], Oldrich O., Petrinska 10, Prague 5..
[illegible], Jaroslava, Prague 6, Dostalova 86.
[illegible], Jaroslava, Praha 4, [illegible] 1233.
•[illegible], Ivan, Bratislava, Kocel'ova 17.
•[illegible], D. Institute of Physiology, Academy of Sciences, Sienkiewiczova, 1,
Bratislava.

•Programme Participant

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
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5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED TO	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARAUJO BERNAL, LEOPOLDO E. /DR/
201-771754
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SECRETARY OF THE CMP /PAN AMERICAN MEDICAL CONFEDERATION/ FOR THE CARIBBEAN ZONE AND MANIPULATED BY JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY /201-22396/ AS A PUPPET TO SERVE HIS ENDS.

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TO
Deputy Chief, WH/C

INFO.
Chief, European Division, UFG
~~Chief of Station, JMWAVE~~

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/AMCOIL-1
Background Information on Medical Colleagues of AMCOIL-1 in Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

-4.

Action: FYI

1. In late December 1966 and early January 1967 QUCHIP-1 debriefed AMCOIL-1 in detail regarding his medical colleagues still in Cuba. AMCOIL-1 said that most of them would like to leave Cuba. The majority of those described below are psychiatrists who are keenly aware of, and depressed by, the effect of the Castro regime. Almost all of the psychiatrists mentioned herein have friends and patients among Cuban Government officials and, in AMCOIL-1's opinion, those defecting would cooperate in extensive debriefings of their considerable knowledge. Most of them frequently travel abroad. AMCOIL-1 is attempting to maintain correspondence with the most promising. The defection of any of the psychiatrists would be especially harmful to the present Cuban Government, since it is faced with a rapid increase of suicides, mental illnesses, and alcoholism, stemming from a general breakdown of morals and mental health as traditional values are uprooted and replaced by repressive, unfamiliar demands.

2. In the descriptions that follow, it should be noted that the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana Medical School is composed of professors and instructors from the psychiatric staffs of several hospitals, where the classes actually are given; there is no University Hospital *per se*.

p. 19 1A

cit: Ch 9 3. Cuban Physicians Considered as Possible Prospects for Defection/Operational Utilization

a. ACOSTA Nodal (fnu). Assistant Director of the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Full professor. Acosta, wife, and mother criticize the regime. Has son 13 years of age. Admits correspondence with a brother in the U.S. Takes a courageous stand against the regime but volubly indiscreet. In August 1966 said that he probably was going to be the father of an illegitimate child. Age 40, 5' 5", 140 pounds, almost totally bald. Would defect and cooperate in being debriefed if abroad with family.

DOB: c. 1926

Possible defector

Distribution:
2 - DC/WH/C
2 - C/EUR 2 cc [illegible] E/IB/S
~~1 - COS, JMWAVE~~

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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification 201-805766

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-22,232	20 January 1967
	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-805766

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEVA-22,232

~~4 P 29~~

DOB: c. 1925 — 3. SUAREZ Ramos, Humberto. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Intelligent and professionally skillful. Admitted he is a candidate for the Cuban Communist Party in order to live more comfortably. Married to a former medical-school student who desires to leave Cuba and who constantly criticizes the political indoctrination in Cuban schools suffered by their four children. Suarez admits corresponding with a brother in Miami. Age 35-40, 5' 7", 170 pounds, black hair. Would probably defect and be debriefed if abroad with family. — Possible defector

DOB. c. 1928 — 4. YODU Prevez, Rene. Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Follows the dictates of the regime with commentary. Is sole member of Calixto Garcia staff to side with the staff of the Department of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana, headed by Jose Angel Bustamante, which is notoriously servile to the regime. Attended the 1966 international psychiatric congress in Madrid. Married and regularly fights in public with his wife. Mulatto, Age 35-40, 5' 11", 170 pounds, black hair. Vague possibility of defection and subsequent debriefing, if Yodu felt there was absolutely no risk involved. — Possible defector

Sex: F
DOB c1940 — 5. Cunill, Cristina. Specially appointed Professor of Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Only intimate friends know that she is firmly anti-regime, as she pretends the opposite, in order to support her widowed mother and younger brother Philip, currently majoring in English Literature at the University of Havana and attempting to obtain a scholarship for study abroad (probably England) in order to defect. Cunill may have been born in the U.S., when her father was a Cuban diplomat posted there. She would leave Cuba if it were not for family commitments. She is a courageous, discreet woman, about 26 years old, who might possibly work against the regime while still in Cuba, and most probably would do so if she and her family were outside of Cuba. Would seek a scholarship to study abroad if there were a way to make up for the loss of her monthly income of approximately 500 pesos, which is needed for the support of her family. — Potential defector

DOB: c. 1939 — 6. Mora (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Admits he desires to leave Cuba but is too gripped by inertia or fear to try. His wife also wishes to leave. They have one or two children. Age 26-27, 5' 6", 130 pounds, blond hair. If abroad with family he would probably defect and consent to debriefing. He is too timid for any other operational utilization. — Possi defec

DOB: c. 1928 — 7. PEREZ Villar, Jose. Instructor and head of the Department of Child Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Admitted being so emotionally distressed by his inability to leave Cuba that he requested not to teach university classes. He is attempting to leave through a scholarship, as a delegate to a medical congress, or through the translation/publication of Intelligence and Experience, a medical text by U.S. author James McV. Hunt, with whom he corresponds. He is married and has a 15-year-old son, whom he is resigned to leave behind to perform obligatory military service, in the event he and his wife can leave. Perez formerly attended a U.S. university. Age 39, 5' 7", 160 pounds, black hair. If outside of Cuba, Perez could be used as an access agent to Cuban officials, as his opposition to the regime is known to only a few friends. — Poss def

DOB: c. 1932 — 8. *Lopez, Mirta. Instructor of Child Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Never makes

Possible defector

FORM 8-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OCMA-22,232

pg 3

political comments but does plan to leave Cuba. In process of divorcing her husband, a physician for the Ministry of the Interior. They have two four- or five-year-old children. [illegible] is a mulatto, age 34, 5' 7", 145 pounds, black hair. She would be of little operational use, for she is too lazy to arrange travel outside of Cuba or to work against it.

DOB: c. 1936 — √H. F *Sanchez, Isidoro. Instructor/intern of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Has an official post, possibly secretary of the Communist Youth, at the University of Havana, but actually plans to defect through obtaining a scholarship to study abroad, probably in England. The scholarship was authorized by the Cuban Government in September 1966. Sanchez is intelligent, discreet, and anti-Castro. He is a bachelor, 30 years of age, 5' 4", 130 pounds, black hair. It is virtually a certainty that Sanchez will defect while outside of Cuba. There would be an excellent chance of recruitment for use as an access agent. — Probable defector

DOB: C.1932 — I. F *Acevedo (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Worked to correct ills of the regime, now disillusioned, depressed, and criticizes the regime in public. Courageous and combative personality. Married, several small children. Brother of Miriam Acevedo, professional singer who represents Cuba in international events. Age 34, 5' 7", 150 pounds, brown hair. If abroad with family would probably defect and could be used as an access agent. — Possible defector

201-756158 — J. FR *ABDO Canasi, Jorge. Head of the Psychiatric Department of the National Hospital, Assistant Professor at the University of Havana Medical School. See paragraph 1 of OCMA-22,121, dated 30 December 1966.

201-107564

~~201-[illegible]~~ Sex: F — √K. FR *Frayde, Marta. Former director of the National Hospital, former delegate to UNESCO, Paris. Frayde told Cristina Cunill that she is completely anti-regime, that she personally told Fidel Castro that Communism is ... (obscenity) and that Castro just laughed by way of reply. She is rumored to be protected by Castro, who has allowed her to dedicate herself exclusively to private practice. AMCIL-1 has never met Frayde personally but believes that she would probably defect and undergo debriefing. — Possible defector

DOB: C. 1928, Sex: F — √L. F *GARCIA Mauri, Clotilde. Assistant Professor of Medical Psychology of the National Hospital and of the University of Havana Medical School. She is single, sexually promiscuous, and has never revealed her political affiliation. Age 38, 5' 6", 125 pounds, brown (but changeable) hair.

DOB: c. 1933 — √M. F *Grau, Miguel. Instructor of Psychiatry of the National Hospital/University of Havana Medical School. He is currently attempting to obtain a scholarship to study abroad in order to defect. Married, two children. Wife is sharply critical of the regime and wishes to leave soonest. Grau is the nephew of Pedro GRAU Triana, who reportedly made millions of dollars in construction and real estate before Castro came to power. Pedro Grau now lives abroad. He gave Miguel a European trip upon graduation from medical school. Miguel;s wife is also from a wealthy family. Age 33, 5' 8", 140 pounds, brown hair. Once outside Cuba with his family, Grau would defect and possibly could be used as an access agent. — Probable defector

DOB: c. 1933 — √N. F *MUNIZ Leon (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Mazorra Hospital of National Psychiatry. Openly anti-regime, Muniz has requested permission

He requested permission to emigrate.

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

4 P. 7

to emigrate." He is married, has no children. Age 33, 5' 5", 150 pounds, light brown hair. Once allowed to leave, he could be debriefed, but his open request to emigrate would make any use as an access agent impossible in spite of his motivation.

D.B: c.1932 ✓5. F *Esteves, Carlos. Psychiatrist of the Civil Hospital of Cienfuegos. Secretly but firmly a [illegible]. Married, two or three children. Age 34, 5' 7", [illegible] pounds, blond hair. AMTOIL-1 has had no contact with him since 1962.

4. Cuban Physicians Whose Defection is Dubious but not Impossible

DOB: c.1924 A. F *Collado (fnu). Official psychiatrist of the Cuban Air Force and formerly of the National Hospital psychiatric staff. He is constantly poking fun at the Cuban Government in sparkling wit at parties that he regularly gives for friends in the Arts, whom he seems to cultivate. He is a close friend of Cristina Cunill and Marta Frayde, to whom he has admitted feigning approval of the Cuban Government. He is cultured and loves the good life. He was first married to Eva FREJA Ville, a French national formerly a professor at the Alliance Francaise in Havana, who is now living in France since their amicable divorce in 1961. He has one child. Collado moves in high government circles. Age 42, 5' 7", 150 pounds, black hair. He might defect, if shown a good offer, in spite of traditionally seeking not to complicate his life. He can be reached through his former wife, with whom he maintains correspondence. AMTOIL-1 is trying to obtain her exact address.

DOB: c.1927 201-741217

[redacted] ✓B. FR *Torroella, Gustavo. Professor of Psychology, University of Havana Medical School, and head of vocational guidance for the University of Havana. His brother-in-law is Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister. Torroella is [illegible] counselor for UNESCO with alternating postings in Paris and Havana. In 1960 he told AMTOIL-1 that he intended to publish books outside of Cuba in order to have income and pretexts to justify travel and residence abroad. In AMTOIL-1's opinion, Torroella studied and failed to justify Marxism, and obtained his current UNESCO posting so as to be out of Cuba. His wife Marta Kouri de Torroella and two daughters are presently in Havana. Age 39, 5' 8", 170 pounds, light brown hair. It is very doubtful that Torroella will openly break with the regime, even though he establishes a semi- or permanent residence abroad, but it might be worth approaching him when he has his family abroad because of his knowledge of, and access to, key Cuban Government officials.

DOB: c.1929 ✓C. F *Palacios, Claudio. National Coordinator of Psychiatric Care, Ministry of Public Health, and full Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Mazorra Hospital. He is extremely clever, intelligent, materialistic, and ambitious. He maneuvered himself into an important post and a wealthy private practice. He is a candidate for the Cuban Communist Party, which probably will be denied him because of a previous internship in a New York hospital, according to the opinion of Jorge Abdo Canasi, a former partner in medical practice. Palacios was a delegate to an international congress of psychiatry in Madrid in 1966. He has two daughters by a first marriage; no children by the second. Age 35-40, 5' 5", 170 pounds, brown hair. Defection is doubtful, but it is felt that Palacios would give serious consideration to the offer of any post that would enhance his professional career. 7?

DOB: c.1902 ✓D. F *Cordoba, Armando de. National Coordinator of Psychiatric Teaching, Ministry of Public Health, full professor, head of the Psychiatric Department of the University of Havana Medical School/Fajardo Hospital. An aristocrat whose effortless adaptation to the regime surprised his cohorts, Cordoba is intelligent, ambitious for power and prestige. He is married, no children. His brother

TI pg. 5 TI

is a former ambassador to Great Britain, who fears that the regime's excesses will strike him. Age 64, 5' 6", 140 pounds, brown hair. Because of his age and position, defection is highly doubtful, but he would consider any post that would enhance his international prestige; however, it is more likely that he will continue to prefer being an important man in a little country.

5. Cuban Physicians Whose Defection is Considered Virtually Impossible

DoB [illegible]

A. F •Rodriguez, Luis. Professor and Director of the University of Havana Medical School, he has been a member of the Communist Party in Cuba since a youth. He is intelligent, personable, and dedicated to his career. He is married and has three or four children. Age 36, 5' 7", 180 pounds, black hair.

DoB c.1921

√B. F •IRIZASTEGUI Dupuy, Fidel. Assistant Professor of the University of Havana Medical School. Member of the Cuban Communist Party. He is quite satisfied with the present situation - is well off financially, has prestige, and travels regularly. He was a delegate to the medical congress in India in 1966. He is married to Noemi Valdes, a professor of the School of Psychology, University of Havana. Age 35-40, 5' 6", 150 pounds, mulatto.

DoB: 1932

√C. •MIYAR Barrueco, Jose. Rector of the University of Havana since August 1966. He made a rapid rise from Director of Rural Medicine to Vice-Minister of Public Health. He is credited with professional skill as an administrator and public relations type and is said to be a traveling companion of Fidel Castro. He is not believed to be a member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Miyar is married and is a former classmate of AMTOIL-1's. Age 34, 5' 8", 170 pounds, black hair.

DoB: 1919

√D. F •DORTICOS Torrado, Francisco. Dean of the Medical School, University of Havana, and brother of the President of Cuba. AMTOIL-1 worked closely with him for six months in a Cienfuegos hospital and describes him as straightforward, honest, hard working, and one who avoids politics. His present post was forced upon him by his brother. He is married, and one of his sons is active in the Communist Youth. Age 47, height 5' 7", 180 pounds, grey-black hair.

DoB: c.1930

√E. F •ROJAS Ochoa, Francisco. Director of National Statistics and member of the Communist Party of Cuba. He represented Cuba as a delegate to the World Health Scholarship in Mexico in 1965 and to a 1966 conference concerning sanitation in Washington, D.C. He was a university classmate of AMTOIL-1's. Age 35-36, 5' 4", 140 pounds, brown hair, balding.

cit: Brazil
DoB: c.1934

F. X •Modesto (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. A Brazilian citizen resident in Cuba since 1961, Modesto is a fanatically anti-American Marxist who broadcasts to Brazil for Radio Havana. He swears he will participate in the violent overthrow of the Brazilian Government, once he returns from Cuba in 1967 via Mexico. He is married to a Cuban whose wealthy father lives in Mexico but travels frequently to Cuba. Age 30-35, 6', 200 pounds, black hair, mulatto. In AMTOIL-1's opinion, Modesto is a dangerous political fanatic, about whom the Brazilian authorities should be warned.

[redacted]
DoB: c.1908
cit: Cuba

201-775411

√G. F •Galigarcia, Jose. Director of the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Havana/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Full professor. Attempts to ignore the realities of Cuban life but has been emotionally depressed by them. Age 58-60. Will stay in Cuba where he is assured of material comfort in return for being integrated with the regime.

DoB: c.1927

√H. F •RODRIGUEZ Rivero, Alipio. Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Fully

201-805766

5 6 11

integrated with the regime. His brother Luis is Director of the University of Havana Medical School. Alipio Rodriguez is ill; he underwent spinal fusion in East Germany in 1965. He is married and has one child. Age 35-40, 5' 7", 130 pounds, light mulatto.

DB. c. 1934 ✓I. •VALDES Mier (fnu). Instructor of Psychiatry, University of Havana Medical School/Calixto Garcia Hospital. Valdes, a mulatto, is not a Communist but follows the dictates of the regime. Age 30-35, 5' 9", 150 pounds, black hair.

DB. 1931 ✓J. •CORNEJO, Carlos. Psychiatrist at the Matanzas Civil Hospital. Cornejo, a recent graduate, is apolitical and so happy with his 600-peso-a-month salary that he will stay in Cuba. He is a bachelor, age 35, 5' 7", 150 pounds, black hair.

DB: 1917 ✓K. •RODRIGUEZ, Anibal. Professor of the School of Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School. He is an opportunist, fully integrated with the regime. His brother is Mariano Rodriguez, the well known Cuban painter. Anibal is married and has several children. Age 49, 5' 6", 140 pounds, black hair.

DB: 1920 ✓L. •GONZALEZ Martin, Diego. Instructor in the School of Medical Psychology, University of Havana Medical School. He is married, a former journalist, and member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Age 46, 5' 7", 170 pounds, black hair.

DOB: c1928 ✓M. •BARRAL, Fernando. Psychiatrist of the Ministry of the Interior and former Instructor of Psychiatry at the University of Havana Medical School Calixto Garcia Hospital. A convinced Marxist-Leninist (and Castroite), he nevertheless was sharply critical of the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, since he is of Hungarian descent. He is currently the director of psychiatric treatment for personnel of the Ministry of the Interior. His clinic is at the corner of Avenida de los Presidentes and 19th Street, Havana, in the building formerly occupied by the Brazilian Embassy. Barral is a skilled and intelligent psychiatrist who is assisted in his work by Dr. Abilio DIAZ Abascal, a Communist. Barral is divorced from a Hungarian-born physician and is now married to a luxury-loving medical student many years his junior. Age 35-40, 5' 8", 150 pounds, brown hair.

201-346662

~~[illegible]~~? DOB: c1928 ✓N. •DIAZ Abascal, Abilio. A recently graduated psychiatrist, he is an assistant to Dr. Fernando Barral in the psychiatric department of a clinic in Havana for personnel of the Ministry of the Interior. He is ignorant and illogical, constantly bragging of revolutionary experiences with Castro in the mountains. Age 35-40, 5' 4", 140 pounds, blond hair.

DOB: c 1911 201-112630

✓O. •VILLA Landa, Florencio. Visiting professor at the Naval Hospital and the University of Oriente in Santiago de Cuba from September 1965 to June 1966. A lifelong Communist, Florencio has a brother who is the physician for the Cuban Embassy in Madrid. Both brothers were born in Spain. Age 45-50, 5' 6", 140 pounds, black hair.

DOB 1916 201-771754

P. •Araujo, Leopoldo. President of the Cuban Psychiatrists' Association and Professor/Assistant Director of the Department of Medical Psychology, University of Havana Medical School. He is fully integrated with the regime but held important posts, such as head of the Psychiatrists' Association, under Batista as well. Araujo is married to Elsa Praderes, President of the Association of Cuban Psychologists. One of two or three daughters, Loipa ARAUJO Praderes, is with the Cuban National Ballet and married to a Russian-born ballet dancer. Age 50, height 5' 7", 160 pounds, black hair.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	CONFIDENTIAL	CEWA-22,232

DOB: 1916   201-022396

[redacted] 6. Bustamante, Jose Angel. Full professor and head of the Department of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana Medical School. He is fully integrated with the regime, but it is believed that he is not a member of the Communist Party of Cuba. Bustamante is materialistic and a political maneuverer who held important posts under Batista as well. He travels regularly. He is married to Maria Luisa Colombie, a professor of Spanish for the Ministry of Education, and they have one son about 25 years old. Age 50, 5' 6", 150 pounds, black hair.

Ernest P. Bybee
Ernest P. Bybee

for Floyd R. Miedema

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 7

[illegible] FROM CUBA [illegible] MEXICO -- Mexico City, [illegible] 1966

Following were among the Mexicans who returned to Mexico City from Havana on 4 September: Olga Campos Peon, Manuel [illegible], Yuri Socarras de Romero, Enrique Garza Trevino, Jesus [illegible] Garcia, Marta Lopez Portillo de Tamayo, Luisa Gomez [illegible], [illegible] Sandoval, and Juan M. [illegible] and his brother [illegible].

Luis Angel Ortiz Monasterio, Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez, [illegible] Gonzalez Arroyo, [illegible], and Catalina Eibenschutz de [illegible] and his children Julia and Pablo left Mexico City for [illegible] on 4 September.

MEXICAN RESIDENTS UNION ELECTS NEW OFFICERS -- Havana, El Mundo, 30 August 1966

The Union of Mexican Residents in Cuba elected new officers. Chosen president was Humberto Espino-Barros Ramirez; other officers are Eduardo Canudas, Carlos Noyola, Miguel Kiriev and Amira [illegible] de Costa.

CUBANS ATTEND CONGRESSES IN WESTERN EUROPE -- Havana, El Mundo, 30 August 1966

Leaving for Madrid were Cuban doctors Claudio Palacios, Angel Lopez Valles, Rafael Larragoiti, Jesus Suarez Ramos and Rene Yodu, who along with Cubans Leopoldo Araujo and Jose Angel Bustamante, who are already in Europe, will participate in the Fourth World Congress of Psychiatry, which will be held from 5 to 11 September.

Doctor Julio Martinez Paez left for France where he will attend the Tenth World Congress on Orthopedics and Traumatology from 4 to 9 September. He will join Doctor Rodrigo Alvarez who already is in Paris.

Cuban Doctor Ubaldo Farnot, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, will travel to Spain, Great Britain, Sweden, and Norway under a scholarship to widen his knowledge in his fields.

14-00000

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] 9 22 38 Z CITE DIRECTOR - 34227 [redacted]

9 Sept 66

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, GERMANY,

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF MADRID 9088 (IN 92840)

AS ...
ABSTRACT X INDEX X

3P

1. TYPIC DESK TRACES SUBJS REF:

A. DR. JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMENTE O'LEARY HARD CORE COMMIE AT LEAST TWENTY YEARS AND DO NOT BELIEVE HE VULNERABLE ANY PITCH.

(201-771754) ze

B. DR LEOPOLDO ARAUJO WAS ONE OF DIRECTORS MEDICAL COLLEGE IN HAVANA AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEDICAL MEN CUBA. ~~ROSE TO THIS~~ POSITION OUT OF COMPARATIVE OBSCURITY. HE COMMIE OF LONG STANDING AND CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF TOP COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. ~~DR.~~ LUIS YODU PREVEZ: ONLY TRACES SHOW HE TRAVELED CZECHOSLOVAKIA '61 AND '62.

D. DR. RAFAEL J. LARRAGOITI, BORN 9/8/12, MATANZAS, CUBA. GRADUATE UNIVERSITY HAVANA '40. '40 - '43 INTERNED CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. '43 - '46 RESIDENT IN DEPT NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASES UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL. TOOK POST GRADUATE TRAINING IN ILLINOIS AT

201-022396

9 Sept 66

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SECRET Page 2. CITE DIRECTOR 34227

TO

PSYCHIATRIC AND NEUROLOGICAL INSITITUTE WHERE ALSO STUDIED ELECTRO-ENCEPHALOGRAM. LICENSED PRACTICE CUBA. PSYCHIATRIST AT CASA DE SALUD, COVEDANGA FROM '48 TO DATE. WAS IN PRIVATE PRACTICE TEACHING UNIVERSITY HAVANA FROM 1943 TO 1946, PROFESSOR EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY AT MAZORRA HOSPITAL DE MENTES DE CUBA FROM 1945 TO AT LEAST 1963. MEMBER CUBAN PSYCHIATRIC SOCIETY. PUBLISHED ARTICLES IN THERAPEUTICAL DIA 1943 AND IN REVIEW MEDICAL CIRCULATION FOR CUBA 1945. ADDRESS CALLE 22 NUMBER 273 ALTO VEDADO, HAVANA.

E. DR JORGE LOPEZ* VALDES PSYCHIATRIC SPECIALIST IN DEPENDIENTES DEL COMERCIO HOSPITAL. ONE TRACE LISTS JOSE LOPEZ VALDES SCHEDULED ATTEND SPECIAL TRAINING IN ORGANIC FUNCTIONS IN PSYCHIATRIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN USSR FOR TWO YEARS. INFO DTD OCT '63.

F. DR. GERARDO NOGUEIRA* RIVERO BORN HAVANA 27 JAN '18. GRADUATED IN MEDICINE FROM UNIV HAVANA. DIRECTOR SANITARY UNIT MARIANAO '44 TO '47. WORKS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY. WAS ASSISTANT CLINIC ANGEL ABELLI FOR CHILDREN. PODIATRIST. ALSO INVOLVED IN TROPICAL AND PARASITIC MEDICINE. BROTHER, AMGERM-1, TERMINATED JAN '64 FOR NON PRODUCTIVITY.

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(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) Page 3.

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 34227

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NOT:

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6 Jun 65 IN 31453

S E C R E T 061143Z CITE MADRID 3294

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS JMWAVE

KEYWAY PBRUMEN MHAPRON

QUDOZE 30 MAY REPORTS ARAUJO (FNU) TRAVELING TO PRAGUE AS CUBAN DELEGATE TO CP CONGRESS. TRAVEL LIST SHOWS ONE LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERNAL, CUBAN DIPLOMAT, LEFT MADRID FOR PARIS 1 JUNE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-771754

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Cuba | REPORT NO. 00-K-323/08240-66

List of Psychiatrists Who Have Attended Medical Congresses and Lectures in the Sino Soviet Bloc | DATE DISTR. 16 May 66

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES (356) DCS Case 42491
Responsive to
C-SI4-50555 (closed)

Apr 66 and earlier

Cuba - Apr 66 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

Cuban national, A 17 357 520, who arrived in the US on 14 Apr 66. He had been on the staff of the Mazorra Hospital in Havana for more than 25 years. This is one of several reports. Source specializes in psychiatry.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

The following Cuban psychiatrists have attended medical congresses and lectures on psychiatry in Sino Soviet Bloc and/or other countries:

a. Jose Angel Bustamante - USSR, Communist China and Italy. He has been a Communist for at least twenty years.

b. Leopoldo Araujo - USSR, Italy, Communist China. He is the current President of the Medical College in Havana.

c. Jose Galigarcia (nmu) - USSR, Communist China, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. He took an intensive course in psychiatry in East Germany.

d. Jorge Abdo Canasi - USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

e. Edmundo Gutierrez Agramonte - USSR, Spain, UK, Czechoslovakia.

f. Armando de Cordova (nmu) - USSR, Communist China, Czechoslovakia.

g. (fnu) Calvizu (nmu) - USSR, Spain, Czechoslovakia, UK.

h. Gerardo Nogueira (nmu) - USSR, Spain, Czechoslovakia, UK.

i. Margarita Prendes Varela - USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Communist China and other SovBloc countries.

53521

S-YES U-YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible] Bernal, Leopoldo Dr.

SCIENTIFIC

CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN MEDICINE

[The following is a translation of the titles, authors and summaries of several articles which appeared in the Revista Cubana de Medicina, Vol. IV, No. 2, Havana, 30 April 1965. The pages are indicated before each title.]

13F

129

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY ON ITS LIMITS AND BASIC CONCEPTS(*)

By Dr. Leopoldo E. Araujo/Bernal(*)

(*) Professor of Medical Psychology. School of Medical Services of the University of Havana. Director of the Department of Social Psychology of the Institute of Advanced Nervous Activity.

137

ELECTROCARDIOGRAPHICAL ALTERATIONS IN THE TRANSVENTRICULAR MITRAL COMMISSUROTOMY

By Dr. A. Hernandez Canero(*), Dr. M. Amoedo Mon(**) and Dr. J. Castillo Navarro(**)

(*) Professor of Internal Medicine, Head of the Cardiology Department of the Comandante Manuel Fajardo Training Hospital.

(**) Assistant Specialists, Department of Cardiology of the Comandante Manuel Farjardo Training Hospital.

142

CONCLUSIONS

1. The electrocardiograms corresponding to 33 cases of mitral stenosis operated transventricularly were studied.

2. The rhythm variations, as well as the favorable changes in the auricular and ventricular complex are those which, according to other authors, are present in patients operated transauricularly.

JPRS Sub No 33413 : Date 20 DEC 65 16

Trans. on Cuba No. 341 : UNCL

3. Many instances of pericardic injury were observed immediately after the operation. This injury is similar to that observed in patients [illegible] through the auricle.

4. We were able to observe a fast deviation of the QRS axis towards the left, accompanied by signs of left ventricular hypertrophy, which shows severe mitral insufficiency.

5. The possibility of myocardial infarction following the transventricular mitral dilatation is mentioned.

165 CHRONIC OBSTRUCTIVE EMPHYSEMA(*)
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

By Dr. Alberto Orlandini N.(**)

(*) Presented before the First Regional Congress on Stomatology of Southern Oriente, on 29 October 1964.

(**) Resident of the Psychiatric Service, Provincial Training Hospital of Santiago de Cuba.

167 SUMMARY

The chronic obstructive emphysema with breathing insufficiency of the fourth degree originates first delirium, and then catatonic stupor. The phychic disturbances following the changes of consciousness are described.

168 CARDIOVASCULAR ASPECTS OF SICKLAEMIA(*)

By Dr. Jose Cabrera Flores(**) and
Dr. Hugo Camargo Gallegos(**)

(*) Presented before the First Regional Congress on Stomatology of Southern Oriente. Santiago de Cuba, October 1964.

(**) Dr. Enrique Cabrera Cosio Cardiovascular Department. Provincial Hospital of Santiago de Cuba.

190 CONCLUSIONS

After studying eight patients with Sicklaemia, the most important observation has been the enlargement of the electric systole shown by the electrocardiograms. This is to be confirmed in subsequent studies. Other observations are the presence of the Heglin syndrome in the two cases presenting the lowest hemoglobin level, the evolution with normal cardiac rhythm in most cases. This phenomenon is present in the evolution of chronic anemic syndromes and has not been fully explained yet.

[illegible]
14

[illegible] which will represent Cuba at the conference of peoples consists of [illegible]: (24 January 1962) in Havana as a reply to Punta del Este Conference)

[illegible]	University Rector
[illegible]	Peace Movement
[illegible]	Peace Movement
[illegible]	Union of Writers
[illegible], [illegible]on Alvarez	CTC Foreign Affairs
[illegible]	FEU
Vilma [illegible]	FMC
Joel [illegible]	AJR
Pedro [illegible]	[illegible]
Leopoldo [illegible]	National Medical College
Jose LOPEZ Sanchez	P/Medical Confederation
Ramon CALCINES	ORI Nat. Administration
Emilio ARAGONES	ORI Nat. Administration
Jose MATA	Committees for Defense of the Revolution
Jesus VALDES Garcia	Tourists

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TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, WHD

SUBJECT

TYPIC/Operational/AMOT
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 20354

Subject has been assigned 201-771754.

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

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TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMOT
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 5 201-771754

REFERENCE: UFGA-18378, 4 November

1. Forwarded herewith are Parts I and II of an AMOT Defection-in-Place Form on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Part I contains biographic data on the Source, Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra (A 12-481-172), a friend of Subject's since 1949; Part II provides background data and an assessment of Subject.

2. Attached to the Defection Form are AMOT traces on Subject covering the period September-December 1964; AMOT traces dating prior to September 1964 were included with the report forwarded in referenced dispatch.

3. No identifiable traces were found in JMWAVE on the Source, Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra. There is voluminous information in Station files on Subject, all available to Headquarters.

4. In view of Source's assessment of Subject as a Communist sympathizer and a follower of the regime, which is corroborated by other information available on Subject, we plan to take no further action on this case at the present time and are forwarding the attached form for the record only.

5. It is requested that Subject be assigned a 201 number and that the individuals appearing in the attachment be carded as marked to Subject's 201 file.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
Defection Form (Parts I & II), h/w

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/2 cys att.

201-771754

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 10 Mar. 65	DATE DISPATCHED MAR 12 1965
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111 ATT. TO UFGA-20354

SECRET

TO: AMOT-2 HH-2753.

FROM: AMDIAL-2 23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: AMCHEER-1 & ANTONIO PORTUONDO LARRIEU

Attached herewith is Part I of the Defection Form giving biographic data on Dr. Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra, who has been Subject's friend since 1949.

(No file traces on this person.)

MICROFILMED
MAR 18 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

att #1 UFGA 20354 [illegible] 201-771754

HB-2753.

No: 237.

Date: 23 Feb 65.

PART I

1. Name: **Alberto Antonio del CASTILLO Guerra.** Cuba [illegible] medical
   (give complete name, including both patronymic and matronymic)
2. Immigration No.: INS = A-12 481 172 (U.S. resident).
3. List any and all nicknames, aliases and war names ever used.
   aka "Castillito" (nickname).

Close friend and source of info on
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Grenal 201-771754
Transmittal of Bio data

4. Date and place of birth: DPOB 20 April 1922, Havana. Cuba
   his A for Birth
   A 525 SW 13th [illegible] Miami, Fla USA
5. Name of spouse (wife or husband): Carmen Rafaela RUIZ Suárez. [illegible]
   (give both patronymic and matronymic for all names requested)
   (Divorced from his 1st wife, Raquel CRUZ Flores.)
6. Date and place of birth of spouse:
   17 July 1935, Bayamón, Puerto Rico. Sex F
7. Children: (list by name, date and place of birth) [illegible] Alberto Antonio del Castillo
   (None by his present wife. The following by his first wife: friend of
   a. Alberto del CASTILLO Cruz. Born 17 May 57 in Havana. Dr. Leopoldo
   b. Roberto del CASTILLO Cruz. Born 29 Dec 58 in Havana. Araujo Grenal
   c. (No others.) 201-771754
   d.
   e.
   f.
8. Father: (give name, date and place of birth)
   José del CASTILLO Avilés. Born in 1884 in Santiago de Cuba, Oriente province. Died in 1948 when he was 64 years old.
9. Present address of father: (if deceased, write "deceased")
   Deceased.
10. Mother: (give name, date and place of birth)
    Bárbara María GUERRA Hanson. Born on 4 Dec 1900 in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas province.
11. Present address of mother: (if deceased, write "deceased")
    Deceased.

List all brothers and si[illegible] date and place of birth and present address:

a. **(None.)**

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

13. What is the date of your arrival in the United States?

1 January 1962.

14. How did you arrive--via PAA, boat, via another country? Give briefly any pertinent details.

Via Spain. Arrived in the U.S. in New York.

15. What is your present address and how long have you lived at this address?

585 SW 13th Ave., Apt. 4, Miami, Fla., phone FR-1-1058.

16. Where are you employed and what is your job title? **Practices medicine clandestinely among old patients and friends. Receives some money from Spain. Trying to enter the USAF as a medical doctor.**

17. How long have you had this employment?

Since I arrived in the U.S.

18. List your employment in Cuba, giving addresses and dates. (approximate if you are not sure of dates)

Medical doctor in the Cuban Air Force (1956-1959). Doctor in the "Sagrado Corazón de Jesús" Clinic in Vedado section, City of Havana (1954-59), and in the "Hijas de Galicia" Clinic, City of Havana (1954-59). Professor of Medical Clinic Pharmacology in the School of Medicine of Havana University.

19. List your affiliations with any and all Cuban political parties, and indicate whether you were merely a member or whether you were active and/or held some office--give dates.

"Partido Acción Unitaria" (pro-Batista). Formerly affiliated with the "Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico)" as a rank-and-file member.

20. If you have or ever have had any citizenship other than Cuban, so indicate, giving dates and other pertinent details.

No.

21. List your travel outside of Cuba, giving dates and purposes of such travel.

To the U.S. on vacation more than 5 times since childhood. In 1961, already an exile, to Spain, France and Italy.

22. List any membership in professional and/or social organizations.

Aerospace Medical Association. Cuban National Medical Association and Havana Medical Association. Cuban Endocrinology Society.

23. List your educational background, giving the names and locations of the schools attended and listing any degrees received.

Grammar school and high school in "Colegio de la Salle," Vedado section, City of Havana. Graduated as a medical doctor in Havana University. Aviation Medicine on 4 Apr 58, Texas, U.S.A.

24. List any languages spoken besides Spanish and estimate your fluency in reading, writing and speaking as poor, fair, good or excellent, as indicated.

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
English	excellent	excellent	excellent
French	good	fair	fair
Italian	good	poor	poor
German	fair	poor	poor

SECRET

TO: AMOT-2 EB-2753.

FROM: AMDIAL-2 23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: AMCHEER-1 + ANTONIO PORTUONDO LARRIEU

Attached herewith is Part II of the Defection Form giving biographic data on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association.

SECRET

SECRET

PART II. EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237.

1. Identify by name your relative (or very close friend) in Cuba who holds an important position in the Communist Party and/or with the Castro regime or in the Cuban Armed Forces.

   Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal.

2. What is the relationship—brother, son, first cousin, etc.; if a close friend, how well do you know him, for how long (give sufficient details)?

   Professional friends and associates (shared the same medical office). 1949-53.

3. List the position he holds with the Castro regime, the Communist Party, and/or the Armed Forces; list his place of employment or assignment. If possible, give the date or approximate date when this individual took this position or office.

   President of the National Medical Association.

4. Date and place of birth: Born circa 1920 (POB unknown).

5. What is his address and phone number (give both official or business and residence listings):

   Unknown.

6. What is the name of his spouse: (give both patronymic & matronymic)

   Unknown.

7. List his children by name, date and place of birth:

   I know he has a son, but I don't remember anything else.

8. Identify his father and mother by name (include patronymic and matronymic), date and place of birth, and present address. If deceased, write "deceased" instead of address.

   I don't know.

9. Identify his brothers and sisters: (give all possible details)

   I don't know.

SECRET

PART II (cont.) (EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237)

10. List any comments or actions taken by the above individual indicative of his loyalty or lack of loyalty to the Communist Party and/or the Castro regime. List any incidents possibly indicative of any disaffection or disillusionment with the Party or the regime.

    In mid-1961, we had a discussion about the Soviet Exhibition in Havana and he praised Soviet medicine, criticized Americans and expressed himself in favor of all the measures of the regime, justifying everything the Castro regime and the USSR did. (Source could not be more specific.)

11. Present political militancy: Sympathizer of the regime & Marxism.

12. Past militancy: Leftist intellectual.

13. Describe this individual—age, height, color of hair, eyes, weight, complexion; list any obvious physical handicaps, scars, peculiarities, distinctive mannerisms, etc.

    White, dark complexion, slender, 5'9" tall, brown eyes, dark brown hair. Usually wore dark glasses.

14. What is his educational background? List the schools he attended and any degrees he has received.

    Doctor in Medicine. Havana University graduate (I don't know when.) No further details known.

15. List any travel this individual has made outside Cuba.

    I don't know.

16. Does he speak any languages other than Spanish? Name and estimate his degree of fluency in each.

    I don't know.

17. Are you in contact with this person by mail, telephone, or any other way? How often do you communicate?

    No.

18. Do you have and may we see some of the letters you have received from him?

Part II (cont.) (EE-2753, 23 Feb 65, Case No. 237)

19. List his close friends in Cuba, particularly those holding high positions in the Government or the Communist Party, and give their positions if you know them.
I don't know.

20. List, with brief background and biographic data, plus your personal assessment, any individual in Cuba who might be willing to act as a go-between to contact this person, such as a relative, a close friend, a mistress, a working associate, etc.

I don't know.

21. If you are not on friendly terms with this individual, list any incidents or individuals in his life or background which might be used to pressure him. (Give all pertinent details.)
I don't know any such incidents.

a. Has he ever been involved in an assassination or assassination attempt?
Not to my knowledge.

b. Has he ever committed any act of violence such as murder?
Not to my knowledge.

c. Has he ever been involved in any embezzlements, misuse of public or private funds, etc.
Not to my knowledge.

d. Does he have a mistress or mistresses? Can you identify?
Not to my knowledge.

SECRET

TO: C-300.

HB-2753.

FROM: C-94.

23 Feb 65.

SUBJECT: Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the National Medical Association. Case No. 237.

DEBRIEFERS: C-90 and P-124.

Attached herewith are file traces on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical Association.

SECRET

SECRET

Report # EE 2753 FEB 23 1965

TO: AMOT-2

FROM: ARCHIVE

SUBJECT: File traces requested on:

ARAUJO Bernal, Dr. Leopoldo

FILE DATA:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo

Information on this person was submitted in Report # EE-1970, of 15 October 1964.(UFGA-18378, 4 Nov 1964)

NEW DATA:

ARAUJO, Leopoldo

President of the National Medical Association and Communist during many years.
SOURCE: Request of file traces AMOT-2, 12 Aug 64.

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Will take part in a Seminary on the Blood Banks, to be held at Havana in the current month, organized by the Ministry of Public Health. It will be held in the Medical Association Building.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 5 Sep 64, page 2.

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Attended a lunch offered in the Restaurant "Rio Cristal" at Havana, by the Ministry of Public Health, as homage to the 247 new Physicians graduated at the University of Havana.
SOURCE: LA TARDE Newspaper, 10 Sep 64, page 5.

President of the National Medical Association. Attended the act of graduation of 250 new doctors in the Theater of the CTC, Havana, to which attended and spoke the Prime Minister.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 11 Sep 64, page 2.

President of the National Medical Association. In the Presidential stand during the graduation of the 247 new physicians at the CTC Theater, on the 10th of September (Thursday).
SOURCE: BOHEMIA Magazine, 18 Sep 64, page 64.

Member of the National Medical Association. Attended the celebration of the Centennial of the International, held at the Medical Association, Havana.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION Newspaper, 22 Sep 64, page 3.

Report # EE 2753

FEB 23 196[illegible]

ARAUJO Bernal, Dr. Leopoldo

ARAUJO, Leopoldo (continued)

Medical doctor. President of the National Medical Association. Attended to day the inauguration of the First Seminary on Blood Banks and Transfusions, which will last two days, meeting at the Medical Association of Havana.
SOURCE: LA TARDE Newspaper, 24 Sep 64, page 1.

Medical Doctor. In the Presidential stand of an act as homage of the birth of the Cuban scientist Carlos Finlay, and the Day of the American Medicine, held in the Central Military Hospital.
SOURCE: REVOLUCION, 4 Dec 64, page 2.

President of the National Medical Association.
SOURCE: HOY Newspaper, 4 Dec 64, page 5.

Physician and Surgeon. Attended last night the commemorative acts to celebrate the 57 Anniversary of the foundation of the Hospital "General Calixto Garcia".
SOURCE: EL MUNDO Newspaper, 5 Dec 64, page 8.

President of the National Medical Association. Attended yesterday the act of presentation of Professor André VOISON.
SOURCE: EL MUNDO Newspaper, 9 Dec 64, page 2.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING

ACTION

TO

Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO

Deputy Chief, [illegible],
Chief, [illegible]

FROM

Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT

Operational/[illegible]
Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, President of the Cuban National Medical School

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 5

REFERENCE: [illegible]-17,392, 12 June 1964

201-67911

1. The following information on Dr. Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal, Subject of Reference, was obtained by [illegible]-1, a member of the [illegible] Group, from an interview with Dra. Leonor [illegible] Borja, who said that she knew ARAUJO well. Source is a medical doctor, currently residing in Miami as an exile. Her first husband, [illegible] Ignacio [illegible] [illegible], aka "Ignacio" and "Alcantara," was a member of the Communist Party's central cell in Cuba. [illegible]

2. Source reports that Leopoldo ARAUJO Bernal was born about 1914 in San Diego de los Banos, Pinar del Rio Province, Cuba. He lived at 12 Calle [illegible] in Habana. Source describes him as white, with a pale complexion, slender, about 5'10" tall, straight brown hair cut short with some grey. He is nearsighted and wears glasses. ARAUJO graduated from the University of Habana School of Medicine in 1937 or 1938 and is a specialist in respiratory diseases. He decided to enter this field after he had tuberculosis.

3. Subject's first wife was Carmen CARRUANA, a rank and file Communist. She was a teacher and had been married before to a Spaniard who was one of the organizers of the Communist Party of Cuba. ARAUJO had two daughters, [illegible] ARAUJO Carruana, born circa 1945, who is a ballerina in Alicia ALONSO's ballet and also a Communist, and another younger daughter whose name source does not remember. Around 1957 ARAUJO married again. His second wife was a physical education teacher but source could give no further information about her.

Attachments:
[illegible] traces on Subj., h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Madrid, w/att. - To [illegible]
2 - DC/WH/SA, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/att.

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
29 Oct. 64

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-18378

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

INDEX

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13378

4. ARAUJO grew up with Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, old-guard Cuban Communist, and was active in many Communist, leftist, and revolutionary organizations in Cuba. During his days as a medical student ARAUJO was a member of the left wing student group and belonged to an organization called "Cuban Anti-Imperialist League" (Liga Anti-Imperialista de Cuba), together with Aureliano [illegible] Franco, Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta, Ruben de LEON, Anibal ESCALANTE, Ruben MARTINEZ Villena, Raul Roa, and Julio Antonio Mella. During the Spanish Civil War Subject collected money to help the Communist faction of the Republican side but he did not go to Spain to fight. Around 1933 he began working in the Ministry of Labor as a labor inspector. About 1935, at the time of the March strike, ARAUJO and Dr. Jose Angel BUSTAMANTE O'Leary, with others, organized the "Frente Unico de Empleados Publicos." Source states that about this time ARAUJO became a militant Communist Party member. In 1943 ARAUJO was a member of the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) cell in the National Medical Association which the Party had organized in an attempt to seize control of the leadership of the National Medical Association. In 1959 Subject was closely connected with Dr. Romulo BETANCOURT, then President of Venezuela, and with Juan [illegible]. ARAUJO had maintained contact with [illegible] since 1935.

5. Attached for your information is a copy of [illegible] file traces on Subject.

6. Reference does not indicate whether the source of the information in reference dispatch was one of the [illegible] stationed in Habana or a Cuban refugee who recently arrived in Madrid. If the latter, and the refugee is planning to come to the U.S., [illegible] would like to be advised of the date of the refugee's departure in order to debrief him.

7. A sterilized version of the above information on ARAUJO may be passed to the [illegible].

ANDREW K. [illegible]

H/

57-1970

Date: October 11, 1964.-

FOR: [redacted] AMOT-2

FROM: ARCHIVE

SUBJECT: Report about all file traces appearing in this Archive in connection with your request on the following:

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo

Promoter of the "Comité Pro-Liberación de Nicaragua" (Committee for the Liberation of the Republic of Nicaragua).-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - 7/22/59.-

Doctor.- General Secretary of the Pan-American Medical Congress.- He requests from the subsidiary associations their sending cablegram to the President of the United States expressing their protest for the air-raid over the City of Havana.
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - 10/27/59.

In connection with Justo CARRILLO and in the company of José Angel BUSTAMANTE and Jorge QUINTANA he suggests statements supporting the Government.
Ref.: "Bohemia" Magazine, part named "Sección en Cuba" (Cuban Section edition of the 10th. of July, 1960, Page 61.-

Doctor.- Office Manager of "Administración de los Departamentos de Orientación y Rehabilitación de Menores" (Management of Departments for the Orientation and Readjustment of Minors). In an article appearing in the Magazine "Bohemia" he explains about the operation of the Readjustment Program for Minor Male Boys at Torrens.-
Ref.: Magazine "Bohemia", edition of the 31st. day of July, 1960, Pa

Vice-President of the Medical College.- Member of the Delegation of Cuban Physicians arriving at Santiago de Chile.
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - edition of 12/10/60.

Doctor.- Director of "Prevención de Bienestar Social" (Prevention of Social Welfare).- Member of "P.S.P". (Popular Socialist Party)
Ref.: José PAZ Novás - January 17, 1961.-

Physician.- Communist.- Informer of the G-2 (Secret Police)
Ref.: [redacted] - February 25, 1961.-
AMOT-71

Arrived to Mexico on December 19/61.- Ref.: 001143.- Sheet No. C0102
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- Professor of Medical Psychology of the University of Havana
Salary $409.66.-
Ref.: CC-32.-

CS COPY

OCT 15 1964

SUBJECT: Report about all file traces appearing in this Archive in connection with your request on the following:

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

Leader of the Medical College. Visits "Granjas del Pueblo" (People's Granges).- Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución" - January 10, 1962, Page 2.-

Doctor.- Head of the "Departamento de Psicología Social del Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Department of Social Psychology of the Research Institute engaged in the top level Nervous Activity) which is located at No. 37 Loma Street, Alturas del Vedado Residential Section.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - December 9, 1962, Page 3.-

In the presidency of the opening event of the X National Medical Congress held in the "Habana Libre" Hotel on the 17th. day of ___, 1963.-
AMDIAL-2
Ref.: S/N - Agent - March 12, 1963.-

He was in the presidency of the closing event of the X National Medical Congress held on the 24th. day of the month of February, 1963 in the "Chaplin" Theater, in which event delivered the closing speech.- Fidel CASTRO
AMDIAL-2
Ref.: S/N - Agent - March 12, 1963.-

Doctor.- Member of the "Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Research Institute for the top level nervous activity) and forming part of the Medical Psychology Department of the University of Havana.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - March 17, 1963 - Página 3.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- He heads a meeting in which it is informed that the goal aimed at in connection with 400 physicians taking part in the events of the 1st. of May, has been surpassed.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo", edition of the 24th. of April, 1963, Page

Doctor.- Communist Professor of the Medical Psychology Faculty of the University of Havana.- Appointed in accordance to paragraph 20/62.- Monthly Salary $409.66.-
AMOT-131
Ref.: Report CC-95 - April 26, 1963 (Agent).-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- He takes part in

OCT 15 1964

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

the 1st. of May Parade in the company of the Socialist Physicians.-
Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución", edition of the 2nd. day of May, 1963,
Page 5.-

White Race.- Older than 45 years old. Domiciled in Cuba at No.
1010 Forty First Street, Nuevo Vedado Residential Section.- It is
understood that at present he is in the United States. He belongs
to the Medical Profession. He belonged to the Staff of the "Centro
Benéfico Jurídico de Trabajadores de Cuba" (a Hospital catering to
workers) which Hospital belongs to the "Partido Comunista" (Communist
Party). He was on record in the "B.R.A.C." (Bureau for Reprisals again
Communist Activities).--
Ref.: Report No. [illegible] - Agent AMOT-14) - May 7, 1963.-

Travels Habana - Mexico on 6/21/63.- Passport 62-631.- Diplomat.-
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College and Professor of
the Medical School of the University of Havana.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - February 20, 1964.- Page 5.-

President of the National Managing Committee of the National Medical
College.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 3, 1964 - Page 8.-

Doctor.- He was in the presidency of an event held at the "Instituto
de Ciencias Básicas y Pre-Clínicas "Victoria de Girón" ("Victoria de
Girón (Giron Victory) for Basic and Pre-Medical Sciences), where on
Institute
the 11th. of March a homage was offered to Dr. Enrique CABRERA,
a Mexican Physician who died in Moskow.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 12/964.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- When the remains
of the Cuban Physician, Dr. Tomas Romay, were moved from the Colon
Cemetery to a special crypt in the "Museo Histórico de Ciencias
Médicas" (Medical Sciences History Museum), he took part in a honor
guard beside such remains.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 31st., 1964 - Page 1

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- Yesterday at
night he received a group of visiting Soviet Physicians in the premise
of the National Medical College.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - April 22,
1964.- Page 5.-

OCT 15 1964

ARAUJO Leopoldo

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo (continued)

the 1st. of May Parade in the company of the Socialist Physicians.- Ref.: Newspaper "Revolución", edition of the 2nd. day of May, 1963, Page 5.-

White Race.- Older than 45 years old. Domiciled in Cuba at No. 1010 Forty First Street, Nuevo Vedado Residential Section.- It is understood that at present he is in the United States. He belongs to the Medical Profession. He belonged to the Staff of the "Centro Benéfico Jurídico de Trabajadores de Cuba" (a Hospital catering to workers) which Hospital belongs to the "Partido Comunista" (Communist Party). He was on record in the "B.R.A.C." (Bureau for Reprisals again Communist Activities).--
Ref.: Report No. CC-124 - Agent (AMOT-14) - May 7, 1963.-

Travels Habana - Mexico on 6/21/63.- Passport 62-631.- Diplomat.-
Ref.: "[illegible]" Passenger List.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College and Professor of the Medical School of the University of Havana.-
Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - February 20, 1964.- Page 5.-

President of the National Managing Committee of the National Medical College.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 3, 1964 - Page 8.-

Doctor.- He was in the presidency of an event held at the "Instituto de Ciencias Básicas y Pre-Clínicas "Victoria de Girón" ("Victoria de Girón (Giron Victory) Institute for Basic and Pre-Medical Sciences), where on the 11th. of March a homage was offered to Dr. Enrique CABRERA, a Mexican Physician who died in Moskow.-
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 12/964.-

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- When the remains of the Cuban Physician, Dr. Tomas Romay, were moved from the Colon Cemetery to a special crypt in the "Museo Histórico de Ciencias Médicas" (Medical Sciences History Museum), he took part in a honor guard beside such remains.
Ref.: Newspaper "El Mundo" - March 31st., 1964 - Page 1

Doctor.- President of the National Medical College.- Yesterday at night he received a group of visiting Soviet Physicians in the premise of the National Medical College.- Ref.: Newspaper "HOY" - April 22, 1964.- Page 5.-

ARAUJO Leopoldo

OCT 15 1964

FILE TRACES:

ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo E.

President "P.S.E." (could be by Special Substitution) of the National Medical College. He appears signing Resolutions Appointing and/or Dismissing several Physicians.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 40 of February 27, 1962, Page 2542.

Departed from Mexico on April 9/1962.- Diplomatic Visa.- Ref.: 1675 Sheet No. 2056.-
Ref.: "Amigos" Passenger List.-

As President "P.S.E." (could be by Special Substitution) he signed minutes of the National Medical College.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 156, Section First, edition of August 14,1962.

Doctor.- Belonging to the "Instituto de Investigaciones de la Actividad Nerviosa Superior" (Research Institute of the Top Level Nervous Activity) of the University of Havana.
Ref.: "Bohemia" Magazine - February 8/1963 - Page 99.-

President "P. S. R." (by substitution determined in the Charter) of the National Medical College.
Ref.: Official Gazette No. 102 - September 20, 1963 - Page 9477.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

La Habana,
5 de Octubre
de 1964 "AÑO DE
LA ECONOMIA"

COLEGIO MEDICO NACIONAL

Calle 23 No. 201
esq. a N, 3er. piso,
Vedado, La Habana.

Pizarra: 32-9551

Dr. Leopoldo Araujo Bernal, Presidente	C
Dr. Rubén Rodríguez Gavaldá, Secretario General	C
Dr. Daniel Alonso Menéndez, Tesorero	C
Dr. Lucas Escalante Bravo, Contador del Comité Ejecutivo	C
Dr. Ramón Granados Navarro, Vice-Presidente	C
Dr. Alfredo Gómez Sampera, Vice-Secretario	C
Dr. Genaro Suárez Suárez, Vice-Tesorero	C
Comp. Clara Cos, Jefe de Despacho	

14-00000

15-9-11

INDEX: YES ☑ NO ☐
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTIAGO

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, SAS 8, S/C 2.

Index-X (HZP) (UFG)

S E C R E T 251552Z

IN48053

INFO PBCY WAVE CITE SAGO 554

26 JUN 1963
AND COPIES MATCHED

EMBRIAR-7 REPORTED THE FO CUBANS ARR SAGO 24 JUNE VIA CPA FROM MEXI: LEOPOLDO ARAUJO BERMAN DPOB 9 JUNE 12, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA, occ: MED DOCTOR DIPL PP D/55/531 TO ATTEND PANAMERICAN MEDICAL CONFERENCE; JOSE ANGEL BUSTAMANTE O'LEARY DPOB 5 JAN 11 CUBA, occ MEDICAL DOCTOR DIPL PP D/52/532 PRESIDENT OF PANAMERICAN MEDICAL DELEGATION; ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ MANZANO DPOB 21 MAR 47 CUBA, occ EMPLOYEE INRA SPECIAL PP E-63-347; BARTOLOME SOLIS OLIVA DPOB 5 FEB 13 CUBA, occ EMPLOYEE INRA SPECIAL PP E-63-348. INDEX.

S E C R E T

MIS: Add to info on all four:

CIT: CUBA
Subj among Cubans who arrived
Santiago, Chile 24 June 63 From
Mexico

ROUTING	INITIALS
FI/D/AN	E.R.
FI/D/FI	

INDEX

ZZ PROCESSED

15-9-11

26 June 63

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible]--A delegation of five Cuban physicians, presided over by the vice president of the national committee of the Academy of Sciences, Jose Lopez Sanchez, left yesterday morning for Bolivia, where it will take part in the special general assembly of the Pan-American medical confederation in La Paz on 28 and 29 June. The remaining members of the delegation are Leopoldo Araujo, the president of the national medical college, Pedro [illegible], the director of the school of medicine of Havana University, Feliciano [illegible], of the staff of the national medical college, and Jose Angel Bustamante, president of the executive committee of the pan-American medical confederation. Leaving Mexico are the ambassador of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosko Vidakovic, and the Cuban manager of the Royal Dutch Airlines, Paul [illegible]. (Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish to Latin America 0115 GMT 24 June 1963--E) (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

CUBAN DOCTORS--The Cuban doctors taking part in the special congress of the pan-American medical confederation in La Paz, Leopoldo Araujo Bernal and Jose Aral Bustamante, were received by Chilean presidential candidate Salvador Allende during their brief stopover in Santiago de Chile on their way to Bolivia. (Havana Spanish Americas 1100 GMT 26 June 1963--E)

14-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: ARAUJO Bernal, Leopoldo
SOURCE: Passport D/62/631
DATE: Nov 62

PROCESSED INTO WH/C CICS PHOTO FILE 15 Oct 65 as #501

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

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PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1. Chapter III. Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TUBE STATION: DW6

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)*

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

CODE

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION *(Clear text)*

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

[illegible]

[illegible]

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

201- [illegible]

FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(36)

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LX 320

16 May 1963

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MEMORANDUM OF CONTACT

05

SUBJECT : Jose Antonio CASAS Rodriguez (201-327702)

DATE OF CONTACT : 2 May 1963 (2000 to 2345 Hours);
4 May 1963 (0900 to 1300 Hours).

1. On 1 May 1963 I travelled to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and attempted to contact Subject at his home at 216 Cumberland Street 010 at 1930 hours. Subject's son answered the door and advised that his father was out for the evening and wasn't expected to return till 2200 hours. At 2200 hours I returned to Subject's home to be advised that he had not yet returned but was expected momentarily. In view of the late hour, I requested the son tell his father that a representative of the United States Government had called and wished to speak to him on matters pertaining to the situation in Cuba. I indicated I would return about 2000 hours on 2 May.

2. At 2000 hours on 2 May I called at Subject's home and found him present. He was friendly and courteous, requesting that I come into the home where I was introduced to his wife and several of his six children. He requested to see my KUBARK identification which he gave only a cursory glance before returning to me. He then indicated his complete willingness to supply any information known to him on the Cuban situation and personalities.

3. Subject and his wife make an excellent impression. They proceeded to put me at ease, offered coffee, and generally showed themselves to be excellent extroverted hosts. The subsequent conversation lasted until approximately 2345 hours and was somewhat general in nature. Basically we rehashed information already provided by Subject during his debriefing by U. S. authorities in Miami and already reflected in his 201 file. Subject was rather difficult to debrief in that his English is somewhat fractured and he is extremely disorganized in his thoughts. He has a tendency to develop one theme which in turn will remind him

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of a second, also of interest, which he will proceed to discuss to the confusion of the first. This problem was perhaps compounded by the fact that Subject was uncertain as to the type of information of interest to KUBARK. He grasped quickly, however, the type of information which would be of most interest to us and it rapidly became less difficult to get to the meat of the subject we were discussing. Further contact and debriefing of him will become progressively less difficult.

4. We are consolidating the information obtained from Subject from our two meetings with him on 2 and 4 May below for reporting convenience.

5. Basically Subject is able to supply specific information of interest on only five personalities. He knows and was acquainted with many other personalities in the Cuban government, but his relationship with them is not close enough to enable him to provide information in sufficient detail or depth to allow valid assessment as to their susceptibility to a recruitment or other operational approach.

6. Information on five Cuban government officials, well known to Subject is set forth below:

a. Esubio AZCUE, born about 1912, is presently employed as a consul at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. AZCUE is a long time friend of Subject. They met during the mid-1950's when both were involved in revolutionary activities attempting to bring about a democratic socialist regime in Cuba. AZCUE is married to a Spanish woman and was involved in the Spanish revolution. He was a very close friend of Manolo CASTRO who was reportedly murdered by a group of Communist left wing revolutionaries which included Fidel CASTRO. About 1952 AZCUE was living in France and is believed to have been arrested by French authorities on charges resulting from his involvement in smuggling penicillin and other antibiotics into France. Subject believes that AZCUE has about five children. During early 1961 while in Mexico City, AZCUE was contacted by Subject in order to obtain advice re the advisability of his defecting from the Castro regime and requesting political asylum in Mexico. As a

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result of this contact Subject obtained the impression that AZCUE is suffering from a lack of funds. Since AZCUE is somewhat of a snob and a fancy dresser, he finds this situation unpleasant. AZCUE also habitually has a mistress which in turn is a drain on his pocketbook.

(1) According to Subject, AZCUE is an excellent draftsman who studied architecture at the University of Habana, although he never obtained a degree. Subject assesses him as a kind man, very happy-go-lucky, but impetuous and one who "blows with the wind". He doesn't seem to have the powers of concentration or of single purpose which would allow him to be successful. Subject feels that AZCUE has appended himself to the Castro regime since it offers him a purpose in life and a feeling of belonging to something.

(2) Subject described AZCUE as being a very brave man. He felt that should AZCUE be approached by KUBARK and requested to cooperate, the physical danger inherent to in-place agent work would not affect his decision. In summary there would be a reasonable chance of persuading AZCUE to cooperate with KUBARK if a suitable monetary and ideological inducement were offered him. Subject feels, on the basis of their 1961 conversations in Mexico City, that AZCUE is not too enthused about the Castro regime and it is possible he has become even less in favor of it during the ensuing period.

(3) Subject appended that it would be helpful in any approach to AZCUE to attempt to convince him that Fidel CASTRO was directly involved in the "gangster" revolutionary group responsible for Manolo CASTRO's murder. AZCUE was a very close friend of Manolo CASTRO's and was affected greatly by his death.

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b. Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeches: RODRIGUEZ was born about 1912 and is presently Cuban Ambassador to Morocco. RODRIGUEZ was involved for a long time in revolutionary attempts to overthrow the BATISTA and previous regimes in Cuba. He was with CASTRO during the 1958-59 period in the Sierra Maestra. Subject became acquainted with and a close friend of RODRIGUEZ when both were members of the same so-called revolutionary "Directorio". Subject alleges that RODRIGUEZ has disliked CASTRO since their first meeting during the 1958-59 period. Both Subject and his wife alleged to have received a letter from RODRIGUEZ written in the Sierra Maestre in which he listed his dislike of CASTRO and among other things referred to him using the Spanish equivalent of the term "dirty prostitute". Subject advised that unfortunately this letter has been destroyed. Subject is convinced that if he met RODRIGUEZ on the street tomorrow the latter would have no compunctions about sitting down for a long discussion on old times as well as the political situation in Cuba. Subject is also convinced that he could on friendly terms "talk defection or recruitment" with RODRIGUEZ should they have the opportunity to meet.

c. Orlando BLANCO, born about 1922, is married to a woman of Puerto Rican birth which makes her an American citizen. BLANCO, according to the latest information available to KUBARK, is stationed with the Cuban Embassy in Morocco with the rank of counselor. Subject met BLANCO when the latter became subordinate to him in the revolutionary "Directorio" working towards the overthrow of the Batista regime. Despite BLANCO's revolutionary activities, Subject assesses him as being relatively passive politically. Both BLANCO and his wife are believed to have applied for employment with the Cuban foreign service as a means of leaving Cuba. Subject feels it is possible they will not return to Cuba when their tour in Morocco expires. During 1960-61 BLANCO was employed in the National Bank of Cuba. During this period Subject obtained the impression that BLANCO had become anti-Castro. Subject, however, assesses BLANCO as a non-courageous type of individual who might be frightened at the idea of working as an in-place agent. As an example of BLANCO's lack of courage, Subject cited the fact that he and his wife attempted to avoid Subject's wife while Subject was an asylee in the Argentine Embassy in Habana. Incidentally, BLANCO's wife's name is Isabelle LAGO de Blanco and she is on excellent terms with Subject's wife. Subject is apparently convinced that BLANCO would welcome an opportunity to meet with him providing he were assured that the fact of the meeting would not become known to his Cuban superiors. 08

d. Faure CHOMON Mediavilla (201-270370): In essence Subject was only able to reiterate the background information on CHOMON outlined in paragraph 5 of UFGW 1874, 13 January 1963. In order to place his relationship with CHOMON in perspective, Subject produced a personal letter to him from CHOMON which was written in January 1959 and referred to Subject in the most familiar of terms. Subject alleged that CHOMON has confided in him on many matters of personal and political nature for many years. As an example, he cited a difficulty in which CHOMON became involved during his tenure as Ambassador to the USSR and while Subject was stationed in Moscow. CHOMON 08 at that time was having an affair with a Russian translator/secretary assigned to him by the Soviets. This person's husband became knowledgeable of the relationship between his wife and CHOMON and beat on the door of the Cuban Embassy one day and proceeded to demand that CHOMON leave his wife alone. Subsequently a formal protest was received through Soviet foreign service channels. As a result of this incident, CHOMON asked Subject to take a 24 walk with him (He didn't trust the Soviets and felt the Cuban Embassy was bugged.) in order to discuss this problem and the possible solution for it. Although CHOMON did not specifically state anything in this vein, Subject obtained the impression during the last two meetings in the Argentine Embassy in early 1962 that CHOMON was anything but happy with his lot under the Castro regime. Subject felt it would be worthwhile and alleged his willingness to prepare a "recruitment letter" for mailing to CHOMON in Cuba.

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e. Floreal CHOMON Mediavilla was born about 1930 in Camaguey, and, according to latest KUBARK information, is presently Charge d' Affaires of the Cuban Legation in Iraq. Prior to this assignment, CHOMON was First Secretary with the Cuban Embassy in Morocco. Subject described CHOMON as a sensitive, slightly effeminate individual who is relatively disinterested in politics. Subject feels that CHOMON obtained the position with the Cuban foreign service by virtue of the fact that he is Faure CHOMON's brother. Subject feels that Floreal CHOMON would also welcome an opportunity to talk with him if the fact of their meeting could be kept from the Cuban government. He speculated that any attempt to gain CHOMON's cooperation would depend on the position Faure CHOMON has assumed toward the Castro regime. Subject feels that most of Floreal CASTRO's decisions are based on the attitude and opinion of his older brother Faure. If through letters from or conversations with his older brother, Floreal had obtained the impression that Faure was becoming dissatisfied with the Castro regime, he probably likewise would assume such an attitude and conceivably be receptive to a recruitment approach.

7. OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS: We are currently retracing the individuals listed in the preceeding paragraph. Upon completion of these traces, it is suggested that a dispatch be prepared to Mexico City Station outlining all information on Esubio AZCUE including that supplied by Subject. This dispatch would also outline Headquarters' interest in perhaps using Subject in an operational approach to AZCUE. Mexico City Station would be asked to describe the extent to which they could support such an operation through surveillance of AZCUE, locating his present residence and other information relative to his current activities and political orientation. (Comment:) We discussed in principle with the Subject whether or not he would be willing to travel to Mexico City with a KUBARK case officer for the purpose of such an approach. Subject tentatively indicated his willingness to cooperate in such a venture but appeared to have some reservation re the danger that might accrue him. He pointed out that he has a wife and six children to support and soon expects to be joined by his father and mother-in-law who are currently in Miami. We attempted to reassure Subject that very little danger

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would be involved since he would be under surveillance by KUBARK officers at all times and would serve only as a means of effecting the introduction of KUBARK to AZCUE. Although we cannot be certain, we feel that if properly presented Subject would cooperate with KUBARK in such a venture.

8. The information reflected above and relating to RODRIGUEZ, BLANCO, Floreal CHOMON, and Faure CHOMON, will be made available to SAS/FI in order to determine whether or not they may be interested in exploiting these leads. An operation involving the preparation of a letter by Subject for forwarding to Faure CHOMON would be simple to prepare but difficult to carry out in that we do not have a current home address for him. Subject indicated that he believed Faure CHOMON in 1961 lived on First Street, #105, Apt. 7, in Habana. However, we cannot be sure that this address is current. Subject indicated that perhaps (fnu) San Pedro y Grillo living at Anunciacion 10, 6th floor, in Madrid, as of 1961, is probably the first wife or another relative of Faure CHOMON. She is allegedly the cultural attache with the Cuban Embassy in Madrid. Perhaps it would be possible to obtain CHOMON's current address through COS Madrid. Conceivably COS Madrid could ask its liaison with the Spanish service to place intercepts on this address and thus obtain Faure CHOMON's current home address in Habana, assuming he is corresponding with this individual.

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9. MISCELLANEOUS: We were only able to obtain the names of two individuals from Subject who he believed definitely to be G-2 officers. These were the individuals who accompanied Faure CHOMON when he visited Subject in May of 1961 at the Argentine Embassy in Habana. The first of these was Carlos FIGARELLO, aka El Chino. FIGARELLO was born about 1930 and Subject was able to say little more about him than this in as much as he spent most of the time during this meeting talking with Faure CHOMON. On CHOMON's second visit to the Argentine Embassy he was accompanied by (fnu) JIMENEZ, aka Jimenito, also born about 1930 and the son of (fnu) Santos JIMENEZ. JIMENEZ was, according to Subject, at one time the director of the revolutionary newspaper "Combate". Subject was unable to supply further information on this individual.

10. Subject was shown the KUBARK list of Cuban diplomatic and consular personnel abroad dated April 1963 and was able to identify a number of individuals appearing on this list as known to him. These individuals would be basically FI leads and Subject indicated he was not

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well acquainted enough to describe their personalities or otherwise aid in an operational approach to them. We are listing them below, however, in the event some of them may be of specific operational interest to SAS/FI components. Any individuals falling into this category can be the subject of future detailed debriefing on the occasion of my next meeting with Subject.

a. Jorge SERGUERA Riviera, aka Papito, is currently the Cuban Ambassador to Algeria. According to Subject, SERGUERA is a homosexual.

b. Eduardo MACHADO Cartas, born about 1925 in Lajas, Cuba, is presently employed as the Cubana Airlines representative in Canada according to latest KUBARK information. Subject hasn't seen MACHADO for about twenty years, but used to know him well in that he dated MACHADO's sister and in this fashion met him and the family.

c. Jose BARRIAL Dominguez: Subject believes this name appearing on the KUBARK list to be incorrect. BARRIAL is listed as Charge d' Affaires, minister counselor at the Cuban Embassy in Chile. Subject knew an individual of this name who was associated with the same revolutionary group to which Manolo CASTRO belonged.

d. Manuel PAYAN Viego is originally from Siego de Avila, Cuba. During BATISTA's regime, PAYAN was studying in Spain. Subject does not believe PAYAN to be a Communist. PAYAN's wife is believed to be identical with Maria Antonio RODRIGUEZ de Payan who is also listed as an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Chile.

e. Oscar PINO Santos, Cuban Ambassador to China, is an acquaintance of Subject. Subject was unable to provide further worthwhile information on PINO.

f. Flora DIAZ Parrado, born about 1910, is currently employed as a counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject believes that DIAZ is apolitical and has been a member of the foreign service for a long time. He also believes

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her to be homosexual.

g. Juan David POSADA is currently employed as cultural counselor with the Cuban Embassy in France. Subject describes POSADA as an "arty type" who is an excellent caricaturist.

h. Manuel R. MORALES, listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in France, is believed by Subject to be identical with an individual he met who used the nickname Tiburon who was an athlete at Habana University and from Santiago de Cuba.

i. Gustavo MEDIAVILLA de la Pena is listed as commercial attache with the Cuban Embassy in Germany. Subject was acquainted with an individual with this name who was a cousin of the CHOMON brothers.

j. Lionel ALONSO Fiel is believed by Subject to be a young man who he knew from Matanzas Province and who is now Charge d' Affaires with the Cuban Embassy in Indonesia.

k. Gustavo ROBRENO Dolz, aka El Mago ROBRENO, is listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in Indonesia. Subject describes ROBRENO as a very unstable individual. Once while drunk, he shot an American in a Cuban bar. He is married to a former prostitute.

l. Jose R. LINARES Delgado is listed as an attache with the Cuban Embassy in Iraq. Subject believes he was at one time acquainted with LINARES who was connected with the Manolo CASTRO group at the University of Habana. Subject describes LINARES as a slender individual with a pleasant personality. He is a mulatto.

m. Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes is listed as Ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg and resident in Brussels. Subject stated ARCOS' brother was killed in Santiago de Cuba on 26 July 1953 during the attack on the "Moncada".

n. Teresa PROENZA, listed as cultural attache, Third Secretary with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, is related to the Cubana Airlines representative in Mexico. Subject

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described PROENZA as a cold-blooded emotionless woman who is nicknamed "the mummy".

o. Silvino SORHEGUY Matos is listed as the Cuban Minister to Saudi Arabia with residence in Cairo. Subject knows SORHEGUY to have been once a Cuban foreign service representative to Honduras and to have been declared PNG by that country.

p. Jose Antonio PULIDO y Ledesma is listed as consul to the Cuban Embassy in Sweden. Subject knows PULIDO as being a good friend of Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeche, Ambassador to Morocco.

q. Armando PEREZ Pinto is listed as commercial counselor with the Cuban Embassy in the USSR. Subject believes PEREZ is not of Cuban birth, but from Haiti. Subject could only say that PEREZ was a nice young man, born about 1935, who did not give the impression of being a rabid Communist.

r. Juan JUARBE y Juarbe is listed as the counselor of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. Subject knows JUARBE and thinks he is Puerto Rican or Venezuelan by birth rather than a Cuban.

s. Laura MENESES de Albizu Campos: According to Subject, MENESES is not a Cuban but he is not sure of her nationality. Although he met MENESES he is unable to supply further significant data.

t. Gilberto MEDIAVILLA is listed as a third secretary of the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations. Subject suspects that MEDIAVILLA is a cousin to the CHOMON brothers.

11. Orlando PEREZ was met by Subject during his tour in Moscow. PEREZ was the Charge d' Affaires at the Cuban Embassy in Moscow. Subject became slightly acquainted with PEREZ and obtained the impression that PEREZ is not pro-Castro. He is married to an American citizen, Rina PEREZ, nee Grossman. PEREZ has since quit the foreign service and occupies a position with the National Bank of Cuba.

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12. We asked Subject whether or not he was acquainted with any individual belonging to the Cuban military. He could supply no significant names or information in this sphere. He did advise us that a potential source for this type of information was one Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo. According to Subject, GUTIERREZ was formerly a Cuban army officer and would have many contacts in this area. As an aside, Subject stated that GUTIERREZ had supplied weapons to Fidel CASTRO during the 1958-59 period through an individual who he knew only as (fnu) GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ apparently in turn obtained the weapons from a (fnu) SAGARO who was a resident of Santiago de Cuba. Of even more interest, Subject stated that GONZALEZ was, during this same period, in contact with Otto SKORZENY in Madrid and Belgium. Subject could no longer remember where he had heard this information and could only add that as he remembered, GONZALEZ had seen SKORZENY in Madrid and Brussels, Belgium, during this period. It is felt that this piece of information may be of more than normal significance in that we recall having been told several years ago that SKORZENY was of operational interest to KUBARK. As we remember, SKORZENY was at that time suspected of or reported to be the key figure in a Communist/KGB illegal funding apparatus. We will check with the CI Staff, WE, and EE, in order to determine whether further information on SKORZENY's alleged activities was ever developed.

13. Raul RODRIGUEZ Feo is, according to Subject, a professional in the Cuban foreign service. Subject does not know for certain where RODRIGUEZ is presently stationed but suspects he is in Habana. RODRIGUEZ does not appear in the KUBARK list of Cuban diplomats abroad. RODRIGUEZ is a good friend of Subject and his wife, and Subject's wife has known Mrs. RODRIGUEZ since both were small girls. RODRIGUEZ was born about 1912 and studied at the University of Habana. He and Subject attended the same secondary schools in Sagua La Grande, Cuba. Subject states that RODRIGUEZ is definitely not a Communist and probably would cooperate in any anti-Castro activity KUBARK might ask of him. 08

14. Carlos LAO was born about 1923 in Cuba and is a Certified Public Accountant. Subject is good friends with LAO in that both of them worked together in attempting to overthrow the Batista regime. LAO refugeed to the United States from Cuba in October 1962 and now lives in Willernie, Minnesota. Subject volunteered LAO's name as an individual who knows everybody of any significance in Holguin, Cuba, and the surrounding area.

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15. UFGA 7428, 31 January 1963, contains information obtained by JMWAVE regarding Subject and indicated him to be emotionally unstable, eccentric, and generally reputed to be something of a nut. We are inclined to agree with this information in so far as Subject's economical theory is concerned. During his stay of almost one year as an asylee in the Argentine Embassy in Habana, Subject spent the copious spare time available to him writing an economic treatise. On our meeting with Subject on May 4th, Subject provided us with a handwritten short summary of this document. According to this summary, Subject has been attempting to correlate economic cycles with peaks of sunspot activity. He backs up his "economic argument" with reference to the Old Testament and the Aztec Calendar. If Subject has been expounding this theory in public we are not surprised that he is considered somewhat of a nut. It should be noted, however, that many otherwise sane and useful people believe in horoscopes and other similar superstitions. We do not feel that this quirk in his personality must necessarily be considered derogatory in terms of his possible operational exploitation by KUBARK. Although we have spent less than ten hours with Subject, our impression is that he is a rational individual in terms of his attitude towards and relationships with other individuals and personalities around him. As a matter of fact, we obtained the impression that Subject possesses more than his fair share of what is sometimes termed "common sense". The handwritten summary of Subject's economic theory as pertaining to sunspots is appended to this memorandum as attachment.

Attachment: Herewith
As stated above

03

GP:sab

Galen Peary
SAS/CI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/SAS/CI (chrono copy)
1 - RID/Index
1 - 201-327702 - Jose Antonio CASAS Rodriguez 05
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30 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 June at 1100 hours

1. Upon Erneido Oliva's request, AMBIDDY-1 went to meet with him last night. At the meeting Oliva mentioned to A-1 that he (Oliva) was receiving the backing of KUBARK and the Pentagon and implied A-1 was also receiving aid. Oliva stated that he has met with Alfredo Rodemeyer, the same Rodemeyer that both of them had met early last year. A-1 replied this was all before the death of Kennedy and he no longer had contact with any of ODYOKE's officials. According to Oliva, Mr. Rodemeyer spoke badly of some of the personnel in A-1's organization, e.g., Antonio Iglesias. Oliva mentioned that he had talked with Thomas Mann recently and expected to see Mr. Mann within the coming week to receive support for his conventional warfare program. A-1 told Oliva he had no objection to the conventional warfare plan and that he would morally support Oliva in liberating Cuba. However, he would continue in his own little way with his unconventional war. According to A-1, he made it clear to Oliva that he was not receiving ODYOKE backing.

2. A-1 expects to leave on 1 July for Costa Rica tomorrow. He again mentioned that Adelaide will soon be leaving the United States. A-1 commented he does not expect to visit the United States as often as he has done in the past. A-1 asked that Enrique and Mr. Archer clearly understand that he does intend to keep his word concerning the changes he has mentioned to us at the last two meetings.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

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3. A-1 expressed a desire to meet with Mr. Archer somtime after the August operations.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Oliva - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
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29 June 1964

AMWORLD'S MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Image and Philosophy

1. AMBIDDY-1's preoccupation with his political image shone thru, when he inquired whether we suspected him of dictatorial leanings. We replied, in effect, that we entertained such suspicions and inclined toward taking his protestations of liberalism and laissez faire with a heavy dose of salt. Once in power, he would treat the 1940 as a scrap of paper and run the country along autoritorian lines. Flattered by his implied inclusion in the line of succession, A-1 only voiced mild dissent.

2. Comment: Considering the exigencies of autonomy which deny us much opportunity, let alone leverage in shaping AMBIDDY-1's political philosophy, we have conveyed to him in a variety of ways that we do not particularly care one way or the other, that we do not fancy him as a chosen instrument outside the periphery of AMWORLD and - that by extension - we have no intention of promoting any political aspirations he may harbor. We have also left no doubt in his mind that we view his performance in the AMWORLD driver's seat rather than any philosophical streams of consciousness, as a dependable gauge of how he would be performing in a position of political responsibility.

3. We pointed out to AMBIDDY-1 that Liberation Day would find a prostrate, bankrupt and exhausted people, weary to death of politics and propaganda, craving to be left alone for a while to collect its thoughts. There would be no political infrastructure on which to build and prematurely called general elections would merely serve to debase the currency of parliamentary democracy even more. For a while at least, a benign and just executive would have to restore Cuba's equilibrium and permit her to rebuild the institutions without which a democracy cannot properly function.

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In this context, we mentioned sentiments expressed by AMBIDDY-1 on Venezuela TV deprecating largescale revenge during the reconstruction phase and voiced hope that he would do his share to see these noble ideas put into effect.

Henry D. Hecksher

cc: Policy
Artime's 201 file ✓

29 June 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN NEW ORLEANS, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: Adelaida PADRON y Cruz - Decision to Move Her to Nicaragua

1. Drawing liberally upon data supplied in UFGA 16312, we reminded AMBIDDY-1 about our misgivings regarding his association with Adelaida PADRON y Cruz. He conceded awareness of some of the rumors circulating about her past private life and stated that he had satisfied himself that they were unfounded. We injected that we knew that Jose Mole Rosales has been asked to do some investigating and had given Adelaida Padron a clean bill of health. We also happened to know that MOLE was aware of the true story and for reasons of his own had decided to withhold it from AMBIDDY-1. We inquired what he knew about Senora MOLE and he commented that she had been a "bad woman". We observed that the "had been" was open to question.

2. AMBIDDY-1 averred that he had listened to a telephone conversation between Adelaida and her former husband, Roger Rojas Lavernia, in which the latter had admitted that the story about his having acted under higher orders when marrying Adelaida were unfounded. AMBIDDY-1 also charged the ex-husband of having tried to entice his wife to participate in orgies, but that Adelaida had refused to do so.

3. As regards Adelaida's alleged illicit relationship with ex-President BATISTA, AMBIDDY-1 simply declared the charge to be unfounded. Adelaida did know Carlos CANTILLO Gonzales who was an old friend of the family. She also had met ex-President JIMENEZ, but nothing of a compromising nature had ensued.

4. When asked whether it was true that Adelaida had introduced him to several prominent Venezuelans, he denied this and stated that introductions had been made by Silvia GARCIA, a trusted childhood friend of AMBIDDY-1.

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5. Our query why Adelaida, if she had AMBIDDY-1's interests at heart, appeared to have qualms about owning up in respect to past events, was parried by AMBIDDY-1 by claiming that Adelaida was of course aware of all these rumors and had warned him of possible political embarrassment.

6. Evaluating UFGA 16512 on the basis of our talk with AMBIDDY-1, we conclude that its main source has a high batting average. At least there appears to be a hard core of truth to practically all allegations made, to the extent we were able to check them out. We would venture the guess that, despite his protestations to the contrary, AMBIDDY-1 is quite conversant with Adelaida's past history, but can see no practical gain in so telling us. He may reason that an avowal of intent to marry a woman whose antecedents are in fact as described, would seriously blemish his image and that by pleading ignorance now he can, if things should get out of control, always strike a pose of injured innocence and elicit a "here but for the Grace of God go I" reaction from his PBPRIME associates.

7. Agreement that all interested parties would benefit by moving Adelaida's abode from the WAVE area to Nicaragua was reached on the basis of AMBIDDY-1's acceptance of our flat statement that we view Adelaida as a potential hazard to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security. We based this reasoning upon numerous indications that Adelaida had become all but completely privy to everything that was going on in AMWORLD and that her discretion left a great deal to be desired. We drew no denial from AMBIDDY-1 when stating that Adelaida had become witting of the WAVE training course for AMBIDDY-1 and that she presumably knew about KUBARK support for AMWORLD. We referred to Adelaida's lesbian associates, without stating that we suspected her of holding charter membership in that sorority. We mentioned by name Aida PEREZ and Lucia CANO. When the latter was labelled by us a lesbian believed to be in Adelaida's complete confidence, AMBIDDY-1 evinced surprise and for reasons difficult to fathom almost dismay. We concluded by stressing the importance of breaking up Adelaida's circle of associates and confidants as an indispensable prerequisite for containing the threat her access to information we consider classified represents and asked AMBIDDY-1 to make sure that no member of this group would follow her to Nicaragua.

~~SECRET~~

8. We made no attempt, which in any case would have been vain, to break up the relationship between AMBIDDY-1 and Adelaida. We apologized to him for involving ourselves in matters of a private and intimate nature which unfortunately were beginning to impinge upon ODYOKE security interests. AMBIDDY-1 in turn made it clear that he thinks he is in love and that separation is not in the cards. We dropped the issue by assuring AMBIDDY-1 that the day would come when things could be seen in better perspective and that he could depend on us not to gloat or remind him that we had told him so.

9. We mentioned offhand that we assumed that Adelaida had all the papers necessary to effect her departure from PBPRIME. AMBIDDY-1 replied that she had not been able yet to get the necessary papers. We simply commented that she should ask for them.

Henry D. Hecksher

cc - WAVE
ADELAIDA's 201
AMBIDDY's 201✓
Counterintelligence

SECRET

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~ IZED

Chief of Station, JMWAVE XX

Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity

REFS: A. UFGA 16512, 15 June 1964
B. DIR 31528

1. Chief, WH requests that an investigation of the truth of some of the allegations made in Ref A report be held in abeyance pending determination whether Subject in fact has decided to leave PEPRIME for Nicaragua.

2. Headquarters continues to be interested in additional data regarding the house in the WAVE area which AMBIDDY-1 intends to purchase in the name of Nilo Messer.

3. If it should turn out that the conditions described in Ref report are not drastically remedied and continue to pose a festering threat to the security of AMWORLD, your Station may have to be requested to investigate. In the meanwhile, we are hopeful that Subject's removal from the WAVE area will serve to attenuate this bad situation.

4. Thanks to Ref A report, we were able (without going into too much sordid detail) to put AMBIDDY-1 on notice that we view his association with Subject in the WAVE area as a potential threat to AMWORLD's and KUBARK's security and that the political scandal potential of the existing situation is equally formidable. We consequently fell in with AMBIDDY-1's suggestion, made during the latest meeting in Panama City, that he move the center of his illicit affair to Managua where it would be easier to contain unpleasant repercussions than in the WAVE area. We urged AMBIDDY-1, and he promised to heed our advice, that he not permit Subject to take along to Nicaragua members of her present entourage, singling out Identity C of Ref A as a particular case in point.

5. It should be stressed that AMBIDDY-1 is unwavering in his (real or feigned) conviction that Subject is pure as driven snow and badly maligned and that he has a ready explanation for every "rumor." It would have been unwise to attempt coercing him into discontinuing his affair with Subject and most likely he would not have yielded to any pressures. Hence, we had no choice but to settle for the proposed move to Nicaragua which represents a palliative at best.

Kenneth E. Philbrook

Distribution:
4 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGW 3963

29 June 1964

SECRET/RYBAT IZED

19-124-27/3

1 - WH/SA/Exec
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH
File: PADRON 201
AMBIDDY-1 201
Lucia Cano 201

WH/SA/SO/HH HDHecksher bh 4215

DC/WH/SA

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~ SITIZED

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGW 3063, dated 29 June 64

Identity - Adelaida PADRON y Cruz

SECRET/RYBAT DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

29 June 1964

Debriefing of Russell H. Sambora in Wash., D.C. 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: DMJM Engineers

Sambora reported he met with AMBIDDY/1 at the Miami airport on 5 June 1964 for a brief discussion of organizational changes. After their talk, A/1 requested Sambora accompany him to the airport hotel to act as interpreter with an American engineer (possibly DMJM). Sambora did not recall the name of the engineer but that the engineer had stated the airstrip in Nicaragua would cost somewhere in the vicinity of a million dollars. According to Sambora, A/1 simply listened to the proposal and said he would take the matter under advisement.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: DMJM
Sambora
AMBIDDY/1 ✓

SECRET [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

A-1

AMWORLD Meeting in Miami, 25 June 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of Adelaida Padron

1. During a lull in the meeting I took AMBIDDY-1 aside (as instructed) and told him it would be best for all concerned to take Adelaida out of PBPRIME as he had suggested. I mentioned to him there is a growing number of reports on Adelaida finding their way to Washington, making it increasingly difficult for us to protect his rear.

2. I then casually mentioned to him that we had received some obscene photographs which have caused us to do some fast talking with "some people in Washington" that are beginning to have some misgivings about AMBIDDY-1 (actually this story is notional).

3. I noticed the remark concerning the photographs upset AMBIDDY-1. "Do you mean immoral pictures, Martin?" AMBIDDY-1 inquired. I nodded and to avoid his asking further questions about the pictures, I reminded him of his promise that Lucia Cano, Natacha d'Angelo (AMBIDDY-1 denied knowing her) and Aida Perez Poso would not follow Adelaida to Nicaragua.

4. During the rest of the meeting AMBIDDY-1 appeared to be somewhat dejected and preoccupied. It is the opinion of the CO's attending the meeting that this was attributed to the remarks made concerning the existence of these photographs.

5. As the meeting was about to end, AMBIDDY-1 asked me again, "Do you really have some immoral pictures of her (Adelaida), Martin?" Again I said "Yes." These photographs had come into our possession plus much more

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downgrading and
declassification

information that we had not divulged to him. AMBIDDY-1 then inquired if he could see the photographs. I replied that it was our feeling that it would serve no useful purpose other than to satisfy his own curiosity. Inasmuch as he had promised to take Adelaida out of the country, there was no sense in rubbing salt into the wound. Furthermore, we did not wish to reveal our sources to AMBIDDY-1. Lastly, both he and I know that photographs could be fabricated and we did not want to be falsely accused of doing just this. AMBIDDY-1 again asked that I inform BECKHOFF that he is interested in seeing the pictures. In order to drop the entire subject, I promised AMBIDDY-1 I would pass the message to BECKHOFF.

6. BECKHOFF believes that this (notional) intervention jarred AMBIDDY-1 out of his complacent assumption that we lack substantial information to back up our claim that Adelaida's immoralities are more than unprovable rumors. Also, hopefully, he may now have been put on guard and may take adequate precautions against blackmail of himself or Adelaida which we consider a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. If in future meetings AMBIDDY-1 should revert to the existence of these photographs, it may be best to state that they were promptly destroyed but that their also being in the possession of potential blackmailers can never be ruled out. AMBIDDY-1 should be reminded of his assurance to alert us immediately if such blackmail attempts are made since he may need our help in warding them off. He has our assurance that we would not use the cropping up of such difficulties to remind him of his failure to heed our warnings.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
[redacted]-1
Adelaida Padron
Aida Pons
Lucia Cano

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in Miami, 28 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Dream House and Personal Finances

1. Without impugning AMBIDDY-1's right to purchase a home we advised him that many derogatory reports have reached our ears concerning his purchase of a home and for this reason only we wanted to get the record straight and thereby be in a better position to combat malicious rumors. A-1 said he understood and it was evident A-1 did not take it (the inquiry) as a personal affront. During a break in the meeting A-1 went home to obtain the necessary data on the house. Within a few hours A-1 returned with the information plus a blueprint of the house.

2. A-1 stated the only house he owns is the one in which he and Adelaida are now residing. This house is located at 1270 N. E. 85 Street, Miami, Florida. The original downpayment was $6,500. The monthly payment on the house is $230. The funds for the downpayment were obtained from:

a. His own personal bank account ($4,000).

b. Adelaida contributed money she had received from an automobile accident ($1,000).

c. The balance was borrowed from Sixto Mesa ($1,500).

A-1 added that the money borrowed from Adelaida and Mesa was paid back to them. According to A-1 the house is valued at $35,000. A-1 was asked why the house was not registered in his name. A-1 replied this was done to prevent rumors from starting as to where he had gotten the money. For this reason the house is registered in the name of Antonio Sanz (A-1's bodyguard). As soon as Adelaida departs for Nicaragua, A-1 intends to lease the house to Sanz for $130 a month.

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3. Without being asked A-1 stated he wanted to clarify his financial situation since his return from prison. A-1 reported he has earned $4,500 from the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio; from the sale of the book Bay of Pigs he has so far earned $4,300 in royalties of which $1,000 has been sent to the underground in Cuba. His personal bank account at present totals $1,700. A-1 also maintains he has no other bank account in any other country.

4. We again mentioned to A-1 that our sole purpose was to hear the facts from him to prevent the waggling of idle tongues.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Adelaida - 201
Antonio Sanz - 201

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6407

FR 1-6408

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI, 37, FLORIDA

PLAN OF THE HOUSE


MAIN ROOM
BATH
CLOSET
CLOSET
CLOSET
DINNING ROOM.
ROOM
ROOM
UTILITY ROOM
CLOSET
LIVING ROOM
KITCHEN
CLOSET
BATH
GARAGE
OFFICE
WALL

~~SECRET~~

TRANSLATION

1. Address: 1270 N. E. 85 Street, Miami, Florida. The downpayment for the house was $6,500. Monthly payments which have to be madeper month, $230.

2. Where did I get the money?

a. From the book Bay of Pigs I have earned $4,300 of which I have to deduct $1,000 I sent to the underground; thereby leaving a balance of $3,300.

b. From the sale of Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio, $4,500.

c. This gave me the sume of $4,500 plus $4,300 giving me a total of $8,800.

d. At the time of buying the house: $4,000 from my own bank account, $1,000 from Adelaida, an automobile accident from which she received $1,400 and $1,800 loaned to me by Sixto Mesa. Tito Mesa and Adelaida's money I have paid back to them.

e. I have remaining in the bank $2,300 minus $600 which I have spent on other things leaving me a total of $1,700. The house is not under my name but in Antonio Sans's name.

f. The house is valued at $5,000.

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[illegible] and
[illegible]ation

26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 26 June at 1130 hours

I telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home and informed him that we (Carl, Dick and I) would be meeting with him on Sunday. We would need the following things at this meeting:

a. A complete up-to-date roster of the personnel in the organization as they are reshuffled.

b. Return of all insurance forms which are no longer applicable.

c. To at least have a formulated idea as to what their operational plans will be for July and and any requests for data which Carl will have to obtain.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓
Conversations

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

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[illegible]

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

H.D.
WH
4477
26 June 64

3 SECRET

NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO DDP, VR

valicy
AMBIDDY-1 201
Padron

26 JUN 64 16 37z

SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 31258

SENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 0176 (IN 94619)*

ON 24 JUNE AT NEW ORLEANS MEETING AMBIDDY-1 AGREED IT BEST IN INTEREST ALL CONCERNED (I.E. AMWORLD, KUBARK, AMBIDDY-1 AND SUBJECT REF) IF SUBJECT MOVES RESIDENCE TO MANAGUA. SINCE THIS IDEA ORIGINALLY BROACHED IN PANAMA BY AMBIDDY-1 HIMSELF, HQS REP SIMPLY APPLAUDED IT. IN THIS LIGHT REQUEST WAVE ADVISE ODURGE TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO SUBJECT'S RENEWED APPLICATION FOR FORM I 512. SINCE ODURGE PLAYED MAJOR ROLE ASSISTING KUBARK IN VERIFICATION OF RUMORS ABOUT SUBJECT'S PAST, WAVE SHOULD FEEL FREE ADVISE APPROPRIATE LEVEL ODURGE WHY IT NOW CONSIDERED BEST INTERPOSE NO OBSTACLES IF SUBJECT DESIRES LEAVE PBPRIME. OF COURSE WE CANNOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE SUBJECT DEPARTING FOR GOOD.

END OF MESSAGE

*WAVE will request ODURGE delay issuance I-512.

WH/SECURITY M.K. Holbik

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH (SA)

HENRY D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH

RELEASING OFFICER 26-9 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2 ~~NOB~~	INT	SS	GB
3	IOS	IMIS	AR
EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	[✓ HH]
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

Policy
Artime 201
Baro 201
Quintero 201

S E C R E T 241548Z
DIR CITE WAVE 8396
RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

24 Jun 64 IN 78641

1. 22 JUNE AMYUM/19 HAD MEETING WITH AMJAVA/4 AND AMBIDDY/1 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP CRISIS WITHIN AMYUM WHICH HAD POTENTIALLY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR AMWORLD. A/1 ADMITTED HAVING CONTROL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS AND SAID HE FINALLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT A/19 HAD BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT. AS RESULT DISCUSSION A/19 BELIEVES A/1 CONVINCED A/19 NOT ATTEMPTING USURP HIS POSITION IN AMYUM AND WILL PERMIT A/19 ASSUME REAL CONTROL OVER ACTIVITIES IN PBPRIME (INCLUDING AUTHORITY OVER INTEL AND PROP ACTIVITIES), IN RETURN A/19 TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES RESOLVE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN CAMPS.

2. ACCORDING A/19 RECENT ANALYSIS, WHICH BEING FORWARDED HQS, BASIC PROBLEM IS GROWING BELIEF AMONG AMYUM ACTIVISTS AND INTELLIGENCIA THAT A/1 USING THEM FOR PERSONAL AMBITIONS AND THAT A/1 EXHIBITING TOTALITARIAN LEANINGS WHICH UNACCEPTABLE AMYUM.

3. WHILE ACCEPTING NECESSITY MILITARY DISCIPLINE OPS MATTERS, AMYUM LEADERSHIP, WHICH MORE CONCERNED FURTHERING IDEALS THAN SERVING AS MACHINE TO SUBSTITUTE ONE PERSONAL LEADER FOR OTHER, COMPLAIN A/1, IN EFFORT CAPTURE CONTROL OF ORGANIZATION FOR SELF

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HAS DONE FOLLOWING:

A. IGNORED BEST QUALIFIED MEN HEAD UP MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR THOSE WHO LACK CONFIDENCE AMYUM RANK AND FILE BUT WHO SUPPORT HIM WITHOUT QUESTION TO KEEP JOB.

B. PERMITTED MILITARY AND PROPAGANDA FIELD BE DOMINATED BY BATISTIANO ELEMENTS WHICH CANNOT EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH PBRUMEN ARMY OR MILITIA.

C. ALLOWED SECURITY SECTION BECOME GESTAPO WHICH INTIMIDATES LOYAL AMYUMS WHO NOT UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS A/1, CONTRIBUTING TO AIR INTRIGUE AND INTERNAL CONSPIRACY WHICH SAPS STRENGTH OF MILITARY PHASE, AND PLAYED PERSONAL ENTOURAGE AGAINST PARTY CADRE IN ORDER KEEP CONTROL.

4. ACCORDING A/19 AMYUM LEADERSHIP WANTS A/1 AGREE TO SHARING POLITICAL DECISION MAKING AND SELECTION KEY PERSONNEL WITH AMYUM DIRECTORATE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OPS PLANNING NOT INCLUDED IN THIS AND ONCE DECISION MADE ORGANIZATION TO BACK A/1 DECISION WITHOUT QUESTION. IF THIS NOT DONE A/19 SAYS IT POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP MAY ATTEMPT DISASSOCIATE SELF FROM AMWORLD IN ORDER PRESERVE IDEOLOGICAL PURITY REGARDLESS EFFECT ON AMWORLD.

5. DIRECTORATE IDEA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO A/1 ACCORDING A/19. WAVE C/O SUGGESTED THAT BRINGING OTHER ELEMENTS INTO DECISION MAKING MACHINERY WOULD ONLY RESULT MORE PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT PERMITTING A/4 AND A/19 EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE RESPECTIVE OFFICES SHOULD PROVIDE AMWORLD WITH SATISFACTORY BALANCE CENTRALIZED CONTROL FOR EFFICIENCY, AND DIVERSITY AS GUARD AGAINST FEARS CREATING ONE MAN DICTATORSHIP.

6. IT GUERTLER OPINION A/1 SHOULD NOT BE ENCOURAGED ATTEMPT DO IT ALONE. FROM LONG RANGE VIEWPOINT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY RECOGNIZE REAL POLITICAL MOTIVATION MANY AMWORLDERS AND FACT THEY WITH PROJECT AS AMYUMS, NOT AS FOLLOWERS A/1. WHILE A/1 PROBABLY ABLE ATTRACT ENOUGH POLITICAL ACTIVISTS CONTINUE COMMANDO AND SAB OPS SEVERAL KEY AMWORLDERS INCLUDING AMSALON/1, AMYUM/29, AMHINT/27 AS WELL AS REBEL ARMY TYPES WOULD LEAVE IF A/1 BROKE WITH AMYUM FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

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AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 24 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMYUM-19 or Nice Guys Finish Last

1. HQS conclusion that AMWORLD interests would best be served by not opposing the termination of liaison contacts with AMYUM-19 was prompted by some of the following considerations:

a. AMBIDDY-1's obvious displeasure with the existing relationship, as evidenced by his rather pointed observations about the corrupting effects of such contacts on subordinate levels. The fact that such contacts provide KUBARK with a certain insight into those AMWORLD affairs which AMBIDDY-1 prefers to keep secret is obviously a factor, but not an overriding one. What really worries AMBIDDY-1 is--he claims--that factionalism draws sustenance from working level liaison between Cubans and Americans except in those rare instances where the loyalty of the Cuban representative is beyond cavil.

b. AMBIDDY-1's lack of confidence in AMYUM-19's loyalty. HQS position has been all along that AMBIDDY-1 is the sole judge of who among his co-workers merit trust and who doesn't. To dispute his judgment would entangle KUBARK into intra-AMWORLD power politics with no adequate basis for intelligent judgment. Either we reserve ourselves the right of co-determination on all personnel action or on none. AMWORLD groundrules are unambiguous on that score. We do not become involved except in those instances where our opinions are specifically elicited, as in the field of background checks which only by inference bear upon the issue of loyalty to AMBIDDY-1. In sum, once AMBIDDY-1 withdraws his confidence from a co-worker we have no leg to stand on in persisting that we have the right to consider that particular individual our chosen instrument in the field of liaison.

c. AMYUM-19's dual role as a ranking functionary of AMWORLD and the Number Two Man in AMYUM. Since we have reason for believing that a dichotomy has been opening up between AMWORLD and AMYUM's old guard (to

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which AMYUM-19 belongs), liaison with AMWORLD conducted through AMYUM-19 ipso facto involves KUBARK in factional strife. We recall that some of the major troubles besetting the action mechanism prior Playa Giron stemmed from the interference of political commissars. Without derogating from the importance of the ideological component in the struggle against AMTHUG, in any showdown between the military command and the political functionary corps, it behooves us to range KUBARK alongside the former unless the points at issue manifestly implicate PBPRIME security. Under AMWORLD groundrules KUBARK supports AMBIDDY-1 as the commander of an unconventional warfare instrument, not an exile organization, let alone the ideology and aspirations which animate it.

d. The AMYUM opposition group represented by AMYUM-19 clearly desires a share in the decision-making processes which KUBARK has entrusted to AMBIDDY-1. While they pay lip service to the principle of non-interference in purely military affairs, in the final analysis it would be impossible to keep the two aspects apart. Any concessions on KUBARK's part to the pretensions of the AMYUM opposition would confront KUBARK with intangibles in the form of occult pressures brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1 whose impact we could not possibly gauge or control.

e. AMYUM dissidence flourishes in the WAVE area, whereas AMWORLD's center of gravity rests in Central America. Unless AMBIDDY-1's stewardship is unimpeded by AMYUM factionalism, AMWORLD's performance is bound to suffer since AMBIDDY-1's preoccupations will always retain a focus on his WAVE area backyard.

f. The impression that AMWORLD may be disintegrating is fed by intel which essentially reflects WAVE area backstage maneuverings in the political sphere, not the situation in the camps about which we are, as a matter of fact, relatively uninformed. By striving to insulate AMWORLD against the vagaries of WAVE area bickering and strife, the AMWORLD picture is bound to move into clearer focus and any shortcomings for which AMBIDDY-1 should be called to account can no longer be blamed upon the debilitating effects of AMYUM intrigue and--most important--cannot possibly be blamed upon KUBARK once its links with AMYUM-19 have been severed.

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[illegible]

g. An emasculated political apparatus in the WAVE area will deprive AMBIDDY-1 of all excuse to divide his time between Central America (where he belongs) and the WAVE area.

h. The tawdry aftermath of the ZENON II raid can justly be blamed if not on AMYUM, at least on AMBIDDY-1's political representation in the WAVE area. With that representation effectively eliminated, one of the main sources of ODYOKE discomfiture will have been effectively dislocated. Impending changes should at least eliminate the AMYUM press and intel sections.

i. Should there be further unpleasantness in the WAVE area, KUBARK will, once contacts with AMYUM-19 have ceased, have a base for plausible denial of responsibility for not preventing it.

j. If we are to believe certain not altogether unbias~~s~~ed reports, AMBIDDY-1, through his mistress Adelaida PADRON, has become linked with the exile demimonde which moves on the fringes of common crime and which is closely intertwined with the remnants of Batista's regime. While AMYUM, and particularly AMYUM-19, may to some extent serve to counteract and slow down these trends, they are obviously unable to halt them entirely. Hence, what little benefit we could have derived from a tie-in between AMYUM and AMWORLD has not been forthcoming. Short of an enduring political compromise between conflicting viewpoints, which we don't consider within the realm of practical politics, any solution which keeps AMBIDDY-1 out of the WAVE area and close to his command post, serves AMWORLD and hence KUBARK interests.

k. AMWORLD in WAVE area had become a breeding ground for rumors and beyond reasonable doubt a valuable source of classified information for AMTHUG's agents. By placing AMBIDDY-1 and his pals out of reach, PBRUMEN's I. S. may be forced to base a major collection effort on Nicaragua which won't be easy.

2. AMYUM-19 is a "nice guy," personally prepossessing and basically honorable. He evidently and in full measure shares PBRUMEN propensity for political intrigue and fractionalization. He is intensely preoccupied with ideological issues and is unwilling to accept the absolute primacy of overthrowing AMTHUG to which, at least at this rather hopeless stage of the

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declass[illegible]

struggle, most ideological reservations ought be subordinated. Regarding this fundamental issue he and KUBARK may be at odds. In serving as our principal working level liaison contact, he has not resisted the temptation to try parlaying it into political power vis-a-vis AMBIDDY-1, a fact that has obviously not escaped AMBIDDY-1's notice. Without impugning AMYUM-19's good faith, we have reason for believing that on occasion he has conveyed our views in the garb of KUBARK criticism of AMBIDDY-1's capabilities, e.g., as a paramilitary planner and, it appears, has left AMBIDDY-1 with the completely erroneous impression that we were taking sides in the factional dispute involving AMYUM, in essence backing AMYUM-19 against AMBIDDY-1. In advising AMBIDDY-1 on the pros and cons of dismissing SAMBORA (P), AMYUM-19 told AMBIDDY-1 that dismissal would in all probability spell a break with KUBARK which he must have known and of which he was subsequently reminded, ran completely counter to KUBARK's oft stated position that personnel matters are in AMBIDDY-1's hands. By implication, at least, he may have reinforced AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that SAMBORA was linked with KUBARK. Apparently AMBIDDY-1 has not been unduly influenced by AMYUM-19's continuous harping on the threat posed by AMBANG-1 (AMYUM-19 was never shaken in his conviction that AMBANG-1 receives KUBARK support). Another bete noire has now reared its ugly head in the person of Oliva.

3. AMYUM-19's ideological preoccupations have seriously detracted from his performance as a liaison contact. As a de facto penetration of AMYUM and as a source of personality information he has done well by KUBARK. Thanks to him KUBARK undoubtedly now has a much clearer understanding of the interlock between AMWORLD and AMYUM, although we shall have to observe the course of events before accepting AMYUM-19's premise that they are Siamese twins who if surgically separated will hemorrhage to death. We owe him a debt of gratitude to have alerted us to the impending rift and to have enabled us to arrive at the only possible decision, i.e., to throw the full weight of KUBARK's support behind AMBIDDY-1. Through him we have also learned a great deal bout AMBIDDY-1's salient characteristics as a leader, of course making due allowance for a subtle injection of AMYUM-19's venom. In fairness to AMBIDDY-1 it should be stated that some of the characteristics to which AMYUM-19 takes most violent exception, even if they are ingrained, have been inculcated into AMBIDDY-1 by KUBARK. Since the inception of the program, we have urged AMBIDDY-1 to place himself in unchallengeable control of the paramilitary apparatus and not allow political considerations to intrude upon the conduct of AMWORLD affairs. Any mismanagement

therefore ought not be blamed upon authoritarianism (without which AMWORLD cannot conceivably prosper) but upon a leadership gap in AMBIDDY-1's personality makeup which even "democratic centralism" couldn't correct or cure.

4. In assessing the prospective consequences of a cessation of contact between AMYUM-19 and KUBARK, we shall have to take into account that he is fully cognizant of the fact that KUBARK supports AMWORLD. The relationship that has existed heretofore is known to him in all its facets.

a. Under assumed names, the following KUBARK reps are known to him:

Bobbie Hernandez	Desmond FitzGerald
Raul Hernandez	Henry Heckscher
Carl Jenkins	Richard Beal
Earl Rohrer	James Smith

b. AMYUM-19 has intimate knowledge of AMWORLD funding arrangements, i.e., amounts, identity of bank accounts both Swiss and New York, and related information. Unless we receive unmistakeable indications that AMYUM-19 is on the warpath against AMWORLD and KUBARK, a change in these arrangements does not appear indicated. Nor can we see any merit in dismantling AMWORLD's logistic infrastructure of which AMYUM-19 has full knowledge .

c. He knows the following individuals and may suspect that they are somehow linked with KUBARK:

Russell H. SAMBORA (P)
Peter C. KNITTEL (P)

d. Telephone numbers which were issued to AMYUM-19 are in the process of being discontinued.

e. AMYUM-19 knows the location of the following KUBARK installations and accommodation addresses (which will be given up or changed:

Maryland safehouse.
Lastra P. O. Box

5. Whether or not AMYUM-19 in an attempt to avenge imagined slights by KUBARK (such as the abrupt termination of the existing relationship without farewell) by divulging

[illegible] downgrading and declassification

what he knows to unauthorised persons, is difficult to assay. Should he in honest conviction reach the conclusion that he was shunted aside because KUBARK considered him an obstacle to establishing full sway over AMWORLD, he could easily rationalize a betrayal. Other "ideological" considerations could be adduced by him to justify actively opposing KUBARK. Whatever he may do along those lines would not be through inadvertence but by design. We have weighed and discarded the possibility of neutralizing him through recruitment. This would not work if our reading of his personality is correct. We can think of a number of deterrents, out of KUBARK's reach, which will probably make him think twice before throwing down the gauntlet. To provoke the enmity of both AMBIDDY-1 and KUBARK would be an act of defiance of which we consider AMYUM-19 incapable. Besides, AMYUM-19 strikes us as an indivudal imbued with a sense of basic decency and of Christian morality.

6. In balance we doubt whether AMYUM-19 is going to pose a major threat to the security of AMWORLD. In any case, HQS decision to accede to AMBIDDY-1's desires on working level liaison, even if it entails a rupture in relations with AMYUM-19, was made in full awareness of the fact that he could cause trouble and inflict damage if this be his intent. Should this come to pass, however, it would be unfair to shift the entire blame onto AMBIDDY-1. While we can hardly applaud the glaring lack of political acumen AMBIDDY-1 has displayed in this whole affair, while his motives in dispensing with AMYUM-19's services may not be entirely honorable, and while MOLE, his main source on the AMYUM cabal, is self serving and questionable to put it mildly, the fact remains that the final decision was KUBARK's as much as it was AMBIDDY-1's.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
AMYUM-19 201
Policy

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

~~SECRET~~

23 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 22 June 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1, sounding somewhat tired and with a bad cold, mentioned that he would like to advance the date of the meeting to 23 June 1964. A-1 advised there are some administrative matters which have to be resolved in Managua and other problems in Miami that he would like to discuss with "Enrique". A-1 then intends to return to Miami.

2. In that case A-1 was notified that we (Henry and Martin) would hold the meeting with him on 23 June 1964 and that Carl could talk with him and AMJAVA-4 on the morning of 24 June. A-1 was advised that this is a routine meeting in which many items would be discussed, e.g., the Miami reorganization that A-1 had mentioned. There was nothing of a critical nature.

3. The ADELAIDA arrived in Monkey Point as they were leaving for the States (21 June).

4. A-1 inquired if there were any outstanding problems. Martin evasively replied that he preferred not to discuss it over the phone. A-1 then asked if we intended to discuss A-19 and "his friends". The undersigned mentioned we would be disposed to talking about anything which A-1 feels is important.

5. A-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America by the end of next week.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

W

File: AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

Artime 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
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XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
AMOT Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: UFGA-16512 of 15 June 64

Transmitted herewith is additional information concerning AMBIDDY/1's home life which may be of interest to BECKHOFF. It would be interesting to learn the origin of the recurrent rumor that the date of the PILON raid was advanced at the instigation of ODYOKE and that AMBIDDY/1 feels himself betrayed.

Warren K Greuther
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachment:
AMOT Report DD-950
1 Copy herewith
Identities, Under Separate Cover

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/att/h/w & u/s/c

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-267437

DATE TYPED
17 Jun 64

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 23 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-16525

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT
DESENSITIZED

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-3/4
19-124-27/3

RYBAT

SEC~~RET~~

Report # DD-950. 11 Jun 64

REF: DD-920.

TO: [redacted].

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: AMRIPPY-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted]

SOURCE: IDEN B [redacted] [redacted] [redacted].

Source had a conversation with IDEN A [redacted], an SHE [redacted] told source AMRIPPY-1 [redacted] would marry her in spite of everything, even if the marriage was opposed by the Catholics, by the Americans, and by everyone. According to IDEN A [redacted], A-1 [redacted] has made this promise to her.

IDEN A [redacted] said the following to source regarding the attack against Pilón: "'Teti' (pet name by which IDEN A [redacted] calls A-1 [redacted]) and I spent four days in the room locked up planning the Pilón attack, but then the Americans changed the date because they suspected I was a [illegible]y."

IDEN A [redacted] told source A-1 [redacted] was willing to give up everything and [illegible] from everything to marry her.

Source further reports that an article was published in Rolando MASFERRER Rojas' newspaper in New York announcing IDEN A [redacted]'s marriage to A-1 [redacted] although her name was mistakenly given as [redacted] RODRIGUEZ (see attached photostatic copy of this clipping). That this article caused commotion in the house and greatly scared A-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted]

IDEN A [redacted] told source that A-1 [redacted] had sent for a copy of the newspaper from New York to see what the article said. Then source told her [redacted] over the phone that she (source) had the newspaper and she [redacted] then asked source to read the article to her over the phone. Source did this while A-1 [redacted] was listening in silence through an extension phone.

After hearing what the article said, A-1 [redacted] asked source whether she thought that harmed him, and source replied that it did. A-1 [redacted] complained to source about all that had happened, and admitted buying the house and the high cost of decorating the house by Modernage.

SECRET

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Report # DD-950, CB, 11 Jun 64 (cont.)

Source's impression is that A-1 [redacted] and IDEN A [redacted] have closed their house to all visitors, because both [redacted] [redacted] are concerned about the way in which all the information about them has been leaked. One time A-1 [redacted] exclaimed with fear: "We have the G-2 in our house!"

After source's telephone conversation with A-1 [redacted], ID A [redacted] [redacted] called source and said: "Last night 'Tuti' [redacted] could not sleep. All this gossip is going to ruin him."

IDEN A [redacted] told source that one time A-1 [redacted] had called her from Caracas, Venezuela, telling her that he could barely speak because he was hoarse from talking to all wealthy Venezuelans asking them to give money for the Cuban cause.

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16525 dated JUN 23 1964

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden A. - Adelaida PADRON y Cruz

B. - Silvia GARCIA Acosta

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET RYBAT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~RYBAT/SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE [illegible]
INFO.

FROM
Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT
AMWORLD--Possible Basis for Entente between AMBIDDY-1 and SAMBORA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We advised SAMBORA at a Washington meeting with him, 16 June 1964, that from the way things look to us he had painted himself into a corner from which he could not extricate himself. Another error was to have permitted someone like MOLE to block his path to the AMWORLD hierarchy. This in retrospect, however, is all water over the dam.

2. If SAMBORA is to perform his functions as we first conceived them he should go to AMBIDDY-1 and arrive at a new understanding. SAMBORA was informed that we intend to meet AMBIDDY-1 before SAMBORA returns to Miami. At this meeting we intend to state in no uncertain terms that the security of the organization is in a deplorable condition. This perhaps may have the effect of placing SAMBORA in a more favorable bargaining position.

3. We counseled SAMBORA to negotiate a hard contract which would encompass at least the following terms:

a. He would not work under nor be responsible to MOLE but only to the highest echelons of AMWORLD hierarchy.

b. Full access to all files, bases, information needed to perform a professional job.

c. The complete and unhesitating support of AMBIDDY-1 in all security matters.

If Am1 is unwilling to accept these terms or offers any restrictions or conditions SAMBORA has our permission to turn in his badge and bid AMBIDDY-1 a fond adieu.

KENNETH PHILBROOK

Distribution:
3 - COS,JMWAVE

201-267457

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW 3918

DESENSITIZED

DATE
22 June 1964

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

RYBAT/SECRET

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WH/SA/SO/HI [illegible]

EXT.
4477

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S NAME

1 - WH/SA/E[illegible]
1 - WH/SA/SO/HI

A-1-201

WH/SA/EOB/HI

RELEASING

DC/WH/SA

DISPATCH

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

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	EOB	EPTS	LOG	CA
	CI	SI	BF	(HH)
	☐		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR

Policy
Mesa-201
Finances
Artime-201
Amyum-19

S E C R E T 201831Z

DIR CITE WAVE 4196

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20 Jun 64 IN 11209

REF DIR 28914

REF DISCUSSED WITH AMYUM-19. DISPATCH BEING FORWARDED HQS. RE PARA 12 A-19 ADMITS AMWORLD FINANCES LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED, CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL EXPENSES CHARGED TO AMWORLD. ADMITS HE HIMSELF GUILTY OCCASIONALLY ALTHO SALARY ADEQUATE. A-19 MADE FOLL OBSERVATIONS. AMWORLD 2 PROBABLY RELATIVELY FREE FROM GUILT DUE FEAR EVENTUALLY BEING CALLED TO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER A-2 KNOWLEDGEABLE SITUATION AND DISPENSES MONEY WITHOUT CALLING FOR RECEIPTS. A-19 HAS NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO SEE BOOKS OR PAYROLL, THIS FOR AMBIDDY-1 EYES ONLY. LARGE PART MISAPPROPRIATIONS FALL UNDER "TRAVEL EXPENSES". IT A-19 VIEW AMOUNT NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO EFFECT AMWORLD OPS CAPABILITY BUT HAS CAUSED MORALE PROBLEM WITHIN AMYUM BECAUSE AMBIDDY-1 MISAPPROPRIATES AMWORLD FUNDS FOR PERSONAL USE, AND THIS KNOWN TO OTHERS. THUS IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR A-1 ENFORCE FINANCIAL PROBITY.

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN	EXTENSION	NO. UFGA 16512 DATE 22 June 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/MIS				
2.				
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ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
The Private Life of AMWORLD's First Family

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFAW-3514 of 6 April 1964

1. The following AMOT report concerning the not-so-private affairs of AMBIDDY/1 and his fiancee may be of interest to BECKHOFF. According to AMYUM/19, AMBIDDY/1 intends to formalize his relationship with Iden B sometime within the next few months. The marriage will probably take place in Latin America and Iden B will make her home there to avoid a public scandal which would have a harmful effect on the AMYUM organization. Attention is called to paragraphs 14, 17, and 26 which answer, in part, some of the questions raised in ref dispatch concerning ODYOKE involvement in AMWORLD. The Station has forwarded reports of this nature which concern claims by members of the Cuban exile community of KUBARK sponsorship of AMBIDDY/1. Of the specifics cited by the Cuban, intelligent or otherwise, to support their allegations those statements attributed to the AMWORLD principals themselves appear to be the only ones which can make a claim to "knowledge" as opposed to conviction based on AMWORLD's affluence. To date no tangible evidence of KUBARK involvement with AMWORLD has come to our attention.

2. Source: Iden A.

Source states that she has known AMBIDDY/1 since they were children in Esmeralda municipal term, Camaguey province, from where both of them come originally. Source further states she is also a close friend of Iden B, who is now AMBIDDY/1's mistress and a homosexual like source (according to source's statements).

Attachment:
Identities, Under
Separate Cover

(Continued)

Distribution:
✓3 - DC/WH/SA

CS COPY

201-267437
~~[illegible]~~

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
15 Jun 64	[illegible] 22 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-16512

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-3/8
19-124-27/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

3. Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress in Cuba for about 8 years, and she claims her 5 year old son is BATISTA's son. Iden B met BATISTA through Carlos CANTILLO Gonzalez. When Iden B was BATISTA's mistress she was married to Iden C, who is now in Miami also and has a very bad moral reputation. On various occasions Iden B has received money from BATISTA, always through Orlando*PIEDRA Negueruela. The last money which she received, $200.00, was when she was already living with AMBIDDY/1 Iden B has many friends among MASFERRER's people and is a very close friend of the wife of Enrique MASFERRER Rojas. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has had various meetings with Orlando PIEDRA Negueruela. Quite some time ago (source doesn't remember exact date). AMWORLD/2 raised $10,000 for AMBIDDY/1 from among "batistianos." AMWORLD/2 and Orlando PIEDRA owned a gasoline firm called "Reca", and at present AMWORLD/2 is still on very good terms with PIEDRA Negueruela.

4. Iden B used to "pose" with her sister, Iden D, to please BATISTA and in the presence and with the approval of her husband, Iden C. Iden B is a very close friend of*"Flor de Loto", Tete *MACHADO, Aida*PEREZ Pozo, a woman called Pat (La Americana) and Natacha*D'ANGELO, all known homosexuals who hold "posing" parties now in Miami like they used to in Cuba. One time when AMBIDDY/1 went to "Flor de Loto's" house he met Iden A.

5. According to source, Iden B was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, former dictator of Venezuela. Iden B met PEREZ Jimenez through Colonel Pulido*BARRETO who was a friend of PEREZ Jimenez. Pulido BARRETO put Iden B in contact with an individual named PELAEZ, a narcotics trafficker according to source, who introduced her to PEREZ Jimenez. Since then Iden B lived with PEREZ Jimenez for about a year, and every time PEREZ Jimenez visited her he gave her $100.00 for the "visit".

6. Iden B was also the mistress of Pedro*SUAREZ (mat. unk.), former Councilman of Marianao municipal term, Havana province. According to source, Pedro SUAREZ was Iden B's lover here in Miami. One time Pedro SUAREZ took Iden B to see a "witch" mulatto who lives in Miami, who is also Rolando MASFERRER's "witch", according to source. Pedro SUAREZ wanted to control Iden B through this "witch", but she came to an agreement with the "witch" so that the "witch" would write a letter to BATISTA to make him send a large sum of money to her. When Pedro SUAREZ learned about this, he beat up the "witch" and denounced her to the Cuban Refugee Center. According to source, Iden B has another lover named "Chicho"*CARDENAS (mat. unk.), who is now Public Works Minister in the Republic of Panama.

7. AMBIDDY/1 talked to Iden C and asked his help in organizing the AMYUM Intelligence Section. For this objective he gave Iden C a sum of money to begin working. In the month of March or April 1963, Iden B filed a divorce suit against her husband.

8. In the same month of March or April 1963, source received a check for $300.00 from Raul GRANDA Hernandez in behalf of AMBIDDY/1, so that Iden B could pay for her divorce. Raul GRANDA lives with Iden B's sister. Iden C was tried for having a stolen knife from a grocery store in his possession, and he was sentenced to pay a $150.00 fine.

9. Source further states that in view of the fact she (source) has many friends who like "poses", she was able to introduce to AMBIDDY/1 some important Venezuelans including Colonel Pulido BARRETO, Carlos SISO (mat. unk.) and Osvaldo * BAJARES (Venezuelan economist). Source states that, at AMBIDDY/1's request, three meetings were held with those individuals in source's house. According to AMBIDDY/1 the objective of the meetings was to get support for his plans, and the objective of the Venezuelans was to overthrow Romulo BETANCOURT, and they were allied to the National Liberation Armed Forces (FALN). The conversations revolved around CASTRO Leon. The Venezuelans believed they could make a pact with the Communists and later eliminate them. At that time various members of FALN came to Miami (source doesn't remember when). AMBIDDY/1 assured the Venezuelans he could influence GPFOCUS and KUBARK to get support for their cause.

Carlos SISO told source he distrusted AMBIDDY/1 and believed he was a KUBARK penetration to learn all their plans. SISO also told source that when Osvaldo BAJARES returned to Venezuela he had been arrested, and SISO believed AMBIDDY/1 had denounced BAJARES. In the last meeting, SISO told source that he was going to put AMBIDDY/1 to a test. SISO asked him "whether it was true he had gone to Haiti on an official mission as an ODYOKE envoy." AMBIDDY/1 was very surprised and said he had, but insisted in SISO telling him how he had learned that. The meetings with the groups of Venezuelans stopped since that time.

After these happenings, AMBIDDY/1 informed source he had written a report to the Americans about the Venezuelan problem, and that he had treated Rafael CALDERAS very well in this report because CALDERAS had given him financial assistance.

10. AMBIDDY/1 showed source an unbound book and told her this was the most important book ODYOKE had because it contained military secrets which were known to a very few people. AMBIDDY/1 boasted of being one of the few men in the U. S., who had that document. Source leafed through the book and saw some weapons, noticing that some of those weapons were marked. AMBIDDY/1 explained that those marked weapons are the ones which AMTHUG/1 has in his possession.

11. Source further reports that on various occasions, in private conversation which AMBIDDY/1 had with Iden B, Iden E and source, he said that when he seizes power in Cuba he is going to organize guerrillas to invade Mexico and other countries which have denied help to Cuba. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 is convinced he will be President and Iden B, First Lady.

When AMBIDDY/1 talks of the 1940 Constitution he says it must be defended publicly and respected as something sacred, but in private he has said that when he seizes power he is going to use every page of the Constitution as toilet paper.

12. Source heard AMBIDDY/1 talk about a book which had been published which strongly accused KUBARK, and say that he, Iden E, and Iden F had furnished all the data for this book and would receive about $8,000.00 as their share of the sale profits.

13. One time AMBIDDY/1, Iden B and source had a meeting and discussed who should be the pilot of his private aircraft. Iden B proposed a pilot named ALEXANDER (according to source, ALEXANDER had relations with Iden B,) but AMBIDDY/1 opposed this and complained that the PBPRIMERS forced him to select the personnel.

14. About 7 months ago (on or about Nov. 63), AMBIDDY/1 told Iden B and source that he was going to receive a secret training course under PBPRIME direction. AMBIDDY/1 used to leave every day at 6 AM and come back at night. According to source, the course lasted 6 weeks and most of the times Iden B used to drive AMBIDDY/1 in an automobile to a place in Coral Gables where the course was being given. Every time AMBIDDY/1 returned from the classes he talked about the things he had learned and talked about secret writing, codes, of some pens with a substance which could kill instantaneously, about sabotage methods, etc., etc.

15. AMBIDDY/1 frequently spends long hours at night in his house making up accounts to justify expenses.

16. After Iden B's divorce, AMBIDDY/1 moved with her to 881 NE 71st Street. AMBIDDY/1 talks constantly in the house where he lives with her about his future plans, about the single party, about the dictatorship which has to be imposed in Cuba, etc. AMBIDDY/1 often puts on a uniform, poses in front of the mirror an talks about invasion.

WAVE Comment: This is one of several recent reports concerning statements attributed to AMBIDDY/1 in which he has spoken of the need for a strongman to run Cuba. AMSHADY/1 reports that on 10 June Aurelio MARIN Naredo (one of approximately 30 AMWORLDERS recently arrived from the camps) states that AMBIDDY/1 appeared at the training camps, took a dictatorial position on a number of issues terminating with the statements to the effect that he was the only one to liberate Cuba, he was the only one to run it later, and that there would be no voting and no elections. MARIN objected, stating that he had joined a revolutionary group, not a dictatorship, and along with other trainees requested to return to the WAVE area. According to AMSHADY/1 when the trainees arrived and went to the AMYUM offices to receive their final check AMJAVA/4 refused, a fight ensued and AMYUM/19 had to intervene. MARIN characterized AMBIDDY/1 as deceitful, liar, coward, demagogu dictator, power mad, a flagrant opportunist who cannot be trusted, etc. Realizing that AMSHADY/1 is strongly prejudiced against AMBIDDY/1 this comment is forwarded for what it is worth. AMYUM/1 has confirmed the incident at the AMYUM office and states that, whether or not it is justified, there is a considerable number of AMWORLDERS who hold similar views now and who attribute statements to AMBIDDY/1 which are inconsistant with his previous public statements.

17. At the time of President KENNEDY's death, source asked AMBIDDY/1 whether this would harm him and he replied smiling that it did not, that now he was receiving more aid than before. AMBIDDY/1 told source that he had received a card from Mrs. Jacqueline KENNEDY in reply to the condolences which he had sent her, and a card written by Bob KENNEDY with greetings.

18. According to source, AMBIDDY/1 has just given Iden B a fabulous residence in Miami. According to Iden B, the residence is in the name of AMWORLD/2, but they wrote another document specifying that the house belongs to her. Iden B told source that AMBIDDY/1 had made a down payment of $8,000.00 and paid $300.00 a month. Source also reports that AMBIDDY/1 has given to AMWORLD/2

documents, valuables and jewelry which AMWORLD/2 keeps in a safety deposit box.

WAVE Comment: The Station is investigating these rumors of an alleged love nest being built for Iden B. AMYUM/19 claims that he is unaware of any validity to the rumor.

19. At present, Iden B lives with her two sons, AMBIDDY/1 and a maid named Iden G who is also a homosexual. This Iden G has brothers in Cuba who are militiamen and she corresponds with them. Iden G's husband is known as "El Gallego", and he is now in the training camps. Iden G has been a friend of Iden B for many years, and is the one who used to accompany her to her dates with BATISTA. According to source, Iden G knows too much about Iden B and is the one who really directs her.

20. Source further reports that the current AMYUM Chief of Intelligence, Iden H, is married to a woman named Iden I, who practices prostitution. AMBIDDY/1 has ordered the Intelligence Chief to collect information on Iden B, but all the reports he submits on her are good because the AMYUM Intelligence Chief is an unconditional supporter of Iden B. One time the AMYUM Intelligence Chief hit an AMYUM member because he made unfavorable comments about Iden B.

21. Source learned from Iden B that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez is one of the newspapermen in exile who receive money from AMBIDDY/1. Iden B also told source that the articles and declarations made by Iden J are written by Iden K.

22. Source further reports she learned AMBIDDY/1 had difficulties with the ERACORN brothers because Hugo ELIAS Martinez, stationed in one of the encampments, brought contraband whiskey into Nicaragua and this angered the ERACORN brothers. Source also learned that an individual named Raul LEAL Garcia deserted from the encampments together with 21 men. This Raul LEAL is now living in marital relations with Martha BRAVO, a very close friend of Iden D.

23. Source 2: Iden L

Both Iden B and her sister Iden D are homosexuals. Iden C works at the Eden Rock in Miami Beach and lives with a Miami Beach gangster in addition to practicing prostitution. Iden M is an accountant, is registered in the Association of Cuban Accountants in Exile and works on Miami Beach.

24. According to source, Iden B was Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldivar's mistress and had a son by him. In order to avoid trouble in this affair, BATISTA married her off to Iden C, a member of the Constitutional Army with a terrible moral reputation.

Iden B used to "pose" with her sister to please her lover BATISTA and her husband. Afterwards, Iden C continued to exploit Iden B with this "posing".

When Iden B arrived in the U. S., (source does not remember date) she became the mistress of former Venezuelan President Marcos PEREZ Jimenez, and later the mistress of Pedro SUAREZ, a former Marianao Councilman. SUAREZ gave Iden B an automobile for which he made the down payment and paid some installments until he quarreled with her. AMBIDDY/1 finished paying for this automobile.

25. Source further reports that Iden B had homosexual relations with Iden A (source #1). In turn, this Iden A also has homosexual relations with a known homosexual named Iden G, aka "Campeona", who lives with Iden B and AMBIDDY/1.

According to source, this group of "ladies" used to meet with Olga*GUILLOT Vidal both in Cuba and here in Miami to hold "parties". One of Iden B's friends is Aida PEREZ Pozo, aka "La Gorda", who together with Pat (aka "La Americana") are partners of a man called "Chucho" who is in jail on charges of narcotics trafficking in which he was recently surprised.

Source states that she is well acquainted with Iden B's intimate affairs because she knew her in Cuba and lived in her house here in Miami for one year.

26. Source 3: AMCRAG/1

On 17 May 1964, Francisco TABERNILLA Palmero talked to AMWORM/1 and told him KUBARK was investigating the private lives of AMBIDDY/1 and Iden B, because it seems it is feared AMBIDDY/1 is being infiltrated by "batistiano" elements.

The investigation that is being made of AMBIDDY/1 is quite publicly known in Miami.

Warren K. Gunther
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

~~RYBAT SECRET~~

JUN 22 1964

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-16512 dated __________

TO : Deputy Chief, WH/SA

Iden. A - Silvia*GARCIA Acosta, friend of Iden B.
Iden B - Adelaida*PADRON y Cruz
Iden C - Roger*ROJAS Lavernia
Iden D - Victoria*PADRON
Iden E - Eineido OLIVA
Iden F - Jose SAN ROMAN
Iden G - Lucia*CANO
Iden H - Jose*MOLE Rosales
Iden I - Olga*GOMEZ Mena
Iden J - Edgar SOPO Granda
Iden K - Roland MERUELOS Baldarrain
Iden L - Milagros*LEIROS Filgueira, friend of Idens A and B.
Iden M - Oneida*PADRON, sister of Iden B.

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RYBAT SENSITIVE SECRET

201-267437

~~SECRET~~

A-1 201

WH/SA 64-540
19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Review of Deficiencies

1. A meeting with AMBIDDY-1 has been called for weekend of 27 June in order to review certain deficiencies in AMWORLD management and, in this context, convey to AMBIDDY-1 expressions of Chief, WH's serious concern over manifestations of insufficient leadership in giving direction to and exercising supervision over the AMWORLD effort and the personnel assigned to it.

2. In reviewing events of the preceding twelve months, it will be possible to balance praise and stricture. What has happened, it appears, is that after a flying start, the project is beginning to feel the effects of a devolution of CIA controls and that deficiencies in the quality of AMBIDDY-1's leadership now appear in more striking relief.

3. In relating to AMBIDDY-1 our views regarding the state of AMWORLD affairs, we propose to dwell on following aspects:

a. Management Slippages, carrying over into the field of finances. Still no capable administrator. No indications disbursement of funds subjected to controls other than requiring receipts. Doubts whether any kind of budgetting still being enforced since we converted to straight and fixed subsidizing. Faint odor of corruption.

b. Quality of Personnel. Leadership bracket poorly staffed. Since program's inception, recruitment drive

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above field grade level either at standstill or unavailing. Why is it good people do not flock to AMWORLD's colors, especially after Pilon? Among reasons most frequently mentioned, AMBIDDY-1's alleged unwillingness to delegate authority and tendency to surround himself with dross of exile community which repels good elements. Sierra and Castillo, who above average, have already quit.

c. Political Action. Other than what taken in hand by AMBIDDY-1 personally, media output of deplorably low quality. AMBIDDY-1 himself goofed after Pilon.

d. Operational Planning. June performance below par despite WAVE training and Jenkins' consultation. Last-minute choice of target in Pinar del Rio ill-conceived and slipshod.

e. Operational Security. Virtually non-existent. Twin-strike against Cabo Cruz and Punta Maisi, originally scheduled for June 1964, prematurely blown and Cuban reception committees presumably lying in wait. Preliminary survey indicates likelihood proposes operation widely known in AMWORLD Miami circles. Leakage, therefore, not necessarily attributable to high-level penetration, but hypothesis such penetration exists is quite supportable.

Remedy: Headquarters will cease discussing operational plans inside U. S. and insist on passing intel abroad.

AMBIDDY-1 has consistently ignored our advice to batten down hatches and prepare for major CIS onslaught, especially post-Pilon. His so-called intel section staffed with camp-followers and headed by a thug. Only professional (Major Gomez) about to be ditched.

f. Morale Situation. Poor, except maybe among combat cadres. AMTUM-19 toying with idea to quit. Others may follow suit. Charisma no substitute for managerial ability. AMBIDDY-1's dissoluteness setting poor example.

g. "Adelaida." Clear indications she henpecks him and possibility that after one year of cohabitation he trusts her unreservedly, withholding nothing. Either

GROUP [illegible]

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refuses to comprehend or does not realize the hugh scandal potential of this relationship. Has proven impervious to low-key advice that scandal could ensue and that its full exploitation by Castro would be foregone conclusion.

4. Above inventory of major defects in AMWORLD probably incomplete and partly based on hearsay and derived from patently prejudiced sources. Some manifestations of disarray may merely be concomitant of organizational shakedown and elimination of marginal personnel. Others may be presumed endemic ills of most resistance organisms left to own devices plus Cuban propensity to fractionalize. In final analysis we could probably justify the Agency input as long as AMBIDDY-1 produces an occasional Pilon. Reconstruction of viable resistance movements inside Cuba, however, is remote prospect, especially if we conclude that target area now virtually denied to all but singleton, short-term operators. Commando raids may continue to prosper as long as we are permitted to render intel support on its present level.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: DC/WH/SA

HDH/bh

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/Exec (blind)
1 - W$_h$/SA/SO/HH - Policy File

AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

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16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMYUM-19 and Raul Hernandez

DATE : 18 June 1964 at 0930 hours

1. AMYUM-19 called to say that he had passed the message to AMBIDDY-1 that GUERTLER had given him stating that the Consejo is interested in meeting A-1. A-19 was advised to tell A-1 the meeting would be preferable at the end of next week, 26 or 27 June in New Orleans, whichever date suits A-1. A-19 also mentioned that he had informed A-1 that there was too much loose talk in the organization.

2. A-19 has forwarded to the Consejo the letter requesting the July budget. Also accompanying this letter is a request for funds to purchase uniforms, tools, bedding, etc. for the camps which according to A-19 has been previously discussed.

3. A-4 has asked A-19 to send the DMJM plans to Nicaragua. A-19 inquired if we knew where these plans are. Also A-19 added he was promised the blueprints for the landing field. The undersigned mentioned that Dick was not in the office and if A-19 would call back later we would have the answers for him.

4. A-19, when asked if the charter fee for the ADELAIDA had been paid for this month, stated he did not know if it had been sent but would check with Mesa.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed private [illegible]

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A-19 promised to have the answer when he calls back this afternoon.

5. A-19 stated that Jorge RODRIGUEZ Quesada is not the AMWORLD representative in Costa Rica.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
- Conversations
- RODRIGUEZ - 201
- AMBIDDY-1 - 201
- DMJM
- ADELAIDA

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

MESSAGE FORM

3 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : H.D.HECKSHER/gt
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4477
DATE : 17 June 1964

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17 JUN 64 18 10z

~~SIG CEN~~

TO JMWAVE

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. DC/WH/SA 3 INFO DDP, VR

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 28814

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]AT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. TELL AMYUM-19 HQS REPS HAD FRANK TALK WITH AMBIDDY-1 ABOUT RELATIONS WITH AMYUM-19. FOR WHATEVER WORTH, AMBIDDY-1 ASSURED HQS REPS HE CONSIDERS AMYUM-19 PLENIPOTENTIARY PBPRIME WITH FULL AUTHORITY ACT ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING AMWORLD THIS AREA (INCLUDING ZOLE).

2. AMBIDDY-1 COMPLAINED ABOUT AMYUM-19'S RELUCTANCE ~~XXX~~ EXERCISE FULL RANGE HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, ATTRIBUTES RELUCTANCE TO FEAR OF AMBIDDY-1, EXCESSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH ANTICIPATED KUBARK VIEWS AND REACTIONS, AND IN THIS CONTEXT CONCERN THAT BY SOME INADVERTENT MOVE HE MIGHT CAUSE RUPTURE BETWEEN AMWORLD AND KUBARK.

3. AMBIDDY-1 ALSO COMPLAINED AMYUM-19 SURROUNDS SELF WITH PEOPLE WHOSE ORIENTATION STRONGLY (EVEN FANATICALLY) CATHOLIC AND THAT AMYUM-19 UPBRAIDED AMBIDDY-1 UPON LATTER'S RETURN FROM DOMREP FOR SEEKING CULTIVATE PROTESTANT MINISTER.

4. ALSO AMYUM-19 IMPARTED TO AMBIDDY-1 RATHER SWEEPING CRITICISM OF PILON RAID PLAN BY "COMPANY" NOT CONFINED TO ALLEGEDLY OVERLOOKED PRESENCE OF MACHINE GUN EMPLACEMENT in TARGET AREA.

5. UNDERLYING ALL COMPLAINTS, AMBIDDY-1'S FEELING AMYUM-19 MAY HEAD SOME KIND OF CABAL MASTERMINDED BY KUBARK. (BELIEVE FLAT

RELEASING OFFICER 17-7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM

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CONF: INFO

PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE DIR

DISAVOWALS OF ANY INTENT UNSEAT OR WEAKEN AUTHORITY AMBIDDY-1 MADE SOME IMPRESSION).

6. AMBIDDY-1'S MOST CONVINCING STRICTURE OF AMYUM-19'S LEADERSHIP, IS TENDENCY TO AVOID CLEARCUT DECISIONS (OR AT LEAST FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THEM). OUR OWN IMPRESSION, AMYUM-19 NOT VERY SKILLFUL IN HANDLING AMBIDDY-1, FAILING PANDER TO HIS VANITIES AND TENDING SATIATE HIM WITH BAD NEWS INSTEAD OF MIXING DOSAGES.

7. DO NOT WISH ADJUDICATE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WHICH MOSTLY TRIVIAL. ASSURE AMYUM-19 HQS AWARE THERE TWO SIDES TO EVERYTHING AND OUR SOLE CONCERN RESTORE TRANQUILITY AND ASSURE PROPER FUNCTIONING AMWORLD.

8. HQS REPS OBTAINED AMBIDDY-1'S PERMISSION DRAW FREELY ON ABOVE EXCHANGE IN ATTEMPTING AMELIORATE SITUATION. SUGGEST GUERTLER DO SO, POINT OUT TO AMYUM-19, KUBARK SUPPORT TO AMWORLD IN PRESENT FORM WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS IT DELIVERS GOODS.

9. WE FEEL AMYUM-19 LOSES NOTHING BY ASSUMING FIRM COMMAND AND TESTING AMBIDDY-1'S PURPORTED WILLINGNESS BACK HIM UP, AS LONG AS HE ESCHEWS BACK STAIR MANEUVERINGS. OUR ADVICE HE QUIT LOOKING OVER SHOULDER WHEN MAKING NECESSARY DECISIONS, TRY DISARM AMBIDDY-1'S SUSPICIONS, KEEP KUBARK'S NAME OUT OF INTRAMURAL SKIRMISHES.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO:

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10. ASSURE AMYUM-19 HE ENJOYS OUR FULL CONFIDENCE AS LONG AS HE ACTS IN BEST INTEREST AMWORLD. SHOULD HE BE FORCED OUT "IN LINE OF DUTY" KUBARK WOULD NOT BE UNMINDFUL HIS SERVICES IN CAUSE CUBAN FREEDOM. HOWEVER KUBARK WOULD FAIL UNDERSTAND IF HE QUITS UNDER FIRE OR SULKS IN TENT OR WASTES VALUABLE TIME ON ECCLESIASTICAL PURSUITS.

11. ADVISE AMYUM-19 WE CRITICIZED AMBIDDY-1'S OWN SHORTCOMINGS AND LEFT NO DOUBT WHERE KUBARK STANDS SHOULD MAJOR SCANDAL (PERSONAL OR OTHERWISE) ROCK BOAT.

12. REQUEST GUERTLER ELICIT AMYUM-19'S FRANK VIEWS RE AMWORLD PROBITY IN MANAGING FINANCES. OUR IMPRESSION FISCAL CONTROLS INADEQUATE AND SOME FUNDS SYPHONED OFF. WE RECEIVE DISQUIETING REPORTS ON HIGH LIVING IN MANAGUA, SAN JOSE AND MIAMI (LATTER HIS BAILIWICK AND WE HOLD HIM ACCOUNTABLE).

END OF MESSAGE

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH (SA)

HENRY D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SAMBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Embezzlement of Funds by Mario Delgado Zueleta

1. Sambora reported that Delgado, who is the head of logistics in Costa Rica, was accused of embezzling $1,000 from AMWORLD. A/1 conducted a personal investigation of the case. The final outcome of the case: He was asked to make restitution out of his salary until the entire amount had been repaid.

2. This case in point was brought up by Sambora to illustrate that A/1 spends a great deal of his time on relatively minor tasks which could easily be delegated to someone else.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Sambora
Delgado
A/1 ✓

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downgrading and
declassification

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~~SECRET~~

DEBRIEFING of Russell H. SAMBORA in Washington, D.C., 16 June 1964

SUBJECT: Loose Talk on Telephone

As an illustration of poor security of AMBIDDY/1 Sambora cited the example of how A/1 had telephoned Sixto Mesa on 14 June 1964 from Nicaragua to notify him that the operation had been called off due to bad weather.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Sambora
A/1
Mesa
ops. Bolivar

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declassification

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 11 JUNE 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN

MANUEL ARTIME

HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA., CHAIRMAN
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA.
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX.
PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ILL.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA.
EUGENE J. MC CARTHY, MINN.
VANCE HARTKE, IND.
J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH
CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
THRUSTON B. MORTON, KY.
EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.
ELIZABETH B. SPRINGER, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

File
A-1

June 9, 1964

Mr. Manuel Artime Buesa
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 Northeast 2nd Court
Miami 37, Florida

Dear Mr. Artime:

This is to acknowledge and to thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing to me.

It was very gratifying for me to mention your daring raid on the port of Pilon in my speech of May 20th. Felicidades. I wish you the very best in your future actions against Castro who poses a grave menace to all of the Americas.

I am very pleased that through the Referendum the Cuban exile community now enjoys a central voice which can serve to co-ordinate effective anti-Castro activity. Hopefully, my Government will turn away from its ill-advised policy of restricting the Cuban exiles, and aid people like yourself to liberate the Cuban people from the Castro-Communist dictatorship. To that end let me assure you of my continued support.

Please do not hesitate to write me again.

With every best wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE A. SMATHERS
United States Senator

GAS:mps

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Sherwood		S
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3	Artime 201 File		
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5	H H		✓
6	SA/SO/Bobbie		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1-5 Have you come to any decision in regard to an internal mailing to Papa through Mama via the British? Could be done o/a 13 July.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

The following is a letter from AMBIDDY-1's father to his son.

8 June 1964

My dear son Manolin,

It has been a while since we have received a letter from you. We are writing this to find out how you are and we suppose you are well. Here everyone is well, thank God.

Your mother is not writing you because I am writing it quickly so that it can leave today.

We have presented everything since 20 March as well as depositing the price of the fares and we are only waiting for permission to leave which we will soon have. When it happens we will send you a cable.

Your Godmother Rosa is sick and when I saw her today she told me she hoped you would come to liberate her. Therefore we know you are doing your duty. I support your position. Don Jaime is well, thank God.

I saw Emilita and she sends her love. She also told me to tell you to write Lino and his brother a letter and to send it via this channel. Emilita is not going there until you send it (the letter) and it should be done through this channel if it is possible.

That letter which is addressed to Conseulc de la Campa de B. put a stamp on it immediately and mail it so it arrives at its destination. I am staying in her father's home and I am very anxious to help her.

SECRET

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

Well, Manolin, there is nothing else for the time being; in reality, so much has been said about the situation that there is no_________to resist the atmosphere.

Your mother and I send our blessing and will never forget you.

M. Artime and Otilla Buesa

I congratulate you on Pilon. Emilita also asked me to congratulate you.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

4.1

7-1

Let written by A-1's a father
to A-1. Given to HCS by A-1 at New Orleans on 24 June 64

Junio 8/964

Mi querido Hijo Manolin:-

Hace tiempo que no recibimos carta tuya y te hacemos ésta para saber de tu salud que suponemos sea buena, por aquí estamos bien G. a D.

Tu mamá no te escribe porque ésta, te la estoy haciendo de momento para que salga ahora-

Tenemos presentado todo desde el día 20 de Marzo del presente año así como depositado el importe de los dos pasajes y solo esperamos el permiso de salida que nos lo darán proximamente, cuando ésto sea te pondremos un cable —

Tu Madrina Rosa M.S. esta enferma y cuando la vi hoy me dijo que esperaba que tu la vinieras a levantar así pues, ya sabes que estas conminado a cumplir con tu deber, yo apruebo su actitud. Don Jaime esta bien G. a D.-

al #2

#2

ayer vi a Emilita y te mandó un abrazo cariñoso y también me dijo que le escribieras a Lino una carta para él y las hermanas y que se la mandaras a ella por esta vía. Emilita no va a ir allí hasta que se la mandes y debes hacerlo a vuelta de esta vía si te es posible

Esa carta que va dirigida a Consuelo de la Campa de R. inmediatamente le pones franqueo y la pones en el correo para que llegue a su destino - yo estoy parando en la casa de su Padre y estoy interesantísimo en saberlo — Bueno Manolín - nada más por el momento, en realidad, ya tanto se ha dicho de la situación que no hay Termómetro que resista la temperatura - Te bendicen tus padres que no te olvidan. Mª Antonia y Otilia besos.
Te felicito por lo de Pilón - Emilita también me dijo que te felicitara -

Junio 8/964

Manolin:

Esa carta que va para la Sra Consuelo de la Campa / Guatemala. le pones franqueo y la mandas enseguida—

Te abraza tu Padre

M. Artime

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Adelaida Padron y Cruz

1. AMBIDDY/1 himself raised this matter with me while neither James nor Ferrer were within earshot. Quoting AMYUM/19, he inquired whether marriage with Subject would be one of the causes for KUBARK to terminate the existing AMWORLD relationship. I emphatically answered in the negative, going over by now well-trodden ground once more and, hopefully, making myself understood.

2. In summary, I stated we held no views one way or the other about his intent to contract marriage. Our concern was strictly political since we could visualize a number of unpleasant consequences flowing from the event. True or false, certain allegations had been made about Subject's past and there were a goodly number of people prepared to testify to the accuracy of those allegations, among them (I presumed) Subject's ex-husband. The political implications of the proposed union could not possibly escape him, especially if AMTHUG should get hold of it.

3. AMBIDDY/1 opined that he had lived in open sin with Subject for over a year. This was what was bothering him and evidently some of his closest associates, not Subject's alleged past. He needed this relationship with Subject to maintain (literal quote) his emotional balance. He was working under considerable strain and the rare moments with Subject alone were his sole relaxation. The issue of sin was deeply disturbing to him, and marriage, he felt, would resolve this situation of conflict. In order to avoid certain political repercussions, he was now giving thought to taking Subject with him to Nicaragua and contract a "secret" marriage. I did not point out to him the evident flaws in his reasoning and merely adverted to the great political responsibility he carries. I made it very clear to him that a major scandal could

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conceivably crystallize opposition to his person and sink the ship. Since I did not interpose an outright veto (of dubious efficacy at best), he will undoubtedly profess to have convinced me of the soundness of his headlong rush toward matrimony and all that could entail for our program. Short of making a mockery of autonomy, I could not tell him any more than I did.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY/1 201 ✓
Pacron 201

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1's Political Reporting

1. I reminded Subject that in the past we had frequently pressed him to keep us abreast of his political activities with particular emphasis upon relations with the host governments in Central America. The response to our urgings had been increasingly disappointing and of late reached the vanishing point. Since it was not curiosity that had prompted us to ask for timely reporting but a desire to be of service in protecting the rear, we were now wondering whether it would not be best to leave the determination whether or not to submit political reports to him rather than continue importuning him which was beginning to place us in a slightly ridiculous position. AMBIDDY/1 pleaded over-work in excuse of his failure to provide timely reporting and we resisted the temptation to point to other more likely causes of mental and physical fatigue.

2. As of now we believe to have reached a clear understanding with AMBIDDY/1 that as always we stand ready to come to his succor if a political crisis or problem arises and is timely signalled to us. Silence will be construed by us as an indication that "all is well."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Policy
201✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AMWORLD Meeting in [illegible] ~~San~~ Juan, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Purchase of House

1. I asked AMBIDDY-1 about rumors that he has brought a house in Miami and he admitted the fact without any show of embarrassment.

2. He claimed to have sunk his savings from the "Bay of Pigs" honorarium into the acquisition, i.e., $3,000, to have borrowed money from AMWORLD. Senora Padron y Cruz had also chipped in to the tune of $1,500. I did not delve into the financial aspects of the transaction. AMBIDDY-1 claims that the home where he now lives with subject has been registered in the name of Nilo Messer. He mentioned in passing that a house might come in handy if his parents should be permitted to emigrate to the United States.

Henry D. Heckscher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
PADRON
AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Father

1. AMBIDDY-1 claims to have learned via QUANTUM 50 that his father is hiding in the home of a friend in the Havana area.

2. AMBIDDY-1 senior sent word that he is in touch with some old CP buddies who have offered to help him get out of PBRUMEN. AMBIDDY-1 is anxious to pass a message to his father but not via QUANTUM 50 because of his distrust in the political orientation of 50's government. In this message, AMBIDDY-1 wants to suggest to his father that he induce an "old CP" emissary to meet with AMBIDDY-1 outside of PBRUMEN, e.g. in Mexico. AMBIDDY-1 believes that the rift between AMTHUG's regime and the old CP offers unprecedented opportunities to cause mischief.

Henry D. Heckscher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: JMWAVE
C/WH/SA/EOB

File: Artime 201 ✓
Spain

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in ~~San Juan~~ Panama, 7-8 June 1964

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Venezuela - Radio Facility

AMBIDDY/1 claims that he was promised time, free of charge, by a Venezuelan broadcasting station under Army control which is an ODYOKE gift and which is considered secret.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: 201 ✓
Publicity

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

Arti 201

JPRS

DC-10568

THE TROOPS THAT WILL OVERTHROW CASTRO ARE ALREADY IN CUBA

THEY ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CHEERED HIM WHEN THEY BELIEVED HIM A HERO OF OUR LIBERTIES

/Following is a translation of an interview of Manuel Artime by Agustin Camargo, as reported in the Spanish language magazine Bohemia Internacional, Caracas, Venezuela, 7 June 1964./

Q. - Your group has initiated a new offensive against the Castro regime during the last few days in cooperation with one carried out by other revolutionary units. Do you expect victory soon?

A. - Everyone knows when wars begin, but never when they end.

I would like to say that it will be soon, but my duty as a leader is to prepare the people of Cuba and the Cubans in exile for the kind of war we expect: a long, hard war, but one that we shall win if all Cubans pull together in accordance with their ability.

There may be imponderable factors, "surprises" which could bring about the fall of the tyrant; but we must never count on "miraculous" solutions, on invasions that do not exist or on organizations that will pull our chestnuts out of the fire.

Q. - Are you considering the possibility of eventually uniting your men and resources with those of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta or the Alpha 66 - II Front - MRP or any other unit that may be currently carrying on the struggle inside Cuba?

A. - The frontiers of our movement have never been closed to anyone who wants to fight for Cuba, with the exception of totalitarian movements either of the right or of the left.

What we do think wise to explain is that we do not believe in political action units in exile. We believe only in unity of martyrdom, of sacrifice, of combat. We want the greatest success for our sister revolutionary organizations, which will never be objects of attack on our part because our only enemy is communism.

Q. - You personally and the M.R.R. in general have always been cited as "favorites" of certain North American groups or governmental agencies. Is that correct?

A. - I would like to have those who speak of this favoritism answer me this question:

Do they call the Bay of Pigs episode favoritism?

Do they call the two years I spent in jail waiting to put my back to the wall and be shot favoritism?

Do they call the state of abandonment in which the clandestine M.R.R. was left in Cuba after the battle of Giron Beach favoritism?

Do they call favoritism the fact that on my leaving jail I had to break with the Revolutionary Committee because it had been converted into an instrument for not carrying the war to Cuba?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have had to leave American territory to be able to continue the struggle against Castro?

Do they call favoritism the fact that we have to fight a long war because we get no help from those who could make it short?

But these campaigns of "favoritism" do not surprise me.

I know that International Communism cannot admit publicly that it is being defeated by the people of little Cuba who are only getting help from their brothers in Latin America, from God and from their indomitable desire to be Free.

Q. - Today you talk of bringing about uprisings in the forces of the Castro regime, and you seem to trust in this as the best way to liberate the island from Soviet and Communist domination. Why didn't you take that position three years ago, since it was just as valid then as now?

A. - Three years ago we took the same position as today. Just remember that the M.R.R. was the first revolutionary organization to rise up against the tyrant Castro to try to overthrow him by internal action at a time when many were convinced that Fidel was a Communist but said "that it was not yet time to say so to the people".

Remember that the first weapons for internal rebellion were carried to Cuba by the M.R.R.

Remember that Francisco, the M.R.R. Coordinator in Cuba was not only the cheerful organizer of the resistance but also eventually the national coordinator of the whole clandestine movement.

Remember that the Bay of Pigs invasion was designed to be only the gold buckle to fasten up the stage of active resistance and guerrilla activities.

Remember the long list of over 150 martyrs of the clandestine war of the M.R.R. which shows clearly the priority we assigned at that time to rebellion in the local forces.

Remember that before the Brigade camps were set up there were infiltration camps provided especially to assist this internal rebellion.

Q. - Some international circles claim that Russia is abandoning Castro, that it has agreed on this abandonment secretly with North America, and that this is visibly evident in the gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the island. They add that confidence in this agreement has caused North America to "tolerate" this fresh outbreak of armed activities in the Caribbean. Do you share this view?

A. - Frankly I do not believe in international pacts that are not clear to me, and I believe much less in the willingness of Russia to carry out its agreements: Poland, Chechoslovakia and Hungary are historical witnesses of Russian treachery.

As for "tolerating our activities", I cannot speak, because we have not asked for "tolerance" for them. It never occurred to me to "ask permission" to die for my country.

Q. - Would you subordinate the possibilities of liberation of your country to any advantage of an international nature for the United States?

A. - My country's interests are greater than those of any other nation. Any Cuban who does not believe that does not deserve to be called a Cuban.

I do not believe the United States expects such a shocking attitude from the Cubans. They may have many faults but they respect the dignity of man.

This is not the first time we say publicly that this war of liberation of our enslaved Cuba must be carried on "no matter whom it pleases, no matter whom it displeases", since it is true that powerful nations have international obligations to carry out and it is also true that we Cubans have our inescapable duties to our enslaved country.

Q. - If armed action within Cuba -- guerrilla war in the mountains and war of terror in the cities -- should, as expected produce a wave of popular uprisings both among students and workers and in the military units of the dictatorship, do you think that the democratic nations of the hemisphere would come to our help? Aren't you afraid of a repetition of what happened in Budapest?

A. - Although I am convinced that at some definite moment they would come to our help, we cannot base our war on collective assistance. We must plan our strategy as a purely Cuban struggle from beginning to end.

Many Latin American nations have already helped us in accordance with their ability and thanks to them we can do what we are doing.

As for the fear of a repetition of what happened in Budapest taking place in Cuba, we cannot forget that Cuba has no frontier with Russia.

Q. - Some foreign analysts and some governments have studied the situation on the island and treat with Castro as if they believed that all hope of liberation had expired. Can you tell us something about the internal struggle against communism?

A. - To think that all hope of liberation has expired in Cuba is to show a complete lack of knowledge of the condition and character of the Cuban people. The history of Cuba is a history of repeated martyrdom in search of real liberty.

I can say very little about the internal struggle that does not affect its security. But let it be sufficient to say that today there are guerrillas in five of the six provinces of Cuba; that the tyrant knows about them and that he has not been able to wipe them out because of the peasants' support for them; that in the cities the sentiment of the workers has begun to be mobilized toward passive resistance, and that within the very ranks of the militia Cuban patriots are forming independent cells.

Q. - From the days of the Bay of Pigs you seemed to trust blindly in North American material backing for your struggle. But lately we see you shifting your interest toward Latin American countries. Why?

A. - Actually my first glance was toward Latin America. I took residence in Mexico where I published my book Traición (Treachery) and I traveled around Latin America carrying the shout of alarm against communism. Afterward I went to North America in constant search of resources for the war, and although I have never had blind confidence in anything human, because everything that is done blindly is done badly, it is true that I had confidence in North American material help. Reason: because we were seeing it. (I do not think it was a secret to anyone where the weapons we used in the invasion came from.) I had no scruples in accepting American weapons to offset those from Russia which Fidel Castro was receiving in gigantic shipments.

After leaving prison I lost confidence in that assistance because since then not only have I seen none, but also I have not seen the possibility even of getting any.

Not only has my interest switched toward Latin America, but also my gratitude toward these people who have opened their arms to offer us help when all doors were being closed against us. Thanks to them we can continue the struggle.

Q. - What opinion do you think the conduct of nations like England and France deserve, who, turning their backs on principles they claim to hold and on moral and humane considerations, take part in propping up Castro's bloody regime by supplying him with credits and all kinds of financial backing?

A. - First I do not want to confuse countries with governments. Most peoples are innocent of the atrocities and treacheries of their governments.

That kind of behavior never surprised me in the case of the English government, as they did something even worse in Korea where their soldiers were dying under attacks from waves of Chinese from red Manchuria while the government was selling steel to Pekin.

In the case of the French government I was sorrowful because of the figure of Gen. DeGaulle. As a young Cuban I used to hold in my heart the image of DeGaulle, hero of the Second World War, leader of his country's resistance in the fight against the foreign invader.

It was hard for me to realize that this same man would turn his back on the principles which made him beloved by the free world. It is unfortunate that such a brilliant career should have been darkened at its ending.

In any case, some day Cuba will be free and those governments can be sure that, if they do not alter their conduct, they will then receive their payment in the same historical currency that they have passed out to our martyred people.

Q. - You and your party have been accused of being fascists, of being a bee-hive for the Central Intelligence Agency and a "cover" for the worst political and economic interests of our country. What do you have to say about that?

A. - Nothing. Let my actions and my history answer the question. Those who are going to go on saying this are the Communists and the foolish tools of communism.

I believe it would be well to recall that the M.R.R. was the only organization at this stage of the Cuban struggle that, before spending its first funds for weapons, spent them for publishing a statement of its ideology precisely because we wanted everyone to know where we intended to go, how we were going and why we were going there. This background statement circulated throughout the underground and the exiles. It contains our complete ideology, and the same thing is contained in the political testament that I wrote before leaving for the Bay of Pigs, as it also appears in my book Marchas de Guerra y Cantos de Presidio (War Marches and Prison Songs), written while I awaited death, as is clearly explained in the recent pamphlet about my full statement to the members of the A.R.E.C.

If wishing to carry to Cuba a state of independence, liberty, justice, respect for the dignity of human beings; if wishing to have the constitution of 1940 effective as long as it is not revoked by the same people who approved it; if opposing all demagogic extremes and all totalitarian impositions; if all this is being a fascist; then I am a fascist.

But since fascism is totalitarianism established by an oligarchy in the name of supposed racial purity, I cannot be a fascist.

As for the other accusations of obeying or being a cover for unsavory interests, I challenge anyone to give me the name of a single individual among our revolutionary directors who has a blemish in this respect; I challenge anyone to analyze the statistics of our martyrs; I challenge anyone to analyze our history.

Q. - Can you sum up in a few words the ideological base of M.R.R.?

A. - Yes. We dream of independence with liberty, liberty with culture, culture with bread, bread for honest work, honest work with respect for the dignity of the human being; and all this in a democratic regime of Latin American character and Christian morality.

Q. - Would your group favor keeping some laws of the Revolution if it is proved that they correspond to some need, or do you think that the Fidel epoch should be swept out completely and a fresh start made?

A. - When Fidel's regime is overthrown, Cuban needs are going to be quite different from those of our country with the tyrant in power. I believe the laws he made which could answer real Cuban needs were badly conceived and [illegible]-directed even worse.

I believe that without fundamentally changing the 1940 constitution, which means for Cuba a return to the rule of law, it will be possible to make laws which will meet Cuban needs.

Q. - Are you opposed to the negroes?

A. - No; nor am I opposed to the whites, which means the same thing to me. What interests us is not the color of the skin but the color of the soul and of the ideals.

Perhaps that is why our movement is the one that has more black brothers in its ranks, including the highest civil and military positions.

Q. - Do you favor, as has been stated, establishment in Cuba of a semi-confessional state with open predominance of the most conservative elements of the Catholic Church?

A. - Neither of the most conservative nor of the most liberal; that would be "clericalism" and it is expressly condemned in Papal Encyclicals.

I personally am a Catholic and will never deny my faith, because I have no vocation to be an apostate.

But of course, the movement is full of men of all religions and creeds.

Certainly we shall reaffirm with the 1940 constitution our belief in God and the necessity for Christian morality.

We believe that every child has the right to receive preparation in whatever religion he chooses.

Q. - What will the M.R.R. do with the Rebel Army and the Militia once Cuba is liberated?

A. - Those who turn around and fight against the tyrant will be retained in the armed forces with the same rank as before. Those who do not will be discharged and returned to private life if they have committed no crime, but if they have, they will have to answer to the civil courts in normal fashion, which will again function in Cuba in accordance with the 1940 constitution.

The only ones who have anything to fear are foreign Communists and members of repressive agencies.

Q. - Will the death penalty be maintained in Cuba?

A. - I do not favor the death penalty, but of course since the 1940 constitution will be in force, this penalty is recognized only for treason. We must end the revolutionary tribunals and return to the rule of law.

Q. - Do you believe Cuban national interests when freed from communism will be better served if the nation is placed in a position of international neutrality?

A. - We shall always be an aggressive forefront of the West against communism. We can never be neutral in a struggle in which the destiny of civilization is at stake.

Q. - Engineer Ray and you seem to be performing parallel activities as you approach almost five years of struggle against Castro and are apparently the two most important political figures of our future. Could you tell us what keeps you apart?

A. - Starting from the assumption that we are fighting for a democracy, any ideological difference between another group of Cubans and ourselves will be resolved in the future by the Cuban people in free elections. I do not think this is the historic moment to talk about differences. If the regime set up in Cuba after Fidel Castro is defeated is a totalitarianism or a dictatorship of left or right, we shall KEEP ON USING OUR GUNS.

Q. - Why don't you take the command of Brigade 2506 and why has it not been possible to consolidate around the brigade all the exile elements since it is the largest group of veterans of our war?

A. - A great many of our brothers of Brigade 2506 are already in our ranks. The brigade could not consolidate exiles around it because it was formed to be a military unit without political plans; recently arrived from Communist prisons, it went to North American army camps to continue its training. That is why I left its ranks. I did not want anyone to say that I was trying to orient the brigade politically by trying to unite the exiles around it. Besides I thought that I was more useful to my country in trying to carry the war into Cuba than in receiving a training that I did not know whether I would put in practice some day. Time has proved I was right.

Q. - What would you do, or what are you doing with the followers of Batista? Do you think this way of naming some people who form closed blocs with persons of very dissimilar history and interests, is real and does any good for Cuba?

A. - For me there are no Batistianos nor Priistas nor any other discriminative "ista". I only believe in a moral classification of men, and there are good ones and bad ones in all the governments our country has had. The only salvation for Cuba is to bring together all worthy and honest Cubans of all epochs, of all social classes, of all colors, and of all ages, into a new historical generation to consolidate our nation after the traitor's regime has been overthrown. Poor Cuba if we continue to harbor sectarian hates and sterile discriminations!

Q. - It is said that you are an admirer of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, that you are familiar with his ideology, and that his assistants say in private that you are an Antillean version of him. Is this true?

A. - It is a fact that I am familiar with Primo Rivera's ideology, as I am also familiar with that of Mahatma Ghandi, Rousseau, Roosevelt, Lenin, Hitler and all the men who for mankind's good or ill have left a political philosophy to history. A leader has a duty to understand them completely. But the ideoligies that are most familiar to me are moulded in the unforgettable thoughts of Jesus Christ, Martí and Bolívar.

This is the first time I hear myself called an "Antillean version" of Primo de Rivera. If anyone says so, it must be in secret because I have never heard it. What I was called once was a "fascist" when I was in prison awaiting the death penalty; it was the traitor Fidel Castro in person. It is possible that he has friends in exile.

Q. - What do you consider the weakest of the Castro regime?

A. - The people, the people of Cuba, who would rather die on their feet than live on their knees; the people who now realize the total surrender to a foreign power and have seen the complete failure of the Communist doctrine. The troops that will overthrow Fidel Castro are already in Cuba, the very people who cheered him when they thought him the hero of our liberty.

The presence of Russian occupation troops in Cuba has definitely revitalized the nationalist spirit of our country.

Q. - What will you do in case you come to govern Cuba, with private schools, with the press and with private initiative of an economic nature?

A. - In the first place, our fight is not for the purpose of putting me in the government; it is to make our country independent. But if you ask me what is my idea about what a government ought to do in Cuba in respect to these matters, my answer is: Regarding private education: protect it in every possible way, and raise public education to the same level as private. Regarding the press: liberty of the press and assistance for the school for reporters to make Cuban newspaper men more efficient. The Cuban press will educate our peoples' background so as to definitively wash the wounds which communism has inflicted on the spirit of our children and young people.

Regarding private enterprise: protection for it, assistance for small business, and by means of modern tax laws make sure that business performs its social function. The United States, Western Germany and many other countries can give us an exact idea of what we want.

Q. - What is your final message to your exiled people in this grave moment of history?

A. - That we cannot and must not trust in international solutions nor in easy paths to our country's independence. That we must return to the romantic spirit of our war of independence, to that difficult, self-sacrificing, hard war of a Martí collecting pennies and a Maceo spending them on bullets; to that war of Cubans within and Cubans without against those who are no longer Cubans.

If every Cuban offers what he can; if we obtain, as was done in 1895, the fraternal embrace of our brother peoples; if we put the interests of a country that must be saved before our personal interests, Cuba will be independent. Because this bat-

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 May 1964 at 0130

1. After being informed by night Security that "Mr. Ignacio" had called I returned A-1's call.

2. A-1 mentioned he would need four RB-12's and two RB-9's for the next operation. A-1 asked if they could be given to him directly to take to Nicaragua. I told him this would have to be checked out with Dick.

3. For security reasons A-1 felt it would be best for AMJAVA-4 alone to meet with Carl. A-4 will be staying at the same hotel he stayed the last time they met. Meeting scheduled for 29 May 64. After 1430 Houston time, A-4 will use alias of Rafael Carela.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

W

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

tle has been won. The tyrant who accumulated guns, tanks and planes is beginning to realize that they only guarantee a government when the people who hold those guns and manage those tanks and planes are convinced that the government represents the purest interests of the nation and the highest destinies of the country. And those guns, those tanks and those planes are already being turned against the red beast. The little western David called Cuba has already let fly the stone which will knock down the ugly Goliath of communism.

5670

A CONTROVERSIAL PERSONALITY

It can be said of the Secretary General of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, Manuel Artime, that there is much to say, but never that he has lacked spirit to fight for the liberty of Cuba.

Combative and polemical, Artime today occupies a singular position in the fight against Castro in which he collects furious insults and almost fanatical proselytism in equal quantities. His early struggle against Batista's dictatorship and his activity in Sierra Maestra in Column One commanded by Fidel Castro, made him an outstanding figure in the Revolution. His break with Castro and his denunciation of the olive green treachery to the great romance of the Cuban people made him the target for all attacks and insults. In the spring of 1960 Artime went into exile. In Mexico he wrote a book denouncing Castro's apostasy. With other eminent democratic leaders he helped found the Revolutionary Front (later Committee) and exerted intense propaganda and political activity throughout the continent which culminated in the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. This was one of the most critical points in Manuel Artime's civic career. His activity in it -- personally heroic though it was -- helped throw on him the shadow of new attacks and suspicions. But it also converted him into a leader of the first rank which the maturity of a prison term and his conspiratorial and revolutionary activities afterward only enhanced.

Manuel Artime has become today, by virtue of the attack of his troops on Puerto Pilón, the principal figure of current Cuban activity. His group has been hammered into one of the most disciplined, one of the largest and most efficient in the heroic struggle of the people of Cuba for their liberty. Consequently everything he does and says is of passionate interest for this people in exile, a people which wants to know closely -- and they should -- the thoughts and activities of the men who will probably lead them in the future.

This is why Manuel Artime is brought to these Cuban pages of BOHEMIA, which have been, are now and will continue to be the ideal civic rostrum for the people of Cuba.

Artime has the floor. . .

A. T.

(A. T. is Agustin Tamargo, assistant director of Bohemia)

5670

Bohemia LIBRE

INTERNACIONAL

25c.

Junio 7, 1964



Reportaje Sensacional sobre la Catástrofe en el Stadium Nacional de Lima

EL DIA QUE TITO DERROTO A STALIN

MANUEL ARTIME EN LA TRIBUNA DE BOHEMIA

LA TROPA QUE DERROCARA A CASTRO YA ESTA EN CUBA

Es el pueblo que lo aplaudió cuando veía en él a un héroe de nuestras libertades.

Preguntas de AGUSTIN TAMARGO fotos de Guayo

P.—Su grupo ha iniciado en los últimos días una nueva ofensiva contra el régimen castrista, al unísono con la que desarrollan otras entidades revolucionarias. ¿Considera Ud. que la victoria será pronta?

R.—Las guerras se sabe cuando empiezan pero nunca cuando terminan.

Me gustaría decir que será breve, pero mi deber como dirigente es orientar al pueblo de Cuba y al exilio cubano hacia el tipo de guerra que nos espera: una guerra dura y larga, pero que ganaremos si todos los cubanos colaboran en la medida de sus fuerzas.

Puede haber factores imponderables, "sorpresas", que precipiten la caída del Tirano; pero nunca debemos descansar en soluciones "milagrosas" de invasiones que no existen ni en organizaciones que nos saquen las castañas del fuego.

P.—¿Contempla Ud. la posibilidad de una unión eventual de sus hombres y recursos con los de la Junta Revolucionaria Cubana, los del grupo Alpha 66-II Frente-MRP, o cualquier otro que esté luchando actualmente dentro de Cuba?

R.—Las fronteras de nuestro Movimiento jamás han estado cerradas para nadie que tenga el deseo de combatir por Cuba, excepto para los movimientos totalitarios, sean de izquierda o de derecha.

Lo que sí es conveniente aclarar es que no creemos en unidades politiqueras del exilio. Creemos solamente en la unidad del martirio, del sacrificio, del combate. Nosotros deseamos el mayor éxito a las organizaciones revolucionarias hermanas, que jamás recibirán ataques de parte nuestra pues nuestro único enemigo es el Comunismo.

P.—A Ud. personalmente y al M.R.R. en general se les ha señalado siempre como "favoritos" de ciertos sectores o agencias gubernamentales norteamericanas ¿Es eso cierto?

R.—Yo quisiera que los que hablan de este favoritismo me respondieran:

¿Consideran favoritismo el episodio de BAHIA DE COCHINOS?

¿Consideran favoritismo los dos años que me pasé en la cárcel esperando el paredón de fusilamiento?

¿Consideran favoritismo el estado de abandono en que quedó el M.R.R. clandestino en Cuba después de Playa Girón?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que a mi regreso de la cárcel tuviera que romper con el Consejo Revolucionario porque se había convertido en un instrumento para no llevar la guerra a Cuba?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que hayamos tenido que abandonar el territorio norteamericano para poder seguir luchando contra Castro?

¿Consideran favoritismo el que tengamos que realizar una guerra larga por no recibir ayuda de quienes podían hacerla breve?

Pero no me extrañan esas campañas de "favoritismos". Yo sé que el Comunismo Internacional no puede reconocer públicamente que está siendo derrotado por el pequeño pueblo cubano que no recibe más ayuda que la de los hermanos de Latinoamérica, la de Dios y el inderrotable deseo de ser Libre.

P.—Ud. habla hoy de provocar levantamientos en las fuerzas internas del régimen castrista y parece confiar en ello como la mejor vía para liberar a la isla del dominio soviético y comunista. ¿A qué atribuye el no haber asumido hace 3 años esa posición, que era entonces tan correcta como hoy?

R.—Hace 3 años asumimos la misma postura que hoy hemos asumido. Es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la primera organización revolucionaria que se alzó contra el tirano Castro para lograr el derrocamiento por rebelión interna, cuando muchos ya estaban convencidos de que Fidel era comunista pero decían "que aún no era el momento de decírselo al pueblo".

Es conveniente recordar que las primeras armas para la rebelión interna fueron llevadas a Cuba por el M.R.R.

Es conveniente recordar que Francisco, Coordinador del M.R.R. en Cuba, no sólo fue el genial organizador de la Resistencia, sino que llegó a ser el Coordinador Nacional de todo el clandestinaje.

Es conveniente recordar que la Invasión de BAHIA DE COCHINOS debía haber sido sólo el broche de oro que cerraba toda una etapa de resistencia

...Cuba será libre, gústele a quien le guste y pésele a quien le pese

PARA PI
NO HAY



Tamargo

Artime

...si caído Castro hay totalitarismo, tomaremos los rifles de nuevo

MI IDEARIO ES EL DE CRISTO, BOLIVAR Y MARTI

activa y de movimientos guerrilleros.

Es conveniente recordar la larga lista de más de 150 mártires del clandestinaje del M.R.R., que indica claramente la primordialidad que concedíamos en aquel momento a la rebelión de las fuerzas internas.

Es conveniente recordar que antes de los campamentos de la Brigada existieron los campamentos de infiltración creados especialmente para ayudar a esta rebelión interna.

P.—En ciertos círculos internacionales se asegura que Rusia está abandonando a Castro, que ha negociado secretamente con Norteamérica tal abandono, y que ello se expresa visiblemente en la retirada gradual de las tropas soviéticas de la Isla. Se añade que es esta seguridad la que ha hecho que Norteamérica "tolere" este recrudecimiento de las actividades armadas en el Caribe. ¿Comparte Ud. este criterio?

R.—Sinceramente, no creo en pactos internacionales que no me consten y mucho menos creo en la lealtad de Rusia para cumplir sus pactos: Polonia, Checoeslovaquia y Hungría son testigos históricos de la felonía rusa.

Con respecto a que "toleren nuestras actividades", no lo sé, pues no hemos pedido "tolerancia" para ellas. No se me había ocurrido "pedir permiso" para morir por mi Patria.

P.—¿Condicionaría Ud. las posibilidades de liberación de su Patria a las conveniencias de índole Internacional de los Estados Unidos?

R.—Los intereses de mi Patria están por encima de los intereses de cualquier otra nación.

El cubano que así no lo crea no merece llamarse cubano.

No creo que los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica pretendan de los cubanos esa monstruosidad. Ellos pueden tener muchos defectos pero respetan la dignidad del hombre.

No es la primera vez que decimos públicamente que esta guerra de liberación de nuestra Cuba esclava tiene que ser llevada adelante "gústele a quien le guste y pésele a quien le pese", porque si es verdad que poderosas naciones tienen deberes internacionales que cumplir, es verdad que nosotros los cubanos tenemos otros deberes ineludibles con nuestra Patria esclava.

P.—Si la acción armada dentro de Cuba —guerra de guerrillas en las montañas y guerra de terror en las ciudades— produjera, como se espera, una ola de levantamientos populares tanto entre los estudiantes y obreros como entre los cuerpos militares de la dictadura, ¿cree Ud. que las naciones democráticas del Hemisferio vendrían en nuestra ayuda? ¿No teme que se repita un Budapest?

R.—A pesar de que estoy convencido de que en un momento determinado vendrían en nuestra ayuda, no podemos basar nuestra guerra en el hecho de esa ayuda colectiva. Tenemos que trazar una estrategia de lucha totalmente cubana, desde el principio hasta el final.

Muchas naciones latinoamericanas ya nos están ayudando en la medida de sus fuerzas, y gracias a ellas podemos hacer lo que estamos haciendo.

Con respecto al temor de un Budapest cubano no podemos olvidar que Cuba no tiene fronteras con Rusia.

P.—Algunos comentaristas extranjeros y algunos gobiernos juzgan la situación de la Isla y tratan con Castro, como si pensaran que allí ha muerto toda esperanza de liberación. ¿Puede decirnos algo sobre la lucha interna contra el Comunismo?

R.—Pensar que en Cuba ha muerto toda esperanza de liberación sólo demuestra un desconocimiento total de la condición e idiosincrasia del Pueblo Cubano. La Historia de Cuba es una historia de martirio incesante en busca de la verdadera libertad.

Muy poco puedo decir de la lucha interna que no ofrezca la seguridad de la misma, pero bástenos con decir que hoy en día existen guerrillas en 5 de las 6 Provincias de Cuba; que el Tirano conoce de ellas y que no ha podido exterminarlas debido a la colaboración del campesinado; que en las ciudades el movimiento obrero ha comenzado a movilizarse hacia la resistencia pasiva y que dentro de las mismas filas de las milicias los patriotas cubanos se van integrando en células independentistas.

P.—Desde los días de Bahía de Cochinos Ud. parecía confiar de modo ciego en el respaldo material norteamericano a nuestra lucha. Ultimamente, sin embargo, se le ha visto cambiar el interés hacia los países latinoamericanos. ¿Por qué?

R.—En realidad, mi primera mirada fue hacia Latinoamérica: me establecí en México donde publiqué mi libro TRAICION y recorrí Latinoamérica dando el grito de alarma contra el Comunismo. Después fui a Norteamérica en busca incesante de medios para la guerra y aunque confianza ciega nunca he tenido en nada humano, porque todo lo que se hace a ciegas está mal hecho, es cierto que tuve confianza en la ayuda material norteamericana. Motivo: porque la estaba viendo. (No creo que para nadie sea un secreto la procedencia de las armas que usamos en la invasión). No tuve escrúpulos en aceptar armas americanas para contrarrestar las rusas que por lotes gigantescos recibía Fidel Castro.

LEAR POR LA INDEPENDENCIA DE LA PATRIA QUE PEDIRLE PERMISO A NADIE

...las fronteras del MRR están abiertas para todo el mundo

...en Cuba no puede darse un Budapest

...no me consta que Rusia esté abandonando a Castro

Después de salir de presidio perdí confianza en esa ayuda, porque desde entonces, no sólo no la he visto, sino que ni siquiera he visto la posibilidad de conseguirla.

No sólo mi interés se ha desplazado hacia Latinoamérica, sino también mi gratitud hacia estos pueblos que nos han abierto los brazos para brindarnos ayuda cuando todas las puertas se nos estaban cerrando. Gracias a ellos podemos continuar la lucha.

P.—¿Qué opinión le merece la conducta de naciones como Inglaterra y Francia que, de espaldas a principios que dicen sustentar y a consideraciones mismas de orden moral y humano, se vienen dedicando a apuntalar al sangriento régimen de Castro por medio de créditos y todo tipo de operaciones financieras?

R.—Primero, no quiero confundir a los países con los gobiernos. La mayor parte de los pueblos son inocentes de las atrocidades y traiciones de sus gobiernos.

Del Gobierno Inglés nunca me extrañó esa conducta porque algo peor hizo en Corea, donde sus soldados morían luchando contra las oleadas de chinos de la Manchuria roja, mientras el Gobierno le vendía acero a Pekín.

Del Gobierno francés sí me ha dolido. En la figura del Gral. De Gaulle mi corazón de joven cubano tenía la imagen del De Gaulle héroe de la 2ª Guerra Mundial, líder de la resistencia de su país en la lucha contra el extranjero invasor.

Me costó trabajo pensar que este mismo hombre diera la espalda a los principios que le hicieron querido por el mundo libre. Es lástima que una carrera tan brillante se haya opacado en su ocaso.

De todas maneras, algún día Cuba será libre y pueden estar seguros esos Gobiernos que si no cambian de conducta reci-

UNA PERSONALIDAD CONTROVERSIAL

Del Secretario General del Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria, Manuel Artime, pueden decirse probablemente muchas cosas. Pero nunca que le hayan faltado arrestos para luchar por la libertad de Cuba.

Combativo y polémico, Artime ocupa hoy en la lucha contra Castro una posición singular en la que se recogen por igual denuestos furiosos y proselitismo casi fanático. Su temprana lucha contra la dictadura de Batista y su acción en la Sierra Maestra en la Columna 1 que comandaba Fidel Castro le hicieron una figura de relieve en la Revolución. Su ruptura con Castro y su denuncia de la traición verdeolivo a la gran gesta del pueblo cubano, lo colocaron en el blanco mismo de todos los ataques y vilipendios. En la Primavera de 1960 Artime marchó al destierro. Escribió en México un libro denunciando la apostasía de Castro. Contribuyó a fundar junto a otros eminentes líderes democráticos el entonces llamado Frente Revolucionario (luego Consejo) y desarrolló una intensa actividad de orden propagandístico y político por todo el Continente que culminó en la fracasada invasión de Bahía de Cochinos. Aquel episodio es uno de los puntos más críticos de la carrera cívica de Manuel Artime. Su participación en él —heroica por lo demás en lo personal— contribuyó a arrojar sobre su figura la sombra de nuevos ataques y sospechas. Pero lo convirtió a la vez en un líder de primer rango, que la madurez de la prisión y la actividad conspirativa y revolucionaria posterior no han podido más que acrecentar.

Manuel Artime constituye hoy, por virtud del ataque de sus fuerzas a Puerto Pilón, un punto principal de la actualidad cubana. Su movimiento se ha forjado como uno de los más disciplinados, numerosos y eficientes en esta lucha heroica del pueblo de Cuba por su libertad. Por lo tanto, todo lo que él haga y diga es de apasionante interés para el pueblo criollo en el destierro. Un pueblo que desea conocer de cerca —y con mucha razón— el pensamiento y la acción de los hombres que probablemente lo habrán de dirigir en el futuro.

Es por eso que Manuel Artime viene a estas páginas cubanas de BOHEMIA —que eran, son y seguirán siendo la tribuna cívica ideal del pueblo de Cuba.

Artime tiene la palabra... A. T.

Los cubanos tenemos que lanzarnos a la lucha sin esperar por acuerdos o ayudas internacionales que pueden venir o no venir.

...el camino está en la América Latina

birán entonces su pago en la misma moneda histórica que ellos han entregado a nuestro pueblo mártir.

P.—A Ud. y a su Partido se les ha acusado de fascistas, de "empolladura" de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia, y de "pantalla" de los peores intereses políticos y económicos de nuestro país. ¿Qué tiene que decir a ello?

R.—Yo no tengo que decir nada. Que lo digan mi conducta y mi historia. Los que van a seguir diciendo eso son los Comunistas y los "tontos útiles" al Comunismo.

Creo que es conveniente recordar que el M.R.R. fue la única Organización de esta etapa de lucha cubana que antes de invertir sus primeros fondos en armas los invirtió en imprimir su ideario, precisamente porque queríamos que todos supieran a dónde íbamos, cómo íbamos y por qué íbamos. Este ideario circuló por todo el clandestinaje y el exilio. Ahí está nuestra ideología completa, como está también en el testamento político que escribí al partir hacia Bahía de Cochinos, como está en mi Libro "MARCHAS DE GUERRA Y CANTOS DE PRESIDIO" escrito mientras esperaba la muerte, como está claramente definida en el reciente folleto que contiene mi conferencia completa ante los miembros de la A.R.E.C.

Si querer llevar a Cuba a un Estado de Independencia, Libertad, Justicia, respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; si querer que la Constitución de 1940 tenga vigencia mientras no sea revocada por el mismo pueblo que la aprobó; si oponernos a todos los extremismos demagógicos y a todas las imposiciones totalitarias; si todo eso es ser Fascista, entonces yo soy fascista.

Pero como el fascismo es el totalitarismo implantado por una oligarquía o casta de una supuesta pureza racial, yo no puedo ser fascista.

Con respecto a las demás acusaciones de obedecer o ser pantalla de intereses turbios, yo reto a que se me diga el nombre de una sola figura de nuestros cuadros dirigentes revolucionarios que tenga una mácula a este respecto; yo reto a que se analicen las figuras de nuestros mártires; yo reto a que se analice nuestra Historia.

P.—¿Puede sintetizar en breves palabras las bases ideológicas del M.R.R.?

R.—Sí. Nosotros soñamos una Independencia con Libertad, una Libertad con cultura, una cultura con pan, un pan por trabajo honrado, un trabajo honrado con respeto a la dignidad de la persona humana; y todo eso en un régimen democrático de proyección latinoamericana con una moral Cristiana.

P.—¿Sería su grupo partidario del mantenimiento de algunas leyes de la Revolución, si se prueba que éstas responden a alguna necesidad, o cree que se debe barrer todo el período fidelista de un plumazo, comenzando de nuevo?

R.—Cuando se derroque al régimen fidelista, las necesidades cubanas van a ser muy distintas a las que tenía nuestra Patria cuando el Tirano ocupó el poder. Creo que las leyes que él hizo, que podían responder a necesidades reales de Cuba, estaban mal concebidas y peor orientadas.

Creo que sin alterar en su base la Constitución de 1940, que significa para Cuba una vuelta al estado de Derecho, se pueden hacer las leyes que hagan frente a las necesidades que encontraremos en Cuba.

P.—¿Está Ud. contra los negros?

R.—No; como tampoco estoy contra los blancos, pues para mí significan la misma cosa. Lo que nos interesa no es el color de la piel sino el color del alma y de los ideales.

Quizás sea por esto que nuestro Movimiento es el que más hermanos negros tiene en sus filas, incluyendo las más altas jerarquías civiles y militares.

P.—¿Favorece Ud., como se ha dicho, el establecimiento en Cuba de un estado semi-confesional, con predominio franco de las fuerzas más conservadoras de la Iglesia Católica?

...no estoy contra los negros ni contra los blancos

R.—Ni de las más conservadoras, ni de las más liberales; eso se llamaría "clericalismo" y está expresamente condenado aún por las Encíclicas Papales.

Yo específicamente soy Católico y jamás negaré mi fé, porque no tengo vocación de APOSTATA.

Ahora bien, el Movimiento está repleto de hombres procedentes de todas las religiones y credos.

Sí reafirmamos con la Constitución de 1940, nuestra creencia en Dios y la necesidad de una moral cristiana.

Sí creemos que todo niño tiene el derecho de recibir preparación sobre la Religión que adopte.

P.—¿Qué hará el M.R.R., una vez liberada Cuba, con el Ejército Rebelde y con las Milicias?

R.—Los que vuelvan sus armas contra el Tirano seguirán en las Fuerzas Armadas con el mismo rango que tenían. Los que no, serán licenciados e incorporados a la vida civil si no han cometido ningún delito común, pues en este caso, tendrían que responder ante los tribunales civiles normales que según la Constitución de 1940 volverán a tener vigencia en Cuba.

Los únicos que tienen que temer son los Comunistas extranjeros y los miembros de cuerpos represivos.

P.—¿Mantendrá Ud. en Cuba la pena de muerte?

R.—No soy partidario de la pena de muerte; pero además, como será aplicada la Constitución de 1940, ésta sólo la reconoce en los delitos de lesa Patria. Hay que acabar con los "Tribunales Revolucionarios" para volver a un estado de derecho.

P.—¿Cree Ud. que los intereses nacionales de Cuba, una vez liberada del Comunismo, estarían mejor servidos si se situase a la Nación en una posición de neutralidad internacional?

R.—Siempre seremos vanguardia agresiva de Occidente contra el Comunismo. Jamás podremos ser neutrales en una lucha donde se está jugando el destino de la civilización.

P.—El Ingeniero Ray y Ud. parecen perfilarse, al borde casi de un quinquenio de lucha contra Castro como las dos figuras políticas de nuestro futuro. ¿Podría decirnos qué lo separa de él?

R.—Si partimos de la base de que estamos luchando por una *Democracia*, cualquier diferencia ideológica entre otro grupo de cubanos y nosotros será solventada en el futuro por el pueblo de Cuba en urnas libres. No creo que sea el momento histórico de hablar de diferencias. Si lo que se implanta en Cuba una vez derrotado Fidel Castro es un totalitarismo o una Dictadura, sea de Izquierda o de Derecha, SEGUIREMOS USANDO LOS FUSILES.

P.—¿Por qué no encabeza Ud. la Brigada 2506 y por qué no se ha podido aglutinar alrededor de ella todo el exilio siendo como es el cuerpo mayor de veteranos de nuestra guerra?

R.—Una gran parte de nuestros hermanos de la Brigada 2506 están ya luchando en nuestras filas. La Brigada no pudo aglutinar el exilio alrededor de ella porque fue creada como cuerpo Militar sin proyecciones políticas y recién llegada de las prisiones Comunistas se fue a los Campamentos del ARMY norteamericano a continuar el training. Este fue el motivo de que yo me separara de sus filas. No quise que dijeran que yo pensaba proyectar políticamente a la Brigada al tratar de unir al exilio alrededor de ella. Pensé además que yo le era más útil a mi Patria tratando de llevar la guerra a Cuba que recibiendo un training que no sabía si iba a poner en práctica algún día. El tiempo me ha dado la razón.

P.—¿Qué hace Ud., o está haciendo, con los "batistianos"? ¿Cree que esta manera de denominar a algunos, que agrupan en bloques cerrados a personas de muy disímiles historias e intereses, es real y le hace bien a Cuba?

R.—Para mí no hay Batistianos, ni Priístas, ni ninguna "ista" discriminativa. Yo sólo creo en la clasificación moral de los hombres, o los hay buenos y malos en todos los gobiernos por los que ha atravesado nuestra Patria. La única solución que tiene Cuba es que se logre sumar a todos los cubanos dignos y honestos de todas las épocas, de todas las clases sociales, de todos los colores, y de todas las edades, en una nueva generación histórica que conduzca a nuestra Nación después de derrocado el Régimen traidor. ¡Pobre de Cuba si seguimos cultivando los odios sectaristas y las discriminaciones estériles!

P.—Se asegura que es Ud. admirador de José Antonio Primo de Rivera, que está familiarizado con su ideario y que sus colaboradores dicen en privado que es Ud. una versión antillana de él. ¿Que hay de cierto en ello?

R.—Es cierto que estoy familiarizado con el ideario de Primo Rivera, como también estoy familiarizado con el ideario de Mahatma Ghandi, de Rousseau, de Roosevelt, de Lenin, de Hitler y de todos los hombres que para beneficio o para desgracia de la Humanidad han dejado una filosofía política en la Historia. Un dirigente tiene el deber de conocerlas perfectamente. Pero los idearios que más familiares me son están plasmados en el pensamiento inolvidable de Jesucristo, de Martí y de Bolívar.

Es la primera vez que oigo eso de que yo sea una "versión antillana" de Primo de Rivera. Si alguno de mis colaboradores lo dice debe ser en secreto porque yo nunca lo he oído. El que sí me dijo una vez que yo era un "fascista", cuando yo estaba preso y esperando la pena de muerte fue el traidor Fidel Castro en persona. Es posible que él tenga amigos en el exilio.

P.—¿Cuál cree que es es el flanco más débil del régimen castrista?

R.—El pueblo, el pueblo de Cuba, que prefiere morir de pie a vivir de rodillas; el pueblo que ya es consciente de la entrega total a una Potencia extranjera y ha visto el fracaso completo de la tesis comunista. La tropa que derrotará a Fidel Castro está ya en Cuba, es el pueblo que lo aplaudió cuando veía en él al héroe de nuestra libertad.

La presencia de una tropa de ocupación rusa en Cuba ha sido definitiva en la revitalización del espíritu nacionalista de nuestra Patria.

P.—¿Qué hará Ud., si gobierna en Cuba, con la escuela privada, con la prensa y con la enseñanza privada de orden religioso?

R.—En primer lugar, nuestra lucha no es para ponerme a mí en el Gobierno: es la independencia de nuestra Patria. Pero si Ud. me pregunta cuál es mi idea sobre lo que un Gobierno debe hacer en Cuba respecto a estos tópicos, yo le respondería: con respecto a la enseñanza privada: protegerla al máximo y elevar la enseñanza pública al mismo nivel de la privada. Con respecto a la prensa: libertad de la misma y ayuda a las Escuela de Periodismo para que cada vez se superen más los periodistas cubanos.

La prensa cubana sabrá orientar la opinión pública de nuestro pueblo para lavar definitivamente las heridas que el Comunismo ha logrado en el espíritu de nuestros niños y de nuestros jóvenes.

Con respecto a la empresa privada: protección a la misma, fomento de la pequeña propiedad, y por medio de leyes modernas de impuestos, asegurar que dicha propiedad rinda su función social. Estados Unidos de Norteamérica, Alemania Occidental y otros muchos países pueden darnos una idea exacta de lo que nosotros buscamos.

P.—¿Cuál sería su mensaje final en esta hora de gravedad histórica, al pueblo en el destierro?

R.—Que no podemos ni debemos confiar en soluciones Internacionales ni en caminos fáciles para independizar a nuestra Patria. Que debemos y tenemos que volver al espíritu romántico de nuestra guerra de Independencia, a esa guerra difícil, abnegada, dura, de un Martí recogiendo centavos y un Maceo gastándolos en balas. A esa guerra de los cubanos de dentro con los cubanos de afuera contra los que ya no son cubanos.

Si cada cubano aporta lo que puede; si logramos, como se logró en 1895, el abrazo fraterno de los pueblos hermanos; si por encima de nuestros intereses ponemos los intereses de una Patria que está por conquistar, Cuba será independiente. Porque esta batalla la tenemos ganada. El tirano que acumuló fusiles, tanques y aviones comienza a darse cuenta de que sólo sirven para garantizar un gobierno cuando el Pueblo que tiene esos fusiles y maneja esos tanques y esos aviones está convencido de que el Gobierno representa los más puros intereses de la nación y los más altos destinos de la Patria. Y esos fusiles, esos tanques y esos aviones se están volviendo ya contra la bestia roja. El pequeño David Occidental llamado Cuba ha dado ya la pedrada que hará caer por tierra al despreciable Goliat del Comunismo.



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43 ~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

4 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 4 June 1964 at 0930 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was advised that he should call the Panama Hilton upon his arrival in Panama and ask for Mr. Boysen or Mr. James.

2. Latest report indicates that the ADELAIDA will arrive at Monkey Point at 0400 4 June. A-1 has obtained his re-entry visa. A-1 was again asked to give us the tapes on his Venezuelan conference. A-1 promised to have them done today.

3. A-1 was asked to please make sure that someone sees Mr. Barnes concerning the petroleum arrangements. It was mentioned to A-1 that Mr. Barnes has been waiting for over a week to see someone in A-1's organization. Mr. Barnes has been kind enough to offer his services and we feel it is unfair to keep this gentleman waiting. A-1 plans to send Sixto Mesa and Mr. King today. A-1 will notify us of what transpired at the meeting.

4. A-1 intends calling later in the day because he has some other matters he would like to discuss with us.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
POL

Above conversation conducted [illegible] frequently changed privacy code

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3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1330 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called the office again to say that he would be meeting Al Burt at 1600. A-1 inquired if it would do any harm in seeing Mr. Summ of the State Department since the latter mentioned to AMJAVA-4 that he had not seen A-1 in over a year. A-1 felt that a courtesy visit was called for. We advised A-1 that we could see no harm in visiting him.

2. A-1 reported that one of his pilots, Ginebra, had received an offer to fly planes in the Congo. A-1 did not know if Ginebra would accept the offer.

3. We told A-1 that we had received a report that in a finca in Nicaragua called Marianita he had met several U. S. Air Force officers and asked if there were any truth to the report. A-1 stated that one of their houses is located in Marianita but he had not met any U. S. officers there.

4. A-1 gleefully reported he contemplates making quite a lot of changes in Miami. A-1 did not elaborate but it appears that most of the propaganda section will be leaving Miami.

5. A-1 was requested to obtain a position report of the DOLORES by 1 June.

W

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] key code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

6. We asked A-1 if he had any ideas of where AMBANG-1 is at present. A-1 is of the opinion that AMBANG-1 is probably hiding in some small island off Puerto Rico.

7. A-1 inquired if he could sue the Newsweek magazine. We advised him that he could sue but the likelihood of him winning the case was slight. A-1 was referring to the article which stated he intended to draw the United States into an open conflict with Castro. We asked if there were any truth to the matter. A-1 laughed and said, "Of course not."

8. A-1 was advised that we consider 7 June a firm date for the Consejo meeting. The reason we are pinning him down to a specific date was because of the necessary preparations that have to be made prior to any meeting. A-1 said he would be there on that date.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Ginebra - 201
State Dept
Nicaragua
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] code.

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 2 June 1964 at 1300 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 expects to get his residency permit today from Immigration in Miami.

2. Concerning A-1's request that we choose frequencies for the 511 radios it was our opinion this task could be done by Felix Rodriguez. In the special commo training given to Felix, a course was specially geared to choosing the correct frequencies and the proper crystals. A-1 mentioned the original request had stemmed from Felix. A-1 was informed that the reports we have gotten about Felix reflect that he likes to give the tedious jobs to someone else and this is the case here.

3. A-1 and AMJAVA-4 will be leaving for Nicaragua on 5 June.

4. A-1 asked if the Consejo meeting could be postponed until 9 June. A-1 was reminded when we originally asked him to pick a day for the meeting we considered it a definite commitment. A-1 acquiesced and said he would be there on 7 June.

5. The tentative date for the departure of the ADELAIDA for the operation is 7 June.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Felix Rodriguez - 201

W

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Deputy Chief, WH/SA

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Haynes Johnson, Author of "Bay of Pigs"

Subject had the chuzpa to attempt to get in touch with AMBIDDY-1 in Miami. He asked for an interview, indicated willingness to go to Central America and "spread any information from Central America."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

HDH/bh

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - Publicity File ✓
- 1 - AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 May 1964 at 1230

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 will be meeting with Carl in Houston this afternoon.

2. A-1 wants to meet with the Consejo on 7 June at 0830 in Panama City.

3. A-1 again reminded we would like to have the tapes on what transpired in Venezuela. Martin reiterated that in order to protect his interest we must have current intelligence concerning his organization.

4. It is the opinion of the Consejo that a frank, off-the-record talk with Al Burt of the Miami press would do no harm. We consider Burt to be a responsible newspaperman and he may be in a position to help A-1 put the Pilon raid in its proper perspective. If A-1 thinks this is a good idea he should speak openly to Burt about the Pilon raid omitting the embroidery that has accompanied his recent press statements. A-1 was reminded this interview, if given, should not mention or allude to KUBARK support. Since Burt is an ambitious journalist he may probably ask A-1 for a scoop on his next raid; again we see no harm in this. A-1 said he would ask Burt if he wanted to go on a future raid. We mentioned that we doubted he would accept the offer.

5. According to A-1, AMYUM-19 is still in New York and is expected in Miami shortly.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

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6. A-1 was informed that the ADELAIDA is scheduled to leave drydock on 31 May.

7. A-1 reported he has talked to Miguel Angel Quevedo of Bohemia Libre and representatives of Life magazine concerning the release of pictures to be taken by his own combat photographer. A-1 added, however, he had made no firm commitments.

8. A-1 was asked if his next operation had been given a name yet. He said the next one was to be called "Simon Bolivar." We told him that we already learned the code name and warned him against loose talk and the damages that could ensue.

9. A-1 was asked to contact Manolin Hernandez and inquire why the DC-3 cannot be in Panama before 2 June 1964. A-1 was advised that Petrosky can furnish a crew to pick up the plane if necessary but cannot since he has no contact with anyone in Costa Rica. A-1 stated he would call Hernandez in Costa Rica.

10. A-1 was informed that three men aboard the ADELAIDA have signed off and should be returning to Miami on 29 May 64 aboard KLM.

Raul J He

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Press
DC-3

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

[illegible]

SECRET

2 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 May 1964 at 1830 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say that he had just arrived in the United States and would only be staying a short period and then return to Central America for the next operation phase. He stated he wanted to discuss some matters with "Enrique" in Panama within the coming week. I advised him to let us know exactly when and where and we would be there.

2. A-1 inquired if AMJAVA-4 had requested rubber boats from us at the last meeting A-4 attended in Washington. A-1 was informed that we had discussed the matter but could not recall A-4 placing any order with the Consejo for rafts. A-1 asked if some rafts could be obtained in time for the coming operation. A-1 did not know the exact amount needed but would consult with A-4 and call Martin later in the evening. The rubber rafts could be sent to same address as were the village radios. A-1 mentioned they had the silent motors.

3. A-1 was asked to inquire what had gone wrong in Santo Domingo. A-1 believes that the reason the JOANNE could not be put into drydock was because there was another ship in the military yard undergoing repairs. A-1 was advised that was not the information we had received and could he please check further into the matter. A-1 will have Rafael GARCIA confront President Reid and obtain the true story.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

4. A-1 wanted five metascopes for the next operation. Since those aboard the MV SANTA MARIA will not arrive in time, Dick will get more and give them to Mike GEIDEL who in turn will deliver them to AMYUM-19.

5. According to A-1 Maritima Bam now is officially registered in Nicaragua.

6. A-1 asked Enrique to convey to Mr. Archer his gratitude for the letter Mr. Archer had sent him.

7. A-1 is very pleased concerning the possibilities of extending his operational bases to Venezuela. A-1 was asked to send us a tape of what had transpired and the government officials with whom he had met.

8. The conversation ended with A-1 promising to call later tonight (28 May) as to where he and A-4 wanted to meet with Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
Logistics
Special Equipment

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

✓

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Excluded from
downgrading and
declassification

C- 7-1 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KYBAT/TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMWORLD
AMOT Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith are five AMOT reports on AMWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
AMOT Reports HE-1291, DD-850,
DD-859, DD-868, DD-891, One
Copy Each Herewith

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/atts/h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-267437

DATE TYPED
28 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 2 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

16 May 64

Report # DD-068.

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted]. AMYUM

SUBJECT: [redacted]. Activities.

SOURCE: [redacted]. Friend of [redacted] and [redacted], who is living with [redacted] as his mistress. Information acquired from [redacted] [redacted], very close friend of [redacted], MISTRESS, [redacted] and [redacted] sister. of MISTRESS

AMBIDDY-1

A-1

Source states that Marta [redacted] is one of the persons who knows more about AMBIDDY-1's [redacted] intimate or personal affairs, and that Marta [redacted] has friendly relations with [redacted], sister of [redacted] who is now living with A-1 [redacted] as his mistress.

According to source, Marta [redacted] informed her that on the night of 12 May 64 SISTER [redacted] made a phone call to A-1 [redacted] (PL-4-[redacted]) right from her house (Marta [redacted] house), and [redacted] said that everything was normal.

The next day, 13 May 64, day of the raid against Cabo Cruz sugar mill, SHE [redacted] returned to Marta [redacted] house and told Marta that [redacted] A-1 had been woken at 5 AM by someone who gave him the news about the [redacted].'s attack against Cabo Cruz sugar mill in Oriente province. When [redacted] A-1 got the news he almost had a stroke. He was hysterical, shouting and hitting the walls with his hands. MISTRESS [redacted] was trying to calm him down, but A-1 [redacted] was shouting and screaming that he had been betrayed.

A-1 [redacted] said: "I cannot take this betrayal! These people think I am an idiot but I am going to show them the opposite! They can't do that to me!"

That same morning, 13 May 64, A-1 [redacted] left for New York. He said he was going there in connection with the betrayal of which he had been the victim. A-1

When [redacted] travels, he frequently travels under the name of Manuel MARTINEZ.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET RYBAT

[illegible] Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

9 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : H. D. Hecksher/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 2 June 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

~~M25~~	IST	SS	SB	
1	EOB	EETS		CA
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2 Jun 64 15 03z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: ~~DC/WH/SA 8~~
INFO : DDP, VR

Pobeon 201
Ambiddy-1

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 25079

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 7218 (IN 95616) PARA 1*

SINCE RUMOR SPREADING COULD STA INVESTIGATE.

END OF MESSAGE

*AMBIDDY-1 has reportedly bought his mistress an $85,000 house in north Miami.

Halpern
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

H. D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2-5

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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AMYUM 19
Contact Rpt #60
UFGA 16215
1 June 64

5. GUERTLER again reminded A-19 that it was no longer safficient to merely deny ODYOKE involvement in the project but was necessary to take positive steps to implicate other Latin American governments and create the impression of increasing difficulties with ODYOKE. It was left to A-19's discretion on how to do this, but when talking about his problems with AMWORLD-2, Sopo and Mole it was suggested that he do this in strictest confidence as just for the inner circle of AMYUM. This will guarantee the story proper dissemination.

File:
Ambiddy-1 ✓
Sopo
Mole
Mesa

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ 46

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

~~ESB~~ INT SS SB
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CI SI EP [✓ [illegible]]
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~~Ambiddy 1-201~~
Adelaide-201

S E C R E T 012228Z

1 JUN 64 IN 95616

DIR CITE WAVE 7218

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD AMRAZZ-1

1. ON 27 MAY 64 AMRAZZ-1 SAID AMBIDDY-1 HAD REPORTEDLY BOUGHT HIS MISTRESS, OFELIA PADRON, AN $85,000 HOUSE IN NORTH MIAMI. PADRON, ACCORDING AMRAZZ-1, HAS BEEN MISTRESS VARIOUS PERSONS DURING AND AFTER BATISTA REGIME.

2. AMRAZZ-1 ALSO SAID TONY BUSTILLO, FORMER "THIRD CHIEF POLICE HABANA" EARLY IN CASTRO'S REGIME, HAD TOLD HIM HE HAD HEARD THAT AMBIDDY-1'S FOLLOWERS WERE AUTHORIZED ATTACK ANY OF AMBANG-1'S OR GUTIERREZ' MEN IF ENCOUNTERED ON HIGH SEAS.

3. ON 28 MAY AMRAZZ-1 ADVISED HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY "PIANO" BORREGO WHO, ACCORDING TO SOURCE, IS MEMBER AMBIDDY-1'S GROUP BUT FRIENDLY TO SFNE, THAT AMBIDDY-1 PLANNED MAKE HIT-AND-RUN RAID EITHER 29 OR 30 MAY. BORREGO DID NOT REVEAL SOURCES.

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

1 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1 June 1964 at 1600 hours

1.

1. AMBIDDY-1 would like to know from Jim what frequencies he would recommend for the 511's. A-1 alleges that the crystals for the sets will cost about $2,000.

2. Since Mr. Summ is leaving tomorrow he will be unable to meet with A-1. A-1 feels that he has fulfilled any obligation by calling Mr. Summ. However, perhaps AMJAVA-4 or AMYUM-19 may visit Mr. Summ in the near future.

3. A-1 expects to receive his visa card today and then re-entry bluebook tomorrow from Immigration.

4. A-1 and A-4 are expected to leave Miami on 4 June for Nicaragua. A-1 will come alone to the meeting in Panama.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Communications
m State Department

✓

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
[illegible] code

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

SS SB
IDDS AR
EOS CA
LR
NS

Venezuela

Ambiddy 1-201

S E C R E T 012100Z

1 JUN 64 IN 95478

DIR CITE CARA 8827

RYBAT-TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF CARA 8014 (IN 93463)

AMFLORA-1, WHO ACCOMPANIED CIUPAS-1 TO AIRPORT 20 MAY TO SEE AMBIDDY-1 OFF, STATES AMBIDDY-1 TOLD HIM HE PLANS RETURN CARA WITHIN 15 OR 20 DAYS. AMFLORA-1 DOES NOT KNOW REASON FOR RETURN VISIT.

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Who is amflora1?

SECRET

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMBIDDY-1
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE AUTONOMOUS PROGRAM.
ENCL. 2,3

019-124-027/03
UFGA-16215 E01
01 JUN 64
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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

27 May 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY's Reaction to Advice to
Delay Return to U.S.

1. AMJAVA/4 reported that AMYUM-19 conveyed to AMBIDDY-1 my advice that he not return to PBPRIME right away, but permit the dust to settle. According to AMJAVA/4 this advice led AMBIDDY-1 to conclude that ODACID did not want him back in PBPRIME. In order to test this theory, AMBIDDY-1 decided to make a beeline for the U.S. Embassy in Managua to pick up his immigration visa.

2. (Headquarters has learned that the visa was promptly granted and we presume AMBIDDY-1's concern that he had been exiled a second time has as a result been assuaged.) I asked AMJAVA/4 to tell AMBIDDY-1 that we would be honored to welcome him as a potential fellow-citizen. Also, our relationship was based upon complete mutual trust. Our job was to protect his rear in PBPRIME. What we were concerned about was that AMBIDDY-1, should he return at this time, would undoubtedly be talked to by ODACID, ODENVY and the press. All this it would be best to sidestep.

3. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey to AMBIDDY-1 that we will tell him when the coast is clear. If this notwithstanding he should return to PBPRIME, the decision would, of course, be his. "It is his right to come back at any time, but I think my advice is good."

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SSIFIED MESSAGE

b/36 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

Artime 201

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3 (MR HECKSHER, WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY BP)

INFO : DOP, C/WH, VR

~~MOB~~ IST SS SB
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EOB DTS LOG CA
CI SI BP (WH)
SEC NS

S E C R E T 272005Z

PRIORITY DIR PACY INFO ROUTINE WAVE CITE CARA 8810

SENSITIZED

RYBA[illegible]PIC YOBITE AMWORLD

27 MAY 64 IN 92631

REF: A. PACY 3615 (IN 89408)

B. CARA 8801 (NOT SENT PACY WAVE) (IN 90576)

AMBIDDY-1 ETD 27 MAY PAA 516. DELAYED FLIGHT SCHEDULED DEPART CARA 1610 HOURS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

26 May 1964

AMWORLD MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY'S PERSONNEL POLICY

1. AMJAVA/4 offered the following analysis of AMBIDDY-1's personnel policy as a significant facet of his relationship with others.

2. AMBIDDY-1 is a leader and a very proud leader who does not like to fail in the presence of his associates.

3. AMJAVA/4 was glad that the Miami incident (13 May press conference) happened. "AMBIDDY-1 was really angry with himself."

4. From the start AMJAVA/4 has tried to convince AMBIDDY-1 that Jose MOLE ROSALES is not qualified for intelligence - so far in vain. "To let MOLE fail in doing the job is the way to convince AMBIDDY-1"

5. AMYUM-19 cannot handle MOLE or Edgar SOTO, because AMBIDDY-1 won't let him. "We shall have to wait until they fall down on the job."

6. AMJAVA/4 claims to have a closer relationship with AMBIDDY-1 than does AMYUM-19. He thinks he understands AMBIDDY-1 better than does AMYUM-19, that he (AMJAVA/4) knows how to get things from AMBIDDY-1. AMYUM-19 makes the mistake of using the direct approach where it would be better to go about it in a roundabout way. "There are some things which you BECKHOFF tell GUERSKLER, then GUERSKLER tells AMYUM-19 who tells AMBIDDY-1, which it would be better to tell AMBIDDY-1 direct." AMJAVA/4 related that AMBIDDY-1 took umbrage at AMYUM-19 for conveying to him BECKHOFF's views about the Miami press conference. AMBIDDY-1 was furious when GUERSKLER passed intelligence about the alleged presence of 50 cal. machine guns positioned near Pilon, because he considered this an implied attack of the soundness of the Pilon plan which AMBIDDY-1 himself had drawn up.

7. Headquarters reps pointed out that during the

SECRET

critical period following the Miami press conference, AMYUM-19 was the only available, cleared channel to AMWORLD and time, in view of ODACID's unfavorable reaction, was of the essence. AMJAVA/4 was asked to convey this explanation to AMBIDDY-1 and to stress that we consider AMYUM-19 his senior rep in PBPRIME.

8. AMJAVA/4 stated that there had been many betrayals and consequently AMBIDDY-1 was always careful. At times he might even think that AMYUM-19 was not loyal which, AMJAVA/4 added, "Of course is not true." As AMBIDDY-1 analyzes his own performance, he is satisfied that he is performing well. He has been in the resistance business since Batista's days and many intimate friends have betrayed him. At the present moment, he does not have 100% confidence in anyone. Everything he is told, he analyzes. As an example, AMJAVA/4 briefs Chavez (the Mexican) on a projected operation. AMBIDDY-1 will question AMJAVA/4 closely in order to make sure that the instructions did not deviate from the plan as conceived by him.

9. Among matters which should be taken up with AMBIDDY-1 direct, no matter how ticklish, was e.g. the case of ...MOLE. AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19 know that KUBARK have a poor opinion of him. Then why beat around the bush? AMJAVA/4 at least had not witnessed any mention of this by BECKHOFF in AMBIDDY-1's presence. Instead AMYUM-19 had reported GUERELER's statement that he considered MOLE a poor choice for the intelligence job to AMBIDDY-1 and the latter had jumped to the conclusion that it was AMYUM-19 putting words into GUERELER's mouth.

10. BECKHOFF commented as follows: AMYUM-19 will have to tell GUERELER or myself if in a given instance a personal demarche is indicated. There are certain things which, with AMBIDDY-1 out of the country, simply cannot be put on the shelf. We have no choice but to tell GUERELER to tell AMYUM-19 who, however, should feel free to counsel us not to use him as a channel. Headquarters rep conceded that AMBIDDY-1 could rightly resent anything which smacks of a junior officer (i.e. GUERELER) giving orders to him via AMYUM-19, an impression we would do our best to eradicate.

11. BECKHOFF stressed that we were anxious not to give AMBIDDY-1 the impression that there exists any special relationship between us and AMYUM-19, AMJAVA/4. Our relationship was with AMBIDDY-1 who is the leader of the movement. AMJAVA/4 replied that he had told AMBIDDY-1 this and that BECKHOFF had made this point very clear at their first meeting in Puerto Rico (see AMWORLD Meeting memo, 3-6 September 1963 Subject: Briefing of AMJAVA/4.) BECKHOFF added that he had told AMYUM-19 and wished to repeat this in the presence of AMJAVA/4 that anything discussed while AMBIDDY-1 was not present, could be told him. Nothing was "off-the-record" in the sense of to be withheld from AMBIDDY-1.

12. According to AMJAVA/4, AMBIDDY-1 knows full well that KUBARK considers him the Chief. If we decided to conspire against AMBIDDY-1 in league with AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19, this could only be done within AMYUM, the political movement, since AMJAVA/4 and AMYUM-19 form part of that organization. Our support, however, is to AMBIDDY-1 and not AMYUM. AMBIDDY-1 knows that.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Policy
AMBIDDY-1 201
WAVE

SECRET

THE HEMISPHERE Artime-201

CUBA

"Something Is Moving"

"This is Radio Free Cuba, the anti-Communist voice of Cuba broadcasting on the 40-meter band. Worker, militiaman, rebel soldier, radio ham—help topple the despot! Close ranks so that the fatherland, today bloodied by Russian imperialism, becomes the tomb of Communism in America. This is Radio Free Cuba transmitting from a point in Cuban territory."

In Cuban exile communities from Miami to Caracas, the word was out: "*Algo se mueve*"—Something is moving. First came the faint, crackling anti-Castro broadcast last week from inside Cuba. Then 24 hours later came word of the biggest raid in months on Castro's fortress. The raiders identified themselves as members of the Movement for Revolutionary Recuperation, led by Manuel Artime, who headed the abortive Bay of Pigs landing.

At 10:30 p.m., said an M.R.R. spokesman in Miami, Artime and a "strong force of commandos" had gone ashore at Puerto Pilón, 145 miles from Guantánamo on Cuba's southern coast. Linking up with a second force of guerrillas from the nearby Sierra Maestra mountains, the exiles had captured the town and held it for three hours against Castro's militia, during that time declaring it a "free territory of Cuba." They then blew up the Cabo Cruz sugar mill and disappeared. Puerto Pilón, the exiles noted with satisfaction, was only a few miles from the spot where Castro himself originally landed in 1956, and the Sierra Maestra was his sanctuary in the early stages of the revolution.

Within hours, Radio Havana was on the air railing about the attack. Castro denied that the exiles had sent in a landing party. The mill, he fumed, was bombarded from the sea "by a pirate vessel of the Rex type, which the CIA operates from bases located in Florida, Puerto Rico and Central America." Nevertheless, he admitted damage to shore installations and cried that "70,000 sacks of sugar" had been destroyed. Naturally, he blamed "a new criminal, vandalistic act by the United States Government." Two days later, Castro's internal radio reported two more landings—one by Artime on the southern coast, and the other by Underground Leader Manolo Ray somewhere in the north. But exile groups in Miami would neither confirm nor deny the new raids.



EXILE RAY

Trips to some isolated farms.

Recruits & Munitions. In Washington, the State Department blandly denied all. "These attacks," said a spokesman, "are neither supported nor condoned by the Government." Perhaps not, but Miami was alive last week with exile activity. Once again, Cubans were turning up at the old clapboard house on 23rd Street that served as a recruiting center for the Bay of Pigs operation, getting physical exams, then mysteriously dropping out of sight. Small groups of Cubans were training at isolated farms outside Miami. At Key Largo, a 28-ft. launch loaded with exile munitions caught fire, was popping while firemen were trying to douse the blaze.

No one believes that a second frontal invasion is in the offing. The exiles agree that it would amount to suicide. What does seem to be in the works is an attempt at infiltration, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Right now, three main groups are operating:

▶ The M.R.R., headed by Artime, reportedly has the strong backing of Nicaragua's Tachito Somoza and other anti-Castroites in Central America. Artime, say exile sources, operates from camps stretching from Costa Rica north to Honduras. A U.S. hunter in the northeastern jungles of Costa Rica recently stumbled onto a camp with three large buildings and a landing strip that was in constant use by light aircraft. "Cubans," said his guide. Artime does not have the kind of support inside Cuba to operate a major underground, is gearing his efforts to sabotage teams inside Cuba and commando raids against 17 coastal targets.

▶ The *Junta Revolucionaria Cubana* (*Jure*), led by Ray, a onetime Castro leader and a popular man inside Cuba. Ray gets his moral—and reportedly considerable material—support from Venezuela's former President Rómulo Betancourt and Puerto Rico's Muñoz Marín, is said to operate training camps in both countries. He has widely publicized May 20 as his deadline for returning to Cuba to revitalize the island's anti-Castro underground. Last week Ray resigned his job as a consultant to the Puerto Rican Planning Board, and dropped out of sight. He is tough, shrewd—and a man of his word. "We are not worried," he says. "Castro is the man who must worry."

▶ A coalition of Alpha 66, the Revolutionary Movement of the People, the Second National Front of Escambray and one or two smaller outfits, led by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, a longtime guerrilla leader who fought against Batista. Menoyo plans to infiltrate a small force into Cuba—probably into the central Escambray Mountains—and start up a guerrilla network. Two weeks ago, Menoyo left Miami. The exiles say he is in Cuba.

Turn of the Screw. If the U.S. is not directly involved, some U.S. influence and support seem apparent. Washington reportedly gave Artime the green light last July. Recruiting personnel and collecting arms would also be difficult without at least tacit U.S. approval. And then there is the U.S. economic embargo. The British and French deals for buses, trucks and locomotives notwithstanding, Castro remains virtually cut off from free-world trade. As another turn of the screw, Washington last week tightened controls on U.S. exports of food and drugs to Cuba. Both had been exempted from the general U.S. trade embargo. Now exporters will need Government approval for shipments.

EXILE ARTIME

Callers at a clapboard house.

• • •

Brazil last week finally took the action everyone had expected since the revolution that overthrew leftist President João Goulart. Cuban agents, said the Brazilian government, had been engaging in "offensive" propaganda "incompatible with democratic and Christian principles. Such interference in the internal affairs of Brazil can no longer be tolerated." Diplomatic relations with Cuba were therefore formally and officially severed.

Artime - 201

FBIS 39

PANAMA CITY RADIO MIA NETWORK IN SPANISH 1100 22 MAY 64 P

(TEXT) FIVE CUBAN EXILES, INCLUDING MANUEL ARTIME, ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION, LAST NIGHT MADE CONNECTIONS AT TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR VENEZUELA. THE GROUP ARRIVED FROM SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, IN THE AFTERNOON AND LEFT AT 2015 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS FLIGHT 513 FOR CARACAS, VIA MARACAIBO. BESIDES ARTIME, THE GROUP CONSISTED OF CESAR BARO, JESUS SANSI, NILO MESSEN, AND RAFAEL QUINTO QUINTERO. THE GROUP REMAINED AT THE AIRPORT WAITING FOR THE PLANE TO TAKE OFF.

22 MAY 1206P FG/RH

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MANAGUA

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

201

~~MOB~~	INT	SS	SB
	ICS	PERS	AR
EOB	[illegible]	LOG	CA
CI	[illegible]	BF	[illegible]
☐		[illegible]	NS

S E C R E T 221625Z

201

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MANA 4906

22 May 64 IN 88913

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

REF: DIR 22836*

ARTIME ISSUED 0-1 (IMMIGRANT) VISA ON 19 MAY 64 AT MANAGUA. GAVE ADDRESS AS 1270 N.E. 85TH STREET, MIAMI.

SECRET

* C/S COMMENT: RE REF LEAVES UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDDY-1 ISSUED IMMIGRATION VISA. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Artime-201

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : San Jose

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

IST SS SB
IOS PERS AS
CA
CI SI

22 [illegible] IN 88431

DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T 2201452

PRIORITY CARA PACY INFO DIR WAVE MANA CITE SJOS 6791

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

MANUEL ARTIME DEPARTED AFTERNOON 21 MAY VIA LACSA FOR PACY AND PROBABLY CARA. SOURCE: HUNAP-8. EVAL: C-2.

DISSEM: NONE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : T.D.Heckster/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 21 May 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 ~~SECRET~~

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : MANAGUA JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

Ambiddy 1
201

~~RI3~~ IST SS SB
IOS PERS AR
EOB EPTS LOG CA
CI SI EP CI
SEC NS

21 May 64 20 46z

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MANA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 22836

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD
REF: USARMA CX-28

REF LEAVES UNCLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AMBIDDY-1 WAS ISSUED IMMIGRATION VISA. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

W Wood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

21-12

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Bruce B. Cheever
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WHD/SA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOCUMENT
DATE: 19 MAY 1964
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA,
ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN LEADER

Artime - 201

19 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Tad Szulc
Telephonic Conversation

1. Tad Szulc called the undersigned at home shortly before 2200 on 18 May 1964 from Miami, Florida. I began the conversation by telling Szulc that I had discussed the matter of a contact in the Miami area and that it was our opinion that we could best collaborate with him from Washington inasmuch as it was only here that the full story is known. Szulc accepted this with the comment that he would naturally go along with our judgment in this matter. The essence of our general conversation follows:

a. Szulc Meets with RAY in Caribbean.

Toward the end of our conversation Szulc interjected the statement, "Oh, I guess I had better tell you because you will read it in the paper in the morning, that I have just come from a meeting with RAY." Szulc gave the impression of being very satisfied with his trip and convinced that RAY was fully prepared for his venture. In answering a question that I had raised on 16 May, Szulc informed me that he was convinced that there was no serious dissension within the ranks of the JURE. It is my opinion that this is true, but that there are small frictions which are particularly inherent in Cuban organizations. I commented to Szulc that if he had just seen RAY, then in all likelihood RAY would not be in Cuba by the 20th. Szulc assured me that he would be in Cuba by the 20th. (Note: On 17 May I spoke with Rogelio CISNEROS, who informed me that he would have an important message for me in two or three days. I have a promise from RAY and CISNEROS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

that we will be the first to know of RAY's arrival in Cuba.) Szulc reiterated his basic theme that RAY's effort is the last hope to free Cuba. I told Szulc that I certainly felt that RAY's contribution is tremendously important. In this connection I observed that RAY's drawing power was obviously increasing for I had only recently received a query from rather conservative elements asking if it would be proper for them to speak with RAY's representatives, specifically Rogelio CISNEROS. I told Szulc that in keeping with our policy, I had said that RAY and his group appeared to represent a patriotic and dedicated group interested in the liberation of their country and in the restoration of a democratic government. I told the person calling me that it might be wise to speak to RAY's group now when the opportunity presents itself rather than to face the possibility of having to stand in line later. Szulc indicated that he knew of which group I was speaking and he undoubtedly would as Rogelio CISNEROS probably told him of the contact recently made by members of the Cattlemen's Association of Cuba.

b. Defection of Samuel RODILES.

Szulc then asked me if I had heard of the defection of Samuel RODILES. I told him that I had not and that in all likelihood if such a thing had happened, I should know about it.

c. Blas ROCA Breaks with Castro.

Szulc then told me that he had heard via Mexico that Blas ROCA had a falling out with Castro. I again had to tell Szulc that I did not know of any such development, but that I seriously questioned it as this made no sense at all and that Blas ROCA will not openly break with Fidel Castro unless ordered to do so by the Soviet Union. I told Szulc that Blas ROCA is too much of a fox to ever even consider such forthright action.

d. Alert in Cuba.

Szulc then informed me that the NEW YORK TIMES had heard via Richard Eder to the effect that the tightest and most general alert in the history of Cuba appeared to be in the making. Eder and all other correspondents have been restricted to Havana. When Eder attempted to make a trip to Pinar del Rio, he was denied this privilege. While discussing these matters with the NEW YORK TIMES by telephone, Eder was cut off and they have not heard from him since. This was presumably yesterday, 18 May.

e. Szulc Asks about General Situation.

Szulc was quite eager to hear something of the general situation in Cuba at this time. I told him that I believed the alert in Cuba was a result of the attack on the sugar mill some days ago and the mounting psychological pressure of RAY's publicized intent to return to Cuba. Szulc then added that in his opinion RAY's publicity was a good thing, particularly given that it was played in a basically moderate key. I agreed with Szulc on this. I then told Szulc that I had heard only a few hours earlier that there was a widespread rumor in Miami to the effect that a U-2 had been shot down over Cuba but that as far as I knew, this was not true. Szulc then naturally asked me: "You would know if this had happened, wouldn't you? You would have heard this from the Defense Department." I answered that it certainly wouldn't be very long before we would know of such a thing, and therefore I did not believe there was any truth to this rumor.

2. On 18 May I discussed with Henry Heckscher the possibility of his releasing certain information regarding AMWORLD which I might subsequently provide to Szulc. In light of this, Henry gave me some indication of the type of thing which he would like to see picked up by the press, the essence of which is an attempt to create a better press

image for ARTIME. In talking with Szulc, the subject of ARTIME arose from time to time. Szulc mentioned that it had come to his attention that ARTIME was in New York "with some babe or another" and nowhere near the scene of the strike. Szulc was also extremely critical of the press releases made by ARTIME. I took this occasion to say that I had discussed the matter of ARTIME with people who are much more familiar with his activities than I, given that they are in another geographical area, and that it was my impression that ARTIME is not being given as much credit for his efforts as perhaps he should be and that it may well be that he has fairly solid plans which cannot be actually initiated until such a time as he has welded together the nucleus of a new organization under fire. Once experienced in their present activity, it could well be that ARTIME could follow the RAY concept of developing resistance within. I told Szulc that I believed that the activities of ARTIME and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo could not but help RAY's program. Szulc's basic reaction to favorable statements regarding ARTIME may be best described as a snort.

END

Alfonso Rodriguez
WH/SA/SO/AR

~~SECRET~~

A-1 201

AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY-1's Relations with Adelaida Padron y Cruz

1. AMJAVA-4 remarked that AMBIDDY-1 had not mentioned to anyone that BECKHOFF had talked with him about this affair. (See AMWORLD Meeting Memo 15-16 Feb 1964, Subject: Adelaida Padron y Cruz.)

2. BECKHOFF re-affirmed that the matter had been raised in compliance with his wishes that we let him know about any derogatory information on subject. He had been told "in slow English" that we in fact had information from several sources which testify to Subject's former intimate relations with Fulgencio Batista. BECKHOFF had drawn AMBIDDY-1's attention to the following alternatives:

a. Rumors are true. AMBIDDY-1's decision is obvious.

b. Rumors cannot be confirmed. How serious is the damage they cause to AMBIDDY-1s public position.

3. AMBIDDY-1 had listened carefully, merely commenting that all this was "very interesting." He had not been pressed to make a decision. Specifically, BECKHOFF had told him that Subject was reputed to have been the mistress of other prominent Cubans, besides Batista, and that AMBIDDY-1 could conceivably be blackmailed by JURE and the press, to mention only a few sources of threat presumed knowledgeable.

4. AMBIDDY-1 had not been told that his affair with Subject was liable to jeopardize AMWORLD. After all, he was an intelligent man who did not have to be told the obvious, viz. that a press scandal would be serious indeed. DAINOLD, ~~whom BECKHOFF~~ had consulted, had taken the position that AMBIDDY-1 should reach the necessary conclusions himself. Our position was that AMBIDDY-1 could not run a political movement unless he could handle his personal affairs. The blackmail potential in thisaffair was serious as far as KUBARK is concerned.

5. AMJAVA-4 believes that the problem in relations between AMBIDDY-1 and AMYUM-19 stems from the fact that the latter has discussed Subject with AMBIDDY-1. AMYUM-19's and

SECRET

[illegible] automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible] declassification

AMJAVA-4's plans call for a threat to quit AMWORLD if AMBIDDY-1 makes known his decision to marry Subject. In the same breath, AMJAVA-4 stated that he had not made his views known to AMBIDDY-1 "because then our position would be the way it is now with AMYUM-19. You cannot put AMBIDDY-1 to the wall. He must be led to believe that it was he who made up his mind."

6. In forecasting his and AMYUM-19's strategy, AMJAVA-4 stated the following:

> "AMYUM is not just AMBIDDY-1. It is all of us. He is working for AMYUM and in that regard is answerable to all of us, because he is part of AMYUM. When we talk about the Adelaida problem, we talk about a problem arising within the organization. AMBIDDY-1 knows that he will have KUBARK's support which is meant for him not for AMYUM. But in AMYUM we have to decide. Even the people in jail inside Cuba want to know if it is true that AMBIDDY-1 has a mistress and believe that we are condoning this. AMBIDDY-1 is not only answerable to use but to the people in jail. We, in turn, are responsible for our imprisoned comrades. As part of AMYUM I have to decide if I will fight or not. AMBIDDY-1 is clear on that."

7. In stating our position, we made clear to AMJAVA-4 that marriage is not a deciding factor in determining our course of action. An ensuing scandal might force our hand.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
PADRON 201

cc: COS, JMWAVE

~~SECRET~~

AMWORLD Meeting in Washington, 19 May 1964

SUBJECT: Delivery of DAINOLD's Letter

1. AMJAVA-4 was handed a message, in AMBIDDY-1's code, conveying DAINOLD's congratulations upon the Pilon raid.

2. The original message was read to AMJAVA-4.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
KENON II
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓

Attachment:
Letter

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Report # DD-837, CE, 30 Apr 64 (cont.)

PADRON to divorce her husband.

Adelaida PADRON is about 26 years old and she is from Yaguajay, Las Villas province. She was a protégée of Fulgencio BATISTA Zaldívar since she was 14 years old. She married Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia and has two children, 5 and 6 years old. According to source, her youngest child is by BATISTA.

Adelaida PADRON was also the mistress of Marcos PEREZ Jiménez, former President of Venezuela.

In addition to being a very attractive woman, Adelaida PADRON is also very intelligent.

According to source, on various occasions (did not specify dates) Adelaida PADRON has talked to BATISTA on the phone from Miami.

SOURCE 3:

P-96 had a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas and told ELIAS that some days ago a Cuban exile lady who was from the City of Santa Clara, Las Villas province, had expressed herself in very bad terms and had criticized AMDIDDY-1 [redacted] while she was in the "Optica López" optical store. That the lady had said A-1 [redacted] had abandoned his fiancée, who is a good girl, to live with another woman who had been married to Roger ROJAS Lavernia.

After hearing this, ELIAS told P-96 it was true that A-1 [redacted] was living with the ex-wife of ROJAS Lavernia.

By the way in which ELIAS answered P-96, it can be understood that ELIAS knows said lady perfectly.

During the conversation, ELIAS told P-96 that when he had arrived in the U.S. Naval Base at San Juan, Puerto Rico, from [redacted], base authorities were [illegible] from him the authorization to [illegible] that they [illegible] away this authorization and therefore he [illegible]

SOURCE 4:

Source reports that, before CASTRO seized power, Adelaida PADRON used to live in Cuba at Milán St. corner of Villoldo, Reparto Apolo, City of Havana. That "big parties" were given in that house in which people posed for pornographic pictures. Source assures that she saw pictures of these parties in Cuba and was shocked by their immorality.

Report # DD-837, CE, 30 Apr 64 (cont.)

According to source, Adelaida PADRON had a poor origin and her marriage to ROJAS Lavernia enabled her to enjoy parties, good food, clothes, etc.

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD [illegible]

DESENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Mike GEIDEL and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 May 1964 at 1030 hours

1. The undersigned reminded Mike GEIDEL that it is essential that AMBIDDY-1 meet with "RODEMEYER" when the former returns to Miami.

2. Mike stated that YERGO (MRR Dominican Republic delegate) had received a telephone call from President Reid or some other high official in the Dominican Republic which stated that President Reid would like to meet with AMBIDDY-1 on 12 May in the Dominican Republic. YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic. ~~YERGO was also informed that they could have anything they wanted in the Dominican Republic~~.

3. Martin next brought up the subject of the MID. It was GEIDEL's impression that this organization might be nothing more than a provacation. This opinion is also shared by JMWAVE. Mike commented that AMYUM-19 has met with members of this organization who for the most part are unwilling to return to Cuba. A-19 would like to test their mettle before negotiating with them any further. A-19 intends to give this organization some sabotage materials and see what happens.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Other Exile
Conversations

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible] ESTIMADO DON MANUEL X SU EXITO ESPLENDIDO VINDICA COMPLETAMENTE NUESTRA CONFIANZA EN SU SALIENTE CAPACIDAD DE ORGANIZAR UN MOVIMIENTO POLITICO TAMBIEN PROVEERLO CON UN LIDERATO INSPIRATIVO X LA MAGNITUD DE SU EXITO CMA TOMANDO EN CONSIDERACION LOS OBSTACULOS QUE UD. HA TENIDO QUE VENCER TAMBIEN LA FUERZA DE SU OPOSICION CMA ES TAL QUE NO REQUIERE MAGNIFICACION OSCAR ADORNO. BUEN TRABAJO X CORDIALMENTE X DON ALFA.

END OF MESSAGE

TRANSLATION: 8. DEAR DON MANUEL: YOUR SPLENDID SUCCESS FULLY VINDICATES OUR TRUST IN YOUR OUTSTANDING ABILITY TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL MOVEMENT AND TO PROVIDE IT WITH INSPIRING LEADERSHIP. THE DEGREE OF YOUR SUCCESS CONSIDERING THE OBSTACLES YOU HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OVERCOME AND THE STRENGTH OF YOUR OPPOSITION IS SUCH AS TO REQUIRE NO MAGNIFICATION OR EMBROIDERY. GOOD WORK. CORDIALLY YOURS, DON A.

Artime-201

Acting Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

19 May 1964
OOA(S) 26484

Chief, Miami Field Office

A(S)3,903,073

Recent Travels of Manuel Artime

WH-1828

Records of the US Immigration Service show that Manuel Artime has made numerous trips in and out of Miami between 3 and 13 May 64. I&NS records show the following:

a. On 30 April Artime was issued an I-512 type visa good for travel to Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. He departed from Miami on 3 May 64 for Managua, Nicaragua on LANica flight number 413. He returned to the US on 11 May 64. No flight information available on return trip.

b. An I-512 was issued in his name on 3 May 64 good for travel to Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Artime left Miami on 11 May and returned on 12 May 64.

c. Another I-512 was issued in his name on 11 May, and he left Miami on 13 May on Pan American flight number 503 for Managua. His I&NS file does not presently show evidence that he has returned to Miami from this trip. A reliable I&NS official has orally confirmed to us this date that Artime has not in fact returned from his latest trip abroad.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

[illegible]:ab

Copy to JMWAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

15 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Carl E. Jenkins

DATE : 1800 hours, 12 May 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to report that he had just arrived in Miami and was on his way to a meeting with Al Rodriguez at the Holiday Inn.

2. I told him that some of our friends had notified some activity that indicated mother and baby might be up to something tonight. AMBIDDY-1 said he didn't know anything about it but would check and let us know. I asked him to try to confirm it so we could help him if he wished us to.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Op ZENON VIERA II

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 11 May 1964 at 0930

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned from the Miami airport to say that he would be leaving in two hours for the Dominican Republic to meet with President Reid on the morning of 12 May 1964.

2. A-1 expects to meet with PETER C. KNITTEL and Tom Murphy at the Miami Airport this morning before A-1 departs for Dominican Republic.

3. A-1 was advised that Mr. Alfredo RODEMEYER would like to meet with him at the Holiday Inn at Coral Gables upon A-1's return tomorrow. A-1 stated he would be at the Holiday Inn after 1800 on 12 May 1964. A-1 was assured this meeting had nothing to do with our operations and not to worry.

4. A-1 has given the commo plans to A-19 who will give them to Mike GUERTLER (P) sometime this afternoon.

5. Due to AMJAVA-4's late arrival in Nicaragua the entire schedule for the operation has been pushed back one day since the ship left one day late. A-1 also mentioned there have been some minor changes in the land operation.

6. Manolin Hernandez is now in Panama dealing with Mike Petrosky concerning the DC-3. A-4 apparently had a narrow escape on a Nicaraguan plane and A-1 appears determined to have his own plane in the air.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

7. According to Maagdenberg, the Dutch engineer, the ship is in fairly good condition and should require no more than five days in drydock. A-1 casually mentioned that the Dutchman had to be dissuaded from going on the operation itself.

8. A-1 was reminded we must have a firm statement from him as to when the operation is to take place if we are to be of assistance to his organization during the critical period. A-1 stated he had promised to break the heads of the commo people aboard the ship if they fail to advise him as to when the Swift departs from the mothership.

9. A-1 would probably leave for Nicaragua on Wednesday to be at the base in time for the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
JOANNE
Dominican Republic
Operation ZENON II
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE | XXX

INFO

FROM: Deputy Chief, WH/Special Affairs

SUBJECT: TYPBIC AMWORLD/ PADRON, Cruz Adelaida Matilda
aka: ~~ROJAS, Adelaida Matilda Padron de~~

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. According to AMYUM-19 (DOI 4 May), AMBIDDY-1 once more is giving serious thought to contracting marriage with Subject.

2. According to AMYUM-19, AMBIDDY-1 suffers pangs of conscience and has premonitions of hell. What he has in mind is a church wedding with all the trimmings. Since Subject's previous marriage was not solemnized by the Church, AMBIDDY-1's conscience appears unbothered.

3. AMYUM-19 claims that AMBIDDY-1 brushes off allegations about Subject's alleged affair with Fulgencio Batista as mere calumny. He does not know whether AMBIDDY-1 has ever asked Subject to confirm or deny the rumor.

4. The root of the trouble, as AMYUM-19 sees it, is that AMBIDDY-1 in the person of Subject is encountering a seasoned pro who plays with consummate skill upon his vanity and who exploits his naivete which is that of "a 14 year old." AMBIDDY-1, in fashioning personal relationships, is unable to make adjustments to the circumstance that, being a person of some importance, his personal affections are not always cultivated on purely unselfish grounds.

5. AMYUM-19 claims that Subject's former husband, Roger Hermilio Rojas Lavernia, is attempting to blackmail AMBIDDY-1 and that some of AMBIDDY-1's seemingly closest associates may be harboring similar designs.

6. BECKHOFF restated the position of KUBARK as one of non-intervention as long as matrimony is kept in abeyance. Conversely, marriage and any ensuing scandal would force us to re-assess our position and, in extremes, might force KUBARK to withdraw its backing of AMWORLD.

7. AMYUM-19 expressed the view that AMBIDDY-1 would probably forego marriage if made aware of KUBARK's position as stated above. We rejoined that AMBIDDY-1, should he solicit our views (but not otherwise), would be told just that.

8. GUERTLER is hereby authorized to state KUBARK's position along lines indicated in Para 6 if the occasion presents itself.

END OF DISPATCH

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO: Distribution
3 - COS, JMWAVE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible] 3668

DATE: 11 May 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: CS COPY IN
19-124-27/3

1 - WH/SA/ESEC
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH
1 - WH/Security

A-1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/SA/SO/HH	Henry D. Hecksher	gt	4477

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/SA		Henry D Hecksher

DESENSITIZED

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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2. 3MB1024-1 201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

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PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD
Transmittal of AMOT Reports on AMWORLD Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith are two AMOT reports on AMWORLD activities which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
AMOT Reports
DD-831, DD-837
One copy each, Herewith

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-267437

DATE TYPED
8 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 11 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO

SANITIZED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15846

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

~~RYBAT~~ SENSITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Report # DD-837.

TO: [redacted].

FROM: CE.

SUBJECT: AMYUM [redacted]. Activities.

SOURCES:
1. [redacted]. AMOT-173 Information acquired from Rolando SANCHEZ Gonzalez of 2340 NE 5th Ave., Miami.
2. [redacted]. AMOT-153 Information acquired during a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta (unwitting source), who is a very close friend of Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Adelaida PADRON Cruz.
3. [redacted]. AMOT-163 Information acquired during a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas of 821 SW 23rd Ave., Apt 15, Miami.
4. [redacted]. Information acquired from Acasia VAZQUEZ Gallo of 1836 NW 15th St., Miami, who lived in Cuba at one block from Adelaida PADRON Cruz.

SOURCE 1:

Source reports that a group of 18 men belonging to the action groups broke with AMYUM [redacted] because they were not in agreement with the manner in which AMBIDDY-1 [redacted] uses the money of the organization.

According to these men, A-1 [redacted] has assigned very good salaries to all his friends in addition to paying their rent and giving very good gifts to them. A specific example is AMLAVA-4 [redacted] to whom A-1 [redacted] gave $1,000 when he married.

According to source, A-1 [redacted] bought a boat for a certain sum of money but said that he had paid a much higher price. This immorality has created great unrest among AMYUM [redacted] members.

Source also reports that, at present, there are about 20 prisoners in the Nicaragua bases and that there are problems with KUBARK [redacted]. on account of this (source did not give details).

Source claims that A-1 [redacted] has already distributed all the political appointments for Cuba, including Councilmen's positions, among his friends and unconditional supporters.

SOURCE 2:

Source learned in a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta that, at present, A-1 [redacted] is having an affair with Adelaida PADRON Cruz and that some days ago A-1 [redacted] gave Adelaida PADRON Cruz a house as a gift. That A-1 [redacted] and Adelaida PADRON are now living in this house, which is a "dream." (Phone number PL-4-7912.)

Adelaida PADRON Cruz was married to prerevolutionary army Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia, and A-1 [redacted] paid all the expenses for Adelaida

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[illegible]

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 commenced by saying that he has obtained the charter for Libernic which Somoza had to sign. The original copy has been lost; however, A-1 has a photostatic copy with General Somoza's signature.

2. The undersigned requested of A-1 that he make quite clear to President Reid that AMWORLD is not receiving aid from the United States. A-1 was warned about making innuendos or ambiguous statements concerning American aid.

3. A-1 stated he would inform this office as soon as arrangements to go to the Dominican Republic were completed. A-1 was advised that we will be in Puerto Rico on Sunday 2 May.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO0HH

File:
ambiddy-1 - 201
Conversations
SANTA MARIA
Dominican Republic

W

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Artime

30 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 1100

1. AMBIDDY-1 was reminded that he should make a quick trip to the Dominican Republic to see President Reid and to arrange for drydocking and refueling facilities. A-1 was advised to use a more subtle approach than used on Colonel Lopez of Honduras. A-1's main objective should be to get "his foot in the door" in the Dominican Republic. A-1 should pursue the soft sell rather than the hard sell. Since he sounded a bit reluctant to forego the next operational phase in order to repair the ADELAIDA, A-1 was reassured that the overhauling of the ADELAIDA would take place after the operation rather than before. A-1 will take AMJAVA-4 with him to the Dominican Republic. Should President Reid ask for the name of the shipping company who will act as the agent for Maritima Bam, A-1 should say it is the Boyd Brothers Shipping Company.

2. A-1 was asked if he had obtained his U. S. visa. A-1 replied he has all the documents ready and will request it next time he goes to Nicaragua.

3. A-1 has no objection to AMYUM-19's attending the next meeting in Puerto Rico. The undersigned informed A-1 that we are preparing the intelligence data on the [illegible] targets he requested, and they will be presented to him at our meeting.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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[illegible]
[illegible] downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

4. A-1 commented if it would be possible for Kelly to arrange fueling facilities at Bluff with Texaco Oil rahter than Esso. The person in charge of the Esso company in Bluff apparently is not in sympathy with MRR movement; therefore, A-1 is reluctant to deal with Esso. A-1 inquired if the person in charge of Esso could be replaced. A-1 was informed that although Kelly enjoys a great deal of influence with Esso we doubt that he has that much influence. As it stands now the LCM obtains supplies there and it is then tranferred to the ADELAIDA because A-1 is reluctant to take the ADELAIDA near the Esso installation.

5. In conclusion A-1 was complimented on the manner his organization behaved during the operation.

6. Should A-1 obtain any definite information as to when he will be going to the Dominican Republic he should call our office in order that we may make our own traveling arrangements.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Dominican Republic
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
POL

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in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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GROUP 1
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[illegible] and
[illegible]

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Internal

29 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 29 April 1964 at 0800

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home in an attempt to reach him before his return to Miami became too well-known and he became engrossed in other matters.

2. A-1 was advised that one of the most urgent matters now pending was his trip to the Dominican Republic to meet President Reid to resolve the problem of drydock facilities for the ADELAIDA.

3. It was obvious from the sound of A-1's voice that he was still half asleep and further conversation at this time would be useless. A-1 was requested to call Martin at the office later in the day.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 -201
Conversations

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD
Recent Declarations by Manuel ARTIME Buesa

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE: None

Transmitted herewith is an AMOT report concerning the Referendum and exile reactions to Manuel ARTIME's speech before A.R.E.C., which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
AMOT Report DD-778
One copy herewith

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS, w/att/h/w

201-267437

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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DATE TYPED
24 Apr. 64

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 28 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15692

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

14-00000

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9 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/External Operations Branch

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Ottilia Buesa

1. Subject, who is Manuel Artime's aged mother, has last been reported as hiding out in Iglesia Cristo de Limpias in Havana city.

2. Artime has been without news from her for the last two months. His link to her used to be the Spanish Commercial Attache in Havana.

3. We have promised Artime to study ways and means of contacting her in order to ascertain her state of health, her husband's whereabouts and any personal needs she may have.

4. Can you come up with any ideas?

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

HDH/bh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH - Artime 201 ✓

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Reality of Autonomy

1. On 4 May 1964 HQS representatives raised with AMYUM-19 the question if AMBIDDY-1 in his own mind accepts the premise of independence from KUBARK control in his management of AMWORLD affairs. AMYUM-19 replied that AMBIDDY-1 had not always done so, but had now become convinced that he was in de facto control of AMWORLD. Commenting upon that fact, AMBIDDY-1 had recently remarked that he now thought he could, if he so decided, fire /sic/ both AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 without KUBARK attempting to gainsay him.

2. The arrival of James ZABOTH on the scene had at first re-kindled AMBIDDY-1's suspicions that KUBARK may after all try to clamp tight controls upon his operations. However, ZABOTH's general approach had disarmed those suspicions and convinced AMBIDDY-1 that he is in fact master of his destiny. AMYUM-19 reminisced that AMBIDDY-1 had in the beginning suspected him and AMJAVA-4 as being KUBARK plants. AMYUM-19 added he wanted to be quite candid in telling us that he would not himself have accepted a position in AMWORLD had he entertained the slightest doubts as to the sincerity of KUBARK's promise of autonomy.

3. We re-emphasized our adherence to the principles of autonomy, witness our desire to disengage from extensive involvement in AMWORLD logistics, our non-interference in personnel matters (except where overriding ODYOKE security interests are involved) and our future handling of subsidy payments.

4. Comment: We found no reason for disbelieving AMYUM-19's acceptance of autonomy as the principle guiding our role in AMWORLD. As an aside, AMYUM-19 observed that AMBIDDY-1 should not be expected to subordinate himself to PBPRIME controls of any kind once PBRUMEN had been liberated and we allowed that this was likely to be the case.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Policy

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

ORIG : H.D.Hecksher/bh
UNIT : WH/SA/SO/HH
EXT : 4215
DATE : 7 May 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-27/3

	IBT	SS	SB
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CI	SI	BI	

7 May 64 16 47z

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA-3

INFO : DDP, VR

AmBIDDY-1 201 Publicity

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 19632

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

PLEASE ARRANGE FOR MEETING BETWEEN "MR. RODEMEYER" AND AMBIDDY-1 DURING LATTER'S FORTHCOMING MIAMI STAY, PREFERABLY IN WAVE SAFEHOUSE USED FOR TNG SESSIONS. IT MOST IMPORTANT MEETING TAKE PLACE AT THIS TIME. (FYI: PROPOSE DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1 ON CONTROVERSIAL EVENTS SURROUNDING COL. FRANK EGAN AS SURFACED IN RECENT BOOK ON BAY OF PIGS.) ADVISE TIME OF MEETING.

END OF MESSAGE

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/SA/SO/AR APPROVED IN DRAFT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

H. D. HECKSHER
WH/SA/SO/HH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

7-7

Copy No.

AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: Cackling Over Unlaid Eggs

1. AMYUM-19 confided to us that AMBIDDY-1 had, prior to the launching of Operation ZENON, prepared a "three and one half page" news release which laid exaggerated claim to damages inflicted during the raid on Santa Cruz del Sur. Only the last sentence stated, more or less as an afterthought, that this should be considered just a minor MRR operation. AMYUM-19 has told AMBIDDY-1 that in his opinion any future announcements should be held down to one or two brief paragraphs.

2. We pointed out to AMYUM-19 that AMBIDDY-1 was evidently paying no more than lip service to our recommendation that he under--rather than over--play his successes. During the Washington meeting (19-21 March 1964) we had criticized a statement made by AMBIDDY-1 during a Miami press conference to wit: "We do not have enough boats. In one night we can make two trips but not more, but we are doing it. We will fill the country with enough arms to free the country from communism." We took the position that if we were in AMBIDDY-1's shoes we simply wouldn't let on about military matters since this plays into Castro's hands, giving him gratuitous access to military intelligence. AMBIDDY-1 countered by asking us how he could raise the morale of the people without saying anything and without talking about successful ops inside.

3. We mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that any vital information not publicized makes the task of Castro's espionage service that more difficult. Besides, things had now come to a pass where little credence was placed in claims of success and promises held out by Cuban exile leaders. What really counted was the demonstrable substance of success inside which speaks for itself. AMBIDDY-1 would be much more effective by preserving a posture of inscrutability. We counselled AMBIDDY-1 to resist a natural tendency to

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inflate the significance of his initial successes and to present them in their proper perspective. He should refer to those successes as mere appetizers, with the main dish to follow later. This approach rather than the claim of a big victory would arouse the kind of interest, and in Castro's case, the kind of premonition which carries psychological impact.

4. We doubt whether AMBIDDY-1 at this stage is prepared to heed our counsel to be conservative in his claims to victory. In the unhealthy climate of competition, engendered by the spectacle of numerous exile organizations vying to be the first, AMBIDDY-1 may be unable to resist the temptation to broadcast his victories and to exaggerate the damage they have inflicted. He will have to learn the hard way.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Publicity

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AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964

SUBJECT: The Nature of the American Commitment

1. Alluding to certain charges levelled against CIA in a recent publication on the Bay of Pigs affair, whose substance was that the Cuban military leadership had been served with erroneous intel estimates by their CIA advisors, I voiced to AMYUM-19 the hope that the U. S. team servicing AMWORLD would never be subjected to similar censure (without implying justification for charges made in the instance of the Bay of Pigs). I reiterated that it was our strong desire to be absolutely forthright with our Cuban counterparts, especially in stressing that our target intelligence had by its very nature to be of limited usefulness, especially when it came to predicting the extent and nature of Cuban defense measures. As an example, certain radar sites had struck us as highly vulnerable to external raids, but that this estimate might not necessarily be borne out if put to the test of an actual operation.

2. In the general context of pacts fulfilled, I once more pointed out to AMYUM-19 that the American commitment to AMWORLD was a tenuous one and that I would never be able to give an estimate of U. S. Government intentions vis-a-vis AMWORLD other than what can be deduced from the events of the preceding day. As an example, official American reaction to the widening repercussions of a limited AMWORLD success in raiding Cuba was simply unpredictable. AMYUM-19 hastened to assure us that AMBIDDY-1 was indeed fully cognizant of the circumstances I had outlined and that this sense of urgency in commencing operations was partly a reflection of a sense of insecurity engendered by the official American posture in respect to Cuba.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: COS, JMWAVE

File:
Policy
Operations

A-1 ✓

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C. Lane AM/WM-14

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PROCESSING		
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XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
KAPOK/TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD
AMWORLD Contact Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-15147 of 8 April 1964

Transmitted herewith are the Contact Reports of Warren K. GUERTLER for the period 5 - 14 April 1964.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Contact Reports (4)
One Copy Each Herewith

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS, w/atts/h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
15 Apr 64

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 17 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15435

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CONTACT REPORT # 54

OPERATION: AMWORLD **DATE TYPED: 6 Apr. 64**

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 0930-1100 Hrs. 4 Apr. 64, S/H 260

NEXT MEETING: Unscheduled

SUMMARY

1. A-19 was asked to provide the Case Officer with a sample of recent AMYUM radio programs. (Comment: P/W requested this. A Station contact is considering producing a "Monitor"-type program, originating in Miami, and broadcast over WRUL. All exile groups would be represented and it would provide a means for special broadcasts such as announcements of any successful AMWORLD ops, etc.

2. Reports from Nacin Elias frequently mention an action group known as "M.L.B", one of whose leaders uses the war name "el Diablo". A report from Nacin dated 16 March included an appeal for help in exfiltrating "el Diablo" and some others who are in danger. A-19 has heard that six men of the M.IDD. have just come out. One of the men is said to be "el Diablo"(Comment: Confirmed by BARR 1553) After they have been processed and debriefed A-19 will have them debriefed by AMFAST-64 and Alonso. A-19 believes that this group is the source of most of the documents furnished by Nacin and are either the only worthwhile contacts of Nacin or are completely controlled by the GOC. The latter theory is probably the correct one.

3. A-19 thinks that the captain of the Adelaida will eventually be replaced by Numne if he does not quit first. He is still not exercising the kind of leadership necessary for military ops. This, of course, will necessitate finding a new captain for the Dolores. Of the three crewmen who recently left the Adelaida, two were having difficulties with the rest of the crew and one, Jose Cabezas, left after his brother had been fired by AMBIDDY-1.

4. Guertler asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had received a security briefing recently reminding him not to discuss AMWORLD business. A-19 wanted to know if A-2 was still talking too much. The undersigned replied that quite a bit of information pertaining to AMWORLD was coming accross his desk and that it appeared to come from AMWORLD-2. When sufficient details are available it will be called to the attention of the Consejo and AMBIDDY-1, but in the meantime A-19 can remind A-2 to keep quiet about AMWORLD business.

5. Infiltration candidate Pablo Roberto FERNANDEZ Perez, PDCR

Guantanamo, Oriente Province 7 June 1916 may be identical with the subject of an AMOT report listing him as candidate for councilman of Guantanamo City Hall on the PSP slate during the Grau regime and stating that his son is private secretary to Carlos Olivares,Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Ministry of the GOC. A-19 was so informed and was asked to have an investigation made, taking into consideration both the CI and operational leads aspects of the matter.

6. Aida PEREZ Pozo. Guertler asked what her function was with AMWORLD. A-19 admitted that he was surprised to see her name on the payroll. She is working with Mole in intelligence. She has all the lesbian contacts in the city and knows everything that goes on. Nothing can be done about it because she is another "woman of confidence" of AMBIDDY-1.

7. The Case Officer brought up the matter of telephone security, the possibility that A-19's private line and his hope phone could be tapped, and suggested the use of pay phones for operational calls, especially to the Consejo. In order to make use of direct dialing A-19 could call the Consejo giving his number and await the return call.(The Consejo might want to bring this up with A-1) According to A-19 Mole's group is monitoring all calls to AMYUM headquarters but he does not think his private line (the one used by GUERTLER) is monitored. In reply to the Case Officer's question A-19 said that A-1 does his business calls from his home, i.e. the house of his mistress. The Case Officer commented that this fact was known to another group (unspecified) and let the matter drop.

8. The reason for the blown AMYUM safe house: While the AMYUMS were on the roof stringing the antenna one of them drove his car onto the lawn of the neighbor so that it would be in the shade of the neighbors tree. Naturally the neighbor came out to see what was going on. He did see. As A-19 said, when he learned of the incident he had to laugh (albeit somewhat hysterically) The only alternative would be to kill the idiot. Guertler agreed. We can only hope that the next safe house will be very isolated.

Warren K. Guertler

CONTACT REPORT # 55

OPERATION: AMWORLD DATE TYPED: 7 Apr 64

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630 Hrs., 6 Apr 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. Attached are two recent reports covering the activities of Jose Elias aka Nacin. The Habana contact, Bernardo Nievares has informed AMYUM that if he can be picked up he will be able to come to the WAVE area for about 15 days for debriefing and training. The Ramon Mondejar Cid, aka "el diablo" mentioned as having been released by the G-2 and waiting for exfiltration is currently in the WAVE area, having escaped with four others. According to A-19 they have been interviewed by ODURGE and were told to have no contact with any other PBRUMEN groups because they could receive special training and be sent back to work against AMTHUG. The AMYUMS have been debriefing the five for several days with the same idea in mind. GUERTLER will get the reports when the debriefings are over. A-19 has not gotten the preliminary reports but says Alonso is impressed with Mondejar. As for the exfiltration of Nievares AMYUM has no intention of attempting it but A-19 is considering offering the opportunity to do so to Aldo Vera (see below).

2. Aldo VERA Serafin (201-326634) This subject is a former member of the DTI, recently considered for use in an attempt to defect a GOC official in Madrid. The AMYUMS consider him a good action type and sought him out with the intention of infiltrating him and his group into Habana province. He is presently receiving special training for the job. Vera's file generally substantiates A-19's evaluation of the man. However, local traces do contain unsubstantiated accusations that he is a G-2 and that he maintains contacts with alleged G-2 agents and informers. An ODENVY report in 1963 said that Vera was engaged in transmitting and receiving messages by radio with Cuba. The Case Officer informed A-19 that while he had nothing definite to offer by way of proof he had some doubts about Vera and cited the above. A-19 says that Vera does have radio contact with friends in Habana (voice) and that he offered his radio facilities to AMYUM. Assuming that Vera himself is clean, A-19 was cautioned to have all internal contacts checked out and to obtain a complete report on Vera's plans before making any commitments. The undersigned continues to have some reservations but Verawas requested by AMSHAG-1, and A-19 likes him so far. Guertler will pursue the matter further at a later meeting.

3. AMLILAC-2 has been told by ODURGE that as long as AMYUM requests permission for him to leave the country he will be blackballed. (see previous reports for reason for blackballing). According to A-19 ODURGE suggested that if he was to be used he could be taken out as a crewman on the Adelaide. A-19 wanted to know if it was KUBARK that was keeping him on the list. Guertler pleaded ignorance

and remarked that it could be for any number of reasons completely unrelated to his past relations with KUBARK.

4. 16 PRQ Is were turned over for traces. The various group leaders are continuing to recruit for their groups. The Case Officer suggested that they might employ their time more profitably by working with what they already have and leave the recruiting to AMYUM-23. A-19 agreed that the system had to be changed in fact. It was changed in theory some time ago. Guertler suggested that it would be a lot easier on all concerned to look for people with the qualifications to fill existing slots instead of the present procedure of looking for jobs to give all the volunteers that present themselves. After having screened at least a thousand volunteers we still keep getting PRQs on potential cooks or people for whom no specific job exists but who are considered "very good boys". A-19 agreed. Probably nothing will change.

WARREN K. GUERTLER

Miami, Fla. 25 March 64

From: Inocencio ALONSO **Re: Report #9**

To: AMYUM-19

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED BY OUR AGENT NACIN SINCE LAST REPORT DATED MARCH 16 64.

Report of MR. MARIO CASAS WHO WORKS WITH SF-1 IN THE RAILWAY SECTOR OF ORIENTE.

He informs that in Guantanamo, Oriente the railway sector has organized a cell. It is composed of: Pablo Eduardo, Coordinator; Jose Sanchez, Vice (coordinator); Luis, Organization and Romualdo, Military Coordinator, promising to advise later on who the Treasurer is.

He also advises that railway equipment continues in the same state; breakages, accidents and stoppages at the Sugar Centrals for lack of sugar cane and transport equipment. They continue to move equipment and troops at night in large scale. The opinion is that this movement is merely a bluff.

REPORT OF BERNARDO NIEVARES, OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY BENNY.

Advises he is anxious to have news and instructions from us; states that altho' true that he has made a pact with us, he will not be able to continue under present conditions. Insists it is necessary he be given plans of concrete jobs and instructions he can give the men who are anxious to fight over there; that as long as this does not happen, he feels he is only on the border of activities and while we may be satisfied, he would not like to land anyone (in Cuba) specially under the present circumstances where repression throughout the island is tremendous.

He insists we be sincere with him and give him replies to these various points: What has the National Direction in Exile of the MRR resolved concerning the "MIR" and its integrated organizations. "What plans will they carry out(his group) in the internal fight for the liberation of Cuba" Secondly: "We urgently need a more effective communication; hoping that you already have the necessary means.- On our part, we are already in contact and making arrangements with embassies for the correspondence with Miami.- We'll advise you the results." - Thirdly: "It is necessary that you urgently answer me if we can make contact with the American boats stationed in front of Havana, in order to exfil "DIABLO" and other compatriots who are in much danger". We have the necessary ship to transport them. The boat will give 3 flashes at one minute intervals each with a lapse of 10 to 15 minutes." "I ask you to try and do what you can to help these brothers in misfortune." Fourth - "On the 12th (March) one of our men, "Michel Adam" left for Lebanon via Mexico with correspondence for the address in Miami". - Fifth - Dr. Gomes' contact has not proved as effective as we had hoped; we have met only twice and nothing else has happened."

14-00000

Miami, 5 April 1964

FROM: INOCENCIO ALONSO

TO : AMYUM-19

REPORT DATED 27 MARCH 1964 RECEIVED FROM OUR AGENT "NACIN"

In a letter dated 27 March 1964 Agent "Nacin" says to SUSPEND THE PRODUCTION OF PASSES FOR THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE, of three colors and with different specifications which were ordered according to samples or patterns he had sent, because the Castro Regime announced that as of 6 April they would be changed. That as soon as he can obtain the new models he will send them so that 50 copies of each color can be made.

Bernardo NIEVARES, more known as "BENNY", in a report dated 18 March 1964, says that Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known as "EL DIABLO" has been set free, together with four other men who were arrested with him, and now all five have been relieved of all activity for security reasons and are waiting in Havana to leave the country.

He adds that if there is a delay in complying with the promise of getting them out of Cuba, he will have to do it himself.

He also reports that Michel ADAM was able to leave Cuba through the Lebanese Embassy, where he took refuge, and is now at the following address: "HOMAY YAPTCHI MIGDALYA, Zagarta, Lebanon".

Regarding Intelligence Reports, he says that he could do much more in that respect, but he has to avoid contacting men whom he cannot brief on our situation, and the state of desesperation which exists among them in Cuba. From what Nacin sees from Benny's messages, he says that he does not have other orientations to give him, and that he has to continue in the same conditions as he has been until now. He says that the person who brought that message refuses to establish contacts, and requests to

OTHER INFORMATION OF BERNARDO NIEVARES, OF HAVANA, KNOWN BY "BENNY", ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Proclaims having knowledge that in the place known as "La Puntilla", at the mouth of the river Almendares, there exists large quantities of antiair batteries, among them "4 barrels", and other major types.

They have also observed large quantities of anti-air artillery in the "Cubanacan" development, along the coast, in front of Villanueva University. This same type has also been observed along the coast of Baracoa, Barlevento development, where they have "4 barrels" and other pieces of major size.

At the Hotel National of Havana, they changed the "4 barrel" anti-air to long range anti-air cannons.

Between the towns of Bahia Honda and Cabanas, there is a Tank Camp where it is calculated there are about 300 tanks of various sizes.

He professes to have knowledge that on the road which goes from La Rotonda of Guanabo to the road to Guanabacoa, there is a Russian Camp where there is a large amount of "rockets".- It is believed they are long range by their size; since they did not see this size at the last military parade they had in Havana.

On the 23th of Jan 64, 26 trailers with this type of cargo were seen on this road; this took place around dawn.

He states: "below I list the various acts of sabotaje commited by "MIR" in Havana province:

At the "Josefita" central in Nueva Paz, Havana province, a piece of steel was put into the sugarcane grinder causing great damage.

In the zone of Nueva Paz, Palos and San Nicolas of Bari, in Havana Province, they caused 10 rows, causing large losses;all this in the month of January. In the month of February they produced 18 fires at the Municipal terminals of San Nicolas, Alquizar, Quivican and Guines, also in Havana province; and lastly, between the 2nd and 3rd of March the "MIR" carried out 9 fires between San Nicolas de Bari and Nueva Paz, destroying more than 300,000 arrobas of sugar cane according to the proper local red authorities.

rapidly answer him because he has to be in Havana early next Saturday and so avoiding things to become complicated.

"Benny" also includes two INTELLIGENCE reports dated 20 March 1964 in which he says:

"The Air Force Captain, Remigio GONZALEZ Espinosa, is being actively sought by the G-2. The charges are that he took apart the controls of five "MIG-21's" on 2 March 1964, one day before practices, in the town of Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province, provoking the crashing of a "MIG-21" in which the pilot, Captain DOMINGUEZ Blas, and a woman photographer of the "FAR" lost the lives."

The other report says:

"Soldier Armando GUEVARA L., was declared a REBEL because he did not agree with the Government, was captured by the G-2 in Guaimaro, Oriente Province, at the beginning of March 1964 and was executed the 14th of the same month."

CONCLUSIONS: This acting officer says that, according with what was reported by Bernardo NIEVARES, known as "BENNY", in his reports to Nacin, regarding the news that the G-2 set 5 men free: Ramon MONDEJAR Cid, known more as "El Diablo", together with 4 other men, it is to be noted that actually, Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other four men, Pablo Gilberto VARGAS Diaz; Ramon NIEVES Guirao, known as "RAMON I": Jóse ARAGON MILIAN, known as "CARRAGUAO" and Rodolfo LICOR Montesinos arrived to this city on 2 April 1964 clandestinally by boat, after they succeeded to arrive 20 miles away from Cuban coasts, where they were picked up by the U.S. Coast-guards and taken to Key West, Fla., where they underwent intorrogations by the American Immigration Authorities and now are free in this city of Miami, Fla.

That all have been located by the undersigned and interrogated separately.

.../

As soon as the job is finished, the results of thiese interrogations will be passed on to the Superior Offices for information.

That the underesigned took note and suspended all production of the passes for the Naval Base which were previously received, waiting to receive the new passes offered in this report.

CONTACT REPORT #56

OPERATION : AMWORLD

DATE TYPED: 10 Apr. 64

CONTACT: AMBIDDY-1, AMJAVA-4, AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1030-2400 Hrs., 9 Apr. S/H

SUMMARY

1. The Case Officer confirmed that A-1 had definitely decided not to attempt Operation Genesis and will mount Operation Zenon instead. The undersigned agreed that this was a wise decision since the latest reports indicated increasing hostile naval activity in the area, making chances for survival extremely slight, and reminded A-1 of his recent speech in which he stated that AMWORLD propaganda was in support of military operations and not the reverse, hinting that AMBANG would sacrifice his men for the sake of publicity for himself. A military operation, even if it failed completely would not be as harmful as an obviously publicity stunt that cost lives and equipment. A-1 appeared to accept the necessity for postponing Genesis but was obviously disappointed at not being able to land his sharpshooter to take a shot at the guest of honor during the military review.

2. A-1 and A-4 were given the sequence of Q signs to be transmitted during the test run of the signal plan to be used during the op. The Case Officer reminded A-1 to tell his people that the transmissions will come from one of his bases, and to make certain that the captain of the Adelaida has his copy of the key. The writer suggested that A-1 merely inform that ship to monitor the frequency and to report to A-1 what signals were received and what action would have been taken.

3. Guertler asked that the Consejo be informed of the Q signs to be used by the Adelaida and the intermediate craft and the base. A-4 said that it would be sent up by radio.

4. The writer suggested that the hourly position reports be started right away to be certain that all would function smoothly during the operation. Since around-the-clock monitoring of the ships transmissions will interfere with Disneyland communications with other bases a second radio will be required. One of the agent radios will be taken to the base.

5. A-19 has not located a site for the WAVE transmitter. Alonso has several prospects and A-19 will inspect them and inform the Case Officer soonest. In the meantime, Guertler suggested using the AMYUM office since amidst all the confusion it would probably not attract attention. A-4 was also reminded to furnish us with the signal plan for the WAVE/ Nicaragua link. (The plans to communicate with Managua were abandoned. Commo will be with Disneyland

6. The complete operational plan for Zenon was turned over to the Case Officer on 10 Apr. The essentials were cabled to headquarters.

The remainder will follow by Dispatch.

7. Guertler suggested Curaçao as a suitable place for drydocking
Adelaida for needed repairs after the operation. A-1 demurred,
stating that it would be needed for an infiltration op on 3 May.
A-19 was told that it was of the utmost importance that the AKL
Dolores be provided with a top quality captain and engineer,
regardless of cost or nationality, that the equipment was very
sensitive and was irreplacable. A-19 stated that it would be a
problem, especially the engineer, but that he would do so. Guertler
offered no suggestions where to look, merely commenting that not
that AMWORLD had made many commercial contacts he should be able
to obtain assistance in locating a good man for the job.*

8. The complete crew for the Dolores has not been signed yet. Some
of the crew from the Adelaida can fill in while she is in drydock.

9. A-19was told that the Consejo was negotiating for Standard Oil
of New Jersey to provide AMWORLD will its fuel on a regular basis
and that the company wanted a letter from some prominent Nicaraguan
official stating that this was acceptable to the GON.

10. The Case Officer asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had closed his Swiss
account for certain. A-19 replied yes. The writer then told him that
that was good because the $25,000 used to open the accound would
be refunded to A-2 and that instead of returning it to the Consejo
they could keep it and we would deduct the amount from the next
month's budget (they have spent most of it already). Shocked looks
around the table. They have already spent most of it. It was
included in the unexpended assets reported three months ago and
was deducted succeeding month's deposit. Henry said we could spend
it. The writer professed surprise since this money was not allocated
to the project but was only to be used to keep the account open.
This lead to a series of complaints about PBPRIME business methods,
the fact that Ramsay Scarlet has recently billed them for A30,000
for something incurred in November, and was that any way to run a
business. The writer commented that they just didn"t understand
anglo-saxon psychology and called it an evening, wishing them
the best of luck on their operation.

Warren K. Guertler

*This will be discussed with A-1 later, after the operation.

CONTACT REPORT # 57

OPERATION: AMWORLD **DATE TYPED: 14 Apr. 64**

CONTACT: AMYUM-19

TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630, 13 Apr. 64, S/H

SUMMARY

1. 22 PRQ Is turned over for traces.

2. As per UFGW-3513 A-19 was reminded that in the future it was absolutely necessary that the AMWORLD monthly accounting be received on time, otherwise our payments may be delayed.

3. Payroll changes: Guertler discussed the payroll changes noted in UFGW-3490. The two crewmen mentioned were terminated for being AWOL but were carried for two months before being told that they would not be given another chance. The two examples cited for pay increases are explained by the fact that while the two man were still in the WAVE area they received no family allotment. They are not at the camps and so are being paid more. A-19 was reminded that the insurance forms must be submitted in order for an AMWORLDER to be covered and that if a person is terminated all coverage ceases and will not be resumed automatically if the person is re-hired. A-19 says he understands this perfectly and will keep us up to date on all hirings and firings.

4. A-19 was reminded that some of the PRQ Is submitted for traces are unnecessarily vague, citing the case of one submitted from Puerto Rico on Oscar RODRIGUEZ Fernandez. The subjects record of employment lists "Secret Police" without indicating when or for what government.

5. The Case Officer told A-19 that the Consejo had learded that Captain Reinaldo BLANCO and Gustavo de los REYES may wish to contact AMBIDDY-1 and that they might prove useful and should be given a hearing. A-19 replied that BLANCO had been trying to see him for two weeks but that he had been stalling because he did not know what he could do with him at this stage of the project. The Case Officer recommended that he should be given a chance since he might prove useful in the future. A-19 said that he would get in touch with him.

6. Guertler asked A-19 if he knew the circumstances surrounding the case of Blas COMAS Castro, captain of a JURE boat reported to be in trouble after having received a letter from AMBIDDY-1 thanking him for signing up for AMWORLD. A-19 said that he would check, but as far as he knew the man must have filled out a form, and that it was not a frameup.

7. Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other members of the M.I.D. recently arrived from Habana have been completely debriefed by the AMYUM intelligence section. Very little was revealed by them during their processing at the Refugee Center, but they have been very cooperative with the AMYUMS. They have been kept isolated from the rest of the PBRUMEN community with the intention of training them and sending them back. A-19 would like to use Aldo VERA Serafin's group to reinfiltrate this group and pick up the Habana coordinator, Bdrnardo NIEVARES. Now that Nacin is not available, having been kicked out of YOACRE (at KUBARK request, according to A-19) the AMYUMS have no way to contact NIEVARES. A-19 mentioned using his embassy contacts to do this, but the writer strongly urged him to keep this group completely compartmented from any other groups. So far MONDEJAR has made a very favorable impression on his interviewers but very little is known about the coordinator, Benny NIEVARES. Guertler suggested that A-19 should have these people questioned about what they know of NIEVARES, the circumstances surrounding their recruitment. This group was sent with the specific mission of contacting AMBIDDY-1 and asking for material help. From what is known of this organization it seems quite likely to be a provocation, and as A-19 admits, these people are either unusually compement or completely controlled. A-19 wants to put them to the test by providing them with sab material and asking them to hit a specific target before discussing the matter of further financial or material aid.

Warren K. Guertler

~~SECRET~~

9 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1, 9 April 1964, 1315 hours

1. The following was relayed to AMBIDDY-1: "We are glad you have second thoughts about Playa Giron. We have received more information about military, especially maritime, build-up in that sector which would make any landing attempt virtually suicidal." AMBIDDY-1 stated he would confer with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 and give us his final decision as to whether or not this operation would be run. AMBIDDY-1 commented that one life meant more to him than the entire operation. However, A-1 again reminded this office of the impact an attack on Playa Giron on the 17th of April would have on the morale of the Cuban people. The undersigned replied that there are two sides to the coin; should their operation fail, this would play into the hands of Castro, and it was the opinion of this office that the alternate plan would also do much to raise the morale of the Cuban people.

2. In conclusion it was reaffirmed to A-1 that the final decision is his. He replied that after his meeting with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 he will let us know the final decision.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Op Genesis

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

AMBIDDY-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin

DATE : 9 April 1964 at 2000 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated he had been unable to obtain the address of the Tampa barge and he was leaving this matter to AMYUM-19.

2. Concerning the DC-3, A-1 stated that Manuel Hernandez had talked to Petrosky. Petrosky did send a letter to Talaria instead of Carrillo as A-1 had informed this office before. A-1 will get a complete story from Hernandez upon arrival in Costa Rica. A-1 was advised to move the DC-3 to Panama under some pretext beofre Talaria notifies Carrillo of the cancellation of the charter. The logic behind this is should Carillo decide to cause some trouble it would be difficult for the DC-3 to leave Costa Rica.

3. In conclusion the undersigned conveyed to A-1 our wishes for a successful operation.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/EO/RH

File: Logistics
C-47

✓

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 9 April 1964

1. A-1 will obtain the address of the Tampa barge today and call our office. A-1 is departing for Nicaragua on 10 April via Lanica at 0730.

2. Manuel Hernandez has gone to Panama and should have returned to Costa Rica by now. A-1 will report on Hernandez' findings upon his arrival in Costa Rica.

3. A-1 told not to forget the budget before his departure. The quarterly charter payment to Talaria for the C-47 is due this month.

4. Petrosky will send a letter to Carrillo stating he would like to charter a C-47. Carrillo will then write back saying that he has a C-47 to sub-let. A-1 hopes that this exchange between Carrillo and Petrosky will culminate in the C-47 being based in Panama.

5. The undersigned asked A-1 if he had his Q signals to be used for the operation. A-1 stated he does have them.

6. A-1 was requested to send the list of those expelled.

7. A-1 should make certain that the Nicaraguan Consulate in New York is alerted to the heavy equipment shipment and the Consular stamped invoice.

8. After signing the Libernic contract General Somoza should mail the contract to the Libernic people.

9. A-1 was advised that someone should now be working on the registration of the DOLORES.

10. We would appreciate A-1 following up on his visa while in Nicaragua.

11. The following was passed to A-1 concerning the village radios: Will arrive in Managua at 1425 hours on 10 April, Pan Am flight no.2501. Air Bill number is Pan Am 026-4-674334. Consists of 27 packages, weighing 2,014. Has been prepaid $603.00. Consignor: Consolidated Electrical Equipment Co. It is identified as transceivers and batteries. No.20763 appears on each case along with the address.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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SECRET

12. The batteries shipped by Pan American to Managua for use with village radios are dry-charged and "electrolyte" must be added to batteries before they are used. Specifically, "electrolyte" is sulfuric acid and distilled water mixed to a specific gravity of 1.275. "Electrolyte" is available from any filling station or automobile garage. You will need 20 gallons of "electrolyte". This liquid could not be shipped on commercial aircraft.

13. Radios do not have consular invoice which is normal. A-1 stated he could handle the situation.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Ambiddy-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Log
C-47

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code.

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GROUP 1
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSDB-3/660,494

SUBJECT Political Philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa

201

DATE DISTR. 9 April 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCE:

DATE OF INFO. 18 March 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (6 April 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A Cuban exile observer who was present during the speech.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a résumé of the political philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa, leader of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) as prepared by Source. It is based on statements made by Artime in his speech on 18 March 1964 to the Associación para Recuperación Económica de Cuba (AREC, Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba), on his first publication entitled Comunismo por qué? (Communism for what?), which was written nine months before Castro came to power, and on Artime's book Traición (Betrayal).

1. Artime does not believe in political extremes -- neither the left nor the right. He believes that extremes always end by touching one another. If any extreme gains power in Cuba, and in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship, he will continue to fight with weapons in hand. Artime does not believe in the classification of men by race, by political ranks in former governments, or by money. He confesses to being an opportunist in the sense that he is taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, but not in the sense of changing his beliefs in accord with opportunities.

2. The main theme of Comunismo por qué? was that more than a change in government a change in the conscience of men is needed. It outlined the duties of the padrón (landowner) toward the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and honor. The padron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker, in turn, has certain obligations to the padron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to, a (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good. In his letter of resignation to Fidel Castro accusing the latter of being a

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REPCINCLANT	CINCSO #	TREASURY	USIA	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

SA/EOB	3	SA/SI	[illegible]/PACY	WE/5/R	1
SA/Intel	1	SA/WAVE		WE/MADR	1
SA/R	3	SA/SO/HH (1)			
SA/CI	2			CI/OPS/WH	2
SA/MOB	1				

LX-1090
NO PROJECT
CSDB-3/660,494

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DODS 1, WH (1), WH/SA 12 (1), WE [illegible] (1)

LIAISON WH/

COORDINATING SA/SO/HH

RELEASING [illegible]

Communist and traitor, Artime mentioned that he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

3. The following excerpts from Artime's book Traicion clearly outline Artime's ideology:

   a. "We believe the state should foment and stimulate private economy, both national and foreign. We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America because the word democracy in that area has been prostituted too often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist and demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of the people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarians have been the strongest allies of Communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not a war of personal hatred--it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you--it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right."

   b. "We don't care if they call us extremist. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philocommunist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us,' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"

   c. "They say we are very ambitious. Our ambition is that in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."

   d. "Our men in Cuba are not only fighting for the independence of our country but also for the independence of the American hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world." Artime maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U.S. is at odds with these two governments--this is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. Artime has supported his statements, by quoting Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence, and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."

   e. "The battle-ground for Latin America lies 90 miles from our shores. Should the Western world lose this battle, the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the Communist camp. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be."

   f. "We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba to the hands of men who could not govern her properly. We have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because our cause is honorable. We cannot afford to wait for miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS and the UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. If we are not going to wage a war of principles, I will not join that struggle."

8 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 8 April 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 informed he had sent man to Tampa to obtain exact location of Tampa barge;he hopes to have the address later today.

2. A-1 is leaving for Central America on Friday, 10 April. Does not expect to return until latter end of April.

3. A-1 was asked to make certain his financial request to the Consejo is in our office by 15 April. Two papers should be in our possession by the aforementioned date: the form for last month's expenditures plusrrequest to Consejo for $225,000. If these papers are not in our hands by the specified date it will result in unavoidable delay which will make them unable to meet their bill by the beginning of the following month. A-1 assured the undersigned the deadline would be met.

4. A-1 was advised that during the operational phase AMYUM-19 must be available to either Mike or the Consejo at all times. We will not accept any excuse should we wish to contact A-19 and are unable to do so. A-1 stated that A-19 will be on call.

5. ADELAIDA to depart from Disneyland on its first operation on 11 April at 1500 hours (local time, which according to A-1 is one hour less than Washington time).

6. A-1 requested the Consejo supply him with more detailed maps of the city of Playa Giron for Rafael Alvarez. A-1 was told we would check into the matter. Today AMYUM-19 is to give

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Mike GEIDEL (A) complete schedule for first operation, e.g. ETD, course of ship, ETA, etc.

7. The undersigned advised A-1 we would like to talk to him by telephone tomorrow after we talk to Carl concerning final aspects of the operation.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:
Finance
Sabotage
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

8 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 8 April 1964, 1500 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was questioned regarding the present status of the Norwegian engineer, his whereabouts, their plans for his use, etc. A-1 said he didn't know the answer, would have to check with AMJAVA-4, and would call us tomorrow with all the details.

2. A-1 was told that the technicians who are to receive training aboard the Dolores should be ready to leave for New York by 15 April. As the van will be shipped directly, it will only be possible to train the technicians on the Dolores. We will be able to train up to ten technicians, and A-1 should send as many as he wants to. We will let AMYUM-19 know on Tuesday, 14 April, exactly when and where they should report for training.

3. A-1 was advised that we have the information he requested and he will have it by tomorrow night. A-1 was very pleased to hear this.

4. A-1 said he will call this office tomorrow morning for sure.

B. Hernandez
Bobbie Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Training
Commo

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declassification

DISPATCH

~~SECRET/KYBAT~~

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMWORLD--Training by JMWAVE of AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In the opinion of JAMES D. ZABOTH the training presented to AMWORLD's principal agents was of great value to the project. Project management and operational planning were very effectively highlighted.

2. Proof of the pudding was in the plan presented by AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 on 28 March in Miami, which envisions a raid on PBRUMEN about mid-April. The good results of the JMWAVE training sessions were readily apparent in the quality of this plan.

3. We appreciate the time and effort expended by JMWAVE on these training sessions and wish to record our impression that they were successful and highly professional.

KENNETH L. PHILBROOK

Distribution:
4 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW 2517	8 April 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KYBAT DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy IN 19-124/27/3

1 - WH/SAESEC
1 - WH/SA/SO/HH
→ AMBIDDY-1 201
AMJAVA-4 201

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/SA/SO/HH	Carl E. Jenkins CEJ	bh	4215

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/SA/SO/HH		Henry Hecksher

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/SA		Henry Hecksher

FORM 1-64 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40) DISPATCH

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April 1964

1. It was brought to the attention of AMBIDDY-1 that the MRR is the only Cuban exile organization that has not properly registered with the United States Government. A-1 will attend to the registration.

2. A-1 requested to check his P.O. box.

3. A-1 reported receiving information this morning that ADELAIDA en route to Disneyland.

4. Concerning his visa, he stated he had received an FS 510 form. According to A-1 these forms have to be filled and submitted to the American Embassy in Managua. A-1 was asked if AMJAVA-4 now has the U. S. re-entry permit. A-4 does presently has the alien resident [illegible] card, but not the re-entry blue book.

5. A-1 was informed that all village radios will be shipped to Bluefields and none would be sent to Miami for him to hand carry. It is hoped that these village radios will arrive in time for the operation. Should this not be the case they have PRC-10s which could serve the same purpose as the village radios.

6. Mr. Mountain is expected to call Sixto Mesa advising the survey has been completed. Mr. Mountain will request Mesa that his three DMJM engineers return to the States. A-1 was asked to make sure that Mr. Mountain's message reaches the engineers.

7. The soil sample sent from Nicaragua is still not in the possession of AMWORLD.

8. A-1 was requested to notify his propaganda personnel not to make any mention of Brasil and their radio broadcasts. A-1 agreed.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed [illegible] code

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: AMBIDDY-1 (201)
Conversations

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 7 April, 1010 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 confirmed what AMJAVA-4 had related to this office earlier, that is, he wanted one large, two medium and two small village radios. This would suffice for one mothership, two Swifts and two rubber boats to rehearse.

2. A-1 stated the Libernic representative would not be needed in Nicaragua to confer with General Somoza since all the arrangements have been made. Gen. Somoza has found the charter very acceptable.

3. A-1 was asked flatly if the Adelaida is ready to begin operations. He replied that it is ready.

4. A-1 was advised that we would like to schedule the dry-run for 10 April, if this would be acceptable to him. A-1 agreed with this date.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Dolores

✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 6 April, 2000 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began the conversation by announcing that he had dismissed seventeen frogmen from AMWORLD and "the next ax to fall" will be on the mothership ADELAIDA.

2. At this time A-1 was informed that the people who had trained Munne were very satisfied with his performance and Munne is now considered capable of being captain of ADELAIDA.

3. A-1 expects to leave for the bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica on 9 or 10 April.

4. A-1 would like to have the dry run of the operation scheduled between 9-11 April. The operations will commence on 12 April.

5. A-1 was told the idea of using the DMJM engineers has been cancelled. A-1 sounded very pleased and stated they were too elaborate for his operation. However, A-1 would like that the survey conducted by the American engineers be submitted to him. A-1 was advised that since he paid $31,000 for this survey it will be submitted to him by the American engineers. A-1 was also advised that we are conducting a survey of our own which will be sent to him. Our project centers around using the Tampa barge as a floating dock. A-1 commented that AMJAVA-4 had had the same idea. A-1 was asked to send us the exact address of the Tampa barge.

6. A-1 has obtained his visa papers in Nicaragua.

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

7. A-1 would like to have several of the village radios sent to him in Miami in order to hand carry them to Nicaragua. A-1 was informed we would have to check into the matter.

8. Upon arriving in Miami, A-1 accidentally met Luis Somoza. The latter stated he is going to Egypt, Italy and West Germany. On his return he will stop in Washington to speak to President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy concerning "his plan."

9. Regarding General Somoza, A-1 mentioned he had no trouble obtaining the contract for the Dolores from the General. A-1 will get the document on his next trip to Nicaragua.

10. A-1 was asked if there were any difficulties in Costa Rica. A-1 stated there was "a little trouble," but nothing of major importance. Cornelio Orlich had spoken to A-1 during his last visit and the former had stated that there would be some grumbling on the part of the Government of Costa Rica but this was intended only to placate the opposition. Cornelio Orlich is scheduled to be operated on for an ulcer on 7 April. Should there be any need to deal with the Costa Rican Government, A-1 will deal directly with President Orlich. A-1 expects to see the president on his next tour through Central America. (There was no indication during this portion of the conversation that AMWORLD would be asked to leave Costa Rica.) A-1 was asked if he still stood by his original guess on Cornelio's age, that is, 73. Martin informed A-1 that reports we had received indicated him to be in his 50's. A-1 stated if he is 50 he looks like 73. A-1 asked if we wanted toknow his exact age. A-1 was told not to go to any trouble to obtain it; we would just like to know for our own information.

11. Reports received by A-1 indicate Adelaida should presently be at Disneyland.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH"

File:
AMBIDDY-1 n201
Conversations
Costa Rica
DMJM
Munne

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD
Speeches of Manuel Artime Buesa

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

Reference : None

Transmitted herewith are three AMOT reports concerning recent public appearances of Manuel ARTIME Buesa which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: H/W
AMOT Report DD-742 - 1 cy
AMOT Report DD-745 - 1 cy
AMOT Report DD-764 - 1 cy

Distribution:
3 - SAS, w/att/h/w

CS COPY

AN/FI	FI	
~~RI~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

201-267437

~~19-124-27/3~~

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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SECRET

DATE TYPED 3 APR 64	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-18133	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-27/3	

1 att.

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Report # DD-742. 20 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] [illegible]-11

SUBJECT: Appearance of Manuel ARTIME Buesa at the A.R.E.C. Session on 18 Mar 64 in the Everglades Hotel, Miami.

At exactly 1550 hours, 18 Mar 64, Manuel ARTIME Buesa appeared before A.R.E.C. members. ARTIME spoke for one hour and twenty minutes, finishing his speech at 1710 hours. During that time he answered questions from the audience.

ARTIME dedicated the first hour of his speech to "presenting his credentials" (that is how he called what he was going to say). During that hour he gave a recount of his actions, beginning with the letter of resignation which he sent to Fidel CASTRO in Cuba, and then reading excerpts from things published in exile by the M.R.R. and from his "Political Testament" which he claimed to have written in the Guatemala training base in the 24 hours preceding the departure for the Bay of Pigs invasion, etc., etc., up to the present time. He finished that part of his speech by declaring that he respected the Constitution of 1940, that he was fighting against a system not against one man, and that he would continue to fight after the fall of Fidel CASTRO Ruz if another dictatorship were established in Cuba—either a rightist or a leftist dictatorship—or if it was simply an attempt to exchange Fidel for another person, no matter who it might be.

Then he said that many persons said he was an extreme rightist and others said he was an extreme leftist, that others said he was an ambitious individual, and others said he was an opportunist. That all he could answer to those who said he was an extremist was that he did not like extremes, either of the right or left, because these extremes always ended by touching each other. That to those who said he was an ambitious individual he replied that yes, he was ambitious, but that his ambition was for his name to be spoken with respect some day in his country. That he had the ambition that at least, after his death, it would be said: He was a worthy man. That, in short, what he had was a great ambition for History. That to those who said he was an opportunist he could say: "If opportunism is making use of every moment and every opportunity to do something for the country, I am an opportunist. If opportunism is

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Att. 1 UFGA-15133

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Report # DD-742, C-4, 20 Mar 64 (cont.)

changing ideas in accordance with this or that situation, then I am not an opportunist because I do not change my ideas. I have upheld the same ideas since I appeared in the public light, and they are here in my Political Testament and in other declarations and documents which I have made and written. For those reasons I cannot be an opportunist." He also said that he had knocked, was knocking and would continue to knock on all doors to get assistance for the liberation of Cuba. That he classified men into two categories only, worthy men and unworthy men, and there were no other differences. That to him are men were equal, be they black or white, rich or poor, members of one regime or of another. That he has known and knows many worthy men from all regimes, etc., etc., etc.

Questions and Answers:

Following are some of the most outstanding questions and answers:

Question: A man who said he was named Filiberto RIVERO and that he worked for a TV station at Los Angeles, California, asked the following question. "Mr. ARTIME, I am going to ask you a strong question which therefore requires a previous explanation. Some time ago one of your representatives in Los Angeles told me you would be going to that city and I was going to ask you this question, but you did not go. Now that I have the opportunity I am going to ask this question to you. The question is this: In Los Angeles and other places there are rumors that in certain U.S. circles, which are described as extreme liberals, they have the plan of using some Cubans--like you, for example--to keep the rest of the Cubans entertained making them think they will go to war when the fact is that their plan is very different. The plan consists of not having that war and thus be able to show, in a few years, how peaceful coexistence is possible. My question is this: Have you ever considered that you might be the Cuban who has been chosen for this and that you might still not be aware of it?

Answer: I don't know whether such a plan exists or not, what I can guarantee to you is that I would not be the Cuban chosen for that. I am precisely supported by the group which is opposed to those liberals, by the group of Latin American men who fear just that, not by the U.S.

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but by the countries of those Latin Americans. I am a Latin American product, not another kind of product. I am receiving help from Latin America and that is why I cannot be chosen for that plan. Maybe others are being selected for that. (Ovation.)

Question: A lady in the audience, not a member of A.R.E.C., who said she was a teacher from Las Villas province, Cuba, asked the next question. She began by saying in brief words the help which she had given to insurgents in Las Villas province, etc., etc., and that she had had to leave Cuba because three of her boys had been executed. Then she asked ARTIME: "Why isn't help given to those insurgents?"

Answer: ARTIME said that he did not understand Americans. Then he said that last week, precisely last week, help had been sent to those insurgents. That unfortunately it was not all that it should be, but it was something. He explained that it is necessary to use small and fast boats and for that reason heavy cargoes cannot be taken, and that it is only possible to make two trips in one night to the Cuban coast and for that reason the help cannot be more effective. That at any rate, they were infiltrating arms, shoes, boots, food and technicians in the handling of armament. He clarified that the function of the technicians was to teach the handling of weapons to the peasants and also to unite them. ARTIME then told the same lady that the person for whom she was asking was precisely where he could help those over there, and for that reason was not in that room. (He was referring to a person for whom the lady had inquired when he accompanied her from the seat to the microphone, as the lady spoke very softly and the audience asked her to go to the microphone to ask her question so all could hear her.)

Question: Another member of the audience asked the following question: "Mr. ARTIME, we understand--through announcements that have been published--that Mr. RAY or JURE will go to Cuba in the coming months, and there are rumors about another organization doing the same thing. Are you thinking in some action of that type to counteract the effects of those possible actions, in favor of your movement?"

Answer: ARTIME gave the following answer: "If they go to Cuba, may God be with them. But I hope it won't be a demagogic action in which men will die to give prestige to others. Let me tell you that we don't make public what we do or plan to do. Some people want publicity for their actions, but we put the liberation of Cuba before publicity."

Comments: In the reporting agent's opinion, nothing new was said in this public appearance. The "presentation of credentials" was already too well known to the audience. The only thing which called attention was his clear position of opposing any maneuver to try to impose a "Fidelismo without Fidel" which the majority of the audience interpreted as meaning Manuel RAY Rivero. Even though ARTIME did not name RAY, his implications were quite clear the same as the look on his face when he was asked something in connection with JURE.

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Report # DD-745. 23 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] [illegible]

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa's appearance before A.R.E.C. on Wednesday, 18 March 1964.

SOURCE: Report from our collaborator [redacted] through direct observation.

Following is a literal transcription of the report from our collaborator [redacted]

"At 3:30 PM, 18 Mar 64, the A.R.E.C. Recording Secretary, Ignacio CANCIO, read the minutes of the preceding A.R.E.C. session in the conference room of the Everglades Hotel, Miami. The minutes were unanimously accepted by the A.R.E.C. members present.

"Abel MESTRE, A.R.E.C. President, announced that the agenda included Dr. Manuel ARTIME as guest speaker at 4 PM. Then the stand was taken by Gerardo ABASCAL who gave a detailed report on the experiences of the newspaperman John CORP (I am not sure of his patronymic because I only heard it spoken), from Life magazine, on his trips around the world.

"At 3:50 PM Abel MESTRE announced that Dr. ARTIME had just arrived and the audience gave him a standing ovation. It is estimated that there were about 500 persons in the audience.

"According to Francisco PRIETO, who is one of the most active members of A.R.EC., this was the A.R.E.C. gathering ever attended by the largest number of persons because the normal audience is from 220 to 240 persons.

"There were from 40 to 45 members of the M.R.R. in the audience, and they could be perfectly identified as such because they had the emblem of that organization in the buttonhole of their lapels.

"ARTIME began his speech by making a recount of his activities since 1959, which he called his 'credentials to A.R.E.C.' He mentioned his letter of resignation to CASTRO six months after the establishment of the CASTRO Government, where he said to CASTRO among other things that he should not deceive the industrialists, merchants and live classes of the nation because when industry, commerce and all private properties passed to the hands of the State that would be Communism. Later he read some paragraphs from the book which he published in exile prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

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Report # [illegible]-745, C-27, 23 Mar 64 (cont.)

"ARTIME said that he is an ambitious man because, since we are on Cuban soil, he wants there to be talk everywhere about ARTIME and the liberation of Cuba.

"That some persons accuse him of being a rightist, others of being a leftist, and others of being an opportunist. That persons who work in favor of collective interests always have detractors. To those who accuse him of being an opportunist, he says that if using some opportunity in benefit of the freedom of Cuba is being an opportunist, then he is the first opportunist.

"ARTIME said that previous Cuban rulers had had their mistakes. That when the Constitution of 1940 had been written it had also had its mistakes, but as it functioned rarely we don't know what those mistakes are. For that reason, until the Cuban people give themselves another Constitution our sole goal upon our arrival at Free Cuba should be to enforce the Constitution of 1940.

"He spoke of the Cuban Case in the international field, in the sense that he does not understand the attitude of the U.S. or of the rest of the Latin American countries which are allowing their fields to be taken by Castro-Communist guerrillas. ARTIME mentioned that he has not the slightest hope the O.A.S. will do something in benefit of Cuba.

"A lady from the audience who said she was a teacher from Encrucijada, Las Villas province, asked ARTIME why help was not given to her young students who were fighting in Las Villas province without shoes, food or ammunition. She also mentioned that some days ago five of her young boys were executed, including a minor.

"When ARTIME went down among the audience to accompany this lady to the microphone, she whispered a name to ARTIME but the audience could not catch the name. ARTIME replied: 'You have mentioned a name who is not now in this room because he is helping in the liberation of Cuba. He is one of my greatest helpers.' However, ARTIME did not mention the name either.

"ARTIME then said that help is being given to the freedom fighters in Cuba, but that he has very few boats and the boats which go to the

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Cuban coast have to be light boats and cannot carry large cargoes. That not only rifles are needed, but also boats, food and other things which they (M.R.R.) are now gradually supplying.

"One of the A.R.E.C. guests in the audience, an unidentified man, asked ARTIME whether it might not be possible that the U.S. Government were using him as an instrument leading to a policy of peaceful coexistence with the USSR, and that he were just someone used to keep people entertained with the Cuban Case, naturally, without this being known to ARTIME himself. ARTIME immediately replied that that might be possible because he did not know U.S. policy plans in that respect, but that naturally, if this were confirmed it was certain he would not lend himself to that manouver.

"ARTIME continued making general considerations about the Cuban military might, and he described Cuba as the 7th country of the world in the aspect of military power. He continued with a comparison between the men who wage war against CASTRO and the Cuban Government, and the story of the giant Goliath represented by CASTRO and the boy David represented by the elements engaging in war activities against CASTRO.

"ARTIME closed by saying that war is the only way of uniting all Cubans and he mentioned that that union had already been achieved at the Bay of Pigs where the blood of Cubans from all ideologies and social classes was mixed.

"ARTIME was questioned about the information appearing in different news media about JURE [illegible] being in Cuba fighting before the 20th of May, and he replied: 'May God be with them, but we shall never accept any Government of the extreme right, and much less of the extreme left, and in that case we shall continue fighting with the rifle in our hand.' When he finished saying this the audience gave him a standing ovation.

"The event ended with disguised precipitation because there were rumors in the conference room that Pedro Luis DIAZ Lanz would arrive to ask questions to ARTIME about his past with CASTRO with the intention of ridiculing ARTIME. (Incidentally, AREC gatherings usually end at 6 PM and this one ended at 5 PM.) And in effect, DIAZ Lanz arrived at 5:30 PM but the event was already over. Even AREC President MESTRE was

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Report # [illegible]-745, C-27, 23 [illegible] 64 (cont.)

already out in the street.

"As a personal comment, I don't think [illegible] would have come out too well because it was noticeable that the M.N.R. elements present were willing to protect their chief in any eventuality."

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Report # DD-764. 31 Mar 64

TO: [redacted]

FROM: [redacted].

SUBJECT: Opinions about Manuel ARTIME Buesa's TV appearance on Sunday, 29 Mar 64.

1. Marcos RODRIGUEZ Menéndez, M.D.C. Executive:

ARTIME showed true leadership qualities. It was a blessing for lawyers when he referred to the 1940 Constitution. He was very good when he said that he was for unity and called all Cubans to war without making any differences among them for their tendencies.

2. José Antonio VALLE (mat. unk.), Miami News distribution manager, attorney, mine owner in Oriente province:

ARTIME is a fake and an egotist, but he is a genius in politics. He scored a win when he said that he did not have time to answer on a political basis because they were at war. RAY and ARTIME are fighting for their future in Cuba. They must be left alone until the Cuban problem is solved because I don't know which of the two is worse.

3. Angel HERNANDEZ Rojo, member of the D.R.E.:

ARTIME is a "yes man" who does not have his own opinion about what he wants and he is unconditionally subjected to the "dollar" without caring for anything else. The D.R.E. has something pending with ARTIME because on one occasion, prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion, he took over a base which the D.R.E. had in Puerto Rico.

4. Jaime MARZOL Morales, president of "Triunfo" sugar mill, resides at 3670 SW 25th St., Miami:

ARTIME was very good. The people liked him as they think he will lead them to war and that is what everyone wants. His statements about the 1940 Constitution were very good.

5. Luis ORTEGA Sierra, newspaperman:

ARTIME is the man chosen by the C.I.A. to create an internal problem in Cuba and open the doors for an invasion

FROM [redacted]

ACTION TO: [redacted]

ADVISE [redacted] BY 13 ON April

ACTION TAKEN:

REASON NO ACTION TAKEN:

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[redacted]

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31 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 March 1964 at 1630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began by reminding this office he has not received the check books which will be necessary to draw money from the First National Bank of New York.

2. A-1 has received various identification carnets from inside Cuba which will be forwarded to this office via AMYUM-19.

3. A-1 informed us he had received a check of $10,000 from Cooper Macdonald. A-1 requested guidance concerning the check. A-1 was advised to forward a check with a covering letter to the Atlantic-Chesapeake explaining that Maritima Bam is forwarding this amount on behalf of Mr. Quires as partial payment for the LCM's. A-1 was reminded there are still $27,000 pending on this bill.

4. A-1 will depart on 0400, 31 March for Nicaragua accompanied by AMJAVA-4. A-1 expects to return on 5 April for their meeting with James D. ZABOTH (P).

5. A-1 was asked to send a letter to Chester, Blackburn, and Roder, Inc. requesting purchase and shipment of a 17 ton bulldozer and two vans equipped for office and dispensary use, and also to request shipment of the Little Giant. After a brief discussion it was decided to ship the heavy equipment to the following address:

Maritima Bam
Monkey Point

A-1 felt this address would be sufficient. However, Maritima Bam should send the letter to Chester requesting these

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heavy items. It was stressed to A-1 the importance of assuring the letter is sent to the attention of Mr. Chester.

6. When the balance of the money ($27,000) is sent to A-1 for the Atlantic-Chesapeake we will also send the $132,000 for construction equipment. The money should be sent to A-1 by 20 April.

7. According to A-1, A-4's travel papers have been returned to him. A-1 also mentioned that he will request his visa on this coming trip to Nicaragua.

8. Manuel Hernandez to leave for Panama as soon as A-1 arrives in Costa Rica.

9. AMWORLD-2 has been told by A-1 to close the Swiss bank account. A-1 was asked to have AMWORLD-2 advise AMYUM-19 when account has been closed in order that the information can be relayed to Mike GUERTLER (P).

10. A-1 stated that the tactical radios can be shipped to Captain Arnoldo PEREZ, Departamento de Immigracion, Managua. A-1 to confirm this address while in Nicaragua and advise us. A-1 told there are 24 tactical radios in all.

11. A-1 commented that the budget was mailed today (30 March) instead of last Thursday as he had previously stated.

12. A-1 inadvertently forgot to ascertain the Tampa barge address. A-19 is to call this office with said information.

13. A-1 requested our opinion concerning the two coming operations. A-1 was informed that the opinion of this office is, "The plan is bold and imaginative and the decision is up to you"

14. A-1 was advised that we have received a report which states that General Somoza is planning a trip to Switzerland in mid-April. A-1 mentioned that he has received reports that General Somoza would leave on the first of April but did not know the destination. A-1 was reminded again not to mention to General Somoza the preventive propaganda we had discussed but rather to use the meat packing story.

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15. A-1 was cautioned not to place all his trust in Cornelio Orlich.

16. A-1 was asked for his opinion about transporting the rest of the infiltration people now in Miami to Costa Rica by means of an off-shore transfer. This would be done in a manner similar to the transfer of sabotage equipment. A-1 advised we would need at least two weeks prior notice. A-1 sounded enthusiastic about the idea and he said he would consider it.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Finance
Commercial

Excluded [illegible]
dow[illegible]
d[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

30 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 28 March 1964, 1430 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 commented that the meeting between Carl Jenkins, AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDDY-1 went off very satisfactorily. The first operations were discussed and according to A-1, Carl was very pleased. A-1 did not go into specific details but stated he had shown Carl blueprints of the first operation. At the meeting A-4 presented another plan which calls for the assassination of Castro or some high official at Playa Giron on 17 April, the anniversay of the Bay of Pigs.

2. A-1 plans to leave for Nicaragua early part of next week. From Nicaragua A-1 intends to visit Costa Rica. A-1 was asked to check in with us before his departure.

3. A-1 was advised the Libernic representative is standing by in case he is needed. Should A-1 desire the presence of the representative in Managua he should contact us.

4. A-1 was remimded we have not as yet received the budget for last month. A-1 commented he had asked his secretary to mail it a few days ago. A-1 was asked to check again to make sure it has been mailed. A-1 was advised the money has been deposited and should be in his account by the end of the month.

5. A-1 was asked to give us the address of the Tampa barge. A-1 said he would have it for Monday.

6. It was suggested to A-1 not to proach the subject of the naval base propaganda with General Somoza but rather to tell General Somoza that if any inquires are made concerning A-1's operation to use the cover that these materials are for Somoza's own meat packing business.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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7. A-1 was told we have two dispensary vans for him, one with an X-ray machine, but we need name of consignee for shipment.

8. A-1 was reminded to have AMWORLD-2 close the Swiss bank account.

9. A-1 was congratulated on his fine report on Col. Lopez of Honduras.

10. The conversation ended by wishing A-1 a Happy Easter.

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Program
Nicaragua
Logistics

Above conversation conducted
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27 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 26 March 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned to say he had received the report from the American engineers. A-1 was informed the cost would be $318,000 without a landing field. A-1 commented it was both his and the engineer's opinion that the job could be done rapidly and well. A-1 was requested to forward a copy to us of the engineer's proposal for our perusal. A-1 was advised not to consult with the engineers until we have completely examined their proposal and suggestions. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 had received an intelligence survey from MOLE and Manuel GOMEZ on the camps. According to A-1 there are many sound recommendations which A-1 intends to employ. A-1 again inferred that there will be a general house cleaning of personnel.

3. A-1 commented that his representatives (AMYUM-19, GUTIERREZ, NAVARRETE) had gone to New York and could not come to agreement with Mr. Chester and Mr. Zweifach. A-1 would like to purchase supplies in the free port of New Orleans since it would be cheaper than shipping the goods from New York. A-1 also mentioned this was what we had agreed upon at our last meeting. A-1 was informed that as a central point for buying and shipping New York offers many advantages. This does not preclude using other cities in the country or in the world for buying and shipping. However, New York is the best point of control for this activity. The simplest and most efficient way to buy and ship is to determine exactly what is needed and the frequency with which it is to be delivered. Once the list of requirements is drawn up, it should be given to Chester or Zweifach specifying the exact recurring dates of delivery. There is no need for

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A-1's people to waste their time on such things as buying, shipping, getting export licenses, etc. This can all be turned over to professional businessmen, thereby relieving you of all burdens.

4. A-1 then commented that in certain cases Mr. King has been able to purchase some items cheaper than Mr. Zweifach. A-1 was informed that in some specific instances this may be the case. However, in large quantities of a recurring nature a professional company will in the long run obtain better rates and render better services than an individual. Also A-1 was reminded that the professional service and efficiency of delivery cannot be duplicated by individuals. A-1 was advised that King could best be used as an adviser and/or consultant to the professional companies doing the work.

5. A-1 was requested to make certain that A-19 clarify to GUTIERREZ and NAVARRETE that there may have been some misunderstanding on their part that Chester was receiving instructions from someone else.

6. A-1 was requested to return the insurance applications of all personnel he no longer has in his employ.

7. The conversation ended with the usual abrazos.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
DMJM
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Commercial

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-003
UFG -04843
27 MAR 64

1926043

PAFR

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS MADE RECENT STATEMENTS CONCERNING PLANNED INVASION OF CUBA IN MAY 64

1 926 043

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE ukr

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMWORLD/Operational
Evaluation of AMBIDDY-1's Training During Period 6 to 18 January 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. INTRODUCTION: In the period 6 to 18 January 1964, AMBIDDY-1 was given 83 hours of tutorial training, in JMWAVE safehouse facilities, on existing operational doctrine and management techniques applicable to a major clandestine effort against PBRUMEN. A copy of the training schedule which was used in this tutorial training is attached. At the completion of the training course, the various training instructors submitted an evaluation on AMBIDDY-1. These evaluations are outlined in the following paragraph.

2. EVALUATIONS: The below-listed evaluations were prepared by the instructors who participated primarily in Phase I of AMBIDDY-1's tutorial training. The Phase I instruction concentrated on imparting to AMBIDDY-1 current operational doctrine relative to unconventional warfare techniques. The evaluations are as follows:

a. Small Unit Operations and Training: AMBIDDY-1 responded most enthusiastically to all aspects of the training on small unit techniques. He made detailed notes on the material covered, and these notes included copies of training charts and diagrams. AMBIDDY-1 displayed particularly intensive interest in that portion of the training dealing with the principles of survival and the issuance of individual equipment. In the course of the training, AMBIDDY-1 was given several practical tactical problems to solve. AMBIDDY-1's solutions to these problems were logical and reflected a grasp of the techniques to which he had been exposed during the training sessions. Thomas L. DARGUZIS was the primary instructor in this phase of the training, and he assessed AMBIDDY-1 as being an intelligent, alert, highly-motivated individual who has a realistic appraisal of his own limitations and capabilities.

b. Clandestine Activity: AMBIDDY-1 received extensive training in FI tradecraft subjects, including the nature and elements of clandestine activity, security, cover, compartmentation,
(continued) 201-367437

Attachment: herewith
Training Schedule

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-124-27/2

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DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
24 March 64	MAR 27 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14923

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
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organization of a basic net, communications and reporting techniques. In the course of this training, AMBIDDY-1 expressed a particular interest in the subjects of security, cover and compartmentation. Charles F. MASENGILL was the primary instructor for this bloc of training, and he reports that AMBIDDY-1 was a keen student who appreciated the opportunity to learn as much as possible about clandestine operations. MASENGILL believes that AMBIDDY-1 at the completion of his training was probably weakest on the topic of how to report intelligence information.

c. Resistance Activity and Guerrilla Warfare: AMBIDDY-1 received training on the principles and concepts inherent in organizing an infiltration team. In addition, he was trained relative to the principles of organizing a resistance net. Additionally, he was trained in caching, demolition and sabotage techniques. AMBIDDY-1 also received instruction in the principles and concepts of guerrilla warfare. AMBIDDY-1 was also given an opportunity to familiarize himself, through actual range firing, with those weapons which are normally used by anti-AMTHUG-1 forces. Alton T. PIRNACK was the principal instructor for this bloc of training. PIRNACK reports that AMBIDDY-1 was responsive to the subject material which was presented to him. AMBIDDY-1 did not hesitate to ask questions nor to seek clarification of points which he did not clearly understand. AMBIDDY-1 did indicate that he was a neophyte in the subject of PM operations, and, as a result, he was most appreciative of the training which he was receiving on these subjects. It was evident during this bloc of training that caching was an entirely new facet of clandestine operations for AMBIDDY-1.

3. COMMENT: Phase II of AMBIDDY-1's training concentrated on exposing AMBIDDY-1 to those management techniques and principles which are applicable to a major clandestine operation against a target like PBRUMEN. This part of the training was carried out exclusively by Andrew K. REUTEMAN and Stanley R. ZAMKA. In this phase of the training, AMBIDDY-1 constantly expressed a great deal of enthusiasm for the subject material which was being presented. Throughout the training, AMBIDDY-1 gave every indication that he was absorbing the major portion of the training. At the same time, it was clear that he was overwhelmed by the material and the implications of what this training meant in terms of his conduct in future operations. After the management phase of AMBIDDY-1's training was completed, REUTEMAN and ZAMKA reviewed the 83 hours training program in its totality with AMBIDDY-1. In addition, the program was reviewed with all of the instructors who participated in the training. As a result of this review, a consensus was reached that, while AMBIDDY-1 is an intelligent and responsive student, the training which he received does not qualify him for the position of senior officer in a major clandestine undertaking against PBRUMEN. The training did, however, alert AMBIDDY-1 to a number of problems and pitfalls which he should avoid in his activities. This training also provided certain guide posts for AMBIDDY-1, but these guide posts were laid out in such a concentrated dose that they cannot be considered as an adequate substitute for experience or training in depth over an extended period of time.

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H/W Attachment to
UFGA-14923

ORIENTATION PROGRAM

AMBIDDY-1

PROGRAM PERIOD: 6 - 18 January 1964

TOTAL HOURS : 83

PERIOD	SUBJECT	INSTRUCTOR	INTERPRETER
6 January 1930-2130	Orientation and Review of Schedule	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None
7 January 1300-1800	Nature and Elements of Clandestine Activities	MASENGILL	None
8 January 0900-1400	Security (Personal, Physical, Organizational and Operational), Cover	MASENGILL	None
1700-2200	The Infiltration Team Principles and Concepts, Organization of a Resistance Net	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
9 January 0900-1200	Compartmentation and Clandestine Communications	MASENGILL	None
1300-1500	Organization of Basic Net for Clandestine Activity	MASENGILL	None
10 January 0900-1200	Caching and Sabotage Techniques	PIRNACK	DECONBARD

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1300-1500	PM Techniques, Reconnaissance, Raid and Ambush	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
1700-2200	Introduction to Clandestine Maritime Operations	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
11 January 1000-1500	Maritime Operational Planning Techniques	FAITELSON	PACHANKIS
13 January 0900-1200	Introduction to Clandestine UDT Operations	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1300-1500	UDT Operational Planning Techniques	TATTERSFIELD	YASUINAS
1700-2200	Small Unit Operations, Training and Application in Clandestine Environment	DARGUZIS	DECONBARD
14 January 1300-1800	Weapons Familiarization and Range Firing	PIRNACK	DECONBARD
2000-2200	Review of Training	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None
15 January 1000-1200	Management Controls Regarding Agent Selection and Team Composition	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1700	Management Review of Team Training and Evaluation	ZAMKA	None
2000-2300	Operational Planning and Use of Operational Plan as Control Device	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None

16 January			
1000-1200	Mission Briefings - A Management Control	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1800	Commando Raids		
1900-2300	Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation Case History)	ZAMKA	None
17 January			
1000-1200	Management of Maritime Assets	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
1400-1700	Analysis of a Commando Raid (Case History)	ZAMKA	None
1930-2030	After Action Reports - Management Self-Critique	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
2030-2230	Cache Operations	REUTEMAN	DECONBARD
18 January			
1400-1700	Analysis of a UDT Operation (Case History)	ZAMKA	None
1000-1200	Photo		
1900-2300	Seminar Discussion and Review	REUTEMAN and ZAMKA	None

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Artime

24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 1300 hours on 24 March 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned our office to say that the ADELAIDA is leaving today for the free port of Colon to pick up provisions and to leave three men who are sick. One has a tumor in the neck, the second has a dislocated shoulder, and the third is suffering from stab wounds. A-1 was unable to hospitalize them in Nicaragua because General Somoza felt that this would attract undue attention.

2. A-1 commented that the provisions which they have to buy will be taken from the March budget.

3. A-1 has received a report from AMJAVA-4 indicating that there is a need for a general house cleaning as far as personnel is concerned in many of the camps.

4. A-1 inquired if there was any objection to ADELAIDA leaving for Panama. Martin stated that off hand he could see no objection; however, A-1 should call later in the day for confirmation.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
ADELAIDA

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Cutime

24 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 March 1964 at 1540 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called as promised to ascertain if there were objections to the ADELAIDA going to the free port of Colon in Panama. A-1 was advised there were no objections. However, the following should be communicated to the ADELAIDA:

a. To stay away from the Folk River pier (this pier is heavily watched as a pier used for the smuggling of arms).

b. ADELAIDA will be boarded by the U. S. Canal Zone Customs and the ship's papers should be in order.

2. The ETA to Colon is 25 March.

3. A-1 finally has received the letter from the Philippino.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations
ADELAIDA

GROUP 1
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23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Richard Beal and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 23 March at 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4, who arrived in Miami last night, told him that Alegrett is arriving at 1700 hours today at Miami on ~~[illegible]~~ Airlines.

2. Alegrett is bringing with him "movies" which he took of the Puerto Cabezas base (Carlay). While at Carlay taking these pictures, Alegrett stated that he was on official business.

3. AMBIDDY-1 was concerned that U. S. Customs may take the pictures away from Alegrett when he entered the country. AMBIDDY-1 was told not to worry about the pictures, for after all Carlay is an official Nicaraguan National Guard base. AMBIDDY-1 said that he would try to get an opportunity to see the pictures.

Richard B. Beal

Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Security
Alegrett - 201
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓

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23 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and G. Thornton

DATE : 23 March 1964 at 1000 hours

AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4 had arrived in Miami on 22 March. Immigration officials have taken his papers and said they would review them at 0830 today. This office told AMBIDDY-1 to call back if AMJAVA-4 ran into any difficulties in the return of his papers.

Gwen Thornton

Gwen Thornton
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Conversations

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AMBANG-1 201

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TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMBANG/AMWORLD
Interviews with AMBANG-1 and AMBIDDY-1 in Puerto Rico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI
REFERENCE: UFG-4784 Para. 3

1. The following information, not disseminated, was reported initially to Gordon R. HAWLOTT by AMING-2 on 8 February 1964 following his return from a month's visit to Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. AMING-2 reported that he had met separately with AMBIDDY-1 and AMBANG-1 in the apartment of a friend in San Juan, the meetings occurring during the last week of January. While HAWLOTT feels that AMING-2 is usually quite reliable and objective on general political reporting, his own participation in exile politics and political ambitions could conceivably influence his objectivity. In an effort to check the accuracy of AMING-2's remarks, the CO again discussed the interviews with AMING-2 on 18 March at which time AMING-2 repeated his account of the interview without any change in text, so that the CO is inclined to accept AMING-2's account as generally accurate.

2. During the last week of January AMBANG-1 told Source at a private meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico that he would like to enlist Source's assistance as an advisor on medical affairs and as a propaganda worker. Source, per PBRUMEN custom, requested that AMBANG-1 explain to Source what resources he had for the liberation of PBRUMEN and asked AMBANG-1 to offer proof why he should consider himself a leader. Source claims AMBANG-1 replied that he had boats and weapons sufficient for strong military action into PBRUMEN and would be able to place combat forces in PBRUMEN during March 1964, said combat forces having an ability to hold their own for weeks on the island. AMING-2 observed that he had driven out to Mayaguez where he had seen four separate

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
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201-267437

DATE TYPED 23 Mar 64	DATE DISPATCHED
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training installations, one of which was reported to be the property of AMBANG/1. AMBANG/1 replied that he had training installations on the Florida mainland and had training and logistical bases or a base in Venezuela.

3. Source asked AMBANG/1 what backing he had from World Powers for the invasion of PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 replied that he still had significant White House contacts despite the death of John F. Kennedy. He added that he was in contact with top personnel of ODACID and held regular meetings with a very high ranking officer of KUBARK. He stated he also had been introduced by the KUBARKER to the Chief of Operations at YOACRE and was in regular communication with the ODOATH officer. In general, AMBANG/1 stated, his sources of funds were largely ODYOKE. Source then asked if he was to understand that AMBANG/1 had the approval of ODYOKE for operations into PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 reportedly replied "I have been given the green light".

4. Around 1 February Source met in San Juan with AMBIDDY/1 for a private talk. AMBIDDY/1 suggested that Source associate himself with AMBIDDY/1's movement in order to help form a post-liberation government. Source replied that he was rather vague as to AMBIDDY/1's plans and backing. AMBIDDY/1 stated that he had been selected by ODYOKE as that PBRUMENER having the necessary leadership and experience for the overthrow of AMTHUG. Source asked if he understood correctly that AMBIDDY/1 was telling him that he had the approval of ODYOKE. If so, why was AMBIDDY/1 drawing support from Venezuela and from Central American Governments. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that he did not actually rely on Venezuela and other Latin American donors for his assistance, since he was receiving all his logistical and financial support from KUBARK. Source stated that he had heard that AMBIDDY/1 was amassing a formidable invasion force in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panaman CZ. AMBIDDY/1 replied that he had been given very large sums of money, which proved the reliance which ODYOKE had in him and made obvious the fact that ODYOKE had selected him to bring about the liberation of PBRUMEN. Source asked why it was that ODYOKE and KUBARK would select AMBIDDY/1 before all others as the means of liberating PBRUMEN. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that ODYOKE had selected him because, in the opinion of ODYOKE, he represented the most sane and centrist political concentration among the PBRUMEN exiles and ODYOKE knew that in AMBIDDY/1 it had a leader resolved to maintain order and centrist democratic government in PBRUMEN following the liberation.

5. AMING/2 asked both AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1 during his separate interviews with them whether AMBIDDY/1's presence in Puerto Rico signified that the two leaders had met or planned to meet, in an attempt to coordinate their activities. Neither AMBIDDY/1 nor AMBANG/1 denied nor confirmed Source's questions, but gave evasive answers. Source therefore assumes that they had not met, but hoped to meet for talks.

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
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	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

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ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-300-004
UFG -04784
19 MAR 64
P2

1930681

PAFR

RE DIRECT CONTACT OF SUBJ, MANUEL RAY RIVERO AND ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AND LACK OF DECISION ON OPERATIONS, FUND ALLOTMENTS BETWEEN JURE AND SFNE. RE DISAFFECTION OF MANUEL QUIZA DOCAL WITH JURE.

1 930 681

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SA/SO/SB		SS
2	SA/SO/AR		
3	Paul		RLB
4			
5			
6	SA/SO/Bobbi		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

File: Ambiddy!

- Interesting & quite well done in some areas of his remarks. I especially think that he fielded the [illegible] to Jure very well — giving credit to himself & organization. AR

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☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

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(40)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Whitney Tucker		
2			
3	WH/SA/SO/HH		✓
4			
5	Manuel Artime		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Could this be made a "third person" dissem setting forth Ambiddy I's pol philosophy in condensation?

Done

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SYNOPSIS OF AMBIDDY-1'S SPEECH TO AREC

18 March 1964

"You will forgive me if before a gathering the Agrupacion de la Reconstruccion Economical de Cuba I do make profound economic or technical analysis of the reconstruction of Cuba, the reason is very simple, it is because I don't know. Inasmuch as I do not like to talk about things which I know nothing of I prefer not to touch upon the subject. Here at this gathering there are men more capable than I . . . men who will have the difficult task of the reconstruction of Cuba upon their shoulders.

I want to talk about what I know about. But first let me present my credentials. Why the presentation of credentials? When two people speak for the first time the first portion is the presentation and this is the first time I talk with AREC, although I have the pleasure of speaking to some of its members separately and in great lengths. Why this presentation of credentials? Because I know our movement is very controversial. They say we are of the extreme right, they say we are of the extreme left, they say we are opportunist and they say we are ambitious. I do not expect to change anyone's mind by this talk. I believe it is my duty to assert certain principles and to mention our beliefs. Not a criteria of profound economic principles . . . I am not an economist nor an expert on the subject. I believe it useful for our movement to assert before this assembly some of its principles

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CSDB-3/660,494

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in which it professes and will continue to profess and for which we are prepared to give our lives and in some cases already have. I believe it is our duty to mention them here or anywhere else. . .

First of all I do not believe in extremes . . . neither left ✓ nor right. I believe extremes always end by touching one another. ✓ Secondly I want to state that if any extreme comes to power in Cuba, in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship; in both cases we shall continue to fight with our weapons in hand.

Thirdly, I do not believe in the classification of men by race, political levels in the government to which they formerly belonged nor by money . . . I know whites who souls are black and I know blacks who souls are white. I know wealthy men who are spiritually poor and poor who are spiritually wealthy. I only believe in one classification of men and that is the moral classification--men of honor and men without honor. Men who keep their word and those who do not keep their word. . . In this classification I do believe . . .

Are we opportunist? This depends what your definition of opportunist is. If by opportunist you mean taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, then ladies and gentlemen, we are opportunist. In order to save Cuba we have to take maximum advantage of every opportunity. But if by opportunists you mean the man who changes his beliefs in accord with the opportunities, then we are not opportunist."

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AMBIDDY-1 goes on to mention his various publications. He describes his first publication, "Communism por que?" (Communism what for?) which he wrote nine months prior to Castro coming to power. The main theme of this pamphlet, according to A-1, was that more than changing a government what is needed is a change in men's conscience. The pamphlet also outlined the duties of the padron (land owner) to the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and ~~im~~ honor. The patron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker in ~~x~~ turn has certain obligations to the patron. If this quid pro quo is not adhered to the (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good.

Later on, after Castro was in power, A-1 wrote his letter of resignation accusing Castro of being a communist and traitor. In this letter A-1 mentions he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling them their property would be confiscated.

A-1 then went into exile and there he published a book called Traiccion (Betrayal). This book clearly outlined the ideology of the movement.

"We believe the state should fo~~r~~ment and simulate private economy both national as well as in foreign. [During the Bay of Pigs I wrote my political thesis.] We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America. [I say effective democracies] because [in Latin America] the word democracy has been prostituted too

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often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militaristic, demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of its people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarian have been the strongest allies of communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not war of personal hatred . . . it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you . . . it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right.

"They continue to call us extremist. We don't care. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philo-communist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us.' Don Quixote replied, 'Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"

"They say we are very ambitious. Yes, we are very ambitious. We have an ambition which blinds us and we are disposed to give our lives for that ambition. An ambition for what? That in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."

"When our men die in Cuba they are not only fighting for the independence of our country . . . they are fighting for the independence of the American Hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world. . . the rest of the Western World." A-1 maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U. S. is at odds with these two governments. This, A-1 maintains, is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. A-1 then quotes Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace offensive, of coexistence and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."

"The battle ground for Latin America lies 90 miles from our shores in a place called Cuba. Should the Western world lose this battle the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the communist camps. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have ceased to be.

"We have knocked on many doors. I have one obsession and that is the liberation of my country and if I have to lose my prestige I will do so. God will know I have not lost it. I do not believe that in order to save my country there are bad doors. The only bad doors are the ones that have been closed to us in order to lock Cuba within them.

"We are all to blame. We are all guilty for having turned over Cuba into the hands of men who could not govern her properly. This is not the time to cry like women for what we were unable to defend as men. I have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because

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my cause is a moral and honorable one and what I ask for is noble. We cannot afford to wait for miracles because only God can create miracles. We must prepare for a long, fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS, UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. We either have to wage a war of principles or not. If we are not going to wage a war of principles I will not join that struggle.

omit

"The present situation of the case of Cuba. The present state of our homeland. Communism is completely established. We lose daily 10 fighters for freedom. In the cities communism is in complete control. It is necessary for an individual to carry five different credentials in order to travel inside of Cuba. Lack of any one of these credentials brings down the repressive measures of the G-2 until the individual can explain the reason for his missing credentials.

omit

"Guerrillas in the mountains; some resistance groups in the cities; a resentment among the militia because the foreigners have privileges which the militia does not. The campesino who will not accept the communist doctrine and guerrillas in Escambray, Camaguey, which are growing stronger daily. This is the situation in Cuba today.

omit

"The status of Cuba outside of Cuba: The U. S. In the most difficult position and the most unexplainable position of the Western World. I can sum it up in one sentence. I do not understand it. We do not want to be saved by the Marines. Let us make this quite clear. The Cuban people have always maintained that they are willing to die."

A-1 then alludes to the Alliance for Progress which he refers to as an Alka Seltzer in the Pacific. He maintains he is not against the Alliance for Progress but rather that something should also be done for Cuba.

Question and answer period

Question: I understand that in certain sections of the United States Government there exist ultra liberals who believe that communist Cuba could be used as an experimental ground and in the coming years communist Cuba could be used as a proving ground for the coexistence of the great world powers, that is, Russia and the U. S. The question is Dr. Artime, have you considered deep in your conscience the possibility that the U. S. Government is using you and your movement to occupy the Cubans who wish to liberate their homeland with other activities so that they cannot liberate their country with the force and enthusiasm they desire. The question is have you considered the possibility that you, under your best intentions, are the instrument by which these ultra liberal forces in the U. S. can paralyze the liberating activity of the Cuban people?

Answer: A very good question. If the U. S. were giving me something this might be true but I believe the ones who are receiving aid, possibly other ultra liberals, may be in collusion with the U. S. This is very possible. I can make a mistake. I can make two mistakes but after one has spent two years in jail one cannot be fooled so easily, more so when one has been condemned to death. It is possible this plan exists but I do not know since I do not have access to these ultra liberals. It is possible they are looking for someone to do it, this is possible. I can guarantee you one thing. I am not doing this because my power comes from men who believe as I do, as you do, and who are located south of the Rio Grande. These men are gambling the lives of the people in their own countries. Because they know if they do not help in overthrowing Fidel Castro in less than two years, their own countries will be victims of communism. I am a product of the desperation of the Latin American countries.

__Question:__ Dr. Artime, how can we unite the Cubans in order to make the cause of those fighting inside felt more deeply?

__Answer:__ Very good question. Very good. A North American friend of mine once said he would rather carry ten cats in a bag than work with two Cubans. I said to him that he was quite right; however, Cubans are not the only ones that are hard to understand. The Latin American is also difficult to understand. Thank God, we are very individualistic and that is why the communists are having such a difficult time. Because we are very individualistic. The war is the only thing which can unite the Cubans. The only thing which can create an unbreakable bond, between rich, poor, Negroes, whites, Catholics, Protestants, Mason, everyone, is sacrifice. I do not believe in theoretical unions.

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__Question__: In Miami they say that JURE, Manuel Ray's organization, will make an attack on 20 May or early in June. Would there be any possibility that your movement also intends to do something in the near future. Also, what is the possibility of having a government in arms.

__Answer__: That is the $64,000 question. If they (JURE) decides to go, may God bless them. And please let it not be a demagogic act to give prestige to others. The only thing I ask God is that He accompany them. I say this with all sincerity. Our strategy is mapped out. What we have done cannot be published. We cannot publicize the arms we have sent into Cuba. We cannot publicize the infiltrations we have made to teach the campesinos about guerrilla warfare. These are things we cannot public. Not that we are enemies of publicity but we cannot subordinate the war to publicity, we are subordinating the interests of publicity to the war. In a free election I would admit all political theories but by violence I will not admit any extremism. The war may last three years against Fidel and five against communism. It does not matter. We will use violence to deter any extremism.

__Question__: About five months ago I arrived here thanks to people with great influence. Students of mine were in the Escambray. I took food and medicines to them. I had 19 girls who helped me gather rosaries and everything in the ways of clothes. There are now 500 students of mine who are now prisoners. Others are being con-

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stantly harassed and persecuted. Why aren't we helping these people?

Answer: There are many, madam, who are now helping. This week we have sent some aid and arms inside, perhaps not as much as we would like but sent some. We also have to send not just weapons but food, shoes, etc. The guerrillas lack everything. The problem of supplying them is very difficult but we are trying. We do not have sufficient boats. To arrive at the coast we cannot use large ships but small boats and these small boats have a limited capacity. These small boats can only make two trips in one day and no more. It is being done on a small scale but it is being done. The force to liberate Cuba is there inside Cuba and it is up to us to assist them.

Question: Doctor, don't you have any confidence in the OAS. I refer specifically to the recent cache of arms discovered in Venezuela?

Answer: I admire the Venezuelan people, I admire Venezuelan democracy and if a strong measure is taken against Cuba, because of the just screams of the Venezuelan people and if the OAS listens to these screams, I will admire the OAS.

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18 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Talk with AMBIDDY-1

AMBIDDY-1 will be meeting with us in the Washington safehouse on 19-20 March. If you can spare the time, it might be helpful if you could have a heart-to-heart talk with him on his relations with Senora Padron, which may be blossoming forth into matrimony. There cannot be much doubt now that she is reputed to have been Fulgencio Batista's mistress and that this fact (if fact it be) is widely known. If he marries her, the political repercussions could be calamitous. It would be helpful if you could tell AMBIDDY-1 point blank that if scandal ensues, this could doom the program.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

DDP/WH/SA/So/HH/HDHecksher:bh (18 Mar 64)

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
1 - PADRON 201

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declassification

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17 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1

DATE : 16 March 1964 at 1630

1. AMBIDDY-1 called this office to say that Luis TOMAS Rey and Eladio BAS Trespalacios couldnot sail because they were unable to obtain their re-entry permits. Since these two could not obtain their permits "the people" had told Amado MUNNE Pantaleon that it was not worthwhile for him to go. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if any mention had been made concerning TOMAS's skin rash and that he did not see a doctor. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he had not been so informed by AMYUM-19. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if the only reason BAS and TOMAS could not leave was because they could not obtain their re-entry permits. AMBIDDY-1 answered that was the sole reason and that all three wanted to go desperately. AMBIDDY-1 agreed that under any condition MUNNE should go since he is the most important of the three.

2. AMBIDDY-1 would call this office at 1800 in order to receive a more concrete answer to this situation.

3. Martin asked AMBIDDY-1 if the suitcase containing the uniforms had been sent. AMBIDDY-1 does not know. However, he will investigate and if the uniforms have not been sent, AMBIDDY-1 will bring them to the Consejo meeting on 19 March.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
TOMAS
MUNNE
~~REX~~ BAS
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1

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[illegible]

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 14 March 1964, 1230 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 would like to have a meeting with the Consejo as soon as possible to talk over many outstanding problems and to discuss thoroughly the new budgetary procedure. Martin informed A-1 that this would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 is speaking to the Agrupacion para la Reconstruccion Economica de Cuba on Wednesday, 18 March, so he cannot make it for that date.

2. A-1 advised that Luis Entialgo has accepted the offer to work for AMWORLD and will be returning from Spain shortly.

3. A-1 has not yet heard from the Filipino and requests that we check into this matter.

4. A-1 was asked for his opinions concerning the DMJM people. A-1 is very pleased with the survey and feels that the engineers plans are reasonable and fitting to his project. A-1 estimated, however, that the total figure may be in the $300,000 category. This is another subject which A-1 would like to discuss in the next meeting.

5. Another topic he wants to discuss is the transfer of the C-47 to Nicaragua.

6. A-1 informed us that "key personnel" are no longer listed on the budget, however, there are individuals which fall into the category of guerrillas and infiltrators who are in Miami and are receiving retainers.

7. A-1 was informed that the propagation charts for the month of April are on their way to him.

Above conversation conducted
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changed privacy code

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Entialgo 201

SECRET

16 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 16 March 1964, 0930 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 was asked if Thursday, 19 March, would be convenient for him to meet with the Consejo here in Washington. A-1 agreed.

2. A-1 will bring with him to the meeting the bank signature cards.

3. A-1 has received a bill from the Atlantic-Chesapeake Co. for the sum of $132,097.50. A-1 opined that the bill seemed a little exhorbitant for the material they have received. Inasmuch as they have paid $100,000 already, the total bill comes out to $232,097.50.

4. A-1 has also received a bill from the Bruan Shipping Co. for the total of $19,221.12. Included in this bill is the petroleum for October and November.

5. AMJAVA-4, Manuel Gomez, AMWORLD-2 and MOLE left today for Nicaragua. From there all but AMWORLD-2 will proceed to Costa Rica to locate a suitable site to relocate the arms barge.

6. A-1 now has a new telephone number: PL 4-7912. A-1 added this is just a new phone number, but not a new address. A-1 stated he expects to move from where he is living soon. [No further explanation]

7. A-1 was asked to have Pineda apply at the Mexican Consulate for a 30 day tourist visa and to state that the purpose was to visit Mexico.

8. A-1 willcheck in again later in the day.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Pineda
Mexico
Finances

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently changed
changed privacy code

14 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 13 March 1964, 1800 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 began the conversation by saying that the reason he had been late in checking was that he had been at a meeting with the DMJM engineers. A series of items had been discussed on which A-1 would like to have our suggestions. A-1 expressed the desire to meet with the Consejo as soon as possible in order not to give the impression to the DMJM people that he was being masterminded by someone else. Martin explained to A-1 that Henry was currently out of town, but that his request for a meeting would be brought to Henry's attention upon his return. A-1 went on to say that the deadline for the budget to be submitted is close at hand which also adds to the urgency for a meeting.

2. Martin asked A-1 if he had checked his Post Office box. A-1 replied yes. A-1 was then asked to confirm or deny the rumor concerning Santiago Alvarez which alleged that A-1 has given him full autonomy within AMWORLD. A-1 said that he has not had a chance to talk to Santiago Alvarez since his return to Miami, but would do so soon. A-1 stated, however, that when he had approached Santiago Alvarez, the latter was informed he could bring with him "a mechanic or two," but A-1 never authorized Santiago Alvarez to bring his entire group en masse.

3. A-1 advised that the radio link between Miami and Costa Rica has been established. A-1 was told that there would be no need to obtain a HAM radio license to operate. Should his organization be approached by the local authorities concerning the operation of the radio, they are to plead ignorance of the law and stop transmitting. /This information was obtained from Jim Smith.7 A-1 mentioned that he had received the dummy

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message sent to him in Costa Rica, however he did not receive the accompanying message. A-1 was asked to find out why the private link message did not reach him. Also, it was explained to A-1 who "El Narizon" is.

4. A-1 was casually asked if there would be any objection to AMYUM-19 attending any of the Consejo meetings. A-1 had no objections.

5. A-1 has some motion pictures and photographs of the bases and will bring them to the next Consejo meeting.

6. A-1 was informed that a letter from Luis Sierra, chief of the guerrillas, was intercepted by his own people in Miami. This letter contained a photograph with Sierra and other members of the guerrilla teams dressed in their new uniforms. A-1 was asked to investigate how this letter had been sent from the base and also how Sierra was able to have the picture developed.

7. This brought up the subject of Manuel Gomez. A-1 said that Gomez will be leaving on Monday, 16 March, for Nicaragua to survey AMWORLD installations. A-1 had just a few hours previously spoken to Gomez. In the conversation, Gomez elaborated on the security measures he wishes A-1 to take concerning his own security. A-1 continues to sing the praises of Gomez. A-1 also commented that he has noticed a marked improvement in the security of his personnel since the last time he was in Miami.

8. While in Costa Rica, A-1 detected being followed by another car. A-1 was able to lose the surveiller. Martin took this opportunity to stress to A-1 the need for increasing his personal security measures such as more body guards and more secrecy concerning his movements.

9. The ADELAIDA arrived in Hollywood o/a 8 March. A-1 was not able to examine the contents of the sabotage equipment due to his preoccupation in Costa Rica with the MCRL and Vico Starke. The ADELAIDA onloaded weapons from the barge and sailed for Nicaragua.

10. AMJAVA-4, AMWORLD-2 and "the Mexican" will leave together for Nicaragua on 16 March.

11. A-1 expressed an interest in moving the C-47 out of Costa Rica. A-1 would like to discuss the method of transfer with the Consejo.

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12. A-1 was told that if it can be done in a secure and discreet manner through some contact, we would appreciate having a list of all Cuban nationals in Costa Rica.

13. Concerning the budget, A-1 would like to discuss this in person rather than through the mail.

14. A-1 said he would keep in close contact with us on a daily basis.

Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Santiago Alvarez
Luis Sierra
Manuel Gomez

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12 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Raul Hernandez (as Martin Ferrer)

DATE : 12 March 1964, 1000 hours

1. Martin began the conversation by welcoming A-1 home.

2. Martin stated that he had a message from Henry which would have been sent out today had A-1 still been in Costa Rica. There were a few questions that Henry would like answered:

a. Since the Consejo had no previous indications of Calderonista attempts to overthrow the government, we would appreciate any additional information A-1 might have. A-1 began by saying that Vico Starke had had meetings with Francisco Calderon. Calderon's brother, Rafael, had been very friendly with Vico Starke's brother as of late. Vico Starke's brother had been at GUILLOT ever since the first arrival of the AMWORLD contingent. Rafael Calderon had a meeting in GUILLOT with Vico Starke's brother of an unknown nature. A-1 considers the Calderonistas the main opposition to the government. Other substantiating reports had reached Figuls, the head of security for the Costa Rican Government. Vico Starke had placed old Calderonista elements in key positions within the MCRL. A-1 gave Col. Figuls as his source of information. Vico Starke had wanted to place these old Calderonista elements within the AMWORLD organization in a supervisory capacity and they also would have the final say within AMWORLD.

b. What did A-1 mean by other reports reaching Cornelio Orlich and are you certain Starke not acting in concert with Orlichs. A-1 replied that Cornelio had received other reports through his intelligence section, however, Cornelio had placed very little credence in them. Cornelio visited

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Starke confronting him with what he had heard. Vico Starke told Cornelio that what he really wanted was to establish a contraband business mainly dealing in whisky. Starke also visited A-1 and timidly told A-1 that he was in financial straits and the reason why he had wanted to move MCRL people into key positions was to use the MRR vehicles as a cover mechanism for contraband. Vico Starke told A-1 that he could obtain the approval of the government to engage in this type of business. It appears to A-1 that Vico Starke did present the contraband proposition to Cornelio Orlich and received tacit approval. A-1 informed both Cornelio and Vico that since it was their country they could do as they pleased, however, he would not permit his vehicles to be used for this purpose. His main concern was to liberate Cuba and not to engage in the internal affairs of Costa Rica. His only desire is to be left alone so he can work effectively.

c. What is Figueres' role in this? A-1 replied that he had not seen any indications that Figueres had been involved. Although he and Vico Starke are close friends, they are political enemies.

d. What were his specific charges against Cabezas? A-1 stated:

(1) The main charge against Cabezas was his collusion with Vico Starke to subordinate AMWORLD to the MCRL.

(2) Cabezas held a meeting with Vico Starke's brother and Rafael Calderon without authorization or informing A-1.

When A-1 initially confronted Rolando Cabezas, the latter refused to answer any of A-1's questions. At a later meeting Cabezas confessed that the reason why Vico Starke had wanted control of the MRR was for the contraband whisky. A-1 feels that this contraband whisky was just an alibi and the main motive had been to overthrow the Costa Rican Government.

e. Will Vico Starke accept defeat or will he try again to control our movement? A-1 feels that Vico Starke no longer poses a direct menace to his organization. Starke has been removed as the intermediary to Cornelio Orlich. Starke, however, is still in close contact with Cornelio Orlich. A-1 emphasized that Vico Starke will not be permitted to enter the camps, mainly GUILLOT, even though it is on his estate.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

f. Has there been an open break between Starke and the Orlichs? A-1 stated that at the beginning of the crisis there had been a break between Starke and Cornelio Orlich, however, Starke has been able to smoothen the rupture by telling Cornelio Orlich that his main interest in controlling the MRR was for financial gains through the contraband trade.

g. Is Cabezas your main source on Starke and Calderon? A-1 commented that Cabezas had been one of his sources, but also Col. Figuls plus reports given to A-1 by his own people in the camps. However, his main source was the facts which speak for themselves.

3. Changing the subject, Martin asked A-1 why he could not go to Guatemala. A-1 explained that what he had wanted to say in his message was that at this particular time Guatemala would have to be ruled out because his passport showed an exit from Mercedes Airport in Nicaragua. However, this did not preclude future meetings in Guatemala. A-1 apologized if he had given us the wrong impression in his message.

4. A-1 stated that within the coming week he might want to have a special meeting with the Consejo concerning the latest political developments in Costa Rica.

5. A-1 is forwarding us a tape on Honduras and Costa Rica as soon as possible.

6. A-1 is not satisfied with the developments in Nicaragua and with Iglesias in particular. A-1 implied that the main problem may be the funding mechanism in Nicaragua and misuse of AMWORLD funds. A-1 is sending AMWORLD-2, who is a public accountant, to review the financial situation there.

7. A-1 was asked to service his post office box since there are several letters waiting for him.

8. A-1 expects to meet with the DMJM people, who are now in Miami, along with AMWORLD-2 and AMJAVA-4.

9. It was requested of A-1 that he precede any Consejo messages which require immediate attention with the word "URGENTE" so that members of this office will not needlessly be called at all hours of the night. A-1 agreed.

10. A-1 was reminded that we still have not received AMWORLD-2's report regarding his interview with Eusebio Mujal.

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11. A-1 promised to call this office again this afternoon.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201✓
Conversations
MCRL
Costa Rica
V.Starke 201
R.Cabezas 201

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AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT: Adelaida Matilda PADRON y Cruz

Regarding Senora Padron, it is finished so far as our side is concerned. We've gathered all the information that is readily available on the lady, we've turned it over to AMBIDDY-1 and any further action will have to be on his part.

Carl E. Jenkins

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
PADRON 201

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AMWORLD Meeting in New Orleans, 29 Feb to 1 March 1964

SUBJECT: Galley Proofs of Book, "Bay of Pigs"

1. The two chapters of subject galley proofs were discussed with AMJAVA-4. We called attention particularly to the part referring to "Frank's" discussion of the possible "arrest" of American advisors in case of orders from Washington changing the plan of the invasion. We passed on Mr. Archer's view that A-1 should stick with the story, if it is true, in case reporters should question him about it, but that we felt that the easiest way out of this matter without building up a new controversy would be to take it fairly lightly. In other words, perhaps we could play it as though it had not been considered serious at the time because it was felt that Frank was a bit of a blowhard anyway who tried to involve himself too deeply in everything, plus the fact that we realized he was under considerable strain and probably this was just a brainstorm. A-4 felt that this was a sensible way to handle the matter. He understood it and agreed to discuss the matter with AMBIDDY-1 and felt that this would be acceptable to him.

2. A-4 asked if we had access to the rest of the book. I answered that to my knowledge these were the only two chapters available at the moment. I conjectured that perhaps they were being proofread, re-written, etc., chapter by chapter and that these were the first two which had been considered suitable to go to the printers. We would try to get the remaining chapters so that they could be studied and considered as soon as possible, but I simply had no way of knowing what was their present status and through which channels they would be handled. We would let them know as soon as we knew anything.

Carl E. Jenkins

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AMBIDDY-1 201
publicity

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Former contacts Havana Station

able personal courage, good security and common sense. In my mind he is the ideal type of Latin American agent. It will be a real loss to the Agency if we lose sight or contact with Adolfo. I have met few men more dedicated and more loyal.

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5. [Ramon USATEGUI Lezama.] AMPAN-3. Recruited by AMPAN-2 and so close to each other that we referred to them as the "Gold Dust Twins." Ramon was in the shipping business in Havana and eventually had to leave. He lost his home, cars, furnishings, etc. His firm is now planning to send him to Nicaragua, and I have recommended him to the Nicaragua desk [Dr. Trenta.] He has all the qualities ascribed to Adolfo SAN PELAYO (see above) except that he has never been an American citizen. He speaks excellent English. He is dedicated, courageous and most anxious to maintain contact with the Agency. It will be our loss if this is not done.

251081

6. Bernard L. Barker. AMCLATTER-1. Wife: Clara. Barker is a Cuban-American. Ex-Captain in the U.S.A.F. See PRQ and 201 for full bio data. I recruited Barker in 1959, and he served faithfully until we had to exfiltrate him sometime in 1960. He recruited a number of valuable agents for the Station (including AMCLATTER-5, which see) and had an amazing encyclopedic knowledge of Cuban persons, events and contacts in all walks of life. He was a boxing manager and knew intimately all Cuban personalities engaged in the sporting industry. He had a puppy-dog loyalty to his case officers and to the Agency. His biggest weakness was his lack of discretion. He was such a loyal American (actually if not technically) that he would fight at the drop of a hat if anyone cast aspersions on the United States or its leaders. In the atmosphere of Castro's Cuba I might say that that was quite often. We are in the process of helping him recover his lost American citizenship. When the Station reopens I would certainly recommend that we continue to maintain contact with Barker. If nothing else he would make a wonderful leg-man for the Chief of Station. His wife is an attractive Cuban gal who is bi-lingual and as belligerently "American" as he is. Barker, by looks and by language, could pass either as an American or a Cuban - a genuine asset if he could be taught to submerge his Americanism.

05

7. [Manolo VEGA Abril.] I met Manolo through Jorge ALONSO PUJOL (now a prisoner in Cuba as a result of the 17th of April invasion). Manolo is working for us now in Miami, and I presume we have full bio data on him. Manolo's family owned, along with Republic Steel, the big steel plant in Havana which was nationalized by the Castro regime (Cia. Antillana de Acero, S.A.). Manolo has a brother, [illegible] who would also be worth cultivating. Through his business and family connections Manolo knew a great many people of operational interest. One of his friends was David SALVADOR, although Manolo did not share SALVADOR's political thinking (extreme left and anti-American). Manolo was objective a reporter as I have ever encountered among Lat

3

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21 mar 60 par

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

29 January 1932, Moron, Province of Camaguey, Cuba

CI/OA FILE NO. C-32064 201-267437	SECURITY OFFICE FILE NO. 210838	PROJECT

SUBJECT (FILL IN ONE ONLY)

TRUE NAME ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Francis	CRYPTONYM AMBIDDY/1	PSEUDONYM

AKA-Manuel Francisco Perfecto Fernando ARTIME Buesa

NAME CHECK & INVESTIGATIVE RECORD

	CHECK (✓)	INITIAL	DATE
PRO I	bio ✓		28 May 60
PRO II	✓	fwo	30 SEP 1963
99756 GREEN LIST	NPR	Ely Noell	24 mar 60 ada
	✓		28 Mar 60
RI TRACES	NDI		
O & DIV TRACES	NDI		
FIELD TRACES	NI OF V		
	ND	fwo	Jan '63
S.O. INDICES	NDI [illegible] TER		24 Mar 60
F.B.I. INDICES	NIC		
S.O. INVESTIGATION	NDI		1 June 60

COMMENTS

ISSUED

	CHECK (✓)	DATE	TO
P.O.A	✓	24 mar 60	WH/4/Cuba
	reinst	28 Oct 60	WH/4/Cuba
	Rein	31 Jan 63	SAS
O.A.	✓	2 Feb 61	WH/4/[illegible]
	rein	30 Sept 63	SAS
C.S.A.			
P.C.S.A.			
P.P.A.			
PROP. APP.			
C.N.C.			

COMMENTS

CASE OFFICER J. Maughan ~~[illegible]~~ (~~Joseph [illegible]~~)	DIVISION ~~4/PA~~ ~~WH/4/[illegible]~~ SAS	EXTENSION 2971

FORM 1206

SECRET

(3-3)

14-00000

Office of Security Investigative Reports

SPEED LETTER ~~SECRET~~

REPLY REQUESTED		DATE 4 Aug 72 pm
X YES	NO	LETTER NO C - 82064 /201- 267437

TO : WH/COG
ATTN:

FROM: CI/OA
Paul Marine, 2B11, x1886

SUBJECT: ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Francis

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to WH/4/PA(SAS) in 1963; OA dated 2 Feb. 61 was Reinstated 30 Sept. 1963.

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

Lee E Pattan
~~[illegible]~~
ACTING Chief, CI/OA SIGNATURE

REPLY DATE 7 Aug 72

TO : CI/OA
FROM : WH/c/OS
SUBJECT: ARTIME Buesa, Manuel Fran...

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( ) Circle one: CSC, CSA, CA .

b. Inactive (X)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY
9 AUG 1972

SECRET
E2 31-6036 EA 2 APDCI WN-9ISM

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-61 1631 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MESSAGE FORM
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C-82064

JOHN M. BURKE:ghd
WH/COG/OPS
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 38 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

INF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

10 JAN 71 21 29z

CITE DIRECTOR 100371

WH/MIAMI

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS NR (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

C-82064

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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COPY NO.

JOHN M. BURKE
WH/COG
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 59 PER ____ # ____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

REF: WHE INFO FILE. VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

08 JAN 71 21 29 z

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI

RE DIR 100371 ?

100372

C-76331

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: Al McWade:cb
UNIT: WH/2/HD
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 9 October 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 7 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

DISEM: WH8 INFO FILE VR. [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 12OCT70 16 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 076615

TO DO BASE NEW YORK, TEGUCIGALPA

INFO MANAGUA WH/MIAMI

File

13 OCT 1970

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 9118 (IN 179726)*

1. ~~UNLESS DO BASE NEW YORK WISHES CONTACT,~~ HQS SEES NO NEED AMBIDDY-1 CONTACT. ~~NEW YORK~~

C-82064

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *COS Tegucigalpa met AMBIDDY-1 in Managua 4 Oct. A/1 asked by SAMOZA to join Nicaraguan delegation to UN Assembly as special advisor. Defer to Hqs. contact AMBIDDY-1.

C/DO/I/B2 Bob Baker (Telcoord)
C/WH/COG
C/WH/2/N
C/WH/2
WH/COG/OPS

JOHN MARKHAM
C/DOI/2

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 — INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, SOD6

ACTION NO. 402

S E C R E T 141703Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7158

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, PORT AU PRINCE,

WH/MIAMI

14 OCT 69 IN 65351

AMBIDDY

REF: A. MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

B. MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

15 OCT 1969

C. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

D. DIRECTOR 39886

E. MANAGUA 7134 (IN 49758)

File

C-82064

1. COS MET WITH AMBIDDY-1 NIGHT 13 OCTOBER. HE REPORTED ON DEVELOPMENTS OF REFS AS FOLLOWS: AS AMBIDDY WAS PREPARING LEAVE FOR SALVADOR IN JULY HE WAS VISITED BY SALVADORAN HUMBERTO RODEZNO (PHONETIC) WHO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION. AMBIDDY EXPLAINED THAT HE COULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY ARMS EXPORT MATTERS, THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN AS PBRUMEN PATRIOT AND DOES NOT WISH CHANGE IMAGE FOR THAT OF ARMS DEALER OR SOLDIER OF FORTUNE. RODEZNO SAID HE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH AN AMERICAN IN MIAMI WHO WAS GOING TO FURNISH 30-06 AMMO AT TEN CENTS A ROUND, SHIP IT FROM INTERARMCO IN VIRGINIA TO CANADA FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT TO SALVADOR. AMBIDDY WARNED RODEZNO THAT THE AMERICAN, WHOSE NAME WAS NOT

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT　INFO　FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7158 S E C R E T

GIVEN, WOULD PROBABLY REPORT HIM TO FBI, CIA, BORDER PATROL, "OR TO THE BOY SCOUTS". AMBIDDY THEN BROKE OFF CONTACT WITH RODEZNO AND DECIDED THERE NO REASON TRAVEL TO SALVADOR.

2. TWO DAYS LATER RICARDO ZUNIGA OF HONDURAS APPEARED IN MIAMI AND CONTACTED AMBIDDY. HE ALSO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST RANGING FROM SMALL ARMS TO ONE THOUSAND POUND BOMB. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL AND ZUNIGA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONDURAN CONSUL "MIKE" (LNU). AMBIDDY GAVE THEM ESSENTIALLY SAME STORY, COMMISERATED WITH THEM, AS HAD WITH RODEZNO, SUGGESTED THEY WOULD DO BETTER TO SHOP IN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE BELGIUM OR SPAIN, WHO WOULD SELL TO ANYONE. ZUNIGA ASKED IF AMBIDDY THOUGHT FABRIQUE NATIONAL WOULD GRANT CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION (KICKBACK) OF AT LEAST TEN PERCENT. AMBIDDY ASSURED HIM FN WOULD. ZUNIGA TOLD AMBIDDY THAT IF HE, ZUNIGA, SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING KICKBACK FROM FN, AMBIDDY COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE NICE PRESENT. AMBIDDY HAS HEARD NOTHING SINCE FROM ZUNIGA BUT HAS HEARD FROM CONTACT IN HONDURAS THAT ZUNIGA BOUGHT ARMS AND AMMO FROM FN AND BOMBS IN PORTUGAL. PORTUGUESE GAVE HIM FIVE PERCENT RAKE-OFF. ZUNIGA TRAVELLED TO EUROPE ON HONDURAN PASSPORT IN ALIAS.

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7158 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY SAYS HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN OBTAINING ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE OTHER THAN REFERRING THEM TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND HAS NO INTENTION OF JEOPARDIZING HIS POSITION WITH U.S. BY GETTING MIXED UP IN ARMS TRAFFIC. HE HAS NO INFORMATION ON ARMS TRAFFIC WITH HAITI. AMBIDDY STILL HAS COPIES OF SALVADORAN AND HONDURAN SHOPPING LISTS AND OFFERED SEND THEM TO BARKER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

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C 2 - [illegible] 26 74 37

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ACTION UNIT: WH-8
INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, SOD 6, C/CA,
ACTION NO.: 326
FI-2

S E C R E T 222223Z SEP 69 CITE MANAGUA 7134

22 Sep 69 IN 49758

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: DIRECTOR 39886

1. COS MANAGUA HAS NOT SEEN AMBIDDY-1 SINCE SALVADOR/HONDURAS WAR. AMBIDDY WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY DURING MID-SEPTEMBER INDEPENDENCE HOLIDAYS AND SENT REGARDS TO BARKER THROUGH MUTUAL CUBAN FRIEND SAYING WOULD BE BACK IN MANAGUA SOON AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CHAT. COS WILL ATTEMPT TO CORRAL HIM IF HE DOES SHOW UP AND ELICIT INFO REQUESTED BY REF.

2. FLE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

23 SEP 1969

SECRET

C-82064

R Harrington

ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON
UNIT: WH/2/HDGES
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1969

TOTAL COPIES 23

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BY 2 PER ___ # ___

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DISSEM: WH 8 | N | FILE. VR. C/AN, DDP, ADDP, SDD6, CI/OPS, C/OA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 17 58Z SEP 69 CITE DIRECTOR 39886

TO MANAGUA INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

23 SEP 1969

1. REQUEST COS MANAGUA CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 AND DEBRIEF ON REF TRIP TO SAN SALVADOR. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS ANY INFO AMBIDDY-1 HAS ON HONDURAS/SALVADOR ARMS PURCHASES.

2. FYI: ON 17 SEPTEMBER HQS LEARNED FROM IUSTEER-1 THAT AMBIDDY-1 ARRANGED CONTACT FROM MIAMI FOR A HONDURAS ARMS BUYER TO PURCHASE ARMS IN SPAIN. FOR THIS SERVICE AMBIDDY-1 WILL RECEIVE A COMMISSION FROM THE HONDURAS ARMS BUYER BASED ON THE TOTAL ARMS PURCHASE PRICE. DO NOT REVEAL THIS INFO TO AMBIDDY-1.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437 AND 201-283488

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: On 22 July COS Managua received urgent phone call from AMBIDDY-1. AMBIDDY-1 said he just received phone call from Salvador and they (Salvadorans) needed eight pilots and wanted to consult with AMBIDDY. A Salvadoran visa had been authorized. COS Managua instructed AMBIDDY to proceed to San Salvador and obtain info on Salvador war plans. Once he acquired this info AMBIDDY was to inform the Salvadorans that he could not be involved in any way. AMBIDDY agreed and told COS Managua that he would contact COS on his return from the trip to San Salvador

C/WH/2/NIC WH/COG/OPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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C-82064

ORIG: Robert C. Toomey
UNIT: WH/2/Nicaragua
EXT: 4489
DATE: 28 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OA, FI, SODC.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

28 22 27Z JUL 69

CITE DIRECTOR 245824

TO MANAGUA INFO: PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 6311 (IN 10768)

B. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

File

29 JUL 1969

C-82064

1. HDQS WELCOMES ANY INFO ON AMBIDDY ARMS DEALINGS.

2. IF TELEPHONE ONLY LINK WITH AMBIDDY, COS IN BEST POSITION DETERMINE POSSIBILITY OF ELICITATION WITHOUT UNDUE SECURITY RISK.

3. FILE: 201-267437

*WH Comment: Ref A indicated Port Au Prince interest in any info obtained by Managua on AMBIDDY involvement in arms sales to Haiti. Ref B reported possibility AMBIDDY and Somoza involved in arms dealings with DUValier and asked addresses if they desire COS try elicit info from AMBIDDY.

Robert F. Rife for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH DIV

RELEASING OFFICER

AC/WH/7

WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. CI/OA, FI 2, RI/AN, SOD 6

146

S E C R E T 261548Z JUL 1969 CIE PORT AU PRINCE 6311 26 Jul 10768

(RACICOT ACTING)

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR , WH/MIAMI

REF: A. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

B. WH/MIAMI 4709 (IN 09904)

1. APPRECIATE INFORMATION REFS. STATION ALWYAS INTERESTED IN ANY DUVALIER OR OPPONENT ARMS DEALING DUE SITUATION IN HAITI, WELCOME ANY INFORMATION AMBIDDY MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE.

C-82064

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

file

28 JUL 1969

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C-82064

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ACTION WH-4 ☐ RID COPY

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INFO. FILE, VR, SOD-6, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2, CI/OA

683

10 FEB 69 IN 90565

S E C R E T 100815Z FEB 69 CITE MANAGUA 6868

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY INFO WH/MIAMI

IUSTEER

REF: DIRECTOR 72449

1. STATION FILES SHOW ERYTHROID-1 (C-72970) REQUESTED TRACES 16 DECEMBER 1964 ON RAFAEL GARCIA BORN 4 FEBRUARY 1932, HABANA, CUBA. WAS ENGINEER EMPLOYED BY MOTOROLA, BEING CLEARED FOR INSTALLATION FM RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR ERYTHROID. NO OTHER TRACES GARCIA.

11 FEB 1969

File

2. BUSINESS PARTNER IS REFLECTED IN STATION FILES AS AMTABLY-27 (C.87513) ON WHOM PRESUME HEADQUARTERS AND WH/MIAMI HAVE EXTENSIVE MATERIAL. STATION FILES SHOW HIM AS EXECUTIVE PILOT.

3. FYI ERLOOP-1 (781872) IS CLOSELY INVOLVED AS BUSINESS PARTNER AND PROTECTOR OF CUBAN CROP DUSTING PILOTS IN NICARAGUA. HAS REPORTEDLY USED HIS OFFICIAL POSITION TO PRESSURE OTHER PILOTS TO LEAVE COUNTRY SO HE CAN MAKE MORE PROFIT FROM CROP DUSTING VENTURES HERE.

4. COS CAN PROBABLY OBTAIN CONSIDERABLE INFO ON REF ACTIVITY BY BRACING ERLOOP-1 DIRECTLY BUT BELIEVE BEST

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

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X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6368 S E C R E T

LET MATTER LIE AT PRESENT.

5. STATION DOES NOT BELIEVE IDEN D OF REF WOULD BE INVOLVED ANY PRO-ARIAS ACTIVITY.

6. COS CAN ELICIT FROM AMBIDDY-~~1~~ C-82064 (IDEN E OF REF) WHEN HE NEXT VISITS MANAGUA. HE ALWAYS CHECKS IN WITH COS.

File

7. FILE 201-283488, 206-287180, 201-323565.0

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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6 CAS

SECRET 081957Z JUL 68 CITE PANAMA CITY 6976 (THEBALD ACTING)

8 JUL 68 IN 40093

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, MANAGUA

REF: MANAGUA 6617 (IN 45324)

1. PANAMA CITY MOST INTERESTED EFFORTS ALFREDO ALEMAN JUNIOR, MINISTER OF HACIENDA, CONTACT AMBIDDY-1. REQUEST AGENT CONTACT PANAMANIAN CONSUL MIAMI TO SEE IF SHE KNOWS WHAT ALEMAN WANTED.

C-82064

2. FYI, ALEMAN AMONG THOSE SUPPORTERS OF DAVID SAMUDIO WHO REFUSING ACCEPT ELECTOR DEFEAT OF SAMUDIO. IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE HE SEEKING CONTRACT CUBAN EXILE STRONG ARM TYPES.

SECRET

9 JUL 1968

BT

File

SECRET

201 C-82064

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CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI FI/INT2 SOD6

7 JUL 68 ... 45324

S E C R E T 071937Z JUL 68 CITE MANAGUA 6617 (TRECKLER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE

C-82064

9 JUL 1968

AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ACOS 7 JULY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM HIS WIFE IN MIAMI ADVISING THAT SOMEONE HAD BEEN TRYING CONTACT HIM. AMBIDDY-1 ASSUMES THIS MIGHT BE HIS HQS CASE OFFICER AND WISHES TO ADVISE HQS THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MIAMI ON 8 JULY.

2. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO PICKED UP IN 2 JULY MEETING WITH AMBIDDY-1 ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI FIRST WEEK JULY:

A. (FNU) BLANCA ROBLES, PANAMA CONSUL IN MIAMI CONTACTED AMBIDDY-1 AND TOLD HIM PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF HACIENDA WHO WAS VISITING IN U.S. WANTED TO MEET WITH AMBIDDY-1 TO DISCUSS UNSPECIFIED URGENT MATTER.

B. EUGENE MAXIMILLIAN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI TOLD AMBIDDY-1 THAT PRESIDENT DUVALLIER WANTED TO SEE HIM. PURPOSE WAS TO CARRY PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA. CLAIMED THAT IF AMBIDDY-1 DID THIS DUVALLIER WOULD RELEASE THE SON OF LEON CANTAVE FROM PRISON. SOMOZA HAS GIVEN AMBIDDY-1 PERMISSION TO MAKE THE TRIP. ACCORDING AMBIDDY-1, HE AND SOMOZA FIGURE THIS IS A PLAY BY DUVALIER TO TRY OPEN MORE DOORS ACCEPTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA.

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S-82064

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FILE VR. DDP, ADDP, CSDO, EUR 6

WH/COG 8, FI, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 201906 MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5618

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MADRID , PARIS

20 MAY 68 IN 14784

M

PBRUMEN LISASSY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5535 (IN 08508)

B. MADRID 4911 (IN 09784)

OVER

1. NR LISASSY-1 RETURNED MEXICO CITY 15 MAY. AFTER MADRID VISIT REF B LISASSY-1 VISITED FRANKFURT, EAST AND WEST BERLIN, AND PARIS. DID NOT CALL CUBAN AMBASSADOR PARIS BECAUSE DECIDED WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE HIS OWN RELATIONSHIP NR LIRING-9 MEXI. ALSO FELT ALTHOUGH HE MET AND KNOWS AMBASSADOR SLIGHTLY, THERE WAS STRONG POSSIBLIITY AMBASSADOR WOULD NOT REMEMBER HIM AND WOULD REFUSE SEE HIM. PURPOSE LISASSY-1 PLANNED CONTACT WAS TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR THAT DR ENRIQUE HUERTAS WHO CONSIDERS SELF MOST REPRESENTATIVE CUBAN EXILES IS WILLING MEET FIDEL CASTRO TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY RAPPROCHEMENT WITH HUERTAS GROUP. DURING 17-18 APRIL MEET MIAMI HUERTAS CLAIMED HE IS CONTACT WITH HIGH LEVEL PERSONS CASTRO GOVERNMENT WHO MAY BE RECEPTIVE PROPOSAL RAPPROCHEMENT WITHOUT CASTRO.

2. LISASSY-1 TOLD STATION ORIGINALLY HIS TRIP EUROPE WAS TO VISIT PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS ON BEHALF HIS COMPANY NEW CONTRACEPTIVE

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FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5618 SECRET

PRODUCT PERLUTAL. ONE MONTHLY INJECTION INLIEU PRESENT DAILY PILL CONTRACEPTIVES. ENROUTE EUROPE LISASSY-1 DECIDED VISIT HUERTAS AND AMBIDDY-1. C-82064 DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH THESE TWO, LISASSY-1 WAS INSTRUCTED BY HUERTAS TO CONTACT MADRID CUBAN EXILES TO FIND ONE WHO HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH CUBAN AMB PARIS. IF SUCH PERSON COULD BE LOCATED, LISASSY-1 WAS TO ASK THAT PERSON TO CONVEY HUERTAS PROPOSAL TO THE AMBASSADOR. FAILING TO LOCATE SUCH A PERSON HE WAS TO DO IT HIMSELF. FOR REASONS CITED PARA 1, ABOVE, LISASSY-1 DID NOT DO SO. LISASSY-1 IS CEROWGN AMBIDDY-1 UNDERSTANDS WHY HE COULD NOT SEE THE CUBAN AMB, BECAUSE AMIBDDY-1 IS ONLY LISASSY-1 FRIEND WHO IS KNOWLEDGEABLE LISASSY-1 DOUBLE ROLE.

3. LISASSY-1 HAD MESSAGE FROM LIRING-9 ON ARRIVAL MEXI, ASKING LISASSY-1 CALL HIM SOONEST. LISASSY-1 PLANS WITHHOLD DETAILS HIS EUROPEAN AND U.S. TRIP FROM LIRING-9 PENDING STATION INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT ELEMENTS OF TRIP CAN BE PASSED LIRING-9.

4. PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE MEXICO LISASSY-1 RECEIVED 100 CUBAN PESOS FROM LIRING-9 WITH INSTRUCTIONS PASS TO HUERTAS, WHO LIRING-9 HOPED WOULD GIVE THE MONEY TO AGENTS HUERTAS MAY BE SENDING INTO CUBA. LIRING-9 TOLD LISASSY-1 HE PHOTOGRAPHED THE MONEY SO IT COULD BE TRACED TO WHOEVER TURNS UP WITH IT IN CUBA. LISASSY-1

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FILE VR

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 5618

DID NOT PASS THE MONEY TO HUERTAS BUT WILL TELL LIRING-9 HE DID. LISASSY-1 EXPLAINED TO STATION THAT HE DID NOT GIVE MONEY TO HUERTAS BECAUSE COULD NOT TELL HIM LIRING-9 PLAN TO TRACE MONEY TO HUERTAS AGENTS. ALSO FELT STATION MAY WISH USE THE MONEY TO BURN SOMEONE, SO HAS IN HIS POSSESSION.

5. WILL ADVISE RESULTS LISASSY-1 MEET WITH LIRING-9.

DIRECTOR: PLS COMMENT RE PARA 4 ABOVE.

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INFO. FILE VR AdWP, CSDO,

Eur-6, WH/COG-8, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

SERVICE

MEXICO CITY 5618
STA & NR

20 MAY 68
DATE

14784 -A
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"EXPLAINED TO STATION C/O HE DID NOT GIVE MONEY"

SECRET

C-82064

CS D O

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S E C R E T 170315Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5237

17 APR 68 IN 92242

8

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE MADRID

PBRUMEN LISASSY

REF A DIRECTOR 90426

B JMWAVE 2031 (IN 90586)

NR NR

1. LISASSY-1 DID NOT DISCUSS WITH LIRING-9 HIS PANAMA MEET WITH ENRIQUE HUERTAS. AS SUGGESTED PARA 1 REF A LISASSY-1 TOLD LIRING-9 15 APRIL HUERTAS ADVISED BY PHONE ORGANIZING INTERNATIONAL GROUPS TO WORK AGAINST AMTHUG. LISASSY-1 WILL SAY DOES NOT HAVE DETAILS AND NAMES BUT WILL ATTEMPT SOLICIT FROM HUERTAS DURING STOPOVER MIAMI 17 APRIL. LISASSY-1 ALSO BRIEFED PARA 2 REF A AND AGREED GO PRAGUE FOR TRAINING IF ASKED. WILL TELL LIRING-9 HE MAY HAVE UPDATED INFO HUERTAS PLANS WHEN ARRIVES MADRID 20 APRIL FOR TWO WEEK STAY AND WILL REQUEST LIRING-9 FURNISH HIM MADRID CONTACT AND/OR ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

2. LISASSY-1 ETA MIAMI AFTERNOON 17 APRIL FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HUERTAS AND AMBIDDY-1 (C-80654). THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL HAVE BEARING HIS MISSION FOR HUERTAS IN MADRID. ON 18 APRIL GOES PUERTO RICO TO VISIT BROTHER WIFE. IN MADRID PLANS SEE QUGROWL-1 (NR) AND QUGROWL-2 (C-106471), AND AMSEELY-1 (C-94565).

17 APR 1968

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INFO

FILE VR

PAGE TWO [illegible] S E C R E T

3. JMWAVE, MADRID: LISASSY-1 VISIT THERE MAY PROVIDE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FEED HIM DECEPTION INFO FOR PASSAGE LIRING-9, BEARING IN MIND PARA 3 REF A FACTORS. AS STATION REPORTED EARLIER, LISASSY-1 APPARENTLY IN GOOD GRACES PBRUMENERS, THUS NOW IS TIME FOR HIM COME UP WITH INFO OF INTEREST TO THEM.

S E C R E T [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

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S E C R E T 021528Z CITE MANAGUA 6400

[illegible] 02041

DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, JMWAVE

3 JAN 1968

REF: MANAGUA 6399 (IN 21302)

1. AMBIDDY-1 IDENTIFIED HIS NEGRO BODYGUARD OF PARA 2 REF AS EUGENIO CLAUDE WHO RETURNED MIAMI BEFORE CHRISTMAS. DID NOT VISIT COSTA RICA.

2. AMBIDDY IDENTIFIED FREDDY OF REF AS FREDDY BORGES, EMPLOYED BY TIRE COMPANY MIAMI. BORGES IS PART-TIME INFORMANT AND FIXER FOR ODYUMA. EFFECTIVE BUT INCLINED SPIN TALES OF OWN IMPORTANCE. AMBIDDY WILL ADVISE HIM SHUT UP.

3. STATION OFFICER HAS IDENTIFIED QUIET CUBAN OF REF AS ALBERTO RUIZ. NO RECORD STATION FILES. AMBIDDY REPORTS BORGES WAS TRYING ARRANGE ENTRANCE TO U.S. FOR CUBAN REFUGEE WHO ARRIVED NICARAGUA FROM SPAIN. DESCRIPTION SIMILAR TO RUIZ.

4. AMBIDDY SAYS NONE OF "HIS" CUBANS IN COSTA RICA RECENTLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, WH/COG8, CI/CA/F1

S E C R E T 301726Z CITE MANAGUA 6399

2 JAN 1968

SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

REF: SAN JOSE 9881 (NOT SENT JMWAVE) (N 20968)

30 Dec 67 IN 21302

1. NO ERYTHROIDS WERE IN SAN JOSE AREA 21 DECEMBER.

C-82064

2. AMBIDDY-1 IN MANAGUA FOR CHRISTMAS SEASON, MAY STILL BE IN TOWN. COS WILL ATTEMPT FIND HIM TO SEE IF HE CAN SHED ANY LIGHT ON THREE MEN OF REF. ABOUT 20 DECEMBER AMBIDDY CAME TO COS HOME TO BORROW BABY CRIB, HAD WITH HIM TALL NEGRO WHO APPARENTLY BODYGUARD. AS SAN JOSE AWARE, BOTH ERACORN-1 AND AMBIDDY-1 WERE ON GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION. AMBIDDY MAY HAVE BROUGHT BODYGUARDS WITH HIM FROM MIAMI THIS TRIP AND SOME OF THESE MAY HAVE SPILLED OVER INTO COSTA RICA.

NR

3. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY: ABOUT 13 DECEMBER SALVADOR TOLEDO OF NICARAGUAN IMMIGRATION BROUGHT TWO CUBANS TO ADLON NIGHT CLUB MANAGUA, INTRODUCED THEM TO OWNER AS FRIENDS OF JOSE IVAN "PEPE" ALEGRETT, IMMIGRATION CHIEF, ASKED THAT THEY BE WELL TREATED. ONE CUBAN DID ALMOST ALL TALKING. GAVE NAME AS FREDDY. LAST NAME UNDECIPHERABLE FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTATION, BEGINS WITH LETTER B, CONTAINS

SECRET

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23211

ABOUT 5 LETTERS. ADDRESS [illegible] NW 16 STREET, MIAMI, PHONE 633-4584. FREDDY ABOUT FIVE NINE, MEDIUM BUILD AND COMPLEXION, DARK HAIR, NO DISTINGUISHING MARKS. OTHER, QUIET, CUBAN WAS SHORT, WALKED WITH LIMP, BLACK MUSTACHE, VERY HEAVY CUBAN ACCENT. FREDDY FLASHED PLASTIC CARD SHOWING HIM TO BE CUBAN REFUGEE (PROBABLY ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD), SAID HE AND OTHER CUBAN BOTH WORKING FOR WOFIRM. CLAIMED HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH CUBANS PICKED UP IN MANAGUA BY IMMIGRATION. WAS PLANNING GO MIAMI NEXT DAY CARRYING SOME PASSPORTS. WOULD RETURN IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. ON 28 AND 29 DECEMBER TOLEDO AND THE QUIET CUBAN APPEARED AT ADLON CLUB BUT FREDDY HAS NOT SHOWN UP AGAIN ALTHOUGH WAS EXPECTED BACK IN MANAGUA 29 DECEMBER.

4. SINCE JMWAVE DID NOT GET EARLIER TRAFFIC, SUGGEST HQS FILL IN AS APPROPRIATE. JMWAVE PLS CABLE TRACES ON FREDDY.

5. ALEGRETT HAS LOTS OF CUBAN CONTACTS MIAMI AREA AND IS CONSTANTLY BRINGING THEM INTO NICARAGUA ON BUSINESS DEALS. STATION HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH HIM, WILL TRY ELICIT INFO ON FREDDY AND OTHER CUBAN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 6399 SECRET

6. SOUNDS LIKE SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA INCIDENTS MAY SIMPLY BE BIG-MOUTHING BY MEN SEEKING ENHANCE IMPORTANCE.

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C-82064

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INFO FILE VR WH 8 CI/OPS CI/OA ICS/PO

6 Nov 67 IN 67575

S E C R E T 06160 CITE MANAGUA 6320

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBIDDY

C. 82064

AMBIDDY-1 HAS LOST PHONE NUMBER OF GROWERY WHOM HE KNOWS AS "MISTER WILSON". WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CONTACT AT HIS MIAMI RESIDENCE 6 OR 7 NOVEMBER.

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ORIG: BARRY CAREW:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: R-9008
DATE: 24 JANUARY 1967

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SECRET 25 1013 Z CITE DIRECTOR 69479

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

File

26 JAN 1967

TYPIC LISASSY/LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 0024 (IN 83232)*

1. HQS CASE OFFICER (GROWERY) IN PROCESS CONTACTING C-820641 AMBIDDY/1 TO REQUEST HE NOT CORRESPOND WITH LISASSY/1 ON THIS OPERATIONAL MATTER. REQUEST STATION EXPLAIN THIS LISASSY/1.

2. DO NOT WISH INTERRUPT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP OR EXILE ORG BUSINESS BECAUSE IT ONE REASON FOR LIRING INTEREST LISASSY/1, AND LISASSY/1 AND AMBIDDY/1 WILL TALK TO EACH OTHER ANYHOW.

3. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE ESTABLISH COMMO FROM LISASSY/1 TO STATION AS DISCUSSED WITH TRECKLER AT HQS.

4. REQUEST STATION SEND PARA FIVE REF COMMO INSTRUCTIONS AND AMSPICE COMMO INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT/

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S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 69479

TO

WH/COG COMMENT:

REPORT ON 16 JAN MEETING WITH LISASSY/1, PARA FIVE: LIRING/1 PROVIDED ELABORATE AND OVER-COMPLICATED COMMO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH APPEAR ENAMATE FROM HAVANA.

C/WH/COG/CICS ______
WH/COG/MO E. CHIOCCA (DRAFT)
WH/COG/FI W. MURRAY (DRAFT)
WH/1/MEXICO J. STEWART (DRAFT)

by JDEsterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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UNIT: WH/C/CICS
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DATE: 26 OCT 66

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INFO: VR, FILE WH8 CI/OPS CI/IC 2 C/AF FI FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

27 17 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 47286

TO S E C R E T

MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MANAGUA

TYPIC LISASSY

fill C-82044

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8972 (IN 25337)

B. MEXICO CITY 8860 (IN 17955)

C. HNMA 3667, 5 OCT 66

D. DIR 47285

1. SUBJECT 201-300923, PRINCIPAL REF CASE, ASSIGNED LISASSY/1.

2. BELIEVE SALIENT POINTS RAISED BY PRELIMINARY HQS ANALYSIS TO BE KEPT IN MIND DURING HANDLING CASE ARE:

[redacted]

A. FACT HE HAS RELATIVES CUBA.

B. CLAIMS CONTACTS WITH OTHER WOFACT STATION CASE OFFICERS (HNMA-3667).

CONT/

RELEASING OFFICER 27-7 COORDINATING OFFICERS S E C R E T

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? How?

C-82064

3. LISASSY-1 IN SECRET WRITING CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY/ AND ALTHOUGH HEADQUARTERS HAS NOT SEEN MESSAGES, BELEIVE HE HAS INFORMED AMBIDDY ABOUT CASE. LATEST MESSAGE BEING DECYPHERED. HEADQUARTERS. ~~HEADQUARTERS FOR COMPLETE DEVELOPMENT.~~ DUE SENSITIVITY OF CASE HEADQUARTERS MAY ASK AMBIDDY MINIMIZE OR COMPLETELY STOP CORRESPONDENCE WITH LISASSY WITH AGREEMENT WE INFORM AMBIDDY ANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT MIGHT AFFECT HIM. AMBIDDY MAY REFUSE THIS REQUEST BECAUSE HE VITALLY CONCERNED AND BECAUSE INITIAL CAVEAT TO WOFACT IN REF C THAT CONTROL OF OPERATION NOT BE GIVEN WOFACT. IN ADDITION, REGARDLESS ANY AGREEMENT, LIKELY THEY WOULD CONTINUE CORRESPOND SECRETLY.

4. HEADQUARTERS DISSEMINATING PARTS REF A TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON LIMITED BASIS AS EXAMPLE CUIS REQUIREMENTS.

C-103058

5. FYI: PER PARA SIX REF A, AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO ENRIQUE (RODRIGUEZ-LOECHES) HERNANDEZ CONTACTED RABAT BY QUWHIP/1 (MADRID STATION ASSET) 12 OCTOBER 1966 IN ATTEMPT RECRUIT OR DEFECT.

CONT

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CITE DIRECTOR 47231

TO

c. CURIOUS DESCRIPTION OF 29 SEPT 66 MEETING WITH CAPOTE, INVOLVING EVASIVE ROUTE TO, AND SURVEILLANCE WHILE AT, RESTAURANT (HNMA-3667).

d. POSSIBILITY SUBJECT WITH OR WITHOUT AMBIDDY-1 KNOWLEDGE "PLAYING" ABREU FOR SOME TIME, WHICH MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY SUBJECT IN POSSESSION SUCH LENGTHY LIST CUIS REQUIREMENTS AFTER ONLY FIVE DEVELOPMENTAL MEETINGS WITH C/O.

LITAMIL-9
?

e. CONFIRMATION CAPOTE IN MEXICO ON SCHOLARSHIP AND INVESTIGATION HIS ACTIVITIES.

f. POSSIBILITY IDENTIFY VALVERDE THROUGH TRAVEL MANIFESTS AND LIONION.

g. AS STATION COMMENTED, PUT BRAKES ON [redacted] OPERATIONAL SLANTS INITIATED BY SUBJECT.

CONT/

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CITE DIRECTOR 47285

TO

752480

ACCUSED QUWHIP BE ASSOCIATED SAME GROUP AS QUBRAVE/1 AND NR AMLASH/2. IMPLIED WOULD SOON BE MEMBER PCC. SAID "KNEW WHAT HE DOING. WAS RETURNING CUBA OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER AND WOULD COME OUT AGAIN IN FEW YEARS". CONSIDER LISASSY/1 [redacted] IDEA SOUND BUT PREFER LET OPERATION STABILIZE BEFORE TAKING ACTION.

whc

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/CA/PA C.
C/WH/C/MO
C/WH/C/FI
WH/1-J.Stewart (draft)
WH/2 P. EDWARDS (phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Earl J. Williamson
fal
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

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Earl J. Williamson
fal
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

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(DATE AND TIME FILED) 27 17 05 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 47285

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MANAGUA.

File

TYPIC LISASSY

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 8972 (IN 25337)

~~B) DIR~~

28 OCT 1966

1. TRACES: AMARO ESTEBAN ALVAREZ TORMO BORN 3 AUG 29 MATANZAS CUBA, CUBAN, MEDICAL SURGEON, SON OF AMARO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ AND MERCEDES TORMO LAGULLON, WIFE MARIA CARMEN CAGIGAS ARTESGABEITIA. UFGS-21693. 1 JUN 65: SUBJECT ENGAGED ANTI-BATISTA ACTIVITIES, DID NOT AGREE CASTRO POLICIES AND WENT MEXICO EARLY 1960. MEXICO CITY 7802, 8 APR 61: OFFICIAL DELEGATE, BUSINESSMENS SECTION FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD). HMYA-1383, 25 NOV 60: MEMBER TOURING FRD TEAM, REPORTEDLY WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN SIERRA MAESTRA. (NO EVAL) UFGA-24076, 21 DEC 65: OFFICER OF JUANA CASTRO GROUP MEXICO. ?

2. NO INDICATION HQS FILES SUBJECT EVER WOFACT ASSET. HE WAS KNOWN PERSONALLY TO ANDREW F. MERTON UNDER EMBASSY COVER AND PROBABLY THOUGHT MERTON WAS WOFACT. HE NEVER USED AS ASSET BY MERTON OR ANY OTHER STATION OFFICER ACCORDING MERTONS BEST

cont/

RELEASING OFFICER

27-6
11

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

RECOLLECTION, WHICH IS THAT HE WAS PEST TRYING ESTABLISH HIMSELF WITH AMEMBASSY AS LEADING EXILE, AS PUSHING OWN VISA CASE AND AS LEADING ATTEMPT BY BUSINESSMENS SECTION FRD TAKE OVER POLITICAL CONTROL FRD MEXICO CITY DURING TRIP TO MIAMI. (DOCUMENT POSSIBLY MEXICO CITY 7802 ABOVE WHICH UNAVAILABLE THIS WRITING).

3. SUBJECT WELL-KNOWN LITAMIL/2 WHO SHOULD BE ABLE PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

28 OCT 1966 File
JA

C/WH/C/CICS
WH/C/MO
WH/C/FI
WH/C/CA
WH/1
WH/2 G. EDWARDS (phone)
WH/C/CA/PA

Earl J. Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
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Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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UNIT: DC/WH/C
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DATE: 18 OCTOBER 66

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(DATE AND TIME FILED) 19 19 03 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 44736

TO MEXICO CITY INFO MANAGUA

c-82064

TYPIC AMBIDDY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8860 (IN 17955)

1. RE PARA 4 REF, AMBIDDY/1 Presumably ~~CONTINUES~~ TO RECEIVES A SUBSIDY FROM WOFACT of $3,000 a month WHICH HE CLAIMS IS DISBURSED TO FAMILIES OF AMWORLD CASUALTIES. THIS SUBSIDY WAS CUT LAST JULY from $5,000 monthly AND HE HAS BEEN WARNED IT MAY BE ELIMINATED IN THE FUTURE. EJW

2. AMBIDDY/1 HAS MENTIONED IN PAST HE LIKELY TARGET FOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT BY CASTRO BUT DOUBT ALVAREZ REPORT IS ATTEMPT BY AMBIDDY/1 TO REGAIN STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CICS
WH/1 J.Stewart (draft)
C/WH/2/CR&N R. EDWARDS (Phone)
DC/WH2 J. THEN (Phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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19-2

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible], CI, FI,

S E C R E T 150140Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8860

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

File AMBIDDY/1 (see over)

TYPIC AMBIDDY

15 OCT 65 = 17955

REF: A. MANAGUA 5808 (IN 12492)

B. DIRECTOR 41783 C 82064

1. ONLY ELEMENT WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY FAN FIRE OF CURRENT ANTI-GOC PROPAGANDA IN MEXICO WOULD BE EXPOSURE OF:

A. CUBAN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT MEXICO, OR,

B. COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR MEXICAN SOVEREIGNITY ON PART OF CUBANS INVOLVED IN THIRD COUNNTRY OPS.

2. IN LINE WITH REF B, STATION PLANNING:

A. IDENTIFY VALVERDE AND COLLEAGUES AND TRY DETERMINE IF THEIR ACTIVITIES INVOLVE MEXICANS.

B. TRY TAPE STRONG ANTI-MEXICAN STATEMENTS HOPEFULLY MADE BY VALVERDE AND FRIENDS DURING MEETING WITH DR. ALVAREZ.

3. PLAN HAVE FIRST MEETING WITH ALVEREZ 18 OCTOBER USING LIEMBRACE TEAM FOR SURVEILLANCE MEETING SITE AND TAILING OF ALVAREZ FOR SEVERAL DAYS. WILL EXPLORE WITH ALVAREZ HOW VALVERDE COULD BE TRAPPED INTO MAKING STATEMENTS DETRIMENTAL TO MEXICO IN CONNECTION WITH STRONG ARM TYPE OPS AND HOW THESE STATE-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8863 S E C R E T

MENTS COULD BE RECORDED. CLANDESTINE PHOTOS OF VALVERDE WOULD BE TAKEN AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS. DEPENDING ON TAKE, TAPES AND PHOTOS COULD BE SENT MEXICAN OFFICIALS WHILE PART OF INFO LEAKED TO FOREIGN PRESS. LIEMBRACE WOULD NATURALLY SURVEIL VALVERDE'S MOVEMENTS FOR PERIOD AFTER INITIAL MONITORED MEETING WITH ALVAREZ.

4. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS AMBIDDY-1 RELATIONSHIP WITH WOFACT. REF A COULD POSSIBLY BE AMBIDDY-1 ATTEMPT TO REGAIN STATUS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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ORIG: E.WILLIAMSON/yb
UNIT: WH/C
EXT: 3481
DATE: 24 JUNE 66

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25 16 30Z CITE DIRECTOR 15470

TO JMWAVE C-82064

TYPIC AMBIDDY/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 13592

B. JMWAVE 1479 (IN 37512)

1. IN MEETING 22 JUNE AMBIDDY/1 (A/1) SAID ONLY GEAR LEFT IN U.S. FROM AMWORLD IS 2-3 RUBBER BOATS AND 6-8 SILENT OUTBOARD MOTORS WHICH STORED SMALL ROOM IN FARM NEAR WEST PALM BEACH. HIS REP, SAENZ, ALSO HAS 6-8 RADIOS IN HIS HOME MIAMI. A/1 CLAIMS HAS NO SIGNIFICANT ARMS OR AMMUNITION IN U.S. AND KNOWS OF NO SOURCES MIAMI AREA WHERE ANY QUANTITY ARMS CAN BE OBTAINED. HE SAID AT TIME GUANTANAMO ALERT HE CHECKED RE PURCHASE ARMS MIAMI AREA IN CASE NEEDED AND COULD ONLY LOCATE ABOUT 60 RIFLES AMONGST 3 EXILE GROUPS.

2. A/1 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE BOB BROWN (REF B), SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN APPROACHED FOR INFO ON ANY MAGAZINE ARTICLES OR FOR INFO RE PURCHASE OR POSSIBILITY PURCHASE ARMS MIAMI.

3. A/1 TO FURNISH INVENTORY REMAINING AMWORLD GEAR IN U.S. ON RETURN MIAMI. UPON RECEIPT, HQS WILL FORWARD COPY AND ANY ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO TO WAVE.

....CONTINUED ....

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CITE DIRECTOR 15480

PAGE TWO

TO

4. A/1 GOING NYC ON OWN EVENING 23 JUNE AND PLANS RETURN MIAMI 24 or 25 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills

E. J. Williamson
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

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for
THOMAS J. FLORES
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ORIG : A.D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6057-1255
DATE : 22 NOV 65

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

TO : CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUCIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE 7 0

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

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TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60386

TYPIC

29 NOV 1965

File

REFS: A. DIR 59681

~~B. DIR~~ ______

JR

e-82064

1. HQS REQUESTED AMBIDDY-1 (A-1) NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF ALEJOS-PONCIANO-SOMOZA MEETING WHICH SEEMINGLY TO TAKE PLACE MANA DURING WEEK 22-28 NOV. WAS ASKED POSTPONE TRIP IN ORDER AVOID GRIST FOR RUMOR MILLS. A-1 UNDERSTOOD BUT EXPLAINED HAD LONG-STANDING APPOINTMENT SOMOZA RELATING OTHER MATTERS SUCH AS TURNOVER OF BASES ETC. AS COMPROMISE OFFERED DEPART MANA 23 NOV FOR SJOS THUS AVOIDING MEETING WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS WHO DUE IN FROM WAVE SAME DAY.

2. IN SJOS A-1 HOPING RECEIVE INVITE FROM IDEN-1 VIA VENEZUELA EMBASSY SJOS. IF FALLS THROUGH WILL RETURN MANA IN ORDER ASCERTAIN WHAT TRANSPIRED AT ABOVE MENTIONED MEET. HOWEVER, IF RECEIVES INVITE PLANS TRAVEL CARA O/A 29 NOVEMBER. HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED STAY TAMANACO HOTEL AND REGISTER UNDER NAME IDEN-2. WAS TOLD IF KUBARK WISHED HIM

CONTINUED//

RELEASING OFFICER

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24-2

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 60386

PAGE TWO

MAKE CONTACT WITH PLOTTERS MENTIONED REF B WOULD RECEIVE CALL FROM "AMIGO DE ANDRES". IF NO INTEREST IN HIS MAKING CONTACT WOULD NOT BE CALLED AT ALL.

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peake
WH/3 (telecon)

B. Miller
WH/C/MO

Flores for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Flores for
JOHN [illegible]. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

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EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 22 NOV 65

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TO : CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUICIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE

SIG CEN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WH 8, C/OPS, C/CA

TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60387

TYPIC

DIR: 60386

IDEN - 1 PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI

IDEN - 2 MANUEL A. BUESA

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peak
WH/3 (telecon)

WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 24-3

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201-0267437
Volume XVI

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FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ASSOCIATION OF VETERANS OF THE
BAY OF PIGS, BRIGADE 2506

MANUEL ARTIME

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T 155286 EIA224 PAGE 01 IN 268135

TOR:3121182 MAY 74 LIMA 28090

S E C R E T 3120402 MAY 74 STAFF/

CITE LIMA 28290 ALAN-AIMORI

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

Juan Valadez X1222 OS/BARRY answering Artime file

REAM

1. DUSKIRT-2 HAS ASKED IF WE COULD OBTAIN FOR HIM THE CURRENT ADDRESS OF MANUEL ARTIME. D-2 WAS FRIEND AND COLLABORATOR OF ARTIME FROM 1959 UNTIL THEY LOST CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IN 1968. WHEN D-2 FIRST CAME TO PERU HE CARRIED LETTER SIGNED BY ARTIME IDENTIFYING HIM AS ARTIME PERSONAL REP IN PERU.

2. D-2 WANTS TO CONTACT ARTIME TO ASK HIS HELP IN OBTAINING NICARAGUAN PASSPORT. HE CLAIMS ARTIME RELATIONSHIP WITH SOMOZA IS SUCH THAT ARTIME COULD OBTAIN FOR D-2 NICARAGUAN PASSPORT AND PERHAPS SOME TYPE OF HONORARY CONCUL DESIGNATION. D-2 WILL WRITE LETTER TO ARTIME EXPLAINING HIS SITUATION AND WILL ASK STATION TO POUCH LETTER TO MIAMI FOR MAILING THERE EITHER DIRECTLY TO ARTIME OR TO D-2 SISTER FOR HER TO DELIVER PERSONALLY TO ARTIME.

3. AS ABOVE INDICATES, D-2 REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH FACT HE DOES NOT POSSESS VALID PASSPORT. HE HAS TRIED NUMEROUS SCHEMES TO OBTAIN SAME WITHOUT SUCCESS. HE STRONGLY FEELS HE MUST HAVE DOCUMENTATION TO LEAVE PERU IF NECESSARY. HE WORRIES ABOUT

~~S E C R E T~~

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T 155286 EIA224 PAGE 02 IN 268135

TOR:312118Z MAY 74 LIMA 28898

POSSIBILITY OF ONE DAY BEING ARRESTED, PERHAPS AS RESULT HIS BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AND DEPORTED TO CUBA BY LEFTIST PERUVIAN GOVT. HE ADMITS THAT HIS EXPERIENCES IN CUBA AFTER CASTRO'S TAKEOVER COLOR HIS PERCEPTION OF THE DANGER IN HIS CURRENT SITUATION BUT HE IS NOT WILLING TO REMAIN VULNERABLE TO SIMILAR DEVELOPMENT IN PERU. EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS WILL OF COURSE NOT REASSURE HIM RE THE SITUATION HERE.

4. OTHER THAN ARTIME GAMBIT, ONLY TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR OBTAINING PASSPORT WHICH REMAIN OPEN TO D-2 ARE PERUVIAN CITIZENSHIP OR GOING TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ASKING THAT THEY RENEW HIS EXPIRED CUBAN PASSPORT. HE REJECTS IDEA PERUVIAN CITIZENSHIP, CLAIMING HE STILL PLANS EVENTUALLY RETURN TO LIVE IN UNITED STATES BUT ALSO BECAUSE HIS FEARS ABOUT ULTIMATE DESTINATION PERUVIAN REVOLUTION AND POSSIBILITY MARXIST DICTATORSHIP COMING TO POWER HERE. HE AND STATION ARE NATURALLY RELUCTANT HAVE HIM APPROACH CUBANS. THERE PROBABLY THICK FILE ON HIM IN HAVANA AND WE WOULD NOT WISH CALL THEIR ATTENTION TO HIS PRESENCE HERE. HOWEVER THIS OPTION MUST BE EXAMINED AND THEREFORE WOULD BE HELPFUL IF HQS COULD PROVIDE INFO ON EXPERIENCE OTHERS SUCH AS D-2, FORMERLY ACTIVE CASTRO OPPONENTS NOW IN EXILE IN COUNTRIES WHICH MAINTAIN

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T 188200 EIA224 PAGE 03-03 IN 268135

TOR:312118Z MAY 74 LIMA 20890

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA, WHO STILL CUBAN CITIZENS AND HAVE HAD TO CONTACT CUBAN EMBASSIES FOR PASSPORT RENEWAL. HAVE CUBANS NORMALLY RENEWED THESE PASSPORTS AND IS THERE EVIDENCE CUBANS HAVE OPERATIONALLY EXPLOITED SITUATION OF THESE EXILES?

5. FILE: 201-0754738. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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~V.

R.F.

☐ YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 22

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S E C R E T 082102Z CITE MANAGUA 6024

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

8 MAR 68 17221

[redacted] TYPIC AMWORLD

1. AS ADDLESSEES AWARE, WHEN AMWORLD WAS CLOSED OUT TWO YEARS AGO, AMBIDDY-1 WAS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD ROUGH EQUIVILENT OF WEAPONS TO ARM ONE RIFLE COMPANY. WEAPONS STORED AT THE MONKEY POINT OPS BASE, AT EL BLUFF SUPPORT BASE, AND IN MANAGUA. ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO, MONKEY POINT BASE WAS CLOSED AND WEAPONS THERE MOVED TO EL BLUFF. STORAGE IN SEALED CONCRETE VAULT UNDER THE FLOOR OF SAFEHOUSE WHICH IS ON UNINHABITED SIDE OF BLUFF NEXT TO AIRSTRIP BUILT BY AMWORLD. STRIP IS 1,800 BY 50 FEET WITH CLAY BASE MIXED WITH NATURAL ROCK.

2. ARMS IN MANAGUA HAVE BEEN STORED IN A SAFEHOUSE OUTSIDE OF CITY AND CONSIST OF TWO WOODEN CRATES, EACH ABOUT 150 POUNDS AND 37 BY 25 BY 14 INCHES. APPROXIMATE CONTENTS ARE:

25 PISTOLS .45 CAL
5 RIFLES AR-15
3 SMG M3

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Signed:
R.O. #[illegible] - Unit WH/Cog
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

201-267437

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6844 SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2 SMG SWISS

6 PISTOLS .22 SILENCED

3. FORTY-FIVE BOXES OF UNKNOWN SIZES AND WEIGHTS ARE STORED AT BLUFF. CONTENTS ARE ESTIMATED FROM MEMORY BY ANTONIO SANZ, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF STORING THEM:

4 HMG .50 CAL
2 RECOILLESS RIFLE 57 MM
2 MORTARS 81 MM
2 MORTARS 60 MM
4 LMG .30 CAL
4 BAR
3 RIFLES FAL
10 SMG M3
10 CARBINES M1
3 CARBINES M2
10 AR-15
10 GARAND M1
4 SHOTGUNS 12 GUAGE
4 SMG K-PISTOL

SECRET

AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE WEAPONS, C-3 AND C-4 EXPLOSIVE

WITHOUT DETONATORS, AMOUNT UNKNOWN, PLUS 13 TO 15 BOXES GRENADES.

4. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED JAMES D. ZABOTH 4 MARCH, SAID HE CLOSING OUT ALL HIS STATIONKEEPERS IN NICARAGUA, DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON WEAPONS TO FALL INTO WRONG HANDS, NOR TO GIVE THEM TO NIC GOVT. GENERAL SOMOZA KNEW AMWORLD WAS LEAVING BEHIND SOME RESERVE EQUIPMENT AND WOULD KEEP ENOUGH WEAPONS FOR LOCAL SECURITY. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBERS AND TYPES REMAINING. AMBIDDY-1 ASKED IF WOFACT WISHED TO RECOVER WEAPONS, OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO DUMP THEM IN OCEAN. ZABOTH, AMBIDDY-1 AND AMJAVA-4, WHO IN MANAGUA ON OTHER BUSINESS, VISITED BLUFF ISLAND 6 MARCH TO CHECK SITUATION. IF HQS WISHES RECOVER WEAPONS, MOST FEASIBLE METHOD IS BY AIR. A CARIBOU OR C-123 TYPE AIRCRAFT COULD LAND ON BLUFF STRIP, LOAD WEAPONS AT NIGHT AND FLY THEM OUT NEXT MORNING. IF HQS DOES NOT WISH RECOVER WEAPONS, AMBIDDY-1 COULD BE TOLD TO MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS TO DUMP WEAPONS AT SEA.

5. DESPITE AMBIDDY-1 DESIRE NOT INFORM SOMOZA ABOUT ARMS CACHE, COS FEELS THAT SOMOZA SHOULD BE INFORMED IF

SECRET

PAGE 4 MANAGUA 6844 S E C R E T ~~SECRET~~

HQS DECISION IS THAT ARMS SHOULD BE RECOVERED. SOMOZA COULD BE TOLD THAT "SOME EQUIPMENT" LEFT BEHIND BY AMWORLD GROUP NOW STORED AT BLUFF AND LNHARP WISHES RECOVER. BELIEVE HE WOULD AGREE TO AIRCRAFT PICKUP AS PROPOSED ABOVE. IN STATION OPINION BLACK RECOVERY WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE TOO RISKY. STATION ALSO FEELS THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA LEST THEY FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

6. HQS PLEASE ADVISE BY CABLE.

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T 546453 EIA367 PAGE 01-01 IN 406400

TOR:0522382 NOV 74 SJOS 17826

S E C R E T 0521552 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 17826

TO: DIRECTOR,

REAM

1. ACCORDING LOCAL DEA REP, MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COSTA RICA DURING LAST WEEK OF OCTOBER. STAYED AT HOTEL COSTA RICA WHERE HE REGISTERED IN ALIAS. ARTIME REPORTEDLY MET WITH HIGH GOCR OFFICIALS INCLUDING HURILL-1, HUSTRAIGHT-1, AND HUGALLY-1, AND ALLEGEDLY TOLD LATTER HE SENT BY "HIGH OFFICIALS" OF NVIDEA TO ASSURE HUGALLY-1 USG POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAD NOT CHANGED. CHARGE UNAWARE ANY CURRENT CONTACT BETWEEN ARTIME AND NVIDEA OFFICIALS. HUFABRIC-2 VERIFIED ARTIME'S PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA.

2. FILE: 201- . E2 IMPDET

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
FIO (B)
[illegible]

201-267437
5 Nov. 74

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RECORD COPY

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
070029Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
618814

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE ~~[illegible]~~, C/OP-2, LSN/ID, AOPS

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0 IP FILES #

TO: SAN JOSE.

REAMY

REF: SAN JOSE 17828 (IN 406400 *)

1. DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME IN CURRENT CONTACT WITH ~~[illegible]~~ STATE AND CERTAIN HE NOT AUTHORIZED, OFFICIALLY OR UNOFFICIALLY, TO SPEAK on State ~~[illegible]~~ BBOBEHALF. IF HUGALLY-1 RAISES QUESTION, SUGGEST COS RECOMMEND HE CHECK WITH CHARGE.

2. AS STATION AWARE, BKHERALD HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH ARTIME SINCE 1967.

3. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: *MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COSTA RICA AND ASSURED LEADERS ON BBEHALF STATE DEPARTMENT THAT USG POLICY TOWARD CUBA HAS NOT CHANGED.

201-267437
7 Nov 74

DATE: 6 NOVEMBER 1974
ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM:BH BG
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1940/7163

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

LA/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAM
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T 458655 EIA012 PAGE 01 IN 375452

TOR:011645Z OCT 74 MANA 11399

S E C R E T 011445Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11399

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

HYEPOCK

REF PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN 374491)

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS LONG TIME BUSINESS ASSOCIATE NICARAGUAN LEADER ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE IN CATTLE AND SUPPLY (UNIFORMS) FOR NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD. THERE IS NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE ARTIME INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MILITARY/REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. ALSO NO INDICATION GON ENGAGING IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST PANAMA. DEFER HQS FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT, BUT WISH POINT OUT ARTIME IS FAVORITE TARGET FOR REVOLUTIONARY ALLEGATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. FILE: 201- . E2 IMPDET

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201-267437

1 Oct 74

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T 456114 EIA591 PAGE 01-01 IN 374491

TOR:3021092 SEP 74 PACY 30061

S E C R E T 3019522 SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 30061

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCH

1. HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) REQUESTS ANY INFO INDICATING THAT MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS CONNECTED WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. ~~72 Ø687411~~ HYGRUFF-1 "KNOWS" ARTIME IS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH GOVT OF NICARAGUA AND TRAVELS TO COSTA RICA WHERE HE CONNECTED WITH "MOVIMIENTOS SUBVERSIVOS EN CONTRA DE PANAMA (SIC)."

2. ARTIME 201- . . . E2 IMPDET

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201-267437
31 Aug 74

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 032044Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 603748

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TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.Y

HYEPOCHY

REF: PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN-374491*)Y

1. HQS HAS NO INFO IMPLICATING SUBJECT IN PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN IMPORTING MEAT FROM NICARAGUA AND HAS BUSINESS FEELERS AND CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. OWING TO HIS FORMER PROMINENCE, HE IS OFTEN CONSULTED BY LEADERS AND WOULD-BE LEADERS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS INTELLIGENCE, SOPHISTICATION, AND BUSINESS ACUMEN, IT IS BELIEVED UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD GET ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS.Y

2. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.d

WH COMMENT: *HYGRUFF-1 HAS REQUESTED INFO RE SUBJECTS CONNECTION WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PANAMA.

CS.

TRAVEL PROGRAM

201-267437
3 Oct 74

DATE: 3 OCT 74
ORIG: ROBERT Y. SHAW:HLL
UNIT: C/LA/PLANS
EXT: 1196

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

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T 458655 E1A012 PAGE 01 IN 375452

TOR:011049Z OCT 74 MANA 11399

S E C R E T 011445Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 11399

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

MVEPCCK

REF PANAMA CITY 30861 (IN 374491)

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS LONG TIME BUSINESS ASSOCIATE NICARAGUAN LEADER ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE IN CATTLE AND SUPPLY (UNIFORMS) FOR NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD. THERE IS/NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE ARTIME INVOLVEMENT IN ANY MILITARY/REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. ALSO NO INDICATION GON ENGAGING IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST PANAMA. DEFER HQS/FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT, BUT WISH POINT OUT ARTIME IS FAVORITE TARGET FOR REVOLUTIONARY/ALLEGATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. FILE: 201- E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
032044Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.Y

HYEPOCHY

REF: PANAMA CITY 30061 (IN-374491*)Y

1. HQS HAS NO INFO IMPLICATING SUBJECT IN PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. HE IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN IMPORTING MEAT FROM NICARAGUA AND HAS BUSINESS FEELERS AND CUBAN EXILE CONTACTS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. OWING TO HIS FORMER PROMINENCE, HE IS OFTEN CONSULTED BY LEADERS AND WOULD-BE LEADERS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, GIVEN HIS INTELLIGENCE, SOPHISTICATION, AND BUSINESS ACUMEN, IT IS BELIEVED UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD GET ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN REVOLUTIONARY PLANS.Y

2. FILE: 201-0267437. E2 IMPDET.H

WH COMMENT: *HYGRUFF-1 HAS REQUESTED INFO RE SUBJECTS CONNECTION WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PANAMA.

DATE: 3 OCT 74
ORIG: ROBERT T. SHAW:MLL
UNIT: C/LA/PLANS
EXT: 1196

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul A.
AC/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 456114 EIA591 PAGF 01-01 IN 374491

TOR:3021092 SEP 74 PACY 38061

S E C R E T 3019522 SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 38061

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, MANAGUA.

HYEPOCH

1. HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) REQUESTS ANY INFO INDICATING THAT MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IS CONNECTED WITH MOVEMENTS PLOTTING AGAINST GOVT OF PANAMA. [illegible] HYGRUFF-1 "KNOWS" ARTIME IS CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH GOVT OF NICARAGUA AND TRAVELS TO COSTA RICA WHERE HE CONNECTED WITH "MOVIMIENTOS SUBVERSIVOS EN CONTRA DE PANAMA (SIC)."

2. ARTIME 201- . . E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE 17

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CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, C/OP2, PS/E64

062211Z DIRECTOR 555934

DISSEM BY: 35

PER ___ # ___

TO: LIMA INFO WH/MIAMI.

KMSTONE

REF: LIMA 28090 (IN 268135*)

1. DUSKIRT-2 SHOULD ADDRESS LETTER TO SUBJECT PARAS 1-2 OF REF AS FOLLOWS:

DR. M. A. BUESA
1270 N.E. 85TH ST.
MIAMI, FLA 33138

STATION SHOULD INFORM D-2 THAT BKHERALD HAS NO CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT. CONSEQUENTLY, D-2 SHOULD NOT IMPLY TO SUBJECT THAT BKHERALD WAS SOURCE ADDRESS. WOULD PREFER D-2 MAIL LETTER FROM PERU HIMSELF RATHER THAN HAVE STATION POUCH TO MIAMI.

2. HQS STRONGLY RECOMMENDS AGAINST D-2 GOING TO CUBAN EMB AND REQUESTING RENEWAL PASSPORT. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH WELL-KNOWN ANTI-CASTRO TYPES AS D-2 APPROACHING CUBAN EMB WITH SIMILAR REQUEST.

3. FILE 201-754738, X-REF 201-267437. E2 IMPDET.

* REQUESTED HQS PROVIDE ADDRESS OF FORMER AGENT AMBIDDY-1 AND COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY D-2 APPROACHING CUBAN EMB WITH PASSPORT RENEWAL REQUEST.

DATE: 6 JUNE 1974
ORIG: JUAN VALADEZ
UNIT: WH/3/P
EXT: 1222

C/WH/PLANS ROBERT T. SHAW (IN DRAFT)

DC/WH/COG JOSEPH SKURA (IN DRAFT)

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T 945167 PAGE 01 IN 198954

TOR:120206Z MAR 74 MEXI 27099

~~SECRE~~T 120047Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 27099

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT KMSTONE KDALCOHOL

REF HMMA-44014

1. DURING RECENT KDALCOHOL-1 (K-1) MEETING WITH SLOTH-21, LATTER PUSHED HIM HARD RE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE TASKS. SLOTH-21 TOLD HIM THAT "HAVANA" HAD COMMENDED HIS REPORTING TO DATE ON EXILES (ESSENTIALLY OVERT BIO AND BACKGROUND INFO AND CONTRIVED SPECULATION BY K-1 CONCERNING EXILE INTENTIONS). FOLLOWING ITEMS ON EXILES REPORTED TO STATION BY K-1 SEEM OF PARTICULAR INTEREST:

A. DURING DECEMBER VISIT MIAMI, K-1 MET WITH MANUEL FRANCIS ARTIME BUESA (201-0267437). ARTIME ASKED K-1 LOOK OUT FOR MEAT EXPORT/IMPORT OPPORTUNITIES IN MEXICO. ARTIME ALSO TOLD K-1 THAT FROM TIME TO TIME HE MIGHT SEND K-1 (FROM A MIAMI P.O. BOX) LETTERS TO BE SMUGGLED INTO CUBA VIA ANY OF K-1'S FRIENDS TRAVELING THERE FROM MEXICO. K-1 TOLD THIS TO SLOTH-21 WHO BECAME VERY EXCITED ABOUT THE MATTER. SLOTH-21 INSTRUCTED K-1 TO ALERT HIM IF ANY LETTERS ARRIVE (NONE HAVE SO FAR). ACCORDING TO SLOTH-21, LETTERS OF THIS SORT ARE MONITORED BY CUBAN SECURITY

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INTO 201-0267437

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED [redacted] [redacted]

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T 945167 PAGE 02 IN 190954

TOR:1232062 MAR 74 MEXI 27099

OFFICIALS WHO THEN SURVEIL THE RECIPIENTS. THIS MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR VNTOGA-TYPE OP INTENDED BURN IMPORTANT CUBAN OFFICIAL. RISK TO K-1 WOULD BE MINIMAL SINCE HE WOULD MERELY BE INTERMEDIARY FOR LETTER OSTENISBLY COMING FROM ARTIME OR SOME OTHER EXILE LEADER.

B. SLOTH-21 TOLD K-1 DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE BACKGROUND INFO ON JOSE IGNACIO RASCO BERMUDEZ (201-0274330), CUBAN EXILE RESIDING IN MIAMI. WHILE SLOTH-21 DID NOT REVEAL REASON FOR CUBAN INTEREST IN RASCO, BASED ON K-1'S KNOWLEDGE OF RASCO AND SLOTH-21'S MANNER, K-1 BELIEVES THAT RASCO ATTEMPTING DIALOGUE WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT. K-1 KNOWS RASCO ONLY SLIGHTLY, BUT KNOWS HIS BROTHER, RAMON, WELL. K-1 AND RAMON RASCO WERE ASSOCIATED WITH A CREDIT UNION IN MIAMI SOME YEARS AGO. K-1 MET RAMON BY CHANCE WHILE IN MIAMI IN DECEMBER. K-1 KNOWS JOSE RASCO AS LEADER IN DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN MIAMI. STATION CARD ON JOSE RASCO LISTS HIM AS PRESIDENT OF "MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO DE CUBA" AS OF AUGUST 1960. CARD ALSO INDICATES THAT "GOBERNACION" HAS A CLASSIFIED FILE ON JOSE RASCO.

C. SLOTH-21 INSTRUCTED K-1 TO COPY FROM FILES OF DR. JOSE MARIA CRUCET BERNAL, CUBAN EXILE ORTHODONTIST WITH

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T 945167 PAGE 03 IN 198954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27899

WHOM K-1 IS ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONALLY, NAMES AND BIO DATA ON ALL CUBAN EXILES. SLOTH-21 SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS REFERRING PEOPLE TO DR. CRUCET.

D. SLOTH-21 HAS INSTRUCTED K-1 TO INFILTRATE AND BECOME INDISPENSABLE TO THE "CIRCULO CUBANO DE MEXICO." SLOTH-21 SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR THE IDENTITY OF THE "CIRCULO" OFFICIAL WHO CONTROLS THE CLUB'S MAILING LIST AND DISTRIBUTES PROPAGANDA TO EXILES. SLOTH-21 HOPEFUL THAT ONCE K-1 REACHES A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE CLUB THAT HE CAN SERVE AS SPOTTER AND ARRANGE FOR FILM SHOWINGS WITH FILMS PROVIDED BY SLOTH-21. INTERESTINGLY, WHEN K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE (K-1) MIGHT MAKE A SHORT SPEECH AT THE CLUB DURING MAY 1974 CUBAN INDEPENDENCE CEREMONIES, SLOTH-21 CAUTIONED HIM AGAINST SAYING ANYTHING CRITICAL OF CASTRO REGIME. ALSO OF INTEREST IS FACT SLOTH-21 DECLINED REIMBURSE K-1 FOR "CIRCULO" ENTRANCE FEES. SLOTH-21 INSISTED THAT IF K-1 BELIEVES IN "THE REVOLUTION" HE WILL ADD THE COST OF FEE ONTO THE BILL OF ONE OF HIS CAPITALIST PATIENTS.

EM BASED ON REPORT TO SLOTH-21 THAT K-1'S FRIEND AND FELLOW "NUEVA GENERACION" MEMBER, RAFAEL ANGEL QUEVEDO, PLANS VISIT MEXICO AND HOPES SETTLE HERE. SLOTH-21 ASKED

~~SECRE~~T

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ISSUING OFFICE IS [illegible]

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.
ACTION #		

STAFF

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 945167 PAGE 04 IN 198954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27099

IF K-1 COULD GET QUEVEDO TO COOPERATE WITH CUBAN GOVERNMENT AS K-1 IS DOING. K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY. (ACTUALLY, K-1 IS ALMOST CERTAIN QUEVEDO, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS ANTI-CASTRO AND ANTI-COMMUNIST, WOULD "COOPERATE" WITH CUBANS ONLY IF HE WERE RECRUITED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT.)

2. IN ORDER INSPIRE K-1 IN HIS OVERT ROLE, SLOTH-21 TOLD HIM STORY ABOUT TONY SANTIAGO, CUBAN MILITARY COMMANDER WHO PRETENDED TO WORK FOR BKHERALD AND WAS VIEWED BY CUBANS AS A TRAITOR UNTIL THE STORY OF HIS DOUBLE AGENT ROLE CAME TO LIGHT AFTER HIS DEATH "AT HANDS OF BKHERALD." PRESUME THIS STORY KNOWN TO ADDRESSEES.

3. SLOTH-21 TOLD K-1 THAT "HAVANA" WANTED HIM AVAILABLE FOR BRIEF ASSIGNMENT TO CARACAS IN JULY OR AUGUST 1974. HE IS TO TAKE HIS WIFE TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE IS ON HOLIDAY. K-1 TOLD SLOTH-21 THAT HE COULD MAKE THE TRIP IF HE HAD SUFFICIENT ADVANCE NOTICE AND KNEW EXACTLY WHAT IS EXPECTED OF HIM. K-1 HAS INVITATION FROM CLAT OFFICIALS EMILIO MASPERO AND EDUARDO GARCIA TO VISIT CARACAS NEXT SUMMER, SO HE COULD COVER BOTH MATTERS DURING ONE TRIP. K-1 WILL MAKE TRIP ONLY IF WE CONCUR AND ONLY IF HE IS CERTAIN THAT RISK IS MINIMAL. IT WOULD APPEAR SLIME PLANS USE HIM AS COURIER OF SOME SORT.

S E C R E T

14-00000

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

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ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 945167 PAGE 05-05 IN 190954

TOR:1202062 MAR 74 MEXI 27899

4. SLOTH-21 CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT K-1 AGREE TO SPOT, CULTIVATE AND ASSESS SOMEONE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY AS A POSSIBLE PENETRATION AGENT. SLOTH-21'S GUIDANCE HAS RANGED FROM AMERICAN SECRETARY TO A CONSUL OR VICE CONSUL TO A MEXICAN EMPLOYEE. AS INSTRUCTED BY US, K-1 HAS RESISTED TASK ON BASIS HIS OSTENSIBLE FEAR THAT BECAUSE OF HIS DISSIDENT/LEFTIST LABOR BACKGROUND, U.S. EMBASSY COULD HAVE HIM EXPELLED FROM MEXICO. SLOTH-21 REFUSES ACCEPT THE EXCUSE AND INSISTS THAT HE (SLOTH-21) IS ON THE HOOK TO PENETRATE THE U.S. EMBASSY. SENDING SEPARATE CABLE ON THIS MATTER.

5. PRIORITY (A-7-6).

6. FILE: 201-0908954, 201-0910353, 201-0267437, 201-0274330. E2, IMPDET.

~~SECRET~~

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 27 PER   TOTAL COPIES 17   ~~SECRET~~   2-Y   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED   AT

ACTION UNIT WH 8

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR [illegible]

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 912962   PAGE 01-01   IN 178948

TOR:271559Z FEB 74   QUIT 19673

S E C R E T 271422Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 19673

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GUAYAQUIL.

REF: HEQM-6869, 13 FEBRUARY 74

1. ACCESS DEVELOPED BY AMBIDY-1 IN BRIEF STAY QUITO IMPRESSIVE. INFORMATION OBTAINED REGARDING PERU MAY SOUND HYSTERICAL, BUT THERE LITTLE DOUBT IT ACCURATELY REFLECTS MOOD OF ECUADOREAN MILITARY DURING PERUVIAN "CRISIS." INFORMATION ABOUT JARRIN TRIP TO CHILE NEW AND OF INTEREST.

2. SINCE AMBIDY-1 OBTAINED ACCESS THROUGH JORGE DIAZ MOLINA, STATION INTERESTED IN CONTACT WITH DIAZ. COULD AMBIDY-1 PROVIDE DIAZ' ADDRESS AND PHONE AND LETTER ADDRESSED TO DIAZ REFERRING TO BEARER AS PERSON OF CONFIDENCE, ETC., IN WHOM DIAZ CAN CONFIDE? NO STATION TRACES DIAZ. REQUEST HQS TRACES AND COMMENTS.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
FOR FILING

3. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

AMBIDDY-201-1.

201-267437

27 Feb 74

~~SECRET~~

RECORD COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Quito

INFO

Chief of Base, Guayaquil

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

C Transmittal of Contact Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for your information only is the account of a meeting between a Headquarters officer and former agent AMBIDY-1 (IDEN). If Station or Base has any interest, AMBIDY-1 can be recontacted for clarification or follow-up questions.

Nina T. MARGANDE

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Quito w/att
- 2 - COB, Guayaquil w/att

Attachments:
1. AMBIDY-1 report h/w
2. IDEN u/s/c

RECORD COPY

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 032693

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HBQW-6069

DATE: 13 February 1974

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201 - 267437

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/E	Barbara Graham	hw	1034

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/E	14 Feb	Dorothy Siegle
WH/PLANS	15 Feb	WWshaw

Distribution:
- 1 - IP
- 1 - Chrono
- 1 - WH/Plans

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S

per

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

20 November 1973

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Eduardo SUAREZ-Rivas y Morales

Eduardo SUAREZ-Rivas Morales, born 8 January 1935, is a Cuban national and a son of former Cuban ex-Senator Eduardo SUAREZ Rivas. SUAREZ was arrested for counterrevolutionary activities in Cuba in the early 1960's and was released from prison and allowed to come to exile in the U. S. in 1962 with return of the ransomed 2506 Brigade members. He was involved in public relations for Manuel Artime's exile group, the Revolutionary Recovery Movement, in the mid-sixties. He did not work for CIA, and there is no record of any attempt by CIA to recruit him.

201-267437

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DC/WH	2 NOV 73	WF
2			
3	AC/WH/COG		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Per conversation

No 3: Arrange conversation with Bill Strubitz. Let me know when its done.

WF

3741

(OVER)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EA/DDO	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)

4 NOV

CONTACTED Boss Shaw AT Senior Seminar He will come to HQS on Monday - 5 NOV

5 NOV

PER AGREEMENT WITH DC/WHD, Boss will drop FR TIME a note and contact him in Miami weekend 10 NOV 73 to convey thanks.

261-267437

DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip

Executive Registry
73-6531

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI			12	D/PPB		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI			14	ASST/DCI		
(5)	DDO	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC			17			
8	D/ONE			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

2 NOV 1973

SUSPENSE ____________
Date

Remarks: Do we have a discreet way to say (sincerely): "Thanks but no thanks"?

11/1/73
DCI/DDCI

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE Y-1

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 26 Oct. 73

ACTION: DCI

INFO: UR. file

ROUTING		
1		4
2		5
3		6

IN 068229

OCT 26 6 15 AM '73

[redacted]

PAID

WUA012 WAF009(0354)(1-001231C299006)PD 10/26/73 0349

55103

ICS IPMMZFA MIA

01116 NL MIAMI FL 100 10-25 652P EDT

PMS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN MISTER COLBY

WASHINGTON DC

M

AT THIS MOMENT OF EVERGENCY MY MEN AND MYSELF ARE READY TO SERVE USA

MANUEL ARTIME BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER

1270 NE 89TH ST MIAMI FL 33138

616A EDT OCT 26 73

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 26 Oct. 73

ACTION: DCI

INFO: VR. file

ROUTING		
1		4
2		5
3		6

IN. 068229

OCT 26 6 15 AM '73

[redacted]

PAID

WUA012 WAF009(0354)(1-001231C299006)PD 10/26/73 0349

55103

ICS IPMMZFA MIA

01116 NL MIAMI FL 100 10-25 652P EDT

PMS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN MISTER COLBY

WASHINGTON DC

AT THIS MOMENT OF EMERGENCY MY MEN AND MYSELF ARE READY TO SERVE USA

MANUEL ARTIME BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER

1270 NE 35TH ST MIAMI FL 33138

616A EDT OCT 26 73

File. ARTIME 201-267437

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

20 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John D. Morrison, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel

SUBJECT : Oscar VILA et al

REFERENCE : OGC Request dated 15 August 1973

1. The following information on the individuals mentioned in Reference for the period 1961-1966 who were involved with this Agency is provided herewith:

Manuel Francisco ARTIME Buesa conducted operations against Cuba under the political banner of his exile group, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). From June 1963 to April 1965 this Agency supported ARTIME's operations against the Castro regime. This support was terminated on 1 May 1965; support for some operations was resumed in June 1965 at a much more modest rate. This support was gradually reduced and finally terminated in December 1966. The formal Agency relationship with ARTIME was severed in January 1967. ARTIME"S Deputy in the MRR was Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia and the MRR Treasurer was Sixto R. MESA-Aloma. Oscar Jesus VILA Mascot was an MRR trainee and was not in the line of command for the MRR. Edgar SOPO was involved in various MRR operations. Maritima Bam was utilized as a cover for the MRR.

2. A comprehensive file search failed to reveal that Oscar VILA had any access to the MRR funds or that he was involved with Maritima Bam. The following biographic data was extracted from the available files which is pertinent to the individuals mentioned in Paragraph One; above:

a. Oscar Jesus VILA Masot (201-291749)

AKA Oscar Luis VILA and Osca J. VILA

DPOB: 8 November 1940, Batabano, Havana, Cuba

SECRET

201-247437

E2 IMPDET CL 054555

~~SECRET~~

Father: Oscar J. VILA; DPOB: 28 January 1915
Havana, Cuba

Mother: Zeida MASOT; DPOB: 19 December 1917
Batabano, Cuba

Wife : Vivian VICTORERO Villegas; DPOB:
28 May 1945, Cuba
Married 15 April 1963, Miami, Florida

CIA Affiliation: Trainee for the MRR in 1961. Member of Airborne Unit of the 2506 Brigade. Missing in action and then appeared on prisoner exchange list as A 13-311-637 in December 1962.

b. **Sixto R. MESA-Aloma (201-0727405, AMWORLD-2)**

DPOB: 20 May 1908, Ranchuelo, Las Villas, Cuba

Wife : Iraida GONZALEZ

Mistress: Blanca ACOSTA

CIA Affiliation: MRR operations.

Occupation: 1963, Treasurer and major stockholder of Laboratorios Gravi de Puerto Rico & Industrias Proben de Puerto Rico.

c. **Manuel Francisco ARTIME Buesa (201-267437)**

DPOB: 29 January 1932, Camaguey, Cuba

Occupation: Presently involved in the export of meat from Central America.

Background: ARTIME was an INRA official in the Castro regime in 1959 but broke with it in late 1959 or early 1960 over a Communist issue and was exfiltrated to the United States. He was the political representative for Brigade 2506 and was captured during the Bay of Pigs. He was sentenced to be executed but this was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 ARTIME was released as part of a prisoner exchange.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

d. Rafael Aurelio Cipriano QUINTERO-Ibarbia (201-281270)

DPOB: 16 September 1940, Camaguey, Cuba

Father: Fernando QUINTERO

Mother: Juana Maria IBARBIA

Brother: Rafael A. QUINTERO

Occupation: Presently registered with ISR as working for the Department of Navy.

CIA Affiliation: Deputy to ARTIME in the MRR.

e. Edgar SOPO-Granda (201-283205)

DPOB: 26 July 1939, Guantanamo, Cuba

Mother: Josefa SOPO

Wife : Alina Elena CORSA Farray

Occupation: Radio Announcer and Salesman

CIA Affiliation: Propaganda officer for the MRR.

3. The two individuals who had access to funds belonging to this Agency; and who would have had the opportunity of diverting these funds to their personal accounts, were Manuel ARTIME and Sixto MESA. There had been allegations that Agency monies were misused and appropriate investigations were conducted but no evidence was found that this had happened.

Orville Bathe
C/WH/COG

Originator: Vivian A. Barry
WH/C/OS

SECRET

25 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime

1. Artime was an INRA official in the Castro regime in 1959 but broke with it in late 1959 or early 1960 over a communist issue and was exfiltrated by CIA. He was the political representative for Brigade 2506 and was captured during the Bay of Pigs. He was sentenced to be executed but this was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artime was released to the U.S. as part of a prisoner exchange.

2. From June 1963 through April 1965 Artime conducted paramilitary operations (Project AMWORLD) against Cuba under the political banner of his exiled group, Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). The Project expenses during this period were approximately $7 million. The support was terminated effective 1 May 1965 but support for political operations was restored in June 1965 at the rate of $15,000 per month. This was scaled down to $5,000 a month in September 1965, to $3,000 a month in June 1966, and terminated on 31 December 1966. Artime accepted this termination gracefully in a meeting on 13 January 1967. That ended the formal operational relationship with Artime, although he maintained informal contact with CIA, most recently with Robert Shaw when Shaw was COS, Managua.

Orville Bathe
AC/WH/COG

E2 IMPDET
CLASSIFIED BY 054555

201-267437

SECRET

Artime 201

14-00000

2 25-1

~~SECRET~~

AGENCY MESSAGE

WH 8 MAN, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, C/FI

529 CI/OA, FI, IW

T :9896 PAGE 01-01 IN 987136

TOR:271626Z JUL 73 MADR 19984

S E C R E T 271623Z JUL 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 19984

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

AKULE REAM QUZONE

1. QUZONE/1 MET FOR ONE HOUR SESSION 18 JUL. HE ARRIVED AND DEPARTED SAME DAY BUT IN MID-AUGUST EXPECTS BE HERE FOR 5-6 DAYS AT WHICH TIME IN-DEPTH DEBRIEFING CURRENT REQUIREMENTS TO BE HELD. AT MEETING NEW CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND REQUIREMENTS REVIEWED IN DETAIL. POUCHING FULL REPORT.

2. FILE: 201-796318. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

QUZONE-1

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 16 Aug 78

TO: LSN/ISR

ROOM NO. 2E306

BUILDING

REMARKS:

please file in Artime 201

201-267437

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 30-4 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 7/23/73

TO: DC/WH/CCG

ROOM NO. | BUILDING

REMARKS

Joe O'Neil will transmit today by phone the attached info (as we discussed) to Jim Woolsey, General Counsel of the Senate Armed Force Committee in response to his questions on Osborne's 13 April 1973 memo re "Contribution to Watergate Prisoners Fund"

FROM

ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

file: Artime 201

23 July 73

Manuel Artime Buesa

DPOB: 29 Jan. 32, Camaguey, Cuba

INRA official who defected and exfiltrated by CIA in December 1959.

Secy. General Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR) -- [illegible]
One of leaders of Bay of Pigs - involved Anti-Castro movements.

Currently in meat importing into U.S. from Nicaragua (Partner is Somoza). Resides in Miami but travels frequently to Nicaragua.

23 July 73

[illegible]

[illegible] FYI [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] GROUP.

FYI: [illegible] Alberto BESU[illegible] [illegible], MARTINEZ [illegible] 31 AUG 72. [illegible] SOURCE.

Manuel ARTIME Buesa.

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM: FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER BU-5	EXTENSION	NO. ISRM 37484	DATE 18 JUN 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~TP/AIG~~ ~~HT-3~~				
2.				
3. ~~TP/201 SECTION~~ ~~DW-6~~				P-L-E-A-S-E
4.				E-X-P-E-D-I-T-E
5. IP/EDI GT-6			R	
6.				
7. FI/ISR BU-5				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE NO. 201- 267437
12.				DOCUMENT DATE 18 JUN 73
13.				
14.				ABSTRACT XXXX
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Based on: UFAA 4436, 2 Oct 1972
200-11-11/7

SECRET
when Filled In

RECORD COPY
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Lee Alder
FI/ISR
2-E-03. Ext. 5046

REQUEST FOR REGISTRATION

DATE SUBMITTED BY SIGN: 13 June 1973 WH/C/OS

NATIONAL FILE NUMBER: BNDD

X NEW: IA

RE-REGISTRATION

RE-CHECK

UTILIZATION

DATE RECEIVED IN ISR: 18 JUNE 1973

NAME ([illegible], First, Middle): ARTIME Buesa, Manuel

ALIASES [redacted] OR [redacted] G VARIATIONS

WH

[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH: 29 Jan 1932

PLACE OF BIRTH: Moron, Camaguey, Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: U.S. Resident Alien

RESIDENCE: Miami, Florida

PRESENT EMPLOYER: Half-Owner with Reinald Torrente of Norably Quality Meats Miami, Florida

OCCUPATION: Businessman

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA: Area of Activity is Caribbean and Central America

Send Field Cards to : 872, UFA, HMM

TRACE RESULTS

IP/INDEX REMARKS

Traces not necessary Station has a plethora of info.

NOTED JUN 20 1973

IP/EIB REMARKS

NAI to that already known to BNDD per Dolly Nickerson WH/NARC

jas 25 June 1973

JUN 19 4 08 PM '73

TO: WH/NARC & WH/C/OS

RESULTS

TO: DIA SOURCE AND DATA REGISTRY	ISRM NUMBER 37,484	DATE 3 JULY 1973	201 NUMBER 201-0267437

1. No information in addition that already known to requestor.

2. ISR has no record of current operational interest in Subject who is hereby registered in ISR to BNDD, Miami.

20 JUN 1973

EVB

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by 002216
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

FORM 11-73 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING X
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
[redacted]/PLEHABYSS/Transmittal of Memos to LNYAPA and LKAGON with Traces on Their Narcotics Sources

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Refs: A. UFAA-4415
B. UFAA-4436

References forwarded the names of LNYAPA and LKAGON sources to Headquarters with a request for registration and traces. Although references were carded (as drug sources), there is some additional information from the SLIGOS in the attached memos which was not included in references. Therefore, you may want to re-index this information to the memos.

Paula A. HOOTNICK

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-267437

Attachments:
1. CAS/C-038, herewith
2. CAS/D-039, herewith

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/atts 1 & 2 herewith

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #518 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[redacted]

RECORD COPY FILED IN 201-294213

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-4479	25 October 1972
	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ DESENSITIZED	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-294213

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 10 1973
MICROFILMED

04479

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 10 1973
MICROFILMED

19 October 1972

3P

LNAgin

TO : Miami

FROM : CAS, Miami

SUBJECT: Traces on Sources of Information on Drugs

1. The following information has been extracted from our files on the 7 persons mentioned below who are narcotic sources of your office. Additional information on them will be forwarded to you as it becomes known to us.

201-294213

AKA A. Bernardo G. de TORRES Alvarez: Also known as Bernardo GONZALEZ de Torres Alvarez. TORRES entered the U.S. in January 1955, and began to play professional baseball. He gave up his studies in civil engineering (he began this career in 1948), and he obtained work with the Ford Motor Co. in Michigan and with the Aldor Co., Inc., for whom he installed garage doors that they manufactured. He went to Cuba in January 1959 to attempt to exfiltrate his father. Although he was unable to do so at that time, due to his father's illness, his father came out himself later. Subject stayed in Havana and worked against the CASTRO regime until November 1959, when he returned to the U.S. After his arrival he took a course given by the Miami Police Department for private detectives, and obtained a certificate allowing him to practice as a detective, which he did for the C.de Torres Detective Firm (C. de Torres is probably his brother, Carlos de Torres). He made two trips to Cuba in early 1960 to discuss shipments of arms to Anti-Castro forces. Torres became the Chief of Intelligence of Brigade 2506. He was captured on 17 April 1961 at Playa Giron, Cuba, and was ransomed for $50,000, after which he was returned to the U.S. on a Pan American charter flight landing at Homestead Air Force Base on 24 December 1962. He later became the Assistant Secretary for Military Affairs and the Chief of Intelligence of the Association of Bay of Pigs veterans. His brother Carlos was the liaison between the Intelligence Department of the Association and the [illegible] and provided the necessary means to guide Subject in his position. Carlos provided information on all matters of

MICROFILMED
RECORD COPY

201-294213
~~200-11-4/7~~

importance to the [illegible]. Subject was involved in the investigation carried out by District Attorney of New Orleans James Garrison on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. About the time that Subject was involved in this investigation, it was said of him that he liked to boast about his influence and contacts. Information from March 19[illegible] indicates that Subject was engaged in narcotics trafficking along with his brother, Carlos, and Roberto VEGA (in Puerto Rico), Ernesto VENERO (Brigade 2506 member); Raul LEAL (in Dominican Republic. He is a steady gambling dealer in Las Vegas clubs); Juan GARCIA (fisherman); (fnu)CUSA, engineer of the fishing boat "El Viejo Comus"); Ramon DONESTEVEZ (appears as a revolutionary to cover his illegal activities); Aton CONSTANZO and his brother Abelino CONSTANZO; and Julian VALDEZ Villa (aka "Nogrete").

Subject is presently living with his second wife (he had 2 daughters and a son by his first wife) at 2700 S.W. 23rd Terrace, Apt. 403, Miami. In early 1973, he was visited by suspicious looking persons who often parked their cars at some distance and tried to enter and leave the building without being seen. One young man, a Vietnam veteran, did not enter Subject's apartment but took a hidden key to open Subject's car trunk and place there a package he had brought. Subject has a heart condition. Those visits have stopped since early spring 1973.

FR/201-0267437

B. Manuel ARTIME. Subject's anti-Castro activities are well known, as is his general prominence in the Cuban exile community in Miami. Therefore, extensive traces on him are not being included since much of the information is surely already available to you.

FR ✓201-0289549

C. Reinaldo TORRENTE: The only information we have on hand is that Subject was a member of Brigade 2506. More information on him is expected from our headquarters, and will be forwarded upon receipt.

FR/201-0285923

D. Ricardo MORALES Navarrete: Subject was a member of the G-2 in Cuba, and was stationed at Boyeros Airport prior to 31 December 1958. He killed G-2 chief at Boyeros, Rolando MATOS Boson. He joined the Rebel Army on 10 December 1959, and deserted on 28 August 1960. He took asylum in the Brasilian Embassy. Subject was considered suspect G-2 when he arrived in the U.S., because of his past affiliation with the G-2. On his arrival, however, he did give an interview to "Bohemia Libre" magazine on his G-2 past. It was understood, when he arrived, that he intended to penetrate the recruitment office of the FRD (Bay of Pigs), however, he did not do this. He worked at the Hotel Sevilla, Miami, after his arrival. About that time, he was always accompanied by one Manolito RODRIGUEZ. Subject became a member of the Cuban Liberation Army (Ejercito Libertador de Cuba), and had the responsibility of fund raising among the exile Cuban population. Subject also was believed to be a member of the group Cuban Power but he was only related to the leader of that group, whose surname is also MORALES Navarrette. Subject was a confident of Manuel ARTIME, and may still be one. In March 1968, Subject was arrested and charged with involvement in a terrorist attempt in Miami.

201-935[illegible]

E. We have ~~no traces~~ on Miguel O. MERCADO Orenas.

XD NO 201 [illegible]

F. Carlos M. MENCHACA Verdaguer. Subject was suspected of being a G-2 informant in Miami in late 1962. One report from October 1963 said he was (in the past) G-2 but "now" considered to be anti-Castro. He was described as "very talkative", but the same source does not believe him to be G-2. He was in the lumber business in Cuba; in 1962 was selling used cars in Miami; and 1963, he was a piano refinisher.

[illegible]

1/[illegible], Miami

Originator: HOGTNICK

2-CAS/M Chrono
2-Hqs
1-JMFALCON Liaison Chrono

1972 NOV -1 PM 4 23

010130

201-294213

~~SECRET~~

21 November 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa has been a close friend of mine since we first met in Nicaragua in late 1966 or early 1967. It was as a result of Artime's revelations at that time that we recovered several tons of AMWORLD arms and munitions which had been secretly buried at El Bluff. I last saw Artime in Tegucigalpa in July or the first days of August 1972.

2. Artime's business activity has narrowed down pretty much to exporting meat from Central America and arranging its importation into the United States at Miami. His principal partner abroad is General Anastasio Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua. I am not sure with whom he deals in the U.S. although he has mentioned on a couple of occasions a business connection with Edgard Buttarri (not sure of this spelling) who, in turn, is supposed to be tied in with "Bebe" Rebozo. I have also heard Artime mention the "United States Meat Company" or the "American Meat Company" (not sure which) as an importer of his Nicaraguan meats.

3. Artime was quite active during the past year trying to get a meat export business going in Honduras. Acting in concert with Somoza, and using to some extent the Honduran connections of Teofilo Omar Rabun Franco (another close friend of mine), Artime was attempting to refurbish an idle meat packing facility at Puerto Arturo on the north coast of Honduras near Tela. The principal motivating force in this Honduran venture was to have been General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano. After repeated attempts to get the business rolling, Artime threw up his hands in disgust about July 1972 owing to Lopez' failure to carry through on the Honduran end. Artime told me that Lopez was "crazy" and "abnormal" (Artime is a psychiatrist) and that

E2, IMPDET
CL BY 539700

SECRET

Artime 201

Artime - Edgard BUTTARRI
lontime friend
of Howard Hunt (Watergate)

he was going to advise his associates in Nicaragua and the Miami area to forget about doing business in Honduras.

4. Artime lives in Miami and commutes often to Managua, always flying on Lanica Airlines (owned by Somoza). When in Managua he usually stays at the home of Jose Fernandez de la Torre (still another close friend of mine).

5. Artime said he would keep me supplied with Nicaraguan steaks during our stay in the U.S. and made me promise to get in touch with him after we got settled in. I have not yet done so. If you wish, using this pretext I can contact him and elicit more up-to-date information on his commercial activities.

6. It might also be added that Artime is a long-time friend of Howard Hunt.

Robert T. Shaw
Chief, WH/2

ORIG: DRAKE S. REID
UNIT: C/WH/2/CN
EXT: 1454-4489
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

~~SECRET~~

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CONF: FILE VR.

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO MANAGUA INFO WH/MIAMI

342468

RYBAT

REF: MANAGUA 18366 (IN-766052)

1. NO ADDITIONAL INFO NEEDED AT THIS TIME. WILL ADVISE IF FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

2. NC FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref provided info on commercial activities Manuel ARTIME and offered obtain additional details from local Cuban contacts including AMPAN-3.

WH/2/CN

AC/WH/COG

~~[illegible]~~
267437

28 NOV 1972

CS COPY

201-267437

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

ROBERT T. SHAW
C/WH/2

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 234513

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FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

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S E C R E T 212015Z NOV 72 STAFF

768052

CITE MANAGUA 18366 MANA

DIRECTOR INFO ~~WH/MIAMI~~.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 339436

1. FOR AT LEAST TWO AND HALF YEARS ARTIME HAS BEEN INVOLVED MARKETING SOMOZA MEAT EXPORTS MIAMI. ALSO SUSPECT HE ACTS AS PURCHASING AGENT AND/OR GO-BETWEEN FOR OTHER SOMOZA PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE WHEN ERYTHROID-33 RECENTLY PURCHASED FIVE AUTOMOBILES MIAMI HE TELEPHONED ARTIME TO HELP EXPEDITE SALE. ARTIME VISITS GADOL AT LATTER'S OFFICE BUT CONVERSATIONS ALWAYS RESTRICTED GENERAL TOPICS. ARTIME HAS INDICATED HE HAS WITHDRAWN FROM WHATEVER ECONOMIC INTERESTS HE HAD COSTA RICA AND EITHER HAS OR IS TRYING DISPOSE OF BUSINESS HE ARRANGED HONDURAS IN COOPERATION WITH GENERAL LOPEZ.

2. ABOVE FRAGMENTARY AS GADOL HAS ATTEMPTED AVOID ARTIME. IF HQS DESIRES, MORE DETAILED INFO CAN BE OBTAINED FROM LOCAL CUBAN CONTACTS PRATICULARLY 201-272764.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

21 NOV 1972

201-267437

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437 200-011-011/08
SEX M DOB ? UFAA-04479A01
25 OCT 72
CIT ? P4
OCC ?
SUBJ ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES ARE WELL KNOWN
AS IS HIS GENERAL PROMINENCE IN THE CUBAN
EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI
INFO MUST NOT BE USED ON NAME TRACE W/OUT
CONSULTING FILE

R 7211100010

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 267437			

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(7-46)

D.S.R.

ORIG: DRAKE S. REID
UNIT: C/WH/2/CN
EXT: 1454-4489
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

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CONF: C/WH/5 INFO FILE VR. C/WH/COG [illegible] [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET [illegible] 72 23 51Z CITE DIRECTOR

TO MANAGUA INFO WH/MIAMI

342468

RYBAT

REF: MANAGUA 18366 (IN-766052)

1. NO ADDITIONAL INFO NEEDED AT THIS TIME. WILL ADVISE IF FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref provided info on commercial activities Manuel ARTIME and offered obtain additional details from local Cuban contacts including AMPAN-3.

AC/WH/COG ____________

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

ROBERT T. SHAW
C/WH/2

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 234513

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO. 432

S E C R E T 242025Z NOV 72 STAFF

768546

CITE WH/MIAMI 16460

WMIM

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA.

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 339436

1. ARTIME HAS HAD BUSINESSES IN NICARAGUA SINCE 1963 IN PARTNERSHIP WITH GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA. HE OWNS LARGE RICE, POULTRY AND LIVESTOCK FARMS AND EXPORTS FROZEN MEAT FROM NICARAGUA TO THE U.S. IN ADDITION, HE MAKES PURCHASES FOR NICARAGUAN ARMED FORCES AND REPRESENTS IN LATIN AMERICA COMPANY DEALING IN PHONOGRAPHS WITH TV SCREENS. ACCORDING TO CARDED INFO FROM LNAGON, HE IS HALF OWNER OF NORABLY QUALITY MEATS IN MIAMI ALONG WITH REINALDO TORRIENTE. IN JUNE 1972 HE WAS REPORTED AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH BERNARD L. BARKER AND AS HAVING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBAN EXILES LINKED TO REPUBLICAN PARTY.

2. HE HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED AS MAIN PARTNER IN VIZCAYA RESTAURANT IN MIAMI, WHICH IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT CENTER FOR DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTICS. AS OF 1969, COMMENTS INDICATED ARTIME, WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING

24 NOV 1972

201-267437

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 16460 SECRET

BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND U.S., HAD GOTTEN OUT OF THAT ILLEGAL BUSINESS BECAUSE SOMOZA HAD PRESSURED HIM TO DO SO. AS OF 1965, HE WAS REPORTEDLY OWNER OF PRINTING SHOP AND FACTORY IN MIAMI, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE STILL IS. IN 1964 HE WAS INVOLVED IN SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES IN COSTA RICA REPORTEDLY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH FRANCISCO J. ORLICH, BROTHER OF FORMER PRESIDENT OF COSTA RICA. 1

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

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SECRET

AWRENCE STERNFIELD
H/COG
451 R. 1948
20 NOVEMBER 1972

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20NOV72 20 59Z CITE DIRECTOR 330436

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

1. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MANUEL ARTIME FOR PAST FEW YEARS.

2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

201-267437

C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
WH/COG
7451 R. 1948
20 NOVEMBER 1972

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ____ PER ____ #____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2[illegible]72 23 59Z CITE DIRECTOR 339436

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

RYBAT

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2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FILE NO. 14-9-9 10

ORIG: R. REYNOLDS
UNIT: WH/4
EXT: 2060
DATE: 19 February 1960

TO: GUATEMALA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: S/C 2

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No CS Record Value Destroy
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ☒ No Index Required ☐
Signature J. Kr[illegible]

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FEB 19 23 57 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

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		ROUTINE	
☐	XX	PRIORITY	INITIALS
		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 25979
OUT 25979

TO GUAT INFO HAVA (ROUTINE). CITE DIR 15981 15931

RE GUAT 679 (IN 43695)

DIRECTORATE COMPOSED OF OSCAR ECHEVERRIA Y SALVAT, LAUREANO BATISTA, ROBERTO ORTIZ CRANE, ANGEL FERNANDEZ VARELA, MELCHOR GASTON. PRESIDENT OF MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO IS JOSE IGNACIO RASCO. MOVIMIENTO RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO HEADED BY ANGEL FERNANDEZ VARELA AND PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT IS ANGEL YARGO. SUBORDINATE MEMBERS INCLUDE MANUEL ARTIME AND ANTONIO MICHEL YABOR, BOTH IN MEXI, AND RICARDO DE LA TORRE IN MIAMI.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH Comment: Requested identities of AMPALM group.

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RI/TY	✓
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C. KING
C/WHD
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R. Reynolds
for J.D. ESTERLINE
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	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL /DR/
201-267437 037-009-005
SEX M DOB ? HMT -02413
12 MAR 71
CIT ?
OCC ?
TO REPRESENT JOINT BUSINESS VENTURE OF JORGE BUESO-ARIAS /201-880782/ AND OSWALDO LOPEZ-ARELLANO /201-183939/

R 7104050633

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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PROPER FILE NO.

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EXT. 4239

CF-437
GHQ
TUBE 077

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

25 JAN 1971

BIDDY-1 wants to see us

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JAN 25 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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4. AC/WH/CCG	26 JAN 1971		29 Jan	VL
5. Namenge	1 Feb 71			
6. Marshall		1 Feb 71		R
7. Albright		1 Feb 71		Ih
8. Dennis		2 Feb 71		
9.				
10.				
11.				
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16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 20 Jan 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFAA 02634

64120

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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DISP NO - UFAA-2634
FILE NO - 201-267437
DATE - 20 JANUARY 1971
MICROFILM - NO
INDEXING - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - OPERATIONAL/MEETING WITH YASUINAS
REFERENCE - DIRECTOR 108371 // John Burke

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. ON 18 JANUARY 1971 HENRY S. PACHANKIS MET WITH NIGEL P. YASUINAS. YASUINAS INFORMED PACHANKIS THAT HE HANDLES INSURANCE BUSINESS FOR AMBIDDY-1. 201- AMBIDDY-1. RECENTLY TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE WAS VISITED BY ARTURO MUGARRA [redacted] ✓(201-331665) SR (PROBABLY ARTURO ROLANDO MUGARRA Y PUPO) WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE JUST ARRIVED IN THE US AFTER ESCAPING FROM A GOVERNMENT OF CUBA (GOC) JAIL. AMBIDDY-1 ADDED THAT HE KNEW MUGARRA IN CUBA AND BELIEVES HIM TO BE CASTRO AGENT. HOWEVER, HE COULD OFFER NO EXPLANATION WHY HE BELIEVES THIS TO BE SO. YASUINAS TOLD PACHANKIS THAT THERE WAS NO HARASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1 AS STATED IN REFERENCE.

probably identical to Arturo Mugarra who visited Subject of 201-267437

2. MUGARRA SAID THAT HE BROUGHT OUT A MESSAGE FROM NICOLAS RIOS ✓NO-201 (PROBABLY NICOLAS RIOS AKA ✓NC-201 MIEPA) WHO PLANS TO TRAVEL FROM CUBA TO CHILE VIA SPAIN. RIOS WANTS TO SEE AMBIDDY-1. IN SPAIN. NO REAONS WERE GIVEN. AMBIDDY-1 DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO MAGARRA ABOUT MEETING WITH RIOS. AMBIDDY-1 GAVE YASUINAS NO FURTHER DATA ON THIS CASE.

Cit Cuba

wishes to make contact with Subject of 201-267437

4. Manuel Francis ARTIME Buesa

3. AMBIDDY-1 WISHES TO MAKE CONTACT AGAIN WITH

SECRET UFAA-2634 PAGE ONE CONTINUED

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D100-5-14

201-267437

SECRET UFAA-2634 PAGE TWO

JKLANCE REGARDING MEETING RIOS. HE TOLD YASUINAS THAT HE HAS NOT HAD CONTACT WITH ANY JKLANCER SINCE HE WAS IN NICARAGUE.

4. THE CIENFUEGOS MATTER REFERRED TO IN REFERENCE PERTAINED TO A REPORT RECEIVED BY YASUINAS "SOMETIME LAST YEAR" FROM MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS. SHE STATED THAT GOC WAS "BUILDING CAVES IN THE CIENFUEGOS AREA AND CAMOUFLAGING THEM WELL."

5. AT THIS JUNCTURE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMBIDDY-1/RIOS MEETING IS ENOUNG JUSTIFICATION FOR STATION CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1. HOWEVER, YASUINAS WAS GIVEN PO BOX BY PACHANKIS AND TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH HIM WHENEVER HE HAD ANYTHING OF IMPORTANCE.

MORRIS Z. GERVENOT

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S E C R E T UFAA2634 PAGE TWO

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DISP NO - UFAA-2634
FILE NO - 201-267437
DATE - 20 JANUARY 1971
MICROFILM - NO
INDEXING - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - OPERATIONAL/MEETING WITH YASUINAS
REFERENCE - DIRECTOR 100371

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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET UFAA-2634 PAGE TWO

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MORRIS Z. GERVENOT

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SECRET UFAA2634 PAGE TWO

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JOHN M. BU[illegible]KE:ghd
WH/COG/OPS
7144/1819
7 JAN 71

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SB PER ____ # ____

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CONF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/OPS, C/CI, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

0 JAN 71 21 29z

WH/MIAMI

CITE DIRECTOR 00371

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT.HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

201- 267437

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 7 JAN 71

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BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
35 PER ____ # ____

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08 JAN 71 21 29z

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI

RE DIR 100371

100372

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T 08 JAN 71 21 29z CITE DIRECTOR 00371

WH/MIAMI

1. FORMER JMWAVE CONTRACT AGENT NIGEL P. YASUINAS (IDEN FOLLOWS) CONTACTED HIS JMWAVE CASE OFFICER, NOW AT HQS, BY TELEPHONE ON 5 JAN AND REQUESTED THAT SOMEONE FROM WH/MIAMI CONTACT HIM. CLAIMED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHO WANTED TO GET MESSAGE TO JKLANCE ABOUT SOME FORM OF FOREIGN HARRASSMENT OF AMBIDDY-1. ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE SIGNIFICANT INFO ON CIENFUEGOS FROM REFUGEE SOURCE OR SOURCES WHO CONCEALED IT FROM JMOPAL SCREENERS.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

FILED

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WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

8 Jan 71

201-267437

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DATE: 7 JAN 71

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UFA
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0 RE DIR 100371 Iden

100372

1. IDEN IS RUBEN MARTINEZ, 17240 S. W. 89 COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33157. TELEPHONE 305-233-7894. EMPLOYED BY PROVIDENT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, MIAMI.

Cit Cuba

2. NO FILE. GP-1. AUSA, Florida, Miami

Claimed to be in contact with Subject of 201-267437

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

8 Jan 71
201-267437

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SECRET 242302Z OCT 69 CITE LIMA 5949

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MANAGUA

REF DIRECTOR 47568

24 Oct 69 IN 72959

WH/3/P

1. AT PRESENT NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON GENERAL LEIGH EITHER IN STATION FILES OR FILES OF ATTACHES. MILATT WILL ADVISE IF TURNS UP ANYTHING.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

24 Oct 69

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201-267437

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137 FI 2

S E C R E T 071628Z OCT 70 CITE TEGUCIGALPA 9118 A TEGU 70 IN 179726

DIRECTOR, DO BASE, NEW YORK INFO MANGUA, WH/MIAMI

REF: BOOK DISPATCH 7552 Meeting with AMBIDDY-1

1. LAWRENCE F. BARKER (COS TEGUCIGALPA) MET AMBIDDY-1 BY CHANCE WHILE IN MANAGUA 4 OCTOBER. AMBIDDY SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT ANASTASIO SOMOZA TO JOIN NICARAGUAN DELEGATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS A SPECIAL ADVISOR ON CUBA. AMBIDDY BELIEVES SOMOZA MAY MAKE A STRONG ANTI- CASTRO SPEECH WHEN HE ADDRESSES ASSEMBLY LATER THIS MONTH. AMBIDDY WILL GO TO NEW YORK WITH AMBASSADOR GUILLERMO LANG IN ADVANCE OF SOMOZA.

2. DEFER TO HQS ON CONTACT WITH AMBIDDY. FEEL FREE TO USE BARKER'S NAME IN MAKING CONTACT.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: AMBIDDY-1 201. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN NS
AB X
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~~FS~~
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~~[illegible]~~ NPD
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WH 2 CHN

OCT 12 1970

CS COPY

SECRET

7 October 1970
201-267437

14-00000

ORIG: Al McWade:cb
UNIT: WH/2/HD
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 9 October 1970

TOTAL COPIES 31

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BY 9 PER

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WH 8 | INFO | FILE VR, DO 4, C/OPS, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 Oct 70 16 53 CITE DIRECTOR 076615

TO DO BASE NEW YORK, TEGUCIGALPA

INFO MANAGUA WH/MIAMI

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 9118 (IN 179726)*

1. ~~UNLESS DO BASE NEW YORK WISHES CONTACT,~~ HQS SEES NO NEED AMBIDDY-1 CONTACT. ~~NEW YORK.~~

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *COS Tegucigalpa met AMBIDDY-1 in Managua 4 Oct. A/1 asked by SAMOZA to join Nicaraguan delegation to UN Assembly as special advisor. Defer to Hqs. contact AMBIDDY-1.

AN	
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~~DE~~	NFD
FI	

C/DO/I/B2 Bob Baker (Telcoord)
C/WH/COG
C/WH/2/N
C/WH/2
WH/COG/OPS

JOHN MARKHAM
C/DOI/2

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WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

12 Oct 70
201-267437

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ORIG: TODD D. HAGENAH TM
UNIT: WH/3/P
EXT: 6223/9388
DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 41 PER ____ #

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CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CA 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 17 23 40 Z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 47568

TO MANAGUA, LIMA INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7157 (IN 65339)*

ABSTRACT INDEX WH/C/OP

1. CERTAINLY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING AMBIDDY-1 LEAD TO GENERAL LEIGH BUT AT THIS TIME ONLY AS SOURCE ON INFORMATION AND NOT AS POTENTIAL PLOTTER AGAINST PERUVIAN GOVT. PLEASE ASK AMBIDDY-1 TO CONTINUE TO ELICIT LEIGH'S OPINIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN PERU AND TRY TO IDENTIFY LEIGH'S PRINCIPAL SOURCES AND CONTACTS.

2. FOR LIMA: PLS PROVIDE STATION READING ON GENERAL LEIGH WHO IS RELATIVELY UNKNOWN TO US HERE.

3. FILE: 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

*AMBIDDY-1 told COS Managua that when Peruvian General Guillermo Leigh visited him recently in Miami, he told AMBIDDY-1 that he & others in Peruvian military were

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CONT'D

17 Oct 69

201-267437

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CITE DIRECTOR 47568

TO

PAGE TWO

attempting to pressure Velasco to get rid of his advisors with Communist beliefs. Leigh and AMBIDDY-1 intend to meet again in Miami area soon. AMBIDDY-1 offered to assist in any way we want.

C/WH/3

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2

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RELEASING OFFICER

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 5 INFO FILE, VR c/WH/SD c/CI c/CA 2 h/FI 2

ACTION NO. 396 DDP

S E C R E T 141720Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7157

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, WH/MIAMI

HPL WFA MANA

RYBAT AMBIDDY

2P 14Oct69N65339

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS MANAGUA NIGHT 13 OCTOBER.

LSD WH/C/O

2. AMBIDDY WAS RECENTLY VISITED IN MIAMI BY RETIRED PERUVIAN GENERAL GUILLERMO LEIGH, CLASSMATE OF MANY OF THE OFFICERS NOW IN POWER IN PERU. LEIGH IS AGED 50-60, HAS ONLY ONE EYE. HIS SON-IN-LAW IS AIDE TO THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. LEIGH ON OFFICIAL PURCHASING MISSION FOR GOP, LOOKING FOR BULLDOZERS, LARGE GENERATORS, PLUMBING FIXTURES, RADIO EQUIPMENT, AND PRE-FAB HOUSING. EXPECTS SPEND ABOUT TEN MILLION DOLLARS. CONFIDED TO AMBIDDY THAT THE COMMISSIONS HE AND HIS CLASSMATES EARN ON THESE PURCHASES WILL BE DEPOSITED IN U.S. BANKS.

MICROFILMED 1969 DOC. MICRO. SER.

3. LEIGH TOLD AMBIDDY THAT MANUEL VELASCO ALVARADO IS CAUGHT UP IN DEMAGOGERY. VELASCO MADE HIS MOVE AGAINST THE IPC IN ORDER TO WIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIS GROUP BUT THE SUBSEQUENT IDOLATRY ACCRUING TO HIM WENT TO HIS HEAD. FURTHERMORE, LEIGH AND MANY OF HIS MILITARY CLASSMATES SEE VELASCO

14Oct69

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201-267437

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7157 SECRET

SURROUNDED BY ADVISORS OF COMMUNISTIC BELIEFS. LEIGH SAID THAT HE AND HIS CRONIES ARE PRESSURING VELASCO TO GET RID OF THESE ADVISORS. ~~HE~~ IF HE DOES NOT, THEY INTEND TO FORCE HIM OUT OF THE JUNTA.

4. LEIGH HAS INVITED AMBIDDY TO GO TO PERU IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCUREMENT MISSION. IN ANY EVENT, AMBIDDY WILL BE SEEING LEIGH AGAIN IN MIAMI SOON WHERE LEIGH STAYS AS AMBIDDY'S HOUSEGUEST.

5. AMBIDDY TOLD COS "IF I CAN HELP IN ANY WAY, YOU CAN COUNT ON ME."

6. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY INTERESTS AND GIVE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE.

7. INDEX LEIGH. FILE: 201-267437.

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083

S E C R E T 252332Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7069

MANA

25 JUL 69 IN 10406

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, PORT AU PRINCE

WH/C/FP 4

RYBAT IUSTEER AMBIDDY

REF: WH/MIAMI 4709 (IN 09904)

1. LIKE GHOSTLY CARIBBEAN LEGION OF YORE? AMWORLD ARMS KEEP POPPING UP IN TALES BUT NOT IN MATERIAL FORM. WITH TWO MAJOR RECOJRIES OF APRIL 1965 (PACY 6431) AND MARCH 1967 (HNMT-1239) PLUS CEDING OF SOME AMMUNITION TO SOMOZA AND COLONEL BRENES OKDIR 94233, 20 MAR 65 ET SEQ) AND MOST RECENT "FINAL" RECOVERY OF SMALL MANAGUA CACHE MARCH 1968 (HNMA-4086), THERE CAN'T BE MUCH LEFT. MANY AND VARIED TALES ABOUND OF AMBIDDY ENRICHMENT BY SELLING AMWORLD ARMS. IF GIVEN CREDENCE, SHEER VOLUME WOULD LEAD TO CONCLUSION HE SOLD HIS INVENTORY SEVERAL TIMES OVER. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUBSTANTIATE THESE TALES. FURTHERMORE, AMBIDDY IS NOT RICH.

2. AMBIDDY COULD HAVE TURNED TIDY PROFIT ON EXTENSIVE EL BLUFF CACHE WHICH NEITHER WOFIRM NOR SOMOZA KNEW ABOUT. INSTEAD, ALTHOUGH FINANCIALLY PRESSED, HE INFORMED STATION AND HELPED IN EVERY WAY TO GET THESE ARMS INTO WOFIRM HANDS.

25 July 69

CS COPY

201-267437

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INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7069 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY MIGHT BE INVOLVED WITH SOMOZA IN SOME SORT OF ARMS DEALINGS WITH DUVALIER. AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, HE IS NOW IN MEAT EXPORT PARTNERSHIP WITH SOMOZA. DOUBT SERIOUSLY HE WOULD USE NOTORIOUS WINDBAG BENITEZ AS AGENT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. PLS ADVISE IF WISH COS TO ELICIT FROM AMBIDDY AT NEXT OPPORTUNITY ON ANY ARMS DEALINGS WITH DUVALIER.

5. FILE 201-267437.

SECRET

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ACTION NO. 717

S E C R E T 222342Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7060
MANA

23 JUL 69 IN 07612

SALVADOR INFO
DIRECTOR

WH/C/OP

REF: SAN SALVADOR 8024 (IN 07549)

1. SUBJECT IS DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, CIVILIAN LEADER OF BAY OF PIGS INVASION. PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE LEADER, NOW RESIDING MIAMI. VISITS MANAGUA FREQUENTLY WHERE HAS BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH PRESIDENT SOMOZA. IS CLOSE FRIND LAWRENCE F. BARKER.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

S E C R E T

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23 July 69

SECRET

201-267437

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ACTION UNIT
C/WH 8

INFO FILE. VR. C/21SD, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3,

ACTION NO.
645

S E C R E T 221811Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7059 22 Jul 69 IN 07442

MANA.

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

WH/C/DO

1. COS MANAGUA RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY-1 1125 HOURS LOCAL TIME 22 JULY. AMBIDDY IN MIAMI. REFERRED TO REF MATTER. SAID HAD RECEIVED URGENT CALL FIFTEEN MINUTES EARLIER FROM SAN SALVADOR STATING THAT GOES URGENTLY NEEDS EIGHT PILOTS AND WANTS CONSULT WITH AMBIDDY. CALLER TOLD AMBIDDY THAT SALVADORAN VISA WAS AUTHORIZED.

2. AMBIDDY ASKED FOR GUIDANCE. COS ADVISED HIM PROCEED TO SALVADOR, OBTAIN AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON SALVADORAN WAR PLANS, CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS. AFTER OBTAINING ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION HE IS TO "DECIDE" NOT TO TAKE PART IN ANY WAY. AS MENTIONED IN REF CABLE, AT BEGINNING OF TALKS

CS COPY

22 July 69

SECRET

201-267437

HE WILL INSIST THAT SALVADORANS PROMISE NOT TO REVEAL TO ANYONE, ESPECIALLY "GRINGOS", THAT HE BEING CONSULTED. THIS DESIGNED TO DISASSOCIATE HIM FROM WOFIRM AND AID IN ELICITING MAXIMUM INFORMATION

3. AMBIDDY WILL REPORT RESULTS TO COS MANAGUA ASAP. PHONE CONVERSATION DOUBLETALKED, NO MENTION MADE OF ANY COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

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S E C R E T 222100Z JUL 69 CITE SAN SALADOR 8024

SALV

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR

WH/C/LA 22 [illegible] 07549

RYBAT/AMBIDDY

REQUEST IDENTITY AMBIDDY.

S E C R E T

22 July 69

201-217437

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53-9-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 29 MAR 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, DDO 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW, SAS 5, DO/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

ROUTING

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ROUTINE

IN 96635

TDCS

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DIR INFO SNTO PACY MANA CARA SJOS CITE WAVE 6507

UFG-2612

INTEL TYPIC DYVOUR

SUPDATA: IWOG PLS DEFER DISSEM TO NICARAGUA/SAS DESK. SOURCE AMBIDDY-1 FROM SOMOZA AND SCHICK. "STRAW MAN" FOR BIDDY PROTECTION. PADA ALSO CHANGED. FILED 290019Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA NICARAGUA

SUBJ 1. PLANS OF RENE SCHICK RELATIVE TO HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES IN NICARAGUA 2. OPINIONS OF RENE SCHICK REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO ANTI-CASTRO EXILES

DOI: 22-23 MAR 63

PADA: U.S. 27 MAR 63

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TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE PRIORITY

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

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LIAISON: 29 May 63

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DATE

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PAGE TWO

IN 96635

TDCS

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UFG 2012

APPR: 3

SOURCE: CUBAN NATIONAL (F) WITH NUMEROUS EXILE CONTACTS FROM MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

[redacted]

R I COPY

C/S COMMENT: *PLEASE SEE PARA 22, PAGE 21, HB 90-400-1 RE USE OF MULTIPLE ACTION INDICATORS.

RW COMMENT:

[redacted]

R I C O P Y

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 96635

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

ON 22 MARCH 1963 MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, FLEW FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA TO MANAGUA, NICARAGUA ON INVITATION OF [illegible] RENE SCHICK. ARTIME'S EXPRESS PURPOSE FOR MAKING THE TRIP WAS TO DETERMINE IF SCHICK WOULD SUPPORT HIS (ARTIME'S) ANTI-CASTRO PARAMILITARY CAMPAIGN BY MAKING MILITARY TRAINING SITES AND OPERATIONAL BASES AVAILABLE TO ARTIME.

2. ARTIME ALSO SAID HE HOPED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SCHICK WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE SOMOZA DYNASTY OR WHETHER SCHICK WAS A TRUE STEP TOWARD DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

3. ON HIS ARRIVAL IN MANAGUA, ARTIME WAS MET BY CAPTAIN PEREZ (FNU) WHO TOLD ARTIME THAT AN INTERVIEW WAS ARRANGED FOR THAT NIGHT, 22 MARCH, WITH LUIS SOMOZA. THE MEETING WAS HELD AS ARRANGED AND LASTED FOR OVER THREE HOURS. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING WAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. SOMOZA SAID THAT ARTIME COULD TALK WITH SCHICK, BUT SOMOZA WISHED TO EXPLAIN HE CONSIDERS SCHICK AN INDEPENDENT AGENT AND NOT AN EXTENSION OF HIS (SOMOZA'S) RULE. HE SAID SCHICK BY HIS OWN RIGHT HAS PRESTIGE, AND WOULD NEVER CONSENT TO BE A "PUPPET RULER". AS FAR AS SCHICK'S FUTURE PROGRAMS WERE CONCERNED, SOMOZA SAID SCHICK HIMSELF WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH ARTIME;

B. SOMOZA SAID NICARAGUA HAS GREAT INTEREST IN BETTERING ITS RELATIONS WITH LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, AND AS AN EXAMPLE SINGLED OUT VENEZUELA;

C. SOMOZA COMMENTED ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND MADE IT CLEAR HE HAS LITTLE USE FOR JUAN BOSCH Y. GAVINO. HE SAID HE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT BOSCH HAS MADE A PACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

4. ON 23 MARCH ARTIME MET WITH PRESIDENT RENE SCHICK FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT TWO HOURS. SCHICK MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE IMPORTANT TASK FOR NICARAGUA IS TO RID ITSELF OF THE "DICTATOR" TAG. SCHICK SAID THAT BY BRINGING THE OPPOSITION INTO THE GOVERNMENT, AND LETTING THE OPPOSITION SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HE IS CONVINCED THAT NICARAGUA CAN PROGRESS TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. THIS APPROACH, HE SAID, CAN ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOCIALIST STATE;

B. SCHICK'S GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAM INCLUDES WORKING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE;

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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IN 96635

C. SCHICK WISHES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA AS WELL AS WITH VENEZUELA. HE SAID HE WANTS TO CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORTS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND THUS HELP ESTABLISH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET.

D. SCHICK IS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT LUIS SOMOZA HAS NO INTENT OF RETURNING TO POLITICS, AND ADDED THAT HE, SCHICK, ASKED GENERAL "TACHO" SOMOZA TO STAY ON AS CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE EXPLAINED THIS AS GOOD POLITICS, SAYING SOMOZA'S PRESENCE WOULD KEEP THE MILITARY IN CHECK AND ALLOW TIME FOR IMPLEMENTING REFORMS. HE HOPED THAT ON THE EXPIRATION OF HIS, SCHICK'S, TERM OF OFFICE, NICARAGUA WILL HAVE PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE SOMOZA'S PRESENCE WOULD NO LONGER BE NECESSARY IN THE ARMED FORCES;

E. NICARAGUA, LIKE ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA IS DISPOSED TO HELP THE ANTI-CASTRO CAUSE CLANDESTINELY, BUT SCHICK ADDED THAT SUCH HELP IS CONDITIONED UPON THE IMPLIED APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY. IF SUCH APPROVAL IS GIVEN ARTIME CAN COUNT ON NICARAGUA'S SUPPORT.

5. SUBSEQUENTLY, AS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION, SCHICK SAID THAT IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY APPROVES, AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE SENT TO CENTRAL AMERICA TO COORDINATE THIS EFFORT.

5. FIELD DISS. : STATE (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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ACTION NO. #157

SECRET 181642Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9287 (ROPARD ACTING)

MADR

26017

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

13 Aug 69 IN 26017

TYPIC

1. QUGROWL-1 REPORTS THAT MANUEL ARTIME HAS REQUESTED HIM GET SPANISH VISA FOR HIM ASAP. Q-1 BELIEVES PURPOSE OF TRIP TO GREET ARTIME'S FATHER WHOM CUBAN GOVT MAY BE ABOUT TO GRANT EXIT AFTER TWO-YEAR DELAY.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

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19 Aug 69

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ACTION NO. #157

S E C R E T 181642Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9287 (ROPARD ACTING)

(MADR)

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2. FILE: 201-267437.

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR R/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2, IW, SB8 DO4, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

ACTION NO. 5H

S E C R E T 182305Z MAY 70 CITE MANAGUA 7336 085604

18 MAY 70

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7332 (IN 081565)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FROM AMBIDDY TO COS MANAGUA 14 - 13 MAY. LEIGH STAYED WITH AMBIDDY IN MIAMI 10 - 13 MAY. LOOKING FOR STATESIDE SALES AGENT PERUVIAN FISHMEAL, OFFERED JOB TO AMBIDDY. EXPLAINED GENERAL ARTOLA, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, PUT ANOTHER GENERAL (NAME UNKNOWN) IN CHARGE GOVT CONSORTIUM FISHMEAL INDUSTRY. PERU NOW TRYING TO SELL ON WORLD MARKET. UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL WENT TO EUROPE TRYING TO PEDDLE FISHMEAL WHILE LEIGH IN STATES ON SAME MISSION. IF STATESIDE DEAL CAN BE ARRANGED, AMBIDDY WILL HAVE EXCLUSIVE SALES REIGHTS IN RETURN FOR TWO PERCENT COMMISSION. AMBIDDY PHONED MINNESOTA AND FLORIDA CHICKEN FEED MANUFACTURUERS AND WAS TOLD THEY WOULD BUY ALL FISHMEAL HE COUND FURNISH. HE SENSED SOMETHING "FISHY" IN BEING OFFERED JOB AS MIDDLEMAN FOR PRODUCT SO READILY MARKETABLE AND SOON LEARNED THAT HE WOULD BE EXPECTED KICK BACK HALF HIS COMMISSION TO GENERALS. THIS MIGHT AMOUNT TO OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. LEIGH HAS INVITED AMBIDDY VISIT PERU END OF MAY TO DISCUSS DETAILS. HE PLANS GO.

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CS COPY FILED IN 201-860098

file: 18 May 70

201-267437

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7336 SECRET

2. LEIGH TOLD AMBIDDY THAT SEVERAL CIVILIAN ADVISORS TO ALVARADO HAVE BEEN OUSTEDD OWING TO PRESSURE FROM ARMY OFFICERS WHO CONSIDER THEM COMMUNISTS. ALSO SAID PERUVIAN GOVT FED UP WITH RUSSIANS WHO BEGAN CONTACTING LABOR LEADERS AND HIGH ARMY PEOPLE IN OBVIOUS CAMPAIGN OF DEVELOPMENT IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVING IN PERU. PERSONS NOW DEALING WITH RUSSIANS ARE BEING CLOSELY WATCHED BY GOVT. LEIGH ADDED THAT PERUVIAN GENERAL STAFF WORRIED ABOUT CHILEAN ARMS PURCHASES AND "AWARE" THAT CHILE PLANNING SOME MOVE AGAINST PERU.

3. OTHER ITEMS ON LEIGH SHOPPING LIST FOR WHICH HE ASKED QUOTATIONS INCLUDE TWO FIELD HOSPITALS IN SIXTY THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE, TWO IN FORTY THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE, SIXTY SMALL MEDICAL CLINIC UNITS IN ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR RANGE. MONEY COMING FROM BID LOA. ALSO WANTED QUOTES ON TEN MOBILE FILM PROJECTOR UNITS WITH LOUD SPEAKER SYSTEMS.

4. AMBIDDY SAID WOULD INFORM COS OF RESULTS PERU TRIP ASAP AFTER RETURN. PLEASE ADVISE ANY REQUREMENTS IN CASE COS SEES HIM BEFORE TRIP.

5. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437. GP-1.

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, SB8, DO4, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

ACTION NO. 873

S E C R E T 212213Z MAY 70 CITE LIMA 6942 (POLLICOVE ACTING)

LIMA

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

21 MAY 70 IN 088069

REF: MANAGUA 7336 (IN 085604)

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE REF MAY BE USEFUL COS MANAGUA:

A. PERU MAKING REAL EFFORT BECOME WORLD'S LARGEST PRODUCER AND EXPORTER FISHMEAL. EXPECTED KICK-BACK ON COMMISSION TO GENERALS NOT SURPRISING. GENERALS PROBABLY INCLUDE ARTOLA.

B. RE PARA TWO REF, STATION HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF OUSTING LEFTIST CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT VELASCO ALVARADO, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF RUIZ ELDREDGE, WHO HAS BEEN NAMED PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR TO BRAZIL. NOT CLEAR WHETHER RUIZ BEING EASED OUT BECAUSE LEFTIST/PRO-COMMUNIST LEANINGS AS RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM ARMY OR WHETHER APPOINTMENT REPRESENTS REWARD TO RUIZ - POSSIBLY COMBINATION BOTH.

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C. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, PARTICULARLY VELASCO AND ARTOLA CONTINUE DENY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT, DESPITE THIS COMMON KNOWLEDGE. GOVT OFFICIALS PRIVATELY

201-267437

21 May 70

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 LIMA 6942 SECRET

ADMIT LEFTIST/COMMUNIST LEANINGS OF ADVISORS, CLAIMING THEY TOTALLY AWARE THEIR AFFILIATIONS AND USING SUBJECTS TO ADVANTAGE REVOLUTION. CLAIM THEY WILL DISMISS SUCH ADVISORS AT PROPER TIME.

D. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME OFFICIALS IN GOP WHO AWARE OF DANGERS SOVIETS AND FED UP WITH THEM, THIS NOT REFLRECTED IN OFFICIAL ATTITUDE. GOP RECEIVING SOVIETS WITH OPEN ARMS AND SIZE OF SOVIET MISSION CONTINUES TO GROW. IN ADDITION TO FREQUENT TDYERS, SOVIETS NOW HAVE 33 OFFICIALS IN LIMA; THIS COMPARED TO FOUR OR FIVE PERUVIANS IN MOSCOW. THERE VERY LITTLE GOP SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER ACTIONS CARRIED OUT AGAINST SOVIETS. IN EYES MILITARY GOVT, JKLANCE CONSIDERED FAR GREATER TARGET IN PERU THAN SOVIETS.

2. LIMITED REQUIREMENTS FOR AM[illegible]DDY AS FOLLOWS:

A. GOVERNMENT HAS RECOGNIZED NEED FOR REVISION OF NEW EXCHANGE CONTROL LAW. WHAT PROBLEMS HAVE BROUGHT THIS ABOUT? FEAR OF DOMESTIC REACTION, WITH POSSIBLE COLLABORATION BETWEEN PLUTOCRATS AND MILITARY? INTERNAL CONFLICT IN CABINET?

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 LIMA 6942 S E C R E T

FEAR OF FURTHER LOSS OF CONFIDENCE FOREIGN INVESTORS?

B. HOW DOES VELASCO GOVERNMENT PROPOSE TO DISCOURAGE CHILEANS FROM WHAT THEY BELIEVE ARE THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS?

C. ARE RECENT ANTI-COMMUNIST STATEMENTS BY PERUVIAN LEADERS ANYTHING MORE THAN RESPONSE TO FEARS SOME SECTORS PERUVIAN SOCIETY?

3. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437 GP-1

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ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RI/AN FI2 CI CI/OPS DDP ADDP CSDO CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 950

S E C R E T 121859Z MAY 70 CITE MANAGUA 7332

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

REF: MANAGUA 7157, 14 OCT 69 (IN 65339)

1. AMBIDDY-1 VISITED COS MANAGUA NIGHT 7 MAY. IN COURSE LONG CONVERSATION MENTIONED HAD BEEN PHONED NIGHT BEFORE IN MIAMI BY GENERAL GUILLERMO LEIGH OF REFERENCE. LEIGH PASSING THRU MIAMI EN ROUTE NEW YORK, SAID WOULD CONTACT AMBIDDY ON RETURN 10 MAY. APPARENTLY INTERESTED IN PLACING SOME MONEY IN U.S. BANKS. REMARKED THAT VELASCO ESSENTIALLY WEAK, BEING RUN BY CIVILIAN ADVISERS AMONG WHOM SOME COMMIES. AMBIDDY WILL REPORT ON RESULTS AND STATION WILL RELAY DETAILS LIMA.

2. AMBIDDY CLARIFIED THAT SUBJECT IS NOT LEGITIMATE GENERAL. WAS MILITARY CLASSMATE PRESENT OFFICERS THAT RANK, LEFT ARMY OWING TO SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED EYESIGHT, IS ~~CALLE~~ CALLED "GENERAL" AS COURTESY BY ARMY FRIENDS WITH WHOM HE STILL KEEPS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS.

3. FILE: 201-860098, 201-267437. GP-1

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ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, SOD 6, CI/OA, FI-2

ACTION NO. 326

SECRET 222223Z SEP 69 CITE MANAGUA 7134 MANA

22 Sep 69 IN 49758

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

REF: DIRECTOR 39886

1. COS MANAGUA HAS NOT SEEN AMBIDDY-1 SINCE SALVADOR/HONDURAS WAR. AMBIDDY WAS IN TOWN FOR ONE DAY DURING MID-SEPTEMBER INDEPENDENCE HOLIDAYS AND SENT REGARDS TO BARKER THROUGH MUTUAL CUBAN FRIEND SAYING WOULD BE BACK IN MANAGUA SOON AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CHAT. COS WILL ATTEMPT TO CORRAL HIM IF HE DOES SHOW UP AND ELICIT INFO REQUESTED BY REF.

2. FLE 201-267437.

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201-267437
22 Sep 69

CS COPY
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ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON
UNIT: WH/2/[illegible]
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1969

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], CI/OPS, CI/OA, [illegible]

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CITE DIRECTOR 39886

TO MANAGUA INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

1. REQUEST COS MANAGUA CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 AND DEBRIEF ON REF TRIP TO SAN SALVADOR. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IS ANY INFO AMBIDDY-1 HAS ON HONDURAS/SALVADOR ARMS PURCHASES.

2. FYI: ON 17 SEPTEMBER HQS LEARNED FROM IUSTEER-1 THAT AMBIDDY-1 ARRANGED CONTACT FROM MIAMI FOR A HONDURAS ARMS BUYER TO PURCHASE ARMS IN SPAIN. FOR THIS SERVICE AMBIDDY-1 WILL RECEIVE A COMMISSION FROM THE HONDURAS ARMS BUYER BASED ON THE TOTAL ARMS PURCHASE PRICE. DO NOT REVEAL THIS INFO TO AMBIDDY-1.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437 AND 201-283488

END OF MESSAGE

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WH/COMMENT: On 22 July COS Managua received urgent phone call from AMBIDDY-1. AMBIDDY-1 said he just received phone call from Salvador and they (Salvadorans) needed eight pilots and wanted to consult with AMBIDDY. A Salvadoran visa had been authorized. COS Managua instructed AMBIDDY to proceed to San Salvador and obtain info on Salvador war plans. Once he acquired this info AMBIDDY was to inform the Salvadorans that he could not be involved in any way. AMBIDDY agreed and told COS Managua that he would contact COS on his return from the trip to San Salvador

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

AC/WH/2/NIC
WH/COG/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOSEPH V. KIYONAGA
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-267437
22 Sep 69

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, CI, C/OPS, C/OA, FI2, SOD6

ACTION NO. 402

S E C R E T 141703Z OCT 69 CITE MANAGUA 7158 MARA

DIRECTOR INFO SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

14OCT69 IN 65351

AMBIDDY

REF: A. MANAGUA 7041 (IN 01386)

B. MANAGUA 7059 (IN 07442)

C. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

D. DIRECTOR 39886

E. MANAGUA 7134 (IN 49758)

1. COS MET WITH AMBIDDY-1 NIGHT 13 OCTOBER. HE REPORTED ON DEVELOPMENTS OF REFS AS FOLLOWS: AS AMBIDDY WAS PREPARING LEAVE FOR SALVADOR IN JULY HE WAS VISITED BY SALVADORAN HUMBERTO RODEZNO (PHONETIC) WHO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION. AMBIDDY EXPLAINED THAT HE COULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY ARMS EXPORT MATTERS, THAT HE IS WELL KNOWN AS PBRUMEN PATRIOT AND DOES NOT WISH CHANGE IMAGE FOR THAT OF ARMS DEALER OR SOLDIER OF FORTUNE. RODEZNO SAID HE ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH AN AMERICAN IN MIAMI WHO WAS GOING TO FURNISH 30-06 AMMO AT TEN CENTS A ROUND, SHIP IT FROM INTER-ARMCO IN VIRGINIA TO CANADA FOR ONWARD SHIPMENT TO SALVADOR. AMBIDDY WARNED RODEZNO THAT THE AMERICAN, WHOSE NAME WAS NOT

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14 Oct 69

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ACTION UNIT: FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7158 S E C R E T

GIVEN, WOULD PROBABLY REPORT HIM TO FBI, CIA, BORDER PATROL, "OR TO THE BOY SCOUTS". AMBIDDY THEN BROKE OFF CONTACT WITH RODEZNO AND DECIDED THERE NO REASON TRAVEL TO SALVADOR.

2. TWO DAYS LATER RICARDO ZUNIGA OF HONDURAS APPEARED IN MIAMI AND CONTACTED AMBIDDY. HE ALSO HAD LONG SHOPPING LIST RANGING FROM SMALL ARMS TO ONE THOUSAND POUND BOMB. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL AND ZUNIGA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HONDURAN CONSUL "MIKE" (LNU). AMBIDDY GAVE THEM ESSENTIALLY SAME STORY, COMMISERATED WITH THEM, AS HAD WITH RODEZNO, SUGGESTED THEY WOULD DO BETTER TO SHOP IN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE BELGIUM OR SPAIN, WHO WOULD SELL TO ANYONE. ZUNIGA ASKED IF AMBIDDY THOUGHT FABRIQUE NATIONAL WOULD GRANT CONFIDENTIAL COMMISSION (KICKBACK) OF AT LEAST TEN PERCENT. AMBIDDY ASSURED HIM FN WOULD. ZUNIGA TOLD AMBIDDY THAT IF HE, ZUNIGA, SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING KICKBACK FROM FN, AMBIDDY COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE NICE PRESENT. AMBIDDY HAS HEARD NOTHING SINCE FROM ZUNIGA BUT HAS HEARD FROM CONTACT IN HONDURAS THAT ZUNIGA BOUGHT ARMS AND AMMO FROM FN AND BOMBS IN PORTUGAL. PORTUGUESE GAVE HIM FIVE PERCENT RAKE-OFF. ZUNIGA TRAVELLED TO EUROPE ON HONDURAN PASSPORT IN ALIAS.

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MANAGUA 7158 SECRET

3. AMBIDDY SAYS HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN OBTAINING ARMS FOR EITHER SIDE OTHER THAN REFERRING THEM TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND HAS NO INTENTION OF JEOPARDIZING HIS POSITION WITH U.S. BY GETTING MIXED UP IN ARMS TRAFFIC. HE HAS NO INFORMATION ON ARMS TRAFFIC WITH HAITI. AMBIDDY STILL HAS COPIES OF SALVADORAN AND HONDURAN SHOPPING LISTS AND OFFERED SEND THEM TO BARKER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-267437.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: Robert C. Mooney
UNIT: WH/2/Nicaragua
EXT: 4489
DATE: 28 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/CA, FI, SODC.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 28 22 27z Jul 69 CITE DIRECTOR 24584

TO MANAGUA INFO: PORT AU PRINCE, WH/MIAMI

REF: A. PORT AU PRINCE 6311 (IN 10768)

B. MANAGUA 7069 (IN 10406)

AN PIU
AB X
IN
PS
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DES H/D
RF
WH/8/N

1. HDQS WELCOMES ANY INFO ON AMBIDDY ARMS DEALINGS.

2. IF TELEPHONE ONLY LINK WITH AMBIDDY, COS IN BEST POSITION DETERMINE POSSIBILITY OF ELICITATION WITHOUT UNDUE SECURITY RISK.

3. FILE: 201-267437

*WH Comment: Ref A indicated Port Au Prince interest in any info obtained by Managua on AMBIDDY involvement in arms sales to Haiti. Ref B reported possibility AMBIDDY and Somoza involved in arms dealings with DUValier and asked addresses if they desire COS try elicit info from AMBIDDY.

AC/WH/7

WH/COG CS

Robert F. Rife for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH DIV
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-267437

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28 JUL 69

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 18 JULY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNLCASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: 105-2617 (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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BY: A AT: 0345 Z

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, DCI, DDCI, LLP, ADDP, CSDO, CSRF, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, [illegible] MPS/PSG 2, SOD 2, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, EUR, [illegible]

ACTION NO. 853

SECRET 130237Z JUL 69 CITE MANAGUA 7841 (MANA) 13 Jul 69 N 01386

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS 12 JULY.

AMBIDDY 1 RECEIVED PHONE CALL 10 JULY FROM (FNU) ALVAREZ, CUBAN BUSINESSMAN SAN SALVADOR. ALVAREZ DOUBLETALKED THAT HE CALLING ON BEHALF SALVADORAN MINDEF WHICH URGENTLY NEEDS SIX P-51 PILOTS ("MUSTANG DRIVERS") AND WILL PROBABLY ALSO NEED SOME "HEAVY TRUCK DRIVERS" WHICH AMBIDDY 1 SAYS MAY MEAN PILOTS FOR LARGER PLANES OR TANK DRIVERS. ALVAREZ SAID THAT MINDEF WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AMBIDDY 1 SERVE AS TECHNICAL ADVISOR IN UPCOMING OPERATIONS.

2. AMBIDDY 1 WISELY DEFERRED, SAID NEEDED TIME TO THINK MATTER OVER, EXPLAINED THAT HE NEEDS GET ALONG WITH BOTH COUNTRIES, SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, FOR BUSINESS REASONS. IS EXPECTING ANOTHER CALL FROM ALVAREZ MOMENTARILY.

3. COS ADVISED AMBIDDY 1 OF POSITION OUR GOVERNMENT IN THIS DISPUTE AND WAS ASSURED AMBIDDY 1 WILL NOT TAKE ANY ACTIVE PART. IF SUMMONED TO SALVADOR AMBIDDY 1 WILL OBTAIN AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ON SALVADORAN WAR PLANS AND THEN "DECIDE" NOT TO PARTICIPATE. ALSO, IF

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201-267437

13 JUL 69

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BY: ______ AT: AUG 13 1 01 PM '69

DISSEM BY: RECEIVED, 37EDI

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 7841 S E C R E T

HE TALKS TO SALVADORANS, HE WILL INSIST BEFORE ANY DISCUSSION THAT THEY PROMISE NOT TO BREATHE WORD TO "GRINGOS" THAT HE IS BEING CONSULTED. THIS PLOY DESIGNED TO SMOKE OUT MAXIMUM INFORMATION. AMBIDDY 1 WILL REPORT ALL FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS TO STATION.

4. DEFER TO HQS FOR DISSEM PARA 1 INFO. AMBASSADOR INFORMED.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
OF INTEREST TO SUBJECT OF 201-816438

201-816438
DBC -55478
23 JUN 69
FBI
P4

R 6907101035

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

IG: J. SEARS:mamd
IT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 11 JUNE 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

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DISP: WH 8 | 4 / 6 | FILE. VR. RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 14 50z JUN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 10935

WH/MIAMI MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-4216 (IN 77932)

B. MANAGUA-7018 (IN 77965)*

1. NO OBJECTION REF A.

2. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: *Managua concurs passage LNERGO.

AN
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wulcop

C/WH/COG Paul Erbest

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-267437
12 Jun 69

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S E C R E T 111004Z JUN 69 CITE MADRID MADR 8701

11 Jun 69 IN 70505 9

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR

11P

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF: MANAGUA 7017 (477198)

1. SUBJ PARA 2 REF, QUGROWL-1, PROVIDED FULL DETAILS ARMS SHIPMENT ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. THANKS.

2. FILE 201-267437.

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201-267437

XR 201-11357

XR 201-71455

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S E C R E T 101525Z JUN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 4216

WMIM

DIRECTOR, MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

10 Jun 69 IN 77932

C

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF MANAGUA 7017 (IN 77198)

1. REQUEST ADDRESSEES CONCURRENCE PASS REF INFO LOCALLY LNERGO.

2. FILE: 201-267437.

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File
201-267437
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FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI 2

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SECRET 101700Z JUN 69 CITE MANAGUA 7018 MANA

10 Jun 69 IN 77965

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

REF: WH/MIAMI 4216 (IN 77932)

1. CONCUR PASS LNERGO.

2. FILE 201-267437.

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(146)

S E C R E T 092056Z JUN 69 CITE MANAGUA 7017 (MANA)

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, MADRID, WH/MIAMI

9 JUN 69 IN 77198

11P

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMBIDDY-1 TO COS MANAGUA 9 JUNE.

2. ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO ENRIQUE TOUS, AMBIDDY ASSOCIATE SPAIN, WROTE AMBIDDY THAT ARMS FROM SPAIN BEING SENT TO GUATEMALA. AMBIDDY SUGGESTS MADRID STATION MAY WISH CHECK WITH TOUS FOR DETAILS IF NOT ALREADY AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION.

3. SON OF "TITO" ARIAS, LIVING IN CORAL GABLES FLORIDA, RECENTLY HAS PURCHASED 30 FOOT BOAT AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS WORTH OF RADIO BROADCASTING EQUIPMENT TO BE SENT TO GUATEMALA. OPERATION BELIEVED FINANCED BY ARNULFO ARIAS WITH SOME INPUT OF MONEY FROM CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. INFO FROM AMERICAN GIRL WHO LIVES NEXT DOOR TO SON OF "TITO" ARIAS. AMBIDDY COULD NOT RECALL NAME.

4. FILE 201-267437.

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WH/2/N

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B201-71155

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201-267437

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-152
GA-50
TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/WH/2		23 MAY 1969		
2.				
3. WH/2/N				NK
4. RM				
5. LC				
6. PA				PA.
7. C/WH/C		Karin 27 MAY 1969		
8. C/WH/COG		27 MAY 1969	27 MAY 1969	
9. DC/WH/COG		27 MAY 1969		
10. Mr. Sears		2 JUN 1969	[illegible]	
11. Mr. Hopkins		3 JUN 1969	3/Jun	RH
12.				
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15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

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COMMENTS

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TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
15 May 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 04335

FORM USE PREVIOUS (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua LFB

SUBJECT 0 : Information Received from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HNMA-4315, 17 April 1969

(B) HNMA-4324, 1 May 1969

1. Attached (USC) for the information of Headquarters is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the LNPURE Chief on 12 May 1969. This memorandum sets forth information received that day by the COS from AMBIDDY-1 who is considering going into a dry dock venture in Corinto with Jose Maria ZELAYA, private secretary to President Somoza. ZELAYA has cabinet rank. He is believed by many to be pro-Communist although, as in the case of similar reports about Francisco J. LAINEZ, no real proof of these allegations seems to be produced.

2. When shown this memorandum, the LNPURE Chief said he thought it quite likely that ZELAYA is strongly anti-American as reported by AMBIDDY.

3. AMBIDDY says that for the first time he recently heard Somoza utter unfavorable words about the United States and AMBIDDY "wondered" to the COS if ZELAYA could be exerting some evil influence on Somoza.

4. The Station will seek to draw AMBIDDY out at length on this matter at an opportune time.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:
Memorandum USC

MICROFILMED
MAY 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

1 att:

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
✓201-822852	HNMA-4335	15 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	✓201-267437

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11

The Ambassador 12 May 1969

Political Attaché

Statements of Jose Maria "Chema" ZELAYA

1. On 12 May I was contacted by a close friend of mine who is engaged in negotiations with "Chema" ZELAYA which may lead to the two forming a business partnership. While my source is not normally a source of intelligence information, I have found him to be a good observer and to be reliable. He told me that ZELAYA told him the following at a meeting on 9 May.

2. The ROCKEFELLER visit is merely a political maneuver on the part of President NIXON to furnish an excuse if anything goes wrong in Latin America. It is preposterous to expect Governor ROCKEFELLER to learn anything about a country in twenty four hours. ROCKEFELLER will go back to the United States, make his report to NIXON, and then go about his normal duties. NIXON will adopt those recommendations regarding U.S. policy for Latin America that are agreeable to him, paying no attention to the rest. If anything goes wrong, NIXON can pin the blame on ROCKEFELLER. In this way he has a scapegoat and also has an opportunity to lessen the prestige of a potential political rival. No possible good can come from this mission.

3. ZELAYA said that he has managed to obtain the blessing (bendición) of the Catholic Church. Now he is working on the blessing of the American Ambassador. In this respect he has proposed setting up youth centers around the country-- places where youngsters can go to read good books, play ping pong, etc. -- and the American Ambassador is interested.

4. My friend is of the opinion that ZELAYA is strongly anti-American.

MICROFILMED
MAY 23 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

S/c att: 1

HNMA-04335

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TO: ACTION BRANCH

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PROPER FILE NO:

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILTNA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-152
GA-60
TUBE GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

Chrono detached - RL

See D 12-B

COPY DETACHED

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~[illegible]~~				
2. C/WH/C		[illegible] 13 [illegible] 1969		R
3. DC/WH/CA ~~[illegible]~~		13 MAY 1969		R. LO
4. C/WH/COG	1	MAY 1969		
5. Mr Sears		13	13	JM
6. Mr Hopkins	14 MAY		14 May	BH
7. JXX Nancy Getz		19 MAY 1969		ng
8. ~~[illegible]~~				
9.				
10.				
11. AC/WH/2		20 MAY 1969		
12. WH/2/N				WR
13. RM				RM
14. LC				
15. PA				Pa
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 1 May 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER HNMA 04324

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO. : Chief, WH/Miami
FROM : Chief of Station, Managua LFB?
SUBJECT C: AMBIDDY-1
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HNMA-4315, 17 April 1969

There is attached (USC) another memorandum based on a conversation with Subject on 28 April 1969. It is forwarded for your information and should be considered a continuation of the memorandum submitted with Reference.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:

Memorandum (split transmission)
1. Right side, HEREWITH
2. Left side, USC

Distribution:
0&1 - Chief, WHDivision,w/att
2 - Chief, WH/MIAMI, w/att

2 att:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HNMA-4324
DATE: 1 May 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267437

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

29 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa

1. On 18 April I saw Subject again briefly and told him that I would appreciate an opportunity to talk to him alone. As he was about to leave town, he promised to contact me again on his next trip to Managua. He phoned me on 28 April. I picked him up that night and drove him up to my house where we had a long conversation over a couple of steaks and a good bottle of wine.

2. I told Subject that I had heard his name mentioned in connection with such unsavory activity as fomenting revolution in Panama and narcotics trafficking--from people who don't know him. My reply to any such dirty-mouthing is that Subject is a hyperactive type who keeps in contact with all sorts of people, some of whom may be involved in unsavory activity. This does not mean Subject is involved. Indeed, I was sure he was not.

3. The provocation yielded desired results and in the ensuing conversation Subject gave me a detailed explanation of his present activities and financial situation.

4. His business dealings are carried on under his company, known as Central South International, Inc. He is president and his wife is secretary. His business activity in Nicaragua consists of :

a. Sales of equipment to the National Guard

b. Sales of livestock (cows) to Nicaragua. These dealings are handled through Colonel Guillermo NOGUERA, the buyer at this end. Subject expects to expand this business to include sales to INFONAC--the National Development Commission.

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NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

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S/c att: 1

HNMA-4324

SECRET

201-267437

Subject obtains the livestock from the Montura Ranch of Florida.

c. Sales of Florida real estate. Subject is not licensed to make such sales in the U.S. but can sell to persons abroad. (About two years ago he was selling lots west of Miami near where a new airport is to be built.)

5. Subject is now involved--on this trip--in a deal with President SOMOZA to furnish well drilling and pumping equipment for an agricultural irrigation system. SOMOZA was approached by a British firm which somehow wangled a U.S.-guaranteed 5 1/2 percent loan to underwrite the same scheme. This low interest was better than Subject's contacts could obtain initially and it appeared that the contract would go to the British outfit. However, Subject's stateside partner, a South Carolina legislator (state level), who operates a business known as INTERGROW, managed to swing the same deal and was due in town on 29 April to talk with SOMOZA. SOMOZA told Subject he would give the business to Subject if he and his INTERGROW friend could equal the British offer. As of 28 April prospects for consummation of a deal looked good.

6. Subject is also trying to work out a deal with SOMOZA regarding export of Nicaraguan meat. Previous dealings with a man from S&W fell through when this chap tried to "go around" Subject by dealing direct with Nicaraguan meat exporters. At present Subject is dealing with SOMOZA to buy meat from CARNIC and IFAGAN to sell in Miami to the Northwestern Meat Company, owned by Elpidio NUÑEZ. In return for his cooperation in the meat business, SOMOZA is to be given a 38% slice of the profits. The remainder would be split up as follows: 16% to Edgardo BUTTARI, 13% to Frank CONDOM, and 33% to Subject. SOMOZA is trying to figure out some way to get his bite without paying U.S. income taxes so the matter of spreading the profits is still up in the air. Central South International Inc. has an account at the Capital National Bank of Miami; Subject showed me an irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of $48,000 issued by this bank to be used for the meat export deal.

FORWARDED BY STAFF TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~

7. As for possible sales of cattle to INFONAC, Subject is working on a deal with SOMOZA which may involve as much as a million and a half dollars.

8. Subject lives on commissions. He is now in debt to the tune of $9,500 of which he owes $1,600 to American Express and $3,900 to SOMOZA. When he has been down and out three persons have helped him with handouts of money to tide him over. These are Sixto MESA, in the construction business in Miami; Jose Luis GONZALEZ, in the lumber business; and "Tacho" SOMOZA. Subject plans to pay back all three every cent they have given him. He considers these handouts as loans. He is now trying to consolidate his debts through a loan from Diners Club. He is paying on his home mortgage at a rate of 5 3/4 percent, quite low by present-day standards. Two Cuban Negro friends of many-years standing live with him at his home. They are taxi drivers and each pays $25 a week to help defray household costs. One of these loyal retainers fired the first shot during the Pilon sugar mill raid pulled off by Subject's followers several years ago.

9. Contrary to popular belief, Subject does not own a piece of the Vizcaya restaurant in Miami although he could have been a partner had he made a $500 investment when the enterprise began. The owners are Oscar VILA, Aramis PIÑON, and the cook, named Tomás (lnu). VILA and PIÑON were with Subject in the Bay of Pigs invasion and both are old friends. VILA has been rumored involved in narcotics but Subject doesn't think he is. Some time ago the Miami Herald sent its lady gourmet reporter to do a story on the Vizcaya. She found it to her liking and wrote a favorable story but some unidentified character at the Herald told her that narcotics were pushed at the Vizcaya and that Subject was one of the owners. Publisher KNIGHT of the Herald had an investigation run before allowing the gourmet reporter's story to be printed. The restaurant was given a clean bill of health and the story was run.

10. One of the persons most prominently involved in blackening Subject's name is Rolando MASFERRER. Subject classifies him as the scum of Batista's Cuba. One gets the impression that Subject would be unhappy if MASFERRER, who Subject says has been involved in narcotics trafficking, were to say anything good about him.

FORWARDED BY [illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

SECRET

11. Subject's only other possible connection with narcotics involves a report he gave to Mr. DREW of the FBI. This was as follows: Subject has a friend named Carlos ARMAS who is skipper of a shrimp boat the "Sea Cat". ARMAS lives at 1800 NW 34th Street, Miami. At sea in British waters (around some British island or cay in the Caribbean). ARMAS has "fraternized" with a Cuban shrimper "El Costero" captained by Antonio LOPEZ. LOPEZ has told ARMAS that his boat, "El Costero", often carries aboard a small, very fast speedboat. While anchored in British waters this speedboat, with a crew of 3, is put overboard with a "package" on board. It disappears only to return sometime later minus the package but with large quantities of money. It then refuels from "El Costero" and heads for Cuba on its own power. Subject and ARMAS think it probable that the package contains narcotics and that Fidel CASTRO is raising money this way. Mr. DREW of the FBI told Subject to tell his story to the Coast Guard. Subject did but the CG said they were not interested because the smuggling was taking place in British waters. As far as Subject knows nothing has ever been done about this matter.

12. Subject says that "politically" his program breaks down to:

a. Keeping about 200 men ("my action men") ready for action in case of a sudden change in Cuba or a "go ahead" on raids against Cuba.

b. Keeping on good terms with Edgardo BUTTARI and Frank CONDOM who are both on good terms with "Bebe" REBOZO who is in turn, an intimate friend of President NIXON. (Subject asked me not to discuss or report this owing to its political sensitivity. It would seem prudent not to accentuate this matter).

c. Keeping good relations with Nicaragua and Haiti for possible future operations against Cuba.

13. I asked Subject if he had any dealings with Colonel Angel ARAUZ of Panama in connection with efforts to overthrow the government of Panama. He said that ARAUZ had tried to get him, Subject, to furnish arms, support, and influential

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

friends in the Miami area. Subject successfully avoided ARAUZ when he showed up in Miami. ARAUZ is now in Venezuela where his wife's family is well connected with the COPEI Party. Subject is not in contact with ARAUZ.

14. Throughout our conversation Subject appeared sincere and anxious to make the facts known. He repeatedly stressed his respect for our organization as he has in the past. I believe he was being forthright and honest. He promised to keep in touch.

FORWARDED BY STAFF [illegible]
FOR FIELD DISSEMINATION

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT : HEREWITH ATTACHMENT (#1) TO HNMA-4324, 1 May 1969

Duplicate

SECRET

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
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RID:

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

DV-T52
GA-60
TUBE,GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
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COMMENTS

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2		28 APR 1969		
2.				
3. [redacted]				
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8. C/WH/C&N				WL
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10. PA			30 APR 1969	P
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16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 17 April 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER INMA 04315

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO. : Chief, WH/Miami

FROM : Chief of Station, Managua LF/B

SUBJECT : AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: FBI Report of 30 January 1969

The Station has seen a copy of an FBI report of 30 January 1969, concerning AMBIDDY-1, which indicates, among other things, that AMBIDDY reportedly claimed to have arranged an interview with Mr. Richard NIXON at the time the latter was a presidential candidate. Since the content and tone of this FBI report differ somewhat from what the COS, Managua, has learned in direct talks with AMBIDDY-1, there is attached (USC) a memorandum from the COS setting forth observations resulting from meetings with AMBIDDY in Managua.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

Attachment:
Memorandum (split transmission)
1. Right side HEREWITH
2. Left side, USC

Distribution:
O&1 - Chief, WH Division
2 - Chief, WH Miami

1 att.

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HNMA-4315	17 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-267437

SECRET

17 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel ARTIME Buesa

1. ARTIME comes to Managua frequently, always using LANICA Airlines and frequently flying over Cuba. He is aware of the possibility of a highjacking and says that he would never make it out of the Havana airport alive if the CASTRO Government were to get hold of him.

2. He explains his trips as legitimate business. One of his enterprises lies in obtaining fatigue uniforms, canteens, web gear, and similar equipment and supplies for the Nicaraguan National Guard. Another enterprise, in which he was involved a year or so ago, involved lumber and cabinet woods which he hoped to export from Nicaragua to the States. He dealt with a Nicaraguan businessman named MOLINA in this matter. It seems to have fallen through. At one point last year (1968) I heard that ARTIME was trying to serve as middleman for investments by KRUPP interests in Germany here. I have heard no more about this. A more recent line is Nicaraguan beef for export to the States. He says that he has made contact with the top man of the S & W restaurants in the States. This man, after checking samples of Nicaraguan beef, says he will buy all he can get. The supplier at this end would be CARNIC, a meat packing enterprise owned by President SOMOZA. (There is no doubt ARTIME could find a ready market in the States but he may be stymied by the import quotas, especially since Nicaragua over-exported to the States in 1968 and had troubles as a result.)

3. ARTIME drops by to see me at my home often although not on every trip. His visits to me have been less frequent of late. We have easy rapport. He knows who I represent.

s/c att: 1

HNMA-4315

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SECRET

201-267437

He is usually accompanied by Jose FERNANDEZ de la Torre, Manager of Distribuidora Inter-Americana, S. A. "Pepe" is a Cuban and a close friend of mine. He is ARTIME's closest friend in Nicaragua. ARTIME often stays at his home. On a couple of occasions ARTIME has been by to see me with another mutual Cuban friend, Primitivo ABLANEDO, who used to live at El Bluff on the East Coast. "El Gallego" ABLANEDO now lives in Managua and makes his living renting out dump trucks and construction and hauling equipment. On one occasion ARTIME came by with a Cuban I believe was named VILA. Mirta PADRON, another mutual Cuban friend (she teaches Spanish at the American Embassy) tells me that VILA owns a restaurant in Miami but that ARTIME has no connection with this enterprise. A couple of times ARTIME has come by with Frank CONDOM, a short, quiet, red-faced Cuban who owns some jewelry stores in Miami. CONDOM is now pretty well-off financially and is a good friend and business associate of "Bebe" REBOZO, who, in turn, is a close friend of President NIXON. I believe CONDOM and, perhaps REBOZO, may be involved in the meat deal.

4. ARTIME always comes with someone when he visits me--not because he feels need for a bodyguard as some suspect, but simply because he still doesn't know how to drive a car and I live some distance out of town. Our visits are pleasant, involve a scotch or two at most. The last two times ARTIME has not had anything to drink. We talk no operations or other such business. My personal views on dealing with CASTRO, especially on howwe should have dealt with him in the past, are rather hawkish and I think ARTIME finds these views pleasant to his ear although he is well aware that they are not "policy."

5. ARTIME told me some months ago--before the elections--of meeting with "Bebe" REBOZO. The meeting was arranged through CONDOM. ARTIME has not claimed to me to have met with Mr. NIXON either before or after he assumed the presidency. He has made it known, as is already well known, that REBOZO is close to the President. He has also speculated that REBOZO might have considerable say in formulation of the new

administration's Cuban policy. He expects this policy to be more hard-line but has not specifically said that REBOZO has said this would be so. He recently told me that some of my ideas on enforcing the economic blockade had been passed on to REBOZO.

6. In response to my queries as to what direction the new Cuba policy might take, ARTIME said in March 1969 that he did not expect the NIXON administration to address itself to the Cuban problem before May of this year. Then he expects a concerted effort to make the economic blockade work. If that does not yield results, he expects that a go-ahead will be given for the resumption of Cuban exile raids against Cuba from non-U.S. bases. He hopes to be the man chosen to lead in this endeavor. Again, in response to my questions, he said that exiles could be trained in Nicaragua. He favors using Haiti as the actual base of operations, i.e., the raiding parties would leave from there. He mentioned having talked with President DUVALIER and indicated that he has DUVALIER's approval for such operations.

7. ARTIME said that operations against Cuba would be designed to knock out shipping and port facilities. He has not recently referred to his earlier invasion plan as outlined in MANAGUA 6752 of 23 October 1968.

8. ARTIME is still as charming as ever, lot's of fun to be around socially--full of jokes, anecdotes, etc. He has not lost faith, is one of the few of what have been termed elsewhere "the old exile hacks" who have not given up. He really does seem determined to play a leading role in unseating CASTRO. He is beginning to go to fat a bit. I saw him in a bathing suit not long ago and thought that he would do well to get into trim if he hopes to lead in any military operation.

9. ARTIME has never made any discernable efforts to pry secrets from me; indeed, he seems to have taken special pains not to do so. He is mature and quite objective--can see various facets to just about any problem. I believe it is well worthwhile maintaining occasional contact with him.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT: HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO HNMA-4315,
17 April 1969 (ATT #1)

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1		6	
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5		10	

S E C R E T 082230Z APR 69 CITE ~~WH~~/MIAMI 3484 (NEBECKER ACTING)
WMIM

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

8 APR 69 IN 31505

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6936 (IN30512)

B. DIRECTOR 90113

1. APPRECIATE REF COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE LNYUMA INFORMALLY THAT WOFIRM HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME AND LEAVE DECISIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE INVESTIGATION OF HIS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TO LNYUMA DISCRETION.

2. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AN	ke
AB	X
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~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
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WH/C/SP	

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201-267437
15 April 69

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO ✓

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO:
FILE VR CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

S E C R E T 071744Z APR 69 CITE MANAGUA 6936 MANA

7 APR 69 IN 30512

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 98113

1. CONCUR IN REF SUGGESTED ACTION.

2. MANAGUA STATION HAS NO INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE TRAINING BASES.

3. FILE 201-267437.

S E C R E T

AC	RW
AD	X
	✓
	✓
I	✓
	✓
FI	

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

7 Apr 69
201-267437

ORIG: J. PICCOLO:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 \R. 1819
DATE: 4 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

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BY 30 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN E2 E, C/CI5

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)

SECRET 05 00 34 1 APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 90113

WH/MIAMI INFO: MANAGUA

REF: WH/MIAMI 3427 (IN 28439)

1. SUGGEST STATION INFORM LNYUMA THAT WOFIRM HAS NO ACTIVE OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME. MAY ALSO SAY THAT ARTIME HAS BEEN IN LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING UNIFORMS AND OTHER MATERIALS TO NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD, IS CONSIDERED TO BE FRIEND OF LNHARP, AND UNLESS MANAGUA HAS INFORMATION TO CONTRARY, ARTIME HAS NO TRAINING BASES FOR CUBAN EXILES IN NICARAGUA.

2. LNYUMA MAY OPEN ACTIVE FILE ON ARTIME IF SO DESIRED BUT THERE NO EVIDENCE AT HAND HE PREPARING ANOTHER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

3. FILE 201-267437.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
IL
PO
wh/cog

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/2/CR&N D.Burris (in draft)

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

201-267437
5 April 69

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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~~SECRET~~ 17

8

WH 8 ☐ RID COPY RI/AN, FI 2, SI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

517

S E C R E T 031327Z APR 69 CITE WH MIAMI 3427 (NEEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MANAGUA

3 Apr 69 IN 28439

1. DURING RECENT INFORMAL SESSION WITH LNYAPA MIAMI REP HE ASKED IF WOFIRM STILL HAD OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MANUEL ARTIME. ON BEING TOLD NO LOCAL INTEREST, HE SAID ARTIME IS NOW IN THE EXPORT-IMPORT BUSINESS, HAS CONTACTS WITH THE NICARAGUAN MILITARY, AND IS USING NICA AIRLINES TO SHIP EXPORT-IMPORT MERCHANDISE. SAID ARTIME HAD SHIPPED MEDICAL SUPPLIES AMONG OTHER ITEMS TO NICARAGUA.

2. LNYUMA REP OBVIOUSLY SUSPECTS ARTIME IS INVOLVED IN ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN NICARAGUA WHICH MAY BE BACKED BY WOFIRM. AT PRESENT HE UNDECIDED WHETHER TO OPEN AN ACTIVE FILE ON ARTIME OR TO DROP THE MATTER. SEEKING STATION ADVICE.

3. REQUEST COMMENTS.

4. FILE: 201-267437.

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Files
201-267437
3 April 69

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 26 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: 105-2617 (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

201-300086
DBC -46353
20 MAR 69
FBI
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
< NICARAGUA
HEAD OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY MOVEMENT. SUBJ CONTACTED BY JORGE ROBLEJO LORIE /201-300086/ RE SECURING FREEDOM POLITICAL PRISONERS CUBA.

R 6904021210

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(7-46)

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(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< CUBA
OPERATES MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

201-294682
DBC -47308
18 MAR 69
FBI

R 6904110968

FILE IN 201- 267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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14-00000

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-018
DBC -46426
12 MAR 69
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
PROMINENT ANTI-CASTRO LEADER, MIAMI

R 6904100167

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437 019-300-018
SEX M DOB ? DBC -45436
28 FEB 69
CIT ? FBI
OCC ?
CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI WHO FORMERLY IN CHARGE ABORTED BAY OF PIGS INVASION CUBA. ARTIME LATER OPERATED TRAINING CAMPS NICARAGUA. RPDLY HAS QUANTITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION NICARAGUA WHICH WANTS TO SELL TO GOVT HAITI. ARTIME RECENTLY VISITED HAITI AND WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI.

R 6903200234

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID,
FILLMORE, EVELYN EJ-562
RID/AN GA50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Chrono detached ah

MICROFILMED
FEB 24 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C/OP		2? FEB 1969	27 Feb	K
2. DC/WH/COG		27 FEB	1969	
3. C/WH/COG		28 FEB 1969		
4.				
5. Nancy Gratz		10 March 1969		NG
6.				
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16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
11 Feb 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 00544

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
C Current Rumors in PBRUMEN Exile Community

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
FEB 24 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. As usual the first month of 1969 featured a large number of rumors making the rounds in the PBRUMEN exile community. While we normally tend to ignore such rumors, we are forwarding a couple of tidbits because they relate to GPVALIANT.

2. The first of these rumors deals with a new group which has presumably been formed for the purpose of trying to deal through GPVALIANT. Among those in the group are Carlos Prio, Lincoln Rodon, Juan J. Remos, Sergio Carbo, and Edgardo Butari. This group reportedly meets every Thursday at different houses. The last meeting in January was held at the home of Lincoln Rodon. At this meeting Prio presumably stated that Butari was a better contact to GPVALIANT than is Emilio Nunez Portuando. The general consensus was that Butari is a better contact because he is a business partner of Bebe Roboso and everyone knows Reboso's influence with GPVALIANT. The rumor mill has it that the group intends to pretend that it favors political and democratic solutions to the PBRUMEN problem but that they really seek armed intervention. In this same connection Father O'Farril has recently told AMPALM-4 that AMBIDDY-1 is once more connected with WOFIRM and that AMCORE-2 has joined him. The rumor mill says further that AMBIDDY-1 and AMCORE-2 are planning to open training camps once again with the tacit encouragement of the above group. According to AMPALM-4 O'Farril himself does not agree with the version of AMBIDDY-1 and AMCORE-2 wanting to establish training camps. O'Farril feels that the solution AMBIDDY-1 is looking for is through agreements between LNFORT (GPVALIANT) and the Soviet Union.

3. WIBALDA has picked up information quite similar to that learned through AMPALM-4. He also has reported the existence of this group and said that they are collecting money from the refugees in order to buy arms and equipment to overthrow AMTHUG-1. According to WIBALDA important members of Alpha-66, Segundo Frente, DRE, Autenticos, and Ortodoxos are involved even though these organizations themselves are not participating as groups in the movement.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

FEB 11 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D- 19-126-65/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-544

DATE
TYPED: 10 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267437

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-544

4. Another rumor has it that AMOTEX-59 is also conspiring in plans for future armed action against PBRUMEN.

5. The above information is being forwarded strictly as unfounded and unconfirmed rumors. We are passing it along only because it represents another indication of what the exiles are expecting from GPVALIANT. We find the rumor concerning AMBIDDY-1 particularly interesting and suspect that it may be an outgrowth of the recent report we have received from AMCHALK-1 that AMBIDDY-1 has been contacted by ACSI.

George T. Copsidas

George T. COPSIDAS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE ACCOUNT ANTICIPATED INFILTRATION
ATTEMPT CUBA

100-009-014
DRC -43715
04 FEB 69
FBI
P4

R 6903070491

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9-61)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 30 JANAURY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 30 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME BUESA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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4		8	

ACTION WH 2

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, [illegible], WH/COG 2, ADDP

HALT

S E C R E T 041527Z AUG 68 CITE MANAGUA 6689

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO JMCOBRA

201-267437 ✓

4 Sep 68 IN 34870

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA VISITED COS MANAGUA NIGHT 3 SEP. DEEPLY DISTRESSED, REPORTED HIS MOTHER, DRA. OTILIA BUESA BEAUJARDIN, OVER 80, GRAVELY ILL IN HAVANA, NOT EXPECTED LIVE MUCH LONGER. ARTIME SPOKE WITH PRESIDENT SOMOZA 3 SEP ASKING HELP IN OBTAINING PERMISSION FOR MOTHER LEAVE CUBA. SOMOZA PROMISED CALL MEXICAN PRESIDENT GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ TO INTERCEDE WITH FIDEL CASTRO.

2. ARTIME ASKED COS IF WOFIRM COULD HELP IN ANY WAY, PERHAPS THROUGH DIAZ ORDAZ WHO HE CONSIDERS BEST CHANNEL TO CUBAN GOVERNMENT. FEELS CASTRO MIGHT BE WILLING LET HIS MOTHER LEAVE TO PROVE HE IS "HUMANITARIAN" OR TO KEEP ON GOOD SIDE OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

3. COS EXPRESSED SYMPATHY, SAID DID NOT KNOW WHAT, IF ANYTHING, COULD BE DONE, BUT WOULD RELAY REQUEST TO HQS.

SECRET

d

AN Z
AB X
IN
PS
~~BX~~
DES NFD
FI

SECRET

201-267437
4 Sep 68

CS C

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

ORIG: Paul E. Gerst:jls
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 5 September 1968

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 6
2 7
3 8
4 9
5 10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-267437

CONF: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR RI/AN WH8 ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 05 22 30z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 30572

TO MANAGUA INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMCOBRA

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6689 (IN 84970)*

1. ASSURE ARTIME HQS WILL CONSIDER WAYS WE MIGHT INDIRECTLY RENDER ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE TO DO SO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS MOTHER'S CHANCES OF GETTING EXIT PERMIT. HE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT COULD PROVOKE NEGATIVE RESPONSE IN VIEW CASTRO'S KNOWN ANIMOSITY TOWARD WOFIRM.

2. FOR MEXICO: ASSUME YOU AGREE THAT DIRECT WOFIRM APPEAL SUGGESTED REF MAY NOT BE DESIREABLE FOR REASON STATED ABOVE PLUS POSSIBILITY LIRAMA-1 MIGHT CONCLUDE ARTIME IS WOFIRM AGENT. IF YOU HAVE ANY ALTERNATE SUGGESTIONS PLEASE ADVISE. OTHERWISE HQS BELIEVES HUMANITARIAN APPEAL THROUGH ARTIME'S OWN CONTACTS IS BEST APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BA~~
~~DE MUD~~
FI
WH/C/OP

C/WH/2
C/WH/1

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

CS COPY

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

201-267437
5 Sept 1968

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG: Paul E. Oberst:jls
UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 5 September 1968

SECRET

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1	6
2	7
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN WH8 ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 05 22 30z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 30572

TO MANAGUA INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMCOBRA

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6689 (IN 84970)*

1. ASSURE ARTIME HQS WILL CONSIDER WAYS WE MIGHT INDIRECTLY RENDER ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE TO DO SO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS MOTHER'S CHANCES OF GETTING EXIT PERMIT. HE WILL READILY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR DIRECT INVOLVEMENT COULD PROVOKE NEGATIVE RESPONSE IN VIEW CASTRO'S KNOWN ANIMOSITY TOWARD WOFIRM.

2. FOR MEXICO: ASSUME YOU AGREE THAT DIRECT WOFIRM APPEAL SUGGESTED REF MAY NOT BE DESIREABLE FOR REASON STATED ABOVE PLUS POSSIBILITY LIRAMA-1 MIGHT CONCLUDE ARTIME IS WOFIRM AGENT. IF YOU HAVE ANY ALTERNATE SUGGESTIONS PLEASE ADVISE. OTHERWISE HQS BELIEVES HUMANITARIAN APPEAL THROUGH ARTIME'S OWN CONTACTS IS BEST APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/2

C/WH/1

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

201-267437

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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DISSEM BY: PER #

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DCI

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5		10	

INFO

FILE, VR D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CSRF, C/WH6
C/WH/COG 5,

SECRET 232102Z AUG 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0699 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

[illegible]

23Aug68 IN 77099

4

REF: DIRECTOR 26796X*

1. MANUEL ARTIME CONTACTED BY STAFF OFFICER FROM JMWAVE, WHO IS SHORTLY TO LEAVE AREA, AND GIVEN MESSAGE.

2. ARTIME EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT KNIGHT HAD SENT PERSONAL EMISSARY

SECRET

BT

C/S Comment: *KNIGHT requested JMCOBRA have some appropriate officer contact Mr. Artime and thank him for his thoughtfulness and courageous offer.

201-267437

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG: RICHARD HELMS
UNIT: DIRECTOR
EXT: 6161
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1968

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: DCI ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/AF RR

C/WH/COG 5 C/WH6

C/WH/[illegible]

SECRET 22 2006Z AUG 68 CITE DIRECTOR 26796

TO JMCOBRA

RYBAT

FROM KNIGHT

1. AM IN RECEIPT TODAY OF TELEGRAM WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN ANY EVENT OF INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY PLEASE RELY ON ME AND MY MEN UNCONDITIONALLY ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD STOP SIGNED MANUEL ARTIME, BAY OF PIGS INVASION COMMANDER, 1270 NORTHEAST 85 ST. MIAMI FLORIDA UNQUOTE

2. PLEASE HAVE SOME APPROPRIATE OFFICER CONTACT MR. ARTIME AND THANK HIM FOR HIS THOUGHTFULNESS AND COURAGEOUS OFFER. RECOGNIZE THIS APPROACH PRESENTS YOU WITH CONTACT PROBLEM, BUT HANDLE IT AS BEST YOU CAN, INCLUDING USE OF INNOCENT PERSON IF YOU PREFER.

(END OF MESSAGE)

201-269437

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C. [illegible]
ACTING DD/P
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION 297 WHP ☐ NO COPY

INFO FILE VR RITAN/WH/COG 8 DDP ADDP CS/DO

CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI 5/IA 2 SOD 6 HALA

[illegible] 32

S E C R E T 071937Z JUL 68 CITE MANAGUA 6617 (TRECKLER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE

1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ACOS 7 JULY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM HIS WIFE IN MIAMI ADVISING THAT SOMEONE HAD BEEN TRYING CONTACT HIM. AMBIDDY-1 ASSUMES THIS MIGHT BE HIS HQS CASE OFFICER AND WISHES TO ADVISE HQS THAT HE WILL BE RETURNING TO MIAMI ON 8 JULY.

2. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO PICKED UP IN 2 JULY MEETING WITH AMBIDDY-1 ON EVENTS THAT OCCURRED PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI FIRST WEEK JULY:

A. (FNU) BLANCA ROBLES, PANAMA CONSUL IN MIAMI CONTACTED AMBIDDY-1 AND TOLD HIM PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF HACIENDA WHO WAS VISITING IN U.S. WANTED TO MEET WITH AMBIDDY-1 TO DISCUSS UNSPECIFIED URGENT MATTER. 201-782436

B. EUGENE MAXIMILLIAN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, TOLD AMBIDDY-1 THAT PRESIDENT DUVALLIER WANTED TO SEE HIM. PURPOSE WAS TO CARRY PRIVATE MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER TO PRESIDENT SOMOZA. CLAIMED THAT IF AMBIDDY-1 DID THIS DUVALLIER WOULD RELEASE THE SON OF LEON CANTAVE FROM PRISON. SOMOZA HAS GIVEN AMBIDDY-1 PERMISSION TO MAKE THE TRIP. ACCORDING AMBIDDY-1, HE AND SOMOZA FIGURE THIS IS A PLAY BY DUVALIER TO TRY OPEN MORE DOORS ACCEPTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA.

CIT: HAITI

OCC: DIPLOMAT

2X

MICROFILMED AUG 1 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN 2 FI WH/1/N

ES

ABSTRACT X INDEX X

1P

SECRET

CS COPY

201-267437

7 Jul 68

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

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ACTION Wukoef ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH 8 [illegible]

AB [illegible] PI

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

mava

S E C R E T 121549Z CITE MANAGUA 6377

12 DEC 67 IN 10885

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBIDDY

file: AMBIDDY-1

REF: MANAGUA 6328 (IN 87575)

1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD BARKER HE TRIED CONTACT "MISTER WILSON" (GROWERY) SEVERAL TIMES BY PHONE AT NUMBER GIVEN HIM EARLY NOVEMBER BY WILSON. PERSONS ANSWERING DID NOT KNOW ANY "WILSON". AS RESULT BROKEN CONTACT, AMBIDDY PASSED ON ONE BIT OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING SOVIET POLICY ON CUBA TO LNERGO MIAMI.

2. PLS CABLE CORRECT PHONE NUMBER AND NOTIFY PERSONS THAT END TO EXPECT CALLS FOR "WILSON".

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-267437
12 Dec 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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3		7	
4		8	

7

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

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UNIT [illegible] TIME 1007 BY 5

INFO FILE VR WH 8 CI/OPS CI/OA [illegible]

MANA

6 Nov 67 IN 87575

S E C R E T 06160 CITE MANAGUA 6320

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBIDDY

AMBIDDY-1 HA[illegible]OST PHONE NUMBER OF GROWERY WHOM HE KNOWS AS "MIST[illegible] WILSON". WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CONTACT AT HIS M[illegible]I RESIDENCE 6 OR 7 NOVEMBER.

S E C R E T

AN [illegible] 1

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

201-267437
6 Nov 1967

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE DOCUMENT

201-819744
DBB -98872
31 OCT 67
FBI

WAS 053-500

R 6801101234

201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9-60)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: JOSE BENITO PASTORA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN
(BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

1 Sept 67

SUBJECT: (Optional)

3P

FROM: WH/COG/CICS/Laura Ca[illegible]rry

EXTENSION: 5106

NO. CSCI 316/03615-67

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/WH/COG/CICS	28/8		STR	
2. WH/3/NICARAGUA				
3. C/I/O/WH CI/Liaison 2-C-35	31 AUG 1967			
4.				
5. RID/AN				
6. RID/MIS				
7. RID/PS				
8.				
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MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-267437

1 SEP 1967

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1 SEP 1967

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Dr. Fau ARAGON

1. A fairly reliable source reported the following information concerning Dr. ARAGON:

a. According to Source, ARAGON is a well-known Communist at the University of Leon in Nicaragua.

b. He writes to the following addresses:

Lic. Roger ARGENAL Araux
2515 Rio Grande
Austin, Texas 78705

Dr. Enrique GALLO Zeledon
P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00831

MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

c. ARAGON is reported to be a good friend of one Allan GROSS Quiros.

2. The attached CS 311/14105-65 of 22 November 1965 contains information on one Oscar ARAGON Valdes which may be identifiable with Subject.

3. The files of this Office did not reveal any pertinent identifiable information on either Dr. Enrique GALLO Zeledon or Lic. Roger ARGENAL Araus.

CS COPY

B-201-819744

201-267437

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. For further information regarding one Allan GROSS Quiros, you are referred to our CSCI 316 03614-67 being disseminated to the Bureau.

5. It is requested that your files be checked for any information they may contain on ARGENAL and GALLO. We would appreciate being apprised of the results of any investigation you might undertake in regard to this matter.

CSCI-316/03615-67

Attachment

28 August 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS:L. Carberry:jaf

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1-CI/LIA
1-CI/R&A
1-WH/2/Nicaragua
1-WH/COG/CICS
1-Originator

Source: AMBIDDY

File: 201-267437
201-819744

Based on: LX 3254 of 12
June 1967
CSCI 316/03614-67

26 — LA PRENSA 25 DE AGOSTO DE 1967

Artime Invita a Revolución Cristiana

Hablando con intensa emoción ante un grupo de empresarios, empleados y obreros, el Dr. Manuel Artime hizo el martes por la noche una rápida revisión del drama de Cuba, invitando a evitar que la sociedad cristiana de Nicaragua enfrente el materialismo dialéctico del comunismo, con el "Materialismo práctico", igualmente destructor.

"No nos dejemos quitar la palabra revolución", proclamó Artime.

El jefe de la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos, que llegó a Nicaragua por décima vez desde el fracaso de la invasión, habló de manera independiente y sin manifestar liga con ningún movimiento, con ninguna agrupación.

Sin embargo, por la insistencia que hizo en citar constantemente las frases de Cristo como doctrina opuesta a la penetración comunista, el combatiente cubano pareció estar hablando como uno de los seglares que la Iglesia Católica utiliza ahora, conforme las nuevas modalidades, para difundir su doctrina.

[illegible] HISTORICO

Empezó el Dr. Artime por hacer una exposición resumida del surgimiento del marxismo, su ideario, su filosofía y sus proyecciones hacia el establecimiento de una sociedad mundial materialista.

[illegible] contrapuso, no como ideario político [illegible], sino como una doctrina que puede impulsar definitivamente al hombre hacia la búsqueda de una [illegible] firme al comunismo, la palabra de Cristo.

Lo hizo de manera hermosa, [illegible] in[illegible]vitó a los cristianos a militar "no con tibieza", porque a los tibios es a los que Cristo dijo arrojar por la boca, prefiriendo a los fríos, o los calientes, en los casos extremos.

Después de exponer el pensamiento cristiano y los pasajes más hermosos e imperecederos de los Evangelios, el Dr. Artime expuso por qué en su opinión una sociedad está amenazada de la penetración comunista, cuando la afligen los siguientes males:

—Los religiosos "puros", que nunca entran en la política, porque dicen que la política es sucia y pueden contaminar su alma.

—Los demagogos que dicen al obrero sus derechos, únicamente, y no sus deberes y al capitalista el derecho arrollador de su capital, pero no sus obligaciones.

—Los mercaderes que usan el templo, es decir, la Iglesia, exclusivamente para su propio beneficio y crean una religión de puertas para adentro, sin predicar la verdadera esencia del cristianismo ni ponerla en práctica.

Otros males que, según el Dr. Artime, predisponen para la instalación del comunismo, son:

—Los indiferentes, que creen que cuando el peligro está a las puertas "eso no es con ellos".

—Los cristianos de caridad farisaica, que regalan 1.000 pesos, cargados de joyas, para salir en primera página en los periódicos.

—Los que están con Dios y con el diablo y predican una moral pública, pero tienen otra moral privada, que deja que desear.

—Los estériles, como la higuera bíblica, que no producen nada.

EL FRACASO Y EL FUTURO

Bajo continuas preguntas, el Dr. Artime analizó el fracaso de Bahía de Cochinos y explicó como un pueblo encarcelado horas antes por centenares de miles, no pudo responder al llamado de la revolución anticomunista y la brigada de 1.400 hombres que atacaba tuvo que enfrentarse con 60.000 soldados protegidos por tanques y artillería.

"Y la protección aérea que hubiera dado el [illegible] en nuestro favor, no nos fue suplida", comentó Artime.

El combatiente de Cochinos insistió en que "sangre cubana, exclusivamente, volverá a derramarse para liberar a Cuba", y que él ha sufrido lo que un sacerdote le predijo a él una vez, como parte de su redención después de haberse olvidado de Dios.

201-267437

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 2

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[redacted] 28

ACTION C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/SOD 3, C/CI, DDP, ADDP

WAVE

S E C R E T 171642Z CITE JMWAVE 7746

DIRECTOR DESENSITIZED 17 Jun 67 IN 92320

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 6160 (IN 88476)

AMWORLD CACHE SAFELY UNLOADED AND STORED JMWAVE NIGHT 16 JUNE. WILL MAKE PRELIMINARY CHECK AND ADVISE CONDITION.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

AN/CI	FI	
~~FS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

S

201-267437
17 June 1967

WHEN FILLED IN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

8 40 AM

FROM: GL

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2		21 JUN 1967		
2. ADC/WH/2				
3.				
4. WH/2/N				
5.				
6. C/WH/COG/CI				MR
7.	~~FA~~			fa
8. ~~[illegible]~~	~~FW~~			
9.	FA			fu
10.				
11.				
12. RID/AN-GL				GL
13.				
14. RID/MIS				CW
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

– suggest this be reclassified to AMBIDDY-1's 201 since they are *his* agents. no?

Barry – What was ref about? We should know about that since appears refer to AMBIDDY.

Bc to FA & 9: See ref attached.

18 JUL 1967

Recommend reclassification of both docs to AMBIDDY-1 201-267437. If there are dissenters let them stand up and ... lets discuss.
x 7657 Barry

12: Please reclassify attached to 201-267437.

AN L	(FI)	
~~DB~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X INDEX	FILE TITLE
		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-267437 ~~53-6-4~~

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	16 June 1967	HNMA 03869

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Managua		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Traces on Persons Mentioned in Letters from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HNMW-2005, 5 June 1967

ACTION : None, For Your Information

1. In reply to the request for traces in Paragraph 2 of reference, James D. ZABOTH personally conducted name checks at SAC and OSN records and offices. There were no SAC traces on any of the persons listed. OSN traces follow:

a. Rodolfo JEREZ Suarez
DOB: 7 September 1917
Owner of Venus Shirt Company in Managua; brother of Julio JEREZ Suarez, a Cuban-oriented Communist who has been active in the FSLN and has been in exile in Costa Rica. Rodolfo JEREZ was found guilty by a board of investigation on 30 July 1959 of promoting and directing the subversive movement "Accion Civica" in support of armed invasion against the Government of Nicaragua. (Managua Station records indicate he was arrested 29 May and released on 17 July 1959.) OSN maintained a record of his travel to Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the United States between 1959 and 1963. On 27 January 1960 he was reported to be second in command of terrorism in Managua for "Accion Civica", the internal front of a revolutionary group. On 10 November 1960 he was reported to be hiding arms in Managua, along with others in a revolutionary group. On 13 November 1960,

continued.....

JDZABOTH:wcg
16 June 1967

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

201-267437
~~53-6-4~~

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HNMA-3869	DATE JUN 16 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 53-6-4

he was reported to be trying to organize a commercial strike in Leon and Managua. He was arrested in November 1960 as a known conspirator in an attempted revolution and for having been involved in the clandestine movement of revolutionaries across the Costa Rican border.

b. Jose FERNANDEZ de la Torre
On 2 March 1962 a report said he was a Cuban refugee who talks anti-Communist but was actually sent to Nicaragua to make Communist propaganda. On 8 May 1965 he vouched for the entry into Nicaragua of Jesus FERNANDEZ Suarez, a Cuban (no OSN or Station traces). (Note: FERNANDEZ is known personally to ZABOTH and to the Chief of Station, whose opinions about him are that he is a Cuban businessman who is both anti-Communist and anti-Castro because of the loss of his business interests in Cuba. His principal business in Cuba involved distribution of the products of Procter and Gamble, the soap and chemical company. He is now manager of Distribuidora Inter-Americana S.A., an import/export and distribution firm in Managua.) On 18 January 1967 the Guatemalan Security Service requested traces on the subject, along with a list of other Cubans. No reason for the request was given to OSN.

c. Orlando CASTRILLO S., Bachiller
On 20 November 1965 he wrote a letter to La Prensa, the opposition newspaper in Managua, asking them for 30,000 copies of an anti-SOMOZA caricature in order to sell them and raise funds for university student grants.

d. German ARELLANO
On 17 January 1967 a report said he had bought $5,000 worth of arms in Miami for illegal shipment to Nicaragua, and they had been confiscated by authorities at Miami. (Station card shows subject's name as German ARELLANO Morales. See JMWAVE-5188, 20 January 1967 and JMWAVE-5247, 24 January 1967 for further details of this report.)

2. There are no OSN, SAC or Station traces on the other persons mentioned in letter number 2 of the reference.

3. Both ZABOTH and the Chief of Station have discussed with AMBIDDY-1 the "intelligence net" mentioned by the reference. The stated Station position was "we are happy to maintain contact with you and to discuss this matter from time to time on an informal and personal basis, but the policy of our organization is that we do not engage in intelligence activities in a friendly country except in coordination with the local government. Therefore, even though you assure us that General SOMOZA knows and approves this activity, we would have to have a direct request from him before we could cooperate with you in any kind of an official capacity." This appears to have sufficied to keep our lines open to those involved without committing us to do anything more than listen.

Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 12

ACTION c/whcog 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible] C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CA 3, [illegible]

SECRET 131417Z CITE MANAGUA 6168

13 JUN IN 88476

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

(UN 35114)

REF: MANAGUA 6157

1. NICARAGUAN PHASE REF OP COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE, SECURELY, AS PLANNED, AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. COOPERATION COLONEL BRENES AND ROBERT BARTLETT COMPLETE.

2. PETREL DEPARTED EL BLUFF EARLY MORNING 12 JUNE. COS, ZABOTH AND DAHLEIDEN RETURNED MANAGUA SAME DAY. DAHLEIDEN RETURNING MIAMI 13 JUNE LANICA FLIGHT 410.

3. COS INFORMING COL GENIE, GENERAL MONTIEL AND PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF SUCCESSFUL REMOVAL CACHE.

4. REQUEST WAVE COMPLIMENT PETREL CREW ON EXCELLENT WORK AT EL BLUFF.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

☐ ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

☐ ☐ ☐

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 33 PER [illegible]

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

UNIT TIME BY

FILE, VR, DDP

S E C R E T 122304Z CITE JMWAVE 7675 12 Jun 67 IN 87925

DIRECTOR

TYPIC YOBITE

SITREP 10-12 JUNE 1967

I. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

A. PV.

(IN 87923)

JMWAVE 7674 REPORTS STATION PLANS TO EXPLOIT VENEZUELAN BOYCOTT OF SPANINSH SHIP ON 12 JUNE.

B. MARITIME.

PETREL DEPARTED EL BLUFF, NICARAGUA, 121045Z AFTER LOADING 18 TONS CARGO AND PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE RETURNING TO BASE.

C. SP.

1. INS PROCESSED 175 AIRLIFTED REFUGEES PLUS 4 THIRD-COUNTRY ARRIVALS FROM MEXICO ON 9 JUNE. CAC SCREENED 36 MALES. OF JMWAVE INTEREST: EMPLOYEE PLANNING DEPARTMENT ELECTRIC ENTERPRISE CAMAGUEY CITY WITH GENERAL INFO ON ENTERPRISE AND ON UNION ACTIVITIES. GROUP INCLUDED 69 FEMALES 53 CHILDREN 15 MALES OVER 60 YEARS.

2. INS AND CAC ALSO PROCESSED AND SCREENED GROUP

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES C
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CA
CICS
CI/OS
RR
F
SS
RS
ESEC

ACTION 7

INFO C/[illegible] ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

FILE VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 6, C/SOD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 011405Z CITE JMWAVE 7475

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

1 JUN 67 IN 79467

REF JMWAVE 7476 (IN 79491)

IDENTITY: MR. JOHN H. HARPER.

SECRET

BT

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

7P.

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN

EXTENSION:

NO. LX-3254

DATE 12 June 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. [redacted]				
2.				
3.				
4. RI Files				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. RID/SOT	RID/AN			RID/SOT
13.				
14.				
15.				201-267437

MICROFILMED
MAR 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN	68	[redacted]
PS		
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X	

FORM 8-63 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

MICROFILMED
MAR 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LX-3254
translation

Miami, 12 June 1967

°Cuban propaganda in western hemisphere

Dear Jim:

Just a few lines to inform you:

1. (Mr) Allan GROSS* Quiros frequently writes to the following addresses in the United States: (No 201*)

J.B. PASTORA* NO 201 → contact of Allan Gross Quiros
Δ P.O. Box 676
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Anibal IBARRA* Gonzales No 201
Δ 1515 Engel Rd. #423
Lawrence, Kansas 66044

Leonel GARCIA* No 201
Δ The School for International Training of the Experiment in International Living
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

X No 201

(Dr.) ARAGON,* Communist like him and well-known in the Communist circles at the University of Leon, writes to the following addresses:

(Lic) Roger ARGENAL* Araus No 201 → contact of Dr Aragon
Δ 2515 Rio Grande
Austin, Texas 78705

(Dr) Enrique GALLO* Zeledon No 201
Δ P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00931

(Dr). Eduardo BISOGNI* No 201
Δ Sucre 1461 16 281
Buenos Aires, Argentina

Refer to my previous letter for data on these two individuals.

2. Incidentally, my secretary Eugenio Claude spoke with a friend named Pedro Pino who lives at 1132 W 71 St., Hialeah, Florida, 33012. PINO told him that his friend, Lourdes BELLO, who lives at 1124 West 71 Pl., Hialeah, Florida and who has lived there for only a short while, has received correspondence which must have been for the previous tenant at that address. This correspondence came from Cuba and consisted of subversive propaganda. All the correspondence is addressed to:

address of Cuban propaganda from U. Masa

(Sr) Carlos GONZALEZ* No 201
1124 West 71 Pl.
Hialeah, Florida USA

The sender of this correspondence appears as:

U. Masa *
Apartado 6240
La Habana, CUBA

No 201

Sender of correspondence of propaganda to Carlos Gonzalez

Being that I was out and that my secretary knows Rafael LLANEZ who works for Sangenis who works for you, gave him this correspondence so that he might sent it to you. I have sent you the propaganda which so far has arrived.

3. I have received from my father, in Cuba, a note with a message in which he tells me that he intends to leave Cuba under a false name. His message is very clear:

I am trying to arrange that the "nucleus" of Gonzalito Penaranda leaves soon. NUMBER IS 117838.

Of course, he is referring to the Airlift from Habana to Miami. I ask you to inform me if you can do anything in this regard as I think it is the last chance my parents have of leaving.

4. Please tell me if it is certain that Fidel intends to go to EXPO 67 in Canada for the 26 of July as it has been rumored. If he is going, I would like to know if Commander Vallejo will go with him as his chief doctor. When I was imprisoned, I received many messages from Vallejo telling me that he was not a Communist and never would change.

REGARDS: ______________
Ignacio

LX-3254

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 12 de Junio de 1967

Querido Jim:

Solo unas letras para informarte:

1-El senor Allan Gross Quiros suele escribir frecuentemente a las siguientess direcciones en los Estados Unidos:

J.B.Pastora
P.O. Box 676
Brattleboro,Vermont 05301

Anibal Ibarra Gonzalez
1515 Engel Rd # 423
Lawrwnce,Kansas 66044

ELeonel Garcia
The School for International Training
of the Experiment in International Living
Battleboro Vermont 05301

El Dr. Aragon,comunista como el ,connotado en los circulos comunistas de la Universidad de Leon,escribe a las siguientes direcciones:

Lic, Roger Argenal Arauz
2515 Rio Grande
Austin Texas 78705

DrEnrique Gallo Zeledon
P.O. Box 21986
University Station
Rio Piedras,Puerto Rico 00931

Dr. Eduardo Bisogni
Sucre 1461 16 281
Buenos Aires Argentina

(Recordar informes de carta anterior sobre estos dos individuos)

2-Accidntalmente,mi secretario Eugenio Claude,hablo con un amigo llamado Pedro Pino,que vive en 1132 W 71 st.Hialeah 33012,el cual le conto que su amigaLourdes Bello,que vive en 1124 West 71 PL.Hialeah,Fla.,y que vivia en esta direccion hacia poco,ha recibido una correspondencia que debe de ser para el inquilino anterior de dicha direccion,cuya correspondencia venia de CUBA y consistia de propaganda subversiva.Toda la correspondencia va dirigida a

D-19-5-52

CS COPY

201-267437

Central South Internacional Inc.
P O BOX 1853 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

(2)

Sr. Carlos Gonzalez
1124 West 71 PL
Hialeah Florida USA

El remitente de esta correspondencia aparece como:

U.Masa
Apartado 6240
La Habana CUBA.

Mi secretario,estando yo ausente y conociendo a Rafael Llaneza,que trabaja Sangenis,que trabaja para Vds.,le dio la correspondencia para que este se la enviara a Vds.De todos modos yo les envio el material de propaganda qu llegado hasta ahora.

3-He recibido de mi padre,en Cuba,una nota con un recado,donde me dice que va a intentar salir con nombre falso,y me envia un mensaje muy escueto:

Trata de conseguir que salga pronto el nucleo de Gonzalito Penaranda
~~SUYO~~-NUMERO ES [redacted] 117838.

Por supuesto,se trata de los Vuelos de la Libertad Habana-Miami.Les pido me informen si se puede hacer algo en este sentido,porque creo que es la unica oportunidad de que mis padres salgan.

4-Les pido me informen si es cierto que Fidel intenta ir a EXPO 67 en Canada para el 26 de Julio,como se ha rumorado.Si va,me interesa saber si el Comandante Vallejo va con el como su medico de cabecera.Estando preso recibi muchos recados de Vallejo,diciendome que el no era comunista y que nunca cambiaria.

ABRAZOS:

Ignacio

Central South Internacional Inc.
P. O. BOX 1458 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI FLA. 33138
CABLE: CENSOIN

(2)

Sr. Carlos Gonzalez
1124 West 71 PL
Hialeah Florida USA

El remitente de esta correspondencia aparece como:

U.Masa
Apartado 6240
La Habana CUBA.

Mi secretario,estando yo ausente y conociendo a Rafael Llaneza,que trabaja Sangenis,que trabaja para Vds.,le dio la correspondencia para que este se la enviara a Vds.De todos modos yo les envio el material de propaganda que ha llegado hasta ahora.

3-He recibido de mi padre,en Cuba,una nota con un recado,donde me dice que va a intentar salir con nombre falso,y me envia un mensaje muy escueto:

Trata de conseguir que salga pronto el nucleo de Gonzalito Penaranda. ~~CUYO~~-NUMERO ES ~~[illegible]~~ 117838.

Por supuesto,se trata de los Vuelos de la Libertad Habana-Miami.Les pido me informen si se puede hacer algo en este sentido,porque creo que es la unica opo tunidad de que mis padres salgan.

4-Les pido me informen si es cierto que Fidel intenta ir a EXPO 67 en Canada para el 26 de Julio,como se ha rumorado.Si va,me interesa saber si el Comanda te Vallejo va con el como su medico de cabecera.Estando preso recibi muchos recados de Vallejo,diciendome que el no era comunista y que nunca cambiaria.

ABRAZOS:

Ignacio

RADIO HABANA CUBA
APARTADO 70-26, LA HABANA, CUBA

La Habana, 15 de mayo de 1967
"AÑO DEL VIET NAM HEROICO"

Estimado amigo:

Como usted sabe, la OSPAAAL —Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Africa, Asia y América Latina— acordó celebrar el próximo día 26 de Julio la "JORNADA MUNDIAL DE SOLIDARIDAD CON CUBA".

Con ese motivo, RADIO HABANA CUBA organizó el concurso "Solidaridad con Cuba" que permitirá a ocho de nuestros oyentes de todo el Mundo disfrutar de una visita a nuestro país y participar en esa fecha en el acto central conmemorativo del inicio de la Revolución Cubana. Ahora, además, confeccionamos el ALBUM DE LA SOLIDARIDAD CON CUBA que contendrá las firmas de nuestros oyentes y amigos. Muchas de las hojas impresas que remitimos oportunamente a usted y a otros oyentes ya se encuentran con las firmas en nuestro poder.

Por otra parte, recibimos noticias de muchísimos amigos de la Revolución Cubana que se disponen a efectuar actividades múltiples que incluirán desde desfiles y concentraciones hasta actos artísticos y culturales, charlas, conferencias y exposiciones para celebrar así el inicio de la revolución en nuestro país y expresar su solidaridad con Cuba.

Como sabemos que usted es uno de nuestros amigos sinceros, pensamos que deseará aprovechar esta efemérides de significación extraordinaria para demostrar sus sentimientos de solidaridad hacia nuestro pueblo. En este caso nos gustaría que usted nos comunicara en cual de los actos que se organizan se dispone a participar o si junto con sus compañeros y amigos organiza algún otro acto. En espera de sus noticias en ese sentido, nos despedimos con saludos afectuosos y revolucionarios.

¡PATRIA O MUERTE!... ¡VENCEREMOS!

Maria Montero Triana
Resp. Dpto. Correspondencia
y Relaciones Internacionales

14-00000



LA HABANA
9 V '67
PERMISO
CUBA
13
CORREOS

SR. CARLOS GONZALEZ.
1124 West 71 P. L.
Hialeah, FLORIDA. U. S. A.

Via Aerea

Via Aerea

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267437
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

[redacted]
#2

ACTION
C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH/COG TIME 1700 BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2.

S E C R E T 081602Z CITE MANAGUA 6157

8 Jun 67 IN 85119

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF: MANAGUA 6153 (IN 81259)

AN	FI	
~~PS~~	DECT	
ABSTRACT X		

1. COLONEL GENIE TOLD COS 7 JUNE PRESIDENT SOMOZA APPRISED OF PLAN AND IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT.

2. ZABOTH AND DAHLEIDEN DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR EL BLUFF MORNING 8 JUNE TO MAKE FINAL INSPECTION CACHE. COS WILL FLY EL BLUFF SATURDAY 10 JUNE TO BE ON HAND FOR LOADING OP.

3. EVERYTHING PROCEEDING NICELY. EXPECT HAVE MATERIAL ON HIGH SEAS EARLY 12 JUNE. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-267437
8 June 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

3

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ACTION
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☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
FILE VR, WH8, WH/COG8, FI, FI/D

S E C R E T 061621Z CITE JMWAVE 1573

cow 6

6 Jun 67 83067

KOLASO INFO DIRECTOR

OOLONG ZRPERUSAL PBRUMEN

[illegible] HV/PETREL ASSIGNED SIGNAL PLAN GEPBAF/M FOR OPERATION "RECOVERY" TO NICARAGUA.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO: Chief of Station, Managua

INFO:

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: 6 Letters from AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See Para. 2.

1. Forwarded in split transmission are two letters from AMBIDDY-1 to his Headquarters Case Officer, which contain a number of interesting items concerning Nicaragua, some of which probably have already been discussed with Station officers. Paragraph 6 of HNMW-2010 of 29 May 1967 also contains pertinent extracts from another of AMBIDDY-1's letters.

2. We are initiating Headquarters traces on the individuals mentioned as comprising the intelligence net of letter No. 2. You will be advised of the results. We would appreciate Station traces on these persons.

Albert K. DANZIGER

Distribution:
2 - Managua w/atts. HW & USC

Attachment:
Two letters - split transmission

1 June 1967

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

CHARGED FROM RID/FI

201-267437
~~53-6-4~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HNMW-2005	DATE 5 [illegible]
CS COPY	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 53-6-4

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/2/CR&NIC	Phyllis Edwards	st	6312

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	1 JUN 1967	Edwin M. Terrell

CS copy
ABSTRACT X
ABSTRACT X

FORM 1-66 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MPO 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

30

ACTION

C/WH KOG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2

S E C R E T 031830Z CITE MANAGUA 6153 3 Jun 67 IN 812[illegible]

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF JMWAVE 7542 (IN 81201)

1. REF PLAN SATISFACTORY. NO INSPECTION WILL BE MADE.

2. ADVISE CAPTAIN CREW MEMBERS WILL BE NEEDED FOR HEAVY LABOR MOVING CACHE. STATION WILL ARRANGE FOR LOAN BARTLETT TRUCK. CCS [illegible] BE ON HAND.

3. WILL MEET DAHLEIDEN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

5

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 031504Z CITE JMWAVE 7542 (STEADMAN ACTING)

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

3 Jun 67 IN 81201

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF: A. MANAGUA 6151 (IN [illegible])

B. JMWAVE 7380 (IN 74455)

1. PETREL SCHEDULED DEPART HOME BASE 5 JUNE AND ARRIVE EL BLUFF 2330 HOURS ZULU 11 JUNE. PETREL WILL CHANGE NAME ENROUTE TO M/V FLETE AND WILL ENTER EL BLUFF WITH THIS NAME AND FLYING PANAMA FLAG. NO HOME PORT WILL BE SHOWN. IT IS HOPED CACHE CAN BE LOADED NIGHT 11 JUNE AND M/V FLETE DEPART EARLY 12 JUNE. REQUEST MANAGUA CONFIRM ABOVE PLAN SATISFACTORY AND THAT NO INSPECTION BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES WILL BE MADE.

2. WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN SCHEDULED ON LANICA FLIGHT 411 DEPARTING MIAMI 0800 HOURS LOCAL 6 JUNE AND ARRIVING 0820 HOURS MANAGUA TIME. PLEASE MEET.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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4		8	

[redacted] 7

ACTION c/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WMK TIME 1640Z BY G

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/SOD 3, C/CI, D/FI 2, CSDO

S E C R E T 011405Z CITE JMWAVE 7476

1 JUN 67 IN 79491

PRIORITY DIRECTOR , MANAGUA INFO PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF A. JMWAVE 7380 (IN 74455)

B. DIRECTOR 05207

1. REQUEST MANAGUA COMMENT RE LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS PETREL ENTRY EL BLUFF PER REF A.

2. PETREL CAN DEPART 5 JUNE AND ARRIVE EL BLUFF 11 JUNE. NO LOGISTIC SUPPORT WOULD BE NEEDED BY PETREL AT EL BLUFF. PETREL WILL FILE "NO FOREIGN PORT" ON DEPARTURE HOME BASE AS IS USUAL FOR OPERATIONAL TRIPS AND THEREFORE FIRST RETURN PORT MUST BE HOME PORT. WE PLAN TO LIGHTER MATERIAL DURING DARKNESS FROM PETREL TO JMWAVE CONTROLLED SAFE AREA IN KEYS AND THEN TRUCK TO SAFE STORAGE AREA. PETREL WILL THEN RETURN HOME PORT CLEAN.

3. PRESENT CAPTAIN OF PETREL WAS CAPTAIN OF AMWORLD MOTHER VESSEL (AKL) AND FAMILIAR LITEL BLUFF AND KNOWS MANAGER FISH PROCESSING PLANT AS DIABLO. DIABLO PROBABLY ROBERT BARTLETT. IF HEADQUARTERS DESIRES CACHE REMOVAL TO LOOK LIKE AMBIDDY RETURNING FOR HIS EQUIPMENT PETREL

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 7476 S E C R E T

CAPTAIN CAN LET HIMSELF BE SEEN BY BARTLETT AND POSSIBLY OTHERS THUS INDICATING IT AMBIDDY OP TO LOCALS. IF NOT DESIRED PETREL CAPTAIN WILL REMAIN OUT OF SIGHT WHILE AT EL BLUFF.

4. IF MANAGUA REPLY PARA 1 SATISFACTORY WILL SEND (IDEN) WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN, JMWAVE ORDANANCE OFFICER, TO MANAGUA VIA AIR O/A 6 JUNE OR DATE SET BY MANAGUA SO THAT HE MIGHT INSPECT CACHE PRIOR ARRIVAL PETREL. PLAN DAHLEIDEN RETURN JMWAVE VIA AIR AFTER CACHE LOADED ABOARD PETREL AND BE AVAILABLE ASSIST IN UNLOADING UPON PETREL RETURN.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R ET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES V

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

28

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CCS 3

SECRET 012147Z CITE MANAGUA 6151 1 Jun 67 IN 79834

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD **DESENSITIZED**

REF: JMWAVE 7476 (IN 79491)

1. MANAGUA UNABLE COMMENT ON JMWAVE 7380 AS HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED IT.

2. BELIEVE RECOVERY BY PETREL CAN BE MADE WITH NO DIFFICULTY. COLONEL BRENES CAN ARRANGE PORT CLEARANCE.

3. REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT THAT "DIABLO" IS ROBERT BARTLETT.

4. PRIMITIVO ABLANEDO BACK IN NICARAGUA. MET WITH COS 1 JUNE, RETURNING EL BLUFF 2 JUNE, WILL INFORM BRENES OF PLAN REMOVE ARMS BY SHIP. COS INFORMED COLONEL GENIE, CHIEF OFFICE NATIONAL SECURITY, OF PLAN REMOVE CACHE BY SEA. GENIE WILL INFORM PRESIDENT SOMOZA.

5. SEE NO OBJECTION HAVE PETREL CAPTAIN SEEN BY BARTLETT, BRENES AND OTHERS AT EL BLUFF.

6. WELCOME VISIT WALTER J. DAHLEIDEN. CABLE FIRM ETA.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

30

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH, C/CI, C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 240317Z CITE JMWAVE 7380 24 May 67 IN 74455

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA

DESENSITIZED

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF MANAGUA 6140 (IN 74295)

1. JMWAVE M/V PETREL CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ARRIVE EL BLUFF ABOUT 8 JUNE IF HQS DESIRES. PETREL CAPABLE HANDLING CARGO. WOULD PLAN USE CUBAN CREW WITH AMERICAN CASE OFFICER AND ORDNANCE OFFICER. APPEARS ORDNANCE OFFICER DESIREABLE TO INSPECT QUESTIONABLE EQUIP ON RETURN TRIP AND DEEP SIX ALL NOT WORK SALVAGING. IF MANAGUA STATION CAN ARRANGE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR NO INSPECTION PETREL AT EL BLUFF BELIEVE MOVEMENT CAN BE SECURELY MADE. WOULD PREFER ENTER EL BLUFF WITH NO NAME SHOWING OR USE PHONY NAME. PETREL BONA FIDE NICARAGUAN REGISTERED WITH HOME PORT BLUEFIELDS AND PETREL'S PAPERS SO STATE.

2. IF HQS DESIRES USE PETREL IT MAY BE DESIREABLE SEND JMWAVE CASE OFFICER TO MANAGUA TO FIRM UP DETAILS. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM

25

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WHC, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, C/CI/PS, C/CI/SGO, C/SI, C/FI/INT 2, C/SOD 5

S E C R E T 241631Z CITE MANAGUA 6140

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY 24 MAY 64 IN 74295

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD DESENSITIZED

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6085 (IN 38450)

B. HMMT-1259

1. COS AND GENERAL MONTIEL DISCUSSED REF PROBLEM 23 MAY. DESPITE HIS REASSIGNMENT AS MINISTER TREASURY MONTIEL STILL INTERESTED THIS MATTER, BECAUSE PRESIDENT CHARGED HIM WITH CS SOLUTION. HE EXPLAINED QUANTITY TOO GREAT TO BE BROUGHT MANAGUA AND FORWARDED PANAMA BY GON AS ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. THUS UP TO WOFACT ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION. SUGGESTED PLANE OR BOAT BE BROUGHT TO EL BLUFF. SAID PRESIDENT SOMOZA HAS MADE IT CLEAR MATERIAL TO BE REMOVED FROM NICARAGUA IN MANNER PRESCRIBED BY COS.

2. AIR LISTS REVEAL PRIMITIVO ABLANEDO HAS DEPARTED FOR MIAMI. ASSUME COLONEL BRENES GUARDING HOUSE WHERE ARMS STORED. COS AND ZABOTH FEEL BEST MEANS REMOVE ARMS IS BRING STOL CARGO PLANE INTO EL BLUFF AIRSTRIP, LOAD AT NIGHT, LEAVE NEXT MORNING. ALTERNATE MEANS, BRING BOAT TO DOCK IN FRONT HOME ROBERT BARTLETT, MANAGER BOOTH FISH PROCESSING PLANT. BARTLETT LIVES

SECRET

CLOSE TO CACHE SITE. HE OWNS ONLY TRUCK IN AREA ADEQUATE TO CARRY ARMS TO DOCK. WAS USED EXTENSIVELY FOR SUPPORT BY AMWORLDERS AND PROBABLY CLOSE TO COMPLETELY WITTING WHOLE SHOW.

3. IF PLANE TO BE USED, SUGGEST LAND AT MANAGUA TO PICK UP COS AND ZABOTH, THEN PROCEED BLUEFIELDS. PILOT CAN BE TAKEN BY SMALL BOAT TO EL BLUFF TO CHECK STRIP ON GROUND BEFORE ATTEMPTING LANDING THERE.

4. PLS ADVISE WHETHER HQS CONSIDERS ANY ITEMS LIST REF B UNSAFE TRANSPORT.

5. SUGGEST EXPEDITE REMOVAL CACHE. BALL NOW DEFINITELY IN OUR COURT.

SECRET SECRET

BT

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/COG

EXTENSION: 7451

NO.

DATE: 23 May '67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Place file in 201-267437
2.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

May 23/1967
Date

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Receipt acknowledged of Treasurer's Check drawn on Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (FE 88018) for the sum of $275.00 (Two hundred seventy-five dollars and no cents).

Manuel Artime Buesa

201-267437

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
ARTIME-BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS 5P

FROM:
RID/AN

EXTENSION:

NO. LX-3253

DATE 23 May 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. ~~[illegible]~~				
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ANS	[redacted]
PS	[redacted]
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

MICROFILMED
SEP 6 1967
DOC. MICRO.

201-267437

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

2X:3253

Miami, 23 May 1967

ARTIME - BUESA, MANUEL FRANCIS

Dear Jim:

I have delayed the trip to Nicaragua until Wednesday the 24th or Thursday the 25th, because the Nat Harrison Company, which is financing my trip, wants me to take some documents to Managua.

I am sending you the signed reciept herewith.

It looks like Roberto (our friend over there) wants Ablanedo to stay on for a complete month in Nicaragua. If it is going to be that way then I will need the money for this month also. If he stays it is because Roberto orders him, and if Roberto orders him to stay, then Roberto should pay.'

I inform you of the following:

1. The manner used to focus the case of Felipe Rivero is absurd. They are converting him into a hero and a martyr. In order "Not to be a slave of Yankee Imperialism" even I had to make declarations protesting the imprisonment of Felipe Rivero, although I clearly stated my discrepancy against his ideology and principals.

Boch, the one from MIRR, is taking the anti-North American campaign and turning his hate toward the United States on this problem.

They could have taken Felipe Rivero out of the United States without informing anyone, and then they could have informed the people that he was already in another country. Or they could

MICROFILMED
SEP 6 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-267437

have started a campaign to discredit him, like the one the Miami Herald started against me at first. But they should never have done it like they did. Another mistake is the public judgement which they are going to give him. Because of that judgement he is going to win more popularity and is going to put the United States in a bad situation.

2. On this trip I am going to see if I can do something about the solidarity of the Central American countries with Venezuela in order to see if anything concrete comes up.

3. I have gotten reports from Cuba that in Bahia Honda they are constructing a subterranean rocket base. I am going to get more reports.

ZZR (201-819744)

4. In Nicaragua there is a man, Allan Gross Quiros, chemistry professor at the University of Leon and recently named to be a professor in Managua also, who was in East Germany and Russia for ten months. He returned to Nicaragua 1 - 15 April, passing through New York. He spoke with a man named "Rayo" for a long time on the telephone. In his conversation with this man he told him (Rayo) that he had "taken a flight" from New York to Chicago where he spoke with "the person whom he had to speak to."

Allan Gross Quiros was in Leon and Masaya on the days in which the markets of Leon and Masaya were burned.

He (Allan Gross Quiros) has written two letters to this address:

Herr Hubert Torres
75 Karlsonhe
Stephanienstrasse 29, Federal Republic of Germany

I am trying to investigate several addresses in the United States where he writes. These are reports from "Pepe" Fernandez.

5. In Honduras there is a young man whose surname is WEANEVER, who is from Honduras and the nephew of Ricardo Zuniga, the Presidential Counsellor. WEANEVER was in Cuba taking training, and in conversations with other young men he said that he hoped to go through Nicaragua. Presently he is in Honduras.

6. It is suspected that guerrilla training is taking place in Chinandega. I will go to that zone on this trip.

Ignacio

(read the back)

P.S. I forgot to tell you that Allan Gross Quiros always carries an "executive bag" which he will not let loose for one moment. He is an inseparable companion of ARAGON and Lillian Garcia, who are both Communists at the University of Leon.

(Or) [illegible] #170201

Some money from the University of Leon supports the subversion. There are "Phantom job positions"; that is to say duties which no one carries out and which receive high salaries. This money goes to the ranks of subversion.

Ignacio

201-267437

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/COG

EXTENSION: 7451

NO.

DATE: 2 MAY 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Please file in 201-267437
2.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

May 2, 1967

Manuel Francis Artime Buesa
1270 N.E. 85th Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Manolo,

Enclosed you will find a check. Please date and sign the receipt and return it to me.

I have found your recent correspondence very interesting and hope you will continue to write me whenever you have an opportunity.

If you run across any information of interest concerning officials at Expo 67 or those planning to attend the Pan American games in Winnipeg, I would appreciate receiving it.

I hope we can get together one of these days--in the meantime good luck in all of your endeavors.

Best regards,

2 Enclosures

201-267437

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Managua X

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD
Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: HMMA 3798, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His KC provided payment of his $[illegible] monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in [illegible]62 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 28 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT./

27 APR 1967

HMMW 1955

S E C R E T

19-124-25/6
201-287437
201-281387

24 April 1967 WH/COG/CICS N. Gratz ljc 7447

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

DC/WH/COG Mr. Williamson

C/WH/COG/MO Mr. Ortman

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/2/CRAN		
2	3B 4402		
3			
4	WH/COG/[illegible] Chicca		
5			
6	G. V. 201- AMBIDDY-		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached letters returned to you for retention per instructions from AC/WH/COG.

for AmBidd,
201 —

per our telecon

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/COG/RR 3E19	22 May 67

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/COG/EXO	18	
2	3E04		
3	AC/WH/COG	19 May	
4			
5	C/WH/COG/RR		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:
No Dissem interest at this time, however We would like to see all of the future Artime letters for operational context. We found these letters very interesting.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/2/CK+N 3B4402	18 May

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET ✓

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/2/CR+N/RO		
2	3B01		
3			E✓
4			
5			
6	WH/COG/EXO 3E04		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached for your review for INFO of possible dissem/interest are copies of letters (with translations) from Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime following his return from Nicaragua where he attended the funeral of Luis Somoza. Letters were written to an CIA officer.

Pls. return to WH/COG/EXO.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
E. Harding WH/COG/RR 3E19 X-7144	10 May 67

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(40)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

MIAMI, 24 April 1967

Dear Jim,

Pardon my lateness in writing to you but I have had to face many problems and I wanted to be calm when I wrote to you.

I was at Luis Somoza's funeral and I think that I made a good impression. I am at present more worried than I was before, but not for my future, because Tacho is a very good friend of mine and Luis was not. I am worried about Nicaragua's destiny. Let us not forget that Nicaragua is the most solid pillar of Central America.

1-Laines grew closer to Tacho during the funeral. Laines took practically all the load of the funeral arrangements upon himself.

2-Many of the good men who gave the Somoza's advice were intimate friends of Luis and they are afraid of coming to Tacho in order to give him advice.

3-The Communists are aware of this and they are also aware of the fact that Tacho is even more violent than Luis, therefore, they take advantage of the situation to provoke Tacho, thereby hoping that without Luis's advisors and possibly with the "bad advice" of "an infiltrator" in Tacho's circle of friends/he will begin to rule his government with an iron hand, which is just what the Communists want from him.

4-I think that Tacho has grown much closer to me and I will try to do everything possible to see that he keeps calm.

5-There is no doubt about the fact that the Communists have brought in a great quantity of weapons into Nicaragua. The weapons have not been found, in spite of the investigations by the Security Corps; even General Montiel recognizes this.

6-Ithink that there is discontent in the young officer's ranks because of the low salaries which the officials, sub-officials and XXXXXXX enlisted men receive. This is not a problem at the present but it could develop into a problem, if the Communists exploit it skillfully.

7-I also think that the Security Corps which continues to function under the orders of Montiel, who is also chief of Staff and also a merchant, loses all its efficiency because of the fact that Montiel cannot dedicate sufficient time to the Corps and as a result leaves its direction to Captain Willop, who I think is entirely incompetent for the job.

8-I think that the only good thing that panorama has is the loyalty of General Somoza's military troops, for I honestly do not trust some of the high officials.

9-Jose Fernandez made the contact with the Nicaraguan girl who received the proposition to study on a scholarship in Russia, at the Patricio Lumumba University, and she is willing to collaborate with us. I gave the contact to Carlos.

10-According to reports from Pepe Fernandez the "comrades" are going to try to intensify their "infiltrative job" in the Nicaraguan departmentsXXX of Education and Agrarian reform.

The following is expected after 2 May, the day on which Tacho is sworn in: sabotage, terrorism, and kidnappings. Provocations!

11-I sincerely think, and excuse me, that the United States should now, due to the psychological state in which Tacho is in, demonstrate that they have confidence in him XXXX and in the success of his Government. He is grateful to the United States for the help which the United States sent to him so that he could save his brother, therefore take advantage of this.

12-According to the comments which I heard in Tacho's close circles (Col. Sanchez from Lanica, Gen. Camilo Gonzalez, etc), Sevilla Sacasa is not in very good standing with Tacho. I think that Washington should become friendly with Tacho in a direct manner.

13-Camilo Gonzalez's son spoke to me and told me that he had to see me later (I do not know when) in order to inform me about a group of Guatemalan Officials who are planning a coup d'etat against Mendez Montenegro and they want my help. When I know something concrete about this I will tell you. I have also heard rumors from Teo Carrasco (a painter, who is the brother ~~XXXX~~ of General Peralta's paramour) that Peralta is "in something also." When I find out something concrete about these reports I will send it to ~~XXX~~ you and let you know.

14-I am going to Nicaragua for the swearing in ceremonies. I am trying to get free tickets to fly ~~XXX~~ on Lanica. As soon as I see something of interest I will let you know.

P.S. Do not forget about Don Manuel Guillot.

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Miami 24 de Abril 1967

Querido Jim:

Perdona la demora en la carta,pero he tenido muchos problemas a los cuales hacerles frente,y quería tener tranquilidad para escribirte.

Estuve en los funerales de Luis Somoza,y creo que causé buena impresión.Pero ahora est[illegible] más preocupado que antes [illegible] pesar de que mi gran amigo es Tacho y no Luis,pero mi preocupación no es por mi futuro,sino por el destino de Nicaragua.No olvidemos que Nicaragua es el puntal más sólido de Centro-América.

1-Lainez logró acercarse más a Tacho durante este proceso .Practicamente fué el hombre que llevó todo el peso de los funerales.

2-Muchos de los buenos consejeros que tenían los Somoza,estaban intimamente ligados a Luis,y le temen acercarse al Tacho Para darle consejos.

3-Los Comunistas son conscientes de ésto y de que Tacho es un hombre más violento que Luis,por lo tanto se aprestan a provocar al Tacho para que éste,sin los consejeros de Luis y posiblemente con los "malos consejos" de "algún infiltrado" en el círculo de Tacho,unido al carácter violento del Tacho,lleve su gobierno a una mano dura que los comunistas desean en Nicaragua.

4-Creo que Tacho se ha acercado mucho más a mí después de éste proceso y yo trataré de hacer todo lo humanamente posible para que vaya por caminos de tranquilidad.

5-No hay dudas de que los comunistas han logrado meter en Nicaragua una gran cantidad de armas,que no han aparecido a pesar de las pesquisas de los Cuerpos de Seguridad;ésto lo reconoce el mismo General Montiel.

6-Creo que hay un leve desagrado en las filas de los oficiales jóvenes, por el salario tan bajo que reciben los oficiales,sub-oficiales y clases.Por el momento esto no es problema;pero puede ser problema si el comunismo lo explota hábilmente.

7-Creo además que el Cuerpo de Seguridad,al seguir bajo el Mando de Montiel,que además es Jefe de Estado Mayor y además es Comerciante, pierde toda su eficecia,ya que Montiel no puede dedicarle el tiempo necesario y el Cuerpo es dirigido por el Capitán Willop,al cual considero completamente inepto para el cargo.

8-Creo que la única cosa buena que tiene el panorama,es la lealtad de la tropa militar al General Somoza,pues,honestamente desconfío hasta de algunos altos oficiales.

9-José Fernández logró el contacto con una muchacha nicaragüense que ha recibido una proposición de estudio (becada) en Rusia,en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba,y está dispuesta a colaborar con nosotros.Yo le dí el contacto a Carlos.

10-Según informes de Pepe Fernández,los "camaradas" van a tratar de aumentar su intensidad de "trabajo infiltrativo" en los departamentos nicaragüenses de EDUCACION y REFORMA AGRARIA.

También se esperan:sabotage,terrorirsmo y secuestros después del día 2 de Mayo,toma de posesión de Tacho.¡Provocaciones!

11-Creo sinceramente,y perdónenme,que los Estados Unidos deben ahora, dado el estado psicológico del Tacho,demostrarle que tienen confianza en él y en los logros de su Gobierno.Aprovechen que él está agradecido por todos los recursos que Estados Unidos mandó para salvar al hermano.

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12-Según comentarios que oí en círculos muy allegados al Tacho(Coronel Sánchez el de Lanica,General Camilo González etc) Sevilla Sacasa no está muy bien parado con el Tacho .Creo que Washington debe intimar más directamente con Tacho.

13-El hijo de Camilo González me habló de que tenía que verme luego (no sé cuando) para informarme de un grupo de Oficiales Guatemaltecos,que están preparando un golpe de Estado contra Mendez Montenegro y quieren mi ayuda.Cuando sepa algo concreto se los mandaré a decir.También he oído rumores de Teo Carrasco (pintor hermano de la querida del General Peralta)de que Peralta está "en algo también". Cuando concrete más los informes se los enviaré.

14-Voy a Nicaragua para la toma de posesión,estoy consiguiendo boletos gratis para volar en Lanica.Tan pronto vea algo de interés se los comunicaré.

Abrazos:

Ignacio

Ignacio

P.P. No se olviden de Don Manuel Guillot.

SECRET

MIAMI, 3 April 1967

Dear Jim,

Pardon my lateness in writing, but I have had to run around a lot. The fundamental subjects which I wished to discuss are

1. I was displeased when our Nicaraguan friend discussed the subject of the implements which we had in Bluefield with General Somoza before I had discussed anything with him (Genral Somoza); above all without even consulting with me before he went ahead and did it, this put me in a difficult position with the Government. This is what I discussed with Carlos:

(a) The company will help me get ~~him~~ them out (b) I will tell Somoza that ~~he is one of us~~ they belong to me (c) I move them to another place which is less accessible. He agreed with me on consulting with the company, and the answer he gave to (b) was that ~~XXX~~ he planted the "other friend" in with Somoza, and nothing else was said. Thank God that I did well on that job, and I did pass some unpleasant moments.

2. During Somozas' stay in the USA I have seen him frequently and I have taken American investors, who wish to put their capital to work in Nicaragua, to see him. We have conversed copiously about his projects. He wants to do the following: Turn over his power when his mandate is terminated. Raise the standard of living for the Nicaraguans. Give the

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GROUP 1
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farmers the chance to take their products to big markets, through the construction of highways, silos to store grains and favorable legislation for the small farmers. The only thing that worries me is the extraordinary influence that "Che Lainez" has on him in economics. There are diverse comentaries about this individual on whether he is a member of the Communist Party or not; but the truth is (I know him personally) that he is a social outcast, bitter, very intelligent and very ambitious. Furthermore, when he tries to please someone he acts like their servant. If he is not a Communist then he is easy material for the Communists.

3. Somoza has promised me to continue to move the subject of Cuba in the international spheres, and in his appearance in "Meet the Press" he has already done it.

4. There is a "GARCIA" who is a syndicate leader of the ?wharfs? of New York, who through Adolfo Jimenez told me about a new invasion that was planned for Haiti, directed by me and leaving from Nicaragua. I responded negatively. It seems that they spoke with others about the project and a rumor started which said that I was preparing an invasion of Haiti from Nicaragua; I then went to see the Haitian consul in Miami to make it clear to him and his Government that I was not an adventurer, and that neither I nor the Nicaraguan Government had the slightest intention of interfering with Duvalier.

The consul has now told me that Duvalier wishes to speak with me. I told him that I would be glad to speak with him when he wished and when the interview would be kept secret. I think that this interview could be useful, for I have found that the Haitian Government has a grudge against the U.S. I do not know what we will speak about but I think that I can get some good information for you (plural).

5. I think that we can expect violent revolts in Nicaragua, in Panama, in Guatemala, and in Honduras (the opposition is in possession of many arms that have not been found yet). This breakout of guerrilla warfare in Bolivia and Brasil demonstrates Fidel's desperate strategy in trying to start other Vietnams in America whether or not Russia is in agreement.

I think that the dismissal of Raul Castro and Vilma Espin from the key posts in Cuban Communism can cause an internal revolt in disagreement between Cuban Communist elements and we have to be on alert in order to take advantage of the event so that it will not surprise as the "bloody rebellion and cultural revolution of China" surprised us.

I believe that propaganda for CUBA should be centered on planting distrust in the Armed Forces and on making Fidel Castro appear unstable as a person. If he has not even been faithful to his own "brother," then what can the rest of them expect if they are not even his relatives? I think that we should emphasize the fundamental part that Raul and Vilma had in consolidation of Castroism and its rise to power.

I do not think that Almeida has the control nor the influence over the Army that Raul had, and therefore a conspiracy and revolt of the Armed Forces is easier. There is no doubt that Fidel is assigning key posts to men and women who are his personal friends, without regard to whether they are good or bad Communists. This is going to bring about problems with the old guard of the Communist Party and with the people in the new guard who have been hastily taught Fidel's doctrine but have received Communist indoctrination (many of them sympathize with Raul). It seems that Russia is very displeased with Fidel and it would not surprise me if Russia would try to cause an attack on him; we should insinuate this in the propaganda against Castro for we know that his paranoic mentality and his disgust for Russia would most emphatically make him start to purify and take reprisals against Moscow's unconditional demands; an atmosphere of tension would then be created between Russia and Fidel.

The divorce of the Latin American Communist Parties from their obedience to Moscow, seems to be a feeling of disgust for Russia.

I have 200 men ready, who upon receiving weapons, can be taken to Cuba in only 48 hours, in case of a revolt. Their mission would be to overtake a town with a radio station in order to take advantage of the chaos of the revolt and establish a military Government that would be immediately recognized by a number of Latin American Governments and some European Country.

6. Ablanedo tells me in a letter that ROBERTO, the "friend" from Nicaragua, has told him that he cannot go to Bluefield until everything is taken out. That will take part of this month which means that apart from the subsidy that I have given him for last month I will have to give him this month's also. Could the company help me with that? The subsidy comes to $275.00 monthly. That is what I give to his family in Miami. This does not include what he is spending in Bluefield.

7. Tell me if at last you know anything about the request that I made for Mr. Manuel Guillot, for the Fundora widow and for the poor, deaf lady whose husband is in prison.

That's all for now, if there is anything new to tell you I will inform you of it.

Ignacio

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Miami 3 de Abril 1967

Querido Jim:

Perdona la demora en escribir,pero he tenido que correr mucho. Los temas fundamentales que quería tratarles son:

1-Me disgusté cuando vuestro amigo de Nicaragua le trató el tema al General Somoza antes que yo ,de los"implementos" que teníamos en Bluefield; sobre todo,sin haberlo consultado antes conmigo;ya que eso me colocaba en una posición difícil con el Gobierno.Lo que yo traté con Carlos fué: a)La compañía me ayuda a sacarlo b)Yo se lo planteo a Somoza como cosa mía c)Los mudo de lugar a otro más inaccesible.
El quedó conmigo en consultar con la Comapañía y la respuesta fué que el otro "amigo" se lo planteó a Somoza sin hablar nada más.
Gracias a Dios pude salir bien del asunto,pero pasé mi momento desagradable.

2-Durante la estancia de Somoza en USA le he visto frecuentemente y le he llevado inversionistas americanos que desean poner a trabajar su capital en Nicaragua.Hemos conversado largamente de sus proyectos.
Piensa: Entregar el poder cuando termine su mandato.Elevar el nivel de vida del pueblo nicaragüense.Hacer asequible al campesino el sacar sus productos a los grandes mercados,mediante la construcción de carreteras,silos para almacenar granos y una legislación favorable a los pequeños productores.
Lo único que me preocupa,es la extraordinaria influencia que,en materia económica,tiene sobre él el "Che Laínez".Sobre este individuo hay comentarios muy diversos sobre si pertenece al partido comunista o no; pero lo cierto es (lo conozco personalmente) que se trata de un resentido social,amargado ,muy inteligente y muy ambicioso.Además,cuando trata de agradar a alguien,llega hasta al"servilismo".Si no es comunista,es materia fácil para el comunismo.

3- Somoza me ha prometido continuar moviendo el asunto Cuba en las esferas internacionales,y en la comparescencia en "meet the press" ya lo hizo.

4- Hay un tal"GARCIA"que es líder sindical de los muelles de New York,que a través de Adolfo Jiménez,me planteó el asunto de una nueva invasión a Haití,dirigida por mí y saliendo desde Nicaragua.Yo respondí que nó. Como parece que ellos hablaron a otra gente del proyecto y se empezó a rumorar en Miami que yo preparaba una invasión a Haití desde Nicaragua; fuí a ver al cónsulde Haití en Miami para que le aclarara a su Gobierno que yo no era un aventurero,y que ni yo,ni el Gobierno Nicaragüense teníamos la más leve intención de meternos con Duvalier.

El Consul,después de eso me ha dicho que Duvalier quiere hablar conmigo. Yo le dije que yo estaba dispuesto a hablar con él siempre y cuando la entrevista fuera secreta.

Creo que esta entrevista puede ser útil,pues he descubierto en el Gobierno Haitiano,un resentimiento contra los Estados Unidos.No sé cual será el tema que iremos a tratar,pero creo que puedo sacar buena información para Ustedes.

5-Creo que hay que e[illegible]rar revueltas violentas e[illegible]Nicaragua(hay muchas armas en poder de la oposición que no han sido encontradas);en Panamá, en Guatemala y en Honduras.

Este brote guerrillero en Bolivia y Brasil,luce una estrategia desesperada de Fidel,de conseguir en América varios "Viet-Nam",quiera o no quiera Rusia.

Creo que la separación de Raúl Castro y Vilma Espín de los cuadros claves del comunismo cubano,puede traer como consecuencia una revuelta interna por pugna entre factores comunistas cubanos,y tenemos que estar alerta para aprovechar al máximum los acontecimientos y que no nos agarre de sorpresa como la "sangrienta revolución cultural china y la rebelión".

Creo que la propaganda para CUBA debe basarse en sembrar dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas la desconfianza y la vacilación hacia Fidel Castro en persona,que no le ha sido leal ni a su "hermano",luego Qué pueden esperar los demás que ni siquiera son familiares de él? Creo que se debía recalcar el papel fundamental qu Raul y Vilma tuvieron en la consolidación del Castrismo y en su llegada al poder.

Creo que Almeida no tiene el control ni la ascendencia sobre el Ejército que tenía Raúl y que por lo tanto,es más fácil la conspiración y la re-

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vuelta de las Fuerzas Armadas.

No hay duda de que Fidel está poniendo en los puestos claves a hombres y mujeres,que buenos o malos comunistas,son amigos personales de él,y ésto le va a traer problemas con la vieja guardia del Partido Comunista y con la nueva guardia que por encima de Fidelista,ha recibido un indoctrinamiento COMUNISTA (muchos de ellos simpatizan con Raul).

Parece ser que Rusia está muy descontenta con Fidel y no me extrañaría que intentara un golpe de mano contra él;de todas formas,hay que insinuar ésto en la propaganda contra Castro,ya que con su mentalidad paranoide y el disgusto que tiene con Rusia,es capaz de creerlo a pié juntillas y comenzar a depurar [illegible] a tomar represalias contra los incondicionales de Moscú;lo cual crearía un ambiente de tensión entre Rusia y él.

El repudio de los Partidos Comunistas Latino-Americanos obedientes a Moscú ,me parece un buen síntoma de disgusto de Ru[illegible].

Yo tengo listos unos 200 hombres,que con solo recibir las armas,pueden ser colocados en Cuba en solo 48 horas,en caso de una revuelta.La misión sería tomar un pueblo con emisora de radio para aprovechar el caos de la revuelta y establecer un Gobierno en armas,que sería reconocido de inmediato por una cantidad de Gobiernos Latino-Americanos y algún país Europeo.

6-Ablanedo me dice en una carta,que ROBERTO,el "amigo" de Nicaragua,le ha dicho que él no se puede ir de Blueffield hasta que todo no se saque. Eso se llevará parte de este mes,lo cual significa que además del subsidio familiar del mes pasado que ya le entregué,le voy a tener que entregar el de Abril.Podía la Compañía ayudarme en eso?Son $275.oo mensuales.Es lo que yo le doy a su familia en Miami.Ahí no está incluído lo que él está gastando en Blueffield.

7-Díganme sipor fin saben algo de la solicitud que hice para Don Manuel Guillot,para la viuda de Fundora y para la pobre señora sorda que tiene su esposo preso.

Bueno,si hay algo nuevo,ya se los comunicaré.Reciban un abrazo de

Ignacio

Ignacio

Dear Jim:

Just a few lines to report the following:

1. I believe that Communism will concentrate on Nicaragua as a point of attack.

2. The men who have returned to Nicaragua after receiving training in Cuba only acted indirectly in the bloody events of the 22nd, because according to information gathered in Nicaragua through "Pepe Fernandez," the "Sandinistas" communists (who follow the Castro line) were awaiting the assassination of the Somoza in Leon and this was never realized (carried out). These men were expecting an outbreak before Tacho Somoza took over the Presidency of the Republic.

3. I am structuring (building) an anticommunist intelligence net in Nicaragua, which I have begun to instruct (train). This net is composed of: Jose Fernández ("Pepe" Fernández) Manager of Casa Hook. Rodolfo Jerez, Owner of casa "Venus." Capitalist of various enterprises.

Orlando Castrillo - Studies law, 5th year (5?) year of age He has a grocery (foodstuffs) business.

Duilio Cabrera - Studies law, 4th year. Works in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the Department of Live Stock. He is 25 years old.

Roberto Arellano - Studies law, 5th year. He works in the National Palace. Department of (Providad?). It is a position related to employees and workers. He is 28 years of age.

Roberto Arias - Studies law, 6th year. Owner of an automobile spare parts business.

These individuals are going to create an anticommunist intelligence net. I have already given them one week of conferences.

4. According to reports received by Pepe, a Nicaraguan named Gustavo Gomez Mesa, acquired through various subjects (persons), about $5,000.00 in arms in Miami, from the Tamiami Gun Shop. The money was contributed by Aguirre, the owner of "Diario de las Americas" (and director), through an individual named Germán Arellano. These arms were going to be infiltrated into Nicaragua in small quantities at a time.

5. Today I received from Adolfo Jiménez (old chief of the Camp "Francisco" of communications, of Costa Rica) the proposition to ask Nicaragua for permision to launch the invasion from there to Haiti. According to him there is a group of Capitalists in New York who are willing to send from Europe about $80,000.00 in arms, to any designated location in Nicaragua. I am attempting to find out the names of these capitalists so that I can report it. I have replied that I will think the proposition over very cautiously before presenting it to Nicaragua. Of course, I will not get involved in this adventure unless you desire the contrary.

Central South Internacional Inc.

P. O. BOX [illegible] LITTLE RIVER STATION MIAMI, FLA. [illegible]
CABLE: CENSOIN

Miami 3 de Marzo de 1967

Querido Jim:

Solo unas letras para informarte:

1- Creo que el Comunia va a tomar como punto de ataque a Nicaragua.

2- Los hombres que han regresado a Nicaragua después de haber recibido entrenamiento en Cuba solo actuandn indirectamente en los sucesos sangrientos del día 22,pues según informaciones recogidas en Nicaragua a través de "Pepe Fernández",los comunistas "Sandinistas"(linea de Fidel Castro)esperaban el asesinato de los Somoza en León y éste no se llegó a realizar.Estos hombres esperan un brote antes de la toma de posesión de Tacho Somoza a la Presidencia de la República.

3- Estoy estructurando una red de inteligencia anti-comunista en Nicaragua,a la cual he comenzado a instruir.Esta red está estructurada por:

José Fernándes "Pepe Fernández" Gerente de la Casa Hook.

[redacted]

Rodolfo Jerez- Dueño de la casa "Venus".Capitalista de varias empressas.

Orlando Castrillo-Estudia leyes,5to. año."5 años de edad.Tiene negoccio de venta de viveres.

Duilio Cabrera- Estudia Leyes,4to. año.Trabaja en el Ministerio de Agricultura,departamento de Ganadería.25 años.

Roberto Arellano-Estudia Leyes,5to. año.Trabaja en el Palacio Nacional.Departamento de Providad.Puesto relacionado con empleados y trabajadores.28 años.

Roberto Arias-Estudia Leyes,6to año.Dueño de un negocio de respuestos de vehículos.

Estos individuos van a crear una red celular de inteligencia anti-comunista.Ya les dí una semana de conferencias.

4-Según informes recibidos de Pepe,un Nicaragüense llamado Gustavo Gomez Mesa,adquirió a través de varios sujetos,unos $5,000.00 en armas en Miami,en el Tamiami Gun Shop.El dinero fué dado por Aguirre,el dueño del "Diario de las Americas" (Y Director).,a través de un individuo llamado Germán Arellano.Estas armas iban a se metidas poco a poco en Nicaragua.

5- Hoy he recibido de Adolfo Jiménes (antigüo jefe del Campamento "Francis-

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co" ,de Comunicaciones,de Costa Rica) la proposición de pedir a Nicaragua permiso para sacar de ahí la invasión a Haití. Según él hay un grupo de Capitalistas en New York,que están dispuestos enviar desde Europa unos $80,000.oo en armas al lugar que se les designe en Nicaragua.Yo estoy tratande de averiguar el nombre de estos capitalistas para informarlo.Les he respondido que pensaré muy detenidamente toda la proposición antes de plantearlo a Nicaragua.Por supuesto no me meteré en esa aventura a menos que Vds. opinen lo contrario.

Un abrazo.

Ignacio

Ignacio.

Central South Internacional Inc.

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CABLE: [illegible]

8

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Mr. Jim Willson
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/COG aew

EXTENSION: 7451

NO.

DATE: 18 APR 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/Files				Please file in 201-267437
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM
WH/COG

TO
Finance Division

DATE
18 April 1967

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

ONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY TURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

One-time payment to Artime for services rendered

PAYEE

AMOUNT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

ATE SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

ATE SIGNATURE OF AGENT

201-267437

AYMENT INSTRUCTIONS

AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREE- NTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

ATE TITLE SIGNATURE

APPROVED

DATE SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER

CERTIFICA NT OR CREDIT

DATE SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

IGATION REFERENCE NO. CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.

ATE SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE AMOUNT SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE / ACC. RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXC PO ED NE D	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO	F. Y.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL / CK. NO. / REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT

PREPARED BY DATE REVIEWED BY

TOTALS

496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-46)

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 18 April 1967

FROM : DC/WH/COG

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)________________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Manuel Artime Buesa , CA $275.00
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA; SA; CE; INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ________-1100
(2) __X__ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	☒	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: ________________
(2) Account Number: ________________
(3) Bank Name: ________________
(4) Bank Address: ________________
________________ Zip: ________
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ________________
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ________________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ________ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Earl J. Williamson 7451 Thomas J. Flores 7451
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ________________ City ________________

FORM 1-66 1864 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(28)

14-00000

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company OF NEW YORK **FE** 88018 $\frac{1-23}{210}$

New York, APRIL 25,1967

Pay MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO $275 AND 00 CTS

To the order of MANUEL ARTIME BUESA **

NOT TO EXCEED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS

FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEPARTMENT

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑈00088018⑈ ⑆0210⑉0023⑆ 404 00 210⑈

14-00000

7 4 3 7

YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO. 2-1-21
TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 4

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/SOD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 052245Z CITE MANAGUA 6085

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD **DESENSITIZED**

REF: DIRECTOR 87509

6 Apr 67 IN 38450

INDEX
FI
RS
ABSTRACT X

1. INSPECTION AND REPACKING COMPLETED. ORIGINAL ESTIMATE CUBE TOO HIGH. MEASURED VOLUME OF 184 REMAINING BOXES TOTALS 418 CUBIC FEET. ALLOWING 20 PERCENT FOR STACKING LOSS ESTIMATE LOAD CAN BE PLACED IN SPACE 500 CUBIC FEET. LONGEST ITEM 70 INCHES. ESTIMATED WEIGHT 15,000 POUNDS.

2. NO INCENDIARIES OR DETONATING DEVICES. TEN BOXES FRAGMENTATION HAND GRENADES. ALL IN ORIGINAL SEALED CANS. FIVE BOXES 60 MM MORTAR AMMO. ONE BOX 81 MM MORTAR AMMO. ONE BOX TNT IN SMALL BLOCKS. ALL ABOVE BOXES MEASURE 24 BY 14 BY 15 INCHES. DEFER TO HQS ORDINANCE EXPERTISE ON WHETHER THIS MATERIAL SAFE FOR SHIPPING.

3. CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY C-3 AND C-4 PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE. ALL IN APPARENT GOOD CONDITION.

4. DETAILED LIST ENTIRE CACHE BEING POUCHED PRIORITY 7 APRIL.

SECRET

201-267437
6 april 1967

RECEIVED
R.O./N.S

SECRET

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6058 S E C R E T MAR 14 12 51 PM '60

5. PLAN DISCUSS WITH GENERAL MONTIEL 6 APRIL. IN VIEW MAGNITUDE CACHE, MAY HAVE TO FALL BACK ON ORIGINAL SUGGESTION LAND STOL CARGO PLANE AT SITE FOR PICK UP. COLONEL BRENES THINKS THIS COULD BE COVERED ADEQUATELY AS FLIGHT CONNECTED WITH JOINT MANEUVER "OPERACION NICARAO" BUT MONTIEL OR PERHAPS SOMOZA WILL HAVE TO MAKE DECISION. BRENES FEELS CACHE MUCH TOO BULKY AND HEAVY BE TRANSPORTED TO MANAGUA BY GUARDAS MONTIEL HAD PROPOSED.

6. LARGE QUANTITY WEB GEAR, CANTEENS, HOLSTERS PUT ASIDE FOR GUARDIA. BRENES GIVEN ABOUT 1000 ROUNDS 50 CAL MG AMMO, SOME 30-06 MG AMMO, FOR USE BY HIS BOATS. THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS SUBSISTENCE PASSED TO ABLANEDO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

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ORIG: Phyllis Edwards
UNIT: C/WH/2/CR & NIC
EXT: 6312
DATE: 28 March 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WHC-5, C/CCS 3, C/CA/PS, C/SOD-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

SECRET 29 00 21'Z CITE DIRECTOR 87509

TO PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD **DESENSITIZED**

REFS: A. MANAGUA 6024 (IN 26753)

B. DIRECTOR 85948

C. MANAGUA 6068 (IN 30488)

1. COS TRAVEL TO EL BLUFF AUTHORIZED AS REQUESTED PARA 1 REF.

2. AUTHORIZE PASSING SMALL QUANTITY 50 CALIBER AMMO TO BRENES PER PARA 2 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Refs concern arms cache belonging AMWORLD Project to be taken from El Bluff by Nicaraguan Air Force plane to Panama City. COS and ZABOTH will supervise preparation and loading of arms and ammo. Also, it may be necessary to dump some of the ammo at sea.

by
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/COG Tom Flores
(in draft)

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT WH/COG TIME 20 BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 3, C/CA PS, C/SOD 2, CS/DO

S E C R E T 271525Z CITE MANAGUA 6268

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

DESENSITIZED

27 MAR 67 IN 30488

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

Hred for G.V.

REF A. MANAGUA 6024 (IN 05332)

B. DIRECTOR 85948

1. PERHAPS USE OF WORK UNIT TERMINOLOGY "MAN DAYS" IN REF A CONFUSING. THREE MEN CAN DO JOB IN THREE DAYS HENCE COS WILL MISS ONLY ONE WORK DAY IF JOB DONE OVER WEEKEND. GUARDIA COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE BUT FOR SECURITY REASONS BELIEVE BEST COS, ZABOTH AND ABLANEDO HANDLE. FOR SAME REASONS DO NOT WISH TDY ASSISTANCE. EL BLUFF "SMALL TOWN." COS AND ZABOTH ALREADY KNOWN THERE AND PRESENCE CAN BE ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OSTENSIBLE FISHING TRIP. PROPOSE BILLET IN ABLANEDO HOME AND WORK STRAIGHT THROUGH UNTIL JOB DONE. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS THAT ACTING ON ORDERS FROM GENERAL SOMOZA, GENERAL MONTIEL HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO CONONEL BRENES THAT COS TO MAKE ALL DECISIONS THIS CASE. THUS FEEL COS SHOULD BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT. IN VIEW FOREGOING REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZE COS TRAVEL EL BLUFF.

2. BRENES IS ALSO COMMANDING OFFICER NICARAGUAN COAST

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CITE MANAGUA 5958 S E C R E T

GUARD SO CAN FURNISH BOAT FOR ANY DUMPING REQUIRED. WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION PASS SMALL QUANTITY 50 CALIBER AMMO TO BRENES FOR PRACTICE USE BY HIS BOATS. THIS WILL HELP CEMENT ALREADY GOOD RELATIONS WITH BRENES WHO WORTHY INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT BY STATION.

3. AGREE DESIRABILITY TURN OVER CANTEENS, WEB GOODS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL TO GUARDIA. WILL HELP ALLEVIATE INEVITABLE DROOLING OVER ARMS AND AMMO.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR SOD6, WH8, CA2, CA/O4, C/OPS,

S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6065

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: JMWAVE 5385 (IN 15199)*

21 MAR 67 IN 26817

1. STATION AWARE ARTIME HAS CONTRACT WITH G-4 NIC NATIONAL GUARD, COL GUILLERMO (NOGUERA) ZAMORA, TO FURNISH FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, AND WEB GEAR. THIS STRAIGHT BUSINESS TRANSACTION

2. NO STATION TRACES TORRE AND NO KNOWLEDGE WEAPONS. DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME INVOLVED ARMS PURCHASES FOR NATIONAL GUARD.

* RE QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY LARGE QUANTITY MIL EQUIP

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-265138

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6266

21 MAR 67 IN 26782

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PORT AU PRINCE

REF: JMWAVE 6138 (IN 28609)

IN PS ABSTRACT X INDEX

1. MANUEL ARTIME WAS IN MANAGUA FROM 11 TO 20 MAR. HE TOLD STATION OFFICERS HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED AGAIN BY HAITIAN EMIGRES INCLUDING CANTAVE, WHO SOMEHOW THOUGHT HE COULD HELP THEM GET BASES AND ARMS. ARTIME ALSO SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM DUVALIER ASKING HIS HELP IN GETTING GENERAL SOMOZA TO PUSH FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA IN ORDER TO KEEP PRESSURE OFF DUVALIER AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

2. ARTIME HAS REPORTED CONTACTS BY HAITIAN EXILES OVER PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS, ASKING FOR HELP TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER, AND FROM DUVALIER REPS ASKING INTERCESSION WITH SOMOZA ON HIS BEHALF. ARTIME SAYS HE HAS LISTENED TO ALL, MADE NONCOMMITTAL REPLIES AND REFUSED TO INVOLVE SELF WITH EITHER GROUP.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-267437
21 March 1967

201-26 437

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR SOD 6, WH 8, CA 2, CA/4, C/OPS,

INDEX
ABSTRACT ✓

MACA

S E C R E T 211825Z CITE MANAGUA 6865

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE INFO SAN JOSE, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: JMWAVE 5883 (IN 15199)*

21 MAR 67 IN 26817

1. STATION AWARE ARTIME HAS CONTRACT WITH G-4 NIC NATIONAL GUARD, COL GUILLERMO (NOGUERA) ZAMORA, TO FURNISH FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, AND WEB GEAR. THIS STRAIGHT BUSINESS TRANSACTION

2. NO STATION TRACES TORRE AND NO KNOWLEDGE WEAPONS. DO NOT BELIEVE ARTIME INVOLVED ARMS PURCHASES FOR NATIONAL GUARD.

S E C R E T

BT

* RE QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY LARGE QUANTITY MIL EQUIP

SECRET

201-267437
21 March 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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ABS PS ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

mail

S E C R E T 211753Z CITE MANAGUA 6064

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD DESENSITIZED

21 Mar 67 IN 26753

REF: MANAGUA 6060 (IN 24548)

1. BARKER RETURNED MANAGUA NIGHT 20 MARCH.

2. CACHE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN ANTICIPATED. TIME AND SPACE AVAILABLE DID NOT PERMIT PROPER INVENTORY. CONDITION ARMS OBSERVED VARIES POOR TO GOOD WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE WATERPROOFING. CACHING OBVIOUSLY DONE IN HASTE. SOME ARMS EXPOSED, RUSTY AND MOLDY. IN ADDITION, CACHE CONTAINS CANTEENS, CARTRIDGE BELTS, GAS MASKS, MACHETES, SIGHTING QUADRANTS, BIPODS, CLIPS, FLAME THROWER, ETC. EXAMINED SOME AMMO AND FOUND IN GOOD ORDER WITH OCCASIONAL SLIGHT CORROSION. DID NOT EXAMINE GRENADES WHICH APPARENTLY NEAR BOTTOM AMMO PILE. CRAMPED QUARTERS HAMPERED MOVEMENT.

3. ESTIMATED CUBE 1200 FEET.

4. ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MAN DAYS work NEEDED TO SECURELY, ARRANGE WORK SPACE, REPACK EXPOSED ARMS, OPEN ALL BOXES TO VERIFY CONTENTS, SEPARATE INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS, DISPOSE OF ANY ITEMS CONSIDERED DANGEROUS TO SHIP. SECRET

201-267437
21 march 1967

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 0364 S E C R E T **SECRET**

RID/M.S

5. FOR REASONS SECURITY, PLAN HAVE THIS WORK DONE BY BARKER, ZABOTH AND AMBIDDY CARETAKER, PRIMITIVO (ABLANEDO) SAN MARTIN WHO OCCUPIES HOUSE ABOVE CACHE. TENTATIVELY PLAN DO THIS FIRST WEEKEND APRIL. BARKER AND ZABOTH WILL FLY TO AREA THUS SAVING TWO DAYS. MEANTIME WILL FUND ABLANEDO TO ENABLE HIM REMAIN EL BLUFF ANOTHER MONTH. HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY SUBSISTENCE MONEY FROM AMBIDDY SINCE JANUARY AND IS ANXIOUS MOVE TO MIAMI.

6. COLONEL BRENES HAS PROVED COOPERATIVE AND SECURE.

SECRET

SECRET

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WH/C/MO

ABSTRACT X

S E CR E T 181457Z CITE PANAMA CITY 2427

PHCY

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, JMWAVE

18 MAR 67 IN 24907

REF: DIRECTOR 83789

1. SOUTHCOM HAS AGREED TO HELP. NEED INFO ON WEIGHTS, CUBS, MARKINGS, AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES AND AMMO IN ORDER PLAN HANDLING.

2. WHETHER MARKINGS ARE FOREIGN AND TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES MOST IMPORTANT IN PLANNING LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Sent to Mangan
RI mark

~~[illegible]~~
~~DO NOT REMOVE~~

NNNN

Sent to
Ernest Chiocca
WH/COG/MO
for RI marking

201-267437
18 Mar. 1967

Haiti

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FI/INT, IW, SOD 4, DO 7, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CS/SGO, WH/COG 8

S E C R E T 172236Z CITE JMWAVE 6138 18 MAR 67 IN 24602

DIRECTOR INFO PORT-AU-PRINCE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, OTTAWA, PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT

INTEL DYVOUR JMUNION

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. OF JMROC INTEREST. PROJECT EVLANE. EVLANE-4. FIRST SUBSOURCE IS UOAMBER-6. REF: JMWAVE 5019. (IN 76125) CROSS-REF 201-267437 (ARTIME), 201-299292 (BOSCH), 201-270455 (GEORGES), 201-118281 (CANTAVE), 201-147945 (FIGNOLE), 201-053765 (HUDICOURT), 201-782436 (MAXIMILIEN).

FILED 172236.

SECRET

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 18 MARCH 1967
IN 24609
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2, D/ONE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COUNTRY: HAITI/CUBA

DOI : EARLY MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: FORMATION OF CUBAN-HAITIAN EMIGRE ALLIANCE WITH THE GOAL OF INVADING HAITI

ACQ UNITED STATES, MIAMI (16 MARCH 1967) UFG-8833

SOURCE : A HAITIAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG HAITIAN EMIGRES. HE IS AN UNTESTED SOURCE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM A FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, AND FROM EUGENE MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI.

1. IN EARLY MARCH 1967 CERTAIN CUBAN AND AHITIAN

SECRET

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

EMIGRES IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, FORMED AND ORGANIZATION CALLED THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE. AMONG THE TOP CUBAN LEADERS ARE MANUEL ARTIME BUESA AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. THE HAITIAN LEADERS ARE FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES, FORMER GENERAL LEON CANTAVE, DANIEL FIGNOLE, AND PIERRE HUDICOURT. (SOURCE COMMENT: HUDICOURT, A MULATTO, IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, A LAWYER AND A FORMER HAITIAN DIPLOMAT.)

2. THE AIMS OF THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE ARE TO PUSH FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND AHITI AT THE PUNTA DEL ESTE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, TO COLLECT FUNDS, AND TO OBTAIN ARMS AND A TRAINING CAMP. THE LEADERS OF THE GROUP PLAN TO CONTACT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF MEXICO, VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND COSTA RICA IN AN EFFORT OT OBTAIN ARMS AND A BASE TO TRAIN AND EQUIP A FORCE TO INVADE HAITI. THEY PLAN TO COLLECT FUNDS FROM AMERICAN NEGROES, HAITIANS IN CANADA AND NEW YORK, AND WEALTHY CUBAN EMIGRES.

3. THE GROUP PLANNED TO MEET AT THE MIAMI HOME OF SEYMOUR PILET, A SUPPORTER OF FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT FIGNOLE, ON THE EVENING OF 15 MARCH TO DEVELOP THEIR PLAN

SECRET

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF ACTION FURTHER.

4. MANUEL ARTIME VISITED EUGENE MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI, AT THE LATTER'S HOME ON THE EVENING OF 8 MARCH. (SOURCE COMMENT: ARTIME AND MAXIMILIEN ARE PROBABLY CONSPIRING TO INFORM HAITIAN PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF THE CUBAN-HAITIAN ALLIANCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MONEY FROM DUVALIER.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, OTTAWA).

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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C/FI 2

MANA

S E C R E T 172245Z CITE MANAGUA 6060

18 MAR 67 IN 24548

DIRECTOR

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF: DIRECTOR 82789 *

WH FI
RC
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

1. COS MET WITH GENERAL MONTIEL AND COLONEL BRENES 16 AND 17 MARCH. LEAVING WITH BRENES FOR EL BLUFF 0600 HOURS 18 MARCH TO INVENTORY CACHED ITEMS. MONTIEL COOPERATION COMPLETE AND ENTHUSIASTIC.

S

2. DITZION ACTING DURING BARKER ABSENCE. ESTIMATED RETURN 20 OR 21 MARCH.

S E C R E T

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* APPARENTLY WRONG REF

201-267437
18 March 1967

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INFO FILE VR, CS/DO, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, CS/DO, C/SOD 3

MANA

S E C R E T 151506Z CITE MANAGUA 6055

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

15 Mar 67 22 32 C

REF: MANAGUA 6054 (IN 21592)

1. COS CONFERRED ALONE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL NIGHT 14 MARCH. MONTIEL HAD MET EARLIER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA AND WAS CLOSETED WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHEN COS ARRIVED. MONT CONFIRMED SOMOZA WILLINGNESS FACILITATE RECOVERY ARMS BUT HAD WORKED OUT WITH SOMOZA OWN PLAN OF HOW BEST ACCOMPLISH. MONTIEL BRINGING COLONEL BRENES, GUARDIA COMMANDER BLUEFIELDS/EL BLUFF AREA TO MANEDUA 15 MARCH. WILL INSTRUCT BRENES, WHO WITTING AMWORLD OPERATION, TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION COS. PROPOSES THAT COS AND BRENES GO TO CACHE SITE TO INVENTORY ARMS. BRENES WILL THEN TAKE CHARGE OF MOVING ARMS SECURELY AND IN SMALL AMOUNTS TO MANAGUA. WHEN ALL ARMS AT MANAGUA, NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE PLANE WILL FLY TO CANAL ZONE FOR "ROUTINE MAINTENANCE" AT WHICH TIME ARMS CAN BE TURNED OVER TO DESIGNATED RECIPIENT THERE.

AN LC	FI	
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ABSTRACT X		INDEX

9

2. MONTIEL (THUS SOMOZA) FEELS BEST NOT TRY BRING IN [redacted]

201-267437
15 March 1967

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MAR 7 2 26 PM '68

14 12 51 PM '68

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 5055 S E C R E T

LNHARP PLANE OR BOAT TO RECOVER LEST THIS AROUSE CURIOSITY OR ACCIDENT CAUSE INCIDENT. SINCE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE HAS SOMOZA BLESSING AND NICARAGUAN WILLING TAKE JOB ON THEIR SHOULDERS STATION RECOMMENDS WE AGREE TO IT WITHOUT CHANGE. APPEARS BE SOUND AND SECURE.

3. MONTIEL AND SOMOZA A BIT PUT OUT WITH AMBIDDY FOR STORING ARMS WITHOUT INFORMING THEM. NO APPARENT RESENTMENT OF ANY SORT AGAINST WOFACT. ACCORDING MONTIEL, AMBIDDY SAID HE BROUGHT ARMS UP FROM COSTA RICA AT LAST MINUTE AFTER HAVING REMOVED ALL ARMS FROM NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY CLAIMED SUPPORTER OF FIGUERES KNEW OF CACHE IN COSTA RICA SO AMBIDDY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KILL HIM AND TRANSFER ARMS TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM ENEMIES OF SOMOZA. THUS APPEARS AMBIDDY HAS DONE GOOD JOB OF TAKING BLAME ON SELF.

4. STATION REQUESTS APPROVAL PROCEED PER PARA ONE ABOVE.

S E C R E T

BT

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ABSTRACT X		

S E C R E T 151506Z CITE MANA~~GUA~~ 6055 MANA

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

15 Mar 67 IN 22320

REF: MANAGUA 6054 (IN 21593)

1. COS CONFERRED ALONE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL NIGHT 14 MARCH. MONTIEL HAD MET EARLIER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA AND WAS CLOSETED WITH AMBIDDY-1 WHEN COS ARRIVED. MONTIEL CONFIRMED SOMOZA WILLINGNESS FACILITATE RECOVERY ARMS BUT HAD WORKED OUT WITH SOMOZA OWN PLAN OF HOW BEST ACCOMPLISH. MONTIEL BRINGING COLONEL BRENES, GUARDIA COMMANDER BLUEFIELDS/EL BLUFF AREA TO MANEDUA 15 MARCH. WILL INSTRUCT BRENES, WHO WITTING AMWORLD OPERATION, TO GIVE FULL COOPERATION COS. PROPOSES THAT COS AND BRENES GO TO CACHE SITE TO INVENTORY ARMS. BRENES WILL THEN TAKE CHARGE OF MOVING ARMS SECURELY AND IN SMALL AMOUNTS TO MANAGUA. WHEN ALL ARMS AT MANAGUA, NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE PLANE WILL FLY TO CANAL ZONE FOR "ROUTINE MAINTENANCE" AT WHICH TIME ARMS CAN BE TURNED OVER TO DESIGNATED RECIPIENT THERE.

2. MONTIEL (THUS SOMOZA) FEELS BEST NOT TRY BRING IN [redacted]

201-267437

UNHARP PLANE OR BOAT TO RECOVER LEST THIS AROUSE CURIOSITY OF ACCIDENT CAUSE INCIDENT. SINCE PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE HAS SOMOZA BLESSING AND NICARAGUAN WILLING TAKE JOB ON THEIR SHOULDERS STATION RECOMMENDS WE AGREE TO IT WITHOUT CHANGE. APPEARS BE SOUND AND SECURE.

3. MONTIEL AND SOMOZA A BIT PUT OUT WITH AMBIDDY FOR STORING ARMS WITHOUT INFORMING THEM. NO APPARENT RESENTMENT OF ANY SORT AGAINST WOFACT. ACCORDING MONTIEL, AMBIDDY SAID HE BROUGHT ARMS UP FROM COSTA RICA AT LAST MINUTE AFTER HAVING REMOVED ALL ARMS FROM NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY CLAIMED SUPPORTER OF FIGUERES KNEW OF CACHE IN COSTA RICA SO AMBIDDY HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO KILL HIM AND TRANSFER ARMS TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM ENEMIES OF SOMOZA. THUS APPEARS AMBIDDY HAS DONE GOOD JOB OF TAKING BLAME ON SELF.

4. STATION REQUESTS APPROVAL PROCEED PER PARA ONE ABOVE.

S E C R E T [redacted]

BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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MAJA

SECRET 142140Z CITE MANAGUA 6054 201-267437

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

15 MAR 67 IN 21552

REF: MANAGUA 6052 (IN 20541)

1. TO GET DUCKS IN ROW COS, ZABOTH AND AMBIDDY-1 CONFERRED AFTERNOON 13 MARCH. AGREED AMBIDDY WOULD SEEK MEETING WITH GENERAL SOMOZA ASAP TO CONFIRM AND REINFORCE COS STATEMENTS EARLIER THAT DAY IN MEETING COVERED BY REF.

AMW ~~FI~~ ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~

2. AMBIDDY AND SOMOZA MET MORNING 14 MARCH. SOMOZA QUITE UPSET WITH AMBIDDY AT FIRST BUT COMPLETELY CALMED DOWN BY END INTERVIEW. AS AGREED, AMBIDDY TOOK FULL "BLAME" FOR HAVING CACHED ARMS WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE. SAID WOFACT ALSO UNAWARE CACHE UNTIL HE REVEALED FEW DAYS AGO. SAID HE CACHED WEAPONS IN GOOD FAITH AFTER THEY MISSED HIS LAST BOAT. DID NOT WISH THEM FALL INTO HANDS PEPE FIGUERES OR ANYONE ELSE WHO MIGHT USE AGAINST SOMOZA.

3. SOMOZA ASKED POINTEDLY IF AMBIDDY IN AGREEMENT HAVE WOFACT RECOVER ARMS. AMBIDDY CONFIRMED, SAID HE HAD MADE SUGGESTION TO WOFACT AND THAT SOLE PURPOSE HIS PRESENT TRIP

SECRET

201-267437
15 March 1967

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PAGE TWO MANAGUA 6054 S E C R E T SECRET
MAR 7 2 26 PM '60

TO FACILITATE RECOVERY AND REMOVAL ARMS. SOMOZA SAID WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION, COS SHOULD PROCEED LAY ON WITH GENERAL MONTIEL.

4. AT THIS POINT SOMOZA AND AMBIDDY BOTH HAPPY, NEITHER ANGRY WITH OTHER OR WITH WOFACT. STATION READY PROCEED WITH RECOVERY AS SOON AS PLAN CAN BE LAID ON. COS TO SEE MONTIEL EVENING 14 MARCH.

S E C R E T

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SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/SOD-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 131817Z CITE MANAGUA 0032

13 Mar 67 IN 20544

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED 201-267437

REF: DIRECTOR 81910

1. COS DISCUSSED REF MATTER WITH GENERAL SOMOZA 13 MARCH. SOMOZA SURPRISED TO LEARN OF ARMS CACHE BUT AGREED LET LNHARP REMOVE WEAPONS. MUSED THAT AMBIDDY-1 HAD BEEN "PLAYING FOOTSIE" WITH HIM AND "MUST BE CRAZY".

2. SOMOZA SUGGESTED COS ARRANGE WITH GENERAL MONTIEL FOR REMOVAL WEAPONS. STATION EXPECTS MONTIEL TO BE COOPERATIVE AS USUAL.

3. BELIEVE STOL PLANE OF C 123 VARIETY COULD HANDLE LOAD. COVER FOR PRESENCE IN AREA CAN BE OSTENSIBLE TESTING OF STRIP PREPARATORY TO JOINT MILITARY OPERATION NICARAO.

4. AMBIDDY-1 AGAIN IN MANAGUA AND MAY CONTACT SOMOZA AT OWN INITIATIVE.

S E C R E T Re Recovery Amworld weapons

BT

SECRET

ANAL	FI	
ID		
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

201-267437
13 March 1967

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MESSAGE FORM
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UNIT: DC/WH/COG
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 9 March 1967

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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CITE DIRECTOR 81910

MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE PANAMA

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

REF MANAGUA 6044 (IN 17221)

1. HQS WISHES PHYSICALLY RECOVER AMWORLD WEAPONS TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

2. REQUEST COS CONSULT WITH SOMOZA AND OBTAIN HIS APPROVAL IN PRINCIP~~AL~~LE FOR LNHARP TO REMOVE WEAPONS.

3. AFTER SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED WILL FORWARD OPS PLAN FOR WEAPONS REMOVAL. DO NOT PLAN CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 UNTIL SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED AND OP REMOVAL PLAN FINALIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

①

WH/COG/MO

C/SOD

C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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BY 7 PER ___ # ___

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CITE DIRECTOR 81910

TO MANAGUA INFO JMWAVE PANAMA

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMWORLD

REF MANAGUA 6044 (IN 17221)

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ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

1. HQS WISHES PHYSICALLY RECOVER AMWORLD WEAPONS TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

2. REQUEST COS CONSULT WITH SOMOZA AND OBTAIN HIS APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE FOR LNHARP TO REMOVE WEAPONS.

3. AFTER SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED WILL FORWARD OPS PLAN FOR WEAPONS REMOVAL. DO NOT PLAN CONTACT AMBIDDY-1 UNTIL SOMOZA AGREEMENT OBTAINED AND OP REMOVAL PLAN FINALIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-267437
9 March 1967

WH/COG/MO

for C/SOD James N. [illegible]

by
William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Flores
for C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MANA

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 0821 CITE MANAGUA 6344

DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

TYPIC AMWORLD

1. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, WHEN AMWORLD WAS CLOSED OUT TWO YEARS AGO, AMBIDDY-1 WAS AUTHORIZED TO HOLD ROUGH EQUIVILENT OF WEAPONS TO ARM ONE RIFLE COMPANY. WEAPONS STORED AT THE MONKEY POINT OPS BASE, AT EL BLUFF SUPPORT BASE, AND IN MANAGUA. ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO, MONKEY POINT BASE WAS CLOSED AND WEAPONS THERE MOVED TO EL BLUFF. STORAGE IN SEALED CONCRETE VAULT UNDER THE FLOOR OF SAFEHOUSE WHICH IS ON UNINHABITED SIDE OF BLUFF NEXT TO AIRSTRIP BUILT BY AMWORLD. STRIP IS 1,800 BY 30 FEET WITH CLAY BASE MIXED WITH NATURAL ROCK.

2. ARMS IN MANAGUA HAVE BEEN STORED IN A SAFEHOUSE OUTSIDE OF CITY AND CONSIST OF TWO WOODEN CRATES, EACH ABOUT 150 POUNDS AND 37 BY 25 BY 14 INCHES. APPROXIMATE CONTENTS ARE:

25 PISTOLS .45 CAL

5 RIFLES AR-15

3 SMG M3

8 MAR 67 IN 17221

SECRET

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8 March 1967

PAGE 2 MANAGUA 6044 SECRET

SECRET

2 SMG SWISS

6 PISTOLS .22 SILENCED

3. FORTY-FIVE BOXES OF UNKNOWN SIZES AND WEIGHTS ARE STORED AT BLUFF. CONTENTS ARE ESTIMATED FROM MEMORY BY ANTONIO SANZ, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF STORING THEM:

4 HMG .50 CAL

2 RECOILLESS RIFLE 57 MM

2 MORTARS 81 MM

2 MORTARS 60 MM

4 LMG .30 CAL

4 BAR

3 RIFLES FAL

10 SMG M3

10 CARBINES M1

3 CARBINES M2

10 AR-15

10 GARAND M1

4 SHOTGUNS 12 GUAGE

4 SMG K-PISTOL

AMMUNITION FOR ABOVE WEAPONS. C-3 AND C-4 EXPLOSIVE

SECRET

WITHOUT DETONATORS, AMOUNT UNKNOWN, PLUS 12 TO 15 BOXES GRENADES.

4. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED JAMES D. ZABOTH 4 MARCH, SAID HE CLOSING OUT ALL HIS STATIONKEEPERS IN NICARAGUA, DID NOT WANT TO ABANDON WEAPONS TO FALL INTO WRONG HANDS, NOR TO GIVE THEM TO NIC GOVT. GENERAL SOMOZA KNEW AMWORLD WAS LEAVING BEHIND SOME RESERVE EQUIPMENT AND WOULD KEEP ENOUGH WEAPONS FOR LOCAL SECURITY. HE DID NOT KNOW NUMBERS AND TYPES REMAINING. AMBIDDY-1 ASKED IF WOFACT WISHED TO RECOVER WEAPONS, OTHERWISE HE WOULD HAVE TO DUMP THEM IN OCEAN. ZABOTH, AMBIDDY-1 AND AMJAVA-4, WHO IN MANAGUA ON OTHER BUSINESS, VISITED BLUFF ISLAND 6 MARCH TO CHECK SITUATION. IF HQS WISHES RECOVER WEAPONS, MOST FEASIBLE METHOD IS BY AIR. A CARIBOU OR C-123 TYPE AIRCRAFT COULD LAND ON BLUFF STRIP, LOAD WEAPONS AT NIGHT AND FLY THEM OUT NEXT MORNING. IF HQS DOES NOT WISH RECOVER WEAPONS, AMBIDDY-1 COULD BE TOLD TO MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS TO DUMP WEAPONS AT SEA.

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5. DESPITE AMBIDDY-1 DESIRE NOT INFORM SOMOZA ABOUT ARMS CACHE, COS FEELS THAT SOMOZA SHOULD BE INFORMED IF

APR 21 10 55 AM '67

APR 2[illegible] [illegible] '67

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PAGE 4 MANAGUA 6044 ~~SECRET~~

HQS DECISION IS THAT ARMS SHOULD BE RECOVERED. SOMOZA COULD BE TOLD THAT "SOME EQUIPMENT" LEFT BEHIND BY AMWORLD GROUP NOW STORED AT BLUFF AND LNHARP WISHES RECOVER. BELIEVE HE WOULD AGREE TO AIRCRAFT PICKUP AS PROPOSED ABOVE. IN STATION OPINION BLACK RECOVERY WITHOUT SOMOZA KNOWLEDGE TOO RISKY. STATION ALSO FEELS THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA LEST THEY FALL INTO WRONG HANDS.

6. HQS PLEASE ADVISE BY CABLE.

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SECRET

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S E C R E T 062327Z CITE JMWAVE 5883

7 MAR 67 IN 15199

AN	FI	
~~PS~~		
ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~		

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. JMWAVE CLEARED CONTACT WHO IS IN MILITARY SURPLUS BUSINESS RECEIVED QUERY FROM UNIDENTIFIED COMPETITOR RE AVAILABILITY 2,000 SETS OF FATIGUES, COTS, PONCHOS, WEB PISTOL BELTS, ETC. FOR SHIPMENT TO NICARAGUA VIA LANICA AIRLINES ON 7 MAR 67. ALSO RECEIVED QUERY FROM MR. PAUL TORRE, 127TH OR 128TH ST. OR AVE., NORWALK, CONNECTICUT RE PRICES AND AVAILABILITY VARIOUS TYPES AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. TORRE SAID HE WOULD CALL BACK IN 30 DAYS. CONTACT PLANS NO ACTION BUT WILL KEEP WAVE ADVISED. WAVE TRACES TORRE NEGATIVE.

2. LOCAL WODISH ALSO RECENTLY REPORTED TO WAVE THAT A SOURCE OF THEIRS IN THE MARINE SURPLUS BUSINESS RECEIVED QUERY FROM MANUEL ARTIME FOR ITEMS IDENTICAL WITH LIST GIVEN WAVE'S CONTACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-267437
7 March 1967

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37

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

38

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Manuel ARTIME Buesa (201 - 267437)

FROM:

Kay Mauer
WH/COG/MO/FI

EXTENSION 4275

NO. LX 3212

DATE 25 January 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RI/AN GA 50	26 JAN 1967		JH	Pls process
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MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN [illegible]
PS [illegible]
ABSTRACT X
WH/C/MO
INDEX X

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

17 January 1967

LX-3212

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Termination of Manuel Artime Buesa

@ of Eric J. Williamson

1. On the night of 13 January 1967 the writer using the operational alias James E. Wilson met with Artime in a room in the Hotel Columbus in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to formally terminate Artime's association with the Agency. This involved the obtaining of termination Secrecy Oath and Quit Claim, the payment of $3,000 to cover the final periodical payment through 31 December 1966 and obtaining outstanding receipts.

2. The meeting was cordial and all paper work involved in the proceedings was accomplished without incident. There was of course the expected lengthy discussion on what he had done (or tried to do) for the Agency in the past and an undoubtedly sincere effort to impress upon me that he was ready and willing for any task he might be called upon to do in the future.

3. Artime made only one request--a rather passionate one--for financial assistance for the immediate family members of two Movement for the Recuperation of the Revolution (MRR) members who were executed as the result of operational missions to Cuba and the wife of another who is serving a 30-year sentence. (It will be recalled that Artime has been furnishing receipts for the $3,000 he has been receiving in recent months claiming that the money goes to the families of MRR members who have lost their lives or been imprisoned while on MRR missions.) We are examining these three cases and if worthy will arrange for financial benefits under the "survivors and martyrs" section of the AMBUD activity.

4. Artime has a sterile Headquarters telephone number and a P.O. box address in Washington, D.C. He was not discouraged in maintaining a loose contact by telephone or correspondence if he had any items of interest to pass along and was assured that if he ever had any "new" ideas, if he put them in writing, they would be studied. It was, however, made very clear to him that his formal association with the Agency was terminated and that there was no prospect of any financial assistance in the foreseeable future.

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5. Mr. Robert Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the Department of State, and Mr. William Bowdler, Staff Member National Security Council (White House Assistant), were notified prior to Artime's termination and voiced no objections.

Earl J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

SECRET

201-267437

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE
TO: Nancy AC/WH/COG	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

Pls. file in
Ambiddy/1 file.

FROM: CICS		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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MESSAGE FORM

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UNIT: [illegible]/COG/CICS

EXT: [illegible]-9108

DATE: [illegible] JANUARY 1967

☐ INDEX

☒ NO INDEX

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Ambiddy

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4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ——— BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

TO

S E C R E T

CITE DIR

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC LISASSY/LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 0024 (IN 83232)*

1. HQS CASE OFFICER (GROWERY) IN PROCESS CONTACTING AMBIDDY/1 TO REQUEST HE NOT CORRESPOND WITH LISASSY/1 ON THIS OPERATIONAL MATTER. REQUEST STATION EXPLAIN THIS LISASSY/1.

2. DO NOT WISH INTERRUPT PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP OR EXILE ORG BUSINESS BECAUSE IT ONE REASON FOR LIRING INTEREST LISASSY/1, AND LISASSY/1 AND AMBIDDY/1 WILL TALK TO EACH OTHER ANYHOW.

3. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE ESTABLISH COMMO FROM LISASSY/1 TO STATION AS DISCUSSED WITH TRECKLER AT HQS.

4. REQUEST STATION SEND PARA FIVE REF COMMO INSTRUCTIONS AND AMSPICE COMMO INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT/

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
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~~SECRET~~

☐ ABSTRACT ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG.:
UNIT.:
EXT.:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

TO: SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO:

WH/COG COMMENT:

REPORT ON 16 JAN MEETING WITH LISASSY/1, PARA FIVE: LIRING/1 PROVIDED ELABORATE AND OVER COMPLICATED COMMO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH APPEAR EMANATE FROM HAVANA.

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO E. CHIOCCA (DRAFT)
WH/COG/FI
WH/1/MEXICO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-267437

ORIG: Nancvé Gratz:new
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 20 Jan 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

~~S E C R E T~~

1 CI
3 C/WH/COG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER ______ # ______
CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS

S E C R E T

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE 20 20 08 Z CITE DIRECTOR 68288

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6351

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIO DATA AND ADDRESSES SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIONS REQUESTED REF.

A. MANUEL (GUILLOT) MONTES, BORN 22 DECEMBER 1905.
VIRGINIA (CASTELLANOS) DE GUILLOT, BORN 24 JANUARY 1892.
3488 NW 3RD STREET, MIAMI.

B. ROSA RABASA, BORN 3 DECEMBER 25
CHILDREN ARE FRANCISCA, AGE 18; ALFONSO, AGE 12;
MANUEL, AGE 6; JOSE ANTONIO, AGE 4.
1152 1/2 SW 10TH STREET, APT 1, MIAMI.

C. SILVIA HEREDIA, BORN 11 JANUARY 33.
CHILDREN ARE EDUARDO, AGE 8; RAQUEL, AGE 6.
180 SE 14TH TERRACE, MIAMI.

2. PLEASE HAVE INVESTIGATOR OBTAIN BIRTHDATES OF RABASA AND HEREDIA CHILDREN.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

17 January 1967

CX-5212

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Termination of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. On the night of 13 January 1967 the writer using the operational alias James F. Wilson met with Artime in a room in the Hotel Columbus in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the meeting was to formally terminate Artime's association with the Agency. This involved the obtaining of termination Secrecy Oath and Quit Claim, the payment of $3,000 to cover the final periodical payment through 31 December 1966 and obtaining outstanding receipts.

2. The meeting was cordial and all paper work involved in the proceedings was accomplished without incident. There was of course the expected lengthy discussion on what he had done (or tried to do) for the Agency in the past and an undoubtedly sincere effort to impress upon me that he was ready and willing for any task he might be called upon to do in the future.

3. Artime made only one request--a rather passionate one--for financial assistance for the immediate family members of two Movement for the Recuperation of the Revolution (MRR) members who were executed as the result of operational missions to Cuba and the wife of another who is serving a 30-year sentence. (It will be recalled that Artime has been furnishing receipts for the $3,000 he has been receiving in recent months claiming that the money goes to the families of MRR members who have lost their lives or been imprisoned while on MRR missions.) We are examining these three cases and if worthy will arrange for financial benefits under the "survivors and martyrs" section of the AMBUD activity.

4. Artime has a sterile Headquarters telephone number and a P.O. box address in Washington, D.C. He was not discouraged in maintaining a loose contact by telephone or correspondence if he had any items of interest to pass along and was assured that if he ever had any "new" ideas, if he put them in writing, they would be studied. It was, however, made very clear to him that his formal association with the Agency was terminated and that there was no prospect of any financial assistance in the foreseeable future.

B-19-124-27/2

B-19-300-11 ✓

201-267437

5. Mr. Robert Stevenson, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the Department of State, and Mr. William Bowdler, Staff Member National Security Council (White House Assistant), were notified prior to Artime's termination and voiced no objections.

Earl J. Williamson
Deputy Chief, WH/COG

~~SECRET~~

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Manuel F. Artime Buesa, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of the United States Government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I acknowledge that should I again be affiliated with another government agency or department, I will preserve the secrecy of intelligence operations, sources, and methods of the Organization from other persons in such government agencies and departments, even though such persons are fully cleared, or are in possession of any type of security clearance, within their own departments.

3. I further affirm that I will not discuss with or disclose to any government employee, foreign service officer, or other official with whom I may later be associated, any information relating directly to clandestine operations, sources or methods, personnel or fiscal figures of the Organization, or to special operations, security measures, or other matters which may have been acquired by reason of my assignment with the Organization unless by permission of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

4. I certify that I have no monetary claims against the Organization, ~~nor does any organization I now direct or have directed during my~~ association with the Organization. My signature as affixed hereto represents a quit claim absolving the Organization of any financial or other responsibility for myself and above-described organizations and members thereof. Should there be any future claims, I have been advised to submit in writing to the Organization any such claims I or any organization I now direct or have directed during my association

SECRET

with the Organization may have against the Organization or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive legal consideration. In the event, however, that the decisions of the Organization concerning such claims are not satisfactory, no other action will be taken to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

5. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

6. During my exit processing and during my period of association with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth below.

7. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

8. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of the United States Government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and the United States Government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 13 day of January 1967.

(SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 13 day of January 1967 at Miami, Florida

James Wilson
Signature

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

17 JAN 67

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DC/WH/COG

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/COG				Authorization for termination attached as background info.
2.				
3. C/WHD	17 JAN 1967		B	1 & 3: although Mr G may kick up a little dust. I think Earl deserves a well done for terminating this thing with a minimum of problems.
4. DC/WHD			E	I fully agree "Well done" B
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. DC/WH/COG (for file)				
11.				
12.				
13.				See also memo dtd 26 Oct 66
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1966
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MANUEL ARTIME
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA
FBI FILE #: UNKNOWN (MIAMI, FLORIDA)

~~SECRET~~

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Manuel F. Artime Buesa, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of the United States Government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to,any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I acknowledge that should I again be affiliated with another government agency or department, I will preserve the secrecy of intelligence operations, sources, and methods of the Organization from other persons in such government agencies and departments, even though such persons are fully cleared, or are in possession of any type of security clearance, within their own departments.

3. I further affirm that I will not discuss with or disclose to any government employee, foreign service officer, or other official with whom I may later be associated, any information relating directly to clandestine operations, sources or methods, personnel or fiscal figures of the Organization, or to special operations, security measures, or other matters which may have been acquired by reason of my assignment with the Organization unless by permission of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

4. I certify that I have no monetary claims against the Organization, nor does any organization I now direct or have directed during my association with the Organization. My signature as affixed hereto represents a quit claim absolving the Organization of any financial or other responsibility for myself and above-described organizations and members thereof. Should there be any future claims, I have been advised to submit in writing to the Organization any such claims I or any organization I now direct or have directed during my association

with the Organization may have against the Organization or the United States Government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive legal consideration. In the event, however, that the decisions of the Organization concerning such claims are not satisfactory, no other action will be taken to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

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I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and the United States Government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

SECRET

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 13 **day of** January **1967.**

(SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 13 **day of** January **1967**

at Miami, Florida

James Wilson
Signature

14-00000

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

File Artime

Enero 13 de 1967

Estimado Jim:

Adjunto te envío el Memorandum sobre los tres casos de que te hablé hoy personalmente:

MANUEL GUILLOT: Este señor es el padre de Manuel Guillot Castellanos, fundador del Movimiento, que trabajó para el MRR y para la "Compañía" durante los años de 1959, 1560 y1961, hasta el 30 de Agosto de 1962, en que fué fusilado por la Tiranía Roja en Cuba.

Fue torturado y murió sin decir el nombre de los rectores del Clandestinaje Cubano que el conocía. Fue infiltrado en Cuba por la "Compañía" varias veces, una de ellas, su último viaje en que fué fusilado.

Don Manuel Guillot padre tiene 65 años de edad y su esposa, que vive, es paralítica y sólo se mueve con aparatos ortopédicos. Este pobre viejo no puede hacer trabajo físico y su mujer es inválida. Nosotros le estabamos pasando $300.oo mensuales. No veo forma en que este hombre pueda hacer otro trabajo que el que hace, de oficinista. Su esposa ha sido sometida a tres operaciones quirúrgicas y el médico dice que necesita una más.

SILVIA HEREDIA: es la viuda de Jorge Fundora, el que descubrió el punto de entrada de la mayor parte de armas y "Teams de infiltracion" que fueron a Cuba antes y después de Bahia de Cochinos. Esta pobre mujer esta sola en el mundo con dos hijos. Ella esta recibiendo tratamiento Psiquiatrico. El MRR le pasa 125 dolares mensuales. Ella no puede abandonar su hogar con los dos hijos para ir a trabajar. Su esposo fue fusilado el 12 de Octubre de 1961 y murió sin decir el punto por donde entraban las armas y los hombres de la "Compañia" en Cuba.

ROSA RABASA: es la esposa de Francisco Echeverria Texier, condenado hace 6 años a 30 años de Presidio por los esbirros rojos. Esta mujer es sorda, solo puede coser en su casa para mantenerse ella y los dos hijos que tiene. No le es suficiente y el MRR le pasa $75.oo dolares mensuales. Este hombre(su esposo) trabajó intensamente con la gente de Francisco, transportando las armas que la "Compañia" metía en Cuba.

En todos estos casos, que son desesperados, el MRR ha costeado hasta los tratamientos médicos.

Para la mayor tranquilidad de los hombres que hantrabajado y trabajan con la "Compañia",sería conveniente que esta gente no pasaran hambre y miseria,ya que han sido sus parientes muertos o presos,hombres que han servido lealmente a la COMPAÑIa y han dado ejemplo de valor y de abnegación;bien distinto de los "héroes" de hoy que van a la Televisión cubana cuando son capturados para hablar mal de la causa anti-comunista,de los EEUU y de la "COMPAÑIA".

Es lo único que me preocupa de la nueva situación creada a partir de Enero de 1967.

Atte. vuestro amigo de siempre:

Manuel F. Artime Buesa

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken, or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

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RI/IS
201-267437

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

This received directly from AMBUDDY-1 and [illegible]

GL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2			10 JAN 1967	jm
2.				
3.				
4. WH/2/N				
5. This				
6. Gentrude			18 JAN 1967	
7.				
8. WH/FI		19 Jan '67		X
9. DC/WH/CO		Jan 1967		
10. WH/C/CI/FA/B				
11. WH/2/CR&W		27 JAN 1967	1 MAR 1967	
12.				
13.				
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15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) [redacted] 201-267437

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 11 Jan. 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER HNMA 03735

FORM 1-61 610e USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

27

TO
Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Managua

SUBJECT 201-267437
6 AMBIDDY-1 Discussions with Frank MARSHALL and Daniel ODUBER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HRS-3845, 12 December 1966
B. HNMW-1930, 19 December 1966

1. AMBIDDY-1 gave the following information to James D. ZABOTH in Managua on 15 December 1966 and was told to pass it on to his Headquarters contact for proper handling and distribution. This report is forwarded as a follow-up in case the information failed to get into proper channels, as it has a direct connection with Reference A and is a sequel to Reference B.

2. Between 7 and 13 December 1966, AMBIDDY-1 talked three times with Frank MARSHALL, at the latter's request. MARSHALL first called AMBIDDY-1 and asked if they could meet at MARSHALL's office to talk about the possibility of MARSHALL investing in the business proposition in which AMBIDDY-1 was involved. (A concession for a commercial record player with a television type screen on which scenes are displayed which are supposed to be synchronized with the music.) After two such meetings, which AMBIDDY-1 described as "get-acquainted" and "feeling-out" sessions (the two men had never met in person previously), MARSHALL asked if he could visit AMBIDDY-1 privately in his hotel room. They met on 12 December 1966 at AMBIDDY-1's suite in the Gran Hotel in San Jose.

continued.....

10 January 1967
JDZABOTH:wcg

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Jose
2 - Chief, WHD

MICROFILMED
JAN 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-263437

[redacted]

B-201-51919
D-53-9-8

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HNMA-3735

DATE
JAN 11 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER

3. MARSHALL said he knew AMBIDDY-1 had some weapons. AMBIDDY-1 replied that the weapons in Nicaragua had been given to the Nicaraguan Government, but MARSHALL continued to press the point, saying he knew there were others. AMBIDDY-1 at last reluctantly admitted that he did have a few more scattered around under tight security (he says this is not true, in fact), but indicated that he had other plans for their use. MARSHALL said he did not care where they were or what they cost, he would buy them. AMBIDDY-1 asked him why he wanted weapons so badly, and MARSHALL replied that he was always in the market for weapons. AMBIDDY-1 said he was aware of that fact, but this did not sound like just another routine business deal. He went on to say that he would not even consider releasing any of his arms without knowing where they were going and for what use, and that he had heard that MARSHALL had sold weapons previously to the Communists. He would have nothing to do with such an operation, regardless of any possible profit in it. He tried to elicit as much information as possible, but got very little. MARSHALL said they had a common friend in General SOMOZA, to which AMBIDDY-1 replied that this was fairly recent as SOMOZA and MARSHALL had been bitter enemies up until about the last three years. AMBIDDY-1 said he had to know how many arms were wanted, when, where, and for what purpose. MARSHALL said he wanted all he could get, as soon as possible, in Costa Rica, and the reason was that he knew a coup was being prepared and he wanted to get his own people ready in time. AMBIDDY-1 said he would have to think about the proposition and would give him an answer in about three weeks. (He intends to stall and make no commitments, hoping to draw out more information. He will not agree to sell any arms.)

4. On 7 December 1966, AMBIDDY-1 talked with Daniel ODUBER at the latter's office. ODUBER said he was worried about all the talk of coup plotting, weapons and other indicators of possible violence. ODUBER again mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that he had a finca on the Pacific Coast near the Nicaraguan border which has an airstrip adequate for a C-46 or C-47 type aircraft, and made an effort to feel out AMBIDDY-1 about the possibility of landing arms on that airstrip. AMBIDDY-1 was noncommital and ODUBER did not press the point.

5. AMBIDDY-1 said (as his opinion) that he had gotten the impression from talking with MARSHALL and ODUBER that ODUBER is pushing MARSHALL to stage a coup attempt in the hope that he, ODUBER, can step in at the right time and claim the Presidency. ODUBER considers Jose "Pepe" FIGUERES to be his main rival in such a plan, however. He seems to think the TREJOS administration is doomed in a matter of time.

Lawrence F. BARKER

14-00000

Earl Williamson: File AMBIDD-1

We sent cable to Mexi asking them to meet with LISASSY-1 and debrief re mission to Venezuela offer.

Discussed commo with Joe Piccolo while he was here and he agreed to give SASSY a means to contact Station (through answering service) when he returns.

Station called Lisassy-1 and met. Results cabled to us. Asked that AMBIDDY-1 be cut out of op and said had lectured SASSY on security.

We asked them if they giving him commo to Station.

fisher

114

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: J. Mahoney

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Source Artime.

Follow-up on his meeting with LISASSY in Miami. What has happened w this Case?

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 30-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(40)

Miami 10 de Enero de 1967

Estimado Jim:

El Dr. Alvarez Tormo estuvo el domingo y el lunes y el martes en Miami.

El motivo de su visita:

1-Contacto con amigo de Carlos en Mejico deficiente. Solo puede hablar con el contacto cuando este lo llama por telefono, y esto lo hace muy de tarde en tarde. Hay cosas urgentes que el espia de la embajada cubana le plantea, que el no puede decidir sin hablar primero con el amigo de Carlos. Por ejemplo: le plantearon un viaje clandestino a Venezuela.

Seria conveniente que Alvarez Tormo pudiera llamar un telefono cada vez que necesite ver al amigo.

2-Los agentes de la Embajada cubana temieron una ruptura con Mejico hace dos semanas y le comunicaron a Alvarez Tormo un sistema de comunicaciones de emergencia, que te envio adjunto en la propia letra de Alvarez Tormo. Antes de venir Alvarez Tormo, el cubano le dijo que la situacion critica con Mejico habia pasado, pero que guardara el sistema de emergencia hasta despues de la "Reunion de Presidentes Americanos"

3-Como vez, le ensenaron a Alvarez Tormo hasta un lugar donde el podia recibir "material" (es decir: Propaganda, materiales de sabotaje, armas etc.)

3-Creo que esto bien trabajado puede dar un resultado formidable, pero creo que si el contacto en Mejico no funciona, Alvarez Tormo va a terminar por evadir lo que para el significa un peligr para sus familiares en Cuba.

4-Ya en Cuba trasladaron al hermano de Alvarez Tormo de la Prision para una granja donde la vida es mas comoda y la familia lo puede ver. Le han traido noticias de su hermano.

Abrazos:

Ignacio

Ignacio

HOTEL MÉRIDA

MERIDA. YUCATAN. MEXICO.

①

Método de Comunicación de Urgencia

Se usarán 2 nombres. El se llamará Luis Gómez (El

Este se usará para la firma de recados, llamadas, cartas, informes, etc

Yo tendré el teléfono de su Casa solo para usar en urgencias y dejaré el recado en la siguiente forma:

"Le habla Z. Hace varias semanas le dejé mi inscripción de documento. Me prometieron tenerlo listo todo enseguida".

Esto significa vernos a 10 hs. mas tarde en el lugar de la proxima entrevista que se hubiera concertado

Se usará un lugar indistintamente para las entrevistas pero habrá un lugar de carácter permanente que llamaremos X. Este lugar se usará solo para el caso de rotas las comunicaciones o desconocerse el lugar de encuentro.

En la Habana contaremos con una dirección que será comunicada periódicamente en cada carta anterior. Le escribiré siempre hablándole de negocios relacionados con talleres mecánicos. Es un sujeto de 29 años, casado con una hija. Nombre de la esposa: Iraida Padrón. Si en una carta yo le señalo que L. G debe llegar acá, indicaré la fecha exacta

HOTEL MÉRIDA

MERIDA YUCATAN. MEXICO.

③

Y nos veríamos en el lugar y hora permanente señalados. La carta se dirige a Evelio pero en el texto se indica que se le entregue a L.G.

Ellos tendrán una dirección mía. Usarán remitente falso y la enviarán a nombre de G.D. dirigida desde Italia por L.G. Hablará de negocios y fijará la necesidad de vernos a una hora y ~~fecha~~ lugar y día. Solo marcará el día pues ~~fecha~~ lugar y hora quedan siempre permanentes.

En caso de vernos en Europa no se mencionará el país pero sería España - Madrid.

Hotel Castellana Hilton

(2) Encuentro ordinario.

Se fijará hora, lugar y fecha en el anterior.

Formas de riesgo:

Para evitar un reconocimiento se usará un pañuelo blanco

Urgencias:

Por parte de Z (L.G) llamará por teléfono. Esto significa encuentro 7 horas más tarde. Lugar: el preestablecido

Suspension

Pasará un telegrama explicando algo de visas en trámite.

Esto significa encuentros suspendidos 10 días

HOTEL MERIDA

MERIDA YUCATAN. MEXICO.

(5) Suspensión de encuentro por parte nuestra.

Pasaremos un telegrama a su oficina

Texto:

En relación propuesta documento juzgo respuesta. G.D.

Remite: Falso

Urgencia: ya queda regulada

Restablecimiento:

Se restablecerán automáticamente en:

Lugar

Hora

Fecha: (a) Si no hay telegrama: el día siguiente

(b) Si hay telegrama 10 días después.

⑥ Depósito de material informativo:

Puntos de Contactos:

Existirá un punto regular y otros de reserva o emergencias.

Habrá un depósito situado en A_1 con un puesto de observación.

En el mapa-croquis se muestran: los lugares de depósito de material informativo y los puestos de observación de ambos sitios.

Estos se podrán modificar de acuerdo con las circunstancias.

Se regulará además que cualquier otra persona podrá llamar a la oficina a nombre de L. G. o podrá establecer una cita refiriendo este nombre.

Se evitarán los contactos a horas desusadas y se esperará en los puntos de contacto únicamente 10 min. antes o después. Al pasar este tiempo se esperarán 10 min. más y en ese caso se traslada el contacto para el día siguiente.

Filed 5 Jan 67

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Subversive and Political Activities in Central America

Source of the following information is a prominent Cuban exile who is a fairly reliable reporter. He has a large number of direct and indirect contacts with influential Latin American nationals. Source acquired the information from discussions held with the individuals mentioned, during the month of December 1966.

During a conversation with Frank Marshall in early December 1966, source learned that Marshall wanted to buy arms and asked source to supply them. Marshall said that he needed them for what he called "an expected revolutionary outburst from one moment to the next in Costa Rica", and he did not want his "private arsenal" to be smaller than the arsenals of the Calderon Guardia group, Pepe Figueres' group, Oduber's group and the Communist group. Source asked Marshall when he needed the arms and Marshall answered NOW. Source replied that he would need at least three weeks to think about Marshall's request and then he would give Marshall an answer. After considering what source had said, Marshall replied, "okay, I can give you one month to give me an answer but no more." Source believes Marshall is in a plot to overthrow the Costa Rican Government. In source's opinion "the situation in Costa Rica is very bad because the president does not have a definite political group to support him and therefore is in the hands of diverse groups; Calderon Guardia, Ulate, Echandi, Frank Marshall etc., who respond to their own sectarian interests and not to Costa Rica, and who respond much less to President Trejos. The Partido Liberacion Nacional, (PLN) is expecting a coup d'etat and plan to counter-attack and stay in power."

In a conversation with Daniel Oduber in early December 1966, source states that Oduber "spoke badly about Don Pepe Figueres and "Chico Orlich". Oduber said that "they wanted to eliminate his presidential aspirations for the coming campaign and postulate Don Pepe again." Oduber said that "they (Don Pepe and Orlich) were the

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

File: Ambiddy-1

Johnsons of Costa Rica and he (Oduber) was the Kennedy. I'm lucky that they are stupid and that they are not aware of the fact that an attack is being created and they are not prepared for that emergency. I am prepared." Oduber then told source of an airfield on his farm close to the Nicaraguan border where at the determined moment he could receive arms.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SAS/ESBC	1 Aug	63-KD
2			
3	SAS/CI/Kube	5 Aug	WC
4	1 Gen - [illegible] file		
5	AMCLATTER/1.		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
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Former contacts Havana Station

able personal courage, good security and common sense. In my mind he is the ideal type of Latin American agent. It will be a real loss to the Agency if we lose sight or contact with Adolfo. I have met few men more dedicated and more loyal.

271764

5. 05 Ramon USATEGUI Lezama. AMPAN-3. Recruited by AMPAN-2 and so close to each other that we referred to them as the "Gold Dust Twins." Ramon was in the shipping business in Havana and eventually had to leave. He lost his home, cars, furnishings, etc. His firm is now planning to send him to Nicaragua, and I have recommended him to the Nicaragua desk (Fr. Trenta). 03 He has all the qualities ascribed to Adolfo SAN PELAYO (see above) except that he has never been an American citizen. He speaks excellent English. He is dedicated, courageous and most anxious to maintain contact with the Agency. It will be our loss if this is not done.

25189

6. Bernard L. Barker. AMCLATTER-1. Wife: Clara. Barker is a Cuban-American. Ex-Captain in the U.S.A.F. See PRQ and 201 for full bio data. I recruited Barker in 1959, and he served faithfully until we had to exfiltrate him sometime in 1960. He recruited a number of valuable agents for the Station (including AMCLATTER-5, which see) and had an amazing encyclopedic knowledge of Cuban persons, events and contacts in all walks of life. He was a boxing manager and knew intimately all Cuban personalities engaged in the sporting industry. He had a puppy-dog loyalty to his case officers and to the Agency. His biggest weakness was his lack of discretion. He was such a loyal American (actually if not technically) that he would fight at the drop of a hat if anyone cast aspersions on the United States or its leaders. In the atmosphere of Castro's Cuba I might say that that was quite often. We are in the process of helping him recover his lost American citizenship. When the Station reopens I would certainly recommend that we continue to maintain contact with Barker. If nothing else he would make a wonderful leg-man for the Chief of Station. His wife is an attractive Cuban gal who is bilingual and as belligerently "American" as he is. Barker, by looks and by language, could pass either as an American or a Cuban - a genuine asset if he could be taught to submerge his Americanism.

7. 05 Manolo VEGA Abril. I met Manolo through Jorge ALONSO PUJOL (now a prisoner in Cuba as a result of the 17th of April invasion). Manolo is working for us now in Miami, and I presume we have full bio data on him. Manolo's family owned, along with Republic Steel, the big steel plant in Havana which was nationalized by the Castro regime (Cia. Antillana de Acero, S.A.). Manolo has a brother, Benigno, who would also be worth cultivating. Through his business and family connections Manolo knew a great many people of operational interest. One of his friends was David SALVADOR, although Manolo did not share SALVADOR's political thinking (extreme left and anti-American). Manolo was objective a reporter as I have ever encountered among Lat

SECRET

3/BR

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: CE

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	15 June 65			Jo
2. WH/C/RR/OS		17 JUN 1965		K
3.				
4.				
5. WH/C/MO/CI				
6. ES/AK			29 JUN	K
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ABSTRACT ✓

INDEX

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FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 19-5-1

DOCUMENT DATE June 1965

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA-21693/3

SECRET

(40)

UFGA [illegible]/14

Att. No. 4 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: ALEMAN, Carlos [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1953 in the home of Agustine ALDAMA Acosta, calle Tejar between San Lazaro y San Anastasio, Lawton, Havana City. Source became a close friend of the Subject during this period because of their mutual activities against the Batista regime. About 1958 Subject was arrested because of his political activities and was confined at Principe prison until the overthrow of the Batist regime. Source believes Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria in the early days of January 1959. In February 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace the same as source, where they were under the direct orders of Cusy AULET (mat unk). In December 1959 Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolutionaria, stationed in a building located at Ave. Misiones y calle Pena Pobre. Subject was transferred to the DTI as chief of the Departamento de Robos about 1961. Source last saw Subject about late 1961 when source went to the DTI to help a friend find his stolen car. Subject was not a communist before 1959, but now he is a staunch supporter of the GOC and a communist. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was residing in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana City. Subject is divorced and has a minor son. Source believes Subject came to the USA about 1952, but Subject has never travelled to any communist countries.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1928, HavanaCity, probably. Race: white. 5'6". 160 lbs. Hair: light and gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Believed identical with Carlos ALEMAN Grass, 201-752505. <Believed ident w ALEMAN, CARLOS who was close friend of subj. of 201-754928>

CS COPY

s/c ~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

19-5-1

~~[illegible]~~

UFG [illegible]

Att. No. 5 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: VALEJO Iniguez, Delfin [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1940 when they were neighbors at calle San Lazaro between Concepcion and Dolores Streets, Lawton, Havana City. Subject as a young man worked as a piano repairman. Source believes that Subject worked in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas during Batista or Prio regimes. In 1959 Subject was working at the Bolsa de Confecciones (Control Office for textile factories) which was located at the Retiro Odontologico building, located on 23 St. and L. St., but source does not know exactly what type of work Subject did. Source believes that Subject worked in that position until he left Cuba for the U.S. in late 1960 or early 1961. Subject now resides at 1529 SW 7th St. Apt. 6, Miami. Source believes that Subject has never been a communist and that he (Subject) was offered the mentioned position at the Bolsa de Confecciones because of his activities against the Batista regime. Subject has never travelled to any of the communist countries and source believes Subject never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, source does not know the place of birth. Race: white. 5'10". 165 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light brown. Shape of face:round. Build: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~[illegible]~~ 2

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

SECRET

UFGA - 21693/14
Att. No. 7 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: AULET, fnu
aka: Cusi

[illegible] DPOB: C1928
[illegible]
201 - 754935

1. Source met Subject about 1955 when they lived in the same neighborhood, Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana City, and since that time they have had frequent contact with one another because of their activities against the Batista government. About 1958 Subject went into exile in New York where he remained until January 1959, when he returned to Cuba. In early 1959 source was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace through the influence of Subject. At that itme source worked under Subject's directions and they had developed a close friendship. When source returned to Cuba in December 1959 he saw Subject only occasionally. Subject became a member of the Rebel Army and source heard that Subject attended a military course in Matanzas City. Source last saw Subject about January 1964 about two months before source departed from Cuba. Source says Subject is married and has children and that he resides at calle Luis Estevez between Mayia Rodriguez and Pasaje Oeste, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled out of Cuba, or if Subject has relatives outside Cuba nor does source know if Subject has ever received any political or intelligence training. Source does not know to what military unit Subject belongs. When source last saw Subject about January 1964, Subject had been shot in one leg during a personnal quarrel with a militia man, which occured in early 1963. Subject is very reserved and source stated they avoided speaking about politics.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1928, source believes Subject once told him he was born in the USA. Race: white. 5'8". 140 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: long. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

3

UFGA - 21693/14

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Att. No. 8 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] UFGA - 21693/11

SUBJECT: VAULET, fnu
aka: Pichi [illegible]
201-754938

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when both were appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace and they remained in contact, but not close friendship, until June 1959 when source left this position. Source has not seen Subject since. In 1961 source heard rumors that Subject had a post at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exterioes, but source does not know exact position held. About 1962 source heard rumors that Subject was in some communist country studying mechanics. When source left Cuba in March 1964 he was under the impression that Subject was still in this communist country studying. Subject is single and lived in Reparto Santos Suarez, exact address unknown. Source does not know if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training, or if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7" 125 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~SECRET~~ 4

C/C ~~Att 3~~ UFGA-21693 A/4 SECRET

SECRET UFG - 21693/14

Att. No. 10 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] DOB c 1926 POB Cuba Havana
[illegible] interrogation early [illegible] 754435

SUBJECT: *BAEZ, Jorge

1. Source has known Subject since 1956 or 1957, being from the same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, in Havana City, Both were involved at that time in activities against Batista's regime. During this period Subject used to work as a construction laborer. In early 1959 Subject was appointed Chief of the Cayo Cruz garbage disposal unit and remained in this position until September 1962 at which time he resigned and left Cuba, coming to the USA. He presently resides at 2 Vicent Court, Apt. 2-C, Newark, New Jersey. Source last saw Subject in Cuba in September 1962. In the beginning of March 1965 Subject visited source in his home in Miami. Source states that Subject was never a communist and that since very early in 1959 was against the Castro regime. Subject has never traveled to any of the communist countries and has many relative residing outside Cuba at the present time. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, Havana City (probably). Race: white. 5'11", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

6

UFGA-21693/1 SECRET

14-00000

UFGA - 21693/14
Att. No. 11 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] dob: c 1930 pob: Havana
[illegible] during interrogation of
subj. 201-754138

SUBJECT: BARRENA Barrena, Obdulio

1. Source met Subject about 1960 at which time source was working at the Ministerio de obras Publicas as "Chief Buyer" for the District of Havara. Source and Subject became very close friends. Subject resigned his post about 1963, in order to arrange for his exit permit, and is waiting to leave Cuba for Madrid, Spain. Source says he believes Subject was never a communist and is sincerely against the present GOC. Since 1960 Subject resided at calle San Anastasio #678, la Vibora, Havana City. Source heard that Subject was separated from his wife and is living with his mother at the above mentioned address. Subject has never traveled out of Cuba; and has a cousin Berta NORIEGA (this is husband's patronymic) who lives in Miami, address unknown. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, Havana City. Race: white. 6'2", 155 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

7

UFGA 21693/14 SECRET

SECRET UFGA- 21693/14

Att. No. 12 to UFGA-21693

Cit. Cuba DOB c1925 POB: Cuba, Havana

SUBJECT: *BELLO San Pedro, Gregorio

[illegible] 201-751538

1. Source met Subject about 1950 being from the same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana. At that time Subject worked in the "La Estrella" (candy factory) located in Via Blanca, Havana City. Source became much more friendly with Subject about 1955 or 1956 when both were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Subject was arrested in 1958 for such activities and was confined to the Castillo del Principe where he remained until January 1959. Source believes that for a few months in early 1959 Subject was a member of the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria. Source believes Subject then returned to his job at La Estrella. Source has a slight idea that Subject also worked for the ICA (Instituto Cubano del Petroleo) in the domestic gas division. Source last saw Subject about January 1964 in the streets in Reparto Santos Suarez where they had a casual conversation. Source says that in his opinion Subject is one of those persons who wants to remain on the "fence"; that sometimes he speaks in favor of the government and at other times against the GOC. It is source's opinion that Subject has never traveled outside Cuba and that he has no relatives outside Cuba. Source also stated that Subject has never received any kind of political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, Havana City probably. Race: white. 5'8", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Gregorio BELLO was the 26th July Movement leader, delegation No. 11 of Santos Suarez, Estrada Palma, and Sola Streets, Havana (AMWREN/1, 6 April 1961).

[redacted] 6

~~[illegible] 12~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

UFGA - 21693/14

Att. No. 13 to UFGA-21693

POB: Cuba DOB: c 1920

SUBJECT: *BONITO, Luis Cuba, during interrogation [illegible] 201-754938 [illegible] 201-157196

1. Source met Subject in December 1957 in Mexico City where Subject was in exile at that time. Source last saw Subject in January or February 1958. Source saw Subject several times in Mexico but never became friends. Source claims he has heard rumors that Subject has traveled to some of the Communist countries. Source believes that after the communist takeover in Cuba Subject had some position as a labor leader in the CTC (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba) but souce is not able to provide any other info on this matter. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. It is source's opinion that Subject was not a communist at the time they met.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1920, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 160 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is possibly identical with Luis BONITO Milian, 201-187196. <Possibly ident w/ BONITO, Luis who was in Cuba during interrogation w/ subj. – 201-754938>

9

[redacted] UFGA. 21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 14 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: CALDERIN, Pedro

201-134438

1. Source first met Subject about 1950 when Subject was a taxi driver in Havana, but had no close contact with him until early 1959 when both were appointed to positions at the Presidential Palace under the direct orders of Cusi AULET. They became friends during this period of time which lasted until June 1959, when source left this job. Source again established contact with Subject in 1960 or 1961, at which time source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas and Subject had been appointed Administrador of "Luis Nion Company" (Terrazo floors) which had been confiscated by the government. Because of Subject's position in said firm he had to frequently go to the Ministerio de Obras Publicas for which Ministerio this firm made terrazo floors. During these visits Subject used to talk with Subject. Source last saw Subject in mid-1963 when source visited him at the office of the Consolidado del Granito (this was the new name for all terrazo floor companies) located at calle Neptuno and Industria, Havana City. Source made this visit in order to try to secure from subject a permit to buy a spare part for his (source) car. Source believes Subject was never a communist prior to 1959, but that he is now a supporter of the GOC. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba or if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military of intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'10", 155 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long and thin. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

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UFGA 21693/14 Att. No. 15 to UFGA-21693

F [illegible]

SUBJECT: *CALZADILLA, fnu [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when both were appointed to similar positions at the Presidential Palace under the direct supervision of Cusi AULET. Source maintained with Subject the normal relations of fellow employees until source left that position in December 1959. Source last saw Subject in June 1959. Source is not able to provide any info on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba, or if he has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. Due to the fact that source was in personnal contact with Subject for a very short time, source is not able to provide any information regarding Subject's political sympathies.

2. Physical DescriptioN: DPOB: circa 1937, Matanzas City, probably. Race: white. 5'11", 170 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

11

[illegible] 15 UFGA-21693/14 [illegible]

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 16 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: de CARDENAS, Orlando

[illegible]

1. Source met Subject in June or July 1959, when source was working at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, which Subject used to visit very frequently because he was a personnal friend of many of the Cubans employed there. Subject is a Cuban who has been residing in Mexico since about 1935. Source became a friend of Subject and this friendship lasted until December 1959, at which time source returned to Cuba. They did not see one another again until 1964 when source re-established his contact with Subject. Source believes Subject has never been a communist and always expressed himself against the Cuban communist regime. Source says Subject has some medical products representations in Mexico City.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 190 lbs. Hair: black and gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Orlando de CARDENAS was a member of the PRD Delegation in Mexico in December 1960. In 1962 one Orlando de CARDENAS Miro attended a meeting in Mexico to discuss the formation of a new Cuban-Mexican anti-Castro organization, where he was named the Provisional Treasurer of the organization (DBA 8997, 30 April 1962).

12

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

Att. No. 17 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CARRASCO, Irma [illegible] 201-754938

1. Source met Subject in 1962 when Subject was residing in an Apartment building located in Marianao, behind the Colegio de Belen, where a friend of source, Dr. Emilio FORS, used to live. Source maintained the social relationship with Subject until March 1964. Afterwhich they have maintained correspondence from Spain, where Subject has resided since September 1964. Subject according to source, is not a communist and is against the Castro regime. Source believes that Subject has never previously traveled outside of Cuba. Subject informed source that she has a brother (name unknown to source) who has been in the US since about 1961. Source believes Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training. Subject resides at calle Martin de los Heros #74-1, Madrid, Spain, and in Cuba Subject used to live in Reparto La Ceiba, Marianao, Havana Province, complete address unknown. According to source Subject intends to emigrate to U.S. from Spain.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'5", 130 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

X

[redacted]

13

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET ~~[illegible]~~

Att. No. 18 to UFGA-21693

UFGA 21693/14

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CASAL, Roberto Cited during interrogation of subj. 201-754938
aka: Pilin

1. Source met Subject about 1960 at the home of Ramon F[illegible] WILTZ Bucelo, who resided on calle Serrano or calle Zapote, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Source had little contact with Subject at that time and they were never close friends. When source arrived in Mexico City in March 1964, he received a letter from WILTZ in which source was given the Subject's US address: 461 E. 13th St., Hialeah, Florida. Source last saw Subject about mid-1961. Source stated that, although he had very little contact with Subject, his opinion is that Subject has never been a communist, and believes Subject never had any position in the Communist regime in Cuba. Source believes Subject left Cuba in early 1962, going to Spain, from where he came to the US. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the communist countries and does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training. Source cannot provide any information on Subject's private life.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: ca 1928, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 165 lbs. Hair and eyes source can't remember. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

Cited during interrogation of subj.
201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

✓

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

14

UFGA - 21693/14

Att. No. 19 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: CONCEPCION Morales, Jose Antonio
aka: Tito [illegible]

1. Source has known Subject all his life because they are distant relatives. Source gave Subject a position as laborer in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas in 1960, when source worked there. Prior to this, Subject had never worked, because of his youth. After working in the Ministerio Subject became a member of the Militia and a staunch supporter of the GOC. Source claims that about 1962 Subject accused him of having removed a TV set from his (source's) home, which the source did because at that time he was arranging his exit permit to leave Cuba. Subject on several occasions received military instructions for periods of one to two months, but source is not able to say the exact nature of these courses or where the Subject received the training. Subject has not traveled outside Cuba, and has no close relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1941, Santa Clara (probably), Las Villas Province. Race: white. 5'7", 130 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

✓

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UFGA - 21693/14 SEC

Att. No. 20 to UFGA-21693
UFGA-1693/14

[illegible] c 1937 [illegible]

SUBJECT: CUENCA, Cesar Ramon

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in 1957 where Subject was then residing at calle Chapultepec, Colonia Narvarte. During the two months source was in Mexico he saw Subject frequently and they became very close but source has not seen or heard from Subject since about February 1958. In 1959 he heard rumors that Subject was stationed at the Estado Mayor in the Ciudad Libertad, Havana City, and also that Subject worked for a period of time at the Ministerio de Recuperacion de Bienes, but was later transferred to G-2 in Camaguey City. Source later heard that Subject was appointed to a post in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's mentioned positions or as to where he might be working at the present time. Subject's father prior to 1959 owned a drug store in Guanajay, Pinar del Rio Province. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the communist countries or if he has any relatives outside Cuba, nor whether Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1937, Guanajay, Pinar del Rio Province, probably. Race: white. 5'8", 160 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above believed identical with Cesar CUENCA Montoto, 201-328945. (Believed identical w/ CUENCA, CESAR RAMON [illegible] during interrogation, [illegible] 201-754438. Reportedly in G-2 in Camaguey City)

[redacted]

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SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14

[redacted]

Att. No. 21 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *DUQUESNE, fnu [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas at which time Subject was a Labor Leader of the Construction Workers, and acted as "liaison" between the Ministerio and the constructions workers. Source's only contact with Subject was in December 1961 when source resigned his job. Subject is a militia member. Source is not able to provide any background information on Subject. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if he has received military or intelligence training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1923, place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 5'10", 145 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Armando DUQUESNE was listed as a Castroite-Communist employee of the Ministry of Justice (19-6-52/4-2, Report from Monte dated 10 November 1961). May be identical w/ DUQUESNE, fnu cited during interrogation of subj. of 201-754936.

[redacted] 17

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

UFGA- 21693/14

Att. No. 22 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: *ESPINO Lezcano, Roberto [illegible] ROBERTO SANTA ANA ESPINO LEZCANO

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was appointed to this position at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was already working there in the Department of Statistical Budget. Source last saw Subject in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas a few days before source left Cuba in March 1964. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Source heard from fellow employees in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, that Subject was an "old" employee of that Ministerio, and had been working there since about 1950. Source saw Subject again in Mexico City, when Subject arrived in June 1964. Source says that Subject left Mexico about October 1964 and has since been residing at 1134 SW 4th Street, Apt. 20, Miami, Florida. Source says in his opinion Subject was never a communist and never was a member of any of the communist sponsored organizations. Source believes Subject had never traveled outside Cuba before. Source says Subject has many relatives outside Cuba at present time. Source says Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1927, Cardenas, Matanzas Province. Race: white. 5'9", 150 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Roberto Santa Ana ESPINO Lezcano, DPOB: 26 July 1928, Cardenas, Matanzas, a former Public Works employee in Cuba is presently residing in Hialiah, Florida (MEXI 1007, 24 Sept 64).

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Att. No. 23 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: FERNANDEZ, Osmin [illegible] cited during interrogation of subj [illegible]
Believed identical w [illegible] 201-334092

1. Source met Subject about 1955 or 1956 in the Castillo del Principe in Havana where Subject was serving time for political crimes and source went there to visit a friend, (Gregorio BELLO San Pedro). Source saw Subject again in 1957 while both were exiles in Mexico City. After his return to Cuba in 1959 source heard that Subject was a member of the Rebel Army. Source saw Subject again in 1959 or 1960 when source visited him at the Marianao City Hall, where Subject was the Comisionado Municipal. Source also saw Subject several times at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas when Subject visited Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran who was his very close friend. Source believes he saw Subject for the last time in late 1960 on one of the visits Subject made to Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source claims he is a friend of Subject, although not a very close one. Source believes that Subject has been a Communist sympathizer since 1957, as he heard Subject on several occasions making pro-Communist statements. Source believes that Subject has traveled on different occasions to Communist countries. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba. Source believes Subject is a staunch supporter of the Cuban Communist regime. Source is not able to say if Subject has ever received any military, political of intelligence training. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life.

Close friend of subj [illegible]

Close friend of FERNANDEZ, OSMIN

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1937 probably in San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio Province. Race: white. 5'5", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: Source can't remember. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Osmin FERNANDEZ Concepcion, 201-334092. < Believed identical w FERNANDEZ, OSMIN who was cited during interrogation of subj. w 201-754938

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SECRET

U-GA- 21693/14

Att. No. 24 to UFGA-21693

cit. Cuba dob: c1925 pob: Cuba, Cifuentes

SUBJECT: FORS, Emilio [illegible] 201-754733

1. Source believes he met Subject about 1955 while both were engaged in activities against the Batista government. Source states that since that time he has had a close relationship with Subject, as both used to visit each other frequently. Source states that since 1955 Subject worked in a Medical organization called O.M.P.O. (Source can't say what these letters mean) which was located on calle 23 in Vedado but source can't say the exact address. This was a Medical organization that made house calls for clients of said organization. Source believes Subject continued this same work after 1959, never worked for the government, and has never been a member of any communist sponsored organizations. (Source says Subject is married to Marta (patronymic and matronymic unknown) and has two minor children. Subject has lived since about 1963 at Ave. 41 #6623 Apt. 1, Marianao, Havana Province, Cuba. Source believes that since February or March 1959 the Subject has realized the evils of Castro's regime and has been against it. Source claims Subject has never been a communist sympathizer. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba. Source says that Subject has a sister named (fnu) FORS (Matronymic unknown), Mrs. Octavio DORESTE who has lived at 105-B Wallworth Park, Cherry Hills, New Jersey, since about 1963. Source says he believes Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, Cifuentes, Las Villas Province. Race: White. 5'9", 140 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

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UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 25 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: 4 *FUENTECILLA, Fernando

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 when source was working at the Presidential Palace and at this time Subject was applying for a position there, which source believes he never got. When source left Cuba in June 1959 Subject was still frequently visiting the Presidential Palace trying to acquire a position there. The next time source saw Subject was about March 1960 at which time Subject visited source at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas where he was then working, and where Subject wanted to get a job. Through source Subject was appointed office clerk at the Distrito #3, Havana which position he held until late 1960, when he was transferred as office clerk to the offices of Reforma Urbana located on calle O between 23 and 25 Streets, Vedado, Havana City. Source does not know why or when Subject was transferred from the offices of Reforma Urbana to the Ministerio de Transporte in Plaza Civica, but during the first half of 1963 source was accompaning a relative who wanted a taxi permit from the Ministerio de Transporte and at this time souce saw the Subject who was then Chief of the Departamento de Licencias de Autos de Alquiler; source says that Subject was very helpful and through him source's relative got the necessary permit. Source believes that Subject is not a communist and if he is working for the government he is doing it because he has to have a job. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba, not has he ever received political, military or intelligence training. Source says Subject once told him that he has a married sister residing in the US; but source is not able to provide the name of the husband or the address. Source is willing to establish mail contact with Subject if necessary, who he believes, if properly approached could and would cooperate.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1941, Cuba Guantanamo, Oriente Province. Race: white. 5'8", 150 lbs. Hair: blonde. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars. Face has acne marks. [illegible] during interrogation Identity of 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

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UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

UFG - 21698/14

Att. No. 29 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: #GAVILAN, Mario [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1957 in Guanabacoa, Havana, through Ezequiel #GOMEZ aka Kelo, who was engaged with activities against the Batista regime. Subject used to work for the Urban buses (routes 3 &5) Guanabacoa, and lived in Cojimar, Havana. On Castro's rise to power Subject continued working as driver in the Urban buses, and never held any position in the Castro regime. Subject went as an "alzado" to Escambray Mountains, with Ezequiel GOMEZ in early 1961 and was arrested in March 1961. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was at the Isle of Pines Prison. Source says Subject has never been a communist and that he was honestly trying to overthrow the Castro regime. According to source Subject has never traveled outside Cuba, not has any relatives residing outside Cuba nor has he ever received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible]

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, Cojimar or Guanabacoa, Havana Province. Race: white. 5'8", 140 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

22

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No. 31 to UFGA-21693

[illegible]

SUBJECT: GIL Suarez, Lino [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in June or July 1959 at which time Subject was Military Attache at the Cuban Embassy. Source and Subject had the normal relationship of fellow employees but they were not close friends. At that time Subject was a sympathizer of the Communist system, and used to read communist and anti-USA propaganda. Source saw Subject again in the latter part of 1960, at which time Subject had a position in the Immigration Department of the DTI located at Monserrate and Empedrado, Havana City (this department issued exit permits). Source had gone there to request Subject's assistance in securing an exit permit for a friend and Subject granted said exit permit. In 1962 Subject was working for MINREX at Calzada & G, Vedado. In early 1963 source heard rumors that Subject had been appointed Military Attache to one of the Cuban Embassies in one of the Communist countries, the exact country is unknown to source. Source was not able to provide any information on Subject's private life, work, or any of Subject's activities prior to 1959. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has ever received political, military or intelligence training. Source believes Subject is a complete and staunch supporter of the Communist regime.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1935, Marianao, Havana. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Gil Lino SUAREZ Hernandez, 201-262638. (Believed to be Ident w GIL SUAREZ, LINO known to duty. + 201-754387)

~~SECRET~~

23

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No. 33 to UFGA-21693

cit: cuba Dob: c1925 Pob: cuba: Guanabacoa

SUBJECT: K *GOMEZ, Ezequiel
aka: K Kelo

201-268917

1. Source met Subject about 1955 at the home of Agustin K *ALDAMA Acosta, located in Calle Tejar between San Lazaro and San Anastasio, in Lawton, Havana City. After they met they became close friends and were engaged together in revolutionary activities against the Batista regime. Subject fought in the Escambray Sierra and was there when Batista was overthrown in January 1959. At the time source met Subject he was a labor leader of the Urban Buses (Routes 3 and 5). Source believes in early 1959 Subject went back to his work at this bus line. In early 1960 Subject was appointed to a position at Customs at the Jose Marti Airport, Havana, but source is not able to provide any information on the tasks the Subject performed there. Source last saw Subject in late 1960 or early 1961 in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Some days after this visit Subject went as an "alzado" again to the Escambray Mountains where he remained until 17 March 1961 at which time he was arrested. When source left Cuba in March 1964 he knew from newspapers that Subject was at the Isle of Pines prison. Source is of the opinion that Subject has always been against the communists and that he had been honestly engaged in activities against the Castro regime in Cuba. Source believes that Subject has a 16 year old son who is residing with his mother in New York, address unknown. Subject made a trip to Mexico about 1956, and also a trip to Miami about 1958.

2. DPOB: circa 1925, Guanabacoa, Havana Province. Race: white. 5'5", 135 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938 [illegible]

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Ezequiel GOMEZ was identified as a pro-Castro infiltree at the Isle of Pines Prison. GOMEZ is a former member of the MRP (DOI: September 1962) (UFGA 6761, E-2, 4 December 1962).

[redacted]

SECRET 24

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

Att. No. 34 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: GONZALEZ Polanco, Horacio [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1955 both having resided in same neighborhood in Reparto Santos Suarez, Havana, and at which time they were both engaged in activities against the Batista regime. About 1957 Subject went to the Sierra Maestra, where he joined Castro's forces, and upon the overthrow of Batista Subject returned to Havana with the rank of Lieutenant in the Rebel Army and now has the rank of Captain. Source last saw Subject in early 1963 at the restaurant "La Antigua Chiquita" in calle Carlos Tercero, Havana, at which time they had a casual conversation. Source has heard rumors that on different occasions Subject has been stationed in Camaguey Province and also at the Isle of Pines. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba, has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has ever received military, political or intelligence training. Source believes Subject is not a real communist, but a person who under that system has obtained a better position in life and has become one of the "new class".

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'11", 160 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Traces on Subject follow by special channel.

~~CS COPY~~

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[redacted] UFGA. 21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 35 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: *GONZALEZ, Victoriano

1. Source met Subject about 1940 both having resided in the same neighborhood in Reparto Lawton. At that time Subject worked as a salesman at a fruit store located on Calle San Lazaro and Dolores in Lawton, Havana City. In 1954 or 1955 Subject and source were also in contact because both were engaged in activites against Batista. Subject was one of the men that was placed with the source near the Presidential Palace in Havana to help in the attack that took place on 13 March 1957. They were not able to do so because the weapons they were supposed to use did not arrive on time. In 1960 source appointed Subject as carpenter in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, and source believes Subject has remained in that post until the present time. Subject is not in favor of the present GOC because he is not a communist. Subject has never traveled to any of the communist countries, but source believes Subject came to the US as a baseball player in 19 3 or 1954. Source says he believes Subject has no relatives outside Cuba, and that Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training. Source says he last saw Subject about October 1963 on the street in Lawton.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1927, Cuba Matanzas City. Race: mulatto. 5'5", 150 lbs. Hair: dark, curly. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

Regard as subj. as cited by subj. 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: ~~No identifiable traces.~~

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

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UFGA 21693/14
Att. No. 36 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: GRANADO, Miguel [illegible] 1915 [illegible]
[illegible] 201-75[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about April 1960 when source was appointed to his position at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, where Subject was the Administrador of the Distrito #3, Havana. Subject remained in that position until early 1961, at which time he was transferred to another job located in the main building at the Plaza Civica, in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Since then source has seen him about two or three times, meeting him casualy in the street. During the period of time in which source and Subject were working together they became friends although not close friends. Source is not able to provide information on Subject's life prior to the time in which they met. Source believes, based on the conversations he had with Subject, that Subject is against the Cuban communist regime although Subject's brother (fnu) GRANADO was the Sub-secretario tecnico de Obras Publicas about 1961. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba or if Subject has received political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 125 lbs. Hair: bald. Eyes: light. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693 SECRET 27 [redacted]

UFGA-21693/14
Att. No 37 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: F *GRAUPERA, Roberto [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about April 1960 at which time source was appointed to the Personnel Department at the Distrito #3, Havana, in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was the Chief Engineer of the said Distrito #3, Havana. In early 1961 Subject was transferred to the main office of Obras Pulicas at Plaza Civica and also at this time source believes Subject was appointed a professor at the University of Havana. At that time source became friendly with Subject. Source went to visit Subject at his home in Calle Santa Catalina, Reparto Santos Suarez, when source heard that Subject was leaving Cuba and coming to the US and source wanted to say goodby. Source has had no contact with him since that time. Source has heard that Subject is living with his family in Miami, and has a position as an Engineer in Nassau, where he goes every week. Source believes Subject has never been a communist, has never traveled to any communist country, nor has received any military, political or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1920, place of birth unknown. Race: white. 6'1", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: oval. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Roberto GRAUPERA was employed as Cuban manager for M&M Dredging before the advent of the Castro regime (KUJUMP Memo, 18 September 1962).

b. Roberto J. GRAUPERA Graniela departed from Mexico 11 November 1960 (Travel Manifest)

c. Roberto J. GRAUPERA Graniela appeared on a list of the Technological Faculty, School of Engineering, Havana University (DOI: September 1962) (UFG 2714, 22 April 1963)

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~~S/[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

14-00000

UFGA- 21693/14
Att. No. 38 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: GRIFFIN, fnu

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas and Subject as one of the labor leaders of the Construction Workers acted as "liaison" with the Ministerio. Source only had contact with Subject while he was in his post in the Ministerio from 1960 until December 1961 when source resigned in order to come to the US. Subject was a militia member at that time but source is not able to provide any information prior to the time in which they met, or after December 1961 when source left the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, nor if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1932 place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 6'1", 210 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of Face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One William GRIFFIN Prado, aka: Willy, 35 years old, a blond with fair skin resides at Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province. He works in a cement factory called "El Morro" as Chief of Fleet, i.e. he is in charge of the ships which belong to the cement factory. His mother is a widow that was a teacher of the American children whose parents used to work and to manage the cement factory. Willy knows English perfectly. He has a brother, Richard GRIFFIN Prado who lives in the U.S. (AMOT Report, 6 June 1963)

b. One Victor GRIFFIN, a Negro is the General Superintendent of Construction Works in "La Antillana" steel rod factory. He is the most dangerous and fanatical defender of the regime. He is rumored to have sent some persons to the "firing wall", but source doesn't remember any specific details about this. Subject gives flash rallies in favor of the regime and against the U.S. (AMOT Report, 24 September 1963).

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.38 UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

Att. No. 39 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21698/14

SUBJECT: ISALGUE, Sara SEKIF [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in June 1959 when Subject's husband, Salvador MASSIP was appointed Ambassador in Mexico City. Source stated his only contact with the Subject was from June 1959 to December 1959. Source believes Subject is a complete communist and a staunch supporter of the communist regime. Source has heard that Subject is now residing with her husband in a communist country where he is the Cuban Ambassador.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1890, ends Matanzas Province, probably. Race: white. 5'5", 150 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Wife of Subject of 201-218391.

[redacted]

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[redacted] UFGA- 21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

Att. No. 40 to UFGA-21693
UFGA - 21693/14

[illegible] c. 1930 [illegible]

SUBJECT: DE JOHN, Roberto

1. Source met Subject in January 1959 when both held positions at the Presidential Place under the direct orders of Cusi AULST. In early 1960 source heard rumors from mutual friends that Subject had a position in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago de Chile but source is not able to provide any information on Subject's position in said Embassy. Source last saw Subject on January 1964 at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores in Havana City, where source went in order to arraign some of his documents for his future departure from Cuba. At this time Subject was wearing a militia uniform and he told source he was now working at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Source does not know Subject's political ideologies, if he has traveled to the communist countries, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1930, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'8", 135 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Roberto de JOHN replaced Julio T. CRUZ as Cuban Civil Attache in Chile. His wife, Hidia ACOSTA is replacing Carmita ZUNIGA as secretary to the Cuban Ambassador (ECSA 8372, 13 January 1961).

b. Roberto de JOHN Fragua, a Diplomat, entered Mexico on 11 September 1961 and departed Mexico on 14 September 1961 (Travel Manifests).

c. Roberto de JOHN Fragua, Diplomat, departed Mexico on 30 March 1962 (Travel Manifests).

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UFGA-2169 3 SECRET 31

Att. No 41 to UFGA-21693

UFGA 21693/14

SUBJECT: LANTIUOD, Francisco [illegible]
aka: Paquito

1. Source met Subject while both were in exile in Mexico City in 1957. Subject previously worked at the Compania de Electricidad in Havana City. Source heard that when Subject returned to Cuba in early January 1959, he returned to work at the Compania Cubana de Electricidad. Source believes Subject never had any position in the Cuban government. Source heard by rumor from mutual friends that Subject took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in La Havana about 1960, and that after a few months he went to Caracas, Venezuela, and then to the U.S. where he has been since late 1960. Source is unable to provide Subject's address. Source believes Subject has never been a communist. Source doesn't know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if he has received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1933, [illegible] Havana City, probably. Race: white. Skin: dark. 5'10", 170 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

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[redacted] UFGA 21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 42 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: FELLERA, Jorge [illegible] [illegible] 201-754938

1. Source stated he has never personally met the Subject. The Subject's name was given to him by a mutual friend, Ramiro RODRIGUEZ Puentes. Source wrote a letter to Subject addressed to 10 Bulkley Avenue, 3rd Fl., Port Chester, New York, 10573, and Subject answered this letter and told source to use his, Subject's name if necessary with the US Immigration Authorities. Source is unable to provide any furthe information on Subject.

[illegible] 201-754938

2. Physical Description: Note: Source is not able to provide any physical description because he (source) has never seen him.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

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[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

Att. No. 43 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: *LOFORTE, fnu Cit: Cuba
aka Jimmy

1. Source met Subject in early 1959 while both were working at the Presidential Palace. About 1960 Subject told source that he, Subject, was working at the Ministerio de Interior (at the department of Foreigners resident in Cuba). Source last saw Subject about February 1964, when source went to the Ministerio de Interior to secure his exit permits. They spoke for a few minutes and source is not able to provide any details on Subject's position there. Source is unable to provide any information concerning Subject's political ideology, if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, Cais Guantanamo, Oriente. Race: white. 5'7", 130 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: slim. No visible scars. [illegible] 201-754938
May be identical w/ Jimmy LOFORTE

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Jimmy LOFORTE is either a member of, or the President of the Comite Para la Defensa de la Revolucion, Committee for the Defense of the Revolution, for a sector of Infante Street in Havana (UFGA 3513, 15 March 1962).

b. Jimmy Cit: Cuba LOFORTE is a member of the Cuban I.S. (UFGA 17532 E-1, 26 August 1964).

[redacted]

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[redacted] UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

[redacted]

Att. No. 45 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *MACHADO, Manuel
aka: Manolo
[illegible] may be identical of 201-267298

1. Source met Subject in June or July 1959 because Subject was a frequent visitor to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, where source worked. Subject used to go there because he was a personal friend of many of the Embassy employees. Subject is a Cuban citizen who has been residing in Mexico since about 1945. Source maintained a friendship with Subject since they first met which was interrupted when source returned to Cuba in December 1959. Source re-established contact with the Subject in 1964, when source arrived in Mexico. From the conversations they had, source believes Subject has never been a communist and is against the Cuban communist regime. Source is not able to provide any other information on Subject.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1915, Cuban citizen. Place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 6'0", 150 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Manuel MACHADO Llosas, 201-267298 <Believed identical MACHADO MANUEL who was contact of subj of 201-754935>

SECRET 35

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 46 to UFGA-21693

cit: Cuba

[illegible] UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: ✝ *MAS, Juan

1. Source first met Subject about January 1959 when both used to work at similar positions at the Presidential Palace. Source believes that in about 1961 he met Subject who stated that he had recently returned from a post in one of the Cuban Embassies in a Latin American country, but source is not able to state the nature of Subject's position nor in which country this position was held. This was the last time source saw Subject. Subject once told source that he had once worked for the Judicial Police when the head of the organization was, Krundino VILELA, thich must have been during the period 1948-1952. Subject told source he was married to an Argentine woman. Source believes Subject still holds some position in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, but is not able to provide any information on this matter. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's trips abroad, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received political, military or intelligence training.

cit: Cuba

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1912, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 165 lbs. Hair: reddish. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

201-285681

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Juan MAS y Luna, Cuban Charge in Tegucigalpa (TEGU 3534, 29 June 1960). (Believed to be identical w/ one MAS Juan [illegible] involved at Presidential Palace with subj.) 201-754938 in 1959)

36

SECRET

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 48 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/1 [illegible]

SUBJECT: *MAZORRA, Rigoberto

1. Source met Subject on circa 1957 through Ezequiel *GOMEZ [illegible] aka Kelo at Guanabacoa, where Subject worked in the Urban Buses (Routes 3 & 5). Subject was then engaged in activities against the Batista government, and in 1958 he went with Ezequiel GOMEZ to the Escambray Mountains to fight against Batista remaining there until January 1959. In 1959 Subject returned to his work in the urban buses (routes 3 & 5) and Subject never held a position in the Castro government. In early 1961 Subject went to the Escambray Mountains to fight against Castro and was arrested about March 1961. When source left Cuba in March 1964 Subject was at the Isle of Pines prison. Source says he believes Subject has always been anti-communist. In 1959 Subject went to Guatemala with Agapito AMARO, who was trying to start a transport business in that country, but they returned because that business didn't work out. Source believes that Subject's wife and children are in the US but he is unable to provide names or addresses. According to source Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1923, Cojimar probably. Race: white. 6'0", 200 lbs. Hair: light brown and gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: oval. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

cited during interrogation in subj of 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

37

UFGA. 21693

Att. No. 49 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: MENDEZ, Placido
aka "El Gallego"

[illegible] - 201-754938

1. Source met Subject about 1955 through a mutual friend Ezequiel GOMEZ, when they both were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Source was exiled in Mexico with the Subject in 1957 in Mexico City, where both resided at calle Milan No. 40. In late 1959 Subject told source (in the street) that he was working in an Electrical Appliances store near Carlos Tercero, Havana. About 1960 source learned from a mutual friend that Subject was under arrest and source believes as of March 1964 Subject was still in jail. Source heard that Subject has a son, who is presently about 18 years of age. Source believes that the Subject is truly anti-communist, and that this is the reason why he is under arrest.

CIT: Cuba

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 160 lbs. Hair: blond. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: mid-heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. Placido MENDEZ Ramos was listed as under investigation by the Cuban G-2 for anti-Castro acts December 1960 (HKHA 7210, 16 December 1960).

b. One Placido MENDEZ Ramos, formerly MRR Chief for Havana was imprisoned at the Isle of Pines (CK 234, 16 August 1962)

c. Placido MENDEZ, member of the MDM was taken prisoner (AMPAID/4 Production, 31 October 1962)

CS COPY

38

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14

SECRET

[redacted]

Att. No. 50 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: F *MENENDEZ, Segundo   UFGA - 21693/14

1. Source met Subject about 1948 at the Tricunal de Cuentas, Plaza Civica, Havana as source's sister, Blanca MONDEJAR Rodriguez, used to work in the same office of which Subject was the Director. Source last saw Subject in Cuba in early 1963, at which time Subject was leaving Cuba for Mexico. Source saw Subject again in Mexico in 1964. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has received any political, military or intelligence training. Source intends to maintain correspondence with Subject.

c. T. Cuba   pob

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1918, place of birth unknown to source. Race: mulatto. 6'0", 210 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: very heavy. No visible scars. Agent on subj. relative by subj.: 201-754938

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET   39

[redacted] UFGA-21693 [redacted]

Att. No. 51 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *PAEZ, Juan Cit: Cuban DOB c. 1930 [illegible] 201-754935 a complete communist [illegible] of GOC

1. Source met Subject about 1961 when Subject was appointed Administrador Distrito #3, Ministry of Obras Publicas, Havana, and source used to work at said Ministerio. Source claimed that their relations were the normal ones between fellow employees, but they were never friends. The last time source saw Subject was in 1963 at the "Bar Canciller" located on calle Paseo y Zapata. Source believes Subject continued working for the Ministerio de Obras Publicas but that he had been transferred to another post. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time they met. Subject always dressed in the militia uniform and from his conversation source believes Subject is a complete communist and a staunch supporter of the regime in Cuba. Source does not know if Subject is a member of the PURS. Source is not able to say if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source heard that Subject had worked in Brasilia, Brazil, while that city was being built. Source does not know if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: 1930, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'9", 150 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed identical with Juan PAEZ Martin, brother of Frank PAEZ Martin. Juan was an active member of the 26th of July Movement during the Batista regime. In December 1962 was the Chief of the Auditors Section of the Ministry of Public Works. (UFGA 06929, 18 December 1962).

Cit: Cuba

CS COPY

SECRET

40

~~[illegible]~~ UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 52 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *PENA, Pablo

1. Source met Subject about 1960 when source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, at which time Subject was one of the labor leaders of the Construction Workers, who acted as a "liaison" between the Ministerio and the Construction workers. Source only had contact with Subject from 1960 until December 1961. Source is not able to provide any information prior to the time in which they met, or after December 1961 when source left the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Subject is a militia member. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has traveled outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received militiary or intelligence training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training, but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

CIT: Cuba DOB

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown. Race: negro. 5'9", 145 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: black. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject is believed identical with Pablo PENA Urrutia, Personnel Chief for Cayo Largo projects; negro. PENA is a member of the Construction Syndicate; lives in a reparto between Cotorro and San Francisco de Paula, Habana; is married and has two children, usually wears an olive drab uniform; is about 38 years of age, 6 feet tall, weighing 190 lbs, and has brown hair and eyes. (KUJUMP Memo, YCAC 2359)

CIT: Cuba DOB: C1927 Believed identical w PENA, PABLO known to subj. of 201-754935

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA - 21693/14 SECRET

41 [redacted]

14-00000

Att. No. 53 to UFGA-21693
[illegible] 21693/14

SUBJECT: *PERAZA, Luis [illegible] 754938, [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in December 1957 at which time Subject was in exile there. Source stated he was only an acquaintance of the Subject and never became a close friend. During this period he learned that Subject's father was Captain Adjutant for General Ruperto *CABRERA, during the regime of Pres. Prio. After source returned to Cuba in early 1958 he didn't see Subject again until early 1959 at which time source visited at his home, located on the second floor of a house located at Ave. 41 about two blocks from the Obelisco near Camp Libertad. Source made this visit because a few days previously someone had thrown a hand granade into the Subject's house and Subject's brother Sergio *PERAZA was [illegible] severely wounded. Source believes Subject has never held a position in the Castro regime and that Subject has never traveled to any of the Soviet countries, nor received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible] 201-754938 Brother LUIS PERAZA

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, Havana Prov. probably. Race: white. 5'7", 140 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. One Luis PERAZA Barrios recently arrested by BRAC as a communist suspect. Distributor of PSP propaganda under Abelardo J. ADAN y Garcia (HKHA 4549, 14 August 1958)

b. Luis PERAZA Barrios admitted having enlisted in the Republican Army in Spain in 1938 during the Spanish Civil War. He was repatriated from France after the war and returned to Cuba. He said he had been affiliated with the PSP since 1946 and had continued to engage in clandestine activities for the Party after it was declared illegal in Cuba (HKH 1693, 13 August 1958).

c. Luis PERAZA Garcia, common passport 251992 arrived in Montevideo from Paris 23 November 1963 on Air France flt 97. (MONT 8411, 28 November 1963)

d. Luis PERAZA organized the Cuban Branch of Cuban-Polish Friendship Society, DOI: 3 October 1960. (WAVE 8244, 28 November 1963)

e. Luis PERAZA Cabrera is a member of the G-2 with an officer's rank. His mother has a pharmacy at 50 meters from AMRICE/2 (SOURCE) father's home. PERAZA supports CASTRO fanatically. His family is very detested in the neighborhood (AMRICE/2, 22 February 1964)

SECRET

42

UFGA-21693/14

Att. 54 to UFGA-21693 dated ____________

SUBJECT: *PERAZA (mat. unk.), Sergio UFGA - 21693/14

1. Source met Subject in Mexico City in December 1957, at which time Subject was in exile there. Source was only an acquaintance of the Subject and they never became close friends. During that time he learned that Subject's father was Captain Adjudant of General Ruperto Cabrera during the presidency of Prio. After Source returned to Cuba in early 1958, he didn't see Subject again until early 1959 at which time Source visited Subject at his home on the second floor of a house located at Ave. 41, abouttwo blocks from the Obelisco near Camp Libertad. Source went to visit Subject due to the fact that a few days previously someone had thrown a hand-grenade into Subject's house and Subject was severely wounded. Source believes Subject has never held any position in the Castro regime, and has never travelled to any of the Soviet countries or received any political, military or "intelligence" training.

CIT: Cuba

2. Physical description: DPOB: circa 1937, cuba Havana Province. 5'8", 140 lbs., race: white; hair: blond; eyes: light; shape of face: long; build: medium. Scars on the left cheek produced by wounds from hand grenade explosion, also has difficulty in speaking from same wounds. May be ident (w) SERGIO PERAZA CABRERA.

CIT: Cuba

3. JMWAVE traces: Sergio PERAZA Cabrera, member of the G-2 with the rank of an officer, supports Castro fanatically. PERAZA's mother has a pharmacy 50 meters from AMRICE-2's (Source) father's home. PERAZA's family is very distrusted in the neighborhood (AMRICE-2, 22 February 1964).

[redacted]

43

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. 55 to UFGA-21693 dated
UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: PERDIGON (mat. unk.), Presbistero Cit. Cuba DOB: c1930
[illegible] 201-[illegible]38. G-2. [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about February 1960 at which time both were working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source is not able to provide any information regarding Subject's life prior to this time. Source stated their relationship was merely that of fellow employees. Source last saw Subject in December 1961 at which time Source resigned his post at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source believes that although Subject is a militia man and has a position in the Purchasing Department at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Subject really works for the DSE or G-2 as Subject used to go frequently to the personnel department where he secured information from the personal files of the employees. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled outside of Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or "intelligence" training. In Source's opinion Subject is a staunch supporter of the Cuban Communist regime. Subject is married to (fnu) FERNANDEZ (mat. unk.) who is a sister of Osmin FERNANDEZ (mat. unk.) Cit: Cuba! Brother-in-law of PRESBISTERO PERDIGON.

2. Physical description: DPOB: circa 1930, San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., dark hair, dark eyes, long face, slim build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces:

a. Previstero PERDIGON is G-2 and head of the supply department for the Public Works, Havana (Navy Intel Info Rpt 9-S-61, 13 December 1961).

b. Prebistero PERDIGON, DOB: c. 1932, is Chief of Unidad 22, Materials Supply for the Ministry of Public Works, via Blanca and Paso Superior, Havana. Subject is also a Lt. in the Rebel Army and wears a uniform (DCE 15394, 5 August 1962).

c. Previstero PERDIGON, DPOB: 1930, Pinar del Rio. Subject is 5'8" tall, 108 lbs., black hair and eyes, a G-2 agent in Ministerio de la Construccion. Works as "Responsable de Suministros de la Regional Habana" of MICON. Office in the MICON warehouse in Carretera de Rancho Boyeros. Subject is a miliciano and a member of the Rebel Army (Source: Olga FORNES Lopez de Espino, AMSIGH-1 debriefing, dated 15 September 1964).

[redacted]

✓

SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

14-00000

SECRET Att. 56 to UFGA-21693 dated ______

UEGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: *RAFART (mat. unk.), Carlota Cit: Cuba

Cit: [illegible] 201-724938 ← DOB: C.1940

SEVIF 201: Cuba

Cit: Cuba

1. Source met Subject in early April 1964 through Olga *GOICOECHEA (mat. unk.) when she visited someone at the boarding house where Source was living in Mexico City. Source was socially acquainted with Subject from March 1964 to 22 December 1964. Subject lived in Cuba with her family until 1959 or 1960 at which time Subject left Cuba with her parents for Mexico where her father, Manuel *RAFART (mat. unk.) was employed by the United Nations in Mexico. Subject is a Cuban citizen by birth, but Subject's father is a Spaniard who went to Cuba (date unknown) where he became a Cuban citizen. Source claims that from conversations he had with Subject, she is not a Communist and is against the Communist regime in Cuba. Subject lives at Calle Versalles #29, Apt. 3, Mexico D.F. Source believes Subject is in some way related to Eloy *GUTIERREZ Menoyo 201-269349 but is not able to say exactly how. Source believes Subject has never received any kind of political, military or "intelligence" training.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1940, Havana City probably. Race: white. 5'7", 150 lbs., light hair, light brown eyes, oval face, build medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 45 [redacted]

Att. 58 to UFGA-21693 dated__________

SUBJECT: *RAMIRO (mat. unk.), Hector UFGA - 21693/14

1. Source met Subject about 1955 at which time Subject had a small cigar store in the entrance of "La Estrella" candy factory in Via Blanca, Havana City. In early 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Presidential Palace where Source had been employed before he went to Mexico in June 1959. Subject remained working at the Presidential Palace but Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's position there. Source frequently saw Subject in their mutual neighborhood in the Reparto Santos Suarez. Subject is married and has three or four children, but Source is not able to provide any other information on Subject's private life. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled out of Cuba, if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or "intelligence" training. Source claims that Subject was never a Communist and that if he is working for the regime, it is because of the need for his job. Source believes that if Subject is properly approached he possibly would cooperate with us, but Source does not have Subject's address nor does he know anyway in which he could establish contact with Subject but is willing to do so if so asked.

2. Physical description: ~~DPOB~~ dob: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white, 5'8", 155 lbs, dark hair but balding, dark eyes, oval face, medium build. No scars. Has a nervous tick on the left side of the mouth.

Cited by subj in 201-754938

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

UFGA-21693/14. SECRET 47

Att. 59 to UFGA-21693 dated ________
UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: *RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, Ramiro [illegible]
[illegible] 201-[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1950 as both resided in the same neighborhood in Havana. Subject was a radio-telegraphist and was employed as such in the Presidential Palace in Havana until 1959. Subject also worked as a radio-telegraphist at the Jose Marti Airport and at the Ministerio de Comunicaciones, all of which positions Subject held prior to the Castro regime. Source believes Subject remained working as a radio-telegraphist in the Jose Marti Airport and that Subject resigned this position in mid 1962 in order to secure his exit permit from the authorities. Since that time, Subject has been trying to leave Cuba. Source is not able to say how Subject has been able to support himself from 1962 up to the present time. Subject left Cuba for Mexico City on 30 October 1964 where they saw each other. Subject resides at Arcos de Belen #73, Mexico D.F., and is attempting to secure a U.S. visa. While in Cuba Subject used to live on Calle Bella Vista between Agua and Santa Lutgarda, Reparto Palatino, Havana. Subject is married to Rosa VILCHES Montero and has an 18-year-old son and a 12-year-old daughter. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and is against the Castro regime. Source says Subject has a brother, Juan *RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, who has been residing at Santurce, Puerto Rico since 1959 or 1960. Source believes Subject has never received any political, military or "intelligence" training. [illegible]

2. Physical description: DPOB: 1925, Sagua la Grande, Las Villas Province. Race: white. 5'5", 165 lbs., black hair, black eyes, round face, heavy build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 48 [redacted]

SECRET

Att. 60 to UFGA-21693 dated ____

UFGA-21693/14
[illegible] 201-[illegible]
[illegible] 201-75438

SUBJECT: *RODRIGUEZ (Mat. Unk.), Ramon

1. Source met Subject in late 1957 when they lived together for two months at Calle Milan #10, Mexico, D.F.. This was the last time the Source saw the Subject. Source believes the Subject had a business of transporting commercial alcohol in Havana during the period from 1950 to 1957. Source doesn't know why Subject was exiled in Mexico, but knows Subject was a close friend of Placido *MENDEZ (mat. unk.). Source has never heard from Subject again, and is not able to provide any information about his political point of view or on his private life.

[illegible] Ramon Rodriguez

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1920, place of birth unknown. Race: white, 5'9", 163 lbs., dark hair, dark eyes. Source cannot remember any other physical characteristics of Subject.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET

[redacted] HFGA-21693/14 49 [redacted]

Att. 61 to UFGA-21693 dated ________

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: (pat. unk.)(mat. unk.)(fnu)
aka: ROLO [illegible] [illegible] indicate this is nickname [illegible] 201-335014

1. Source met Subject in 1959 when both were employed at the Presidential Palace, Havana. Source never saw Subject again until 1960 when both were employed at the Ministry of Obras Publicas. Subject was a delegate of the Minister, Osmani CIENFUEGOS. During that time Source saw Subject frequently until December 1961 when Source resigned his post at the Ministry. After this time Source never saw Subject again. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside of Cuba, if Subject has ever travelled outside of Cuba or if Subject has received any kind of political, military or "intelligence" training. Source says he has never talked to Subject and cannot provide any information on Subject's political point of view.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1930, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., black hair, dark eyes, long and thin face, slim build. No visible scars. Subject limps on one leg -- Source believes due to a gunshot wound.

3. JMWAVE traces: Card references for aka: ROLO indicate that this is the nickname for Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni, 201-335014.

One aka ROLO cited by subj. of 201-754938 probably nickname for subject

[redacted]

SECRET 50

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

/

Att. 62 to UFGA-21693 dated __________

SUBJECT: *SALINAS (mat. unk.), Pablo   UFGA -1693/14

1. Source met Subject about September 1959 when Source visited Ciudad del Carmen, Mexico, where Subject lived. This trip the Source made on instructions of Agustin ALDAMA Acosta who told the Source to visit the Subject who would introduce Source to journalists and directors of newspapers at Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche, and Merida who would write and publish articles in favor of the Cuban Communist regime. Source saw Subject for about three or four days at that time and never saw him again. Source has the impression that Subject was a Communist by the way in which he talked. Source says he heard during this trip that Subject's wife and children lived in Mexico City and Subject remained in Ciudad del Carmen mainly because he had a small coconut plantation there. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life prior to the time they met nor afterwards.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1910, Mexican citizen. Race: white. 6'0", 190 lbs., black hair, light eyes, oval face, heavy build. No visible scars.

c.r. Mexico [illegible] c1910

3. JMWAVE traces: One Pablo SALINAS, Communist, who is an agent of Hector GARCIA Vidal, former Cuban Military Attache, is now in southeastern Mexico (CSCI 3/763,359, 9 January 1961, EMM 5286).

[redacted]

SECRET   51

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14   [redacted]

[illegible]

Att. 63 to UFGA-21693 dated

SUBJECT: *SANTANA (mat. unk.), Odilio [illegible]

1. Source met Subject through Ezequiel GOMEZ (mat. unk.) at Guanabacoa in about 1957. Subject was engaged in activities against the Batista Government and was employed as a conductor in the urban busses (Routes 3 and 5) in Guanabacoa. Source believes Subject was exiled in Miami in 1958. After Subject's return to Cuba, Source believes he went back to work at the urban busses in Guanabacoa. Source has not seen Subject since 1957. Source heard that Subject was "alzado" with Ezequiel GOMEZ (mat. unk.) aka Kelo in the Escambray Sierra in early 1961, and they were arrested together circa March 1961. When Source left Cuba in March 1964 he heard that Subject was at the Isle of Pines Prison. Source believes Subject has no relatives outside Cuba and has not received any military, political or "intelligence" training.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1932, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: white. 5'10", 150 lbs., blond hair, light eyes, long face, slim build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

X

SECRET 52

Att. 64 to UFGA-21693 dated [illegible]

SUBJECT: *EARDA (mat. unk.), (fnu) [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

1. Source met Subject about early 1960 when Source was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas, and at which time Subject was the Secretario of the Constructions Workers and acted more or less as "liaison" between the Ministerio and the Construction Workers. Because of his work, Subject made frequent visits to the Ministerio de Obras Publicas where he would contact Source because of Source's position there. Source had no contact with Subject since 1961 when Source left his position with the Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Source says Subject is a militia man, which uniform he constantly uses. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to the time when they met, or after December 1961. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has travelled outside of Cuba or if Subject has ever received military or "intelligence" training. Source believes Subject has received some kind of political indoctrination or training but is not able to provide any other information on this matter.

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1930, place of birth unknown to Source. Race: Negro. 5'10", 165 lbs., black hair, black eyes, long face, medium build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

X

[redacted]

53

14-00000

Att. 65 to UFGA-21693 dated

UIGA- 216[illegible]/11

SUBJECT: F*SOLIS Gonzalez, Piedad SEX: F CIT: Cuba DOB: c 1933 POB: Mexico Veracruz

Cited in only of 201-754935

1. Source met Subject in 1957 in Mexico City at which time Subject (who is a Mexican citizen) was married to Reinaldo BENITEZ (mat. unk.). According to Source, BENITEZ was one of the men who went to Cuba in 1956 with Castro on the GRANMA . Source stated he saw Subject again in 1958 when Subject visited Cuba. Source believes Subject stayed with the ALDAMA family on Calle Tejar between San Lazaro y San Anastasio, Lawton, Havana City. Source stated he may have seen Subject when he was working in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico from July to December 1959. Source saw Subject again when Subject went to Havana in 1960 when Subject resided at the Edificio Los Colonos on Calle Juan Delgado and Lacret, Santos Suarez, Havana City. Subject returned to Mexico in late 1961. Source does not believe she later returned to Cuba. Between March and December 1964 Source saw Subject once or twice a week as Source received mail at Subject's address in Mexico City. Subject told him that she is separated from her husband. Source does not believe there is another man in Subject's life. Source stated he is almost positive that Subject has never been a Communist and that she is against the Communist regime in Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has ever travelled to any Latin American country or to any Soviet Bloc country. Source says Subject has a brother, Ignacio F*SOLIS Gonzalez, who has been in New York since about 1960, address unknown to Source. Cit: Cuba Brother of Solis Gonzalez, Piedad - a New York

2. Physical description: DPOB: Circa 1933, Veracruz (probably) Mexico. Race: white (Indian characteristics). 5'3", 130 lbs., dark hair (straight), light brown eyes, round face, mid-heavy build. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE traces: None.

[redacted]

SECRET 54

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 [redacted]

Att. No. 66 to UFGA-21693

UFGA-21693/14

SUBJECT: F SUAREZ, Jose [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in late December 1957 in Mexico City, but had very little contact with him then. Source saw Subject again early in 1959 in a public office building in Havana. This was the last time he saw Subject. Source says that Subject was one who attacked the Cuartel Moncada on the 26 of July of 1953 and was arrested with Fidel CASTRO. Source believes the Subject is not a Communist. As far as source knows Subject does not hold any position in the Cuban government. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled to any of the Soviet bloc countries or if he has any relatives outside Cuba.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: Circa 1926, probably Artemisa, Pinar del Rio. Race: white. 5'6", 145 lbs. Hair: light. Eyes: light. Shape of face: long. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: One Jose SUAREZ, member of the 26th of July Movement, N.Y.C., resides at 610 W. 163rd Street, Apt. 16, N.Y. 32, N.Y. (DBF 97723, 29 Dec 61).

X

55

UFGA-21693/14 SECRET

Att. No. 67 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 1693/14

SUBJECT: TOMAS, Israel Cit: [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in early 1961 when Subject was appointed Chief of Distrito #3, Havana in the Ministry of Obras Publicas where source also works. Source claims his relation with Subject was as fellow employees and they never became friends. Source heard in the Ministerio de Obras Publicas that Subject had been appointed to that post because of his old membership in the Communist Party. Source is unable to provide any information on Subject's life prior to this period. Source heard that Israel TOMAS is not the real name of the Subject, but an aka used according to Communist practice. Source last saw Subject on December 1961 at which time source resigned his post at said Ministerio. Source is sure that Subject has to be a PURS member. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, or if Subject has ever received any military, political or intelligence training. Source does not know any information on Subject's private life. Cite [illegible] 201-754938

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, Cuba Havana Province. Race: white. 5'11", 210 lbs. Hair: gray. Eyes: light. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Believed to be identical with 201-315876.

[redacted]

56

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

U GA - 21693/14
Att. No 63 to UFGA-21693

[illegible] DOB c 1910 [illegible]
[illegible]

SUBJECT: TORRES Picart, Juan [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about July 1960 when Subject was appointed Chief of Personnel of Distrito #3, Havana, where source worked. Source learned from Subject that he, Subject, was a Spaniard, who came to Cuba about 1938 after the Spanish Civil War. Source also learned that during the 1930's Subject was a member of the Partido Anarquista in Spain. Source believes he last saw Subject in early January 1962 on a visit he made to the Ministerio Obras Publicas. Source says Subject always wore the militia uniform, and that Subject claims he is a good friend of Carlos DIAZ ex-father-in-law of Osmani CIENFUEGOS Gorriaran, and is an old member of the Communist party. Source says Subject is married and has a son of about 18 years of age, but source is unable to provide any other information about Subject's private life. Source does not know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba. Source has heard rumors that Subject worked prior to 1960 in the Departamento de Cultura of the Rebel Army. Source was unable to provide any information as to whether Subject had ever received any political, military or intelligence training. [illegible]

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, Spain, Cuban citizen. Race: white. 5'6", 185 lbs. Hair: almost bald. Eyes: brown. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces:

a. Juan TORRES Armesto's name appeared in a list of alleged Communist, informers and voluntary collaborators. Subject is a resident at the Calixto Sanchez Section in Rancho Boyeros (UFGA 1914, 19 July 1961)

b. One Juan TORRES is the Administrator of the Telephone Company in Cienfuegos. Subject is anti-Communist and trustworthy. (AMOT Report, 22 August 1962)

c. One Juan D. TORRES was identified as a pro-Communist employee at the Cuban Telephone Company. (UFGA 5663, 13 Sept 1963)

d. One Juan TORRES is Head of the Defense Committee in Holguin. Age approximately 50, Address: Marti Street, near the corner to Central Highway. Employed in the Public Works. Subject was repatriated from the U.S. but is dissatisfied with the CASTRO regime and regretted having left the U.S. (AMOT Report, 23 Oct 1962)

e. One Juan TORRES is a member of the Communist Party in Ceiba Mocha. (AMOT Report, 28 October 1965)

f. One Juan B. TORRES works for the Communist regime in Cuba. Address: Jzdo. Instruccion Cienfuegos (UR MEMO 110, 13 February 1963)

g. Juan TORRES Picart, is listed as the Head of the Personnel Department of the Havana Regional (AMOT Report, 29 July 1963)

57

UFGA-21693/14

Att. No. 70 to UFGA-21693

UFGA- 21693/14

SUBJECT: VALDES Meneses, Pedro

1. Source met Subject when source began to work at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas in 1960, where the Subject also worked, from which time they became very close friends. Source last saw Subject on 31 July 1962 on which date Subject left Cuba and came to the U.S. Subject used to work in private construction companies, before the Castro regime. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and that although he was working at the Ministerio de Obras Publicas he was against the Cuban Communist regime. Source believes Subject has never traveled before outside Cuba. Source says Subject has some relatives outside Cuba but is not able to provide their addresses. Source says Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

CIT: Cuba

Cuba

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1938, Marianao, Havana. Race: white. 6'0", 150 lbs. Hair: light brown. Eyes: brown. Shape of face: long. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None. Cite Tng subj. ~ 201-754938

X

X

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 58 [redacted]

Att. No 73 to UFGA-21693

UFGA - 21693/14

SUBJECT: VICTORIA, Aido [illegible] [illegible]

1. Source met Subject about 1953 or 1954 when they were engaged in activities against the Batista regime. Subject used to work as a truck driver for "Expresos Amaro" in Havana City and about 1959 he was employed at the Compania Cubana de Telefonos as a truck driver, working there for about two years when he resigned in order to be able to get an exit permit to leave Cuba. Source does not know why Subject has not as yet been able to leave Cuba. Since about 1961 Subject has been able to support himself as a truck driver, driving a truck owned by Subject's friend. Subject has lived since about 1960 at calle Teresa Blanco #35, Apt. 4, Luyano, Havana, residing there with his wife, Lucia Maria PERDOMO Mirabal, no children. Source says Subject has never been a Communist and is against the Castro regime. Source believes Subject has never traveled outside Cuba. Subject, has one sister in the US and another one in a Central American country, but source is not able to provide their addresses. Source says he is almost sure Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

wife of VICTORIA, ALDO

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1932, Las Villas Province. Race: white, dark skin. 5'6", 155 lbs. Hair: dark. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: round. Physique: heavy. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: None.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET 59

UFGA-21693

Att. No. 74 to UFGA-21693
UFGA 21693/14

cit: Cuba [illegible]

SUBJECT: *VIDAL, Ricardo DOB: c1910 [illegible] 201-290894

1. Source met Subject in June 1959 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City where Subject was the first Secretary. During this period source became a friend of Subject's. While in Cuba source heard rumors in late 1960 or early 1961 that Subject had defected from the Castro regime. When source returned to Mexico in March 1964, and after he was denied his entrance in the U.S. he went to see Subject at a printing shop where Subject was employed at calle Sandalo #93, Mexico D.F. The source made this visit to Subject because source knew that Subject had very good relations with many U.S. Diplomats, and also had good contacts in Washington, D.C. (Source knew Subject had been a career diplomat for more than 30 years.) Subject orientated the source in the steps he should take such as writing a letter to the State Department and to others. During the time source was in Mexico from March to December 1964 source saw Subject about six or seven times, sometimes in the streets, or visiting him at the printshop. Subject resided at calle Cholula #109, Apt. 3, Colonia Hipodromo, Mexico, D.F. Since source arrived in the U.S. he has had no contact with Subject. Source believes that Subject has never been a Communist and that if Subject was in a post in Mexico it was because he was an experienced Diplomat and the Cuban Government needed him. Source believes Subject has never traveled to any Communist country. Source believes Subject has his immediate family in Mexico with him, and does not know if Subject has any relatives in Cuba or in the U.S. Source does not know if Subject has received any military, political or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1910, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'4", 140 lbs. Hair and eyes source can't remember. Shape of face: round. Physique: medium. No visible scars. Wearsmoustache.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above believed to be identical with Ricardo VIDAL Dominguez, 201-290894.

VIDAL, RICARDO [illegible]
Subj. of 201-754938.

60

UFGA [illegible] 14

Att. No. 75 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *VILLAFANA, Manuel [illegible]

1. Source met Subject in 1959 when Subject was the Military Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, D.F. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's life prior to this date. When source returned to Cuba in December 1959 Subject remained in his post in Mexico City, and source has not seen Subject since that time. Source said he read in the newspapers in 1960 that Subject left his post and had come to the U.S. Source says that he wrote to Subject from Mexico when source was denied his U.S. visa, securing Subject's address through source's sister who was in Miami. In source's opinion Subject is not a Communist and resigned his post when he realized the Cuban regime was a Communist one. Source does not know if Subject has ever traveled outside Cuba besides the trip to Mexico and to the U.S. Source does not know if Subject has relatives outside Cuba or if Subject ever received political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1925, place of birth unknown to source. Race: white. 5'7", 150 lbs. Hair and Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject (cited by subj. 201-754938) above is believed to be identical with Manuel VILLAFANA y Martinez, 201-098818.

201-98818

(Believed to be iden/c Manuel Villafana cited by subj. ~201-754938)

[redacted]

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET 61 [redacted]

Att. No. 76 to UFGA-21693

SUBJECT: *WILTZ Bucelo, Ramon [illegible]
DPOB: c1926 Havana, Cuba; 201-75493

1. Source met Subject about 1940 being from the same neighborhood, Reparto Lawton, Havana. Before the Castro regime Subject used to work as office clerk in a Notary Public office. In early 1959 Subject was appointed to a position in the Ministerio de Salud Publica, but source is not able to provide any information on this position. Subject worked at this position for one or one and a half years. About 1960 Subject was appointed as coach of the basket-ball team at the University of Havana but resigned this position in late 1961 in order to secure his exit permit. He left Cuba in early 1962 and presently resides at 2565 SW 25th St. Apt. 2, Miami. Source says that in his opinion Subject has never been a Communist and is completely against the present GOC. Subject has traveled widely to Latin America, the U.S. and also Europe, with different sport teams. Subject has a brother and a sister residing in Miami. Subject has never received any political, military or intelligence training.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1926, Havana City. Race: white. 5'9", 165 lbs. Hair: black. Eyes: dark. Shape of face: oval. Physique: medium. No visible scars.

3. JMWAVE Traces: Ramon Francisco WILTZ Bucelo. DPOB: 12 December 1926, Arroyo Naranjo, Habana, arrived in the U.S. on 22 June 1962 (DBA 14541, 7 July 1962).

X

[redacted]

21693/14 SECRET 62 [redacted]

to [redacted]169.

SUBJECT: x *YOUNG, Manuel
aka: x "El Chino"

E.T.: Cuba DOB: c 1940 POB: Cuba
Cited [illegible] 201-7.+938. Reportedly
G-2 [illegible] Pinar del Rio. [illegible]

1. Source met Subject when both were exiled in Mexico City in late 1957. Source saw Subject again in about 1960 in Pinar del Rio City on a trip source made there accompaning his father who had a farm in Consolacion, Pinar del Rio Province. Source claims he never was a close friend of Subject. Source heard about 1959 that the Subject is a Lieutenant in the G-2 in Pinar del Rio City. Source is not able to provide any information on Subject's private life nor does he know if Subject has any relatives outside Cuba, if Subject has ever traveled to any country in the Soviet bloc, or if Subject has ever received any political, military or intelligence training.

Manuel Young Lezcano.

2. Physical Description: DPOB: circa 1940, San Juan y Martinez, Pinar del Rio Province, probably. Race: Mulatto with chinese characteristics. 5'5", 135 lbs. Hair: black and straight. Eyes: dark. Face: thin. Physique: slim. No visible scars.

CIT: Cuba

3. JMWAVE Traces: Subject above is believed to be identical with Manuel YOUNG Lezcano. DPOB: 8 October 1940, Pinar del Rio. YOUNG is the Deputy Chief, G-2, Pinar del Rio. cit

63 19-5-1

[redacted] UFGA-21693/14 SECRET [redacted]

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARTIME-Buesa, Manuel
201-0267437
Volume XIII

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
7 AUG 1978	7 Aug 1978	Leslie WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

~~SECRET~~

8 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE: 7 January 1965, 2130 Hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Manolin Hernandez arrived from Central America and reported that Vico Starke and Frank Marshall, with the support of General Anastacio Somoza of Nicaragua, were planning a coup against President Francisco Orlich in Costa Rica. A-1 planned to depart Miami for Managua at 0700 hours, 8 January on Lanica airline to check this information with General Somoza and to attempt to ensure that his equipment is not being used to carry out the coup. A-1 will have his private communications pad and promised to send us a message as soon as he talked with General Somoza and with the Orlichs and Starke in Costa Rica.

2. A-1 agreed to try to return to New York on Saturday, 9 January, for a meeting with Mr. Archer (Chief, WH). A-1 will call as soon as he arrives in New York at which time arrangements will be made to bring him to Washington for the meeting.

3. A-1 reported he and Al Burt had signed a non-aggression pact. A-1 feels there is little to gain from his point of view in continuing the squabble with Burt.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Tel Conversations
Costa Rica
Nic
Press

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-003
DBA -96789
27 JAN 65
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE ALLEGATION BY ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO 201-269349 OR MRR WAS WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER THE ORDERS OF A COUNTERINTELL AGENCY OF US AND THAT SUBJ WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SINKING OF SPANISH SHIP SIERRA ARANZAZU.

R 6502082325

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

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OK

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
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TIME 2000

BY Dm

INFO VR, FILE, DDP

AMBIDDY-1 201 13 FEB 65 IN 80247

Security

SECRET 132358Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 8261

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. AMCLATTER/1 TOLD 13 FEB 65 BY FRANK FIORINI THAT MANUEL ARTIME'S HOUSE AT 1270 NE 85TH STREET MIAMI WAS RANSACKED DURING EVENING 12 FEB. ARTIME TOLD FIORINI THAT INTRUDERS HAD STOLEN JEWELRY, NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS AND TELESCOPIC LENS RIFLE THAT FIORINI HAD GIVEN ARTIME AS GIFT.

2. ARTIME ASKED FIORINI HELP HIM OUT BY GETTING IN TOUCH LOCAL AUTHORITIES (UNSPECIFIED) WITH REQUEST THEY KEEP MATTER QUIET. FIORINI SAID ARTIME DOES NOT WANT INCIDENT PUBLICIZED.

3. FOR SECURITY REASONS WAVE HAS MADE NO EFFORT OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, WAVE HAS RECEIVED NO OTHER REPORT ON THIS MATTER AS OF PREPARATION THIS REPORT.

SECRET

Note: Artime confirmed this 11 Feb - Event was about 3 Feb — no sensitive documents taken

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

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JMWAVE

ACTION
DC/WH/SA 3

INFO
VR. FILE DDP

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S E C R E T 181589Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8420

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF WAVE 8419 (IN 83360)

IDEN: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES.

S E C R E T

CFN

p-1/201

18 Feb 65 IN 83422

SECRET

14-00000

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	[illegible]	SS	SB
	[illegible]	FE	AB
	[illegible]	[illegible]	CA
UNIT	CI	SI	BP
		SEC	KS

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION ~~FE~~/WH/SA 3

INFO VR. FILE, DDP,

S E C R E T 181509Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8419 AMBIDDY-1 201 83366

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD Security

REF WAVE 8261 (IN ~~[illegible]~~)

DESENSITIZED

1. AMCLATTER/1 PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS REF 15 FEB 65 BY STATING RANSACKING AMBIDDY/1'S HOUSE ACTUALLY OCCURRED SOME TIME BETWEEN 1-3 FEB AND DISCOVERED BY MAID LUCY ACOSTA 3 FEB. FIORINI HOWEVER LEARNED OF RANSACKING ABOUT 1330 HOURS 13 FEB WHEN RCVD PHONE CALL FROM AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) WHO TOLD FIORINI THAT ALTHO HOUSE BURGLARIZED 8 FEB HE DID NOTHING UNTIL FIRST SPEAKING WITH AMBIDDY/1 WHO OUT TOWN. AMBIDDY-1 RECOMMENDED IDEN CONTACT FIORINI WITH REQUEST FIORINI CONTACT LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF ABLE DO SO WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

2. FIORINI, AFTER RECEIPT TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEN CONTACTED PERSONAL FRIEND FRANK CAMPBELL, FORMER CHIEF INTEL METRO, WHO ADVISED FIORINI CONTACT POLICE CAPTAIN LEE NAPIR USING CAMPBELL'S NAME. FIORINI, WHO ALSO KNOWN TO CAPTAIN NAPIR, CONTACTED NAPIR WITH IDEN. NAPIR PROMISED MAKE INVESTIGATION WITHOUT MAKING "REPORT."

3. MTG 15 FEB IDEN SHOWED NAPIR 24 PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING

SECRET

BROKEN DOOR AND LARGE NUMBER DOCUMENTS SCATTERED OVER FLOOR. IDEN ALSO GAVE NAPIR FOLLOWING LIST MISSING ARTICLES: (A) ROLEX WRIST WATCH: (B) ANOTHER INEXPENSIVE WRIST WATCH; (C) RING WITH FOUR TWO CARAT DIAMONDS AND LARGE ZIRCON; (D) TWO EIGHTEEN CARAT GOLD NECKLACES; (E) ONE WOMAN'S IDENTIFICATION BRACELET, AND (F) ONE HIGH POWERED 300 MAGNUM RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC LENS AND TRIGGER GUARD INSCRIBED "AMBIDDY/1, LEADER OF REVOLUTION, FRANK FIORINI." ALTHO SOME DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM A/1'S HOUSE IMPORTANT PAPERS KEPT HOUSE SAFE WHICH NOT DISTURBED. IDEN WHO CONDUCTING OWN INVESTIGATION, TOLD NAPIR IDEN SUSPECTED HOUSE REPAIRMAN WHO RECENTLY WORKED A/1'S HOUSE WALDO BADO PEREZ, 1285 NW 29TH STREET TERRACE, MIAMI. BADO WHO HAS NO REGULAR MEANS INCOME RECENTLY BOUGHT WIFE 60 CORVAIR (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4370) AND PAST WEEK MADE PERSONAL GIFTS NUMBER FRIENDS. ALSO PURCHASED FOUR NEW TIRES HIS OWN 61 FALCON (65 FLORIDA LICENSE 1D-4302).

4. IDEN ALSO LOCATED JEWELRY STORE 964 WEST FLAGLER STREET WITH A/1'S ROLEX WRIST WATCH FOR SALE. IDEN HAD WIFE A/1 VISIT STORE AND PURCHASE ROLEX FOR $200 CASH PLUS $45 STILL OWED SALESMAN NAMED GUILLERMO TABRAUE. WIFE A/1 ABLE IDENTIFY WATCH BY TWO MARKS BACK WATCH. NAPIR PROMISED IDEN WOULD HANDLE INVESTIGATION JEWELRY

STORE AND SUGGESTED IDEN PUT SURVEILLANCE CUBAN COFFEE SHOP MIAMI EL GOZO.

5. AMCLATTER/1 SAID THAT IDEN HAS NO CURRENT INFO INDICATE "ESPIONAGE" OR "REVOLUTIONARY MOTIVATION" BEHIND ROBBERY.

6. INSPECTOR (CAPTAIN) F. L. NAPIER ASSIGNED DETECTIVE BUREAU MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL CAPT NAPIR PARA TWO ABOVE. FRANK CAMPBELL PROBABLY IDENTICAL FRANK KAPPEL FORMER METRO CHIEF INTEL WHO RESIGNED WORK WITH STATE RACING COMMISSION.

7. NO SPECIFIC WAVE TRACES WALDO BADO PEREZ ALTHO ONE WALDO PEREZ REPORTED MAY 62 AS HAVING HELPED ORGANIZE PROPAGANDA AND MILITARY PLANS LIBERATION CUBA IN CUBAN LIBERATION ARMY (UFG 992; 14 MAY 62). WAVE TRACES GUILLERMO TABRAUE INDICATE HE POSSIBLY IDENTICAL GUILLERMO TABRAU NUECER (201-283992).

SECRET

CFN

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☐ [illegible] ☑ [illegible]

FROM
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ACTION
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INFO
VR. FILE, DDP

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S E C R E T 281400Z

DIR [illegible]VE CITE SJOS 7403

201

[illegible] 84348

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]BAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 17 FEBRUARY ON PAA FLIGHT 501 FROM MIAMI.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

24

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UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA-3

INFO VR. FILE, DDP

A-1 201

S E C R E T 201927Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8522

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20 FEB 65 IN 85084

U

REF: WAVE 8521 (IN 85083)

IDEN: JOSE ANTONIO MOLE ROSALES

S E C R E T

PR

WH

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

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UNIT

TIME

AMBIDDY-1 201
Security

S E C R E T 201927Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8521

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

20 FEB 65 IN 85083

REFS: A. WAVE 8261 (IN

B. WAVE 8419 (IN [redacted])

C. WAVE 8420 (IN [redacted]

1. AMCLATTER/1, AS FOLLOW UP REFS, REPORTED 19 FEB 65 THAT MIAMI POLICE CAPTAIN NAPIR PHONED FIORINI 18 FEB AND ARRANGED FOR FIORINI AND AMWORLD INTEL CHIEF (IDEN) MEET WITH TWO POLICE SERGEANTS FORM POLICE HEADQUARTERS AT 1145 NW 11TH STREET MIAMI. MTG HELD FROM 1330 TO 1430 HOURS 18 FEB MAYFLOWER RESTAURANT NORTH MIAMI AVENUE AND 36TH STREET WITH SERGEANTS (FNU) DOWDA AND (FNU) MCCRACKEN

SECRET

OF POLICE BURGLARY SQUAD. BOTH SERGEANTS SAID NAPIR INSTRUCTED THEM "KEEP CASE OFF REPORT". IDEN TOLD SERGEANTS THAT AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HE AND AMWORLD BOTH CONCLUDE ROBBERY WAS "G-2 SPONSORED", POINTED UP FACT $500 LEICA CAMERA AND TWO $300 TAPE RECORDERS VISIBLY ACCESSIBLE NOT TOUCHED. ALSO SUSPECT SOME DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED. SURMISE INTRUDERS WANTED GIVE OUTWARD APPEARANCE ROBBERY.

2. FIORINI SAID ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUSPECT WALDO BADO PEREZ INDICATE HE FORMER BRIGADE MEMBER. POLICE SERGEANTS AND IDEN AGREE

IN 25[illegible]-18

AND COULD HAVE CASED HOUSE FOR SOMEONE ELSE.

3. ACCORDING FIORINI NAPIR INSTRUCTED IDEN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS IN WRITING ON STOLEN RIFLE AND MAIL REPORT TO HIM. NAPIR WANTS REPORT POSTMARKED AND ALLEGEDLY WOULD DISCLOSE CONTENTS ONLY TO CLEAR AMWORLD ANY COMPLICITY OR RESPONSIBILITY EVENT RIFLE USED BY UNKNOWN PARTY SOME FUTURE CRIME.

SECRET

Jose Antonio Tomé Rosales

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

~~SECRET~~

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UNIT CI TIME SI BY

FROM CARACAS

ACTION DC WH/SA 3

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, C/WH

201

S E C R E T 231620Z

23 FEB 65 IN 85926

DESENSITIZED

DIR INF[illegible]VE PACY SJOS CITE CARA 0003

KAR[illegible] TYPIC AMWORLD YOBITE

MANUEL ARTIME AND RAFAEL QUINTERO ARRIVED CARA FROM ~~PACS~~ PACY 20 FEB PAA 513. PLANS REMAIN CARA UN ~~1~~ TIL 24 OR 25 FEB WHEREUPON WILL DEPART FOR COSTA RICA.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

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TIME

FILE

201

S E C R E T 241320Z

DIR PACY CITE SJOS 7468

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

DESENSITIZED

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA LEFT SAN JOSE 20 FEBRUARY FOR PACY ON LACSA 629.

S E C R E T

CFN

24 FEB 65 IN 86580

SECRET

8 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Phase-out of ARTIME Autonomous Group

1. On the night of 5 March 1965, the case officer for Manuel ARTIME Buesa met with him and outlined the policy decision reached by the 303 Committee on 4 March. ARTIME was told the decision was to terminate our operational relationship in as friendly and cooperative manner as possible, but not later than 1 May 1965. The case officer had been empowered to convey this information and to conduct an exploratory discussion of the problems and possible solutions connected with a phase-out program. The two main points the United States Government was concerned with were (a) fair but reasonable demobilization support to the personnel of the autonomous group, and (b) ARTIME's assistance in insuring that the balance of power in Central America was not upset, particularly by preventing the weapons of his group from falling into the hands of political extremists or free-booters.

2. ARTIME had been on notice for several months that a phase-out might be ordered at any time, and had an inkling that the decision had been made because his regular monthly subsidy had not been received on schedule. He had obviously given the matter considerable thought and made up his mind as to his course of action when he arrived at the meeting. He began the discussion by summarizing the things he might have done had he been so inclined. Among the possibilities mentioned, he included loading up his troops and weapons and taking over Haiti as a base against Cuba, intervening in Costa Rica to bring down the liberal PLN administration in favor of a rightist junta of dissidents, or throwing in completely with General Anastasio SOMOZA in Nicaragua the weapons, personnel and equipment of the autonomous group. He has the capability of fielding an infantry battalion reinforced with artillery (4.2 mortars), supported by air and maritime elements, with a cadre of trained and combat-experienced Cubans, provided he teams up with an organization

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who can furnish about 1,000 men to flesh out the unit. Case officer acknowledged that we recognized his potential for harmful action, had considered it thoroughly, and hoped he would not do anything of the kind. ARTIME said he had also considered all the possibilities and concluded there was no point in his being childish and trying to "bite us about the ankles."

3. ARTIME accepts the decision and will cooperate in a phase-out program. He does not understand the rationale, and, of course, does not agree with the decision, but he acknowledges our prerogative to make it. If we really wish still to be friends, he is willing, just as he told Mr. FitzGerald originally. He asks only that we help him make it possible to remain friendly and makes two requests from us: (a) help take care of his men and their families until they can rehabilitate and resettle themselves, and (b) do everything possible to get his parents out of Cuba.

4. The major elements to be considered in a phase-out were discussed with the following results:

a. Personnel. The first priority is support payments to dependents which were due 1 March in the total amount of $100,00. This must be done soonest if ARTIME is to maintain control of the situation. The next most immediate problem is re-entry permission for fifteen of his men who have been stranded in Nicaragua trying to return to the United States since December. These men were exfiltrated "black" from the United States with our assistance and require special authority for re-entry from Department of State and Department of Justice, which we thought was arranged in early January.

The demobilization plan proposed by ARTIME seemed as realistic and effective as could be hoped for. He proposes to return the bulk of his men, approximately 200, to the United States during March and give them one month's pay on 1 April as a mustering out payment to support them and their families while they seek other employment. The balance of his men, less than 100, will be held in Central America for one month longer as a security and administrative force muster the group's equipment at Monkey Point from which disposition can be made during the month of April. The security force will be returned during April and will be paid a mustering out payment on 1 May. This will terminate the project.

The cover story which ARTIME intends to use for demobilization is to inform his men that their mothership is out of commission and will require about six weeks for repairs. This is true enough so that it will be believed. He will then grant leave to all men with dependents to get their personal affairs in order before operations commence again. He will publicize the fact that it is less expensive and better for morale to send them on leave than to have men sitting around the camps with no operations to run. When all the first contingent are back home, individual notice will be given each to start looking for other work as operations have been postponed. They will be told that the salary payment of 1 April will be the last one and should be considered as a mustering out bonus. ARTIME feels this method will soften the impact and lower the noise level as the men will be home with their families and scattered throughout the community instead of being in an organized group in Central America when they realize they are being demobilized.

b. **Funds.** ARTIME had done his homework and brought with him facts and figures upon which phase-out costs could be estimated. These cost estimates are outlined below:

1 March -	$100,000	Dependents support and salaries
	25,000	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 200 men
	50,000	Accrued debts due 1 March, mainly food and other expenses for camps in Central America
	$175,000	(In lieu of regular monthly subsidy of $225,000)
1 April -	$100,000	Mustering out payment for 200 men and salaries for security and administrative details
	12,500	Travel from Central America to U.S. for approx. 100 men
	12,500	Estimated food and other camp expenses
	$125,000	

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1 May	- $ 50,000	Mustering out payments for approx. 100 men and final contractual obligations of project
	$ 50,000	

c. Weapons. ARTIME agreed that it would be in nobody's interest for his weapons to fall into the wrong hands. He was asked for ideas on disposition of the arms and came up with the following suggestion which appears to be an excellent one. The mothership, MV SANTA MARIA, is in need of repairs and must go into a shipyard. Tentative arrangements have been made to put her in the yards at Galveston, Texas, some time in March or April. ARTIME can order his security detail to store the arms aboard the ship for "security" reasons before she leaves for the yard. They will simply remain on board when the ship leaves and we can take control of the ship and the weapons from that point on.

d. Maritime.

(1) MV SANTA MARIA. See above. The ship would be sailed from Monkey Point with a contract crew supplied by Chester, Blackburn, & Roder, Inc. of New York, who are agents for the ship's owner, Libernic Corporation, a CIA proprietary company. One of ARTIME's senior officers would accompany the ship as his representative, with orders to turn over control of it and the arms upon its arrival at Galveston. CIA officers, possibly documented as Customs officials, would accept custody and Office of Logistics could recover the weapons and any other equipment which might be shipped by this method. The ship would then be disposed of according to Headquarters wishes at any time after 17 April when the charter arrangement with General SOMOZA expires and the ship legally reverts to control of the owner.

(2) Swifts, V-20's, Boston Whalers, rubber boats and other operational craft are all owned, technically, by ARTIME's group. He has had title to the Swifts legally transferred from a Costa Rican politician to one of his own senior officers. He wants to retain these craft for the time being, hoping against hope that lightning will strike and he may, after all, be able to use them in the next

two months. Case officer recommends we go along with him on this, at least for the time being, as it could be sticky legally and might antagonize him at the time when we most need his cooperation. In the end, he should be reasonable about disposition of these craft if we shoot square with him in the meantime.

(3) Support craft, LCMs, Barges, etc. Disposition arrangements to be worked out together on these craft.

e. Aircraft.

(1) DC-3. ARTIME is willing to release the aircraft back to its "owners," TASA, a CIA proprietary company in Panama. However, one month's charter payment of $1,250 was due 1 March, and another will be due by the time the aircraft can be returned. ARTIME was reluctant to let the plane go back without payment, but also reluctant to squeeze the $2,500 out of his budget. Case officer voiced his opinion that the owner would probably be glad to get the plane back and would not likely think it worth going to court. However, in view of the fact that it would be a "closed-circuit" transaction and would actually cost the Government nothing, it is recommended that a special authorization of $2,500 be channeled to ARTIME for payment in order to maintain ARTIME's reputation for fiscal probity. He will surely appreciate this gesture.

(2) L-20 Beaver and Cessna-180. These aircraft technically belong to ARTIME's group and recovery would be a sticky matter, legally. ARTIME hopes to hold control of these aircraft for the time being, and it is recommended that we go along with him, saving disposition arrangements until later.

5. ARTIME again emphasized at the close of the meeting that he must have soonest the March payments for families as an absolute minimum, before he could face his people and maintain control of them in order to insure an orderly phase-out program.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: C/WH
DCWHD/C
C/WH/C/CA

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19 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, WH remarks on Termination of AMWORLD

1. At a meeting with DCWHD/C and Mr. Jenkins on 18 March, Chief, WH expressed general satisfaction with the status of termination of AMWORLD and the plans therefor. He stated specifically that he was pleased with the cooperation of AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 and would make it a point to inform higher levels in the Agency and the U. S. Government and put a good word for them on the record. He also directed that they be told:

a. He personally appreciates their cooperation and the good sense, goodwill and maturity they displayed in accepting and executing the U. S. Government decision to terminate their operations.

b. He wants to meet with them personally, at the earliest mutually convenient time, in order to discuss the situation with them.

c. After termination of the paramilitary project is completed, he has some other ideas for ventures of mutual interest which he wishes to pursue with them.

2. The gist of the above points had been passed to AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 previously by Mr. Jenkins, and on the night of 18 March he confirmed by telephone to AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH had expressed the above sentiments.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
AMJAVA-4 201
Policy

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-1

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~ DESENSITIZED

TO: Chief, WHD X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/AMWORLD - Future of AMBIDDY 1/AMJAVA 4

PRIORITY

Action Required: For your information

Reference : DIR 98189

1. Ref cable raises a number of fundamental issues of concern to Caracas Station. In brief, we do not welcome an activation of the movement's center in Caracas, an event which would greatly complicate our operational situation. We have reasons for believing that the host government likewise would probably be embarrassed if AMBIDDY 1 chose Venezuela as a base for whatever program he is planning to undertake. Repeated failures of his attempts at being received by President LEONI are significant in this context.

2. Since we must assume that AMBIDDY 1 has alluded to his close ties with KUBARK (and more specifically with BECKHOFF), the Venezuelan security services may well jump to the conclusion that AMWORLD is in fact a KUBARK operation and sooner or later we would be forced to disavow AMBIDDY 1, a circumstance of which he would be bound to learn with consequent embitterment. All these predictable developments, Caracas is most anxious to forestall. Needless to say, both BECKHOFF and ONTRICK are unhappy about this situation of conflict since it involves a man whom both admire and who (in their opinion) has served ODYOKE interests loyally, at times to the detriment of his abiding cause to liberate PBRUMEN.

3. For the above reasons, we would welcome indeed if formal and institutional ties between AMBIDDY 1 and AMJAVA 4 could be put in abeyance, at least to the extent that AMBIDDY 1 be prevailed upon to pass up Venezuela as a base of operations. This discriminatory approach reflects our awareness that

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

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[redacted] 201-267437

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCA-12232

DATE: 5 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION: DESENSITIZED SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER:
201 - AMBIDDY/1
201 - AMJAVA/4

AMBIDDY 1 is temperamental [illegible] Headquarters [illegible] elementary standards of operational security and is a [illegible] impulse, frequently with no regard to consequences. We doubt that AMJAVA 4 could exercise a moderating influence. Should AMBIDDY 1 get himself and his associates into serious trouble, the Station could not help but intercede with concomitant damage to our standing with the liaison services. We can further predict that the Venezuelan trade union movement (which is belligerently anti-AMBUD) may view an active AMBIDDY 1 sponsored program with disfavor and would also bring strong pressure to bear on the Government to curtail or surpress the movement.

4. We realize that the Station's position, as set forth above, saddles Headquarters with an exceedingly delicate task. While as a last resort we could of course drop discreet hints to our Venezuelan liaison contacts suggesting the inadvisability of affording AMBIDDY 1 and his associates sanctuary in Venezuela, we would only entertain that distasteful prospect as a last resort and with the full approval of Headquarters.

5. Another approach, only slightly less unsatisfactory, would be to restrict AMBIDDY 1's radius of activity to an extent tantamount to denying him all freedom of political action while in Venezuela. But all in all, it would probably be best for KUBARK if AMBIDDY 1 could be dissuaded from going through with his proposed move in a manner which does not hurt his pride and which does not alienate him from KUBARK. Headquarters may be able to suggest palatable alternatives to Venezuela.

6. As regards AMJAVA 4, we share some of Headquarters misgivings about surfacing him to Liaison. What prompted us to suggest this approach was a desire to overcome the difficulties which would be facing AMJAVA 4 in any case should he decide to make his home here. We are inclined to doubt that he could obtain permission to enter Venezuela in immigrant status without powerful intercession. He would be used by the Station on projects which we (and presumably the host government) view as compatible with Venezuela's national security interests.

7. Some of the doubts raised by Headquarters are altogether valid and were considered before we made our proposal. We are least concerned, however, about the issues of dual loyalty and dual control etc, because it happens to be one of our objectives in building a more durable relationship with liaison, esp DIGEPOL, to entice them into joint ventures where dual control does exist. We find AMJAVA 4 temperamentally suited (esp since his basic loyalty belongs to KUBARK) to serve as an operational link between Station and liaison, without acting to the detriment of either. Although the tenor of our relationship with DIGEPOL has undergone a notable improvement, there are still deep-rooted reservations and suspicions which a man of AMJAVA 4's personality traits might help to dispel.

8. With regards to the substance of our operations against PBRUMEN, especially those which are CE-oriented, there is a natural congruity of interests between ODYOKE and Venezuela which renders joint pursuits in fact most desirable. More likely than not, DIGEPOL will do Station the favor of facilitating the admission of AMJAVA 4 and of providing him with viable cover, maybe including official (DIGEPOL) documentation, and let it go at that. We rather doubt that unless prodded by Station DIGEPOL would avail itself of AMJAVA 4's services, let alone use him to penetrate Station's operational program. This leaves in the balance the pros and cons of surfacing a valuable KUBARK asset to liaison.

9. The general concepts guiding Caracas Station in desiring to secure the services of AMJAVA 4 were spelled out in HVCA-12052.

10. In presenting Station's proposal to AMJAVA 4, the following points could be made:

A. We do not propose that he sever his longstanding personal and political links with AMBIDDY 1.

B. We do not expect that he disconnect his links with the movement, let alone cease supporting its program.

C. We would oppose, however, his exercising functions of political leadership within the movement, the reason being that a [illegible] role would as far as the host government is concerned be an unmistakable admission that [illegible] is officially backing AMWORLD.

D. We would expect AMJAVA 4 to compartmentalize himself to the extent that he treat any knowledge acquired in his clandestine role as operational adjunct to the Station as privileged in the sense of not imparting it to anyone without a need to know. Specifically, this information would have to be withheld from AMBIDDY 1 and other members of the movement.

E. AMJAVA 4 will have to make a clear choice between serving the cause of PBRUMEN liberation by actively associating himself with AMWORLD (a doomed undertaking if our reading of the situation is correct), or by countering PBRUMEN's program to subvert Venezuela under Station control.

[illegible]

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2.a AMJAVA/4 told me AM[illegible]/2 went to Spain on 15 May for 2 or 3 months vacation. A/4 said later that A/2 was starting a new business in Spain and wanted him (A/4) to move over there and manage it for him. A/2 left William King, the Vice-President in charge of Maritima Bam in his absence. AMBIDDY/1 has always had ultimate control of the AM[illegible] funds and has simply been exercising closer personal control of them since A/2 is gone.

2.b AMBIDDY/1 told me that he is selling off some of the equipment which is not suitable for his current program of Community Development/Civic Action in Latin America in order to raise money to obtain equipment and materials that will be needed. For example, he has bought 22 acres of farm land near West Palm Beach to establish a model farm for training purposes. He has been conducting evening classes for several weeks for about 20 MRR men, who are working full time at other jobs, in rural Community Development. He has gotten some training materials and advice from Prof. George Lodge of Harvard, who, according to letters from him, appears to be enthusiastic about his contact with A/1 and his organization.

2.c A/1 says his only political plans at this time are to try to continue holding his movement (MRR) together while he changes its emphasis and direction toward the constructive activity of help in Community Development for friendly Latin American countries and away from the PM emphasis for which we supported him in the AMWORLD program. The farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice is a planned cooperative on the east coast (Bluefields - Monkey Point) to complement a shrimp fishing cooperative and boat yard at Bluefields which he has already discussed with President Schick, who requested him to go ahead. A/1 and the MRR part in these enterprises is purely advisory in training local residents and helping them to organize and build facilities. A/4 reports, and A/1 himself admits, that he is simply feeling around now trying to get all the information and ideas he can about this new field of endeavor. (For example, A/1 just bought 300 baby chicks to work with in order to find out they can best fit into a rural development program.)

2.d. Of course, AMWORLD is finished and all members of the organization know it. A/1 and A/4 have both told me they have made it clear to all hands and have advised them to get jobs immediately in order to support their dependents. Most of them have done so, several going back to work for WAVE, for instance. The death of AMWORLD and the reorganization necessary to go into a new phase (Community Development) is no doubt causing a crisis in the MRR, but both leaders believe the movement will weather the crisis and survive. Mr. Tom Clines, who talked with other members of the MRR, believes the same thing, and is certain it will survive with enough support from Washington to pay for publicity, travel, and administrative costs.

3.a There are 5 men at Monkey Point where one cache (a platoon) of weapons is stored. The other two are located at Bluefields and at Managua, under control of the Nicaraguan National Guard. The MRR delegate at Managua is the only person who can authorize their release, and this must be on written authority of A/1 and approved by General Somoza. The 5 men at Monkey Point are simply station-keepers who, in addition to guarding the camp and weapons, are teaching the local Indians to read and write, to operate and maintain basic machinery, and to plant crops to raise their standard of living.

3.b. There has been no evidence from any source of any attempts to sell AMWORLD arms or ammunition.

3.c It is not clear what this source is trying to report, but presumably he is trying to indicate that A/1 is hoarding the AMWORLD money he has been issued for his personal use. Anyone who knows A/1 knows that the last thing he will ever give up is his magazine and radio broadcasts. The ability to make speeches and have them printed and see his picture reproduced is the top requirement in his makeup. The next most important requirement is the capability to travel and hob-nob with Heads of State and other VIPs, at which he excels. These two attributes are of considerable interest to KUBARK, as witness the fact that Mr. Fitzgerald has insisted on retaining these capabilities for A/1 to use in behalf of the Agency. They are certainly more important to him than money, as such, concerning which he is incredibly naive and disinterested. He is notorious for having to have somebody else go around with him to be sure he has necessary documents and money, otherwise he would never have a dime in his pocket. I checked further on this point with A/4 at our last meeting on 27 June and he said there was no evidence of A/1 pilfering the till, the problem if any was simply honest mismanagement. We should remember that A/1 has been paid a salary, with Hqs agreement and at our suggestion for that matter, of $1,000 a month. AMWORLD/2 made it a point to deposit the check in A/1's personal account every month, and A/2 maintained de facto control of the account. A/1 told me this incident because he was amazed to find when A/2 left for Spain and turned the records of the account over to A/1, he found that he had 4 or 5 thousand dollars in the bank, the most he had ever owned in his life. In addition to this salary, it should be remembered that A/1 is a co-author of the "Bay of Pigs" book, which was worth several thousand dollars to each of the 4 co-authors.

Note: This line of reporting has been going on for at least the past 2 years in the case of A/1 and is typical of the incessant gossip and character assassination within the Cuban exile community in Miami that has been going on for the last 5 years. While certainly no paragon of virtue or of efficiency, it will take more than this to convince me A/1 is a crook. In the first place, AMJAVA/4 would be the first one to put the finger on him if he started misappropriating MRR funds or otherwise playing games that would hurt the movement. In the second place, A/1 is too disorganized to be an effective crook, even if he tried, and it would show up in more concrete form than this report.

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FROM PANAMA CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 3

INFO FILE DDP, C/WH

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UNIT TIME BY

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22 Apr 65 IN 50512

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DIR INFO CARA BOGO SJOS MANA GUAT CITE PACY 6583

R[illegible] TYPIC AMWORLD

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1. AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH HE HAD MEETING PRES LEONI IN MARCH, PRES VALENCIA 7 APRIL, AND PLANS SEE PRES ROBLES 22 OR 23 APRIL. PLANS RETURN VIA COSTA RICA FOR TALKS PRES ORLICH AND FONMIN ODUBER AND NICARAGUA TO SEE PRES SCHICK AND GEN SOMOZA. THEN TO GUATEMALA FOR MEETING PRES PERALTA AND GIVE HIM COMPLETE BRIEFING ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP PLOTTING, WHICH INCLUDES SOME FORMER MRR PEOPLE FOR WHOM A-1 WISHES DISCLAIM ANY RESPONSIBILITY. DURING WEEK 3 MAY HE HOPES MEET DAINOLD TO REPORT ON TERMINATION AMWORLD AND DISCUSS ANY OTHER

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IN 50512
PAGE 2

OPICS DAINOLD WISHES.

2. A-1 FUTURE PLANS APPEAR INVOLVE SELLING IDEA OF PROGRAM TO CASTRO/COMMIE THREATENED COUNTRIES WHICH INCLUDE (1) INTERDICTION CUBAN INFIL OPNS, (2) PENETRATE AND ELIMINATE INTERNAL CASTROITE OPS, (3) POSITIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM BASED ON "COMANDES RURALES" WHICH WAS BASIS MRR STRENGHT RURAL CUBA AND CONCEPT A-1 DEVELOPED WHICH CASTRO CONTINUED AFTER A-1 DEFECTION. HE BELIEVES SMALL TEAMS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED CUBANS WORKING DIRECTLY WITH LOCAL GOVTS COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO LATIN AMERICA COUNTER INSURGENCY PROGRAMS. FEELS WOULD BE IN ODYOKE INTEREST TO ASSEST BUT WILL LEAVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO LOCAL GOVTS.

4. INDICATIONS ARE A-1 MAY ASK DAINOLD IF IN RETURN FOR OPS INTEL AND POL ACTION ON HIS PART, KUBARK CAN CONTINUE ASSIST HIM IN BROADCASTS TO CUBA, MRR MAGAZINE, DELEGATES IN CARIBBEAN AREA, AND CONTINUED CONTACT WITH THE AMLASH GROUP INSIDE CUBA (THEY ARE STILL IN COMMUNICATION). HE INSISTS HIS BASIC ORGANIZATION CONTINUES AND WILL SURVIVE, WITH DOME MEMBERS WIRKING IN FLORIDA, NICARAGUA, AND OTHR PLACES, PLUS EXPANSION LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTERESTS BBY PEOPLE SUCH AS

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TATO MESA, RICARDO ARIAS, MANOLIN HERNANDEZ, ETC. A-1 AND AMJAVA-1 BOTH SAY THEY INTEND MOVE FROM FLORIDA AND ESTABLISH RESIDENCE CENTRAL AMERICA OR VENEZUELA TO ESCAPE FATE OTHER EXILE LEADERS WHO STYMIED IN MIAMI AND ABLE ONLY TO TALK, NOT TO CONTINUE USEFUL WORK.

5. A-1 APOLOGIZED FOR ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FRANK HE PLAYED COLOMBIA. SAID HE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BOTH BY CUBAN WELL KNOWN KUBARK AGENT AND A-1 CONFESSED SOME EXAGGERATION AND SHOW JOBS FOR HIS BENEFIT. HOPES REPORTS WILL BE CONSIDERED THIS CONTEXT AND TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF SALT. SAID HE ACTUALLY HAS NOT COMMITMENT FROM COLOMBAI, MET WITH PRES VALENCIA FOR TWO HOURS, ONE HOUR TALKING POETRY, ONE HOUR TALKING OPS. NO DECISION BUT VALENCIA WISHES TALK AGAIN AFTER TIME TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES. ABOUT THE SAME RESULTS FROM VENEZUELA ALTHOUGH LEONI APPEARED MORE INDECISIVE BECAUSE NOT SURE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

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27 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Present Activities:

During the past six weeks Manuel Artime has devoted his time to the task of disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Artime has returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by this Agency. This includes the mothership, nearly all of the heavy weapons such as mortars, machine guns and artillery pieces, as well as other miscellaneous items such as communications vans and earth-moving equipment. The small arms not recovered from Artime are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans:

During the same period Artime has attempted to gain support for a plan by which he, and a small nucleus of his paramilitary force, would conduct counterinsurgency-type operations against Castro-supported rebel bands operating in several Latin American countries. Artime has outlined these proposals to Presidents Leon Valencia of Colombia and Marcos Robles of Panama, and endeavored to obtain an interview with Raul Leoni of Venezuela, but has been able to conduct conversations on this proposal only on the Venezuelan Cabinet level.

To implement such a scheme Artime envisions using a small group of highly-trained individuals plus

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

two fast motor launches originally provided to him by this Agency. Artime would use this force to patrol the coasts of one or the other of the aforementioned countries to prevent the smuggling of arms and/or general contraband. In exchange for this service, Artime would receive the permission of these governments to keep any arms which he might capture in the course of these patrols. In addition, he would be allowed to maintain bases of operation from which to launch attacks against Cuba. So far none of these governments has made any commitment to Artime. He claims, however, that both Presidents Valencia and Robles have expressed interest in his proposals.

Artime has requested an interview with this Agency, presumably to discuss his future, during which it is expected that he will bring up his scheme as outlined above.

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (27 Apr 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

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28 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Present Activities

For the past six weeks Artime has devoted his time to disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He has;

a. returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by us,

b. returned the mothership,

c. returned nearly all the heavy weapons including mortars, machine guns, and artillery pieces.

The small arms not recoovered are sufficient to equip an infantry company.

2. Future Plans

Artime has attempted to peddle a plan to the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian governments utilizing the nucleus of his paramilitary force. Essentially this program is the same for all three countries and involves a

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

quid pro quo arrangement whereby:

a. Artime would use his force to patrol the coast of these countries and prevent smuggling of arms and/or general contraband,

b. Artime would receive, in exchange for this service, permission from these governments to keep any arms which he might capture and be allowed to maintain bases from which to launch operations against Cuba.

Some of the specifics follow:

Colombia

Artime wants petroleum, food, and clothing from the government for a group to be stationed there and a beachhead to establish a camp.

If there is a landing in Cuba, Artime wants immediate recognition by the Colombian Government as head of a government in exile.

Artime would guarantee to wipe out smuggling and would patrol from Riohacha to the Panama border; He would also guarantee to solve the guerrilla problem by using two MRR groups. One group to conduct operations against Cuba and the other to act as instructors and field advisers to the Colombian army.

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Artime would seek private financing from wealthy Cuban exiles and Latin American sympathizers.

Panama

Artime would start a "comandos rurales" operation, similar to that which was the base of MRR strength in rural Cuba.

Artime would launch a civic action program and also would interdict Cuban infiltration operations.

The above plan would be carried out mainly in Chiriqui Province.

Miscellaneous

We have no information on what Artime proposed in Venezuela but assume it is much the same as for Colombia and Panama. We also believe Artime may ask CIA to continue to assist him in radio broadcasting to Cuba, financing the MRR magazine, and helping him maintain continued contact with the Cubela group. This would be in return for his counter insurgency program outlined above.

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

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701

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Meeting Between Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1

1. AMBIDDY-1 went to Nicaragua on 11 May 1965 to remove his remaining men and equipment from that country and to complete secure storage arrangements for the small arms which he has retained. He has a meeting scheduled with General Peralta in Guatemala later this week and expects to be back in Miami by 17 May.

2. He hopes to meet with Chief, WH at any convenient time thereafter to report on the disbanding of AMWORLD and to discuss any other matters which may be of mutual interest. AMBIDDY-1 has indicated that he is willing to continue cooperating with the Agency by furnishing information and undertaking political action tasks as required. He hoped that the Agency, in turn, will be able to assist him in financing a limited publicity program consisting mainly of radio broadcasts and the MRR magazine. This would help to keep his movement alive and maintain him as a recognized exile leader who would thus be of continued value to the Agency in activities of mutual interest.

3. We suggest that his witting deputy, AMJAVA-4, might be invited to visit Washington at the same time to participate in other discussions concerning possible activities in the future. It would be appreciated if Chief, WH were able to set a convenient date for a meeting in order that we may notify AMBIDDY-1 in advance.

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (13 May 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with AMJAVA-4

1. In addition to the matter of meeting the AMWORLD Swifts on their arrival in New Orleans, AMJAVA-4 indicated he was even more interested in talking with me about AMBIDDY-1's present frame of mind and plans for the future, about some of which he is a little concerned. AMJAVA-4 intends to see AMBIDDY-1 for a few days the first part of this week and will try to get a complete and current reading from AMBIDDY-1 during this time. AMJAVA-4 wants to discuss this in detail with me prior to the meeting of AMBIDDY-1 with Chief, WH, presently planned for the week of 24 May.

2. AMJAVA-4 also wishes to discuss the two job offers he has received from the Agency, ie, a job with Caracas Station, or to go into university level training in a holding capacity for future commitment to a post-Castro Cuban regime. He has some topics for discussion concerning last-minute questions in the close-out of AMWORLD and disposition of some of the key personnel of the organization.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Policy
AMJAVA-4 201
AMBIDDY-1 201

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downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

Meeting with AMJAVA-4 in New Orleans, 21-23 May 1965

Subject: AMBIDDY-1 Activities

1. AMJAVA-4 said he had talked only briefly with AMBIDDY-1 on his return from Guatemala and Nicaragua (21 May, just before A-4 left to meet me in New Orleans). A-1 said he had talked with General Peralta in Guatemala and had disclaimed any connection with Roberto Alejos' coup plotting or the former MRR Cubans who had been involved with it. He had also outlined his proposal for Peralta to consider whereby A-1 and the MRR would undertake, at the invitation of the local government, to assist in countering Castro/Communist infiltration and subversion, and to help develop rural civic action programs as a positive counter-insurgency program. A-1 claimed that Peralta seemed very seriously interested in the proposals and appeared quite appreciative that A-1 had been able to visit him. A-1 expects that Peralta will wish to talk to him further in regard to his counter-insurgency proposals.

2. A-1 also talked again with President Schick in Nicaragua about the above proposal. Schick had thought over their previous discussion and approves a pilot program to be run on the east coast, with the rural civic action program near Bluefields. This will allow A-1 to keep a few of his men in the country to work on the program while maintaining security of the weapons he has stored there. A-1 also talked with Luis Somoza, at the latter's invitation, but indicated there was nothing new or interesting from this source.

3. A-4 is not sure himself how much A-1 has been able to accomplish in his visits in Central and South America, and how much of his reporting is wishful thinking. He is not ready, however, to sell A-1 short and has watched him "selling ice-boxes to Eskimos" successfully over too long a period of time.

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declassification

4. A-1 decided to come to New Orleans on the night of 24 May in order to meet the two Swift boats at Morgan City on 25 May (their latest ETA). Having done all the preliminary leg work and made all the arrangements, A-4 decided both of them would not be necessary and he planned to return to Miami the night of the 24th. I promised to contact both of them by phone on Tuesday night (25 May) to make sure the Swifts get in with no problems, and to inform A-1 a firm time for his meeting with C/WH (scheduled for 1800, 27 May).

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
Guatemala
Nicaragua

C.I.P

2 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Interview between Mr. George Cabot Lodge and Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Pursuant to your conversations with Manuel Artime on 27 May 1965, the latter has expressed a desire to meet with Mr. George Cabot Lodge in order to further discuss practical means of implementing a civic action program in Nicaragua.

2. Artime's current plans and schedule are as follows: 2-4 June in Miami, Florida; 4-12 June in Nicaragua; 12-14 June in Panama; 14- possible trips to Colombia and Guatemala.

3. Artime emphasized, however, that he could revise this schedule if need be in order to meet with Mr. Lodge in Cambridge, Mass. or any other location at Mr. Lodge's convenience.

(Signed) John L. Hart

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

DDP/WH/C/C[illegible]EA/ADRohlfing:bh (2 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/EA/CA

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downgrading and
declassification

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~~SECRET~~

3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/PO/B

ATTENTION : Mr. J. De Stefano

SUBJECT : Background Sketch on Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Manuel Artime Buesa, a non-practicing medical doctor, began his political activities in Cuba during the year 1959 when he participated in the formation of a civic action type program known as the "Comandos Rurales." The Comandos Rurales actively participated with the Castro regime during its initial agrarian reform, but eventually broke with it due to Castro's shift to Marxism-Leninism. It was at this point that Artime formed the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution), a political organization which he heads up to date. The degree of Artime's activities in the civic action program was reflected by the fact that Artime, prior to his break with Castro, had been appointed a deputy in the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agregaria (INRA) for Oriente Province. Artime's first contact with the Agency took place just prior to his open break with Castro and he was exfiltrated from the island by the Agency. Artime dedicated himself to the continued development of the MRR until called upon by the Agency to be the political representative for the Cuban Brigade 2506 which landed at the Bay of Pigs. Artime was captured and sentenced to be executed. This was later commuted by Castro to life imprisonment. In 1962 Artime was among those repatriated to this country under the prisoner exchange.

2. In mid-1963 the Agency again asked Artime to head an autonomous paramilitary organization made up and trained exclusively by Cubans and funded by the Agency. Subject set

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declassification

up a series of training camps in Central America. Using the political banner of the MRR Artime's group conducted several paramilitary operations against the island of Cuba with varying degrees of success. In early 1965 by order of the 303 Committee it was decided to phase out the Agency's support to Artime since it was felt that paramilitary operations against Cuba were futile and ineffective. Although he disagreed with this decision, Artime has been fully cooperative in disbanding his organization. The paramilitary wing of the MRR is now completely disbanded, and a few political representatives remain in Central America and Florida.

3. Subject is currently attempting to re-enlist the Agency's support in order to keep his political organization intact. If approved by the 303 Committee, Artime's MRR will receive a small subsidy. Artime also plans to establish a civic action program along the lines of the Comandos Rurales in various Central and South American countries. In such an endeavor Artime would be strictly on his own without any support from the Agency.

4. It is in order to discuss this future program that Artime is anxious to meet with Mr. George C. Lodge, Jr. The undersigned, who is subject's current case officer, is ready and willing to contact Mr. Lodge directly and travel to Cambridge should this be useful. Artime permanently resides in Miami, Florida and his telephone number is: (305) 754-8144.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

3 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/C

SUBJECT : Support for Manuel Artime and the MRR for the month of June 1965

1. On the basis of the discussion on 27 May between Chief, WH and Manuel Artime, we are currently in the process of submitting a recommendation to the 303 Committee that we maintain contact with Artime and render support to him on a modest basis. His monthly operating budget, which he submitted to us, would enable him to keep the MRR alive as a recognized exile political organization, and would allow him, personally, to maintain his status as an important exile leader. This would, in turn, continue his access to heads of state and other leading political figures in Latin America.

2. Pending action by the 303 Committee, it is recommended that you grant approval to fund Artime and the MRR for the month of June 1965, on the basis of the following budget estimate:

a.	MRR delegates		
	Spain	$ 500	
	Honduras	350	
	Guatemala	350	
	Colombia	400	
	Costa Rica	350	
	Venezuela	450	
	HQS office expenses	800	$ 3,200
b.	Publishing costs of MRR magazine "Tridente"		$ 2,860
c.	Radio broadcasts to Cuba in name of MRR		$ 1,805

d.	Travel costs of Artime and MRR officers	$ 2,000
e.	Support of dependent families and survivors of MRR members (mostly in Cuba)	$ 5,000
	Total	$14,865

3. If approved, these funds will be channeled through the secure AMWORLD funding channels, which are still in operation.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:
John L Hart
Deputy Chief, WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	FROM AMWORLD/AMBIDDY TO Monetary Division	DATE 4 June 1965	VOUCHER NO. (Finance use only)

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

Deposit to AMBIDDY/1 INWOVEN Account for extraordinary expenses

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that subsidy funds previously made available to AMWORLD have been or are being expended for authorized objectives of the activity and further support is warranted.

Carl E. Jenkins

EE AMBIDDY/1	PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS On file in Monetary Division	AMOUNT $14,865.00

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. (To be signed when applicable)

DATE	TITLE WH/C/CA/EA	SIGNATURE Carl E. Jenkins

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 4004	CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. 5135-1182
DATE 6/4/65	SIGNATURE WH/B&F

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER DCWHD/C

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF FINANCE DIVISION

PREPARED BY	REVIEWED BY	VOUCHER NO. 7-12

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION-ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. P.O. NO. (QTY.)	34-39 STATION CODE PROP. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-42 EXPEND CODE F.Y.	43 FUNDS	45-46 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	47-52 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	53 CA YR	54-57 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	58-67 ALLOT. OR COST ACCT. NO.	62-67 CE. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
											TOTALS		

FORM 596 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Fin
Dr Carlo

Miami 4 de Junio de 1965

Srs. del Consejo de Liberacion
P.O. Box 8697.Baltimore 40 Md.

Srs del Consejo:

Disculpen la molestia de solicitar de Vds. la aprobacion de un presupuesto de emergencia para cubrir las necesidades mas urgentes del mes de Junio desde el punto de vista netamente civil.

El presupuestoes el siguiente:

a) **DELEGACIONES:**

Costa Rica ————————	$ 350.00	
Venezuela ————————	450.00	
Espana ————————	500.00	
Honduras ————————	350.00	
Guatemala ————————	350.00	
Colombia ————————	400.00	$ 2,400.00

b) **REVISTA "TRIDENTE":**	$ 2,860.00	$ 2,860.00
c) **Hora Radial:**	$ 1,805.00	$ 1,805.00
d) **Oficina para Hora Radial y Revista:**	$ 800.00	$ 800.00
e) Viajes por Latino-America:	$ 2,000.00	$ 2,000.00
f) Ayuda al personal que se encuentra en el interior de Cuba y familiares de presos que nos siguen informando desde dentro (informes como los queadjuntamos)————		$ 5,000.00
	TOTAL:	$14,865.00

Pidiendo la mayor rapidez en la aprobacion de este presupuesto de emergencia para Junio,se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Ignacio

Ignacio

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 26

☐ RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : C. E. JENKINS:1s
UNIT : WH/C/CA/AA
EXT : 4550
DATE : 5 JUNE 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : GUATEMALA CITY INFO: JMWAVE, PANAMA CITY, NORFOLK

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY , WH 7, C/OPS, C/CA, FI,
SOD 6, 1

TO GUAT INFO WAVE, PACY, LANT CITE DIR 16781

REF: GUAT 4922 (IN 80580)

TYPIC AMBIDDY ONE

A.1

1. AT MEETING WITH DAINOLD ON 27 MAY, AMBIDDY ONE REPORTED ON HIS MEETINGS WITH PERALTA AND PONCIANO. SAID PERALTA HAD INVITED HIM TO VISIT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. AMBIDDY ONE SAID HE TOLD PERALTA FORMER MRR MEMBERS IN RECENT ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP ATTEMPT HAD NO CONNECTION AND NO SUPPORT FROM AMBIDDY ONE. MAIN THRUST OF TALK WITH PERALTA WAS ON COUNTER SUBVERSION, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AMBIDDY ONE SAID PERALTA ASKED AND GOT HIS FRANK OPINIONS ON EACH SUBJECT. SAID HE TOLD PERALTA THAT YON SOSA WAS MAIN THREAT. PERALTA SAID HE UNDER CONTROL, BUT AMBIDDY ONE TOLD HIM SO LONG AS YON SOSA SURVIVES AND HAS FOLLOWING WITH EXTERNAL CONTACT AND SUPPORT HE IS NOT UNDER CONTROL. AMBIDDY ONE SAID PERALTA MUCH INTERESTED HIS IDEAS AND ASKED HIM COME BACK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS SOON.

2. AMBIDDY ONE ALSO TALKED WITH PONCIANO BRIEFLY. SAID PONCIANO CLAIMED HAVE ORGANIZED SUPPORT AND READY MOVE AGAINST PERALTA. IN AMBIDDY ONE OPINION, PONCIANO IS SIMPLY ANOTHER INVETERATE PLOTTER

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 16781

WHO WILL SEIZE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY IF IT APPEARS, BUT IS NOT SERIOUSLY WORKING TOWARD A COUP AT PRESENT. FYI, AMBIDDY ONE CURRENTLY HAS NO CAPABILITY FURNISHING SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN MEN OR MATERIAL TO ANY COUP GROUP, EVEN IF HE AGREED, WHICH HE DENIES. ON BASIS PAST PERFORMANCE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BELIEVE AMBIDDY ONE NOT LIKELY ALIGN SELF WITH ANY POLITICAL FACTION WITHOUT HDQS APPROVAL.

C/WH/2/Guatemala

C/WH/2

WH/C/Intel Mr. Ortman (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/CUBA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

7 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact of Manuel Artime with Professor George Lodge and with Col. Barrientos of Bolivia

1. I talked with Manuel Artime by phone the night of 4 June. He said he had received a call from Professor Lodge that afternoon but was not at home to talk with him. (This was obviously a follow-up from the offer made to Artime by Chief, WH to put him and Lodge together on his proposed civic action activities.) I told him there was no reason he should not return the call and arrange for a meeting with Lodge at their mutual convenience.

2. Artime said that was his first reaction, but before he could make the call another message had come in from Col. Barrientos of Bolivia asking if he could visit the country for the benefit of his advice and counsel and offering to send a Bolivian Air Force plane to pick him up and bring him to La Paz. I asked if he were acquainted with Barrientos or an expert on Bolivia and he said he knew no more about either of them than what he had read in the papers. He had no idea of the reason for the invitation, but wanted to check with us and find out if we had any requirements for him in case we wanted him to make the visit. I told him I would check with Chief, WH next morning and call him back.

3. On the morning of 5 June I called Artime. He said Professor Lodge had called him at 0700 that morning and told him he was interested in getting together with him. Lodge said he would be in Panama on 14 June, and Artime said he planned to be travelling in that area at that time and could easily meet him there. Artime told Lodge he was willing to make a trip to Boston to see him earlier and that after such a preliminary meeting, the next meeting in Panama would probably be more useful. Lodge seemed delighted and invited Artime

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to lunch with him on 9 June. I suggested to Artime that he plan to meet Lodge on 9 June, stop in Washington on the way home where I could meet with him (and furnish him a briefing on Bolivia which he desperately requested). I suggested he send a message to Barrientos saying he could be in Panama on 11 June and could see Barrientos as soon thereafter as transportation could be arranged. (Artime has a visit with President Robles of Panama scheduled about that time and can work it in, together with the meeting with Lodge on 14 June in Panama.)

4. Artime said he had found out the background of the invitation from Barrientos. One of Barrientos' trusted aides had been to Washington or New York and in passing through Miami enroute home heard a MRR radio broadcast about countering subversion, civic action, etc. that attracted his attention. There was also a brief analysis of the situation in Bolivia which appealed to him as the best-balanced hehad heard. He thereupon started asking questions about the MRR and Artime and was referred to one of Artime's people who turned over some copies of "Tridente" (magazine of the MRR). The aide remarked that he was going to report to Barrientos of his discovery of a Cuban exile group that seemed knowledgeable of Castro and Communist subversion operations and had some useful ideas of how to counter them. Two days later Artime received the invitation from Barrientos.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/3
WH/PO/B

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 2P

PROCESSING

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Activities in AMWORLD and of AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None. For Your Information.

1. The AMOTs have recently submitted two short reports providing some information about AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1 activities.

2. AMOT-84 reported the following in Report DD-1414, 19 May 1965, which he had acquired from Iden A, whose ultimate source of information was AMWORLD-2:

a. AMWORLD-2 left for New York with his family on 15 May 1965, this being his first step towards disconnecting himself from AMWORLD. Before he left, he handed over to AMBIDDY-1 the AMWORLD money which he had in the bank.

b. AMWORLD-2 said that AMBIDDY-1 was devoting all his attention to obtaining money by the sale of military equipment which he had at the camps. AMBIDDY-1 had already realized U.S. $30,000 in this manner and hoped to raise still another $30,000. AMBIDDY-1 currently had all the AMWORLD money under his absolute control and said he intended to act as treasurer of the organization.

c. AMBIDDY-1 gave the impression of not being involved with any political plan. Occasionally he talked to friends about interviews with his "contacts" and about a budget for propaganda. Other times he gave consideration to propositions of friends, such as the Spaniard who acts as his chauffeur and secretary, concerning various business deals. He also talks of buying a farm in Nicaragua to cultivate rice, etc.

d. The general opinion within AMWORLD is that the organization is entering a crisis and, with the separation of AMWORLD-2 from the organization, AMWORLD members would no longer continue to receive their salaries.

Attachment:
Identities, u/s/c(ACL)

Distribution:
3 - WH/c, w/att.

CS COPY

201-267437

DATE TYPED
9 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 11 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21947

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-124-27/3

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-95/4

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-21947

3. In AMOT Report EE-1438, 4 June 1964, AMOT-84 further reported information he had received from Iden A, as follows:

a. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was only concerned with maintaining the small AMWORLD camp in Nicaragua, where there were weapons, ammunition, and seven men, who were there without the knowledge of the ODYOKERs. Iden B said that AMBIDDY-1 was awaiting an opportune moment to arm as many friends as possible and leave for PBRUMEN.

b. Iden C said that there really were arms and ammunition cached in the camp in Nicaragua, but that the seven men there spent all their time looking for persons to buy the arms and ammunition.

c. Iden C also said he believed that if AMBIDDY-1 was keeping up his radio transmissions and payments to some journalists it was because they served as a cover for his commercial operations and that all the propaganda would disappear when AMBIDDY-1 had to use AMWORLD money to keep up the propaganda.

Sophia L. Mayhouse

Philip G. ELMARD

14-00000

1P

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21947

Iden A - Rolando MERUELO Alfonso, A 12 829 707 (AMOT subsource)

Iden B - Nilo MESSER Pujol (201-294655)

Iden C - Carlos MARTINEZ Baraque (AMOT subsource)

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

S/C att. 1 UFGA-21947

201-267437

June 9

Chucker Bob's

To: Andy

From: George Lodge

Re: Manuel Artime

In general, Artime impressed me greatly and we got along very well. He is energetic, idealistic, enthusiastic, highly motivated and in my judgement well suited in every way to the task he intends to ~~[illegible]~~ perform. As you know, he is 33 years old, tough-minded and filled with ideological fire. His weakness would appear to be a certain lack of ~~xx~~ focus and conceptualization. He does not really have a plan but appears to be reacting to immediate crises and opportunities like a fire fighter. He and his group, therefore, need careful and thoughtful leadership and guidance to get the most out of them and to deal with problems in the proper order of priority and urgency.

He arrived late at the Business School because the taxi driver got lost. We had a quick lunch together ~~[illegible]~~ which I had to leave early in order to be in class at 1:30. At my request he joined me in the classroom. I was giving a lecture on the role of the manager in the midst of radical change to a group of alumni who are at the School for a short seminar on international business problems. During the discussion period he spoke well and with great conviction about his work in the hills with Castro and the Cuban problem in general.~~xx~~ He made an excellent impression.

We then talked in my office for 1½ hours. A summary of the conversation follows:

He told me of his work with the Indians on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua where he has 5 men working on community development problems including health, education, road building, rice marketing and ~~xxx~~ boat building. He has 10 men at his base of operations on the coast. He mentioned that he knew Enrique Pereira, a young manager in Managua closely associated with INCAE and in my judgement a good, active, properly oriented young man.

He discussed his civic action training program in Miami which has just started and in which he said he has 32 men enrolled. This is a 3-month program to prepare men for rural organization work of various kinds. He spoke of his need for help xx with respectxxx to cooperative training and especially cooperative leadership selection and preparation.

He spoke of his conversation with xxx Col. Peralta in Guatemala and said that after a four-day field trip he reported to the President that:

a. The Army was old fashioned, had poor ideas and was ill equipped to fight guerilla warfare or to carry out the civic action program which were urgently necessary.

b. He said he found serious subversion among the Indians largely through small radios which Cuban trained Guatemalans were giving to the Indians and which were tuned in on Radio Cuba only. He knew specifically of 5 Guatemalans engaged in this work.

c. He spoke of the danger of Sosa in the mountains and said that Peralta showed his ignorance by brushing Sosa off as a small-time operator with only a handful of men around him. Artime said he had about 25 men with him and added that this was enough to start a lot of trouble. He said he would like to begin something in Guatemala but had no specific suggestions.

He said he had 3 people working in San Jose, Costa Rica, inside what he referred to as "the Cuban community."

He has one man in Colombia organizing three cooperatives in the Cali area at the request of a local Senator who owns a sugar mill and the Cali newspaper and who Artime described as a very good xxxx man. He is deeply concerned about the pxxxxx situation in Colombia.

He is leaving shortly for Bolivia where xxx he has been invited to spend four days by the President.

During the course of the conversation I made the following suggestions which met with his enthusiastic approval:

I believe his key contribution may be in the area of rural organization and motivation. He and his men (he said he has 220 available for immediate action) need rural organization training. Only a few know much about it. I suggested therefore he investigate the cooperative training school at Antigonish, Nova Scotia, which from everything I have been able to find out in Panama and elsewhere is the best thing of its kind in the world. He said he had heard of it very favorably and mentioned he would talk with a Bishop friend of his and see if he could get some of his men enrolled in the school immediately.

I told him in some detail of our work in Veraguas Province and of Bishop McGrath's general development plans and also of the Bishop's intention to establish a cooperative training center in Veraguas. I mentioned the possibility of one or two of his men working in Veraguas alongside my men who will be there this summer and thereafter. He was extremely enthusiastic about this and suggested Nestor Izquierdo, a 29-year-old Cuban Negro whom he said had done rural organization work with him in Cuba. He spoke very highly of him. My thought was that perhaps Mr Izquierdo might join my men during the summer with Bishop McGrath's approval, work on our cooperative project there and perhaps remain to help the Bishop set up his training center and carry on such other activities as might be useful. Izquierdo is apparently very versatile in his talents. He might go to Antigonish somewhere along the way if that seemed wise. We left it that I would see how the Veraguas project goes, would talk informally to the Bishop and would meet Artime and possibly Izquierdo in San Salvador on August 5. At that time we would decide whether it would be wise for Artime and/or Izquierdo to come with me to Veraguas.

He asked me to send him some books about chicken raising in Central America. Could you take care of this?

He gave me his address as 1270 NE 85th Street, Miami, and telephone as 754-8144.

All in all, I was deeply impressed by Artime and would like to work with him.

SECRET

WH/C 65-236
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Bern to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $14,868 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (8 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Exec
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declassification

SECRET

WH/C 65-235
8 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : INWOVEN Deposit

For the attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $14,865 to the INWOVEN account of AMBIDDY-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attached:
Voucher

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (8 June 65)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
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14-00000

ORIG : J. HALKE
UNIT : WH/3/BOLIVIA
EXT : 5269
DATE : 14 JUNE 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM 23

SECRET

ROUTING	
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TO : LA PAZ JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CAP

CONF : WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, WH/C 8, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO PRIORITY LAPA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 19220

REF: DIR 19219

IDEN: MANUEL ARTIME, HEAD OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION, MRR.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA/EA G.D.

WH/SOB

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM 23

ORIG. J. G. HAKE
UNIT. WH/3/BOLIVIA
EXT. 5269
DATE. 14 JUNE 1965

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

34 SECRET

ROUTING
1
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8

TO : LA PAZ JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, WH/C 8, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

CAP

TO PRIORITY LAPA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 19219

1. AMBIDDY-1 (IDEN) REP IN WAVE APPROACHED BY AS YET UNIDENTIFIED AIDE OF BARRIENTOS (B) EARLY JUNE WHO SAID B INTERESTED HAVING A-1 COME BOLIVIA SOONEST FOR FOUR DAY VISIT GIVE B BENEFIT A-1 "ADVICE AND COUNSEL" ON CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION. AIDE SAID HAD HEARD A-1 RADIO PROGRAM WAVE ABOUT THESE SUBJECTS AND UPON RETURN LAPA TOLD B WHO THEN INVITED A-1 TRAVEL LAPA NEXT FLIGHT BOL GOVT AIRCRAFT WHICH MAKES WEEKLY TRIPS WAVE AREA. NO FURTHER INFO AVAILABLE WHETHER PRIMARY INTEREST B IN A-1 IS FOR CIVIC ACTION OR COUNTERSUBVERSIVE MATTERS.

2. TIMING A-1 TRIP BOLIVIA NOT YET CLEAR BUT MUST BE AFTER A-1 TRIP PACY MID-JUNE. A-1 HAS NOT RECEIVED FURTHER WORD ABOUT TRANSPORTATION LAPA AND ATTEMPTING PLACE PHONE CALL DIRECT TO B.

3. HQS VIEWS SHORT EXPLORATORY TRIP BOLIVIA BY A-1 AS OFFERING OPPORTUNITY SEE WHETHER COULD IN FACT HELP ON CIVIC ACTION FRONT. WE ~~BELIEVE~~ BELIEVE COUNTERSUBVERSION ASPECTS TOO POLITICALLY LOADED. A-1 GIVEN BRIEFING AT HQS ON BOLIVIA WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS NEED FOR JUNTA UNITY AND DESIRABILITY QUICK IMPACT PROGRAMS HELP JUNTA IMAGE WITH PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY MINERS. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS WOULD AFFECT ABILITY CARRY OUT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM ALSO COVERED. DELIBERATELY AVOIDED REFERENCE TO COUNTERSUBVERSIVE MATTERS AND A-1 CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS WHEN AND IF HE TALKS TO B THAT

- CONTINUED -

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ROUTING

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O :
ROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

ONF: INFO

O INFO CITE DIR 19219

WE WISH HIM RESTRICT SELF SOLELY TO CIVIC ACTION FIELD.

4. A-1 RESPONSIVE KUBARK DIRECTION AND NOT EXPECTED MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION KUBARK, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE SPREAD THIN ALREADY AND HAS OTHER PENDING COMMITMENTS IN HEMISPHERE. THEREFORE WE INTERESTED HAVING STATION CONTACT A-1 TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS, GUIDE HIM WHERE NECESSARY AND MAKE FINAL RECOMMENDATION TO HQS ON WHAT UTILITY IF ANY HE MAY HAVE IN BOLIVIAN SITUATION.

5. A-1 TOLD EXPECT CONTACT LAPA FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF CARL". HE WILL XXXXXXX AWARE NEED KEEP FACT OF STATION CONTACT FROM BOL GOVT.

6. WILL ADVISE A-1 ETA LAPA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA/PA

WH/POE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Joe Di Stefano (3B-[illegible])		JD
2	Don Rohlfing (6G-1907)		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Attached are copies of Geo. Lodge's report of his day with Artime - which you should find useful.

2. Undersigned called Lodge on 14 June & told him that we encourage Artime & his civic action training plans and secondly, that Nestor meets with our approval.

3. Any books on "chicken raising" in Central America?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Andy [illegible]	14 June

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O—587282

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MESSAGE FORM 31
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RIG : CARL E. JENKINS
NIT : WH/C/CA/EA
XT : 4550
ATE : 14 JUNE 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
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SECRET

O : CARACAS

CAP

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: WH/C-8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH-7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, SOD-6, OPSER, CI/OA, CI/PS,

O CARA INFO BOGOTA CITE DIR 19531

REFS: A. CARA 1040 (IN 86689)

B. BOGO 5748 (IN 82355)

1. ~~A/1~~ AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH MORNING 11 JUNE HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE CHE GUEVARA LOCATION OR ACTIVITIES AND HAS NOBODY IN VENEZUELA OR ELSEWHERE TRAILING HIM. FABIO FERMIN FERNANDEZ KNOWN ONLY BY SIGHT TO A/1 AS CUBAN EXILE IN BOGOTA. NO OTHER CONNECTION.

2. SINCE HIS LAST VISITS CARACAS AND BOGOTA MARCH AND EARLY APRIL A/1 HAS TRAVELLED IN NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA IN CONNECTION RETURN OF AMWORLD MOTHERSHIP AND ARMS, DISBANDING PM ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION AMWORLD PERSONNEL. ALSO VISITED COL. PERALTA OF GUATEMALA AT HIS INVITATION TO DISCUSS CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERING PBRUMEN SPONSORED SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY OPS. NOW HAS INVITATION VISIT BOLIVIA TO DISCUSS SIMILAR TOPICS WITH JUNTA CO-PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS. WAITING BOLIVIAN OFFICIAL FLIGHT MIAMI TO LA PAZ.

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO :

PAGE # 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 19531

3. FOR COS INFO: A/1 HAS TRAINING COURSE IN PROGRESS AT MIAMI FOR KEY MRR PEOPLE IN CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTER INSURGENCY. APPEARS HAVE ACCEPTED FACT OF LIFE PM OPS ARE OUT AND PUTTING FULL EFFORT INTO SWITCHING MRR TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES LATIN AMERICA WHILE WAITING OTHER RESOLUTION PBRUMEN PROBLEM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs report evidence Che Guevara is in Colombia, and cite AMBIDDY-1 as source of info.

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
for C/WHD

WH/FO/B
WH/C/CA
DC/WH/3

John T. Flynn
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

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FROM LAPAZ

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1830 BY

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

SECRET 151955Z CM 15 JUN 65 IN 80944

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE LAPA 8370

REF: DIR 19219 *

1. NO RPT NO BOLIVIAN GOVT AIRCRAFT MAKES WEEKLY FLIGHTS TO WAVE AREA.

2. WHOLE STORY OF REF SOUNDS SUSPICIOUS. ESPECIALLY IN VIEW FACT AIDE OF KICHEER-1 ~~AO~~ REMAINS IDENTIFIED.

3. BELIEVE STATION CAN SECURELY ATTEMPT DETERMINE VALIDITY OF STORY SINCE CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERSUBVERSION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN KICHEER-1, KICANAL-1, KICALIX-1, AND COSOV WILL ASK PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND WHETHER THEY NEED OTHER THAN ~~IYON~~ ODYOKE HELP.

4. BELIEVE ENTRY OF PBRUMEN EXILE WILL DAMAGE REPUTATION OF JUNTA NO MATTER WHAT HIS POLITICAL COLORATION. MILGROUP AND ODWIFE IN BOLIVIA HAVE MANY COMPETENT PERSONS EXPERIENCED IN CIVIC ACTION. IF INCREASED CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS TAKE PLACE IN THE MINES IT WILL BE WITH MILGROUP AND ODWIFE FUNDS AND THEY WILL INSIST ON PARTICIPATION AND SUPERVISION.

SECRET

*Re A-I TAKING TRIP See whether Could in FI Help on Civic Action Front

SECRET

El Panamá Hilton

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: 3-1660 (15 LINEAS) CABLES: HILTELS

June 15 1965

Roger Garvey

Dear Andy:

I have just come back from a three-day visit to Veraguas where things are going along very well. There are now 9 small cooperatives in the region around Santiago. In the village of San Francisco a large training center is under construction which will house 60 persons for cooperative training courses and for other teaching in rural development. There is dormitory as well as classroom space. The building was financed as follows: $12,000 from the German Bishops, $6500 from the community of San Francisco itself (pop.1000), ~~wix~~ which is really quite remarkable and testimony to the truly unique and effective organization which the Bishop and his associates are creating in Veraguas and $8,000 is being raised in Panama. This Center will be where Father Steele will conduct regular four-month cooperative and rural development traning courses for persons from all over Latin America. It will also be used for local training. Father Steele's first course was held in Panama city and was attended by 25 men from Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia andPanama. This course seems to be the best of its kind in Latin America.

The land has finally been broken free around San Jose. This is the first real land reform in Panama. My two men are hard at work.

I talked to the Bishop about Nestor and he was most enthusiastic. He wants him to come as soon as possible and work alongside Oswaldo Rodrigues ~~whtw~~ who is the young man in charge of his development operations. His organisation is called CEPAS, Center for Studies, Promotion and Social Assistance. He hopes that Nestor will be able to ~~the~~ be the executive director and operator of the San Francisco Center now under construction. In my view this would be an ideal set-up. Nest

PANAMA. REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: [illegible]
CABLES: HILTELS

would be in at the beginning of this effort which could have major effects throughout Latin America. He would be learning and also teaching. The Bishop suggested that he could use another man as well and further suggested that four of Nestor's friends from Miami might want to come and take Father Steele's course in January at San Francisco. It costs about $60 a month, including everything.

The Bishop knew Manuel, having met him in Chicago at some meeting, and he has the highest regard for him. He suggested that he could meet Manuel and Nestor in Miami on June 28 when he will be there staying with his ~~[illegible]~~ step-father, Col. Harry Scheible, 6491 Allison Island Rd., Miami Beach. I called Manuel and he and Nestor will see the Bishop on the morning of June 28. I told the Bishop that financing for Nestor could be arranged, suggesting possibly the Fund but making nothing definite. I suggest that if all this meets with your approval you may wish to contact Manuel and/or Nestor and pin down the financial part of it. I would suggest that Nestor be paid about $200 a month. That is what Oswaldo Rodriguez gets. Incidentally this Oswaldo is really first class — a good man to watch. You may want to just let things go as they are but in any case the Bishop expects Nestor to be ~~[illegible]~~ financed somehow.

I am off to Colombia tomorrow.

All the best,

G.

Meetings with AMJAVA-4 in Washington, 27-28 June 1965

Subject: Proposed Agency Programs

1. Following the demise of AMWORLD, AMJAVA-4 has become familiar with three other Agency programs, or proposed programs, and he asked if he could have some clarification as to just what we wanted from him and his people. I explained that there were three different functions which needed to be done and that the Agency was trying to develop programs to meet each need. The three functions concerning Cuba are:

(a) to maintain the MRR as a respected resistance organization with a political posture which is acceptable to most Cubans and not inimical to U.S. interests. We are asking approval of a minimum budget for subsidy of the MRR which will pay for its published and radio publicity matter, subsistence to survivors of MRR killed, disabled, or captured, and travel expenses for AMBIDDY-1 as the leader of the movement outside Cuba. We are trying to guide A-1 into a program of Community Development/Civic Action projects in Latin America as a means of projecting an image of the MRR and of A-1 as constructive, forward-looking people instead of simply exile counterrevolutionaries. We would hope that such activities would keep the movement together, give the members practical experience which would eventually be useful in Cuba, and in the meantime, would render useful results in countering problems of insurgency in Latin America.

(b) to prepare a managerial and executive team of specially selected Cuban exiles who would be ready to move into Cuba should relations be resumed with the United States in order to furnish effective direction of necessary governmental functions and assist the United States in denying the island to Communist control. Selected candidates would, hopefully, be fairly young as well as intelligent and capable of profiting from extensive training programs which would be designed for each to prepare him to perform a specific function in a future Cuban regime. The program would be apolitical, each person being considered as an individual and not as representative of any organization. This is the program for which A-4 is being considered for training in the field of internal security for work with the Agency in a post-Castro Cuban regime.

(c) to select and maintain a small cadre of Cuban exile paramilitary people who would be ready for emergency contingency situations anywhere in the world on short notice and for short periods of time. When not mobilized, the Agency would assist them inmaintaining employment and supporting themselves. They would also, of course, be available for emergency operational commitment to Cuba if required. (It was explained that this was the program handled by Mr. Tom Clines of SOD, who was present and discussed it more in detail with A-4.)

2. A-4 understood that the programs outlined above were only parts of an overall concept concering Cuba, that the first was designed to meet long-term political considerations, the second to meet long-term strategic requirements, and the third to meet current operational needs. He understood and completely agreed with each program, and agreed to cooperate in executing each of them, to the maximum of his ability. He will be happy to spot and recruit for us in each program, and will try to influence AMBIDDY-1 along the lines we want him to follow. A-4 appreciated our explanations and stated that he could be much more helpful to us now that he understood what we were trying to accomplish.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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INFO.

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FROM

CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
AMBIDDY-1 ACTIVITIES

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

AMLITAINT-1 REPORTED ON 28 JUNE 1965 THAT AMBIDDY-1 WAS AGAIN ACTIVE IN THE WAVE AREA. AMBIDDY-1 HAS RECONTACTED MANY OF HIS AMWORLD MEMBERS. HE HAS TOLD THEM THAT HE IS RE-OPENING THE TRAINING CAMPS FOR THOSE WHO WERE IN THE INFILTRATION TEAMS AND THE GUERRILLA WARFARE TEAMS. HE HAS STATED THAT HIS SUPPORT WILL BE RE-INSTATED ON 1 AUGUST. AMBIDDY-1 HAS ALSO TOLD HIS MEN THAT HE STILL HAS MOST OF HIS WEAPONS AND SOME OF HIS SHIPS FROM THE AMWORLD PROJECT.

CS COPY

PHILIP G. ELMARD

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-22205	30 JUNE 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-267437

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OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

PANAMA, REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
TELEFONO: 2-1660 (15 LINEAS) CABLES: HILTELS

July 7, 1965
Panama en route Venezuela

For Andy, Bill and others:

I just spoke with Bishop McGrath who saw Art in Miami last Wednesday afternoon. Art was accompanied by a man named Tees (sp?), who the Bishop said had come from Boston. Nestor was not there. After a lengthy conversation, the Bishop said that he and Art agreed that the best plan to follow would be to send from 4 to 6 of Art's younger men to Father Steele's cooperative-community development training course which will be held in San Francisco, Veraguas, around January 15. At the end of the course, which I believe runs four months, the Bishop could then pick one or two of the men to remain and work with him and his group. The Bishop was concerned about having someone with his project who was too closely connected with ~~ART~~ Art. He felt and he said Art did too that probably both [illegible] and Poso were too well known as associates of Art's. That is why they decided on younger men who are less identified.

The Bishop said he made some discreet inquiries about Art among "friends" of his in Miami and found that he had once been the fair-haired and much admired leader of young Cubans, but that in Central America he had had a love affair with the wife of one of Batista's [illegible] which sort of took some of the gloss off as far as his followers were concerned. The Bishop said he has since married the woman and is working his way back to a position of respectability. The Bishop liked him a lot and he said they got along very well.

It sounds to me as though this is a very good plan and could well lead to something of long-term value.

George.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Joe Di Stefano (38-44[illegible])	8 July	
2	Dan Rohlfing		
3	(Rm. GG 1908)		C
4	Carl		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. Attached memo from E[illegible] re McGrath - Art - meeting in Miami.
2. For your retention.

Arnie

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible] (K-1282)	8 July

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(40)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

SECRET

12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDDY-1 for Month of July 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of $12,000 for the month of July 1965 to be given to AMBIDDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E. Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DC/WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET

12 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Activities of AMBIDDY-1, 1-10 July 1965

1. I talked to AMBIDDY-1 by telephone on 2, 8 and 10 July with the gist of the conversations outlined below:

   a. AMBIDDY-1 had two long conversations with Bishop McGrath of Panama on 30 June and 2 July. They discussed the center for studies of rural cooperatives at San Francisco village in Veraguas Province, Panama, that is being developed under the Bishop's auspices with support from Harvard University and which has two men there at present. Prof. George Lodge is the Harvard representative and has been visiting the center. A-1 received a letter from Prof. Lodge asking for assignment of an experienced man to the staff of the center. Bishop McGrath repeated the request, saying he would like to have two men as soon as possible, with a total of six by January when he plans to increase the program. The two men selected were Silvano POZO Carrillo (201-73977[illegible]) and Nestor IZQUIERDO Diaz (201-281933) both Negroes from Oriente Province and former Comandos Rurales. A-1 asked the Bishop what part the Panama Government played and was told they approved, although they were not directly involved. A-1 understands that the center will train students from all over Latin America and has already graduated more than twenty students from several countries.

   b. The five man security force left by A-1 at Monkey Point, Nicaragua, in addition to guarding a weapons cache, continues to teach the local Indians in reading, writing, basic operation and maintenance of machinery, and rice planting.

   c. The community development/civic action training program for MRR members which A-1 has been running in the evenings in Miami is about half finished. He has about twenty men attending regularly after work with several others attending whenever they can get away from their jobs. The

GROUP 1
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class is now studying organization of rural cooperatives. Silvano POZO is chief instructor for this phase and will be sent to Panama as soon as the classes in Miami are completed.

d. A-1 has bought a small farm (22 acres) near West Palm Beach to develop as a model farm for his training program. He is installing generators, water pumps, and starting to raise chickens, etc. He hopes eventually to bring a few students at a time from Latin America as his program progresses to show them what can be done with small plots if proper farming techniques are used.

e. A-1 received another message from Bolivia saying in effect that the situation was still about the same and again asking if he were able to visit there. He stalled them again (at our request) and agreed to be out of town or otherwise scheduled until the matter dies a natural death.

2. The West German Government has issued scholarships paying all tuition plus $100 per month subsistence in German universities to three of A-1's people who have been living in Spain. They will go to Germany in August to study the language for six months then begin their studies. They are Angel LAVANDERA, economics; Carlos MAYO, engineering; and Luis CAVADA, engineering. This is follow-up to the meeting A-1 had in Rome with the German Ambassador that was arranged for him by the Vatican Secretary of State last December.

3. A-1 is leaving 13 or 14 July for about 10 to 15 days visiting Central America. He will go to Nicaragua first to talk with President Schick and General Somoza, then to Monkey Point to check on the condition of the base, security of the arms he has cached there, and to observe the civic action training his men there are conducting for the local Indians. He will then go to Costa Rica to talk with President Orlich and Foreign Minister Oduber who have sent word they would like to meet with him as soon as convenient for him. From there he will go to Panama to see President Marcos Robles, who has been expecting him for several weeks. A-1 will describe the project he is about to enter with Bishop McGrath and Professor Lodge and confirm President Robles' attitude toward it. A-1 will also visit Veraguas Province and look over the training center.

4. I also informed A-1 that his proposal to maintain U. S. support for the MRR to pay for support to dependents and

survivors of MRR people, for delegates, the Tridente, and radio broadcasting had been approved for $12,000 monthly. He was gratified to receive continued support for the movement. I told him we would try to get the July payment into the bank through the old AMWORLD funding mechanism pending development of a new funding system.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM WH Division (AMBIDDY)

TO Monetary Division

DATE 13 July 1965

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS: Deposit to AMBIDDY/1 INBOVEX Account for extraordinary expenses for July 1965.

I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that subsidy funds previously made available to AMBIDDY have been or are being expended for authorized objectives of the acrivity and further support is warranted.

Carl E. Jenkins

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS
On file in Monetary Division

PAYEE AMBIDDY/1

AMOUNT $12,000.00

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______________ of aforesaid funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my accountability therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	**SIGNATURE OF PAYEE**
DATE	**SIGNATURE OF AGENT**

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. (To be signed when applicable)

DATE	**TITLE** WH/C/CA/EA	**SIGNATURE** Carl E. Jenkins

APPROVED

DATE	**SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER** DCWHD/C

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	**SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER**

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.	**CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.** C135-1176
DATE 7/13/65	**SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER** WH/B&P

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	**AMOUNT**	**SIGNATURE OF** ☐ **PAYEE** ☐ **AGENT**

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33		34-39 STATION CODE	40-41 EXPOSED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL		67-70 OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT	
DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 V/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO.	REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.		ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.				F. FUND	61-66 CK. NO. & REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE	DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE	**PREPARED BY**	**DATE**	**REVIEWED BY**	**TOTALS**

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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13 July 65

NICARAGUAN INVESTMENTS
(INVERNICA)

PRELIMINARY STUDY

SHIPYARDS
and
REPAIR YARDS

IN THE AREA OF BRAGGMAN'S BLUFF • BLUEFIELDS

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I

INTRODUCTION

This industrial development plan is presented by the INVERNICA Company located in the city of Managua, D.N.(Naval District), Nicaragua.

This report is part of the preliminary study which [illegible] INVERNICA has effected in regard to an investment program for the concentration of repair yards and shipyards in the Bluff-Bluefields area. These facilities will provide complete service to the fishing fleets and other boats which operate on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. The initial cost of building these facilities, with their necessary complex operational sections, is ~~staggering~~ high. This cost, however, will be significantly reduced ~~because~~ in view of the equipment, experience and personnel ~~of~~ at the disposal of INVERNICA. This study analyzes the various elements of ~~this~~ such investment which totals US$ 237,000 of which INVERNICA is contributing 68.4 percent and INFONAC 31.6 percent.

~~Similarly b~~ Because of ~~the~~ its status ~~of~~ as a new industry in the country and the benefits which would accrue to the national economy, this plan may be classified as a ~~fundamental~~ key industry (Law Nr 135, Law of Protection and Stimulation for the Development of Industry, 20 March 1958) and, therefore enjoy this protection and stimulation for its full initial development.

As will be seen in this preliminary report, the necessity of modern shipyards and repair yards on the Atlantic coast is of vital importance to the survival of the fishing fleets. These fleets suffer serious operational restrictions because of the absence of ~~these~~ such services which are common to the NorthAmerican and Mexican fleets. We have the necessary equipment and technical personnel, and, moreover, the full con-

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fidence of being able to offer the most modern and efficient services, facilities and yards in the entire Carribean area.

13 July 1965

Braggman's Bluff, Nicaragua

Eng. Luis A. Prieto Portar
INVERNICA

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II

ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET

The primary function of the shipyard will be the construction of 20 to 200-ton boats ~~from~~ of steel and wood. This will include shrimpboats, lobsterboats, barges, light cargoships, and passenger and patrol launches. The secondary function of the Combine will be to provide repair and maintenance service to all boats of this class within the Carribean area ~~[illegible]~~ of equal or better quality than that offered in Mexico, Trinidad or the United States.

To a degree, the shipyard will attempt to specialize ~~specialization~~ in the construction of 35-ton shrimpboats for favorable competition in the world market. Construction will be attempted ~~from~~ in steel and ~~from~~ wood. Construction from wood will be advantageous because of the procurement of wood in large part, if not all, from the local sawmills in Bluefields. Another advantage of construction from wood is a plan for mass production ~~[illegible]~~ in which prefabricated sections of boats will be constructed. It is possible to visualize in the near future not only the sale of fully-equipped shrimpboats but also prefabricated parts for those shipyards which do not have the necessary machinery, wood, and other items.

The ~~[illegible]~~ Domestic and Central American Market: There are only a few countries in America which possess the facilities for construction of boats ~~of~~ with the shrimpboat ~~[illegible]~~ draft. These countries are Peru, Mexico and the United States. The production in Peru is small and relatively insignificant, and its influence in the Carribean is ~~nought~~ nil. Mexican boats are constructed from good material, but because of poor ~~labor~~ workmanship together with antiquated designs, they are subject to enormous structural fatigue in heavy seas. In the United States, the production of shrimpboats is ~~[illegible]~~ limited to

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by five main companies ~~because of the annual quota~~ at an average rate of five boats per shipyard. They are excellent products with the latest fishing and navigation equipment. Nevertheless, they are costly because of the high cost of labor and raw materials in the country. Since we possess most of the wood in Bluefields, trained and competent personnel, and a superior funcional boat design, we ~~[illegible]~~ will be able to supply the necessities for a national fishing fleet, as well as to place these boats on the world market. We base ~~conclusions~~ this opinion on preliminary calculations which prove the possibility of our ability to produce an excellent boat at less cost and superior to the North American boats.

The ~~National~~ Domestic Market: The immediate market for our shrimp boats is the ~~national~~ domestic fleet. The Booth Fisheries express great interest in procuring six additional boats as soon as possible. It plans possible expansion to 20 more boats in the next two or three years. There is also the possibility of renting or selling these boats on terms to local ~~captaincies,~~ individuals as well as of stimulating investment by other ~~national~~ domestic capital. We estimate a national market of some 25 shrimp boats in the next three years. The demand from the rest of the Carribean can be conservatively estimated at 40 boats, totalling 75 [sic] boats, which ~~they~~ will be purchased ~~from~~ in Mexico and the United States. With our production of 15 boats during this three-year period, it is evident that we possess a rich market here in the Carribean area, not to mention the demand forthcoming from the Pacific and other large fishing areas.

As regards the repair yard, we estimate servicing 400 boats annually with our modern installations. Compare this ~~[illegible]~~ with the repair yard services of Schooner Key which is offering partial services to 45 boats annually.

The plans for the Nicaraguan shrimpboat fleet this year call for 80 boats. Add 40 coastal boats of all types and the total comes to 120 boats which will require repair yard services four times per year(3 normal ~~groundings~~ beachings and one emergency), that is, a total of 480 ~~groundings~~ beachings annually. The local repair yards are able to service only 100 ~~groundings~~ beachings. This situation ~~now~~ forces many shrimpboats to seek repairs outside of the country, either at Honduras, Mexico or the United States, with the resultant loss of fishing time and ~~profits~~ foreign exchange for Nicaragua.

Initial Technical Limitations: The lack of local technical personnel, and time required to import various mechanical parts and materials.

Consideration for future expansion was taken in designing the shipyard and repair yard. Carpentry and mechanic workshops are also planned. There are two factors however which affect the overall operation. The first factor is the lack of personnel trained in steel construction of boats, but this will be overcome initially by personnel trained by the Company. The second factor will be resolved only by an efficient coordination with the distribution and supply personnel of the Company in Miami. In this way it will be possible to have any spare parts or materials forwarded to Bluff within two weeks after the request is made by the local offices, (via airline). Furthermore, plans have been prepared to stock the shipyard warehouses with spare parts.

External or Internal Competition: As regards the shipyard, there is neither external nor internal competition in Central America. The only competition we will encounter will be Mexican and North American. The following is a comparative study of this competition:

(a) Prices.	Shrimpboat (of wood, 35 tons, no motor)
Mexico	US$ 41,000
United States	US$ 45,000
Nicaragua	US$ 40,000 (Planned)

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(b) Quality of Materials.

Mexico: Good materials; bad design and ~~[illegible]~~ construction.

U.S.A.: Good materials; excellent designs; construction depends on the Company and varies from good to excellent.

Nicaragua: Good materials; excellent designs and construction.

(c) Channels and Policy of Distribution: Eventhough it will be difficult to compete initially in sales in the Mexican and North American markets, because of their high duties, we will enjoy an unlimited market in the rest of the Carribean. We will compete favorably due to the excellent position of Nicaragua with respect to Central American, Venezualan, Colombian, and other markets.

As regards the repair yard, it is to be noted that the foreign repair yards are much less ~~[illegible]~~ expensive than the ~~national~~ domestic ones, sometimes up to 500 percent. From the study of typical costs of each repair yard we conclude that we are able to offer more service at equal or less cost. The following examples assume a typical ~~grounding~~ beaching of three days, cleaning, caulking, straightening the shaft, changing a number of sheets of metal, ~~[illegible]~~ tightening the framework or sternposts, ~~securement of~~ tightening the rudder and ~~bottom~~ seating, and, finally, the paint:

(a) Cost

Honduras	US$ 330	(excluding straightening of shaft)
Mexico	US$ 350	
U.S.A.	US$ 375	
Schooner Key	US$ 1000	
INVERNICA	US$ 350	(planned)

(b) Quality of Labor

Honduras	Good	
Mexico	Good	
U.S.A.	Excellent	
Schooner Key	Common	
INVERNICA	Excellent	(planned)

Sales Estimate: Potential sales are estimated from the following three means: The shipyard, the repair yard, and mechanical and electrical services to the community of the area in general.

(a) Costs (assuming the stability of prices in the next three years).

Shipyard: US$ 40,000 for each shrimpboat(excluding motor); costs of other boats will be in proportion.

Repair Yard: Cost of normal beaching, US$ 350. The cost will be higher if there are mechanical problems or spare part are needed.

(b) Quantity(Output)

Shipyard: two shrimpboats the first year, six the second and six the third years; all domestic sales.

Repair Yard: 300 beachings of a possible 400 the first year; 350 the second, and 450 the third year.

(c) Gross Income (approximate)

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year
Shipyard:	US$ 80,000	US$ 240,000	US$ 240,000
Repair Yard:	US$105,000	US$ 122,500	US$ 157,500
Miscellaneous	US$ 5,000	US$ 7,000	US$ 10,000

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III

ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF THE PROJECT

Costs of Overall Production for the First Year of Production:

In the calculation of costs, consideration is taken of the construction of two shrimpboats, complete repair and maintenance service for 300 bearings [redacted], and other miscellaneous service at a total of 31,000 [redacted] work hours.

Production Costs:

(a) Raw Material: The materials required for construction and repair of boats are varied and many times specialized. Following are principal materials at approximate rates:

Wood:	Laurel or yellow pine	25,000 square feet;
	Mahogany, 1st and 2nd grade	20,000 square feet;
	Oak, 1st grade	5,000 square feet.

Metal: Steel and Steel-2(S.A.E.), 40 tons;
Cast-iron and other metals, 10 tons.

At a total value of US$ 30,000.

(b) Materials:

Paints - Epoxy zinc, silver, primece, epoxy bases, latex, copper antifouling, varnishes ~~[illegible]~~, etc.).
About 1800 gallons.

General hardware - Zinc, copper, iron, and steel screws and nails; washers; cotter-pins; metal, plastic and rubber tubing; polyfoam, styrofoam, and cement insulation; glass plates and Bakelite, etc.

Miscellaneous Equipment: Propellers(46" x 34"): rust-proof steel

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shafts, CMC in-line winches, anchors, batteries, ordinary and navigational lighting systems, electrical accessories, electric power plants, bilge pumps, kerosene stoves, cooling and refrigeration units, fathometers, radio-communication equipment, etc.

At a total value of US$ 50,000.

(c) Labor:

During the first year of production the Enterprise will employ a chief of mechanics and lathe shop, two specialist mechanics, two mechanics assistants, a master ~~[illegible]~~ carpenter, three ship-carpenters, and two carpenter assistants.

At total annual wages of US$ 32,000.

Operation Costs:

(a) Administration Expenses: Administration personnel include one ~~[illegible]~~ administrater-public accountant, assistant office worker, and two servicemand maintenance managers. Together their annual wages will amount to US$ 8,400, and an annual amount of US$ 2,000 will be kept in reserve.

Total Administration Expenses: US$ 10,400.

(b) Sales Expenses: Because of the nature of the Enterprise ~~[illegible]~~ no expenses will be incurred from sales, advertisements, etc., and, therefore, we ~~[illegible]~~ foreseen no expenses for this section. Fixed and Variable Costs: All the expenses previously quoted may be considered as fixed costs, and only variable costs will be considered, that is, 20 percent of materials consumed by the mechanics workshops depending on the mechanical repairs. The rest is controlled by a simple system of production which will clearly show the detailed costs of construction and repairs of the boats in consideration.

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Plan of Production Costs for the Second and Third Year of Operation.

(See the following statement:)

STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS

A. Total Income:	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Shipyard Sales	80 $~~[illegible]~~,000	$240,000	$240,000
Repair Yard Sales	$105,000	$122,500	$157,500
Misc. Sales	$ 5,000	$ 7,000	$ 10,000
Net Sales	$190,000	$369,000	7 $409,500

B. Production Cost:			
Raw Materials	$ 30,000	$ 85,000	$ 90,000
Materials	$ 50,000	$ 90,000	$ 90,000
Direct Labor	$ 32,000	$ 40,000	$ 43,000
Depreciation (Machinery, 20%)	$ 10,000	$ 10,000	$ 5,000
Repairs and Maintenance	$ 2,000	$ 10,000	$ 10,000
Fuel (Electricity)	$ 2,500	$ 2,800	$ 3,000
Plant Secur~~[illegible]~~ity	$ 1,000	$ 1,300	$ 1,300
Sub-Total	$127,500	1 $239,000	$242,300

C. Administration Expenses:			
Wages	$ 8,400	$ 9,000	$ 9,000
Office Expenses	$ 2,000	$ 3,000	$ 3,000
Sub-Total	$ 10,400	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 12,000	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 12,000

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D. Financial Expenses:	1st Year	2nd Year	3rd Year
Capital	$ 15,000	$ 15,000	$ 15,000
Interest	$ 4,500	6 $ 3,800	$ 2,700
Sub-Total	$ 19,500	[illegible] $ ~~18,600~~	$ 17,700
E. Total Expenses	$157,400	$269,700	$272,000
F. Utility Net	$ 32,600	$ 99,800	$137,500

IV

(IV) SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION

Employment: In the first year of production, 16 men will be employed by the Enterprise, and assigned as follows:

Administration Personnel: 4 employees (one administrator and public accountant), one office assistant, and two managers of services and maintenance).

Carpentry [redacted]: 7 employees (one chief of carpentry, three ship-carpenters, two carpenter assistants).

Mechanics [redacted]: 5 employees (one chief of mechanics and lathe-shop, two specialist mechanics, and two mechanics assistants).

The initial wages of all employees of the Enterprise will be based on their technical knowledge, years of experience, etc. This pay scale will surpass the normal in order to attract the best possible personnel to the Enterprise. A plan for increase of fixed and meritorious wages is also being planned as an incentive for the employees.

The number of personnel is expected to increase to 20 in the second year of production, and to 22 in the third year.

Effect on ~~[illegible] in~~ the Balance of Payments: The shrimpboat fleets in Nicaragua have expanded by ~~to some~~ 10 to 15 boats annually. These boats are bought only ~~entirely equipped from~~ in Mexico and the United States. Their total value within a period of three years extends from a minimum of US$ 900,000 to a maximum of US$ 2,025,000. Our production during this period will be 14 shrimpboats at a value of US$ 560,000 which will remain in the country.

Consumer Benefits and Economic Development: At present, most of the shrimp boats in the area have no facilities for mechanical repairs, and, in most cases, no facilities for beaching ~~grounding~~. This is due in part to the shallow draft of ~~the insufficient~~ the marine railways ~~accommodations~~ in the local repair yards, as well as to antiquated equipment. Because of these difficulties, many shrimpboats are forced to put into Honduras, Mexico and, at times the United States, for repairs. [redacted] It is difficult to estimate with certainty the total losses which these boats incur through [illegible] negotiations for entry to and departure from other countries, fuel and personnel expenses, and, of more importance, the incalculable losses in fishing time. Inasmuch as our repair yards will possess a greater capability than normally required, those boats with emergency and other types of damages will be guaranteed service. In this way we will attract to our repair yards those boats which ordinarily would seek repairs outside of the country with the consequent ~~subsequent~~ loss in ~~foreign~~ profits and valuable ~~time~~ fishing time in the waters of Nicaragua.

Protection and Incentive: Because of the characteristics of key [illegible] Industry (See law Nr 135, of 20 March 1958), a shipyard will need ~~may request~~ governmental aid during the first ~~six~~ years of its development in order to assure the necessary investments required by an enterprise of such complexity and magnitude. The necessary negotiations are presently being undertaken in Managua to obtain for this enterprise the legal recognition of a ~~fundamental~~ new industry with all governmental aid.

V

TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Designs have already been drafted for the first model in wood of a 35-ton shrimpboat, and for the first model in steel of a 30-ton shrimpboat. The general specifications for the steel boat are the following: tonnage - 30; length - 62 feet; breadth - 20 feet; draught - 8 feet; keel (bar/steel-3) 3/4 inch x 8 inches; transverse frames (plate/steel); deck 3/16 inch (plate/steel). Paint: Hart and Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosive and antifouling - a total of six coats. Refrigerator: capacity 20 tons, in shrimp-ice, constructed of styrofoam-concrete. Driving power plant: D-342 Caterpillar with supercharger. Propellers, 48 inches x 34 inches, with three Michigan blades. stainless steel propellor shaft, 3 inches x 14 feet. GMC in-line winch. Eight 8-volt batteries with battery charger. Kerosene cooking-range. Searchlights and navigational lights. RCA Cruisephone 160. Ritchie, magnetic compass, model B453. Raytheon fathometer, model DE-725. Special fuel tanks in the hull, with capacity of 6,000 gals. Potable water tank, with capacity of 750 gals, etc.

Production Process: The processes in constructing boats and the services required for the boats are necessarily complex, al~~even~~though the processes are immensely simplified by new methods. Below is a description of the processes to be followed in the shipyard and in the repair yard. The construction of a boat begins with the laying of the keel on the slipway, followed by the attachment of the pre-formed transverse framework to the keel. The crossbeams

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and sternpost are then set in place after the framework is cut to size. The shell plating is next attached from the keel upwards in a such a manner that upon entering the water the wood undergoes a precalculated expansion which completely seals the hull without necessitating calking. A hole is drilled for the shaft and the supports and pin for the rudder are then set in place. Following this is the flooring for the deck and ~~xxxxxx~~ the crew's cabin, and steel reinforcemnts for the prow, stern and machine room. After all of this is completed, the secondary installations are carried out, such as the painting, electrical wiring, plumbing, masts, gavits, winches, and finally the launching of the boat. Final touch-up is effected ~~where~~ when the boat is in the water.

The process for the construction of a boat from steel is a simpler matter, and therefore less costly.

The normal process of drydock-repair service for a boat is as follows: The cradle(See diagrams Nrs 1 and 3) awaits the boat at the entrance of the ramp. With the use of maneuvering-buoys, the boat is lifted onto the cradle where it is made stationary ~~with~~ by transverse beams. The moving cradle is brought up the ramp and the boat is then transferred from it to a lateral cradle. The boat is brought to Section Nr 1 where it is immediately scraped with electric portable brushes and high water pressure. While the hull is drying, a detailed inspection is carried out in search of worm ~~xx~~ holes. ~~xxxxx~~ After drying the hull is ~~xxx~~ calked and a general inspection is made. Paint is applied, and while that is drying the necessary interior mechanical work is carried out. Upon termination of the final painting and a final inspection, the boat is launched. The complete operation lasts no more than two or three days in a modern drydock, and the support personnel consist of two carpenters, a mechanic, and two yard assistants, as well as the usual repair and spare parts.

Installations: As can be seen from diagram nr 1, the area occupied by the shipyard is relatively small, some 15,500 square meters. It consists of a reinforced-concrete ramp with 4-inch rails, and an area 150 meters long by 20 meters wide. The [illegible] descends to a depth of 7 meters. The Central Yard contains a lateral cradle(25 x 17 x 1 meters), which rolls on a concrete base(117 x 25 x 1 meters); three sections of the cradle (42 x 20 meters) with the third section terminating near the shipbuilding shed (33 x 22 x 11 meters). Two identical buildings are planned for the machine shops, carpentry shop, offices and warehouses, on a total working area of 1200 square meters. A building will house two 75-kilowatt electric power plants, spare parts and general electrical equipment. A 350-gallon petroleum tank will be installed underground along side of this building to provide the fuel. A 6,000-gallon fresh-water tank with its well and turbine will complete the first phase of the plan. The second phase will be carried out during the year of production.

Cost of Each Section (Approx):

Retention Wall and Filling in the Swamp	$ 1,500
Ramp	$ 4,000
Central Yard	$ 10,000
Base for the Lateral Cradle	$ 5,000
Buildings for Workshops/Warehouses/Offices	$ 12,000
Building for Ship Construction	$ 3,000
Building for the Power Plants	$ 2,000
Lateral Cradle	$ 4,000

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Three Repair Yard Cradles	$ 12,000
Water Tank with Well	$ 500
Electric Wiring, Drainage, Plumbing, etc.	$ 1,000
Total -	$ 55,000

Location of the Operation: It was evident from the beginning that the location of a shipyard-repair yard complex on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua had to be situated in the Bluff-Bluefields area, or at Rio Escondido. The reasons are as follows:

(a) Geo-Economical - The Bluff-Bluefields port is the only port with river and highway access to the interior of the country. (b) It is the only port with sheltered anchorage (compare this with Puerto Cabezas' exposure to the sea). (c) It is the center of the fish market (Booth and Pescanica). These two companies attract a large number of boats and create a local demand for drydocking facilities. (d) It is ~~the~~ a center for supplies of fuel, food, parts, and other articles. (e) INVERNICA is fully aware of the potentials in the area. Without doubt, ~~the~~ a port with deep draft and good access would have been even more advantageous. At present, however, the sandbar of Bluff limits access to the port to boats ~~in~~ with 13 feet of draught or less (a maximum of 800 tons). This greatly limits the commercial traffic to Bluefields. Possibly in the near future, the sandbar may be dredged, and we would then be sufficiently developed to offer floating-drydock services to large boats. The Port of Bluefields would then have the opportunity of becoming a prime mercantile port.

Possible Future Expansion: This preliminary study provides for the construction of an additional 90 x 35 x 7 meter building to serve as a general workshop for the three slipways simultaneously, and for the construction of a concrete pier for jobs not requiring drydocking. This pier will be equipped with a mobile crane, and electrical and water facilities. This plan (Phase II) [redacted] is tentatively [redacted] SCHEDULED FOR the second year of operations. (See diagram Nr 1).

VI

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Total Estimated Investments for the Project: The estimated total sum of the project is US$ 237,000. The breakdown of this amount is given at the end of this chapter. The [redacted] loan requested from INFONAC is given below under general headings:

Construction Equipment: Two [redacted] 2 1/2- ton dump-trucks, [redacted] Carts for concrete, concrete vibrators(we have compressors), crane bucket for concrete, canvas tubing for submerged cement work, iron piping, etc. Total value (approx) US$ 25,000.

Construction Materials: 20,000 bags of Lone-Star cement;

100 tons of corrugated [redacted] reinforcing rods, 1/2 inch and 3/4 inch; with tie wire

15,000 square feet of zinc sheathing;

5,000 square feet of construction wood;

50 tons of rail[redacted] sections, 4 inches;

64 [redacted] (1 and 1/2 to 2 and 1/2 feet in diameter);

Railroad accessories; etc.;

Total Value of approx US$ 40,000.

Carpentry Equipment: Table saw (2 feet x 10 feet), handsaws, hinged vise [redacted], two 2-inch electric drills, two electric sanders, table sander [redacted] and table presses, 'torsion boxes', two complete sets of tools and [redacted] electric portable equipment, etc.

Total Value of approx US$ 5,000.

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Machine Shop

[redacted] Equipment: US$ 25,000 additional investment by INVERNICA, and US$ 5,000 by INFORMAC.

Lathe for shafts (24-foot bed, 48-foot drum);

Southbend precision lathe (6-foot bed, 13-foot drum);

Two-inch Buffalo/Force drill, with accessories;

[redacted] Walter-Turner Auger [?] model Nr 3310;

Four manually-operated 20-ton hydraulic presses;

Electric Grinders;

Medium milling machines;

Twelve-inch press;

Differential [redacted] systems (1 ton);

Three sets of complete die stocks, torque [redacted] wrenches, combination wrenches, anvils, etc;

Two complete sets of [redacted] tools, torsion meters, calibrators, cutters, polishing machines, automatic VALVES [redacted], die sets, [redacted] one unit for testing engines

Total Value of approx US$ 36,500.

Characteristics of company [redacted] Capital: INVERNICA's [redacted] capital is drawn from two sources, namely, total equipment and materials within Nicaragua which is valued at US$ 150,000, and the [redacted] capital of the Enterprise, approximately [redacted] US$ 50,000.

Guarantees: Following is a general list of the equipment of INVERNICA which will be utilized in the project. This equipment for the most part is new and in full operational status, that is, INVERNICA has the necessary technical personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. In spite of the fact that this equipment is new the total [redacted] value is subject to the usual depreciation of 25 percent of the price which INVERNICA paid for the equipment in the United States. The following is exclusive of freight [redacted], customs and other fees. Since I do not have price lists, the prices are approximate.

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Construction Equipment:

1 D-7 Caterpillar bulldozer;

1 Nr 112 Caterpillar grader;

1 15-ton Little Giant crane;

2 75-Kw D333 Caterpillar electric power plants;

2 Kohler power plants;

1 20-ton L.C.M., with all equipment;

1 40-ton barge;

1 KWIK-MIX concrete mixer, model 6S;

1 1964 Willys truck;

1 1964 Willys Jeep;

1 3-ton trailer;

1 Compressor with Caterpillar equipment, 60 HP;

1 Small Compressor with [redacted] equipment and 9 HP Wisconsin motor;

2 GONDAS turbines, of 2 and 2 1/2 inches diameter, with motors;

1 SEARS turbine, of 1 inch, with motor;

10 Sets of construction tools (picks, shovels, diggers, etc.).

Total Value of approx US$ 90,000, less 25% depreciation.

Mechanical Equipment:

3 Complete sets of tools;

1 Granville lathe (bed 3 feet by 10 inches);

1 Linde/W-2000 electric aluminum welding unit;

1 Hobart, model AFB 260, electric welding unit;

2 Oxi-acetylene welding units;

1 Craftsman 3/4 inch drill table;

1 Craftsman aluminum AUGER [?] [redacted];

8 [redacted] electric drills (1½ inch)

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5 3/4-inch electric drills;

2 Electric buffing and polishing machines;

2 Electric fine saws(portable)

Miscellaneous equipment.

At Total Approx Value of US$ 6,500.

Miscellaneous Materials:

5,000 feet of high-voltage electric wiring;

3,500 feet of 600-volt electric wiring;

2,500 iron sheets, 1 and 1/2 inches by 10 feet;

2 electric chargers 12 and 24 volts;

3 electric transformers;

15 boxes of spare parts for Caterpillar, G.M., and Willys' motors;

Iron, copper, and zinc tubing; paint, plumbing fittings, 12-volt batteries, 1500, 1000, 350, 100 and 50 gallon water tanks, insulators, etc.

At Total Approx Value of US$ 15,000.

TOTAL INVESTMENT PLAN

Investment Fields	INVERNICA	INFCHNAC	TOTAL
A. Installation Expenses:			
a. Construction Equipment	$ 90,000	$ 25,000	$115,000
b. Construction Materials	$ 15,000	$ 40,000	$ 55,000
c. Machine Shop Equipment	$ 31,500	$ 5,000	$ 36,500
d. Carpentry Shop Equipment	$ ———	$ 5,000	$ 5,000

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	(INVERNICA)	(INFORNAC)	(TOTAL)
B. Organization Expenses:	$ 500	$ ———	$ 500
C. Workigg Capital:	$ 15,000	$ ———	$ 15,000
D. Contingencies:	$ 10,000	$ ———	$ 10,000
Total:	$162,000 (68.4%)	$ 75,000 (31.6%)	$237,000 (100. %)

Note: The land will be rented to the Booth Fisheries for a nominal fee which will be resolved once the credit is established .

SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

	Installation Period	Operational Period 1st	 2nd	 3rd
A. Sources:				
1. Equity Capital	$162,000	———	———	———
2. Medium-term loans	$ 75,000	———	———	———
3. Sales	$ ———	$190,000	$369,000	$409,500
4. Balance from previous year	$ ———	$140,000	$172,600	$221,900
Total Sources:	$237,000	$330,000	$541,600	$631,400
B. Uses:				
5. Fixed Investment				
a. Bldgs, etc.	$ 55,000	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———
b. Machinery	$ 41,500	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———
6. Cost of Production	$ ———	$127,500	$239,100	$242,300
7. Administration Expenses	$ 500	$ 10,400	$ 12,000	$ 12,000
Total Uses:	$ 97,000	$137,900	$251,100	$254,300

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Cash and Bank Deposits(A-B):	$140,000	$192,100	$290,500	$377,100
a. Amortization of the loan	$ ———	$ 19,500	$ 18,600	$ 17,700
b. Reinvestments	$ ———	$ ———	$ 50,000	$ ———
c. Dividends	$ ———	$ ———	$ ———	$ 50,000
Balance for the Following Year:	$140,000	$172,600	$221,900	$309,400

Note: This capital represents the value of the construction equipment, the working capital and the capital for contingencies, and is, therefore, the maximum figure. It is not necessarily true that this capital will remain intact, but we do believe that it will be no less than US$ 115,000.

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Production Potential - Shipyard

Number of
Shrimpboats

Planned production
Demand in Nicaragua
Plant capacity

Years

Production Potential - Repair Yard

Number of
Drydockings,
per annum

Planned production
Demand in Nicaragua
Plant capacity

Years

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25

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VII

APPENDIX

A re-study of the necessities of the shipyard, of the extensive (and intensive) repairs which the fleets will require, and of the immense volume of maintenance, has revealed the enormous load which the [redacted] machine shop and carpentry [redacted] shop must bear.

With the capital available to INTERBICA at this time, only US$ 25,000 can be channeled to these workshops, (plus [redacted] the US$ 6,500 in equipment in our possession), since [redacted] the present emphasis is placed on construction and immediate production. Nevertheless, I believe that an additional investment in the workshops is of vital importance for less costly [redacted] and efficient production. For mass production [redacted] the shipyard, naturally, requires sophisticated equipment, a significant volume of spare parts and additional capital.

We may choose to purchase this equipment with the first year's profits. But I believe that it is suitable for this sum to [redacted] be incorporated into the plan of initial loans, requested by the enterprise.

L.A.P.P./sl

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DIAGRAM NR. 1 - GENERAL VIEW

Storage Yard

Electric Power Plants

Warehouses

Carpentry Workshop

Office

Mechanical Workshop

Shipyard Nr 1

Building for Shipbuilding (Planned)

Winch 1

Section 6

Section 5

Section 4

Section 3

Section 2

Section 1

Winch 2

Lateral Cradle

Ramp

Phase II

Phase I

Working Pier

DIAGRAM NR. 2 - MAIN BUILDINGS

Workshops and Office

Shipyard Nr. 1

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DIAGRAM NR. 3 - SHRIMPBOAT CRADLE

Specifications:

Net weight - 18 tons

Capacity - 32 tons

Length - 20 meters

Width - 10 meters

Maneuvering time - 15 minutes

Scale

meters



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3

INVERSIONES NICARAGUENSES S. A.
(INVERNICA)

ESTUDIO PRELIMINAR

VARADERO - ASTILLERO

EN EL AREA DEL BRAGGMAN'S BLUFF - BLUEFIELDS

INDICE GENERAL

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1. INTRODUCCION

Este proyecto de desarrollo industrial lo presenta la Compañía INVERNICA (Inversiones Nicaraguenses), ubicada en la ciudad de Managua, D. N., Nicaragua.

El contenido de éste informe forma parte del estudio preliminar que ha efectuado la INVERNICA en torno a un programa de inversión de un concentrado de astilleros - varaderos en el área del Bluff- Bluefields. Dichas facilidades estarán orientadas a dar servicios completos a las flotas pesqueras y demás embarcaciones que operan en la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua. Dada la complejidad de las operaciones requeridas en los trabajos y servicios de un astillero, el costo del monto de dichas facilidades es inicialmente elevado. Gracias a los equipos, experiencia y personal técnico que posee la INVERNICA, éste costo inicial se reduce enormemente. Este estudio analiza los diferentes elementos que forman parte de dicha inversión y los integra a una cifra total, cuyo valor es de US$ 237,000.00 (DOSCIENTOS TREINTA Y SIETE MIL DOLARES), con dos inversionistas: INVERNICA supliendo el 68.4% (sesenta y ocho punto cuatro por ciento), y el INFONAC supliendo el 31.6% (treinta y uno punto seis por ciento).

Ya por su condición de industria nueva en país, y del alto beneficio que ello conlleva a la economía nacional, éste proyecto puede clasificarse de industria fundamental (Ley #135, Ley de Protección y Estímulo al Desarrollo Industrial, 20 de Marzo de 1958), y por tanto, gozar de dicha protección y estímulo para su pleno desarrollo inicial.

Como se verá en éste informe preliminar, la necesidad de facilidades modernas de varadero y astillería en la Costa Atlantica, es de vital importancia a la sobrevivencia de las flotas de pesca. Dichas flotas sufren graves restricciones operacionales debido a la ausencia de dichos servicios, tan comunes y extensamente brindados a las flotas norteamericanas y mejicanas. Nosotros poseemos los equipos y el personal técnico necesarios, pero más aún poseemos la plena confianza de poder llegar a ofrecer los servicios, facilidades y naves más modernas y eficientes en todas las costas del Caribe.

12 de Julio de [illegible]
Braggman's Bluff, Nicaragua
[illegible]

Ing. Luis A. Prieto Portar
INVERNICA

II. ANALISIS DEL MERCADO

La función primaria del astillero será la construcción de embarcaciones de acero y madera, de 20 a 200 toneladas. Esto incluye camaroneros, langosteros, falvas, cargueros ligeros y lanchones de pasajeros y de patrulla. La segunda función de la empresa, será el darle servicios de reparación y mantenimiento a toda clase de embarcaciones de ésta índole en el área del Caribe, de igual o superior calidad que las ofrecidas en Méjico, Trinidad o los Estados Unidos.

Hasta cierto punto el astillero intentará la especialización en la construcción de un camaronero de 35 toneladas de tal calidad que pueda competir favorablemente en el mercado mundial. Se intentarán construcciones en acero y en madera. La construcción en madera presenta la ventaja que una gran parte, sino toda la madera, puede procurarse en los aserraderos locales de Bluefields. Otra ventaja que posee la construcción en madera es un proyecto de producción en serie, en la cual, las formas de las diferentes piezas de las naves, se construirán en grupos previstos para la prefabricación. Será posible visualizar en un futuro, vender camaroneros, no solamente completamente armados, sino tambien en piezas prefabricadas listas para armar por varaderos con pocas facilidades en maquinaria, madera, etc.

Mercado nacional y centroamericano. Son pocos los paises en la America que poseen las facilidades de astilleros para la construcción de embarcaciones del calado de un camaronero. Estos paises son el Perú, Méjico y los Estados Unidos. La producción del Perú es pequeña y relativamente ineficiente, y su influencia en el Caribe, es nula. Las naves mejicanas están hechas de buen material, pero de pésima mano de obra, unidos a diseños anticuados y crudos, por lo cual sufren enormes fatigas estructurales en mares crecidos. En los Estados Unidos la producción de camaroneros se reduce al producto de cinco compañías principales, a razón de un promedio de unas cinco naves anuales por astillero. Son embarcaciones excelentes, con los últimos adelantos en equipos de pesca y navegación. Sinembargo, son naves costosas, debido al alto costo de la mano de obra y materias primas del país. Ya que poseemos la mayor parte de la madera en Bluefields, un personal técnico adiestrado y competente, y un diseño funcionalmente superior de embarcación, podremos suplir las necesidades para una flota de pesca nacional, así como también exportar dichas embarcaciones al mercado mundial. Nos basamos en cálculos preliminares, de poder producir una excelente nave, de menor costo que las naves norteamericanas, con una calidad que esperamos, sea superior.

El mercado nacional. El mercado inmediato para nuestros camaroneros son las flotas nacionales. La Booth Fisheries tiene mucho interes en procurar seis naves mas de inmediato. Proyecta una posible expansión de veinte naves más en los próximos dos o tres años. Tambien la posibilidad de arrendar o vender a plazos de pago dichas naves a capitanes locales, asi como tambien, estimular las inversiones de otros capitales nacionales. Estimamos un mercado nacional de unas veinticinco naves camaroneras en los próximos tres años. Las demandas del resto del Caribe, podrán estimarse conservadoramente en unas cuarenta naves, haciendo un total de setenta y cinco embarcaciones, que se compraría en Méjico y los Estados Unidos. Con nuestra producción de quince naves en ese período de tres años, es evidente que poseemos un mercado riquísimo aquí mismo en el Caribe sin contar con las demandas del Pacífico y otras áreas de intensa pesca.

En cuanto al varadero, estimamos que con nuestras modernas instalaciones podremos dar servicio a 400 naves anualmente. Compárese con los servicios del varadero de Schooner Key, que está dando servicios parciales a 4[illegible] naves anualmente.

En proyección, se estima que las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua llegaría a 80 naves en éste año. Añádase unas 40 embarcaciones costeras de todas índoles. Esto constituye un total de 120 embarcaciones que requieren los servicios de un varadero cuatro veces al año (tres varajes al año normales y uno de emergencia), o sea, un total de 480 varajes anuales. Los varaderos locales, podrán satisfacer unos cien varajes en conjunto. Esta situación ha forzado a un gran número de camaroneros tener que irse del país para reparar sus naves (a Honduras, Méjico, y hasta los Estados Unidos), con la consiguiente pérdida de tiempo de pesca y de divisas para Nicaragua.

Limitaciones de orden técnico. Serán las siguientes inicialmente: la ausencia de personal técnico local, y el tiempo de importación de la gran diversidad de piezas y material mecánico.

El diseño del astillero - varadero se ha hecho contemplando expansiones futuras al paso que progresen las demandas. Esta planificación se ha hecho tambien en torno a los dos talleres (carpintería y mecánica). El primer factor, la ausencia de personal adiestro en construcción de naves de acero se superará inicialmente con la utilización del personal maestro de la Compañía. Al asignarle dos o tres asistentes locales, estos podrán aprender prácticamente las especialidades requeridas. El segundo factor, solo podrá resolverse con una eficiente coordinación con el personal de distribución y suministros de la Compañía en Miami. Será posible tener cualquier pieza o material en el Bluff en no más de dos semanas después de pedida por las oficinas locales.(vía aérea). Se contempla además tener un gran surtido de piezas de repuestos en nuestros almacenes del astillero.

Competencia externa o interna. En cuanto al astillero, no existe competencia externa ni interna en el orden centroamericano. La única competencia que encontraremos será la mejicana, y la norteamericana. El estudio comparativo de ésta competencia sigue a continuación:

(a) Precios. Camaronero, (madera, 36 ton., sin motor).

Méjico	US$ 41,333.33	
Estados Unidos	US$ 45,000.00	
Nicaragua	US$ 40,000.00	(Proyectado)

(b) Calidad de materiales.

Méjico: Buen material; malos diseños y construcción general.

EEUU: Buenos materiales; excelentes diseños: construcción varía con la Compañía desde buena hasta excelente.

Nicaragua: Buen material: diseños y construcción excelentes.

Policy

(c) Canales y política de distribución: Aunque sin duda será dificil al afrontarse inicialmente en ventas con los mercados Mejicanos y Norteamericanos, debido a los altos aranceles de estos países, tenemos un mercado ilimitado en el resto del Caribe. Competimos favorablemente debido a la excelente posición de Nicaragua con respecto a los mercados Centroamericanos, Venezolanos, Colombianos, etc.

En cuanto al varadero, es de notar que comparativamente, los varaderos extranjeros son por mucho, menos costosos que los nacionales, a veces en un año. Tras un estudio de los precios típicos de cada varadero, llegamos a la conclusión que se puede dar mucho más servicio por un costo igual o menor. En los ejemplos que siguen, hemos asumido un varaje típico de tres días, limpieza, calafateo, enderezar eje, cambiar un número de tablas, asegurar el costillaje o cadastres, asegurar timón y asientos, y finalmente la pintura.

(a) Precios

Honduras	US$ 330.00	(sin enderezar el eje)
Méjico	US$ 350.00	
EE.UU.	US$ 375.00	
Schooner Key	US$1000.00	
INVERNICA	US$ 350.00	(Proyectada)

(b) Calidad de la mano de obra.

Honduras	buena	
Méjico	buena	
EE. UU.	excelente	
Schooner Key	regular .	
INVERNICA	excelente	(Proyectada)

Estimación de ventas. En la estimación del potencial de ventas, entran tres vías de utilidad: los del astillero; los del varadero, y los servicios de mecánica y electricidad a la comunidad del área en general.

(a) Precios (asumiendo estabilidad de precios en los próximos tres años). Astillero: US$ 40,000.00 por cada camaronero (sin motor); otras embarcaciones proporcionalmente cotizadas.

Varadero: precio de varaje normal, US$ 350.00. Cuando se presentan desperfectos mecánicos o piezas de repuestos, el precio será mayor.

(b) Cantidades.

Astillero: Dos camaroneros el primer año, seis el segundo y diez el

Tercer año; todos para venta nacional-

Varadero: 300 varajes de un posible total de 600 el primer año; 350 el segundo y 450 varajes el tercer año.

(c) Ingresos brutos. (aproximados).

	1er año	2ndo año	3er año
Astillero:	US$ 60,000.00	US$ 240,000.00	US$ 340,000.00
Varadero:	US$105,000.00	US$122,500.00	US$ 157,500.00
Misceláneos:	US$ 5,000.00	US$ 7,000.00	US$ 10,000.00

III. VIABILIDAD ECONOMICA DEL PROYECTO

Costo de Producción Unitaria para el primer año de producción. En el cálculo de costos, se toma en consideración la construcción de 4 camaroneras, servicios completos de reparación y mantenimiento en 300 varajes, y demás servicios misceláneos, con un total de 31,000 horas de trabajo (en unidad de turno diario).

Costos de Producción.

(a)° Materias Primas: Los materiales requeridos para la construcción y reparación de embarcaciones, son muy variados y muchas veces, especiales. A continuacion solo enumero los materiales principales con cotizaciones generales y aproximadas.

Maderas.	Laurel o pino amarillo	25,000	pies cuadrados.
	Caoba de 1era y 2nda.	20,000	" "
	Roble de 1era.	3,000	" "

Metales. Acero y acero-8 (S.A.E.) 40 toneladas.
Hierro colado y demás metales 10 ton.

Con un valor total de US$ 30,000.00

(b) Materiales:

Pinturas: Epoxy zinc, Silver, primoco, epoxy bases, latex, copper antifouling, barnices, etc.). Unos 1800 galones.

Ferretería en general: Tornillos y clavos de zinc, cobre, hierro, acero; arandelas; pasadores; tuberías metálicas, plásticas, [illegible]; insulación de polyf[illegible], styrofoam, cemento; láminas de vidrio y bakelite, etc.

Equipos diversos: Hélices (40" x 34"); ejes de acero inoxidables, winches CMC en linea, anclas, baterías, sistemas de iluminación ordinaria y navegacionales, tejidoy accesorios electricos, plantas electricas, bombas de achique, cocinas de petróleo, unidades de enfriamiento y refrigeración, fatómetros, equipos de radio-comunicación, etc.

Con un valor total de US$ 30,000.00

(c) Mano de obra. La empresa empleará, durante su primer año de producción, un jefe de mecánica y tornería, dos mecánicos especializados,

14-00000

dos asistentes de mecánica, un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de ribera y marina, y dos asistentes de carpintería.

Con un sueldo anual colectivo de US$ 13,000.00

Costos de Operación.

(a) Gastos de Administración: El Personal de Administración consistirá de, un administrador- contador público, un asistente oficinista y dos [illegible] encargados de servicios y mantenimiento. En conjunto cobrarán un sueldo anual de US$ 8,400.00 y demás, se reservará la cantidad anual de US$ 2,000.00.

Gastos Totales de Administración US$ 10,400.00

(b) Gastos de Ventas: Dada la naturaleza de la empresa, no es necesario incurrir en gastos de ventas, anuncios, etc... y por tanto asumimos un gasto nulo para esta sección. Costos fijos y variables. Todos los gastos anteriormente cotizados, pueden considerarse como gastos fijos, y solo se consideraran gastos variables, el 20% del material consumido por los talleres de mecánica, dada la variabilidad de las reparaciones mecánicas. El resto, está gobernado por un sistema sencillo de producción que produce necesariamente, los costos detallados de la construcción y reparación de las naves en consideración. Proyección de los Gastos de Producción para el Segundo y el Tercer Año de Operación. (Véase el Formato a continuación).

ESTADOS DE PERDIDAS Y GANANCIAS

A.	**INGRESOS TOTALES:**	**1er año**	**2ndo año**	**3er año**
	VENTAS ASTILLERO	$ 60,000.00	$ 230,000.00	$ 240,000.00
	VENTAS VARADERO	$ 105,500.00	$ 122,500.00	$ 157,500.00
	VENTAS MISCELANEAS	$ 5,000.00	$ 7,000.00	$ 12,000.00
	VENTAS NETAS	$ 1[illegible]5,500.00	$ 3[illegible]9,[illegible]00.00	$ 409,500.00
B.	**COSTO DE PRODUCCION:**	**1er año**	**2ndo año**	**3er año**
	MATERIAS PRIMAS	$ 30,000.00	$ 85,000.00	$ 90,000.00
	MATERIALES	$ 60,000.00	$ 90,000.00	$ 90,000.00
	MANO DE OBRA DIRECTA	$ 32,000.00	$ 40,000.00	$ 43,000.00
	DEPRECIACION (MAQ.20%)	$ 10,000.00	$ 10,000.00	$ 5,000.00
	REPARACION Y MANTENIMIENTOS	$ 2,000.00	$ 10,000.00	$ 10,000.00
	COMBUSTIBLES (ELECTRICIDAD)	$ 2,500.00	$ 2,500.00	$ 3,000.00
	SEGURO DE LA PLANTA	$ 1,000.00	$ 1,300.00	$ 1,300.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 127,500.00	$ 238,000.00	$ 242,300.00
C.	**GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION:**	**1er año**	**2ndo año**	**3er año**
	SUELDOS	$ 8,400.00	$ 9,000.00	$ 9,000.00
	GASTOS DE OFICINA	$ 2,000.00	$ 3,000.00	$ 3,000.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 10,400.00	$ 12,000.00	$ 12,000.00
D.	**GASTOS FINANCIEROS**	**1er año**	**2ndo año**	**3er año**
	DEL CAPITAL	$ 15,000.00	$ 15,000.00	$ 15,000.00
	DEL INTERES	$ 4,800.00	$ 3,800.00	$ 2,700.00
	SUB-TOTAL	$ 19,800.00	$ 18,800.00	$ 17,700.00
E.	**TOTAL GASTOS**	$ 157,400.00	$ 2[illegible]9,700.00	$ 272,000.00
F.	**UTILIDAD NETA**	$ 32,[illegible].00	$ [illegible]8,800.00	$ 137,[illegible]00.00

IV. JUSTIFICACION SOCIO - ECONOMICA

Empleo. En el primer año de producción, el personal de la empresa será de diez y seis hombres, distribuidos en la forma siguiente:

Personal de Administración: cuatro empleados (un administrador y contador público) un asistente de oficina, y dos encargados de servicios y mantenimiento).

Personal de Carpintería: siete empleados (un jefe de carpintería, tres carpinteros de rivera y marina, dos asistentes de carpintería).

Personal de Mecánica: cinco empleados (un jefe de mecánica y tornería, dos mecánicos especializados, y dos asistentes de mecánica).

Todos los empleados de la ~~empresa~~, recibirán inicialmente sueldos basados en sus conocimientos técnicos, años de experiencia, etc. Dicha escala de pagos será superior a las normales, para atraer a la empresa, el mejor personal posible. Se contempla además un plan de aumentos de sueldos fijos y meritorios, para estímulo de los esfuerzos de superación de los empleados.

Se espera aumentar el número del personal a veinte para el segundo año de producción, y a veintidos para el tercer año. Efectos en la Balanza de Pagos. Las flotas camaroneras en Nicaragua han aumentado sus efectivos por unas diez a quince embarcaciones anualmente. Dichas embarcaciones son compradas en su totalidad, en Méjico y los Estados Unidos. Sus valores conjuntos en un periodo de tres años ascienden a un mínimo de US$ 900,000.00 a un máximo de US$ 2,026,000.00. Nuestra producción durante éste periodo, será de catorce camaroneros con un valor de US$ 840,000.00 que representan divisas que permanecen en el país.

Beneficios al Consumidor y al Desarrollo Economico. Presentemente, la mayoria de los camaroneros en el área, no tienen facilidades para servicios de reparación mecánica, y en la mayoria de los casos, ni aun facilidades de varaje. Esto es debido en parte, al poco calado de las vias férreas de los varaderos locales, asi como también, lo anticuado que resultan sus equipos. Debido a éstas dificultades, muchos camaroneros tienen que remontarse a Honduras, Méjico y a veces hasta los Estados Unidos para efectuar reparaciones de averias normales o accidentales. Es dificil estimar con certeza las pérdidas totales a que incurren dichas embarcaciones, entre los trámites legales de entradas, y salidas a otros paises, los gastos de combustible y personal, y de mayor importancia, las pérdidas enormes que representa el tiempo perdido de pesca. Puesto que nuestros varaderos poseeran mayor capacidad que el requerido normalmente, esto representará una garantia de servicio a aquellas embarcaciones con averias de emergencia. etc. De éste modo, capturaremos aquellas embarcaciones que ordinariamente tienen que abandonar el pais para efectuar sus reparaciones, con las consiguientes repercusiones de divisas y tiempo valioso de pesca en aguas nicaraguenses.

Protección y Estimulo: Dada las caracteristicas de industria fundamental (Vease Ley #135, del 30 de Marzo de 1958), un astillero requerirá ayuda gubernamental durante sus primeros años de desarrollo, para asegurar las tan necesarias reinversiones requeridas por una empresa de tal complejidad y magnitud. Presentemente, se están haciendo en Managua, las gestiones necesarias para darle a ésta empresa el reconocimiento legal de industria fundamental, con todo auxilio gubernamental.

V. Análisis Tecnológico

Características tecnológicas de los productos a elaborar. Ya está en diseño el primer modelo de camaronero de 36 toneladas (en madera). Igualmente hay otro diseño en acero, de 30 toneladas. Las especificaciones generales para la nave de acero son las siguientes: Tonelaje: 30 toneladas; eslora: 52'; manga: 20'; calado: 8'; quilla: barra/acero-3, 3/4" x 3"; travesaños: plancha/acero; cubierta 3/16" planchas/acero. Pinturas: Rust & Burns, Bond Primer, Anticorrosivo y antifouling, un total de seis capas. Frigoríficos: capacidad 30 ton, en hielo-camarón., construcción de styrofoam- concreto. Planta motriz Caterpillar D 343 con supercargador. Hélices 46" x 34" de tres paletas Michigan. Eje de transmisión 3" x 14' de acero inoxidable. Winch CMC en línea. Ocho baterías de ocho voltios con cargador de baterías. Fogón de cocina de petróleo. Luces de navegación y sistemas de reflectores. Radioteléfono RCA Cruisephone 100. Compás magnético Ritchie modelo B455. Fatómetro Raytheon modelo DE-721. Tanques de petróleo especiales al casco, con capacidad para 6,000 galones de petróleo. Un tanque para agua potable de 780 galones, etc.

Proceso de Producción

Los procesos de construcción de embarcaciones y los servicios requeridos por dichas naves son por necesidad complejos, aunque con metodología llegan a simplificarse enormemente. A continuación, se da una descripción breve de los procesos a seguir en el astillero, y en el varadero. La construcción de una nave comienza con la colocación de la quilla sobre la plataforma de moldes. Luego se va colocando el costillaje, que ya debe tener su curvatura preformada en las cámaras de torsión a vapor. Se fijan las traviesas y codastes, seguido a lo cual se cortan los excesos del costillaje. Empezando desde la quilla hacia arriba se van colocando el entablado del casco de modo que cada pieza posea un ajuste perfecto y parejo (al echar el casco al agua, la madera sufre una expansión precalculada que sella por completo el casco sin necesidad de calafatear). Se barrenan el encause del eje y se fijan los soportes del timón y su camisa. Se colocan los tanques de combustible, agua potable y la bodega de refrigeración. Se tira el entablado de la cubierta y la caseta de la tripulación. Se colocan los refuerzos de acero a la proa, popa y cuarto de máquinas. Ya en ésta etapa comienzan las instalaciones secundarias como son, la pintura, tendido electrico, plomería, colocar equipos y mástiles, plumas con su winch, colocar la planta motriz y echar la nave al agua. Ya en el agua, se llevan a cabo los trabajos finales.

Para una embarcación de acero, el proceso es mucho más sencillo, y por consiguiente de menos costo.

El proceso normal de servicio de varaje a una embarcación es lo siguiente: La cuna (ver diagrama No. 1 y No. 3), espera a la embarcación a la entrada de la rampa. Usando las boyas de maniobra, la nave penetra sobre la cuna y queda presa por las traviesas que la tripulación sube desde la nave. El winch No. 1 sube la cuna sobre la rampa lateral y de allí la asigna a su sección correspondiente. Ya en la sección, se raspa inmediatamente con cepillos electricos portátiles y agua á presión. Mientras el casco se seca, se le inspecciona minuciosamente para advertir alguna señal de penetración por gusanos en la madera.

Se comienzan los trabajos de calafateo y el asegurar el casco en general. Le sigue, las primeras capas de pintura de protección. Mientras tanto, los trabajos necesarios de mecánica se están efectuando en el interior. Al darle las últimas capas de pintura al fondo, se efectúa la inspección final, y al secar la última capa se echa al agua. La operación completa no dura más de dos o tres días en un dique moderno, y conllevo los trabajos coordinados de dos carpinteros, un mecánico, y dos asistentes de patio, así como también el usual surtido de piezas de reparación y repuesto.

Instalaciones

Como se puede observar en el diagrama No. 1, el terreno ocupado por el astillero es relativamente pequeño: de unos 18,800 metros cuadrados. Consiste en una rampa de concreto-reforzado, con vía férrea de 4", y posee una extensión de 150 metros de largo por 20 metros de ancho, y en su parte más profunda desciende a una profundidad de siete metros. El patio central consiste en: una cama-lateral (26 x 17 x 1 ms.) que rueda sobre la cámara de concreto (117 x 25 x 1 ms.); tres secciones de cama (42 x 20 ms) la tercera terminando en la nave de trabajos de astillería (22 x 32 x 11 ms). Dos edificios identicos estan destinados para los talleres de carpintería, mecánica, oficinas y almacenes, con un área de trabajo de 1200 metros cuadrados. Un edificio para la instalación de las dos plantas electricas de 75 kilowatts cada una, piezas de repuesto y equipos de electricidad en general (un tanque de 350 galones de petroleo estará soterrado al lado del edificio para proveer las plantas de combustible). Un tanque de agua dulce (4000 galones) con su pozo y turbinas, completan las instalaciones de la primera fase del proyecto. La segunda fase se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de producción.

Costo por cada sección: (aproximado):

Muro de retención y relleno del pantano	$	1,300.00
Rampa	$	4,000.00
Patio central	$	10,000.00
Cámula de la cuna lateral	$	5,000.00
Edificios de talleres/almacenes/oficinas	$	12,000.00
Edificio del taller de astillería	$	3,000.00
Edificio de las plantas electricas	$	2,000.00
Cuna lateral	$	4,000.00
Tres cunas de varadero	$	12,000.00
Tanque de agua con pozo	$	800.00
Tendido electrico, drenaje, plomería, etc.	$	1,000.00
TOTAL--- ---------	$	55,000.00

Dictámen y juicio acerca de la localización de la planta. Fué evidente desde el primer momento, que la localización de un astillero-varadero en la Costa Atlantica de Nicaragua, tenía que residir en el área del puerto del Bluff- Bluefields, o en Río Escondido. Las razones eran las siguientes:

(a) GEOECONOMICA

Es el único puerto con comunicación fluvial y de carretera con el interior del país, con las consiguientes facilidades de movimiento para la compra de piezas de repuesto y materiales de construcción.

(b) Es el único puerto con fondeo guarecido (compárese con lo expuesto que se encuentra Puerto Cabezas al mar abierto).

(c) Es centro de compra de la pesca (Booth y Pescanica). Entre las dos Compañías atraen un gran número de embarcaciones y crean una demanda local para facilidades de varajo.

(d) Es un centro de abastecimientos de combustible, víveres, piezas, y demás artículos.

(e) Pleno reconocimiento de los potenciales del área por la INVENAUTICA. Sin duda, de aún mayor beneficio, hubiese sido un puerto con gran calado de fondo y acceso. Presentemente, la barra de arena del Bluff, limita la entrada a dicho puerto a embarcaciones con un calado de 13 pies o menos (un máximo de 800 tons.). Esto limita enormemente el tráfico comercial en Bluefields. Posiblemente, en un futuro no muy remoto, se drague dicha barra, y para entonces, nosotros estaremos lo suficientemente desarrollados para dar servicios en diques flotantes a naves de gran tonelaje, haciendo así, del Puerto de Bluefields, un puerto de primera magnitud mercantil.

Posibilidades previstas de Expansiones Futuras:

Se prevee, en éste estudio preliminar, la construcción de una nave adicional de 80 x 35 x 7 metros, para servir de taller general a tres gradas de astilleros simultaneamente. Igualmente, la construcción de un muelle de concreto para aquellas tareas que no requieran varaje. El muelle irá equipado con una grua móvil, y servicios de electricidad y agua potable. Tentativamente, éste plan (Fase II) se llevará a cabo durante el segundo año de operaciones. (Vease el diagrama No. 1).

VI, ANALISIS FINANCIARIO

Monto estimado de la inversión total del proyecto:

El estimado del monto total del proyecto es de doscientos treinta y siete mil dólares (US$ 237,000.00). Sus rubros específicos están presentados en el formato No. 3 al final de este capítulo. El monto del préstamo solicitado al INFONAC, y su utilización se da a continuación en forma general por rubros.

Equipo de Construcción:

Dos camiones de volteo de 2 1/2 toneladas cada uno. Carretillas para concreto, elementos de vibradores de concreto (nosotros poseemos dos compresores), cubo de concreto para la grua, tubería de lanzeta para echar concreto bajo del agua, tremies y sus tuberias de hierro, etc.

chute [illegible] for tremie-concrete

, tremie-pipes, etc

Valor total(aprox.) de US$ 25,000.00

Materiales de Construcción:

[illegible],000 Sacos de cemento Lone-Star
[illegible] toneladas de cabillaje de 1/2" y 3/4" corrugado, con su alambre de [illegible].
1[illegible],000 pies cuadrados de tejado de zinc.
[illegible],000 pies cuadrados de madera de construcción.
[illegible] toneladas de vía férrea de 4".
64 carriles de ferrocarril (1 1/2'a 2 1/2' diámetro).
Accesorios de vía, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 40,000.00

Equipos Taller Carpintería:

Sierra de mesa (2' x 10').
Sierras de mano, bisagras de presión, dos taladros electricos de 2", dos lijadoras electricas, lijadora y procesadora de mesa, cajas de torsión, dos juegos completos de herramientas y equipos portátiles electricos, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 8,000.00

Equipos Taller Mecánico:

Inversión (adicional) INVENICA de US$ 2[illegible],000.00, y US$ 3,000.00 por INFONAC.

Torno para ejes (cama 24' tambore [illegible]').
Torno de precisión Southbend (cama [illegible]' tambore 1[illegible]').
Taladro Buffalo Forma de 2" con accesorios
Sinfín Walter Turner modelo No. 3310
Cuatro prensas hidraulicas manuales de 20 tons. cada una.
Esmeriles electricos.
Fresadora mediana.
Prensa de apertura de 12".
Sistemas de diferenciales (1 ton)
Tres juegos de tarrajas completas, juegos de copas, con manerales, extensiones, llaves de torsión, llaves de combinación, yunques de capacidad, etc.
Dos lotes completos de herramientas con sus gabinetes, torciometros, calibradores, cortadoras, pulidoras, auto. de válvulas, juegos de troqueles, una unidad de analisis de motores, etc.
Valor Total (aprox.) de US$ 36,800.00

Características del Capital Social:

El capital de financiamiento de la INVENICA tiene dos fuentes,: los múltiples equipos y materiales que ya posee dentro de Nicaragua, con un valor total de más de US$ 130,000.00, y segundo, el capital social de la empresa, suma que asciende a US$ 50,000.00.

Garantías:

A continuación, se presenta la lista general de los equipos de la INVENICA que se utilizaría en el proyecto. Dichos equipos son en su mayoría equipos nuevos y en pleno estado operacional, es decir, que la INVENICA posee el personal técnico necesario para sus operaciones y mantenimiento. A pesar que en su mayoría dichos equipos son nuevos, el monto total de sus valores conlleva la usual depreciación del 25% del precio que pagó la INVENICA por dichos equipos en los Estados Unidos en maquinarias por seis meses de uso. No se incluye costos adicionales de flete marítimo, aduana, etc. Ya que carezco de listas de cotización los precios son aproximados.

Equipo de Construcción.

1 BULLDOZER CATERPILLAR D-7
1 Autoniveladora CATERPILLAR No. 112
1 Grua Little Giant de cap. 15 ton
2 Plantas Electricas CATERPILLAR D333 de 75 Kilowatts cada una
2 Plantas HOMELITE
1 L. C. M. de 30 ton. con todos sus equipos
1 Patana de carga de 40 ton
1 Concretera KWIK-MIX modelo 6S
1 Camioneta WILLYS 1964
1 Jeep WILLYS 1964
1 Trailer de tres toneladas.
1 Compresor con equipos CATERPILLAR de 60 H. P.
1 Compresor con equipos chico con motor Wisconsin de 9 H.P.
2 Turbinas GOULDS de 2" y 2 1/2" de diametro con sus motores.
1 Turbina SEARS de 1" con motor
20 Lotes de herramientas de construcción (picos, palas, cavadoras, etc.
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 90,000.00 con 35% depreciación.

Equipos con Mecánica:

Tres lotes completos de herramientas.
1 torno GRANVILLE (cama 3' x 10")
1 soldadora de aluminio electrica LINDE tipo V - 300S
1 soldadora electrica HOBART modelo APB 300
2 equipos completos de soldaduras de oxi-acetileno.
1 taladro de mesa de 3/4" CRAFTSMAN.
1 Sinfin para aluminio CRAFTSMAN
6 taladros electricos de 1 1/2"
4 taladros electricos de 3/4".
2 cepilladoras y pulidoras electricas.
2 sierras finas electricas de mano
Equipos miscelaneos
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 6,300.00

Materiales Diversos:

8,000 pies de tendido electrico de alto voltaje.
3,500 pies de tendido electrico de 600 voltios.
2,500 planchas de hierro de 1 1/2" x 10'
2 cargadores electricos de 12 y 24 voltios.
3 transformadores electricos.
15 cajas de piezas de repuesto para nuestros motores CATERPILLAR, G. M. y WILLYS.
Tuberías de hierro, cobre, zinc; pintura, lonetas, accesorios de plomería, baterías de 12 voltios, tanques de agua de 1500, 1000, 250, 100 y 50 galones, inyectadores, etc.
Con un valor total (aprox.) de US$ 15,000.

PLAN GLOBAL DE INVERSION

	RENGLONES DE INVERSION	INVERNICA	INFONAC	TOTAL SECCIONAL
A.	GASTOS DE INSTALACION:			
	a. Equipos de Construcción	$ 90,000	$ 25,000	$ 115,000
	b. Materiales de Construcción.-	$ 15,000	$ 40,000	$ 55,000
	c. Equipos Taller Mecánico	$ 31,800	$ 5,000	$ 36,800
	d. Equipos Taller Carpintería.-	$ ------	$ 5,000	$ 5,000
B.	GASTOS DE ORGANIZACION:	$ 800	$ ------	$ 800
C.	CAPITAL DE TRABAJO:	$ 15,000	$ ------	$ 15,000
D.	IMPREVISTOS:	$ 10,000	$ ------	$ 10,000
	TOTAL	$162,000 (68.4%)	$ 75,000 (31.6%)	$ 237,000

NOTA:

Los terrenos serán arrendados a la [illegible] por una suma mensual que se acordará una vez colocado los créditos.

FUENTES Y USOS DE FONDOS

	PERIODO INSTALACION	PERIODO OPERACIONAL 1er	2do	3er
A. FUENTES				
1.- Capital Propio	$ 162,000	------	------	------
2.- Finac. a mediano plazo	75,000	------	------	------
3.- Ventas	------	$180,000	$366,000	$408,500
4.- Saldo del año anterior	------	$140,000	$172,600	$221,900
TOTAL FUENTES	$237,000	$320,000	$541,600	$631,400
B. USOS				
5.- Inversion fija				
a. Edificios etc.	$ 56,000	$------	$------	$------
b. Maquinaria	$ 41,500	$------	$------	$------
6.- Costo de Producción.-	$------	$127,500	$339,100	$242,300
7.- Gastos de administración.-	$ 200	$ 10,400	$ 12,000	$ 12,000
TOTAL USOS	$ 97,700	$137,900	$351,100	$254,300
FONDOS DISPONIBLES (A-B):	$140,000	$182,100	$190,500	$377,100
a. Amortización del préstamo	$------	$ 18,500	$ 18,600	$ 27,700
b. Reinversiones	$------	$------	$ 50,000	$------
c. Dividendos	$------	$------	$------	$ 80,000
SALDO PARA EL AÑO SIGUIENTE:	$140,000	$173,600	$221,900	$269,400

NOTA:

Este capital representa el valor de los equipos de construcción, el capital de trabajo y el capital para imprevistos, y por tanto, es una cifra máxima. No es necesariamente cierto que éste capital permanezca intacto, pero sí estimamos que no sea menor de los US$ 118,000.00.-

POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- ASTILLERO



POTENCIAL DE PRODUCCION- VARADERO



NOTA DEL APENDICE:

El reestudio de las necesidades del astillero, de las extensas (e intensas) reparaciones que requieren las flotas, y del enorme volumen del mantenimiento, reveló el enorme peso que tendrá que sobrellevar los talleres de mecánica y carpintería.

Dado el capital que dispone INVEMNICA en estos momentos, solo puede disponer de US$ 25,000.00 para dichos talleres (más US$ 6,500 en equipos que ya poseemos) para dichos talleres, ya que en ésta etapa, el enfasis está en la construcción y una producción inmediata. [illegible], sin embargo, que una inversión adicional en los talleres, son de vital importancia para una producción eficiente y de menor costo. El astillero, por naturaleza, demanda en una producción en serie, varios equipos sofisticados, un notable volumen de piezas de repuesto y capital auxiliar.

Podemos optar por comprar dichos equipos con las ganancias del primer año. Pero creo conveniente, que esta suma adicional se le incorpore al plan de préstamos iniciales, solicitados por la empresa.

L.[illegible].D.P./sl


PATIO DE MATERIALES
PLANTAS ELECTRICAS
ALMACENES
TALLER C
OFICINA
TALLER A
ASTILLERO 1
AREA DE ASTILLERO (PROYECTADA)
SECC. 6
SECC. 5
SECC. 4
SECC. 3
SECC. 2
SECC. 1
RAMPA 1
RAMPA NO. 2
FASE II
FASE I
MUELLE DE TRABAJO

DIAGRAMA NO. 1

VISTA GENERAL


TALLERES Y OFICINA
ASTILLERO NO. 1
DIAGRAMA NO. 2
EDIFICIOS PRINCIPALES



ESPECIFICACIONES :

PESO NETO : 18 TONELADAS
CAPACIDAD : 82 TONELADAS
ESLORA : 20 METROS
MANGA : 10 METROS
TIEMPO DE MANIOBRA : ~ 15'

ESCALA

0 5 METROS

DIAGRAMA NO 3
CUNA PARA CAMARONEROS

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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TYPIC AMWORLD AMTABBY

1. FOLLOWING FROM AMTABBY-27 WHO AT 2130 HOURS 14 JULY 65 VISITED MRR OFFICES AND DISCOVERED ARTIME GIVING CLASSES ON "HUMAN RIGHTS," AND ANTONIO IGLESIAS ON STREET FIGHTING TO GROUP ABOUT 20 MEMBERS. INCLUDED IN GROUP WERE FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET, EDGAR SOPO BARRETO (ARTIME'S AIDE), QUINTANA (MIL SEC) (POSSIBLY RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA) GOILIOT (PROBABLY MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA) (FORMER MEMBER ALPHA 66) [illegible]; NILO MESA (POSSIBLY NILO MESSER PUJOL).

2. ARTIME NOW DESCRIBED AS QUITE PLUMP, CHAIN SMOKER, VERY NERVOUS AND NEVER STRAYS FAR FROM PERSONAL BODY GUARD "GALLEGO" SAENZ. ARTIME WHO ON FRIENDLY TERMS A-27, GREETED WARMLY, ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO KUBARK ASSIGNMENT WHICH PLANNED FOLLOWING A-27 LEAVING MRR. A-27 INFORMED ARTIME HAD TURNED DOWN KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AS INVOLVED ACTIVITIES NOT DIRECTED AGAINST PBRUMEN. ARTIME STATED HE LEAVING FOR ERUOPE ON 16 JULY FOR TWO WEEK TRIP; SIXTO "TITO" MESA ALOMA WHO DESCRIBED AS ARTIME'S "MONEY MAN" IN ERUOPE AS OF 14 JULY.

3. ARTIME HAS PURCHASED PICK-UP TRUCK FROM DUMAS MILNER, LOCAL AREA CHEVY DEALER, AND ALLEGED ACTING VERY CLANDESTINELY RE ACTIVITIES,

SECRET IN 13378 Pg 2

ARTIME VISITS MRR OFFICES ONLY AT NIGHT. CHANGES RESIDENCES EVERY OTHER DAY OR SO. THESE ACTIONS PREDICATED ARTIME CONCERN THAT "SOMEONE OUT TO KILL HIM" AND FEAR ATTACK FROM SOME EXILES WHO CONSIDER HIM LIABILITY. HAS "RECRUITED" TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO PREVIOUSLY IN MRR CAMPS NICARAGUA, AND RECENTLY PAID EACH 350 DOLLARS REPRESENTING FIRST MONTH'S PAY. ALSO TOOK THESE TWO TO WAREHOUSE WHERE GREAT AMOUNT CRATES WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MILITARY EQUIPMENT; MEN SAW NO WEAPONS. ARTIME CLAIMED EXPECTED ADDITIONAL SHIPMENT MATERIEL SHORTLY AND WANTED THESE TWO PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR SHIPMENT TO MONKEY POINT, NICARAGUA, THEN PROCEED TO MONKEY POINT ASSIST REOPENING CAMP. ARTIME TOLD TWO MEN HAS SUPPORT (UNIDENTIFIED) HIGH ODYOKE OFFICIAL WHO TOLD ARTIME CARRY OUT THREE OR FOUR OPERATIONS. IF OPERATIONS SUCCESSFUL, ARTIME ALLEGED, HE TOLD HE WOULD RECEIVE FULL SUPPORT AS PREVIOUSLY, BUT ONLY IF "HE PRODUCES." ARTIME INFORMED TWO MEN THAT "WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN SECOND CHANCE; WILL NOT FAIL THIS TIME."

SECRET

CFN.4049 AMTAEBY-27 2130 14 65 MRR ARTIME ANTONIO IGLESIAS 20
FREDDIE BORGES CAIGNET EDGAR SOPO BARRETO QUINTANA RAFAEL
RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA GILIOT MANUEL GUILLOT DE LA SERNA ALPHASAYY
NILO MESO NILO MESSER PUJOL GALLEGO SAENZ A-27 A-27 MRR A-27
EUROPE 16 SIXTO TITO MESA ALOMA 14 DUMAS MILNER CHEVY MRR NICARAGUA

SECRET

IN 13378 /82

350 DILLARS NO WEAPONS MONKEY POINT NICARAGUA ODYOKE NOT FAIL

BT

SECRET

WH/C 65-303
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Frankfurt to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $12,000 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/Exec
1 - WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

14-00000

61

SECRET

WH/C 65-402
19 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT : Deposit to INNOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $12,000 to the INNOVEN account of AMBIDDY-1.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attached:
Voucher

cc: WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (19 Jul 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
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DATE : 19 July 65

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24 SECRET

ROUTING
1 EA- 5 CA
2 6 C
3 MO 7 D
4 8 Z

19 JUL 65 22 43

TO : JMWAVE MANAGUA SAN JOSE PANAMA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WHK 8 INFO: VR . FILE, ☐ RID COPY WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA FI, FI/INT 2

~~SIG CEN~~

TO WAVE INFO MANA SJOS PACY CITE DIR 22330

TYPIC AMBIDDY AMTABBY

REF: WAVE 4049 (IN 13378) (NOT SENT SJOS PACY)

1. KINDLY IDENTIFY TWO INDIVIDUALS SOURCE/PARA 3 REF. ANY OTHER EVIDENCE CRATES IN WAREHOUSE CONTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT? PLEASE DO NOT INDICATE UNDUE INTEREST THIS MATTER TO AMBIDDY-1 PEOPLE. S.C

2. FYI, SO FAR AS HQS KNOWS AMBIDDY-1 IS WELL AWARE AMTABBY-27 WORKS FOR WAVE; SIXTO MESA HAS BEEN EUROPE SINCE 16 MAY ON VACATION AND PERSONAL BUSINESS; A-1 LEFT 16 JULY FOR NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA AND PANAMA FOR TWO WEEKS VACATION WITH SOME MEETINGS OFFICIALS ALL COUNTRIES; MRR HAS BEEN RUNNING RURAL CIVIC ACTION TRAINING AT NIGHT BECAUSE MEMBERS WORK DAYTIME; PURCHASED TRUCK TO SUPPORT TRAINING BY DEVELOPING SMALL MODEL FARM; A-1 PLANS VISIT MONKEY POINT TO ASSESS FOR POSSIBLE RURAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM IN RICE COOPERATIVES HE DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT SCHICK, ALSO POSSIBLE FISHING COOPERATIVE AT BLUEFIELDS; A-1 SAID HAD RECEIVED INVITATION VISIT PRESIDENT ORLICH AND DONMIN ODUBER; A-1 PLANS VISIT RURAL COOPERATIVE CENTER IN VERAGUAS PROVINCE HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO PARITICPATE BY BISHOP MC GRATH AND MR. GEORGE LODGE OF HARVARD, THEN TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT ROBLES.

3. A-1 CASE OFFICER, JAMES D. ZABOTH, PLANS MEET HIM MIAMI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

PAGE 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 28980

AREA ABOUT 1 AUG. WILL DEBRIEF AND ADVISE ALL STATIONS CONCERNED HIS ACTIVITIES. WILL CONTACT WAVE BY PHONE ON ARRIVAL. WILL LOOK INTO MATTER OF POSSIBLE MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO WAREHOUSE DURING VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2
WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO

by Joseph O. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION DC/WH/C5

INFO FILE, VR, SUSPENSE DC/WH/C, C/S[illegible] [illegible], DDP, ADDP, CSRF, C/CA2, C/CA/O2, C/CI, C/FI2, C/WH6, [illegible], C/WE5, C/CI/PS

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S E C R E T 220025Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAVA CITE WAVE 4156

KAPO[illegible] [illegible]WORLD AMKNOB

DESENSITIZED

NIGHT ACTION

22 JUL 65 16311

REF DIR 28960 *

1. AMKNOB-1[1] LEARNED FROM ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET OF AMYUM[2] GROUP THAT AMBIDDY-1[3] AND WIFE VISITED NICARAGUA WEEK 11 JULY AND MIGHT RETURN MIAMI SOON. AMBIDDY-1[3] PLANS TRAVEL CENTRAL AMERICA IN ORDER MAINTAIN CONTACT THOSE GOVERNMENTS. ONLY AMYUM[2] BASE LEFT IS IN NICARAGUA WHERE ABOUT 50 TRUSTED MEN REMAIN. GROUP HAS ARMS AND EQUIPMENT CACHED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. ACCORDING BORGES, ODYOKE[4] ASSISTANCE AMYUM[2] REDUCED "SEVERAL THOUSAND DOLLARS MONTHLY FROM HUNDREDS THOUSANDS MONTHLY." CURRENT SUBSIDY FOR PSYCH OPS, MAINTENANCE TWO PT BOATS, AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

3. BORGES SAID THAT ALTHOUGH ODYOKE[4] HAS FORBIDDEN FURTHER BELLIGERENT OPS, AMBIDDY-1[3] PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPS AGAINST PBRUMEN[5], ESPECIALLY BLOWING UP OF SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED PBRUMEN[5] TRADE. THIS BEING DONE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE ODYOKE[4]. AT SAME TIME AIR ATTACK BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET IN 11311 PA-2

ACCORDING BORGES, AMYUM[2] HAS ACCESS TWO NON-AMYUM PLANES MIAMI AIRPORT UNKNOWN TO ODYOKE[4] SINCE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (AMKNOB[1] SAID PILOT OF ONE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) AMYUM[2] GROUP GETTING FUNDS FROM NON-PBPRIME[6] SOURCE. (AMKNOB[1] SAID SOURCE MAY BE JESUITS SINCE AMBIDDY-1[3] HAS CLOSE CONTACTS CATHOLIC CHURCH AND RECENTLY VISITED ROME.)

4. AMBIDDY-1[3] ALLEGEDLY SAID ODYOKE[4] HAS DEFINITE PLANS WHICH WILL BE DECISIVE WHEN PLACED IN EFFECT BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN. AMKNOB-1[1] STATES BORGES CLAIMS KUBARK VERY BUSY INFILTRATING ARMS AND EXILES INTO PBRUMEN[5] SINCE SOME FORMER AMYUM[2] MEMBERS USED BY KUBARK THIS PURPOSE.

5. WAVE ATTEMPTING OBTAIN MORE INFO PLANS AMBIDDY[3] AND AMYUM[2] AND WILL FORWARD SOONEST.

6. WAVE PLANS NOT RPT NOT HAVE AMKNOB-1[1] PASS ABOVE INFO CUIS.

SECRET

CFN 1156 28980 AMKNOB-1 ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET AMYUM AMBIDDY-1 NICARAGUA 11 JULY MIAMI CENTRAL AMERICA 50 PT SPANISH BRITISH SOVIET CUBA 25 26 JULY FRANK FIORINI ROME NOT HAVE CUIS

SECRET

BT

CS Comment: *AMBIDDY-1 (3) plans to visit Monkey Point to assess for possible rural civic action program.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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34 SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/CA, S:06, FI

S E C R E T 220025Z

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 4157 22 JUL 65 IN 16327

TYPIC AMWORLD AMOT

1. DURING WEEK 4 - 10 JULY 65 ROGELIO JHONES AND LUIS H. VIDANA (PLS PROTECT) TOLD AMOT-120 FOLLOWING:

2. AMBIDDY-1 HAS TRANSPORTED STEEL BARGE LOADED WITH EQUIPMENT TO PORT EVERGLADES, FLORIDA. CARGO BELONGED DISMANTLED BASE NICARAGUA. AMBIDDY-1, USING KING (FNU) AS MEDIATOR, OFFERED TEOFILO BABUN OF ANTILLEAN MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION BARGE FOR $25,000, WHICH 80 BY 27 FEET AND IN VERY GOOD CONDITION. BABUN DID NOT AGREE ON PRICE FOR BARGE BUT MADE OFFER FOR PURCHASE BOTH BARGE AND OTHER EQUIPMENT OF INTEREST HIM.

3. KING OFFERING SELL CONSIDERABLE RADIO EQUIPMENT, SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS, RAFTS AND BOATS, WINCHES, ELECTRIC GENERATORS, ALL OF WHICH KEPT IN TWO WAREHOUSES IN WAVE AREA.

4. ACCORDING PEDRO ACEVO, FORMER HEAD AMYUM'S BASE NICARAGUA, AMBIDDY-1 PLANNING SELL ALL EQUIPMENT THAT WAS USED IN NICARAGUA FOR HIS OWN PROFIT. WIFE OF AMBIDDY-1, IN TALKING WITH CLOSE FRIENDS, SAID HER HUSBAND THINKS HE WILL BE ABLE SELL ALL EQUIPMENT FOR $200,000, WHICH SUM ADDED TO THEIR SAVINGS OF $300,000 WILL MAKE

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET IN 16327 PAGE 2

ITEM HOLDERS OF $500,000. SHE SAID THIS MONEY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COPE WITH FUTURE EMERGENCIES.

5. ACEVO SAID HE KNOWS SOME OF AMBIDDY-1'S TRICKY WAYS HANDLING AMYUM FUNDS. AMONG THEM WAS ONE IN WHICH ACEVO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING BEEN PAID $30 FOR SPECIAL EXPENSES. ACEVO CLAIMED HE NEVER RECEIVED ANYTHING MORE THAN HIS $400 MONTHLY SALARY. OTHER OF ACEVO'S FRIENDS ALSO APPEARED ON PAYROLL AS HAVING RECEIVED $30 DAILY, BUT THIS ALSO UNTRUE.

6. ACCORDING AMOT-120, VIDANA SAID THAT AMBIDDY-1 BLAMES KUBARK FOR HAVING BROKEN INTO HIS HOME RECENTLY. VIDANA, HOWEVER, SAID HE KNOWS IT WAS "COJO MORIN" WHO ROBBED AMBIDDY-1.

SECRET

CFN 4157 4 10 JULY 65 ROGELIO JHONES LUIS K. VIDANA AMOT-120 AMBIDDY-1 PORT EVERGLADES FLORIDA NICARAGUA KING (FNU) TEOFILO BABUN ANTILLEAN $25,000 80 BY 27 FEET NOT AGREE PEDRO ACEVO $200,000 $300,000 $500,000 $30 $400 $30 AMOT-120 VIDANA "COJO MORIN"

SECRET

RT

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT 095

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**

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BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
WAVE-4156 (IN-16311)
NP (AYKNOB-1)
Liaison *

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/CENTRAL AMERICA

TDCSDB-315/02467-65

DATE OF INFO. EARLY JULY 1965

DISTR. 22 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

ALLEGED PLANS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA TO BLOW UP A SHIP INVOLVED IN TRADE WITH CUBA; PLANNED AIR ATTACK AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY 1965

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (22 JULY 1965)

REF IN-16311

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: SELF-EMPLOYED FOREIGN NATIONAL WHO RESIDED IN CUBA FOR MANY YEARS PRIOR TO AND AFTER CASTRO'S ADVENT. HE RETAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN FRIENDS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED. SOURCE CLAIMS HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, AN MRR MEMBER.

1. ACCORDING TO ALFREDO BORGES CAIGNET, A MEMBER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, MRR LEADER, AND HIS WIFE VISITED NICARAGUA THE WEEK OF 11 JULY 1965 AND HE WAS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO CENTRAL AMERICA AGAIN IN ORDER TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-JULY ARTIME INDICATED THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO NICARAGUA IN ORDER TO VISIT THE FORMER MRR TRAINING CAMPS AND TO LOOK INTO THE CURRENT STATUS OF A SMALL INDIAN-EDUCATION TRAINING PROGRAM BEING CONDUCTED BY HIS GROUP OF ABOUT FIVE MEN REMAINING IN NICARAGUA. FROM NICARAGUA, ARTIME PLANNED TO PROCEED TO COSTA RICA AND PANAMA TO LOOK INTO A NEW

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [illegible] USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR [illegible] DCS FBI
I&NS REPCINCLANT CIA/NMCC FAA COAST GUARD BORDER PATROL
CUSTOMS

CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM OF INTEREST TO HIM IN THOSE COUNTRIES. HE WAS TO RETURN TO MIAMI, FLORIDA, IN EARLY AUGUST.)

2. BORGES CLAIMS THAT ONLY ONE MRR BASE REMAINS IN NICARAGUA, WHERE THERE IS A GROUP OF ABOUT 50 TRUSTED MEN. THE GROUP HAS ARMS AND EQUIPMENT CACHED THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

3. ACCORDING TO BORGES, ARTIME IS PREPARING AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA, ESPECIALLY THE BLOWING UP OF A SPANISH, BRITISH, OR SOVIET SHIP INVOLVED IN CUBAN TRADE. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AIR ATTACK IS BEING PLANNED AGAINST CUBA FOR 25 OR 26 JULY. THE MRR HAS ACCESS TO TWO AIRPLANES AT THE MIAMI AIRPORT, WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO THE MRR; THE AIRCRAFT HAVE COMMERCIAL COVER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE PILOT OF ONE PLANE MAY BE FRANK FIORINI.) THE MRR GROUP IS GETTING FUNDS FROM A NON-AMERICAN SOURCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SOURCE OF THE FUNDS MAY BE THE JESUITS, BECAUSE ARTIME HAS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND HE RECENTLY VISITED ROME.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO. (ALSO SENT MANAGUA.)

END OF MESSAGE

23 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with George Lodge, Harvard School of Business

1. On 15 July 1965, with Mr. Andy Croce of CA Staff, I met Mr. Lodge at the Key Bridge Marriott Hotel to discuss what he knew about the relations among AMBIDDY-1, Bishop McGrath of Panama, and a rural development program they are all working on in Panama. Mr. Lodge described Bishop McGrath as a real ball of fire, about 39 or 40 years old, born of U. S. parents in the Canal Zone but he has taken Panama citizenship. He graduated from Notre Dame University, did graduate work in Rome and has taught in several European and Latin American universities, such as in Chile. He is one of the three top Catholic prelates in Latin America and has extremely close ties with the Vatican, e.g., he is on the Ecumenical Council and on the birth control group. He has an official operating budget of $2,000 per year which he augments from every conceivable source, particularly from the German bishops. He is politically and operationally minded, an American completely in his attitude and behavior, a typical Irish politician, Mr. Lodge submitted somewhat wryly. His parents are retired and live in Miami where he visits often. He recently met AMBIDDY-1 there on two occasions. On this same visit he also met the Papal Nuncio from Santo Domingo (he appears to receive most of the hot potato type assignments in his part of the world).

2. Veraguas Province of Panama is a selected testing ground for community development programs in rural areas. It is the poorest and most hopeless province of Panama, a small armed uprising took place there in 1958 and was put down. The Communists have their best organization in Panama in this province. The program there is based on the village of San Francisco, about 10 miles off the highway, and is an expansion of the efforts of the parish priest Father VASQUEZ

Pinto who has been thereabout 10 years. He is a dynamic young man who has lead the villagers to rebuild their village and church to develop their land and organize a cooperative and small credit facilities. The village is only 1,200 people but they raised by themselves $1,000 to buy materials and then built a training center capable of housing, feeding and training 60 men at a time in rural cooperatives and rural development. One of their ideas is to select bright looking leaders and potential leaders from rural areas, first in Panama and later, hopefully, from other nearby countries for visits of a few days in which they hope to brain-wash them of Communist type propaganda they may have heard and show them what can actually be done so they can take the good word with them to their own communities. This is in addition to the regular formal course of 4 months for selected young potential leaders from rural communities in Panama and all over Latin America.

3. Another leading light in the program is Father Steele who was thrown out of Dominica by Trujillo for organizing cooperatives and is a recognized authority on the subject. Father Steele uses Veraguas as a home base but travels to Chile, Colombia and other countries conducting short training courses on the ground. There are some Dutch priests on the staff whom Bishop McGrath personally recruited. Father Vasquez Pinto has sent about 10 to 15 local boys to the Antigonish School in Nova Scotia and they are back for duty. Mr. Lodge describes the group as a highly motivated and energetic group and Father Vasquez Pinto as a young and effective Panamanian priest who is a good operator. Mr. Lodge has two men from Harvard University there to study the program and assist in any way they can. The Peace Corps has 54 people in the Central Provinces of Panama, about 30 of them in Veraguas Province. They cooperate with the center, in fact the two Harvard men are interviewing each of the Peace Corps volunteers about their work. Mr. Lodge said they are coming up with some good information and ideas which otherwise would be lost as there is a good deal of experience among the Peace Corps kids but they don't know to recognize its significance or how to organize it into useable form.

4. The above group is trying to organize the center as a viable base with an effective staff to continue the training program even if the present leaders should move on. They hope it will become a pilot program for Latin America and that they will be able to seed other similar programs from

SECRET

this one. They hope to be able to spot and develop leaders in remote areas for future operations in those areas. Incidental to these major objectives, they are also helping to develop the economy of Veraguas, to develop production, transport to markets, credit facilities, and in general to help alleviate grievances which the Communists have exploited in the past.

5. Bishop McGrath has arranged with AMBIDDY-1 for about six of AMBIDDY-1's people to attend the January 1966 training course, with 3 or 4 to remain on the staff. Hopefully, one of them will develop into the executive director of the center. It was agreed that the first man will not be too closely associated in the public eye with AMBIDDY-1 in order to try to forestall initial bad publicity from opposition elements. AMBIDDY-1 and Bishop McGrath agreed, therefore, that Nestor IZQUIERDO (who is well known as a long-time adherent of AMBIDDY-1 from 1958-59 Comandos Rurales days in Oriente) would not be assigned to the Panama center at this time. AMBIDDY-1 told Bishop McGrath that he would try to obtain sufficient funds to support the men assigned to the center. He has not yet brought up this matter with his case officer, and as the amounts will be very small, he may try to squeeze it out of his newly authorized budget. However, he may ask the Agency for additional help to sponsor these men while they are working their way into the program. It is intended that the Cubans would continue [illegible] cooperation in the program, eventually working them into the field wherever they are needed and acceptable.

6. Mr. Lodge will meet Bishop McGrath next in Panama on 29 or 30 July. As a coincidence AMBIDDY-1 will probably be in or near Panama around the same time, as he left 14 July for Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama for meetings with their presidents and several days visit in each country.

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

File:
AMCIVIC ✓

CC: WH/PO/B
C/WH/2
CA STAFF - Close

SECRET

SECRET

3 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3

ATTENTION : Jonathan Hanke, C/WH/3-Bolivia

SUBJECT : Eleodoro VENTOCILA Camara

1. On 29 July 1965 I discussed Subject with Major Lupton of Detachment "A" of ACSI Headquarters. In response to my direct questions Major Lupton stated the following:

a. ACSI is not using subject but they have been considering such use.

b. Subject is not working in Bolivia or anywhere else for ACSI or any other Defense Department component that Major Lupton is aware of.

c. ACSI was unaware that subject had been designating himself as a sort of public relations representative and press man in behalf of General BARRIENTOS.

2. I stated to Major Lupton that we held a poor opinion of subject, regarded him as an opportunist, and a possible candidate for "burn" action. Furthermore we were concerned about his alleged press activities in behalf of BARRIENTOS and felt if he were in anyway connected with a United States Intelligence agency and this became known, it could have an adverse affect on the extremely delicate political situation which now exists in that country and very well place the U.S. Government in an embarrassing position with respect to the Bolivian Government. Based on our views regarding subject I told Major Lupton that we would not coordinate any operational proposal ACSI might put forward aimed at using subject's services.

3. Major Lupton took the above in good grace and asked if it were possible for us to provide him with any information concerning subject's background and other details which would give ACSI a clearer picture of his activities. I told Major Lupton that I would look into this and let him know whether we

SECRET

could comply.

4. In light of Major Lupton's request in paragraph 3 above, is there any material of such nature that is suitable for passage to his office?

Benjamin A.G. Fuller
WH/POA

C/P

SECRET

5 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD/Cuba

VIA : Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal FOC

SUBJECT : Payment to AMBIDDY-1 for Month of August 1965

It is requested that you approve a payment of $12,000 for the month of August 1965 to be given to AMBIDDY-1. These funds will be used by him for propaganda and political activity of the MRR, plus payment of support to dependents and survivors. In order to expedite getting the funds to AMBIDDY-1, the AMWORLD funding channel will be used until another mechanism has been established which can be more closely controlled by Headquarters.

Carl E. Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DC/WHD/C

cc: WH/B&F

SECRET

SECRET

WH/C 65-332
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA: Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT: Transfer of Funds

Please cable instructions to your representative in Bern to contact the bank in Zurich to cable transfer the amount of $12,000 to the First National City Bank, New York, for credit to the account of Gregory Cardinal or Charles Ramsey.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: C/WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

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WH/C 65-329
6 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Monetary Division

VIA: Chief, WH/Budget & Fiscal

SUBJECT: Deposit to INWOVEN Account

Per attached voucher, it is requested that you deposit the amount of $12,000 to the INWOVEN account of AMBIDDY-11

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Attachment:
Voucher

cc: C/WH/B&F

DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CeJenkins:bh (6 Aug 65)

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13 AUG

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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC, Operational/AMWORLD/AMLILACs
Report on AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AUG 13 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - FYI

REFERENCE - None

1. In late July 1965 members of the AMLILAC Group reported the following information as a result of their contacts with various members of AMYUM located in the JMWAVE area.

A. AMBIDDY-1 has a warehouse in the WAVE area in which he is storing equipment brought back from his Central American base. The equipment includes UDT gear, boat motors, rafts, uniforms, and bulldozers. There are no weapons in the building.

B. AMBIDDY-1 is planning to put the BABUN PC into proper condition for use as a Mother Vessel. The vessel is now in Tampa. AMBIDDY-1 spent over $10,000. on this ship last year.

C. AMLILAC-8, a former AMLILAC who was fired a couple of years ago and who has been with AMBIDDY-1's group since then, was in the local area recently and told AMLILAC-6 that A-8 was the caretaker at one of the Bases in Central America along with 9 other men. He stated that they had all the weapons from the last effort and were preparing the camp for re-activation. AMBIDDY-1 told A-8 that $500,000. was available for the reactivation.

2. The penchant of PBRUMEN exiles for exaggeration, embellishments, and contortion of information (as can be seen from para 1 B, and C) continues to plague the remnants of AMWORLD and as a consequence gives rise to jealous fears on the part of the AMLILAC Group particularly as to the real state of AMWORLD. Such reports as those above and others when

~~19-124-27/3~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

CS COPY

Distribution
3 - WH/C

~~B 201-267437~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 Aug 1965	AUG 10 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-267437
19-124-27/3-4

CLASSIFICATION
~~KAPOK~~/SECRET

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]K S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-22667

DESENSITIZED

collected by the AMLYLACs - tend to affect the latters' morale and confidence in KUBARK because the AMLILACs believe that anything AMBIDDY-1 does is done with KUBARK support and blessing. As Headquarters is aware the great fear of the AMLILACs is that AMBIDDY-1 will get all the action and all the glory. However, in view of the current KUBARK/AMBIDDY-1 relationship the AMLILACs have little to fear and a renewed morale crisis is not expected to arise. On the other hand, if AMBIDDY-1 were to re-activate part of his action force and conduct a raid utilizing non-KUBARK support, that would be another matter. It would then be very difficult to convince the AMLILACs that KUBARK was not involved and their morale and confidence would be badly shaken. This situation is brought to your attention simply to show what effect such AMBIDDY-1 activities would have on this Station's painstaking efforts to retain a superior and experienced commando capability under already difficult psychological conditions.

Philip G. ELMARD

DESENSITIZED

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION K [redacted] E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Possible Arms Purchases from AMWORLD by Bay of Pigs Veterans Association.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

References: A. UFGA-21947, 11 June 1965.
B. UFGA-22527, 30 July 1965.

1. On 21 July 1965, AMOT-237 furnished the following in AMOT Report BD-1521, which information he had received from ESIRE-1:

a. Juan Jose PERUYERO Rodrigues (201-294249), President of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, Alberto MARTINEZ Echenique (201-290790) and Ruben GONZALEZ de la Heria, are making overtures to buy arms from AMBIDDY-1. The Association's Directorate, and the membership-at-large, have not yet been told officially of this contemplated deal.

b. ESIRE-1 felt this information was partially confirmed by the following comment made to him by Luis Humberto VIDANA Guasch (201-274645) in a conversation: "What do you think that AMBIDDY-1 has been reduced to doing? He now wants to sell the arms he has left over from all that business he was mixed up in ... and to think that a person like him is receiving aid."

c. ESIRE-1 thinks it possible that the BABUN brothers may be the persons financing PERUYERO in the purchase of the AMWORLD arms. ESIRE-1 commented that PERUYERO would not dare tell him about buying any AMWORLD arms as he knows that ESIRE-1 would be opposed to such negotiations on the grounds that this would be immoral.

2. Previous reporting on AMWORLD/AMBIDDY-1 activities has indicated, as in Reference A, that AMBIDDY-1 was interested in buyers for arms and ammunition.

201-267437

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 August 65	[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22709

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-96

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

3. ESIRE-1's comment, about a possibility that the BABUN brothers may be the persons interested in purchasing the AMWORLD arms, ties in with the AMCRAG-1 information reported in Reference B that Teofilo BABUN, Luis Humberto VIDANA Guasch, and EMBARB-1 were acting as go-betweens for General IMBERT's Junta in the Dominican Republic and the recruiting of Cuban exiles in Miami.

4. On 30 July 1965 AMOT-14 reported in DD-1532 that AMLINT-1 had been in a local restaurant where he overheard a conversation between Alfredo BORGES Caignet (201-347593), now Immigration Secretary for AMWORLD, and Jose Luis SOSA Sancio (201-746587). BORGES told SOSA: "Be ready to go back to the place where you were before, because you will have to leave for there in the first four or five days of August. AMWORLD will function in the same manner as previously, but with more independence." BORGES also commented to SOSA that AMBIDDY-1 is the current owner of the Vizcaya Restaurant at 142 S.W. 37th Avenue."

Philip G. ELMARD

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	EA	5	HO
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4	CA	8	X

FROM SAN JOSÉ

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

201 Jenkins - for your

12 Aug 65 IN 31282

S E C R E T 122229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 7870

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED IN COSTA RICA 10 AUGUST ON TACA 773 FRROM MANAGUA.

2. PLEASE ADVISE STATION IF HEADQUARTERS STILL DESIRES TRAVEL OF SUBJECT.

SECRET

CFN 7870 MANUEL ARTIME BUESA COSTA RICA 10 TACA 773 MANAGUA

BT

SECRET

WH/2/CR-NIC
will answer -
I made Tele con -
CC

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/C/CA - Attn: Don Rehlfing		
2			
3			
4			
5	A/1	201	
6	~~WH/3/Bolivia~~		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

See HOPW-4307 which is attached. ~~being sent to you~~. How much, if any, of the VENTOCILLA contact with AMBIDDY-1 do you think we might give to ACSI?

J. Hawkes

Nothing now - Wait till (guy) pops up again + if we need more ammo to [illegible] him we may use the A/1 contact by him — 25 Aug [illegible]

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/3/Bolivia - J. Hawkes R-1034	13 Aug

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

TO Chief of Station, La Paz

INFO Chief of Station, JM [illegible]
Chief of Station, Lima

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT Theodore [illegible] Camara (201-[illegible]) P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. [illegible], 25 June 1965 (not sent [illegible])
B. [illegible], 3 June 1965 (not sent Lima and La Paz)

1. The long-delayed meeting with [illegible] took place on 29 July 1965 to discuss whether [illegible] has a current operational interest in Theodore [illegible] Camara. Headquarters was informed that [illegible] is not using Subject operationally but that they had been considering it. [illegible] was not aware that Subject has been representing himself as a public relations representative for General Rene BARRIENTOS, Co-President of the Bolivian Junta. [illegible] was informed that KUBARK has a poor opinion of Subject, regarding him as an opportunist whose dubious activities, ostensibly on behalf of the Bolivian Junta and specifically BARRIENTOS, combined with any covert relationship with [illegible] could, if discovered and exploited by leftists in Bolivia, have an adverse effect on the extremely delicate political situation in Bolivia. As a result, [illegible] was informed that KUBARK would not at this time be in favor of coordinating any operational use of Subject which [illegible] might propose.

2. For Lima: [illegible] said that the initial notification to KUBARK about Subject being handled by an [illegible] detachment in Lima was in error.

3. For [illegible]: [illegible] evidently has some sort of contact with Subject in the [illegible] area since his file had to be requested from their [illegible] representatives before the 29 July meeting could be held. Also, the information in reference B obtained from Subject was most probably gathered by him for transmittal to [illegible]. (The information about the Communist situation in Bolivia is completely erroneous.)

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - La Paz, w/att [illegible]
2 - [illegible], w/att ([illegible])
2 - Lima, w/att ([illegible])

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible] - 4307	DATE 23 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible] - [illegible]

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WH/3/Bolivia	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/[illegible]		

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	[illegible] - 4307

4. For La Paz: Has the Station checked on VERTOCILLA with the Junta contacts as requested in DIR [illegible]? Depending on the results of such checks, Headquarters would have no objection if the Station were to provide liaison with sufficient information extracted from the traces on Subject forwarded with reference A to dissuade [illegible] from having any further contact with Subject. Please advise Headquarters of the action you take in this matter.

Ernest A. [illegible]

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT (AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA)
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1965
SUBJECT: FOREIGN PUBLICATION: PROCUREMENT
FOR INR/CS/FP
UNCLASSIFIED
NO FILE # GIVEN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION		
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMOT/AMWORLD
Charges Against KUBARK in the Death of Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. On 11 August 1965, AMTAUP-2, accompanied by Dr. Luis CASAS Martinez, former provincial commissioner of Camaguey, held a conversation with AMTAUP-1 in which he learned the information given below. This information was reported in AMOT Report DD-1562, 13 August 1965.

2. According to AMTAUP-1, Alicia *TUDELA Sanchez is planning to bring up again the case of the the death of her husband, Roberto TRUJILLO Rodriguez, who died in the AMWORLD training camps which were under the direction of AMBIDDY-1. According to AMTAUP-1, TUDELA plans to blame KUBARK for the death of her husband. TUDELA claims details of her husband's death which she has in her possession will substantiate this accusation.

3. AMTAUP-1 also says that TUDELA is preparing to make an attempt on the life of AMBIDDY-1. She is receiving information from persons close to AMBIDDY-1 on all AMBIDDY-1's movements and is looking for a silencer to put on the gun she will use in this attack. AMTAUP-1 reports that he has attempted to calm TUDELA down and is trying to persuade her to give up the idea of attacking AMBIDDY-1.

4. AMTAUP-2 commented that AMTAUP-1 boasts that he is the one who obtained the information and proof against AMWORLD and KUBARK in the death of TRUJILLO and that he has this proof in his possession. AMTAUP-2 believes that it was AMTAUP-1 who steered TUDELA's accusations from AMWORLD towards KUBARK.

cs cy filed 201-743522

Philip G. ELMARD

201-267437

Distribution:
3 - WH/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
19 August 65	AUG 25 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-22888

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

☑ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL SE ONLY ☐ CON ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
RID/FIP GE 66		UFGW-5472
		DATE 26Aug65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/AN GA 50				201-267437 Subject: Manuel ARTIME [redacted]
2.				
3. RID/MIS				6 to 1: Herewith document erroneously classified to 201-267457 subject of which is Nikoliy BARABULIYA ([redacted]), Attache at Soviet Embassy in Paris. Please review for reclassification to subject's 201-267437
4.				
5.				
6. RID/FIP GE 66				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-267437

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

XX

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational/AMWORLD/AMLILACs
Report on AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: At WAVE's discretion, pass para 5 to AMLILACs.

REF: UFGA 22667, 10 August 1965

1. As you know, the HQS AMWORLD case officer recently visited the WAVE area and went to the warehouse with AMJAVA-4 and his wife, described as a possible purchaser of some of the equipment. The warehouse is full of moldy and rusting camp and support equipment, most of it of no use in mounting raiding operations. There are outboard motors, small generators, engine spare parts, air drop equipment, bedding, etc. in addition to a large pen of baby chicks purchased by AMBIDDY-1 in his latest venture of training for rural civic development programs in Central America. There was one custodian working around the warehouse and taking care of the chickens. AMBIDDY-1 has also purchased an off-set printing press, for $10,000 according to him, which is set up a few blocks away. He plans to use it to print the AMYUM magazine, plus hopefully making some profit for AMYUM from it on commercial printing jobs.

2. AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDDY-1 both laughed heartily at the idea that the PC of BABUN could be converted to a mothership. This was considered and rejected several months ago when AMWORLD was still authorized to operate. They turned down the offer of the ship as a gift then on grounds that it would be uneconomical even if given to them free of charge.

3. AMBIDDY-1 said he did have a total of ten men in Nicaragua; five at Monkey Point guarding a cache of small arms and teaching the local Indians to read, write and grow rice; three men at Bluefields guarding a cache of small arms and working to develop a small boat yard for repair and maintenance of shrimp boats from which AMBIDDY-1 hopes to build a fishing cooperative; and two men at Managua with a smaller cache of small arms, one of whom is the AMYUM delegate to the Nicaraguan Government. AMBIDDY-1 kept about 150 small arms, with the knowledge and consent of HQS, in return for his giving back or accounting for the heavier and crew-served weapons and most of the small arms from AMWORLD. He claims that all three caches in Nicaragua are in concrete underground locations which are rigged

- continued -

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW 5472 CS COPY

DATE: 23 August 1965

25 AUG 1965

201-267437

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-267457~~ 201-267457

① - WH/C/CA/EA
1 - WH/C/Esec

AN | DESENS | INDEX
ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/EA	CEJenkins	bh	4550

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/MO		
DC/WH/C/CA		
ADC/WH/C		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

for immediate destruction by the custodians should an attempt be made to seize them. AMBIDDY-1 said he had neither plans nor money to reactivate any bases, except as they might be used for local civic action type programs.

4. AMBIDDY-1 was advised by his case officer in strongest terms to sell or throw away everything from the Central American camps, to concentrate on trying to project a new image of himself as a constructive and progressive leader involved in community development and civic action type programs in Latin America by invitation of the local governments, and to stop talking or acting as a paramilitary operator. He was advised in even stronger terms to get out of the WAVE area as soon as possible to remove himself as a target of constant personal attacks against which he could not defend himself. He agreed in principle, subject to waiting three months for his wife to deliver their first child.

5. WAVE may assure the AMLILAC leader that, to the best knowledge of KUBARK, the AMWORLD program is dead, that AMBIDDY-1 has no real intention and only limited capability of mounting raids, and that anything he might do along the lines of paramilitary action would certainly be without ODYOKE support or blessing given the present political climate in HQS area.

6. FYI, HQS continues to try to influence AMBIDDY-1 to stay out of paramilitary matters entirely. To this end, we shall try to keep his top operational personnel otherwise occupied in KUBARK or other employment, to keep him as fully and usefully occupied as possible away from the WAVE and PBRUMEN area, and to convince him to sell or lease his two Swift boats to commercial enterprises or to another KUBARK program outside the WAVE area.

7. HQS will welcome continued reporting on AMBIDDY-1's activities from WAVE sources, which serves a useful purpose as a check and monitor for the case officer to compare and contrast with AMBIDDY-1's reports to him. In addition, we are recruiting the former AMWORLD Deputy for Support and Administration, who also serves as legal and political advisor to AMBIDDY-1. He is now residing in the HQS area, is back on the staff of a large university and has agreed to assist in keeping AMBIDDY-1 on the straight and narrow path following the lines of paragraphs 4 and 6 above.

ERNEST A. LUSBY

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-267437

SECRET

26 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1 - 23 August 1965

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussions with General Anastasio SOMOZA, President SCHICK and other Nicaraguan officials, 24 Jul-20 Aug 1965.

1. A/1 first met with General SOMOZA 27/28 July. The following points were made in these discussions:

a. General SOMOZA said the State Department is making an investigation of how much money he is using to control the government and win the next presidential elections. SOMOZA told A/1 that he intended to run and fully expected to win the election, but would not need to buy any votes. He asked A/1 to please tell "Washington" that State is very clumsy and if they really want to know anything they should call on the Agency, or the FBI, either of which is much more effective. SOMOZA said everybody in Managua knows about State's efforts to block his candidacy and are laughing at them.

b. SOMOZA said he was meeting Daniel ODUBER of Costa Rica at the border shortly, and they would make a "non-aggression pact" agreeing that neither will make trouble for the other's campaign for election to Presidency. ODUBER had asked for the interview. SOMOZA told A/1 that he thought ODUBER had made a "live and let live" agreement with the Communists, and that at their meeting, he would demand from ODUBER a public denunciation of the Communists to be followed by effective control measures against them.

c. The MRR will be allowed to build and operate a small boatyard for construction, maintenance and repair of shrimp boats at Bluefields without SOMOZA or the Nicaraguan Government to be cut into the proceeds. This is part of A/1's community development program, aimed at developing a large fishing cooperative based on Bluefields which will be self-sustaining and profitable for the members and the local economy. SOMOZA also approved continuation of the basic education program being conducted by A/1's five man contingent at the old Monkey Point base and eventual development of that area as a rice-growing cooperative for the benefit of the local Indians.

SECRET

d. General SOMOZA, at A/1's strong recommendation, agreed to start pushing Civic Action programs through the National Guard in an effort to enhance his personal image preparatory to the next Presidential campaign. SOMOZA asked A/1 to assist and advise in this effort.

2. The next meeting with General SOMOZA by A/1 was on 4 August, with following points:

a. SOMOZA said that the latest program of Fidel CASTRO is targetted against Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Part of the plan includes assassination of the presidents of the three countries as part of a terror campaign to soften them up. He said that in Panama, particularly, President Marcos ROBLES is a prime target but the Communists are exploiting a recent turn against him by the National Guard because he has cut down on their costs, pensions, and other privileges. If ROBLES is eliminated from power, the Communists feel the chief of the National Guard will take over and they think~~ing~~ they can handle him more easily than they can ROBLES.

b. Source for above, according to SOMOZA, was a close associate of Marcial AGUILUZ, whom he described as the top Communist in Costa Rica and one who had recruited (fnu) FONSECA, a Nicaraguan now living in Mexico. FONSECA is a bastard son of one of SOMOZA's foremen, a Communist, and an agent working directly under order of Fidel CASTRO.

c. A/1 and SOMOZA talked again about a Civic Action program in Nicaragua and SOMOZA said again that he would support it. He will assign Father LUGO, a Cuban priest who served with the Bay of Pigs forces, to a position similar to a chaplain in the National Guard in order to assist in the program. SOMOZA will support MRR community development programs with whatever authorizations are required and with whatever official or personal prestige he may offer.

3. A/1 next returned to Managua on 17 August and met with Major PEREZ of the Nicaraguan Customs Service, a personal aide to the General. PEREZ said SOMOZA was very angry (not at A/1 or his people) and difficult to see. He said 3 Colonels were under arrest for 3 days each for disobeying orders. PEREZ was afraid to see SOMOZA for fear he might be arrested also. However, A/1 called SOMOZA by phone and was invited to visit him next day at Tipitapa. A/1 met him the next day (18 Aug) and had lunch with SOMOZA and (fnu) BENITEZ, a Puerto Rican, former politician there who is now in business but remains in contact with and working for the U. S. Government. After lunch, BENITEZ left

and A/1 went with SOMOZA in his car. While they were riding, SOMOZA told A/1 why he was so angry.

d. A message had recently come to General SOMOZA from the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Panama saying that he had it from authoritative sources that the U. S. not only would not support his candidacy for the Presidency, but would strongly oppose it. In addition, SOMOZA had word that Sydney ROSS, Director of El Tiempo (Spanish language newspaper in New York), after a recent interview with Asst. Secretary Jack Vaughn of the State Department, had an off-the-record talk with VAUGHN after the interview. VAUGHN had said that, so far as he was concerned, SOMOZA was no different from the other Latin American dictators such as TRUJILLO, PERON, DUVALIER, STROESSNER, Col. LOPEZ, or Gen. CASTELL Branco, and that he could certainly not support installing another military dictator in Nicaragua. The two reports were confirmatory in SOMOZA's mind and made him feel extremely bad as he said he has always talked favorably about the U.S. and tried to cooperate with them at every chance.

e. SOMOZA checked with the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua (whether in person or by sending Pres. SCHICK was not made clear) about the matter, and received a typical State Department reply that the U.S. was neutral in Nicaraguan internal affairs and would take no action about the elections. The Ambassador said he could not believe VAUGHN could have made such statements because of the U.S. position of neutrality in Nicaraguan affairs.

f. SOMOZA also said he had sent a message to Washington suggesting that if some of the other countries heard about themselves being lumped with TRUJILLO, PERON, etc. they might well call back their troops from Santo Domingo and tell Washington to go to hell.

g. He said he was going ahead with his plans regardless of what the U.S. does about it and reminded A/1 of Mr. J. C. KING's talk with him (SOMOZA) at the airport in Washington to let him know after the mistaken attack on the SIERRA ARANZAZU that Washington would understand if SOMOZA decided to kick A/1 and his camps out of Nicaragua. He used this as an example of an attempt from Washington to dictate to him which he had ignored, telling A/1 that he was a friend, would continue to be, and would continue to make his own decisions regardless of what Washington might want from him. A/1 made another strong suggestion that SOMOZA take off his uniform and start making public his civic action ideas. In addition, he again advised him to go personally to Washington to talk directly with VAUGHN and other U. S. officials to get the picture cleared up. A/1 said, "Let's try to get along with the Norteamericans, it's better to have them with us than against us." SOMOZA agreed, but said he had sent his brother, Luis SOMOZA, ahead.

h. The following day, 19 Aug, General SOMOZA called A/1 and said Luis had called him, reporting he had talked to Vaughn in Miami. Said Vaughn had denied talking to Sydney ROSS or of passing such information to the Ambassador in Panama. Luis said he dropped the subject at that point and talked about other things. (A/1 believes Luis could be fabricating as usual or could have botched up the interview if it did take place.) A/1 again strongly recommended that General SOMOZA make his own visit to Washington and talk to Vaughn and others in person.

4. On 19 August, A/1 interviewed President SCHICK for the Tridente (MRR news magazine). He had previously interviewed General SOMOZA. The interview reports will be relatively innocuous coverage of some of the major events of the day. The agenda of points for each interview is attached. A/1 intends to dedicate an issue of Tridente to each country which has helped the MRR, e.g. Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

Atts.

SECRET

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH HIS EXCELENCY THE CHIEF
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE
ANASTACIO SOMOZA DERAYLE DIVISION, FOR
THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE

1. GENERAL, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD?

2. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD IS DULY PREPARED TO FIGHT ANY COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE PLANS IN YOUR COUNTRY.

3. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE COMMUNIST DANGER IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

4. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE ROLE THAT THE ARMY SHOULD PLAY IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATES IN LATINAMERICA.

5. ARE YOU SATISFIEDWITH THE ROLE THAT YOUR TROOPS HAVE PLAYED AS INTEGRANT PART OF THE INTERAMERICAN PEACE FORCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

6. GENERAL, WE WOULD LIKE FROM YOU A FEW WORDS FOR THE CUBANS VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST TYRANY.

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH THE EXCELENCY. THE PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA, DR. RENE SCHICK FOR THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE.

1. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WHO HAVE BEEN AN EXAMPLE AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, EVEN FOR YOUR PARTY'S OPPOSITION, YOU SHOULD HAVE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT WORK SOMETHING ELSE WHICH YOU CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE AND WHICH IS THE MOST LOVED ONE. WHICH IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT WORK AND YOUR MOST LOVED ONE?

2. DO YOU HAVE FAITH IN THE CENTROAMERICAN COMMON MARKET? WHAT FUTURE DO YOU SEE IN IT?

3. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE DOMINICAN PROBLEM?

4. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE VIET NAM PROBLEM?

5. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH, AS FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE IT AMONG THEIR PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATIONS?

6. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE WAYS OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM?

7. TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE PREPONDERANCE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF NICARAGUA? IN THESE LAST YEARS?

8. WE WOULD LIKE A MESSAGE FROM YOU FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : AMBIDDY/1

SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect

1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Ron Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Managua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOZA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.

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SECRET

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Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

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3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people in Guatemala very well (not true, of course) and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/1 also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.

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WH/C/CA/EA

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201-267437

Miami. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary, Roberto MADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can be convinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to make political speeches.

2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto MADRIZ. ODUBER admitted that he knew the Cubans were not guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against them. He also appreciated A/1's previous refusals to assist coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1 said he told ODUBER, "I know you have been told I am a S. O. B. and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your mind. I know the people who have so described me and would like to meet you together with them so you can make your own judgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.

A/1 said he gave ODUBER a quick history of the MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He told ODUBER he realized they had not been close before, but he felt ODUBER and the PLN were the best choice for Costa Rica and therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any way they can, including training, men and equipment. ODUBER asked for a specialist to do some training of his personal security group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios for them if possible. A/1 assigned Luis ARRIEURIETA Sardinas (201-298890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica, who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty as a security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donate one issue of Tridente, the MRR news magazine, to Costa Rica with favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies to Costa Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer to print posters, etc. A/1 told him that the MRR people had heard of a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategic moment and making a widely publicised declaration that they are supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and might lose the election for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactionary group whom the Communists could control or overthrow. ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on them by saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists. A/1 offered to help him with this through Tridente.

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Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/C/CA		✓
2	WH/C/COPS		
3	DCWH/C		
4			
5			
6	WH/C/CA/EA		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1 - I talked to WH/2 people and got follow-up requirements — CET

2 to 6: I believe copies of these memos should go to appropriate stations for their info.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C. E. Jenkins 1908 - Ph. 6567	27 Aug

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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-61

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

(40)

SECRET

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Carl E. JENKINS
WH/C/CA/EA

SECRET

201

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3/p SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MADRID

ACTION: WH/SA 8 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1540, 2 JUL (J)

INFO : DOP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH 7, VR

~~MOB~~ INT SS SB
IOS PERS AR
COB RPTS LOG CA
~~OI~~ SI BF ~~EE~~
SEC ~~NS~~

2 JUL 61 IN 20035

SECRET 021523Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE MONT CITE MADR 1194 (AUMONT ACTING)

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM RECEIVED CABLE FROM HABANA 2 JULY SAYING PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA IN SERIOUS DANGER. IF FATHER ARRESTED, PROBABLY WOULD BE SHOT.

2. QUANTUM SOURCE SAID ONLY WAY SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR GOVT URUGUAY TO ORDER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HABANA GRANT ASYLUM.

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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DATE	2 July 1964	3		6	

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DATE DISTRIBUTED
2 July 1964

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SA/EOB	2	SA/SO/HH	1						
SA/CI	1								
SA/MOB	1								

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MADR-1194 (IN-20035)
QUANTUM
Liaison K

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA/URUGUAY

TDCS -314/00124-64

DATE OF INFO. 2 JULY 1964

DISTR. 2 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

SERIOUS SITUATION OF PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SPAIN, MADRID (2 JULY 1964)

REF IN -20035

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE.

1. ACCORDING TO A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HAVANA, CUBA, ON 2 JULY 1964, THE PARENTS OF MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, LEADER OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR, MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER, AND IF THE FATHER IS ARRESTED, HE WILL PROBABLY BE SHOT. (SPANISH SERVICE COMMENT: THE INFORMANT SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THEM WOULD BE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY TO ORDER ITS CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN HAVANA TO GRANT THEM ASYLUM.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NIA NIC XIS USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI INS
TREASURY

SECRET

3 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDBY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 June 1964 at 2130

1. I was called at home by the security officer and informed that AMBIDDY-1 wished to speak to me. When I returned A-1's call he mentioned that he would be leaving for Costa Rica on 1 July. AMJAVA-4 would be remaining in Miami for four or five days to get the new reorganization under way. A-1 asked if we could intercede with INS in facilitating the departure of four or five of his men who wish to leave for the camps. A-1 was informed that we would be unable to take any action until the names have been submitted to us.

2. A-1 asked that we assist in obtaining a visa for Inocencio ALONSO Ramirez who will be sent to Mexico. Alonso will replace Pineda in the job that he was originally going to do. A-1 would prefer that Alonso have no contacts with any other Cuban exile organization while in Mexico.

3. A-1 stated that some of the MRR secretariats would need at least one or two weeks to wind up their affairs in Miami. A-1 was advised that we realize the dismantling of MRR in Miami could not be done over night. However, any procrastination would be viewed as an act of bad faith.

4. I informed A-1 that the ADELAIDA is being insured for $14,000 per annum. A letter of confirmation from the Consejo would be sent shortly.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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declassification

14-00000

5. In concluding our telephone conversation A-1 stressed that he would like to meet Mr. Archer in August to report on the reorganization and improvements of his movement.

6. A-1 asked when he could meet with Carl in Latin America. I again reminded him that any time he wishes to meet with any of the Headquarters personnel he needs only to send us a message.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
Inocencio ALONSO Ramirez - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--Proposed Meeting between Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-1 in August 64

1. AMBIDDY-1 has expressed a desire to meet with Chief, Western Hemisphere Division after the raids in August 64.

2. We have replied via AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH will be glad to meet with AMBIDDY-1 at that time.

3. We intend to hold on to the Maryland safehouse until after the meeting has taken place. Preferably AMBIDDY-1 should be routed via San, Puerto Rico, to Baltimore Friendship Airport whence he would be picked up at a nearby motel and taken to the safehouse.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

HDH/gt (6 July 64)

Distribution:
Orig - C/WHD

File:

SECRET

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : Deputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)

SUBJECT : AMWORLD--AMBIDDY-1, Personality and Handling Problems

1. Has AMBIDDY-1, who is the linchpin of AMWORLD, acquitted himself well so far and by and large lived up to our expectations? The answer to this question is a qualified "yes."

2. Not having been selected by CIA as the man most likely to rally the best elements of the Cuban exile community round his cause, AMBIDDY-1's disappointing showing as a political figure should come as no shock to anyone.

3. AMBIDDY-1 never claimed that remnants of his movement inside Cuba were active or could be directed from abroad.

4. AMBIDDY-1's ability to enlist and organize some good activists has been successfully put to the test. Given the extent of American help (and our methodical harassment of competing action groups), to have accomplished less would have been difficult to excuse.

5. AMBIDDY-1's personality was formed in the crucible of student conspiracy against Batista, American exile, the Bay of Pigs fiasco, two years imprisonment under sentence of death and, since July 1963, headship of an unconventional warfare mechanism supported by the United States. He is a man of many engaging traits: Sincerity of demeanor, seeming ability to place events in a broader context of history, ready wit and self-depreciation, empathy based on shrewd evaluation of his interlocutors, to mention a few. Subjected

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[illegible]
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declassification

to stress or suffering misfortune, some of the obverse traits begin to show: Uncontrollable outbursts of fury, impulsive reactions, peevish vindictiveness and self-pity (none of which have been observed by us firsthand).

6. Imbued with a somewhat shallow philosophy, AMBIDDY-1 is prone to tailor ideas to what he strives to accomplish at any given moment and to the impression he desires to leave with his opposites. Since he rightly views his relationship with the Americans as crucial toward the achievement of main goal, viz., to overthrow and succeed Castro, his pronounciamentos usually hew close to what he conceives to represent the main lines of American thought.

7. AMBIDDY-1's personality feeds on adulation and surface manifestations of loyalty, despite the fact that he claims to view loyalty to his person as ephemeral and as under continuing threat of subversion, especially by his American allies. To the extent possible, we have attempted to assuage his preoccupations on that score.

8. In the final analysis, AMBIDDY-1 trusts only himself and views even his closest associates as mere pawns whose relative value fluctuates as the chess game progresses.

9. Endowed with an inquisitive and retentive mind, AMBIDDY-1 has a remarkable knowledge of facts which in any discussion he ably marshals and articulates.

10. AMBIDDY-1's views of things American is conditioned by his quest for a key position in the struggle to overthrow Castro. Hence, any advice is selectively accepted or (usually tacitly) rejected, depending on whether it serves to strengthen that position. There is, of course, nothing reprehensible about this.

11. AMBIDDY-1 relates to his environment in essentially conspiratorial terms. His world is peopled with demons and saints, the latter frequently epitomized by CIA, the former by the Department of State. All American moves toward himself and his organization are interpreted by him in those terms.

12. AMBIDDY-1 probably fancies himself as an adept student of human behavior. Applying as a gauge his choice of intimates and bedmates, he appears to be capable of committing appalling blunders in his judgements of human nature.

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

13. AMBIDDY-1 has permitted himself to get snared in a web finely spun by a squad of hardened veterans of Havana's halfworld. This can be analyzed as manifestation of rank immaturity. More difficult to explain is that AMBIDDY-1 has relinquished control over this affair to an extent where it now threatens his life's work. In AMBIDDY-1's PRQ II we predicted, more boldly than wisely, that he would not get caught up in female entanglements. While we did not underrate the power of sex, we probably overrated AMBIDDY-1's character and motivation.

14. In a project which may have vast consequence as regards the security of the United States (transcending by far its intrinsic value as an unconventional warfare instrument) we, of course, have to take into consideration the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 could be working for the other side——either now or later. We view this possibility as most unlikely, yet feel somewhat remiss in not having paid much attention to what transpired between the landing at Playa Giron and the Rose Bowl ceremony. There has been some talk about his having undergone marked personality changes during that period in his life, but we actually do not know whether and, if so, to what extent hispsyche suffered damage.

15. AMBIDDY-1's aged parents live in Cuba. He professes intense filial devotion toward his mother. Thus, Castro has in his power two valuable hostages. We havehad some frank talks with AMBIDDY-1 about this subject and he knows that we are not unmindful of the purpose to which such hostages can be put. We have received no indications that pressures have as yet been brought to bear upon AMBIDDY-1, nor do we have any concrete reason for believing that such pressures would be of much avail.

16. AMBIDDY-1's intense love of country strikes me as unfeigned. In the light of his resistance record and feats of personal sacrifice, we doubt whether he could consciously bring himself to harming Cuba. His hatred of Castro stems in the main from the latter's betrayal of the revolution. AMBIDDY-1 frequently mentions Cuba's subvervience to the USSR as the darkest betrayal of all, but also voices exception to other aspects of Castro's tyrany.

17. Can we take AMBIDDY-1's professions of faith in democratic principles and the Constitution of 1940 at face value? I submit that we not do so as long as we are unable

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downgrading and
[illegible]

to fathom the bedrock of his political convictions. I am reluctant to accept his writings and the program of the MRR as a valid base for judgement in this regard. In the final analysis, it may turn out that what animates AMBIDDY-1 in his unwavering opposition to Castro is the fact that as long as Castro is "in" AMBIDDY-1 is likely to remain "out." That, for purposes of justifying our support to him, may suffice.

18. Our methods of handling AMBIDDY-1 will have to remain circumscribed by the imperatives of autonomy. He cannot be treated as a controlled agent without making a mockery of autonomy.

19. One of the benefits we have reaped from autonomy is that the American position vis-a-vis AMWORLD and particularly the elements of self-interest which animate us in supporting this project can be clearly spelled out without necessarily jeopardizing the project.

20. AMBIDDY-1's manifest dependency upon American goodwill, while an element of latent control and as such recognized by AMBIDDY-1, ought not be kept in the forefront of our dealings with him inasmuch as it injects another element of instability which forces AMBIDDY-1 to worry about his rear whereas he ought be concentrating on his front. Too frequent harping on the consequences of American displeasure cannot serve to forward our project.

21. AMBIDDY-1 has been known to make quite a fetish of his resentment at deceptive promises and broken commitments. Our record in this respect, while not unblemished, is fairly good. We can see no merit in practicing deception and much to commend candor in dealings with him. AMBIDDY-1's own record of living up to commitments is somewhat marred by his shortcomings as an organizer and administrator. There have been no instances of demonstrable bad faith. However, seeming indications of assent on his part are frequently meant to denote no more than that he comprehends what has been said.

22. In providing AMBIDDY-1 with political guidance, we should strive to relieve him of all preoccupation with the vagaries of United States foreign policy and to discourage sterile demonological speculation.

23. Hopefully, recent realignments within AMWORLD will serve to usher in a period of political tranquility

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declassification

14-00000

in CIA's relations with AMBIDDY-1. For purposes of AMWORLD, the task in hand is in the realm of paramilitary and not political warfare.

Henry D. Hecksher
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: DC/WH/SA

HDH/bh

Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
       1 - AMBIDDY-1 201
       1 - Policy File
       1 - Counterintelligence File

cc: COS, JMWAVE

SECRET

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ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	~~WH~~	INT	4 SS	SB
2			5	
3		ICS	6 PERS	AR
	EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
	CI	SI	BF	(EE)
	☐		SEC	WS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : *DDP, C/WH, VR

201

S E C R E T 061835Z

06 Jul 64 IN 21980

DIR INFO MANA WAVE CITE SJOS 6865

TYPIC AMWORLD

ON 3 JULY TACA CARRIED FOL CUBANS TO MANA: MANUEL FRANCISCO ARTIME BUESA; JACINTO LUZARRAGA GARCIA.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YOBITE CABLES.

SECRET

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SECRET

AMWORLD Meeting in Panama, 10 July 1964

SUBJECT: Photographs of Adelaida Padron y Cruz

The subject of photographs' of AMBIDDY-1's mistress was not raised by him at this meeting. He made no reference to Adelaida, and I did not bring up the subject. I did get the impression on no basis in particular that he was not concerned about the problem of Adelaida and apparently she is settled in Managua and not causing any problems at the moment. As the subject was not discussed, however, I would like to state that as a nebulous personal opinion, not as a reporting of fact.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Padron - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ←

SECRET

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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT

TYPIC/AMWORLD--Identity [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : UFGW-3963, 29 June 1964

1. WAVE has determined that IDEN presently resides at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Miami. The house she lives in has a "For Sale" sign on it by a real estate broker named Henry Chamberlain whose office is located at 7768 Biscayne Blvd.

2. WAVE has checked the public records pertaining to the above property and the following information was obtained:

A. "The property is reported being located at 881 N.E. 71st Street, Lot 124, Washington Place, Plot Book 20, Page 54. The house was built in 194[illegible] and purchased on 4 May 1951 by Miriam C. Humes for $19,000. Miss Humes married John C. McCarthy on 4 October 1961. The couple got a mortgage from First Federal Bank, Miami, for $12,400, at which time the house was appraised for $18,475. McCarthy died on 15 August 1962, and the title is now in the name of Miriam C. McCarthy. She has approximately $6,000-$7,000 in equity. Present mortgage is $11,495.57, and she pays $87.00 per month."

3. WAVE was unable to obtain any information regarding AMBIDDY-1's interest, if any, in the property. It is possible that he intends to purchase some other property. WAVE will continue to check all leads regarding houses in Miami of interest to AMBIDDY-1 and will inform Headquarters of the results.

201-267437

Attachment - USC
IDEN Sheet

ATTACHED

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

~~19-124-27/3~~

Distribution:
3 - Addressee
Att. - USC

CS COPY

1 att.

DESENSITIZED

GROUP 1
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AN	FI	
~~RI~~	~~DESK~~	
CROSS REFERENCE TO ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Jul 64	JUL 27 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-17035

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

19-124-27/3

S E C R E T

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO UFGA-17035

IDENTITY - **Adelaida PADRON y Cruz**

distri:
✓ 3-WH/SA

DESENSITIZED

S E C R E T

~~DESENSITIZED~~

S/C att. 1 UFGA-17035

CS COPY

201-267437

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: xeus

EXTENSION: 2157

NO.

DATE: 27 JUL 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/AN			KW	Please reclassify into 201-267437
2. RID/MIS			CT	
3.				
4.				
5. RID/Files				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				Subj. ~~This~~ is Mrs. AMBIDDY-1
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : (Artime) Buesa, Manuel Francisco
201-210838

1. It is requested that the sterile telephone answering service on Washington, D. C. telephone number 638-4640 be extended until 25 September 1964.

2. It would be appreciated if your office handle the necessary arrangements to extend the answering service.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/SO/HH

R.J.Hernandez/gt (29 July 1964)

File:

Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible] from automatic

SECRET

29 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reported Marriage of AMBIDDY-1

SAMBORA has received conflicting reports concerning the possibility that AMBIDDY-1 has married Adelaida PADRON. One of the reports stated that AMBIDDY-1 married Adleaida in Miami during the first part of July. Another report originating from Sixto Mesa reported that AMBIDDY-1 was married in Costa Rica during the latter part of July.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
SAMBORA - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

AMWORLD Meeting in Houston, 31 July

SUBJECT: Status of AMBIDDY-1's Parents

AMJAVA-4 stated that he had received in Miami a letter from the Spanish Consul in Cuba that AMBIDDY-1's parents had planned to come out of Cuba before the Pilon raid. Afterwards they felt that it would be too dangerous and had stayed in place. Now orders are out to find them and to pick them up. The Spanish want them to take refuge in the Mexican Embassy at the earliest moment. The Spanish say that they can arrange to deliver the aged couple to the Mexican Embassy. The question is, can we at HQS check with the Mexican Government to try to arrange that they guarantee to receive and afford safe travel to Mexico for AMBIDDY-1's parents. I agreed to investigate but gave no commitment or real hope of any success.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

31 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMJAVA-4
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 31 July 1964, 1300 hours

1. AMJAVA-4 complained that the regular budget funds for August had not arrived at their bank and inquired as to the reason for the delay. Martin stated he would check into the matter and Carl would have the explanation at their meeting tonight. In the meantime, A-4 will ask AMWORLD-2 for a loan. A-4 also asked for an itemized account of the deposits still remaining in Bank Account II.

2. A-4 claimed he spoke to Mr. Summ recently concerning the exit of AMWORLD personnel from Miami. According to A-4 it is presently impossible for their people to leave.

3. A-4 asked that we obtain radio cryptographic pads since their supply is running short.

4. A-4 stated that ADELAIDA is being repaired at their base and, in his opinion, the ship will be able to carry out operations in the early part of August. A-4 suggested that Mr. Mitchell go to the base and talk to Francisco NIN Morales who is handling the repairs on the ADELAIDA. A-4 felt that these are only temporary repairs and the ADELAIDA will have to go into drydock. A-4 believes that a meeting of the minds between Mitchell and Nin would be beneficial on how to best keep the ADELAIDA operational. The undersigned stated he did not know if this would be possible for security reasons and the results would be passed through Carl.

5. A-4 stated he had received the spare parts for the 50 caliber machine guns and the 20 mm. cannons.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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downgrading and
declassification

6. According to AMJAVA-4 Carrillo has paid all the bills of Talaria.

7. A-4 deported that AMBIDDY-1 was married in Nicaragua on 13 July. A-4 was asked to convey our best wishes.

8. Carl stated he would meet A-4's flight into Houston. In the event they did not meet at the airport, A-4 was to proceed to the usual place.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/DO/HH

File:
AMJAVA-201
Conversations
ADELAIDA
AMBIDDY-1 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged securely
changed privacy code

Excluded f[illegible] [illegible]atic
Downgrading and
Declas[illegible]

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

R.D. SANCHEZ/gt
WH/SA/SO/HH
6 August 64
34477

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO 19-124-27/2

ROUTING

CI | SP | EP | SPC | NS

TO : PANAMA CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: [illegible]/SAB
INFO: DDP, [illegible], VC Admin
A-1 201

TO PRIORITY PACY INFO CITE DIR 40248

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: DIR 40165

FOR JENKINS:

1. MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AMBIDDY-1, ETA PANAMA 7 AUGUST.

2. ALSO RAISES SUBJECT PARENTS DIFFICULTIES IN PBRUMEN AND ASKS IF WE CAN ARRANGE ASYLUM THRU MEXICANS. WHILE MOST SYMPATHETIC AMBIDDY-1 PERSONAL PROBLEM, SEE NO WAY SECURELY INTERCEDE HIS BEHALF WITHOUT COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP AND INDICATING ODYOKE INTEREST TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

W Wood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

Halpern
SAMUEL HALPERN
ADC/WH (SA)

RELEASING OFFICER 6-3 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : YOGURT (TEMP FOR MR SANCHEZ WH/SA 0300 6 Aug (WH/SA)
ACTION: DC/WH/SA 2
INFO : DDP, VR

6 Aug

SECRET 060545Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE YOGU 1304 IN 44129
RYBAT TYPE
AMWORLD LASBAR TYPIC
FOLLOWING RECEIVED AT 06/0540Z
GROUPS 53

DESENSITIZED

IMMEDIATE

Fachav 201

FOLLOWING RECEIVED ON THE AMBIDDY PRIVACY LINK (TWO NOT SLUGGED AMBIDDY)

XXXXX SEIXX ENTER ADOPO RGALL INAKG AJLIN AMISP ADRES TIENE
SITU ACION DIFIC ILRFT DIFIC ILENC UBAKC UBAKS UPLIC OLESV
ERSIK SIPUE DENCO NSEGU IRCON GESTI ONESE NEMBA JADAD EMEJI
UKME ICOE NCUBA KCUBA CMAAS ILUPA RAELL CSKIR EALFA MANZA
MAPAR AVERA LFACA RLOSK CARLO SCMAV IERNE SSIET EKGRA CGASK
LLEVO
END OF AGENT MESSAGE
SECRET

TRANSLATION

Informed my Omar that my parents are having difficult situation in Cuba. I request you see if arrangements can be made with Mexican embassy in Cuba for their asylum. I will go to Panama 7 Aug. to meet Carl. Thank you. Ignacio

SECRET

SE

AMWORLD Meeting in Panama City, 8 August 1964

SUBJECT: Parents of AMBIDDY-1

In connection with his parents I told AMBIDDY-1 that my HQS had investigated the possibility of intercession with Mexico in their behalf. Our considered opinion was that this would not serve a useful purpose and might be counter-productive. The relations with Mexico are strained at present because of their adverse vote in the OAS meeting and my people could see no way in which they could intercede without directly indicating an official U. S. Government interest in AMBIDDY-1 himself. He agreed that this was probably the situation. He asked only if in my opinion we might be able to assist in expediting their entry into the United States as refugees seeking asylum in case they were able to make their way to Mexico. I stated that in my opinion we would be able to assist in such a situation.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

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declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
CI SI bF RP
SPC MS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 072130Z

DIR CITE PACY 4244

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

REF: A. DIR 40165

B. DIR 40248 - A-1 201

C. DIR 40297

D. DIR 40466

E. DIR 40534

8 Aug 64 IN 45982

1. REFS DISCUSSED WITH ZABOTH 6-7 AUG. HE WILL TAKE UP WITH AMBIDDY-1 8 AUG.

2. LAROUSSE ADVISED STA 7 AUG THAT 60-DAY TOURIST VISAS OF AMWORLD DC-3 CREW EXPIRED THAT DATE. COULD EXTEND VISAS LOCALLY BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL APPLICATION AND SUBJECT CREW TO TAX DECLARATIONS AND OTHER RED TAPE TO SECURE EXIT PERMITS LATER. ZABOTH AND STA AGREED PREFERABLE CREW RETURN MANA AND SECURE NEW VISAS THERE. LAROUSSE SO ADVISED. ZABOTH WILL BRIEF AMBIDDY-1 THIS ASPECT AND A-1 WILL DIRECT CREW RETURN PACY AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM IN NIC.

3. ZABOTH ETD PACY 9 AUG. WILL CALL FROM HOUSTON.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CS COMMENT:* AMBIDDY-1 DELAYED UNTIL 8 AUG DUE VISA PROBLEMS.

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-14759, 21 August 1964

SUBJECT: Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa

DATE : 15 July 1964

FROM : Carlos A. RIVERA

A few days ago I was able to read a report on the activities in large scale of Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, and the beginning of his intimate relations with his present mistress.

Of this report I can mention the most outstanding passages as I had to memorize them.

"Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa takes his first steps in the public life as Political Sargent of the 'Partido del Pueblo Libre' (Party of the Free People) whose leader at that time was Dr. Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling.

Later he directed his activities in the fight against General BATISTA, going in the Sierra Maestra where he was apointed Lieutenant by Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.

He was appointed Lieutenant because of his friendship with Major SORI-MARIN, because he was catholic, and because of the lack of trained persons in the Sierra Maestra.

There are more news on Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa when he published the open letter in the newspaper "Avance" denouncing the Castro Regime. The letter was published after he left Cuba, while in Exilo in Mexico.

In answering, the CASTRO Regime accuses him of having stolen funds from the Cooperative of which he had charge. This was certified by his friend Major Humberto SORI-MARIN.

When he arrives in the USA, that is in Miami, Florida, he is a guest of Mr. Ricardo LORIE and Mr. Michael YABOR.

An argument begins within the MRR, in which there are two sides, one includes Ricardo LORIE and Michael YABOR, and the

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declassification

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SECRET/RYBAT

other Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Miss Pepita Riera.

This argument becomes stronger because of the appointment of the MRR Delegate to the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa aspires with all his strength and intrigues to this position.

He seeks the help of Mr. "Macko" BAQUER, who is said to belong to the CIA and who at the same time supports the FRD (DRF).

He holds a meeting with Mr. SANJENIS in the Cafeteria Dough-Nuts, at 8 and 33 Ave., SW.

Later, at a luncheon at the home of Mr. SANJENIS, in Fort Lauderdale, he obtains the support of Manuel VILLAFANA, Pepita RIERA, SANJENIS, and Mr. PAULA, who agree to help him in his plans.

Nevertheless, he continues to look for support and tries with the BATISTA sector, maintaining reunions with MUJAL, Chile MENDOZA and Engineer BADIA.

The plans of the Council are being completed as far as the camps in Guatemala, etc., and in order to get the control on the civil and military sections, due to his excessive ambitions, he tries and obtains the support of the following persons: Col. RASCO, Dr. SARDINAS, Col. Orlando PIEDRA, Miguel SUAREZ Fernandez, Caho HERMIDA, Laureano BATISTA Falla and Mr. Juan MESA, who is said to be a CIA representative. It is common understanding that this gentleman has helped him quite a bit.

He also receives the help of the Catholic Front through Father GONZALEZ Posada and Father LLORENTE, who refused it at a beginning.

With all this in his hands, he obtains the control of the military phase and appoints officers of his trust to the commanding posts in Guatemala, such as the brothers San Roman, SUEIRAS, Eneido OLIVA, Andrew Jr., Manuel VILLAFANA and Carol.

After the disaster of the Bay of Pigs and the return to Miami, he continues with his activities, taking active part in the Orange Bowl act, where President John F. KENNEDY is presented with the "false" banner of the Brigade 2506.

DESENSITIZED

That banner was never, at any time, in front of the Bay of Pigs, but came from Guatemala, brought by MORO-MOLINET and which bears his signature on one corner.

The Government of the USA was advised that they would make a political play with this banner, so it is returned to Fort Bernnet, and is later destroyed by true revolutionaries.

Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa has had contact with the BIRCH Society, group of crazy Nazi who is an infiltree of the Communists.

There are reports that his father has been a communist for years in a department of Las Villas Province.

Beginning of his relations with his present mistress and date on several figures forming his group.

A certain morning Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa visits the Restaurant Rancho Luna, at 8 and 9 Ave., SW, accompanied by his chauffeur, BASULTO.

Casually or prearranged, he meets Mr. Edgar SOPO Granda, friend of Dr. ARTIME and member of the Brigade 2506. (This young man is the son of a Navy officer under BATISTA, who committed suicide in La Cabana at the beginning of the Revolution.)

SOPA Granda was in the company of his close friend Aida PEREZ Pozo, who in turn was in the company of her "intimate" friends Juana MANUELA and Adelaida PADRON.

At this meeting Dr. ARTIME and Adelaida PADRON liked each other, and the great idyl is born.

Dr. ARTIME set up a house for Mrs. Adelaida PADRON on 71 NE 6 Ave., where she lives with her two smaller children by her first marriage to Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia. It is rumored in the circles close to this couple that Dr. ARTIME will soon marry this woman.

These three women: Adelaida PADRON, Juana MANUELA, Aida PEREZ Pozo, are known for their sexual deviations, that is, they are three famous lesbians.

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They began to visit the MRR offices, and several of its members complained because of their lack of morals.

Nevertheless, Mrs. Aida PEREZ Pozo was assigned in the Intelligence department of the MRR with a salary of $100.00 per month. It is rumored this was because of her close friendship with Adelaida PADRON and ARTIME.

Adelaida PADRON:

Of humble family, she is known as servant of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, famous lesbian of the high society of Cuba.

She is her favorite servant and takes her along in her trips to Europe, having great regards for her.

At the time that Adelaida PADRON was working for Mrs. Ma. Luisa GOMEZ-MENA, the chauffeur of the latter was a brother of the well known lesbian, Mrs. Lucia CANO, better known by the nickname of "La Campeona" (The Champion).

This is the reason for the great friendship between Adelaida PADRON and Lucia CANO - "La Campeona".

Adelaida PADRON is also a close friend of Flor de Lotto LARRUA and Toni LAVERNIA, famous artists in Cuba.

Adelaide PADRON has arrived to her corruption. She boasts of having had intimate contacts with leading women of the Cuban society.

While she was still married to Major Roger ROJAS, she gave a party at her house at 445 NE & 30 Ave., Miami, where among the approximately thirty persons who assisted, there were about fifteen lesbians and about five homosexuals. There is a picture of this party in the "Revista Farandula", published about one and a half years ago.

General Fulgencio BATISTA was the witness at the wedding of then Lieutenant Roger ROJAS Lavernia and "Miss" Adelaida PADRON.

This wedding took place with great roar in the Night-Club Tropicana, of Havana, Cuba.

It is said that Adelaida PADRON maintained intimate relations

DESENSITIZED

with General BATISTA, and that it is even certain that one of her sons is of the General.

Later Adelaida PADRON gets the divorce and maintains intimate relations with Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ.

Mr. Pedrito SUAREZ was a candidate for Mayor of Marianao and is a close friend of Dr. Rolando MASFERRER.

At present Mr. SUAREZ has intimate relations with a woman named YOLANDA.

Mr. SUAREZ requested that Adelaida PADRON return a Chevrolet Belair, 1953, to him, since he bought it, but she does not return it because she says that "it is in her name and it is hers".

Mr. SUAREZ at this time has a business of fruit seeds in Homestead, Florida.

Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia:

Of rich family, son of Mr. Pedro ROJAS Bermudez, Chamber representative for the Liberal Party in the Oriente Province, Cuba, for several terms. Owner of sugar cane farms and live stock ranches. Roger ROJAS Lavernia entered the Cadet School, graduating a sub-officer. He served in several squadrons of the Rural Guard and because of his close friendship with General BATISTA, in 1957 he was sent to the USA (Washington) to take an intelligence course, in order to create the BRAC (Buro de Repression de Actividade Comunistos - Bureau of Repression of Communist Activities)- "Cuerpo de Investigaciones Anticommunistas" (Anti-Communist Investigation Corps).

After working for a while in the BRAC, he was promoted to Major, Chief of this corps,

It is said that this promotion was due to the relations of Adelaida PADRON with General BATISTA.

At the present time Mr. Roger ROJAS Lavernia resides at 445 NW 30 Ave., is owner of a boarding house, but he is going to dispose of it this month.

Major Roger ROJAS Lavernia faced problems at the beginning of the Revolution, but through his friendship with the rebel Major,

DESENSITIZED

William GALVEZ, he was able to take care of them.

It is to be noted that Major William GALVEZ is the lover of Adelaida PADRON's sister.

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA:

Aida PEREZ Pozo and Juana MANUELA entered the USA through the Mexican border, crossing the Rio Bravo.

They are lesbians and it is said that Juana Manuela is the "husband" in this couple.

Juana MANUELA is the daughter of a District Attorney of Las Villas, who has lately run into trouble with the Miami Police.

Because of their obscure positions here, it is believed that they are infiltrees of the G-2.

At the present time Aida PEREZ Pozo resides with her sister, Migdalia PEREZ Pozo, at 1432 NW 16 St., Apt. 1, Miami, Florida.

Migdalia PEREZ Pozo is married to Mr. Santiago SANCHEZ, who is a revolutionary, working at this time for the MRR.

Lucia CANO "La Campeona":

Lucia CANO, known by the nickname of "La Campeona", is a lesbian, famous in this milieu.

The brother of this "lady" is the chauffeur of Mrs. Maria Luisa GOMEZ-MENA; he is known to be a communit; he even made trips to Russia and Czechoslovakia.

The sisters of Lucia CANO are also communist and are still in Cuba.

The husband of Lucia CANO is Jose SEBLEDO, known as "El Gallego", and is almost always around the restaurant owned by TURQUITO, on 8 St. SW. This TURQUITO is the one of the ORFILA trouble. Mrs. Lucia CANO has a lover, a married man with two children. His name is unknown.

Mrs. Lucia CANO, "La Campeona", is "intimate" friend of Adelaida PADRON.

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

Although Adelaida PADRON maintains "intimate" relations with several of her girl friends in Miami, she has confessed that the one she likes completely is her "intimate girl friend", the wife of Dr. Pedro RAMOS, well known doctor who resides in Miami, Florida.

Dr. Pedro RAMOS resides at 213 NW 50 St., Miami, Florida.

Victoria PADRON:

She is the sister of Adelaida PADRON. She is tied in this matter because whe introduced and directs all of her sister's activities.

Victoria PADRON is married to an Italian-American whose name is unknown.

Victoria PADRON lives in common-law with Mr. Raul GRANDA, married, ex-chief of the Military G-1 in the era of General BATISTA.

According to what Aida PEREZ Pozo informed to Mr. Manolin GARCIA, when the counter-revolution will succeed, Mr. Raul GRANDA will occupy his post because it is a family affair through ARTIME, Adelaida, etc.

NOTE: In all this love intrigue around Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, there could be the influence of two factors: either the infiltration of BATISTA elements, as almost all the components of the groups have some link with him; or else infiltrees of Castroites who work in the USA, since there are involved the relatives of Lucia CANO, who are communists and still in Cuba. There is also the link of Adelaida PADRON's sister with Major William GALVEZ.

DESENSITIZED

AMBIDDY-1 201

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD
Reports on AMBIDDY/1 Activities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : None.

1. The Station continues to receive numerous reports on AMBIDDY/1 activities. Most are fragmentary and based on stories which someone has heard about town but invariably cannot be traced to exact sources. Some of these reports are as follows:

a. AMRAZZ/1. The departure of AMBIDDY/1 and his group from the WAVE area was due to pressure from ODACID. This action was the result of the publicity generated by AMWORLD after their successful operation. The departure did not signify a loss of aid to AMWORLD from ODYOKE. The exit of AMYUM/19 from AMWORLD was due to his dissatisfaction with AMBIDDY/1's immoralities. It is supposed that AMYUM/19 is a spokesman in this regard for the AGRUPACION CATOLICA. AMBIDDY/1 is accused of leading a licentious life for some time; having a mistress who was formerly a mistress of Batista; and buying a house and presenting it to this woman. It is also reported that he will marry this woman soon.

b. AMRAZZ/1. Carlos MONTANER advised that AMBIDDY/1 has almost run out of funds and that his group will soon be liquidated.

c. AMSHADY/1. The talk around town is that AMBIDDY/1 is now married to his girl friend. However, he is still living with a male friend and she is still living with a girl friend.

CONTINUED

CS COPY

201-267437

Attachment: U/S/C
1 cy, Rpt by Carlos A. RIVERA

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 21 Aug 64	DATE DISPATCHED AUG 24 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-17459	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

DESENSITIZED

d. AMCHEER/25. (This information is from Pedro LEYVA Ugarizza, sub director of the paper, REPLICA, through Carlos RIVERA.) Report attached under separate cover.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

14-00000

(24)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE 201

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH/SA 8, VR

[illegible]	INT	CS	SB
	ICS	IRCS	AR
[illegible]	[illegible]	LOG	CA
CI	[illegible]	EF	○
☒		SEC	NS

4 Sep 61 IN 68301

S E C R E T 042315Z

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 6987 ✓

TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE FROM PACY 3 SEPT TACA FLT 730.

SECRAT

CS COPY

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	✓
RI/MIS	✓
201-267437	✓
RI/Files	

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

1F

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

RI ☐ COPY ☑ DESTROY

30 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM SAN Jose

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION DC/WH/SA 3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT CI TIME SI BY

INFO DDP, C/WH, VR

A-1 201

S E C R E T 220302

22 SEP 64 IN 78499

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO MANA PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 7013

RYBAT/AMWORLD/TYPIC/YOBITE

1. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA ARRIVED SAN JOSE 16 SEPTEMBER FROM PACY IN PRIVATE PLANE. TRAVEL RECORDS INDIcATE FOLLOWING CUBANS ON PLANE WITH ARTIME: ANTONIO GONZALEZ TORRECILLA, JORGE MINERVINO NAVARRO RODRIGUEZ, PABLO ANTONIO ASTUDILLO OJEDA, CARLOS ORLANDO PILOTO Y VALLES. A JESUS ANTONIO SANZ DE ACEDO Y OLEA, LISTED AS SPANISH CITIZEN, ALSO IN THE GROUP.

2. ARTIME LEFT SAN JOSE FOR PACY 19 SEPT ON LACSA 629 AND RETURNED SAN JOSE 20 SEPL LACSA 628.

3. ARTIME AGAIN LEFT SAN JOSE 20 SEPT FOR MANA IN PRIVATE PLANE. RECORDS INDIcATE GONZALEZ, NAVARRO, ASTUDELLIO, SANZ, AND A ADELAIDA PADRON CRUZ ON SAME PLANE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Apr 64

UNCAN CENES AAYUD AQUER ECIBE YANKE EQUES ISHIF ICALA ULTIM
ACPOR -UNID ADDEL IBERA CIOND EMIPA TRIAE SCLAV AAYER PORES
PANAM ESPAN AYANK EEHOY POREL COMUN ISMOK RESPE TUCSA MENTE
KHUEV 0----

ABOVE MESSAGE RECEIVED ON FREQUENCY 14355 KCS. FIELD ENDED SCHEDULE WITH "VA VA" VICE LONG DASH, WHICH INCORRECT PROCEDURE.

WASH S/C NOTE: NO AMBIDDY/1 SLUG USED.

SECRET

14. MR PRESIDENT OF THE "CONSEJO DE LIBERACION": 1) I ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ERROR THAT WAS COMMITTED. 2) I GUARANTEE THAT IT WAS AN HONEST MISTAKE. 3) FORTUNATELY WE DISCOVERED A CLANDESTINE CARGO GOING TO BENEFIT MANY CUBAN COMMUNISTS. THE ERROR HAS PARALYZED 12 SUGAR MILLS. FORTUNATELY MARITIME INSURANCE RATES GOING TO CUBA HAVE INCREASED 30%. 4) FORTUNATELY THE COUNTRY THAT OWNS THE SUNKEN SHIP HAS NEVER BEEN A LOYAL FRIEND OF THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND IS REBUKED BY ITS FORMER COLONIES WHICH TODAY ARE FREE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. 5) NEVERTHELESS, I AM AWARE OF THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS ERROR AND BECAUSE OF IT, IF NECESSARY, I OFFER MY RESIGNATION OF MY DUTIES AND MY SEPARATION FROM THE CUBAN PROBLEM BUT I REQUEST OF THE CONSEJO THAT NONE OF MY FIGHTING MEN OR ORGANIZATION BE DENIED THE AID THEY ARE RECEIVING WHICH SIGNIFIES THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO LIBERATE MY ENSLAVED HOMELAND, YESTERDAY BY SPAIN AND TODAY BY COMMUNISM. RESPECTFULLY, ARTIME.

1-1

20

AMWORLD Meeting in New York, 6 October 1964

SUBJECT: AMWORLD Contingency Plans

1. AMJAVA-4 said that AMBIDDY-1 was very enthusiastic about the AMEIJEIRAS operation and felt this was the real key to success of our program to overthrow the Castro regime. He is prepared to concentrate on this operation completely for the immediate future.

2. I asked A-4 if they had done any planning on the basis that the AMEIJEIRAS operation might not pan out. He asked me directly whether a decision had been made to continue or to cut off support to AMWORLD. I told him that a decision had not been made but that my Headquarters was very interested in the outcome of the AMEIJEIRAS operation on which he was working. He recognized the importance of this operation and stated that he and A-1 had conjectured that future support to AMWORLD might be contingent on success or failure of their handling of that case. I did not confirm or deny this point but told him that the organization would surely be happy if they were able to handle it with success.

3. A-4 then explained that he and A-1 had spent considerable time discussing the future of their program and their prospects vis a vis the Agency. He said that in their opinion one of two things would happen; either the AMEIJEIRAS operation would pay off in which case they would be able to continue to operate with Agency support but with a diversion of major objectives or the operation would peter out, in which case they would have to consider what to do without Agency support. He said that A-1 was not only prepared to accept a diversion of primary objective but felt that present circumstances dictated the wisdom of such a move. However, both of them feel that their present paramilitary program must be continued, not because it is crucial to the outcome of the Cuban situation, but because the strength which they exhibit through these operations is the only attraction to AMWORLD that has caused the AMEIJEIRAS group to contact them.

GROUP 1
[illegible]

4. In case the AMLEIJEIRAS operation fails to develop, and the Agency should decide to cut off support to AMWORLD, A-4 says they will continue to try to operate as long as they can. He said that instead of 200 people they might be operating with 20, but they could do something. So long as they have the hardware with which to operate they can "sell" operations each time. For example, he said, they would go to Cuban exiles, to Venezuela, to American businessmen, etc. and would tell them, "The October operation will cost $25,000. If you will underwrite it we will dedicate it to you and run it in your name." He feels this would carry them for a few months provided they can run a few successful operations.

5. A-4 said that when the support ran out, the hardware was all gone, and there was nothing left with which to operate, A-1 would take 12 or 15 of his hard core followers and go into the Escambray in Las Villas to make one last ditch effort. I asked him if A-1 felt he would have any chance of a success and A-4 stated that should such a state come to pass, A-1 would definitely go in with the expectation of being run down eventually and shot but that he would do this in order to go out in a blaze of glory and to continue to serve as a martyr. A-4 said there was absolutely no doubt in his mind that A-1 would follow this course, that he had a hero compulsion and a martyr complex and was completely without fear of death. A-4 again mentioned an idea held by A-1 that he will not live past 29 January 1965 (his birthday) because he is convinced that he is destined to reach the peak moment of his life during his 33rd year (as did Jesus Christ) and does not expect to live beyond that time.

6. I asked A-4 where he, personally, stood in such a future undertaking. He said that he was no hero, but he had dedicated seven years of his life as a schoolboy and young man to Cuban independence, and he could not stop now. He would not go in deliberately to die as a martyr, but he would continue with his work doing the best he could with whatever means he could come by. He stated, "A-1 is not such a leader as Tony VARONA who can separate himself completely from the struggle and go out to sell used cars. A-1 cannot exist in a life which is routine and without personal power. He will die first even in a suicidal mission." A-4 stated that

he, himself, was of a different nature but that it would be just as impossible for him to go to a routine type of work and leave the work of liberation of his country.

7. I asked A-4 what AMWORLD would do if they were able to commence operations again. He said they had two targets on the north coast that they would like to hit when they have another chance. One is Puerto Vita, the other is Manati. They have target studies on Puerto Vita and have just recruited a refugee from Manati who knows the area thoroughly and brought out a large number of photographs of the target with him from Cuba. Unfortunately some of them were confiscated by U. S. Customs when he came through Miami, but there were still enough remaining to plan an operation. He asked if we might be able to help recover the confiscated photos. I told him that if approval to recommence operations was given, I was sure we could do so. In the meantime, I was, of course, not authorized to discuss possible future operations but was interested in what AMWORLD was thinking along these lines. A-4 understood our position with the current suspension of operations.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Internal ops
AMJAVA-4 - 201
Policy

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME RUFSA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

200-300-024
UFG -06030
14 OCT 64

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RE SANTIAGO ALVAREZ SR. AND JR. EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS AT CONDITIONS AT A BASE OPERATED BY MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

R 6410232076

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

19 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation betweeen AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 16 October 1964 at 1045 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 said he had met yesterday with a newspaperman named Robert Stark of the London Times. A-1 first knew Stark during his imprisonment after the Bay of Pigs and claims Stark was one of the few correspondents who was allowed to interview the prisoners. According to A-1 Stark and the governor of the Bahamas are involved in smuggling to and from Cuba. Stark smuggles salt pork into Oriente Province and brings out rum and cigars. Stark is the owner of an LCM (Andros Engineer) and an LCU (Charlestown). While A-1 was jotting down the names of the vessels Stark said, "Now don't go sinking my ships." A-1 replied, "We don't sink anyone's ships." Stark is leaving today for Canada to purchase fire bricks for sugar centrals in Cuba. Stark advised A-1 that Ramon Castro, Fidel's brother, would like to defect. Stark is willing to assist Ramon exfiltrate clandestinely provided that A-1 supply a boat to meet the exfiltrating party somewhere in the open seas. Before A-1 commits his organization to such a plan he would like to have Headquarters investigate Stark. A-1 expects to meet Stark within a week and give him an answer at that time.

2. A-1 has received a report from his base that ALBUERNE is involved in a narcotics and numbers racket based in Miami. A-1 is requesting that the complete report be forwarded to Miami in order to turn it over to us.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

3. A-1 is leaving today for Puerto Rico to solicit funds from several wealthy businessmen. He then expects to leave for Santo Domingo to meet with President Reid. He will then return to New York where he will talk to some New York businessmen and attempt to collect financial support for his organization.

4. AMWORLD has been notified by the Justice Department that they have to register as agents of a foreign government. Manolin Hernandez drafted a letter in reply objecting to being called "agents of a foreign government." A-1 maintains that his organization does not report to nor is responsible to any other government, etc. A-1 was asked to send us a copy of their reply for our records.

5. A-1 commented he has hired Luis PRIETO Portar to head the AMWORLD "Brain Trust."

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Robert Stark - 201
Luis PRIETO Portar - 201
AMBIDDY-1 - 201 ✓
Conversations

cc. DC/WH/SA

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

19 Oct 1964



REPUBLICA
DE
NICARAGUA

PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA

PASAPORTE

32 Paginas (PASSPORT) 32 Pages

No [illegible]17

Nombre del Portador
Bearer's Name

IGNACIO MARTINEZ BAÑOS.

Acompañado de su Esposa
Accompanied by his wife

y de
and

niño
child

Válido hasta
Valid until
19 DE OCTUBRE DE 1964

PARA REVALIDACIONES VEASE PAGINA 6
(For Revalidations See Page 6)

FILIACION:
PERSONAL DESCRIPTION

	Portador (Bearer)	Esposa (Wife)
Estatura / Height	5.10 PLG	
Peso / Weight	[illegible] LBS	
Color / Complexion	[illegible]	
Ojos / Eyes	CAFES	
Frente / Forehead	AMPLIA	
Nariz / Nose	REGULAR	
Pelo / Hair	CASTAÑO	
Señas particulares / Personal marks	NINGUNA.-	

Niños / Children

Nombre / Name	Edad / Age	Sexo / Sex

PASAPORTE
(PASSPORT)

(Decreto Legislativo de 3 de Agosto de 1917)
(Legislative Decree of August 3rd, 1917)

ALFONSO ORTEGA URBINA.-

Secretario de Estado en el despacho de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Nicaragua

Concede pasaporte a / Extends this passport to: IGNACIO MARTINEZ DIAZ.-

Para dirigirse a / For traveling to: NORTE - CENTRO Y SUR AMERICA.-

y suplica a las autoridades Civiles y Militares / and requests the civil and military authorities of the countries de los países por donde transite, no le pongan / through which the bearer travels not to offer any obstacle obstáculo y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario / and to give him such aid and protection as may be necessary.

Dado en / Given at: MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.-

a los / the 19 días del mes de / day of the month of OCTUBRE de 19 85

FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH



Nacido en / Born in: SAN MARCOS NICARAGUA.-

el / the: 23 **de** / of: ENERO **de** / of: 1932

Profesión / Profession: COMERCIANTE.-

Estado civil / Civil status: SOLTERO.-

Domicilio / Residence: LAS CONCHITAS NICARAGUA.-

Firma del Portador
Bearer's Signature

FOTOGRAFIA
PHOTOGRAPH

Nacido en / Born in:

el / the: **de** / of: **de** / of:

Profesión / Profession:

Estado civil / Civil status:

Domicilio / Residence:

Firma
Signature



6

REVALIDACIONES
REVALIDATIONS

Revalidado este pasaporte de
This passport is revalidated from

Válido hasta
Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

Revalidado el
Revalidated on

Válido hasta
Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

Revalidado el
Revalidated on

Válido hasta
Valid until

Firma Autorizada
Authorized Signature

7

OBSERVACIONES
OBSERVATIONS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

8

VISAS

OFICINA DE [illegible]RACION
Departamento [illegible]ntes

Visa No. ______ Tarjeta No. ______
BUENO PARA [illegible]

La Visa [illegible]
por u[illegible]
hasta ______

NOV 1964

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

9

VISAS

33

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

VISAS

REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA
AMERICA CENTRAL

26 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 25 October 1964 at 1330 hours

1. The Office of Security called the undersigned to advise that AMBIDDY-1 had telephoned.

2. Upon returning A-1's call, he stated he telephoned merely to inform us that he would be going into retreat on 26 or 27 October. He will be staying at the Diplomat Hotel in Hollywood, Miami as a guest of the management since the manager is one of the "100 men." A-1's rooms are 2255 and 2257. The telephone number is WA2-8111. A-1 can be reached at that number for the next week.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

30 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 30 October 1964 at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 inquired as to when the organizational charts he requested from Carl would be ready. A-1 explained these charts are urgently needed to prepare future plans concerning the "dissident group." At present Nilo Messer is being groomed to go to Madrid to be the liaison after "Cuco" de Leon is replaced. "Cuco" de Leon is leaving shortly for Nicaragua to commence infiltration training.

2. As to A-1's future plans he intends to leave for Central America on Tuesday or Wednesday, 3 or 4 November. AMJAVA-4 is leaving for Nicaragua on 2 November.

3. AMBIDDY-1 is sending Rafael Garcia, Luis Grillo, and Amado Cantillo to the Dominican Republic to survey the new location which President Reid has offered AMWORLD. According to A-1 Reid has offered them an operations base much closer to Cuba than Isla de Beata. At present A-1 is getting cost estimates on the 12 Swifts which President Reid wishes to buy in the U. S. The different estimates will be sent to President Reid with the three aforementioned AMWORLDers. According to A-1 President Reid suggested that AMWORLD could paint their Swifts the same colors as the ones which the Dominicans will have.

4. A-1, Sixto Mesa, and John Monahan intend to meet a group of wealthy American and Cuban businessman on Sunday to solicit funds for AMWORLD. A-1 was advised to take a hard look as to the motives of Mr. Monahan before getting

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

too involved with this gentleman. A-1 feels that Monahan is perhaps looking into the future to the day when Cuba will be liberated.

5. A-1 was asked to check if they had purchased the extra commo equipment and spare parts.

6. A-1 was asked to investigate if the steel planking has been paid.

7. A-1 expects a telephone call from Robert Starkie tomorrow, 31 October, concerning the fire bricks. This matter is now being handled by Manuel Hernandez.

8. A-1 was advised that Carl would have the charts by Tuesday night. A-1 will be called on Monday to make arrangements for the meeting between himself and Carl.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 - 201✓
Dissident group
Dominican Republic
Business Support
Sabotage Equipment

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

201 ✓

SECRET

3 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 2 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated that he, AMWORLD-2 and John Monahan met some wealthy, American businessmen on 1 November. One of the Americans was the President of the American Medical Association in Miami who promised AMWORLD medical supplies. A-1 mentioned that John Monahan spoke eloquently before the group on behalf of AMWORLD. The undersigned mentioned to A-1 that unlike Cuban businessmen, one has to take a more direct approach with American businessmen as far as money is concerned. A-1 said the reason he has not made a direct pitch for money is because he does not want to take the same approach other exile organizations do. A-1 felt he would have better success in getting a little from alot of people instead of alot from a few.

2. According to A-1, AMJAVA-4 will be leaving Thursday for Nicaragua.

3. A-1 advised that Nilo Messer and Antonio Sanz are now in Spain. Antonio Sanz will return after placing Nilo in contact with appropriate people in Spain. A-1 expects to meet with a representative of the dissident group within the next two weeks. A-1 did not elaborate as to the reason for his expectation. A-1 again asked if the charts he requested would be turned over to him when he meets Carl. A-1 was assured that Carl would bring the charts to the meeting.

4. "Cuco" de Leon is leaving on 3 November for Nicaragua.

5. The three man group scheduled to go to the Dominican Republic to survey the new AMWORLD site has been temporarily

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
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delayed due to expired visas. A-1 has obtained the necessary information for President Reid concerning the purchase of twelve Swifts. This information will be sent with the three man group. When asked why President Reid has not negotiated the purchase of the Swifts himself, A-1 stated Reid tried to but found embezzeling within his group. President Reid wants to show the naval group he can purchase the Swifts on his own.

6. A-1 expects the Philco training school to begin on 3 November. Approximately 25 AMWORLDERS will attend the school. A-1 said he had submitted a list of needed spare parts to Philco but he has not received a reply. A-1 is checking other radio corporations to obtain the lowest possible prices.

7. The MV SANTA MARIA is anchored off Monkey Point and according to A-1 is in top notch condition.

8. A-1 said he terminated his contract with station WRUL in New York. A-1 intends to use the Dominican Republic to beam long-wave programs to Cuba.

9. As of this month the "Tridente" will be reduced in size and will be published monthly.

10. A-1 was informed that Carl will arrive in West Palm Beach at 2130 on 3 November. A-1 will be expecting a call from Carl at the Diplomat Hotel.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Converxations
Financial Aid
Internal Ops
DR

Abc a conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

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26 ✓

4 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 3 November 1964 at 2130

1. After several unsuccessful attempts I was finally able to contact AMBIDDY-1 and advise him that Carl wold be unable to meet him at the agreed time. I informed A-1 that Carl would contact him at 0900 on 4 November and make arrangements for their meeting.

2. A-1 said he had received confirmation that the Philco school had started on 2 November.

3. During this non-operational period A-1 is having all his vessels checked out to see that they will be in good operational condition. A-1 specifically alluded to the LCM's that are presently being overhauled. The Swift GITANA is also undergoing maintenance repairs.

4. Besides setting up Nilo Messer as AMWORLD's liaison to the dissident group, Antonio Sanz is inquiring as to the departure date of the RIO CAONAO. A-1 intends to broach the topic of attacking the CAONAO with Carl. A-1 stated that he hopes that Carl will have a final decision for him on the CAONAO

5. Feeling that A-1 was probing for a sign as to what decision has been made on the CAONAO, I changed the subject and asked A-1 if he was watching the election returns. A-1

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stated that he was, and the election was progressing nicely. Judging from the tone of A-1's voice, he apparently feels that the re-election of President Johnson and the election of Robert Kennedy would guarantee the continuation of AMWORLD.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 - 201
Conversations
RIO CAONAO
Commo

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
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RE PLANS TO ESTABLISH A CUBAN
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IN BRAZIL

019-006-041/04
UFG -06142
04 NOV 64
WAVE-04258
P2

R 6412100287

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

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9 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and
Martin Ferrer

DATE: 7 November at 1130 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated he expects to leave for Central America on 11 November. He is waiting for the return of Antonio Sanz from Madrid. Sanz is bringing "some information" with him (A-1 did not elaborate) which A-1 wants to evaluate before he (A-1) returns to the bases.

2. A-1 reiterated his promise of obtaining a new roster for Headquarters. A-1 mentioned he is having all his materiel inventoried and expects to have the results for his meeting with Mr. Archer.

3. A-1 was notified that perhaps it would be better if he proceeded to the camps and we would contact him as to the time and place of the meeting with Mr. Archer.

4. A-1 was reminded to submit his request for the December budget.

5. A-1 said he would telephone prior to his departure for Central America.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: Telephone Conversations
Antonio SANZ 201
A-1 201
Finance

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A-1

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 And Martin Ferrer

DATE : 12 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Antonio Sanz returned from Spain last night (11 Nov) and according to Sanz a representative of the dissident group will be leaving for Spain on 15 Nov. Sanz does not have the name of the representative, however, all indications point to Dr. Faustino Perez. A-1 has only talked to Sanz briefly by phone and therefore did not have all the details of Sanz trip.

2. According to A-1 Sanz talked to the captain of the Caonao and the captain is more willing than ever to deliver the ship to AMWORLD. The Caonao will leave Spain on 16 Nov. A-1 said he would like a reading from Carl on the status of the Caonao operation.

3. A-1 stated that some of his men who were formerly in the U. S. Army are being recalled. A-1 requested that we do whatever possible to remedy this situation. A-1 was advised to submit a list of names of the individuals involved and we would review the problem.

4. Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez is encountering difficulties with I&NS in leaving the U. S. A-1 did not elaborate as to the difficulty, however, it appears to be a matter of not having the proper papers.

5. A-1 said he is very pleased by the intelligence section in Miami, particularly the debriefing of Cuban exiles. A-1 promised to give Headquarters copies of all intelligence reports.

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6. A-1 commented that there is a possibility that AMWORLD may get a free ship from Babun. A-1 feels that by acting as an intermediary for the JOANNE, Babun will give AMWORLD another ship after obtaining possession of the JOANNE.

7. A-1 expects to leave within the next few days for Central America. He will see AMJAVA-4 and get up-to-date reading on the situation at the camps and obtain the inventory from A-4. A-1 would like to see Carl in the U. S. rather than in Panama.

8. A-1 claimed that the $18,000 balance due on the JOANNE repairs had been sent to Ramsey Scarlett.

9. A-1 was advised that Carl would meet him tonight (12 Nov) in West Palm Beach. A-1 should make reservations at a motel in that city and call Headquarters at 1600 hours today with the name of the motel.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201
Conversations
Internal Op
Rio Caonao

Above conversation conducted
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changed privacy code

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16 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1
and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 16 November 1964, 1100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 expects to leave on 17 November for Costa Rica. He has received an urgent message that Cornelio Orlich would like to talk to him. A-1 hopes to return to Miami as soon as possible to be on call for the meeting with representative of the dissident group.

2. AMJAVA-4 is leaving on the same flight as A-1 but will go directly to Managua. A-4 would prefer to meet with Carl on 19 November in Panama. A-1 was requested to tell A-4 to bring the plans for Jucaro, Casilda, Santa Cruz del Sur and Guayabal to the Panama meeting. A-1 will tell A-4 the address of the Panama safehouse.

3. A-1 said he received word from Managua that several shots were fired at his private automobile yesterday (15 November) in Managua. Fortunately the bullets went astray and the driver was unharmed. The assailant or assailants escaped.

4. According to A-1 approximately a week or so ago the Guardia Fiscal in Parismina, which is near Tortuguero, saw a light out at sea. When they went to see what it was they saw a submarine. A-1 also claims that the U.S. Army is in that area building a tower of some sort.

5. A-1 believes the weapons ordered by Costa Rica from the U.S. were requested by Pepe Figueres under the pretext ~~that~~ of turning them over to Manolo Ray. A-1 opined that some may be given to Ray but a great bulk of the arms would be kept by Figueres.

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declassification

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6. A-1 said he is mailing the plan for the RIO CAONAO defection and the silencer developed by AMWORLD to Headquarters this very day.

7. A-1 was asked to call Headquarters upon his return from Costa Rica. A-1 agreed to do so.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File: AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Telephone Conversations
AMJAVA-4 201
Costa Rica
RIO CAONAO
Operations

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changed privacy code

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17 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 17 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 stated William King will advise Philco today that AMWORLD no longer wished to employ Jim Lee. A-1 sent a message to the base for Lee to return to the U. S.

2. A-1 reported he received a call from Nilo Messer who said that Robreno wished to see AMJAVA-4 to make arrangements for the "summit" meeting. It appeared to A-1 that the representative of the dissident group in Spain wants to deal with a higher ranking person than Nilo Messer. Nilo has received indications that the representative has already left Cuba and is somewhere in Europe on a shopping spree. Mr. Santell suggested perhaps it would be best for AMJAVA-4 to arrange the meeting in Paris rather than in Spain. A-1 agreed. AMJAVA-4 will probably leave for Spain on 21 November after his meeting with Carl.

3. A-1 was advised that HQS had received a report stating Guayo is in possession of photographs presumed to be on the ARANZAZU affair that were not turned over to AMWORLD for censorship. A-1 stated that Guayo was searched thoroughly after the ARANZAZU affair and doubts he has photographs in his possession unbeknownst to AMWORLD, however, A-1 will investigate. We advised A-1 we had no way of checking the veracity of the report, however, wanted to alert him of the possibility. A-1 said Guayo is now in Caracas working for "Bohemia Libre."

4. A-1 plans to leave for Costa Rica on 19 November. We informed him that one of the topics which Cornelio Orlich may discuss is the increasing publicity being generated by the training of Cuban exiles in that country.

5. A-1 was asked to call HQS on his return from Costa Rica.

Above conversation conducted
in prearranged frequently
changed privacy code

Raul J Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

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File:
A-1 201, Conv
Int Ops, ARAN, C.R.

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27 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM SAN JOSE

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20 Nov 64 IN 27486

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21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 20 November 1964, 2100 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 called to say he had just returned from Costa Rica where he spoke to President Orlich and his brother. The Orlichs made no mention of expelling A-1, but, to the contrary, are willing to continue to support AMWORLD. The only request made by President Orlich was that the arms barge be taken out of Costa Rica for fear the Communists would learn of its existence. A-1 said he will comply.

2. The topic of conversation quickly changed to the newspaper article by Hal Hendrix which greeted A-1 upon his arrival from Costa Rica about A-1 involvement in smuggling activities in Costa Rica. We informed A-1 that Al Burt had intended to publish a similar story but was scooped by Hendrix. We asked A-1 what he thought of the idea of having President Orlich issue a complete denial as soon as possible of A-1's smuggling activities in Costa Rica. A-1 felt a presidential denial was essential in counteracting this damaging publicity. A-1 stated he would call President Orlich the first thing in the morning on this matter. Another suggestion to neutralize Hendrix's story was for A-1 to see Al Burt as soon as possible and categorically deny the story. If need be A-1 might want to invite Burt to Costa Rica to speak to President Orlich and confirm A-1's side of the story.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed [illegible] code

File:
A-1 201✓
Conv
C. R.
Press

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declassification

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21 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1, Norman Santell and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 21 November 1964, 1030 hours

1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 to see if he had an opportunity to speak with President Orlich. A-1 stated he was unable to reach the President but did speak to the President's secretary. The secretary advised A-1 that he was unaware of the Hendrix story but he assured A-1 the entire story would be denied. A-1 informed Headquarters that he has sent Manolin Hernandez with a copy of the story to see President Orlich. A-1 commented that the initial reaction in Miami to the story was one of indignation toward Hendrix.

2. When we called A-1, he was on his way to see Al Burt. A-1 had already talked to Burt by phone and they had made an appointment to discuss the entire matter this morning. Burt told A-1 on the phone that rumors concerning A-1's activity had reached him. A-1 said he would tell Burt that President Orlich would issue a complete denial of the Hendrix allegations. A-1 was cautioned not to forget that Burt is primarily a newspaperman and therefore to be on guard as to what he tells Burt.

3. A-1 was advised to take a firm stand against Philco concerning Jim Lee. Lee should be sent back to the U. S. as soon as possible. A-1 was requested to reject any proposals by Philco for consultations in Miami or Central America concerning Lee. A-1 should tell King to telephone Philco on Monday (23 Nov) and make it quite clear AMWORLD cannot afford to pay needless travelling expenses of Philco representatives. King should also ask for a price list for the spare parts. If Philco cannot comply, A-1 was advised to tell them he will buy his spare parts elsewhere.

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in prearranged frequently
changed arbitrary code

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4. According to A-1 Babun has loaned a PC to A-1. He promised to send us data on the boat.

Raul J. Hernandez

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
a-1 201 ✓
Conversations
CR
Press
Commo
Maritime

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changed privacy code.

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FR

23 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Dick

DATE: 21 November 1964, 1600 hours

1. At 1600 hours, 21 November 1964, I complied with AMBIDDY-1's request relayed through the Security Office that he be called on FRanklin 3-1568 in Miami.

2. AMBIDDY-1 described reports reaching him of mysterious phone calls being received by various Cubans in Miami, mostly MRR personnel or wives of MRR members. These calls started during the morning of 21 November. The caller was a North American who spoke Spanish and gave his name as "Bill Jones." The caller sought in each case to solicit derogatory information about AMBIDDY-1, with particular emphasis on A-1's alleged participation in smuggling activities. The caller offered money (A-1 did not know how much) for derogatory information.

3. A-1 mentioned two persons who received calls: AMYUM-19 and the wife of Manolin Hernandez. In addition to smuggling, A-19 was also asked if the reason he broke with A-1 was because of the marriages of AMJAVA-4 or A-1. A-19 denied these allegations to the caller.

4. A-1 said that the story spreading through Miami as a result of these calls is that the U.S. Government -- and probably CIA specifically -- was attempting to discredit A-1 as a basis for denouncing him. A-1 was obviously distressed by these speculations, and in reporting them he was in reality asking the question. I gave him my unequivocal assurance that the U.S. Government was not responsible for the calls.

5. I asked A-1 who he thought was responsible and he said "maybe the Miami Herald." A-1 said that he had seen Al Burt earlier in the day (Saturday, 21 November) and that Burt was angry because he felt that the recent

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declassification

TV coverage of the AMWORLD camps and activities in Central America was a scoop to which he was rightfully entitled because of a prior agreement with AMBIDDY-1. A-1 gave Burt his side of the stories being circulated about AMWORLD's contraband activities. A-1 felt that he made an impression. Burt was particularly interested in a denial of these charges which A-1 told Burt would be issued very soon by the President of Costa Rica (see following paragraph). A-1 said he thought that he may have mollified Burt somewhat by having the meeting and by promising him scoops in the future, but that Burt still holds a grudge against him.

6. AMBIDDY-1 said he was expecting momentarily a call from Manolin Hernandez in San Jose. Hopefully, Hernandez' call would be to read a public letter from President Orlich officially denying the presence of AMWORLD training camps in Costa Rica and disavowing charges that A-1 or his people were involved in smuggling. Orlich promised A-1 to issue such a letter. When he gets a copy of this letter A-1 intends to hold a press conference and use it as the heart of his effort to set the record straight about charges that AMWORLD is involved in running contraband.

7. I told A-1 that we would look into his report on the mysterious phone calls and that we would let him know what we find out.

Richard B. Beal

Richard B. Beal
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: MOB

File: Telephone Conversations
AMBIDDY-1 201
Publicity
Rumors

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.
Chief, WHD
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
AMBIDDY-1's Involvement in Haitian Affairs

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. On 18 October 1964 AMCARBON-1 accidentally met AMBIDDY-1 in the lobby of the hotel El Embajador in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. AMBIDDY-1 was obviously embarrassed by the fact that he had the chance meeting with AMCARBON-1 and he asked that AMCARBON-1 not tell anyone in Miami that he had seen AMBIDDY-1 in Santo Domingo. As an aftermath of this chance meeting, AMCARBON-1 arranged for AMBIDDY-1 to talk with Mr. Bernard *DIEDERICH, a free-lance newspaperman residing in Santo Domingo. The purpose of this conversation was to enable Diederich to give AMBIDDY-1 a briefing on the Haitian scene and, as a follow-up, arrange a meeting between AMBIDDY-1 and certain Haitian exile leaders. The meeting with the Haitians took place at Diederich's house on 18 October 1964. The meeting was attended by AMCARBON-1, AMBIDDY-1, a Cuban known as Nilo Jesus MESSER Pujol (201-294655), Father *BAJEUX and Sylvia *WADESTRANDT. After a preliminary series of discussions, AMBIDDY-1 adjourned to another room of the Diederich house to talk privately with Father Bajeux and Sylvia Wadestrandt. At the end of this private meeting, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk with AMBIDDY-1. As a result, AMCARBON-1 learned that, as of 18 October 1964, it was AMBIDDY-1's intention to help the Haitians in their fight against Duvalier. AMBIDDY-1 believed that he could furnish the arms and the transportation for the invasion of Haiti by Haitian exiles. AMBIDDY-1 was also talking about committing some of his troops to such an invasion as he felt that, if he were successful in this venture, he could obtain significant base rights for his organization in Haiti. These bases would in turn be used by AMBIDDY-1's operations against PBRUMEN.

2. On the morning of 19 October 1964, AMCARBON-1 had an opportunity to talk in Santo Domingo with a Cuban called Rafael Garcia who is AMBIDDY-1's representative in the Dominican Republic. Garcia indicated that he doubted that AMBIDDY-1 would participate in a Haitian invasion. In this connection, Garcia made the point

(continued) 201-267437

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201-267437

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that AMBIDDY-1 had a tendency to get excited about various projects, but he very rarely followed through on any project. As a result, Garcia felt that the Haitians could not count on AMBIDDY-1.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

24 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE : 24 November 1964, 0630 hours

1. AMBIDDY-1 said he is leaving this morning at 0800 for Nicaragua. He expects to return to Miami within three to four days. A-1 requested that the information Carl had promised be ready upon his return. Although A-1 would not say specifically what the information was, he apparently was referring to detailed maps of the coming operation.

2. A-1 reported the 100-man squad has been increased to 120 men.

3. A-1 asked if it would be possible to obtain Esso road maps of Havana pinpointing strategic locations such as G-2 headquarters, communications centers, police precincts, etc. A-1 also requested a list of all prisons in Cuba and other pertinent data on the prisons.

4. A-1 has complied a breakdown on how he would like to arm the 120 men. He is sending this information directly to the Lastra address before he departs for Nicaragua today.

5. A-1 commented he had received a cable from President Orlich branding the Hendrix story a complete falsehood. A-1 is circulating this cable around Miami in order toclear himself of the smuggling charges.

6. A-1 said he would call HQS upon his return.

Raul J. Hernandez
Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

File: ✓
A-1 201
Conversations
"Palace Guard"
CR
Press

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25 Nov 64 IN 30071

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RYBAT/TYPIC/~~Y0853~~ YOBITE/AMWORLD

MANUEL ARTIME BUESA LEFT COSTA RICA 28 NOV PAA 501.

S E C R RE T

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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1

DATE: 7 December 1964

1. I telephoned Subject in Miami and introduced myself as "Andres" and indicated that I was calling for "Carlos" who wished to know what Subject wanted as per his telephone call to "Martin" on the previous Friday.

2. Subject indicated that he had three messages he wished to deliver and they were as follows:

   a. The President of Panama had given his whole-hearted consent to "Manolin" (Hernandez) in helping them establish their operations in Panama. This message was then relayed to "Carlos" (Jenkins) who was listening in on the conversation.

   b. Subject then stated that he had promised to pay the passage of the individuals who were supposed to take part in the meeting set for 10 December. He indicated that he was worried since he had not heard from the "Flechero." This was related to Carlos who indicated that the money had been approved but as yet had not been forwarded to the bank. This information was relayed to A-1 and he seemed satisfied.

   c. Subject stated that he was leaving for Nicaragua tomorrow. He also asked if we had read his message to the base. I said that we had not and he then gave me the gist of his message to the effect that the "foreign power" had as yet not vetoed their plans but that in the event they did, he (A-1) would have to drastically revise his policy of adherence to their views. Subject stressed that the message was only to bolster the morale of the men.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
A-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Panama
Finances
Op VICTORIA

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GROUP 1
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[illegible]
[illegible]

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7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversations with AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 6 December 1964, 1630 and 1645 hours

1. After being notified by the Office of Security that AMBIDDY-1 had called on the emergency number, the undersigned returned A-1's call. A-1 stated he had just received a message from AMJAVA-4 saying the SANTA MARIA was located at Cerrania Bank due to bad weather and would remain six hours at that position. In the message A-4 said he would comply with the order given him to return, however, requested Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. A-1 requested that the following portion of A-4's message be passed to appropriate persons: "I (A-4) request the suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered for the good of future operations because a person who loses faith in operations, believing himself subject to foreign decisions, is a demoralized person." In light of A-4's message, A-1 urged that suspension of Operation VICTORIA be reconsidered. I assured A-1 that his message would be delivered.

2. DC/WH/SA was notified of the above message. On the instructions of DC/WH/SA the undersigned called A-1 and advised him that the contents of his conversations with Mr. Santell (Sanchez) on 5 December were still valid and our position regarding Operation VICTORIA remained the same.

for Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
A-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Op VICTORIA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin Ferrer

DATE: 3 December 1964

1. AMBIDDY-1 called from Houston, Texas to say that he had just arrived from Central America. A-1 was advised to proceed to New York to meet with Mr. Santell and Carl. A-1 agreed to get on the first plane to JFK airport.

2. A-1 stated that VICTORIA was the operation against Casilda. A-1 stated that AMJAVA-4 had gone on theoperation. A-1 contended that he could no longer hold his troops back. A-1 asked if approval had been given to the CAONAO operation and to the Casilda operation. The undersigned stated that Mr. Santell would discuss the entire matter with him at their meeting. A-1 expects to return to Miami for a few days and then go to the Dominican Republic for the CAONAO operation. After the CAONAO operation, A-1 will go to Paris to meet with the pepresentative of the dissident group.

Raul J. Hernandez
WH/SA/SO/HH

File:
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
Conversations
Operations

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy code

8 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Juan Antonio CANCELA Gomez (201-758689)
Possible Connection with Cuban G-2

1. On 7 December 1964 during the course of a telephone conversation with AMBIDDY-1, he indicated that it was possible that Subject was connected with the Cuban G-2. AMBIDDY-1 suspects that CANCELA was sent by the G-2 to penetrate the AMYUM training camps.

2. Subject spent one month at the training camps and then asked to return to Miami. Upon his return to Miami he then made plans to travel to Nassau alleging that he had to go to Nassau in order to obtain a permanent visa to enter the U.S. AMBIDDY-1 had this story checked out with the U.S. I&NS and discovered that this was not necessary to enter the country on a permanent basis. AMBIDDY-1 therefore concluded that Subject was attempting to go to Nassau and eventually work his way back to Cuba.

3. No further information was obtained on this matter.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/SA/SO/HH

cc: WH/SA/CI
WH/Security

File: CANCELA 201
AMBIDDY-1 201 ✓
CI & Sec

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ARTIME-Buese, Manuel
201-0267437
Volume XIV

INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
7 AUG 1978	10:45 7 Aug 1978	Leslie WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

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14-00000

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PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMBIDDY/CIHARSH/Operational
Venezuelan Right Wing Plotters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCES:
A. DIR 60049, 23 Nov 65
B. HVCW 6746, 1 Nov 65
C. CARA 8309, 2 Jan 64
D. WAVE 9889, 3 Jan 64

1. References A and B concern reporting by AMBIDDY/1 on an alleged conspiracy developing in Venezuela among right-wing members of COPEI to overthrow the LEONI regime. JMWAVE reviewed the two reports (references) and is forwarding pertinent information developed for appropriate use by addressees.

2. Reference A paragraph 2 states AMBIDDY/1 said Venezuelan Major (fnu) *GUTIERREZ (Miami representative for plotters) commutes between Caracas and Miami, and his telephone number in Miami is 887-0795.

A. The Miami numerical telephone directory lists the telephone number 887-0795 for Anselmo *ALVARADO, 550 Falcon Ave., Miami Springs, Florida. (For additional WAVE info re one Anselmo ALVARADO, see Reference D.)

B. Reference C reported that a (fnu) GUTIERREZ, 550 Falcon Ave., Miami Springs; telephone: TU 7-0795 (i.e. same number), was listed in the telephone notebook which belonged to Major Rafael Angel MOLINA Franco when he (MOLINA) was captured.

Distribution:
3 - WH/C
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - C/WH

201-267437

(continued)

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
20 Dec 65

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 24 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24109

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
CS copy
201-768511

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

3. Reference B states that their (coup group) military contact is Colonel (fnu) *MARTIN Parada. On 30 July 1965 CIHARSH/1 reported he had received the following information on a Colonel (fnu) MARTIN Parada from Major Hugo *ARAQUE, a retired member of F.A.V. (Venezuelan Armed Forces) residing in Miami, who claims to be a close friend of Colonel MARTIN:

A. (fnu) MARTIN Parada, a retired colonel of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, arrived from Venezuela on 28 July 1965 aboard a LEBCA plane as "an extra passenger", and was staying at the Hotel DiLido on Miami Beach.

B. ARAQUE said Colonel MARTIN had participated in several ill-fated uprisings since General Marcos PEREZ Jimenez was ousted.

C. In 1962 MARTIN was imprisoned and later released by presidential decree. However, upon his release, he was dismissed from the Venezuelan Armed Forces.

D. CIHARSH/1 commented that from conversations with ARAQUE, he believes that MARTIN is active in conspiracies supported by financially strong elements such as Eugenio *MENDOZA, who collaborates with the PCV/FALN in order to protect his interests. CIHARSH/1 said MENDOZA pays the PCV/FALN for protection as do many wealthy people in Venezuela.

Philip G. ELMARD

19 de Diciembre de 1965

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 MD.

Estimado Señor:

La presente es para notificarle de varios asuntos de interés:

1-Una conspiración militar guatemalteca, encaminada a derrocar al Gobierno de Peralta, ha fijado como plazo hasta un término de 15 días a partir de la fecha de la presente, para dar el golpe. Dicho grupo militar envió una representación al Coronel Ponciano para ponerle la siguiente alternativa: o se une al Golpe y lo eligen Jefe de Gobierno, o de lo contrario, lo sacarían del país en caso de que ellos triunfaran. El Coronel Ponciano está dudoso y ha mandado a preguntar al General Somoza su opinión al respecto. Le han dado 3 días para decidir. Procuraré averiguar los nombres de los militares y su fuerza real dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas. El estado del país es caótico y de terror por los secuestros perpetrados por las guerrillas de SOSA, que amenazan con el secuestro y hasta con la muerte, a quienes no colaboran con dinero.

2-El Licenciado Oduber, de Costa Riza, me ha pedido ayuda abierta del Movimiento para demostrar en su campaña electoral que él no es un nuevo Fidel Castro. La revista Triden iniciará a partir del número de Diciembre, una serie de reportajes exclusivos con Oduber, encaminados a este fin.

3- Voy a verificar una lista que me han dado de casas en Costa Rica, donde se supone haya armas escondidas, parte de los comunistas, y parte de los conspiradores Frank Marshall y Compañía. Cuando la verifique se las envío.

4- Tengo toda la organización de seguridad de Costa Rica (la del MRR) para tratar de secuestrar al tal Giovanni que luce ser el Jefe de subversión para el Caribe de Fidel Castro.

5-Les envío el último ejemplar de "Criterio Juvenil", órgano de nuestras juventudes, que circula por todas las organizaciones juveniles, incluyendo las universitarias, de todo el Mundo, y más ampliamente por Latino-América.

6-Se iniciará en Enero la Construcción del Astillero de Bluefields y de la Escuela técnica para enseñanza de los indios de mecánica, electricidad y soldadura y manejo de Equipos pesados.

7-Esperamos que a fines de Enero venga el primer grupo de Indios a tomar el curso de cooperativas en nuestra Granja Modelo. El Gobierno Nicaragüense paga el viaje, nosotros pagamos la estancia y solo necesitamos saber, cómo conseguimos las visas de los Estados Unidos. Los cursos durarán 3 meses. Cada grupo será de tres indios.

8- La Revista Tridente ha aumentado su venta y su tirada, y actualmente se distribuye en:

Miami, New York, Chicago, California, Los Angeles, Puerto Rico, Tampa, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela, España y Alemania. En España se distribuye gratis y personalmente, pues el Gobierno no ha permitido su venta libre.

9- Se está terminando el Círculo de Política Internacional de la Escuela de Capacitación de Dirigentes del MRR.

10- Adjunto varios ejemplares del folleto: "Puntos de Meditación", que forma parte de los textos que se editan para los militantes del Movimiento, pero que puede ser útil para quien quiera conocer la idiosincracia del Latino-Americano.

11-Este año el Movimiento repartirá juguetes en Navidad (sin la humillación de la publicidad) entre los hijos de los mártires y presos del Movimiento que estén en Miami.

12- Está listo para la impresión el libro: "Cuba: Rostow, Marx o Lim-Piao?" del que les escribe, que es un analisis de los factores que han intervenido en el subdesarrollo económico de latino-america y que analiza muy de cerca la excepción del caso Cuba. Sostiene que los comunistas jamás han sido Marxistas en la aplicación del determinismo económico, y que la tesis China es peligrosa porque no es marxista, sino que analiza los problemas económicos de acuerdo con la tesis realista y verídica de Rostow.

13- Están en estudio dos panfletos que circularían periódicamente por correo, uno para los cubanos: Cuba por dentro. Otro para circular por Latino-América: Cuba: la vecina dolorosa.

14- Volvemos a insistir en la necesidad de empezar cuanto antes con un programa en onda larga para Cuba, dos o tres veces a la semana, donde se nos dé oportunidad de hablarle a los milicianos, a los becados, a los militares, a los técnicos, a los estudiantes, a los obreros y a los campesinos. Solo necesitamos el espacio de tiempo y el costo de los "Tapes". Lo demás va por cuenta del Movimiento.

Sin otra cosa por el momento se despide de Vds. con un abrazo, en "Cuba o nada":

Ignacio

15 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT: Status of AMCIVIC - AMBIDDY-1

1. The status of the AMCIVIC activity has reached the point where it must either be made into a useful ongoing activity or die for lack of purpose and justification.

2. As it now stands the activity's Principal Agent, AMBIDDY-1, is both literally and figuratively "flaying about" in a series of half-projects and half-plans which are neither meaningful to the Agency, meaningful to A-1 nor meaningful to his political movement. If he is to be taken at his word he is currently deeply involved both financially and politically with General Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. Financially he has committed some $75,000 of his Movement's money in a shipbuilding scheme supposedly to be established at Monkey Point, Nicaragua. The plan, as envisioned by A-1, would be, that upon completion of these shipyards, they would offer employment and educational opportunities for the ignorant and poverty stricken Indians of the area. Once in operation, A-1 expects that the profits from this operation will be plowed back into other endeavors such as a fishing cooperative and a farming cooperative—also to ultimately benefit the area's indigenous population. All of this, of course, hinges upon two fundamental factors: Firstly, it depends upon the continued goodwill of General Somoza, together with his willingness to contribute monies to the previously mentioned scheme. Secondly, it depends to a lesser extent upon A-1's ability to forge ahead with the program. This in turn hinges upon A-1's financial status and abilities.

3. As to the first factor, General Somoza has never had a reputation for benign magnanimity. The facts show quite the opposite. He has a reputation for being a hard-headed self-seeking businessman/militarist who now aspires to political office. Anyone who can help obviously receives his support.

GROUP 1
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[illegible]

Therefore, should A-1's project meet with success, Somoza would benefit both financially and politically. It is difficult to imagine A-1 deriving the same advantages especially when added to these considerations, is the fact that they have nothing whatever to do with Cuba or Cubans.

4. As to the second factor, and returning to the more realistic aspects of the problem, A-1 in the past has demonstrated his ability to sell ideas and projects. In a word he is a politician. However, when it comes to administrative, business and financial matters he is singularly inept. This was amply demonstrated during the AMWORLD era when it was only thanks to the efforts of other well-qualified people that the project was ever able to sustain itself. In summary, as it now stands A-1 is in the position of being wholly beholden of the good offices of General Somoza. He further derives no political advantages from this and is engaged in projects for which he has no basic qualifications. In a sense he is leading with his weakest card. More seriously, his efforts are politically out of focus.

5. The above presents an admittedly gloomy picture of A-1 and his current activities, however, there are certain aspects of the situation which might be used in order to rechannel A-1's efforts. For one, A-1 claims that his magazine Tridente is now running in the black (this, of course, comes from A-1 who probably has difficulty distinguishing an asset from a liability). Secondly, he has purchased 22 acres of land in West Palm Beach where he is supposedly to start training Nicaraguan Indians in the complexities of cooperative farming. Both of these endeavors represent the positive and realistic side of A-1's program. They also represent, or could represent, his Cuban efforts instead of his Nicaraguan efforts. Instead of Nicaraguan Indians, A-1 should be concentrating on training Cuban exiles. Using the proceeds from the two Swift launches, he should expand the acreage of his farm to the point of possibly making it a self-sustaining show place for his cooperative students. In so doing he would be refocusing his political efforts while at the same time improving his Cuban image. From the Agency's point of view it could also be more easily supervised.

6. It is therefore requested that the undersigned be allowed to sit down with A-1 and point out the folly of his current activities and attempt to refocus them along the lines mentioned above. Should he accept these suggestions further efforts would then be made to encourage A-1 to hire a

competent businessman to supervise his financial affairs. Further, once located (preferably by us) future support payments would be made to the business manager instead of to A-1, with stricter accounting and double-checking involved. It would also be suggested that less security would be observed and more direct looking into A-1 business would be the order of the day. As such, it is also recommended that the undersigned be allowed to actually visit the farm and report back on the actual status of the farm. A-1 would also be told that henceforth, except on FI collection missions, he should confine his efforts to the farm and developing a sensible program for cooperative training of Cubans, not Nicaraguans, or any other nationals.

7. In summary A-1 should be told that unless he is prepared to refocus his activities more realistically the Agency's gravy train is about to pull into the station.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW: nancy [illegible]

Dist.
Orig - addressee (file) AMBIDDY
1 - AMCIVIC
1 - EW chrono

SECRET

Rohlfing

CA —

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/CR ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO FILE, VR, WH7, CS/29, SID6, CA2, CA/24, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT [illegible]

S E C R E T 111826Z

11 Dec 63 IN 12969

PRIORITY DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 7851Ø
NO NIACT

TYPIC AMKNOB MHGUILE AMNIP

1. PROPOSE HAVE AMKNOB-1 PASS FOLLOWING TO CUIS VIA SW LETTER:
A. FROM ALFREDO BORGES: MANUEL ARTIME ARRIVED MIAMI 6 DEC FROM NICARAGUA WHERE HE INSPECTED BASE WHICH HE STILL HAS THERE. ARTIME CONTINUES BE VERY FRIENDLY WITH PRESIDENT LUIS SOMOZA.

B. FROM OSIEL GONZALEZ: "EL COJO" ROCHE WAS FORMERLY G-2 CHIEF IN CAMAGUEY. LATER TRANSFERRED TO HAVANA. TOOK EXILE IN EMBASSY OF ECUADOR AND LEFT CUBA VIA BRASIL. ACCORDING TO OSIEL ROCHE HAS MADE VISITS TO PUERTO RICO AND MIAMI, BUT IS NOW IN NEW YORK.

C. FROM OSIEL GONZALEZ AND HECTOR PONCE: BOTH II FRENTE AND EJERCITO LIBERTADOR HAVE DEVELOPED NEW MOMENTUM AND ARE CURRENTLY MAKING PLANS FOR ACTION. NEITHER SOURCE GAVE ANY DETAILS.

D. FROM FATHER INURRIETA: DOMINGUEZ LOYO, SUB DIRECTOR OFICINA DE GOBERNACION IN MEXICO, IS COMPLETELY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND IS OPPOSED TO THE REVOLUTION.

③

E. FROM FATHER INURRIETA: NAME OF PRIEST WHO IS CONFESSOR OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ IS FATHER MENDOZA, WHO IS FROM PUEBLA. HE IS

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2. SINCE ITEM B LEGITIMATELY PICKED UP BY AMKNOB-1, BELIEVE IT SERVES PURPOSE BETTER THAN SUGGESTION IN DIR 63500.

3. ITEMS D AND E ARE RESPONSES TO ABREU REQUIREMENTS WHICH AMKNOB-1 DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITTY TO PASS BEFORE LEAVING MEXICO AND WERE DISCUSSED WITH MEXI BY DORENFEST AND TOBIASON.

4. PLEASE ADVISE PRIOR 1220 HOURS 13 DECEMBER.

SECRET

CFN 7851 NO NIACT AMKNOB-1 CUIS SW ALFREDO BORGES MANUEL ARTIME 6 NICARAGUA LUIS SOMOZA OSIEL GONZALEZ EL COJO G-2 CAMAGUEY HECTOR PONCE II FRENTE EJERCITO LIBERTADOR FATHER INURRIETA DOMINGUEZ LOYO OFICINA DE GOBERNACION PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ FATHER MENDOZA PUEBLA B -1 63500 D E ABREU -1 NOT HAVE DORENFEST TOBIASON 1200 13

BT

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14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM
SAN JOSE

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, C/OPS, CA2,

S E C R E T 110026Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 8157

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

11 DEC 65 IN 12701

REF: WAVE 7832 (IN 12626)

1. BASED MAYLOTT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH JMWAVE OFFICERS ON 2 AND 8 DECEMBER, SUGGEST HQS RELAY STATE TRAFFIC RE ALEGRETT/RUIZ CASE, PARTICULARLY SAN JOSE ASSESSMENTS AND RESULTS MANAGUA TALKS WITH SCHICK AND SOMOZA.

2. FOR WAVE: ALTHOUGH RUIZ MAY HAVE BEEN SLOWED DOWN, BOTH STATION AND EMBASSY, AS WELL AS HOST GOVERNMENT CONTINUE CONCERNED WITH COUP POSSIBILITIES. THUS WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUED COVERAGE ALEGRETT.

S E C R E T

CFN: 8157 WAVE 7832 1 MAYLOTT'S 2 8 RE ALEGRETT/RUIZ SAN JOSE MANAGUA SCHICK SOMOZA 2 WAVE RUIZ

BT

SECRET

10 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1 201

1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned the undersigned and indicated that he was forced to postpone his projected interview with President Raul Leoni of Venezuela due to the latter's having a tight schedule. As it now stands, A-1 plans to travel to Venezuela within ten days for the projected meeting.

2. A-1 stated that he was in contact with Costa Rican Presidential candidate, Daniel Oduber, during his last visit. Oduber supposedly asked for A-1's assistance in trying to overcome a recent spate of rumors surrounding his (Oduber's) allegiance with Communists. (Note: A-1 is already printing some of Oduber's campaign material, so presumably this request falls within the context of the general propaganda discussions which A-1 and Oduber held).

3. A-1 was asked if he had picked up any further information on the "mysterious Italian" which he reported on during his previous Costa Rica visit. He said that he had not but that his local representative in San Jose had been given instructions to try in every way possible to develop further information on the man. As an aside, A-1 stated that he had discussed the matter with the Chief of the Costa Rican Security Service. More specifically, A-1 asked that if by chance his own men located the individual, whether the Costa Rican Service would mind if he "transported" the man across the border to Nicaragua where they would be better able to deal with him. He claimed that the chief offered no objections to this plan. The undersigned cautioned A-1 on any international "transporting" schemes.

4. From Costa Rica, A-1 traveled to Nicaragua where he held a meeting with Anastasio Somoza. The discussion centered on A-1's scheme for setting up a shipbuilding and dry dock facility near Monkey Point. In the course of this discussion, A-1 claims to have obtained an offer from the GON for the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

financing of the shipyard in the amount of $125,000. A-1 claims that this amount, coupled with his own contribution of $75,000, should be enough to begin construction of the facility as well as a school for teaching the indigenous people of the area how to read and write in addition to acquiring a skill in shipbuilding and repairing.

5. As for politics, A-1 stated that Somoza was definitely not interested in embroiling himself with the Guatemalan and Costa Rican coup planners such as Roberto Alejos Arzu and Miguel Ruiz Herrera. The main reason for this was his concern with his own campaign in Nicaragua. Somoza, however, admitted to A-1 that he had given some money to Guatemalan Col. Ponciano in order that the latter would be able to start his electoral campaign in Guatemala. A-1 emphasized that the money was intended to support a legal campaign within the framework of the current constitutional and electoral laws and not for support of the extra-legal efforts of Alejos and company.

6. As an item of incidental interest, A-1, while in Costa Rica, met with Roberto Madrid, the current Secretary to the Costa Rican President (possibly Secretary to the future President). Madrid in the past had been most helpful to AMBIDDY-1's movement in Costa Rica. By coincidence, Madrid was on his way to Miami for a one-week vacation so that A-1 invited him to stay at his house and attend his daughter's baptism. Madrid and his wife, therefore, are current AMBIDDY-1 house guests.

7. Finally, the undersigned queried AMBIDDY-1 on whether he had been successful in obtaining a Nicaraguan passport for AMJAVA-4 in order that the latter might proceed with his plans for enrolling in the University of Mexico. A-1 replied that the passport was issued by the GON and would be mailed direct to A-4 within the next week or two.

A. D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

SECRET

10 December 1965

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

201-267437

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A. D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/Rohlfing:fph
Distribution:
Orig - File (AMBIDDY
1 - EW Chrono
1 - Rohlfing's File
1 - WH/2 (Attn: P. Edwards
1 - WH/3 (Attn: R. Hernandez

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM JMWAVE

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INFO FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

SECRET 102137Z

10 DEC 65 IN 12628

DIR INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE WAVE 7832

DYVOUR PERUMEN

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B WAVE 7503 (IN 02576)*

* COL MIGUEL RUIZ DEPARTED U.S. FOR CENTRAL AMERICA INT'L AIRPORT.

1. HAWLOTT ON TDY MEXI BUT WILL RETURN WAVE CIRCA 22 DEC. WILL HAVE HIM CONTACT ALEGRETT, TELL LATTER THAT HIS INFO PASSED TO APPROPRIATE QUARTERS, THAT THESE HAD NO INTEREST IN FOLLOWUP AND THUS ALEGRETT MAY CONSIDER MATTER CLOSED. ALONG LINES REF HAWLOTT THEN CAN GIVE PERSONAL ADVICE TO ALEGRETT TO ACT IN LEGAL MANNER AND REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO ODENVY ANY MATTERS WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO ODYOKE.

2. IF HQS WISHES ALEGRETT BE CONTACTED BEFORE 22 DEC WAVE CAN ARRANGE GIVE HIM WORD BY PHONE. ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 7832 63132 7503 HAWLOTT TDY 22 ALEGRETT NO INTEREST 22

BT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/PROPAGANDA/AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are tape recordings of talks which have been taped by AMBIDDY-1 at the request of Headquarters for possible re-broadcast into Cuba. As originally conceived, it was thought that AMBIDDY-1 would firstly set forth in broad terms reasons for his talks and then proceed through a series of short speeches to address various political and economic groups within Cuba - such as the "becados" and the Military elements. In each case the overall theme would be to appeal to the basic patriotic emotions of the various social groups and then contrast this patriotism with the current regime which has not only betrayed the ideals of genuine social justice but has betrayed the nation itself.

2. It is therefore requested that the Station review the attachments, which have been submitted on a pilot basis, and that any suggestions and/or comments regarding their usage be forwarded to Headquarters for further consideration. Please also include views on what Radio Station would be most appropriate for the broadcasts.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Attachment:
As Stated Herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-5717

CS COPY

DATE: 07 DEC 1965

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-267437

1 December 1965
Distribution:
1 - WH/C/CA/EW
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/C/MO

ABSTRACT X INDEX

WH/C/ES

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/EW	A.D. Rohlfing	jmg	6957

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/C/CA		David Ronis
DCWHD/C		John L. Hart
WH/C/MO	DEC 10	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		William V. Broe

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

7 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Current Status of AMJAVA-4

1. AMJAVA-4 is currently awaiting news from Nicaragua on obtaining a Nicaraguan passport for use in getting into Mexico. AMBIDDY-1 has promised to look into the matter for him and upon his return from Venezuela, via Nicaragua, should have definite news. AMBIDDY-1 returns from his trip around 15 December. In the interim, AMJAVA-4 has been doing some work for SOD/Maritime such as spotting and recruiting suitable candidates in the JMWAVE area for use in an operation currently being run on Lake Tanganyika. He was also scheduled to travel to Buenos Aires in order to give a familiarization course in Maritime operations to a group of Argentine naval people who were to be used in Africa. This latter plan, however, fell through. He has also been enrolled at a junior college in the JMWAVE area in order to improve his English.

2. AMJAVA-4 has been asked in very general terms if he could put together a sabotage team composed of trained ex-AMWORLD personnel. He was most enthusiastic and stated that he was in constant touch with many of the ex-AMWORLD group and that he could put together a team in fairly quick order. It was emphasized that we (KUBARK) did not have anything specific in mind but if his Mexican schooling plans failed we might have to consider other possibilities including his use in a sabotage operation.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/Rohlfing:mak
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
- AMBIDDY File
1 - AMJAVA-4 File
1 - EW Chrono

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

F.le

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Jm WAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, COMMO 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 062350Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE 7728

TYPIC AMWORLD AMBIDDY-1

7 Dec 65 IN 08990

1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMJOKE-1, 4 DEC 65:

A. AMBIDDY-1 HAS 18 OR MORE WT SETS, SUPPOSEDLY RS-511, STORED IN HOUSE IN DOWNTOWN MIAMI NEAR COURTHOUSE AND VICINITY RIVER AT 12 STREET. THEY ORIGINALLY ISSUED TO HIM AND PICKED UP IN NORFOLK, VA., WHEN HE LEADING AMWORLD.

B. ACCORDING JULIO YANEZ PEREGRIN (201-741155), AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE WANTED TALK WITH YANEZ SOON RE OPPORTUNITY YANEZ WORK WITH AMBIDDY-1 FROM BASE IN VENEZUELA. AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE CONDUCITNG HIGHLY SELECTIVE RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN IN ORDER AVOID SOME OF PITFALLS OF AMWORLD DAYS. YANEZ GAVE AMJOKE-1 IMPRESSION THIS OPPORTUNITY MEANS "GOOD MONEY."

C. ACCORDING RENE CANCIO (PROB IDEN WITH SUBJ 201-285784) AMBIDDY-1 SAID HE EXPECTS TO START WORKING ON CUBAN CAUSE IN TWO OR THREE MONTHS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN: 7728 AMJOKE-1 4 DEC 65 AMBIDDY-1 18 WT RS-511 MIAMI 12 NORFOLK VA AMWORLD JULIO YANEZ PEREGRIN 201-741155 -1 -1 VENEZUELA

201-267437

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 59
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ | BY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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ORIG : [illegible] CASTROIST
UNIT : WH/C/CICS
EXT : 9256
DATE : 4 DECEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING DDC

1	CICS	5	CA
2		6	RR/RE
3	MO	7	C
4	FI	8	D

TO : JMWAVE MANAGUA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, CA2, CA/O4

TO WAVE INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE DIR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7572 (IN 04077)

File - AmBIDDY-1 3132

1. FYI: HQS HAS BEEN ADVISED BY COACID THAT ON MORNING 3 DEC 65, COL MIGUEL RUIZ DEPARTED US FOR CENTRAL AMERICA FROM MIAMI INT'L AIRPORT. OOURGE, AT THE REQUEST OF ODBOON, AFFIXED CANCELLATION STAMP HIS VISA THUS PRECLUDING RE-ENTRY. IT INEVITABLE ALEGRETTE WILL SOON LEARN HIS CO-CONSPIRATOR'S FATE AND HOPEFULLY PROFIT BY EXAMPLE.

2. WAVE ONLY: SUGGEST HAWLOTT RE-CONTACT ALEGRETTE AND ADVISE HIM HE MUST ABIDE BY LAWS OF LAND WHILE HERE. THIS TO INCLUDE REGISTERING AS SOMOZA AGENT WITH ODENVY SHOULD THEY REQUIRE THIS. FINALLY, THAT KUBARK HAS NO INTEREST IN HIM AND THAT HE IS TO REFER TO ODENVY ■ ANY FUTURE CONTACTS HE MAY WISH TO MAKE WITH ODYOKE. SUGGEST HAWLOTT APPROACH BE PHRASED IN TERMS OF PERSONAL ADVICE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL ADMONITION. FYI: WISH POINT OUT ANY HARASSMENT ALEGRETTE MAY BE EXPERIENCING IS MOST LIKELY WORK OF ODBOON RATHER THAN ODENVY.

3. SINCE ALEGRETTE CAN LOGICALLY ASSUME HAWLOTT SPEAKING FOR GALBOND, HQS EXPECTS NO FURTHER ATTEMPTS ON HIS PART TO RECONTACT KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

6-4

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

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ROUTING			
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4		8	

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☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

INFO CITE DIR 63132

[illegible]

C/WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/[illegible]
DC/WH/2 Charles Katsainos (telecoord)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance date: 3 December 1963

FROM : WH/C/CA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)__________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria $ 5,000
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA:SA:CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1)_____ Devised Cover Check. Account No._____-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

	BOSTON		DALLAS*		KANSAS CITY		MIAMI		NEW ORLEANS		RICHMOND		ST. LOUIS
	CHICAGO		DENVER		KNOXVILLE		MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*		SAN FRANCISCO		WASHINGTON, D.C.*
	CLEVELAND		DETROIT		LOS ANGELES		MINNEAPOLIS		PHILADELPHIA		SEATTLE		WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name:__________
(2) Account Number:__________
(3) Bank Name:__________
(4) Bank Address:__________
__________ Zip:_____
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from__________
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired:__________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Andrew D. Rehlfing 6957 John L. Hart 7264
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment__________ City__________

FORM 1-68 1884 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (88)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Chrono Copy

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH/C AMCIVIC/AMBIDDY

TO: Confidential Funds Division

DATE: 3 Dec 65

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

December payment to AMBIDDY-1 of $5,000 for supporting the dependents of members of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, funds passed to AMBIDDY-1 are being used or have been used for the purpose intended and further advances are warranted.

Andrew D. Rohlfing

PAYEE: AMBIDDY-1

AMOUNT: $5,000

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE:

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF AGENT:

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS: See 1834 Attached

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE:

TITLE: WH/C/CA/EW

SIGNATURE: Andrew D. Rohlfing

APPROVED

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER:

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER: John L. Hart

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.:

CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.:

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER: WH/[illegible]

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE:

AMOUNT: $5,000

SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP.DOC.NO. / 32-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE / REC.RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA CR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL: F.Y. / FUNDS	61-66 CK. NO. / REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT: DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE:

PREPARED BY:

DATE:

REVIEWED BY:

TOTALS:

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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(1-49)

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

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ROUTING			
1	CICS	5	FI
2		6	CA
3	MO	7	
4	RR	8	

2 DEC 65 23 6Z

ORIG : E.SCOGGIN:ST SCS
UNIT : WH/C/CICS
EXT : 9286
DATE : 2 DECEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-74[illegible]618

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH8

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR

62469

TYPIC AMBIDDY

REF: DIR 58809*

AMBIDDY/1 ASKED BY HQS CO TO IDENTIFY CUBAN INTERROGATORS IN EFFORT DETERMINE IF ONE COULD HAVE BEEN ABREU. A/1 STATED UNABLE MAKE IDENTIFICATION BECAUSE CONSTANT FOCUS BRIGHT LIGHT IN EYES PROHIBITED SEEING INTERROGATORS.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref concerns Hqs attempts identify AMKNOB/1 CO who claimed he interrogated AMBIDDY/1 Cuba

C/WH/C/CICS

WH/1

WH/C/MO

WH/C/FI/~~TC~~

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

2-15

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
3212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami 30 de Noviembre de 1965

Mr. Federico R. Lustra
Baltimore. Md.

Estimado Señor:

Primero quiero enumerarle el significado de los documentos que le adjunto:

#1- Copia fotostática de la carta que se supone Daniel Oduber escribió a Mora Valverde. No hay certidumbre de ésto, pues el documento es procedente de José Ivan Alegret, quien lo recibió de Miguel Ruiz Herrero.

#2 y # 3 -Copias fotostáticas de peticiones hechas por Daniel Oduber a distintos funcionarios del Gobierno Costarricense, presentando a ciertas comunistas para que les resuelvan los problemas que tienen. Tienen la misma procedencia que el documento anterior.

#4 y # 5- Cartas recibidas por Eduardo Mora Valverde y Manuel Mora Valverde de la República Dominicana, donde se exponen detalles interesantes sobre Raúl Castro y sobre la situación interna de Costa Rica. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta, delegado nuestro en Costa Rica, obtenidas a través de un amigo de "Costa Rica Libre", que parece ser amigo también de Ruiz Herrero. Pero estos documentos, si son inventados, lo son por el amigo de Miguel Ruiz, no por él.

6.- Documento que se supone sea la organización comunista en Centro América y el Caribe. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta.

7 .- Lista de los miembros de la S.C.A.P., sociedad que se supone sea la que suministra hombres en Costa Rica, para ser entrenados en Cuba y regresar a su país con planes de subversión y sabotaje. Fuente de origen: Luis Arizurrieta.

El Sr Luis Arizurrieta tiene un grupo de muchachos jóvenes, reclutados entre los amigos de un jóven costarricense que trabajó con nosotros cuando teníamos campamentos allí; que se han infiltrado en la juventud socialista de Costa Rica. A través de esta red; se han obtenido los siguientes informes:

1-Que desde Julio de 1965, hay un hombre en Costa Rica, que llegó al parecer de México, que es conocido con el nombre de "Giovanni", que luce ser italia-

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria
3212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(2)

no, que medirá aproximadamente 1.75 ms. de alto, delgado, pálido, que siempre suele llevar gafas, que tiene el pelo largo y lacio, con entradas pronunciadas, y manchas canosas a los lados de la cabeza (sienes), que viste bien y suele andar erguido. Manos largas y afiladas. Nuez del cuello prominente.

Este individuo ha sido visto en Turrialba, Costa Rica, en conversaciones con Marcial Aguiluz, que lo trata con mucho respeto. También ha sido visto en el Restaurant "El Príncipe", frente al Hotel Costa Rica, en charla con individuos de acento panameño.
Ha sido visto también en el Restaurant "Chi-Kon" San José.

Una vez estaba en este último Restaurant, conversando con Isidoro Guzmán, policía de las Radio-Patrullas, vestido de paisano Guzmán.

Todos lo tratan con mucho respeto y se han oído comentarios entre ciertos sectores comunistas, de que este hombre viaja mucho por Centro-América. Lo consideran un jefe de muy alta jerarquía.

Según lo que se ha reportado de Costa Rica; la Embajada Cubana en Méjico, envía mensajes a Costa Rica a través de la Embajada de Bolivia en San José; muchas veces, a través del Apartado 1261 de San José.

Parece ser que Ubaldo García, cubano que trabaja en Televisión, canal 9 y Francisco Gamboa, son los encargados de manejar el asunto de cubanos infiltrados en Costa Rica, bien para Costa Rica, o bien para otros países de Centro-América.

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte. su s.s.

Ignacio

29 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH/SAF

SUBJECT : Accounting for Advance in Amount of $5,000 to AMBIDDY-1 for Month of October

There follows a breakdown of expenses incurred by AMBIDDY-1 during the month of October:

A) Amount sent to Father Llorente for delivery to dependents inside Cuba via the Embassy of Spain $ 2,000

B) Breakdown of pensions or allotments to dependents of ex-MRR members who have either been imprisoned or executed by the Castro regime in Cuba:

[illegible] Alonso	275.00
Alfredo [illegible] [illegible]	250.00
[illegible] [illegible]	200.00
Gustavo [illegible] Vidal	275.00
[illegible] [illegible]	250.00
[illegible] del Rio	100.00
[illegible] [illegible]	125.00
[illegible] [illegible]	200.00
Antonio [illegible] [illegible]	200.00
[illegible] Garcia	250.00

Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claudo	100.00
TOTAL	$5,000.00

Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/PW

DDP/WH/C/CA/PW/Rohlfing:mak
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - AMBIDDY File

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ORIG : B. MILLS/ear
UNIT : WH/C/MO/PM
EXT : 4215
DATE : 26 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MO	5	RR
2		6	A
3	CI	7	C
4	CA-	8	D

26 NOV 65 22 52Z

TO : JMWAVE INFO: MANAGUA SAN JOSE TEGUCIGALPA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH8 SOD6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT2

TO PRITY WAVE INFO MANA SJOS TEGU CITE DIR 61115

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMTABBY-27

REFS: A. WAVE 7490 (IN 01866)

B. WAVE 7491 (IN 01886)

1. AS GENERAL MONTIEL ACTUALLY SAID TO AMTABBY-27 PER REF A, THAT "COUP A NECESSARY UNDERTAKING IN COSTA RICA", CONSIDERABLE CREDENCE ADDED REF A AND PAST REPORTS THIS SUBJECT. VIEW THIS, REQUEST WAVE RECONFIRM MONTIEL STATEMENT ABOVE MADE TO AMTABBY-27 AND IF POSSIBLE ELABORATE.

2. CAN WAVE OFFICER WHO CONTACTS ALEGRETT DISCREETLY DETERMINE VALIDITY IMPLIED SOMOZA SUPPORT TO COUP EFFORT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills
WH/C/CICS J. Castoro (draft)
WH/2/CR P. Edwards (draft)

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

26-28

SECRET

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3 Dul

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH 4

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/IC 2, CA/PS, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT 2

ACTION

SECRET 251520Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 3117 [illegible]

REF DIR 60049

1. MAJ. (FNU) GUTIERREZ REF IDENTICAL (RETIRED) MAJOR JOSE ISABEL GUTIERREZ RODRIGUEZ, VENEZUELAN MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS 44. HISTORY AS RIGHTEST PLOTTER, IN LATER YEARS INFLUENCED BY MARXIST IDEAS OF LT. COL. JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL WHO IN JAIL. GUTIERREZ DECLARED ENEMY OF ACCION DEMOCRATICA PARTY AND LEONI GOVERNMENT. INVOLVED SEVERAL CONSPIRACIES LAST ONE BEING THAT OF GENERAL JESUS MARIA CASTRO LEON. ACCORDING CIWHIM-5 VENEZUELAN ARMY G-2 AND SIFA AWARE BUT NOT CONCERNED OVER HIS ACTIVITIES. MILITARY ARREST ORDER PENDING, THEREFORE DOUBT GUTIERREZ OPENLY TRAVELS CARACAS.

2. ACCORDING CIWHIM-9, GUTIERREZ INVOLVED CONTRABAND BETWEEN MIAMI AND VENEZUELA IN CONJUNCTION SEVERAL VENEZUELAN PILOTS SUCH AS (FNU) PARODI (PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GONZALO PARODI GRANES; SEE WAVE 6881 8JAN 65). GUTIERREZ REPRESENTS ANSELMO ALVARADO WHO MARRIED TO SISTER OF GUTIERREZ'S WIFE. ALVARADO IS UNION REPUBLICAN DEMOCRATICA (URD) POLITICIAN AND OWNER OF RACE HORSES

SECRET

Copy detached and logged

201-267437

14-00000

PAGE 2
IN 62279

WHICH SOMETIMES RUN IN MIAMI. INVOLVED WITH ALVARADO IN HORSE BUSINESS IS DR. MIGUEL TORREALBA ALSO URD POLITICIAN WHO MARRIED TO SISTER OR COUSIN OF ALIRIO UGARTE PELAYO'S WIFE AND RELATED TO COLONEL GONZALO MURILLO SPERANDIO. SINCE GUTIERREZ'S BUSINESS AND FAMILY TIES ARE WITH URD POLITICIANS DOUBT HE PLOTTING WITH PROMINENT COPEI LEADER.

3. GUTIERREZ WAS CLOSE FRIEND OF GENERAL CASTRO LEON AND THEREFORE IN GROUP WHICH SUPPORTED GENERALS SANCHEZ VALDERRAMA, MERCHAN LOPEZ, TRUJILLO ECHEVERRIA, MAJOR LUIS MARCELO PACHECO. THESE INDIVIDUALS EITHER IN SEMI-MILITARY POSITIONS SUCH AS ARMY SOCIAL SERVICES OR PRIVATE BUSINESS. OTHER FRIENDS ARE:

A) MAJOR ALI CHALBAUD GODOY, RETIRED, WANTED BY SIFA FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOVERNMENT.

B) MAJOR CARDIER RODRIGUEZ

C) COL. MIGUEL ANGEL NIETO BASTOS, RETIRED NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER

D) MAJOR OSWALDO GRAZIANI FARINAS, RETIRED

E) LT. COL. JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL, SAN MARCOS JAIL.

F) MAJ. RAFAEL ANGEL MILINA FRANCO

G) MAJOR EDGAR DUHAMEL CASTRO

H) COL. OSCAR TAMAYO SUAREZ 201-42094 RETIRED.

OF PRIME IMPORTANCE IN MILITARY COUP IS INVOLVEMENT OF OFFICERS WHO

SECRET

PAGE 3
IN C2277

SECRET

COMMAND TROOPS. NONE OF GUTIERREZ'S FRIENDS IN SUCH POSITION. IN CARACAS IT ESSTENTIAL CONTROL OR NEUTRALIZE MINIMUM FOUR KEY UNITS, BOLIVAR INF. BN., AYACUCHO ARTILLERY GP, BERMUDEZ TANK BN, AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, TO SAY NOTHING OF NATIONAL GUARD MOBILE DETACHMENT AND MILITARY POLICE BN. GARRISONS IN MARACAY, ORIENTE (PRESUMABLY MATURIN) AND CIUDAD BOLIVAR REPORTEDLY CONTROLLED BY SO-CALLED CENTRALIST MOVEMENT. STATION HAS NO INFO PTJ INVOLVED IN ANY PLOT.

4. STORY INVOLVING COMMANDO GROUP BEING TRAINED BY EX WWII GERMAN OFFICERS SOUNDS LIKE OLD STORY PARROTED FOR YEARS BY CARLOS SAVELLI MALDONADO WHOSE LINE INVOLVES "SHOCK TROOPS" TRAINED BY "NAZI INSTRUCTORS," "ABDUCTIONS AND ASSASSINATIONS" OF POLITICAL LEADER. POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUTIERREZ AND SAVELLI, OR WITH ANY GROUP WORKING AGAINST GOVERNMENT PROVIDED THEY WOULD ACCEPT GUTIERREZ WHO HAS LITTLE TO OFFER. GUTIERREZ DISCONTENTED INDIVIDUAL WITH COMPLEX REACTIONS, HIGHLY INFLUENCED BY WIFE. STATION SERIOUSLY DOUBTS HE PLAYS IMPORTANT ROLE IN ANY PLOTTING GROUP. HE MAY HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF CENTRALISTS AND ATTEMPTING GET CLOSE THIS GROUP.

5. PARASA, 201-98533, RETIRED AND DISCREDITED OFFICER OF NO IMPORTANCE.

SECRET

PAGE 4
IN 62279

6. CONCERNING POSSIBLE CHURCH INVOLVEMENT, PARSON AT NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA IS FATHER TEODORO AGUIRRE, NOT KNOWN AS CONSPIRATOR. PARSON AT PARISH EL ROSAL (NOT ROSARIO) MONSENOR BERNARDO HEREDIA WHO REPORTEDLY ADECO ENEMY AND FREQUENTLY INVOLVED POLITICAL ACTIVITY AGAINST GOVERNMENT. OTHER CONSPIRING PRIESTS ARE FATHER SALVATIERRA PITO, FATHER AGUAS AND FATHER RAFAEL MARIA ALVAREZ FLEGAL. THERE IS GROUP WITHIN CHURCH PRESSURING CARDINAL TO INTERVENE AGAINST GOVERNMENT BUT PRESENT CHURCH POLICY IS TO STAY CLEAR OF OR AT BEST ON FRINGE SUCH ACTIVITY.

7. SINCE DOUBT VALIDITY REF REPORT AUTHORIZE PASSAGE ABOVE (MINUS PARA 6) TO AMBIDDY-1 FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE WITH GUTIERREZ WHOSE GUNS SHOULD BE SPIKED.

SECRET

CFN 3117 MAJ (FNU) GUTIERREZ JOSE ISABEL GUTIERREZ RODRIGUEZ 44 JUAN DE DIOS MONCADA VIDAL LEONI JESUS MARIA CASTRO LEON CIVHIM-5 G-2 SIFA NOT CONCERNED 9 PARODI GONZALO PARODI GRANES 6881 8 63 ANSELMO ALVARADO URD DR. MIGUEL TORREALBA ALIRIO UGARTE PELAYO'S GONZALO MURILLO SPERANDIO COPEI SANCHEZ VALDERRAMA MERCHAN LOPEZ TRUJILLO ECHEVERRIA LUIS MARCELO PACHECO ALI CHALBAUD GODOY CARDIER RODRIGUEZ MIGUEL ANGEL NIETO BASTOS OSWALDO GRAZIANI FARINAS JUAN DE DIOS

PAGE 5
IN 62279

MONCADA VIDAL RAFAEL ANGEL MOLINA FRANCO EDGAR DUHAMEL CASTRO OSCAR TAMAYO SUAREZ 201-42794 NONE OF BOLIVAR INF. BN. AYACUCHO BERMUDEZ ORIENTE MATURIN CIUDAD NO INFO PTJ EX WWII 201-98533 NO IMPORTANCE NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA TEODORO AGUIRRE NOT KNOWN EL ROSAL NOT ROSARIO BERNARDO HEREDIA ADECO SALVATIERRA PITO AGUAS RAFAEL MARIA ALVAREZ FLEGAL 6 AMBIDDY-1

BT

201-267437

☐ DCL ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG : A.D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6957-1255 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 22 NOV 65 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

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3	CA	7	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	8	[illegible]

TO : CARACAS MANAGUA SAN JOSE GUATEMALA TEGUICIGALPA PANAMA CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY , WH 8, C/OPS, C/OA

TO CARA MANA SJOS INFO GUAT TEGU PACY WAVE CITE DIR 60387

TYPIC

DIR: 60386

File
AMBIDDY-1

IDEN - 1 PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI

IDEN - 2 MANUEL A. BUESA

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

Terrell
WH/2 (telecon)

M. Peak
WH/3 (telecon)

WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-3

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DATE : 22 NOVEMBER 65

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23 NOV 65 15 02z

TO : CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY [illegible]

[illegible] FI

TO CARA INFO WAVE CITE DIR

60049

REF: A. DIR-59681*

B. HVCW-6746**

1. AMBIDDY-1 CONTACTED IN MIAMI BY VEN MAJOR (FNU) GUTIERREZ CLAIMING HE LOCAL REP FOR GROUP OF PLOTTERS CURRENTLY TRAINING FOR COUP AGAINST LEONI REGIME. A-1 UNABLE OBTAIN NAMES OTHER THAN COL. MARTIN PARADA. ACCORDING A-1 LEADER OF PLOT LOCATED IN CARACAS CONVENT NUESTRA SENORA DE FATIMA OR NUESTRA SENORA DEL ROSARIO.

2. A-1 SAID GUTIERREZ COMMUTES BETWEEN CARA AND MIAMI. TELEPHONE IN MIAMI 887-0795 (NO GUTIERREZ LISTED MIAMI DIRECTORY WITH THIS NUMBER).

3. GUTIERREZ GAVE A-1 FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTACTING LEADER: A-1 SHOULD PROCEED CARA AND CALL DR. (FNU) MORELOS (WHOM A-1 SUSPECTS MAY BE PRIEST). MORELOS WILL THEN TAKE A-1 TO LEADER.

4. A-1 REPORTED CONSPIRATORS HAVE ENLISTED SUPPORT PROMINENT COPEI LEADER (A-1 UNABLE SUPPLY NAME). PURPORTEDLY GARRISONS IN MARACAY, ORIENTE AND BOLIVAR ALREADY HAVE GIVEN TACIT CONSENT JOIN

CONTINUED.....

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TO :

PAGE #2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 60049

PLOTTERS. ALSO CARA ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ JUDICIAL TECHNICAL POLICE WILLING GO ALONG WITH PLOT. ALLEGEDLY PLOTTERS IN CONTACT WITH SPANISH EMB CARA.

5. A-1 REPORTED COUP TO EVOLVE AS FOLLOWS: COMMANDO GROUP CURRENTLY BEING TRAINED BY EX-WW II GERMAN ARMY OFFICERS TO SURROUND HOMES OF 60 PROMINENT CIVIL AND MILITARY LEADERS ON DATE DESIGNATED AS "NOCHE DE LOS CUCHILLOS LARGOS" (NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES). SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOVE MENTIONED GARRISONS WOULD SEIZE LEADERSHIP ARMED FORCES.

6. HQS TRACES PARADA: IDEN WITH SUBJ 201-98533; LEADER MIL PLOT AGAINST BETANCOURT REGIME 196 . LATER SOUGHT ASYLUM COLOMBIAN EMB AND EXILED. ODENVY REPORT DBB-6953 DATED 28 JUL 65 STATED SUBJ ARRIVED MIAMI 28 JULY.

7. ONLY HQS TRACE ON MORELOS REFLECTS ONE FATHER JOSE MARIA MORELOS IN MEXI APPROX 1956. NO OTHER IDEN INFO. WISH TO POINT OUT POSSIBILITY DR. MORELOS MAY BE IDEN WITH DR. MORENO (201-42[illegible]33) WHO ALSO KEY FIGURE 1961 MILITARY PLOT.

CONTINUED......

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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PAGE #3

ROM: DIRECTOR

ONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

O INFO CITE DIR 60049

8. SEPARATE CABLE TO FOLLOW OUTLINING A-1'S VEN ITINERARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *A-1 confirms Alegrett approach to buy arms and former in direct contact with Vene and Guat plotters.
**Re A-1 Conversation with alleged Vene right wing plotters.

WH/C/MO E. Chiocca (by phone)
WH/CA D. Rohlfing (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

HERSCHEL PEAK
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

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22 November 1965

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Contact Report

1. I contacted AMBIDDY-1 (A-1) 17 November in order to discuss the rumors surrounding his having met with Nicaraguan Captain Jose Ivan Alegrette. A-1 confirmed that he had held a meeting with Alegrette 16 November. During the course of the meeting Alegrette had proposed to purchase the remaining AMWORLD arms currently located in Nicaragua. A-1 refused to discuss the matter with Alegrette and told him they were not for sale. He assured the undersigned that KUBARK need not worry about the arms falling into Alegrette's or anyone elses hands. Alegrette also offered to put A-1 in contact with Roberto Alejos Arzu, Guatemalan millionaire and a constant plotter against the regime of Peralta. A-1 met Alejos the following day and the details of the meeting are outlined below. In any case, A-1 assured the undersigned that the arms in his possession are currently hidden in the basement of two houses located in Managua and Bluefields respectively. The arms total about 100 rifles, sub-machine-guns and carbines. There are also two bazookas and four small (60 millimeter) mortars. A-1 also stated that only three trusted AMWORLDER's are aware of the location of the arms; one of these being AMJAVA-4. I later checked with AMJAVA-4 and he confirmed this last point.

2. A-1 plans to travel to Managua on 22 November in order to meet with Anastasio Somoza and turn over the bases to the latter. A-1 feels that he cannot use the bases any-more, and the ammunition which is now located there constitutes a serious hazard to the local populace since A-1 no longer has people to guard the storehouses. Hence, all of the ammunition at the bases will be turned over to Somoza. Another reason for A-1's visit is to discuss Somoza's election campaign with him (A-1 is printing Somoza's campaign posters for him and he provided me with two exemplars). A-1 also stated that his "cooperative training center at West Palm Beach" will soon receive its first three natives from

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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Nicaragua. Somoza has promised to pay the passage of the three trainees while A-1 for his part will provide them with food lodging and training while in the U.S.

3. From Nicaragua A-1 plans on travelling to Costa Rica. A-1 will possibly meet with the Presidential candidate Daniel Oduber in order to discuss his campaign, since A-1 has offered to print his posters for him. However, the main purpose of A-1's visit to Costa Rica is to obtain a Venezuelan entry visa. A-1 reasoned that it would be more discreet to apply from Costa Rica, in addition to which he is expecting an invitation from President Leoni via the Venezuelan embassy in San Jose. As yet, however, he has received no word on the matter so that if this latter plan falls through he will return to Miami. A-1 provided a complete account on his latest dealings with a certain group of Venezuelan plotters (again courtesy of Alegrette, who put him in touch with them). There follows the two accounts mentioned previously:

Guatemala

At a meeting which A-1 held with Alejos (18 November), the latter invited A-1 to attend a meeting between himself, Colonel FNU Ponciano and Somoza. The purpose of the meeting will be to attempt to enlist the support of Somoza in an attempt against the government of Enrique Peralta. A-1 asked for instructions from KUBARK on whether or not to attend the meeting. In any event, Alejos stated that the plans call for the calling of a general strike throughout the country, followed by a coup under the leadership of Ponciano. Ponciano would then set up a two year provisional government after which general elections would be called. As with Alegrette, A-1 promised Alejos nothing.

Venezuela

A-1 has been in contact (in Miami) with a Venezuelan Major by name of FNU Gutierrez who claims to be the local representative and cut-out for a group of plotters who are currently training for a coup against the regime of Raul Leoni. A-1 has not been able to ascertain the names of any of the principles other than a Colonel Martin Parada, who in the past worked with the Perez Jimenez regime in flying arms to Somoza (who in turn was attempting to overthrow the Costa Rican government). The leader of the plot is currently located in a convent in the Caracas area. He is located at either the convent of Nuestra Senora de Fatima or Nuestra Senora del Rosario. Gutierrez has offered to put A-1 in contact with the leader and has even given him contact instructions. A-1 is to proceed to Caracas and call on a Dr. Morelos, who A-1 suspects may be a priest. The Doctor will then take him to the leader. The conspirators have enlisted the support of a prominent COPEI leader of the right-wing faction but again his name remains a mystery. In addition, the garrison a Maracai, the Provinces of Oriente and Bolivar states have already given their tacit consent to join. The judicial police of Caracas are also willing to go along with the plotters.

The actual plan will consist of a group of commandos (who are currently being trained by ex-WW II German Army officers) surrounding the homes of 60 of the most prominent Civil and Military leaders of the country on a date designated as the "night of the long knives". Simultaneously, the above-mentioned garrisons will rise up and take over the leadership of the Armed forces. Again, A-1 awaits KUBARK instructions as to whether or not to attend a meeting with the secret leader of the coup group.

Andrew D. Rohlfing
Andrew D. Rohlfing
WH/C/CA/EW

MRR

Movimento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Nov 22 1965.

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 Md.

Estimado Amigo:

Tengo el gusto de reportar el empleo de los $5,000.00 recibidos para gastos del mes de Octubre.

Entregadas al Padre Llorente para enviar a través de la Embajada de España ———— $ 2,000.00

Entregados para su envío a Cuba, a familiares de presos o fusilados del Movimiento ————:

Inocencio Alonso	275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tapanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández Vidal	375 300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del [illegible]	100.00
Silvio Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	100.00
Totals	$5,0[illegible].00 000.00

MRR
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2312 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA
TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6406

Como se vé, en subsidios a familiares de presos o fusilados hemos gastado $25.00 más de lo que recibimos.

Esto sin contar con los gastos de :

- Revista "Tridente"
- Oficina
- Delegaciones de Costa Rica
  - Nicaragua
  - Venezuela
  - España
  - Honduras
  - Guatemala

Todo ésto ha costado en Octubre : $ 5,700.00 dólares

Tampoco estáincluido aquí:

- Mis viajes
- Mi supervivencia
- El personal que cuida las armas en N.
- El personal de Acción Cívica
- El personal de la granja modelo

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Ignacio

Ignacio

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

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20 Nov 65 IN 98944

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REF DIR 59291

SPYCHALSKI DEPARTED STATION PRIOR RECEIPT REF.

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CFN 7386 59291 SPYCHALSKI

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DATE	20 Nov 65				

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BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
GUAT 5503(IN 98668)
WAVE 7343(IN 97731)
HGG 4039, UFG 7736
NP (ANTABBY-27)
ESGARDEN (ESGARDEN-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR PACY, LANT, GUAT, MANA, SJOS, WAVE, BARR, AND SALV

Rohlfing — Have you seen this?

File (AMBIDDY) [illegible]

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

file [illegible]

yes - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] not [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]!

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COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/C

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SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/EL SALVADOR/NICARAGUA

TDCS DB-315/03768-65

DATE OF INFO. 17 AND 19 NOVEMBER 1965

DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

1. TRAVEL OF MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON TO EL SALVADOR TO REQUEST AID OF SALVADORAN PRESIDENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF MIGUEL ANGEL PONCIANO SAMAYOA.
2. PLANS OF ROBERTO ALEJOS TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA IN A PLAN TO OVERTHROW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (18 NOVEMBER 1965)
GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA CITY (19 NOVEMBER 1965)

REF IN 97731
98668

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG 7736
HGG 4030

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: PARA 1 AND 2: MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN) WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG LEADERS OF THE MLN AND RIGHTIST POLITICAL GROUPS. HE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR MORE THAN SEVERAL YEARS, AND THE INFORMATION HE HAS PROVIDED USUALLY HAS BEEN ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM SANDOVAL.

PARA 3: A CUBAN EMIGRE, FORMER MEMBER OF A CUBAN COMMANDO GROUP, WHO IS NO LONGER ASSOCIATED WITH ACTIVISTS. SOURCE IS REGARDED AS RELIABLE, AND PREVIOUS REPORTING FROM HIM HAS PROVED TO BE ACCURATE. HE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM A CONVERSATION WITH ALEGRETTE WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN INDICATIONS OF BEING MENTALLY UNSTABLE. THIS INFORMATION CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED.

1. MARIO SANDOVAL ALARCON, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN-RIGHTIST PARTY), PLANNED TO GO TO EL SALVADOR ON 30 NOVEMBER TO CONFER WITH JULIO RIVERA, PRESIDENT OF EL SALVADOR. SANDOVAL WILL PRESENT A COMPLETE REPORT ON THE GUATEMALAN POLITICAL SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON 6 MARCH 1966. SANDOVAL WILL ASK PRESIDENT RIVERA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

FOR FINANCIAL AID FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF COLONEL MIGUEL ANGEL PONCIANO SAMAYOA, THE CANDIDATE OF THE MLN FOR PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL ALSO URGE RIVERA TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE UPON COLONEL ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, CHIEF OF THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF DIPLOMATS AND MILITARY OFFICERS, TO BACK PONCIANO'S CANDIDACY.

2. ON 22 NOVEMBER SANDOVAL PLANS TO GO FROM EL SALVADOR TO MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, GUATEMALAN EXILE RESIDENT IN MIAMI. THIS MEETING BETWEEN SANDOVAL AND ALEJOS WAS ARRANGED ON 18 NOVEMBER BY ALEJOS THROUGH THE FORMER NICARAGUAN CONSUL IN MIAMI BY TELEPHONE TO SANDOVAL IN GUATEMALA CITY. ALEJOS TOLD SANDOVAL THAT GENERAL SOMOZA HAD ASKED HIM TO COOPERATE POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY WITH THE MLN DIRECTLY THROUGH SANDOVAL. IN MANAGUA ON 22 NOVEMBER SANDOVAL WILL REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH ALEJOS IN FAVOR OF PONCIANO'S CANDIDACY.

3. ON 17 NOVEMBER JOSE IVAN ALEGRETTE, FORMER NICARAGUAN VICE CONSUL IN MIAMI, WHO IS INVOLVED IN A PLOT OT OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA, MET WITH ALEJOS, MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, A CUBAN EXILE, AND A GUATEMALAN KNOWN AS "BRAN" DESCRIBED AS THE RIGHT HAND MAN OF ALEJOS. ALEJOS AND BRAN ASKED ALEGRETTE TO ARRANGE A MEETING FOR THEM IN NICARAGUA WITH COLONEL PONCIANO AND WITH GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA. ALEGRETTE AGREED TO DO THIS. ALEJOS HOPES TO OBTAIN SOMOZA'S BACKING OF A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING WEAPONS. (FIELD COMMENT: "BRAN" IS PRESUMED TO BE IDENTICAL WITH CARLOS ADOLFO BRAN SANCHEZ, FORMER GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER AND DEPUTY, ARRESTED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS

BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA, AND EXPELLED FROM GUATEMALA IN FEBRUARY 1964 AT WHICH TIME HE WENT TO NICARAGUA. SUBJECT HAS WORKED WITH ALEJOS AND FORMER GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES. SEE CS-311/06517-65.

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ARTIME SAID THAT ALEJOS HAD INVITED ARTIME TO ATTEND A MEETING IN MANAGUA. BETWEEN HIMSELF, COL. PONCIANO (FNU) AND SOMOZA. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF SOMOZA IN AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF ENRIQUE PERALTA. ALEJOS ALSO STATED THAT HIS PLANS CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, FOLLOWED BY A COUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PONCIANO. PONCIANO WOULD THEN SET UP A TWO YEAR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AFTER WHICH GENERAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE CALLED).

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE,ARMY,AIR,CINCLANT,CINCSO,COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG. (ALSO SENT PANAMA CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, MANAGUA,SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR).

END OF MESSAGE

COPY

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

☐ ‘OY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1		5	
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ORIG : A.D.Rohlfing:new
UNIT : WH/C/CA
EXT : 6957/1255
DATE : 19 Nov 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO : MANAGUA JMWAVE TEGUCIGALPA CARACAS PANAMA CITY GUATEMALA CITY
SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8 SOD 6

TO MANA INFO WAVE TEGU CARA PACY GUAT SJOS CITE DIR 59681

TYPIC

REF DIR 58232 (NOT SENT CARA)

1. AMBIDDY-1 CONFIRMS ALEGRETTE APPROACH AND OFFER BUY REMAINDER AMWORLD ARMS. A-1 REJECTED OFFER AND PROMISED WOULD NOT SELL OR GIVE ARMS TO ANYONE. WEAPONS WHICH TOTAL 100 PIECES CURRENTLY HIDDEN IN MANA AND BLUEFIELDS. A-1 CLAIMS ONLY THREE PERSONS AWARE LOCATION. AMJAVA-4 QUERIED SEPARATELY CONFIRMS LATTER POINT.

2. A-1 LEAVES FOR MANA 22 NOVEMBER IN ORDER TURN OVER BASES TO ANASTASIO SOMOZA. IN SO DOING WILL TURN OVER FAIRLY SIZEABLE AMOUNT OF AMMO CONSISTING 30 AND 50 CALIBER BULLETS, GRANADES AND SOME MORTAR SHEELS.ALSO FIVE CARBINES. BELIEVES TURNING OVER AMMO NECESSARY SINCE CANNOT USE HIMSELF AND MOSTLY UNGUARDED CASES COULD EASILY CONSTITUTE HAZARD TO LOCAL NATIVES NEAR BASES.

3. A-1 REITERATED THAT ALEGRETTE ROLE IN VENEZUELA COSTA RICA AND GUATEMALA PLOTS IS THAT OF MIDDLEMAN SOLELY INTERESTED IN GAIN. AS SUCH IN CONTACT ALL PARTIES. FURTHER, SINCE ALEGRETTE AWARE A-1 IN POSESSION ARMS LOGICALLY FOCUSES ATTENTION ON HIM AS POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR LUCRATIVE BUSINESS DEAL. A-1 ALSO OPINES ALEGRETTE BEING SQUEEZED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 20-5

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

Y: [redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 59681

OUT AS MIDDLEMAN SINCE PLOTTERS NOW IN DIRECT CONTACT A-1. SEPARATE CABLES FOLLOW ON INFO PROVIDED BY A-1 REGARDING GUAT AND VENEZUELA PLOTS.

4. FOR CARA: SEE HVCW 6746.

END OF MESSAGE

John L Hart

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO
WH/3 (Mr. Welch by phone)
WH/2 (Mr. Katsainos in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John L. Hart
DCWHD/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

COPY NO.

☐ RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG : D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 16 NOV 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

23/SECRET

ROUTING			
1	EW	5	CA
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16 Nov 65 20 16 5

TO : JMWAVE PANAMA CITY SAN JOSE MANAGUA TEGUCIGALPA SALVADOR GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☑ ~~RID~~ COPY WH 8, SODC

TO PRITY WAVE INFO PACY SJOS MANA TEGU SALV GUAT CITE DIR 58323

TYPIC

REF: A. WAVE 7209 (IN 93794)

1. HQS C/O LEONARD L. SPYCHALSKI (IDEN 1) PLANS MEET AMBIDDY-1 (IDEN 2) ASAP IN ORDER CLARIFY AND/OR DISSUADE HIM FROM PROVIDING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT TO ALEGRETTE. WILL CALL STATION ON ARRIVAL.

2. AMJAVA-4 (IDEN 3) CONFIRMS HAVING MET ALEGRETTE BUT STATED LATTER ONLY INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING REMAINING AMWORLD MATERIAL FOR RESALE IN WAVE AREA. A-4 ALSO STATED V-20 BOATS CURRENTLY IN WAVE AREA.

3. FYI LARGER MORE POWERFUL SWIFT LAUNCHES ALREADY RETURNED KUBARK BY AMBIDDY-1 AND CURRENTLY AF.

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED/

RELEASING OFFICER 16-16

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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ORIG :
UNIT :
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DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO PAGE TWO INFO CITE DIR 58323

[illegible]

DC/WH/C/CA

B. Mills
WH/C/MO

WH/2

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

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CPF

ORIG : D. ROHLFING/mak
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 6957-1255
DATE : 13 NOV 65

23/ SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

TO : JMWAVE PANAMA CITY SAN JOSE MANAGUA TEGUCIGALPA SALVADOR GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH 8, S00(

TO PRITY WAVE INFO PACY SJOS MANA TEGU SALV GUAT CITE DIR 58324

TYPIC DIR 58323

IDEN 1 - ANDREW D. ROHLFING

IDEN 2 - MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

IDEN 3 - RAFAEL QUINTERO IBARBIA

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/C/CA

B. Mills
WH/C/MO

WH/2

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for
JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

16-17

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH/C Amcurie/AMBIDDY

TO: Finance Division

DATE: 12 Nov 65

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12: [illegible]

PAYEE: AMBIDDY-1

AMOUNT: $5,000

[illegible]

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE:

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF AGENT:

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

November payment to AMBIDDY-1 of $5,000 for supporting the dependents of member of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, funds passed to AMBIDDY-1 are being used or have been used for the purpose intended and further advances are warranted.

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS: See attachment

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE:

TITLE: WR/C/CA

SIGNATURE: Andrew D. Rohlfing

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 738

CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO. 6135-1176

DATE: 11/15/65

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER: WH/B&F

APPROVED

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: John L. Hart (Signed) John L. Hart Walter T. Ciel

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER:

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE:

AMOUNT: $5,000

SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33		34-39 STATION CODE	40-41	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO.	48-49	50 CA OR	51-54	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL		67-70 OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT	
DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP.DOC.NO.	REC.RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	F XC PO ED NE D	ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	PAY PER. L.I.C. CODE	COST YR.	GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	FY FUNDS	61-66 CH. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE	DEBIT	CREDIT
Nov Pmt Ambiddy/ AMBIDDY-1				039262			14441		2384	016	5,000.00	
												5,000.00

DATE: 11/22

PREPARED BY: Joseph C. Carey

DATE:

REVIEWED BY:

TOTALS:

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-40)

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance Date: 13 Nov 65

FROM : WH/C/CA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria $ 5,000
   NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA: SA: CA: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

   a. By check:
   (1) _____ Devised Cover Check. Account No. _______-1100
   (2) __x__ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

   * Checks are available for immediate delivery

   b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
   Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following
   (1) Account Name: ________
   (2) Account Number: ________
   (3) Bank Name: ________
   (4) Bank Address: ________
   ________ Zip: ________
   (5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
   (6) Payment to be originated from ________
   (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
   (7) Indicate remittor if desired: ________

   c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ________ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Office

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be pick

/S/ Walter T. [illegible]

Andrew D. Rohlfing 6953 John L. Hart 728
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ________ City ________

FORM 1-65 1004 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 27 October 1965

FROM : WH/C/CA/EA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)______________ ______ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria ______ $ 5,000
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA:SA:CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1)______ Devised Cover Check. Account No.________-1100
(2)__X__ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	KNOXVILLE	☐	MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: ____________________
(2) Account Number: ____________________
(3) Bank Name: ____________________
(4) Bank Address: ____________________
____________________ Zip: ________
(5) Transfer: ☒ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ~~New York~~ ____________
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ____________________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ________ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked up

Andrew D. Rohlfing 6958 John L. Hart 7264
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ____________________ City ____________________

FORM 1-65 1884 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

FROM: WH/C

TO: ~~[illegible]~~ Finance Division

DATE: 27 October 1965

DATE-VOUCHER NO. 2-12

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS ARE REQUESTED FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY OR EMERGENCY NATURE AND ARE INTENDED FOR USE AS FOLLOWS:

October payment to AMBIDDY-1 - $/ $5,000 for supporting the dependents of ~~his~~ members of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement who are currently imprisoned in Cuba. ~~and are incapable of providing for their support of their dependents~~.

PAYEE: AMBIDDY-1

AMOUNT: $5,000

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF PAYEE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF AGENT

PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS: See Attachement

THE AMOUNT REQUESTED IS DUE THE PAYEE FOR SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF HIS CONTRACT OR OTHER WRITTEN OR ORAL AGREEMENTS. *(To be signed when applicable)*

DATE	TITLE	SIGNATURE
	WH/C/CA/EA	Andrew D. Rohlfing

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
	John L. Hart

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. | CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER
	WH/B & F

CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE | SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF FUNDS TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE STATED ABOVE

DATE	AMOUNT	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT
	$5,000	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP.DOC.NO. 32-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE REC.RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL F.T. FUNDS	61-66 CK. NO. REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 4-65 496 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-49)

14-15 OCT 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 Report on Nicaragua, and on General Anastacio SOMOZA, and on Costa Rica

1. A/1 visited Washington and saw me on 14 and 15 October 1965. He visited Gen. SOMOZA at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore the night of 15 October and called me later to report on his meeting. The following items were derived from his reports to me on these occasions:

a. Gen. SOMOZA has been in the hospital since late September for a general physical check-up but specifically for a special diet and treatments for gout and over-eating and drinking. He has had no unusual problems, shows no evidence of neurosis or mental problems, and in fact, exhibited an alert and aggressive mental attitude. SOMOZA intends to run for President next year, and A/1 will print campaign posters for his approval. A/1 will print them at his Quality Off-Set Printing Company in Miami. (I saw the poster lay outs; they are an attempt to show "Tachito" as a man of the people. one has him on horse-back much resembling Sgt. Bilko and surrounded by a lot of Indians also mounted on horses and waving machetes in the air. the other shows "Tachito" directing the National Guard in Civic Action work building roads and bridges and helping in peasant villages, etc.). SOMOZA has heard that Jack Vaughan opposes his election. When he gets out of the hospital (estimated about 25 October), SOMOZA plans to run a party at the Nic Embassy in Washington to which Vaughan will have to come, and to confront him on this point. SOMOZA is not worried about being elected, with or without U.S. support, and says he will not have to steal or buy the election either.

He has always been a friend of the U.S. and tried to work with them, and will be very happy if they will simply relax and try to live with him for a few years. They may find out it will not be so difficult as they seem to expect. On the other hand, if the U.S. cuts him off, there are other countries eager to fill the gap.

b. On the latter point (made about mid-September 1965), A/1 followed up by eliciting from the Nic Consul-General in Miami, who revealed that the French Ambassador in Managua had offered to match the U.S. Alliance for Progress commitments to Nicaragua if the State Dept. cut them off because of SOMOZA's election. A/1 followed up further on this point with Gen. SOMOZA the night of 15 October and he confirmed the report, saying that the French Ambassador had by-passed Pres. SCHICK and come to him direct.

c. Gen. SOMOZA told A/1 that, when he met with Daniel ODUBER at the Costa Rican border for their "non-aggression pact", he had handed ODUBER $80,000 in cash to help with his candidacy. SOMOZA later contacted a representative of the CR opposition and gave him $20,000 in cash, telling them he was little short of cash but wanted to help them as much as he could. He told A/1 it is good business to bet most of your money on a sure winner, even if you don't particularly like his form. (A/1 is doing the same thing by printing 8,000 posters for ODUBER free of charge; he would rather ODUBER owe him a favor than vice versa.) A/1 will check with ODUBER and sources close to him on the alleged donation by SOMOZA next time he gets to CR.

d. SOMOZA's sources and A/1's representatives in Costa Rica agree that ODUBER is going to win handily, but he will have to push for a good majority as the opposition is working hard. Frank MARSHALL and his cohorts continue to conspire but pose no real threat.

e. One of A/1's men, a former AMWORLDer named Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas, is a member of ODUBER's personal security group and has gotten rather close to him. He was assigned by A/1 at (201-298890)

ODUBER's request for a specialist in personal security who was trustworthy as ODUBER was afraid of assassination attempts. ARRIZURIETA reported that the leader of the CR opposition party had met secretly with the French Ambassador there on two occasions. He will investigate further and report if he can get more information.

Carl E. Jenkins

SECRET

14 Oct 65

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 Report on Nicaragua, and on General Anastacio SOMOZA, and on Costa Rica

1. A/1 visited Washington and saw me on 14 and 15 October 1965. He visited Gen. SOMOZA at Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore the night of 15 October and called me later to report on his meeting. The following items were derived from his reports to me on these occasions:

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c. Gen. SOMOZA told A/1 that, when he met with Daniel ODUBER at the Costa Rican border for their "non-aggression pact", he had handed ODUBER $80,000 in cash to help with his candidacy. SOMOZA later contacted a representative of the CR opposition and gave him $20,000 in cash, telling them he was little short of cash but wanted to help them as much as he could. He told A/1 it is good business to bet most of your money on a sure winner, even if you don't particularly like his form. (A/1 is doing the same thing by printing 8,000 posters for ODUBER free of charge; he would rather ODUBER owe him a favor than vice versa.) A/1 will check with ODUBER and sources close to him on the alleged donation by SOMOZA next time he gets to CR.

d. SOMOZA's sources and A/1's representatives in Costa Rica agree that ODUBER is going to win handily, but he will have to push for a good majority as the opposition is working hard. Frank MARSHALL and his cohorts continue to conspire but pose no real threat.

e. One of A/1's men, a former AMWORLDer named Luis ARRIZURIETA Sardinas, is a member of ODUBER's personal security group and has gotten rather close to him. He was assigned by A/1 at

ODUBER's request for a specialist in personal security who was trustworthy as ODUBER was afraid of assassination attempts. ARRIZURIETA reported that the leader of the CR opposition party had met secretly with the French Ambassador there on two occasions. He will investigate further and report if he can get more information.

Carl E. Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
~~Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT~~
Activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. On 17 September 1965, AMOT 246 held a conversation with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following concerning the activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1, reported in AMOT Report DD-1609 of 21 September 1965.

2. The three-months' period during which AMWORLD received aid amounting to $12,000.00 ended with the month of August 1965. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 covered the AMWORLD payroll, which amounted to $18,000.00 for the period, with the above aid money to which he added the sum of $6,000.00 which he received from the sale of equipment from the camps in Central America.

3. Iden is in charge of the warehouse in Miami where the AMWORLD equipment brought back from the camps, such as arms, radios, tape recorders, medical supplies, etc., is stored. AMBIDDY-1 believes that this equipment in the warehouse has a sale value of $250,000.00. Iden, however, believes the sale of the equipment will not bring in more than $15,000.00. Because of the low price he believes he would receive, Iden has refused to sell the equipment for fear AMBIDDY-1 will think he has been stealing money. Iden informed AMWORLD-2 that things are disappearing daily from the warehouse since several members of AMWORLD have access to the place. Several tape recorders and one piece of equipment worth $2,500.00 have already disappeared. The medical supplies are spoiling because of the haphazard way in which they are being stored.

4. AMWORLD-2 has suggested to AMBIDDY-1 that he return all the equipment to the people who supplied it, accept at least a fifty percent reduction in its value, and ask that payment for

201-267437

Attachment:
Iden, USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2 - WH/C, w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
COPY

DATE TYPED
30 Sep 65

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 7 - 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23356

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UPGA-23356

whatever the equipment is worth be made in monthly installments. AMBIDDY-1 is not interested in this plan. He is interested in obtaining new aid, independent of what he may obtain from the sale of the equipment, in order to maintain what remains of his group.

5. AMBIDDY-1 is planning to make some changes in his propaganda activities. He is considering a radio broadcast through stations in PBPRIME which can be heard in PERUMEN. He also wants to publish a high-level theoretical magazine which will be distributed exclusively to opinion makers on the continent, the press, universities, and the diplomatic corps. All these plans hinge on AMBIDDY-1's receiving aid. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 is expecting to receive aid next month.

Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23356

**IDEN - fnu KING (probably William Kenneth KING-GODFREY
(201-742345))**

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance
Date: 6 October 1968

FROM : WH/C/CA/PP

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Abel Mestre (NAME OF PAYEE (True)), ________ (STATUS (e.g.) CA/SA/CE, INTEREST) $ 20,000 (AMOUNT)

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1) ______ Devised Cover Check. Account No. ______-1100
(2) ______ Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

☐	BOSTON	☐	DALLAS*	☐	KANSAS CITY	☐	MIAMI	☐	NEW ORLEANS	☐	RICHMOND	☐	ST. LOUIS
☐	CHICAGO	☐	DENVER	☐	HOUSTON	☐	MILWAUKEE	☐	NEW YORK*	☐	SAN FRANCISCO	☐	WASHINGTON, D.C.*
☐	CLEVELAND	☐	DETROIT	☐	LOS ANGELES	☐	MINNEAPOLIS	☐	PHILADELPHIA	☐	SEATTLE	☐	WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name: Abel Mestre
(2) Account Number: Acct. #2 (Acct. #005-237-002)
(3) Bank Name: Chemical Bank, New York Trust, N.Y.
(4) Bank Address: 49th & Park Avenue, N.Y.
________ Zip: ______
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from ________ (SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired: ________

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☐ Check to be picked up

R.L. Harrison (SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER) 5518 (EXT.) John L. Hart (SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER) 7264 (EXT.)

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ________ City ________

FORM 1-68 1864 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Activities of AMWORLD and AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI

1. According to AMOT Report DD-1619 of 27 September 1965, AMOT-246 held a conversation on 22 September with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following.

2. On the morning of 21 September 1965, AMBIDDY-1 held a meeting with a group of his friends and followers to notify them that he had been notified by his "contact" that AMWORLD aid would cease at the beginning of October.

3. AMBIDDY-1 also notified Iden A that he should inform the persons who take part in the radio program that the program will not be broadcast after 1 October and therefore, their employment and salaries will cease. This will affect Iden A, AMRAZOR-1, Iden B, and AMOT-246.

4. AMBIDDY-1 planned to leave for Washington, D. C. on 22 September 1965 in order to meet with Iden C and discuss the handing over to Iden C of two hundred tons of arms which AMBIDDY-1 is holding at Iden D. AMBIDDY-1 decided to take this action in order to avoid having to pay the salaries of the seven men of AMWORLD in Nicaragua who each receive $300.00 per month.

5. AMBIDDY-1 is thinking of selling a barge for the sum of $20,000 and the rest of the equipment in storage in Miami for the sum of $19,000. With this, AMBIDDY-1 hopes to pay off all his debts, plus the salaries of the personnel. AMBIDDY-1 told AMWORLD-2 that he has only $18000 in the bank. AMWORLD-2, however, believes this is not true and that AMBIDDY-1 has more money than he claims.

AN rl	FI	
~~PS~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

Jane T. Jenks 201-267437
Philip G. ELMARD
19-124-27/3
~~19-124-27/3~~

Attachment:
Idens, usc. (att.)

Distribution:
3 - WH/C,

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
29 Sep 65	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23354

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/3
~~[illegible]~~

1 att.

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23354

IDEN A - Edgar SOPO Barreto, director of the "Tridente" radio program (probably 201-283205)

IDEN B - Martha Elena RODRIGUEZ (201-338880)

IDEN C - Anastasio SOMOZA

IDEN D - Camp "Zenon Viera" in Nicaragua

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-267437

S/C ATT. 1 UFGA-23354

CS COPY

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SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

UFGA-23354

CO

IDEN A	Raul GARCIA Casanas 201-783725
IDEN B	Jesus COLE
IDEN C	Jorge PEON Perez
IDEN D	Jaime CALDEVILLA, counsel for Economic Affairs in Spanish Embassy in Havana

SECRET

201-267437

~~19-124-27/3~~

201-~~264437~~ per DRS

S/C att

UFGA 23354

CS COPY

~~19-124-27/3~~

SECRET

TO : Office of Finance

Date: 28 September 1965

FROM : WH/C/CA/EA

SUBJECT: Request for Covert Payment (Other Than Cash and Treasury Check)

It is requested that payment authorized on attached documents reflecting obligation reference number (or other divisional ref. No.)________ be made in the following manner:

1. Payment to Manuel Artime Buesa, A $ 532.55
NAME OF PAYEE (True) STATUS (e.g.) CA: SA: CE: INTEGREE AMOUNT

2. Method of Payment

a. By check:
(1)______ Devised Cover Check. Account No.______-1100
(2) X Bank Cashier's Check (specify city by checking list below)

	BOSTON		DALLAS*		KANSAS CITY		MIAMI		NEW ORLEANS		RICHMOND		ST. LOUIS
	CHICAGO		DENVER		KNOXVILLE		MILWAUKEE	X	NEW YORK*		SAN FRANCISCO		WASHINGTON, D.C.*
	CLEVELAND		DETROIT		LOS ANGELES		MINNEAPOLIS		PHILADELPHIA		SEATTLE		WILMINGTON

* Checks are available for immediate delivery

b. By deposit, bank transfer, etc.:
Banking instructions to effect deposit (for use by Requesting Officer if instructions are not on file in Office of Finance). Complete the following:
(1) Account Name:
(2) Account Number:
(3) Bank Name:
(4) Bank Address:
Zip:
(5) Transfer: ☐ via Air Mail or ☐ Bank Wire
(6) Payment to be originated from
(SELECT CITY FROM ABOVE LIST)
(7) Indicate remittor if desired:

c. If payment is to be originated by Foreign Bank, specify country ______ and complete section b.(1) through (7) above. After delivery, discuss with Monetary Division, Field Operations Branch.

3. Payment by other means: Discuss with Monetary Division, Banking Branch Officer

4. Indicate preference: ☐ Notify when transaction is complete ☒ Check to be picked u

Andrew B. [illegible] 6257 John L. Hart 7264
SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER EXT. SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER EXT.

FOR USE BY OFFICE OF FINANCE ONLY

Method of Payment ______ City ______

FORM 1-65 [illegible] OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(39)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMOT
Financial Circumstances and Plans of AMBIDDY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. On 5 September 1965, AMOT-246 held a conversation with AMWORLD-2 in which he learned the following information concerning the activities of AMBIDDY-1, reported in AMOT Report DD-1599 of 10 September 1965. AMWORLD-2 obtained most of his information on AMBIDDY-1 from a friend, Iden A, who is closely linked with AMBIDDY-1 in matters regarding the sale of the military equipment AMWORLD had in Latin America. In addition, some data was given to AMWORLD-2 personally by AMBIDDY-1, who would like to get AMWORLD-2 on his side again. AMBIDDY-1 introduced Iden A to "his contacts in KUBARK," "and plans to introduce AMWORLD-2 to them in the near future. AMBIDDY-1 says he is doing this because of his confidence in both AMWORLD-2 and Iden A.

2. According to AMWORLD-2, AMBIDDY-1 has some $80,000.00 at present, although AMBIDDY-1 told Iden B that he only had $30,000.00 at his disposal. AMBIDDY-1 followed the advice of his secretary, Iden C, his wife, and others in investing money in the following businesses:

a. A printing establishment costing $20,000.00.

b. A factory, about which the Source had no details.

c. A "farm" where he is thinking of raising poultry and grain for which he paid $1,000.00 down and is paying $300.00 a month on the mortgage.

3. AMBIDDY-1 received notice from his "contacts" of the suspension of further aid in the presence of Iden A, who got the impression that it would be very difficult for AMBIDDY-1 to receive aid again. According to Iden A, during the interview between

Attachment:
IDENs, use

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3 - WH/C w/att

201-267437

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CROSS REFERENCE

GROUP 1
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DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
20 Sept 65	SEP 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23188

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
Cs copy 19-124-27/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

AMBIDDY-1 and his "contacts", he noticed that the relationships seemed strained and that on some occasions the "contacts" made fun of AMBIDDY-1 with regard to his investments. One of the "contacts" made reference to the "chickens of liberty bought by AMBIDDY-1."

4. In view of the financial situation with which he is faced AMBIDDY-1 has begun to reduce expenses. He has stopped having his radio programs recorded by America Production in order to save $250.00 per month. If his present financial condition continues, it is possible that next month he will also suspend his hour radio program "Trident."

5. However, despite the suspension of aid, AMBIDDY-1 is planning to maintain one radio program and to carry on other propaganda activities following new guide lines. Among the plans he has in mind is the publication of a "high-level theoretical" review. AMBIDDY-1 is thinking of presenting this latter plan to his "contacts."

Philip G. ELMARD

S E C R E T

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-23166

IDEN A - fnu *KING (probably William Kenneth KING-GODFREY
(201-742345)

IDEN B - Edgar *SOPO Barreto (probably 201-283208)

IDEN C - Nilo MESSER Pujol (201-294655)

S E C R E T

14-00000

201

20 September 1965

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 3
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTACT REPORT

FROM: AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

SUBJECT: Costa Rica Communist Activities

1. A-1 told me he had followed up with his delegates in Costa Rica and got some details on his former vague report about a Costa Rican official name ZUÑIGA who was anti-American and Communist-influenced. The man's name is Eduardo Zuñiga, a high official of the Instituto Nacional de Vivienda Urbana (INVU), in which there is a Communist cell directed by Architects Pablo JENKINS and Cano ROJAS. no 201
no 201

2. ZUÑIGA has a girl friend named Thelma (lnu), whose family is Communist. Her father is a Communist and a member of the INVU cell mentioned above. He is chauffer for Macho CARAZO who is running for Deputy under the PLN and is very close to Daniel ODUBER.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl Jenkins

CS COPY

XAAZ 23269

20 Sept. 1965
201-267437

SECRET

20 September 1965

CONTACT REPORT

FROM: AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

SUBJECT: Death of Gervasio Silvano POZO Carrillo (201-739773)

1. A/1 reported that subject was shot dead the night of 30 August 1965 by a jealous husband in a cafe in Miami. He has been chief instructor in rural rehabilitation for the MRR, and was slated to go to Panama to teach in the Veraguas project about the first of next year.

2. The Panama slot will be filled by Eugenio CLAUDE (201-747928), a negro Cuban of Haitian descent, who is also a former Comando Rurales. A/1 will inform Bishop McGrath of the change at their next meeting.

Carl E. Jenkins

Distribution:
1 - A/1 Contact Reports
1 - AMCIVIC

SECRET

15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Request for Payment to AMBIDDY-1

1. It is hereby requested that you approve a payment of $532.55 for AMBIDDY-1. This payment is to reimburse him for expenses incurred during a trip taken by him in August 1965 on our behalf.

2. Attached for your information is a translation of AMBIDDY-1's request in which he outlines his expenses.

Carl E Jenkins

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DCWHD/C

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Artime 201

SECRET

8 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Status Report on AMBALLOT as of 1 September 1965

1. GENERAL

a. We have completed preliminary arrangements with DODS and are prepared to move into the Community Development Counseling Service, Inc. (CDCS) cover offices in Arlington at any time. I propose to furnish the office they have available during September, to install our own telephone, and to start making an appearance there for an hour or so daily in order to begin switching my Cuban contacts to that address and phone number. In October I should like to move the young lady we discussed in there and start processing the correspondence, applications for training, etc. which I hope to have generated by that time preparatory to the selection of about five or six men for the Spring Semester under AMTRACK.

b. From 23 to 31 August Tom Clines and I were in Miami making arrangements to buy the two Swifts from Artime and recruiting Ricardo Chavez (The Mexican) to put together two AMWORLD crews for the boats to be used on Lake Tanganyika. We agreed on a net to Artime of $100,000 for the two boats and got the sales agreements signed. My proposal for handling the $100,000 is included under AMCIVIC below. Chavez had already applied for enrollment in an Accounting and Public Administration program at the University of Miami, but we talked him into delaying it for the Fall Semester in order to handle the Congo operation for us. I told him we would consider him as a candidate for a future job handling a Coast Guard and Customs Service position in a post-Castro regime and would look into the possibility of getting him some support under AMTRACK after he returns. He likes the idea and will be a good candidate.

SECRET

2. AMTEACH

a. Quintero cannot get into the University of Mexico before the regular school year starts next February. He will have trouble getting in then unless he spends some time in Mexico to make his own arrangements. The only way he can get into Mexico is to have been accepted by a university in Mexico and to prove financial security. The only university he can get an acceptance from in time is the University of the Americas (formerly Mexico City College), a five-year degree granting institution run on the U. S. quarter system and accredited by the Southern Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges. He has applied as a special student (non-degree candidate) for the Fall Quarter only and I have worked out a program of studies with him for that period. This will give him a scholastic record and a transcript, none of which he now has, which will meet the documentation requirements for admission to the University. He can also go in person and take care of his admission, visa, and other problems. He will have a chance to get acquainted with the city, to meet the case officer who will handle him there and get an idea of his operational requirements, and to find himself suitable quarters. School will be finished mid-December and he can return to Miami, pick up his family, and get moved and settled in during January. He will then be ready to go to school and to work on a regular basis starting in February. If, for some reason, he cannot get enrolled in the National University, the worst that will happen then is that he must continue in the other school for his first year. This is not lost time as the credits he earns are transferable to U. S. schools.

b. Inocencio Alonso Ramirez, the fifty-one year old former Police Chief of Pinar del Rio Province, is the man who has handled the internal operations of the MRR for the past three or four years. He was detailed a few months ago to go to Mexico as the MRR representative there and had a Mexican visa issued to him which has expired. He is trying to get a new one issued and believes he will be able to do so. He is the man who helped Wave in debriefing refugees, whom Clines says is top-notch. He also controls the passage of support to dependents and survivors inside through the Spanish Mission. Quintero strongly recommends him as a valuable asset to our Mexico City program, working with him or directly with our Station officers.

c. We have about fifteen files on possible candidates for AMTEACH, culled from names known to me, to Clines, to Artime, to Quintero, and anybody else I have been able to get suggestions from. I propose to select five or six of the most likely looking ones to bring into the program by next February (Spring Semester), then to get WAVE into the act and look over any candidates they can come up with for screening and consideration prior to next summer. In the meantime, I would like to generate an authentic appearing mechanism through CDCS by which we can cover our contacts and selection of candidates through applications and awards of special grants through various foundations. I am waiting for Jake Golder, Chief of the A&E Staff, to get back from leave this week in order to start working out a testing and evaluation program for the candidates.

3. AMCIVIC

a. Artime appears to be going ahead with a local civic action program at his old base at Monkey Point, Nicaragua. In addition, he is going ahead to put in a boatyard at Bluefields around which he proposes to organize a local fisheries cooperative. His man there is Luis Prieto, a physicist who worked on the DEW line project in Canada before joining AMWORLD about a year ago. The Panama program had a set-back due to the death by shooting by a jealous husband of Silvano Pozo, the Negro Rural Comando who had been slated to go to Veraguas Province and head up Artime's contribution to the school being sponsored there by Bishop McGrath and Harvard University. An alternate has been selected, another Negro of Haitian descent from Oriente named Eugenio Claude.

b. Later this week, Artime plans to return to Central America, particularly to visit Panama and talk with Bishop McGrath and President Robles. He will also go through Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for which I gave him intelligence requirements from WH/2.

c. We paid two subsidies of $12,000 each for July and August through the old AMWORLD funding mechanism, and allowed him the remaining $13,000 from the "insurance money" of the LOBO team as the payment for September. I propose that starting October we inform him of a new decision from the "policy committee" that we will subsidize him for $5,000 a month for six months to cover payments to dependents and survivors. At the end of that time, they

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will take another look at him and the MRR and see what progress they have made in organizing constructive programs in Latin America which the U. S. could justify supporting through the MRR under the AMCIVIC concept. The $100,000 from the Swifts should give him capital to operate on for that long.

Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

CEJ/bh

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee

File:
AMCIVIC
AMTEACH
AMTIMEX 201
QUINTERO 201

SECRET

TRANSLATION

MRR Letterhead

Miami
4 September 1965

Mr. Carl J. James
P. O. Box 9549
Arlington 22209, Virginia

Dear Friend:

I wish to submit for your approval this extraordinary budget in order to be able to reimburse the Movimiento for the expenses I incurred during my last trip, during which I believe I obtained very interesting reports.

PanAm ticket Miami-Managua (4 Aug)	$ 92.00
Stay in Managua (4-10 Aug) (I only paid for food since the MRR rents a house there)	$ 25.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas for the MRR station wagon, dinner with Major Perez and drinks with Lt. Corrales (aide of General Somoza)	$ 20.00
Pan Am ticket Managua-San Jose (10 Aug)	$ 22.00
Stay in San Jose (10-13 Aug) (Only food since I lived in the house of the MRR delegate)	$ 12.00
Extra expenses in San Jose (taxis, invitation for dinner to Guillermo Vargas of INVU and Roberto Madriz, secretary to the President, invitation for drinks to the people of INVU, invitation for drinks to Colonel Lippa and people of the Resguardo Fiscal	$ 53.00
TACA ticket San Jose-Panama-Managua	$103.02
Quarters in Panama, Motel "La Siesta," 13-15 Aug	$ 57.53

Extra expenses in Panama (taxis, drinks with Major Arauz, aide of the President	$ 20.00
Stay in Nicaragua from 15-20 Aug (food only)	$ 30.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas, drinks with Major Perez, Captain Morales and Major Brennes)	$ 18.00
Lanica ticket Managua-Miami	$ 76.00
Taxi - airport to residence	$ 4.00
Total expenses for trip	$532.55

This is only my last trip, taken at your behest. If it is possible to reimburse this amount, I would be extraordinarily appreciative..

14-00000

MRR
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA
TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Septiembre 4 de 1965

Mr. Carl J. Janes
P.O. Box 9549
Arlingtong 22209.Virginia.

Estimado Amigo:

Tengo el gusto de remitirle cuentas del dinero recibido por el Consejo de Liberación para los meses de Julio,Agosto y Septiembre.

MES DE JULIO

Recibí del Consejo $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista Tridente (Imprenta,colaboraciones,circulación)-----	$ 3,000.oo
Hora Radial (Grabacion,colaboraciones,emisoras)	1,805.00
Oficina (Alquiler---$200.oo Don Manuel Guillot$ 400.oo Valdés Castilla $ 200.00 Rafael Garcia $ 300.oo)	1,100.oo
Delegado de Costa Rica (Luis Arrizurrieta)	350.oo
Delegado de Venezuela (Maximo Díaz)	450.oo
Delegacion de Espana: Enrique Tous	150.oo
Cuco León	250.oo
Mago "Rohreño"	250.oo

Honduras (Jose Antonio Molé)	350.00
Guatemala (Oscar Vila,)	200.00

Clandestinaje:

Entregado al Padre Llorente para enviar a traves de la Embajada de España-$2,600.00

Entregado a los siguientes sujetos para hacerlos efectivo en Cuba a familiares de presos o fusilados de sus provincias:

Inocencio Alonso ————————	275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet ————	250.00
Rolando Tapanes ———————————	200.00
Gustavo Fernandez Vidales ——	300.00
Domingo Borges Carbot———————	300.00
Emilia del Mar —————————	100.00
Silvia Heredia ———————————	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga —————————— (Aqui tuve que adelantar 3 meses por operación de la senora,)	300.00
Antonio Crespo Olivero ———————	300.00
Angel García Alvarez ———————	275.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo ———————	200.00
TOTAL DE GASTOS:	$12,530.00

Como se ve,en Julio invertí en los gastos $530.00 más que lo que recibi,sin contar con los gastos de mis viajes por latino-America,ni mi subsidio familiar con el que tengo que mantener mujer,dos hijos y mis dos padres.

(3)

MES DE AGOSTO

Recibi del Consejo: $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista "Tridente"		$ 3,000.oo
Hora Radial		1,805.oo
Oficina (tuve que aumentar el gasto en:		
Articulos de consumo	$100.oo	
Luz y telefono	50.oo	
Nilo Messer (secretario) ✓	275.oo)	
		1,525.oo
Delegado de Costa Rica		350.oo
Delegado de Venezuela		450.oo
Delegacion de España(suprimí al "Mago Robreno")		400.oo ✓
Delegado de Honduras		350.oo
Delegado de Guatemala		200.oo
Clandestinaje:		4,625.oo
TOTAL DEL MES DE AGOSTO:		$12,705.oo

Como se vé,en Agosto invertí en gastos,$705.oo más que lo que recibí,sin contar con los gastos de mis viajes,ni el subsidio familiar con el que tengo que mantener mi hogar y mis padres.

MES DE SEPTIEMBRE

Recibi del Consejo $ 12,000.oo

Lo empleé en:

Revista Tridente	$ 3,000.oo

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(4)

Hora Radial	$ 1,805.00
Oficina	1,525.00
Delegado de Costa Rica	350.00
Delegado de Venezuela	450.00
Delegado de España	400.00
Delegado de Honduras	350.00
Delegado de Guatemala (este mes no le pagué pues regresa el mes que viene a Guatemala, pero este mes va a estar aquí)	
Clandestinaje	4,625.00

TOTAL DEL MES DE SEPTIEMBRE $12,505.00

Como se ve, gasté $505.00 más que lo que recibí del Consejo. Todo esto sin contar mis viajes y mi subsidio familiar. Por supuesto, nada de esto incluye mi delegado en Nicaragua, que recibe $400.00 dolares mensuales (Antonio Sanz), ni el personal que cuida de las armas en los tres puntos donde se hayan en Nicaragua, ni el personal que se haya haciendo Acción Civica en Monkey Point y el Bluff, ni el personal que cuida de la Granja Modelo, ni el pago de gastos del almacen donde tengo los equipos de los campamentos (equipos civiles todos) en Miami.

De Vds. muy atte. su s.s.

Ignacio

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER FOR PURCHASES AND SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL	NAME OF CLAIMANT AMBIDDY-1 (Carl E. Jenkins)	DATE-VOUCHER NO. Z-12

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	AMOUNT
Reimbursement for operational travel expenses for trip to Central America in August 1965 per attached letter dated 4 Sep 1965 which outlines expenses.	$532.35

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIG. REF. NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
DATE	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John L. Hart, DCWHD/C

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $

DATE	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33		34-39 STATION CODE	40-41 EXCEED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR CO ST YR	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL		67-70 OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT	
DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP.DOC.NO. WH	REC.RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.		ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.				F Y O B S	61-66 CE. NO. X REF. NO.	68-70 OC OR DUE DATE	DEBIT	CREDIT

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS		

FORM 2-65 264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

Miami Septiembre 4 1965

Mr. Carl J. James
P.O. Box 9549
Arlingtong 22209 .Virginia.

Estimado Amigo:

Quiero someter a Vd. la aprobacion del presupuesto extraordinario para poder restituir al Movimiento, los gastos que tuve en mi ultimo viaje, durante el cual creo que obtuve informes muy interesantes.

Tiket de Panamerican Miami-Managua-(4 de Agosto)------ $ 92.00

Estancia en Managua (del 4 de Agosto al 10 Agosto)---- $ 25.00
(Solo pague comida, pues el M.R.R. tiene alquilada una casa alli)

Gastos extras en Managua ------------------------------ $ 20.00
(Gasolina del Station Wagon del Movimiento, invitacion al Mayor Perez a comer y tragos con el Tte. Corrales, ayudante del General Somoza) ,------

Tiket de Panamerican Managua-San Jose (10 de Agosto)--- $ 22.00

Estancia en San Jose (del 10 de Agosto al 13 de Agosto)-$ 12.00
(Solo comida, pues vivi en casa del delegado del MRR).

Gastos extras en San Jose (taxis, invitaciones a comer a Guillermo Vargas, del INVU y Roberto Madriz, secretario del Presidente, invitacion a tragos a la gente del INVU, invitacion a tragos a Coronel Lippa y gente del Resguardo Fiscal) -- $53.00

Tiket de Taca International Airline San Jose-Panama,
Panama-Managua --$103.02

Gastos estancia en Panama, Motel "La Siesta", del 13 al 15 de Agosto --$ 57.53

Gastos extras en Panama (taxis, tragos con el Mayor Arauz, ayudante del Presidente)-----------------------------------$ 20.00

Estancia en Nicaragua desde el 25 de Agosto al 29 de Agosto (solo comida)	$ 30.00
Gastos extras en Managua (gasolina, tragos con Mayor Perez, Capitan Morales y Mayor [illegible])	$ 18.00
Tiket de Lanica Airline Managua-Miami	$ 76.00
Taxi de Aeropuerto a la casa	$ 4.00
TOTAL DE GASTOS DEL VIAJE,	$ 532.55

Este es solamente mi último viaje, realizado con conocimiento de Vds. Si fuera posible el reintegro de esta cifra, les estaria extraordinariamente agradecidos.

De Vds. muy atto. su s.s.

Ignacio

AMCIVIC

TRANSLATION

MRR Letterhead

Miami
4 September 1965

Mr. Carl J. James
P. O. Box 9549
Arlington 22209, Virginia

Dear Friend:

I wish to submit for your approval this extraordinary budget in order to be able to reimburse the Movimiento for the expenses I incurred during my last trip, during which I believe I obtained very interesting reports.

PanAm ticket Miami-Managua (4 Aug)	$ 92.00
Stay in Managua (4-10 Aug) (I only paid for food since the MRR rents a house there)	$ 25.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas for the MRR station wagon, dinner with Major Perez and drinks with Lt. Corrales (aide of General Somoza)	$ 20.00
Pan Am ticket Managua-San Jose (10 Aug)	$ 22.00
Stay in San Jose (10-13 Aug) (Only food since I lived in the house of the MRR delegate)	$ 12.00
Extra expenses in San Jose (taxis, invitation for dinner to Guillermo Vargas of INVU and Roberto Madriz, secretary to the President, invitation for drinks to the people of INVU, invitation for drinks to Colonel Lippa and people of the Resguardo Fiscal	$ 53.00
TACA ticket San Jose-Panama-Managua	$103.02
Quarters in Panama, Motel "La Siesta," 13-15 Aug	$ 57.53

Extra expenses in Panama (taxis, drinks with Major Arauz, aide of the President	$ 20.00
Stay in Nicaragua from 15-20 Aug (food only)	$ 30.00
Extra expenses in Managua (Gas, drinks with Major Perez, Captain Morales and Major Brennes)	$ 18.00
Lanica ticket Managua-Miami	$ 76.00
Taxi - airport to residence	$ 4.00
Total expenses for trip	$532.55

This is only my last trip, taken at your behest. If it is possible to reimburse this amount, I would be extraordinarily appreciative...

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Costa Rican Counter-intelligence Reports
from AMBIDDY-1, 1 September 1965

1. AMBIDDY-1 reported that Capt. ALEGRETTE (El Ladron) of the Nicaraguan National Guard, ostensibly vice-consul in Miami, is trying to buy arms in Miami for a coup attempt in Costa Rica. A-1 believes he has had no luck, but has forbidden any of his people to have anything at all to do with ALEGRETTE.

2. A-1 said that he saw a young Costa Rican named Francisco GAMBOA Guzman at the airport in San Jose in late July. He rode to Panama on the same flight as A-1. GAMBOA was described by the MRR delegate, who was with A-1, as a pro-Communist who had just returned from Cuba about a month earlier. He claims to be finishing his studies in Costa Rica, after which he plans to return to Cuba. He is a reporter who interviewed Teodore (Ted) PICADO when he was imprisoned in Cuba and published the story from there.

3. In late May or early June 1965, A-1 said some of his people who had been guarding the AMWORLD arms barge near Tortuguero in Costa Rica had picked up a rubber boat, not of U. S. manufacture, floating just off the Costa Rican coast. They gave the boat to Colonel LIPPA of the Costa Rican Civil Guard. A-1 said the thought had occurred to him, could the Cubans be infiltrating people into Panama through the Costa Rican coast and then overland?

Carl E. Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

cc: WH/2/CR
WH/C/RR

File: AMBIDDY-1 201

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

301

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

SUBJECT : Meeting with AMBIDDY-1, 30 August 1965

1. Disposition of "Insurance" Claim for AMWORLD Team LOBO. AMBIDDY-1 showed me the savings books indicating trust accounts in the Coconut Grove Bank, Miami, Florida for the two LOBO team members:

Acct. No. 25203, 26 Aug 1965 for Elpidio DELGADO Soto	$4,000
Acct. No. 25202, 26 Aug 1965 for Nilo ALONSO Morejon	$4,000

Manuel J. GUILLOT and/or Jose GONZALEZ Puig must co-sign with the account owner in person before withdrawals can be made.

2. AMCIVIC Subsidy Payment for September 1965, and Subsequent Support. I told AMBIDDY-1 that Headquarters had approved our proposal to consider the remaining $12,000 of the "insurance" money ($20,000 total minus $8,000 in the two accounts mentioned above) as the AMCIVIC subsidy payment for September. He agreed and told me that payments of $12,000 for July and for August had been received. He promised to submit certified budgets soonest for the three months.

AMBIDDY-1's understanding is that the "policy" committee in Washington had approved a provisional subsidy payment for three months, or until 1 October 1965. At that time he believes there will be a new hearing and the decision may be that he will get anything from nothing up to the $15,000 monthly budget he originally requested. In

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

view of the fact that we have just paid him for the two Swift boats ($100,000 net), which will furnish him a capital reserve to operate on for a few months, I recommend that we tell AMBIDDY-1 the decision has been made to continue only that part of the subsidy ($5,000 per month) that was budgetted for support of dependents and survivors of MRR dead, wounded, and imprisoned. We may then consider, on a case by case basis, reimbursement to him for actual expenses of travel incurred on our behalf. We may also wish to invest something in individual civic action programs he may sponsor in Latin America, again on a case by case basis. In the meantime, he has enough capital to operate on for a few months and to generate civic action programs. He will continue to travel on MRR business and is quite agreeable to handling any requirements we place on him for intelligence or political action. He is not yet willing to sign an agent contract, and I propose we go along with him till the end of the year on this basis and see what he can generate on his own in the way of meaningful assets.

Carl E Jenkins
Carl E. Jenkins
WH/C/CA/EA

APPROVED:

DCWHD/C

SECRET

DEPT DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DATE: 2 SEPTEMBER 1965
SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF USSOUTHCOM INTEREST
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT #: 2 230 0878 65
FILE # NOT GIVEN

TRANSMIT
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

119

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

EA

SEP 1 11 21

ORIG. HELEN MORGAN	ROUTING			
UNIT WH/2/CR & NIC	1		4	
EXT. 6312	2		5	
DATE 1 SEPTEMBER 1965	3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 17

TDCS DB-315/02854-65

INFORMATION COPIES
DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF,
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO/H, WH/C 10.

DATE DISTRIBUTED
1 SEPTEMBER 1965

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/2/CR	5	WH/C/CA/EA	3
WH/R	1	WH/2/N	3	WH/WAVE	1
WH/PO/A	1	WH/2/P	2		
WH/PO/B	1				
WH/6	1				

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1031
NP (AMBIDDY/1)
LIAISON *
HC: WAVE 5431 (IN 43038)
(AMCLATTER/1)

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☒ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE DCI.

RECOMMEND FOR EXO.

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO PACY, LANT, SJOS, AND MANA. dl

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/C/R - W. Tucker (Telephone)
WH/C/CA/EA - C. Jenkins (Telephone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

GROUP 1
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DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
Leo Fraenkel
C/WH/R

COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 [illegible] OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISS CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA/PANAMA

TDCS DB-315/02854-65

DATE OF INFO. 27-28 JULY AND 4 AUGUST 1965

DISTR. 1 SEPTEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

REMARKS MADE BY GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA CONCERNING DANIEL ODUBER OF COSTA RICA AND COMMUNIST PLANS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTION AGAINST COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, AND PANAMA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 27 AUGUST 1965

REF

IN

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

A PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE, WHO IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH INFLUENTIAL LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALS. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FROM DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH GENERAL SOMOZA, WHO WAS AWARE THAT HIS REMARKS WOULD PROBABLY REACH OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

1. DURING CONVERSATIONS HELD ON 27 AND 28 JULY 1965 GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA, CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN NICARAGUA, SAID THAT HE WOULD SOON MEET DANIEL ODUBER, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN COSTA RICA, AT THE BORDER AND THAT THEY WOULD MAKE A "NON-AGGRESSION PACT," AGREEING THAT NEITHER WOULD MAKE TROUBLE FOR THE OTHER DURING THEIR CAMPAIGNS FOR PRESIDENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. ODUBER HAD ASKED FOR THE INTERVIEW. SOMOZA SAID THAT HE THOUGHT ODUBER HAD MADE A "LIVE AND LET LIVE" AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT AT THEIR MEETING HE WOULD DEMAND FROM ODUBER A PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF THE COMMUNISTS TO BE FOLLOWED BY EFFECTIVE CONTROL MEASURES AGAINST THEM.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OCX

CIA/NMCC INS FBI DCS D/OCI 2 SECRET SERVICE (PRS)

EXO

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCSDB-315/02574-65, 31 JULY 1965, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED ON ODUBER'S VERSION OF A MEETING BETWEEN ODUBER AND SOMOZA ON 29 JULY. ODUBER SAID THAT SOMOZA TOLD HIM HIS FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON WERE CONCERNED ABOUT ODUBER'S LEFTIST AND POSSIBLE PRO-COMMUNIST BACKGROUND BUT THAT HE (SOMOZA) REALIZED THIS WAS NOT TRUE. THEY AGREED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES.)

3. ON 4 AUGUST SOMOZA SAID THAT A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF MARCIAL AGUILUZ ORELLANO, A LEADING COMMUNIST IN COSTA RICA, HAD SAID THAT THE LATEST PROGRAM OF FIDEL CASTRO IS TARGETED AGAINST NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, AND PANAMA. PART OF THE PLAN INCLUDES ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES AS PART OF A TERROR CAMPAIGN. HE SAID THAT IN PANAMA, PARTICULARLY, PRESIDENT MARCO ROBLES IS A PRIME TARGET, THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE EXPLOITING OPPOSITION TO ROBLES BY THE NATIONAL GUARD, BECAUSE HE HAS CUT DOWN ON THEIR PENSIONS AND OTHER PRIVILEGES. IF ROBLES IS ELIMINATED, THE COMMUNISTS FEEL THAT THE CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD WILL TAKE OVER; AND THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN HANDLE HIM MORE EASILY THAN THEY CAN HANDLE ROBLES.

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ~~A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN~~, WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HAVANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND WHO HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE, REPORTED ON 31 AUGUST THAT DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VAL SOUZA, FORMER CUBAN SUPREME COURT MAGISTRATE, SAID THERE IS A PLOT AFOOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA).

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTR ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

	ROUTING		
1	EA	5	OA
2		6	CA
3	RI	7	D
4	CS	8	×

IG : John Davis:sd
IT : WH/2/Panama
T : 5421
TE : 1 Sept 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

: SAN JOSE INFO: PANAMA

1 SEP 65 22 Z

PRIORITY

~~SIG CEN~~

OM: DIRECTOR

NF: WH 2 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY with 2 cc/pes, cc/pcs. 2.

PRITY

SJOS INFO PACY CITE DIR 39815

REF: A. SJOS 7908 (IN 38832)*
B. SJOS 7923 (IN 42636)

1. ONLY ADDITIONAL INFO ON VIDAL ESPINAL ERREA WHICH WAS NOT MENTIONED IN REF IS CONTAINED IN HNMA 3348, 9 JUNE 65.

2. HDQS MEMO DATED 27 AUG 65 (SOURCE AMBIDDY-1) MENTIONS ESPINAL AS BEING A SPANIARD, WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE WORKING NOW AT THE RON CARTA VIEJA FACTORY IN PANAMA CITY. HE PREVIOUSLY LIVED IN MANAGUA AND WORKED FOR COL. MIGUEL RUIZ HERRERA (A COSTA RICAN SOMETIMES EMPLOYED BY GENERAL ANASTASIO SOMOZA) AS A SPECIALIST IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. ABOUT LATE MAY OR EARLY JUNE, ESPINAL CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN IN GUATEMALA RECENTLY WHERE HE HAD WORKED IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVT. HE QUOTED AT LENGTH, AND ACCURATELY, FROM CHE GUEVARA AND USED EXAMPLES, ALSO ACCURATELY, FOR SOME FIDEL CASTRO OPERATIONS ON HOW TO OVERTHROW A GOVT. SUBJ HAD ALSO BEEN OVERHEARD TO SAY IN MANAGUA THAT HE HAD A SPECIAL MISSION TO ASSASSINATE A CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENT.

CONTINUED...

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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3		7	
4		8	

PAGE TWO

DIRECTOR

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE ~~XX~~ TWO

INFO

CITE DIR 39815

3. NO PERTINENT IDEN INFO ON OSCAR RAMIREZ HEILBRON.

4. ~~XXXXX~~ SUBSTANCE PARA 2 INFO MAY BE PASSED LIAISON. PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

R

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Requested Hdqs traces Vidal ESPINAL Arrea and Oscar RAMIREZ Heilbron.

WH/2/CR Edward

WH/PO/A

WH/C Carl Jenkins by phone

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ile. AMCIVIC

ACCOUNTING BY INDIVIDUAL FOR ADVANCE

NOTE: *Follow Instructions on Reverse*

SUBMITTED BY: Carl E. Jenkins

PERIOD OF ACCOUNTING — FROM: July 65 — TO: Sep 65

VOUCHER NO. *(Finance use only)*

RECEIPTS

1. CASH ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD			$
1a.			
2. RECEIPT NUMBER	DATE	DESCRIPTION	
2087	July	AMCIVIC subsidy	12,000
2129	Aug	AMCIVIC subsidy	12,000
TOTAL TO ACCOUNT FOR			24,000

DISBURSEMENTS

3. VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
	4 Sep	See attached translations and accountings for July & Aug AMCIVIC subsidies. (In Sept no subsidy was furnished although an acct. has been rendered for purposes of C/O control.)	$
TOTAL EXPENSES			$ 24,000
3a.			
4. REFUNDED HEREWITH ☐ CASH ☐ CHECK ☐ MONEY ORDER			
5. CASH ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR			$ 24,000

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.:

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.:

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER:

APPROVED

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER:

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER:

I certify that the expenditures listed hereon and on any attachments were incurred for official purposes of a confidential nature, that payment or credit therefor has not been received, and that this accounting is true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF FINANCE DIVISION

PREPARED BY:

REVIEWED BY:

VOUCHER NO. 7-12

DESCRIPTION - ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / P.O. NO. / 28-33 DIV.	34-39 STATION CODE / PROP. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-42 EXPEND CODE / FY	43 FUNDS	45-46 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	47-52 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	53 CA YR	54-57 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	58-67 ALLOT. OR COST ACCT. NO.	62-67 CE. NO. / & REF. NO.	68-70 DUE DATE / OBJECT CLASS	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
										TOTALS			

FORM 9-61 282 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. If funds, in the form of other than U.S. Dollars were on hand, received, or disbursed during the accounting period, all pertinent data, i.e., rate, method of acquisition, etc., must be shown. If advances have been made to third parties, enter the total of such advances outstanding at the beginning of the accounting period on line 1a.

2. If more space is required to explain receipts, prepare receipt form, number and attach hereto. In every case, completely identify the source of receipts.

3. Attach a voucher for each expenditure and assign a number thereto in numerical sequence. The voucher may be the receipt obtained from the payee. When a receipt is not obtained, prepare a certificate and attach as a voucher. When space on form is not sufficient to list all vouchers, prepare a listing on a separate sheet and enter the total under item 3. If advances to third parties are outstanding at the close of the accounting period, attach an itemized list and enter the total on line 3a.

4. Final credit will not be given for disbursements which are advances to be accounted for. When accounting for advances are obtained, list as expenditures or refund of cash, as appropriate.

5. Total receipts entered on the line "Total to Account For" must agree with the total disbursements entered on the line following "Total Accounted For."

SECRET

✓ ✓ ✓

ACCOUNTING FOR AMCIVIC SUBSIDIES FOR JULY, AUG & SEP 1965

(TRANSLATION)

Gentlemen:

I have the pleasure to submit accountings for money received from the Consejo de Liberacion for the months of July, August and September.

JULY

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine		$ 3,000.00
(Printing, collaborations, circulation)		
Radio Time		1,805.00
(Recording, collaborations, breadcasts)		
Office		1,100.00
Rent	$200.00	
Manuel Guillot	400.00	
Valdes Castilla	200.00	
Rafael Gracia	300.00	
Delegate in Costa Rica (Luis Arrizurrieta)		380.00
Delegate in Venezuela (Maximo Diaz)		450.00
Delegates in Spain: Enrique Tous		150.00
Cuco Leon		250.00
Mago Robreno		250.00
Delegate in Honduras (Jose Antonio Mole)		250.00
Delegate in Guatemala (Oscar Vila)		200.00
Clandestine work:		
Delivered to Father Llorente to be sent through the Spanish Embassy		2,000.00
Delivered to the following persons to maintain them in Cuba to families of prisoners o killed in their provinces		
Inocencio Alvarez		275.00
Alfredo Borges Caigast		250.00
Rolando Tapanes		200.00
Gustavo Fernandez Vidales		200.00
Domingo Borges Carbot		200.00
Emilia del Mar		100.00
Silvia Heredia		125.00
Jacinto Lazarraga		300.00
(Here I had to advance 3 months for the wife's operation)		

Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.00
Angel Garcia Alvarez	275.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.00
TOTAL EXPENSES	$12,530.00

As you see, in July I spent $530.00 more than I received, without taking into account the expenses for my travel in Latin America, or my personal expenses of my family, with which I have to maintain my wife, two sons and parents.

AUGUST

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine		$ 3,000.00
Radio Time		1,805.00
Office		
(I had to increas expenses as follows:		
Office supplies	$100.00	
Light & telephone	50.00	
Nilo Messer (secretary)	275.00	1,525.00
Delegate in Costa Rica		350.00
Delegate in Venezuela		450.00
Delegation in Spain (I cancelled Mago Robreno)		400.00
Delegate in Honduras		350.00
Delegate in Guatemala		200.00
Clandestine work		4,625.00
TOTAL FOR AUGUST		$12,705.00

As you see, in August I spent $705.00 more than I received, without accounting for my travel expenses, nor my personal expenses of maintaining my home and parents.

SEPTEMBER

Received from the Consejo - $12,000

I spent it as follows:

"Tridente" magazine	$ 3,000.00

Radio Time	$ 1,805.00
Office	1,325.00
Delegate in Costa Rica	350.00
Delegate in Venezuela	450.00
Delegate in Spain	400.00
Delegate in Honduras	350.00
Delegate in Guatemala (this month was not paid but next month he will return to Guatemala, but this month will be here)	
Clandestine work	4,[illegible].00
TOTAL FOR SEPT	$12,585.00

As you see, I spent $505.00 more than I received from the Consejo. All this without taking into account my travel or my family. Of course, none of this includes my delegate in Nicaragua who receives $400.00 per month (Antonio Sanz) nor the personnel who guard the arms in the three locations in Nicaragua, nor the personnel involved in Civic Action in Monkey Point and el Bluff, nor the personnel who take care of the "Granja Modelo," nor the storage payments for the warehouse where I have the equipment from the bases (all civilian equipment) in Miami.

Truly yours,

(signed)

Ignacio

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Anderson		
2	Mr. [illegible]		
3	E. Williamson		EJW
4	It would depend on		
5	circumstances, but might be		
6	too obvious a vehicle.		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

These are put out by Artime's gang. Do you see any use for these as a mechanism to surface items which are to ~~be~~ appear as inspired by US? or CIA?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

14-00000

File
Artime
EJW

TO: WILLIAMSON
SUBJ: COMMENTS ON TRIDENT
FROM: CHACONAS
DATE: 16 MAY 66

1. I DO NOT REGARD TRIDENT AS A PARTICULARLY USEful
VEHICLE FOR PROP ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE TRIDENT IS CLOSELY
IDENTIFIED WITH ARTIME AND AS SUCH IS LESS [illegible] A CONVINCING PROP
OUTLET THAN WOULD BE THE CASE OTHERWISE. I WOULD NOT THEREFORE FAVOR
FINANCIAL SUPPORT (KUBARK) OF THE TRIDENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE KUBARK
IS NOT IN POSITION CLOSELY TO MONITOR THE CONTENTS PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.
ALSO, THE CIRCULATION IS EXTREMELY LIMITED TO WARRANT PLACING A CASE
OFFICER IN CHARGE FOR THIS ACTIVITY, I.E. GUIDING THE PROP LINE OF
TRIDENT.

2. WE HAVE NOT USED TRIDENT IN THE PAST(AS FAR AS I
AM AWARE) FOR PLANTING MATERIAL AND I DONT FOR THE MOMENT VISUALIZE
USING TRIDENT FOR OUTLET IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE "MIG-21
PROJECT", CONCEIVABLE MIGHT FIND TRIDENT USEFUL - THAT IS, IF IT
IS DESIREABLE TO ADD A QUASI-OFFICIAL AURA TO THE PROPOSAL.

GC

CHACONAS

This seems to have no value to us
C Anderson

OK

HARRY - BM

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS[illegible]TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/C/OP		
2			
3	C/WH/C/PA		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls attach your comment as to possible utility of this publication for your purposes - Either positive or negative appraisal should be made -

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
D. R	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

(40)

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2-61

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	ADC/WH/C		
2	WH/C Plans	13	WZ
3	WH/C/CA		JK
4			
5	C/WH/C/FI		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: 2 to 5:

In view of distribution in Latin America, WH/CA should also be consulted - WZ

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Earl J Williamson	12 Nov

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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
2-61

SECRET

12 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Tridente Publication

1. Tridente is a slick news-type magazine published by Manuel Artime Buesa and the MRR. A copy is attached to this memoranda.

2. According to Artime 6000 copies of Tridente are being published every two weeks at an approximate cost of $2,000 a month. The publication is sold on newstands in the U.S. and also to some extent in Latin America. He gave the following figures for monthly distribution in Latin America.

Costa Rica - Approximately 500 copies
Nicaragua - Approximately 100 copies
Mexico - Approximately 200 copies
Panama - Approximately 75 copies
Venezuela - Approximately 150 copies

Artime claims that most of the above copies are sold but some are sent gratis to his contacts. In addition 200 copies are sent to Spain as hand-outs because they do not have permission from the Spanish Government to put them on sale. The distribution in Spain is done by Enrique Tous his representative in Madrid. Artime also claims that the copies in all the countries are passed along to friends and relatives and therefore the publication has a larger audience than the circulation figures would indicate. He says that only about $500.00 is derived from the sale of Tridente and he personally has been putting in about $1,500 monthly to keep the magazine going.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. Recently Artime inquired if the Agency had any interest in supporting Tridente or furnishing any material for publication in it. He indicated he could probably not keep the magazine going much longer without financial support and inasmuch as his "assistance" from the Agency will be cut from $5,000 to $3,000 monthly effective 1 June 1966 this is undoubtedly true.

4. Artime was told that he would be advised in the near future if there was any Agency interest in the publication or in seeing it continued. I would therefore appreciate a hard appraisal of the publication in terms of WH/C/CA overall propaganda objectives together with any indication of interst in using the publication. On the latter point it might be a good idea to bear in mind that Artime may continue the publication on his own for several months and in view of our present subsidy to him we could possibly make some use of the magazine in the interim period at no additional cost.

Earl J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

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14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/SERVICES/DISSEMINATION
1 B 4004

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 13 MAY 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ESEC		16 MAY	aH
2. WH/C/RR/OS		16 May	JM
3. WH[illegible] WH/C/CECS			[illegible]
4. WH/C/FI (Williamson) FI/D/OB DUBOIS 19 May			[illegible]
5. (Someone has not done this homework - RID)			
6.			
7. FI/SIG			g
8. a g 8	8 JUN 1966	8 June	AS
9.			
10. [illegible]/ISG/B			
11.			
12. DCS/SD-Virginia Thorne	6/14	6/14	[illegible]
13.			
14. FI/INT/L/Betty Burger 4C17			BB
15. [illegible]			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

This document has not been integrated into the CS records system.

If you feel it should be classified into a CS file, please indicate file number (and other necessary processing) and return to RID/AN.

RETAIN: 201-267437
File Number

INDEXING: YES ☐ NO ☒

Do not return this document to RID if coding and indexing are not required.

WH/C/FI maintains regular contact with Antonio and he is presently receiving a monthly payment from the Agency. Efa
201-267437
DCS [illegible] interest [illegible]

FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☑ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

201-267437

12 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]
[illegible]

FROM : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : Alien Interview **ARTIME BUESA, MANUEL F.**

This office has requested FBI approval to contact **MANUEL F. ARTIME BUESA**, an alien national described in the attachment, and expects to exploit him as a source of foreign intelligence information.

Please advise Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 2738, regarding any interest you may wish to have considered in this connection.

Virginia L. Thorne
for B. FRANK YOUNG
Chief, Services Division

Attachment: Biographical Data On Subject Alien

VLThorne: par

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declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-267437
12 May 66

14-00000

Case 47640 - Sullivan

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME
Artime Buesa, Manuel F.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
[redacted] Zora - Cuba

2. ALIASES

4. SEX
M

5. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
		1270 NE 85th Street, Miami, Florida

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1962	Present	Employed in anti-GOC activities in US and Latin America	

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

1. Former Graduate Medical Doctor
2. Participated in Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba
3. Frequent travel to Cuba and Dominican Republic.

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downgrading and
declassification

FORM 160 USE PREVIOUS
3-58 EDITIONS

SECRET

10 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

File

SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1

1. The attached material was furnished by AMBIDDY-1 to the undersigned during a meeting in Miami, Florida on 4 May 1966. As noted AMBIDDY-1 had only a vague conception of the date when the information originated and was unaware of the identity of the end sources. Obviously these copies were made from old material in AMBIDDY-1's files on the spur of the moment so that he could bring some material to our meeting.

2. AMBIDDY-1 was told that the attached reports had no significance because of the lack of details as to date and place acquired and source.

Wallace A. Growery

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

CON LOS FUNCIONARIOS QUE SE PUEDEN CONTAR EN EL MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA son los siguientes:

Dr.Jose [illegible]--Director de la Caja de Resarcimiento.

Gustavo Rivero--Jefe del Departamento de Entrada y Salida de Documentos.

Luis Gomez--Segundo Jefe del Departamento de Antecedentes Penales.

Jesus Miranda Medina--ex-Superintendente y por anticomunista hoy simplemente empleado del Registro de Entrada y Salida con categoria de Jefe.

Pedro Diaz Gil--Jefe del Departamento de Ancedentes Penales.

Esteban Puebla Pacheco--Jefe del Departamento de Matrimonios.

Dr.Lluria--Jefe del Departamento de Informes Legales.

Dr.[illegible]--adscripto al Departamento Legal.

Dr.Llerena--Jefe del Departamento de Legalizaciones y firmas de Jueces.

Frita Rita Martinez--Jefe de Barnizadores.

Celestino Gomez Saavedra--Supervisor de Superintendencia.

Jorge Felix--Jefe del Departamento de Bibliotecas.

FUNCIONARIOS ADICTOS DEL REGIMEN a la vez colabores directos del Ministro para con el sistema.

Dr Arturo Ferber Orozco--Sub-Secretario.

Dr.Gerardo Arrazola Ferrer--Director Legal de Justicia.

Dr.Juan Gualberto Caballero Moreira--Jefe del Departamento Legal.

Adela Hallib Hallib--Jefa Departamento de Compras.

Migdalia [illegible]--Jefa Departamento de Suministros.

Dra.Ada Guerrero--Departamento de Biblioteca.

Dr.Rigoberto Betancourt Martinez--Jefe del Registro del Notariado.

Dr.Eugenio Arza Ortega--Director de los Registros y del Notariado.

Dra.Concepcion Portela--Jefe del Departamento D.S.P.

Gustavo [illegible]--Jefe Departamento de Personal.(Curso estudios en una de las llamadas escuelas de "Cuadros Politicos".

Marina Diaz Calvet--Jefa del Departamento de Tabulacion.

Humberto Chediak Chediak--Jefe del Departamento de Estadistica.

Carlos Vega Vega--Director de racionalizacion y sustituto en mi cargo de Director General.Despues de mi asilo.Agente del G-2.

Claro Rafael Cordero Espinosa--Jefe del Departamento de Contabilidad y dirigente de la juventud comunista.

Julio Lorenzo Crespo--Jefe del Departamento de Carpinteria.

Rafael Bouza Calvo--Superintendente del Edificio.

Dr.Guido Petriccione--Jefe Contabilidad Caja de Resarcimiento.

Y por ultimo,deseo exponer tambien que han sido creadas,varias Escuelas de Capacitacion,obligatoria a los empleados,cuya capacitacion consiste en una nueva humillacion de adoctrinamiento comunista, por lo tanto puedo informar con toda honradez, que la contrarevolucion en el Ministerio de Justicia abarca por lo menos un 80 por ciento de los empleados, asi como se nota claramente el desmoronamiento moral y fisico del actual sistema.

PROVINCIA DE ORIENTE

Término de Santiago de Cuba

Felipe Quintero Revillas

Dra. María Luisa Caminero Roman

El Sr. Quintero y la Dra. Caminero son localizables a través de Dulce María Regueiro, en la dirección de ella.

Dulce María Regueira
Dirección: 705 Lacret (altos)
Stago. de Cuba

Dr. Vicente Guash Oviedo

Término de Puerto Padre

Francisco Concepción
Finca Platería "La Redención"
Esta finca está en el centro
de Chaparra, San Andrés y Velasco

[illegible] Ramón Pérez Banda
Vive en el mismo pueblo de Puerto Padre

Rafael Mora Quesada
Coordinador Municipal

Barrio Norte: Andrés Suarez Calvo

Barrio Sur: Abelardo Hurtado

Barrio San Andrés: Eliecer Martín Porcell

Barrio Los Alfonsos: Guillermo Lasa Castellanos

Barrio La [illegible]: Enrique [illegible]

[illegible] Campos

Barrio Santa María: [illegible] Carballo

Central Chaparra: Felipe Bustamante

Central Delicias: Victor [illegible]

San Martín: Roger Batista

Término de Manzanillo

Angel Ballester

[illegible]

[illegible] Alvarez

Manuel Praia, Coordinador Manzanillo-Niquero-Campechuela

José Ramón Aguilar

Enrique Almaga, este es correo y enlace de la Sierra al pueblo.

Zona de Veguita

Rey Gonzales, correo y enlace.

Rafael Chaves

Juan Tabanda

Roberto Rodríguez

Pantaleon Rodríguez

Término de Yateras

Sr. Enrique Iglesias Avilé
Coordinador Municipal

Término de Bayamo

[illegible] González Longoria de la Torre
Dirección: Prolongación de García S/N (La Quinta)
Ganadero

Manuel Castillo García
Dirección: Edificio Vallejo (Banco Canadá)

Enrique Hernández [illegible]
Dirección: Reparto [illegible]
Ex-panadero

Enrique Arias
Dirección: Padre Batista S/N, por la Iglesia Católica Mayor

Municipio del [illegible]

Santiago Martínez

[illegible] Iluminado Castellanos Urdaneta

[illegible] Mesa Quiala

Término de Guantánamo

Manuel Borgellá
Coordinador Municipal

Sr. Hernando [illegible]
[illegible] Coordinador Municipal y
[illegible]

Alvaro Infante
Tarqrero

Barrio Caimanera: Rufino Quevedo [illegible]

Organización: Teodoro Raymond Orozco
Loma del Sur #31
Coordinador Civil: Ramón Robles Díaz

Coordinador Militar: DEL MRR — Claudio Fernandes Roche

[illegible] Ramón López [illegible]
Coordinador

[illegible] Casas
Delegado Provincial Oriente Sector Ferroviaria
y vive en Guantánamo

Antonio Guet
Calle 2da. Oeste e/. 5 y 6 Sur, Gtánamo.

Dr. Ramon Rebé Reyes
Paseo e/. 1 y 2
Guantánamo

[illegible] Rebé Reyes
Santa Rita e/. Donato Mármol y Varona
Guantánamo

[illegible] del Río
Calle Beneficencia e/. 8 y 9 Sur Gtánamo.

[illegible]
Calixto García #1383 Sur, Gtmo.

[illegible] de [illegible]

[illegible] Lamoth
Coordinador Militar

[illegible] Vega
Obrero

Dioscórides Enger
Organización

Srta. Melba Idelisa Quevedo Peña
Coordinadora

[illegible] de [illegible]

[illegible] Quevedo — Obrero
[illegible]
[illegible] — Coordinador Militar
[illegible] Díos — Organización

Barrio Caimanera:

Juan Guerra Pérez
Calle Marina Norte #60
Caimanera
y
Faustino Pérez
De la plaza del mercado

Ramon Rey
Marina Norte S/N

Anstergilio Hernandez
del comercio

Miguel Pérez
Correo frente al mercado

Términos de Palma Soriano, Jiguaní y San Luis:

Javier Bosch

Dr. Yuti Sozodeville
Delegado

Término del Caney:

[illegible] bajo conocido por [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

José Miguel [illegible]
Vive [illegible] calle Colon # 2106 en Artemisa.
Coordinador de [illegible] desde la fundacion del M.R.R. en dicho Termino.

[illegible]
[illegible] del Bar de Arturo [illegible] Cabañas.

[illegible]

[illegible]
Calle [illegible] de [illegible] Contador Publico.
Coordinador del M.R.R.

3- [illegible]

Dr [illegible] de Cabañas.

[illegible] Antonio [illegible]
Republica y Primera [illegible] del M.R.R.

Olga Valdes Cuesta
Calle [illegible] # 2106, Reparto [illegible]

Francisco [illegible]
Colon 2106 Artemisa

5- CANDELARIA
Pedro Vera [illegible]
Calle Maceo esquina a [illegible].

6- SAN CRISTOBAL
Eligio [illegible].
Vive en Santa Cruz de los Pinos.

7-LOS PALACIOS

Alfredo [illegible].
Vive en Paso Real de San Diego. Los Palacios.

Enrique Fernandez Martinez
Entronque de [illegible]. Los Palacios.

8-CONSOLACION DEL SUR

Baldomero Torres Perez.
Vive en Barrio de [illegible]. Consolacion del Sur. Fundador del M.R.R.

9-PINAR DEL RIO

Lorenzo Hernandez. Maestro de Escuela.
Localizarlo a traves de la Iglesia de [illegible].

Pedro [illegible] de la [illegible].
Vive en calle [illegible] entre [illegible] y Solano Ramos.
Trabaja en el Departamento Provincial de Educacion.

Efrain Saavedra Perez.
Calle B 102. Reparto [illegible]. Pinar del Rio. Comerciante.

10-SAN JUAN Y MARTINEZ

Ingeniero [illegible]
Vive al [illegible] Miembro del M.R.R.

Andres Cabanes.
Vive en la Finca La Primavera. Barrio [illegible] Sainz. (Lagunilla).

11-SAN LUIS

Juan Garcia Gonzalez.
Barrio [illegible]. Coordinador Municipal del M.R.R.

Ernesto Cruz.
Calle [illegible] Numero [illegible]. Comerciante.

12-GUANE

[illegible]
Localizarlo con el cura del Pueblo.

Tomas Delgado. (Tomasito)

Ricardo Cuetara Santovenia.

Florentino Fernandez [illegible].

Roberto [illegible].

13-MANTUA

[illegible]

Faustino C[illegible]

[illegible] Corrales.

Eladio Villanueva.

14-VIÑALES

Sergio Suarez.
Localizar la estacion ferrocarril, Pinar del Rio.

Miguel Perez.
Vive en Puerto Esperanza.

Vicente San Juan.
Puerto Esperanza. Viñales.

15-CONSOLACION DEL NORTE

Silvio Cruz.
Miembro del [illegible]

Simon Cruz.

Francisco [illegible]

MATANZAS

[illegible] [illegible]

1.- MANGUITO

Lole García Barreiros
(Independcа esq a/s "La Ferreteria"

Nota: Su dueño

Presos: Fidel Barreto Llano
(Isla de Pinos)

Juan González Pajardo
(Isla de pinos)

2.- JOVELLANOS

René Revoredo Vallejo
([illegible] #2 Jovellanos Electricidad Local C.T.R.)

Presos: Enrique Revoredo Vallejo
(Jovellanos, Isla de pinos, 30 Años)

Ismael Ramos Pérez
(Isla de Pinos 30 Años)

3.- PERICO

Joaquín Sotolongo
(Presidente de los Colonos, Santa Rosa Esq. a Carretera Central)

Presos: Pedro del [illegible]
([illegible] en San Severino)

Rafael [illegible]
(Obras Públicas, Isla de Pinos)

4.- COLON

Ignacio de Armas
(Calle Central, Máximo Gómez, Carnicería de Zinguaro, lugar donde trabaja)

Presos: José Guerra [illegible]
(Isla de Pinos)

[illegible] Alonso y José García

15.- **JAGUEY GRANDE**

Arturo Lorenzo Alvarez
(Administrador de las Farm. del Padre, vive en los altos de la Farmacia "Dr. Reyes"

Presos: Dr. Mario Rodríguez (Abogado)
(Isla de Pinos)

Jorge Gutierrez Izaguirre
(sheriff, Isla de Pinos)

6.- **CARLOS ROJAS**

Ignacio Nodarse
(Calle Lagunilla, Dueño Café, Restaurant)

Presos: Wilfredo Fernández Riverón
(Isla de Pinos)

Orlando Fernández Riverón
(Isla de Pinos)

[illegible] SAN JOSE DE LOS RAMOS

Nicolás Sánchez
(Calle [illegible] s/n. Ex-Oficial Constitucional)

Presos: José Miguel Gómez Reveredo

Ramiro [illegible] Rodríguez

[illegible] **MATANZAS**

Antonio Rivera
([illegible] 111/2 Matanzas, Trabaja en Audiencia)

Presos: Leonel Rodríguez de la Torre
(Isla de Pinos)

Pedro Casas Carrillos
(Isla de Pinos)

Rogelio Cruz
(Isla de Pinos)

9.- CARDENAS

Ing. Amaira Pérez Martínez
(Calle 35 Bar Varadero)

Presos: Juan Argüelles
Isla de Pinos)

Javier Márquez
(Cabaña)

10.- UNION DE REYES

Alberto Ferret (Dueño Fundición "Ferret")

Francisco Arencibia
(Agente Seguros, American National)

Presos: Evelio Martín González
(Isla de Pinos)

Humberto López García)
(Cabaña 10 años)

11.- BOLONDRON

Aurelio Rivero P.
(Vive en su Finca y en el Calle Central del Pueblo)

Presos: Generoso Hidalgo
(San Severino)

12.- CANASI

[illegible] Prieto
[illegible] en que [illegible] cerca de [illegible]

Presos: Eligio Santana
(Isla de Pinos)

13.- SANTA ANA

Carmen Fernández (Maestra)

Presos:

COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION

Abel Santamaria...25 No.164.Vedado
Amistad No.552?.Habana.Cuba
Amistad No.595...Habana.Cuba
Animas No.29.Casablanca.Habana.Cuba
Arango y Reforma.Luyano.Habana.Cuba
Aranguren No.665.Habana.Cuba
Ave.de Maceo.No.511.Habana.Cuba.
Ave.de Maceo No.513.Habana.Cuba
Calzada del Cerro No.1469.Habana.Cuba
Calzada [illegible].Habana.Cuba
[illegible]
Campanario No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Carmen No.17[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Clavel No.20.Habana.Cuba
Clavel No.217.Habana.Cuba
Comandante J.A. [illegible].Compostela No.758.Habana.Cuba.
Corrales No.75[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Crespo No.122.Habana.Cuba
Cuba No.660.Habana.Cuba
Dominguez No.467.Cerro.Habana.Cuba
Empedrado No.415.Habana.Cuba
Escobar No.71[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
Estevez No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba
Industria No.462.Habana.Cuba
Jose A.Echeverria.Samarrate No.68.Habana.Cuba
J.M.Diaz.Compostela No.758.Habana.Cuba.
Lealtad No.595.Habana.Cuba.
Manuel Porto Pena.Estrada Palma No.95.Habana.Cuba
Marcelo Salado.Soledad No.368.Habana.Cuba
Marques Gonzalez.No.310.Habana.Cuba
Marti No.111.Guanabacoa.Habana.Cuba.
Monte No.211.Habana.Cuba.
Mercaderes No.16.Habana.Cuba.
Neptuno No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
Nueva del Pilar No.209.Habana.Cuba.
[illegible].12.Cerro.Habana.Cuba

Patricio Lumumba..Sol.No.462.Habana.Cuba.
Puerta Cerrada No.222.Habana.Cuba.
Belascoain.No.[illegible]99.Habana.Cuba
Pepe Gomez Wangüemert..11.No.808.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
Porvenir No.23.Arroyo Apolo.Habana.Cuba.
Santa Teresa No.420.Habana.Cuba.
Santo Tomas No.10.Habana.Cuba
Sitios No.777.Habana.Cuba.
K.No.318.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
23.No.63.Vedado.Habana.Cuba
17.No.4414.Marianao.Habana.Cuba
25.No.6494.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
26.No.3518.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
43.No.5010.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
Ave.de los [illegible].No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
[illegible].No.[illegible].Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
Campanario.No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
Lindero No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
17 y B.Vedado.Habana.Cuba.
[illegible].No.13606.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
"JOSE LUIS TASENDE"..50.(e).35 y 37.Marianao.Habana.Cuba.
"ABEL SANTAMARIA".Industria.No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
"HERMANAS GIRAL".Hospital No.658.Habana.Cuba.
"ROSA E.HERNANDEZ".Serafines 69.Santos Suarez.Habana.Cuba.
Emilio [illegible].Presidente Comite de Defensa.JUAN DE DIOS FRIETO.
Inquisidor No.[illegible].Habana.Cuba.
MARIA TERESA [illegible]CA..Responsable Nacional Instruccion Revolucionaria.Es de la Vieja Guardia.
ANGEL VALIENTE..Responsable Nacional de Educacion.
RADAMES MANCEBO..Secretario Organizacion Nacional.
RIGOBERTO FORRAS..Dirigente Nacional.
PEPE SIM[illegible]..
ENRIQUE TOLEDO..Coordinador Provincial de la Habana.
OSCAR FRAGA..Coordinador General.Coordinacion 11.Arroyo Apolo.Habana.
ROBERTO [illegible]....Vigilancia Orden Publico " " "
MANUEL A[illegible]..Resp.Reforma Urbana. " " "

CONSUELO ALVAREZ........Resp.Fiscalizadora....Arroyo Apolo.Habana.
ENRIQUE DOMINGUEZ.......Resp.Defensa Popular. " " "
ALIVIA [illegible]..........Resp.Salud Publica. " " "
LUISA PERALTA...........Resp.Educacion... " " "
FRANCISCO BLANCO........Resp.Inst.Revolucionaria." " "
ELSA MORALES............Resp.Frente de Paz. " " "
ORLANDO HERNANDEZ.......Resp. Deportes. " " "
SALUSTIANO [illegible]........Resp.Propaganda. " " "
DR PEDRO M.[illegible]..Comite "Lidia Gomez [illegible].Lca s/n/
Loma de Chaple.Vibora.Secc.4.Arroyo Apolo.
CARMEN VAZQUEZ....Presidenta.
RAUL SANCHEZ...PEPITO TAY.San Mariano 176,Vibora.
DR ANTONIO MARTINEZ BELLO...PEPE PRIETO.Ofarril 42.Vibora.
TOMIA SANSANO..BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ.Milagros 403.
WILFREDO ALONSO TORRE.Presidente. de Comite de Defensa situado
[illegible] 403.San Antonio de los Baños.
FRANCISCO [illegible].....Distrito 1.45 A.y 97.Marianao.
TEOBALDO [illegible]...Comite PARQUE [illegible] # 1410.La Sierra.[illegible]
CONRADO SUAREZ....COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL DE MATANZAS
RADAMES LOPEZ ...Responsable.COORDINACION.LAS VILLAS.
ISRAEL RUIZ......COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL DE CAMAGUEY
NESTOR [illegible] VELAZQUEZ...Secc.ORGANIZADOR.

COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION DEL INTERIOR

[illegible]

148 No.[illegible].
Ave.[illegible].No.15087.
Ave.233.No.13403.
Ave.249.No.15606.(Zona 2).
138. No.23320.
138. No.25710.
136. No.25716.

COTORRO

Independencia No.7.
Independencia No.489.
10 de Octubre No.8.(Seccion 4).
Republica s/n.Santa Maria del Rosario.
Abel Santamaria.Lugo Norte No.55.
Armando Mirabal.Callejon de Guanabacoa No.58
Camilo Cienfuegos.Independencia No.396.
[illegible] I [illegible] No.19.
Frank País.3a No.10
Guido [illegible].Lugo No.42.
Independencia No.[illegible].
10 de Octubre No.78-A.
Jose A.Echeverria.[illegible] 15
Jesus Menendez.[illegible] Palma No.28.
Manuel [illegible].[illegible] Alegre.

GUINES

Habana No.66.

JARUCO

Jose M.Layne No.3.

MADRUGA

Cespedes No.312.

QUIVICAN

Ave.23.No.1803.

SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS

Coordinacion.Norte No.[illegible]

Antonio Maceo Fco.Delgado.No.155.

SANTA CRUZ DEL NORTE

Alfredo Lima No.42.

SANTA FE

Comite Municipal Ave.1a.No.3229.

Occidentales A [illegible] 1a.No.5202.

SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS

11.No.8.

Ave.General [illegible]

Molinos [illegible] de la Habana.

14 y [illegible]

SURGIDERO DE BATABANO

Marino Ospina No.207.

COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION

ORIENTE

MANOLO BORJAS....COORDINADOR PROVINCIAL ORIENTE.
ONELIO VALDES.... " " SALUD
CANDIDO JUSTIZ... " " VIGILANCIA
HUMBERTO TORRES.. " " TRABAJO VOLUNTARIO
NICOMEDES DESPAIGNE...Resp.Organizacion.San Luis.Oriente.
GONZALO HERRERA.... " RECUPERACION VALORES DEL ESTADO
ARISTIDES BAEZA... " Organizacion.DEL DISTRITO.San Luis.
ALBERTO VILA.... " Instruccion Revolucionaria.San Luis.Oriente.
MIRTA DIAZ............Presidente Comite San Luis Oriente.
ISABEL BORGES PORTILLO....Comite de Vigilancia de San Luis.Oriente
AMIN GONGORA........RESPONSABLE PROVINCIAL DE LOS C.D.R. EN LAS E.I.R.

[illegible] DE [illegible]

[illegible] TRAIDORES [illegible] DE PINAR DEL RIO

JUNIO DE 1962

COMERCIANTES.
Felipe [illegible] MARQUEZ.
Alcides [illegible].
Carlos CARUS.(Puerto Esperanza). (muerto).
[illegible] PEREZ.
Orlando VALDES ALVAREZ DE LA CAMARA.
[illegible] FERNANDEZ.
Isidro [illegible].
Pedro VILAS.

MEDICOS.
Pedro DIAZ [illegible].
Andres N. MASSON [illegible].
Francisco [illegible] CABAL.
Reinaldo [illegible].
[illegible] FORTE.
[illegible] ROCA.
[illegible]
[illegible] HERRERA.
[illegible]

[illegible] MAGISTERIAL

Reynaldo VALLEY [illegible].
Anibal LLANES TRUJILLO.
Pablo ALVAREZ TRUJILLO.
Marta LARA CAMACHO.
Diosdado FERNANDEZ.
Jacinto MELLA.
Leopoldo GONZALEZ PEREZ.
Norma AGUILAR.
Alfonso VALDES.
Esther VALDES PEREIRA.
Hilda CLAUSELL DE GONZALEZ.
Zoraida ALVAREZ TRUJILLO.
Juanita COLLADO DE CABRERA.
Manolo AMADOR.
Osvaldo HERRERA QUINTANA.
Yolanda LABORI.
Teresa OTERO.

[illegible] Y G-2-

"Chiquitin" y Candido ALVAREZ
Panchito JUNCO.
Israel CARDENAS
Raul BARCON.
Emilito REGALADO.
"Cohito" ESCOBAR.
Elbeo DE ARMAS.
Agustinito MIERS
Elena MARTINEZ [illegible]
Enrique [illegible].
Jose M.S PARIS (Padre).
Jose [illegible]-SUERO.
[illegible] P. CALLEJA.
[illegible] E. [illegible] y sus hijos.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Manolo [illegible] (Laboratorista)
Rafael [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] SARRAGA.
[illegible] CAMPS.
Dr. Luis [illegible]
[illegible]
Carmelo ARIAS [illegible]

GUANAJAY.
[illegible] y [illegible], Cobrador del Agua.

[illegible]
[illegible] ZILLIAN propietario de una ferretería y Juan GARCIA EMPLEADO de la Compañía de Electricidad.

RELACION DE LOS MIEMBROS COMUNISTAS Y MILICIANOS PARA EL M.R.R.

Termino Municipal.-- GUINES.

Provincia Habana.

ROGELIO BANIRA. Miembro de las Milicias. Fue profesor en la escuela Superior de Guines. Es propietario de una vidriera de cigarros y apuntaciones situada en el Bar Pancho. En su casa funciona un Comite de Defensa, situado en la Calle Concha o General Asbert entre Trujillo y Clemente Fernandez.
Caracteristicas. Mide aproximadamente 6-3 pesa unas 170 a 180 lbs. ojos azules, pelo risado y canoso, tiene bigote y usa espejuelso, complexion fisica mediana.

SRA. ARMANDA RODRIGUEZ. Divorciada. Miembra de las Milicias y de la Federacion Cubana, empleada de la oficina del Hospital Municipal, reside en la Calle Habana esquina a Cinco en el Reparto Praga, miembro del Comite de Defensa de su cuadra, y del que funciona en el Hospital, mide 5-2 unas 115 lbs., pelo rubio o castano pintado usa espejuelos.

ANTONIO SOLANA. Miliciano, miembro del G 2 y actual administrador del que fuera Central Providencia, fue interventor del Grocery Estrada en el que trabajaba desde hacia 5 anos, mide 5-8 unas 140 lbs. vive en la Calle Molino esquina a Concha.

RUBEN ROQUE. Miliciano, miembro del Partido Comunista, pertenece a la llamada vieja guardia, posee un carro amplificador por el que da las consignas comunistas, posee un Comite de Defensa en su casa, situada en la Calle Dos entre Tres y Ave. Juan Rodriguez en el residencial Mayabeque, mide 5-2, unas 140 lbs.

HAROLDO SIGLER. Miliciano, miembro del C.D.R. de la Cia. de Electricidad donde trabaja, mide unos 5-6 de alto, de 150 a 160 lbs. reside en la calle Habana esquina a 8 en el Nuevo Vedado.

WILLIAM DEGRACIA. Miembro de la Cruz Roja, ex director del Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza de Guines, confidente del G-2, de procedencia Portorriquena, mide aproximadamente 5-8, unas 180 lbs., ojos obscuros pelo trigueno y piel trigueña, usa bigote y espejuelos, habla y fue profesor de Ingles, y vive en el callejon de Muerte entre Soparda y Amistad.

OLGA GONZALEZ. miembro de la Federacion de Mujeres Cubana, de la que es ejecutivo, maestra del Centro Escolar en el que adoctrina, pertenece al C. D. R. de su barrio, asi como tambien al de los maestros.

DR. ANTONIO DIAZ ABASCAL., conocido por el Polacero, medico, miliciano aunque viste de uniforme en raras ocasiones, trabaja en el hospital Municipal, mide unos 6 pies. pesa aprox. 190 lb. reside en el Callejon Guerra entre San Julian y Maximo Gomez.

DR. FRANCISCO ORTEGA, conocido por Panchitan, dentista, miembro del C.D.R. radicado en la casa del Sr. Estrada, (antigua agencia de seguros), posee su consulta en la calle habana entre Soparda y Maximo Gomez, en la cera de los numeros impares, vive en la calle en la farmacia Chambles, frente a la calle Maso.

SR. FRANCISCO CHILLA JR. hijo del anterior, estudiante de la Universidad de la Habana, este sujeto pertenece a la Aso. de Jovenes Comunistas, tiene la funcion de abrir las casas que abandonan los cubanos al trasladarse al extranjero, reside en la misma direccion de su padre.

HORACIO FERNANDEZ, dueno de la casa Gallito (efectos electricos en la calle San Julian esq. a Trujillo), miembro de las Milicias, aunque no usa uniforme., miembro del C.D.R de su barrio, funciona como activo delator, es ademas activo del G-2, vive en el residencial Mayabeque.

TITI, conocido por la Catalinera, pertenece al C.D.R. miembro del G-2 denuncio a Hugo Marlen, que estuvo preso durante 7 meses, reside en [illegible] frente al [illegible] Yath Club.

ADRIAN FERNANDEZ, conocido por Pata de Plancha, jefe del G-2 en Guines, ha sembrado el panico y el terror en la poblacion con sus abusos y desmanes, es considerado como muy peligroso, mide unos 5-5 y unas 180 lbs. de peso, reside en la calle Maceo esquina a la calle Dos.

CARMEN BETANCOURT, fue empleada de la compania de telefonos de Guines delatora de su centro laboral, trabaja en la actualidad en la oficina de la Estacion de Trenes, tiene un comite de Defensa.

CASIMIRO PEREZ, dueno de la ferreteria del mismo nombre, activo militante del P.A.U. en epoca de Batista, mason, miliciano, posee un comite de defensa en su casa. ACTIVO DELATOR, reside en Maceo entre [illegible] y [illegible], frente a la antigua bodega Espiga de Oro.

CARLOS PEREZ, hijo de Casimiro Perez, hoy es medico de nueva formacion comenzo sus estudios en el ano 1959, operaba en la Habana y Guines como propagandista del regimen, practicaba la cirujia sin tener titulo bajo la responsabilidad del Dr. Marin, la misma direccion de supadre.

[illegible] PEREZ, hijo tambien de Casimiro Perez, miliciano y delator, mecanico, reside con su padre.

CARLOS SAAVEDRA, colaborador del regimen en lo que a la ensenanza se refiere, delator, reside en el Edificio Balerdi.

ROBERTO PEREZ GALERO, miembro de la Cruz Roja de la que fue miembro jefe, miembro de las milicias y del G-2, dueno de la Casa Perez en el Edificio Balerdi en ropa de hombres y ninos, mide 5-1 unas 150 lbs. reside en Trujillo frente al parque Central de Guines en el edificio Balerdi.

GUIDO BETANCOURT, empleado del Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza de Guines Miliciano y miembro del G-2, posee un comite de Defensa en su casa situada en la Calle 2. entre Herrera y Medio por la acera de los numeros impares.

ESTEBAN GARCIA DAVILA, dentista, colaborador del regimen, vive en Trujillo entre Marti y Concha.

PEDRO RODRIGUEZ DU[illegible], empleado del Juzgado de Guines, delator vive en entre Palmas y Maceo, al lado de la Sociedad Bella Union.

RAMON MESA, conocido pr Mesita, Miliciano, joven comunista y G-2 vive en Valdes y Maximo Gomez

RAMON ARSA padre, miliciano y G-2 viejo miembro del Partido Comunista vive en Valdés y Maximo Gomez

Rafael GUZMAN, conocido por Cepillo, miliciano, trabaja en la agencia bancaria de Guines No. 308-31, delator vive en Maximo Gomez y Primera en el Residencial Mayabeque.

WILFREDO [illegible], bancario, miliciano vive en Maximo Gomez casi esquina a Beneficencia.

CHITA PERDAN, esposa del anterior, miliciana muy activa, miembro de la Federacion de mujeres y delatora.

LINCIN FONTANIL, miliciano, jefe de los jovenes comunistas, delator vive en la Ave. Juan Rodriguez y M. Gomez.

FRANK FONTANIL, miliciano, comunista y G-2, misma direccion del anterior, su hermano.

ANTONIO [illegible], dueño de la tienda La Nueva, comunista, miembro del C.D.R. vive en Herrera entre Habana y Maso. es e sujeto tiene dos hijos que son del G-2 a uno le dicen o se llama Pino.

FELIPE MARRERO, responsable de las estaciones de gasolina, miliciano.

DRAFT

The following are the highlights of operational meeting with AMBIDDY-1 on 3-4 May 1966 conducted in Room 1609 in the Hotel Everglades in Miami, Florida.

The first part of our discussion concerned reports which he had recently originated or been responsible for concerning possibility of agitation and disturbances in Costa Rica preceeding and during the inauguration of President-elect Trejos' 9 May 1966.

AMBIDDY-1 first spent considerable time in attempting to justify his ~~assets~~ efforts to establish relations with various Government leaders in Central America and why he had placed certain of his people in position to develop information on these Governments. He said that sometime ago it had been ~~stressed~~ impressed upon him by other people ~~which~~ with whom he had been in contact including agency personnel that it would be important to the future of his movement to be sure that he had the support of the Central American Governments. This he added was considered important in connection with the necessity of ~~this~~ their support in establishing his training basis in Costa Rica and Nicaragua but also ~~that the~~ political support of these ~~Contributions~~ countries would be essential if and when the movement had any success in developing internal opposition within Cuba and to bring about circumstances for Castro's overthrow.

He said that ~~his~~ as part of the efforts he has maintained or tried to maintain ~~to~~ periodic ~~personal~~ contact either personally or thru one of his Representatives with Government leaders in Central America, ~~and that~~ the recent source of information on activities in Costa Rica, ~~is~~ Luis Arrizurieta Sardinas, is a man of his personal confidence and a member of the MRR, and was placed as Secretary to Former Pres. ODUBER in Costa Rica through his

(AMBIDDY-1's) effor[illegible] He admitted that Arrizu[illegible]eta had been ~~was~~ on his payroll for $[illegible]80 a month. Arrizurieta is now in Miami and will remain there and not return to Costa Rica, principally according to AMBIDDY-1, because it is necessary to cut back his financial commitments.

AMBIDDY-1 said that Arrizurieta had four sources of information which he used in Costa Rica which he claims were the following: Walter Vazquez, who ~~which~~ he said had been infiltrated into the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre, Jose Luis Cascante, student who had been infiltrated into the Youth ~~Use~~ Section of the Communist Party, Rigo Marin, a farmer employed as chauffer who was an infiltration of the farm section of the Communist party and Jose Gamboa, nickname "Chepe," who works as a laborer in Puerto Limon and is allegedly an infiltration of the Communist Party in Puerto Limon. AMBIDDY-1 said that all four of the above had been in direct contact with Arrizurieta for the purpose of furnishing him with information. He claimed that Jose Luis Cascante, a student, was the most intelligent of the four.

In connection with a ~~Speaking of the~~ recent report which ~~was~~ originated with Arrizurieta concerning Communist Party Plans Along with ~~in connection with~~ former President Pepe Figueres to agitate during President-elect Trejos' inauguration AND ~~there was~~ the reported plan to attempt the assassination of Pres. Samoza, if he ~~was~~ attended the inauguration, AMBIDDY-1 said he rechecked this information with Arrizurieta. He said that according to Arrizurieta Jose Gamboa was the original source of the information on the strikes and agitation. This information however was conveyed verbally to Arrizurieta by an unnamed Captain of Guardia Fiscal stationed in Puerto Limon. According to Arrizurieta this unnamed Captain said that Gamboa told him the Communist Party had their people mobilized for a strike at the time of the inauguration. As far as former Pres. Figueres' activities in relation to the strike activity and assassination attempt on Samoza were concerned, AMBIDDY-1 said Arrizurieta told him that he knew that there had been a meeting in Figueres house on 17 April and there were several people present at this meeting who expressed concerned about the possibility that Samoza would attend the inauguration with a large number of Nicaraguan officials and military and that this would be an insult to the National [illegible] dignity of Costa Rica. Pepe Figueres is reported to have said that "it might bo a good idea to have a dead one to aid the cause" but as far as AMBIDDY-1 is concerned there is no direct reference made by Figueres to Samoza. AMBIDDY-1 further could not confirm that Figueres had discussed this matter with any members of the Costa Rican Communist Party.

With regard to AMBIDDY-1's personal relationship or contact with Figueres he said he knows him but that they are not friends. According to AMBIDDY-1 he felt it necessary to circumvent/Figueres and go directly to Orlich when he had to obtain training camp sites in Costa Rica ~~and~~ which naturally did not help their relationship with Figueres. In regard to the Figueres-Nunez group previously reported AMBIDDY-1 said his source of information on this group is Guillermo Vargas who is Chief of the Exterior Relation of INUU (Costa Rican housing agency). He said that his access to the P.L.N. and the Orlich-Odubr group is through Roberto Madriz who is his personal friend and is Orlich's personal secretary. Arrizurieta is also an intimate friend of Madriz and obtained information from Madriz while in

Costa Rica.

In regard to an earlier report which allegedly originated with Freydue Borges from Luciano Nieves concerning the possibility of Nieves Agitation-Propaganda mission to Costa Rico, AMBIDDY-1 said he had no further information on this but had rechecked it again and had been told that Nieves was living very well in Miami apparently without any obvious employment. He had been unable to confirm the report that Nieves was receiving support from Figueres.

Highlights of the
draft incorporated in
dispatch to interested
station. No further
action. -

File [illegible]

MRR
Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
22'2 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA
TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Received from [illegible] 3.5.7

No action

Memorandum sobre hora Radial

Nombre del Programa (posibles): Hora Cubana
La Voz Verde Olivo
La Voz del pueblo
La voz cubana
Conciencia Revolucionaria

Orientación: La programación constaría de tres partes:

1-Una sección dedicada a comentar noticias internacionales, encaminadas a crear en el miembro de las Fuerzas Armadas la conciencia de que:
  a)El Comunismo Internacional está dividido y perdiendo terreno
  b)Rusia se siente insegura con Fidel y por eso le está quitando el apoyo y la ayuda
  c)Rusia no ayudaría a Fidel en caso de una rebelión interna
  d)Fidel es mal visto por el resto de los comunistas internacionales

2-Una sección dedicada a comentar noticias internas de Cuba, encaminada a
  a)Con Fidel no lograrán más que miseria, inseguridad física y opresión
  b) Fidel es el único que se interpone en el camino de la riqueza nacional, la felicidad y el progreso económico.
  c)Fidel no confía en nadie y elimina a sus mejores amigos, a la más leve sospecha, aunque esta sea infundada.
  d)El pueblo vería como un héroe al hombre o grupo de hombres que quitara de en medio a Fidel Castro, y de seguro las riendas del Gobierno caerían en sus manos, sin ninguna interferencia del exilio.
  e)El pueblo odia a los que sirven a Fidel de soporte.

3-Una sección dedicada específicamente al el miembro del Ejército Rebelde, la Milicia, la Marina, la Fuerza Aérea, los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, etc. Los Becados.

Objetivos:
  a)La lucha no es contra ellos
  b)Todo lo contrario, esperamos que la iniciativa sea de ellos y que ellos asuman las riendas del poder a su caída.
  c)Estamos para ayudarlos y brindarles garantías.
  d)Con Fidel, nadie está seguro, lo mismo que le pasó a Camilo, Hubert Matos, Ché Guevara, Cubelas, Almejeiras, le pasa a cualquiera de ellos en cual-

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

quier momento. No importa que sean comunistas.

e) América entera está esperando la Revolución que Castro comenzó y prometió y que después fué puesta en manos de extranjeros. America tiene los ojos puestos en ellos, no en los politiqueros ni en los viejos líderes gastados de antaño.

f) Las necesidades económincas más elementales tocará a las puertas de las más altal jerarquías si Fidel sigue en el poder.

g) La muerte de Fidel no es tan difícil si se lo propone un grupo valiente. Esos serán los hombres que demostrarán que pueden llevar las riendas del poder.

h) La Cuba tan feliz y rica que ellos podrán gobernar si Fidel es eliminado. (Dibujar el futuro)

Costo del Programas

1- En la WRUL (onda corta para Cuba), cada 15 minutos cuestan $100.00 mensuales, de modo que si tenemos 3 programas a la semana, serían $300.00 semanales por 4 semanas que tiene el mes: $1,200.00 mensuales.

2- La transmisión telefónica del programa de Miami a New York cuesta unos $250.00

3- Tres individuos que trabajarán el programa, a $300.00 cada unos $900.00

4- En "Radio America" luce que todo es más barato, pero no tenemos cotizaciones. "Radio America" tiene la ventaja de que los programas son en onda larga y lo pueden captar más radios en Cuba.

Nota final: En el programa se pueden lanzar consignas de sabotajes fáciles. Pero ha de ser cosas muy fáciles de hacer, pues en Cuba cae mal que los que están afuera le manden a hacer cosas difíciles. Me refiero al pueblo.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ([illegible])
([illegible])

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Memorandum alternativo sobre hora radial

Nombre del programa (posibles): Diálogo con Cuba
La Voz de la Revolución
Conciencia Verde Olivo
La voz de las palmas.

Duración: 5 minutos diarios

Orientación: Voz de Manuel Artime dedicada a los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Cubanas, a los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución, a las Milicias, a los becados?

Objetivos:

1-La lucha no es contra las fuerzas armadas.

2-Nos sentimos parte de ellos.

3-Esperamos la iniciativa y el liderazgo de ellos.

4-Los ayudaremos sin aspiraciones que solo corresponden a los que salven a Cuba

5-Con Fidel nadie está seguro; lo mismo que le pasó a Camilo, Hubert Matos, Ché Guevara, Cubelas, Almejeiras etc, le pasa a cualquiera de ellos, aunque sean comunistas y aunque la sospecha que sobre ellos se tenga sea falsa, pues Fidel no confía en nadie.

6-America entera está esperando la Revolución que Castro prometió y después traicionó. America tiene los ojos puestos en ellos, no en los dictadores y politiqueros de antaño.

7-El pueblo y América entera odian a los que sirven de sostén a Fidel, pero verían como héroes a los que lo derribaran del poder.

8-Las necesidades económicas más elementales tocará a las puertas de las más altas jerarquías del régimen si Fidel sigue en el Poder.

9-Fidel es un desprestigio para el Comunismo, por eso Rusia le está retirando el apoyo

10-Rusia nunca se comprometería defendiendo a Fidel contra una rebellón interna.

11-Fidel es el único obstáculo en el camino de la felicidad, la riqueza y el bienestar delpueblo.

12-Eliminar a Fidel no es tan difícil si se lo propone un grupo valiente de oficiales que no solo tomarían las riendas del poder, sino que pu-

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surían a la Historia como los Libertadores de la nueva guerra de Independencia.

13-Recordación de los ideales de la Sierra Maestra, y del brillante futuro que aguarda a Cuba con un Gobierno Revolucionario verdadero(planteamiento de futuro).

14-Revolución que Cuba necesita y que solo ellos pueden dar al pueblo.

Condiciones técnicas: debe ser transmitido en onda larga (solo conozco Radio América) e ignoro el presupuesto que haga falta, ya que no conozco las cotizaciones de esta Emisora. Solo haría falta el dinero que esta emisora cobrara y unos $250.oo para el técnico de grabación y los "tapes" de la grabación.

14-00000

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S E C R E T 022317Z

86

DIR SJOS INFO PACY WAVE CITE MANA 5674 2 MAY 66 [illegible] 0[illegible]01

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REF: SJOS 8588 (IN 07232)*

1. AMBIDDY-1 WENT MIAMI 30 APRIL. HE INDICATED ARIZURRIETA WAS PRIMARY ACCESS TO PLN AND HAD HANDLED CP PENETRATION. A-1 SAID ARIZURRIETA HAD MOVED BACK TO MIAMI AND HE HAS NO REPRESENTATIVE IN COSTA RICA AT PRESENT.

2. A-1 STATED HE MET THREE TIMES WITH ERACORN-1 LAST WEEK AND DISCUSSED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STRIKE PLANS AND POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS IN COSTA RICA. ERACORN-1 SAID ERACERB-1 WOULD ATTEND TREJOS INAUGURATION WITH A SMALL PLAIN CLOTHES SECURITY DETAIL.

S E C R E T

CFN 5674 SJOS 888 AMBIDDY-1 MIAMI 30 APRIL ARIZURRIETA PLN CP
A-1 MIAMI NO REPRESENTATIVE COSTA RICA
A-1 ERACORN-1 COSTA RICA ERACORN-1 ERACERB-1 TREJOS
BT

SECRET

*REF DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT RE TIME BY DM

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, SOD 6,

S E C R E T 291755Z

29 APR 66 07232

DIR INFO MANA PACY WAVE CITE SJOS 3538

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REFS: A. DIR 97358 (NOT SENT MANA OR PACY)

B. SJOS 3564 (NOT SENT MANA OR PACY (IN 00907)

C. HNMA-3536, 27 APRIL (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. REF C REPORT FROM AMBIDDY-1 (RE FIGUERES/CP PLAN FOR BANANA ZONE STRIKE AND POSSIBLE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION SHOULD SOMOZA ATTEND TREJOS INAUGURATION) IS SECOND QUESTIONABLE REPORT HE HAS "PASSED ON" IN LAST TWO WEEKS. (FOR PACY AND MANA: FIRST REPORT CONCERNED FIGUERES PLAN TO IMPORT AGIT PROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME.)

2. REQUEST APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1 IN DETAIL ON HIS PRESENT ACCESS TO PLN AND ATTEMPT PIN HIM DOWN ON REF REPORTS. WE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED HMUCP PENETRATION WHICH HE STATED LUIS ARIZURRIETA IS RUNNING. FYI ARIZURRIETA HAS BEEN WORKING WITH HURILL-1 ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY CLOSE TO HUGALLY-1 WHO COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS LAST NAME WHEN

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(When Filled In)

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DOCUMENT DATE
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DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA 25031

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	ABSTRACT	
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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Divisio.

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMLASH/AMHAM/AMTRUNK/AMOT
Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa and Article Reporting His Appearance on TV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None, For Your Information

Reference: UFGA-24875, 31 March 1966

Forwarded under separate cover is AMOT Report DD-1820, dated 31 March 1966, concerning statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba; and its attachment which is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the TV program "Panamericana" on 13 February 1966.

for Gary L. Ikustoff
PHILIP G. ELMARD

ATT'D R.olan

Attachment:
AMOT Report - USC

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19-6-95/4

CLASSIFICATION
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1 ATT.

SECRET

FROM: [redacted] DD-1820

AGENT: [redacted] 31 March 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba

SOURCE: Edgar SOPO Barreto

REF: DD-1810, paragraphs 2 and 3

1. The following information was obtained by P-112 at 4:30 p.m. on 30 March 1966 at Station WMIE during a conversation with Edgar/SOPO Barreto, propaganda chief of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR).

2. The statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, which were mentioned in DD-1810 and which were to be broadcast on 19 March 1966 over the radio programs, "Newspaper of the Air" and "Panamerican News", were not given by ARTIME to the directors of these programs to be broadcast. ARTIME decided not to do so after consulting with the Executive Committee of the MRR. (See DD-1815 which covers the radio broadcasts of the above-mentioned programs on 17, 18, and 19 March in which no mention is made of ARTIME's statements.)

3. ARTIME's statements were broadcast four time over Station WRUL and Radio Americas. According to SOPO the taping of the statements by ARTIME lasted eight minutes.

4. According to SOPO, the reason ARTIME's statements were not broadcast on "Newspaper of the Air" was that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez, the director of the program, had been attacking the members of the Armed Forces of CASTRO in his comments on the program, whereas ARTIME's statements were precisely directed to the Rebel Army.

5. SOPO also said that the statements were not given to Norman DIAZ Artiles [redacted]

DD-1820
31 March 1966

SUBJECT: Statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, etc. (cont.)

for broadcasting because the language of the statements was "leftist", maintaing the thesis of the "revolution betrayed" and "Fidelism without Fidel" and defending the revolution of the Sierra Maestra, the revolutionary laws, and Agrarian Reform.

6. According to SOPO, the statements made by ARTIME were directed especially to Cuba and to those who are connected with the CASTRO regime, whereas the exiles were not ready to assimilate the advanced ideas which ARTIME set forth in his statements. It was for this reason, said SOPO, that during a meeting with ARTIME he was advised not to make his statements public to the exiles, for the leftist language would fall like a bomb and would not fit in with the idea that the exiles had of ARTIME as a centrist or a moderate.

NOTE FROM SE:

Attachment No. 1 of DD-1815 carried the statements made by ARTIME as published by Tridente in March, with reference to the CUBELA affair.

Attached to this report is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the program "Panamericana" on TV Channel 10 on 13 February 1966. This article appeared in Tridente in February 1966.

Comparecencia del Doctor MANUEL ARTIME en el Programa "Pan Americana", Transmitido por el Canal 10-TV de Miami, Florida, el dia 13 de Febrero de 1966.



DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

GANDERO: Muy buenos días, amables televidentes.

Tenemos hoy, ante nuestras cámaras, a un anti-Castrista muy conocido por ustedes. Pese a su juventud, ha sido actor de grandes acontecimientos en la lucha contra el dictador de Cuba. Me refiero al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa, a quien el destierro quiere oir porque tiene muchas declaraciones importantísimas que hacer y, por lo tanto, no vamos a hacerle una larga presentación, sino hacer ésta lo más breve posible. No hace falta presentar al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa..... Así que voy a presentarles el Panel de esta mañana que se compone del conocido Periodista y Gran Comentarista de Miami, Norman Díaz, quien dirige el Periódico "Pan-Americano", y a Ricardo Nuñez, también muy conocido de ustedes y que escribe en dos diarios aquí en esta ciudad.

Así que, cedo la palabra a Norman Díaz, para la primera pregunta.....

NORMAN DIAZ: Muchas gracias, compañero Gandero....

Doctor Manuel Artime, su presencia en este programa tiene un doble interés, en lo que representa su opinión y el hecho de ser usted uno de los cubanos combatientes que más cauteloso ha sido en el uso de los vehículos de propaganda; al grado que a nosotros, los Periodistas, se nos ha hecho a veces difícil conseguir oportunidad para entrevistarlo.

Pero hay algo más significativo, Doctor Artime. En cada ocasión que usted se ha presentado en público es debido a acontecimientos que, indudablemente, tuvieron apariencia de ser decisivas en la lucha contra los comunistas. Tenemos que agregar a esto que, casi siempre, usted dijo lo que resultó después una amarga verdad... Que la lucha iba a resultar "larga, dura y penosa..."

En esta oportunidad, Doctor Artime, y ante sucesos tan espectaculares como los presentes, también cree usted que ahora la liberación es un problema que está lejos de resolverse?

ARTIME: Bien, Norman, creo que ahí hay varias cosas que contestar...

En primer lugar, las pocas veces que yo he hecho uso de los canales de publicidad. En realidad -por desgracia- el tipo de labor a que estamos dedicados nosotros, nos impide muchas veces dar pautas para entrevistas periodísticas, porque ustedes los Periodistas preguntan demasiado y uno muchas veces, queriendo infundir ánimo o queriendo contestar realmente a la pregunta que se hace, comete indiscreciones que, a la larga, redundan en perjuicio de la Patria.

Es el cuento del famoso monito de la selva, que estaba haciendo ejercicios... Pasó una jirafa y le preguntó: "Monito, que estas haciendo?..." "Estoy haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y darle un golpe de carate al león y tumbarlo"... Al poco rato, pasa un rinoceronte... "Monito, que tú estás haciendo?"... dice, "Yo, aquí, haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y tumbar al león..." Le llegaron los comentarios al león y pasó el león y le dijo, "Monito, que cosa que tu estas haciendo?"... Dice él

"Mira, haciendo ejercicios y hablando más basura que el diablo..."

(Se escucha un murmullo de risas)

Yo no quiero, yo no quiero hacer el papel del monito. Efectivamente, yo dije que la guerra iba a ser muy larga y muy dura... que iba a ser muy cruel. Sé que, con esto, no me gané simpatías; yo lo siento, mi función no es de ganarme simpatías mi función es dedicarme por entero a la labor de liberación de mi Patria. Y esa labor de liberación de mi Patria exije que cuando haya que decir una cosa dura se diga esa cosa dura, aunque no sea simpático.

Yo creo hoy que la liberación de Cuba está cerca... Y creo que la liberación de Cuba estaba distante, hoy digo que estoy completamente convencido que la liberación de nuestra Patria se acerca...

NORMAN DIAZ:.... Exponga las razones Comandante...

ARTIME: Varias razones... Primera razón, el estado interno de Cuba. No sólo el estado de desesperación de un pueblo que con la burla de que el que quiera salir podría salir, llenaron sus planillas y hoy se ven discriminados y en la miseria, sabiendo que a lo mejor van a demorar tres años en salir por la vía de salida que les ha ofrecido el Dictador.

Por el estado de las Fuerzas Armadas: de estado no sólo de desmoralización sino de división y de conspiración de las Fuerzas Armadas. Y no solamente los que están conspirando con una idea occidentalista, sino los que están conspirando con una línea china que existe dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas que fué inaugurada por el desaparecido Che Guevara... Y por último, por la Tricontinental, mi querido Norman.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Existe o existía?

ARTIME: Existe, existe.

NORMAN DIAZ: Al desaparecer el Ché Guevara de las filas del Ejército Rebelde de Cuba, no desapareció la linea china?

ARTIME: El Comunismo nunca pone todas las esperanzas en un solo hombre, sino en organizaciones que crea. Y el Comunismo-Chino no es una excepción.

NUÑEZ: Comandante, esta res-respuesta que usted le ha dado al colega Norman Diaz me plantea una duda que yo quisiera que usted me la esclareciera. La duda consiste en lo siguiente: Usted detuvo los ataques comandos que se realizaban: Cuando usted detuvo estos ataques comandos, ¿se debió a que eran inefectivos o estos ataques comandos usted los detuvo porque encajaban dentro del plan de liquidación del régimen de Fidel Castro, o sea, dentro de la estrategia occidental?

ARTIME: Ricardo, en realidad, nosotros estamos dentro de una estrategia en la cual no solamente estamos nosotros sino que creo que está Occidente entero empeñado en ella.

En el momento en que nosotros hicimos ataques comandos, lo que había que hacer eran ataques comandos. La gente decía, "¿pero, con ataques comandos ustedes van a tumbar a Fidel Castro?" ¡No!, con ataques comandos no vamos a tumbar a Fidel Castro; pero, con ataques comandos Fidel Castro tuvo que sacar, de las filas de la producción, cuatrocientos mil hombre para cuidar las costas de Cuba. Y la crisis económica violentísima que tiene hoy Fidel Castro, se debe, en parte, a aquellos ataques comandos que paralizaron en gran porcentaje, la producción cubana.

Ahora bien, en estos momentos no hacemos ataques comandos porque creo que hay labores más indispensables que nosotros concretamente podemos hacer. No estoy condenando los ataques comandos: todo lo contrario. Yo creo que cualquier esfuerzo contra Fidel Castro es un esfuerzo bueno. Quiero decir que nosotros, concretamente, nosotros tenemos cosas más importantes que hacer que ataques comandos. ¿Quiere decir que ya nosotros no volveremos a la etapa de la guerra? ¡No! no quiere decirlo tampoco... Van a seguir sonando las balas. Y van a seguir sonando las balas, pero de una manera distinta.

Unas balas con objetivos concretos; unas balas que están detrás de un plan previamente trazado. En aquel momento, la estrategia correcta eran los ataques comandos. En estos momentos no quiere decir que sean malos. ¡No! son buenos los ataques comandos; pero creemos que nosotros nos podemos dedicar a labores que sólo nosotros podemos realizar para incluir a Cuba dentro de un plan latino-americano que ha venido a concretarse en la agresión de la Tri-Continental.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo quisiera que usted me concluyera una pregunta, a modo de esclarecimiento. Yo le pregunté que Ernesto Guevara, alias el Ché, que representaba la línea china dentro del Ejército, al desaparecer, todavía continuaba habiendo pués rezagos en las filas del Ejercito de Cuba, de la tendencia pro-

PAN
AMERICANA

ALBERTO GANDERO

China.

¿Usted considera que Guevara fué "separado del cargo" o "liquidado físicamente"?

ARTIME: Guevara fué liquidado, porque era el hombre de China para eliminar a Fidel Castro concretamente...

Lo dijimos ya una vez en un programa radial, cuando se anunció el canje. Dijimos que habia una violenta pugna y que Ché Guevara era el precio que Rusia habia exigido para seguir relaciones con Fidel Castro. La pugna comenzó cuando se llevó a Marcos Rodriguez al juicio... quien fué al juicio aquel es la vieja guardia y quien llevó a Marcos Rodríguez ante el juicio, es precisamente la tendencia pro-China.

NORMAN DIAZ: Vamos a esclarecerle a los oyentes, Doctor Artime, quien es Marcos Rodriguez.

ARTIME: El famoso comunista que fué juzgado y, según dicen, condenado a muerte por haber "delatado" el lugar donde se escondian los estudiantes fusilados durante la época de Batista.

Fueron condenados, en realidad, en aquel juicio, toda la "Vieja Guardia", que sabia la historia de Marcos Rodriguez y habia apañado a Marcos, en aquella oportunidad.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Quien fué quien la condenó?

ARTIME: Quien la condenó fue, la linea china... y todos los dirigidores e intimos amigos del Ché Guevara. Fidel Castro sirvió de intermediario, al final, para que la censura recayese sólo en la figura de Marcos Rodriguez y no en la figura de la "Vieja Guardia".

NUÑEZ: Comandante Artime, ¿qué resultados cree usted que se produzcan de la Conferencia Tricontinental que se acaba de celebrar en Cuba?

ARTIME: Desde 1935, en que Dimitrov lanzó -en el Congreso del Komitern- la tesis de los "frentes populares", no se habia producido un impacto de estrategia tan violento como el que se ha producido con la Tri-Continental. La Tri-Continental ha puesto a los paises latinoamericanos- y yo vengo de Latino América ahora exactamente- y a los gobiernos latinoamericanos en la disyuntiva de una declaración de guerra.

Y así lo han reconocido grandes personajes de Latino-América; entre ellos, Lleras Camargo de Colombia. Sus resultados han influído, inclusive, en las elecciones de Costa Rica.



NORMAN DIAZ

En estos momentos, Latino-América es completamente consciente que se encuentra en guerra con Cuba. Esta es una jugada rusa... es una jugada rusa para quitarle el control de los comunistas "cabezas calientes" de Latinoamérica a China de la mano. ¿Y a quién utiliza? ¡Utiliza al peón que puede quemar! ¡Utiliza a Fidel Castro.!

¿Quiere decir que Rusia va, hasta sus últimas consecuencias con esta tesis que ha avanzado en la Tri-Continental? Me luce que no. Me luce que Rusia se está guardando las espaldas. Y prueba de ello es que líderes francamente pro-soviéticos -como Mora Valverde de Costa Rica, Prestes de Brasil y como Lombardo Toledano de México- no asistieron a la Tricontinental, ni se comprometieron con la Tri-Continental.

Moscú está preparándose para otra etapa que no es la de la Tricontinental; pero necesita la Tri-Continental para arrebatarle los partidos comunistas jóvenes a China de la mano y necesita para socabar la retaguardia de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.

Nosotros tenemos las primeras consignas que han llegado a Latino América, de la Tri-Continental. Las primeras consignas fueron, en primer lugar, intensificación de la campaña de paz; denuncia del imperialismo norteamericano, tanto en su aspecto militar como económico, fundamentalmente en Viet-Nam, tratando de llevar esta campaña de paz a un "boycot" a los buques de cualquier país que lleven ropa o armas, o tropas o alimentos a Viet-Nam.

Segunda consigna: Penetración de los partidos de izquierda, para hacer que estos partidos de izquierda adopten posiciones radicales que hagan juego con el Comunismo.

Tercera consigna: Cambio de la palabra "Comunismo" por la palabra "Socialismo"... porque se han dado cuenta que la palabra "Comunismo" inspira asco ya hasta en las zonas sub-desarrolladas.

Incremento de las revoluciones y de la subversión en cada uno de los países. Y, en esto, los comunistas jóvenes tendrán que caer en manos de Moscú, si quieren recibir alguna ayuda para sus planes subversivos. La van a recibir, pero tendrán que comprometerse con la linea moscovita.

Y, por último, campaña contra el imperialismo, en los dos aspectos, militar y económico dentro de Latino América. Incrementación de las revueltas en Santo Domingo, para tomar a Santo Domingo como una espina irritativa constante que de base a esta campaña.

Todos los paises latinoamericanos son conscientes de esto. Todos los paises latinoamericanos! Y hay países latinoamericanos que no pueden darse el lujo de continuar la estabilidad de su pais con la presencia de un Fidel Castro en Cuba.

La O.E.A. está en una disyuntiva: o toma la decisión para la cual fué creada, o sencilla y llanamente, la O.E.A. perderá su vigencia en Latino América.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, en los rotativos internacionales, como en los hilos cablegráficos también internacionales, se ha destacado extraordinariamente la crisis Castro Pekín. ¿Ese hecho puede beneficiar a Castro o, de lo contrario, cree usted que le hará daño suficiente como para contribuir a su derrocamiento?

ARTIME: La linea china, en estos momentos, ya está ocasionándole grandes dificultades a Fidel Castro. Raúl Castro está reunido, hace tres dias, con su Estado Mayor y con la Jefatura Suprema de los Cuerpos Represivos para una purga que se avecina en estos dias próximos.

Como usted comprenderá, el señor Embajador Chino, que reparte la propaganda, no va a ir campamento por campamento repartiendo la propaganda china. Habia vehiculos, dentro de esos campamentos, que hacian circular esa propaganda; y hay hombres, dentro de los campamentos militares de Cuba, que son fanáticos de la linea china. El Che Guevara fué eliminado porque el Ché Guevara era la cabeza visible de aquello; pero queda la organización y está vigente y será- en los próximos dias- la primera de la serie de purgas que amenaza al Ejército Rebelde Cubano...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo vuelvo a insistir otra vez... "Eliminado" ¿en que sentido? ¿Separado de las filas del Ejército o eliminado...?

ARTIME: Eliminado físicamente.

NORMAN DIAZ: ...físicamente.. Gracias.

ARTIME: ....El Comunismo los grandes fallos no los perdona con separación del cargo...

NORMAN DIAZ: Gracias Doctor.

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime, usted sabe que los comunistas -como regla general- utilizan una serie de medidas para difamar y una serie de rumores para difamar a los dirigentes que se enfrentan contra ellos con éxito.

...Con respecto a esto, me viene a la memoria una anécdota de un Profesor mejicano, que era profesor Universitario, que era destacado anticomunista. Y, a este Profesor, los comunistas empezaron a decir que él había aumentado y se había superado en su carrera debido a que su hermana mantenía relaciones con un influyente personaje. Tiempo después, este señor fué a un programa de Radio y un Periodista, no pudiendo contenerse ante esos rumores que existían, le preguntó "Oigame, existen rumores Profesor, de que su hermana ..." Dice el hombre... "pues mire, yo soy el primer sorprendido, porque yo soy hijo único, yo no tengo hermanas"... o sea, yo quisiera que usted me dijera a qué atribuye usted, Comandante Artime, el hecho de que Fidel Castro lo haya tomado como centro de los ataques a los exilados, inclusive llegando a atribuirle riquezas personales y acusaciones de otros tipos?

ARTIME: Esas campañas hace tiempo que yo las conozco... la célebre campaña del restaurant que yo tengo, de los cuatro supermarkets; creo que también di dinero para una joyería, vivo en un palacio, que es mío... Esto es viejo...

Cuando yo dije que Fidel Castro era un traidor, muchos creían en Fidel Castro. La primera acusación que me lanzaron por la espalda fué la de "ladrón de los fondos del INRA"... Ya estoy acostumbrado a esto, es decir, el pueblo de Cuba no cree en nada. ¡Eso es lo que me interesa! Los gobiernos que me ayudan a mí en Latino América, ¿lo creen? No son tontos... no son tontos. ellos no se dejan llevar por campañas; ellos sí saben la verdad. Y saben que todo esto es mentira.

Hay un drama que se está representando en Europa, que es ge-



RICARDO NUÑEZ



PANEL

nial. Se llama "La Hoguera Feliz". Ponen a Juana de Arco en la actualidad y, por supuesto, Juana de Arco llevada por su espiritualismo combate contra el Comunismo.

Se reúne la Dirección del Partido Comunista Francés y toman una línea contra Juana de Arco... ¿Quemarla? ¡No!, porque se crea un mártir... ¡INFAMARLA! Y empiezan a decir que Juana de Arco lleva una vida libre, que Juana de Arco se ha entregado a las drogas, que Juana de Arco vive con los Capitanes de su Ejército... y el drama termina cuando Juana de Arco, llorando, le suplica a los comunistas ¡que la quemen! Y el Dirigente del Partido Comunista le dice: ¡NO!, ya tú estas quemada hace rato.....

Esa es una vieja campaña... que puede circular dentro de ciertos límites, pero, después de estos límites, ya no circula.

Me da ganas de reír, porque el otro día me encontré yo con el dueño de una Joyería y me dijo: "¿Tu sabes que dicen que me diste 10,000 pesos ...?" Yo le dije: "Empiézamelos a pagar, porque de verdad que me hacen gran falta....

Yo sí tengo riquezas... pero no son esas. La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una organización, en toda el área del Caribe que está velando por la seguridad de esos países y más de un Presidente nos debe la vida a nosotros.

La riqueza mía es saber que nosotros tenemos una pequeña "Granja Modelo" donde se están formando hombres para el futuro y, a partir del mes que viene, empezarán a venir indios latinoamericanos a recibir formación para cambiar el medio ambiente en que ellos se están desarrollando.

La riqueza mía es saber que hay diez muchachos, en distintas universidades, preparándose en campos en que, hasta ahora, Cuba no tenía técnicos y los tendrá en el futuro.

La riqueza mía es saber que las viudas y los familiares de los presos nuestros no están abandonados ni van a pasar hambre.

La riqueza mía está en saber que, dentro de Cuba, se recibe la ayuda del Movimiento... y eso nos cuesta mucha sangre.

Quizá la única riqueza que yo le deje a mi hija sea el nombre mío, limpio... porque, por desgracia, ni siquiera un seguro de vida me quieren hacer las compañías aseguradoras. ¡Será lo único que, por tristeza, le pueda dejar yo a mi familia! Y eso sí lo cuido, y eso sí lo cuidaré hasta sus últimas consecuencias...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, todo proceso revolucionario produce siempre nuevas figuras. Y el mensaje de la revolución democrática cubana entraña un gran anhelo, que sólo puede llevarse adelante con figuras, como usted acaba de decir hace unos momentos, de promociones limpias y sin compromisos pasados.

¿Serán estas figuras, que emergen de este proceso, las que lleven a Cuba liberada el noble mensaje de estos años de sacrificio, de dolor, para darnos una patria mejor que la que teníamos? ¿Tiene usted fé en la fuerza espiritual de su generación? ¿Es usted eminentemente revolucionario, Doctor?

ARTIME: Yo me considero revolucionario, Norman, porque yo quiero revocar todas las medidas demagógicas y desastrozas que se han implantado en mi Patria. Yo quiero acabar con el paredón; yo quiero acabar con la abolición de la propiedad privada; yo quiero acabar con la discriminación de los hombres que hoy, más violentamente que nunca, se está estableciendo en mi Patria; yo quiero acabar con la oligarquía que disfruta de las riquezas de mi Patria, mientras el pueblo se muere de hambre.

Yo tengo fé en mi generación, Norman. Pero mi generación no es de edad; mi generación es histórica. La generación mía es la de todos los hombres limpios de todos los gobiernos, de todas las edades, de todas las clases sociales y de todos los colores de piel que han pasado por la Historia de Cuba. Hombres que, dentro de sus posiciones, han querido una Cuba mejor que la que siempre tuvimos... Yo en esa generación histórica creo, Norman... tengo fe en ella y creo que el pueblo de Cuba tiene suficiente reserva moral como para obviar todas las dificultades.

Yo creo que nosotros tenemos que lograr la unidad. La unidad de la base, la unidad de la masa, que se acaben ya las pugnas tontas... Vamos a olvidarnos de Presidencias de Repúblicas y vamos a olvidarnos de Generalaturas.... vamos a acabar con todos los individuos que están concretamente por una ambición personal.

Que se unan las masas a espaldas de los líderes... Que los líderes se tendrán que unir si se unen las masas... Vamos a lograr esa unidad necesaria.

Yo quisiera ver, por ejemplo, obras como las de los Municipios Cubanos. Una obra que no es política, una obra que sí da ayuda mutua, una obra que para lograr la unidad de nuestra Patria en pequeños sectores... Obras como esa, apolíticas; unidades como esta, que son unidades de bases, mientras no tengan el control político de nadie... Yo creo que eso es fundamental para el futuro de los que se están lanzando por el camino de la guerra.

Y porque mi organización está constituida por hombres de todas las procedencias, por hombres de todas las edades y por hombres de todas las clases sociales, nosotros tenemos fuerza moral para lanzar un mensaje de esperanza al futuro de Cuba.

Y yo creo que sí, Norman; yo creo que hay una generación histórica que tiene la responsabilidad moral de esta liberación; y tengo fe en esa generación histórica.

NORMAN DIAZ: Lo felicito, Doctor, porque ese es el pensamiento mío.

GANDERO: Ricardo Nuñez, una pregunta rápida y una explicación rápida...

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime...

¿Qué nos puede decir usted sobre este reciente proceso de Costa Rica, que ha sido tan importante para toda Latino América. Cual es su opinión sobre este proceso y sobre los factores que llevaron a la victoria al ya Presidente Trejos?

ARTIME: En primer lugar, yo creo que es un resultado de la Tri-Continental. Era tal el miedo, que la sospecha de que un candidato pudiera tener contacto con el Comunismo - la sospecha, porque me consta que no había tal pacto - fué suficiente para liquidar a un hombre. Pero, además, se debatió un punto muy importante. Se debatió el control total de la economía por el Estado ó se debatió la libre empresa con proyección social. Eso fué lo que se debatió en realidad en Costa Rica.. y el pueblo dió el voto; y el voto del pueblo costaricense es un resumen de lo que es la opinión pública latino-americana en estos momentos.

Yo creo que el momento histórico de los extremismos, tanto de derecha como de izquierda, ya pasó.. Y yo creo que el voto, en definitiva, fué dado en San José de Costa Rica.

GANDERO: Una última pregunta rápida, creo que quedan unos segundos...

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Doctor, realmente usted considera que la pauta trazada en las elecciones efectuadas en estos momentos, en Costa Rica, va a ser decisiva en el resto de Centro y Sur América?

ARTIME: Yo sí lo creo. Yo creo que el que quiera salir por elección popular tiene que analizar, muy detenidamente, el resultado de las elecciones de Costa Rica. Yo lo creo honestamente. Y yo quiero felicitar al Señor Presidente de Costa Rica porque ha mantenido la dignidad de ser el hombre que está en el poder y garantizar unas elecciones libres y garantizar la entrega del poder. Es un hombre a quien nosotros los cubanos debemos mucho y es un hombre -el Presidente Orlich- que merece el máximo de respeto.

Yo quisiera utilizar este medio para mandar un mensaje a él. No llega, porque se queda en Miami, pero alguien se lo dirá, dándole las gracias a él, en nombre de todos los cubanos que luchamos por la independencia de nuestra Patria.

GANDERO: Muchísimas gracias, Doctor Manuel Artime, por su comparecencia aquí esta mañana y quiero agradecerle también al buen amigo y compañero Norman Díaz y a Ricardo Nuñez, de servir de Panelistas en este domingo.

Así es que quedan invitados para el próximo domingo, a las 10:30 de la mañana, como de costumbre.

Les deseo a todos muy buenos días.

DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA



SECRET

FROM: [redacted]

DD-1820

AGENT: [redacted]

31 March 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Statements made by Manuel ARTIME Buesa which were broadcast to Cuba

SOURCE: Edgar SOPO Barreto

REF: DD-1810, paragraphs 2 and 3

1. The following information was obtained by P-112 at 4:30 p.m. on 30 March 1966 at Station WMIE during a conversation with Edgar/SOPO Barreto, propaganda chief of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR).

2. The statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, which were mentioned in DD-1810 and which were to be broadcast on 19 March 1966 over the radio programs, "Newspaper of the Air" and "Panamerican News", were not given by ARTIME to the directors of these programs to be broadcast. ARTIME decided not to do so after consulting with the Executive Committee of the MRR. (See DD-1815 which covers the radio broadcasts of the above-mentioned programs on 17, 18, and 19 March in which no mention is made of ARTIME's statements.)

3. ARTIME's statements were broadcast four time over Station WRUL and Radio Americas. According to SOPO the taping of the statements by ARTIME lasted eight minutes.

4. According to SOPO, the reason ARTIME's statements were not broadcast on "Newspaper of the Air" was that Juan AMADOR Rodriguez, the director of the program, had been attacking the members of the Armed Forces of CASTRO in his comments on the program, whereas ARTIME's statements were precisely directed to the Rebel Army.

5. SOPO also said that the statements were not given to Norman DIAZ Artiles

[redacted]

DD-1820
31 March 1966

SUBJECT: Statements of Manuel ARTIME Buesa, etc. (cont.)

for broadcasting because the language of the statements was "leftist", maintaing the thesis of the "revolution betrayed" and "Fidelism without Fidel" and defending the revolution of the Sierra Maestra, the revolutionary laws, and Agrarian Reform.

6. According to SOPO, the statements made by ARTIME were directed especially to Cuba and to those who are connected with the CASTRO regime, whereas the exiles were not ready to assimilate the advanced ideas which ARTIME set forth in his statements. It was for this reason, said SOPO, that during a meeting with ARTIME he was advised not to make his statements public to the exiles, for the leftist language would fall like a bomb and would not fit in with the idea that the exiles had of ARTIME as a centrist or a moderate.

NOTE FROM SE:

Attachment No. 1 of DD-1815 carried the statements made by ARTIME as published by Tridente in March, with reference to the CUBELA affair.

Attached to this report is a copy of an article reporting the appearance of ARTIME on the program "Panamericana" on TV Channel 10 on 13 February 1966. This article appeared in Tridente in February 1966.

Comparecencia del Doctor MANUEL ARTIME en el Programa "Pan Americana", Transmitido por el Canal 10-TV de Miami, Florida, el dia 13 de Febrero de 1966.



DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA

GANDERO: Muy buenos días, amables televidentes.

Tenemos hoy, ante nuestras cámaras, a un anti-Castrista muy conocido por ustedes. Pese a su juventud, ha sido actor de grandes acontecimientos en la lucha contra el dictador de Cuba. Me refiero al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa, a quien el destierro quiere oir porque tiene muchas declaraciones importantisimas que hacer y, por lo tanto, no vamos a hacerle una larga presentación, sino hacer ésta lo más breve posible. No hace falta presentar al Doctor Manuel Artime Buesa..... Así que voy a presentarles el Panel de esta mañana que se compone del conocido Periodista y Gran Comentarista de Miami, Norman Díaz, quien dirige el Periódico "Pan-Americano", y a Ricardo Nuñez, también muy conocido de ustedes y que escribe en dos diarios aquí en esta ciudad.

Así que, cedo la palabra a Norman Díaz, para la primera pregunta.....

NORMAN DIAZ: Muchas gracias, compañero Gandero.

Doctor Manuel Artime, su presencia en este programa tiene un doble interés, en lo que representa su opinión y el hecho de ser usted uno de los cubanos combatientes que más cauteloso ha sido en el uso de los vehiculos de propaganda; al grado que a nosotros, los Periodistas, se nos ha hecho a veces difícil conseguir oportunidad para entrevistarlo.

Pero hay algo más significativo, Doctor Artime. En cada ocasión que usted se ha presentado en público es debido a acontecimientos que, indudablemente, tuvieron apariencia de ser decisivos en la lucha contra los comunistas. Tenemos que agregar a esto que, casi siempre, usted dijo lo que resultó después una amarga verdad... Que la lucha iba a resultar "larga, dura y penosa..."

En esta oportunidad, Doctor Artime, y ante sucesos tan espectaculares como los presentes, también cree usted que ahora la liberación es un problema que está lejos de resolverse?

ARTIME: Bien, Norman, creo que ahí hay varias cosas que contestar...

En primer lugar, las pocas veces que yo he hecho uso de los canales de publicidad. En realidad -por desgracia- el tipo de labor a que estamos dedicados nosotros, nos impide muchas veces dar pautas para entrevistas periodísticas, porque ustedes los Periodistas preguntan demasiado y uno muchas veces, queriendo infundir ánimo o queriendo contestar realmente a la pregunta que se hace, comete indiscreciones que, a la larga, redundan en perjuicio de la Patria.

En el cuento del famoso monito de la selva, que estaba haciendo ejercicios... Pasó una jirafa y le preguntó: "Monito, que estás haciendo?..." "Estoy haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y darle un golpe de estado al león y tumbarlo"... Al poco rato, pasa un rinoceronte... "Monito, que tú estás haciendo?"...dice, "¡Yo, aquí, haciendo ejercicios para ponerme fuerte y tumbar al león..." Le llegaron los comentarios al león y pasó el león y le dijo: "Monito, que es lo que tu estas haciendo?"... [illegible] el-

"Mira, haciendo ejercicios y hablando más basura que el diablo..."

(Se escucha un murmullo de risas)

Yo no quiero, yo no quiero hacer el papel del monito. Efectivamente, yo dije que la guerra iba a ser muy larga y muy dura... que iba a ser muy cruel. Sé que, con esto, no me gané simpatías: yo lo siento, mi función no es de ganarme simpatías, mi función es dedicarme por entero a la labor de liberación de mi Patria. Y esa labor de liberación de mi Patria exige que cuando haya que decir una cosa dura se diga esa cosa dura, aunque no sea simpático.

Yo creo hoy que la liberación de Cuba está cerca... Y creo que la liberación de Cuba estaba distante, hoy digo que estoy completamente convencido que la liberación de nuestra Patria se acerca...

NORMAN DIAZ:.... Exponga las razones Comandante...

ARTIME: Varias razones... Primera razón, el estado interno de Cuba. No sólo el estado de desesperación de un pueblo que con la burla de que el que quiera salir podría salir, llenaron sus planillas y hoy se ven discriminados y en la miseria, sabiendo que a lo mejor van a demorar tres años en salir por la vía de salida que les ha ofrecido el Dictador.

Por el estado de las Fuerzas Armadas: de estado no sólo de desmoralización sino de división y de conspiración de las Fuerzas Armadas. Y no solamente los que están conspirando con una idea occidentalista, sino los que están conspirando con una línea china que existe dentro de las Fuerzas Armadas que fué inaugurada por el desaparecido Che Guevara... Y por último, por la Tricontinental, mi querido Norman.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Existe o existía?

ARTIME: Existe, existe.

NORMAN DIAZ: Al desaparecer el Ché Guevara de las filas del Ejército Rebelde de Cuba, no desapareció la línea china?

ARTIME: El Comunismo nunca pone todas las esperanzas en un solo hombre, sino en organizaciones que crea. Y el Comunismo-Chino no es una excepción.

NUÑEZ: Comandante, esta res- respuesta que usted le ha dado al colega Norman Díaz me plantea una duda que yo quisiera que usted me la esclareciera. La duda consiste en lo siguiente: Usted detuvo los ataques comandos que se realizaban. Cuando usted detuvo estos ataques comandos, ¿se debió a que eran inefectivos o estos ataques comandos usted los detuvo porque encajaban dentro del plan de liquidación del régimen de Fidel Castro, o sea, dentro de la estrategia occidental?

ARTIME: Ricardo, en realidad, nosotros estamos dentro de una estrategia en la cual no solamente estamos nosotros sino que creo que está Occidente entero empeñado en ella.

En el momento en que nosotros hicimos ataques comandos, lo que había que hacer eran ataques comandos. La gente decía, "¿pero, con ataques comandos ustedes van a tumbar a Fidel Castro?" ¡No!, con ataques comandos no vamos a tumbar a Fidel Castro; pero, con ataques comandos Fidel Castro tuvo que sacar, de las filas de la producción, cuatrocientos mil hombre para cuidar las costas de Cuba. Y la crisis económica violentísima que tiene hoy Fidel Castro, se debe, en parte, a aquellos ataques comandos que paralizaron en gran porcentaje, la producción cubana.

Ahora bien, en estos momentos [illegible] porque creo que las labores más indispensables que nosotros [illegible]. No estoy condenando los ataques comandos: todo lo contrario. Yo creo que cualquier esfuerzo contra Fidel Castro es un esfuerzo bueno. Quiero decir que nosotros, concretamente, nosotros tenemos cosas más importantes que hacer que ataques comandos. ¿Quiere decir que ya nosotros no volveremos a la etapa de la guerra? ¡No! no quiere decirlo tampoco... Van a seguir sonando las balas. Y van a seguir sonando las balas, pero de una manera distinta.

Unas balas con objetivos concretos: unas balas que están detrás de un plan previamente trazado. En aquel momento, la estrategia correcta eran los ataques comandos. En estos momentos no quiere decir que sean malos. ¡No! son buenos los ataques comandos; pero creemos que nosotros nos podemos dedicar a labores que sólo nosotros podemos realizar para incluir a Cuba dentro de un plan latino-americano que ha venido a concretarse en la agresión de la Tri Continental.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo quisiera que usted me concluyera una pregunta, a modo de esclarecimiento. Yo le pregunté que Ernesto Guevara, alias el Ché, que representaba la línea china dentro del Ejército, al desaparecer, todavía continuaba habiendo pués rezagos en las filas del Ejercito de Cuba, de la tendencia pro-

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ALBERTO CANDERO



China.

¿Usted considera que Guevara fué "separado del cargo" o "liquidado físicamente"?

ARTIME: Guevara fué liquidado, porque era el hombre de China para eliminar a Fidel Castro concretamente...

Lo dijimos ya una vez en un programa radial, cuando se anunció el canje. Dijimos que había una violenta pugna y que Ché Guevara era el precio que Rusia había exigido para seguir relaciones con Fidel Castro. La pugna comenzó cuando se llevó a Marcos Rodríguez al juicio... quien fué al juicio aquel es la vieja guardia y quien llevó a Marcos Rodríguez ante el juicio, es precisamente la tendencia pro-China.

NORMAN DIAZ: Vamos a esclarecerle a los oyentes, Doctor Artime, quien es Marcos Rodriguez.

ARTIME: El famoso comunista que fué juzgado y, según dicen, condenado a muerte por haber "delatado" el lugar donde se escondían los estudiantes fusilados durante la época de Batista.

Fueron condenados, en realidad, en aquel juicio toda la "Vieja Guardia", que sabía la historia de Marcos Rodriguez y había apañado a Marcos, en aquella oportunidad.

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Quien fué quien lo condenó?

ARTIME: Quien lo condenó fue, la línea china... y todos los diriguidores e íntimos amigos del Ché Guevara. Fidel Castro sirvió de intermediario, al final, para que la censura recayese sólo en la figura de Marcos Rodriguez y no en la figura de la "Vieja Guardia".

NUÑEZ: Comandante Artime, ¿qué resultados cree usted que se produzcan de la Conferencia Tri-continental que se acaba de celebrar en Cuba?

ARTIME: Desde 1935, en que Dimitrov lanzó -en el Congreso del Komintern- la tesis de los "frentes populares", no se había producido un impacto de estrategia tan virulento como el que se ha producido con la Tri-Continental. La Tri-Continental ha puesto a los países latinoamericanos -y yo vengo de Latino América ahora exactamente- y a los gobiernos latinoamericanos en la disyuntiva de una declaración de guerra.

Y así lo han reconocido grandes personajes de Latino-América; entre ellos, Lleras Camargo de Colombia. Sus resultados han influído, inclusive, en las elecciones de Costa Rica.

NORMAN DIAZ

En estos momentos, Latino-América es completamente consciente que se encuentra en guerra con Cuba. Esta es una jugada rusa... es una jugada rusa para quitarle el control de los comunistas "cabezas calientes" de Latinoamérica a China de la mano. ¿Y a quién utiliza? ¡Utiliza al peón que puede quemar! ¡Utiliza a Fidel Castro.!

¿Quiere decir que Rusia va, hasta sus últimas consecuencias con esta tesis que ha avanzado en la Tri-Continental? Me luce que no. Me luce que Rusia se está guardando las espaldas. Y prueba de ello es que líderes francamente pro-soviéticos -como Mora Valverde de Costa Rica, Prestes de Brasil y como Lombardo Toledano de México- no asistieron a la Tri-continental, ni se comprometieron con la Tri-Continental.

Moscú está preparándose para otra etapa que no es la de la Tri-continental; pero necesita la Tri-Continental para arrebatarle los partidos comunistas jóvenes a China de la mano y necesita para socavar la retaguardia de los Estados Unidos de Norte América.

Nosotros tenemos las primeras consignas que han llegado a Latino América, de la Tri-Continental. Las primeras consignas fueron, en primer lugar, intensificación de la campaña de paz; denuncia del imperialismo norteamericano, tanto en su aspecto militar como económico, fundamentalmente en Viet-Nam, tratando de llevar esta campaña de paz a un "boycot" a los buques de cualquier país que lleven ropa o armas o tropas o alimentos a Viet-Nam.

Segunda consigna: Penetración de los partidos de izquierda, para hacer que estos partidos de izquierda adopten posiciones radicales que hagan juego con el Comunismo.

Tercera consigna: Cambio de la palabra "Comunismo" por la palabra "Socialismo"... porque se han dado cuenta que la palabra "Comunismo" inspira asco ya hasta en las zonas sub-desarrolladas.

Incremento de las revoluciones y de la subversión en cada uno de los países. Y, en esto, los comunistas jóvenes [illegible] que cae en manos de Moscú, si quieren recibir alguna ayuda para sus planes subversivos. La van a recibir, pero tendrán que comprometerse con la línea moscovita.

Y, por último, campaña contra el imperialismo, en los dos aspectos, militar y económico dentro de Latino América. Incrementación de las revueltas en Santo Domingo, para tomar a Santo Domingo como una espina irritativa constante que de base a esta campaña.

Todos los países latinoamericanos son conscientes de esto. Todos los países latinoamericanos! Y hay países latinoamericanos que no pueden darse el lujo de continuar la estabilidad de su país con la presencia de un Fidel Castro en Cuba.

La O.E.A. está en una disyuntiva: o toma la decisión para la cual fué creada, o sencilla y llanamente, la O.E.A. perderá su vigencia en Latino América.

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, en los rotativos internacionales, como en los hilos cablegráficos también internacionales, se ha destacado extraordinariamente la crisis Castro Pekín. ¿Ese hecho puede beneficiar a Castro o, de lo contrario, ¿cree usted que le hará daño suficiente como para contribuir a su derrocamiento?

ARTIME: La línea china, en estos momentos, ya está ocasionándole grandes dificultades a Fidel Castro. Raúl Castro está reunido, hace tres días, con su Estado Mayor y con la Jefatura Suprema de los Cuerpos Represivos para una purga que se avecina en estos días próximos.

Como usted comprenderá, el señor Embajador Chino, que reparte la propaganda, no va a ir campamento por campamento repartiendo la propaganda china. Había vehículos, dentro de esos campamentos, que hacían circular esa propaganda; y hay hombres, dentro de los campamentos militares de Cuba, que son fanáticos de la línea china. El Che Guevara fué eliminado porque el Ché Guevara era la cabeza visible de aquello; pero queda la organización y está vigente y será- en los próximos días- la primera de la serie de purgas que amenaza al Ejército Rebelde Cubano...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor, yo vuelvo a insistir otra vez... "Eliminado". ¿en qué sentido? ¿Separado de las filas del Ejército o eliminado...?

ARTIME: Eliminado físicamente.

NORMAN DIAZ: ...físicamente. Gracias.

ARTIME: [illegible] Comienzan los grandes fallos no los perdona con separación del cargo...

NORMAN DIAZ: Gracias Doctor.

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime, usted sabe que los comunistas -como regla general- utilizan una serie de mentiras para difamar y una serie de rumores para difamar a los dirigentes que se enfrentan contra ellos con éxito.

...Con respecto a esto, me viene a la memoria una anécdota de un Profesor mejicano, que era profesor Universitario, que era destacado anticomunista. Y, a este Profesor, los comunistas empezaron a decir que él había aumentado y se había superado en su carrera debido a que su hermana mantenía relaciones con un influyente personaje. Tiempo después, este señor fué a un programa de Radio y un Periodista, no pudiendo contenerse ante esos rumores que existían, le preguntó "Oigame, existen rumores Profesor, de que su hermana ..." Dice el hombre... "pues mire, yo soy el primer sorprendido, porque yo soy hijo único, yo no tengo hermanas"... o sea, yo quisiera que usted me dijera a qué atribuye usted, Comandante Artime, el hecho de que Fidel Castro lo haya tomado como centro de los ataques a los exilados, inclusive llegando a atribuirle riquezas personales y acusaciones de otros tipos?

ARTIME: Esas campañas hace tiempo que yo las conozco... la célebre campaña del restaurant que yo tengo, de los cuatro supermarkets; creo que también di dinero para una joyería, vivo en un palacio, que es mío... Esto es viejo...

Cuando yo dije que Fidel Castro era un traidor, muchos creían en Fidel Castro. La primera acusación que me lanzaron por la espalda fué la de "ladrón de los fondos del INRA"... Ya estoy acostumbrado a esto, es decir, el pueblo de Cuba no cree en nada. ¡Eso es lo que me interesa! Los gobiernos que me ayudan a mí en Latino América, ¿lo creen? No son tontos... no son tontos, ellos no se dejan llevar por campañas; ellos sí saben la verdad. Y saben que todo esto es mentira.

Hay un drama que se está representando en Europa, que es ga-

RICARDO NUÑEZ





PANEL

nial. Se llama "La Hoguera Feliz". Ponen a Juana de Arco en la actualidad y, por supuesto, Juana de Arco llevada por su espiritualismo combate contra el Comunismo.

Se reúne la Dirección del Partido Comunista Francés y toman una línea contra Juana de Arco... ¿Quemarla? ¡No!, porque se crea un martir... ¡INFAMARLA! Y empiezan a decir que Juana de Arco lleva una vida libre, que Juana de Arco se ha entregado a las drogas, que Juana de Arco vive con los Capitanes de su Ejercito... y el drama termina cuando Juana de Arco, llorando, le suplica a a los comunistas ¡que la quemen! Y el Dirigente del Partido Comunista le dice: ¡NO!, ya tú estas quemada hace rato.....

Esa es una vieja campaña... que puede circular dentro de ciertos limites, pero, después de esos limites, ya no circula.

Me da ganas de reír, porque el otro dia me encontré yo con el dueño de una Joyeria y me dijo: "¿Tu sabes que dicen que me diste 10,000 pesos ...?" Yo le dije: "Empiézamelos a pagar, porque de verdad que me hacen gran falta....

Yo sí tengo riquezas... pero no son esas. La riqueza mia es saber que nosotros tenemos una organización, en toda el área del Caribe que está velando por la seguridad de esos paises y más de un Presidente nos debe la vida a nosotros.

La riqueza mia es saber que nosotros tenemos una pequeña "Granja Modelo" donde se están formando hombres para el futuro y, a partir del mes que viene, empezaran a venir indios latinoamericanos a recibir formación para cambiar el medio ambiente en que ellos se están desarrollando.

La riqueza mia es saber que hay diez muchachos, en distintas universidades, preparándose en campos en que, hasta ahora, Cuba no tenia técnicos y los tendrá en el futuro.

La riqueza mia es saber que las viuda y los familiares de los presos nuestros no están abandonados ni van a pasar hambre.

La riqueza mia está en saber que, dentro de Cuba, se recibe la ayuda del Movimiento... y eso nos cuesta mucha sangre.

Quizá la única riqueza que yo le deje a mi hija sea el nombre mio, limpio... porque, por desgracia, ni siquiera un seguro de vida me quieren hacer las compañias aseguradoras. ¡Será lo único que, por tristeza, le pueda dejar yo a mi familia! Y eso sí lo cuido, y eso sí lo cuidaré hasta sus últimas consecuencias...

NORMAN DIAZ: Doctor Artime, todo proceso revolucionario produce siempre nuevas figuras. Y el mensaje de la revolución democrática cubana entraña un gran anhelo, que solo puede llevarse adelante con figuras, como usted acaba de decir hace unos momentos, de promociones limpias y sin compromisos pasados.

¿Serán estas figuras, que emergen de este proceso, las que lleven a Cuba liberada el noble mensaje de estos años de sacrificio, de dolor, para darnos una patria mejor que la que teníamos? ¿Tiene usted fé en la fuerza espiritual de su generación? ¿Es usted esencialmente revolucionario, Doctor?

ARTIME: Yo me considero revolucionario, Norman, porque yo quiero revocar todas las medidas demagógicas y desastrozas que se han implantado en mi Patria. Yo quiero acabar con el paredón; yo quiero acabar con la abolición de la propiedad privada; yo quiero acabar con la discriminación de los hombres que hoy, más violentamente que nunca, se está estableciendo en mi Patria; yo quiero acabar con la oligarquia que disfruta de las riquezas de mi Patria, mientras el pueblo se muere de hambre.

Yo tengo fé en mi generación, Norman. Pero mi generación no es de edad; mi generación es histórica. La generación mia es la de todos los hombres limpios de todos los gobiernos, de todas las edades, de todas las clases sociales y de todos los colores de piel que han pasado por la Historia de Cuba. Hombres que, dentro de sus posiciones, han querido una Cuba mejor que la que siempre tuvimos... Yo en esa generación histórica creo, Norman... tengo fe en ella y creo que el pueblo de Cuba tiene suficiente reserva moral como para obviar todas las dificultades.

Yo creo que nosotros tenemos que lograr la unidad. La unidad de la base, la unidad de la masa, que se acaben ya las pugnas tontas... Vamos a olvidarnos de Presidencias de Repúblicas y vamos a olvidarnos de Generelaturas.... vamos a acabar con todos los individuos que están concretamente por una ambición personal.

Que se unan las masas a espaldas de los lideres... Que los lideres se tendrán que unir si se unen las masas... Vamos a lograr esa unidad necesaria.

Yo quisiera ver, por ejemplo, obras como las de los Municipios Cubanos. Una obra que no es politica, una obra que es de ayuda mutua, una obra que para lograr la unidad de nuestra Patria en pequeños escenarios... Obras como esa, apoliticas; unidades como esta, que son unidades de bases, mientras no tengan el control politico de nadie... Yo creo que es [illegible] fundamental para el futuro de los que se están lanzando por el camino de la guerra.

Y porque la organización está constituida por hombres de todas las procedencias, por hombres de todas las edades y por hombres de todas las clases sociales, nosotros tenemos fuerza moral para lanzar un mensaje de esperanza al futuro de Cuba.

Y yo creo que sí, Norman; yo creo que hay una generación histórica que tiene la responsabilidad moral de esta liberación; y tengo fe en esa generación histórica.

NORMAN DIAZ: Lo felicito, Doctor, porque ese es el pensamiento mío.

GANDERO: Ricardo Nuñez, una pregunta rápida y una explicación rápida...

NUÑEZ: Doctor Artime...

¿Qué nos puede decir usted sobre este reciente proceso de Costa Rica, que ha sido tan importante para toda Latino América. Cual es su opinión sobre este proceso y sobre los factores que llevaron a la victoria al ya Presidente Trejos?

ARTIME: En primer lugar, yo creo que es un resultado de la Tri-Continental. Era tal el miedo, que la sospecha de que un candidato pudiera tener contacto con el Comunismo - la sospecha, porque me consta que no había tal pacto - fue suficiente para liquidar a un hombre. Pero, además, se debatió un punto muy importante. Se debatió el control total de la economía por el Estado ó se debatió la libre empresa con proyección social. Eso fué lo que se debatió en realidad en Costa Rica. y el pueblo dió el voto; y el voto del pueblo costarricense es un resumen de lo que es la opinión pública latino-americana en estos momentos.

Yo creo que el momento histórico de los extremismos, tanto de derecha como de izquierda, ya pasó.. Y yo creo que el voto, en definitiva, fué dado en San José de Costa Rica.

GANDERO: Una última pregunta rápida, creo que quedan unos segundos..._

NORMAN DIAZ: ¿Doctor, realmente usted considera que la pauta trazada en las elecciones efectuadas en estos momentos, en Costa Rica, va a ser decisiva en el resto de Centro y Sur América?

ARTIME: Yo sí lo creo. Yo creo que el que quiera salir por elección popular tiene que analizar, muy detenidamente, el resultado de las elecciones de Costa Rica. Yo lo creo honestamente. Y yo quiero felicitar al Señor Presidente de Costa Rica porque ha mantenido la dignidad de ser el hombre que está en el poder y garantizar unas elecciones libres y garantizar la entrega del poder. Es un hombre a quien nosotros los cubanos debemos mucho y es un hombre -el Presidente Orlich- que merece el máximo de respeto.

Yo quisiera utilizar este medio para mandar un mensaje a él. No llega, porque se queda en Miami, pero alguien se lo dirá, dándole las gracias a él, en nombre de todos los cubanos que luchamos por la independencia de nuestra Patria.

GANDERO: Muchísimas gracias, Doctor Manuel Artime, por su comparecencia aquí esta mañana y quiero agradecerle también al buen amigo y compañero Norman Diaz y a Ricardo Nuñez, de servir de Panelistas en este domingo.

Así es que quedan invitados para el próximo domingo, a las 10:30 de la mañana, como de costumbre.

Les deseo a todos muy buenos días.

DR. MANUEL ARTIME BUESA



DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO
Chief, WH Division; Chief of Station, Panama

FROM
Chief of Station, Managua 11'4/11

SUBJECT
AMBIDDY-1 Report on Internal PLN Maneuverings; Possible Plans to Disrupt Inauguration of President-Elect TREJOS; and Plans for Major Strike in Banana Plantations on Pacific Coast of Costa Rica and Panama

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI or such action as COS, San Jose may wish to take

NOTE : This report is being sent FYI and not in intel format because of the fact that it comes from uncontrolled sources which cannot be checked out by this Station. It is passed along mainly because of the mention of a possible assassination plot in Paragraph 3. We believe any dissemination should be done from Headquarters, if applicable.

1. AMBIDDY-1 arrived in Managua on 22 April 1966 to discuss with Nicaraguan contacts a private business operation involving the publishing of a Central America oriented news magazine. On 25 April 1966, he received by mail the report outlined below and passed it to James D. ZABOTH, his former case officer who is now a Staff Agent for Managua Station. The report was written by Luis ARIZURRIETA, a Cuban member of AMBIDDY-1's organization, who has been working for about a year as a security advisor and member of the personal security guard of Daniel ODUBER. According to AMBIDDY-1, he has been documented as a member of the PLN security detail, has been a trusted aide to ODUBER, and is privy to confidential information from ODUBER and from other PLN officials. ARIZURRIETA returned to Miami on 22 April 1966, where he was located as of 26 April 1966.

continued.....

JDZABOTH:wcg

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Jose
2 - Chief, WHD
2 - COS, Panama City

28 April 1966

201-267437

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HNMA-3536	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	

2. Contents of this paragraph are based on personal observation and personal contacts with PLN officials by ARIZURRIETA. They constitute his analysis of the current state of affairs within that party.

A. The PLN is now split into two main groups, with "Chico" ORLICH and Daniel ODUBER in a temporary marriage of right and left wings opposing a second group headed by "Pepe" FIGUERES and Father NUÑEZ. The ORLICH-ODUBER group proposes to turn over the government peacefully to President-elect TREJOS, then to operate as a democratic opposition through the National Assembly where they hold the real power and can cooperate with or oppose the President when it is to their advantage. They feel that, in the long run, this will strengthen their party and allow them to win the next elections. They do not want to fight with the SOMOZA's on the grounds that this might unnecessarily force TREJOS and the SOMOZA's closer together.

B. The FIGUERES-NUÑEZ group do not wish to turn the power over to TREJOS under any circumstances. They are trying to stir up trouble as soon as possible, saying the election was won by immoral means and is, therefore, not valid. They say that now is the time to strike before TREJOS and his people get into power and get better organized. They claim to be waiting only for a reasonable pretext to make their move. On 17 April 1966 at FIGUERES' plantation "La Lucha", he met with a group of PLN leaders, mostly loyal to himself, but with a few whom he believed would go along with his plans, and discussed what steps to take. The decision was to make a big publicity campaign through the National Assembly, accusing the SOMOZA's of violating Costa Rican dignity and national integrity by bringing along a large unit of Nicaraguan armed soldiers each time they visit their holdings in Costa Rica. (ARIZURRIETA stated the campaign was actually begun on 19 April 1966. At about that time, Managua Station noted articles in the same vein in the local opposition newspaper, "La Prensa".)

who?

3. ARIZURRIETA says he got the contents of the following sub-paragraphs from a young Costa Rican who worked at one of the AMWORLD training bases, was approached by the Communists for recruitment, and has been handled since as a penetration of the Party by ARIZURRIETA. This individual is unidentified. — for PLN?

A. Classes in subversion and guerrilla warfare are being conducted at training centers in Limon for the Atlantic Coast region, and at Nicoya for the Pacific area. One of their basic texts is a pamphlet titled "Cuba en Marcha" by Francisco GAMBOA. Their objective is to organize a general strike in the banana fields, particularly on the Pacific Coast to include Chiriqui and David in Panama. This strike is planned for about 8 or 9 May 1966 so it will be in progress during the TREJOS inauguration. At the same time, the Party is preparing agitators and student organizers to make demonstrations against the presence of either of the SOMOZA brothers at the ceremony. They are considering two possibilities:

continued.....

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-3536

(1) If a big bodyguard accompanies SOMOZA, they will make accusations of violation o. Costa Rican sovereignty and national integrity by an invasion of armed Nicaraguans and try to get demonstrations started that will snowball into uncontrolled riots.

(2) If SOMOZA does not bring a large bodyguard, they will shoot him. (Note: ARIZURRIETA says the Communists claim that FIGUERES is in league with them. They say that after the 17 April 1966 meeting at "La Lucha", he discussed the plans for the strike and student demonstrations with them. When talking about SOMOZA, he was quoted as saying, "Perhaps we need a dead man to help our revolution.")

3. AMBIDDY-1 says the following information has come to him and to ARIZURRIETA from Roberto MADRIZ, described as personal secretary to President ORLICH. MADRIZ says he has heard ORLICH and ODUBER discussing FIGUERES' opposition to TREJOS taking over the Government, and they decided the real reason was that he owes the National Bank several millions that he cannot repay and which were borrowed over the years on the basis of his political prominence without sufficient collateral. FIGUERES feels that if this fact were revealed by an unfriendly government, such as that of TREJOS, he would be finished forever politically.

Michael H. MARTUFFI

14-00000

SECRET

SAN JOSE

WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ ☐ ☐

FILE, VR WH8 CI/OPS CI/IC2, CA2 CA/PROP CA/O4

28 APR 66 Z 00807

IN 00407

IN 07232 24 apr 66

S E C R E T 282155Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE SJOS 8564

TYPIC PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 97358

1. NO STATION TRACES ON NIEVES OR BORGES THUS WE SOMEWHAT IN DARK.

2. WHILE IT POSSIBLE THAT FIGUERES MAY BE INVOLVED IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING SHOULD CALDERON ELEMENTS ASSUME PREDOMINANT POSITION IN TREJOS GOVERNMENT, STATION HAS HAD NO INDICATION THAT FIGUERES HAS EITHER FUNDS OR INCLINATION TO IMPORT AN AGIT PROP MISSION. PLN SOURCES CONTINUE TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO MOVE IF CALDERONISTAS RETURN TO POWER POSITION WITH ENSUING POLICE BRUTALITIES AND OTHER EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS THEY REPORTEDLY USED IN 1940'S. GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION THIS DANGER SOMEWHAT FARFETCHED ALTHOUGH IT POSSIBLE THAT FIGUERES MAY BE THINKING OF CREATING INCIDENTS SAY CIRCA OCTOBER 1966 WHEN TRUE COMPLEXION OF NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE MORE EVIDENT.

(5)

3. IN 15 APRIL MEETING WITH COS, FIGUERES SEEMED

SECRET

SECRET

TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN CONTINUING POLITICAL PRESSURE (WITH PBSWING ASSISTANCE IF POSSIBLE) ON TREJOS TO KEEP CALDERONISTAS OUT OF KEY PUBLIC SECURITY POSITIONS THAN ANY MACHAVELLIAN SCHEME TO CREATE A CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW OF TREJOS GOVERNMENT. (NOTE: WE ASSUME AMBIDDY-1'S SOURCE DID NOT MEAN PRESENT ORLICH GOVERNMENT WHICH TURNS OVER POWER ON 8 MAY.)

SECRET

CFN: 8564 97358 1 NO STATION NIEVES BORGES 2 FIGUERES TREJOS NO INDICATION PLN CALDERONISTAS 1940'S 1966 3 15 COS A AMBIDDY-1' NOT MEAN ORLICH 8

BT

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] R.P. [illegible]:jck
[illegible] WH/C/FI/TC
[illegible] R. 1271
DATE: 19 APRIL 1966

☐ [illegible]
☐ [illegible]
☒ [illegible] 201-788521

SECRET

MOP
[illegible]

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY [illegible]

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

IN 07332
24 april 66

IN 00907
20 april 66

Wave 331
4/22/66

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FREYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

2. ALTHOUGH CONSIDER AMBIDDY 1'S REPORT RATHER WILD RUMOR WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SJOS COMMENTS AND CURRENT READING NIEVES ACTIVITIES.

④

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY 1 reported the above information by telephone.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 59

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : E.T. MAHONEY:ck
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : R. 1271
DATE : 19 APRIL 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-788521

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	MCD-1	5	RID
2		6	C
3	CI	7	CG
4	TC	8	

ES AMBIDDY-1

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/P, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/O-4, CA/PROP, SODS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2, C/OH

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FFSYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

2. ALTHOUGH CONSIDER AMBIDDY 1'S REPORT RATHER WILD RUMOR WOULD APPRECIATE WAVE AND SJOS COMMENTS AND CURRENT READING NIEVES ACTIVITIES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY 1 reported the above information by telephone.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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RIG :
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☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PAGE TWO

ROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: VR . FILE ☐ RID COPY

INFO CITE DIR 97358

[illegible]

C/WH/C/FI Seen Wm

C/WH/C/MHAPRON C. LeMaistre (in draft)

C/WH/C/CA/PM C. Anderson (in draft)

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills (in draft)

C/WH/C/CI J. Vidal (in draft:)

C/WH/2

C/WH/2/C.R. P. Edwards

John T. Flynn
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 59

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

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4		8	

SECRET

Whalen

ORIG : H.T. MAHONEY:ck
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : 1271
DATE : 19 APRIL 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-788321

TO : JMWAVE INFO: SAN JOSE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY NTP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CA/PROP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI, CI/INT 2, C/FI

TO WAVE INFO SJOS CITE DIR 97358

TYPIC PBRUMEN

1. HQS RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM AMBIDDY 1 ON 18 APRIL DURING WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED INFO FROM FREYDUC BORGES THAT LUCIANO NIEVES BEING SUPPORTED BY JOSE FIGUERES IN MIAMI AND FIGUERES HAS REQUESTED NIEVES AND ANOTHER CUBAN BY NICKNAME "YOYI" TO COME COSTA RICA ON AGITPROP MISSION TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR OVERTHROW PRESENT REGIME. AMBIDDY 1 CLAIMS NIEVES LIVING WELL IN MIAMI WITH NO VISIBLE MEANS SUPPORT. HQS UNDER IMPRESSION HE IMPOVERISHED AND LIVING HAND TO MOUTH.

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END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: AMBIDDY-1 reported the above information by telephone.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

MSG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 97358

[illegible]

C/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/MHAPRON C. LeMaistre (in draft)

C/WH/C/CA/PM C. Anderson (in draft)

C/WH/C/MO B. Mills (in draft)

C/WH/C/CI J. Vidal (in draft:)

John T. Flynn
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH

C/WH/2

C/WH/2/C.R. Edwards

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN T. FLYNN
A/DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

AMBIDDY-1 file

FROM: WH/C/[illegible]
OO 2702
X 6578

COPY DETACHED
22 Apr 66

EXTENSION

NO. UFGA - 15729

DATE 18 Apr 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/c/ca/EW(~~[illegible]~~)			
2. WH/C/FI Williamson			
3. WH/C/CICS WH/c/ca/PP	29 [illegible] 6		
4.			
5. WH/c/MO			
6.			
7. WH/C/FI		21	
8. Ray S—			
9.			
10. WH/HONDURAS			✓
11. Carole ANN			
12.			
13. WH/2/HD			
14.			
15. WH/C/FI			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

[illegible] Trace CS-1

— AA Anything for us. J
US/calt
22 Apr 66

dissemed to 7 A I
10 June 66

CSCI-316/02850-66

7-10 This should be sent Honduras for comments, I think.

10 + 11 See me on this pls.

sent to Station

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE BPV

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
Transmittal of Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

1. The Station has received, via William S. WIBALDA, a letter addressed to AMBIDDY-1, JMHOPE Post Office Box.

2. The JMWAVE KURIOT office opened the letter covertly, after which it was passed to the addressee. A copy of the letter is forwarded, under separate cover, for your information.

Arlene W. Kenteris
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
Letter u/sc

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/att u/sc

201-267437

DATE TYPED
14 Apr 66

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-126-3-16/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-15729

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-126-30/3

14-00000

PERSONAL

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS
L 0.20

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS
L 0.04
CINCO CENTAVOS DE LEMPIRA

MAR 18
19

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

SR: Manuel Artime
Apartado Postal 1144
Miami 1-Florida
E:U:A

San Pedro Sula, Honduras Centro America.
Marzo 18-1966.-

SR: Manuel Artime
Director Frente Revolucionario Cubano en el Exilio.
Miami Florida E:U:A.-

Van estas lineas para desearle toda clase de ventura personal y al mismo tiempo exitos en el Honrrozo cargo que esta depositado en sus manos, para destruir definitivamente de Cuba al sanguinario Gobierno Comunista de Fidel Castro.-

A continuacion quiero manifestarle lo siguiente: En esta Ciudad de San Pedro Sula vive una familia de Idiologia Marxista, ademas mandaron a un Hijo de ellos a prestar sus servicios al Gobierno Comunista de la Habana en Marzo de 1961, este peligroso Comunista Internacional se llama Eliceo Mejia Cabrera O Rovelo, segun tenemos datos esta siendo entrenado en diferentes ramas de sabotage y Terrorismo es Hombre de toda confianza del Sanguinario Jefe del G=2 CubanoRamiro Valdez.

Esta sirviendo como enlace del Comunismo Internacional para varios Paices de Centro América y la America del Sur, entre los cuales se encuentra Guatemala- HONDURAS- Panama- Venezuela-Colombia-Peru-Bolivia.-Dando Consignas para Derrocar a estos Paices Democráticos de América y ponerlos a las ordenes de Moscu- Pequin y la Habana, el Pasaporte lo tiene con nombre distinto lo mismo que apellido y Nacionalidad tambien, a viajado a Paices Comunistas tales como ,Praga-Moscu- Pequin.-

Sus viajes para nuestra America los hace via Mexico, Paiz éste que se presta para la infiltracion Comunista en nuestra America, UD: SR. Artime lo comprende que haci es.-

Aqui esta otra Informacion importante para UD: Con ordenes de Eliceo Mejia Rovelo O Cabrera quien se encuentra en la Habana, se han traslado a fijar su Recidencia a los Angeles Estado de California E:U:A: tres primas Hermanas de este Peligroso Comunista Internacional, llamadas Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, las tres cumplieron ordenes de Eliceo desde la Habana para dicho viaje, el dinero para sus pasages en Avion y demas gastos en este Consulado se los envio su muy famoso primo Hermano Eliceo desde la Habana. Tambien tenemos noticias que existe correspondencia desde la Habana con ellas tres , pero con nombre y direccion distinta, cosa que les va ser difil controlar estas cartas , estas tres Comunistas que se encuentran alli en los Angeles son muy vivas y astutas.

Tienen ordenes de su primo hermano Eliceo de la Habana que vijilen todas las Actividades de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (Cia) y del F-B-I.- Tambien tienen Ordenes de su primo hermano Eliceo de negar bajo todo punto de vista que son primas Hermanas de él y que todo eso quede en el misterio mas grande ,para burlar una ves más a las Actoridades de los E:U:A.- Debido que si la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) llega a saber ese parentesco existente con él serian extrañadas de los E:U:A.-y el perderia el control que tiene por el momento con ellas tres, las cartas que ellas mandan van a dar directamente a manos del Comandante Raúl Castro, para mejor Informacion suya .-

Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, burlaron al Honorable Consul Americano de esta Ciudad en toda forma, tambien se manifestarle que cuando Marina Amaya Cabrera recibio ordenes de Eliceo de la Habana para que se trasladara a los Angeles, no quiso sacar su visa en este Consulado de San Pedro Sula, donde tenia que sacarla por recidir ella aqui en esta Ciudad, xxxxxxxxxx segun tengo Informacion fue a sacar su Visa a Tegucigalpa sorprendiendo una ves mas a dicha Embajada Americana, pues ella ya tenia datos que se le estaba siguiendo la pista, UD: sabe muy bien SR: Artime que los Comunistas agotan todos los recurzos que poceen para triunfar con sus planes que tienen y sugun las ordenes que reciben.-

Tambien le comunico que tiene viaje a fijar su Recidencia a los Angeles Estado de Ca California otra prima Hermana del Comunista Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera y Hermana de las tres Comunistas que xxxx le menciona en esta carta , llamada Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez, llegando en esa forma cuatro primas Hermanas del peligroso Comunista Internacionalque tendran su asiento en los E:U:A. saboteando la Labor de la (CIA) Sirviendo todas ellas de Puente de Enlace del Comunismo Internacional.-

La Señora. Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez solamente espera el dinero que le enviara su primo Hermano Eliceo desde la Habana, para presentarce al Consulado Americano xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx para su correspondiente Visa burlando una ves mas al Consul Americano de esta Ciudad.-

Seria correcto SR: Artime que se le ordene al Consulado Americano de esta Ciudad que cancele la Visa de la Señora Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez por ser enemiga de los E:U:A. y profesar Idiologia Extra-Continental y por tener un primo Hermano prestando sus servicios a un Gobierno que busca la destruccion de la Gran Democracia Americana, ~~como son: la Habana Moscow y Pequin.~~- Desterrar de los Angeles Estado de California a estas tres Comunistas Internacionales llamadas Nora- Oneyda y Marina Amaya Cabrera, por las vinculaciones familiares y Correspondencia, con su primo Hermano Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera quien se encuentra prestando sus servicios al Gobierno Comunista de la XXXXXX Habana, para que sean remitidas a su Paiz de Origen San Pedro Sula, Honduras Centro America.-

Tengo la plena seguridad que UD: sabra atender esta mi carta, debido que esta basada a la verdad y nada mas que a la verdad, tengo la seguridad que al ser cauturadas estas tres Comunistas alli en los Angeles negaran a pie junto toda clase de vinculaciones familiares con Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera, todo eso se debe que tienen ordenes del Comunista Mejia Robelo de negar ese parentesco Familiar.- Se manifestarle tambien que tiene Viaje para Cuba Comunista un sobrino del Peligroso Comunista Internacional Eliceo Mejia Robelo O Cabrera llamado Heicel Mejia Moralez, quien Estudia en un Instituto de esta Ciudad , el propio XX Eliceo lo llama de la Habana, Heicel tiene viaje para Cuba en Septiembre de este Año segun tengo noticias, Heicel es sobrino de estas cuatro Comunistas Mujeres que le menciono en esta mi carta, tres de ellas ya tienen fijada su Recidencia alli en los E:U:A. otra mas esta por irce de esta Ciudad hacia los Angeles con el mismo propocito.-

Pongace en contacto con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) para desterrar de los Angeles a estas tres Comunistas que le menciono en esta mi carta y que den ordenes al Consul Americano de esta Ciudad para cancelar la visa que le menciono, dela Señora Lila Amaya V de Lopez.- Quiero que mi nombre no balla hacer revelado por temor a las represalias de esta Familia Comunista.- Afmo.--

GILBERTO NAVARRO R

Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria
2612 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Miami Marzo 31 de 1966.

Estimado Jim:

Tengo el gusto de reportar el empleo del dinero recibido durante los meses de Enero, Febrero y Marzo.

Enero

Recibí $ 5,000.oo dólares

Entregué:

Para su envío a Cuba a través de la Embajada Española ——— $ 2,000.oo

Entregados para su envío a Cuba, para familiares de presos o fusilados ———:

Inocencio Alonso	$275.oo
Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.oo
Rolando Tápanes	200.oo
Gustavo Fernández Vidal	300.oo
Angel García	300.oo
Emilia del Mar	100.oo
Silvia Heredia	125.oo
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.oo
Antonio Crespo Olivero	300.oo
Rafael García	300.oo
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	200.oo
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.oo
Eugenio Claude	100.oo

Total: $3025.oo ——— $ 3,025.oo

Total del Mes: $ 5,025.oo

Febrero

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

(2)

Febrero

Recibí: $5,000.00

Entregué:

Para su envío a Cuba a través de la Embajada Española ———————————— $ 2,000.00

Entregados para su envío a Cuba para familiares de presos y fusilados ————:

Inocencio Alonso ———— 275.00
Alfredo Borges Caignet—250.00
Rolando Tápanes ———— 200.00
Gustavo Fernández ——— 300.00
Angel García ———— 300.00
Emilia del Mar ———— 100.00
Silvia Heredia ———— 125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga ——— 300.00
Antonio Crespo ———— 300.00
Rafael García ———— 300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo— 300.00
Nilo Messer Pujol ——— 275.00
Eugenio Claude ———— 200.00
$3,225.00 ———————— $ 3,225.00

Total del mes: $ 5,225.00

Marzo

Recibí: $5,000.00

Entregué:

Para Cuba a través de la Embajada Española: ——————$ 2,000.00

Para Cuba a través de familiares:

Inocencio Alonso: 275.00

Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS:
371-6407
371-6408

Alfredo Borges Caignet	250.00
Rolando Tápanes	200.00
Gustavo Fernández	300.00
Angel García	300.00
Emilia del Mar	100.00
Silvia Heredia	125.00
Jacinto Luzárraga	300.00
Antonio Crespo	300.00
Rafael García	300.00
Antonio Sanz de Acedo	300.00
Nilo Messer Pujol	275.00
Eugenio Claude	200.00
	$3,225.00

Entregados a Sofía Angel Bello, esposa de José Fernández Planas, recien llegada de Cuba, para su encaminamiento en el exilio ——$300.00

Total: $ 5,525.00

Por supuesto, en nada de ésto está contado: Revista "Tridente", Oficina del MRR, Delegaciones en Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, España, Honduras, Guatemala y Perú. Tampoco está incluído: viajes de agentes y míos propios, el personal que cuida las armas en Nicaragua, el personal de Acción Cívica, el personal de la Granja Modelo, y mi propia subsistencia/

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de Vds. muy atte.

Manolo

MRR

Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
2212 N. E. 2 COURT
MIAMI 37, FLORIDA

TELEFONOS.
371-6407
371-6408

Miami 31 de Marzo de 1966

Estimado Jim:

Como acordamos, te envío un reporte del resultado de la visita de Antonio Sanz a Europa.

1- Antonio salió para Francia el 12 de Marzo de 1966.

2- Pasó de Francia a España en automóvil (no exigen mas que la presentación de Pasaportes a los ciudadanos españoles y Antonio lo es) por Irún. Llegó a San Sebastian.

3- Se entrevistó el 16 de Marzo de 1966, a las 12 de la noche con el "Mago" Robreño y con "El gallego" López Lourido. La entrevista se prolongó hasta las 3 de la madrugada.

4- Lo que se trató:

a) Almeijeiras, el Comandante Angel Quevedo Valdivia (el de la Universidad), el Comandante Almeida y el Comandante Guillermo García. Estaban en el complot. Es de notar que cuando se celebró la entrevista, aún no se había detenido a Almeijeiras en Cuba; es decir, no puede haber sido invención del "Mago".

b) Que en realidad, el grupo complotado no necesitaba de nosotros militarmente, sino politicamente, pues nuestros contactos internacionales y nuestro prestigio con el pueblo cubano, iba a acortar la lucha y conduciría rapidamente a la estabilización del país.

c) Que a través del piloto de Cubana que le servía de correo, supo que lo que quedaba de la conspiración (si es verdad que Almeida y Guillermo García están, lo que queda es lo principal) quería establecer contacto con gente de Artime y que como "El Mago" ya estaba "quemado", tratarían de hacerlo a través del Embajador de Cuba en Suiza.

5- Q d) Que sería conveniente que alguien importante del grupo de Artime hablara con el Embajador de Cuba en Suiza.

Esto que te envío es un resumen de lo importante que se habló.

Como ves, si es cierto todo lo que dice, merecería la pena ir a Suiza (Antonio Sanz u otro) para hacer contacto con este señor.

El viaje de Antonio, más los gastos de transporte para no ir directamente a España, más otros gastos, como fué darle $300.00 al "[illegible]", no me permite seguir en ésto si

* Vds. no consideran ésto de valor. Si creen que debo seguirlo, por indicios de que pueda ser cierto, entonces sí estoy dispuesto a seguirlo, cueste lo que cueste.

Adjunto te envío unas declaraciones que creo se están trasmitiendo por onda larga (radio) a Cuba. Si es cierto, opino que los párrafos que están subrayados pueden ser muy negativos para cualquier conspiración que exista dentro de Cuba. Si pudiera evitarse el que esto se trasmitiera para Cuba, sería muy bueno, pues a ningún militar rebelde le va a gustar que lo traten como "corrompido", "inmoral", etc, etc.

Suplícote hagas lo posible por conseguir el programa radial para Cuba.

Sin más nada por el momento se despide de tí, tu amigo que te aprecia:

Manolo advised by phone 5 April that we had no interest in further trips re contacts in Europe.

Manolo

14-00000

SECRET

9 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime Buesa (201-267437)

1. As a result of a conversation with Carl Jenkins, Artime's present C/O, the following was decided:

a) Jenkins will continue to see and handle Artime in Nicaragua. (Jenkins plans to go to Managua PCS within the next two weeks.

638-5074
652-4499
652-5954

b) Jenkins will set up a Hqs contact with Artime by telephone. Artime is to be given the name "Jim Wilson" and the direct line phone ~~[illegible]~~, located in the FE's office ~~IO Section~~ of WH ~~FI~~/Cuba to call when he needs an agency contact and has something important he wants to discuss. The Hqs C/O for Artime will either be Thomas Hazlett or the undersigned.

c) Artime can be reached at his Miami address, 1270 NE 85th St. Phone 751-~~3648~~ (Code 305).
751-5981

Earl J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson

SECRET

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declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ARTIME BUESTA, MANUEL
201-267437
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
VISITED ORLANDO PIEDRA /201-247879/ ON
11 FEB 66
ARRIVAL IN FLORIDA OF ORLANDO PIEDRA
NEGUERUELA FROM VISIT WITH FULGENCIO BATISTA
ZALDIVAR

201-247879
UFG -07971
21 FEB 66
P1

R 6603031094

FILE IN 201-267437

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

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~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ROUTING			
1	EW —	5	
2		6	CA
3		7	2
4		8	X

ORIG : WAYNE CARLEY
UNIT : WH/3/PERU
EXT : 6223
DATE : 4 FEB. 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-754738

24 SECRET

4 FEB 66 22 59z

TO : LIMA JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH-8 INFO: VR . FILE ☑ RID COPY, WH/C 8, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS SIG CEN

TO LIMA INFO WAVE CITE DIR 77832

file AMBIDDY-1

REFS: A. LIMA 8423 (IN 45015)
B. WAVE 8858 (IN 45106)

ARTIME CONFIRMED 3 FEBRUARY THAT AMSKIRT TWO "APPOINTED" AS FORMERS LIAISON WITH CUBAN COLONY PERU.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: A-2 is walk-in to Lima who claimed be Manuel ARTIME's liaison man in Peru. Refs requested validation this claim. ARTIME confirmed in telecon night of 3 Feb. 66.

WH/C D. Rohlfing (by phone)

WH/FI ✓

Rohlfing

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
DC/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

21

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MO—	5	CA
2		6	RF
3	FI-TC	7	D
4	CI	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, RB, WH 8

S E C R E T 312256Z

DIR INFO LIMA CITE WAVE 8858 31 JAN 66 IN 45106

TYPIC

REF: LIMA 8423 (IN 45015)

SINCE ALL CONTACT WITH ARTIME HANDLED BY HQS DEFER TO HQS FOR ANSWER REF.

S E C R E T

CFN 8858 8423 ARTIME HQS HQS

BT

SECRET

CS COPY

DECLASSIFIED	✓
RI/AN	✓
RI/MIS	
201-267437	✓
RI/Files	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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24 SECRET

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1	MO -	5	CA
2		6	RR
3	FE-TC	7	D
4	CI	8	S

FROM LIMA

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

SECRET 311550Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE LIMA 8423

TYPIC

REF WAVE 8716 (IN 41088)

ACTION

31 JAN 66 IN 45015

REQUEST WAVE CHECK WITH ARTIME GROUP TO ESTABLISH WHETHER AMSKIRT-2 IN FACT APPOINTED LIAISON WITH CUBAN COLONY PERU. ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 8423 8716 WAVE ARTIME AMSKIRT-2

BT

SECRET

Wayne Curley x C223

CS COPY

DECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS
201-267427
RI/Files

Eduardo Garcia Portugal

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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15 SECRET

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2		6	
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4		8	

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, ADDP, CI/OA

SECRET 291330Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 3517 29 JAN 66 IN 44250

PBRUMEN AMBIDDY-1

REF: CARA 3478 (IN 41127)*

AMBIDDY-1 DEPARTED CARA FOR MIAMI 28 JANUARY 1500 HOURS PAA 442. DID NOT HAVE INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LEONI.

SECRET

CFN 3517 3478 AMBIDDY-1 28 1500 PAA 442 NOT HAVE LEONI

BT

*AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED CARA 22 JAN.

SECRET

201-267437

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

24 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	RI	5	EI
2		6	C
3	CC	7	[illegible]
4	RD	8	[illegible]

FROM Managua

ACTION LWHC-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 262327Z

WAVE INFO DIR PACY CITE MANA 5584

27 JAN 66 IN 42124

TYPIC AMTABBY-27 AMLITAINT-1 AMWORLD

REF: WAVE 8529 (IN 36546)

1. STATION HAS NO INFO RE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ERACORN-1 PERMISSION TO REOPEN MONKEY POINT CAMP. HOWEVER AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED MANA 17 JAN VIA LANICA FROM MIAMI.

2. ERACORN-1 LEFT MANA 24 JAN FOR PBPRIME VIA LANICA. ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS PERSONAL BUSINESS IS PURPOSE OF VISIT. ERFACT-1 SAYS REASON IS MEDICAL RECHECK.

SECRET

CFN 5584 AMTABBY-27 AMLITAINT-1 AMWORLD 8529 NO INFO RE ERACORN-1 MONKEY POINT CAMP AMBIDDY-1 17 JAN VIA LANICA MIAMI 24 PBPRIME ERFACT-1

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CA-	5	IC
2		6	FI
3	MD	7	D
4	KR	8	X

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH/C 8 CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI

S E C R E T 251900Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 3478 25 Jan 66 IN 41127

PERUMEN AMBIDDY-1

CIPUN-1 REPORTS AMBIDDY-1 ARRIVED CARA 22 JANUARY 1966 PAA 515 ACCOMPANIED BY ANTONIO SANZ. UNDERSTAND HE TRYING ARRANGE APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT LEONI.

S E C R E T

CFN: 3478 CIPUN-1 AMBIDDY-1 CARA 22 1966 PAA 515 ANTONIO SANZ LEONI

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG : A. [illegible]ST
UNIT : [illegible]/C/CICS
EXT : 9206
DATE : 24 JANUARY 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-749553

SECRET

1 CICS
2 FI
3 TC

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ FID COPY ADDP C/WH 6 C/CI C/FI 2 C/E/D 4

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 74986

DESENSITIZED

KAPOK TYPIC AMSPICE AMHOAN

REF: WAVE 8603 (IN 38412)

1. RE PARA 5 REF: RATHER THAN SPECULATE ON IDENTITY ARTIME GROUP PENETRATION HQS INTENDS TO ASK ARTIME SERIES SUITABLY DISGUISED QUESTIONS IN EFFORT EDUCE IDENTITY PERUVIAN. WILL ADVISE.

Riblefrny
what this about?
JK

2. TO INDUCE COOPERATION AND/OR DEFECTION CUBANA PILOTS ON HAVA MEXI ROUTE, HQS SEEKING APPROPRIATE MEANS (WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION TO AMSPICE/1) APPRISE SELECTED CUBANA PILOTS OF ABREU'S COMMENT THAT DAYS NUMBERED FOR BOURGEOIS PILOTS. WOULD WELCOME MEXI AND WAVE COMMENTS. DOES AMSPICE/1 KNOW IF RQMT TO REPORT ON CUBANA MEMBERS GIVEN TO OTHER CUIS AGENTS MEXI?

C/WH/C/CICS S. Vidal
WH/COG B. Mill
WH/1 [illegible]
WH/C/FI F. Eamhert

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

25-3

5

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

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CLASSIFY TO FILE NO:
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	MO	5	[illegible]
2		6	CF
3	JH	7	[illegible]
4	FI/RC	8	D

FROM LIMA

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN

D

SECRET 212330Z

DIR WAVE CITE LIMA 8360

22 JAN 65 IN 39233

1. ON 21 JAN CHIEF OF EMB POLITICAL SECTION MET WITH INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFYING SELF AS EDUARDO GARCIA DARTAYET, CUBAN REFUGEE, WHO UNTIL RECENTLY RESIDED MIAMI. GARCIA SAID HE RECENTLY SOLD HIS BUSINESS IN MIAMI (BUSINESS CARD INDICATES HE WAS PRES OF MINIMAX SUPER MARKET FOOD INC, 1545-47 S.W. 27 AVENUE, MIAMI) TO COME TO PERU TO MARRY DAUGHTER OF EX-PERUVIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI AND SEEK EMPLOYMENT HERE. SAID HE WAS APPOINTED AS LIAISON FOR ARTIMES' GROUP WITH CUBAN RESIDENTS PERU. ALSO INDICATED THAT WHILE IN MIAMI HE HAD COLLABORATED WITH KUBARK AND ODENVY.

2. REQUEST TRACES GARCIA. IF GARCIA BONA FIDES SATISFACTORY STA DESIRES CONSIDER HIM AS SOURCE OF INFO ON LOCAL CUBAN COLONY.

3. INDEX.

SECRET

CFN: 8360 21 JAN EMB EDUARDO GARCIA DARTAYET PRES OF MINIMAX SUPER MARKET FOOD INC, 1545-47 S.W. 27 AVENUE MIAMI APTIMES' ODENVY BONA FIDES STA

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WHF, C/CI, CI, FI

file

CW

SECRET 182315Z

DIR INFO PACY MANA CITE WAVE 8529 19 JAN 66 IN 35540

TYPIC AMTABBY 27 AMLITAINT 1 AMWORLD

REF A WAVE 937 (NOT SENT MANA) (IN 31428)

B DIR 72[illegible] (NOT SENT MANA)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL TO INFO FORWARDED REF A.

2. AMTABBY 27 ON 17 JAN 66 ADVISED BY JOSE ALEGRETTE THAT ON 15 JAN JAIME VARELA CANOSA VISITED ALEGRETTE ASKING ALEGRETTE CONTACT SOMOZA TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR VERELA AND "HIS GROUP" USE FORMER AMBIDDY-1 CAMP MONKEY POINT. VARELA STATED "HIS GROUP" SHORTLY TO RECEIVE ENOUGH AID TO START OPERATIONS AGAINST PBRUMEN AND WOULD USE AMBIDDY 1 NICARAGUA CAMPS AS BASES.

3. WAVE OFFICER ON 17 JAN CONTACTED AMLITAINT-1 WHO LONG TIME FRIEND VARELA TO DETERMINE WHETHER ANY BASIS VARELA STATEMENTS. A-1 STATED THAT HAD SEEN VARELA LAST TIME NOV 65 AT WHICH TIME VARELA STATED HE WORKING WITH ODBEAT ALONG WITH PERUYERO OF 2506 BRIGADE VETS ASSOCIATION.

4. WAVE COMMENT: TRACES INDICATE VARELA FORMER PRESIDENT 2506 BRIGADE VETS ASSOCIATION REPLACED BY PERUYERO. VARELA ALSO IDENTIFIED AS ACSI SOURCE NUMBER 1002 AS OF 17 JUN 65.

SECRET

IN 36

PAGE 2

SECRET

5. IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE ODBEAT INVOLVEMENT HAVE NOT FOLLOWING SUGGESTION PARA 3 REF B TO PERMIT DIR CHECK OUT ODBEAT INVOLVEMENT.

6. FOR MANA: REF A FORWARDED INFO FROM AMTABBY-27 WHO APPROACHED BY PERUYERO, CURRENT PRESIDENT OF BRIGADE 2506 VETS ASSOCIATION TO JOIN PERUYERO AS HE OBTAINED UNSPECIFIED AID FROM UNSPECIFIED ODYOKE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PERMIT ASSOCIATION START OPERATIONS AGAINST PERUMEN FROM PACY BASES. NEITHER DIR NOR PACY COULD CONFIRM SUCH AID.

SECRET

CFN ✓ REF RYBAT.

8529 8374 72665 A 27 17 66 JOSE ALEGRETTE 15 JAIME VARELA CANOSA SOMOZA AMBIDDY-1 MONKEY POINT NICARAGUA 17 AMLITAINT-1 A-1 65 PERUYERO 2506 2506 ACSI 1002 17 65 NOT FOLLOWING 3 B -27 2506 NEITHER DIR NOR PACY

BT

SECRET

SENDER WILL CHECK CLA ATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Rastetter		
2			
3			
4	Per my telecon with		
5	Mr. Chacon		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Attached are CV's of Cubans recommended by Artime to George Lodge for inclusion in the next class at Veraguas. Unfortunately: (1) Carlos Orlando Piloto Valle and Juan Fernandez Garrido seem to be either unqualified or disqualified , and Felipe J. Villerans Gallo is a dubious choice; and(2) X George Lodge sent all five CV's to Veraguas without waiting for our opinion. We are asking George to write another note to Father Steele at Veraguas ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ saying that he, George, wonders whether all these men are qualified and asking for Father Steele"s opinion. If Steele would prefer some other candidates, then George can ask Artime for some more names.

(over)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Chris Russell #R-1254	4 Jan 66

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(4)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

CA/4's interest, obviously, is to protect project KMOCHROID, our proprietary fund in Philadelphia which xxxdx would pay for the training, from becoming tarnished in liberal Latin American circles by sponsoring Cubans who lack qualifications xx in the rural labor field but are overqualified as guerrila warriors.

Meanwhile, any comments you might have on Artime's candidates would be appreciatedx, and we xxxxxxxxxx be sure that you are kept informed of George's next xxxxxx moves.



Resume

Name: Carlos Orlando Piloto Valle

Age: 29 years old

Civil Status: Single

Nationality: Cuban

Address: 5830 W. 15 Ct. Hialeah, Fla.

Telephone: 821-0325

Ocupation in Cuba: Businessman. Underground against communism; 5 months in jail before leaving the country in Pinar del Rio Prov.-

Ocupation in U.S.A: Working for the liberation of Cuba. Member of the Bay of Pigs Invasion (Bon. 3 Infantery) 22 more months in jail.

Studies: High School in Cuba (Bachillerato)

Experience Student until 1958. Working as a businessman until 1960. In training camps from 1961. Bay of Pigs Invasion. In jail until Dec.1962. Working for the liberation of Cuba from 1962 until today.

Resumé

Name: Felipe J. Villazan Galis

Age: 34 years

Status civil: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 1349 W. 62 st. Hialeah.Fla.

Telephone: 8215808

Languages: Spanish and English

Occupation in Cuba: Lawyer

Salesman and Public Relation

Journalist

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the last five years.

Studies: High School - La Salle del Vedado-Havana, Cuba-Sept 1938 to June 1950

Doctor in Law - Universidad Católica de Santo Tomás de Villanueva-Havana-Sept 1950 to June 1955.

Post-Graduate- Madrid University-Madrid, Spain-Dec. 1958 to May 1959

Journalism School-Havana- 1948 to 1950.

Experience: 1950-1955: Salesman and Public Relation in a factory of food products.

1955-1959: Lawyer (own law office) in Havana. Specialist in customs and Import and export laws.

1950-1958: Director of V.T.C. magazine.

Sport writer of Prensa Deportiva, "Prensa Libre" newspaper.

Member of the Lion Club of Havana

Delegate of the Board of Lawyer of Havana.

President of the promotion 1950 La Salle School.

Director of Public Relation and Propaganda (1955-1958) of Former Students Asociation in Universidad Católica de Santo Tomás de Villanueva.

1960-1965: Psycological War Fare.

[illegible]

Name: Eugenio Claude Garcia

Age: 29 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 1035 NW 10 st. Miami Fla.

Telephone: 5773521

Languages: Spanish

Occupation in Cuba: Gastronomic Labor. (1954-1962)
Electro-Mecanic School Of Belen, student 1954-1956 Havana, Cuba
Social Studies Board of Electro-Mecanic School of Belén (member)
1954-1955. Havana-Cuba.

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the last four years.

Studies: High School-Instituto de Camagüey-Camagüey province, Cuba-1949 to 1953.
Electrical Equipment-Electro-Mecanic School of Belén, -Havana, Cuba-1954 to 1956.
Cooperative principles-Social Studies Board of Electro Mecanic School of Belén. Havana, Cuba

Experience: Gastronomic labor (1954-1962)
Refrigeration mecanic (1951 to 1963)
Cooperative. La Lisa . Marianao. Havana. Cuba (1961-1963)
Guerrilla War Fare. 1963 to 1964

Resumé

Name: Luis Fernández [illegible] Iglesias

Age: 25 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 3079 NW 15 st. Miami Fla.

Telephone: 634-5013

Languages: Spanish and English

Occupation in Cuba: Ciencias Sociales Student in the University of Havana

Occupation in U.S.A.: Working for the Liberation of Cuba during last four years.

Studies: High School- La Salle del Vedado-Havana, Cuba-Sept 1947 to June 1957

Social Sciences- Havana University-Havana, Cuba- Sept 1959 to June 196

Experience: Farmers Associations-Comandos Rurales-Agrarian Reform Program-Provincia de Oriente, Cuba-1959-1960.

Clandestine Operations-1960-1964

Aspirante Instructor Agrupación Católica Universitaria-Havana, Cuba-1960.



Resumé

Name: Juan Fernández Garrido

Age: 32 years

Civil Status: single

Nationality: cuban

Address: 121 NW 42 pl. Miami. Fla.

Telephone: 448 2421

Language: Spanish

Occupation in Cuba: Farmer (1953-1957) Las Villas province. Cuba
Policeman (1957-1960)
Guerrilla man (1960-1962) Escambray mountains. Las Villas province, Cuba.

Occupation in U.S.A.: Gastronomic labor (1962-1963)
Working for the Liberation of Cuba during the two last years.

Studies: Primary School in Las Villas Province. Cuba (1940-1948)
High School (only two years) Las Villas province Institute, 1949-1950.

Experience: Farmer
Gastronomic labor
Policeman
Guerrilla War Fare
Agriculture (1953-1957)

10 Jan 66

SECRET

10 [illegible]

WH/C 66-14

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Transmission of Booklet Written by Manuel Artime Buesa

1. Attached is a booklet entitled Points for Meditation written by Manuel Artime. It is essentially written for the younger elements of his Revolutionary Recovery Movement and in effect assembles a list of quotes and observations of an essentially political or philosophic nature.

2. The inscription on the inside cover is dedicated to you and translated reads as follows:

> "To Mr. Arthur - the generous lawyer of difficult causes - with affection in Cuba or Nothing"
>
> (signed)
>
> Manuel Artime Buesa

(Signed) John L. Hart

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WHD for Cuba

DDP/WH/C/CA/EW/A. Rohlfing:fph
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - C/WH
1 - WH/Registry
1 - DCWHD/C
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - DC/WH/C/CA
1 - WH/C/CA/EW

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Miami 9 de Enero de 1966

Mr. F.R. Lastra
P.O. Box 8697
Baltimore 40 Md.

Estimado amigo:

Quisiera notificarles de lo siguiente:

1-Han sido becados para estudiar en Panamá, por la Universidad de Harvard:

Felipe Villaraus
Eugenio Claude
Luis Fernández Mayato
Juan Fernández Garrido
Orlando Piloto

2-Ha sido invitado por Daniel Oduber a presenciar los comicios de Costa Rica:

Rafael García (Secretario de Juventudes)

3- Ha partido para Lima, Perú, como Delegado del Movimiento, que informará de la situación en ese lugar: Eduardo García Dantayet

4- El General Somoza se entrevistó con el Coronel López de Honduras, para aconsejarle dejara la bebida y prestara más atención a su Gobierno, pues las Fuerzas Armadas estaban muy inquietas y descontentas.

5- La Base "Zenón Viera" fué entregada al fin al Gobierno, por lo que retiramos los hombres que allí nos quedaban. Hemos tenido que dejar personal en el Bluff por motivos que Vds. comprenderán.

6- El detenido Albuerne fué entregado al Gobierno Nica para que lo condujese a El Salvador con algún dinero que se le entregó. El detenido parece que no formará escándalo dado que tenemos un papel escrito por una madre donde se le acusa de violación de un menor de edad en Miami.

7- Insisto en la necesidad de un programa de onda larga para Cuba.

8- A través de una tía política del líder estudiantil preso Pedro Luis Boytell (la tía se llama Esperanza Valdés) me he enterado por cartas de la madre de Pedro Luis, que se encuentra en estado de coma en el Hospital del Presidio de Isla de Pinos. La madre dice que la única forma de salvarlo es sacándolo de Cuba por canje con otros Gobiernos Latino-americanos. Es decir: cambiándolo por otros presos comunistas. Yo le dije a la tía que haría gestiones con Somoza pero que dudaba que él tuviera presos comunistas para canjear. La madre de Pedro Luis cometió el error de hablar por teléfono con la tía y mencionar mi nombre como individuo que quizás pudiera hacer algo por él. (La madre habló desde Cuba)

9- Por carta de Emilia Luzárraga me he enterado que la situación de los presos que han rechazado el indoctrinamiento comunista, es terrible. Entre ellos están los [redacted] presos del M.R.R. y por supuesto Lino Fernández entre ellos.
La esposa y los hijos de Andrés Cao posiblemente salgan para Miami.

10- Noto ciertas irregularidades en el vehículo español con respecto a la correspondencia, estoy tratando de comprobar si algunas cartas "se pierden" y tratando de "chequear" si eldinero que se manda se recibe en esa. Sé que el dinero se recibe, lo que no sé es si en la cuantía en que se manda.

11- A petición de Daniel Oduber hemos publicado un reportaje en "Tridente" donde se rebate la posibilidad de que Daniel sea comunista. Daniel utilizará esto en su campaña.

12- Informes de Panamá me dicen que la situación en ese país empeora por días, ya que el Gobierno tiene una actitud muy débil y muchos amigos que rodean a Marcos Robles han caído en robos al dinero del Estado, desacreditando al Gobierno. El recién surgido Partido Demo-Cristiano, está en plan de agitación, habiendo hecho contactos con la gente de Arias y según me cuentan, con algunos elementos comunistas. Parece ser que el comunismo se está escudando detrás del Partido Demo-Cristiano. Lo que sí es positivo, es que la agitación tiene un franco matiz anti-norteamericanista, y que el Gobierno está a la defensiva, una defensiva muy débil. Que carece de elementos capacitados para iniciar una ofensiva propagandística de defensa. El tema del nuevo contrato del Canal, será uno de los temas más candentes de la campaña de agitación. Los muchachos nuestros becados, tienen instrucciones de observar e informar al respecto.

13-En Venezuela el anti-norteamericanismo se hace cada vez más patente en las esferas gubernamentales. Parece ser que Paz Galarraga es el centro de esta actitud hostil. Parece ser que en conversaciones privadas ha llegado a llamar al dinero de la Alianza para el Progreso: "el dinero maldito". Parece ser que tiene una gran influencia sobre Leoni y posiblemente sea el próximo candidato del Gobierno a la Presidencia de la República. Se habla insistentemente de que si "El Partido Copey" sigue ganando campo, el Gobierno soltará a Perez Jiménez para que aspire y divida la oposición restando votos al Copey.

Cada vez hay más militares en estado de descontento.

14-Suplico se me dé el nuevo teléfono de vuestra Oficina, ya que al llamar al que yo conocía, me sale un "record" que me dice que el teléfono no está en uso, creándome una dificultad si tengo que notificar algo urgente e importante.

Con un abrazo de su amigo:

Ignacio

Ignacio

SECRET

19 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bernard BARKER's Contract

1. Mr. Hudson of Finance Division called this date concerning his search for a copy of Bernard BARKER's signed contract with the Agency. He is unable to locate it. Mr. Hudson has talked with Jan in Contract Personnel Office and asked that I check with her re same.

2. I called Jan on X 9179 and asked that she request any information on Bernard BARKER available at Headquarters or in Archives either under his name or his pseudonym Spencer O. Tertiling. She is to make a request on a priority basis. Any available information should be provided to this office by 22 April 1974.

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/OS

201-[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

19 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Limited Release from Secrecy Agreement--
Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez

copy located and sent to Mr. [illegible] 24 Apr. 1974

1. In preparing the letter of 18 April 1974 (copy attached) from the General Counsel to Daniel E. Schultz in response to Mr. Schultz's letter of 9 April, I obtained from Ms. Chris Hopkins, WH/COG (x-1325), copies of (1) a secrecy agreement (in Spanish) by Eugenio Rolando Martinez dated 3 April 1965, (2) an unexecuted contract (an executed copy cannot be located) between the U.S. Government and Mr. Spencer O. Terteling (Bernard L. Barker) and (3) a termination secrecy oath signed by Bernard L. Barker dated 12 August 1966. Copies of those documents are attached.

2. After discussing the matter with Mr. David Phillips, C/WH Division, I prepared the 18 April letter adding the second sentence of the first paragraph at the request of Mr. Joe Skura, AC/WH/COG (x-1948). After completing the letter, I coordinated it on 15 April 1974 with Mr. Skura and agreed to send him a copy of the final.

3. On 18 April I met with Mr. Schultz. I questioned him as to his intentions regarding the information he was seeking as, in the Agency's view, clearly there is no connection between the Agency's association with Messrs. Barker and Martinez and the subject case. Mr. Schultz explained that he, as the lawyer representing them, feels obligated to know what they did for the Agency in order that he can make the determination as to whether it is relevant to the current trial--currently scheduled for 17 June. He mentioned that to date both Messrs. Barker and Martinez had been completely unwilling to discuss any aspect of their duties with the Agency. They had been reluctant to even acknowledge

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

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their association with the Agency. I explained the Agency's serious reservations concerning the possibility of compromise of agents and operations that are still in being. I explained that the Agency continues to have associations with some of the individuals with whom Messrs. Barker and Martinez had contact during their Agency association. Mr. Schultz seemed to appreciate this problem. Thus, in order to attempt to protect those individuals, I explained that the Agency is currently not in a position to give Messrs. Barker and Martinez blanket authorization to identify individuals with whom they had contact during their Agency association. Mr. Schultz readily acknowledged those conditions.

4. I mentioned to Mr. Schultz that if, as a result of the discussions that are now being authorized, Mr. Schultz believes that certain individuals need to be identified he can make such a narrow request to the Agency at that time. I made no guarantee that we would approve such a request, only that we would consider it in view of (1) the rationale that Mr. Schultz would offer as to his needs, (2) the possibility of publication, (3) the damage to current operations, and (4) the precedent in terms of weakening the confidence of current and potential Agency relationships.

J. Edwin Dietel

J. EDWIN DIETEL
Assistant General Counsel

cc: IG
OLC
D/Security
AC/WH/COG

SECRET

RAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 April 1974

Daniel E. Schultz, Esq.
Schultz & Overby
1990 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Schultz:

Re: Defendants Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez, in the case of United States v. Ehrlichman, et al., Criminal No. 74-116, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

In response to your letter to me of 9 April, this letter will serve to authorize Messrs. Barker and Martinez, pursuant to their security agreements with this Agency, to discuss with you their employment with this Agency. This authorization does not include, however, the identification of individuals with which Messrs. Barker and Martinez had association or contact in conjunction with their duties for this Agency.

You recognize that during those conversations some information may be revealed that is classified. As a result, it is herein agreed that you will not reveal any information concerning the employment by this Agency of either Mr. Barker or Mr. Martinez without the prior written approval of the Central Intelligence Agency. I appreciate your cooperation in this matter and acknowledgment of the terms of this agreement.

Sincerely,

John S. Warner
General Counsel

ACKNOWLEDGED,
Daniel E. Schultz

DATE

cc: The Honorable Leon Jaworski

S E C R E T

18 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Request from OGC for Signed Copy of Bernard BARKER's Contract

1. On 18 April 1974 Mr. Dietel of OGC asked if I had been able to locate a signed copy of Bernard Barker's contract which we were unable to locate a few days ago. The answer was no. I took advantage of Pete Palmer's presence at Hqs. on TDY to ascertain whether a signed copy of BARKER's contract could possibly be at [redacted] Station WH/Miami. Pete said with certainty there was no signed copy at Station WH/Miami since much of the material at the Station had been destroyed. Also, since BARKER was terminated in mid-1966, the Station file should have been transferred to Hqs. back then.

2. I passed the foregoing informaton to Mr. Dietel who simply asked that I double check with WH/Contracts and the Contract Personnel Division for same which I promised to do and advise.

Chris Hopkins
WHD Task Force
Watergate

SECRET

15 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information in re Watergate Passed to Mr. Dietl of OLC

1. On 15 April 1974 I gave to Mr. Dietl of OLC the following documents which he requested:

   a. Copy of AMSNAP-3's Secrecy Agreement dated 3 April 1965, which I translated for him verbally oat the desk.

   b. Copy of Termination Secrecy Oathlby Bernard Barker dated 12 August 1966. Also a General Release signed by Barker 12 August 1966.

CH

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/OS

✓

201-251689
201-289937

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Bernard Barker/Helms' Statement

FROM: DC/WHD	EXTENSION	NO.	DATE 11 March 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO				We went through Barker's 201 again plus all other material provided to the 7th floor on this case and cannot find any statements which could conceivably serve as a source for Mr. Helms' testimony in question. A copy of this is also being sent to Scott Breckinridge. JEF
2.				
3.				
Mr. Scott Breckinridge IG.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

11 March 1974

SUBJECT: Bernard Barker

1. POA granted 16 April 1959. Terminated amicably 31 July 1966. Review of Barker's file does not reveal that he had any association with gambling interests. Mr. Helms might have confused Barker with Frank Sturgis who allegedly had Mafia connections. Please note Mr. Sturgis was never associated in any manner with this Agency.

2. Miss Christine Hopkins has discussed Mr. Helms' testimony, which appeared in the "Washington Post" on 11 March 1974, with Mr. Fred Evans, Office of Security, Mr. Scott Breckenridge, Inspector General's Office, and Mr. Lyle Miller, Office of Legislative Counsel. Mr. Sturbitts received a call from Mr. Miller early on 11 March 1974 and referred Mr. Miller to Miss Hopkins who subsequently talked to him.

SECRET

1407 Scott Breckinridge co.

X5521 X-1407

Bernard Barker - over week end Feb 73

test. released - Helms said Barker left

mid 60's because of a "criminal connections."

details of Barker's termination unclear

WH when he terminated amicably ~~and~~

nice

Barker phoned last nite say he

mildly indignant re "criminal

associations."

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

CASE OFFICER: Norris Z. GERVENOL
PROJECT : AMABDUCT
AGENT : AMSNAP-3
NARRATIVE :

TIME:
DATE: 11 March 1971
PLACE:
FUNDS PASSED: None RECPT RCVD:

1. AMSNAP-3 reported on 11 March 1971 that the charges of sale of narcotics levied on Jorge ALONSO, the son of Guillermo ALONSO Pujol (AMECRU-1), were dropped (no exact date given). Jorge was arrested 21 June along with forty others and charged with being a top figure in the heroin and cocaine distribution racket.

2. AMSNAP-3 stated that he had talked with a friend of his, Ray BARKER, on the morning of 11 March. BARKER told him that he had spoken to Attorney Miguel SUAREZ. SUAREZ is a law partner of Fernando FREIRE. FREIRE told SUAREZ that Jorge ALONSO had been released because all charges stemming from the 21 June arrest were dropped by the authorities. Therefore, there will be no trial.

3. CO Comment: It is a sad day when justice can be bought by the likes of ALONSO. The little man loses again because if he were charged with an offense 1/10th the magnitude of Jorge ALONSO's, he would be behind bars for a long time, ~~and~~ to make it worse, Jorge ALONSO can now go back ruining lives.

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10 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Mr. Paul Wilson

SUBJECT : Bernard L. Barker

1. Reference is made to our discussions regarding the letter written to this Agency by Mrs. Edwin T. Moffett in regard to her son's marriage to Subject's daughter.

2. As discussed with you, Mrs. Moffett was telephonically contacted and was advised that the Agency could not give her any information regarding Subject's possible employment with the Agency. Mrs. Moffett understood this and did not attempt to argue the point. Mrs. Moffett also was advised that her fears regarding the possible kidnaping of her daughter-in-law were not based on any known incident.

3. Mrs. Moffett was also advised that she should contact her daughter-in-law and son in order to get more information regarding the daughter-in-law's background. Mrs. Moffett said that she had only met the daughter-in-law for a brief time and was not able to ask all the necessary questions.

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4. Mrs. Moffett was satisfied with our call and there was no indication that she would pursue this further with any government agency or Congressman.

Steven L. Kuhn
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
for Personnel Security

SECRET

14-00000

31 MAR 1970 See [illegible] 7 Nov 69

In response to your letter of March 10, we wish to advise we are unable to provide you with any information concerning ~~the former~~ employment of Mr. Bernard L. Barker.

With regard to your concern for the safety of your daughter-in-law, we are unaware of any cases of a former resident being kidnapped and returned to Cuba. Furthermore, since it is assumed Mrs. Moffett is a U. S. citizen, such a possibility ~~xxxx~~ appears rather ~~too~~ remote to warrant ~~justify~~ the apprehension expressed by her family.

24 MAR 1970 John Maury [illegible]

14-00000

PERSONNEL DEPT.
C.I.A.
WASHINGTON,D.C.

I CONTACTED THE FBI AND THEY SAID I SHOULD WRITE YOU FOR THIS INFORMATION.

HAS BERNARD L. BARKER OF HAVANA,CUBA, CHICAGO AND MIAMI, FLORIDA (5229 N.W.4th St.) EVER BEEN IN THE EMPLOY OF THE C.I.A IN THE ABOVE PLACES?

OUR SON MARRIED HIS DAUGHTER (MARIAELENA) IN CALIFORNIA AND WE KNOW NOTHING OF BACKGROUND....ONLY WHAT SHE TOLD US.

IF YOU CAN CONFIRM ANY OF THE ABOVE OR GIVE US ANY INFORMATION ON HER FAMILY, I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. MARIAELENA SAID SHE CAME TO THIS COUNTRY AT AGE 13 TEN YEARS AGO.

IS SHE IN ANY DANGER OF BEING KIDNAPPED BACK TO CUBA AS SHE AND HER FAMILY BELIEVE COULD HAPPEN?

SINCE SHE SAID HER FATHER HAD BEEN WITH THE C.I.A. I FELT THIS WAS THE FIRST PLACE TO START TO FIND OUT ABOUT HER.

THANK YOU FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DO FOR ME.

SINCERELY YOURS,

MRS. EDWIN T. MOFFETT
2931 CENTER STREET
BETHLEHEM,PA.18017

MARCH 10,1970

P.S. I AM CONCERNED OVER MARIAELENA'S LARGE COLLECTION OF PRICELESS JEWELS. SHE TOLD US THEY WERE SMUGGLED INTO THE U.S.A. OF (OUT OF CUBA) WHICH ¼ ONLY REACHED HERE BECAUSE THE BALANCE WERE STOLEN..(FROM THEM)

I UNDERSTAND THIS WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL,AM I CORRECT?

NDI


Barker - Herrera - Jimenez - Collazo
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SRY
11/5/67
Rel

FORM G - 325 A (11-1-66)

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

(FAMILY NAME) Barker	(FIRST NAME) Clara	(MIDDLE NAME) Elena	☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO.-DAY-YR.) 8-12-1917	NATIONALITY Cuban	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A12 418081
ALL OTHER NAMES USED none	NDI 15 May 67			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Havana, Cuba		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 262-68-6012

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE)	FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Yes	Barker 83	Bernard	3-17-17	Haven.Cuba	7-6-45	Hav.Cuba

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) 201-251689? (Husband)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE
Herrera	Alberto		march 1935, N.Y.	1936 or 37, Cuba.

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	Jimenez	Amado	Cuba	deceased
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	Collazo	America	2-24-1895, Hav.Cuba	Augusta, Ga.U.S.A.

RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM: MONTH	YEAR	TO: MONTH	YEAR
2572 W. Summerdale	Chicago	Illinois	U.S.A.	15 Oct.	1966	PRESENT TIME	
4400 NW 5 St.	Miami	Florida	U.S.A.	4 July	1962	30 Sept.	1966
420 NW 44 Ave	Miami	Florida	U.S.A.	2 Sept.	1960	3 July	1962

EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
Housewife		Aug.	1965	PRESENT TIME	
G.C. Murphy Co. 3709 NW 7 St., Miami Fla.	Buyer	Aug.	1958	Aug.	1965
G.C. Murphy Co. 3709 NW 7 St., Miami, Fla.	saleslady	Feb.	1953	Aug.	1958
Before that date, housewife.					

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE): CITY Havana COUNTRY Cuba FROM 1948 TO 1960

LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE): CITY COUNTRY FROM 19 TO 19

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY) Residence

10 MAY 1967

12-16-66
DATE

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

FORM G-325 A REV. 1-1-67

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

WH

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

482-P

(FAMILY NAME) BARKER	(FIRST NAME) BERNARD	(MIDDLE NAME) LEON	☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO.-DAY-YR.) 3-17-1917	NATIONALITY ~~Stateless~~ CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) A 10 144 090
ALL OTHER NAMES USED NONE OTHER				CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH HAVANA CUBA		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) 213-07-0844

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	BARKER	BERNARD	1-2-1890, COLUMBIA TENN.	U.S.A (DEC)
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	TERRY	ALICIA	CIENFUEGOS CUBA	(DECEASED)

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
FERNANDEZ	CLARA	8-12-1917	HAVANA CUBA	6/4/1945	HAVANA CUBA

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE) NONE

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

201-251689

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST.

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
9330 N.W 20 ST	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	3-2	67	PRESENT TIME	
2552 W. SUNNYSIDE	CHICAGO	ILL	U.S.A	6-1	66	2-15	67
4400 N.W. 5 ST	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	7-1	63	6-1	66
42 N W 44 AVE	MIAMI	FLA	U.S.A.	7-1	61	7-1	63

BARKER BERNARD L. DOB 17-3-17

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS. (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST.

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	YEAR	TO MONTH	YEAR
SELF EMPLOYED	TRANSLATOR	3-1	67	PRESENT TIME	
THE RAVVANA CORPORATION 2402 W. NORTH AVE CHI. ILL	ASS. WORKS MGR.	7-15	66	2-15	67
SELF EMPLOYED	TRANSLATOR	1-15	60	7-15	66

NDI
21 MAR 67
H

LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE) CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH)	(YEAR)	TO (MONTH)	(YEAR)	LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD (IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE)	CITY	COUNTRY	FROM (MONTH) (YEAR)	TO (MONTH) (YEAR)
HAVANA	CUBA	7	1946	1	1960	[illegible] HAVANERA	HAVANA	CUBA	1-1959	1-1960

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR:
☒ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

10 MAR 1967

3-8-1967
DATE

Bernard L. Barker
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

File 201-[illegible]

14-00000

[CLATTER-1]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-251689
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Willey

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CI/OA

RI COPY

SECRET 152235Z

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TYPIC

REF UFGW 4928

REQUEST AMCLATTER/1 POA BE EXTENDED THROUGH 1 APR 65. POUCHING PRQ PART II.

SECRET

CFN

AB AC FI
PS DEST WH5A/10
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

15 Mar 65 IN 23389

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201-251689
15 MAR 65

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
AMCLATTER/1 Progress Report for February 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None, For Your Information.

I. OPERATIONAL CHRONOLOGY

A. During the period under review AMCLATTER/1 was transferred from the PW Branch to the CI Branch for future handling. Subject's files were turned over to CI on 27 January 1965 and he was informed by his PW case officer of his proposed transfer at a meeting on 2 February. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for 8 February with AMCLATTER/1 and the PW case officer at which time the latter introduced him to the CI case officer. Subject appeared to be pleased with this turn of events expressing the wish that he could be put to more frequent use and be given a heavier work load. He said that he enjoyed his 2½ year association with his previous case officer but looked forward to getting into a new line of activity, preferably some type of PM activity or investigative work which he claims to enjoy as a result of his previous police experience in Cuba. Subject was told by the CI case officer that his duties would remain essentially the same as they had been and that he should continue his coverage of exile activities with emphasis on any rumors of impending exile raids on Cuba.

B. On 18 February Subject was introduced to AMBLINK/1 and was told that AMBLINK/1 would keep in daily touch with him either by telephone or by personal meeting. Subject and AMBLINK/1 know one another from the time when they both were working in Cuba and both

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA

CS Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
4 March 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 9 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-20209

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-126-3-21/3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

seem pleased with the current arrangement whereby they will be in contact with one another. In addition to this daily contact, meetings are held with Subject and AMBLINK/1 about once a week by the CI case officer to discuss Subject's reporting as well as any difficulties he may have encountered or guidance he may need. For all practical purposes, however, AMCLATTER/1 is being handled by AMBLINK/1. Subject knows nothing about AMBLINK/1's other operational duties and contacts, and the latter has been instructed to limit his discussions with AMCLATTER/1 to any mutual business at hand. AMCLATTER/1 knows AMBLINK/1 by true name (which he knew in Cuba) and has his home telephone number. During the absence of AMBLINK/1 from the area the CI case officer will meet directly with Subject.

II. PRODUCTION

Subject provided a number of useful reports during the period under review mainly concerned with proposed MIRR bombing missions over Cuba and details concerning the ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's house. The following disseminations were made as a result of Subject's production:

A. UFG-6635 (WAVE 7900; 3 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Alleged abortive Air Raid over Cuba by the MIRR.

B. WAVE 8261 (Rybat; 13 February 1965): Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's house.

C. UFG-6710 (WAVE 8326; 16 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Planned Air Strike Against Havana by the MIRR.

D. WAVE 8419 (Rybat; 17 February 1965): Additional information on Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's House.

E. UFG-6727 (WAVE 8394; 17 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini: Decision of Orlanda Bosch Avila to Use Cuban Pilot on MIRR's Air Strike of Havana.

F. WAVE 8521 (Rybat; 20 February 1965): Additional information on Ransacking of AMBIDDY/1's House.

G. UFG-6747 (WAVE 8618; 23 February 1965) from Frank Fiorini and Bill Johnson: Insistence of Orlanda Bosch Avila that the MIRR Bomb Havana.

III. FINANCES

Subject was paid his February salary in the amount of $433.77. (This amount is arrived at after withholding his income tax from $500.)

IV. FUTURE PLANS

AMBLINK/1 will continue to contact Subject on a daily basis either by telephone or by personal meetings and will see that Subject's reports are promptly relayed to the CI case officer. Subject has been instructed to continue his coverage of exile activities in the area with emphasis on prompt reporting of any impending exile raids on Cuba. Subject will also continue to report in writing any conversations that he has with Cuban exiles who appear of operational interest and will explore his wide array of contacts for any information that may lead to the identification of Cuban intelligence assets operating in the area. In this connection Subject is currently exploring a lead involving two Cuban mulatto women who allegedly have hit the bolita numbers frequently (six or seven times) and for large sums of money. Subject, who has a theory that Fidel Castro may be using the bolita racket to fund agents in the U.S., is trying to learn the identities of the two mulattos. He

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-20209

has been cautioned not to delve too deeply in this matter however since he may become involved with local underworld elements who may take drastic action against him in the belief that he is working for either the local ODENVY or the police. Subject said that he is well aware of this possibility and is making very discreet inquiries with the assistance of certain friends (Cuban ex-policemen) who are bolita runners and who know that he has no interest in their bolita activities per se except to learn the identities of the two Cuban mulatto women. Subject said that his friends, in addition to possibly helping him, would like to know the identities of the two women since they would then play the same number as the two women and make some money on their own.

for Chester R Murdock
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

FORM 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

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ROUTING

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DATE : 282 28 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMASH

ACTION : WH 9

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RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

NOV 28 1920Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 48700

PRITY DIR CITE MASH 1935

JMNET
NO NIACT
REF TRAV 0158 (IN 48394)

1. STRUGGLE UNDERWAY BETWEEN CIVIL AND MIL ELEMENTS OF AMRASP. MARTIN ELENA HAS REJECTED AMHAWK THESIS THAT ESTADO MAYOR IS SUBJECT AT AMCIGAR, WHEREAS TWICKER FEELS NECESSARY ESTABLISH PRINCIPLE THAT MIL POWER DERIVES FROM CIVIL.

2. AS COMPROMISE WE MIGHT MAKE SELECTION OF ESTADO MAYOR SUBJECT TO AMCIGAR APPROVAL AND PERMIT SUBORDINATE NOMINATIONS, PROMOTIONS, ETC. TO BE FILLED BY ESTADO MAYOR ON INDEPENDENT BASIS.

3. AMHAWK POINTS OUT THAT EVEN MARTIN ELENA REFERS TO GOUDIE AS "MINISTER OF WAR" WHEREAS GOUDIE MAIN FUNCTION IS LIAISON BETWEEN MASH REPS AND MIL ELEMENTS. IN RECENT TALK WITH AMCLATTER-1 SANJENIS ACCUSED GOUDIE OF "SABOTAGING MIL EFFORT" AND OF PUTTING LOYALTY TO AMWAIL ABOVE AMRASP INTERESTS. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT FACT IS THAT AT LEAST ON CIVIL SIDE GOUDIE IS BECOMING HEATEDLY CONTROVERSIAL.

4. FIRM ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ASCENDENCY IN AMRASP (PER USA PATTERN) WOULD GO FAR TOWARD RESTORING CORRECT FOCUS. REQUEST HQS CONCUR.

END OF MESSAGE

COPY

SECRET

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

BILL :

Things turned out very well. For I was invited to a small dinner party last night. Ernesto was there, and he freely brought out the subject personally with me, as though he wanted me to know. He expects the NYT man--HARPER--to return from Miami this week (I do not know if he meant back to Washington or to New York), and something to appear in the paper some time after that. As I told you, the NYT is convinced there are three related events:

a) The Watergate affaire.
b) The break-in at the Chilean Embassy.
c) An attempt to "beat up" ELLSBERG on the Capitol grounds.

These three events, in turn, were carried out by a single group of Cubans either recruited by or in the pay of the Agency. In fact, they think that Tram GONZALEZ and another one of the people that I mentioned to you were actually in the Watergate, but managed to escape. In addition, as they say, this group has links not only with the Agency, but also with the GOC...perhaps separately, but with similar objectives. A very serious charge. That is precisely the connection that the NYT wants to establish. The NYT man claims--according to Ernesto--to have a photo of Manuel GIBERGA, a Cuban who is a White House assistant for Spanish-speaking affairs--and Bernard BARKER, who they think is the key man ("A CIA agent recruiter"), together.

HARPER also visited Felipe PAZOS, a well-known Cuban economist who, at present, is with the Inter-American Development Bank. Harper might have also seen some Chilean dips, but this is only an inference on my part.

The other birds on the list that I gave you were specifically tied to the Ellsberg case. They were brought up from Miami--armed--to physically disrupt Ellsberg's appearance before a Congressional Committee. The Cubans were unable to get to him, but did fight with some of his supporters, who were arrested. The Cubans were not. Official protection is what they are looking for in this particular case.

John V. HANNON (T)

Harold V. KARABLY (P)

1971 - Retired as Staff employee

1971 - June - Picked up as contract employee by FR Division

1972 - June 30 - that contract terminated.

1972 - June 30 - retired under CIARDS.

1972 - June - new contract with FR Division as a retired annuitant. Came aboard as independent contractor.

1973 - 30 June - that contract was terminated.

FR Division has the following address for HANNON, but does not know the date of the info:

150 Ridgewood Drive
San Rafael, Calif 94901
Tele: 454-1322

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12 TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROUTING

1	CCS	5	OS
2		6	170
3		7	RI
4		8	FI-TC

FROM Dissem By 26

ACTION WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OPS

19 MAY 66 Ⓘ 20644

20644

SECRET 191802Z CITE JMWAVE 0947

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLATTER

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7348 (IN 18355)

NO TRACES JMWAVE NOR LOCAL ODENVY NAMES GIVEN REF.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

ACTION - D.D.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Cuba

Photographs of Grain Silos at
Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla,
Havana

9 March 1966

1

1962 - December 1965

United States, Miami
(4 March 1966)

UFG-8016

Angel M. Maceda Sanchez (A 14 088 180) a Cuba refugee who was a welder and mechanic employed by the Cuban Ministry of Construction and participated in the construction of silos at Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla, Havana. Maceda departed by air from Cuba on 16 December 1965 and arrived in the United States that same day.

1. In 1962 the Government of Cuba drew up plans for the construction of a grain silo complex at Ensenada de Guanabacoa, Regla, Havana on property adjoining an edible oils manufacturing plant which had a daily capacity for processing 300 tons of soy beans. Actual construction of the silo complex started on 3 November 1964 following the September arrival of a number of Polish technical personnel who were to supervise the construction.

2. The silo complex consists of 36 silos, each 37 feet high and six feet (as received) in diameter. The complex is arranged into two groups of 18 silos each with a building to be built between the two groups. The top of the silos will be interconnected by a railway. In addition a system of tubing and pipes will interconnect the silos at the bottom.

3. On deposit in the   Graphics Register are four photographs of the silo complex under construction which were probably taken about December 1965. Copies of these photographs may be obtained by requesting the following control numbers:

Field Comment: Maceda, who is not a highly qualified technician, was of the opinion that an inordinate amount of cement was being utilized in the construction of these silos. He also states that on one occasion a delivery of cement was returned to the cement plant as it did not meet certain technical specifications.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

JMWAVE UFG-7831

John H. SCHOENDIENST/Leonard W. [illegible]
Henry J. SLOMAN/Gabriel J. RADESKIN 9 Feb 66

John C. TARBELL/bcp

Philip G. ELMARD

AMWRIST-1/AMOT-237
UOAMBER-3/AMCLATTER-1

Miami reps of:
State
FBI
I&NS
Customs
Border Patrol
USCG

4 - Hqs.
1 - DCS
2 - Mexico City
2 - Madrid

TYPIC

SOURCES: Paras. 1 to 7: UOAMBER-3, 16 December 1965 and 7 January 1966. Para. 8: AMCLATTER-1, 13 December 1965. He received the information from AMOT-245 who received it from Israel SOTO Barroso. Para. 9: AMOT-237 (DD-1733) 17 January 1966, from Alfredo GALLO Cantus. Field Comment 4: First sentence from AMOT report DD-1767, 4 February 1966, from GALLO who received the information from Ruben BATISTA. Balance from AMWRIST-1, 16 December 1965. Field Comment 11 is based on UFG-7907. Please add dissem number. Subject of 201-064127 is mentioned in para. 7 because the omission of his name might jeopardize his security. FYI, according to the source of para. 8, he also attended the meeting reported therein.

RID: Index: NAME: BATISTA Godinez, Ruben
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : Cuban
Occ or Status: Son of Fulgencio BATISTA. Titular head of BAR (Buro de Aclaraciones y Respuestas) BATISTA'S personal organization in Miami.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

(continued)

SECRET

Cover Sheet Page Two UFG-7951

NAME: FERNANDEZ Miranda, Roberto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban

Occ or Status: Activities in Miami for Fulgencio BATISTA, his brother-in-law.

NAME: SAIF Yapor, Nicolas Jacobo
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit: ?
Occ or Status: Fulgencio BATISTA's brother-in-law. In Miami. Activities on behalf of BATISTA.

NAME: TORRA, Antonio D.
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Member of BAR, Fulgencio Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll

NAME: GUERRA Suarez, Florencio
SEX : M
DOB : 30 Oct 1899
POB : Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban ambassador. Emigre in Miami. Member of BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll.

NAME: COBAS Reyes, Mario
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban Min of Transportation, Emigre in Miami. Member of BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. Also journalist, radio commentator. On Batista payroll.

SECRET

Cover Sheet Page Three UFG-7951

NAME: GONZALEZ Puente, Jose
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former Cuban senator. Emigre in Miami. Mbr BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. Journalist & Radio commentator. On Batista payroll.

NAME: PIZZI de Porras, Enrique
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Mbr BAR, Batista's personal organization in Miami. On Batista payroll.

NAME: PIEDRA Negueruela, Orlando
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in New Orleans, La. Former head Cuban Natl Police. Trusted mbr Batista's entourage in US. To Spain to confer with Batista Jan 66.

NAME: ATORRESAGASTI Garcia, Manuel
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Former military aide of Batista. In charge Batista's office Miami.

NAME: MONTANER, Ernesto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Journalist. Miami. Receives $400 monthly from Fulgencio BATISTA.

SECRET

NAME: KRAMER, Oscar aka "Bebo"
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Receives $400 monthly fm Fulgencio BATISTA for his newscast on radio WMIE, Miami.

NAME: FLORES, Martha
SEX : F
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Receives $300 per mo fm Fulgencio BATISTA for her radio program station WMIE, Miami

NAME: GUAS Inclan, Rafael
SEX : M
DOB: ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Former vice-Pres of Cuba. Receives $300 fm Fulgencio BATISTA. Journalist & Radio commentator.

NAME: SIRGO, Otto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit: Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Actor, also journalist, radio commentator. Receives $200 monthly fm Fulgencio BATISTA.

NAME: GUELL Morales, Gonzalo
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Former Cuban Prime Minister. Receives $600 per mo fm Fulgencio BATISTA

SECRET

Cover Sheet Page Five UFG-7951

NAME: RIERA Hernandez, Mario
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: Author of book "Historial Obrero Cubano". Fulgencio BATISTA financed publication, $2,000.

NAME: RODRIGUEZ Rotger, Alberto
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. With "Patria", Fulgencio BATISTA's newspaper.

NAME: BLANCO Cortina, Miguel Angel Antonio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : ?
Occ or Status: On editorial staff of Oscar "Bebo" KRAMER, newscaster, Miami radio WMIE, who paid by Fulgencio BATISTA.

NAME: FREYRE Varona, Ernesto
SEX : M
DOB : 23 July 10
POB : Camaguey, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Ldr RECE. Past with Fulgencio BATISTA reps.

NAME: RIVERO Hernandez, Jose Ignacio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or status: Emigre. Plans publish newspaper "Foto Impresiones de la Marina". Financed by Fulgencio BATISTA.

Also: cross reference to 201-106808, 201-064187.

Cuba

Activities in Miami on Behalf of
Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar

9 February 1966

5

Mid-November 1965 to mid-
February 1966
United States, Miami
(16 December 1965 to 4 February 1966)

UFG-7951

See below

Summary. Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar has an organization in Miami which is composed of a small group of his trusted followers. The main function of this group is in the field of propaganda. Between $5,000 and $7,000 per month of Batista's money is channeled through this group, most of which is spent in support of these activities. On Batista's instructions, the newspaper Patria will adopt a more moderate line, including a friendly attitude toward the United States Government and its foreign policy. Attacks on agencies of the Government and support for RECE, with which the Batista group is making an agreement, will be published in a different newspaper. A Batista confidant left the United States for Spain in January on Batista's invitation.

Source for paras. 1 to 7: Former high-level Latin American Government official who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. He is a rightist, a trained reporter and his information has been fairly reliable in the past. Because of his past and present political affiliations, it can be assumed that he is biased in favor of Batista.

1. Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar, former President of Cuba, has a personal organization in Miami known as the Buro de Aclaraciones y Respuestas (BAR, Bureau of Explanations and Answers) which is composed of a small group of men who enjoy his trust and confidence. The titular head of BAR is Ruben Batista Godinez, Batista's son, and includes the following people:

Roberto Fernandez Miranda, Fulgencio Batista's brother-in law who lives at 2424 Alton Road, Miami Beach, Florida.

Nicolas Jacobo Saif Yapor, another brother-in-law[2]

Antonio D. Torra

Florencio Guerra Suarez, former Cuban ambassador

Mario Cobas Reyes,[3] former Cuban Minister of Transportation

Jose Gonzalez Puente,[3] former Cuban senator

Enrique Pizzi de Porras[3]

Other trusted members of Batista's entourage include Orlando Piedra Negueruela,[4] former head of the Cuban National Police, who lives at 1505 Westbrook, Apartment D, New Orleans, Louisiana; and Atorresagasti (fnu), Batista's former military aide and confidant, who is now in charge of Batista's office in Mexico.[5]

2. Members of BAR meet on an irregular basis in an office in Cobas' garage at 2770 S.W. 22nd Avenue, Miami, because Cobas, who is in poor health, does not leave his home. The group monitors news media for items of interest to Batista, particularly those items in which he is mentioned. Members of the group recommend items to be published, and Guerra is responsible for the preparation of a weekly report to be released to the press and radio.

3. The finances of BAR are handled by Fernandez, with the assistance of Saif. Batista provides between $5,000 and $7,000 (U.S.) per month, which is used for salaries, propaganda and other expenses and contributions. Following is a list of some of the regular monthly payments:

Patria newspaper, $2,000

Ernesto Montaner, journalist, $400

Oscar "Bebo" Kramer, for his newscast, $400[6]

Martha Flores Montero, for her radio program, $300[6]

Rafael Guas Inclan,[3] former vice-President of Cuba, $200

Otto Sirgo, actor,[3] $300

Gonzalo Guell Morales, former Prime Minister of Cuba, $300

Also, Torra, Guerra, Cobas, Gonzalez, Pizzi and others each receive between $200 and $300 each month.

4. Requests for financial assistance are received from other Cuban emigres such as former military and naval personnel and policemen. Often these requests are honored, on a one-time basis, and in a manner that will assure that they do not become permanent financial obligations on the part of Batista. Some publications are financed with Batista's money, such as the book *Historial Obrero Cubano* by Mario Riera Hernandez, a journalist, which was published in the latter part of 1965 at a cost of $2,000.

5. Batista does not contribute a fixed amount of money to any emigre organization. However, he does offer financial assistance to individual members of organizations, particularly those of the Alianza Para la Libertad de Cuba (ALC, Alliance

for the Liberty of Cuba) which is headed by Generoso Campos Marquetti. The majority of the members of the ALC are Batista adherents.

6. At a meeting on 8 December Ruben Batista and Fernandez relayed Batista's instructions to a group of his followers who are employed in the news media. The instructions included the following:

   a. The newspaper Patria must take a more moderate line. Attacks on agencies of the United States Government and on emigres who were formerly followers of Fidel Castro Ruz will no longer be published. The newspaper must adopt an attitude friendly toward the United States Government and its foreign policy.

   b. Batista is pleased with the news program broadcast by Kramer and would like to increase the program from one half to a full hour. The expansion of this program is not for the purpose of enhancing Batista's stature, because he no longer aspires to return to Cuba in a position of power. He realizes that such aspirations would be unrealistic. Batista feels that the time that will be favorable for the liberation of Cuba is approaching, and he wants Cuban emigres to re-double their efforts in working toward the liberation.[8]

7. Among others who attended the 8 December meeting were Arnando Garcia Sifredo, editor and publisher of Patria, Alberto Rodriguez Rotger, also of Patria, Kramer, Miguel Angel Antonio Blanco Cortina, a member of Kramer's editorial staff, Saif, and Santiago Rey Perna, a news commentator on radio station WMIE.

   Source for para. 5: A Miami businessman who was a resident of Havana for several years. The source has contacts who recognize him as a channel to U. S. Intelligence. The ultimate source of this information is a Cuban emigre in Miami whose reliability cannot be judged.

8. In about mid-November 1965 a group of Batista's followers met at Fernandez' house to discuss policy changes which were considered necessary to prevent persecution of Ruben Batista and Fernandez by Cuban emigres in Miami, and by authorities of the United States Internal Revenue Service. The following decisions were reached:

   a. They would proceed to arrange an agreement with the Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile).[9] In this agreement, Batista would support RECE in Batista-sponsored press and radio, and furnish RECE with war materiel, such as boats and arms. In exchange RECE would pledge to support Batista's political organization in Cuba after Cuba has been liberated. To show good faith in this agreement Ernesto Freyre Varona, leader of RECE, would be asked to appear on a radio interview in which he would indicate "tacit tolerance" of Batista.[10] The agreement between the two groups will not be acknowledged.

   b. Mundo Americano will be given financial support.[11] This newspaper will be used instead of Patria for publishing attacks on agencies of the United States Government, and for articles supporting RECE.

Source for para. 9: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

9. On 13 January Jose Ignacio Rivero Hernandez, former editor of the newspaper El Diario de la Marina in Cuba, said he is planning to publish a newspaper which will be called Foto Impresiones de la Marina. Montaner will assist Rivero in this endeavor. The newspaper will be financed by Batista. Rivero opined that when this newspaper is established, Patria will no longer be published.

1. Source Comment. Followers of Batista ("Batistianos") fall into two categories: (1) those who are directly associated with Batista, are employed by him, and receive instructions from him or his intermediaries; and (2) those who were formerly connected with his administration and, even though they are no longer directly associated, they remain loyal to him.

2. Field Comment. Source has also reported that Fernandez' wife, Adela, is Saif's sister.

3. Source Comment. Cobas, Gonzalez, Guas and Sirgo are also journalists and radio commentators. Pizzi was at one time employed by the newspaper Mundo Americano, a job which he received on Batista's recommendation.

4. Field Comment. An independent source reported that Piedra left the United States for Spain during the week of 16 to 22 January. He went at Batista's invitation. In mid-December another usually reliable source reported that it was rumored in the emigre community in Miami that Piedra and Laurent (fnu) were to meet with Batista in the near future, after they had concluded an agreement with Aureliano Sanchez Arango whereby Sanchez and his group would cooperate with Batista in an effort to overthrow Castro. Laurent is probably identical with Julio S. Laurent Rodriguez, former Cuban Chief of Naval Intelligence. Sanchez is a leader of the Frente Nacional Democratico Triple A (FNDTA, National Democratic Front/Triple A/).

Source Comments:

5. Since the death of Leopoldo Pio Elizalde, Atorresagasti has been in charge of the publication Defensa Institucional Cubana. Formerly Atorresagasti assisted Fernandez in handling finances, the function now performed by Saif.

Field Comment. Atorresagasti is probably Manuel Atorresagasti Garcia. Pio directed the publication of Defensa Institucional Cubana from Mexico City.

6. The two radio programs which are sponsored and controlled by Batista are those of Flores from 1:30 to 1:45 p.m., and Kramer from 1:45 to 2:15 p.m., both on Miami radio station WMIE.

7. The attitude of the RECE has become more favorable to "Batistianos." Although it has not been acknowledged, it is possible that Batista has helped that organization.

8. Batista feels that it is useless to attempt to finance a war against Castro with personal funds. Such ventures are costly and the results are negative. Therefore, he refuses to consider plans for military action.

Field Comments:

9. TDCSDB-315/03734-65 from an independent source, reported that Batista had instructed his representatives in the United States to attempt to gain control of RECE.

10. According to the source of paras. 1 to 7, Freyre has appeared on Kramer's radio program twice.

11. The last issue of Mundo Americano was published in New York on 29 November 1965. An independent source reported that a new weekly newspaper called Nuevo Mundo Americano will be published in New York. Rolando Masferrer Rojas will be the director of the newspaper. It was believed that Batista would provide $20,000 with which to establish the publication. (Cf.).

Source Comment. Masferrer writes under the name Policarpo Pineda.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, WH	XXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
INFO.		
FROM	Acting Chief of Station, JMWAVE	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC AMCLATTER/1 Progress Report: October-December 1965	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	FYI	

1. During the reporting period AMCLATTER/1 has continued to serve as contact point for matters pertaining to Cuban exile activities and related affairs of possible CI interest. He has maintained his large number of contacts within the Cuban exile community, contacts representing such varied sectors as exile political leaders, officials of exile organizations, former members of the police force, as well as suspected underworld characters. AMCLATTER/1's close relationship to Identity A has resulted in a number of reports which were of interest to other Station components and some of which were disseminated. AMCLATTER/1 is at his best when asked to furnish information about individuals in the WAVE area who may be of operational interest to the Station; he pursues such assignments with the zeal of a trained bloodhound, combing his many and various contacts for information and rarely coming up with a negative report. AMCLATTER/1 works diligently and likes to be kept busy. It is preferable to give AMCLATTER/1 highly specific and detailed instructions, which he will then follow to the letter. When left to his own devices he will at times not use the best operational judgment, which is usually the result of over-zealousness and expediency rather than lack of operational know-how or experience.

2. In November 1965, with the increase in the refugee flow, the CI Branch began using the services of AMCLATTER/1 in interviewing refugees of interest to this Branch and preparing debriefing reports. In this respect he is performing the same kind of work as members of the AMSERVE Team. However, because of his continuing reporting on Cuban exile matter, his many contacts within this community, and the fact that he is known to be in touch with KUDARK among a large number of this

1 att.

Attachment:
IDEN, u/s/c (att 'A')

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/att, u/s/c

CS COPY

201-251687

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-24268	11 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-21/3

community, it was decided not to incorporate AMCLATTER/1 into the AMSERVE Unit but rather continue running him as a singleton agent. It was also felt that he responds more favorably under the direction and guidance of one case officer rather than as a team member. AMCLATTER/1 has performed very well in his new duties as refugee debriefer, and his debriefing reports are models of thoroughness, if not of organization.

3. During the reporting period October-December, AMCLATTER/1 conducted a total of 16 refugee debriefings and prepared reports on these. Some of the debriefings required as many as four separate sessions. In addition, AMCLATTER/1 submitted ten operational reports dealing with information concerning the Cuban exile community, the majority of these stemming from contacts with Identity A. Two of these were disseminated.

4. During the period October-December 1965 the following funds were expended for AMCLATTER/1: Salary - $1,344.87; reimbursement for POV mileage and operational expenses - $209.44; total - $1,554.31.

John H. Schoendienst
for FREDERICK J. INGHURST

SECRET

JAN 14 1 22 PM '66 Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-24268

TYPIC

IDENTITY A: Dr. Julio GARCERAN Del Vall Souza
Leader of the PGCC (Pro-Constitutional Government of Cuba)

Distribution:
3 - WH/C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

CS COPY

[illegible] UFGA 24269

201-251678

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/AN

EXTENSION:

NO. UFGA-24306

DATE 14 JAN 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/C/ESEC		25 JAN 66	AH	
2. WH/C/MO				
3. WH/C/RR/RK				
4.				
5. WH/C/FI		2 Feb		
6. WH/C/CA				
7. WH/C/CECS	3 FEB 1966	3 Feb		
8. Barry C				Amlatter file
9. Al [illegible]				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
WH/C, COS Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/JMPALM/AMCLATTER-1 Production
Activities of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281386)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

RID: Please see last paragraph.

1. On 7 January 1966 AMCLATTER-1 reported the following information concerning recent activities of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu, wealthy Guatemalan emigre in Miami. AMCLATTER-1 got the information from his 19-year-old daughter, who in turn got it in conversation with Cristina ALEJOS, 19-year-old daughter of Roberto ALEJOS, during a visit to the ALEJOS residence on 5 January. The two young women are close friends.

a. Roberto ALEJOS has leased his house at 180 Palm Island Drive, Miami Beach, to an unknown person effective 15 January, for a period of one year. The ALEJOS family will move to another house owned by ALEJOS and located at 2395 North Meridian Avenue, Miami Beach, Telephone No. 538-3148. This house has been used as a guest house for relatives and friends from Guatemala visiting Miami. The house is currently occupied by Rafael CASTILLO Menocal /see copy of his card, attached/, who is related to the Cuban MENOCALS.

b. CASTILLO arrived in Miami from Guatemala on 17 December 1965 for a two-week visit, extended since. A close friend or relative of ALEJOS, CASTILLO is

Att: ASA H/W

Distribution:
- 3 - WH, w/atts.
- 2 - WH/C, w/atts.
- 2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/atts.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
19-126-3-4	UFGA-24306	JAN 18 1966 14 January 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	(201-281386)

ORIGINATING

wealthy, in his early 50's, well educated, and speaks Spanish, French, Italian, and English. He is deaf in his left ear. His daughters, who attended schools in Brussels, are also well educated and speak several languages. CASTILLO plans to return to Guatemala on 12 January 1966.

c. Cristina ALEJOS plans to leave for Guatemala on 15 January. For the past month her father has been training her on his properties in Guatemala about which she is to give him a report after her arrival there. Her father is particularly worried about "his large farm which is losing money." ALEJOS has indicated to Cristina that eventually she will take over control of all his property in Guatemala. She will stay with the CASTILLO Menocal family for three weeks, after which she will stay with her father's brother Arturo in Guatemala City.

d. Roberto ALEJOS does not plan to go to Europe this year because of the uncertain status of his financial affairs. He often speaks of his concern about the tense political situation in Guatemala and the danger of a Communist takeover. He is also concerned about his daughter's American boy friend, Arthur GORDICK (phonetic), who has had some problems in Guatemala involving the police. ALEJOS has forbidden Cristina to see GORDICK, but she is not complying with his order.

2. Station index files have no traces on Cristina ALEJOS, Arturo ALEJOS, or Arthur GORDICK; nor are there any traces identifiable with Rafael CASTILLO Menocal.

3. RID, please index:

a. NAME: *ALEJOS, Cristina
SEX : F
DOB : Ca. 1946
POB : ?
CIT : Guatemalan
OCC : (See below)

19-year-old daughter of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281383). Re conversation in Miami 6 Jan 66 with AMCLATTER-1's daughter, her close friend. Subj plans to leave for Guat 15 Jan. Eventually to take charge her father's properties in Guat.

b. NAME: *CASTILLO Menocal, Rafael
SEX : M
DOB : Ca. 1914
POB : ?
CIT : ? Probably Guatemalan
OCC : Rep of Wayne Motorbus Assembly Plant, Guatemala City

(continued)

Arrd Miami from Guat 17 Dec 65; plans to leave for Guat 12 Jan 66. Close friend or relative of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu (201-281386). Staying in ALEJOS' guest house. Wealthy, well educated, speaks Spanish, French, Italian, English. Deaf in left ear.

c. NAME: *GORDICK (phon.), Arthur
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : United States
OCC : ?

Friend of Cristina ALEJOS (daughter of Roberto ALEJOS Arzu - 201-281386), who is seeing Subj against her father's orders. Subj has problems in Guat involving police.

Philip G. ELMARD



Planta Ensambladora de Carrocerias WAYNE
TODO METAL – PARA AUTOBUSES

Rafael Castillo Menocal

INGUACA
7a. Av. 19-72, Zona 1.

GUATEMALA, CITY
CENTRAL AMERICA

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: Judi Pursen

BRANCH: WH/C

ROOM: GC14

EXTENSION: 1263

DATE:

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		20 Oct	JB
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DU-6			
RID/MIS	GT-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

RECEIVED RID/IN 20 10 30 AM '65

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: LAMAR Laine,

GIVEN NAMES: Margarita

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX:

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 MAY 07

PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana

CITIZENSHIP:

RESIDENCE: Mexico

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: Confined to a wheelchair

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction). Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

Note 1. Records of COI, BGU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARC, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHR 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201.

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject:

RESTRICTION (If any)

PSEUDONYM

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in RR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 8-64 362 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-8-66)

14-00000

LAMAR ¤A¤ 201-157175*

BORN - - CHIN H K

RES. CHIN OCCUPATION

HO TUNG ROBERT 01[illegible]9/2839 201-157175*

2 APR-57

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

029258

LAMAR, fnu

201-43786
(XX-5379)
(17 Feb 45)

029259

XX-5379

LAMAR, FNU

01R-004-0115
EGBA-[illegible]
03 JAN [illegible]
S., P. 2

BULGARIAN
MEMBER, PRESIDIUM OF THE GOVERNING BOARD
OF THE WRITERS UNION.

[illegible] IN
[illegible]
IN

029260

14-00000

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM:	ROOM	EXTENSION	DATE	RID CONTROL NO.

TO	ROOM		DATE	INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	GE 6				
REQUESTER				②	
RID/FILES	GE 6				
REQUESTER				③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GE 5				
RID/201	GE 6				
RID/MIS	GE 6				
RID/INDEX	GE 6				

RECEIVED
RID/IN
20 10 00 AM '65

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME Lamar Laine	GIVEN NAMES Maria Luis A.
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED	
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
	21 July 1900	Havana		

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS
☑	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label, type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

DESIGNATION (If any)	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED
	TYPE | NO.
STAFF INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE IN RE REF.
	DATA | DESK

Note 1. Records of OSI, SRU, CRR and OCD are in RID/AMD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in those records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7971.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 8-63 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-0-00)

008

Lamar Maria

Rio de Janeiro-CIA-Int-1
Folder [illegible]

3

029281

SECRET

WH/C 65-499

9 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

ATTENTION : Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Admission to the U.S. for Two Aunts of Bernard L. Barker's Wife

1. Bernard L. Barker, a Cuban-American refugee in Miami (and former Captain in the USAF) has been actively cooperating with this agency since 1959 in Havana and Miami. He has shown his loyalty to the U.S. Government and his work for this agency has been very satisfactory.

2. It has now been learned that two aunts of subject's wife arrived in Mexico from Cuba on 22 September 1965. On 28 September 1965 they applied for visas to the U.S. Applicants are: Margarita LAMAR Laine; DPOB 20 May 1907, Havana, Cuba; PP 51527 (confined to a wheelchair since 1933) and her sister Maria Luisa LAMAR Laine; DPOB 21 July 1909, Havana, Cuba; PP 44495.

3. Headquarters and Miami Station traces on applicants are negative as are Miami FBI traces.

4. It is requested that Alien Affairs Staff arrange with Immigration and Naturalization Service for the expediting of these applicants into the U.S.

(Signed) Thomas J. Flores
Thomas Flores
WH/C/COPS

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/RSMC
1 - WH/EMC
1 - WH/C/MO
1 - Subject File

SECRET

Originated by B. Hidalgo, WH/C/MO/FI-CI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
CHIEF, WHD

SUBJECT
AMCLATTER-1'S IN-LAWS DESIRE TO ENTER PBPRIME FROM MEXICO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - FYI

REFERENCE - WAVE 6697 /IN 76287/

1. AS WAVE IS AWARE CERTAIN STEPS MUST BE TAKEN BY ALL FOREIGN NATIONALS DESIRING TO ENTER PBPRIME BEFORE KUBARK CAN INTERCEDE WITH ODACID TO EXPEDITE THE ISSUANCE OF A VISA.

2. IN THIS CASE, REFERENCE APPLICANTS MUST PERSONALLY APPLY PBSWING MEXI FOR ADMISSION TO PBPRIME. SPECIFICALLY THEY SHOULD HAVE NOTARIZED STATEMENTS FROM RELATIVES IN PBPRIME CERTIFYING THAT APPLICANTS WILL NOT BECOME PUBLIC CHARGES.

3. AS ADMISSIBILITY TO PBPRIME DEPENDS /ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF INVALIDS/ ON THE PRESENT PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE APPLICANTS, A HEALTH CERTIFICATE IS REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF APPLICATION.

4. ONCE HQS HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN, EXACT DATE PROVIDED WHEN VISA APPLICATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PBSWING AND NO DEROG FOUND KUBARK HQS FILES, KUBARK CAN THEN ASK ODACID TO EXPEDITE ISSUANCE OF VISAS.

5. FYI - HQS TRACES ON REFERENCE APPLICANTS NEGATIVE.

ERNEST A. LUSBY

ISTRIBUTION BY TAPE -
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-251679

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
UFGW-5632	22 OCTOBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-251689

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
WH/C/MO/FI-CI	Barney Hidalgo, man	7147

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
/WH/C/MO, FI-CI		Ernest Chiocca E C Chiocca
/WH/C/MO		Robert Ortman R Ortman, Jr.
H/C/FI/TC H/1		Figueroa Frankhouser F.H.C.R.
		W. WIEKERSHET FRP

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	72	

Distribution:
1 - WH/C/RRRC
1 - WH/C/MO
1 - OS/AAB

ANAC WH ABSTRACT X

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

PLS INEX

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-251669
[redacted]
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
DC/WH/C 5

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, WH 8

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

20 Oct 65 [illegible]

DESENSITIZED

SECRET 200153Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6697

~~W~~POK TYPIC AMCLATTER

w. SF

1. AUNT ~~OF TWO~~ AMCLATTER 1, MARGARITA (LAMAR) LAINE, DPOB 20 MAY 07, HAVA, PP 51527, ARRIVED MEXI FROM CUBA 22 SEPT 65 ACCOMPANIED BY SISTER, MARIA LUIS A (LAMAR) LAINE, DPOB 21 JUL 1900, HAVA, PP 44495. MARGARITA CONFINED TO WHEELCHAIR SINCE 33.

20 OCT 65 IN 76281

2. AMCLATTER 1 HAS ASKED FOR KUBARK AID IN EXPEDITING ADMITTANCE SUBJECTS PARA 1 TO PBPRIME WHERE THEY HAVE RELATIVES WHO HAVE CERTIFIED WILLINGNESS SUPPORT THEM. RECENT CONSULTATION BY WAVE OFFICER MEXI INDICATED ACTION TO EXPEDITE VISA CLEARANCE MUST BE UNDERTAKEN BY HQS WITH ODACID WASH.

3. VIEW AMCLATTER 1 LONG LOYAL SERVICE CONSIDER KUBARK INTERVENTION WARRANTED IF THIS DOES NOT INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORT BY HQS. PLS ADVISE HQS VIEWS.

4. NO WAVE OR LOCAL ODENVY TRACES SUBJECTS PARA 1.

SECRET

CFN 6697 AMCLATTER 1, MARGARITA (LAMAR) LAINE DPOB 20 MAY 07 ,VA PP 51527 CUBA 22 SEP 65 MARIA LUISA (LAMAR) LAINE DPOB 21 JUL 1900 HAVA PP 44495 33 1 1 NOT INVOLVE NO WAVE 1

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

MG 1-65

ROUTING			
1		5	
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3	HO	7	
4		8	

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW ☒ RID COPY(COPIES ISSUED TO: IW, SDO & CSDO 2330 JM)

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6
DCI, D/DCI, DDP, CS/DO, SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH 10, WH/C 12, CS/RF

S E C R E T 130107Z 13 OCT 0304Z 65 IN 71454

PRIORITY DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR MANA SJOS GUAT MEXI SALV
TEGU CITE WAVE 6516

EC/B#/B

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: AMCLATTER-1 FROM GARCERAN ON 8 OCT 65. PARA 7 BASED HMM-9901, 29 SEPT. POSSIBLE TRACE ONE OF BARRIOS PENA BROTHERS MAY BE MARIO WHO, ACCORDING GUAT 996, 4 AUG 60, WORKING FOR HONDURAN GOVERNMENT. RID: INDEX ALEJOS, GARCERAN, ROJAS, MALDONADO, ARENAS, KRAMER, MENDEZ. FILED 130107Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

GUATEMALA/CUBA/NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA

SUBJ: INTEREST OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU IN RECRUITING CUBAN EMIGRES THROUGH JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA FOR TRAINING IN NICARAGUA IN PREPARATION FOR AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE

IW COMMENT:

	WH/REG	8	
	WH/2/N	1	
	WH/2/CR	1	
	WH/C	12	

TDCS DB-315/03317-65

☐ ROUTINE ☒ XX PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7601
NP(AMCLATTER-1)

LIAISON: N

RELEASING IWO: E. J. MULLANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 13 OCTOBER 0506Z65

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIFD MESSAGE

SECRET

MFG 1-65

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 71454

GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT DOI: 8 OCTOBER 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 OCTOBER 1965) UFG-7601

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CONFIDANT OF JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY GUATEMALA / CUBA / NICARAGUA / COSTA RICA

TDCSDB-315/03317-65

DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1965

DISTR. 13 OCTOBER 1965

SUBJECT

INTEREST OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU IN RECRUITING CUBAN EMIGRES FOR TRAINING IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 OCTOBER 1965)

REF IN 71454

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-7601

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. HE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CONFIDANT OF JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE RESIDING IN MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, PLANNED TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA IN THE SPRING OF 1965, USING A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES WHOM HE HAD RECRUITED FOR THE OPERATION. ON 4 MAY ALEJOS AND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, MILITARY LEADER OF THE GROUP, WERE APPREHENDED AND THEIR ARMS CACHES SEIZED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS).

2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1965 DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA, LEADER OF THE PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUTIONAL DE CUBA (PGCC, PRO-CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CUBA), SAID THAT ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU HAD INDICATED TO HIM THAT DAY THAT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
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CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR ORR
TREASURY FBI I&NS CUSTOMS BORDER PATROL COAST GUARD FAA D/OCI 2 CIA/NMCC EXO

RECEIVING AID FROM GARCERAN IN THE FORM OF ABOUT 40 CUBAN EMIGRES WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO NICARAGUA FOR TRAINING IN PREPARATION FOR AN EVENTUAL COUP AGAINST THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT. ALEJOS PROMISED GARCERAN THAT IF THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, ALEJOS WOULD ESTABLISH A CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IN GUATEMALA WITH GARCERAN AS ITS "PRESIDENT."

3. GARCERAN SAID THAT THE PLAN IS MERELY IN THE "TALKING STAGE" AND STRESSED THAT THERE ARE AS YET NO SPECIFIC PLANS, LOCATIONS, OR TIMETABLES IN EFFECT.

4. ALEJOS SAID THAT HE HAD MADE SEVERAL TRIPS TO GUATEMALA, AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED A MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH ROJAS MARROQUI (FNU) ON 14 SEPTEMBER DURING THE COURSE OF A FOUR-DAY TRIP "THROUGH THE FRONTIER." ON THE SAME TRIP ALEJOS ALSO MET WITH ABUNDIO MALDONADO, JOSE LUIS ARENAS, VILLAGRAN KRAMER, TWO BARRIOS PENA BROTHERS, AND MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO. (FIELD COMMENT: MENDEZ MONTENEGRO WAS CHIEF OF POLICE DURING THE REGIME OF JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMAN AND RAN FOR PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY TICKET IN 1957.) IN ADDITIONA ~~LAEJOS~~ ALEJOS MET WITH UNNAMED "NON-COMMUNIST" SUPPORTERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT JUAN JOSE AREVALO AS WELL AS WITH SUPPORTERS OF ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, CHIEF OF STATE, AND COLONEL MIQUEL ANGEL PONCIANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. (FIELD COMMENT: TDCSDB-315/03135-65, 25 SEPTEMBER 1965, REPORTED THAT ALEJOS WAS ASKED TO LINE UP BEHIND PONCIANO IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW PERALTA.) ALEJOS SAID THAT HE MET WITH THE MILITARY LEADERS

AT CAMPO DE MARTE IN FRONT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE GUARD OF HONOR. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS ILLEGAL TRIPS TO GUATEMALA HE HAD STAYED IN ABOUT 11 DIFFERENT HOUSES.

5. ALEJOS TOLD GARCERAN THAT, IN ORDER FOR HIS COUP TO HAVE ANY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT HE HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE GUATEMALAN AIR FORCE. HE ASSURED GARCERAN THAT HE HAS SUCH SUPPORT.

6. ALEJOS SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPLY THE NECESSARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE CUBAN EMIGRES RECRUITED BY GARCERAN. HE REVEALED THAT THE LOCATION OF THE TRAINING SITE WOULD BE IN NORTHERN NICARAGUA, A NECESSARY CHOICE BECAUSE SOUTHERN NICARAGUA IS TO BE USED BY THE SOMOZA/SCHECK FORCES AS A LAUNCHING SITE FOR A COUP AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS PROBABLY INVOLVES THE PLANS OF MIGUEL RUIZ HERRERA, A COSTA RICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND LEADING ORGANIZER IN NICARAGUA OF A COUP EFFORT AGAINST COSTA RICA, ON WHICH THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL REPORTING.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT: A NEW SOURCE, WHOSE ACCESS IS BELIEVED TO BE GOOD, REPORTED IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT ONE CARLOS ALEJOS, RESIDENT OF MIAMI, HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MOVING A LARGE QUANTITY OF ARMS INTO GUATEMALA VIA EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS AND THAT HE HAS ALSO BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO FOR HIS COUP. ALEJOS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS

OF STATE, FBI, I&NS, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, FAA, AND USCG.

(ALSO SENT PANAMA CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, SAN SALVADOR, TEGUCIGALPA, SAN JOSE AND MANAGUA.)

CONFIDENTIAL

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] requires additional
info needed to meet CS indexing
requirements.

INDEX ☒ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-251689
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR ADDP, C/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

RI | FI | DEST | PS | ABSTRACT | INDEX

S E C R E T 292302Z

DIR INFO MANA CITE WAVE 6214

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMCLATTER/1

65 IN 62395

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

REF A WAVE 5431 (IN 43038)
B DIR 43562
C WAVE 5849 (IN 54607)

1. AMCLATTER/1 MET DR JULIO (GARCERAN) DEL VALL SOUZA AFTER LATTER'S RETURN FROM WASHINGTON 22 SEP 65. GARCERAN REPORTED HE INVITED BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS AND HUSBAND COL JOHN KELLY DINNER 20 SEP 65. COL KELLY DID NOT ATTEND DINNER, HIS WIFE EXPLAINING TO GARCERAN THAT HER HUSBAND HEAVY DRINKER AND HAD EXCEEDED HIS QUOTA THAT DAY. FROM COMMENTS MADE BY MAYORGAS GARCERAN INFERS COL KELLY RETIRED BUT "STILL WORKS PENTAGON IN CIVILIAN STATUS IN ALLOCATION OF TROOPS IN VIET NAM."

2. MAYORGAS TOLD GARCERAN SHE HAD NOT YET TRAVELED TO NICARAGUA BUT STILL PLANS DOING SO "AROUND FIRST PART OF 66." GARCERAN DID NOT PURSUE MATTER FURTHER ORDER NOT AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICION HIS INTEREST HER PLANNED TRIP.

3. GARCERAN FURTHER LEARNED THAT MAYORGAS NOT CUBAN BUT NICARAGUAN CITIZEN. HE HAD KNOWN HER IN CUBA WHEN SHE WAS STUDYING

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

SECRET

201-251689

SECRET IN 62395 PAGE 2

ITALIAN IN HAVANA. AT THAT TIME SHE MARRIED TO FNU DEBARGAS (PHONETIC), A MEMBER OF ITALIAN EMBASSY HAVA. LIVED AT PASEO AND 17 STREET, VEDADO. MAYORGAS ALSO SAID SHE "AT ONE TIME" WAS MEMBER NICARAGUAN CONSULAR STAFF IN SAN FRANCISCO.

4. WAVE FILES REFLECT NO TRACES DEBARGAS OR VARIANTS. PERHAPS ODACID COULD IDENTIFY. DID ODENVY INTERVIEW GARCERAN PER REF B.

SECRET

CFN 6214 5431 43562 5849 AMCLATTER/1 DR JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA 22 65 BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS COL JOHN KELLY 20 65 NOT ATTEND VIET NAM NOT YET 66 NOT PURSUE NOT AROUSE NOT CUBAN FNU DEBARGAS PASEO 17 STREET VEDADO NO TRACES B

BT

SECRET

14-00000

AMCLATTER-1
201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

22 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2		6	RR
3		7	
4		8	

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

EJC
LD

S E C R E T 082127Z

8 Nov 65 IN 90695

DIR BOGO CITE WAVE 7112

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF DIR 56346 *

RE PARA 2 REF. IN TALKING WITH AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO SAID HE JUST RETURNED FROM BOGO, IS NOW LOOKING FOR RANCHLAND EVERGLADES AREA FOR CATTLE RAISING AT REQUEST UNNAMED WEALTHY COLOMBIANS.

SECRET

CFN: 7112 56346 RE 2 AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO BOGO EVERGLADES COLOMBIANS

SECRET

* CAN YOU CONFIRM ORIZONDO'S RETURN FROM BOGO

BT

14-00000

File - AMCLATTER-1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

7 SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	TC	5	MO
2		6	OO
3	FI	7	
4	CI	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8 CI/OPS

S E C R E T 021737Z

EJC

LD

BH

BOGO INFO DIR CITE WAVE 6982 2 Nov 65 IN 85580

DYVOUR PERUMEN

REF A BOGO 6317 (IN 77677)

B BOGO 6262 (IN 69601)*

STATION ASSET AMCLATTER/1, USING APPROPRIATE COVER LOCAL CUBAN EXILE GROUP, CONTACTED HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO-BORGES 29 OCT 65. ORIZONDO CLAIMS NEVER HEARD OF JULIO TOMAS CRUZ, A/1 BELIEVES HE TELLING TRUTH.

SECRET

*(REQUESTED) TRACES ON HECTOR NORIZON

CFN 6982 6317 6262 AMCLATTER/1 HECTOR CLETO ORIZONDO-BORGES 29 65 JULIO TOMAS CRUZ A/1

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

31 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/C CD

AC

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 1340 BY XD

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 172193Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO MANH CITE WAVE 5649

17 SEP 65 IN 54607

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMCLATTER/1

REF: DIR 43562

1. WAVE HAS NO OBJECTION FBI [redacted] CONTACT true name [redacted] IN CONNECTION [illegible] PLOT. HOWEVER STRONGLY URGE HQS IMPRESS FBI [redacted] WITH NECESSITY PROTECT WAVE SOURCE THIS MATTER AND ATTRIBUTE INFO TO OTHER THAN WAVE SOURCE, E.G. ONE OR SEVERAL KELLY'S "WIDE MILITARY CONTACTS WASHINGTON" COULD IMPLY same true name [redacted] BEING QUESTIONED RE HIS OWN POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT SINCE HE KNOWN BE FRIEND OF KELLY'S.

2. RE PARA 2 QUERY SEE NO NECESSITY FBI [redacted] CONTACT AMCLATTER/1. SINCE HE HAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF PLOT BEYOND THAT TOLD HIM BY same true name [redacted] WHICH FULLY REPORTED BY WAVE. WOULD RECONSIDER FBI [redacted] CONTACT AMCLATTER/1 IN EVENT DIRECT QUESTIONING same true name [redacted] FAILS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE.

S E C R E T

CFN 5649 43562 NO OBJECTION same true name [redacted] KELLY'S WASHINGTON 2 NO NECESSITY AMCLATTER/1 NO PERSONAL [redacted] same true name

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

REQUEST FOR NAME CHECK

☐ IMMIGRANT
☑ NONIMMIGRANT

2. DATE 8/31/65

3. TO: Department of State
☒ Visa Office
☐ Office of Security - Att'n SY/I Liaison

4. APPLICANT (Include maiden name/aliases, etc.)
Clara Elena FERNANDEZ Collazo de BAKER
~~xxxx~~ maiden name formerly JIMENEZ Collazo
(Fernandez supposedly step-father)

5. FROM:
[illegible], Toronto

6. PLACE OF BIRTH Habana, Cuba

7. DATE OF BIRTH Aug/12/17

8. ACTION REQUESTED
☐ SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION
☐ WAIVER UNDER 212(d)(3)(A)
☐ NAME CHECK
☐ OTHER (See Item 27)

9. PRESENT ADDRESS
4400 N.W. 5th St., Miami, Fla.

WH

10. REFERENCE (Previous correspondence, Foreign Affairs Manual, etc.)

11. DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF IDENTIFICATION none

12. SEX F

13. MARITAL STATUS Married

14. OCCUPATION (Include name and address of employer) Floorlady at Dept. Store

15. NATIONALITY Cuban

16. PURPOSE OF VISIT AND DESTINATION OR ITINERARY IN U.S. to reside

17. REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM

18. LENGTH OF STAY permanently

19. TYPE PASSPORT Cuban

20. FATHER'S NAME Amado JIMENEZ Campo

21. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME America COLLAZO Laine

22. SPOUSE (Maiden name) Bernard L. BAKER

23. APPLICANT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY: none

24. RESIDENCES PAST 15 YEARS (Dates, street addresses, cities, countries)
8/33 to 5/~~33~~ 34, Hotel Roma O'Reilly St., Habana, Cuba
5/34 to 8/36 Hargrave Hotel 72nd St. New York, N.J.
8/36 to 6/46 San Miguel and Leal, Habana, Cuba
6/46 to 5/47 Vernam Field Jamaica B.W.I.(Husb. U.S.Army)
5/47 to 2/60 Calle 98 #5901 Marianao, Cuba
2/60 to pres. 420 N.W. 44th Ave., Miami, Fla.
4400 N.W. 5th St., " "

26. RELATIVES IN U. S. (Names, street addresses, cities, states)
Mrs. America Alvarez 1401 Magnolia Dr., Augusta, Ga. Mother

28. AFFILIATIONS
Partido Democrata

☐ Return to Visa Office

REQUESTING OFFICER

DATE

(For use of Office of Security)

RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST
☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ OTHER (See below)

11/9/65

CHECKED BY

DATE

REMARKS

NP11
16 Sept 65
HKP

10 SEP 1965

FORM FS-402
8-60

FILE IN 201-751687 (Clara de 201)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
AMCLATTER-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 20475

Subject was granted an Operational Approval 31 March 1965.

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

201-281689

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-8060

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
13 APR 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-281689

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	DATE	EXT.
WH/C/RR/OBOA	W. Ullery	db	9 Apr 65	7840

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OBOA	9 Apr 65	J. Houghan
WH/C/MO/FI		N. Darling

1 - WH/C/RR/OBOA
1 - WH/C/RRRO
1 - 201-281689

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	13 Apr 65	Desmond Fitzgerald

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

CLATTER-1

SECRET

201 No.251689

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~WH/C/RR/OSOB~~ ~~C.A. Williams~~
WH/C/MO/FI (Darling)

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AMCLATTER/1 ______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 29 March 1965.

UFGA 20475

FYI & file

FI-CI Support Agent.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 31 March 1965 dlm

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

201-251689

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FORM 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (01)

CLATTER-1

SECRET

29 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Chief, CI-OA~~

SUBJECT : AMCLATTER/1
201-251689

Attached for your retention is one copy of Subject's PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is hereby requested.

Joseph Moughard
for John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w att.
1 - WH/C/RR/OSOA
1 - 201-251689

SECRET GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

201-251689

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
PRQ Part II for AMCLATTER/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Process Subject for an OA

Refs: A. UFGW-4928, 5 March 1965
B. WAVE-9534, 15 March 1965

Attached herewith as requested in Reference A is a completed PRQ Part II for AMCLATTER/1.

staff agent
[redacted]
for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Defection would be too far

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA (w/PRQ II, h/w)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
6 Mar 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-20478

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

10 SEP 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Involvement of Blanca Rosa MAYORGAS,
Wife of U.S. Army Colonel John H. Kelly,
in Plans to Overthrow the Government of Nicaragua

1. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of TDCSDB-315/02854-65, dated 1 September 1965, Subject: Remarks Made By General Anastasio SOMOZA Concerning Daniel ODUBER of Costa Rica and Communist Plans for Revolutionary Action Against Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama.

2. Source of the following information, who was also source of above reference, is a Miami businessman, who was a resident of Havana for several years and who has contacts who recognize him as a channel to U.S. intelligence. The information was received on 31 August 1965.

A. Dr. Julio GARCERAN del Vall Souza, former Cuban Supreme Court Magistrate, said there is a plot afoot to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

B. On 3 August 1965, GARCERAN visited Blanca Rosa MAYORGAS, whom he knew in Cuba, at her home, 1310 Longfellow Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where she resides with her husband, U.S. Army Colonel John H. KELLY, who is employed in the Pentagon. Blanca Rosa told GARCERAN that she would soon be leaving for Nicaragua where her cousin, who married Tachito SOMOZA, lives. At the request of Francisco AGUIRRE, owner of Diario Las Americas and brother of Horacio AGUIRRE, managing editor, Blanca Rosa has agreed to deliver messages and reports to a number of Nicaraguans who, with Francisco AGUIRRE, are involved in plans to overthrow the SOMOZA government.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C. GARCERAN explained that on 4 August he accompanied his "Washington delegate," Gerardo MORA, to the home of Col. KELLY, who, according to MORA, has wide military contacts in Washington because of his position in the Pentagon. GARCERAN had prepared a memorandum which he left with KELLY, who was to try to arrange an interview with Secretary McNAMARA for GARCERAN. When GARCERAN changed his mind about the proposed meeting with Secretary McNAMARA, who would probably not receive him anyway because of pressing problems in Vietnam, he returned to the KELLY home on 5 August to request return of his memorandum. He was received by Blanca Rosa, who told him that Francisco AGUIRRE had waited to see him but had to leave. She then told GARCERAN about her mission for AGUIRRE for which she was especially suited because of her relationship to Mrs. "Tachito" SOMOZA and because her husband is a U.S. Colonel, whose status would place her above suspicion.

3. No additional information is available to this office concerning Blanca Rosa MAYCHEAS.

4. Files of this office identify one Gerardo MORA, of Cuban origin, as a lawyer employed at the OAS in Washington, D.C.

5. Additional information is available in this office concerning GARCERAN, Francisco AGUIRRE, and Horacio AGUIRRE.

CSCI-316/03513-64

CC: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Dept. of State (Security)
I&NS

DDP/WH/2/N Helen Morgan

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee   1 - WH/C/MO/FI
1 - WH/2/MIC
1 - RI (03-9-8)   7 September 1964
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/OA
1 - Off. Sec. of Defense
1 - Dept. of State
1 - I&NS [illegible] Word, WH/C/R

BASIC: WAVE 0431
(IN [illegible])
(AMLATTRN-1)
(Whitney Tucker)

AMCLATTER-1 (201)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 55

2/30 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, C/ICE, C/OPS, C/FI, C/CA, C/PS, SOD 6, FI/INT

DIR ~~INFO MANA~~ CITE WAVE 5431 31 Aug 65 IN 43038

DYVOUR ~~PBRUMEN~~ AMCLATTER-1

1. ACCORDING AMCLATTER-1, DR. JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA, FORMER CUBAN SUPREME COURT MAGISTRATE, SAID THERE PLOT AFOOT TO OVERTHROW SCHICK GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING GARCERAN, ON 5 AUG 65 HE VISITED BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS, WHOM HE KNEW IN CUBA, AT HER HOME, 1319 LONGELLOW ST., NW, WASHINGTON, D. C., WHERE SHE RESIDES WITH HER HUSBAND, U.S. ARMY COLONEL JOHN H. KELLY WHO EMPLOYED PENTAGON. BLANCA ROSA TOLD GARCERAN THAT SHE WOULD SOON BE LEAVING FOR NICARAGUA WHERE HER COUSIN LIVES, WHO MARRIED TO TACHITO SOMOZA. AT REQUEST OF FRANCISCO AGUIRRE, OWNER OF DIARIO LAS AMERICAS AND BROTHER OF HORACIO AGUIRRE, MANAGING EDITOR, SHE HAS AGREED DELIVER MESSAGES AND REPORTS TO NUMBER OF NICARAGUANS WHO WITH FRANCISCO AGUIRRE INVOLVED PLANS OVERTHROW SCHICK GOVERNMENT.

3. GARCERAN EXPLAINED THAT ON 4 AUG HE HAD ACCOMPANIED "HIS WASHINGTON DELEGATE" GERARDO MORA TO HOME OF COL. KELLY WHO, ACCORDING TO MORA, HAS WIDE MILITARY CONTACTS WASHINGTON BY VIRTUE HIS POSITION

SECRET

IN PENTAGON. GARCERAN HAD PREPARED MEMO WHICH HE LEFT WITH KELLY WHO WAS TO TRY OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA FOR GARCERAN. WHEN GARCERAN CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT PROPOSED MEETING WITH MCNAMARA, WHO WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE HIM DUE PRESSING VIETNAM PROBLEM, HE RETURNED TO KELLY HOME ON 5 AUG TO REQUEST RETURN OF MEMO. HE RECEIVED BY BLANCA ROSA WHO TOLD HIM THAT FRANCISCO AGUIRRE HAD BEEN WAITING TO SEE HIM BUT HAD TO LEAVE. SHE THEN TOLD GARCERAN HER MISSION FOR AGUIRRE (DESCRIBED PARA 2), ONE FOR WHICH SHE ESPECIALLY SUITED IN VIEW HER RELATIONSHIP TO MRS. TACHITO SOMOZA AND FACT HER HUSBAND U.S. COLONEL. LATTERS STATUS WOULD PLACE HER ABOVE SUSPICION.

4. WAVE WILL ADVISE IF AND WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RECEIVED THIS REGARD.

5. WAVE FILES REFLECT NO TRACES ROSA MAYORGAS, KELLY OR TACHITO SOMOZA. MORA MAY BE IDEN WITH GERARDO MORA RIVERA WHO LAWYER EMPLOYED OAS WASHINGTON. ACCORDING DBF-45084, 9 MAR 60, FRANCISCO AND HORACIO (201-045645) AGUIRRE BACA REPORTEDLY MET WITH CASTRO BROTHERS OCT 59 TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR INVASION NICARAGUA. FRANCISCO DENIED THIS IN DBF-69629, 31 JAN 61. POA OBTAINED ON FRANCISCO CANCELLED FEB 61. ACCORDING TDCS-3/387,024, 4 FEB 59, HORACIO ACTING AS LIASON AGENT

SECRET IN 43078 PAGE 3

BETWEEN NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. ACCORDING DBF-40783, 20 JAN 60, PERSONS ACQUAINTED WITH HORACIO BELIEVED HE NOT ENGAGED REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST NICARAGUA. HE LABELLED COMMUNIST AGENT OPERATING MIAMI AREA BY DOMINICAN INTEL CHIEF TORRES IN HDCA 2000, 21 APR 60.

SECRET

CFN: 5431 -1- DR JULIO GARCERAN DEL VALL SOUZA CUBAN SCHICK GARCERAN 5 65 BLANCA ROSA MAYORGAS CUBA 1319 LONGFELLOW ST NW WASHINGTON D C U.S. ARMY COLONEL JOHN H KELLY PENTAGON BLANCA ROSA GARCERAN NICARAGUA TACHITO SOMOZA FRANCISCO AGUIRRE DIARO LAS AMERICAS HORACIO AGUIRRE NICARAGUANS FRANCISCO AGUIRRE SCHICK GARCERAN 4 "HIS WASHINGTON DELEGATE" GERARDO MORA COL KELLY MORA WASHINGTON PENTAGON GARCERAN KELLY MCNAMARA GARCERAN GARCERAN MCNAMARA NOT RECEIVE VIETNAM KELLY 5 BLANCA ROSA FRANCISCO AGUIRRE GARCERAN AGUIRRE 2 MRS TACHITO SOMOZA U.S. WAVE WAVE NO TRACES ROSA MAYORGAS KELLY TACHITO SOMOZA MORA GERARDO MORA RIVERA OAS WASHINGTON DBF 45084 9 60 FRANCISCO HORACIO 201-045645 AGUIRRE BACA CASTRO 59 NICARAGUA FRANCISCO DBF 69692 31 61 POA FRANCISCO 61 TDCS-3/387,024 4 59 HORACIO NICARAGUAN CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS DBF 40783 20 60 HORACIO NOT ENGAGED NICARAGUA COMMUNIST MIAMI DOMINICAN TORRES HDCA 2000 21 60

BT

SECRET

1460 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

ROUTING ZC

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT
SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI/PS, RI/AN, IW, WH/C 8,

AD/CI 2

S E C R E T 121901Z WU 12 JUN 65 2124Z IN 89148

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR GUAT MEXI TEGU SJOS CITE WAVE 2946

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: AMCLATTER-1 FROM HIS DAUGHTER WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU'S DAUGHTER 10 JUNE 65. FIELD COMMENT PARA TWO BASED UFG-7266. RID: INDEX. FILED 121901Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTILA CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA/GUATEMALA

SUBJ: CANCELLATION OF EUROPEAN VACATION BY ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, QUATEMALAN EXILE REPORTED TO BE RESUMING EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT

DOI: 10 JUNE 65

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (11 JUNE 65)

UFG-7270

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

(REVISED 4-63)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 89148

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A PERSON WHO SPOKE WITH THE DAUGHTER OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU.

JW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

FORM 10-61 3000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO.

TDCS

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 89148

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

1. ON 10 JUNE 1965, CRISTINA ALEJOS, DAUGHTER OF ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, A GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE LIVING IN EXILE IN MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, SAID THAT HER FATHER HAD CANCELLED HIS PLANS TO VACATION IN EUROPE THIS SUMMER. SHE SAID THAT HE CANNOT OBTAIN THE FUNDS THAT HE HAS IN GUATEMALA AND THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO USE THE MONEY HE HAS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TRIP. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCSDB-315/01726-65, DATED 20 MAY 1965, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALEJOS HAD PLANNED TO TAKE HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER ON A EUROPEAN VACATION IN EARLY JUNE AND THAT HIS ITINERARY INCLUDED ITALY, FRANCE, AND SWITZERLAND).

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ALEJOS HAD RECRUITED ABOUT 30 CUBAN EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA WHOM HE INTENDED TO USE IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE OPERATION ABORTED IN EARLY MAY WHEN HE AND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, MILITARY LEADER OF THE EXILES, WERE APPREHENDED AND THEIR ARMS CACHES WERE SEIZED BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, ON 8 JUNE, ALEJOS IS REPORTED TO HAVE ASKED ODELIO GARCIA DERIZANZ, A CUBAN EXILE LIVING IN MIAMI, TO RECRUIT ABOUT 50 MEN FOR A VENTURE THAT ALEJOS IS PLANNING, WHICH IS BELIEVED TO INVOLVE THE AREA OF PETEN, IN NORTHERN GUATEMALA. ACCORDING TO GARCIA, ALEJOS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GOING TO COSTA RICA WITHIN A WEEK WHERE HE EXPECTED TO SEE FORMER GUATEMALAN PRESIDENT MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES AND WHERE HE WOULD REMAIN FOR ABOUT ONE MONTH. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED THAT ALEJOS TOLD GARCIA THAT HE (ALEJOS) HAD ALREADY MADE ONE TRIP TO HONDURAS AND COSTA RICA AND HAD MET WITH YDIGORAS. ALEJOS CLAIMED THAT HE AND YDIGORAS HAD AGREED TO REMAIN QUIET UNTIL JULY WHEN THEY WOULD BE BACK IN BUSINESS BUILDING THE FORCES FOR A COUP).

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, FAA, BORDER PATROL, USCG, (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA, AND SAN JOSE).

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ROUTING
1
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5
6

REVISED 6

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: IW [☒ RID COPY] (COPY ISSUED TO IW & SOD 2330 10 JUNE EP)

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP,
VP, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, 11, FI/D, FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH/C 12, WH 7, SR/FR

SECRET 110114Z 11 JUNE 0300Z 65 IN 87815

PRIORITY DIR SDOM INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 2835

PITEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMCLATTER-1 FROM [redacted] (PLS PROTECT), FORMER CUBAN POLICEMAN, FROM ATON CONSTANZO PALAU ON 8 AND 9 JUNE 65. RID: INDEX. FILED 110114Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SUBJ: RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES BY ATON CONSTANZO PALAU TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE LOYALIST FORCES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO

DOI: 8-9 JUNE 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (10 JUNE 1965)

UFG-7261

IN COMMENT.

WH/REG
WH/2/DR/FF
WH/C

TDCS DB-315/02005-65

☐ ROUTINE ☒ PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7261
NO PROJECT (AMCLATTER-1)

RELEASING IWO

LAURIE H. KIRBELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
11 JUNE 1965
0834 Z

LIAISON: H

SECRET

SECRET
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(REVISED 4-63)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION:

☒ RID COPY

INFO.

VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 87815

SOURCE: A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HABANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CUBAN EXILE WHO SPOKE WITH ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

FW COMMENT:

TDCS

☐ ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING I WO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

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Copy No.

MFG 11-63

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	TDCS	DB-315/02005-65
DATE OF INFO.	8 - 9 JUNE 1965	DISTR.	11 JUNE 1965

SUBJECT

RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES BY ATON CONSTANZO PALAU TO JOIN RANKS OF THE FORCES OF GENERAL IMBERT AND GENERAL WESSIN Y WESSIN

PLACE & DATE ACQ.	UNITED STATES, MIAMI (10 JUNE 1965)	REF	IN 87815
SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:		FIELD REPORT NO.	UFG-7261

A MIAMI BUSINESSMAN WHO WAS A RESIDENT OF HAVANA FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THE SOURCE HAS CONTACTS WHO RECOGNIZE HIM AS A CHANNEL TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CUBAN EXILE WHO SPOKE WITH ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

(SEE TDCSDB-315/01965-65)

1. FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED/THAT A COMMANDO TEAM OF 49 CUBAN EXILES AND 11 AMERICANS IS BEING FORMED IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, BY ODELIO GARCIA DERIZANZ AND GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, AN AMERICAN ADVENTURER AND SOLDIER-OF-FORTUNE. ATON CONSTANZO PALAU AND RAMON ESCARDA RUBIO APPEAR TO BE LEADERS WITHIN THE GROUP. THE COMMANDO TEAM IS ALLEGEDLY TO BE USED BY DOMINICAN GENERAL ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS, HEAD OF THE LOYALIST FORCES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, PRESUMABLY TO TRY TO TOPPLE FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO, LEADER OF THE REBEL FORCES. THE FINANCIAL BACKER OF THE COMMANDO TEAM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN AMERICAN LAWYER LIVING IN MIAMI.)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

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GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR
AD/CI 2, CIA/NMCC, FBI, I&NS, USCG, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, FAA

CONFIDENTIAL

2. ON 8 JUNE 1965, ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, A FORMER CUBAN REBEL ARMY CAPTAIN WHO RESIDES AT 752 SW 4TH STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA, SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF 60 CUBAN EXILES WHO ARE TO FIGHT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE EXILES ARE BEING RECRUITED TO JOIN THE FORCES OF DOMINICAN GENERALS ELIAS WESSIN Y WESSIN AND ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE REBEL FORCES OF FRANCISCO CAAMANO DENO, AND ARE TO BE PAID $50 A DAY FOR THEIR SERVICES. ALL OF THE RECRUITS HAVE A REVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND BUT DO NOT INCLUDE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE FORCES OF FULGENCIO BATISTA. CONSTANZO SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN RECRUITING THESE MEN FOR A RICH DOMINICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO LIVES IN THE MIAMI AREA.

3. CONSTANZO SAID THAT IN ABOUT APRIL 1965 HE HAD RECRUITED SEVERAL CUBAN EXILES FOR ROBERTO ALEJOS ARZU, A GUATEMALAN MILLIONAIRE LIVING IN MIAMI BEACH, WHO WERE TO BE USED BY ALEJOS IN HIS ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA. CONSTANZO STRESSED THAT THERE WERE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS INVOLVED IN ALEJOS' RECRUITMENT OPERATION, IN THAT THE CUBAN EXILES WERE TO BE PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH AN ANTI-CASTRO BASE OF OPERATIONS IN GUATEMALA IF THE ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW WERE SUCCESSFUL. (FIELD COMMENT: ALEJOS' ATTEMPTED OVERTHROW ABORTED IN EARLY MAY AND THE CUBAN EXILES DISBANDED. CONSTANZO HAD BEEN RECRUITED FOR THE OPERATION AS A TEAM LEADER.) IN THE PRESENT RECRUITMENT OPERATION, HOWEVER, CONSTANZO POINTED OUT THAT THE PRIMARY ATTRACTION IS THE $50-A-DAY PAYMENT FOR SERVICES RENDERED.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, AN AMERICAN, IS REVIEWING ALL THE FORMS SUBMITTED BY THE POTENTIAL RECRUITS FOR THE OPERATION AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE CANDIDATES. ON 8 JUNE HE WAS SEEN DRESSED IN COVERALLS AND WAS WEARING A SILVER-COLORED HELMET, ATTIRE WHICH IS USUALLY EMPLOYED BY MEN ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK.

5. AS OF 9 JUNE, A GROUP OF THE EXILES WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART FROM THE UNITED STATES ON 12 JUNE, PRESUMABLY FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

6. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, FAA AND USCG. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO.)

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

AMCLATTER-1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

MICROFILMED MAY 10
DOC. MICRO.

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC Operational
Receipt of Threatening Telephone Calls by AMCLATTER/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

1. AMCLATTER/1 reported on 19 April 1965 that he had received that same evening a total of four phone calls from an unidentified party threatening to kill both his wife and himself.

2. The first three phone calls were received between 1800 and 1830 hours whereas the fourth call was received at 2130 hours. The caller spoke fluent English and used extremely vile language insulting to both A/1 and his wife. The conversation during each phone call was short and made no sense to A/1 who said the caller at one point identified himself as Jerry WALKER when A/1 asked who was speaking. A/1 has never heard of anyone by this name and believes it to be fictitious. The caller also said on one occasion, "I've been hearing the things you said about me up in Fort Lauderdale." Again, this remark made no sense to A/1. Re: Threatening phone calls received by 201-251689.

3. A/1, when offered by his JMWAVE C/O the use of a motel room or safehouse for the evening, said that he appreciated our offer but was armed with a 38 caliber revolver and could take care of himself. He said that his wife and 18 year old daughter agreed with him about staying in their own house since they had fled their home once before in PBRUMEN and did not intend to run again. A/1 is of the opinion that the caller is a crank but has not ruled out the possibility that it may be PBRUMEN intel inspired. He said that one of his friends (IDEN) also had recently received a number of threatening phone calls from someone who spoke fluent Spanish but refused to identify himself by name.

4. WAVE traces on WALKER are negative.

for Chester R. [illegible]
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Distribution:
✓ 3-WH/Cuba (w/IDEN u/s/c) (attached)

CS COPY

201-251689

DATE TYPED 9 Apr 65	DATE DISPATCHED APR 30 1965
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-21355
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-21/3

C141-1

14-00000

1P

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-21355

IDEN- Reynaldo PICO Ramon (201-284658)

MICROFILMED
MAY 10 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

~~D~~istribution:
3 - WH/Cuba

CS COPY

S/c
Att #1 to UFGA-21355

SECRET

[illegible]

201-251689

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: WH/COG/FI

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Bill Fritze

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : [illegible] (47)

SECRET

TO : Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Alicia CRUZ Bustillo

It is requested that the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State be searched for any information they may contain regarding Alicia CRUZ Bustillo, and that information be forwarded to this Office. Available information indicates that Miss BUSTILLO, a Cuban ballet dancer, is about 20 years of age, and was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. She reportedly has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing but is working as a secretary to Alicia ALONSO, the prima ballerina of Cuba.

CSCI-316/[illegible]-67

21 February 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS/Elaine Ayers:mak

Source: DCS [illegible] 17067

File : 10-2-4

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/COG/FI/TC-B.Frietsc
1 - Originator
2 - WH/COG/CICS

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

FORM 1020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

F

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
WH/C

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES /

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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4		9	
5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: S AT: 1835 Z

DISSEM BY: 12 PER #

ACTION: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, CS/DO, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 131712Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1634

PRIORITY MADRID, DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, FRANKFURT

TYPIC MHAPRON AMMEDIA

REF JMWAVE 1633 (IN 69663)

13 Mar 68 IN 69673

IDENTITY: FORMER WITHRUSH ASSET WHO TERMINATED FEB 66 FOR UNSUITABILITY IN PROPOSED CONGO ASSIGNMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-289885

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 38

17 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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(3)		7	
4		8	

FROM Leopoldville

ACTION SOD6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF7, [illegible] 4, WH/C8, WE8, CCS3,

SECRET 101550Z

WAVE DIR CITE LEOP 3961 (LAMPRIGHT ACTING)

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

10 FEB 66 52472

1. FOLL ITINERARY FOR BARTES: DEPT LEOP 9 FEB VIA SABENA TO MADRID. ARRIVE NEW YORK VIA TWA 901, 11 FEB.

2. FOR WAVE: BARTES VERY UNHAPPY OVER TERMINATION CLAIMING HE NOT TREATED FAIRLY BY AO'S OR TRAVIESO. FACT IS HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT HOME A MONTH AGO. REQUEST LORENTZ MAY WANT TO USE TRAVIESO IF BARTES PROVES BE DIFFICULT.

3. BARTES PAID USD 200 AND SIGNED RECEIPT STATING HE HAS NO FURTHER MONEY DUE HIM.

SECRET

CFN 3961 BARTES DEPT 9 VIA SABENA MADRID NEW YORK VIA TWA 901 11 NOT TREATED AO'S TRAVIESO A LORENTZ USD 200 NO FURTHER

BT

SECRET

201-289885

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

4/15 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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4		8	

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, AF7, CI/OA, OPSER

S E C R E T 071105Z

IN 49760

7 FEB 65 49760

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 3892 LAMPRIGHT ACTING

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF A. LEOP 3701, PARA 2 (IN 42743) *

B. LEOP 3274 (IN 26440)

1. FURTHER OBSERVATION BARTES (B) INDICATES HE CONTINUALLY EMPLOYS DANGEROUS PRACTICES ALTHOUGH GIVEN REPEATED INSTRUCTION. B SHOWS NO SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT NOR ABILITY TO RETAIN INSTRUCTION. CHECK FLIGHT GIVEN BY CHIEF PILOT TRAVIESO (T) 4 FEB CONVINCED T THAT B SHOULD BE TERMINATED. T INFORMED SAO THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP TRYING TO TEACH B WHO ARGUMENTATIVE AND MAKES NO EFFORT TO IMPROVE HIMSELF.

2. PLAN RETURN B MIAMI 10 FEB.

SECRET * PERTAINS TO TRAINING / STANDARDS AT WAVE.

CFN 3892 3701 2 3274 BARTES (B) B NO SIGNS NOR ABILITY TRAVIESO (T) 4 T B T SAO B NO EFFORT B 10

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-282285
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-282295
X-REF TO FILE NO. See below
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

[illegible]5

SECRET

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR AF 7 WH/C 8 CI/OA OPSER

S E C R E T 012043Z

DIR CITE WAVE 8881

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 3701 (IN 42743)

1 FEB 66 IN 45963

AN
PS
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

1P

1. REF INDICATES EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH EVALUATION BY PBRUMEN FLIGHT EVALUATORS IN MIAMI OF BARTES (B) AND NAVARRO (N). 201-282295

2. PLS SEE WAVE 7591 (IN 04663) FOR (B) EVALUATION. AFTER RECEIPT OF LEOP 2362 (IN 97504), WAVE CONCENTRATED ON MULTI-ENGINE PROCEDURES BASED UPON PROPOSED USAGE OF SUBJ.

3. PLS SEE WAVE 7846 (IN 12088) FOR (N) EVALUATION.

S E C R E T

CFN

8881 3701 MIAMI BARTES B NAVARRO N 7591 B 2362 7846 N

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B-201-282295

201-282295
1 Feb. 1966

14-00000

[illegible]

(C) OSCAR CORDO LUGO - CO-PILOT

(D) ANGEL PEDRIANES - CO-PILOT (S/E ALBERT)

IN-45640-

3. DEPARTURE FORECAST:

RENE TRAVIESO - 31 MARCH (BACK IN TWO MONTHS).

FAUSTO VALDES - 30 APRIL (RETURN TO U.S.A.)

ERNESTO DESPAIGNE - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY.

JORGE QUINTERO - INDEFINITE.

EFRAIN MORANTES - 30 [illegible]

CASTOR CERECEDA - WILL REPORT 30 DAYS BEFORE LEAVING.

ANGEL DE LA CUESTA - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY

JUAN PERON - POSSIBLY ONE YEAR.

ENRIQUE CADENAS - 10 APRIL (DEPENDING ON WORK).

FRANK CARTES - [illegible] JUNE - [illegible]

JORGE NAVARRO - POSSIBLY ONE YEAR.

ROBERTO DE CARDENAS - MORE THAN SIX MONTHS.

RAUL CRUZ - POSSIBLY 8 MONTHS.

J.M. HERNANDEZ ROJO - WILL DECIDE IN FEBRUARY.

RAFAEL GARCIA - 15 JANUARY (BACK IN 30 DAYS).

ARMANDO PIEDRA - JUNE OR JULY

ROBERTO HERNANDEZ - 30 JUNE (WILL BE BACK IN 30 DAYS).

[illegible]

[illegible]

45640
1 Feb 66

IN-45640-

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

7/3 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Leopoldville

ACTION 5006 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, AF 7, C/OP, CI/SEC,

S E C R E T 271647Z

27 JAN 65 IN 42743

DIR CITE LEOP 3701

WAVE CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

+Reg PCA TRAC

REF: A. WAVE 8539 IN 38365

B. DIR 73665

C. DIR 71114

1. REQUEST CECELIO PADRON (P) BE REINTRACTED PER PARA 2 REF B ASAP. WAVE CAN TELL (P) THAT HE WILL FLY T-28'S.

2. NAVARRO (N) AND BARTES (B) CHECKED BY SAO AND CONCLUSION REACHED THAT STANDARDS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED TOO HIGH. STA WILL GIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING TO N AND B WITH VIEW TO USING BOTH CONGO OPS. PROBLEM BASICALLY CIVILIAN PILOTS NOT FAMILIAR WITH T-28 NOR TACTICAL APPLICATION OF T-28. NEITHER PILOT MEASURED UP TO EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH EVALUATION GIVEN BY PBRUMEN INSTRUCTORS WAVE. SUGGEST THAT PBPRIME INSTRUCTOR/CHECK PILOT BE INTEGRATED INTO WAVE/PBRUMEN PROGRAM ASAP.

S E C R E T

CFN 3701 8539 73665 71114 CECELIO PADRON P B B ASAP WAVE P

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 10 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-289885 201-282285

31 SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

10 JAN 66 23 32z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY, AF 7, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR, CI/OA, RI/AN, CS 3 OP 2

SIG CEN

TO LEOP INFO WAVE CITE DIR

71114

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 70172*

WITH STATION CONCURRENCE AND IF SUBJ REFS NOT ALREADY DEPARTED, REQUEST THEY BE HELD LEOP UNTIL MOCERINO (M) RETURN O/A 18 JAN 66. FYI, M DESIRES RE-EVALUATE AS RESULT PERSONAL EXAMINATION THEIR RECORDS AT WAVE. MEANWHILE PERHAPS SUBJS USEFUL IN ADMIN DUTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

Bartes
Navarro

*Hqs concurred termination contracts two WITHRUSH pilots.

SOD/AB/OPS/3 ________

AF/5 ________

WH/C/MO Brian Mills (phone)

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN [illegible]

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Bill T.

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Can we get a check on State files — I vaguely recall talking with this gal in 1968 just before her first trip to USSR —

Travel lists —

CI files — etc.

FROM:

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED ☐ TERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CON. IENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Mr. Frank Bartes

FROM: DCS/OSS
Archie J. Richardson/js
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS HH-17967

DATE: 9 January 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/OS			S	& cc: OS
2. WH/C/CA 404 Ames Building	10 JAN			Attached: NO-380-66, dated 28 Dec 66.
3. C/WH/COG				
4. C/WH/COG/FI				
5. Bill F.				4-6: Let's name Trace alias and Frank Bartes. Looks like there could be something here.
6. Mr Munoz				→ Nothing on the Dancer. I have Frank Bartes' 201 file. ¿What action?
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				CSCI 316/00869-67
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET/SENSITIVE NO-380-66

Memorandum

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 28 December 1966
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: Possible Opportunity to Recruit Agent in Place in Cuba

1. On Tuesday, 20 Dec 66, I received a call from Mr. Frank Bartes, former President of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba. He is an alien but we have FBI approval to contact dated 14 Apr 61. Mr. Bartes is the source of five reports on Cuba and we, as well as the FBI, have been in frequent contact with him.

2. He called on me primarily to tell me that his mother had arrived from Cuba and would be willing to talk to me.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Bartes told me that he had a cousin still living in Cuba named Alicia Cruz Bustillo, who is a ballet dancer associated with Alicia Alonzo, the prima ballerina of Cuba and also a well-known Communist. Bartes says that Alicia Bustillo is not a Communist and he and his family have been in contact with her.

4. Miss Bustillo, who is about 29 years of age, was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. A group of these Cubans defected while the troupe was Paris, and this received wide publicity in our newspapers. Miss Bustillo, however, did not defect and continued on the tour and returned to Cuba with the group. According to Mr. Bartes, Alicia Bustillo has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing, but is working as secretary to Alicia Alonzo.

5. Mr. Bartes told me that he had planned to meet Alicia Bustillo in Paris and that she had agreed to meet him in Paris, but Mr. Bartes did not have the money to make the trip nor did he think that he would be able to obtain the necessary visa for the trip to Paris because of his status as a Cuban refugee.

6. Mr. Bartes says that Miss Bustillo has traveled all over the world with the Cuban ballet group and has visited most of the Communist countries including China. He feels quite certain that the Cuban group will make another tour and that he will be advised in advance of the date and itinerary. He feels quite certain that he will be able to arrange a meeting with Miss Bustillo provided the group visits a non-Communist country. He claims that he has always been very close to Miss Bustillo whom he considers almost as a sister. He feels quite certain that she would be willing to help the US if she were approached in the proper manner, and he feels that the approach should be made through him because of his relationship and former closeness to her.

7. He says that he believes Miss Bustillo does not attempt to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

14-00000

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

NC-383-66
28 Dec 66

leave Cuba because of the fact that her family is there and that she would not leave unless she could also get her family out. He believes that, despite the risk involved, she would be willing to act as an agent in place.

8. My relations with Mr. Bartos have been very good, and I am inclined to believe what he says. However, this whole matter, of course, would have to be evaluated by the Clandestine Services.

9. There is one other matter I would like to mention in connection with Mr. Bartos and that is that he served for two and a half months with a group of Cuban fliers in the Congo, as he holds a pilot's license. He did not tell me and I did not ask who the sponsors of this group were or what their duties were. He did, however, mention a Colonel Weber and a Mr. Saunders. I strongly suspect, of course, that this was an agency operation and, if so, the Clandestine Services will already have a good deal of information about Mr. Bartos.

10. I pass this on for whatever it is worth and, if there is any further information which I can provide, I shall be glad to do so.

Lloyd A. Ray

LARay:gg

SECRET/SENSITIVE

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 5 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-
201-

34 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE JMWAVE

6 JAN 66 23 12z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C8, AF7, CI/OA ~~SIG GEN~~

DDP-AIR

TO LEOP INFO WAVE CITE DIR 70172

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 3274 (IN 26440)*

1. VIEW REF CIRCUMSTANCES HQS HAS NO OBJECTION TERMINATION both CONTRACTS.

2. HQS RECORDS INDICATE FOLL:

A. BARTES: 1145 HRS. NOTARIZED LETTER IN 201 FILE FROM CESSNA DEALER STATES "MR BARTES IS THOROUGH AND COMPETENT PILOT".

B. NAVARRO: 1525 HRS. PBRUMEN AF 1956-58.

3. REQUEST ANY INFO LEOP MIGHT HAVE SUBJS FALSIFIED RECORDS. IF SO, WOULD BE POSSIBLE TERMINATE CONTRACTS WITHOUT 30 DAY PAY (AT LEOP DISCRETION).

4. PLS CLARIFY STATUS RENE GARCIA "ACTING CHIEF PILOT". HQS UNDER IMPRESSION TRAVIESO CHIEF PILOT, GARCIA EMPLOYED AIR CONGO.

5. FOR WAVE: IN FUTURE INCLUDE QUERY RE STATED FLIGHT TIME ON LOFLUTTER.

END OF MESSAGE

*Suggested termination two pilots.

SOD/AB/COPS J Smith
AF/5
WH/C/MO [illegible]

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

28/30 SECRET GROUP 1

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FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA, OPSER,

S E C R E T 041700Z

DIR WAVE CITE LEOP 3274 4 Jan 65 IN 26440

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: A. WAVE 7846 (IN 12688)
B. WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)
C. LEOP 3037 (IN 17722) *

1. MARYINOTTI AND MACIOCE HAVE DEVOTED MOST OF THEIR TIME TO TRAINING NAVARRO AND BARTES SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONGO. FOLL IS SUMMARY OF RESULTS:

A. BARTES: FIRST FLIGHT LEO 13 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 2 JAN. TOTAL TIME IN AIR LEOP 23 PLUS 35 (IN WAVE 14 PLUS 55). SUBJ CONSISTENTLY FAILS SET UP RADIO PANEL CORRECTLY; POWER SETTINGS USUALLY WRONG FOR IN FLIGHT MANEUVERS; UNABLE PERFORM BASIC MANEUVERS SUCH AS LAZY EIGHT, SPLIT S, CHANDELLE, ETC; ROUNDS OUT HIGH ON LANDINGS; NAVIGATION EXTREMELY POOR; FAILS REPEATEDLY TO ANSWER TOWER OPERATOR; AO FORCED RECOVER AIRCRAFT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FROM AELERON ROLL; LIED ON NUMBER OCCASIONS RE FLIGHT TIME WHEN AO IN BACK SEAT; CONSISTENTLY FORGETS USE CHECK LIST; DRANK BEER BEFORE ONE FLIGHT AND AO REFUSED FLY WITH

SECRET

HIM; RENE GARCIA CLEARED HIM FOR SOLO 31 DEC AND TOLD SUBJ FLY IN PATTERN MAKING LANDINGS, SUBJ FLEW TO RIVER HOUSE WHERE HE BUZZED FRIENDS AND THEN ENGAGED IN DOG FIGHT WITH NAVARRO, MADE ONLY ONE LANDING; DOES NOT RETAIN TRAINING EVEN THOUGH REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN.

B. NAVARRO: FIRST FLIGHT LEO 16 DEC, LAST FLIGHT 3 JAN. SICK THREE TIMES, ONCE FROM DRINKING TOO MUCH; GROUNDED ONCE FOR DRINKING BEFORE A FLIGHT; DOES NOT CHECK VOR OR COMPASS (IN FIRST FLIGHT COMPASS OFF 90 DEGREES AND DID NOT NOTICE); WILL NOT DO 60 DEGREE TURN BECAUSE "I DON'T LIKE 60 DEGREE TURNS"; SAME AS BARTES ON SIMPLE MANEUVERS IN AIR; TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS TOLD REPEATEDLY USE 40 INCHES BUT STILL USES 42-43 INCHES; SPEED BRAKES DOWN ONE ENTIRE FLIGHT; POWER SETTINGS AND MIXTURES CONSISTENTLY WRONG; CLEARED BY AO FOR SOLO 31 DEC BUT ONLY TO FLY IN PATTERN AND MAKE TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS, INSTEAD BUZZED RIVER HOUSE AND GOT INTO DOG FIGHT WITH BARTES. WHEN AIRCRAFT RETURNED AO CHECKED G METER AND FOUND MINUS THREE G REGISTERED. SUBJ SOAKING WET INDICATING HE HAD BEEN IN SOME TROUBLE.

B. FULL REPORT FOLLOWS BY POUCH. ABOVE HIGHLIGHTS ONLY

BUT FULLY DOCUMENTED FROM AO NOTES TAKEN WHILE RIDING IN BACK SEAT.

3. RENE GARCIA, ACTING CHIEF PILOT, TOLD AO'S THAT IN HIS OPINION NEITHER MAN HAS HAD MORE THAN 250 FLIGHT HOURS EACH. GARCIA, WHO PRONE PLAY UP PBRUMEN PILOTS AS BEING BETTER THAN THEY ARE, SAID BOTH NEED MINIMUM 50 ADDITIONAL FLIGHT HOURS.

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SECRET IN 26440 Page 4 of 4

RECENT PILOT ARRIVALS PLUS POSSIBILITY TRAINING 2-3 21ST SQDN PILOTS. ON BALANCE AND CONSIDERING FACT LEOP CANNOT AFFORD TIE UP COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN TRAINING PROGRAM, BELIEVE ADVISABLE ALSO RETURN NAVARRO TO CONUS.

6. REQUEST HQS EARLY REPLY.

SECRET * RE FLIGHT TRAINING

CFN: 3074 7746 7591 3037 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE NAVARRO BARTES BARTES LEO 13 2 23 35 14 55 S CHANDELLE AO AO AO RENE GARCIA 31 NAVARRO NOT RETAIN NAVARRO 16 3 A NOT CHECK VOR 99 NOT NOTICE WILL NOT 60 I 60 BARTES 47 AO-43 AO 31 AO C C AO RENE GARCIA AO'S 250 GARCIA 59 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE T-28 AO'S 55 - 8 25 13 12 RICARDA BARTES NAVARRO NAVARRO 59 A-5 2-3 21ST SQDN LEOP CANNOT NAVARRO

BT

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Possible Rocket Launching Site in Oriente Province

REPORT NO. 00- B-3161933

DATE DISTR. [illegible]

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Late May 1960

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Late May 1960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, a pathologist who has recently returned from Cuba where he spent five years in charge of rice production and associated research on a large rice plantation at Jobabo near the Camaguey/Oriente border.

1. Just prior to my departure from Cuba on 26 May 60 I talked with a Vice President of one of Cuba's larger railroads. He occasionally goes on inspection tours of the railroad's facilities, and had just returned from an inspection of the company's spur lines in the Sierra Maestra region of Oriente province. He was accompanied at all times by a Cuban Army officer.

2. One of the spur lines in the Sierra Maestra ran into a restricted area. In this area my friend observed under construction numerous large concrete slabs, immediately adjacent to which were very tall towers of metal framework and wire construction. He says that these were not TV or radio antenna-type towers. From his very limited knowledge of the subject, i.e, the few pictures he has seen in magazines and newspapers of rocket launching sites, he said that these towers appeared similar to steel structures he has seen in pictures of rocket launching bases. He asked his Cuban Army escort what purpose the construction was to serve, and was told "It is not a good idea to ask too many questions where lightning might strike".

3. The concrete construction work was being handled by Mexican technicians.

4. Castro's construction of large storage tanks "for pure water" on Cayo Largo is widely known in Cuba, but few accept the fact that the storage tanks are for water. It is the consensus that these tanks are for fuel storage and will serve as a refueling base for submarines. I have flown over Cayo Largo and seen these tanks from the air. They do not look like water storage tanks to me.

5. I have heard that the tenth floor of the Havana Hilton is reserved for the Soviets. While staying there just prior to my departure from Cuba I noticed the elevators never stopped on the tenth floor. I inquired of elevator boys, the desk clerks, and even the assistant manager, why the tenth floor wasn't open to guests. I was told that there were no guests on the tenth floor, that it was not completed, and accommodated no guests. The next day my laundry was returned to me with several pairs of shorts which did not belong to me. The laundry is marked by room number at the Havana Hilton and the number stamped in these shorts was a tenth floor room number.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-239665

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN LIMITED — NO DISSEM ABROAD — LIMITED Dissemination limited to full time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 08933
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-238305
201-283345
201

S E C R E T 062222Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7720

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

1. FRANCISCO BARTES (B), JUAN PERON (P), AND SANTIAGO MENDEZ (M) DEPARTING NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 WITHOUT CONGO VISA. PLEASE MEET.

2. P AND M UNDER CONTRACT 3 DEC. P ADVANCED $800 AND M ADVANCED $600. BOTH CONTRACTS STIPULATE BASE PAY USD 600 UNTIL CERTIFIED BY FAC THAT SUBJECTS HAVE MET LOCAL STANDARDS FOR PIC. CONTRACT CONTAINS CLAUSE FOR UPGRADING AUTOMATICALY TO USD 800 BASE PAY.

3. P RECEIVED 6 PLUS 30 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TRAINING AND M RECEIVED 2 HOURS T-28 REFRESHER AND 4 HOURS AND 30 MIN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT AND VOR WORK.

4. B RECEIVED U512 FROM ODURGE IN NEW ORLEANS AND P AND M RECEIVED PBPRIME MULTI ENTRY DOCUMENTS MIAMI.

5. TO EXPEDITE P DEPARTURE UNABLE TO GIVE SECOND PLAGUE SHOT, REQUEST LEOP GIVE IMMUNIZATION UPON ARRIVAL.

S E C R E T KRG BARTES DEPARTING NY 7 DEC.

CFN 7720 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES B JUAN PERON P SANTIAGO MENDEZ M

P 201-138305
B 201-253212

201-244885
6 Dec. 1965

SECRET IN 08933

PAGE 2

NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 P M 3 P $800 M $600 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800

FEB 10 11 18 PM '66

P 6 30 M 2 T-28 4 30 VOR 1512 P M P

BT

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2306 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

3 Dec. 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Florida

Re: BARTES, FRANK

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Bartes was examined by me 20 November 1965 for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical examination which he successfully completed and was issued a medical certificate. He has a glasses limitation due to distant and near vision deficiency.

He was given the following vaccines; Cholera, Typhus, Typh. para-typh., Small Pox, Dipth. Tet. and Plague.

Mr. Bartes is to return at a later date for his Chest Xray and Hbg.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,
William S Piper, MD
William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM: JMWAVE

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO: FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR

S E C R E T 301717Z

30 Nov 65 IN 04683

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7591

CRAPPIE WITHRUSH [illegible]

1. FRANCISCO BARTES HAS CONCLUDED MIAMI FLIGHT EVALUATION. SCHEDULED DEPART NY 1 DEC.

2. BARTES UNDER CONTRACT 1 DEC AND ADVANCED USD 600 REPRESENTING ONE MONTH SALARY ADVANCE. CONTRACT STIPULATES THAT ONCE QUALIFIED IN ACCORD FOR FAC STANDARDS AS PIC, BASE SALARY TO INCREASE TO USD 800.

3. SUBJECT RECEIVED 3 HOURS NAVIGATION GROUND SCHOOL, 1 HOUR SURVIVAL; 10 PLUS 55 T-28A FLT TIME; 4 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENTS AND 4 HOURS MULTIENGINE PROCEDURES IN APACHE; 17 HOURS T-28A AND C GROUND SCHOOL. IP RATES SUBJECT AS QUALIFIED FOR MULTI-ENGINE CP BUT WILL REQUIRE TACTICS AND GUNNERY IF UTILIZED IN T-28. HOLDS VALID PBPRIME PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE. KNOWN PERSONNALY TO FAUSTO VALDES.

4. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES NY 7 1 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800 3 1 10 55 T-28A 4 4 APACHE 17 T-28A C IP T-28 FAUSTO VALDE

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio WITHRUSH NUMBER 102

201 NUMBER 289885 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3002	92924	17 Jun 1965
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2901	86050	11 June 1965
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2516	81431	2 June 1965
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 2627	11713	9 Dec 65
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 7590	04662	30 Nov 1965
LCFLUTTER			
REQ LEOP ARRANGE BOARD WITHOUT VISA	WAVE 7569	04012	29 Nov 65
CABLE SENT AUTHORIZING SUBJ BOARD	LEOP 2704	07256	8 Dec 65

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Bill T.

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Can we get a check
on State files — I
vaguely recall
talking with this girl
in 1968 just before
her first trip to USSR —
Travel lists —
CI files — etc.

FROM: Rets [illegible]

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

14-00000

/AB/OPS/3
Jan 66
OPOLDVILLE
CTOR
SOD6
OP
PPIE WITHRU
P: LEOP 32
1. VIEW
NTRACTS.
2. HQS
A.
CESSNA D
B.
3. REQU
SO,
4. PLS
5. FOR

CLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Mr. Frank Bartes

FROM: DCS/OSS
Archie J. Richardson/js
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS HH-17967

DATE 9 January 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/OS				E cc: OS
2. WH/C/CA 404 Ames Building	10 JAN			Attached: NO-380-66, dated 28 Dec 66.
3. C/WH/COG				
4. C/WH/COG/FI				4-5: Let's name trace [illegible] and Frank Bartes - Looks like there could be something here.
5. Bill F.				→ Nothing on the Dancer & none Frank Bartes' 201 file. ¿what action?
6. Mr Munoz				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				CSCI 316/00869 67
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECRET/SENSITIVE NO-380-66

Memorandum

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 28 December 1966

Attn.: Operations: Support Staff

FROM : Chief, New Orleans Office

SUBJECT: Possible Opportunity to Recruit Agent in Place in Cuba

1. On Tuesday, 20 Dec 66, I received a call from Mr. Frank Bartes, former President of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba. He is an alien but we have FBI approval to contact dated 14 Apr 61. Mr. Bartes is the source of five reports on Cuba and we, as well as the FBI, have been in frequent contact with him.

2. He called on me primarily to tell me that his mother had arrived from Cuba and would be willing to talk to me.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Bartes told me that he had a cousin still living in Cuba named Alicia Cruz Bustillo, who is a ballet dancer associated with Alicia Alonzo, the prima ballerina of Cuba and also a well-known Communist. Bartes says that Alicia Bustillo is not a Communist and he and his family have been in contact with her.

4. Miss Bustillo, who is about 29 years of age, was one of the group of Cuban ballet dancers which recently made a tour of Europe. A group of these Cubans defected while the troupe was Paris, and this received wide publicity in our newspapers. Miss Bustillo, however, did not defect and continued on the tour and returned to Cuba with the group. According to Mr. Bartes, Alicia Bustillo has recently injured her foot and is not now dancing, but is working as secretary to Alicia Alonzo.

5. Mr. Bartes told me that he had planned to meet Alicia Bustillo in Paris and that she had agreed to meet him in Paris, but Mr. Bartes did not have the money to make the trip nor did he think that he would be able to obtain the necessary visa for the trip to Paris because of his status as a Cuban refugee.

6. Mr. Bartes says that Miss Bustillo has traveled all over the world with the Cuban ballet group and has visited most of the Communist countries including China. He feels quite certain that the Cuban group will make another tour and that he will be advised in advance of the date and itinerary. He feels quite certain that he will be able to arrange a meeting with Miss Bustillo provided the group visits a non-Communist country. He claims that he has always been very close to Miss Bustillo whom he considers almost as a sister. He feels quite certain that she would be willing to help the US if she were approached in the proper manner, and he feels that the approach should be made through him because of his relationship and former closeness to her.

7. He says that he believes Miss Bustillo does not attempt to

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn.: Operational Support Staff

NC-389-66
28 Dec 66

leave Cube because of the fact that her family is there and that she would not leave unless she could also get her family out. He believes that, despite the risk involved, she would be willing to act as an agent in place.

8. My relations with Mr. Bartes have been very good, and I am inclined to believe what he says. However, this whole matter, of course, would have to be evaluated by the Clandestine Services.

9. There is one other matter I would like to mention in connection with Mr. Bartes and that is that he served for two and a half months with a group of Cuban fliers in the Congo, as he holds a pilot's license. He did not tell me and I did not ask who the sponsors of this group were or what their duties were. He did, however, mention a Colonel Weber and a Mr. Saunders. I strongly suspect, of course, that this was an agency operation and, if so, the Clandestine Services will already have a good deal of information about Mr. Bartes.

10. I pass this on for whatever it is worth and, if there is any further information which I can provide, I shall be glad to do so.

Lloyd A. Ray

LARay:[illegible]

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, CI/OA, OPSER

S E C R E T 041700Z

DIR WAVE CITE LEOP 3274 4 JAN 65 IN 26440

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: A. WAVE 7846 (IN 12688)
B. WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)
C. LEOP 3037 (IN 17722) *

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SECRET

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6. REQUEST HQS EARLY REPLY.

SECRET * RE FLIGHT TRAINING

CFN: 3274 7346 7591 3037 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE NAVARRO BARTES BARTES LEO 13 2 23 35 14 55 S CHANDELLE AO AO AO RENE GARCIA 31 NAVARRO NOT RETAIN NAVARRO 16 3 A NOT CHECK VOR 90 NOT NOTICE WILL NOT 60 I 60 BARTES 42 42-43 AO 31 AO 9 6 AO RENE GARCIA AO'S 250 GARCIA 50 MARYINOTTI MACIOCE T-28 AO'S 55 - 8 25 10 12 RICANDA BARTES NAVARRO NAVARRO 50 A-5 2-3 21ST SQDN LEOP CANNOT NAVARRO

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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21 SECRET

058

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, AF7, WH/C8, CI/OA

SECRET 062222Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7720

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7591 (IN 04663)

201 - 138302

201 - 28320

201

MICROFILMED

[illegible] 08933

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. FRANCISCO BARTES (B), JUAN PERON (P), AND SANTIAGO MENDEZ (M) DEPARTING NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 WITHOUT CONGO VISA. PLEASE MEET.

2. P AND M UNDER CONTRACT 3 DEC. P ADVANCED $800 AND M ADVANCED $600. BOTH CONTRACTS STIPULATE BASE PAY USD 600 UNTIL CERTIFIED BY FAC THAT SUBJECTS HAVE MET LOCAL STANDARDS FOR PIC. CONTRACT CONTAINS CLAUSE FOR UPGRADING AUTOMATICALY TO USD 800 BASE PAY.

3. P RECEIVED 6 PLUS 30 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENT TRAINING AND M RECEIVED 2 HOURS T-28 REFRESHER AND 4 HOURS AND 30 MIN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT AND VOR WORK.

4. B RECEIVED U512 FROM ODURGE IN NEW ORLEANS AND P AND M RECEIVED PBPRIME MULTI ENTRY DOCUMENTS MIAMI.

5. TO EXPEDITE P DEPARTURE UNABLE TO GIVE SECOND PLAGUE SHOT, REQUEST LEOP GIVE IMMUNIZATION UPON ARRIVAL.

SECRET K RE BARTES DEPARTING NY 7 DEC.

CFN 7720 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES B JUAN PERON P SANTIAGO MENDEZ M

P 201-138305

B 201-253206

201-284555

6 Dec. 1965

SECRET IN 08933
PAGE 2

NY VIA PAN AM 150/7 P M 3 P $800 M $600 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800

FEB 10 11 18 PM '66

P 6 30 M 2 T-28 4 30 VOR 1512 P M P

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR

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UNIT | TIME | BY

S E C R E T 301717Z

30 Nov 65 IN 04663

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7591

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH FORUMEN

1. FRANCISCO BARTES HAS CONCLUDED MIAMI FLIGHT EVALUATION. SCHEDULED DEPART NY 7 DEC.

2. BARTES UNDER CONTRACT 1 DEC AND ADVANCED USD 600 REPRESENTING ONE MONTH SALARY ADVANCE. CONTRACT STIPULATES THAT ONCE QUALIFIED IN ACCORD FOR FAC STANDARDS AS PIC, BASE SALARY TO INCREASE TO USD 800.

3. SUBJECT RECEIVED 3 HOURS NAVIGATION GROUND SCHOOL, 1 HOUR SURVIVAL; 10 PLUS 55 T-28A FLT TIME; 4 HOURS ACTUAL INSTRUMENTS AND 4 HOURS MULTIENGINE PROCEDURES IN APACHE; 17 HOURS T-28A AND C GROUND SCHOOL. IP RATES SUBJECT AS QUALIFIED FOR MULTI-ENGINE CP BUT WILL REQUIRE TACTICS AND GUNNERY IF UTILIZED IN T-28. HOLDS VALID PBPRIME PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE. KNOWN PERSONNALY TO FAUSTO VALDES.

4. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

SECRET

CFN 7591 FRANCISCO BARTES NY 7 1 USD 600 FAC PIC USD 800 3 1 10 55 T-28A 4 4 APACHE 17 T-28A C IP T-28 FAUSTO VALDES

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL-CABLE LOCATOR

NAME BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio WITHRUSH NUMBER 102

201 NUMBER 289885 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.	WAVE 3062	92924	17 Jun 1965
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2901	88650	11 June 1965
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.	WAVE 2516	81431	2 June 1965
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 2827	11713	9 Dec 65
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 7590	04662	30 NOV 1965
LCFLUTTER			
REQ LEOP ARRANGE BOARD WITHOUT VISA	WAVE 7569	04012	29 NOV 65
CABLE SENT AUTHORIZING SUBJ BOARD	LEOP 2704	07266	8 Dec 65

14-00000

C28

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, AF 7, DDP/AIR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3,

S E C R E T 292121Z

29 Nov 65 IN 04012

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7569

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST LEOP ARRANGE WITH PAN AM TO BOARD FOLLOWING PERSONNEL NY FOR PAA 150 ON 7 DEC WITHOUT CONGO VISAS.

FRANCISCO BARTES
JORGE NAVARRO — 201 - 282285
SANTIAGO MENDEZ - 201 - 738305
JUAN PERON - 201 - 283202

2. WILL CONFIRM ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN: 7569 PAN AM NY PAA 150 7 DEC CONGO FRANCISCO BARTES JORGE NAVARRO SANTIAGO MENDEZ JUAN PERON

BT

SOD/AB

MICROFILMED
FEB 2 5 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

B - 201 - 282285
B - 201 - 738305
B - 201 - 283202

201-282285
[illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

2 SECRET

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JMWAVE

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DS 4, WH/68, AF 7, C/IPS, C/WA

S E C R E T 292121Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7567

Y-2016

CHAPPIE SECUR WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

1. PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMITS ISSUED TO ANGEL DE LA CUESTA AND ERNESTO DESPAIGNE. I-512 ISSUED TO JORGE NAVARRO.

29 NOV 65 IN 03984

2. MIAMI ODURGE NOT IN RECEIPT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE I-512 FOR FRANCISCO BARTES, AND ADVISED SUBJECTS FILE LOCATED NEW ORLEANS. RETURNING SUBJECT TO NEW ORLEANS TO CONCLUDE PERSONAL AFFAIRS PRIOR TO DIRECT DEPARTURE FROM NEW ORLEANS TO NY/LEOP. REQUEST ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF ARRANGE FOR ISSUANCE I-512 IN NEW ORLEANS (PER MIAMI SUGGESTION) AND ADVISE LORENTZ VIA TELECON NAME OF CONTACT FOR BARTES. TO MEET URGENT LEOP PILOT REQUIREMENTS, WISH FOR SUBJECT TO DEPART NY ON 7 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN 7567 PBPRIME ANGEL DE LA CUESTA ERNESTO DESPAIGNE I-512 JORGE NAVARRO MIAMI ODURGE NOT IN I-512 FRANCISCO BARTES NEW ORLEANS NY/LEOP I-512 LORENTZ VIA NY 7

BT

SECRET

Ⓦ ✓

*

In the Name of God. Amen

I, Francisco Bartes Clarens a citizen and resident of

Metairie County, State of Louisiana being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last

Will and Testament

hereby revoking any and all prior wills, codicils and testamentary dispositions.

FIRST ~~I give, bequeath and devise~~ I direct my executor to use the proceeds of all insurance proceeds on my life payable to my estate to first pay debts, estate inheritance taxes, claims and charges of administration and then I give and bequeath all of my estate real, personal or mixed wheever situated to my beloved wife Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez, 1608 Mason Smith, Metairie La.

I hereby make, constitute and appoint Mr Roberto [illegible], 1612 NW 19 Terr [illegible] Fla

as executor of this my last Will and Testament,

and that no bond or security will be required by such executor.

(SEAL) (SEAL)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

BARTES CLARENS, FRANCISCO ANTONIO
201-289885
SEX M DOB ?

1CC-300-017
WAVE-00483
04 DEC 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
FRANCISCO ANTONIO BARTES CLARENS FILE GIVES NO INDICATION OF ANY EMPLOYMENT OTHER THAN THE SHORT TERM CONGO ASSIGNMENT LATE 65

R 7205101529

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 289885

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

and direct him to pay all of my lawful debts, if any, and the funeral and burial expenses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix my seal this 27th day of November A. D. 19 65, in the presence of attesting witnesses.

(SEAL)

The foregoing instrument, part being printed and the residue written, was subscribed, sealed, published and declared by Francisco Bartes Clarens *as and for* his *last Will and Testament, in our presence and in the presence of each of us, and we, at the same time, at* his *request, in* his *presence and in the presence of each other, hereunto subscribe our names and addresses as attesting witnesses, this* 27th *day of* November *A. D. 19* 65

Armando J. Piedra — Witness — 5614 Rogero Rd. Jacksonville, Fla. — Residence

Eli Vega — Witness — 219 Antilla Ave. C. Gbls. — Residence

Witness — Residence

Will

OF

Executors

RAMCO FORM 35

November 27,1965

I hereby authorize any salaries or monies due me to be paid to my checking account No. 0015-24-527 at The National Bank of Commerce in New Orleans located at 210 Baronne in said city.

Francisco Bartes

file

SECRET

201 No. 289885

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 — Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio, for the purpose specified in your request dated 9 September 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward R. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 19 November 1965 jeb

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

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[illegible]

FORM 11-64 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

S E C R E T

Chief, KUSODA

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

PJDUST/LCFLUTTER/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of LCFLUTTER Results

Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith (BYHAT) are the following LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IRD numbers, and if available, 201 numbers and cryptonyms: Also forwarded herewith are copies of the reports to be transmitted to COS, Caracas and COS, Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(#)	(355496)	(SUBELT/7)
(#)	(267488)	( )
(#54931)	(294451)	(AMTOBY/13)
(#55377)	(310133)	(AMSPAN/29)
(#54903)	(736622)	(AMBEGIN/34)
(#72648)	(231207)	(GIMAVOC/7)
(#72649)	(763730)	(SMADOFF/1)
✓(#72650)	( )	( )

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment along with copies for Chief of Station, Caracas and Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa.

23881/04

Attachments:
A. Reports (BYHAT)
B. Identities (BYHAT)

Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3-C/KUSODA w/atts.A/1-8 B/w:B/1-8 u/s/c
2 WH/C w/o atts.

Copy

201-289885

17 Nov 1965

NOV 19 1965

UFGA-23881

201-355496, -267488,
-294451, -310133,
-736622.

S E C R E T

UFGA 23881/04

[redacted]

SECRET

# 72650
15 November 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 13 November 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward W. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

Subject is being considered for use as a pilot with the WITHRUSH Program.

RESULTS

Subject has never cooperated with any Castro intelligence or security service and except for PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

There is no indication that Subject has engaged in homosexual activities in his adult life.

DETAILS

Subject stated that he is an informant for the ODENVY office in New Orleans, Louisiana. His ODENVY contact is Iden B.

Subject stated he is a close friend of Iden C, who is connected with the WITHRUSH Program.

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN [illegible]

UFGA 23881/04
[illegible] 23881/04

Place doc in 201-389488

CS COPY

19 Nov-65

[redacted]

UFGA 23881/04

SECRET

201-289885

[redacted]

SECRET

72650
15 November 1965
IDENs

Iden A Francisco Antonio BARTES Clarens
DPOB: 14 September 1920
Havana, Cuba

201-289885

Iden B Warren C. de BRUEYS

Iden C Fausto VALDEZ

UFGA 23981/04

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

SOD 5-1418
16 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Lou Weinckowski

SUBJECT: Project WITHRUSH

1. SOD and AF Division are jointly interested in obtaining the services of the Cuban nationals identified below for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

	Personnel Data	Document Needed
Name:	Ramon Alonso ALVAREZ Fdez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	20 January 1923	
POB:	Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number:	12460263	
PGA Granted:	10 November 1965	
OS Case Number:	T 3668	
Remarks:	None.	
Name:	Ernesto DESPAIGNE Perez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	7 September 1925	
POB:	Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number:	12411097	
PGA Granted:	24 August 1965	
OS Case Number:	EE 487	
Remarks:	None.	
Name:	Jorge Minervino NAVARRO Rodriguez	Re-entry Document
Status:	Unknown	
DOB:	31 December 1934	
POB:	Artemisa, P. Del Rio, Cuba	
"A" Number:	11[illegible]536	
PGA Granted:	16 September 1965	
OS Case Number:	817090	
Remarks:	None.	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Name: ~~David R. RODRIGUEZ Santiana~~ Re-entry Document
Status: ~~Unknown~~
DOB: ~~22 October 1931~~
POB: ~~Esperanza, L.V., Cuba~~
"A" Number: ~~12438004~~
POA Granted: ~~6 July 1965~~
OS Case Number: ~~220764~~
Remarks: ~~None.~~

Name: Francisco Antonio BARTES Clarens Re-entry Document
Status: Unknown
DOB: 14 September 1920
POB: Havana, Cuba
"A" Number: 12552976
POA Granted: 7 October 1965
OS Case Number: 225714
Remarks: None.

Name: Juan PERON Sosa Re-entry Document
Status: Unknown
DOB: 24 November 1940
POB: Havana, Cuba
"A" Number: 1216#158
POA Granted: 30 November 1964
OS Case Number: 223425
Remarks: None.

2. It is requested that your office facilitate prompt and favorable action by the Miami office, INS, to provide the documentation required.

Sidney D. Stembridge
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

SOD/AB/OPS/B:L.MURPHY:has(16 Nov 65)

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2.

201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]
201 - [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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BY

INFO

FILE, VR AF7 WH/C8 [illegible]

S E C R E T 122116Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7286

12 DEC 65 IN 93713

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/PBRUMEN

REFS: LEOP 1841 (A)(IN 80410)

LEOP 2189 (B)(IN 02044)*

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. FOR PLANNING PURPOSE, WILL HAVE JUAN PERON DEPART 14 DEC REF (A).

2. HAVE THREE POTENTIAL T-28 PILOTS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING LOCAL CHECKOUT (NAVARRO, RODRIGUEZ AND BARTES) IN ADDITION TO MENDEZ AND SEDA.

3. ALL FIVE SHOULD BE DISPATCHED WITHIN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS.

SECRET

CFN: 7286 1841 2189 LORENTZ MIAMI JUAN PERON 14 DEC 2 T-28 NAVARRO RODRIGUEZ BARTES MENDEZ SEDA

BT

* MENDEZ AND T-28 PILOT.

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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V

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

~~26~~

SECRET

ORIG : W.WAINWRIGHT:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS3 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4475 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 25 OCT 65 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

Bartes

26 OCT 65 22 00z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH/OA, AF7, CI/OA ~~SIG CEN~~

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR ~~53428~~ 53428

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 6607 (IN 74001)*

SUBJECT GRANTED POA.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested clearance status of Subject.

WH/C/MO Mr Maughan Kilcen

SOD/AB/COPS

CI/OA G.Ball/Telecon

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Bernard J. [illegible]
BERNARD J. [illegible]INAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, AF7, WH/C8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 152331Z

DIR CITE WAVE 6607

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 3062 (IN 92924) *

15 Oct 65 IN 74001
IN 74001

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

REQUEST INFO CLEARANCE STATUS OF FRANCISCO (BARTES) CLARENS.

S E C R E T * Requested POA RE Subj.

CFN 6607 3062 LORENTZ FRANCISCO BARTES CLARENS

BT

SECRET

NNNN

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CHECK LIST NUMBER 102

XXXXX LAST MATRONYMIC FIRST MIDDLE

NAME BARTES Clarens Francisco Antonio

JOB PILOT

201-NUMBER 289885

C-NUMBER

RI TRACES REQUESTED 21 May 1965

RI TRACES RETURNED 24 May 1965 - No derog

DPOB 14 MAR 1920 HAVANA

DIVISION TRACES REQUESTED 24 May 1965

DIVISION TRACES RETURNED 24 May 1965 - No derog

FIELD TRACES REQUESTED Auto

FIELD TRACES RETURNED ND per WAVE 2195 IN 76667

MIAMI ACTIONS ACCOMPLISHED AS FOLLOWS:

A. I & N SERVICE ~~and~~ ND PER WAVE 2195 IN 76667 ND per WAVE 3062 IN 92929

102

B. LOCAL (WAVE) POLICE AND CREDIT 14 June per WAVE 2901 (IN 88650)

C. WAVE FBI 2 June per WAVE 2516 IN 81431

POA REQUESTED 27 May 65

GREEN LIST REQUESTED 27 May 65

IF REQUIRED:

A. MEMO TO CI/OA RE RI TRACES

B. MEMO TO CI/OA RE DIVISION TRACES

C. MEMO TO CI/OA RE FIELD TRACES

POA GRANTED 20 July 1965

CONTRACT SIGNED

I & N ASSISTANCE REQUESTED DATE FOR DOCUMENT

POA CANCELED

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

NUMBER: 201-289885

SUBJECT: BARTES Clarens, Francisco A.

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 27 May 1965 prc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

sent 9 Sept

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	30 JUL 1965

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

(9)

SECRET

SOD. 5-879
15 JUL 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT: Francisco A. BARTES Clarens

REFERENCE: CI/OA Memorandum Dated 6 July 1965

1. The document cited in the reference has been reviewed and found to contain no derogatory information on Subject.

2. It is, therefore, requested that a POA be granted Subject.

SIGNED

William Wainwright
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
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1 - C/SOD/AB
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1 - 201-289885
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chron

SOD/AB/OPS/3:W.WAINWRIGHT:kas(14 Jul 65)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK №. 167232

DATE 27 May 1965

[redacted]

78

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Larry Murphy

OFFICE DESIGNATOR SOD/AB/OPS/3

ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 55

EXTENSION 4475

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LE[TTE]RS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
14 September 1920 Havana, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Real Estate Salesman
Landco Investment Corp.
3535 Veterans Hwy. Nov 64-Present
Metairie, La.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Pilot

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Vice President - Consolidated Railroads of Cuba	Havana, Cuba	1953-1958
President - Consolidated Railroads of Cuba	Havana, Cuba	1958-1960
President & Director - Arrozax Bartes, S.A.	Camaguey, Cuba	1951-1960
Vice President-Santa Ceoizis Sugar Refin.	Oriente, Cuba	1947-1951
Real Estate Salesman-Ted Homes, Inc. 2311 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Mar 63-Oct 64
Real Estate Salesman-Weber Homes, Inc. 1809 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Nov 63-Oct 64
Real Estate Salesman-Lanco Investment Corp. 3525 Veterans Hwy.	Metairie, La.	Nov 64-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'8"	178	Brown	Brown	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Esperanza Vazquez R.

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Francisco Bartes Marsal
Mother: Maria Antonia Clarens

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

JUN 14 1 52 PM '65

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY, SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 801 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Larry Murphy

14 June 1965

DATE

FROM: FI/D [redacted]

67

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO XXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* Previous green list request from WH/4, 30 Dec 1960, op, GL 107415, No record.

CI/OA

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1965

TO:	☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3
2 D 55

SUBJECT: *(True name)* BARTES Clarens, Francisco Antonio

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 289885

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167238

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY WH	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Larry Murphy	4475	Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

FORM 5-60 772

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
JMWAVE
ACTION
SOD 6
INFO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

VR. FILE, WH/C 8, REG, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 262110Z

DIR CITE WAVE 2195

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH BRUMEN

26 Mar 65 IN 76667

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

ODURGE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98, 99 AND 95. WAVE AND ODURGE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 100, 101 AND 102. Bartes ADDITIONAL INFO WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

CSCI Memo
Ahern - Sec of State.

CSCI Memo

Aliens - Sec of State.

IN CONSIDERATION of my employment on the terms hereinafter set forth, I, **Francisco Bartes** hereinafter called employee, hereby agree to the following conditions of employment:

1. That the term "employer" as used in this agreement shall be the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or any designated Department or Agency of said Government, or any Company or Agency that the said Government may designate.

2. That the service to be rendered by the employee under this agreement is to be an aircraft pilot, with no specific aircraft assignment.

3. That the term of employment under this agreement shall be for a period of one -1- year from **1 December** 1965. During the first six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by the employer at any time by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the employee. During the last six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by either the employee or the employer by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the other party.

4. That the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Six Hundred -$600.00- Dollars per month during the first six month. However, at any time during the tenure of this contract, that you are certified in writing by the Chief Pilot as Pilot in Command, your base salary will be increased to Eight Hundred -$800.00- Dollars per month on the effective date of such certification. Additionally, you shall be paid an additional hourly rate per flying hour for all flight time in excess of sixty hours per schedule listed in amendment No. 2 of this contract. During the last six month term of this agreement, the employees base pay is increased an additional One Hundred -$100.00- Dollars.

5. That the employee accepts the responsibility of the payment of all applicable taxes on all income earned by him under the terms of this agreement.

6. That the employee shall be furnished round trip tourist class air transportation costs from Miami, Florida, to destination, and return, and all other expenses directly relating to the travel involved. In the event at the termination of this agreement, the employee accepts employment with an employer other than the Government of the Republic of the Congo, the return transportation cost shall not be paid said employee. The return ticket shall be surrendered upon arrival at destination.

7. INSURANCE BENEFITS:

The employee shall be enrolled in the employer's group insurance program for which the emplyer pays the total premium. The insurance program provides death disability and medical benefits for the employee substantially as follows:

(1) $10,000 payable in the event of the employee's death from any cause whatsoever during the term of this agreement.

(2) $40,000 payable in the event of the employee's death from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, provided death occurs within one (1) year from the date of the accident. This benefit is in lieu of (1) above and is also reduced by any payments made under (3) below for the same accident.

(3) Temporary and permanent total and permanent partial disability benefits plus medical expenses for injuries or disablement to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. Said benefits are paid in accordance with the terms and limits of said insurance coverage and the maximum payable thereunder is $40,000 for the same injury or disablement.

CONTINUANCE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCE

(1) In the event the employer determines the employee to be missing in action, the authorized designee of the employee will receive his basic salary plus an additional 25 per cent thereof for a period of up to six (6) months. If, at the end of the missing in action period, findings indicate that the employee is deceased, the appropriate insurance benefit provided for above will be paid to the employee's designated beneficiary.

(2) If the employee is captured and imprisoned, his authorized designee will receive the employee's basic salary plus an additional 25 per cent thereof for the duration of his confinement. In addition, the appropriate death benefit insurance provided for above will be paid if the employee dies during said confinement.

8. That the employee agrees to undergo a medical examination within five calendar days after his return.

9. That the employee promise he will not reveal in writing or any method, the activities, the sponsors, or any other facts that come to his attention by virtue of the performance of services under this agreement.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this _______ day of _______________, 1965.

________________________ -Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this _______

day of ___________________, 1965.

________________________ -Seal-

AMENDMENT #1

This contract is considered the binding agreement between both parties and any oral or verbal agreements as partains to any portions of said contract are not considered binding unless said agreement becomes a written part of this contract.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this __________ day of ____________,1965.

Paul Brulle ______________________-Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this __________ day of __________________, 1965.

___________________________-Seal-

Amendment No. 2

Pay Scale

1. As employee is hired as a Pilot, you will receive $600.00 base plus $5.00 per hour over 60 hours actual flight time.

2. Once certified in writing as Pilot in Command, your base pay automatically is raised to $800.00 per month - pro-rated to that portion of the month applicable. Additionally while acting as Aircraft Captain, all time over 60 hours flying is compensated at the rato of $10.00 per hour. However, although certified as Pilot in Command, any time over 60 hours not considered command time (Co-Pilot), the hourly compensation is reduced to $7.50 per hour.

3. All flight time must be actual flight time and Dead Heading, Passenger, etc. time may not be recorded as meeting minimum hours, overtime or hazard pay.

4. The Chief Pilot has sole discretion of upgrading and/or down grading pilot status in writing and the employee shall have no recourse towards this decision.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM T/N Francisco Antonio BARRES Clarens	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

1. Subject first considered in JMATC project December 1960 for possible FI/PM operations primarily against transportation targets in Camaguey and Oriente Provinces. POA requested by administrative case officer, Joseph Piccolo. It was granted 30 January 1960 and cryptonym assigned was AMSERF/1.

Subject submitted job application form to Roberto Medell (principal agent, WITHRUSH, Miami, Florida) on 3 May 1965 for the purpose of consideration as a pilot in the WITHRUSH Project.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer, however, a mature, politically inclined case officer would probably have more success handling Subject. He has long experience in management of transportation and agriculture enterprises. He is well educated and articulate in Spanish and English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

File does not show that Subject personally knew his case officers.

FORM 8-60 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Estimate Subject's primary motivation is financial. He has large family (wife and seven children) and has, in the past, been accustomed to high standard of living. Possibly his present occupation in real estate is not meeting his requirements for income and status. Also, he probably has continuing ideological interest in deposing Castro.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No real control exists over Subject other than financial. He needs guaranteed employment to provide for his family. However, manipulation of his resident alien status, aviation occupation property, and U.S. licenses could offer control elements.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

The principal agent represents himself as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Government of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no U.S. Government interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that Subject suspects [illegible] of the operation.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

In all probability he is or will become aware that the GOC air program is sponsored by KUBARK.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject was a leader in one of the anti Castro resistance cells in Cuba prior to 1960. He was also a leader of an anti-Castro resistance group in New Orleans after emigration. His file indicates liaison with the FBI concerning this groups' willingness to cooperate with the U.S. Government in operations against Cuba. In his connections with the FBI he was extremely conscious of all aspects of security to the extent that he volunteered to be prosecuted for any breach

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

of security or evidence of collusion. His record indicates no connection with any other national intelligence service.

Probably wife and brother, Mario, and possibly some cousins residing in the Miami area. However, Subject's file indicates attention to personal security in control of information concerning political affiliations and objectives.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has no KUBARK training in clandestine operations. However while residing in Cuba he participated in resistance operations against Castro. His planning in sabotage shows thought, originality, and daring.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject may collaborate with any Government or group presenting a well conceived, financed, and disciplined program for re-invasion of Cuba. Still, prospects of collaboration become less likely as his personal contacts in Cuba are lost and urgent political issues cool.

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SECRET

SECTION VI	**OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

He was granted a POA in January [illegible] for prospective [illegible]/FI use in the [illegible] operation; however, he departed for the United States prior to being used.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject has education, language ability, and management experience. Given training in tradecraft and proper handling he probably could function successfully in FI or CI operations, particularly in the Western Hemisphere.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject presently projected to be used as a pilot in counterinsurgency air operations.

SECTION VII	**PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII	**AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to the GOC although presumably he knows the program is under U.S. sponsorship.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing pilot in light aircraft.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, plus $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, also $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $10,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None known.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Subject granted POA's on two occasions. It is assumed pertinent Headquarters, field and Agency files checks and investigations have been made. These include in the Subject's case, WAVE Station, FBI, I&NS, and Headquarters.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Polygraph and personal interview at WAVE Station.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Yes. (C-57494)

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA on 30 January 1960 and 30 July 1963.

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject's record indicates no adverse character traits. His records show consciousness of importance of security in clandestine operations.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No use of liquor or narcotics, gambling or paramours is indicated in 201 file.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject's record does not reflect hobbies or avocational interests.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Perhaps certain Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I is supplied by Subject; Part II by check of file and assessment of informationocontained therein by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

None.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

From 1947-1960 Subject acted as vice president and later president of family railroad and agriculture enterprise. He made a commercial successof these operations which were later confiscated by the Castro Regime. He lost a large personal fortune as did other close members of his family. He was an ardent anti-Castro, anti communist leader of resistance groups both in Cuba and in New Orleans.

Subject previously used his own private aircraft in managing his commercial interests. It is hard to judge from the Subject file precisely why he has applied for a flying position in the Congo for reasons other than obvious financial aspects. Further, his 1[illegible] May 1965 applicationsto Roberto Medell indicates a [illegible] degree of stability and solvency in his present position as a real estate salesman. Given Subject's age and previous background [illegible] available to him [illegible]

DATE

8 Sept

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

NAME: Francisco A. Bartes

DATE OF BIRTH: September 14,1920

MARITAL STATUS: Married

WIFE'S NAME & AGE: Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez 41 yrs.

NAMES OF CHILDREN & AGES:

Olga Maria Bartes 22yrs.
Maria Esperanza Bartes 18yrs.
Miriam Bartes 16yrs.
Maria Antonia Bartes 14 yrs.
Maria Leonor Bartes 13 yrs.
Maria Teresa Bartes 5yrs.
Ana Maria Bartes 1 yrs

NAMES OF PARENTS/BROTHERS SISTERS: [illegible] (give name of close relative or friend)

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Francisco Bartes	father	deceased	
Maria Antonia Clarens	mother	Linea 507 Havana,Cuba	

EMPLOYEE'S POSITION TITLE: Pilot

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Pilot

SALARY: $800

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Esperanza Vazquez Ramirez	wife	1608 Mason Smith Ave.Metairée LA.	835-3462

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
wife			

LIST OF ALL INSURANCE POLICIES:

DATE OF POLICY	COMPANY	POLICY NO.	COVERAGE	BENEFICIARY	CONTAIN WAR OR AIR CLAUSE YES	NO
none						

LAST WILL & TESTAMENT IF EXECUTED:

DATE OF WILL	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL	COPY ON FILE WITH
	R.Medell	

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON HOLDING POWER OF ATTORNEY:

DATE________________________ SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Frank Bartes

14-00000

#162

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF. # A-12 552 978
I-5[illegible]

NAME Borges (LAST) Francisco (FIRST) [illegible] (MIDDLE)
Clarens

PHONE NUMBER 835-5462 SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 436-68-1566

☒ MALE
☐ FEMALE

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

PRESENT ADDRESS 1008 Mason Smith Ave (STREET) Metairie (CITY) La. (STATE)

PERMANENT ADDRESS SAME

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) 9-14-1920

PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Havana - Cuba

WEIGHT 178 COLOR OF HAIR Brn COMPLEXION Strong

HEIGHT 6'0" COLOR OF EYES Brn

DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS.

PASSPORT PARTICULARS:
ISSUING AUTHORITY State Dept.
PLACE OF ISSUE Havana - Cuba
PASSPORT NO. 09063
DATE OF ISSUE 4-8-454
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD 4-8-462

CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES ☐ NO ☒

NATURALIZED: DATE — PLACE

NATIONALITY: Cuban

HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	La Salle Catholic School at Havana	4 years	1940	Bachelor of Arts & Sciences
COLLEGE	University of Havana	5 years	1946	Public Accountant
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES				

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK Statistics

VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC. Aviation - [illegible] Pilot. CUBA
[illegible]

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish
English

READ Yes WRITE Yes

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) FROM. None TO: TYPE OF DISCHARGE: RANK: PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.) [illegible]

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES		STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
FROM	TO			
1955	1960 [illegible]	[illegible]	Havana	Cuba
[illegible] 1960	Now	[illegible]	Metairie, La.	U.S.A.

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

	NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Wife	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	"
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	" " "
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	"
	[illegible]	[illegible]	" " " " "	

[illegible]

EMPLOYMENT – In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work, including any active military service. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: Nov. 1964	TO PRESENT TIME Date	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $? PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] Investment Corp. 3131 Veterans Hwy Metairie La.			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Boyd P. Guefet Pres[illegible]		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT			
B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: Nov. 1963	TO: Oct. 1964	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ 1.777 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Weber Homes Inc. - 1809 Veterans Hwy. Metairie La.			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Fred Weber President Manager		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman & Draftsman	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT Low earnings. - [illegible] Company, now operates under [illegible] Real Estate			
C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: March/63	TO: Oct./64	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Real Estate Salesman	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR. FINAL $ 1690.00 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Ted Homes Inc. - 2711 Veterans Hwy. Metairie La.			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Fred Weber (Manager)		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Salesman	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT Low earnings. -			

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☒ YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR: Pilot MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ Open PER YR.

REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Raphael Ballestero	Sioux Sanatorium Rapid City S.Dak.	M.D.
Douglas Dinton Jr.	1218 Whitney Bank, N.O. 12 - La.	Asst. Sales Manager A.L. Mechling Barge Lines
Bruce Hancock	Texas West Indies - El Campo, Texas	President of Corp.
William C. Davis	American Consulate General APO 653 N.Y.	Visa Technician
Ernesto Vandama	941 West 36 Terrace Hialeah Fla.	Pilot

FATHER'S NAME Francisco [illegible] Marsal DATE OF BIRTH 9-1-1873 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) [illegible] Spain

PRESENT ADDRESS (Died in 1944) PRESENT OCCUPATION

NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Spanish PRESENT NATIONALITY

MOTHER'S FULL NAME Maria Antonia Cardoni DATE OF BIRTH 1-16-1896 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) [illegible] Cuba

PRESENT ADDRESS Linea #507 Vedado, Habana Cuba PRESENT OCCUPATION Housewife

NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban PRESENT NATIONALITY Cuban

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY (wife) Esperanza Vazquez - 1818 Patterson Smith, Metairie La. 835-4462
NAME ADDRESS PHONE NO.

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for is cause for dismissal.

4-19-65
DATE SIGNATURE

Continuation Sheet—Employment

D. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1942 TO: 1947
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office assistant
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 1200.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 4200.00 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Guantanamo & Western R.R. Co. [illegible] Aguiar St. Havana Cuba.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: F. [illegible] Jr. (President)
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: General office work accounting & statistics

E. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1947 TO: 1951
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Vice-President
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 6000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 9600.00 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Santa Cecilia Sugar Mill - Guantanamo, Oriente, Cuba.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: F. [illegible] Jr. (President)
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Sugar mill was sold
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: In charge of sugar sales and preparation of financial reports & statements etc.

F. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1951 TO: 1960
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: President & Director
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 12,000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 24,000.00 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Arrocera Barrios S.A. - [illegible] - Camaguey - Cuba.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Board of Directors
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Confiscated in 1960
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Full responsibility and supervision of the 7,200 acres of rice land totally mechanized.-

G. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1953 TO: 1958 —
1958 1960 —
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Vice President
President
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 12,000.00 PER YR. FINAL $ 60,000.00 PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Consolidated Railroads of Cuba - Ambar Motor Bldg. Havana Cuba.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Board of Directors
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: Confiscated in 1960
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Full responsibility & supervision of 1,400 miles of freight & passenger service - [illegible] [illegible] terminals and a bus company.

Continuation—Other

14-00000

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Francisco R. Barres

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying:

B. Airline: As a Private Pilot, inland and over water flying. Single & multi-engine

C. Far East:

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	**PILOT (IN HOURS)**	**CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)**	**OTHER CREW**	
			TITLE	**(IN HOURS)**
A. C-46				
B. C-47				
C. DC-4/C-54				
D. DC-6				
E. DC-7				
F. Jet Transport (By Type)				
G. Amphibian (By Type)				
H. Flying Boat (By Type)				
I. Helicopter (By Type)				
J. Cessna 172 (in Cuba)	128:00			
K. " 182 (in Cuba)	750:00			
L. " 310 (in Cuba)	75:00	— (Multi-engine)		
M. " 172 (in USA)	15:27	(including [illegible]	[illegible] minutes	[illegible])
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	1,145:27			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Hood	5:00			
Actual	10:00			
V. Total Night Time	1:30			
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months	15:27			

VII. Type Equipment in Past Six Months Cessna 172 & Piper Apache

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.	From Cuba. Pilot Licence	1017	Single-multi-engine land VFR
B.	" USA Private Pilot (Pending)		Single Engine Land - VFR
C.	FAA → (Date of issuance [illegible])		
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☒ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

[illegible]
DATE

Frank R. Barlis
SIGNATURE

SUNNY SOUTH
AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC.
Cessna
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Cessna 210 [illegible]
[illegible] Cessna 210 [illegible]

[illegible]

SUNNY SOUTH AIRCRAFT SERVICE, INC.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] day of [illegible]

NOTARY
[illegible]

SALES
AIRPLANES
AIRPLANE PARTS
ENGINES
ACCESSORIES
GAS-OIL
ELECTRONICS

Pan Air Corporation

SERVICE
REPAIRS AND
MODIFICATIONS
OF ALL TYPES OF
LAND & SEAPLANES
OR AMPHIBIANS
ELECTRONICS

AIRCRAFT SERVICE - MAINTENANCE AND SALES
APPROVED REPAIR STATION No. 3823
288-1471
P. O. BOX 20425 • NEW ORLEANS AIRPORT • NEW ORLEANS 20, LA.

14 April, 1965

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I have known Mr. Francisco A. Bartos since June, 1962. He contacted our company tp obtain a license permitting him to continue flying in the United States after his departure from Cuba.

Mr. Bartos held a Cuban pilot license issued by the Civil Aeronautics Commission of Cuba, November 22, 1956, No. 1017, Multi-engine Aircraft VFR.

The total aircraft flying time has been estimated due to the fact all personal effects including his log books were left in Cuba. A certification from Sunny South Aircraft, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, substantiates his estimated time due to single and multi-engine aircraft he purchased from them:

Cessna 172	130:00
Cessna 182	250:00
Cessna 310	750:00

Mr. Fausto A. Valdez, a Cuban citizen now residing at 10 SW 32nd Ave., Miami, Florida, holding an ATR certificate, 1515842, issued 11/28/61, has also certified via affadavit, Mr. Bartos, has close to 1,000:00 hours of multi-engine time.

Mr. Bartos has completed the Private Pilot course with us and has the necessary papers pertinent to an FAA license. He is presently continuing his studies for a Commercial Pilot rating - single and multi-engine.

PAN AIR CORPORATION

A.LeCagle, Chief Flt. Instructor

ALC/e

CESSNA
ANNIVERSARY
FLEET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WE/2 MARION E. LINDE

NO. CSCI - 3/753,461

DATE 11 ~~26~~ February 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WE/2			JO	
2.				
3. CI/Liaison	11 FEB 1959			
4.				
5. RI/AN				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/MIS				
15. RID/FI				

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

23 FEB 1959

BLOCK, MORRIS

	201	177	251
ABSTRACT ~~X~~	INDEX		

DATE 12, 9, 1959.

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 410731

SECRET

13 FEB 1959

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Mollie BLOCK; Morris BLOCK (201-194231)

NO 201

1. The following information on Subjects has been received from the Dutch Internal Security Service (BVD). 29

2. On 4 November 1958 Mollie BLOCK (born 6 November 1911 in New York), holder of American passport No. 116708, left Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam on a KLM flight bound for Moscow via Warsaw. She traveled with her child Johanna Morris BLOCK, born in 1950, who was said to be in possession of a Greek passport. Mrs. BLOCK had originally planned to fly to Moscow on 2 September, but her trip was postponed by the circumstances outlined below.

3. On 30 August 1958 Morris BLOCK, husband of Mollie BLOCK, arrived at Amsterdam on a KLM flight from Montreal. BLOCK was carrying American passport No. 921617, issued 12 April 1956 but changed by him to read 12 April 1958 so that it would appear to be still valid. Morris BLOCK was refused entry to The Netherlands on the basis of his falsified passport. The American Consulate in Amsterdam validated his passport for a single return trip to New York, and he was sent back to New York on a KLM plane at 2359 hours on 30 August 1958.

4. Morris BLOCK was born in New York on 30 March 1920; he is a machinist by occupation, and his home address was given as 258 Corbin Place, Brooklyn, New York. BLOCKS's passport carried the following stamps:

England	IN via London Airport 23-7-1957 OUT via Dover 24-7-1957 IN via Dover 16-10-1957 OUT via London Airport 16-10-1957
France	In via Dunkirk 24-7-1957 OUT via Strassbourg 25-7-1957

SECRET CS COPY 201-194231

1-JD

Denmark IN via Kastrup Airport 15-10-1957
OUT via Kastrup Airport 16-10-1957

Canada IN via Montreal Airport 17-10-1957

BLOCK stated to the Dutch passport control officer that he had visited the USSR 25 July 1957 - 15 October 1957 as a delegate to the World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957. BLOCK stated it was his plan to travel from The Netherlands to Moscow and to settle himself and his family there. He said his visa for Russia was ready at the Soviet Embassy in The Hague and that since he was not permitted to obtain a new valid passport, he had changed the date of issuance of his former passport to make it appear to be still valid. Since he had not known for sure that he would be allowed to depart from the United States, his wife and child were to take a later plane to Amsterdam after his wife knew he had reached Canada. He said that he had been unemployed in the United States and that his wife had had to support the family on her salary of $65 a week.

5. BLOCK stated to the Dutch passport control officer that there was only one country in the world where freedom was really possible, and that he wished to go there. He no longer wanted to live in America, for the laws were made there by three or four families and the rest had to fall in line. He had had more than enough of the clique around Eisenhower. He stated he no longer valued his American nationality and asked if they could not admit him so that he could apply to the Russian Embassy. He said his wife had the money and tickets for the trip to Moscow from Amsterdam.

6. BLOCK had with him a suitcase and a cage with a parrot; his wife was to take the rest of their belongings with her. Also in his possession were:

a. Membership book for District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, 13 Astor Place, New York 3, issued to Morris BLOCK -- 238 Corbin Place, Brooklyn 35, Membership number 58923, membership paid up to 25 August 1958. In addition, he carried a District 65, AFL-CIO Employment Office Guide giving a registration date of 29 July 1958.

b. Birth certificate No. 14861, issued by State of New York certifying the birth of Morris Block on 3 March 1930.

c. Two visiting cards on which were: SH 35145 and SE 31054.

d. A small pin with the legend "VIth World Festival of Youth and Students Moscow 1957";

e. Two visiting cards, on which were:

Stanley FAULKNER, Counselor at Law, 9 East 40th Street, New York 16, Lexington 2-7760. Hunter 7-4093 was written on this.

Stella ELIASHOW, Remedial Reading, English Tutoring, 56 Seventh Avenue, New York 11, New York.

7. BLOCK also threw away a used piece of carbon paper which he obviously did not want to have with him on his return to the USA. The carbon read as follows:

WINDSOR Clothing Company
97 5th Avenue
New York City, NY

27 August 1958
gr

For Mr. Jack ELGERT	
1 round-trip United Air ticket 162.2.361424	$ 54.90
La Guardia-Cleveland-La Guardia - 10% tax	5.49
For Mrs. Jack ELGERT	
1 round-trip United Air ticket 162.2.361425	$ 40.85
10% tax	4.09
	$ 105.33

8. BLOCK had $63 with him. A room had been reserved at the Hotel Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam for him and his wife, since they had planned to travel together to Moscow on 2 September 1958. On his departure for the United States, BLOCK exclaimed as follows: "Oh, now I have to go back to the United States, but I have no money and I also had not paid for the trip, so what more can happen to me?"

OSOI - 3/753,461

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - FBI
1 - RI/AN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Staff
1 - WE/2

Prepared by: Marion E. Linde
10 February 1959

13 Feb

201-114231

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] NOVEMBER 1968 (EXCERPT - LOS ANGELES [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL [illegible])
SUBJECT: [illegible] JESUS [illegible]
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (LOS ANGELES)

DATE: [illegible] NOVEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: [illegible] SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR (GROUP OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA)
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: BOMBING ACTIVITIES BY CUBAN EXILES
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855

DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (PC)
MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-15556; 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; THREE MEN ALLEGED TO HAVE LEFT THE NEW YORK AREA AUG 16 68 TO PLACE A BOMB NEAR THE WHITE HOUSE...
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 23 SEPT 1968 CLASS: [illegible] SECRET
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (PC) FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (LOS ANGELES)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: [illegible] SEPTEMBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; EXPLOSION ABOARD
BRITISH FREIGHTER "CARIBBEAN [illegible]"...
FBI FILE NO: [illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA PODER CUBANO (CUBAN POWER)
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, ALSO KNOWN AS CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 AUGUST 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 AUGUST 1968 (EXCERPT - COPY AVAILABLE IN IP/AR)
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; EXPLOSION IN ENGINE
ROOM OF BRITISH FREIGHTER "GRANWOOD"...
FBI FILE NO: 45-1156 (MIAMI) 4 MAY 68

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Panama City
Chief of Base, JMCOBRA

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Origin of a Telegram Concerning the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR) and Poder Cubano, Headed by Orlando BOSCH Avila (201-299292)

Action: Panama City: See Paragraph 3
JMCOBRA : See Paragraph 4

References: A. DBC-22168, dated 15 July 1968 (Not sent Panama City or JMCOBRA)
B. DBC-23423, dated 23 July 1968 (Not sent Panama City or JMCOBRA)

1. The Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR--Insurrectional Movement of Revolutionary Recovery) is an anti-Fidel Castro organization of Cuban exiles headquartered in Miami, Florida, under the leadership of Orlando BOSCH Avila, who has been involved in numerous revolutionary acts, some of which have involved violence. He allegedly issues press releases and other communications which are signed "Ernesto, General Delegate, Cuban Power."

2. On 7 July 1968, the following communication was sent via Tropical Radio Telegraph Company, Panama City, Panama, to the Associated Press in Miami, as follows:

"CABSOO

" A TEP118 VIA TRTECKC RSA117 XHCRC MPA183 PR300
" UTMI HL PAPA 54
" PANAMARP VIATROPICAL 54 7 1830
" LT
" MR TED EDIGER
" ASSOCIATED PRESS
" 2125 BISCAYNE BLVD MIAMI/FLA
" BEING MIAMI VITAL CENTER CUBAN EXILES WE INFORM YOU CUBAN POWER IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE SABOTAGES HAVANA'S NICO OIL REFINERY AND CORINTE'S FEED FACTORY STOP ALL MEN SAFE STOP CONSIDERABLES LOSSES AND DAMAGES ON GOVERNMENT PROPERTY STOP HAVANA MAKING LONG REPORT ON DAMAGES STOP
"ERNESTO

201-299292

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Panama City
2 - COS, JMCOBRA

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HXPW-[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 12 AUG 1968
Typed: 7 August 1968

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-299292

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST: rson pi / EXT. 5421

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Art Kamm (In Draft
CI/LS		I. Roman

AN 2

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2		Edwin M. Sorrell

FORM 143 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66

1401

DISPATCH

"CFN 7125
"AP MIA 1AT
"1000P EDT"

Investigation reflects that BOSCH has a friend or representative of his organization in Panama, name and address unknown. Circumstances indicate that BOSCH may have telephoned or cablegrammed this individual on or about 7 July 1968, from Miami, Florida, requesting that the above-quoted telegram be transmitted.

3. Headquarters received the above information from LNERGO accompanied by a request to initiate appropriate inquiries in Panama City in an effort to determine the sender of the aforementioned transmission and also to discover if Orlando BOSCH Avila or one of his immediate associates may have been responsible for having this message sent. LNERGO cautioned that its role as the source of the above information should not be revealed in making the requested inquiries, though the data itself could be utilized.

4. If feasible, it is requested that JMCOBRA check its sources and report any information which connects BOSCH or any of his associates with the transmission of the above-quoted telegram.

Alice J. Borchsenius
Alice J. BORCHSENIUS

CS COPY

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 15 JULY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 22 JULY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: (LA) 97-4474 (WASH.D.C.)

DATE: 27 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 JUNE 1968
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR, AKA CUBAN POWER...
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, WH Division

[illegible] - LNERGO Report ([illegible]) possible bombing of a plane from Nassau to Cuba.

The following paragraphs were extracted from a detailed report on the activities of Dr. Orlando BOSCH Avila, a Cuban medical doctor and head of the anti-Castro revolutionary organization, MIRR, and resident in the U.S.:

"On June 10, 1968, MM T-3 reported that BOSCH claims to have a man now in Nassau, Bahama Islands, who is checking British flights used by Cuban United Nations personnel traveling from New York City to Cuba. MM T-3 expressed the belief that this procedure is a preliminary survey to some form of action, possibly the bombing of a plane going from Nassau to Cuba with Cuban United Nations personnel aboard.

"On June 17, 1968, MM T-3 reported that BOSCH had declared that he intends to continue bombing ships of countries trading with Cuba. On June 19, 1968, BOSCH disclosed to MM T-3 that he has men in New York City, Tampa and Miami who are checking out BOSCH's plan to bomb ships."

[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, JMWAVE

KM

201-299292

201-299292

1 August 1968

SECRET

189-9-1

WH/1/[illegible] 4133/1349

1 - J/TS Chrono
1 - 189-9-1
1 - DC/WH/COG

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 14 JULY 1967
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 3 JULY 1967 (CROSS REFERENCE SHEET -
DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN ITEM 68 -
CLASS: NOT KNOWN MIRR)
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NOT KNOWN

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 8 APRIL 1968
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 JULY 1967
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: FRANK ANGELO FIORINI;
DR. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ....
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MOVIEMENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)

F

FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

O. WILLIAMS:JAF
WH/COG/CICS/OS
9044
28 APRIL 67

SECRET

153

3/29

☒ RID COPY

☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
☒ ☐ 201-299292
201-728607

INFO: 3/CI/SO, DDP, ADDP, C/CI

SECRET

97049

28 14 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY JMWAVE

~~SUBJECT~~ DESENSITIZED TYPIC

1. FOLLOWING PERSONS WILL BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATION ARMS CONTROL ACT, CONSPIRACY, NEUTRALITY ACT. ~~THE~~ U.S. ATTORNEY MIAMI WILL PROBABLY PRESENT ~~THE~~ CASE TO ~~THE~~ GRAND JURY 15 MAY 1967.

A. ORLANDO BOSCH Y AVILA (201-299292) DPOB 18 JULY 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA. RESIDING 1849 N.W. 35TH STREET, MIAMI.

B. LOUIS CONCEPTION BERTOT AGE 36, U.S. CITIZEN, RESIDING 910 N.W. 29TH AVE. MIAMI.

C. JOSE ANTONIO MULET Y GONZALES (201-728607) DPOB 31 DECEMBER 1921, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. RESIDING 201 N.W. 35TH STREET, MIAMI.

D. JOSE DIAZ Y MOREJON DPOB 23 MARCH 1942, CUBA. RESIDING 72½ S.W. 11TH STREET, MIAMI.

E. MARCOS RODRIGUEZ Y RAMOS DPOB 16 JUNE 1944, CUBA. RESIDING 227 N.W. 17TH AVENUE, MIAMI.

F. BARBARO BALAN Y GARCIA DPOB 4 DECEMBER 1936, CUBA. RESIDING 735 S.W. 1ST STREET, MIAMI.

201-299292
28 April 1967

B 201-728607

RECORDS
The
authorized:
Signed
R.O.
Note:
reasons
if appropriate

MICROFILMED
JUL 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DESENSITIZED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 97049

G. ARTHUR ANDREW GIRTEIT RESIDING 890 N.W. 45TH AVENUE, MIAMI. (POSSIBLY [illegible] WITNESS RATHER THAN [illegible] DEFENDANT IN CASE).

2. PLEASE FORWARD PRIOR COB [illegible] MAY 67 ANY TRACES NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS ON SUBJECTS PARA 1.

3. JMWAVE'S COMMENTS ARE REQUESTED ON POSSIBLE EFFECT THIS TRIAL ON STATION'S OPERATIONS AND SECURITY IN SAME CONTEXT AS MASFERRER CASE. HEADQUARTERS ALSO INTERESTED [illegible] KNOWING WHETHER OR NOT ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF ANY KIND EVER EMPLOYED AGAINST THESE INDIVIDUALS (INCLUDING SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING OF SGSWIRL INTERVIEW).

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/~~[illegible]~~ FI

C/WH/COG/CICS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO FILE, [illegible]

720PM 3-29-67 FBC

DBA-77240

TO SECRETARY OF STATE 2

TO DIRECTOR CIA 1

TO DIRECTOR DIA 1

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: SECRET SERVICE (PID) 1

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR)
INTERNAL SECURITY -CUBA
NEUTRALITY MATTER -CUBA
(SECRET)

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN 32580

MIRR IS AN ANTI-CASTRO ORGANIZATION HEADED BY DR. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND HAS CONDUCTED RAIDS AGAINST CUBA IN THE PAST.

201-299292

ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHICH CONDUCTS INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS ON MARCH TWENTYTHREE, SIXTYSEVEN, ADVISED THAT AN ~~[illegible]~~ ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALL HAD BEEN RECEIVED ON MARCH FIFTEEN, SIXTYSEVEN, STATING AN AMERICAN PILOT INTENDED TO RENT AN AIRPLANE IN APRIL, SIXTYSEVEN, AND DROP SEVERAL ONE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS OVER CUBA FOR ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.

CS COPY

D-19-300-20

SECRET

201-299292

THE ANONYMOUS PERSON ON MARCH TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN, AGAIN CALLED AND CLAIMED THAT THEIR TARGET WOULD BE PUNTO ALEGRE, CUBA. FOUR TO SIX BOMBS WOULD BE USED. THE RAID WOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS. A TWIN ENGINE AIRPLANE WOULD BE USED. THE FLIGHT WOULD BE OUT OF OPA-LOCKA, FLA. AND THE PILOT WOULD RECEIVE BETWEEN FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS.

A SECOND SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH BOSCH IN THE PAST AND WITH WHOM INSUFFICIENT CONTACT HAS BEEN HAD TO DETERMINE HIS RELIABILITY, ON MARCH TWENTYNINE, SIXTYSEVEN, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

ON FEBRUARY TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN AND MARCH TWELVE, SIXTYSEVEN, BOSCH MET WITH AN AMERICAN PILOT CONCERNING A BOMBING MISSION OVER CUBA. BOSCH SAID THAT BETWEEN THIRTYFIVE HUNDRED AND FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE THE RAID, A RENTED AIRPLANE WOULD BE ACQUIRED FROM OUTSIDE FLORIDA, A PILOT AND TWO OTHERS WOULD CARRY OUT THE MISSION, AND THAT BETWEEN FOUR AND SIX ONE HUNDRED POUND BOMBS WOULD BE USED. THE TARGET WOULD BE A SUGAR MILL ON THE NORTH COAST OF CUBA.

THIS SOURCE REPORTED THAT BOSCH IS VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS, WOULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CREW OF THE AIRPLANE, THE SOURCE OF THE

BOMBS, OR FROM WHERE IN THE UNITED STATES THE PLANE WOULD TAKE OFF.

BOSCH SAID HE WOULD CONTACT THE PILOT ON APRIL ONE, TWO OR THREE, SIXTYSEVEN, BRIEF HIM ON THE MISSION, FINALIZE ALL ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE PILOT WOULD BE READY TO LEAVE AFTER THE BRIEFING. BOSCH INDICATED THE PILOT AND CREW WOULD NOT KNOW EACH OTHER'S IDENTITIES OR THE DESCRIPTION OF THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE TIME OF THE MISSION.

U.S. CUSTOMS IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ADVISED THAT IT IS CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION IN THIS MATTER. ACCORDINGLY NO INVESTIGATION IS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY FBI.

GP-1

END

201-299292

14-00000

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.
2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
3. DATE
4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
5. DATE OF INFO.
6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST
8. DATE PROCESSED
9. DISSEMINATED IN
10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE FORMATION OF CUBAN-HAITIAN EMIGRE VALLIANCE
WITH GOAL OF INVADING HAITI.

036-009-006
WAVE-06130
18 MAR 67
UFG -08833
P2

HTPWMMHVCHGGHNMHRS-

R 6704130682

FILE IN 201-299 292

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMOT/Operational
Anti-US/CIA Cuban Exile Rally Held in New York on 19 February 1967

Action Required: None, FYI

1. Attached herewith is AMOT Report Number DD-2088, dated 20 February 1967, Subject: Rally Held in New York on 19 February 1967 Under the Sponsorship of the Cuban Nationalist Association (ANC) and the MIRR-Comandos L Alliance.

2. As noted in the report, Felipe RIVERO Diaz, ANC leader, and Orlando BOSCH Avila, MIRR leader, violently attached the United States and CIA during the rally.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment - herewith
AMOT Report

Distribution
3 - WH/COG

File in
201-299292

CS COPY FILED IN 19-300-30

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-281688
201-299292

DATE TYPED
24 Feb 67

DATE DISPATCHED
MAR -1 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27081

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-3/4

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 24 FEBRUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: MIRR

FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

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FILE [illegible]

SECRET 170849Z CITE JMWAVE 4132

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

IN 40572

TYPIC

1. LOCAL QKMAGNET RECEIVED PHONE CALL 15 NOV 66 FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS DR. ORLANDO BOSCH WHO REPORTED ONE OF HIS TWO ENGINE AIRCRAFT MISSING ON BOMBING RAID ON CUBA STAGED FROM CENTRAL AMERICA. HE REFUSED DETAILS ON ROUTES USED BUT IDENTIFIED CREW AS EVELIO GUTIERREZ AND RAUL FONTONY. JMWAVE TRACES NEGATIVE.

2. QKMAGNET TALKED WITH MRS. GUTIERREZ AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS MIRR EVENING 15 NOV. SHE DESCRIBED MISSING AIRCRAFT AS DARK IN COLOR, TWIN ENGINE, NO NUMBER. AIRCRAFT LAUNCHED FIRST ATTACK FROM BIMINI. SECOND ATTACK ALSO LAUNCHED FROM BIMINI WITH MATANZAS OR LOS VILLAS PROVINCES AS TARGETS BUT AIRCRAFT DID NOT RETURN.

SECRET

FI

ABSTRACT

201-299292

16 Nov., 1966

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4132 S E C R E T SECRET

3. SKMAENET ADVISED BY LASOLD OF SAN JUAN RUMOR THAT UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL PICKED UP TWO MEN NAMED (FNU) GUTIERREZ AND EVELIO ALPIZAR ON RAFT. SAN JUAN QNMASHET ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE VALIDITY RUMOR. STATION TRACES SHOW ALPIZAR POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH EVELIO ALPIZAR PEREZ DOB 27 NOV 1931 HAVANA CUBAN AIR FORCE PILOT UNDER BATISTA, NOW RESIDING MIAMI.

S E C R E T

3T

SECRET

NNNN

RID/MIS
RID/MIS
Dec 6 11 03 AM '66
Dec 2 3 50 PM '66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-299292
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH/C 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

TIME 0200Z BY B

INFO FILE, VR, CS/EE, DCI, D/DCI, DCI (GOODWIN), DDP, ADDP, C/OZ, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, SOD6, CCS3, EUR8, C/OA, DO4, DO/H3

70[illegible]11550

S E C R E T [illegible]542Z CITE JMWAVE 3413

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.

2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT AMTAUP-2 HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE GUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF PROPAGANDA OF MIRR, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER. AMTAUP-2 ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL JORGE VEGA, BOSCH DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE HOMELAND FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS WOFACT, WHICH WAS CONDUCTING "SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY" FROM A BASE LOCATED AT THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.

3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT [illegible]

SECRET

201-299292

7 Oct 66

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3418 S E C R E T

WITH CURRENT WAVE RIGGER IS LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER HAS NOT BEEN AT [illegible] SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS USE AND REPAIRS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1 OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ. RIGGER NOW AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO NAPLES SITE. AS HQS AWARE LATTER SITE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITE. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION, GULFLANT, WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER.

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER AMTAUP-2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE NOT HELD BY MIRR BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI, AP, MIAMI HERALD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA CLAIM RE WOFACT ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF 1700 HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY MENTION IN PRESS OF ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF BOSCH TRAIL DID NOT MENTION STATEMENTS. CHECKING NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

SECRET

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SECRET

7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT SHOWS THAT WOFACT NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIOONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFACT ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFACT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

SECRET

201-299292

SECRET

PAGE 4 JMWAVE 3413 S E C R E T

OR OPS SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

S E C R E T

BT

RID/MIS

Oct 17 11 01 AM '66

NN SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1966
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JULY 1966
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMOT
Statements Made by Orlando BOSCH Avila at His Trial

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, For Your Information

Reference: JMWAVE 1326, 6 June 1966

1. Forwarded herewith is AMOT Report DD-1875, dated 9 June 1966, and its attachment which is a copy of a "Diario Las Americas" article dated 5 June 1966, concerning BOSCH's testimony that he was encouraged by the CIA to plan an attack against a refinery in Cuba in 1965.

2. The reference in AMOT Report DD-1875, DD-1848, was disseminated in UFG-8249 on 5 May 1966.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachment:
AMOT Report - H/W

Distribution:
-3 - WH/C, w/att

Copy

201-299292

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-299292

CS Copy
#17

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 21 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-25340

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-300-20

CLASSIFICATION
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SECRET

FROM: [redacted] UD-1879

AGENT: [redacted] 9 June 1966

VIA: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Activities of the MIRR

SOURCE: Diario Las Americas

REF: UD-1848, para. 9

1. With regard to the statement made by Orlando BOSCH Avila, director of the MIRR, on 4 June 1966 at the trial going on in Orlando, Florida to the effect that the CIA had encouraged him to set up an attack against a refinery in Cuba (see the attached copy of the item in Diario Las Americas on 5 June) we have the following to report.

2. On 30 April 1966 BOSCH told P-86 during a conversation (see UD-1848, para. 9) that he intended to involve the United States in his plans, thus using this form of blackmail against the authorities of the United States.

DIARIO LAS AMERICAS

5 Junio 66

Afirmó Orlando Bosch que la CIA lo Alentó a Volar una Refinería

ORLANDO, Florida, junio 6 (UPI) — El líder cubano anticastrista Orlando Bosch testificó hoy en el juicio que se le sigue bajo el cargo de exportar armamento bélico, que la Dirección Central de Inteligencia "CIA" alentó una conjura para volar una refinería de petróleo en La Habana en 1965.

El proceso ante un tribunal federal, que se sigue asimismo a otros tres exiliados cubanos (Marcos Rodríguez, José Díaz y Gerulio Gutiérrez, deberá culminar mañana con la entrega del caso a un tribunal de 12 hombres.

Bosch declaró que un tal Bill Johnson, a quien identificó como agente de la CIA, le propuso bombardear desde el aire la refinería, para lo cual le prometió un avión, un piloto y las bombas. Añadió haber convenido el traslado de los explosivos a la casa de Frank Swanner, el piloto que atestiguó, por la fiscalía, que los reos intentaron contratarlo para la incursión aérea.

El acusado dijo a los abogados del gobierno que no intentaba infringir las leyes estadounidenses de neutralidad y exportación de municiones, pues el plan fue concebido por la CIA.

Mientras los acusadores señalan que Bosch fue advertido sobre las normas federales, sus defensores aducen que el Gobierno Federal proporcionó los materiales y había contratado a Johnson.

El abogado defensor argumentó que la incursión no iba a ser realizada desde territorio de Estados Unidos, y que las bombas que debían utilizarse no estaban clasificadas como armamentos bélicos.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

DATE

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

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DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

019-300-020
UFG -08238
03 MAY 66
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
POSSIBLE PICKETING IN MIAMI BY
THE MIRR ON BEHALF OF RAMON
DONESTEVEZ DOMINGUEZ.

R 6605100753

FILE IN 201-299292

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-60)

7 1/21/66 C/S 2/5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

ROUTING

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2	6
3 RE	7
4	8

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION IN ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED TO CSDO AT 0815 D)

INFO DCI, D/DCI, EX/DIR, DDP, CS/RF, VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, CS/DO, SOD 4, RI/AN, DO/H 4, WH 8.

ADDED: WH/C 12, VR

SECRET 202318Z 21 JAN 0046Z 66 IN 38401

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 8598

INTEL TYPIC 1

SUPDATA: AMTAUP-2 IN AMOT DD-1740 OF 19 JAN 65 FROM SERGIO SANCHEZ SUAREZ. RID: INDEX SUAREZ, BOSCH. FILED 202318Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA

SUBJ: REPAIR OF TWIN ENGINE VESSEL TO BE USED BY THE MIRR TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO LAV VILTAS PROVINCE

DOI: 19 JANUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (20 JANUARY 1966)

UFG-7902

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE

IW COMMENT:

201-299292

	WH/C	12	
	WH/REG	8	

TDCSDB-315/00235-66

X ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON: UFG-7902
TP (AMTAUP-2)

LIAISON: x

RELEASING IWO: Launie M. Ziebell
LAUNIE M. ZIEBELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
21 JANUARY 1966
0316 Z

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM:

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

PAGE 2 IN 38401

TECHINQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

[illegible]

IV. COMMENT:

[illegible]

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

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CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA

TDCS DB-315/00235-66

DATE OF INFO. 19 JANUARY 1966

DISTR. 21 JANUARY 1966

SUBJECT

REPAIR OF TWIN ENGINE VESSEL TO BE USED BY THE MIRR TO INFILTRATE PERSONNEL INTO LAV VILTAS PROVINCE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (20 JANUARY 1966)

REF

IN 38491

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-7902

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

1. ON THE MORNING OF 19 JANUARY 1966 SERGIO SANCHEZ SUAREZ, 3635 NW 23RD COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WAS REPAIRING A TWIN-ENGINE VESSEL OWNED BY THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECSPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY). SUAREZ HAD ALREADY COMPLETED WORK ON ONE ENGINE AND WAS EXPECTED TO FINISH WORK ON THE OTHER BY THE AFTERNOON OF 19 JANUARY.

2. THE MIRR PLANS TO USE THE VESSEL TO INFILTRATE TEN MEN INTO THE NORTH COAST OF LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. THE GROUP IS ONLY WAITING FOR THE WEATHER TO IMPROVE BEFORE MAKING THE TRIP. THE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR EXO

CIA/NMCC, FBI, I&NS, TREASURY, COAST GUARD, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL

201-244242

CONFIDENTIAL IN 30481 TDCS DB-315/00235/PAGE 2

VESSEL WILL TAKE THE MEN TO WITHIN EIGHT MILES OF THE COAST WHERE THEY WILL THEN BOARD A SMALLER BOAT AND PROCEED TO LAND.

3. ACCORDING TO SUAREZ, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, LEADER OF THE MIRR, HAD SAID THAT THE INFILTRATION TEAM WOULD BE CARRYING OUT "A VERY IMPORTANT ACTION" IN CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROLLED DISSEM

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 17 DECEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT : MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible]855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 13 DECEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE)
FBI FILE NO: 105-8280 (MIAMI)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO
FILE VR, CSDO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, [illegible] C/CI, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, DDI, C(E.W) [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]

DIR CITE WAVE 7653

IN 03784

TYPIC AMOT

1. FYI AMOT REPORT DD-1698 DTD 30 NOV REPORTS GIST OF 27 NOV TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMTAUP-2 AND MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ OF MIRR. GARCIA STATED HAD TALKED ON TELEPHONE ON 27 NOV TO ORLANDO BOSCH WHO IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT. BOSCH INDICATED STUDENTS AT HARTFORD UNIVERSITY HAD MADE $5000 BOND FOR BOSCH PERMITTING HIS RELEASE: BOND ORIGINALLY SET AT $15,000 SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCED TO $5,000. ACCORDING BOSCH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS HAVE ASKED THAT BOSCH BE TRIED IN "PUBLIC TRIAL" BUT ACCORDING BOSCH THIS INFO CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. SAME CAVEAT PASSED TO A-2 BY GARCIA. BOSCH ALSO INDICATED WOULD SPEND THREE OR FOUR DAYS AT HARTFORD, HAVE MEETING AT THE UNIVERSITY AND ATTEMPT COLLECT FUNDS "FOR AN OPERATION HE (BOSCH) HAD PLANNED".

2. GARCIA INDICATED TO A-2 THAT PREVIOUSLY PLANNED PROTEST DEMONSTRATION CANCELLED WHEN BOSCH RELEASED, AND ADDED THAT HENCEFORTH ALL EFFORTS OF MIRR WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS EFFECTING PLANNED AIR RAID OVER PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE. (WAVE

SECRET

201-299292

2 Dec 65

SECRET IN 06764 page 2

COMMENT: SEE UFG 7754 FOR INFORMATION ON PLANNED DEMONSTRATION AND UFG 7739 FOR INFORMATION ON PROPOSED STRIKE).

3. WAVE DOES NOT INTEND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION LOCALLY SINCE ASSUME SUBSTANCE ABOVE INFO KNOWN TO ODENVY WILL CONTINUE MONITORING MIRR PLANS. WOULD APPRECIATE DIR DETERMINE WHETHER HARTFORD UNIVERSITY STUDENTS DID IN FACT MAKE BOND, WHETHER PLANNED MEETING HELD, AND ESTIMATE AMOUNT COLLECTED IF ANY. WILL USE REPLIES IN SUBSEQUENT DISSEMINATIONS IF APPROPRIATE.

SECRET

CFN 7653 FYI DD 1698 DTD 30 NOV 27 NOV AMTAUP-2 MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ MIRR 27 NOV ORLANDO BOSCH HARTFORD CONNECTICUT HARTFORD UNIVERSITY $5000 $15,000 $5,000 NOT FOR A-1 GARCIA A-2 PINAR DEL RIO UFG 7754 UFG 7739 NOT INTEND

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

WH/C/CICS

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26/3 SECRET

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ACTION WH/C 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, PPB, OGC 2, FI, FI/INT, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, DDP, ADDP

ABSTRACT

S E C R E T 012209Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7629

TYPIC AMOT

1 Dec 65 IN 05856

FOR YOUR INFORMATION ON BASIS AMOT REPORT DD 1699 OF 30 NOV 65. AMOT-2 OBTAINED FOLLOWING FROM MARIO BARRERA DIAZ, WHO IN NEW YORK AND REGULAR AMOT SUB-SOURCE. WHILE VISITING NEW YORK OFFICES "EL TIEMPO" 30 NOV DIAZ WAS INFORMED BY PEDRO YANES OF MIRR ORGANIZATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WOULD MEET SENATOR DODD ON 3 DEC AT WHICH TIME BOSCH TO COMPLAIN ABOUT "PERSECUTION, INSULTS AND OTHER ATROCITIES" COMMITTED AGAINST HIS PERSON BY ODYOKE OFFICIALS.

S E C R E T

CFN 7629 AMOT DD 1699 30 NOV 65 AMOT-2 MARIO BARRERA DIAZ NEW YORK EL TIMEPO 30 NOV PEDRO YANES MIRR ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA SENATOR DODD 3 DEC

BT

SECRET

201-299292

1 Dec 65

EJJ

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
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	5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 6. DATE OF INFO. / 7. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST / 9. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
POSSIBLE RAID PLANS BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, LEADER OF MOIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA/MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY/

019-002-004
UFGA-23848
22 NOV 65
+19-2-4-2
A02

R 6512031956

FILE IN 201-299292

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

m.m

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

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3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
POSSIBILITY THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
MAY BE PLANNING AN AERIAL RAID OVER
CUBA.

019-006-095/04
WAVE-07391
20 NOV 65
UFG -07739
P3

MZP

R 6511301958

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ | | 29 | 92 | 92

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET [illegible]

m. m

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. | DATE

SOURCE CRYPTONYM | DATE OF INFO. | EVALUATION

ANALYST | DATE PROCESSED

DISSEMINATED IN | DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-300-020
WAVE-07369
19 NOV 65
UFG -07738
P4

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA 201-299292, LEADER OF THE MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT OFR REVCLUTIONARY RECOVERY, IS PLANNING AN ATTACK ON CUBA WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ADOLFO JIMENEZ AGUILERA 201-327701, HAS BEEN ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION. DOI 18 NOV 65.

MZP R 6511301959

FILE IN 201-

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➪ 29 92 92

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (40)

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

DATE

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

DISSEMINATED IN

DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

BUSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
LDR OF THE MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT
FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION
PLANS OF CUBAN EMIGRES TO ATTEND CONF- ERENCE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RIO DE JANEIRO

019-006-095/04
WAVE-07282
17 NOV 65
UFG -07719
P3

R 6512060194

FILE IN 201-299292

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(10-60)

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

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INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/OPS, FI, CI

S E C R E T 172228Z

DIR INFO MIOD CITE WAVE 7315 (INCHURST ACTING)

17 Nov 65 IN 96796

MHMOOSE PBRUMEN

REFS A. DIR 47960

B. WAVE 7282 (IN 95999)*

1. ODFOAM REPORTS: JUAN JOSE CERILO (MORENZA) ABREU AND HIS CLOSE FRIEND MARIO (BARRERA) DIAZ (201-281387) PREPARING TRAVEL RIO OAS MEETING. BOTH ASSOCIATED COLLEGE OF NEWSPAPERMEN IN EXILE AND FRIENDS ORLANDO (BOSCH) AVILA, HEAD INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION (MIRR), MILITANT ACTIVIST ORGANIZATION.

2. ODFOAM IN JULY 1965 INVESTIGATED AND CLEARED MORENZA FOR ALLEGED THREAT GPLOGIC. ODFOAM OPINION THERE NO INDICATION SUBJECTS PLAN HOSTILE ACTION OAS MEETING DESPITE BOSCH ASSOCIATION.

3. AMOTS REPORT MORENZA BORN 1904, NEGRO, ALLEGEDLY NOT ALLOWED MEXICO BECAUSE INVOLVED ROLLASON VISA SALES. IN PAST WAS DELEGATE TO MEXICO FOR AGENCIA DE INFORMACIONES PERIODISTICAS (AIP) AND ASSOCIATED PRIO ELEMENT PRO-OBIERNO CONSTITUCIONAL DE CUBA (PGCC).

4. MORENZA ON FINANCE DEPT DELEGATION CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) IN MEXICO 1962.

201-299292

17 Nov 65

SECRET IN 96796 PAGE 2

CFN 7515 47968 7282 JUAN JOSE CERILO MORENZA ABREU MARIO CARRERA DIAZ 201-281387 RIO OAS ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA MIRR 1965 MORENZA NO INDICATION OAS BOSCH 1964 NEGRO NOT ALLOWED MEXICO AIP PRO-GOBIERNO FOCC CRC 1962

BT

* CUBANS PLANS TO ATTEND RIO CONF*

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MINE
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; MINING OF SPANISH
VESSEL "SATRUSTEGUI" AT SAN JUAN...
FBI FILE NO: 105-10602 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

DISPATCH

SECRET

X

Chief, Latin America Division

HCO HCB

Chief of Station, Quito; Chief of Station, Bogota

Chief of Base, Guayaquil TDS

Orlando BOSCH Avila (Efrain LEITONE)

10

[illegible] MICROFILMED

Forwarded herewith are two photographs of **Orlando Bosch Avila, Cuban exile pilot who is believed to be traveling on a Colombian passport using the alias Efrain Leitone. During the recent OAS Conference in Quito, Ecuadorean immigration officials added Bosch to the Ecuadorean watchlist of known and extremely dangerous terrorists. The photographs were provided by PJBREEZY-3.

Theodore E. Kuvallis
Theodore E. KUVALLIS

1 Attachment:
As stated above h/w

Distribution:
✓Orig. & 1 - C/LAD w/att
1 - COS, Quito w/att
1 - COS, Bogota w/att

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DEC 23 5 02 [illegible] E-2 IMPDET

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HEGA-4688	DATE 13 December 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-0299292 ~~201-0855937~~

DOC. MICRO. SER.
DEC 24 1974
MICROFILMED



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201-0299292
13 Dec 74

Atw att. #1 to HEGA-04688

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; BOMB RECEIVED IN MAIL
AT POST OFFICE, MADRID, SPAIN...

FBI FILE NO: 105-22456 (MIAMI)

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ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR [illegible], CI/OPS, [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]

T 592618 EIA298 PAGE 01 IN 423538

TOR:222259Z NOV 74 CARA 26354

4

S E C R E T 222248Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26854

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTO DOMINGO INFO PRIORITY QUITO, LA/MIAMI.

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 15971 (IN 421799)

1. VENEZUELAN LIAISON ADVISES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS IN CURACAO. STATION DOES NOT YET KNOW CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOSCH'S MOVE FROM VENEZUELA TO CURACAO, BUT HOPE OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO NIGHT 22 NOVEMBER.

2. GOV WAS FULLY AWARE THAT PERSON THEY DETAINED WAS BOSCH EVEN THOUGH HE WORE DISGUISE AND CARRIED VALID DOMINICAN PASSPORT. WHEN U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE DECIDED NOT EXTRADITE BOSCH, VENEZUELANS WERE SOMEWHAT UNSURE WHAT TO DO WITH HIM. THEIR CASE AGAINST BOSCH FOR COMPLICITY IN LOCAL AND QUITO BOMBINGS WAS LARGELY HEARSAY; THIS COUPLED WITH POTENTIAL ADVERSE REACTION FROM LOCAL CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IF ATTEMPT MADE TO PROSECUTE, PROBABLY MADE EXPLUSION TO DOM REP (FEIGNING IGNORANCE OF ~~THE~~ HIS IDENTITY) AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE. WHETHER HE HAS NOW BEEN EXPELLED ONLY SO FAR AS CURACAO OR TO SOME FURTHER POINT (INCLUDING

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TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
INDEX

201-0299292
22 Nov 74

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT

INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 592010 EIA298 PAGE 02-02 IN 423530

TOR:222259Z NOV 74 CARA 20854

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC) IS NOT YET KNOWN. IF IT IS VENEZUELAN INTENTION TO SEND BOSCH TO DOM REP, THE COURSE MAY BE CLOSED TO THEM IF THEY ACKNOWLEDGE TO GODR THEIR AWARENESS BOSCH TRUE IDENTITY AND RESULTANT OBVIOUS FALSITY OF DOM REP PASSPORT. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO ACT AS BROKER TO PUT GOV ON OFFICIAL NOTICE, ON BEHALF OF GODR, THAT SUBJECT IS BOSCH AND THEREBY COMPLICATING GOV HANDLING OF MATTER.

3. FYI STATION UNILATERAL SOURCE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH BOSCH PRIOR TO HIS ARREST, SAID BOSCH TOLD HIM THE DOMINICAN PASSPORT WAS VALID AND HAD COST HIM U.S. $3000 IN DOM REP.

4. FILE: DEFER.

DEC 9 74

06

SECRET

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 20

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3		6	

ACTION UNIT LA8

INFO RF FILE VR

T 592597 EIA879 PAGE 01 IN 423455

TOR:222138Z NOV 74 SDOM 15980

SECRET 222125Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 15980

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 15971 (IN421799)

DUPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS FILING INTO 201-299292

1. 22 NOVEMBER EDITION "EL CARIBE" NEWSPAPER REPORTS ORLANDO BOSCH (201-299292) DEPORTED FROM VENEZUELA TO CURACAO ON 21 NOVEMBER FOLLOWING HIS ARREST ON 19 NOVEMBER. STORY CARRIES AP NEW YORK BYLINE AND WAS WRITTEN BY MIGUEL GALLASTEGUI.

2. WHEN HE RECEIVED NEWS, EMPYREX-1 CALLED DOMINICAN CONSUL IN CURACAO AND TOLD HIM TO ADVISE LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF BOSCH ARRIVAL AND REQUEST THEY TAKE AWAY FALSE DOMINICAN PASSPORT HE CARRYING. CONSUL ALSO TOLD TO ADVISE AUTHORITIES THAT BOSCH WILL NOT BE PERMITTED ENTER DOMREP. EMPYREX-1 TOLD STATION EFFORTS DISCOVER NAME UNDER WHICH BOSCH TRAVELING HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. HE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE PHOTOGRAPH OF BOSCH AND THESE HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO AIRPORT SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO PICKUP BOSCH IN EVENT HE TRIES TO GET INTO THE COUNTRY.

3. FILE 22-9-28, BOSCH 201. E2 IMPDET

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ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR [illegible]

CCS2

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2		5	
3		6	

T 574780 E1A725 PAGE 01 IN 416946

TOR:152215Z NOV 74 CARA 25993

S E C R E T 152115Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25993

TO: DIRECTOR, QUITO INFO LA/MIAMI.

REF: QUITO 21108 (IN 411939)

1. FYI WKSCARLET-3 MET WITH ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN CARACAS EVENING 13 NOVEMBER AND HE CERTAIN BOSCH HAS NOT LEFT VENEZUELA RECENTLY. BOSCH HAS ALIAS DOMINICAN PASSPORT AND VENEZUELAN 30-DAY TOURIST CARD WHICH HAS EXPIRED. BOSCH HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO IMPROVE LOCAL DOCUMENTATION AND THEREFORE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING BACK INTO VENEZUELA IF HE LEFT.

2. WKSCARLET-3 SAID BOSCH IS USING DARK WIG WHICH LAYS OVER TO RIGHT SIDE OF HEAD. IS USING A COSMETIC TO BLEND A SKIN DISCOLORATION AT RIGHT SIDE OF MOUTH AND RIGHT CHEEK. HAS SHAVED OFF MOUSTACHE HE WORE FOR MANY YEARS AND NOW APPEARS WEIGH ABOUT 210 POUNDS.

3. BOSCH CLAIMED AC RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF BOMBINGS IN QUITO AT MFM AND THAT IT ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

4. STATION ADVISING LOCAL LEGATT ORALLY ABOVE PARA TWO DESCRIPTION AND THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS 13 NOVEMBER; SOURCING TO

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ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO

RF FILE VR

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T 574788 EIA725 PAGE 02-02 IN 415946

TOR:152215Z NOV 74 CARA 25993

"A CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI". REQUEST QUITO ADVISE CARACAS ASSISTANT LEGATT GORDON ELLISON SAME, CITING SAME SOURCE.

5. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

[illegible]

SECRET

FBI CABLES

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - FIGITIVE, PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, AKA - FUGITIVE - PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT LA15

ACTION #

RF FILE VR [illegible], SECUR4, [illegible], C/CCP, [illegible], [illegible], DDO, DOCBO, [illegible], PSIEB4,

T 501013 EIA048 PAGE 01-01 IN 411939

TOR:112345Z NOV 74 QUIT 21108

S E C R E T 112330Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21108

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GUAYAQUIL INFO CARACAS, LIMA, LA/MIAMI,

VWLOFTY

REF: QUITO 21087 (IN 410675)

1. STATION PASSED TO SECURITY CHIEF COPIES OF PHOTO OF ORLANDO BOSCH PROVIDED BY LEGATT GORDON ELLISON. SECURITY HEAD REPORTED THEY HAVE TRACED RESIDENCE OF ROBERTO VERDAGUER BOAN TO GUAYAQUIL. RESIDENCE IS BEING ~~CAQHOLJD~~ *SURVEILLED AND PHOTO WILL ASSIST POLICE IF BOSCH MAKES CONTACT WITH VERDAGUER.

2. DFILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET

*BEING SVLD

SECRET

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FOR [illegible] FILING
[illegible], 0299292

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 091603Z DIRECTOR 620133

CONF: LA 15 INFO: FILE OPSINT, SECUR 4, LA/COG, OPS/ITG, VR, DDO, DDO/CO, DWD 2, SS/SEC 6, PS/EG 4, IW 0 0 0 0 6

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO. LIMA INFO GUAYAQUIL. V

ELVULOFTY V

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 619818 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED LIMA, GUAYAQUIL)

B. LIMA 29138 [IN 410127] V

1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FBI INDICATES BOSCH MAY BE TRAVELING ON FALSE COBLOMBIAN PASSPORT BUT NO INFO ON ALIAS BEING USED. BOSCH WAS RELEASED FROM ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY 15 DEC 72 ON PAROLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA (AC). THIS GROUP HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA AND MADRID DURING PAST YEAR. V

2. FBI DESCRIBES SEBOSCH AS EGOTISTICAL AND DANGEROUS FANATIC WITH A FLARE FOR THE DRAMATIC. THE F GBI SOURCE HAS SPECULATED THAT BOSCH MAY SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM ROBERTO VERDAGUER, CUBAN EXILE PILOT WHO IS REPORTED TO RUN A CROP DUSTING BUSINESS IN ECUADOR. THE F GBI SOURCE DID NOT HAVE FURTHER INFO ON VERDAGUER BUT HE MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT OF 201-231540 WHO HAS SAME NAME AND CARDED AS BOTH ECUADOREAN AND CUBAN WITH OCCUPATION AS PILOT.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE DISSEM BY:

620133

BRIEF NOTATION STATED HE WAS INVOLVED IN ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. CHECKING FURTHER, WILL ADVISE.

3. FOR LIMA: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST WANTED BY FBI AND REPORTED TO BE IN QUITO (OR WITH INTENT OF TRAVELING TO QUITO) TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AGAINST OAS MINISTERS MEETING. REF B MENTION OF EFRAIN LEYTONE YATE TRAVELING ON COLOMBIAN PASSPORT AND ARRESTED FOR CARRYING ARMS RAISES QUESTION WHETHER LEYTONE MIGHT BE ALIAS BEING USED BY BOSCH. EBOSCH BORN 18 AUG 26, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA IS DESCRIBED AS 5 FEET E010 INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 170 POUNDS, DARK COMPLEXION, BOOOBLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, RED BIRTHMARK ON CHIN, WEARS HORN RIMMED GLASSES. HE IS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. REQUEST LIMA COORDINATE WITH LIAISON TO INSURE LEYTONE IS HELD UNTIL END OF OAS CONFERENCE (12 NOV) AND ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF LEYTONE IS BOSCH.

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

LA/COG

DATE: 9 NOV 74
ORIG: HARRY ARCHER:TH
UNIT: LA/NW/E
EXT: 1034

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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SECRET

STAFF

1 4
2 5
3 6

T 550606 E1A547 PAGE 02 IN 418642
TOR:081036Z NOV 74 CARA 25042

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOR SUBJECT'S PAROLE INTO THE UNITED STATES FOR PROSECUTION HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL NECESSARY BEFORE ARREST CAN BE OFFICIALY REQUESTED. THIS APPROVAL IS FORTHCOMING MONDAY MORNING AND CAN BE EXPEDITED IF ARREST ACTUALLY EFFECTED SOONER OR IF CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE THIS IS NECESSARY.

D. BOSCH DESCRIBED AS BORN AUGUST 18, 1926, LAS VILLAS, CUBA, 5 FEET 10 INCHES, 170 POUNDS, DARK COMPLEXION, BLACK HAIR BROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, VERY NOTICIBLE RED BIRTHMARK ON CHIN, WEARS HEAVY HORN RIMMED GLASSES.

E. CONSIDER BOSCH ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS."

2. ASSISTANT LEGATT GORDON F. ELLISON WILL ARRIVE QUITO ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 11 NEXT, ON AF 217 AT APPROXIMATELY 10:15 AM. ELLISON WILL BRING PHOTOGRAPHS AND FINGERPRINTS TO FACILITATE INQUIRY.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

32 — LA6

SECRET

STAFF

LA15 OPS/INT, SECUR 4, LSN/OC/DO, OPS/ITG, (FAA), DDO, DDO/DO, DIV D2 PS/EG 4

T 950281 E1A729 PAGE 01-01 IN 418075

TOR:0922358 NOV 74 QUIT 21807

SECRET 092229Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21807

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, CARACAS, LIMA INFO LA/MIAMI, GUAYAQUIL.

VMLOFTY

REFS: A. CARACAS 25942 (NOT NEEDED LIMA, GUAYAQUIL) (IN 410642)

B. DIRECTOR 628113 (NOT NEEDED LA/MIAMI, CARACAS)

1. REF A AND B INFO ON ORLANDO BOSCH POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO QUITO, HIS PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, DOCUMENTATION AND POSSIBLE LOCAL CONTACT WAS PASSED TO HEAD OF LOCAL SECURITY SERVICE AFTERNOON 9 NOV.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

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LA KAS

LA8

C/LOPZ, LSN/ID, 9085

T 550080 E1A547 PAGE 01 IN 410042

TOR:0916382 NOV 74 CARA 25942

S E C R E T 091600Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25942

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, QUITO INFO LA/MIAMI.

NIACT QUITO.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 619018

B. QUITO 21873 (IN 410089)

1. FOLLOWING INFO PASSED STATION BY ASSISTANT LEGAT GORDON ELLISON. ELLISON SAYS INFO MAY BE PASSED BY STATION TO ECUADORAN SECURITY FORCES:

"A. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS CURRENTLY IN FUGITIVE STATUS FOR HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE. HE WAS CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO 10 YEARS IN MIAMI ON CHARGES RELATED TO SHIP BOMBINGS, EXTORTION AND CONSPIRACY. HE WAS RELEASED ON PAROLE DECEMBER 15, 1972.

B. BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED QUITO ON NOVEMBER 5 OR 6, 1974 IN POSSESSION OF COLOMBIAN PASSPORT. NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE RE NAME BEING USED OR SPECIFIC DESTINATION IN QUITO. HOWEVER, HE MAY CONTACT ROBERTO VERDAGUER, CUBAN EXILE PILOT, WHO NOW OPERATES A COMMERCIAL AIRLINE TRANSPORT AND FUMIGATION COMPANY IN ECUADOR.

C. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS OBTAINED APPROVAL FROM

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LA

LAS

ELAD, CI/OPS, OPS/ITG5, OPS/INT, LEN/IO

STAFF

PRECEDENCE

T 555060 514507 PAGE 01-01 IN 409903

TOR:0010922 NOV 74

LMIA 22611

SECRET 001030Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 22611

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO, DIRECTOR.

1. FBI/MIAMI INFORMS US THAT IT HAS REPORT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, LEADER OF CUBAN ACTION IS IN QUITO.

2. BOSCH HAS RECENTLY SERVED FIVE YEARS IN ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY FOR BOMBING OF POLISH SHIP IN MIAMI HARBOR. ARREST WARRANT CURRENTLY OUT ON HIM FROM FBI. FBI HAS BEEN SEARCHING FOR HIM FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: WE UNDERSTAND THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN REPORTED TO FBI HEADQUARTERS. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH TO CONTACT FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

4. FILE: ~~DEFER~~, E2, IMPDET

201-299292

[illegible] PROGRAM

LA/ppt

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8 NOV 74

201-299292

OUTGOING

93-1

S E C R E T

88888 8322462 88888888CIA 619753

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE (C/PLAN), C/CI/OPS, C/OPS/INT, C/OPS, DDO, DDO/DO, C/LA/WH/10.

SLOTTED BY: 38

TO: IMMEDIATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

ATTENTION: SY/PIB MR. BENNINGTON

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. WE ARE ADVISED THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY ORLANDO BBBBBB BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN CITIZEN AND KNOWN TERRORIST MAY BE PRESENT IN QUITO. BOSCH HAS SERVED 5 YEAR SENTENCE ATLANTA PENETENTIARY FOR BOMBING POLISH SHIP IN MIAMI HARBOR. HE IS CURRENTLY FUGITIVE WANTED BY FBI AND CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. BOSCH, BORN 18 AUGUST 1926 LAS VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA. HEIGHT 5 FEET 10 INCHES, WEIGHT 170 POUNDS, BBBBDARK COMPLEXION, BLACK HABIR, BBBBROWN EYES, THICK LIPS, RED BIRTH MARK ON CHIN, WEARS HORN RIMMED GLASSES.

3. OUR BREPRESSENTATIVE IN QUITO IS AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION AND WILL COORDINATE WITH YOUR SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE ON THIS MATTER.

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 74
ORIG: HARRY WARCHER
UNIT: C/LA/WH/E
EXT: 1034

C/LA/WH J Henney

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INTO 201-0299292

R Payne
C/OPS/[redacted]
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 062063

S E C R E T

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

STAFF   082211Z   DIRECTOR   639818

CONF: LA8   INFO: FILE IR/AN, CI/OPS, LSN/IO, C/OPS   DISSEM BY: DT

TO: IMMEDIATE QUITO INFO CARACAS, LA/MIAMI.

REFS: A. QUITO 21071 (IN 410029) (NOT SENT OR NEEDED CARACAS.)

B. CARACAS 25938 (IN 409912)

C. LA/MIAMI 22614 (IN 410070) (NOT SENT OR NEEDED CARACAS)

1. [redacted] FBI STATES REF SUBJECT IS CUBBAN CITIZEN AND WANTED ON SEVERAL CHARGES INCLUDING ASSAULT [redacted] FBI OFFICER. SUBJECT CONSIDERED EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. [redacted] FBI HQS STATES THAT ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN CARACAS HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR HANDLING CASE AND PREFER WE DO NOT BECOME INVOLVED ANY ASPECT THIS MATTER.

2. BGNO ADDITIONAL BIO DATA TO ADD REF C. ADVISING [redacted] STATE SEPARATELY.

3. FOR CARACAS: REF A AND C INVOLVE ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA POSSIBLE PRESENCE QUITO.

4. SUGGEST QUITO ADVISE [redacted] STATE SECURITY DETACHMENT OF POSSIBLE PRESENCE BOSCH IN QUITO AND LET LATTER COORDINATE MATTER WITH LOCAL SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER.

5. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 74
ORIG: HARRY ARCHER
UNIT: C/LA/NW/E
EXT: 1034

OPS/LSN C. ENWRIGHT (IN SUBSTANCE)

DC/LA/CAR

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INTO 201-0299292

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ACTION UNIT
LAB
ACTION #
INFO: FILE VR IC/CI, CI/OPS, DCO2
CSN/IO C/OPS
STAFF [illegible]

T 555986 EIA619 PAGE 01-01 IN 418029
TOR:0820347 NOV 74 QUIT 21071

S E C R E T 0820132 NOV 74 STAFF

CITE QUITO 21071

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

REF: LA/MIAMI 22611 (IN 409983)

1. NEED TO KNOW CITIZENSHIP OF ORLANDO BOSCH. IF HE IS AMERICAN, HQS PLS PUT THIS INFO THRU OTHER CHANNEL TO STATE SECURITY FOR PASSAGE TO COL. CABRERA IN QUITO. EITHER WAY, PLS ALSO CABLE BIO DATA AND PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION.

2. NO FILE: E2 IMPDET

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INTO 201-0299216

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

DATE: 19 AUGUST 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-6193 (SAN JUAN)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 31 JULY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT (EXCERPTS - DOC. AVAILABLE IN IP/CFS)

DATE: 25 JUNE 1974

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: "ZERO" (AN ORGANIZATION)

FBI FILE NO: 105-22094; 9-2690 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 JUNE 1974
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ACCION CUBANA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 1 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-21892 (MIAMI)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

BOSCH Avila, Orlando

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

6

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C/A 97563.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 299292

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 30 APRIL 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: AGRUPACION ABDALA ESTUDIANTIL;
AKA ABDALA
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (CHICAGO)

DATE: 27 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

DATE: 14 MARCH 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MEDICAL UNION
FBI FILE NO: 105-21663; 105-21664 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK
FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (COPY AVAILABLE IN FILE OF
MAX LESNICK - No. 30)

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNITY OF CUBAN PARACHUTISTS
GOLDEN FALCONS
FBI FILE NO: 105-20898

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ALFREDO SANTIAGO SOLER ALVEREZ
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: UNSUB; BOMB RECEIVED IN MAIL AT CUBAN
EMBASSY, OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA,
JANUARY 29, 1974
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORY (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20202 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSE ANTONIO COLMENARES IZQUIERDO
FBI FILE NO: 105-21598

DATE: 16 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: BOMBING OF CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY,
DECEMBER 3, 1973
FBI FILE NO: 174-728 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 15 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: FRENTE CUBANA DE LIBERACION
FBI FILE NO: 105-21892 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MAX LESNICK, AKA MAX EDGARDO LESNICK-MENENDEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-3492 (DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN FILE OF MAX LESNICK, NO. 30)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20602 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 NOVEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20602 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO (DR)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20602 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: RICARDO FELICIANO CASANUEVA
FBI FILE NO: 105-21501 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 AUGUST 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: SERGIO FRANCISCO GONZALEZ ROSQUETE
FBI FILE NO: 105-21500 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 JULY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLE (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc., if applicable)

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
SEX M DOB ?

019-002-004
UFAA-05126A01
15 JUN 73

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
DEROG TRACE REPLY TO SECRET SERVICE IN CONNECTION W/ BREZHNEV VISIT. 11 OCT 68 ARRESTED BY FBI AGENTS CHARGE CARRYING OUT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. LATER SENTENCED 10 YRS PRISON FOR PLANNING TERRORIST CAMPAIGN.

R 7306270349

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 299292			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-60

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-60)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 26 JUNE 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 APRIL 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 30 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO
FBI FILE NO: 105-20913 (MIAMI)

DATE: 24 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (PRP)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

~~DATE~~

14-00000

Impresión pulgar derecho.
Thumbprint, right hand.

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

PASAPORTE

(PASSPORT)

LA DIRECCION GENERAL DE MIGRACION
DEL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD PUBLICA

Suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares
Requests the civil and military authorities of the countries

de los países por donde transite el portador,
through which the bearer travels to provide

no le pongan obstáculo y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.
assistance without delay or hindrance and protection as may be necessary.

30 Páginas 30 Pages

RECORD COPY

h/w [illegible] #7 to HQCA. 11056 [illegible]

No. DEL PASAPORTE 2746-71

Nombre del portador
Bearer's name: Dr. José Luis Cariaga Meindez

Nacionalidad [illegible] Estado civil: boliviano [illegible] 1350

Domicilio
Address: [illegible] C.R.

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth: 27 marzo 1935

[illegible]: [illegible]

Céd. de Identidad No.: 1-241-102

[illegible]: [illegible] Blanco

[illegible]

Dado en
Given at | SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

a los 18 días del mes de Febrero
The of
de 1971
of

Válido hasta
Valid until 18 Febrero 1973

Pudiendo ser renovado a su vencimiento hasta completar diez [illegible]

Director General de Migración

PERSONAS INCLUIDAS EN ESTE PASAPORTE
PERSONS INCLUDED IN THIS PASSPORT

a. Nombre de la esposa
Wife's name

Céd. de Identidad
Identification card

a. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

a. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

a. Nombre del niño
Child's name

Fecha de nacimiento
Date of birth

FOTOGRAFIA
Photograph

San José, C.R.

Firma del Portador
Bearer's Signature

REVALIDACIONES
REVALIDATIONS

Revalidado el
Revalidated on } 11 Set. 74

Válido hasta
Valid until } 11 Set. 76

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el
Revalidated on }

Válido hasta
Valid until }

Director General de Migración

Revalidado el
Revalidated on }

Válido hasta
Valid until }

Director General de Migración

ESTE PASAPORTE ES VALIDO PARA DIRIGIRSE A
THIS PASSPORT IS VALID FOR TRAVEL TO

Panamá

7

VISAS

6

OBSERVACIONES

REMARKS



DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

VISAS

SALIDA

16 SET. 1971

DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

SALIDA

SET. 20 1971

REPUBLICA DE PANAMA
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

ENTRADA

SET. 16 1971

DELEGADO DE MIGRACION

ENTRADA

20 SET. 1971

SALIDA

MAR 23

ENTRADA

NICARAGUA

VISAS

315624

Panamá

Guillermo

SET.

VISAS

SALIDA

15 SET. 197[illegible]

Pas 3673

DELEGADO DE [illegible]

ENTRADA

30 SET. 1972

PEÑAS [illegible]

COSTA [illegible]

26 MAR 1976

SALIDA

10

VISAS

VISA: No. 4141/9 82.

DEPARTAMENTO DE [illegible]

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

Panama

Cuenta

San José 12 [illegible]

14-00000

13

VISAS

VISA Nº [illegible]

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

Esta visa caduca a los [illegible] días

Bueno para dirigirse a [illegible]

Vía Cualquier Derechos C 24

San José, 24 de [illegible]

Director de Migración

12

VISAS

VISA No. 41419

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION

REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA

Válida para dirigirse a Panamá

11 SET. 19[illegible]

San José



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VISAS

23

30 FEB 1973

23

GUATEMALA, C. A.

31 [illegible] 73

VISAS

MANAGUA

Visado [illegible] No. 52

Fecha de Expedición [illegible]

Expira el [illegible]

Válido para viajar a la República Dominicana [illegible]

A favor de [illegible]

DOMINICANA

29 73

17

VISAS

16

VISAS

24/5/71

From

24/2/73
2.00

201-199192

20

VISAS

"William Hitchcock".

$115.- 30-9-71

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

IP/

IP/AN
EXT. 7327

GT-280
CA50
TUBE 6Y5

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1A		MAR 1972	MAR 1972	
2. Clarkson				LS
3. DC/WH/C		21 MAR 1972		DJ
4. Monroe				
5. Amori		27 Mar		
6. OS		27 Mar		
7.				
8. WH/3/V		APR 1972		pk
9. ND		4 APR 1972		nd
10.				
11. WH/COG/FI		6 Apr		
12.				
13.				
14. IP/AN				
15. IP/Files				
16. ~~[illegible]~~				
17. IP/FI				

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized:
Signed:
R.O. #1
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Chimo detailed
please inform re Carmen interest.
pk

PLEASE INDICATE ACTION
☐ Destroy. Records Officer Stamp and Signature Required. Return to RID RM GH58
☒ Classify to 201-299222 File No.
Return to RID/AN RM GH58 for final processing

Pls index.

201-299222

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~DS~~
BY 2
DES NFD
FI

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

IP/FA - Already ...

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

~~201-299222~~ 7 July 72

DOCUMENT DATE

27 Mar 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFAA 03979

29

[redacted]

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAA 3979

DATE 22 MARCH 1972

FILE DEFER

REF NO

INDEX NO

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SUBJECT MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS

DOC MICRO SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

1. LNERGO/MIAMI PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WITH A REQUEST FOR ANY DATA STATION COULD PROVIDE ON SUBJECT:

MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, A DEFENDANT IN THE ORLANDO BOSCH CASE, JUMPED BOND AND SKIPPED OUT OF THE COUNTRY. HE WAS APPREHENDED IN VENEZUELA AND RETURNED TO MIAMI 18 MARCH 1972 IN THE CUSTODY OF "CIFENCE-4 (IDEN U/S/C), A FORMER INTRUST EMPLOYEE NOW WORKING WITH THE VENEZUELAN POLICE." RODRIGUEZ RAMOS SAID THAT HE WENT TO CHILE ON A MISSION TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO WHEN CASTRO VISITED CHILE LAST YEAR. THE MISSION WAS NOT CARRIED OUT FOR VARIOUS REASONS. RODRIGUEZ RAMOS ALSO SAID THAT ONE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ASSASSINATION MISSION WAS JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ. RODRIGUEZ RAMOS THREATENED THAT, IF HE IS TRIED FOR BOND JUMPING THAT HE WILL "EMBARRASS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT." HE IMPLIED THAT HE WAS ON THE MISSION FOR A COMPONENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

no 201 Member of Chile mission to assassinate Fidel Castro

2. STATION FILES DISCLOSED THAT STATION CARACAS REQUESTED TRACES ON RODRIGUEZ RAMOS IN FEBRUARY 1972 (CARACAS 18711) WHEN SUBJECT REQUESTED A VENEZUELAN RESIDENT VISA AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD LIVED IN MIAMI FOR SEVERAL YEARS. STATION TRACES

DESENSITIZED

22 Mar 72

[redacted]

201-299292

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

/All (asc)

FORWARDED TO CARACAS IN UFA/MIAMI 41739 AND 41762) NOTED THAT SUBJECT ENTERED THE U.S. ON 23 JANUARY 1964 WITH OCCUPATION LISTED AS "SEAMAN". HE WAS ONE OF THE SEVERAL LEADERS ARRESTED BY LNERGO ON 11 OCTOBER 1968 FOR PARTICIPATION IN CUBAN POWER AND MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR) ACTIVITIES. FILES ALSO INDICATED THAT SUBJECT WAS ONE OF FOUR CUBAN EXILES ARRESTED IN ZELLWOOD, FLORIDA, ON 10 JUNE 1965 AND LATER INDICTED ON A CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO EXPORT MUNITIONS.

3. AS WILL BE RECALLED, JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ WAS ANOTHER OF THE BOSCH DEFENDANTS (9 IN ALL, INCLUDING BOSCH) ARRESTED IN MIAMI ON 11 OCTOBER 1968 IN CONNECTION WITH CHARGES INVOLVING ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.

4. FILE TRACES ON BOTH MARCO RODRIGUEZ RAMOS AND JESUS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ WERE PASSED TO LNERGO/MIAMI WITH A FIRM ASSURANCE THAT BKTRUST WAS IN NO WAY INVOLVED WITH THE "MISSION" OF RODRIGUEZ RAMOS. THIS FIRM ASSURANCE WAS GIVEN SINCE RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, THREATENED " TO EMBARRASS THE USG" IF HE IS TRIED FOR BOND JUMPING. RODRIGUEZ IMPLIED HE WAS ON THIS MISSION FOR A COMPONENT OF THE USG.

LEWIS J. SHOQUIST

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

ATTACHMENT: U/S/C (IDENTITY)

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

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SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH UFAA 3979 END

14-00000

1P

S E C R E T RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFAA 3979

IDENTITY: LUIS CLEMENTE P O S A D A CARRILES

S E C R E T RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT O UFAA 3979 END

DOC. MIC. NO. SER.
APR 12 1972
MICROFILMED

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: PAULINO MARIO GUTIERREZ-VIDAL
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible]53 (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JORGE LUIS GUTIERREZ ULLA
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSE DIAZ MOREJON, AKA TONY PRINTO
FBI FILE NO: 105-1[illegible]01 (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO FREE CUBAN POLITICAL PRISONERS
FBI FILE NO: 105-19785 (MIAMI)

DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1970
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMANDOS MARCELINO GARCIA
FBI FILE NO: 105-19269 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MARCELINO GARCIA JIMENEZ
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 1[illegible] SEPTEMBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA; ET AL
FBI FILE NO: [illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 26 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

DATE: 17 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 11 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-3[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 JUNE 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF
ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 30 APRIL 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF
ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF
ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 26 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANO (MNC)
FBI FILE NO: 105-[illegible] (NEW YORK)

DATE: 21 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 MARCH 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DIRECCION CENTRAL DE ORGANIZACIONES
REVOLUCIONARIAS DEMOCRATICAS CUBANAS
FBI FILE NO: 105-16691 (MIAMI)

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: AGUSTIN ARMANDO SOSA RODRIGUEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-15889 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2855 (MIAMI)

DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: 149-225 (MIAMI)

DATE: 10 FEBRUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: OMAR BOSCO OSCAR JESUS DE LA CARIDAD
SOTO PUJOL
FBI FILE NO: 105-15774 (EXTRACT OF DOC. WITH
ALL PERTINENT INFO ENCLOSED)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIRR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN POWER (PC)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 28 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MIGUEL SAN PEDRO GARCIA
FBI FILE NO: 105-12822 (MIAMI)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 27 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: C ONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (MIAMI)

DATE: 15 JANUARY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: EJERCITO SECRETO ANTICOMUNISTA (ESA)
FBI FILE NO: 105-14843 (MIAMI)

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT (CROSS-REFERENCE SHEET)

DATE: 11 DECEMBER 1968

CLASSIFICATION: NOT KNOWN

SUBJECT: RE RECENT ATTEMPT TO BOMB BRITISH
BRITISH FREIGHTER LANCASTRIAN PRINCE

FBI FILE NO: NOT KNOWN

DOCUMENT AVAILABLE FROM RECORDS CENTER:
FILE 19-300-21
JOB # 69-839/59

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
201-299292
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10/10 1 AUG. 78	11/1/78	BETSY PALMER	Betsy Palmer

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

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~~CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

14-00000

US AIR FORCE CABLE

FROM JCS

DATE: 10 JANUARY 1978

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

(VENEZUELAN)
SUBJECT: VEN/AIRCRAFT SECURITY THREAT EXPANDS

FILE NO: MSGNO 46 (MIIR)

14-00000

FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE 8 DECEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE: 6 DECEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: DOORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS

STATE CABLES

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1977 FM UNINT HAVANA
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: VISAS FOR WIFE AND CHILD OF O. BOSCH

DATE: 26 NOVEMBER 1977
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: WIFE AND CHILD OF ORLANDO BOSCH APPLY
FOR VISAS

FBI CABLE

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 16 JULY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

FBI

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 2883
DATE: 13 JULY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MIAMI TERRORISTS CLAIM BOMB BLAST

FROM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1281
DATE: 12 JULY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: BOMB BLAST IN BRIDGETOWN

FROM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 2852
DATE: 12 JULY 1976
SUBJECT: BOMB BLAST AT AIRPORT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 24 JUNE 1976 CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

DATE: 24 JUNE 1976 (CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI)
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA (FLNC)

DATE: 7 JUNE 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

65/20/63 SECRET FRP: .2. . . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-20 (001) INFO: EZ-E, VE, DDO-6, AF-9, C/PCS, CA-4, EUR-8, FO-5, ~~IP/DMS~~, LSA/ID, DDPD-2, PCS/INT, PCS/ITC-4, PCS/LSN, SIA, SIA/FL, (63/a)

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TO 0025222 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0025222
TOR: 161000Z MAR 78 CARA 35765

S E C R E T 161515Z MAR 78 INTEL TDFIR DB-315/03752-78
CITE CARACAS 35765 (LADENBURG ACTING) HVC-7866

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGOS, MONROVIA, PANAMA CITY, MILDIST.

WNINTEL INTEL KETONE

SUPADATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT CARACAS 33185. SOURCE PARA 3 FIELD COMMENT WKDIET/WKDIET-5. NOT FOR LIAISON. OO OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO KINDEX. FILE: DEFERRED. MILDIST: PLEASE PASS ALL AFTER FILED TO CINCSO (J-2) ONLY). CL BY 037171.

FILED: 161515Z XXXXXX

Mar 16 2 03 PM '78

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IP/CDR		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
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IP/CRU		[illegible]

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201-299292

16 Mar 78

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTINE
IN 0425222
PAGE 001 OF 002

Intelligence Information Cable

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STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA NMCC SS/ID FBI
(SV/TAG) SDS NSA TREAS INS (HARD COPIES TO:
NCS/S NFAC [illegible] DCA [illegible]).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

[illegible]

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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WNINTEL-NOFORN-NO CONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/03752-78
DIST 10 MAR 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

SUBJECT: STATUS OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH
(DOI: 9 MARCH 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS REPORTING IS OF GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. ON 9 MARCH 1978 FRANCISCO LEANDRO MORA, LAWYER FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, SAID THAT A GROUP OF BOSCH'S CUBAN EXILE FOLLOWERS PLANNED TO MEET IN THE CARACAS HILTON HOTEL IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON THE EVENING OF 1 APRIL 1978. TO ATTEND THIS MEETING, LEANDRO SAID, ONE INDIVIDUAL WOLD BE COMING FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND ONE FROM PUERTO RICO. REPRESENTATIVES FROM VENZUELA WOULD ALSO BE ATTENDING. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE REASON FOR THE MEETING IS NOT KNOWN.)

2. LEARDRO ASSURED BOCH THAT HE FELT THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON MOVE ON BRINGING BOSCH TO TRAIL AND THAT HE HOPED TO GET A FIRM DECISION BY EARLY APRIL. IN ADDITION, LEANDRO TOLD BOSCH THAT THE EXILE COMMUNITY IS

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IN 6425222
TDFIR DB-315/03752-78
PAGE 002 OF 002

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

SENDING FINANCIAL AID TO BOSCH'S FAMILY.

3. BOSCH'S PHYSICAL CONDITION IS MUCH IMPROVED SINCE HE ABANDONED HIS HUNGER STRIKE AND ACCEPTED MEDICAL ATTENTION. (FIELD COMMENT: A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT WHILE BOSCH IS NOW EXPECTED TO RECOVER, HIS GENERAL PHYSICAL CONDITION IS POOR. BOSCH GAVE UP HIS STRIKE WHEN CUBAN EXILE LEADERS CONVINCED HIM THAT PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ HAD AGREED TO EXPEDITE HIS CASE. THE EXILES, HOWEVER, EXAGGERATED PEREZ' COMMENTS SO AS TO GET BOSCH TO GIVE UP HIS STRIKE. PEREZ MERELY PROMISED THE EXILES THAT HE WOULD TRY TO DETERMINE WHAT COULD BE DONE TO SPEED UP THE COURT.)

4. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS 15 MARCH 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7866.

5. FIELD DISSEM. EMBASSY, FBI, SECRET SERVICE AT CARACAS; SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGSO, MONROVIA , USCINCSO (J-2 ONLY), PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T -WARNINING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOEIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

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05/27/65 SECRET FRP: .2. . . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (302) INFO: FILE, VR, C/PCS, CA-2, EPS/EG-2, IID, IP/DMS, LSN/ID, DDO/DO, PCS/INT-5. (38/W)

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T8 0290000 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0290000
TOR: 041604Z FEB 78 CARA 35420

S E C R E T 041540Z FEB 78 INTEL

TDFIR DB-315/01009-78
HVC-7009

CITE CARACAS 35420

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL RNMUM INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: AKDIET/AKDIET-5 FROM IDEN (BY OPS CABLE DIRECTOR ONLY). NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVES J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED. ALL AFTER FILED RNVIEW. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 041540Z XXXXXX

INTEL PROGRAM
IP/CRU

201-299292
4 Feb 78

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IN 1298068
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REPORT CLASS SECRET--NINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/01669-78
DIST 04 FEB 78

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

SUBJECT POSSIBLE RELEASE OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH (DOI: LATE JANUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHOSE ACTIVITIES BRING HIM INTO CLOSE CONTACT WITH VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. IN LATE JANUARY 1978 AN ADVISER TO VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ SAID THAT PEREZ IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING GIVING FINANCIAL AID TO CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN RETURN FOR BOSCH'S AGREEMENT NOT TO MOLEST VENEZUELAN PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES. BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DENTENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL SOON, THE ADVISER SAID. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF GETTING A LEGAL CONVICTION AGAINST BOSCH.

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING GIVING BOSCH'S WIFE BS. 10,000 (U.S. $2,300) A MONTH. UPON BOSCH'S RELEASE FROM PRISON PEREZ PLANS TO GIVE HIM U.S. $50,000 ON THE CONDITION THAT HE NOT RETURN TO VENEZUELA AND THAT THE

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IN 0290048
TDFIR DB-315/01009-78
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CUBAN EXILE GROUPS HE LEADS NOT ATTACK VENEZUELAN FACILITIES.

3. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (2 FEBRUARY 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7849

4. FILED DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT ACARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOVLED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

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SECRET

55/21/69 SECRET 23 FRP: .2. . . . .

INTEL

ACTION: LA-13 (111) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, CA-4, EPS/EG-2, IIO, IP/C-8, ODPD-D, PCS/INT-5, (32/4) TD

T8 0350612 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0350612
TOR: 231648Z FEB 78 CARA 35501

S E C R E T 231621Z FEB 78 INTEL TDFIR DB-315/06830.
HVC-7853

CITE CARACAS 35501

TO: DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL RMSTONE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON.
DD OBJECTIVES: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE DEFERRED.
CL BY 035133.

FILED: 231621Z XXXXX

1. C/[illegible]
2. DC/[illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. O/[illegible]
8. O/[illegible]
9. O/[illegible]
10. O/WH[illegible]

Estella Corbet
IP/EIS
DW-7
201-299292

SECRET File: Orlando BOSCH

SECRET

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IN 0350612
PAGE 001 OF 003

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

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(ST/TAG) SWS NSA TREAS SDO (HARD COPIES TO:
NSC/S NFAC NMSITRM OCR SECUR DDA).

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL-NORORN-NOCONTRACT

CITE TDFIR DB-315/02582-7
DIST 23 FEB 78

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

SUBJECT: FEARS THAT THE DEATH OF ORLANDO BOSCH AS A RESULT OF A HUNGER STRIKE MAY BRING ABOUT REPRISALS (DOI: 20-21 FEBRUARY 1978)

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WHO MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH CUBAN EXILES. HIS REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.

1. BOTH THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA ARE CONCERNED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH MAY DIE AS A RESULT OF HIS CURRENT HUNGER STRIKE. FURTHERMORE, THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT FEARS THAT SHOULD BOSCH DIE, CUBAN EXILE GROUPS WILL STEP UP THEIR ATTACKS ON VENEZUELAN FACILITIES. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY, IN TURN, FEARS THAT EXILE ATTACKS ON THE VENEZUELANS WOULD BRING ABOUT FURTHER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT REPRISALS AGAINST THE EXILE COMMUNITY. (FIELD COMMENT: BOSCH HAS BEEN IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA SINCE OCTOBER 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. HE, AND THE OTHER INDIVIDUALS ACCUSED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING, HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL. BOSCH, WHO SUFFERS FROM A HEART AILMENT AND ULCERS, HAS BEEN ON A

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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
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UNGER STRIKE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS.)

2. ON 20 FEBRUARY 1978 OCTAVIO LEPAGE, VENEZUELAN
INISTER OF INTERIOR, DISCUSSED BOSCH'S CONDITION WITH A
BAN EXILE LEADER IN VENEZUELA. LEPAGE SAID THAT HE HAD
CEIVED REPORTS ON BOSCH'S PHYSICAL CONDITION AND THAT HE AND
HER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE CONCERNED THAT BOSCH MIGHT
DEED DIE. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, LEPAGE SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT
AT VENEZUELA WOULD BECOME THE TARGET FOR CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST
TTACKS. LEPAGE EXPLAINED THAT BOSCH'S DEATH WOULD MEAN
ROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND THE EXILE COMMUNITY. THEREFORE,
EPAGE ASKED THE EXILE LEADER TO TALK WITH BOSCH AND ATTEMPT
O DISSUADE HIM FROM CONTINUING WITH THE STRIKE.

3. THE CUBAN EXILE LEADER ACCOMPANIED BY REINALDO
ARTIN CANO, A CUBAN EXILE PHYSICIAN, VISITED BOSCH IN
HE HOSPITAL ON 21 FEBRUARY AND FOUND HIM TO BE IN SERIOUS
HYSICAL CONDITION. BOSCH ALLOWED MARTIN TO GIVE HIM INJECTIONS
O COMBAT BRAIN DEHYDRATION, BUT REFUSED ANY OTHER TREATMENT.
OSCH ALSO REFUSED TO GIVE UP HIS HUNGER STRIKE.

4. BOSCH EXPLAINED THAT HE WANTS TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL,
UT ADDED THAT VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ
S AFRAID TO BRING HIM BEFORE A COURT OF LAW. PRESIDENT PEREZ,
OSCH SAID, BETRAYED HIM AND THE CUBAN EXILES. FURTHERMORE,
RESIDENT PEREZ WILL BE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DEATH
ND WILL PAY THE PRICE FOR HIS GUILT. (SOURCE COMMENT:

WARNING NOTICE
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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

DETAILS OF PEREZ' SUPPOSED BETRAYAL OF BOSCH ARE NOT KNOWN. THE OPINION OF THE EXILE COMMUNITY IS THAT BOSCH AND PEREZ HAD SOME SORT OF DEAL WHICH BOSCH FEELS PEREZ BETRAYED.)

5. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (22 FEBRUARY 1978) FIELD NO. HVC-7853

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

10/29/ SECRET FRP: . . . .

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (911) INFO: FILE, VR, CA-4, CA/SOG-4, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, EUR-8, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/INT, PCS/ITC-4, SIA, SIA/FL. (40/W)

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78 0196415 PAGE 001 IN 0196415
TOR: 071453Z JAN 78 CARA 35159

SECRET 071440Z JAN 78 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 35159 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM REAM

REF: THE HAGUE 33452 0193080

1. FOR PAST 14 MONTHS VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH AND THREE OTHER INDIVIDUALS UNDER DETENTION IS CONNECTION WITH THE OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. DURING THE PAST WEEKS SEVERAL BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN INSTALLATIONS IN THE U.S. HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITH CALLERS INDICATING THAT THEY HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS IN RETALIATION FOR BOSCH'S IMPRISONMENT. STATION RECENTLY RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM WKRAPIER-5 (A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY) THAT THE GOV HAD INFORMATION THAT ADDITIONAL ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN INSTALLATION AND/OR GOVERNMENT FIGURES BOTH INSIDE VENEZUELA AND ABROAD WERE BEING PLANNED. (THIS LAST SENTENCE MAY NOT BE PASSED LIAISON.)

2. REF REQUEST IS PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL GOV DIRECTION URGING ADDITIONAL CAUTION AT ALL VENEZUELAN INSTALLATIONS.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

File: Orlando Bosch
201

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

55/24/57

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INTEL

ACTION: LA-11 (527) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA-4, CA/SDG-4, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, EUR-8, FR-5, IID, IP/DPS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, PCS/INT-5, PCS/ITC-4, SIA, SIA/FL, (59/1)

77 0160663 PAGE 001 OF 001 IN 0160663
TOR: 241502Z DEC 77 CARA 35091

TDFIR DH-315/15285-77
HVC-7828

S E C R E T 241429Z DEC 77 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 35091 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL RNMUM INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF CARACAS 33185 NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J-1. NO INDEX. FILE: DEFERRED. ALL AFTER FILED: REVIEW. CL BY 035133.

FILED: 241429Z XXXXX

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PAGE 001 OF 002

Intelligence Information Cable

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

STATE/INR JCS/MC(DIA) CIA/NMCC
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(HARD COPIES TO: NSC/S NFAC NMSITRM OCR NSA).

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Classified by [illegible] Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B(1), (2) impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

CITE TDFIR DB-315/15285-77
DIST 24 DEC 77

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA/NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

DOI MID DECEMBER 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH ON CUBAN EXILE MEETINGS IN CURACAO

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (23 DECEMBER 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7828

SOURCE A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN MID DECEMBER 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES INTERCEPTED A CODED MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE PRISON CELL OF ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

"WE EXPECT THAT YOU WILL REGAIN YOUR FREEDOM AROUND THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF FRIENDS ON 20 JANUARY, AT THE HOTEL CURACAO INTERNATIONAL. WE WILL DISCUSS A VERY

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IN 810400
TDFIR DB-315/15285-77
PAGE 002 OF 002

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

IMPORTANT MATTER. TONY"

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECONWAC REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

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DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO
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P2

SUMMARY OF INFO TO THE FBI AND ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY RE INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER, INFO ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU.
FURTHER INFO CONTAINED: 316-0360577 AND 312-0329077

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TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CIR-316/03605-77

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER: INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CORU

REFERENCE: FIRCI-312/03290-77, 7 OCTOBER 1977

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINS TO INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY EUGENE M. PROPPER.

2. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON ROBERTO CARRERAS, AN ARGENTINE NATIONAL WHO WAS IDENTIFIED AS A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE GULF AND WESTERN CORPORATION AT THE FALCONBRIDGE PROJECT, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (SIC) AND WHO IS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY "EL ROSARIO" MINE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SAME SOURCE WHO PROVIDED PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT EULALIO FRANCISCO "FRANK" CASTRO PAZ AND ROLANDO OTERO (HERNANDEZ) TRAVELLED AT LEAST

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TWICE TO LA ROMANA TO SEE ALVARO CARTA, CUBAN BORN PRESIDENT OF GULF AND WESTERN AMERICAS, TO SEEK ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.) (SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: CARTA NOW HAS A TOP JOB WITH GULF AND WESTERN IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.)

3. RUBEN SOTO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE SOTO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS ONE OF THE BEST FRIENDS OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR JUAN ARMAND MONTES. SOTO, THE OWNER OF "LA FRANCESA" BAKERY (PASTRY SHOP) AND A CUBAN EXILE, IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO.

A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED IN LATE 1976 THAT HE WAS TOLD BY A CUBAN EXILE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC THAT A DELEGATION OF LOCAL CUBANS, AMONG THEM RUBEN SOTO, WAS SOLICITING MONEY FOR CUBAN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES.

ONE RUBEN SOTO HAYET, WHO WAS BORN IN ISLA DE PINOS, CUBA, ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1937, WAS A MEMBER OF BRIGADE 2506 AND WAS A CANDIDATE TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1962. THERE HAS BEEN NO AGENCY CONTACT WITH SOTBO HAYET SINCE THEN.

IN 1963 ONE RUBEN SOTO AULET, POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RUBEN

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SOTO WAVET, WAS DESCRIBED AS A FORMER 2506 BRIGADE MEMBER WHO WAS AN EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY (MRR).

4. IN DECEMBER 1976 THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 - 6 OF REFERENCE REPORTED THAT IN JULY OR AUGUST 1976, DURING A MEETING OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES AT THE PIZZA RESTAURANT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ARMANDO CABALLEROS, OWNER OF THE RESTAURANT, SPOKE OPENLY ABOUT PLANS TO ASSASSINATE "UN GRAN FUNCIONARIO AMERICANO" IN COSTA RICA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PLEASE SEE CIOL-0445-76, 23 DECEMBER 1976, WHICH PROVIDED YOU WITH INFORMATION ON TERRORIST PLOTTING OF CUBAN EXILES AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMY MAJOR MONTES. IN RELATION TO THE PARAGRAPH TWO MEETING, SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" (PROBABLY
201-112675
ARMANDO HART DAVALOS). KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER (OR PEDRO)

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MARTINEZ. SOURCE BELIEVED THAT MARTINEZ RESIDED IN MIAMI. THE PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE THE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN IMPORTANT EXILE," IDENTIFIED AS MANOLO REYES, WHO ALSO LIVED IN MIAMI, OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE A PROMINENT U.C. POLITICIAN [redacted] BY 101-294955

ONE ARMANDO CABALLERO PARODI, WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 10 JULY 1941, WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE 2506 BRIGADE. HE WAS TERMINATED BY THIS AGENCY IN MAY 1963. IN LATE 1963 THERE WAS INTEREST IN USING CABALLERO IN TEACHING INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS CONTACTED IN THIS REGARD.

NO 201

3. THIS AGENCY HAS NO INFORMATION ON DANILO GONZALEZ, IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN CLUB IN SANTO DOMINGO, OR ON LOCAL EMPLOYEES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN SANTO DOMINGO, JOSE RENE ROMAN, NO 201 JOSE JEREZ NO-201 OR FRANKLIN POLANCO. 201-778101

NO-201

4. JOREGE ALONSO PUJOLS IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ 201-783235 WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 20 JULY 1923. HE IS THE SON OF FORMER CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT GUILLERMO ALONSO-PUJOL, 61063 WHO SERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CARLOS PRIO. ALONSO-PUJOL RECEIVED

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TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY DURING 1961 AND WAS CAPTURED AT THE BAY OF PIGS. HIS FATHER PURPORTEDLY PAID $100,000 FOR HIS SON'S RELEASE. HOWEVER, AT THE TIME THE RANSOM WAS EFFECTED, THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG EXILES IN THE MIAMI AREA THAT HIS FATHER DID NOT PAY THE RANSOM BUT HAD MADE A DEAL WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR ALONSO-PUJOL TO UNDERTAKE PRO-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN LATIN AMERICA IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS FREEDOM. ALONSO-PUJOL WAS ARRESTED IN MIAMI IN JUNE 1970 ON NARCOTICS-RELATED CHARGES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION ON JORGE ALONSO-PUJOL BERMUDEZ.Y

7. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY ERNESTO HERNANDEZ BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

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8. PABLO MARTIN IS THE PEN NAME USED BY AVENOL FRANCO, WHO IS ALSO KNOEWN AS FRANCISCO AVENOLL. FRANCO, WHO MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MARTIN MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 26 JUNE 1936. FRANCO HAS SERVED AS PROPAGANDA SECRETARY FOR THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA" AND WAS EDITOR OF THE ANTI-CASTRO

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PUBLICATION "AMIGO DEL PUEBLO" AS OF MAY 1968.V

201-253367

✓ 9. FRANK TEIRA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ANTONIO ✓201-253367 TEIRA ALBBFONSO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 18 JULY 1934. TEIRA IS A FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO JUMPED SHIP IN PANAMA IN JULY 1969 AND REQUESTED ASYLUM. HE HAS APPEARED BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE U.S. VIA THE CARIBBEAN.V

10. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY LUIS ✓Null ROSS BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.V

✓201-332281

✓ 11. JOSE AGUILA IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE RAMON FLORENCIO 201-332281 AGUILA CALIMANO WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 27 OCTOBER 1932. AGUILA HAS LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED AS AN INFORMANT FOR DOMINICAN INTELLIGENCE.V

✓201-298826

12. ONE A. WILFREDO BLANCO (DEL) CASTILLO, BORN IN GUINES, CUBA, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1943, WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN EARLY 1961. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON A. WILFREDO BLANCO DEL CASTILLO.V

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13. LEVI MARRERO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH LEVI C. MARRERO

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ARTILES WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 5 OCTOBER 1910. MARRERO HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF THE PEOPLE (PRP) SINCE ITS FORMATION IN COSTA RICA IN NOVEMBER 1972.V

14. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY JOSE ✓115 7?1 LUIS PRADO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.V

✓201-355380

15. ANDRES SARGEN IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ANDRES NAZARIO ✓201-355380 SARGEN WHO WAS BORN IN LAS VILAS, CUBA, ON 11 MARCH 1926. NAZARIO IS A LONG TIME ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION "ALPHA 66."V

✓201-617841

16. JORGE MAS CANOSA IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JORGE LINCOLN ✓201-277817 [illegible] MAS CANOSA WHO WAS BORN IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1939. MAS WAS RECRUITED BY THIS AGENCY IN MARCH 1961 TO PARTICIPATE IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. HE HAS NOT BEEN USED BY THIS AGENCY IN ANY OPERATIONAL CAPACITY SINCE THE BAY OF PIGS. MAS HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN THE CUBAN REPRESENTATION IN EXILE (RECE) GROUP. IN JANUARY 1966 HE WAS THE SUBJECT OF A DEPARTEMENT OF JUSTICE INQUIRY REGARDING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN A HIT-AND-RUN RAID CONDUCTED IN THE HAVANA HARBOR AREA IN NOVEMBER 1965.V

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17. JUAN PEREZ FRANCO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN EDUARDO PEREZ FRANCO WHO WAS BORN IN HAVANA ON 28 JANUARY 1928. PEREZ RECEIVED PARAMILITARY TRAINING FROM THIS AGENCY IN LATE 1960 AND WAS ACTIVE IN THE B2506 BRIGADE. AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH PEREZ WAS TERMINATED IN JANUARY 1962.Y

201-285794

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18. FREDDY LUGO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE FREDDY LUGO WHO WAS ARRESTED IN 1976 IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBANA AIRLINER CRASH.Y

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19. GERMAN LOZANO IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH GERMAN RICARDO LOZANO WHO WAS ARRESTED ALONG WITH FREDDY LUGO IN 1976.Y

No 201

20. THIS AGENCY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY FERNANDO BUENO BASED ON THE LACK OF PERTINENT BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION.Y

201-355001

21. GENERAL JUAN NEPOMUCENO FOLCH PEREZ, AIR ADVISOR TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WAS BORN IN PUERTO PLATA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 3 AUGUST 1926. FOLCH HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND MORE RECENTLY AS AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. IN LATE MAY 1972 USDAO, SANTO DOMINGO, REPORTED THAT FORMER CHIEF OF THE CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE, GENERAL MANUEL BENITEZ VALDEZ, HAD

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VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN AN EFFORT TO SELL, TO THE DOMINICANS, ARMAMENT AND SPARE PARTS FROM A U.S.-BASED FIRM WHICH BENITEZ WAS REPRESENTING. BENITEZ HAD CONTACTED TWO DOMINICAN GENERALS, ONE OF THEM BEING FOLCH. USDAO COMMENTED THAT FOLCH'S ASSOCIATION WITH CUBAN EXILES AND ARMS SALESMEN HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE DURING 1972 AND THAT FOLCH WAS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WITH MILITANT CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, SUCH AS "ALPHA 66," DURING 1962-1963.Y

22. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, IN LATE DECEMBER 1965 ONE VIRGILIO H ~~No~~ 201 POU WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF A RIGHTIST GROUP WHICH WAS ORGANIZED TO COUNTER THE SPREADING OF INFLUENCE BY FORMER "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE GROUP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLACING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE AT THE GRAVESITE OF LT. COLONEL RAFAEL TOMAS H No 201 FERNANDEZ DOMINGUEZ IN SANTIAGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, IN MID-DECEMBER 1965 IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO MURDER COLONEL FRANCISCO 201-775139 CAAMANO DENO, WHO WAS ATTENDING A CEREMONY IN HONOR OF FERNANDEZ. THE GROUP WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS ATTEMPT TO DETONATE THE EXPLOSIVE.Y

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23. FRANK CABRAL IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH DR. FRANK CABRAL CALCAGNO WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON 6 FEBRUARY 1942. CABRAL SERVED AS CIVILIAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER FROM 1970 UNTIL HIS ARREST IN LATE JUNE 1974 AS A RESULT OF THE DISCOVERY OF NUMEROUS WEAPONS AND TELTAP EQUIPMENT IN HIS HOME. CABRAL HAD USED HIS RESIDENCE AS A CENTER OF OPERATIONS WHILE RUNNING HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE NETWORK. CABRAL WAS SENT INTO EXILE AND RETURNED TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM SPAIN IN JULY 1975. HE HAS SERVED AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DISSIDENT FACTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUISQUEYAN PARTY (PQD).4

✓201-842677

24. MAJOR JUAN POU CASTRO, MORE COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS JUAN POU, JUNIOR, IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE BROTHER OF MAJOR JOAQUIN ANTONIO ✓201-842677 POU CASTRO. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON JUAN POU. HOWEVER, HIS BROTHER JOAQUIN, WHO WAS BORN IN SANTO DOMINGO ON 1 MARCH 1935, GAINED NOTORIETY BY "NEUTRALIZING" TERRORISTS WHEN HE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION (J-2) OF THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES.4

25. IN APRIL 1966 ONE COLONEL PAULINO REYES ✓NO 201 DE LEON, WHO IS

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PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH THE REYES MENTIONED IN REFERENCE, WAS ONE OF THREE DOMINICAN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WAS CALLED TO SANTO DOMINGO TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE GENERAL JOSE MORILLO. PREVIOUS INFORMATION FROM 1965 INDICATES THAT JOSE PAULINO REYES DE LEON, WHO WAS BORN ON 5 MAY 1932 IN LA VEGA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WAS COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL POLICE IN SAN FRANCISCO DE MACORIS.Y

26. AN FBIS ITEM FROM JULY 1966 IDENTIFIES ONE CAPTAIN FELIPE E. ROJAS LOPEZ AS AN AIDE WITH THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD. THIS AGENCY HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROJAS LOPEZ. {SANTO DOMINGO STATION COMMENT: SOURCE WAS NOT POSITIVE THAT ROJAS ATTENDED THE MEETING.}Y

[illegible]

27. ONE MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL, WHO WAS BORN IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ON 19 DECEMBER 1936, IS A MEMBER OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PARACHUTE BRIGADE.Y

[illegible]

28. ANA MARGARITA (DE) WINDT IS THE WIFE OF EULALIO FRANCISCO {FRANK} CASTRO PAZ.Y

[illegible]

29. IN MAY 1977 OUR MEXICO CITY FIELD STATION IDENTIFIED

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WINFRED E. HODGEN AS THE PARTNER OF FRANK CASTRO. THE STATION ADVISED THAT IN EARLY 1977 HODGEN GAVE A PHONY CHECK FROM A MIAMI BANK IN THE AMOUNT OF $23,000 TO A DOMINICAN MONEY CHANGER (FNU) SANTANA. SANTANA STATED THAT HE HAD CHANGED "■■■■MANY MANY" DOLLAR CHECKS INTO DOMINICAN PESOS FOR HODGEN/CASTRO AND THIS■■■ WAS THE FIRST PHONY CHECK. SANTANA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED HODGEN WAS HIDING IN GUATEMALA.Y

IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FAA MAY HA~~D~~VE ADDITIONAL PEERTINENT INFORMATION ON WINFRED E. HODGEN.Y

30. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY THIS AGENCY ON EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ, ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND GUILLERMO NOVO SAMPOL HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO YOU IN PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE.Y

✓201-142365 ✓201-284811 ✓201-299292 ✓N0201

31. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON FOREIGN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THIS AGENCY.Y

32. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1.2.H

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"B CODE" TO FOLLOWING: 201-0292411 (SOTO-HAYET), 201-0284805 (CABALLERO), 201-0294335 (ALONSO-PUJOL), 201-0834598 (FRANCO) 201-0853367 (TEIRA), 201-0332287 (AGUILA), 201-0298826 (BLANCO), 201-0355380 (NAZARIO), 201-0297817 (MAS), 201-0285794 (PEREZ, 201-0355001 (FOLCH), 201-0878309 (CABRAL), 201-0842677 (POU, JOAQUIN), INDEX: MAJOR DARIO L. DIAZ GIL; WINFRED E. HODGEN, AND ANA MARGARITA DE WINDT, WIFE OF CASTRO PAZ (201-0742365).

ORIG: LA/AN/CH (BASHAW X1034); COORD: C/LA/AN (BEARDSLEY); C/LA/CAR (PALMER); C/LA/COG (LATRASH); AGC/DDO (GOLDIN); C/LA/OPS (DISTEFANO); SA/C/LA (STURBITTS); AUTH: C/LAD (WARREN); REL: C/PCS/LSN/ID (KUHN).

C/LA/AN Beardsley
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AGC/DDO Goldin
C/LA/OPS ✓
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DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1977
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CITE CARACAS 34322 (LADENBURG ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI,

WNINTEL INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKRAPIER/WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT OF CARACAS
33185. NOT FOR LIAISON, OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. (in 414460)
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PAGE 1 OF [illegible] PAGES

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
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DIRECTORATE OF
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CITE TDFIR DB-315/[illegible]-77

DIST 3 OCTOBER 1977

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI LATE SEPTEMBER 1977

SUBJECT EFFORTS BY PROMINENT VENEZUELANS TO ENSURE IMPARTIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE AGAINST CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (30 SEPTEMBER 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7761

SOURCE A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1977 A GROUP OF PROMINENT VENEZUELANS MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ TO DISCUSS THE CASE AGAINST CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY IMPRISONED IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, AND TO SPEAK IN BOSCH'S BEHALF. WHILE NOT SOLICITING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

S E C R E T

FOR BOSCH. THEY DID ATTEMPT TO IMPRESS UPON THE PRESIDENT THAT THE CASE SHOULD BE HANDLED UNEMOTIONALLY ON ITS JUDICIAL MERITS. AS PART OF THEIR ARGUMENT THE GROUP REMINDED PRESIDENT PEREZ THAT BOSCH AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY(AD) WHEN THEY WERE FORCED TO LIVE IN EXILE IN CUBA.

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ ASSURED THE GROUP THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSE RAMON MEDINA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BOSCH CASE. FURTHERMORE, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MEDINA IS WORKING WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND OTHER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES TO EXPEDITE THE RESOLUTION OF THE BOSCH AFFAIR.

3. THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT INCLUDE ANTONIO DIAZ MARTINEZ, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PETROVEN; ANTONIO LEIDENZ, A FORMER MINISTER OF LABOR AND AN AD MEMBER; LUIS ALVAREZ DOMINGUEZ, MINISTER OF DEVELOPMENT; AND JOSE VARGAS, PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATION OF VENEZUELAN WORKERS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET-WARNING NOTICE- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

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IN 63 WAS GENERAL COORDINATOR OF THE INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY

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AGENCY MESSAGE

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CITE CARACAS 34072

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL INTEL WEAM

SUPDATA: ORWAMOO FOR LA/MIAMI COMMENTS ON PARA 2. DEFER TO HQS ON DISSEM TO THE HAGUE. SOURCE: WKRAPIER/ WKRAPIER-5 FROM SUBJECT CARACAS 33185. (IN 399037) NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX, FILE DEFERRED. CL BY 035133.

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Orlando BOSCH AVILA

201 in Chris Hopkins' vault per Horace

[illegible] 4 Nov 77

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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DATE 31 AUGUST 1977
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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
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The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or circulated outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA/NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

DOI: LATE AUGUST 1977

SUBJECT: INTERCEPTED MESSAGE FOR CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH; POSSIBLE EXILE ACTIVITIES IN CURACAO

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (30 AUGUST 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7730

SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF VENEZUELA.

1. IN LATE AUGUST 1977 VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES INTERCEPTED A CODED MESSAGE WHICH WAS BEING SMUGGLED INTO THE PRISON CELL OF ORLANDO BOSCH, WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN VENEZUELA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE NOTE:

"ACTIVITIES SUSPENDED. WE AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

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[illegible] 3007 [illegible]

IN [illegible]

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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I AM GOING TO CURACAO. MEETING TO BE HELD THE TWENTIETH. OMAN."

2. THE ABOVE REFERENCE TO CURACAO REINFORCES THE BELIEF BY SOME VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES THAT CURACAO IS BECOMING A STAGING AREA FOR CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES, CUBAN EXILE LEADERS FROM THE UNITED STATES HAVE RECENTLY MADE FREQUENT TRIPS TO CURACAO. FURTHERMORE, CUBAN EXILE MEETINGS HAVE OF LATE TAKEN PLACE AT THE PARK AND INTERNATIONAL HOTELS IN CURACAO. MOREOVER, A STORE KNOWN AS THE "ALMACEN AMERICANO" IN CURACAO IS BEING USED TO MASK SOME TYPE OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

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T 603655 E1A948 PAGE 01

IN 132125

TOR:1620222 DEC 76

SDOM 17932

SECRET 1610302 DEC 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17932

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL [redacted] MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 951524

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17881 (IN 115115)

Paquette
McClain
Dn/Prager

1. EMFIST-1 MET WITH COLONEL USINO GUZMAN LIRIANO FEW DAYS AGO, TOOK TACK DESCRIBED PARA 3 REF B (SANS MENTION OF MAJOR MONTES). SAID HE WAS WORRIED GUZMAN WOULD GET HIMSELF IN TROUBLE. GUZMAN WAS VERY CONCERNED, TALKED ABOUT MEETINGS OF CUBAN EXILES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE SANTO DOMINGO, BUT WAS NOT CLEAR ON WHICH OF THESE MEETINGS HE PERSONALLY ATTENDED. FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION PROVIDED BY GUZMAN:

Cit. Cuba

A. ONE OF THE MEETINGS ATTENDED BY MAJOR MONTES IN SANTO DOMINGO IN EARLY NOVEMBER 1976 TOOK PLACE IN THE HOME OF A FORMER SENATOR IN THE BATISTA GOVERNMENT WHO LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO. (EMFIST-1 FORGOT THE NAME. HE IS CERTAIN IT WAS NOT SANTIAGO REY PERNA.) MONTES CAME TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO GET DOMINICAN SUPPORT FOR THE "CRUSADE AGAINST CASTRO." MONTES SAID THAT CUBAN EXILES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, TOGETHER WITH DOMINICAN MILITARY

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AND CIVILIANS ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE.

B. THE LIAISON MAN BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS WAS, AND PERHAPS STILL IS, JUAN (OR JOSE) ANTONIO PRAT. X 201-244073 (EMFIST-1 GOT THE IMPRESSION PRAT LIVES IN MIAMI.)

C. AT ONE MEETING (DURING THE PERIOD ORLANDO BOSCH WAS RESIDING IN SANTO DOMINGO), THE PARTICIPANTS SPOKE OF PLACING BOMBS ON CUBAN AIRCRAFT AND IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, SABOTAGING CUBAN AND SOVIET SHIPS. THEY TALKED OF KIDNAPPING THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO EFFECT THE RELEASE OF POLICTICAL PRISONERS AND DISCUSSED KILLING CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, "AN IMPORTANT CUBAN FUNCTIONARY IN LISBON", BECAUSE HE IS CONTRIBUTING TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA.

D. DISCUSSED AT THE SAME MEETING WAS THE FACT THAT SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER MET IN EITHER MEXICO OR COSTA RICA WITH "AN IMPORTANT FIGURE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NAMED HART" (PROBABLY ARMANDO HART DAVALOS). KISSINGER WAS LABELED A TRAITOR AND PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH COORDINATING THIS ACTION WAS PETER (OR PEDRO) MARTINEZ. (EMFIST-1 BELIEVES MARTINEZ RESIDES IN MIAMI. STATION HAS TRACE ON ONE PEDRO MARTINEZ, CUBAN EXILE NAVAL EXPERT

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WHO WORKS FOR VICINI FAMILY IN SANTO DOMINGO.) THE PLAN WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE "CIA FOUND OUT" AND "AN IMPORTANT EXILE", MANOLO REYES (WHO LIVES IN MIAMI), OBJECTED AND THREATENED TO ADVISE HIS FRIEND, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR RONALD REGAN.

E. AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING DESCRIBED IN SUB-PARAS C AND D ABOVE WERE ORLANDO BOSCH, DOMINICAN AIR FORCE GENERAL SALVADOR LLUBERES MONTAS, AIR FORCE COLONEL ABREU (POSSIBLY COLONEL JUAN DISLA ABREU, COMMANDER OF THE NORTHERN ZONE, OR GENERAL ELADIO MARMOLEJOS ABREU, COMMANDER OF SAN ISIDRO AIR BASE, WHO IS CURRENTLY VERY CLOSE TO GENERAL LLUBERES), CUBAN EXILE JUAN PEREZ FRANCO (NOT CLEAR WHERE HE LIVES), AN ARGENTINE NAMED RAUL OR RUBEN BLINDER (PHONETIC), DOMINICAN FERNANDO MUNIZ (POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH RIGHTIST LABOR LEADER WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE U.S. CITIZEN), JOSE BADURRI (PHONETIC, CITIZENSHIP UNKNOWN), AND LUIS POSA, PEZA OR POSADA. (RE LAST NAME, STATION WILL ASK EMCLIPPER-1 TO CHECK ON POSSIBLE TRAVEL TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OF LUIS POSADA WHO WAS ARRESTED BY VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ALONG WITH ORLANDO BOSCH).

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2. REQUEST HQS TRACES BRA[illegible], MARTINEZ, PEREZ, BLINDER,

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BADURRI.

3. INDEX: GUZMAN, MONTES, PRAT, MARTINEZ, REYES, BOSCH, LLUBERES, ABREU, PEREZ, BLINDER, MUNIZ, BADURRI. FILE: 22-9-28, 201-299292.

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12 NOV 1976 NEW TIMES

[illegible] sarcastically, [illegible] way [illegible] preferred not to hear.

Council members are said now to fear that they, once again, will be subjected to what one called "Henry's interminable Germanic monologues." But a few of them hope to escape—by getting jobs with the new administration in Washington themselves.

The saga of Orlando Bosch (NT: October 29)

The case of the anti-Castro terrorist leader whose network reportedly extends from Miami deep into Latin America has taken its most bizarre turn.

Amid widespread speculation about Orlando Bosch's involvement in both the September 21 car-bomb slaying in Washington of former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and the October 6 crash of a Cuban airline jet that claimed the lives of all 73 persons aboard, Venezuelan authorities suddenly announced the arrest of the 49-year-old Miami pediatrician and old CIA hand on October 14. Since then, the veil of intrigue around Bosch has begun lifting, threatening to implicate the CIA, FBI, Miami-based Cuban exiles and high-ranking officials of Venezuela and Chile.

It all began when Caracas police rounded up 14 anti-Castro Cubans—including Bosch and Venezuela's own former security chief—and accused them of involvement in a terrorist ring responsible for the Letelier assassination and the Cuban plane sabotage. Further attacks in the U.S. and six Latin nations were said to have been planned.

The next day, speaking at a mass funeral rally in Havana for the Cuban plane crash victims, Castro accused the CIA of backing a campaign that had resulted in nine incidents against Cuban diplomatic missions and its national airline since April 6. Therefore, he announced, he was canceling the 1973 Cuba-U.S. anti-hijacking agreement. Castro also named a Venezuelan photographer, Hernando Ricardo, as a CIA agent who had [illegible] the Cuban airliner's destruction. Henry Kissinger promptly denied any U.S. complicity.

In [illegible], who is the ill-fated Cuban [illegible] engineered the plot [illegible] Venezuela and [illegible] an FBI agent stationed in Caracas, whom the U.S. embassy confirmed had been in contact with Ricardo. Meanwhile, back in Venezuela, two Cuban exile brothers were identified as primary suspects in the Letelier killing.

Then, on October 22, three U.S. journalists arrived in Venezuela on the same plane with a group of Florida police and prosecutors. One of the journalists—Hilda Inclan of the Miami *News*—recognized a man greeting the Florida officials as Ricardo (The Monkey) Morales Navarrete—a former CIA agent and FBI informant in Miami who is today the number-two man in Venezuela's intelligence service.

Anti-Castro terror: police with the body of a passenger on the bombed plane

When the reporters tried to interview Morales—addressing him by his true name—in front of his fellow security officers, he became outraged and placed them under house arrest. After being held incommunicado for 10 hours, Inclan, Taylor Branch of *Esquire*, and free-lancer John Rothschild were forcibly expelled from Venezuela and placed on flights back to Miami. Branch flew on to Washington to meet with State Department officials and prepare a written formal protest. (The Venezuelan government denied the American journalists' charges.)

Nobody was talking about how Morales—and a number of other anti-Castro Cubans—happened to hold such high positions in the Venezuelan government, but this much seemed clear: the Morales affair, like all the rest, focused finally on Orlando Bosch. Morales, a former CIA operative [illegible] 1975 [illegible] bomb that nearly [illegible].

Bosch went on to head a Coordination of the United Revolutionary Organizations (CORU), which claimed responsibility for most of the international wave of anti-Castro terrorism. Until recently, Bosch had been in Chile, where he had close ties to the right-wing military junta. Some Miami sources say that Morales lured Bosch to Venezuela to arrest him, while others claim that Morales had made peace with Bosch.

Meanwhile Bosch's fate remains up in the air. He was arrested once before in Venezuela, only to gain release and resume his hemispheric wandering. Latin American governments are said to fear retribution if he is treated harshly. Representatives of five Caribbean governments, including Cuba, have assembled in Trinidad to discuss jurisdiction (the U.S. has sought his extradition on the parole-jumping charge).

Guarded by heavily-armed security men, Bosch appeared October 22 in a Venezuelan courtroom to deny any involvement in the airplane sabotage or the Letelier murder. As cries of "assassin" echoed outside, Bosch was asked if he was a CIA agent. He declined to answer.

—*Dick Russell*

Mind & Body

Beyond loose shoes

A U.S. foot surgeon has returned from a 16-year stint in India and Africa convinced that going barefoot protects feet. The surgeon, Paul Brand, acknowledges that people have to wear shoes to work, but he says if Americans went barefoot at home they probably would never develop corns, bunions, hammer toes, athlete's foot, or ingrown toenails—afflictions he found nonexistent in barefoot populations overseas.

Brand, who teaches orthopedic surgery at Louisiana State, told last month's American College of Surgeons meeting in Chicago that a "shod foot sleeps inside an unchanging environment and gradually loses its sensitivity, mobility and intrinsic muscle strength. The average person who walks barefoot has much healthier

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TO: LASS, MADRID, PARIS, LONDON, LISBON, ROME, BONN, BONN BASE, COPENHAGEN, KINSHASA, LUSAKA, TOKYO, OTTAWA, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON. Y

TOO MANY ACTION [illegible]
SEE HHB 90-1 & DOI 10-19

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1. FYI only: RECENT REPORTS FROM SENSITIVE FBI SOURCE DESCRIBE INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS AND COORDINATION ON PART OF CERTAIN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. ONE OF NEWEST AND MOST UNIFIED GROUPS IS CALLED "COORDINACION DE ORGANIZACIONES REVOLUCIONARIAS UNIDAS" (COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS - CORU), ALSO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED REF AS "EJERCITO SECRETO ANTICOMUNISTA LATINO-AMERICANO (SECRET LATIN-AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST ARMY - LACA). FOLLOWING IS AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON CORU AND BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE FIVE EXILE ORGANIZATIONS IT EMBRACES: Y

A. [redacted] CORU WAS FORMED AT A MEETING, HELD SANTO DOMINGO ON 10-13 JUNE 1976 OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM FIVE ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATIONS: ACCION CUBANA (AC); FRENTE DE LIBERACION

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NACIONAL DE CUBA {FLNC}; MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANA {MNC}; BRIGADE 2506; AND MOVIMIENTO 17 DE ABRIL {M-17-A}. AS A RATHER LOOSELY FORMED FEDERATION OF THESE FIVE GROUPS, CORU HAS NO SEPARATE MEMBERSHIP OF ITS OWN AND HAS BEEN REFERRED TO IN PRESS AS "ORU." EACH MEMBER GROUP IS TO HAVE ITS OWN MILITARY CHIEF WHOSE PRESS RELEASES CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTIONS BY HIS ORGANIZATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THE FLNC PROPAGANDA CHIEF, WHO IN TURN WILL CLAIM CREDIT FOR SUCH ACTIONS IN THE NAME OF CORU. TWO COVER ORGANIZATIONS {TERRORIST CELLS} WERE FORMED TO CARRY OUT AND CLAIM CREDIT FOR ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES BENEFICIAL TO CORU: JOVENES DE LA ESTRELLA { YOUTH OF THE STAR} IN THE MIAMI, FLORIDA AREA; AND F-14, A NEW NAME TO REPLACE OMEGA 7, IN THE NEW YORK AREA. CORU WILL CONDEMN SUCH ACTIVITIES SO THAT CUBAN EXILES AND AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT CONDEMN CORU BUT VIEW IT RATHER AS A LEGITIMATE ANTI-CASTRO UNIFIED FRONT FIGHTING COMMUNISM OUTSIDE AND CONDEMNING TERRORISM WITHIN THE U.S. ROGELIO LOPEZ AVALO, FORMER SECURITY CHIEF OF FLNC, WILL BE THE CORU SECURITY CHIEF. LOPEZ IS TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AND INSURE THAT "LEAKS" DO NOT OCCUR. A STRICT POLICY OF COMPARTMENTATION HAS

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BEEN STRESSED TO PREVENT "LEAKS." A SO-CALLED "ZERO GROUP" WILL HANDLE EXECUTIONS OF "TRAITORS" SUCH AS FBI AND CIA SOURCES OF INFORMATION. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA PROPOSED THAT CORU MOUNT A CONCERTED EFFORT AGAINST A COUNTRY, BE IT THE U.S. OR ANOTHER, IN WHICH A MEMBER, OR AN EXILED CUBAN PATRIOTIC COMBATANT (NON-MEMBER) BECOMES JAILED. IT WAS PROPOSED THAT A DIPLOMAT FROM THAT COUNTRY WOULD PROMPTLY BE KIDNAPPED AND OFFERED FOR EXCHANGE; SHOULD NO EXCHANGE OCCUR, THE DIPLOMAT WOULD BE PROMPTLY EXECUTED SO AS GAIN NATIONS' RESPECT FOR CORU FUTURE SITUATIONS.

B. ACCION CUBANA (CUBAN ACTION - AC) IS A SMALL TERRORIST GROUP IN MIAMI HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. AC IS TO CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO AND HIS ALLIES, WITH COLOMBIA, MEXICO, PANAMA SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. GASPAR JIMINEZ (AKA GASPARITO) IS AC MILITARY CHIEF. THE MILITARY UNIT TWICE HAS ATTEMPTED TO BLOW UP A CUBANA AIRLINES PLANE SINCE THE SANTO DOMINGO MEETING: A BOMB PLACED ABOARD CUBANA PLANE IN PANAMA, CIRCA MID-JUNE 1976, WHICH DID NOT EXPLODE; AND BOMB IN SUITCASE TO BE LOADED INTO CUBANA PLANE IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA, ON 19 JULY 1976, WHICH EXPLODED [illegible]

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BEFORE SUITCASE ~~[illegible]~~ WAS PLACED ON BOARD. (CORU REPORTEDLY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR BOTH THESE BOMBING EFFORTS.) (ACCORDING TO MEXICAN LIAISON REPORT DATED 26 JULY, CORU ALSO CLAIMING AUTHORSHIP OF ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP CUBAN CONSUL IN MERIDA, MEXICO ON 24 JULY.) 4

C. FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (CUBA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - FLNC) IS ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MIAMI. ITS TITULAR HEAD, FRANK CASTRO, LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOM. REP. GUSTAVO CASTILLO IS FLNC MILITARY CHIEF, AND OSCAR ANGULO ITS PROPAGANDA CHIEF. FLNC REPORTEDLY IS CONTINUING ITS NAVAL OPERATIONS (ATTACKS ON CUBAN AND RUSSIAN VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS), AS WELL AS BOMBINGS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRY EMBASSIES OUTSIDE THE U.S. AT THE SANTO DOMINGO MEETING CASTRO PROPOSED THAT FLNC CARRY OUT HARRASSING TACTICS AGAINST TARGET COUNTRIES TO INCLUDE CALLS TO AIRLINES ADVISING THAT BOMB IS ABOARD A PLANE IN FLIGHT SO AS FORCE EMERGENCY LANDING. ALSO PROPOSED WAS ACTUALLY PLANTING A BOMB EVERY TEN OR MORE HOAX CALLS TO PREVENT TARGET COUNTRY FROM DISTINGUISHING HOAX FROM REAL THING, PLACING BOMBS IN UNOCCUPIED AIRCRAFT SO AS PREVENT INJURY INNOCENT PERSONS AND

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AVOID GIVING FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM A BAD NAME. FRANK CASTRO REPORTEDLY HAS ALREADY FORMED A TERRORIST GROUP IN VENEZUELA HEADED BY DR. AURELIO ALVAREZ ECHEVARRETA, A CUBAN PHYSICIAN RESIDENT CARACAS. ALVAREZ' GROUP PURPORTEDLY IS FORMED OF CUBAN EXILES, SOME OF THEM U.S. CITIZENS. FLNC HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND ACTIONS VIOLATORY OF U.S. NEUTRALITY ACT.

D. MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANA (CUBAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT - MNC) IS AN ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, HEADED BY FELIPE RIVERO DIAZ. MNC DELEGATES AT SANTO DOMINGO MEETING WERE JOSE DIONICIO SUAREZ ESQUIVEL AND DR. JUAN B. PULIDO. SUAREZ PRESENTED A PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF A MILITARY COORDINATION (MC) GROUP CONSISTING MILITARY CHIEF OF EACH GROUP. IT WOULD JOINTLY PLAN GENERAL ACTIONS AND ISSUE GUIDANCE RELATIVE TO IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES AND EXISTING NEED OF CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY. THIS PROPOSAL APPROVED, MC'S FIRST MEETING WAS SET FOR 27 JUNE 1976 AT A LOCATION IN FLORIDA. DR. PULIDO PROPOSED THE EXECUTION OF RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CHIEF OF AIR FORCE SECURITY AT CARACAS, VENEZUELA BECAUSE HE HAD DOUBLE-CROSSED DR.

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BOSCH. THIS PROPOSAL ALSO APPROVED.

E. BRIGADE 2506 COMPRISES VETERANS OF THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION CUBA. ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA IS MILITARY CHIEF, AND PEDRO "FICO" ROJAS RAMIREZ CHIEF OF PRESS, PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE. BRIGADE 2506 PREVIOUSLY DISCLAIMED ASSOCIATION WITH MILITANT OR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, BUT WILL NOW PUBLICLY CLAIM SOLIDARITY AND FORMAL PACT WITH THE OTHER FOUR ORGANIZATIONS, I.E., WITH CORU. THIS CLAIM WILL BE MADE EVEN THOUGH M-17-A AND FLNC MEMBERS HAVE NEVER OPENLY DECLARED EXISTENCE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS OR MEMBERSHIP IN THEM. BRIGADE 2506 ACTIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN CUBA AS DISTINCT FROM ITS RADIO STATION ON SWAN ISLAND BEAMING ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA INTO CUBA. BRIGADE 2506 DISCLOSED AN ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE "BLOQUE MILITAR CUBANO" WHICH BELIEVED BE A CLANDESTINE GROUP OPERATING INSIDE CUBA REPORTING TO SOMEONE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

F. MOVIMIENTO 17 DE ABRIL (17TH OF APRIL MOVEMENT - M-17-A) IS BRIGADE 2506 SPLINTER GROUP FORMED BY JUAN PEREZ FRANCO, OF MIAMI, FLORIDA AFTER HIS DEFEAT AS BRIGADE 2506 PRESIDENT ON 17 APRIL

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1976 BY ROBERTO CABALLO. BOTH PEREZ AND CABALLO WERE DELEGATES TO SANTO DOMINGO MEETING. THE SPLIT WAS THE FIRST MATTER DISCUSSED. BRIGADE 2506 REPRESENTATIVES CLAIM THAT FORMATION OF M-17-A HAS CAUSED A SPLIT WITHIN THE BRIGADE. ACCORDING TO PEREZ, M-17-A HAS MAJORITY OF CUBAN PROFESSIONALS AND MEMBERS OF CUBAN MUNICIPALITIES IN EXILE, AS WELL AS BRIGADE 2506 VETERANS, AND IS IN HARMONY WITH PATRIOTIC GOALS OF THE EXILE COMMUNITY. THE DISPUTE WAS SETTLED IN FAVOR OF M-17-A, WHICH WILL HANDLE ALL NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA. RAMON OROSCO WILL BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, RAUL CABRERA CHIEF OF MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY, AND PEREZ THE POLITICAL LEADER AND REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN CORU. END FYI Only. Y

2. WISH AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT DUE ITS NATURE AND SOURCE SENSITIVITY, ABOVE INFO IS FOR ADDRESSEES BACKGROUND ONLY, AND IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE BKHERALD WITHOUT PRIOR HQS AUTHORIZATION. ONLY ACTION REQUIRED OF ADDRESSEES IS TO PROVIDE HQS ANY INFO THAT COMES TO ATTENTION YOUR SOURCES RELATIVE TO ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS IN YOUR AREAS. STATION SHOULD NOT MOUNT COLLECTION OPS THIS MATTER WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL. Y

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3. CONDUCTING HQS TRACES ON AFOREMENTIONED INDIVIDUALS TO DETERMINE PAST OR PRESENT AGENCY AFFILIATION. WILL CABLE RESULTS.

4. FILE: 39-300-24, 39-300-26, 39-9-9. E2 IMPDET.

E/ROC

AGC/OOO A E Goldin

OPS/ITG - PAUL PLUMB (DRAFT)

C/EA/JKJ

AC/CI

C/OPS/LSN Curtis Glenn

C/LA/PNC F J Desmond

C/LA/M&CA

C/LA/CAR

C/FR/OPS

C/E/BC

AC/E/IB

DC/LA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DATE: 27 JULY 76
ORIG: CHRIS HOPKINS
UNIT: LA/COG
EXT: 1493

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STAFF 3719582 DIRECTOR 885958

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TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO.

RYBAT HUFANG.

REF: A. GUATEMALA CITY-19637 (IN-978269)

B. SAN JOSE 19715 (IN-978488)

C. KINGSTON 21021 (IN-978299) (BEING RELAYED GUATEMALA)

1. HQS FILES CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON HECTOR E. DAVANZO, OR DABANSO. OTHER THAN THAT PROVIDED IN REF B, HQS HAS NO INFORMATION THAT DAVANZO IS AN ALIAS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.

2. THE FOLLOWING TRACES ON BOSCH, IN ADDITION TO PARAGRAPHS ONE, TWO AND THREE OF REF C, MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON:

BOSCH, AKA PEDRO ANTONIO PENA, BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA, CUBAN CITIZEN, IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO ~~888888~~TERRORIST GROUPS SINCE 1957. IN 1960, HE CAME TO THE U.S. TO SERVE AS CIVILIAN COORDINATOR FOR THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECTIONAL DE RECUPERACION (MIRR). IN 1965, HE REPORTEDLY PLANNED AN AERIAL RAID OVER CUBA. IN 1967 HE ATTACKED THE U.S. AND BKHERALD AT A RALLY IN

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201-299292
17 July 76

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NYC UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF CUBAN NATIONALISTIC ASSOCIATION (ANC) AND THE MIRR. IN 1967, HE WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATE LAW CONCERNING THE TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES. IN 1968, HE WAS CONVICTED IN A MIAMI FEDERAL COURT OF CHARGES RELATING TO BOMBING OF SHIPS, CONSPIRACY AND EXTORTION, SERVED A SENTENCE IN THE ATLANTA FEDERAL PENITENTIARY AND WAS RELEASED ON PAROLE IN DECEMBER 1972. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA. (AC). IN 1974 THE FBI HAD AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR BOSCH AND CONSIDERED HIM DANGEROUS. HIS GROUP HAD CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA AND MADRID. IN NOVEMBER 1974 , HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN CARACAS USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND DISGUISE. IN FEBRUARY 1976 HE WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA FOR ENTERING THE COUNTRY WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN DOCUMENTS. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED BOSCH WAS SUPPOSEDLY PLANNING TO KILL SECSTATE KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR A NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, BCHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, WHO WAS THEN IN SAN JOSE. IN APRIL 1976, HE WAS

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CONF: INFO: FILE 885958 DISSEM BY: PER

REPORTED TO BE IN SANTIAGO, CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL, AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST HIM ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY BBBBQUBBESCAPED LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT (PASSPORT NAMES NOT AVAILABLE). IN MAY 1976, HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, WHERE PRESIDENT BALAGUER WAS ALLOWING HIM TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH FOR AN EYE OPERATION.

3. FILE: 201-299292, 18-9-5. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A REQUESTS TRACES ON DABANSO FOR PASSAGE TO ESLOGIC-27, WHO MAY PASS THE INFO TO FOREIGN MINISTER MOLINA.
REF B STATES D'AVANZO IS A DOCUMENTED ALIAS OF BOSCH.
REF C SUMMARIZES PRESS REPORTS THAT THE BOSCH LED GROUP BBBBB ORU UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO PLACE A BOMB ON A CUBANA FLIGHT AT KINGSTON.

C/LA/COG/OPS W. DEVINE (DRAFT)

LA/GJT (DRAFT) B. BOYLE

LA/SB/CH (DRAFT) B. TURBEVILLE

C/LA/CAR

DATE: 16 JULY 1976
ORIG: MASSEY/BOYLE
UNIT: LA/M&CAM/GES, LA/GJT
EXT: 9041/1249

201-299292

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TO: PRIORITY KINGSTON INFO LA/MIAMI.

KMSTONE

REF: KINGSTON 21021 (IN 978299)

1. INFORMATION ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA FOR PASSAGE TO AMBASSADOR FOLLOWS:

HE WAS BORN 18 AUG 1926 IN SANTA CLARA, CUBA, CUBAN CITIZEN, IS MEDICAL DOCTOR AND HAS [redacted]BEEN INVOLVED IN ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN TERRORIST GROUPS SINCE 1957. IN 1960 HE CAME TO U.S. TO SERVE AS CIVILIAN COORDINATOR OF MOVIMIENTO INSURRECIONAL DE RECUPERACION (MIRR).

IN 1965 IT WAS REPORTED HE PLANNED AN AERIAL RAID OVER CUBA. IN 1967 HE ATTACKED U.S. AND BKHERALD IN RALLY IN NYC UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF CUBAN NATIONALISTIC ASSOCIATION (ANC) AND MIRR. IN 1967 HE WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATE LAW CONCERNING TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVES.

IN 1968 HE WAS CONVICTED IN FEDERAL COURT IN MIAMI ON CHARGES RELATING TO BOMBING OF SHIPS, CONSPIRACY AND EXTORTION AND SERVED SENTENCE IN ATLANTA PENETENTIARY AND WAS RELEASED DECEMBER 1972

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TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
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INFO (8)

15 Jul 76

201-299292

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ON PAROLE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY FOUNDED A SMALL ACTION GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES CALLED ACCION CUBA (AC).

IN 1974 THE FBI HAD AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR BOSCH AND CONSIDERED HIM DANGEROUS. HIS GROUP HAD CLAIMED CREDIT FOR SENDING PACKAGE BOMBS TO CUBAN CONSULATES IN LIMA, OTTAWA, AND MADRID. IN NOVEMBER 1974 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN CARACAS USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND DISGUISE.

IN FEBRUARY 1976 HE WAS IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA AND ARRESTED FOR ENTERING WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN DOCUMENTS. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED POSSIBLE PLANS OF BOSCH TO KILL DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR CHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, WHO THEN IN SAN JOSE.

IN APRIL 1976 HE WAS REPORTED TO BE IN SANTIAGO, CHILE WITH CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST HIM ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY EVADED THE CHILEAN INVESTIGATORS, LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND PERSONAL CLOTHING.

IN MAY 1976 HE WAS REPUTED TO BE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND

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PRESIDENT BALAGUER WAS ALLOWING HIM TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH FOR AN EYE OPERATION.

2. FOLLOWING TWO PARAS FOR STATION ONLY:

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, HQS FILE ON BOSCH (201-299292) INCLUDES SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL INFO FROM FBI. PERTINENT AND TIMELY FBI INFO INCLUDES FACT THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN MEETING OF CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN SANTO DOMINGO ON 2, 3 AND 4 JUNE 76, INCLUDING THREE DELEGATES FROM BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BRIGADE 2506, THREE DELEGATES FROM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT FOR CUBA (FLNC), THREE DELEGATES FROM AC (INCLUDING BOSCH), AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE APRIL 17TH. THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES. (NOTE: THIS CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS PROBABLY IS UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION REFERRED TO IN REF, BUT FBI REPORT DID NOT REFER TO ORGANIZATION AS SUCH, HOWEVER, EMBTEL 2883 STATES "ORU IS HEADED BY CUBAN EXILE DOCTOR BOSCH".)

IN JANUARY 1962 BOSCH WAS GRANTED A POA FOR USE IN PM OPERATIONS FOR USE BY LA/MIAMI STATION. APPARENTLY HE WAS WITTING, AS HE

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DIRECTOR 884725

WAS SUCCESSFULLY SGSWIRLED IN MAY 1962. HIS CLEARANCE WAS CANCELLED IN NOVEMBER 1962 AND THERE IS NO INDICATION HE WAS ACTUALLY USED.Y

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REF CONCERNS [redacted] ORU, REPORTEDLY HEADED BY BOSCH, CLAIMED CREDIT FOR ATTEMPTING TO PLACE BOMB ON CUBANA FLIGHT AT KINGSTON AIRPORT. STATION REQUESTS INFO ON BOSCH AND ADVISE ON INFO WHICH CAN BE PASSED TO THE AMBASSADOR.

29 JUL 1976

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DATE: 15 JUL 76
ORIG: BARBARA BOYLE
UNIT: LA/CAR/JAM
EXT: 1249

C/LA

AC/LA/COG

C/LA/CAR

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CL BY: 012919

BOSCH ORLANDO

CUBA

COSTA RICA

FOREIGN MINISTER FACIO CLARIFIES COUP REPORT

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] Referring to the news conference he held yesterday in connection with the alleged plotting of a coup d'etat in Guatemala, Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio said that his statements were distorted by certain international news agencies.

BF

Facio said that the Guatemalan Government was not involved and had no part in the plot. He added that the coup was under preparation and this was why he and the security minister had gone to Guatemala to investigate the armed movement apparently headed by Cuban Orlando Bosch.

Facio said the coup was not imminent but that it was suspected in view of Bosch's trips to Guatemala.

Congressmen Concerned Over Rumors

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] A motion was submitted today at the Legislative Assembly to summon Public Security Minister Mario Charpentier Gamboa and Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio to explain in full detail at a plenary session what is really happening in Guatemala. Furthermore, we see some connections in the plot, which is now a chronic occurrence originating in Guatemala and El Salvador, against our country's institutional stability with the CIA's collaboration. Precisely this week the Public Security Ministry ordered James Williamson to leave the country. As we all know, Williamson is the CIA's chief in Costa Rica. During Figueres' administration he was declared persona non grata for publicly bragging about the activities of the CIA, the Costa Rica Libre Movement and other groups trying to overthrow the government in power at the time.

We expect Charpentier and Facio to explain to the deputies and the nation what is really happening in Guatemala and what role the CIA is playing inthe plot to overthrow our democratic institutions and to place Costa Rica under a fascist dictatorship similar to those which exist in the continent's southern cone.

ODUBER STRESSES COUNTRY'S FREEDOM OF PRESS

Paris AFP in Spanish 0240 GMT 7 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 6 Jul--President Daniel Oduber today reiterated that there is unlimited freedom of press in Costa Rica. He was speaking on a nationwide radio and television network in connection with the forthcoming UNESCO conference on mass communications media, which will open in San Jose on Monday.

He said that Costa Rica is willing to allow the holding there of a discussion reflecting all the various trends of thought regarding freedom of information. "We want the delegates to make an on-the-spot evaluation of the system of freedoms--including freedom of speech--existing in Costa Rica," Oduber emphasized.

Oduber contended that he is against state control of publicity agencies and the communications media, although, he said, a certain amount of coordination between the government and those agencies is necessary.

FBIS DR #132 (LA) 8 JUL 76

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BOSCH Orlando

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COSTA RICA

FOREIGN MINISTER REPORTS ON ALLEGED COUP PLOT

San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Excerpts] Costa Rican Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo Facio told newsmen during a news conference just ended that he spent the weekend in Guatemala with Costa Rican Public Security Minister Mario Charpentier Gamboa talking with Guatemalan Government officials about a coup that was supposed to take place in the next few days in Guatemala to overthrow President Kjell Laugerud Garcia.

Facio said that Orlando Bosch and other persons were presumably involved in it but that the names of the others would not be immediately revealed. The Guatemalan Government has the situation under control and the plan has failed.

BF

Facio said: [recording] (?And since we also knew) that Orlando Bosch had entered and left Guatemala several times using different passports he has [words indistinct]. He came and went from here. We felt that it would be advisable to make a fast trip to Guatemala to take a close look at things and to talk [word indistinct] with Guatemalan officials.

Mario Charpentier and I went to Guatemala on Sunday afternoon and held the pertinent conversations. Of course, I talked with the foreign minister; Mario talked with the defense minister. The two (?reported to the president), and we reached the conclusion that there was nothing serious--that there is always the same group, which is connected or [words indistinct] with the same group which people say is a (?cell) of world communism and must be smashed.

To me these people are completely half-witted and irrational, and I believe that part of the whole thing was the usual gossiping by Orlando Bosch and the group that helps him. He boasted of (?having support) from other governments [words indistinct] and the important thing was that the Guatemalan Government learned that there was at least talk about a movement and offered, very sincerely in my opinion, all cooperation to avert continued activity of this type.

Minister Charpentier and I came back pleased with the results of our efforts. I wanted to tell you this so there will be no other interpretations of our trip to Guatemala. [end recording]

Facio said in connection with the coup brewing in Guatemala that, unquestionably, there are groups who are interested in violently changing the government to establish a rightist regime, such as the one sponsored by the Free Costa Rica Movement [MCRL].

Asked if this coup plan was related in any way to one former President Jose Figueres was allegedly hatching, Facio said there was no connection. Asked if U.S. citizen Williamson--a former U.S. Embassy official--had anything to do with it, Facio said he has no concrete evidence involving him. He added that Williamson has 15 days to leave the country.

The Guatemalan Mano Blanca and the MCRL have always been involved in these matters, Facio said. He ended by saying that he has nothing concrete about the coup and that his and Charpentier's purpose in going to Guatemala was to gather information and to inform the Guatemalan Government so it may thwart any further coup attempts against Costa Rica.

FBIS, DR # 131 (LA) 7 JUL 76

Further Details

Paris AFP in Spanish 2329 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, 6 Jul--Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio denied today that he went to Guatemala because a coup was being planned there against President Kjell Laugerud. At a news conference Facio said that he went to Guatemala to discuss with his colleague Adolfo Molina the rumors circulating here to the effect that Guatemalan groups led by the Cuban Orlando Bosch are attempting to create problems in Costa Rica, provoking a delicate situation.

Facio added that Bosch and the Guatemalans are plotting outside Guatemala and that they would implement a subversive plan in Costa Rica, including the assassination of President Daniel Oduber and Facio himself. He added that for months Guatemalan groups [words indistinct] the Costa Rican Government. Facio said repeatedly that he went to Guatemala accompanied by Public Security Minister Mario Charpenteir to report on the rumors to the Guatemalan Government.

OPPOSITION PARTY DEMANDS VESCO'S EXPULSION

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1640 GMT 6 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, 6 Jul (ACAN-EFE)--The opposition Democratic Renovation Party [PRD] has asked the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to have U.S. millionaire Robert L. Vesco expelled from Costa Rica on the charge of meddling in the country's domestic politics. The accusation was made by the president of the PRD's Executive Committee, Rodrigo Carazo Odio, based on public charges which have been lodged here..

One of those charges is based on former President Jose Figueres' statements to a newsman from Mexico City's newspaper EXCELSIOR to the effect that Vesco had financed several political parties during the 1974 election campaign. Another one is based on statements by Deputy Sigurd Koberg who some time ago said that Vesco had offered financial aid to his party. Carazo Odio also recalled the incident of a speech delivered by Vesco justifying his presence in Costa Rica, his businesses and his ties with politicians, a speech based on notes drafted by Figueres himself while in office as president.

A constitutional norm forbids foreigners from interfering in domestic politics. Vesco came to Costa Rica in 1972 and immediately caused intense discussions over his invesments and his ties with known politicans. Here he has escaped from legal action to recover $224 million belonging to the investors Overseas Services, a mutual fund which he managed.

EL SALVADOR

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE UNITES AGAINST GOVERNMENT

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1930 GMT 1 Jul 76 PA

[Text] San Salvador, 1 Jul (ACAN-EFE)--It was learned here today that a 30 July Committee of People's Organizations (COP-30 de Julio) has been created which, according to its members, seeks to rally support this month for mass mobilization "to honor the memory of our student heroes who were killed on the aforementioned date" during the repression of a demonstration.

Peasant, worker, student organizations and opposition parties--the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN)--announce that the committee also seeks to strengthen the unity and fighting spirit of the people in their struggles against what they term a "dictatorship."

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T 078699 E1A283 PAGE 01 IN 978269

TOR:1317032 JUL 76 GUAT 19637

SECRET 1316402 JUL 76 STAFF

CITE GUATEMALA CITY 19637

TO: DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO.

RYBAT WUFANG

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 19625 (IN 975057)

1. DURING LATE 2 JULY MEETING WITH ESLOGIC-27, HE BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF COSTA RICAN COUP PLOT AND ACCUSATIONS OF ROBERTO "TITO" ARANA INVOLVEMENT AS PUBLICIZED IN GUATEMALAN NEWS MEDIA. ESLOGIC-27 SAID THAT AS SOON AS HE HEARD ABOUT THE ALLEGED PLOT HE CALLED GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINSTER TO FIND OUT IF ANY NAMES HAD BEEN MENTIONED. HE TOLD CASE OFFICER BY WAY OF EXPLANATION THAT "EVERY TIME COSTA RICANS COME UP WITH A GUATEMALAN PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVT, HIS (ISLOGIC-27'S) NAME HEADS THE LIST OF GUATEMALANS MENTIONED." HE CLAIMS FOREIGN MINISTER TOLD HIM FACIO DID NOT MENTION ANY GUATEMALAN NAMES.

2. ESLOGIC-27 DID HAVE ONE NAME WHICH HE SAID FACIO ASKED ABOUT: HECTOR DABANSO, CHILEAN CITIZEN WHO HAD ENTERED COSTA RICA ON CHILEAN PP NO. 26583. FACIO CLAIMED TO HAVE INFO THAT DABANSO HAD RECENTLY TRAVELED GUATEMALA SEVERAL TIMES FROM COSTA RICA ON ABOVE PASSPORT AND THEY SUSPECTED DABANSO CONNECTED

[illegible]-6-1

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T 970039 EIA203 PAGE 02 IN 970269

TOR:1317032 JUL 76 GUAT 19637

WITH PLOT. ESLOGIC-27 CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT DABANSO AND SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED BKHERALD TRACES.

3. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION BASED ON MEDIA COVERAGE THIS SUBJECT, ESLOGIC-27 PROFESSED NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PLOT AND REITERATED OPINION EXPRESSED BY SOME THAT COSTA RICANS PERIODICALLY COME UP WITH PLOT STORY TO TAKE PRESSURES OFF OTHER PROBLEMS. PER SAN JOSE AND HQS GUIDANCE, STATION CASE OFFICER DID NOT ASK ESLOGIC-27 ANY QUESTIONS BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED IN PREVIOUS TRAFFIC THIS SUBJECT.

4. NO STATION TRACES DABANSO. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ADDEE TRACES INDICATING WHAT, IF ANYTHING, CAN BE PASSED LIAISON.

5. RE ACCUSATIONS OF TITO ARANA INVOLVEMENT REPORTED REF, 9 JULY GUATEMALA CITY PRESS QUOTED STATEMENT BY FACIO CATEGORICALLY CONDEMNING "IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNFOUNDED SPECULATION BY NEW COMMENTATORS" LINKING TITO ARANA TO "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT."

6. FILE: 10-9-5, 201-0281695, 201-0184708. E2, IMPDET.

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FILE RF c/WHB, c/ei4 c/LA/SG2

LA8

T 878841 E14788 PAGE 01 IN 97848

TOR:1322272 JUL 76 SJOS 19715

SECRET 132036Z JUL 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19715

TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO.

RYBAT WUFANG

REF: GUATEMALA 19637 (IN 978269)

CHRONO
DO NOT REMOVE

1. BELIEVE NAME MENTIONED PARA 2 REF IS GARBLE OF HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI WHICH IS A DOCUMENTED ALIAS OF DR. ORLANDO BOSCH. WHEN BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 HE HA AIN HIS POSSESSION A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN THAT NAME #265831 IT WAS PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS WHO CONJURED UP INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH IN THE ARMS MOVEMENT STORY WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF RECENT TRAFFIC. STATION HAS NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT BY BOSCH. ODUBER OBVIOUSLY PASSED HIS THOUGHTS TO FACIO RE BOSCH.

2. WHEN BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED IN SAN JOSE HE WAS FOUND WITH HIS DAUGHTER, LOURDES TERESITA BOSCH DE BRINDER (OR BRINER), BORN IN CUBA ON 17 FEBRUARY 1958, AND AMERICAN CITIZEN, HOLDING U.S. PASSPORT #C-2267692 ISSUED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1972. HER HUSBAND, MARIO RUBIN BRINDER (BRINER), WAS BORN IN BUENOS AIRES ON 27

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T 078641 E1A780 PAGE 02-02 IN 076400

TOR:1322272 JUL 76 SJOS 19719

APRIL 1959 AND HOLDS ARGENTINE PASSPORT 7234917. THE BRINDERS HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABOUT ONE AND ONE-HALF YEARS AND ONE OR BOTH WAS STUDYING MEDICINE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS IN GUATEMALA. AS A RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE THEY LEFT GUATEMALA FOR COSTA RICA ON 9 FEBRUARY 1976. THERE ARE RUMORS HERE THAT THE BRINDERS HAVE SINCE RETURNED TO GUATEMALA. BOSCH IS NOW IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. FILE: 18-9-5, 201-388985. E2 IMPDET

DISPATCH

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Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

Chief, Latin America Division

Orlando BOSCH/Rightist Cuban Activities in the Dominican Republic

None

1. Forwarded herewith are two Federal Bureau of Investigation reports dated 23 June 1976 concerned with Subject.

2. Your attention is called to paragraph eight, page two, of the report which discusses the Cuban meetings in the Dominican Republic. Although we know of no mountains close to Santo Domingo, we recall that EMFETCH-9 was well known for his "hideway" on a mountaintop "in the clouds" outside of either San Cristobal or Bani. Given the indications that we have received of EMANTHEM-1's interest in Orlando BOSCH, and the occasional "confusion" by EMPYREX-10 and EMFETCH-9 on BOSCH's presence in Santo Domingo, is it possible that EMFETCH-9 might be concealing what he really knows about the BOSCH matter? If anything does turn up along this line, we would be interested in learning about it.

Howard T. BAGAUS

Attachments: as stated above h/w

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ABSTRACT
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1 July 1976

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DEPT OF DEFENSE DOCUMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT DATED 9 JUNE 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST GROUP

REPORT NO: 2 231 0021 76
470th MI Group
Ft. Amador, CANAL ZONE

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 06/07/76

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
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CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE [illegible], C/OB, OPS/ITG 4, [illegible], SIV, SS/SOG-4, CI-4 DISSEM BY: 49

TO: [redacted] CARACAS INFO SANTO DOMINGO, PANAMA CITY, SAN JOSE.

MHSPIKE KMSTONE

REFS: A. CARACAS 30159 (IN 958679*)

B. SAN JOSE 19662 (IN 959993**)

1. INFO OBN HAND AT HQS INDICATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH HAS BEEN IN DOMREP SINCE EARLY APRIL 76.

2. ON 281 JUNE 76 DOMREP CHIEF OF POLICE TOLD STATION THAT HE CONSIDERING THROWING BOSCH OUT OF COUNTRY.

3. SANTO DOMINGO: WHILE NOT NECESSARY MAKE EFFORT MONITOR BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES, PLS ADVISE IF YOU HEAR HE LEAVES DOMREP.

4. FILE: 201-299292, 22-12-200. E2, IMPDET.

*A CUBAN EXTREMIST GROUP OF WHICH ORLANDO BOSCH IS A LEADER PLANNING TO BOMB CUBINA FLIGHT TRAVELLING BETWEEN PANAMA AND HAVANA ON 21 JUN 76. BOSCH CURRENTLY RESIDING IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE WAS ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN FEBRUARY. IT UNKNOWN WHEN HE RELEASED.

**BOSCH WAS ESCORTED/DEPORTED TO NICARAGUA BY OVERLAND ROUTE 26 MARCH 76.

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25 Jun 76

201-299292

DATE: 24 JUN 76
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OPS/ITG Paul Plumb (telecoord)
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T 829878 EIA422 PAGE 01 IN 950609

TOR:2221322 JUN 76 SDOM 17584

S E C R E T 2221822 JUN 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17584

TO: DIRECTOR.

[redacted] MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 862914

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 (IN 935896)

C. DIRECTOR 861876

1. LINCOLN RONDON, WELL-KNOWN CUBAN RESIDING MIAMI, VISITED SANTO DOMINGO FEW DAYS AGO, ASKED EMGARNET-1 IF HE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT RECENT VISITS OF RIGHTEST CUBANS TO CONTACT ORLANDO BOSCH. EMGARNET-1 EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS SUCH MEETING TOOK PLACE, POINTING OUT THAT AIRPORT CONTROLS OF ENTERING CUBANS VERY TIGHT. RONDON (WHO IS AN OLD BOSCH HATER) SAID HE WAS CERTAIN MEETING TOOK PLACE AND CLAIMED CUBANS ENTERED COUNTRY WITH FALSE PUERTO RICAN DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE BEING USED INCREASINGLY BY EXTREME RIGHTEST CUBANS BECAUSE THEY ARE SO EASY TO OBTAIN.

2. EMGARNET-1 REPEATED RONDON'S REMARKS TO EMFETCH-9, WHO SAID HE WAS SICK OF WASTING TIME CHECKING ON BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO POLICE OFFICER TO

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The appropriate action in authorized: clean-type

Joan M. Pilley
LA/COG/EA

..., cite
reasons and coordinate
if appropriate.

22 Jun 76

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T 819878 E14422 PAGE 02-02 IN 958689

TOR:2221322 JUN 76 SDOM 17584

TELL BOSCH TO DEPART DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITHIN A WEEK.

3. AT RECEPTION ON 21 JUNE, EMFETCH-9 TOLD COS HE WAS "THROWING BOSCH OUT". HE SAID HE HAD LONG SUSPECTED THAT BOSCH WAS ACTUALLY CASTRO AGENT (HE UNDOUBTEDLY IS INFLUENCED BY EMGARNET-1 IN THIS REGARD) AND WONDERED IF THE BEST THING WOULDN'T BE TO "GET RID OF BOSCH." COS EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT, SAID HE DID NOT THINK SUCH ACTION SHOULD BE GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT, POINTING OUT, AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE COUNTRY AND PRESIDENT BALAGUER COULD ILL-AFFORD THE RESULTANT PUBLICITY. [redacted]N THINKS THIS IS SIMPLY A CASE OF EMFETCH-9 TALKING MACHO.

4. REQUEST QUERY FBI IF REF C MEETING ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE.

5. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

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CI DOCUMENT EXTRACT

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BOSH, ORLANDO
201-0299292 096-005-009
SEX M HZPA-21288
03 JUN 76
CIT CUBA

RES NICA. CUBAN EXILE LDR OF GRP CALLED CUBAN ACTION GRP /CAG/. MBRS ARE KNOWN BOMB-THROWERS ND MAJORITY ARE YOUNG MEN BETWEEN 20-35 YRS OLD UBJ ALLEGEDLY TRAINED CAG IN NICA, MEXI AND U.S. CAG WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT BOMBING IN PANA CITY. SUBJ RPTDLY HAS AN ARMS CACHE IN M X E R SE N EVENT CASTRO TRAVELED TO MEX

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T 997293 EIA216 PAGE 01 00100 CAQ IN 950364

TOR:150035Z JUN 76 SUSPENSE C/LA SJOS 19625

S E C R E T 142302Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19625

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT HUFANG

REF: SAN JOSE 19569 (IN 928580)

1. MEETING WITH HUFANG-1 (F-1) ON 14 JUNE BEGAN WITH [illegible] F-1 QUESTION TO CASE OFFICER REGARDING WHAT USE WOULD BE MADE OF INFO REGARDING PLAN TO OVERTHROW COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. F-1 WAS TOLD THAT USG HAS NO DESIRE INTERVENE DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THAT SOURCES AS WELL AS INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED WOULD BE PROTECTED. COMMENT: INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED ARE CLOSE PERSONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATES OF F-1. WITHOUT SUCH ASSURANCES IT IS CONSIDERED THAT F-1 WOULD NOT HAVE SPOKEN FURTHER OF THE MATTER.

Bosch

2. IN EARLY MAY ONE MARIO FERNANDEZ PIT PIZA, EX JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYO UN TRAVELLED TO CHILE TO ATTEND A MILITARY SCHOOL REUNION. FERNANDEZ WAS A CLASSMATE OF PRESIDENT PINOCHET AND THEY REMAIN GOOD FRIENDS. ACCORDING TO F-1, WHILE IN CHILE FERNANDEZ SECURED AGREEMENT THAT A QUANTITY OF SOVIET AND CZECH WEAPONS CAPTURED BY THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT FROM LEFTIST FORCES IN CHILE AFTER THE FALL OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SENT TO COSTA RICA

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T 997293 EIA218 PAGE 02 IN 950364

TOR:150035Z JUN 76 SJOS 19625

VIA GUATEMALA FOR USE IN OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. THE WEAPONS ARE SAID TO CONSIST OF RIFLES AND SUB-MACHINE GUNS FOR A FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 300 MEN, AS WELL AS SOME 3 MILLION ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION. THE CONTRACTING PARTIES IN CHILE, PRESUMED TO BE THE GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY BUT NOT CONFIRMED, HAVE AGREED TO SEND 2 MEN TO COSTA RICA TO ASSIST IN PREPARATIONS. THE WEAPONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN SHIPPED FROM CHILE.

3. THE PLOTTING GROUPS IN COSTA RICA CONSIST OF THE RECENTLY FORMED "LEGION OF EX-MILITARES" WHICH INCLUDES MANUEL ENRIQUE "PIYIQUE" GUERRA VELASQUEZ (201-226625), AND ROGELIO CASTRO PINTO (201-0926755); THE "SINDEP" GROUP OF CONSERVATIVE BUSINESSMEN LED BY LEONEL PINTO AND ARMANDO GUARDIA VILLALAS; THE MCRL ~~CON~~INCLUDING RAFAEL ANGEL ULLUA, EDGAR CARDONA QUIROZ AND BERNAL URBINA PINTO; AS WELL AS FERNANDO ORTUNO SOBRADO, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ DURAN AND GERARDO FERNANDEZ DURAN.

4. HUFANG-1 IS CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PLAN BUT UNABLE TO EITHER CONVINCE HIS ASSOCIATES TO DESIST OR ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLANNED ACTION. ~~N~~EVEN IF HE DOES NOT

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T 997293 EIA218 PAGE 03 IN 950364

TOR:1500352 JUN 76 SJOS 19625

PARTICIPATE. HE AND THE GROUP WILL RECEIVE THE BLAME FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. AND IF HE OPPOSES TOO STRONGLY FROM WITHIN HIS ASSOCIATES WILL STOP CONFIDING IN HIM, AND BLAME HIM FOR ANY FAILURES. F-1 IS THEREFORE DESIROUS OF FRUSTRATING THE PLAN BUT NOT AT THE COST OF BETRAYING HIS FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES.

5. F-1 BELIEVES THE PLAN WILL FAIL, AND FEARS THAT IT MAY RESULT IN GIVING EX-PRESIDENT JOSE "PEPE" FIGUERES A MOTIVE FOR TAKING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO SAVE "DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM". GIVEN THE LONG TIME ASSOCIATION OF "PIYIQUE" GUERRA VELASQUEZ WITH FIGUERES, THERE IS SPECULATION THAT FIGUERES HAS MANIPULATED THE SITUATION IN ORDER TO PROVIDE HIMSELF A MOTIVE FOR RETURNING TO POWER.

6. WHILE ALL THE ABOVE REMAINS SOMEWHAT MURKY, THE STATION AND F-1 ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT SOMETHING BE DONE TO PREVENT ANY MOVEMENT OF ARMS, BUT WITHOUT BETRAYING TO THE GOCR NAMES AND DETAILS OF INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. STATION PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING TWO STAGE PLAN FOR HQS APPROVAL:

A. SANTIAGO STATION APPROACH HIGHEST POSSIBLE LIAISON CONTACT TO ADVISE/WARN OF INCIPIENT PLAN TO MOVE ARMS FROM CHILE TO COSTA RICA VIA GUATEMALA, FOR USE IN OVERTHROWING THE

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TOR:1500352 JUN 76 SJOS 19625

COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN. PURPOSE OF APPROACH BEING TO MAKE CHILEANN OVERNMENT AWARE THAT PLAN IS KNOWN, AND THUS DISCOURAGE SHIPMENT OF WEAPONS, IF INDEED THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS A PLAN TO DO SO. DETAILS OF PERSONS AND GROUPS INVOLVED IN COSTA RICA WOULD NOT BE REVEALED TO CHILEANS.

6. CHIEF OF STATION WILL RAISE SUBJECT WITH HUGALLY-1 AS HAVING ORIGINATED IN CHILE, AGAIN WITHOUT OTHER DETAILS THAN MOVEMENT OF ARMS FROM CHILE TO COSTA RICA. THIS WILL SERVE TO ALERT HUGALLY-1, ~~DEMUSTTING~~ DEMONSTRATING TO HIM STATION AND USG GOOD FAITH IN OUR DESIRE TO PROTECT DEMOCRACY AND THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF COSTA RICA. IT WILL BE EMPHASIZED TO HUGALLY-1 THAT GOCH NOT KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN ORDER TO NOT PREJUDICE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

7. COS HAS REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH HUGALLY-1 (FOR OTHER REASONS) FOR MORNING 16 JUNE. THEREFORE REQUEST HQS APPROVAL PARA 5 ACTION PRIOR COB 15 JUNE.

8. REQUEST HQS MAKE NO DISSEMINATION ABOVE INFORMATION WITHOUT PRIOR STATION APPROVAL.

9. FILE: 201-281695," 10-9-15. E2 IMPDET.

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TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.Y

VWLOFTY Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 861876 |*|

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 |IN 935896**|

C. DIRECTOR 862497 |***| Y.

1. FBI ADVISED THAT SUBSTANCE REF A MAY BE PASSED TO LOCAL LIAISON AND SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE DETAIL, PROVIDING NO RPT NO REFERENCE IS MADE TO FBI INFORMANT PARTICIPATION IN EXILE MEETINGS OR PRESENCE SANTO DOMINGO. FBI, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZES RISK THAT INFORMANT STILL MIGHT BE ARRESTED ALONG WITH OTHER CUBAN EXILES BY DOMINICAN POLICE.Y

2. FILE: 200-4-495. E2 IMPDET.H

* FBI REPORT ON PLANS OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES TO HOLD CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS IN SANTO DOMINGO 2, 3, AND 4 JUNE 76.

** STATION REQUESTED PERMISSION PASS SUBSTANCE REF A TO LOCAL LIAISON AND DISCUSS WITH SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM. SAID CHANCES GOOD, HOWEVER, THAT POLICE MIGHT ARREST FBI INFORMANT ALONG WITH OTHER CUBAN EXILES.

*** ADVISED STATION THAT FBI NOT YET DECIDED ON HOW TO HANDLE REF B REQUEST BUT WILL ADVISE.

DATE: 2 JUNE 76
ORIG: DAN SMITH
UNIT: C/LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1349

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

OPS/LSN S. KUHN (TELECOORD)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

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STAFF [illegible] DIRECTOR 652437

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TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.Y

VULOFTY Y

REF: A. DIRECTOR 861876

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17445 (IN 935896) Y

1. FBI HAS BEEN ADVISED OF YOUR CONCERN ABOUT DOMINICAN REACTION TO CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST GROUPS MEETING IN SANTO DOMINGO AND OF YOUR REQUEST TO BRIEF LIAISON AND SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM. BUREAU HAS NOT YET DECIDED HOW IT WANTS TO HANDLE MATTER. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS SOME RESPONSE RECEIVED.Y

2. FILE: 200-86-495. E2 IMPDET.H

A - FBI SOURCE TO ATTEND MEETING OF ANTI-CASTRO TERRORIST GROUPS SANTO DOMINGO JUNE 2-5.
B - SANTO DOMINGO ASKS PERMISSION TELL EMPYREX, EMWISE AND SECRET SERVICE ABOUT THE MEETING.

DATE: 1 JUNE 76
ORIG: FISHER AMES
UNIT: C/LA/TFK
EXT: 1349

Ops/LSN - Steve Kuhn Telecoord

C/LA
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T 962263 E14654 PAGE 01 IN 035896

TOR:311034Z MAY 76 SDOM 17445

S E C R E T 311025Z MAY 76 STAFF 3.

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17445

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

NIACT DIRECTOR

VWLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 861876

1. PLEASE ASK FBI FOR PERMISSION PASS SUBSTANCE REF TO EMPYREX AND EMWISE.

2. AIRPORT CONTROLS ON CUBANS ARE NORMALLY TIGHT AND WOULD EXPECT SCREENING TO BE FURTHER TIGHTENED PRIOR KISSINGER VISIT.

3. ONE POSSIBLE REASON REF MEETING PLANNED FOR SANTO DOMINGO IS PRESENCE HERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH. WHETHER VISITING CUBANS MEET WITH BOSCH OR NOT, JUDGE CHANCES THAT POLICE WILL ARREST THEM (AND FBI SOURCE) AS FAIRLY GOOD.

4. HAS REF INFO BEEN PASSED TO S JRET SERVICE? REQUEST PERMISSION DISCUSS WITH SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE TEAM WHICH ARRIVING 1 JUNE.

5. NO FILE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

STAFF 11/27 DIRECTOR [illegible]

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO.

1. FOLLOWING IS QUOTE OF REPORT PROVIDED BY FBI WHICH [illegible] ARE FORWARDING FOR YOUR INFO ONLY.

"THE FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC) IS A CUBAN TERRORIST GROUP HEADQUARTERED IN MIAMI WHICH HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR BOMBINGS OF CUBAN EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AS WELL AS BOMBINGS WITHIN THE U.S. ON MAY 26, 1976, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THERE HAD BEEN A MEETING OF SOME LEADERS OF THE FLNC IN MIAMI ON MAY 25, 1976. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A CONGRESS OF TERRORISTS SCHEDULED IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ON JUNE 2, 3 AND 4, 1976. THE LEADERS DESIRE THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATION AT THIS MEETING: THREE DELEGATES FROM THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BRIGADE 2506, THREE DELEGATES FROM THE FLNC, THREE DELEGATES FROM ACCION CUBANA AND THREE MEMBERS OF THE APRIL 17TH GROUP. ALL OF THE FOREGOING ORGANIZATIONS ARE COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN EXILES."

2. BUREAU HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AGENCY CONCURRENCE TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 012928

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

851876

HAVE THEIR SOURCE TRAVEL SANTO DOMINGO FOR THREE OR FOUR DAYS TO MEET WITH LEADERS AND REPS OF THESE GROUPS.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 28 MAY 76
ORIG: WM. RANDOLPH
UNIT: DC/LA/CAR
EXT: 1497

C/LA

C/LA/CAR

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FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 28 MAY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

14-00000

25 41

SECRET

LA 2157 STAFF

4/LA 7 OPSITGH ebps

T 007001 E14506 PAGE 01 IN 906392

TOR:0321218 MAY 76 SDOM 17355

SECRET 032040Z MAY 76 STAFF

3P

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17355

HCS HRS NVC

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO ROUTINE SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

MHSPIKE EMWISE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17347(IN 906509)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 28 1978
MICROFILMED

1. EMFETCH-9 TOLD LYNER 3 MAY THAT EMWISE LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH, CALLED HIM IN FOR QUESTIONING BASED ON STATION'S PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HIS WHEREABOUTS. EMFETCH-9 CONFIRMED THAT ADMIRAL DE WINDT PERSUADED PRESIDENT BALAGUER TO LET BOSCH REMAIN SANTO DOMINGO LONG ENOUGH FOR EYE OPERATION. EMFETCH-9 SAID PRESIDENT ANNOYED BOSCH HAS NOT YET HAD OPERATION, WANTS BOSCH ATTEND TO THIS IMMEDIATELY AND GET OUT OF COUNTRY ASAP.

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(2, 3) 2
OUR FILING

2. BOSCH NOW STAYING HOTEL CERVANTES UNDER LOOSE SURVEILLANCE. STATION SUGGESTED SURVEILLANCE BE STEPPED UP BECAUSE BOSCH CAPABLE GETTING FALSE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AND AGAIN DISAPPEARING FROM SIGHT. EMFETCH-9 GAVE EMWISE-15 INSTRUCTIONS TO TIGHTEN SURVEILLANCE.

3. EMFETCH-9 ASKED IF BKHERALD PREFERENCE IS TO KEEP

SECRET

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3 May 76
201-299292

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S E C R E T

STAFF

T 067001 E1A900 PAGE 02 IN 980392

TOR1632121Z MAY 76 SDOM 17355

BOSCH IN SANTO DOMINGO UNTIL OAS MEETING IN SANTIAGO HAS ENDED. LYNER THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE IDEAL SOLUTION. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS. (WHILE BELIEVE EMFETCH-9 WILL TRY TO KEEP BOSCH IN SANTO DOMINGO IF THIS IS WHAT WE WANT, PRESIDENT MAY NOT BE WILLING TO GO ALONG.)

4. EMFETCH-9 HOPED USG WOULD NOT FORMALLY REQUEST EXTRADITION. HE SAID PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE FAVORABLY INCLINED BECAUSE OF FEAR OF POSSIBLE REPRISALS AGAINST DOMINICAN INSTALLATIONS ABROAD.

5. EMWISE-15 TOLD LYNER IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION THAT AT TIME BOSCH PICKED UP FOR QUESTIONING, HE WAS LIVING IN APARTMENT OF PEDRO DANIEL REYNOSO, CHILEAN ENGINEER WHO WORKS FOR COMPANIA DOMINICANA DE ELECTRICIDAD. NO STATION TRACES.

N 621

36

6. CHARGE APPRISED THAT BOSCH DEFINITELY IN SANTO DOMINGO AND INFORMED MATTER BEING HANDLED LIKE HOT POTATO BY SECURITY SERVICES BECAUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT. CHARGE WILL NOT SEND MESSAGE, BUT REQUESTS DIRECTOR INFORM DEPARTMENT.

7. DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO: REQUEST TRACES REYNOSO.

S E C R E T

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RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 087901 E1A986 PAGE 03-03 IN 980302

TOR:0321218 MAY 76 SDOM 17358

8. INDEX: REYNOSO. FILE: 201-299202. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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11-1

SECRET

STAFF

201-9292 DIRECTOR 851473

CONF LA5 INFO FILE IPM CPS/EFTCH

SP

111

TO: SANTO DOMINGO INFO SANTIAGO, SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES. V

RNSPIKE EMUISE V

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 37355 (IN 908392) V

1. STATE, FBI AND SECRET SERVICE NOTIFIED THAT BOSCH NOW IN DOMREP. WHILE THEY WELCOME WHATEVER INFO IS OBTAINED, THEY DO NOT NOW HAVE PRIORITY INTEREST IN BOSCH AND DO NOT EXPECT THE AGENCY TO MAKE EFFORT TO COVER HIM. V

2. FYI. SECRET SERVICE HAS ADVISED US THAT ALTHOUGH BOSCH WANTED IN U.S. FOR PAROLE VIOLATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSIDERS HIM TO BE AN "UNWANTED ALIEN" AND U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY DECLINE ANY OFFERS FOR EXTRADITION TENDERED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY. MOST RECENT INTEREST GREW FROM REPORTS THAT HE WAS POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN PLOT TO KILL NEPHEW OF FORMER CHILEAN PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE WHILE KISSINGER WAS TOURING LATIN AMERICA FEB 76. SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE EMBARRASSED U.S., EFFORTS WERE MADE TO PREVENT IT. HE IS NOT CONSIDERED THREAT TO U.S. OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, AND WE SEE NO REASON TO HARRY HIM FROM PLACE TO PLACE. REPORTING ON TRAVEL FROM DOMREP WOULD STILL BE WELCOME. V

DATE:
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10 May 76

201-299292

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

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DISSEM BY:

3. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE ON PEDRO DANIEL REYNOSO. Y

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2,IMPDET.W

*ASKED FOR GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE BOSCH'S PRESENCE IN DOMREP AND REQUESTED THAT STATE BE NOTIFIED.

OPS/LSN
C. ELGUN

DATE: 5 MAY 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1349

C/OPS/ITG J. REAGAN (IN SUBSTANCE)
C/LA/SB
AC/LA/MOCAM
C/LA/P&NC
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

[redacted] 0619372 CIA 849936

CONF: C/LA7 INFO: FILE C/PLAN, C/EN/IO, C/OPS, C/CI4, C/OPS/ITG4

0 0 0 PER 0 DISSEM BY: 29

TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (SY/I/PIB). Y

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SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y - Trace Reply SS, FBI, State

CIR-316/02000-76 Y

1. AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE HAS CONFIRMED THAT ORLANDO ✓201-299292 amended BOSCH AVILA IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND AS OF 3 MAY 1976 WAS STAYING AT THE HOTEL CERVANTES. THIS AGENCY WILL MAKE NO SPECIAL EFFORT TO MONITOR BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES AND TRAVELS UNLESS REQUESTED BY ADDRESSEES. Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. E2,IMPDET.H

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17355 (IN 9083[illegible])

PROJECT: EMFETCH/9 LIAISON: 22

OBJ: L

DATE: 5 MAY 76
ORIG: V. GARDELLA:JP
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 1249

IP/DM ☒ ABSTRACT
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PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/DM CODE NO. (2, 3)
RYBAT RSTR. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
RID (8)
IP/CRU FOR FILING

CIR-316/02000-76
6 MAY 76
201-299292

C/OPS/LSN

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C/OPS/ITG

C/LA/CAR

for C/LA

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ACTION UNIT C/LA7

INFO: FILE VR C/CI/AN, C/CI4, C/OPS, C/OSG, C/OSG/IC, C/OPS/ITG4, C/PS/EG2.

STAFF

T 062115 ~~E1A666~~ PAGE 01 IN 906509

TOR:302202Z APR 76 SDOM 17347

S E C R E T 301940Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17347 301940Z APR 76 STAFF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO ROUTINE SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHSPIKE EMPREDICT EMPYREX

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 840677

B. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569)

C. SANTO DOMINGO 17299 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES) (IN 881352)

LA/DR

1. OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, EMPYREX AND EMWISE HAVE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. HOWEVER, EMPREDICT COVERAGE OF ADMIRAL DE WINDT ON 27 APRIL INDICATES THAT BOSCH IS IN SANTO DOMINGO, HAS NOT ENTERED LOCAL HOSPITAL FOR CATARACT OPERATION (PER PARA TWO REF C), AND WAS PICKED UP BY ONE OF THE DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICES AFTERNOON 27 APRIL. PRESENT WHEREABOUTS NOT KNOWN.

2. EMPYREX-20 SAYS HE HAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE WHERE BOSCH LOCATED OR WHO DETAINED HIM ON 27 APRIL. EMPYREX-20 ADVISED STATION THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTION SINCE HE CONVINCED BOSCH MATTER BEING HANDLED OUT OF PALACE BY PRESIDENT BALAGUER.

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30 apr 76

201-299292

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T 082115 EIA566 PAGE 02-02 IN 006580

TOR:302021Z APR 76 SDOM 17347

3. DAY FOLLOWING BOSCH DETENTION, EMFETCH-9 TOLD EMBARNET-1 THAT PRESIDENT WAS FOOLISH TO PERMIT BOSCH ENTER COUNTRY, SAID HE SHARED AMERICANS CUNCERN OVER BOSCH ON THE LOOSE AND SAID HE WOULD PICK HIM UP IF HE LOCATED HIM. STATION BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE POLICE ARRESTED BOSCH AND EMFETCH-9 SIMPLY NOT ADMITTING FACT TO EMGARNET-1.

4. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 26/05/76

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0299292	SJOS-19491	30 APR 76	201-0300965

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S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0299292

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FORM [illegible] PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO

CUBA

VI. 22 Apr 76 C U B A

BF

"FORMER CIA AGENT" MANUEL DE ARMAS HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Havana Domestic Radio/Television Services in Spanish 0109 GMT 22 Apr 76 FL/PA

[Press conference held by "Former CIA Agent" Manuel de Armas in Havana on 22 April 1976--videotape]

[Text] First of all, I would like to explain that I am going to read a written statement which I have great interest in presenting in such a way that there is no doubt about the quality of its contents. That is why, due to a problem I have in expressing myself in Spanish, I would like to proceed in this manner.

I would like to take this opportunity to denounce what has been a phase of my life, also to briefly explain my presence in this country. My objective is to openly denounce all immoral acts carried out, directly or indirectly, against Cuba under the sponsorship of the North American government, of which I have knowledge.

I left Cuba 2 years after the triumph of the revolution for family reasons. Thus I was a member of a family which did not know how to or was not able to adapt itself to the life here and opted to live abroad. I attended secondary school and college in the United States until 1969 when I was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency. My relations with the CIA and a number of U.S. repressive organizations began then.

In doing this, great difficulties arise in cases such as mine. There are always many unanswered questions as to my possible motives or political affiliation. My motivation has been created over a period of 5 years of personal, political and ideological degradation resulting in a high degree of personal frustration. Regarding my political affiliation, I unfortunately have none.

I know that many who listen to this press conference abroad will identify me as part of this system. Nevertheless, I would like to make a brief explanation. I want to make it very clear that it is not directed to those who accuse me of being allied to the system, because I do not owe them an explanation. Perhaps, the thing I would like best now is that those who accuse me would be right, but unfortunately their concept of identification, just like mine during the past 5 years, has no meaning in this revolutionary system.

The past 17 years of revolution have not been based on identifications but on principles, principles that many are not capable of recognizing precisely because they lack them.

As a North American intelligence agent and, of course, functioning at the service of North American political interests, I lived approximately 5 years in a world of opportunism, in an immoral manner of ideological degradation and in an antiprogressive position which have forced me to come to Cuba to denounce these facts from a totally personal viewpoint and under my responsibility, and thus denounce the activities of the CIA and other U.S. governmental organizations which work for that system's interests.

It is necessary to explain certain characteristics which are common to them as part of such a system. In that system I lived, grew, studied and finally functioned as an active part of the intelligence community, and that is why I consider it my right to make the following comments.

In the environment that I lived in until very recently, like others, I was never able to adjust. I do not believe there is any other system like that, capable of developing a lack of personal and social identity due to its capitalist nature, which does not grant values to any type of ideology or social progress but only to an apathetic materialism characteristic of the already degraded interests of that system.

FBIS DRM 79 (LA) 22 APR 76

The CIA, as defender of those interests, acts without moral scruples to support them. This system is well-known to all but not all are willing to admit it. We can talk extensively about this, but it is not my intention to point out generalities but facts, facts in which the CIA has participated in activities against revolutionary interests within and without the Republic of Cuba by using counterrevolutionary groups.

Historically, the CIA has been a principal factor in the coordination, financing, direction and absolute control over these counterrevolutionary groups. Oddly enough, they consider themselves bulwarks of rebellion and heroism as well as possessors of a high level of ideological independence in the struggle for recovery of the liberties removed, according to them, by the Cuban revolution. These are the same groups that have carried out various activities against Cuba, financed and coordinated by the CIA. These are the same groups which have proudly assumed responsibility for the cowardly attack against Cuban fishermen last 8 April, which the world will have to judge and condemn.

My relations with these elements began in 1970 and it specifically began with the group ABDALA, of which I was coordinator for the Chicago cell at the very beginning. Later, in 1971, I became ABDALA coordinator for all cells of the midwestern part of the United States. My fundamental mission as CIA agent was to penetrate the ABDALA organization at the highest level in order to concretely evaluate its political orientation, have the necessary information to be able to fully and effectively control the organization and, through it, be able to control other counterrevolutionary organizations associated with ABDALA.

I began my activities by attempting to determine the possible affiliation of some members of the organization with the illegal drug traffic in North America. This CIA task was aimed at ascertaining the relations of these elements with the Cuban Revolutionary Government, in other words, to demonstrate that those persons were acting as counterrevolutionary elements to cover up the illegal drug traffic under orders from the Cuban Government.

After a year of investigations, that theory was not proved. Despite that, the CIA and other organs continued to look for evidence aimed at involving Cuba and distorting its foreign image. In 1971, the CIA leadership decided to transfer me to New York State where I was given the identification of a high-level official in the drug control commission of the state. These activities did not affect my ties to the ABDALA group but, on the contrary, helped strengthen my ties with the organization's board of directors.

I maintained relations with the following CIA officials: Brackenhouse, first CIA agent to contact me and recruit me; and Richard (Tomly), staff officer of the McLean, Virginia, Operations Office, who conducted my initial training and acted as evaluating supervisor in the ABDALA organization. By then, the main interest of the CIA in ABDALA was in determining the operational capacity of this counterrevolutionary group, the possibility of using it in terrorist activities and predicting its future development. The ABDALA program was known not only to the CIA but also to other governmental organizations and their respective intelligence organs.

At the time the ABDALA leadership, which was tied to terrorist activities, was made up of Gustavo Marin, Enrique Encinosa, Lazaro Alvarez, Eduardo Lima, Leo Viota and myself. The CIA Operations Office considered ABDALA to be one of the best possibilities as opposed to the rest of the organizations, which are believed to be made up of ineffective elements and charlatans who waste the agency's funds without any results.

Now I will enumerate the activities of this organization that were coordinated or directed by the CIA as an organ of the U.S. Government.

New York: Through Gustavo Marin I learned about a general coordination of ABDALA with persons of other counterrevolutionary groups to create a more concrete and stronger program of terrorist actions. It is in this manner that ABDALA directly participated in the founding of the so-called Cuban Front of National Liberation (FLNC), whose fundamental objective was to carry out terrorist acts. The talks on the founding of the FLNC were held by the ABDALA leadership and Orlando Bosch, Dr Vasquez Leyva and Dr Humberto Fontana. I was introduced to a counterrevolutionary by the name of Gutierrez, a militant of ABDALA who directly participated in the terrorism against the Cuban Consulate in Madrid, Spain. A powerful explosive was placed at the entrance of the Cuban offices in Madrid, causing severe material damages. Two offices were totally destroyed and the rest of the offices were seriously damaged as well as other floors of the building where the consulate was located. Present at the time of the explosion were the Cuban consul, his wife and other officials.

Knowledge of plans of terrorist acts against Venezuelan tourist offices in Puerto Rico: These acts were carried out by Juan de Dios who resided in Puerto Rico. They were developed in reprisal for the temporary detention of Orlando Bosch in Venezuelan territory and were of course made known to the CIA by me. Nothing was done to stop them. The CIA also knew of and coordinated through ABDALA a public event in New York City when a terrorist act was to be carried out against the building of the Cuban mission to the United Nations using molotov cocktails. This was called off by the CIA through officer Brackenhouse when some contradictions arose in coordinating with the FBI on how it should be done.

The CIA knew of attacks by persons residing in Miami against Cuban fishing vessels in international waters in which leader Gustavo Marin directly participated. Cesar Sanchez, a CIA informer, also took part.

Knowledge by the CIA and coordination of terrorist activity against the Cuban Embassy in Montreal, Canada: In this second attempt, the ABDALA group, which was going to use me as liaison, was given a certain quantity of explosives. I must explain that this was not carried out because the required prior coordination with the RCMP, the Canadian authorities, was not made, even though the coordination with the FBI had been made. In personal conversations held with FBI agents, the NSA--this is the National Security Agency--and representatives of the Justice Department at the federal level, which took place in the Federal Building of the southern district in the City of Manhattan, the possibility of controlling the activities of these terrorist groups inside U.S. territory was discussed. However, despite the talks, we--that is, the CIA--did not interrupt the activities in these terrorist programs. In conversations with the ABDALA leadership, I learned of possible attempts on the lives of certain individuals in exile who had defrauded the counterrevolution. This took place 3 months before the death of the notorious counterrevolutionary leader Jose de la Torriente. I also learned about the attack on the Hispano Warehouse in New York City because it was sending goods to Cuba. This was carried out by ABDALA militant Fernando [illegible]. The activity was authorized by the CIA to determine how far the ABDALA terrorist apparatus would go. By then, Bob (Dynus), a CIA officer who supplied explosives, was participating in the operational program with ABDALA. Bob (Dynus) now works in CIA programs related to Chile.

The CIA knew about and approved acts against the Cubana de Aviacion offices in Mexico City. Participating in this act was Leo Victa, an ABDALA leader who traveled to Mexico from Venezuela.

BF

Knowledge by the CIA of personal contacts with representatives of the present Chilean Government in New York City to take Orlando Bosch to Chile after his arrest in Venezuela: Representing ABDALA was Enrique Encinosa, who is a rabid admirer of Orlando Bosch, and representing the Chilean intelligence services was Mr Julio Solose.

Knowledge by the CIA of the financing of ABDALA by the ultraright John Birch Society and the Latin American Club of the University of Illinois: Participating in the talks on financing was Senator Buckley of the U.S. Congress, who maintains close relations with ABDALA leader Encinosa as well as the notorious Carlos Prio Socarres and Nicaraguan President Somoza.

CIA coordinated a program for collecting funds for ABDALA, extorting cash from the President of the Republic National Bank in Miami and assassinating Rolando Masferrer. For the killing of Rolando Masferrer, CIA officer Robert "Bob" Mills gave me four packages [petacas] of C-4. I personally gave them to Lazar Alvarez, a leader of ABDALA. Later, as everybody knows, Masferrer was murdered.

I must explain that my relations with CIA officer Mills came about because of his experience in Cuban problems. He acted as liaison officer between the CIA and the Justice and Defense departments. These are all the activities that I personally participated in as a CIA agent. I will now enumerate other activities which I learned about during my stay in the United States and while traveling in other countries. I had no direct participation in these programs. At this time I would like to explain that, even though I say that I had no direct participation there should be no doubt as to the veracity of the following events. I mainly learned about these things through official sources, and that is work, comrades.

Attempt on the life of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro during his stay in Chile: It was prepared and directed by the CIA, which introduced counterrevolutionary Antonio (Beciana) to the Alfa-66 organization, requesting from its chief, Nazario Sargent, the men needed. The (?chambers) and diplomatic passports were prepared by the CIA. Participating for Alfa in this activity were Jesus Dominguez Benitez and several others.

Kidnaping of Cuban fishermen in May 1970: It was directed by the notorious CIA agent Ramon Orozco Crespo and Raul Carreras, former member of the 2506 Brigade who participated in the Playa Giron landing. This activity was also carried out by members of Alfa-66. In activities against Cuban fishing boats, counterrevolutionary Roberto Tur acted as permanent informer, establishing the positions of the boats. He lives at 12th Avenue between 8th and 9th Streets in southwest Miami.

Other activities carried out by Alfa-66 were: Attacks on the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in the early hours of 20 January 1974, when two explosive devices were used. One exploded and the other, which did not explode, was hurled at the children's playground at the Cuban Mission. In the early hours of 5 August 1974, a bomb exploded in the garden of the Cuban Embassy in Jamaica. In October 1974, the Bahamian authorities captured seven Cuban counterrevolutionaries who, on orders of the Alfa-66 organization, were going to infiltrate Cuba through the northern coast of Oriente Province. They were to land Luis Lobaina and Aristides Marquez armed with M-1 carbines and pistols with silencers. The objective of this mission was to assassinate Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

S E C R E T

STAFF

C/1655 [illegible]

[illegible]

IN 667839

[illegible] APR 76

CARA 26641

S E C R E T 222124Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26641

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY (FOR LACSC), IMMEDIATE LA/MIAMI.

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MHSPALSH KMSTONE SGCHART MHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 814526

1. FYI, CARACAS DAILY NEWSPAPER ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, 22 APR 76 CARRIES PRENSA LATINA STORY DATELINED HABANA 21 APR TITLED: CIA ACCUSED OF MURDERING ANTI-CASTRO LEADERS. STORY CENTERS AROUND ALLEGED PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH MANUEL DE ARMAS, CLAIMING TO BE A FORMER CIA AGENT, "TELLS ALL" ABOUT "OPERATION ABDALA." DE ARMAS CLAIMS THAT WHILE STATIONED IN NEW YORK IN 1971 HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH TWO CIA OFFICIALS (FNU) BLACKENHOUSE WHO HAD RECRUITED HIM TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY, AND RICHARD TOMLEY OF MCLEAN, VIRGINIA, WHO HAD TAINED HIM AND WHO EVALUATED HIS PERFORMANCE INITIALLY IN OPERATION ABDALA. DE ARMAS ALSO CLAIMS THAT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST VENEZUELAN TOURIST OFFICIALS IN PUERTO RICO WERE COORDINATED WITH THE CIA AND CARRIED OUT BY A PERSON NAMED JUAN DE DIOS IN REPRISAL FOR THE DETENTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN CARACAS. FURTHER, DE ARMAS CLAIMS TO HAVE HAD KNOWLEDGE

✓201-0[illegible]1157

✓201-0[illegible]19[illegible]

P.201-299292 P.201-22[illegible]906 P.201-2[illegible]

201-299292

STAFF

T 036445 E1A709 PAGE 02 IN 697535

TOR:221051Z APR 76 CARA 20641

OF PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST EXILES AND THAT THIS PLANNING WAS BEGUN THREE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JOSE DE LA
201-335909 [illegible]
TORRIENTE. DE ARMAS SAYS BOB DYNES, A CIA OFFICER, PARTICIPATED IN ABDALA FOR THE SUPPLY OF EXPLOSIVES IN CIA MISSIONS RELATED TO CHILE. DE ARMAS SAID HE SERVED IN THE ABDALA OPERATION ALSO AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN ROBERT BUD MILES AND LAZARO ALVAREZ FOR THE DELIVERY OF 5 PACKS OF C-4 EXPLOSIVE WHICH WERE USED IN
✓201-43667 [illegible]
THE KILLING OF ROLANDO MASFERRER. DE ARMAS IDENTIFIES MILLS AS A LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND DEFENSE. DE ARMAS REFERRED TO ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN FISHERMEN AND SAID ROBERTO TUR, A CIA INFORMANT LIVING ON 12TH AVENUE BETWEEN 8 AND 9 (SIC) IN SOUTHWEST MIAMI, HAS THE MISSION OF LOCATING THE BOATS.

2. DE ARMAS CLAIMS THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN A PLAN TO BRING ABOUT RUPTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND CUBA, AND THAT FRED DUNCAN DOUGH PHILLIPS, UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER, ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PLAN. DUNCAN AND PHILLIPS ARE ALLEGED TO BE USING AN APARTMENT IN THE "MY FLOWER" BUILDING IN CARACAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS PLAN.

3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS CONFERENCE, DE ARMAS IS REPORTED

TO HAVE HEAD A LIST OF CIA OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDED JOHN [illegible] [illegible] OPERATOR IN THE AREA OF LA [illegible] (SECTION OF CARACAS. STATE OF FLORIDA NOT CLEAR) AND [illegible] TOMBLY, AN OPERATIONS OFFICER IN MCLEAN VIRGINIA SPECIALIZING IN CUBAN OPERATIONS. BOB JONES IS IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN CHILE, FRED DUNCAN AS AN OPERATOR IN THE CARACAS STATION, DOUGH PHILLIPS AS A LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A. NASS, AN OFFICER OF THE SANTO DOMINGO STATION, AND LUIS MESA SOTO, A CIA OPERATOR IN THE MIAMI AREA.
201-087814
ANSELMO ALLIEGRO IS IDENTIFIED AS A CIA AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI.
4731
JUSTO ALFONSO ALIAS EL GALLEGO, ANOTHER AGENT-INFORMANT IN MIAMI.
201-0255103
RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CIA OPERATOR IN CARACAS, ARMANDO RUIZ, AN AGENT IN CARACAS AND ANTONIO DE LEON, AN AGENT IN MEXICO.

4. AS HEADQUARTERS AWARE FRED DUNCAN AND LEE PHILLIPS ARE THE TWO CARACAS DEA DISTRICT OFFICERS. DEA USED SAFEHOUSE IN MAY FLOWER BUILDING TO MEET DE ARMAS. NESS IS (OR WAS) STATE SECURITY IN SANTO DOMINGO.

5. AMBASSADOR HAS DIRECTED NO COMMENT EMBASSY RESPONSE TO ANY INQUIRIES.

6. FILE: 200-120-150. E2 IMPDET.

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14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19-2

SECRET

1932562 CIA 841240

C/LA7 C/IPMAN, DDO, DDO/PO, 29

C/LA/NIO, C/OPS, C/CI2, 50P

C/OPS/ITG4 132

TO: U.S. SECRET SERVICE, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

CIR-316/01680-76

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

1. IN EARLY APRIL 1976, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD ARRIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, USING A COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH A FALSE NAME. BOSCH WAS REPORTEDLY TO ENTER A CLINIC IN SANTO DOMINGO FOR A CATARACT OPERATION.

2. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE, BOSCH ARRIVED IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, ON APPROXIMATELY 5 APRIL 1976. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH CHILEAN OFFICIAL. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ARREST BOSCH ON 10 APRIL BUT HE SUCCESSFULLY EVADED THE CHILEAN INVESTIGATORS LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND AN ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND HIS PERSONAL CLOTHING.

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

19 Apr 76

201-299292

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 016988

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

CIA

84/248

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

BASED ON: SANTIAGO 34347 (IN 891569) AND SANTO DOMINGO 37299 (IN 883352)

[illegible]

C/LA/SB

C/LA/CAM

C/LA/NW

DC/LA/CAR

C/OPS/LSN

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W. A. CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 3471

C/OPS/ITG
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 018952

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

23-1

SECRET

STAFF 170013Z DIRECTOR 640677

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE MAN, OPS/ITG-S, CCS, LSN/IP, CI-4, PS/EG-2

0 0 0 0 DISSEM BY: 4/9

TO: SANTIAGO INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES, SANTO DOMINGO.

MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17299 (IN 881352) (BEING RELAYED SANTIAGO, NOT NEEDED OTHER ADDRESSEES)

B. SANTIAGO 34147 (IN 891569) (BEING RELAYED SANTO DOMINGO)

1. GIST PARA 1 REF A AND B IS BEING FURNISHED TO U.S. SECRET SERVICE AND FBI. SUGGEST STATION ALSO ADVISE APPROPRIATE EMBASSY OFFICER.

O INFO BOSCH

2. VIEW BOSCH'S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH ACCION CUBANA, WHICH REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBING SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNSULATES IN U.S. AND ABROAD, AND POSSIBLE VISIT OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO SANTIAGO OAS MEETING IN JUNE, WILL APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS AVAILABLE RE BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES, TRAVEL AND/OR INTENTIONS.

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REPORTED UNSUCCESSFUL CHILEAN ATTEMPT TO ARREST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA ON 10 APRIL, AND THE ARRIVAL IN SANTIAGO OF "SCOPED RIFLES" ON 12 APRIL FROM ARGENTINA.

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☒ ABSTRACT
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PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
NIU (G)
FOR FILING
FILE

C/LA/NW -F. DESMOND (IN DRAFT)
OPS/ITG -PAUL PLUMB (IN DRAFT)

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W.A. CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

201-299292
17 Apr 76

C/LA/CAM

AC/LA/CAR

For C/LA

C/LA/SB

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BOSCH 201

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STAFF · 1623532 DIRECTOR 840584

CONF: LA7 INFO: FILE -2

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TO: CABLE SECRETARIAT. Y

PLEASE RELAY SANTIAGO 34147 [IN 891569] TO SANTO DOMINGO

FOR INFO. E2 IMPDET.d

COPY ATTACHED

DATE: 16 APRIL 1976
ORIG: W.A. CANTRELL:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
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18-2

S E C R E T

APR 15 1976

STAFF

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RF FILE VR PLAN, CI/Y, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG

T 843565 EIA291 PAGE 01 IN 891569

TOR:152036Z APR 76 34147

S E C R E T 152012Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 34147

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES.

FUBARGAIN

941865

1. NEW FUBARGAIN (IDEN FOR HQS ONLY) LIAISON CONTACT WHO WILL BE WORKING WITH ROGOVER UNTIL OAS MEETING ADVISED 15 APRIL ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA SHOWED UP IN CHILE APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO. BELIEVED BOSCH HERE WITH CONTRACT ASSASSINATE HIGH GOC OFFICIAL. FUBARGAINS ATTEMPTING LOCATE IN ORDER ARREST AND POSSIBLY TURN OVER FBI FOR EXTRADITION TO U.S. BOSCH EVADED INVESTIGATORS 10 APRIL BY MATTER OF 10 MINUTES, LEAVING CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT AND ALL CLOTHES BEHIND.

2. POSSIBLY RELATED TO ABOVE (ACCORDING FUBARGAINS) IS ARRIVAL FIVE SCOPED RIFLES 12 APRIL FROM ARGENTINA. ROGOVER SUGGESTED THEY ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THIS SEPARATE CASE AND RELATED TO DIRECTOR 839291 CASE.

3. IDEN REFRAINED FROM PROVIDING DETAILS AND IN THAT HE NEW CONTACT ROGOVER RELIED ON ELICITATION. NONETHELESS HE HAS VOLUNTEERED MORE INFO THAN MOST FORMER STATION

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T 843565 EIA291 PAGE 02-02 IN 891569

TOR:152836Z APR 76 SAGO 34147

CONTACTS.

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INFO: FILE VR, EPI/ac, OSG/IC, CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG,

T 839881 EIA633 PAGE 01-01 IN 898828
TOR:1416362 APR 76 MANA 12278

S E C R E T 1416292 APR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12278

TO: SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19402 (IN 884044)

B. CARACAS 29876 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE) (IN 826512)

1. ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, BORDER AND LOCAL RECORDS SHOW ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA DID NOT ENTER NICARAGUA TO DATE ON REF A CHILEAN PASSPORT OR REF B ALIAS DOCUMENTATION IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2, IMPDET.

Ked

TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
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[illegible]

[illegible]

14 Apr. 76
201-299292

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 9 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - FUGITIVE; PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (CABLE FM DIRECTOR, FBI)

DATE: 8 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: MARTIAN INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT (MIM)
FBI FILE NO: 105-22201 (MIAMI)

14-00000

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[illegible]

T 625218 EIA375 PAGE 01-01 IN 884844

TOR:0819432 APR 76 (SJOS 19402)

S E C R E T 0819052 APR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19402

TO: MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: MANAGUA 12256 (IN 882463)

1. ACCORDING HUFABRIC-14 ORLANDO B O S C H AVILA CARRIED CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF HECTOR E. D' A V A N Z O CINTOLESI, NUMBER 26583. REQUEST MANAGUA CHECK TO SEE IF BOSCH ENTERED NICARAGUA ON ABOVE CHILEAN PASSPORT.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

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08 Apr. 76
201-299292

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INFO RF. FILE VR (Phan) CCS2 OS9/IC, C/OPS OS9 C/4 RS/EG2

T 021238 EIA455 PAGE 01-01 IN 002463

TOR:071633Z APR 76 MANA 12256

SECRET 071614Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12256

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE.

REF: SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)

1. ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, THERE IS NO RECORD TO DATE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAVING ENTERED NICARAGUA SUBSEQUENT TO HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL IN COSTA RICA. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE (BOSCH) MAY HAVE ENTERED NICARAGUA USING ALIAS DOCUMENTATION.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2, IMPDET.

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07 Apr 76
201-299292

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/ OUTGOING MESSAGE -- 60-3

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STAFF 072203Z DIRECTOR 835291

CONF: NE8 INFO: FILE. IP/AN, EUR, LA7, FR5, SPG3, PS/PG, CPS/ITG, PS/EG2, SS4, PS/INT, ITG, CI4, OSG, D/OMS2, DDO, DDO/DO, SS/DO4, DDO/SI40 0 0 0 DISSEM BY: 45 PER

TO: STOCKHOLM, OSLO, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, PARIS, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, MUNICH, HAMBURG, GENEVA, BERN, MADRID, LISBON, VIENNA, ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, NICOSIA, ROME, ~~[illegible]~~, MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN JOSE, PANAMA CITY, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, LA/MIAMI, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, BUENOS AIRES, TUNIS, RABAT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN.

9R

R

ARJUICE MHSPIKE

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, WHICH HAS BEEN DISSEMINATED TO WASHINGTON TERRORIST ADDRESSEES, WAS RECEIVED FROM AN OFFICIAL JORDANIAN SERVICE ON 21 MARCH AND 1 APRIL 1976. THE JORDANIANS HAVE NOT DISSEMINATED THE INFORMATION TO OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DOING SO. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO THE JORDANIANS IN PASSING THE INFORMATION TO OTHER SERVICES. PARAS 2 THROUGH 4 BELOW MAY BE PASSED LOCAL LIAISON SERVICES.

2. "ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE, CIRCA MID-MARCH 1976 FIVE FATAH MEMBERS LEFT BEIRUT FOR AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION, EITHER IN

DATE:
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RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

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CONF: INFO FILE.

835341

NORTH OR SOUTH AMERICA. THE GROUP PLANS TO LOCATE THEMSELVES IN A HOTEL SOMEWHERE IN NORTH OR SOUTH AMERICA AND SUBSEQUENTLY DRAW UP A DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR AN OPERATION AGAINST AN UNKNOWN TARGET. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE OPERATION, ATIF BUSAYSU RECENTLY TRAVELED TO BEIRUT FROM CAIRO. ~~THE FOLLOWING DAY,~~ ONE ABU-'AYSHA SUBSEQUENTLY WENT TO BEIRUT ALSO, AND ON ORDERS FROM FATAH OFFICIAL SALAH KHALAF (ABU IYAD), WAS APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN PROCURING WEAPONS FOR THE OPERATION. WHILE ATIF BUSAYSU WAS IN CAIRO, HE SENT THREE GIRLS TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION FOR THE SAME OPERATION.Y

3. "THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS WERE TO TRAVEL TO THEIR DESTINATION BY AIR FROM BEIRUT VIA ATHENS CIRCA MID-MARCH:Y

A. SUBHI 'ARIF, A JORDANIAN CARRYING A FORGED LEBANESE PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF MITRI KARAM. SUBJECT WAS LATER SEEN, HOWEVER, [redacted] IN BEIRUT IN THE OFFICE OF SALAH KHALAF.Y

B. MUHAMMAD ABU-AL-KHAYR, A PALESTINIAN WHO RESIDES IN LEBANON AND WHO CARRIES A FORGED LEBANESE

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UNIT:
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3 3

SECRET

CONF INFO FILE

835291

PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF ELIA MUZAWWAR.V

C. SAMI SALIM MIKHAIL, CARRYING A FORGED PASSPORT IN THAT NAME.V

D. SAMIH SALIM MIKHAIL, CARRYING A FORGED LEBANESE PASSPORT IN THAT NAME AND POSING AS SAMI'S SISTER.V

E. WILLIAM NASIR, CARRYING ABBB FORGED JORDANIAN PASSPORT IN THAT NAME.V

~~3~~ 4. "ON 28 MARCH TWO OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF FATAH ALSO TRAVELED TO BBBBBBBB 'AMERICA.' ALSO INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION IS AN INDIVIDUAL IN SALAH KHALAF'S OFFICE KNOWN ONLY AS 'COLONEL SAMI' WHO CARRIES AN ALGERIAN PASSPORT."

5. PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUBHI ARIF, SAMI SALIM MIKHAIL AND 'COLONEL SAMI' WILL BE FORWARDED VIA TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST CIRCA 8 OR 9 APRIL FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISONS.V

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

RELEASED PER AUTHORITY OF MR. JONATHAN PETRY, DC/SPG/DDO/TELECON

DATE: 6 APR'76
ORIG: B.FOSTER/KAD
UNIT: NEARN/F/R
EXT: 1474

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DDO/SPG/TELECON

DCNE/AD
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ACTION # [illegible] FILE VR 1PLAN, CIX, AS/DO2

T 016417 E1A745 PAGE 01 IN 001352

TOR:0620278 APR 76 SDOM 17290

SECRET 062011Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17290

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO PRIORITY LA/MIAMI.

1. EMGARNET-1 REPORTED 5 APRIL THAT ORLANDO BOSCH IS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DESPITE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE BY POLICE CHIEF GENERAL NIVAR THAT BOSCH IS IN SPAIN. EMGARNET-1 LEARNED FROM LOCAL CUBAN CONTACTS THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN FALSE NAME ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT ISSUED BY GOCR, THAT TRAVEL WAS CLEARED BY GOCR WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER, WHO ACCEDED TO REQUEST OF ADMIRAL DE WINDT (FATHER-IN-LAW OF UMBERTO LOPEZ, WHO DEPORTED TO U.S. A FEW MONTHS AGO).

2. EMGARNET-1 CONFORNTED EMFETCH-9 WITH ABOVE INFORMATION. EMFETCH-9 DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE AND SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED WITH PRESIDENT BALAGUER WHO FINALLY ADMITTED THAT BOSCH WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BECAUSE ADMIRAL DE WINDT HAD APPEALED TO HIM ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. IT APPEARS THAT BOSCH NEEDS CATARACT OPERATION AND SCHEDULED TO ENTER PEREZ PATINO CLINIC.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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6 Apr 76

RECORD COPY

201-299292

BOSCH, ORLANDO

CUBA

PCD ATTACKS POLITICAL LEADER PEREZ

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 2 Apr 76 FL

[Text] The Dominican Communist Party [PCD] today asserted that if Luis Julian Perez becomes president he will persecute PCD members. The PCD Political Committee, in a press statement sent to Radio Clarin, indicates that Julian Perez has retreated and postponed his anticommunist offensive. The former chairman of the National Development Commission had asserted that he would disclose the names of each member of the communist party that holds positions with the government.

The PCD adds in its statement that Julian Perez now states that he never said it. In fact, he contradicts himself, retreats and is avoiding a political confrontation in which he can only lose. The PCD also points out that his statement was nothing but a gross lie.

MEMBERSHIP IN SUGAR PRODUCERS UNION OPPOSED

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 2 Apr 76 FL

[Station commentary]

[Text] We have insistently said that to belong to the famous Union of Latin American Sugar Producers--to which the Philippines has been added--is not [word indistinct] or beneficial to the Dominican Republic because there is a notable difference between producing and exporting countries and in their respective interests.

We have also criticized the series of limitations imposed on the Dominican Republic by virtue of meetings held and commitments acquired. These limitations and commitments are made in exchange for nothing because a country that produces sugar but does not export it has nothing to lose in agreeing to limitations on its free right to negotiate, to sell, and so forth.

Right now the Philippines has acquired a contract on sugar sales for a 5-year period with a U.S. refinery amounting to 650,000 tons annually. Did the Dominican Republic know anything about this? Or did it learn about it, as we did, from international news dispatches? What prior consultations were made? How does this (?agree) with the famous meetings and agreements of Cozumel, Puerto Plata, Lima and Cali?

It is not that we believe the deal with the Philippines will have any effect on the price of sugar or the market; however, we take the opportunity to stress this example and make known the reasons we have had and have to criticize the Dominican Republic's entry in an international group from which we will get no benefits.

AUTHORITIES DENY ARRIVAL OF ANTI-CASTRO LEADER

BK

Santo Domingo Radio Clarin Network in Spanish 2200 GMT 30 Mar 76 FL

[Excerpts] It is not true that anti-Castro exile Orlando Bosch is in the Dominican Republic, Immigration Director General Commodore (Ret) Enrique Rafael Valdez Vidaurre declared today. He added that a report to the effect that Dr Bosch had been expelled from Costa Rica to our country was journalistic speculation. The report had been made in San Jose, Costa Rica, last night by a spokesman for the government of President Daniel Oduber.

The Foreign Relations Secretariat today also pointed out that it had no knowledge that Bosch had been expelled to our country on orders of the Costa Rican Supreme Court after many countries consulted by the government of that Central American country refused to admit the anti-Castro exile.

FBIS, DR# 67 CIA) 6 Apr 76

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

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C/LA 7 C/CCS [illegible] [illegible]

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1231

TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.V

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.V

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA.V

REFS: A. SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 106, 21 FEBRUARY 1976

B. CIR-316/01060-76.V

CIR-316/01441-76.V

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1978
MICROFILMED

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA ON FRIDAY, 26 MARCH 1976 ON AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO NICARAGUA.V

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19367 (IN 875024)

CIR-316/01441-76.V

03 Apr. 76

201-299292

DATE: 2 APRIL 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDL
UNIT: AC/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

RECORD COPY

B. Graham
AC/LA/CAM

C/OPS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] EIB028L[illegible]

[illegible] RUEAIIB RUEAIIB

DE RUEHFB #0028 0950210

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 040115Z APR 76

APR 3 9 42 PM '76

APR 3 9 15 PM '76

DDO/ISS
SEC/ISS

Bosch
201

FM DIRECTOR, FBI

TO RUEBWJA/DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

ATTN: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION UNIT

RUEBWJA/ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION

ATTN: INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

ATTN: GENERAL CRIMES SECTION

RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CIA

RUEHSE/U.S. SECRET SERVICE (PID)

RUEHC/SECRETARY OF STATE

RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

ATTN: BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS

BT

UNCLAS

UNSUB: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, MARCH 29, 1976, EID: PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS.

PAGE TWO DE RUEHFB 0022 UNCLAS

RE MIAMI TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED MARCH 29, 1976.

ON APRIL 3, 1976, MR. DIEGO LOPEZ, COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, ADVISED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A SECOND LETTER DIRECTED TO THE CONSUL GENERAL OF COSTA RICA WHICH MADE A [illegible]. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE MIAMI OFFICE, FBI, ON APRIL 3, 1976. THE LETTER IS IN SPANISH AND AGAIN MAKES REFERENCE TO DR. BOSCH BELIEVED TO BE DR. ORLANDO BOSCH. THE LETTER NOTES THAT IT WILL BE COSTLY TO THE COSTA RICAN CONSUL FOR HAVING TURNED OVER DR. BOSCH TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SO THAT THAT GOVERNMENT CAN RETURN DR. BOSCH TO A UNITED STATES JAIL.

THE LETTER WAS ENDED WITH THE SENTENCE THE BOMB IS READY. THE LETTER IS SIGNED SIMILAR AS THE FIRST WITH THE SIGNATURE GROUP X.

SECRET SERVICE AGENT PHILLIP LINDSEY, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON APRIL 3, 1976 REGARDING CONTENTS OF THE LETTER.

BT

#0022

OSCH, ORLANDO

CUBA

... most among young people and failing to instill "Communist virtues" in them.

BF WASH POST 3 APR 76

Costa Rica Ousts Anti-Castro Cuban

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica, March 30 (AP) — Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro Cuban, was deported by Costa Rica to the Dominican Republic Sunday, government sources report.

Bosch came to Costa Rica Feb. 6, a few days before the arrival of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during a Latin American tour.

Bosch was arrested Feb. 12 and was accused by Security Minister Mario Charpantier of entering the country illegally with a Chilean passport issued in the name of Hector Emilio Davanzo. He was transferred from the jail to a hospital after a 10-day hunger strike.

1. REVIEW OF ~~XXXXXXXX~~ RECENT TRAFFIC ON BOSCH, ~~WHICH SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING, TENDS TO~~ INDICATE THAT BOSCH HAS PROBABLY BEEN IN DOMREP SINCE EARLY PART APR 76, FOLLOWING DEPORTATION FROM COSTA RICA.

2. EMGARNET-1, A SANTO DOMINGO ASSET WITH GOOD ACCESS TO LOCAL CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY AND TO DOMINICAN CHIEF OF ~~XXX~~ POLICE, ~~XXXX~~ GEN. NEIT NIVAR, REPORTED ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ON 5 APR 76 THAT BOSCH WAS IN DOMREP, ~~XXXXXXX~~ THAT HE HAD ARRIVED FROM COSTA RICA WITH ALIAS ~~NAME~~ ~~FALSE~~/COSTA RICAN ~~XXX~~ PASSPORT PROVIDED BY GOCR, AND THAT ENTRY TO DOMREP WAS APPROVED BY DOMINICAN PRESIDENT BALAGUER. EMGARNET-1 CONFRONTED NIVAR WITH THIS INFO WHO SUBSEQUENTLY RAISED QUESTION WITH BALAGUER. BALAGUER REPORTEDLY ADMITTED TO NIVAR THAT HE HAD ALLOWED BOSCH TO TRAVEL TO DOMREP ON "HUMANITARIAN" GROUNDS SO THAT BOSCH COULD RECEIVE "CATARACT OPERATION." AN ARTICLE IN SAN JOSE NEWSPAPER "LA NACION" AS WELL AS AN FBI REPORT DATED 8 APR 76 FROM A "HIGHLY-~~XXX~~ PLACED ACCION CUBANA SOURCE IN PUERTO RICO" ALSO INDICATED THAT BOSCH WAS ~~XXXXXXX~~ FLOWN TO THE DOMREP FROM COSTA RICA.

3. EMPREDICT COVERAGE INDICATED THAT BOSCH WAS IN DOMREP BY AT LEAST 27 APRIL, WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. ~~AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY AN UNKNOWN DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE ON THAT DATE~~. CHIEF OF DOMINICAN LIAISON TOLD STATION THAT HE WOULD TAKE NO INVESTIGATIVE ACTION SINCE HE CONVINCED THAT "MATTER BEING HANDLED OUT OF PALACE BY PRESIDENT BALAGUER." ~~XXX~~ LIAISON REPORTED THAT AS OF 3 MAY 1976, BOSCH WAS ~~HAD BEEN~~ STAYING AT THE HOTEL CERVANTES IN SANTO DOMINGO.

SANTO DOMINGO:

4. FBI REPORT WHICH JUST RECEIVED (AND BEING POUCHED SANTO DOMINGO) COMMENTED ON RECENT CUBAN RIGHTIST MEETINGS HELD IN SANTO DOMINGO WHICH INCLUDED PARTICIPATION OF BOSCH. ONE OF MEETINGS WAS HELD ON 12 JUNE AT A "HOUSE LOCATED ATOP A MOUNTAIN NEAR SANTO DOMINGO." THERE ARE FEW IF ANY ~~XXXX~~ MOUNTAINS IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF SANTO DOMINGO, HOWEVER, GENER NIVAR IS FAMOUS FOR HIS HOUSE" LOCATED IN THE CLOUDS " ON TOP OF A HIGH MOUNTAIN NEAR SAN CRISTOBAL AND BANI, WEST OF SANTO DOMINGO. IN VIEW OF ABOVE INDICATEONS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST IN THIS CASE, IS IT POSSIBLE THAT NIVAR MIGHT BE CLOSER TO THE ACTION THAN HE HAS ADMITTED TO DATE?

5.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE
TO:	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

2 April 76

Paul Plumb of
TOPS/ITG checked
w Secret Service
& FBI. They have
no interest in
BOSCH activs in
Nicaragua.

FROM: Kay Maue

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-4 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

14-00000

C/LA 15

ACTION

c/SN/10, DDO, [illegible]

c/CI4, [illegible]

T 723983 E14633

IN 842549

TOR:222217 MAR 76

SJOS 19272

S E C R E T 212150Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19272

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS,

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19265 (IN 841160)

4362

CIRA 25 [illegible] 76

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DIRECTOR 810820 STATION CONTACTED HUFABRIC (HUGLIB-8) TO ADVISE OF A POSSIBLE THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF PASCAL ALLENDE, AS INSTRUCTED BY HEADQUARTERS. HUGLIB-8 SAID THE SAME INFORMATION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO FROM THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT: FACIO HAD ALREADY PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE HUFABRICS. PRIOR TO HUGLIB-8'S RECEIPT OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE STATION HE HAD ALREADY PERSONALLY VISITED ALLENDE TO WARN HIM OF THE THREAT.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARCCI-3/76

S E C R E T

Put all in 201 [illegible]

UVCP 4303

9 July 1973

SECRET

LA NACION, jueves 1º de abril de 1976

San José, Costa Rica

Bosch viajó a Dominicana con nombre falso

A pesar de las declaraciones hechas por funcionarios del Gobierno dominicano, es un hecho que el exiliado cubano, líder anticomunista que estuvo preso en Costa Rica por más de dos meses, se encuentra en República Dominicana, a juzgar por información dada a conocer ayer por voceros del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.

Lo que ha ocurrido es que Bosch ingresó en aquel país con el nombre de Emilio Lavanza, con el cual aparece en un pasaporte chileno falsificado, el mismo que usó para venir a nuestro país.

El encargado de negocios a. i. de la República Dominicana en San José, señor Schiffino, negó la versión dada a conocer por La Nación en el sentido de que Bosch había viajado a su país. Pero la aclaración hecha por los funcionarios de la Cancillería determina cuál es la real situación.

Bosch fue deportado a Dominicana tras una serie de gestiones del Gobierno costarricense, que lo tuvo detenido desde el 18 de febrero, fecha en que ingresó en nuestro territorio, días antes de que visitara el Secretario de Estado norteamericano, Henry Kissinger.

14-00000

7-71 MFG. 10/75

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ACTION UNIT LA 7

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF.~~ FILE VR I/AN, OSG, CI4 PS/EG2, C/OPS

STAFF			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

T 802364 EIA304 PAGE 01-01 IN 875024

TOR:311517Z MAR 76 SJOS 19367

S E C R E T 311506Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19367

TO: DIRECTOR, MANAGUA,

REF: SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)

1. ALTHOUGH LOCAL PRESS OF 30 MARCH REPORTED VARIOUSLY THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN DEPORTED TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OR EUROPE, ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 30 MARCH, BOSCH WAS IN FACT DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA ON FRIDAY, 26 MARCH, ON OVERLAND ROUTE TO NICARAGUA.

2. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP/[illegible]	X	~~[illegible]~~
		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/CCU		[illegible]

31 Mar 76
201-299292

RECORD COPY

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SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT LA 7

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. PLAN, CI 4, C/OPS, PS/EG2, OSG, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG4

STAFF			
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3		6	

T 737196 EIA722 PAGE 01-01 IN 848642

TOR:052253Z MAR 76 MANA 12202

SECRET 052248Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12202

TO: DIRECTOR.

REF MANAGUA 12179 (IN 835555)

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-299292
DO NOT DESTROY

1. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST FOR HQS ACTION, ERYTHROID-33 NOTIFIED STATION THAT IGNAZIO O X NO 201 PALOMERA PEREZ OBTAINED NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH FOR TRAVEL TO UNITED STATES. DATE OF HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL IS UNKNOWN. PER REF. PALOMERA IS PROBABLY TRAVELING ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-69 WHICH CONTAINS VALID FOUR YEAR MULITIPLE ENTRY U.S. VISA GOOD UNTIL JANUARY 1977. PALOMERA IS CUBAN NATIONAL WHO IS APPRENTLY CLOSE CONTACT OF AND ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA.

2. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

E. 201-299292

5 Mar 76
200-6-484/3

FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 4 APRIL 1976
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 30 MARCH 1976
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: THREAT TO BOMB COSTA RICAN CONSUL, MIAMI, FLORIDA, MARCH 29, 1976..

14-00000

SAN JOSE, CR

File, BOSCH 201

LA NACION, martes [illegible] de marzo de 1976

23 MCH 76

Extraño aislamiento del doctor Bosch

Del Movimiento Costa Rica Libre, recibimos la siguiente comunicación:

"La incomunicación de que es objeto el Dr. Orlando Bosch, dirigente anti-comunista cubano con más de veinticinco años de lucha, primero contra la dictadura de Batista y luego contra la dictadura comunista de Fidel Castro, es una vergüenza para el prestigio internacional de nuestro país.

La negación de asistencia médica adecuada y la prohibición de que un abogado le visite son una clara [illegible]ción de los Derechos Humanos. Si el señor Ministro de Seguridad Pública después de haber manifestado públicamente que no le importaba que el señor Bosch continuara en huelga de hambre, anuncia ahora —sin que podamos confirmar— que le ha dado este Gobierno asistencia médica, ello ha sido obligados por la presión del Movimiento Costa Rica Libre que amenazó con denunciar esta actitud ante Amnistía Internacional en Londres y ante la Comisión de Derechos Humanos en New York.

La actitud del Gobierno de Costa Rica con el dirigente anticomunista G. Bosch, contrasta con la asumida con el terrorista marxista Allende, quien disfruta en nuestro país de todos los derechos y comodidades necesarias brindados por las esferas oficiales.

¿Cuál es la razón para mantener aislado al Dr. Bosch como si fuese un delincuente común? ¿Por qué no se permite ser visto por un médico de su confianza? ¿Por qué no puede ser visitado por un abogado? ¿Va el Dr. Orlando Bosch a permanecer en una cárcel indefinidamente hasta que algún país le reciba? ¿Es esta la forma como el Gobierno de Costa Rica entiende los Derechos Humanos?

Resulta extraño que el Ministro de Seguridad Pública que ahora no contesta interpelaciones de quienes como contribuyentes pagamos su sueldo, le moleste que se haga publicidad alrededor de un caso que tiene alarmados a la opinión pública, pero si permiten toda clase de publicidad cuando se trata de detenidos de filiación comunista. ¿Cuáles son y de dónde provienen las presiones contra el señor Ministro para que haya tomado esta actitud? Todos conocemos la filiación anticomunista del Ministro. Entonces, ¿por qué actúa así?

El Ministro Charpentier debe explicar claramente las razones del Gobierno para mantener a un anticomunista que no es un delincuente, sin asistencia médica de confianza y sin asesoramiento legal. Explique que el señor Ministro por qué se le mantiene incomunicado. ¿Es acaso que existe temor que el Dr. Orlando Bosch diga algo inconveniente para el Gobierno?

El señor Ministro debe explicar en forma clara y sin irritarse; todas estas interrogantes, ya que él es un servidor público y por lo tanto está obligado a dar explicaciones a los ciudadanos que las solicitan. De no ser así tendremos que recurrir a otros organismos para que se ponga en claro esta extraña persecución y aislamiento del dirigente anticomunista cubano Dr. Orlando Bosch".

Junta Directiva
Movimiento Costa Rica
Libre.

BOSCH, ORLANDO

COSTA RICA

NO GOVERNMENT WANTS TO ACCEPT CUBAN EXILE

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0229 GMT 19 Mar 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 18 Mar--The fate of exiled Cuban leader Orlando Bosch has been complicated by the fact that no government in the hemisphere is willing to grant him territorial asylum.

Meanwhile, Bosch began today his 7th day on a hunger strike which he is staging to call attention to his case, and is accepting only water in his cell in the prison of Cartago, east of San Jose, where he is being held.

Bosch was deprived of his freedom when his presence and illegal entry into Costa Rica were proved. He used a Chilean passport with a false name to enter the country shortly before U.S. Secretary of Stat Henry A. Kissinger's official visit.

Bosch's deportation has been ordered, but no government has shown any willingness to receive him. Today, Foreign Affairs Minister Gonzalo J. Facio negotiated with a country not previously consulted--one of the latest to be approved--Facio explained. The results of these negotiations were negative.

Apparently, Bosch's guerrilla background influences these rejections.

The anti-Castro leader claims to be a victim of the circles which foster a reconciliation with Prime Minister Fidel Castro's regime.

FACIO ON CUBAN-COSTA RICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0036 GMT 23 Mar 76 PA

[Text] San Jose, Costa Rica, 22 Mar--(ACAN-EFE)--Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo J. Facio this afternoon rejected criticism by newsmen who have said he is propitiating a rapprochement with the Cuban regime. Facio said that the Castroite adventure in Angola and the proletarian internationalism doctrine it represents have thrown cold water on the possibility of renewing relations with that island.

The minister thus responded to a newspaper editorial which noted the dangerous inclination of the Foreign Ministry toward reconciliation with Cuba at a time when, according to the commentary, the Havana regime has decided to embark on an expansive and aggressive foreign policy.

Facio rejected this criticism and freed his ministry from all responsibility for what officials from other ministries said or did after their trip to Cuba. Some have praised the system in effect there.

The foreign minister commented that the adventure in Angola and the theory advanced by Cuba--according to which it is prepared to back insurrections provoked by communist movements--are very much taken into account by Costa Rica and are considered to be enough reason for cooling the possibility of a renewal of relations with Havana.

Facio also said that he did not share the opinion of the New York TIMES which commented that Jamaica and Guyana have become beachheads for Cuban penetration in the hemisphere.

FBIS, DR# 57 (LA) 23 MAR 76

CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 17 MARCH 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA

Policiales/Judiciales

Orlando Bosch no variará su vida como terrorista

Orlando Bosch [illegible] por la [illegible] de tres [illegible] de prisión en los Estados Unidos, [illegible] a la vez la posibilidad de ser [illegible] en Chile o de ser [illegible] en cualquier país de América por las variadas aventuras en que se ha visto envuelto en su largo e [illegible] lucha contra el régimen de Fidel Castro.

Bosch de [illegible] años de edad considera que es un hospital ambulante. El único de los cinco jefes contrarrevolucionarios de las Villas que logró escapar con vida de Cuba, hace más de 12 años, ha sido operado dos veces de úlceras, ha recibido 81 transfusiones de sangre y sostiene que tiene poco que perder, incluyendo la vida.

Bosch, arrestado en San José el 18 de febrero, se encuentra recluido actualmente en la cárcel de Cartago y la posibilidad de que hoy o mañana sea expulsado [illegible] ha sido completamente descartada.

Hasta ahora esa decisión se había visto retrasada por motivos jurídicos. Bosch a quien se señala como el responsable de colocar una bomba en la sede de las Naciones Unidas en Nueva York, de dinamitar un buque soviético en Miami y de ingresar a Costa Rica para conspirar contra la vida del señor Kissinger, durante la visita de este a nuestro país, ha llegado a ser muy conocido en el ámbito latinoamericano y con sus antecedentes pocos países se han mostrado interesados en darle asilo, excepto en los que tiene pendientes varias cuentas con la justicia.

Bosch disfruta en la cárcel de una libertad de movimientos excepcionales y ha captado la simpatía de todos [illegible] de la [illegible] en un hombre valiente y [illegible].

"Aunque al principio [illegible] la [illegible] y [illegible] luego se me trasladó a Cartago. En la Penitenciaría he recibido un tratamiento incomparable", dijo.

Antes de ser referido a la cárcel de Cartago, Bosch fue duramente interrogado, inclusive por un agente de la Central de Inteligencia Norteamericana, según manifestó.

"Un señor macho, con el pelo chuzo, hablando con acento inglés y acompañado de un perrito faldero cubano de apellido Menéndez estuvo a interrogarme en la Tercera Compañía. Aunque inicialmente acepté responder a unas preguntas, me incliné [illegible] que los [illegible] Bosch.

Estima de otro lado que ninguno de los cargos que se le formularon en su contra es [illegible]. En Cuba [illegible] a la ONU. Bosch [illegible] en poner los pies en ese [illegible].

Bosch se llama asimismo el hombre que ha tenido que salvar la dignidad tantas veces mancillada del pueblo cubano, "pues alguien tiene que saber poner en alto su hidalguía".

Afirma también que es parte de un frente continental de lucha contra el régimen de Fidel Castro.

Asegura que, "hemos castigado duramente al enemigo en América" y cita el caso del embajador cubano en Argentina, "el enlace entre la izquierda argentina y el comunismo cubano, el cual escapó milagrosamente de un atentado".

Opina firmemente que Castro está ampliando su esfera de influencia en América, gracias a la actitud feminoide de políticos y gobernantes, entre los cuales incluyó, también a los nuestros.

Dijo que los diplomáticos latinoamericanos son figuras feminoides disfrazadas para los bufets, las comilonas y la intriga.

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y políticos blendengues.

Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a mancillar la memoria de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ningún cubano atacó nunca a funcionarios norteameri-

Llegué a Costa Rica para hacer una pausa en mis actividades. Pero también aquí le hicieron el juego a Fidel Castro, de modo que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdoba).

[illegible]

agregó más

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

"Fui interr

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ndo Bosch no iará su vida o terrorista

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Aunque al principio [illegible] tratamiento incomparable", dijo.

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Estima de otro lado que ninguno de los cargos que se le formularon en su contra es verídico. En cuanto a la ONU, "nunca me [illegible] en poner los pies en ese [illegible]".

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Dijo que los diplomáticos latinoamericanos son figuras feminoides disfrazadas para los bufets, las comilonas y la intriga.

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y políticos blendengues.

"Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a mancillar la memoria de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ningún [illegible]

[illegible]

"Estoy desesperado", dijo Bosch, [illegible] a Cuba [illegible] llegue al pido favores", agregó más adelante.

A pesar de todo Bosch se expresa en forma elogiosa de Chile. Recuerda el espíritu generoso de su pueblo. Luego afirma que en Chile no hay represión y que existe libertad absoluta.

Bosch tiene familiares en Atlanta, Miami y Guatemala. Su hija Lourdes, casada con un norteamericano de apellido Plinter, fue deportada dos días después de ingresar a Costa Rica. Había sido llamada por Bosch para una entrevista formal.

Actualmente Bosch está en huelga de hambre como protesta por el trato que recibió de las autoridades, pero especialmente por la forma en que los políticos costarricenses le hacen el juego a los intereses de Fidel Castro en el continente.

una pausa en mis actividades. Pero también aquí le hicie- modo que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdo-

"Fui interrogado por un agente del servicio secreto norteamericano, y un perrito faldero cubano de apellido Menéndes". (Foto Córdoba).

[illegible]

[illegible] Pero también aquí le [illegible] que me voy desilusionado, dijo Bosch. (Foto: Córdo-

mparte un cuarto con los choferes de las Radiopatrullas de la Co-
e EXCELSIOR, manifiesta que entró al país con un pasaporte falso,
e lo haría alguien llevando un cargamento de explosivos, se iba a
(Foto: Córdoba).

[illegible]

Dijo [illegible] que Castro está [illegible]

Dijo que los diplomáticos latinoamericanos son [illegible] disfrazados para [illegible]

Expresó que, por un lado Castro está protegido por los Estados Unidos y por otro por los diplomáticos y [illegible]

Cuando un periodista le preguntó si se podía comparar a Pascal Allende con Matos, señaló que era absurdo, pues en su opinión eso equivaldría a humillar la figura de un hombre valiente como Matos, preso actualmente en las mazmorras del régimen de Castro.

Refiriéndose a los métodos violentos a veces empleados por cubanos anticastristas, declaró: "La violencia puede ser noble, justa, digna, o no. Nosotros luchamos solos por nuestra patria, y racionalmente la defendemos".

Dijo por ejemplo que aquí mismo en Costa Rica, un país al que creía libre y en el cual la gente podía asilarse, había interés en hacerle daño. "Aquello del atentado a Kissinger es una falacia. Ningún cubano atacó nunca a funcionarios norteamericanos. Pero, como tantos otros países de América, en Costa Rica políticos y diplomáticos como el señor Facio le siguen haciendo el juego a Castro", dijo Bosch.

Añadió que nadie ha hecho tanto para dejar sin efecto el bloqueo a Cuba que el señor Facio y sin embargo, Castro le ha respondido en forma rápida. Eso demuestra, dijo, que él es un peligro que hay que combatir.

SEGUIRE CONSPIRANDO:

Bosch declaró que tiene una misión que cumplir y que, no importa donde el gobierno lo mande, ahí encarará a su suerte: "Seguiré luchando racionalmente como lo he hecho hasta ahora. Seguiré envuelto en actividades conspirativas. Nadie debe tenerme miedo, excepto los comunistas", dijo Bosch.

Bosch ingresó al país a principios de este año con un pasaporte falso a nombre de otro, según afirma, con el propósito de permanecer unos días fuera de acción, descansando. "No pensaba en realidad disfrutar del sol y la playa, pues como solía advertir Martí: "Los pueblos deben tomarse un descanso pero no sus líderes". Sin embargo, consideré que podía hacer una pausa aquí. No tenía interés en comprometer al Gobierno. Después de lo que me han hecho me voy desilusionado", añadió.

Repuso que el pasaporte falsificado no es chileno, sino un pasaporte emitido en La Habana y que estaba en
un ex-militar chile-

[illegible] Bosch está [illegible]

"Fui interrogado por un agente del servicio secreto norteamericano, y un [illegible] cubano de apellido Mercedes". (Foto: Córdoba).

BOSCH Avila Orlando

BF

CUBA

Bosch: seguiré conspirando

Orlando Bosch, el controvertido anticastrista cubano que se encuentra recluido en la cárcel de Cartago, espera para ser deportado en las próximas horas. Bosch, dijo que políticos "feminoides" le están haciendo el juego a Castro en el continente, y aseveró que no importa donde lo envíen ni lo que le hagan, seguirá conspirando contra el régimen comunista de Fidel. (Foto: Córdoba). Amplia información en página 6.

Excelsior, 16 March '76

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CONF: C/CA FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] C/CI4

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TO: SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.V

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.V

SUBJECT: PALOMERA PEREZ, IGNAZIO.V

DPOB: 16 MARCH 1940, HAVANA, CUBA.V

REF: SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105, 21 FEBRUARY 1976.V

CIR-316/01060-76V

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL NICARAGUAN SERVICE, IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ OBTAINED A NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH 1976 FOR TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. THE DATE OF HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL IS UNKNOWN. PALOMERA PROBABLY WILL TRAVEL ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-69 WHICH CONTAINS A FOUR YEAR U.S. MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA VALID UNTIL JANUARY ~~1971~~ 1977. THIS VISA WAS ISSUED ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS IN JANUARY 1973 TO PERMIT PALOMERA TO ATTEND HIS FATHER'S FUNERAL IN THE UNITED STATES.V

2. PALOMERA MAY BE A CONTACT OF CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHO WAS ARRESTED BY AUTHORITIES IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

12 Mar 76

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: [illegible]

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SECRET

CIA
822742

CONF: INFO: FILE

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON CHARGES OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION. AS OF 10 MARCH 1976 BOSCH CONTINUED IN THE CUSTODY OF COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES IN SAN JOSE. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEPORT HIM BUT ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AN APPROPRIATE COUNTRY.V

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

BASED ON: SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105, 21 FEBRUARY 1976
SAN JOSE 19295 (IN 853351)V

DATE: 12 MARCH 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDI
UNIT: LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

C/OPS/LSN
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T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 01 IN 841160

TOR:2820422 FEB 76 SJOS 19265

S E C R E T 2808282 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19265

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

RYBAT VHLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 814328

1. FOLLOWING ARE PERTINENT QUOTES FROM EXCELSIOR ARTICLE RE PASCAL:

SIXTH PARAGRAPH: "BOSCH, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES ARRIVED HERE WITH A PASSPORT, PRESUMED TO BE CHILEAN, TO PREPARE A PLOT AGAINST THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), PASCAL ALLENDE".

ELEVENTH (AND FINAL) PARAGRAPH: "THE REVELATION THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY WITH A CHILEAN PASSPORT, APPARENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY TO THE SUPREME COURT, WOULD CONFIRM THE THESIS THAT HE CAME HERE WITH INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE, POLITICAL SOURCES SAID YESTERDAY".

2. STATION UNWARE ORIGIN EXCELSIOR CONNECTION OF BOSCH WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL. SPECULATE THAT SOURCE WAS PROABLY SOMEONE IN LOCAL SECURITY STRUCTURE. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF THIS

S E C R E T

C/LA/LCW - Talked with DC/[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 2 could be [illegible] [illegible] Monday, with [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Bill

C/LA/NC/V - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Copy of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Schaller [illegible]

WLC SCHALLER 3/[illegible]

2-23 WH-- 10/75

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T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 02-02 IN 041168

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 19265

DESIRED.

3. BASED STATION KNOWLEDGE THAT HUFABRIC AWARE BOSCH BACKGROUND OF BOMBINGS AND POSSIBLE THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING VISIT, PLUS HUFABRIC KNOWLEDGE THAT PASCAL LIFE MIGHT BE THREATENED, HUFABRIC OR OTHERS COULD HAVE PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. HUFABRIC CONCERNED FROM ARRIVAL PASCAL HERE ON 2 FEBRUARY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT WISH TO ELIMINATE HIM. E2 IMPDET.

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T 748286 EIA471 PAGE 01-01 IN 853351

TOR:102333Z MAR 76 SJOS 19295

S E C R E T 102316Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19295

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA,

REF: DIRECTOR 819272

1. WE HOLD NO STATION TRACES ON IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ. A/k/a ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

2. AS OF 10 MARCH BOSCH WAS STILL BEING HELD BY COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES. INDICATIONS ARE THEY WOULD LIKE TO DEPORT HIM BUT ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AN APPROPRIATE COUNTRY.

3. FILE: 201-299292, E2 IMPDET.

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		[illegible]	
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D-200-6-484/3

10 MAR 76

201-299292

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 3 MARCH 1976

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

14-00000

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STAFF 062337Z DIRECTOR 819272

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201-299292

TO: SAN JOSE INFO MANAGUA.Y

TRACEY

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12202 |IN 848642| (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

B. MANAGUA 12179 |IN 835555|

C. SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105 - 21 FEBRUARY 1976Y

1. PLS FURNISH STATION TRACES ON IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ, DPOB 16 MARCH 1940 HAVANA, CUBA. REFS INDICATE HE RESIDENT MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, HOLDS COSTA RICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 3208-68 OR 3208-69. MAY BE CONTACT OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (201-299292). HQS PLANS NOTIFY SECRET SERVICE AND FBI OF PALOMERA'S INTENDED TRAVEL TO THE U.S.Y

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER BOSCH STILL BEING HELD BY COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES.Y

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.d

LA/COMMENT: PALOMERA OBTAINED NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH FOR TRAVEL TO THE U.S. HE MAY BE CONTACT OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE ACTIVIST ARRESTED SAN JOSE 18 FEBRUARY ON CHARGESFALSE DOCUMENTATION. BOSCH REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE IN SAN JOSE.

No Traces" [redacted] SJS-19295 10 Mar 76

DATE: 8 MARCH 1976
ORIG: KAY MAUER:PDL
UNIT: LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

OPS/ITG Paul Plumb (telecord) 200-6-4PY 8 Mar 76

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CL BY: 054584

FBI DOCUMENTS

CABLE FM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 7 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DATE: 6 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: 105-1742 (MIAMI)

5 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/LA/CAM

FROM: C/LAD

1. In a meeting with Assistant Secretary Rogers today, he told me that he had learned from Foreign Minister Facio that Bosch, at the time of his arrest in San Jose during the Kissinger visit, had two recently issued passports from the current Chilean government. Facio also said that 10 to 12 persons also had come into Costa Rica with Bosch but the Costa Ricans do not know who they are nor have they been able to locate them. I mentioned to Rogers that a U.S. Secret Service agent had interviewed Bosch.

2. In view of State's interest in this case, I suggest you send a cable to San Jose and try to find out the number of these Chilean passports and to whom they were issued. Also it might be worthwhile to have a summary of what Bosch and the U.S. Secret Service agent talked about.

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STAFF 272142Z DIRECTOR 814328

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECOR 3, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 4, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DWD 3, C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2

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0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.Y

27 FEB

RYBAT VULOFTY Y [illegible]-3 201

REF: SAN JOSE 19260 |IN 839451| (RELAYED TO CARACAS)Y

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER REF "EXCELSIOR" ARTICLE CONTAINS ATTRIBUTION FOR ALLEGATION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. IS STATION AWARE OF ORIGIN OF "EXCELSIOR" OR GOCR KNOWLEDGE/PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL? Y

2. HQS HAS ADVISED SAIC MASTROVITO OF SUBSTANCE REF. MASTROVITO REPORTS THAT SUBJECT OF PASCAL NEVERD BROUGHT UP EITHER BY HIM, BY BOSCH OR BY HUFABRICS.Y

3. PLEASE KEEP CARACAS ADVISED OF ALL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: SAN JOSE DAILY "EXCELSIOR" CARRIES 26 FEB ARTICLE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, IN JAIL IN COSTA RICA, WAS INTERROGATED BY NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT. ARTICLE ALSO REPORTS ALLEGATION BOSCH CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, CURRENTLY IN COSTA RICA.

NOTE: U.S. OFFICIAL WHO INTERVIEWED BOSCH WAS SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

DC/LA/NW - WILLIAM DEVINE (DRAFT)
(FOR) C/TFK - LEHMAN SMITH (TELECOORD)
OPS/LSN/ID - CURTIS GLENN (TELECOORD)

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: ROBERT CULLOIME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

R.L. Connolly
for C/LA
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STAFF 272024Z DIRECTOR 814215

CONF: C/LA 7 INFO: FILE HCP/AN, C/LEW/IB-C/OPS/ITY 4 C/OPS, 0 DISSEM BY: 45

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0 # 231

TO: IMMEDIATE SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

ATTENTION: JAMES MICHAEL MASTROVITO.

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SUBJECT: INTERROGATION OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ACCION CUBANA. Summary of traces to Secret Service

CIR-316/20060-76 ref

1. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THIS AGENCY IN SAN JOSE HAS REPORTED THAT THE POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF THE SAN JOSE DAILY NEWSPAPER "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL.

2. THE ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID HE ACCEPTED

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/R
EXT: 1668

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☒ ABSTRACT
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CONF: INFO: FILE

814215

THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. THE ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED COSTA RICA WITH AN ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME TO COSTA RICA IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST THE CHILEAN EXILE ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE.Y

3. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, AS OF 26 FEBRUARY THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO DECISION ON BOSCH'S STATUS. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.Y

4. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1) (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. E2 IMPDET.H

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19260 (IN 839451)
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OBJECTIVE L

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/R
EXT: 1868

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054924

BOSCH, ORLANDO

CUBA

No advantage can be gained and no good conclusions reached from a visit which lasted less than a day and during which he spoke for only a half hour with each foreign minister, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy said.

In this regard, Socialist Action Party Deputy Nora Valverde said Kissinger's visit was a failure for U.S. imperialism, since the chiefs of state who had been invited to the meeting decided not to come, considering Dr Kissinger's visit of little interest.

Nothing can be achieved in such a short period of time, the Soviet official said.

Regarding former President Nixon's visit to the PRC, the Soviet official said it will not affect Soviet foreign policy in any way. It is only another of the many tourist or courtesy trips to the PRC. This is why we do not attribute any importance to it, he said.

Regarding Fidel Castro's participation in the CPSU congress which began 2 days ago, Mr Arnold Mosclov said all countries in the world were represented at the congress, but that the visitors were participating as observers in the discussions of what the Soviet people have done and will do in the field of development.

The Soviet official said regarding Cuba's intervention in Angola: The Cuban Government is helping Angola because the latter needs it. Previously, when the U.S. Government blocked aid to Cuba, the latter had to ask for the Soviet Union's cooperation, because it was being suffocated by the economic blockade imposed by the U.S. Government. Now the Angolan people had to ask for Cuba's help because the United States refused to help and in addition was blocking aid.

On this issue of the peoples' liberation struggle the blame lies with the United States, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy concluded.

CUBAN EXPELLED FOR PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE

Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0123 GMT 26 Feb 76 PA

BF

[Excerpt] San Jose, 25 Feb--(ACAN-EFE)--The Costa Rican Government ordered anti-Castro Cuban Orlando Bosch to leave the country. He is allegedly involved in a plan to attack Chilean Marxist leader Andres Pascal Allende, in exile in Costa Rica.

It was reported that Bosch, who entered this country on 19 February, resides in the Dominican Republic and entered Costa Rica with a Chilean passport.

He categorically denied any links with subversive groups and the authorities were unable to prove this association, but as a preventive measure they ordered him to leave the national territory.

FBIS, DR #40 (LA) 27 Feb 76

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T 715898 EIA158 PAGE 01 IN 039451

TOR:2618062 FEB 76 SJOS 19268

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SECRET 2617242 FEB 76 STAFF

The following action is authorized: Sensitize

Signed: J. Ruiz LA/CAN

R.O. #

Note: If a ... cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CITE SAN JOSE 19268

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19248 & 31824

1. POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF LOCAL DAILY "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT: WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." ARTICLE STATES THAT BOSCH WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL. ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ~~ACCPT~~ ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. POUCHING ARTICLE.

RE ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

2. PLEASE PASS ABOVE TO SAIC MASTROVITO OF THE

Bosch

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28 Feb 76

201-299292

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T 715098 EIA158 PAGE 02-02 IN 839451

TOR:201806Z FEB 76 SJOS 19268

SECRET SERVICE.

3. ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 26 FEBRUARY, NO DECISION YET BEEN MADE CONCERNING BOSCH. ON POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.

4. FILE: 201 BOSCH. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE 37-1

8 1 1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF 231840Z DIRECTOR 811488

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECURITY, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 5, DIP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DC/JD2, C/CI 4, C/OS 6 DISSEM BY: 45 PER LA # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS.

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RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35654 (IN 834057)

LA/CNH

1. WKSCARLET-1 AND WKSCARLET-3 ARE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS WORKING FOR PROMINENT VENEZUELAN WHOSE NAME WAS USED IN RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN VENEZUELA IN LATE 1975. W-1 AND W-3 HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED TO DETERMINE AUTHORSHIP OF LETTER BOMB, AND WHETHER IT WAS CUBAN EXILE EFFORT. W-1 AND W-3 TRAVELS ARE RELATED TO INVESTIGATION. INCLUSION OF SAN JOSE ON ITINERARY DUE TO PRESENCE THERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHOM THEY PLAN "INTERVIEW" IN CONNECTION WITH LETTER BOMB.

2. IN ORDER TO APPEAR UNWITTING OF BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA, PER REF B W-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON ABOUT 25 FEBRUARY.

3. FILE: 201-0931810, 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: A. ASKS PURPOSE OF W-3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA
B. W-3 ADVISED OF BOSCH ARREST; STILL PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA

201-240849
201-299292

BOSCH

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:SA
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

C/LA/CAM
C/LA/NW
AC/LA/SB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-300985
C/LA/TFK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Robert
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

SECRET

300985

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STAFF PRECEDENCE

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2	5
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T 782475 EIA615 PAGE 01 IN 834062

TOR:211652Z FEB 76 CARA 29161

S E C R E T 211629Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29161

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO BUENOS AIRES.

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY SGCHART

REF: DIRECTOR 610829

1. WKTANGO-1 TOLD WKSCARLET-9 20 FEBRUARY THAT CHILEAN SERVICE (DINA) HAD CONTRACTED WITH TWO GROUPS, THOSE OF CASTRO AND BOSCH, FOR ASSASSINATION OF PASCAL. CASTRO TO HAVE FIRST SHOT AT PASCAL. ACCORDING TO WKTANGO-1, CASTRO'S GROUP TO ENTER COSTA RICA FROM NICARAGUA CIRCA 20-22 FEBRUARY. IF CASTRO GROUP FAILED, BOSCH TO HAVE NEXT SHOT. (WKTANGO-1 OBVIOUSLY UNAWARE OF BOSCH ARREST.) WKSCARLET-9 UNAWARE OF SOURCE WKTANGO-1'S INFO.

2. FILE: 201-0941810; 200-6-495. E2, IMPDET.

B

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SECRET SERVICE CABLE

FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105

DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: RE ARREST OF JUAN BOSCH AT THIS LOCATION

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT C/LA15

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT, DSECURY, C/ISN/ID, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DD, C/DIVD2, C/OSG, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2,

T 702789 EIA110 PAGE 01 IN 834109

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

Doc

LA/CNH

S E C R E T 2121232 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19250

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VNLOFTY 0 Bosch Avila, Orlando

REF: BUENOS AIRES 39654 (C 834057)

1. TELL WKSCARLET-3 THAT, BASED ON INFO PASSED TO LIAISON BY FBI, BOSCH HAS BEEN TARGET OF INTEREST TO LOCAL LIAISON FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR. LIAISON AWARE OF BOSCH BOMBING BACKGROUND AND THEIR INTEREST IN HIM INCREASED AS RESULT SERIES LOCAL BOMBINGS AND IMMINENT VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THROUGH THEIR INFORMANTS THEY LEARNED THAT BOSCH GETTING SUPPORT LOCALLY (HOUSING, ETC); THAT HE USING NAME CONRADO CORTEZ OR CORTES,HRND, IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THAT HE KNOWN TO BE USING A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN ANOTHER NAME. IN LATE JANUARY THEY PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH HE WAS LIVING AND BEGAN INTENSIVE SEARCH (THEY ALSO HAD REPORTS OF HIS PRESENCE IN DOWNTOWN AREA). THROUGH POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER LOCAL SOURCES THEY PINPOINTED THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE IN JARDINES DE CASCAJAL AND ARRESTED HIM (THIS DONE BEFORE SAN JOSE STATION WAS ADVISED BY W-3 VIA BUENOS AIRES AS TO HIS EXACT LOCATION). ALL ABOVE CAN BE PASSED TO W-3 AND HE SHOULD

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21 Feb 76
201-299292

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 10/75

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INFO RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 02-02 IN 834109

TOR:2122142 FEB 76 SJOS 19250

ALSO BE CLEARLY TOLD HIS INFO DID NOT RESULT IN BOSCH ARREST.

2. RE CONTACT WITH CASTRO IN SAN JOSE, WE CAN ONLY SAY THE FOLLOWING:

A. WE HAVE NEVER DISCUSSED OR MENTIONED CASTRO WITH LIAISON, SO WE DO NOT KNOW IF THEY EVEN AWARE HIS EXISTANCE, HIS BACKGROUND, HIS INTENTIONS, OR THAT HE IN COSTA RICA.

B. IF THEY ARE AWARE OF CASTRO'S PRESENCE HERE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT PICK HIM UP TOO. THAT BEING CASE, W-3 COULD ALSO BE PICKED UP (WHICH AGAIN RAISES QUESTION OF PURPOSE WKSCARLET-1 AND 3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA).

3. FILE: 201- BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO. E2 IMPDET.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: Jane D. Zeeman

R.O. # ______ w/fcay

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

43-2

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20 FEB 76 1 DD

SECRET

STAFF 2023502 DIRECTOR 810829

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT D/SECUR 4 C/CS/A/IQ C/OPS/ITG 5, C/PLAN, DDO DDO/DO, C/DIVO 2, C/SS 3 C/CI 4 C/OS/ITG C/PS/EG 2 C/OS 9

DISSEM BY: PER LA # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES. Y

NIACT FOR CARACAS, SAN JOSE. Y

RYBAT VULOFTY Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 29144 (IN 872705)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35646 (RELAYED CARACAS)

C. DIRECTOR ~~[illegible]~~ 810006 Y

Desensitize

1. O CASTRO'S PRESENCE IN SAN JOSE, AS REPORTED IN REF B, ADDS WEIGHT TO WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT THAT CASTRO PLANS TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW. ANY SUCH ACTION AGAINST ALLENDE'S NEPHEW ON EVE OR DURING SECSTATE'S VISIT, WOULD BE ~~[illegible]~~ DOUBLY UNFORTUNATE. BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT ON US NOW TO ADVISE HUFABRICS THAT BKHERALD HAS UNCOVERED INFORMATION THAT A SERIOUS THREAT EXISTS AGAINST THE LIFE OF ALLENDE'S NEPHEW, LUIS ANDRES PASCAL. Y

2. FOR CARACAS: COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PUP) FEARS THAT SOMEONE WILL ATTEMPT TO KILL PASCAL DURING HIS STAY IN COSTA RICA, POSSIBLY PASCAL'S EX COHORTS IN THE CHILEAN MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR). ALSO CHILEAN PRESS OF 30 NOV 75 REPORTED THAT THE MIR HAS CONDEMNED PASCAL AS A TRAITOR AND SENTENCED HIM

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ORIG:
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EXT:

D-200-6-495/14

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CLASSIFICATION

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STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

810829

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO DEATH. (THIS REPORT MAY HAVE BEEN A GOC HILE PROP PLAY).

3. SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE STATION USE THE ABOVE PRESS REPORT AS THE PEG FOR SURFACING PLOT ON [redacted] PASCAL. HOPEFULLY, COMBINATION OF PRESS REPORT AND SKHERALD WARNING WILL PRO[illegible] VOKE HUFABRICS TO SPEED PASCAL'S DEPARTURE FROM COSTA RICA.

4. THEREFORE, UNLESS CARACAS PERCEIVES OVERRIDING OBJECTIONS, REQUEST THAT SAN JOSE INFORM HUFABRICS AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

5. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 20 FEB 76
ORIG: W. DEVINE
UNIT: AC/LA/NW
EXT: [redacted]

C/LAD

RELEASING OFFICER

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T 609255 EIA660 PAGE 01-01 IN 832905

TOR:201349Z FEB 76 CARA 29144

S E C R E T 201334Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29144

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLUFTY SGCHART

REF: DIRECTOR 810006

1. CONCUR ADVISING WKSCARLET-3 OF BOSCH ARREST PER PARA 2 REF. AGREE HE SHOULD CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE.

2. BELIEVE FACT OF BOSCH ARREST AND ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO LIAISON OF SPECIFIC PLOT INFORMATION RUNS TOO HIGH RISK OF COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2, IMPDET.

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ACTION UNIT C/LA-15

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE. VR. DDO, [illegible]

STAFF

T 697542 EIA305 PAGE 01 IN 832155

TOR:2001202 FEB 76 SJOS 19243

S E C R E T 2002092 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19243

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 35629 *

1. WE BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH DETENTION SOONEST. W-3 SHOULD ALSO BE ADVIS~~AD~~ED THAT HOUSE WHERE BOSCH ARRESTED HERE IS SAME ADDRESS AS THAT PROVIDED BY W-3 PER REF PARA ONE.

2. PLS ADVISE IF W-3 STILL INTENDS COME SAN JOSE DESPITE ARREST OF BOSCH. BOSCH MAY ALSO BE EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL W-3 ON 26 FEBRUARY. IF YES, REASON FOR VISIT WILL ENABLE SAN JOSE DECIDE IF CONTACT WITH W-3 HERE DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

* PORTION SVCD

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: [illegible]

Signed: LA/CAR

R.O. #

Note: [illegible] SECRET

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LA/CNA

2-201-299292

20 Feb 76
201-300775

(2)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SS - 1

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

2022572

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

810735

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SEC/R 4, C/LSN/10, C/OPS/ITGS, ETIPTAY, ODO, ODO/DO, C/DIU/DO, C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2

0 INDEX DISSEN BY: 29

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER LA

0 IP FILES # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE BOGOTA, SAN JOSE.Y

RYBAT VULOFTY Y

1. FYI: SECRET SERVICE ADVISED US 20 FEBRUARY THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM FBI/MIAMI TO EFFECT THAT ACCION CUBANA IN MIAMI KNOWS THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAS BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA. SOURCE OF INFO, ALDO VERA SERAFIN, SAID THAT A BOMB WOULD GO OFF IN SAN JOSE ON 23 FEBRUARY AND THAT THIS WOULD BE A "GOOD RECEPTION" FOR DR. KISSINGER, BUT WOULD NOT BE AIMED AT HIM. Y

201-299292

2. VERA, 201-326634, IS FORMER CHIEF OF INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT OF CUBAN NATIONAL POLICE. HE WAS MOST PROMINENT 26 OF JULY MEMBER IN URBAN GUERILLA MOVEMENT IN HAVANA IN LATE 1950'S. CAME TO U.S. ABOUT 1959-60. WAS USED BY BKHERALD IN AN APPROACH TO CUBAN OFFICIAL IN PARIS WHERE HE PERFORMED WELL. Y

3. FILE: 200-6-495/14. E2,IMPDET.#

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B-201-326634

B-201-299292

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: D. GEISLER:LH
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1249

30 FEB 76

200-6-495/14

C/LA/CAR

AC/LA/NW

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/TFK

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

STAFF 2000032 DIRECTOR 810006

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 4, C/CSN/ID 0 DISSEM BY: 45
C/OPS/ITG5, C/IP/AN, DDO 0 PER LA
C/IS/CG2, DDO/DD, C/OIJD2, C/CI4, Jose 0 #6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, ROUTINE SANTIAGO.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29129 |IN 830506|

C. SAN JOSE 19235 |IN 830494|

D. CARACAS 29135 |IN 830540|

E. SAN JOSE 19237 |IN 830647|

19 FEB

Crypt: UKSCARLET-3

1. SHARE CARACAS CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF UKSCARLET-3 IF INFO HE RECEIVED FROM CUBAN EXILE SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO BKHERALD IS REVEALED TO LIAISON SERVICES IN CARACAS AND SAN JOSE, AND THEY TAKE ACTION TO FRUSTRATE PLANNED ASSASSINATION. CUBAN EXILES INVOLVED IN REPORTED ATTEMPT WILL NOT ASK WHERE SERVICES OBTAINED THEIR INFORMATION, BUT LOOK FOR LEAKS IN THEIR MIDST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE DANGER OF COMPROMISE TO UKSCARLET-3 LESSENS WITH PASSAGE OF TIME BECAUSE OF PROBABLE REVELATION OF PLANS TO ADDITIONAL PERSONS. THEREFORE, SUBJECT CARACAS CONCURRENCE SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE ADVISE HUFABRIC THAT STATION HAS RECEIVED TIP THAT THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. PLACE OF ACQUISITION SHOULD

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CONF: INFO: FILE

810006

DISSEM BY:

PER

NOT BE REVEALED.

2. ALTHOUGH ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA NOT RESULT OF WKSCARLET-3 INFORMATION, WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH ARREST IN SAN JOSE. WE DEFER TO CARACAS, HOWEVER, TO ADVISE BEST COURSE. IF AFFIRMATIVE REQUEST BUENOS AIRES ATTEMPT CONTACT WKSCARLET-03 AND ADVISE HIM BOSCH ARRESTED, BUT THAT ARREST WAS NOT BASED ON ANY INFORMATION OR ACTION ON OUR PART. HE SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE AS THOUGH HE HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ARREST.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A - ADVISES AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE POSSIBILITY USE AGENCY INFO TO PREVENT HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS.

REF B - ALLENDE WIDOW IN CARACAS. BELIEVE BEST WE COULD DO AND STILL PROTECH WKSCARLET-3 IS ADVISE THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY IN CARACAS.

REF C - PASCAL STILL IN SAN JOSE. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE HUFABRIC OF MURDER THREAT.

REF D - PLEASE ADVISE IF ORLANDO BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA DUE TO PASSAGE OF W-3 INFO. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF W-3 INFO OUTSIDE LNBUZZ SINCE RISK OF

DATE:
ORIG:
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C/LA/CO, C/LA/CA/5, C/CI/SP

DDO, DDO/SO, C/LA/LO 2

STAFF

T 696463 E1A963 PAGE 01

TOR:1917302 FEB 76

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following [illegible] SJOS 19248 [illegible]

Signed

R.O.

LA/CAM

Note: [illegible], cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

S E C R E T 1917002 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19248

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS, BUENOS AIRES

RYBAT VHLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 809281

1. SECRET SERVICE REP MASTROVITO ADVISED OF CONTENTS REF. AT HIS REQUEST, AND IN VIEW QUESTION OF LENGTH BOSCH DETENTION, STATION ARRANGED FOR MASTROVITO TO INTERVIEW BOSCH AT HUFABRIC HQS AT 1400 HRS LOCAL TIME 19 FEBRUARY. NO STATION REP WILL PARTICIPATE THAT INTERVIEW. MASTROVITO HAD INTERVIEWED BOSCH SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN THE U.S.

2. COSTA RICANS ARE DISCUSSING HOW LONG THEY CAN HOLD BOSCH ON ENTRY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTS CHARGE. THEY CONSIDERING CONTACTING GENERAL GENI IN MANGUA AND DEPORTING HIM TO THAT COUNTRY. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. STATION HAS REMINDED DCM OF BACKGROUND THIS CASE (ESSENCE PARAS 1 AND 2 SAN JOSE 19237), OF PLANNED MASTROVITO INTERVIEW, AND ESSENCE REF.

Dm

IP/EVO		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	~~ABSTRACT~~	
		INDEX	
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IP/MS		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		RYBAT REST. CODE	
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D-200-6-475/14

19 Feb 76

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T 696460 EIA963 PAGE 02-02 IN 031024

TOR:1917382 FEB 76 SJ08 10248

4. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

52-2

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SECRET

STAFF

192304Z DIRECTOR 809923

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/CS/INT, D/SECUR 4, C/ISG/IO, DDO, DDCI/DO, C/DIVD 2, C/OPS/ITG 5 0 DISSEM BY: 27

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C/LA/A2

0 # 6

TO: IMMEDIATE MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE, CARACAS.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

1. COSTA RICAN LIAISON HUFABRIC HAS REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AT MIDDAY ON 18 FEBRUARY. HE WAS CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND COULD BE HELD FOR MINIMUM 24 HOURS. AT REQUEST SECRET SERVICE REP MASTROVITO, SAN JOSE STATION ARRANGED FOR MASTROVITO TO INTERVIEW BOSCH AT HUFABRIC HQS AT 1400 HOURS LOCAL TIME 19 FEBRUARY. MASTROVITO HAD INTERVIEWED BOSCH SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN U.S.

2. COSTA RICANS ARE DISCUSSING HOW LONG THEY CAN HOLD BOSCH ON ENTRY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTS CHARGE. THEY CONSIDERING CONTACTING ERYTHROID-33 IN MANAGUA AND DEPORTING HIM TO THAT COUNTRY.

3. VARIOUS SOURCES REPORTED POSSIBLE PLANS OF BOSCH TO KILL DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND/OR CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN CARACAS OR CHILEAN EXILE LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

IP/IDX
TRAVEL PROGRAM
☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP/CR/V
PREPARE FOR FILMING
CODE NO. (2, 3)
IP/MS
RYBAT REST. CODE
CABLE IDEN (11)
HFO (8)
FOR FILMING

D-200-5-495/14

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

19 Feb 76

2.DM 299292

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SECRET

STAFF

CONF: INFO: FILE

809923

DISSEM BY:

PER

#

ALLENDE, WHO NOW IN SAN JOSE.

4. SECRET SERVICE HQS ADVISES THAT ALTHOUGH BOSCH WANTED IN U.S. FOR PAROLE VIOLATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSIDERS BOSCH AN "UNWANTED ALIEN" AND USG PROBABLY WOULD DECLINE ANY OFFERS FOR EXTRADITION.

5. ALL ABOVE IS FYI IN CASE NICARAGUAN AUTHORITIES BRING MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION. NO ACTION ON YOUR PART IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: ATTEMPT MAY BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IS IN CARACAS

C/LA/CAM

C/LA/NW

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: LA/CAM

R.O. #

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

DATE: 13 FEB 76

ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK:ME

UNIT: C/LA/CAM/TFK

EXT: 1868

C/LA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/TFK

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY 054824

14-00000

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LA C/ 9C5

ACTION UNIT C/LA5

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INFO FILE VR DDSHNT O/SECUR4 C/CSE/OPS DDS/OPS SOPKW DDO DDO/DO DDCI/DDI

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STAFF

T 696788 E1A288 PAGE 01 IN 831949

TOR:1919342 FEB 76 SJOS 19241

S E C R E T 191910Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19241

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VNLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19237 (IN 830647)

1. BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH HUFABRIC-14 EVENING 18 FEB AND MORNING 19 FEBRUARY, WHAT FOLLOWS ARE DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:

A. BASED ON EARLIER BACKGROUND TO THIS CASE (PARAS 1 AND 2 REF), SPECIFICALLY FBI INVOLVEMENT, BOSCH HAS BEEN OF INTEREST TO HUFABRIC LIAISON SINCE ABOUT FEBRUARY 1975. THEIR INTEREST WAS INTENSIFIED BY THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF BOSCH'S INVOLVEMENT WITH BOMBINGS, NOT ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT BOMBINGS IN COSTA RICA BUT ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH KISSINGER'S VISIT.

B. AS INDICATED PARA 3 REF, LIAISON HAD PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD WHICH BOSCH WAS BELIEVED TO RESIDE. RECENTLY LIAISON LEARNED THAT BOSCH WAS INTERESTED IN TALKING TO THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF THE LIAISON SERVICE (HUGLIB-8, A STATION PENETRATION OF THAT SERVICE) BUT WAS ADVISED BY OTHER

DM

IP/DDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	~~ABSTRACT~~
		INDEX
IP/SR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CODE
		CABLE ITEM (11)
		NBU (0)
IP/CRG		FOR FILING
LA/CAR		

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

DT 800-5-498/14

19 Feb 76

201-299292

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ACTION #			3		6	

GOVERNMENT CONTACTS NOT TO DO SO. BOSCH SOON LEARNED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE HIM. LIAISON ALSO LEARNED FROM ITS SOURCES THAT BOSCH WAS ALSO USING THE NAME CONRADO CORTEZ (THIS ALL HAPPENED BEFORE HUFABRIC-14 WAS ADVISED THAT BOSCH MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER THAT NAME).

C. THROUGH ITS CONTACT WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND THE OWNER OF A LAUNDRY KNOWN TO BE PROVIDING SERVICES TO BOSCH, LIAISON PINPOINTED HIS RESIDENCE IN PRIVATE HOME IN A SECTION IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE CITY OF SAN JOSE CALLED JARDINES DE CASCAJAL WHERE HE WAS APPREHENDED AT 1100 HOURS ON 18 FEBRUARY.

D. THROUGH ANOTHER SENSITIVE SOURCE, LIAISON LEARNED THAT BOSCH WAS USING DOCUMENTS UNDER THE GARBLED VERSION OF THE NAME HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI. BASED ON PARAS 4 A AND B OF REF, LIAISON LEARNED THAT D'AVANZO HAD ARRIVED IN COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY ON COPA FLIGHT 317 FROM NICARAGUA. INCIDENTALLY, LIAISON DOUBTS THAT BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA RECENTLY.

D. AFTER HIS APPREHENSION ON 18 FEBRUARY, BOSCH

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CONF: INFO: FILE

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COMPROMISE TO [illegible]-3 RUNNING TOO HIGH.

REF E HUFABRIC HAD ALREADY WATCHED FOR AND LOCATED BOSCH DUE PREVIOUS TIPS (UNRELATED PASCAL) FROM DEA AND FBI. PASSED ONLY INFO THAT BOSCH HAD BEEN SEEN IN CARACAS 7 FEB AND MIGHT TRAVEL COSTA RICA USING DOCS IN NAME "COTTEZ".
R

COORD:
C/LA/CAM
A C/LA/SB
C/LA/TFK

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: LA/NW/V
EXT: 1535

R.S.

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CABLE FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA - 103

DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 2 FOR THE VISIT OF
SEC. KISSINGER TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
ON 23-24 FEBRUARY, 1976

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________

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T 696780 EIA280 PAGE 03 IN 831949

TOR:191934Z FEB 76 SJOS 19241

PRODUCED HIS CHILEAN PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF D'AVANZO AND WAS NOT RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS THE HISTORY OF HIS BOMBING VENTURES.

E. APPREHENDED WITH BOSCH WERE HIS DAUGHTER LOURDES TERESITA BOSCH DE BRINDER AND HER HUSBAND MARIO RUBIN BRINDER. LOURDES WAS BORN IN CUBA ON 17 FEBRUARY 1958 AND IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN HOLDING U.S. PASSPORT C-2267692 ISSUED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1972. SHE ARRIVED IN THE U.S. IN 1960 AND CLAIMS THAT HER CURRENT ADDRESS IS 7501 SOUTHWEST 19TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA. BRINDER WAS BORN IN BUENOS AIRES ON 27 APRIL 1955 AND HOLDS ARGENTINE PASSPORT 7234917. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE LIVED IN THE U.S. FOR SOMETIME WITH HIS FAMILY AND GAVE A FAMILY ADDRESS OF 4101 HARVEST LANE, TOLEDO, OHIO. THE BRINDERS HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABOUT ONE YEAR AND BRINDER (AND POSSIBLY LOURDES) WERE STUDYING MEDICINE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS IN GUATEMALA. AS A RESULT OF THE EARTHQUAKE, THEY LEFT GUATEMALA FOR COSTA RICA ON 9 FEBRUARY 1976. (WHICH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR BOSCH'S RETURN TO COSTA RICA FROM NICARAGUA.) THE BRINDERS ARE NO LONGER UNDER DETENTION.

SECRET

201-299292

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INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

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T 696780 EIA280 PAGE 04-04 IN 831949

TOR:191934Z FEB 76 SJ0S 19241

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

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Signed:

R.O.

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ACTION UNIT C/LA 13

ACTION #

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE VR A/SECUR 4, C/OPS/INT, C/OPS/IT65, C/LSN/ID, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DIVD 2, C/CI 4, C/OSG/IC

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3		6	

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 01 IN 830647

TOR:190155Z FEB 76 SJOS 19237

S E C R E T 182342Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19237

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29135 (IN 830540)

1. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO FBI IN EARLY 1975. ITINERANT FBI REP FROM MEXICO CITY (CAMAROTA) MENTIONED NAME TO STATION AND IT IS BELIEVED HE DID SAME TO LOCAL SERVICE (HUFABRIC), AND MAY HAVE LEFT SOMETHING IN WRITING WITH THEM. BOSCH NAME ALSO MENTIONED TO STATION BY LOCAL DEA REP BUT IT NOW DETERMINED THIS WAS BASICALLY ON FBI BEHALF.

2. ON OCCASION OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER'S MEETING AT HIS RANCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ON 10 JULY 1975, ITINERANT FBI REP MEXICO CITY CALLED STATION TO WARN COSTA RICANS OF AN ALLEGED ~~ONLEGED~~ CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF BOSCH ON PACIFIC COAST TO DISRUPT THAT MEETING. HUGLIB-3, WHO HAD SECURITY FOR THAT MEETING, CHECKED OUT INFO TO NO AVAIL. THIS INFO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO STATION BY HQS AND EMBASSY (WHICH RECEIVED IT VIA COSTA RICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON).

3. AT MEETING WITH CHIEF, HUFABRIC-14 ON 12 FEBRUARY HE

SECRET

14-00000

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE VR.	1	4
			2	5
ACTION #			3	6

T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 02 IN 830647

TOR:190155Z FEB 76 SJOS 19237

REPORTED THAT HIS SERVICE HAD DEFINITELY SPOTTED BOSCH ON TWO OCCASIONS ON OR ABOUT 10 FEBRUARY, HAD LOCATED THE AREA WHERE HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED AND HOPED TO GRAB HIM SOON.

4. ON 17 FEBRUARY STATION INFORMED HUFABRIC-14 OF THE FOLLOWING INFO FROM PARA 3 OF CARACAS 29109:

A. BOSCH WAS KNOWN TO BE IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY.

B. BOSCH MIGHT HAVE LEFT CARACAS SOME TIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA.

C. BOSCH MIGHT BE USING CHILEAN PASSPORT (WHICH THEY ALREADY KNEW) AND MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER NAME CORTEZ. HUFABRIC-14 HOWEVER STATED THAT BOSCH TRAVELLING UNDER NAME HECTOR E. DAVANZO CINTOLESI, USING CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 20983.

NO OTHER PORTIONS OF CARACAS 29109 OR ANY OF PART OF CARACAS 29110 PASSED TO ANYONE.

5. WE CHECKING WITH HUFABRIC-14 ON DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST AND WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Note - per Caracas 29101 (IN 828704) [illegible]-5 told [illegible] That in contacting Bosch by telephone in CR, he should ask for "Cortez".

SECRET

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 182236Z

CITE ~~CIA~~

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER ~~009159~~

CONF: C/LA 7 INFO: FILE, IP/AN, DDO, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/INT 2, C/CI 2, D/OCI,

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 48

TO: IMMEDIATE FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, SECRET SERVICE// INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALSY

SUBJECT: ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TERRORIST AND LEADER OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP, IN COSTA RICAY

CIR-316/20,049-76Y

P/CW		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	~~ABSTRACT~~
		INDEX
P/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FI
P/CB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CO.
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NFD (6)
~~RID~~		FOR FILING

LA/C/OP

1. ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL COSTA RICAN SERVICE, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, A TERRORIST AND LEADER OF THE ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE AT MID-DAY ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. HE WAS CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CAN BE HELD FOR A MINIMUM OF 24 HOURS.Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.H

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 19236 (IN-
HUFABRIC
OBJECTIVEB L

18 Feb 76

RECORD COPY

201-299292

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: E. DREISONSTOK:LW
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/TFK
EXT: 1868

C/LA/CAM E. Dreisonstok

C/LA/TFK (FISHER AMES) (PHONE)

C/OPS/EBN/TG
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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CL BY: 054524

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7-71 MFG. 10/75

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STAFF PRECEDENCE

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ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR, SECUR 4, OPS/INT, OPS/IGS, LSN/ID, ICHLK, DDO, DIVD 2, CI 4, OPS/IC, ADC/DO

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3		6	

T 693558 EIA150 PAGE 01 IN 830540

TOR:182143Z FEB 76 CARA 29135

S E C R E T 182135Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29135

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES,

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19236 (IN 830508)

B. CARACAS 29110 (IN 828721)

C. CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

D. CARACAS 29129 (IN 830506)

E. SAN JOSE 19235 830494

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF A ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA RESULTED FROM REFS B AND C INFORMATION. ~~IF SO, SUGGEST~~ NO FURTHER DISSEM OF PARA TWO REF C PLOT INFORMATION OUTSIDE LNBUZZ CHANNELS AS RISK COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3 TO EXILE EXTREMISTS RUNNING TO HIGH.

2. FILE: 200-6-495, E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3/(W)

SECRET

ABLE SEC DISSEM BY J PER CA TOTAL COPIES 11-1 BY 22

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CTION UNIT LA 15

CTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR. C/OPS/INT, SECURITY, C/OPS/PROG 5, ISA/IO, C/[illegible], DDO, [illegible], [illegible], C/CI4, [illegible], C/OSG, C/OSG/[illegible],

T 693460 EIA055 PAGE 01 IN 830506

TOR:182041Z FEB 76 CARA 29129

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29129

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29094 (IN 827361)

1. IN CONTEXT OF ARRIVAL CARACAS HORTENSIA BUSSI DE AILENDE 201-05740 PER REF B, STATION BELIEVES WE COULD ADVISE LOCAL LIAISON UNILATERALLY THAT WE HAVE TIP THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY HERE IN CARACAS. FEEL THIS AS SPECIFIC AS WE COULD GET AND STILL REASONABLY PROTECT SOURCE. EVEN THEN THERE IS RISK TO WKSCARLET-3 WHO OBTAINED INFO DIRECTLY FROM SELF-DECLARED PRINCIPAL IN PLOT: WKSCARLET-3 IS ONLY PERSON WE SURE FRANK CASTRO HAS TOLD. POSSIBLY ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IS NOT YET AWARE VICTIM IDENTITY. IF WKSCARLET-3 COMPROMISED TO EXILE EXTREMISTS, STATION FEELS HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY.

2. FILE: 201-0300985, E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILM COPY FOR
201- [illegible]
DO NOT DESTROY

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT CA15

INFO FILE VR OPS/INT, SECURY, LSN/ID4, OPS/ITG 5, IPLAN, CI4, PS/EG2, DDO/DO, DIUD 2,

STAFF

T 693416 EIA620 PAGE 01 IN 832494

18 Feb

TOR:182025Z FEB 76 SJOS 19235

S E C R E T 182000Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19235

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. SAN JOSE 19195 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (812972

C. SAN JOSE 19215 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (818963)

D. SAN JOSE 19227 PARA 2 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (82

E. DIRECTOR 808856

1. RE PARA 3 REF A AND REF E: REFS B,C, AND D REPORTED ARRIVAL ON 2 FEBRUARY AND PRESENCE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE REPEAT ANDRES PASCAL ALENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, IN COSTA RICA. AFTER SPENDING DAY IN LOCAL HOTEL HE MOVED TO HOME OF MARXIST DANIEL CAMACHO MONGE, POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA. CAMACHO HOME LOCATED IN SUBURBAN TOWN OF CURRIDABAT 25 METERS NORTH OF HOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT PEPE FIGUERES. PASCAL [illegible]WN TO BE AT ABOVE LOCATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY.

2. PASCAL AND GIRLFRIEND MUST REMAIN COSTA RICA FOR SIXTY [illegible] ARRIVAL TO GIVE COSTA RICAN COURTS OPPORTUNITY TO [illegible]IFY OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST TO EXTRADITE THEM.

SECRET

AO 13130

14-00000

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

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T 693416 EIA828 PAGE 02-02 IN 832494

TOR:1820252 FEB 76 SJOS 19235

(IN 516963)

3. SOURCE SAN JOSE 19215 WAS HUCOD-1.

4. IN VIEW KISSINGER VISIT, ADVISE IMMEDIATE PERMISSION DISCUSS MURDER THREAT WITH LOCAL LIAISON (HUFABRIC).

5. FILE: 201-931810. E2 IMPDET

A medium-level of Costa Rican CP (PVP). His reporting has been usually reliable in the past.

CIR-316/20049-76

Official CR service

Bosch arrested in San (HC : TD

Jose 18 Feb 76

1349

SECRET

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLE

DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1976

FROM: CARACAS, SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 779

SUBJECT: DEPARTURE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM
CARACAS, VENEZUELA

CLASSIFICATION: AIUO

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-7

C/LA/SB
DC/LA/SB
C/LA/SB/AR
C/LA/SB/CH
C/LA/SB/UP
LA/SB Sec'y

MG

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

SECRET

STAFF 181403Z DIRECTOR 236622

CONF 197 INFO FILE [illegible], OSC, C/OPS 0 DISSEM BY: 37

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

1. IN ORDER AVOID CRITICISM OR ALLEGATIONS THAT AGENCY FAILED IN SOME RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS, THE AGENCY MUST EXAMINE SUCH ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE IF IT IS POSSIBLE OR PROPER TO USE AGENCY INFORMATION TO DIVERT OR ARREST THE ACTIVITY. IN SOME SITUATIONS NOTHING CAN BE DONE EITHER BECAUSE NO CHANNEL EXISTS TO AFFECT THE SITUATION OR THE SOURCE CANNOT BE PROTECTED.

2. REF PARA TWO REPORT FROM UKSCARLET-3 ON ALLEGED ~~[illegible]~~, PLOT ~~[illegible] AMERICAN CITIZEN [illegible]~~ TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP FROM CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, IS THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED PER ABOVE TO SEE IF THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF USING UKSCARLET-3'S REPORT TO MITIGATE THE PLANNED ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU BELIEVE UKSCARLET-3'S REPORT CAN BE PASSED TO APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN LIAISON, OR OTHER FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICES, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING UKSCARLET-3'S IDENTITY AND SAFETY.

3. SAN JOSE: LATEST HQS INFO IS THAT LUIS ALLENDE RESIDES IN

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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CONF: INFO: FILE

305822

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SAN JOSE. PLEASE CONFIRM.V

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.A

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: WILLIAM J. DEVINE
UNIT: LA/NW
EXT: 1128

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUC[illegible] BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR[illegible]ITED

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CL BY: 019453

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SECRET

LA/SDO ... 1830 17 FEB 76 15 18

ACTION UNIT

LA 27

FILE, VR, DDO, PS/EG2, ... IID, OPS/INT 5

ACTION # CI 4, SS 4, OSG/IC, OPS/ITG 4

T 680305 EIA878 PAGE 01 IN 078721

TOR:171815Z FEB 76 CARA 29118

S E C R E T 171722Z FEB 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB 315/01603-76 3P

HVC-7327

CITE CARACAS 29118

HRS HBB HBR HPL

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA,

HLB HGC HAB HCS

BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY, BUENOS AIRES, SANTIAGO.

INTEL VHLEFTY

SUPDATA: ERWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: WKSCARLET/WKSCARLET-3 DIRECTLY (SEE OPS CABLE FOR DETAILS WHICH DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM). OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NOT FOR PASSAGE LIAISON. WILL BE PASSED WKSCARLET69 UNILATERALLY. INDEX BOSCH. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 059820.

FILED: 17/1722Z

IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT WITH CHANGES PER DESK:

DELETED FOLLOWING RELIABILITY STATEMENT FROM SOURCE BYLINE: "HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED." INSERTED A MODIFIED RELIABILITY STATEMENT.

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
	☒	INDEX
		PREPARE FOR FILMING
	☒	CODE NO. (2, 3) 2
		RYBAT RIST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		INFO (8)
		FOR FILING

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 11 1976
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S E C R E T

D-200-120-495/14

17 Feb 76

201-299292

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M

201-0931810
CARA-29119
17 FEB 76
HVC-07328
P2

HIS ANTI-CUBAN GOVM EXILE GROUP IS TO ATTEMPT TO KILL PASCAL ALLENDE, LUIS ANDRES /201-0931810/ IN CARACAS AS RETURN FOR AID GIVEN BY CHILEAN GOVM
RES VENE, CARACAS.

DATE 04 MAR 76 09380026

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

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(TUBED) LA BY C AT 1500

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T 689340 EIA832 PAGE 01 IN 826704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

S E C R E T 171722Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29109

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29029 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES) 818997

B. CARACAS 29076 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE) 826512

C. CARACAS 29110 (HVC-7327)

1. WKSCARLET-3 LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE 16 FEBRUARY AND SPOKE BRIEFLY BY TELEPHONE WITH HIM TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW IN SAN JOSE FOUR OR FIVE DAYS HENCE. WKSCARLET-3 LEAVING CARACAS WITH WKSCARLET-1 FOR BUENOS AIRES AFTERNNON 17 FEB AND ANTICIPATES STAYING BUENOS AIRES FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE GOING SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 CAN BE CONTACTED IN EITHER BUENOS AIRES OR SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL FROM NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS "RAMIREZ." HE WILL BE STAYING SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES BUT DOES NOT YET KNOW NAME OF HOTEL IN SAN JOSE. AT BOTH LOCATIONS HE WILL BE ALERT FOR CALL

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T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 02 IN 028704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

FROM "RAMIREZ" BETWEEN 0800 AND 0930 DAILY. CAUTION NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER MUST MAKE CALL IN ORDER AVOID AROUSING EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS NATURE WKSCARLET-1 WHO MAY ANSWER TELEPHONE AND IS UNWITTING WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT WITH BKHERALD. IN ORDER VERIFY BOSCH EXACT MOVEMENTS DURING VWLOFTY, SUGGEST SAN JOSE MAY WISH FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO BUENOS AIRES FOR PASSING TO WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORT OF BOSCHS INTENTIONS ON LIFE OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR OR SECRETARY KISSINGER IN CARACAS. WKSCARLET-3 DID SEE FRANK CASTRO AT VENEZUEL'S MAIQUETIA AIRPORT ON 16 FEB. CASTRO TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE WAS HERE TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE, AND THAT HIS SPONSOR WAS THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. CASTRO SAID ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ WOULD BE HELPING HIM AND INDICATED HE EXPECTED OTERO TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. WKSCARLET-3 INTERPRETS CASTRO'S CLAIM OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP TO MEAN QUASI-GOC SPONSORSHIP: POSSIBLY MILITARY. CASTRO SAID THIS ACTION WAS BEING PERFORMED IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP THAT BOSCH, CASTOR OR CALATAYUD (FNU), ANOTHER ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO CUBAN, HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE GOC.

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Y 689349 EIA032 PAGE 03-03 IN 820734

TOR:1717572 FEB 76 CARA 29109

3. USSS SECRET SERVICE REP CARACAS ADVISES THAT CARACAS LEGATT HAS INFORMATION FROM RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE (ALLEGEDLY FROM TELTAP) THAT BOSCH WAS IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY 1976 AND LEFT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA USING CHILEAN PASSPORT. SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK FOR "CORTEZ" WHEN HE TELEPHONED BOSCH IN SAN JOSE ON 16 FEB. SUGGEST BOSCH MAY HAVE ENTERED COSTA RICA SOMETIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY USING CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF CORTEZ.

4. ABOVE INFOR ON WHEREABOUTS BOSCH, OTERO AND CASTRO PASSED SECRET SERVICE AND LEGATT AT CARACAS. ✓

5. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-20/4. E2 IMPDET.

Ricardo Morales Navarrette

S E C R E T

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DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 828721

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CITE TDFIR DB 315/01683-76

DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/COSTA RICA

DOI: 16 FEBRUARY 1976

SUBJECT: WHEREABOUTS OF ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT TERRORIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (17 FEBRUARY 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7327

SOURCE: A BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

1. AS OF THE EVENING OF 16 FEBRUARY 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, A TERRORIST AND LEADER OF THE ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT GROUP KNOWN AS ACCION CUBANA, WAS IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH'S EXACT LOCATION WITHIN SAN JOSE IS NOT KNOWN.) WHILE BOSCH'S PLANS ARE UNKNOWN, HE HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL REMAIN IN SAN JOSE AT LEAST UNTIL 22 FEBRUARY.

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, SECRET SERVICE AT CARACAS: SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, GUATEMALA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

201-299292

IN 828721

TDFIR DB 315/01683-76

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
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(classification)

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U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE CARACAS 778

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 5 FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO CARACAS.

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 777

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 4 FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER TO CARACAS VENEZUELA ON FEB. 16-18, 1976

7-71 MFG. 10/76

5

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INFO: RF FILE VR DDO OPSINT LSN/ID OPS/ITG 5 IP/AN DIV 02 SECUR 4 DDO/DO

T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 01 IN 827484

TOR:152016Z FEB 76 CARA 29096

S E C R E T 151951Z FEB 76 STAFF

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		ISOLATE PROGRAM
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		NFO (8)
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2-3/Nov/76		

CITE CARACAS 29096

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO. HCS

NIACT DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 11 1976
MICROFILMED

1. ADDRESSEES WILL APPRECIATE USSS CONCERN TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ORLANDO BOSCH-AVILA. 201-0299292 THRUST USSS EFFORT NOW IS DETERMINE SUB-SOURCE FOR RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE REPORT THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS. 201-285923 ASSISTANT LEGATT HAS DIRECT CONTACT WITH MORALES WHO EXPECTED RETURN FROM MIAMI EVENING 15 FEBRUARY. USSS ATTEMPTING SET UP INTERVIEW WITH MORALES THROUGH LEGATT.

2. WKSCARLET-9 HAS MOUNTED 24 HOUR STAKE-OUT CARACAS HOME OF DOCTOR TEBELIO RODRIGUEZ MACEDA (No 24) WITH WHOM BOSCH ALLEGEDLY STAYING: AS OF EARLY AFTERNOON 15 FEB BOSCH WAS NOT SEEN. A WKSCARLET INITIATED TELEPHONE TAP ON RODRIGUEZ WAS OPERATIVE UNTIL WEEK 9 FEBRUARY AND NO INDICATION THAT BOACH MIGHT BE IN CARACAS HAD BEEN DETECTED.

3. STATION ANTICIPATES NEXT CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3

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201-0299292

D-75-2-20/4

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T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 02 IN 827484

TOR:152016Z FEB 76 CARA 29096

MORNING 16 FEBRUARY. WKSCARLET-3 IS AWARE STATION INTEREST BOSCH AND, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE AWARE MORALES REPORT THAT BOSCH IN CARACAS, HE HAS NOT INITIATED EMERGENCY CONTACT TO REPORT BOSCH PRESENCE HERE: A COURSE OF ACTION HE WOULD FOLLOW IF HE LEARNED OF BOSCH PRESENCE.

4. SO FAR, ALL ATTEMPTS VERIFY BOSCH MOVEMENT/PRESENCE CARACAS, INCLUDING SANTIAGO TRAVEL CHECK, NEGATIVE. WKSCARLET IS PROVIDING ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STREET DUTY FOR VWLOFTY EVENT WITH PHOTOS AND DESCRIPTION OF BOSCH.

5. SANTIAGO: IF YOU HAVE NECESSARY ASSETS, WOULD APPRECIATE ATTEMPT DETERMINE RESIDENCE ADDRESS FOR LESSEE PARA 3 REF POSTAL ADDRESS AND UNILATERAL STAKE-OUT OF ADDRESS TO POSSIBLY VERIFY BOSCH LOCATION. BOSCH IS FIVE FEET NINE INCHES, BLACK HAIR, BROWN EYES, FIFTY YEARS OLD. MAY BE WEARING GOATEE IN EFFORT HIDE PROMINENT STRAWBERRY BIRTH MARK, LOWER MOUTH AREA. WEIGHT LAST REPORTED 190 POUNDS BUT UNDERSTAND HE HAS LOST SIGNIFICANTLY IN LAST TWO YEARS.

6. AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN UNDERSTANDS THAT JULIO DURAN, CHILEAN RADICAL PARTY FIGURE WHO WAS AT ONE TIME SANTIAGO CA CONTACT, HAS BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BOSCH IN PAST

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T 686394 EIA146 PAGE 03-03 IN 027484

TOR:152016Z FEB 76 CARA 29896

AND PROBABLY HAS GIVEN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO HIM. CAN SANTIAGO CONTACT DURAN AND QUESTION HIM ABOUT BOSCH'S CURRENT WHEREABOUTS?

7. FILE: 201-6-495; 75-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET

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201-0299292

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 775
DATE: 15 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 3 FOR THE VISIT OF
SEC. KISSINGER TO CARACAS

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT NO. 2 FOR THE VISIT OF
SEC. KISSINGER TO CARACAS

FBI CABLE

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VISIT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO LATIN AMERICA, FEBRUARY 16-23, 1976

U.S. SECRET SERVICE CABLES

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS 771
DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

FROM: SECRET SERVICE ID ADVANCE CARACAS
DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

FROM: SECRET SERVICE HQS INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (FIB) FILE: 650.0

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER IN VENEZUELA

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T 003822 E14987 PAGE 01 IN 026512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29876

S E C R E T 131610Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29876

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS RES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29863 (IN 924723)

B. SANTIAGO 33711 (IN 825993)

1. USSS HEADQUARTERS HAS FORWARDED TO CARACAS ADVANCE TEAM NOTICE THAT USSS MIAMI REP RECEIVED REPORT ON 12 FEB 76 FROM "EXTREMELY RELIABLE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" THAT ATTEMPT TO BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IN VENEZUELA. INFORMANT DESCRIBED AS "VERY CLOSE" TO ORLANDO BOSCH ✓201-0299292 AVILA (USSS LATER IDENTIFIED SOURCE AS RICARDO MORALES ✓201-285723 NAVARRETE). BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED CARACAS FROM MANAGUA TWO DAYS AGO.

2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES CHECK OF TRAVEL CONTROL FOR POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION BOSCH TRAVEL. CONSIDER MORE LIKELY BOSCH WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH DOMINICAN PASSPORT 086768 IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA. ✓201-0299292

3. FYI: WKSCARLET-3, WHO PLANNED CONTACT BOSCH IN SANTIAGO [illegible] HE SENT TELEGRAM TO SANTIAGO ACCOMMODATION

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INFO RF FILE VR

T 603022 EIA907 PAGE 02-02 IN 026512

TOR:131840Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

ADDRESS LAST WEEK ASKING CONFIRMATION BOSCH WOULD BE AVILABLE. NO REPLY YET RECEIVED. ADDRESS TO WHICH TELEGRAM SENT IS:

SRTA. ADRIANA DELGADO
CASILLA 477 CORREO CENTRAL
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

4. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-28/4. E2 IMPDET

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T 683619 EIA477 PAGE 01-01 IN 826738

TOR:132255Z FEB 76 MANA 12173

S E C R E T 132246Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12173 (MANKUNAS ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SANTIAGO INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29076 (IN 826512)

1. IMMIGRATION AND AIRPORT TRAVEL CONTROL REPORT NO TRAVEL BY BOSCH OR PEDRO ANTONIO PENA THROUGH NICARAGUA 8 FEBRUARY TO PRESENT. BOTH NAMES HAVE BEEN PUT ON WATCH LIST AND STATION WILL BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY IF BOSCH ENTERS OR LEAVES NICARAGUA.

2. FILE: 200-6-495; ~~75-2-20/4.~~ E2, IMPDET.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
ABSTRACT ☒
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T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 01 IN 824723

TOR:1216252 FEB 76 CARA 29063

S E C R E T 1216052 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29063

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

WKBOXER SECURE MHSPIKE

REF: HVC-7280, 4 DEC 75

1. WKSCARLET-3 (FORMER UNILATERAL ASSET) CONTACTED STATION 11 FEB 76 TO ADVISE HE AND WSKCARLET-1 PLAN TRAVEL SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI DURING WEEK 15 FEB. PURPOSE IS INVESTIGATION OF ATTEMPTED LETTER BOMBING CUBAN AMBASSADOR CARACAS.

2. BOMBING INCIDENT SURFACED WHEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO REPORTED TO WKSCARLET ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO ALLEGED RECEIPT OF BOMB. WKSCARLET-10 DEACTIVATED DEVICE WHICH CONTAINED IN LARGE MANILA ENVELOPE BEARING RETURN ADDRESS DR. GUSTAVO A. VOLLMER. WKSCARLET-1, FORMER WKSCARLET CHIEF IS SECURITY CONSULTANT TO VOLLMER AND HE HAS RETAINED WKSCARLET-3, A FORMER WKSCARLET OFFICER NOW OPERATING COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATIONS SERVICE, TO DETERMINE WHO USED VOLLMER'S NAME. WKSCARLET-3, CUBAN EXILE, RETAINS SIGNIFCANT CONTACTS WITH EXTREMIST EXILES AND HAS REGULAR CORRESPONDENCE WITH ORLANDO

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679288 EIA993 PAGE 02 IN 824723

TOR:121625Z FEB 76 CARA 29863

O S C H AVILA IN SANTIAGO.

3. IN A LETTER APPROXIMTELY THREE MONTHS AGO BOSCH TOLD KSCARLET-3 HE HAS MADE AGREEMENT WITH EXTREMIST GROUP IN RGENTINA (WKSCARLET-3 THINKS GROUP CONNECTED WITH OR IS ERP) FOR UTUALLY SUPPORTIVE ACTION: I.E. (ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3) IF BOSCH ROUPS WANTS SOMEONE KILLED WHERE IT DOES NOT HAVE ASSETS, THE RGENTINE GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION IF IT HAS THE ASSETS, AND IF THE RGENTINE GROUP WANTS THE SAME THING ANY WHERE ELSE INCLUDING UERTO RICO, HIS GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION. WKSCARLET-3 SAID TI WAS ON ASIS THIS AGREEMENT A PAST ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ASSASSINATE UBAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES.

4. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS INTERVIEW BOSCH AND OTHERS IN SANTIAGO, UENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI IN ATTEMPT LEARN WHETHER CARACAS ETTER BOMB WAS EXILE EFFORT OR POSSIBLY DGI COVERT ACTION PERATION.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ANY ADDRESSEE STATIONS INTEREST CONTACT ITH WKSCARLET-3.

6. FOR DIRECTOR: STATION HAS OBTAINED LETTER BOMB VIA KSCARLET LIAISON. EXPLOSIVE CONSISTS OF COILED PRIMA CORD. ETONATOR HAS BEEN REMOVED AND OBTAINED SEPARATELY. WOULD LIKE

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T 076008 EIA003 PAGE 03-03 IN 024723

TOR:1216252 FEB 76 CARA 29063

EXPERT OPINION RE ORIGIN OF MATERIALS USED: PLEASE ADVISE SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS.

7. FILE: 75-2-28/3. E2. IMPDET.

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[illegible]

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FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 6 NOVEMBER 1975

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)

FBI FILE NO: 105-21947 (MIAMI)

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FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HECTOR DURAN
FBI FILE NO: 105-22[illegible] (MIAMI)

DATE: 9 JULY 1975
CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
CLASSIFICATION: AIRO
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)
CONFERENCE, JULY 16-18, 1975, IN COSTA RICA

DATE: 9 JUNE 1975
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: EDUARDO PAZ BELLO
FBI FILE NO: 105-21552 (MIAMI)

DATE: 12 MAY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: GUSTAVO BIENVENIDO MARIN Y DUARTE
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 8 MAY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: DUNNEY PIO PEREZ ALAMO
FBI FILE NO: 105-4953 (MIAMI)

DATE: 18 MARCH 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: LEONARDO S. VIOTA SESIN
FBI FILE NO: 105-22254 (MIAMI)

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BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292 075-120-028
SEX M HVC-07280
04 DEC 75
CIT CUBA P2

RES CHIL. LOR OF LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST R VOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PLANS TO ASSASSINATE MB HERNANDEZ. FLED TO CHILE IN DEC 74 FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE FROM JAIL FOR ILLEGAL EXILE ACTIVITIES IN VENE

DATE 22 DEC 75 09362139

201-299292

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Chief, Latin America Division

Chief of Station, Caracas

Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

Orlando BOSCH Avila

References: A. CARACAS 26054
B. SANTO DOMINGO 15980

Forwarded as an attachment are copies of a memorandum addressed to the Dominican Foreign Office from the Dominican Ambassador in Caracas regarding Orlando *Bosch Avila, the Subject of References. The document was passed to the Station on 4 February 1975 by EMPYREX-1. The memorandum notes that Bosch was travelling on Dominican documents in the name of Pedro Antonio *Pena, and that the documents were procured in Santo Domingo.

Wendel J. RAMOVA

Attachment:
Memorandum H/W

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2 - COS, Caracas w/att

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E2, IMPDET

HDCA-10887 5 February 1975

SECRET 22-9-28

20 de Enero de 1974

Al : Excelentísimo Señor
Doctor Víctor Gómez Bergés
Secretario de Estado de Relaciones
Exteriores,
Santo Domingo, República Dominicana

Asunto : El hombre que ha jurado matar a Fidel
Castro: TRES MESES VIVIA EN VENEZUELA
CUBANO TERRORISTA EXPULSADO.

Ref. : a) Nuestro C-105 del 25 de Nov. 1974, y
y b) Nuestro oficio O-550 del 26 de Nov.
de 1974.

En adición a nuestro Cable y Oficio de referencia, cumplimos con informarle sobre este caso lo siguiente:

a) Que el ciudadano cubano señor doctor Orlando Bosch Avila, ingresó a Venezuela por el aeropuerto de Maiquetía el día 8-7-74, portando el pasaporte número 036768, dominicano, a nombre de Pedro Antonio Peña y la cédula de identidad No. 26741, también dominicana.

b) Que salió de Venezuela para Curazao el día 21-11-74 y regresó como transeunte el 29-11-74, saliendo para Chile el día 2-12-74.

c) Que salió de Venezuela con la tarjeta de turismo No. 298715 y finalmente, que actualmente debe encontrarse en Chile.

Que todos los documentos dominicanos le fueron expedidos en Santo Domingo, según la información que me ha ofrecido el Sub-director de la Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención (DISIP), Dr. Gustavo Rodríguez M. quien me visitó para darme una información completa del caso, hoy en mis oficinas de esta Misión.

Atentamente le saluda.

Rafael Bonilla Aybar
Embajador

14-00000

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING
	ABSTRACT CARD REQUIRED

TO
Chief, Latin America Division

INFO

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Bogota

SUBJECT
Orlando BOSCH Avila AKA Efrain LEITONE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HEGA-4688, dated 13 December 1974

There are no Station traces on Efrain LEITONE. According to CIFENDER-2, Colombian Passport No. G-034892 was issued on 7 July 1970 to one Efrain LEITON Yate for the purpose of travel to Ecuador. Leiton was born in Ortega, Tolima Department on 7 August 1924. He is described as 1.65 m. tall, black hair, brown eyes, medium complexion. The photograph on his passport application does not appear to be identical with that of the Subject of referenced dispatch.

Warren K Guertler
Warren K. GUERTLER

Distribution:
3-Chief, LA Division

IFH SS

RECORD COPY

Note: 2 copies to Quito (T.M.)
2 Guayaquil (T.M.)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBA-14009	DATE 14 January 1975
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-0299292 ~~201-0855937~~

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1975
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ACCION CUBANA (AC)
FBI FILE NO: SJ 105-16193 (SAN JUAN)

DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA - PAROLE VIOLATOR
FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST / DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROWDER, EDWARD /JR./
201-059919
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

23
[056-006-004]
PACY-07673
23 MAR 62

24

U.S. CITIZEN ON WHOM [PANAMANIAN DEPT OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS] HAS DEROGATORY INFO MAR 62.

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PLZR

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FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2/PV

9 May 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - General
02

02
1. WUBRINY/1 called on the sterile line from Washington at 1430 hours to discuss the subject covered below.

02
2. Tire Recap: WUBRINY/1 said that he had just heard from the Mohawk people who will be in New York the week of 20 May and has stated that they are now prepared to go ahead investing some $30,000 of their own money in a tire recap plant in Greece. 02 WUBRINY/1 will give us more details as he has them and feels that Lodi will also come in with some money and that WUSALINE can also, if this is desired or needed.

02 02 02 04
3. WUBRINY/4: WUBRINY/1 said that Luis Borwne is briefed him in detail on the difficulties that apparently have built 02 up regarding WUBRINY/4's suspicisons and said that he plans to have RECKREY devote himself to this sonest. WUBRINY/1 said 02 that if this is as serious as Mr. Browne appears to believe 04 it may be necessary to isolate him elsewhere in the WUBRINY 02 interests, such as the partnership, and taper him off for termination at the end of his six months. WUBRINY/1 suggested 02 that it might be useful to send him to Greece in conjunction with the Mowhawk tire recap plant.

02
4. Martinique - Pumice: WUBRINY/1 said that all arrangements are now made and this is ready to go forward and that KUBARK should decide right away the contribution we wished to b e made by RECKREY. I told WUBRINY/1 we would be back on this 02 early next week, but I felt sure it was as had been earlier discussed, namely, that we will foot the bill for RECKREY's time and travel, etc., expenses. Note: I trust Mr. Allen will give this priority attention when he returns.

02
5. Haitian Banker - M. CHARLES: WUBRINY/1 said that he had encountered M. Charles at the National Airport in Washington at 1920 hours just at the time he was reporting in to me at my 02 home. WUBRINY/1 said that M. CHARLES was nattily dressed in a gray silk suit and said that he was on his way to Chicago but had not said why. M. CHARLES was accompanied by George deMOHREN- 02 SHILDT. WUBRINY/1 asked M. CHARLES what in the world is going on now in Haiti and M. CHARLES shrugged and said that he felt that they would "bring down Papa Doc." No further details were given and this was apparently a personal opinion rather than something based on fact or knowledge.

SECRET

Distribution:
Orig - EQ subject, 1 Chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops
02

C. FRANK STONE III
Chief
DO/CORO

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19/BR

201-299292
Aug 76 - Oct 76
Vol V

ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

On 28 October 1976 INS informed CPS/LSN over the telephone that Bosch has no immigration status. In 1968 he was granted an "A" card but he never fulfilled the requirements to become a U.S. person. In 1973 he was granted indefinite voluntary departure.

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

14-7

SECRET

2819932 CIA/330 934476

C/LA 8 INFO FILE C/LSN, C/LSA/10, C/OPS

C/SI 2

TO: IMMEDIATE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. ATTN: LEE BEAUCHAMP Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Y

CIR-316/04416-76 Y

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CLARIFICATION ON THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA. Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM [illegible] GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.#

FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-299292.

AC/LA/SB

TRAVEL PROGRAM

INDEX

FOR FILING

316/04416-76
28 Oct 76
201-299292

DATE: 28 OCT 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/OPS/LSN
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C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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200-12-200/1

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16-1

CNF 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 282232Z DIRECTOR 35

CONF LA 5 INFO FILE 1/TAS

TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS, SAN JOSE.

UNINTEL Bosch passport

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35326 (IN 077749) HCS-10,772 (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

B. SANTIAGO 35332 (IN 079599) (NOT NEEDED SAN JOSE)

1. FOLLOWING IS CORRECTION ISSUED FOR HEADQUARTERS CUSTOMERS ON 28 OCTOBER 1976: "A FOUR-PAGE INFORMATION REPORT WITH THE ABOVE HEADING AND NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 22 OCTOBER 1976. ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH FOUR OF THAT REPORT, THE PASSPORT FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF ORLANDO BOSCH WAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966. ON 26 OCTOBER THE SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH FOUR, CORRECTING HIS EARLIER INFORMATION, REPORTED THAT BOSCH'S PASSPORT WAS AN ORDINARY CHILEAN PASSPORT BEARING THE NUMBER 26583 AND WAS ISSUED IN SANTIAGO ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1975."

2. REF A BEING RELAYED TO SAN JOSE FOR DISSEM TO AMBASSADOR

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF A CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

B .UPDATING ON BOSCH'S PASSPORT

DATE: 26 OCTOVER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: KX LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1473

C/LA/MCA

C/LA/PNC

28 Oct 76

201-299292

C/LA
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SECRET

2819432 CIA/DDO 934476

CONF: C/LA7 INFO: FILE O/MAN, C/LSN/IO, C/OPS, C/CI 2

DISSEM BY: 57

PER

TO: IMMEDIATE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. ATTN: LEE BEAUCHAMP Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Y

CIR-316/04416-76 Y

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE CLARIFICATION ON THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION STATUS OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE BORN 18 AUGUST 1926, SANTA CLARA, CUBA. Y

File

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

FILE: 200-12-200/1, 201-299292.

AC/LA/SB

DATE: 28 OCT 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/OPS/LSN

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ACTION #

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T 336956 EIA875 PAGE 01 IN 002793

TOR:2815152 OCT 76 SJOS 20051

SECRET 2815022 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20051

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35352 (IN 081609) LAHECH

B. SAN JOSE 19715 (NOT SENT CARACAS) (IN 978488)

Source: HUGALLY-1

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS RE PARA 2 OF REF A ARE BEING REPEATED FOR CLARIFICATION.

2. PER PARA 1 OF REF B, IT WAS COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER QUIROS WHO APPARENTLY CONJURED-UP INVOLVEMENT OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN THE ARMS MOVEMENT STORY DISCUSSED BETWEEN COSTAN RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO AND CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA JORGE ARANDA PARRA. "CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONARIES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY" (ACTUALLY U.S. AMBASSADOR USING STATION INFO) WHO ADVISED THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT OF AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST PLOT DID NOT REPEAT NOT MENTION THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THIS PLOT, AND STATION HAS NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT BOSCH WAS INVOLVED.

3. ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF BOSCH WAS APPARENTLY PURE INVENTION BY PRESIDENT ODUBER AND FOREIGN MINISTER FACIO AND THEY TOLD INVENTION

B201-300985
D200-12-200/1

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28 Oct 76
201-299292

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INFO RF FILE VR

ACTION #

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2		5	
3		6	

T 336956 EIA875 PAGE 02-02 IN 082793

TOR:281515Z OCT 76 SJOS 20051

TO ARANDA POSSIBLY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR CASE SINCE BOSCH TRAVELLED ON CHILEAN PASSPORT.

4. FILE: 201-300985, 200-12-200/1. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

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OUTGOIN MESSAGE

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SECRET

272336Z CIA/DDO 934175

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/PPAN, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS, C/OPS/INT

0
0
0 PER SOP
0 # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R. K. MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.Y

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FIRCI-312/03218-76 Y

SUBJECT: CONTACT BETWEEN ORLANDO BOSCH AND THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BEMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.Y

2. SINCE HIS ARREST ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, HAS ADMITTED TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER,

DATE: ~~27 OCTOBER 1976~~
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

Bosch 201

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SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

934175

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FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES, IGNACIO NOVO AND GUILLERMO NOVO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY SEVERAL OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN VENEZUELA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR ~~AGENCY~~ BUREAU HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE NOVO BROTHERS, IGNACIO AND GUILLERMO.)*

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.d

[redacted]

BASED ON: CARACAS 31234 (IN 080249)
WKSCARLET (WKSCARLET-17)

OBJ: J

CI/R&A W. GODSON (TELECOORD)
C/LA/PNC Beardsley
C/LA/RR

* CS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO HQ.

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 3473

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T 334209 EIA113 PAGE 01 IN 881648

TOR:271832Z OCT 76 SAGO 35351

S E C R E T 271700Z OCT 76 INTELL HCS-10,775

CITE SANTIAGO 35351

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SAN JOSE. HVC HRS

7P

WNINTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. SOURCE: FUDOUBLE-49 FROM DOCUMENT CITED, COPY OF WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED HQS. SEE OPS CABLE PRIOR DISSEM. RELATED TO ODIKIA. NOT PASSED LOCAL LIAISON. INDEX BOSCH, DAVANZO CL BY 04869. FILE: 15-5-1/1.

FILED : 271700Z XXXXX

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LA/SBCH

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D15-5-1

27 Oct 76
201-299292

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1976
IN 921643
PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

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COUNTRY: CHILE/COSTA RICA

DOI : FEBRUARY-MARCH 1976

SUBJECT: O ADDITIONAL DATA ON CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS USED
BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (27 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HCS-10,775

SOURCE : A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: HCS-10,772 ( ) FROM THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED CHILEAN CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN EARLY 1976 CARRYING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THIS REPORT PROVIDES FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AS REPORTED AT THE TIME BY THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.)

201-299292

2. ACCORDING TO SECRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2 OF THE CHILEAN

SECRET

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 081640

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, DATED 16 MARCH 1976, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON SUSPICION OF BEING INVOLVED IN A PLOT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. BOSCH WAS CHARGED WITH HAVING ENTERED COSTA RICA ILLEGALLY USING DOCUMENTATION IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. AS OF 16 MARCH 1976, BOSCH WAS UNDER DETENTION IN CARTAGO, COSTA RICA. THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPELLING HIM BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A COUNTRY WILLING TO ACCEPT HIM.

3. WHEN ARRESTED, BOSCH WAS CARRYING THE FOLLOWING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS:

A. A BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI, ISSUED BY THE CIVIL REGISTRY OFFICE OF THE QUINTA NORMAL (A SANTIAGO SUBURB) ON 6 AUGUST 1975. THE CERTIFICATE WAS SIGNED BY ALBERTO CASAL, A CIVIL REGISTRY SECTION CHIEF, AND REFLECTED A BIRTH DATE OF 6 AUGUST 1927, REGISTRY NUMBER 953 OF THE LAS BARRANCAS (A LOWER CLASS SANTIAGO SUBURB) INSCRIPTION OFFICE. THE PARENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HECTOR DAVANZO AND AMALIA ENRIGUETA CINTOLESI.

B. CHILEAN IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 2357422, ISSUED IN

SANTIAGO. THE CARD ALSO LISTED A TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF 2,357,422-5. (FIELD COMMENT: NO DATE OF ISSUANCE WAS REPORTED FOR THIS ITEM.)

C. AN AUTOMOBILE TITLE FOR A SIMCA 1000, ISSUED BY THE SANTIAGO PROPERTY REGISTRY OFFICE ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1966 AND BEARING REGISTRY NUMBER 682712.

D. CHILEAN ORDINARY (RED COVER) PASSPORT NUMBER 26583, ISSUED 25 SEPTEMBER 1975, IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. THE PASSPORT CONTAINS PRINTING OFFICE REGISTRY NUMBER 14441-1975, AND THE SIGNATURES OF VICTORIA MORAN DOREN AND MARIA ELENA SELMAN AS ISSUING OFFICERS. IT CONTAINS THE APPROPRIATE TAX STAMPS, WATERMARKS, AND SEAL ON THE PHOTOGRAPH.

4. THE CHILEAN PASSPORT CARRIED BY BOSCH CONTAINED ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS INDICATING THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL:

A. EXIT FROM CHILE VIA PUDAHUEL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 28 DECEMBER 1975.

B. ENTRY AND EXIT FROM PANAMA VIA TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 29 DECEMBER 1975.

C. ENTRY IN EL SALVADOR ON 29 DECEMBER 1975.(FIELD

COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY OR SUBSEQUENT EXIT WAS RECORDED.)

D. ENTRY IN COSTA RICA ON 7 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

E. EXIT FROM COSTA RICA AND ENTRY INTO NICARAGUA ON 30 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

F. EXIT FROM NICARAGUA AND ENTRY INTO COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.)

5. BOSCH REMAINED IN SAN JOSE FROM 6 FEBRUARY 1976 UNTIL HIS ARREST ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. ACCORDING TO A SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, BOSCH OBTAINED THE FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FROM A FRIEND IN CHILE WHO IS A COLONEL IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY WAS NOT IDENTIFIED, BUT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE SOURCE ALLOWED A CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICER TO EXAMINE BOSCH'S FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, IT WAS PROBABLY GONZALO FACIO, COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF IN FACT THE CHILEAN EMBASSY'S SECRET SOURCE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE

CHILEAN COLONEL OR IF THE PREPARER OF THE REPORT PHRASED IT IN THIS MANNER IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS SUPERIORS.)

6. THE REPORT WAS SIGNED BY FRANCISCO CRUZ PACHECO, CHILEAN CHARGE IN SAN JOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: CRUZ IS NORMALLY THE CHILEAN CONSUL IN SAN JOSE, BUT WAS CHARGE IN MARCH 1976 DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR ON LEAVE. IN OCTOBER 1976, CRUZ WAS SUDDENLY RECALLED FROM SAN JOSE SHORT OF TOUR, AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN SANTIAGO IN LATE OCTOBER. THE REASON GIVEN WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR CRUZ' RECALL IS THAT A NIECE OF PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET HAD OCCASION TO REQUEST CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FROM HIM DURING A PRIVATE VISIT TO COSTA RICA, AND FOUND HIM ABSENT FROM HIS OFFICE DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS. UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THIS IS A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, AND THERE IS NO CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION AVAILABLE.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY). ALSO SENT SAN JOSE (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY) AND CARACAS (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS AND LEGATT ONLY).

REPORT CLASS SECRET -- WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED -- NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN

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IN 083648

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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FILE VR CI/PLAN, C/OPS/INT, CIPS/EG2, AG/1020

STAFF PRECEDENCE

T 334884 E14749 PAGE 01 IN 001680

TOR:2710038 OCT 76 SAGO 35352

S E C R E T 271700Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 35352

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, CARACAS.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL O [illegible] Orlando Bosch

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 35326 (id Aranda) (HCS-10,772 ERWAHOO)(NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

B. SANTIAGO 35351 (id [illegible]) (HCS-10,775 ERWAHOO)

1. IN ADDITION TO DOCUMENT REPORTED REF B, FUDOUBLE-49 PROVIDED COPY OF CHILEAN EMBASSY COSTA RICA "RESERVADO" AIRGRAM 228/34, DATED 7 JULY 1976, WHICH TOGETHER WITH REF B DOCUMENT WERE BASIC DOCUMENTS IN FILE WHICH FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSEMBLED ON ORLANDO BOSCH, DESCRIBED REF A. (SUGGEST REF A AND CORRECTION BE RELAYED SAN JOSE.) REMAINING DOCUMENTS WERE NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND DOCUMENTS ORIGINATED IN OCTOBER 1976 AFTER BOSCH ARREST IN CARACAS.

2. THE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT REPORTS THAT IN CONVERSATION WITH COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTR GONZALO FACIO, CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA JORGE ARANDA PARRA WAS TOLD THAT "CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONARIES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY" HAD ADVISED THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT THAT AN ULTRA-RIGHTIST PLOT, LED BY BOSCH, WAS BEING ORGANIZED IN GUATEMALA TO OVERTHROW THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT. FACIO WENT ON TO SAY BOSCH CLAIMED TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE GUATEMALAN

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RECORD COPY

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RF FILE VR

T 334804 614840 PAGE 02 IN 061689

TOR:2710032 OCT 76 SAGO 35352

AND CHILEAN GOVERNMENTS IN THIS PLOT. HE ADDED THAT OF COURSE NEITHER HE NOR PRESIDENT ODUBER PLACED ANY CREDENCE IN THIS CLAIM, WHICH THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVESTIGATED.

3. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR ARANDA, FACIO SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT MAKE AN EFFORT TO RECOVER BOSCH'S ALIAS CHILEAN DOCUMENTATION FROM GUATEMALAN POLICE AUTHORITIES. THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT SAY (AND F-49 DID NOT KNOW) WHY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES HAD THE DOCUMENTS, BUT APPARENTLY BOSCH RETAINED THEM WHEN HE WAS EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA.

4. STATION DEFERS TO HQS ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS INFORMATION. COPIES OF BOTH DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED 2 NOVEMBER.

5. AS SIDE ISSUE, STATION BECOMING CONCERNED OVER SOURCE PROTECTION FOR FUDOUBLE-49 IN THIS MATTER. BECAUSE HE MADE SAME ERROR ON DATES IN COMMENTS TO EMBASSY OFFICER (EMBASSY SANTIAGO 10187) AND IN INITIAL REPORT TO STATION (PER REF B, 1966 DATE APPLIES TO EARLIEST DOCUMENT IN HIS POSSESSION, WHICH WAS MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE, NOT PASSPORT), CORRECTION TENDS TO CALL ATTENTION TO THIS COINCIDENCE. STATION PREPARED REF B WITH HIS REGULAR SOURCE DESCRIPTION, BUT IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT MISLEADING CONSUMERS OR PROVIDING FALSE CONFIRMATION, WOULD PREFER USE ALTERNATE,

(43/202)

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TOR:271603Z OCT 76 SACS 35352

6. SUGGEST USING FOLLOWING AS ALTERNATE SOURCE DESCRIPTION IF POSSIBLE:

"A CONSERVATIVE CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH OCCASIONAL ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE PROVIDED THE INFORMATION BASED ON REVIEW OF SECRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2, OF 16 MARCH 1976, FROM THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, A COPY OF WHICH HE PROVIDED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH OR USED TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT."

7. STATION IS ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY SANTIAGO ADDRESS WHICH APPEARS AS MARGINAL NOTATION IN REF B DOCUMENT. FUDOUBLE-49 IDENTIFIED HANDWRITING AS THAT OF COLONEL ENRIQUE VALDEZ PUGA, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, WHO HAD DOCUMENT IN HIS POSSESSION EVER SINCE IT RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY (FUDOUBLE-49 DID NOT KNOW OF EXISTENCE OF REF B DOCUMENT UNTIL 15 OCTOBER, WHEN HE NOTED REFERENCE TO IT IN THE SECOND DOCUMENT DESCRIBED ABOVE). ADDRESS IS MIGUEL CLARO 1129, APARTMENT B, AND STATION OPERATING ON ASSUMPTION IT POSSIBLY BOSCH'S SANTIAGO ADDRESS.

8. FILE: 201-299292; 15-5-1/1. E2. IMPDET.

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PAGE 01 OF 01

IN 008240

TOR:201993Z OCT 76

CARA 31234

SECRET 201915Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31234

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

1. WHSCARLET-17 (W-17) REPORTED ON 19 OCTOBER THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAS ADMITTED TO DISIP OFFICER THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO (FNU) BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE BOMBING DEATH OF ORLANDO LETELIER IN WASHINGTON ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1976. W-17 ACQUIRED ABOVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH DISIP OFFICERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF DISIP INVESTIGATION OF BOSCH. AS YET THERE ARE NO AMPLIFYING DETAILS ON CONTACT AND OFFICERS DID NOT NOTE TO WHOM SPECIFICALLY ADMISSION WAS MADE.

2. SUGGEST ABOVE BE PASSED TO FBI, IF APPROPRIATE.

3. FILE: 201-0933924; 200-12-203/4. E2, IMPDET.

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201-299292
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SECRET

2723362 CIA/DDO

CLA 8

Clifton, Charles, cld. Christino

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: [redacted] CHIEF, INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

FIRCI-318/03816-76

SUBJECT: CONTACT BETWEEN ORLANDO BOSCH AND THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

2. SINCE HIS ARREST ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE LEADER, HAS ADMITTED TO AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) THAT HE HAD CONTACT WITH THE NOVO BROTHERS IN MIAMI SHORTLY BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIE

DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1976
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CONF: INFO: FILE

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FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO A NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES, IGNACIO NOVO AND GUILLERMO NOVO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY SEVERAL OF THEIR COMPATRIOTS IN VENEZUELA AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER. IT IS BELIEVED THAT YOUR ~~AGENCY~~ BUREAU HAS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE NOVO BROTHERS, IGNACIO AND GUILLERMO.)

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

[redacted]

BASED ON: CARACAS 31234 (IN 080249)
UKSCARLET (UKSCARLET-17)

OBJ: J

CI/R&A W. GODSON(TELECOORD)
C/LA/PNC Beardsley
C/LA/RR J.S. Brig

* CS SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO 4U.

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: M. GINN:AA
UNIT: LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/LA/SB

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CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/IFPAN C/ISN/IO C/OPS C/CI 2 AGC/ODD C/OPS/ITG 2 D/OMS 2

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TO: IMMEDIATE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (INTD/3).

2P

SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL IN PUERTO RICO OF CUBAN EXILE GUSTAVO CASTILLO

CIR-316/03981-76

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ACQUIRED ABROAD IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND WHATEVER ACTION YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE. IT IS FELT THAT THE SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT MAY BE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. ON 15 OCTOBER 1976 GUSTAVO CASTILLHO, DPOB 28 APRIL 1946, HAVANA, CUBA, U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER 1764302, ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO FROM CARACAS ON VIASA 970. AS CASTILLO LISTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS BELONGING TO TERRORIST GROUP OF ORLANDO BOSCH, HE WAS NOT ALLOWED ENTER THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. DOMINICAN AUTHORITIES PLANNED TO PUT CASTILLO ON RETURN FLIGHT TO CARACAS, BUT THEY ACQUIESED TO HIS REQUEST TO BE PUT ON 15 OCTOBER DOMINICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 603 TO PUERTO RICO BECAUSE HE IS AN AMERICAN. CASTILLO IS REPORTED TO BE MILITARY CHIEF OF CUBAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. IT APPEARS HIS

Info sent to FBI

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DISSEM BY:

DEPARTURE FROM CARACAS COINCIDES WITH THE PICKUP OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA.Y

2. CIA TRACES, IF ANY, ON CASTILLO WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.Y

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS 1,2.4

BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17806, 22 OCTOBER 76.

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPY AVAILABLE TO IP/AN FOR 201-299292.

NOV 9 76

DQ

LA, ET3
Regina

DATE: 22 OCT 76
ORIG: LEN THERRY
UNIT: LA/CAR
EXT: 9156

LA/COG, TOM CLAYTON (TELECOORD)

AGC/DDO, TONY GOLDIN (TELECOORD)

C/PCS/LSN

LA/CAR

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T 324692 E14927 PAGE 01 IN 878163

TOR:2219062 OCT 76 SDOM 17803

SECRET 2218422 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17803

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REF: DIRECTOR 931119

1. STATION ASSUMES (BASED ON REPORTING FROM CARACAS) THAT POSSIBILITY OF CORU INVOLVEMENT IN LETELIER SLAYING IS UNDER ACTIVE LNERGO INVESTIGATION. CORU LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH LIVED IN SANTO DOMINGO SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEPORTATION ON 29 AUGUST. HIGH RANKING CORU MEMBER EULALIO FRANCISCO (FRANK) CASTRO PAZ (201-742365), A U.S. CITIZEN MARRIED TO A DOMINICAN, LIVES IN SANTO DOMINGO. VIEW IN EMPYREX AND EMWISE, BASED IN PART ON CASTRO'S PATTERN OF EXTENSIVE TRAVEL, IS THAT HE IS BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTEST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. STATION PROPOSES CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPING INFORMATION ON CORU AND ROLE OF FRANK CASTRO, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RESORT TO TELEPHONE TAPS, WITH MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF DETERMINING IF CORU INVOLVED ON ITS OWN OR AT BEHEST FOREIGN POWER IN LETELIER MURDER.

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T 324692 EIA987 PAGE 02 IN 078163

TOR:2219062 OCT 76 SDOM 17803

TO EFFORT:

A. EMPYREX-20

B. EMFETCH-9

C. EMCLIPPER-1

D. EMPYREX-2

E. EMPYREX-8

F. EMGRANET-1

G. EMPYREX-14.

3. PROPOSE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. TALK TO EMPYREX-20 AND EMFETCH-9 TOGETHER AND ENLIST OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF EMPYREX AND EMWISE TO TARGET ON ASSOCIATES OF BOSCH/CASTRO IN SANTO DOMINGO. MAKE EFFORT TO RECRUIT PENETRATION OF CORU. MOUNT TELTAP OF CASTRO OR PERSONS WITH WHOM HE IN CONTACT.

B. INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO MONITOR CASTRO TRAVEL THROUGH EMCLIPPER-1 (UNILATERAL) AND EMPYREX-20 (LIAISON). WORK TO GET ADVANCE NOTICE OF TRAVEL.

C. WORKING THROUGH EMPYREX-2 (UNILATERAL) GET EMPYREX-8 IN MIAMI TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON CORU. (IF THIS APPROACH LOOKS PROMISING, COULD PROBABLY ARRANGE

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T 324692 EIA987 PAGE 23-23 IN 078163

TOR:221906Z OCT 76 SDOM 17803

THROUGH EMPYREX-2 TO HAVE SKHERALD OR LNERGO OFFICER MEET DIRECTLY WITH EMPYREX-2.)

D. HAVE EMGARNET-1 (UNILATERAL) STEP UP HIS CONTACTS IN SANTO DOMINGO AND ELSEWHERE WITH CUBANS KNOWN TO SYMPATHIZE WITH BOSCH. WOULD PLAN HAVE EMGARNET-1 TRAVEL TO MIAMI TO CONCENTRATE ON DEVELOPING LEADS. IN THIS CASE, HE SHOULD BE IN REGULAR TOUCH WITH SKHERALD OFFICER.

E. USE EMPYREX-14 (UNILATERAL) TO OBTAIN PHONE NUMBER LEADS FROM KEY CONTACT IN TELEPHONE COMPANY, MAINTAIN CAPABILITY FOR UNILATERAL TEP TAP.

4. FILE: 200-12-299/1, 201-681118, 201-299-292, 201-742365, E2, IMPDET.

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ADDED: C/LA8 VR FILE

T 324085 E1A383 PAGE 01 IN 077831

TOR:221529Z OCT 76 102 MANA 12534

S E C R E T 221454Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12534

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT FUDWELL

REF: DIRECTOR 931119

1. FOLLOWING KEYED TO PARA 3 REF REQUEST:

A. BELIEVE ERYTHROID-1 MAY BE ABLE TO SHED LIGHT ON POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONS SUCH AS 201-ORLANDO BOSCH ~~299292~~ AND THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT (GON). VIW FACT PRESIDENT SOMOZA OPENLY SUPPORTIVE OF CUBAN EXILES AND THEIR OBJECTIVES, IT PROBABLE HE OR HIS AGENTS, SUCH AS MANUEL ARTIME BUESA, NOT ADVERSE TO ALLOWING EXILES TO USE NICARAGUA AS A SAFEHAVEN AND/OR SUPPORT BASE. CURRENT GON ATTITUDE PERHAPS BEST EXEMPLIFIED BY TARDY ANSWER RE DPARTURE OF 201-299292 PROVIDED BY ERTHROID-33 AND REPORTED TO HQS IN MANAGUA 12488. ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIPT OF ERHAPPY-1 201 FILE (REQUESTED DURING COS' RECENT HQS TDY) WHO MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE SOME USEFUL INSIGHT INTO LOCAL EXILE COMMUNITY.

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T 324085 EIA383 PAGE 02 IN 077831

TOR:221529Z OCT 76 MANA 12534

B. WILL TASK ERYTHROID-13 WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENT AT NEXT MEETING. ALSO PLAN TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH ERYTHROID-33 TO GET CURRENGON LINE. BELIEVE THIS MAY ALSO LEAD ERYTHROID-3 TO DISCUSS SUBJECT WITH ERYTHROID-13 WHO MAY BE ABLE TO ELICIT INFORMATION RELATING TO REF.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS DESK REVIEWING 201 FILES OF FORMER STATION ASSETS IN EFFORT LOCATE CUBAN EXILE OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO IN PAST PROVIDED ACCESS TO LOCAL EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. RE PARA 4 REF: IT POSSIBLE MANAGUA STATION EFFORTS MAY TIRN M INFORMATION OF INTEREST ON Frank Castro 201-742365 WHO CAME TO MANAGUA WITH 201-299292 - SEE MANAGUA 12461 AND MANAGUA 12470. DEPENDING ON WHAT INFORMATION MAY TURN UP INITIALLY, PLEASE ADVISE IF STATION MAY CONDUCT FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATION AND HOW INFORMATION ON THIS PERSON SHOULD BE RECORDED IN STATION AND REPORTED TO HQS.

4. FILE: 200-12-200/1. E2, IMPDET.

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SS 4, OSG/IC 2

T 323958 E1A266 PAGE 01 IN 877749

TOR:221444Z OCT 76 SAGO 35326

S E C R E T 221413Z OCT 76 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/10576-76

HCS-10,772

CITE SANTIAGO 35326

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

INC

WNINTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HQS REVIEW. PLEASE CALL THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT TO THE ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR POPPER. SOURCE PARA 3-4 IS FUDOUBLE-49; PARAS 6-7 IS FUBARGAIN TAKEN FROM SANTIAGO 34147* AND 34309.* RELATED TO ODIK1A. NOT PASSED LOCAL LIAISON.

INDEX: BOSCH AND OTERO. CL BY 04869.

FILE: 15-5-1/1.

FILED : 221413Z XXXXX

IID COMMENT: LIFTER CABLE SENT. SENT ELECTRICALLY TO S&S PER DESK REQUEST.

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Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 077749

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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Classified by Reporting Officer Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1)(2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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CITE TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : MID-APRIL TO MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (21 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HCS-10,272

SOURCE : SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3-4: A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 10107 OF 19 OCTOBER REPORTED THAT THE CHILEAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD BEEN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN

F201-

EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, AND WAS NOW REVIEWING ALL ITS INFORMATION, PRESUMABLY IN LIGHT OF HIS RECENT ARREST IN VENEZUELA.)

3. ON 15 OCTOBER, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ASSEMBLED

A FILE ON BOSCH AT THE REQUEST OF ADMIRAL PATRICIO CARVAJAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FILE CONSISTS MAINLY OF EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONCERNING BOSCH'S ARREST IN SAN JOSE IN MARCH 1976, AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.

4. THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A BIRTH CERTIFICATE, IDENTITY CARD, TAX IDENTIFICATION CARD AND PASSPORT, ALL IN THE NAME OF RICARDO RAMON DAVANZO CERUTI. THE PASSPORT WAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966, AND HAD NEVER BEEN RENEWED. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHILEAN PASSPORTS NORMALLY REQUIRE RENEWAL EVERY TWO YEARS.) THE PASSPORT CONTAINED ONE CHILEAN EXIT STAMP, DATED 1966, AND NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED TO ENTER OR EXIT CHILE. IT CONTAINED MANY EXIT AND ENTRY STAMPS INDICATING EXTENSIVE TRAVEL BY ITS BEARER IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA, BETWEEN 1966 AND MARCH 1976. THE PASSPORT AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION WAS SHOWN TO CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN SAN JOSE BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS; HOWEVER, THE COSTA RICANS DID NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

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5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-7: AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE.

6. IN MID-APRIL 1976, THE DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BOSCH HAD JUST ARRIVED IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (UNIDENTIFIED). ACCORDING TO DINA, BOSCH EVADED AN ARREST ACTION ON 18 APRIL, ESCAPING BY A MATTER OF MINUTES BUT LEAVING BEHIND ALL HIS CLOTHES AND TWO PASSPORTS.

7. ON 29 APRIL, DINA, HOWEVER, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, AN ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, WHO ALONG WITH THE LATTER WAS WANTED AS A FEDERAL FUGITIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. IN EARLY MAY, DINA INFORMED THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) OF OTERO'S ARREST, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OTERO OVER TO FBI AGENTS FOR RETURN AND PROCESSING IN THE UNITED STATES. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-7328 (TDFIRDB-315/01676-76) FROM AN UNTESTED SOURCE WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN EXILES REPORTED THAT OTERO WAS PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN MARXIST EXTREMIST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, AND THAT HE WAS WORKING UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. DINA'S ARREST AND DEPORTATION TO THE U.S. OF

15-5-1

IN 077749

TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

OTERO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALLEGATION OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF OTERO AND HIS GROUP.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO; SENT TO CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

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TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

FIRCI-311/01327-76

SUBJECT: VIEW OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO LETELIER AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF OBRLANDO BOSCH Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH TWO: A MIDDLE-LEVEL FUNCTIONARY OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PVP) WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE PVP CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HE IS BELIEVED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE.Y

2. DURING THE 23-25 OCTOBER 1976 PLENUM OF THE PVP, SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS COMMENTED THAT ORLANDO LETELIER, FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, HAD BEEN KILLED BY RIGHTIST CUBAN EXILES BASED IN MIAMI AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. ONE OF THE PARTY LEADERS SAID THAT THE CHILEAN NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DINA) HAD DIRECTLY FINANCED BOSCH'S GROUP IN THIS EFFORT AS IT HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY IN THE

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CL BY: [illegible]

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CIA/DDO

CONF INFO FILE

935633

ABORTIVE ATTEMPT IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, FORMER SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR).V

3. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.\

BASED ON: SAN JOSE 20052 (IN 083169)
HURUM (HURUM-9)
OBJ: J

DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN/LL
UNIT: LA/SU/CH/RR
EXT: 1471

C/LAD

C/LA/MCA John Bushnell
C/LA/RR
CI/REA - W. GODSON (TELECOORD)

C/LA/SB

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

STAFF 2930122 [redacted] CIN000 934832

CONF C/LA8 INFO FILE VR FBN C/LSN/10 D/OPS/INT C/CI2 0003 000100

TO: PRIORITY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R.K. MCHARGUE/ GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE/SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE/INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

SECRET-WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS-DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR Y

FIRDI-312/03225-76 Y

Chile

SUBJECT: (U) ADDITIONAL DATA ON CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS USED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA Y

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS THREE THROUGH SEVEN: A MEDIUM-LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WHO SAW THE DOCUMENT. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH OR USED TO ELICIT INFORMATION FROM OFFICIALS OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. Y

2. (FIELD COMMENT: HCS-10,772 (TDFIRDB-315/10576-76) FROM THE

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29 Oct 76
201-299292

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CIA/DDO

934832

SAME SOURCE REPORTED CHILEAN CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN COSTA RICA IN EARLY 1976 CARRYING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THIS REPORT PROVIDES FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT AS REPORTED AT THE TIME BY THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.) Y

3. ACCORDING TO SECRET AIRGRAM NUMBER 2 OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, DATED 16 MARCH 1976, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS ARRESTED IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976 ON SUSPICION OF BEING INVOLVED IN A PLOT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE. BOSCH WAS CHARGED WITH HAVING ENTERED COSTA RICA ILLEGALLY USING DOCUMENTATION IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. AS OF 16 MARCH 1976, BOSCH WAS UNDER DETENTION IN CARTAGO, COSTA RICA. THE COSTA RICAN GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPELLING HIM BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND A COUNTRY WILLING TO ACCEPT HIM. Y

4. WHEN ARRESTED, BOSCH WAS CARRYING THE FOLLOWING CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS:

A. A BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON

DATE:
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CL BY: 016758

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64/020 [redacted]

924832

DAVANZO CINTOLESI, ISSUED BY THE CIVIL REGISTRY OFFICE OF THE QUINTA NORMAL (A SANTIAGO SUBURB) ON 6 AUGUST 1975. THE CERTIFICATE WAS SIGNED BY ALBERTO C A S A L, A CIVIL REGISTRY SECTION CHIEF, AND REFLECTED A BIRTH DATE OF 6 AUGUST 1927, REGISTRY NUMBER 953 OF THE LAS BARRANCAS (A LOWER-CLASS SANTIAGO SUBURB) INSCRIPTION OFFICE. THE PARENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS HECTOR D A V A N Z O AND AMALIA ENRIQUETA C I N T O L E S I. Y

B. CHILEAN IDENTITY CARD NUMBER 2357422, ISSUED IN SANTIAGO. THE CARD ALSO LISTED A TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF 2,357,422-5. (FIELD COMMENT: NO DATE OF ISSUANCE WAS REPORTED FOR THIS ITEM.) Y

C. AN AUTOMOBILE TITLE FOR A SIMCA 1000, ISSUED BY THE SANTIAGO PROPERTY REGISTRY OFFICE ON 21 SEPTEMBER 1966 AND BEARING REGISTRY NUMBER 8882712. Y.

D. CHILEAN ORDINARY (RED COVER) PASSPORT NUMBER 26583, ISSUED 25 SEPTEMBER 1975, IN THE NAME OF HECTOR EMILIO RAMON DAVANZO CINTOLESI. THE PASSPORT CONTAINS PRINTING OFFICE REGISTRY NUMBER 14441-1975, AND THE SIGNATURES OF VICTORIA M O R A N DOREN AND MARIA ELENA S E L M A N AS ISSUING OFFICERS. IT CONTAINS THE

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STAFF

CAPDO [redacted]

CONF: INFO: FILE

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APPROPRIATE TAX STAMPS, WATERMARKS, AND SEAL ON THE PHOTOGRAPH.Y

5. THE CHILEAN PASSPORT CARRIED BY BOSCH CONTAINED ENTRY AND EXIT STAMPS INDICATING THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL:

A. EXIT FROM CHILE VIA PUDAHUEL INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 28 DECEMBER 1975. ✓

B. ENTRY AND EXIT FROM PANAMA VIA TOCUMEN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON 29 DECEMBER 1975. ✓

C. ENTRY IN EL SALVADOR ON 29 DECEMBER 1975. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY OR SUBSEQUENT EXIT WAS RECORDED.) ✓

D. ENTRY IN COSTA RICA ON 7 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) ✓

E. EXIT FROM COSTA RICA AND ENTRY INTO NICARAGUA ON 30 JANUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) ✓

F. EXIT FROM NICARAGUA AND ENTRY INTO COSTA RICA ON 6 FEBRUARY 1976. (FIELD COMMENT: NO PLACE OF EXIT OR ENTRY WAS REPORTED.) ✓

6. BOSCH REMAINED IN SAN JOSE FROM 6 FEBRUARY 1976 UNTIL HIS ARREST ON 18 FEBRUARY 1976. ACCORDING TO A SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, BOSCH OBTAINED THE FALSE IDENTITY

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[redacted]

CA/DDO [redacted]

CONF: INFO: FILE

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DOCUMENTS FROM A FRIEND IN CHILE WHO IS A COLONEL IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES OF THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SECRET SOURCE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY WAS NOT IDENTIFIED, BUT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE SOURCE ALLOWED A CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICER TO EXAMINE BOSCH'S FALSE IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, IT WAS PROBABLY GONZALO FACIO, COSTA RICAN FOREIGN MINISTER. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF IN FACT THE CHILEAN EMBASSY'S SECRET SOURCE FAILED TO PROVIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE CHILEAN COLONEL OR IF THE [redacted] PREPARER OF THE REPORT PHRASED IT IN THIS MANNER IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS SUPERIORS.)

7. THE REPORT WAS SIGNED BY FRANCISCO CRUZ PACHECO, CHILEAN CHARGE IN SAN JOSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: CRUZ IS NORMALLY THE CHILEAN CONSUL IN SAN JOSE, BUT WAS CHARGE IN MARCH 1976 DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR ON LEAVE. IN OCTOBER 1976, CRUZ WAS SUDDENLY RECALLED FROM SAN JOSE SHORT OF TOUR, AND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN SANTIAGO IN LATE OCTOBER. THE REASON GIVEN WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR CRUZ' RECALL IS THAT A NIECE OF PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET HAD OCCASION TO REQUEST CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FROM HIM DURING A PRIVATE VISIT TO COSTA RICA, AND FOUND HIM ABSENT FROM HIS

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201-299292

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S E C R E T

CIA/DDO [illegible]

CONF: INFO: FILE

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OFFICE DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS. UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THIS IS A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION, AND THERE IS NO CONTRADICTORY INFORMATION AVAILABLE.}Y

8. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS IN SANTIAGO, CARACAS AND SAN JOSE AND THE LEGAL ATTACHE INB CARACAS.Y

9. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2. H

BASED ON: SANTIAGO 35351 |IN 081640|
HCS-10,775
FUSMIRK {FUDOUBLE-49}
OBJ: J

CI/R&A (W. Goodson) telecord

C/LA/RR J. C. Bennin

C/LA/OPS

C/LA/MCA

C/LA/PNC Berkeley

DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: MARY GINN
UNIT: XE/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

DC/LAD

C/LA/SB

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FBI CABLE FROM DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 28 OCTOBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN PROTEST REGARDING ALLEGED FBI INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE N.Y. TIMES ON OCT. 24, 1976

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

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(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
DIRECTOR 932728	22 Oct 76	73	6	46	/3

DOC. SUBJECT
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SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

PER 20 OCT 76 ISSUE OF WASHINGTON POST, ORLANDO BOSCH IS DESCRIBED AS A RIGHT-WING CUBAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBAN AIRPLANE ON 6 OCT AND THE MURDER OF ORLANDO LETELIER ON 21 SEPT. BOSCH IS APPARENTLY NOW UNDER ARREST IN VENEZUELA AS A RESULT OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THESE ACTIVITIES. THE POST ARTICLE SAYS THAT BOSCH IS THE LEADER OF AN ANTI-CASTRO UMBRELLA GROUP KNOWN AS THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. BOSCH IS WANTED IN MIAMI FOR A PAROLE VIOLATION STEMMING FROM THE 1968 CONVICTION FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
BOSCH, Orlando Avila

201- 299292

FORM 10-78 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

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T 323732 EIA147 PAGE 01-01 IN 076560

TOR:211625Z OCT 76 SJOS 20031

S E C R E T 211541Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 20031

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL REAM HUFABRIC MHSPIKE

1. LOCAL LIAISON HAS REQUESTED STATION ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING DETAILS COSTA RICAN PASSPORT REPORTEDLY USED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA TO ENTER VENEZUELA. LIAISON HAS TRIED TO OBTAIN INFO DIRECTLY FROM VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES WITHOUT SUCCESS.

2. ANY DATA CARACAS MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ON THE COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON WILL BE APPRECIATED.

3. FILE: ~~201-300785~~, 18-6-20/3. E2 IMPDET

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21 Oct 76

201-299292

Terrorist Plot by Rightist Cuban Exiles See

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Foreign Service

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 19—Venezuelan police have uncovered what they believe to be wide-ranging plans by right wing Cuban exiles to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and six other nations, according to a newspaper report here.

The respected Caracas newspaper El Nacional said today that the alleged terrorist acts by anti-Castro agents included the killing of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the United States, in Washington last month, and the bombing of a Cuban airliner off Barbados Oct. 6. The plane crash killed 78 persons.

Venezuelan police have already arrested a group of anti-Castro Cubans including right wing Cuban exile leader Orlando Bosch, in connection with the Cuban plane crash. At least 14 persons have been arrested by Venezuelan security agents and about 30 other Cuban refugees called in for questioning, according to United Press International.

[In Washington, sources close to the investigation of the bombing death of former Ambassador Letelier have said that Bosch is wanted for questioning. Bosch is not, however, regarded at this time as a target of the Letelier investigation, the sources said.]

El Nacional said that the rightest Cuban terrorist plans were discovered in a raid on a private home in Caracas during the investigation of the Cuban plane crash. The reported terrorist acts were planned to take place in the United States, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, Panama and Colombia, the newspaper said. Past acts related to these plans included the bombing of Guyana's consulate in Trinidad and Tobago, according to the newspaper account.

The wide-ranging terrorist plans reported by El Nacional today were the latest development in a broad investigation in several nations of the Letelier killing, the Cuban plane crash and other incidents.

Letelier, a former ambassador to Washington, foreign minister and minister of defense in the government of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende, died Sept. 21 when a bomb exploded beneath his car as he drove along Washington's Embassy Row.

[In Washington, sources close to the Letelier investigation said Tuesday that they expect Bosch to be returned to the United States and to be questioned about Letelier's death. A State Department source said the United States is urging Venezuela to return him informally as an undesirable alien rather than to go through formal extradition procedures.

[Bosch is the leader of a rightist anti-Castro umbrella group known as the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations. He is wanted in Miami, Fla., for a parole violation stemming from his 1968 conviction for attacks on Polish and other foreign ships.]

ORLANDO BOSCH
. . . detained in Venezuela

The Caracas newspaper El Nacional has previously reported that Cuban exiles arrested in Caracas have implicated two brothers—identified only as the "Novos"—in the Letelier killing. (The paper's reference was apparently to Ignacio and Guillermo Novo, who were indicted in 1963 on charges of firing a bazooka at the United Nations. The indictments were later quashed on the ground that their constitutional rights were violated when confessions were taken from them. Guillermo Novo was convicted in 1974 in connection with a 1969 bombing incident and sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment and 5 years' probation. No more could be learned of Ignacio Novo.)

In Caracas this week, a high government source disclosed apparent links between the present Chilean military junta and the Cuban exile community in Venezuela. Critics of the Chilean government have accused it of taking part in the Letelier killing. Chilean officials have denied any link to Letelier's death and denounced his murder.

The Venezuelan government source said that the Chilean government has helped finance activities by rightist Cuban exiles against the Cuban government of Prime Minister Fidel Castro. "We've known it for years, but there's no way to do anything about it," the source said.

This and other sources also ported that Bosch was among se Cubans who regularly made trips Santiago, Chile. A Venezuelan nalist has letters written to him Bosch last January. The letters return addresses of apartments to be used for guests of the Chi government.

Authorities in Trinidad have tained two suspects, Hernan Lozano and Freddy Lugo, in tion with the Cuban plane crash, cording to information reaching from Trinidad. Ricardo was carry an address book listing the numbers of the U.S. ambassador a an FBI agent stationed at the U.S. bassy here. A U.S. embassy spok man said the embassy did not why Ricardo — who reportedly fessed planting the bomb — had phone numbers.

[The Institute for Policy Studies Washington-based leftist think tan where Letelier worked until his dea reported Monday that it had been t by the FBI that FBI agents were f ing to Venezuela in connection w the investigation. Sources close to t investigation and the Institute said Tuesday however that no F agents would fly to Venezuela. stead, the sources said, the FBI stationed in Caracas as the legal attache would help pursue investigation.]

The Washington Post
20 October 1976

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		TOR:2115412 OCT 76	CARA 31192

S E C R E T 2114542 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31192

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE KMSTONE

1. AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AT OUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE RESUME OF ORLANDO BOSCH'S TRAVELS FROM BEGINNING OF 1974 TO PRESENT. HE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ALLEGED TRIP TO CHILE WHICH VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONTACT HAS MENTIONED DURING TALK ON CUBANA BOMBING CASE.

2. FILE: 201-0299292. E2, IMPDET.

		INDEX
	☒	ABSTRACT
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		FOR FILING

201-299292

21 Oct 76

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BOSCH, ORLANDO	
201-0299292	075-008-015
SEX M	CARA-31189
	20 OCT 76
CIT CUBA	HVC-07522

RES VENEZ. CUBAN EXILE LDR, CUBAN GOVT HOLDS SUBJ DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR 6 OCT 76 BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINER. CUBANS WILL REQUEST HE BE TURNED OVER TO THEM FOR PROSECUTION. CUBAN GOVM INTENDS TO LIQUIDATE SUBJ EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

DATE 01 NOV 76 09446974

201-299292

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STAFF 2017002 DIRECTOR 930679

CONF: 1A5 INFO FILE EUR4. 14A OPS/ITG 4

TO: PRIORITY LONDON. Y

UNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE TRACE Y

REFS: A. LONDON 77234 (IN69943)

B. DIRECTOR 917974 Y

1. RE REF A, HQS HAS EXTENSIVE TRACES ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (201-0299292), WHO IS LEADER OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AND BELIEVED TO BE A "U.S. PERSON". WE ASSUME BOSCH IS THE BUSH OF REF A. SINCE BOSCH IS BELIEVED TO BE A "U.S. PERSON", HOWEVER, WE MUSBT COMPLY WITH REF B BEFORE PASSING INFO TO JAGUAR. Y

2. PLEASE PROVIDE THE DETAILS AND JUSTIFICATION REQUESTED IN REF B SO WE CAN PROCESS JAGUAR'S REQUEST. Y

3. FILE: 201-0299292. E2. IMPDET. H

LA COMMENT: REF A: REQUESTED PRIORITY TRACES ON BOSCH FOR PASSAGE TO JAGUAR.

REF B: BOCK CABLE [redacted] PROVIDING GUIDANCE TO STATIONS AND BASES ON COLLECTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING "U.S. PERSONS".

20 Oct 76

201-299292

DATE: 19 OCTOBER 76
ORIG: KAREN CRANDALL/MS
UNIT: LA/COG/CI
EXT: 7808/1443

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C/LA/COG

C/LAD

DC/EVNB

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PAPER SCORES ACTIVITIES OF CUBANS IN MEXICO

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2256 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

[Text] The Mexican daily EL DIA in today's edition denounces the existence of real ties between the Latin American dictatorships and the organizations of Cuban counterrevolutionaries financed by the CIA. The daily affirms that the sabotage of a Cubana de Aviacion airliner has uncovered the radius of activities of the so-called worms and their ties with the North American State Department, the CIA and the fascist dictatorships of the continent.

The daily adds that the investigations into the sabotage of the aircraft have delineated the profile of a sinister personage called Orlando Bosch to whom Pinochet's junta assigned the task of assassinating Chilean revolutionary Andres Pascal Allende.

The daily mentions the charges filed against Bosch, implicating him in the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and in placing a bomb on the Cuban aircraft destroyed off Barbados.

Bosch 201

HAVANA COMMENTARY EQUATES CIA WITH NAZI SS

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1730 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

["Inside the News" commentary by Rafael Berastegui--read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Since its very beginning, the repressive institutions created by the capitalist production system have included espionage organizations.

The criminal machinery at the service of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, perhaps can be compared to a degree to the one which, in the days of Hitler's Germany, obeyed the orders of the SS chief Heinrich Himmler.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which was created at the end of the decade of the forties in the midst of the cold war against the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist camp, also has as its official function the centralization of intelligence supplied by the different North American espionage organizations to facilitate the decisions of the U.S. president.

But the book "The Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti, a former high CIA official, acknowledges that unofficially the fundamental mission of the agency is to carry out the decisions of the President which, if implemented by other public bodies, could cause difficulties. Even though it recruits all types of mercenaries, the established image of the CIA agent is the same stereotype of the supposed superman of the SS troops used by the fascist propaganda.

During the war against the Vietnamese people, the United States confined in so-called strategic hamlets entire populations of southern peasants who were scrutinized by and under the custody of civilians working for the agency.

A special department of the Central Intelligence Agency has the exclusive task of carrying out actions that attest its criminal nature such as coups d'etat abroad, economic destabilizations, attempts against the lives of leaders and others.

Equally, the CIA offers counseling to reactionary regimes in the methodic torture of its opponents. The sinister traditions of the SS troops and its modern continuator, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, coincide in many concrete ways.

Let us cite as last example a CIA protege which bears the initials DINA, considered to be the Gestapo of the Chilean military junta and whose last known villainy is the assassination of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier in Washington. The DINA was organized by [Walter Rauche], a former official of Hitler's SS troops who designed the gas chambers for the NAZI concentration camps.

CUBA SCORES RECRUITMENT OF MERCENARIES FOR US

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2232 GMT 19 Oct 76 FL

[Text] Cuba today denounced before the United Nations the recruitment of mercenaries in Western Europe and the United States and their use against national liberation movements and legitimately constituted governments.

The Cuban delegate to the UN Commission on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs, Miguel Alfonso, declared that there are reliable reports on the increased recruitment of mercenaries as a result of the changes that have taken place in the political panorama of the African Continent.

Alfonso demanded the creation of international mechanisms that would forbid such activities and offered the cooperation of the Cuban Government in attaining such a goal. The Cuban delegate stressed that the FRG, the United States, France and Great Britain have maintained a growing pace of capital investment and a flow of technologically advanced arms to South Africa.

Miguel Alfonso indicated that the manner and the means with which the peoples struggle for self-determination have not been delineated in the UN Charter or in international accords on human rights. Restricting the peoples from using the means at their disposal--including armed struggle--in the face of the violence unleashed by those subjugating them would practically amount to keeping them at the mercy and benevolence of those oppressing them, Alfonso pointed out.

The Cuban delegate added that Puerto Rico has been transformed into an appendage of the North American economy. It is impossible, Alfonso said, to pretend to be defenders of self-determination in Zimbabwe and at the same time practice colonialism in the Caribbean and neocolonialism in other places.

HAVANA LASHES AT IMPERIALISM'S HIRING OF MERCENARIES

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 20 Oct 76 FL

[Alberto D. Perez commentary]

[Text] Imperialism headed by the United States has increasingly resorted to the recruitment of mercenaries to attack legitimately constituted governments or peoples struggling for freedom. Let us recall, for example, that in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia the CIA recruited what it euphemistically termed irregular forces to assist it in its efforts to crush the massive insurrection of the Indochinese peoples in the zone occupied by the enemy.

Against the legitimate government of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, a government determined to end the terrible economic and social situation of the African population caused by the greedy actions of the mining transnationals and centuries of colonial exploitation, the imperialists also used mercenary armies. The former Belgian Congo, known today as Zaire, continues to pay the consequences of these actions of imperialism.

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BOSCH, ORLANDO
201-0299292
SEX M
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075-005-009
CARA-31174
19 OCT 76
HVC-07521
P3

CUBAN EXILE LEADER CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION BY VENE AUTHORITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER 6 OCT 76. MET WITH LUIS POSADA /201-0300985/ IN COSTA RICA IN SEPT. SHORTLY BEFORE COMING TO VENE.
RES VENE.

DATE 27 OCT 76 09446117

201-299292

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA COVERAGE OF CUBANA CRASH AFTERMATH

FROM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LETELIER ASSASSINATION: ORLANDO BOSCH

14-00000

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FR 5

T 314352 EIAC26 PAGE 01 IN 273655

TOR:191757Z OCT 76 CARA 31174

S E C R E T 191516Z OCT 76 INTEL

TDFIRDB-315/10454-76
HVC-7521

CITE CARACAS 31174

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN.

Chile

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR RESOLUTION CARACAS 31137. SOURCE DESCRIPTION, AND RELIABILITY STATEMENT, WKDIET-3. SOURCE PARAS 2-3 WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET-17. SOURCE PARAS 5-8 NP/WKDIET-3 FROM WKNOBLE-24. SOURCE PARAS 10-11: WKNOBLE/WKNOBLE-8 - SOURCE DESCRIPTION FOR APPROVAL, NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: K.1.A. INDEX ALL NAMES. FILE: 75-5-9.

FILED: 19/1516Z XXXXX

LIFTER SENT. PER LA INSTRUCTION, FOLLOWING DELETED FROM SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 4 TO THAT IN TEXT. "HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER."

19Oct :6 53

SECRET

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 073[illegible]

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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CITE TDFIRDB-315/10454-76

DIST 19 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO TIE THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY TO INDIVIDUALS LINKED TO THE BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (16 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7521

SOURCE: SEE BELOW.

SUMMARY: OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO FULLY INVESTIGATE THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTIONS TO THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER. UNOFIFICIALLY, HOWEVER, DISIP OFFICERS HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BUILD A CASE LINKING COPEI TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE INCIDENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DISIP OFFICERS FEAR THAT INFORMATION LINKING SOME DISIP OFFICIALS TO CUBAN EXILE ORLANDO BOSCH MIGHT BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, EMBARRASSING THE GOVERNMENT AND FURTHER TAINTING DISIP. END OF SUMMARY.

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1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2-3: A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WHILE OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) HAVE RECEIVED OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CARRY OUT A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF ALL VENEZUELANS CONNECTED WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER, UNOFFICIALLY DISIP OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO CONCENTRATE THEIR INVESTIGATION ON MEMBERS OF THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY (COPEI). DISIP OFFICIALS, THEREFORE, HAVE DRAWN UP A LIST OF LOW TO MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIALS OF COPEI WHOM DISIP INTENDS TO TIE TO LUIS POSADA, A FORMER DISP OFFICER WHO IS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING. AS CURRENTLY PLANNED, DISIP WILL BEGIN PICKING UP THESE COPEI LEADERS FOR QUESTIONING DURING THE WEEK OF 18 OCTOBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH POSADA DOES HAVE COPEI CONNECTIONS, MOST DISIP OFFICERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT COPEI PLAYED A ROLE IN POSADA'S ANTI-CUBAN ACTIVITIES. RATHER THEY

SECRET

BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO IMPLICATE COPEI FOR POLITICAL REASONS.)

3. AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT IS WORKING ON ITS CASE AGAINST COPEI, DISIP OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED THAT INFORMATION CONNECTING DISIP OFFICIALS AND CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, WILL BECOME PUBLIC. SUCH REVELATIONS, DISIP OFFICERS BELIEVE WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSSING TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRESA PEREZ AND DISASTEROUS FOR DISIP, WHICH HAS RECENTLY BEEN HURT BY CHARGES OF MISTREATING PRISONERS ACCUSED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF WILLIAM F. NIEHOUS.

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5-8: A VENEZUELAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. ON 14 OCTOBER DISIP DIRECTOR RETIRED GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA SAID THAT PRESIDENT PEREZ HAD ORDERED HIM TO CARRY OUT AN EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE VENEZUELAN CONNECTION IN THE CUBANA INCIDENT. ALTHOUGH GIMENEZ SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS, HE PERSONALLY FEARED THAT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION MIGHT LEAD TO PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES OR TO COPEI LEADERS. IN EITHER CASE, GIMENEZ SAID

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CONTROLS STATED AT G AND END OF REPORT.

THAT HE FELT THERE COULD BE DIFFUCLTIES FOR THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION.

6. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, GIMENEZ SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY CONCERNED THAT ORLANDO GARCIA, PRESIDENT PEREZ' INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ADVISER WHO HAS BEEN ACTING AS DE FACTO HEAD OF DISIP, MIGHT BE IMPLICATED. GIMENEZ QUICKLY ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE LINKING GARCIA TO THE BOMBING INCIDENT, BUT THAT HE IS KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN UNSPECIFIED ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. GIMENEZ SAID THAT AS AN ADDED PRECAUTION HE HAS ASSIGNED SPECIAL GUARDS FOR BOSCH AND POSADA, BOTH OF WHOM ARE CURRENTLY UNDER DISIP DETENTION.

7. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON BOSCH'S RECENT ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND POSADA'S AND GARCIAS'S CONNECTION WITH HIM SEE HVC-7514, TDFIRDB-315/10256-76, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. IN NEWS BROADCASTS A LOCAL TELEVISION STATION (CHANNEL 2) HAS REPORTED THAT SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CURRENTLY HOLDING POSITIONS WITH DISIP WERE SEEN ABOUT CARACAS WITH BOSCH. THE STATION INDICATED THAT IT WOULD REVEAL THE IDENTITIES OF THESE OFFICERS AT A LATER DATE.)

8. AS FOR A POSSIBLE COPEI CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN EXILE MOVEMENT IN VENEZUELA, GIMENEZ DENIED THAT HE OR THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPLICATE COPEI IN THE INVESTIGATION FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE FACT IS, GIMENEZ SAID, MANY PEOPLE WITH COPEI CONNECTIONS APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND THEY MAY HAVE HAD THE BACKING OF UNSPECIFIED COPEI LEADERS. (FIELD COMMENT: VARIOUS SOURCES HAVE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN CONVINCED THAT POSADA'S PRIVATE INVESTIGATION COMPANY KNOWN AS COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL INVESTIGATIONS (ICI) WAS BEING USED BY COPEI.)

9. SOURCE OF PARAGRAHS 10-11: AN AD PARTY ACTIVIST WITH GOOD ACCESS TO HIGH LEVELS IN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

10. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT IS AWARE THAT GARCIA AND POSADA TRAVELLED TO COSTA RICA TOGETHER SHORTLY BEFORE BOSCH CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM COSTA RICA IN SEPTEMBER. THE OBJECT OF THEIR TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA WAS TO MEET WITH BOSCH.

11. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF THE RELATIVE LARGE NUMBER OF CUBAN EXILES

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PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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HOLDING POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS GROWING ALARM WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT THAT THESE EXILES MAY HAVE GOTTEN VENEZUELA INTO A DIFFICULT SITUATION.

12. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN. REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2.

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T 314727 EIA398 PAGE 01 IN 073932

TOR:192007Z OCT 76 SAGO 35307

S E C R E T 191942Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 35307

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL INTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 885958

1. REF PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF HQS TRACES ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA. COULD HQS PLEASE PROVIDE THE SOURCE FOR THE APRIL 1976 PORTION REFERRING TO HIS ALLEGED PRESENCE IN CHILE TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN OFFICIAL AND FACT THAT HE ESCAPED AN ATTEMPT TO ARREST HIM, LEAVING BEHIND A CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN PASSPORT.

2. EMBASSY HAS A REPORT (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS REVIEWING ALL INFO IN ITS FILES ON BOSCH. STATION WILL TRY TO OBTAIN MORE ON THIS FROM FUDOUBLE-49 OR OTHER APPROPRIATE SOURCE.

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

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SUBJECT: FRANK CASTRO Y

CIR-316/20,041-76 Y

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO TDFIRDB-315/01696-76 WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION ON A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT ON THE LIEFE OF A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE, SALVADOR ALLENDE, TO BE CARRIED OUT SOMETIME SOON AFTER 17 FEBRUARY 1976. ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN THIS ATTEMPT, WHOSE NAME DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE FOREGOING DISSEMINATION, IS FRANK CASTRO, A CUBAN EXILE WHO WAS NATURALIZED AS US CITIZEN IN NOVEMBER 1971 AND WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO THE FBI.Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976

ORIG: HOWARD BRUBAKER

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C/LA/NU

C/WH

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FBI CABLES

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE: 16 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: SUSPECTED BOMBING OF CUBAN AIRLINES
DC-8 NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT 6,76

FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DATE 16 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: AIUO
SUBJECT: SUSPECTED BOMBING OF CUBANA AIRLINES DC-8
NEAR BARBADOS, WEST INDIES, OCT. 6, 1976



Cuban Exiles Arrested In Crash of Airliner

CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct. 14 (AP)—Venezuelan authorities announced tonight the arrests of Cuban bana Airlines crash that killed 73 persons near the exile leader Orlando Bosch and several other persons in connection with the investigation of a Cu island of Barbados.

The Interior Ministry said evidence had been found linking one of those arrested, Cuban-born Venezuelan citizen Luis Posada Carriles, with two Venezuelans being held in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in connection with the Oct. 6 creash.

The DC-8 jet, operated by Cubana Airlines under lease from Air Ganada, reported explosions on board and plunged into the sea off Barbados shortly after takeoff from Bridgetown airport. There were no survivors.

Cuban officials said later that sabotage was a possibility and a group calling itself El Condor telephoned the Miami Herald and claimed it had planted a magnetic bomb aboard the aircraft.

(Bosch is wanted in the United States for questioning on Miami-area attacks laid to exile groups under his umbrella organization. Federal investigators in the case of Chilean exile Orlando Letelier, [illegible] by a bomb in Washington, indicated last week [illegible] they have under scrutiny Cuban exiles [illegible] linked to Bosch.)

Washington Post
15 Oct 76
Friday

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TOR:1512512 OCT 76 LOND 77214

S E C R E T 1511352 OCT 76 STAFF

CITE LONDON 77214

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

AKULE REAM MHSPIKE TRACE

1. JAGUAR REQUESTED PRIORITY TRACES ON ONE ORLANDO B U S H (PH). ONLY INFO ON SUBJ IS HE LEADER OF CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET

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ORIG. HARRIET WEILER
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EXT. 9454
DATE 14 OCTOBER 1976

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CONF. LA 22

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OSG IC 2, FR 5 DDO 2.

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER -12 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7514

SOURCE: A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HAD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISER ORLANDO GARCIA TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZURLA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE HVC-7498, TDFIRDB-315/09834-76. IN HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09480-76.

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OF MID-SEPTEMBER, A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER.)

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-TIME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS, BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS. 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,118) A PLATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITION TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

4. DURING THE EVENING BOSCH APPROACHED THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL THROUGH GARCIA PROPOSING THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RETURN, BOSCH AGREED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CUBAN EXILE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING PRESIDENT PEREZ' PLANNED

NOVEMBER APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS(UN). (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT BOSCH'S PROPOSITION WAS AT LEAST TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL.)

5. ALSO DURING THE EVENING BOSCH MADE THE STATEMENT THAT, "NOW THAT OUR ORGANIZATION HAS COME OUT OF THE LETELIER JOB LOOKING GOOD, WE ARE GOING TO TRY SOMETHING ELSE." BOSCH DID NOT NAME THE ORGANIZATION NOR DID HE EXPAND ON HIS MEANING. (FIELD COMMENT: THE LETELIER MENTIONED ABOVE IS PROBABLY FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER, WHO WAS ASSASSINATED IN THE UNITED STATES ON 21 SEPTEMBER.)

6. A FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE FUND-RAISING DINNER, POSADA WAS OVERHEARD TO SAY THAT, "WE ARE GOING TO HIT A CUBAN AIRPLANE;" AND THAT "ORLANDO HAS THE DETAILS." (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IDENTITIES OF THE "WE" AND "ORLANDO" MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENT ARE NOT KNOWN.)

7. FOLLOWING THE 6 OCTOBER CUBANA AIRLINE CRASH OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS, BOSCH, GARCIA AND POSADA AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR BOSCH TO LEAVE VENEZUELA. THEREFORE, ON 9 OCTOBER POSADA AND GARCIA ESCORTED BOSCH TO THE COLOMBIAN BORDER, WHERE THE LATTER CROSSED OVER INTO COLOMBIAN TERRITORY.

8. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TRINIDADIAN

AUTHORITIES IMPLICATING HIM, POSADA WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP AUTHORITIES ON 12 OCTOBER. HIS OFFICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED AND ALL FILES AND EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED.

9. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT PEREZ HAS ASSURED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL ENERGETICALLY PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA CRASH. IN RETURN, HOWEVER, CUBA WILL BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION AT THE UN.

10 (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS: "THE LEGATT HAS DIFFERENT INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER BOSCH WAS EXFILTRATED OR IS OR IS NOT IN VENEZUELA. GARCIA SPOKE TO LEGATT SUNDAY MORNING, 10 OCTOBER, AND ON THE AFTERNOON OF 12 OCTOBER TOLD HIM "INFORMALLY" THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SHORTLY ADVISE ME THAT BOSCH WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO US. THIS WAS REPEATED TO LEGATT BY DISIP DIRECTOR RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA AND OTHER DISIP OFFICIALS (INCLUDING GARCIA) IN A MEETING THE MORNING OF 13 OCTOBER. CONCEIVABLY GARCIA CAN BE PLAYING A DARK GAME, BUT THE DISCREPANCIES ARE NOTEWORTHY. I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD AS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.")

11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS; SENT TO

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T 302470 EIA453 PAGE 01 IN 069101

TOR:141957Z OCT 76 CARA 31117

60 HVC-7514

S E C R E T 141900Z OCT 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 31117

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA.

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SUPDATA: ZNWAHOO FOR DESK REVIEW: SOURCE PARAS 1-8: WKMAY88/ WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-8 FROM WKSCARLET-3. SOURCE PARA 9: WKMAYOR/WKSCARLET-5 FROM WKSCARLET-3 FROM 201-0285923. NOT FOR LIAISON. DD OBJECTIVE: J.1. INDEX GARCIA, POSADA, MORALES, FOLGAR. FILE: 75-120-28. CL. BY 002063.

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : LATE SEPTEMBER -12 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7514

SOURCE : A FORMER VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO STILL MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1976 A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. FURTHERMORE, PEREZ HAD APPOINTED HIS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISER ORLANDO 47 GARCIA TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN VENEZUELA. FOR THIS INFORMATION SEE HVC-7490, TDFIRDB-315/09834-76. IN HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09497-76.

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(classification)

OF MID-SEPTEMBER. A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY REPORTED THAT BOSCH ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER.)

2. UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, BOSCH WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT BY GARCIA AND LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR AND ONE-TIME MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHO ESCORTED BOSCH TO HIS CARACAS HOTEL. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE CURRENTLY NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZENS, BOTH GARCIA AND POSADA ARE NATIVE-BORN CUBANS.)

3. SOMETIME FOLLOWING BOSCH'S ARRIVAL IN CARACAS, A BS. 5,000 (APPROXIMATELY U.S. $1,116) A PVATE FUND-RAISING DINNER FOR BOSCH WAS HELD AT THE HOME OF HILDO 201-290306 FOLGAR, A PROMINENT SURGEON AND CUBAN EXILE. IN ADDITION TO BOSCH, AMONG THOSE ATTENDING THE DINNER WERE GARCIA; RICARDO 201-285923 MORALES NAVARETTE, GARCIA'S DEPUTY WHO IS ALSO A NATIVE-BORN CUBAN; POSADA; AND AN UNIDENTIFIED HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

4. DURING THE EVENING BOSCH APPROACHED THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL THROUGH GARCIA PROPOSING THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CASH CONTRIBUTION TO HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RETURN, BOSCH AGREED TO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CUBAN EXILE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES DURING PRESIDENT PEREZ' PLANNED

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NOVEMBER APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS(UN). (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT BOSCH'S PROPOSITION WAS AT LEAST TENTATIVELY ACCEPTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL.)

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8. ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TRINIDADIAN

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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AUTHORITIES IMPLICATING HIM, POSADA WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP AUTHORITIES ON 12 OCTOBER. HIS OFFICE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RAIDED AND ALL FILES AND EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED.

9. MEANWHILE, PRESIDENT PEREZ HAS ASSURED THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO, THAT THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT WILL ENERGETICALLY PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CUBANA CRASH. IN RETURN, HOWEVER, CUBA WILL BE EXPECTED TO SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S ANTI-TERRORISM POSITION AT THE UN.

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11. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, LEGATT AT CARACAS. SENT TO

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TOR:141957Z OCT 76 CARA 31118

SECRET 141900Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31118

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY BOGOTA, ROUTINE PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN.

WINTEL RYBAT REAM MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 31117 (HVC-7514) (IN 069101)

1. ACCORDING TO REF, ORLANDO BOSCH MAY HAVE BEEN DEPORTED TO COLOMBIA 9-10 OCTOBER, ALTHOUGH VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE CONTINUED TO ASSURE AMBASSADOR AND LEGATT THAT AS OF 13 OCTOBER BOSCH STILL IN VENEZUELA AND WILL BE PRODUCED SHORTLY FOR DEPORTATION TO U.S. AMBASSADOR HAS NO OBJECTION TO BOGOTA STATION CHECKING FOR BOSCH'S PRESENCE COLOMBIA THROUGH UNILATERAL SOURCES BUT ASKS THAT NO INQUIREIES BE MADE THROUGH LIAISON OR OTHER OFFICIAL CHANNELS UNTIL IT CLEAR WHAT VENEZUELANS REALLY HAVE DONE OR PROPOSE TO DO ON BOSCH'S DEPORTATION.

2. BOSCH EARLIER ALLEGED TO BE TRAVELLING ON COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA OR CARLOS LUIS PANIA GUU A MENDEZ. ON THE OTHERHAND, WE HAVE ONE REPORT THAT HE ENTERED VENEZUELA IN TRUE NAME.

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COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI 8 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN CARACAS ON RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE CUBANS

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (11 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7513

SOURCE A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. ON 8 OCTOBER 1976 LUIS JORGE MARTINEZ MENOCAL, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, SAID THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE CUBAN EXILE GROUP HEADED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 6 OCTOBER BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER OUT OF BARBADOS. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN REACTION TO RECENT

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TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE CUBANS, SEE HVC-7509, TDFIRDB-315/10100-76, OF 8 OCTOBER 1976, FROM THIS AND ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

2. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY BELIEVES BOSCH HAS BEEN RECEIVING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG), VIA ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SINCE BOSCH IS ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY AND OBVIOUSLY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTATION, AS HIS MOVEMENTS CANNOT BE TRACED. HOWEVER, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS DO NOT BELIEVE THE USG IS OR WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA FLIGHT. USG INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT, MARTINEZ SAID, WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE USG'S INTERESTS BECAUSE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WOULD SURELY BREAK THE AIR PIRACY AGREEMENT, WHICH IS TO THE BENFIT OF THE USG.

3. THE CUBANS, MARTINEZ SAID, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BOSCH AND CUBAN EXILES WORKING FOR THE CAPRILES PUBLISHING CHAIN IN VENEZUELA. SHOULD FREDDY LUGO, ONE OF THE TWO VENEZUELANS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN TRINIDAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLANE CRASH AND A REPORTER FOR ONE OF THE CAPRILES PUBLICATIONS, BE DEFINITELY IMPLICATED IN THE AFFAIR, THE CUBANS WILL BE CONVINCED OF THIS BOSCH/CAPRILES CONNECTION. ANOTHER

EXAMPLE OF THIS CONNECTION, MARTINEZ SAID, IS A 2 OCTOBER ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE CAPRILES PAPER "EL MUNDO" WHICH DESCRIBES AN EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON A CUBANA FLIGHT OUT OF BARBADOS AND, WHILE DEPLORING SUCH ACTS, SAYS THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT STARTED THEM. THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK DESCRIBED IN THE ARTICLE, AND ABOUT WHICH THE CUBANS KNOW NOTHING, IS BELIEVED TO BE SIMILAR TO WHAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CASE OF THE 6 OCTOBER DISASTER. THE CUBANS, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT THE AUTHOR MAY WELL HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK ON THE CUBANA AIRLINER. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN CONCERN ABOUT ARTICLES APPEARING IN "EL MUNDO," SEE HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/09683-76, 27 SEPTEMBER 1976, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

4. WITH REGARD TO THE 21 SEPTEMBER ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ORLANDO LETELIER IN THE U.S., MARTINEZ SAID THAT THIS KILLING SHOWED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORK DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILEAN PRESIDENT GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. DESPITE SOME MEDIA SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, MARTINEZ SAID THAT HE DOES NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE USG IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED WITH LETELIER'S DEATH.

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5. CONCERNING THE 8 OCTOBER MACHINEGUN ATTACK ON THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE PLACING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EVENT. THE ATTACK, MARTINEZ SAID, WAS PROBABLY THE WORK OF CUBAN EXILES; HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THAT IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY BOSCH'S GROUP.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

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DVC-7533

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

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SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR DESK REVIEW. SOURCE: NP/WKMIXER DIRECTLY, NOT FOR LIAISON. OO OBJECTIVE: C.I.E. (THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO DIRECTOR 925568 AND DIRECTOR 924067.) INDEX LUGO, LLANO. FILE: 75-190-28. CL. BY 062863.

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : 8 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN CARACAS ON RECENT ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE CUBANS

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (11 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7513

SOURCE : A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

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2. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY BELIEVES BOSCH HAS BEEN RECEIVING ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

GOVERNMENT (USG), VIA ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SINCE BOSCH IS ABLE TO MOVE ABOUT FREELY AND OBVIOUSLY WITH FALSE DOCUMENTATION, AS HIS MOVEMENTS CANNOT BE TRACED. HOWEVER, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS DO NOT BELIEVE THE USG IS OR WOULD BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF THE CUBANA FLIGHT. USG INVOLVEMENT IN THE INCIDENT, MARTINEZ SAID, WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO THE USG'S INTERESTS, BECAUSE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WOULD SURELY BREAK THE AIR PIRACY AGREEMENT WHICH IS TO THE BENEFIT OF THE USG.

3. THE CUBANS, MARTINEZ SAID, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT APPARENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN BOSCH AND CUBAN EXILES WORKING FOR THE CAPRILES PUBLISHING CHAIN IN VENEZUELA. SHOULD FREDDY LUGO, ONE OF THE TWO VENEZUELANS CURRENTLY UNDER DETENTION IN TRINIDAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE PLANE CRASH AND A REPORTER FOR ONE OF THE CAPRILES PUBLICATIONS, BE DEFINITELY IMPLICATED IN THE AFFAIR, THE CUBANS WILL BE CONVINCED OF THIS BOSCH/CAPRILES CONNECTION. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS CONNECTION, MARTINEZ SAID, IS A 2 OCTOBER ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE CAPRILES PAPER "EL MUNDO" WHICH DESCRIBES AN EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON A CUBANA FLIGHT OUT OF BARBADOS, AND WHILE DEPLORING SUCH ACTS, SAYS THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT STARTED THEM. THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN BY ANTONIO

LLANO MONTES, A CUBAN EXILE WHO WHILE LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES, WRITES A COLUMN FOR "EL MUNDO." THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK DESCRIBED IN LLANO'S ARTICLE AND ABOUT WHICH THE CUBANS KNOW NOTHING, IS BELIEVED TO BE SIMILAR TO WHAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CASE OF THE 6 OCTOBER DISASTER. THE CUBANS, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT LLANO MAY WELL HAVE HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK ON THE CUBANA AIRLINER. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON CUBAN CONCERN ABOUT ARTICLES APPEARING IN "EL MUNDO" SEE HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/ -76, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.)

4. WITH REGARD TO THE 26 SEPTEMBER ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER ORLANDO LETELIER IN THE UNITED STATES, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THIS KILLING SHOWED THE CHARACTERISTICS OF WORK DONE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILEAN PRESIDENT GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE. DESPITE SOME MEDIA SPECULATION TO THE CONTRARY, MARTINEZ SAID THAT HE DOES NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THE USG IS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED WITH LETELIER'S DEATH.

5. CONCERNING THE 8 OCTOBER MACHINE GUN ATTACK ON THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE CUBANS ARE PLACING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EVENT. THE ATTACK, MARTINEZ SAID,

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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WAS PROBABLY THE WORK OF CUBAN EXILES; HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THAT IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY BOSCH'S GROUP.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS; SENT TO PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO.

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STATE CABLES

FROM SECSTATE WASHDC STATE 252295
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: US POSITION ON INVESTIGATION OF CUBANA AIRLINES CRASH

FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS 12098
DATE: 29 OCTOBER 1976
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION OF BOSCH
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 2652
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION OF BOSCH

FROM SECSTATE WASHDC STATE 251567
DATE: 9 OCTOBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR DEPORTATION TO US OF FUGITIVE ORLANDO BOSCH

TRANSMITTAL OF TDFIR INFORMATION REPORT

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DIST 9 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE -SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/ CUBA

DOI 30 SEPTEMBER -7 OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT REACTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS TO RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST CUBAN AIRCRAFT AND INSTALLATIONS.

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (8 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7509

SOURCE SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. ON 7 OCTOBER 1976 PEDRO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ, SECOND SECRETARY AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, SAID THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY WAS AWARE THAT A BOMB WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRASH OF THE CUBANA AIRLINE FLIGHT OFF THE COAST OF BARBADOS ON 6 OCTOBER. THE CUBANS, GOMEZ SAID, DID NOT KNOW ON WHICH LEG OF THE FLIGHT THE BOMB WAS PLACED HOWEVER.

(FIELD COMMENT: THE PLANE WAS DOWNED WITH THE LOSS OF 78 LIVES

INCLUDING FENCING TEAM WHICH HAD RECENTLY COMPLETED COMPETITION IN VENEZUELA.)

3. GOMEZ SAID THAT ON 30 SEPTEMBER THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD INFORMED THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), THE VENEZUELAN CIVILIAN SECURITY SERVICE, THAT A CUBAN EXILE NAMED SALVADOR ROMANI WAS OBSERVING THE CUBAN FENCING TEAM AT ITS CARACAS HOTEL. ROMANI, GOMEZ SAID, IS A UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: GOMEZ IMPLIED THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBILITY THAT ROMANI'S ACTIVITIES ARE INVOLVED WITH THE PLANE CRASH.) FURTHERMORE, THE CUBANS TOLD DISIP THAT THE TEAM WOULD DEFEND ITSELF SHOULD ROMANI CAUSE TROUBLE. SHORTLY AFTER THE CUBANS MADE THEIR FEELINGS KNOWN TO DISIP, GOMEZ SAID THAT ROMANI'S ACTIVITIES CEASED. (FIELD COMMENT: IN HVC-7495, TDFIRDB-315/09683 -76, OF 28 SEPTEMBER, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD COMPLAINED TO DISIP ABOUT ANTI-CUBAN GOVERNMENT ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE LOCAL PRESS. IN THIS INSTANCE THE CUBANS INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE NEWSMAN INVOLVED IF DISIP DID NOT

TAKE ACTION).

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6: A FOREIGN DIPLOMAT WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. DURING THE WEEK OF 4 OCTOBER LUIS MARTINEZ MONOCAL, CUBAN FIRST SECRETARY, SAID THAT THE EMBASSY WAS AWARE THAT CUBAN EXILE EXTREMIST ORLANDO BOSCH WAS IN VENEZUELA. THE EMBASSY, HE SAID, WAS ATTEMPTING TO INVESTIGATE BOSCH'S ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS STILL IN THE COUNTRY. MARTINEZ SAID THAT THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT BOSCH HAD MOVED OUT OF THE CARACAS AREA AND WAS THEN IN THE VENEZUELAN INTERIOR. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON THE PRESENCE OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA, SEE HVC-7498, TDFIRDB-315/09814-76, OF 30 SEPTEMBER, FROM A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.)

6. IN ADDITION TO AND IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF BOSCH IN VENEZUELA, CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MACHINE-GUNNING OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS ON THE EARLY MORNING OF 8 OCTOBER.

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO

IN 064432

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PORT OF SPAIN, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, PANAMA CITY, SANTO DOMINGO.

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FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, PAROLE VIOLATOR

FBI FILE NO: 105-2856 (MIAMI)

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T 263627   E1A559   PAGE 01   3P   IN 854142

TOR:2916142 SEP 76   CARA 38979

HVC-7498

S E C R E T 291429Z SEP 76 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 38979 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

HNM HGG HMM HJK HWS HRS HFG HZP

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

SUPDATA: SOURCE: WKBOXER/MURAWSKI (NOC) FROM WKNORTH-6. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. INDEX BOSCH, GARCIA. FILE DEFERRED. CL. BY 035133.

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COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: O PRESENCE OF ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (20 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7498

SOURCE: A MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT.

1. IN LATE-SEPTEMBER 1976 GENERAL RAUL GIMENEZ GAINZA, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PRVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, IS CURRENTLY IN VENEZUELA UNDER THE PROTECTION OF PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ. THE PRESIDENT, GIMENEZ SAID, HAS ORDERED ORLANDO GARCIA, A PRESIDENTPAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR, TO PROTECT AND ASSIST BOSCH DURING HIS STAY IN

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VENEZUELA. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR ANOTHER REPORT ON BOSCH'S PRESENCE IN VENEZUELA SEE HVC-7483, TDFIRDB-315/09430-76, OF MID SEPTEMBER, FROM A SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. FOR A REPORT ON GARCIA'S ROLE AS DE FACTOR DISIP CHIEF SEE HVC-7493, TDFIRDB-315/ -76, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. WHILE CURRENTLY A NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN, GARCIA IS A NATIVE BORN CUBAN.)

2. PRESIDENT PEREZ, GIMENEZ SAID, HAS BEEN SYMPATHETIC TO BOSCH FOR SOME TIME. FURTHERMORE, GIMENEZ SAID THAT WHEN BOSCH WAS DETAINED BY DISIP IN NOVEMBER 1974, PRESIDENT PEREZ PERSONALLY ARRANGED HIS RELEASE AND SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL TO CHILE.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

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T 249378 EIA655 PAGE 01-01 IN 045877

TOR:232007Z SEP 76 SDOM 17786

S E C R E T 231954Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17786

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL REAM HHSPIKE

1. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HQS THINKING ON WHO OR WHAT ORGANIZATION CARRIED OUT LETELIER ASSASSINATION.

2. HAS FBI INVESTIGATION EXPLORED POSSIBILITY ASSASSINATION MIGHT BE WORK OF ORLANDO B O S C H'S CORU?

3. FILE: 201-299292, E2, IMPDET.

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T 246282 EIA282 PAGE 01-01 IN 047613

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CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17702

TO: PORT OF SPAIN INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS, MANAGUA, GEORGETOWN, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL REAM

REF: A. CARACAS 30917 (IN 046859)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17682 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED LA/MIAMI) (IN 039341)

1. NO OBJECTION RELEASE OF REF B MATERIAL ON ORLANDO BOSCH.

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The RCMP Liaison Office,
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20008

SECRET

76WLO-15-83(B)

11 September 1976

S E C R E T

Mr. Arthur Stimpson,
C.I.A.,
Washington, D.C.

Re: *EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA
(SECRET ARMY OF CUBA - USA)

Dear Arthur

My Headquarters advises that the above captioned faction, which is Miami based, has been sending what appears to be warning letters to several Canadian establishments, public and private, at home and abroad. We had the handwriting analyzed and our expert stated that those letters we do have were all written by the same person.

Recently the EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA (ESC) has come to our attention again and we are speculating that it may be tied in with the *UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION (URO), headed by Orlando Bosch *AVILA, and composed of five anti-Castro Cuban exile (ACE) terrorist groups: ACCION CUBANA (AC), FRENTE NACIONAL DE LIBERACION CUBANO (FLNC), MOVIMIENTO NACIONALISTA CUBANO (CNM), BRIGADE 2506, and THE 17th OF APRIL MOVEMENT.

URO came into being in June 1976 and since that time has claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks, i.e., the airport bombing in Kingston, Jamaica; the attempted kidnapping of the Cuban Consul in Merida, Mexico; and murder of an official of the Cuban Institute

Cont'd...

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1 September 1976

of Fisheries during the attempted kidnapping, as well as the bombing of the Guyanese Consulate General in Port of Spain, Trinidad.

We would appreciate receiving any background data you may be able to supply us regarding the URO and EJERCITO SECRETO DE CUBA.

A similar request is being made to the FBI.

Yours truly,

Kenneth G. Osborne,
Assistant Liaison Officer

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T 236560 EIA535 PAGE 01 IN 043688

TOR:181953Z SEP 76 CARA 30987

S E C R E T 181707Z SEP 76 INTEL

HVC-7483

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CITE CARACAS 32907 (HACKELING ACTING)

HNM HGG HMMI

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY,

HAB HJK HWS HRS HFG

BUENOS AIRES, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN,

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WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

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REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : MID-SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA; AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS GROUP

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (18 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7483

SOURCE : A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, SAID THAT HE HAS UNITED ALL OF THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS INTO ONE CLOSELY-KNIT ORGANIZATION WHICH FOLLOWS HIS LEAD. BOSCH GAVE THE GROUP NO TITLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS WELL-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING THE REGIME OF CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOSCH, WHO ARRIVED IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, VIA AN UNSPECIFIED ROUTE ON OR ABOUT 13 SEPTEMBER, SAID THAT ON A PREVIOUS VISIT TO VENEZUELA HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND ORLANDO GARCIA, AN EXTRA-OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

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PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

CHIEF. DURING THIS MEETING PEREZ TOLD BOSCH THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH BOSCH'S ANTI-CASTRO EFFORTS BUT THAT HE WOULD ALLOW NO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. AT THAT TIME BOSCH GAVE PEREZ HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD UNDERTAKE NO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND PEREZ, IN TURN, GAVE BOSCH A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. $500.00 FOR HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RECENTLY ARRANGING FOR HIS RETURN TO VENEZUELA, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO FIND THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ISSUED HIM A VISA, IN HIS TRUE NAME, WITHOUT DELAY. (FIELD COMMENT: AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT LUCILO PENA AND ARMANDO FERNANDEZ, BOTH MEMBERS OF RADICAL CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 6 SEPTEMBER. THE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IS NOT KNOWN.)

4. BOSCH COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS RUNNING OUT OF SAFE HAVENS. THE DOMINICANS, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIM TO LEAVE AND THAT, OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, HE SAID, HAD DONE NOTHING TO CURB HIS ACTIVITIES, IT ALSO GAVE HIM NO REAL SUPPORT. COSTA RICA, HE NOTED WITH DISDAIN, IS PRO-CASTRO.

5. BOSCH SAID THAT HE NOW REALIZED THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO

SECRET

HAVE CARRIED OUT BOMBINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO MAKE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL OR PROPERTY THE TARGETS OF ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS. IN COMMENTING ON HIS FEBRUARY 1976 DETENTION BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WAS AT THAT TIME VISITING LATIN AMERICA.

6. IN COMMENTING ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, BOSCH SAID THAT DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, HIS GROUP HAD NOT KIDNAPPED THE CUBANS. BOSCH OPINED THAT THE CUBANS HAD PROBABLY DEFECTED AND WOULD TURN UP SOONER OR LATER.

7. BOSCH, WHO HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT, SAID THAT HE WAS ILL AND PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED. NEVERTHELESS, BOSCH INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH IS OBVIOUSLY ILL AND SUFFERING FROM EYE PROBLEMS. DESPITE BOSCH'S CLAIMS OF A STRONG, UNITED ANTI-CASTRO GROUP, BOSCH'S DETERIORATING PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT DOUBTFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF IT FOR VERY LONG.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO: SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, MANAGUA, MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA

FORM 9-73 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET
(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

CITY, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

SECRET

201-277262

STATE CABLES

FROM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 6515
DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1976
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLOTTING BY CUBAN EXILE
ORLANDO BOSCH

File
Ops Liaison
& Contracts

SEP 17 '76

SECRET 171325Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26893

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

OPERATIONS SERVICES GROUP (WALKER) FROM SILVERMAN

WNINTEL

SUBJ: POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL ACCESS TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OFFICIAL

1. OUR COOPERATIVE CONTACT, GEORGE H. LEWSON OF OCEANOGRAPHY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, DANBURY, CONNECTICUT, HAS INFORMED US THAT ANSELMO PAULINO, DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND, MAY WISH TO ASSIST THE AGENCY IN REGARD TO THE DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION IN HIS HOME COUNTRY. PAULINO'S SON, A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN, WORKS WITH LEWSON AND WILL BE INTRODUCED TO US IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. PLEASE DETERMINE FOR US WHETHER LA DIVISION HAS ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN PAULINO AND/OR IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN GENERAL.

FILE: MISC "O" (OCEANOGRAPHY DEVELOPMENT)
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
SECRET

"No Interest"
DCD informed
28 Sept 76

14-00000

FORM 6-75 3005 (20-44)

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INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible] IP/AN, IID, OPS/INT, CI 4, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG 4.

T 236560 EIA535 PAGE 01 IN 043608

TOR:181953Z SEP 76 CARA 30907

S E C R E T 181707Z SEP 76 INTEL HVC-7483

CITE CARACAS 30907 (HACKELING ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION. SOURCE: NP/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. SOURCE PARA 2 FIELD COMMENT MURAWSKI (NOC).
NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1.
INDEX BOSCH, FERNANDEZ, AND PENA. FILE DEFERRED.
CL. BY 035133.

FILED: 18/1910Z

18 Sep 0

18 SEP 76 19 34

F) 22-9-28

F) BOSCH-201

SECRET

FORM 8-75 3015 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 20 SEPTEMBER 19
IN 043608
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

The following report, transmitted from a CIA field station, requires review within the Directorate of Operations before being used in any other document or publication, or released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is provided for your advance information.

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTOORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI : MID-SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH IN VENEZUELA, AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF HIS GROUP

ACQ : VENEZUELA, CARACAS (18 SEPTEMBER 1976) FIELD NO. HVC-7483

SOURCE : A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1976 ORLANDO BOSCH, A CUBAN EXILE LEADER, SAID THAT HE HAS UNITED ALL OF THE VARIOUS CUBAN EXILE GROUPS INTO ONE CLOSELY-KNIT ORGANIZATION WHICH FOLLOWS HIS LEAD. BOSCH GAVE THE GROUP NO TITLE, BUT SAID THAT IT WAS WELL-ORGANIZED AND PLANNED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING THE REGIME OF CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOSCH, WHO ARRIVED IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, VIA AN UNSPECIFIED ROUTE ON OR ABOUT 13 SEPTEMBER, SAID THAT ON A PREVIOUS VISIT TO VENEZUELA HE HAD MET WITH PRESIDENT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ AND ORLANDO GARCIA, AN EXTRA-OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

SECRET

14-00000

CHIEF. DURING THIS MEETING PEREZ TOLD BOSCH THAT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH BOSCH'S ANTI-CASTRO EFFORTS BUT THAT HE WOULD ALLOW NO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. AT THAT TIME BOSCH GAVE PEREZ HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD UNDERTAKE NO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND PEREZ, IN TURN, GAVE BOSCH A TOKEN CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. $500.00 FOR HIS ORGANIZATION. IN RECENTLY ARRANGING FOR HIS RETURN TO VENEZUELA, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO FIND THAT VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES ISSUED HIM A VISA, IN HIS TRUE NAME, WITHOUT DELAY. (FIELD COMMENT: AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED THAT LUCILO PENA AND ARMANDO FERNANDEZ, BOTH MEMBERS OF RADICAL CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA ON APPROXIMATELY 6 SEPTEMBER. THE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IS NOT KNOWN.)

4. BOSCH COMPLAINED THAT HE WAS RUNNING OUT OF SAFE HAVENS. THE DOMINICANS, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIM TO LEAVE AND THAT, OF COURSE, HE WAS NOT WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE, HE SAID, HAD DONE NOTHING TO CURB HIS ACTIVITIES, IT ALSO GAVE HIM NO REAL SUPPORT. COSTA RICA, HE NOTED WITH DISDAIN, IS PRO-CASTRO.

5. BOSCH SAID THAT HE NOW REALIZED THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE TO

HAVE CARRIED OUT BOMBINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO MAKE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL OR PROPERTY THE TARGETS OF ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS. IN COMMENTING ON HIS FEBRUARY 1976 DETENTION BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS, BOSCH SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE WHO WAS AT THAT TIME VISITING LATIN AMERICA.

6. IN COMMENTING ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, BOSCH SAID THAT DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY, HIS GROUP HAD NOT KIDNAPPED THE CUBANS. BOSCH OPINED THAT THE CUBANS HAD PROBABLY DEFECTED AND WOULD TURN UP SOONER OR LATER.

7. BOSCH, WHO HAS GAINED A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT, SAID THAT HE WAS ILL AND PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED. NEVERTHELESS, BOSCH INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME. (SOURCE COMMENT: BOSCH IS OBVIOUSLY ILL AND SUFFERING FROM EYE PROBLEMS. DESPITE BOSCH'S CLAIMS OF A STRONG, UNITED ANTI-CASTRO GROUP, BOSCH'S DETERIORATING PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT DOUBTFUL THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF IT FOR VERY LONG.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS: SENT TO: SANTO DOMINGO, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, MANAGUA, MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA

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T 231316 EIA423 PAGE 01 IN 041818

TOR:1623052 SEP 76 MANA 12488

SECRET 162244Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12488

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS, KINGSTON, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12478 (NOT SENT ALL ADDEES) (IN

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17682 (IN 039241)

1. ERYTHROID-33 REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR GUATEMALA CITY ON 8 SEPTEMBER VIA COPA FLIGHT 310.

2. ERYTHROID-33 APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN ADVISING STATION, BUT SAID HIS SURVEILLANCE HAD LOST BOSCH AND ONLY DISCOVERED HIS DEPARTURE ON 13 SEPTEMBER AFTER REVIEWING FLIGHT MANIFESTS.

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ADVISE LEGAL ATTACHED OF BOSCH'S TRAVEL.

4. FOR GUATEMALA CITY: REF A AND PREVIOUS TRAFFIC REPORTED BOSCH ARRIVAL IN MANAGUA ON 30 AUGUST.

5. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.

[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	☒	ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
P,CT		[illegible]
		[illegible] (2, 3)
6,98		[illegible] COG
		[illegible] (11)
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16 Sep 76

201-299292

SECRET

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FORM 8-75 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 043606

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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CITY, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN, PANAMA CITY.

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CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-2

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 27 AUGUST 1976

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ORLANDO LAZARO FERNANDEZ VAZQUEZ

FBI FILE NO: 105-22619 (MIAMI)

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-1

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 — PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF 151907Z DIRECTOR 913396

CONF: CA-8 INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 0
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: IMMEDIATE GEORGETOWN INFO SANTO DOMINGO.Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE Y

REF: A. DIRECTOR 910267*

B. GEORGETOWN 21275 |IN 040247|** Y

1. () PERMISSION GRANTED TO PASS INFO CONTAINED IN SANTO DOMINGO 37682, PARAGRAPH TWO, TO CHARGE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS.Y

2. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET.M

*REF STATED THAT NICARAGUA LIAISON REPORTED BOSCH AND CASTRO WERE IN NICARAGUA AND THIS COULD BE PASSED TO GOG VIA CHARGE. IF NO OBJECTION RECEIVED FROM MANAGUA STATION {NO OBJECTION RECEIVED}.

**REF REQUESTED PERMISSION PASS INFO THAT BOSCH WAS DEPORTED BY DOMINICAN GOVT ON 29 AUG AND IS CURRENTLY IN MANAGUA. FRANK CASTRO TRAVELLED ON SAME FLIGHT AS BOSCH.

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
		PREPARE FOR FILMING
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		RYBAT FLST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NIS (0)
		FOR FILING

15 Sep 76
201-299292

DATE: 15 SEPT 76
ORIG: JOANNE HARRIS
UNIT: LA/CAR/GT
EXT: 1249

C/LA/COG
C/LA/MCA
C/LA/CAR

C/LA
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T 224998 EIA267 PAGE 01 IN 039291

TOR:142329Z SEP 76 GUAT 19822

S E C R E T 142228Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE GUATEMALA CITY 19822

TO: DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, LA/MIAMI, SANTO DOMINGO.

WNINTEL MHSPIKE

REF: DIRECTOR 912772

8

File: Orlando Bosch 201

1. REF BOMBING, WHICH WIDELY COVERED IN LOCAL PRSSS, OCCURRED ON 31 AUGUST IN THE MEXICAN CONSULATE IN DOWNTOWN GUATEMALA CITY. THE CONSULATE SUFFERED SOME DAMAGE AND A RECEPTIONIST WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED. SINCE BOMB EXPLODED WITHIN THE MEXICAN CONSULATE OFFICES, WHICH LOCATED IN A LARGE BUILDING, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CONSULATE WAS INDEED THE TARGET. NEITHER ESMICA-68 NOR ESCE--4 (WHO INVESTIGATED THE BOMBING) HAD ANY HARD INFORMATION ON THE IDENTITIES OR MOTIVES OF THE BOMBERS, ALTHOUGH SOME SUSPICION WAS ATTACHED TO THE GUARD WHO WAS HOME SICK ON THE DAY OF THE BOMBING.

2. NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

STATE CABLE

FROM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 4497

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION PLOTS:
MEETING WITH WILLS

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 24

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INFO: FILE VR Plan, NE8, 0002, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, OPS/INT, CI4, PS/EG2

LA 2144

T 224821 EIA898 PAGE 01 IN 039241

TOR:1421482 SEP 76 SDOM 17682

S E C R E T 1421292 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17682

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, GEORGETOWN INFO PRIORITY CARACAS, GUATEMALA CITY, KINGSTON, MANAGUA, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. EMBASSY GEORGETOWN EXDIS 1810 (#95266)

B. EMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO EXDIS 4497 (#

1. REF A MESSAGE, WHICH SENT TO INFO ADDEE EMBASSIES, REPORTS ON 10 SEPT MEETING OF AMBASSADOR AND LEGAL ATTACHE LEO (WHO IS APPARENTLY ASSIGNED CARACAS) WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WILLS CONCERNING CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS AND BOMBING OF GUYANESE CONSULATE IN PORT OF SPAIN. ACCORDING TO REF A, LEO SAID THAT CORU AND ORLANDO BOSCH OPERATING OUT OF SANTO DOMINGO.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
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INDEX
FOR FILES

2. AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST STATION DRAFTED FOLLOWING REF B REPLY ON 14 SEPTEMBER:

"SRF ADVISES THAT ORLANDO BOSCH WAS DEPORTED BY DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT ON 29 AUGUST AND IS CURRENTLY IN MANAGUA. FRANK CASTRO TRAVELLED ON SAME FLIGHT WITH BOSCH.

SRF REQUESTS ANY USE THIS INFORMATION BE CLEARED WITH

14 Sep 76

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T 224821 E1A898 PAGE 02-02 IN 039241

TOR:1421402 SEP 76 SDOM 17682

SRF HEADQUARTERS,"

3. FILE: 201-299292. E2, IMPDET.

X NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

STAFF 141732Z DIRECTOR 912771

CONF: C/S/ITG 4 INFO: FILE IP/AN LA8 DDO2 DDO/DO NE8 AGC/DDO CS/HOS CI4 PS/EG2 SS/SO64 [illegible]

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TO: GUATEMALA CITY INFO MEXICO CITY, WH/MIAMI, SANTO DOMINGO.

UNINTEL MHSPIKE

1. FYI: PER LNERGO INFO DTD 3 SEP 76, ORLANDO BOSCH, HEAD OF CUBAN EXILE GROUP "CORU", CALLED CONTACTS IN [illegible] U.S. ADVISING THAT CORU REPS BOMBED MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY ON 1 SEP, CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. END FYI. HOWEVER, FBIS INFO DTD 2 SEP INDICATED THAT MEXICAN CONSULATE, GUATEMALA CITY, BOMBED, AND THAT ATTACK MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED FOR MINING COMPANY OCCUPYING SAME BLDG AS CONSULATE.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF BOMBING, PLUS ADDITIONAL INFO INCLUDING CLARIFICATION OF TARGET, IF POSSIBLE.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

COORDINATION: LA/M&CA/M
LA/M&CA/GS/G
LA/CAR
LA/COG

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D-200-6-484/3

14 Sep 76
201-299292

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1976
ORIG: EASTON WARNER:JAB
UNIT: OPS/ITG
EXT: 9496

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/OPS/ITG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 058783

OUTGOING MESSAGE 31-2

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SECRET

STAFF

082313Z DIRECTOR 910267

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE LA/AN, NE8, AG/DDO, DDO2, DDO/DO, OPS/ITGY, CSN/ID, DDS, C/OPS

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DISSEM BY: 45

PER #

TO: PRIORITY GEORGETOWN INFO PRIORITY MANAGUA.

UNINTEL MHSPIKE

REF: GEORGETOWN 21260 (IN 031993) (NOT NEEDED MANAGUA)

1. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS REQUESTING INFORMATION FROM THE FBI ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL OF THE COORDINATION OF THE UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION (CORU). THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM EMBASSY GEORGETOWN WHAT INFORMATION THE FBI IS WILLING TO RELEASE FOR PASSAGE TO THE GOG. RATHER THAN REQUEST SEPARATE AND DUPLICATE INFORMATION FROM THE FBI, WE SUGGEST THAT YOU ADVISE THE CHARGE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTION IN THIS REGARD.

2. THERE IS NO IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ON GIL NOBLE. TRAVEL INFORMATION SHOWS ONE G.H. NOBLE, U.S. CITIZEN, BORN 4 AUG 1944, PLANNED TO TRAVEL TO EAST GERMANY IN 1964, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION OF TRAVEL.

3. WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CORU. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM NICARAGUA LIAISON THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA AND FRANK CASTRO PAZ WERE IN NICARAGUA AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER. IN VIEW OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

8 Sep 76

B 201-742365

RECORD COPY

201-249292

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE OF PAGES 2 2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
910267

CONF: INFO: FILE

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0 NO INDEX
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0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

THE LACK OF SENSITIVITY RE THE TRAVEL OF BOSCH AND CASTRO TO NICARAGUA. YOU MAY PASS THIS INFORMATION (SOURCING DELETED) TO THE CHARGE FOR PASSAGE TO THE GOG IF MANAGUA DOES NOT DISAGREE BY COB 9 SEPTEMBER. YOU MAY ALSO SAY THAT BOSCH AND CASTRO DO NOT RESIDE IN U.S.

NOT

4. FILE: 201-299292; 201-742365. E2 IMPDET.

* GEORGETOWN WOULD LIKE TO ASSIST THE CHARGE IN HIS DEALINGS WITH FRED WILLS, GUYANESE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE ACTIVITIES ON CORU.

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CABLE IDEN (11)
NTU (6)
FOR FILING

DATE: 8 SEPT 76
ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: AC/LA/CAR/GT
EXT: 1849

DC/LA/MCA, JOHN BECKWITH
(TELECOORD)

C/LA
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ACTION UNIT: LA8

ACTION #

INFO: ~~RF~~ FILE VR, PLAN, DDO2, ACC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, OS4/I?, CI4, NE6, PS/EG2, OPS/INT, LSN/ID

T 210060 EIA294 PAGE 01 IN 033325

TOR:082204Z SEP 76 MANA 12470

S E C R E T 082100Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12470

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY INFO SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, CARACAS, PANAMA CITY, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAUGA 12461 (027/03) (033511)

B. MANAGUA 12468 (SENT DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY ONLY)

1. ERYTHROID-33 REPORTED FRANK CASTRO PAZ DEPARTED MANAGUA FOR MIAMI ON 5 SEPTEMBER 76 VIA TACA FLIGHT NO. 310.

2. ORLANDO BOSCH IS STILL IN MANAGUA AND, ACCORDING TO ERYTHROID-33, HAS CONTACTED SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL CUBAN COMMUNITY. E-33 HAS BOSCH UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND WILL PASS TO STATION SUMMARY OF REPORTS INCLUDING NAMES OF BOSCH'S LOCAL CONTACTS. WILL POUCH TO HQS WHEN RECEIVED. (IN 033133)

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: PER MEXICO CITY 37673, PLEASE ADVISE LEAGAL ATTACHE THAT BOSCH IS STILL IN MANAGUA.

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2, IMPDET.

8 Sep 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

SECRET

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TOTAL COPIES 19-1

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED

STAFF

ACTION UNIT LAF

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR PLAN LSN/ID C/OPS CI/4 PS/EG2

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2		5	
3		6	

T 209997 EIA232 PAGE 01-01 IN 033311

TOR:0821232 SEP 76 MANA 12468

S E C R E T 0820502 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12468

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12461 (027103)

B. MEXICO CITY 37673 (032133)

1. PER REF A. LEGAL ATTACHE MAY BE TOLD THAT BOSCH WAS IN MANAGUA AS OF 30 AUGUST.

2. STATION STILL WAITING FOR GENERAL GENIE TO REPORT ON WHERE BOSCH IS CURRENTLY LOCATED. WILL ADVISE WHEN THIS INFORMATION RECEIVED.

3. DEFER FILE. E2, IMPDET. Orlando Bosch 201

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08 Sept 76

201-299292

14-00000

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF

LA 8

FILE

T 207172 E:A476 PAGE 01-01 IN 032133

TOR:0723592 SEP 76 MEXI 37673

S E C R E T 0722162 SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 37673

TO: MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR.

1. REQUEST PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY: "FOR: ROBERT FAMBRINI-MANAGUA. FROM: LEGAT, MEXICO. URGENTLY REQUEST THAT GENERAL GENIE BE APPROACHED FOR ANY CONFIRMATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH, ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVIST, WAS IN MANAGUA AS OF SEPTEMBER TWO LAST."

2. FILE 50-2-4/A. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible]		[illegible]
	✓	ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible] FOR FILING
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
		CABLE FILE [illegible]
		[illegible]
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SECRET

07 Sept 76

201-299292

FBI CABLE

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DATE: 3 SEPTEMBER 1976

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY
ORGANIZATIONS (CORU)

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

0220222 CIA 907954

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/LA/AN, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS, C/CI 2, C/OPS/ITG 2

0 DISSEM BY: 21
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0 PER SUP
0 # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE//SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - NICARAGUA, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST.

FIRCI-312/02698-76

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO FIRCI-312/02647-76, DATED 31 AUGUST 1976. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:

IP/ERU

ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1976 AN OFFICIAL NICARAGUAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD ARRIVED IN MANAGUA, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK CASTRO PAZ, AND WAS GIVEN PERMISSION TO REMAIN THERE IN TRANSIT STATUS FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THIRTY DAYS.

ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1976 AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAD OBTAINED A VENEZUELAN VISA IN MANAGUA.

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EGDS 1.2.d

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

2 Sep. 76

201-299292

RECORD COPY

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COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 026090

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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2 2

SECRET

CIA

CONF: INFO: FILE 907954

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0 PER
0 #

BASED ON: MANAGUA 12461 |IN 027103| AND SANTO DOMINGO 17653 |IN 027288| 1 SEPTEMBER 1976. PROJECTS: ERRATIC/EMPYREX OBJECTIVE: J

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPIES AVAILABLE TO IPAN FOR 201-299292.

LR

JAN 11 77

C/LA/CAR

OPS/LSN C. ENRIGHT |IN DRAFT|

LA/COG C. LANGALIS |IN DRAFT|

C/LA/M&CAM

DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1976
ORIG: E. CHARLES PAYNE:PDL
UNIT: LA/M&CAM/CN
EXT: 9041

OPS/ITG
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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CL BY: 026090

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ACTION UNIT: LA8

ACTION #

INFO: RF FILE VR IP/AN, NE8, DCO2, AGC/DOO, OPS/ITG4, LSN/ID, CI4, C/OPS, PS/EG2

T 194519 EIA168 PAGE 01-01 7 IN 027383

TOR:012212Z SEP 76 CAR: 38756

S E C R E T 012200Z SEP 76 STAFF

File Book-201
cc 22-5-76

CITE CARACAS 38756 (CARROLL ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MANAGUA, LA/MIAMI.

WNINTEL BEAM MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17653 (IN027258)

1. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE LOCAL LNERGO REP OF REF DEVELOPMENT TO HAVE HIM ALERT VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES. AMBASSADOR ADVISED.

2. FILE: 201-0299292; 201-0742365. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

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INFO: RF. FILE VR 3202, A6/000, DDO/AN, CI/STG4, OSG, C14, IS/EG2, C/OPS, SS/SO64

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T 194282 EIA865 PAGE 01 IN 027288

TOR:011941Z SEP 76 SDOM 17653

S E C R E T 011920Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17653

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MANAGUA, CARACAS INFO SAN JOSE, MEXICO CITY, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY, LA/MIAMI. pdg

		[illegible] PROGRAM
[illegible]	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		[illegible] FOR FILMING
[illegible]		[illegible] NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible] REST. [illegible]
		CABLE [illegible] (11)
		NFO (8)
[illegible]		FOR FILING

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. MANAGUA 12461 (027103)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17647 (024537)

C. SANTO DOMINGO 17646 (024037)

D. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (NOT NEEDED MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (016194)

1. EMWISE-15 REPORTED MORNING 1 SEPTEMBER THAT ORLANDO BOSCH GRANTED VISA BY NICARAGUAN AUTHORITIES. HE SAID BOSCH HAD ALSO OBTAINED VENEZUELAN VISA IN MANAGUA. HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT FRANK CASTRO HAD ALSO GOTTEN VENEZUELAN VISA BUT ASSMED THIS TO BE THE CASE.

2. AS NOTED REF D, CASTRO CARRIES U.S. PASSPORT A-2867917.

3. ACCORDING EMWISE-15, LOCAL CUBANS CLOSE TO BOSCH HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PUBLICLY DENOUNCE POLICE ACTION IN DEPORTING BOSCH BECAUSE "THEY WANT AMERICANS TO THINK HE'S STILL IN SANTO DOMINGO."

4. FILE: 201-299292, 201-742365, E2, IMPDET.

1 Sep 76

201-299292

S E C R E T

B201-742365

RECORD COPY

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG 2/76

Derby.

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TOTAL COPIES 26 RUN BY

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STAFF PRECEDENCE

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ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO RF. FILE VR LA/CN, DDO2, ADG/DDO

OPS/ITG4 C/OPS, CI4, OSG

PS/EG2, OSG/IC,

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T 193696 EIA364 PAGE 01 IN 027103

TOR:011650Z SEP 76 MANA 12461

S E C R E T 011630Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE MANAGUA 12461

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

MININTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17646 (024037)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17647 (024537)

ddy

[illegible] PROGRAM
RESTRICT
INDEX
CABLE IDEN (11)
NFG (3)
OCR FILING

1. ON MORNING 1 SEPTEMBER ERYTHROID-33 (CHIEF, LOCAL LIAISON) REPORTED THAT BOSCH AND CASTROL ARE IN MANAGUA. E-33 SAID THEY LEFT PARA 1, REF A FLIGHT AND WERE GIVEN PERMISSION TO REMAIN IN MANAGUA IN TRANSIT STATUS. THEIR REQUEST BASED ON THEIR CLAIM THAT THERE NO ROOM ON PLANE FOR THEM. IN ACCORDANCE LOCAL PROCEDURES, NON-US CIT TRANSIT PASSENGERS MAY REMAIN IN MANAGUA FOR UP TO THIRTY DAYS, BUT HAVE TO LEAVE THEIR PASSPORTS WITH IMMIGRATION. E-33 HAS BOSCH'S COSTA RICAN PASSPORT AND SHOWED IT TO COS. NAME IN PASSPORT IS AS REPORTED REF A, NUMBER 8744-71, DATED 10 FEB 71, VALID TO 1 SEPT 76. DOMINICAN EXIT STAMP IS DATED 29 AUGUST 1976. E-33 SAID CASTRO IS CARRYING US PASSPORT.

1 Sep 76

2. E-33 WILL ATTEMPT TO LOCATE BOSCH AND CASTRO, FIND OUT

B201-742365

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-299292

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S E C R E T

STAFF

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ACTION #

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T 193696 EIA364 PAGE 02-02 IN 027103

TOR:011650Z SEP 76 MANA 12461

WHERE THEY ARE STAYING IN MANAGUA, WHEN THEY PLAN TO LEAVE AND THEIR DESTINATION. WILL REPORT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AS RECEIVED.

3. FILE: 201-299292 AND 201-742335. E2, IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE 18-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR ~~[illegible]~~

DATE-TIME GROUP 3120432

CITE CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 906701

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/H/AN, C/LSN/10, C/OTS C/OTS/IT6 2, D/OMS 2, C/CI 2

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
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PER 50P
132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, DEPT OF STATE//SY/I/PIB, SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.Y

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.Y

SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC - COSTA RICA, ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST.Y

FIRCI-312/02647-76 BY

1. IN REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE DATED 16 JULY 1976, ENTITLED "NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF CUBA", COPY SENT ADDRESSEES, THIS AGENCY HAS THE FOLLOWING CURRENT INFORMATION ON ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA:Y

ON 29 AUGUST 1976 AN OFFICIAL DOMINICAN SERVICE REPORTED THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA HAS BEEN DEPORTED TO COSTA RICA USING HIS ECOSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. BOSCH DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 29 AUGUST 1976 ON IBERIA FLIGHT NO. 979 FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA VIA MANAGUA, NICARAGUA.Y

312/02647-76

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS 1,2.4

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

31 Aug 76

201-299292

D22-9-28

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CONF: INFO: FILE

906701

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BASED ON: SANTO DOMINGO 17646 |IN 024037| 30 AUGUST 1976

PROJECT: EMPYREX

OBJECTIVE: J

CABLE SEC: PLS MAKE CCS COPIES AVAILABLE TO IPAN FOR 201-299292 & 22-9-28

[illegible]

0170100

DO

DATE: 30 AUG 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 3487

C/LA/CAR

OPS/LSN CHARLES ENRIGHT (TELECOORD)

C/LA/COG

OPS/ITG
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CL BY: 018819

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OUTGOING MESSAGE 14-1

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
312218Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
906799

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE 2 OPS/ITG 4 7

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TO: SIGNAL CENTER.Y

PLEASE TRANSMIT SANTO DOMINGO 17646 TO SANTIAGO FOR INFORMATION. E2,IMPDET.H

Orlando Bosch
201

*COPY ATTACHED

DATE: 30 AUG 76 031
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT:

OPS/ITG P. PLUMB (TELECOORD)

C/LA/COG

C/LA

C/LA/CAR

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 012912

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

27-1

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CLASSIFICATION
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STAFF	312218Z	DIRECTOR	906798

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE DDO 2, AGC/DDO, NE 8 OPS/ITG 4, C/OPS, IP/AN DDO/DO

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TO: SANTO DOMINGO. Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE MHSPIKE Y

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17646* (IN 024037)

1. REF BEING RELAYED TO STATION SANTIAGO AND SUBSTANCE REF TO FBI. Y

2. FILE: 201-299292; 22-9-28. E2.IMPDET.d

*CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA DEPORTED TO COSTA RICA.

TRAVEL PROGRAM
~~RUSHMAC~~
INDEX
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[illegible] (4)
[illegible]

D22-9-28

31 Aug 76
201-299292

DATE: 30 AUG 76
ORIG: D. SMITH:JI
UNIT: LA/CAR/DRH
EXT: 3497

OPS/ITG P. PLUMB (TELECOORD)
LA/COG

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CL BY: 018913

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CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
TO Chief, Latin America Division		☐ INDEXING REQUESTED ☐ NO INDEXING
INFO. COS, San Jose, COS, Managua, COS, Guatemala City		☐ APERTURE CARD REQUESTED
FROM Chief of Station, Santo Domingo		
SUBJECT Passport Used by Orlando BOSCH to Enter and Depart the Dominican Republic		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17646
B. SANTO DOMINGO 17643
C. SANTO DOMINGO 17629
D. SAN JOSE 19662

1. Forwarded herewith is a Xerox copy of the Costa Rican passport used by Orlando BOSCH to enter the Dominican Republic in the name of Carlos Luis PANIAGUA Mendez. The passport was obtained and Xeroxed by EMCLIPPER-1 who provided a copy to the Station.

2. EMWISE-15 had previously reported that BOSCH entered the Dominican Republic with a false Costa Rican passport in the name of Pedro Antonio PENA. While BOSCH may be carrying a second Costa Rican passport in the PENA name, it appears that he entered the Dominican Republic with the PANIAGUA passport. The PANIAGUA passport forwarded herewith shows the following:

A. The Department of Migration of Costa Rica issued a visa on 24 March 1976 for travel to "C.A., Republica Dominicana" (p.13).

B. BOSCH departed Costa Rica at Pena Blancas on 26 March (p. 11) and entered Nicaragua (p. 9).

C. The Dominican Consulate in Managua issued a one-trip visa for the Dominican Republic on 30 March (p.14).

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
3 - C/LAD, w/att
2 - COS, San Jose, w/att
2 - COS, Managua, w/att
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att

To out pouch

TRAVEL PROGRAM

RECORD COPY

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HDCA-11056	30 August 1976
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-299292

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HDCA-11056

D. It appears that BOSCH entered Guatemala City by air on 30 March and departed 31 March (p. 15).

E. BOSCH arrived in Santo Domingo at Las Americas airport on 31 March (p. 15).

3. BOSCH told EMCLIPPER-1 that the real PANIAGUA had undertaken most of the travel shown in the passport, but EMCLIPPER-1 did not establish the date the passport was acquired by BOSCH or how.

4. As reported Ref A, BOSCH was deported to Costa Rica via Managua on 29 August on Iberia Flight 979. EMWISE-15 reported that the PANIAGUA passport was used to deport BOSCH.

for Rutherford J. LYNER

[illegible] EDITION

☐ CONTINUED

NO.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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		OSG

T 186729 EIA112 PAGE 01 IN 024037

TOR:301302Z AUG 76 SDOM 17646

S E C R E T 301245Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17646

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE, MANAGUA, DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. SANTO DOMINGO 17643 NOT SENT MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (IN 022601)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 NOT SENT MANAGUA, SAN JOSE) (IN 016194)

1. EMWISE-15 ADVISED STATION AT 0945 HOURS ON 29 AUGUST THAT ORLANDO BOSCH HAD BEEN DEPORTED ON IBERIA FLIGHT 9[illegible] AT 0600 HOURS, WITH DESTINATION SAN JOSE VIA MANAGUA. DECISION TO PUT BOSCH ON THIS FLIGHT WAS MADE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. BOSCH TRAVELLED ON SAME COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH WHICH HE ENTERED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN NAME OF CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. (EMWISE-15 HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF PEDRO ANTONIO PENA. THIS INFO WAS IN ERROR.)

2. ON 27 AUGUST STATION OBTAINED COPY OF PANIAGUA PASSPORT FROM EMCLIPPER-1 WHICH BEING POUCHED TO ACTION ADDEES.

3. NO OBJECTION ACTION ADDEES STATIONS INDICATING TO LIAISON THEY AWARE OF BOSCH TRAVEL WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME 30 Aug 76

SECRET

RECORD COPY.

201-299292

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ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 186729 EIA112 PAGE 02-02 IN 024837

TOR:301302Z AUG 76 SDOM 17646

PANIAGUA.

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT LA8

ACTION #

INFO: FILE VR 1P/AN DDO2 AGC/DDO NE8 OPS/ITG4 OSG 1/OPS CI4 PS/EG2 LSN/ID

T 183140 EIA621 PAGE 01

IN 022917

TOR:272050Z AUG 76

SDOM 17645

S E C R E T 272030Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17645

TO: DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 905008

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (IN 016194)

Orlando Bosch 201

1. PER PARA 2 REF B. ENCLIPPER-1 HAS PROVIDED STATION WITH FULL RUN-DOWN ON TRAVEL OF FRANK CASTRO PAZ (201-742365) FROM FEBRUARY 1975 THROUGH JULY 1976 AS FOLLOWS:

EXITS FROM SANTO DOMINGO:

1 FEBRUARY 1975

1 APRIL 1975

15 JUNE 1975

30 JUNE 1975

30 JULY 1975

17 AUGUST 1975

16 SEPTEMBER 1975

4 OCTOBER 1975

1 NOVEMBER 1975

15 FEBRUARY 1976

SECRET

14-00000

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ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______

ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF, FILE, VR.	STAFF 1 4 2 5 3 6
ACTION #			

T 103148 EIA621 PAGE 02 IN 022017

TOR:272050Z AUG 76 SDOM 17645

20 FEBRUARY 1976

12 APRIL 1976

23 APRIL 1976

20 MAY 1976

16 JUNE 1976

ENTRIES TO SANTO DOMINGO:

4 FEBRUARY 1975

10 APRIL 1975

22 JUNE 1975

13 JULY 1975

8 AUGUST 1975

6 SEPTEMBER 1975

30 SEPTEMBER 1975

20 OCTOBER 1975

25 NOVEMBER 1975

16 FEBRUARY 1976

29 FEBRUARY 1976

14 APRIL 1976

5 MAY 1976

20 MAY 1976

SECRET

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T 103148 EIA621 PAGE 03-03 IN 022917

TOR:2720582 AUG 76 SDOM 17645

8 JULY 1976.

2. ACCORDING EMPYREX, CASTRO DEPARTED SANTO DOMINGO 5 AUGUST AND RETURNED 15 AUGUST.

3. REQUEST HQS COMPARE DATES OF CASTRO TRAVEL WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED CUBAN EXILE TERRORIST ACTS.

4. NO OBJECTION PASS PARAS ONE AND TWO TRAVEL DATE TO LNERGO OR LOCAL SERVICES.

5. FILE: 201-742365. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

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38-2

SECRET

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DSM-DDO/DO

LA D 1610

LA 8

INFO RF/AN DDO2, AGC/DDO, OPS/ITG4, NE8, PS/EG2, SS4, OSG, 014, C/OPS

STAFF PROCESSING

T 182374 EIA864 PAGE 01 IN 822681

TOR:271685Z AUG 76 SDOM 17643

SECRET 271541Z AUG 76 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17643

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (016194)

1. MEMORANDUM OF ORLANDO BOSCH CITED PARA 3 REF WAS NOT GIVEN TO CHIEF OF POLICE, GENERAL NIVAR, UNTIL 25 AUGUST WHEN HE RESUMED HIS POST FOLLOWING EMERGENCY APPENDECTOMY. NIVAR IMMEDIATELY GAVE EMWISE-15 INSTRUCTIONS TO "LOCATE BOSCH AND THROW HIM OUT."

2. MEMORANDUM, WHICH SHOWN TO LYNER BY EMWISE-15 ON 26 AUGUST, STATES THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED COUNTRY WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA. EMWISE-15 CONFIRMED THAT BOSCH IS CARRYING ANOTHER COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ, AS REPORTED PARA 1 REF.

3. EMWISE-15 SAID HE HAS NOT YET LOCATED BOSCH. HE WAS ASKED TO INFORM STATION WITH AS MUCH LEAD TIME AS POSSIBLE WHEN BOSCH BEING DEPORTED, AIRLINE FLIGHT NUMBER AND NAME

27 Aug 76

RECORD COPY.

201-299292

S E C R E T

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T 182374 EIA864 PAGE 02-02 IN 022681

TOR:2716052 AUG 76 SDOM 17643

AND PASSPORT BEING USED. ALTHOUGH EMWISE-15 HAS PROMISED DO THIS, SLIP UP IS POSSIBLE. IN ORDER KEEP TABS ON BOSCH'S FUTURE WHEREABOUTS, SUGGEST HQS INFO LA STATIONS THAT BOSCH MAY BE DEPORTED IMMINENTLY, WILL PROBABLY TRAVEL, AT LEAST DURING FIRST LEG OF TRIP, WITH COSTA RICAN PASSPORT IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA OR CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ. STATION'S GUESS IS THAT DOMINICAN'S WILL INSIST HE LEAVE WITH PENA IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THIS IS HOW HE ENTERED COUNTRY. NO OBJECTION PASS ABOVE INFO TO LNERGO AND TO LOCAL LIAISONS AS APPROPRIATE.

4. FILE: 201-299292. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

Attachment to IN-469937

SRF/M-105

27 August 1976

Chronology
Files
Orlando
BOSCH

MEMORANDUM FOR: LNERGO, Miami

FROM : SRF, Miami

SUBJECT : Orlando BOSCH Avila

According to a reliable source in Santo Domingo, the Government of the Dominican Republic has decided to deport Orlando BOSCH Avila as soon as security officials can locate him. BOSCH may be deported using a Costa Rican passport in the name of Pedro Antonio PENA or Carlos Luis PANIAGUA Mendez. We suspect that the Dominican Government will insist that BOSCH depart from the Dominican Republic in the name of PENA since this is how he entered the country. There is to date no evidence as to what country BOSCH will be deported.

OUTGOING - MESSAGE

27-3

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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S E C R E T

STAFF

270032Z DIRECTOR 905008

CONF: LA5 INFO: FILE I/PIAN, EURY, AFY, EAY, FRY, OPS/ITGY

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DISSEM BY: 45

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TO: LASS, MADRID, PARIS, LONDON, LISBON, ROME, BONN, BONN BASE, COPENHAGEN, KINSHASA, LUSAKA, TOKYO, OTTAWA, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON. Y

ORLANDO BOSCH 201

UNINTEL REAM MHPROSE TRACE Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 896657

B. SANTO DOMINGO 17629 (IN 0161941) NOT SENT OR NEEDED ALL ADDEES

1. REF B ADVISED THAT FRANK CASTRO PAZ, LIVING IN SANTO DOMINGO, IS KNOWN TO BE ORLANDO BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTIST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. IT REQUESTED CONFIRMATION OF INFO ON FRANK D. CASTRO PEREZ CITED PARA 1 C REF A. THIS IS TO CLARIFY THAT THE FRANK CASTRO INVOLVED WITH FLNC IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IS IN FACT EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ, AKA FRANK CASTRO, OF REF B, AND NOT THE FRANK D. CASTRO PEREZ CITED IN PARA 1 C REF A. Y

2. MOST OF FOLLOWING IS SENSITIVE FBI SOURCE INFO, FYI ONLY IN CONNECTION REF B, AND NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE BKHERALD WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL. Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 025231

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2

SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

905008

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 0 0 DISSEM BY: PER.

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3. THE CASTRO CITED PARA 2 REF B IS EULALIO FRANCISCO CASTRO PAZ (201-742365), BORN 4 JUNE 42 AT MARIANAO, CUBA; AKA PAPO, E. CASTRO, F. ASTRO, AND FRANK CASTRO. PHOTO AVAILABLE. REPORTEDLY LEFT CUBA FOR U.S. CLANDESTINELY BY BOAT 11 DEC 62 (SIC - BELIEVED BE 61). RESIDED PHILADELPHIA JAN TO OCT 62; NEW YORK OCT TO NOV 62; SERVED U.S. ARMY 5 NOV 62 THRU 6 DEC 63 AS LIGHT WEAPONS INFANTRYMAN. REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR MANUEL ARTIME IN APR 65 RECRUITING PEOPLE IN MIAMI TO FIGHT COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AS OF MAR 74 WAS EMPLOYED AS SALESMAN WITH FABRIC BAZAAR, INC., MIAMI, FLA. MOVED TO DOM REP EARLY 75. AS OF MAR 75 WAS ESTABLISHING INTERIOR DECORATOR FIRM CASTEVILLE C. POR A. IN SANTO DOMINGO. REPORTEDLY WAS TRYING SET UP EXPORT-IMPORT BUSINESS IN DOM REP APR 75. DURING 72 MARRIED ANA MARGARITA DE WINDT, DAUGHTER OF RETIRED REAR ADMIRAL CESAR DE WINDT LAVANDIER OF DOMINICAN NAVY. CASTRO REPORTEDLY TOLD FBI SOURCE OCT 75 THAT HEAD OF SANTO DOMINGO POLICE HAD IT IN FOR HIM AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY FRIEND OF CASTRO'S FATHER-IN-LAW.

4. CASTRO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY BETWEEN DOM REP AND MIAMI. WAS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SECRET

STAFF

DIRECTOR

90500 8

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

DEPORTED FROM DOM REP 4 OCT 75 WITH HUMBERTO LOPEZ JR., A FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL DE CUBA (FLNC) LEADER AND FEDERAL FUGITIVE ARRESTED BY FBI UPON ARRIVAL FLA. UPON ARRIVAL MIAMI 4 OCT 75 CASTRO'S U.S. PASSPORT BORE CACHETS SHOWING DEPARTURE VENEZUELA 23 SEPT 75; ENTRY "ELDORADO-BOGOTA" COLOMBIA 27 SEPT 75. CASTRO CLAIMED HE AND OTHERS PLACED BOMBS AT RUSSIAN EMBASSY AND IN THEATRE IN BOGOTA. CASTRO IS LICENSED PILOT, PROFICIENT PARACHUTIST AND SKYDIVER. WAS/IS LEADER OF "GOLDEN FALCONS" SKYDIVING CLUB OF CUBAN EXILES OPERATING OUT OF HOMESTEAD, FLA. HE BECAME U.S. CITIZEN 5 OCT 71. HQS RECORDS CONTAIN NO INDICATION HE EVER EMPLOYED BY BKHERALD. Y

5. FILE: 201-742365; 201-309124. E2, IMPDET.A

LA/COG/COMMENT: SANTO DOMINGO RIQUESTED CLARIFICATION OF INFO ON FRANK CASTRO CITED IN DIRECTOR 896657.

DATE: 24 AUGUST 76
ORIG: CHRISTINE HOPKINSIMS
UNIT: LA/COG/CICS
EXT: 1491

C/LA/OPS
AP Cups
EA Cups
26/8/ww

AC/EHR
AC/LA
C/EA
C/AF
DC/FR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 052231

~~[illegible]~~
bcd for [illegible]

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, August 23, 1976 C23

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Plot to Assassinate Kissinger

A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by U.S. and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was to have been carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and U.S. intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on Kissinger's life was expected, according to reports, during his visit to Costa Rica in February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Cost Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and the Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified Costa Rican authorities. Bosch was arrested and put in all four days before Kissinger arrived.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in 1973. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story in 1974 after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 19, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination . . . against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a . . . thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger was a target came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's Little Havana. He later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said about "the plan to assassinate the U.S. Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

In a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact, which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the U.S. journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro leaders who had conspired to kill American and other leaders promoting a Cuban-American detente. Bosch had been convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a bazooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped federal parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Forida's Dade County Public Safety Department, because of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellent ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he testified" that there was going to be attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger . . . We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

Johnson's Junkets — Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter must have Don Johnson mind when he charges that the Republicans find cushy jobs in the bureaucracy for defeated GOP legislators.

Johnson, a former Iowa congressman, was appointed by President Nixon to head the Veterans Administration. But he was forced out of office when he proved to be a lackluster leader. So he was shuffled over to the Commerce Department, where he has been ensconced as deputy assistant secretary for domestic and international business.

Johnson has used both posts to travel, mostly to Iowa, where he has kept his political fences mended in the hope of running for office again.

At the Commerce Department alone, he has spent at least $7,000 on travel, $5,204 in the last year. He always goes first class, despite the fact that government regulations require coach travel for federal employees. The enterprising Johnson, however has a ready excuse for his luxury accommodations.

"I'm a hell of a big man," he told our reporter Barbara Takel. "I'm 6-foot-6 and weigh 270 pounds." Johnson also said his bad back forced him to fly in the forward compartment. Despite his many excursions to his home state, he denied having any plans for a comeback in politics.

Bosch
24

14-00000

"THE WASHINGTON STAR"

23 AUGUST 1976

Miami Called Base Of Cuban Terrorists

United Press International

Militant pro- and anti-Castro Cuban groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to closed-door testimony before a Senate subcommittee released yesterday.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security chaired by Sen. James O. Eastland, D-Miss. It said that as many as 50 different Cuban groups of various shadings have been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lt. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County, Fla., Public Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

LYONS SAID MOST Cubans in the area are hard-working and industrious, but some individuals "use Dade Country as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lyons said, there have been four homicides with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Diaz said some Castro groups have infiltrated exile organisations and there were plans to assassinate Latin American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

THE FBI AND Secret Service were notified, he said. A widely-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There were no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the CIA's own efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and U.S. gangsters to kill Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of underworld figure John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Comitteee that he and Chicago gangster Sam Giancana were hired by the CIA to recruit Cubans to kill Castro.

Giancana was killed by unknown persons last year just before he was to testify before the Washington panel.

IT WAS LEARNED yesterday a lawyer for Roselli told the FBI in 1967 that the underworld figure, recruited by the CIA to kill Castro, believed agents of the Cuban leader were involved in slaying President Kennedy.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Edward P. Morgan, Roselli's former lawyer, was included in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation. But it did not identify Morgan at the interviewee.

Morgan told the FBI, according to the summary, that Roselli and another client were called on to participate in a government-approved project aimed at assassinating Castro. He said Castro employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

Egyptian Plane Hijacked, Other Arabs Blamed

CAIRO (AP) — An Egyptian airliner was hijacked today by seven gunmen believed to be Libyans, Palestinians and Lebanese, informed sources said.

The plane was on its way from Cairo to Luxor, 330 miles to the south.

A spokesman for Egyptair, the Egyptian airline, said the plane, a Boeing 737, landed in Luxor, and the hijackers threatened to blow it up unless fuel was provided.

Security men surrounded the plane, the spokesman said.

He reported there were 65 passengers and crew members aboard. Some of the passengers were foreign tourists on their way to Luxor to see the ancient Temples of Karnak and the Valley of the Kings. But their nationalities were not available.

7-71 MFG 2/76

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CIOPS NE8 DDO2 CI4 PS/EG2 059
059/IG SS4

T 166233 EIA163 PAGE 01 IN 016194

TOR:202134Z AUG 76 SDON 17629

SECRET 202108Z AUG 76 STAFF

30

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 17629

TO: DIRECTOR INF LA/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM MHSPIKE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 896657

B. DIRECTOR 899232

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DEC 17 1976
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1. EMCLIPPER-1 HAS ADVISED STATION THAT ORLANDO BOSCH CALLED ON HIM A FEW WEEKS AGO TO REQUEST THAT DOMINCAN GOVERNMENT ISSUE VISAS TO HIS MOTHER AND SISTER TO VISIT HIM IN SANTO DOMINGO. (VISAS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED BY CONSULATE IN MAIMI) ON THIS OCCASION EMCLIPPER-1 ASKED BOSCH IF HE HAD ENTERED DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WITH FALSE DOMINICAN PASSPORT. DENYING THIS, BOSCH BRANDISHED COSTA RICAN PASSPORT WITH EMCLIPPER-1 ASKED TO SEE. PASSPORT IS IN NAME OF CARLOS LUIS PANIAGUA MENDEZ AND PHOTO IS GOOD LIKENESS OF BOSCH. BOSCH SAID HE HAD HIS EYE OPERATION FOR CATARACTS AND WOULD BE LEAVING DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SHORTLY.

2. STATION HAS RECEIVED REPORT FROM EMPYREX (WRITTEN BY EMPYREX-8 IN MAIMI) STATEING THAT FRANK CASTRO PAZ.

20 Aug 76

201-742365

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
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201-299292

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F-71 MFG. 2/76

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INFO RF FILE VR

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T 166233 EIA163 PAGE 02 IN 016194

TOR:2021342 AUG 76 SDOM 17629

WHO IS MARRIED TO DAUGHTER OF RETIRED DOMINICAN ADMIRAL AND LIVING IN SANTO DOMINGO. (SEE PARA 1 C REF A) IS KNOWN TO BE BOSCH'S CONTACT MAN AND MESSENGER CARRIER TO CUBAN RIGHTEST GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA. STATION BELIEVES THIS MAY WELL BE TRUE. CASTRO, WHO CARRIES AMERICAN PASSPORT B-2097917, DEPARTED AND RETURNED SANTO DOMINGO THREE TIMES DURING MAY AND JUNE ALONE. EMPYREX REPORTS HIS MOST RECENT RETURN ON 15 AUGUST. EMCLIPPER-1 WILL ATTEMPT DETAIL ALL OF FRANK CASTRO'S TRAVEL DURING PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. HE IS ALSO THINKING OF LIFTING CASTRO'S PASSPORT NEXT TIME HE ENTERS SANTO DOMINGO AIRPORT IN EFFORT PIN DOWN TRAVEL DESTINATIONS. WE NOTE THAT REF A, PARA 1 C LISTS CASTRO'S MATRONYMIC AS PEREZ RATHER THAN CORRECTLY AS PAZ. ALSO, EMPYREX REPORTS THAT U.S. PASSPORT (B-2097917) WHICH HE USING AT LEAST FOR TRAVEL BETWEEN DOMINCAN REPUBLIC AND PUERTO RICO, LISTS HIS BIRTH DATE AS 6 JUNE 1942 RATHER THAN 4 SEPTEMBER 1919 AS REPORTED REF A PARA 1 C. PLEASE CONFIRM 201 NUMBER FOR CASTRO IN REF A IS ACCURATE.

5. ON 18 AUGUST EMWISE-15 SHOWED TO EMCARNET-1 COPY OF MEMO HE HAD WRITTEN TO CHIEF OF POLICE URGING THAT BOSCH BE THROWN

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FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/76

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T 166233 EIA163 PAGE 03-03 IN 016194

TOR:2021342 AUG 76 SDOM 17629

OUT OF COUNTRY. MEMO STATES THAT INFO HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY POLICE FROM RELIABLE SOURCES THAT DURING HIS STAY IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BOSCH HAS MET WITH CUBAN EXILE LEADERS FROM PUERTO RICO, MIAMI, NEW YORK, CARACAS, MEXICO CITY AND "POSSIBLY PANAMA".

4. INDEX BOSCH, CASTRO. FILE: 201-299292, 201-390124.

E2, IMPDET.

90

SECRET

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-406

FROM AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

DATE: 11 APRIL 1963

CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: U.S. BUSINESSMAN SIGNS CONTRACTS WITH HAITIAN GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL BANK

CHARLES, Clenard Joseph L. HAITI

President and General Manager
of the Commercial Bank of Haiti

President and General Manager of the Commercial Bank of Haiti (Banque Commerciale d'Haiti - BCH), [illegible] Clemard Joseph Charles is known as a confidant of President [illegible] Francois Duvalier and as a businessman of questionable repute. One well-informed [illegible] official source reports ~~that Charles, is~~ [illegible] a "slippery character"; ~~and that although~~ is active on the Haitian scene; ~~there is~~ considerable doubt exists ~~as to Charles'~~ [illegible] his importance or political significance despite the fact that he appears to have a "line into the Palace" and is persona grata with the President. Source: President, National Bank of Haiti Regarding Charles' business interests, a prominent and knowledgeable Haitian recently (March 1963) reported that the Commercial Bank ~~of Haiti~~ is in bad shape, "holding a worthless portfolio made up of notes guaranteed by political figures," and that Charles himself was dishonest. ~~having~~ for example, he recently approved a loan for $14,000 on his daughter's signature alone. Furthermore, Charles was alleged by this same source to know nothing about banking and to be a favorite of President Duvalier. [illegible] This estimate is confirmed by one U.S. official who adds that Charles is more accurately described as a "promotor" than as a businessman and that he is a partner in the BCH rather than the sole owner. Charles ~~frequently~~ endeavors to attract US venture capital for various Haitian projects and claims to be an honorary citizen of Long Beach, Long Island, New York, having promoted a "sister city" relationship between that town and Port-au-Prince.

?

A dark Negro about five-feet seven-inches tall, Clemard Joseph Charles

S REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED IN ROUGH UNEDITED — for biog. files, Report on Haitian opposition personalities
M TO EXPEDITE THE SERVICING OF AN URGENT REQUEST. ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

201-457029

was born of peasant parents at Gonaïves, Haiti, on 21 April 1923, ~~and received~~ ~~[illegible]~~ received his primary education at a parochial school, and graduated from the Lycée Geffrard in 1939. According to Charles' own account, during his early career he taught in rural Haitian schools, and worked as an upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor and free lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed comptroller general of the Haitian Southern Banana Industry, and in 1949 he became general agent ~~in 1949~~; he then established himself as a manufacturer's representative and created his own export-import business. Charles traveled to London in 1953 and to Brussels in 1957 as a member of various Haitian Government missions. Charles ~~further~~ states that he created the Commercial Bank of Haiti in 1960 and is its sole owner, as well as being the sole representative in Haiti of the General Electric Company, Ltd., of London, England and of Siemens Schuckert Werke, Germany.

Charles and his wife, Sophie, have one adopted son.

March 1963

DJR

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED IN ROUGH UNEDITED FORM TO EXPEDITE THE SERVICING OF AN URGENT REQUEST.

Y-1

STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4 of 5
Enclosure No. 1
Port-au-Prince A-345
5 March 63

Pres Natl. Bk. of Haiti

Smaller Commercial Banks in Bad Shape

Antoine André remarked quite flatly that there are really only two banks in Haiti, the BNRH and the Royal Bank. The others are pretty sad affairs. The BANQUE COLOMBO-HAITIAN, for example, has a portfolio of $1.4 million which is, as André put it, "all fraud". The president of that bank, he said, is a rich man today. His technique, according to André, is to find someone willing to accept a loan which he knows cannot or will not repay on which he kicks back in some cases more than half. André said he knows personally of one man who was leaving for the United States who signed notes for $10,000 and accepted $2,000, the remainder going into the pocket of the bank president. As for reserves, the Colombo-Haitian bank has been below the legal requirements for months and is now paying, in accordance with law, fines of $150 daily. What will happen when depositors want their money back he, André, would rather not think about.

André said he knew the bank had tried to interest some American investors in the business, perhaps in the hope of getting new capital with which to keep going. He, André, however, understood that the Americans were a rather dubious Miami group; even if they did come in (which he did not at the moment foresee) he didn't think it would improve the situation. The Colombo-Haitian bank, he said, was in such poor shape it would take a major overhaul to save it.

I had led the conversation over to the Colombo-Haitian bank because of certain special interests we have. I now took the occasion to ask about Clemard CHARLES and his COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. André replied that the situation was practically the same. The bank held a worthless portfolio made up of notes guaranteed by political figures. Charles himself was dishonest - recently, for example, he had approved a loan for $14,000 on his daughter's signature alone - and he also knew nothing about banking but he was something of a favorite with the President who gave him support. The BNRH holds mortgages on the Commercial Bank of Haiti, for example, and, since payments are now substantially in arrears, André said, he might have foreclosed. The President, however, had asked him not to in order to avoid a scandal.(5)

Balance of Payments Situation Temporarily Improved

Turning briefly to the balance of payments question, I asked André how matters now stood (having in mind, but not mentioning, some

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(5) The latest balance sheet on the Commercial Bank of Haiti, with some comment on its president, was forwarded with Embassy A-325, February 15, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-325

DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

SUBJECT: BANKING: BALANCE SHEET OF THE
BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 2 AUGUST 1962

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: RE: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: 105-6311 (MIAMI)

SECRET

File: 201-97839

JOSEPH D. CHARLES

Joseph D. Charles, a Negro, was born 15 November 1907, at Limbe, Haiti. He is married and has five children. He received his law degree at the Law School in Cap Hatien in 1928. A former law professor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney and Judge of the Civil Court in Cap Hatien (1928 - 1940), Charles served as Ambassador to the United States from 8 October 1946 until 1 June 1960. During this period, he served also as Ambassador on the Council of the Organization of American States (1949 - 1950). He resigned his ambassadorial post after the fall of the government of President Estime who had appointed him. On 29 February 1952, he was designated Secretary of Education and Public Works by President Magloire and resigned from the cabinet on 31 March 1953, allegedly because of his opposition to increasingly close ties between the governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Charles chaired the Haitian delegation to the second post of the first session of the UN General Assembly (1946), the second session (1947) and the fourth session (1949). He chaired also the delegation to the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogata (1948) and is reported to have been friendly to the United States.

Charles has in the past been mentioned more than once as a possible successor to the incumbent president. The most recent occasion was in 1955 when he was mentioned as a possible successor to President Paul E. Magloire.

SECRET

Madame Charles, nee Telson, is a sister of Adelphin Telson, formerly Minister of Defense and Justice, formerly President of the Chamber of Deputies, who is friendly to the US and in contact with US officials in Port-au-Prince. A sister of Madame Charles is married to Colonel Marcaisse Prosper, former Chief of Police under the Magloire government. It has been alleged that the three men, Charles, Telson and Prosper, constitute a potentially strong political force in Haiti.

SECRET

COUNTRY	Haiti	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,260,765
SUBJECT	Interview with Clemard Joseph Charles/ Possible Duvalier Successor/His Ideas/ Friends and Supporters/Interpretation of Current Situation	DATE DISTR.	10 May 1963
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	00/CD Case 40556
DATE OF INFO.	To early May 63		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---/2 May 63		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, former journalist, who has followed developments in the Caribbean area closely for many months and maintains contact with persons directly concerned with the area.

His command of French and his habit of making detailed shorthand notes enable him to report with an unusual degree of accuracy.

1. On 2 May 63, we had a four-hour interview with Clemard Joseph Charles, president and general manager of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, vice president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, and cousin of Joseph D. Charles, former Haitian ambassador to the US.

2. Clemard Charles, whose PO Box in Port-au-Prince is No. 5751, told us that he was a man of peasant stock and that while a business leader he has the full confidence of the predominantly peasant population of Haiti, and, that with the additional backing of forcibly retired anti-Duvalier army officers, intellectuals, journalists and businessmen, he is in a position to become the head of a provisional government after Duvalier is removed. He believes the span between now and 15 May when Duvalier's term expires and 22 May, when his new term is scheduled to commence, will be the most crucial period for Haiti. He believes Duvalier is ready to institute a reign of terror, killing those who oppose him, and is willing to accept Sovbloc help. About two weeks ago the Polish charge d'affaires left Port-au-Prince for Poland, and Charles believes he carries Duvalier's request for economic and possibly military help.

3. As vice president of the Chamber of Commerce, he learned that in early April 1963 a Czechoslovak delegation arrived in Port-au-Prince, presumably to discuss trade matters, a fact which gave rise to rumors that it consisted of military technicians.

4. Charles firmly believes this will be the last chance for the US Government to help establish a democratic Haiti friendly to the US and save the country for a Castro-type Communist takeover. Although he has been on good terms with Duvalier, he now feels that the President "went crazy and must be stopped before he liquidates the opposition. Shortly after Charles made this statement he was called to the phone. Returning, he told us that one of his friends had been killed two days before by Duvalier forces. He declined to give the name of the alleged victim, but talked freely about some of his own influential supporters on whom he could rely with a firm pledge of holding free elections:

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

CONTROLLED DISSEM: The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

14-00000

Ambrose IHARINKY (201-345467) to FBI in Nov 62 that DESINOR is one of two card-carrying Communists in Gov't.

a. Clovis Desinor, Secretary of Commerce & Industry, and a good friend.
b. [illegible], retired colonel, former Haitian military attache in Washington
c. Col. (fnu) Honorat, now an asylee in the Brazilian Embassy, Port-au-Prince
d. Col. H. [illegible], retired officer, "a good and honest man."
e. Former Ambassador Joseph D. Charles
f. Dr. Emile Saint-Lot, former law professor; president of Haitian Senate and National Assembly in 1957; former ambassador to France, now in exile in New York (Apt. 12J, 392 Central Park West at 100th St., tel. UN 5-5315). Charles called him a "player," that is, an Opportunist, but anti-Duvalier.
g. Col. (fnu) Cham

5. Charles intimated that he had many other prominent supporters who are violently anti-Duvalier and who are ready to back "my government." He has just passed his 40th birthday (he was born 21 Apr 1923 in Gonaives), ~~who~~ which makes him eligible for the presidency in so far as the constitutional age requirement is concerned. In case he did not become provisional president after Duvalier's overthrow, he would be satisfied with the post of Secretary of Finance & Economic Affairs. He said the present secretary, Dr. Herve Boyer, has leftist tendencies, and his wife is definitely a Communist.

HARNETT described BOYER as second card-carrying Commie known to him

6. Charles added that as he is of "100% black origin" (He is very black), he would be qualified to become president. He said that only those who are in this category can become president.

7. Charles said he would need the "moral and economic help of the US Government and people" to transform Haiti into a true and prosperous democracy. He said he would need about one year to put into ~~use~~ effect his "plan for the economic and social development of Haiti," which, among others has these salient points:

a. Creation of a balanced economy adapted to Haitian conditions
b. Development of industry and exploitation of natural resources
c. Modernization of agriculture

8. Charles would like to present his plan to US officials for consideration. He said about 90% of Haitians are against Duvalier, who maintains his rule by keeping the militia strong. ~~Duva~~ Duvalier no longer has funds to pay the militiamen but allows them to "live off the land." Charles believes that in the event of an anti-Duvalier uprising, the army would kill the hated militiamen who are ~~respon~~ responsible only to Duvalier.

9. Once Duvalier is finished, Charles would suggest that as a goodwill gesture toward the Haitians, who are overwhelmingly pro-US, the US construct the promised airport and thus create jobs. Another way to bolster the economy would be to encourage tourists.

10. Charles hopes the Dominican Republic will not invade Duvalier's Haiti. He believes the Dominicans could easily defeat Haiti's army and militia but an invasion would cause the Haitians to rally around Duvalier in defense of their country.

11. Before leaving Port-au-Prince, Charles worked out a telephone code with his wife, Sophie. On 30 Apr 63, he called her, and she told him "not to rush home," which meant that his life might be in danger if he returned to Haiti now. In view of this, he told the Haitian Consul in New York that he has to stay a few days longer to buy parts for machines used in his Haitian sisal enterprise.

12. Charles gave the following data concerning his career: He went to parochial school; in 1937, was graduated from Lycee Geffrard, Gonaives; taught in rural schools after his father's death in 1939, and also supported his family by working as upholsterer, timekeeper, plantation supervisor and

free-lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed controller general of southern Haiti banana industry and became general agent in 1948. In 1949 he established his own export-import business. In 1953 he went to London as a member of a Haitian government economic mission. In 1954 on behalf of Haiti he negotiated a contract with General Electric, Ltd., of Coventry, UK, for modernisation and extension of Haiti's telecommunications system. In 1957 he was appointed member of a Haitian mission to an international conference in Brussels. In 1960 he founded Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, of which he is sole owner. In addition, he is full or part owner of the following Haitian enterprises: Universal Enterprises SA; National Deutsch (sic) Associates; Clemard Joseph Charles Import-Export; a South Haiti cocoa enterprise; J.C.Charles & Co. He is sole representative of General Electric, Ltd., of London, and Siemens Schukert Werke, West Germany. In the past few years he has made many business trips to the US, UK, France, Italy and West Germany. He said he had invested about US$500,000 in the Haitian economy and as a patriot under no circumstances will he take money out of Haiti.

merit

13. Charles, who is married and has one adopted son, has received many honors, including the Civil Mast Order, Officer of the Labor Order, etc. In 1962 he was given the Key of the City of New York.

14. Charles concluded by saying that in the world today there are two alternatives: The US or the USSR. He says he and his group have chosen the US. As to how to get rid of Duvalier, he said "the tyrant may be killed by the army" before 22 May 63. He did not elaborate; he merely called attention to Trujillo's fate.

-end-

14-00000

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE NO. ______

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 2 MAY 196[illegible]

☐ ROUTINE ☒ PRIORITY ☐ URGENT

FROM: WH [illegible]

ORIGINATING OFFICER: LATIN AMERICA DB

PHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

TRANSMIT TO:

NYOR CITE W______

CONFIDENTIAL
(CLASSIFICATION)

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

[illegible]

NEW CASE 40556: RE FREUND-CZAJKOWSKI TELECONS OF 1 AND 2 MAY: THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE SUBMITTED FOR CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES:

A. WHOM DOES CHARLES SEE AS THE MOST DESIRABLE INTERIM PRESIDENT IN CASE DUVALIER IS OUSTED? WHAT ARE HIS REASONS FOR THIS PREFERENCE?

B. WHAT IS SOURCE'S ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN HAITIAN POLITICAL FIGURES WHO ARE COMMONLY CHARACTERIZED AS LEFTISTS OR COMMUNISTS? AMONG THESE ARE PAUL BLANCHET, EDRISS ST. ARMAND AND HERVE BOYER. DOES HE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE UNDER MOSCOW DISCIPLINE?

C. DOES CHARLES KNOW ANYTHING OF THE REPORTED ENTRANCE INTO HAITI IN EARLY APRIL OF A SMALL NUMBER OF CZECH MILITARY TECHNICIANS?

D. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BACKGROUND DATA ON CHARLES. SEE CASE 40257. ALSO, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE PLACE AND DATE OF HIS BIRTH FOR NAME CHECK PURPOSES.

E-N-D

00/C learned from Army intell that Charles [illegible]
00/ [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 172 REPLACES FORM [illegible] 1949
1 SEP 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, DO/COEO	EXTENSION 2224	NO. IX-122
		DATE 2 May 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/COEO/Allen				
2. DO/COEO/Bessette				
3. 14 MAY 1963 RI/AN Attn: Dick Leach				Please classify into ~~200-6-203/3~~ 201-357029
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. 10 MAY 1963 DO/COEO/Bessette				File Copy - 201 file
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

ROUTING	ITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
~~[illegible]~~	

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

IX-122
2 May 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - M. Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. WUBRINY/1 telephoned on the sterile line from Chicago, on his way to the West Coast, to report his final contact before departing with subject.

2. Subject telephoned WUBRINY/1 on 1 May and said that because of the recent unpleasant developments in Haiti he thought it would be quite inappropriate to continue discussions regarding WUSALINE possible investment in the area at least until things were clarified.

3. M. CHARLES indicated that he was returning to Haiti shortly and asked if WUBRINY/1 could visit him there. WUBRINY/1 said that he would consider this or have one of his representatives go, if it later seemed desirable. He indicated, however, a continuing interest in the investment picture in Haiti if, as, and when.

C. FRANK STONE, III
Chief
DO/COEO

DO/COEO/CFS:jj(2 May 1963)
Distribution:
Orig - EO subject
1 - EO chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops

201-352029
ABSTRACT X INDEX
IX 122
DATE

CS CO

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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1999

IX-104

30 April 1963

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY - Haitian Operation

1. WUBRINY/1 telephoned from his residence on the sterile line at approximately 0930 hours to report the following.

2. WUBRINY/1 said that he believed that the meeting that is to be held by Mr. CHARLES and WUBRINY/1 plus an unnamed third party would involve a Mr. Tardieu.

3. I told WUBRINY/1 there had been considerable interest in this general development on the part of the Department of State and cited (without identification) A-406, Amembassy, Port-au-Prince, dated April 11, 1963, subject: U.S. Businessman Signs Contracts with Haitian Government and Local Bank. I told WUBRINY/1 that the Department information I had before me cited Le Moniteur of March 13, 1963 and said that the Airgram also mentioned a Mr. Bert Cindine TARDIEU. I also gave WUBRINY/1 the points raised under "comment" on page 2 of the Airgram.

4. WUBRINY/1 said that he agreed with all of these comments as he had come to the same conclusions.

5. I told WUBRINY/1 that there was obviously considerable interest in any reporting that he can do on this subject and requested that he let me know when the meeting takes place and continue his detailed reporting as heretofore. He agreed to do so.

C. FRANK STONE, III
Chief
DO/COEO

DO/COEO/CFS:jj(30 Apr 63)
Distribution:
Orig - EO subject
1 - EO chrono
1 - WUBRINY Ops

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downgrading and
declassification

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~~1999~~

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-419

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT-AU-PRINCE

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI ON APRIL 18, 1963

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DO/HQT Rm. 5 B 2825

EXTENSION: 4551

NO.

DATE: 25 April 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/COEO Attn: Gale W. Allen		30 APR 1963		2-4.
2. C/DO/COEO	[illegible]	[illegible]		Suggest additional
3. DODS/ops/Janney				info obtained from B/1 be added to the
4. DO/COEO/ALLEN				official 201-
5.				
6.				
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~~SECRET~~

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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1999

IX No. 76

23 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/COEO

ATTENTION : Mr. Gale W. Allen

SUBJECT : Trace Reply - Clemard Joseph CHARLES

REFERENCE : DO/COEO Memorandum dated 23 April 1963 requesting traces on CLEMARD, Joseph Charles

1. There are no traces on Clemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357-029) born 21 April 1923 at Gonaives, Haiti, who is President and General Manager of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, in RID or at the WH/Haitian Desk. In March 1963, Biographics Register prepared a summary of information on Mr. CHARLES for inclusion in the Biographic Intelligence Report on Haitian Opposition Personalities. This summary is made up of information obtained from several different sources. One source classifies CHARLES as a slippery character who is active on the Haitian scene and refers to him as a "promoter" rather than a businessman, who endeavers to attract United States "venture" capital for various Haitian projects and then becomes a partner by virtue of the promotion. Biographics Register has a very high opinion of this Source, who is the State Department's Haiti Desk Officer. During a debriefing on CHARLES, in February 1963, this same source stated that CHARLES is a confidant of President Duvalier and that he has emerged as an active businessman by virtue of his priviledged position with the President.

2. Another source of information regarding CHARLES' business interests is the President of the National Bank of Haiti who considers CHARLES, himself, as dishonest. For example, according to Source, CHARLES approved a loan of $14,000.00 on his daughter's signature alone. Also, the Commercial Bank of Haiti held a worthless portfolio made up

SECRET

SUBJECT: Trace Reply - Clemard Joseph CHARLES

of notes guaranteed by political figures. This Source also stated that CHARLES was "something of a favorite of the President, who gave him support."

3. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of Department of State Airgram No. A-325, dated 16 February 1963, from the United States Embassy, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, subject: Banking: Balance Sheet of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti which includes some information on CHARLES' life story. You will note the comment in the last paragraph of Airgram A-325 that reads, ". . . Be all that as it may, the Embassy has no strongly adverse information concerning Mr. Charles' integrity or banking honesty. And as the balance sheet shows, his bank, if not thriving, is at least still a going concern.

4. It may be that a check with OO/C through Mr. Schreyer's office and a request for field station traces will provide additional information concerning CHARLES. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to RID with a request for a 201 file on Subject which will be forwarded to you on permanent charge.

Anna Panor

Anna Panor
DO/HQT

Enclosures:
1. State Airgram No. A-325 (copy)
2. Draft BR Summary

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

24 April 1963

201

CONTACT REPORT

WUBRINY/1 - Ambassador Boengnignon - Clemard Joseph Charles

1. Ambassador Boengnignon had previously informed WUBRINY/1 that Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, was coming to New York on 24 April and suggested that WUBRINY/1 might work with him in financing Boengnignon's diplomatic residence in Haiti.

2. Mr. Allen informed WUBRINY/1 that Charles is a confident of President Duvalier and could be expected to report on all Americans with whom he had conversations and the substance of these conversations. WUBRINY/1 was admonished that in any contact with Charles the security of WUBRINY/1's relationship with KUBARK should be uppermost in his mind. WUBRINY/1 was informed that Charles is reported as a businessman of questionalbe repute. He is characterized as slippery, dishonest, and more of a promoter than businessman. His bank holds a worthless portfolio of notes guaranteed by political signatures. For example, he approved a loan of $14,000 for his daughter on her signature alone. He is also reported to be a partner in the bank rather than sole owner, as he alleges.

3. Mr. Allen said that Charles was of great interest and that we would like to know why he was in the U. S. at this time. WUBRINY/1 was admonished in any conversations with Charles to concentrate on economic rather than on political matters unless Charles himself first raised political matters. It was suggested to WUBRINY/1 that he might inquire about Haiti's economic status, the outlook for the coffee crop on which Haiti's economy may stand or fall, and how the currency is being backed in the absence of a foreign aid program.

4. It was further suggested to WUBRINY/1 that should the conversation with Charles get loose that he might inquire as to whether top Haitian officials are putting aside funds outside the country and question the rationale for an expensive inaugural celebration for the President, given the bad state of the Haitian economy. WUBRINY/1 said that he could easily add the flight of capital question by discussing the availability of Haitian capital for investment outside Haiti.

5. WUBRINY/1 said that in view of the delicacy of this operation that he would wear his other hat, i.e., represent his own firm rather than WUSALINE in making this contact. He foresaw no problems stating

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

that it is routine for business people to ascertain each other's views. Messrs. Stone and Allen concurred in the use of WUBRINY/1's private firm and admonished WUBRINY/1 to keep Charles on the string in view of our interest in him.

6. Mr. Allen indicated to WUBRINY/1 that we were definitely interested in [illegible] and needed a good assessment such as WUBRINY/1 had done on FALAY/1. WUBRINY/1 said that this presented no problem. He stated that he had not specifically asked [illegible] who his opposition sources are because he did not want [illegible] to become suspicious.

Gale W. Allen

Gale W. Allen
[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig - [illegible]
1 - [illegible] Ops
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
1 - Charles - 01

SECRET

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201- 97839

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

C/4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

		ROUTING				
ORIG.	HELEN E MORGAN					
UNIT	WH/6/H	1		4		May 7 13 26:53
EXT.	4506	2		5		
DATE	7 MAY 1963	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 11

TDCS DB-3/654,521

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI/D, FI, FI/INT 6, IW 2, CA/O 4, CA/PEG 2, CA 2, SAS 5

DATE DISTRIBUTED
7 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

~~WH/6/H~~	3			WH/PRIN	1			
WH/6/DR	1			WH/PACY	1			
				WH/SNTO	1			
				JMWAVE	1			

BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)
WAVE 8122 (IN 32935)
NO PROJECT
EMTIN-1
LIAISON*

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO DOPA

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
SAS/INTEL/R (BY PHONE)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RELEASING OFFICER
C. Bauer
[illegible]/R

COPY NO.

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED LISSEM

COUNTRY HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/654,521

SUBJECT REMARKS MADE BY FELIX FRANCIS CONCERNING THE HAITIAN SITUATION

DATE DISTR. 7 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 5 MAY 1963

REFERENCES TDCSDB-3/654,459

IN 32935

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (6 MAY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3 (THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-2784

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE CUBAN (F) IN TOUCH WITH PRO- AND ANTI-DUVALIER HAITIANS, FROM FELIX FRANCIS, WHO HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A CONFIDANT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER.

1. ON 5 MAY 1963 RUDOLPH BABOUN, HAITIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN MIAMI, TOLD FELIX FRANCIS THAT IT WAS THE BELIEF OF THE HAITIAN FOREIGN OFFICE THAT THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WOULD NOT ATTACK HAITI UNLESS THE UNITED STATES INTERVENED MILITARILY. BABOUN SAID THAT THIS BELIEF WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY INFORMATION WHICH THE HAITIAN FOREIGN OFFICE OBTAINED FROM ALBERTO ZULUETA ANGEL, HEAD OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) WHICH VISITED HAITI.

2. FRANCIS SAID THAT THE ONLY RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER WAS THE WEAK CLANDESTINE GROUP HEADED BY CLEMENT BARBOT. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT BARBOT COULD TOPPLE DUVALIER; HOWEVER,

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC		OCI	ONE	OCR		FBI
STATE/DIR	REPCINCLANT													

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (10-60)

14-00000

IF SUCCESSFUL, HE WOULD PROBABLY INSTALL JOSEPH D. CHARLES, FORMER HAITIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, AS HEAD OF THE GOVERNING JUNTA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (MIAMI) CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

6 May

XXXXX ZEA

SECRET TDTG 061700Z

PRITY VA CITE NYCR 8910

L/A BR INFO SUPPORT (STUNTZ) AND CZAJKOWSKI

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATIO

CASE 40556

THIS IS REPORT NY 2147-3 FOR 00-A(S) CREDIT.

1. THE SITUATION CONCERNING CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES ACTIVITIES IS JUST AS "FLUID" AS THE SITUATION IN HAITI. CHARLES ADVISED US THAT HIS FRIEND OF MRS. DOROTHY MATLOCK (SEE WHAT I MEAN BY "FLUID"?) HAD CHANGED HIS TRAVEL PLANS TO WASHINGTON. INSTEAD OF TUESDAY HE (DRYER) NOW EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON IN THURSDAY OR FRIDAY. CHARLES INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME THIS WEEK. HE ASKED US TO SEE HIM AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. OUR MEETING (THE THIRD SINCE THIS WEEK. HE ASKED US TO SEE HIM AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. OUR MEETING (THE THIRD SINCE LAST THURSDAY) IS SCHEDULED AT 1430. BALOG (STILL CAPTAIN BALOG, US ARMY TO CHARLES) WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH STUNTZ RE THEIR TELECON AFTER BALOG-CHARLES MEETING.

2. CHARLES TOLD US THAT HIS "SPIRITUAL FATHER", B. GINDINE TARDIEU, A FRENCH CITIZEN, A CONSULTANT TO CHARLES' BANK IN PORT-AU-PRINCE IS IN NEW YORK NOW. TARDIEU WHO HAS SPENT AT LEAST 20 YEARS IN HAITI, IS NOW STAYING AT THE PARTK SHERTON HOTTEL, ROOM 2032.

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYCR 8910 L/A INFO (STUNTZ) CZAJKOWSKI BALOG 40556 NY 2147-3

00-A(S) REPORT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES "FLUID" HAITI [illegible]

SEI

XXXXX ZEA

3 May PRIORITY

S E C R E T TDTG 031830Z

PRITY VA CITE NYOR 8918 8919

MAY 3 4 PM 63

L/A BR INFO CZAJKOWSKI FROM BALOG

GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CASE 48556

THIS IS REPORT NY-2128-3 FOR OO-A(S) CREDIT. IT IS SUPPLEMENTAL TO NY-2119-3.

1. AT HIS REQUEST, ON 3 MAY 63 WE HAD AN ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW WITH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM JOSEPH F. DRYER, TAMPA, FLORIDA. DRYER TOLD CHARLES THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HIM OVER THE WEEK END, BUT WOULD VISIT HIM IN NEW YORK CITY NEXT WEDNESDAY, 8 MAY. PRIOR TO THAT DRYER PLANS TO MEET IN WASHINGTON DC JACQUELINE DELMAR, 3130 P STREET, NW, TEL: FE 3-9066, A FRIEND OF MISS MADLOCK'S TO DISCUSS "THINGS OF MUTAL INTEREST CONCERNING HAITI."

2. CHARLES TALKED TO US ABOUT THE WORSENING SITUATION IN HAITI. HE BELIEVES THAT IT WAS TIME FOR THE US TO LAND THE MARINES IN HAITI TO LIBERATE THE COUNTRY FROM "MADMAN DUVALIER" AND PROTECT THE LIVES OF AMERICANS THERE. HE FEELS THAT THE US SHOULD ACT UNDER THE AEGIS

OF OAS IN THE INTEREST OF HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY. HE MENTIONED THAT THE US DID NOT HESITATE TO SEND MARINES TO LEBANON WHEN US INTERESTS WERE THREATENED.

3. CHARLES DECIDED TO STAY IN NEW YORK "FOR THE TIME BEING". TODAY HE SENT A CABLE TO HIS BANK IN PORT-AU-PRINCE INDICATING THAT HIS BUSINESS TRANSACTION (BUYING MACHINE PARTS FOR HIS ENTERPRISES) WILL KEEP HIM IN US FOR AWHILE.

4. DISCUSSING THE REPORTED MASSACRE OF ANTI-DUVALIER ARMY OFFICERS CHARLES URGED FAST ACTION ON PART OF US. HE REITERATED HIS OPINION THAT DUVALIER WOULD BE "ELIMINATED" BY 22 MAY, BUT WARNED AGAINST LETTING ANTI-DUVALIER EXILES NOW IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA AND ELSEWHERE RETURN TO HAITI AND "START SHOOTING THERE". HE BELIEVES THAT THE BEST POLICY FOR THE US TO FOLLOW WOULD BE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH LEADING HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS. IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED NAMES, HE FEELS THAT GENERAL CONSTANT, COL. CHAM AND COL CAILLARD COULD BE WON OVER FOR COOPERATION. HE CLAIMS TO KNOW THESE OFFICERS WELL AND IN CASE OF LANDING OF US MARINES HE WOULD BE GLAD TO GO ALONG AND SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY. HE FEELS THAT HE HAS ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO BRING ABOUT A SITUATION WITHOUT BLOODSHED IN WHICH SETTING UP A PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FEASIBLE. IF NECESSARY WE WOULD BE WILLING TO STAY IN THE BACKGROUND IN THE ROLE OF "EMINENCE GRIS" FOR THE GOOD OF HIS COUNTRY.

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYOR 8918 L/A BR INFO CZAJKOWSKI BALC3 40556 NY-2128-3 00-A(S)
CREDIT NY-2119-3 3 MAY 63 CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES A JOSEPH F. DRYER
TAMPA NOT SEE NEW YORK WEDNESDAY 8 MAY PRIOR DC
JACQUELINE DELMAR 3130 P STREET, NW, TEL: FE 3-9066 A MISS MADLOCK'S
"THINGS OF MUTUAL INTEREST CONCERNING HAITI"
US DUVALIER US AEGIS OAS US NOT HESITATE LEBANON US A PORT-AU-PRINCE
US ANTI-DUVALIER US "ELIMINATED" 22 MAY US GENERAL CONSTANT, COL.
CHAN COL CAILLARD US A WITHOUT BLOODSHED A PROVISIONAL "EMINENCE GRIS"
NBT

03/2026Z MAY ESG

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	December 29, 1966

A-2

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES,	First Name Clemard	Middle Initial J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): Consulate General of Haiti, Miami, Fla.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 432

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 626 Pacot, Port Au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE 4-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives, Haiti

NAI CSCI-316/03952-66 Subj as above
12 Jan 67

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 12-20-66 - Miami, Fla.

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: A-2 - Duration of status

DESTINATION: Consulate General, Haiti, Miami, Fla.

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357029

FORM I-67
(REV. 6-1-65)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries [illegible] capital letters. All Spanish names shall be [illegible] with father's name first and the mother's [illegible].

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO.
DATE 12-4-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) First Name Middle Initial
[illegible] J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP
Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)
Ambassador of Haiti, Washington, D. C.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL
PAA 23[illegible]

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Pacot, Port au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE
4-21-32

BIRTH PLACE
Haiti

NA 1
22 Dec 66

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION
11-27-66 NYC

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION
A-2 D/S

DESTINATION

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Jwp

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357024

FORM I-69
(REV. 6-1-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UAA

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)	17/2
DATE	7/12/66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES - Clemard	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED ~~STATES ADDRESS~~ Haitian Consul - NYC	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 119	
PERMANENT ADDRESS PACUT #26 PTO prince Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 7/13/66	BIRTH PLACE GONALVES Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 7/13/66 NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION OFFICIAL D/S	
DESTINATION Haitian Consul - NYC	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 req 22 Jul 66

NAI
2 Aug 66

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

22 July 66
Ref.

cc CIA
G2
OSI
State Dept.

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters., All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

A-2

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	5-3-67

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES	First Name CLEMARD	Middle Initial J.
COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP HAITI		
UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code) WALDORF ASTORIA NEW YORK CITY		
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 432		
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE PORT AU PRINCE HAITI		
BIRTH DATE 4-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives, Haiti	

NAI
6 June 67
RB
201-357029

CHARLES CLEMARD JOSEPH

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION	4-30-67 Miami, Fla.
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION	official-dur. of status
DESTINATION	above U.S.

201-357029 *

lh

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
G.2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
ONI

Gi[illegible]
f.t.
02/5/67

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

201-357029

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - NO FORN DISSEM

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE
12-4-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES,	First Name Clennard	Middle Initial J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP
Haiti

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)
Ambassador of Haiti, Washington, D. C.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL
PAA 234

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Pecot , Port au Prince, Haiti

BIRTH DATE 4-21-32	BIRTH PLACE Haiti

NAI
22 Dec 66

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION
11-27-66 NYC

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION
A-2 D/S

DESTINATION

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

jwp

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

File in 201-357029 + 12-19

FORM I-57
(REV. 6-1-66)

S-1 Y[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-739205

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. 201-737125 = Godard

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BY J.

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 5, CA/O 4, CI/PS, FI/SPG, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3,
WH/C 9

AN [redacted]
PS [redacted]
ABSTRACT [redacted]
WH/7/HT

PRIN

S E C R E T 191615Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4164

DIRECTOR INFO REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

19Nov66 IN 42726

INTEL

SUPDATA: EVMISER-1. FIELD COMMENT PARA FIVE FROM EVLEMON-2. NO INDEX.

4P

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-739205
B 201-737125

19 NOV 66
201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 42726

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI I&NS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 192027Z CITE TDCS-314/15055-66

DIST 19 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY	HAITI
DOI	MID-NOVEMBER 1966
SUBJECT	POWER JOCKEYING AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS
ACQ	HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE, 18 NOVEMBER 1966 (HTP-971)
SOURCE	A HAITIAN STUDENT AND MEMBER OF THE CLANDESTINE CATHOLIC ACTION PERSONNALISTE MOVEMENT WHO HAS MANY CONTACTS AMONG CATHOLIC, COMMUNIST, AND DUVALIERIST STUDENTS. SOURCE USUALLY REPORTS ACCURATELY THE INFORMATION HE RECEIVES. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM FOUR DIFFERENT SOURCES WITH ACCESS TO OPPOSITION AND PRO-DUVALIER CIRCLES INCLUDING FRANTZ LEROY, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO AGRICULTURE MINISTER VICTOR NEVERS CONSTANT.

1. WITHIN DUVALIER'S ENTOURAGE THERE ARE THREE

PERSONS VYING FOR POWER AFTER THE FALL OF PRESIDENT DUVALIER. THEY ARE JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE HAITIAN BANK OF COMMERCE, CLOVIS DESINOR, MINISTER OF FINANCE, AND LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. EACH OF THEM HAVE THEIR SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE GOH OR DUVALIER POWER STRUCTURES AND SOME HAVE SUPPORT FROM SOME OPPOSITIONISTS. ALL THREE REMAIN OUTWARDLY PRO-DUVALIERIST AND THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THEY INTEND TO TRY TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER THEMSELVES. THEY ARE PRESENTLY JOCKEYING FOR SUPPORT FOR THEIR BID FOR POWER WHEN DUVALIER LEAVES THE PRESIDENCY.

2. CLOVIS DESINOR IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL. HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF COLONEL JACQUES LAROCHE, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, AND IS WIDELY CONSIDERED TO BE A RUTHLESS AND UNSCRUPULOUS SEEKER OF POWER. (SOURCE COMMENT: DESINOR HELD POSTS UNDER PRESIDENTS DUMARSAIS ESTIME AND PAUL MAGLOIRE YET SUPPORTED THE OVERTHROW OF BOTH THESE PRESIDENTS.)

3. JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES HAS THE SUPPORT OF FORMER ASSISTANT FINANCE MINISTER LIONEL LAJOIE AND AGRICULTURE

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

MINISTER VICTOR N. CONSTANT PLUS THAT OF SEVERAL PRO-DUVALIER BUSINESSMEN IN PORT AU PRINCE.

4. LUCKNER CAMBRONNE HAD THE SUPPORT OF COLONEL DANIEL BEAUVOIR AND THEREFORE LOST GROUND WHEN BEAUVOIR WAS DISMISSED FROM THE ARMY AND TOOK ASYLUM IN THE BRAZILIAN EMBASSY. THE HOUSE OF CAMBRONNE'S MISTRESS, NEE LAFOREST, WHO IS THE SISTER OF MRS BEAUVOIR, WAS PILLAGED BY THE MILITIA ALONG WITH THE HOUSE OF BEAUVOIR, AND THIS IS INTERPRETED BY MANY OBSERVERS AS AN INDICATION OF CAMBRONNE'S LACK OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOH HIERARCHY. WITHIN THE PALACE IT IS RUMORED THAT CAMBRONNE WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO KEEP HIS DEPUTY'S SEAT FROM ARCAHAIE IN THE JANUARY ELECTION AND THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED BY DABELMAR MENTOR. (FIELD COMMENT: IN 1961, DABELMAR MENTOR WAS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.)

5. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER RELIABLE SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS WITHIN THE GOH HAS REPORTED MUCH THE SAME INFORMATION AS ABOVE.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSM

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

14-00000

ISR

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~201-[illegible]~~

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-357029

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, IDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2,

SECRET 211435Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 5939 PRIN

21 Jul 66 IN 61072

AN	RF	WH/7/~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT X		INDEX

DIRECTOR

1. EVMOUNT-1 REPORTED 19 JULY FOLLOWING:

A. FROM HIGH RANKING PALACE SOURCE WHO CLAIMS OBTAINED INFO FROM TOP PALACE PERSONALITY THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELED TO ITALY TO ARRANGE CONTACT AND PAYMENT OF 125 THOUSAND DOLLARS TO WOFACT OFFICER WHO KEEPING DUVALIER INFORMED RE WOFACT PLANS FOR HAITI. - wow!!!

B. FROM SEPARATE SIMILAR SOURCE THAT DUVALIER RECEIVING INFO FROM POLE WHO MILITARY LEADER WOFACT SUPPORTED CARIBBEAN LEGION.

C. FROM SAME SOURCE A ABOVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT DUVALIER PEN USED BY JOHNSON IN SIGNING IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION.

2. EVMOUNT-1 ANESAIEMISE DUVALIER LEAKING FALSE INFO IN EFFORT TRACK DOWN INFORMERS IN ENTOURAGE. FOR THIS REASON EVMOUNT-1 HAS NOT SENT INFO TO EVMEND.

3. SEE ALSO PORT AU PRINCE EMBTEL 62.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

21 JUL 66

[redacted]

201-357029

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2		6	
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[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION

WH 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2.

21 Jul 66 IN 61072

S E C R E T 211435Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 3939

DIRECTOR

1. EVMOUNT-1 REPORTED 19 JULY FOLLOWING:

A. FROM HIGH RANKING PALACE SOURCE WHO CLAIMS OBTAINED INFO FROM TOP PALACE PERSONALITY THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELED TO ITALY TO ARRANGE CONTACT AND PAYMENT OF 125 THOUSAND DOLLARS TO WOFACT OFFICER WHO KEEPING DUVALIER INFORMED RE WOFACT PLANS FOR HAITI.

B. FROM SEPARATE SIMILAR SOURCE THAT DUVALIER RECEIVING INFO FROM POLE WHO MILITARY LEADER WOFACT SUPPORTED CARIBBEAN LEGION.

C. FROM SAME SOURCE A ABOVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT DUVALIER PEN USED BY JOHNSON IN SIGNING IMPORTANT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION.

2. EVMOUNT-1 ANESAIEMISE DUVALIER LEAKING FALSE INFO IN EFFORT TRACK DOWN INFORMERS IN ENTOURAGE. FOR THIS REASON EVMOUNT-1 HAS NOT SENT INFO TO EVMEND.

3. SEE ALSO PORT AU PRINCE EMBTEL 52.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CHRONO

CHRONO

201-357029

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UA

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (if any)	14/2
DATE	7/12/66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES - Clemard	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED ~~STATES ADDRESS~~ Haitian consul - NYC	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 119	
PERMANENT ADDRESS PACUT # 26 PTO Prince Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 7/13/66	BIRTH PLACE GONALVES Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 7/13/66 NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION OFFICIAL D/S	
DESTINATION Haitian Consul - NYC	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 req 22 Jul 66

NAI
2 Aug 66
Jm3

HMB
22 July 66
Ref.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

WA

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE 7-1-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle): CHARLES CLEMARD

NATIONALITY (Citizenship): HAITI

~~UNITED STATES ADDRESS~~: IN TRANSIT

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PA 26

PERMANENT ADDRESS: HAITIAN CONSUL, PORT AU PRINCE

BIRTH DATE: 1-21-23

BIRTH PLACE: HAITI

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 6-28-66 NYC

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: A-2 D/S

DESTINATION: TRANSIT

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

201 req 13 July 66

NA 19 Jul 66
dms To CCI/216

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

FILE IN 201-350029

REF

Form I-97
(Rev. 7-15-63)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 23 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: 109-51 (CHICAGO)

14-00000

Atts to OOE 3,260,843

Attachment #2
ODE 3,260,843

PLAN FOR THE ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF HAITI

By Clement Joseph Charles

The very best way to affirm the existence of true Democracy lies in the creation of a political agency which would consecrate the inalienable rights of men to live, to enjoy freedom and happiness. A true an effective political decentralization would then corroborate the existence of this Democracy.

Fully confident in the power of the truth which cannot ever be hidden, much more in the indisputable justness of the cause we are endeavouring to diffuse; convinced of the practical possibility to put an end to the leonine privileges of a minority whose personal interest stands against all honest and impartial government managements, as the son of peasants, we reaffirm here our faith in the final trimph of a true and indispensable political evolution through a broader representation of the interest of the people, thereby assuring to our miserable co-citizens still fighting for the acknowledgement of their most sacred rights new reasons to believe and to hope. In this view our action shall tend toward the evolution of our masses in order that they may enjoy living conditions compatible with their dignity. And by means of social productivity expressed in terms of the welfare of our rural population, we shall formulate the economic requirements of the country within the framework of a realist and rational program. In line with this goal we are outlining below a program for the economic reconstruction and the social promotion of our rural masses.

An objective consideration of the present condition of our country makes it clear that the solution of the country's social and economic problem lies in the following considerations:

1.- Creation of a balanced economy adapted to the conditions of the country;
2.- Development of Industry and exploitation, of our natural ressources so as to promote an improvement of living conditions;
3.- Transformation of rural way of living and modernization of agriculture so that the peasants who represent the largest portion of the country's population come out of their ancestral misery and participate in the prosperity of the nation. And then, arrive at the integration of the rural population of the country in its economic life by means of literacy and the preparation of skilled workers in order to increase the productivity of the agricultural activities, also that of the traditional handcrafts and of the manufacturing industries which are still got a primitive stage.

The formation of man and the preparation of leaders is a factor of primary importance for the speedy achievement of the contemplated objectives.

.../....

These phases of equal importance are linked together. Therefore, they cannot be separated without endangering the whole pattern. Of course errors have been made repeatedly. However, the straightening which is a must calls for a general review of the principles and objectives of our economic and financial policy, which should be considered the first steps to be taken towards a true economic start.

For a long time, the people responsible for our Economic and Financial Policy had built their programs upon illusions. The continuous demographic pressure and the influence of social progress, together with the normal desire of the different classes of the population to benefit a reasonable part of the national revenue, have made indispensable the development of a well balanced economy. This development can be conceived but in terms of industries using to the latest extent the raw materials and the resources of the country. As a matter of fact, the mobilization of these resources is paramount for the achievement of true progress in the way of political liberty and for the improvement of material living. Education, medical care, transportation facilities and the improvement of living conditions are the primary requirements for modernizing the living conditions of the population. To sum up, the increased production of riches through the creation of industries and the systematic exploitation of our subsoil, added to other natural assets, shall furnish the resources necessary to the adequate operation of our system. For fault of considering the situation in this point of view, any and all idea of generalized social welfare and national grandeur will remain purely a dream.

The modernization of agriculture, and the improvement of the rural way of living which will result therefrom should go abreast with Industrialization. The rapid increase of the rural population and the recession of infantile mortality, as well as the extension of life limit obtained through the application of Hygiene rules, make it necessary to use to the largest extent the rejects of agricultural production in Processing Manufactures in order to assure the surplus subsistence to the surplus population and, through the export of the thus processed agricultural rejects and products, supply the Treasury with the proper foreign exchange stock necessary to maintain a well balanced economy.

The improvement of the living standard, as said before, is subject to the adequate development of the production assets, which cannot be attained without the improvement of the people. Brought up to a level which make them aware of their needs and of the role that Society and the development of their region request from them, those people will understand that the essential data of the problem reside in the following: better cultivated land, adequate equipment, creation of industries, application of experienced agricultural techniques, processing industries, skilled labor.

.../...

It may be well to recall that at the Conference in Punta del Este was emphisized the importance of the transformation of the people in the development process of under developed countries.

All this leads to consider the protection and preservation of the understructure works of which the urgency cannot be underestimated. Electric power, roads, bridges, urbanism, irrigation and drainage system etc, are the factors that the contemplated development calls for its full realization.

Of course the Haitian State has always cared for the understructure equipment of the country. However, the investments - very important at times- to this end have been made without an all out plan, not with a statisticol and rational estimae of the country's needs, but with such awastes in the execution that the general problem of the country's basis equipment is still a matter of consideration.

In Haiti, the National Capital comprises broadly the understructure equipment and the production equipment, as a result of the fact that our social and Economic System lacks a natural repartition of the functions as exist in the advanced countries where the State takes care of the understructure equipment while private enterprise engages in production. The obligation for the State to devote its activities to both the understracture and the production problem, the latter private initiative cannot assume due to failure or lack of experience, compels saw State to build proper methods and means to accelerate the formation ofthe National Capital through the adequate and honnest exploitation of our financial sources.

To this end, we propose to build a program including the execution of specific projects already studied and for which the financing can be obtained from abroad:

A.- PRIMARY FACILITIES:

1.- Hydro-Electric Plant at Peligre	$ 20.000.000.-
2.- Electrification of the Southern Peninsula - Saut Mathurine-Saut du Baril & others	9.000.000.-
3.- Wharf and Airport - Port-au-Prince	6.000.000.-
4.- Wharf and Port facilities in the Southern Peninsula	3.000.000.-
5.- Market - Port-au-Prince	1.500.000.-
6.- Telecommunication system	4.000.000.-
7.- Sewage system - Port-au-Prince	1.500.000.-
8.- Port-au-Prince - Cayes (156 km) & Dufort-Jacmel (66 km) roads.	8.000.000.-
9.- Along the coast way, Miragoane - Jérémie	4.000.000.-

.../....

10.- Dam & Hydro-Electric Plant - Trois Rivières ....$ 7.000.000.-
11.- Improvements - Water Supply - System - Port-au-Prince 4.000.000.-

TOTAL ....$ 68.000.000.-

B.- PROJECTS ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT:

12.- Sugar Mill in the Artibonito ....
13.- " " " " North West ....
14.- " " " " South ....
15.- " " " " North ....
16.- Vegetable Oil refinery ....
17.- Castor Oil Extracting Plant ....
18.- Tapioca Starch Extracting Plant ....
19.- Salt Refinery (Gonaives) ....
20.- Sesame Oil Processing Plant ....
21.- Banana Industry ....
22.- Canned Fruits Plant ....
23.- Spinning Mill ....
24.- Kenaf Industry ....

Estimated cost for the whole ....$ 32.000.000.-
GRAND TOTAL ....$ 100.000.000.-

Within the framework of the objectives outlined in this summary, we propose the creation of an agency titled "National Planning Committee". Concurrently with this Committee would be created a Bank for Economic Development.

The National Planning Committee would build a plan of general development of which the execution would spread over a period of 25 years, split into 5 year periods. The plans and programs applicable to each period would be executed under the close supervision of the Committee, and modified in accordance with such economic changes as may happen. The program would be maintained in a permanent basis. In the course of its execution and as a result of the possible modifications, would follow the curve of international progress and thereby remain actual.

First of all would be prepared a priority order which would be based on the nervous centers of the economy to be straightened. This priority order would embrace a well coordinated and concrete actions, based upon observation and experience.

The lack, or rather the absence of financial means against the important disbursements called for by the general program obliges to rely upon investments from abroad. It would be the duty of the Bank for Economic Development to channel the foreign under the form of grants - counterpart funds - or of private investments jointly with the mobilization of our national resources.

As for the assistance to be given to private initiative towards the development of new agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises, it will be necessary to reorganize our banking system by the creation of a Central Bank : Stock Exchange, Mortgage Bank, Agricultural & Rural Credit Bank and other financial institutions such as: Savings & Credit Bank, Bank for Financing low cost Housing for the people with low revenue, etc.

Besides, negotiations shall be made with the International Financing Company which has been created lately in order to finance national private enterprises. We will work jointly and closely with the International Monetary Funds, the BIRD, and the BID in view of obtaining the financing of a certain amount of revenue - producing projects. At the same time, we shall endeavour to strengthen the position of our national currency.

In addition, the Budgetary Reform will be accomplished. A National Budgetary policy which observes the difference between administrative expenses and capital expenditures shall permit a proper adaptation of the budget to the requirements of the economy so as to make of it a true instrument of a general policy.

Also The Fiscal policy shall take into account the requirements of the economy. A revision of the Customs Tariff shall be pursued and made. Measures shall also be taken to guaranty honesty and integrity in handling the State's Funds. Just consider that for the fiscal years 1949-1950 to 1956-57, the total disbursements of the state has reached the sum of G: 1,350,596,631.-, or around $270.000.000.-, and that the largest portion of this sum has gone into triple expenses or served for spectacular works most of which with absolutely no economic justification. In this sum are not included neither the various financial disbursements made outside of the budget through loans obtained during the same period and which brought the public debt up to G: 249,184.000.- or $49.836.800.- as at September 30, 1957, nor the expenses supported by the non-fiscal accounts and the various autonomous enterprises of the State. All this is the evidence that the formation of the National Capital can be worked out through sound administration.

As regard Public Finance, emphasis shall be made on the following points:

1.- Harmonization of the fiscal policy with the economic policy;

2.- Harmonization of the budgetary policy with the economic policy;

3.- Improvement of our banking system in to mainly smooth credit conditions;

.../...

4.- Creation of new private banks for the development of handcrafst and industry;

5.- Reorganization of the Supreme Court of Accounts upon such basis as shall guaranty its most complete autonomy;

6.- Reorganization of the Department of Finance. Integration of the Finance Inspection Service and the Public Accounting within the General Accounting;

7.- Complete reform of our fiscal legislation by means of measures able to modify the structure of fiscality so to attain a better orientation of the economic and financial policy of the country;

8.- Remodelling our Code of Commerce in order to give more guaranties to local and foreign creditors, and to adapt the law to the requirements of internal exchange.

If the straightening of our public finance is of primary importance, production and equipment are likewise necessary. Therefore, in the execution of the 25 year development plan submitted and within the priority order to be invited out by the National Planning Committee, serious consideration shall be given to the following revenue producting and understructure projects:

a) Colonization and transformation of the rural centers through the integration of the agricultural section in the economic, political and social life of the country in order to obtain better economic and social results, and to attain the following primary objectives:

I : Increase production.

II : Build villages in order to avoid the dispersion of the rural groups and thus, to better use the working force of the community:

III: Raise the rural living standard, and,

IV : Assure to the rural laborer a permanent living upon the economic lot through an adequate agrarian reform; fight the peasant's inclination to migrate to the towns and thereby, protect agriculture.

All of this implies that problems shall have to be sold in as various fields as Education, Public Health, Housing, Transportation, Agricultural Credit, Agricultural Extension, Agricultural Equipment, Irrigation, Drainage, Reforest ration and the control of Erision, Access roads, Professional and Handicrafst Schools, Rural Police, Electric Power, Hygiene, Sanitation, Creation of Cooperatives, Transformation of our 550 Rural Sections into villages where the priest, the doctor, the sanitation Inspector, the Agricultural Agent, the Teacher, the Judge, the Tax Collector, the Minister, the Mayor, the natural leaders of these villages shall join together toward a mutual action including mainly the improvement of the diary, the organization of sound recreations, a modification in the usual behaviour of the peasants with regards to the problems of their families and the community to which they [illegible] the radio and television.

audio-visual centers, movies with well balanced programs.

However, the transfer of part of the agricultural labor to Industry, to be appreciable, shall necessitate the creation, besides the agricultural industries, of other enterprises to process either the resources of our sub-soil, or imported raw-materials.

In this field, we shall concentrate our efforts on the following:

1.- Project for the processing of coconut and vegetable oils.
2.- Factory for deshydrate coconut for export.
3.- Vegetable oil extrating Plant for local consumption.
4.- Toilet soap Factory
5.- Extension of Palm Oil Plants and Production of Oleaginous.
6.- Cocoa Production along with a Processing Plant.
7.- Extension of Cotton Production for a modern spinning-Mill.
8.- Spinning-Mill.
9.- Plant for the preparation of Hydrophil and Absorbent Cotton) (100.cons).
10.- Creation of a Mechanical Industry with branches over the whole territory for the manufacture of agricultural tools and spare parts for all kinds machines.
11.- Plant for the manufacture of low cost electric range and of all electric accessories.
12.- Plant for the Production of Organic Fertilizer.
13.- Assembling Industries to work for Export.
14.- Sisal, Fruits sugar Cane Straw Processing Plants.
15.- Bottle manufacture.
16.- Safety match factory.
17.- Paper Mill.
18.- Cattle Raising Industry to intensify the development of our live-stock.
19.- Fishing Industry.
20.- Tourism.

In preparing our plan, we will not underestimate the fact the transportation, and communication determine at all their stages the rhythm and the trend of the economic development. Therefore shall have to be given due consideration the improvement and extension of our road and rail network in order to enlarge the rural market. Only through good roads and sufficient and low-cost transportation means shall the agricultural products reach the consumers at moderate prices. This will contribute towards raising the living standard of the entire population. Also shall be necessary proper communication means to ease the mobility of labor and attenuate to the price fluctuations. These facilities make it possible to decide on the geographic implantation of new industries and on the extent to be given to the development of various zones in line with the all our program.

These shall be considered:

a) The asphalting or cementing of all main roads; the stonning of all secondary roads, and the construction of new roads.

b) The construction of telepheries to join certain commodity-producing centers to urban centers.

c) Organization of an adequate railway system.

d) Nationalization of general transportation (transport en commun).

As for marine transportation, our country has not yet exploited its insular position and its geographic situation. Rather than developing normally, our coasting-vessel is jeopardy for lack of well equiped dry docks, also due to the insufficient technical preparation of our sailors. Yet, the marine way remains the cheapest in internal trade.

We shall consider the creation of a Navigation School, the acquisition of a merchant Marine for external trade, and we shall give such facilities as can facilitate the modernization of the coasting-vessels, the opening of new ports for external trade; the construction of a modern and free port in Port-au-Prince to serve as warehousing for goods consigned to certain south-American countries, also the repair and modernization of our existing ports.

In the field of air-transportation, these shall be created a national airline to link Port-au-Prince with foreign cities. Shall also be created airports in the large towns of the Republic.

It is obvious that the success of this program which calls for disbursements amounting to around one billion five hundred millions dollars ($1.500.000.000.-) over 25 years, shall depend largely upon the competence of all engaged in the Public Administration.

We shall also concentrate our efforts on the following points:

a) Complete autonomy to the Communes. The Council of Notables shall be re-established on new basis in both the Commune and the Village (Rural Section). Periodic Congress between the Mayors of a same Department and the different officers of this Department shall make possible the preparation of local programs of which the execution shall promote the general plan.

b) Organization of the Administrative career which shall be free from political influence. A law shall fix the statute of public officers;

c) Remodelling of our different codes to adapt them to the present economic and social conjuncture, and the adoption of each measures as can speed up legal decision;

d) Complete emancipation of women who shall be able to fill the same administrative and technical positions as men, inasmuch as they are quqlified;

e) Technical assistance shall be requested from the following International Institutions: FAO, CEU, BIRD, FMI, and BID towards a complete remodelling of public administration, mainly for the adequate execution of the general plan.

f) Remodelling of National Education, for Education is basic for the success of all actions undertaken by the community. The remodelling of our universities and the new orientation to be given to our Primary, Secondary, Superior and Professional Schools shall be in line with the formation of our technicians and our Philosophic of Education;

These are, briefly, the various phases of the programs intended to change the social and economic structure of the country.

Ever since the conquest of his independence, the Haitian, to-date, has been suffering: morally as the result of an excessive discrimination; physically because of a criminal misunderstanding and a generalized corruption, so much so that the impression remains this corruption, has been made a political system.

A new concept is imperative to assure the normal distribution of the National riches. A new concept of which the operation shall be accomplished by the sound portion of the country jointly with the specialized agencies of the United States Government.

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(Translation #5)
00E-3,260,843

FRIDAY 24th August 1962:

CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, a pioneer
by
EMMANUEL C. PAUL

If the competitive communities are so dynamic and impose by the rate of their cycle of evolution, it is because, to the end, their social struggles result into economic terms through the production of valuable men superior to their consumption.

Because we failed to draw up our balance-sheet at each epoch of our life, we do not seem to understand that we are arriving at inverse reports. Our bachwaraness is the result of this negative unbalance between the production and the consumption of our valuable men.

We should be concious of the urgency if not to change our method of struggling, at least to come up with superior principles susceptible of making our struggles less nocive and much more profitable to the community. On this point, the example offered by more advanced countries of which we are copying the bad sides can be of service to us. To decrease the rate of consumption of our valuable men in order to increase their production in the course of time is to learn to appreciate, them to utilise and to respect them. We shall, thereby, create the condition that will preserve and fecundate them.

We know, indeed, that it is extremely hard to come to this reasoning, it is much more difficult to adopt it as the motto of our collective behavior. We are only a few to grasp this thruth because this phase of our social competitions results into a mass of historic factors. The first effect of our internal divisions generated by colonialism and fed up, afterwards by the old regime of oppresion was the creation, at the various levels of our societies of a complex of self destruction, that turned into a social cannibalism. In the production of this event where everyone, without undergoing in any way the influence of a mystic or of a superior principle, is moved while believing he is moving towards his rightful interest, one has the impression that the community is unable to find its was without the help of a trustee, hence the implicite or public acknowledgement of the superiority of the former boss.

These truths that are found in filigree thoughout the pages of modern and contemporary history of colonialism should rouse the Haitians' thought in order that they may endeavour to increase their national potentiallities and ever appreciate and respect their social values.

.../..

Of course in the political, military and intellectual domain we have had real stars. However, our economic and social history is rather poor on a certain point of view. This means that very few are those who, in spite of numerous obstacles, have succeeded by notably increasing the national economy and improving the living condition of our people. Our understanding of the "Benevolent State" requires that this objective be its main job.

There have been numerous attempts, indeed. Comes to our memory Pantaléon Guilbaud, the tobacco king during the time of our youth, but at last! just fugitive attempts! If this is the case and of we really love this country we wish to be fully ours, our duty is to tie up the old man binding us, and meaning hatred, meanness, above all, envy. Then we will limit the consumption of our valuable men.

Not so long ago, we have written an article about Dr.Day when his laboratory was consumed by fire. We did it then because in our opinion, for two generations, this name stood as the sumbol of continuity for the community. In the same spirit, we would like to evoke a new name, another social value who deserves admiration. This name is Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

This emersion dates back from yesterday, and yet, he is already a pioneer. Dark, average in size. Quick yes under a boad forehead which is already graved by a premature baldness. This is his phisical stature in brief. Still young, only 39 years of age. Clemard Joseph CHARLES was born in Gonaives in April 1923 and is proud of his peasant origin. It was in this town that he received his primary and secondary education, at the "Frères de l'Instruction Chrétienne" and the "Lycée Geffrard" Schools. It was alse in this Artibonite that he began the struggle for life, first as a rural teacher. His father's death in 1939 marked a stage in his life. He had to take over the heavy responsibility of meeting his family needs. Charles then proved to be a disciplined man and became successively craftsman, plantation supervisor, without giving up intellectual studies; he ventured in journalism as an amateur. As a progressivemind, he strongly believes in the value of effort. From one activity, he goes to another and is never discouraged by obstacles. He is a man who searches his way and is determined to find it. In 1947, he was General Controller of the Banana Industry in the south and the year after, he was appointed General Agent for a Corporation. His numerous contacts gave him at this time sufficient business experience for him to undertake his own business. In 1949, he settled as Manufacturer's Agent and dealt in import-Export. By dint of discipline, of dynamism and tenacity, the little rural

..../..

teacher of the year 1939 is already well know as an experienced businessman, and his relations overseas are such that in 1953, he was appointed as a member of an Economic Mission sent to London by the Government. Hd did so well that one year later, he was encousted by the Government with the mission of negociating a contract with the General Electric of Coventry for the improvement and extension of our telecommunication system. In 1957, as a member of another mission, he took past in the International Conference in Brussels. In the meantime, Clemard Joseph CHARLES devoted himself to various commercial and industrial activities. His life is shared between his office in the Capital City and numerous trips in the country where he kept inquiring on possibilities of investment. Whenever you happen to meet him, he speakes of new projects for the development of the country. His waiting-room is always full of people either awaiting instructions for the countries, or agents, also of other people asking for credit. Among his enterprises we note the Universal Enterprise Co. (USACO) the National Deutsch Associates, The Cotton Industry in the South and Charles-Mews & Co., without mensionning the branches of his store, All These activities do not hinder him from representing the General Electric Co.,Ltd. of London and the Siemens Schukert Werke Co.

But the masterpiece of his life as a businessman was the creation in 1960 of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, a project he had long been dreaming of! His initiative ranks him as a great Pioneer. The Commercial Bank of Haiti is the first private Haitian Bank. When one reals that the National Bank was redeemed only in 1949 to become property of the Haitian State, then one will realize the amount of daring throught, tenacity and broadness of view it took Clemard Joseph CHARLES in such a place to materialize this creation that will have a part in the Economic History of our country. Clemard Joseph CHARLES is the image of a new type of businessman we did not know before. He broke up with the low customs of tradesmen, these brokers who find themselves selfishly satisfied with profit margins which the accumulate in banks abroad and who begin again the routine each year. The reason for the backwardness of our masses is that they do not have the support of an enterprising bourgeoisie creating welfare opportunities. Charles believes that it should not be left to the State alone the duty of promoting the economic development of the country. He is well aware of his mission and he knows that he must give a hand to the less fortunate ones to help their evolution. Therefore, this Commercial Bank that has met with so much success in so short a time is the center of multiple activities profitable to many people with low pay. If we do not loose faith in this country and that we believe in its potentialities, then we believe that a Pioneer as Clemard Joseph CHARLES ought to be better known in order to be better understood and encouraged.

.../..

This is the reason for our writing this article. At the same time we would like to present to the youth a model of honesty, discipline and tenacity in a community that so much lakes these qualities.

OOE 3, 200,843

CLÉMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

PRÉSIDENT ET DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL
BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

Apt 12 [illegible]
396 Central Park West 100th St
NYC
Tel UN 5-5815

COE 3.260.843
Attachment #10

CURRICULUM VITAE

DR. EMILE SAINT-LOT.

Né à Port-au-Prince, Haiti, le 11 Septembre 1908.
Etudes classiques : Institution St.Louis de Gonzague,
Baccalauréat 2e. Partie.
Licencié en Droit, Avocat du Barrau de Port-au-Prince.
Docteur ès-lettres, honoris causa, de l'Université de Lybie(1957)

ENSEIGNEMENT. Professeur d'Enseignement primaire, Secondaire et Supérieur,
Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Professeur de Sociologie et d'Histoire du Droit,
Professeur de Droit à l'Académie Militaire d'Haiti,
Professeur d'Economie Politique et de Géographie Commerciale à l'Institut Commercial d'Haiti,
Doyen de la Faculté de Droit de Port-au-Prince (1946).

CARRIERE PUBLIQUE. Commissaire du Gouvernement près le Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince,
Juge au Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince,
Sénateur de la République (1946-1957)
Président du Sénat et de l'Assemblée Nationale (1957)
Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Education Nationale et de la Justice(1947)
Secrétaire d'Etat du Travail et de la Santé Publique (1950)

CARRIERE DIPLOMATIQUE. Membre de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Première Session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies (1946) et à la Première Partie de la Deuxième Session de la dite Assemblée (1947)
Délégué Permanent aux Nations-Unies (1947)
Ambassadeur à Paris (1948)
Chef de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Troisième Session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations-Unies, tenue à Paris en 1948,
Rapporteur de la Troisième Commission (Droits de l'Homme)
Chef de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Conférence Générale de l'UNESCO, tenue à Mexico en 1947,
Président de la Délégation d'Haiti à la Conférence Interparlementaire tenue à Helsinki (1955),
Délégué des Intellectuels Haitiens au Premier Congrès de Culture des Intellectuels Noirs, tenu à Paris en 1956,
Chef de la Mission Permanente d'Haiti aux Nations-Unies (1957),
Observateur à la Conférence des Etats Indépendants d'Afrique(1958)
Ambassadeur d'Haiti en Ethiopie (1958)

DECORATIONS. Officier de l'Ordre de l'Education Nationale,
Officier de l'Ordre du Mérite Agricole,
Grand Officier de l'ordre du Bénin Noir,
Grand Officier de l'Ordre Honneur et Mérite,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre de l'Indépendance de la Lybie,
Grand'Croix de l'Ordre de l'Etoile de la République de Somalie,
Vice-Président de la Société Africaine de Culture.

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BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAÏTI

00E, 3,260, 843


BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

SOCIETE ANONYME DE BANQUE
AU CAPITAL AUTORISE DE UN MILLION DEUX CENT CINQUANTE MILLE GOURDES
FONDÉE EN 1960
MEMBRE DE : THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

JANVIER 1963

CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
Président et Directeur Général

14-00000

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Bilan arrêté au 21 Janvier 1963

ACTIF

DISPONIBILITES :			Gdes	262.640.30
Encaisse	Gdes	178.322.65		
Dépôts — Banques locales		31.858.40		
Chèques s/Banques locales		31.040.10		
Dépôts — Banques étrangères		21.419.15		
REALISABLES :			Gdes	2.580.599.75
Souscripteurs	Gdes	421.500.00		
Titres et Bons du Trésor du Gouvernement Haïtien		197.950.00		
Bons à Présentation (Warrant et Divers)		579.080.05		
Prêts, Escomptes et Autres		1.219.841.70		
Prêts hypothécaires		151.606.75		
Divers débiteurs		10.621.25		
IMMOBILISES :			Gdes	97.882.10
Matériel et Mobilier	Gdes	72.057.10		
Véhicules		24.750.00		
Cautionnement		1.075.00		
INTANGIBLES :			Gdes	347.870.75
Frais de constitution	Gdes	25.666.35		
Frais de premier établissement		322.204.40		
VALEUR A REGULARISER :			Gdes	127.025.80
Intérêts acquis non perçus	Gdes	37.162.25		
Frais à régler		89.566.95		
Manques et Surplus de caisse		296.60		
PARTS DE FONDATEURS :				Pour mémoire
TOTAL ACTIF :			Gdes	3.416.018.70

ADRIEN LAURENCEAU : CHEF DE LA COMPTABILITE

PASSIF ET CAPITAL

EXIGIBILITES :			Gdes	2.126.802.25
Dépots.— Comptes Courants	Gdes	617.122.90		
" Comptes d'Epargne		1.141.550.45		
" Compte Marginal		12.937.55		
" Marginal Account garantie de de Prêts		158.803.05		
" A Terme		108.232.05		
" A l'ordre spécial		3.195.20		
Divers créditeurs		11.297.00		
Chèques de Direction		3.017.40		
Chèques certifiés		70.646.65		
RESERVES ET AMORTISSEMENT :			Gdes	10.938.65
Provisions pr. int. à payer s/dépôts à Terme	Gdes	6.679.90		
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Figure de Pionnier: Clémard Joseph Charles

Par Emmanuel C. PAUL

Si les sociétés compétitives sont tellement dynamiques et s'imposent par la rapidité de leur cycle d'évolution, c'est parce qu'au fond les luttes sociales qui s'y livrent se soldent en termes économiques par une production de valeurs supérieures à la consommation.

Nous autres, pour ne nous être pas souciés de faire, à chaque époque notre bilan, nous n'avons pas l'air de nous rendre compte que nous aboutissons à des rapports inverses. Notre retard est dû à ce déséquilibre négatif entre la production et la consommation de nos Valeurs. Nous en sommes tous responsables.

Il nous faut être conscients de la nécessité sinon de changer la forme de nos luttes, du moins d'y introduire des principes supérieurs susceptibles de les rendre moins nocives et plus profitables à la collectivité. Sur ce point, l'exemple d'autres pays plus avancés dont nous imitons les mauvais côtés peut nous servir. Ralentir le rythme de la consommation de nos Valeurs pour en augmenter la production dans le temps, c'est en effet apprendre comme ailleurs à les apprécier, à les utiliser, à les respecter. Du coup, nous aurons créé des conditions à leur conservation à leur fécondation.

Nous savons certes, qu'il est extrêmement difficile d'arriver à ces raisonnements, voire d'en faire le mobile de comportements collectifs. On est une minorité à saisir cette vérité parce qu'un tel aspect de nos compétitions sont les résultats d'un ensemble de facteurs historiques. Les divisions internes de tous ordres secrétées par le colonialisme et approfondies par la suite sous l'influence des séquelles de l'ancien régime d'oppression ont pour premier ef [illegible]

de répondre aux besoins de la famille. Charles fait alors preuve de discipline et devient tour à tour artisan, superviseur de plantation, sans négliger le commerce des choses intellectuelles en faisant du journalisme amateur. Esprit progressiste, il croit ardemment en la valeur de l'effort. Il passe d'une activité à une autre et ne se laisse jamais décourager par les obstacles. C'est un homme qui cherche sa voie et est déterminé à la trouver. En 1947 nous le voyons comme Contrôleur Général de l'Industrie bananière dans le Sud et l'année suivante comme Agent Général d'une Compagnie. Ses divers contacts lui donnent déjà assez d'expériences en affaires pour lui permettre d'entreprendre son propre «business». Il s'établit en 1949 comme Représentant de Manufactures et fait le commerce d'importation et d'exportation. Le petit instituteur rural des environs de 1939 à force de discipline, de dynamisme, de ténacité, est déjà assez connu par ses expériences en affaires et ses relations à l'Etranger pour qu'en 1958, il soit choisi comme Membre d'une Mission Economique du gouvernement à Londres. Il s'y est si bien tiré que c'est lui qui, une année plus tard, négociera pour le gouvernement un contrat avec la General Electric de Conventry pour la modernisation et l'extension de notre système de Télécommunication. En 1957, il se voit envoyé dans une autre Mission à la Conférence Internationale de Bruxelles. Entre temps, Clémard Joseph Charles s'adonne à de multiples activités commerciales et industrielles. Sa

(voir suite page 4)

Brillante réception à l'Ambassade Américaine

La réception qu'ont offerte hier soir en leur résidence à Bourdon, l'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis et Mme Thurston a connu un très grand succès. Elle avait été organisée en l'honneur du nouveau conseiller de l'Ambassade américaine et de Mme Edward Glion Curtis Jr.

De nombreuses personnalités avaient répondu à l'aimable invitation de l'Ambassadeur et de Mme Thurston. Ce furent deux heures magnifiques. Les amphitryons, dont l'amabilité est connue, comblèrent leurs invités d'attentions.

On eut l'occasion de prendre contact, de causer avec le nouveau Conseiller de l'Ambassade américaine dont nous prenons plaisir à publier le curriculum vitae:

x x x x

BIOGRAPHIE DE
M. E. G. CURTIS JR.

Né à St Louis (Missouri), le 8 septembre 1909, Mr. Edward Glion Curtis Jr., 1er Secrétaire et Ministre Conseiller de l'Ambassade des Etats Unis en Haïti, est un officier de carrière du Service Diplomatique.

Après avoir obtenu sa Licence en Lettres à l'Université de Washington, il reçut son diplôme à l'Institut Cesare Alfieri à Florence (Italie). C'est en 1935 qu'il fit son entrée dans le Service Diplomatique. Le premier poste qu'il occupa fut celui de vice-Consul à Budapest (Hongrie), de 1935 à 1936, avant de se rendre à Wellington, en Nouvelle Zélande.

Nommé 3ème Secrétaire de Légation à Port-au-Prince (Haïti), le 24 Avril 1939, M. Edward Glion Curtis Jr. devait occuper ce poste jusqu'en 1943. Il fut promu 2ème Secrétaire de Légation à Port-au-Prince, le 23 Août 1943. Après avoir quitté Haïti en 1944, M. Curtis Jr. se rendit à Madrid (Espagne) en qualité de Second Secrétaire d'Ambassade et Vice Consul (1944-1947).

Il fut nommé par la suite Consul et 2ème Secrétaire à La Haye. En 1950, il occupa les fonctions d'officier économique et celles de Consul à Zurich (Suisse) de 1950 à 1951. Nommé 1er Secrétaire et Consul à Panama, M. Curtis Jr. séjourna à Managua comme Conseiller (1953-57), avant d'être assigné au poste d'officier en charge de la Securité Inter-américaine et d'Assistant aux Affaires du Département d'Etat, le 28 juillet 1957.

M. Edward Glion Curtis Jr. est marié et il a quatre enfants.

Le Vatican et le cas Sherry Finkbine

CITE DU VATICAN — AFP

Il était un homme vivant et innocent, on l'a tué on a commis un crime, a déclaré la presse du Vatican en commentant le cas d'avortement de la nord américaine Sherry Finkbine.

Après avoir critiqué le cas de la mère qui se fait opérer pour ne pas donner naissance à un enfant déformé, la radio du Vatican déclare que «même les malades désirent vivre.» La félicité est un fait intérieur. Un secret de l'esprit que personne, même une mère ne peut imposer de l'extérieur. Ce n'est pas un privilège de riche, ni de jeunes, ni de forts de personnes saines. Ceux qui ont essayé de justifier le cas de Finkbine ignorent ce que c'est que l'amour, le secret de la félicité, le fondement de la vraie grandeur humaine, ajoute la Presse du Vatican.

Les puissances

truction se [illegible] par un véritable cannibalisme social. Dans la production de ce phénomène, où chacun sans subir nullement l'influence d'une mystique ou d'un principe supérieur, est agi tout en croyant agir dans le sens de ses intérêts les plus légitimes, on a l'impression que la communauté ne peut se frayer sa voie sans un tuteur, d'où la reconnaissance implicite, qui avoue de la supériorité de l'ancien patron.

Ces vérités qu'on trouve en filigramme à travers les pages de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine du colonialisme, devraient susciter des réflexions chez les haitiens pour qu'ils s'efforcent d'augmenter les potentialités nationales et se dépasser dans l'appréciation et le respect de leurs Valeurs sociales.

Si dans le domaine politique, militaire, intellectuel, nous avons compté des étoiles, notre histoire économico - sociale est bien pauvre en un certain sens.

On veut dire que l'on trouve très peu de gens qui, en dépit des obstacles, sont arrivés à faire époque, en augmentant de façon notable la richesse nationale, en améliorant les conditions de vie de notre peuple. Notre représentation de l'Etat - Bienfaisance veut que cet objectif soit son job principal.

Nous avons certes, bien noté des tentatives — et nous songeons à un Pantaléon Guilbaud, le roi du tabac du temps de notre enfance — mais seulement des tentatives sans lendemain, hélas! Nous pensons que s'il en est ainsi que si nous aimons sincèrement ce pays que nous voudrions être globalement nôtre, il nous faut ligoter en nous le vieil homme — ce condensé de haine, de petittesse, de haine, et surtout d'envie — et limiter la consommation de nos Valeurs de cet ordre.

Il n'y a pas longtemps, nous avons consacré une page au Docteur DAY, à l'occasion de l'incendie d'un Laboratoire, parcequ'à notre sens, à travers deux générations, nous avons trouvé en ce nom un symbole de continuité dans le travail, une Valeur sociale positive, enrichissante pour la communauté. Dans le même esprit nous voudrions évoquer ici un nouveau nom, une autre Valeur sociale qui mérite l'admiration. Nous citons Clémard Joseph CHARLES.

Son émersion est d'hier et pourtant c'est déjà une figure de Pionnier. Noir, taille et corpulence moyennes. Des yeux vifs sous un front large que ronge déjà une calvitie précoce. Voilà, en deux traits, l'homme au physique. Encore jeune: 39 ans seulement, Clémard Joseph Charles qui est né aux Gonaïves en avril 1923 est fier de son origine paysanne. C'est dans cette région qu'il a fait ses études primaires et secondaires à l'Ecole des Frères de l'Instruction Chrétienne et au Lycée Geffrard. C'est aussi dans cette Artibonite qu'il a commencé la bataille de la vie d'abord comme instituteur rural. La mort de son père survenue en 1939 n'a été que une étape dans sa vie; il lui faut prendre la lourde succession

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Anciens Régiments. Coup d'Jaill. Casser D'janne. Sérénade.

Pétion Gé-Pé-Té

Par Constantin DUMERVE

Dédié à mon aimable confrère Lucien Montas, rédacteur en Chef du Quotidien Le Nouvelliste

Haiti devenue Nation — 1er Janvier 1804 — le premier soin des dirigeants fut de promouvoir l'essor du nouvel Etat. Les Arts ne furent pas négligés. L'Armée trouva dans la Musique un stimulant pour appuyer ses manifestations pacifiques ou guerrières.

Les régiments étaient répartis ainsi :

1er Port-au-Prince, 2ème Cap-Haitien, 3ème Port-au-Prince, 4e Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, 5e Dondon, 6ème St Michel de l'Attalaye, 7e et 8ème St Marc, 9ème Port de Paix, 10ème Mirebalais, 11 et 12èmes Port-au-Prince, 13e Les Cayes, 14ème Gonaives, 15e Aquin, 16e Anse à Veau, 17ème Les Cayes, 18ème Jérémie, 19ème Anse d'Hainault, 20ème Verrettes, 21ème Léogâne, 22ème et 23ème Jacmel, 24ème Petit Goâve, 25ème Gonaives, 26ème Borgne, 27ème Grande Rivière du Nord, 28ème Trou du Nord, 29e Fort Liberté, 30ème Cap Haitien, 31ème Lascahobas, 32ème Môle St Nicolas, 33ème Aux Côteaux, 34ème Limbé, 35ème Vallières, 36ème Hinche, 37ème Plaisance 38ème Saltrou.

Ces régiments, annuellement, tenaient garnison six mois à la Capitale. Ce séjour permettait aux soldats de compléter leur formation militaire et les musiciens attachés aux régiments de s'initier à la théorie et à la pratique sous la direction d'instructeurs spéciaux.

Les Batteries Sonores groupaient les bruyants tambours, les clairons au timbre éclatant, les fifres aux effets ingénieux. Leur jeu d'ensemble déterminait un programme compliqué selon occasion et leur rythme varié d'une technique parfois endiablée se multipliait sans perdre haleine.

Vers quelle époque ont paru ces manifestations musicales dénommées Coup d'Jaille (non coudiallen), Casser d'janne, (diane) (espagnole : diana), les Sérénades?

Aux premiers jours de l'Indépendance.

Le 30 Octobre 1804 lors de la cérémonie du Sacre de l'Empereur Dessalines, les Coup d'Jaill s'emparant du pays, le peuple ne put contenir son allégresse.

En 1805, un coup d'Jaill de 400 tambours — batteries sonores se fusionnant avec les musiques militaires, le premier anniversaire de l'Indépendance connut un éclat dont le souvenir ne s'effacera jamais.

CASSER D'JANNE : (Diane), a été institué pour stimuler le réveil des soldats au point du jour dès quatre heures du matin, les Batteries Sonores parties des postes militaires (Fort National, Bureaux arrondissement, la Place, Fort etc) fendaient l'air. Le Leitmotiv conducteur modulé, transformé en mille manières, suivant les péripéties de l'action, changeait d'expression ou de sens.

A ces mélodies vivantes, de couleur locale, l'esprit haitien adapta d'un souffle admirable, paroles que tout le monde enthousiasme, chantait avec une bonne humeur communicative. Nous en détachons parmi les quatorze formant le Casser d'janne les couplets suivants :

Toutt moun lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé,
Soldats ! lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé, lévé,
Si nous pas lévé,
Ya mété'n lan Salle police,
Si nous pas lévé
Ya mete'n lan Salle police.

—II—

Si nous té gain l'agent
Nou ta fait gnou gros bouillon,
Général si nous gain l'agent
N'a fait gnou gros bouillon

—III—

Pour se faire distinguer, la Batterie de chaque régiment se signalait par le numéro d'ordre. Par exemple, celle de ma ville natale Môle St Nicolas (32ème) faisait éclater :

Trentt déxième pas gangnin manman (bis)
Trentt déxième pa gangnin papa
Toutt ti qui choille
Cé trentt déxième
Toutt gran qui choille
Cé trentt déxième

—IV—

Maintenant, tour de la Méringue. Du copieux catalogue nous extrayons la mélodie et paroles suivantes parues sous Tirésias :

Gadé Zouzoutt, (bis
Gadé Thémo,
Thémo piti, piti, piti con ça
Fait bo[illegible]a zouzoutt tout doux boutt.

Voici en quelle circonstance ce Chanté a été trouvé. Commissaire Zouzoutt chef de la police, gran gabari, arrogant, ventru se tenait au Bureau Central (actuellement Centre de Santé près de la Cathédrale).

Commissaire Thémo, sous Chef de la police sympathique, court de taille, mince en un mot Ti-corps répondait au service du bureau.

Un jour à la suite d'une vive altercation, Commissaire Zouzoutt, s'oubliant, administra trois coups de cocomaquatt à Thémo. Celui-ci indigné enleva le bâton et à son tour ronfla une dégolée en règle à Zouzoutt qui, ne pouvant plus tenir, ouetta. L'incident fit sensation. La chanson s'en empara.

Sait-on que peu de jours après, les deux cocomaquateurs se rencontraient journellement chez Rose Pinpin au wharf sherh (Cité.

(Suite page 4)

WASHINGTON (AFP)

Les Etats Unis, [illegible] Grande Bretagne remettront [illegible]bablement avant la fin de [illegible] semaine leurs notes au Gouv[illegible]ment Soviétique à propos de [illegible]lin. Dans cette note, les trois [illegible]sances occidentales réitéré[illegible] leurs positions respectives à [illegible]gard de la décision unilatéral[illegible] l'URSS d'abolir son Comma[illegible]ment militaire à Berlin Est.

Prêts de l'AID à un syndicat

WASHINGTON — AFP

L'agence pour le Dévelo[illegible]ment International a octroyé [illegible] prêt de 400.000 dollars au sy[illegible]cat de la Compagnie de Che[illegible] de Fer du Honduras pour la [illegible]truction de logements.

Incidents entre cubains à Kingsto

KINGSTON (AFP)

Une fois de plus on a enu[illegible]tré hier des incidents avec l[illegible] légation cubaine à Kingston. [illegible]cident le plus grave a été [illegible]gistré au marché «Victori[illegible] où il y eut bagarre entre [illegible]bains de la délégation et l[illegible] lés résidant à la Jamaique.

D'après une version, les fi[illegible]tes ont attaqué les exilés;d'[illegible] une autre c'est le contraire [illegible] est dit. Il n'y a aucun rappo[illegible]ficiel à ce sujet.

Depuis la police jamaica[illegible] pris des mesures spéciales [illegible] caution.

Le système de fus des USA est invulnérable

WASHINGTON — AF

Le Ministre de la Défe[illegible] Namara a affirmé que le sy[illegible] de fusées télé - guidées des [illegible] Unis est «invulnérables [illegible] peut être détruit par l'Uni[illegible]viétique.

Interrogé par les journ[illegible] au sujet de la possibilité [illegible] Russie de détruire les fu[illegible]méricaines avant même [illegible] ne soient lancées de leurs [illegible] le Secrétaire d'Etat M[illegible] déclaré: «Il n'existe pas [illegible]sibilité immédiate pour l[illegible] Soviétique de désorganiser [illegible] d'une façon notre système [illegible]sées téléguidées.»

Mort de Mme Maurice Castera

Madame Maurice Caste[illegible] Lucie Tancrède Auguste [illegible] son âme à Dieu le merc[illegible] Août 1962 à 7 hres du s[illegible]

Nos sincères condoléan[illegible] son époux, M. Maurice [illegible] ainsi qu'aux autres pare[illegible] cruellement éprouvés.

Institut des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Port-au-Pce signe un Accord

Des nouvelles qui nous parvien nt, il semble qu'un accord est rvenu entre l'Ecole des Hau Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Montréal que dirige — M ur Roger Charbonneau et l'I ut des Hautes Etudes Commer ales et Economiques (IHECE) Port - au - Prince, dirigé par ssieurs Gérard R. Latortue et anz Alcindor.

C'est grâce au dévouement de tre compatriote le Docteur Vé- Leroy, professeur de Sciences onomiques à l'Ecole des H. E. de Montréal que Gérard R. atortue a pu prendre contact ec Messieurs R. Charbonneau Directeur des H. E. C. et Fran- ois Albert Angers Directeur de nstitut d'Economie Appliquée, cole des H. E. C. Montréal.

Nous sommes en mesure de nseigner nos lecteurs sur les ints importants de cet accord.

1 — H. E. C. se fera un plai- ir d'envoyer à IHECE de Port - Prince tous les livres à ca- ctère économique et commer- qu'elle a en double. — Des structions seront passées au Directeur de la Bibliothèque Mr. llen — dans ce sens.

— H. E. C. envoie à IHECE. s revues et une copie des cours fessés à HEC.

IHECE. devra également envo er à Montréal une copie des dif ents cours — ceux qui sont nséographiés — de ses profes- seurs.

HEC. va faire des démar- s près du Ministère des Af- ires Culturelles pour établir a- IHECE un programme d'é- e de professeurs et peut - même d'étudiants.

EC. est prête à faciliter le sé au Canada d'hommes d'affai haitiens que l'IHECE lui re mmanderait, à charge bien en- du pour l'IHECE de faciliter le séjour en Haiti d'hom d'affaires canadiens qui se intéressés à avoir des re ns en Haiti.

— En outre l'Institut d'Eco- Appliquée publie une re- «L'Actualité Economique». Directeur de cet Institut Mr. rt Angers est prêt à publier articles des professeurs de l'I et en général de tout é- miste haitien que l'IHECE recommanderait. L'IHECE se le correspondant de la revue Port - au - Prince où elle sera ndue par la Librairie Athénée au No. 139 de la Rue Pavée.

Nul doute qu'un tel accord facilitera le développement des échanges commerciaux culturels et économiques avec le Canada et qu'un plus grand nombre de nos compatriotes, s'intéresseront davantage à l'Institut des Hautes études Com. et Economiques qui répondait à une nécessité dans notre milieu.

Monsieur et Mme Otto Ed. Thur, professeurs de Sciences Economiques à Montréal et à l'Université Laval ont grandement encouragé les initiatives de l'Institut des Hautes Commerciales et Economiques. Ils seraient prêts dès Mai prochain à venir prononcer quelques conférences surtout sur l'épineuse question de la «Stabilisation des prix des matières premières». Monsieur THUR s'intéresse particulièrement au problème des fluctuations économiques.

[illegible]

TOCKHOLM (AFP)

Les unités de la Marine sué- ont dû faire usage de bom [illegible] marines pour expulser [illegible] territoriales de Suède, [illegible] non identifié, qui [illegible] au commandement [illegible] pressé, d'émerger.

MAGIC CINE

ANCHE à 5 hres, 7 hres et
[illegible] - Vendredi - Samedi,
[illegible]
EPOUSER UN HORS
LA LOI
Barry Sullivan, Marjorie, Ray-

LA SITUATION A BERLIN

Policier tué à Berlin

BERLIN — AFP —

Un membre de la police de transport en uniforme de la R. D. U. a été tué cette nuit par la police de Berlin. Est, au moment où il essayait de traverser le mur.

x x x

A propos de Berlin

WASHINGTON — AFP —

Les Etats Unis continueront à considerer l'Union Soviétique comme responsable du secteur Soviétique à Berlin. Les gouvernements des Etats Unis du Royaume Uni et de France continueront d'exercer pleinement leurs droits et d'assumer leurs responsabilités à Berlin, ajoute une déclaration publiée cette nuit par le Département d'Etat.

Et aucune mesure ünilatérale du gouvernement soviétique ne peut affecter l'unité de Berlin dans son ensemble conclut-il.

Jean 23 et Pie 9

CITE D UVATICAN — AFP—

Pie IX sera-t-il béatifié au cours du prochain Concile oecumenique? Le Pape Jean 23 a confié aujourd'hui au cours d'une audience générale accordée à Castelgondolfo que son voeu le plus cher est de voir «que le Seigneur lui accorde la grâce de décréter les honneurs de l'autel à celui qui a convoqué le premier Concile du Vatican.» En parlant de la fête du Coeur Immaculée de Marie que l'église célébrait ce jour, le Pape a dit que trois pontifs s'étaient distingués par leur dévotion à la Vierge: Pie VIII qui inaugura le culte de Marie, Pie IX qui a proclamé le dogme de l'Immaculée Conception et Pie XII qui a consacré le genre humain au Coeur Immaculée de Marie. Jean 23 a insisté sur les mérites de Pie IX et a dit que beaucoup ont comparé ce pape avec Jésus Christ pour avoir été à la fois l'homme le plus chéri et le plus haï par ses contemporains.

FIGURE DE PIONNIER

(Suite)

vie se partage entre ses bureaux à la Capitale et de multiples voyages à l'intérieur du pays où il enquête sans cesse sur les possibilités d'investissement. A chacune de nos rencontres, il nous parle de projets nouveaux qu'il a pour contribuer au développement du pays. Sa salle d'attente est toujours remplie de gens venus prendre des instructions pour la Province, d'intermédiaires, de solliciteurs de crédits. Parmi les Entreprises qu'il dirige, nous notons La Universal Enterprise Co. (USACO) la National Deutsch Associates, la Cocon Industry in the South et Mews Charles et Co sans compter des Succursales de sa Maison de Commerce. Cela ne l'empêche pas de représenter la General Electric Co Ltd. de Londres et la Siemens Schuckert Werke Co.

Mais le chef d'oeuvre de la vie d'homme d'affaires de Clémard Joseph Charles, c'est la création en 1960 de la Banque Commerciale d'Haiti dont il a longtemps caressé le projet. C'est cette initiative qui fait de lui un Grand Pionnier. La Banque Commerciale est la première banque privée haitienne. Si l'on s'imagine que même la Banque Nationale n'a été rachetée qu'en 1949 pour devenir propriété de l'Etat Haitien, on s'imagine ce qu'il a fallu à Clémard Joseph Charles dans un milieu comme le nôtre, de hardiesse de pensée, d'audace, de ténacité et de largeur de vue pour arriver à une telle création, laquelle fera époque dans l'histoire économique de notre pays. Clémard Charles nous donne l'image d'un nouveau type d'hommes d'affaires que nous ne connaissions pas avant lui. Il a divorcé d'avec ces usages sans grandeur de commerçants - - courtiers à la petite semaine qui se contentent égoïstement d'une marge de profits qu'ils accumulent à l'Etranger et qui recommencent la routine chaque année. Si nos masses restent si arriérées c'est parce qu'elles ne sont pas encadrées par une bourgeoisie entreprenante, créatrice d'opportunités de bien - être. Charles pense qu'il ne faut pas laisser à l'Etat tout seul la tâche de promouvoir le développement économique du pays. Il est conscient de sa mission sociale et sait qu'il doit donner la main aux moins munis pour les faire monter. Aussi cette Banque Commerciale qui a connu dans le public un succès si étonnant en un court laps de temps est - elle conçue comme le centre de rayonnement de multiples activités dont tireront profit de milliers de gagne-peu. Les projets à l'étude, lorsqu'ils seront réalisés, feront de cette initiative, une véritable institution nationale.

Si nous ne désespérons pas de ce pays et que nous croyons en ses virtualités, nous pensons qu'une figure de Pionnier comme celle qui vient d'être esquissée méritait d'être mieux connue afin d'être comprise et encouragée. C'est pourquoi nous avons écrit cet article. Nous voudrions en même temps avoir proposé à la jeunesse un Modèle d'honnêteté de discipline, de ténacité dans une communauté qui en manque tellement.

Emmanuel C. PAUL

TO

LE GOUVERNEUR
C. POLETTI ET SA
EN AMERIQUE LA

Hier après midi, co
demment annoncé, le
Charles Poletti et sa
épouse Jean Ellis son
la capitale, accompagn
George H. Bennett. I
accueillis à l'aéroport
lentin Edward Blacqu
Commercial à l'Ambas
tats Unis à Port au
sa charmante femme
par M. Mc Elhannon,
la Pan American.

Le gouvernuer Pol
à la boutonnière la
Commandeur avec Etoi
dre du St. Grégoire le
ne distinction, du Pape
plus haut rang jamais
un laique pour les ren
services rendus comm
neur militaire allié en
rant la guerre. Le vic
dent des Affaires Int
les de la prochaine Foi
le de New York répon
un français impeccable
haits de bienvenue qui
té adressés. Avenant,
gouverneur Poletti a l
enveloppant d'un parfa
du monde. On compren
son don de persuasion
sons qui ont porté les
teurs de la Foire à le
la mission délicate de
adhésions des pays du
cette grande manifesta
diale de la Paix.

Gouverneur Poletti vi
ter la Jamaique, nou
née à l'indépendance, à
nifestation. Il s'est ent
vec le Chef de la nouve
blique, Monsieur Bu
avec les Ministres des
et du Commerce, avec
dent de la Chambre de
ce et le Chef de la Ja
dustrial Development
tion, M. Braham pour
quer l'objectif de cette
Il était accompagné
ces réunions du Dr. Gé
Bennett, Docteur en Ph
l'un de ses huit Assista

Ici le vice - préside
Foire mondiale a pris
hier avec le Secrétaire
Tourisme, M. Victor N
il s'est entretenu ce m
le Secrétaire d'Etat du
ce, M. Clovis Désinor
avec le Ministre des
M. Herve Boyer. Dema
une conversation avec
dent de la Chambre de
ce, M. Louis Décatrel
conférence de presse q
roulera au local de cett
sation.
C'est l'ingénieur Har
hauer qui a été chargé
des plans du Stand d'
Foire de New York de
- Gouverneur Poletti
Haiti Samedi pour se
Quito où il sera reçu p
sident Arosemena qui
comment visité l'aire d
tion à Flushing Mead
ensuite à Bogota où l'A
deur des Etats Unis est
sin de sa femme et term
tournée dans l'Amérique
pour une visite à Cara
Nous souhaitons la
diale bienvenue au Go
et Mme. Charles Poletti et

[illegible] #2

OOE- 3,260,843

MR. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

President & General Manager, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince.

Life Story

Born at Gonaives, Haiti, on April 21, 1923, of peasant parents; went to Parochial School; in 1939 graduated from Lycée Geffrard, Gonaives; taught in rural schools; in addition, father having died in 1939, did various jobs to support his family; upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor, free lance journalist, etc.

In 1947, appointed Controler General of Haytian Southern Banana Industry; became General Agent in 1948.

In 1949 established himself as Manufacturers' Representative and created his own export and import business.

In 1953 went to London as Member of the Economic Mission of the Haytian Government, and in 1954 negotiated on the Haytian Government's behalf a contract with the General Electric Co.Ltd., of Coventry, England for the modernizing and extending of the telecommunication system in Haiti.

In 1957, appointed Member of the Haytian Mission to the International Conference held in Brusselâ, Belgium.

In 1960 created the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.

Mr. Charles is the sole owner of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti and the full or part owner of several industrial and commercial enterprises in Haiti, such as :

Universal Enterprises Co.,S.A. (U.S.A.C.O.)
National Deutsch Associates, S.A. - Clemard Joseph Charles Import-Export
Cocoa Industry in the South - Clemard Joseph Charles & Co.
Mevs Charles & Co.

He is the sole Representative in Haiti of the following concerns :

The General Electric Co.,Ltd., London, England
Siemens Schuckert Werke, Germany

Bank References :

Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti
Port-au-Prince, Haiti
The Royal Bank of Canada, New York
Irving Trust Company, New York

Member of :

The Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti
The Haitian Chamber of Commerce
The International Club of Commerce, Haiti
Commerce & Industry Association of New York - Charter Member
Rotary Club, Port-au-Prince, Tennis Club of Port-au-Prince.

es/

Honors & Awards :

Knight of the National Order " Honor & Merit "
Officer of the Labor Order
Commander of the Civil Merit Order
Honorary Citizen of the City of New York - Honorary Citizen
Of the City of Long Beach, L.I.,N.Y.

- - - - - -

Mr. Charles married his wife, Sophie, in 1952; they have one adopted son.

June 21, 1962

14-00000

G

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. R Galante

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

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UNIT TIME BY

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ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 202054Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 3885 PRIN

20 Jun 66 IN 41197

DIRECTOR

1. COLONEL CLAUDE RAYMOND, DR. ROGER LAFONTANT, PORT AU PRINCE UNIVERSITY MILITIA LEADER, AND DUVALIER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY PIERRE BIAMBY APPLIED U.S. CONSULATE 17 JUNE FOR TRANSIT VISAS FOR SPECIAL MISSION TO LONDON. TRIO REQUESTED TWO WEEKS STAY U.S. GOING TO UK AND TWO WEEKS ON RETURN TRIP.

2. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TRAVELLING AS INSPECTOR HAITIAN EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES REQUESTED SEPARATELY TRANSIT VISA FOR TRIP TO EUROPE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

20 JUN 66

201-357029

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ TERNAL E ONLY ☐ CON ENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE

EXTENSION:

NO. CSCI 316/02952-66

DATE 10 June 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	14 JUN 1966		
2.			
3. [illegible]			
4.			
5. RID/AN GA 50			
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7. RID/MIS			
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13.			
14.			
15. RID/FI 1B 4003			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: DIR/FBI

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER 201-357029

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT

DOCUMENT DATE 16 JUN 1966

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

16 JUN 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: CHARLES, Clemard
DOB: 21 April 1923
POB: Gonaives, Haiti
VISA: Haitian

1. Reference is made to the I-57 request form concerning Subject who entered the United States on 3 April 1966. The files of another Office of this Agency contain the following pertinent information regarding Subject more recent than that contained in TDCSDB-315/00977-64 dated 9 October 1964, subject: Inquiries Regarding the Possibility of Buying Aircraft for Haiti.

2. According to an unevaluated report dated 14 April 1966, from a United States national with forty years' experience in the tobacco industry who makes frequent trips to Latin America and who is considered a shrewd observer, which contained biographic information concerning Subject, CHARLES was specifically referred to as President DUVALIER's banker and financial manager. Subject was regarded by Source as being "very close to the Palace" and as having ready access to DUVALIER. Source described Subject as a "crook and poor liar; in other words, truly a Haitian political character and not to be trusted under any conditions." Subject had mentioned to Source his activity in 1954 as a negotiator on behalf of the Haitian Government with the General Electric Company of England for modernization of Haiti's telecommunications system. As a result of this contract, Haiti experienced one of its greatest political scandals, for the contract was for 4 million dollars, and the actual delivery of products was only 1 million dollars. Source observed that CHARLES was president of the Haitian Banana Corporation which was originally operated by Eric TIPPENHAUER and Colonel PROSPER, and subsequently went bankrupt because of financial mismanagement; further, Subject had headed the Essential Oils Company since the death of Senator Louis DE JOIE. Source was satisfied that these companies headed by Subject were actually owned and/or controlled for the benefit of DUVALIER. At the time of the report CHARLES' principal assistant in the tobacco industry was Remy ABCLAIT, who

FILE IN 201-357029

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201-357029

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declassification

was director of the Haitian Tobacco Monopoly and secretary-treasurer of Le Tabac Haitien, S.A. SICLAIT was generally believed to be Subject's "hatchet man" but Source was unable to verify this.

CSCI-316/02932-66

RID/CE: JMA/MD/mac

Based on: 00-E-324/06340-66

FILE IN 201-352,029

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UH

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	4/11/66

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES Clemard	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED STATES ADDRESS Haitian Cons NY	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 234	
PERMANENT ADDRESS Pacot Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 4/21/23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION JFKNY 4/3/66	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A2 D/S (TS)	
DESTINATION As Above	

Oth[illegible] any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

[illegible] COORDINATION

Date 2 May 66	INITIALS
BY ANALYST	[illegible]
DIV. BRANCH	WH/HAITI
[illegible] EDITION	[illegible]
[illegible]	

cc: C.I.A.
O.S.I.
G-2
(Army)

Ref B.A.
4/23/66

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

Form I-[illegible]
(Rev. 7-15-63)

FILE IN 201-352,029

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 24 APRIL 1966

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

SECRET

12 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCS/OSS
Attention: Mr. Musulin

SUBJECT : Contact with Clemard Charles

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation on 8 March, it is requested that your representative, in talking with Clemard Charles, obtain the latter's views on the following:

a. the economic and political stability of the Haitian Government for the next four months;

b. current threats to President Duvalier and origin of these threats;

c. ability of President Duvalier to control opposition from within or outside the country;

d. attitudes of Haitian business men in Port-au-Prince relative to the present government.

2. I would be very interested in any indication from Clemard Charles that he is anti-Duvalier or that Duvalier's tenure is limited.

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

WH/7/Ht/MJGremillion:rae

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1 - 201-357029 ✓ file in ISR 4C 24
1 - Memo chrono

SECRET

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declassification

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 6 APRIL 1966

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO 00-E-324/16314-66

SUBJECT Clémard Joseph Charles Believed to be President Duvalier's Personal Financial Manager/Biographical Data on C J Charles

DATE DISTR [illegible]

NO PAGES 5

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Feb - Mar 66

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince/Feb - Mar 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, sales representative of a US tobacco manufacturing company who has had 40 years' experience in the industry. Source makes frequent business trips to Latin America and recently returned from a six weeks' visit to Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti. He has excellent contacts in the areas he visits, speaks moderate Spanish and French, and is a shrewd observer.

1. During the period 1952-59 I tried to establish business association with certain Haitians including such characters as Eric Tippenhauer, Colonel M Prosper, Senator Louis De Joie, George Léger, and many others. On the occasion of my first visit to Port-au-Prince in five years, I encountered a new set of characters, but they are obviously of the identical "cut" as my previous acquaintances.

2. A reportedly privately-owned tobacco company known as Le Tabac Haitien, S. A. is directed by Clémard Joseph Charles, a black Haitian who also happens to be President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti. This cigarette manufacturing firm is the direct descendant of the long defunct Haitian-American Tobacco Co. Some six months ago Le Tabac Haitien began ordering moderate quantities of leaf tobacco and providing letters of credit to pay for the leaf. When I held my first series of conferences with Mr Charles, he immediately attempted to impress me with his political, social, and economic influence in Haiti and then proceeded to enlist my principal's financial participation to the small sum of US$300 thousand. Fully cognizant of the Haitian style of business, I deferred the offer and proceeded to discreetly inquire of Mr Charles' status in Haiti.

3. As a matter of convenience Mr Charles provided me with a curriculum vitae which I quote as follows:

CLÉMARD JOSEPH CHARLES: President & General Manager of the
'BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI'
President of the CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HAITI

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S-YES

U-NO

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GROUP 1
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S-E-C-R-E-T

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

201-357039

CURRICULUM VITAE

Born in Gonaives, Haiti, on April 21, 1923, from a peasant family. Had his primary schooling at the 'Ecole des Freres des Gonaives,' and his secondary schooling at the 'Lycée Géffrard' in the same town.

Upon his father's death, did various jobs to support his family. Was in turn schoolmaster at the rural school of Verrettes, at $15 a month, free lance teacher at $0.40 per month per child, timekeeper, plantation supervisor, photographer, sanitary clerk, free lance journalist. In the latter capacity, founded 'L'Intrepide' and 'L'Aurore' in cooperation with the late Emmanuel C. Paul.

Phyto-Pathologist.

In 1946, was appointed Controller General of the Banana Development Company (BADECO), of which he became the General Agent in 1948. The following year, established himself as Manufacturer's Agent, and created an Import-Export trade house.

Married in 1952, Sophie Lherisson.

In 1953, went to London as a Member of the Economic Mission sent to England by the Haitian Government, and in 1954, negotiated, on behalf of the Government, a contract with The General Electric Co., Ltd., Coventry, England. This contract was in connection with the extension and modernization of the Telecommunication System in Haiti.

In 1957, was appointed as a member of the Economic Mission to the International Conference held in Brussels, Belgium.

Created in 1960, the 'BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI,' of which he is the President and Director General. Is also the President of the following firms he himself created:

Universal Enterprises Co. S.A. (USACO)
National Deutsch Associates, S.A.
Makcorp d'Haiti, S.A. (Kenaf Cultivation)
Mugéco Enterprises, S.A.
Société Haitienne de Peaux à Cuirs (Leather & Skins)
Le Tabac Haitien
Administration Portuaire de Port-au-Prince
Caribbean Cordage Mill
Corporation Philatélique d'Haiti
Shada Division, Montrouis
Automobile Insurance Division - Third Party Liabilities
Les Essences Aromatique d'Haiti (Essential Oils)
Produits Nationaux, S.A.
Assurance Vieillesse Obligatoire (ONA)
Entrasa, S.A.
Société Général de Matériaux de Constructions (SOGEMACO)
Société Nationale de Fruits et de Légumes (SONAFRUCO)

He is the exclusive Agent for the following firms:

The General Electric Co., Ltd. of Coventry
Siemens Schuckertwerke A. G. Erlangen, Germany

Presently: President of the Chamber of Commerce of Haiti

Member of: Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti
Commerce & Industry Association of New York
Rotary Club of Port-au-Prince
Tennis Club of Port-au-Prince
Action for Latin American Unity, Mexico
Academia de Derecho International, Mexico

Awards & Distinction:

Knight of the National Order 'Honor & Merit' (HAITI)
Officer of the Labor Order
Commander of the Civil Merit Order
Commander of the International Order for Public Welfare - France
Commander of the National Order for Agricultural Merit
Commander of the Order 'Petion & Bolivar' - for services rendered to the cause of Pan Americanism
Honorary citizen of the City of Longbeach, L. I., New York
Honorary citizen of the City of New York
Honorary citizen of the City of Berlin
Medal of His Holiness Pope Paul-VI.

4. In addition Mr Charles made available two other papers that are likewise of interest. One is a list of correspondents for the Commercial Bank of Haiti and the second consists of enterprises controlled by that bank which were not included in the latest balance sheet. I quote these papers as follows:

BANKS - LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS

U. S. A.:

(1) Bank of America (International)
P. O. Box 3415
Rincon Annex, San Francisco 20, California

(2) First National City Bank
399 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

(3) Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, N. Y.

(4) Irving Trust Company
One Wall Street
New York 15, N. Y.

(5) First National Bank of Boston
Boston 6, Mass.

(6) Pan American Bank of Miami
P. O. Box 831
Miami 30, Florida

FRANCE:

Crédit Lyonnais
19 Boulevard des Italiens
Paris, France

SWITZERLAND:

(1) United Overseas Bank (Banque Unie pour les Pays d'Outre-Mer)
3-5 Rue du Conseil Général
Genève, Suisse

(2) Union de Banques Suisses
8, Rue du Rhone
Geneve, Suisse

ENGLAND:
MIDLAND BANK LIMITED
(Overseas Branch)
P. O. Box 831
60 Gracechurch Street
London, E. C. 3

ENTERPRISES CONTROLED BY BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Not Included in the Balance Sheet

(1)	SHADA - St. Marc Division (Yearly Income)	$	500.000.-
(2)	PORT AUTHORITY - PORT-AU-PRINCE (Yearly Income)	$	600.000.-
(3)	THIRD PARTY LIABILITY - VEHICLE INSURANCE (Yearly Income)	$	1.000.000.-
(4)	ESSENTIAL OILS (Yearly Income)	$	300.000.-
(5)	SEAFOOD - EXPLOITATION (Yearly Income)	$	250.000.-
(6)	MODERN TANNERY (Yearly Income)	$	[illegible].000.-
(7)	PHILATELIC CORPORATION (Yearly Income)	$	300.000.-
(8)	[illegible] (Yearly Income)	$	150.000.-
(9)	U.S.A.C.O. (Yearly Income)	$	275.000.-
(10)	TOYOTA SALES DIVISION - C. J. Charles Import-Export (Yearly Income)	$	150.000.-
(11)	SEGUIN - LUMBER DIVISION (Yearly Income)	$	100.000.-
(12)	O.N.A. - RETIREMENT INSURANCE (Yearly minimum income expected)	$	2.000.000.-

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5. Since my previous commercial associations in Haiti dated prior to 1959, I found it extremely difficult to locate old acquaintances, for most are dead or in voluntary exile. I did manage to assemble some data on

Mr Charles that I regard as reliable. He is specifically referred to as "Papa Doc's" banker and financial manager. Mr Charles, as would be expected is "very close to the Palace" and has ready access to President Duvalier. As for his character, he is described as "a crook and a poor liar." In other words, Mr Charles is truly a Haitian political character and not to be trusted under any conditions.

6. I noted that Mr Charles mentions his activity in 1954 as a negotiator on behalf of the Haitian Government with the General Electric Co of England for modernization of the country's telecommunications system. As a result of this contract Haiti experienced one of its greatest political scandals for the contract was for US$4 million, and the actual delivery of products was only US$1 million. I, likewise, observed that Mr Charles is president of the Haitian Banana Corp which was originally operated by Eric Tippenhauer and Colonel Prosper, and subsequently was bankrupt because of financial mismanagement. Still further, Essential Oils Co was at one time the exclusive domain of Senator Louis De Joie, and since his death the company is headed by Mr Charles.

7. I am personally satisfied that Mr Clémard Joseph Charles is President Duvalier's personal financial manager, and the companies directed by Mr Charles are in fact owned and/or controlled for the benefit of Haiti's chief executive. At the moment Mr Charles' principal assistant in the tobacco industry is Henry Siclait, who just happens to be Director of the Haitian Tobacco Monopoly and Secretary-Treasurer of Le Tabac Haitien, S. A. Siclait is believed to be Mr Charles' "hatchet man" but I was not able to verify this allegation.

- end -

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

UAH

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)	A-2
DATE	2-13-66

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle) CHARLES, Clemard Joseph	NATIONALITY (Citizenship) Haiti
UNITED STATES ADDRESS Hatian Consulate, New York, N.Y.	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL PAA 234	
PERMANENT ADDRESS c/o Banque Commerciale, Port-au-Prince, Haiti	
BIRTH DATE 4-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Port-au-Prince, Haiti
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION 2-2-66, NYC	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION Duration of status	
DESTINATION see above	

NAI
9 Mar 66
mac

28/66

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

201-357029 *

14-00000

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS OI VERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible] 65

FROM: Name OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☑ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) D1

CLUMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

5. 201 NO. E2

725692

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			

7. SEX F1 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F2

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP N1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL K1

14. OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1 DATE K1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

[illegible] 201

357029

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE B1

19. ACTION DESK CODE 2C/A1

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE A1

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES B1 & A1

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. 725692

FORM 5-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(20-21)

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

4 November 1965

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: IRR

FROM: Interagency Source Register

SUBJECT: CHARLES, Joseph Clemard (ID 11612)

1. Reference is made to your requests concerning Subject dated 8 May 1963 and 27 October 1965. The files contain no pertinent information in addition to that which has been incorporated into the enclosed Biographic Report dated July 1964.

2. The Interagency Source Register has no record of a current operational interest in Subject.

ISRM-11,348

Encl. 1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/HP/bjr

Based on: 201-357029

FILE IN 201-357029

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH

		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
Glenn Crispell FI/ISR 4 C24 X5045	RECHECK REGISTRATION REQUEST	ISRM NO. 11,348 DATE 27 Oct 1965 201 NO. 357029

NAME
CHARLES, Joseph Clemard

dup 725692

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
21 April 1923	Gonaives, Haiti	Haitian

PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, (Presently travelling in the U.S. '63)	Unknown

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT
Unknown

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

RID/CE: Both 201s are held by ISR.

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION		
Date 29 Oct 65		INITIALS
RI ANALYST		H.W.P.
DIV.	BRANCH	
WH	7/Haiti	
FI	ISR	
RI EDITOR		
RI TYPIST		

RECEIVED
RID/IM
27 8 48 AM '65

10/27/65
RH ReFs

FILE IN 201-357029 *

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CLARLES
REGISTRATION ACT - HAITI
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

AGENCY CHECK SHEET

WH

DATE: 16 Sep 65

TO: ☐ FBI ☐ G2 ☐ ONI ☐ OSI ☐ DO4 ☐ CSC ☐ HCUA ☒ OTHER CIA

FROM: Defense Intelligence Agency

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - MAIDEN NAME (if any): Charles, Clemard Joseph, or Clemard, Joseph Charles

ALIAS(ES) OR NICKNAMES: Neu CI

SEX: Male

MARITAL STATUS: Unk/

DATE OF BIRTH: Unk

PLACE OF BIRTH (City and state): Unk (Haiti)(?)

PURPOSE OF CHECK: Request for Record Check.

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, SOCIETIES OR CLUBS WITH WHICH AFFILIATED: President, Chamber of Commerce, Port-au-Prince, Haiti

MILITARY SERVICE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERVICE NUMBER	FROM (Dates)	TO	ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S FULL NAME: Unk

ALIAS(ES) OR NICKNAMES:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH (City and state):

RESIDENCES DURING PAST 15 YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
Unk	Present		Port-au-Prince	Haiti

EMPLOYMENT DURING PAST 15 YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
Unk	Present	Director, Commercial National Bank of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, Haiti	

NAI to TDCS-DB-315/00974-64 dated 9 Oct 64, subject: Inquiries Regarding the Possibility of Buying Aircraft for Haite

For additional information are referred to the Department of the State (Commercial references).

me 6 Oct 65

(2) 201's req. 1 Oct
Office of Sec. info req. 1 Oct

EDUCATION

DATES FROM	DATES TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	LOCATION OF SCHOOL

RETURN TO RID/CE/CS -

Ref
30/9/65

REMARKS OF CHECKING AGENCY

5

29 SEP 1965

This is a request for a name check only and is not a request for an investigation or a clearance.

DIA FORM 6 (Rev 3-65) 031852 OPI: DIACI

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1965

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAMS

FROM PORT AUPRINCE EMBTEL 1188

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1965

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VERBATIME TEXT

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
PORTAUPRINCE 1214
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. J. Merghan??

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 38

RI COPY ☐ DUMMY ☐

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Port Au Prince

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO VR, FILE, CI, CI/OPS CI/SP CA 2 CA/[illegible]
DO 4 DD/P 3 SOD 6 EE 4 FI NE 4

SECRET 291525Z

29 Dec 64 IN 50391

DIR INFO GNVA BERN CITE PRIN 2974 FIASCONARO ~~ACTING~~

AN	[illegible]	~~PE~~	WH/2/HT
		~~PE~~	~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~	

REF: DIR 68358 (NOT SENT GNVA, BERN)

1. PER PRIN DAILY LE NOUVELLISTE REPEAT LE NOUVELLISTE, ELIZABETH DABINOVIC LEFT PRIN 23 DECEMBER AFTER FIVE DAY VISIT WITH MRS. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WIFE PRESIDENT COMMERCIAL BANK HAITI.

2. VISIT SIGNIFICANT SINCE PER REF, BOZO DABINOVIC, ELIZABETH'S HUSBAND, POSSIBLY INVOLVED MOHAMMED FAYED'S EFFORTS PURCHASE ARMS FOR HAITI. CLEMARD CHARLES IS HAITIAN MOST INVOLVED FAYED'S AFFAIRS PRIN. PER GNVA INFO, BOZO'S SHIPPING FIRM GNVA REGISTERED IN ELIZABETH'S NAME.

SECRET

SECRET

29 Dec 64

201-357029

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-35722
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG J. Manahan

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1-1

3 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
PORT AU PRINCE

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ LOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE, DO4, DO/H3, FI/SPG, FI,

AN		~~RS~~	
FI		~~FL~~	DESTROY
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~	

S E C R E T 231525Z

DIR CITE PRIN 2966

REF: PRIN 2953 (IN 42019)

23 Dec IN 48045

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES RETURNED PRIN 21 DECEMBER. NO INFO AS YET AVAILABLE RE RESULT HIS NEGOTIATIONS.

2. LUCKNER CAMBRONNE RETURNED SAME FLIGHT BUT, PER PRESS REPORTS, PROBABLE HE TRAVELED TO ESCORT DUVALIER'S DAUGHTER FROM GNVA SCHOOL TO PRIN.

SECRET

201-357029

23 Dec 1964

14-00000

CS

WH A2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	12-13-64

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS) (First) (Middle): CHARLIE CLYMAT JC	NATIONALITY (Citizenship): HAITI
UNITED STATES ADDRESS: 66 E 42 ST CONSULATE OF HAITI NY CITY	
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 222	
PERMANENT ADDRESS: PACOT PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI	
BIRTH DATE: 4-25-23	BIRTH PLACE: HAITI
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 12-12-64 JFKIA	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: A-2 (T.S) DUR. OF STATUS	
DESTINATION: CONSULATE OF HAITI, NY CITY	

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

NAI to TDCS DB 315/00974-64
dated 9 Oct 64

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc C.I.A.
[illegible]
[illegible]
State Dept.

JJB 8 Feb 65
JJB

Form I-57
(Rev. 7-15-63)

FILE IN 201-337029 *

14-00000

201-357029 (Joseph [illegible])

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

131 SECRET

Oct 9 21 59 '64

ORIG. HELEN MORGAN
UNIT WH/2/HAITI
EXT. 6026
DATE 9 OCTOBER 1964

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 12

TDCS DB-315/00974-64

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI/FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 6, CA/PEG, DODS, WH/SA 5, SOD 4

DATE DISTRIBUTED
9 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/2/HAITI	4		WH/PRIN	1	WH/PRIN	#
			WH/JMWAVE/JMPALM			1

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
IN 89699 (WAVE 2976)
UFG-6004
NP (UOAMBER/8)
LIAISON #

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE	XX	ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

RELAY REQUEST ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO CINCSO AND CINCLANT. B

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/R H. Benches

COPY NO.

FORM 1K-8 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI

TDCS DB-315/00974-64

DATE OF INFO. 3 OCTOBER 1964

DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

INQUIRIES REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING AIRCRAFT FOR HAITI

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (7 OCTOBER 1964)

REF IN 89699

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: UNITED STATES CITIZEN (C) WHO OPERATES A BUSINESS IN HAITI, WHERE HE ENJOYS THE FRIENDSHIP OF MANY MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS, AND WHO IS A FORMER MILITARY OFFICER AND A TRAINED REPORTER, FROM SAUDERS V. ROBERSON. APPRAISAL: 3.

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6004

1. ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 1964 THE AVIATION INVESTORS COMPANY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA, RECEIVED AN INQUIRY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING A C-119 AIRCRAFT FOR THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. THE CALL WAS MADE BY RAYMOND (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) TO SAUDERS V. ROBERSON, AN AVIATION INVESTORS COMPANY EMPLOYEE, WHO AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE PROPOSED AIRCRAFT PURCHASE.

2. ON 5 OCTOBER ROBERSON RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A MAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS "RASH" (PHONETIC) REGARDING THE POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF A P-51 AIRCRAFT OSTENSIBLY FOR THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WAS ACTUALLY INTENDED FOR HAITI. ROBERSON AGREED TO MEET WITH "RASH" AT THE CONGRESS BUILDING IN MIAMI TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF BOTH PURCHASES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
TREASURY FBI INS

SECRET

3. SOURCE COMMENT: ROBERSON IS A CAUCASIAN BORN CIRCA 1917 WHO ONCE ATTEMPTED SUGAR NEGOTIATIONS IN HAITI, WHERE HE BECAME KNOWN TO SEVERAL HAITIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, INCLUDING JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT CHARLES HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED TO BUY T-28 AIRCRAFT IN ARIZONA.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CUSTOMS, FBI, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, CINCLANT, CINCSO (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

END OF MESSAGE

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

FROM PORT-AU-PRINCE CONTROL: 7094

DATE: 8 OCTOBER 1964

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE CLEMARD CHARLES AND
FNU SANJURJO)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, JOSEPH D.
201-097839
SEX M DOB ?

CIT HAITI
OCC ?

201-727690
UFGA-14051
19 FEB 64
◆200-120-63
P2

SUBJ REPORTEDLY WOULD RECEIVE POWER POSITION IF DUVALIER GOVT OVERTHROWN IN HAITI. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

#HTP

1892208
PAFR

1 892 208

W14/6/DR

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 2-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-40)

201-97839

13 June 1963

Evlucil/, Comments:

IV. Joseph D. Charles (Black): A man of correct behavior, cultured, honest, would like to be Chief of State, but does not have the real stuff to lead the people.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, M. CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

201-725439
IX -00193
21 MAY 63

PAZR 2054126

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01000010000000080000
11111111111111111111
22222222222222222222
33333333333333333333
44444444444444444444
55555555555555555555
66666666666666666666
77777777777777777777
88888888888888888888
99999999999999999999
```

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS RETURNED TO HAITI AND IS BEING SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED AS THE NEXT PRES. SUBJ 201-725439 SAID THAT M. CHARLES IS RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT.

AR278
5/5/64 718

2 054 126

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: Chief, Contact Division (Support) Stuntz

EXTENSION 2270

NO. Case ~~40,556~~ 39,201

DATE 21 May 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Fritz Janney, DODS			fj	For the 201 I sent a copy to K.T. Ripley
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

COA(S) 3,262,278

17 May 1963

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN: Support (Stuntz)
INFO: LA (McCrea) and Czajkowski

Chief, New York Office

Case-40,556 --- Clemard Joseph Charles

1. At Clemard Joseph Charles' request, on 14 May 63 C/S Balog had a "farewell" interview with the Haitian banker. The private conversation, which took place at Charles' room at the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York, lasted about one hour. On 15 May 1963 Charles flew back to Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

2. At the outset of our "confidential" interview Charles' showed us a letter written by William Stix Wasserman, 40 Wall Street, New York 5, N.Y. whom Charles' described as a "big financier and my adviser" and addressed to Senator Hubert Humphrey. According to Charles, Humphrey and Wasserman are good friends, an allegation which may be true since the salutation of the letter was "Dear Hubert" and the general tone of it indicated a fairly close relationship between the two.

3. In his letter, Wasserman asked the Senator to receive Charles whom he described as a man with "liberal views in regard to cooperatives." Wasserman went on saying that Charles sees "the necessity of creating a new relationship between capital and labor primarily through profit sharing that will at least nullify to some extent the siren song of Communist propaganda." Wasserman concluded by stating the following: "I think at this very critical time in Haitian affairs and with Castro only 60 miles away that the Administration might begin to look for men with Mr. Charles' ability and attitude to see what can constructively be done to bring some hope to that unfortunate island."

4. Charles stated that since he was unable to make another trip to Washington to see Senator Humphrey he asked his friend and business partner, Joseph F. Dryer, Tampa, Florida to present Wasserman's letter to the Senator and request him to receive Charles when the Haitian banker returns to the US on one of his frequent business trips.

5. Charles reiterated his willingness to cooperate with the US Government. He wishes to be contacted at his bank in Port-au-Prince, but not his his home, Pacot 21. He stated that after his return to Haiti he will contact "in utmost confidence" some of his influential friends: Army officers, intellectuals, writers, journalists, business men and will be

SECRET

glad to talk with a US Government official concerning the "general political climate in Haiti." Although he has had several contacts with members of the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince, he prefers to cooperate with "one of Captain Balog's friends." All the US official has to do is to walk into his office at the bank and say that "Im am a friend of Captain Balog's". If a contact is made this way he will be willing to cooperate "to the fullest."

6. He told us that he was not prepared to give his support to those anti-Duvalier politicians in exile who had a few days ago announced the formation of a government in exile since "they are not the right people to take over in Haiti." He emphasized that he would not under any circumstance support Duvalier with whom he is thoroughly disillusioned. In fact, he thinks that Duvalier "went crazy and must be and will be eliminated." He did not elaborate and stated that first he must go back to Haiti and talk with his friends. He mentioned, however, that his cousin, Joseph D. Charles, a former ambassador of Haiti to the US who now lives in "forced retirement" in Cap Haitien, was ready to re-enter the political life at a propitious moment. He believes that his cousin will have enough Army support to become provisional President and then with popular support will be elected President of Haiti. Upon his return to Port-au-Prince, Charles will work toward rallying support for Joseph D. Charles. He is confident that once in power, his uncle would pursue a pro-US policy. At this point, Charles intimated that "a Joseph Charles government could grant the US rights to establish a naval base at Môle St.-Nicolas, which is about 60 miles from Cuba."

7. We wished Charles bon voyage and, of course, promised nothing concerning his offer to be contacted in Port-au-Prince. We merely told him that we would report our conversation to "our mutual friends in Washington" for their decision. Regardless of this decision, Charles" stated that during his next trip to New York he would call us on the telephone to discuss "things" in confidence.

JAY B.L. REEVES

JXBalog:pas

file - Charles - 201
Card ✓

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

10 [illegible] 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative [redacted] It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texan geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batu, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gomulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Mayo Stuntz checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

11. [redacted], DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

Distribution:
Orig - O/Chief
1 - New York Office
1 - Support (Stuntz)
1 - LA Branch
1 - Index (Control)
1 - Dep/Coll chrono

AFCzajkowski:aer

[redacted]

file - Charles - 201
Card

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texan geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

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A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

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AFCzajkowski:acr



HAITI

CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH. BANKER,
PORT-AU-PRINCE.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-162573

1

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Y-59

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BIOGRAPHIC SUPPLEMENT

HAITI

Clémard Joseph CHARLES

President and General Manager
of the Commercial Bank of Haiti

CENTRAL REFERENCE
SERVICE

Clémard Joseph Charles, a man who has insisted on numerous occasions that he will be the next President of Haiti, has been chronically involved, directly or indirectly, in rumored plots against President Duvalier which have never materialized. In May 1963 Charles is reported to have passed word to US officials through an American journalist that he was in a position to head a provisional government after President Duvalier had been removed from power. In subsequent years, particularly in 1966 and 1967, Charles approached US officials both in New York and Port-au-Prince with the apparent intention of enlisting US support for a group of conspirators he claimed to lead which was determined to topple Duvalier from power. None of these plots materialized, however, and there was never any evidence to suggest that any serious plans had been made.

In January 1969 Charles had a lengthy conversation with an official of the US Embassy in which the former candid- discussed his grievances against Duvalier and the plot he claimed to be instigating to overthrow Duvalier and replace him as President of Haiti. Charles stated that the group supporting his efforts consisted primarily of soldiers, a few militiamen, some professional men, priests, students, and assorted other well-placed individuals. He claimed that representatives of these groups had already agreed on the essential elements of a constitution which would include a bicameral legislature and an operative political party structure. The reporting official cautioned, however, that Charles' remarks should be viewed in light of his previous history of relating such conspiracies.

When President Duvalier was reported to be seriously ill in mid-May 1969, Charles' name was again mentioned in connection with myriad rumors of imminent government takeovers. According to a reliable source, a military junta was formed to take power in the event of the death of Duvalier. The junta purportedly included Gen. Gérard Constant, Col. Octave Cayard, Col. Kesner Blain, Col. Roger St. Albin, and Col. René Prosper. Charles was said

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declassification

Clémard Joseph CHARLES (cont.)

to be aware of the identities of these men. Furthermore, according to an official of the US Embassy, at one time it appeared that Charles had originated the idea of the junta, hoping to utilize it eventually to launch his own candidacy for the Presidency. Subsequently, however, Charles changed his statements about being "the next President" to being "a future President," and he seemed to be placing some distance between himself and the proposed junta.

During Charles' aforementioned conversation with an Embassy official in January 1969, he revealed other facets of his personality as well as his penchant for plotting. He conceives of his role in Haiti in grandiose, almost messianic terms. He said that he had invested $2 million in Haiti and had done more for the development of the country than any other indigenous Haitian. He claimed, for example, that the workers in the Artibonite were passionate admirers of his because his tannery in Port Sondé (now closed) provided needed jobs. He also claimed the special allegiance of the chauffeur guides, the only truly organized workers in the country, because when he directed the compulsory Government Motor Vehicle Insurance program, legitimate chauffeur claims were paid. He implied that such claims were no longer honored.

Discussing the internal problems of his country, Charles stressed the need for immediate steps to prevent the total destruction of Haiti's land and resources, to control the spiraling population growth, and to rejuvenate the country's secondary cities. To achieve these goals before current trends become irreversible, Charles believes that it is essential to pursue relations with the United States that would be conducive to massive assistance and investment. In this respect he insists that Duvalier has been grossly unrealistic and has done Haiti great damage by his refusal to recognize the role the United States must play in Haitian affairs.

DR:eab May 1969

CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. OO- B 321/36801-68

SUBJECT Clemard Charles Statement That He Will Attempt Duvalier Overthrow Feb-Mar 69/ Charles Comment On No. 2 and 3 Men In Duvalier Regime; Confirmation by UK Consul General/Weak Condition of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti/Background On Various Personalities and Their Present Location

DATE DISTR. 23 DEC 1968

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES (360) C-DC8-54950

DATE OF INFO. Dec 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Haiti/Dec 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; independent businessman who has visited in Haiti for extended periods during the past four years. He is currently attempting to promote private financial backing for installation of generating equipment at the Barrage de Peligre dam and for educational television in Haiti.

[This report was developed and prepared by a US Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I recently spent approximately three days in Haiti (9-12 Dec 68) and while there had extended visits with Clemard Joseph Charles, President, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, and also owner of a sisal plantation and mill. Present during my visits with Charles was his personal assistant and confidant, Ludovich Celestines. Charles, a devout Catholic, personally told me that he intended to attempt to overthrow Duvalier. He has made specific plans for this overthrow in late February or early March 1969. He claims that he definitely has the Army and the Catholic Church with him, and that the overthrow will be without bloodshed.

2. I had not intended to contact other officials or individuals in Haiti. However, on the last day of my stay I was invited to visit with Clovis M. Desinor, formerly Haiti's representative to the UN and currently Dr. Duvalier's Minister of Finance. He is said to be the No. 2 man in Haiti - next to Duvalier. Present at the meeting with Desinor was his assistant, Dr. Herve Boyer and reportedly the No. 3 man.

BACKGROUND

3. I first met the individuals mentioned above in 1965-66 while on an extended stay in Haiti for business purposes. I was introduced to Charles by Max Rowe, a driver assigned to me by the Haitian Government and whose wife, Raymonde, was the personal secretary for Charles. Rowe continued to drive for me on that first and subsequent visits to Haiti except on this latest visit when he was absent in the US.

Charles

4. When I first met Charles he was President of the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, owned the Sisal plantation and mill, also owned a tannery financed by West German interests, and was the President of the Haiti Chamber of Commerce and Haitian correspondent for the First National City Bank of New York. During the period approximately one year prior to June 1967, Charles put into effect a system of Social Security (Office of National Assurance) which was working well and liked by the Haitian

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	S YES

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Sent FR 1/10 Jan 69

people. He also devised an automobile insurance system and was financing this through the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti.

5. In a period just prior to June 1967 Duvalier was convinced by Desinor and Boyer that Charles was, or at least had been, plotting Duvaliers' overthrow. Together with a large group Charles was imprisoned in Port-au-Prince from June 1967 to June 1968.

6. Just prior to the arrest of Charles, Max Rowe's wife, Raymonde, took US$200,000 out of the bank and hid it near Cap Haitien in the north and advised Charles' wife of the location. In addition, Max Rowe claims that in June 1967 he and his wife [Raymonde Rowe is in process of getting US citizenship. Max is in the US on a visitor's permit] brought papers incriminating Charles to the US and destroyed them.

BANK'S FINANCIAL CONDITION

7. Although Charles has the bank, his position at present is difficult. I saw the bank balance sheet which shows assets of US$2.9 million but only US$29,000 (as of 10 Dec 68) cash on hand. With this small amount of cash he can no longer make loans. He says that he has found it necessary to make sizeable loans to Haitians who have in turn made highly speculative loans to others at exorbitant rates of interest. Very minor amounts of these loans have been repaid to the bank and thus his current financial position.

8. Charles is hopeful that when Duvalier's overthrow has been completed he will be able to get private financial assistance from the US. According to Charles, US financial organizations have almost completely stopped their assistance because of the oppressive Duvalier Government.

9. Charles says that Max Rowe is aware of his plans to overthrow Duvalier which were communicated to Rowe by a La Bonte Jean, who is also in the US. Charles says that the Army is unhappy with Duvalier because of the execution of fourteen officers after the abortive May 1968 invasion, which included Major Toma, who was popular and powerful in his position as a censor and in control of all foreigners coming into Haiti. Charles maintains that the Ton Ton Macoutes are no longer a potent force - not operational. They have no food and are receiving no pay.

10. John Pierre La Grand, UK Consul General in Haiti and Shell Oil General Manager, agrees with Charles that Desinor and Boyer are Duvalier's closest confidants. Fito Metales (alias Fritz Belmont) is said by Rowe and La Grand to be Duvalier's hatchet man. He is manager of the Croupiers at the Royal Cabaret. La Grand says that the "old man", (Duvalier) is stronger than ever, both in health and power.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM (EXCERPT)

A-347

DATE: 3 AUGUST 1968

~~CLASSIFICATION:~~ HAITIAN FINANCIAL STATESMEN,
SUBJECT: MID-1968

CLASSIFICATION: NOT KNOWN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-E-324/21215-68

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph Charles Has Reportedly Paid US$200 Thousand Ransom And Promised An Additional US$400 Thousand in Return for Release from Prison And Reinstatement As President of Commercial Bank of Haiti

DATE DISTR 26 JUL 1968

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Jul 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---------/Jul 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of an import-export company. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. Effective 10 Jul 68, Clemard Joseph Charles was reinstated as the president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti (BCH), as announced in the Haitian public press. A stockholders' meeting is scheduled for mid-Aug 68.

2. I have heard from previously reliable sources that Charles was compelled to pay to the Government of Haiti (GOH) the sum of US$200 thousand (not Haitian gourds) as the price of reinstatement as head of the BCH. Charles has also promised, as part of the price of reinstatement, to pay an additional US$400 thousand. This total of US$600 thousand closely approximates the US$605 thousand cited earlier as the "ransom" for Charles' release from prison. I understand that the US$200 thousand has already been paid. Where Charles got this sum I do not know. He could have withdrawn the US$100 thousand which he has on deposit at the First National City Bank in New York City; I do not know whether or not he has done so. It seems clear that President Duvalier has decided that the possible long-term benefits of allowing the bank to function (and thus enabling Charles to raise the required US$400 thousand and also possibly attracting foreign investment capital to Haiti) outweigh the benefits of refusing him permission to operate until the total "ransom" should have been paid.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
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S NO

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24 July 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: Source Register

FROM: Interagency Source Register

SUBJECT: CLEMARD, Joseph Charles SD-11612
aka: CHARLES, Clemard Joseph

1. Reference is made to your request for registration dated 3 June 1968 concerning Subject. You are referred to OO-E-324/06340-66 dated 14 April 1966, subject: Clemard Joseph Charles Believed to be President Duvalier's Personal Financial Manager/ Biographical Data on C J Charles; OO-A(S) 322/14068-68 dated May 1968, subject: Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking and Other Activities; and OO-A(S) 322/14367-68 dated 22 May 1968, subject: Rearrest of Clemard Joseph Charles/Charles Is Not Able to Raise US$605 Thousand Ransom/ Data Concerning Charles' US Bank Accounts/President Duvalier Might Settle for US$100 Thousand Cash/Charles Has Credit of US$300 Thousand in National Bank of the Republic of Haiti and Claims an Additional US$100 Thousand. Copies are attached for your retention.

2. The Interagency Source Register has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. DCS reserves the right to contact Subject under the provisions of DCID 2/3.

ISRM-28,910

Encl. 3 attachments as stated above
RID/CE: JMA/JD/bdt
BASED ON: 201-357029
FILE IN: 201-357029*

FILE IN 201-357029

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SECRET (When Filled In)

PRIORITY

ISR LOG

FROM

IMMEDIATE

SERVICE NO.

INDEX

SECURITY

DATE

TO:

FROM:

TO OO:

RESULTS

COVER

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ISRM NO.	DATE
28,910	7 JUN 68

AREA DESK TO: [illegible] - 13 [illegible] 1968

No Present Contact

SOI:

COMMENTS No objection to registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject under provisions of NSCID 2, DCID 2-3 and 2-8/GSM,b

FORM 11-63 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20-38)

14-00000

SECRET WH
(When Filled In)

VINCENT A. DI BENEDETTO
FI/ISR
2-E-03
Ext. 5045

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
ISRM NO.	28910
DATE	3 Jan 68
201 NO.	357029

NAME: CLEMARD, Joseph Charles

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
21 April 1923	Gonavives, Haiti	

PRESENT ADDRESS:

OCCUPATION: Sole representative of

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: General Electric Co., Ltd, London

TRAVEL: US, UK, France, Italy, and West Germany

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA:

201 filed by FI/ISR.

SD 11612

PRIORITY

RECEIVED
RID/IN
JUN [illegible] 11 41 AM '68

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION	
Date 18 Jul 68	INITIALS
RI ANALYST CET	JHD
DIV. / BRANCH	
ISK	
WH/7/HT	
RI EDITOR	
RI TYPIST	

18 JUL 1968

SD-11612 Recheck

24 Jul 68

1. Subject is being carried under SD-11612. SD-19022 is hereby cancelled.

JDW

FILE IN 201-357029

12 JUN 1968

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SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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(When Filled In)

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(PRINT)

S E C R E T 191640Z JUL 68 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 5289

19 JUL 68 IN 53746

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMCOBRA

HENRI SICLAIT DIRECTOR OF TOBACCO MONOPLY AND INTRIGUER AGAINST CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, AND WHO IS NOW RUMORED IN DIFFICULTIES SINCE CHARLES RELEASE, LEFT PORT AU PRINCE 17 JULY ON PANAM 234 PRESS STATED PURPOSE TO VISIT WIFE'S SICK MOTHER.

S E C R E T

BT

AN	
AB	
IN	
DS	
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19 JUL 68

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16 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service
Operational Support Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. George S. Musulin

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact
with Louis A. Brun

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 12 April 1966 and subsequent communications on the subject of WH/7 interest in the contact which had been established by DCS representatives in New York with Louis A. Brun. This contact served to monitor the activities of Clemard Joseph Charles, the Haitian banker, who was plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime in Haiti.

2. In June 1967, Charles was arrested in Port-au-Prince and has spent the majority of the time since then in jail. He is released at various intervals by Duvalier apparently to give him the opportunity to locate more money for the regime. Since Charles fell from grace, it has become apparent that any hopes or plans he may have had to overthrow Duvalier have long since past. Accordingly, we wish to advise that WH/7 has no special interest in DCS maintaining contact with Brun to cover Charles' activities. Likewise, we do not feel that there are any special requirements at this time which Brun could service regarding Haitian matters.

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declassification

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3. We do not, however, wish to interpose any objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes and we would appreciate being advised of any information of significance on Haiti which may be produced through this contact.

Paul V. Harwood
Chief, WH/7

DDP/WH/7/Haiti/RWBerg:klh (16 Jul 68)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addee
1 - WH/7/Ht
1 - Subj file

14-00000

NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY-467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

1. Reference "A" forwarded to you a letter from Louis A. Brun, B&B International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to Clemard Joseph Charles, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This letter was to be sent by State Department diplomatic pouch to Mr. Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and given by him to Charles. Brun had told us that Felder had agreed to act as intermediary for correspondence between himself and Charles and added that he and Charles had already used the system. The letter in Reference "A" was the first time we had been approached in the matter.

2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 27 June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

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15 July 1968

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JRMitchell:ch

FILE: Louis A. Brun
B&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,540

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011

Mme. Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
HAITI

SECRET

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

New York, N.Y.

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Deuxièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles des derniers événements en Haiti on eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

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BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te voir mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par example, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

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BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haïtien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les tiens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

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SECRET

14-00000

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brun
R. [illegible] International Corp.
154 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

I apologize for the delay in responding to your suggestion concerning the commercial bank in Haiti. My activities here have been such that I have been unable until the past day or so to give your proposal adequate thought and consideration.

First I must admit that the recent abortive invasion attempt caused certain reflection and it is this kind of activity, successful or unsuccessful, that could create serious dislocations for those established in business. However I must assure you that this was only a reflection and the reason that I will be unable to accept your offer is the extent and nature of my activities here in Washington. I believe I alluded to some of them during your visit. The occasions when I would find it possible to visit Port-au-Prince or to devote any significant amount of time to the bank's activities here would be rare indeed. I shall confess to you that I declined a similar position on a bank board here in the states for the same reason.

I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

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FORMALITES A REMPLIR PAR SOPHIE:

1) Envoyer, signe par Sophie, un mandat original notarie et legalise par le Consul Americain, a une personne amie ou parent habitant New York, donnant a cette personne les memes pouvoirs donnes par Clemard a Sophie. Ce mandat devra etre accompagne d'une copie authentifiee de celui de Clemard a Sophie.

2) Envoyer les clefs des deux "safe deposit box" qui se trouvent a la First National City Bank avec les formes attachees qui doivent aussi etre legalisees par le consul americain.

3) Indiquer le nom et la fonction de la personne autorisee par le gouvernement haitien a regler la transaction avec Clemard pour communication eventuelle relative a la transaction.

Ma chere Sophie:

Cette communication te parviendra par une voie que Clemard a eu a m'indiquer et que je crois etre sure. Fais bien attention a ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'indiscretion.

Je voudrais suggerer que tu habilites Paulette selon le paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

Loulou

SECRET BACKGROUND USE ONLY

du Duplicata

DATE____________________

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

________________________________BRANCH

____

SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

____

ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF __________________________ WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO.____________IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

____

SB 84 REV. 10-61

SECRET

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

In Triplicate

66 (L) REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 12-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE ______________________

________ HEREBY AUTHORIZE ______________________

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO. ________ NOW RENTED BY ______________________ IN THE VAULT OF FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT ______________________, NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO. ________ AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

____

STATE OF
SS.:
COUNTY OF

ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RWBerg
WH/7/Ht
BB 2630

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 12 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/7/Ht	12 JUL 1968			
2. c/wh/7				
3. DC/WH/7				
4. c/wh/7/ht			✓	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

12 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Letter from Louis A. Brun to FSO Felder

1. I talked with George Musulin (DCS/Ops Support Staff) at 0840 hours this morning about the letter mailed to FSO Felder at the American Embassy in Port au Prince. Musulin said that he had spoken with Brun about the letter and Brun had assured him that Felder said to mail letters to him through Foreign Service mail channels. Brun is in contact with Felder during his visits to Haiti and this system was laid on between them during one of his trips.

2. Brun also said that he was a little upset about the problems which had arisen in sending his letter. Brun said that he had received a letter from Felder (mailed in New York City) saying that he had never received the letter from Brun. Brun was concerned that the letter may have fallen into the wrong hands in Haiti. Musulin said that he would try to recover the letter and send it back to Brun.

3. I told Musulin that Ambassador Ross was very much disturbed about this matter and that any further involvement by the Agency with correspondence between Brun and Felder should be avoided. Brun is a business agent of Clemard Joseph-Charles and thus any correspondence between Brun and an official of the American Embassy is of particular concern to the Ambassador because of the obvious political implications. Musulin said he understood this and would tell Brun that the dispatch of any correspondence in the future would be his own responsibility.

Harold O. Chaidez

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. Case 47540 DATE 17 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		
2. WH/7/HT Mr. Berg 3 B 0001 Hq.	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		For your information.
3. C/WH/7				
4. DCWH/7				
5. C/HATT				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY-467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

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2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 26 June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

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NY-529-68
15 July 1968

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JBMitchell:eh

FILE: Louis A. Brun
F&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,540

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10011

Mme. Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

SECRET

New York, N.Y.

Le [illegible] juin [illegible]

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

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Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haïtien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les tiens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

SECRET

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brun
R. S. [illegible] International Corp.
134 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

I apologize for the delay in responding to your suggestion concerning the commercial bank in Haiti. My activities here have been such that I have been unable until the past day or so to give your proposal adequate thought and consideration.

First I must admit that the recent abortive invasion attempt caused certain reflection and it is this kind of activity, successful or unsuccessful, that could create serious dislocations for those established in business. However I must assure you that this was only a reflection and the reason that I will be unable to accept your offer is the extent and nature of my activities here in Washington. I believe I alluded to some of them during your visit. The occasions when I would find it possible to visit Port-au-Prince or to devote any significant amount of time to the bank's activities here would be rare indeed. I shall confess to you that I declined a similar position on a bank board here in the states for the same reason.

I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

SECRET

FORMALITES A REMPLIR PAR SOPHIE:

1) Envoyer, signe par Sophie, un mandat original notarie et legalise par le Consul Americain, a une personne amie ou parent habitant New York, donnant a cette personne les memes pouvoirs donnes par Clemard a Sophie. Ce mandat devra etre accompagne d'une copie authentifiee de celui de Clemard a Sophie.

2) Envoyer les clefs des deux "safe deposit box" qui se trouvent a la First National City Bank avec les formes attacheed qui doivent aussi etre legalisees par le consul americain.

3) Indiquer le nom et la fonction de la personne autorisee par le gouvernement haitien a regler la transaction avec Clemard pour communication eventuelle relative a la transaction.

Ma chere Sophie:

Cette communication te parviendra par une voie que Clemard a eu a m'indiquer et que je crois etre sure. Fais bien attention a ce qu'il n'y ait pas d'indiscretion.

Je voudrais suggerer que tu habilites Paulette selon le paragraphe 1 ci-dessus.

Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

SECRET

In Duplicate

DATE

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

BRANCH

SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF
WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO. IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

SD 34 REV. 10-61

SECRET

SECRET
BACKGROUND USE ONLY



66 (IJ) REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 12-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE ____________________

__________ HEREBY AUTHORIZE ____________________

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO. __________ NOW RENTED BY __________________ IN THE VAULT OF FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT __________________, NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO. ______ AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

____

STATE OF
SS.:
COUNTY OF

ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

____

: ONLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
RWBerg
WH/7/Ht
BB 2630

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 12 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/7/Ht	12 JUL 1968			
2. C/WH/7				
3. DC/WH/7				
4. C/WH/7/HT			✓	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

12 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Letter from Louis A. Brun to FSO Felder

1. I talked with George Musulin (DCS/Ops Support Staff) at 0840 hours this morning about the letter mailed to FSO Felder at the American Embassy in Port au Prince. Musulin said that he had spoken with Brun about the letter and Brun had assured him that Felder said to mail letters to him through Foreign Service mail channels. Brun is in contact with Felder during his visits to Haiti and this system was laid on between them during one of his trips.

2. Brun also said that he was a little upset about the problems which had arisen in sending his letter. Brun said that he had received a letter from Felder (mailed in New York City) saying that he had never received the letter from Brun. Brun was concerned that the letter may have fallen into the wrong hands in Haiti. Musulin said that he would try to recover the letter and send it back to Brun.

3. I told Musulin that Ambassador Ross was very much disturbed about this matter and that any further involvement by the Agency with correspondence between Brun and Felder should be avoided. Brun is a business agent of Clemard Joseph-Charles and thus any correspondence between Brun and an official of the American Embassy is of particular concern to the Ambassador because of the obvious political implications. Musulin said he understood this and would tell Brun that the dispatch of any correspondence in the future would be his own responsibility.

Harold O. Childes

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. Case 47540	DATE 17 July 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968		
2. WH/7/HT Mr. Berg 3 B 0001 Hq.	17 JUL 1968	17 JUL 1968	e	For your information.
3. C/WH 17				
4. DCWH/7				
5. C/HAIT			T	
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7.				
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12.				
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14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

NY-529-68

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : Operational Support Staff (Musulin)

15 July 1968

Chief, New York Field Office

Letter from Louis A. Brun to Clemard Joseph Charles (to be Forwarded Via Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti)

REFERENCES: (A) NY 467-68 (20 June 1968); (B) CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 80548;
(C) Case 47,540

1. Reference "A" forwarded to you a letter from Louis A. Brun, BAM International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, to Clemard Joseph Charles, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This letter was to be sent by State Department diplomatic pouch to Mr. Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and given by him to Charles. Brun had told us that Felder had agreed to act as intermediary for correspondence between himself and Charles and added that he and Charles had already used the system. The letter in Reference "A" was the first time we had been approached in the matter.

2. Reference "B" stated that the letter had been dispatched via Message Center Courier to the State Department on 24 June 1968.

3. On or about 26 June 1968 Brun telephoned us and stated that Charles had not received the letter. We telephoned Mr. Musulin, who double-checked and assured us that the letter had gone to the State Department and that it should go out in the next pouch.

4. On 10 July 1968, Brun telephoned us and stated that on 9 July 1968 he had received a telephone call from a Ray Alvarez. Alvarez identified himself as a State Department employee in Washington and told Brun that he had the letter destined for Charles. Alvarez then told Brun that he would return the letter if Brun would tell him how it had reached the State Department. Brun refused to give Alvarez any information. We then telephoned Mr. Musulin and relayed the foregoing information. Mr. Musulin inquired into the matter and learned that the letter had gone to Haiti in the State Department pouch, had not been delivered to Felder and had been returned to Washington. He and we surmised that the State Department did

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

NY-529-68
15 July 1968

not wish to lay itself open to the charge of becoming embroiled in local Haitian politics and so had refused to deliver the letter to Felder. We reported this information to Brun.

5. On 11 July 1968 Brun telephoned us and told us that he had received a letter from Charles via the Felder channel. This letter bore a New York City postmark. We gave this information to Mr. Musulin. We told Brun that it is quite probable that Felder has a personal arrangement with unknown parties which permits him to use the diplomatic pouch facilities. Since we do not, letters can go only from Charles to Brun and not from Brun to Charles. Brun and we agreed that he will not henceforth attempt to use Felder to send letters to Charles.

6. Mr. Musulin agreed to retrieve the letter from the State Department and to send it to us. We shall return it forthwith to Brun.

Jackson R. Horton

JBMitchell:ch

FILE: Louis A. Brun
B&B Int'l Corp.
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY

and Case 47,540

SECRET

SECRET

B. & B. INTERNATIONAL CORP.
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10010

MME. Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES
PORT-AU-PRINCE
HAITI

SECRET

LOUIS A. BRUN
134 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Le 14 juin 1968

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que premièrement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Deuxièmement, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles des derniers événements en Haiti on eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te vois mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par exemple, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

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Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
encl. 1

SECRET

HOWARD L. BURRIS

SUITE 101, R.C.A. BUILDING
1725 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

June 7, 1968

Mr. Louis A. Brún
B. & [illegible] International Corp.
134 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10011

Dear Mr. Brun

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I regret that this decision is necessary but I hope that in future relationships we may be able to do something useful and successful in Haiti.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Burris

SECRET

SECRET

le 14 juin 1968

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Je t'envoie aussi par cette meme voie une lettre qui saura te renseigner sur l'etat de nos demarches et possibilites.

Encore une fois, Bon Courage et bonjour a tous.

Invariablement,

Loulou

du Duplicate

DATE ______________________

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT

______________________________________ BRANCH

____
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY

____
ADDRESS OF DEPUTY

THE SIGNATURE APPEARING ABOVE IS THAT OF ______________________ WHO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE NO. __________ IN THE VAULTS OF YOUR BANK.

____

SD 54 REV. 10-61

SECRET

REV. 10-61
PRINTING OF 10-61

DEPUTYSHIP FORM

DATE

HEREBY AUTHORIZE

TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF SAFE NO. NOW RENTED BY IN THE VAULT OF **FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK**, SAFE DEPOSIT DEPARTMENT AT , NEW YORK, TO EXCHANGE SAID SAFE FOR ANY NEW SAFE OR SAFES IN SAID VAULT AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE LIKE EXCHANGES, AND IN MY NAME AND ON MY BEHALF TO EXECUTE A LEASE OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES UPON SUCH TERMS AS HE MAY DEEM PROPER AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, AND TO RECEIVE ALL THE LESSEE'S KEYS TO ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES, WITH POWER AT ALL TIMES TO SURRENDER THE SAID SAFE NO. AND ANY SUCH NEW SAFE OR SAFES; THIS AUTHORITY TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS REVOCATION IS RECEIVED BY THE SAID BANK.

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ON THE DAY OF ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND

BEFORE ME CAME

TO ME KNOWN TO BE THE INDIVIDUAL DESCRIBED IN, AND WHO EXECUTED, THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE EXECUTED THE SAME.

SECRET

Clemard Joseph Charles

George Musulin/bm
CDCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

2268

Case 47,540

1 July 1968

DO/DCHL

WH/7/Haiti
3 B 4001, Hqs.

For your information.

SECRET

ENY 00-A(S) 322/17664-68

COUNTRY: Haiti

27 June 1968

DCS Case: 67,540

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph Charles Has Gained Postponement of Deadline for Ransom Payment/Charles' Relationship with Rene Adrien and Yvon Saint-Victor and Background of His Rearrest/ President Duvalier's Need for Money May Possibly Induce Him to Accept Scheme for Reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti

1. Recently-released Clemard Joseph Charles has received a postponement of the deadline by which he must produce the US$605 thousand required as "ransom" for his permanent release. The new deadline is late September 1968.

2. Shortly before Charles' rearrest in May 1968 Rene Adrien visited him at his residence and remonstrated with him. Adrien, one of the directors of the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti (BNRH), told Charles that he (Charles) had not done enough since his release to procure the US$605 thousand and added that Charles was receiving too many visitors. Charles responded with such a tirade of abuse that Adrien left the house. Charles was rearrested that same afternoon. At about the same time, Yvon Saint-Victor visited Charles and talked to him in much the same vein as had Adrien. Charles' response to Saint-Victor was about the same as his answer to Adrien. Saint-Victor's wife is President Duvalier's secretary.

3. Since his release in June 1968, Charles has agreed to intensify his efforts to raise the US$605 thousand and to cease receiving so many visitors at his house.

4. Charles will undoubtedly revive the scheme to raise the US$605 thousand through subscription by foreign investors and to place it in a reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (BCH). [Collector's Note: this plan is outlined in 00-A(S) 322/14367-68 (Paragraph Two).] Alternatively, he may try to interest the Government of Haiti (GOH) in his visible cash assets and GOH bonds now on deposit in banks in New York City [Collector's Note: see 00-A(S) 322/14367-68 (Paragraphs Three, Four and Five.) See also 00-A(S) 322/17056-68.].

5. The idea of the reorganized BCH was formulated in order

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SECRET

BNY 00-A(S) 322/17664-68

27 June 1968

DCS Case: 47,540

to get the required sum into Haiti and at the same time to ensure that it would not simply be confiscated by the OOH. The idea was born because Charles and his friends felt (and still feel) that if he simply handed over US$605 thousand he would then be liquidated. Thus, the BCH scheme would serve as a sort of insurance policy on Charles' life. On the other hand, it is possible that the OOH would refuse to accept the BCH scheme as a substitute for a direct payment and would continue to insist on the direct payment of the US$605 thousand as ransom. It is possible, however, for the following reasons that President Duvalier would consent to the BCH scheme. First, he is desperate for money and does not much care in just what form it may enter Haiti. Second, he approaches his problems on a day-to-day basis and does not plan far into the future. Third, he is obsessed with the idea of retaining power for life. Now, Duvalier is perfectly well aware, I am sure, that the BCH scheme will not net him US$605 thousand. On the other hand, however, he is quite anxious for foreign investors to place their money in Haiti, both for the economic benefits which such investments will bring to Haiti and also for the propaganda value which a new foreign business will bring to him. If he liquidates Charles, either before or after receiving the US$605 thousand, he will suffer much unfavorable publicity. It is possible, too, that he may think that he may be able to get his hands on the US$605 thousand even though it may be tied up in the BCH scheme. In any event, Charles is, I believe, going to make the effort to induce the President to allow the BCH scheme and thereby to bring an end to the "ransom" demands.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Letter Concerning Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js 4481
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 25 June 196[illegible]

TO. (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/25		CE	Attached is a copy of a letter in French from Mr. Brun to Mme. Charles. The original of this letter was sent to Robert C. Felder, United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, via State Department channels, for transmittal to Mme. Charles.
2. C/WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.	26 JUN	26 JUN		
3. WH/7/HT Chief				
4. Int Ext I/A				
5. R/O REB Sec				
6. File				
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8. FI/BR				108: For filing in 201-357029
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FORM 2-63 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

LOUIS A. [illegible]
156 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Le 14 juin 1968

Mme Clémard Joseph Charles
Port-au-Prince
Haiti

Ma chère Sophie,

Cette lettre est pour t'accuser réception des tiennes des 17 et 26 mai écoulés et du 4 juin en cours.

Si tu n'as pas eu de mes nouvelles depuis mon départ d'Haiti le 7 mai dernier, c'est que primitivement, je me proposais de retourner voir Clémard la semaine suivante. Le voyage a dû être différé lorsque j'ai su que Clémard avait, à nouveau, été arrêté le 11 mai. J'ai même eu à faire un câble à un ami pour lui annoncer mon arrivée et je suis sûr qu'il a dû t'en informer.

Évidemment, l'arrestation de Clémard ainsi que les nouvelles des derniers événements en Haiti ont eu des effets négatifs sur les négociations en cours que j'avais entamées pour Clémard et qui semblaient vouloir aboutir. Je n'ai pas besoin de te dire combien j'en ai été bouleversé. Alors que nos amis d'ici et moi pensions pouvoir aider Clémard que nous estimons comme un frère, sa nouvelle arrestation est venue nous assommer avec une rigueur dont nous nous remettons à peine.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois te dire que tu ne dois point douter de notre dévouement pour Clémard. Il sait, et tu dois aussi le savoir, que nous ne saurions jamais marchander notre concours à un ami pour qui nous avons la plus grande affection et pour qui nous sommes prêts à consentir tous les sacrifices personnels que les circonstances peuvent exiger. Je crois devoir te dire que si, en dehors d'Haiti, je n'arrive à le tirer de l'impasse dans laquelle il se trouve, je doute fort, sans fausse modestie, que quelqu'un d'autre puisse réussir à le faire.

Nos puissants amis communs tant à New York, Washington, Miami et ailleurs ont tous manifesté un désir sérieux de lui venir en aide dans les limites de leurs possibilités respectives.

Depuis mon retour d'Haiti je me suis mis en action à cette fin et ai personellement vu plusieurs personnalités du monde financier qui n'ont pas hésité à consacrer une grande partie de leur temps précieux à la concrétisation des plans que j'ai eu à envisager avec Clémard en vue de le tirer d'embarras le plus rapidement possible.

/...

Mes espoirs de réussite ainsi que ceux de tous les amis contactés se sont heurtés aux effets négatifs inévitables provenant tant de la nouvelle arrestation de Clémard que des derniers événements survenus en Haiti depuis le 20 mai écoulé. Je t'envoie, pour preuve, copie d'une lettre d'un de ces grands amis, Mr. Howard Burris de Washington, D.C. Je te demande de garder cette lettre strictement confidentielle car je n'aurais pas aimé que le nom de Mr. Burris soit mentionné à quiconque en Haiti. Si cela arrivait, nous pourrions perdre un très bon ami.

Pour ton information, je te dirai que Mr. Burris est un colonel retraité du Corps de Génie de l'armée américaine, ami personnel et conseiller du Président Johnson et extrêmement influent à Washington tant dans le monde politique que financier. J'ai eu à faire deux voyages à Washington entre le 8 et 11 mai au cours desquels lui et moi envisagions les moyens d'aider Clémard selon le "modus" envisagé. La copie de sa lettre du 7 Juin en cours saura te confirmer ce qui précède.

J'ai aussi vu personnellement et lui ai causé maintes fois au téléphone, Joseph Dryer, qui devait se rendre en Haiti le 24 mai pour te voir mais qui a dû renvoyer son voyage après les nouvelles de la dernière tentative d'invasion. Je lui ai encore causé récemment au téléphone et il a eu à me faire part des résultats négatifs de ses efforts, toujours en fonction des mêmes circonstances.

Le lettres adressées aux autres amis de l'étranger, dont Dabinovick, par exemple, sont restées jusqu'ici sans réponses. Je vais une nouvelle fois écrire longuement à Dabinovick pour lui transmettre ta dernière communication avec l'espoir d'avoir un mot encourageant de lui.

Comme tu dois le comprendre, ma chère Sophie, nos efforts, malgré toute notre bonne volonté, ne sauraient se concrétiser à brève échéance, car les valeurs en question qu'il nous faut trouver ne sont pas insignifiantes. Je te signalerai en passant un point qui a été soulevé au cours des négociations et qui fait ressortir que même si nos amis seraient en mesure d'avancer à Clémard les valeurs nécessaires, ils ont des doutes sérieux non pas sur la sincérité de Clémard à faire face aux obligations qui devront être contractées, mais à la possibilité matérielle de rapatrier, en dollars américains, les valeurs avancées. J'ai personnellement assisté à des contacts avec des banquiers d'ici qui affirment qu'avant longtemps, Haiti n'aura presque plus de devises-dollars pour solder ses comptes à l'étranger. Autant d'obstacles que je suis malheureusement obligé de te signaler pour que tu saches à quoi t'en tenir.

Concernant maintenant le grand banquier noir dont j'ai eu moi-même à dire à Clémard que je croyais pouvoir nous aider, celui-ci a eu à me faire comprendre qu'il ne pouvait en l'occurrence intéresser son institution à une affaire de ce genre qui comporte trop de risques. De ce côté là il n'y a donc pas grand espoir.

/...

Ceci dit, malgré tous ces obstacles qui sembleraient insurmontables, je n'ai pas totalement perdu l'espoir de pouvoir t'aider à sortir Clémard, sain et sauf, de la prison où sa santé se détériore rapidement, je le sais. L'essentiel est que le Chef lui-même soit persuadé que l'inhabilité que nous éprouvons à satisfaire les exigences du moment, ne sont en aucune façon imputables à Clémard mais plutôt à des circonstances totalement indépendantes de notre volonté.

Je prie Dieu Tout-puissant pour que l'on finisse par réaliser que Clémard, en bon patriote haitien, a eu foi en son pays et n'a pas cru bon d'expatrier, comme plus d'un l'a fait, le fruit de ses durs labeurs et de son intelligence productive.

Je me proposais d'écrire personnellement à Son Excellence le Président à Vie d'Haiti, pour implorer sa clémence et sa générosité pour un ami qui nous est cher. Je me suis alors demandé si c'était là un geste sage qui pourrait avoir la vertu de l'épargner et, dans le doute, j'ai préférer m'abstenir.

Pour revenir maintenant aux possibilités de réaliser au moins partiellement, la valeur exigée, je dois te dire que je suis heureux de savoir que tu détiens une procuration générale en bonne et due forme t'habilitant à ratifier tout ce que nous pourrions entreprendre à cette fin.

Séparément, par cette même voie, je te communiquerai toutes les formalités à remplir pour nous mettre en mesure de réaliser dans un délai raisonnable au moins le tiers de la somme réclamée. Il serait souhaitable que tu sois mise en mesure de venir ici à New York, ce qui faciliterait beaucoup les choses, mais dans l'impossibilité d'une pareille alternative, tu devras donc agréer aux conditions stipulées. Il faudra donc agir avec dilligence pour nous permettre d'aller au plus vite.

Ma chère Sophie, je terminerai cette lettre déjà longue et ardue en te renouvelant mon dévouement le plus entier à la cause de notre ami Clémard et en te priant une nouvelle fois de ne jamais douter de mes sentiments propres et ceux de ma famille pour Clémard, toi et les Siens.

Affections à Gros-Miche, Marie-Claudine, Toto, Eddie et sa femme.

Bon courage!

Invariablement,

Louis A. Brun

LAB/jvb
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clouard Joseph Charles/Data Concerning Bozo Dabinovic Dabimar X 002-2744

FROM: George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE 21 June 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/20	6/20	CE	cc: SR/HYA
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.	24 JUN 1968	24 JUN 1968	R	Attached for your information is copy of OO-A(S) 322/17056-68.
3.				WH/7/HT Chief Int Exc I/A (Card) Wm S/O Sec File
4. ~~FI/ISR~~				
5. ~~AC/WH/7/CI~~ WH/7/CI	[illegible]	[illegible]	(uA)	
6. Att. M. Osborne		1 Jul		
7. RID/AN	1 AUG 1968		8L	to 9: Please file in 201-357029
8. ~~EUR/SA~~ E/BSS				INDEX as indicated
9. FI/ISR				
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FORM 8-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

XAAZ-27949

ENY 00-A(S) 322/17056-69

COUNTRY: Haiti

19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph Charles Spared During Rumored Recent Wave of Executions in Fort Dimanche Prison/Charles Must Produce Ransom Money/Charles Is Living Under Rigorous Prison Conditions/Data Concerning Bozo Dabinovic Dablinar, Swiss Friend of Charles

DCS Case: 47,540

Supplement to:
00-A(S) 322/14367-69

1. During the week of 27 May 1969, the Government of Haiti (GOH) is reported to have carried out many executions among the prisoners held in Fort Dimanche prison. Clemard Joseph Charles, Haitian banker, was not among those executed, because his life was spared on direct orders from President Duvalier.

2. The GOH is becoming more insistent than ever that Charles produce the ransom of US$605 thousand, which it has set as the price for his release. Charles now seems to feel that if he does not produce the money, he will be executed. During May 1969, he gave to his wife, Madame Sophie Harrison Charles, a general power of attorney. This power of attorney gives to Mme Charles the right to function as her husband's alter ego and sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of his assets.

3. Charles still has the US$100 thousand in cash in New York City banks [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Four.] His holdings in GOH bonds total US$400 thousand [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Two]. These bonds are guaranteed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Mme Charles is now endeavoring to collect the US$100 thousand cash and to pledge as collateral the US$400 thousand in GOH bonds, in the hope that the GOH will accept as payment of the US$605 thousand ransom whatever she is able to realize from the bonds plus the total of the cash. She hopes to place this sum in the reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (BCH) [Collector's Note: See reference, Paragraph Two] and hopes that the GOH will accept that as the payment of the ransom.

4. Charles is not being treated as well in Fort Dimanche

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MEY 00-A(S) 322/17056-68

19 June 1968

DCS Case: 47,540
Supplement to:
00-A(S) 322/16367-68

as he had been before his release in late April 1968. The Fort Dimanche authorities now refuse to accept food and clothing parcels sent to Charles from the outside. In consequence, he is still wearing the clothes in which he was rearrested in May 1968 and is compelled to subsist solely on the regular prison meals. During his previous incarceration he was permitted to receive food and clothing from the outside and lived not too badly.

5. The following individual is a good friend of Charles.

[illegible] Bozo Dabinovic Dabimar
120160/62
[illegible] Geneva, Switzerland

[Collector's Note: Source did not volunteer Dabimar's postal address; we did not judge it suitable to press him for it. We do not know the significance of the number listed above. We copied the above name and address from an envelope addressed by Mme Charles to Dabimar.] Dabimar is a Swiss citizen who owns a fleet of cargo ships. Until about 1961 or 1962 he had a contract with the GOH, under the provisions of which he sailed his ships under the Haitian flag. The GOH ultimately canceled the contract, because, I understand, Dabimar failed to pay the royalties called for under the terms of the contract. Dabimar is opposed to President Duvalier, because the latter canceled the contract just discussed, but is (or was) interested in developing projects (no additional data available) in Haiti. The letter which Mme Charles has just addressed to Dabimar contains an urgent appeal for financial assistance.

-end-

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO 00-B-321/16909-68

SUBJECT Invaders Have Gained Control of Quartier Morin And Citadelle Laferriere/Government of Haiti Has Adopted Defensive Attitude/Reported Execution of 100 Prisoners in Fort Dimanche/Status of Clemard Joseph Charles

DATE DISTR

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case: 47,540

DATE OF INFO 20 Jun 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ [illegible]/Jun 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export enterprise. Source makes occasional trips to Haiti and has many contacts among Haitian business and political figures both in the US and in Haiti.

1. The Government of Haiti (GOH) has issued claims that the invaders of 20 May 68 have been wiped out and that total victory against them has been achieved. A special Thanksgiving mass was celebrated recently in Port-au-Prince to commemorate and celebrate the event. On the surface, things are politically quiet.

2. The realities seem, however, to differ to a marked degree from the foregoing. Although the populace has remained quiet, it does not believe the GOH claims of total victory. In point of fact, the invaders have not been wiped out and they have succeeded in gaining of control of the small town of Quartier Morin and of the Citadelle Laferriere (both situated near Cap Haitien). The GOH has decided not to begin military operations against them, but to adopt a defensive attitude and wait and see what happens. The GOH realizes that to dislodge the rebels from the citadel, which is located in very rugged terrain, would be extremely difficult militarily and would be quite inadvisable politically, because the citadel has strong emotional historical associations for Haitians. To bombard it into rubble, which would be the only feasible way to recapture it, would create resentment among the populace. Accordingly, the GOH seems prepared to do nothing, in the hope that the rebels will fade away. Such an eventuality seems unlikely, however, because the invaders have not only succeeded in gaining control of the two above-mentioned places, but also have succeeded in rallying about 140 of the local populace to their side. Reports in the US Spanish-language press of 12 Jun 68 stated that the rebel force is now 300 strong and that 140 of these are local people who have rallied to them. My information corroborates those figures. The populace in Port-au-Prince expects further action from the rebels. The latest rumors (and the word "rumors" must be emphasized) in Port-au-Prince are that another invasion will be launched into southern Haiti this time, and that Cuba has infiltrated a number of illegal entrants

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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201-357029

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into Haiti (not into the present rebel force). I have no way of knowing whether or not there is any substance to these rumors.

3. The latest invasion was launched from Inagua Island, Bahama Islands. The mayor of Cap Haitien went personally to Port-au-Prince to ask for troops to defend his area. He received none. The invaders themselves and Haitian exiles in general are now all very optimistic, after having been quite depressed at the beginning of the invasion.

4. The GOH, which seems to be about to sit tight and await further action by the rebels, has not been idle in dealing with the local population. During the week of 27 May 68, many people (no additional data available) were arrested. And the GOH has executed about 100 of the prisoners held in Fort Dimanche prison. The well-known banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, was not, however, among those executed. His life was spared on specific instructions from President Duvalier.

5. During the recent debate in the United Nations Security Council concerning the Haitian complaint about the invasion, Haitian ambassador Alexander Bonhomme stated that Jean Theard, Haitian diplomat, had been killed by the invaders. This is not true. Theard was, in fact, killed by GOH troops. He had gone to Cap Haitien to make some sort of survey designed to put a sugar mill there into working order.

6. There are a number of Syrians in Haiti. These individuals are sensitive to the directions in which political winds are blowing. I learned that one of these Syrian businessmen is, for the first time, considerably worried about the outcome of the invasion. Previous invasions have left him totally unperturbed. Now, however, he is worried, because he has for some years done business with the GOH and fears reprisals at the hands of a new government.

-end-

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Washingtonian Howard L. Burris

FROM: CSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47540 DCE I 8157

DATE ~~3 June 1968~~ 27 May 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	3 JUN 1968	3 JUN 1968	S	For your information and retention.
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001 Hq.	5 JUN 1968	5 JUN 1968	R	
3. DC/WH/7				Here we go again.
4. C/WH/7			H	
5.				
6.				
7. WH/7/HT/ Ruth		6 June 68		- [illegible]
8. RID/AN			CH	7 to 8: Pls index and classify to 201-357029 Insufficient Bio Data. Poss. ID/w 201-145770, BURRIS, LEE /LTCL/. RID/201/
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DCE 18157
27 May 68

MICROFILMED
JUN 20 1968
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WAS-247-68
27 May 1968

Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn: Operational Support Staff

Chief, Washington Field Office

Washingtonian Howard L. Burris Begged to Accept Chairmanship of Commercial Bank of Haiti

REFERENCE: Especially WAS-602-67, dated 5 September 1967; but also WAS-787-67 dated 21 December 1967.

201-145770

1. Contact Specialist R.K. Oakley of the Washington Field Office 21 May 1968 received a telephone communication from Howard L. Burris, 1725 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., a wealthy Texas oil man currently engaged primarily in real estate development in this area. Considerable background is afforded in the memoranda under reference but, briefly, Burris (Colonel, USAF retired) is a former chief of Air Force Foreign Liaison and later was attached to the White House staff, prior to his retirement a few years ago. His social contacts in Washington at present reach well into both Kennedy and (President) Johnson circles. The US citizen of Haitian origin mentioned below is the same as that referred to in the earlier memorandum under reference. He is said to travel "freely" between his home in New York City and Port au Prince.

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OCC: BUSP

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2. Burris recently had a visit from Louis A. Brun of B. & B. International Corporation, 134 Fifth Avenue, New York City, a US citizen of Haitian origin whom he has known for several years. Brun brought a letter from Clemard Joseph Charles dated 6 May 1968 in Port au Prince. A copy is attached but in essence it says he, Charles, was illegally imprisoned for ten months but now is released. As President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti in Port au Prince, Charles professes great interest in the patriotic duty of developing his country economically. He states that the bearer, Mr. Brun, is charged with presenting orally a proposition from him, Charles. He also asked Burris to deliver a letter addressed to Vice President Humphrey. (Burris declined and suggested it be sent through the mails.)

CIT USA
POB: HAITI
OCC. BUSP

3. About a year ago Brun approached Burris in Charles' behalf, urging Burris to buy at a low price, stock in the Commercial Bank of Haiti, and to accept a directorship if not the Chairmanship of the Board. On this latest visit Brun opportuned Burris to buy 50 to 51 percent of the stock at a "nominal fee, probably US$1.00 and other considerations" and definitely to accept the Chairmanship. Burris is not interested

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201-[illegible]

WAS-247-68
27 May 1968

because he thinks this would be merely an opening gambit to attract investment funds from Burris' contacts. Moreover, he is not sanguine about the prospects in Haiti at present, to use understatement. However, Oakley has reason to believe that Burris might be cooperative should it suit official purposes to have him become involved. This aspect was not discussed in the least.

4. Burris says that Brum and Charles are somehow involved with the Bank of Nova Scotia which apparently operates in Haiti. Moreover, the two banks are offering participation in some kind of concession which they have, or hope to obtain, involving mineral rights throughout Haiti. Burris (and Oakley) are not overly impressed that this consists of more than the usual promotional effort.

W. J. Sheridan

[illegible]Oakley:em

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BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 6 Mai 1968.

Cher Monsieur Barrie,

Pour avoir compris que la faiblesse de l'Economie Haitienne réside dans l'inutilisation des forces de travail du pays, j'ai créé une Institution dynamique qu'est la Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, génératrice de nouveaux standards économiques et qui doit engendrer l'intégration de la personnalité à partir d'une massification radicalisée et qui bien assimilée aurait pû projeter les approches de développement culturo-social en vue d'arriver à un déplacement économique en faveur des éternels démunis par la pullulation de toute une gamme d'initiatives telles qu'Haiti puisse devenir une rûche d'activités.

Mais, [illegible] la conception dynamique de ce Renouveau Economique d'Haiti, bien peu semblent l'avoir pénétrée: c'est ce qui m'a valu cette "cabale" montée contre moi à desseins par des attardés qui feignent d'ignorer que, bien plus qu'à la politique on doit accorder le primat à l'économique.

Dieu aidant, après dix mois de détention illégale je suis encore vivant et, je profite de la visite de notre ami commun Louis A. BRUN pour vous remercier de votre grande sollicitude à mon endroit durant ce contre temps. Mais si ma situation et la vôtre ne me laissent guère entrevoir la possibilité de vous être utile, soyez assuré du moins que je serai toujours prêt à vous témoigner ma gratitude.

Notre ami commun est chargé de vous parler de vive voix de mon problème et de vous remettre en mains propres une lettre adressée à l'Honorable Hubert H. HUMPHREY où se trouve exprimer mes voeux sincères pour son triomphe total aux Comices de Novembre prochain sur lesquelles reposent bien des espoirs!

Le Président

Il est difficile en vérité, de déraciner cette propension à la politique tapageuse, à la politique verbeuse à l'infra-politique néfaste pour le citoyen, et encore plus néfaste pour la Nation Haitienne.

Cependant ma sagacité à résoudre les problèmes de l'heure et l'impact constructif et évolutif engendré par la B.C.H., m'ont permis de faire école et cette nouvelle génération politico-économique qui partage avec moi les responsabilités que posent ce renouveau de la Nation. Des Missionnaires de la Régénération Nationale, des Missionnaires "dont la valeur et l'efficacité mettent en jeu des hommes convaincus qui travaillent à discipliner l'Economie en vue d'un objectif bien défini; des hommes qui rejettent systématiquement toute idée de" fatalités économiques", mutation de la conscience sociale", Voilà ce qu'impose notre triomphe total pour et en faveur de notre peuple.

Cette cabale je puis l'attribuer à l'oeuvre du Destin. La foi en mon Destin réprime l'inquiétude maladive de l'esprit et le fixe dans la vérité.

"La vérité ne triomphe jamais mais ses ennemis succombent toujours" je vaincrai! Oui je vaincrai ! C'est dans cette guerre de chaque moment que je me perfectionne et c'est en combattant avec une foi ardente dans mon Destin que je peux dire comme l'Apôtre: "Je ne pense point être encore arrivé où j'aspire; mais oubliant ce qui est en arrière et m'étendant à ce qui est devant, je cours au terme de la carrière pour saisir le prix que Dieu nous a destiné la félicité à laquelle il nous a appelés par le Christ".

Je vous souhaite la santé et le bonheur pour vous et pour votre famille et le succès dans vos entreprises.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Mr. Burris l'expression de mes respectueux sentiments et reconnaissants.

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES.-

COLONEL HOWARD L. BURRIS
WASHINGTON D.C.,-

201-357429

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. Case 47,540

DATE: 22 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	22 MAY 1968	22 MAY 1968		Attached copy of 00-A(S)-322/14367-68 and NYOR (TWX) 9891 is furnished for your information and possible interest.
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.	22 MAY 1968	22 MAY 1968		
3. WH/7/Ht Chief				
4. Int Ext LI				
5. R/D Sec				
6. File				
7. DC/WH/7				Brun is recognized by Joseph as self-serving and an enemy of the coalition. Highly doubtful if Joseph made any of the statements attributed to him. There was no need for Joseph to call the Haitian consulate to find out about the invasion.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. FI/ISR				Please file 201-357029
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

MAY 21 11 03 AM '68

S E C R E T 211544Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9891

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (GNUSULIN) FROM JHMITCHELL

SUBJECT: CASE 47,540

ON 20 MAY 1968, LOUIS A. BRUN TOLD US THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS SEEKING HELP IN RAISING THE REQUIRED US$600,000 RANSOM FROM TWO PRINCIPAL SOURCES. ONE SOURCE IS BRUN HIMSELF, TOGETHER WITH SOMEBODY NAMED ALBERT (NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE), IN NEW YORK CITY. AS ALREADY REPORTED, THIS GROUP HAS FAILED TO RAISE THE MONEY, BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE THIS MELANCHOLY INTELLIGENCE TO CHARLES. THE SECOND GROUP IS CONNECTED WITH A MAN NAMED JOSEPH DRYER. MME. CHARLES WROTE TO BRUN (LETTER RECEIVED ON 20 MAY 1968), TOLD HIM THAT MR. DRYER WAS INVOLVED IN THE MONEY-RAISING EFFORT AND MADE A CRYPTIC REFERENCE TO THE CARNER BANK IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. BRUN, WHO KNOWS DRYER, STATED THAT HE HAS QUERIED DRYER ABOUT THE CARNER BANK AND THAT DRYER TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD NEVER EVEN HEARD OF IT. BRUN DESCRIBED DRYER AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE INVESTMENT FIRM GOODBODY IN MIAMI AND SAID THAT HE HAS BUSINESS INTERESTS IN HAITI AND THE NETHERLANDS, AMONG OTHER PLACES. BRUN AND DRYER ARE MEETING DURING THE EVENING OF 20 MAY 1968, AFTER

WHICH BRUN WILL TAKE DRYER TO THE AIRPORT. DRYER IS TO FLY TO HAITI ON 24 MAY 1968. BRUN SAID THAT DRYER IS A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY. WE BROUGHT UP THE NAME OF MME. SAINT-VICTOR, SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER, WHOM WE REPORTED AS HAVING BEEN IN MIAMI SINCE 9 MAY 1968. IT NOW DEVELOPS THAT IT IS MR. SAINT-VICTOR (NOT MME.) WHO HAS BEEN IN MIAMI SINCE 9 MAY 1968. SAINT-VICTOR, WHO IS OFTEN EMPLOYED BY PRESIDENT DUVALIER ON CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS AND WHO CONTROLS THE HAITIAN PHILATELIC CORPORATION (WHICH ISSUES HAITIAN STAMPS), HAS ACTED AS THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN PRESIDENT DUVALIER AND CHARLES AND HIS WIFE. HE REPORTEDLY VISITED CHARLES WHILE THE LATTER WAS IN FORT DIMANCHE AND DELIVERED TO HIM THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE WOULD BE SET FREE (I.E., THE US$605,000). BRUN OPINED THAT THE REASON FOR SAINT-VICTOR'S PRESENCE IN MIAMI MIGHT POSSIBLY BE TO OBTAIN SOME OR ALL OF THE US$605,000 FROM SOMEBODY THERE.

NEW SUBJECT: BRUN ALSO KNOWS A REPUTED MULTIMILLIONAIRE NAMED JOHN BOLTEN AND INTRODUCED HIM, VIA CABLE APPOINTMENT, TO LOUIS LEVEQUE. BOLTEN IS REPORTEDLY A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF EITHER GERMAN OR AUSTRIAN BIRTH AND IS NOTED FOR HIS PHILANTHROPIC INTERESTS.

NEW SUBJECT: BRUN WHO KNOWS MITCHELL AS COLONEL MITCHELL (RETIRED) OF THE ARMY, SAID THAT HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE REPORTED 20 MAY 1968 INVASION OF HAITI BY EXILES IS THE WORK OF THE HAITIAN COALITION AND OF CIA. HE TOLD US THAT HE IS A GOOD FRIEND AND CONTACT OF RAYMOND JOSEPH, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE HAITIAN COALITION IN NEW YORK AND THAT JOSEPH TOLD HIM THAT THE HAITIAN COALITION IS SPONSORED IN EVERY WAY BY THE CIA. BRUN SAID THAT WHEN HE HEARD ABOUT THE REPORTED INVASION HE CALLED JOSEPH AND ASKED HIM WHETHER OR NOT THE REPORT WAS TRUE. JOSEPH FIRST DENIED IT, BUT LATER (AT ABOUT 1130 HOURS) CALLED BRUN BACK AND TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD CHECKED WITH HIS PATRONS IN WASHINGTON. THE PATRONS TOLD HIM THAT THE INVASION STORY IS TRUE, BUT THAT THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED NOT FROM CUBA, BUT FROM "SOME OTHER PLACE". BRUN TOLD US THAT JOSEPH DID NOT IDENTIFY THE "OTHER PLACE". BASING HIS BELIEF UPON JOSEPH'S BEHAVIOR AND ANSWERS, BRUN IS CONVINCED THAT THE INVASION HAS BEEN ORGANIZED BY CIA. LOCAL NEWS MEDIA REPORT THAT A B-22 PLANE DROPPED EITHER THREE OR FIVE BOMBS ON PORT-AU-PRINCE. ONE FELL NEAR THE PALACE, ONE IN THE CITY AND ONE AT THE AIRPORT (NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OTHER TWO), BUT ONLY ONE

EXPLODED. NO CASUALTIES WERE SUFFERED BY THE HAITIANS. JOSEPH CALLED THE HAITIAN CONSULATE AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INVASION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS THINGS FIRMLY UNDER CONTROL. BRUN TELEPHONED PAN AMERICAN AND WAS TOLD THAT DEPARTURES AND ARRIVALS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE ARE PROCEEDING NORMALLY.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
AND
CASE 47,540

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO 00-B-321/14367-68

SUBJECT Rearrest of Clemard Joseph Charles/Charles Is Not Able to Raise US$605 Thousand Ransom/Data Concerning Charles' US Bank Accounts/President Duvalier Might Settle for US$100 Thousand Cash/Charles Has Credit of US$300 Thousand in National Bank of the Republic of Haiti And Claims an Additional US$100 Thousand

DATE DISTR 22 MAY 1968

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case: 40,556
47,54

SUPPLEMENT TO: 00-B-321/14068-68

DATE OF INFO to 16 May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 4-7 May 68/--------,16 May 68 (Paragraph One only)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles was rearrested at 1600 hours 11 May 68. His present whereabouts are not known to me.

2. It became clear, during the period between 3 May 68 and 16 May 68 that Charles would not be able to raise the ransom sum of US$605 thousand. His release from prison, which took place on 25 Apr 68, was apparently contingent on his ability to produce that sum. [Collector's Note: See 00-B-321/14068-68.] Immediately following his release, Charles attempted to interest foreign investors in subscribing to a fund of US$605 thousand. This sum was to be placed in a reorganized Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly Charles' private preserve, and used to pay off depositors and to stimulate investment in Haitian enterprises. Charles soon learned, however, that the present political and particularly the present economic conditions in Haiti were such as to discourage foreign investors from risking their money there. Nobody would invest US dollars. Nobody wants gourds. Nobody is interested in investing in a bankrupt country. Even Charles' reported willingness to pledge as collateral his extensive holdings in Haiti (essential oils and various other business enterprises, land, buildings and Haitian government bonds) failed to change the negative opinions of those approached as possible investors.

3. Charles holds a receipt from the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti (BNRH) in the amount of US$300 thousand dated 1966, and claims from the BNRH another personal credit of US$100 thousand, dated 1963. He does not, however, hold a copy of any receipt for the latter sum. Charles apparently cannot utilize these sums, or his credit for them, to pay off the US$605 thousand ransom.

4. Charles' current visible cash assets consist of US$100 thousand, deposited in the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the First National City Bank, both of New York City. He originally had US$110 thousand in these two banks. When he was first

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imprisoned in 1967, the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) compelled him to sign a number of blank checks of these two banks. The authorities then cashed a check for US$10 thousand, which the bank honored. When the Haitian authorities next presented filled-in checks, however, the bank refused payment, because it knew of his arrest and refused to believe that he had signed a check after his arrest. The Haitian authorities then abandoned their attempts to lay their hands on the rest of the money.

5. It is possible that President Duvalier might settle with Charles for the US$100 thousand on deposit in New York, when, as and if he finally realizes that Charles is not able to raise the original US$605 thousand demanded. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that Charles has other funds secretly deposited outside of Haiti. It must be recalled that he acted for some time as courier for President Duvalier, periodically took money for the President to Switzerland and deposited it there for him. Charles may therefore have utilized the opportunity to deposit some of his own money outside of Haiti.

6. If Charles did in fact deposit money of his own in Switzerland or some other locality outside of Haiti, President Duvalier may know or suspect that he has done so. He definitely does know about Charles' US$100 thousand in New York. Accordingly, Charles' 11 May 68 rearrest may be the preliminary to renewed pressure to induce Charles to part with his New York money and/or the funds which he may have secreted elsewhere outside of Haiti.

-end-

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js GSM DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540 DATE 21 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	21 MAY 1968	21 MAY 1968	SH	Attached, for your information, is copy of New York (TWX) 9881).
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001, Hqs.			X	
3. WH/7/HT Chief				
4. [illegible] C/A				
5. R/O Soo ~~File~~				
6.				
7. FI/ISR				for filing in 201-357029.
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

MAY 20 11 25 AM '68

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 201444Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9881

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (GMUSULIN) FROM JHMITCHELL

SUBJECT: CASE 47,540 (CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES)/PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S SECRETARY IN MIAMI/GUERRILLA LANDING IN HAITI

FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES USES THE PSEUDONYM "JACOBY" IN HIS CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE AND ALLOTS THE PSEUDONYM "HEAD" TO LOUIS LEVEQUE.

NEW SUBJECT: THE 20 MAY 1968 ISSUE OF "THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS" CARRIES ON PAGE 20 A REUTERS REPORT FROM SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THAT ANTI-GOVERNMENT GUERRILLAS FROM CUBAN HAVE LANDED IN HAITI REUTERS QUOTES REPORTS FROM PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, THAT ACCORDING TO SOURCES CLOSE TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER, TROOPS WERE SENT OUT TO DEAL WITH THE INVADERS, SAID TO INCLUDE ARMED HAITIAN EXILES, A NUMBER OF CUBANS AND SOME EUROPEAN MERCENARIES. THEY LANDED ON THE HAITIAN COAST FROM ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA, ACCORDING TO REUTERS. PRESIDENT DUVALIER IS SAID TO BE DIRECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE.

LOUIS A. BRUN TOLD US ON 15 MAY 1968 THAT MADAME SAINT-VICTOR, WHOM HE IDENTIFIED AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S SECRETARY, HAD BEEN IN

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9081 CONFIDENTIAL

MIAMI, FLORIDA, SINCE 9 MAY 1968. HE DID NOT KNOW THE REASON FOR VISIT, BUT SPECULATED THAT SHE MIGHT BE COLLECTING INFORMATION CONCERNING AN INVASION, RUMORED IN NEW YORK AS ABOUT TO BE LAUNCHED. SOME HAITIAN EXILES IN NEW YORK (NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE) ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MISSING FROM THEIR USUAL HAUNTS SINCE THE FIRST WEEK OF MAY 1968. WE CANNOT VOUCH FOR THE ACCURACY OR TRUTH OF ANY OF THE FOREGOING BITS OF INFORMATION CONCERNING INVASIONS AND MERELY PASS THEM ALONG TO YOU FOR TRANSMITTAL TO INTERESTED PARTIES.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
134
[redacted] FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
AND
CASE 47,948

CONFIDENTIAL

CCC: RE FILE: BOTTOM MESSAGE LINE THREE SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS
134 FIFTH AVENUE XXX VICE OER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 20 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	20 MAY 1968	20 MAY 1968	5	Attached for your information and possible interest is copy of OO-A(S) report 322/14068-68.
2. WH/7/HT 3 B 0001, Hqs.	20 MAY 1968	20 MAY 1968		
3. DC/WH/7				
4.				
5. WH/7/Ht Chief				
6. Int Ext I/A				
7. RID/				
See File C.Jo.				
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201-357029

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO B-322 ✓ OO [redacted]/14068-68

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking And Other Activities/Outline Of Charles's Plans/President Duvalier Reportedly Hopes To Improve His Image And To Attract Foreign Capital And Business Activity/Rumors Continue Concerning Possible Reorganization Of Haitian Government

DATE DISTR

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Cases 40,556 and 47,540 Supplement to: 00-B-321/12106-68

DATE OF INFO May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, May 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth. Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph-Charles was released from prison during the evening of 25 Apr 68 in return for a "ransom" of US $605 thousand.

2. Charles has been given until 24 May 68 to produce the US $605 thousand. This sum must be in an irrevocable letter of credit on an American bank in favor of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti. It has been intimated that the 24 May 68 deadline can be extended, should Charles be experiencing any really unusual difficulties in producing the required money.

3. In order to obtain his release from prison, Charles had to sign a memorandum of understanding that he would produce the US $605 thousand plus some unidentified real property. These terms were agreed to by both Charles and his wife prior to the release. At the same time, Charles wrote a personal letter to President Duvalier asking for release and promising to hand over the money and property in question.

4. Charles is now under house arrest in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

5. Charles's immediate resources consist of about US $100 thousand in cash in two US banks (no additional data available), various homes, businesses (essential oils, an automobile dealership and others (no additional data available)), buildings, land and about US $400 thousand worth of Haitian government bonds. He did have another US $300 thousand in personal funds in Haiti. He can no longer count on this money to help raise the US $605 thousand, however, because prior to his release from prison the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) confiscated it.

6. Charles has agreed to raise the US $605 thousand on condition that it be used to pay off legitimate claims of depositors in his Banque Commerciale d'Haiti. He has stated that he will permit the money to be paid out only to those depositors who are able to produce documentary proof that they had deposited funds in his bank.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

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GROUP 1
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S NO

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7. Charles and several associates now propose to reorganize the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly his private preserve, into a corporate entity and to incorporate it in the US. The associates plan to raise US $500 thousand for this new corporation. This sum will be separate from the US $605 thousand and will serve to put the new banking corporation into business. Secretarial help and at least some of the six directors of the corporation will be US citizens. Two of the directors will be Charles himself and Louis Leveque.

8. President Duvalier is reportedly most interested in the new venture and is anxious to see it succeed. He has finally realized that the economic situation in Haiti has deteriorated so badly during the past 18 months that he must do something before total bankruptcy occurs. Accordingly, President Duvalier wants to improve his "image" in the eyes of the outside world, particularly in the US, and by doing so hopes to attract investments and business activities from outside Haiti. He apparently hopes that the new, incorporated, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, will help attract such activity to Haiti and is therefore permitting Charles to proceed.

9. [Collector's Note: 00-B-321/18106-68 described a possible reorganization in the Haitian government. This reorganization, sponsored by Duvalier, would place Duvalier on the elevated plane of spiritual adviser and father of the people and would, on the surface, at least, turn over to a president the day-to-day management of Haitian government affairs. Various names have been mentioned for the position of president under the possible new system.] The name of Luc-Albert Foucard has recently been mentioned frequently in Haiti as the possible new president under the rumored reorganization of the government. Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Haiti. He is in charge of tourism. Some say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to a degree, influenced by him. I doubt this very strongly.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO OO-[redacted]/14068-68 A(s) 322/

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking And Other Activities/Outline Of Charles's Plans/President Duvalier Reportedly Hopes To Improve His Image And To Attract Foreign Capital And Business Activity/ Rumors Continue Concerning Possible Reorganization Of Haitian Government

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Cases 40,556 and 47,540
Supplement to: 00-B-321/12106-68

DATE OF INFO. May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, May 68

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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7. Charles and several associates now propose to reorganize the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly his private preserve, into a corporate entity and to incorporate it in the US. The associates plan to raise US $500 thousand for this new corporation. This sum will be separate from the US $605 thousand and will serve to put the new banking corporation into business. Secretarial help and at least some of the six directors of the corporation will be US citizens. Two of the directors will be Charles himself and Louis Leveque.

8. President Duvalier is reportedly most interested in the new venture and is anxious to see it succeed. He has finally realized that the economic situation in Haiti has deteriorated so badly during the past 18 months that he must do something before total bankruptcy occurs. Accordingly, President Duvalier wants to improve his "image" in the eyes of the outside world, particularly in the US, and by doing so hopes to attract investments and business activities from outside Haiti. He apparently hopes that the new, incorporated, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, will help attract such activity to Haiti and is therefore permitting Charles to proceed.

9. /Collector's Note: 00-B-321/12106-68 described a possible reorganization in the Haitian government. This reorganization, sponsored by Duvalier, would place Duvalier on the elevated plane of spiritual adviser and father of the people and would, on the surface, at least, turn over to a president the day-to-day management of Haitian government affairs. Various names have been mentioned for the position of president under the possible new system./ The name of Luc-Albert Foucard has recently been mentioned frequently in Haiti as the possible new president under the rumored reorganization of the government. Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Haiti. He is in charge of tourism. Some say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to a degree, influenced by him. I doubt this very strongly.

- end -

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540 DATE 20 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	20 MAY 1968	20 MAY 1968	S	Attached for your information is copy of New York (TWX) 9873.
2. C/WH/7/Ht 3 B 0001, Hqs.			R	
3. WH/7/Ht Chief Int				
4. Ext I/A				
5. R/O Sec File CSC				
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610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 16 4 09 PM '68

CONFIDENTIAL 161949Z MAY 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 9573

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (GMUSULIN) FROM JHMITCHELL

SUBJECT: REARREST OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES (CASE 47,540)

MR. BRUN TOLD US ON 16 MAY 1968 THAT ON 11 MAY 1968 AT 1600 HOURS CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WAS REARRESTED. HIS PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ARE NOT KNOWN TO MR. BRUN. MR. BRUN TOLD US THAT HE RECEIVED THE WORD IN A LETTER RECEIVED DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY 1968.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
134 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM: George S. Musulin/js gsm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47540

DATE: 2 May 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/DCSL 3 MAY 1968		3 MAY 1968	
2. WH/7/Haiti AT TN: Mr. Berg	3 MAY 1968	3 MAY 1968	
3. DC/WH/7			
4. C/WH/7			H
5.			
6. C/WH/7/RO			PRO
7. WH/7/RO/HT			
8.			
9. WH/7/HT — Ruth			
10. George			
11.			
12. FI/ISR — file			
13.			
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15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REF: Ripley/Musulin Telecon,
2 May 1968

Attached 00-A(S)322/13163-68, which was summarized in ref telecon is furnished for your information and interest.

We shall confine our reply to ~~New York~~ to advise our New York Office to counsel source to check in with US Embassy in Haiti and to thoroughly debrief source on his return to New York.

— clemard joseph charles

201-357029

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

COUNTRY: HAITI

DATE OF INFO: 27 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH-CHARLES HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM PRISON AND APPARENTLY MUST PAY RANSOM OF US$685,000

00 A(S) 322/13163-68
My 27 Apr 68

PLACE AND DATE ACQUIRED: --- 30 APRIL 1968

THIS IS MY REPORT NO. 00-A(S) 1316368

SOURCE DESCRIPTION: NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN BIRTH. SOURCE MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH HAITIANS IN THE US AND WITH PROMINENT BUSINESS AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN HAITI AND TRAVELS AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS TO THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH-CHARLES WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON THE EVENING OF 25 APRIL 1968 AND PROCEEDED TO HIS RESIDENCE. OUR SOURCE TELLS US THAT CHARLES IS BOTH PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY WELL AND IS NOW MAKING PREPARATIONS TO RETURN TO WORK.

2. [redacted] SOURCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY CHARLES, THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, EDMOND VILAIRE, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, TO TRAVEL TO HAITI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BECAUSE CHARLES WANTS TO TALK TO HIM. CHARLES HAS BEEN COMPELLED TO AGREE TO TAKE OUT A LETTER OF CREDIT IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI IN THE AMOUNT OF US$685,000. THIS LETTER IS TO REMAIN VALID FOR 30 DAYS FROM THE TIME IT IS TAKEN OUT. CHARLES HAS BEEN GIVEN A SHORT TIME (NOT SPECIFIED) TO PRODUCE THE MONEY AND THE LETTER OF CREDIT.

3. MADAME CHARLES COMMITTED HER HUSBAND TO THE FOREGOING COURSE OF ACTION. FOLLOWING HER OWN RELEASE FROM PRISON, SHE WAS VISITED BY AN UNKNOWN (TO OUR SOURCE) PARTY. THIS INDIVIDUAL SET FORTH THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CHARLES WOULD BE RELEASED. THE CONDITIONS INCLUDED THE US$685,000 MENTIONED ABOVE. MADAME CHARLES ACCEPTED THE CONDITIONS AND SIGNED A PAPER TO THAT EFFECT. HER SIGNATURE COMMITTED HER HUSBAND.

4. OUR SOURCE BELIEVES THAT WHAT CHARLES WANTS HIM TO DO IS TO TAKE THE MONEY FROM WHEREVER CHARLES HAS IT (THE SOURCE PROFESSES NOT TO KNOW WHERE THE MONEY NOW IS) AND DELIVER IT TO HAITI.

5. THE SOURCE PLANS TO FLY TO PORT-AU-PRINCE ON EITHER 2 MAY 1968 OR 3 MAY 1968 AND TO RETURN TO NEW YORK ON 6 MAY 1968. THIS SCHEDULE IS, OF COURSE, SUBJECT TO CHANGE, DEPENDING UPON THE LOCATION OF CHARLES'S MONEY AND DEPENDING UPON WHETHER OR NOT SOURCE IS CORRECT IN HIS SURMISE THAT CHARLES WANTS HIM TO ACT AS COURIER.

6. SOURCE REQUESTED US TO NOTIFY THE US EMBASSY IN HAITI THAT HE WILL BE IN THE COUNTRY. HE WISHES THE EMBASSY TO BE NOTIFIED AS A PRECAUTION. SOURCE IS A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN BIRTH AND DOES NOT FEAR THAT ANYTHING UNTOWARD WILL HAPPEN TO HIM. HE FEELS THIS WAY NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF HIS US CITIZENSHIP [illegible] BECAUSE HE REASONS THAT THE HAITIANS WILL NOT HARM THE [illegible] US$625,000. HE IS, HOWEVER, MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE [illegible]Y KNOW THAT HE WILL BE IN HAITI. SOURCE IS VERY PROUD OF [illegible] CITIZENSHIP AND SWORE THAT HE WILL DO NOTHING TO [illegible] IT OR OTHERWISE GET HIMSELF IN TROUBLE.

[illegible] SUGGESTED STRONGLY TO HIM THAT AS SOON AS HE ARRIVES [illegible] PORT-AU-PRINCE HE VISIT THE EMBASSY AND LET THE PEOPLE THERE KNOW THAT HE IS IN HAITI. WE ALSO TOLD HIM TO TELL THE EMBASSY PEOPLE HIS DATE OF DEPARTURE AND TO CHECK IN WITH THE EMBASSY JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. SOURKE AGREED TO DO THIS.

8. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KENNETH RIPLEY, DDP, IS AU COURANT OF THIS ENTIRE AFFAIR. ~~AGED~~, PLEASE HAVE HIM NOTIFY THE APPPROPRIATE INDIVIDUALS IN HAITI THAT SOURCE WILL BE THERE DURING THE TIMES MENTIONED ABOVE.

2 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph-Charles - Plans for Payment of Ransom

1. Mr. George Musulin (DCS) called today to give WH/7/Haiti advance notice of a report his office has received relative to the release from prison of Clemard Joseph-Charles.

2. Louis BRUN, who is the business representative of CHARLES in New York, has been urgently requested to come to Port au Prince. The request came to BRUN from one Edmond VILAIRE who, BRUN asserts, represents CHARLES in Haiti. BRUN plans to leave New York on 2 or 3 May and return on 6 May.

3. According to BRUN, CHARLES has agreed to pay $605,000 to the Duvalier Government for his release from prison. BRUN claims not to know where the money is located but suspects that it may be in Europe. He further suspects that he will be asked to act as courier.

4. BRUN, who is a naturalized U.S. citizen, has some qualms about his own safety in Port au Prince and has asked his DCS contact in New York, Mr. Mitchell, that the Embassy in Port au Prince be advised of his arrival. He was told that he should go to the Embassy himself upon arrival and make his position known.

5. Mr. Musulin said he assumed WH/7/Haiti would pass the information to the State Department.

John B. Kensett

File Charles (201-357029)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

TDCSDB-315/00106-68

HTP-1126

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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ACTION

IW (ACD) ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 5 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

CS/DO, FI/D . FI/INT 6, DDP, SOD 4, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3, DO 5.

9 JAN 68 IN 26694

SECRET 091700Z JAN 68 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4912

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

INTEL

SUPDATA EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 14

FILED 091700Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN-26694

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
			FBI	I&S				XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX

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SECRET 092148Z

CITE TDCS DB-315/00106-68

DIST 9 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY: HAITI

DOI: 30 DECEMBER 1967

SUBJECT: AMNESTY OF PRISONERS

ACQ: HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (8 JANUARY 1968) HTP 1126

SOURCE: A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE. HIS INFORMATION HAS PROVED ACCURATE DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF HIS REPORTING.

1. PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER RELEASED 107 PRISONERS IN A NEW YEARS AMNESTY. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LUCIEN BELIZAIRE, MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH DUVALIER CABINETS FROM 4 NOVEMBER 1958 TO 21 DECEMBER 1959, WERNER APOLLON, FORMER OFFICIAL IN THE TABAC REGIE,

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Mme Clemard Joseph Charles Reportedly Released From Prison

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	2268	Case 47,540
		DATE 4 January 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	4 JAN 1968	4 JAN 1968		For your information and retention.
2. WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001 Hqs.	5 JAN 1968	5 JAN 1968		(00-B-00156-68)
3. Ruth		5 Jan 68		
4. George		5		
5. Don				
6. Connie				
7. Bernie				
8.				
9. WH/7/HT/RO				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. FI/ISR				Please file in 201-357029
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FORM 8-65 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

SUBJECT Mme Clemard Joseph Charles Reportedly Released from Prison/Clemard Joseph Charles May Be Released from Prison

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/00156-68

DATE DISTR. 4 JAN 1968

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCS Case: 40,556
00B-321/36765-67
00B-321/37063-67

DATE OF INFO. Late December 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---, Late December 1967

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export company. Source's business activities make it necessary for him to travel at irregular intervals to the various countries of the Caribbean area. During such trips, he maintains existing business and personal contacts and develops new ones.

I have learned that during the last week of December 1967 Mme Clemard Joseph Charles was released from prison. Reports persist that Clemard Joseph Charles will soon be released. No date has been indicated for the reported forthcoming release.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence compo of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically cont in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/36765-67

SUBJECT Rumored Release of Clémard Joseph Charles

DATE DISTR. 27 Dec 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCS CASE: 40556
49755

DATE OF INFO. December 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---, December 1967

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, official of a US import-export company. Source's business activities make it necessary for him to travel at irregular intervals to the various countries of the Caribbean area. During such trips, he maintains existing business and personal contacts and develops new ones.

I have heard that Clémard Joseph Charles may be released at the end of December 1967. President Duvalier has reportedly sent people to restore Charles' residence to its former state and has ordered the return of the items which were stolen from the house at the time of Charles' arrest. Duvalier has also ordered new clothes to be sent to Charles in jail.

-end-

201-357029

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET SENSITIVE

NY-909-67
10 October 1967

Subject: Case 47,540 - Reported Relationship Between Haitian Banker Clemard Joseph Charles and Colonel Max Dominique, Son-in-Law of Haitian President Duvalier

1. On 6 October 1967, Louis A. Brun, President, B & B International Corporation, 1182 Broadway, New York City, stated that Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles has, in fact, contrary to previous information, been in contact with Colonel Max Dominique, son-in-law of Haitian President Duvalier. While Brun was not able to supply any details concerning this relationship, he believes that it is political in nature and possibly not unrelated to the various stories now circulating concerning plots to unseat the President.

2. Brun also stated that Dominique is scheduled to arrive in New York City for a visit in the near future (no additional details available).

201-357029

SECRET SENSITIVE

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declassification

14-00000

(Charles) 201-357029

TDCSDB-315/03967-67

HTP 1101

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

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INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

CS/DO, FI/D . FI/INT 6 . DDP, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, CI, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3.

SECRET 031630Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4728 RACHFIELD ACTING

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE 3 Oct 67.

INTEL IN 64877

SUPDATA PARA 1 EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 14

PARA 2 EVLEMON 2 FROM EVLEMON 5

FILED 031630Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-357029

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ROUTINE

IN 64877

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO [redacted]

D/ORR 5 [redacted] ONE [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

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032238Z CITE TDCS DB-315/03967-67

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 3 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 30 SEPT 1967

SUBJECT 1. ATTEMPTS BY HAITIAN GOVERNMENT TO GET MONEY FROM THE SWISS BANK ACCOUNT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES.

2. POSSIBLE RELEASE OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FROM PRISON.

ACQ 2 OCTOBER 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP 1101

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FOR PARAGRAPH 1 FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE. HIS INFORMATION HAS PROVED ACCURATE DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF HIS REPORTING. PARAGRAPH 2 RECEIVED

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS OPPOSED TO DUVALIER, WHO HAS ACCESS TO THE FILES OF A HAITIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AND WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION.

1. ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO EUROPE HERVE BOYER, EX-MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND FINANCE [redacted] (PORTION MISSING) FRANCOIS DUVALIER. BOYER HAD WITH HIM TWO BLANK CHECKS ON A SWISS BANK WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM DUVALIER BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, EX DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. BOYER WAS SHOCKED WHEN THE SWISS BANK REFUSED TO HONOR THE CHECKS.

2. IT IS STRONGLY RUMORED WITHIN THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WILL SOON BE RELEASED FROM PRISON.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO, (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, JOSEPH CLENARD
201-357029
SEX M DOB ?

CIT HAITI
OCC ?
< HAITI
SUBJ RPTDLY IS STILL ALIVE.

036-006-020/03
UFGA-28501
19 SEP 67
P3

HTP:4JR804

R 6709290819

FILE IN 201-357029

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 8 AUGUST 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES
INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

14-00000

DISPATCH

KAPOK
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO.

FROM

Chief, WHD

SUBJECT

Plotting Against the Duvalier Regime

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Information Only

Forwarded under separate cover is a Memorandum for the Record prepared by an LNGOLD Official on the reported plotting by Clemard Joseph Charles to overthrow the Duvalier regime. The memorandum was prepared on the basis of a conversation held with a representative of Charles in Washington on 29 June 1967.

Harold O. CHAIDEZ

Distribution:
2 - COS, Port au Prince

Attachment:
1 - Memorandum, U.S.C.

~~KAPOK~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HTPS-696

DATE

12 JUL 1967

Typed: 11 July 1967

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-357029

1 - RI
1 - WH/7/Haiti

ORIGINATING

OFFICE

OFFICER

TYPIST

sld

EXT.

5598

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

C/WH/7

11 JUL 1967

ul V. Har ood

FORM

PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard J. Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/cs
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION
2268

NO.
Sensitive Case 47540

DATE
11 July 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	7/11	7/11		
2. WH/7/Haiti Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	11 JUL 1967	11 JUL 1967		
3. 3 B 0001 HQS ~~[illegible]~~ 2/14/17			H	
4. Ruth		12 July 67	M	
5. Carrie File		12 Jul	cd	
6.				
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Attached for your retention is Clemard Charles' letter carried by Mr. Brun which was passed to our New York Office and in turn delivered to Mrs. Matlack. Mrs. Matlack bucked this copy to us. She also encouraged Mr. Brun to use our New York Office for similar transmittals. Brun also passed a copy of his 10 page "opus" dated 20 June 1967 to Mrs. Matlack. A copy of this report was previously furnished your office.

201-357029

Clemard Joseph Charles

C. J. Charles

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI
SOCIETE ANONYME DE BANQUE
AU CAPITAL AUTORISE DE UN MILLION DEUX CENT CINQUANTE MILLE GOURDES

ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE
COMBANK
P. O. BOX 1007
CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES
PRESIDENT ET DIRECTEUR

SIEGE SOCIAL ET BUREAU PRINCIPAL
RUE DU CENTRE
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

PORT-AU-PRINCE June 6, 1967
REFERENCE Confd.

Miss D. K. Matlack
CACSI/DA
Washington 25, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Miss Matlack:

May I recall the kind reception you gave me in May 1963, when I was in Washington, also your courtesy in recommending me the Alban Towers Hotel, 3700 Massachusetts Avenue, where I lodged in Room 522. You will remember the conversation I had with you regarding the future of my country, and the hope I expressed that the assistance of the U. S. would not fail us.

I have earnestly worked since in order that Haiti may be relieved from the tyranny and misery in which has been inconsiderately thrown, and have succeeded in securing the sympathy and support of a great majority of the populations all over the Republic, including religious people, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals, etc. A plan has been prepared and will be executed by a Military man who has with him most of the officers in the Army. These people are ready and eager to begin operations and are only awaiting word from me.

I would have already given them order to strike, through the Chief who is the only one in contact with me, were it not for my apprehension that the turmoil that will necessarily follow might serve Castro's plan to introduce communist agitators in the country. I also have reason to wonder about Balaguer's position on account of his friendly feelings for Duvalier. Therefore, before going any further, I feel that it would be wise for me to have the U.S. assurance that these two forces will be properly neutralized, and I am requesting your kind cooperation so that this assurance may be given to me.

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14-00000

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PORT-AU-PRINCE June 6, 67.

Page 2.-

REFERENCE Confd.

I have requested my friend and associate in New York, Mr. Louis A. Brun, to turn personally this letter over to you, also to give you all the details that it would not be proper for me to write. You may feel free to talk at length with Mr. Brun on all matters relating to my project. You will also be kind to give him any reply you may have for me, which he will keep in New York until my next visit to the U. S. shortly.

Permit me to thank you in advance for your contribution to the relief of my country, and to assure you that your cooperation will ever live in my memory.

Respectfully yours,

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES.-

[illegible] Brown
Pres. [illegible]
[illegible] Corp.
NYC

20 June 67

The following is my humble appraisal of the political situation now prevailing in Haiti.

As I repeatedly stated to anyone who may have asked me, my motivations are purely patriotic while I am also moved by a sincere desire to see Haiti emerge as a democratic independent nation friendly to the United States.

Since I left Haiti with my family ten years ago to later become an American citizen, I have made several trips to Haiti and have maintained close contacts with people in all walks of life both in Haiti and with those who were forced out of the country for political reasons or otherwise.

My latest visit to Haiti took place on June 5th of this year and I stayed two days in Port-au-Prince. Although the purpose of my trips were mostly business I also had the opportunity to discuss the Haitian political situation with politicians, as well as with average Haitian citizens concerned with the situation. My personal conclusions are as follows:

The fact is that the Duvalier regime is, at present, in a state of internal political confusion in which no one directly or indirectly connected with it can predict the outcome. There is strong evidence showing that his son-in-law, Colonel Max Dominique, has in fact tried to overthrow Duvalier in order to personally assume the direction of Haiti's political affairs. How Duvalier became aware of Colonel Dominique's intentions is the question everybody is trying to find the answer to. Nevertheless, Duvalier rounded up the alledged associates of Colonel Dominique and, after a mock court martial accusing and convincing 19 young army officers of treason they were all killed by a firing squad on June 8, 1967 at Fort Dimanche on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Duvalier himself was present at the slaughter and he ordered Col. Dominique to be a member of the firing squad. Non-confirmed information from usually reliable sources

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indicates that several other persons, low ranking military personnel, militia men and civilians were also executed on similar charges, without fanfare. It is also the general concensus of opinion that the "purge" will continue at a rate that no one can yet determine.

No one ignores that there has been and still are very hostile feelings between two groups within the President's family and close associates. One is headed by Colonel Dominique and his wife Marie-Denise Duvalier, and another is led by Mrs. Yvon St.Victor, the President's private secretary and confidante. The names of the President's wife, Simone, his son Jean-Claude and his younger daughter Simone, are being mentioned as being part of the first group. In the second group, Mrs. St.Victor's brother, the present Head of the Department of Tourism, Mr. Luc-Albert Foucard, who is also married to one of the President's daughter, is among other names such as Henri Siclait, head of the Regie, Minister Lebert Jn.Pierre, etc. mentioned to be siding with Mrs. St.Victor. So far, the President has shown signs that he favors the latter group. The ramifications of both groups extend to people who were considered the most fanatic supporters of Duvalier himself. The fact is that none of the remaining so-called strong men of Duvalier in the militia, the Tonton Macoutes or the Army know for sure how the president feels towards them and are very much concerned about their own future and survival. In other words, confusion and insecurity are wide spread amongst Duvalier's followers.

I believe that in spite of the actual confusion and sense of insecurity prevailing in government circles, there is no real organized opposition as such against Duvalier at this moment, except for what I will point out later in this paper.

There is, however, strong anti-Duvalier feelings in the middle and upper classes of Haiti, representing only a small percentage of the whole population. A segment of the population to be taken into very serious consideration is the one made up of the people living in the slum areas,

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both within and on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. These people to be differentiated with the rural peasants, live in abject poverty with no established means of subsistence, and represent the most volatile and dangerous political force to be watched closely in the event of any significant development of the political and social situation. These people which formed, in 1956 and 1957, the core of former president Daniel Fignole's followers, can be swung to any movement and play a decisive role in the confusion that may arise in the event of a coup. We are convinced that these people will welcome a change should any demagogue lead them to believe that they will benefit by such a change.

I am informed that in Port-au-Prince there are some political personalities, in and out of the Government, that are waiting for an opportunity to swing that sector in their favor, whenever a serious attempt to overthrow Duvalier is made, whether by them or anyone else.

Under those circumstances, Duvalier loosing his old grip on key elements committed to his support, a large portion of which he has recently liquidated, is trying to instore a new political philosophy reaching out for elements of the middle class as well as those of the slum areas mentioned above. I have a feeling that the new philosophy is aimed at antagonizing the U.S. Government for its hands-off policies and the economic squeeze applied by the U.S. against his government. This antagonism will go as far as necessary even to an almost impossible alliance with communist countries such as Cuba or other communist nations of Europe, Africa or Asia. As evidence of that direction in Duvalier's Government, he has allowed the so-called "Little Red Book" of Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung of Communist China to circulate freely in Haiti, whereas previously the same book was banned and seized in local librairies and newsstands in Haiti. Several articles appearing in local Haitian newspapers have lately referred with much emphasis to the "Cultural Revolution" of Duvalier which has yet to take place. The appointment in his newly formed cabinet of three Blanchet brothers, all well-known communist sympathizers, is also an indication of his subtle shift towards a

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radically leftist oriented Government. If allowed time, Duvalier may well succeed to turn the country into a new communist satellite and work out some agreements with communist countries. Here again, we should not fail to mention the new exchange of diplomatic representations between Haiti and some communist countries. The most significant one is the new appointment in Haiti of an Ambassador from Poland with whom, I was told, Duvalier is closely working with.

Taking everything into consideration:

1. The non existence of any organized opposition in Haiti;
2. The state of non cohesiveness and distrust amongst the exiled political elements abroad, therefore nullifying any positive action from outside Haiti;
3. The fear of local politicians that, if outside forces were to come in, their safety and security would be very much at stake, therefore they should resist such intervention and do whatever is necessary to prevent it at all cost;
4. The fear of Duvalier's so-called followers that they may be eliminated upon mere suspicion, just or unjust denonciations;
5. The middle and upper classes sentiment that the U.S. is not working as it should to bring about the downfall of Duvalier and that the U.S. is even supporting the regime intentionally or unintentionally by not encouraging or allowing the opposition to organize itself;
6. The interpretation of the above classes which are at a loss to understand the silence of the U.S. press in general for not having raised the usual indignation about the recent mass killings, therefore making room for the belief of a possible collusion by means of money or otherwise of Duvalier with said press, particularly the New York Times, to refrain from bringing these facts to the attention of international public opinion;
7. The strong belief that compromises have been worked out with President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic to return to Haiti all opponents of Duvalier who had fled there,

all this leads to believe that Duvalier will hold in power for quite a while more.

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It would be childish, however, to formulate an opinion only on the basis of the mentioned facts, although on the surface, they appear logical enough to confirm these conclusions.

I am convenced in my own mind, that when some politicians close to Duvalier will feel that their lives are in real danger, some of them will successfully attempt to eliminate him even though they may not be, themselves, in a position to control the chaotic situation that will necessarily follow. This is where the real danger is. If any such unplanned action was allowed to take place, the U.S. will then find itself with a real "hot potato", requiring such drastic action similar to those takin in 1965 during the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic. Such actions are not to be desired, not only because they are costly to the American taxpayers, but because they inevitably provoke strong Anti-American feelings based on the opinion that the U.S. did nothing to help bring about the collapse, but is merely there to impose its choice and decisions against the will of the people. If the U.S. is to wait for the OAS to decide on joint action in the eventuality of chaos, we are afraid that communist influence and even control of the situation by forces based in Cuba and other countries, will make it much more difficult to cope with within the context of our national security. It is, therefore, imperative, in our opinion, that the U.S. take some steps towards working with local politicians to take the initiative of a coup which, when performed, would receive the strong backing of this country, militarily, financially and otherwise, to secure an orderly succession of the present regime. As far as Haiti is concerned, I feel that I have the most adequate solution for the proposed action. I feel that whenever the security of this nation or any nation is concerned, there is no time for wait-and-see considerations. In the case of Haiti, in particular, where the political scene is really deprived of individuals of strong convictions, one way or the other, we feel that the U.S. should not have any problem in finding someone that they can build politically and work with in a sincere and loyal effort to help that small nation solve some of its perennial problems.

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In connection with the possibility of finding a political leader, as indicated above, I must say that I have been in contact with a man whom, I feel, could very well fill the position. His name is Clémard Joseph Charles, President of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, President of Haiti's Chamber of Commerce, a director of several other business and industrial organizations in Haiti.

I have known Mr. Charles since 1951. We have been friends and business associates eversince. To me, Mr. Charles is a true and sincere patriot. Of course, today, a number of people question his patriotism on the basis of his close cooperation with the Duvalier regime. I have myself, sometimes, felt that he went too far. I have also told him so, many times. His answers on such occasions have, most of the time, satisfy my own judgement. In fact, Mr. Charles told me that, knowing Duvalier, as he knows him, it would have been a question of life or death if he were to behave in a different manner. What would his death serve if he had taken a position of non-compromise? He feels that in order to be able to control the situation and outlive Duvalier, it was better to be "in" than "out" or to put it another way to be alive than dead. I can say that on several occasions, was it not for Mr. Charles' influence on Duvalier, this latter would have done more harm to the poor pelple of Haiti , in general, than he has done so far.

I have always maintained a dialogue with Mr. Charles and passed on to him as much as possible the judgements of Haitians and others with whom he had no direct contact. I must say that I have always find him receptive to their opinions.

Eversince I have known Mr. Charles, he has always told me of his ambitions and determination to be a great Haitian. He asked me to never let him down and to stay with him to help him carry out his dream. Though it has cost me some of my friends, I have extended to him everything that I could possibly offer to help him reach his goals.

Unlike the majority of Haitian politicians, Mr. Charles has an unsurmontable faith in the future of his country. He feels that if Haiti, under Duvalier, has considernbly regressed in every way, the time will come

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where, like a miracle, the country will again take its course forward to join the other progressive nations of this hemisphere. Unlike those politicians who have seen their prominent positions as a temporaty state of affairs with absolutely no future beyond Duvalier, Mr. Charles has practically invested in Haiti almost all the wealth that he has accumulated before and during Duvalier's reign through genuine efforts and self-discipline. Of course, I will admit that his wealth would not have increased in its present proportion if it was not for Duvalier's favors to him. But who else under the previous regimes who were in the same position have genuinely directed their efforts in using their gains for the betterment of the people? I have always find that Mr. Charles took very much satisfaction in giving employment and assistance to as many people as he possibly could. As a matter of fact this is one of his biggest assets in his present struggle.

Mr. Charles is not a demagogue. He believes in the realities of the modern world. He realizes that without the assistance of the U.S., progress is impossible for Haiti. He sincerely believes in the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. Having traveled extensively, he is fully aware of the tragic state of stagnation in which his country is in. He deeply wishes to see Haiti make some progress in the fields of human dignity, education, technology and above all, Freedom.

All that I have said so far are my own personal opinion and also the opinion of a large number of people in and out of Haiti. If some defer in their evaluation of Mr. Charles, it is their privilege and undeniable rights.

Now, if we are to take for granted my opinions, what does Mr. Charles have to offer to the U.S. to prevent the chaos that will necessarily follow Duvalier's downfall? First of all, Mr. Charles is at present ready and willing to provoke the desired collapse of Duvalier's regime. This, he assured me, he can do without any outside assistance. I am personally aware of certain confidential dispositions taken by him to assure the success of a coup if and when he decides to make it. Why does

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not he go ahead and make it, you may ask? His reply is that should he make it, what assurances does he have that his action will satisfy the U.S. As I stated before, Mr. Charles feels that without United States backing, no government can possibly exist in Haiti except under the very same conditions of Duvalier's Government. There would be no reason to precipitate a change if Haiti were to remain under a tyranical dictatorship like Duvalier's.

What Mr. Charles is asking as a prerequisite of any action to be sponsored or initiated by him is the assurance from a person of established authority in the U.S. Government that the United States will support the provisional government that will necessarily have to assure power after Duvalier.

The dispositions taken by Mr. Charles are that a military coup by a Junta will take over and stay in power until free elections are held. The members of that military junta have been already selected by Mr. Charles, who has their commitments to that effect. Mr. Charles believe that if free elections are held he should not have any great difficulty in selling his plans and programs to the people and therefore be elected the next president of Haiti. In my opinion, Mr. Charles is not asking too much. Should the United States consent to his request in the form mentioned above, I feel that the Haitian situation, long a sore note in the U.S. hemispheric relations, could be changed without risk for all parties concerned.

Why should the United States gamble on any other calculated risk, while I feel, it can wrap up the situation safely in accord with Mr.Charles' plans? The military junta proposed by Mr. Charles will be made up by high ranking officers of the Haitian army loyal to him, therefore on the side of the U.S. With U.S. assistance - it is almost impossible otherwise - the steps proposed by Mr. Charles after the junta will take over are as follows:

1. Disarm the Militia and the Tonton Macoutes immediately;
2. Reorganize the Army and the Government services;
3. Prevent the interference of communist forces made of exiles Haitians based in Cuba or elsewhere;

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4. Prevent the return to the Haitian political scene of such "rabble-rouser" so-called leaders as Daniel Fignole and Henri Vixamar;

5. Start the ground work for free elections as soon as possible. Mr. Charles feels that although it will probably be impossible to prevent acts of reprisals during the first 72 hours of the military take over, strong efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Mr. Charles, in my opinion, is one of the few individuals around whom a reconciliation of all the social divisions and subdivisions of the Haitian family can be achieved. I will mention some of the basic reasons behind this opinion:

1. He is of modest rural extraction, therefore is what is called in Haiti a "son of the masses";

2. He is black, therefore representing the vast majority of the Haitian people who, at this point, considers the light-skin Haitian as a threat for the return of the domination of the mulatto minority;

3. He is deprived of the prejudice of color, therefore the mulatto minority will find in him a certain feeling of security and can be assured that it will not be persecuted solely on the basis of the color of their skins;

4. He is wealthy, therefore credited for not ambitioning power for mere personal gains;

5. He is known to be a hard, intelligent industrialist and administrator capable of promoting and encouraging the establishment of new business and industries in Haiti;

6. He has shown respect for certain moral values such as the undeniable right of the individual to live without fear within the framework of the laws of the land;

7. He is a Roman Catholic who professes to have nothing to do with "Voodoo" as a religion or a cult and who has given all the other religious denominations functioning in Haiti all the evidence of his encouragement and support for their pastoral activities;

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8. Being a businessman in his own right, the business community with which he has dealt through the Chamber of Commerce and his bank will always have a dialogue with him and therefore will find him receptive to their suggestions and endeavours;

9. Having dealt with elements of the actual regime who have his confidence, he will be able to control them in a way which will avoid unnecessary hardships should someone else - a complete stranger to them - be in a position of Government leadership;

10. He is known to be strongly anti-communist and pro-American, therefore opening the door to close cooperation with the United States, under the doctrine of the Alliance for Progress, to promote better understanding and opportunities for the Haitian people with the help of the United States;

11. He will welcome the return of all Haitian exiles to take their place anew within the Haitian community and to work with him to the task of making the country a safer and better place to live;

12. He does not contemplate any reprisals or even sanctions against anybody for their past political affiliations, his efforts to be mainly directed not to solve the errors of the past, but to provide a better present and future for those who want to live in Haiti.

The task, if and when he succeeds to gain power, will not be an easy one. I am sure, however, that Mr. Charles will be able to find the support of enough honest and patriotic Haitians to help him carry out his dream of building up a better Haiti.

Mr. Charles' past affiliation with the Duvalier regime should not, therefore, be held against him. As a matter of fact, this affiliation may give him the foresight that he should do his utmost not to repeat the same mistakes.

In conclusion, I feel that the U.S. Government, through its qualified Agencies, should give Mr. Charles' offer to topple the Duvalier regime, all the required careful consideration and make a decision as fast as possible.

JUNE 20, 1967

SECRET
LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

June 29, 1967
3:30 p.m.

ARA/CAR - Edward T. Long

Plot of Clemard Charles to Overthrow Duvalier

At the suggestion of Mr. Bowdler, Howard L. Burris, 1725 K St., N.W., a Washington businessman who served in the past as an assistant military aide to the President, telephoned this morning and asked me to meet Mr. Louis A. Brun at Mr. Burris' office. This I did this afternoon.

Mr. Brun, a nationalized American, owns and operates the B & B International Corporation, 1182 Broadway, New York. A native-born Haitian, he has lived in the States since 1957. He is a close friend and confidant of Clemard Joseph Charles, a Haitian banker who has been deeply involved with the Duvalier government. Charles has fallen in disfavor with Duvalier and several of his government concessions have been cancelled. Charles is actively plotting the overthrow of Duvalier and, according to Brun who saw Charles in Port au Prince June 5-7, has 167 military and civilians ready to move with him. None of this group was represented by the 19 officers who were recently executed or the 80 some Haitians who are currently in diplomatic asylum.

In the past, Charles has made efforts himself and through Brun to get the U.S. Government to commit itself in favor of the overthrow of Duvalier but until recently all of these approaches were rebuffed, U.S. officials having stated U.S. policy was such that no plot of this nature could be supported. Brun showed me a letter he had just received from Charles written on June 23 stating in a commercial language code which Brun and Charles use in their correspondence that an American official last week had met with Charles in Port-au-Prince and that Charles was most pleased with the meeting. The implication was that this "American" had indicated to Charles that the U.S. Government favored the plotting. I flatly told Brun that the U.S. was not interested

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in supporting plotting of this nature, that our policy had not changed, and that he should know this categorically. Brun smilingly accepted this statement, but obviously considered the "approach" in Port-au-Prince was more important than my exposition of U.S. policy.

Brun said he was in regular contact with Major James Balog who, he described, as an intelligence officer from the Pentagon. He said that he, Brun, had written a report on his opinion re things Haitian and had given one copy to Major Balog and one to Mr. Burris. He then handed me a copy which is attached. This report is basically a plea for U.S. prior indication to Charles that the U.S. would support any Charles-formed provisional government created following the overthrow of Duvalier.

I closed the half hour meeting with Brun insisting again that he should clearly understand the U.S. Government was not interested in becoming involved in this sort of an operation.

Attachment

ARA:CAR:ETLong:jr

14-00000

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-3

DATE: 7 JULY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUBJECT: WOES OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES INCREASE

FROM: AMEMBASSY, PORT AU PRINCE

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES 44

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SECRET 061345Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4547 (PRIN)

6 JUL 67 IN 05671

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

AN	FI	
~~[illegible]~~	~~REPT~~	
ABSTRACT	~~[illegible]~~	

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4545 (IN 05039)

CLEMARD JOSEPH *

1. RACHFIELD CHECKED AT CHARLES HOUSE MORNING 6 JULY. NO MEMBERS FAMILY IN SIGHT AND TWO GUARDS WITH RIFLES ON DUTY WHO SAID CHARLES AND WIFE "NOT THERE." OBVIOUSLY CHARLES IS UNDER ARREST.

2. COMMUNIQUE SIGNED BY ANTONIO ANDRE PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL BANK 5 JULY 1967 STATES THAT NATIONAL BANK HAS TAKEN CHARGE OF COMMERCIAL BANK AND THAT "THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI JUSTIFIABLY ALARMED AT THE SITUATION IN THE COMMERCIAL BANK HAS DECIDED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO SEE TO IT THAT THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI MR. CLEMARD JOSEPH * CHARLES IS MADE TO FURNISH THE COMMERCIAL BANK WITH THE MEANS TO PAY ITS DEBTS." THIS FIRST NOTICE THAT CHARLES IS EX-DIRECTOR.

SECRET

BT

6 Jul 67
201-357029

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG. Chiluna

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 38

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PRIN

S E C R E T 052200Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4545

5 JUL 67 IN 05039

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

1. NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR ANTONIO ANDRE TOLD EMBASSY ECON OFFICER THAT HE WAS TOLD BY DUVALIER TO GO TO CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AT FORT DIMANCHE AND GET HIM TO SIGN CHECK FOR BALANCE HIS NEW YORK BANK ACCOUNT. Antonio Andre told by Duvalier to get Saly to sign check for balance his New York bank account.

2. RACHFIELD SURVEILLANCE CONTRADICTS ABOVE. WILL CHECK ON HOUSE DETERMINE WHETHER CHARLES THERE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JUL 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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ABSTRACT	✓ INDEX	✓

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5 Jul 67

201-357029

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INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-244418

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

AN / FI
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ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX ✓

S E C R E T 292140Z CITE SANTO DOMINGO 3786 SDOM

30 JUN 67 IN 01443

DIRECTOR INFO PORT-AU-PRINCE, JMWAVE

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

EVMUSCLE HTP UFG

MICROFILMED JUL 31 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. DURING REGULAR MEETING AFTERNOON 27 JUNE EVMUSCLE-1 SAID IN RESPONSE TO QUERY THAT:

A. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS A SLIPPERY, LESS THAN ORDINARY INTELLIGENT, AND GENERALLY WEAK MAN WHO IS A TOADY OF DUVALIER'S. CHARLES MADE ALL HIS MONEY THROUGH VARIOUS MANIPULATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OR KNOWN TO DUVALIER.

B. COLONEL JACQUES LAROCHE IS A STRONG, INTELLIGENT MAN AND A GOOD LEADER. HE IS UNACCEPTABLE AS A POSSIBLE LEADER OR HEAD OF STATE TO THINKING EXILES AND PERSONS IN HAITI DUE TO HIS KNOWN LEFTIST SYMPATHIES AND BELIEFS OVER A LONG PERIOD OF YEARS. DESPITE A GOVERNMENT BAN ON OFFICERS BELONGING TO POLITICAL PARTIES, HE WAS KNOWN AMONGST FREINDS TO HAVE BEEN A SECRET MEMBER OF THE OLD PSP (PARTI SOCIALISTE POPULAIRE). IT IS NOT KNOWN IF HE IS A SIMILAR TYPE MEMBER OF THE PSP'S SUCCESSOR (PEP). HE HAS BEEN A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF DUVALIER AND APPEARS TO ALL AS A TRUE DUVALIERIST.

2. BELIEVE ABOVE MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO THESE PERSONS WHO ARE OF CURRENT INTEREST.

3. INDEX: CHARLES, LAROCHE.

SECRET

30 Jun 67

201-357029

S E C R E T

XB 201-244418

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 30 JUNE 1967

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD (WASH., D.C.)
ARA/CAR

DATE: 29 JUNE 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - LIMDIS

SUBJECT: PLOT OF CLEMARD CHARLES TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-349

CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DATE: 28 JUNE 1967 FROM AMEMBASSY, PORT AU PRINCE

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FALLS FROM GRACE

SENSITIVE

SECRET

JUN 29 [illegible] 23 [illegible] 67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 291405Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8319

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

SUBJECT: CASE 47340

CONFIRMING FREUND/MUSULIN TELECON, 28 JUN

1. BALOG TALKED BRUN OUT OF PAYING A "COURTESY VISIT" TO DOROTHY.

2. BRUN WILL SEE COL. BURRIS IN WASHINGTON TODAY. 29 June.

3. YESTERDAY BALOG INTRODUCED HARRY REAL TO BRUN. DURING BALOG'S VACATION IN JULY HARRY WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH BRUN.

4. BRUN TOLD US THAT ON 28 JUN HE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HAITIAN BANKER CHARLES ADVISING THAT HIS HEALTH WAS MUCH BETTER AND THAT HE WAS ABLE TO VISIT FRIENDS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. APPARENTLY CHARLES' HOUSE ARREST WAS LIFTED.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

BT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

201-357029

Charles 201 [illegible]

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FROM: George S. Musulin/js GSM DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540	DATE 28 Jun 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/28			
2. WH/7/HT ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	28 JUN 1967	28 JUN 1967		Attached copy of New York 8312 per our telephone conversation, this date.
3. 3 B 2630, Hqs.				
4. C/WH/7	28 JUN 1967	28 JUN 1967		
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SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 8-60 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

SECRET

JUN 27 3 11 PM '67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 271859Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8312

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (HUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS IS SENSITIVE

CASE 47348

1. IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THIS TWX FOLLOWING CODE USED BY HAITIAN BANKER CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND LUIS A. BRUN IS QUOTED:

A. BELL & CO -- "MAJOR" BALOG AND DOD

B. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NY -- US GOV'T

C. D. K. & CO. -- DOROTHY MATLACK OF DOD

E. THE HOWARD CORPORATION -- COL. BURRIS, A FORMER MILITARY AID TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

D. BUSINESS TRANSACTION -- HELP OF US GOVERNMENT TO CHARLES

2. ON 21 JUN 67 AFTER REPEAT AFTER HIS ARREST AND CONFINEMENT TO HIS HOME IN PORT-AU-PRINCE CHARLES WROTE FOLLOWING FRENCH-LANGUAGE LETTER VIA AIR MAIL TO LOUIS BRUN.

3. " ... AS FAR AS BUSINESS IS CONCERNED I RECEIVED AT MY HOME A REPRESENTATIVE OF BELL & CO. I AM VERY HAPPY NOW. I THINK WE HAVE NO FURTHER WORRY CONCERNING THE BUSINESS TRANSACTION. HE ACCEPTED TO SPONSOR THE BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH D. K. & CO. THE

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8518 S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

HOWARD CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES. THIS IS A VERY BIG SUCCESS, AND I HOPE THAT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK WE'LL MAKE RAPID PROGRESS. AFTER ALL OUR EFFORTS WILL NOT HAVE BEEN IN VAIN AND OUR FIELD OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY WILL BE ENLARGED."

4. BRUN BELIEVES THAT PAPA DUVALIER "DOES NOT DARE TO KILL CHARLES WHO HAS MANY FOLLOWERS IN HAITI" (SEE BRUN'S 18-PAGE MEMO MEMO POUCHED ON 27 JUN, THIS CASE).

5. BRUN WILL SEE COL. BURRIS WITHIN A FEW DAYS. HE'LL BRIEF BURRIS ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS; ALSO WILL GIVE HIM A COPY OF MEMO.

6. BRUN IS IN TOUCH WITH CHARLES VIA MAIL AND TRAVELERS FROM HAITI (US, HAITIAN AND CANADIAN BUSINESSMEN).

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029 (Cita Leo)

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/7/H BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. B.E. Bachman

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HTP 1072

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CS/DO, FI/D . FI/INT 6 . WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, WH/COG 8,

DDP.

PRIN

28 JUN 67 00388

S E C R E T 272055Z CI WKTE PORT AU PRINCE 4515

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO

~~DH~~

JMWAVE

INTEL

SUPDATA EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-10

FILED 272055Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

AN	~~PT~~	WH/7/H
~~RS~~	~~DESP~~	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

201-357029
28 Jun 67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 00388

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
FBI USIA ONE ORR

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 290212Z CITE TDCS DB-315/02404-67

DIST 28 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 25 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT VIEWS OF GENERAL GERARD CONSTANT ON PRESENT SITUATION

ACQ 26 JUNE 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP-1072

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM A HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES WHO IS CLOSE TO GENERAL CONSTANT.

1. THE REASONS FOR PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER'S MEASURES AGAINST CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK ARE NOT HARD TO FIND. DUVALIER HAS

LEARNED THE LESSONS OF HAITIAN HISTORY. PRESIDENT ESTIME AND PRESIDENT PAUL MAGLOIRE WERE OVETHROWN BY THEIR CLOSE ASSOCIATES. DUVALIER HIMSELF WAS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE CONSPIRACIES AND KNOWS FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE THE MOTIVATION OF THE PLOTTERS. WHEN HE GETS RID OF MILITARY MEN OR CIVILIANS FROM TIME TO TIME EVEN THOUGH THEY HELPED HIM GAIN POWER, IT IS BECAUSE AS CHIEF OF STATE HE IS FULLY AWARE OF THE REALITIES OF HAITIAN POLITICS. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WHO GAINED MUCH OF WHAT HE HAS UNDER MAGLOIRE, WAS AMONG THOSE WHO FINANCED DUVALIER'S CAMPAIGN. IT IS ONLY LOGICAL THAT DUVALIER WOULD RESENT THAT FACT. FURTHERMORE, SINCE CHARLES IS ACTUALLY A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND MANEUVERING AGAINST DUVALIER, DUVALIER WILL DISCOVER SOME "EVIDENCE" LINKING CHARLES WITH THE NINETEEN EXECUTED OFFICERS.

2. IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT CHARLES WAS NOT REALLY AN ASSOCIATE OF DUVALIER'S. HE WAS REALLY NOTHING MORE THAN AN EMPLOYEE. IT WAS NOT BECAUSE OF HIS PRETTY EYES THAT DUVALIER MADE CHARLES THE CONTROLLER

OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES. DUVALIER ARRANGED THIS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES. HE NEEDED TO HAVE A BANK TO RECEIVE NON-FISCAL DEPOSITS FROM WHICH HE COULD MAKE WITHDRAWALS AS HE WISHED. OUT OF THIS ALSO GREW ANOTHER REASON WHY DUVALIER IS ANGRY AT CHARLES. WHEN THE NON-FISCAL ACCOUNTS IN THE COMMERCIAL BANK RAN DRY, THE BANK ADVANCED THE GOVERNMENT MONEY AGAINST BONDS. CHARLES USED THESE BONDS IN HIS FINANCIAL MANIPULATIONS AND THEY FELL INTO THE HANDS OF FOREIGN SPECULATORS WHO ARE NOW DEMANDING PAYMENT.

3. PLOTS SUCH AS CHARLES WAS ENGAGED IN WILL NOT SUCCEED. DUVALIER HAS SO ORGANIZED THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE OLD WAYS OF OVERTHROWING A REGIME ARE DENIED TO CONSPIRATORS. HE IS NOT INVULNERABLE BUT ONLY BY ASSASSINATION WILL HE BE REMOVED. HIS GOVERNMENT IS BASED ON TERROR AND INTIMIDATION. THE BOLD STROKE IS HIS STRENGTH. HE EXECUTED THE NINETEEN OFFICERS IN ORDER TO STRIKE THE POPULAR IMAGINATION AND CREATE A PSYCHOSIS OF FEAR. HE MEANS IT WHEN HE SAYS THAT HE ADMIRES LENIN, NKRUMAH, MAO, LUMUMBA, ETC. THE DANGER IN HIS

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RID/MIS
JUN 30 10 43 AM '67

REGIME LIES IN ITS DRIFT TO THE LEFT. PROFESSORS LIKE RENE PIQUION AND ULYSSES PIERRE-LOUIS, TWO CLOSE DISCIPLES OF DUVALIER, ARE PREACHING TO THEIR STUDENTS A RACIST, LEFTIST, PHILOSOPHY. IT IS TIME THAT THE AMERICANS REALIZE THIS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION AGAINST THE HAITIAN CALIGULA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO INDEX

NO. 201-357029 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 29

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DESTROY SIG.

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS

PRINT

S E C R E T 281420Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4517

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

28 JUN 67 IN 00401

REF: DIRECTOR 14279

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

MB

1. STATION AGREES CHARLES LIFE IN IMMINENT DANGER DUE HIS PLOTTING AND AMBITIONS. BELIEVE CHARLES PLACING HOPES ON AMERICAN FINANCIAL ASSOCIATES AND U.S. GOVERNMENT TO SAVE HIM IN CASE HE IS ARRESTED. AMERICAN FLAG NOW FLYING DAILY OVER CENTRAL OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL BANK.

2. UNFORTUNATELY RACHFIELD CONFINED TO HOME FOR ONE WEEK DUE CIRCULATORY DISTURBANCE AND CHUBB HAS NO ACCESS. WILL ARRANGE EVLEMON-2 WHO LIVES FAIRLY CLOSE TO MAKE PERIODIC NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK. DAILY DRIVE-BY PAST CHARLES HOUSE REVEALED NOTHING ABNORMAL MORNINGS 26 AND 27 JUNE. ALSO WILL ASK EMBASSY JUNIOR OFFICER TENANTS OF ANOTHER CHARLES HOUSE TO LOOK IN ON HIM.

3. LEGISLATIVE SESSION AFTERNOON 26 JUNE PROMULGATED STIFF OMNIBUS LAW ON "DESERTION" WHICH COULD EASILY BE USED BY DUVALIER MAKE ARREST AND

SECRET

28 JUNE 67

201-357029

SECRET

PAGE 2 PORT AU PRINCE 4517 S E C R E T

EXECUTION CHARLES "LEGAL".

S E C R E T

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js GSM
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47540 (SENSITIVE)

DATE: 27 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/27		CCH	Copy of NY-556-67, with attached letter designated for Mrs. Dorothy Matlack is forwarded for appropriate handling, coordination , and disposition. We are not familiar with the contents of Charles' letter to Mrs. Matlack, but would urge that all matters referred to this case should be confined to channels already established for this purpose to avoid duplication and multilateral communications.
2. WH/7/HT ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley	28 JUN 1967			
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET SENSITIVE

NY-556-67
22 June 1967

Director, Domestic Contact Service
FOR : OSS
Chief, New York Office

Case 47,540 - Clemard Joseph Charles of Haiti

1. Please forward attached letter of Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles to Mrs. Dorothy Matlack, Department of Defense. In his letter Charles asks the Department of Defense to support him against President Duvalier.

2. Mrs. Matlack asked Louis A. Brun, President, B&B International Corp., NYC, to have letter forwarded to her by "Major" Balog.

Jackson R. Horton

JJBalog:gh
Attachment: a/s

SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Chief
Davis = Defector Committee
Don Huffman FI/ICG

SECRET

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS (Musulin) - Info: International Div. (Alyea)
Chief, New York Office

NY-577-67
27 June 1967

Case 37,540

1. The attached paper describing the present political situation in Haiti was written by Louis A. Brun, President, B&B International Inc., NYC, before the arrest of Haitian banker Clemard Joseph Charles.

2. Brun asked "Major" Balog to forward a copy to Dorothy Matlack, DOD. He will furnish a copy to Col. Burris, the one-time military aid to President Johnson.

Jackson R. Horton

JJBalog:gh
Attachments: (2)

SECRET SENSITIVE

[illegible]

Louis A. Brav
President
B & B International Corp.
NYC

20 June 67

The following is my humble appraisal of the political situation now prevailing in Haiti.

As I repeatedly stated to anyone who may have asked me, my motivations are purely patriotic while I am also moved by a sincere desire to see Haiti emerge as a democratic independent nation friendly to the United States.

Since I left Haiti with my family ten years ago to later become an American citizen, I have made several trips to Haiti and have maintained close contacts with people in all walks of life both in Haiti and with those who were forced out of the country for political reasons or otherwise.

My latest visit to Haiti took place on June 5th of this year and I stayed two days in Port-au-Prince. Although the purpose of my trips were mostly business I also had the opportunity to discuss the Haitian political situation with politicians, as well as with average Haitian citizens concerned with the situation. My personal conclusions are as follows:

The fact is that the Duvalier regime is, at present, in a state of internal political confusion in which no one directly or indirectly connected with it can predict the outcome. There is strong evidence showing that his son-in-law, Colonel Max Dominique, has in fact tried to overthrow Duvalier in order to personally assume the direction of Haiti's political affairs. How Duvalier became aware of Colonel Dominique's intentions is the question everybody is trying to find the answer to. Nevertheless, Duvalier rounded up the alledged associates of Colonel Dominique and, after a mock court martial accusing and convincing 19 young army officers of treason they were all killed by a firing squad on June 8, 1967 at Fort Dimanche on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Duvalier himself was present at the slaughter and he ordered Col. Dominique to be a member of the firing squad. Non-confirmed information from usually reliable sources

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indicates that several other persons, low ranking military personnel, militia men and civilians were also executed on similar charges, without fanfare. It is also the general concensus of opinion that the "purge" will continue at a rate that no one can yet determine.

No one ignores that there has been and still are very hostile feelings between two groups within the President's family and close associates. One is headed by Colonel Dominique and his wife Marie-Denise Duvalier, and another is led by Mrs. Yvon St.Victor, the President's private secretary and confidante. The names of the President's wife, Simone, his son Jean-Claude and his younger daughter Simone, are being mentioned as being part of the first group. In the second group, Mrs. St.Victor's brother, the present Head of the Department of Tourism, Mr. Luc-Albert Foucard, who is also married to one of the President's daughter, is among other names such as Henri Siclait, head of the Regie, Minister Lebert Jn.Pierre, etc. mentioned to be siding with Mrs. St.Victor. So far, the President has shown signs that he favors the latter group. The ramifications of both groups extend to people who were considered the most fanatic supporters of Duvalier himself. The fact is that none of the remaining so-called strong men of Duvalier in the militia, the Tonton Macoutes or the Army know for sure how the president feels towards them and are very much concerned about their own future and survival. In other words, confusion and insecurity are wide spread amongst Duvalier's followers.

I believe that in spite of the actual confusion and sense of insecurity prevailing in government circles, there is no real organized opposition as such against Duvalier at this moment, except for what I will point out later in this paper.

There is, however, strong anti-Duvalier feelings in the middle and upper classes of Haiti, representing only a small percentage of the whole population. A segment of the population to be taken into very serious consideration is the one made up of the people living in the slum areas,

formed cabinet of three Blanchet brothers, all well-known communist sympathizers, is also an indication of his subtle shift towards a

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radically leftist oriented Government. If allowed time, Duvalier may well succeed to turn the country into a new communist satellite and work out some agreements with communist countries. Here again, we should not fail to mention the new exchange of diplomatic representations between Haiti and some communist countries. The most significant one is the new appointment in Haiti of an Ambassador from Poland with whom, I was told, Duvalier is closely working with.

Taking everything into consideration:

1. The non existence of any organized opposition in Haiti;

2. The state of non cohesiveness and distrust amongst the exiled political elements abroad, therefore nullifying any positive action from outside Haiti;

3. The fear of local politicians that, if outside forces were to come in, their safety and security would be very much at stake, therefore they should resist such intervention and do whatever is necessary to prevent it at all cost;

4. The fear of Duvalier's so-called followers that they may be eliminated upon mere suspicion, just or unjust denonciations;

5. The middle and upper classes sentiment that the U.S. is not working as it should to bring about the downfall of Duvalier and that the U.S. is even supporting the regime intentionally or unintentionally by not encouraging or allowing the opposition to organize itself;

6. The interpretation of the above classes which are at a loss to understand the silence of the U.S. press in general for not having raised the usual indignation about the recent mass killings, therefore making room for the belief of a possible collusion by means of money or otherwise of Duvalier with said press, particularly the New York Times, to refrain from bringing these facts to the attention of international public opinion;

7. The strong belief that compromises have been worked out with President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic to return to Haiti all opponents of Duvalier who had fled there.

all this leads to believe that Duvalier will hold in power for quite a while more.

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It would be childish, however, to formulate an opinion only on the basis of the mentioned facts, although on the surface, they appear logical enough to confirm these conclusions.

I am convenced in my own mind, that when some politicians close to Duvalier will feel that their lives are in real danger, some of them will successfully attempt to eliminate him even though they may not be, themselves, in a position to control the chaotic situation that will necessarily follow. This is where the real danger is. If any such unplanned action was allowed to take place, the U.S. will then find itself with a real "hot potato", requiring such drastic action similar to those takfn in 1965 during the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic. Such actions are not to be desired, not only because they are costly to the American taxpayers, but because they inevitably provoke strong anti-American feelings based on the opinion that the U.S. did nothing to help bring about the collapse, but is merely there to impose its choice and decisions against the will of the people. If the U.S. is to wait for the OAS to decide on joint action in the eventuality of chaos, we are afraid that communist influence and even control of the situation by forces based in Cuba and other countries, will make it much more difficult to cope with within the context of our national security. It is, therefore, imperative, in our opinion, that the U.S. take some steps towards working with local politicians to take the initiative of a coup which, when performed, would receive the strong backing of this country, militarily, financially and otherwise, to secure an orderly succession of the present regime. As far as Haiti is concerned, I feel that I have the most adequate solution for the proposed action. I feel that whenever the security of this nation or any nation is concerned, there is no time for wait-and-see considerations. In the case of Haiti, in particular, where the political scene is really deprived of individuals of strong convictions, one way or the other, we feel that the U.S. should not have any problem in finding someone that they can build politically and work with in a sincere and loyal effort to help that small nation solve some of its perennial problems.

/...

In connection with the possibility of finding a political leader, as indicated above, I must say that I have been in contact with a man whom, I feel, could very well fill the position. His name is Clémard Joseph Charles, President of Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, President of Haiti's Chamber of Commerce, a director of several other business and industrial organizations in Haiti.

I have known Mr. Charles since 1951. We have been friends and business associates eversince. To me, Mr. Charles is a true and sincere patriot. Of course, today, a number of people question his patriotism on the basis of his close cooperation with the Duvalier regime. I have myself, sometimes, felt that he went too far. I have also told him so, many times. His answers on such occasions have, most of the time, satisfy my own judgement. In fact, Mr. Charles told me that, knowing Duvalier, as he knows him, it would have been a question of life or death if he were to behave in a different manner. What would his death serve if he had taken a position of non-compromise? He feels that in order to be able to control the situation and outlive Duvalier, it was better to be "in" than "out" or to put it another way to be alive than dead. I can say that on several occasions, was it not for Mr. Charles' influence on Duvalier, this latter would have done more harm to the poor pelple of Haiti , in general, than he has done so far.

I have always maintained a dialogue with Mr. Charles and passed on to him as much as possible the judgements of Haitians and others with whom he had no direct contact. I must say that I have always find him receptive to their opinions.

Eversince I have known Mr. Charles, he has always told me of his ambitions and determination to be a great Haitian. He asked me to never let him down and to stay with him to help him carry out his dream. Though it has cost me some of my friends, I have extended to him everything that I could possibly offer to help him reach his goals.

Unlike the majority of Haitian politicians, Mr. Charles has an unsurmontable faith in the future of his country. He feels that if Haiti, under Duvalier, has considerably regressed in every way, the time will come

/...

where, like a miracle, the country will again take its course forward to join the other progressive nations of this hemisphere. Unlike those politicians who have seen their prominent positions as a temporaty state of affairs with absolutely no future beyond Duvalier, Mr. Charles has practically invested in Haiti almost all the wealth that he has accumulated before and during Duvalier's reign through genuine efforts and self-discipline. Of course, I will admit that his wealth would not have increased in its present proportion if it was not for Duvalier's favors to him. But who else under the previous regimes who were in the same position have genuinely directed their efforts in using their gains for the betterment of the people? I have always find that Mr. Charles took very much satisfaction in giving employment and assistance to as many people as he possibly could. As a matter of fact this is one of his biggest assets in his present struggle.

Mr. Charles is not a demagogue. He believes in the realities of the modern world. He realizes that without the assistance of the U.S., progress is impossible for Haiti. He sincerely believes in the spirit of the Alliance for Progress. Having traveled extensively, he is fully aware of the tragic state of stagnation in which his country is in. He deeply wishes to see Haiti make some progress in the fields of human dignity, education, technology and above all, Freedom.

All that I have said so far are my own personal opinion and also the opinion of a large number of people in and out of Haiti. If some defer in their evaluation of Mr. Charles, it is their privilege and undeniable rights.

Now, if we are to take for granted my opinions, what does Mr. Charles have to offer to the U.S. to prevent the chaos that will necessarily follow Duvalier's downfall? First of all, Mr. Charles is at present ready and willing to provoke the desired collapse of Duvalier's regime. This, he assured me, he can do without any outside assistance. I am personally aware of certain confidential dispositions taken by him to assure the success of a coup if and when he decides to make it. Why does

/...

not he go ahead and make it, you may ask? His reply is that should he make it, what assurances does he have that his action will satisfy the U.S. As I stated before, Mr. Charles feels that without United States backing, no government can possibly exist in Haiti except under the very same conditions of Duvalier's Government. There would be no reason to precipitate a change if Haiti were to remain under a tyranical dictatorship like Duvalier's.

What Mr. Charles is asking as a prerequisite of any action to be sponsored or initiated by him is the assurance from a person of established authority in the U.S. Government that the United States will support the provisional government that will necessarily have to assure power after Duvalier.

The dispositions taken by Mr. Charles are that a military coup by a Junta will take over and stay in power until free elections are held. The members of that military junta have been already selected by Mr. Charles, who has their commitments to that effect. Mr. Charles believe that if free elections are held he should not have any great difficulty in selling his plans and programs to the people and therefore be elected the next president of Haiti. In my opinion, Mr. Charles is not asking too much. Should the United States consent to his request in the form mentioned above, I feel that the Haitian situation, long a sore note in the U.S. hemispheric relations, could be changed without risk for all parties concerned.

Why should the United States gamble on any other calculated risk, while I feel, it can wrap up the situation safely in accord with Mr.Charles' plans? The military junta proposed by Mr. Charles will be made up by high ranking officers of the Haitian army loyal to him, therefore on the side of the U.S. With U.S. assistance - it is almost impossible otherwise - the steps proposed by Mr. Charles after the junta will take over are as follows:

1. Disarm the Militia and the Tonton Macoutes immediately;
2. Reorganize the Army and the Government services;
3. Prevent the interference of communist forces made of exiles Haitians based in Cuba or elsewhere;

/...

4. Prevent the return to the Haitian political scene of such "rabble-rouser" so-called leaders as Daniel Fignole and Henri Vixamar;

5. Start the ground work for free elections as soon as possible. Mr. Charles feels that although it will probably be impossible to prevent acts of reprisals during the first 72 hours of the military take over, strong efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

Mr. Charles, in my opinion, is one of the few individuals around whom a reconciliation of all the social divisions and subdivisions of the Haitian family can be achieved. I will mention some of the basic reasons behind this opinion:

1. He is of modest rural extraction, therefore is what is called in Haiti a "son of the masses";

2. He is black, therefore representing the vast majority of the Haitian people who, at this point, considers the light-skin Haitian as a threat for the return of the domination of the mulatto minority;

3. He is deprived of the prejudice of color, therefore the mulatto minority will find in him a certain feeling of security and can be assured that it will not be persecuted solely on the basis of the color of their skins;

4. He is wealthy, therefore credited for not ambitioning power for mere personal gains;

5. He is known to be a hard, intelligent industrialist and administrator capable of promoting and encouraging the establishment of new business and industries in Haiti;

6. He has shown respect for certain moral values such as the undeniable right of the individual to live without fear within the framework of the laws of the land;

7. He is a Roman Catholic who professes to have nothing to do with "Voodoo" as a religion or a cult and who has given all the other religious denominations functioning in Haiti all the evidence of his encouragement and support for their pastoral activities;

/...

8. Being a businessman in his own right, the business community with which he has dealt through the Chamber of Commerce and his bank will always have a dialogue with him and therefore will find him receptive to their suggestions and endeavours;

9. Having dealt with elements of the actual regime who have his confidence, he will be able to control them in a way which will avoid unnecessary hardships should someone else - a complete stranger to them - be in a position of Government leadership;

10. He is known to be strongly anti-communist and pro-American, therefore opening the door to close cooperation with the United States, under the doctrine of the Alliance for Progress, to promote better understanding and opportunities for the Haitian people with the help of the United States;

11. He will welcome the return of all Haitian exiles to take their place anew within the Haitian community and to work with him to the task of making the country a safer and better place to live;

12. He does not contemplate any reprisals or even sanctions against anybody for their past political affiliations, his efforts to be mainly directed not to solve the errors of the past, but to provide a better present and future for those who want to live in Haiti.

The task, if and when he succeeds to gain power, will not be an easy one. I am sure, however, that Mr. Charles will be able to find the support of enough honest and patriotic Haitians to help him carry out his dream of building up a better Haiti.

Mr. Charles' past affiliation with the Duvalier regime should not, therefore, be held against him. As a matter of fact, this affiliation may give him the foresight that he should do his utmost not to repeat the same mistakes.

In conclusion, I feel that the U.S. Government, through its qualified Agencies, should give Mr. Charles' offer to topple the Duvalier regime, all the required careful consideration and make a decision as fast as possible.

JUNE 20, 1967

14-00000

ORIG: R. Berg
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 5995
DATE: 24 June 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

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S E C R E T

24 17 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 14279

TO PORT AU PRINCE E INFO: SANTO DOMINGO JMWAVE

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4800 (IN 97136)*

1. APPRECIATE REF REPORT ON CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. THIS CORRESPONDS TO REPORTS FROM LNERGO, WODISH, AND OTHER SOURCES. LNERGO ALSO HAS REPORT FROM SOURCE CONSIDERED RELIABLE THAT CHARLES LIFE IS IN IMMINENT DANGER BECAUSE OF ALLEGED OPPOSITION HE HAS ORGANIZED AGAINST THE DUVALIER REGIME. CAN YOU EX CONFIRM THIS?

2. PLS REPORT PRIORITY ALL DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: CHARLES HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND ALL PROPERTY TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM.

C/WH/FI

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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18 53

217PM 6-23-67 MLT

TO THE PRESIDENT 08

TO SECRETARY OF STATE 08

TO DIRECTOR CIA 05

TO DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 05

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 02

TO DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 02

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

(CONFIDENTIAL - FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - HAITI)

23 JUN 96894

ON JUNE TWENTY THREE, NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT HE HAD LEARNED THE FOLLOWING CONCERNING CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN HAITI:

JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI AND FINANCIAL ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, UPON LEAVING A HOSPITAL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI, AFTER HAVING HAD A TONSILLECTOMY PERFORMED WAS ARRESTED BY DUVALIER HENCHMEN ON JUNE TWENTYONE, AND IMMEDIATELY INCARCERATED IN AN UNKNOWN LOCATION

CONFIDENTIAL

201-357029

IN PORT-AU-PRINCE BY HIS CAPTORS. CHARLES' BANK ACCOUNTS AND FINANCIAL HOLDINGS HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY DUVALIER. CHARLES' LIFE IS IN IMMINENT DANGER AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT CHARLES WILL BE KILLED BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED OPPOSITION WHICH HE HAS ORGANIZED AGAINST THE DUVALIER REGIME.

THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE SITUATION IN HAITI HAS DETERIORATED GREATLY DURING THE PAST MONTH AND SAID THAT HE FELT THAT THIS SITUATION IS THE WORST IT HAS BEEN IN THE LAST YEAR.

GP 1

SECRET 23 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report from George Musulin

1. George Musulin, Washington DCS representative, called this afternoon to advise the following:

a. Dorothy Matlack (Dept. of Army G-2) has now been cut out of the contact between the DCS and Mr. B in New York. Presume that Mr. B refers to Luis Brun, the New York lawyer and representative of Clemard Joseph Charles.

b. Mr. C. (Clemard Joseph Charles) has been placed under house arrest as of 21 June. He cannot leave the country. All of his properties and possessions have been taken from him. The only thing Chrles has left is his interest in the Commercial Bank. The situation in Haiti is believed to be deteriorating very rapidly. (Note: Musulin or Brun apparently have no explanation as to how Charles managed to retain his banking interest after having everything else stripped from him.)

c. Two children of Max Dominique from his previous mariage arrived in New York last night by plane from Port au Prince.

d. Papa Doc is very concerned about the impression one gets from business interest in the city. Apparently the place ~~takes~~ looks like a ghost town after dark. Accordingly he has issued ~~[illegible]~~ orders that all stores stay open from 8-12 in the morning and 4-9 in the evening.

2. Will advise when more info available. Musulin believes that Duvalier placed Charles under arrest because ~~we~~ he got wind of his proposed conspiracy. He does not know where the leak occurred.

SECRET

aides

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HTP-1067
TDCSDB-315/02303-67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO (Charles)
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-357029
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/7/HT BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. B.E. Backman

DISSEM BY 28 PER

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CS/DO, FI/D , FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO 5, CA/O 4, WH/COG 8, WH/REG 8, WH/7/H/RE 3

PRIN

S E C R E T 231726Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4500 23 Jun 67 IN 97136

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO, JMWAVE

INTEL

AB/1L	~~FI~~	WH/7/HT
~~RE~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

SUPDATA PARA 1 EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-6 FROM COLONEL GRACIA JACQUES

PARA 2 EVLEMON-6

FIELD COMMEND FROM OBSERVATION AND TALK FRANCIS D. RACHFIELD HAD WITH CHARLES.

FILED 231726Z S E C R E T

201-357029
23 Jun 67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 97136

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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TREASURY	FBI		INS		D/MS 2			[illegible]	ONE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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CITE TDCSDB-315/02303-67

DIST 23 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 22 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK

ACQ 23 JUNE 1967, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, HTP-1067

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS ANTI-DUVALIER BUT WHO HAS CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS TO KEY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER ENTOURAGE AND HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE ACCURATE IN THE INFORMATION HE PROVIDES.

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK, HAS CAUSED PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER TO BE ANGRY WITH HIM. HE IS PUBLICLY CAMPAIGNING FOR THE PRESIDENCY

TO SUCCEED DUVALIER. WHILE IN THE GENERAL HOSPITAL FOR A THROAT OPERATION DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JUNE 1967 CHARLES MAINTAINED A REGISTER IN WHICH ALL THOSE WHO CAME TO SEE HIM COULD SIGN THEIR NAMES. DUVALIER NOW KNOWS THAT CHARLES IS AMBITIOUS AND LACKING IN GRATITUDE, FOR WITHOUT DUVALIER HE WOULD BE NOTHING. BUT CHARLES WILL FEEL DUVALIER'S WRATH. ALL HIS PROPERTY WILL BE TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM AND HE WILL BE KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST.

2. WHILE CHARLES WAS IN THE HOSPITAL HIS BUSINESS VENTURES WERE SEIZED BY THE TAX OFFICE AND PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF TWO TAX INSPECTORS, SERGE SALOMON AND MAURICE LAFONTANT.

3. FIELD COMMENT: CHARLES RETURNED TO HIS HOME ON 19 JUNE 1967 AND WILL REMAIN THERE FOR AT LEAST FIFTEEN DAYS UNDER DOCTORS ORDERS TO RECUPERATE. HIS HOUSE IS NOT UNDER GUARD NOR UNDER VISIBLE SURVEILLANCE. CHARLES CLAIMS TO BE CONTINUING TO PLOT THE OVERTHROW OF DUVALIER WHOM HE CONSIDERS INSANE AND WILL NOT SEEK

14-00000

ASYLUM DESPITE FACT HE HAS LOST MOST OF HIS BUSINESS VENTURES. CHARLES IS STILL DIRECTOR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK WHICH IS NOW CONTROLLED BY AN UNNAMED INVESTMENT CORPORATION IN NEW YORK CITY TO PREVENT ITS SEIZURE BY THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCLANT, CINCSO (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET 21 June 1967

Bob,

Mr. Musulin (DO), extention 2268, called to say that Dorothy Matlack had called to inform him that she had reached Mr. B and that per instructions Mr. B. would pass info for Matlack ~~xm~~ to Balog in New York. Mr. Musulin said that from his conversation with her he believed that Matlack wanted to be cut in on this activity and wanted to receive copies of any disseminations.

Mr. Musulin mentioned that ~~x~~ Mr. B had told Matlack that he had heard that the operation (tonsillectomy) was performed on Charles and he is feeling fine.

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 20 JUNE 1967
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOSEPH CLEMARD CHARLES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

DATE: 21 JUNE 1967 (cross reference sheet)
DBB 84012

14-00000

SECRET

SENSITIVE

JUN 15 2 01 PM '67

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 151540Z CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 8213

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) INFO: MCCONNELL FROM BALOG

SUBJECT: CASE 47540

1. ON 14 JUNE 67 LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT, B&B INTERNATIONAL CORP., NEW YORK CITY, SAW IN WASHINGTON COLONEL (HOWARD) BURRIS. THEY DISCUSSED IN PRIVATE THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI.

2. COLONEL BURRIS, WHO THINKS VERY HIGHLY OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, TOLD BRUN THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTS THE HAITIAN BANKER'S PLANS AND THAT HE WILL SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BURRIS TOLD BRUN THAT HE WILL URGE THE PRESIDENT TO CONSIDER GIVING US GOVERNMENT HELP TO CHARLES.

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

BT

201-357029

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SECRET

C. J. Charles

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357029)

1. Background: Clemard Joseph CHARLES, born Gonaives, Haiti, 21 April 1923, is a Negro of peasant origin. CHARLES is a shrewd, opportunistic, basically dishonest individual whose natural talents have been channelled to President DUVALIER's advantage over a period of ten years. Having made considerable money in the banana business, CHARLES was able, in 1960, to create the Commercial Bank of Haiti, of which he is still the sole owner. Since its beginning, the Bank has been an instrument for DUVALIER's financial manipulations, and CHARLES is a subservient agent for the President in many of the latter's clandestine operations conceived to evade U. S. Government surveillance. CHARLES, for example, was DUVALIER's agent in the operation designed to smuggle surplus U. S. military aircraft to Haiti and, in fact, made a trip to a USAF base in Arizona to effect purchase, which was later blocked. After long, close association with DUVALIER, during which CHARLES had become extremely wealthy, he managed to incur DUVALIER's displeasure. Gradually CHARLES' influence diminished in favor of Henri SICLAIT, Director of the Regie de Tabac. As CHARLES began to realize that he no longer enjoyed DUVALIER's favor, he began, for the second or third time, to seek channels to the U. S. Government and to solicit support for himself as a successor to the President.

2. Agency Contact: CIA contact with CHARLES in the U.S. dates back to May 1963 when he was visited in his suite in the Hotel Willard in Washington by a representative of WH Division. Since that time, he has made his every visit to the U.S. an occasion to talk to some official of the U. S. Government. The most persistent of his approaches has been made to DCS/New York, which he believes leads him to the Department of Defense. Never has this unscrupulous, overly-ambitious charlatan offered any evidence that he has anything going for him inside Haiti. The names he has furnished as his alleged collaborators have meant little or nothing. His approach to a Station representative in Port-au-Prince in January 1967 produced nothing in the way of hard information. His reports, passed to DCS/NY through his business representative in New York, have been evasive and, in some instances, utterly false. Fabrication has in some cases been obvious.

3. In brief, CHARLES is trying to coerce the U. S. Government into some sort of support for his presidential aspirations. Should anyone listen to him, it would simply mean that the U. S. would have to take over the entire operation and move him in behind a regiment of Marines. State Department, Haiti Desk, has long considered him highly undesirable. Let higher-placed buyers beware!

K. T. R.

SECRET

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/7

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1500 hours, the DCS representative, George Musulin, informed the Haiti Desk that Mr. BRUN, lawyer for Clemard Joseph CHARLES, had met COLONEL HOWARD L. BURRIS on 14 June and had passed the "word" to him plus allegedly the two letters from CHARLES. BURRIS assured BRUN that his plea would be taken to the White House level.

2. DCS will keep Haiti Desk informed of further developments.

R. Lehman

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WHD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1530 hours, the DCS representative, George Musulin, called WH/7/Haiti Desk to report the following:

> "On 14 June 1967, Mr. BRUN met Colonel HOWARD L. BURRIS in Washington, D. C. They discussed in private the current developments in Haiti. Colonel BURRIS, who thinks very highly of CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, told BRUN that he fully supports the banker's (CHARLES) plans and that he will see the President as soon as possible. BURRIS told BRUN that he will urge the President to consider giving U. S. Government support to CHARLES."

2. No other information available.

SECRET

201-357029

SECRET

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

REFS: Attached two teletypes from DCS/New York City

1. At 1115 hours, 15 June, Dorothy MATLACK, Department of the Army, called the DCS Washington representative, George MUSULIN, to inform that she had just received a phone call from Louis BRUN, President, B & B International, NYC, requesting an "audience". MATLACK contacted DCS for advice. Allegedly, BRUN wants to pass the two letters from Haitian Banker CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES to MATLACK. DCS called the Haitian Desk for advice to formulate a reply to MATLACK.

2. WH/7/Haiti has identified the two American contacts mentioned in references as follows:

a. DOROTHY MATLACK: Employed in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U.S. Army. Has been a participant on the Interagency Defector Committee and has been issued an Agency badge. Both TSD and OCR have shown interest in her.

b. COLONEL HOWARD LAY BURRIS: Born Texas, 1918, graduate of U. S. Military Academy. Believed to be retired from the USAF. His name, along with Pierre SALINGER, etc. was included on a list from the Office of the Vice President requesting an SI clearance, 10 February 1961. Considered to be a Texas millionaire.

3. DCS suggested that MATLACK inform BRUN to contact Major BALOG (DCS representative, New York City) with whom BRUN has been in contact, and pass the letters to him. Final decision rests with WHD.

SECRET

file 201-357029

Chuckos

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #154 SECRET

ORIG. B. E. BACKMAN

UNIT WH/7/HAITI

EXT. 4222

DATE 14 JUNE 1967

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S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE TDCS DB-315/02061-67

7

DIST 15 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 9 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT 1. CONTINUING BIDS BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIS PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

2. CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS IN HAITI

ACQ 9 JUNE 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE FOREIGN BUSINESSMAN WITH WIDE CONTACTS IN PORT-AU-PRINCE WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE LEARNS. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND OF CHARLES. THE CLOSE FRIEND AND CHARLES WERE AWARE THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD REACH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

1. (SUMMARY: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AGAIN IS PLANNING TO SEEK U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIS PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO CHARLES, HE NOW HAS 290 SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND MEN) WHO ARE READY TO STRIKE AT ANY TIME AND KILL PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, AND HE HAS NAMED SOME OF HIS SUPPORTERS AND "FELLOW CONSPIRATORS" THROUGHOUT HAITI. CHARLES SAID THAT HE AND HIS ARMY FRIENDS WILL GET RID OF DUVALIER,

14-00000

BUT THEY ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH WITHOUT FOREIGN HELP TO STAY IN POWER. HE WARNED THAT IF U.S. GOVERNMENT HELP IS NOT FORTHCOMING, THE CASTROITE HAITIANS HAVE A VERY GOOD CHANCE OF SEIZING POWER.)

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES HAS BEEN DRAWN FROM INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES: SINCE ABOUT 1963, CHARLES HAS TRIED TO GAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AS THE SUCCESSOR TO PRESIDENT DUVALIER; HE HAS THE REPUTATION OF BEING AN OPPORTUNIST, SHREWD, CAPABLE, AND UNSCRUPULOUS, AND HAS DUVALIER'S CONFIDENCE WHICH HE HAS USED TO FURTHER HIS OWN EFFORTS AGAINST DUVALIER. THE INFORMATION WHICH FOLLOWS APPEARS TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN AN EXTENSION OF CHARLES' ATTEMPTS TO PANIC THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THEREBY GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHICH MAY CONSIDER CHARLES AS THE LESSER OF A NUMBER OF EVILS. HIS ALLEGED SUPPORTERS, LISTED BELOW, ARE BELIEVED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT AND HIS ALLEGED ARMY SUPPORTERS ARE SUSPECT. CHARLES' REFERENCE TO FIDEL CASTRO AND DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER AS HIS COMPETITORS IN A RACE TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER IS CONSIDERED TO BE WITHOUT BASIS - A CALCULATION BY CHARLES TO FORCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S HAND IN HIS FAVOR.

FOR OTHER RECENT REPORTING ON CHARLES' PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER, SEE TDCSDB-315/01965-67, CSDB-312/01428-67, AND CSDB-312/01625-67.)

3. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, WHO IS PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT, IS TO UNDERGO A MINOR THROAT OPERATION ON 14 JUNE 1967 IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. CHARLES WANTED TO HAVE THE OPERATION IN THE U.S., BUT DUVALIER "STRONGLY SUGGESTED" THAT IT BE DONE LOCALLY.

4. CHARLES, WHO IS INCREASINGLY FEARFUL THAT DUVALIER WILL BECOME AWARE OF HIS PLOT AND WILL "ELIMINATE" HIM, AGAIN PLANS TO SEEK U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT. HE DESCRIBED THE CONDITIONS IN HAITI AS NEAR CHAOTIC AND REITERATED THE NEED TO GET RID OF DUVALIER. HE SAID THAT HE NOW HAS 290 SOLDIERS (OFFICERS AND MEN) WHO ARE READY TO STRIKE AT ANY TIME AND KILL DUVALIER. CHARLES SAID THAT HE AND HIS "HIGH-RANKING ARMY OFFICER FRIEND" FEEL THEY HAVE ENOUGH AMMUNITION AT THEIR COMMAND TO HOLD OUT FOR 24 HOURS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: CHARLES MAY BE REFERRING TO MAJ. COICOU,(FNU), COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, OR CAPT. WALTER PREVAL REPORTED IN

CSDB-312/01625-67.) HOWEVER, AFTER 24 HOURS, THEY DEFINITELY WOULD NEED U.S. HELP AGAINST THE FOLLOWING THREE POSSIBILITIES:

A. COUNTERACTION BY FANATICAL DUVALIER FOLLOWERS

B. AN INVASION ATTEMPT BY CUBAN-TRAINED HAITIAN EXILES

C. DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER'S ACTION TO SUPPORT THE DUVALIER FOLLOWERS SO THAT CHARLES AND HIS MILITARY JUNTA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TURN HAITI INTO A STAGING AREA FOR DOMINICAN ANTI-GOVERNMENT EXILES.

5. CHARLES NAMED THE FOLLOWING AS SOME OF HIS CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS AND "FELLOW CONSPIRATORS" THROUGHOUT HAITI:

A. IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) SYLVESTER JEAN-BAPTISTE, A TANNER

(2) PIERRE GABRIEL, A MERCHANT

(3) G. PAINSON, A BUSINESSMAN

(4) EUGENE PAUL, A MERCHANT

(5) WALLACE B. TURNBULL, A PROTESTANT CLERGYMAN

(6) JOSEPH VOLCY, AN INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMAN IN BEL-AIR SECTION

(7) ANDRE BALE, "POPULAR LEADER" IN BEL-AIR SECTION

(8) JOSEPH RAYMOND, IN MORNE A TUF SECTION

(9) PIERRE JEAN-BAPTISTE, IN CARREFOUR SECTION

B. TRADE UNION LEADERS

(1) JACQUES ST. LOT

(2) ACHILLE LA ROSE

(3) JEAN BERNARD

(4) LELIO JOSEPH

C. CATHOLIC CLERGYMEN

(1) ROGER AUGUSTINE, OF CATHOLIC RELIEF

(2) MSGR. PETER CAYES

(3) MSGR. CONSTANT (FNU), OF GONAIVES

(4) FATHER HILAIRE (FNU), WHOSE BROTHER, AN ARMY OFFICER, WAS FIRED BY DUVALIER

(5) FATHER DELVA (FNU), OF THE GENERAL HOSPITAL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(6) BROTHER VICTOR, OF THE JEAN-MARIE GUILLOUX SCHOOL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(7) BROTHER RICHARD

D. SYRIAN BUSINESSMEN IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) NAGIB HANDAL

(2) NASTRI AND ELIAS BABOUN

(3) THE ACRA BROTHERS

(4) FOUAD MOURU

E. ITALIAN BUSINESSMEN IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

(1) THE PETOIA FAMILY

(2) THE MAGLIO FAMILY

F. OTHERS

(1) FRANK PEURIES, A BUSINESSMAN IN CORAIL

(2) ALPHONSE BAZIL, A LAWYER IN JEREMIE

(3) JEAN BOURGEOIS, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAYES

(4) MIDOUIN TURNIER, A BUSINESSMAN IN JACMEL

(5) LEON ST. REMY, A BUSINESSMAN IN GONAIVES

(6) CLAUDE FORBIN, A BUSINESSMAN IN GONAIVES

(7) SERGE HARLIEN, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAP HAITIEN

(8) FELIX ANGELOUSE, A BUSINESSMAN IN CAP HAITIEN

(9) CHARITE JEAN, A BUSINESS LEADER IN PLAISANCE

(10) MARC BELOT, A LAWYER IN PETITE RIVIERE DE L'ARTIBONITE

(11) MICHEL FEQUIRE, A BUSINESSMAN IN PETIT TROU DE NIPPES

(12) GERARD BARTHOLOMY, A PHARMACIST IN MIRAGOANE

6. CHARLES CLAIMS THAT THE FOLLOWERS OF THE LATE CLEMENT JUMELLE, A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 1957, ARE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING INFLUENTIAL NEWSPAPERMEN:

A. DUMERIC (FNU), PRESIDENT OF PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, WHO WRITES FOR LE MATIN

B. MAX CHAUVET, PUBLISHER OF LE NOUVELLETTE.

HE ALSO COUNTS ON THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF PERSONS WHO ARE STUDYING IN WEST GERMANY, SPAIN, AND OTHER COUNTRIES ON SCHOLARSHIPS WHICH HE GAVE THEM.

7. CHARLES, THROUGH HIS AGENTS, ALSO HAS GOOD CONNECTIONS WITH WITCH DOCTORS AND "PERSONALITIES IN THE VOODOO MOVEMENT."

8. ALTHOUGH CHARLES GAVE NO DATE FOR THE ACTION, HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS ARMY FRIENDS WILL GET RID OF DUVALIER, BUT THAT THEY ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH WITHOUT FOREIGN HELP TO STAY IN POWER. HE WARNED THAT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO HELP THEM, THE CASTROITE HAITIANS HAVE A VERY GOOD CHANCE OF SEIZING POWER.

9. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE)

12 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM : Kenneth T. Ripley

SUBJECT : Assessment of Clemard Joseph-Charles.

Clemard Joseph-Charles, President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti and President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, is the source.

For four years Charles has tried to gain U.S. support for himself as successor to President Duvalier.

He is an opportunist of the first water-shrewd, capable and unscrupulous. He has played Duvalier's game to the hilt, often entrusted with missions abroad which were, in effect contrary to U.S. government interests. (He played a principal role in the attempt to smuggle B-26 aircraft out of the U.S. for Duvalier's use. In that connection he went to Arizona to try to purchase U.S. Air Force surplus planes, using U.S. citizens of suspicious nature as his agents.)

Charles has been forced in recent months to make loans to the Duvalier government, the last one having been in the vicinity of $700,000. As a result he claims that his bank is in a precarious position. Therefore, he wants out.

Charles has many business interests in Haiti apart from his banking operation (essential oils, sisal etc.). Haitian exiles estimate that as many as 4,000 persons may be dependent upon him for their livelihood. (This includes dependents of his employees).

Charles is poorly regarded by the State Department. The department's stance towards him as a successor to Duvalier has been even more negative than is customary.

The current report turned in by Louis BRUN, his representative in New York, appears to be nothing more than an extension of his attempts to panic the U.S. and thus to gain for himself support as the lesser of a number of

201-357029

evils. The list of names of his alleged supporters is meaningless. His adherents in the army are not identified and are suspect.

His referral in this, and in a previous report, to Castro and Balaguer as his competitors in a race to overthrow Duvalier is considered to be nonsense. All this is calculated to force the U.S. hand in his favor.

His attempt to find a channel to the Pentagon are in the pattern of his action for several years. Should he succeed he might be convincing enough to cause trouble.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO

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ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

MBH

1. CHARLES USING VISA BUSINESS AS EXCUSE CAME TO EMBASSY. WHILE THERE HE ASKED SPEAK TO POLITICAL OFFICER. WAS DIRECTED TO MR. CLARENCE BREAUX WHO LISTENED TO HIS STORY WHICH ALMOST IDENTICAL REFERENCE.

2. DUE FACT CHARGE LIMITING CABLE TRAFFIC MEMCON WILL BE POUCHED. CHARLES INSISTED NO ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL OCTOBER. STATION CONCURS HQS COMMENT THERE NO INFORMATION SUBSTANTIATE CHARLES CAPABILITY FOR A COUP.

SECRET

BT

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9 JUN 67

201-357029

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/01625-67

SUBJECT Further Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles To Overthrow the Haitian Government; His Military Supporters and His Bids For Support from Haitian Exiles

DATE DISTR. 8 June 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Mid-late May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (15, 22 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince who is believed to report accurately what he learns. This information was obtained from a close friend of Charles who probably was aware that it would reach U.S. officials.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, claims that since Maj. Colcou (fnu),[1] a close friend, has replaced Capt. Harry Tassy in the Presidential Guard, he (Charles) now has an access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the Palace and is in a position to carry out a coup against President Francois Duvalier "in the near future." Although no definite date has been set yet for the coup, Charles is convinced that it must be carried out "within the next few months" to save Haiti from economic and political chaos. Charles, and especially his military friends, feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

2. Although Col. Pierre-Louis (fnu),[2] commander of the Dessalines Barracks, was not named as a fellow-conspirator, Charles believes that Pierre-Louis knows of and approves his plans to overthrow Duvalier, and that he (Charles) "controls" the Dessalines Barracks through Pierre-Louis. Col. Octave Caillard is one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Caillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate. Caillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, Haiti's economy will be completely ruined and Haitian exiles receiving guerrilla training in Cuba may attempt to seize power in Haiti.

3. Charles has the support of Capt. Preval (fnu),[3] of the Presidential Guard, and realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed; Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of the coup.

4. In addition to ships of the Haitian Coast Guard, Charles now has the use of a 352-ton converted landing craft (LC) which normally sails between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5. Charles had no contact with Haitian exile groups until early May 1967, when he sent an emissary to New York City to talk to Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in a final showdown with Duvalier and promised to line up some of his fellow exiles to support Charles. A close friend of Charles was planning to go to New York in mid-May 1967 ostensibly to discuss port development projects in Port-au-Prince with a U.S. construction firm; however, the real purpose of the trip is to contact Haitian exiles to gain their support for Charles.

6. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles held a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers of the meeting was Dr. Jumelle (fmu),[4] a medical doctor whose brother was a former Haitian Minister of Finance and who was killed by Duvalier. Another exile who attended the meeting was Vixamar (fmu)? who claims to be a legal advisor to the Republic of Chad and who said that he was going to be the next president of Haiti. The group of Haitian exiles, believed to call itself the "National Organization of Haitian Exiles", has some members who back Charles.

7. Following are prominent Haitians who Charles believes must be eliminated after the coup:

   a. Col. Gracia Jacques of the Presidential Guard - Jacques, who is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier, will be needed in the execution of the coup, and can be bought; however, once power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques will be eliminated.

   b. Luc Desir, head of the Tonton-Macoute.

   c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance - an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has an "underground movement in Haiti."

   d. Gen. Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff.

   e. Col. Jacques Laroche, Deputy Chief of Staff - a "convinced Communist."

8. If the coup is successful, Charles hopes to give Andre Theard, former Haitian Ambassador to the United States, a (diplomatic post; Theard is strongly pro-U.S. Charles regards Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health, as a very sick man with no further political aspirations.

9. Close friends of Charles are convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out a coup with or without foreign help, and that his chances of success are good because several of Duvalier's new appointees to key positions are friends of Charles; also, that Charles must act soon because the morale of many of Duvalier's military and civilian supporters has reached an all-time low and because the Haitian Treasury is almost empty.

Headquarters Comments

1. Coicou may be Maj. Serge Coicou.
2. Probably Lt. Col. Luc Pierre-Louis.
3. Another source has identified Preval as Capt. Walter Preval.

4. Probably Dr. Gaston Jumelle.

5. Probably Henri Vixamar.

CSDB-312/01428-67 recently reported other plans of Clemard Joseph Charles.

file 201-357029

Charles

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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DATE 8 JUNE 1967

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S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE TDCSDB-315/01965-67

DIST 8 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI LATE MAY 1967

0 22 20 Z

SUBJECT READINESS OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT

ACQ 6 JUNE 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE FOREIGN BUSINESSMAN WITH WIDE CONTACTS IN PORT AU PRINCE WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE LEARNS. THIS INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM A CLOSE FRIEND OF CHARLES WHO PROBABLY WAS AWARE THAT IT WOULD REACH U.S. OFFICIALS

1. ON 24 MAY 1967, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, SAID THAT HE WAS "100 PERCENT READY TO GO THROUGH WITH THE 'BUSINESS TRANSACTION' " AND DID NOT WANT TO WASTE TIME BECAUSE "LOCAL BUSINESS COMPETITORS" MIGHT GET AHEAD OF HIM. CHARLES REITERATED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT HIS TWO PRINCIPAL "FOREIGN COMPETITORS," I.E., FIDEL CASTRO AND DOMINICAN PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER, BE NEUTRALIZED TO PREVENT THEM FROM SPOILING HIS "PROMISING BUSINESS DEAL."

(SOURCE COMMENT: THIS DEAL IS, OF COURSE, CHARLES' ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT.)

2. ON 30 MAY, CHARLES AGAIN WARNED OF THE NECESSITY OF NEUTRALIZING CASTRO AND BALAGUER BECAUSE OF THE "EXTREME URGENCY OF THE BUSINESS MATTER." (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS BELIEVED THAT EVEN IF CHARLES IS SUCCESSFUL IN HIS COUP AGAINST DUVALIER, HE STILL WILL FEAR INTERVENTION BY CASTRO AND BALAGUER.) IN THIS RESPECT, CHARLES HAS URGED HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO PREVENT CASTRO AND BALAGUER FROM ANY ACTION AGAINST HIS PLAN, AND HAS ENDEAVORED TO SECURE SUPPORT FROM HAITIAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES.

3. LOUIS SANSARICQ, A HAITIAN EXILE IN THE UNITED STATES, AND HIS SON HAVE PROMISED CHARLES THEIR FULL COOPERATION. SANSARICQ'S SON, WHO IS CONNECTED WITH THE HAITIAN COALITION IN NEW YORK, NOW IS PLANNING TO INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AGAINST DUVALIER AND HIS HENCHMEN. FROM TIME TO TIME, THIS PROPAGANDA WILL ATTACK CHARLES FOR HIS "SUPPORT" OF THE DUVALIER REGIME IN ORDER NOT TO AROUSE DUVALIER'S SUSPICION; THESE ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WILL BE LESS SHARP THAN THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME. THE SANSARICQS WILL TRY TO MAKE CHARLES

ACCEPTABLE TO THE HAITIAN COALITION IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR THEIR EFFORTS, CHARLES HAS PROMISED THE SANSARICQS "IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSTS IN HIS (CHARLES') FUTURE CABINET."

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOR SOME TIME, CHARLES HAS SAID THAT HE PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER WITH OR WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT. HIS STATEMENTS IN THIS REPORT THAT HE IS READY TO GO THROUGH WITH THE COUP MAY BE ONE OF HIS FINAL BIDS FOR U.S. SUPPORT. SEE CSDB-312/01428-67 AND CSDB-312/01625-67 FOR SOURCE'S RECENT INFORMATION ON CHARLES' PLANS AND HAITIAN SUPPORT FOR A COUP. THERE IS NO INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES TO SUBSTANTIATE CHARLES' CAPABILITY FOR A COUP.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE AND SANTO DOMINGO.)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles, Plot to Overthrow Duvalier Government

FROM:
George S. Musulin/js
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: DCS Case 47540 (Sensitive)

DATE: 7 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	6/7			Attached is copy of Contacts/New York 8152 for your info and retention.
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CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS SENSITIVE

CASE 47,540

CONFIRMING MUSULIN/BALOG TELECON 5 JUN 67

1. AT MIDNIGHT SUNDAY, 4 JUNE, LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT B & B INTERNATIONAL CORP, NYC CALLED AND TOLD BALOG ABOUT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN HAITI.

2. A TRUSTED HAITIAN FRIEND JUST ARRIVED IN NYC AND BROUGHT BACK NEWS OF WIDESPREAD FEAR GRIPPING HAITI. COLONEL TASSY, IN CHARGE OF CRIMINAL DIVISION AT PORT-AU-PRINCE AND HIS BROTHER TOOK REFUGE AT AN UNNAMED (PRESUMABLY LATIN AMERICAN) EMBASSY IN THE CAPITAL. THE COLONEL WAS RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO "DEPARTMENT OF N NORTH"; INSTEAD OF TAKING UP HIS NEW POSITION HE FLED TO EMBASSY.

3. RELATIVES OF DE CATALOGNE, FORMEER DIRECTOR OF TOURISM (PRESENT DIRECTOR IS DUVALIER'S SON-IN-LAW) ALSO SOUGHT AND FOUND REFUGE AT AN EMBASSY.

4. FEAR PERMEATES PORT-AU-PRINCE; NO ONE KNOWS WHO IS NEXT TO BE ARRESTED, DISMISSED, TRANSFERRED OR SIMPLY TO "DISAPPEAR". TON TON [illegible]

[illegible]

5. [illegible]

MACOUTE IS BUSIER THEN EVER.

5. SUNDAY EVENING A NEPHEW OF CANADIAN CITIZEN HARRY A. DOLANSKY, LEFT PORT-AU-PRINCE TOGETHER WITH ALLAN COLTON, CANADIAN OWNER OF HAITIAN INTERNATIONAL LEATHER CORPORATION, PORT-AU-PRINCE. DOLANSKY'S NEPHEW CALLED BRUN FROM MONTREAL. ACCORDING TO HIM DUVALIER LEARNED ABOUT CHARLES' PLOTTING AND ALSO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF BRUN'S INVOLVEMENT. THE NEPHEW STRONGLY ADVISED BRUN TO FOREGO HIS TRIP TO PORT-AU-PRINCE AT THIS TIME; HE FEELS THAT THE LIFE OF BRUN, A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN OF HAITIAN DESCENT MAY BE IN DANGER IF HE GOES TO PORT-AU-PRINCE SINCE PAPA IS "COMPLETETLY UNPREDICATABLE AND FEELS CORNERED BY HIS ENEMIES AND FRIENDS SUCH AS CHARLES AND OTHERS". THE NEPHEW REMINDED BRUN THAT HE (BRUN) HAS A WIFE AND FOUR SMALL CHILDREN IN NYC.

6. NOW BRUNS IS TORN BETWEEN HIS LOYALTY TO HIS FRIEND CHARLES AND HIS OWN FAMILY. IN HIS PLIGHT HE ASKED BALOG FOR ADVICE. WE TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE PERSONALLY WE SYMPHATIZE WITH HIM, PROFESSIONALLY WE ARE NOT IN POSITION TO ADVISE HIM ON HIS PROJECTED TRIP TO PORT-AU-PRINCE WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 11:30 AM, 5 JUNE. BRUN INFORMED US THAT HE'LL ALSO SEEK THE ADVICE OF HIS FBI CONTACT MAN WHO HAS DEALT WITH HIM RE HAITIAN DEVELOPMENTS FOR

SOME TIME.

7. AT 7 AM MONDAY, 5 JUNE, BRUN CALLED CHARLES IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. THE BANKER REPEATED HIS TELEPHONE REQUEST MADE ON MONDAY, 4 JUN FOR BRUNS'S TRIP TO HAITIAN CAPITAL ON MONDAY TO DISCUSS "URGENT BUSINESS MATTERS." CHARLES EMPHASIZED THAT "NO POLITICS WAS INVOLVED; THE PURPOSE OF THEIR GET TOGETHER IS PURELY BUSINESS NATURE." AFTER THAT BRUN, OVERRULING HIS WIFE'S OBJECTIONS, DECIDED TO GO. HE TOOK OFF FROM KENNEDY IAP, MONDAY, AT 11:30 AM ON PAN AM.

8. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BRUN WILL REGISTER WITH US DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AT PORT-AU-PRINCE. HE HAS NOT DONE THAT BEFORE. [illegible] HAITIAN FRIEND JUST ARRIVED IN [illegible]

9. BRUN HOPES TO BE BACK WEDNESDAY THIS WEEK AT WHICH TIME HE'LL CALL BALOG. [illegible]

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE [illegible]

[illegible] ITAL. THE COLONEL WAS RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO "[illegible] NORTH", INSTEAD OF TAKING UP HIS NEW [illegible] HE FLED [illegible]

SECRET

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3. RELATIVES OF DR. CATALOGNE, FORMER DIRECTOR OF TOURISM (PRESENT DIRECTOR IS GAMALIER'S SON-IN-LAW) ALSO SOUGHT AND FOUND REFUGE AT AN EMBASSY.

4. FEAR PERVADES PORT-AU-PRINCE; NO ONE KNOWS WHO IS NEXT TO BE ARRESTED, DISMISSED, TRANSFERRED OR SIMPLY TO "DISAPPEAR". TON TON [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard Joseph Charles, Plot to Overthrow Duvalier Government

FROM: Operational Support Staff, DCS George S. Musulin:yj GSM 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47,540 (Sensitive) DATE 6 June 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM BALOG

THIS IS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: CASE 47,540

JUN 6 10 42 AM '67

1. CLEMARD JOSEPHQ CHARLES AND LOUIS A. BRUN HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT PHONE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IN RECENT DAYS. IN ADDITION BRUN RECEIVED SEVERAL LETTERS FROM CHARLES WHICH WERE HANDCARRIED BY TRUSTED FRIENDS.

2. IN A LETTER, DATED 24 MAY, CHARLES STATED THAT HE WAS "100 PER CENT READY TO GO THROUGH BUSINESS TRANSACTION AND I DON'T WANT TO WASTE TIME BECAUSE LOCAL BUSINESS COMPETITORS MAY GET AHEAD OF ME." CHARLES REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS REQUEST THAT "MR BELL AND COMPANY" (THE CODE NAMES CHARLES BESTOWED ON MAJOR BALOG AND THE PENTAGON) MUST MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE TWO PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COMPETITORS, I.E., CASTRO AND BALAGUER, TO SPOIL THE "PROMISING BUSINESS DEAL." THIS DEAL IS OF COURSE HIS ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT.

3. IN ANOTHER LETTER, DATED 30 MAY, CHARLES WARNS BRUN OF THE "EXTREME URGENCY OF THE BUSINESS MATTER VIS-A-VIS MR. BELL AND

DB-312/01625-67

COMPANY" AND AGAIN REQUESTS THE "NEUTRALIZATION OF FOREIGN COMPETITION BY SAID COMPANY". BRUN FEELS THAT EVEN IF HIS COUP AGANST DUVALIER SUCCEEDS CHARLES STILL FEARS INTERVENTION BY CASTRO AND BALAGUER. CHARLES URGED BRUN "TO DO EVERYTHING TO PERSUADE MR. BELL'S COMPANY HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO GET RID OF POSSIBLE FOREIGN COMPETITION." CHARLES ALSO ADVISED BRUN THAT HE HAS TO UNDERGO AN OPERATION TO REMOVE A BENIGN GROWTH FROM HIS THROAT.

4. AT CHARLES' REQUEST BRUN HAS BEEN IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH HAITIAN EXILES IN NYC TO SECURE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE BANKER. LOUIS SANSARICQ, AND HIS SON PROMISED FULL COOPERATION. SANSARICQ'S SON WHO IS CONNECTED WITH THE HAITIAN EXILE RADIO BROADCASTING ANTI-DUVALIER MATERIAL FROM THE US TO HAITI NOW REGULARLY DELIVERS TAPED PROPAGANDA TO BRUN BEFORE TRANSMISSION. BRUN AND YOUNG SANSARICQ ARE NOW PLANNING TO INTENSIFY PROPAGANDA AGAINST DUVALIER AND HIS HENCHMEN. FROM TIME TO TIME EXILE RADIO WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK CHARLES FOR HIS SUPPORT OF REGIME SO AS NOT TO AROUSE PAPA'S SUSPICION. THESE ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WILL BE LESS SHARP THAN THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME. IN ANY EVENT, THE SANSARICQS WILL TRY TO MAKE CHARLES ACCEPTABLE TO THE

"HAITIAN COALITION" IN NYC. FOR THEIR LABOR THEY WERE PROMISED "IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POSTS IN CHARLES' FUTURE CABINET."

5. BRUN INFORMED US THAT CHARLES'S SUPPORTER EDMOND VILAIRE, PORT-AU-PRINCE SHIPOWNER, WILL RETURN FROM NYC TO HAITI ON 8 JUN 67 AND THAT LOUIS LEVEQUE WILL VISIT NYC AGAIN MID-JUN. BEFORE HIS RETURN TO HAITI LEVEQUE EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE THROUGH BRN TO MMEET BALOG AGAIN IN NYC.

END

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BT

CCC: PARA 5. SHOULD HAVE BEEN INDENTED THREE SPACES SRI

PARA 5. LINE FOUR VA THROUGH BRUN VNCE BRN

COUNTRY Haiti

CS NO. CSDB-312/[illegible]-67

SUBJECT Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank Of Haiti, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

DATE DISTR. 22 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (9 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince. Source reports infrequently, but his information is believed to be reliable. He received the information from a person close to Charles.

1. In discussing the possibility of overthrowing the Duvalier Government in the near future, Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, said he now is ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, "with or without the help of the U.S. Government."[1] If he fails in his efforts to obtain U.S. support for his plan, Charles still intends to go ahead with the plot, but he said the execution of his scheme will take more time. However, Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of President Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.[2]

2. Charles said that he has rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti" and that through his good friend Colonel Octave Cayard,[3] commander of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats, which carry cannons, will be under his control. Cayard cannot furnish enough ammunition for the cannons, but Charles hopes to obtain the necessary amount from the U.S. Government. He would like to get the ammunition from the U.S. aircraft carrier, BOXER, which has been on duty in the Caribbean area for some time.

3. Besides Cayard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer.[4] Charles and his military and civilian friends plan to set up a provisional junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the junta, Charles plans to run for President and is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in the rural areas of Haiti. Charles claims that he "controls" the Catholic and Episcopal clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militiamen in the rural areas who are waiting for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

5
4
3
2
1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

4. Charles has stated that should he become President of Haiti, he would pursue a pro-U.S. policy, eliminating the Duvalierists and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime.

5. Charles still is pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier; however, his position has become shaky and he believes that his life is in danger. He feels that he may fall victim to Duvalier unless he (Charles) strikes first. For the time being, Charles will continue to support Duvalier in an effort to allay the President's suspicions. As president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, Charles soon will deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. He is anxious for the U.S. to know that his overtures toward Duvalier are pretense and that he is determined to go into action against the present regime.

Headquarters Comments

CS-311/05457-67, from another reliable source, reported that Charles and Herve Boyer, former Minister of Finance under Duvalier, were contending for power in the Haitian Government.

1. In the past several months, Charles has made numerous attempts to elicit support from several U.S. Government agencies for his plot against the Duvalier Government.

2. No reason was given for Charles' belief that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to support his scheme to overthrow Duvalier. However, he may be referring to his claim that should he become President of Haiti following the overthrow of Duvalier, he intends to pursue a pro-U.S. policy and establish a "liberal democratic" regime.

3. Source Comment: Cayard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles.

[illegible]
[illegible] May [illegible]
Case [illegible] ([illegible])

SUBJECT: New Messages from Clemard J. Charles/Current Haitian Exile Activities in New York City

1. On 20 May 1967, Louis A. Brun, President, B & B International Corporation, New York City, furnished the following information:

2. Clemard Joseph Charles, President, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, Port-au-Prince, claims that his military and civilian anti-Duvalier forces are organized in "strong cells ready to strike when the time arrives." He also claims to have supporters among Haitian exiles in the US and "on the islands surrounding Haiti."

3. Charles reiterated his previous assertion that he will depose Duvalier with or without the help of the US, but he would prefer to make contact with a "US liaison man in Port-au-Prince to speed up things."

4. The financial crisis deepens each day. Revenues are falling, and foreign capital continues to stay away. Attempts to sell Treasury bonds abroad and attract tourists have utterly failed. In an effort to attract foreign investment, Mr. Auguste, Haiti's former ambassador to the UN and recently appointed ambassador to West Germany, persuaded a businessman from Kuwait (name not given) to have an audience with President Duvalier on 25 May 1967 in order to discuss a business deal. Charles expects to be present on this occasion.

5. Duvalier is not well. In addition to diabetes, he has what Charles describes "arteriosclerosis psychosis." He is very much upset by the failure of his son-in-law, the Minister of Tourism, to sell Haiti to foreign tourists. He is also disturbed about the recent behavior of his other son-in-law, Lt. Col. Maximilien Dominique. According to Charles, Dominique incurred the presidential wrath by moving out of the palace with his wife and Mrs. Duvalier without Papa's permission. After Duvalier personally brought the party back to the palace, Dominique resigned his palace assignment via his wife. Duvalier angrily refused to accept the letter of resignation from his daughter saying that, "as long as I am the president, people cannot resign--they are fired."

201-357029

6. Charles states that Gracia Jacques, chief of the Presidential Guard, "will be needed in the execution of the plan." He feels that Jacques is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier and that he can be bought. Once the power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques "will be eliminated."

7. The banker further states that honest and competent citizens, who are also pro-US, will be brought into the government. Some of the exiles now in the US will be in the government.

8. Charles insists that he and his friends are strong enough on the domestic scene to do away with the Duvalier government "sooner or later." His greatest fear is that either Castro or Balaguer might interfere in Haiti's affairs following a coup against Duvalier. He earnestly hopes that the US will neutralize Castro and Balaguer. Charles is convinced that Duvalier and Balaguer are "close friends." He feels that the time has definitely come for the US Government to get in touch with him now in Port-au-Prince. If his wish is granted, he will divulge his plan (names, etc.) to the "liaison man."

9. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles had a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers was Dr. [illegible], an M.D. whose brother, a former Minister of Finance, was killed by Duvalier. Another exile in attendance was (fnu) Vixamar, who claims to be a legal adviser to the Republic of Chad. Vixamar, who is described by Brun as a mystic, stated, "I am going to be the next president of Haiti." Brun believes that the group calls itself "National Organization of Haitian Exiles." According to him, some of the members are now backing Charles' presidential aspirations.

10. Louis Léveque, a member of the Economic Planning Board of Haiti, a confidant of Charles', will come to New York City after a few days' stay in Miami, Florida, and Memphis, Tennessee. On 24 May 1967, Leveque will meet with representatives of the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad Street, NYC, to discuss the port modernization project of Port-au-Prince. According to Brun, Leveque has "some very important information relative to the Charles' plan."

NY-[illegible]
12 May 1967
Case 47,540 (Baupanel)

SUBJECT: Additional Information Concerning Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. Louis A. Brun, B and B International Corporation, 1133 Broadway, New York, NY, furnished the following additional information concerning new developments in Haiti and plans of Haitian banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, and his military and civilian associates to overthrow the Duvalier government.

2. Colonel Gaillard, Chief of the Haitian Coast Guard, is definitely one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Gaillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate with Charles. Gaillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, the economy of the country will be completely ruined and that Haitian exiles now being trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba may attempt to seize power. As a prosperous dairy farmer, whose wealth is estimated to be approximately US$1 million, Gaillard has a large stake in the future of Haiti. He feels that "patriots such as Charles and himself" must eliminate Duvalier and his henchmen.

3. Although Charles did not name Colonel Pierre Louis, officer in charge of the Casernes Dessalines, Port-au-Prince, as a fellow-conspirator, there is reason to believe that Louis knows and approves the plans to overthrow Duvalier. Charles and Louis are good friends; the banker was best man at the wedding of the Colonel's daughter. When the government was unable to pay Louis and his soldiers on time, on several occasions, Charles advanced money so that Louis and some of his trusted associates "could eat."

4. Engineer Louis Leveque, a member of the Economic Planning Board of Haiti, is also aware of Charles' plans. Leveque is a respected public figure who has made several trips to the US in an effort to obtain capital for the Haitian economy. He has given up all hope and is convinced that the Duvalier government must be eliminated.

5. Charles claims the support of a substantial segment of the clergy, intelligentsia, teachers, and students as well as peasants in the rural areas. As a devout Roman Catholic, he maintains a close relationship with the church authorities and also befriended Père [illegible] P. Gilles, Bishop Voegeli's successor at the Episcopalian Church's St. Trinite Cathedral in Port-au-Prince. In addition, he claims to have several important newspapermen on his payroll.

6. Charles is fully aware of the danger confronting him and his fellow-conspirators, but they are determined to "eliminate" Duvalier and his key supporters. Since Charles "controls" Casernes Dessalines through Colonel Louis, and the Coast Guard through Colonel Gaillard, he is confident that in the event of a successful coup by a military junta he and his associates will be able to round up the principal supporters of Duvalier. Although he has his man, Captain Preval, in the Presidential Guard, he realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed. Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of their coup. No definite date has yet been set for action, but Charles is convinced that the coup must be carried out "within the next few months" to save the country from economic and political chaos. In any case, Charles and especially his military friends feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

7. At present, Charles has no contact with Haitian exile groups. However, initial steps to establish a good relationship with exiles in the US have been taken. In early May 1967, Brun met Leslie Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in case of a final showdown with President Duvalier. Moreover, he promised to line up some of his fellow-exiles for Charles and his friends. Negotiations between Brun and Sansaricq are in progress.

8. Dr. Fourcand, an M.D. in Haiti, is no longer trusted by Duvalier. Now Duvalier and his family have the services of four doctors: Dr. Medard, an orthopedist; Dr. Tournay, another orthopedist; Dr. Bontemps, a general practitioner; and Dr. Marie-Therese Duplessi. Duvalier's dietitian is Mrs. Susie Scott Mahu. A male nurse, Turgo Saudi, is entrusted with taking periodic blood sugar tests of Duvalier. Saudi is well liked by the President, who made him a member of the Legislative Chamber.

9. Charles is of the opinion that Duvalier is determined to remain in Haiti and face any opposition from inside and outside the country. Although Duvalier is confident that he can meet any inside crisis, he has made a secret agreement with President Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. Duvalier asked for and was granted asylum in the Dominican Republic in the event his government is overthrown. The two presidents maintain close liaison through Andre Simon, a member of the Legislative Chamber in Haiti. Simon, who, according to Charles, is responsible for the murder of several anti-Duvalier persons in the Jacmel area, frequently travels in a jeep with diplomatic license plate between Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince. Simon received a diplomatic passport from Duvalier. While on business in Santo Domingo, he stays in the presidential palace.

10. It seems that the "battle of the sons-in-law" has been won by Foucard, Minister of Tourism. In early May 1967, Duvalier's other son-in-law, Dominique, who is an Army officer, moved out of the presidential palace together with his wife. They took up residence in Port-au-Prince but their independence did not last long. After a few days in their new home, President Duvalier and his bodyguards made a "friendly visit" to the Dominique home and took his daughter and son-in-law back to the presidential palace. Charles believes that Dominique is now virtually a prisoner. He also learned from those close to the palace that Duvalier either will appoint or has already appointed Dominique to a foreign diplomatic post, which amounts to "golden exile." At the same time Foucard continues to enjoy Duvalier's full confidence. He was allowed to visit New York City with his wife "to promote Haitian tourism." After an unsuccessful stay in the US, Foucard flew to Mexico City, where he was also unsuccessful in his bid to attract Mexican tourists; but as a consolation prize, he received a decoration from the Mexican government.

11. Charles made the following comments to Brum concerning certain individuals in Haiti:

a. Gracia Jacques, in charge of the Presidential Guard. No compromise with him in case of coup; he must be eliminated.

b. Luc Desir, head of Ton Ton Macoute. Must be eliminated.

c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance. He is an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has some "underground movement in Haiti." To be eliminated.

d. Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health. In early May 1967, he was in New York City to seek treatment of a serious brain tumor condition. A very sick man, he no longer has political aspirations.

e. General Gerard Constant, chief of staff. To be eliminated.

f. Theard, a former ambassador to the US. He is strongly pro-US. Charles "hopes" to give him a diplomatic post when he is in a position to do so.

g. Colonel Jacques Laroche, deputy chief of staff, "a convinced Communist." To be eliminated.

12. Charles stated that Dr. Laughlin, a US citizen, an M.D., who lives with his son in Port-au-Prince, is "an undercover agent for Duvalier." As one-time Laughlin was running a tannery for Duvalier; his son is now in charge of an extensive rice plantation.

13. If Charles receives no US help against Duvalier, he will act on his own. However, he knows that without US help (ammunition, weapons) it may take several months before he and his friends are ready to strike. During the interim period, he will endeavor to undermine the Duvalier government on the economic front. To be specific, he plans to tell his foreign friends connected with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that they must abandon the present regime to complete economic chaos. In addition to furnishing a copy of his memorandum addressed to Duvalier to the US ambassador in Haiti on the wrongdoings of Henri Siclait, president of the Haitian Tobacco and Match Monopoly, he gave copies to "foreign communists." Charles feels that once the "economic situation of Haiti is absolutely hopeless" he and his friends will be able to carry out the coup.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Clemard J. Charles

FROM:
Operational Support Staff, DCS
George S. Musulin:yj
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO. DCS Case 47,540 (Sensitive)

DATE: 16 May 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/DCSL			16/5/67
2. WH/7/Haiti (ATTN: Messrs. Gremillion and Ripley) 3 B 2630, Hqs.			WH
3.			
4. C/WH/7/RU		17 MAY 67	
5. DC/WH/7		17 MAY 1967	
6. C/WH/7			
7. WH/7/HAITI			W
8. Shari			
9. FI/ISR 2E03			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attachment: NY-419-67 w/encls.

2 & 4: Pass copy of this to Paul Harwood as he can keep abreast of the Charles affair.

2 to 8: Put in Charles' file.

Pls. file in Clemard J. Charles 201. 357029

FORM 8-64 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Case 47,540 (Reopened) New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

NY-419-67

Chief, New York Field Office(JIBalog/br)

15 May 1967

Director, DCS

ATT: ORS (Masalin)

Contacts:

Louis A. Brun
B & B International Corp.
New York, N. Y.

and

Edmond Vilaire
Commission Agent
Shipping Service
Box 916
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

A copy of this memorandum will be furnished to DO/NY.

Info contained herein is responsive to requirements of WH/H which "Major" Balog received from Ken Ripley. On 12 May 67, in telecon with Ken and his boss, Balog passed on portions of this memo. They requested this memo indicating that new info is "vital."

Info on stealing of UN funds comes from Brun's wife, an employee of the UNDP in NYC. Brun, who has been a contact of the FBI in NYC, on Haitian exile matters, decided not to tell his FBI contact about Charles' plans.

NY-419-67
15 May 1967
Case 47,540 (reopened)

SUBJECT: New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. On 11 May 67, Edmond Vilaire, a Haitian national, who operates a 352 ton converted LC as a cargo ship in Port-au-Prince, arrived in New York City. On 12 May 67 in the company of Louis A. Brun, B & B International Corp., New York City, he stated the following. (Letterhead of the Port-au-Prince firm is attached.)

2. President Duvalier has just transferred Captain Harry Tassy of the Presidential Guard to a rural post and replaced him with Major Coicou, who happens to be a good friend of Clemard Joseph Charles. Charles claims that through Coicou, he now has access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the palace and is in a position to carry out a coup "in the near future."

3. After an explosion near the palace in mid-April 1967, Duvalier quietly embarked upon a major shake-up in the military and the civil service. He dismissed or transferred a number of Army, Militia, and Ton Ton Macoute officers and civil servants, including those who had previously served in the presidential palace. To date no official announcements have been made concerning these important changes.

4. In addition to Captain Tassy, the following officers lost their positions in Port-au-Prince:

   a. Captain Laroche of the Presidential Guard; transferred to an unknown post outside the capital.

   b. Major Sony Borges of the Army; Borges, a confident of Duvalier, was in charge of radio propaganda. He used to see the president at least twice a day. Borges was transferred to a town in the northwest region of Haiti.

   c. Paul Verigain of the VSN.

5. Veriquin, who was in charge of the VSN in the Petionville section of Port-au-Prince, was dismissed by Duvalier because the President suspected him of siding with the Dominique clique. Dominique, an Army officer and son-in-law of Duvalier, was offered a military attache position either in Spain or Italy, which he refused to accept as his wife is reluctant to leave Haiti at this time. This situation is complicated by the decision of Duvalier's wife to side with her daughter. The rift in his own family as well as the attempt of his enemies to disrupt the celebration of his 60th birthday and the 10th anniversary of his taking office prompted Duvalier to remark that the only man he trusts is Gracia Jacques, commander of the Presidential Guard. This statement antagonized even those who have hitherto been loyal to Duvalier. Moreover, even the most faithful Duvalier supporters now fear for their lives. Colonel Caillard, who is in charge of the Coast Guard, bitterly complained to Charles about Duvalier's remark and reassured the banker that he and his friends were ready to set up a military junta.

6. In addition to the Coast Guard ships, Charles would have the use of Vilaire's converted LC, which normally plies the waters between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc. Vilaire is convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out the coup with or without foreign help and that his chances of success are good since several of the new Duvalier appointees to key military and civilian positions are Charles' friends. Vilaire feels that Charles must act now since the morale of many of the military and civilian supporters of Duvalier has reached an all-time low and the Haitian Treasury is almost empty. Since Duvalier has been unable to obtain foreign capital, he has again resorted, through his Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry Lebert Jean-Pierre, to a shake-down of commercial and industrial enterprises. In a circular letter, dated 2 May 67, the Secretary appealed for "voluntary contributions as a fitting homage to the Venerable President for Life, Chief of the Duvalierist Revolution." (A copy of the letter is attached.)

7. Jean-Pierre and Henri Siclait, confidants of Duvalier in charge of the Regie du Tabac and des Allumettes, are among the staunchest supporters of the president. Both men have stolen considerable amounts of public funds and succeeded in smuggling some of their money out of Haiti.

8. Secretary of State for Justice Rameau Estimé, who is a good friend of Captain Tassy, is in serious trouble. Estimé, a brother of a former president of Haiti, may lose his position. Since he himself has presidential ambitions, he may become a candidate for this office if he survives the present crisis.

9. Another potential rival for the presidency is Secretary of State for Labor and Social Welfare Max A. Antoine, who claims the support of the labor unions.

10. According to Vilaire, the wildest rumors are rampant in Haiti. For example, even intelligent persons give credence to the allegation that the US Government is not really anxious to see the downfall of Duvalier and that a portion of the US$40 million hitherto allocated to President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic as development loans was passed on, with the tacit consent of the US, to "Balaguer's good friend," Duvalier. Another rumor states that the CIA is now in the process of training Haitian exiles in the US for a possible invasion of Haiti. The name of Luc Fouche, a former Senator in Haiti and a former Ambassador to the US now in exile in New York City, has been mentioned as one of those receiving training in guerrilla warfare.

11. One of Vilaire's aims during his present visit to the US is to convince influential Haitian exiles that Charles is not a Duvalier supporter and that he would make a good president. Vilaire has already contacted, through Brun, Louis [illegible], a prominent anti-Duvalier exile in New York City, and hopes to meet other exile leaders.

12. Brun stated that the newly appointed representative of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) in Port-au-Prince, a Greek, has just returned to New York and stated that he will not go back to Haiti because he discovered that funds granted by the UNDP were "misappropriated by the Duvalier government."

13. Brun also asserted that an organization comprised of US citizens and calling itself the "Society for Haiti" will try to raise money for "nutrition, education, reforestation, cultural and economic developments in Haiti." Bonhomme, Haiti's ambassador to the US, is connected with this organization. An OAS mission is expected to be in Port-au-Prince this week and Bonhomme will be on hand. (A copy of a list of the names of persons supporting the Society for Haiti is attached.)

14. Engineer Louis Leveque, a member of the Haitian Economic Planning Board and a close friend of Charles', is expected in New York on or about 29 May 67 ostensibly to discuss port development projects of Port-au-Prince with the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad NYC. . The real purpose of his visit, however, is to contact US friends and Haitian exiles in an effort to gain support for Charles.

15. Charles and Brun talked on the phone 12 May 67. The banker stated that he is "tied down" in Port-au-Prince until the end of May, at which time he may make another business trip to the US.

16. Brun is firmly convinced that Charles has already made the decision to overthrow the Duvalier government with his friends and that he must act fast to prevent chaos and a possible Communist take-over. Vilaire and Brun agree that the political and economic situation in Haiti is such that "the population wants a change, any change, and would even welcome a Communist coup." They added that Charles and his military friends wish to prevent a Castro-supported Communist seizure of power.

[illegible]
SHIPPING SERVICE
BOX 618
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

[illegible]

PORT-AU-PRINCE, le 2 Mai 1967.-

Messieurs,

A l'occasion des grandioses manifestations commémoratives de l'AN X de la Révolution Duvaliériste, les forces vives de la Nation se sont associées pour donner à cette célébration toute l'ampleur qu'elle mérite.

A cet hommage que la Nation tient à rendre à Son Vénéré [illegible] à Vie [illegible] le Docteur François DUVALIER, digne Chef de la Révolution, il est louable que le Commerce et l'Industrie apportent leur participation effective.

C'est pourquoi, il vous est donné l'opportunité d'inviter les employés de votre entreprise à apporter eux aussi leur contribution suivant le barème ci-après.

De	5	à 200	Gourdes	: Gdes	5.00
De	201	à 500	Gourdes	: Gdes	10.00
De	501	à 1500	Gourdes	: Gdes	15.00
A partir de	1501		"	: Gdes	25.00

Il demeure entendu qu'il est laissé à vous individuellement, ainsi qu'à votre haut personnel, la liberté d'accomplir tout geste de générosité, le plafond de la contribution, en l'espèce demeurant illimité.

Les valeurs ainsi recueillies par vos soins, seront converties en chèques à l'ordre de la Secrétairerie d'Etat des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, accompagnées de la liste de votre personnel et transmises au Département du Commerce et [illegible]

Agréez, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Docteur [illegible]
Secrétaire d'Etat

Society for Haiti

Miss Ella F. Harllee - President of Educational Communities Association
John Paul Riddle - founder of American Airline/Riddle Airline/Embry Riddle University
Dr. Simpson - Economist (in Roosevelt's first Braintrust)
Dr. Hock - Economist
Col. King - Retired Executive with Park Service
Dr. deBessanyey - Retired ex President of Ociam University & Regent of Peru
Mrs. Denby - Editor of "Grace" Magazine
Ray Libeon - Developer Architect
Marshall Diggs - Attorney/past Comptroller General of U.S.

SECRET SENSITIVE

[illegible]

Case 47,540 (Reopened) New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

NY-419-67

Chief, New York Field Office(JIBalog/br)

15 May 1967

Director, DCS

ATT: OSS (Masulin)

Contacts:

Louis A. Brun
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New York, N. Y.

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Commission Agent
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SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-357029

SECRET

NY-419-67
15 May 1967
Case 47,540 (reopened)

SUBJECT: New Developments in Plans of Haitian Banker, Clemard Joseph Charles, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

1. On 11 May 67, Edmond Vilaire, a Haitian national, who operates a 352 ton converted LC as a cargo ship in Port-au-Prince, arrived in New York City. On 12 May 67 in the company of Louis A. Brun, B & B International Corp., New York City, he stated the following. (Letterhead of the Port-au-Prince firm is attached.)

2. President Duvalier has just transferred Captain Harry Tassy of the Presidential Guard to a rural post and replaced him with Major Coicou, who happens to be a good friend of Clemard Joseph Charles. Charles claims that through Coicou, he now has access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the palace and is in a position to carry out a coup "in the near future."

3. After an explosion near the palace in mid-April 1967, Duvalier quietly embarked upon a major shake-up in the military and the civil service. He dismissed or transferred a number of Army, Militia, and Ton Ton Macoute officers and civil servants, including those who had previously served in the presidential palace. To date no official announcements have been made concerning these important changes.

4. In addition to Captain Tassy, the following officers lost their positions in Port-au-Prince:

   a. Captain Laroche of the Presidential Guard; transferred to an unknown post outside the capital.

   b. Major Sony Borgs of the Army; Borgs, a confident of Duvalier, was in charge of radio propaganda. He used to see the president at least twice a day. Borgs was transferred to a town in the northwest region of Haiti.

   c. Paul Veriquin of the TTM.

SECRET SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. Veriquin, who was in charge of the TTM in the Petionville section of Port-au-Prince, was dismissed by Duvalier because the President suspected him of siding with the Dominique clique. Dominique, an Army officer and son-in-law of Duvalier, was offered a military attache position either in Spain or Italy, which he refused to accept as his wife is reluctant to leave Haiti at this time. This situation is complicated by the decision of Duvalier's wife to side with her daughter. The rift in his own family as well as the attempt of his enemies to disrupt the celebration of his 60th birthday and the 10th anniversary of his taking office prompted Duvalier to remark that the only man he trusts is Gracia Jacques, commander of the Presidential Guard. This statement antagonized even those who have hitherto been loyal to Duvalier. Moreover, even the most faithful Duvalier supporters now fear for their lives. Colonel Cailliard, who is in charge of the Coast Guard, bitterly complained to Charles about Duvalier's remark and reassured the banker that he and his friends were ready to set up a military junta.

6. In addition to the Coast Guard ships, Charles would have the use of Vilaire's converted LS, which normally plies the waters between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc. Vilaire is convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out the coup with or without foreign help and that his chances of success are good since several of the new Duvalier appointees to key military and civilian positions are Charles' friends. Vilaire feels that Charles must act now since the morale of many of the military and civilian supporters of Duvalier has reached an all-time low and the Haitian Treasury is almost empty. Since Duvalier has been unable to obtain foreign capital, he has again resorted, through his Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry Lebert Jean-Pierre, to a shake-down of commercial and industrial enterprises. In a circular letter, dated 2 May 67, the Secretary appealed for "voluntary contributions as a fitting homage to the Venerable President for Life, Chief of the Duvalierist Revolution." (A copy of the letter is attached.)

7. Jean-Pierre and Henri Sialait, confidants of Duvalier in charge of the Regie de Tabac and des Allumettes, are among the staunchest supporters of the president. Both men have stolen considerable amounts of public funds and succeeded in smuggling some of their money out of Haiti.

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8. Secretary of State for Justice Rameau Estimé, who is a good friend of Captain Tassy, is in serious trouble. Estimé, a brother of a former president of Haiti, may lose his position. Since he himself has presidential ambitions, he may become a candidate for this office if he survives the present crisis.

9. Another potential rival for the presidency is Secretary of State for Labor and Social Welfare Max A. Antoine, who claims the support of the labor unions.

10. According to Vilaire, the wildest rumors are rampant in Haiti. For example, even intelligent persons give credence to the allegation that the US Government is not really anxious to see the downfall of Duvalier and that a portion of the US$40 million hitherto allocated to President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic as development loans was passed on, with the tacit consent of the US, to "Balaguer's good friend," Duvalier. Another rumor states that the CIA is now in the process of training Haitian exiles in the US for a possible invasion of Haiti. The name of Luc Fouche, a former Senator in Haiti and a former Ambassador to the US now in exile in New York City, has been mentioned as one of those receiving training in guerrilla warfare.

11. One of Vilaire's aims during his present visit to the US is to convince influential Haitian exiles that Charles is not a Duvalier supporter and that he would make a good president. Vilaire has already contacted, through Brun, Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile in New York City, and hopes to meet other exile leaders.

12. Brun stated that the newly appointed representative of the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) in Port-au-Prince, a Greek, has just returned to New York and stated that he will not go back to Haiti because he discovered that funds granted by the UNDP were "misappropriated by the Duvalier government."

13. Brun also asserted that an organization comprised of US citizens and calling itself the "Society for Haiti" will try to raise money for "nutrition, education, reforestation, cultural and economic developments in Haiti." Bonhomme, Haiti's ambassador to the US, is connected with this organization. An OAS mission is expected to be in Port-au-Prince this week and Bonhomme will be on hand. (A copy of a list of the names of persons supporting the Society for Haiti is attached.)

[illegible] reported this 1 Mar 68

SECRET SENSITIVE

14. Engineer Louis Leveque, a member of the Haitian Economic Planning Board and a close friend of Charles', is expected in New York on or about 16 May 67 ostensibly to discuss port development projects of Port-au-Prince with the J. G. White Engineering Corporation, 80 Broad Street, NYC. The real purpose of his visit, however, is to contact US friends and Haitian exiles in an effort to gain support for Charles.

15. Charles and Brun talked on the phone 12 May 67. The banker stated that he is "tied down" in Port-au-Prince until the end of May, at which time he may make another business trip to the US.

16. Brun is firmly convinced that Charles has already made the decision to overthrow the Duvalier government with his friends and that he must act fast to prevent chaos and a possible Communist take-over. Vilaire and Brun agree that the political and economic situation in Haiti is such that "the population wants a change, any change, and would even welcome a Communist coup." They added that Charles and his military friends wish to prevent a Castro-supported Communist seizure of power.

Cable Address: EDVIL.

EDMOND VILAIRE

COMMISSION AGENT
SHIPPING SERVICE
BOX 916
PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

TEL. No. 3104

DEPARTEMENT DU COMMERCE ET DE L'INDUSTRIE

PORT-AU-PRINCE, Le 2 Mai 1967.-

Messieurs,

A l'occasion des grandioses manifestations commémoratives de l'AN X de la Révolution Duvaliériste, les forces vives de la Nation se sont associées pour donner à cette célébration toute l'ampleur qu'elle mérite.

A cet hommage que la Nation tient à rendre à Son Vénéré Président à Vie, Son Excellence le Docteur François DUVALIER, digne Chef de la Révolution, il est louable que le Commerce et l'Industrie apportent leur participation effective.

C'est pourquoi, il vous est donné l'opportunité d'inviter les employés de votre entreprise à apporter eux aussi leur contribution suivant le barème ci-après :

De 5 à 200 gourdes	: Gdes 5.00
De 201 à 500 gourdes	: Gdes 10.00
De 501 à 1500 gourdes	: Gdes 15.00
à partir de 1501 "	: Gdes 25.00.

Il demeure entendu qu'il est laissé à vous individuellement, ainsi qu'à votre haut personnel, la liberté d'accomplir tout geste de générosité, le plafond de la contribution, en l'espèce demeurant illimité.

Les valeurs ainsi recueillies par vos soins, seront converties en chèques à l'ordre de la Secrétairerie d'Etat des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, accompagnées de la liste de votre personnel et transmises au Département du Commerce et de l'Industrie.

Agréez, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Docteur L[illegible]-PIERRE
Secrétaire d'Etat

"Society for Haiti"

Miss Ella F. Harllee - President of Educational Communicati
Association
John Paul Riddle - founder of American Airline/Riddle Airline/Embry Riddle Universit
Dr. Simpson - Economist (in Roosevelts first Braintrust)
Dr. Hock - Economist
Col. King - Retired Executive with Park Service
Dr. deBessenyey - Retired 1st President of Ociam University & Represent
of Peru
Mis. Denby - Editor of "Grace" Magazine
Roy Mason - Developer Architect
Marshall Digs - Attorney/past Comptroler General of U.S.

NY 406-67
10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Plans of Haitian Banker Clemard Joseph Charles to Overthrow the Duvalier Government - Case 47,540 (Re-opened)

1. On 9 May 1967 Louis A. Brun, B&B International Corp., New York City, furnished the following information.

2. He and Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Banque Commerciale D'Haiti and President of the Chamber of Commerce of Haiti, have discussed in detail the possible overthrow of the Duvalier Government in the near future. During his visit to New York City in the first week of May, 1967, Charles stated that he is now ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, with or without the help of the United States Government. Charles further stated that he had rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti." In addition he will have, through his good friend Colonel Caillard, Chief of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats under his control. Caillard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles and is now ready to place the three boats, which carry cannons, at the disposal of Charles. The trouble is that Caillard does not have enough ammunition for the cannons. Charles hopes to obtain the necessary ammunition from the US Government. He would like to receive the ammunition from the US Carrier, BOXER, which has for some time been on duty in the Caribbean area. Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the US Government to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.

3. Besides Caillard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer. Charles and his military, as well as civilian, friends plan to set up a provisional Junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the Junta, Charles will run for President. He is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in rural areas. Charles claims that he "controls" Roman Catholic and Episcopalian clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militia figures in the rural areas who now wait for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

4. Charles is still pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier. However, he feels that his life is now in danger and unless he strikes first, he may fall victim to the President. His position has become shaky. In early 1967, at Duvalier's request, he submitted a memorandum to the President describing the wrong doing of Henri Siclait, who is in charge of the Regie de Tabac and Des Allumettes (tobacco and match industry),

[illegible]

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NY 406-67
Case 47,540 (Reopened)
page 2

but it appears that Duvalier took Siclait's side. According to Charles, Siclait has been successful in raising money for Duvalier and also had beautiful homes built for some of the President's key supporters. Charles stated that he had given a copy of his memorandum on Siclait to the US Ambassador in Port-au-Prince.

5. Although he has relationships with the US diplomatic service in Port-au-Prince, Charles expressed his desire to "cooperate with a Liaison Officer from the US". When asked to elaborate, he stated that it would be too dangerous to contact a US diplomat in Port-au-Prince; instead he would prefer to cooperate with "a Liaison man from the Pentagon."

6. Charles stated that as President he would pursue a pro-US policy, eliminating the Duvalier elements and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime. If he fails to receive US help in his effort to overthrow the present Haitian Government, he will still go ahead with the planning, but the execution of his scheme will take more time.

7. For the time being, Charles will continue to support the Duvalier government, in an effort to allay the suspicions of the President. Charles, in his capacity as the President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, will soon deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. Charles is anxious for the US Government to know that this is just a pretence, that he now is determined to go into action against the regime, and that he knows that he and his friends are facing an extremely difficult task.

SECRET SENSITIVE

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS-311/05457-67

SUBJECT Efforts by Haitian Civilians And Military to Gain Power In Haitian Government

DATE DISTR. 10 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. April 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 28 April 1967

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman who has lived in Haiti for a number of years and who is acquainted with high officials of the Haitian Government. He is an untested source. Source obtained this information from a high-level Haitian Government official.

1. Haitians Clemard Joseph Charles and Herve Boyer are contending for power in the Haitian Government, and each has hopes of succeeding President Francois Duvalier. Although they are working together and will join forces in order to get rid of Duvalier, they probably will start fighting between themselves once this objective is obtained.[1]

2. Colonel Jacques Laroche is the military's primary contender for power, and undoubtedly he will be the one to consolidate a military movement against Duvalier. Since the dismissal of high-ranking military officers by Duvalier in November and December 1966, Laroche has enjoyed the greatest power within the Army.[2]

3. If Duvalier is assassinated, it is likely that there will be bloodshed in the streets. In this event, it would be the Army who would step in immediately and control the situation. Despite the fact that the Army is small and weakened from its loss of high-ranking offficers, it still would be powerful enough to neutralize any effort by the Haitian militia (VSN) because the VSN is disorganized and would be unable to cope with the confusion which would be caused by an unnatural death of Duvalier. However, if Duvalier dies a natural death there would be less chance of hostilities because the people around Duvalier would have a better chance of taking power.

4. There is little chance that Duvalier will step down from power voluntarily because of his pride. However, in this respect his family, particularly Mrs. Duvalier, has constantly encouraged him to give up the presidency and appoint a successor.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	
		CINCSO #						

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CA/INT	2	WH/7/Ht	6	WHC/CA	1
CA/PROP	1	WH/PRIN	1	WHC/WAVE	1
WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1
		WHC/FI	1		

TOTALS IN 2, CI 2, FI 3, CA 3, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 7 (2), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

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CS-311/05457-67

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FORM NO. 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (20)

Headquarters Comments

1. Charles is president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, and Boyer is a former Minister of Finance under Duvalier. Another source, whose reporting has been infrequent, but considered reliable, has reported that Boyer has signed a contract to work with an international organization in Europe. If Boyer leaves Haiti, it is possible that he will forego his ambitions for power in the Haitian Government, or that his endeavors will be hampered seriously by his absence from the country.

2. Laroche is Deputy Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces. His ambitious and corrupt character, and his overtures toward Duvalier, have gained him his power within the Army over the placid, easy-going General Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army. For biographic information on Laroche see CSIT-313/00918-67.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 201-351629

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/01428-67

SUBJECT Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles, President of the Commercial Bank Of Haiti, to Overthrow the Duvalier Government

DATE DISTR. 22 May 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (9 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince. Source reports infrequently, but his information is believed to be reliable. He received the information from a person close to Charles.

1. In discussing the possibility of overthrowing the Duvalier Government in the near future, Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, said he now is ready to execute his long-planned scheme to seize power with his military and civilian friends in Port-au-Prince, with or without the help of the U.S. Government.[1] If he fails in his efforts to obtain U.S. support for his plan, Charles still intends to go ahead with the plot, but he said the execution of his scheme will take more time. However, Charles believes that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to give him all necessary help in his effort to get rid of President Duvalier who has brought Haiti to the brink of total economic collapse.[2]

2. Charles said that he has rifles and hand grenades hidden "somewhere in Haiti" and that through his good friend Colonel Octave Cayard,[3] commander of the Haitian Coast Guard, three Haitian boats, which carry cannons, will be under his control. Cayard cannot furnish enough ammunition for the cannons, but Charles hopes to obtain the necessary amount from the U.S. Government. He would like to get the ammunition from the U.S. aircraft carrier, BOXER, which has been on duty in the Caribbean area for some time.

3. Besides Cayard, Charles has the support of an unnamed high-ranking Haitian Army officer.* Charles and his military and civilian friends plan to set up a provisional junta and get rid of the "enemies of Haiti," that is, Duvalier and his supporters. After the consolidation of power in the hands of the junta, Charles plans to run for President and is convinced that he can win since he has many supporters in Port-au-Prince as well as in the rural areas of Haiti. Charles claims that he "controls" the Catholic and Episcopal clergy, teachers and students, several businessmen, and key militiamen in the rural areas who are waiting for his signal to overthrow the present regime.

* Per Memo fo Record dated 16 May 1967 - (EVMEWD-1) Capt. Walter Reevar

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 2
		CINCSO #						I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

(DDC (unn) EVMEWD-1)

CA/INT	2	WH/7/Ht	4	WHC/MO	1			TX-1176 NP (NRS) CSDB-312/01428-67
CA/PROP	1	WH/FRJH	2	WHC/WAVE	1			
WH/R	1	WHC/FI	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) 1				
		WHC/CA	1					COORDINATING / RELEASING HK ELV/BEB DHG
TOTALS IN 2, CI 2, FI 3, CA 3, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 5 (2), DO/H 1.				LIAISON *				

4. Charles has stated that should he become President of Haiti, he would pursue a pro-U.S. policy, eliminating the Duvalierists and the Communists and establishing a "liberal democratic" regime.

5. Charles still is pretending to be a loyal supporter of Duvalier; however, his position has become shaky and he believes that his life is in danger. He feels that he may fall victim to Duvalier unless he (Charles) strikes first. For the time being, Charles will continue to support Duvalier in an effort to allay the President's suspicions. As president of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, Charles soon will deliver a speech praising the achievements of Duvalier. He is anxious for the U.S. to know that his overtures toward Duvalier are pretense and that he is determined to go into action against the present regime.

Headquarters Comments

CS-311/05457-67, from another reliable source, reported that Charles and Herve Boyer, former Minister of Finance under Duvalier, were contending for power in the Haitian Government.

1. In the past several months, Charles has made numerous attempts to elicit support from several U.S. Government agencies for his plot against the Duvalier Government.

2. No reason was given for Charles' belief that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to support his scheme to overthrow Duvalier. However, he may be referring to his claim that should he become President of Haiti following the overthrow of Duvalier, he intends to pursue a pro-U.S. policy and establish a "liberal democratic" regime.

3. Source Comment: Cayard, who enjoys the confidence of Duvalier, is a secret ally of Charles.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/01625-67

SUBJECT Further Plans of Clemard Joseph Charles To Overthrow the Haitian Government; His Military Supporters and His Bids For Support from Haitian Exiles

DATE DISTR. 8 June 1967

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Mid-late May 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (15, 22 May 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A foreign businessman with wide contacts in Port-au-Prince who is believed to report accurately what he learns. This information was obtained from a close friend of Charles who probably was aware that it would reach U.S. officials.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti, claims that since Maj. Coicou (fmu),[1] a close friend, has replaced Capt. Harry Tassy in the Presidential Guard, he (Charles) now has an access to arms and ammunition in the basement of the Palace and is in a position to carry out a coup against President Francois Duvalier "in the near future." Although no definite date has been set yet for the coup, Charles is convinced that it must be carried out "within the next few months" to save Haiti from economic and political chaos. Charles, and especially his military friends, feel that 1967 is the year of decision.

2. Although Col. Pierre-Louis (fmu),[2] commander of the Dessalines Barracks, was not named as a fellow-conspirator, Charles believes that Pierre-Louis knows of and approves his plans to overthrow Duvalier, and that he (Charles) "controls" the Dessalines Barracks through Pierre-Louis. Col. Octave Caillard is one of the key military figures on whom Charles pins his hopes. Caillard is thoroughly disillusioned with Duvalier and is willing to cooperate. Caillard fears that if Duvalier remains in power, Haiti's economy will be completely ruined and Haitian exiles receiving guerrilla training in Cuba may attempt to seize power in Haiti.

3. Charles has the support of Capt. Preval (fmu),[3] of the Presidential Guard, and realizes that high-ranking officers loyal to Duvalier could cause bloodshed; Charles and his associates expect violence during the initial stages of the coup.

4. In addition to ships of the Haitian Coast Guard, Charles now has the use of a 352-ton converted landing craft (LC) which normally sails between Jamaica and Port-au-Prince carrying flour, fuel oil, etc.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 2
		CINCSO #						[illegible]

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".) (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/IC	1	AF/345/R	2	WHC/FI	1	TX-1188 HRS (HQS: EVMEND-1) CSDB-312/01625-67
CI/OP/WH	1	WH/R File	1	WHC/CA	1	
		WH/R	1	WHC/MO	1	
CA/INT	2	WH/7/HR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	
CA/PROP	1	WH/PRIN	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1	COORDINATING: CI/[illegible] RELEASING: HK/ FJM[illegible], DOS
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, AF 2, WH/COG 3 (1), WH 5 (2), DO 1.		LIAISON	*		

5. Charles had no contact with Haitian exile groups until early May 1967, when he sent an emissary to New York City to talk to Louis Sansaricq, a prominent anti-Duvalier exile, whose entire family was killed by Duvalier's henchmen. Sansaricq agreed to support Charles in a final showdown with Duvalier and promised to line up some of his fellow exiles to support Charles. A close friend of Charles was planning to go to New York in mid-May 1967 ostensibly to discuss port development projects in Port-au-Prince with a U.S. construction firm; however, the real purpose of the trip is to contact Haitian exiles to gain their support for Charles.

6. On 19 May 1967, a group of prominent Haitian exiles held a meeting in New York City to celebrate Haitian Flag Day. One of the organizers of the meeting was Dr. Jumelle (fnu),[4] a medical doctor whose brother was a former Haitian Minister of Finance and who was killed by Duvalier. Another exile who attended the meeting was Vixamar (fnu)[5] who claims to be a legal advisor to the Republic of Chad and who said that he was going to be the next president of Haiti. The group of Haitian exiles, believed to call itself the "National Organization of Haitian Exiles", has some members who back Charles.

7. Following are prominent Haitians who Charles believes must be eliminated after the coup:

   a. Col. Gracia Jacques of the Presidential Guard - Jacques, who is no longer blindly loyal to Duvalier, will be needed in the execution of the coup, and can be bought; however, once power is in the hands of a military junta and Charles, Jacques will be eliminated.

   b. Luc Desir, head of the Tonton-Macoute.

   c. Clovis Desinor, Minister of Finance - an "anarchist" with presidential aspirations who has an "underground movement in Haiti."

   d. Gen. Gerard Constant, Chief of Staff.

   e. Col. Jacques Laroche, Deputy Chief of Staff - a "convinced Communist."

8. If the coup is successful, Charles hopes to give Andre Theard, former Haitian Ambassador to the United States, a diplomatic post; Theard is strongly pro-U.S. Charles regards Gerard Philippeaux, Minister of Health, as a very sick man with no further political aspirations.

9. Close friends of Charles are convinced that Charles has no choice but to carry out a coup with or without foreign help, and that his chances of success are good because several of Duvalier's new appointees to key positions are friends of Charles; also, that Charles must act soon because the morale of many of Duvalier's military and civilian supporters has reached an all-time low and because the Haitian Treasury is almost empty.

Headquarters Comments

1. Coicou may be Maj. Serge Coicou.

2. Probably Lt. Col. Luc Pierre-Louis.

3. Another source has identified Preval as Capt. Walter Preval.

4. Probably Dr. Gaston Jumelle.
5. Probably Henri Vixamar.

CSDB-312/01428-67 recently reported other plans of Clemard Joseph Charles.

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ACTION

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

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DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE, DO BASE/NEW YORK

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REF DIRECTOR 98884

B. UFGT 19382

1. ON 4 MAY 1967, EVLOFT-1 LEARNED FROM CONSUL EUGENE MAXIMILIEN THAT CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES IS IN NEW YORK CITY ATTEMPTING BORROW MONEY ON GOH BONDS. ACCORDING TO MAXIMILIEN, PRESIDENT DUVALIER HAS INSTRUCTED CHARLES TO ADVANCE $50,000 FROM ONA (SOCIAL SECURITY) FUNDS FOR PURCHASE OF CARS FOR TOURISM DEPARTMENT. MAXIMILIEN STATED THAT ALTHOUGH ONA SUPPOSEDLY HAS $425,000 IN CASH, CHARLES HAS ALREADY ADVANCED $125,000 AND CANNOT FIND ENOUGH CASH TO MEET DUVALIER'S REQUEST. BECAUSE OF THIS, CHARLES IS SCARED TO RETURN HAITI ESPECIALLY IF PRESENT NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. CHARLES IS ALSO WORRIED THAT HE MAY NOT BE ABLE DEPART HAITI.

2. MAXIMILIEN ALSO SAID THAT FRITZ GREGER, DUVALIER TROUBLE-SHOOTER, NOW IN NEW YORK AND WAS INVOLVED IN COUNTERFEITING HAITIAN STAMPS AND MONEY AND HAS BEEN BANISHED FROM HAITI. EVLOFT-1 OPINES THAT HIS STORY FALSE AND GREGER

SECRET

201-357029

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 7327 S E C R E T

ACTUALLY IN NEW YORK OBTAIN INFO HAITIAN EXILES. SECRET

3. JMWAVE FORWARDING UNDER REF B COPY OF DOCUMENT PREPARED BY PRESIDENT OF BANK OF HAITI, ANTONIO ANDRE, FOR TREAGER BROS AND ASSOCIATES, MIAMI EXPORTERS, WHICH OUTLINES FINANCIAL SITUATION OF HAITI AS OF 26 DECEMBER 1966. EVLOFT-1 OBTAINED DOCUMENT FROM TRAEGER BROS WITH WHOM HE HAS PERSONAL CONTACT. TRAEGER BROS APPARENTLY APPROACHED FOR HELP IN PROPOSED GOH $2 MILLION BOND ISSUE, BUT HAS NOT RESPONDED. THE DOCUMENT WAS PASSED TO STATION ON 4 MAY.

4. INDEX CHARLES, GREGER, ANDRE.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

SECRET

4 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation with Genevieve Alyea (Domestic Contact Service) re Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1600 hours, 26 April 1967, Genevieve Alyea, DCS, (Green Phone 3024) relayed the following message to the undersigned, re Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

2. Today the DCS Headquarters received the following teletype from Mr. BALOG, New York City DCS representative, from Luis A. BRUN, President of B&B International Corporation, New York City.

A. Haiti's financial situation is now catastrophic. All efforts by President DUVALIER to attract foreign capital have failed. Domestic financial resources exploited through threats, extortion, etc. are rapidly drying up and unless the Government receives foreign help, it faces complete financial ruin.

B. In another effort to raise money abroad, DUVALIER gave permission to Banker Clemard Joseph CHARLES to visit the United States and contact his business friends there. (See Cases 40570 & 40576). CHARLES' visit to the U.S. is scheduled on or about 9 May 1967, at which time he will contact his business partner, Joseph DRYER, in Miami.

C. According to BRUN, CHARLES also plans to go to Washington where he wants to tell "U.S. Government officials in strict confidence that he is ready and able to overthrow DUVALIER's regime provided he receives U.S. help." BRUN will fly to Miami to meet CHARLES and will, in turn, tell "Capt. BALOG" about the results of CHARLES' efforts.

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201-357029

3. There is a possibility that CHARLES will also come to New York City. If he does, BRUN and Capt. BALOG will discuss the latest developments with him.

4. During the past few days, CHARLES and BRUN have been in almost daily telecommunications, ostensibly discussing business matters. Using certain code words previously agreed upon in person, CHARLES is able to tell BRUN about the recent situation in Haiti without arousing the suspicions of Haitian phone censorship. Parts of the information contained in Paragraph 1 was received from CHARLES by BRUN during their teleconversation on 25 April 1967.

Wilma R. Van Scoy

Genevieve Alyea stated she would obtain copies of the DCS reports referred to in Para. 2-B above and call the Haiti Desk on 27 April 1967.

SECRET

3 May 1967

Requirements for BALOG Contact With Clemard Joseph Charles

A. Basic Points To Be Stressed:

1. The U.S. Government cannot make any commitment of support to Clemard Joseph Charles.

2. Clemard Charles should not infer, imply or boast of U.S. support in his attempts to gain support for his project. The U.S.G. does not wish to be accused of overthrowing other governments.

3. Charles should be told, however, that any information concerning his plans, intentions and movements will not under any circumstances be divulged to the GOH nor to other countrymen of his.

4. Balog and his friends are definitely interested in Charles' activities and information he can provide relative to the situation in the latter's country.

B. Specific Requirements Relative to His Plans Since he Claims to Have Certain Capabilities:

1. What elements or groups within the GOH, the military and police do you have actually committed to your plan of overthrowing Papa Doc (Duvalier)?

2. Give the strength of each group? Names of leaders?

3. When do you plan to execute your project?

4. How do you intend to handle the situation with regard to the Presidential Guard, the Dessalines troops and the police in Port au Prince?

5. In the execution of your scheme what is the extent of violence foreseen?

6. What connection do you have with exiles and where?

7. In case you decide to act would you notify Mr. Brun beforehand?

SECRET

C. Other Requirements:

1. What is the true evaluation of Papa Doc's health?

2. Who are his personal doctors?

3. In view of the deteriorating economy of the country do you think Papa Doc will step down and depart?

4. What is the reason or circumstances for the recent dismissals and transfers of junior officers within the military?

5. In a struggle for power what would be the situation between Lt Col Max Dominique and Luc Fourcard? Are these two individuals part of your scheme?

6. What part would Gracia Jacques, Luc Desir, Clovis Desinor, Gerard Philippeaux and General Constant play in case Papa Doc goes or there is a power struggle?

7. What part would the people outside of Port au Prince play in an attempt of an overthrow? What groups in the interior and other cities would begin fighting each other at this juncture?

SECRET

1 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Telephone Conversation with Genevieve ALYEA, DCS, re Clemard Joseph CHARLES

1. At 1530 hours, the DCS Hqs. representative, Genevieve ALYEA (Green phone 3024), relayed the following message received this date from the DCS New York office, Mr. BALOG:

2. The "EARL" referred to in my previous message is Earl SMITH, former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba and a friend of the KENNEDYS. SMITH, who was approached by Joseph DRYER, florida businessman, to take Haitian banker Clemard Joseph CHARLES to the State Department, refused to do so. In turn, DRYER contacted Paul ROGERS, Congressman from Florida, who agreed to talk with Senator Ted KENNEDY. According to Luis A. BRUN, KENNEDY agreed to make an appointment for CHARLES at the State Department.

3. Last night (presumably 30 April), CHARLES flew from Port au Prince to New York City. He is staying at the Lincoln Square Motor Inn, Suite 1002-1003, SU-7-6800, until Wednesday (3 May) when he plans to go to Washington and Miami.

4. Also, last night, Luc Albert FOUCARD, son-in-law of President DUVALIER who is Minister of Tourism, and his wife arrived in New York City. They are staying at the Waldorf Astoria, EL 5-3000.

5. Allan COLTON, part owner of Haiti International Leather Corp, Port au Prince, a Canadian national who requested an interview with Capt. BALOG, flew back to Haiti yesterday. He told us (DCS) that his efforts to sell Haitian treasury bonds in the United States and Canada were unsuccessful.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

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25 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Melville Osborne
ARA/CAR
Department of State

Per our telephone conversation, there follows a copy of the message from Ambassador TIMMONS, dated 22 April 1967, concerning Clemard Joseph CHARLES:

> "As Department and CIA Washington are well aware, CHARLES has inordinate ambitions and has several times in past taken similar line. In my judgment he is again fishing to see if he can attract some form of U.S. Government support. We are most circumspect here in dealing with CHARLES and I am sure Washington is handling in same fashion. Ambassador asks this message be shown to LONG AND OSBORNE, ARA/CAR, State."

Original & 1 - addressee
1 - WH/7/Haiti Chrono
① - Clemard Joseph CHARLES 201

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201-357029

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24 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Genevieve ALYEA, Domestic Contact Service re CLemard Joseph CHARLES (201-357029)

1. At 1500 hours, 21 April 1967, Miss Genevieve ALYEA, Domestic Contact Service, X3026 (Green Phone 3024) called the undersigned to inform the Haiti Desk of comments made on a teletype message from their DCS representative in New York City, Mr. BALOG. According to Miss ALYEA, Mr. BALOG had interviewed a U.S. businessman who travels frequently in Latin American (later identified as Luis BRUN), on conditions in Haiti. Mr. BALOG had teletyped the report to DCS Headquarters, and had added the following comment at the end of the report.

"On 20 April, Mr. BALOG in New York City, interviewed the source (BRUN). The source visited Port au Prince during the latter part of February 1967 and spent one week as the guest of CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES (President of the Commercial Bank of Haiti). Source, who maintains telephone and cable contact with CHARLES, is convinced the latter (CHARLES) has decided with his unnamed Army friends, to overthrow President DUVALIER now. Source says CHARLES had asked his U.S. business partner, Joseph DRYER, Palm Beach, Florida (Home phone: 655-2610; Business phone: 832-6331) and another person identified as "EARL" (probably Earl O. FINNEY, AID official) to get in touch with the U.S. State Department before the end of this week. "EARL", who is supposed to have influential friends at the State Department, will try to persuade the U.S. Government that CHARLES, who has presidential aspirations, now has the power and determination to get rid of DUVALIER. CHARLES, who now fears for his life, sent his son to New York City a few weeks ago for a medical checkup and advised him to remain in the U.S."

2. Mr. BALOG then referred to Paragraph 6 of the intelligence report which contained the following question and answer:

Question: What is your assessment of youths, their political orientation or lack of one and their general outlook for the future?

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Source Anwer: Students, as well as educated persons, listen regularly to two foreign radio broadcasts -- one emanating from the United States and one from Cuba. The Cuba station, which emphasizes Communist ideology, appears to be popular with the intelligencia and students while the "man-in-the street" prefers the U.S. broadcasts.

3. Mr. BALOG then commented regarding paragraph 2 above as follows:

"The radio station mentioned above is located somewhere in Massachusetts, according to our source and his Haitian friends in New York City. The believe it is a CIA operation."

4. Clemard Joseph CHARLES' Army friends mentioned above may possibly include Jacques LAROCHE, Deputy Chief of Staff.

5. At 1630 hours, the undersigned contacted Miss ALYEA to obtain additional information from Mr. BALOG concerning his interview with BRUN. Unfortunately, Mr. BALOG put the above message on the teletype and then departed for the weekend and will not be available for recontact until Monday, 24 April 1967.

Wilma R. Van Scoy
Wilma R. VAN SCOY

Distribution:
Original - 201-357029
1 - WH/7/Haiti Memo file
1 - 36-9-10

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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S E C R E T 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4390

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

PRIN

22 Apr 67 IN 51252

AN 74	25	FI/ISR
~~DO~~	~~BCM~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

REF: DIRECTOR 95076

1. REF SHOWN TO AMBASSADOR MORNING 22 APRIL.

2. FOLL FROM AMBASSADOR: AS DEPT AND WOFACT WASHINGTON WELL AWARE, CHARLES HAS INORDINATE AMBITIONS AND HAS SEVERAL TIMES IN PAST TAKEN SIMILAR LINE. IN MY JUDGMENT HE IS AGAIN FISHING TO SEE IF HE CAN ATTRACT SOME FORM OF USG SUPPORT. WE ARE MOST CIRCUMSPECT HERE IN DEALING WITH CHARLES AND I AM SURE WASHINGTON IS HANDLING IN SAME FASHION.

3. AMBASSADOR ASKS THIS MSG BE SHOWN TO LONG AND OSBORNE, ARA/ CAR, *STATE.

S E C R E T *BEING SERVICED

SECRET

ET

22 APR 67

201-357029

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

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ORIG: R.LEIMAN:sld
UNIT: WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 April 1967

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☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-357029

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, SOD 6, CS/SG 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4

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SECRET 21 23 18 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95076

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE

[redacted]

AN 71		FI/ISR
ABSTRACT		

1. ON 21 APRIL, ANOTHER WOFACT COMPONENT PASSED FOLLOWING INFO RE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES WHICH OBTAINED FROM SOURCE WHO IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH CHARLES. SOURCE CLAIMS HE SPENT WEEK LATTER PART FEBRUARY AS GUEST CHARLES IN PORT AU PRINCE.

2. SOURCE REPORTED 20 APRIL HE CONVINCED CHARLES HAS DECIDED OVERTHROW DUVALIER NOW WITH AID FROM UNNAMED ARMY FRIENDS. SOURCE STATED CHARLES HAD REQUESTED U.S. BUSINESS PARTNER AND ANOTHER FRIEND TO GET IN TOUCH WITH STATE DEPARTMENT "BEFORE END OF WEEK" TO PERSUADE U.S. GOVT THAT CHARLES ~~HOW~~ NOW HAS THE POWER AND DETERMINATION TO GET RID OF DUVALIER. SOURCE ALSO REPORTED THAT CHARLES, WHO FEARS FOR HIS LIFE, SENT HIS SON TO NYC FEW WEEKS AGO FOR MEDICAL CHECKUP WITH INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN IN U.S.

3. SOURCE ABOVE INFO NOT AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER QUESTIONING PRIOR 24 APRIL. HQS PASSING INFO TO MR. OSBORNE OF STATE DEPT. ACOS PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

21 APR 67
201-357029

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Port au Prince WHC

SUBJECT
Operational/Contact with Clemard Joseph Charles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-357029

Reference: PORT AU PRINCE 4342

1. On 8 January 1967 Subject again made contact with RACHFIELD. Contact was established through one of Subject's assistants who came to RACHFIELD's home at approximately 1750 hours on 7 April 1967. Subject's assistant asked RACHFIELD if he would like to borrow some books on the history of Haiti and if so he could go to Subject's home and make a selection. RACHFIELD, in order to stall for time to affect the proper coordination, stated he would be able to proceed to Subject's home the following afternoon at 1600 hours. On the morning of 8 April RACHFIELD touched base with both the COS and Chief, LAPURE who agreed that RACHFIELD should go to see Subject.

with assistant?

2. Subject was expecting RACHFIELD and apologized to RACHFIELD for not proceeding to RACHFIELD's home himself but explained that he was afraid RACHFIELD may have had guests. He proceeded to tell RACHFIELD that the economy of Haiti was in a deplorable condition and that noone can tell the President what to do. He then left the room and returned a minute later with a copy of "Le Moniteur", the official Haitian newspaper, which, he said, would not be released until sometime the following week. This newspaper stated that the Haitian Government plans to pay for the minting of new silver coins. Subject was very upset because, he stated, the Haitian Government cannot afford such an expense. The newspaper was turned over to LAPURE.

gold +

/continued/

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2-Chief, WHD

CS COPY

201-357029

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-2011	DATE 11 April, 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

3. Subject once again reiterated to RACHFIELD that he was willing to answer any questions. He also stated that he hoped that the outgoing Chief, LARUKA would inform the incoming Chief, LAPUKA that he is most willing to cooperate with LAHAAP because he believes that the salvation of his country depends on such cooperation.

4. Case Officer Comments. Charles appeared much more at ease during this meeting than he did at the previous one. It appeared as though he actually wanted to talk to someone and knew that he could trust RACHFIELD not to leak the conversation to the GOH. RACHFIELD, once again, left the door wide open for future conversations.

Francis D. Rachfield
Matthew H. CHUBB

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Port au Prince

SUBJECT: Summary of LNPURE Traces on Clemard Joseph CHARLES

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 85314, 21 March 1967

1. A dark negro about 5'7" tall, Clemard Joseph L. Charles was born at Gonaives, Haiti, on 21 April 1923. According to himself, his father was a professor and his mother a "simple peasant". According to others he is sensitive about his origins and is reported to have changed his name from Canerien because of the connotation of nothingness implied in the name. His father is variously reported to have been a carpenter and a peasant. He received his primary education at the parochial school and graduated from the Lycee Geffrard in Port au Prince in 1939. According to his own account he taught in rural schools, worked as a pathologist, upholsterer, time-keeper, plantation supervisor, and free-lance journalist. In 1947 he was appointed Controller General of Haitian Southern Banana Industry and in 1948 became General Agent. The following year he established himself as Manufacturer's Representative and created his own export and import business. In 1953 he went to London as a member of the Economic Mission of the Haitian Government, and in 1954 negotiated on the Haitian Government's behalf a contract with the General Electric Co., Ltd. of Coventry, England for the modernizing and extending of the telecommunications system of Haiti. He later said that both his ventures into the banana and telecommunications businesses were unsuccessful due to political interference. His success story, according to a U.S. official "apparently hinges on the fact that he feels that he has achieved stature in the community both socially and politically". Charles states that he created the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti (CH) in 1960 and is now the sole owner. The

/Continued/

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2-Chief, WHD

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201-357029

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HTPA-2005

DATE
29 March 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

principal officer in Charles' bank when the bank was opened in 1960 with Charles as president was an American citizen in the savings and loan business named ZOLIN (fnu), who was later indicted, convicted and jailed in the United States for using the mails to defraud. Another original partner of the bank, one Gerald F. CONNOLLY, allegedly from Chicago, Illinois has a criminal record and various jail sentences and convictions. Neither Zolin or Connolly are currently signatories to the bank, nor partners. The bank is reported to have a very poor portfolio of loans since, according to rumor, the loans have been made to government officials on the basis of their signature and without proper collateral. Besides the bank, he is also full or part owner of several other industrial and commercial enterprises in Haiti and is the sole representative in Haiti of the General Electric Co., Ltd., London England, and the Siemens Schukert Werke, Germany. He is Director of Port Concession (after Mohammud Fayed departed) and also took over the oil refinery concession which originally belonged to Valentine. (Now involved in litigation with AID over their investment guarantee.)

2. Charles is President of the Chamber of Commerce, and also belongs to several other commercial and civic organizations including the Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Sections of Haiti, the International Club of Commerce of Haiti, the Commerce and Industry Association of New York, and the Rotary Club. (According to a report of March 1967 he was dropped from the last club in 1966 for non-attendance.)

3. In March 1967 he was forced to give up his interest in a number of smaller concerns (Sonafrugo, Haitian Tobacco, Haitian International Leather, etc.) but retained his monopoly of the insurance business and the bank as well as his individually owned export-import business.

4. Although it is obvious that Clemard Joseph Charles has been a favorite of President Duvalier, the recent changes in his financial empire indicate a loss of trust. The economy is in such a poor shape that Charles is not making as much out of his enterprises and the money and credit squeeze is hitting him as well as the rest of the more honest businessmen in Haiti. As symbols of past favor Charles has been decorated with the Order of Petion and Bolivar (Commander), the Order of Agricultural Merit (Commander), Knight of the National Order "Honor and Merit", Officer of the Labor Order, and Commander of the Civil Merit Order.

5. One well-informed high United States official reported in early 1963 that Charles was a "slippery character" but that some doubt existed concerning his importance or political significance within the regime. A few months after this estimate was made, Charles conversed with a US Embassy official. Throughout their talk he showed an obvious desire to demonstrate his total political disinterest in the past while simultaneously hinting that he could become a political figure in the near future. He made guarded statements about the Duvalier regime, unhesitatingly giving the impression that he was the President's friend, both through desire and necessity, but that he definitely did not agree with some of the government's policies. He attributed his support of the current government to the fact that it would be dangerous for a Haitian to withhold it. The following month (May 1963), on a business trip to the United States, Charles told a former US journalist that he was in a position to become head of a provisional government after Duvalier was removed from the scene. He expressed a belief that the President was ready to institute a reign of terror and that he was willing to accept Soviet aid. In the opinion of the journalist, Charles firmly believed that this was the last chance for the United States to help establish a democratic Haiti, friendly toward the United States, and save the country from a Castro-type Communist takeover. Charles said that although he was on good terms with the President, he felt

/continued/

that he had gone crazy and must be stopped before he liquidated the opposition. Charles talked freely of his wide range of support (peasants; forcibly retired, anti-Duvalier army officers; intellectuals; journalists and businessmen) and of the prominent individuals who were anti-Duvalier and ready to back "my government". He added that if he did not become Provisional President he would be satisfied with the post of Secretary of Finance and Economic Affairs. In addition to his having reached the constitutional age requirement for President (40), Charles gave as another qualification the fact that he was of "100 per cent black origin," noting that only those in this category could win the presidency.

6. Charles said that if he were to be President he would need the "moral and economic help of the US Government and people" to transform Haiti into a true and prosperous democracy. He noted that he would need about a year to put into effect his "plan for the economic and social development of Haiti", which included the following points: creation of a balanced economy adapted to Haitian conditions; and modernization of agriculture. He said that he would like to present this plan to US officials for their consideration.

7. Charles endeavors to attract US venture capital for various Haitian projects and claims to be thoroughly pro-United States. He is reported to be an honorary citizen of the city of Long Beach, Long Island, New York, having promoted a "sister city" relationship with that town and Port au Prince; in 1962 he reportedly received the key to the City of New York. He has visited the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe many times on business trips. In July 1964 Charles traveled to Mexico and the United States, ostensibly to discuss the establishment of a sisal cordage factory in Haiti, but in reality to obtain 30 surplus T-28 trainer aircraft. Charles subsequently was reported to be attempting to purchase 24 US surplus naval craft for Haiti's armed forces.

8. He is married to Sophie, nee Lherisson, and has an adopted son.

9. Personality. Charles is generally considered as shrewd but not intelligent. This is borne out by his willingness to cooperate with the international swindler, Mohammed Fayed in a number of money-making schemes which came to a grinding halt when Fayed absconded with an undetermined but large amount of money. He has little sense of economic realities and is apparently sensitive about his knowledge or lack thereof. The Embassy reported in December 1965 that at a meeting Duvalier was holding with Antonio Andre (President of the National Bank of Haiti - BNRH) that Andre should be made to divert some of the "coffee money" from the National Bank to Duvalier's own needs. (Apparently Charles was referring to certain taxes on coffee exports which go to the Bank for debt amortization.) Andre roundly criticized Charles and other self-styled financial and fiscal experts in the Government, and ended by telling Duvalier that if the latter followed the advice of such persons he would wreck Haiti. Charles reportedly burst into tears and was taken ill. This gave rise to the story which was current at the time that he had had a nervous breakdown.

Matthew H. CHUBB

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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ABSTRACT X		IX

22 MAR 67 I 27 4 3

S E C R E T 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4332

PRIN

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 85314

1. NO TRACES WOFACT FILES OTHER THAN REF TO REF AND 00-B-3,260,765, 10 MAY 1963.

2. SEE BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER REPORT OF JULY 1964 FOR SUMMARY EMBASSY TRACES. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH HOWEVER DO NOT CHANGE PICTURE OF SHREWD UNSCRUPULOUS MONEY MAD PROMOTER WITH UNORTHODOX IDEAS ABOUT BUSINESS AND WITH HIGH POLITICAL AMBITIONS.

S E C R E T

BT

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NW 53

22 Mar 67

201-357029

Clemard Joseph Charles

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 221522Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4332

22 MAR 67 IN 27432

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 85314

1. NO TRACES WOFACT FILES OTHER THAN REF TO REF AND 00-B-3,260,765, 10 MAY 1963.

2. SEE BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER REPORT OF JULY 1964 FOR SUMMARY EMBASSY TRACES. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH HOWEVER DO NOT CHANGE PICTURE OF SHREWD UNSCRUPULOUS MONEY MAD PROMOTER WITH UNORTHODOX IDEAS ABOUT BUSINESS AND WITH HIGH POLITICAL AMBITIONS.

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14-00000

ORIG: M.J.GREMILLION:sld
UNIT: C/WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 March 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

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BY 25/M PER ______ # ______

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85314

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE 21 1956Z

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4324 (IN 22385)

1. EVMEND-1 RECEIVED WORD CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES DUE ARRIVE NEW YORK 21 OR 22 MARCH. CAN STATION CONFIRM SOONEST.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHARLES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref describes contact of Clemard CHARLES with Station officer.

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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14-00000

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ORIG: M.J.GREMILLION:sld
UNIT: C/WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 21 March 1967

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INFO: FILE , VR CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85314

TO PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE 21 1958Z

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 4324 (IN 22365)

1. EVMEND-1 RECEIVED WORD CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES DUE ARRIVE NEW YORK 21 OR 22 MARCH. CAN STATION CONFIRM SOONEST.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHARLES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref describes contact of Clemard CHARLES with Station officer.

Thomas Polgar
William V. Broe
C/WHD

Paul V. Haywood
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ACTION
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SECRET 151634Z CITE PORT AU PRINCE 4324

PPIN

15 MAR 67 IN 22385

AN ✓	~~FI~~	FI/ISR
~~DS~~	DRST	
ABSTRACT ✓		~~INDEX~~

DIRECTOR

1. ON 11 MARCH CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES VISITED RACHFIELD'S HOME OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS NEEDED REPAIRS. (RACHFIELD RENTS HOUSE FROM HIM). AFTER ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES SOCIAL CONVERSATION, CHARLES ASKED RACHFIELD IF IT POSSIBLE TO PASS A MSG OUT OF CHANNELS DIRECTLY TO CHIEF LNPURE. RACHFIELD ASKED FOR MSG WITH COMMENT THAT HE WOULD MAKE ATTEMPT BUT COULD NOT SPEAK FOR CHIEF LNPURE. CHARLES SAID MSG NOT READY. RACHFIELD SAID THAT WHILE CHARLES PREPARED MSG HE WOULD CHECK WITH CHIEF LNPURE. RACHFIELD THEN REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO COS WHO STATED CHIEF LNPURE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED SOONEST. CHIEF LNPURE THEN GAVE HIM PERMISSION ACCEPT MSG.

2. SAME EVENING RACHFIELD WENT CHARLES' HOME TO PICK UP MSG. CHARLES AGN STATED MSG NOT READY BUT PROCEEDED TELL RACHFIELD HE VERY PRO-WOLADY AND WELL KNOWN HIGH LEVELS LNHARP. CHARLES SAID HE WOULD HAVE MSG READY BY 1000 HOURS FOLLOWING MORNING AND WOULD BRING TO RACHFIELD'S HOME.

3. NEXT MORNING CHARLES ARRIVED ON TIME CARRYING RECORD

SECRET

15 Mar 67

201-357029

SECRET

JACKET CONTAINING CONCEALED MANILA ENVELOPE SEALED WITH SCOTCH TAPE. RACHFIELD STATED THIS PACKAGE NOT IN KEEPING WITH MEANING OF WORD MSG AND HAD NO AUTHORITY TRANSPORT PACKAGE TO CHIEF LNPURE. IN ATTEMPTS MAKE CHARLES REVEAL CONTENTS, RACHFIELD STATED HE NOT PREPARED TALK AGAIN WITH CHIEF LNPURE UNLESS HE ABLE INFORM CHIEF LNPURE CONTENTS OF PACKAGE. CHARLES STATED PACKAGE CONTAINED REPORT OF COMMERCIAL BANK AND TOBACCO MONOPOLY. RACHFIELD SET UP ANOTHER MEETING FOR ONE HOUR LATER WITH CHARLES. RACHFIELD MET WITH COS AND CHIEF LNPURE WHO TOLD HIM TO ACCEPT PACKAGE.

4. WHILE PICKING UP PACKAGE CHARLES MADE ALL OUT PITCH TO IMPRESS RACHFIELD WITH HIS PRO-VOLADY TENDENCIES. HE TOLD RACHFIELD HE FORCED GO ALONG WITH DUVALIER TO PROTECT HIS TWO AND HALF MILLION DOLLAR INVESTMENTS HAITI AS WELL AS PROTECT HIS LIFE. ALSO, JUST PRIOR RACHFIELD'S DEPARTURE CHARLES STATED HE WILLING TELL ANYTHING CHIEF LNPURE WANTS TO KNOW. RACHFIELD LEFT DOOR WIDE OPEN FOR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS.

5. PACKAGE CONTAINED OVERT MATERIAL PLUS TWO MEMOS CHARLES HAD WRITTEN TO DUVALIER POINTING OUT DISCREPANCIES

SECRET

TOBACCO MONOPOLY FUNDS. PAPERS ADDED NOTHING NEW. WILL POUCH COPIES.

6. AS HQS AWARE, CHARLES PRESENTLY IN POWER STRUGGLE WITH HENRI SICLAIT AND RUMOR IS THAT CHARLES LOSING. FROM CONVERSATION RACHFIELD BELIEVES CHARLES RUNNING SCARED. IT ALSO RACHFIELD'S OPINION THAT CHARLES WANTED OPEN CHANNEL TO LNPURE, AND BEING UNSURE TYPE RECEPTION, USED PAPERS OF SOME BUT LITTLE VALUE TO OPEN CONTACT. HOWEVER, WHAT MOST INTERESTING IS NOT VALUE OF ORIGINAL PAPERS BUT FACT HE DID PASS ANYTHING AT ALL PLUS HIS OFFER ANSWER QUESTIONS.

7. CHARLES APPROACHED LNFORT BEFORE. SINCE HE OPPORTUNIST SEEKING REINSURANCE LNHARP AND LNPURE HAVE TAKEN POSITION WILLING TO LISTEN ANY TIME CHARLES WANTS TO TALK BUT NO STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN IN HIS DIRECTION IN HAITI. COS HAS INSTRUCTED RACHFIELD TO FOLLOW LNPURE PATTERN. HOWEVER STATION WILL BE ALERT TO CHARLES EXTERNAL TRAVEL PLANS AND WILL ADVISE HQS AND AFFECTED STATIONS IMMEDIATELY.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Miami, Florida

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

UAI

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)

A-2

DATE 5-3-67

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) CHARLES	First Name CLEMARD	Middle Initial J.

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: HAITI

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): WALDORF ASTORIA NEW YORK CITY

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: PAA 432

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: PORT AU PRINCE HAITI

BIRTH DATE [illegible]-21-23	BIRTH PLACE Gonaives, Haiti

NAI
25
6 June 67
83
201-357029*

CHARLES CLEMARD Joseph

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: 4-30-67 Miami, Fla.

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: official-dur. of status

DESTINATION: above U.S.

201-357029*

ih

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

CKM
RC
22/5/67

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

FORM I-97
(REV. 6-1-68)

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 02/02/67

X-REF. S

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-357029	HTPA-01960	06 JAN 67	201-808464
	DBB -66019	03 JAN 67	036-009-010
	DBB -66106	03 JAN 67	036-009-006
	DBB -66473	03 JAN 67	036-009-010

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

S-E-C-R-E-T

(1)

REPORT

On Friday, 19 June, departed Miami for Kingston, Jamaica via Pan American, leaving Miami at 0800 and arriving Kingston via Montego Bay at 10:15 AM. This flight continues to on to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Latin passengers are commonplace. In passing through immigration and customs, it is necessary to give the immigration inspector the name of a specific hotel or address at which you can be reached in Jamaica.

Obtained rental car from Hertz Car Rental and departed Kingston Airport at 10:45 AM via Highway A-4 for Port Antonio of the north coast. Highway A-4 follows the coast around the eastern tip of the island. There is another route to Port Antonio, over the mountains, but it is not recommended. As shown on the standard highway map of the island, there is a small cove about seven miles east of Port Antonio designated as "Blue Hole". The cove is roughly 200 feet wide by 500 feet long, and completely protected from the open sea and weather. The cove is extremely deep, and is reported to have a minimum depth of six feet at the entrance. Tidal range appears to be very small, perhaps one to two feet.

When I arrived at Blue Hole, which is about 2-1/2 hours by road from Kingston, Robin Moore was not available; I went into Port Antonio and secured a room at the Bonnie Vue Hotel. I returned to Blue Hole about five o'clock and there met Robin Moore. Mr. Moore owns most of the land surrounding Blue Hole, with the Jamaican government owning the balance. On the beach facing the sea, Moore has built and operates a bar-restaurant which he calls the Teahouse of the Blue Lagoon. This accounts for the confusion between Blue Hole and Blue Lagoon. On the side of the mountain descending to the water, Moore has built and lives in a small studio apartment. He also owns another small house overlooking Blue Hole. This house was occupied temporarily by a girl who was introduced to me as his fiancee, Margot Palmer, and her mother, Rita Palmer. They are supposed to return to their home in Vancouver, B.C., about the end of June.

About five o'clock I introduced myself to Moore as a friend of Antonio de la Carrera, and gave him the note with the recognition symbol. We talked from five o'clock until about 7:30 at which time we had dinner and parted until the next morning at 11:30.

I spent the night at the Bonnie Vue Hotel and noted in passing that a U. S. destroyer escort based at Guantanamo Bay was anchored in the harbor for the weekend, with the sailors being given liberty in Port Antonio. This seems to be a common occurrence, and could perhaps be a source of information about Cuban patrol practices along the south coast.

Saturday morning, 20 June, met Moore again, and continued our discussion of the previous day. During our conversation, he introduced me to Fred Barrett, a native Jamaican (colored), who is in charge of the operation of the bar-restaurant. I left Mr. Moore and Blue Hole about 2:00 o'clock and drove to Kingston, catching the 6:30 Pan American flight back to Miami, via Montego Bay.

Following my two serious conversations with Moore, plus my observations of the man himself, plus my reconnaissance of the site itself, I submit the following items of information as being of significance:

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1. Robin Moore

a. Moore has just returned from Viet Nam where he participated in the combat operations of the American Special Forces in Viet Nam, after he had gone through about eight months of training at the Special Forces School at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Some understanding of Moore's personality may be obtained from reading an interview between him and the magazine U. S. News and World Report, which was published recently, and copy of which was left with Maria. Further understandings and impressions of Moore may be obtained from reading his previously published book about Jack Youngblood, an American who participated in the events leading to Castro's overthrow of Battista.

b. In my opinion, Moore has a burning desire to be known as a tough, two-fisted, rip roaring soldier of fortune. He has participated in real war in Viet Nam, and has received what is probably the best training in the world for guerilla fighters, namely, the U. S. Special Forces. This includes training as a parachutist. He is inclined to brag, and is probably inclined to intemperate use of alcohol and women, and his judgement of important matters is probably immature. However, he definitely understands and is experienced in guerilla fighting, is experienced in military operations, and must surely understand military security.

c. He is definitely willing to help, but cannot contribute cash directly; is willing to furnish the use of the guest house on his property for limited periods of time. Is willing to participate and aid in an operation to land people on the south coast of Cuba, but is not willing to commit the use of his property and facilities as a staging area for resupply in the future.

d. Is willing to come to Miami, for conferences if his expenses are paid.

2. Site Evaluation

a. Blue Hole is an excellent harbor; protected against all weather, and with six feet of water at the bar. Is surrounded by very steep slopes, heavily wooded. Dock facilities are presently very meager, but could be quickly and easily improved. No fuel for a boat is available at Blue Hole, and at Port Antonio (the closest source), the fuel available is diesel fuel or automotive gasoline; no marine white gasoline is available anywhere is the area. This is a most significant factor in selecting a suitable boat.

b. The nearest source of food and other supplies is Port Antonio; Fred Barrett, manager of the Blue Lagoon Club, orders and hauls supplies from Port Antonio constantly, and could deliver whatever supplies were desired. Firearms and explosives are not obtainable on the island. They would have to be smuggled in illegally.

c. A small station wagon is available for transportation, provided expenses are paid by users.

3. Miscellaneous Information

a. A local man, George Munroe, is reported to be a very experienced small boat captain and one who has brought boats down from Miami on five different occasions. He is reported to be available to serve as captain on a fishing boat, and to train a crew.

b. The S.S. Evangeline sails every two weeks from Miami direct to Port Antonio, and could be employed for the delivery of supplies and even a boat to Robin Moore.

c. Fred Barrett, manager of the bar-restaurant, seems to be a very capable man, and for an additional $10 per week added to his regular pay, would be quite willing to assist any operation.

d. A Mr. Anthony Gason, a retired British army colonel, is the Jamaica representative for TROJAN boats, at a place called Turtle Cove, between Port Antonio and Blue Hole.

e. The immigration chief for Jamaica is a man by the name of George Eubanks, who is the former chief of police at Port Antonio: Moore claims that they are very close personal friends.

d. Moore is acquainted with a man by the name of Mike Hedges, who is a nephew of Burke Hedges, the American who became Cuba's ambassador to Chile some years ago. Mike lives in Kingston, and, if he is not a Battista sympathizer, might prove to be a very valuable connection. The family is reported to be quite wealthy, and would establish an excellent cover.

4. Operational Considerations

a. In order to avoid the use of significant names, I instructed Moore to refer to Manolo as George King, and the operation of landing him in Cuba would be referred to as OperationKing. The most likely scheme seems to be to establish a suitable boat at Blue Hole, with the cover story to be that it belongs to American friends of Robin Moore. Housing is available locally for a limited number of Cubans, with Moore being able to accommodate up to six on his own property. The local boat captain, George Munroe, could be employed as captain initially, to train the Cuban crew in the local marine conditions, as well as serving as an effective cover. In my opinion, it will not be too difficult for persons to enter Jamaica without difficulty, provided they know a certain minimum amount of English.

I think a suitable location could be found for radio transmission and reception facilities on the hills surrounding Blue Hole, but this would have to be examined by someone skilled in radio techniques. Mateo would be excellent.

In summary, I would say that Robin Moore and his property and buildings at Blue Hole would serve as an excellent base of operations, but that the boat necessary for the operation would have to be acquired and equipped in the states and shipped down there, except for the remote possibility that a suitable boat could be found in Kingston. I think a headquarters could be established at small cost through Moore's good offices, and I think that Rudy would be a good choice to coordinate the initial operations there.

03
[Jack Reed]

201-353107

1/90

Clemard Joseph CHARLES
Vol: III

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHARLES CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-#357029
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

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DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
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9AM 16 AUG 78	11:00 16 Aug 78	BETH LICHTENFELS	Beth Lichtenfels
11AM 24 AUG 78		SUREL BRADY	
18 DEC		S. BRADY	

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

Clemard Joseph CHARLES
Vol. III

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-#357029
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10AM ~~3 AUG 78~~		~~BETH LICHTENFELS~~	
9AM 16 AUG 78	11:00 16 Aug 78	BETH LICHTENFELS	Beth Lichtenfels
11AM 24 AUG 78		SUREL BRADY	
18 DEC		S. BRADY	

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2D

14-00000

Political Prisoner in Hospital

Clémart Joseph Charles was taken from the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince to Haiti's General Hospital. The former Duvalier banker has been jailed since 1971 "for political reasons." No proper trial was held.

Mr. Charles is suffering from an acute liver infection and the physicians attending him have warned that he will die unless he's allowed to travel abroad for special treatment.

This isn't the first time Mr. Charles was taken from his cell to a hospital. Last year he was rushed to Haiti's military hospital for treatment of the same disease.

Mrs. Charles has been allowed to visit her husband.

This is the first time the Duvalier regime has acted half humanely with a political prisoner. It's been pointed out that Marie-Denise Duvalier Dominique, a friend of Mr. Charles, has often interceded for him.

● Army chief-of-staff Jean-Baptiste Hilaire will soon be replaced, say military sources in Port-au-Prince. His likely replacement? Col. Roger St. Albain.

On a lighter note, the General ran for cover on September 22 while there was a review on the Palace grounds to commemorate Duvalier's "election" in 1957. Accidentally the loaded automatic weapon of a militiaman went off. Many officials, General Hilaire among them, scrambled for protection. Jean-Claude, his mother and their bodyguard General Gracia Jacques were trembling, but they kept standing, says a source that was standing close to them.

201-357029
"Haitian Observateur"
4-11 Oct 74

Clemard CHARLES
201

Intelligence Information Report

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. FIRLT-313/01268-74

DATE DISTR. 18 October 1974

COUNTRY Haiti

DOI Early October 1974

SUBJECT Transfer of Political Prisoner Clemard Joseph Charles to Port-au-Prince General Hospital.

ACQ 15 October 1974

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A reliable source from a Haitian exile leader who is well educated and who has a wide variety of contacts in Haitian exile groups. The exile was aware that his information would reach the U.S. Government.

1. Clemard Joseph Charles, former president of the Commercial Bank of Haiti who has been held political prisoner since April 1970 on charges of plotting against the government, was recently transferred from jail to the general hospital in Port-au-Prince. Charles is said to be dying of cirrhosis of the liver and was transferred to the hospital on orders of Madame Simone Ovide Duvalier, mother of Haitian President Jean Claude Duvalier.

2. Doctors recommended that Charles be sent abroad for proper medical treatment but Mme. Duvalier authorized his transfer only to the local hospital. According to close relatives, this occurred only after Minister of Interior and Defense Paul Blanchet told the President and his mother that he would refuse to become involved in this case and would not sign any papers required of him as Minister of Interior certifying that Charles had died in prison. Relatives of Charles still intend to press for his removal from the country.

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Port-au-Prince.

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S E C R E T

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	OCI	FBI		CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

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					OBJ:KIb			COORDINATING RELEASING RH:ER VG:lh
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3

r) Charles 201-357039

FORM 4-73 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 1630

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GRANTS CLEMENCY TO 89
PRISONERS

14-00000

OF TDCS INFORMATI REPORT

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(When Filled In)

#178

			ROUTING		
ORIG.	BETTY A. VAZQUEZ	1		4	
UNIT	WH/7/HAITI/REPORTS	2		5	
EXT.	4178/1528	3		6	
DATE	24 MARCH 1972				

CONF. WH-20

CA 5, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CS/DO, FR-4, FI 5, IW, EUR-6, DCI, DDP, ADDP, CS/RF

TDCS -314/01961-72

DATE DISTRIBUTED
24 MARCH 1972

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WH/CA	1	WH/1	2	CA/B4	1
WH/7/H	10	WH/3/V	2		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-1534
EVMEND
(EVMEND-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

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Robert Hopkins
C/WH/RR

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File 201-357029 (Clement Joseph Charles)

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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FBI, EXO, DDI

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SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/01961-72

DIST 24 MARCH 1972

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 20 MARCH 1972

SUBJECT FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI TO BRING ABOUT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH HAITIAN EXILES

ACQ 22 MARCH 1972

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A YOUNG HAITIAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS WELL EDUCATED AND WHO HAS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE.

1. ON APPROXIMATELY 20 MARCH 1972 LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, HAITIAN MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, TELEPHONED FERMIN JOSEPH, AN OFFICIAL OF THE NEW YORK-BASED, HAITIAN EXILE NEWSPAPER "HAITI OBSERVATEUR," AND TOLD JOSEPH THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT OF HAITI (GOH) STANCE TAKEN BY THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" IN GENERAL AND JOSEPH IN PARTICULAR IN THE 18 MARCH EDITION OF THE PAPER. CAMBRONNE STATED THAT HE HAD HOPED THAT HIS RECENT INVITATION TO ALL HAITIAN EXILES TO RETURN TO HAITI, COUPLED WITH HIS PRIVATE DISCUSSION

WITH JOSEPH, WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE PAPER CAUSE TO RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE GOH.

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED IN TDCS-314/01942-72 THAT DURING A MEETING ON 16 MARCH 1972 BETWEEN THE TWO, CAMBRONNE TOLD JOSEPH THE GOH CONSIDERED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" AND ITS SUPPORTERS TO BE THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO THE GOH'S PLANS TO REUNITE ALL HAITIANS IN AN EFFORT TO BUILD A NEW, PROGRESSIVE NATION. AS A FIRST STEP TO RAPPROCHEMENT, CAMBRONNE ASKED JOSEPH TO REALIGN HIMSELF WITH THE GOH AND RETURN TO HAITI. IF JOSEPH ACCEPTED, CAMBRONNE SAID, THE GOH WOULD BE WILLING TO NAME HIM TO WHATEVER OFFICIAL POSITION HE DESIRED EITHER INSIDE HAITI OR ABROAD.)

3. JOSEPH REPLIED THAT BEFORE HE OR THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" COULD GIVE ANY THOUGHT TO SOFTENING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE GOH, THE GOH WOULD HAVE TO SHOW ITS GOOD INTENTIONS THROUGH DEEDS RATHER THAN MERE PROMISES. CAMBRONNE THEN INVITED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" TO SEND A TEAM OF REPORTERS TO HAITI TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES THE CHANGES WHICH WERE BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER. BEFORE SUCH A TRIP COULD BE MADE, JOSEPH SAID, POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD HAVE TO BE RELEASED. ALSO,

THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" WOULD INSIST THAT ANY SUCH TEAM OF REPORTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY NEWSMEN FROM OTHER NATIONS WHO WOULD ACT AS GUARDS AGAINST ANY PRESSURE THE GOH MIGHT APPLY AGAINST THE HAITIAN REPORTERS.

4. JOSEPH ASKED CAMBRONNE WHETHER THE GOH INDEED INTENDED TO RELEASE SUCH POLITICAL PRISONERS AS HUBERT LEGROS, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, AND COL. KESNER BLAIN AS CAMBRONNE HAD INTIMATED DURING HIS 15 MARCH PRESS CONFERENCE. TO THIS CAMBRONNE REPLIED THAT HE CONSIDERED LEGROS TO BE A VERY DANGEROUS MAN AND THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF EVER RELEASING HIM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: LEGROS, A LAWYER AND SELF-PROCLAIMED COMMUNIST, WAS ARRESTED IN MAY 1970 AFTER HAVING BEEN SOUGHT BY HAITIAN AUTHORITIES FOR SEVERAL YEARS. CHARLES, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AND BLAIN, FORMER COMMANDANT OF THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS, WERE ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 FOR PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOH.)

5. CAMBRONNE REITERATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE "HAITI OBSERVATEUR" POSED THE NUMBER ONE THREAT TO THE GOH'S PLANS TO REUNITE ALL HAITIANS. CAMBRONNE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOH ALSO BELIEVED GEORGES RIGAUD, A LEADER OF THE HAITIAN

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN MONTREAL, AND A PROFESSOR RENE SAINT-LOUIS, WHO IS ALSO LOCATED IN CANADA, TO BE IMPORTANT ENEMIES OF THE GOH.

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO PORT AU PRINCE, PARIS, SANTO DOMINGO, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, OTTAWA.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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TDCS-314/02923-71

HTP 1469

ACTION UNIT WH 13

FILE. VR. ADDP. CS/DO. FI 5, ID. RI/AN.

ACTION NO. 544

DDP, CA 3, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DO 4, EUR 5, SOD 3.

S E C R E T 171719Z MAR 71 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 17429

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, PARIS, REP/LANT, SANTO DOMINGO

INTEL

17Mar IN289530

SUPDATA: EVLEMON/2 FROM EVLEMON/10 FROM SUBJ PORT AU PRINCE 7355 WHO TALKED TO RAYMOND. NO INDEX. FILE: 35-9-11.

FILED: 171719Z

201-357029

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Clemard Joseph Charles

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

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IN 289539

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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SECRET

CITE TDCS -314/02923-71

DIST 17 MARCH 1971

COUNTRY : HAITI

DOI : MID-MARCH 1971

SUBJECT : RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATION OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND KESNER BLAIN

ACQ : HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (16 MARCH 1971) HIP-1469

SOURCE : A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAD THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS PAST REPORTING HAS GENERALLY BEEN ACCURATE. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A HIGH RANKING MEMBER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF.

1. ACCORDING TO BRIG. GEN. CLAUDE RAYMOND, CHIEF OF HAITIAN ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER COMPLETED HIS PERSONAL INTERROGATION OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, AND COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, ON 15 MARCH 1971.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

(FIELD COMMENT: HTP-1467, TDCS-314/02737-71 , REPORTED THAT DUVALIER HAD SEEN BLAIN PRIVATELY ON 9 MARCH 1971 AND BLAIN AND CHARLES TOGETHER ON 12 MARCH 1971. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT DUVALIER HAD AGAIN SEEN BLAIN AND CHARLES ON 15 MARCH 1971.)

2. RAYMOND SAID THAT, IN HIS INTERROGATION OF CHARLES, DUVALIER APPEARED PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH DETERMINING IF CHARLES HAD SERVED AS A FUNDING CHANNEL FROM AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN TO THE HAITIAN CONSPIRATORS. IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERROGATION, DUVALIER SHOWED CHARLES A PHOTOCOPY OF A CASHIER'S CHECK FOR $170,000 DRAWN IN CHARLES' NAME. CHARLES ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THAT HE HAD DEALINGS WITH MANY FOREIGNERS AND HAITIANS. HE DENIED DUVALIER'S CHARGES SAYING THAT, IF HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A PURELY HAITIAN AFFAIR AND THAT HE WOULD NOT SULLY HAITI'S HONOR BY SEEKING HELP FROM FOREIGNERS.

3. ACCORDING TO RAYMOND, BLAIN ALSO DENIED ANY FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT ALL THE CABINET MEMBERS HAD CONSPIRED WITH HIM AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER, EXCEPT FOR AURELE JOSEPH, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; MAX ANTOINE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS; AND ANDRE DUBE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC

AFFAIRS. BLAIN ALSO IMPLICATED ABOUT ONE QUARTER OF THE 49-MAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, INCLUDING SUCH PERSONS AS ULRICH ST.-LOUIS, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY AND DEPUTIES LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, VICTOR NEVERS CONSTANT, AND MME. MARCELLE AUGUSTIN. BLAIN ADDED THAT HE HAD ALSO CONSPIRED WITH COL. BRETON CLAUDE, COMMANDER OF THE DESSALINES BATTALION, AND COL. FRED M. ARTY, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES. BLAIN SAID THAT, LONG BEFORE APRIL 1970, CLAUDE HAD ALSO BEEN INVOLVED IN VARIOUS CONSPIRACIES WITH CLOVIS DESINOR, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, AND THE LATE LEON BORDES, AND THAT THESE MEN HAD FORMED A CLANDESTINE POLITICAL PARTY WITH DESINOR AS PRESIDENT.

4. RAYMOND SAID THAT DUVALIER WAS CONTINUING A SECRET INVESTIGATION OF THESE ADMISSIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FOREIGN FINANCING OF THE PLOT. IN RAYMOND'S OPINION, DUVALIER WILL TAKE NO ACTION UNTIL THE INVESTIGATION IS COMPLETE.

5. CONCERNING THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL WHICH WAS CONVENED IN EARLY MARCH 1971, RAYMOND SAID THAT THE TRIAL WAS SIMPLY

FOR THE SAKE OF FORM. THE SENTENCES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DECIDED UPON, BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEM AWAITS WORD FROM DUVALIER. THE TRIAL OF THE THREE DEFENDANTS CURRENTLY IN EXILE, ALPHONSE LAHENS, CLEMENCEAU PROSPER, AND GERARD LOISEWU, IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON 3 APRIL 1971.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS -311/07138-70

DATE DISTR. 28 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI LATE AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT PROSPECTIVE RELEASE OF REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 FOR ALLEGEDLY PLOTTING AGAINST GOVERNMENT

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (26 AUG. 1970) **FIELD NO.** HTP-1435

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE POSITION PROVIDES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARRESTS ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR ONLY A SHORT TIME, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS APPEARED RELIABLE.

1. ACCORDING TO A HIGH-RANKING OFFICER IN THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, THE THREE REMAINING POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL 1970 ON CHARGES OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING, WILL BE AMNESTIED ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE ANNIVERSARY OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER'S ELECTION AS PRESIDENT FOR LIFE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: CS-311/06776-70 REPORTED THE RELEASE OF THE OTHER POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED IN APRIL AND MAY 1970.) THE PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED IN SEPTEMBER ARE COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE ARMED FORCES; CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

CI/ICG	2	WH/PRIN	1		PORT AU PRINCE 7103		HTP-1435
CA/INT	1	WH/7/DR	1		(IN 151419)		EVLEMON
CA/PROP	1	WH/SDOM	#			(EVLEMON-2	from EVLEMON-17)
WH/R (1)	1	WH/PACY (CINCSO) #					CS-311/07138-70
WH/7/Ht	4	REP/LANT	#				COORDINATING / RELEASING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 6 (2), DO 1.						LIAISON *	RR BEB

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S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

HAITI; AND EDMOND PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE HAITIAN SUPREME COURT. ALL THREE MEN, CURRENTLY CONFINED IN THE NATIONAL PENITENTIARY, ARE IN POOR STATE OF HEALTH.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

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REPORT NO. CS -311/06776-70

DATE DISTR. 13 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI EARLY AUGUST 1970

SUBJECT RELEASE OF HAITIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (11 AUGUST 1970) FIELD NO. HTP-1432

SOURCE A FORMER HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN ACCURATE SINCE 1963. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE POSITION PROVIDED HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARRESTS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS ONLY BEEN REPORTING FOR A SHORT TIME, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS APPEARED RELIABLE.

1. AS OF 3 AUGUST 1970, FORTY OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS ARRESTED BETWEEN EARLY APRIL AND LATE MAY 1970 FOR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING OF COL. KESNER BLAIN, FORMER QUARTERMASTER OF THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, AND COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE HAITIAN COAST GUARD, HAD BEEN RELEASED. BY 7 AUGUST 1970, AN ADDITIONAL NINETEEN PRISONERS WERE RELEASED, MAKING A TOTAL OF 59. AMONG THE PRISONERS RELEASED WERE FRITZ THEBAUD, FORMER SECRETARY OF FINANCE; VOLVICK CAYARD, FORMER DEPUTY AND BROTHER OF COL. CAYARD; MAX PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CBS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

PAIN 7087 (IN 141314) HTP-1432
EVLEMON
(EVLEMON-2 FROM EVLEMON-17)
CS-311/06776-70

CI/IC	ZWH/PRIN	1
CA/INT	1WH/7/CR	1
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IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 6(2), DO 1.

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DEPUTY; RAMEAU ESTIME, FORMER SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; MME. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES; MME. CLEMENCEAU PROSPER AND HER DAUGHTER MARYSE; AND ALL OF THE DETECTIVES OF THE PORT AU PRINCE POLICE DEPARTMENT WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

2. AS OF 11 AUGUST 1970, THE ONLY PERSONS STILL BELIEVED TO BE UNDER ARREST ARE CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI; COL. BLAIN; EDMOND PIERRE-PAUL, FORMER CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE HAITIAN SUPREME COURT; AND A COUSIN OF CLEMENCEAU PROSPER. OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED IN THIS CONNECTION, ONLY TWO, CITE DOUGE AND LEON BORDES ARE DEAD. BOTH DIED AS A RESULT OF MISTREATMENT WHILE IN PRISON.

3. (SOURCE COMMENT: SEVERAL OF THE FORMER PRISONERS, INCLUDING THEBAUD, MME. PROSPER, AND PIERRE-PAUL, HAVE BEEN SEEN ON THE STREETS OF PORT AU PRINCE SINCE THEIR RELEASE. ALL OF THE FORMER PRISONERS ENCOUNTERED THUS FAR HAVE EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT THEIR HAVING BEEN RELEASED AND ARE UNABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNEXPECTEDLY LENIENT TREATMENT THEY RECEIVED. ONE UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMOR CIRCULATING AROUND PORT AU PRINCE HAS IT THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS THE RESULT OF PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 967
DATE: 6 AUGUST 1970
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 5-1
DATE: 8 MAY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SUBJECT: MEASURES TAKEN BY GOH AGAINST ALLEGED
CONSPIRATORS

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM
PORT AU PRINCE 546
DATE: 8 MAY 1970
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: CONFISCATION ASSETS CLEMARD JOSEPH
CHARLES

FORM 3023 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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ACTION NO. 605

S E C R E T 231600Z MAY 70 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6879

DIRECTOR IN 07929

1. ACCORDING MORNING PRESS 8 MAY, LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER PASSED DECREE 7 MAY WHICH STRIPPED FOLLOWING PERSONS OF HAITIAN CITIZENSHIP AND CONFISCATED THEIR GOODS AND CHATTELS; CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, CLEMENCEAU PROSPER, ALPHONSE LAHENS, AND KESNER BLAIN. STATED REASON FOR DECREE WAS THAT THESE PERSONS WERE ACCOMPLICES OF REBEL COASTGUARDSMEN. THIS DECREE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS ONE PASSED 27 APRIL ACCORDING IDENTICAL TREATMENT TO COASTGUARDSMEN.

2. PALACE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST COASTGUARDSMEN BUT WOULD JUDGE THEM IN ABSENTIA. THIS ACTION FOLLOWED NOTE RECEIVED BY EMBASSY ON 7 MAY WITHDRAWING EARLIER REQUEST FOR EXTRADITION.

3. NET EFFECT THESE ACTIONS LENDS CREDENCE TO IMPRESSION THAT HAITIAN GOVT PREPARED ACT IN OUTWARDLY LEGAL WAY IN DEALING WITH REBELLION. ON ONE HAND, REMOVAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY LEAVES FAMILIES DESTITUTE WHICH PROBABLY AMPLE OBJECT LESSON TO OTHERS CONSIDERING REBELLION

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6379 SECRET

WHILE AVOIDING ADVERSE PUBLICITY ENGENDERED BY WHOLESALE ARRESTS AND KILLINGS IN PAST. ON OTHER, WITHDRAWAL OF EXTRADITION REQUEST PROBABLY DONE IN RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT U.S. WOULD NOT HONOR REQUEST AND THUS NEEDLESS CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. AVOIDED.

4. IN BOTH RESPECTS, THESE MOVES REPRESENT MUCH MORE MODERATE RESPONSE THAN HAD BEEN TRUE IN PAST. WHILE THEY SUGGEST DUVALIER MAY BE MELLOWING WITH PASSING YEARS, INCLINED BELIEVE THAT THEY PROMPTED MORE BY HIS BELIEF THAT HIS POSITION SUFFICIENTLY SOLID TO MAKE MORE DRASTIC MEASURES UNNECESSARY TEMPERED BY NOTION THAT SUCH MEASURES MIGHT PROVOKE ADDITIONAL REBELLIONS. THUS DUVALIER WOULD APPEAR ONCE AGAIN TO HAVE STRUCK WORKABLE POLITICAL BALANCE BETWEEN VARIOUS CONTENDING FORCES AND FACTIONS IN HIS ENTOURAGE.

5. ON PERSONAL SIDE, FRAYNE'S LIFE SOMEWHAT COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT CHARLES WAS HIS LANDLORD AND EFFECT OF CONFISCATION ORDER REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

6. NO FILE. GP-1.

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ORIG. BERYL E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7/HAITI/REPORTS
EXT. 4222
DATE 7 MAY 1970

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CONF: WH 15

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TDCS-314/04593-70

DATE DISTRIBUTED 7 MAY 1970

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WH/FI	1 WH SDOM 1
WH/CA	1 WH PACY (CINCSO) #
WH/7/R	1 REP LANT #

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
PORT AU PRINCE 6870,6871
(IN 075915, 075925)
HTP-1406, 1405
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CITE TDCS -314/04593-70

DIST 7 MAY 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI APRIL 1970

03 14 32Z MAY 70

SUBJECT 1. STATUS OF COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF ARMED FORCES, AND CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF COMMERCIAL BANK, IMPRISONED FOR ALLEGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING
2. DENUNCIATION OF COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF COAST GUARD, BY LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (1 MAY 1970) **FIELD NO.** HTP-1406, 1405

SOURCE A HAITIAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE WHO HAS GOOD CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY. HE IS A NEW SOURCE AND THE RELIABILITY OF HIS REPORTING HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

1. ONE OF THE SOLDIERS AT THE DESSALINES BARRACKS WHO IS GUARDING COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, WHO WERE ARRESTED IN EARLY APRIL 1970 FOR ALLEGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING, SAID THAT BOTH MEN STILL WERE ALIVE AS OF 30 APRIL. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 REPORTED THE ARRESTS OF BLAIN AND CHARLES.)

2. ACCORDING TO A SOLDIER AT THE NATIONAL PALACE, COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD, WAS SUMMONED

TO THE PALACE ON 22 APRIL 1970 BY PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER AS A RESULT OF A DENUNCIATION BY LUCKNER CAMBRONNE, A DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 REPORTED THAT CAMBRONNE WAS A MEMBER OF A COMMISSION ASSIGNED BY DUVALIER TO INTERROGATE THE PERSONS ARRESTED DURING THE WEEK OF 1 APRIL 1970.) WHILE CAYARD WAS WITH DUVALIER, CAMBRONNE TELEPHONED DUVALIER TO SAY THAT CAYARD SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED BECAUSE HE (CAMBRONNE) HAD IRREFUTABLE PROOF OF CAYARD'S COMPLICITY IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOTTING. DUVALIER ASKED CAMBRONNE TO REPEAT HIS ACCUSATION WHILE HE GAVE CAYARD THE TELEPHONE RECEIVER TO LISTEN. FOLLOWING THE CONVERSATION WITH CAMBRONNE, DUVALIER REASSURED CAYARD OF HIS TRUST IN HIM AND REQUESTED CAYARD TO ARREST TWO COAST GUARD OFFICERS DURING THE COURSE OF THAT WEEK. CAYARD AGREED TO FOLLOW THE ORDER, BUT TOLD DUVALIER THAT HE KNEW THE ADDRESS OF ONLY ONE OF THE TWO OFFICERS. (FIELD COMMENT: ON 24 APRIL 1970, CAYARD LED AN ABORTIVE REVOLT BY THE COAST GUARD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. SEE TDCS-314/04646-70 AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, DEFATT, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

(ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 472

DATE: 28 APRIL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: REPORTS OF EXECUTIONS OF PERSONS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN COAST GOARD ATTACK

[redacted]

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

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201-357029
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036-009-006
PRIN-06803
15 APR 70

CIT ?
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ACCUSED OF COUP PLOTTING

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WH/FI	1			WH/PACY (CINCSO) #
WH/CA	1			REP/LANT #
WH/7/R	1			

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., NO.)
PORT AU PRINCE 6798
(IN 060590)
HTP-1379
EVLEMON (EVLEMON-19)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

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Charles 201-357029

14-00000

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IN 060590

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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SECRET

13 22 02Z APR 70

CITE TDCS -314/04019-70

DIST 13 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI 9 APRIL 1970

SUBJECT DENUNCIATION BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOT

ACQ HAITI, PORT AU PRINCE (10 APRIL 1970) FIELD NO. HTP-1379

SOURCE A HAITIAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WHO HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF MANY MEMBERS OF THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT. HE IS A NEW SOURCE AND THE RELIABILITY OF HIS REPORTING HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

1. ACCORDING TO DR. JACQUES FOURCAND, ONE OF THE PERSONAL PHYSICIANS TO PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER, DUVALIER WAS INFORMED OF THE RECENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT PLOT, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY LED TO SEVERAL ARRESTS OF SUSPECTED PLOTTERS, BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI. CHARLES DENOUNCED THE PLOT TO DUVALIER WHEN HE REALIZED HE HAD BEEN "DOUBLE-CROSSED" BY COL. KESNER BLAIN, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHO HAD PROMISED TO MAKE CHARLES PRESIDENT OF HAITI IN RETURN FOR $100,000 TO FINANCE

● SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

A REVOLT AGAINST DUVALIER. CHARLES ALSO HAD REFUSED TO GIVE THE MONEY TO BLAIN. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SOURCE DID NOT INDICATE HOW BLAIN HAD "DOUBLE-CROSSED" CHARLES, CHARLES WAS REPORTED IN OCTOBER 1969 TO BE FINANCING A PLOT BEING HEADED BY COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD. SEE TDCS-314/15048-69. ALSO IN OCTOBER 1969, TDCS-314/15083-69 REPORTED ANOTHER PLOT AGAINST THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT BEING HEADED BY BLAIN. CHARLES, HOWEVER, WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT AS BEING INVOLVED IN BLAIN'S PLOT.)

2. FOURCAND SAID THE INQUIRY IS CONTINUING. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD DEFEND THE PRISONERS AND ADDED THAT NO ONE WOULD BE SHOT AS HAD HAPPENED BEFORE. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: FOURCAND PROBABLY IS REFERRING TO A SIMILAR PURGE OF SUSPECTED PLOTTERS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT CARRIED OUT BY DUVALIER IN MID-1967, WHICH RESULTED IN THE EXECUTION OF 19 ARMY OFFICERS.) (FIELD COMMENT: TDCS-314/03869-70 AND TDCS-314/03496-70 REPORTED THAT FOURCAND IS A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION INTERROGATING BLAIN AND THE OTHER PERSONS ARRESTED DURING THE WEEK OF 1 APRIL 1970.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO)

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION NO. 599 | [illegible]

S E C R E T 091700Z APR 70 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6795

DIRECTOR

9 Apr 70 059504

1. CONSIDERING FACT THAT BLAIN AFFAIR IS FIRST JUICY MORSEL LOCAL RUMOR MILL HAS HAD TO CHEW ON IN SOME MONTHS, RUMOR CIRCUIT REMARKABLY QUIET AS OF MORNING 9 APRIL. STATION ASSETS HAVE HAD NOTHING NEW TO REPORT SINCE EVMISER/8'S ACCOUNT OF UNCERTAINTY IN COAST GUARD. EVEN LEPURE INFORMANTS WHO SOMETIMES WORK OVERTIME CONCOCTING RATIONALES OF PAST EVENTS AND GUESSTIMATES OF FUTURE IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION HAVE BEEN SILENT.

2. CURRENT BOX SCORE OF DETAINEES COMPRISES BLAIN, DOUGE, BORDES, CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES AND HIS ASSISTANT, APOLLO GARNIER. ALPHONSE LAHENS STILL AT LARGE AND REPORTEDLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN SEEKING ASYLUM AT VARIOUS LATIN EMBASSIES. MME. LAHENS NO LONGER IN CUSTODY. ALSO CONSTANTIN DUPLESSIS HAS BEEN RELEASED.

3. NO HARD INFO AND LITTLE INFORMED SPECULATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE ON NATURE OR EXTENT OF PLOT IF ONE ACTUALLY EXISTED. MOST PERSISTENT RUMOR IS THAT BLAIN SOMEHOW PLANNED SEIZE GC-10 AND LAY SIEGE TO PALACE WITH

SECRET

Charles 201 file.

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6795 SECRET

PORT AU PRINCE POLICE SOMEHOW PLAYING ROLE OF GROUND TROOPS IN ATTACK ON PALACE. IF THERE ANY SUBSTANCE AT ALL TO THIS RUMOR, SEEMS ODD THAT GOVT HAS NOT MOVED AGAINST COAST GUARD. SEEMS EQUALLY ODD THAT BLAIN WOULD HAVE BEEN BADMOUTHING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE IN TALKING TO EVMENDS LAST DECEMBER IF HE ENVISIONED SOME ROLE FOR THEM.

4. OUR TENTATIVE JUDGEMENT AT THIS POINT IS THAT PLOT, IF ONE EXISTED, STILL VERY MUCH IN TALKING STAGE AND THAT ARRESTS PROMPTED MORE BY INDISCREET TALK BY BLAIN, CHARLES, ET AL WHO NOTORIOUSLY VOLUBLE THAN REAL CAPABILITY FOR ACTION. ALSO BY FACT THAT GOVT HAD NOT TAKEN DECISIVE ACTION OF THIS SORT FOR SOME TIME AND DUVALIER MAY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT TIME RIPE TO REMIND DISSIDENTS THAT HE STILL IN SADDLE.

5. NO FILE. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM

PORT AU PRINCE 295

DATE: 7 APRIL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ARRESTS OF COMMERCIAL BANK OFFICERS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

MIAMI FLA.

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	1-21-70

G-5

NAI [illegible]

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters): CHARLES — First Name: JOSEPH — Middle Initial:
AKA CLEMARD, JOSEPH

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP: HAITI [redacted] [redacted]

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code): UNIVERSITY PLACE 2 E. ORANGE, NY

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL: AF 242

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE: RUE LAMARRE #2 PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI

BIRTH DATE: 10-07-39 — BIRTH PLACE: CAPOTILLE, HAITI

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION: MIAMI, FLA. 1-17-70

RW
2/5/70
REF

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION: official dur of status

DESTINATION: USA above

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

pm

cc: CIA

RW
2/18/70
REF

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

file in 201-357029

FORM I-57
(REV. 9-1-67)

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ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR, I/AN, DO4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2, ADDP

ACTION NO: WH7

S E C R E T 281630Z OCT 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6531

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFS: A. DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (N 70936)

B. DO BASE NEW YORK 7106 (N 74095)

28Oct69 N74697

1. INTERESTED TO NOTE THAT REF A CITES IDENS F AND H REF A AS ONLY POSSIBLY WITTING OF REF A PLOT, WHEREAS IDEN H IS SOURCE OF INFO ON REF B PLOT IN WHICH IDEN F IS ALLEGEDLY PRIME ACTIVIST. POSSIBILITY THUS EXISTS, IF THERE ANY VALIDITY TO EITHER REF, THAT REF B IS SIMPLY EFFORT BY IDEN H AND/OR IDEN F TO SMOKE OUT INFO ON REF A PLOT FROM EVMEND/1. EVMEND/1'S ACTION IN INFORMING IDEN H AND URGING BC TO COORDINATE WITH IDEN F SEEMS FOOLHARDY SINCE IT BROADENS SPECTRUM OF LOOSE-LIPPED HAITIANS PRIVY TO ONE OR BOTH ALLEGED PLOTS.

2. ALSO INTERESTING THAT BC EMERGES FROM BOTH REFS WITH ACTION CAPABILITY OF WHICH WE HITHERTO UNAWARE. WHILE THIS POSSIBLY MORE CASE OF EVMEND/1 ATTEMPTING CREATE IMPRESSION OF IN COUNTRY CAPABILITY THAT ACTUAL FACT, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL LIGHT 29 OCTOBER MEETING ABLE SHED ON BC PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

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ACTION NO.

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6531 SECRET

3. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS ON IMPLICATIONS FOR BC OF APPARENT RIFT BETWEEN EVMEND/1 AND EVMEND/4.

4. CONCERNING PARA 5 REF A REQUEST FOR FAST COMMO BETWEEN EVMEND HQS AND BC, HQS MAY WISH CONSIDER FLOATING FRAYNE'S NAME AS PERSONAL FRIEND OF GILBRIDE FROM SAIGON WHO RECENTLY ARRIVED LNGOLD OFFICER BUT PROBABLY WILLING PASS ON PRIVATELY ANY WORD FROM BC. THIS PLOY USEFUL IN SMOKING OUT EVMEND/1 WILLINGNESS IDENTIFY BC OPERATIVES, WHILE LEAVING FRAYNE FREE TO DISAVOW IN EVENT CIRCUMSTANCES ON GROUND SO DICTATE. THIS ALSO PRESUPPOSES EVMEND/1 CONTINUING VIABILITY AS CHANNEL TO EVMEND ORG DESPITE RIFT WITH EVMEND/4 SINCE WE SEE LITTLE VIRTUE IN OFFER OF COMMO CHANNEL BECOMING SOURCE OF FURTHER FRICTION BETWEEN VARIOUS EVMENDS.

5. FILE: 36-124-25/3.

SECRET

SECRET

27 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Chief, WH/7

REFERENCE : Your request this subject

Following our receipt of information that Clemard-Joseph Charles had taken a list of requirements into the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince and asked help in filling them, WH Division sent a memorandum on 19 August 1969 to the Chief, DCS, asking that DCS's contact with Louis A. Brun (from whom Charles had received the requirements) be terminated.

The DCS New York office on 29 August 1969 sent a memorandum to Chief, DCS, which reviewed the case, noted Brun had been guilty of sloppy security, and concluded that no further requirements would be given him. This memorandum did not, however, say that contact would be terminated; in fact, it said they would continue to debrief Brun whenever he returned from a trip to Haiti. This memorandum was sent to Port-au-Prince (HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969).

The Station replied (Port-au-Prince 6496, 11 Oct 69) that this was not enough, that the contact should be completely severed. WH/Branch 7 officers then met with Mr. George Musulin of DCS to discuss the matter further, WH/7 officers maintaining that there was more political action hazard to this contact than the FI product justified. Musulin agreed to raise the matter with C/DCS. The result was a memorandum on 16 October 1969 from C/DCS to C/WHD which referred to the original WHD memorandum of 19 August and advised that contact with Brun has been terminated. Port-au-Prince was so informed (DIR 48277, 21 Oct 69).

James P. Mullen
James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

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[illegible]

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WH 8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, DCI, ES/DO, ADDP, DDP, SDX, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO.
ECI | CI/PS, FI 2, CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, MPS/PSG 2

S E C R E T 272212Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7186 27 Oct 69 IN 74095

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

NO NIACT

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF A DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (IN 70936)

B DO BASE NEW YORK 7076 (IN 70937)

MARCEL BONT

1. SOURCE PARA 2 BELOW IS IDEN H OF REF B VIA EVMEND/1. DOI CA 25 OCTOBER.

KESNER BLAIN

2. SEPARATE PLOT FROM THAT DESCRIBED REF A IS UNDER WAY HEADED BY IDEN F REF B WITH ALLEGED SUPPORT OF UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS WHO PLANNING TO TAKE POWER USING TWO COMPANIES FROM DESSALINES BARRACKS.

BLAIN

IDEN F REQUESTS THAT EVMENDS LAUNCH FAKE INVASION PLOT DIVERSION SIMILAR TO ONES IN PAST, LETTING

BLAIN

IDEN F KNOW DATE AND PLACE INVASION SUPPOSED TO OCCUR. COUP WOULD THEN BE TIMED ACCORDINGLY.

BONT

IDEN H IMPLIED THAT COAST GUARD ONCE ALERTED COULD BE COUNTED ON TO GO ALONG WITH INSURGENTS BUT DID NOT MENTION

CAYARD

IDEN A REF B IN THIS CONTEXT.

SECRET

[illegible]

3. EVMEND/1 INFORMED IDEN H IN GENERAL TERMS THAT REF A PLOT IS JELLING AND ANY ACTION BY IDEN F GROUP AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WOULD BE MISTAKE. EVMEND/1 INFORMING BUREAU CENTRAL OF IDEN F PLANS AND URGING THEM COORDINATE, SAYS EVMENDS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO FLOAT INVASION STORY OR APPROVE ANY SUCH ATTEMPT ON PART OF EMIGRES.

4. EVMEND/4 HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED BY EVMEND/1 OF INFO PARA 2 ABOVE, ALTHOUGH EVMEND/4 AWARE THAT EVMEND/1 HAS BEEN SEEING IDEN H. EVMEND/1 HAS APPRAISED EVMEND/3 OF GENERAL FEATURES OF REF A PLAN BUT NOT OF PARA 2 ABOVE. RELATIONS BETWEEN EVMEND/1 AND EVMEND/4 APPEAR TO BE AT NADIR, HENCE SUGGEST GILBRIDE PLAN DETAILED DISCUSSION PRESENT SITUATION IN MC WITH BASE PRIOR TO AFTERNOON MEETING WITH EVMEND/1 ON 29 OCTOBER.

5. FILE: 35-124-25/3. INDEX DEFER.

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INFO FILE VR. RI/AN. DDP, ADDP, DO 4, FI 2.

232

S E C R E T 231325Z OCT 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6520

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

23 OCT 69 IN 71559

9

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 7075 (IN 70936)

1. ONLY POSSIBLE INDICATION OF REF PLOTTING IN RECENT STATION REPORTING WAS DELPHIC COMMENT BY EVLEMON/10 TO E-2 ON 21 OCTOBER THAT WHILE MEN LIKE DESINOR, RAMEAU ESTIME, FREDERIC DESVAPIEUX MANEUVER TO REPLACE DUVALIER, IT IS ARMED FORCES WHICH HAS THE LAST WORD IN SUCH MATTERS. ALSO THAT THERE ARE TIMES, IN POLITICS, WHEN E/10 MUST BE RETICENT DESPITE HIS CONFIDENCE IN E/2'S INTENTIONS, ALSO WHEN E/2 LEAST EXPECTED IT, E/10 WOULD TELL HIM EVERYTHING THAT WAS GOING ON. REMARKS WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO E/2 QUESTION ABOUT IMPACT OF RECENT NOUVEAU MONDE ARTICLE BY ANTOINE HERARD WHICH BEING INTERPRETED BY E/10 AS DUVALIER PLANT FORESHADOWING PURGE OF MORE CORRUPT ELEMENTS IN GOVT. (REACTION OF E-5, 10 AND 16 TO ARTICLE BEING DISSEMED). THUS E/10'S REMARKS MAY SIMPLY HAVE REFERRED TO THIS SORT OF PURGE INSTEAD BROADER PLOT NOTED REF.

2. FRAYNE HAS APPOINTMENT WITH IDEN B REF 0930 27 OCT TO .

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INFO

FILE VR

PAGE TWO PORT AU PRINCE 6520 SECRET

DISCUSS NEW LEASE ON HOUSE HE OCCUPYING. PLAN USE MEETING TO OPEN LOW KEY CHANNEL TO IDEN B. REALIZE THIS DUPLICATES EXISTING CHANNELS OTHER LNPURE OFFICERS AND IDEN B NOTORIOUSLY INDISCREET, BUT MAY BE OF VALUE IF REF PLOT JELLS.

3. ALSO PLAN PAY COURTESY CALL ON IDEN A WHO LIVES TWO HOUSES AWAY IN CONTEXT GETTING ACQUAINTED WITH NEIGHBORS.

4. RE IDEN I WHO ENCRYPTED EVLEAF/1, BELIEVE UPCOMING PERLITE ONE VISIT MAY AFFORD CHANCE GET FIRST HAND READING HIS VIEWS. OR FRAYNE MAY APPROACH DIRECTLY AS PERSON TEEGAST SUGGESTED WAS WELL INFORMED ON HAITIAN AFFAIRS. PLS ADVISE IF HQS HAS OBJECTIONS TO LATTER TACK.

5. ACCORDING MILATT, IDEN D REF IS PROBABLY MAJOR JEAN THOMAS, PDOB, ST. MARC, HAITI, 5 JUN 35, GRADUATED HAITIAN MILITARY ACADEMY '56.

6. UPON CLEARANCE FROM HQS, WILL PASS SUBSTANCE PARAS 2 AND 3 REF TO CHARGE. ALSO PLEASE ADVISE WHEN LNGOLD INFORMED.

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #179 **SECRET** 23

ORIG. BERYL E. BACKMAN
UNIT WH/7 REPORTS/HAITI
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DATE 23 OCTOBER 1969

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WH/7/R	1		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
DO BASE NEW YORK 7075
(IN 70936)
EVMEND (EVMEND-1)

LIAISON: *

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DR Wilson
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23 21 01 z Oct 69

CITE TDCS-314/15048-69

DIST 23 OCTOBER 1969

COUNTRY HAITI

DOI MID-AUGUST - MID-OCTOBER 1969

SUBJECT PLANS BY HAITIAN MILITARY OFFICER TO OVERTHROW THE DUVALIER GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A JUNTA

ACQ (23 OCTOBER 1969) **FIELD NO.**

SOURCE A YOUNG HAITIAN EXILE LEADER WHO IS WELL EDUCATED AND WHO HAS A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS IN HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM ONE OF HIS CONTACTS INSIDE HAITI WHO HAS BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PLOTTING. SOURCE WAS AWARE THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

1. ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC DATE HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE ACTION, COL. OCTAVE CAYARD, COMMANDER OF THE COAST GUARD, GEN. GERARD CONSTANT, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND COL. GRACIA JACQUES, COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, ARE LAYING PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT FRANCOIS

DUVALIER AND TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AS A JUNTA. THE PLOT IS BEING HEADED BY CAYARD AND IS BEING FINANCED BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF HAITI, IN THE AMOUNT OF $600,000.

2. IN THE ORIGINAL PLAN, THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WAS REGARDED AS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN AND, THEREFORE, CAYARD AND CONSTANT AGREED TO INCLUDE JACQUES IN THE JUNTA ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS A NECESSARY EVIL. CAYARD'S ONLY CONTACT WITH JACQUES, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INDIRECTLY THROUGH CAPTAIN THOMAS (FNU). (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THOMAS PROBABLY IS IDENTICAL WITH MAJOR JEAN THOMAS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.)

3. BESIDES THE ASSISTANCE THE PLOTTERS HAVE OBTAINED FROM INSIDE HAITI, THEY ALSO ARE SEEKING SUPPORT FROM HAITIAN EXILES WHO ACTIVELY OPPOSE THE DUVALIER REGIME.

4. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-MAY 1969, A MILITARY JUNTA, WHICH INCLUDED CAYARD AND CONSTANT, WAS BEING FORMED TO OVERTHROW THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT. AT THAT TIME, IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THE GROUP HAD ACTUALLY APPROACHED JACQUES, BUT IT WAS THOUGHT THAT AS COMMANDER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO

OFFER NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR THEIR PLAN. SEE TDCS-314/07619-69. THE PLANNING IN MID-MAY 1969 WAS FOR ACTION IN THE EVENT OF DUVALIER'S DEATH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESENT PLOT IS IN FACT ONLY A CONTINUATION OF THAT CONTINGENCY PLANNING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT PORT AU PRINCE AND SANTO DOMINGO)

3

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FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, C/WH, [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, [illegible], C/CA, [illegible]

ACTION NO. 101

FI 2

SECRET 221622Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7876 (ALLENSWORTH ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

22 Oct 69 IN 70937

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REF DO BASE NEW YORK 7875 (IN 70936)

IDENS

A. OCTAVE CAYARD

B. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

C. GENERAL CONSTANT

D. CAPTAIN FNU THOMAS, PROBABLY JEAN

E. GRACIA JACQUES

F. KESNER BLAIN

G. ROLAND MAGLOIRE

H. MARCEL BONY

I. BERTHONY MADHERE

J. FNU RIGAUD

K. FRITZ HYACINTHE, DOB CA 1929, CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF HUBERT LEGROS, EMPLOYED EITHER AT BANQUE COLOMBO-HAITIENE OR BANQUE NATIONALE DE LA REPUBLIQUE.

L. WILNER CADET, BROTHER OF FRANCKEL, DPOB CANADA, 21 JUNE 1936, EMPLOYED SNEM PORT AU PRINCE.

SECRET BT

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | FILE, VR. DO 3, ADDP, CI/OPS, DO 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CA 5, CA/PEG, FI 2

ACTION NO. 82

S E C R E T 221621Z OCT 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7275 (ALLENSWORTH

CTING)

RIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PORT AU PRINCE

KULE DOMOPS EVMEND

220ct69 N 70536

EF DO BASE NEW YORK 7275 (N 70937)

1. SOURCE PARAS 2 THRU 4 BELOW IS BUREAU CENTRAL (BC) REPORTS ATED 16 SEPT THRU 11 OCTOBER. REPORTS ENCODED IN PRIVATE NUMERICAL CDE USED BETWEEN EVMENDS AND BC, MAILED TO EVMEND/1 COVERT LETTER ROP WHICH SAME AS THAT USED BY EVMOUNT/1.

2. IDENS A, C AND E PLANNING OVERTHROW DUVALIER AND SET UP LVES AS JUNTA. TIMING NOT GIVEN. IDEN B FINANCING THE PLOT TO UNE OF $600,000. INSIDE WITTING PARTIES ARE IDENS D AND POSSIBLY F. TSIDE WITTING PARTIES ARE EVMENT/1, EVMEND/4 IDEN G, AND POSSIBLY EN H WHO BROTHER OF IDEN F.

3. CHRONOLOGY OF BC INVOLVEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: 21 AUG, BC ETING WITH IDEN B, WHO INDICATED HE PLANNING SUPPORT COUP WHICH CIPIENT BUT NEEDS HELP IN REMOVING OBSTACLE OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. GAVE HIM NAMES OF RELIABLE INDIVIDUALS AT SPECIFIC POSTS AND GGESTED APPROACH TO IDEN E VIA IDEN D. 11 SEPTEMBER, BC MEETING TH IDEN B WHO REVEALED THAT HE DEALING WITH IDEN C. BC PLACED

AGE 2 OO BASE NEW YORK 6?75 S E C R E T

TO INDIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN C VIA IDEN I. 16 OR 17 SEPTEMBER, C CONTACT WITH IDEN I, LEARNED THAT IDEN A IS HEADING PLOT. BC SKED FOR CONTACT WITH IDEN A. 25 SEPTEMBER AND 2 OCTOBER, BC EETING WITH IDEN A. 23 SEPTEMBER, LAST BC MEETING WITH IDEN B. ROM THAT DATE TO 11 OCTOBER ONLY BC CONTACT WAS IDEN A. AS OF 11 CTOBER BC FELT HAD COMPLETED BROKER ROLE IN PLAN AND UNDERSTANDS HAT IDENS A AND C AGREED TO INCLUSION OF IDEN E IN JUNTA ON GROUNDS HIS NECESSARY EVIL. IDEN A MAINTAINS INDIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN E IA IDEN D. IDEN C IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH IDEN I. NAMES OF ITTING GUARDS OTHER THAN IDEN D NOT DISCLOSED BY BC TO EVMENDS.

4. BC MEMBER WHO CARRYING BALL THIS OP IS IDEN J.

5. BC REQUESTS FOLLOWING ACTION FROM EVMENDS: ESTABLISHMENT OF AST TWO-WAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN BC AND EVMENDS HQ, AND AUNCHING OF DIVERSIONARY ACTION TO DISTRACT DUVALIER ATTENTION. MENDS 1 AND 4 REQUEST RVROCK ASSISTANCE ON FIRST ITEM AND ADVICE N SECOND.

6. EVMOUNT/1 PLANNING TRIP TO NYC 2 NOVEMBER. EVMENDS WOULD CCEPT HIM AS COMMO LINK TO BC BUT UNSURE HOW BC WOULD REACT TO AKING HIM WITTING. EVMEND/1 PROPOSES TWO OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR NTERMEDIARY, IDENS K AND L, COULD ASCERTAIN FROM BC BY TELEPHONE HETHER EITHER OR BOTH ABLE TRAVEL TO US ON SHORT NOTICE. EVMEND/4 TTITUDE THESE CANDIDATES NOT YET KNOWN.

7. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVMEND/1 AND GILBRIDE FOR 29 CTOBER. WILL ADVISE RE EVMEND/4 AVAILABILITY 30 OCTOBER. LELAND MEETING EVMEND/4 23 OCTOBER.

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ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1969

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SECRET 21 23 41z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 48277

TO PORT AU PRINCE

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6496 (IN 63672)*

1. ON 16 OCTOBER, WODISH ADVISED AKULE THAT IT HAD TERMINATED CONTACT WITH SUBJECT OF REF.

2. FILE: 201-357029.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Subject of Ref is Louis A. BRUN, contact of Clemard Joseph CHARLES.

SM

AN UP
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[illegible]
~~IT~~
WH/7/HT

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

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201-357029

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ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
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WH/7/HT
Chief
Int
Ext
I/A
P/P
Sec
File

WH COMMENT: *Subject of Ref is Louis A. BRUN, contact of Clesard Joseph CHARLES.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
DCS Contact With Louis A. Brun

FROM: GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg	EXTENSION 2268	NO. Case 47540	DATE 16 October 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	10/16	10/16		See Attached Memorandum.
2. Acting Chief, WH Division 3 D 3107 Headquarters				
3. C/WH/F1 Haiti	20 OCT 1969	20		
4. C/WH/7	21 OCT 1969			
5. C/WH/7		21 Oct		
6. DC/WH/7		21 OCT 1969		
7. C/WH/7/Haiti		21 OCT 1969		Pls. advise P-au-Prince. Done - by DIRECTOR 48277 dtd 21 Oct 1969
8. Ruth				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

16 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : DCS Contact With Louis A. Brun

REFERENCE : 19 August 1969 Memorandum To DCS From WH

We have terminated contact with Louis A. Brun.

JAMES R. MURPHY
Director
Domestic Contact Service

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SECRET 102219Z OCT 1969 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6496

(CHAIDEZ ACTING)

11 OCT 69 IN 63672

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REF: HTPW-1347, 17 SEP 69

1. APPRECIATE REF RESPONSE BUT CANNOT SEE HOW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WODISH DCS AND LOUIS A. BRUN IS ALTERED TO ANY APPREICABLE DEGREE THROUGH NEW HANDLING PROCEDURES NOR IS THE POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE LESSENED. THE FINE NUANCES RE WODISH HANDLING OF BRUN (DEBRIEFING BUT NO BRIEFING) MAY BE UNDERSTANDABLE TO US BUT WILL BE UTTERLY MEANINGLESS SHOULD BRUN WIND UP IN FRONT OF A FIRING SQUAD. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DO NOT SEE HOW RVROCK WOULD BE IN POSITION TO DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRUN'S INVOLVEMENT.

2. HARDLY A WEEK GOES BY BUT THAT LNPURE IS NOT MADE AWARE OF ANOTHER PLOTTING EFFORT BY CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER. CHARLES PLOTTING EFFORTS HAVE AGAIN REACHED A PITCH STRANGELY REMINISCENT OF THE ONE WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDED HIS ARREST IN 1967. CHARLES NOW CLAIMS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN POLICE, COAST

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INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 PORT AU PRINCE 6496 SECRET

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SECRET 102219Z OCT 1969 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6496
PREN

(CHAIDEZ ACTING)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

11Oct69 63672

WH/7/HT

C

REF: HTPW-1347, 17 SEP 69

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11 Oct 69

Charles C.

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7. FILE : 201-357029.

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UNIT: WH/7/HT
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15 17 52Z [illegible] 69

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY PORT AU PRINCE INFO: SANTO DOMINGO DO BASE NEW YORK

AIGIE 02378

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6024 (IN 57320)*

1. GIVEN BELOW IS TEXT OF DCS REPORT CONCERNING REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH U.S. OFFICIAL. DCS REPORT CAME FROM LOUIS A. BRUN ON BEHALF OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES. BRUN IS CHARLES' NEW YORK LAWYER AND BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVE. DCS WAS ADVISED THAT WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN CONTACTING ANY REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF PLOTTING GROUP.

2. DIFFICULT AT THIS STAGE TO DETERMINE DEGREE (IF ANY) CHARLES INVOLVED IN PLOT. THERE GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT CHARLES HAS ONLY HEARD OF PLOT AND ATTEMPTING TO ACT AS BROKER BETWEEN PLOTTERS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR OWN INTERESTS. IN MID-67, CHARLES USED THE BRUN-DCS CHANNEL IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ONE OF HIS PLOTS.

3. LAHENS, FNU, MENTIONED IN DCS REPORT PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ALPHONSE LAHENS, FORMER DEPUTY FROM ARCAHAIE, WHO IN JUN 68 WAS REPORTED BY DCS TO BE ORGANIZING PLOT

Continued. . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S E C R E T PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 02376

WITH GENERAL CONSTANT, COLONEL BLAIN, AND OTHERS. CF. PORT AU PRINCE 5247 (IN 40288) (NOT SENT DO BASE NEW YORK). NO TRACES EDGARD BONI. PLS PASS REPORT TO AMBASSADOR ROSS. HQS SENDING COPY TO ARA/CAR. REPORT FOLLOWS:

4. ONE OF THE UNDERGROUND OPPOSITION GROUPS IN HAITI IS CENTERED IN THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: LAHENS, FNU (FORMER DEPUTY, NOW IN SEMI-HIDING); COLONEL KESNER BLAIN (HEAD OF ARMY QUARTERMASTER WAREHOUSES); COLONEL CAYARD (HEAD OF THE COAST GUARD): CONSTANT, FNU (CHIEF OF STAFF). THEY WISH TO ORGANIZE A JUNTA, FOLLOWING THE DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF HAITIAN PRESIDENT DUVALIER, AND EXERCISE POWER DURING TRANSITION PERIOD. FOLLOWING TRANSITION PERIOD, THIS GROUP WISHES TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS AND THEN RETIRE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY. LAHENS WOULD LIKE TO BECOME A MINISTER. BLAIN WOULD LIKE DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENT. CAYARD WOULD LIKE TO RETIRE TO HIS CATTLE RANCH. THE GROUP HAS NO PARTICULAR CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.

5. THIS GROUP ALLEGES THAT IT COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT AMONG ARMY PERSONNEL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE AND IN THE HAITIAN HINTERLAND. THE GROUP IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO WORK WITH ANY

Continued.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FILE, VR.

CITE DIRECTOR 82376

SECRET PAGE THREE

OTHER NON-HAITIAN POWER.

6. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE PLAN OF THIS GROUP WAS TO SIT BACK, WAIT FOR INTERNAL UPHEAVALS AND THEN MOVE IN TO ASSUME POWER. THEY DID NOT WANT TO ACT ON THEIR OWN, BUT PREFERRED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN INTERNAL UPHEAVAL CREATED BY SOMEBODY ELSE.

7. THE MOST RECENT RUMORS CONCERNING PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S HEALTH HAVE, HOWEVER, CAUSED THE GROUP TO CHANGE ITS MIND. THE MEMBERS NOW DECLARE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT AS SOON AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER "GOES ON THE OPERATING TABLE" THEY WILL MOVE.

8. THE GROUP RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES LIE IN ITS PATH AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER IN SECRET WITH A U.S. ENVOY. WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY TO THIS ENVOY IS NOT KNOWN.

9. THE GROUP HAS ORGANIZED THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR THE ENVOY TO FOLLOW. FIRST, HE MUST SEND A CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING CABLE ADDRESS: ETHLAHAB, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI.

CONTINUED. . . .

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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GROUP 1
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SECRET PAGE FOUR

CITE DIRECTOR

2376

THE CABLE MUST READ AS FOLLOWS: "ARRIVING ON (LIST DATE) TO DISCUSS THE SISAL DEAL. PLEASE RESERVE ROOM FOR ME AT THE SANS SOUCI HOTEL." THE NAME SIGNED TO THE CABLE DOES NOT MATTER. THE CABLE ADDRESS IS THAT OF ESTABLISSEMENTS LAKERE-BLAIN & CO., PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI. SECOND, HE MUST REGISTER AT THE SANS SOUCI AND AWAIT CALL OR VISIT FROM MAN NAMED EDGARD BONI. BONI IS KESNER BLAIN'S BROTHER. THE ORIGINAL FAMILY NAME IS "BONI"; BLAIN CHANGED HIS NAME. BONI WILL EITHER TAKE THE ENVOY TO TALK TO CONSTANT OR WILL INFORM HIM OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE INTERVIEW. THE ONLY PERSON PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW WILL BE CONSTANT AND THE ENVOY. THIRD, WHEN THE ENVOY MEETS CONSTANT HE MUST ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES BY SAYING "I HAVE BEEN SENT BY MR. EISENHOWER TO DISCUSS SISAL." THE KEY WORD IS "EISENHOWER."

10. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, BUT NOT MANDATORY, IF THE SECRET U.S. ENVOY WAS ABLE TO SPEAK FRENCH." (END OF REPORT)

11. FILE : 30-0-6.

CONTINUED. . . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE FIVE

CITE DIRECTOR

C2376

*WH COMMENT: On 10 May, Clemard Joseph Charles told Embassy Officer and COS of plot against Duvalier. Date of plot may be advanced now that Duvalier is ill.

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/DDP

THOMAS S. CLAYTON
AC/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO

FROM

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HTPA 2457, 19 August 1969
B. DIRECTOR 26288, 1 August 1969
C. PORT AU PRINCE 6323, 29 July 1969
D. HTPA 2443, 29 July 1969

1. Headquarters agrees with Station that the continued contact between Subject of 201-357029 and IDEN A, on behalf of WODISH, poses a potential security threat for the LNHARP components in Haiti. Upon receipt of Ref C, the Desk sent a memorandum to Chief, WODISH, on 19 August 1969, which forwarded a resume of the Ref C information, and requested that the contact between IDEN A and Subject on behalf of WODISH be terminated.

2. On 29 August 1969, the WODISH officer who is in contact with IDEN, replied to the Desk's memorandum as follows.

"a. We (WODISH) have carefully considered the Desk's comments re IDEN A and his relationship with Subject. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti, IDEN A has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and (we) have decided to modify our relationship with him.

"b. Subject has never doubted that IDEN A represented a channel to LNHARP authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the LNPURE staff in Port au Prince. IDEN A

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER Continued. . . . . .
IDENS

Distribution:
2 - Port au Prince w/att U/S/C

23 SEP 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HTPW-1347

DATE
17 September 1969

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S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-357029

① RI
1 - WH/7/HT

IP
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AS
RF
PI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/7/HT/Ruth Lehman:gt TYPIST EXT. 5595

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7	18-9-69	David L. Snock

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

was originally introduced to WODISH in New York City by Subject on 15 April 1966. Until the early fall of 1967, much of WODISH activity with IDEN A was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of LNHARP, which IDEN A requested on behalf of Subject, and reporting operational information. To the best of WODISH knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Subject's various schemes. With two exceptions, WODISH relationship with IDEN A since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Subject's request for a secret meeting with a WOLADY envoy in May 1969, and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, IDEN A made it perfectly clear to WODISH and to Subject and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We (WODISH) simply transmitted the request. We wish to point out that what the Desk calls IDEN's "Lobbying" for Subject ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which the contact in the WODISH New York Office has dealt with IDEN A, the latter has never sponsored or "lobbied" for Subject's various schemes. IDEN A has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told WODISH repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Subject.

"c. We wish also to point out that IDEN A, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Subject, and, therefore, IDEN A is not merely Subject's mouthpiece. Specifically, IDEN B and IDEN C are two of IDEN A's Haitian sources. IDEN B is a well-known Haitian businessman; IDEN C is a former deputy.

"d. We (WODISH) are not concerned with Subject, but are very much so with IDEN A. We do not believe that IDEN A is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which IDEN A handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request IDEN A to consult Subject about the requirements on foreign companies and, in view of the manner in which IDEN A handled our requirements, we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti, and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our WOROMP customers to give us an evaluation of IDEN A's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit IDEN A in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between IDEN A and Subject is concerned, (1) we cannot prevent IDEN A from talking to Subject (or anybody else), but (2) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that IDEN A contact Subject on behalf of WODISH."

3. To date, the WOROMP evaluation of IDEN A's reporting has not been received. However, since WODISH has agreed to refrain from briefing IDEN A prior to any future trips he may make to Haiti, there should be no recurrence of the type of situation described in Ref C.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

201-357[illegible]

Attachment: U/S/C
HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969

IDENTITIES: A. Louis A. Brun

B. Louis Leveque

C. Alfonse Lahens

CS COPY

U/C ATT 1 TO HTPW 1347

201-357029

WH/7/HT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

TO

Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO.

FROM

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HTPA 2457, 19 August 1969
B. DIRECTOR 26288, 1 August 1969
C. PORT AU PRINCE 6323, 29 July 1969
D. HTPA 2443, 29 July 1969

1. Headquarters agrees with Station that the continued contact between Subject of 201-357029 and IDEN A, on behalf of WODISH, poses a potential security threat for the LNHARP components in Haiti. Upon receipt of Ref C, the Desk sent a memorandum to Chief, WODISH, on 19 August 1969, which forwarded a resume of the Ref C information, and requested that the contact between IDEN A and Subject on behalf of WODISH be terminated.

2. On 29 August 1969, the WODISH officer who is in contact with IDEN, replied to the Desk's memorandum as follows.

"a. We (WODISH) have carefully considered the Desk's comments re IDEN A and his relationship with Subject. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti, IDEN A has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and (we) have decided to modify our relationship with him.

"b. Subject has never doubted that IDEN A represented a channel to LNHARP authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the LNPURE staff in Port au Prince. IDEN A

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
IDENS

Continued. . . . . .

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HTPW-1347

DATE

23 SEP 1969

17 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-357029

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST

WH/7/HT/Ruth Lehman:gt

EXT.

5595

1 - RI
① - WH/7/HT

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7		David L. Smock

FORM 1-67 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

was originally introduced to WODISH in New York City by Subject on 15 April 1966. Until the early fall of 1967, much of WODISH activity with IDEN A was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of LNHARP, which IDEN A requested on behalf of Subject, and reporting operational information. To the best of WODISH knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Subject's various schemes. With two exceptions, WODISH relationship with IDEN A since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Subject's request for a secret meeting with a WOLADY envoy in May 1969, and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, IDEN A made it perfectly clear to WODISH and to Subject and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We (WODISH) simply transmitted the request. We wish to point out that what the Desk calls IDEN's "Lobbying" for Subject ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which the contact in the WODISH New York Office has dealt with IDEN A, the latter has never sponsored or "lobbied" for Subject's various schemes. IDEN A has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told WODISH repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Subject.

"c. We wish also to point out that IDEN A, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Subject, and, therefore, IDEN A is not merely Subject's mouthpiece. Specifically, IDEN B and IDEN C are two of IDEN A's Haitian sources. IDEN B is a well-known Haitian businessman; IDEN C is a former deputy.

"d. We (WODISH) are not concerned with Subject, but are very much so with IDEN A. We do not believe that IDEN A is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which IDEN A handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request IDEN A to consult Subject about the requirements on foreign companies and, in view of the manner in which IDEN A handled our requirements, we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti, and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our WOROMP customers to give us an evaluation of IDEN A's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit IDEN A in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between IDEN A and Subject is concerned, (1) we cannot prevent IDEN A from talking to Subject (or anybody else), but (2) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that IDEN A contact Subject on behalf of WODISH."

3. To date, the WOROMP evaluation of IDEN A's reporting has not been received. However, since WODISH has agreed to refrain from briefing IDEN A prior to any future trips he may make to Haiti, there should be no recurrence of the type of situation described in Ref C.

Attachment: U/S/C
HTPW-1347, 17 Sept 1969

IDENTITIES: A. Louis A. Brun

B. Louis Leveque

C. Alfonse Lahens

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

NY#632-69

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service DATE: 29 August 1969

ATTN: OSS (Musulin)

FROM : Chief, New York Field Office

SUBJECT: DCS Relationship with Louis A. Brun
Ref: WH/7 Memoranda, 28 May 69, and 19 Aug 69, same subject

1. We have carefully considered WH/7's comments about Louis A. Brun and his relationship with Clemard Joseph Charles. We have concluded that in the matter of the nine questions concerning the activity of foreign companies in Haiti Brun has been guilty at least of sloppy security procedures and have decided to modify our relationship with him.

2. Charles has never doubted that Brun represented a channel to US government authority which he could use to supplement his contacts with members of the US Embassy staff in Port-au-Prince. Brun was originally introduced to DCS in New York City by Charles on 15 Apr 1966 (see memorandum NY-251-66). Until the early fall of 1967, much of our activity with Brun was devoted to arranging contacts with various elements of the US government, which Brun requested on behalf of Charles, and reporting operational information. To the best of our knowledge and belief, however, none of these contacts produced any tangible assistance to Charles's various schemes. With two exceptions, our relationship with Brun since October 1967 has been exclusively that of foreign intelligence collection. The exceptions were Charles's request for a secret meeting with a US envoy in May 1969 and an independent similar request from another group in the same month. As has been fully reported, Brun made it perfectly clear to us and to Charles and to the other group that he was acting only as a channel and that he was not actively involved or interested. We simply transmitted the requests. We wish to point out that what WH/7 calls Brun's "Lobbying" for Charles ended before October 1967. During the nearly two years in which Mitchell has dealt with Brun, the latter has never sponsored or "Lobbied" for Charles's various schemes. He has occasionally relayed information concerning them, but has told us repeatedly that he no longer wishes to be involved politically with Charles.

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

3. We wish also to point out that Brun, as a regular supplier of foreign intelligence on Haiti, has supplied data which originate with Haitians other than Charles, and, therefore, that Brun is not merely Charles's mouthpiece. Specifically, Louis Leveque and Alfonse Lahens are two of Brun's Haitian sources. Leveque is a well-known Haitian businessman; Lahens is a former deputy.

4. We are not concerned with Charles, but are very much so with Brun. We do not believe that Brun is involved in any current revolutionary scheme in Haiti. We are, however, disturbed at the unprofessional way in which Brun handled the questions concerning foreign companies in Haiti. We did not request Brun to consult Charles about the requirements on foreign companies and in view of the manner in which Brun handled our requirements we shall continue only to accept information which he proffers on his return from his frequent trips to Haiti and shall refrain from briefing him. We have requested our DD/I consumers to give us an evaluation of Brun's intelligence reporting. Unless this evaluation is unfavorable, we shall continue to exploit Brun in the manner just described. Insofar as contact between Brun and Charles is concerned, (a) we cannot prevent Brun from talking to Charles (or anybody else) but (b) we have never in the past and shall not in the future request that Brun contact Charles on behalf of DCS.

6. Please pass the foregoing information to WH/7.

JACKSON R. HORTON

JHMitchell:kf

File: Louis A. Brun, President
B&B International Corporation
230 Fifth Avenue
New York City

14-00000

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/24207-69

SUBJECT New Opposition Group Allied With Clemard Joseph Charles/Outline of Charles's Future Political Plans

DATE DISTR. 27 AUG 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES
Supplement to: 00-B-321/06913-69
00-B-321/14515-69

DATE OF INFO. Late Jul 69

C-DC9-55300

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince/Late Jul 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. Opponents of Haitian President Francois Duvalier have formed a new political opposition group. The following are members: Colonel Cayard (Commandant of the Haitian Coast Guard); Captain Daniel (assistant to Cayard); Gerard Constant (Haitian Army Chief of Staff); Colonel Kesner Blain (in charge of Haitian Army quartermaster depots); and Colonel Gracia Jacques (Commandant of the Presidential Palace Guard). [See 00-B-321/06913-69 (paragraph 2-e) and 00-B-321/14515-69 (paragraph 3) for earlier data concerning some of the members of this group.]

2. This group is now working with Clemard Joseph Charles and has formulated, largely under the direction of the latter, a tentative political plan for the organization of a post-Duvalier Haiti. The group is anxious to act, because some of the members, notably Daniel and Cayard, fear that they will be arrested in the not-too-distant future. The entire membership displays, however, the trait common to all Haitian opposition groups: they will not act until President Duvalier dies, becomes totally incapacitated or is overthrown by somebody else. Jacques is an important addition to the group. He is completely loyal to President Duvalier, but has no use for the other members of the Duvalier family. Consequently, he will play no active part unless the President in some manner disappears from the scene.

3. This group still wishes to exercise power during a transitional period following President Duvalier's departure [see 00-B-321/14515-69 (paragraph 3)]. Charles does not want to hold any political appointment during this transition period, but plans to recover his position as the head of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce and travel abroad, to raise money for foreign economic assistance to Haiti. He plans to establish a political party, to be known as TOP (Travail,

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GROUP 1
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The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

CHARLES

Ordre, Progres). Charles hopes that TOP will become one of two or three political parties in the post-Duvalier period and is convinced that TOP will win a constitutional victory at the polls and propel him to power. In the meantime, Colonel Kesner Blain will be the head of the provisional government. Blain has no long-range political ambitions. Charles and his colleagues plan a new constitution for Haiti, which will provide for a President and for a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will exercise the effective power. Charles expects that TOP's electoral victory will make him, as TOP's leader, Prime Minister in the new constitutional government.

4. Reportedly, Charles recently received from the US (no additional data available) the sum of US$230 thousand. This money is to be used to finance the overthrow of President Duvalier. I cannot confirm the accuracy of this reported gift.

-end-

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1969

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CITE DIRECTOR 31845

TO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 31844 *

IDENTITY: MR. JOHN MITCHELL

END OF MESSAGE

WH/7/Ht
Chief
Int
Ext
I/A
R/O
Sec
File

*Cable Secretariat: Pls insert DIR number.

WALTER O'BRIEN
C/DOI/2
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Robert H. Riefe
JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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COPY NO.

CHARLES

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TOTAL COPIES: 19

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ORIG: R. LEHMAN:gt
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 1349-5595
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1969

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Chief
IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR
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31847

TO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 26288

1. ON 21 AUGUST, IDEN, WODISH NEW YORK REP WHO ~~HANDLES~~ IN CONTACT WITH RR LOUIS A. BRUN, SUBJECT OF REF, PHONED WODISH WASHINGTON OFFICE TO INQUIRE IF EVMEND-1 OR THE EVMEND ORGANIZATION WAS OF INTEREST TO RVROCK. BASIS FOR INQUIRY IS THAT BRUN HAS REPEATEDLY MENTIONED TO IDEN THAT EVMEND-1 AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN EXILE WORK IN NEW YORK AND THAT BRUN SUSPECTS THEY HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH RVROCK. WODISH REPS SPECULATE THAT BRUN SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF RVROCK CONNECTION AND THAT BRUN MAY TRY PENETRATE EVMEND ORGANIZATION.

2. WODISH WASHINGTON REP WAS INFORMED THAT EVMEND-1 AND HIS ORGANIZATION ARE OF INTEREST TO WOMACE AND THAT IDEN SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING ANY CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH THEM. WODISH AGREED PASS ABOVE TO IDEN AND SUGGEST WODISH RELATIONS WITH BRUN BE DISCONTINUED.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE, REQUEST CLELAND TELL EVMEND-1

CONTINUED.....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TO 31844

DROP ANY CONTACT HE MAY HAVE WITH BRUN, SINCE BRUN SUSPECTS HE CONNECTED WITH RVROCK AND MAY BE TRYING CONFIRM.

4. FILE: 36-124-25/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * BRUN, who collaborator of Clemard Joseph CHARLES on political matters in Haiti, is contact of WODISH, N.Y. office.

DOI/B2

W. J. O'Brien

WALTER O'BRIEN
C/DOI/2

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

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19 AUG 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact with
Louis A. Brun/Clemard Joseph Charles

1. On 29 July 1969, Station Port au Prince advised that Clemard Joseph Charles had passed a list of nine questions concerning the Haitian economy to an official of the United States Embassy in Port au Prince. The list of questions was written in English in standard U.S. Government format and, although sterile, appeared to be intelligence requirements. Charles told the Embassy official that he had just finished a "big job" for the Pentagon and implied that the list also came from the Pentagon. The Embassy official suspected that Charles had passed a copy of the list to the National Palace.

2. On 2 August, a representative of the WH/Haiti Desk contacted Mr. George Musulin, Operational Support Staff of DCS, and learned that the DCS office in New York had briefed Mr. Louis A. Brun and had orally passed a list of CIRL requirements to Brun concerning Haiti prior to his trip to Haiti during the week of 21 July. Mr. Musulin speculated that Brun had probably noted the DCS requirements on paper and then had passed a copy to Charles upon his arrival in Haiti.

3. For a number of years, the United States Government has been aware of the political ambitions of Charles and his alleged plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime. In 1967, this rather open plotting led to his imprisonment for over one year. Also, since May 1963, Charles has been trying to obtain support from the United States Government for his plots but he has been consistently rebuffed. Charles is not held in high esteem by U.S. officials and his motives are highly questionable. He owes his position in Haiti to his relationship with Duvalier and his ability to successfully manage some of

SECRET

Charles file

the more notorious financial rackets of the regime. Charles enjoys no political following and even the "plots" with which he is associated are viewed with considerable reserve. For example, we have never been able to confirm that Charles was involved with the "military junta" formed in May 1969, as he claimed. In February 1969, the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince commented that, with regard to the most recent plotting of Charles, "the possibility cannot be excluded that Charles....could be a provocation to determine the real motives of the United States Government towards the Duvalier regime." We concur in the Embassy's views.

4. During the past three years, the WH Division has been kept advised of the contact between DCS and Brun and his relationship with Charles. We are also aware from DCS and other sources of the efforts by Brun to obtain support from the United States Government for Charles. Brun is, of course, a close collaborator of Charles and a business representative of his in New York City. Brun has contacted officials of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and even a person with access to President Johnson on Charles' behalf. The Chief of Caribbean Affairs of the Department of State categorically told Brun in June 1967 that the United States Government was not interested in supporting the plots of Charles or anyone else against Duvalier, but this advice seems to have fallen on deaf ears. The most recent example of Brun's lobbying was in May 1969 when Brun passed on to DCS a request from Charles for a secret meeting between a U.S. envoy and a representative of the "military junta." Brun's involvement with Charles requires that he be considered a biased source of information. While some of the information Brun has obtained from Charles has been of interest, there is hardly anything that was not available through other channels and indeed, much of it was slanted.

5. As was set forth in WH/7 memoranda to the Operational Support Staff, DCS, on 16 July 1968 and 28 May 1969, we interpose no objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, the

relationship between Brun and Charles has now taken on operational characteristics (agent/sub-agent) with Brun levying requirements on Charles in Haiti to service on behalf of DCS. The relationship between Brun and Charles also has manifested political and security aspects which could adversely affect the interests of the United States Government regarding Haiti. Accordingly, we request that the contact between Brun and Charles on behalf of DCS be terminated.

Signed John R. Horton

John R. Horton
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/7/Ht: R.Berg gt

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - C/WHD
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- 1 - WH/Registry
- 1 - WH/7/HT (CHARLES)

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Port au Prince

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 26288 dated 1 August 1969

B. HTPA-2443 dated 29 July 1969

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paragraph 5.

1. The Station would like to offer its views on the WODISH contact, through Identity of Paragraph 1 Reference A (hereinafter IDEN), with 201-357029, as well as on the question of the requirements which 201-357029 gave LNPURE and which were forwarded to Headquarters in Reference B.

2. Since IDEN has been told that his contact is with LNSHOE and since he has told 201-357029 that fact, and since 201-357029 has apparently, in his mind at least, converted that fact into contact with RVROCK, and has probably spread both stories with his associates and thereby throughout the local milieu, we have, in effect, a dangerous security situation. When we consider that the LNPURE receives all the information that 201-357029 gives IDEN anyway, and most of the time receives the information directly from 201-357029, then we have an operation that is difficult to justify.

3. In the case of the requirements forwarded with Reference B, we have a situation in which WODISH levied requirements on 201-357029, through IDEN. 201-357029 then turned those requirements over to LNPURE which returned them via 201-357029 and IDEN to WODISH. Why not cut out the middleman and the security complications, and save the headaches?

4. The Station feels that the WODISH handling of 201-357029 results in a case that has the potential of causing severe problems for AKULE, and that it could well be that AKULE will be made to bear the blame since elements within RVROCK might feel that the ultimate responsibility for supervision of the case lies with AKULE.

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HTPA-2457

DATE
19 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-357029

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HTPA-2457

5. We would appreciate obtaining Headquarters' views on our thoughts as expressed above as well as on what seems to be a contradiction between Reference A, paragraph 2 and the evidence presented in Reference B Attachment. It appears unlikely to us that IDEN could have typed the Attachment.

Vincent H. RACICOT

201-357029

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 17 AUGUST 1962

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

FBI FILE NO: 105-6311 (MIAMI)

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-134

DATE: 13 AUGUST 1969

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

SUBJECT: FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF CLEMARD
JOSEPH CHARLES

SECRET

Aug 4, 69

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Contact with Louis A. Brun/Clemard Joseph Charles

1. On 29 July 1969, Station Port au Prince advised that Clemard Joseph Charles had passed a list of nine questions concerning the Haitian economy to an official of the United States Embassy in Port au Prince. The list of questions was written in English in standard U.S. Government format and, although sterile, appeared to be intelligence requirements. Charles told the Embassy official that he had just finished a "big job" for the Pentagon and implied that the list also came from the Pentagon. The Embassy official suspected that Charles had passed a copy of the list to the National Palace.

2. On 2 August, a representative of the WH/Haiti Desk contacted Mr. George Musulin, Operational Support Staff of DCS, and learned that the DCS office in New York had briefed Mr. Louis A. Brun and had orally passed a list of CIRL requirements to Brun concerning Haiti prior to his trip to Haiti during the week of 21 July. Mr. Musulin speculated that Brun had probably noted the DCS requirements on paper and then had passed a copy to Charles upon his arrival in Haiti.

3. For a number of years, the United States Government has been aware of the political ambitions of Charles and his alleged plotting to overthrow the Duvalier regime. In 1967, this rather open plotting led to his imprisonment for over one year. Also, since May 1963, Charles has been trying to obtain support from the United States Government for his plots but he has been consistently rebuffed. Charles is not held in high esteem by U.S. officials and his motives are highly questionable. He owes his position in Haiti to his relationship with Duvalier and his ability to successfully manage some of the more notorious financial rackets of the regime. Charles enjoys no political following and even the "plots" with which he is associated are viewed with considerable reserve. For example, we have never been able to confirm that Charles was involved with the "military junta" formed in May 1969, as he claimed. In February 1969, the

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201-357029
Charles soft fil

U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince commented that, with regard to the most recent plotting of Charles, "the possibility cannot be excluded that Charles could be a provocation to determine the real motives of the United States Government toward the Duvalier regime " We concur in the Embassy's views

4. During the past three years, the WH Division has been kept advised of the contact between DCS and Brun and his relationship with Charles We are also aware from DCS and other sources of the efforts by Brun to obtain support from the United States Government for Charles Brun is, of course, a close collaborator of Charles and a business representative of his in New York City Brun has contacted officials of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and even a person with access to President Johnson on Charles' behalf The Chief of Caribbean Affairs of the Department of State categorically told Brun in June 1967 that the United States Government was not interested in supporting the plots of Charles or anyone else against Duvalier, but this advice seems to have fallen on deaf ears The most recent example of Brun's lobbying was in May 1969 when Brun passed on to DCS a request from Charles for a secret meeting between a U.S. envoy and a representative of the "military junta " Brun's involvement with Charles requires that he be considered a biased source of information While some of the information Brun has obtained from Charles has been of interest, there is hardly anything that was not available through other channels and indeed, much of it was slanted

5 As was set forth in WH/7 memorandums to the Operational Support Staff, DCS, on 16 July 1968 and 28 May 1969, we interpose no objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, the relationship between Brun and Charles has now taken on operational characteristics (agent/sub-agent) with Brun levying requirements on Charles in Haiti to service on behalf of DCS. The relationship between Brun and Charles also has manifested political and security aspects which could adversely affect the interests of the United States Government regarding Haiti. Accordingly, we request that the contact between Brun and Clemard Joseph Charles on behalf of DCS be terminated.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

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ORIG: RUTH LEHMAN; nvs
UNIT: WH/7/HT
EXT: 5595/1349
DATE: 1 AUGUST 1969

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CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE. VR. RIAN DO5. FI2. CI/OPS CI/OA.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S - E-C-R-E-T

01 22 22z Aug 69

CITE DIRECTOR 252888

TO PORT AU PRINCE INFO: DO BASE NEW YORK

REF: PORT AU PRINCE 6323 (IN 12581)*

1. PER REF REQUEST, ONE LUIS BRUN, WELL KNOWN COLLABORATOR OF SUBJECT REF ON POLITICAL MATTERS IN HAITI, IS CONTACT OF WODISH OFFICE, NEW YORK. PRIOR TO BRUN'S TRIP TO HAITI, WEEK OF 21 JULY, WODISH BRIEFED BRUN AND ORALLY PASSED LIST OF CIRL REQUIREMENTS ON HAITI. FYI, BRUN BELIEVES WODISH CONTACT IS FROM DEFENSE AND THAT REQUIREMENTS LEVIED BY DOD.

2. IT WODISH BELIEF THAT BRUN PROBABLY NOTED REQUIREMENTS ON PAPER FOLLOWING BRIEFING, AND PASSED COPY TO SUBJECT REF UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN HAITI.

3. FYI, SUBJECT REF WAS REGISTERED IN INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER UNTIL 17 MARCH 69, WHEN ACSI TERMINATED HIM, WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SUBJECT WELL KNOWN FOR HIS REPEATED ATTEMPTS OBTAIN USG BACKING FOR HIS [redacted] PLANS TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER.

AN	JB
AB	X
~~SH~~	
~~PS~~	
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WH/7/HT	

Continued . . .

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201-357029

01 AUG 69

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 26288

PAGE 2

TO

4. WODISH BRIEFED ON CONTENTS REF AND PROMISED TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION.

5. FILE: 201-357029.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Clemard Joseph CHARLES passed list of questions to EMBOFF re Haitian economy. Advised Emb. he had finished "big job" for Pentagon. Advise if list of WOFIRM origin.

SEP 15 69

RH

Robert H. Riffe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

FI/DCG
DOI/B-2
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C. B. Dickens
CHARLES B. DICKENS
AC/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, DO4, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, F2, CI, CI/OPS

F402

S E C R E T 292Ø5Z JUL 69 CITE PORT AU PRINCE 6323 (RACICOT ACTING)

29 Jul 69 IN 12581

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

AKULE DOMOPS EVMEND

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES PASSED TO EMBOFF COPY OF LIST
OF 9 QUESTIONS WRITTEN IN ENGLISH DEALING WITH HAITIAN ECONOMY.
MENTIONED HE HAD JUST FINISHED "BIG JOB" FOR PENTAGON AND
IMPLIED LIST ALSO CAME FROM PENTAGON. ALTHOUGH STERILE, QUES-
TIONS WRITTEN IN STANDARD GOVERNMENT FORMAT AND APPEAR TO BE
INTEL REQUIREMENTS.

2. STATION POUCHING LIST TO HQS ONLY PER HTPA 2443 DTD
29 JULY SINCE CANNOT DUPLICATE LOCALLY. WOULD APPRECIATE
LEARNING IF LIST IS OF WOFIRM ORIGIN. FYI EMBOFF SUSPECTS
CHARLES HAS PASSED LIST AT PALACE AND STATION THEREFORE FEELS
SECURITY ASPECTS RE HANDLING CHARLES BY ANY USG AGENCY SHOULD
BE REVIEWED. SINCE CHARLES HAD PASSED LIST TO EMBASSY FOR
ANSWERING OF QUESTIONS, IT WOULD APPEAR "INTELLIGENCE" COULD
HAVE BEEN OVERTLY OBTAINED.

2. FILE: 201-357029.

S E C R E T

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Port au Prince (VHR Acting) VHR

SUBJECT
Subject of 201-357029

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: Port au Prince 6323 dated 29 July 1969.

Per Reference attached is the list of questions given Subject.

Vincent H. Racicot
Vincent H. RACICOT

Attachment:
As stated above (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att h/w

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HTPA-2443	29 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-357029 ✓

US manufacturers are setting up subsidiary companies in Haiti or are forming partnerships with Haitian enterprises to produce such itesm as underwear, baseballs, footwear and other export items. They use Haitian facilities and materials imported from the US.

1. What specific companies are involved in producing these goods, and are they completely owned by Haitians (US?) or are they in partnership with US companies?
2. Are there prospects that other companies are entering the field (using Haitian enterprises to produce goods from imported US materials)?
3. Will these enterprises expand? How important would it be to Haiti if these enterprises expanded? discontinued production?
4. What articles are produced?
5. What materials are imported to produce the final product? What percentage of the imported materials are part of the finished product?
6. Give the figures on the value of the imported goods vs. the value of the export goods to gain Haitian profit figures.
7. How do the domestic producers and the US importers feel about operating under President Duvalier? Are there any difficulties? Have investment conditions in Haiti changed since these enterprises began operating?
8. Does the Haitian workers' lack of education affect their training?
9. How effective is the Haitian social security system? Do US importers contribute to the social security fund?

H/waa1 HTPA-2443 CS COPY 201-357029

SECRET

28 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, Domestic Contact Service
Operational Support Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. George S. Musulin

SUBJECT : DCS Case 47540 - Request by Haitian Opposition Group for Secret Interview with U.S. Official

1. This memorandum will serve to confirm the telephone conversations between your office and the Chief of the Haiti Desk on 15 and 27 May 1969 concerning the request made through Mr. Louis A. Brun on the above subject. During these conversations, your office was advised that the WH Division has no interest in contacting any representative or member of the plotting group.

2. The WH Division considers Clemard Joseph Charles to be a perennial anti-Duvalier plotter in Port au Prince with little means or following to carry out his anti-government designs. During the week of 11 May 1969, Charles approached the Embassy in Port au Prince with basically the same information as relayed to the DCS office in New York by Mr. Brun. The only difference was that he did not request that a U.S. Government official make contact with the internal group, but rather that the Embassy provide some assurance that the U.S. Government would look benevolently on the group once the coup was launched. The Embassy replied that the U.S. Government had a firm policy not to intervene in such matters and that no such assurance could be expected.

3. Since 1967, Charles has made similar overtures to the U.S. Government for support of his anti-government plans. When reviewing these approaches, there has always been some doubt as to the accuracy of the information that Charles (or Brun) has furnished. While it was accepted that Charles was actually plotting against Duvalier, it could never be determined if he was actually a member of the plotting group, which usually included members of the Haitian Army, or if Charles had simply become aware of an anti-Duvalier plot and was trying to act as a broker between the plotters and the

SECRET

U.S. Government for his own interests.

4. At the present time, fairly reliable reports have been received that certain officials of the Haitian Army are trying to form a junta to take power in the event Duvalier dies. Some members of this junta are reportedly anxious to overthrow Duvalier, should he recover, but so far have not established a timetable or decided how they intend to carry out the coup. Also, the illness of Duvalier has undoubtedly inspired anti-Duvalier plotting by other groups in Haiti but no reliable information is available on their plans. It is interesting to note that Clemard Joseph Charles is not identified as a plotter in any of the reports from internal sources.

5. As was mentioned in the WH/7 memorandum dated 16 July 1968, we do not interpose any objection to DCS maintaining contact with Brun for its own purposes. However, we feel that in the interests of security and also in conformance with U.S. policy, that Brun should clearly understand that we have no interest in establishing contact with any member of the internal group through his channel and further that the U.S. Government has no interest in becoming involved in any anti-Duvalier activities.

Charles B. Dickens
AC/WH/7

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/7
2 - WH/7/HT (CHARLES file)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Request by Haitian Opposition Group For Secret Interview with US Official

FROM: GSMusulin/bm DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Bldg.	EXTENSION 2268	NO. Case 47540 DATE 23 May 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DC3L	5/22	5/2		For your information.
2. C/WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.	26 MAY 1969			Shirley Stenson.
3.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

S E C R E T 291542Z MAY 69 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 1568

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT STAFF (MUSULIN) FROM [illegible]

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW WITH US OFFICIAL

REFERENCE: S E C R E T/SENSITIVE [illegible]

OUR SOURCE RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM GROUP MENTIONED IN REFERENCE ON 29 MAY 1969, WHICH STATED THAT "THE TRANSACTION HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE". THIS TELEGRAM THEN REQUESTED "URGENTLY" THAT THE TRANSACTION BE SET IN MOTION. SOURCE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO REFERENCE REQUESTERS THAT HE IS NOTHING BUT A CHANNEL. WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO SOURCE THAT WE ARE NOTHING BUT A CHANNEL (WHICH HE UNDERSTANDS). WE PASS ALONG THE REQUEST FOR THE RECORD. THANK YOU.

FILE: LOUIS A. BRUN, PRESIDENT
B&B INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
350 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

S E C R E T

NOTE: LIKE SUBJECT: REQUEST .... ETC [illegible] [illegible] COPY

GROUP 1
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Clemard Joseph Charles

FROM:
GSMusulin/bx. Gsm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO.: Case 47540

DATE: 21 May 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	5/21	5/21		2-1 For your information and file.
2. WH/7/HT 3 B 0001 Hq.				
3. DC/WH/7				
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5. WH/7/HT				
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SECRET/SENSITIVE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1. CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES, WHO HAS STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT HE WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF HAITI AND WHO HAS GATHERED ABOUT HIMSELF A PERSONAL FOLLOWING OF INDIVIDUALS COVERTLY OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT DUVALIER /COLLECTOR'S NOTE: SEE 00-B - 321/ 26913-69./, HAS NOW DECLARED THAT ACTION AGAINST HAITI'S PRESIDENT IS IMPERATIVE AND THAT DUVALIER'S OVERTHROW MUST AND CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE 1969. HE HAS SET A 1 JULY 1969 DEADLINE FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS GOAL. CHARLES HAS ALSO STATED THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE BECAUSE OTHER OPPOSITION GROUPS /COLLECTOR'S NOTE: PRESUMABLY, HE REFERS TO ONE OR MORE OF THOSE GROUPS LISTED IN 00B-321/269.3-69./ MAY TRY TO ACT BEFORE HE CAN. CHARLES LISTS NO REASON FOR THE SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT OF 1 JULY 1969.

2. CHARLES HAS REQUESTED THAT "THE PENTAGON" (SPECIFICALLY, HIS FORMER INTERMEDIARY, COLONEL HOWARD BURRIS) DISPATCH A SECRET ENVOY TO TALK TO HIM. HE LAYS DOWN NO MODUS OPERANDI FOR THE ENVOY AND PRESUMABLY WILL TALK TO HIM IN PORT-AU-PRINCE. THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN LABELED "URGENT".

-END-

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

[illegible]
Excluded from [illegible]
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CHARLES, CLEMARD JOSEPH
201-357029
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MBR OF OPPOSITION GP.

036-009-006
PRIN-00024
13 MAY 69

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FILE IN 201-357029

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

10 MAY 69

REPORT CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

REFERENCES: NONE

COUNTRY/S: HAITI

DATE OF INFO: 5-10 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: REQUEST BY HAITIAN OPPOSITION GROUP FOR SECRET INTERVIEW
WITH US OFFICIAL

1. ONE OF THE UNDERGROUND OPPOSITION GROUPS IN HAITI IS CENTERED IN THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: FNU LAMENS PPT LAMENS (FORMER DEPUTY, NOW IN SEMI-HIDING); COLONEL WESTNER BLAIN PPT BLAIN (HEAD OF ARMY QUARTERMASTER WAREHOUSES); COLONEL CAYARD PPT CAYARD (HEAD OF THE COAST GUARD); FNU CONSTANT PPT CONSTANT (CHIEF OF STAFF). THEY WISH TO ORGANIZE A JUNTA, FOLLOWING THE DEATH OR RETIREMENT OF HAITIAN PRESIDENT DUVALIER, AND EXERCISE POWER DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD. FOLLOWING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THIS GROUP WISHES TO HAVE FREE ELECTIONS AND THEN RETIRE FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY. LAMENS WOULD LIKE TO BECOME A MINISTER. BLAIN WOULD LIKE A DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENT. CAYARD WOULD LIKE TO RETIRE TO HIS CATTLE RANCH. THE GROUP HAS NO PARTICULAR CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT.

2. THIS GROUP ALLEGES THAT IT COMMANDS WIDE SUPPORT AMONG ARMY PERSONNEL IN PORT-AU-PRINCE AND IN THE HAITIAN HINTERLAND. THE GROUP IS REPORTEDLY WILLING TO WORK WITH ANY OTHER OPPOSITION GROUP, EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS BUT IT DOES NOT WANT TO APPEAR PUBLICLY BEHOLDEN TO THE US OR TO ANY OTHER NON-HAITIAN POWER.

3. UNTIL RECENTLY, THE PLAN OF THIS GROUP WAS TO SIT BACK, WAIT FOR INTERNAL UPHEAVALS AND THEN MOVE IN TO ASSUME POWER. THEY DID NOT WANT TO ACT ON THEIR OWN, BUT PREFERRED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

AN INTERNAL UPHEAVAL CREATED BY SOMEBODY ELSE.

4. THE MOST RECENT RUMORS CONCERNING PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S HEALTH HAVE, HOWEVER, CAUSED THE GROUP TO CHANGE ITS MIND. THE MEMBERS NOW DECLARE THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE AND THAT AS SOON AS PRESIDENT DUVALIER "GOES ON THE OPERATING TABLE" THEY WILL MOVE.

5. THE GROUP RECOGNIZES, HOWEVER, THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES LIE IN ITS PATH AND IS MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER IN SECRET WITH A US ENVOY. WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY TO THIS ENVOY IS NOT KNOWN.

6. THE GROUP HAS ORGANIZED THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR THE ENVOY TO FOLLOW. FIRST, HE MUST SEND A CABLE TO THE FOLLOWING CABLE ADDRESS: ETSLAMAB, PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI. THE CABLE MUST READ AS FOLLOWS: "ARRIVING ON (LIST DATE) TO DISCUSS THE SISAL DEAL. PLEASE RESERVE A ROOM FOR ME AT THE SANS SOUCI HOTEL." THE NAME SIGNED TO THE CABLE DOES NOT MATTER. THE CABLE ADDRESS IS THAT OF ESTABLISSEMENTS LAHENS-BLAIN & CO., PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI. SECOND, HE MUST REGISTER AT THE SANS SOUCI AND AWAIT A CALL OR VISIT FROM A MAN NAMED EDGARD BONI RPT BONI. BONI IS KESTNER BLAIN'S BROTHER. THE ORIGINAL FAMILY NAME IS "BONI"; BLAIN CHANGED HIS NAME. BONI WILL EITHER TAKE THE ENVOY TO TALK TO CONSTANT OR WILL INFORM HIM OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE INTERVIEW. THE ONLY PERSONS PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW WILL BE CONSTANT AND THE ENVOY. THIRD, WHEN THE ENVOY MEETS CONSTANT HE MUST ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES RPT BONA FIDES BY SAYING: "I HAVE BEEN SENT BY MR. EISENHOWER TO DISCUSS SISAL". THE KEY WORD IS "EISENHOWER".

7. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, BUT NOT MANDATORY, IF THE SECRET US

ENVOY WAS ABLE TO SPEAK FRENCH.

-END-

S E C R E T/SENSITIVE

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/10754-69

SUBJECT Reported Final Terms for Award of Gambling Concession/Clemard Joseph-Charles' Involvement

DATE DISTR. 21 APR 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Supplement to: 00B-321/07210-69

DATE OF INFO. Apr 69

PLACE & DATE ACQ. /Apr 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. As part of his effort to obtain foreign exchange, Haiti's President Duvalier has decided to award a gambling concession. A US syndicate, consisting of a New York City firm, Keynote Associates, and of Count Michel Levitch, Bishop of the American Orthodox Church, has been trying to obtain the concession. [Collector's Note: see reference for additional details.]

2. The Bishop has severed his connections with Keynote, which bombarded President Duvalier with telegrams and made an unannounced trip to Haiti to obtain the concession.

3. However , Keynote received a telegram from Antonio André, Director of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. This message informed them that they would not receive the concession. President Duvalier relies very heavily upon André for advice and guidance in economic matters.

4. Almost at the same time that Keynote received André's telegram, Clémard Joseph-Charles notified the Bishop that he would receive the concession on the following terms:

   a. A new group of associates of the Bishop will receive 80 percent of the gross receipts from the concession.

   b. The Government of Haiti will receive 10 percent of the gross receipts.

   c. The Bishop and his chief partner will receive five percent of the gross receipts.

U 20

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S 80

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

d. The remaining five percent of the gross receipts will be used by the Bishop, reportedly under Haitian supervision, to begin construction of schools and child care centers in Haiti. These schools and centers will be under the auspices of the American Orthodox Church.

5. Joseph-Charles's authorship of the telegram which virtually promised the concession to the new group indicates that his fortunes may be on the mend. He certainly could never have sent such a message without the approval of President Duvalier. That he was permitted to send it indicates that the President may be beginning to look upon him more favorably than he has done in the recent past.

- end -

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/10768-69

SUBJECT Possible Improvement in Fortunes of Clemard Joseph-Charles/Possible Reason for President Duvalier's Harsh Treatment of Charles/Eclipse of Luc-Albert Foucard

DATE DISTR. 22 APR 1969

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Supplement To: 00B-321/07210-69
00B-321/06914-69

DATE OF INFO. Apr 69

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Port-au-Prince, Haiti/Apr 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth, who makes frequent trips to Haiti. Source maintains close contact with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti.

1. During recent weeks, the fortunes of Clemard Joseph-Charles seem to have improved. He has been playing a not unimportant role in the award of the Haitian gambling concession [Collector's Note: see reference.], an activity which is designed to bring to Haiti some badly-needed foreign exchange. Although I do not believe that he sees President Duvalier as frequently as he used to prior to his incarceration, he does seem to have recovered some of the confidence which the President used to repose in him.

2. One reason for President Duvalier's dislike of Charles (and one possible reason why the President eventually threw him in jail) is that Charles was instrumental in bringing about the marriage of the President's daughter, Marie-Denise Duvalier, to Colonel Max Dominique. Charles and Marie-Denise have been close friends for many years. Marie-Denise became pregnant by Dominique and went to Charles for help. Charles then intervened with President Duvalier, who was furious, and persuaded him to agree to the marriage. The President was bitterly angry at Dominique and somewhat unjustly blamed Charles for the marriage. He agreed to the necessity for the wedding, but resented his new son-in-law and, by association, so to speak, resented Charles. The President and Dominique have formally reconciled. The President met Colonel Dominique at the airport, when the latter returned to Haiti, and made a point of inviting his son-in-law to ride in the presidential limousine from the airport to the palace. The purpose was to demonstrate the burial of old grudges. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the reconciliation was genuine and whether or not the President has really forgiven his son-in-law.

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S | NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

3. Luc-Albert Foucard, Haitian Minister of Tourism, is now in political, if not personal, eclipse. He no longer goes to his office. The New York City manager of the Haitian Tourist Bureau, Jean Sorel, is in Haiti and is acting in Foucard's stead. Ramah Theodore, Deputy Director of Tourism, is amiable and is a friend of President Duvalier. He is, however, of little stature and is not capable of doing anything more than the routine daily chores of the office. Foucard cannot afford to call attention to himself, because he is fearful for the physical safety of his sister, Madame Saint-Victor. President Duvalier recently dismissed her as his personal secretary and replaced her with his daughter, wife of Colonel Max Dominique. Since then, rumors have abounded that Madame Saint-Victor may be marked for physical liquidation /Collector's Note: see reference./. Whether or not these rumors have any foundation in fact, there is no doubt that the members of the Foucard family (i e, Luc-Albert, Madame Saint-Victor and their sister, Madame Bella Foucard Poitvien) have all made themselves as inconspicuous as possible. The President's change in secretaries has led to a diminution of the power and influence of the Foucard clan.

- end -

17 March 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

ISSUE NO. 28,910

DATE

201 NO. 357029

NAME
CHARLES, Clemard Joseph

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

PRESENT ADDRESS

OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

SD 11612 is terminated without prejudice by the Department of the Army.

For additional information, you are referred to the Army Source Registry.

DATE: 17 Mar 69

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP - 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1797

DEPT OF STATE AIRGRAM A-14

FROM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1969

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLOT OF CLEMARD JOSEPH CHARLES

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Letters from Clemard Charles, Haiti, to US Officials and Businessmen

FROM: Daniel J. Shine for GSMusulin/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 900 Key Building	EXTENSION 2268	NO. DCS Case 47540 DATE 10 January 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL	13 JAN 1969	13 JAN 1969		Attached, for your information, is copy of PHI-457-68, with attachment.
2. C/WH/7/Haiti 3 B 0001, Hqs.		21 JAN 1969	R	
3.				
4. OZ				[redacted]
5. E				
6. OE				
7. Return to FI/ISR				
8. ATTN: VINCE 2-E-03				
9.				
10.				To 8: Pls file in Charles 201
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

PHI-457-68

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service
Attn : International Division (GAlyea)

DATE: 24 December 1968

FROM : Chief, Philadelphia Office

SUBJECT: Letters From Clemard Charles, Haiti, to US Officials and Businessmen

Ref : Phil 00-B-321/36501-68 dated 17 Dec 68

1. Attached for your information are letters from Clemard Joseph Charles addressed to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and President-elect Richard Nixon. These letters were received in person from Charles, in Haiti, by Donald E. Rowe, source of reference, and brought to the US by the latter. The letters have not been delivered as of this date. Rowe plans to ask the New Jersey Third District Member of the US House of Representatives to deliver them.

2. In addition to the correspondence referred to above, Rowe also received letters of introduction from Charles to:

Howard L. Burris (believed to be a lawyer)
Suite 101, RCA Building
1725 K. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. A. E. Incledon, Vice President
J. G. White Engineering Corp.
80 Broad Street
New York, N. Y. 10004

Monsieur Albert J. Krieger (believed to be an accountant and business acquaintance of Charles)
401 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10013

Mr. Herman Albert Miller (an accountant)
230 W. 41st Street
New York, N. Y. 10036

Mr. N. V. Rosello (an old friend and very reliable acquaintance of Charles)
Export Credit Western Hemisphere Corp.
477 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

The addressees are individuals from whom Charles is seeking financial assistance.

JAY B. L. REEVES

BRWatson/cjs
Attachments

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

01-357029

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 8 Novembre 1963

Excellence,

Vous n'ignorez pas l'intérêt avec lequel j'ai suivi les étapes de la campagne électorale qui devait aboutir au Triomphe de votre Compétiteur Républicain aux élections présidentielles Américaines.

Vous le savez, à n'en pas douter, que j'ai souhaité de tout coeur Votre propre Triomphe. Je le croyais irrésistible.

Vous avez fait de votre mieux, mais Vous avez perdu.

Que pouviez-Vous faire? Les sages sentent qu'il y a quelque chose qu'on ne peut écarter par des mots ou des votes - une ceinture qui enserre le monde.

> " Tout ce qui a été décidé arrivera.
> La volonté infinie et supérieure de
> Dieu ne peut pas être transgressée."

Certes, pour atteindre l'objet de vos aspirations, Vous Vous êtes heurté à des bornes immuables. Vous Vous êtes enflammé de l'espoir de bousculer les faits et les hommes.

Après maintes expériences Vous convenez que depuis le départ la victoire constituait pratiquement une gageure, et qu'il fallait commencer plus tôt: c'est dire que le monde est régi par des lois.

Maintenant que le rideau est tiré, je prends plaisir à formuler des voeux pour que se maintienne intact le courage magnifique dont Vous avez fait preuve tout au long de Votre campagne électorale.

Je sais, pour répéter le Président JOHNSON, que "Vous continuerez à servir l'Amérique aussi longtemps que Vous vivrez".

.../.2

Annexe 1

Je Vous prie, Excellence, de recevoir l'expression de mes hommages respectueux, et en même temps Vous assurer de mes sentiments indéfectibles d'attachement et d'admiration.

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES, P.I.B.A.

CJC/pcl

SON EXCELLENCE
L'HONORABLE HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
VICE-PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BANQUE COMMERCIALE D'HAITI

Le Président

Port-au-Prince, le 8 Novembre 1968

Monsieur le Président Elu,

J'ai suivi, comme tous les Haïtiens d'ailleurs, les élections présidentielles Américaines qui constituent toujours un événement international de première importance.

En effet, le Monde entier a enregistré les différentes phases de la campagne électorale qui devait aboutir à Votre Avènement à la Présidence des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Un vent de renouveau souffle sur l'Amérique consciente de Sa force et de Son rayonnement dans le Monde.

Vous jouissez, Monsieur le Président Elu, d'un prestige incontesté.

Je suis donc certain que, sous Votre Administration, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, avec le prestige que lui donnent Son passé incomparable et Ses grandes ressources tant humaines qu'économiques, sauront remplir sa vocation de Leadership du Monde libre et Sa place de premier plan parmi les autres Nations du Globe qui soupirent ardemment après un monde pacifique et plus humain.

C'est le souhait que je forme à l'occasion de Votre Triomphe aux élections présidentielles Américaines.

Je Vous prie de recevoir, Monsieur le Président Elu, mes voeux sincères pour Votre Bonheur personnel et la prospérité du peuple Américain.

Clémard JOSEPH CHARLES, P.D.G.

CJC/psl

MONSIEUR RICHARD NIXON
PRESIDENT ELU DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHAYES, ABRAM
DCD FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible]		BETH LICHTENFELS	

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CONFIDENTIAL

A-19-91-59

PROF. ABRAM CHAYES

BUSINESS:

Subject is with the following:

A000723 - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-459/78
19 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations Request (OLC 78-0986/1)

The following material is forwarded in response to subject request:

a. DCD file A-19-91-59 on Abram Chayes (on loan).

b. Documents concerning Monica Kramer and Rita Naman. (Please excuse the poor quality of some of this material, it was impossible to get a clear reproduction from our microfilm.)

Ruth Elliff
Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
0 - Addressee
1 - DCD Chrono
1 - Staff A
3 - RElliff
3 - Control

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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19-91-59

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PES-263-77
31 August 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Boston Field Office
Chief, New York Field Office
Chief, San Francisco Field Office
Chief, Syracuse Field Office
Chief, Washington Field Office

FROM : Acting Chief, USSR-EE Collection Group, DCD

SUBJECT : Case 64574 - USSR External Policy - Pugwash Conference, Munich, Germany, August 1977

1. Enclosed you will find a list of attendees (Enclosure A) to the Pugwash Conference held in Munich, Germany, in August, and a set of questions (Enclosure B) prepared by the ORPA analysts at our request. Since the original list of attendees contained only the last name and first initial of each US participant, we had to make some educated guesses as to the true identities of many of them. As a result, do not be surprised if some question why we felt they had attended. In many cases, however, there was no question as to the true identity of the source.

2. ORPA has been quite pleased with the reporting generated by their previous requirements. As a result, they have made an extra effort to write even more thought provoking requirements. We feel that the enclosed questions are the best we have sent out to date.

3. Responsive reporting should cite the current CIRL, Objective A1a and KIQ 90. We look forward to receiving your responses.

William P. Blake
for THOMAS A. NESSER

Enclosures: As stated above

WPBlake/bjp

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AND METHODS INVOLVED

ENCLOSURE A

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Abram Chayes Harvard University	A 199159
Carl Djerassi Stanford University	A 49345
Paul Doty Harvard University	A 46309
Bernard T. Feld MIT	A 5927
George B. Kistiakowsky Harvard University	A6304
Richard N. Rosecrance Cornell University	A124263
Jack P. Ruina MIT	A 99072
Herbert Scoville McLean, Va.	A157380
W. Murray Todd National Academy of Sciences	A123586
John S. Toll State University of New York Stony Brook, New York	A 28995

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(when filled in)

19-91-59

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD/ RESIDENT OFFICE 1 2 3 4	ORGANIZATION NUMBER 5 6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. 21 22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	JOINT 34	UO 35	36
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SUBJECT AND AREA
Four Papers by Soviet Scientists on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, the Complete General Ban of Nuclear Tests, and European Security
(USSR)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 0 9 2 3 6

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Prof. Abram Chayes
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Documentary

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
D	E	C	O
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[✓ 2] 8	P	O	L
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4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	S	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
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5	5
6	[✓ 6]
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METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐	INTERVIEW	☐	TRIP REPORT
☒	OTHER DOCUMENT	☐	OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM: 1

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)

	1-EXCHANGE		3. COMMERCIAL
	2-BILATERAL		4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	OSG	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
		x			TWebbe.

FIELD COMMENTS

AIA-06-01

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Extra copies of documents to:

① JOHN SOUDERS OCI/SRE 7G31
② ~~MARTHA~~ MAUTNER STATE/INR/DDR/RSE/SOV 4841
③ GLENN BUCHAN OSR 5F25
④ WILLIAM CHAPIN STATE/INR/DDR/PAT 6638

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I.O. CCPyeAts

F.O. CHIEF John H. Mahoney

DESK OFFICER

BRANCH SECTION CHIEF Tom Webbe

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(20-41)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N- -A-L

HEADQUARTERS BY

DISSEMINATIONS STAFF

Domestic Collection Division

Foreign Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COUNTRY USSR

DCD REPORT NO. OO-B-321/26659-76

SUBJECT Four Papers by Soviet Scientists on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, the Complete General Ban of Nuclear Tests, and European Security

DATE DISTR. Sept. 23, 1976

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case: 6 ,574
C-JT-6-50174

DATE OF INFO. August 1976

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[illegible] DOCUMENTS

SOURCE Documentary

[Available in CRS Central Libraries Division, Document Services Branch are four papers presented by Soviet scientists at the 26th Pugwash Conference on Disarmament, Security and Development, Muhlhausen, German Democratic Republic, 26-31 August 1976. The papers are as follows: (1) "On Complete and General Ban of Nuclear Weapon Tests" by L.S. Semeiko of the USSR Institute of the USA and Canada; (2) "Implementation of the Agreements of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" by Professor V.G. Trukhanovsky, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO); (3) "Concerning the Question of Atomic Power Energetics and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" by Academician V.S. Emelyanov; and (4) "Pugwash and Development" by Academician V.A. Engelhardt - UNCLASSIFIED.]

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WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 001595. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/7.

FORM 2290 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-76

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

19-91-59

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD/ RESIDENT OFFICE 1 2 3 4	ORGANIZATION NUMBER 5 6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14.15	CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DAY YR 21 22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
H B O S			6 4 5 7 4	0 9 1 4 6	X 2 6 5 1 4 7 6	

SUBJECT AND AREA
Reports of the Four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference

(USSR/INTERNATIONAL)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR 40 41 42 43 44: 09236

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Prof. Abram Chayes
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA

INDIVIDUAL NO.
45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 * NOT DISSEMINATED
ORGANIZATION NO.

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Documentary

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
[✓ 1]	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	[✓ 6]
7	7
8	8
9	9

METHOD OF COLLECTION
INTERVIEW
X OTHER DOCUMENT
TRIP REPORT
OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM: 1

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)
1-EXCHANGE
2-BILATERAL
3. COMMERCIAL
4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO	OSS	SREE	ICG	ETF	DESK OFFICER
		X			Webber

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
Extra copies of documents to:
① JOHN SOUDERS OCI/SRE 7G31
② ~~MARTHA~~ MAUTNER STATE/INR/DDR/RSE/SOV 4841
~~WAYNE LIMBERG CAR/USSR 5632~~
③ GLENN BUCHAN OSR 5F25
④ WILLIAM CHAPIN STATE/INR/DDR/PMT 6638

A1B-06-01

MBO 55 56 57 58	KIO 59 60 61	GRADE 62 63 64 65 66	INDIVIDUAL NO. 67 68 69 70 71 72	MA 73	TR 74 75	COUNTRY 76 77 78 79
A1 ar	X6	01		1	B	1EG

I/O JSorge/ds
F.O. John H. Mahoney
DESK OFFICER
BRANCH SECTION CHIEF Tom Whitley

E2 IMPDET CL BY 006687

(20-61)

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Domestic Collection Division
Foreign Intelligence Information Report

COUNTRY	USSR/International	DCD REPORT NO.	OO-B-321/26514-76
SUBJECT	Reports of the Four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference	DATE DISTR.	Sept. 23, 1976
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	DCD Case: 64,574 C-JT-6-50174

DATE OF INFO. August 1976

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Documentary

[Available in CRS Central Libraries Division, Document Services Branch are copies of the reports of the four Working Groups at the 26th Pugwash Conference on Disarmament, Security and Development held at Mulhausen, German Democratic Republic, 26-31 August 1976. The subjects discussed in each of the Working Group reports are as follows: "Problems of Limiting and Reducing Strategic Nuclear Armaments and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction," "Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Armaments," "European Security and Co-operation Issues," and "Development and Security" - UNCLASSIFIED.]

- end -

WARNING NOTICE—SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 001595. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/7.

SECRET

The Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc., New York, New York

Purposes and Activities: Interests include the improvement of inter-cultural and inter-racial relations; the protection of civil liberties; the prevention and treatment of emotional disturbances, etc.

Norman Fund channeled the following amounts of CIA money to CIA projects:

1961 - $15,000 to American Society for African Culture (AMSAC)

1962 - $10,000 to African-American Institute (AAI)

1963 - $15,000 to Pan American Foundation (PAF). (This represented a part of the total budget for PAF in 1963. Virtually all PAF funds in 1963 were used for grants to individual recipients of Agency operational interest. No domestic organizations received any of the funds.)

1964 - $10,000 to International Development Foundation (IDF)

Norman Fund gave its own money to the following CIA projects:

1962 - $7,500 to American Society for African Culture (AMSAC)

1962 - $3,000 to African Research Foundation

1962 - $3,100 to U.S. National Student Association (USNSA)

We hold copies of Schedule of Ordinary Grants of the Norman Fund for 1962 and 1963. These documents confirm the figures and the recipients cited in the Drew Pearson column. No CIA funds were given for other than the four grants listed above.

SECRET

SECRET

20 FEB 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Alleged CIA Use of the Norman Foundation and the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. to Pass Funds to Organizations Involving Mr. Leo Cherne

REFERENCE : New York Times Article of February 17, 1976 by Mr. John M. Crewdson, Same Subject

1. Reference reports that the President of the Norman Foundation, Mr. Frank Weil, said that he was approached by a "mysterious gentleman" from the CIA in 1963 or 1964 and asked to pass about $15,000 in Government funds to the International Rescue Committee of which Mr. Leo Cherne was then Chairman of the Board. CIA files reveal that the Norman Foundation (formerly the Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc.) was never used to pass CIA funds to the International Rescue Committee as implied in Reference. Attached is the record of CIA funds passed through the A. E. Norman Fund, Inc. and bonafide grants made by the funds to CIA projects. It is noted that in 1961, the Norman Fund passed $15,000 of CIA funds to the American Society for African Culture (AMSAC). Possibly Mr. Weil confused this funding for African activities with the International Rescue Committee.

2. It is true as reported in the article and sourced to an executive of the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc., that the Fund supported a single Agency program in the 1960s. This program was the Institute of International Labor Research, Inc. (IILR) an Agency-controlled non-profit organization active inthe Latin American labor field. CIA's use of the J.M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. to fund the IILR terminated in 1964 when use of the Kaplan Fund was exposed in Congressional hearings of thje Patman Committee on Tax-exempt Foundations. CIA files confirm that the J.M. Kaplan Fund, Inc. made in 1963 a bonafide grant to the International Rescue Committee for Czech refugee relief. There is no evidence that CIA funds were passed to the Kaplan Fund for any other purpose than support of the IILR.

3. Although there is no evidence that CIA ever directly or indirectly funded the International Rescue Committee or Freedom House, Mr. Cherne personally and through his firm, Research Institute of America, Inc., actively assisted the Agency in the past. A DDO agent, Joel A.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 959779

SECRET

SECRET

SHALLOWAY (P) currently in Paris was provided cover in Paris, France from 1954-1965 by the Research Institute of America, Inc. During operations against Cuba in 1959-60 Mr. Cherne was active in both an FI and CA capacity. He was also subsequently a DCD source.

/s/ ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff

Attachment: Pending Record

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Aise (handcarried)
- 1 - 18382 (Shalloway) file
- 1 - C/CCS
- 1 - LPCORSET/46 - FS-1121 (Aaron E. Norman Fund)
- 1 - MD-296 (International Rescue Committee)
- 1 - 201-76662 (Cherne, Leo)
- 2 - CCS/PRG chrono & board

DDO/C/CCS/PRG/GWAllen:ekw (20 February 1976)

SECRET

SECRET
Classification

JFK MICROFILM FILE SUMMARY

SUMMARY; REEL 4 , FOLDER(S) 3, CREATED 02/07/94 by ES

SUBJECT OF FOLDER : Abram Chayes

201 NUMBER, IF ANY

INCLUSIVE DATES OF FILE MATERIAL Undated THRU APRIL 1978

RELEVANCE OR NON-RELEVANCE TO OSWALD & JFK ASSASSINATION:

Neither the information or time frame is relevant. See Summary below.

REASON OR ASSUMED REASON FOR INCLUSION IN THIS COLLECTION.

A review of the HSCA volumes did not surface an "Abram" Chayes but an "Abraham" Chayes, a legal advisor to the State Department, who maintained that at the time Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinik, normally at least 1 week would elapse between the time of a tourist's application and the issuance of a vias. It would appear that Abram and Abraham are not identical to each other. Betty Lichtenfeld of the HSCA reviewed the file on 17 August 1978.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION WITHIN FILE:

Harvard Law School professor who attended a Pugwash Conference in Munich in 1977.

CIA/U. S. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP:

None.

PAGES OF NON-JFK-RELATED MATERIAL: 8

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

A1412377

RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECKS	DCS FILE NUMBER 532 652
FROM: Clearance Support Branch, Personnel Security Division	DATE 7 May 1973
TO : Domestic Contact Service, FO: MIAMI (MOCubria)	~~20 October 1972~~

SUBJECT'S NAME Last	First	Middle		US CITIZEN	ALIEN
CISNEROS	Rogelio	Wenceslao	US		

OTHER NAMES USED INCLUDING MAIDEN, ALIASES, ETC.
CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslav

THIS NOTICE IS VALID THRU May 1978 (Mo-Yr.)

USE OF SUBJECT DURING THIS PERIOD BY OFFICES OTHER THAN DCS (except those having prior interest) MUST BE COORDINATED WITH DCS.

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the Subject person. If the identifying information furnished is erroneous in any way, this division should be notified immediately. Checks based upon erroneous information *are invalid.*

2. The necessary checks have been completed and no pertinent information has been obtained except as noted below:

CITIZEN:

☒ Passport data attached.

☐ Subject was last favorably investigated in ______

☐ Denied Area Case: FBI Check was completed ______ Other NAC's were completed ______.
This office has no objection to Subject being used in accordance with DCI's memorandum dated 25 November 1961.

☐ Summary of noteworthy information is attached for your consideration in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

ALIEN: This is *not an approval* for this alien's access to classified information.

☐ FBI has no objection to your *preliminary* contact with Subject. *(Resubmit with full biographic data if contact is to continue.)*

☐ FBI has no objection to continuing contact with Subject. ☐ Pertinent information has been developed, and is attached.

3. This advisory on investigative results is *for contact purposes only* and is not to be construed as a clearance of Subject person beyond that.

4. Coordination of prior covert interest:

☐ Not necessary ☐ No objection interposed by ______

☐ Please contact ______

5. Remarks:

Chief, Personnel Security Division

FOR DCS/HQS USE ONLY

APPROVED/SECRET

FORM 2-70 2941 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

3 – DCS/HQ

SUBJECT: [illegible]

NUMBER : [illegible] DATE: [illegible]

The passport file of SUBJECT in: ☐ name as shown above; or ☐ under the variation ______ was reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State, with the following results:

BIRTH: On [illegible] at [illegible]

PASSPORTS ISSUED:

Most recent-# [illegible], issued on [illegible] at [illegible]

for (time) [illegible] travel to or residence in [illegible]

[illegible]

for purpose of [illegible]

SPOUSE: Name ______; born at ○ ______ on ○ ______. Married (date) ○ ______ and marriage not terminated; or terminated on ______ due ______.

Never Married ☐

FATHER: Name ______

Born at ○ ______ on ○ ______

If foreign born, U. S. citizen: ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Deceased

MOTHER: Name ______

Born at ○ ______ on ○ ______

If foreign born, U. S. citizen: ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Deceased

PERMANENT RESIDENCE: [illegible]

MAILING ADDRESS: [illegible]

OCCUPATION: [illegible]

. . . .

Previous - ☐ Over

☐ File at FRC, Suitland, Md., (Check if applicable)

"X" in circle indicates verification of information on Bio Sheet. Any discrepancies or variations are written in as shown on Passport application.

14-00000

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

A141537

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE REQUEST FOR SECURITY CHECKS

OS FILE NO.
(OS Use Only)

TO : Clearance Support Branch, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security

FROM: Domestic Contact Service, FO: MIAMI (MOObrie)

DATE 20 October 1972

SUBJECT'S NAME	Last CISNEROS	First Rogelio	Middle Wenceslao	US ☒ US CITIZEN	☐ ALIEN

OTHER NAMES USED INCLUDING MAIDEN, ALIASES, ETC.
CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslao

SEX Male	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 20 March 1927/Camaguey, Cuba	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 265 78 6136
CITIZENSHIP (Country) US (Naturalized)	NATURALIZATION NUMBER, PLACE AND DATE 9260415/Miami, Florida/July 1969	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO.

	FULL NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
SPOUSE			
FATHER			
MOTHER			

RESIDENCES – COMPLETE ADDRESS (Current and last 5 years)

FROM	TO	ADDRESS
1963	1969	549 Deleon Drive, Miami Springs, Florida
1969	Present	264 Palmetto Drive, Miami, Florida

HF 17550

EMPLOYMENTS (Current and last 5 years)

FROM	TO	EMPLOYER'S NAME	ADDRESS
1972	Present	Reina Trading Corporation	5574 S.W. 8th Street Coral Gables, Florida
1970	Aug 1972	Colombia Institute of Language	1005 S.W. First Street Miami, Florida

EDUCATION (College, Graduate Work)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE AND MAJOR

PRIOR US GOVERNMENT SERVICE INCLUDING MILITARY

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY CLEARANCES HELD

☐ NEW REQUEST ☒ RECHECK

OS NUMBER AND DATE (If a recheck)
6532 652 – 22 Nov 67

REMARKS

26 OCT 1972

FORM 2941 2-70 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

4 – DCS/HQ

F-14-12-37
Miami Office

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

DATE : 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT : CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio Wenceslav
#532 552

1. This will confirm our report that the FBI interposes no objection to the proposed interrogation of the Subject alien and is to inform you that security checks on Subject have been completed.

2. The FBI has requested that they be advised if information of an intelligence nature, which may be of interest to that Bureau, is developed as a result of the contemplated interrogation.

3. This is not a security clearance of this person.

4. Any additional information we have obtained is attached and is submitted for your confidential use only. It is not to be disseminated outside of CIA.

William R. Kotapish
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION
Office of Security

CONTACT APPROVED
(ALIEN)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 18 October 1967

TO: SERVICES DIVISION

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Form 180 attached on:

Rogelio Wenceslav CISNEROS Diaz

FROM: Miami Field Office/ACharneco

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : [illegible] (47)

14-00000

Miami (Charnue)

23 OCT 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 October 1967

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO.

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME CISNEROS Diaz, Rogelio, Wenceslav	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 20 Mar 27/Camaguey, Cuba
2. ALIASES # 141237	4. SEX M
	5. CITIZENSHIP Cuban
6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP	

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1947	1959	Owner - teacher at private school in Camaguey
1957	1959	Coordinator in Camaguey for 26 July Movement
1960	1961	Coordinator in Camaguey for Peoples Revolutionary Movement (Anti-Castro)
1961	Present	In exile in the US; present address 549 De Leon Drive, Miami Springs, Florida PHONE: 887-8830

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1961	1964	Traveled considerably in the Caribbean area on JURE affairs	
	Present	Post, Buckley, Mooney and Schuh Inc., Engineers S-140902 # 141238	225 Westward Drive Miami Springs, Florida

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

23 OCT 1967

A 12 406 212

Cisneros has five children 5 to 17 years old; foster daughter age 22, named Mirtha Borras.

☐ CONTINUED

FORM [illegible] USE PREVIOUS
6-66 EDITIONS
MFG. 11-66

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

F-14-12-37

DATE 17 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

ATTENTION : CHARNECO

SUBJECT : FBI Approval to Contact Alien

REFERENCE :

A-141237

Re ROGELIO WENCESLAV CISNEROS-DIAZ, Security Division has informed us that the FBI has no objection to your proposed interrogation.

Security checks will be completed.

SECURITY

Virginia L. Thorne
VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

CC:

SECURITY MESSAGE# 3451

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

VLT:ore:pat

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

A-14-12-37

ROGELIO WENCESLAV CISNEROS DIAZ

549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida
Phone: 887-8830

BUSINESS:

Subject is with:

A141238 - Post, Buckley, Mooney and Schuh Inc., Engineers, 225 Westward Drive,
Miami Springs, Florida

Subject is now affiliated with the following organization as of October 1972:

A172020 - Relma Trading Corporation, Coral Gables, Florida

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

18 JUN [illegible]

FIELD OFFICE X [illegible] I M	CASE NUMBER 63307	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 06165	B X 1686475	

SUBJECT AND AREA
Construction and Expansion of Sugar Mills/Activities of Cuban Infiltrated Guerrillas and Agitators

~~(Honduras)~~

RELEASED MO. DA. YR.: 06245

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio Cisneros
Relma Trading Co.
5574 S. W. 8th St.
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.:

ORGANIZATION NO.:

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52	53	54
1	S	R	E
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3	D	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT
☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS:

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SREE	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

FIELD COMMENTS

CIA X

C/A

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

OCI/WH/HG - J. WALLACE sent
6D28

OER/D/LA - METZGER sent
4D31

DDO/LA/CNH thru OSS HALE sent
3B4402

OCI/WH - D. Lynch

Luis---I attempted to get a reaction from the analyst regarding the information in paragraph 2.Unfortunately there is a new analyst for Honduras who is now awway on vacation and he left no second who understands the situation in Honduras. So rather than hold on to this report--I am returning it with no response from the analyst.
Fred

7-018

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES
55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
C	1	a		X							

~~Clie~~

LDesa-Soto:ljh
for BENAL MARING

DESK OFFICER

BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-74 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Construction and Expansion of Sugar Mills/Activities of Cuban Infiltrated Guerrillas and Agitators

DCD REPORT NO. 00-B 321/16864-75

DATE DISTR. 07 JUL 1975

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case 63307

DATE OF INFO. May 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa, Honduras/May 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, executive of an import/export company with extensive business connections in Central America and the Caribbean. He makes frequent trips to these areas, and has contact with high ranking military and political leaders. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. The Government of Honduras (GOH) recently obtained a US$12 million loan from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration for the expansion of the Azucarera del Sur sugar mill located in Choluteca, Honduras. In addition, the GOH has purchased two sugar mills, one in Brazil and the other in Puerto Rico. The mills, bought at a cost of US$15 million each, will be dismantled and shipped to Honduras, where they will be reassembled with the aid of foreign technicians. Also, another sugar mill is to be built in the country at a cost of US$20 million; however, the Japanese Mitsubishi enterprise will be the major stockholder, while Honduran private businessmen will hold a minority interest. This is part of an expansion and modernization program by the GOH with hopes of obtaining a larger share of the world's sugar market.

2. The GOH is somewhat concerned with the infiltration through Mexico and Guatemala of Communist agitators and guerrilla training personnel. These guerrillas, mostly Cubans who remained in the country after they had arrived allegedly to assist the GOH following Hurricane Fifi, are causing growing concern as a result of several uprisings and invasion of private lands by peasants in several parts of the country. The Cubans, who stayed in the country following Hurricane Fifi and others who have arrived clandestinely since that time, reportedly are training leftist militants and sympathizers among the Honduran peasants. The agitators and guerrilla instructors are taking advantage of growing unemployment and the overall poor national economic situation to stir the peasants into activity against the government.

- end -

5
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1

U	YES

S	YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007672. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

DCID 1/7 establishes the controls for the dissemination and use of the intelligence and intelligence information in this report. The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. Dissemination of this report outside the States of the United States, or to any individual or organization, other than those specified above, is forbidden without the specific approval of the Domestic Collection Division, Directorate of Operations.

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE	CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.		
1 2 3 4	16 17 18 19 20	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
X M I M	6 3 3 0 7	0 6 1 3 5	1 6 7 1 6 7 5	

SUBJECT AND AREA

Negotiations for Economic Agreement with Venezuela/Influential Officers in National Defense Council

(Honduras)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44): 0 6 2 4 5

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
Relna Trading Company
557¼ S. W. 8th St.
Coral Gables, Florida

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
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7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
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*
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2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
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HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52	53	54
1	S	P	E
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	I	R

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SREE	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

KIA 51

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

OCI/WH/HS – J WALLACE
6G28
DDO/LA/CNH thru OSS (HALE)
3B4402
OER/D/LA – METZGER

7-018

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES											
55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
K	1	a		5	1						

LLesa-Soto:ljh

for BENAL WARING

DESK OFFICER F Metcalf

BRANCH CHIEF for P Austen

FORM 25 8-74 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(20-41)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Honduras	**DCD REPORT NO.**	00-B 321/16716-75
SUBJECT	Negotiations for Economic Agreement with Venezuela/Influential Officers in National Defense Council	**DATE DISTR.**	03 JUL 1975
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	DCD Case 63307

DATE OF INFO. May 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa, Honduras/May 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, executive of an import/export company with extensive business connections in Central America and the Caribbean. He makes important trips to these areas and has contact with high ranking military and political leaders. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. The new military regime in Honduras currently is holding talks with Venezuela and hopes to sign an economic agreement in the very near future. With that in mind, the Government of Honduras (GOH) recently sent a high level commission to Venezuela headed by Captain Armando San Martin, Secretary of State for Economy and Commerce and by Attorney Antonio Jose Cuello to hold discussions with high ranking Venezuelan Government officials. Prior to the talks, the GOH recently sold to Venezuela 25 million linear feet of lumber at a total cost of US$5 million. The GOH hopes to reach an agreement by which Venezuela would buy Honduran agricultural products for an unspecified mix of cash and petroleum products. In addition, Venezuela would support a new agricultural production plan to be implemented in the very near future by Fernando Montes, Honduran Secretary of State for Agriculture.

2. Despite reports that Chief Executive Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro has unquestioned authority, Honduran military sources have indicated that Mario Maldonado, Agrarian Reform Chief; Lieutenant Colonel Mario Fonseca, Director of the Military Academy, and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Ramon Molina Cisneros, Commander of the First Artillery Battalion are the real "power behind the throne." These officers, who profess a strong nationalist ideology, are interested simply in the general welfare of the Honduran people, and they are maintaining a "watchdog" attitude to insure that no one, especially people in positions of power, uses such positions for his own personal benefit. These officers are members of the National Defense Council (NDC), which also includes the commanders of all major military units in the country. Maldonado, Fonseca, and Molina appear to be the "first among equals" in the 15 member NDC.

- end -

U YES S YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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(when filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD OFFICE	CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.				
1 2 3 4	16 17 18 19 20	22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34	35	36
Y M I M		0 3 1 8 5	0 6 7 1 5 7 5			

SUBJECT AND AREA

Current Political and Economic Situation/Expected Nationalization of Fishing Industry/Leftist Influence in Cabinet

(Honduras)

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44): 6 4 0 1 5

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros Diaz
[redacted] Reina Trading Co.
5574 S. W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — R

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT (47 48 49 50)

0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

0

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

HQ PROCESSING ELEMENT (51 52 53 54)

1	T	S	R
2	I	N	T
3	O	S	S
4	A	L	N
5	F	O	R

0

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

METHOD OF COLLECTION

X	INTERVIEW		TRIP REPORT
	OTHER DOCUMENT		OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

DIRECTED TO	SUP	SPEE	INT	DESK OFFICER
			X	(Metcalf)

FIELD COMMENTS

KIB 52)
53

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

OCI/WH – Joanna Wallace
6G-28 HQ

PDO 3B4402 HQ-CH/LA/CAM
Earl Dreisonstok
Coordinate thru Craig Walke
OSS Rm 900

OER-4G31 ID/LA
C. Spalding

OBJECTIVE REFERENCES

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

KIB 48

7-018

Desa-Soto:ljh

J.J. BEMAINWARING

DESK OFFICER: F.M. [illegible]

BRANCH DESK CHIEF: P.P. Austin

FORM 25 1-74 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(20-61)

1

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

DCD REPORT NO. OO-E 324/06715-75

SUBJECT Current Political and Economic Situation/Expected Nationalization of Fishing Industry/Leftist Influence in Cabinet

DATE DISTR. 1 APR 1975

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. February 1975

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Tegucigalpa/February 1975

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, executive of an import-export company. He is a frequent traveler to Central and South America where he has developed good contacts in the political and business sectors. He speaks Spanish fluently.

1. Businessmen in Honduras have reported that the economic and political situation in the country, currently in a sad state of affairs, is bound to become worse as a result of the indifference being exhibited by President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano. On the economic side, the private business sector is quite concerned about an expected government move to nationalize the fishing industry. Some foreign firms already are pulling out of the country and moving to nearby countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador. On the political side, President Lopez has failed to name a permanent foreign minister since November 1974, when Cesar Batres occupied that post. Ricardo A. Pineda is performing those duties on an interim basis. The President also has undermined Honduran youth by giving in to the demands of the leftist-controlled labor unions. He gives businessmen the impression that he does not know much about government; consequently, the situation in the country has become very unstable.

2. Apparently, the regime in Honduras wants to emulate the current Peruvian Government in failing to even consider elections at all. In fact, the government, which is controlled by the military, has three pro-left ministers in the cabinet. They are Manuel Acosta Bonilla, Secretary of State for Finance; Guatama Fonseca Zuniga, Secretary of State for Labor and Social Security, and Manlio Martinez Cantor, Executive Secretary, Planning Board. At one time, Acosta was the private secretary of the Mexican leftist leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, so he has been thoroughly indoctrinated along Marxist lines.

- end -

U YES — S YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622. Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

DCID 1/7 establishes the controls for the dissemination and use of the intelligence and intelligence information in this report. The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. Dissemination of this report outside the States of the United States, or to any individual or organization, other than those specified above, is forbidden without the specific approval of the Domestic Collection Division, Directorate of Operations.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M
B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): 60000
C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):
FORWARDED MO. DA. YR (22 23 24 25 26): 1 1 0 7 2
REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): 3 3 4 1 9 7 2
J (34) U (35) O (36): 2

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Horacio Moya Posas, Agrarian Reform Director/Rigoberto Sandoval in Italy/His Attitude Towards the US

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):
RELEASED MO. DA YR (40 41 42 43 44): 1/1/72

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relsa Trading Corporation, 5574 S.W. 8 St.
Coral Gables, Fla.

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — R
46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
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5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
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4			

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
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DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Copies To:

OCI - G. Rufty
6728

DIA - DI-5D3
MB-877
[redacted]
Pentagon

CRS 7-08

C/S: MOCabrera:bmm MOC
F.O. CHIEF: REMAINWARING
CASE OFFICER: HRC
DIVISION/STAFF/DESK: Mo H. Snitzer

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. X 00-~~B~~E-32~~1~~4/33419-72

SUBJECT Horatio Moya Posas, Agrarian Reform Director/Rigoberto Sandoval in Italy/ His Attitude Towards the US

DATE DISTR. 14 NOV 1972

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DIRM NO.: 1-7-B8 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. October 1972 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Horacio Moya Posas is the present director of Agrarian Reform in Honduras. He is inefficient and lacks some of the necessary qualifications for that position. In spite of his being a lawyer by profession, he is not astute, is only of average intelligence, is far from decisive, and frequently vacillates when called upon to make decisions. He is, however, extremely anti-Communist. His deputy director is Roberto Oliva. He is no asset. He has no outgoing personality whatsoever, and in fact, he is rather innocuous. One thing that can be said in his favor is that he is reported to be a good engineer.

2. The previous Agrarian Reform director was Rigoberto Sandoval. He is an extremely capable lawyer, very sagacious, intelligent and he displayed great foresight in that position. His present and future course of life is worth observing closely because a possibility does exist that he may be a candidate for an important political position in the not too distant future. To date Sandoval has not mentioned which political position he plans to seek. Another reason for observing him is that he is exceedingly anti-US.

3. If Sandoval does decide to seek a political office, it would most probably be General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano who would sponsor him.

4. Early in October 1972 a US importer-exporter received a very pleasant personal letter from Rigoberto Sandoval. By the tone of the letter one would judge that a close relationship has existed between them for some time. Sandoval stated that he was in Italy working for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and that for the present his stay there was for an indefinite period. He enclosed a long list of items which he requested the US importer-exporter to send to him immediately if at all possible. The list consisted mostly of furniture, household furnishings, electrical appliances, etc.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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(When Filled In)

14.12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4	B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR 22 23 24 25 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	J 34	UO 35	36
X M I M	40000		1 1 0 7 2	B 3 3 4 1 8 7 2			2

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Possible Reactivation of The Central American Common Market/
Labor Not Endorsing Any Specific Political Party

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39	RELEASED MO. 40 41 DA 42 43 YR 44
	11153

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50		AREA 51	52	53	54
[✓ 0]	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	[✓ 2]		N	T
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3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER MISC				
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S.					

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relma Trading Corporation
5574 S.W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.:
ORGANIZATION NO.:

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.:
ORGANIZATION NO.:

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.:
ORGANIZATION NO.:

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): ☐ NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS:

11DS

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS
- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

On 18 October an interim agreement was reached that re-established a free trade area among the five CACM countries. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are now in. Honduras remains outside.

11114

7-018

C/S.	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF DESK
MOCubria:hmm MOC	BEMainwaring	Hell	L. H. SMITZER

FORM 7-66 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

Intelligence Information Report

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. CO- B-321/33418-72

SUBJECT Possible Reactivation of The Central American Common Market/Labor Not Endorsing Any Specific Political Party

DATE DISTR. 23 NOV 1972

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES CIRL NO.: IRG-LA2-72

(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Early October 1972

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Honduran merchants, industrialists and some of the people have been urging the revival of the Central American Common Market (CACM). To all intents and purposes it has been practically non-existent. Salvadorians and Guatemalans have also expressed the same desire.

2. In early October 1972, these urgings were taken into consideration by the Secretaryship of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) (Secretaria Permanente de Integracion Economica Centro Americana). SIECA appointed a president, and a board of directors was selected. Eduardo Ortes Colindres, a Honduran lawyer was named president. General Samoza of Nicaragua and General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano approved the appointment of Eduardo Ortes Colindres so much that they offered to aid him in revitalizing the CACM. The board is composed of members from Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras. They are authorized to represent their countries in all matters pertaining to the CACM.

3. It is interesting to note that in spite of Honduras having informally retired from the CACM, not only is the president a Honduran, but so is the president of the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), with headquarters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The fact that General Samoza of Nicaragua and General Lopez Arellano of Honduras have volunteered their assistance to Eduardo Ortes Colindres has led most of the Central Americans to believe that the CACM can once again be made active. If this does occur, it would indeed be most beneficial to the Central American countries concerned.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U | YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S | YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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4. Labor is better organized in the northern part of Honduras than anywhere else in that country. It has a headquarters in every city where administrative activities are conducted and where meetings of union leaders are held. So far meetings have not taken place at work centers.

5. Transactions between labor and the government are carried out by labor delegates Celio Gonzalez, through the Ministry of Labor, never directly.

6. Labor, as such, does not subscribe to any one particular political party. The Marxist theories do not appear to appeal to Labor Unions. However, many of their members do seem to be leaning towards the Liberal Party.

7. On the surface Labor Unions' actions in Honduras appear to be demagogic at times. They make demands on the government, industry and businesses in spite of their knowing that their demands may prove to be harmful to the economy of their country. It would be rather unfair to always hold the Honduran Union Leaders responsible for this demagogism, because frequently the union members themselves are guilty of pressuring their leaders to execute some specific demand, even though they had already been warned of the possible harmful effects.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): 6000

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED (MO. DA. YR.; 22 23 24 25 26): 1 1 0 6 2

REPORT NO. (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): B
3 3 4 1 5 7 2

J U O (34 35 36): 2

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED (MO. DA YR.; 40 41 42 43 44): 11/1/62

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

General Lopez Arellano Unwilling to Lead Coup d'etat at Present/Army Officers Being Trained in Peru/Zuniga's Stratagems to Retain Present Power (Honduras)

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros
Relma Trading Corporation
5574 S.W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT			
47	48	49	50
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[✓ 2]	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA			
51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	[illegible]	N	T
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H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

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DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
				X	RHeller

FIELD COMMENTS

- Army report

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-018

C/S: MOCUBRIA:hmm MOC

F.O. CHIEF: BEMAIN/HARING

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION/STAFF DESK

FORM 7-60 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. REQ CODE 11 12 13 14 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO DA YR 22 23 24 25 26	B 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	I U O 34 35 36
X M I M		60000		X	06160	X 1731870	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Sandoval's Dissatisfaction with the US/Possible
Lopez "Continuismo" Maneuver

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39	RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44
	06190

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATION, REPORTS, OTHER

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	G
1	S	&	T
[✓ 2]			
3	M		
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	C
7	B		C
8	-	-	-
9	M		S

*
1 SUBJECT WELL KNOWN
2 TOO GENERAL
3 DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4 OTHER, MISC.
5 COMBINES WITH
6 INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	5		V
[✓ 2]			T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
International Division
(RHeller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-019

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff Desk
RHHaldane/css	JFGLEICHAUF	Heller	[illegible] 0

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Honduras	REPORT NO.	OO- B-321/17318-70
SUBJECT	Sandoval's Dissatisfaction with the US/Possible Lopez "Continuismo" Maneuver	DATE DISTR.	24 JUN 1970
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES (2356)	CIRL LA1-70

DATE OF INFO. Jun 70 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE —/Jun 70

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras. He maintains contact with high ranking Honduran Government and business leaders and travels frequently to that country.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have recently had the opportunity to spend an evening with Rigoberto Sandoval, who as the General Secretary, Planification Board, is responsible for agrarian reform within the Republic of Honduras. He told me the following information:

2. Sandoval is making a trip to West Germany and possibly other non-Communist European countries in an attempt to procure technical assistance, credit and other unspecified help for the Honduran agrarian reform program. He feels it is in the best interests of Honduras to turn to countries other than the US for assistance. He claimed the US is now in decline; that she is both unable and unwilling to fulfill her international obligations, particularly within Latin America, and that she is slow to react and bogged down with bureaucratic red tape. Sandoval also suspicions that the Peace Corps, initially very beneficial to Honduras, is a tool of the CIA.

3. Sandoval considers himself to be the enemy of foreign businesses, particularly American, as they are holding large amounts of property which should figure in the agrarian reform movement. He did not mention plans to appropriate foreign land holdings however.

4. Sandoval has not heard President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano personally claim interest in another term. The feeling inside government circles is that Lopez will request a constitutional amendment permitting him to remain in office for six more years without benefit of election. If this happens Sandoval will resign. Although Lopez is behind the agrarian reform program his remaining in office would not be beneficial to the country.

- end -

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5): X M I M

B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10):

C. REQ. CODE (11-15): C C C C C

D. CASE NUMBER (16-20):

E. (21): X

RECEIVED (22-26) MO. DA. YR.: 0 5 2 0 [illegible]

REPORT NO. (27-33): 1 4 3 [illegible] 3 7

I U O (34-36):

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Interest of Lopez in Second Term/Decline in Influence of Zuniga/Lack of Support for Candidacy of Fernandez (Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)

RELEASED (40-44) MO. DA. YR.: [illegible]

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
1885 SW First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47-50				
0	E	C	O	
1	S	&	T	
[✓ 2]	P	O	L	
3	M	I	L	
4	-	-	-	
5	S	O	C	
6	G	E	O	
7	B	I	O	
8	-	-	-	
9	M	I	S	

* 1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN 2. TOO GENERAL 3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES 4. OTHER/MISC. 5. COMBINED WITH 6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51-54			
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]		N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

1RS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
International Division
(RHeller)

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

An excellent report. I am sure OCI will find it useful. It answers their questions. Another reason that it appears that Lopez plans to continue in office after 1971 is that he keeps the threat from El Salvador on a high key.

Heller

7-018

C/S: DWHaldane/css

F.O. Chief: JFGLEICHAUF

Case Officer:

Division/Staff/Desk: L. H. SNITZER

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/14313-70

SUBJECT Interest of Lopez in Second Term/ Decline in Influence of Zuniga/ Lack of Support for Candidacy of Fernandez

DATE DISTR. 2 JUN 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL LA1-70 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. May 70 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/May 70 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano is interested in a second term. This opinion is based on a growing consensus among Congressmen, Honduran business leaders and the military that Lopez desires to remain in office for another term. The thinking in these Honduran circles is that the lack of disclaimers by Lopez is, in itself, a strong indication of his "continuismo" plans. Approximately ten days ago Herman Pascua, manager of the National Railroad, headquartered in San Pedro Sula, had a discussion with the President during which Pascua passed the remark that he would like to remain with the railroad as long as Lopez remained in office. Lopez made no specific rejoinder to this but Pascua left the President's office with the distinct impression that Lopez would run for reelection.

2. Lopez would probably be reelected with relative ease. The opposition Liberal Party is divided internally and lacks both an effective candidate and the capital necessary to offer a serious challenge.

3. The power and influence of Ricardo Zuniga has declined drastically in recent months. This is not due to any specific act but more to a growing realization by President Lopez of Zuniga's dishonesty, ambition for power and his inability to get along with some government officials and prominent military officers. President Lopez was particularly dismayed at Zuniga's handling of Honduran propaganda during the recent Honduran/El Salvadoran border war. Lopez allegedly felt that the invective against El Salvador often mirrored the type used by Cuban Communism.

4. Miguel Andonie Fernandez, a self-appointed presidential candidate, is an honest, sincere and well respected man. There is a small group of roughly ten Arab and Jewish businessmen in San Pedro Sula known as the "economic mafia" because they control so much of Honduran business activity. This group has taken note of the candidacy of Fernandez and has been impressed by his honesty and sincerity. They will not support him however, because they feel he lacks the political experience and popular base for a successful campaign.

- end -

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

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(When Filled in)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY / FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	
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F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Anti-American Sentiment/Apparent Industrial Incentive/
Purchase of Armament

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

11/1/49

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
1885 S. W. 1st Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50

AREA 51 52 53 54

1 SPECIFIC ENTITY UNKNOWN
2 TOO GENERAL
3 DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4 OTHER MISC.
5 COMBINED WITH
6 INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

7-018

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ARCharneco/jls	JPGLEICHAUF	Keller	

FORM 366 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | CONFIDENTIAL | **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Anti-American Sentiment/Apparent Industrial Incentive/Purchase of Armament

REPORT NO. OO-B 321/33715-69

DATE DISTR. 19 NOV 1969

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL LA2-69

(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Oct 69 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa/Oct 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has social and business contacts with officials of the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. For over five years I have been in close contact with Hondurans of different backgrounds and social position. Never before have I seen the anti-American sentiment which is sweeping Honduras at the present time. The feeling is not only evident among student and labor organizations, but among sectors of what is considered to be the best informed and educated individuals in the country. Most of them are convinced that the US has the influence to exert diplomatic pressures on El Salvador in order to settle the pending border dispute, but has failed to do so. They see the US Government as favoring El Salvador.

2. During conversations with several government officials they emphatically stated that Honduras was not going to open the Pan American Highway to Salvadoran traffic. This is the attitude of almost everybody that I talked with. This single issue has served to unite the country like never before. There is a new feeling of patriotism which was lacking before the conflict with El Salvador.

3. The campaign against Salvadoran products has resulted in an incentive for Honduran investors. I have had several inquiries from Honduran businessmen who are interested in establishing production facilities for consumer articles which were normally imported from El Salvador. These individuals are eager to invest and establish factories in order to fill the demand for products which were imported from El Salvador.

4. Honduras has been purchasing arms and ammunition from Portuguese and Belgian sources. Some of this armament has arrived in the country. According to a military informant most of the armament has not been delivered, but is expected in the country before the end of the year.

- end -

U | YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S | YES

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE 1-5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6-10	C. REQ. CODE 11-15	D. CASE NUMBER 16-20	E. 21	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22-26	REPORT NO. 27-33	I U O 34-36
XMIM		60000		X	09029	2611369	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Honduran Government Interest in Purchasing Weapons to Arm Reserves/Alleged Purchase of Combat Aircraft by Honduran Official (Honduras/El Salvador)

ESTPA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40-44: 09079

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio CISNEROS
1885 SW First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	D
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
[✓ 3]	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
[✓ 2]	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

The business associate referred to in the body of the report is the contact.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Advance to:
Al [illegible], OCI

7-018

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ARCharneco/css	FGLEICHAUF		H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

2

(20-41)

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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...an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY	Honduras/El Salvador	**REPORT NO.**	OO-B-321/26113-69
SUBJECT	Honduran Government Interest in Purchasing Weapons to Arm Reserves/ Alleged Purchase of Combat Aircraft by [redacted] Honduran Official	**DATE DISTR.**	11 SEP 1969
		PAGES	1
		REFERENCES (2356)	C-DC9-55300

DATE OF INFO. Aug 69 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa/Aug 69

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has social and business contacts with officials of the government, the armed forces, and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During early August 1969 a close business associate met with Colonel (fnu) Coreccolli (phonetic) and members of the Honduran Army General Staff. Colonel Coreccolli and members of the Staff were alarmed by the continuing reports of arms and ammunition stockpiling by El Salvador. These individuals were of the opinion that the armament of the Honduran Armed Forces was inferior to that of El Salvador.

2. During the meeting Colonel Coreccolli inquired about the possibility of a legal or illegal purchase of approximately 2500 M-1 rifles and an undetermined amount of .30 caliber ammunition from US sources. He explained that the weapons were needed to arm personnel with prior military service in case of a renewal of hostilities with El Salvador. These individuals were considered to be a reserve for the Honduran Armed Forces.

3. My associate explained to Colonel Coreccolli that under the circumstances the US Government would not issue an export permit for the armaments. As for illegal sources my associate disclaimed knowledge of any. He also considered the transportation problem. Colonel Coreccolli stated that if acquired the weapons could be smuggled aboard a Honduran refrigeration ship which was anchored in the Miami River at that time. Following this Colonel Coreccolli closed the meeting indicating that he was going to explore other possibilities.

4. Following the meeting my associate had a conversation with Rigoberto Sandoval, a member of the Planification Board. Upon being informed of the meeting, Sandoval warned my associate to be careful in any dealings with Colonel Coreccolli, since he was known as a corrupt government official, a "thief". Sandoval stated that this was the opinion of President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano who distrusted Coreccolli. A few days later my associate learned that Ricardo Zuniga, Minister of the Presidency, has been given the task of purchasing arms and ammunition for Honduras.

5. Mauricio Hernandez, wealthy owner of a lumber mill in Honduras, visited the US during the first part of August 1969. He told me that he was going to purchase two "combat aircraft" for the Honduran Government. He did not specify the type nor the source of the aircraft. About a week later I had a telephone conversation with Hernandez, during which he told me that he had been "successful" in his purchasing mission. He did not give any details. - end -

U | YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S | YES

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14-12-37

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.
1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	11 12 13 14 15	16 17 18 19 20	21
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FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

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22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
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F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Alleged Dissatisfaction of Aurelio Trillo, Cuban Merchant Marine

(Cuba)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 1 1 1 3

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio W. Cisneros
1885 S.W. First Street
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E: (S) GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
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3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
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4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

III 19634

FYI - Possible Interest

Copies to: WH/COG/OPS.

CI/LS.

PD

ii)

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharneco:mab	JPGILKICHAUF		DS/SS.

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY: Cuba

[illegible] 00-A(S) 322/33115-63

SUBJECT: Alleged Dissatisfaction of Aurelio Trillo, Cuban Merchant Marine

4 November 1963

1. A contact of this office recently reported the information presented below.

2. I had a conversation with some relatives who arrived from Cuba during October 1963. During the course of the conversation I inquired on the whereabouts of Aurelio Trillo Huerta, a former close friend of my family. From my relatives I obtained the below information and impressions concerning Trillo and members of his family.

3. Trillo is the second or third officer aboard the [illegible] ship "La Plata". He is dissatisfied with the GOC. This dissatisfaction arises from the unjust imprisonment of his father, Aurelio Amado Trillo de Escajedo from September 19[illegible] to October 19[illegible]. He was convicted for "counterrevolutionary activities" by the GOC. Subsequently his father was released and at the present time is in Mexico waiting for a visa to enter the US. During the time of his father's imprisonment Aurelio was planning to leave the island by clandestine means but was dissuaded by his family.

4. Trillo remains in the Merchant Marine because of the privileges obtained as an officer and because of the opportunity to travel. In his trips he acquires items which are scarce in Cuba and gives them as gifts to his family. Most of these gifts are then sold or bartered in the black market for foodstuffs and other necessities.

5. Trillo has two sisters who are married to Merchant Marine officers. Teresa Trillo Huerta is married to Alfredo [illegible]. She is a government secretary who works in classified foreign trade activities. She has one child, four years old. Among her close relatives, she is openly anti-GOC. The other sister is Lilian Trillo Huerta. One of these Merchant Marine officers is a captain but I don't recall which one.

6. Aurelio Trillo is about 25 years of age, intelligent and an introvert. He is not married. Though it has been about nine years since I have seen him, from what my relatives told me I believe that Trillo would be willing to cooperate against the GOC. During the fourth week of October the "La Plata" was supposed to be at Bilbao, Spain undergoing repairs.

-end-

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5): X M I M I

B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10):

C. REQ. CODE (11–15):

D. CASE NUMBER (16–20):

E. (21): X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22–26): 0 1 2 5 8

REPORT NO. (27–33): 0 1 7 6 3 6 8

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Opinions of Moises Lopez Maldonado on Possible Presidential Candidates

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37–39):

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40–44):

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
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4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
- NO
- TO USSR
- FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

IRS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
ACharneco:mzb	JFOLEICHAUF		L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-K 323/01763-68

SUBJECT Opinions of Moises Lopez Maldonado on Possible Presidential Candidates

DATE DISTR. 1 FEB 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900

(2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa-Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras for several years. During this time he has developed social and business contacts with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the middle of January 1968 I had a lengthy conversation with Moises Lopez Maldonado, Honduran Consul in Costa Rica and a leading personality in the Partido Nacional (PN). He is a very close friend of Martin Aguero, leader of the PN. Lopez spends about half of his time in Honduras. He is an intelligent and cunning politician with a lot of common sense. He is critical of the soft lines used by the US in internal and foreign affairs.

2. During our conversation he stated that the next President of the country would be a civilian. He doubted very much if the Armed Forces could come up with a suitable candidate. He gave his opinions about several individuals with presidential aspirations.

> "Armando Velazquez Cerrato has completely disregarded the Party machinery. He is ambitious, but too individualistic. He has no political future in the country.
>
> "Manuel Acosta Bonilla present Minister of Economy, is capable, a hard worker and a good man. His Presidential ambitions at the present time are very subtle.
>
> "Ricardo Zuniga is well qualified and would have support from most of the influential people in the government who would like to see him as a Presidential candidate. A hard working individual, he is the right hand of President Lopez Arellano. I consider him the best qualified to run for the Presidential office."

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1 [illegible]

S YES

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)
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FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. B E F OTHER (27-33)	I U O (34-36)
C1158	0102068 X (F)	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Opinions on Rigoberto Sandoval/Manuel Acosta Bonilla/Armando Velasquez Cerrato/Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Status of Present Government (Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44)
	01158

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio Cisneros
549 De Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	*	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	P	O	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.	3			
3	M	I	L		4			
4	–	–	–	4. OTHER/MISC.				
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH				
6	G	E	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
7	B	I	O					
8	–	–	–					
9	M	I	S					

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

J
BE

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
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FORM 25 3-66 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Opinions on Rigoberto Sandoval/Manuel Acosta Bonilla/Armando Velasquez Cerrato/Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Status of Present Government

REPORT NO. 00- OCK 323/01020-68

DATE DISTR. 22 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900
(2356)

DATE OF INFO Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Tegucigalpa-Dec 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I have known Rigoberto Sandoval for approximately eight months. As the General Secretary of the Planification Board he is a very capable and competent individual. He is progressive and liberal in his ideas, though at times seems to be inclined to the left. He is a man of great potential for the development of the country. Sandoval was instrumental in instituting a housing project of approximately one thousand houses, to be constructed in San Pedro de Sula. The houses will be built for needy families. A loan of US$2 million has been granted by the "Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo" for the project.

2. The Minister of Economy, Manuel Acosta Bonilla, is an honest, hard working, and responsible individual. I have talked with him and with people who are close to him and got the impression that Acosta has no higher political aspirations. At least he does not show any outward signs of it.

3. Armando Velasquez Cerrato is being handled by the government very carefully. He is considered to be a dangerous individual. However, he is regarded by some of his followers as a scapegoat of the present government. Personally I don't think that he has any opportunities or enough popular support to intervene in the government successfully.

4. Ricardo Zuniga, Minister of Presidency, remains as an influential figure with President Lopez Arellano. Zuniga provides financial support to the non-Communist student organizations who support his claims that the US is intervening in Honduran internal affairs. In a recent confrontation with an official of the US Embassy, President Lopez Arellano openly supported Zuniga.

5. Since the last two years there has been a marked change in the country. There could have been more progress but the government is not dynamic enough, even though President Lopez Arellano is in complete control of the government. The opposition to the government is weak, plagued by differences of opinions, and lacking unity. The large majority of the people are undergoing great misery and poverty. Still, the masses are contented. Their interest is in subsisting from one day to the other, not politics.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L S YES

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5): X M I M I
B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10):
C. REQ. CODE (11-15):
D. CASE NUMBER (16-20):
E. (21): X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26): 0 1 1 2 8
REPORT NO. (27-33): 0 1 0 1 3 6 8
I U O (34-36):

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Proposed Steel Plant and Paper and Pulp Plant

(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)
RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40-44): / /

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

J. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
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1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
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J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S [illegible]
F.O. Chief [illegible]
Case Officer
Division, Staff/Desk L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Proposed Steel Plant and Paper and Pulp Plant

REPORT NO. OO-B 321/01013-68

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Honduras/Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in the government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Negotiations are going on with Mexico for the establishment of a steel plant in Honduras. The principal force behind the establishment of this industry is (fnu) Alduvin, an engineer with the "Banco Central". Alduvin studied in Mexico, and is a very intelligent and capable person. Alduvin was Minister of Public Works during the regime of Villeda Morales. At that time he was a supporter of Brown and Root, a US company with offices in the country. Though Alduvin was instrumental in granting several important projects to the company he now criticizes it as another extension of "Yankee Imperialism".

2. A US firm, International Paper Company, has been selected as one of the major stockholders, with participation of ADELA and the Government of Honduras, for the establishment of the paper and pulp plant and for the exploitation of lumber reserves in the country. The paper and pulp plant is tentatively to be established at the junction of the Aguan and Mame rivers. The area selected by the government for the exploitation of lumber reserves covers approximately 15 thousand square kilometers in the departments of Olancho and Yoro. The government is going to face a problem trying to determine the ownership of property in the area. I estimate that it will take three years to survey the boundaries and to set landmarks in the area.

3. Two access roads will be constructed to serve the area. One, "Carretera del Projecto Forestal de Olancho", will connect the paper plant with the forest reserves, extending from Mame to Salama, a total of 130 kilometers. The other road will connect the plant to the coast, from Mame to the port of La Ceiba, a total of 100 kilometers.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

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14-12-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10)	C. REQ. CODE (11–15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16–20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22–26)	REPORT NO. S E K OTHER (27–33)	IUD (34–36)
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F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Civic Action Program Success/Armed Forces Capability to Cope with Insurgency/Activities of CIAC, Cuban Propaganda Organization
(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39)
RELEASED MO. DA. YR. (40 41 42 43 44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
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*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
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2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ XX Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
[illegible]	[illegible]		L H Snitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/00869-68

SUBJECT Civic Action Program Success/Armed Forces Capability to Cope with Insurgency/Activities of CIAC, Cuban Propaganda Organization.

DATE DISTR. 19 JAN 1968

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53900 (2356)

DATE OF INFO. Jan 68 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Honduras/Jan 68 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the last two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the armed forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The armed forces are doing a splendid job in their civic action projects. Their primary interest seems to be the construction and repair of roads throughout the Republic. In conversation with a liaison officer between the army and other government agencies he mentioned that the only difficulties they are facing in their programs is the lack of adequate equipment, and the lack of cooperation by the Public Works Office. He told me that in most instances the requests made by the army for the use of additional transportation or utilization of existing equipment are disregarded by minor officials. This creates problems requiring the action of higher officials, who are given the impression that the army is the originator of these problems.

2. Considering the available resources and facilities of the country the armed forces are well trained and disciplined. During the latter part of 1967 President Anastacio Somoza and a group of other Nicaraguan dignitaries visited Honduras. Several groups under Communist influence demonstrated against the visit. I had the opportunity to observe the development of the demonstration, from a meeting to a riot, from a vantage point. Despite the fact that the army riot control troops were stoned and abused they were disciplined enough to prevent what could have been a serious incident. They did not attack or fire at the mob, as would have been the desire of the leaders, who incidentally always remained behind the mob and utilized other people to direct and incite the demonstrators. The troops and junior officers who were present during the demonstration were highly praised by the responsible elements of the society.

3. If a guerrilla movement started I believe the armed forces would act swiftly. A special counter-guerrilla unit is well trained and equipped to prevent development of small units into large and organized guerrilla bands.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S YES

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

4. Two or three months ago I met three Cuban nationals, Jose de Jesus Flana, Carlos Morris, and Eduardo Garcia, members of the "Confederacion Latino Americana Cristiana", CLAC, with central offices in Caracas. These individuals travel through Latin America with the purpose of familiarizing groups with Communist methods of operation and spreading democracy. I talked several times with them, and with people who had attended their meetings. It is my impression, as well as that of others, that they tended to create the wrong impression. Several times they justified the actions of Fidel Castro, and seemed to be anti-American in their line of propaganda. Certainly they did not do anything worthwhile to aid democracy. These individuals claimed not to have any association with the US, and to receive financial support from Germany.

-end-

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/33415-72

SUBJECT General Lopez Arellano Unwilling to Lead Coup d'etat at Present/Army Officers Being Trained in Peru/Zuniga's Stratagems to Retain Present Power

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES (2356) CIRL NO.: IRG-LA2-72 DIRM NO.: 1-C 1

DATE OF INFO. Late September 1972 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Honduras/1972

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen who has worked and lived in Honduras for a number of years. He has numerous social contacts and business connections with officials of the government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The Honduran economy is in a deplorable state. Some young army officers are urging General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano to lead a coup d'etat to displace President Ramon Ernesto Cruz, and have offered to help him. Early in October 1972 a government official and several young army officers stated in a private conversation that Lopez Arellano did not believe it advisable for him to lead a coup d'etat until most of the following events took place:

   a. A rally in the general economy of the country.

   b. Improved diplomatic and commercial relations between Honduras and El Salvador. This improvement would further a better functioning of the Central American Common Market (CACM).

   c. Completion of the Pan American Highway extending between El Salvador and Honduras. Completion would benefit both countries by giving access to new markets for their products.

   d. Decreased corruption among government officials. Not only are some of them feathering their future nests with currency, but also permitting individuals to do likewise in return for something the government official desires the recipient to give or to do for him.

   e. Enrichment of the Treasury so that funds could be made available for projects beneficial to the country and its people.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

U	YES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S	YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

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2. During the same private conversation, General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano was quoted as having stated that it would be futile for him to lead a coup d'etat unless there was hope of improving the welfare of the masses and the general economy of the country as well; he firmly believes it would be impossible to accomplish that goal until a change in most of the above conditions were met prior to any coup d'etat in which he would be interested.

3. Selected Honduran army officers have attended special courses at an army facility in Peru since approximately 1967. According to an army officer the number of candidates sent since early 1972 has not only been increased but also each has been ordered to specialize in any one of the branches of their choice. They previously attended the various courses given at that facility.

4. The army gives an outward appearance of being in sympathy with the present regime, but in reality not all the members sympathize with President Cruz. In private conversations some speak of him in a derogatory manner, especially young officers.

5. A man who continues to wield a great deal of power in Honduras is Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus, Minister of Government and Justice, also leader of the Nationalist Party. Zuniga's ability to continue wielding power is due to his being a very clever, astute, wealthy man. He always knows exactly what he wants, and does not hesitate to utilize his personal characteristics and his wealth in obtaining his objectives.

6. Zuniga's present ambition for continued power has forced him to feign being a firm constitutionalist. That is, he is claiming loud and clear that commitments made between the government and political parties must not only be respected but must also be adhered to. Zuniga does not claim this because he really believes this to be a moral obligation, or because he is a fervent democrat. The fundamental reason is that he knows he is the recognized leader of the Nationalist Party, as well as having become influential in the Liberal Party. He believes these parties are the ones sustaining the present regime of President Ramon Ernesto Cruz in power. Therefore, he calculates that through these two parties he can protract the power he has today.

7. Today relations betwen General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano and Zuniga are not as cordial as they were previously. However, one must not be led to believe that this situation is unrepairable because if Zuniga needed Lopez Arellano's help, or vice versa, the former pleasant relationship would be hastily nursed back to life. It is just possible that if a coup d'etat led by General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano should take place, and be successful, Zuniga would make a great effort to settle any differences existing between them. This might not please some of the army officers who dislike Zuniga due to his character and the procedures used by him to obtain power.

8. Up to the present time the Armed Forces do not appear to be leaning towards the "left". They are naturally desirous of improving their way of life. The Air Force has recently organized a company whose entire net profits will go to the Air Force for the benefit of its members. General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano is investing in various industries and small private industries. He has very recently established a company called Empacadora de Carnes (meat packing firm) whose net profits will be for himself alone. The Armed Forces hold General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano in the highest esteem. This knowledge is based on his observations and personal contact with officers and enlisted men.

- end -

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2-35-37

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO.	I U O
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F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Naval Interest in Ceramic Radome Developments/New Technique for Fabricating Silica Radomes
(France/USSR/China)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39 | RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Professor Jesse Walton S-23537
(Georgia Tech) High Temperature Laboratory
DeKalb-Peachtree Airport
Atlanta, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A# 142336
ORGANIZATION NO A-23537

45 TYPE CODE GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER | 46 NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same as Contact.

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
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1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER WISE
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
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J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

FLEX P
CASE
X-REF K.D.
FILED on

24 JAN 1968

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
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FORM 4-25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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14-12-37

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.
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FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DA. YR.	REPORT NO. B E K OTHER	I U O
22 23 24 25 26	27 28 29 30 31 32 33	34 35 36
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EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO. DA. YR.
37 38 39	40 41 42 43 44

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Economic Conditions in Rural Areas/Unemployment/Lack of Economic Development

(Honduras)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45	TYPE OO-E	46	* NOT DISSEMINATED
	GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER		

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	–	–	–
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	–	–	–
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	I	N	T
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

P

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
SAcosta ACharmoccoloed	JEOLEY/CHAUP		L H Smith

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Honduras	**REPORT NO.**	00-K-323/33118-67
SUBJECT	Economic Conditions in Rural Areas/ Unemployment/Lack of Economic Development	**DATE DISTR.**	10 Nov 67
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	CIRL C-DC7-53550 (356)
DATE OF INFO.	Oct 67 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--- Oct 67 and earlier		

201-

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

TION:

ROOM:

SOURCE Cuban national, and engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the past two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. My work takes me to the rural areas in Honduras where I have opportunity to talk with the peasants. It is my considered opinion, based on personal observations, that the peasants in the rural areas are bitter and disgusted with their lot. They have little or no faith left in anyone. Economically, their condition is second only to Haiti, in comparison with the countries in the Caribbean. The prices of staples compare with prices in the US, but Honduran wages are far below US wages. Unemployment is a very grave problem. My company hires unskilled labor but does not need more than 200. We have had to refuse hundreds who applied because we had no need for them. A small fraction of those turned back will be able to find work, the rest will remain unemployed.

2. There is little economic development in the country and almost complete lack of initiative and vigor. Seldom is a man found in Government or industry who is not afflicted with the two major vices among this segment of the population: wine and women. The economic inactivity at times appears to be the result of indifference, other times the result of intentional delays by Communist infiltrators in Government. As an example of this "lack of initiative" I will make reference to the road in the Olancho area. The loan for this 110 kilometers of road was approved in October 1963. The road is badly needed to move agricultural products from this region, to provide employment for hundreds of needy people, and to provide the only access for the construction of a US$ 20 million pulp and paper plant in the area. Until the summer of 1967, these funds remained idle. Preliminary studies were not even made. With luck, construction may commence in 1968, but by this time payments on the principal and interest are due to start.

-end-

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U YES	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	[illegible]	S YES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
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F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato
(Honduras)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rogelio CISNEROS
549 de Leon Drive
Miami Springs, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

45 TYPE OO-E
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	*	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	P	O	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	3			
3	M	I	L		4			
4	-	-	-	4. OTHER/MISC.				
5	S	O	C	5. COMBINED WITH				
6	G	E	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
7	B	I	O					
8	-	-	-					
9	M	I	S					

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ XX Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
[illegible]

C/S SAcosta
ACharneco:eed

F.O. Chief
JEGLEICHAUF

Case Officer

Division/Staff/Desk

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

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(20-41)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Honduras

SUBJECT Activities of Ricardo Zuniga/Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato

REPORT NO. 00-K-323/33117-67

DATE DISTR. 10 Nov 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES CIRL C-DC7-53550 (356)

DATE OF INFO. Oct 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --- Oct 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, an engineer, who has worked and lived in Honduras for the past two years. During this period he has developed social and business contacts with officials in government, the Armed Forces and the business community.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. Ricardo Zuniga, Ministry of Presidency, is the hardest working man in the Honduran Government. He enjoys his liquor as well as any other official in government, and when he goes on a drinking spree it may last for days. However, he has a great capacity for work and lately he has cut down on his drinking. He is too intent in his presidential aspirations. President Lopez Arellano has left the administration of government to Ricardo Zuniga. Zuniga's trusted man is Lucas Lozano Zelaya, Procurador General (Attorney General).

2. There are two others who have designs on the presidency, Mario Rivera Lopez, President of Congress, and Colonel Armando Velasquez Cerrato, Honduran Ambassador to Mexico. Rivera Lopez' chances are very small, but Colonel Velasquez is a very serious contender. Both Zuniga and Lopez Arellano are fully aware of his strength. Even though Colonel Cerrato has publicly denied that he is behind the pro-Cerrato committees being formed within the National Party, I am informed that he is in fact supporting them.

- end -

U YES

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

S YES

201-169934
COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
6 NOV. 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

OLC- 78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB ___ [illegible]

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 12 September 1972

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Leibel Bergman 201-780814

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NK-105-23027

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD- 43223, 12 September 1972 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 9 July 1971

ORIGIN: new york

SUBJECT: Re: Foreign Political matter - albania - internal security - albania

BUREAU FILE: none

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD-18022, 9 July 1971 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT X MEMO ___ DATE: 16 July 1971

ORIGIN: New Haven

SUBJECT: Arthur William Galston - sec. matter - Communist.

BUREAU FILE: 100-415809

FIELD OFFICE FILE: 100-16221

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD 18046, 16 July 1971 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER X REPORT ___ MEMO ___ DATE: 9 December 1964

ORIGIN: Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - Russia - China

BUREAU FILE: (SC- 100-364447)

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA- 92503, 9 December 1964 (attached)

Doc ___ LETTER ___ REPORT ___ MEMO X DATE: 23 march 1966

ORIGIN: San Francisco, Calif.

SUBJECT: Robert Stephen Coe

BUREAU FILE: none

FIELD OFFICE FILE: none

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBB-44105, 23 march 1966 (attached)

OLC-78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB___ [illegible]

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 23 March 1959

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NY 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: unnumbered, 23 March 1959 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 2 July 1959

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NY. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-28133, 2 July 1959 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 9 March 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-01292, 9 March 1958 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 28 January 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: NY- 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-97368, 28 January 1958 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 29 May 1958

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447
WASH. F.O. 77-2536

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-03883, 29 May 1958 (attached)

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OLC-78-0070/29

FBI REFERRALS TAB____ KR-____

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT X MEMO___ DATE: 20 December 1957

ORIGIN: New York

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank Coe - Espionage - R

BUREAU FILE: 100-364447

FIELD OFFICE FILE: N.Y. 100-96778

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-95144, 20 December 1957 (attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 12 March 1951

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, V. Frank

BUREAU FILE: File - 100-004-020/32

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB 08099/04 (ser. 2) 12 March 1951

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 23 October 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File - 016-500

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-88780 (pg. 1) 23 October 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 15 April 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius

BUREAU FILE: File - 100-300-003

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-70905 (pg 6) 15 April 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 8 August 1962

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File - 100-008-017

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA 20943 (pg 4) 8 August 1962

FBI REFERRALS TAB ___

OLC-78-0070/29

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 19 april 1961
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: Milton Harry Freedman (201-251919)
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF-75040, 19 april 1961

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 6 may 59
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: Coe, Virginius Frank
BUREAU FILE: filed- 201-251919 Milton Harry Freedman
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBF 23226 (pg 8) 6 may 59

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 17 april 1953
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: File- 100-4-20-13-4
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-26027, 17 april 1953

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: april 1946
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT: The Gregory Case (FBI Document
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE:
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: (gist attached)

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 12 march 1951
ORIGIN:
SUBJECT:
BUREAU FILE:
FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)
CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB 8099, (pg 36) 12 march 1951

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FBI REFERRALS TAB___

OLC-78-0070/29

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 10 October 1952

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT:

BUREAU FILE: File - 100-4-20-4-10

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DFB-21674, 10 October 1952

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 29 mar 1965

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Frank

BUREAU FILE: Filed 201-251919. Milton Harry Friedman

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBB-03533 (pg 8) 29 mar 1965

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 8 February 1960

ORIGIN: 201-083341 on temp. charge to John Clancy

SUBJECT: IP/EIS X 9228

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBD-08302, 8 February 1960

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: 30 June 1964

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: Coe, Virgenius Frank

BUREAU FILE: File 201-731043 in IP files)

FIELD OFFICE FILE: (gist attached)

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-77091 (pg 4) 30 June 1964

Doc___ LETTER___ REPORT___ MEMO___ DATE: april 1946

ORIGIN:

SUBJECT: TS-46492-F (control) Coe, Virgenius Frank

BUREAU FILE:

FIELD OFFICE FILE:

CIA DOC SYMBOL/DATE: DBA-81235/04, april 1946

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OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — TELEPOUCH 11/DP 7

DATE-TIME GROUP — 272232Z

DISPATCH NUMBER — WASHINGTON 101637 27

File

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 013522

TO: BONN INFO HAMBURG, GERMANY.

FROM: CH/EULA INFO EUR/G/DAO

SUBJECT: UN~~INTEL~~ TAPPER/CO CAREPLICA INTEL OP - IDENTIFICATION OF LONG-TIME U.S. RESIDENT OF PEKING

REF: BONN 62743 [IN 404398]

1. FOLLOWING, IN RESPONSE PARA 2 REF REQUEST FOR IDENTIFICATION OF FRANK COOK (SIC), LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF PEKING AND EMPLOYEE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE SECTION OF "PEKING REVIEW," SUBJECT IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO VIRGINIUS FRANK C O E AKA FRANK COE, DPOB: 5 JANUARY 1907, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA (201-0169934). FILE SUMMARY, GIVEN BELOW, IS PROVIDED FOR STATION INTERNAL USE ONLY AND IS NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE PASSED RE

2. PER FBI REPORTING SUBJECT IS [redacted]

DATE: 21 SEPT 77 ORIG: [redacted] AB UNIT: CH/EULA EXT: 1972	COORDINATING OFFICERS RECORD COPY	IP USE ONLY

27 Sep 77
201-169934

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CLASSIFICATION

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OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

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CL BY: 019522

[redacted]

3. [redacted] JULY 1971 FBI REPORT [redacted]

STATES [redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE OF PAGES 3

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CL BY: 019522

[redacted] JULY 1970 "NEW YORK TIMES" ARTICLE REPORTED IT WAS NOT KNOWN IF SUBJECT SERVED PRC AS FINANCIAL SPECIALIST BUT OPINED SUBJECT WAS MAINLY EMPLOYED IN EDITING ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS AND PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, A VIEW WHICH CORRESPONDS TO REF REPORTING FROM CAREPLICA/6. 4

4. SUBJECT'S FAMILY: SUBJECT AND HIS WIFE RUTH BOTH RESIDED IN PRC WITH THEIR TWO DAUGHTERS. ONE DAUGHTER, ELIZABETH COE, LEFT PRC IN 1971 AND WENT TO LONDON; PER 1971 FBI REPORT [redacted] FILE DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S DAUGHTERS HOLD U.S. PASSPORTS. SUBJECT ALSO HAS ONE SON, ROBERT COE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF EARTH SCIENCES AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ. ROBERT COE VISITED HIS PARENTS IN PEKING IN SEPTEMBER 1974 AND WAS FETED BY KUO MO-JO, VICE CHAIRMAN OF

DATE:
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019522

STANDING COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. Y

5. REPLY TO PARA 5 REF REQUEST FOR TAILORED REQUIREMENTS IN BRIEFING CAREPLICA/6 WILL FOLLOW. Y

6. FILE: 201-0169934. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: [redacted]

CH/RS ( ) [redacted]

CEA/SACI [redacted]

DATE: 21 SEPT 77 ORIG: [redacted] AB UNIT: CH/EULA EXT: 1972	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
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EUR/G	DCH/RS [redacted]	
RELEASING OFFICER	EUR/G/D [redacted]	
CLASSIFICATION	E4/CI [redacted]	

ANALYST CHECKLIST F OPS/ITG FILE REDUCTION PROGR

SUBJECT: Coe Virginius Frank 201 NUMBER 016-9934

IP MACHINE LISTING ✓ (REVIEWED) Fu Ching (DATE REVIEWED) 12 July 1974

OPS/ITG INTERNAL TRACE ____ (REVIEWED) ____ (DATE REVIEWED)

RAG HIT ____

SENSITIVE FILE ____

MACHINE DOSSIER NUMBER ____

REVIEWED BY ____

DISPOSITION OF FILE : ____

COMMENTS: Visited China

14-00000

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T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 01 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

S E C R E T 161250Z SEP 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE BONN 62740 /ADASKA ACTING/

TO: WASHINGTON INFO HAMBURG, GERMANY. ✓ACTION

FOR CH/EULA INFO E/G/DAO

SUBJECT TAPPER/CO CARELPLICA INTEL - CAREPLICA/6 TRIP TO PRC.

REF A. WASHINGTON 087988

B. HAMBURG 31545 (IN

C. HAMBURG 31830 (IN 258717)

1. CAREPLICA/6 MET ADASKA IN KOELN EVENING 12 SEPT. REPLICA/6 HAD JUST RECEIVED LETTER FROM LIAO CHENG CHIH ADVISING HIM THAT HE HAD ARRANGED VISA FOR MRS. CAREPLIC/6 TO REMAIN IN PEKING FOR THREE MONTHS. HE ALSO RECEIVED LETTER FROM STMIMOSA/1 CONFIRMING ARRANGEMENTS FOR REF B ACUPUNCTURE CLASSES AND MIMOSA/1 INVITATION FOR MRS REPLICA/6 TO RESIDE AT MIMOSA/1 HOME DURING HER STAY IN PEKING. MRS REPLICA/6 WILL DEPART HAMBURG CIRCA 21 SEPT TO REACH PEKING IN TIME FOR WEDDING OF MIMOSA/1'S SON TO DAUGHTER OF LONG TIME AMERICAN RESIDENT OF PEKING FRANK COOK /SIC/. COOK /REPLICA/6 NOT CERTAIN OF SPELLING/ IS

RBH
RB
-EH

Stan Bergmant
Jim Lilly are pretty sure
this is
(Frank COE not
Frank Cook rd
have initiated DDO & CCIS
trace

SECRET

201-169934

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________ SECRET

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | RF. FILE. VR.

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3 6

T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 02 IN 484398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62742

EMPLOYEE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE SECTION OF PEKING REVIEW. REPLICA/6 BELIEVES HE AND HIS DAUGHTER STILL HOLD AMERICAN PASSPORTS.

2. IN SAME LETTER MIMOSA/1 TOLD REPLICA/6 HIS SON AND NEW DAUGHTER-IN-LAW WILL TAKE HONEYMOON IN EUROPE AND US. THEY WILL STAY WITH REPLICA/6 IN HAMBURG DURING PART OF EUROPEAN TRIP. CAN YOU FURTHER IDENTIFY COOK?

3. REPLICA/6 HIMSELF WILL LEAVE FOR PRC CIRCA 15 OCTOBER TO ATTEND CANTON TRADE FAIR AND WILL JOIN HIS WIFE IN PEKING FOR ONE WEEK FOR VISITS WITH LIAO CHENG CHIH AND MIMOSA/1. HAVE SUGGESTED TO REPLICA/6 THAT RECENT AIRE OF RELAXATION IN PRC AFTER 11TH PARTY CONGRESS MAY GIVE HIM GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT INFO ON PRC FOREIGN POLICY FROM LIAO. ALSO MRS REPLICA/6'S THREE MONTH STAY IN HOME OF MIMOSA/1 MAY BE RARE OPPORTUNITY FOR INSIGHTS INTO RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SENIOR PARTY CADRE. DURING RECENT ONE DAY MEETING IN WASHINGTON MRS REPLICA/6 IMPRESSED ADASKA AS BEING BRIGHT, SAVY, AGGRESSIVE, PRAGMATIC WOMAN. SHE IS INDEPENDENT, FASHION CONSCIOUS AND DECIDEDLY WESTERNIZED BY TRADITIONAL CHINESE STANDARDS. SHE HAS DEEP INTEREST IN

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T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 03 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNN8 62740

PAGE 2 BONN 62740 SECRET

CHINESE PAINTING AND PORCELAIN /SHE VISITED EVERY ORIENTAL ART COLLECTION IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK SHE COULD FIND/ AND HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH MANY FORMER SCHOOL FRIENDS FROM HER STUDENT DAYS IN U.S. REPLICA/6 SAYS SHE IS NOT WITTING OF HIS AGENT ROLE. SHE HAS APPARENTLY ESTABLISHED GOOD RAPPORT WITH MIMOSA/1 AND HIS WIFE.

4. REPLICA/6 IS SKEPTICAL THAT LIAO AND/OR MIMOSA/1 WILL BE ANY MORE FORTHCOMING THAN ON PREVIOUS VISITS AND DOUBTS WIFE WILL LEARN MORE THAN PERSONAL LIFE STYLE OF MIMOSA/1 AND SOMETHING ABOUT ACUPUNCTURE. HE BELIEVES HOWEVER THAT HE MAY GAIN SOME INSIGHTS BY CONTINUING HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS WITH LIAO'S DAUGHTER WHO IS MFA JAPANESE INTERPRETER /SEE REF C PARA 4/.

5. PLAN BRIEF REPLICA/6 PER RECENT CHINA NARRATIVES. ALSO WELCOME ANY TAILORED REQUIREMENTS YOU MAY WISH LEVY. PLS CABLE HAMBURG INFO BONN PRIOR 3 OCT.

6. HAMBURG. HAVE ARRANGED TO MEET REPLICA/6 IN HAMBURG ON 3 OCTOBER FOR REQUIREMENTS BRIEFING. REQUEST RESERVATIONS FOR HOTEL ROOM SUITABLE FOR BRIEFINGS FOR

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INFO RF. FILE. VR.

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T 175635 EIA496 PAGE 04-04 IN 404398

TOR:161645Z SEP 77 BNNB 62740

ALIAS PAUL L. HOWELL, U.S. ARMY PROCESSING AND PLACEMENT UNIT, FRANKFURT FOR EVENINGS 2 AND 3 OCTOBER.

7. RE CONTACT WITH LOCAL EMBASSY. FOUR MEMBERS OF TRADE MISSION VISITED REPLICA/6'S EXHIBIT AT KOELN FOOD FAIR ON AFTERNOON 12 SEPT. THEY WERE CHU CHIEN-HUA, HO NAI-HUA, TIEN TSENG-CHENG AND NEW ARRIVAL UNKNOWN TO REPLICA/6. THEY STOPPED AT HIS STAND 30 MINUTES TO DISCUSS DELIVERY PROBLEMS WITH ORDERS HE PLACED AT LAST CANTON FAIR. HO ASKED IF REPLICA/6 HAD HEARD RECENTLY FROM ''LIAO KUNG'' /1675/0361/ /TERM OF RESPECT FOR LIAO CHENG CHIH WITHIN PARTY RANKS/ AND INVITED HIM TO NATIONAL DAY FEST. REPLICA/6 WILL NOT GO TO NATIONAL DAY, BUT WILL SEEK INTRODUCTION TO NEW PRC AMBASSADOR VIA LIAO WHEN HE IS IN PEKING.

8. FILE - 201-290073. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In
SECRET

30 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on COE, Virginia (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6. CI interest.

Signed R. Stec (name) Analyst (title) OPS/ITG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ________ (initials) 26 Nov 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-169934

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S E C R E T

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COE, FRANK
201-0169934
SEX M

201-0204693
OCOA-18437 A01
25 JUN 74
P3

SUBJ HAS BEEN IN CHIN SINCE BEFORE 58. SUFFERED FROM HEPATITIS. WILL BE GOING TO VISIT SOUTHERN CHINA

DATE 09 APR 77 CORR CARD 09281445

201-169934

S E C R E T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

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COE, FRANK	
201-0169934	016-120-041/01
SEX M	OCOA-18779
	25 FEB 75
	P3

SUBJ IN CONTACT W/PRC MISSION OTTAWA, CAN

DATE 28 MAR 75 09263806

201-169934

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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COE, FRANK
201-0169934 016-120-041/C1
SEX M OCOA-18437 A01
25 JUN 74
P3

SUBJ HAS BEEN IN CHIN SINCE BEFORE 58.
SUFFERED FROM HEPATITIS. WILL BE GOING TO VISIT
SOUTHERN CHINA

DATE 14 MAY 75 09281445

201-0169934

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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COLLINS, GEOFFREY
201-0169934 016-120-041/01
SEX M OCOA-18397
02 JUN 74
CIT USA P5

NEPHEW OF RUTH AND FRANK COE USA WAS APPROVED TO VISIT THE PRC W/HIS MOTHER

DATE 18 DEC 74 09219883

201-169934
Coe, Virginia

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

TO:

1. BW
2.
3.

DATE: 31 Jan 74

SUBJECT OF REQUEST:

201- 169934

Coe, Virginius

REQUESTER: Jackie

COMPONENT: IP\EIB2

PHONE: X1885

T.C. ✓ or P.C. __

FILE REQUESTED:

DOC. REQUESTED:

SYMBOL & NO.

DATE:

REASON REQUESTED:

trace for FBI. Any deragatory

No Derog

ACTION TAKEN:

SECRET

SECRET

TO:

1. ____________________

2. ____________________(file holder)

3. CI/SO/F

DATE 15 July 1971

SUBJECT OF REQUEST: COE, Robert
COE, Frank
COE, Virginius Frank

201-169934

REQUESTER: Bill Neuman

COMPONENT: Office of Security

PHONE : 9371

T.C. ☐ or P.C. ☐

FILE REQUESTED: 201-169934

or

DOCUMENT REQUESTED: __________

Symbol & No. Date Filed

REASON REQUESTED: Office of Security is running a check and they are interested in seeing the 201

ACTION TAKEN:

SECRET

File in 201-________

SECRET

CI STAFF USE ONLY

N. HAVATY FIO/CE
Ext14 23 Nov. 1967

EX- 01851

SUBJECT: COE, Frank
AKA: COE, Frank Virginius

Virginius Frank COE, former Sectary of International Monetary Fund, in June 1953, was called before the McCARTHY Senate Investigation subcommittee concerning his alleged involvement in a Communist spy ring. Prior to this in the 1930's, Subject was implicated in the espionage ring that included Alger HISS, Henry COLLINS (COE's brother-in -law), John ABT, and others. He allegedly was a relatively unimportant member of the Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER espionage network. In 1958 Subject was elected a member of the Awards Committee of the Fund for Social Analysis, formerly Fund for Social Studies, (a Communist propaganda organization). During the year 1958 Subject and his wife, Ruth Coe, were associated with Isidore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a suspected Soviet espionage agent. In the fall of 1958 Subject wrote an article for the Chinese Communist publication China Reconstructs , praising the industrial and agriculture advancements of the Chinese Communists. Subject visited China, at that time, and could still have been there in Februaty 1959. While in Peking he and his wife studied the Chinese language at Peking University. Subject was

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A15868

CI STAFF USE ONLY

a member of the governing board of the Two Continent Commodity Corporation (TCCC) an import-export firm whose other board members were:

Milton FRIEDMAN-an Excutive of the Queens County Communist Party.

Tom JONES- a Brooklyn negro attorney, a CP member.

Jeremiah C. INGERSOLL,- a contributor to the CP in the early 1940's.

Harriet and Chao Ting CHI- both member of Chinese Communist Party.

In 1959 Subject was employed as an analyst and economist in the Communist State Economic apparatus in Peking.

Subject's wife Ruth Alice Coe was identified as a Communist. Confronted with this accusation, she denied that she had ever been connected with the Communist Party.

BASED ON: 201-169934

Processed: H. McClintick

COE, Virginius Frank

~~See FIS NOTEBOOK on Subj~~
filed dossier 100-4-20-13.

Collected info
for Sov. St Sec
apparat active in
WASHINGTON dur
WWII

Subj in GREGORY
case.

Member of the
SILVERMASTER
Group.

over ->

Subj requested to resign from Internat'l Monetary Fund 2 Dec 52, refused to testify before Fed Grand Jury 20 Nov 52, and refused to testify before McCarran Committee 1 Dec 52. Whittaker CHAMBERS has said that while he was in Sov espionage apparatus in 30's he heard from various sources of plans to bring Subj from Canada so he could be placed in Treas. Dept. In 43, Eliz BENTLEY testified, SILVERMASTER told her that Sub had said he met former friend of his in Canada who was "in same category", i.e. Communist. BENTLEY doesn't recall name of Subj's friend but it might poss be Eric ADAMS. It is known that Subj knew ADAMS was on the Canadian For Exchange Control Board, but it hasn't been est whether men were personally acquainted. IFB-26027, 17 Apr 53, 100-4-20-13-4.

COE

Virginius Frank COE

Family: Brother: Robert. Member of the CPUSA known to W. CHAMBERS. CHAMBERS saw Robert in connection with the Underground Wash Group to whom he was a courier in the middle 1930.. CHAMBERS admitted he did not see Robert attend any of the meetings of the Group under Harold WARE.

Passport: In Sept 1941, COE returned to the US from London. He had a dip passport.

Address: 1945, Wash DC NW 2700 35th St.
1948, Wash DC NW 1918 N Roosevelt St.

History as it relates to the Gregory Case.

1934-1939, Canada. Taught at McGill Univ.

XXXX Prior to 1940 employed by the Treasury Dept.

1940, August. Resigned from the Advisory Commission to the Council of Nat'l Defense to return to the Treasury Dept.

At unknown date went to England in connection with US Gov't work. Returned to the US in Sept 1941.

1941, Dec. XXXXXXXXXXX Listed as the Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research in the Treasury Dept. This division was headed by Harry Dexter WHITE.

1942, Dec. Attended the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Mt Tremblant. At this time he indicated his position as Assistant to the Executive Director of the Board of Exonomic Warfare and well Mas his position mentioned above.

1945 Still with Monetary Research Division.

1945, Dec. Was Assistant Administrator in the Foreign Ec Admin.

1948, Secretary of the Internat'l Monetary Fund

Espionage Activities in Connection with The Gregory Case:

Member of the SILVERMASTER Group.

BENTLEY advised that COE was considered relatively unimportant to the S Group.

When BENTLEY first became aware of COE he was in South America on a mission for the Treasury Dept., but during all but two months while he was away he was in touch with the SILVERMASTERS. He communicated directly with the SILVERMASTERS, sending them reports and other info to which he had access.

BENTLEY believes that COE also gave the info to Harry Dexter WHITE and that this info was eventually furnished by WHITE to the SILVERMASTERS.

BENTLEY in 1945 could not definitely recall having seen any material which could be identified as definitely originating with COE, but she does state that the info supplied by him was made available for transmittal to BENTLEY's superiors.

It is BENTLEY's recollection that he supplied economic info.

Contacts in the Gregory Case.
WHITE, Harry Dexter
CURRIE, Lauchlin
KAPLAN, Dorothy and Irving.
ULLMAN, William
SILVERMASTER, Abraham George
Contacts not subj of Case:
LAWLER,

References: The Gregory Case, FBI Document, Apr 1946
Newspaper clippings
IFB 5099, 12 March 51, p 36.

ABOVE IS ALL FROM THE FIVE BY EIGHT CARDS.

ADLER, Solomon, also in Gregory Case. It is reported that at one time Subj directed the work of ADLER in the Treasury Dept and in 1941 signed ADLER's efficiency rating. Subj was listed by ADLER as a ref on ADLER's Form 57. It is also noted that ADLER on his return from China in 1946 was in c/w Subj and visited the COE household. IFB 21674, 10 Oct 1952
100-4-20-4-10

---

on 1 Dec 52 Subj refused to tell a Senate Internal Security subcommittee in New York if he was eve ever a Communist or a member of an underground spy ring. He had flatly denied the same charges when they were made by Elizabeth Bentley in 1948. Subj claimed the constitutional right which prohibits a witness from being forced to testify about matters which might incriminate him. Subj was fired as secretary of the International Monetary Fund 3Dec 52. Subj lives at 1918 N. Roosevelt st., Arlington Va.
Wash. Post, 4 Dec 52.

&

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Subj in [illegible] case. Member of the
Silvermaster group.
See [illegible] dossier on subj.

CCE's [illegible] in RI/Files

[illegible]

SECRET

COE, Frank

201-103780
(DFB 82715)
(24 Apr 56)

COE, Frank

100-4-10-1314
([illegible]-2094)
([illegible]. 1)

COE, Frank

100-4-20-14-11
([illegible]-352

COE, FRANK

[illegible]

14-00000

[redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

COE, Frank 201-46537
DFB-30373

201-465[illegible]3
(DFB-30[illegible]73)
(Encl. 1)
(19 Oct 53)

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Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:

COE, FRANK
DOB ?

CIT USA

- MEMBER OF A SOVIET E[illegible]PIONAGE GRP. ACTIVE IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

201-231754
DBF -14238
03 DEC 53
P7

COE, Frank

U.S. Aug. 48

100-4-20-1-6

COE, Frank 201-108780
DFB-60128

201-10[illegible]
(DFB-60[illegible])
(5 [illegible] 53)
(Encl. 2)

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Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:

COE, Frank

201-11425-4
(9 Jan 53)

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[redacted] [redacted]

COE, FRANK 201-169954.

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SEX M DOB ?
USA
CIT USA
OCC ECONOMIST
REF
A CHINA
AKA OF COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
FORMER SECTY OF IMF. AS OF NOV 58 ATTENDING
PEKING UNIF STUDYING CHINESE LANGUAGES. DEFECTOR TO EAST. FORMER RIS AGENT. FORMER
HUSBAND OF NORA COE /201-148442/. HUSBAND
OF RUTH ALICE COE /201-762723/

COE, Frank

201-185053
(DFB-13003)
(29 Oct 51)

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Please complete

Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers. info

8 NOV 57

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INDEX

COE, Frank

201-110029
(DFB -64238)
(4 Jun 56)

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Please [illegible]

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COE, Frank

201-562[illegible]
DFB-35[illegible]57
Encl. 1
27 May [illegible]

[illegible]
(DFB-35937)
[illegible]
page 9

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100-4-19-1
p. 5

COE, Frank

U.S. - Aug 48

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COE, Frank

100-4-20-26-2
DEE-13003)
(Encl. 1)
P. 23

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IN MAIN INDEX

2 422103

COE, Frank

201-62004
(EGMA 12571)
(21 Sept 54)

14OCT54

201-62004
EGMA-12571
21 Sept 54

2 42210

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7-71 AUG 11 73

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T 110427 EIA002 PAGE 01-01 ~~NC 27545~~

TOR:151853Z MAY 74 IN 253040

R 151822Z MAY 74
FM DIRECTOR, FBI
TO RUEAIIA/DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BT
SECRET
CHARLES JOSEPH COE, AKA; IS - CH.
VIRGINIUS FRANK COE, AKA; IS - CH.

REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE MAY 10, 1974, YOUR REFERENCE 549248.

THIS BUREAU INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION TO YOUR PASSING TO MI-5 INFORMATION RELATING TO SUBJECTS AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED TELETYPE.

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V.F. COE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY People's Republic of China

SUBJECT Background Information on Frank COE, Sol ADLER, and Dr. Hans MUELLER

REPORT NO. 00- B-324/16221-73

DATE DISTR. 13 June 1973

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCS Case 56,929

DATE OF INFO. May 1973

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE May 1973 Peking

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US Citizen; Businessman who has visited relatives who reside in China

1. Frank Coe has received a promotion within the ranks of the Ministry of Finance; however, the specific position to which he has been promoted is unknown. When the US devalued the dollar, Coe determined Chinese policy regarding the devaluation. It is speculated that the People's Republic of China (PRC) will be taking a more active role in the world money market and that Coe will be in charge of that operation. He recently was given a new home that is extremely large and beautiful. It contains approximately 25 rooms with two large courtyards. The interior is beautifully decorated with paintings and artifacts. The house is comparable to the home of Madame Sun Yat-sen, which would also tend to indicate that Coe has become a person of prominence.

2. Sol Adler, who has acted as a financial advisor to the PRC for a number of years, had a lung removed in 1972 because of cancer and he is making a satisfactory recovery. He has been able to work only a few hours since his operation, but outwardly he appears healthy once again. He recently traveled to Hai Nan Tao with Dr. George Hatem to inspect the island, but it was mostly a rest trip for Adler. Adler's wife, Pat, is teaching higher education at the University of Peking.

3. Dr. Hans Mueller, head of the Medical School, University of Peking, was granted a visa from the Japanese Government to travel to Japan with his wife. Mueller's wife is Japanese and she has been permitted to travel to Japan, but it took ten years before they could travel together. They brought her mother back to Peking with them and she is now living with them. Mueller stated that there is continuous pressure on him to increase the production of medical doctors, and he is finding it difficult to find qualified students to enter the medical school; this means qualified educationally and by Party standards. He feels a cut in curriculum time would be detrimental rather than beneficial, so he continues to advocate a five- to six-year course of study.

- end -

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SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

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COE, FRANK
201-169934 201-169934
SEX M DOB ? OCOA-17674
24 APR 73
CIT USA
OCC ?
RES CCOM. POSS IDEN TO VIRGINIUS FRANK COE.

WAS 016-120-041/01
647 R 7305300871

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) Coe, Virginius Frank	201- 169934			

FORM 867

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GROUP 1

LY

FUNERAL CEREMONY HELD FOR NPC VICE CHAIRMAN HO HSIANG-NING

Peking NCNA International Service in English 2210 GMT 6 Sep 72 B

[Text] Peking, September 6, 1972 (HSINHUA)--Ho Hsiang-ning, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and honorary president of the National Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China, died of illness in Peking on September 1, 1972 at the age of 95.

A solemn ceremony in her memory took place in the capital yesterday afternoon, and flags were flown at half mast at Tienanmen Square and in front of Hsinhuamen and the Foreign Ministry. A funeral ceremony was held today for the deceased in Nanking.

The ceremony in Peking was held in the Great Hall of the People. A portrait of Ho Hsiang-ning hung in the meeting hall.

Wreaths presented by the great leader Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were placed there.

There were also wreaths presented by Tung Pi-wu, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and acting chairman of the People's Republic of China; Soong Ching-ling, vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China; Chu Te, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Chou En-lai, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the State Council; Kang Sheng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Liu Po-cheng, Chiang Ching, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien, members of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; and Nieh Jung-chen, vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee; and wreaths from the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee, the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee, the National Women's Federation of the People's Republic of China, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Public Health and other departments, and the CCP Peking Municipal Committee and the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee.

Attending the ceremony were Tung Pi-wu, Soong Ching-ling, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-kuei, Li Te-sheng, Wang Tung-hsing, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kuo Mo-jo, Ngapo Ngawang-Jigme, Chou Chien-jen, Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Hsu Te-heng, Fu Tso-i, Tsai Chang, Yeng Ying-chao, Hua Kuo-feng and Wu Te. They expressed sympathy with Liao Cheng-chih, Liao Meng-hsing and Ching Pu-chun, family members of the late Ho Hsiang-ning.

Chu Te, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, presided over the ceremony. Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-ling made a memorial speech.

Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-ling said: "Madame Ho Hsiang-ning in her earlier years followed Dr. Sun Yat-sen in carrying out the revolution of 1911 to overthrow the feudal rule of the Ching dynasty. Later, she took an active part in the punitive expedition against Yuan Shih-kai and in the movement to uphold the provisional republican constitution. In 1924, she firmly supported Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary programme of the new three peoples principles, the reorganization of the Kuomintang and co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party.

COE, Virginius Frank 201

After Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution in 1927, she firmly upheld Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three great policies of alliance with Russia, co-operation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, resolutely resigned all her posts in the reactionary Kuomintang government, openly exposed the reactionary features of Chiang Kai-shek and waged an uncompromising struggle. During the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, she actively responded to the call issued by the Chinese Communist Party for [a] national united front against Japan and resolutely opposed Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policy of passive resistance against Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party, and of false democracy and real dictatorship. She took an active part in the anti-Japanese democratic movement. After the southern Anhwei incident of January 1941, she sternly condemned Chiang Kai-shek's criminal plot to launch a civil war and waged unremitting struggle to persist in resistance and oppose capitulation, persist in unity and oppose a split and persist in progress and oppose retrogression. During the period of the liberation war, she was indignant at Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary policy of national betrayal, dictatorship and civil war; she actively called on and organized the democratic forces in the Kuomintang to oppose Chiang Kai-shek, organized the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, responded to the May 1, 1948 call of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the convening of the new Political Consultative Conference, and contributed to China's new democratic revolution.

"After nation-wide liberation, Madame Ho Hsiang-ning became member of the Council of the Central People's Government, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs and chairman of the Union of Chinese Artists. She consistently supported the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and took the socialist road. In the struggle against foreign and domestic enemies, she stood firmly and showed a clear distinction of whom to love and whom to hate. Particularly, in the struggle against the rightists in 1957, she sternly condemned the anti-party and anti-socialist fallacies of the bourgeois rightists. She warmly praised the great socialist motherland, often through her poems and paintings. She paid great attention to affairs of state, supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and worked energetically and consistently in defence of the territorial integrity of the socialist motherland and for the liberation of Taiwan.

"Madame Ho Hsiang-ning was a revolutionary comrade-in-arms of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary companion of Mr. Liao Chung-kai, a close friend of the Chinese Communist Party and an outstanding representative of the Kuomintang revolutionaries. She warmly loved the motherland, the socialist system, the Chinese Communist Party and the great leader Chairman Mao. Madame Ho Hsiang-ning remained a revolutionary and a fighter all her life.

"We deeply mourn over the death of Vice-Chairman Ho Hsiang-ning. Let us turn our sorrow into strength and, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, closely follow the great leader Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and unite to win still greater victories!"

Also present at the ceremony were:

Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Ma Chun-ku, Ou Tang-liang, Pei Shih-chang, Teng Chu-min, Lu Han, Shih Liang, Chuang Hsi-chuan, Chu Liang-tsai, Yen Chi-tzu, Wu Yu-hsun, Wu Leng-hsi, Chang Yun, Chen Chi-han, Wu Hsin-yu, Mao I-sheng, Lin Lan-ying, Lin Chiao-chih, Lo Shu-chang, Chu Ko-chen, Chi Fang, Chao Chung-yao, Hu Tzu-ang, Hu Chueh-wen, Hu Yu-chih, Hu Yao-pang, Tung Yi-chou, Hsieh Fu-min and Feng Shao-hui;

Member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Liu Fei, Chu Yun-shan, Yang Tung-chun, Chang Hsi-jo, Chen Tzu-sheng, Chou Pei-yuan, Chao Pu-chu, Jung I-jen, Hsu Po-hsin, Tseng Tse-sheng and Tung Chi-wu;

Leading members of various departments under the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, the offices of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the National Women's Federation Wang Liang-en, Yang Te-chung, Liu Chien, Liu Yu-fa, Li Chi-huang, Li Chin-te, Lien Kuan, Kang Ko-ching, Chiao Kuan-hua, Han Nien-lung, Ma Wen-po, Ho Ying, Wang Hai-jung, Lin I-hsin, Hsieh Hua, Wu Ching-tung and Ho Chun-huai;

Members of the Central Standing Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Kan Tzu-sen, Liu Chung-jung, Wu Mao-sun, Hou Ching-ju, Hsu Wen-tien and Chien Chang-chao, and members of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Wang Pao-chen, Li Ping-heng, Li Chun-lung, Li Cheng, Chen Li and Chiao Shih-chai;

Deputies to the National People's Congress, representatives of fine art circles, well-known personages and Ho Hsiang-ning's relatives and friends Wang Chen, Wu Te-feng, Sha Chien-li, Chuang Ming-li, Huang Ting-chen, Tien Pu-ta, Wu Huan-hsing, Chu Kuang-ya, Huang Chang-shui, Chang Kuo-chi, Ho Ching-chang, Ho Lien-chih, Chang Jui-hua, Yu Li-chun, Fu Ya, Ku Yuan, Li Ko-jan, Chiang Chao-ho, Chou Hai-ying, Lung Chien, Cheng Szu-yuan, Teng Kuang-yin and his wife, Ma Hai-te (George Hatem), Su Fei, Frank Coe, Ruth Coe, Sol Adler, Pat Adler, Ichihei Sugiyama and his wife, Rewi Alley and Jack Chen.

More than 500 party and government functionaries and representatives of the masses attended.

After the ceremony, Ho Hsiang-ning's coffin was transported by special train to Nanking to be buried by the side of Mr. Liao Chung-kai's coffin in the same grave.

Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Kuo Mo-jo and leading members of departments concerned escorted the coffin to Peking railway station.

Liu Yu-fa, Teng Ying-chao, Hsieh Fu-min, Li Chin-te, Liu Fei, Chu Yun-shan, Chen Tzu-sheng and Kan Tzu-sen and Ho Hsiang-ning's relatives Liao Cheng-chih, Liao Meng-hsing and Ching Pu-chun escorted the coffin to Nanking.

Ho Hsiang-ning's coffin arrived in Nanking this afternoon and the funeral ceremony was held at the grave of Mr. Liao Chung-kai on the eastern outskirts of the city.

Present at the ceremony were Hsu Shih-yu, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, first secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee of the CCP and chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and leading members of the Kiangsu Provincial and Nanking municipal party and revolutionary committees Tu Ping, Wu Ta-sheng, Yang Kuang-li, Hsiao Yung-yin, Chiang Ko, Fang Min, Liu Chi-chang and Fang Ming.

Liu Yu-fa and others and relatives of the deceased who had escorted the coffin to Nanking attended the ceremony.

Also present were deputies to the National People's Congress, members of the Kiangsu provincial and Nanking city committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and leading members of the provincial and municipal committees of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Wu I-fang, Liu Kuo-chun, Chi Yu-ting, Liu Shu-hsun, Chang Ching-li, Chang Kuang-chung, Jen Chung-kao, Chen Ho-chin, Pan Tsun-chung, Ting Kuang-hsun, Chan Chung-fan, Liao Yun-tse, Liao Yun-sheng and Lai Ti-an, and 300 cadres and representatives of local people.

During Ho Hsiang-ning's illness, Vice-Chairman Soong Ching-lin, Premier Chou En-lai and other leaders went to the hospital to see her.

Ho Hsiang-ning's remains were encoffined on September 3. The coffin was placed in Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Peking's Chungshan Park. Party and state leaders paid last respects to her at the hospital. Also paying last respects to the deceased were members of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, leading members of departments concerned and Ho Hsiang-ning's friends. Among them were Li Chen, Wang Shu-sheng, Su Yu, Fang I, Shen Kuang, Tseng Tao, Liu Hsin-chuan, Chang Hsiang-shan, Chang Wen-chin, Yang Chi, Ting Hsueh-sung, Lin Yueh-chin, Wang Ting-kuo, Liu Chung-jen, Tung Hsiao-peng, Li Chih-chung, Chou Jung-hsin, Shen Chien, Pu Chieh and his wife, and Paul T.K. Lin and his wife.

A wreath was presented by Prasit Kanchanawat, deputy director of the Division for Economics, Finance and Industry of the National Executive Council of Thailand, when he was in Peking.

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DR. ROBERT S. COE

SECRET – (when filled in)

Chief, CO

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, FR Division

INFO.
Chief, CO Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Base, San Francisco

SUBJECT
ISOLOG TPFAST
Dr. Robert S. Coe

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI

Ref: USFA-6217 dated 14 December 1971 - 201-196934

Attached herewith is a copy of DCS Memorandum SF 68-72 reporting the results of contact with Professor Aaron C. Waters of the University of California at Santa Cruz concerning the individual and organization which contacted Santa Cruz in early summer 1971 with reference to the travel to China of Dr. Robert Coe. As will be seen, this contact did not resolve the issue, however, from the details given, it appears possible that the contacting organization was LMERGO.

Oliver C. WHIKEHART

Attachment:
Memorandum, h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/FR w/att
2 - C/CO w/att

FRank COE 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
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	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER -------

DO/SF

SF-68-72

26 January 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : International Division (CCS/Durbin)
Operational Support Staff (Grant)
Chief, San Francisco Office

Case 57,563 - Robert S. Coe, Report of Initial Contact - Professor Aaron C. Waters, Department of Earth Sciences, University of California at Santa Cruz

REFS - Headquarters memo on Case 57.563, 30 December 1971
SF-994-71 (Sensitive), Robert S. Coe, 28 December 1971, on Case 54,406

1. On 20 January 1972 we met with Professor Aaron C. Waters, Department of Earth Sciences, University of California at Santa Cruz, and a cordial but not very productive discussion ensued concerning the "US Government official" who showed up on campus during the early part of the summer 1971. Professor Waters could recount few lucid details of what transpired on that particular day. In general, Waters appeared confused and even slightly pixillated over the whole matter; at one point he remarked that he was very pleasantly surprised to discover that Hudson was not the same individual who badgered him a few months ago. How Waters formed the belief that the same man was going to see him at the time of our appointment is unclear, for we explicitly outlined our reason for seeing him when we scheduled the interview. At any rate, the following information, incomplete as it may be, was provided by Waters.

2. The incident occured in late June or early July 1971 just prior to Coe's visit to mainland China. A man came to the door of Waters' office and said that he wished to ask some questions about Robert Coe. He was about five feet eight inches in height, weighed about 150 pounds, had dark hair, and used glasses only for writing. He wore a sport coat and a colored shirt. Neither the name of this individual nor his affiliation can be recalled by Waters for "he mumbled a great deal." Nor can any of the information on the credentials be remembered except that they were similar in design to the ones used by the Agency (we allowed Waters to scrutinize ours) but were not in color. For openers the man asked why Coe was going to China, and then began to ask about Coe's parents. He then inquired about Coe's character and whether he belonged to any subversive organizations. This persistent and offensive line of questioning really turned Waters off, and the man was asked to leave. Waters doubts if the individual were any kind of an impersonator because he has had "similar experiences

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SF-69-72
26 Jan 72
c. 57.562

with the FBI in the past. Needless to say, Waters maintains a high regard for Robert Coe and felt such questions were an infringement upon Coe's privacy and were completely unwarranted.

3. During our conversation with Waters he left the room momentarily and went into Robert Coe's office directly across the alcove. When he returned he explained that he told Coe about our presence and asked him to join us for a few moments. Coe would not. Unless directed otherwise, we plan no further action on this matter.

JEROME V. [illegible]

EJHudson:ma

cc. SB/SF

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
< CHINA
SUBJ AND WIFE RUTH RPTD LIVING CHINA FOR NEARLY 6 YRS DESCRIBED AS OLD MAN LIVING SUBURBS PEKING NEAR CHINESE MILITARY MUSEUM ALLEGED HAVE LED AMERICAN PORTION OF DEMONSTRATION HELD PEKING DURING CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS SUBJ AND WIFE WORK CHINA PEACE COMMITTEE.
WAS DEFERRED

016-120-041
FCHA-29293
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Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

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He praised the heroic Cuban people for the tremendous victories they won under the leadership of Prime Minister Fidel Castro in opposing U.S. imperialist aggression, subversion and interference, defending national independence and state sovereignty and building up their motherland.

He said: This year U.S. imperialism unreasonably detained Cuban fishing boats and fishermen on the high seas on two occasions and savagely attacked a fishermen's village in Cuba and killed innocent inhabitants there, committing one crime after another gainst the Cuban people. The Cuban navy recently captured two pirate ships which participated in the counter-revolutionary activities against Cuba. This is an entirely just action. U.S. imperialism has gone so far as to rampantly bluff and threaten Cuba and other Latin American countries and people who are fighting in defense of their national independence and state sovereignty. The Chinese people strongly condemn U.S. imperialism for its criminal activities against Cuban and other Latin American people and resolutely support the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries in their just struggle against U.S. imperialism.

He said the fact that people of all Latin American countries are joining forces to resist U.S. imperialist aggression and control has become an irresistible historical trend. Whatever tricks it may resort to, U.S. imperialism can never stop the people of Cuba and other Latin American countries in their victorious advance.

Ambassador Jesus Barreiro Gonzalez said: "We are very glad to be invited to attend the gathering this afternoon in commemoration of the 13th anniversary of the victory of our country's liberation, which is filled with fraternal friendship."

He said that January 1, 1959 was a day of special significance. It marked the successful completion of a stage in the struggle for the liberation of Cuba. In a century and more, the ambassador continued, the Cuban people have resisted attempts at colonialist and neo-colonialist domination, the basic hallmark being the liberation wars in 1868 and 1895 against the Spanish colonial yoke and the struggle against U.S. imperialism which attempted to replace Spain and occupy the land of Cuba. He said a new stage began in 1959 after the overthrow of the Batista dictatorial regime which was abetted by the United States.

The ambassador pointed out that the U.S. imperialist government has continued carrying out its policies of aggression, sabotage, subversion, blackmail, economic blockade, invasion and piratical attack against Cuba. But all these schemes have met with the most ignominious failure.

He said that the restoration to the People's Republic of China of her lawful rights in the United Nations and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from the UN is a victory for the people of the world and a failure for the U.S. imperialist government.

A Cuban film "Hundred Years of Struggle" and a Chinese film "The Working Class Creates Miracles" were shown at the reception.

PARTY, STATE OFFICES FETE FOREIGN EXPERTS AT NEW YEAR

Peking NCNA International Service in English 2145 GMT 31 Dec 71 B

[Text] Peking, December 31 (HSINHUA)--The General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Office of the State Council gave a New Year's

Virginius Frank COE
201 -

Eve banquet here today in honor of foreign experts and their wives coming from various countries of the five continents.

Seated at the tables for guests of honor were Rajko Lutovac and his wife, Vasilija, Un Bon Su and his wife, Ha Huu Cy, Frank Coe and his wife, Sol Adler and his wife, Tatsu Tokuda, Rani Karthigesu, Hamid Rashid, Inorz Souvarin and his wife, Mohammed Hassan Aydie, Aysha Amour Zahor, Claudio Cini, Adriana Boltinti, Denise Ly, Jayme Martins, Maria Angelina Picchi, Yaw Ansante, Sid Engst, Joan Chase Hinton, Julian Schuman, Rose Smith, and Leopold Christer and his wife.

Attending the banquet and happy get-together with the foreign friends to greet the militant new year of 1972 were Chou En-lai, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the State Council; Yao Wen-yuan, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; Li Hsien-nien, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and vice premier of the State Council; Chi Teng-kuei, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee; Keng Piao, member of the CCP Central Committee and head of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee; Chi Peng-fei, acting foreign minister; Li Po-shih, a leading member of the Bureau of Foreign Experts Affairs; and others.

The banquet was presided over by Wang Tung-hsing, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and director of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee.

When the leading Chinese party and government comrades entered the banquet hall, they warmly shook hands with the foreign experts and their wives and thanked them for their valuable contributions to China's socialist revolution and construction.

Making a speech at the banquet, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien extended warm festival greetings and cordial regards to the foreign experts and their wives.

He said: "You experts have come to China from thousands of miles away and have worked diligently in the press, publication, education, health and other departments of our country with your efforts and know-how, you have made valuable contributions to China's socialist revolution and socialist construction and to the support and assistance to the world revolution. Your noble internationalist spirit is well worthy of our emulation. On behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Government and people, I extend to you our sincere gratitude!"

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien said: "In his solemn statement of May 20, 1970, the Chinese people's great leader Chairman Mao said: 'The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today. The development of the world situation in the past year and more has fully proved the correctness of Chairman Mao's wise conclusion. The three Indochinese peoples have won brilliant victories in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Palestinian and other Arab peoples are persevering in their struggle against U.S.-Israeli aggression. The Pakistan people are waging a just struggle in defense of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against aggression and interference.

"The national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are continuing to surge forth vigorously. The revolutionary mass movements of the peoples of Europe, North America and Oceania are developing in depth. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become an irresistible historical trend. The truculent practice of power politics and hegemony by the superpowers has met with the strong resistance of an increasing number of small and medium countries; the superpowers are beset with internal and external difficulties and are having a tougher and tougher time."

The Chinese vice premier said: "In external affairs, our country has firmly carried out Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs and won great victories. The exchange of friendly visits between our people and the people of other countries, including the American people, is continuously expanding; and the number of countries which have established diplomatic relations with our country is ever increasing. The vain scheme of the superpowers to blockade and isolate China has gone totally bankrupt!"

He continued: "The domestic situation of our country is also excellent. Since the Ninth Congress and the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of our party, the whole party, the whole army and the whole nation, acting on our great leader Chairman Mao's instruction 'carry out education in ideology and political line', have unfolded a deep-going movement for criticizing revisionism and rectifying the style of work, further heightened their consciousness of class struggle, the struggle between the two lines and of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and have won great victories. The struggle-criticism-transformation campaign of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is continuing to develop in depth. We have reaped bumper harvests for 10 years running. A new upsurge is emerging in industrial production. Prices are stable and the market [is] flourishing. The revolutionary spirit of our people is rising higher than ever. Our socialist motherland is prospering and thriving with each passing day."

Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien wished the experts success in their work and good health. In conclusion, he said: "Let us work together to better promote the mutual understanding and militant friendship between the Chinese people and the people of other countires and support and assist the world revolution!"

The banquet proceeded in a warm and friendly atmosphere. Hosts and guests talked cordially and proposed toasts to the daily consolidation and development of the revolutionary friendship and militant unity of the people of various countries.

Also attending the banquet were leading members of departments under the CCP Central Committee, Chinese Government departments, the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries and other departments concerned Wang Liang-en, Wu Ching-tung, Ma Wen-po, Yang Te-chung, Tu Wan-jung, Hsieh Hua, Chang Chi-chih, Liu Chien-kung, Cheng Shih-chang, Lu Ying, Li Meng-fu, Liu Fu, Chiu Wei-kao, Liu Chuan-hsin, Wu Yin-hsien, Ting Hsi-lin, Li Ching-chuan, Wang Lei, Chu Kai-yin, Chu Chih-tung and Chiang Shou-li.

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DISPATCH NO - USFA-6217

FILE NO - HQS PLS ASSIGN

DATE - 14 DECEMBER 1971

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, DOMESTIC OPS

INFO - CHIEF, CHINA OPS

FROM - CHIEF OF BASE, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT - ISOLOG TPFAST - ROBERT S. COE, PHD

ACTION - FYI

REF - NONE

THIS RECORDS ISOLOG TELECONS OF WEEK 6 DEC RE SUBJECT, WHO PROFESSOR GEOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA CRUZ AND REPORTEDLY MADE 10 WEEK TRIP TO CHINA CIRCA JULY 71 TO VISIT "ILL FATHER." (NOT CLEAR IF SUBJECT NAME ANGLICIZED VERSION OF ORIGINAL CHINESE NAME OR WHAT.) VIA UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR, WODISH ATTEMPTED MAKE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT CIRCA OCTOBER TO DEBRIEF RE TRIP BUT SUBJECT REBUFFED. WODISH LATER HEARD FROM CASUAL SOURCE THAT SUBJECT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY SOMEONE PRIOR CHINA TRIP CLAIMING BE JKLANCE WHO TRIED "BADGER" SUBJECT INTO COOPERATION. BASIS YOUR ADVICE THAT THERE NO HQS RECORD ANY JKLANCE INTEREST ASIDE FROM RECORD WODISH CLEARANCE ACTION, WODISH IS GOING TO TRY TO GET TO BOTTOM OF INCIDENT AND FIND OUT WHO CONTACTED SUBJECT AS JKLANCE. WILL ADVISE OUTCOME.

WILLIAM G. BOLAND

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ARRIVALS, DEPARTURES, ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN VISITORS

Arrival of 'American Friends'

Peking NCNA International Service in English 0744 GMT 12 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 12 (HSINHUA)--American friends Jack Shulman and his wife arrived in Peking by air today for a visit at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship With Foreign Countries. They were welcomed at the airport by leading members of the organizations concerned including Tu Wan-jung and Lin Chen.

Kuo Meets U.S., British Guests

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1507 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and president of the Academy of Sciences of China, met and feted this evening American scientist Robert Coe and Judy Coe and British Doctor David Adler as well as Geoffrey Collins. The meeting and banquet proceeded in a friendly atmosphere, during which the host and guests talked cordially.

Attending the meeting and banquet were American friends in Peking Frank Coe, Ruth Coe, Sol Adler and Pat Adler.

Present on the occasion were leading members and staff members of Chinese organizations concerned Tang Ming-chao, Li Hsiao-pai, Hsing Chu-fang, Ku Kung-hsu, Shih Chen-liang and Tai Sheng-pu.

Departure of American Couple

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1500 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--American friends Mr and Mrs Bronson Clark left Peking by air for home today via Canton, after paying a friendly visit to China. They were seen off at the airport by leading members of Chinese organizations concerned Hsu Chung-ching, Hsi Chen-huan, Liu Ko and Liu Tzu-han.

Mr and Mrs Clark arrived in China on August 18. They visited factories, people's communes, schools and a hospital and scenic spots and places of historical interest in Peking, Chengchow, Sian, Yenan, Nanking and Linhsien County in Honan Province. They were given a warm welcome by people in these places.

American Mathematician in Shanghai

Peking NCNA International Service in English 1502 GMT 10 Sep 71 B

[Text] Peking, September 10 (HSINHUA)--After visiting Peking, American mathematician Professor Chandler Davis enplaned here this morning on a visit to Shanghai and Canton before leaving China for home. He was seen off at the airport by leading members of Chinese organizations concerned and scientists including Hsu Chung-ching, Hsi Chen-huan and Tien Fang-tseng.

Frank Coe
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S/C ATT TO
[redacted]USLA-1705

1 July 1971
DATE

CONTACT REPORT

TP

A. AGENT STCLOY/1

B. DATE, PLACE, TIME OF MEETING 30 June 1971; Ting Ho Restaurant, Highland Av., Hollywood; 1230 - 1330 hours.

C. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS On 25 June 1971, called STCLOY/1 and made this arrangement.

D. PURPOSE OF MEETING To seek confidential information.

E. SECURITY FACTORS Nothing derogative observed.

F. PAYMENT MADE Nil

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 3 1971
MICROFILMED

G. MEETING EXPENSES Lunch to cover meeting $9.85

H. MATERIAL PASSED AGENT Nil

I. MATERIAL RECEIVED FROM AGENT One 'Biomedical News' II/5-71 published in Washington, D.C.

J. NEXT MEETING Will see STCLOY/1 the next day to give him the address of Dr. S.C. SUNG and the 'Biomedical News'.

K. NEW BIO DATA ON AGENT/NEW LEADS Please see para. L for info re news article 'Scientists Bid for Travel to China', the identity of 'Mrs. YANG' who was the original source of information re engineers' travel to Mainland.

KPP

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S/C USLA-1705

S/C ATT TO USLA-1705

CS COPY

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L. DETAILS OF MEETING (continued)

1. DELASCIO initiated this meeting with STCLOY/1 to discuss about the following operational matters:-
   a) Can he write to Dr. S.C. SUNG, the Taiwanese bio-chemist in Vancouver, B.C., and invite him down to Los Angeles for a visit?
   b) What is the medical publication he has received which purports a travel of American scientists to Mainland China?
   c) Has he found out the name of that 'Mrs. YANG' who first talked about the travel plans of the American/Chinese engineers?
2. In reply, STCLOY/1 answered as follows:
   a) He can write to Dr. S.C. SUNG, but he does not have a good reason to request for his visit. Unless there is a medical conference or certain occasion of interest to SUNG, STCLOY/1 feels he can not just suggest SUNG to make a trip to see him.
   b) The medical publication which reports the interest of some American scientists in the travel to Mainland China is 'Biomedical News' (copy of the news attached). The II/5-71 issue of the news has published an article written by Harry L. TENNANT entitled 'Scientists Bid For Travel to China', which names Dr. William McElroy, director of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Philip HANDLER, president of the National Academy of Science, as ones who had suggested to make a trip jointly to China. The article also promotes the cultural exchange of scientists between Mainland China and U.S., and it credits members of two academic committees for their efforts.
   c) The name of that 'Mrs. YANG' is 'Mrs. Paul YANG'. Paul YANG, husband of the woman who first talked about the travel plan of a group of local Chinese engineers to Mainland China, is an engineering staff of Southern California Edison Company, Los Angeles. STCLOY/1 does not think that the travel plan as mentioned by Mrs. YANG has materialized yet. Therefore, there is not much to be found out.
3. STCLOY/1 showed DELASCIO two postcards which STGAZER/1 and STPEEK/1 had sent him from Spain. He undertood that STGAZER/1 had returned to Los Angeles a few days ago, and he is going to meet STGAZER/1 to find out when is he going to Canada to bid for travel permission to China. STCLOY/1 also agreed to contact Dr. ROSENFELD to check about their movements as well as new activities of HAN Suyin. STCLOY/1 believed that HAN might play an active role in the near future in the Chinese-American relation developments.
4. DELASCIO sought STCLOY/1's assistance to look for a job for TS'AI Yin-Ying (201-875838), wife of P'AN Han-Sung. STCLOY/1 regretted that he could not help because he does not know directly any hospital laboratory in this area, but he estimated that she should find a position of Lab Assistant to work under a licensed laboratory technician or to work as a clinical assistant in a physician's office if she persists in trying.

M. ACTIONS PLANNED OR REQUIRED - RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. HQ - For information.

b. Local - Please make Xerox copies of Biomedical News and forward to HQ as members of these committees may be good sources to provide us with information about exchanged scientists.

Will see STCLOY/1 to give him the full address of Dr. SUNG because STCLOY/1 has mislaid it. Then will discuss with him again about what reason he can invite SUNG's his visit. Will also pursue the case of Paul YANG and STGAZER/1 and Dr. ROSENFELD.

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K. ACTIONS (continued)

On 30 June 1971, DELASCIO returned STCLOY/1 with the 'Biomedical News'. At the same time, DELASCIO gave him the business address of Dr. S.C. SUNG, and convinced STCLOY/1 that he could try to write Dr. SUNG, stating that STCLOY/1's office xxxxxxx will soon move to a new address and that STCLOY/1 welcomes SUNG for a visit because SUNG will surely enjoy the new tourist attractions in Los Angeles such as 'The Magic Mountain' and 'The Lion Safari'. STCLOY/1 still doubted that SUNG would spend so much money to make such a trip, but he promised to write this letter inviting him.

SECRET

Scientists Bid for Travel to China

by Harry L. Tennant

WASHINGTON—Nearly 100 U.S. scientists who are hoping to be China-bound this summer are thread- ray through papers, reports, journals and third country s while they patiently rance from the People's Re- China. This was evident reports that three U. S. have been cleared to enter

epped-up activity here in scientific quarters seems to have spurred preparation for what could be an influx into China of U. S. scientific specialists of all types. Early indications point to the possibility that an exchange of citizens between U. S. and China might place the scientist in a priority position over professions of other areas, as well as the general tourist himself.

Meantime, the overall rush was ob[illegible] as by a flood of applications and inquiries from U. S. professors to China's new and only embassy in North America at Ottawa, Canada. The fast-moving breaks came after the two U. S. scientists, Dr. Arthur W. Galston, Yale University plant physiologist, and Dr. Tchan Signer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology biologist, had received clearance. Another scientist, Dr. Robert Coe, geophysicist, University of California at Santa Cruz, also was cleared for entrance.

The National Academy of Sciences said large groups of biochemists and

Biomedical News
The newspaper for the life scientist

II/5-71 Washington, D.C. © May 1971

Nobel Winner to Get Cancer Research Aid

by Faye Marley

A man who claims to know how to cure cancer can have all the research help he needs from the National Cancer Institute.

Dr. Saul Schepartz, assistant scientific director for drug research and development, says the institute would be glad to collaborate with Nobelist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi of Woods Hole,

FASEB Surveys Research

Some 10,000 experimental biologists discussed the frontiers of research in physiology, pharmacology, pathology, immunology and nutrition in mid-April when the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology met in Chicago.

A last-minute change in speakers was made at the General Session April 13 because Dr. Marshall W. Nirenberg, Nobelist in physics in 1968, was

in this country were present.

The 400 industrial and institutional exhibits at McCormick Place featured instruments applicable to research in experimental biology.

Among the session highlights were 28 symposiums of invited speakers and 45 intersociety meetings having to do with current fundamental problems of the diseases that research biologists in all fields are trying to conquer.....

biomedical, biological, and natural scientists are eager to survey the scientific scene. At the same time it was pointed out that Dr. William McElroy, director of the National Science Foundation, and Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, had suggested that they make a trip jointly to China. This view was part of the feeling in science quarters in Washington that an exchange of scientists between both countries would be very beneficial to the two countries even though all sorts of understandings would have to take place. This was the reasoning expressed by President Nixon's science advisor, Dr. Edward Davis, Jr.

Up to this point there has been no official Government effort to initiate exchanges and an early appraisal of this possibility indicates that funds would have to be obtained to finance any sizeable program. Nevertheless, those on the scene say these could probably come from foundations. It is even quite possible that the White House would push for early passage of an emergency request for funds to see that such a scientific venture got underway. The present Administration, which credits itself with the break-through which led to the ping pong matches, is certain to push harder for a more forceful exchange now that the door is slightly open, even if the Administration has to finance an exchange from funds which it might consider of an emergency nature.

The updating of papers on Chinese advancements has been underway for some time. The National Academy of Sciences prepared about 300 papers for just such a possibility in 1968. But the papers remained undisturbed after it became known that an exchange was far in the future.

The Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China, a highly placed group, has been studying the activity intensely. Headed by Dr. John Lindbeck until his recent death, this committee is perhaps the most knowledgeable of any group as to just what is to be found in China, if and when an exchange takes place. Committee members are Professor A. Doak Barnett, Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution, (Chinese Studies); Dr. Horace R. Byers, Academic Vice President, Texas A & M University, (Meteorology); Dr. James

See China . . . p. 12

China . . . *from p. 1*

Cahill, Department of Art, University of California, Berkeley, (Fine Arts); Professor Jerome A. Cohen, Langdell Hall, Harvard Law School, (Law, Chinese Studies); Dr. Paul Doty, Department of Chemistry, Harvard University, (Physical Chemistry), and Dr. Alexander Eckstein, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, (Economics). Dr. Eckstein heads another group interested in scholarly exchanges, the National Committee on United States-China Relations, and is a well known authority on Chinese economics.

Others on the Scholarly Communications committee are: Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, President, Carnegie Institution of Washington, (Physiology, Genetics); Dr. Gerald J. Holton, Department of Physics, Harvard University, (Physics); Dr. Walsh McDermott, Department of Public Health, Cornell University Medical College, (Medicine); Dr. Emil Smith, Department of Biological Chemistry, University of California, Los Angeles, (Biochemistry, Biophysics); Dr. Kenneth V. Thimann, Provost and Professor of Biology, University of California, Santa Cruz, (Botany, Plant Physiology), and Dr. John A. Wheeler, Palmer Physical Laboratory, Princeton University, (Physics).

Medical Progress

Despite a 25-year period of no exchange of information between the U.S. and China, a vast amount of detailed data has been accumulated, all indicating that China has again stabilized itself after the turmoil of 1966. Since 1969 over 2,000 types of Chinese traditional and Western medicines have been reduced in price by an average of 30 per cent. Imports of scientific equipment and chemicals such as pharmaceuticals, fertilizers and synthetic fibers have dropped because of China's improving capability to produce its own instruments, machinery and chemicals. This accounts in some measure for the fact that the Department of Commerce does not expect a vast amount of medical goods and equipment to be exported when and if the Administration relaxes controls on movement of non-strategic goods to China.

Western Influence

The Autumn Canton Trade Fair recently gave some indication of the trends in China. Among the changes noted were the 30 per cent increase in customers and the Chinese favoritism for West European countries, especially France and Italy, at Japan's expense. Exhibits at the fair reflected numerous technological advances over the previous year. Among the displays were silicon-controlled automatic electronic and punch-tape-controlled tools, measuring and testing instruments, oscilloscopes, microscopes, and a wide range of synthetic plastics, resins and such basic drugs as antibiotics, sulphur drugs and vitamins.

The revolution in Chinese education has produced many schools such as the Shantung University of Science and Technology in Tsinan which opened last October.

Chairman Mao's thinking along medical lines is responsible for the "cooperative medical service" intended to bring medical treatment to all rural areas. It has been reported that one-third of a million city medical workers and graduates of medical colleges have settled in rural areas while 400,000 others were organized into mobile medical teams to tend rural areas. This has prompted shifting of some hospitals from large metropolitan centers to the country. The Hailung area, it is reported, has set up a so-called "red medical network" designed to enable each production team and factory to have its own highly publicized "barefoot doctors."

In another area all medical school graduates have been dispatched to the countryside and one-half of the medical workers in Harbin, Tsitshihar, Mutanchiang and Chiamusze have been sent to the rural and mountainous regions. "In this spirit," the Chinese say, "they have converted rural homes to allow for surgical operations."

Curing the 'Incurable'

Other reports point out that the integration of western medicine and Chinese traditional medicine has resulted in successful treatment of many common and recurrent diseases as well as curing some of the "incurable" diseases such as osteomatosis, epilepsy and chronic laryngitis proliforans.

A mass program in which Chinese traditional medicine and medicinal herbs are being used to prevent and treat diseases and heal injuries is sweeping the country, according to reports. Several instances of rejoining severed limbs to the body by using herbal drugs have been described. As part of this broad movement "red medical counters" have been set up in Canton's state-run drugstores to treat minor injuries and illnesses and recurring diseases by several methods including acupuncture and injections.

To assist in the struggle against disease a new type of diadynamic current stimulator used for back strains, sprains and neuralgia has been developed. Transistors substitute for electronic tubes and ordinary dry batteries for alternating current, the stimulator no larger than a book. A transistor device with a freezing microtome and a unit for cryotherapy has been developed, lessening the time for making thin sections for rapid biopsy inspections and used in the treatment of skin diseases and surgical procedures in dealing with warts and tiny vascular tumors.

Population Control

Shanghai recently has been the scene of posters urging young people to marry later in life, prompting observers to believe the Chinese are taking serious note of the population increase. At a Tokyo family planning conference recently it was reported that the mainland China urban birth rate was down. If this is true, it is the result of a 15-year birth control campaign. Through a combination of contraception, abortion, sterilization and encouragement of the late marriages, China is said to have almost halved its earlier population growth pace.

New developments in the pharmaceutical industry also have been reported. Of particular pride are drugs made from indigenous herb medicines. A new medical herb in Yunnan proved effective in curing 12 cases of acute hepatitis and streptomycin and another antibiotic have been produced from active carbon.

On the research front, there is continued interest in prevention of pollution and re-utilization of waste products. In Shanghai it is reported that an electrolysis plant made six different commodities including cryolite, pure soda and liquified ammonium chloride from waste materials.

Peking Pollution

According to published reports, Peking shares the Western world's concern for environmental control. Methods for anti-pollution measures include producing new substances from chemicals extracted from waste materials for medical and commercial purposes, using unwanted materials from large-sized factories to construct smaller industries, and maximizing possible usage and resusage of material products in order to economize in production costs are under study.

In a controlled set of laboratory experiments using operant conditioning techniques, five of seven patients with moderate to severe hypertension were able to reduce their systolic blood pressure by 9 per cent through their conscious reaction to external stimuli such as tones, lights and projected slides.

The reductions in blood pressure occurred during a series of studies under the direction of a group of four Harvard investigators in the behavioral laboratory of the Thorndike Memorial Laboratory and the Channing Laboratory, Boston City Hospital.

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2 U.S. SCIENTISTS WILL VISIT CHINA

Biologists Critical of War Said Either to Be There or About to Go From Hanoi

11 May 71 NYT

By WALTER SULLIVAN

Two American biologists are reported by their colleagues to be in China or about to go there from Hanoi, the North Vietnamese capital. A third American, a geophysicist from the University of California at Santa Cruz, is also said to have received permission to visit Peking shortly.

The biologists are Dr. Arthur W. Galston, professor of biology at Yale University, and Dr. Ethan Signer, an associate professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The geophysicist is Dr. Robert Coe, whose father has been living in Peking. Dr. Galston is a specialist in plant physiology who has been an outspoken critic of American defoliation in Vietnam. Dr. Signer, a specialist in the genetics of bacterial viruses, has also been an active critic of the war in Vietnam.

Few, if any, American scientists have been able to visit the Chinese mainland since the

Continued on Page 12, Column 1

2 U. S. SCIENTISTS REPORTED IN CHINA

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

Communists took control in 1949. For a number of years scholarly journals were exchanged, but in about 1966 with the onset of the Cultural Revolution this flow was cut off. In fact, publication of many journals in China was apparently suspended during that period of tumult.

However, a trickle of publications out of China has continued, primarily to scientists in countries other than the United States. Thus there has been a limited flow of information on developments in such fields as astronomy, archeology and biochemistry.

Some Western Visitors

There have also been some scientific visitors from Western nations whose relations with China were less hostile than those of the United States, notably Britain, France and Canada. In recent years such visits have become rare. However, it is reported that Dr. Pierre Chouard, professor of botany at the Sorbonne in Paris, has now received clearance for a trip.

The sudden opening of China to visits by American journalists a few weeks ago has raised hopes for a breakdown of the barriers against scientists. Last week the Committee for the Development of Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China met in Washington to consider possible action.

The committee was headed by Dr. John Lindbeck, director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, until his death in January, and a new chairman has not been chosen. It represents the National Academy of Sciences and other learned societies. Under consideration by the committee is an invitation to some Chinese scientists to meetings to be held in this country next summer.

Another group interested in scholarly exchanges is the National Committee on United States-China Relations. It is headed by Dr. Alexander Eckstein of the University of Michigan, an authority on Chinese economics, and includes businessmen and retired government officials as well as scholars.

Of major importance to the scholarly community will be the restoration of exchanges of specialized journals. Visitors to China have found American journals on file at research centers, but the flow has been one-way and, apparently, of a limited nature.

Dr. Arthur W. Galston

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'American Friends' at Rallies in Peking

CX

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, July 10 — Frank Coe and Sol Adler, two aging former officials of the United States Treasury Department, appear to be filling the social niche formerly occupied in Peking by Anna Louise Strong, the 84-year-old American leftist who died last March after years of service in the cause of Chinese Communism.

For the second time in little more than a month Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler were listed this week in Peking reports sent here by Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency, as "American friends" present at a mass function along with top Chinese and foreign officials.

The function, on Tuesday, was a sports performance before 20,000 people in an indoor stadium arranged in honor of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former Chief of State of Cambodia who now heads a Cambodian government in exile in Peking.

Mao's Wife Present

Tung Pi-wu, the aging deputy head of state; Premier Chou En-lai; Chiang Ching, the wife of Mao Tse-tung; and Huang Yung-sheng, chief of staff of the armed forces, were among the Chinese officials present. In the Prince's entourage were his premier, Penn Nouth, his wife, Princess Monique, and three sons and others of the Cambodian community in Peking.

Associated Press

Frank Coe

The previous occasion at which Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler were listed in attendance as "American friends" was a Peking mass rally on May 21 held to mark the statement made by Chairman Mao the revious day calling for world evolution against "United ates imperialism."

Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler fig-red in Washington investiga-ions of alleged Communist subversives in the United States Government in the late 1940's and early 1950's, at the time of the Alger Hiss case. They have both been in Peking for many years and seem to have escaped serious trouble during the Cultural Revolution purges in 1967-68.

Wives Also in Peking

Whether they have helped the Chinese Communists as financial specialists is not known, but it is thought here they have mainly been employed in editing English-language news and propaganda material.

Both have wives in Peking. Mr. Adler is author of a book on the economy of Communist China.

There are a few other Americans in Peking in good standing with the regime there, but only Mr. Coe and Mr. Adler have been listed as "American friends" at the two functions. This is believed to indicate that they have been selected to act as the American representation at public affairs at which the Chinese wish to give the impression of broad international participation.

COE-201/VAULT

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JULY 11, 1970

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ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, SELF-CONFESSED FORMER ESPIONAGE COURIER ADVISED SUBJ TO BE A MBR NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER-ESPIONAGE GRP, WHICH CONSISTED OF GOVT OFFICIALS WHO WERE FURNISHING INFO FROM GOV FILES TO AGENTS SOV UNION.

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	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1976810

COE, VIRGINIUS
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

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DBA -70905
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CIT ?
OCC ?
GEORGE HENRY JAFFIN, ON APR 17, 53 WAS INTERVIEWED CONCERNING ASSOCIATION WITH SUBJ, ADVISED THAT HE AND SUBJ EMPLOYED DIFFERENT FIELDS ON OCCASION DID SIT IN DISCUSSIONS THEORETICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUBJ TOOK PART. SUBJ IMPRESSED JAFFIN OVER-BEARING, POMPOUS INDIVIDUAL THOUGHT POSSES-SED SUPERIOR QUALITIES.
*

1 976 810

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COL. VIRGINIUS FRANK
201-[illegible]
SEX M DOB ?

100-008-017
~~DBA [illegible]~~
08 AUG 62
P4

PA/R 1113440

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORTEDLY MBR OF SOV ESPIONAGE GROUP WHICH WAS HEADED BY NATHAN GREGORY SILVERMASTER AND WAS ACTIVE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. IN EARLY 40'S.

1 113 440

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 169 9341

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

3 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Charles Joseph COE
John [illegible]
George Shaw WHEELER
Charles Oscar [illegible]

1. The following report was received from a source of unknown reliability:

"An American with the name of (first name unknown) COE arrived in Prague in August and stayed there until September 1961 ostensibly as a tourist. He had his hotel room booked beforehand by the Party headquarters. (He lived at the new hotel "International.")

"During his stay there he had several conferences with the Communist Americans resident in Prague, George S. WHEELER and a [illegible]. COE is reportedly a fattish man in the fifties with dark hair and rather smallish (about 165 cm.).

"Regarding the recent U.S. defector to the CSR, Professor Charles [illegible], who came to Prague with wife and child, everything was reportedly prepared before his arrival and his hotel room had been booked. His son, Larry, had a Czech tutor after his arrival."

2. The COE referred to above is presumably identical with Charles Joseph COE, the subject of your memorandum of August 21, 1961 from the Baltimore Field Office. George S. WHEELER is presumably identical with a George S. WHEELER born May 22, 1904 in Tacoma, Washington. [illegible] may be identical with John [illegible] born June 28, 1901, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Professor Charles [illegible] is presumably identical with the subject of your memorandum of November 1[illegible], 1961 captioned Charles Oscar [illegible], Josephine [illegible], nee [illegible].

CSCI-3/769,713
Based upon IN 37178
IC/Sec JJMdr/jlb

Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - FI/D
1 - EE/C
1 - CI/SIO
1 - CI/IA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - IC/Sec
1 - IC/Rpts
4 - RI
(201-810)
(201-169934)
(201-316906)
(201-319559)

Original file in 201-810

201-169934
3 May 1962

SECRET

14-00000

26 Jan. 1962

Charles Joseph Coe

TO: [illegible]

FROM: M. J. [illegible], SR. Evaluator,
CS Research & Evaluation Section,
[illegible] ext. 353

I have been informed by a source which may be considered reliable that an American of the name /fnu/ COE who arrived in Prague in August and stayed there until September 1961, ostensibly as a tourist, had his hotel room booked beforehand by the Party headquarters /he lived in the new hotel "International"/.

During his stay there he had several conferences with the Communist Americans resident in Prague, George S. WHEELER and /fnu/ CLARK. COE is reportedly a fattish man in the fifties with dark hair and rather smallish /about 165 cm/.

Regarding the recent U.S. defector to CSSR, Prof. Charles JUNGE, who came to Prague with wife and child, everything was reportedly prepared before his arrival. His son Larry had a Czech tutor after arrival and the hotel room had been booked.

FILE IN 201-169934

ORIGINAL FILED IN 201-310966

26 Jan 62

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4/30/64

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE Virginius, Frank

VI.

Virinius COE, FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
AT JOHN HOPKINS UNIV 28-29 ACQUAINTANCE
OF FRANK NEWTON TRAGER STU 28-30

201-083341
DBD -08302
08 FEB 60
FBI

[illegible] GILS
2-6
Frank
Coe

R 7104120583

FILE IN 201-169934

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 0-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PAX

MIJARFPMA

COE, VIRGINIUS FRANK
DOB ?

201-251919
DBF -23226
06 MAY 59
P 8

PAZR

CIT ?
201-169934

ELIZABETH T. BENTLEY, TESTIFIED IN
JULY '48, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE
UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, THAT FRANK COE
WAS A MEMBER OF A SOVIET ESPIONAGE GROUP
WHICH WAS HEADED BY NATHAN GREGORY SILVER-
MASTER AND WHICH WAS ACTIVE IN WASH.,D.C.
IN THE EARLY 1940'S. ACQUAINTANCE OF
MILTON HARRY FRIEDMAN /201-251919/

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-60)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/ RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER FCTA-22190

DOCUMENT DATE 24 Feb. 1959

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]			19 MAR 1959	Jm
2.				
3. Trmi	Austin	1959		AW
4.				
5. Chi/ops Supp		17 MAR 1959	17 MAR 1959 17 Mar	R
6.				
7. 18 MAR 1959 FE-CHI-PP			18 Mar	J
8.				
9. Ops/Sig		18 MAR 1959	20 MAR 1959	cto
10.				
11.				
12. FE/Chi				
13.				W
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

RECORD COPY

PUNCHED
20 NOV

[illegible] in RI/AN

FILE TITLE
C E FRANK

FILE NUMBER
201- 169934

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT
0321
INDEX

DATE PROCESSED 24 Feb 59

FORM NO. 610a
3 OCT. 55

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
FCTA-22190

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO Chief, FE

INFO
Attn Chief, KUSODA

FROM Chief of Station, Taipei EES

DATE 24 FEB 1959

SUBJECT PJDCST

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None, for information only

REFERENCES

1. The Chinese Communists publish in Peking, China, a magazine named China Reconstructs. This publication parallels other Communist publications in its attacks on the United States, Imperialism, etc.

2. Iden, who, it is believed, was of previous interest to KUSODA had written for this magazine a highly laudatory article on the industrial and agricultural progress made by the Chinese Communists during the preceding year. Iden reportedly visited the Mainland during the fall of 1958 and may still be in that area.

3. The January 1959 issue of China Reconstructs carries the article by Iden.

Robert K Hinchrick
Robert K. HINCHERICK

Enclosures:

1. Iden, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

20 February 1959

Distribution:

~~2~~ 1 - CFE, w/encls as stated
2 - C/KUSODA, w/encls as stated — 2004 - 7005

24 Feb 59
201-117934

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1.

14-00000

Separate Cover Encl #1 to PCIA-22190

Dated: [illegible]

IDEN - Frank Coe, American economist, formerly Secretary of the International Monetary Fund and Director of International Finance, U.S. Treasury Department.

CS COPY

201-169934

SECRET ~~NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL~~

The following information is SECRET:

COE, Virginius Frank
Traveled to China
c 1958

Formerly Secretary of the International Monetary Fund and Director of International Finance, U. S. Treasury Department, Virginius Frank COE is reported to be currently employed as an economist in the Chinese Communist State apparatus. It will be recalled that in 1948 Elizabeth ~~Terrill~~ BENTLEY, an admitted former Soviet espionage agent, testified before the Committee on Un-American Activities ~~Authorities~~, United States House of Representatives, that Frank COE was a member of a Soviet espionage group headed by Nathan Gregory SILVERMASTER, which was active in Washington, D. C., in the early 1940's. According to our records, COE and his wife, Ruth Evans COE, are residing in Peking, China, at the present time. Prior to the fall of 1958, the COEs ~~was~~ resid~~ing~~d in New York City.

SECRET ~~NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL~~

201-169934

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

19 JUNE 1953

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 34824

ROUTING
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2
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MEXICO CITY

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

2006Z 19 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/PI 2

Coe, Frank-

MEXI 56[illegible]

Subj. " "

TO: DIR

CITE: SMEXI

RE: MEXI 562 (IN 32856)

NO INDICATION SUBJECT ARRIVED HERE BY AIR. SOURCES AND CONTACTS HAVE NO INFO REGARDING VISIT. BELIEVED POSSIBLE SUBJECT DID NOT VISIT MEXICO CITY.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

~~201 [illegible]~~ 3

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 26 JUN 1953

COPY NO. 1

[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

14-00000

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 JUNE 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 32856

ROUTING
1
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP MEXICO CITY

ROUTINE

ACTION: WH 4

1833Z 12 JUNE 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

Coe, Frank

MEXI 562

TO: DIR CITE: SMEXI

RE: DIR 97664 (OUT 67001)

on subject

Subj! NO INFO NOW AVAILABLE. INVESTIGATION UNDERWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

~~201 129424~~ 2

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE 16 JUN 1953

COPY NO.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-82
JULY 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 JUNE 1953

OUT 67001

ROUTING
1
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TO: CHIEF OF MISSION, MEXICO (MEXI)

R. CONNALLY WH 455

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: WH 4

2038Z 10 JUN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

Coe, Frank

DIR 07664

TO: SMEXI Subj; CITE: DIR

CABLE ALL AVAILABLE INFO RE ACTIVITIES OF FRANK COE, FORMER SECRETARY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WHILE IN MEXICO. SEE AP DISPATCH DATELINED WASHINGTON 8 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

201-169934

~~201-[illegible]~~
.CSTRICT ☒ [illegible]
DATE 26 JUN 1953

J.C. King
J. C. KING

O. H. DONEFLINGER

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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14-00000

4 THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 4, 1953

Coe Calls Charges 'Outrageous, False'

By Herbert Foster
United Press Reporter

V. Frank Coe, former secretary of the International Monetary Fund, yesterday denounced as "outrageous and false" charges that he was a fugitive and once tried to regulate Austrian currency valuations to favor the Communists.

FRANK COE

He read his statement to reporters after secret questioning by the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee. Acting Chairman Karl E. Mundt (R-S.Dak.) said Coe refused to say under oath whether he is a Red.

Apparently there was little testimony concerning charges by two former United States officials in Austria that Coe tried in 1949 to block negotiations to devalue the Austrian shilling because Communist Czechoslovakia had objected.

Mundt gave Coe until Friday to go over his records. At that time, he will be questioned in private again before testifying in public.

Coe told reporters the subcommittee had released "two serious allegations concerning me ... that I was a fugitive, and that I in some manner had attempted, in concert with the Russians or Czechs in 1949, to have the Austrian currency devalued in a way desired by those governments.

"Those allegations are outrageous and false," he said.

Mundt said Coe testified that he is not a spy now nor was he one last December 2. But he said the witness refused to say whether he had been a spy on December 1, when he was questioned by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

Last Friday, Mundt announced that the subcommittee was unable to locate Coe and was asking the Attorney General to search for him.

The 46-year-old Coe said he has been out of work since his forced resignation from the Monetary Fund last December and had traveled in Canada, Cuba, the Bahamas and Mexico looking for a job. He would not say why his wife did not know his whereabouts.

201-169934

[illegible]

14-00000

Wash Post 6 June 1953

McCarthy Suggests Borders Of Nation Be Closed to Coe

By G. Milton Kelly
Associated Press Reporter

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) suggested yesterday that the State Department "immediately close the borders" to Frank Coe, saying the former secretary of the International Monetary Fund should not be allowed to leave the country.

"I think he is an extremely dangerous man," McCarthy said after Coe, a former Federal financial expert, refused to say whether he is a Communist or was a Communist spy while holding his $20,000-a-year job with the Monetary Fund.

Coe protested what he called McCarthy's "command" to the State Department.

McCarthy told him he had not commanded the State Department to do anything but had suggested that Coe be forbidden to leave the country.

The exchange came at a hearing by McCarthy's Senate Investigations subcommittee.

Coe was called before a televised public hearing of the subcommittee to answer testimony that in 1949 he had tried to block a revaluation of the Austrian currency opposed by Communist Czechoslovakia.

He came with a lengthy prepared statement in which he denied he had a hand in any such intrigue.

The currency matter was scarcely mentioned, however, as the Senate investigators went over his record and fired questions at him about Communist Party membership and espionage.

McCarthy asked Coe if he had contacted any member of the Russian secret police on a recent trip to Mexico.

Coe replied that he saw a great many people in Mexico, but so far as he knew none was a member of the Soviet secret police.



Associated Press Photo

FRANK COE
... in exchange with McCarthy

Asked if he had met with any members of the Communist Party in Mexico, Coe refused to answer. He said that to do so might tend to incriminate him.

Were any of the persons he met there members of an espionage ring? McCarthy asked.

Again Coe replied that so far as he knew none was.

It was at that point that McCarthy suggested to L. M. Drury, a State Department security officer present as an observer, that the borders of the United States immediately be closed to Coe.

Coe, 46, is a witness McCarthy's group has been trying to get before it for a long time.

Coe, who showed up Wednesday, denied he was a fugitive. He said he had been looking into employment possibilities in Mexico, Cuba and elsewhere. He resigned his well-paid job with the Monetary Fund last December 2 after refusing to tell another Senate group whether he was a Communist.

Coe testified he is "not engaged in espionage now" and was not last December 2. But he refused, on grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate him, to say whether he was so engaged on December 1.

201-1699

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

COE, V. FRANK
201-169934
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CONTACTS AND ASSOCIATES OF IRVINA KAPLAN. WAS NAMED BY ELIZABETH TERRILL BENTLEY AS HAVING BEEN ENGAGED IN SOV ESPIONAGE IN EARLY 40'S.

100-004-020/32
DFB -08099 /04
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SER 2

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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS

Washington Post Article dtd 30 Nov. 1949
"HISS TRIAL NOTE HINTS REDS GOT SHIP PLANS"

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	201 ~~100~~	466 4	19	6

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
4. DATE 30 Nov. 1949
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE COE, Virginius Frank

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Datelined: New York, Nov. 29, (AP).

"A cryptic note hinting that the Russians obtained plans for two prewar American superbattleships was read today at an explosive session of Alger HISS' perjury trial.

"The Government also bared secret reports intended to show how a fantastic Soviet underground web was woven deep into Washington in the early New Deal days to influence United States Government Policy.

"Both disclosures came in the form of reports by Government officials of talks with Whittaker CHAMBERS, chief accuser of HISS and former courier for a Russian spy ring.

"The battleship note, jotted by Assistant Secretary of State Adolph BERLE in 1939, read:

'Plans for two superbattleships -- secured in 1937 -- who gave KARP -- brother-in-law of MOLOTOV -- working with Scott FERRIS got this released -- now; naval architect working on it, why; FIELD was original contact. He introduced Z to GOMPERTZ (Hedda) -- Z relationship was casual -- shall excuse? ---where is Hedda GOMPERTZ? --Z and FIELD supposed to have been both members of party.'

"The Z referred to an individual whose name was blacked out. Defense Attorney Claude B. CROSS said he did not object to the document but thought use of the name would affect the reputation of a dead man.

"MOLOTOV, former Russian Foreign Minister, now is Deputy Premier.

"A Hedda GUMPERZ MASSING is a former wife of Gerhart EISLER, who fled the U.S. last spring after being identified as the No. 1 Communist in this country.

"Mrs. MASSING has been described as a 'cooperative witness' in post-war American spy hunts.

"There was no clew to the identity of "FIELD" or the "Scott FERRIS" mentioned.

(continued)

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 109934

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

"CHAMBERS has testified that he approached BERLE in 1939 to warn him of Communist activities in the U.S.

"CHAMBERS has also accused HISS of feeding him State Department secrets before the war in wholesale fashion. HISS was indicted for perjury when he denied ever giving CHAMBERS state documents or even seeing him after January 1, 1937.

"HISS was tried for perjury last spring but a jury split eight for conviction and four for acquittal, and a new trial was ordered.

"The second report in the form of twin memos on the underground was full of some of the names from Franklin D. ROOSEVELT's early New Deal. The individuals were described as 'anti-Administration' at the time.

"The names came out in memos written by Raymond MURPHY, Security officer of the State Department, who made notes of two talks in 1945 and 1946 with CHAMBERS.
"

"The underground's purpose was said in the memos to be 'far more important and cunning' than spying.

"'.......... each member (was) to advance as high as possible in the Government to shape legislation favorable to the program of the Communist government,' read the hitherto secret reports.

"Named in the memos were: Alger HISS and his brother, Donald (HISS); Harold WARE, Lee PRESSMAN, Henry COLLINS, Charles KRAMER (KRIVITZKY), Helen WARE, Alice MENDHAM, Harry Dexter WHITE, Nathan KAPLAN, Rose WEINSTEIN, Nathan WITT, John ABT, Eleanor NELSON, Nat PERLOW, and persons identified by their last names only, as CDLER, GLASSER AND COE.

"The guiding genius of the entire underground was identified as Hungarian-born J. PETERS, a 'little dark fellow, small feet and wavy black hair.'

"Top man and founder of the 10-man Washington cells was said to be the late Harold WARE, who died in 1936, and was allegedly succeeded by Nathan WITT and later by John ABT.

"Immediately below him in order of importance, the reports charged, were Lee PRESSMAN, former general counsel of the CIO, and Alger HISS, later to become a top-level State Department aide.

"The memos said HISS' job 'was never to make converts -- his job was to mess up policy.'

"The Government aides whom CHAMBERS accused were said in the memos to have 'arranged among themselves a program committing this Government to a policy in keeping with the desires of the Communists.'

"Underground headquarters in Washington, the memos said, included 'a violin study near Dupont Circle run by Helen WARE, (and) a school on the outskirts of Washington run by Alice MENDHAM.'

"CHAMBERS was quoted as saying he entered 'the Washington picture' in 1935 and left it and the party at the end of 1937.

"'The heads of the various underground groups in Washington who met with PETERS,' the memos continued, 'were the HISSES, KRAMER (KRIVITZKY), Henry COLLINS who was either a secretary or treasurer of the group; John ABT, Lee PRESSMAN, Nat PERLOW and Nat WITT.

"'These men met regularly at special meetings, with the exception of Donald HISS, who did not have an organization. They headed parallel organizations......'

"The memos alleged there were other underground Communist groups in Washington at the time, 'but this was the elite policy-making, top-level group.'

"'It was not a spy ring,' read the records, 'but one far more important and cunning because its members helped to shape policy in their departments.'

"The memos described Henry COLLINS, as an employee of the forestry division of the Agriculture Department at the time and said he took the lead in deliverying Government documents to CHAMBERS.

"In testimony after the memos were read, CHAMBERS said sailors or stewards of the North German Lloyd Line usually took Government secrets to Europe for the ring."

201-169934

14-00000

SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Virginius Frank COE, was., Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to a communication from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 17 April 1953, subject "Virginius Frank COE, was., Espionage - R", your reference 100-364447.

2. This Agency is attempting to comply with your request that Mr. O. J. McDIARMID, presently employed by the Mutual Security Agency in Manila, Philippines, be interviewed concerning the activities of subject. The Bureau will be notified immediately the Bureau's request has been fulfilled.

CS DB 6372

FE/3
BJHouston/sg
DFB-26027 (100-4-20-13-4)

SECRE

14-00000

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

REPUNCH

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24-3-59

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: RID/201

ROOM NO.: 1019 L

TELEPHONE: 2677

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1.: 169934

SOURCE DOCUMENT: DBF - 20409

NAME (Last): COE (First): VIRGINIUS (Middle): FRANK (Title):

SEX 3.: ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
V	COE	FRANK		

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BIRTH DATE 5.: D — M — Y —

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.: —

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.: —

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.: 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: 11/58 attending Peking University studying Chinese language

OCC./POS. CODE 9.: STU

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.: CHIN

ACTION DESK 11.: FE/CHIC

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.:

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.:

COMMENTS: CIT: ?
Connected with the Inca Continent Commodity corporation, 246 Fifth Ave. New York City.

VERIFIED

PUNCHED

~~PUNCHED~~

CS COPY

201- 169934

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: Lira

Form No. 831 Use previous edition.
1 Oct. 58

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 9 May 57	ACTION X OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM Lee Everitt RI/CO per FE/3	ROOM NO. 2021 L	TELEPHONE 2231

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐ NONSENSITIVE ☐

201 NO. 169934

1. SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) COE (First) Virginius (Middle) Frank (Title)

SEX 3. M ☐ F ☐

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2. (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. YES ☐ NO ☐

BIRTH DATE 5. MO DA YR

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.

ACTION DESK 11. FE/3

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

Formerly filed in 100-4-20-13

201- 169934

PERMANENT CHARGE YES ☐ NO X

RESTRICTED FILE YES ☐ NO X

SIGNATURE

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.

SECRET
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104-10165-10169

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

JMWAVE

ACTION

WH8

INFO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 50

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Mr. Napoli

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 2222

FILE, VR WH/C8 SOD6 DO4, DO/H3 CI/OPS, CI/IC, CS3 CA2 CA/19 FI FI/SPG

30 Aug 65 [illegible]

S E C R E T 313126Z

16-10 16-26

IMMEDIATE [SDOM] INFO IMMEDIATE DIR [SNDR] CITE WAVE 5413

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

31 AUG 1965

21-10

REF [SDOM] 6746 (IN 42286)*

1. PLANE PROCUREMENT PROBLEM DIFFICULT DUE SHORT DEADLINE BUT HAVE STARTED TRY WORK OUT SOLUTION. TRYING ARRANGE CHARTER IN AMCORE-2 NAME DC-3 TYPE AIRCRAFT. WAVE AIR OFFICER USING CLEARED CONTACT WITH [KUBARK PROPRIETARY] AS FRONT IN TRYING ARRANGE CHARTER WITH OTHER AIR SERVICE SUCH AS MACKEY AIRLINES. CLEARED CONTACT WOULD TELL SUPPLIER THAT AMCORE-2 HEAD OF GROUP TRAVELLING NEWSMEN STRANDED SDOM THRU PLANE FAILURE, ADD AMCORE-2 KNOWN TO HIM AS RELIABLE PERSON AND HE WILLING VOUCH FOR AMCORE-2 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND IF NECESSARY TO ADVANCE CHARTER PRICE. CONTACT WOULD TELL SUPPLIER AMCORE-2 WILL ARRANGE NECESSARY LANDING, REFUELLING CLEARANCES AT SDOM COMMERCIAL AIRPORT.

24

91

2. IF SUCCESSFUL IN ARRANGING CHARTER, MAY WISH FOR COVER REASONS THAT AMCORE-2 SEND CABLE (PHONE NOT NECESSARY AND MIGHT CONFUSE SITUATION) TO SUPPLIER CONFIRMING REQUEST FOR CHARTER FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE LATER RE DETAILS.

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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4/PJ

3. IN ORDER TRY ADD COVER AT SDOM END SUGGEST AMCORE-2 INDICATE TO HIS PARTY THAT IMBERT PROVIDING HIM WITH FUNDS 16-10 TO CHARTER REPLACEMENT PLANE TO GET GROUP BACK TO MIAMI. [SDOM] CAN THE PASS FUNDS TO AMCORE-2. POSSIBLY 16-10 [SDOM] COULD GET IMBERT TO BACKSTOP STORY HE GAVE MONEY TO AMCORE-2.

SECRET

CFN 5413 6745 AMCORE-2 DC-3 24 [KUBARK] MACKEY AIRLINES -2 THRU -2 -2 -2 -2 NOT NECESSARY RE -2 IMBERT MIAMI -2 IMBERT -2

BT

* PRIVATE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE OBTAINED FOR TRIP.

SECRET

3/01

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
C O N F I D E N T I A L

PROCESSING	
ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
INTEL/TYPIC - AMCORE 2 Production
Deployment Sketch of Battalion Defensive Positions

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. On 16 August 1963 AMCORE-2 delivered to his Case Officer the attached document which was obtained through the mails from Agent 1995, also identified as [Modesto VENTOSO Mendez]. The letter was postmarked 15 April 1963. 05

2. The sketch is described as showing a defensive position for a battalion size force; three companies are on the line, and the fourth company is in reserve.

END OF DISPATCH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Attachment: H/W
Sketch

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/att. h/w

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-278130

DATE TYPED 24 AUG 63	DATE DISPATCHED AUG 29 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-10862	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-126-3-20/4	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
C O N F I D E N T I A L

1/BR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC
Letters Received by AMCORE-2

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION: As stated below

REF: UFGT 3613, 3 January 1963

1. Headquarters appreciates receiving the enclosures to UFGT 2737 and the reference. The usefulness of this material, however, could be enhanced considerably if AMCORE-2's source were guided as to the items to be diverted. Also, headquarters envisions an excellent possibility for placing or exchanging items, were it possible to communicate with AMCORE-2's source. Could this be achieved, a profitable relationship with the source might develop, gradually dropping AMCORE-2 out of the picture.

2. JMWAVE is requested to try to get the identity of AMCORE-2's source and/or to consider ways to establish contact.

END OF DISPATCH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-278130

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 Feb 63	27 FEB 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW 1661

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-278130

1 - SAS/PA-PROP
1 - SAS/Registry
1 - C/SAS

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~RID/...~~
RID/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SAS/PA-PROP 03	B. McMaster	tw	7824

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SAS/PA-PROP		Seymour R. Bolten
SAS/FI		03

RELEASING

2/BA

```
[illegible]
[illegible]
L    [illegible] Q   CHF OF [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] IN DGI [illegible]
L    [illegible] M   [illegible] NEW YORK
L    [illegible] M   CUBA EMB
L    62A01 M   UK                         LONDON         62
L    62A01 Q   PCS
L    64A01 M   CAN                                       APR 64
L    64A01 Q   EXPECTED TO ARRIVE CAN APR 64
L    64A02 M   MEX                        MEXICO CITY    64
L    64A02 Q   KNOWN TO BE IN MEX CITY AS OF 1? DEC, DEPARTED FOR HAVA 21
L    64A03 M   MEX DF                     MEXICO CITY    DEC 64 X
L    64A03 Q   TEMP ON VISIT TO SEE AGENT
L    64A04 M   CUBAN EMBASSY                             MAR 64
L    64A04 M   CAN
L    64A04 Q   TDY
L    64A05 M   69 AND 51ST AVES AND 78 AND 80TH STS LARGAZABAL
L    64A05 M   CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA MARIANAO    APR 64
L    64A05 Q   OFFICE MAIN DGI HDQS
L    64A06 M   MEX                        MEXICO CITY    23 MAR 64
L    64A06 Q   TRAV MEX FM HAV 21-23 MAR 64 BY PLANE ECCA 465 ENROUTE CAN
L    65A01 M   CUBA                                      65
L    65A02 M   UNITED NATIONS
L    65A02 M   USA NEW YORK               NEW YORK       65               16 OCT 67   ->

28/08/75       PAGE    1944                        116781       E2 IMPDET CL BY 063729
                              SECRET/NOFORN
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                              SECRET/NOFORN
116781                        CONT.
L    65A02 Q   DEPORTED PNG
L    68A01 M   CUBA                                      68
L    69A01 M   CUBA                                      69
L    70A01 M   MAZATLAN CONDESA                                           66
L    70A01 M   MEX                        MEXICO CITY    11 DEC 70        27 AUG 73   <-
L    70A01 Q   PCS
L    73A01 M   CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA         27 AUG 73        OPEN
L    62A02 R   CID COLON                  DIMAS                           115501
L    62A02 S   UK                         LONDON         CA JUL 62
L    62A02 T   COLLEAGUE
L    62A02 U   ODENVY                     DBA-18727                       21 JUL 62
L    64A08 R   DOMENECH GADEA             CAMILO                          114207
L    64A08 S   MEX                        MEXICO CITY    18 DEC 64
L    64A08 T   ASSOCIATE-SPENT AFTERNOON WITH SAKER AT CUBAN EMB AND DOMEN
L    64A08 U   LIEMBRACES                 MEXI-2067 IN-50724              30 DEC 64
L    64A09 R   LNU                        LUCIO                           116
L    64A09 S   CUBA HAVANA                HAVANA         APR 64
L    64A09 T   SUPERIOR PEREZ WORKS FOR LUCIO ILLEGAL DEPT
L    64A09 U   AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763  19-6-102/4      11 JUN 64
L    73A02 R   SANTIESTABAN               ROBERTO LAZARO  CASANOVA        115249
L    73A02 S   MEX                        MEXICO CITY    20 JUL 73
L    73A02 T   SAKER ACCOMPANIED SANTIESTEBAN MEX CUBA
L    73A02 U                              HMMA 43312                      13 AUG 73
L    00A01 U   ODENVY                     DBA-18727                       21 JUL 62
L    00A03 U   AMMUG-1                    CS311/00115-64                  8 JUL 64
L    00A05 U                              HMMA 27312                      30 SEP 65
L    00A06 U   SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                        03 FEB 71
L    00A06 W   P 925
L    00A07 U   SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                        03 FEB 71
L    00A08 U   SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                        03 FEB 71
L    00A09 U   SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                        03 FEB 71
L    00A10 U   SLIGOS                     OTA 2947                        03 FEB 71
L    62A01 U                              OCOW-4646                       17 APR 64
L    64A01 U   VARIOUS
L    64A02 U   LIEMBRACES                 MEXI-2067 IN-50724              30 DEC 64
L    64A03 U   AMSPICE-1                  WAVE-6967 IN-56945              10 JAN 65
L    64A04 U   PASSPORT
L    64A04 W   TSD PASSPORT MACHINE RUN AUG 65
L    64A05 U   AMMUG-1                    CS 311/00115-64
L    64A05 W   FORMER CUBAN IS OFFICER SERVED W CUBAN IS UNTIL APR 64
L    64A06 U   AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763  19-6-102/4      11 JUN 64
L    64A06 W   FORMER CUIS OFFICER SERVED W CUBANIS UNTIL APR 64
L    64A07 U   AMMUG-1                    CSCI 3/781,763  19-6-102/4      11 JUN 64
L    64A07 W   FORMER CUIS OFFICER SERVED W CUIS UNTIL APR 64
L    65A01 U                              52A-05650       201-335014      13 JAN 35
L    65A02 U                              HMMA 26340                      11 JUN 65
L    65A02 W   PASSPORT                   [illegible]                     [illegible]
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[illegible]                                    FILE
..........................................................................
         [illegible]                          [illegible]
L        [illegible]  B  [illegible]          CHAFIK HOMERO   ZENNI         I
L        00A03 C  CUBA HAVANA                 HAVANA          11 MAR 36     M
L        00A03 D  CUBA
L        00A03 O  WIFE DORA RIVERA HERNANDEZ 06 JAN 38
L        00A22 B  ROLO                                                      A
L        00A23 B  LUNAS                       ROLO                          A
L        64A25 B  PEREZ                       SANTIAGO                      A
L        65A02 B  ZAKER                       HOMERO          ZENNI         Y
L        69A01 B  MARTINEZ                    ROLO                          A
L      A 99A01 B  SAKER                       CHAFIK HOMERO   ZENNI         T
L        00A06 D                              D00054619
L        64A01 C  CUBA HAVANA                 HAVANA          11 MAR 36     M
L        64A04 D  CUBA                        D00064168       HAVANA        13 MAR 64
L        65A01 C  CUBA                                        04 MAY 37
L        65A02 D                              D00065278       HAVANA
L        70A01 D                              D000?968
L      A 99A01 C  CUBA HAVANA                 HAVANA          11 MAR 36     M
L      A 99A01 D  CUBA
L        00A06 E  BLA/BK/STRAIGHT
L        64A06 E                              MEDIUM/S/10     160
L        00A06 E  BRO
L        64A06 F  UNK/BK                      CAUCASIAN
L        00A06 I   SCAR ON RIGHT TEMPLE                                     SKIN
L        00A06 O   SON HOMERO
L        00A07 I   SON ROLANDO
L        00A07 O   SON IVAN JUAN
L        00A08 I   FATHER CHAFIK RAFOUL SAKER
L        00A08 O   MOTHER SURALIA ZENNI
L        00A09 I   SISTER MARGOT SAKER ZENNI
L        00A09 O   SISTER GLADYS SAKER ZENNI
L        00A10 I   SISTER NORMA SAKER ZENNI
L        00A10 O   SISTER FRANCISCA SAKER ZENNI
L        64A04 O                                                    MB 01 525
L        64A05 O                                                    MB 01 437

28/08/75      PAGE     1963                   116781
                          SECRET/NOFORN                 E2 IMPDET CL BY 063729
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                          SECRET/NOFORN
116781                    CONT.
L        64A06 I   PROTRUDING TEETH
L        65A02 O                                                    MB 01 526
L        70A01 O                                                    MB 03 466
L      A 99A01 O   WIFE DORA RIVERA HERNANDEZ 06 JAN 38
L        00A01 G  DIPT ATTACHE
L        00A01 H  EMBASSY CUBA/LONDON
L        62A01 G  DIPT
L        62A01 H  CUBA FORN MIN
L        64A04 G  DIPT INSPECTOR CONSULATES
L        64A04 H  CUBA FORN MIN
L        68A01 G  DIPT FIRST SECRETARY 66
L        68A01 H  CHUN
L        70A01 G  DIPT FIRST SECRETARY DEC 70-AUG 73
L        70A01 H  EMBASSY CUBA MEXICO CITY
L        00A06 J  MEMBER
L        00A06 K  PCC
L        62A01 J  OFFICER
L        62A01 K  CUIS              G-2
L        64A03 L   CASE OFFICER
L        64A05 J  OFFICER
L        64A05 K  CUIS              DGI           ILLEGAL DEPT
L        70A01 L   DGI CHIEF OF CENTER IN MEXICO
L        00A01 X   PLAYS IMPORTANT ROLE IN EMB AND CORDOVA COORDINATES ACTS WI
L        00A02 X   CLAIMED CUIS USING EVERY AVAILABLE DOLLAR TO PAY AGENTS
L        00A02 Z   CLAIMED CARRYING OVER US DOLL 100,000 TO PAY AGENTS US AND
L        62A01 X   REPORTED G-2 MEMBER & FORMER STUDENT HAVA MILITARY ACADEMY
L        64A01 X   RECALLED HAVA SEP 62
L        64A03 X   OFFERED PAY US 4000 DOLLARS FOR INFO ON FOREIGN AGENTS INFI
L        64A03 Z   CUBA AND PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO DEC 64
L        64A07 X   JEWISH APPEARANCE BUT NOT OF DESCENT OR RELIGION
L        64A07 Z   SOURCE AND PEREZ MET MEXI WENT OUT FOR HAIRCUT TOGETHER
L        65A01 X   VISAS REQUESTED FM US EMB MEXICO CITY, MES. JAN 65
L        69A01 X   ONE OF FOUNDERS OF DGI-PRESENT POSITION IN DGI WAS UNK
L        00A05 N   CUBA NEW YORK
L        69A01 N   CUBA FMR
```

21 x [illegible]
Green 3124 X6

1. Charlie Murphy, DCD - Key Bldg 4 Sept had call from DCD Hq. Louden Cuesta contacted DCD Miami & said she wants written response to her letter. DCD concerned that she will get lawyer to make request if we don't comply.

2. I have letter written by Len Fleury. DC/LAD decided it should not go out. Did Ray W. coordinate w Blue and lawyer in OGC?

3. What should we do now. Send out letter already prepared by L.T. or ~~send another~~ re write.

① Rejected letter from AC/LAD and attached docs left with Mary Mullen 11 Sept 75 for decision by C/LAD.

②. Advise DCD Charlie Murphy & have him advise Josh Hemeny, Hq.

your husband has never
worked for the agency

2 O'clock

X2268

Jack
Mr. Henessy

Miami Field
Office
–
She said to
State
[illegible]

1 cc – Castro –
1 cc – McGowen

14-00000

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

[illegible]

/Chris [illegible] Agency

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

MURPHY

OF (Organization)

☒ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 2268

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

But plz call him on GREEN 3124

RECEIVED BY Owen

DATE 8/9/75

TIME 1150

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

☆ U. S. GPO: 1972 — 474-020

63-108

FBI doc
7 Oct 71 (Miami)
Re: antonio Cuesta Valle

FBI doc
30 Mar 71 (Miami)
Re- antonio Cuesta Valle

N. CRATTI:mll
WH COG/SA
4163/1325
27 JANUARY 1971

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH-8 FILE, VR. C/FI/AN, C/CI, C/FI-2 DDP HMP CSDO

SECRET

WH/MIAMI

MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

28J 71 01 14z

CITE DIRECTOR 105957

R.O.

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMECRU AMDENIM

REF: WH/MIAMI-0125 (IN-248374)

1. SUGGEST LNERGO BE ADVISED JKLANCE HAS NO PRESENT OR FUTURE OPERATIONAL INTEREST AMDENIM-14 AND CAN NEITHER INFLUENCE NOR ASSIST ANY EFFORT OBTAIN RANSOM TO EFFECT RELEASE. ANY PROPAGANDA VALUE RESULTING FROM RELEASE CONSIDERED HIGHLY UNLIKELY. LNERGO CERTAINLY AWARE SEVERAL FORMER PRISONERS OF EQUAL STATURE RANSOMED BY FAMILIES IN PAST TWO YEARS WITH LITTLE IF ANY PROPAGANDA MILEAGE GAINED FROM RELEASES.

MICROFILMED
FEB 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. SINCE LNERGO FULLY AWARE LNGOLD IS APPROPRIATE CHANNEL TO APPROACH FOR GUIDANCE AND ASSISTANCE IN CONDUCT OF SUCH DELICATE MATTER, HQS SUSPECTS RATHER TRANSPARENT APPROACH TO JKLANCE MOTIVATED BY POSSIBLE RUMORS IN EXILE COMMUNITY THAT JKLANCE PROVIDED RANSOM FOR AMSIGH-2 AND OTHERS.

3. ALTHOUGH HQS RECORDS FAIL REFLECT EXTENT LNERGO

CS COPY

/CONTINUED/

28 JAN 1971

28 Jan 71

201-281313

B201-061063

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RECEIVED
RID/EDI

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 105957

PAGE 2

RELATIONSHIP WITH AMDENIM-14, HE OBVIOUSLY WAS VOLUNTARY LNERGO INFORMANT FROM 62 UNTIL 65 WHEN HE WAS RECRUITED BY LNMICA. LNMICA TERMINATED THE RELATIONSHIP 10 MAY 66, SHORTLY BEFORE THE FATAL COMMANDOS L EXPEDITION WHICH RESULTED IN AMDENIM-14'S CAPTURE 29 MAY 66.

4. FILE: 201-281313, 201-061093.

END OF MESSAGE

MAR 17 '71

OS

James E. Flannery
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
for

W. L
WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT
C/WH 5

ACTION NO.
770

FILE, VR [illegible]

S E C R E T 222301Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0125

DIRECTOR

20 Jan 71 240374

RYBAT TYPIC AMECRU

1. LNERGO/MIAMI ADVISED STATION THAT:

A. CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY WIFE OF AMDENIM-14 WITH AMECRU-1, TO ATTEMPT RANSOM HUSBAND. DR. MARTINIANO ORTA, A FRIEND OF AMDENIM-14'S, IS ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY WITH AMECRU-1 AND MET WITH HIM CIRCA 1 JAN 1971 IN MIAMI BEACH TO DISCUSS RANSOM TERMS.

B. RANSOM PRICE QUOTED BY AMECRU-1 WAS $50,000 AND HE WANTED ASSURANCE IN WRITING FROM WIFE OF AMDENIM-14 THAT SHE COULD RAISE THE MONEY. SHE GAVE ASSURANCE ALTHOUGH SAID PRIVATELY SHE HAD NO IDEA WHERE SUCH AN AMOUNT WOULD COME FROM.

C. AMECRU-1 WAS IN NEW YORK 9 JAN ON HIS WAY TO PARIS PRESUMABLY TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. LNERGO HAS A "HUMANITARIAN" INTEREST IN FREEING AMDENIM-14 AND ASKED FOLLOWING QUESTIONS INFORMALLY OF STATION:

(1) CAN JKLANCE SUBSCRIBE TO THIS RANSOM IN ANY AMOUNT?

(2) CAN JKLANCE INFLUENCE OR OTHERWISE ASSIST IN THIS RELEASE, I.E., GET PRICE REDUCED?

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 0125 SECRET

(3) CAN JKLANCE SUGGEST ANY SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE OR ACT AS INTERMEDIARY IN OBTAINING SUCH FUNDS?

2. LNERGO/MIAMI COMMENTED THAT RELEASE OF AMDENIM-14 MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO JKLANCE AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION (AND, POSSIBLY, AS OPERATIONAL AGENT) AS WELL AS BEING A PROPAGANDA VICTORY IN THE CUBAN COMMUNITY.

3. STATION WH/MIAMI HAS REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL RE THIS CASE AS WELL AS ENTIRE SUBJECT OF RANSOMING CASTRO PRISONERS. PLEASE ADVISE TACK HQS WISHES STATION TO TAKE WITH LNERGO CONCERNING ABOVE.

4. FILE: 201-281313; 201-061063. GP1.

SECRET

SECRET

FBI doc
27 Oct 69 (Miami)
Re - Antonio Cuesta Valle
Bureau # 105-1795



634498 01 CUESTA VALLE ANTONIO 606 26

SUPPLEMENTARY MASTER LIST NO 103 MO YR

NCI 11/2/65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA (DFL) VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< CUBA, HAVANA

100-009-014
DBC -23857
22 JUL 68
FBI

R 6901100852

FILE IN 201-281313

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI doc
10 May 68 (Miami)
Re - Antonio Cuesta Valle
(aka - Tony Cuesta)

Bureau # mm 105-1795

FBI doc
29 April 68 (Miami)
Re: Commandos L

OGC 68-0374

5 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG

SUBJECT: James C. Wray

1. I called Mr. James C. Wray today to determine his reason for having called the Agency on 27 February regarding Antonio CUESTA Del Valle's patent application. At that time Wray had stated that as a patent attorney he was representing CUESTA who had an application pending on which some $140 in fees was due.

2. Wray advised that he had been retained by CUESTA several years ago to file an application concerned with a high speed boat on which a patent was ready to issue upon payment of $140 in filing fees. He stated further that as a consequence of CUESTA's subsequent capture he had been unable to communicate with him and that he had failed in his efforts to interest CUESTA's friends in assuming responsibility for the fees. Wray readily accepted my representations that the Agency had no responsibility in the matter. According to him, he had called us merely as a matter of last resort.

3. I found Wray's description of the boat's configuration and attributes to be interesting. While emphasizing that we had no responsibility for his client's present situation or for his fees, I suggested that he might want to provide me with the boat's specifications. Wray accepted this suggestion. My thought here was that an item of this nature might be of interest to SOD/Maritime Branch.

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

cc: Mr. George Ladner (CS)

SECRET

201-281313

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Nancy Gretz		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐ ACTION	☐ DIRECT REPLY	☐ PREPARE REPLY
☐ APPROVAL	☐ DISPATCH	☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ COMMENT	☐ FILE	☐ RETURN
☐ CONCURRENCE	☐ INFORMATION	☐ SIGNATURE

Remarks:

After much zigging and zagging, we agreed it would be desireable to return call as a matter of Courtesy. Please ask OGC to do so — denying any knowledge of the matter.

Mr. Bladergroen called & will handle matter 3/4/68

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE 3/4/68

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

INCIDENT REPORT

BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 21 February 1968

TIME 1520 Hours

NAME James C. WRAY GRADE N/A OFFICE N/A

Munsey Building, Room 1204
1329 "E" St., N.W., Washington, D.C.
Phone: NA 8-5555

INCIDENT Request for assistance TIME 1520 Hours PLACE Headquarters

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

At 1520 hours, Mr. James C. WRAY called identifying himself as a Patent Attorney and requested someone contact him concerning Mr. Anthony CUESTA. Mr. Cuesta, according to Mr. Wray, filed a patent application, $472 763, on 19 July 1965, for a high speed boat with a flexible hull. Mr. Wray siad that after filing, Mr. Cuesta left the United States and is now in a Cuban prison. Mr. Wray stated the reason he called is that he wants the Agency to either pay $145.00 for the patent issue fee as the deadline is 10 April 1968, or talk to the Patent Office. Advised Mr. Wray that a report would be made of his call.

(201- 281313)

Security discussed with OGC (Bladergroen) and WH/COG/EXO. Agreed no response desired.

3/1/68 PEo.

WH/Security/Hannah called and said OS recommend return telecon. WH/COG will ask Bladergroen to handle.

ACTION TAKEN:

A check in SR & CD was negative re Mr. Wray but two files, 242 095 and 530 946, were found on Mr. Cuesta.

REPORTING OFFICER
William E. Craig

CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH
for ROBERT D. BUCKLEY

DISTRIBUTION:
ORIG: DD/SEC (PTOS)
COPY: C/PHY. SD
COPY: C/PSD
FILE: BSB/PHYS. SD
COPY:

FORM 6-67 1798 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(36)

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]

[illegible] CL

FROM:

RID/C L

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/COG/Reg		22 JUL	1967	WR
2. WH/C/1				MR
3.	MC CL		27/7 28 [illegible]	[illegible]
4. [illegible]	CT AK CT	2 AUG 1967	2 AUG 1967	[illegible]
5. RID/[illegible]				
6. WH/C/[illegible] Alice D.				
7. WH/C/FI				
8. RECORDS OFFICER STAMP				
9. The following action is authorized: Destroyed				
10. Sign: [illegible] R.O. WH/Cog				
11. Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.				
12. WH/[illegible]				
13. RID/CL				
14. RID/MIS RID/FS WH/C/1 Alice Williams				CF
16.				
17.				

re a detailed to be passed for [illegible] files

To H/T. [illegible] copy in my file [illegible]

PROCESSING DEFERRED
PLEASE INDICATE ACTION
☐ Destroy. Records Officer Stamp and Signature Required. Route to RID/DU, RM G-[illegible]0
☒ Classify to: 201-281313 (CS File Number) 1-D-17 Route to RID/[illegible] RM G-[illegible] for final processing.

[illegible]	
[illegible]	WH/C/CI
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

DEFERRED

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	FILE TITLE [illegible] - 821216
	INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-281313
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE 19 Jun 67
		DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 27020

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible] 1962

DISPATCH

KAPOK/SECRET

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
CUIS Recruitment of IDENTITY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. On 8 and 13 June 1967 the local LNERGO officer who is handling the *IDENTITY case informed a JMWAVE officer that she had been recruited by the CUIS on her recent visit to Cuba. LNERGO requests that the knowledge of this information be kept to a minimum, for they intend to operate her as a double agent. LNERGO does not intend to disseminate any information on the case, at this time; however, the following information was provided so that JMWAVE could furnish LNERGO with traces and comments:

A. IDENTITY received permission from U.S. and Cuban authorities to travel to Cuba to visit her imprisoned husband. She arrived in Cuba on 7 April 1967 and *(fnu) INFANTE of the MININT met her at the airport. In general, INFANTE was her escort; however, she also had to keep Tita (lnu) at *telephone number 30-2056 informed of her movements. *Enrique ECHEVARRIA was also assigned to IDENTITY's case and she thought possibly that he was INFANTE's superior officer. She described ECHEVARRIA as a DSE officer who had formerly been in the U.S. and who had some type of a back ailment.

Attachment: USC

IDENTITY

Distribution:

③ - WH/CCG w/att. U/S/C

/continued/

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 Jun 67	JUN 19 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27820

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-331313

CLASSIFICATION: KAPOK/SECRET

14-00000

B. *Omar HERNANDEZ was in charge of her husband's case and *Raul ALFONSO was his assistant. IDENTITY said that her husband was normally kept at the Campo Libertad Hospital, not at the main building, but at a small building on the hospital grounds. She visited him frequently at the hospital and on one occasion they met in an office at the Villa Marista Detention Center. This office had*telephone numbers 40-3535 and 40-3536.

C. On 13 April INFANTE made the recruitment pitch to IDENTITY. He said the pitch was on behalf of the DSE and would benefit her and her husband. He said if she would successfully report on anti-Castro activities in Miami, and especially activities of the Commando L, for a period of six months they would release her husband from custody; and after three years of reporting they would grant him permission to depart from Cuba. She said that she certainly wanted to help her husband; however, she did not have any information regarding her husband's activities nor information about anti-Castro activities in Miami. INFANTE instructed her to just do her best and he thought everything would work out all right.

D. For the next few days, INFANTE debriefed her on her family, friends, work, etc.

E. From 20 thru 22 April she was picked-up daily by INFANTE and taken to a safehouse in the Marianao district of Havana for training. Somewhere along the route, they would stop and pick-up the instructor, *Pascual (LNU). Pascual gave IDENTITY training in document photography, development, and techniques in the collection of information. She was instructed in the use of a single lens reflex camera and although she claimed to have done very poorly, Pascual assured her, that with more practice, she would do OK. He told her to purchase a camera and two goose neck table lamps with 100 watt bulbs on her return to Miami and practice until she became proficient.

NK [illegible]

F. IDENTITY was instructed to print or typewrite (using all uppercase letters) her reports as she obtained the information, hold them and every fifteen days photograph them, develop the film, destroy the reports, and hold the negatives. Every six months she would take all of the negatives to New York and deliver them to *Chafik Homero SAKER Zonni (201-335014) at the Cuban U.N. Mission. Her first assigned meeting with SAKER was scheduled for any work day between 28 September and 2 October 1967.

G. IDENTITY was told that she would have no further contacts with the DSE in Cuba, but should she have any serious trouble, she could write to *"Rafaela Domenech S.
Avenida 41 # 6011
Ent. 68 y 70, Ceiba,
Marianao, Havana, Cuba"

NK; which might be related to DGI [illegible]

She was told to make up a false name and return address and sign the letter with the first name used in the return address. She did not receive a code name, was told nothing about SW, was not promised money nor expenses, and was not given any further information or training.

/continued/

2. Possible JMWAVE traces on the above are as follows:

A. Havana telephone number 30-2056.

(a) Number listed to Ma Antonieta MARRERO; 8 No. 10 Vedado. (1965 Havana Telephone Directory)

(b) Lt. (fnu) MARRERO was listed as a DSE member assigned to Villa Marista and in charge of prisoners. (UFGA-26564, 30 Dec 66)

[illegible]

B. Avenida 41 # 6811. Address listed to Pedro Raul RODRIGUEZ. (1962 Havana Address Book)

C. Omar HERNANDEZ.

(a) Omar HERNANDEZ name appeared on list of Cuban G-2 agents and/or Cuban officials involved in the Revolutionary Trials in La Cabana from 18 April 1960 through 25 August 1961. (UFGA-03228, 6 Feb 62)

(b) Omar HERNANDEZ was identified as a Communist and a G-2 agent in Havana who infiltrated anti-Castro groups. (UFGA-03492, 13 March 62)

(c) Lt. Omar HERNANDEZ was identified as a DSE interrogator at Villa Marista. (UFGA-24423, 8 Feb 66)

(d) Omar HERNANDEZ was described as a DSE agent who has acted as an investigator in several trials acted on by the Cuban Revolutionary Courts. (UFGA-25012, 25 April 66)

D. Raul ALFONSO was described as a DSE interrogator stationed at Villa Marista. (UFGA-27168 A01, 16 March 67)

John H. BARRIDRIER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH [illegible] INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [illegible]-27[illegible] page 4

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible] 201. [illegible]

1

SURNAME IDENTITY	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			

2

SURNAME INFANTE	GIVEN NAME fnu	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuban	OCCUPATION [illegible] MINIST/[illegible]		RESIDENCE Cuba
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			

3

SURNAME ECHEVARRIA	GIVEN NAME Enrique	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuban	OCCUPATION [illegible] MINIST/[illegible]		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Has formerly been in U.S. Has some type of a back ailment.			

4

SURNAME Havana Telephone No. [redacted]	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION [redacted]		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible] - 2056			

5

SURNAME HERNANDEZ	GIVEN NAME Omar	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuban	OCCUPATION [illegible] [illegible]		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			

FORM 10-60 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4

CONTINUATION PAGE [illegible] INDEXING INFORMATION | SECRET | [illegible]

[illegible]: [illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] 201 [illegible]

NAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME [illegible]	MIDDLE NAME	201-
	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP [illegible]		OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION			

NAME vana Telephone No. 40-3535	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP		OCCUPATION [illegible]	RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 40-3535 No. at Villa Marista Detention Center			

NAME vana Telephone No. 40-3536	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP		OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 40-3536 No at Villa Marista Detention Center			

NAME (LNU)	GIVEN NAME Pascual	MIDDLE NAME	201-
	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP uban		OCCUPATION [illegible] [illegible]	RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible] instructor			

NAME AKER Zonnl.	GIVEN NAME Chafik	MIDDLE NAME Homoro	201- 335014
	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP		OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible]			

FORM 63d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 5

[illegible]	KAPOK SECRET	UFGA-27920

INSTRUCTIONS: Enter "ASSIGN" after 201 if number needed.

SURNAME [illegible]	GIVEN NAME Domenech S.	MIDDLE NAME [illegible]	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION KINILT/DSB Letter Drop		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Avenida 41 #5811
Ent. 68 y 70, Ceiba
Marianao, Havana, Cuba

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

201-721214

FORM 10-60 631	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 86

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	KAPOK/SECRET	USC Att. to UFGA-27520

IDENTITY

= [illegible]

Maria Lourdes BLANCO Diez de Cuesta (201-921416) dead

JUN 19 1967

201-821216

FORM 1-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION KAPOK/SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

S/C att: "LA" UFGA-[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Treatment of Antonio Cuesta Valle, Political Prisoner of the GOC

REPORT NO. 00-K-323/16570-67

DATE DISTR. 9 Jun 67

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES LA CIRL C-DC7-53338

(356)

DATE OF INFO. 17 May 67

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---17 May 67

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Honduran national, US resident, executive of a foreign airline. Through travels and contacts he keeps in touch with events occurring in foreign countries.

[This report was developed by an Air Force AFNIN representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. My secretary recently returned from a 17-day visit to Havana, Cuba. Through conversation, with her, I learned of her visit and permission to visit her husband, Antonio Cuesta Valle, a political prisoner of the Cuban government.

2. Cuesta, who was active in an anti-GOC movement, was taken prisoner on 29 May 66 in company of four other men, while on an infiltration mission. While trying to escape he supposedly blew up his boat and as a result of the explosion he lost his left hand at the wrist. He was captured along with Eugenio Saldivar Cadena, and both are presently held prisoners at the Military Hospital in Marianao, Havana.

3. While in Havana she was permitted, on a daily basis, to visit with her husband in his hospital cell. She was permitted to visit alone with him on one occasion in a room that had several mirrors and for a period of approximately 15 minutes. The remainder of her visits were in the presence of her assigned escort or the guard assigned to her husband's ward. She knew her escort as "Infante," and he was always dressed in civilian clothes. He was most polite and courteous at all times. She was told what hours she could visit her husband by phone each specific day, and her escort would pick her up and take her to the hospital.

4. I was told that her husband has been given the best treatment available and that he had no complaints in that respect. He is suffering from advanced active cataracts and is almost blind. He has been treated by two Soviet doctors, but due to the language barrier proper treatment was not administered and the Soviets became very angry at the nurses at the hospital. Considering his background he is being treated like a VIP. He was told that a Cuban specialist is going to take his case in the near future. He said that his food is very good and generous servings are the order of the day. By direct order of Fidel he is furnished a box of the best cigars, and they are replenished each time the box becomes empty. During a Sunday afternoon he and his wife were taken to the beach, complete with a picnic lunch, in company of four guards that kept a distance of about 100 feet.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U	YES	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	GROUP 1 [illegible]	S	YES

201-281313

5. He has not been formally charged and she was told that because of his condition a date could not be set. However, she was told not to worry because Fidel was a kind man and would be most lenient with his case. She was also told that as far as the Cuban government was concerned she could visit with him again at any time in the future.

6. She stayed with family members of her husband and was permitted to go anywhere she liked when not visiting her husband, but because of fear she stayed in her quarters.

-end-

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

23

ACTION

WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, CA, CA/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

S E C R E T 071945Z CITE JMWAVE 6475

7 Apr 67 IN 40135

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 74423 (NOT SENT MEXICO)

AN 19	[redacted]	
[redacted]	[redacted]	
		[redacted]

1. FYI: AMOTS AND AMCLEVE-15 HAVE REPORTED LOURDES BLANCO DE CUESTA, WIFE OF TONY CUESTA, DEPARTED MIAMI FOR MEXICO CITY 2 APRIL, PLANS LEAVE FOR HAVANA 7 APRIL FOR TWO WEEK VISIT WITH HUSBAND.

2. FYI. IN NOVEMBER 1966 LOCAL ACSI INFORMED STATION OF BLANCO PLANS TO GO CUBA AND VISIT IMPRISONED HUSBAND WHO FORMERLY ACSI SD 6836. ACSI SAID SHE HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CHAFIK HOMERO SAKER ZENNI OF NEW YORK CUBAN UN MISSION. ACSI ASKED IF STATION WANTED TO PURSUE AS OPS LEAD. STATION DECLINED OFFER AND SUGGESTED ACSI INFORM FBI. FBI WAS INFORMED AND THEY HAVE BEEN MONITORING CASE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Antonio de la Cuesta Valle, 281313

201-281313

7 April 67

DIA doc
20 May 66
Subject - Withdrawal of U.S.
Army Proposal - Cuba

SECRET

[redacted]

4-25-66

SD 15413 ILLAS GONZALEZ, Francisco (201-783822)

Subject was terminated without prejudice by ACSI on 17 January 1966

File: F/DC/8-66

Lt. Col. Ferris notified 4/25/66
that SD 15413 and SD 15410
were dropped in January.

28 Apr 66: ACSI requested reinstatement of
SD-15413 and SD-15410.
Reinstated 28 Apr 66.

SECRET

201-281313

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
		2. RI FILE NO.				
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA (DEL) VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MEMBER OF THE PUERTO RICO GROUP OF COMANDOS L. OF INTEREST TO WESTERN INTELL.

019-002-012
UFGA-25032
02 MAY 66
P19-2-4-7
P2

R 6605170628

FILE IN 201-281313

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Cuesta, Antonio Valle	2. 201 FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST nl / 6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Jun 61	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO 201 FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Joe Piccolo

WH/4

8565

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C$ 90118.

C

file

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

7 April 1966

FOR DETAILS OF COORDINATION, PLEASE SEE: F/DC/8-66

File in: 201-281313

SECRET

OGC 66-0119

19 JAN 1966

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

By letter of 5 January 1966, you advised that the Department is contemplating prosecutive action against certain individuals involved in the hit-and-run raid conducted in the Havana Harbor area in November 1965. In this connection, you requested our comments relative to any past or current interest this Agency might have had or has in Antonio CUESTA Del Valle and whether disclosure of that interest in the event of prosecution would be detrimental to its operations. In addition, you also requested to be advised whether this Agency has or ever had an operational interest in Jorge MAS Canosa or his anti-Castro organization, the Cuban Representation In Exile (RECE).

This Agency has no present operational interest in CUESTA or MAS, although it did have in times past. We do not believe that disclosure of these past interests would have any serious consequences for the Agency.

For your information, with 303 Committee approval, this Agency does have a relationship with the RECE pursuant to which limited financial support is provided for the maintenance of its Miami office. While MAS should not be knowledgeable of this fact, any statements he might make should not affect our relationship with that organization.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

cc: Thomas Flores
Donald Huefner

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

MC

Jan. 14, 1966

1. Mr. Bladergroen of OGC phoned on 12 January. After checking back with Dept. of Justice he learned that latter is in contact with Army concerning Cuesta. He suggested I not tell Army this but tell them that Justice has an interest in the man.

2. This date I called Maykovich who was well aware of the Justice interest. He said that Justice was now waiting for an assessment of the man by Army.

D. Huefner

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RIB

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	
ITEM NO.	1979
DATE	
201 NO.	281313

NAME
CUESTA VALLE, Antonio

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
PRESENT ADDRESS		OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

Terminated without prejudice 10 May 1966
SUBJECT would not submit to control.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

ABSTRACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

15R1

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

DISSEM BY 26

ACTION

WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 0030Z BY D

INFO

FILE VR, DCI, D/DCI, DCI(MCRAN), DDP, ADDP, CS/RE, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 302315Z CITE JMWAVE 1209

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

TYPIC PBRAMPART

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1208 (IN 26931)*

30 MAY 66 IN 26933

ordered

15R

file CUESTA 201

1. FOLLOWING FILE INFO SUPPLEMENTS REF.

A. NO INDICATION JMWAVE FILES THAT OTHER THAN GUILLERMO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ ANY OF PERSONS MENTIONED HAVE EVER BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH KUBARK. ONLY POSSIBLE TRACE RE GUILLERMO ALVAREZ GONZALEZ IS UNDATED CARD CITING 201-301881, STATION SUBJECT ON "FRD" PAYROLL, POA NOT REQUESTED.

B. GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES, LATER IDENTIFIED AS CUESTA, ROMER, FERNANDEZ ANTA, DIAZ, ZALDIZAR, EXERCISING WITH SEABIRD BEARING REGISTRATION FL-8509-F, WERE SPOTTED BY WAVE OFFICER IN FLAMINGO KEY AREA ON 18 APRIL 66. SINCE CUESTA KNOWN AS ACSI AGENT, CHECK MADE WITH LOCAL ACSI, WHICH REPLIED THAT CUESTA STILL BEING USED BUT ACTIVITY IN QUESTION NOT SPONSORED BY ACSI.

SECRET

C. SEE ATTACHMENT TO FI/DEPARTMENTAL COORDIN-

201-281313

SECRET

ATION GROUP MEMO DATED 11 APRIL 66 (POUCHED TO JMWAVE WITHOUT MANIFEST). ATTACHMENT, DATED 5 APRIL 66, CONCERNS COORDINATION OF ACSI OP INTO CUBA INVOLVING USE OF ANTONIO CUESTA, CRAFT OWNED BY HIM, AND NINE OTHER EXILES ASSOCIATED WITH COMMANDOS L AND ALPHA 66.

2. ON 16 MAY, AFTER RECEIVING INFO INDICATING CUESTA AND COMMANDOS L PLANNING SOME FORM OF OP INTO CUBA OR HAITI, COS JMWAVE QUERIED CHIEF LOCAL ACSI DET RE STATUS OF CUESTA. ACSI CHIEF STATED CUESTA IN PROCESS OF BEING TERMINATED.

3. UPON RECEIPT REF INFO COS JMWAVE CHECKED BY TELEPHONE WITH CHIEF LOCAL ACSI CONCERNING ALL PERSONS MENTIONED REF. LOCAL ACSI CHIEF STATED FOLLOWING:

A. CUESTA TERMINATED BY ACSI MORNING 25 MAY.

B. ON 19 APRIL LOCAL ACSI "ESTABLISHED INTEREST" IN ALVAREZ, FERNANDEZ ANTA AND ZALDIZAR BUT THIS STILL PENDING, NAMELY, THEY HAVE NOT HEARD FROM ACSI HQS RE THEIR REQUEST.

C. ROMER AND DIAZ NEVER OF OPS INTEREST

SECRET

[illegible]

TO LOCAL ACSI ALTHO THEY KNOWN TO ACSI AS SOMETIME MEMBERS CF BOAT CREW HEADED BY ENRIQUE GONZALEZ (PERSON INVOLVED IN NORTORICUS BAHAMAS INCIDENT OF APRIL 66)

4. WHILE IMPOSSIBLE PREDICT CUBAN REACTION BELIEVE THEY MAY CHARGE THAT 29-33 MAY INCIDENT WAS OPERATION BY U.S. ARMY AND PRESENT INFO FROM CAPTURED PERSONNEL AS SUBSTANTIATING THEIR CLAIM. IT CLEAR THAT ACSI HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CUESTA AND THRU HIM WITH VARIOUS COMMANDOS L-ALPHA 66 PERSONALITIES SINCE AT LEAST 65, PROBABLY EARLIER. CUESTA ASSOCIATION WITH ACSI WIDELY KNOWN IN LOCAL EXILE AND ODYOKE CIRCLES. ALSO POSSIBLE THAT CUBANS WILL CHOOSE TO CHARGE THAT OP WAS DIRECTLY SPONSORED OR MASTERMINDED BY KUBARK. IT WOULD APPEAR UNLIKELY THAT CUBANS CAN PRODUCE ANY PLAUSIBLE EVIDENCE LINKING INCIDENT PARTICIPANTS WITH KUBARK.

SECRET

***Reported a clash at sea between a Cuban exile group and the Cuban Armed Forces.**

BT

NNNN

201-281313

FBI doc
13 Dec 65 (Miami)
Re- Representacion Cubana del
Exilio (RECE)

FBI doc
19 Nov 65
Re- Representacion Cubana del
Exilio (RECE)

14-00000

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	RE		EE
2			LAl
3	MO	7	
4	AG	8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WHC 8 ☒ RID COPY (COPY ISSUED TO CS/DO AT 2338 21 OCT 0*1)

INFO DCI, D/DCI, EX DIR, CS/CC, DDP, VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SOD 4, CI, CI/PS, WH 8, CS/RF. D/OCI 2, D/ONE.

SECRET 220021Z 22 OCT 65 03072 IN 75044

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR CITE WAVE 6751

INTEL TYPIC

SUPDATA: AMMED-16, 21 OCTOBER 1965. INFO WAS PASSED TO EWAN K. SCHWAMBORN (P) BY PETER B GUAROTTI (P) MARI BRANCH CREW MEMBER WHO RECEIVED INFO FROM AMMED-16. NOTE GUESTA IS ACSI SOURCE NO. 232. FIELD COMMENT BASED UFG 7574. NO INDEX FILED 220021Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM CUBA

SUBJECT: PLANS OF COMANDOS L FOR ATTACK AGAINST CUBA

DOI: 21 OCTOBER 1965

PADA: UNITED STATES, MAIMI (21 OCTOBER 1965) UFG 7645

SOURCE: A CUBAN EMIGRE WHO IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH CUBAN EMIGRE MARITIME MATTERS IN THE MIAMI AREA. HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A RELIABLE REPORTER.

COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

(S)

TDCS

ROUTINE PRIORITY

BASED ON:

BWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

[illegible]

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 78044

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

1. ON OR ABOUT 25 OCTOBER 1965 ANTONIO CUESTA DEL VALLE, CHIEF OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE COMANDOS L, A MILITANT CUBAN EMIGRE ORGANIZATION, PLANS TO LEAVE FLORIDA FOR CUBA WITH A GROUP TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION AGAINST CUBA. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION IS TO DISRUPT THE MOVEMENT OF CUBAN REFUGEES FROM CUBA TO THE UNITED STATES, BECAUSE CUESTA FEELS THAT THIS EMIGRATION IS AN INDICATION THAT THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING TOWARD A POLICY OF COEXISTENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

2. CUESTA WAS SOLICITING MONEY IN MIAMI ON 21 OCTOBER TO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FINANCE THIS OPERATION. CUESTA OWNS A GASOLINE STATION ON 12TH AVENUE, HIALEAH, MIAMI, FLORIDA. HE OWNS A 55-FOOT BOAT.

3. (FIELD COMMENT. A RECENT REPORT FROM AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE, REPORTED THAT CUESTA WAS A LEADER OF A GROUP OF 13 MEMBERS OF COMANDOS L WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE MIAMI FOR PUERTO RICO ON 10 OCTOBER.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, I&NS, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, USCG, US ARMY FIELD APPRAISAL DETACHMENT 1.

Intelligence Information Cable

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy Detached

CS DB - 312/00 ~~Feb~~ 65
23 Feb 65

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHSAFSC			17FEB65	QH
2.				
3. WH/SA/Resto			23 Feb.	D
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15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
FEB 16 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-281313

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
10 Feb 1965

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFG 06676

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

HGS

REPORT COVER SHEET | SECRET | REF. NO. LFG-6676

FROM JMWAVE	DATE OF REPORT 10 February 1965
REPORTING OFFICER James D. TATTERSFIELD	SO NO
REPORTS OFFICER Margaret R. NANKALL/uta	PROJ.
APPROVING OFFICER Andrew K. REUTEMAN	CS CR

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

TYPIC

Source: AMDECK-1 from Luis Diaz, a friend who joined Comandos L in 1963.

RID: Please index.

MICROFILMED
FEB 16 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

REPORTS
FEB 11 1965

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - OO/C 2 - Santo Domingo out pouch 2 - JMBARR 2 - Panama (for CINCSO) out pouch	1 cy. each to Miami reps. of: State, F.B.I., I&NS

HQS RI COPY

COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES 1
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	
APPR	SECRET	DOI

FORM 8-60 1407 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CS COPY

201-281313

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	**Cuba/Dominican Republic**	REPORT NO	
C SUBJECT	**Attempts of Antonio Cuesta del Valle of Comandos L to Establish a Training Camp in Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic**	DATE OF REPORT	**10 February 1965**
		NO. PAGES	**1**
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	**3 February 1965**		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	**United States, Miami (5 February 1965)**		**UFG-6676**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A Cuban exile with good access to activities of exile activist groups. His reporting on raider activities has been generally reliable since 1962. This information was obtained from Luis Diaz.

cir Cuba Δ Puerto Rico

201-281313

1. According to Luis Diaz, a member of Comandos L, a militant Cuban exile organization, Antonio Cuesta del Valle has been in Puerto Rico for several months attempting to set up a camp there for training Cuban exiles. He has also been attempting to obtain permission from the Dominican Republic to use the Dominican camp which was used by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a military leader of the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (SFNE, Second National Front of the Escambray), and has been making regular trips to the Dominican Republic from Puerto Rico for that purpose.

2. On 3 February 1965, Ramon Font Saumell, second in command of Comandos L, told Diaz that the recent accusations made against the top Dominican military personnel by Gutierrez after his capture in Cuba in January had jeopardized his organization's good relations with the Dominican Government.

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201-281313

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

CUESTA DEL VALLE, ANTONIO
201-281313
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RECRUITING MEN FOR ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO'S CAMP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

019-300-003
UFG -06214
17 NOV 64
WAVE-04911
P1

R 6501053230

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: DAVIS, THOMAS E.
50-1987

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA (ARCHIVES)

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 June		LESLIE WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman
"		JAMES P. KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

pdt 29 Jan 58

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

CI/OA FILE NO. SO-1987	SECURITY OFFICE FILE NO. 67378	PROJECT

SUBJECT (FILL IN ONE ONLY)

TRUE NAME DAVIS, Thomas E.	CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

NAME CHECK & INVESTIGATIVE RECORD

	CHECK (✓)	INITIAL	DATE
PRO I			
PRO II			
GREEN LIST			
RI TRACES			
OPS & DIV TRACES			
FIELD TRACES			
S.O. INDICES			
F.B.I. INDICES			
S.O. INVESTIGATION			

COMMENTS

ISSUED

	CHECK (✓)	DATE	TO
P.O.A			
O.A.			
C.S.A.			
P.C.S.A.			
P.P.A.			
PROP. APP.			
C.N.C.			

COMMENTS

CASE OFFICER	DIVISION Cover WE/1	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 126a
1 MAY 56

SECRET

(5-5)

ECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE 6 Mar 1956

CI/OA FILE NO. 50 1297

TO : Chief [illegible]/1

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : Thomas E. DAVIS

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

✓(a) No longer are being used;

(b) Do not satisfy the requirements for operational approval;

(c) Are of no further interest to the office of original request.

2. CI/OA records indicate the subject has been of interest to you since 1952 for: MAPPING WORK

☑ operational use

☐ informational purposes

3. It is requested that you notify CI/OA of the present operational status of subject, using the bottom of this form for your comment.

4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

FORM NO. 700
JUN 55

SECRET

(30)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE [illegible]

CI/OA [illegible]

TO : FE/Covert [illegible]

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : [illegible]

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

[✓ (a)] No longer are being used;

(b) Do not satisfy the requirements for operational approval;

(c) Are of no further interest to the office of original request.

2. CI/OA records indicate the subject has been of interest to you since for:

☑ operational use

☐ informational purposes

3. It is requested that you notify CI/OA of the present operational status of subject, using the bottom of this form for your comment.

4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

New Query sent Covert

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

FORM NO. 700

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PRESENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF SUBJECT

DATE	6 Mar '56
CI/OA FILE NO.	SO 1987

TO : Chief, WE

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : Thomas E. DAVIS

1. A review of the files of CI/OA is being made for the purpose of retiring files on covert personnel who:

✓ (a) No longer are being used;

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☐ informational purposes

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4. If no answer is received from you within 30 days, CI/OA will assume that you are no longer interested in the subject and will retire the file without further notification to you.

COMMENTS FROM OFFICE OF ORIGIN

Send query to FI/Cover/Plans.

INITIALS

EXTENSION

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL & 1 TO ADDRESSEE; 1 TO CI/OA FILE

NO. 700
JUN 55

SECRET

(60)

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

T. E. D. 8 February 1952

#67378

The files of G-2, Department of the Army, were checked in Subject's name on 5 February 1952. A file in the name of Thomas Edgar _______ was reviewed and disclosed the following information:

In a letter to the Commanding General, 2nd Army, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland from Intelligence Division, General Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., dated 25 May 1949, the Investigations Section states that information has been received from the Plans and Operations Division, General Staff, U. S. Army, liaison agency with the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, for the Department of the Army, that _______, Thomas Edgar was granted "Q" clearance on 2 February 1949. The AEC clearance number if NY 6514.

The above information was predicated upon an L/S from 2nd Army, to Director of Intelligence, requesting verification of "Q" clearance regarding above individual.

File further reflects that the FBI conducted investigations on 18 January 1949 at Cincinnati, Ohio and 12 January 1949 at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania regarding Subject.

FIELD OFFICE
FEB 52 8 29 AM '52
CHICAGO

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

SYNOPSIS:

SUBJECT presently resides at 2596 Neil Avenue and not at 1596. He is married, has a son, about 25 years of age. SUBJECT attended Ohio State University from 1935 to 1939, receiving a B.S.C. degree. He was formerly employed as a garage mechanic in Hilliard, Ohio and is presently Assistant Director of a Research Foundation at the Ohio State University. Neighborhood investigation was extremely favorable, nothing of a derogatory nature was developed. Credit favorable and Police negative. SUBJECT reportedly investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This data is property of Inspection and Security Office, to be returned when subject is no longer covertly used. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

BIRTH AND CITIZENSHIP:

At Columbus, Ohio:

According to the records of the Registrars Office, Ohio State University, SUBJECT was born in Wellston, Ohio during January 1903.

EDUCATION:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Registrars Office, Ohio State University on 21 February 1952, revealed that SUBJECT was a student from 1935 to 1939, at which time he graduated with a B.S.C. degree.

EMPLOYMENT:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 7 February 1952, the records of the Ohio Bureau of Credits revealed that SUBJECT is presently the Assistant Director of the Research Foundation of the Ohio State University. Upon graduation from O.S.U., or shortly thereafter in December 1939, SUBJECT was employed by the university as Assistant Fraternity Auditor. He later moved from that position to that of Assistant Director in 1946. Prior to the time, he was employed as a mechanic in Arch Alder's Chevrolet Garage, Hilliards, Ohio.

NEIGHBORHOOD:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 2 April 1952, it was determined that SUBJECT resides in an apartment building located at 2596 Neil Avenue, near the university. Mrs Mae OWEN, Apt. "D", 2596 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known the SUBJECT and his wife since the time of their moving in the building, which was about three years ago. She described them as "most substantial people" and added that SUBJECT is the Assistant Director of the Research Foundation, Ohio State University. He is most capable, likeable and respectable man and enjoys a fine reputation in the building and in the neighborhood generally. She further stated that the FBI had investigated him several years ago, apparently in connection with his job at the Foundation. She described SUBJECT and his wife as

SECRET

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

"upper middle class" with one son, about twenty-five years of age who is married and resides out of Ohio, although he is preesently staying with his folks because his wife is in a hospital in Columbus with their newly arrived baby. Informant stated that she knew nothing but good relative to SUBJECT and his family and that he is truly a patriotic American.

On 2 April 1952, Mrs Thomas REEDER, Apt. "B", 2506 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known SUBJECT and his wife as neighbors and that they are fine people, respected in the community and are conservative in their living and habits. They have one son, Ed, who is preently staying with them. SUBJECT, according to informant, is "homey" and does not drink or have any bad habits to her knowledge. She considers him a one-hungred percent American.

On 2 April 1952, Mrs. F.W. HOMSHER, Apt. "C", 2590 Neil Avenue, stated that she has been acquainted with the SUBJECT and his wife for about a year as neighbors. She knew little about them except that they are nice people and well thought of in the neighborhood. They are quiet, do not engage in many social activities. Informant confirmed SUBJECT's employment and added that she knew of nothing of a derogatory nature regarding the SUBJECT or his family.

Mrs John R. SNOWBALL, Apt. "A", 2596 Neil Avenue, stated that she has known SUBJECT and his wife just three years or since the time they moved into the building, three years ago this month. She stated that she liked them very much and knew of no finer people. They are respected in the community and are quiet and conservative. SUBJECT neither drinks or carouses and is a "homebody", except that he plays a great deal of golf with her husband. Informant stated that SUBJECT's son Ed is presently with SUBJECT coming here from West Virginia for the arrival of their newborn youngster. She added that SUBJECT has a fine poistion with the Research Foundation as Assistant Director, and is a therough American.

REFERENCES:

At Columbus, Ohio:

On 3 April 1952, Mrs Harvey BROWER, 2268 Summit Street, stated that she purchased the premises on which she now resides, from SUBJECT about twelve years ago and although she did not know the ----- family except for the real-estate transaction, she had heard many good things about them from neighbors that used to live

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

in this part of the community. She stated that everyone seemed to have a good word for both SUBEJET and his wife and she knew of nothing derogatory in the regard. She added that Mrs John MONROE, 2262 Summit Street, knew the SUBJECT and his wife.

On 3 April 1952, Mrs John MONROE, was interviewed and stated that she had known the SUBJECT's wife since they were younsters living in Hilliard, Ohio and that she has known SUBJECT since he and his wife married nearly thirty years ago. The -----'s were wonderful people and well thought of by everyone. SUBJECT was formerly employed by Arch Alder's Chevrolet Gagage in Hilliard, Ohio after which he returned to Ohio State University. He was later employed by O.S.U. in some capatity, becoming Assistant Director of the Research Foundation. Informant suggested another person that was acquainted with the -----'s, Mrs Harry MYERS, 6500 Dublin Road, north of Columbus, Ohio.

On 3 April 1952, Mrs Harry MYERS, was interviewed and stated that she had known the -----'s and that they were very close friends. She knew of nothing derogatory regarding SUBJECT and stated that she considered the ----- family as the highest type of people. SUBJECT's son, Ed, is engaged in some type of Engineering work, believed to be in Detroit, Michigan

AGENTS NOTE:

It was determined that Arch Adler, SUBJECT's former employer. and personally known to the writer, is presently confined to a hospital and not available for interview.

Norman ARMENTROUT, Manager, Alder's Garage, Hilliard, Ohio stated that SUBJECT was the best mechanic they had ever had in the garage. Informant stated that he has heard Mr. Adler make this statement many times since SUBJECT left in 1937. He further stated that SUBJECT and his wife had a fine reputation and were patriotic Americans. Informant had attended high school with SUBJECT's son Ed, whom he described as a first rate fellow, who displayed that he came from good people.

CREDIT AND CREDIT REFERENCES:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Ohio Credit Bureau, 83 S. 4th Street, examined on 7 February 1952, revealed that SUBJECT married Helen

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Case No: 67378 8 April 1952

B. in Hilliards, Ohio; that he has worked for Alder's Garage in Hilliards until about 1927; that he had been hurt and collected a claim from the Ohio Industrial Commission; further that he went to Ohio State University and graduated with a B.S.C. degree in 1939 and then went on the payroll of O.S.U. in December 1939. Presently Assistant Director of the O.S.U. Research Foundation, and prior to this was Assistant Fraternity Auditor. Further, in 1949 he had financed an automobile through General Motors with a mortgage of $749.00 which is prompt; that his credit rating is good, nothing against him and most purchases are for cash.

POLICE (CRIMINAL AND SUBVERSIVE) RECORDS:

At Columbus, Ohio:

The records of the Columbus Police Department, on 7 February 1952, failed to reveal any information on SUBJECT. The files of the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission were examined on 4 April 1952 and failed to reveal any information on SUBJECT.

SECURITY INFORMATION

23 APR 1952

SECRET

SECRET

TO : Assistant Director for Special Operations
ATTENTION: Staff C

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT : PZ 2359 [illegible]
#67378

1. Reference is made to your request dated 27 December 1951 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as cover in Europe under cover of present employment.

2. The attached information regarding the Subject is furnished to you as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used under the authority of an Operational Clearance in the capacity set forth in your request.

3. This memorandum pertains only to the assignment mentioned in Paragraph 1 above. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision as to whether you intend to use the Subject. If the Subject is not used, the attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only," indicating the reasons for not using the Subject.

O.C.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Attachments:
NCD 2/19/52
Inv. rpt. 3/8/52
Biog. Data

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton

FROM: STC SSB 700

SUBJECT: PZ-2359

1. The following biographical data is available on Subject:

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

Acting Head of Research, Ohio State University
Research Foundation

BSC in Business Administration 1939 Ohio State U.

1939-1942 Assistant Auditor, Dean's Office

Since 1942 has been Assistant to Director
Research Foundation.

2. Date of Birth will be forwarded as soon as received.

SECRET

SECURITY [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

COVERT NAME CHECK REPORT

DATE: 19 February 1952

SUBJECT: T.E.D. 67378 OC OSO

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on Subject with results as indicated below:

AGENCY	RETURN	DATE
G-2	SA	2/6
ONI	NR	2/19
STATE (less Passport)	NR	2/11
FBI	*	2/13
CSC	NR	2/12
HCUA	NR	2/6
OSI	NR	2/5
PASSPORT	NR	2/13
I&N		

* 10/12/50 - Investigation revealed nothing derogatory regarding Subject's character, reputation, employment, neighborhood, and associates.

This data is property of Inspection and Security Office, to be returned when subject is no longer covertly used. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned

SECRET

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-46
JUL 1952

P2-2359F 1987

FBI-CRENA - 0150 Nothing Derog

OSI - NR

ONI - NR

15 Feb 52

Talked to Bill [illegible] on 23 Jan 52 — Ken [illegible] — will call if anything new 7220

Called Osborne & gave secretary info that will check again 4 pm 23 Jan

Called Ken Clayton 4:10. 15 Jan. Is going to expedite these checks and will let me know soonest the results. Couldn't say how long it will take

Called Clayton 23 Jan 52

Clayton called me & said Jean was still cooking 24 Jan

DC Air Force Navy

19 Jan 1903

Wellston, Ohio

Q clearance NY 6514 Feb 49.

TO: Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton

FROM: STC SFB

SUBJECT: PZ-2359

1. The following biographical data is available on Subject:

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

Acting Head of Research, Ohio State University Research Foundation

BSC in Business Administration 1939 Ohio State U.

1939-1942 Assistant Auditor, Dean's Office

Since 1942 has been Assistant to Director Research Foundation.

2. Date of Birth will be forwarded as soon as received.

SECRET

Received this info from Osborne 11 Dec 58
Birth date still to come.

Thomas Edgar Davis
1596 Neil Avenue
Columbus, Ohio
Act Head of Research
OSU Research
Foundation
BSC - Bus Adm 1939
Ohio State U.
1939-1942 Asst Auditor
Dean's Office
Has been asst to Director
Research Foundation Aug 1942

14-00000

SECRET

TO : Chief, Special Security Division
Attn: Mr. Clayton
FROM : STC/SPB
Date 27 December 1951

SUBJECT: Thomas E. Davis **
~~James B. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation~~
P.Z. # 2359
EE-742-AD

A. DEADLINE: (1)____ (2)____ (3)____ (4)____ (5)____

B. CHARACTER OF CASE: (1)O.C. x (2)P.O.C. x (3)C.N.C.____ (4)C.S.C.____ (5)P.____

C. CLASSIFICATION: Agent____ Clerical____ Service____ Other Cover

D. AREA: Europe x Middle East____ Far East____ Latin America____ Specific____

E. SUBJECT'S COVER: U.S. Govt.____ For. Govt.____ Academic____
Commercial____ Religious____ Professional____ Pres. Empl. x
Undesignated____ Other____

F. ACTION: Investigation, including covert name checks x
Covert name checks only____
Development of biographic data____
Reply as soon as possible re I&S check____ FBI check____ Other____
Special name checks____

G. SUGGESTED COVER FOR INVESTIGATION:
General U.S. Government interest____
Non-government, commercial interest x
Special____

H. The chief of the interested Division has certified that OSO operational files and documents contain no information of investigative or security interest in addition to that set forth in PRQ I and II. (Reviewed by):____

I. Please return attached PRQ Part I PHS 57's Biog.Data with result of your action.
Biographic Data Is contained IN EE-742-AD

00 has granted a release for subject's use by the Division.

**Per telephone conversation McMahon/Clayon 29 Dec 51

SECRET

Tom,

Pls. make paper changes to replace Owens with Davis in this action. because Owens resigned his position and Davis has taken his place. I have orally done this with K. Clayton I&S - 29 Dec 51. Att. paper should be returned to Osborn of Plans Staff when new papers have been initiated.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CS-1124 (Osborn)
Priority
21 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STC/SPB

FROM: Chief, PLANS

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance on James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation

1. With reference to the conversation between Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Osborn on 20 December 1951, it is requested that action be taken to secure provisional operational clearance on Dr. James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation.

2. Subject to successful clearance, it is planned to have a representative of FDW contact Dr. Owens through an appointment arranged by OO to determine if he would be willing to prepare a letter from the Foundation to the American-Scandanavian Foundation in New York. The content of this letter would introduce and sponsor financially an agent whom FDW has arranged to send to one of the Scandanavian countries under sponsorship of the American-Scandanavian Foundation.

(US dep't's [illegible] clearance [illegible]

3. Mr. Owens and his assistant, Thomas B. Davis, already possess a CIA clearance up to and including "Secret" in connection with a classified CIA project being carried out by the Mapping and Charting Laboratory of the Foundation. The O.S.U. Research Foundation has a considerable unclassified program, however, and its connection with CIA is not publicly known. It is understood that Mr. Harris Lyons, IASS, has all the details concerning the clearances on Dr. Owens and Mr. Davis.

[illegible] 27 Dec 51

Has limited clearance

[illegible]

4. FDW is extremely anxious to complete these arrangements, and it would be appreciated if you would treat this request as a priority matter.

cc: FDW/Barringer

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICE MESSAGE

(DATE)

TO:

NAME (PERSON CALLING) | IN PERSON | TELEPHONE

A. M. | P. M.

TELEPHONE NO. | EXTENSION

RETURNED YOUR CALL

WILL CALL AGAIN

PLEASE CALL

DISREGARD

REMARKS:

~~Please write up a~~
~~POC. I've already~~
~~telephoned this to~~
~~Osborne on 27 Dec.~~
~~TPO.~~

RECEIVED BY

FORM NO. 36-9
SEP 1946

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—60874-1

Dr. Owens

cross EE-742-AD

HCUA
SC
FBI - NCI
ONI
G-2

} neg

neut

2/1987

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Chief, PLANS

NO.

DATE 21 Dec 1951

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. STC/SPB		Entered	26 Dec 51	
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

BY HAND ONLY

Clayton checking
to find proper 1&5 [illegible]
(Cobrook not [illegible]"))
27 Dec 51

POC 1541 eff 27 Dec 51
OSBorne states they have
clearance from OO to
use name 27 Dec 51
TPO

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CS-1124 (Osborn)
Priority
21 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, STC/SPB

FROM: Chief, PLANS

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance on James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation

1. With reference to the conversation between Mr. Kaufman and Mr. Osborn on 20 December 1951, it is requested that action be taken to secure provisional operational clearance on Dr. James S. Owens, Director, Ohio State University Research Foundation.

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3. Dr. Owens and his assistant, Thomas E. Davis, already possess a CIA clearance up to and including "Secret" in connection with a classified CIA project being carried out by the Mapping and Charting Laboratory of the Foundation. The O.S.U. Research Foundation has a considerable unclassified program, however, and its connection with CIA is not publicly known. It is understood that Mr. Harris Lyons, IASS, has all the details concerning the clearances on Dr. Owens and Mr. Davis.

4. FDW is extremely anxious to complete these arrangements, and it would be appreciated if you would treat this request as a priority matter.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SUPPORT AND PROTECTION BRANCH
Operational Clearance Work Sheet

SPB File No. 1987

Name ~~[illegible]~~ S. DAVIS, Thomas E.
(real, pseudo or Crypto)

(check) (date)

PRQ I ____
Division Traces ____
OP Files ____
Green List ____
Staff C ____
Local Field Traces ____
Other Field Traces ____
I&S Indices ✓ NAL 15 Jan 52
I&S Covert Report [illegible]
I&S Investigation ____
Biog data ✓
____
____
PRQ II ____

Project ____ Reviewed ✓
EFF 25 JAN 52
Sent FEB 2 1952 Provisional O.C. 1763
Operational Clearance 2362 MAY 7 1952
Operation Reviewed ____
____
____

Checked w/JAK [illegible] Osborne for us on such a [illegible], thought it would be all right to give the POC on the Q clearance of AEC + Air Force & Navy — to be [illegible] called in [illegible] something concrete develops. TDO 25 Jan 52

Osborne to see [illegible] more [illegible] info 7 Feb 52 TDO

~~SECRET~~

2 FEB 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SAUREL, Jean K.
DOB: 17 December 1929
POB: Port au Prince, Haiti
VISA: Haitian

1. Reference is made to the I-57 form regarding Subject who entered the United States on 2 October 1964. The files of this office contain the following pertinent information.

2. According to another office of this Agency, a Pan American Airways employee who spends considerable time in Haiti stated that during her many trips there she learned Subject has demanded and received things from members of the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTM, President DUVALIER's internal Security Force). One incident occurred at a DUVALIER rally held at the Presidential Palace on 1 May 1964. A palace guard refused to allow Subject to leave the grounds while someone was speaking. SAUREL called a member of the TTM, demanded to be released, and was allowed to leave. On 20 September 1964, a subsource of unknown reliability, whose family was well acquainted with Subject, commented that Subject was a member of the TTM.

3. According to a report received in September 1964 from an untested source, Subject, a former employee of Pan American Airways in Port-au-Prince who was recently named Director of the Haitian Tourist Bureau in New York, is an agent of President DUVALIER. DUVALIER is counting heavily on SAUREL because of the latter's experience in dealing with American personalities and situations.

CS COPY FILED IN 100-2-82

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

~~SECRET~~

CSCI-316/00444-56 2/2/65
ROUTINE TRAFFIC

201-725439

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SECRET

4. In a report dated 23 June 1964, a Pan American Airways employee who spends considerable time in Haiti advised another office of this Agency she attended a cocktail party in Port-au-Prince in late November 1963. Other guests included Jean and Susanne SAUREL and George and Jeanne DEMCHRENSHILDT. [This office has previously furnished the Federal Bureau of Investigation with information concerning the DEMOHRENSCHILDT's (file 100-32965) who were acquainted with Lee Harvey OSWALD.] Although it was not clear to Source if Subject and his wife were personally acquainted with the DEMCHRENSCHILDT's, the SAURELS provided the following information about George DEMOHRENSCHILDT at the party:

a. He is of Polish descent or citizenship.

b. At the time of the KENNEDY assassination, he had a $100 thousand contract with the Haitian Government to explore the country's natural resources.

c. He is said to be a geologist.

5. It is requested that the above information not be disseminated further without the prior approval of this Agency.

CSCI-316/00444-65

RID/CE: JMA/JB/ab

Based on: MIM 469-64 (Marilyn Wilcox 06
06 Mrs. A. LEVEQUE Bernadine)
22 HTPA 1414 (EVLEMON-5) 01
extract of DCE 17071 (WILCOX) 06 provided by Paul Hartman,
CI/RA

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Do Not Reproduce

5/17

DIAZ Lanz

SECRET

22 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversations with REICHHARDT, 8, 9, 16, 17 September 1959

1. On 8 September Reichhardt phoned to report the following:

a. He took Marcos DIAZ Lanz to the office of INS on Monday, 7 September to take care of his immigration status. (Comment: I was later called by Bill COTTER of the Alien Branch, OS concerning this. COTTER said that when they reported this to INS - that service said that AHRENS, the INS man in Miami has told them that DIAZ' hearing had already been held shortly after his arrival. COTTER implied that Bernie was not reporting accurately on the situation in Miami. I have not repeated this to Bernie, because Alien Branch seems to be in something of a tissy in regard to the new people in INS with whom they are dealing as a result of recent transfers of personnel.)

b. Bernie asked me to clarify what I wanted in the way of an affidavit of support for the wife of Marcos DIAZ. I dictated a simple statement and told Bernie to have it notarized and accompanied by a bank statement or similar document indicating WILLIAMS' ability to support Mrs. D should it become necessary.

c. Bernie reported that Mrs. Catherine TAAFE, the international busybody claims that she is going to Cuba on our instigation. She is accompanied by her entire family. This information came from the Miami Chief of Detectives to the OO Representative.

d. Bernie asked how he could identify himself to the three evacuees in Miami we have instructed him to contact re going to the Dominican Republic on our behalf. I told him to use Dave Morales' name.

e. He asked me for information on our dispatch to Cuba in connection with the PRQs for AMCOO and the gift. I told him I'd check and let him know. (Comment: The same day I saw a dispatch from Havana answering the questions, an info copy of which went to Bernie.)

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SECRET

2. I phoned Reichhardt on 9 September and we discussed the following matters:

04

a. I told him about the visit of Angel ROS. He said he had talked with BYERS on this matter and that BYERS 04 reported that ROS came to Miami on 1 September and left on 3 September. 04 BYERS thinks ROS is a secret police agent. Bernie is to see BYERS for details on 04 this. (Comment: Reichhardt's report was received on 11 September.)

b. Reichhardt asked me to check on his money situation since no deposit has been made.

c. Reichhardt asked if I had seen copies of the news letter being distributed by Emilio NUNEZ Portuondo called Latin American Events. NUNEZ is listed as editor and publisher and the firm is Latin American Affairs Inc., 1028 Connecticut Avenue, Washington. The first issue was published on 7 August. The 17 August issue includes a list of Communists. (Comment: I am arranging for the CIA library to procure loan copies of the publication for me to review.)

d. NUNEZ was in Miami last week. ORTEGA did not see him, but according to ORTEGA's sources, NUNEZ strongly implied that he has succeeded in obtaining US support in the Departments of State and Defense including commitments for training sites in the United States. NUNEZ also said that he is in touch with Col. King. This was covered in UFGA-15.

3. On 15 September I talked with Reichhardt concerning the following:

a. Ricardo LORIE saw ROS. Bernie will see LORIE about this.
b. Bernie will see FOX this week.
c. The addresses for the two evacuees who came by way of El Salvador are not correct. I told Bernie to try to find out where they are from the third, with whom he is in contact.
d. Bernie asks that his local travel order be renewed. (Comment: I checked this and the order has been renewed through 31 December 1959.)

4. On 16 September the following matters were discussed with Reichhardt:

SECRET

4/88

SECRET

* ([illegible])

a. SALVENTIS: He called in the morning to ask for information on this man. According to Reichhardt, LORIE says that he was fired from the DIER for anti-Communist activities and was expected to arrive in Miami last night. LORIE is worried about him because of his previous post as No. 2 man in the DIER. The Cuban card confirms that he held the latter post.

b. De LORIE says that he knows ROS well, and likes him. They met in Miami last week. ROS is in Miami again. ROS is principally interested in getting Reynaldo BLANCO out of Cuba. ROS says he was told the American Embassy can have no part of this but suggested he (ROS) ask De LORIE to see his Miami contact about assistance. Bernie discouraged LORIE about helping BLANCO. Bernie feels it is strange that Station Havana would tell ROS about LORIE's Miami contact and that the former might have mis-represented what was said. (Comment: We cannot positively identify BLANCO - although such an individual was listed by LORIE and the DIAZ Lanz as an Army officer. He may have been one of the 1957 regular army plotters.)

c. LORIE also asked help in converting Pesos to dollars. Bernie did not give him an answer on this.

d. LORIE said he wants to establish contact with ROS. The plan we have so far only envisages communication from ROS in Havana to LORIE. While Bernie would prefer to handle the matter personally, I think I convinced him that this is unfeasible because of the danger of provocation. He therefore suggested having 04 Cheesman brought into the picture, anonymously, as an individual who would get in touch with LORIE when there is something for him from ROS - and who will call LORIE periodically to find out if LORIE wants to transmit anything to ROS. This sounds OK to me. Bernie will see CHEESMAN within the next few days on this. 04

e. LORIE told Bernie that Cuban opposition views BONSAL's trip to the US as a victory for the opposition - but that if BONSAL returned to Cuba they will view the return as a triumph for CASTRO.

f. According to an OO source Mrs. Katherine TAAFE will be returning to the US from Cuba in a few days. She told at least one American in Cuba, Harry Rosenfeld, that she is working for CIA.

SECRET

2188

SECRET

g. In connection with my earlier query re the report from Cuba that the Revolutionary Air Force is planning to remove a couple of planes from the US to Cuba without an export permit, Bernie got the following information 04 from BYERS. A Cuban air force mission is in Miami concerning the aircraft. The Cubans are happy with the 04 way BYERS has handled things for them even though they don't have the export license yet. BYERS has been asked 04 to a party in Havana to be given by Juan Almeida in his honor. He may go on Friday. Do we have requirements for him?

5. On the morning of 17 August I phoned Bernie to tell him about the followup on the report concerning the planes (Haba 2653). He said Keynolds 03 phoned him on the evening of 16 September about this. Bernie said he passed the information to Customs, who said that since the Cuban Air Force are the owners of the planes (they are AT 6's) there is little that can be done if they file flight plans for a local flight and then leave for Cuba. They asked Bernie for suggestions and he said he had none. BYERS reports that 04 the Cubans asked him if he could find American pilots for the planes - and he said he'd try, but actually has no intention of doing so. BYERS 04 was impressed at the speed and accuracy of our information, but believes that the Cuban Government is being precipitate in expecting to get the planes out.

03
T. J. Flores
WH/III/AO

SECRET

7/BR

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. THARE WH/3 Cu				
2.				
3.				
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11.				
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13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19. RIMIS				
20. RID/FI	1400L			2361

COMMENTS

PERMANENT CHARGE
FOR YOUR RETENTION

RECORD COPY

RETURN TO CIA
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QDCHAR

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT INDEX	FILE NUMBER 201-259716
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 18 Aug 59	DOCUMENT NUMBER UMWA-12

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. UMMA 12

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. 03 WH/III/AO/Flores				
2.				
3. AO/Then				
4. Carib/C			R	1- COPY DETACHED for chrons
5. AO/Tharpe				1 to 3: Please see that copy goes to Hava. Discuss this w/WH 3/Carib
6.				
7. Carib/R				
8.				Copy sent to Station Havana non accountable pouch 3 Sept
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				14- Pls process for 201-259716. Leave this cover sheet attached
13.				
14. RI/AN				
15. RI/FI				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

VBR

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
UMWA-12

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Miami (KARHLEY)

DATE
13 August 1959

SUBJECT
Report of Contact with QDCHAR on 13 August 1959

(3 [illegible])

RE "X" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See Para 10.

REFERENCE(S)
UMWA-11

1. QDCHAR was asked first to bring me up to date on what he and the others in his group have been doing and he reported that they were not doing much of anything except waiting. Waiting, first, for some funds which they are expecting to come primarily from the sale of the C-46; and, second, waiting for the establishment of some better communication with their contacts in Cuba.

2. With regard to the aircraft, DALLM told me on this date that he believes he does now have a sale for the aircraft and he thinks the sale price will be between US$50 and US$55 thousand.

02

3. QDCHAR said that QDCOVE has communicated with someone (he wasn't sure of the name) in an attempt to solicit funds from people in Cuba. QDCHAR presented this in the light that QDCOVE 02 was "authorizing" some people in Cuba to go ahead and solicit funds. In this connection, QDCHAR mentioned that at one time in the past Julio LOBO (note: this name has never been mentioned in any previous conversations with this group) had considered donating US$100 thousand for the air force school which QDCHAR was promoting at that time. but apparently became frightened of the deal and nothing along this line materialized. QDCHAR said that he was hopeful that sometime he would be able to re-establish contact with LOBO. All this reference is entirely coincidental to my suggestions made to LEBANOW that I might try to bring this group together with Julio LOBO. Having learned of this previous connection, I want to revive this idea and proceed with the plan to bring these two together.

4. If and when they are able to accumulate some funds, it is their intention to go ahead with their plans for the establishment of a propaganda program which would be initially voice radio. QDCHAR said that he had been trying to persuade 02 QDBIAS and QDCOVE to a more narrow program within the limitations which I had cited for them in a previous meeting (See UMWA-11). He said he thinks now that this is the more realistic approach, but 02 QDCOVE holds to the original thinking that they 02 cannot commit themselves to such limitations. QDCHAR informed me that QDCOVE requests another meeting with me. He was told that I would be away for a few days but would contact him as soon as I return.

5. I then questioned QDCHAR about his knowledge and QDBIAS' knowledge of the presence of Soviet Russians in Cuba. QDCHAR stated that his only information had come 05 to him through Douglas ROOT (this is the Canadian whom QDCHAR referred to frequently in his earlier debriefing by SADELLY et al). Root claimed to him to have seen the 05 Soviets in Santiago de Cuba and QDCHAR said that furthermore he had obtained the names which he passed to Colonel NICHOLS in the American Embassy in Havana. When asked if he thought these were the same Soviets that QDBIAS had referred to in his testimony in Washington, QDCHAR said he felt that they were, although he believed QDBIAS' information was obtained independent of his, QDCHAR's, source.

05

6. Going on in this vein, QDCHAR stated that ROOT is one of several people whom QDCHAR encouraged to remain in place and to go along with Raul CASTRO and others for the purpose of obtaining more specific information on Communists and Communist activities in the armed forces. He said that along this line ROOT had been intro- 05 duced to Fidel CASTRO's secretary, whose name is Maria. QDCHAR said her full name is a Russian name but at the moment he can only recall the name "Maria". Through this relationship, it was expected that ROOT 05 would develop a good deal of information. Others named in this connection were Ramir VALDES, who is close to Raul Castro, Juan FERNANDEZ de Castro of the Air Force, and Efrain FECHARDO, whom QDCHAR says is an American. QDCHAR is certain that if he by some means can re-establish communication with these individuals he will obtain important information regarding Communist activities in the Cuban armed forces.

201-259716

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

10/BR

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
		[illegible]A-12

7. In answer to his appeal for assistance, I said I would try to help him devise some means of establishing this communication. He suggested that we pass word to his wife to contact Juan FERNANDEZ de Castro before she leaves for the purpose of putting him in contact with anyone we want to name and to instruct him in QDCHAR's name to pass on any and all information he has at this time.

8. This group still believes, in spite of what has been reported from Cuba, that, while they may have some little different view as to how much MORGAN can be trusted, Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo and MORGAN and the men of the Second Front of the Escambray are and will remain anti-Castro and eventually will move against him.

9. It was learned that QDCHAR is presently living in Frank FIORINI's house at 2030 SW 60th Court, Miami, telephone [illegible] 7-[illegible]. He also informed me that ODENVY had been talking with him about some local friends through whom he produced the names of some acquaintances of those whose names are Russian. I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss this with the ODENVY agent involved.

10. I will meet with the group again at the end of this week, at which time I expect they will have some modified position with regard to their activities and will appeal again for assistance. Meantime, it is recommended that QDCHAR's recommendation with regard to having his wife get in touch with FERNANDEZ de Castro and to get him debriefed be passed to the Havana Station.

Hanley
PATRICK I. HANLEY

3-WH

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS 2/WHD 31

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO Chief, Special Affairs Staff		
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKF		

SUBJECT JMPALM/Operational
Progress Report for the Months of November and December 1963 for Identity

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA 12038, 24 October 1963
B. UFGA 11883, 15 October 1963 → 201-301754
C. UFGA 12903, 10 October 1963

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Subject reportedly is a regular contact
201-301754

1. Identity was originally contacted by JMPALM Case Officer in mid-1963. The results of Identity's assessment by the JMPALM Case Officer were reported in detail in Reference B. It later developed that Identity was an acquaintance of AMPAL-1 who was subsequently put in contact with Identity for training and subsequent recruitment.

2. Training sessions continued between AMPAL-1 and Identity through most of November and early December 1963. As in other newly recruited JMPALM assets, the agent was regularly critiqued as to the value of his information and was provided with regular guidance in order to better strengthen his value to JMPALM. Following is a list of those persons with whom the subject is in contact on a regular basis or with whom he corresponds frequently:

05 CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

no 201 a. Dominican Air Force Colonel Pedro BENOE who visited Miami from the Dominican Republic. BENOE plans to return to Miami in early 1964.

05 05 CIT CUBA CSC

no 201 b. Antonio ALLANO Montes, a Cuban newspaperman now living in the Dominican Republic who occasionally visits the Miami area.

05

no 201 c. Retired Dominican Army Colonel Fernando CARTAGENA who resides in Miami but who maintains regular correspondence with many Dominican military leaders.

201-330804 05 FR 201-330804 CIT HAITI a miami CSC

d. Edward DENIS, a Haitian exile currently residing in Miami, who corresponds regularly with several Haitian youth leaders who are in opposition to Duvalier and who visit Miami from time to time.

(continued)

Attachment: u/s/c
Identity

COPY

att. dmr RID/AN 7 SAS/CSC

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/attch USC
2 - C/SAS w/attch USC

INDEX

DATE TYPED 18 Jan 64	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13643	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 200-120-59 201-301754	

SECRET

1 Encl - 5

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	UFGA-13543

201-73[illegible] e. George FRANCIS, [illegible] Consul in Miami. FRANCIS is in [illegible] daily contact with [illegible] when the latter is in Miami, and is visited by Identity frequently.

201- 05, 05

f. Mario, GOBA del Caribe and Jean Louis CROSSIER, Dominican newspapermen who frequently visit Miami and are old acquaintances of Identity.

05 CIT HAITI 201-737853

201-737853 g. Lamy CAMILLE Lamille, ex-the Haitian diplomat who now resides in Port-au-Prince. CAMILLE Lamille has known Identity for many years. ~~He is now residing in Port-au-Prince, but~~ plans to visit Miami, Fla. in early 1964. (See UFGA-11873). 05

3. Identity uses several exile front groups as cover for his meetings with his Miami contacts and in strengthening his position as a trusted acquaintance in his communications with the aforementioned sub-sources in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

4. Identity has presented no problems of a security nature during the period under review and no problems are foreseen at this time. He knows the JMPALM Case Officer only as "Jorge" and meets regularly with AMPAL-1 under secure conditions.

5. Subject has not yet been granted a JMPALM cryptonym as was requested in reference C which transmitted Identity's PRQ Part II to Headquarters.

RUDOLPH FR SABOUN 201-734802 CIT: HAITI nephew of George Francis (201-737803); Subj is Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida.

PRODUCTION

6. During the months of November and December Identity is credited with having provided JMPALM with the following intelligence reports:

UFG 4045	"Visit to the Dominican Republic by Unidentified Representative of Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt".
UFG 4046	"Political Activities Against the Civilian Junta in the Dominican Republic"
UFG 4169	"Permission for the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC) to Establish a Cuban Exile Base in Venezuela" and "Involvement of Former Cuban President Carlos Prio Socarras with the MDC."
UFG 4187	"Plans of the Dominican Triumvirate to Appoint General Elias Wessin y Wessin to the Post of Minister of War."
UFG 4255	"Alleged Plans for a Military Coup d'etat in Venezuela."
UFG 4256	"Plans of Dominican Military Leaders to Sabotage the San Isidro Air Base."
UFG 4258	"Attempts of the 14th of June Movement to Deter Recognition of the Dominican Triumvirate by the U.S."
UFG 4264	"Cuban Exile Plans to set up anti-Communist Radio and Television Programs in the Dominican Republic."

COST

7.

November 1963 Salary	$175.00
December 1963 Salary	180.00
Christmas Bonus	25.00
Total	$380.00

4

8/RS

FUTURE PLANS

8. Identity will continue to be met by AMPAL-1 until 1 March 1964 when his production will be further evaluated and he will be turned over to AMDOROTHY-1 for handling on a permanent basis. It will be noted that AMDOROTHY-1, who was recruited for a job as JMPALM principal agent to handle several recently acquired assets, is now undergoing training by AMPAL-1 in an effort to better groom this agent for the principal agent job.

END OF DISPATCH

201-301254

0

5/pd

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA 13543

04

✓ IDENTITY: [~~Pedro~~ VALDIVIA] 201-301754 CIT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC? △ MIAMI, FLORIDA Re: contact of subj IN MIAMI, FLORIDA.

S/C Encl p/ to UFGA 13543

21 Jan 64 201-301754

SECRET

1/PN

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. 22 [HSSA]-2054
TO Chief, WH INFO Chief of Station, Habana 16-26		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 23 Field File [30]118.30
FROM COS, [San Salvador]		DATE 16 June 1959
SUBJECT Operational Delivery of Material to Subjects of HAVA-2027		RE: "43-J" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See Para 1		

REFERENCE(S)
HAVA-2027 (RYBAT)

It is requested that the following items sent under separate cover be delivered to subjects of reference.

1. Tribuna Libre dated 13 May 1959
2. Opinion Estudiantil dated 15 May 1959
3. Notebook containing notes on communists and communist activities extracted from local publications.
4. March issue of Latinamerica
5. Copies of La Jolarria dated 23 May 1959
6. Copy of Las Historias de Espionaje mas asombrosos del mundo by Kurt Singer
7. Paradojas del Comunismo by Jose H. Leitz
8. Cartas de un Cura Comunista by Agustin B. Elizalde
9. Two copies of the study mentioned in HSSA-3039
10. Book entitled KRUSCHEV by David Rosenberg and Mauricio Carlavilla and newspaper clippings.

Arthur K. Shealant
Arthur K. SHEALANT

Enclosure:
1-10 As listed above USC

16 June 1959

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
1 - Habana w/o encl
3 - Files w/o encl

AKS:lhe

201-259120

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1.

3/90

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/[illegible]

RI/AN

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH [illegible]			3 Jun 1959	E/?
2. CH/M/IPS				PT
3. SALV/R				
4.				
5. Cuba				M
6. WH/3/Martin Tharpe				MT
7. WH/3/J Then				
8.				
9.				
10. WH/3/C				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. RI/AN				
RI/MIS				
17.				
18. RI/Files				
19.				
20. RID/FI	14[illegible]			7 i.

RECLASSIFIED

RECORD COPY

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED

Subjects are Pedro Diaz Lanz and Andres Diaz Rojas

6 to 7 AMWARBLE 03
Believe [Owen Jaunt] as holding these things?

10, [illegible]
FOR YOUR ATTENTION

8341 S.W. 27th Terrace
Miami 55, Florida

~~removed~~ it does sent to umw.w-13 Triami
~~for~~ [illegible] to him?

~~AMWARBLE~~
~~Zite~~

Cross reference to 201-185,869
Pedro Diaz Lanz

~~[illegible]~~

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT X INDEX	FILE NUMBER 201-259120 ~~63-120-11~~	
DATE MICROFILMED		DOCUMENT DATE 19 June 59	DOCUMENT NUMBER 23 [illegible]-03044

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT H01

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (When Filled In) AUG 24 17 58 Z'62

ORIG. J. Langdon:jg
UNIT TFW/Intel/Reports
EXT. 5547
DATE 24 August 1962

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
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6

R[illegible] CABLE SECT.

CONFIRMATION COPIES
TFW 13

TDCS DB-3/651,144

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WH 9

DATE DISTRIBUTED
24 August 1962

PRECEDENCE
x ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

TFW/R	2	TFW/PA-PROP	2	WH/PACY	1
TFW/INT	2	TFW/WAVE	1	WH/3/CR	1
TFW/FI	2	TFW/SI	1	WH/3/P	2
TFW/CI	2				
TFW/PM	1	OS/SSD/Bauman	1		

BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)
PACY-8333 (IN-46636)
NP (HY IF-1) 02
PACY-8349 (IN-49327)
NP (HY HULA-1) 02
WAVE-7053 (IN-45475)
~~NP (AMBUD - 1)~~
Liaison *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

~~Thanks~~

Ryan file Varona

DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/3/P/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER
John W. Koppel for ACD
C/TFW/Intel

03

COPY NO.

3/8R

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA/PANAMA	REPORT NO.	TDCSDB-3/651,144
SUBJECT	ATTEMPT OF ANTONIO VARONA, OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT CHIARI OF PANAMA IN ACTION TO OVERTHROW CASTRO REGIME	DATE DISTR.	24 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	14-21 AUGUST 1962	REFERENCES	IN-46636 IN-49327 IN-45475
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	PANAMA, (PANAMA CITY (15-21 AUGUST 1962)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: PANAMANIAN (F) CLOSE TO PRESIDENT CHIARI. PARAS 2-3: PANAMANIAN (C) WITH CONTACTS IN HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL CIRCLES.

1. ON 15 AUGUST 1962 ANTONIO VARONA LOREDO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC), VISITED PRESIDENT ROBERTO CHIARI OF PANAMA AND REQUESTED CHIARI TO ORGANIZE AND HOST A MEETING OF CENTRAL AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE ON THE CUBAN ISSUE WITH EMPHASIS ON INFILTRATION OF CASTRO AGENTS INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. VARONA SAID THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULD BE HELD AT A VERY EARLY DATE AND THAT CHIARI SHOULD INVITE PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO ATTEND. CHIARI TOLD VARONA THAT THIS WOULD BE A MOST SERIOUS UNDERTAKING REQUIRING INTENSIVE STUDY AND THAT HE COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO VARONA ON THE MATTER. ON 16 AUGUST VARONA LEFT PANAMA FOR SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, SAYING HE WOULD RETURN TO PANAMA ON

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T
CONTROLLED DISSEM

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	FBI

INS REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1/8R

20 AUGUST AND HOPED TO TALK TO PRESIDENT CHIARI AGAIN AT THAT TIME.

2. ON 20 AUGUST A GROUP OF CUBAN EXILES IN PANAMA CALLED ON MARCOS ROBLES, PANAMANIAN MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE, AND REQUESTED ROBLES TO TRY TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT CHIARI TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN PANAMA OF A TRAINING BASE FOR CUBAN EXILES.

3. ON 21 AUGUST PRESIDENT CHIARI SAID THE MAIN PURPOSE OF VARONA'S VISIT WAS TO REQUEST CHIARI'S APPROVAL OF A TRAINING BASE IN PANAMA, AND THAT HE HAD TOLD VARONA HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, CHIARI DISCUSSED IT WITH MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT SUBSEQUENTLY AND IT WAS AGREED THAT PERMISSION WOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRAINING SITE.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ON 13 AUGUST DR. JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CRC, SAID IN MIAMI THAT VARONA WAS LEAVING MIAMI 14 AUGUST ON A TRIP TO PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. MIRO SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WAS GENERAL PUBLIC RELATIONS WITH NO PARTICULAR MOTIVE IN MIND. HE MENTIONED THAT VARONA WOULD SEE PRESIDENT CHIARI WHILE HE WAS IN PANAMA TO DISCUSS THE CUBAN PROBLEM IN GENERAL AND ATTEMPT TO ENLIST "FURTHER SUPPORT FOR THE CAUSE." HE SAID VARONA WOULD ALSO INQUIRE OF CHIARI WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON A SUGGESTED MEETING OF THE

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CENTRAL AMERICA WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WHEN HE (MIRO) WAS IN THE AREA IN JUNE. THERE WERE APPARENTLY REASONS FOR VARONA'S TRIP OTHER THAN THE OSTENSIBLE ONES STATED BY MIRO. THERE ARE RUMORS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HELP IN CONVINCING PRESIDENT CHIARI TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT IN PANAMA OF A CUBAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE HEADED BY DR. MIRO CARDONA.

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

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DISPATCH

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ABSTRACT	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT JMATE/
Transmittal of Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Alberto PONZOA y Alvarez
04

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Process MOC

1. Transmitted herewith is the Memorandum of Oral Commitment for Mr. Alberto PONZOA y Alvarez (aka "Junior").
04 08

2. Subject was originally a contact of the Havana Station and in the summer of 1960, using his boat PISCIS made the first of four successful sea rendezvous operations with MATUSA TIME. He was subsequently forced to escape from Cuba, in PISCIS, in December 1960. Since this date Subject has sailed on many maritime operations in WASP, MATUSA TIME and on several Cuban-crewed boats. On several occasions he has effected rubber-boat beach landings to meet reception parties under extremely hazardous circumstances.
08 08

3. In Miami Subject was associated with the AMDIPs but has become disenchanted with this group because of constant political squabbles and their lack of ability to perform to his satisfaction. He now wishes to disassociate himself completely from any Cuban political group and desires to place himself under KUBARK control.

4. It is proposed to use Subject as a small boat captain in maritime operations; as an intermediate craft crewman in beach landings; as interpreter on American-crewed vessels; to assist in training Cuban, non-English-speaking crews and to assist generally where and when needed.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:

MOC

DATE TYPED
10 August 61

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-2011

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

5/BR

de Varona

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM

Chief of Base, JMWAVE

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END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:

MOC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED

10 August 61

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGA-2011

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

[illegible] - 105
2 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
FAL/Vertice Tres

05

1. On 31 March 1962 [Alberto Mariano Parejon Cardenas, A 12895479], born 11 December 1933, a bank employee, Miami address: [4901 NW 18th Ave.], no telephone, was interviewed.

10

2. Source said he was a member of SAC, FAL and Vertice Tres ("The Third Position").

3. Source said that SAC (Salvar a Cuba) was destroyed by Cuban security forces.

4. Source said that FAL (Fuerza Anti-Comunista de Liberacion) is well organized, the best organized being the forces in Pinar del Rio Province. He said that FAL has some arms and ammunition, and is an action type group, conspiring to provoke an uprising and cutting off communications. Source was reluctant to name any FAL contact, but finally named 06 [Reno Parejon Perez] as a contact man. He said that he could arrange bona fides with Parejon, and he was told that perhaps in the future someone would call upon him and introduce themselves as "amigos de Roberto" and discuss this in further detail. He agreed. He said that some months ago the FAL sent out microfilmed maps showing sites for landing arms and also its proposed caching sites, but he did not know to whom this information was passed.

MRP uses microfilm all the time to transfer its documents'

5. Source said that he was also associated with Vertice Tres, and described this organization as being composed of intellectuals and professionals. Its mission is not clear because as he described it one of the functions is to explain the horrors of the Communist system to the masses by the adoption of a third position. Vertice is also interested in more subtle approaches, such as industrial slowdowns and sabotage. The emphasis, however, appears to be on propaganda and he said Vertice is on the point of obtaining a radio plant. He was asked if this was a "pirate radio", but he replied no, that it would remain on the air so that it could be heard. When asked about the DFing problems, he said he was told by an engineer who is working on this project that it was a "Delta System Radio" and they would not have to be afraid of DFing. (This does not make sense, but it was all the source knew on this subject.)

6. Source said that Vertice needs supplies, such as Minox cameras, but he would not or could not give the name of a Vertice contact in Habana.

He said there/

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He said there is a Vertice contact in Miami, Gerardo (lnu) and although he did not know the lastname or address of Gerardo, he was going to try and locate him. He was again reminded of the "amigos" who would call on him for this information.

06.08

7. Source said that before he left Cuba he met with Maccio Carrillo, the niece of Justo Carrillo. She told him that Justo sent in a message saying "Be careful with Flavio." 06 Maccio asked the source to get in touch
06 with Justo and tell him that if he had derogatory information on Flavio he should send the details. 06 She thought Justo's message was confusing. Source said that "Flavio" is the war name for Evelio Duque who also uses "Frank" and "Manolito." Source said that it is believed that the name Evelio Duque is in itself a war name.

8. Source identified Arturo Golpi, an employee of the National Bank, Agencia 4-10-40, Linea y O Vedado, Habana, as a self-admitted member of G-2. Arturo is about 32 years old, white, stocky (about 190 pounds), 5'8" tall, white, black hair and has a large mustache. He was formerly the handyman at the bank, but because of his G-2 position he is now a man of prestige and catered to by all.

Nelson L. RAYCOCK

21 FEB 1962

SECRET

[illegible]

SECTION A

REQUEST FOR: Pseudonym ______ Alias **XX** Crypto or Derivative Number ______
(Check one)

1. Pseudonym Assigned ______

   Alias Assigned **Catherine Marie STONE** 207

   Cryptonym Assigned ______

2. Project or Agent (give adequate description) **AELADLE**
   If a project, please give description at bottom of page/Section B.

3. Status (Staff Employee; Staff, Contract, or Field Agent; etc.) **N.A.**

4. **SR/CI/P** **S.M. Harrison**
   Branch/Staff Case Officer

5. **CI**
   (Type of Activity: FI, CA, CI, etc.)

6. To be used in cable traffic (Yes or No) **No**

NOTE: List any pseudonyms or cryptonyms previously assigned **None**

SECTION B

True Name or Project Description **AELADLE (Debriefing of Soviet intelligence defector)**

SR/CI ______

Sections A and B are to be separated by RI/AC when completed.

SECRET

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO
BOGT-14334, 31 January 1962

IDENTITY A is Mr. James Brown, a security officer on TDY from Headquarters.

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
S&DC

NO. [EGOT-14004]

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/SR	24 Feb	14/2/62	
2. SR/DCOP	2/15	2/15	RW
3. SR/COP	15 Feb 62		
4.			
5. C/SR/CI	19 FEB	21 FEB	
6. ACSR/CI/P			
7.			
8. DC/SR MAR 1962			
9.			
10.			
11. CSR/CI			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3-5: Please note last para of covering memo from [BENTHAM] Is this statement about Berlin true? G

5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.

5-8: I suggest [redacted] might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we

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knew they were doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SR/DC

NO. EGOT-14004

DATE 31 Jan 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/SR	14FEB	14/2/62	
2. SR/COP	2/15	2/15	
3. BR/COP	15 Feb 62		
4.			
5. C/SR/CI	19FEB	23FEB	
6. ACSR/CI/P			
7.			
8. DC/SR 8 MAR 1962			
9.			
10.			
11. CSR/CI			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3-5: Please note last para of covering memo from Bentham. Is this statement about Berlin true? Q

5-6: It is not, and I have so informed Q.

5-8: I suggest COS might appreciate a word from you, possibly to the effect that we knew they were doing a good job but are even more impressed by the details.

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DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGOT-14604
TO	Chief, EE (ATTN: Matthew L. CARSON)	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief, SR (ATTN: Sherman G. CUSICK) Chief, WE (ATTN: Leonard P. SACKETT)	
FROM	Chief of Station, Germany	DATE 31 January 1962
SUBJECT	ADMINISTRATIVE Handling of a Soviet Defector	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	See below.	
REFERENCE(S)		

1. I suggest that the story of AELADLE, from the moment he walked into the home of Martin A. HOODINE until he was safely under ALBAHA custody in the United States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Operational Aid. It richly illustrates the many problems which must and can be surmounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries where the next Soviet defector might appear.

2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a compilation: a cliffhanger from start to finish, but also a commentary on the many types of problems which can arise, and the fact that it takes hard work and skillful improvisation to solve them. It was a cliffhanger both before and after the Frankfurt chapter (I nominate HOODINE for a medal for his part) and ought to make excellent reading.

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3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the German Station. The CAMKZONE facility which exists primarily for the receipt, establishment of bona fides, debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has existed here for the last decade. Nor is the movement by black evacuation of operational personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have accomplished this many times by use of our own integrated ODUNIT facility and also by the furnishing of alias documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via scheduled NATS flights. The significant points which made the AELADLE case unique may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they may well be, and therefore should be enumerated:

a. A Soviet diplomat, and member of the RIS, stationed in a non-Satellite but politically sensitive country, which at the time of AELADLE's defection was under considerable Soviet pressure.

b. The fact that the actual circumstances concerning his act of defection were such that an immediate decision by the man on the scene had to be made to take advantage of the opportunity.

c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts as described in (a) above, except to believe the defector's statements and acquiesce in his demands, i.e., he possessed information of a significant and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in the United States.

d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand.

e. In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, i.e., black evacuation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to successfully proceed with the undertaking.

4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique factors connected with it as enumerated above, lead me to suggest for Headquarters study what I refer to as "findings" and "areas of study." What I have labeled as "findings" in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would have deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the AELADLE family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either answerable questions or matters in areas wherein operational discussions may well take place to see if some type of school-book solution can be devised.

5. I will elaborate below, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but will first record them:

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a. The wisdom of ALMARK maintaining in the European area at least one field installation having assigned to it personnel representing the many competencies necessary in the intelligence undertaking has been reconfirmed.

b. The wisdom of obtaining appropriate security clearances, and having Stations brief and make witting of at least an AIS contact, the resident senior United States citizen personnel of United States flag air carriers operating within any Station's area.

c. The fallacy of depending on marginal or obsolescent equipment to accomplish sensitive tasks of high priority. We here refer to 17-year C-54 aircraft.

d. A realization that a ratio exists between the number of people made aware of a given undertaking in relation to the obstacles encountered in successfully accomplishing that undertaking.

6. A few words of elaboration are in order on the four preceding points. Because the initial endeavor at black evacuation by ALMARK aircraft aborted, we were given an opportunity to see with great clarity the application of these points. If the attempt to evacuate by ALMARK-assigned aircraft had been successful, then knowledge of the defection could have been held to approximately six staff and assigned military personnel. Because that endeavor was unsuccessful, at least nine additional staff and military personnel became generally or specifically aware of the matter, plus the Consul General and one of his senior officers. Additionally one private United States citizen, the senior Pan American official in Frankfurt, became very much aware of this sensitive case. This increase in the number of individuals came about because of an immediate need late in the evening of Saturday, 16 December, to use two CALZONE staffers to assist in the safehousing function, a total of six KUTOPAZ staffers (documentation, graphics, photographic) to prepare and issue fraudulent and alias passports, and an assigned enlisted man to act as a safehouse guard. The Consulate General had to affix visas to the fraudulent passports. The most crucial individual involved, however, was the Pan American official who to a certain degree put his position in jeopardy by being as cooperative on the matter as he was. Without previously having cleared and briefed this official (His counterpart in TWA is also so cleared and briefed) the whole undertaking would have been precluded. It would have been impossible to accomplish departure without documentation on a commercial aircraft without the connivance of the commercial airline involved. Indeed with such connivance it was difficult and risky enough. Finally, the point concerning obsolescent equipment speaks for itself. Headquarters is fully aware of the feelings of this Station concerning the inadequacy for our purposes of assigned aircraft. Suffice it to say that when defectors apparently of significant value refuse to ride such aircraft the matter merits thorough study.

7. The matter of "areas of study" appears to us to encompass at least the following:

a. Average time differences in transmitting high precedence electrical communications between and among representative groupings of Stations. The German Station is extremely fortunate in having KW-26 circuits with Headquarters. It affords us a facility for instantaneous communication. We can make certain rough estimates as to how long it might take appropriate Headquarters officials to answer our queries and we can then approximate the arrival time of answers to high precedence traffic. Other Stations, however, do not have KW-26 equipment, all do not have the same type of cryptological equipment, and there is a different pattern as to the type of circuitry, i.e., direct leased lines, twx, straight commercial service, etc. We believe there is merit in the appropriate Headquarters unit endeavoring to group geographically Stations and then based on the type of communications and cryptological equipment and the channel of transmission to come up with predictions as to the average length of time the transmission of a priority or operational immediate cable would take between and among the various representative groupings. In the case under study, which represented a rather fast-breaking situation, it was not possible for us to estimate the length of time it took to transmit an operational immediate cable between Stockholm and Frankfurt. It would have been of value to us to have had some idea on this matter.

b. Coordination between U.S. Air Attaches and COS. We believe it would be worthwhile to request each Chief of Station in a location where the Air

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Force or Navy has an assigned attache plane to establish procedures whereby the Air or Naval Attache will advise COS of any absence of the attache plane, the point of designation of the aircraft, and the duration of the absence. There have been previous defections where attache planes were used as the initial vehicle of black evacuation. In the evacuation plan of Stockholm 14-3 for AELADLE they informed us by cable that they proposed to use the attache plane. We are of the opinion that when the statement was made Stockholm 14-3 made the assumption the plane was immediately available. As was later discovered by us the particular plane in question was at Wiesbaden and not Stockholm. 14-3 This, however, was some six hours after Stockholm 14-3 stated its intent to use that aircraft. While in this particular case matters eventually worked out successfully the story might be otherwise in a different set of facts.

e. Priority furnishing of traces. When a Station is alerted to a request to render operational support to the movement of a defector and simultaneously answers a request in the negative if it can furnish traces, the following procedure is worthy of study. If Headquarters possesses, and time permits, we believe it worthwhile to forward an immediate summary to the Station rendering support if the background of the defector is such that it would be a matter of local interest. This would have been the case in AELADLE. As subsequent headquarters debriefing developed (and we assumed it would have been disclosed in Headquarters traces) AELADLE had previously been stationed in Berlin. Had such facts been known here, and had time allowed, certain debriefing on the Berlin period designed to elicit any matter of immediate concern could have been undertaken.

JDB

JOEL D. BENTHAM

Attachment
Memo dated 18 Dec 1961 h/w
Identities usc/tmp

Distribution
2 - EE w/atts
✓1 - SR w/atts
1 - WE w/atts

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TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 1962

18 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Handling at German Station 16 and 17 December of Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at Helsinki

1. This memorandum is designed to record, soon after the event, all facts pertaining to the handling within the German Station of the evacuation of a Soviet Vice Consul (and member of the RIS) from the Russian Embassy at Helsinki. At the time of this writing there is still lacking certain information to complete the entire story. However, it is felt worthwhile to record all events while the memory is still fresh. In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to as "subject" and pseudonyms and identities are used in all other cases.

2. At approximately 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J. LYACK (Chief, CABEZONE) contacted me at my home and asked me to proceed immediately to the residence of Joel D. BENTHAM (Chief of Station). Upon arrival at BENTHAM's residence, BENTHAM and LYACK briefed me on the Stockholm cable which announced Stockholm's intent to endeavor to fly subject and family "black" from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard the Air Attache aircraft. Cable also requested Frankfurt to have an aircraft available to receive immediately subject and family and take off forthwith to the United States. LYACK also mentioned an IN cable from DIR which requested Stockholm to move family soonest to CABEZONE in Frankfurt for establishment of bona fides. 14-3 02

3. We then adjourned to the office and awaited more word from either Stockholm, which would advise on the arrival time of the family at Frankfurt, or from Headquarters concurring in Stockholm's request for immediate departure of the family for the United States upon arrival at Frankfurt. EAOB was immediately alerted and they made arrangements to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for the United States by 1200 hours. A compartment for the subject's family was put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was removed and a false number put on the aircraft. Conrad V. LAPOLLA (Acting Chief, COS/KUSODA) was contacted and asked to come to the office immediately. Discussions were then held with LYACK and Carl T. UPDILL as to the availability of a KUDOVE case officer with Russian language capability to act as escort.

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4. Having heard nothing from either Stockholm or Headquarters by 0945 hours OPIM traffic was sent in both directions telling them Germany was prepared to receive and effect immediate black evacuation of the family to the United States. In the meantime, it had been determined that IDENTITY A would be used as the security escort and Russel K. MUCHANE (AD/PI Staff) would be on standby to serve as a KUDOVE escort. This was a contingency arrangement because we lacked knowledge whether or not a KUDOVE officer from either Helsinki or 14-3 Stockholm was prepared to travel with subject all the way to Washington.

5. Around 1100 hours I asked Edward P. TOCHENSKY (Chief, EAOB) to establish contact with the Wiesbaden Air Base tower and lay on arrangements to monitor the flight of the 14-3 Stockholm Air Attache plane. This was done because we have had previous instances of "black" arrivals at Wiesbaden where the aircraft actually arrived before the EPA cable from 14-3 the Station dispatching the body. At about 1115 hours TOCHENSKY informed me by telephone that the 14-3 Stockholm Air Attache aircraft, a C-45, was and had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since 12 December. At about 1130 we cabled this information to Stockholm 14-3 and DIR and also offered to dispatch an aircraft to Copenhagen to make the pickup if 14-3 Stockholm could move the body there. Because of technical difficulties involving air clearances and lengths of runways, we could not immediately get into any field north of Copenhagen.

6. At approximately 1145 hours a cable was received from Headquarters concurring in the immediate evacuation from Wiesbaden by EAOB aircraft of subject's family upon arrival. If such could not be arranged we were then requested to hold subject and family at CABEZONE. 02

14-3

7. Having heard nothing from Stockholm by approximately 1600 hours we again sent them OPIM traffic asking that they inform us immediately of their intentions. I had previously left the office about 1430 hours in order to get some lunch and take care of one or two personal items. I had called Nelson R. POLIAKOFF (Deputy for Administration Staff) in to cover for me and had briefed him on the then current situation. When I returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had come into the office prepared for the trip. We then sent the above-mentioned cable and suggested that MUCHANE return to his quarters and await further developments. I phoned TOCHENSKY and suggested that he and his communicator return to their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the meantime, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport to meet an incoming staffer carrying classified material and get him through Customs. He then returned to his home. I left word with the Signal Center Watch Officer that any incoming traffic on subject's trip should be telephoned immediately to LAPOLLA who would come in, review the traffic and contact me. The

Watch Officer was also asked to immediately phone the Wiesbaden Communicator who in turn would contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would go to their office.

8. At approximately 1900 hours LAPOLLA contacted me at home from the Signal Center and informed me that an ETA and other information was in from [Stockholm] 14-3. I told him to stand by and I would immediately come in. Based on [Stockholm's] 14-3 cabled statement that Martin K. ROODINE [(Chief of Station, Helsinki)] was escorting subject to the United States, I told LAPOLLA not to alert MUCHANE. I arrived at the office at 1930 hours and immediately dispatched the Guard Sergeant to buy certain types of foods and magazines that [Stockholm] 14-3 asked to be put aboard the United States-bound aircraft. We contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained that EAOB was in a state of immediate readiness. David R. MULFALL (COS/KUSODA Office) then arrived with IDENTITY A. IDENTITY A was given a general briefing on the mission and his responsibility following which he and LAPOLLA took off immediately for Wiesbaden. They took with them the purchases of the Guard Sergeant. 27, 14-1

9. I then proceeded to the home of Ronald M. CORBANE (COS Lawyer) where we were guests for dinner. At approximately 2200 hours I received a call from LAPOLLA that subject and family had arrived, the turnover was made, and that the EAOB aircraft was airborne at approximately 2150 hours. I telephoned this information to BENTHAM.

10. At approximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer who relayed to me the following message from the Wiesbaden Communicator. That message stated the EAOB aircraft was immediately returning to Wiesbaden because of a sick passenger. Immediately thereafter I received a call from LAPOLLA who was at the quarters of Arthur G. DREIBELLIS (EAOB) in Wiesbaden. LAPOLLA stated that he had gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was proceeding to the Air Base. He knew at that time no other details. I told him Chester E. FAGERLUND (COS Medical Officer) and myself would leave immediately for Wiesbaden Air Base.

11. FAGERLUND was in attendance at the same dinner party and we departed immediately for the Air Base. Upon arrival at approximately 2300 hours the EAOB aircraft had already landed and maximum security provisions were observed in the area. Air Police had the "Hangar 34 Area" blocked off two blocks in either direction.

12. TOCHENSKY met me outside the building and informed me that immediately after take-off subject's six-year-old daughter had become extremely airsick and suffered respiratory difficulties. She was administered oxygen. The mother became hysterical and the father demanded that the aircraft immediately be returned to its point of

departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel to the United States except by commercial jet. We then entered the Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced to ROODINE, who recited basically the same story as told by TOCHENSKY. We also ascertained that the Flight Surgeon had looked at the daughter and had found nothing organically wrong. We then asked ROODINE to bring FAGERLUND into the room where subject's family was staying and introduce him as an "American Intelligence Service Medical Officer" and have FAGERLUND examine the child. FAGERLUND's results were the same as the Flight Surgeon and no medication was given the child. A discussion of some fifteen minutes then took place as to how best to proceed with onward transportation arrangements. ROODINE took me aside and strenuously impressed me with the fact that subject was of the opinion that certain of his information on the matter of Soviet/Finnish relations was of great perishability and that subject deeply felt his necessity to arrive in Washington and state this information within the next 48 hours. ROODINE also stated he concurred in subject's feelings. All KUBARK representatives then on the scene again got together and the undersigned made the decision to abort the mission, arrange immediate safe-housing overnight for subject and his family, and attempt commercial transportation on Sunday.

13. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me that he had cleared out their Eschborn safe-house in case we should need it. I immediately tried to contact LYACK by phone but there was no answer. I then phoned Henry R. GARLINGAY (Deputy for Administration Staff) and asked him to do for me the following things:

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a. Contact Stephen R. LACKLEN (CABEZONE) and tell him we had an immediate need to house a family of three, plus two KUBARK officers at Eschborn. To further tell LACKLEN to be standing by at Opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis Honeywell Building at 0100 hours and be prepared to escort another vehicle to Eschborn.

b. Phone BENTHAM and tell him we would drop by his house later that evening to brief him on any developments.

c. Phone LYACK and tell him we were using Eschborn.

14. All concerned departed Wiesbaden Air Base at approximately 0020 hours on 17 December and arrived at the meeting point at Opel Circle at exactly 0100 hours. Subject's family plus MULFALL, who had also gone immediately to Wiesbaden, followed LACKLEN's car to Eschborn. FAGERLUND, LAPOLLA, ROODINE, and myself went immediately to BENTHAM's house.

15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and ROODINE gave certain operational information of a sensitive nature from subject to BENTHAM. After necessary analysis and discussion the following decisions were reached:

a. We would endeavor to remove the family out of Frankfurt by commercial aircraft that day, i.e., Sunday, 17 December.

b. In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would endeavor to remove them on an Air Force Medical Evacuation Flight on Monday, 18 December.

c. Joseph Q. KLEMACK (Chief, COS/KURIOT) was contacted by phone from BENTHAM's residence and said he believed that his people could affix in the subject's passports a Federal Republic entry stamp. This was considered necessary in order to prevent embarrassing questions by German Immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would depart by commercial air. The family had entered the Federal Republic "black" and accordingly there was no entry permit in their Soviet Diplomatic passports.

d. We would return LAPOLLA and ROODINE to the safe-house and I would also send out one enlisted guard with sidearm.

16. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this information and everyone departed the BENTHAM residence for their respective missions. I proceeded to the Signal Center and released the drafted cable.

17. I arrived back at my quarters about 0330 hours. At about 0410 hours I received a call from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with LAPOLLA on matters pertaining to the documentation work he was trying to accomplish. I gave him the telephone number of the Eschborn safe-house. It turned out that the cold weather had affected telephone communications to Eschborn and the phone was dead. KLEMACK then went out to Eschborn and discussed his problem with LAPOLLA and ROODINE. I am informed, but as yet do not know the technical reason why, that KURIOT could not put in the subject's passport the required German entry stamp. It was decided at the meeting at the Eschborn safe-house that KURIOT would try to make and have ready by the next morning Austrian passports for subject and his family.

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18. At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center Watch Officer informing me that Headquarters "approved your plan." I immediately tried to contact the Eschborn safe-house by phone but to no avail. Around 0630 I contacted KLEMACK at the KURIOT installation and was then informed by him of his earlier visit to Eschborn around 0400. He told me during his phone conversation that LAPOLLA was going to get up about 0700 hours. I surmised that LAPOLLA would proceed immediately to the office and then did so myself.

19. LAPOLLA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 0800. We then discussed what our possibilities were, based on the situation as we then saw it. We had no guarantee that the [Austrian] passports would be finished by AURIOT in time to be used by an early afternoon United States flag commercial jet. We discussed again, as we had the previous evening, contacting Mr. William Naylor, the Pan American Senior Officer in Germany and a cleared and witting contact, as to whether or not he could arrange to board passengers without going through German Immigration, i.e., Passport Control. The question of the availability of seats was also involved. LAPOLLA suggested that we phone Naylor in his residence in Bad Homburg and explain to him we had a matter of serious urgency and ask him to come immediately to the I.G. Farben Building and discuss the matter with us. The phone call was made and Naylor agreed to do this. LAPOLLA then contacted the MATS Office at Rhein/Main to ascertain if MATS had any commercial jets chartered for departure that day. He discovered that they had no commercial jet chartered flights that day but at midnight on Sunday they were dispatching a C-135 configured to carry 66 passengers. He was further informed that 36 of these seats had been given to the Air Force and 30 to the Army to be used only by single military personnel departing to the States on Christmas leave. No families could be sent on the flight. Inasmuch as a C-135 is the military cargo version of a Boeing 707, LAPOLLA and myself discussed seriously the advisability of endeavoring to get military authority to fly this family out. We decided against such course of action for several reasons. We anticipated that there would be too much conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight when they observed five civilians, three of whom were obviously a family, flying on the same plane. The fact that the six-year-old daughter spoke no English also contributed to the adverse situation we anticipated. Secondly, subject and family had already been aboard one cargo type aircraft and were reported by ROODINE to have made a series of uncomplimentary remarks of the type transportation that they were being afforded.

20. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and was made generally aware of our problem. He was informed that the principal traveler involved was a defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and child, and that we were under obligation to expeditiously and securely return them to the United States by jet aircraft. He was further informed that we lacked the proper documentation to board them on the commercial aircraft through normal clearance procedures and we had no guarantee that we would have the documentation by flight departure time of PAA No. 73 at 1315 hours. We then asked him what he considered to be the possibilities of working out a procedure to board the party "black" and to prevent any divulgence of their existence to the German Immigration Authorities. After considerable discussion it appeared that there

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existed a very good possibility to get the passengers aboard the aircraft and successfully circumvent German passport controls. Naylor contacted his own assistant and the PAA Operations Officer assigned to Rhein/Main, both of whom are United States citizens, and asked that they proceed to the airport and stand by to assist him in the handling of some very important personages who were departing on PAA No. 73. He then ascertained that only three first class seats were available on this flight. He told his assistant to seat two passengers in the aircraft lounge and he would accept full responsibility for it. This is somewhat touchy in the airlines business as lounge seats have no safety belts. He also knew additional first class seats were available out of London.

21. In the meantime, KLEMACK and one of his men working on the documentation had returned to Eschborn to take pictures of subject and his family that would be necessary for the Austrian passports. The best reading we could get from the KURIOT people working on the documents was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmuch as decisions had been made, we decided to set the wheels in motion and started the family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and a plan was agreed upon where he would arrive with the family in front of the Rhein/Main Departure Building at 1230 hours. Naylor would be standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport building route to the PAA Operations Office which is located on the second floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed at about the same time as LAPOLLA and went directly to the airport.

22. Earlier in the morning I had asked BENTHAM if he could effect arrangements at the Consulate to have a Visa Officer standing by to put United States visitors' visas for subject's family in the Austrian passports. BENTHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's suggestion, we asked if the Consulate Officer could go to the PAA Operations Office at Rhein/Main and stand by there to accomplish his visa work. By so doing we could save approximately 30 minutes time. I contacted Mr. Rollie White of the Consulate office and he agreed to meet us at the airport at 1245 hours.

23. I next phoned BENTHAM and made him aware of our situation. It did not look as if we would have any usable documentation to pass the family and would have to take the chance of circumventing the Passport Control. Our principal concern was that a German Immigration Officer would be standing by the aircraft departure area and would ask to see subject's passport. We could not get subject's family aboard the regular bus that goes from the departure building to the aircraft because there was no way we could get them to the bus loading area without going through Passport Control. BENTHAM asked how we evaluated an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if challenged by German

authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of the regular airport procedures and that the passports had been left in the PAA office. We would then put the party back in the vehicle that took them out and just keep going. BENTHAM authorized us to proceed with the "black" evacuation.

24. I then made one last call to KURIOT and told them if they could not complete their work and get the passports to the airport by 1315 hours to forget it. With that MULFALL and myself left for Rhein/Main.

25. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1230 hours as subject's party was drawing up. The group was then taken by a circuitous route to the PAA Operations Office. It was ascertained that PAA No. 73 would arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.

26. During our wait at the PAA Operations Office, ROODINE got me aside three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's fear that an attempt would be made to sabotage his plane. He had evidenced this concern ever since his arrival in Frankfurt. Subject told ROODINE he felt sure that Soviet agents would be found among some of the employees of the commercial airlines and the management of Rhein/Main Airport. He mentioned the section of the RIS that works specifically on assassinations and sabotage. He was fearful of any baggage being loaded very late or any "spare baggage" that might be found aboard the aircraft. I told ROODINE we were very sympathetic but we were not about to ask Naylor, who had now gone much further than one could be reasonably expected to on our behalf, to off-load the baggage of 184 passengers and search it.

27. Two events happened while we were waiting in the office to board the parties that were of some disturbance. The airplane Captain reported to the PAA Operations Officer that a gun was found aboard the plane. Upon investigation it was determined that this gun belonged to an Armed Forces courier who had carried classified material on the aircraft to Frankfurt. The airplane captain, upon being asked by Naylor if there had been any unusual activities on the part of the passengers, then described one party flying in the first-class compartment. This flight had originated in San Francisco and was flying around the world westbound. At New Delhi a United States citizen, a correspondent for an unknown newspaper, boarded the plane with his wife and a female nurse. The flight crew had been informed that he was an alcoholic and was being returned to the United States at the request of the United States Embassy at New Delhi. For part of the trip he had acted in somewhat of an obnoxious fashion and had insulted some of the other passengers. The Captain had investigated the situation and was of the opinion that the correspondent was now sufficiently drunk and lacked sufficient stamina

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to insult anybody. I asked the Captain if there was a purser or a male attendant assigned to the first-class section. He stated on this particular flight all cabin service personnel were female. He stated, however, that another PAA Captain was flying dead-head on the trip, was a big burly sort of fellow, and if need be, could spend most of the trip in the lounge to watch the correspondent. IDENTITY A expressed grave reservation about now going forward with the trip because of the correspondent. It was my opinion, however, that between IDENTITY A, ROODINE, and the extra PAA Captain that if the correspondent again got obnoxious they could sufficiently cope with him. The regular Captain left the definite impression with me that the correspondent was sufficiently drunk, that he would either soon pass out or in any event would not represent a threat to subject's making the trip. It was, therefore, decided that the trip would proceed. IDENTITY A informed the Captain that he was a United States Government representative escorting a family aboard the plane and requested the Captain to keep the door of the flight deck locked from the inside during the length of the trip. To this the Captain agreed.

28. Subject's party, accompanied by Naylor and the PAA Operations Officer departed the office at 1325 hours, entered a PAA crew bus, drove immediately to the first-class ramp and successfully boarded the aircraft. At about 1335 KLEMACK arrived with subject's two original Russian passports. These were then put in a brown manila envelope and one of Naylor's United States citizen employees was asked to proceed immediately to the aircraft and give these to ROODINE.

29. At about 1300 hours we had phoned to KURIOT and told Ralph O. NASSBOCK that he had another thirty minutes to get the Austrian passports to the airport because of the aircraft's delayed departure. The Austrian passports arrived at approximately 1345 hours. Hollie White immediately started to enter in those passports the United States visitor's visas. At approximately 1355 the PAA Ground Crew Chief notified PAA Operations that Flight No. 73 was mechanically cleared for departure and completely loaded. At that time a PAA representative started to run from the Departure Building to the plane with a little piece of luggage. Naylor was coming back from the plane in the crew bus. He intercepted the PAA employee and took the bag and drove it back to the plane. He later told us he opened the bag, one of the flight bag variety, and on his own initiative examined the contents. It contained items of apparel used by ladies that will not be further identified.

30. At 1400 the Ground Crew Chief stated again the plane was ready for departure and asked why the plane was being held up. It was being held up because White had not finished all the entries on the passports. However, the PAA Operations Officer informed the Ground Crew Chief that

the weight of the loaded plane had been questioned and they were recomputing total weight. At about 1405 the Austrian passports with United States visas were carried in a brown envelope by a PAA United States citizen employee and given to ROODIGE. The plane was then cleared for departure and rolled out at 1414 hours.

34. The only other information known at the time of this writing is that the aircraft was diverted to Bermuda because of bad weather conditions in New York. Naylor telephoned me that information about 1000 hours on Monday morning, 18 December.

ROGER I. MCKEE

SECRET

SECRET

FP 10762
Germany

13 FEB 1952

S/C ATT B TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 52

RYBAT

RYBAT

TO: Chief, SR

ATTN: Sherman O. CUSICK

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

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DUQUE

532

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 15 FEB 61

ROUTING
1 2 3 4 5 6
CI info

TO : BELL
FROM : WAVE
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

FEB 15 23472 61

PRIORITY

IN 0044

GR

PRITY BELA CITE WAVE 3691

JMZIP/AMDIP-3/AMHAZE

1. AMDIP-3 COURIER ARRIVED WAVE AREA FROM HAVA 14 FEB. INFORMED A-3 HE ON WANTED LIST AND DUE TO SECURITY INCIDENT HIS RADIO LINK TEMPORARILY CUT OFF.

2. SEVERAL DAYS AGO A-3 S/H RAIDED BY G2. HOUSE LOCATED NEAR 13TH AVE AND 198 ST, BILTMORE, HABANA AND OCCUPIED BY ADREA "LUISA" GIQUEL. GIQUEL PICKED UP AND DETAINED 48 HOURS. HOUSE CONTAINED ONE VIKING II RADIO, 2 HAND GENERATORS-GN58, A-3 CODES AND MSG FILES. NONE FOUND DURING SEARCH WHICH APPARENTLY ACCOUNTS FOR GIQUEL RELEASE.

3. AGENT 2515 DISPATCHED TO HABANA LEGALLY ON 12 FEB WITH ORDERS TO CONTACT GIQUEL ABOUT 14 OR 15 FEB AND JOIN A-3 MOVEMENT LINE TO ESCAMBRAY AS W/T OPR FOR OSVALDO RAMIREZ GROUP.

4. DUE GIQUEL INCIDENT ZABOTH INSTRUCTED AGENT 2517, WHO DEPARTED WAVE LEGALLY FOR HABANA ON 14 FEB, TO CONTACT 2515 ON ARRIVAL AND WARN HIM AVOID CONTACT A-3 GROUP AND LAY LOW UNTIL HE GIVEN FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS BY S/W.

5. WAVE AND A-3 CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL ESTABLISH SECURE COMMO BETWEEN WAVE AND A-3 GROUPS. PROPOSE DISPATCH AMJAVA-4 BY BLACK, SEA INFILTRATION TO CUBA FOR THIS PURPOSE. INFILTRATION PLANNED

SECRET

6/90

BETWEEN 17-19 FEB. JAVA/2 AND 3 TO ACCOMPANY A-3 SOONEST SECURE RECEPTION ARRANGED.

END OF MESSAGE

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23 DEC 60 SECRET

DIRECTOR

HAVANA

ION: C/BELL 13 (MR CROLLER, WH DIV NOTIFIED 1800 23 DEC)

DOP, COP, ADCP/A, WH 3, S/C 2

DEC 23 2232Z 60 DUQUE

PRIORITY

IN 21843

PRITY WAVE INFO PRITY DIR CITE HAVA 7288

JMZIP ~~RYBAT~~

1. ON 23 DEC 03 ROBERT M. GEDDES (WHO WORKS WITH AMPAN-22) CONTACTED CO AFTER FAILURE TO MEET 06 RALPH DIAZ HANSCOM AND ASKED CO DELIVER SPECIAL AIRDROP MAP TO MIAMI FOR "CLARENCE".

2. 03 GEDDES EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH "CLARENCE" IN MIAMI AND WAS TOLD THAT EARLIER DROP MAP BROUGHT BY 06 VILLALON IS NOT SUITABLE. NEW MAP IS IN INDIA INK PREPARED BY 06, 06 ENGINEER CRESPO WHO HEAD PUBLIC WORKS DEPT IN CIENFUEGOS. 06 CRESPO PASSED MAP TO 06 MARIO BOLANO WHO GAVE TO 03 GEDDES. 03 GEDDES SAID AIR DROP SPECIAL FOR LIMAS, RAMIREZ, MONTIEL, AND PORTION FOR DUQUE. 03 GEDDES SAID PRELIMINARY DROP SIGNALS WOULD CONSIST ONE RED LIGHT, ONE WHITE LIGHT, ONE RED LIGHT ABOUT 15 FT DISTANCE APART. CLOCKWISE MOVEMENT OF LIGHTS INDICATE PREPARED TO RECEIVE. GROUP REQUESTING ARMS AND AMMUNITION FOR 400 MEN PLUS 100 PISTOLS. ALSO EXTRA AMMO FOR THOSE ALREADY IN PLACE.

3. MAP BEING SENT WAVE BY COURIER ARRIVING 24 DEC.

4. 03 GEDDES SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTACT 06 HECTOR FEBLES (FR 3-1982) ON ARRIVAL SINCE 06 FEBLES HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH "CLARENCE".

FILED 23/1750Z

END OF MESSAGE

# Gonzalez Cruz 06 calls D6 Febles a security risk due lack of discipline. HAVA 7286 (27 Dec, [illegible] file)

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ABC

NOV 15 21:22 60

DUQUE, Evelio

PRIORITY

IN 42921

S (WH REGISTRY ISSUED TEMPO COPY 1612 15 NOV 60)

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, DPD, S/C 2

See also Dir 12516 (out 94375) 19 Nov 60

SMR

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY WASH CITE HAVA 6985

JMNET JMCLEAR

REF DIR 13931 (out 91075)*

OUT 94375
DIR 12516

1. AMYUMS REPORTED GOC PICKED UP FOLL: 28 PISTOLS, 6 SUBMACHINE GUNS AND ONE BAZOOKA. SURMISE ABOVE MAY HAVE BEEN CONTENTS ONE BUNDLE WHICH FELL ON TRINIDAD HIGHWAY.

2. REMAINDER CARGO BELIEVED IN HANDS ANTI CASTRO FORCES. SAID (FNU) PACHECO, LEADER UNIDEN GROUP, RECOVERED SIZABLE QUANTITY WHICH HE DIVIDED WITH (FNU) MESA WHO ALSO HAS SMALL INDEPENDENT GROUP. LATTER NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH NYINGO MESA WHO BROTHER OF GUIDE USED IN AMPANIC-5 OP.

06

3. DESPITE ABORTIVE DROP AMYUMS FEEL HAD GOOD MORALE EFFECT ON ESCAMBRAY FIGHTERS WHO SEE GENUINE EFFORT BEING MADE SUPPORT THEM. ESTIMATE PRESENT ANTI CASTRO ELEMENT ESCAMBRAY NUMBERS 2000 MEN. AMYUMS ALSO REPORTED TWO SUCCESSFUL DROPS TO EVELIO DUQUE FORCES (3 AND 11 NOV) BY AMHAWK USING CESSNA AIRCRAFT. EACH DROP CONSISTED 60 SUBMACHINE GUNS. CAN HQS CONFIRM FOR INFO HAVA ONLY IF SUCH DROPS ACTUALLY MADE.

FILED 15/1410Z.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Headquarters has reliable information that at least half of bundles dropped on 6 November picked up by GOC.

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1/60

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
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201-191098 (Vol. I)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1958-63

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/14/78	3/17/78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf
3 MAY 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf
18 MAY 78		JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith

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SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, 201-191098 (VOL 1 of 4)

3rd AGENCY DOCUMENTS

① BUREAU FILE 100·339235
② NY FILE 100·42479
③ BUREAU FILE 100·401762
④ NY FILE 100-107383

FBI	NY	11/22/63	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	11/21/63	" "	" "
FBI	HQS	10/18/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILE (NI) 100·401762
FBI	NY	10/14/63	RE SUBJECT	FILES # 1 + 2
FBI	NY	10/8/63	RE RICHARD C.	NO FILE
FBI	NY	10/6/63	" " "	" "
FBI	NY	10/2/63	" " "	" "
FBI	HQS	9/23/63	RE SUBJECT	" "
FBI	NY	9/18/63	" "	" "
FBI	HQS	9/17/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILE # (NI) 100·401762
FBI	NY	9/12/63	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	9/12/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	9/12/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	9/10/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	8/30/63	" "	" "
FBI	NY	7/2/63	" "	FF 42479
FBI	NY	6/26/63	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	7/2/62	" " "	" 3 + 4
FBI	NY	7/2/62	" SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	6/16/61	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	6/16/61	RE SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/25/60	" "	" "
FBI	NY	6/17/60	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	HQS	2/11/60	RE BOTH	FILES 1 + 3
FBI	HQS	1/26/60	RE SUBJECT	NO FILE
FBI	NY	11/25/59	" "	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	6/19/59	RE RICHARD C.	FILES 3 + 4
FBI	NY	11/26/58	RE SUBJECT	FILES 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/26/58	RE RICHARD C.	FILE # 3
FBI	NY	4/25/58	" " "	" 3 + 4
FBI	NY	11/7/55	RE SUBJECT	FILES # 1 + 2
FBI	NY	11/27/56	" "	" "
FBI	SAN FRAN.	7/14/55	RE FREDERICK FIELD	FILES # 100.2278 (BUREAU)
FBI	NY	1/7/55	" " "	" " "
FBI	NY	2/20/62	RE COMMITTEE FOR A DEMOCRATIC FAR EASTERN POLICY	100-3 01

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REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
A	/ /		IN			
A	10/07/57	DFB-87905	IN			
A	10/08/57	DFB-87904	IN			RICHARD CYRIL FRANK SECURITY MATTER-C
A	26/11/58	CBF-14398	AO	IP		
A	30/12/59	ESEA-08833	IN			TWO CONTINENTS COMMODITY CORPORATION.
C	12/04/60	CBF-46377	IN	IP	100-008-017	1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	02/07/62	CBA-14983	AO	CI		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	02/07/62	CBA-14982	IN	CI		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK SECURITY MATTER-C
A	26/06/63	CBA-44692	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	02/07/63	CBA-45538	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	30/08/63	DBA-52730	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, AKA SUSAN WARREN
A	10/09/63	CBA-50303	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CH
A	12/09/63	CBA-50326	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AKA, SUSAN WARREN
A	12/09/63	CBA-50385	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	12/09/63	CBA-51511	AO	CI/LS		3 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	17/09/63	CBA-51120	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	18/09/63	CBA-52729	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CH
A	23/09/63	CBA-51738	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	02/10/63	CBA-52667	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	06/10/63	CBA-53125	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	08/10/63	CBA-54007	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	14/10/63	CBA-54296	AO	CI/LS		3 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK-INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	19/10/63	CBA-54106	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILINGMAN FRANK
A	21/11/63	CBA-57428	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	22/11/63	CBA-57240	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	27/01/64	CBA-62478	AO	CI/LS		1 YUNG KOON-MAN
A	26/02/64	CBA-65006	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/03/64	CBA-65744	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	04/03/64	CBA-65510	AC	CI/LS		1. CAIC
A	05/03/64	CSCI-3780320	AO	IP		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	16/03/64	CBA-66277	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	18/03/64	CBA-68817	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	19/03/64	CBA-66206	AO	CI/LS		3 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	19/03/64	CBA-65690	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	26/03/64	CBA-66540	AO	CI/LS		1 YUNG KOON-MAN
A	03/04/64	CBA-68370	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	04/05/64	CBA-72041	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	20/05/64	CBA-71934	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	25/05/64	CBA-72034	AO	CI/LS		1 IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO
A	09/06/64	CBA-74309	AO	CI/LS		1-FREDERICK VANDERBILT FIELD
C	11/06/64	DBA-74845	AC	IP	201-0001042	RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 100-500
A	31/07/64	CBA-80360	AO	IP		

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A	10/09/64	CBA-83347 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	11/09/64	CBA-84176 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	22/09/64	CBA-84318 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	24/09/64	CBA-84546 ✓	AO	CI/LS		3 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	12/10/64	CSMW-09477 ✓	AC	IP		ODENVY REQUEST TO SHOW ULTIMATE SOURCE OF TDCS-314/02323-64 PHOTO OF POSS PBPRIME REP AT THE AUG PRO-CHICOM MEETING IN ALBANIA
A	13/10/64	316-0157864 ✓	AO	IP		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK, INTERNAL SECURITY CHINA
A	20/10/64	CBA-88516 ✓	AO	IP		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 201-278559
A	04/11/64	CBA-89646 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	25/11/64	MACR-02378 ✓	AO			
A	02/12/64	316-0233764 ✓	AO	IP/FI		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA WAS 201-019198
C	27/01/65	NYDC-00394 ✓	AC		200-120-087	
A	10/02/65	CBA-98698 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	12/02/65	CBA-98227 ✓	AO	CI/LS		1 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	09/03/65	UNCW-00325	AO	IP		KOBIRO LCHARVEST
A	19/04/65	CIRW-23914 ✓	AO	IP		ODENVY REPORTS ON SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AND RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	20/04/65	CIRA-40214 ✓	AO	WE/4		ODENVY REPORTS ON SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK AND RICHARD CYRIL FRANK WAS 201-040214
C	28/05/65	CBB-09540	AC	CI/LS	201-0017638	3 LEO HUBERMAN INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA.
C	08/06/65	CBB-11297 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0107029	1 IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO 201-107029.
A	16/06/65	CBB-11757 ✓	AO	CI/LS		0 SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK RICHARD C. FRANK LEO HUBERMAN
A	25/06/65	CBB-13700 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRGNK
A	28/06/65	CBB-13658 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/12/65	CBB-32064 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/01/66	CBB-35009 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK-IS-CHINA
A	25/01/66	CBB-36631 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/02/66	CBB-37188 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/02/66	CBB-38170 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	18/02/66	CBB-39888 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0046209	MORRIS ROBERT WILLS.
A	08/03/66	316-0105966 ✓	AO	IP		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	28/03/66	CBB-43161 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	29/03/66	CBB-43444 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	09/05/66	CBB-47822 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0771141	RUTH SHULMAN
C	07/06/66	CBB-50389 ✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0107029	IVAN GERALD SHAPIRO
A	27/06/66	CBB-51514 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	19/07/66	CBB-54475 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/09/66	CBB-59986 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	29/09/66	CBB-60663 ✓	AO	CI/LS		PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY /PLP/
A	13/10/66	CBB-62355 ✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	13/12/66	CBB-65707 ✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD C. FRANK SUSAN H. FRANK
B	17/12/66	PARI-01051 ✓	AC		029-002-004	

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A	13/01/67	CBB-70124✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	27/01/67	DBB-71826✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
C	10/03/67	CBB-76693✓	AC	CI/LS	201-0315837	NORMAN VICTOR SHULMAN
D	03/04/67	CBA-80250	AO	TSCO		TS-195669 I RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	04/08/67	DBB-89841✓	IN	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	30/11/67	CBC-01102✓	AC	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	01/03/68	DBC-09794✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	03/04/68	CBC-12127✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	30/04/68	CBC-17078✓	AC	CIOP/D	201-0728979	MAUD MURIEL RUSSELL
C	04/06/68	CBC-12016✓	IN	TSCO	016-005-013	TS-197328 CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELL BIO DATA ALBUM
A	12/06/68	CBC-18988✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/07/68	CBC-20859✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	23/07/68	CBC-22931✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	01/08/68	CBC-24440✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	06/08/68	CBC-25112✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	19/02/69	CBC-44884✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK. RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	28/03/69	DBC-50149✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	23/08/69	CBC-60987✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	03/10/69	CBC-64586✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	16/04/70	CBC-73990✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	27/08/70	CBC-91571✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK INTERNAL SECURITY-CHINA
A	21/09/70	DBC-94819✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	17/11/70	CBC-99426✓	AC	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
A	09/09/71	DBD-22103✓	AO	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	23/09/71	CBD-22955✓	AC	TSCO	201-0208523	TS-201555 JAMES LEE
A	08/10/71	CBC-23871✓	AO	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
A	14/12/71	CCOA-16515✓	AC	CH/SECT		KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE-CONTACT WITH CHINESE EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CANADA
A	22/12/71	DBC-29006✓	AC	CI/LS		RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
B	14/01/72	CCOA-16612✓	AC	CH/SECT	014-008-008	KOBIRD/CO SMABOVE-SUSAN WARREN
A	21/01/72	CBC-30450✓	AC	CI/LS		SUSAN HEILIGMAN FRANK
C	17/03/72	CBD-33673✓	IN	CI/LS	201-0000993	TANG MING-CHAO /201-000993/
C	11/04/72	DBD-22961✓	AC	TSCO	201-0208523	TS-201596 ANN LEE
A	28/04/72	DBC-36558✓	AC	CI/LS		FRANK, RICHARD C
A	05/09/72	DBC-42084✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	16/11/72	CBD-46438✓	AC	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	21/02/73	CBD-51366✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN
A	08/06/73	CBD-57181✓	AO	CI/LS		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN NEE WARREN
C	20/07/73	DBD-60693✓	IN	OPS/LSN	100-300-091	COMMITTEE FOR UNIFICATION OF CHIN, AKA AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF CHIN 722 N. CAROLINA S.E., WASH. DC. THE WASHINGTON AND BALTIMORE COMMITTEE FOR UNIFICATION OF CHIN, COMMITTEE FOR CHIN REUNIFICATION
C	10/08/73	CCOA-17926✓	IN	CH/OCCR	016-120-041/01	CONTACTS WITH PRC OFFICIALS IN CANADA

*REF. CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962, ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION. CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED SINCE JULY 1970.

S-E-C-R-E-T

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

FILE CONTENT LIST OF FILE NO. 201-C191098

REF CODE*	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT SYMB. AND NUM.	ABST. TYPE	ORIG. ROUTING	CS COPY FILED IN	SERIAL NUMBER AND/OR SUBJECT
C	14/08/73	CCOA-17933 ✓	IN	IP/FI	016-120-041/01	CONTACTS WITH PRC OFFICIALS IN CANADA
A	12/09/73	080-61748 ✓	AO	OPS/ITG		FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN

ABSTRACTS LISTED = 122

*REF.
CODE:
A - RECORD COPY FILED
B - DUPLICATE COPY FILED
C - EXTRACT FILED
D - CROSS REFERENCED

DOCUMENT ABSTRACT TYPES:
AO - ABSTRACTED ONLY
AC - ABSTRACTED AND CROSS REFERENCED
IN - ABSTRACTED, INDEXED, AND POSSIBLY CROSS REFERENCED

NOTES:
IF THE FILE WAS OPEN PRIOR TO 1962, ADDITIONAL ABSTRACTS MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM THE MANUAL ABSTRACT COLLECTION. CALL EXT 4127. MACHINE ABSTRACTS ARE NOT KEPT FOR NON-RECORD COPY REFERENCES. CABLE SUBJECTS ARE RECORDED SINCE JULY 1970.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011981

S-E-C-R-E-T

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In
SECRET

15 JAN 1976
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on FRANK, SUSAN (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed M C Hart (name) ______ (title) OPS/ITG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______ (initials) 19 JAN 1976 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-191098

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: SAS/CI/L Demos	GH43	EXTENSION 6471	NO.
			DATE 3 March 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/SAS/CI	3 Mar		uk	
2.				
3. CI/LIAISON	4 MAR 1964			
4.				
5. RID/AN				
6. RID/MIS				
7. RID/FI				
8.				
9.				201-191098
10.				
11.				DATE 5 MAR 1964
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5 MAR 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : I. CAIC

1. Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum (NI) 100-401762 of 18 October 1963, subject: Richard Cyril FRANK, page 3 of the attachment.

2. The records of this Agency reveal no identifiable information on I. CAIC.

CSCI-3/780,320
3 March 1964
SAS/CI/LDemos:pap
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SAS/R
2 - SAS/CI

Based On: DBA-54106
DBA-54007
18 Oct 63

File No.: 201-191098

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-191098

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

Eugene J. Welch - EE/Switzerland

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EE/S		25 MAY 1960		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Fe/ch/P-	X-362			
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/DP				
15. EE/S				
16. RI/AI				
17. RI/FI				
18.				

COMMENTS

PERMANENT CHARGE
FOR YOUR RETENTION

RECORD COPY

FRANK, Susan

COORDINATING OFFICERS	
NAME	OFFICE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
Eugene J. Welch	EE/S

RELEASING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
Robert W. Crowell	C/EE/S

RID USE ONLY

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT INDEX	FILE NUMBER 201-191098
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 25 MAY 1960	DOCUMENT NUMBER EBSW 8468

A-1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ESBW 8468
TO Chief of Station, Bern INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-191098
FROM Chief, EE		DATE 25 MAY 1960
SUBJECT General - Operational/INK/LCHARVEST Specific - Susan and Richard FRANK		RE: "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
		☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED		☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

ESBW 8273 dated 8 February 1960 (Information on FRANK travel plans plus background info)

1. The ODENVY approval for passage of information on Subjects to the INANITIONS was received in February, but, apparently through an inadvertence, was retained an inordinately long time in KUDESK. It has just now reached our hands.

2. ODENVY has approved the following for passage to the INANITIONS:

> "Susan FRANK, nee Heiligman, wife of Richard C. FRANK of New York City, has for several years been active in Communist front organizations in the United States, has taught courses in such schools as the Jefferson School of Social Science, which appears on the Attorney General's list, and her writings have appeared in such magazines as "Political Affairs", which has been listed in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", and described as an official Communist Party theoretical organ. Susan FRANK appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on 22 July 1959, and declined under "Privileges under the Fifth Amendment" to answer the Committee's questions as to whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party, had written an article which appeared in the November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled "No Peace for the Chinese People", had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization and had been an instructor at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Susan FRANK had used the name Susan Warren in her lectures and writings, most of which indicate her interest in Chinese affairs.
>
> "Richard C. FRANK, born 22 August 1922, has described his occupation as a free lance moving picture assistent director. He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is information to indicated Communist Party membership on his part as late as 1957."

3. ODENVY states that they have referred the case of the FRANKs to the Legal Attaches in London, Paris and Tokyo to alert appropriate security

CS COPY

201-191098

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS

SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

services concerning possible travel of the FRANKs in England, France, and Japan. Should the IRAKTIONs be able to furnish any additional info concerning travel of Subjects, it is requested that you communicate it to the appropriate KUBARK station for passage to the Legal Attache, and into info Hqs. This is still pertinent for - although Subjects would by this time probably be in China if they did in fact intend to go there - they may possibly return to the U.S. via Prague, with a break of a month or so for travel in Western Europe. According to what is known of their plans, they do not intend to return to the U.S. before August or September.

[illegible]

[illegible] May 1960

Distribution:
3 - COS, Bern
2 - WE/8
1 - RI ✓

CS COPY

201-191098

EGBW 8468

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

James B. Burson - EE/Switzerland

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. C/EE/S	FEB 1960	4	FEB 1960		
2.					
3. FE/CA/PERCE		FEB 1960	5 FEB 1960		Please Coordinate
4. CFE/CA					
5. RI/DP		18 FEB 1960	FEB 1960		
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16. RI/AN				JL	
17. RI/FI					
18.					FRANK, SUSAN

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NAME	OFFICE
	CFE/CA/[redacted]

AUTHENICATING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
James B. Burson James B. Burson	EE/S

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
Robert M. Crowell	C/EE/S

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT
INDEX

FILE NUMBER
201-191098

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
8 FEB 1960

DOCUMENT NUMBER
ESBW 8273

14-00000

R1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ESBW 8273
TO Chief of Station, Bern INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-191098
FROM Chief, EE		DATE 8 FEB 1960
SUBJECT General - Operational/LCHARVEST Specific - Susan and Richard Frank		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED		

REFERENCE(S)

ESBA 8833 dated 30 December 1959

1. The information provided in reference was most timely in its arrival. Shortly after we had received it, ODENVY informed us that the Frank couple was traveling abroad, and that in view of Susan Frank's interest in Far Eastern affairs and Chinese history it was not unlikely she and her husband would attempt to travel to China before returning to the U.S. ODENVY asked for any information we might receive which would indicate Subjects had traveled to China. We have passed the gist of the information in reference to ODENVY. We shall appreciate receiving any additional information on the activities of Subjects which you may be able to uncover utilizing liaison as you see fit. FYI: Susan Frank has indicated she does not expect to return to the States until August or September, and most likely the latter month.

2. The material in Headquarters' file on the Franks, all of which was supplied by ODENVY, indicates they are active members of the Communist Party in the U.S. Upon receipt of ODENVY's approval to our request to pass a summary of this material to our official source of reference we shall forward the summary to you for passage to the IMARTYIONS. Meanwhile, the following, most of which was supplied by informants rated as having provided reliable information in the past, is forwarded for your information:

a. Susan Frank, nee Heiligmann, born 8 November 1913 of Russian parentage, resides with her second husband, Richard Cyril Frank, at 110 Christopher Street, New York City. There are reports as early as 1942 providing information on Susan Frank's activities in behalf of Communism, all of which refer to her as Susan or Sue Warren, the alias she has commonly used in her Communist activities and in articles she has written. One example of her activities in 1942 refers to an application for a permit to operate a public address system at street meetings in New York City. The application bore the signature of Sue Warren, and listed her as Chairman of the Communist Party at 132 East 26th Street, New York City. Since 1942 there have been numerous informant reports of Sue Warren's active participation in Communist affairs in the U.S., the most recent describing her as a member of the Greenwich Village Section, NY County CP as of October 1959. Frank has given her present occupation as writer and lecturer, and has taught at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Jefferson School of Social Sciences, conducting courses entitled, "The New China", "The Chinese Communes", "World of Socialism", "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions (Mao)", etc. The Faculty of Social Sciences was apparently established by Max Weiss, who was referred to in the April 1956 edition of the "Daily Worker" as "National Educational Director, Communist Party". The Jefferson School of Social Sciences has been designated by the Attorney General.

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201-191098

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGBW 8273

On 22 July 1959 Susan Frank appeared before the House Committee on UN-American Activities, and refused under provisions of the Fifth Amendment to answer questions as to whether she had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization, had been an instructor at the Jefferson School of Social Sciences, was the author of an article in the 13 November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled, "No Peace for the Chinese People", and was "at this time" a member of the CP.

b. Richard Cyril Frank was born 22 August 1922 in Rochester, New York. He has given his profession as film technician and has worked in various directing and production jobs in television. Indications of Richard Frank's CP membership and activities in behalf of the CP are:

1. In June 1956 Sue Warren (Frank) stated at a Greenwich Village CP meeting that she could not contribute the $75.00 she had previously pledged because her husband (Richard Frank) had given $100.00 in "his club", and they had planned to contribute together only $150.00.

2. Frank was reported to have been seen on 1 February 1954 at a meeting of the New York Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions, which has been cited as a Communist front organization.

3. Frank has written letters in behalf of persons on trial for their Communist activities, has provided storage in the basement of his residence for cartons containing volumes of Communist literature, has received through the mail CP literature from Czechoslovakia, and has been a recipient through the mail of the "Daily Worker".

4. He has refused to speak to agents of ODENVY about his activities.

[illegible] O. [illegible]

3 February 1960

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, Bern
- 2 - EE/S
- 1 - RI ✓
- 1 - FE/CA/PENCE

CS COPY

EGBW 8273

SECRET

2 FEB 1960

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Susan and Richard Frank

1. In response to your 22 December communication (File No: 100-339235, 100-401762) we wish to inform you that we have received the following from an official Swiss source:

"Richard Frank (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December leaving for Zurich. Frank inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, Frank had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. Frank having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia."

2. We have observed that persons desiring to travel to Communist China from Switzerland frequently fly via Prague.

3. The following summary has been drawn from material which you have provided us on Subjects (see NY 100-43479, NY 100-107383 and Bureau 100-339235). Please advise if we may pass this summary to our Swiss source, but without revealing that your organization supplied the information contained in it:

SECRET

Susan Frank, nee Hailigman, wife of Richard C. Frank of New York City, has for several years been active in Communist front organizations in the United States, has taught courses in such schools as the Jefferson School of Social Science, which appears on the Attorney General's list, and her writings have appeared in such magazines as, "Political Affairs", which has been listed in the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications", and described as an official Communist Party theoretical organ. Susan Frank ~~appeared before the House Committee on Un-American~~ Activities on 22 July 1959, and declined under "Privileges under the Fifth Amendment" to answer the Committee's questions as to whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party, had written an article which appeared in the November 1949 issue of "The Worker" entitled, "No Peace for the Chinese People", had ever lectured on Chinese culture and Chinese civilization, and had been an instructor at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Susan Frank has used the name Susan Warren in her lectures and writings most of which indicate her interest in Chinese affairs.

Richard C. Frank, born 22 August 1922, has described his occupation as a free lance moving picture assistant director. He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is evidence to indicate he is a member of this party.

CSCI-3/758,444

Distribution:
  Orig &#1 - Addressee
    1 - ~~[illegible]~~ /SID
    1 - CI/LS
    1 - CI/R&A
    2 - EE/S ✓

EE/S:James B. Burson:jbs:26 January 1960

File 201- Frank, Susan

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: ESBA-8333

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 68-8-8

1P

TO: Chief, FE

XXX

VIA: Chief, EE

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

DATE: 30 December 1959

SUBJECT: LCHARVEST/Operations
FRANK, Richard (201-) (DOB 1922)

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Trace request

REFERENCE(S):

1. The following report, dated 24 December 1959, was given to us by INANITION:

Trace Request CIT: USA

> Richard *FRANK (born 1922) U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December, leaving for Zurich. FRANK inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, FRANK had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. FRANK having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia.

A N.Y., N.Y., USA

Subject is the ~~Husband of~~ Heiligman Susan Frank (201-191098)

2. We would appreciate any available traces in Headquarters' files on FRANK.

MICROFILMED
AUG 13 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Hilda G. Vagionas
HILDA G. VAGIONAS

30 December 1959

Distribution:
- 2 - FE
- 2 - EE
- 2 - Bern

INDEX
CS COPY

CS COPY

201-191098
~~EE-500~~

ESBA-8833

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: *Name* OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* [illegible] 01

5. 201 NO. [illegible] 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (*see Instructions, item 6*)

TYPE	*(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)*
02	[illegible]
02	[illegible] Mildred
02	[illegible]
02	[illegible] Mildred [illegible]
02	[illegible]
02	

7. SEX 01 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH 01

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH 01

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH 01

11. CITIZENSHIP 01

12. OCCUPATION (*clear text*) J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL 01

14. OI CODE 01

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER 01 DATE 01

16 RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (*text for Index cards*)

01

[illegible] ADDITIONAL NAME VARIANTS 01

[illegible] 01

01

01

01

01

01

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE 01

19. ACTION DESK CODE 01

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES 01 & 01

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. [illegible]

FORM 8-69 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(30-61)

14-00000

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible] OFFICE ROOM PHONE TUBE ADDRESS [illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION	☐	OPEN	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐	YES	3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☐	YES
	☐	AMEND		☐	NO		☐	NO
	☐	CLOSE						

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
FRANK, Susan [illegible] 01

5. 201 NO. [illegible] 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last) (First) (Middle)
A N2	[illegible], Fred (Mrs.)
A N2	[illegible]BERG, Mildred M.
A N2	[illegible]BERG, Louis (Mrs.)
N2	
N2	
N2	

7. SEX F1 M F
8. DATE OF BIRTH F1
9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1
10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1
11. CITIZENSHIP H1
12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2
13. SWL K1
14. OI CODE M1
15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1 DATE K1
16 RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

N1

P1

R1

S1

T1

U1

V1

W1

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE X1
19. ACTION DESK CODE Y1
20. SECONDARY DESK CODE Z1
21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES 01 & 02
22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO.

FORM 8-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(20-21)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] punch

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 29 Sept 1959

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: RID/201

ROOM NO.: 1028 L

TELEPHONE: 2231

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☒ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO.: 191098

SOURCE DOCUMENT: DBF-32269

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): FRANK, RICHARD CYRIL (MRS.)

SEX: ☐ M ☒ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME	(Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)
PA	WARREN SUE
PA	FRANK, SUSAN HEILIGMAN

DESTROYED UPON RECEIPT OF MACHINE LISTING

PHOTO: ☐ YES ☒ NO

BIRTH DATE: 05 11 13

COUNTRY OF BIRTH: USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH: MANHATTAN, NYC.

OTHER IDENTIFICATION: 1. 5B 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: HOUSEWIFE

OCC/POS. CODE:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE: USA

ACTION DESK: CI/ICD

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST: UK

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST:

COMMENTS: Cit: USA

Husband: FRANK, RICHARD CYRIL DOB 22/08/22 POB: Rochester, N.Y.
Passport # 42431. Renewed Aug 58. Would not answer questions
relating to past or present membership in C[illegible] Subject had
been member of CP (NY) but denied [illegible] of husband's
a Apt 30, 110 Christopher St. NYC. Liaison with CBS TV program, "CONQUEST".
Communist Party Member suspect

UK

VERIFIED

PUNCHED

CS COPY

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE:

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(88)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 9 - AUG 1957	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM P Cuffee	ROOM NO. 1306K	TELEPHONE 2015

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☒ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO. 1. 191098

SOURCE DOCUMENT DFB 87904

NAME (Last) FRANK (First) HEILIGMAN (Middle) SUSAN (Title)

SEX 3. ☐ M ☒ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
A	WARREN	SUSAN	M	
A	FRANK	RICHARD	C	(MRS)
M	HEILIGMAN	SUSAN	MILDRED	
A	KANE	ANNA	MAY	

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☒ NO	D M Y			1. CA 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
USA	CI		

COMMENTS:

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☐ YES ☒ NO	☐ YES ☒ NO	PCuffee

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

SECRET
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PUNCHED

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

RE PUNCH

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 13-03-59	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RID/201	ROOM NO. 1619 L	TELEPHONE 2677

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

	201 NO. 1. 191098	SOURCE DOCUMENT DBF-19795

NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)	SEX 3.
✓	FRANK,	SUSAN	HEILIGMAN		

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
✓Y	BREITBERG,	MILDRED	H. x	
✓Y	BREITBERG,	LOUIS		/MRS./ x
✓Y	FRANK,	RICHARD	C.	/MRS./ x
✓Y	KANE,	ANNA	MAY x	
✓Y	WARREN,	SUSAN	M. x	
✓Y	WARREN,	BRETT		/MRS/ x

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☐ NO	D 08 M 11 Y 13	USA	MANHATTAN, NYC.	1. CL 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.
Housewife	

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
USA	CI/ICD		

COMMENTS:

CIT: USA
In contact with Communist party members in 1958
Residence Nov. 1958, 110 Christopher N.Y.C.

PUNCHED

CS COPY

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE		RESTRICTED FILE		SIGNATURE
☐ YES	☐ NO	☐ YES	☐ NO	LMR.

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

VERIFIED ✓

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(58)

14-00000

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NONSENSITIVE
201 NO. 1.
SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title) SEX 3. ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
M	HEILIGMAN,	SUSAN	MILDRED ✗	
V	~~HEILIGMAN,~~	~~MILDRED~~	~~S.~~	

COPY TO BE DESTROYED UPON RECEIPT OF MACHINE LISTING

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☐ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION
OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM
PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

CS COPY

201- 191098

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO
RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO
SIGNATURE

VERIFIED ✓

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 66 (20)

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE/KUWOLF
AMSPELL Underground Activities - November 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action: For your information

Ref : UFGA-5897, dated 25 September 1962

1. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment A is a copy of the original, and translation of a letter from the National Coordination Committee of AMSPELL in Cuba dated 28 November 1962. This letter was obtained through the AMBLEAK courier intercept channel prior to delivery to AMSPELL on 4 December 1962.

2. The communication is of interest since it contains the most recent report of AMSPELL underground activities and particularly claims commitment of a guerrilla warfare effort in two provinces. It also refers to the infiltration of AMHINT-58 as still feasible, and confirms the arrest of AMHINT-40, who is described as a prisoner in Block 9 at La Cabana Prison.
01

3. Attachment B is a report of underground financing for October 1962 and is the first detailed analysis of Cuban finances ever received by JMWAVE. This report was compiled by "Cuca" (National Coordinator for Civil Resistance identified in Para 5 of Reference). It should be noted that the total of $9,129.67 Cuban pesos as monthly maintenance is for the "Resistance" only and does not include the "National Military Committee" expenses for the month.

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW, w/att. ~~u/s/c~~

Attachments:
A and B, Under Separate Cover - attached

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
10 Dec 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-6857

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19

2 Encls.

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

1/6R

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-6857

4. It should also be pointed out that the dire need for money expressed in Attachment A letter was soon thereafter satisfied when JMWAVE funded AMSPELL with $5,000 for exchange of $40,000 Cuban pesos and this was transmitted via local deposit and credit in Cuba.

END OF DISPATCH

19-124-26/3

Attachment A to UFGA 6557 Havana, 28 Nov 62

Dear Brothers:

I hope from my call (LD telephone) yesterday you are aware of how desperate we are, financially. The week before last, I went to Las Villas and I want you to know that the DRE flag has now been raised in the Free Territory in Cuba. A small guerrilla (group) well supplied, is now representing us in the North Zone of Las Villas. And the guerrilla banda in Matanzas to whom we have offered some support will no doubt come into our organization if assured a little more help from the DRE.

We have been working on the total reorganization and if we cannot claim complete success it is because if our limited resources. Propaganda, although on a small scale, is functioning well, I am enclosing a copy of our last issue of Trinchera and examples of the seals we are producing in homes of Pre- University members. These are now appearing in public places. As you can see there is a willingness to work and with a little material support a great deal of effective work could be forthcoming.

I cannot understand yet, the delay in sending money. You remember how you witnessed our needs that day in Varadero, Luis? We only had a few centavos in capital? Well, that is the way we are now. We have asked a small local loan and after that must travel to Las Villas for a loan from the Provincial (Committee) there, since they seem to have money. I hope upon receipt of this (letter), if you have not sent money, you will do so immediately.

Concerning the travel of Angel (AMHINT-58 infiltration), advise me as soon as this can be arranged so that we can check the security aspects here. Our purpose is to be organized to facilitate the work

Encl A to UFGA 6557 19-124-26/3

of the infiltrees since it has been our unfortunate experience that if those infiltrating must move about, the exposure to arrest is greater.

Write at the first opportunity and advise me of the planning sq that we may work toward that end. Greetings from Marivi, Maggie, Pancho, Lazaro, etc. Rest assured we have not forgotten you.

(Signed) Ramon

01

P.S. Julio's mother has visited him and found he is well (AMHINT-40). Apparently all of them (prisoners) have been transferred to La Cabana. Luis, Julito is in the Cabana, Block 9 and tomorrow, Thurdday, is visiting day. They have not given me a copy of Trinchera as yet.

(Signed) "Cuca"

VSR

La Habana 28-Nov 62

Queridos hermanos:

Espero por mi llamada de ayer se habrán dado cuenta de lo necesitados que estamos, economicamente hablando. La semana antepasada estuve en Las Villas, sepan que la bandera del D.R.E. ondea ya en Territorio Libre de Cuba. Una guerrilla pequeña, pero bien abastecida. nos representa en la zona Norte de Las Villas. Y los alzados de Matanzas a los que hemos hecho llegar varias cosas, de podérseles hacer llegar una ayuda más efectiva, no dudarían en pasar a las filas del D.R.E.

Se ha trabajado en la reorganización total de la organización y si no te digo aún que está totalmente organizada es porque la ~~escasez~~ escasez de recursos no se ha hecho sentir mucho. Propaganda, con lo poco que tenemos está funcionando bien. Con esta les va una copia del último Trinchera y una muestra de los sellitos, que con material casero han fabricado los muchachos de la Pre y que ya hoy se empiezan a ver en los lugares públicos. Como verás los deseos de trabajar son muchos y de tenerse los medios necesarios, el trabajo sería mucho más efectivo.

No comprendo aún la demora con el dinero; nos las hemos visto, como aquellos días de Varadero. ¿Te acuerdas, Luis? Cuando teníamos unos centavos por capital, bueno pues así estamos. Ahora pedí una pequeña cantidad prestada y como no podemos mantener más esta situación voy a Las Villas a pedir un préstamo a la Provincial ya que son los únicos que tienen algún dinero. Espero si al recibo de esta aún no han enviado el dinero, lo hagan inmediatamente.

El viaje de Angel, avísame tan pronto se pueda realizar, para comprobar aquí la seguridad. El propósito nuestro era organizarnos, para facilitar el trabajo a los que vengan ya que si después de estar aquí tienen que ponerse a organizar, iríamos a caer nuevamente en otra desgracia.

Tan pronto tengas una oportunidad escribe para saber qué planes hay y organizarnos con vistas a eso. Recuerdos a todos, y salúdenme a Mariví, Maggie, Pinolo, Lázaro etc. Tengan la certeza de que no los olvidamos.

Ramón

P.D. La madre vio a Julio y lo encontró muy bien de ánimo físicamente. Él parece ya lo pensaron todo para [illegible]

FINANZAS - RESISTENCIA

Informe No. I (Oct. 31)

			OCT.	TOTAL
PROVINCIALES.-	CAMAGUEY	-(Ricardo)	500.00	
	MATANZAS	-(Armando)	200.00	
	LAS VILLAS	-	400.00	
	ORIENTE	-(Salas)	200.00	
	PINAR DEL RIO	-(JAIME)	200.00	
	HABANA	-(Aquiles)	60.00	
			$ 1,460.00	$ 1,460.00
NACIONALES .-	PRO-UNIVERSITARIA	-(Diego)	100.00	
	PROPAGANDA	-(Tony)	700.00	
	ORGANIZACION	-(Pepe)	100.00	
	OBRERO	-(Reno)	200.00	
	ABASTECIMIENTO	-(Alfredo)	150.00	
	INTELIGENCIA	-(Amado)	100.00	
	ACCION	-(Juan)	200.00	
			$ 1,550.00	$ 1,550.00

06

06

		Sept.	Oct.	Total	
LA CABAÑA .-	MAXIMO	50.00	25.00	75.00	
" "	RAFAEL	50.00	25.00	75.00	
" "	ORESTES	60.00	30.00	90.00	
" "	TONY RAMIREZ		50.00	50.00	
" "	CARLOS RUBIERA		50.00	50.00	
" "	R. VALDES D'WOLF		50.00	50.00	
SAN SEVERINO.-	SRA. DE RUIZ (Encargada)		500.00	500.00	
BONIATO ② .-	SRA. DE MONTOYA (Encargada)	1,050.00	525.00	1,575.00	
" ① .-	SRA. DE O'FARRILL		80.00	80.00	
ISLA DE PINOS.-	OTROS PRESOS		53.75	53.75	
" " " .-	A. MILLER (Tía para frutas)		50.00	50.00	
" " " .-	TONY FERNANDEZ		40.00	40.00	
" " " .-	4 OTROS FAM.		203.92	203.92	
③ ABOGADO .-	M. CALAS		250.00	250.00	
CLANDESTINOS.-	RODOLFO CABEZA	100.00	50.00	150.00	
" " .-	OQUENDO	60.00	30.00	90.00	
" " .-	SRA. DE J. GARCIA	40.00	20.00	60.00	
" " .-	CHANY Y FAM.	160.00	80.00	240.00	
④ " " .-	MERI. MERALAS Y ROGELIO	180.00	90.00	270.00	
" " .-	ROBERTO Y CARMENATE	80.00	40.00	120.00	
④ " " .-	ED. FERRER, TOMAS Y SERAFIN	120.00	60.00	180.00	
" " .-	ROGELIO ORTIZ		60.00	60.00	
" " .-	JORGE ULLOA		50.00	50.00	
" " .-	M. SABAS		150.00	150.00	
" " .-	SATAN		60.00	60.00	
" " .-	FERNANDO		50.00	50.00	
" " .-	MONGO (Arreglo carro)		97.00	97.00	
" " .-	MONGO		550.00	550.00	
⑥ .-	TRASPASO FIAT		1,000.00	1,000.00	
.-	Casa Chinas		50.00	50.00	
.-	FAM. DE ARNALDO SOCORROS		80.00	80.00	
.-	M. SANCHEZ		150.00	150.00	
⑦ .-	COJIN DE FLORES		10.00	10.00	
		$ 1,950.00	4,169.67	6,119.67	6,119.67
					$ 9,129.67

3/BR

Nov. 23 de 1962

La Habana, Noviembre 23 de 1962

Querido Bruno:

Adjunto enviamos el Estado de Cuentas desde el 19 de Octubre hasta el 23 de Noviembre. Te haremos algunas explicaciones:

1 .- Cuando recibimos los $10,000.00, pagamos el mes de Septiembre (el 19 de Octubre). Más tarde dimos la mitad de la ayuda correspondiente a Octubre.

2 .- La Sra. de Montoya y Ruiz* son las encargadas de repartir el dinero entre los familiares y presos de Boniato y San Severino respectivamente. Próximamente enviaremos un informe detallado de cada prisión y de cada giro.

3 .- Al Abogado, M. Calás* se le habían dado $100.00 y faltaban $250.00. Es el encargado de defender al grupo de Pinar del Río y Rafael, Máximo y Orestes.

4 .- Cuando veas tres nombres y $180.00 quiere decir $60.00 para cada uno.

5 .- Mongo ha firmado varios vales porque se está encargando de arreglar y recoger los carros.

6 .- El traspaso varía de precio según los papeles que se tengan. Casi todos tienen a los dueños presos o fuera del territorio Nacional, y para no perderlos hay que ir por trasmanos. No es verdaderamente un traspaso si no la inscripción para la nueva chapa y tiene que ser personalmente.

7 .- El cojín fué para la Sra. que vivía en la calle 6 que falleció y es donde duermen los muchachos cuando no tienen donde ir. Luis conoce el lugar, pues tuvimos allí una reunion.

8 .- El mes de Noviembre fué la ayuda familiar solamente de $20.00 pues no había más. Solo Oquendo recibió mas, $30.00, porque la Sra. tuvo un bebito muerto, nacido antes de tiempo y estaba ingresada delicada de salud.

9 .- Malanga y Fernando reciben el dinero quincenalmente, por eso es que aparecen dos veces en el mismo mes.

10.- Ninguna familia recibe la cantidad de la madre de Julito, pero esto es provisional, ya que el padre está también preso y sin su firma Julia no puede cambiar cheques ni sacar dinero del banco.

11.- Juanoco era el encargado de Finanzas y me entregó $409.00 que era lo que tenía en caja. Uno de los carros que estaba a su nombre lo tenía que entregar al gobierno porque se embarcaba y nos dió $500.00 por el, aunque nos tiene que dar más, ya que costó $2,400.00 ó $2,500.00, no me han informado aún.

12.- Yo no soy responsable de Finanzas, sólo he aceptado guardar y repartir el dinero provisionalmente hasta que se nombre a alguién definitivamente.

No tenemos que decirte la necesidad que hay de dinero. Ya Luis te habrá explicado como está el asunto de la comida, por ejemplo. Para comer hay que comprar en bolsa negra o si no morirse de hambre. El pollo está ya a $2.50 la libra en pie, y todo por el estilo. Esto no quiere decir que empecemos a comer pollo y no picadillo, pero el asunto es que se puede conseguir uno y no lo otro.

Te aseguramos que no malgastamos ni un centavo. Si quieres tener mas datos nos lo dejas saber que con mucho gusto te complaceremos. Hoy en día ni se consigue ni la gente tiene para hacer donativos. Acuérdate que ha habido un canje "FUNESTO" y no hay muchas personas con efectivo.

Espero me escribas aunque sean dos líneas, ya que no me has mandado mas que recados con los muchachos. Dime si ya eres padre, pues nos gusta estar al tanto de los acontecimientos de nuestra GRAN FAMILIA.

Un abrazo para todos mis sobrinos en XTO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 19-124-20/7

SECRET

DATE : 665 8 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, DDP/SIT 3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSO 4, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 8 2343Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 15095

WAVE INFO DIR HAGU CITE SJAN 0835

GYROSE

REF HPSW 1362 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH IDEN A, HE INFORMED KARNLEY THAT HE IS IN CONTACT LOCALLY WITH DRE (FOR DIR: SEE PARA 1 REF). IDEN A SAID HIS CONTACT HAS BEEN WITH JOSE ARTECONA, BROTHER OF CARLOS "TRIPA" ARTECONA.

2. ARTECONA HAD SOUGHT IDEN A'S ASSISTANCE OBTAINING MINIATURE CAMERAS WHICH SAID HE WISHED TRANSMIT TO PBRUMEN THROUGH CHANNEL WHICH HIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOW ESTABLISHED WITH IDEN B. ACCORDING TO ARTECONA IDEN B COOPERATING AS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL USING "DIPLOMATIC POUCH" AND HAS NOT ONLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGES BUT ON ONE OCCASION TRANSMITTED ONE UNIT SMALL ARMS.

3. WHEN QUERIED FURTHER IDEN A SAID ARTECONA HAS NEVER IDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL WHO ACTUALLY IN CONTACT WITH IDEN B NOR INDICATED EXTENT IDEN B'S GOVT INVOLVED. WHOLE STORY FAIRLY LOOSE.

4. KARNLEY DECLINED IDEN A SUGGESTION THAT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH ARTECONA. SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT IDEN A ADVISE ARTECONA TO PRESENT HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO HIS KUBARK CONTACT,

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE. :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI CS this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

IN 15095 SJAN 0835

(ARTECONA HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED DRE/KUBARK CONTACT) EXPRESSING OPINION THAT IF DRE HAD INDEED DEVELOPED SUCH CHANNEL TO PBRUMEN, KUBARK VERY LIKELY BE MUCH INTERESTED.

5. IDEN A HAS NOW MADE ABOVE SUGGESTION AND ARTECONA HAS SAID WILL PRESENT TO KUBARK CONTACT DURING VISIT MIAMI WHICH EXPECTS MAKE LATER THIS MONTH.

6. SJAN ELECTED HANDLE MATTER THIS WAY SO AS TO AVOID CROSSING WAVE CHANNEL TO DRE. IF CONSIDERED DESIRABLE HOWEVER BELIEVE SJAN CAN EASILY ESTABLISH CONTACT AND FOLLOW THIS UP FROM HERE.

7. ADVISE.

8. FOR HAGU: DRE IS DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL, PROMINENT CUBAN EXILE STUDENT GROUP WITH LONG STANDING KUBARK
ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIAN. HQS IS IN MIAMI WITH MARGINAL REPRESENTATION SAN JUAN.

END OF MESSAGE

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GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 666
8 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DOP, DOP/SIT 3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 9, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ Name required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 8 23432 62

ROUTINE

IN 15096

WAVE INFO DIR HAGU CITE SJAN 0836

GYROSE

REF SJAN 0835 (IN 15095)

IDEN A: COLLIN E. OSTRANDER, USIA REPRESENTATIVE, SAN JUAN.

IDEN B: WALDEMAR F. LEE, NETHERLANDS CONSUL, SAN JUAN.

04;11

END OF MESSAGE

NO COPY

RETURN TO CIA
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ROUTING	INIT.
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
TFC/FA FILE	
DESTROY	

DEC 10 3 PM '62

RID\MIS
RECEIVED

SECRET

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3/11/98
29

Date: 02/12/98
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10170-10051
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
TO : CHIEF, TASK FORCE W
TITLE : AMSPELL PROGRESS REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1962
DATE : 10/09/62
PAGES : 73
SUBJECTS : AMSPELL
PROGRESS REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/07/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK64-25:F27 1998.02.07.11:28:56:590031: ATTACHMENTS INCLUDED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

14-00000

5P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE/KUWOLF
AMSPELL Progress Report for September 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action: For your information

Ref : A. UFGA-5728, dated 21 September 1962
B. UFGA-5897, dated 25 September 1962
C. UFGA-6065, dated 8 October 1962
D. CARA-7019, dated 25 September 1962
E. CARA-6994, dated 15 September 1962
F. WAVE-8311, dated 7 September 1962
G. WAVE-8356, dated 8 September 1962

1. The September Progress Report for AMSPELL, including AMHINT and AMBARB activities, is transmitted herewith:

A. AMSPELL

1) General:

01

a. On 21 September 1962, AMHINT-53 exfiltrated PBRUMEN in a refugee vessel and made his preliminary operational report on release from CAC on 22 September (Reference B). Subject was accompanied by the National Coordinator for Agricultural Affairs (actually an organizer for guerrilla warfare and resistance groups throughout the Island) Jose Angel LOZANO y Lozano. Briefly, AMHINT-53 and LOZANO rendered an optimistic operational report on

01

Continued

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW, w/att, ~~u/s/c~~

Attachments:
Under Separate Cover

RETURN TO CIA
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19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED
9 October 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 15 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-6140

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19/1

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

21BR

AMSPELL organization in PBRUMEN, including the situation in the underground, compartmentation, organization, communications control and intelligence structure. Subjects are undergoing intelligence debriefing on a continuing basis.

01

b. While AMHINT-53 was arranging his exfiltration and AMSPELL Psywar operations in PBRUMEN and the hemisphere were continued on their normal course, the AMHINTs were still smarting from the ODYOKE confiscation of their vessel, the JUANIN-I, as a consequence of the 24 August attack on Havana. AMHINT-2 went to Caracas on 7 September for a meeting with President BETANCOURT (or his official representative) and a press conference where he released an AMSPELL statement, which in effect, served a notice on PBRUMEN and the USSR that any Communist shipping encountered in PBRUMEN territorial waters will be attacked on sight. (Reference F and G) 01

01

c. Behind the scenes, however, AMHINT-2 was reportedly (Reference D and E) negotiating with Venezuelan Naval Officials for surfacecraft and possibly a base from which to operate. What success he achieved in this quest, or to what extent President BETANCOURT is prepared to help AMSPELL, is still an unknown quantity. Judging from their attempts to raise funds in other spheres, allegedly for the purchase of a replacement vessel, they were not very successful in Caracas. (A PM Case Officer handling the CEDAR team has reported that one of the members complained of forfeiting a 20-percent "kick-back" in his AMSPELL salary. (For a breakdown of AMSPELL salary see Attachment B.)

01

d. AMHINT-2 returned from Caracas and as to be expected, gave no indication of the "secret negotiations" or their outcome. On 27 September, along with AMHINT-5, he requested a meeting with the JMWAVE officer for discussion of the AMBARB funding disagreement and the general AMSPELL situation (See Attachment C). Perhaps this session gave JMWAVE a bit more insight as to AMSPELL plans and intentions, but no real solution for the AMBARBs resulted. In short, AMSPELL policy is to mold PBPRIME public opinion and bring pressure to bear on ODYOKE and GPIDEAL for action in the PBRUMEN situation within the next four months.

e. To implement such a policy, AMSPELL has exploited the impact of their 24 August attack on PBPRIME news media, as well as their Caracas Declaration. Also, they have published a weekly news letter in English entitled "The Cuban Report" (Reference C) and about 1,000 copies are mailed out to ODYOKE officials and congressmen. Initiated in late August, the main theme of this publication has been the Soviet/Bloc materiel buildup in PBRUMEN. (See Attachment A)

2) Total AMSPELL Support for September 1962: $50,960.40

a. AMBARB Section:	Salaries	$12,240.00	
	Operations	7,700.00	
	Processing	1,020.40	$20,960.40
b. AMHINT Section:	Support	$ 5,000.00	
c. AMSPELL General:	Salaries	9,000.00	
	Overhead	2,100.00	
	Operations	13,900.00	$25,000.00

4/BR

3) Intelligence Production:

UFG-1572 - "Status of Equipment at the Nico Lopez Refinery & UK, Czech, and Soviet Assitance in its maintenance: Shipment of Gold Bullion from the Refinery to the USSR."

UFG-1585 - (As above)

UFG-1607 - (As above)

UFG-1622 - (As above)

UFG-1628 - (As above)

4) Development and Plans:

All planning phases of AMSPELL activities supported by JMWAVE at the present time are subject to the results of meetings with AMSPELL concerning increased control, and, the decisions of JMWAVE to continue a support relationship if an acceptable degree of KUBARK control can be established.

B. AMHINTS:

1) General:

a. As reported in Reference B, the most important AMHINT development during September was the exfiltration of AMHINT-53. 01 This was also significant for JMWAVE, since all negotiations with AMSPELL would be transferred from AMHINT-2 to 01 AMHINT-53. 01 Although AMHINT-53 01 will undoubtedly be fully briefed and re-indoctrinated by AMHINT leaders concerning AMSPELL present status and operational relationship with JMWAVE, AMHINT-53 01 is a mature and astute leader and can be expected to appreciate the broad scope of JMWAVE-AMSPELL operations.

b. In the Psywar field, the AMHINTs in PBRUMEN continue to produce "Trinchera" on a hand-operated mimeograph machine in Havana and distribute about 10,000 copies monthly. They are also committed to the collection and transmission of reports and photographs on the Soviet buildup, at least until the DAMSON intelligence operations are begun. This activity is in direct support of the AMSPELL policy cited in Paragraph A.1)e above. The AMSPELL propaganda section is divided into four departments to carry out this program: PBRUMEN, Latin American, PBRUMEN Exile Community and PBPRIME.

c. 24 Diplomatic pouches intercepted for JMWAVE by AMBLEAK-1 have revealed much of AMSPELL operational planning not heretofore reported. In a series of letters written by the AMSPELL national coordinators in exile to their opposite numbers in PBRUMEN on 20 September, it was indicated that:

i. Negotiations by AMHINT-2 01 in Caracas, Costa Rica and Panama are practically completed for an AMSPELL operations base. (Letter from Bernabe PENE to AMHINT-40)

ii. AMSPELL has levied intelligence requirements on AMHINTS in PBRUMEN for sending out information on PBRUMEN ports that can be attacked from the sea. (Intelligence Plans Numbers 5, 6 and 7, in a letter from AMHINT-39 to "Jesus", National Coordinator for Intelligence.)

iii. In the interim, reports on Mariel, Cabanas, Bahia Honda, La Habana, Matanzas and Cardenas are requested on a continuing basis.

24

d. Subsequently, in an incoming pouch and probably crossing with the foregoing communications, a series of letters from the National Coordinators in PBRUMEN reported a severe blow to AMSPELL clandestine organization. Jore MEDINA Bringier ("Mongo"), National Coordinator for Military Reception and Supply, reported that AMHINT-40 01 (PBRUMEN National Coordinator) had been missing. (Later reported as arrested and being held at G-2 Headquarters on Ave 5 in Miramar.) Also, "Juan" and "Miguel" were arrested in Havana. Several others were missing. MEDINA went on to describe security measures implemented and report on a re-organization of the National Coordinator Committee. He closed with a plea for a small shipment of small arms for defensive use, clothing and medicine, and a full-scale propaganda effort if AMHINT-40 should be sentenced to summary execution.

24

01 e. In this same pouch, the National Coordinator for Propaganda, Nicolás PEREZ Diez-Argüelles ("Jose Alfredo") rendered a detailed report on Agit/Prop assets in PBRUMEN. The printing and distribution of "Trinchera" has been moved up to every fortnight, and efforts to get it printed on a commercial printing press in Havana appear to be successful. Regular couriers are being trained for delivery of the newspaper to the provinces. PEREZ also reported their progress in mounting two clandestine radio transmitters for Agit/Prop purposes, one in Las Villas and one in Havana. These are powered by 110 volt generators usually found on a small farm. It is projected to transmit a regular propram, probably entitled "Tele-periodico Trinchera". The report does not explain what counter measures will be taken to prevent GOC detection. Finally, PEREZ describes an Agit/Prop program already in progress: First a plan for printing and marking walls with their organization abbreviation, carried out in one operation, synchronizing municipal and borough teams for the job. As a follow-up phase, large cloth banners bearing the same letters will be raised or tended in congested areas and photographs taken for publication in "Trinchera". Also, with the aid of their Intelligence Section, AMHINTS have penetrated two radio stations in Havana and are identifying all Sov/Bloc personnel employed there, their security practices, addresses and routes for commuting.

2) Total AMHINT Support for September 1962: $5,000.00

(Included in AMSPELL General section of this report)

3) Intelligence Production:

(Reported in AMSPELL General Section.)

4) Development & Plans:

(See this section under AMSPELL General of this report)

C. AMBARB

During the reporting period no changes occurred 01 in AMBARB personnel assignments. With the exfiltration of AMHINT-53 from PBRUMEN it is hoped that it will be possible to negotiate with AMBARB the still unsettled question of AMBARB funding. We will report further to Headquarters as soon as an agreement is reached with AMBARB on funding of AMBARB representatives in the field by local KUBARK Stations. For the present it can only be said that the AMBARB leaders are strenuously resisting any effort by JMWAVE to increase to more than eight the number of their people whom they will permit KUBARK to fund directly rather than through AMBARB Headquarters in Miami.

The inspection tour of AMBARB-16 to delegations in Latin America resulted in the general report forwarded for your information as Attachment D: in reading this report, it is useful for reference purposes to examine Attachment E a report which the AMBARB office has prepared on its general progress since inception

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of the AMBARB program. As Attachment F we forward a special report prepared by AMBARB-16 on AMBARB mailing operations capabilities.

Individual reports on the activities of AMBARB overseas delegations are forwarded in the following Attachments, which Headquarters may wish to bring to the attention of KUBARK Area Divisions or Stations as it deems best:

G. Bolivia
H. Brazil
I. Costa Rica
J. Chile
K. Colombia
L. Ecuador
M. Mexico
N. Panama
O. Peru
P. Uruguay
Q. Venezuela

The AMBARB salary schedule for September is forwarded as Attachment R.

END OF DISPATCH

B

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con sus ideas en marcha

SALARY - 1-30 September, 1962

DEPENDANTS ALLOWANCES:

Dependants	- Alberto Muller (In Isla de Pinos)	US$ 200.00
"	- Miguel Lasa (In Intrusion)	200.00
"	- Rodolfo Vidal (Havana Ops.)	200.00
"	- Jorge de Armas (Two in Isla de Pinos)	225.00
		US$ 825.00

DRE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE:

Luis Fernandez Rocha	Sec. General	US$ 275.00
Jose M. Lasa	Sec. Propaganda	275.00
Fernando Garcia Chacon	Sec. Actas	250.00
Jose A. Gonzalez Lanuza	Sec. Relaciones Interiores	325.00
Elio Mas Hernandez	Sec. Planificacion	275.00
General Fatjo	Sec. Finnanzas	275.00
Raquel Lavilla (Cecilia)	Ast. Inteligecia y visas	180.00
Ronnie Ramos	Ast. Propaganda	200.00
Zoila Diaz	Ast. Propaganda	150.00
Teresa Valdos Hurtado	Ast. Archivo y Propaganda	150.00
Elvira Weiss	Ast. Rel. Internas	150.00
Mercedes Ramirez	Telephone	150.00
Luisita Esquiroz	Ast. Rel. Internas	110.00
Lula Santos	Ast. Propaganda	100.00
		US$2865.00

SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES FUTURE OPS:

Ana Diaz Silveira	Ast. Finanzas	US$ 200.00
Maria V. de los Reyes	Ast. Archivo y Prop.	120.00
Isabel Alonso	Ast. Informacion	170.00
Carlos Bravo	Ast. Propaganda	80.00
Angelica Martinez	Ast. Finanzas y visas waiver	100.00
Luis Gutierrez	Telegrafist	150.00
Carlos A. Muller	Ast. Propaganda	125.00
		US$ 945.00

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ATT "B"

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MILITAR INFILTRATION OPS TRAINING:

Bernabe Pena	Militar Cord OPS	US$ 275.00
Gilberto Aleman	Trainee # 1	150.00
Francisco Calvet	Trainee # 2	175.00
Carlos DuQuesne	Trainee # 3	125.00
J. M. Fiol	Trainee # 4	325.00
Angel A. Fontanils	Trainee # 5	225.00
Francisco Garcia	Trainee # 6	120.00
Julio Jo	Trainee # 7	120.00
Carlos Obregon	Trainee # 8 (Tele)	170.00
Lesmes Ruiz	Trainee # 9	200.00
Arnaldo Santa Cruz	Trainee # 10	150.00
Ernesto Fernandez	Trainee # 11	200.00
John Koch	Trainee # 12	250.00
Julian Gomez	Maritime - Militar	100.00
Lazaro Fariñas	Trainee # 13	100.00
Enrime Torres	Maritime - Militar	100.00
Juan M. Salvat	Sec. Asuntos Militares	375.00
Ignacio Arjona	Trainee # 14	100.00
Albor Ruiz	Resp. Asuntos Navales	200.00
Francisco Blanco	Trainee # 15	200.00
Luis Camps	Trainee # 16 (Naval)	150.00
Julio Hernandez Rojo	In Cuba (his family)	200.00
Raul de Cespedes	Ast. Militar	125.00
Maria ODoardo	Ast. Militar	130.00
Isidro Borja	Ast. Sec. Aasuntos Militares	100.00
		US$ 4365.00

Dependats Allowances	US$ 825.00
DRE Office and Executive	2865.00
Subistence Allowance	945.00
Militar Inf. Ops. Training	4365.00
	US$ 9000.00

Responsable de Finanzas DRE

R.

D R E
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

MIAMI 30 AUGUST 1962

INTERNATIONAL SECTION PAYROLL MONTH for Sept 62

MAIN OFFICE

1)	Eduardo Muñiz Melo	Coordinator	$275.00	for Aug 62
2)	Mario Pita Garcia	Sub-Coordinator	$325.00	
3)	Evelio Ley Fernandez	Contacts & Finance	$250.00	
4)	Aida Rodriguez Mendez	Secretary & Typist	$200.00	
5)	Margarita Esquiroz Martinez	Translator	$170.00	

RADIO CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA

6)	Pedro Ynterian Garcia	Sub-coordinator	$275.00
7)	Clara Alvarez Perez	Asst Secretary	$120.00

PHOTOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT

8)	Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo	Sub-Coordinator	$300.00	for Aug 62
9)	Joaquin Martinez de Pinillos	Photo Tech	$250.00	
10)	Antonio Abella Calderin	Photographer	$200.00	

ARGENTINA

11)	Rogelio Helu Vital	Waiting Visa	$350.00
12)	Alejandro Portes Cortada	Waiting for visa	$300.00

BOLIVIA

~~13)~~	~~Amado Oscar [illegible] Rodriguez~~	~~Sept 1961~~	~~$200.00~~
~~14)~~	~~Luis Benigno Gonzalez~~	~~December 1961~~	~~$200.00~~
15)	Jose Adolfo Barro Garcia	Waiting to be approved	$200.00

BRAZIL

16)	Raul Gonzalez Simon	October 1961	~~$[illegible]~~ $150.
⑰	Carlos Valdesuso Rodriguez	January 1962	$200.00
18)	Jose Vega Rivera	October 1961	$200.00
19)	Guillermo Asper Valdes	December 1961	$200.00
20)	Pedro Castello	May 1962	$200.00
21)	Benito Diaz Peret	June 1962	$200.00
22)	Jorge Guerra Guerra	December 1961	$350.00
23)	Carlos Badias Vazquez	Waiting to be Approved	$250.00

CHILE

~~24)~~	~~Nelson Amaro Victoria~~	~~October 1961~~	~~$230.00~~
~~25)~~	~~Rafael Espinosa Zarata~~	~~May 1962~~	~~$250.00~~
~~26)~~	~~Nolis Mesa Villariño~~	~~June 1962~~	~~$375.00~~
27)	Luis Figueras Valdes	November 1961	$200.00

Att to UFGA 6140

19-124-36/3

D R E

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

CONTINUATION

COSTA RICA

31 (28) Evelio Companioni Esteva ---------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
29) Jorge Hermida Arenas -------------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
30) Julian Osante Fernandez ----------July 1962 ---------------$250.00----
31) Armando del Pozo -----------------October 1961------------$225.00----

COLOMBIA

(32) Jose A. Guerra Rodriguez----------January 1962------------$275.00----
33) Andres de la Rosa-----------------January 1962------------$200.00----
34) Nelson Federico Better Dotres-----May 1962 ---------------$200.00----
35) Rolando Castaño ------------------January 1962 ---------- ----

ECUADOR

~~(36) Rafael Orlando Soto ------------November 1961 ----------$200.00----~~
37) Francisco Haded Secnili-----------January 1962 -----------$200.00----

HONDURAS

38) Fernando Arco Hernandez ----------Waiting to be approved--$225.00----
39) Eduardo Tomas Torres Ramos--------Waiting to be approved--$225.00----

MEXICO

~~(40) Angel Gonzalez Fernandez ---------September 1962----------$200.00----~~
41) Jorge Dorticos Arlegui -----------November 1961 ----------$300.00----
42) Martin Morua Arrechea ------------Waiting for visa -------$200.00----
43) Carlos Garcia Soler --------------Waiting for visa -------$250.00----

PANAMA

(44) Jorge Mendigutia Ramirez----------October 1961 -----------$200.00----
(45) Jorge Marban Garcia ---------------May 1961 ---------------$275.00----

PERU

46) Rolando Fernandez Corredera ------October 1961------------$300.00----
47) Nestor Campaneria Angel-----------October 1961------------$250.00----
48) Sixto Rubiales Ros ---------------Waiting for visa--------$200.00----
49) Ricardo Rubiales Ros--------------Waiting for visa--------$200.00----

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

50) Pablo Acanda ---------------------May 1962 ---------------$250.00----
51) Delio Gonzalez -------------------Waiting for visa -------$250.00----

URUGUAY

(52) Mario Garcia Gonzalez--------------July 1962---------------$250.00-----
53) Armando Frias Mesa ---------------July 1962---------------$250.00----
54) Rene Morato Fontana --------------July 1962 --------------$225.00----

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D R E DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

CONTINUATION

VENEZUELA

56)

55) Rafael Tremols Fresneda ---------September 1961 -----------275.00----

~~—) Joaquin Perez Rodriguez ------------May 1961 ------------------275.00----~~

57) Jose Gonzalez Llorente -----------November 1961-------------200.00----

58) Lorenzo Martin Rodriguez ---------November 1961-------------200.00----

59) Luis Boza Dominguez --------------June 1961 ---------------200.00----

60) Ricardo Rodriguez Jimenez---------May 1961 ----------------200.00----

61) Ramon Calero Rivero --------------May 1962 ----------------200.00----

62) Roberto Prego Novo ---------------May 1961 ----------------200.00----

$12,240.00

TOTAL AMOUNT INTERNATIONAL PAYROLL, RECEIVED FIVE DAYS LATE

ON SEPTEMBER 1962..................................

MARIO PUIG
SUB-COORDINATOR

[illegible] JR.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

F.

DRE
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
josé antonio echeverría con tus ideas en marcha

REPORT

During the recent trip I made through the DRE Delegations in Latin America, the results of the sending of propaganda by mail to Cuba were reported to me. For the better understanding of the agreements reached, we will now explain them within each Delegation visited.

VENEZUELA.-

The Delegation at Venezuela sent some months ago the propaganda we sent them to be mailed to Cuba. They used the lists of addresses given by Roger.

Venezuela has continued this system using the propaganda edited by the DRE and the propaganda prepared in Venezuela. An average of 1,700 letters was sent during May, June, and July, mailing them from Caracas one month, from Maracaibo another month, and from Barquisimeto another. All security means were studied (that they be sent by different persons with different handwriting, that regular, and not commemorative, stqmps be used, ordinary envelopes, and mailed in different post offices, etc.)

BRAZIL.-

The Delegation at Brazil also sent the propaganda given by Roger, but no reply was obtained from any person. We studied the security means and the conditions for the sending of the propaganda to Cuba. The Delegation remarked on the risk run with the mail and the violations to which it is subject in Brazil (they explained that the salaries of post office employees are so low that they take off the stamps from the letters when they have not been marked, to sell them, and then they destroy the letter.)

They sent 1,500 letters during May, June, and July.

URUGUAY.-

We did not send the propaganda to Uruguay because then we had no Delegation there.

CHILE.-

The Delegation at Chile sent the third propaganda given by Roger, which was the propaganda on the members of the 26th of July that are imprisoned or have been executed. They sent 1,000 letters.

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D R E
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
josé antonio echeverría con tus ideas en marcha

NOTE.- The list of addresses had to be previously checked up, because there were persons in it who are actually working in the underground, and the sending of propaganda addressed to them could, consequently, place them under great danger.

SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

[illegible] Muñiz

3. While AMHINT-[illegible] 01 is now PBPRIME, he will determine AMSPELL policy as approved by the AMSPELL Executive Committee. However, the activities of the last four months were planned and controlled by AMHINT-2 01 and assisting him were AMHINT-5 and Bernabe PENA, who were present at this meeting. After the AMBARB discussion, the meeting turned into a long discussion of the International Communist situation, ODYOKE, KUBARK and AMSPELL policies as related to this situation. Some of the noteworthy items revealed:

a. AMSPELL had the 24 August Havana attack plan for six months, but had shelved it for the "right time" and a considered decision not to embark upon a course independent of KUBARK approval. The Sov/bloc buildup changed that decision.

b. AMSPELL analyzes the situation as hopeless for the PBRUMEN revolutionary movements after four months because:

1- The Soviets will be firmly established and ODYOKE policy as defined by GPIDEAL tends toward and will probably result in a hemisphere acceptance of PBRUMEN as a satellite.

2- After four months, the degree of police controls, repression and persecution will make any internal action in civic resistance and guerrilla warfare virtually impossible.

c. AMSPELL feels that ODYOKE policy on PBRUMEN cannot be influenced by the rising tide of public opinion and congressional action, partly because GPIDEAL is surrounded by a group of advisors who are "one step from being parlor pinks or worse". The list began with Chester BOWLES.

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d. This situation ~~is not an original~~ AMSPELL observation. During his European travel in August, AMHINT-2 went to the Vatican for a meeting (claimed to be high level) which had been arranged some time ago. His impression of thinking in the Vatican re World Communist advance, was that ODYOKE or PBPRIME was no longer calculated as an effective power for defending the world against total takeover. That the Catholic Church was beginning the long process of preparing their forces for a world dominated by Communism.

4. As a result of their observations and analysis, AMSPELL has assumed a "now or never" attitude and policy. They feel they must resort to tactics that mold PBPRIME public opinion and bring pressure to bear on ODYOKE and GPIDEAL for action in the PBRUMEN situation. Latin America must also be kept aware and urged to support an action. They would hope that such an AMSPELL policy and resultant activity would not be interpreted as opposition or hostility to KUBARK or ODYOKE, and that their KUBARK relationship would survive the critical months before them. They recognize that KUBARK is bound by policy and burdened by ~~xxx~~ bureaucracy, and feel that the actions - although independent and uncontrolled - of AMSPELL might contribute to the formation of action policy in PBRUMEN, despite consternation in ZRMETAL.

BRN

5/BR

C.

A [illegible] T-2, S N [illegible] A | [illegible]

27 September 1962 | 1600-1830 hrs

Tip-Top Restaurant, Coral Gables.

Harold R. NOEMAYR

01

1. The meeting with AMHINT-2 was to clarify the continuing misunderstanding and disagreement over AMBARB funding. The original AMBARB policy meeting with AMHINT-2 was reviewed, and AMHINT-2 pointed out that it was not agreed that KUBARK station would pay all AMBARBS, but only the coverts. Without going over the entire evolution of the AMBARB project funding, it was pointed up to AMHINT-2 that the project was a two-way arrangement, of great mutual convenience, and we must find a functional "middle-ground" upon which to operate, although it may not be entirely satisfactory to either of the parties. AMHINT-2 agreed, and the following ground rules were arrived at as a workable funding plan:

a. AMBARBs assigned as overt AMSPELL representatives will be funded by AMSPELL from Miami on all future assignments. Those now being funded by station will remain status quo.

b. Covert AMBARBS for station contact will be assigned by individual processing, both parties agreed, and station will fund and control.

c. Re the four pending cases where stations have requested funding as soon as possible - a meeting is to be held where each case will be considered individually and decided upon.

2. While this arrangement is not entirely acceptable, it is believed that upon the return of AMHINT-53 to the operational control, a better arrangement can be made.

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AT

(U) C6 UFGA 6140

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D.

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

REPORT

SUBJECT. Eduardo Muñiz' trip to Latin America.

This report is aimed on narrating briefly the results of Mr. Eduardo Muñiz recent trip to several countries of Latin America carried through for the purpose of visiting the D.R.E. Delegations.

In order to make easier the understanding of its points, we will outline the impressions gathered throughout the different countries according to the order in which they were visited, and dividing them into the following aspects.

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

B.- Deficiencies

C.- Future possibilities.

VENEZUELA

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation.

Undoubtedly, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela is at present the best delegation the D.R.E. has in Latin America

There are many reasons for which this Delegation has reached to occupy the first place in the Latin American Plan of the D.R.E. Suming them up they are the following.

1.- It is identified with the nation's problems and national aims.

2.- Team-work coordination and unity in the accomplishment of labor

3.- A high sense of duty and a skilful plan of labor intelligently organized.

Consequently, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela has succeeded in attaining a high prestige for the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil among the most representative elements and institutions of the Venezuelan people agreeing their ideals with ours. The central management of the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela is located in Caracas. It is a small office situated at a central city point.

att. D to UFGA 6140

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It has two sub-delegations, one in Maracaibo, a northern city of Venezuela, under the direction of Roberto Frego, Ramon Celera, and Ricardo Rodriguez, and the other one in Barquisimeto.

At the central office of the D.R.E. Delegation in Venezuela under the direction of Rafael Tremols, General Delegate of the D.R.E. in Venezuela, José Miguel Gonzalez Llorente, Lorenzo Martin, Joaquin Perez, and Luis Boza are actually working. In Caracas, the D.R.E trasmits a daily radio broadcast which lasts for 30 minutes. Also in Maracaibo the D.R.E. transmits a radio broadcast which holds great popularity. (It is interesting to point out as a proof for the advantageous effects of this broadcast that a group of action men of the communist party tried to burn with Molotov bombs the radio station which transmit the broadcast).

The labor accomplished by the D.R.E. in the student field is of vital importance. At present the Delegation has the possibility of moving enough forces in a definitive moment to counteract Communist action inside the University which is totally controlled by Communists.

We can ~~to~~ point out as highly important the so - called "personality - building courses" which were created by the members of the D.R.E. and which are carried through today due to intimate cooperation, among the D.R.E. , the government, the Cristian Social Party and ecclesiastical hierarchy. Each of these courses last for approximately one week and las for approximately ~~one week~~ and are generally given in a farm. The attendants are almost always no more than 35 and are submitted during one week to strong military discipline and intensive indoctrination which lasts until night , ending the activities of the day with a General Assembly in which the results attained during the day are discussed. I had the opportunity to assist personally at one of these courses which was being given by Ricardo Rodriguez, member of the D.R.E. Delegation at Maracaibo, in a farm given by the Venezuelan government for such purpose. Up to the present 1,800 Venezuelan Students have received these courses and, certainly, their effects have influenced greatly in the consolidation of the democratic system in Venezuela.

We could now tell of the many other activities of the Delegation but would result unending. That is why we have only pointed out the most important.

B.- Deficiencies

Generally, we could assert that the balance maintained by the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela on this aspect cannot be more positive. Excepting the logical and natural deficiencies in the labor due greatly to the limitations, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela does not have any deficiencies of importance. On the other hand, the Delegation at Venezuela presented to me a complaint which was also made by the rest of the Delegations, as I will explain further on. It is that the Delegation has been an several occasions under emotional pressures motivated by the large periods of time it has gone through with no visits by anyone of the Central Office of International Relations. In other words, the D.R.E. Delegation at Venezuela asked through all its members more frequent visits in order to avoid a feeling of forlorness during our common struggle.

C.- Future possibilities

The D.R.E. has huge future possibilities in Venezuela. The prestige it actually has among the people and inside government circles opens new fields for a near future in all the aspects. We will synthesize these possibilities in the following points.

1.- More "personality-building coursses" in order to double the number of Venezuelan students receiving them.

2.- Organization of brigades to encounter Communists and move them out from the Central University of Caracas in the elections next year.

3.- Increase in the propaganda

4.- Spreading of activity throughout all the States of the country.

BRAZIL.-

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation.

For the better understanding of the situation of the DRE in Brazil, we will first consider the situation of the DRE Delegation at Rio de Janeiro and then the labor of the Delegation at Sao Paolo.

As well as the Delegation in Caracas, the Delegation in Rio de Janeiro has succeeded in carrying through a labor which is worthy of all praise.

In spite of the idiosyncrasy of the Brazilian people and the seriousness of the interior situation of the nation, we believe that the Delegation at Brazil follows the Delegation at Venezuela in best functioning. We could point out as main reasons for this success the following.

1.- The members of the Delegation are fully identified with the reality and problems of the Brazilian nation . All the members of the Delegation speak Portuguese.

2.- As well as in Venezuela there is"team work" and unity in the accomplishment of labor.

Undoubtedly, the labor at Brazil is the hardest to be carried through, followed by Chile. The idiosyncrasy of the Brazilian people, which are in general somewhat ignorant about the most serious problems the world is actually encountering, the powerful forces of extreme left, the desperate economic situation product of the growing depression which has more than once almost drawn the nation to civil war, are the reasons for which many times the Cuban problem has been placed in second level, generally giving it little importance even inside democratic sectors.

For approximately one year, the DRE Delegation at ~~the~~ Rio de Janeiro has been struggling against this real difficult situation, and the results obtained cannot be better.

1.- The Press which for long time had held an indifferent attitude towards the Cuban problem - most of the times it even refused to publish any communiques or news given by the DRE - has offered us its support for the first time and the name of the DRE appears frequently in its pages (at my arrival at Rio de Janeiro they interviewed me).

2.- In the student ground, the National Union of Students of Brazil (U.N.E.B.) has already experienced the labor the DRE is accomplishing. At the National Assembly recently held by the UNE, though the DRE Delegates were not permitted to speak, the support our movement has awakened among the Brazilian students was clearly displayed, when several State Student Unions protested for the measures taken against us. During the trip recently made by Benito Diaz Paret to Santa Catarina he succeeded in attaining a resolution voted by that State Union and signed by [illegible],000 students soliciting the intervention in Cuba to move out the Russian troops which have been recently landed in the Island.

3.- The Delegation has already edited three pamphlets in Portuguese which have had great acceptance among the people "Que es el DRE" (What the DRE is) "Bases para una revolucion Latinoamericana" (Fundamental points for a Latin American revolution) "Cuba Socialista" (Socialist Cuba). Good relations are held with the Government of Carlos Lacerda. Useful trips to Recife, Minas Gerais, and Belo Horizonte, have been made and good contacts have been established.

B.- Deficiencies

In general terms, the deficiencies of the Delegation are very few, though the limitations are greater. The legal situation of Carlos Valdesuso and Julio Hasger in the country is rather difficult due to the fact that Joao Goulart's Pro Communist government has obstructed them greatly in their staying at Brazil. Nevertheless, the solution of this problem is shortly expected. As well as in Venezuela the Delegation protested because of the "supposed" abandonment to which it is submitted (since January nobody has visited them). Undoubtedly, this visit encouraged them greatly and lifted up high their moral spirit.

The Delegation also complained about the lack of propaganda. For such purpose they solicited funds in order to reprint in Portuguese the most important propaganda the DRE edits.

C.- Future possibilities

It is important to point out that the Cuban Embassy at Brazil formally protest to the Brazilian government because of the presence of Eduardo Muñiz in the country, also other Communist Brazilian figures backed up the protest. However, new activities for the future were planned. They are.

1.- Continue editing pamphlets of guidance for the people on the Cuban problem.

2.- Send two Delegates to Recife for the next visit of President Kennedy to Brazil.

3.- Perform several trips throughout the country in order to establish groups of supporters in the different places of the nation.

4.- Attaining of a radio broadcast.

5.- Intensify the labor with the democratic student groups in order to continue the work to restore the U.N.E. to our democratic cause.

DRE
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SITUATION OF THE DRE DELEGATION AT SAO PAOLO

The case of the DRE Delegation at Sao Paolo which is composed by Raul Gonzalez Simon and Antonio Vega, can be considered as an exceptional case inside the Latin American plan. In Sao Paolo, I had the opportunity to hold deep conversations with Raul Gonzalez Simon, and we reached at the following conclusions.

1.- In one whole year the DRE Delegation at Sao Paolo HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH ANY EFFECTIVE LABOR, nothing has been published by the DRE, not one communique of the Delegation has appeared in the [illegible] event held by the Delegation, not one of the campaigns and plans traced by the Section of International Relations has been carried through. Summing up the genuine words of the DRE Delegate at Sao Paolo, Raul Gonzalez Simon, together with the conversations held at my arrival at Miami with Antonio Vega, another member of the Delegation at Sao Paolo, we reached at the following conclusion.

a.- During one year no effective labor has been accomplished in the city of Sao Paolo on the Cuban problem.

b.- Time has been wasted uselessly to obtain only as a result a sounding failure.

The motives for this failure can be outlined as follows.

1.- The DRE Delegates in Sao Paolo have been submitted to the arbitrary direction of Mr. Vladimir Lydoskenky, director of the S.E.I. (Service of Inter American Studies) who during the whole year prohibited the Delegates to work in the name of the DRE, submitting them to a labor system which has nothing to do with the Cuban problem. It would be wise to point out that for the Chancellors ' Conference held at Punta del Este, special funds had been dedicated to the Cuban case. But Mr. Lydoskenki, did absolutely nothing about this, remaining this unsuccessful the "handling" of such funds.

2.- The DRE Delegates did not take in time the decision of working independently in order to accomplish something useful, and consequently, continued submitted to an entirely discredited organism which is the S.E.I.

Future possibilities.

Both Mr. Raul Gonzalez Simon and Mr. Antonio Vega are unwilling to continue working with the S.E.I. For such end, Mr. Gonzalez Simon and Mr. Antonio Vega are preparing numerous and detailed reports which will openly disclose the attitute taken by Mr. Bladimir Lydoskenki, for what he has used the fonds destined to the Cuban case, his repeated boycott to everything which holds the name of ~~the DRE~~, and the little labor accomplished throughout the year. In the report which is being made by Mr. Raul Gonzalez Simon, a plan of labor to be carried through in Sao Paolo will be presented. The DRE well engage to accomplish in 6 months a superior labor then that accomplished by the S.E.I. during one whole year on the Cuban problem. Good contacts and a well traced plan are arranged for such ends. The plan together with the reports will be presented as soon as they reach us.

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URUGUAY

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

Though the DRE Delegates in Uruguay, Mario Garcia and Armando Frias, have been in Montevideo for scarcely one and a half month, they are beginning to carry through a very positive labor which promises to bear splendid fruits. We must have in mind that anti-Castrist propaganda has widely circulated throughout Uruguay. Up to the present a great number of public acts have been held and it results difficult to move public opinion on the Cuban problem, since it is somewhat exhausted. Nevertheless, the plans which have been worked out will strengthen public opinion on this aspect. During my stay at Uruguay, the voting campaign for the elections which will be held on next November was being carried through. Thus it was rather difficult to turn the attention of public opinion towards the Cuban problem. However, in order to reinitiate the labor, the Delegation has worked out a plan which will last for one month and end with a great public act. While I was there, 100,000 leaves of propaganda exhorting the people to express their protests for the presence of Russian troops in Cuba were distributed throughout the city. Also a manifestation which took place the 8th of September in front of the Cuban Embassy was organized. The Dele gation will shortly begin to edit a news bulletin which will be sent to the Press, Radio, TV, to political, civic, and religious leaders. Also a trip throughout the different cities of the country in order to strengthen the contacts we already had there is being planned.

In the student field, the Delegation is striving to work to achieve unity in the groups of opposition to the FEUU (Federation of University Students of Uruguay) by creating a common front and thus move out the Communists which control fully the leading position of the FEUU.

B.- Deficiencies

The deficiencies of the Delegation at Uruguay can be considered as little important due to the fact that it has been functioning for only a few weeks and this does not permit to see things clearly and judge them how they really are. In general, the Delegation is at present in a process of consolidation and self-securing, for which reason its deficiencies cannot be fully observed.

C.- Future possibilities

The DRE Delegation at Uruguay has huge possibilities which we believe will be determined during the next few days. In addition to the news bulletin and the trip through the different cities of the country, a one-hour radio broadcast and new public acts are being planned. Besides the Delegation is working together with a group of students that are interested in creating the DREU (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil of Uruguay).

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CHILE

A.- Actual situation of the Delegation

The DRE Delegation at Chile -which is composed by Nelson Amaro, Rafael Espinosa, and Nolis Mesa- is now accomplishing a rather hard labor. However, it is beginning to bear fruits. As we had stated before, the Delegation at Chile follows Brazil in a situation which implies great care in Latin America. The outstanding force of the FRAP in contrast to the weak position held by Christian Democracy towards the Cuban problem have enormously hindered the development of labor. Undoubtedly, however, the situation has greatly improved. During the last month, three different posters were printed and distributed throughout Santiago, short trips through the communities of the country were made and conferences on the Cuban problem were given, a half-hour radio broadcast is transmitted every Sunday (it is the only anti-Castrist radio broadcast in Chile). In the student field, the best relations are held with the Union of University Federation of Chile (UFUCH), maximum student organism of the nation.

B.- Deficiencies

On repeated occasions the Delegation has had to face the distrustful attitude taken by Demo-Christian leaders. As a consequence, the Delegates have sometimes felt disconcerted, in a situation of disorganization at work and lack of coordination. However, through repeated efforts the Delegation has succeeded in keeping itself functioning, and is actually fully working.

C.- Future possibilities

After glancing over the labor already accomplished, we reached at the following conclusions in several assemblies we held at Santiago. We determined what were to be the next steps to be taken in Chile.

a.- Strengthen the bonds which tie us with the UFUCH and with the youth of the Democrat Christian Party.
b.- Create a clashing force ready to be used at any moment.
c.- Begin the edition of a news bulletin which will be sent to all the radio stations, the press, TV, Senators, Representatives, and institutions of the nation.
d.- Attaining of a radio broadcast to be heard throughout the nation.
e.- Strengthen our activities inside the communities and the popular mass by means of giving conferences, public acts, etc.
f.- Plan the possibilities of carrying through an action with relation to the Cuban Embassy.

E.

D.R.E.
DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
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INTRODUCTION

This report is a general analysis on the labor performed by the Section of International Relations of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) and on its plans for the future. Hower, it would take much time to make a precise account on the labor accomplished in more than one year, so we will limit it to be a general outline, hoping that in the near future a more detailed one may be presented.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE LABOR ACCOMPLISHED

The DRE can firmly assert that the labor carried through by the Section of International Relations has been a definite triumph for the organisation, due to the importance of the ground of operation and the intensity with which it has been developed. It is not an easy task to organise in such a brief term an international field of operation like ours, which has already born fruits and, in only one year, has attained great renown, even outside the borders of our continent. If all the motives for which the DRE's Latin American Plan has attained such success were to be outlined, we would never finish. We are going to list those which we consider are the most important:

A.- There can be no doubt that the most important labor has been the one developed by teh DRE Delegates in Latin America. During many months, the economic support given to the Section of International Relations was so short that only with the voluntary sacrifices of our delegates in Latin America could the section be kept in function. We can name countless examples of generosity and self-sacrifice to our cause: There were Delegates who, for many months, slept in cots and even on the floor, others who lived surrounded by a wretched atmosphere, and others who even went hungry. Our delegates fought to undergo all difficulties and, many times against hostile atmospheres, equipped only with their enthusiasm and their ardent desire to carry our truth throught America. The merits of our enterprise belong solely to them.

B.- Maintain the DRE identified with the struggles of Latin America Students, with whom we have shared ideals and cooperation during this year.

C.- Mantaining the system of propaganda from Miami to the labor which has made the DRE known throughout the continent and has increased Delegations its prestige, in spite of the lack of information and economic means.

D.- Maintain the DRE identified with the representative movements in each country, its firm position fighting for the redonstruction of Cuba, crossing out Batista's abhorrent past and Castro's inhuman present, and holding an understanding posture towards the serious problems in Latin America, social injustice, oppression, militarism and ignorance. We have made also ours the longing for the ransoming of our continent. We have experienced all this surrounded by gigantic difficulties, limitations and, in many occasions, incomprehensions by those whom we had trusted. Moments of downheartedness have lived within us more than once , but our spirit has maintained its firmness still hoping that the

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people of the world towards our desperate calling may be some day achieved and that they may stretch their friendly hand to our patient, but erect, people. For the better understanding of the labor accomplished we will synthesise the main steps taken by this section in the develop ment of the mission the DRE has assigned it.

ORIGIN OF THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Section of International Relations was created by the National Executive of the DRE in the months of November-December 1960. Luis Bosa Bomingues, ex-President of the Faculty of Science of the University of Havana, was appointed for its direction on January 1961, Mr. Eduardo Munis was ordered to come to Miami and was assigned the coordination of the DRE's labor in Latin America. Mr Munis arrived on the 8th of February, 1961.

THE FIRST STEPS

Before Muniz's arrival at Miami, the DRE's activity in the international ground was so limited that it lacked importance, even thought had sent a Delegation to the Chancellars' assembly which was held on 1961 in the city of San Jose Costa, Rica, and had also sent a Delegation to Central America for the purpose of establishing contacts with student leaders in these countries. On the last days of February 1961, a DRE Commission composed by Ernesto Fernandez Travieso, Teresa Valdes Hurtado, and Eduardo Muniz was sent to Washington for the purpose of delivering a letter written by the DRE as genuine representation of Cuban Students to the President of the United States John F. Kennedy. This letter was handed to Mr. Richard Godwin (se ignore if it ever reached President Kennedy) It stated the basis and ideals which moved the DRE to fight the Castro regime and the common inspirations which led it together with the rest of Latin American Students towards the ashievement lf social justice for the people of our continent.

Despite all this - and for motives which have not yet been given to us - during February, March, and April 1961, we were entirely restrained in the development of our labor because of the poor admitance given to our plan. Our labor was reduce to the sending of some propaganda to Latin America, to the organising of files of contacts and organizations, and to the maintaining relations with them by mail. However, at the beginning of March 1961 the first three DRE Delegations in Latin America were stablished : Costa Rica, Venezuela , and Mexico. These Delegations practically, received no economic support for more than five months (they subsisted almost only by their own means) and so its labor was reduced to the least.

GIRON INVASION; NEW OUTLOOKS

New possibilities in the Latin American ground were disclosed when, on the 17 th of April, the invasion through Playa Giron was defeated by the Communist forces, demonstrating thus the mistake which the administration of the United States had performed in not relying upon continental publick opinion which had been skillfully influenced by Castrist propaganda. An objective glance on the actual reality clearly made this known to us, continental opinion supported the Castro regime, Latin American youth beheld Fidel Castro as the legendary leader who would guide the Latin American people towards their total emancipation and development. Little or nothin had been done to face this skillful propaganda. The possibilities of opening a battle front against Castrism in the Latin American countries - the fundamental point of our plan - began to be taken into consideration. The first attempts were;

1.- In May 1961, our members Zoila Dias, Marta Elena Rosdrigues and Raul Gonzales Simon were sent to Sao Paolo, Brazil, and stayed there for one month carrying through labors of propaganda.

2.- Immediately after Alberto Muller, Secretary-General of the DRE, was caught, a Delegation composed by Jorge Dorticos, Rogelio Helu and Joaquin Perez Rodrigues, traveled through Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile working to avoid the execution of our Secretary-General by the Castro regime. The labor it accomplished together with the labor accomplished in other countries turned public opinion towards our cause. When the Deletation arrived at Montevideo, Uruguay, the " Congreso por la Libertad y la Democracia " was being held in that city, and the Delegation was invited to take part in it, holding an outstanding posture in its acting.

3.- Immediately after the trial of our Secretary-General, Alberto Muller, and other 32 prisoners with him, one of the strongest and most successful campaigns we have accomplished, was carried through. Four delegations were urgently sent to Latin America, organized as follows.

Brazil - Raul Gonzales Simon, Mario Garcia, Jose Basulto
Chile - Nelson Amaro, Alejandro Portes, Rafael Oller
Argentina- Rogelio Helu, Jorge Dorticos.
Uruguay - Eduardo Muniz, Rene Morato, Ramon Machado

At the same time, cables were sent from our main office at Miami to all the governments of the continent, Student Unions, and civic organizations, making use of the contacts we had made by mail from our beginnings. The results of the campaign were really astonishing. All the governments of the continent pleaded in favor of Muller and the other prisoners, almost all the Student Unions, countless civic organizations did the same, public manifestations were made in Mexico, Panama, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, stones were thrown at the Cuban Embassy at Bolivia all the Liceos (High Schools) in Montevideo, Uruguay, went on strike on the day of the trial, the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria(FEUH) in Honduras also went on strike for one day, through the streets of San Jose, Costa Rica, a great student manifestation was made, and the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEUCR) proposed to change Alberto Muller for one tractor.
The labor performed was so effective that traitor Ernesto Che Guevara, in his interview with President Janio Quadros during his stop at Brazilia returning from the Conferencia Interamericana Economica y Social (CIES), was asked from the Brazilian government to spare the lives of Muller and the other prisoners. We must point out that in speech pronounced by Guevara

in the city of Manzanillo in Oriente province, Cuba, he stated that in his trip through South America he had seen certain stirring in favor of a group of prisoners caugh in Cuba. (He was evidantly talking about the campaign in favor of Muller) . This Campaing clearly showed the great possibilities we had in Latin America and the urgent need to carry through all the nations the great truth of what was happening in Cuba.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PLAN

In Agust, 1961, the fust conversations to achieve the economic support for our plan were held. They lasted for approximately one month because we were not in accordance on several points. It was decided that permanent delegations were to be established in Latin America and for such purpose we made a well-studied and detailed plan in which we exposed our opinion on how to develop the labor throughout the continent. Unfortunately, many of the points we exposed in the plan were not approved (time gave us after the reason for as labor was being developed it was necessary to enforce many of the points which had once been rejected) and we began to develop the plan through the limited means we passessed to achieve the objectives we had assigned ourselves. The main objective in the first plan of the DRE were:

A.- Make the DRE known through continental public opinion, principally the Students ' opinion.
B.- Make openly known the truth of what was happening in Cuba through all the means which could be useful.
C.- Stir public opinion in favor of our cause.

Delegation were established in less than three months in the following countries : Costa Rica, Venezuela , Mexico, Bolivia , Brazil (Sao Paolo) , Peru, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay. Later, Delegations were established in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Puert Rica and Santo Domingo and Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) The activity unfolded since then needs not be narrated, not only because it would take mucha time , but also because evident facts demostrate the importance and the dimension achieved by the labor in the plan of the DRE for Latin America. In general form we will list wome of the most important events during this period of time.

1.- 27th of November: day of duel for Latin American Students in memory of the Students executed in Cuba. At the IV Latin American Assembly of Students (CLAE) to which a DRE Delegation assisted and which we detail later on this report, it was decided to declare the 27th of November (date in whichi 8 students of Medicine were shot by the Spanish soldiers during the Cuban war of Independence) day of duel for Latin American students. This date was commemorated in almost all the Latin American countries, being this one of the first great blows we achieved coordinately throughout the continent. All the acts which were performed and the propaganda which was issued are filed in our office.

2.- Student manifestation in Costa Rica on the 17th of October. It was possibly the greatest student manifestation that has taken place in San Jose. More than 6.000 students asking the goverment to break relations with Castro were present at it.

3.- The campaign to save the life of Miguel Garcia Armengol. For this campaign, as well as for the campaign in favor of Muller, we appealed to every means possible, thus attaining the help from the Latin American governments and from almost all the Student Unions and civic organizations of the continents.

4.- The campaign to save the life of Hans Gengler and Juan Pereira (Juanin) As in the previous campaigns, we moved continental public opinion in favor of our just demands. Unfortunately, our dear Juan Pereira Varela was killed in the coast of Cuba, before the pleadings for mercy from all places of the continent reached Castro and before the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Brazil, San Thiago Dantas, could interseds for his life, as he had promised Jose I. Rodriguez, with whom he had held a private interview. The whole account on the labor we accomplished for this campaign and for the campaign in favor of Miguel Garcia Armengol, is filed in our offices.

5.- Help rendered to Latin American Student Unions. From the Latin American outlook, this labor has probably been one of the most important labors carried through by our Delegations. During this year many of our Delegations have worked intimately with the democratic leaders of the Student Unionsof the continent in order to throuw the Communists out from the positions which they control and to attain success in student elections of simply maintain the actual positions held. Some efforts which deserve to be named are: The labor accomplishe by our Delegation in Panama due to which (according to the exact words of student leaders in Panama) the direction of the Union de Estudiantes Universitarios (UEU) which had follen in Communist control, was reconquered by the Democrats. The labor accomplished by our Delegation at Venezuela has been perhaps the mos important, through which student groups of the Partido Social Cristiano (COPEI) and the Partido Accion Democratica (AD) have stronly apposed in armedactions the Communist groups which control the University and have even received the compliments of President, Romulo Betancourt. The labor accomplished by our Delegation at Honduras, through which it has helped and guided the democratic administration of the Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria (FEUH) and also payed for the publication of the newspaper "Avance", official reporter of the FEUH. The account on the labor carried through by the DRE together with the Confederacion Universitaria de Bolivia, the Federacion Universitaria del Peru, with that of opposition of Uruguay, Argentina and Brasil and Santo Domingo is filed in our offices.

6.- The system of propaganda of the Section of International Relations. Our system of propaganda is probably one of the most strong in the student Latin American ground, in spite of the limited means we possess. Our labor of propaganda has been so intensive that we have practically had to use a larger place, to file the propaganda the Delegations have issued and sent us. We have maintained the best relations with Latin American press, which frequently publishes articles on the DREalso the international news agencies (UPI, AP, etc.) have published cables related to the DRE. For the better understanding of the labor developed we are going to divide it in written propaganda and propaganda by radio broadcasts.

a.- Written propaganda

Mexico.- Tho newspaper " Ataque ", official reporter of the Delegation, is published. Many pamphlets,as the one about the 27th of November, and tons of written propaganda have been edited.

Costa Rica.- Posters and great amounts of written propaganda have been printed and pamphlets edited by our main office at Miami have been printed again.

Venezuela .- "Trinchera", official reporter of the DRE Delegation at Maracaibo, is edited in Maracaibo. The Delegation at Caracas has printed the pamphlet, "Cuba, Misery and Hunger", propaganda which had been edited in Miami,as the pamphlet " Mire Ud como nos autodeterminamos ". Posters and tons of written psopaganda have been also printed .

Peru .-TheDelegation aids the edition of the magazine "Clamor", though not in the name of the DRE. The series of pamphlets " Seguiremos Informando " are edited and also posters and lots of written propaganda.

Uruguay.- The DRE Delegation at Uruguay edited the pamphlet "Cuba Comunista" and has also edited a great amount of written propaganda.

Ecuador .-The Delegation has edited the pamphlet " Fidel Castro tridos a America", countless posters,and has printed again propaganda received from Miami,

Brazil .- The Delegation at Rio de Janeiro has edited the pamphlets "Bases para revolucion latinoamericana ", "Que es el DRE". The Delegation at Sao Paolo has also edited countless pamphlets with photograph illustrations.

Santo Domingo .- The Delegation has printed lots of propaganda sent by the main office at Miami.

Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Panama, Honduras .- These Delegations has printed Propaganda edited by the main office at Miami, also posters and lots of propaganda, and have regularly written articles in the press.

b.- Propaganda by radio broadcasts

Honduras.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" by radio America,

Santo Domingo.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" which lasts 30 minutes by Radio Caribe.

Venezuela.- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" which lasts 30 minutes, by radio "Libertad"

Costa Rica.- The Delegation broadcast " Trinchera Estudiantil Cubana" three times a week by " Voz de la Victor"

Panama.- The Delegation broadcasts "Trinchera" three times a week by radio Miramar .

Chile.- The Delegation broadcasts "Trinchera" once a week by radio Chile

Bolivia.- The Delegation broadcasts daily " Trinchera" by radio "Amauca"

Uruguay.- The Delegation broadcasts " Trinchera" three times a week by radio " Rural".

Colombia- The Delegation broadcasts daily "Trinchera" by radio"Santa Fe"

Peru, Ecuador, Puerto Rico, - broadcast weekly programs.

c.- Photographic propaganda.

There can be no doubt that the success attained in this fiel is of the greatest importance. The main office has been supplying photographic material to the Delegations for several months, so that they could use it for propaganda. A great blow was achieved with the photographs illustrating the events at the Ecuador Embassy in Cuba, when three Cubans, seeking political assile, tried to enter the Embassy and were shot by the militia being already inside Ecuatorian field. These photographs were distributed among all the Delegations and a day was appointed for their publication in all places of the continent. Thus, a great success was achieved. This same the photographs were published in almost all the Latin American newspapers, and, later, they were even published in extra-continental press.

It is of vital importance to point out the success achieved by the photograph exhibition, organized by the photograph department of the Section of International Relations. This exhibition was composed of 30 enlarged photographs to be shown at public squares and organizations and were sent to each Delegation. These exhibitions are still being shown in Latin America. Thousands of persons have visited them and the success achieved up-to-date has been great.

7.- Intelligence and Agitation. During one lo ng year we have received through the Delegations many informations on Castrist activities throughout the continent, as well as on Communist activities in general. Stirring has neither been absent - Two libraries of the Communist Party were destroyed in Montevideo, a place were support for Fidel Castro was received was also destroyed in Montevideo, and students groups in Venezuela have been trained.

THE CHANCELLORS ' CONFERENCE

When the Chancellors' Conference was held inJanuary 1961, there was a plan to turn public opinion in favor of taking energetic steps against the Castro regime. For this purpose, the 25th of January was appointed as the day in which " La Marcha del Silencio" (The Silence March) was to be carried through in the principal Latin American cities, to give support to the Conference and protestd for the crimes accomplished by the Castro Communist Regime. The results were truly astonishing. In Bolivia more than 20,000 people took part in " La Marcha del Silencio", they all carried lighted torches since it was at night fall. In Peru , more than 10,000 persons were assembled and in Guayaquil, Ecuador, around 5,000. Also smaller manifestations were made in Honduras, Panama, Mexico, and Colombia. The DRE Delegation sen to the Chancellors ' Conference visited several countries before arriving at Montevideo, so as to develop in them the labor of propaganda and organization previous to the events that would take place during the Conference. This Delegation was divided in two groups. The first one was composed by Juan M. Salvat, Fernando Garcia Chacon, Jose Maria Lasa, Ernesto Fernandez Travieso, and Mario Pita. This group visited Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. The second group was composed only by Eduardo Muniz, who visited Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, and Brazil. During this trips, press conferences, interviews with secretaries of Foreign Relations, and with Presidents of the nations, were held. In Uruguay, the first photograph exhibition was shown in the Plaza Libertad, a gigantic meeting was held in Montevideo and four meetings were held in other cities of the country (San Carlos, Piriapolis, Minas, and Maldonado), pest bombs were placed at the Communist meeting in the University, press conferences were held, and radio programs were broadcasted, all during the Conference.

In a general form, we have explained some of the activities developed by the Section Of International Relations of the DRE. It would be impossible to describe them all completely.

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ASSEMBLIES

We are going to narrate separately the labor accomplished by the Section of International Relations in the international student assemblies, for it results of great importance. The DRE has sent Delegations to three great student assemblies: IV CLAE (Congreso Latinoamericano de Estudiantes), III CEUCA (Congreso de Estudiantes Universitarios de Centro America) and X CIE (Conferencia Internacional De Estudiantes). A Delegation was also sent to travel through several countries of Africa (Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Egipto, Marruecos, Nigeria, Argelia, and Tunez) in order to establish contacts with the Student Unions of Africa in preparation for the CIE.

a-. IV Congreso Latinoamericano de Estudiantes (IV CLAE)

The DRE sent a Delegation to the IV CLAE -the most important LatinAmerican student assembly- composed by: Luis Fernandez Rocha, Luis Boza Dominguez, Joaquin Perez, Jose I. Rodrigues Lombillo, Antonio B. Abella, and Eduardo Muniz.

The report on the labor accomplished by this Delegation in the IV CLAE -a Delegation from the FEU of Cuba was present at it also- has been already presented. But we will only list the following resolutions which were taken in the assembly due to our vigorous action.

Condemn the executions of students in Cuba.
Demand freedom for Alberto Muller and the other imprisoned students.
Proclaim the 27th. of November day of duel for Latin American students, in memory of the Cuban students that have been executed.
Ask the Comision de Estudios e Informacion (RIC), organism of the International Student Conference, to perform an investigation on the situation of Cuban students.

b-. Congreso de Estudiantes Universitarios De Centro America (III CEUCA)

The DRE sent a delegation to this assembly, held in San Jose, Costa Rica, led by Rogelio Helu and composed by delegates of the DRE in Costa Rica. The celebration of the III CEUCA did not finally take place because the Unions controlled by Communists asked that the Cuban Revolution be given a vote of confidence. Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, opposed this petition. At this critical situation, the democratic delegation retired, finishing thus the Assembly and leaving the Communists unable to reach their objective.

c-. Conferencia Internacional de Estudiantes (X CIE)

In the X CIE just held at Quebec, Canada, the DRE Delegation obtained the greatest success ever in the assistance to a student assembly. This Delegation was composed by: Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo, Rafael Tremols, Joaquin Perez, Lourdes Casals, Rogelio Helu, and Eduardo Muniz. Their assistance at the assembly turned out to be a great success owing to the efforts of the Delegation. The assembly condemned, with only one vote of opposition from India, the executions and imprisonments of Cuban students and the suspension of the publication of the newspapers of the University by the Totalitarian State.

Copies of this resolution will be sent to all Student Unions of the world, to the United Nations, and to the government of Fidel Castro. The report on the X CIE will soon be delivered.

d-. The Delegation sent by the DRE to Africa

On the last days of May, 1962, the DRE sent a delegation to Africa composed by Jose I. Rodriguez Lombillo, Raul Gonzalez Simon, and Lourdes Casals. They traveled through these countries: Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, Marruecos, Tunez, and Argelia. They established contacts with the leaders of Student Unions and distributed among them extensive informations on the actual situation of Cuban Students, translated to English and French. The leaders were greatly impressed by the panphlet "The Parversion of a University". The positive sesults of this trip to Africa were clearly disclosed at the X CIE, where the Student Unions from Ghana, Nigeira and Kenya ardently defended us.

e-. Actually the DRE is planning to send a Delegation to the Festival Mundial de la Juventud whcih will be held this year at Helsinki, Finland.

DRE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

DEFICIENCIES AND DIFFICULTIES

During more than one year of vigorous working, the Section of International Relations has encountered countless deficiencies and difficulties, many of which have been already surpassed, though others still prevail. We will state bellow the main difficulties which we are actually facing and which we endeavor to surpass as soon as possible.

1.- Personnel

The problem on lack of personnel has been and is one of the main difficulties which the Section has encountered in its labor. Countless are the motives for this, among which we can list.

A.- Lack of capable personnel : Due to the importance of the labor developed in Latin America, the personnel with capacity for the work is not very abundant.

B.- Personal problems of the aspirants to Delegates : This is one of the most conflictive motives we are actually facing.
More than exile by the Cuban people, what is actually taking place is a massive exodus of our people. Consequently, being in the need of working to help their families, many Delegates have had to give up their labors and cooperation with us. In many cases, aspirants to Delegates have been forced to abandon the Plan remaining only a few days for their departure.

C.- Problems on obtaining visas: The difficulties in obtaining the visas for several countries (like Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, Santo Domingo) has also , on many occasions, hindered the departure of the Delegates for Latin America. There is a specific example in Mexico, for which it has been absolutely impossible to obtain the visas; in spite of all the efforts made. Many delegates in these said conditions of inactivity have consequently abandoned the plan.

D.- Problems of Delegates in the respective countries: The problems the Delegates have had to face in the different countries have been so many that it results imposible to outline them all. We will try to point out those which we consider are the most important:

a.- Economic difficulties : The Delegates lacked operational funds to develop their plans for approximately one year. Their field of operation was logically reduced to the least. Actually the delegates do have these funds, though, evidently, many of the plans could not be carried through them.

b.- Problems with American officials in the different countries: Though in the majority of the countries our relations are the best, nevertheless, we have had to face problems in some. For example, in Honduras we have had to change the Delegate due to pressure of Batista supporters. In our Delegation at Sao Paolo, Brazil, our Delegates have even had to clean fields, just as simple workers, (they were not sent to Latin America for such purposes) and further more they have even been prohibited to use the name of the DRE.

C) Psychological pressures which influence on the Delegates. One ought to understand the situation which a DRE Delegate has to encounter in Latin America. Generally, they are young boys and the lonesome atmosphere in which they are, influences greatly upon them. In repeated occasions we have stated the need of making frequent trips to the Delegations, but up to the present, no heed has been paid to our demand. We consider this of vital importance and, once again, we state our demand of traveling to the Delegations in order to maintain high the moral of the Delegates and to avoid a feeling of forlornness and isolation in them.

We have briefly exposed some of the deficiencies and difficulties which we are actually facing. They have been written in the best spirit and not moved by any wrong motive, but for the only purpose of attaining a prompt solution for our problems.

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M.

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DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
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MEXICO.-

Due to the special situation of the DRE Delegation at Mexico, it fundamentally worked on the following points:

a) Denunciation of the presence of Russian troops and war equipment in Cuban soil. We enclose abundant material and the map the Delegation gave the press which published it throughout the world.

b) Demonstrating that Castro has weaknesses throuhg the shelling of Havana's seacoast.

c) Celebration of a Mass on the 8th of September at the Cathedral of Mexico, which resulted in a great success.

At the same time a great campaign for a declaration signed by the Mexican people backing up the Chancellors' Assembly is being carried through. We enclose paper clippings, articles, maps, etc.

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PERU.-

The Delegation at Peru performed the following activities:

A.- It gave out numerous press communiques denouncing the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba.

B.- Declarations about the attack to Havana's seacoast by members of the D.R.E were made and great support was obtained.

C.- An article appeared on the "Time" Magazine of September 7 , 1962 was traslated and distributed in great amount. The article narrated the present and past actions of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil

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VBR

Bombardeo a Cuba fue militarmente premeditado - dicen jóvenes cubanos

300 mil son los exilados que luchan por liberar a Cuba de rojos

Que el último bombardeo a La Habana, por miembros del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, fue "militarmente premeditado", revelaron a LA CRONICA, Roberto Pérez San Román y Rafael Quintero, miembros de la Brigada de Asalto 2506 que participaron en la invasión a la isla Cochinos y que actualmente visitan el Perú. El primero, tiene el cargo de Jefe de Artillería. En su visita a nuestro diario estuvieron acompañados de Rolando Fernández, delegado del DRE en el Perú.

Manifestaron también que esos ataques se estaban preparando desde hace tiempo y que en el momento del bombardeo al hotel ICAP, Fidel Castro se encontraba comiendo con los técnicos rusos. "De allí el bombardeo al hotel", dijeron.

Revelaron igualmente que el gobierno de Fidel Castro va a fusilar a seis jóvenes, entre ellos estudiantes y líderes obreros y campesinos, acusados de ser autores de los bombardeos. Esto, sin juicio previo.

Como se sabe, el bombardeo a La Habana, se produjo en la noche del viernes 24 del presente, hecho que motivó que Cuba culpase a Estados Unidos de ser el autor intelectual.

[illegible] Roberto Pérez San Román manifestaron que y Rafael Quintero participaron dos en el bombardeo, lanchas con 23 hombres al mando del Secretario del DRE en Miami, Juan Manuel Salvat. Los 23 hombres no pasan de los 23 años.

El objetivo de estos dos exilados cubanos, miembros del Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, recorrer toda Latinoamérica, con el objeto de informar sobre la verdadera situación de Cuba. Ellos ya han visitado Caracas, Montevideo y Santiago, y posteriormente encumbrarán a Colombia y de allí a Centro América.

Dijeron también que visitaban Latinoamérica, para recabar toda ayuda que estos países podrían proporcionar y contribuir así a la liberación de la Cuba oprimida.

"Hay en Miami — manifestaron — más de 300,000 exilados cubanos que están haciendo esfuerzos desesperados por lograr la liberación de su país. Ellos — continuaron — prefieren morir luchando por la liberación que estar impasibles ante los fusilamientos impunes que se hacen en Cuba".

Revelaron que en la prisión de La Cabaña se encuentran Manuel Guillot, estudiante de la Universidad de La Habana, y Enrique Cepero, sobrino de un actual Ministro de Fidel Castro.

Los exilados cubanos que actualmente se encuentran en el país. De izquierda a derecha, Rolando Fernández, Delegado Oficial en el Perú del DRE, y Roberto Pérez San Ramón y Rafael Quintero, miembros de la Brigada de Asalto 2506.

DECLARACIONES DE ROLANDO FERNANDEZ

El Delegado en el Perú del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil de Cuba, Rolando M. Fernández, declaró "que la actual política de Estados Unidos con respecto de Cuba parece querer ingresar a una etapa de convivencia".

"Llegó a esta conclusión — expresó — luego de considerar las afirmaciones hechas por el Departamento de Justicia y el Encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado del país del Norte, referentes al bombardeo efectuado desde el mar contra una zona militar de La Habana, y la incautación por el gobierno estadounidense de las dos embarcaciones que tomaron parte en la citada acción naval".

"Me pregunto — dijo el Delegado cubano — ¿qué beneficios puede aportar a la democracia, a la lucha contra el comunismo amenazante una actitud como la que está adoptando Estados Unidos? Me pregunto, también, si es posible creer que vamos a fortalecer la democracia impidiendo actuar a los cubanos demócratas o si va a aumentar el prestigio del sistema occidental cristiano disponiéndose la incautación de los instrumentos que sirven a la lucha contra el comunismo ateo".

"Yo en particular, desearía equivocarme en la consideración de los propósitos norteamericanos, porque juzgo que una política de convivencia de la democracia continental o de la democracia estadounidense con Cuba comunista no arrastraría sino una secuencia de perjuicios muy grandes para el sistema Interamericano y el robustecimiento del comunismo en América. Lamentablemente, empiezo a dudar de las palabras del Presidente Kennedy, en el sentido de que "Cuba no será abandonada".

"El movimiento democrático de los cubanos en el exilio y de los cubanos de la resistencia en Cuba contra el régimen de Castro, reitero, o discrepa totalmente de toda actitud o política que pretenda dirigirse o se dirija a lograr una coexistencia con el comunismo que desgobierna a la república del Caribe. Estamos, por el contrario, de acuerdo con toda posición que no signifique daño para la democracia continental y sí, más bien, el debilitamiento y la destrucción del [illegible] en Cuba y sus ves- [illegible] vo, más que el [illegible]

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écnicos" rusos comenzaron a forti

ES ESTARIAN INSTALANDO CERCA DE GUANTANAMO. — CRECE LA PREOCUPACION EN LO

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galpa, A- (UPI) — dos com- se dijo la mañana misterioso no estuvo dose a fl- la pasada frente al insular de manaja, en el rtamento de de la Paha.

cigalpa, A- 27 (AFP) — submarino de nacionalidad des- conocida fue a- vistado ayer tarde frente al puerto Guanaja, en isla del mismo nombre, sobre el litoral Atlántico Honduras

WASHINGTON. — PROTESTA DE REFUGIADOS CUBANOS. — Un policía contempla el paso de un piquete de refugiados cubanos los cuales llevan rótulos con las inscripciones: "Rusos, váyanse a Moscú" y "Rusos no metan sus narices en Cuba". La protesta se originó ante el anuncio de que tropas y técnicos soviéticos habían desembarcado en La Habana.

NUEVA YORK, 27 (UPI).—La fortificación de Cu gana de cantidades importantes de técnicos militares y del bloque soviético, se realiza mientras el Gobierno de se diariamente que aviones norteamericanos de la base tenemos "violan" el espacio aéreo y las aguas territoriales

Aún no ha sido determinada la relación que puede existir entre los hechos. Se sabe que autoridades norteamericanas están preocupadas particularmente ante la posibilidad de que entre el equipo automático por la Unión Soviética haya proyectiles de lanzamiento lateral, por ejemplo.

La instalación de este equipo cerca de Guantánamo, por ejemplo, podría aumentar peligrosamente la tirantez cubano-norteamericana con respecto a la inmensa base naval que el Primer Ministro Fidel Castro confía en que eventualmente estará bajo su control, según indicaron fuentes políticas.

En los dos últimos meses, el Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas de Cuba publica comunicados diarios en los que acusa a aviones, barcos y submarinos norteamericanos de "violar" territorio cubano. En su mayoría, las supuestas violaciones ocurrieron alrededor de la base de Guantánamo.

La más reciente de estas acusaciones, publicada ayer, dice que un avión norteamericano voló sobre varias poblaciones en la provincia de Matanzas durante una acción que duró 28 minutos después de la medianoche del viernes. El comunicado no indicó de qué manera pudo ser establecido el punto de origen del avión.

Según el comunicado, un avión bimotor voló el viernes sobre un barco cubano en aguas de Cuba, al noreste de Mariel.

El estilo, contenido y continuidad de estas acusaciones se asemejan mucho a las "advertencias" frecuentes que la radio de Pekín, en China Comunista, dirige a Estados Unidos, al acusar a embarcaciones y aviones norteamericanos de cometer "violaciones" territoriales.

Los comunicados cubanos frecuentemente contienen acusaciones ag cionales, sobre ataques armados de la Infantería de Marina norteameric na "hacia Cuba" desde la base.

El anuncio hecho el viernes último por el Gobierno norteamericano sobre la llegada de refuerzos soviéticos a Cuba coincidió con las afir maciones de exilados cubanos de que tropas rusas y de otros países c "bloque soviético" se encuentran en gran número en La Habana.

No obstante, funcionarios norteamericanos se refirieron a "técnic y a "técnicos militares" y no a soldados.

El anuncio fue hecho, además, pocas horas antes de que refu cubanos, en dos lanchas, lanzaran un ataque contra el litoral de La bana, el viernes por la noche, utilizando un cañón de 20 milímetros

Un grupo de estudiantes exilados en Miami se atribuyó la resp bilidad por el ataque. El Departamento de Justicia norteamericano cio pocas horas después que investigaría el hecho para determinar grupo había violado la Ley de Neutralidad de Estados Unidos. Un voz del Departamento dijo hoy que "la cuestión seguía siendo exam

El Gobierno de Fidel Castro publicó el sábado una declaración que acusaba a Estados Unidos por el ataque. Dijo que había sido zado por "el Gobierno norteamericano y los agentes mercenarios diendo a los refugiados cubanos anticomunistas" que ha reclutado mado".

Castro agregó que su Gobierno había tomado "todas las med cesarias" para hacer frente al ataque norteamericano.

El Presidente de Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticós, pronunció ayer un en el cual, al igual que Castro, aludió a los preparativos defe Cuba.

Los diarios de Cuba" anunciaron ayer que "ciudadanos nor nos" no identificados que viven en Cuba enviaron un cablegra sidente John F. Kennedy, exigiendo que "ponga término a es y retire todas las embarcaciones norteamericanas en la costa de

Los supuestos norteamericanos también enviaron un cab Secretario General Interino de las Naciones Unidas, Thant, intervención de la organización internacional "ante estas p que conducirán a una guerra nuclear y a la destrucción de la según la prensa castrista.

El Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, integrado por banos que residen en Miami, dijo que la acción contra el Habana incluyó el cañoneo de un teatro de La Habana en el braba una reunión de "técnicos" —presumiblemente del blo No descartaron la posibilidad de que Fidel Castro hubiese es

Sólo promesas convertidas en hambre hizo Fidel Castro al pueblo de Cuba

MIAMI, Agosto 27 (UPI).— Hace hoy justamente un año que el Primer Ministro de Cuba, Fidel Castro, prometió al pueblo cubano que en unos meses "su cinturón estaría nuevamente ceñido", y que serían resueltos los principales problemas de abastecimiento de la nación, según recordó un diplomático destacado en Cuba, de paso en esta ciudad.

Hace un año, tuvo lugar la primera reunión nacional de producción y el discurso central de ese acto fue dicho por Castro. El cuadro de promesas halagüeñas presentado por el Primer Ministro, afirmó el diplomático, fue el siguiente:

—En el mes de Diciembre de 1961, estaría resuelto plenamente el abastecimiento de aves en La Habana, y para el 1º de febrero del entrante año, en todos los mercados nacionales.

—A partir de Enero de 1962, la producción de viandas —tubérculos— superaría las necesidades del mercado nacional.

—En junio de 1962, la producción de pescado satisfaría la demanda del consumo.

—El 1º de Enero de 1963, quedaría abolido el racionamiento de grasas comestibles.

Sin embargo, apuntó el diplomático, en vez de la mejoría prometida, la situación se ha agudizado. Por primera vez en su historia, el pueblo cubano sufre los rigores e inconvenientes de la libreta de racionamiento para obtener alimentos.

Doce meses pues de aquella histórica reunión —agregó— la escasez de alimentos, ropas, zapatos y medicinas se hace más agobiadora.

Las futuras madres tienen que hacer largas colas, para obtener piezas de telas con qué hacer pañales. Ni siquiera pueden enviar a un familiar, pues para comprarlas tienen que exhibir su estado de gravidez.

En las tiendas de ropa interior de mujer o de hombre, sólo venden dos piezas por persona.

En las tiendas de calzado, para evitar que los escaparates se vean vacíos, se obliga a que sean llenados con cajas vacías.

En cuanto a los alimentos, el diplomático se remitió a las propias admisiones públicas de los gobernantes, durante el año actual, mucho después de las promesas de hace un año:

—El 24 de Marzo, el Presidente del poderoso Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, admitió que el "racionamiento empieza a sembrar el descontento y la desconfianza en nuestro pueblo". Castro a- [illegible] de Marzo, [illegible] tendremos q'

Canciller Unda de Guatemala, dice:

Presencia de tropas rojas en Cuba pondrá a prueba el Tratado de Rio

GUATEMALA, agosto 27. (UPI).— El Canciller Jesús Unda Murillo declaró hoy que la presencia de tropas comunistas rusas, checas y chinas en Cuba "justifica poner a prueba inmediatamente la efectividad de los artículos sexto y noveno del Tratado de Río de Janeiro que prevén el caso de agresiones armadas contra el Continente americano.

"Justificaría también una conferencia inmediata de Ministros de RR. EE. para tomar medidas en nuestra propia defensa, en lo que estimo que estarían de acuerdo muchos Gobiernos americanos" —agregó.

"La llegada de esas tropas a Cuba —explicó Unda Murillo— significa grave peligro para la América en general y especialmente para Centro América, considerada como el punto más vulnerable de la defensa del Continente.

"Ello es parte de la maniobra militar anunciada en Moscú hace tiempo, que persigue dividir al continente en dos fracciones, dejando aislados en esta forma a los Estados Unidos, que constituyen la fuerza militar más poderosa capaz de enfrentarse al comunismo soviético.

"Estos hechos —la llegada de tropas— pueden significar dos cosas: primero, que Castro ha perdido la confianza del propio pueblo y de las milicias populares y se ve obligado a recurrir a fuerzas mercenarias comunistas para sostenerse en el poder.

Cuba cree que EE.UU. invadirá la

CONSIDERAN QUE PRELUDIO ES GIRA DEL GENERAL TAYLOR Y MOVIMIENTO AER

PARIS, Agosto 27 (AFP).—"Los Estados Unidos preparan una acción directa contra Cuba". Tal es la opinión expresada en los círculos oficiales y en los diarios gubernamentales de Cuba después del ataque por mar lanzado el pasado viernes por la noche contra La Habana por contrarrevolucionarios cubanos.

Para establecer esta conjetura en La Habana se ha unido el ataque del viernes a cierto número de [illegible] concordantes": la gira efectuada por el General Maxwell Taylor, Jefe del Estado Mayor Conjunto Norteamericano, a las tres bases [illegible] situadas alrededor de Cuba, la presencia desde hace quince días frente a las costas norteñas de la Isla de un barco de observación estadounidense, el "Oxford", las "violaciones" del espacio aéreo cubano por aviones norteamericanos, sobre las cuales el Ministerio cubano de las Fuerzas Armadas lanzó ayer su 142 denuncia después del 1º de julio. Por otra parte, los exilados cubanos en Florida son presentados como "mercenarios al servicio de los Estados Unidos".

Por su lado, Lombardo Toledano, que dirige en México el Partido Popular Socialista, protestó ayer en la noche, lo mismo que otros movimientos de izquierda mexicanos, contra el ataque del pasado viernes, y declaró: "Si el Presidente Kennedy no condena esta agresión y a sus autores, la responsabilidad de esta nueva violación a la soberanía cubana recaería sobre el [illegible] un portavoz del Departamento de [illegible] de su país en la [illegible] los guardacostas estadounidenses utilizados en este

Anuncian en México rebelión de mi

Che Guevara voló a

La HABANA, agosto 27. — (AFP). — El Comandante Ernesto Guevara, Ministro de Industrias, partió hacia Moscú ayer domingo según reveló el matutino semioficial "Revolución". Viaja acompañado por el Capitán Emilio Aragonés, miembro del Secretariado de las ORI (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, es decir, la versión transitoria del Partido Único Marxista Leninista). Guevara es el principal dirigente económico del gobierno cubano. El viaje no fue anunciado con antelación.

Según "Revolución", Guevara [illegible] en Moscú sobre la futura [illegible] ería sovi-

milicianos cuba las sierras del contra el régi fuerzas antica el boletín del cionario Estu ción de Méx guardaban la de Bonilla, e taños de Esc juntarse con los antigober encuentran mente con sembarcaron por la costa de Las Vill dad de C letín.

El Dire

DRE fue responsable dice Departamento de Estad

En declaración oficial expresan que no podían aprobar que se utilice territorio de E.U. como base de acción na

Kennedy examina Tensión en Cuba

HY[illegible] PORT, MASSACHUSETTS, Agosto 25 (UPI). — El Pre lente John Kennedy, que pasa el fin le semana en Cape Cod examinó hoy odas las informaciones del Servicio e Inteligencia en relación con el aumento de la tirantez en Cuba.

En Washington, el gobierno negó ategóricamente la afirmación hecha or el Primer Ministro cubano Fidel astro, de que el bombardeo de la osta de La Habana "fue un ataque recto Norteamericano".

El Jefe de Estado conferenció por lefono con varios funcionarios. Dis ao que su principal asesor en cuesones militares realice inmediatamente una inspección de las instalaiones norteamericanas que se ven an directamente complicadas en cao de que el armamento fortificamiento del personal soviético en Cuba die lugar a algún incidente.

El Ayudante Naval del Presidente, apitán Tazewell Shepard, conferenó con Kennedy y lo puso al tanto e la información recogida por el Servicio de Inteligencia. A pesar de que mas se obtuvo información sobre el articular, se tiene entendido que la onferencia de hoy estuvo relacionaa con la situación en Cuba.

Fuentes oficiales en la residencia l Presidente en Cape Cod descartaron totalmente la denuncia de Casro de que el ataque fue realizado r Estados Unidos.

BAN HOUEI SAI, Laos. — CONTRA EL ENEMIGO ROJO. — Estos pacíficos ciudadanos se ven obligados a abandonar sus hogares ante el continuo hostigamiento de las guerrillas comunistas. Las fuerzas gubernamentales controlan la situación, pero no faltan los alevosos ataques de parte de incondicionales rojos que traicionan a su patria con tal de servir los inconfesables designios del Kremlin.

WASHINGTON, agosto 25 — (UPI). El Departamento de Estado declaró hoy que tiene pruebas de que el Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) [illegible] tista de Miami fue "responsable [illegible] ataque" contra el litoral del puerto de La Habana.

Un portavoz autorizado [illegible] el Servicio Guardacostas intenta el secuestro de los [illegible] involucradas.

El Departamento dijo que toda la operación [illegible] "ataque inspirado en la excitación del momento" no puede realmente derrotar el [illegible] comunista Cuba.

Al mismo tiempo, el Departamento de Justicia anunció que está investigando si la Ley de Neutralidad de los EE. UU. ha sido violada como consecuencia de [illegible].

"Aunque comprendemos los [illegible] sentimientos de este grupo de estudiantes [illegible] y su [illegible] hacia el régimen opresivo, no podemos aprobar que se utilice el territorio norteamericano como base de semejante acción", dijo el Encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado, Robert J. McCloskey, hablando con los periodistas.

Los funcionarios dijeron que el ataque probablemente fue realizado con dos lanchas a motor privadas.

Añadieron, sin embargo, que aún no saben si las lanchas salieron realmente de aguas norteamericanas para llevar a cabo la expedición.

Se tiene entendido que los miembros del DRE anticastrista en Miami están siendo interrogados allí funcionarios norteamericanos.

La Ley de Neutralidad considera un delito [illegible] zar en suelo de los EE. UU. una invasión contra país.

El anuncio del Departamento de Estado dice:

"Debemos informar a los participantes que toda petición de semejante acción por parte de cual grupo pudiera significar la aplicación de lo previst la Ley de Neutralidad".

Posteriormente, empero, dichos funcionarios di que esto no quiere decir que el grupo estudiantil a [illegible] de las leyes de los EE. UU.

Previamente, durante el día, el Departamento Estado había negado firmemente que los Estados Un estuvieran "involucrados en forma alguna o tuvieran nocimiento del ataque a Cuba que se ha anuncia

Los funcionarios aludidos dije que esa declaración es exacta, el Gobierno norteamericano no en ningún momento conocimiento plan.

En fuente norteamericana se que los dos embarcaciones involu das "presumiblemente están en aguas de los EE UU." No se plió esta declaración. Previame los funcionarios aludidos insinu que a su juicio elementos de la mada Cubana fueran responsables ataque.

Agregaron que unidades nav cubanas estuvieron realizando niobras recientemente y que en el sado el DRE se ha atribuido cré por actos en los que no tuvo pa pación.

WASHINGTON, agosto 25 — (U El Departamento de Justicia anu hoy que está investigando para de minar si la Ley de Neutralidad de Estados Unidos fue violada en ción con el ataque al litoral de Habana ocurrido anoche, que se anunciado.

Entretanto, el Departamento de tado negó categóricamente que habido "involucración o conocim to por parte de los Estados Un respecto del incidente, en que se alegó el Primer Ministro cubano, del Castro, "buques armados" caron el litoral de La Habana fuego de cañones.

La Ley de Neutralidad hubie do afectada en el caso de que expedición de cubanos exilados hubiera salido de algún lugar de Estados Unidos para llevar a esa aventura en La Habana.

La ley prevé que semejantes ex diciones no pueden ser organiz en suelo de esta nación.

Un organismo anticastrista, el rectorio Revolucionario Estudi (DRE) se responsabilizó con el dente. Un portavoz del DRE dijo dos pequeñas embarcaciones de organismo participaron en el ata

Una persona asociada con el mi miento dijo que las embarcacio partieron de las Bahamas.

Desembarcos y alzamientos se anun

INAR DEL RIO, ESCAMBRAY, SIERRA CRISTAL Y LOS ORGANOS FOCOS DE REBELION

MEXICO, agosto 25 — (AFP) El bombardeo efectuaanoche contra la costa Norte de la provincia de Habana, estuvo combinado con desembarcos de condos del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil Cubano, en la Provincia de Pinar del Río, informaron hoy igentes de este Directorio, en México.

Refiriéndose a la operación efectuada anoche con la capital cubana, Angel González y Modesto Vázez, que dirigen la sección de México del Directorio tudiantil, suministraron hoy los siguientes datos: embros del Directorio que están en exilio partieron che desde bases secretas, en varias embarcaciones, ra bombardear la costa Norte de la Provincia de La bana. Las bombas lanzadas hicieron blanco en el Ho "Rosita Hornedo", y se escogió este lugar por ser nde se concentran los técnicos rusos y checoslovacos han llegado a Cuba últimamente.

Al mismo tiempo, otras unidades de miembros del ectorio desembarcaban en la Provincia de Pinar del , mientras estudiantes del Directorio en La Habana ma se sublevaban y se internaban en la Sierra del ambray, en la Cordillera de Los Organos y en la rra Cristal. Campesinos y obreros en número todavía no determinado se han unido a estos estudiantes en mismos montes.

González especificó que ha habido ya encuentros con fuerzas castristas y que se han registrado bajas por bos lados, pero sin suministrar cifras. Añadió que no den dar datos sobre las fuerzas que desembarcaron que "son bastante crecidas" y están al mando de uno los altos jefes del Directorio Estudiantil.

Seguidamente agregaron que según informaciones tenían fueron muertos muchos de los técnicos soviéticos que están en La Habana, pero sin concretarse a más detalles. "Esperamos que esta operación sirva o catalizador para que el pueblo cubano se subleve, estaba siendo esperado por los cubanos que tran en la clandestinidad en el interior de Cuba y ha ficiado algo así como un "grito de guerra" para el ntamiento contra Castro", prosiguió Vázquez.

Ninguno de los dos dirigentes quiso dar precisiones e las bases secretas de las cuales partieron las emaciones que efectuaron el bombardeo de La Ha, pero indicaron que las armas y los barcos que n a los cubanos que realizan tal operación son mu-

Delegado de los estudiantes anticastristas hace declaraciones sobre bombardeo a Cuba

El delegado Oficial en el Perú, del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, Rolando M. Fernández, declaró ayer "que las declaraciones formuladas por el Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos son impropias e improcedentes, ya que lo que se ha violado no es la Ley de Neutralidad de ese país, sino el Tratado de Río celebrado por los cancilleres de la Organización de Estados Americanos, al permitir en este Continente en primer lugar el propio Gobierno de los Estados Unidos— que impunemente tengan acceso a la Isla del Caribe, barcos repletos de armas y hombres procedentes de una potencia extracontinental."

En relación con las declaraciones hechas por Robert Mac Closkey, encargado de Prensa del Departamento de Estado, Rolando M. Fernández dejó constancia, "Que la Delegación del DRE en el Perú es la que no comprende de cómo si el Departamento de Estado se da cuenta de la actual situación existente en ese Hemisferio— como consecuencia de la intervención comunista en Cuba— formula semejantes declaraciones".

Para nosotros los cubanos —afirmó el Delegado del DRE en el Perú— la Liberación de Cuba de las garras del comunismo que la oprime, ha estado y estará siempre por encima de cualquier otra consideración, y jamás estaremos dispuestos a entrar en una política de convivencia con los rojos.

Al conocerse la noticia del bombardeo a La Habana, el Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, por intermedio de su delegado en Lima, emitió el siguiente comunicado:

Como era de esperar, los últimos acontecimientos que se refieren al traslado a Cuba de soldados y material bélico comunista realizado por buques soviéticos ha provocado la reacción enérgica de las fuerzas contrarias al régimen de Castro.

Es, pues, la intervención militar comunista en Cuba la que ha originado el bombardeo de un hotel de La Habana en el que se hospedaban militares de países de detrás de la Cortina de Hierro y la que ha precipitado el alzamiento armado de un importante grupo de patriotas del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil de Cuba en la histórica Sierra del Escambray.

Como era lógico, también, que tenía que ocurrir, el Gobierno de Castro con el claro propósito de engañar a la opinión continental trata de desprestigiar la valiente acción armada iniciada por las fuerzas que se le oponen. Ha llegado a decir, incluso, en una maniobra netamente demagógica, que los disparos hechos contra el citado hotel habían puesto en peligro la vida de varios niños.

Reiteramos la transmisión radiofónica del DRE lanzada al aire desde el mismo suelo cubano, que hizo un dramático llamamiento a las naciones del Mundo Libre sobre la situación cubana y planteó la "lucha frontal contra el despotismo rojo", las declaraciones sobre cómo Cuba comunista vulnera impunemente los tratados de Defensa Continental como el de Río de Janeiro, la Carta de Bogotá y los acuerdos de Punta del Este y la política de "guerra total al presidio que las circunstancias nos exigen". José Antonio Echevarría con sus ideas en marcha.

[illegible] "LIFE", DE FECHA 7 [illegible] DE 1962.-

P: 7

[illegible]

El estaba solo en la calle, su sombra era el otro único objeto que se movía. Nerviosamente iba de un lado a otro, como si no supiera adonde dirigirse. En la callada y calurosa tarde, su voz se escuchó perfectamente cuando gritó: "No tire más". Varios hombres situados en la [illegible] levantaron sus rifles. Los primeros tiros lo alcanzaron en la espalda. La víctima tropezó y cayó. Luego los hombres pasaron por encima de él, aplastándole la cabeza.-

- Ruby Hart Phillips,
en Cuba, Isla Paradójica.-

* * *

Este suceso parece un episodio ocurrido bajo el régimen comunista de Fidel Castro; o quizá bajo el de su predecesor, el Dictador Fulgencio Batista. En realidad este incidente ocurrió hace casi 30 años atrás, durante el régimen de otro tirano cubano, Gerardo Machado. La victima era un estudiante, apresado por realizar actividades contra el gobierno, quien fué deliberadamente fusilado, mientras trató de escapar. La brutalidad no es nada nuevo en la Perla de las Antillas; tampoco lo es, el valor.-

El pequeño bombardeo en la Habana castrista, hace 15 días, fué obra de una nueva generación de estudiantes cubanos que no está de acuerdo con el gobierno. Estos estudiantes son miembros del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil.-

[illegible]:

El Directorio se formó durante los sangrientos días de Machado, contribuyó a derribar al Dictador en 1933, asesinando al Jefe de la Policía Secreta y al Presidente del Senado. (Uno de los pocos fracasos, lo constituyó el intento de asesinar al propio Machado, abriendo un túnel que iba a dar a un cementerio, donde Machado pronunciaría un discurso fúnebre). El Directorio también se opuso al ex-sargento Batista, cuando tomó el poder en 1952. Encabezado por un estudiante de derecho, llamado José Antonio Echeverría, el Directorio llevó a cabo una serie de actos contra el Dictador Batista, por toda la Isla, cooperando entonces con Castro, pero manteniendo su independencia.-

Su acción más espectacular tuvo lugar en la tarde del 13 de Marzo de 1957, en el Palacio de Batista, en la Habana. Un camión llegó al Palacio y de él saltaron 35 estudiantes, miembros del Directorio. Lanzando granadas de mano y ametrallando, tomaron de sorpresa a la Guardia del Palacio, tiraron abajo las puertas, y llegaron hasta el segundo piso, antes de que muriera el último de ellos. Batista, tembloroso y con pistola en mano, estaba en el tercer piso.

//..

Cerca de la Universidad, Echeverría tomó una emisora de radio para llamar a ¡Revolución!, pero fué capturado por la policía, y fusilado luego. Hacía sólo unas semanas que él había dado al Directorio su lema: "Los estudiantes cubanos no tememos la muerte". En otro acto, miembros del Directorio irrumpieron en la Boite Montmartre en La Habana, y mataron al Jefe del Servicio de Inteligencia Militar de Batista.-

BOMBAS CON CAPA DE CHOCOLATE:

Después de la huída de Batista, de Cuba, en 1959, los miembros del Directorio tuvieron divergencias con Castro. En el mes de febrero de 1960, estudiantes del Directorio, llevaron a cabo la primer demostración contra el régimen comunista de Castro, un motín en La Habana, durante la colocación de una corona al Primer Diputado Soviético, Premier Anastas Mikoyan, ante el Monumento a José Martí. Dirigidos por el estudiante de derecho, Alberto Müller, de 20 años; y el de sociología, Juan Manuel Salvat, de 19 años; un grupo de jóvenes estudiantes del Directorio, tomaron las armas nuevamente, cuando el viejo comunista cubano Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, ocupó una cátedra universitaria.-

Los jóvenes volaron plantas generadoras de electricidad (su herramienta favorita la constituía una bomba recubierta con chocolate, que era fácil de transportar en el bolsillo), tomaron parte en el incendio que destruyó la tienda "El Encanto", en La Habana; usaron durante 3 meses una estación transmisora clandestina, desde donde salían al aire en un programa de 15 minutos, tres veces por semana, utilizando la frecuencia de un canal de T.V. de La Habana, que se encontraba en desuso. El Directorio estuvo también envuelto en el plan relacionado con la invasión de Bahía de Cochinos, pero sufrió consecuencias desastrozas: Müller, con órdenes de abrir un frente guerrillero en Sierra Maestra, no vió ninguno de los prometidos abastecimientos que le enviarían por paracaídas; tampoco recibió la noticia de la invasión, por lo que él mismo bajó de la Sierra para averiguar. Fué capturado, y actualmente está preso en la Isla de Pinos, condenado a 20 años de prisión. Aún así tiene suerte, el Directorio dice que entre 170 y 200 de sus miembros han sido fusilados luchando contra Castro.-

"Los [illegible]":

A pesar de sus víctimas, el Directorio es una de las pocas unidades efectivas, entre las 30 ó más, de grupos anticastristas que trabajan dentro y fuera de Cuba. El mes pasado, Salvat y tres miembros más del Directorio, viajaron a Helsinki para hostigar a la delegación castrista que se encontraba allí, participando en el Festival Mundial de la Juventud, patrocinado por los rojos. Salvat fué golpeado por 6 de sus compatriotas comunistas.-

Hace dos semanas, Salvat y 7 hombres más, salieron en una lancha veloz, de 31 pies, con un viejo cañón alemán de 20 mm. (que ellos compraron por 300 dólares), sobre la cubierta.-
Luego Isidro Borja, un estudiante de ingeniería, de 26 años, que comandaba el ataque, contó lo que había ocurrido:

"A las 9 p.m. vimos las luces de La Habana. Nos dirigimos directamente al Castillo del Morro, y dimos vuelta a la derecha. Contábamos con el hecho de que el radar estaba más alto que nuestra lancha, por lo que podíamos pasar por debajo. Llegamos a 250 yardas de la costa, frente al Hotel Rosita de Hornedo (donde se alojaban técnicos del bloque comunista). Hicimos fuego durante 7 minutos, efectuamos alrededor de 24 descargas. Nuestros proyectiles atravesaron las ventanas y las luces se apagaron. Cuando comenzamos a escapar, huímos de verdad. Pusimos los motores a toda velocidad, durante más tiempo del que se debía, luego disminuímos. Nos besamos unos a otros. Todos llorábamos como niños. Acabamos sentándonos en el piso de la lancha, y lloramos".-

H.

DRE

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

jose antonio echeverria con tus ideas en marcha

Aug '62

BRAZIL.-

The main campaign carried through by the Delegation was to move public opinion against the buildup of Russian troops in Cuba.

A trip was made to Minas de Gerais accepting the invitation of the members of the University Faculty. Also a meeting was held and excellent relations with the Organizacion de Centros Culturales were established. This group has its branches througout Brazil.

Another trip was made to the State of Santa Catarina. Six conferences were given there and condemnations to the Cuban case were broadcasted through the radio.

During the trip we obtained the support of the Union Florianapolitana of Secondary Students and of the Secondary and University State Unions. We enclose paper clippings.

Other activities carried through by the Delegation were:

a) A Mass at the Cathedral of Rio de Janeiro to commemorate the 8th of September

Publication of:

b) The pamphlet "Cuba Socialista". (We enclose one copy)

c) A campaign in favor of the Cubans under political asylum at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana.

d) A strong campaign in protest for the execution of Manuel Quillot by the Castro regime.

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19-124-26/3

Fundador
JAIRO CALLADO
Diretora
MARIA INA VAZ

A GAZETA
Jornal sem qualsquer ligações partidárias
ANO XXIX Florianopolis Domingo, 26 de Agôsto de 1962 NUMERO 7.179

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"Fidel Castro traiciono la revolucion!" -- declara o estudante cubano Benito Diaz

Convidado pela direção da União Catarinense dos Estudantes, encontra-se em nossa Capital, o estudante cubano Benito Diaz.

O acadêmico Rogério Duarte de Queiroz responsavel pela secção "Notícias Universitárias" dêste matutino procurou ouví-lo a respeito da Revolução Cubana, bem como da situação atual do regime imposto por Fidel Castro, resultando no que se segue.

Quem é Benito Diaz

Benito Diaz nosso entrevistado, iniciou seus estudos superiores na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Havana quando se viu forçado pelos acontecimentes a pedir e obter asilo na embaixada brasileira em Havana, lá permanecendo pelo espaço de três meses, após o que veio para nosso país no dia 28 de março dêste ano

Conta 20 anos de idade e continua atualmente seus estudos de Direito na Pontifícia Universidade Católica da Guanabara. Lutou ativamente contra o regime de Fulgêncio Batista participando da Frente Estudantil Nacional, que agrupava tanto estudantes secundários como universitários. Após a memorável vitória sobre Batista continuou apoiando a Revolução durante dois anos quando compreendeu que a mesma tinha sido traída em seus princípios. Daí em diante passou a lutar contra Fidel Castro principal traidor, filiando-se ao Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil — DRE —, usando de todos os meios necessários como guerrilhas, sabotagens constantes e atentados pessoais.

Cuba: Situação atual

Respondendo primeiramente, qual a situação atual de Cuba, declarou-nos Benito Diaz, que o racionamento de viveres e gêneros de primeira necessidade é constante, provocando com isso muitas desorderas e descontentamento na população. Apesar da bem armada e terrivel milícia, a luta contra Fidel continua progredindo. Comícios organizados contra o regime são sempre dissolvidos pelas armas sendo prêsos seus manifestantes .Contudo, é oportuno que se destaque — prossegue — que essas mesmas milícias viram-se contra Castro quando têm oportunidade de fazê-lo com êxito.

Quanto da chegada à Cuba de contingentes do exército russo disse que nada podia acrescentar além daquilo que tem lido através de jornais.

Frisou, porém, que quando de sua vinda ao Brasil, grande era o número de russos, tchecos e chineses que entravam diàriamente em Cuba com a finalidade de garantir o regime castro-comunista, mas, rotulados todos êles de técnicos, os quais vivem confortàvelmente instalados nas antigas mansões dos latifundiários inclusive com carros de luxo à disposição numa afronta ao bom povo de seu país.

O operário cubano

É lastimável as condições do operário cubano — declarou nosso entrevistado. Não possuem a mínima liberdade sindical sendo seus órgãos de classe dominados pelos comunistas, e seus legítimos líderes, como aconteceu com David Salvador secretário-geral da Confederação dos Trabalhadores de Cuba e dirigente máximo da clandestinagem operária contra Batista que foi condenado a 30 anos de prisão.

Além diso a classe operária cubana se viu privada do direito de greve, direito de enfermagem por nove dias, e 13.o salário que vinha percebendo há cinco anos. O regime castrista, impôs ainda um desconto mensal obrigatório de 14% dos salários e quase que diàriamente fazem-se coletas voluntári para todos os fins chegando-se e tão a um desconto aproximado 25% ao mês.

Como são realizados os comícios

Os famosos comícios de Fic Castro, são de fato muito conco ridos, pois para tanto são convic

(Continua na 5.a pág.)

«Fidel Castro...

(Continuação da 1.a página)

dos todos os operários. Aquêle que não aceita tal convite é tido como contra-revolucionário sofrendo as consequências de seu ato. E claro que a grande maioria prefere ouvir as demagogias de seu falso líder a ter que enfrentar "el paredón!

Resultados positivos da Revolução

Indagado dos resultados positivos da Revolução Cubana respondeu que a mesma conseguiu despertar o povo latino-americano para seus problemas.

Disse que as desapropriações e nacionalizações das emprêsas e companhias americanas de nada resolveram, pois apenas trocaram de patrão, passando para os russos.

Sôbre o ataque de Playa Girón

"Grande êrro que não devia ter sido cometido, pois destruiu completamente a clandestinagem e mesmo porque, não era o momento propício. Mal preparados militarmente, não consideraram as tropas de Fidel. O próprio povo cubano foi colhido de surprêsa pela invasão, pois não esperava".

Afirmou Benito, que não se precisará de nova invasão, pois Fidel Castro não permanecerá por muito tempo no poder.

Diretório Revolucionario Estudantil

O que é DRE? Explicou-nos o estudante cubano: "O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil — D.R.E. —, é o representante da opinião e do sentimento dos estudantes cubanos e por esta causa faz questão de levar ao conhecimento de todos os estudantes e povos da América Latina o que está acontecendo de verdade na minha terra. E mtodos os países de govêrno democrático de nosso continente temos representantes. No Brasil somos em seis quatro no Rio e dois em São Paulo".

Fez questão de acentuar que o DRE não é contra-revolucionário, mas, sim revolucionário contra a traição comunista!

Terminando suas declarações, pediu ao reporter que transmitisse aos estudantes e povo catarinenses o seu abraço cordial, e a confiança de melhores dias para Cuba!

O DRE de Cuba e o desembarque de tropas comunistas em Havana

"O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil de Cuba denuncia perante o povo de Santa Catarina o desembarque de cêrca de 10 mil soldados do bloco comunista mandados chamar por Fidel Castro neste momento que os operários, os camponeses, e os estudantes estão lutando e pondo em perigo a continuidade do regime comunista do traidor Castro. Entre os dias 26 e 31 de julho desembarcaram no pôrto de Mariel, na costa norte de Pinar del Rio, de 2.500 a 3.000 "técnicos" com uniforme verde-escuro, casquete branco, mochilas, fuzil-metralhadora; 2 mil de aspecto asiático ou coreano entre 4 e 9 de agôsto no pôrto de Casilda, na costa sul de Las Villas. Chegaram em jipes e caminhões, trazendo canhões e ambulâncias-hospitais; entre 26 e 31 de julho aportaram em Banes na costa norte de Oriente, 500 homens, a 7 de agôsto no pôrto de Havana 2.000 russos.

Também em Matanzas ocorreu um desembarque sôbre o qual não há outros detalhes. As informações recebidas indicam que as tropas invasoras estão localizadas em Guatana, antigo campo de tiro entre os quilômetros 7 e 8 da estrada que vai de Pinar del Rio ao pôrto de La Coloma. Em San Julian, onde nem a entrada de Dermidio Escalona, chefê militar de Pinar del Rio é permitida; na Cordilheira dos Orgãos, perto de Cabana; na Costa norte de Pinar del Rio, entre os portos de Santa Lúcia e Esperanza e entre o de Santa Lúcia e Dimas, em Torrens e Limonar, nas províncias de Havana e Matanzas; em La Cayuga, no aeroporto subterrâneo de San Antônio de Los Banos em Havana. Com todos êstes desembarques de soldados estrangeiros a serviço do imperialismo soviético, que dirão os defensores da "auto determinação de Cuba"? Possivelmente calarão e não reconhecerão que neste momento a verdadeira auto determinação do povo de Cuba está em perigo. Não reconhecerão que o povo cubano continua lutando pela sua liberdade. Continua lutando contra o homem que traiu a revolução cubana, a verdadeira Revolução Cubana. E nêste momento a América Latina não pode permanecer calada ante a invasão de Cuba por soldados comunistas. O O D.R.E. de Cuba faz um apêlo ao povo de Santa Catarina, para que expresse ao conselho de segurança da OEA sua condenação. O D.R.E. faz um apêlo a juventude catarinense, a todo o povo de Santa Catarina para que não permita que Cuba seja uma nova Hungria, para não permitir que sejam afogados êsses gritos de revolta do povo cubano pela sua auto determinação.

De vocês depende nêste momento que Cuba seja Livre !

Benito Díaz, Delegado".

A GAZETA
Florianopolis, Quinta-Feira, 30 de Agôsto de 1962

Brasil = 5

Os Estudantes Cubanos Morrem no Século XX Pela Liberdade

MANUEL GUILLOT, [illegible] da Universidade [illegible]. Foi preso [illegible] GUILLOT [illegible] OUTRO [illegible] DA JUVENTUDE [illegible] SANGUE [illegible] HANS GENGLER [illegible]

[illegible] GENGLER [illegible]

O [illegible] GENGLER [illegible] P.U.C. [illegible] D.C.E. [illegible] Janeiro e [illegible] JORNAL UNIVERSITÁRIO [illegible] a Gengler [illegible] Castro, o qual [illegible]

Os [illegible] de F.C. [illegible] GENGLER a uma [illegible] na Hungria [illegible]

[illegible] a luta que [illegible] cubano, buscando a liberdade, a justiça, enfim a própria felicidade, [illegible] com a sua completa libertação do jugo do imperialismo que lhes foi imposto pelo traidor Fidel Castro. Os estudantes cubanos [illegible] em que diariamente derramam seu sangue [illegible] pela sua pátria.

AUTODETERMINAÇÃO

[illegible] em que [illegible] estudantes cubanos [illegible] não podemos [illegible] abandonar [illegible] que se apoderaram de Cuba. Não podemos deixar que Cuba, hoje, se transforme na Hungria de 1956. O [illegible] do estudante e de todo o povo cubano está a exigir uma verdadeira autodeterminação para Cuba. [illegible] voltar aos tempos da barbárie. Levantemos, portanto, o nosso apelo ao povo brasileiro, para que [illegible] do povo cubano [illegible] Aquele [illegible] que está [illegible]

CONCHA ACÚSTICA NA PUC



Foi inaugurada, quinta-feira última, com a presença de várias autoridades, representantes de entidades estudantis e colégios da Guanabara, a primeira concha acústica do Rio.

A PUC, que foi a contemplada, por assim dizer, com esta peça indispensável às realizações artísticas e culturais da Universidade Católica, deu mostra do que serão as atividades neste setor nos próximos anos, convidando a magnífica orquestra sinfônica do Corpo de Bombeiros para a cerimônia de abertura.

Na foto, um aspecto dessa cerimônia quando, representando os doadores da Concha — Lions Internacional — falava o presidente daquela entidade no Brasil, dr. Pinearillo [illegible] já em [illegible].

Apesar [illegible], até hoje não conseguiram quebrar a vontade do líder [illegible], embora se tenham [illegible] para tal os satânicos [illegible] de Castro chegando [illegible] a lhe causar uma lesão na [illegible] vertebral, que o tornou [illegible] das duas pernas.

A UNIÃO [illegible]NOPOLITANA DE [illegible]DANTES CONDENA A [illegible]SÃO SOVIÉTICA A CUBA — MAIS DE 2 [illegible] ASSINATURAS APOIAM A DECLARAÇÃO DOS ESTUDANTES BRASILEIROS — O MANIFESTO — «A União Florianopolitana de Estudantes, em vista das últimas informações referentes ao desembarque de tropas [illegible] em Cuba, [illegible] pode deixar de levar a todo o Brasil o seu brado de protesto ante esta [illegible] que estão praticando [illegible] comunistas, contra o povo e os estudantes cubanos [illegible] fazer calar a revolta de um [illegible] traído em [illegible] Representantes que somos da classe estudantil secundária florianopolitana, é um dever de honra, manifestar[illegible]mente, como em 1958, desta vez contra inimigos mais perigosos, faz com que solicitemos imediatas e enérgicas medidas por parte da Organização dos Estados Americanos».

NOSSA BANDEIRA

«Conclamamos, nesta hora, todos os brasileiros para que se unam a este nosso protesto contra a violação do continente americano por tropas soviéticas. Aos estudantes, principalmente, cabe uma resposta aos nossos irmãos cubanos que lutam por liberdade e por justiça dentro de sua própria pátria. A bandeira empunhada pelos estudantes democratas cubanos é também a nossa».

OUTRO PROTESTO

Assinado pelo sr. Arquimedes Naspolini Filho, presidente da União Catarinense de Estudantes Secundários, recebemos o seguinte telegrama: «Protestamos contra a intervenção extracontinental de soldados russos em Cuba e pedimos à Organização dos Estados Americanos que tome providências».

Entrevista Exclusiva Com Eduardo Muniz

À esquerda, Eduardo Muniz, ao lado de Carlos Valdesuso, delegado no Rio de Janeiro, no aeroporto do Galeão

— Qual o motivo de sua viagem por todos os países da América Latina?

— Coordenar ao máximo o trabalho que vêm realizando os delegados do Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil, ao lado dos estudantes latino-americanos, nesta etapa decisiva de nossa luta.

— Quais são os planos insurrecionais do DRE para derrubar a Tirania, e que importância teve a ação levada a cabo no dia 24?

— Primeiramente, dividimos nossa luta em dois campos de vital importância, dentro de Cuba e no estrangeiro; enquanto, no interior do país, preparam-se as circunstâncias propícias para o levante das massas, através ações de sabotagem nas cidades e incremento das guerrilhas nas montanhas, no estrangeiro levamos adiante uma campanha de esclarecimento, que contribui para que ganhemos adeptos, que nos auxiliem moral e materialmente. Assim sendo, o climax da luta só se produzirá quando tenhamos as condições necessárias. Lograremos o triunfo com o desembarque de fôrças expedicionárias, armadas na mesma proporção em que o estão as tropas de Castro. Êste desembarque será efetuado em coordenação com os elementos da clandestinidade, que conduzirão o povo: as fôrças castristas se encontrarão entre dois fogos e êsse será o comêço do fim.

— Quais os resultados do ataque do dia 24 de agôsto ao litoral cubano?

— Em primeiro lugar, logrou que se produzisse, sem maiores dificuldades, o soerguimento de nossa resistência na Serra de Escambray, ao se distraírem os esbirros de Castro com o ataque marítimo; em segundo lugar, serviu para fazer lembrar ao tirano que os estudantes de Cuba não se conformarão diante da já consumada invasão soviética da nossa Ilha, e, se bem que a localização de Brigadas Internacionais em Cuba coloca a libertação em mãos de organismos internacionais, não será por isso que cruzaremos os braços, embora os esperemos que êles atuem; nossa luta é sem quartel, e nela deixaremos até o último gemido de nossa existência.

— O que nos pode dizer quanto à posição dos EE.UU. em relação a Cuba?

— Sinceramente, devo dizer que não estranhamos a atitude de coexistência pacífica por êles assumida com respeito a Cuba, pois que inúmeras vêzes sua posição foi errada para com muitos povos da América Latina; no entanto, confiamos em que modifiquem esta posição, e o mesmo dizemos de outros países da América Latina, que se mantêm em plano idêntico.

— Como é que vocês se intitulam — Revolucionários? O FC não é um Revolucionário?

— Esta pergunta, companheiro, é quase uma insinuação de que somos Contra-revolucionários; nada mais falso, já que os militantes do "Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil" são jovens que combateram a Tirania Batistiana, seguindo os ideais daquêle que foi então o líder do Diretório Revolucionário, o Mártir Universitário José Antônio Echevarría. Não somos sòmente revolucionários quanto à ação, mas também quanto à ação, mas também quanto à ideologia. Quando lutamos contra Batista, tínhamos ideais bem definidos, sabíamos claramente que era necessária uma mudança radical das estruturas existentes; víamos com ânsias a implantação de uma Reforma Agrária, que proporcionasse uma distribuição mais justa das terras, proscrevendo o latifúndio, tecnificando a produção agrícola e pecuária em todos os seus aspectos, inspirando aos camponêses a criação de cooperativas, para evitar que se produza o fenômeno do minifúndio por meio de uma educação bem orientada e intensiva, para que as ditas cooperativas sejam única e exclusivamente dirigidas pelos camponêses que a formem, sem intervenção estatal, a não ser uma ajuda desinteressada de tipo econômico e técnico. Bem assim as demais reformas: educacional, urbana, fiscal, reforma de Emprêsa, a instauração de um Salário Social de Rendimento. E quanto à política no exterior, uma de total independência em nossas decisões, reafirmando nossa soberania e repudiando todos os totalitarismos, desde o soviético até os dos Somoza, Stroessner, Salazar e Franco.

[illegible] a PUC [illegible] os totalitários em demagogos da UNE, Walter Maciel é o candidato dos democratas [illegible] da Universidade Católica.

Manifesto da Aliança Democrática Universitária Aos Colegas da PUC RJ

[illegible] PUC RJ [illegible] para que a opinião pública [illegible] do nosso país e da Universidade [illegible] grupo [illegible] da PUC RJ [illegible]

[illegible] democracia [illegible].

Registramos como manifesto a fórmula, "educação para o desenvolvimento", [illegible] mais acertada a fórmula "educação para o bem comum", já [illegible] com clara evidência, que a educação e a formação profissional são os principais fatores do desenvolvimento e do bem comum.

[illegible]

ACABAR COM A UNE, CONQUISTÁ-LA OU CRIAR OUTRA ENTIDADE?

O movimento universitário brasileiro se apresenta na atual conjuntura dividido em três grandes correntes: acabar com a UNE, conquistá-la ou criar outra entidade.

O processo que muitos advogam para acabar com a UNE seria o desligamento em grande escala dos diretórios acadêmicos. Simplesmente passariam a ignorar a União Nacional dos Estudantes, por a considerarem nefasta à vida universitária do país. [illegible] não vejam mais os pés.

Esta parcela da opinião estudantil, despolitizada, bem intencionada, mas sem compreender o mecanismo usado pelos totalitários para se perpetuarem no poder, comporta-se como crianças face a um aparelho indecifrável. A primeira reação é quebrá-lo ou deixá-lo de lado.

Outra coisa não querem os atuais dirigentes da UNE do que continuar a receber 1 bilhão e setecentos milhões que deve subir em 1962 para 2 bilhões e 400 milhões fora o financiamento do senhor Santos Vahlis via governador Brizola, sem apresentação de contas, e baixar o dinheiro do povo em viagens, gastar em propaganda política de entidades estudantis e sindicais dominadas pelos pelegos e comunistas, conforme revela o próprio relatório da UNE apresentado ao seu 1º Conselho Ordinário na gestão Aldo Arantes. Enfim, continuar com a vida que pediram ao bom deus totalitário. O estudante [illegible] dane; o negócio é enriquecer com a política.

Os estudantes que defendem o extermínio puro e simples da UNE são tão inocentes e irresponsáveis que ignoram que a União Nacional dos Estudantes não é propriedade do atual grupo da UNE. Por mais que seja exibida como instrumento pelos totalitários que vivem de [illegible] idéias como dinheiro, demagogia e agitação, pertence aos universitários.

É pela falta de participação dos democratas, que nem sequer comparecem às assembléias para eleger o presidente do seu diretório ou para impedir a [illegible] a paralisação da vida universitária, que o movimento estudantil, deturpado, se transformou na desonesta galinha dos ovos de ouro conhecida, em 1962, como UNE.

Os estudantes comodistas, que não comparecem às eleições do seu diretório, ou quando o fazem é sem critério de escolha, são os principais responsáveis pela utilização dos diretórios acadêmicos para finalidades puramente políticas, [illegible] da sujeira e da desonestidade dos pelegos e dos ignorantes como Santos Vahlis, que põe em dúvida a capacidade dos nossos professores, como fez nesta semana com o ilustre professor e amigo dos estudantes, Alcântara Figueiredo. Espera que o Santos Vahlis não vá à Faculdade Nacional de Ciências Econômicas para ter uma idéia do conceito de que ali goza atitudes, só servindo para conservar os atuais dirigentes da UNE no poder.

Conquistar novamente a União Nacional dos Estudantes para as verdadeiras causas da universalidade do homem e particularmente para ajudar decisivamente, através de uma aprimorada educação, o povo a libertar-se das garras do subdesenvolvimento e do totalitarismo que já nos ameaça [illegible] — esse é o pensamento da grande maioria dos estudantes brasileiros, que atualmente sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE esbanjar [illegible] o suor do povo ao visitar as suas [illegible], muitas vezes parcela do que tem [illegible] aos próprios filhos. Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE se fazer representar com exclusividade para os círculos do poder nos conclaves totalitários, representando os [illegible] como o pequeno [illegible] em Helsinque. Sentem a vergonha de ver a UNE [illegible] no [illegible] dos estudantes [illegible] o governador Brizola quando faz [illegible] estudantes, [illegible] [redacted] [illegible] a vergonha de ver a [illegible] na [illegible] Venezuela [illegible] Vermelho [illegible] UNE [illegible] vermelho [illegible] [illegible] aberta.

Esta é a vergonha estudantil brasileira. E contra este [illegible] que a grande maioria está disposta a lutar. Aos poucos, tomam consciência de que a operação se faz [illegible] e para isso começam a participar das atividades dos seus diretórios, a comparecer, a votar e a [illegible] enquanto [illegible]. Os futuros médicos da Faculdade de Medicina já tomaram providências, os da Odontologia idem, os da Nacional de Ciências Econômicas fazem o orçamento do [illegible], os da Engenharia estudam [illegible] para que nada falte.

[illegible] que [illegible] as [illegible] do [illegible], como as [illegible] do mundo presente [illegible] a [illegible] da [illegible] espiritual do homem [illegible] existência de Deus.

[illegible] o vocabulário [illegible] pelos princípios da [illegible] do cristianismo, [illegible] que nos falta [illegible] experimental.

Não [illegible] os títulos de "[illegible]", "[illegible]", "[illegible]" com que os dirigentes [illegible] dos títulos.

[illegible] com [illegible] estudantes [illegible] formados em [illegible] trazidas [illegible] leira.

Somos um grupo [illegible], muito mais numeroso do que parece, que temos consciência viva e grave dos trágicos problemas dêste mundo que espera de nós sòmente preparação profissional.

Como estudantes sabemos que nosso [illegible] deve ser urgentemente essa preparação e como [illegible] observadores do mundo e dos problemas brasileiros, [illegible] temos consciência do [illegible] da educação, da competência profissional, na [illegible] problema do desenvolvimento [illegible] melhor [illegible] numa reforma universitária [illegible] de uma mobilização geral de todos os recursos do país para a educação, e que permita oportunidades iguais a todos [illegible].

Em matéria de política, nossa experiência, alimentada pelas fontes do cristianismo, nos levam a repelir tôdas formas de totalitarismos que são, essas sim, verdadeiras alienações. Temos como critério principal a especial nobreza da natureza humana e seus direitos fundamentais, que os totalitarismos desconhecem ou ferem.

Democracia, para nós, é a forma política que se coaduna com os direitos do homem e que, por imperativos de justiça, e não por uma lei mecânica, procura levar a todos os frutos do gênero humano e a melhor participação dos frutos da terra.

Finalizando, desejamos ardentemente a concórdia em nosso meio, mas não poderemos, de forma alguma, aceitar um falso compromisso, uma paz de conveniência, com sacrifício de nossas mais profundas e vitais convicções de brasileiros e cristãos.

É por isso, para preservar o que cremos nessa hora crítica para a PUC RJ, lançamos a ALIANÇA DEMOCRÁTICA UNIVERSITÁRIA, que será estrutura e ação para os que acreditam como nós, na democracia e na dignidade humana.

Eurico de Andrade Neves Borba, pela ADU. — Walter Maciel Filho pelo [illegible].

LEVANTE EM CUBA

O Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil em Caracas, Venezuela, informa que às 21,30, hora local, do dia 24 de agôsto, o Comando Marítimo do Diretório Revolucionário Estudantil, sediado em Cuba, bombardeou o Hotel Rosita Hornedo e o Teatro Blanquita, próximos ao mar, onde se encontravam os tchecos e russos chegados recentemente a Havana para reforçar as tropas fidelistas.

Ocorreu também um Levante dos Comandos de Resistência nas serras de Escambray.

Foi distribuído clandestinamente um manifesto concitando o povo à revolução.

[illegible] na-paga e [illegible] de dinheiro.

Infelizmente muitos estudantes, bem intencionados, vivem situações normais em tempos anormais. Esquecem que nos dias que atravessamos, além de estudar, temos que lutar para continuar estudando. O duplo esfôrço é enorme, mas êsse é o preço da liberdade.

Êsse grupo simplesmente abandona a luta, apesar de vontade e vitalidade para lutar, considerando a UNE invencível, apesar de os estudantes livres da Alemanha comunista, no intervalo entre uma aula e outra, atirarem suas pedradas no muro da vergonha, e os portuguêses aliarem-se aos professôres também nos intervalos das aulas, para lutar pela democracia.

A segunda corrente advoga o desligamento dos diretórios acadêmicos para a posterior criação de uma entidade autênticamente democrática, capaz de fazer frente à União Nacional dos Estudantes, mesmo sem possuir 1 bilhão e quatrocentos milhões, para serem gastos da mesma forma que a do ano anterior, a não ser que o atual tesoureiro da UNE, Kleutau, disponha-se, no entender de alguns, a preservar o conceito de honestidade de que goza entre os seus colegas de estudo, independentemente de qualquer posição ideológica, fizer pé firme na prestação de contas que nunca foi feita e enfrentar as iras do Partido Comunista, negando-se a compactuar com êste acinte ao povo.

Esta corrente, quase tão despolitizada quanto a primeira, não explica como criar uma nova entidade, impedir a infiltração da mesma, participar do [illegible] movimento universitário. Falam em criar uma entidade sem saberem como mantê-la, arregimentar estudantes, politizá-los, impedir que a famosa minoria domine os diretórios acadêmicos e, o que é fundamental, acabar com a imoralidade existente na UNE em nome do estudante e em prejuízo da nação. Com a mesma boa intenção da primeira corrente, consideram a UNE propriedade dos que viajam enquanto o povo passa fome.

Esta parcela dos estudantes, os totalitários também não temem e sabem perfeitamente que a tentativa não dá em nada, muito menos em nova entidade. Não precisarão sequer utilizar a violência e o terrorismo, como aconteceu em Quitandinha, para derrotá-los. Afinal de contas sabem os da UNE que, se demora algum tempo para fabricar um totalitário com todos os apetrechos tècnicamente necessários, demora muito mais educar um ser humano. Esta posição de criar outra entidade é, como a primeira inútil e sem sentido para o movimento univer- [illegible] se preparava [illegible] UNE, porque pretendem [illegible]. [illegible] fique boa na primeira tentativa, serão feitas a segunda, a terceira e quantas se fizerem necessárias.

Os [illegible] desligaram-se da UNE que estão [illegible] em todo o país são o protesto contra a [illegible] que houve no XXV Congresso da UNE e a orientação dada à entidade nos últimos anos. A grande maioria dos estudantes, que não votaram no congresso da UNE, votam agora no desligamento, enquanto a UNE for totalitária, não compactuando com a opressão e a desonestidade.

O desligamento dêstes estudantes da UNE, não é uma fuga, não significa retirada, é sua participação política no seu diretório, onde [illegible] para decidir sôbre os destinos ideológicos do estudante e da Universidade brasileira.

Votem os democratas que são órgãos nos centros acadêmicos, dispostos a comparecer, em 1963, em massa ao Congresso da UNE, para pôr abaixo o [illegible] muro da vergonha dos estudantes brasileiros, representado pelo domínio dos atuais detentores do poder na Praia do Flamengo, face ao totalitarismo vermelho.

Não acreditam os [illegible] que [illegible] de dentro da UNE, em [illegible] que não possuem coragem suficiente para enfrentar os prepotentes, e [illegible] físico e intelectual. [illegible] estudantes na política estudantil são definidos ideològicamente e exigem definição. Repudiam a covardia, o mêdo e [illegible] de muitos que se dizem [illegible] e se calam. São democratas e [illegible] que o são. E são dispostos a [illegible] um dia se fôr necessário para salvar [illegible] ou ganhar a [illegible], acabar com o comodismo, principal fator da vitória das minorias e, para isso, [illegible] mais democrático, a assembléia [illegible] a maioria diz não à UNE, não [illegible] e partem para a conquista daquilo que é de todos, dos estudantes, dos velhos, dos moços, do povo: a UNE. Estão dispostos a acabar com a falta de vergonha dos [illegible] do bem público e lutar por uma educação adequada à realidade brasileira juntamente com os seus professôres. Estão cansados dos falsos, dos demagogos, dos que só querem poder para afirmar a personalidade, muitas vêzes perdida no próprio trabalho para infelicidade de todos.

A FALSA F.E.U. DE CUBA CHEGOU

Nos Bastidores

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CUBA

CR$ 30,00

Cuba Socialista

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CUBA SOCIALISTA

> "A palavra é para dizer a verdade, não para encobertá-la."
>
> JOSÉ MARTI

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A Economia, Talvez, mas a Liberdade, Não

O Profissional não tem Liberdade

O Estudante não tem Liberdade

O Camponês não tem Liberdade

O Operario não tem Liberdade

Em Cuba ninguém tem Liberdade

Conclusões Finais

Epilogo

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDANTIL DE CUBA

Rio de Janeiro, G. B. Caixa Postal 3926

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PALAVRAS INICIAIS

Na primeira publicação feita por esta delegação do "Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil de Cuba" no Rio de Janeiro, G. B. (BASES PARA UMA REVOLUÇÃO LATINOAMERICANA), adotamos uma posição ideológica a respeito dos critérios que pretendem orientar o desenvolvimento econômico, social e político de nossos países. Já sendo conhecido nosso pensamento a êsse respeito pelos estudantes e pelo povo brasileiro, agora nos propomos a lhes trazer informações concretas sôbre o que ocorre presentemente em nossa pátria.

Foi implantado em Cuba um regime marxista-leninista, comumente chamado comunista. Isso não é novidade, porque todos o sabem. Seu líder máximo teve que mentir muito até chegar a tal ponto; teve que trair a todo um povo.

Não viemos aqui analisar a espécie de traição de que fomos vítimas; em outra ocasião, será analisada devidamente. Vamos demonstrar que o regime marxista-leninista introduzido em Cuba não conseguiu realizar a prosperidade e nem levar à liberdade, mas sim à miséria e ao terror.

Vamos citar palavras dos dirigentes comunistas cubanos e suas próprias leis. Discursos e leis estas que qualquer comunista tem... mas que não querem divulgar como o fazem ao propagar os ensinamentos de Marx e Lenine. Tão terrível é, portanto, o comunismo que nem as suas próprias doutrinas e realizações pode revelar.

Vamos esquematizar apenas tudo o que se passa em Cuba, apresentando exatamente a legislação revolucionária e os discursos de Fidel Castro, de Guevara, e outros.

VAMOS MOSTRAR O QUE REALMENTE SE PASSA NA "CUBA SOCIALISTA".

O Primeiro encontro Nacional de Produção

No sistema comunista implantado em Cuba por Fidel Castro e seus camaradas, seguem-se ao pé da letra as práticas dos partidos comunistas de todo o mundo. Uma delas consiste nas reuniões de autocrítica entre todos os membros participantes de uma determinada atividade do Estado comunista.

A baixa do nível da produção, o aumento dos preços, a qualidade inferior dos produtos, o aumento exorbitante dos custos da produção, o fechamento de indústrias e os deficits enormes das chamadas Indústrias Consolidadas — tudo isso, produto do plano de industrialização do Ministério de Indústrias, controlado por Ernesto Guevara — obrigou o estado maior comunista cubano a convocar uma reunião de todos os elementos que intervêm no processo de produção.

Entre os dias 26 e 27 de agôsto de 1961, com dois anos e nove meses de govêrno revolucionário, no Teatro Blanquita de Havana, localizado em Miramar, os "líderes da indústria cubana" estiveram reunidos, analisando o fracasso de seus planos e o êxito conseguido na destruição das principais fontes de riqueza de Cuba.

Os jornais, controlados pelo regime, reproduziram aspectos de tais reuniões, transmitidas pelo rádio e pela televisão, mas às quais quase ninguém prestaria atenção, por já estar acostumado demais a tais "shows". Ao ser publicada a matéria relativa a êsses encontros, evitou-se menção a todos os insultos e recriminações que os "camaradas" se fizeram ao tentar cada um sair mais "limpo", mas foram tantos os insultos que a censura não pôde policiar a todos.

As expressões de Fidel Castro e de "che" Guevara aqui vão citadas, (1) e delas se deduzem muito bem as "grandes" conquistas realizadas no processo da industrialização de nosso país, e que se constituem numa das bases da propaganda do regime para a América Latina.

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(1) Diario "Revolución" 28 e 29 de Agosto 1961

EIS AS EXPRESSÕES PROFERIDAS POR ERNESTO GUEVARA, MINISTRO DAS INDUSTRIAS :

"Não se realizou nenhuma das metas assinaladas para a produção. Apenas uma ou duas das quarenta Emprêsas Consolidadas conseguiram isso".

"Na Emprêsa Consolidada do Fósforo, êsse produto é uma das maiores vergonhas que temos a registrar no Ministério das Indústrias".

"A verdade é que os refrescos têm o sabor de algo que não se sabe muito bem o que é... A Coca-Cola, que era o mais tomado, tem um gôsto de Xarope de tosse".

"Todos estamos enfrentando a falta de garrafas. Ela se faz sentir tanto para os refrescos como para os vidros utilizados nos laboratórios médicos e apresenta-se também para o leite, em alguns momentos".

"Isso quer dizer que havia uma série de indústrias que estavam se ressentindo da falta de vasilhames adequados e as fábricas de vidro permaneciam paradas, muito provàvelmente por falta de capacidade".

"Não é nada bom, por exemplo, haver sabão em Havana e não haver no campo, devendo ser o produto distribuído de tal forma que não haja falta em parte alguma".

"No caso da borracha, houve insuficiência nos começos de ano. Houve ausência de papelão e de sacos de papel, em momento determinado. Há atualmente escassez de pastas para dentes. É necessário ser pontualizada a razão. Há quatro meses que se vem verificando paralização do fabrico e não se tomou ainda providência urgente, como seria de desejar".

"Se bem que não tenham sido muitas as indústrias paralisadas, o ritmo da produção tem sido mais lento do que era previsto".

"A escassez de sucos concentrados foi uma falta de previsão dos companheiros do INRA na planificação de sua produção dos sucos de laranja".

"A "Antilhana do Aço" foi obrigada a parar".

"É verdade que o Ministério do Comércio Exterior cometeu êrros e que alguns dêles nos custaram paralização, mas não é menos verdade que houve uma ausência total de previsão por parte da maioria dos diretores de emprêsas".

"O crescimento da produção poderia ter sido mais intenso e a distribuição mais eficiente, se se houvessem superado as falhas de organização postas em destaque no curso das exposições e discussões".

"NÃO PODEMOS CONVERTER NEM O IMPERIALISMO, NEM O AUMENTO DO CONSUMO EM "TOTI" (*) E PRETENDER QUE TUDO SEJA INCRIMINADO PELO AUMENTO DO CONSUMO, PORQUE NÃO É EXATO".

◆

EXPRESSÕES DE FIDEL CASTRO NO PRIMEIRO ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE PRODUÇÃO.

"Cada um de nós se encontra ante a circunstância de fazer algo que jamais tinha feito antes, e daí tôda a atual situação do país, a reestruturação nacional, a sua administração terem caído entre mãos que não tinham experiência de tais trabalhos".

"No primeiro aniversário da Revolução havia abundância de tudo, nada faltava e os armazéns andavam abarrotados".

"Já existem muitas obras projetadas e falta cimento, faltam vergalhões de ferro e não há o material necessário para começá-las".

"Além de tudo, êsse primeiro encontro está cheio de deficiências de organização".

Ser mais claro não é possível. Aí está o desastre na bôca dos próprios líderes. Bem como a necessidade de consertar um pouco as coisas, com umas tantas promessas. Por isso Castro prometeu que em dezembro de 1961 estaria solucionado o problema do abastecimento de aves em Havana; a partir de janeiro de 1962, a produção de cereais superaria tôdas as necessidades do mercado nacional; em junho de 1962, a produção do pescado atingiria as necessidades do consumo; a 1.º de fevereiro de 1962, estaria abolido o racionamento de banha de porco, etc., etc.

Mais uma vez ficaria comprovado que o Socialismo Econômico é um "sistema de futuro"...

(*) Toti, pássaro tropical cubano.

"A culpa é do toti", frase popular cubana, usada para encerrar as discussões.

Mas o que sucedeu com as promessas?

A 12 de março de 1962 foi promulgada a lei n.º 1015, (2) que diz o seguinte:

"Lei sobre a melhor distribuição do abastecimento".

Art. 1.º — Com o objetivo de conseguir melhor distribuição no abastecimento do consumo corrente, cria-se uma Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros.

Art. 2.º — A Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros será integrada de um representante do Instituto Nacional da Reforma Agrária, um representante do Ministério das Indústrias, um representante do Ministério do Comércio Exterior, um representante do Ministério do Trabalho, um representante do Comitê Executivo da Central dos Trabalhadores de Cuba, um representante dos Comitês de Defesa da Revolução e um representante da Federação das Mulheres Cubanas.

Art. 3.º — São atribuições da Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros: a) organizar, com prévia consulta ao Conselho de Ministros, a lista de artigos de consumo que, por motivos justificados, devem ser submetidos a um racionamento local ou nacional; b) determinar, com audiência prévia do Conselho de Ministros, o regime de racionamento que se deve adotar com relação a cada artigo, assim como as quantidades dos mesmos que devam ser distribuídas entre a população; c) determinar, com prévia consulta ao Conselho de Ministros, as retificações relativas que devam ser feitas no que diz respeito ao abastecimento da indústria privada (?) e estatal e do comércio de gêneros de primeira necessidade, privado e estatal, dos produtos submetidos ao racionamento; d) organizar, com prévia audiência do Conselho de Ministros, o sistema de racionamento e fiscalização de sua execução, assim como determinar os organismos estatais e populares (?) que devam participar da execução e fiscalização desse regime de racionamento; e) propor ao Conselho de Ministros quantas medidas ache oportunas para a melhor execução do racionamento.

Art. 4.º — Revogam-se as disposições legais e regulamentares em contrário com a presente lei, a qual começará a vigorar a partir de sua publicação na "Gazeta Oficial" da República.

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(2) Diario "El Mundo" 13 de Março 1962

PORTANTO — Mando que se cumpra e execute a presente lei em tôdas as suas partes.

Palácio da Presidência, em Havana, a 12 de Março de 1962

Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado
Presidente
Fidel Castro Ruz
Primeiro Ministro
Máximo Berman Berman
Ministro do Comércio Interior

Nessa mesma noite, Fidel falou com amargura e anunciou o próximo racionamento. Disse que "a situação põe à prova a capacidade da Revolução e dos revolucionários. Nem tudo são rosas. Há também espinhos no caminho".

Enquanto a "Nova Classe" come e bebe...

Anunciou que se adotariam medidas drásticas contra os especuladores... "Se fôr necessário chegar ao paredão contra os especuladores, chegaremos ao paredão".

Disse também, como de costume, QUE A CULPA DE TUDO CABE AO IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO e que "é difícil construir o paraíso", mas "a grande tarefa revolucionária é construir para o futuro...".

No dia seguinte, entrava em vigor a primeira Resolução da Junta Nacional para Distribuição dos Gêneros, que é a seguinte:

POR QUANTO — O Conselho de Ministros baixou, com a data de 12 de março de 1962, a lei n.º 1015, criando a Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros, encarregando-a de propôr ao mesmo Conselho de Ministros tôdas as medidas condizentes à melhor distribuição do abastecimentos dos artigos de consumo corrente;



MINISTERIO DE
COMERCIO INTERIOR

LIBRETA DE CONTROL
DE ABASTECIMIENTOS

PATRIA O
MUERTE
VENCEREMOS

CON LA GUARDIA
EN ALTO

... o povo passa fome.

POR QUANTO — Com a data de 13 de março de 1962, ficou devidamente constituida a Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros.

POR QUANTO — Cumpre por execução a lei n.º 1015, no que diz respeito à melhor distribuição do abastecimento.

POR TANTO — No uso das atribuições que lhe são conferidas pela lei n.º 1015, esta Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros, com prévia audiência ao Conselho de Ministros,

RESOLVE:

PRIMEIRO: — Declarar os seguintes artigos de consumo, sujeitos ao racionamento em todo o território nacional: a) banha de porco; b) azeite vegetal; c) arroz; d) feijões de todos os tipos.

SEGUNDO: — Declarar, além disso, os seguintes artigos sujeitos ao racionamento no território da Grande Havana, que compreende os municipios de Havana, Guanabacoa, Regla, Marianao, Santiago de las Vegas e Santa Maria del Rosário e as cidades de Pinar del Rio, Artemisa, San Antônio de los Baños, Bauta, Guines, Cardenas, Matanzas, Colón, Santa Clara, Sagua la Grande, Cienfuegos, Sancti-Spiritus, Caibarien, Trinidad, Camaguey, Ciego de Avila, Flórida, Morón, Santiago de Cuba, Holguin, Victoria de las Tunas, Bayamo, Manzanillo, Guantanamo e Palma Soriano: a) sabão de roupa; b) detergentes; c) sabão de banho; d) pasta para dentes.

TERCEIRO: — Declarar, por último, além dos artigos compreendidos nos parágrafos primeiros e segundo, os seguintes gêneros sujeitos ao racionamento no território da Grande Havana: a) carne de boi; b) frango; c) peixes; d) ovos; e) leite fresco de vaca, leite condensado e leite evaporado; f) banana da terra, batata doce, mandioca, aipim, cabaça, batata e inhame.

A QUANTIDADE DOS RACIONAMENTOS

QUARTO: — Os artigos acima relacionados serão distribuidos nas seguintes quantidades: a) 920 gramas de gordura comestivel, azeite ou banha de porco, por pessoa, ao mês, em todo o território nacional; b) 2,760 gramas de arroz por pessoa, ao mês, em todo o território nacional; c) 6,210 gramas de feijão de qualquer tipo, grão-de-bico, ervilhas e lentilhas, por pessoa, nos próximos nove meses, em todo o território nacional, distribuidas mensalmente.

Para as mercadorias reguladas no território da Grande Havana e cidades acima relacionadas na segunda parte distribuir-se-á: a) uma barra de sabão de roupa, por pessoa, ao mês: b) uma porção média de detergente por pessoa, ao mês, ou uma porção grande para duas pessoas de cada familia, ao mês: c) um pedaço de sabão de toilete por pessoa, ao mês: d) um tubo de pasta dentifricia, para cada duas pessoas ao mês ou um tubo gigante, cada quatro pessoas ao mês.

Para os artigos racionados no território da Grande Havana: a) 3,450 gramas de carne de boi, por pessoa, por semana: b) 1 frango de 920 gramas por pessoa, ao mês: c) 230 gramas de pescado com escamas, lavado e em posta, por pessoa, cada 15 dias; d) 5 ovos para cada pessoa, ao mês; e) 1 litro de leite diário para cada criança menor de 7 anos, e 1 litro diário para cada 5 pessoas ou crianças maiores de 7 anos, ou o equivalente a 6 latas de leite condensado ou evaporada ao mês: f) 1,610 gramas de legumes por semana para 1 pessoa, distribuidas segundo as determinações desta Junta: g) 920 gramas adicionais de legumes semanais, para cada criança que não tenha completado os 7 anos de idade; e h) 0,125 gramas de manteiga por pessoa ao mês.

QUINTO: — No caso de pessoas que sofram de enfermidades que a exija, obedecer-se-á às disposições que ditará imediatamente esta Junta.

SEXTO: — Para a organização do racionamento, distribuir-se-á uma "Caderneta de Contrôle do Abastecimento", publicada pelo C. D. exijam imprescindivelmente uma dieta, ou cuja idade avançada também R. no ponto mais próximo ao local de sua residência. No caso de uma familia não receber, no momento oportuno, a sua caderneta, deverá reclamá-la no distrito do C. D. R. correspondente à sua zona. A demarcação dos Distritos e a direção do órgão do C. D. R. serão divulgadas pela imprensa, no periodo da inscrição.

SÉTIMA: — Entender-se-á por responsável pela familia a pessoa em cujo nome figura o recibo de casa na Reforma Urbana, ou fôr encarregada da mesma no caso de ser proprietário do imóvel.

OITAVO: — Para comprovar a sua condição de responsável pela familia, apresentará tal pessoa ao respectivo Comitê de Defesa da Revolução o último recibo que tenha sido abonado pela Reforma Urbana ou pelo convênio de pagamentos firmado com a Reforma Urbana, ou o último recibo que tenha pago do respectivo imposto, no caso de ser o proprietário

NONO: — A pessoa que não possuir nenhum dêsses documentos comprobatórios fará constar êsse fato no distrito a que pertença o seu Comitê de Defesa, e êste entregar-lhe-á provisòriamente a Caderneta, notificando à Reforma Urbana sôbre a situação anormal da referida família.

DÉCIMA: — Nos casos das aldeias ou fazendas, assim como nos chamados bairros insalubres ("Las Yaguas", etc.), os distritos dos C.D.R. a que pertençam procederão a uma prévia e cuidadosa investigação na entrega das cadernetas de Abastecimento.

DÉCIMO PRIMEIRO: — Se houver numa casa mais de uma família, a pessoa identificada como responsável fará constar, sob juramento, o número de pessoas de que se compõe o seu núcleo familiar. Nesse caso, os C. D. R. procederão a entrega da Caderneta correspondente a cada família.

DÉCIMO SEGUNDO: — Cada responsável por família inscrever-se-á no estabelecimento (super-mercado, botequim, açougue, aviário, posto de fornecimento de legumes) que preferir, dentro de sua localização. A inscrição será limitada por uma área cobrindo 4 quadras em qualquer direção. Se a prática aconselhar, nos mercados ou supermercados e em outros estabelecimentos análogos, estabelecer-se-á uma zona mais ampla, determinando a Junta as normas necessárias.

DÉCIMO TERCEIRO: — Se em qualquer estabelecimento o número de responsáveis por famílias inscritos fôr notòriamente superior à capacidade de operação do mesmo, o Ministro do Comércio Interior poderá dispôr sôbre o limite do número de clientes, respeitando a ordem da inscrição. Nesses casos, o C. D. R. e o Ministério do Comércio Interior disporá sôbre a inscrição em qualquer outro estabelecimento, que acolherá o responsável por família dentro de sua zona de jurisdição.

DÉCIMO QUARTO: — Os hotéis, casas de pensão, restaurantes, clínica, colégios com internato, postos de fritas (*), etc. serão atendidos diretamente pelo Ministério do Comércio Interior. No caso dos hospitais e clínicas, o pessoal do mesmo não poderá consumir rações superiores às correspondentes ao resto da população, limitando-se os benefícios da alimentação suplementar aos enfermos neles internados.

DÉCIMO QUINTO: — Quanto à regulamentação relativa às cidades mencionadas no artigo segundo desta resolução, assim como para a melhor distribuição das gorduras, do arroz e de outros artigos de racionamento os C. D. R. e as delegacias provinciais do M.I.N.C.I.N. deverão coordenar com os comitês provinciais das O.R.I. e com as J.U.C.E.I. provinciais, e êstes submeterão à decisão da Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros qualquer sugestão que dessas consultas resultar para o melhor funcionamento da distribuição.

DÉCIMO SEXTO: — A infração das disposições contidas nesta Resolução será sancionada com as penas previstas na lei.

Havana, 13 de Março de 1962, "ANO DA PLANIFICAÇÃO"

Junta Nacional para a Distribuição dos Gêneros

Pior que os escravos da Colônia

Estão os cubanos fazendo História. Em 1842, sob o domínio espanhol, os escravos tinham, garantidos por lei e tradição, ao menos 280 gramas ao dia de carne ou bacalhau, 2.240 gramas de legumes, 140 gramas de arroz e 420 gramas de banha de porco. (*)

Em 1962 sob a dominação comunista, os escravos — ou seja, qualquer cidadão que não pertença à classe dirigente... nem Fidel nem Dorticós vão entrar na "fila" — só tem direito por lei (o que também não quer significar que seja encontrado efetivamente nos estabelecimentos fornecedores) 59.5 gramas de carne e 17.5 gramas de peixe por dia, 112 gramas de arroz, 280 gramas de legumes e 35 gramas de banha pe porco.

Tudo isso foi o que conseguiu quem afirmou que "sem a satisfação das necessidades do homem não há nem democracia nem liberdade possível": "os homens são escravos de tôda espécie de misérias e por isso, reclamamos um regime que liberte o povo de todo gênero de privações e explorações..." (3)

Uma Sentença Econômica

No mês de abril de 1962, Castro condenou formalmente os frustrados invasores de Playa Girón a trabalhos forçados durante 30 anos, a menos que fossem resgatados por um total de 62 milhões de dólares.

(*) Postos de fritas. Pôsto de churrasquinhos, bolinhos de carne.

(*) Tomado do "Bando de 14 de novembro de 1843 do Governador Don Joaquim Ezpeleta e dos "Apuntes Autógrafos Inéditos" de José Antonio Saco".

(3) Palavras de F. Castro na CMQ-TV 21 de Maio 1959

Não nos interessa analizar aqui a parte moral ou juridica da questão. (Basta dizer que tôdas as organizações revolucionárias cubanas rechaçaram tal proposta de negociação do Tirano):

É interessante frisar apenas a necessidade urgente que têm os comunistas cubanos de conseguir dólares.

Explicação? Muito sutil. A sua maior fonte de divisas é a indústria açucareira. Mas, a troca de compradores — U.S.A. pelo Bloco Socialista — teve resultados inteiramente negativos, apesar das declarações do atual Ministro das Indústrias, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, em março de 1960:

> "FALA-SE EM DIMINUIR A COTA DE AÇUCAR CUBANO E MESMO SUSPENDÊ-LA INTEIRAMENTE. QUANTO ANTES MELHOR; PARA CUBA ERA UM SÍMBOLO DO COLONIALISMO. NÓS NOS ARRUMAREMOS MELHOR SEM OS JUGOS IMPERIALISTAS".

Sirva como ilustração das consequências desta "libertação do imperialismo" o seguinte fato: em 1957, o total dos salários pagos aos trabalhadores agricolas e industriais, no setor açucareiro, subiu a *327* milhões de pesos (dólares), cifra que representava quase 50% do valor total da produção dêsse ano, e que era o resultado das conquistas devidas à Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Açucareiros (Os outros fatores da produção eram: os colonos — empreiteiros agricolas — e os fazendeiros — empresários industriais —).

O valor total da produção açucareira vendida ao Bloco Socialista, segundo o Convênio que serviu de base para regular a safra de 1961, elevou-se a $320 milhões de pêsos (4 milhões de toneladas a $ 0,04 as 460 gramas). Isso quer dizer que o total percebido pela safra vendida ao Bloco Socialista não chegou a cobrir o que era antes a participação de um só dos fatores da produção açucareira.

Além disso, essa quantidade paga-se, sobretudo, em mercadorias de má qualidade e não em dólares.

E como se isso fôsse pouco, a safra (como tôdas as demais atividades do país) foi bastante fraca. Em março de 62, afirmou "Che" Guevara, numa reunião de trabalhadores açucareiros: "A primeira afirmação a fazer é que a safra foi má".

E afirmou que a sêca afetou os canaviais, mas que a principal razão da baixa da produção foi o trabalho agricola e industrial mal feitos.

Depois de revelar que sòmente três ou quatro das cento e sessenta usinas de açucar haviam conseguido as cotas previstas, acrescentou: "Trabalha-se com deficiência no cumprimento das metas pré-estabelecidas". Segundo Guevara, a produção dêste ano atingiu sòmente a 3 milhões de toneladas de açúcar bruto.

Por último, revelou que em muitos pontos do território também foram queimados muitos canaviais.

RESUMINDO:

— Não foram criadas novas indústrias.
— Algumas indústrias foram paralisadas.
— Diminuiu a produção.
— Caiu a qualidade dos produtos.
— Há necessidade urgente de divisas.
— O trabalho foi mal feito.
— Há sabotagem.

Tudo isso por que?

Os marxistas apresentam dois motivos: o primeiro, as agressões do imperialismo ianque; o segundo, as dificuldades inerentes ao comêço de tôda Revolução.

Sôbre o primeiro, deve-se afirmar claramente, e de uma vez por tôdas, que foi Fidel Castro quem, deliberadamente, procurou o apoio do Bloco Socialista e a inimizade dos Estados Unidos. E assim procedeu com todo o cinismo, enquanto proclamava o contrário, fazendo-se de vítima.

A 17 de abril de 1959, em seu discurso perante a Associação Norte-Americana de Diretores de Jornais em Washington, Fidel Castro declarou (em inglês):

— Desejo explicar que não viemos aqui por dinheiro. É possivel que muitos outros govêrnos tenham vindo aqui por dinheiro e muita gente crê que cada vez que um govêrno vem aqui vem por dinheiro.

Eu estava mais interessado na opinião pública do que no dinheiro. E não estava de acôrdo com que se confundisse a finalidade da viagem. (4)

O antigo ministro da Fazenda cubano Rufo López Fresquet declarou:

— Quando acompanhei Fidel a êste país em abril de 1959, o primeiro ministro me advertiu, quando saímos de Havana, para que não discutisse assuntos econômicos cubanos com as autoridades, banqueiros ou capitalistas do Norte. Em diversos ocasiões, durante a viagem, Castro repetiu a advertência. Esta é a razão por que, quando visitei o secretário do Tesouro, Robert B. Anderson, não respondi às indicações oficiais de que os Estados Unidos eram favoráveis a prestar ajuda ao nosso país. Também por esta razão, durante nossa permanência em Washington, quando troquei pontos de vista com o Subsecretário de Estado para Assuntos Latinoamericanos, Roy Rubottom, fingi uma indiferença cortês ante sua declaração concreta de que o govêrno dos Estados Unidos desejava saber como e de que forma poderia cooperar com o govêrno cubano na solução das necessidades econômicas mais urgentes. (5)

Outro dos peritos financeiros cubanos, o antigo presidente do Banco Nacional de Cuba, Felipe Pazos, falou da reunião a que assistiram o subsecretário Rubottom, funcionários do Departamento de Estado e do Departamento do Tesouro, o Ministro da Fazenda cubano López Fresquet, o Ministro cubano de Economia Regino Boti e o próprio. Os norte-americanos, que haviam tomado a iniciativa de convocar a reunião, pediram repetidas vêzes aos cubanos que dissessem o que os Estados Unidos podiam fazer para ajudá-los econômica e financeiramente. Atados pelas instruções de Castro, os cubanos só puderam responder que não necessitavam de ajuda e que não tinham nenhum pedido a fazer. Pazos passou pela mesma experiência no Fundo Monetário Internacional. O terceiro perito cubano, Dr. Ernesto Betancourt, fêz as mesmas revelações.

Isto não quer dizer que negociações financeiras ou econômicas entre os Estados Unidos e Cuba teriam tido necessàriamente um desfêcho feliz. Significa, sim, apesar de uma impressão contrária muito disseminada, que Castro nem sequer quis tentar a negociação. Poder-se-ia replicar que a revolução na qual pensava não podia ser apoiada pelos Estados Unidos, mas não é isso o que têm dito os propagandistas de Castro, que têm preferido a versão mais fantástica do Prof. Mills sôbre a "fria acolhida" dispensada, inclusive, a "pedidos de escassa importância".

Muito mais lúcido foi o "camarada" Ernesto "che" Guevara. Fidel demorou mais, porém já proclamou seu pensamento. E assim, a 13 de março de 1961, declarou pomposamente: "Por isso, vista a questão de fôrça contra fôrça, o poderio do imperialismo é um poderio decadente face ao da União Soviética, da Republica Popular da China e dos países socialistas".

A entrega de Cuba ao Bloco Socialista tem trazido fome e opressão ao povo cubano o que parece fazer rir a Fidel e Nikita, unidos em íntimo abraço.

E melhores ainda, mais cínicas e descaradas foram as declarações que circunstâncias internas levaram-no a expressar a 1.º de dezembro de 1961. (6) "Acredito no Marxismo? Sim, creio no Marxismo! Acreditava o 1.º de Janeiro? Sim, acreditava o 1.º de Janeiro (1959)! Acreditava o 26 de Julho? Sim acreditava o 26 de Julho (1953)!"

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(4) Problemes of Journalism, Atas da Sociedade Norte-Americana de Diretores de Jornais 1959 pag. 82

(5) The Times of Havana, Miami 15 - 17 de Setembro 1961

(6) Palavras de F. Castro na CMQ-TV 1.º de Dezembro 1961

"Terei algumas dúvidas a respeito do Marxismo e entendo que algumas interpretações foram equivocadas, e será preciso revê-las? Não tenho a menor dúvida sôbre êle !".

"Algumas pessoas têm me indagado se eu pensava, quando do ataque ao Quartel Moncada (26-7-53) como penso hoje".

"Quem quer que leia o que dizíamos naquela ocasião verá... que se trata de um documento escrito com muita cautela. "Se *o* tivéssemos escrito sem cuidado, se houvéssemos lançado um programa mais radical... não teria conseguido a amplitude que teve e que *tornou* possível a vitória". "Não se poderá esquecer jamais, a *meu* crédito, os primeiros dias depois do triunfo os visitantes que chegavam a minha casa". "... repugnava-me de verdade aquela procissão em tôrno de mim de tôda aquela gente naquele dia. Bem, mas, em *primeiro* lugar, que estarão *acaso* acreditando? E eu dizia: os que acreditam, melhor. Quanto maior número acreditar que poderá vir até cá e *contar conosco*, melhor! MAIOR SERÁ A SURPRESA QUE ÊLES TERÃO"!

Ei-lo aí, em suas próprias palavras. Marxista há *muito* tempo, negou essa condi*ção* durante muitos anos e acredita que o *bloco socialista* está em ascenção do mundo e que a fôrça do "*imperialismo*" está em decadência com relação a êle.

Pois bem: *o* "poderoso" Bloco Socialista, liderado *por* um grande país, que conta com 45 anos de socialismo, não pôde salvar a economia cubana. Isso está sendo já demonstrado... com as leis e palavras dos próprios comunistas cubanos.

A Economia, Talvez, mas a Liberdade, Não.

Agora vamos proceder a concessões no campo da *Lógica* pura. E vamos conceder muito... Tanto como nem sequer Kruschov concederia... (*E se não o acreditam, verifiquem seu discurso, de março de 1962 — 45 anos de socialismo — sôbre a agricultura na URSS*). Vamos conceder que o problema econômico possa vir a ser resolvido daqui a 100 ou 150 anos... Mas o que não se pode solucionar é a falta de liberdade; e com isso passamos ao segundo argumento.

As dificuldades inerentes ao início de tôda revoluçã*o* — conseqüência da eliminação da oposição da *Direita* — não foram grandes.

Isso foi reconhecido pelo próprio Fidel Castro. (7)

"O Comunismo coloca a unidade de um setor e a guerra de classe. Nós queremos a união de todos os setores e de tôdas as condições simplesmente porque devemos procurar colaboração em todos os setores da vida social. E isso já o conseguimos, contando a Revolução entre 90 e 95% do povo, pois o priva de nada e nada lhe exige e sem dúvida adota leis profundamente revolucionárias".

O Povo, de fato, apoiou Castro em seu programa,

Encontram-se nas mais ínfimas condições. (note-se o lixo chão, e a falta de assistência médica).

Mas o Povo, logo depois, devido a sua traição, se opôs a Castro. E é por isso que se queimam casas comerciais, indústrias e canaviais. Por isso, o trabalho é mal feito. Por isso, as prisões estão cheias. Por isso, é grande o número de exilados. Por isso, fuzila-se continuamente.

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(7) Palavras de F. Castro na CMQ-TV 21 de Maio 1959

Sirva como fato esclarecedor da oposição do povo o êxodo dos profissionais. Dos 5 mil médicos que havia em Cuba saíram do país 1.300; das 1800 farmacêuticos, 300; dos 700 engenheiros agrônomos, 330; dos 1800 contadores públicos, 1000; de 800 engenheiros civis, 350; de 530 engenheiros eletricistas, 300.

Por que? Porque ninguém quer ser escravo. Sim, tal como soa a palavra: ESCRAVO. Porque em Cuba...

O Profissional não tem Liberdade

QUE SE VAYAN
LOS COBARDES
Profesionales de Enfermeria
QUINTA DE DEPENDIENTES
Revolucionaria

Muitas Associações Profissionais foram tomadas à fôrça, sem subterfúgios legais de espécie alguma.

Exige-se um juramento de fidelidade ao regime. Torna-se difícil a saída do país, para o que se é obrigado a negar a profissão no passaporte, ou a refugiar-se numa embaixada estrangeira.

Milhares de profissionais dignos têm abandonado o país, colaborando desta maneira ao enfraquecimento do Regime.

Por fim, as Associações Profissionais foram transformadas em "Academias" e os fundos e abrigos, suspensos.

Se se acredita que os profissionais são os "menos mal" tratados pelo regime vigente, pela necessidade que tem dêles poder-se-á formar uma idéia de como terão sido tratados os setôres restantes do trabalho.

O Estudante não tem Liberdade

Nos centros oficiais, foram substituídas as Associações Estudantis pela "Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes", organização militar juvenil que teve a sua origem na "Juventud Socialista", generosamente dissolvida "em sacrifício da unidade revolucionária".

Brigadas Universitarias. Hoje em Cuba, o estudante só tem "o direito" de desfilar uniformizado.

Esta A.J.R. conseguiu precisamente o oposto da propaganda castrista: CONVERTER ESCOLAS EM QUARTÉIS, entronizando a ediçião física nos centros de estudos.

A A.J.R., além disso, serviu de trampolim. A 13 de março de 1962 Fidel Castro declarou que deveria mudar seu nome para "JUVENTUDE COMUNISTA". Como se pode verificar, da evolução dos nomes que lhe foram dados, foi ela muito significativa: "Juventude Socialista — Jóvenes Rebeldes (A máscara) — Juventude Comunista".

Para os centros privados, foi promulgada uma lei que permite a "intervenção" do Ministério da Educação em caso de desordens para garantir a normalidade funcional do curso escolar. E paralelamente se fomentou a criação de grupos de "Jovens revolucionários", para provocar tais desordens, ou seja: o pretexto da "intervenção". O primeiro centro a sofrer intervenção por êsse método foi a Escola Eletromecânica Belém, em Havana, em fevereiro de 1961.

Mas, a oposição firme dos estudantes provocou a radical ESTATIZAÇÃO DE TODOS OS CENTROS EDUCACIONAIS NA NAÇÃO, no mês de maio de 1961.

Na Universidade de Havana, a 15 de julho de 1960, em reunião
realizada no anfiteatro da Faculdade de Filosofia e Letras, uma minoria
de estudantes e alguns poucos catedráticos traidores concordaram em
dissolver o Conselho Universitário e todas as Congregações de Pro-
fessores e constituir uma Junta de Govêrno integrada por quatro es-
tudantes e quatro professores para dirigir totalitàriamente os destinos
da Universidade. A Junta assim constituída — absolutamente ilegal —
conclamou todos os professores a acatarem sua "autoridade" publi-
camente. Os professores que não atenderam ao "apêlo" — mais
de 80% — foram "afastados" de suas cátedras. A 4 de agôsto, por meio
da lei 859, o Govêrno legalizou a espúria "Junta de Govêrno".

Na Universidade de Oriente, chegou-se aos extremos de forçar, mediante uma campanha de calúnias, a renúncia do Reitor, fundador da mesma, Dr. Felipe Salcines e de expulsar um numeroso grupo de alunos pelo simples fato de terem assistido às festividades religiosas de "Santo Tomás de Aquino", no Dia do Estudante Católico.

O Reitor da Universidade de Las Villas, Dr. Pedro Oliver, e um
grupo professores arriscaram suas vidas, fugindo numa embarcação,
face à perseguição de que foram vítimas depois de protestar contra o
fusilamento do Presidente da Federação Estudantil Universitária, Por-
firio Ramirez, que foi capitão do Exército Rebelde na luta contra a
Ditadura de Batista.

Completa êsse quadro da situação universitária o contrôle, por um organismo supra-universitário, composto de representantes das três Universidades, funcionários do Ministério da Educação e do I.N.R.A.; a ausência de eleições estudantis e a substituição do sistema de concurso para a entrada de catedráticos pela contratação.

Resumindo, ouçamos o próprio Castro: "Naturalmente, hoje o Ministério da Educação tem que estar também ao serviço da Revolução". E isto significa: 1) Os pais não podem ministrar a seus filhos a educação que desejarem; 2) Só os membros da "Juventude Comunista" podem ser dirigentes estudantis; 3) Só os professores incondicionais podem ser catedráticos; 4) Em todos os níveis e currículos deve-se ensinar obrigatòriamente o Marxismo, ficando abolido o ensino de qualquer outro sistema filosófico.

O Camponês não tem Liberdade

A Lei de Reforma Agrária Cubana, baseada nos mesmos princípios da mexicana e da boliviana, pode ser sintetizada, enquanto promessa e texto, a êste fragmento da auto-defesa de Fidel Castro no processo pelo ataque ao Quartel Moncada: (8). "Um govêrno revolucionário, depois de assegurar em suas colônias, com caráter de donos, aos cem mil pequenos agricultores que hoje pagam arrendamentos, solucionaria satisfatòriamente e de forma definitiva, o problema da terra. Primeiro: estabelecendo, como ordena a Constituição, um máximo de extensão para cada tipo de emprêsa agrícola e adquirindo o excesso, por meio da expropriação, reivindicando as terras usurpadas ao Estado, secando os pantanais e alagadiços, plantando grandes viveiros e reservando zonas para o replantio florestal; segundo: repartindo o restante disponível entre as famílias camponesas, de preferência as mais numerosas, fomentando cooperativas de agricultores para a utilização comum de equipamentos de grande custo, dos frigoríficos e de uma só direção profissional e técnica para as culturas e a criação e facilitando por fim, os recursos, equipamentos, proteção e conhecimentos úteis aos camponeses".

Na realidade, porém, que aconteceu?

- A formação de cooperativas — sobretudo nas terras dos latifúndios exploradores — já vem viciada desde a própria Lei. Diz o artigo

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(8) Folheto "La Historia me Absolverá" por F. Castro 1953

43: "Sempre que seja possivel, o Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria fomentará cooperativas agrarias. As cooperativas agrarias organizadas pelo Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria nas terras de que disponha em virtude do determinado nesta Lei, estarão sob a sua direção, reservando-se o direito de designar os administradores das mesmas com o objetivo de assegurar o seu melhor desenvolvimento na etapa inicial dêsse tipo de organização econômica e social, até que se conceda por lei a sua mais ampla autonomia"

Como se vê, a Lei pretende organizar Granjas Estatais e o fato de se referir a uma "etapa inicial" não diminui tal juizo, ja que não enumera os principios cooperativos. Tudo fica nas mãos do I.N.R.A. que não procedeu a nenhuma regulamentação tendente à "mais ampla autonomia". E, além disso, não se "fomentou" senão que se "fez" isto é, não foi permitida a livre iniciativa do camponê.

Devido à resistência do camponês pelas imposições da Reforma Agrária Comunista, o Regime têm tido que obrigar as mulheres fazer trabalho de lavoura

• "A terra é de quem a trabalha", é o que pretende defender o artigo 18: "As terras de domínio privado cultivadas pelos colonos, subcolonos, arrendatários e subarrendatarios, parceiros e biscaristas, serão adjudicadas gratuitamente a seus cultivadores, quando a sua extensão não excede do "minimo vital". (*) Quando tais agricultores cultivarem terras inferiores a êsse "minimo vital", ser-lhe-ão acrescentadas gratuitamente as terras necessarias para completá-las, sempre que se possa dispor das mesmas e as condições econômicas e sociais da região o permitirem".

Se as terras cultivadas nos casos que se mencionam no paragrafo anterior, excedem do "minimo vital", sempre que não passam de 67,5 hectares o arrendatario, sub-arrendatario, colono, sub-colono, parceiro ou biscarista, irecebera 27 hectares a titulo gratuito, depois de prévia expropriação feita pelo Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária, podendo adquirir do proprietário, mediante venda forçada, a parte de sua possessão que excede da area adjudicada gratuitamente, até um limite de 67,5 hectares.

Mas aqui, como se vê, não se fala de propriedade. E na prática tem sido assim. Relativamente foram distribuidos poucos titulos de propriedade e os repartidos são "papel molhado" (**), pois só se pode vender a terra, ceder ou explorar com permissão do I.N.R.A. Raro tipo de propriedade na qual o uso depende da permissão de outra pessoa.

• Além de tudo isso, o artigo 61 põe nas mãos do I.N.R.A. uma arma formidavel: "Toda pratica em contrário aos fins desta Lei, ou o abandono ou aproveitamento negligente das terras que em seu amparo se ortorgam, poderá ser sancionado pelo Instituto da Reforma Agrária, declarando rescindida a transação a titulo gratuito das mesmas e seu reingresso no fundo de reserva de terras. O Regulamento desta Lei regerá a aplicação dêsse artigo".

Mas aqui, como de costume, não foi feita a regulamentação.

• E ainda que existisse, o artigo 54 diz: "São criados os Tribunais da Terra, para julgamento dos processos judiciais que regem a aplicação desta Lei a dos demais relacionados com a contratação agricola e a propriedade agricola em geral. O Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agrária formulará, dentro do prazo de três meses, a partir da promulgação desta Lei, o projeto de Lei Orgânica dos referidos Tribunais".

(*) Minimo Vital. Equivalente a 27 Hectares.

(**) "Papel Molhado". Significa em Cuba uma lei que não se cumpre.

Passados três meses, a Lei Orgânica ainda não apareceu. Quem resolve na verdade são os advogados do I.N.R.A. NÃO HÁ OUTRA ALTERNATIVA.

E o que é mais conclusivo: o completo contrôle do mercado, que converte o agricultor em vendedor forçoso do I.N.R.A., acaba de delinear a situação atual do agricultor cubano: usufrutuário das terras estatais, sob o seu contrôle completo.

O Operário não tem Liberdade

¡ASESINOS!
BESTIAS.
EL COMUNISMO LES
PAGA con Rublos:
HEROICA

O operario Iulián Montesinos assassinado pela Milicia Comunista enquanto procurava asilo na Embaixada do Equador.

O Govêrno Revolucionário promulgou acaso alguma lei que ponha as massas trabalhadoras em condições de dirigir a produção e distribuição de acôrdo com o interêsse de todos?

Não.

As indústrias, os comércios exterior e interior e os sindicatos estão nas mãos do Estado. O Estado — segundo a "Lógica" marxista — há de refletir as decisões do Partido, não as da sociedade. E por isso não se procurou que representantes livremente eleitos por unidades produtora, setor ou profissão, se constituíssem em assembléias planificadoras, mas os homens do Partido vêm ocupando a direção da vida econômica do país, para dirigi-lo como bem quiserem, sem responder perante o povo.

Os quatro passos principais para conseguir isto foram: as "intervenções", o "censo trabalhista", as "nacionalizações" e as "depurações".

1) A Lei 698, de 22 de janeiro de *1960*, orgânica do Ministério do Trabalho, conferiu ao Ministro, no inciso j de seu artigo 7, a faculdade de "intervir em empresas patronais e organizações operárias, patronais e profissionais, quando as circunstâncias o exigirem, para manter em atividade os centros de produção ou o exercício dos direitos sindicais e sociais, sempre por motivo justificado ou com vistas à Lei, designando para isso os delegados interventores que achar adequados por sua capacidade". Estas "intervenções", sem regulamentação, na verdade, convertem o Ministério do Trabalho em patrão efetivo, equivalendo a "nacionalização".

2) A Lei 761, de 19 de março de *1960*, dispõe sôbre a confecção do Primeiro Censo Trabalhista, convertendo o Ministro do Trabalho no empregador único, privando assim os sindicatos de tôdas as suas prerrogativas, posto que lhes nega até o direito de negociar com as emprêsas. Em seu artigo 1.º ela dispõe, de acôrdo com o estabelecido na Lei n.º 696, de 22 de janeiro de *1960*, sôbre "a organização e realização do Primeiro Censo Trabalhista para efeito do qual o Ministério do Trabalho REGULAMENTE E CONTROLE o movimento do emprêgo em todo o país e se cumpram assim os fins que lhe forem impostos".

3) A 13 de outubro de *1960* foram "nacionalizadas" 381 emprêsas nacionais, por meio da Lei 890 e todos os bancos mediante a 891. Já no mês de junho haviam se nacionalizado (aí tem sentido a palavra nacionalização) as usinas de açúcar de propriedade norte-americana.

A 17 de outubro, Castro comentou tais leis pela televisão e de seu discurso se deduz, implícita, a definição socialista da Revolução. Disse êle: "O programa de Moncada foi cumprido". Mas os trabalhadores que tinham memória não poderiam acreditar. Disse Castro naquela ocasião: "A terceira lei revolucionária outorgava (no caso de ter triunfado o ataque ao Quartel Moncada) aos trabalhadores e empregados o direito de participarem de trinta por cento das utilidades em tôdas as grandes emprêsas industriais, mercantis e de mineração, incluindo as centrais açucareiras. Excetuavam-se as emprêsas meramente agrícolas, tendo em vista a implantação futura de outras leis agrárias".

Decididamente, o programa do Moncada não se havia cumprido.

4) A dominação dos sindicatos foi iniciada pelo Executivo da Confederação de Trabalhadores de Cuba, C.T.C., mediante a submissão, coação ou expulsão de seus integrantes. Face a isso, não foi difícil preparar eleições gerais com candidatura única e colunas em branco. Houve o caso de alguém que tomou a decisão de apresentar sua candidatura pela coluna em branco, em seu centro de trabalho; os milicianos do centro, um dia antes da eleição, deram-lhe a escolher: *retirar* o pedido ou ir para a prisão. Em outros lugares foi mais fácil: o aviso de ter-se encerrado o prazo da candidatura chegou no dia seguinte ao previsto.

Com tal esquema não é difícil compreender a "nova mentalidade proletária", tal como se expressa na revista "Cuba Socialista" (fevereiro de 1962, n.º 45): "... com antecedência ao XI Congresso Nacional, na totalidade dos Congressos das Indústrias se havia concordado, por unânimidade que, a partir de 1962, se renuncie a algunmas vantagens de ordem secundária que certos setôres operários haviam conseguido, em suas justas lutas contra os patrões. Entre essas se acha, por exemplo, o chamado 13.º mês de fim de ano.

Os milhões de pesos que se destinavam a este conceito, aumentariam os fundos do desenvolvimento industrial... Entre essas vantagens, encontra-se também o pagamento dos chamados nove dias por enfermidade, que em algumas indústrias era feito aos trabalhadores no fim do ano, mesmo sem ter estado doentes. Os Congressos Sindicais de comum acôrdo renunciaram a esta *prática viciosa que alimenta a falta ao trabalho*...

"O XI Congresso da CTC-R e os Congressos Sindicais das Indu-trias... consideram a necessidade de revisão dos velhos contratos de

trabalho, que não correspondem mais à nova situação... e dentro dos quais se encontram *cláusulas que freiam o processo produtivo*.

Um dos acordos feitos com êsse sentido é o que estabelece que em tôdas as indústrias e trabalhos, com exceção dos insalubres e perigosos, ou em que o trabalho resulte penoso e esgotante, *os trabalhadores trabalhem efetivamente o dia de oito horas*.

Com esta falta de liberdade é muito fácil mostrar ao mundo um país em que as classes trabalhadoras, "como estão no poder", não necessitam de recorrer a greves ou reclamações.

Em Cuba ninguém tem Liberdade

- Em Cuba não ha liberdade de expressão. Disse Castro a 10 de novembro de 1961. (9)

(As históricas declarações desse dia, ante os Instrutores Revolucionários das "Organizações Revolucionárias Integradas", tinham dois fins: livrar-se da responsabilidade pelas injustiças que citou e ir preparando o ambiente para a creação do Partido Unico com férrea disciplina): "Pois bem, todo êsse aparato (de informação e propaganda) está hoje nas nossas mãos e esteve práticamente em parte considerável desde os primeiros meses da Revolução,", "... já tôdas as estações de rádio estão em mãos revolucionárias e sob a direção da Comissão de Orientação Revolucionária". "As 156 estações estão hoje ao serviço da Revolução, as duas estações nacionais de televisão e todos os jornais".

- Dentro de um esquema totalitário, como o existente em Cuba, é muito fácil usar a coação.

Igual método é usado para conseguir as "grandes concentrações".

"Porque em vez de fazer tantas coletas (Disse Castro) não travaremos uma batalha pela produtividade? Com o aproveitamento dos recursos humanos, em vez de coletar 500 mil miseráveis pesos, pela fôrça, coletaremos 50 milhões de pesos, honesta e revolucionariamente. Não é muito melhor do que andar mendigando, pedindo e recolhendo tostões, e começar tôda a gente ver nos delegados e revolucionários uns "picaretas"? Interessa-nos que comprem uma revista que não se lê? Perde o país, com o papel que consome e perde o jornal porque, então, se procede a um desconto ao leitor, que não o lê, mas que lhe parece ter sido imposto. É muito melhor serem tirados 5 mil, 10 mil exemplares a menos e que todo o mundo o compre espontâneamente. Se causam dano ao jornal, se causam dano à Revolução, as coisas que implicam nesse tipo de *descontos obrigatórias*, isso está refletido na desconfiança de tôda a gente".

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(9) Todos os trechos que seguem foram publicados no Diário "El Mundo" de 11 de Novembro de 1961.

"Quando me indagavam: bem, por que querem descontar o sindicato por assembléias? Porque de outra maneira não pagarão todos. Ou seja: no fundo há um *processo coercitivo* para obrigar a gente a pagar".

"Há momentos em que são mais psicológicos para falar ao pessoal que outros; talvez no momento em que todo mundo tem fome com vontade de ir logo para casa, se o detêm ali, detem-se a desgosto. Haverá muitos que para que não digam que não querem ouvir, ficam".

- Já mais diretamente, têm a seu cargo a vigilancia os "Comitês de Defesa da Revolução" e os agentes do "Departamento de Segurança do Estado".



Os membros dos C. D. R. são os instrumentos para coagir o povo.

Os "Comités" estão organizados por bairros e centros de trabalho e estão integrados pelos piores elementos populares. Uma idéia disso é-nos dada pelas próprias palavras de Fidel Castro: "... temos o paradoxo de que enquanto intervínhamos nas sociedades da burguesia e havíamos estabelecido nela um Comité de Defesa... Comité de Defesa que tinha êsses lugares num abandono espantoso, que mais parecia um "chiqueiro" que outra coisa".

- Sôbre os temíveis agentes do Departamento de Segurança do Estado ouçamos de nôvo a Castro: "Basta que qualquer companheiro numa granja, numa cooperativa, numa usina de açucar, venha a crer que é membro da Segurança... e que tem poderes omnímodos sôbre a liberdade das pessoas, qualquer trabalhador, qualquer camponês, qualquer cidadão pode se ver prêso durante 15 dias ou 20, sem ver a sua mulher, sem os filhos, sem ver ninguém, e isso é realmente uma iniquidade".

"Mas há algo que me preocupa mais: mencionar o nome do órgão de Segurança, com certo temor, como um aparato misterioso do qual poderia surgir a qualquer momento alguma arbitrariedade...".

"E não é fácil explicar o fato de que um cidadão possa ser vitima de uma arbitrariedade desse tipo. Como explicar que um cidadão esteja 40 dias preso, sem julgamento? Ou que outro fique 30 dias e depois o soltem? Que outro fique 35 e outro 60? E que, nesse interim, além da prisão, lhe tenham tomado o carro e o tenham arrebentado, se é que chegaram a devolve-lo? ... nossa luta face aos ladrões de automóveis, aos "ocupadores de carros livremente", que tinha levado o Govêrno Revolucionário a sancionar uma lei determinando prisão de dez anos a todo o membro das fôrças armadas, miliciano, membro da Segurança, que utilizasse por conta própria veículo de uma pessoa prêsa... lei que, infelizmente não foi aplicada uma só vez".

"E vou dizer com toda franqueza: grande número de cidadãos em nosso país podem ser perfeitamente vitimas inocentes da arbitrariedade de cem e provàvelmente de mil pessoas".

"...a Revolução é a primeira a lamentar que não possa conceder garantias individuais...".

"...propor as coisas como o prêço inevitável da Revolução".

• A essas palavras, que não precisam de comentário, há que se juntar a anulação do recurso de "habeas corpus" e a criação dos "Tribunais Revolucionários", cujas terríveis características são as seguintes:

1) Fazer parte da jurisdição militar, que indica em cada caso os soldados e oficiais do Exército Rebelde e das Milícias que deverão integrá-los; soldados e oficiais, iletrados na maioria das vêzes, que padecem das condições mínimas de imparcialidade, independência e capacidade necessárias à função de administrar a Justiça.

2) Têm faculdades para "definir o delito e suas circunstâncias", assim como para "determinar o grau e quantidade das penas". (*)

Em Cuba, antes, as Leis diziam que "ninguém podia ser julgado por um crime que não estivesse previsto no Código", nem se poderiam impor outras sanções que as estabelecidas nas leis penais". Do mesmo modo proibia-se a aplicação por analogia dos citados preceitos. Mas Castro eliminou tôdas as garantias do moderno Direito Penal.

3) Não há necessidade de provas para condenar um acusado; basta a acusação do agente do Departamento de Segurança do Estado.

4) Não há limite de tempo para a apresentação dos detidos ante as autoridades, nem para a realização dos julgamentos. O caráter irregular dêsses Tribunais tem levado a casos extremos, no Presídio Militar de la Cabaña, de Lázaro Reyes — convocando-se, de surpresa, para julgamento, sem se poder dispor de advogado e condenando à morte em 15 minutos — e Efrén Rodrigues Calo, fusilado após ter sido condenado à pena de 30 anos.

• Para resumir, bastam algumas palavras do magnífico analista do regime comunista, Milovan Djilas:

"O mecanismo do poder comunista é aliás o mais sutil que se possa conceber, ainda que leve à tirania refinada e à exploração mais brutal.

A sutileza desse mecanismo se deve a que um só partido, o Partido Comunista, constitui o fundamento de toda a atividade política, econômica e ideológica. Tôda a vida pública fica detida, avança, retrocede e dá voltas, de acordo com o que sucede nos centros do Partido.

(*) Lei 33 de 21 de Janeiro de 1959.

No sistema comunista a gente se dá conta em seguida do que se lhe permite e não se lhe permite fazer.

As leis e os regulamentos não tem importância mais especial para ela. Mas, sim, as regras reais e não escritas, no que diz respeito às relações entre o Govêrno e seus súditos. Com independência das lèis todos sabem que o Govêrno está nas mãos dos comitês do Partido e da Polícia Secreta".

Conclusões Finais:

O Comunismo Internacional pretende apontar a Revolução Cubana como modêlo para a América Latina.

Sai de Cuba continuamente enorme quantidade de propaganda, absolutamente contrária ao que ali acontece e tem acontecido.

Os comunistas cubanos incitam à realização da Revolução Marxista-Leninista. Inclusive durante a crise brasileira de 1961, Fidel Castro conclamou o povo brasileiro à insurreição. Menos mal que êste povo é inteligente e não lhe fêz caso.

Pois os que fizeram caso do "máximo líder de Cuba Socialista" encontrarão para seus povos a Miséria e o terror.

Esperamos que a leitura dessas páginas ajude a que se compreenda isso.

Quizemos apenas citar fatos, cifras concretas.
Sejam suficientes, por fim, os seguintes:
Em três anos de Revolução:

2.245 fuzilados
93.500 presos
300.000 exilados
1.000.000 de vistos pedidos.

Eis o que é "Cuba Socialista". "Viva o Marxismo-Leninismo"!

EPILOGO

"Todo o poder que iria adquirindo a casta de funcionários, unidos pela necessidade de manter-se numa ocupação privilegiada e pingue, iria o povo perdendo, sem ter a mesma razão de cumplicidade com esperanças e proveitos, para fazer frente aos funcionários enlaçados por interesses comuns.

Como tôdas as suas necessidades públicas viriam a ser satisfeitas pelo Estado, adquiriram os funcionários então influência enorme que naturalmente advém aos que distribuem algum direito e benefício.

Aquêle que quer agora que o Estado cuide dêle para não ter que cuidar de si, teria então que trabalhar na medida, por tempo e em tarefa que o Estado pudesse lhe assinalar, posto que êste, sôbre quem cairiam todos os deveres, se daria naturalmente tôdas as faculdades necessárias para conseguir os meios de cumprir aquilo. De ser o servo de si próprio, passaria o homem a ser escravo do Estado. De escravo dos capitalistas, como se diz agora, iria até ser escravo dos funcionários.

Escravo é todo aquele que trabalha para outro que tem domínio sôbre êle; e nesse sistema SOCIALISTA dominaria a comunidade ao homem, que à comunidade entregaria todo o seu trabalho.

E como os funcionários são seres humanos e portanto prevaricadores, soberbos e ambiciosos, e nessa organização teriam grande poder, apoiados por todos os que se aproveitassem ou esperassem se aproveitar dos abusos e por aquelas fôrças vis que sempre cumprem entre os oprimidos, o terror, prestígio ou habilidade dos que mandam, êste sistema de distribuição oficial do trabalho comum conseguiria usufruir em pouco tempo brutalidades, violências, furtos e tergiversações que o espírito de individualidade, a autoridade e ousadia do gênio e da astúcia do vício originam pronta e fatalmente em tôda organização humana. "Do mau elemento humano — diz Spencer — não se podem fazer boas instituições". A miséria pública será, pois, com semelhante Socialismo, palpável e grande. O funcionalismo autocrático abusará da plebe, cansada e trabalhadora. Lamentável será, e geral, a servidão".

JOSÉ MARTÍ



JOSÉ MARTÍ

(1853 - 1895) Apóstolo da Independencia de Cuba

Agosto 1962

24 | SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: WH

INFO: [illegible], ADDP, [illegible] 6, [illegible] 2, CA/PEG, CA PROP, CA/[illegible], CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, CI/PS, [illegible], WH 11, WH/SA 12, VR.

TDCS-3 [illegible]

S E C R E T 132200Z AUG 14 [illegible] 64 [illegible] 3335

DIR WAVE INFO PACY LANT CITE SDOM 3335 (SHRYOCK ACTING)

INTEL

02 02

SUPDATA [EMSEM-1. {EMSEM-1 HAD SAID ON 2 JULY 64

THAT FOLCH AND LUNE WERE AIDING CUBAN REBELS.

INDEX FOLCH, LUNA. FILED 132200Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM HDC [illegible]

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/CUBA

SUBJ SUPPORT OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY FOR CUBAN EXILE OPERATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DOI: EARLY AUGUST 1964

PADA: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (13 AUGUST 64)

APPR 3

IN COMMENT:

WH/REG	2	WH/SA	12		TDCS PRE EDENCE
WH/R/CWH/PE	3				
					ROUTINE
					PRIORITY

RELEASING [ ]03 | DATE DISTRIBUTED 14 AUGUST 1964 0302Z | BASED ON: | LIAISON

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3/PV

SECRET

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

TDCS

SOURCE [DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL] 24
(F) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN MILITARY CIRCLES.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS
PRECEDENCE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC / CUBA

TDCS [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. EARLY [illegible] 1964

DISTR [illegible]

SUBJECT

SUPPORT OF THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND NAVY FOR CUBAN EXILE CACHING OPERATIONS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (13 AUGUST 1964)

REF

IN [illegible]35

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

24

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [A DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (F)] WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN MILITARY CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: 3

1. THE DOMINICAN AIR FORCE AND THE DOMINICAN NAVY ARE ALLOWING CRAFT MANNED BY CUBAN EXILES, TO CACHE ARMS AND OTHER SUPPLIES ON THE DOMINICAN COAST AT LAS PENAS AND PUNTA LUNA, SOUTH OF MONTE CRISTI. THE BOATS ARRIVE AND DEPART QUICKLY, WITH PERMISSION FROM THE DOMINICAN NAVY, TO CACHE THEIR CARGO. THE ARMS AND OTHER SUPPLIES ARE NOT OF DOMINICAN ORIGIN. THE CUBAN EXILES DO NOT REMAIN ASHORE, BUT LEAVE WITH THE CRAFT THAT BROUGHT THEM.

2. AIR FORCE COL. JUAN N. FOLCH PEREZ, COMMANDER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

c/pv

OF THE AIR FORCE BASE IN SANTIAGO, IS IN CHARGE OF THIS OPERATION. (SOURCE COMMENT. IN EARLY JULY, FOLCH AND GEN. ATILA LUNA WERE REPORTEDLY AIDING CUBAN EXILES.) THE DOMINICAN ARMY IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE CUBAN EXILE OPERATIONS.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Tour of Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFS:
A. WAVE 1448
B. HLBA 6911
C. BOGO 4332
D. QUIT 5867
E. HEGA 2900
F. SAGO 6577
G. SAGO 6595
H. LAPA 5550
I. HVCA 11,393

1. SUMMARY. The Reference A. AMSPELL exhibit toured six Latin American countries during a five-month period, February-June 1964. With the exception of Guayaquil and La Paz -- where excellent results were achieved -- the tour was only moderately successful, and must be classified a failure in Quito, Santiago and Montevideo. According to AMSPELL, the total number of persons who viewed the exhibit was 6,720. Another 2,792 persons reportedly attended conferences at which the AMSPELL team gave talks on the Reference A. exhibit and the dangers and weaknesses of Castro-Communism. Publicity was given the exhibit by 34 newspapers (47 items), 30 radio stations, and six television stations. AMSPELL estimated the TV audience at 1,300,000. Sample clippings are enclosed under separate cover. Reports from WH stations and the WAVE debriefing of the AMSPELL team lead us to conclude that the tour was a moderate success that could have been much better if if had been better organized and if the AMSPELL team had had more experience. (On balance) we believe the tour was well worth the approximately $12,000.00 KUBARK paid out. We do not, however, believe it should be repeated in the foreseeable future in view of the relative inexperience shown by the AMSPELL team on the recent tour and the many difficulties encountered in trying to organize the exhibit in the various cities.

/ CONTINUED /

CS COPY

Attachments: U/SC
A. AMSPELL Statistical Report
B. Misc. Press Clippings

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19-124-26/3

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN

DATE TYPED 23 July 64	DATE DISPATCHED JUL 24 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-16,980	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26-/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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2. COLOMBIA.

a. Bogota. The AMSPELL team arrived in Bogota on 12 February 1964 but were unable to make contact with the local AMSPELL/AMBARB contact until the next day. They were unable to get adequate advance publicity and had trouble finding space for the exhibit. About 200. persons attended the exhibit, and AMSPELL conferences were attended by approximately 485 persons. HLBA-6911reported GISNEAKER-9's observations on the local reaction to the tour, which he judged to be indifferent. The AMSPELL team freely admitted to WAVE that the Bogota operation was something less than successful, but blamed the lack of advance preparations and the existence of an unfriendly press for their failure. It should also be noted that the AMSPELL team was not on the best of terms with some of the local Cubans, and this fact probably had a good deal to do with the poor showing.

b. Medellin. The showing in Medellin was better than in Bogota. The press was lukewarm but the director of the Caracol radio station gave them considerable publicity, and they were able to hold the exhibit in a central spot in the city. About 400 persons visited the exhibit over a period of three days, and 850 persons attended conferences given by the team.

c. Cali. The team received good advance press play in Cali, which was perhaps one reason for the fact that the local Communist party was also well prepared for their arrival. On the very first morning of the exhibit, a large crowd of Communists tried to enter the exhibit with the obvious intention of starting trouble. and when they were locked out began to throw rocks and "stinkbombs" into the exhibit hall. The incident provided considerable publicity for AMSPELL, as reported in BOGO 4332. A total of 100 persons attended the exhibit. The AMSPELL team claimed that the Communists were very strong in Cali and that working there was like swimming upstream.

3. ECUADOR.

a. Quito. The team arrived in Quito on 25 March, after spending several days in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain visas for Peru. QUIT 5867 reported the AMSPELL team's personality clashes with the local AMBARBs and the consequent poor performance by the AMSPELL team, who complained of the absence of police protection, adequate facilities for the exhibit, etc., and departed just two days later on the 27th. One member remained in Bogota to hold conferences, attended by 325 persons. While not accepting the blame for this fiasco, the AMSPELL team generally corroborated the above story in their debriefing by WAVE. After such incidents as reported in QUIT 5867, we are reluctant to recommend any future tours.

b. Guayaquil. The AMSPELL team considered Guayaquil their most successful operation, an opinion seconded by Guayaquil base who termed it a "resounding success." (See QUIT 5867 and HEGA 2900). The exhibit received front page coverage in "El Universo" and "El Telegrafo", and they were given a half hour on a major TV station. An estimated total of 1,200 persons visited the exhibit, and the team spoke before 40 members of a local group, Frente de Defensa Nacional.

4. Santiago, Chile.

The AMSPELL team arrived in Santiago on 5 March to coincide with the opening of the Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC). The Santiago operation was a complete loss because Chilean customs authorities would not release the exhibit during the congress and the AMSPELL team was unable to obtain space of any kind to hold conferences due to competition from the congress for space. (See SAGO 6577). The AMSPELL team had been counting on a contact in the Catholic University, Fernando SANHUESA, to facilitate their activities but SANHUESA told them that the LAYC was a failure from the Communist side and that the AMSPELL team could contribute more by remaining quiet than by actively propagandizing

04

CONTINUED /

3/PV

against (and thereby calling attention to) the congress. The end result was that the AMSPELL team did nothing. An amateurish plan to kidnap a Cuban delegate to the LAYC as hostage for political prisoners in Cuba was quickly scotched by the Station. (See SAGO 6595).

5. La Paz, Bolivia.

The AMSPELL team arrived in La Paz on 17 March, and after some difficulty in obtaining space were finally able to open the exhibit in Club La Paz on 21 March. As noted in LAPA 5550, exhibits and conferences were held in various locations in the city, with the closing performance on 25 March at the Scala Theater hosted by the Venezuelan ambassador. The exhibit received excellent coverage in all four of the leading La Paz newspapers and the three largest radio stations carried AMSPELL conferences. Despite the excellent publicity, a total of only 600 persons visited the exhibit in La Paz. According to AMSPELL, this was due to Bolivian preoccupation with such things as a national day to demand a passage to the sea for Bolivia which stopped all traffic and communication.

6. Argentina.

a. Buenos Aires. The AMSPELL team arrived in Buenos Aires on 27 March during Holy Week. In addition to the delay caused by Holy Week celebrations, the team had difficulty finding space for the exhibit. With the help of the Chamber of Commerce, the exhibit finally opened on 6 April in Chamber of Commerce offices on Leandro Allem street. An estimated 1,200 persons visited the exhibit during a four-day period, and good publicity was also obtained in the La Prensa and La Razon newspapers. The AMSPELL group also obtained 10 minutes on Panorama Mundial, Channel 7 TV, as part of a 30-minute program on Cuba and the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil. According to AMSPELL, the Panorama program is rated as having 500,000 viewers. The AMSPELL team also held four conferences before small groups of Rotarians and university students which were attended by a total of 400 persons.

b. Rosario. The AMSPELL team arrived in Rosario on 11 April and opened the exhibit on 15 April, after the customary difficulties of finding a site due to the lack of advance preparations. The local chamber of commerce finally came through with an excellent site, the "Galeria Libertad", in the center of town. A total of 2,000 persons visited the exhibit during the three days it was open. Local newspapers (La Cronica, La Tribuna, La Capital) gave good publicity to the tour. The local radio stations gave spot announcements of the exhibit but did not give any additional publicity.

c. Cordoba. The AMSPELL team made a hurried trip to Cordoba, where they were able to show the exhibit to an estimated 600 persons during a three-day stay, 20-23 April. The local chamber of commerce was again very helpful in arranging for space for the exhibit and obtaining local press publicity. Good press coverage was obtained in Los Principios and Cordoba.

7. Montevideo, Uruguay. The AMSPELL team reported that Montevideo was the worst performance of the entire tour, with only twenty persons attending the exhibit. They arrived on 26 April and after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a site in a central location, felt obliged to accept space in the Catholic Club, considered a center of reaction by many Uruguayans and remote from the main thoroughfares. Despite the poor reception and the lack of good local contacts, a fair amount of publicity was obtained in the local press and the AMSPELL team had a one-hour show on the local TV channel 10.

/ CONTINUED /

8. Caracas, Venezuela. The AMSPELL team arrived in Caracas on 9 May, having cut Brazil from the tour because of visa problems. Their early arrival caught their local contacts unprepared and it was not until 16 May that the exhibit opened. Excellent support was provided by station assets and widespread publicity was given to the event. However, the exhibit was located in a relatively remote spot and only 300 persons attended the exhibit, according to AMSPELL. (The Station estimate was 400-500). Another 140 persons attended AMSPELL conferences. The station report (HVCA-11393) which has been corroborated by the WAVE debriefing of the AMSPELL team, describes the typical experience of the AMSPELL team throughout the tour with the exception that local support was not always as effective as in Caracas.

9. Enclosed under separate cover is an AMSPELL statistical summary of the tour and press clippings from the countries visited.

for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

SECRET

From: Habana | Report No: [illegible] | Local File No: 10-18

No. of Pages: 2 | No. of Enclosures: None

Report Made By: [illegible]/dat | Approved By: Sherwood P. [illegible]

Distribution:
By copy to: 2 - Washington
2 - Files
1 - Santiago de Cuba
1- Embassy
1 - L A
1 - Naval, Army, Air Attachés
Orally to: None

Source Cryptonym: | References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Plans and Activities of the Directorio Revolucionario

Source: [Juan NUIRY Sanchez] 05

1. Part of the information in the attached report was forwarded by HAVA 831.

2. Source, whom [illegible] had previously met through a mutual acquaintance, sent word through another student contact of [illegible] that he wanted to talk to [illegible]. Since source is wanted by the Cuban authorities, he was met clandestinely. The information in the attached report was elicited from him during meetings on 9 and 10 March 1957.

Classification SECRET

(2)

17-8-31

1/90

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SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

SUBJECT: Plans and Activities of the Directorio Revolucionario

REPORT NO. HKH-1432

DATE OF INFO: October 1956 - 9 March 1957

DATE ACQUIRED: 9-10 March 1957

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 11 March 1957

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT:

Source: Member of Directorio Revolucionario (F)

Appraisal of Content: 3

1. José Antonio ECHEVERRIA Bianchi[2] and Juan NUIRY Sánchez,[2] leaders of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil[4] (Revolutionary Student Directory) formed at the University of Habana, met in October 1956 in Miami, Florida, with two delegates of Fidel CASTRO Ruz and with Carlos PRIO Socarrás to plan the uprising against the BATISTA regime. The delegates of the three groups agreed on a plan which called for CASTRO's group to land in Oriente and the other two groups to go into action at the same time in support of CASTRO's landing and subsequent activities. Faustino PEREZ,[2] a physician, and Juan Manuel MARQUEZ,[2] who was killed in the Sierra Maestra fighting, were CASTRO's delegates. Carlos MARISTANY,[2] former Minister of Labor, accompanied Carlos PRIO.[2]

2. After the assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico in late October 1956, ECHEVERRIA, NUIRY, and other members of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil had to go into hiding because they were accused by President Fulgencio BATISTA of having been the authors of BLANCO Rico's death. Since then they have been working clandestinely to organize, arm, and prepare their group to go into action. There are approximately 100 men hidden in the Habana area awaiting the signal to strike, and other groups are ready throughout the island. Considerable support is expected from Cuban Navy personnel, [illegible], as well as from many persons who have asked to join the group but have not been incorporated into the group for lack of proper arms. The Directorio has also been in contact with Army personnel and hopes that many of the troops will desert or go over to the Directorio's side when the fighting begins.[1]

3. The Directorio does not know or understand why the PRIO group, which is believed to be well-armed, has not gone into action as yet. The Directorio knows that PRIO has given instructions to his group leaders to remain quiet, but the reasons behind these instructions have not been determined.

(2)

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UNIT : SAS/MOB/PA-PROP
EXT : 6055
DATE : 12 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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TO : SEE BELOW
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, S/C

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RE Indexing (check one):
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Signature:

12 JUN 63 20 24z

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CAPA RIOD HONT LUEN
SAGO LIMA LAPA QUIT
BOGO

DYVOUR/AMBARB

REF: DIR 46562 ~~OUT~~

IDEN: LUIS FERNANDEZ ROCHA RODRIGUEZ

MANUEL SALVAT-ROQUE

FELIX GUILLERMO OTHON PACHO

FERNANDO GARCIA-CHACON CHACON

END OF MESSAGE

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SAS/MOB/Mr. Tilton
WH/1 (in draft)
WH/2 (in draft)
WH/3 (in draft)
WH/5 (in draft)
C/WH/CA/Mr. Sternfield (in draft)

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W. Hood
W. C. KING

DESMOND FITZGERALD

19-124-26/4

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

12-12

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CAS NR [illegible] ROUTINE [illegible]Z

SECRET CH NR 13[illegible] TO NEW ORLEANS FI WASHINGTON

~~S-51877~~

TO BURKE FROM ASHCRAFT BY CIESIELSKI (SUPPORT) - CITE WA-[illegible]

A 116921

CASE 16633 RPT 16633. WE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING FROM NEW YORK:

~~S-51877~~

1. THE INTERESTED FI RPT FI AREA DIVISION WELCOMED YOUR DETAILED INVENTORY OF THE VERSON RPT VERSON MATERIAL. HAVANA FI RPT FI STATION HAS ADVISED THAT VERSON WAS IN TOUCH WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY IN PAST AND IS OF OPINION THAT IMPORTANT PART OF VERSON MATERIAL IS IN CIA POSSESSION. THIS LAST PROBABILITY - SUPPORTED BY YOUR DESCRIPTION AND OPINIONS - HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED DESIRE TO SECURE THE FOLDERS. THE NEED FOR INVOLVING CUSTOMS IN A SERIES OF DELIVERIES AND VERSON'S DESIRE TO HAVE THE FOLDERS RETURNED ARE FURTHER FACTORS COMPLICATING THE SITUATION. FINALLY FI/WH RPT FI/WH DIVISION STATES THAT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY VERSON WARRANT A SUSPICION THAT THIS DEAL HAS BEEN DESIGNED FOR EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIO GROUP RPT PRIO GROUP IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS IN CUBA.

2. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT FORWARDED YOUR LETTER BUT SUBSTITUTED A DRAFT ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY FI RPT FI. WE HAVE POUCHED YOU A COPY AND YOU WILL NOTE THAT IS IS VAGUE AND EVASIVE. THIS HAS BEEN DONE DELIBERATELY WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL AROUSE A REPLY; FOR OBVIOUS REASON THE WASHINGTON RETURN ADDRESS IS INDICATED. FI WILL RPT FI WILL CONTINUE TO PREPARE REPLIES UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE OFFER IS FINALLY REJECTED OR YOU ARE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER MEETING.

3. WE TRUST THE ARRANGEMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE MEET WITH YOUR APPROVAL. IF THERE ARE ANY C E RPT C E ASPECTS YOU CAN CALL TO OUR ATTENTION, ADVISE AND THEY WILL BE USED TO ADJUST THE OPERATION.

[illegible]/1[illegible]Z SEP CBS

~~F-27877~~
F 11692

[illegible] WASH PRIORITY [illegible]

(PRIORITY) SECRET CN NR 132 TO NEW ORLEANS FROM WASHINGTON

TO BURKE FROM ASHCRAFT BY CIESIELSKI - CITE WA-9970

A 11692 ~~27877~~ S-27877

THIS IS NEW CASE 15595 RPT 16659 SUBJECT: MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS RPT CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS. RE CONVERSATION BURKE-CIESIELSKI ON 1 RPT 1 SEPTEMBER 54. ACCORDING TO FI/WH RPT FI/WH DIVISION, FRANK JACKSON RPT FRANK JACKSON OF MIAMI, FLORIDA APPROACHED PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SHERMAN ADAMS RPT SHERMAN ADAMS WITH A STORY THAT INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL CONCERNING SOVIET PLANS IN THE CARRIBEAN AREA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH CARLOS PRIO. IT APPEARS THAT SHERMAN ADAMS TOLD JACKSON THAT IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO CIA RPT CIA AND INDICATED THAT HE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

~~27877~~ A 11692

FRANK JACKSON IS REPORTED TO BE CONNECTED WITH AN ORGANIZATION KNOWN AS WORLD SURVEYS; HE ALSO SERVES AS PUBLIC RELATIONS REPRESENTATIVE FOR PRIO. IN SPITE OF THIS BUSINESS CONNECTION IT IS BELIEVED THAT JACKSON'S MOTIVATION IS CORRECT. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT HE HAS HAD SERVICE WITH ONI RPT ONI AND THE SECRET SERVICE, AND IS PERSONALLY VOUCHED FOR BY A MEMBER OF THE CIA RPT CIA SECURITY OFFICE.

AS YOU KNOW, PRIO IS CURRENTLY INVOLVED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND SCHEDULED TO STAND TRIAL ON AN ARMS SMUGGLING CHARGE.

THE FI RPT FI AREA DIVISION HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS CURRENT PRIO OFFER IS A MANEUVER DESIGNED TO PLACE THE US RPT US GOVERNMENT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, JACKSON STATES THAT THE PRIO GROUP IS MAKING THIS OFFER WITHOUT ANY THOUGHT OF FINANCIAL RETURN OR POLITICAL FAVORS.

THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS FURNISHED FOR BACKGROUND. WE HAVE ASKED SECURITY TO COORDINATE WITH FBI RPT FBI ON A CRASH BASIS AND WILL ASK YOU TO TAKE NO RPT NO ACTION UNTIL THIS COORDINATION IS EFFECTED AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS WIRE AS AN ALERT AND ADVISE US OF YOUR ESTIMATED DEPARTURE TIME SO THAT WE CAN NOTIFY YOU BY TELEPHONE THAT THE NECESSARY COORDINATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. AT MIAMI JACKSON CAN BE CONTACTED THROUGH THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBER: 46-6650 RPT 46-6650, AND TOLD THAT YOU ARE IN MIAMI AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE MEETING HE HAD IN WASHINGTON WITH MR. HENRY THOMAS RPT MR. HENRY THOMAS (THOMAS IS THE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS JACKSON'S FRIEND).

IT IS NOT RPT NOT KNOWN WHETHER PRIO WILL ATTEND PERSONALLY OR SEND REPRESENTATIVES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A BI-LINGUAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE BROUGHT BY THE PRIO PEOPLE. AT THE MEETING YOU ARE ASKED TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

A. SECURE AS MUCH DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE OFFER OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PLANS AS POSSIBLE.

B. SECURE THE NAMES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES.

UNFORTUNATELY, YOU WILL BE IN NO RPT NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS AND THE PRIO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE SO ADVISED BY

UNFORTUNATELY, YOU WILL BE IN NO RPT NO POSITION TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS AND THE PRIO REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE SO ADVISED BY YOU. YOU WILL ALSO ADVISE THOMAS ON THIS POINT AT YOUR FIRST MEETING WITH HIM. WE FEEL THAT IT WILL BE BEST IF YOU COULD LIMIT KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR CIA RPT CIA AFFILIATION TO JACKSON AND INTRODUCE YOURSELF TO THE PRIO MEN AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US RPT US GOVERNMENT WHO IS VOUCHED FOR BY JACKSON.

31/2459Z SEP CBS

A-116921

Chief, Contact Division

22 September 1958

Chief, New Orleans Office

15-21877

Case 16603

1. Confirming and supplementing our several long-distance telephone conversations, I report herewith concerning my interview with Mr. Frank Jackson and two members of the Prio Socarras' group in Miami, Florida, on 18 and 19 September 1958. This portion of the report is concerned with the mechanics of the operation and the personalities involved. It would be, I presume, of little interest to FI. A supplemental section contains a description of the material offered by the Cuban refugees, which portion, I assume, you will turn over to FI/WH Division.

2. On arrival in Miami, I called at the office of the FBI with a view to informing that agency of my presence and of the general nature of the activities I proposed to engage in; so that the agents of the Bureau would not be unduly surprised if they learned of my activities from other agents who were presumably keeping my proposed contacts under surveillance. The SAC was absent from the office. I accordingly talked with one of the Duty Officers, a Special Agent named Schilldecker, whom I had met before and who has frequently cooperated with our representative in Miami, John H. Dyer. Schilldecker was most pleasant and cooperative. I informed him that the matter on which I was engaged had been coordinated with FBI headquarters through Mr. Charles Bates and that the Bureau interposed no objections. I then told him, in general terms, about the activities of Mr. Frank Jackson in Washington. The agent said that he had known Jackson for about 10 years and that he considered Jackson to be an unreliable person and a complete opportunist. He said that Jackson had been in Naval Intelligence during World War II and that since the end of his tour of active duty he had held a number of jobs in none of which he had been able to make a success. These jobs included the agency for a wine manufacturer, the position of deputy sheriff in Miami Beach, the agency for a maker of concrete blocks and several other enterprises. In one of his jobs Jackson had been suspected of pilferage and had been discharged on that account, although no prosecution was instituted. Jackson is now, according to Schilldecker, operating a private detective agency and is also acting as public relations adviser to Prio and his group. He is believed to be the owner of a corporation known as "Enterprises Many, Inc," the exact operations of which are unknown.

3. Schilldecker said that Jackson claimed to have excellent sources of information on Cuba and that he particularly had referred to a Captain Salvador Diaz y Verson, a political refugee from Cuba, who had engaged quite intensively in anti-Communist activities. Schilldecker said that the "legal attache" (I assume that means an FBI representative) at the US Embassy in Havana had at one time written to the SAC in Miami about Verson and had said that the latter had once been in a position to obtain valuable information concerning the activities of the Communists in Cuba, but that, in his belief, Verson was given to flights of fancy.

4. Schilldecker pointed out that, although the criminal cases against Prio and Curti had been ended with pleas of nolo contendere and fines, cases were still pending against four other Cuban exiles who are allegedly engaged in the gun-running plot. He said that inasmuch as the cases were primarily the interest of the Customs Department, the FBI was not immediately interested. He voiced the opinion that Customs representatives were maintaining surveillance on the defendants in the various suits.

5. Returning from the FBI office, I telephoned Jackson, as arranged, at 3:00 p.m. and identified myself as directed in WA-9979. Jackson said that it would be impossible to arrange a meeting with the Cubans that afternoon, since the leader of the group would not be available. He said that a meeting could be arranged for the following morning, Sunday, 19 September, at 11:00 a.m., and I accordingly arranged to meet the group in a room at the Columbus Hotel which I had reserved for that purpose. I suggested a preliminary meeting with Jackson so as to obtain information about the persons I was to see, but he said that that would not be feasible on Saturday and that he would drop in on Sunday morning a few minutes ahead of the rest of the group.

6. Jackson arrived at the designated room on Sunday morning at 10:45 a.m. He did not request the exhibition of credentials and I did not exhibit them. He said that the meeting with the Cubans would have to be postponed until 4:00 o'clock Sunday afternoon, inasmuch as the leader of the group was at that time engaged in preparing a speech. He said he would bring two members of the group to the Columbus Hotel at 4:00 p.m., and I agreed to meet them at that time.

7. Jackson said that the two men he wanted me to talk to were Senor Carlos Hevia and a Captain Verson, whose full name Mr. Jackson did not know. He said that Carlos Hevia is a leading Cuban consulting engineer and is a graduate of the US Military Academy of the class of 1919. For a short time he was President of Cuba and was subsequently Ambassador to the US. He is a member of Prio's Authentico Party, but belongs to the conservative wing which is highly critical of some of Prio's actions. Hevia was exiled from Cuba when his name was found on an envelope in the possession of Sanchez Arango. He is under indictment in the US District Court but has pleaded not guilty to charges of gun-running growing out of the same incident concerning which Prio pleaded "nolo contendere."

8. Captain Verson, according to Jackson, is and has been for many years the president of the Anti-Communist League of Cuba. During a part of the terms of Grau San Martin and Prio, Verson held the rank of Captain in the Cuban army and was in charge of a counter-espionage section dealing with Cuban Communists. Verson, in his official capacity, was largely instrumental in having the Soviet Embassy in Havana closed. He was removed by Batista from his Army post in 1952 and, after spending some months in sanctuary in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana, he came to Miami in June of 1954.

9. Jackson also wished me to meet Prio, Dr. Pedro Martinez Fraga and uis Ortega. Prio was currently in New York. Martinez was formerly Ambassador to he US and a delegate to the United Nations. He was described by Jackson as one f the most brilliant persons he had ever met and he said that I could obtain a

great deal of information from him concerning the present political and economic situation in Cuba. He was not immediately available and had no connection with the documents allegedly possessed by Verson. Ortega, a former newspaper columnist and member of Batista's Consultative Council, was also described by Jackson as a prolific source of information on Cuban political matters. He too was not immediately available and had no connection with the Verson documents. In the circumstances, I told Jackson that I would defer interviews with Martinez and Ortega until some future time.

10. At 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, 19 September, Jackson returned to the room in the Columbus Hotel, bringing with him Senor Hevia and Captain Verson. Jackson introduced me as Mr. Druton, a pseudonym I had supplied. He told them that I was a representative of the US Government and that we were interested in the documents in Verson's possession. He assured them that the information which they might give me would be treated as highly classified material, and he then left the meeting. It developed that Captain Verson could not speak any English (incidentally, Jackson does not speak Spanish), so that it was necessary to converse with him through Hevia, who acted as interpreter. Hevia is fluent in English and Spanish.

11. The substance of the information supplied by Verson concerning the documents in his possession is contained in the second part of this report. Verson appeared to attach a very high historical value to the contents of his documents and seemed anxious to make them available to US authorities. He disclaimed any desire for a fee and merely said that he wished to retain the originals, since he considered that they constituted an authentic account of the growth of the Communist movement in Cuba, but that we would be entirely welcome to photostat or otherwise copy the contents of his files.

12. At the conclusion of the interview, I thanked the two Cubans for their courtesy and cooperation and told Senor Hevia that I would get in touch with him later in the week either directly or through Mr. Jackson.

13. I enclose herewith a letter to Hevia confirming our interest in the Verson documents and asking him to notify me when it is expected that they will begin arriving, so that we may attempt to facilitate their entry. You will note that I have signed the letter with the name "Druton" which is how I was introduced to Hevia and Verson by Jackson. I think the letter should be mailed in Washington rather than in New Orleans, so as to allay any suspicions that Hevia may harbor that I am not actually a government representative. You will note that I have suggested that Hevia write to me in New Orleans in care of Miss Joan M. Eaton at Post Office Box 1016. He will, no doubt, assume that this is a letter-drop.

14. In view of the fact that I refer by implication to the Customs Department, I suggest that you hold the letter to Hevia until you or Cleveland have discussed the matter with Mr. Emerick, who is the superior of Mr. Wyatt, the Supervising Customs Agent in Miami. I suggest that the letter be sent air mail, unregistered. I have left the date blank and I request that you insert it before mailing. If you wish to change the letter in any way, please do so. Hevia does not, of course, know my handwriting, so that the letter can be signed by anyone.

William P. Burke

Burke:gn
Enclosure

SECRET
Security Information

F 116921

~~F-77877~~

26 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs All Field Offices

FROM : Chief, Contact Division (L/A)

SUBJECT : Case 14063

REFERENCE : 00-B-67546 (ARQS-3589)
00-A-20309 (NO-3094)

~~S-37797~~

A-40192

CUBA — Economic

1. For your information, the following requirements were submitted by OCI for action by FI.

A 116921

WES-116921

2. Background

00-A-20309 states that Carlos Prio has been transferring funds from his Miami bank to his ~~brother~~ Francisco Prio, c/o Guaranty Trust Company, New York. 00-B-67546 states that there is a rumor that Carlos Prio has invested money in a chain of hotels in Switzerland.

A8

For some months past Carlos Prio has been suspected of preparing an invasion of Cuba to oust Batista; however, other reports indicate that Francisco Prio is engaged in handling transfers out of the US for Carlos "for investment abroad", i. e., for unspecified non-revolutionary purposes.

3. Requirements

a. Evidence that Carlos Prio has been investing in Swiss hotels and details of the transaction, e.g., date, price paid, intermediaries, etc.

b. Any information available of other foreign investments that he has made.

Harry a McCue
(E. M. ASHCRAFT

RHeller/th

Info: All Field Offices

FILE: Source of 00-B-67546
NO-Y-83.6

SECRET

~~F 27877~~
F 116921

[illegible], Office of Collection & Dissemination [illegible] 8 September 1953

[illegible] Contact Division, OO (I/A Branch)

[illegible] of Funds by Prio Socarras (~~OO-A-5998, ID-966~~)

A 116921 ~~S 27877~~ S-116921

[illegible] US bank at which Carlos and Francisco Prio Socarras have accounts [illegible] neither Carlos nor Francisco has sought the bank's advice on [illegible] investments.

Francisco's account shows that in early June 1953 there was a balance [illegible], that the highest balance reached was US$14,841.72 on 19 June 1953, [illegible] July 1953 the account had fallen to US$1,434.38. There has been [illegible] since that date.

[illegible] account shows the following:

	Debits	Credits	Prev.Bal US$7,718.12
[illegible] May		50,000	57,718.12
[illegible] June	340.99		57,377.13
[illegible] June	150.00		57,227.13
[illegible] June	5,700.00		51,527.13
	40,000.00		11,527.13
	2,000.00		9,527.13
[illegible] June	2,800.00		6,727.13
[illegible] July		86,500	93,227.13
[illegible] July		15,000	108,227.13
[illegible] July	5,000.00		103,227.13
[illegible] August	100,000.00		3,227.13

[illegible] deposit of US$86,500 on 3 July was in the form of a check drawn by [illegible] of Miami Beach, Fla.

S-8

[illegible] deposit of US$15,000 on 9 July was in the form of a check on the Bank [illegible], New York, the drawer's signature illegible.

[illegible] withdrawal of 26 August was in cash. Carlos asked for one thousand [illegible] was given mostly one hundred dollar bills and a few five hundred [illegible]

During 1952, the most unusual activity of Carlos' account was the deposit [illegible] on 25 September, a US$150,000 deposit on 29 September, and a withdrawal [illegible] of US$140,000. Since the withdrawal was by check, which was [illegible] to the depositor after cancellation, the identity of the payee is not [illegible]

4. Mrs. Prio has a safety deposit at a branch of this bank and her husband

as access to it. We probably could learn the extent of the activity which has taken place with regard to this box if it would serve any good purpose.

4. During the week of 28 August-4 September 1953, Carlos presented one hundred thousand pesos in new bills at the bank, requesting dollars therefor. He was told the currency would have to be sent to the Banco Nacional de Cuba for evaluation and that the bank in all probability would want to know the identity of the person exchanging the pesos. Carlos reluctantly agreed to [illegible] but said he had previously sold a large sum of pesos to another bank [illegible] difficulty. Carlos said his reason for requesting the exchange was that he feared a devaluation of the Cuban peso because of the rapid depletion of [illegible] gold reserves in the US.

5. The foregoing information was made available with the understanding that it would be for CIA internal use only. If there are inquiries concerning this data, please call Harry L. [illegible], extension [illegible].

E. H. [illegible]

[illegible]/2h A-8

F[illegible] Guaranty Trust Co. of New York

14-00000

F 116921

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR ~~LA~~ (MCCREA) FROM LEA--SECURITY INFORMATION--CITE NY-9115

CASE 14,063 RPT 14,063

FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

S-116921

~~27877~~

A-8

OUR CONTACT AT THE GUARANTY TRUST ADVISED THAT INSOFAR AS HE WAS ABLE TO LEARN NEITHER CARLOS NOR FRANCISCO PRIO HAS SOUGHT THE ADVICE OF ANY OFFICER OF THE BANK CONCERNING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. BOTH CARLOS AND FRANCISCO HAVE ACCOUNTS AT THE GUARANTY TRUST.

THE ACCOUNT OF FRANCISCO SHOWS THAT IN EARLY JUNE 53, RPT 53, THERE WAS A BALANCE OF $4,841.72 RPT $4,841.72; THAT THE HIGHEST BALANCE REACHED WAS $14,841.72 RPT $14,841.72 ON 19 RPT 19 JUNE; AND THAT AS OF 30 RPT 30 JUL 53 RPT 53 THERE WAS A BALANCE IN THE ACCOUNT OF $1,434.38 RPT $1,434.38; THERE HAS BEEN NO ACTIVITY SINCE THAT DATE.

A TRABS RPT TRANSCRIPT OF CARLOS' ACCOUNT SHOWS THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITY IN 53 RPT 53:

~~S 27877~~

A 116921

CARLOS PRIO SOCARROS

04/1900Z

	DEBITS	CREDITS	
			PREV BAL 7,718.12
MAY 27		50,000.00	57,718.12
JUNE 1	340.89		57,377.13
12	150.00		57,227.13
17	5,700.00		51,527.13
	40,000.00		11,527.13
	2,000.00		9,527.13
18	2,800.00		6,727.13
JULY 3		86,500.00	93,227.13
9		15,000.00	108,227.13
29	5,000.00		103,227.13
AUG 26	100,000.00		3,227.13

THE DEPOSIT OF $86,00

BUST THIS PARA PLEASE. THANKS.

THE DEPOSIT OF $86,500 RPT $86,500 ON 3 RPT 3 JULY WAS IN THE FORM OF A CHECK DRAWN BY MARIA SOLEDAD ALBA RPT MARIA SOLEDAD ALBA, MIAMI BEACH, FLORD RPT FLORIDA.

THE DEPOSIT OF $15,000 RPT $15,000 ON 9 RPT 9 JULY WAS IN THE FORM OF A CHECK DRAWN ON THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, NEW YORK. THE DRAWER'S SIGNATURE WAS ILLEGIBLE.

THE DEBIT OF $100,000 RPT $100,000 ON 26 RPT 26 AUGUST WAS A WITHDRAWAL IN CASH MADE ON THAT DATE BY CARLOS WHO ASKED FOR BILLS OF ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR DENOMINATION BUT WAS GIVEN MOSTLY ALL ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR BILLS AND A FEW OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLAR DENOMINATION.

THE MOST UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN THE ACCOUNT OF CARLOS DURING 1952 RPT 1952 WAS THE DEPOSIT OF $45,000 RPT $45,000 ON 29 RPT 29 SEPTEMBER 1952 RPT 1952 AND A $150,000 RPT $150,000 DEPOSIT ON 29 RPT 29 SEPTEMBER 1952 RPT 1952, NEITHER OF WHICH CAN BE IDENTIFIED, AND A WITHDRAWAL IN OCTOBER 1952 RPT 1952 BY CHECK IN THE SUM OF $140,000 RPT $140,000. SINCE ALL CANCELLED CHECKS ARE RETURNED TO THE DEPOSITOR AT THE END OF EACH MONTH THIS CHECK IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION.

WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT THERE IS A SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX IN THE NAME OF MRS. CARLOS PRIO AT THE BANK, TO WHICH HER HUSBAND HAS ACCESS. WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO FIND OUT THE EXTENT OF THE ACTIVITY WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS BOX BUT COULD POSSIBLY DO SO IF IT WOULD SERVE ANY GOOD PURPOSE.

WITHIN THE PAST WEEK CARLOS PRIO PRESENTED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS TO THE BANK AND REQUESTED CASH IN EXCHANGE THEREFOR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ENTIRE AMOUNT WAS IN NEW BILLS. HE WAS TOLD THAT THE CURRENCY WOULD HAVE TO BE SENT TO CUBA FOR EXAMINATION AND THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY THE BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA WOULD WANT TO KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON EXCHANGING THE PESOS. CARLOS SAID HE WOULD RATHER NOT HAVE HIS NAME DISCLOSED BUT CONSENTED TO BE NAMED IF THE BANK INSISTED UPON IT. AT THAT TIME, CARLOS TOLD THE BANK OFFICIALS THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SOLD A LARGE SUM OF PESOS TO ANOTHER BANK WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.

APPARENTLY IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE EXCHANGE OF THE PESOS CARLOS REMARKED THAT HE FEARS A DEVALUATION OF THE CUBAN CURRENCY BECAUSE OF THE RAPID DEPLETION OF CUBAN GOLD RESERVES IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A LARGE FINANCIAL LOSS TO HIM.

OUR CONTACT IS AT THE MAIN OFFICE OF THE GUARANTY TRUST AND THE ACCOUNT AND SAFETY BOX OF THE PRIO'S ARE LOCATED IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES. BECAUSE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE DEPOSITOR AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS NECESSARILY OBTAINED, OUR CONTACT HAS ASKED THAT THE DATA BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. ACCORDINGLY THIS INFORMATION MUST BE RESTRICTED TO CIA RPT CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

24/1900Z

14-00000

F116921

~~F27877~~

Chief, Office of Collection & Dissemination 10 September 1953

Chief, Contact Division, OO (I/A Branch) ~~27877~~ A116921

Financial Activities of Carlos Prio Socarras (EB-A-5995, IB-966)

1. On 2 September 1953, Carlos Prio Socarras converted 98,000 Cuban pesos to US currency at a US bank. The bank is not that referred to in our memorandum of 8 September 1953 on the same subject. In this second transaction, the bank kept a record of some of the bills issued to Prio.

2. If there are inquiries concerning this communication, please call Harry A. McCrea, extension 2251.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

HAMcCrea/th

File: HO 779-91.6

Orig filed in 35519

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 19
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26/3
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLANCO

DISSEM BY 35/ N

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR EUR 8, CI/OPS,

S E C R E T 2020[illegible] CITE JMWAVE 3725 WAVE

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF MADRID 9464 (IN 20553) *

1. NO ADDITIONAL PERTINENT TRACES SUBJ REF. 20 OCT 66 IN 22060

2. VIEW SUBJS CONNECTION AMHINTS, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING RESULTS SUBJS DEBRIEFING.

S E C R E T *REQUEST TRACES RENE BLANCO

BT

SECRET

19-124-26/3
20 Oct, 1966

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, January through June 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: A. UFGT 16628
B. UFGT 15216

A. OPERATIONAL

1. During the period under review, financial support to the AMSPELL organization has been reduced significantly. As reported in references, the primary reason for the reduction was the inconsistencies of many AMSPELL activities with current WOFACT directives.

2. Cooperation between AMSPELL and the Station has been maintained through AMHINT-2, the principal agent of the AMSPELL operation. Although no longer being carried on a salaried basis, AMHINT-2 has continued to be responsive to Station guidance.

3. AMSPELL has continued its correspondence with various student groups and leaders throughout the free world, and especially in Latin America. AMSPELL has contacted various international student groups requesting passage money so that its delegates could be afforded the opportunity to attend upcoming international student conferences.

4. A campaign was launched to call attention to the plight of Pedro Luis BOITEL, a Cuban student leader who was unjustly imprisoned on the Isle of Pines by the CASTRO regime. A report/denunciation of the imprisonment of BOITEL was prepared and sent to AMSPELL's principal contacts in the Latin American student field seeking support for AMSPELL's demand that BOITEL be released.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(continued)

Attachment:
Prop Samples, USC

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/att., USC

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
26 July 1966

DATE DISPATCHED
JUL 29 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 25653

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3
19-124-26/3

B. PRODUCTION

1. AMSPELL bi-monthly magazine (copy being forwarded under separate cover)

a. AMSPELL efforts during recent months have been mainly concentrated on the preparation of its new bi-monthly magazine. 8,000 copies of the magazine's first edition which was published in May 1966 were distributed as follows:

(1) 3,000 copies sent to Latin America
(2) 1,100 copies distributed by AMSPELL delegations
(3) 3,000 copies distributed among Cubans in the United States
(4) 100 copies were sent to AMSPELL contacts and student movements in Europe, Africa, Asia, Canada, etc.
(5) Members of the AMSPELL organization also received copies in which the AMSPELL internal bulletin was inserted. Each member was asked to promote the sale of subscriptions and advertising space as well as to seek persons who would collaborate with the magazine staff by contributing their talents.
(6) The remainder was distributed among the various embassies, official representations of governments and organizations, both in the United States and abroad, as well as among Cuban exile journalists and organizations.

2. AMSPELL Cuban mailing

Since March 1966, 1,000 envelopes containing AMSPELL propaganda have been mailed to Cuba on a monthly basis. This propaganda is directed particularly at students who support the regime (copies of the propaganda are being forwarded under separate cover).

3. Press

The majority of AMSPELL press releases have been in connection with the mistreatment of political prisoners by the Castro regime. Other releases concerned the aforementioned BOITEL campaign and a tribute to Cuban martyrs who gave their lives fighting against the BATISTA dictatorship in 1957. (Copies of the press releases are being forwarded under separate cover.)

C. FINANCIAL

1. Final payment of AMSPELL salaries and termination bonuses was made in February in line with the Station's reduction of financial support to AMSPELL. Under the present arrangement JMWAVE support is limited to $1,600 monthly, this includes the $200 monthly financial support payment to AMHINT-1's family, office overhead, and support for printing/distributing the bi-monthly publication.

2. The following amounts were expended by the Station in support of AMSPELL activities during the second half of FY 66:

Operational expenses	$ 9,929.74
Salaries and termination bonuses	6,200.00
Total expenditures	$16,129.74

D. FUTURE PLANS

It is anticipated that AMSPELL efforts in the near future will be directed at the upcoming CLAE meeting which is scheduled to be held in Havana 29 July to 9 August 1966.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, November and December 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 23946, 24 November 1965

A. OPERATIONAL

1. General

During the period under review AMSPELL continued operations aimed at the student/youth target. AMSPELL sent a circular letter to students and youth in Cuba in an effort to establish a "dialogue" between these young people and AMSPELL. Other AMSPELL activities during this period are contained below.

2. Printed Propaganda.

a. Monthly AMSPELL Bulletin:

	November	December
To Cuba	4,800	4,800
To Latin America (Spanish)	2,900	2,900
To Latin America (French)	1,925	1,925
To Latin America (English)	1,925	1,925

b. The regular bulletin highlighted the following themes: The need for solidarity in the struggle for liberty for Cuban political prisoners; the new trend in Polish communism and its criticism toward the system; the attitude of Soviet students toward totalitarianism and the failure of Castro's plan to indoctrinate Cuban students. The December bulletin carried a special Christmas message. (Copies of the bulletin are being sent for Headquarters information under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda

19-124-26/3

AMSPELL continued its regular weekly radio broadcast during

(Continued)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Attachment :
Prop Samples, USC ATT'D RIO/P

CS COPY

Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. USC
-ATT-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
17 Feb 66

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 21 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 24575

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

November and December without interruption. Topics discussed on the program included: The war in Viet Nam; commentaries supporting work of student groups throughout the world in combating communism; news of student and youth activities in Cuba and Latin America; world news reports; and a special Christmas message in December.

4. Press Releases

During the period under review, AMSPELL press releases, themes of which are listed below, received replay as follows:

Diario las Americas: a. Tighter control over university councils in Cuba.

b. Activities of Cuban agents in Mexico.

c. The large number of relatives of high Cuban officials reported among refugees.

Bohemia Libre: a. Reports on the exodus.

b. Comments on Che Guevara's disappearance and his wife's condition.

AMHIM: a. AMSPELL comments on a Miami Herald article concerning statements by Cuban students regarding the incompatibility between Christianity and Communism.

b. Cuban agents reportedly responsible for demonstrations against Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy while on tours in Latin America.

c. Analysis of anti-Christian policies in Cuban universities.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

	November	December
Salaries:	$ 2,250.00	$ 2,250.00
Operational Expenses:	$ 3,850.00	$ 4,150.00

C. FUTURE ACTIVITIES

An overall review of AMSPELL operations is currently being made by the Station. When discussions between the Station and AMSPELL are concluded, it is anticipated that Station support of the AMSPELL organization will be considerably reduced.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
AMBARB-54/AMSPELL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

UFGA 23946 (Para. 4) Dated 30 November 1965

KULAMP contacted AMBARB-54 and in turn put in contact with Identity, which is a KULAMP operation located in New York. AMBARB-54 has not yet been placed on Identity's payroll but, according to KULAMP, will be employed when he has obtained some travel visas which will be necessary in his job assignment with Identity. His work will involve traveling to Latin America on a survey assignment for Identity.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Attachment:
1 - Iden - U/S/C/

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE with S/C/A

19-124-26/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-5726 CS COPY	14 DEC 1955
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26/3

TYPED: *8Dec 65

Distribution:
1 - Subj File ✓
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - PP/Chrono

WH/C/CS

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL		TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CA/PP	JOLL	nea	5518

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/C/CA		C. T. Barrio
DODS		Bernice A. Smith for
WH/C/MO	[illegible]	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATC

14-00000

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFGW-5726

DATE: ______________________

IDENTITY: Freedom Fund

SECRET

19-132-26/3
([illegible])

DEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

22 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP—	5	CA
2		6	C
3	MO	7	D
4	FI	8	X

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CE 6, WE 8, CA 2, CA/O4, CI/OPS, FI, CE/ERIG, WH/C2

11 Dec 65 IN 12973

SECRET 111828Z

DIR INFO ATHE MADR CITE WAVE 7852

TYPIC MHSPAWN THUNIFORM

REFS: A. DIR 64401 *

B. ATHE 7970 (IN 11828)

1. SUBJECT DELEGATION DEPARTED WAVE 10 DEC AFTER RECEIVING ASSURANCE FROM TSIRIMOKOS SECRETARY THAT MEETING POSSIBLE. FIRST SCHEDULED FOR 11 DEC BUT CHANGED TO 12 DEC DUE URGENT UN MATTER. WILL ADVISE OUTCOME.

2. MEMBERS DELEGATION: AMWORD-3 (IDEN A), AMBLEAK-1 (IDEN B) AND IDEN C.

SECRET

CFN 7852 64401 7970 10 TSIRIMOKOS 11 12 AMWORD-3 A AMBLEAK-1 B C

BT

* REQUESTED WAVE COMPLY SEND DEL TO SEE GREEK DEPUTY MINISTER NY.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, July-October 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 23069, 16 September 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

During the period under review, AMHINT/2 visited Caracas and turned in a report on the university situation in that country which was submitted in Reference. In addition to the normal propaganda activities, the AMSPELL group waged a campaign for the release of political prisoners and has intensified this campaign since the announcement of the "open door" policy on 28 September 1965.

2. Propaganda Production (samples forwarded under separate cover)

a. 4,800 copies of the bulletin were mailed into PBRUMEN each month. Over 6,000 copies of the international edition were sent monthly to addressees in Latin America and Western Europe. Among the main issues treated in the bulletins were: internal problems of PBRUMEN communism as a result of Ben Bella's overthrow; communist atrocities in Viet Nam; testimony of Alberto Muller on the secret executions in Communist PBRUMEN; the comments of Identity A with respect to the PBRUMEN situation, the exodus and Che Guevara's disappearance.

b. Miscellaneous press clippings and press releases are also forwarded under separate cover. Included is an article by AMHINT/2 on the student discontent in PBRUMEN which appeared in Identity B. Other articles and press releases were used by Identities B, C and D and by AMHIM.

(continued)

19-124-26/3

Attachment: USC (att.)
1- Prop samples
2-Iden List
Distribution:
3- WH/C, w/att. usc

CS Copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

2 att.

DATE TYPED
24 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 30 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23946

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-23946

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its weekly radio programs and in addition prepared tapes for distribution to numerous Latin American radio stations. One such tape featured statements made by Alberto MULLER before his imprisonment. Local Spanish language stations also used AMSPELL tapes.

[illegible]

4. Other developments

In September, AMBARB/54 and two other members of AMSPELL resigned to seek other employment. The Station would appreciate current information regarding KULAMP's interest and possible employment of AMBARB/54 (per DIR 40414). He is an intelligent and capable individual and is currently investigating job possibilities in ZRMETAL with several international agencies.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

	July	August	September	October
Salaries	$3,000.00	$3,000.00	$4,100.00*	$2,250.00
Operational Expenses	4,009.70	3,850.00	3,850.00	3,850.00
Totals	$7,009.70	$6,850.00	$7,950.00	$6,100.00

*Includes one month's salary as severance pay.

C. FUTURE PLANS

AMSPELL will continue its political action and propaganda activities during the coming months and will engage in special campaigns and press releases as current developments dictate.

Philip G. ELMARD

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attachment #2;UFGA 23946

IDENTITY LIST

Identity A. Carlos Andres Perez, former Venezuelan Minister of Interior.

" B. Diario las Americas

" C. Miami Herald

" D. Time Magazine

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE 2.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE RR, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2,

MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
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4		8	

UNIT	TIME	BY

17 Nov 65 IN 96000

SECRET 162259Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7234 INGHURST ACTING

TYPIC MHSPAWN AMSPELL

REFS: A. DIR 52818

B. WAVE 7171 (IN 92601)

5c

1. AMSPELL ISSUED 28 OCTOBER PRESS RELEASE TO EXPLOIT CHE GUEVARA DISAPPARANCE AND ALLEGED HOUSE ARREST GUEVARA'S WIFE. RELEASE REPORTS DOUBTS AND CONTROVERSY WITHIN OFFICIAL GOC CIRCLES OVER GUEVARA'S FATE AND CLAIMS GUEVARA'S WIFE PRACTICALLY UNDER HOUSE ARREST. POUCHING COPY PRESS RELEASE. AMSPELL USED SAME REPORT OVER RADIO. STATION HAS SEEN NO INDICATIONS REPORT PICKED UP BY PRESS.

2. AMSPELL WILL CONTINE PLAY REPORTS ON GUEVARA AND FAMILY WHEN PEGS ARE AVAILABLE. HOWEVER STATION DOES NOT PLAN HAVE AMSPELL ENGAGE CAMPAIGN FOR RELEASE GUEVARA FAMILY AS THIS OUT OF CHARACTER FOR AMSPELL GROUP. ORIGINAL PROP PLAY INITIATED UNILATERALLY BY LIRCOK-1 WAS CLEVER ATTEMPT TO PUBLICIZE GUEVARA CASE BUT NO SERIOUS CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO AMSPELL CAMPAIGN.

3. IF AMOTS DEVELOP USEFUL INFO PER REF A SUGGESTION STATION WILL PURSUE FURTHER.

SECRET

IN 96000
PAGE 2

CFN 7284 52318 7171 AMSPELL 28 CHE GUEVARA GOC NO INDICATIONS
NOT PLAN LIROOK-1 NO SERIOUS A
BT

KAMOT TRYING LOCATE RELATIVE OF
GUEVARA.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSPELL
Political Prisoners List

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: WAVE 6425

Forwarded under separate cover is a list of political prisoners in Cuban jails. The list was compiled by the AMSPELL organization and contains the names and addresses of relatives who are living in the United States.

Philip G. Elmard

Attachments:
Political Prisoners List, usc ATT'D

Distribution:
3-WH/C, w/atts, usc

Removed from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-26/3
JOB # 68-773/14
Box: 4 Fold: 4

CS COPY

1 Atts.

19-124-26/3
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DATE TYPED
1 Nov 65

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 4 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-23725

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
A				
ALMOINA PEDLON, Carlos Francisco	Abril/61	218-61	30	Habana
ARMAS BLANCO Rene de	" "	127-61	5	Oriente
ARMAS BLANCO Carlos de		" "	5	"
ARENAS AMIGO, Alfredo Jesus	"	" "	3	"
ALBA MORRELL, Eugenio	"	" "	3	"
ALZUGARAY OLIVERA, Conrado	Dic-62	11-63	10	Matanzas
AMARO, Heriberto	"	" "	30	"
ARGUELLES-SOSA OROZCO, [illegible]	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
ANTON ASPIRI Evelio Severino	"	" "	20	"
ABAY GALINDO, Santiago Julian	"	" "	10	"
ALFONSO MARMOL, Ricardo Osmany	"	" "	10	"
ALONSO MORA, Elio	"	" "	10	"
AVILA ESTRADA, Maximo	Abril 62	56-63	30	Habana
ARENCIBIA RIOS, Felix	Dic-62	11-63	9	Habana
ADENGO MARENTE, Roque	"	" "		"
ALVAREZ GONZALEZ, Modesto Hilario	"	" "		"
ALVAREZ CABARGA, Raul				
B				
BORBOLLA ROQUETA, Roberto	Abril/61	127-61	10	Oriente
BARRIENTOS FERNANDEZ, Alejandro	Mayo 61	178-61	20	Habana
BERMUDEZ, Aniceto	Sept.61	473-61	12	Habana
BACALLAO Nicasio				Matanzas
BETANCOURT ABREU, Luis				"
B ISAAC, Abraham	Dic-62	11-63	10	"
BARRERAS PEREZ, Celestino	Dic-62	11-63	9	Habana
BARREITO LOBELLE, Josefina	"	" "	6	"
BALBUENA CORREA, Felipe	"	" "	5	"
BLANCO SANJUAN, Mercedes	"	" "	3	"
BARRETO MASSON, Nicolas	"	" "	3	"
BEQUER DIAZ, Baldomero	"	" "	1	"
BASAVE GARRIGA, Martha	"	" "	1	"
BYRON , Miguel				
BASTIDA FERRER, Rafael	Feb-61	529-63		Sta. Clara
C				
COPADO FERNANDEZ, Antonio	Sept. 60	405-60		Habana
CAOS PEREZ, Jorge		829-60	20	Sta.Clara
CA BUSO PEREZ, Enrique	Abril-61	127-61	20	Oriente
CABALLERO OROZ, Gustavo	"	" "	10	"
CASTILLO FERRAL, Patrocinio	"	" "	5	"
CARVAJAL RODRIGUEZ, Julio	"	" "	5	"
CACICEDO CABAL, Carlos	"	" "	5	"
CABEZAS CABEZAS, Miguel	"	" "	3	"
CISNEROS LIMA, Juan	Marzo 61	227-61	10	Matanzas
CAY GISPERT, Raoul	Sept-62	484-62	20	Habana
CAY HERNANDEZ, Raoul	" "	" "	9	"
CALVO PORTE, Jose Luis	Dic. 62	11-63	10	Matanzas
CERVERA ARANGO, Armando	"	" "	30	"
CASTRO GARCES, Rafael				

CS COPY

(sigue en Pág. 2) 19-124-26/3

~~19-124-26/4~~

S/Att. #1 UFGA-23725

NOMBRE

A

ALMOINA PERLON, Carlos Francisco
ARMAS BLANCO Rene de — Jorge de Armas (hermano) 2448 S.W. 3 St. Miami
ARMAS BLANCO Carlos de
~~[illegible]~~
ALBA MORRELL, Eugenio
ALZUGARAY OLIVERA, Rolando — Orlando Alzugaray (hermano)
AMARO, Heriberto — Berta Michelena 327 N.E. 1 Ave., Miami room1014 Pacific House
ARGUELLES-ROSA OROZCO,
ANTON ASPIRI Evelio Severino
ABAY GALINDO, Santiago Julian
ALFONSO MARMOL, Ricardo Osmany
ALONSO MORA, Elio
AVILA ESTRADA, Maximo
ARENCIBIA RIOS, Felix
ADENOO MARENTE, Roque
ALVAREZ GONZALEZ, Modesto Hilario
ALVAREZ CABARGA, Raul

B

BORBOLLA ROQUETA, Roberto — Aida Roqueta (tía) 209 NE Blvd., Gainesville, Fla.
BARRIENTOS FERNANDEZ, Alejandro
BERMUDEZ, Aniceto

BACALLAO Nicasio
BETANCOURT ABREU, Luis
B [illegible] ISAAC, Abraham
BARRERAS PEREZ, Celestino
BARRETTO LOVELLE, Jorge
BALBUENA CORREA, Felipe — Nilia Balbuena (hermana
BLANCO SANJUAN, Mercedes — Jorge de Armas Blanco (hijo) 2448 S.W. 3 St., Miami
BARRETO MASSON, Nicolas
BEQUER DIAZ, Baldomero
BASAVE GARRIGA, Martha
BYRON, Miguel
BASTIDA FERRER, Rafael

C

COPADO FERNANDEZ, Antonio — Virgillio Sanchez Ocejo-334 S.W. 8 Ave., Miami (tío)
CAOS PEREZ. Jorge
CA SUSO PEREZ. Enrique — Frank Casuso Pérez (hermano) c/o R. Ramos 1410 S.W. 19 Terr. Miami
CABALLERO OROZ, Gustavo — Mercedes Ramirez Manila 1053 Urb. Sta. Rita, RioPiedras, P. Rico
CASTILLO FERRAL, Patrocinio
CARBAJAL RODRIGUEZ, Julio
CACICEDO CABAL, Carlos — Manuel A. del Valle (padrasto?) 1667 S.W. 10 St., Miami
~~[illegible]~~
CISNEROS LIMA, Juan
GAY GISPERT, Raoul — Anita D. Silveira (prima) 1309 Brickell Ave. Miami
GAY HERNANDEZ, Raoul — " " " " " "
CALVO FORTE, Jose Luis
CERVERA ARANGO, Armando — Mercedes Quintana 327 N.E. 1 Ave. Miami
CASTRO GARCES, Rafael

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
C (continuacion)				
CEPERO LOPEZ, Pablo	Dic-62	[illegible]-63	30	Sta. Clara
CEPERO LOPEZ, Juan Gualberto	"	" "	30	"
CEPERO LOPEZ, Heraclio	"	" "	30	"
CRESPO GARCIA, Regino	"	" "	10	"
CENTURION NORIEGA, [illegible] Miguel	Abril-62	300-63	15	H abana
CRIADO GARCIA , Abel	Dic. 62	33-63	20	Habana
CARDENTEY FACENDA, Omar	"	" "	9	"
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Heriberto del	"	" "	9	"
CRISPO GONZALEZ, Medardo del	"	" "	9	"
CASUSO CASUSO, Enrique	"	" "	6	"
CABRERA RAMIR Z, Ubaldo	"	" "	[illegible]	"
CAMINO CORRIPIO, America del Carmen	"	" "	3	"
CASAÑAS PEDROSO Bruno Julio	"	" "	2	"
CARMENATE MIRANDA, Roberto	Abril-62	56- 63	30	Habana
CASTRO, Valentin				
CASTILLO VERDECIA, Raimundo				
CASTRO Vicente				
CERRALLO, Oscar				
D				
DOMINGUEZ DIAZ, Josee		300-6 3	12	Habana
DURAN GALLARDO, Faustino	Dic-62	33-63	9	H abana
DIEGUEZ DE CORCUERA, Gonzalo F.		" "	5	"
DIAZ-MUELLER TARIO, Sara	"	" "	3	"
DIOS GONZALEZ, Claudio	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
DIEZ, Carmita	61		12	Cienfuegos-S.Clara
DIAZ, Hugo				
DIAZ VIDAL, Julio				
E				
ELIAS RIOS, Heriberto	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
ESPINOSA VARONA, Rogelio J.E.	Dic.62	33-63	5	H abana
ESTRADA MICHELENA, Juan	"	" "		"
ESCARAMUZA PERRAMONT, Magdalena				
F				
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, [illegible] Bernabe	Abril		30	Habana
FERNANDEZ PLANA, Jose	Dic-59	51-6 1		Sta. Clara
FERNANDEZ PLANAS, Nicolas	Enero-61	2761-61		R abana
FONSECA PUIG Rafael	Abril-61	373-61	20	Habana
FERRER ORDONEZ, Juan	Abril-61	127-61	10	Oriente
FRAGELA RODRIGUEZ, Abilio	"	" "	5	"
FONSECA TORRES, Benito	"	" "	3	"
FERRERA ALEMAN Roberto	Dic-61	1108-61	12	Matanzas
FLEXAS GOMEZ, George Leon	Sept	478-62	12	Habana
FERNANDEZ FUENTES, Claudio	Dic.	58-62	30	Habana
FERNANDEZ GALIENES, Salvador	Dic-62	4-63		Sta.Clara
FERNANDEZ REYES, Francisco	Dic-62	33- 63	20	Habana
FE HERNANDEZ, Miguel de la	"	" "	9	"
FE DELGADO, Carlos de la	"	" "	9	"

(sigue pag. 3)

NOMBRE DE

C (continuacion)
CEPERO LOPEZ, Pablo
CEPERO LOPEZ, Juan Gualberto
CEPERO LOPEZ, Reinaldo
CRESPO GARCIA, Regino
CENTURION NORIEGA, Antonio Miguel
CRIADO GARCIA, Abel
CARDENTEY PACHECO, Omar
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Heriberto del
CRISTO GONZALEZ, Melanio del
CASUSO CASUSO, Enrique Frank Casuso Pérez (hijo)c/o R.Ramos 1410 S.W.19 Terr.Miami
CABRERA RAMIREZ, Ubaldo
CARINO CORNIPIC, America del Carmen
CASANAS PEDROSO, Bruno Julio
CARNEVATE MIRANDA, Roberto
CASTRO, Valentin
CASTILLO VERDECIA, Raimundo
CASTRO Vicente
CERRALLO, Oscar

D

DOMINGUEZ DIAZ, Jesus
DURAN GALLARDO, Faustino
DIEKESME DE CORDOVA, Gonzalo V.
DIAZ ARGUELLES MARIO, Sara
DIOS GONZALEZ, Claudio
DIEZ, Carmita
~~DIAZ, Hugo~~
DIAZ VIDAL, Julio

E
ELIAS RIOS, Heriberto
ESPINOSA VARONA, Rogelio J.B.
ESTRADA MICHELENA, Juan Berta Michelena(tía)327 N.E. 1 ave.rm1014 PacificHouse Miami
ESCARAMUZA PERRAMON, Magdalena

F
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, Lino Bernabe Emilia Ma.,Lucía, y Lino Bernabé Fernández Luzarraga 3 hijos 1101 N.W. 26 Rd.Miami 633-1035
FERNANDEZ PLANA, Jose
FERNANDEZ PLANAS, Nicolas
— Conchita Fdez.Plana,hermana, 1210 N.Taft St.Apt.208 Arlington, Va.
FONSECA PUIG Rafael
FERRER ORDONEZ, Juan Francisco Muller, 241 N.E. 24 St., Miami
FRAGELA RODRIGUEZ, Abilio
FONSECA TORRES, Benito

FERRERA ALEMAN Roberto
FLEXAS GOMEZ, George Leon
FERNANDEZ FUENTES, Rolando
FERNANDEZ GALIENES, Salvador
FERNANDEZ REYES, Francisco
FE HERNANDEZ, Miguel de la
FE DELGADO, Carlos de la

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
F (continuacion)				
FERNANDEZ GARAY, Antonio	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
FERNANDEZ GARCIA, Sixta J.	"	" "	3	"
FUENTES CORDOVES, Gregorio de la	"	" "	3	"
FERNANDEZ PUIG, Tomas		61	30	Habana
FERNANDEZ, Jorge V.				
G				
GUERRA CABRERA, Jose	Dic.	620-60		Habana
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo	Abril-61	127-61	10	Oriente
GONZALEZ BARROSO, Bernardo	" "	" "	3	"
GONZALEZ LARA, Anselmo	Nov-61	1144-61	2	Matanzas
GARCIA HERNANDEZ, Orestes	Marzo-61	145-61	3	Habana
GARCIA ARMENGOL, Miguel	Abril-61	238-61	30	Habana
GOMEZ QUESADA, Osvaldo	Sept-62	478-62	20	Habana
GUERRA VIDAL, Ernesto	Dic-61	58-62	30	Habana
GONZALEZ NARCILIO, luis P.	"	" "	10	"
GONZALEZ CASTILLO, Carmelo N.A.	"	" "	30	"
GARRIDO ARGUELLES, Walter	"	" "	30	"
GOMEZ BOQUET, Juan Maria	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta.Clara
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Gilberto Jesus	"	" "	10	"
GARCIA AGRAMONTE, Armando	"	" "	10	"
GARRIDO GARRIDO, Renato	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
GARRIDO PERDOMO, Leonardo	"	" "	5	"
GIBART, Nelson	"	" "	5	"
GUERRERO, ROBERTO	"	" "	30	"
GENGLER EBNER, Hans Max Franz	Marzo-62	300-63	30	Habana
GOMEZ BARRUECO, Ramiro	61		20	Oriente
GARCIA ROSALES, Lester	Sept-62	484-62	9	Habana
GONZALEZ, Carmelo	Dic-62	11-61	12	Habana
GOMEZ FONSECA, Fernando	"	" "	12	"
GONZALEZ MONTERO, Alfredo	"	" "	12	"
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Bernardo	"	" "	9	"
GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, Andres	"	" "	9	"
GARCIA VALDES, Waldo	"	" "	9	"
GARCIA TORO, Mario	"	" "	9	"
GONZALEZ HERRERO, Clara Gladys	"	" "	6	"
GARCIA CABRERA, Orestes	"	" "	3	"
GRAVERAN MORENO, Nelida	"	" "	3	"
GARCIA FERNANDEZ, Celerino J.	"	" "	3	"
GARCIA ALONSO, Martha	"	" "	3	"
GRAU MENA, Rafael				
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo				
GONZALEZ SILVA, Ibrahin				
GONZALEZ CURBELO, Manuel		51-61		Habana
GARCIA C[illegible] Antonio				
GONZALEZ BORROTO, Jose				
GUTIERREZ, Jose Ramon				
H				
HURTADO MARTINEZ, David	Abril-61	127-61	5	Oriente

(sigue en pag. 4)

NOMBRE

F (continuacion)

FERNANDEZ GARAY, Antonio
FERNANDEZ GARCIA, Sixto J.
FUENTE CORDOVES, Gregorio de la
FERNANDEZ PEREZ, Tomas
FERNANDEZ, Jorge V. Corina Perez (madre) 229 N.E. 24 St. Miami

G

GUERRA CABRERA, Jose
GRILLO GONZALEZ, Reinaldo
GONZALEZ BARROSO, Bernardo
GONZALEZ LARA, Anselmo
~~GARCIA HERNANDEZ, [illegible]~~
GARCIA ARMENGOL, Miguel Miguel y Digna García (padres) 2423 Biscayne Blvd. Miami
GOMEZ QUESADA, Osvaldo
GUERRA VIDAL, Ernesto Delia E. Guerra (esposa) 312 S.W. 31 Ave., Miami, Fla.
GONZALEZ NARCILIO, Luis P.
GONZALEZ CASTILLO, Carmelo N.Y. Olga Castillo (tía)
GARRIDO ARGUELLES, Walter
GOMEZ BOQUET, Juan Maria
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Hilario [illegible]
GARCIA AGRAMONTE, Armando
GARRIDO GARRIDO, Renato
GARRIDO PERDOMO, Leonardo
GIBART, Nelson
GUERRERO, ROBERTO
GENGLER KEN ER, Mann May [illegible]
GOMEZ BARRUECO, Ramiro
GARCIA ROSALES, Lester Nelson García (hermano) St. Marys Jesuit H., St. Marys, Kansas
~~[illegible]~~
GOMEZ FONSECA, Fernando
GONZALEZ MONTERO, Alfredo Hilia Balbuena
GONZALEZ GONZALEZ, Bernardo
GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ, Andres
GARCIA VALDES, Waldo
GARCIA TORO, Mario
GONZALEZ HERRERO, [illegible]
GARCIA CARRERA, [illegible]
GRAVERAN MORENO, [illegible]
GARCIA FERNANDEZ, [illegible] J.
GARCIA ALONSO, Martha
GRAU MENA, Rafael
GRILLO GONZALEZ, [illegible]
GONZALEZ SILVA, [illegible]
GONZALEZ [illegible], Manuel
GARCIA [illegible], Antonio Eddy Crews
GONZALEZ BORROTO, Jose
GUTIERREZ, Jose [illegible]

H

HURTADO MARTINEZ, David

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
H (continuacion)				
HERNANDEZ ROJO, Julio	Sept-62	454-62	30	Habana
HERNANDEZ PEREZ, Angel Manuel	Oct-62	508-62		Habana
HERNANDEZ MOREJON, Humberto	Dic-62	5-63	30	Sta. Clara
HURTADO LARA, Lazaro	"	" "	30	"
HEREDIA CASTANEDA, Manuel	Dic-62	13-63	5	Matanzas
HERNANDEZ PUJOL, Juan	"	" "		"
HACES DIAZ, Jose Antonio	Dic-62	13-63	1	Habana
HERNANDEZ, Osbon				
I				
IBAGUIRRE, Alfredo				
J				
JANE ARGUDIN, Luis	Abril-62	127-61	5	Oriente
JIMENEZ ROBERTO				
JIMENEZ , Gertrudis	Dic-62	4-63	3	Sta. Clara
JAMIS BERNAL, Kemel	"	" "		"
JUNCO MARTINEZ, Guillermo Clemente	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
K				
KAY GISPERT, Paul				
L				
LOPEZ CASALES, Lazaro [illegible]	Abril-62	56-62	20	Habana
LOPEZ ARENCIBIA, Elio	Dic-62	13-63	9	Habana
LINARES RODRIGUEZ, Jose de [illegible]	"	" "	20	"
LUNAS CORTES, Miguel Angel	"	" "	20	"
LUNAS OLARIO, Miguel Angel	"	" "	3	"
LORENZO [illegible], Jose	"	" "	3	"
LAMADRID JUVIER, Bernardo	Dic-62	4-63		Sta. Clara
LOPEZ ADAY , Juan	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
M				
MULLER QUINTANA, Juan Antonio	Sept-60	403-60		Habana
MULLER QUINTANA, Alberto	Abril-61	127-61	20	Oriente
MARTI URQUIZA, Isidro	"	" "	3	"
MIRO SOTO, Jaime	Marzo-61	227-61	10	Matanzas
MENDIOLA FERNANDEZ, Jose Manuel	Mayo-61	101-61	12	Habana
MENENDEZ FERNANDEZ, Luis	Nov.	1160-61		Habana
MORETON, Addon	Nov-60		10	Camaguey
MEDINILLA RODRIGUEZ, Angel Fco.	Dic-62	5-63	20	Sta. Clara
MACHADO MACHADO, Andres Avelino	"	" "	10	"
MACHADO RISAL, Celestino	"	" "	10	"
MUGUERA PEREZ Martin	"	" "	10	"
MARTINEZ CALDERIN, Pedro	Dic-62	11-63	30	Matanzas
MIRABAL LOPEZ, Pedro	"	" "	30	"
MARTINEZ OSABA SOLIS, Eraiser	62	300-63	15	Habana
MORERA DEL CAMPO, Gerardo	Dic-62	13-63	20	Habana
MARROQUI [illegible], Julian	"	" "	12	"
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, RAUL	"	" "	9	"

(sigue en pag. 5)

NOMBRE

H (continuacion)

HERNANDEZ ROJO, Julio   Angel Hernandez Rojo (hermano) 1120 S.W. 5 St. Miami 379-6722
HERNANDEZ PEREZ, Angel Manuel c/o Mov. 30 de Nov. 631 S.W. Miami Ave.
HERNANDEZ MOREJON, Humberto
HURTADO LARA, Lazaro
HEREDIA CASTANEDA, [illegible]
HERNANDEZ PUJOL, Juan
HACES DIAZ, Jose [illegible]
HERNANDEZ, Othon

I

IRAGUIRRE, Alfredo   Rosa Riva (madre) 223 Menores Ave. Coral Gables

J

JANE ARGUDIN, Luis   Julio Jané (hermano)
JIMENEZ ROBERTO
JIMENEZ, Gertrudis   Monserrate Casademón de Gomez, hija, 1730 E Valley Ave. Birgmingham, Ala.
JAMIS BERNAL, Kemel
JUNCO MARTINEZ, Guillermo Clemente

K

[illegible]

L

LOPEZ CASALES, Lazaro [illegible]
LOPEZ ARENCIBIA, [illegible]
LINARES RODRIGUEZ, Jose [illegible]
LUNAS COBAS, Miguel Angel
LUNAS OLARIO, Miguel Angel
LORENZO PORTOS, Jose
LAMADRID JUVIER, Bernardo
LOPEZ ADAY, Juan

M

MULLER QUINTANA, Juan Antonio   Francisco y Sara Muller (padres) 241 N.E. 24 St. Miami
MULLER QUINTANA, Alberto   " " " " " "
MARTI URCHAGA, Isidro
MIRO SOTO, Jaime
MENDIOLA FERNANDEZ, Jose Manuel   Dulce Mendiola (hermana)   USA
MENENDEZ FERNANDEZ, Luis
MORETON, Addon
MEDINILLA RODRIGUEZ, Angel Fco.
MACHADO MACHADO, Andres [illegible]
MACHADO RISALTA, Celestino
MUQUERA PEREZ Martin
MARTINEZ CALDERIN, Pedro
MIRABAL LOPEZ, Pedro
MARTINEZ OSADA SOLIS, [illegible]
MORERA DEL CAMPO, Gerardo
MARROQUI TEJO, Julian
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, PAUL

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUS	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
M (Continuacion)				
MARTINEZ SARDINAS, Luis A.	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
MILIAN RIVERO, Manuel [illegible]	"	" "	9	"
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Rafael	"	" "	9	"
MAESTRI PEREZ, Raul	"	" "	6	"
MARTINEZ D,OSABA, Nelson	"	" "	6	"
MORENO CABRERA, Carlos M.	"	" "	5	"
MASPULEX LOPEZ, Antonio	"	" "	3	"
MORALES ALVAREZ, Enrique	"	" "	3	"
MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ Celso				
MARTINEZ GARCIA, Eberto				
MARTI,JOSE				
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Pablo				
MONTES DE OCA, Ignacio				Matanzas
MARTINEZ, Juan Pedro				"
MARTINEZ JIMENEZ, Vicente		368-63	9	Habana
MELIAN CABALLERO, Angela	Dic-62	63	1	Camaguey
MENENDEZ,RICARDO	Enero-62		15	Habana
MORALES, Rene				
MORALES, Reinaldo				
MITRE Luis				
MARQUES, Rafael				
N				
NAUMAN UBEDA, Manuel	Dic-62	33-63		Habana
NUNEZ TRINCADO, Teresa	" "	" "		"
NICIOLINI, Pedro				Oriente
O				
O,FARRIL PEREZ, Agapito	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
P				
PEREZ CARBONELL, Manuel	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
PEREZ DIAZ-ARGUELLES Nicolas B.	Sept-62	484-62	20	Habana
PEQUENO VELO, Laureano	" "	" "	20	"
PENA FERNANDEZ, Roberto	" "	" "		"
PEDRAZA MARTI, Mario	Marzo-62	300-62	12	Habana
PERES DELGADILLO, Jose	Mayo-62	3-63	30	Habana
PARRA LEYVA, Diego	[illegible]-62	33-63	12	Habana
POLL VALDES, Wilfredo	"	" "	9	"
PEREZ HERNANDEZ, Benito	"	" "	6	"
PADRON CURBELO, Virgilio David	"	" "	6	"
PAZ VALDES, Martha de la	"	" "	3	"
PEREYO CARRERA, Jose Luis	Dic-62	11-63	30	Matanzas
PEREZ GONZALEZ, Leonel	"	" "		"
PINTADO,RAUL				
POVEDA PACHECO, Argimiro				Oriente
PENA,Oscar				
PENA, Jaime				Matanzas
PINEIRO MARINO, Julian				"

(sigue en pag- 6)

NOMBRE

M (Continuacion)
MARTINEZ SARDINAS, Luis A.
MILIAN RIVERO, Manuel [illegible]
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Rafael
MAESTRI PEREZ, Raul   Angelina Pérez (tía) 534 [illegible] 23 St.Apt.4,Miami
MARTINEZ D.OSABA, Nelson
MORENO CARRERA, Carlos M.
MASPULEX LOPEZ, Antonio
MORALES ALVAREZ, Enrique
MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ Celso

MARTINEZ GARCIA, Eberto

MARTI,JOSE
MENENDEZ GONZALEZ, Pablo
MONTES DE OCA , Ignacio
MARTINEZ, Juan Pedro
MARTINEZ JIMENEZ, Vicente
MELIAN CABALLERO, Angela   Marta Hernández(novia)Manila 1053 Urb.Sta.Rita Rio Piedras Puerto Ric
MENENDEZ,RICARDO
MORALES , ene   Lilia García (prima) 1343 [illegible] Miami St.Apt.10
MORALES, Reinaldo   Conrada Robres(tía)2783 [illegible] 21 Terr.,Miami
MITRE Luis
MARQUES, Rafael   Hilda Tabares(prima)4046 S.W. 9 Terr.,Miami

N
NAUMAN UBEDA, Manuel
NUNEZ TRINCADO, Teresa
NICIOLINI, Pedro

O
O,PARRIL PEREZ, [illegible]

P
PEREZ CARBONELL, Manuel
PEREZ DIAZ-ARGUELLES Nicolas R.   Benito Perez Diaz(hermano)
PEQUENO VELO, Laureano
PENA FERNANDEZ, Roberto
PEDRAZA MARTI, Mario
PERES DELGADILLO, Jose   Conchita Modarse
PARRA LEYVA, Diego
POLL VALDES, Wilfredo
PEREZ HERNANDEZ, Benito   Benito Perez (hijo)
PADRON CURBELO, Virgilio [illegible]
PAZ VALDES, Martha de la [illegible]
PEREYO CARRERA, Jose [illegible]
PEREZ GONZALEZ, Leonel
PINTADO,RAUL   Jose M.Pintado(hermano) 10276 N.E. 12 Ave.Miami
POVEDA PACHECO, Argimiro
PENA,Oscar
PENA, Jaime
PINEIRO MARINO, Julian

NOMBRE	DETENCION	CAUSA	AÑOS	PROVINCIA
Q				
QUINTAIROS SANTISO, Roberto Jose	Mayo-62	300-63	20	Habana
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo				
QUESADA RIOSECO, Ruben				
R				
RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor	Abril-61	127-61	5	Oriente
RUIZ OHERRA, Francisco	"	" "	3	"
RUIZ HERRERA, Ricardo	Abril-61	1169-61	5	Matanzas
ROJAS LORENZO, Rodolfo	Agosto-61	48-61	9	"
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar	Oct-61		30	Camagüey
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes	Abril-62	300-63	20	Habana
REYES VALDES, Carlos	Sept-62	478-62	12	Habana
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos	Sept-62	484-62	30	Habana
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, Gerardo				
RODRIGUEZ TOINIL, Rafael				
RODRIGUEZ-GALDO MARTIN, Francisco	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta.Clara
REYES GARCIA, Manuel	Mayo-62	3-63		Habana
ROBAU VIDAL, Mariano-Mario	Dic-62	33-63	9	Habana
ROJAS LORENZO Nelie	"	" "	9	"
RAMIREZ, ANTOnio	Feb-62			Habana
RASPAL Carlos,				
ROJAS MOYA, Rodolfo	Dic-62	59-63	12	Habana
S				
SABORIT LEYVA, Mario	Abril-61	127-61	3	Oriente
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, Ricardo	"	372-61	9	Habana
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente	Sep-62	484-62	20	Habana
SOWERS GOMEZ, ALBErto	Mayo-62	3-63		Habana
SIMON FERRER, Jose R.,	Dic-62	11-63	5	Matanzas
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan	"	" "	30	"
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de los	"	" "	10	"
SANTA CRUZ HECHAVARRIA, Bertha Maria	Mayo-62	300-63	6	Habana
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis	"	" "	20	"
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Rafael	"	" "	9	"
SAPAS NICOLADES, Manuel	Dic-62	33-63	30	Habana
SANTOS GOMEZ, Rene	"	" "	20	"
	"	" "	6	"
SALESSA LOPEZ, Mario	"	" "	6	"
SIERRA COPO, Justo Luis	"	" "	1(domicilio)	"
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, Felicite				
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto				
SILVA, Roberto				
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo				
T				
TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la	Dic-62	11-63		Matanzas
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio	Dic-62	5-63	10	Sta.Clara

(sigue en pag-7)

NOMBRE

Q

Marta Hdez. Manila 105
QUINTAIROS SANTISO, Roberto Jose Antonio Quintairos (hermano) c/Sta. Rita, R. Pied P. Rio
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo
QUESADA RIOSECO, Ruben

R

RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor
RUIZ HERRRA, Francisco
RUIZ HERRERA, Ricardo Lídice y Albor Ruiz (hijos) 2762 N.W. 15 St. Miami 634-6753
ROJAS LORENZO, Rodolfo
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes
REYES VALDES, Carlos
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos Vicente Rubiera 2 S.W. 17 Ave. Apt. 203, Miami
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ POIMIL, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ-BALDO MACHIN, [illegible]
REYES GARCIA, Manuel

~~ROBAU VIDAL, [illegible]~~

ROJAS LORENZO Nelie

RAMIREZ, ANTOnio
RASPAL Carlos,
ROJAS MOYA, Rodolfo

S

SABORIT LEYVA, Mario
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, [illegible] Ricardo Sarabasa (padre) Apdo Altamira Caracas V.
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente
SOWERS GOMEZ, ALBerto Guillermo Sowers (tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SIMON FERRER, Jose ,
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de Jos
~~SANTA CRUZ-[illegible]~~
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis Guillermo Sowers (tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Manuel
SABAS NICOLADES, Manuel

SANTOS GOMEZ, Rene

SALESA LOPEZ, Mario
✓ SIERRA COTO, Justo Luis
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, Felicita
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto
SILVA, Roberto Conrada Robles, 2783 N.W. 21 Terr., Miami
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo

T

TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio

NOMBRE

Q
QUINTAIROS SANTISO, oberto Jose Antonio Quintairos(hermano) c/Sta.Rita, R.Pied P.Rico Marta Hdez.Manila 105
QUEIPO CADENAS, Alfredo
QUESADA RIOSECO, uben

R
RODRIGUEZ LEYVA, Victor
RUIZ CHERRA, Francisco
RUIZ HERRERA, icardo Lídice y Albor Ruiz(hijos) 2762 N.W. 15 St. Miami 634-6753
ROJAS LORENZO, odolfo
RODRIGUEZ SANCHEZ, Omar
RUIDIAZ LEDESMA, Orestes
REYES VALDES, Carlos
RUBIERA FEITO, Carlos Vicente Rubiera 2 S.W. 17 Ave. Apt.203,Miami
RODRIGUEZ SARMIENTO, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ OIMIL, [illegible]
RODRIGUEZ GALDO MACHIN, [illegible]
REYES GARCIA, Manuel

~~ROBAU VIDAL, [illegible]~~

ROJAS LORENZO Nelie

RAMIREZ,ANTOnio
RASPAL Carlos,
ROJAS MOYA, odolfo

S
SABORIT LEYVA, Mario
SARABASA GARCIA VELEZ, [illegible] Ricardo Sarabasa (padre)Apdo Altamira Caracas V.
SUAREZ PUIG, Juan Vicente
SOWERS GOMEZ,ALBerto Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SIMON FERRER, Jose ,
SUAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Juan
SANTOS, Felipe Armando de los
~~SANTA CRUZ ECHAVARRIA, [illegible]~~
SOWERS GOMEZ, Antonio Luis Guillermo Sowers(tío) 401 N.E. 29 St. Miami
SUAREZ GONZALEZ, Manuel
SABAS NICOLADES, Manuel

SANTOS GOMEZ, ene

SALESA LOPEZ, Mario
✓ SIERRA COTO, Justo Luis
SOMEILLAN RIBALTA, Felicite
SANCHEZ PRADO, Alberto
SILVA, Roberto Conrada Robles, 2783 N.W. 21 Terr.,Miami
SANCHEZ GARCIA, Magardo

T
TORRE FERNANDEZ, Francisco de la
TEJERA OLITE, Rafael Antonio

NOMBRE

T (continuacion)

TORRES MENA, Pablo de la
TORRES MENA, Angel
TORRES GARCIA, Raul
TARABELA, Francisco
TORRES, Raimundo

V

VILLANUEVA MARTINEZ, Manuel c/o Nov.30 de Nov. S.W. 12 Ave.

VARONA PRIMELLES, Jose [illegible]
VERDECIA CASTILLO, Lorenzo
VERDECIA CASTILLO, L[illegible]
VEGA URQUIZA, Mario Leonides Jose F. Azor,O'Neill 140,Hato Rey, Puerto Rico

VALDES CARRERA, Pelta
VALDES D,WOLF, Rolando
VALDES DE ARMAS, Juan Humberto
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Clemente
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Antonio
VARGAS CARBO, Mario
VILLAMIL SANTORRES, Jose
VICENS VEGA, Francisco
VICENS VALDES, Raul
VALERO LLENES, Saturnino
VILLARQUIDES [illegible]
VAZQUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Jose Manuel
VARGAS SARMIENTO, Pedro

Z

ZALDIVAR SERRANO, Clara Norma
ZALDIVAR, Armando María Zaldívar(tía)577 S.W. 5 St. Apt.1,Miami

CORUJO BLANCO de Perez,Hilda Lino Pérez Gomez(marido)Bldg.66 Opa-Laoka AirPort
Hernandez Loredo, Humberto Maria Hortensia Hernandez(hija) 3333 293St.Willowi en OHIO
DIAGO, Jorge Ma.Antonia Diago(hija)117 Rusell Ave.Buffalo N.Y.
PATINO GONZALEZ,Francisco J.-Marta Patino(hermana)3221 S.W. 5 St.,Miami
VILLARQUIDES,Agata Ma. - Tete Rodriguez,Unidad Revolucionaria,Miami

NOMBRE

T (continuacion)
TORRES MENA, Pablo de la
TORRES MENA, Angel
TORRES GARCIA, Raul
TARABELA, Francisco
TORRES, Raimundo

V

VILLANUEVA MARTINEZ, Manuel c/o Mov.30 de Nov. S.W. 12 ave.

VARONA PRIMELLES, Jose [illegible]
VERDECIA CASTILLO, Lorenzo
VERDECIA CASTILLO, L[illegible]
VEGA URQUIZA, Mario Leonides Jose F. Azor, O'Neill 140, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico

VALDES CARRERA, Feliz
VALDES D,WOLF, Rolando
VALDES DE ARMAS, Juan [illegible]
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Clemente
VELIZ CASTELLANOS, Antonio
VARGAS CARRO, Mario
VILLAMIL SA[illegible]ORRES, Jose
VICENS VEGA, Francisco
VICENS VALDES, Raul
VALDES LLENES, Saturnino
VILLARQUIDES [illegible], [illegible] M.
VAZQUEZ RODRIGUEZ, Jose Manuel
VARGAS SARMIENTO, Pedro

Z

ZALDIVAR SERRANO, Clara Norma
ZALDIVAR, Armando María Zaldívar(tía)577 S.W. 5 St. Apt.1,Miami

CORUJO BLANCO de Perez,Hilda Lino Pérez Gomez(marido)Bldg.66 Opa-Laoka AirPort
Hernandez Loredo, Humberto Maria Hortensia Hernandez(hija) 3333 293St. Willowich OHIO
DIAGO, Jorge Ma.Antonia Diago(hija)117 Rusell Ave.Buffalo N.Y.
PATINO GONZALEZ,Francisco J.-Marta Patino(hermana)3221 S.W. 5 St.,Miami
VILLARQUIDES,Agata Ma. - Tete Rodriguez,Unidad Revolucionaria,Miami

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/AMSPELL/Operational
AMHINT-2 Trip to Caracas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
AR: FYI

1. Subject, Identity A, recently visited Caracas for the purpose of obtaining his residence visa and while there was in contact with the local AMSPELL delegation as well as with representatives of the major student political groups at the Central University in Caracas (UCV). AMHINT-2 was particularly interested in promoting a productive working relationship between AMSPELL in Caracas and Identity B, which appears to be a new Christian-oriented group organized to provide Liceo students with courses and seminars in fighting communism. A copy of the Identity B brochure is being forwarded under separate cover No. 1.

2. On his return, AMHINT-2 reported on the present composition of the local AMSPELL group. He indicated that Identity C, who first joined AMSPELL in 1960 in Cuba and who recently arrived in Venezuela from Santo Domingo, has replaced Identity D as leader of the group. A list containing the names of the other members of the delegation, as well as a brief description of their AMSPELL duties, is also forwarded under separate cover, Attachment No. 2.

3. At present, the AMSPELL group in Caracas is concentrating its efforts on working with Identity B and in maintaining good relations with the press in order to carry out propaganda at the least cost with such groups as the Jose Marti Patriotic Club and the UCE.

4. The AMSPELL delegation is in contact with a number of student political leaders not only at UCV but at several of the other universities. These contacts include Identities E, F, G, H and I.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

Attachments:
1. Brochure, u/sc
2. Description of Duties, u/sc
3. Identities, u/sc

DISTRIBUTION:
3-WH, w/3 attachments
2-WH/C, w/attachment Nos - 1&3
2-COS, Caracas, w/attach Nos 2&#3

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 7 Sept 65	DATE DISPATCHED SEP 16 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 23,069	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26/3	

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

1 att.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER U/SC Attachment No. 3 UFGA 23,069

IDENTITIES:

A. Manuel Salvat Roque.

B. "OSEEM" - Oficina al Servicio del Estudiantado de Educacion Media.

C. Lazaro Farinas

D. Enrique Baloira.

E. Regulo Arias.

F. Guillermo Alvarez Bajcires.

G. Humberto Celi.

H. Carlos Artimani Gasperi, President of the FCU at the University of Zulia.

I. Oscar Yanez, Director of OSEEM.

Distribution:
3 - WH, u/sc
2 - WH/C, u/sc
2 - COS, Caracas,u/sc

PRINCIPIOS ESENCIALES
DEL
GREMIALISMO ESTUDIANTIL

Un Centro de Estudiantes, para considerarse ORGANISMO GREMIAL, debe distinguirse por su:

UNICIDAD:

— Debe ser único por eficacia, conveniencia económica, educación del estudiante en materia de solidaridad y fundamentos legales de representatividad de TODO el estudiantado.

— En muchos paises (el nuestro) no se da por la violenta división politica.

NEUTRALIDAD:

— No puede identificarse con intereses de grupo.

— Su formulación aparece en un articulo de los estatutos que señala la aconfesionalidad y el apartidismo del gremio.

— No significa desinterés por las actividades religiosas o politicas.

— Tampoco puede significar la neutralidad, que el gremio no puede pronunciarse frente a la realidad: contra el engaño y en favor de la verdad.

DEMOCRACIA INTERNA:

— Principio que tiende a promover y a garantizar la libre contribución de todos los estudiantes en todo lo que atañe a la vida misma del Gremio Estudiantil.

REPRESENTATIVIDAD:

— Un Centro de Estudiantes debe ser el UNICO gremio estudiantil de derecho y de hecho.

— La Unicidad y la Democracia Interna son bases de la Representatividad.

— Lo fundamental es el contenido: SERVICIO DEL BIEN COMUN ESTUDIANTIL.

HACIA UN GREMIALISMO ESTUDIANTIL VENEZOLANO

Graficas Alfer — Telf 55 52 02
10.000

OFICINA AL
SERVICIO DEL
ESTUDIANTADO DE
EDUCACION
MEDIA

—

DIRECCION PROVISIONAL:

QUINTA ARAGONESA - LOS CAOBOS
(FRENTE A LA ESTATUA DE C. COLON)
TELEFONO 55 54 01

ESTUDIANDO • JUGANDO • TRABAJANDO • LUCHANDO • HAGAMOS NUEVA PATRIA



Que es O. S. E. E. M.?	Que servicios presta O. S. E. E. M.?
OSEEM es una **Oficina al Servicio del Estudiante de Educación Media.**	
OSEEM es una **Oficina de Formación**	.. Ofrece al Estudiante una formación social, cultural, humana y espiritual.
OSEEM es una **Oficina de Orientación Gremialista**	Da al Estudiante los implementos indispensables para crear una conciencia gremial en su ambiente y despolitizar su institución educacional.
OSEEM es una **Oficina Relacionadora de los Estudiantes Cristianos**	..Crea en el Estudiante cristiano el "Espíritu de Unidad" .. Todos los cristianos construimos una comunidad, aspiramos los mismos ideales, deseamos una nueva Patria .. Aúna los esfuerzos de todos los cristianos.
OSEEM es una **Oficina al Servicio de todo el Estudiantado de Educación Media**	.Pretende colaborar y servir en la renovación de la Educación Media, estudiar los actuales problemas de Educación y colaborar en la transformación de sus estructuras para que cumplan lo mejor posible con su objeto.
OSEEM es una **Oficina Animadora de la vida Estudiantil**	...Pretende dinamizar la vida humana, social, cultural, deportivo, etc. del estudiantado de Educación Media, mediante servicios "ad hoc"...

OSEEM

nació para servir: al Movimiento Estudiantil Venezolano.

NO VINE A SER SERVIDO, SINO A SERVIR

En síntesis...

O. S. E. E. M. es

Io. Servicio de

FORMACION Y ACCION


OSEEM
Formación
Religiosa
Cívica
Social
Cultural
Acción
Cívica
Gremial
Servicios
Culturales
Religiosos
Cívicos
Económicos
Recreativos
Estudiantiles

IIo. Servicio de

COORDINACION


OSEEM
COORDINACION
Estudiantes Cristianos de Educación Media

[illegible] SOBRE VENEZUELA

I) DELEGACION DEL D.R.E.

Hasta nuestro viaje a Caracas el delegado era Enrique Baloira, quien fue sustituido debido a su decision de venir a seguir estudios en Estados Unidos. El nuevo delegado es Lazaro Fariñas, quien es miembro del D.R.E. desde 1960 en Cuba dentro de la Pre-Universitaria y luego en Accion y Sabotaje. En el exilio participo dentro de la seccion militar y mas tarde en Santo Domingo como delegado ocupado en resolver los asuntos pendientes despues de la paralizacion del plan militar. Lleva alrededor de un mes en Venezuela.

✓ Antonio Yaníz, miembro del DRE. desde Cuba en 1960. Actuo como Coordinador Provincial de Las Villas. Mas tardo vino al exilio y se infiltro a principios de 1961 clandestinamente en coordinacion con nuestros amigos para preparar ~~unxx~~ un alzamiento en las Villas. En 1961 llega a Caracas incorporandose a la delegacion. Mas tarde trabaja con un grupo de venezolanos en actividades de Inteligencia en coordinacion con los "[illegible]. En la actualidad estudia Medicina en la Universidad Central donde [illegible] el trabajo de la delegacion.

Jose Miguel Gonzalez Llorente, acaba de terminar estudios de [illegible] en la Universidad Catolica en Caracas. Es encargado de Propaganda de la delegacion. Es necesario recalcar que el trabajo de Propaganda es [illegible] mucho mayor reducido despues de terminar las relaciones entre la delegacion y nuestros amigos, manifestandose unicamente en notas de prensa y relaciones personales con periodistas y organos de publicidad. En estos momentos Jose Miguel se encuentra fuera de Caracas pues fue enviado por unos meses a España por la compania donde trabaja en asuntos de publicidad

Lula Santos, igualmente trabajo dentro del DRE desde 1960. En la actualidad estudia Psicologia en la Universidad Católica donde desempena su labor del DRE. Su trabajo especial consiste en asuntos relacionados con la Secretaria de la Delegacion.

Guillermo Boza , estudia en la Universidad Catolica dentro de la Facultad de Sociologia. Ademas trabaja en el Instituto Venezolano de Accion Comunitaria(IVAC) ocupado en conferencias y charlas a campesinos para incorporarlos a un trabajo de desarrollo comunitario. En este campo desenvuelve actividades de la delegacion.

Sergio Gomez, Actualmente trabaja como Vice-Generente de la Empresa de Television "Vene-Vision". Es miembro del DRE. desde 1960 en Cuba. Su actividad dentro de lq delegacion es de colaboracion en diversos asuntos pues carece de tiempo para algo especifico. La importancia basica es la influencia dentro de una estacion de Television, paralizando noticias que alienten o favorezcan el comunismo.

Pacífico Calera, estudia en la Universidad del Zulia junto con Aurelia Bussot. Viven en Maracaibo donde mantienen la delegacion especialmente en actividades de relaciones estudiantiles. Tienen una gran amistad con Carlos Artimani Gasperi(presidente de la Federacion de Centros Universitarios del Zulia) de inspiracion social-cristiana.

German Adolfo Maleiro, Venezolano que estudia derecho en la Universidad de Carabobo. Reside en Valencia. No es miembro de la delegacion pero realiza las actividades correspondientes en los campos de propaganda y relaciones. Trabaja en el Rectorado de la Universidad teniendo acceso a las listas de estudiantes. En caracas se paso una lista de estudiantes comunistas de aquella Universidad brindada por este contacto. Al mismo tiempo se senalo la importancia de mantener relaciones con el a nuestros amigos.

[illegible]CIPIOS ESENCIALES
DEL
[illegible] ESTUDIANTIL

Un Centro de Estudiantes, para considerarse ORGANISMO [illegible], debe distinguirse por su:

[illegible]DAD:

—Debe ser [illegible] por eficacia, conveniencia económica, [illegible] solidaridad y fun[illegible] de TODO el estu[illegible]

[illegible] (El [illegible]) no se [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] y [illegible]

[illegible] todo lo que [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] y de [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]O

[illegible] ESTUDIANTIL [illegible]

OFICINA AL SERVICIO DEL [illegible]DIANTADO DE [illegible] EDUCACION [illegible]DIA

[illegible]

[illegible]

([illegible])

[illegible] 58101

ESTUDIANDO... o JUGANDO... o TRABAJANDO... o [illegible]ANDO... [illegible]



[illegible] O. S. E. E. M.?

es una Ofi[illegible]

[illegible]

es una Ofi[illegible] de Formación [illegible]

es una [illegible]

es una Ofi[illegible] de los Estud[illegible] Cristianos

es una Ofi[illegible]

es una Ofi[illegible] la vida Estudiantil [illegible]

> OSEEM
> ... nació para servir al Movimiento Estudiantil Venezolano.

Qué [illegible]

[illegible] O. S. E. E. M.?

...Ofr[illegible] al E[illegible] una formación [illegible], humana y c[illegible]

...Da al E[illegible] [illegible] y [illegible] su [illegible]

...Crea en el Estudiante cristiano el "Espíritu de Unidad" ... Todos los [illegible] construiremos una [illegible], [illegible] remos l[illegible] mismos ideales, de [illegible] una nueva Patria ... [illegible] los esfuerzos de todos los cristianos.

...Pretende [illegible] y servir en la renovación de la Educación. [illegible] los [illegible] los problemas de Educación y colaborar en la transformación de sus estructuras para [illegible] su objeto.

...Pretende dinamizar la vida humana, social, cultural, deportiva, etc. del estudiantado de Educación Media, mediante servicios "ad hoc"...

> NO VINE A SER SERVIDO, SINO A SERVIR

[illegible]

O. [illegible]

Lo [illegible]


O SEEM
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Gremial
Servicios
Culturales
Religiosos
Cívicos
Académicos
Estudiantiles
Recreativos

Ho. Servicio de [illegible]

([illegible])


OSEEM
COORDINACION
Estudiantes Cristianos de Educación Media

Jxx

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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1	PP-	5	CA
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4		8	+

UNIT	TIME	BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

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INFO FILE VR, DO 4, DO/H 3, WH 8, CI/OA

12 SEPT,

59330

ACTION

SECRET 112038Z

DIR INFO DOST CITE WAVE 5664

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: DIR 40414

1. ALTHO AMBARB-54 STILL CONNECTED WITH AMSPELL, AND CONSIDERED VALUABLE ASSET WITHIN AMSPELL, HE PLANS LEAVE AREA END OF SEPT TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT IN HQS AREA AT HIGHER SALARY WITH MORE CAREER POTENTIAL WITH PRIVATE FIRM OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCY. PRESENT AMSPELL SETUP AND SALARY PREVENT MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF AMBARB-54 WHOM WAVE ASSESSES AS INTELLIGENT CAPABLE AGENT.

2. IF AMBARB-54 IS NOT OF INTEREST OF DYVOUR IN SOME OTHER CAPACITY, WAVE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO KULAMP CONTACT.

SECRET

CFN 5664 40414 AMBARB-54 AMSPELL SEPT HQS NOT OF NO OBJECTIONS

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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3		7	
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FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

File
Amspell

S E C R E T 122323Z

12 JUL 65 IN 09903

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3887

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF SDOM 5890 (IN 05918)

1. AMSPELL HAS 16MM BEFORE-AND-AFTER COMPARISON CONDITIONS PBRUMEN, ENTITLED "LA CUBA DE AYER." ALTHOUGH NOT HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL QUALITY, FILM CONSIDERED SATISFACCTRY FOR TV SHOWINGS (AS BEEN SHOWN IN WAVE AREA AT SPANISH-LANGUAGE MOVIE THEATERS AND AT ORGANIZATIONAL MEETINGS).

2. SUGGEST EMADLIB-1 WRITE AMSPELL (IDEN).

SECRET

S E C R E T

CFN 3887 5890 AMSPELL 16MM "LA CUBA DE AYER." NOT HIGHEST TV SPANISH EMADLIB-1

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

GROUP 1
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

FROM
WAVE

ACTION
WH 2

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

SECRET 122334Z 12 JUL 65 IN 09904

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 3888

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF WAVE 3887 (IN 09905)

DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL
2893 NORTH WEST SEVENTH STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA.
TELEPHONE: 633-3508.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN 3888 3887 DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL 2890 NORTH WEST SEVENTH STREET MIAMI FLORIDA 633-3508

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO File AMSPELL
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 78

17 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP--	5	MO
2		6	CA
3	FI-TG	7	D
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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE IVR, FE6, CA/04, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT

SECRET 061600Z

6 JUL 65 IN 05693

DIR INFO TOKY CITE WAVE 3533

TYPIC AMSPELL [illegible]

1. AMSPELL INVITED BY JAPAN STUDENT ASSOCIATION SEND OBSERVER ATTEND INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE JAPAN 19 JULY - 9 AUGUST. HOWEVER NO FUNDS OFFERED TO COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES. (Conservative Group)

2. PLS ADVISE IF AMSPELL ATTENDANCE DESIRED.

SECRET

CFN 3533 AMSPELL JAPAN 19 JULY 9 AUGUST NO FUNDS

BT

CHACONAS
HARRISON
[illegible]

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7 4

84 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM JMWAVE
ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY
INFO. VR, FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP,

S E C R E T 262012Z
DIR CITE WAVE 3333
TYPIC PSYCH
REF DIR 20523 *

26 Jun 65 IN 99758

AMSPELL WORKING ON PRESS RELEASE WITH IDEN FOLLOWING REF GUIDANCE, ATTRIBUTING BASIC STORY TO INSIDE UNIVERSITY SOURCES. EXPECT IDEN WIRE SERVICE ARTICLE 28 JUNE. WAVE RADIO ASSETS AND AMHIM WILL PICK UP FOR WIDER PLAY AND EDITORIALIZING.

S E C R E T * RE. PROP EXPLOITATION OF N.Y TIMES AND WASH- POST ARTICLE

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR. CA2, CA/PROP.

SECRET [illegible]127

DIR CITE WAVE 3534

TYPIC PSYCH

26 Jan 65 IN 99757

REF WAVE 3533 IN 99758

IDEN: ADOLFO MERINO, UPI, REP.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

5 ✓

MESSAGE FORM 18

46 SECRET

ROUTING

1	P-	5	SS
2		6	
3	mmo	7	D
4	CA	8	✗

ORIG : S. CHACONAS:car
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PP
EXT : 6678
DATE : 24 MAY 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

25 MAY 65 22 07

TO : JMWAVE SANTIAGO

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH/C 8

INFO VR, FILE, WH 7, CI/OA

File

TO WAVE

INFO SAGO

CITE DIR 13438

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

REF: WAVE 2106 (IN 73874)*

FUBIAS-5 PLACEMENT BEING DISCUSSED WITH OTHER KUBARK COMPONENTS. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CHACONAS
HARRISON
OTT
GONZALEZ

WH/C Comment: *Suggests F-5 may be used elsewhere L.A.

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
WH/4 Michael C. Capraro (phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DC/WHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 25-21

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 9

84 **SECRET**

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19-124-26

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE WH 7, CI/OA, PG 2

S E C R E T 222047Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 2136

22 MAY 65 IN 73874

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

REF A. DIR 12292 *

B. SAGO 5581 **

1. WAVE HAS NO PLANS USE FUBIAS-5 (201-288237) LOCALLY. AFTER HIS ARRIVAL WAVE AREA, STATION WILL DISCUSS HIS QUALIFICATIONS WITH AMHINT-2. HOWEVER, HE WILL BE PLACED AMSPELL PAYROLL ONLY IF AMSPELL NEEDS REPLACEMENT AS STATION DOES NOT INTEND INCREASE PAYROLL.

2. DEFER HQS RE USE ELSEWHERE LATIN AMERICA. REF B INDICATES FUBIAS-5 HAS STRONG SENSE LOYALTY TO AMSPELL. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DIVIDED LOYALTY, SUGGEST RECRUITMENT FOR LATIN AMERICAN ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE SINGLETON BASIS WITH NO COVER OR OTHER RELATIONSHIP WITH AMSPELL.

* RE TERMINATION FUBIAS PROJECT

** CABLE OVER A YEAR OLD.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

WH/C/ES

19-124-26/3

22 May 65

MESSAGE FORM 21

ORIG: J. LINTON/ems
UNIT: WH/4/CHILE
EXT: 6868
DATE: 20 MAY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-124-26/3

24 SECRET

ROUTING

1	PP	5	SS
2		6	
3	mo	7	D
4	CA	8	

TO: SANTIAGO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8 INFO: VR, FILE, WH/C-8, PG-2, CI/OA,

TO SAGO INFO WAVE CITE DIR

CHACONAS
EMRISON
OTT
GONZALEZ

12292

REFS: A. SAGO 9424 (IN 71039)*

B. WAVE 2014 (IN 71458)**

1. CONCUR IN TERMINATION FUBIAS PROJECT AS PROPOSED REF A.

2. NO OBJECTION TO TERMINATION FUBIAS-5. ASSUME F-5 ~~KXX~~ WOULD RESETTLE IN WAVE AREA.

3. FOR WAVE: DO YOU HAVE ANY INTEREST IN FUTURE EMPLOYMENT FUBIAS-5 LOCALLY OR IN OTHER ~~XXXX~~ DYVOUR AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/ES

RI COPY

WH COMMENT: *Believe results FUBIAS Project not worth present costs and would like terminate, retaining FUBIAS-4 and FUBIAS-7 in other projects, unless DIR and WAVE have overriding reasons for continuing project in present form. FUBIAS-5 would be terminated but SAGO defers to Hqs re F-5's future employment and/or relocation.

**WAVE has no overriding reasons for continuation FUBIAS project.

19-124-26/3

21 May 65

C/WH/4/C

WH/C Mr. Chaconas (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH Y. KIYONAGA
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report - March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

REF: A. UFGA 20,729, 26 March 1965
B. UFGA 20,262, 9 March 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

AMSPELL has continued its normal propaganda activities as outlined below. On 23 March 1965, AMHINT-2 agreed to the terms outlined in Reference B, including a substantial budget reduction, to become effective 1 April. AMSPELL's chief problem at the present time is to liquidate debts incurred as a result of the defunct AMSPELL paramilitary operation.

2. Propaganda

a. The March 1965 edition of the regular AMSPELL newspaper was mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the U. S. (9,800 copies), attachment No. 1 under separate cover.

b. The March 1965 edition of the pony AMSPELL newspaper was mailed into Cuba (4,800 copies), attachment No. 2 under separate cover.

c. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during March 1965. Spanish edition -- 2,900 copies, attachment No. 3. French edition -- 1,925 copies, attachment No. 4. English edition -- 1,925 copies, attachment No. 5.

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments:
1 thru 12, u/sc (aute.)

Distribution:
3 - C/WH, w/attachs, u/sc

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 10 May 65	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 21,514	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-26/3	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

d. In connection with the prisoners' campaign (paragraph 5(a) below), 10,000 copies of the Prisoners' Message were printed, attachment No. 6; 5,000 copies of a letter to Chilean President Eduardo Frei, attachment No. 7; 5,000 circular letters to Latin American Identity A organizations, attachment No. 8; and 5,000 copies of a circular letter to AMSPELL Delegates, attachment No. 9.

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 15-minute program Tuesdays through Saturdays on AMTHIGH, and a 15-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin American stations.

4. Press Releases

Miscellaneous press releases are included as attachment No. 10, under separate cover.

5. Other Activities.

a. The prisoners' campaign got off to a slow start. The Identity B meeting in March, which was supposed to have been the kick-off of the campaign, did not produce the expected results. Identity C was on a Latin American tour and was unable to attend, and Identity D, who had promised to push the prisoners' cause at the meeting, limited himself to pleas for Cuban Identity E prisoners. The letter written to Chilean President Eduardo Frei (attachment No. 7) by AMSPELL members imprisoned on the Islo of Pines was forwarded to the AMSPELL delegation in Santiago for delivery to the President. The Chilean elections, followed by the earthquake complicated this plan and the delivery of the letter was delayed. (See paragraph 2-d above for information re propaganda printed by AMSPELL in connection with the campaign.)

b. In connection with the 13 March anniversary of the assault on the Cuban Presidential Palace, AMSPELL issued a press release (attachment No. 10), all publications contained appropriate editorials and, in addition to full coverage on the regular AMSPELL radio programs, additional radio coverage was obtained on JMHOPE and AMTHIGH with a special interview. The AMSPELL publication re the anniversary is attached under separate cover, No. 11.

c. The AMSPELL delegation in Mexico participated in the tribute to Venezuelan workers (CTV) organized by the Cubans residing in Mexico City. (See attachment No. 10 for pertinent press releases.) Activities of other AMSPELL Delegations including publications and press releases are included under attachment No. 12.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Operational expenses	$ 10,224.46
Salaries	5,650.00
Additonal printing expense (prisoners' campaign)	2,100.00
T O T A L	$ 17,974.46

C. FUTURE PLANS

Implement the Reference B decisions.

for ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1

☐ NO ☐ YES 77-125

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH

DESTROY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

INFO VR. FILE DDP WH 7

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BY

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SECRET 011924Z

DIR INFO PACY CITE WAVE 0166

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. DIR 97621

B. WAVE 0108 (IN 35201)

C. HZPA 14984

1 Apr 65 IN 36082

U

REF B REPLIED QUERIES REF C.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

AN W	[redacted]	WH/C/ES
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TRACT		[redacted]

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19-124-26

1 Apr 65

FORM 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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Amspell

31

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FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 2

INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CI 2, CI/PS, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC, CI/...2, CI/... FI, FI/INT

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UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 312121Z

PACY INFO DIR COTE WAVE 8108

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. HZPA 14830
B. HZPA 14984
C. HZPA 14737

31 Mar 65 IN 35201

1. FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH AMSPELL CHIEF AMHINT-2, BELIEVE AMSPELL MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED REF A ACTION BY AMBARB-43 BUT NOT IN EXAGGERATED FORM PUBLICIZED BY AMBARB-43. AMHINT-2 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE REF B ACTION, SPECULATED AMBARB-43 TRYING IDENTIFY AMSPELL WITH AIMS PANAMANIAN STUDENTS. WAVE OPINION AMBARB-43 REF B ACTION PROBABLY COMPLETELY OWN INITIATIVE AS PERSONAL PIQUE AGAINST KUBARK. AMBARB-43 WAS POSSIBLY AWARE DETERIORATING AMSPELL WAVE RELATIONSHIP AND THIS COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED SOUR ATTITUDE.

2. FYI, FOR REASONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED AMBARB-43 SITUATION, WAVE MADE DRASTIC CUT AMSPELL SUBSIDY EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL AND TOLD AMHINT-2 AMSPELL WOULD HAVE TO CEASE ANTI KUBARK ACTIVITY. AFTER RECEIPT REF B ATTACHMENT, AMHINT-2 WAS TOLD AMBARB-43 MUST BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL OR REMOVED FROM PANAMA.

3. PENDING OUTCOME CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 RE FUTURE

SECRET

[illegible]
IN 35201

[illegible], DO NOT WISH RECOMMEND REPLACEMENT FOR AMBARD-1 REQUESTED PARA 6 REF C. AT THIS MOMENT COULD NOT GUARANTEE AMBARD AGENT LOYALTY TO STATION. WILL ADVISE FURTHER AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH AM[illegible]-2 ABOUT 3 APRIL.

SECRET

SECRET

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SECRET

31

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FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/C 2

INFO

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UNIT | TIME | BY

VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 312121Z

PACY INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0108

TYPIC AMSPELL AMBARB

REFS: A. HZPA 14800

B. HZPA 14934

C. HZPA 14737

31 Mar 65 IN 35201

1. FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH AMSPELL CHIEF AMHINT-2, BELIEVE AMSPELL MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED REF A ACTION BY AMBARB-43 BUT NOT IN EXAGGERATED FORM PUBLICIZED BY AMBARB-43. AMHINT-2 DISCLAIMED ANY KNOWLEDGE REF B ACTION, SPECULATED AMBARB-43 TRYING IDENTIFY AMSPELL WITH AIMS PANAMANIAN STUDENTS. WAVE OPINION AMBARB-43 REF B ACTION PROBABLY COMPLETELY OWN INITIATIVE AS PERSONAL PIQUE AGAINST KUBARK. AMBARB-43 WAS POSSIBLY AWARE DETERIORATING AMSPELL WAVE RELATIONSHIP AND THIS COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED SOUR ATTITUDE.

2. FYI, FOR REASONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED AMBARB-43 SITUATION, WAVE MADE DRASTIC CUT AMSPELL SUBSIDY EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL AND TOLD AMHINT-2 AMSPELL WOULD HAVE TO CEASE ANTI KUBARK ACTIVITY. AFTER RECEIPT REF B ATTACHMENT, AMHINT-2 WAS TOLD AMBARB-43 MUST BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL OR REMOVED FROM PANAMA.

3. PENDING OUTCOME CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 RE FUTURE

SECRET

[illegible]
IN 35201

[illegible], DO NOT WISH RECOMMEND REPLACEMENT FOR AMBARB-[illegible] [illegible] PARA 6 REF C. [illegible] THE MOMENT COULD NOT GUARANTEE AMBARB AGENT LOYALTY TO STATION. WILL ADVISE FURTHER AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH AMHINT-2 ABOUT 9 APRIL.

SECRET

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report -- January and February 1965

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

FYI:

REF: UFGA 19,393, 18 January 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

1. General.

AMSPELL operational activities during January and February were of a routine nature, details of which are noted in the paragraphs below. AMSPELL-KUBARK relations have continued to deteriorate since the collapse of the AMSPELL paramilitary effort in the fall of 1964, an at the end of February the Station decided to reduce the AMSPELL subsidy. This problem was discussed in UFGA 20,262, 9 March 1965. We shall start implementing this decision at the beginning of April.

2. Propaganda.

a. The January and February 1965 editions of the regular AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the U. S. (9,800 copies each), attachment No. 1 under separate cover. This represents a planned reduction from the previous 19,800 monthly figure.

b. The January and February 1965 editions of the pony AMSPELL newspaper were mailed into Cuba (4,800 copies each), attachment No. 2 under separate cover.

c. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during January and February 1965. Spanish editions--2,900 copies each, attachment No. 3. French edition--1,925 copies each, attachment No. 4. English edition--1,925 copies each. attachment No. 5.

/ CONTINUED /

19-124-26/3

Attachments:
1 thru 7, as stated, u/sc
8 Identity, u/sc

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Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA,w/attachs
u/sc

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
23 Mar 65	MAR 26 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 20,729

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	

d. 5,000 copies of the leaflet enclosed as attachment No. 6 were mailed to Cuba during January.

e. 10,000 copies of attachment No. 7 have been printed and will be distributed in Latin America in connection with the prisoners' campaign discussed in paragraph C below.

3. Radio Propaganda.

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 15-minute program daily except Sunday on AMTHIGH, and a 15-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin American stations.

4. Other Activities.

CARA 9922 and related traffic discussed problems with AMSPELL representatives in Caracas.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED:

	January	February
Operational Expenses	$ 10,078.	$ 10,040.
Salaries	5,650.	5,650.
Printing (10,000 pamphlets, attachment No. 6)	2,200.	- - -
Extra Mailing Expenses	-	900.
TOTAL	$ 17,928.	$ 16,590.

C. FUTURE PLANS:

AMSPELL is planning a publicity campaign in cooperation with Identity to publicize the situation of prisoners in Cuba. The major phase of this campaign will not be launched until the March executive-committee meeting of Identity. AMSPELL representatives in Santiago, Chile, who are local station assets, will also launch a related campaign regarding AMSPELL martyrs in prison (See WAVE 9497).

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
Attachment No. 8, u/sc
UFGA 20,729

IDENTITY: Inter-American Press Society (SIP).

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, u/sc

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

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X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM SANTIAGO
ACTION WH/C 8
INFO

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TIME
BY

VR. FILE DDP, WH7, CA2, CA/CRIP, CI/ ... CI/IC2

WH/SA/NP

S E C R E T 232057Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE SAGO 8956

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: SAGO 8923 (IN 24230)

23 MAR 65 29240

AMHINT LETTER ARVD SAGO 23 MARCH ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL PRISONER PROP. FUBIAS GROUP WILL ATTEMPT ARRANGE DIRECT INTERVIEW WITH FREI APPROX FIRST WEEK APRIL THRU FERNANDO SANHUEZA, PDC DEPUTY. F-5 WILL PRESENT LETTER TO FREI AND THEN REQUEST FREI ASSISTANCE. WILL ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW JUST BEFORE SOLIDARITY WITH POL PRISONERS WEEK TO INCREASE PUBLICITY AND EFFECTIVENESS. IF FREI REFUSES MAKE ANY COMMENTS SAGO WILL REPLAY LETTER IN LOCAL PRESS INDICATING FREI RCVD ORIGINAL AND NOW STUDYING MATTER. ALSO PLAN FUBIAS PRESS RELEASE, RADIO AND PRESS REPLAY.

S E C R E T

CFN [illegible]

SECRET

19-124-26/3

23 Mar 65

File Comf 19-124-27

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

34 **SECRET**

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FROM SANTIAGO

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/O 4, SI/CA, CI/OPS

[illegible] T 152155Z

[illegible] CITE SAGO 3923

TYPIC AMSPELL

REF: WAVE 9497 (IN 2[illegible])

16 MAR 65 IN 24230

Info accordingly

NO NEED AMHINT-2 TRAVEL SAGO. FUSIAS GROUP CAN ARRANGE APPROPRIATE PUBLICITY AND CAN PRESENT LETTER TO FREI THROUGH INFLUENCE PDC FRIENDS. IF FREI DESIRES PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH A-2 THEN FUSIAS GROUP CAN INFORM A-2. REQUEST MAIL MATERIAL TO FUSIAS GROUP.

- Salvat

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

2 SECRET

☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PP —	5	MMO
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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, C/IO, DO 4, DD/H2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

10 MAR 65 IN 20011

S E C R E T 101641Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9375 (INGHURST ACTING)

REFS A. UFGA 20262

B. DIR 89097

1. RE PARA 4 REF A PLS ADVISE AMCOUP-1 AMSPELL TIME ON AMTHIGH WILL BE REDUCED TO ONE FIFTEEN MINUTE PROGRAM WEEKLY EFFECTIVE ONE APRIL. AMCOUP-1 SHOULD NOT DISCUSS WITH AMSPELL AT THIS TIME.

2. WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE USE PRESENT AMSPELL TIME FOR OTHER WAVE PROGRAMS AT REF B RADIO CONFERENCE.

S E C R E T

CFN

[illegible] What will be free time?

SECRET

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T1/2, SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 3108

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4	CA	8	✗

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UNIT

TIME

BY

FROM CARACAS

ACTION WH/C 5

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 242145Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 0081.

4MAR 65 IN 16100

TYPIC CITUTOR

REF: CAR[illegible] (82543)

1. CITUTOR-1 RETURNED CARA 1 MARCH. SAID CITUTOR-2 REQUESTED HIS PRESENCE TO HELP STRAIGHTEN OUT AMSPELL-KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

2. STA CASE OFFICER MET CITUTOR-1 3 MARCH AND EXPLAINED REASON FOR DISMISSING CITUTOR-2 AND CITUTOR-7. (CITUTOR-1 TOLD PROPAGANDA PERFORMED BY CITUTOR-2 AND CITUTOR-7 NO LONGER OF INTEREST TO STA.) CITUTOR-1 UNDERSTOOD BUT SAID AMSPELLS WERE PBRUMENS UNITED IN ONE CAUSE AND THAT DISMISSAL OF ONE WOULD RESULT RESIGNATION WHOLE GROUP. STA CASE OFFICER ACCEPTED RESIGNATIONS AND AT MEETING 4 MARCH PRESENTED CITUTOR-1 WITH LETTERS OF TERMINATION FOR EACH CITUTOR. CITUTOR-1 TOLD EACH MEMBER INCLUDING SELF WOULD RECEIVE TWO MONTHS SEVERANCE PAY AGAINST SIGNED QUIT CLAIM.

3. CITUTOR-1 REMINDED THAT KUBARK COULD NOT CONTINUE WORK WITH UNIT WHICH HAS SPLIT LOYALTIES. IT POINTED OUT TO CITUTOR-1 THAT HIS UNILATERAL DECISION REMAIN JMWAVE AREA CONSIDERED UNFRIENDLY ACT. BELIEVE ~~[illegible]~~ CITUTOR-1 GOT MESSAGE AND ALTHOUGH PARTS OF CONVERSATION

IN 16100 PAGE .

S
TRAINED, MEETING ENDED ON FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE NOTE.

4. FOR WAVE: AT STA DISCRETION IT CAN BE POINTED OUT TO
AMSPELLS THAT CARA DECISION ACCEPT RESIGNATIONS ESSENTIALLY REACHED
ON PROFESSIONAL GROUNDS AND NOT MEANT TO DEROGATE FROM THEIR POLITICAL
ASPIRATIONS. HOWEVER THEIR CONDUCT (ESP CITUTOR-1'S BORDERING ON
STUDIED CONTEMPT FOR KUBARK.

SECRET

CFN

6

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG. E.I. HARRISON:cm
UNIT. WH/C/CA/PP
EXT. 6055
DATE 2 MARCH 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

21 SECRET

ROUTING

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MAR 65 22 53z

TO . JMWAVE

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF. DC/WH/C 3 INFO 3DP, VR, FILE

TO WAVE INFO. CITE DIR

89889

TYPIC AMWORLD AMSPELL PSYCH

REFS: ~~A. WAVE-8234 (IN [illegible])~~

~~B. DIR-85862~~

C. WAVE-8905 (IN 14149)*

1. NO RESPONSE YET FROM SMABET.

2. PARA 4 REF A. CASE OFFICER WILL QUERY AMBIDDY-1 AT NEXT MEETING.

3. WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *REQUESTED INFO REGARDING FATE AMYUM-1.

WH/C/MO

C/WH/C/CA

WH/C/CA/EA C. JENKINS

WH/C/RR

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER 4-23 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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14-00000

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FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

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TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, [illegible]

11 FEB 65 IN 78555

S E C R E T 111620Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE CARA 9922

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMSPELL

REF: WAVE 8082 (IN 77043)

1. SEE NO NEED CITUTOR-1 RETURN CARA.

2. FOR DIR: STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES FOR REPLACEMENT CITUTOR-1. PREFER OUTSIDER, NON-AMSPELL TYPE, WHOSE LOYALTY WOULD BE WITH KUBARK AND NOT WITH TWO BOSSES. WILL ADVISE RE CHOICE.

S E C R E T

CFN

MCB INT ~~SB~~ SB
IOS PERS AR
~~FOB~~ RTTS LOG CA
~~CI~~ SI BF HH
SEC NS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 703

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/WIARES/Operational
C AMSPELL Propaganda on the Congo Situation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI:

REFS: A. DIR 68739, 4 December 1964
B. DIR 72761, 23 December 1964

1. Attached under separate cover is AMSPELL production of printed propaganda on the Congo situation. Page two of the AMSPELL December bulletin carried a full-page spread with photographs, attributing the Congo atrocities to Communist intervention. Approximately 3,000 copies of the Spanish-language edition were sent to Latin America and Spain in December. Approximately 2,000 copies each of the English and French language editions are being sent overseas (Europe, Asia, and Africa) during January. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.) The French edition was not available as this dispatch was being written but will be mailed 15 January.

2. The pony edition of the AMSPELL newspaper for December carried a brief story with photographs concerning the death of missionary Paul Carlson. Approximately 5,000 copies were mailed into Cuba at the end of December and early January. (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) In addition to the printed propaganda AMSPELL also carried appropriate news bulletins regarding the Congo atrocities on its 10-minutes' AMTHIGH program, with editorial comment attacking Communist exploitation of the Congolese.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
1. Bulletin (2 copies), u/sc
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AÑO 1 DICIEMBRE 1964 BOLETIN INFORMATIVO DEL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL No. 7

NUESTRA OPINION

MENSAJE DE NAVIDAD

Al finalizar un año más, encontramos ante nosotros el panorama de un Mundo Nuevo en muchos aspectos, pero estatico y quizás atrasado en otros sentidos de la vida. La humanidad cumplirá dentro de unos días un año más; ¿pero acaso no está el hombre de hoy buscando para sí al igual que hace siglos un camino que le ayude a encontrar el verdadero objetivo de su Ser?

Diciembre es un mes de meditación en la vida de los hombres. Finaliza un año y comienza otro. Es hora de análisis y planificación de vida. Pero más que todo esto representa el renacimiento de una idea y de un modo de vivir para la humanidad. Un orden nuevo y revolucionario que nació hace veinte siglos, vuelve cada año en este mes a tomar plena vigencia, porque nosotros no hemos olvidado en nuestro duro bregar de meses la verdad y la razón de nuestras vidas.

Cabe entonces en este momento hacer una pregunta: ¿Se ha logrado consolidar la Paz Mundial? Una respuesta semejante y definitiva aparece cada año. El Mundo de hoy no solamente vive alejado de la Paz sino que cada día escoje caminos más dificiles para su logro, llevándole al irremediable peligro de las guerras nacionales e internacionales.

Dos causas hay en la realidad de este Mundo, una de orden Moral, la otra de caracteristicas sociales y políticas. Ambas se complementan entre sí y son necesarias para lograr una estabilidad dentro de la sociedad que ha tocado vivir al hombre.

Se quiere por una parte lograr la Paz en el Mundo de hoy, mientras por otra se rompen las fuerzas de Paz interior que existen en cada hombre. El hombre, la familia y la sociedad; únicos elementos capaces de lograr para el Mundo una Paz real y positiva se encuentran totalmente divididos y dentro de cada uno de ellos se ha sembrado la desconfianza y el temor hacia los demás.

Se ha jugado demasiado con las doctrinas e ideologías y éstas en vez de sembrar en el hombre confianza en su destino y a su función dentro de la sociedad han servido para acrecentar el odio entre pueblos y razas, y aún entre hombres dentro de una misma comunidad.

Razón Moral esta que se basa en el olvido de un mandato: "Amaos los unos a los otros como yo os he amado" y "Mi Paz os dejo, mi Paz os doy".

Razón Social aquella que parte de una realidad olvidada por conveniencias particulares o de gobiernos: "La Paz es solamente consecuencia del establecimiento en cada Nación y el Mundo de regimenes o sistemas de gobierno basados en la justicia y la libertad del hombre".

El Mundo de hoy no es muy propicio a una Paz verdadera. El colonialismo, el imperialismo y los regimenes totalitarios de izquierda y derecha, proliferan sobre el globo ahogando al hombre sus ansias de libertad y justicia.

Nosotros como jóvenes y cubanos tenemos un derecho y deber para con nuestra Patria y la Paz del Mundo. Creemos que solamente habrá Paz en nuestra Patria cuando devolvamos a nuestros hermanos su derecho a pensar y actuar libremente, haciendo desaparecer el régimen de injusticia y terror que hoy sojuzga indiscriminadamente a nuestro pueblo.

El Mundo tiene un camino semejante al nuestro pero en una mayor escala. Debe darse a cada hombre dentro de cada sistema la libertad y la justicia a las cuales tiene derecho todo ser humano.

Prometer y hablar de Paz es un crimen y una cobardía cuando no existen detrás una clara y noble decisión de luchar incansable y tenazmente por su establecimiento dentro de cada país o conglomerado de naciones.

La Paz como todas las cosas valederas tienen un alto precio y hay que luchar por ella. Los enemigos del hombre son sus principales enemigos. Los que matan y esclavizan los pueblos condenándoles a vivir en condiciones indignos también son sus enemigos. Los que niegan al hombre su personalidad calificándole como cosa animal y deshumanizada, están contra la Paz del Mundo porque siembran más que nadie el odio dentro de la sociedad.

Quien quiera la Paz declare la guerra a estos enemigos de la humanidad.

Que estos días de Navidad sirvan para hacernos tomar una decisión definitiva: El restablecimiento moral de nuestra sociedad y el imperio total de la justicia en el Mundo.

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LOS SUCESOS DEL CONGO

UNA MUESTRA DE LO QUE ES EL COMUNISMO

Los hechos sucedidos recientemente en el Congo han estremecido con honda preocupación al mundo civilizado, ya que en ellos se han violado los más esenciales principios humanos en un alarde de crueldad y crimen.

Los movimientos de Liberación han tenido para nosotros la natural simpatía porque mejor que nadie conocemos lo significativo de esa lucha. Sin embargo, en el caso de las mal llamadas tropas de Liberación del Congo, no tenemos, al igual que el resto del mundo civilizado, que repudiar esa acción sanguinaria que constituye una contribución más del comunismo internacional en su lucha por llevar a las naciones el dolor y la esclavitud.

El movimiento de Liberación del Congo al igual que otros, ha sido infiltrado totalmente por los comunistas y en este como en todos los anteriores puede verse con claridad el verdadero fin de destrucción y muerte que persigue la Internacional.

La lucha de Africa ha sido para los jóvenes del mundo una lucha mirada con honda simpatía y el crecimiento del Continente negro en Repúblicas con gobiernos propios es un símbolo de la decisión incontravertible de llevar esos países hacia un destino mejor.

Por ello es que cuando una nación dentro del Continente africano ha peleado por su liberación ha tenido siempre el apoyo de todas las naciones del mundo.

Hoy sin embargo nuestra actitud y la del mundo civilizado y libre es totalmente adversa. Los hechos del Congo no están inspirados en un ansia de justicia y libertad, sino que por el contrario son el reflejo de la política que quieren imponer desde Moscú y Pekín.

Si ha molestado el hecho de sangre con sus consecuencias de crímenes, violaciones y atrocidades mucho tiene que molestar la actitud de los países del Bloque Comunista y de algunos que sirven a sus intereses consciente o inconscientemente.

Estos sin el menor escrupulo se han lanzado a acusar a los países que participaron en la acción de rescate menospreciando totalmente el acto humanitario de salvar la vida a personas de nacionalidades pertenecientes a países no beligerantes.



Esa actitud acompañada con las protestas organizadas de estudiantes dentro de los países comunistas demuestran claramente la dirección e intervención que mantienen en la guerra del Congo que pudiera haber sido una guerra de liberación y que infortunadamente se ha convertido en una guerra de mercenarios dirigida y alentada por las potencias comunistas.

Ante los hechos a un funcionario soviético sólo se le ocurrió decir que se había avisado de la ejecución de los prisioneros si se intentaba rescatarles.

Nosotros queremos hacer una pregunta al mundo civilizado porque sabemos que los comunistas no contestan estas preguntas ya que carecen de sentido humanitario: ¿Desde cuándo y en que Código de Guerra es permitido asesinar masivamente a los prisioneros cuando se les trata de rescatar? ¿Desde cuándo se autoriza a un ejército perpetrar crímenes contra ancianos, mujeres religiosas y niñas indefensas como represalia? ¿Desde cuándo es permitido realizar actos racistas a un pueblo o raza, máxime cuando este ha sido defendido en múltiples ocasiones de la descriminación a que fueron sometidos por intereses colonialistas?

Los asesinatos masivos, las violaciones de religiosas, mujeres y niñas y el crimen del Congo no pueden tener justificación nada más que para los que siembran el odio y dividen los pueblos.

Los comunistas no ganaron esta batalla. Africa tiene que ser libre pero no condicionada a la política soviética o china. Los causantes de estos hechos vandálicos no son representativos del verdadero espíritu del pueblo congoleño y tienen el total repudio de Africa y el Mundo.

Africa se siente avergonzada de esta acción, pero ello servirá para comprender que existe otro enemigo tan peligroso o más que el colonialismo.

La acción criminal del comunismo en Africa sólo tiene una respuesta y se la darán los propios africanos: SU DESTRUCCION.



LA SITUACION UNIVERSITARIA

Antes del Comunismo

1.- Habian 8 Universidades en Cuba.

2.- En 1959 habian más de 30,000 estudiantes Universitarios en las 8 Universidades.

3.- La Constitución de 1940 estipulaba que el 1% del Presupuesto Nacional sería entregado a la Universidad de La Habana.

4.- La Carta Magna Cubana garantizaba la autonomia Universitaria lo que hacia que la enseñanza superior en Cuba no estuviera sometida a ningún gobierno.

5.- En nuestras Universidades existia el ejercicio libre de las ideas, no coartandose ningún pensamiento.

6.- Los estudiantes Universitarios eligian cada año sus representantes estudiantiles en libres elecciones, asistiendo los dirigentes a Congresos Internacionales de juventudes en representación de los jóvenes cubanos.

7.- Las Universidades como centro máximo de la Democracia servian de medio idóneo para plantear las mejoras que el pueblo cubano pedía.

8.- Era requisito para el ingreso en las Universidades el tener 17 años de edad y haber cursado el Bachillerato (enseñanza de estudio) o aprobar severos exámenes de ingreso.

9.- El 90% del profesorado Universitario actuante en junio de 1959, ha marchado al exilio o ha renunciado a sus catedras por no querer aceptar al comunismo o no quererse doblegar a su doctrina.

10.- Cientos de estudiantes Universitarios guardan prisión en las cárceles comunistas, por el solo delito de amar la libertad. Las listas de martires cubanos asesinados ante los pelotones de fusilamiento o muertos por sus gestos de rebeldía han aumentado con los nombres de estudiantes universitarios como, Juanin Pereira, Virgilio Campanería, Julio A. Yebra, Tapia Ruano, Porfirio Ramírez, y tantos otros que han sabido morir antes que claudicar frente al comunismo.

Con el Comunismo

1.- Hay tres Universidades.

2.- Actualmente no llegan a 20,000 los estudiantes Universitarios.

3.- Abolida la Constitución del 40 y según el Presupuesto Nacional del Gobierno Comunista, la Universidad de la Habana ha recibido una rebaja de un 75% de sus entradas.

4.- El gobierno comunista, pisoteó la Autonomía Universitaria, alegando que las Universidades deben marchar junto a la Revolución Roja, sirviendo los intereses del régimen.

5.- El régimen dictatorial de Fidel Castro impuso el marxismo-leninismo, como asignatura obligatoria en todas las carreras y proscribió la enseñanza de cualquier ideológia contraria al comunismo.

6.- Desde octubre de 1959, no se han celebrado elecciones Estudiantiles, ya que la única vez que quisieron legalizar la representación universitaria, los comunistas celebraron una llamada Asamblea General, donde por "aclamación" se aligió la Nueva Directiva que después de 3 años sigue rigiendo, salvo contados casos.

7.- Actualmente las Universidades son organismos serviles al Gobierno comunista, controlados directamente por funcionarios de la Dictadura Roja.

8.- No hay requisitos de edad ni tampoco de haber cursado estudios secundarios. Dandose el caso que jóvenes de 14 años de edad realicen estudios universitarios sin estudios previos actualmente.

9.- No es requisito actualmente ser graduado universitario para ejercer de profesor en las Universidades comunistas de Cuba. Alumnos que han aprobado asignaturas del primer año y que cursan el segundo, son profesores de sus compañeros que inician sus estudios ese año, y asi en la misma proporción los alumnos del 3er. curso con profesores del 2do. y los del 4to. el 3ro. etc.

10.- Mientras los verdaderos estudiantes dejan de estudiar en Cuba, guardan prisión, marchan al exilio o realizan la lucha contra el comunismo, el gobierno Rojo utiliza jóvenes que sin preparación previa asisten a las aulas universitarias con el solo propósito de servir de títeres a los comunistas en el Tablado Internacional.

Noticiero ESTUDIANTIL

CIEN ESTUDIANTES PANAMEÑOS A MOSCU – Según César Bruglatti, estudiante en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba de Moscú y dirigente de la Asociación de Estudiantes Panameños en la capital moscovita, treinta jóvenes de Panamá estudian actualmente allí; su número se elevará muy pronto al centenar. Los becados panameños se dirigen a Moscú vía México, La Habana y Praga.

EN EL FUTURO: UNION DE ESTUDIANTES UNIVERSITARIOS CENTROAMERICANOS – Dirigentes estudiantiles de las universidades de Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador y Panamá se hallan laborando - local y colectivamente - en pro del propósito de fundar una Unión de Estudiantes Universitarios Centroamericanos. La idea no es nueva, pero ahora gana fuerza y es probable que se convierta en realidad antes de que transcurran muchos meses.

EL PROGRAMA DE COOPERACION POPULAR, MOTIVO DE DISCORDIA EN PERU – Los partidos de oposición convienen en la utilidad del programa de Cooperación Popular - asistencia técnica para proyectos comunales - auspiciado por el presidente Belaunde e impulsado por los estudiantes en gran parte, pero se oponen a su centralización de control en las manos personales de aquél. La coalición oposicionista - encabezada por el APRA - reclama que Cooperación Popular sea "municipalizada" o sea que cada municipio reciba los fondos pertinentes y los utilice localmente como estime conveniente. "Así se evitará la infiltración de comunistas en el programa", alega el APRA.

PARA VISITAR ALEMANIA OCCIDENTAL, UN REQUISITO: NO SER JOVEN – Alemania del Este permite que sus ciudadanos de avanzada edad visiten a familiares en Alemania Occidental, pero no deja que los jóvenes den ese viaje. Excusa alegada: "Es más fácil que allá tomen represalias con los jóvenes y no con los viejos". Y agrega el periódico Neues Deutschland de Alemania Oriental, como quien pone un parche: "Nadie debe pensar que nuestro gobierno no tiene confianza en la juventud ..."

UN "NUEVO CAMINO" PARA LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE – En conclave reciente, los estudiantes de la Universidad Católica analizaron "la necesidad de adaptar sus estudios y la Universidad a las exigencias sociales del mundo de hoy". Punto aprobado, entre otros: que la Universidad actúe "con mayor independencia frente a la jerarquía eclesiástica", imprimiéndosele a ese centro de altos estudios "el espíritu renovador de la Iglesia de Juan XXIII y de Paulo VI contenido en el actual Concilio Ecuménico.

ESTUDIANTES UNIVERSITARIOS GUATEMALTECOS EN CAMPAÑA DE ALFABETIZACION – Por boca de su presidente, la Asociación de Estudiantes Universitarios de Guatemala se ha comprometido a emprender una campaña de alfabetización a escala nacional. Se espera que un buen número de alumnos de las dos universidades del país (la de Guatemala y la denominada Rafael Landivar) coopere con la Coordinación de Alfabetización AEU creada al efecto.

CHILE – Santiago: La Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad Católica (FEUC) llevó a cabo su **SEXTA CONVENCION ORDINARIA DE ESTUDIANTES** del 30 de septiembre al 3 de octubre, en ella se abordaron temas de gran solidez como: "Idea de Universidad", "Naturaleza y Problemas Actuales de la Universidad"; "Evolución y Situación de la Universidad Latinoamericana", etc. Llegando a conclusiones que abren el camino de una Reforma Universitaria moderna y eficaz. La documentación base se halla condensada en el libro especialmente editado por FEUC: "La Universidad: Nuestra Tarea", única obra en su género en Latinoamérica.

Juanin Pereira Varela

Los hombres que alcanzan a comprender el sentido de la existencia no pueden orientarse a un mero subsistir. Sus vidas encuentran razón y objetivo sólo en el servicio. Servicio a Dios y al prójimo. Quizás estas palabras encierran la grandeza de todos los hombres que han podido ser recogidos por la historia y admirados por la humanidad por los frutos positivos que alcanzaron. El afán de servicio los llevó a construir nuevos órdenes para que el hombre alcanzara plenamente la satisfacción de sus necesidades y adquiriera conciencia acerca de sus fines más elevados. Quizás estas palabras sean las únicas que pudieran hacer comprender a todos los jóvenes del mundo el sentido profundo y absoluto del sacrificio de cientos de estudiantes cubanos y especialmente el sacrificio de Juanin Pereira Varela.

Su vida no contemplaba otros ideales que servir. Servir a Dios, servir a la Patria. Servir a todos los cubanos brindándoles una oportunidad de vivir en una tierra libre y justa. Su vida desde que se consideró como realidad el establecimiento de un régimen totalitario en Cuba, fue dedicada desde las filas del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, a combatir y a sembrar. Combatir el mal que rompía la armonía, quebraba la sonrisa, reducía a la impotencia los afanes permanentes de libertad y justicia de nuestro pueblo. Combatir al enemigo que impedía la creación de un Orden Cristiano y que ahogaba la felicidad de sus hermanos de tierra. Sembrar su sacrificio y sus ideas para que en el futuro pudiera existir ese Orden, esa felicidad y esa justicia. Sembrar, pues, su destino no era triunfar humanamente. Su destino era morir y que su sangre hiciera lo que sus manos no lograron. Que despertara las conciencias de su pueblo, resucitando los latidos apagados del patriotismo y de la nacionalidad. Que su sangre fuera riego de destinos que en el futuro se realizacen plenamente para felicidad de su pueblo y para ejemplo del Continente de las Esperanzas, que ya quiere ser continente de realidades humanas.

Esa fue la vida de Juanin Pereira. En su afán de combatir fue abatido por balas milicianas, entregadas por la Unión Soviética para dominar a aquellos que se oponían a su Imperio. Pero esa bala que pretendió cortar su vida en un 17 de diciembre de 1961, en aquella playa de sombras de la Provincia de Pinar del Río, hizo nacer la luz que aún ilumina. Pues esa bala que mataba al hombre hacía germinar la semilla. Semilla que crece oculta entre palmas en cada rincón de Cuba. Semilla que está gritando al mundo el afán de libertad de un pueblo mártir. Semilla que ya no está oculta entre tierras, que ya nace y crece y se levanta altiva para hacer patente que Cuba no se rinde, ni se somete, ni muere. Que Cuba, pese a la traición de algunos de sus hijos, pese a la invasión de elementos extranjeros a nuestra nacionalidad y principios, pese al oportunismo ciego de algunos gobiernos occidentales, se mantiene firme y segura en su victoria. Porque en Cuba aquella semilla regada de sangre que fue y es Juanin Pereira Varela, aún existe en nuestros aires que mantienen sus gritos seguros de victoria y radiantes de esperanza:

¡VIVA CUBA LIBRE! ¡VIVA CRISTO REY!

DRE international

YEAR 1 DECEMBER 1964 CUBAN STUDENT DIRECTORATE'S INFORMATION BULLETIN No.7

OUR OPINION

CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

As another year draws to its end, we find before a world new in many aspects but sadly stagnant if not actually retrogressive in some of life's most vital facets. Humanity is a year older but is it not still engaged in a relentless search for the true meaning of its being?

December is a thoughtful month in the lives of men. It is the hour of retrospect, of questioning, of reorganization and projection into the future. Above all, December is a yearly reminder of an idea and a way of life for men. A new and revolutionary order born twenty centuries ago, comes vigourously to the forefront for in the long months of toil we have not forgotten the cause and the goal of our existence.

No time is perhaps more adequate to ask this question: Have men achieved for the world a lasting peace? Each year the same unconditional, negative answer meets the question. Not only does mankind live far removed from peace but each new day embarks upon roads that can only lead farther and farther away from it into world of national and international wars.

Two causes exist in the reality of our world, one in the moral order, the other in the realm of social and political entities. Each complements the other and both are necessary to the attainment of stability in the society in which man must live.

Men would have peace in today's world but do nothing to preserve the forces of internal peace in each man. Man, the family, society: the elements capable of achieving for the world a real and positive peace are totally disunited and into each has been sown the seed of distrust and of fear.

There has been such juggling of doctrines and ideologies, instead of being a source of confidence and strength by which men may rule their lives, have served only as a source of fear and hatred among nations and races and even among men in the same community.

Morally, our world has chosen to forget the command: "Love one another as I have loved you".

Socially, convenience and self interest have made this world blind itself to the fact that, "Peace can only be the consequent to the establishment in each Nation and in the world of regimes or systems of government based on justice and the freedom of the individual.

Today world is not a very adequate breeding ground for peace. Colonialism, imperialism, rightist and leftist totalitarianism thrive throughout the world stiffling in man his longing for liberty and equity.

We as young men and as Cubans have a duty and right to our land and to the world. Our land, we firmly believe, will know peace only when we have returned to our brothers the right to think and to speak freely, abolishing the rule of terror and injustice that today shackles our people.

The world faces much our same task but on a vaster scale. Each man must be given the freedom of choice and the justice which are his right.

To promise and to speak of peace without the noble purpose and the firm decision of fighting tirelessly for its attainment is a cowardly crime.

Peace, as all worthwhile things, has a high price and its achievement entails a struggle. Those who would have peace must willingly take up the battle against those forces at work in our world which dehumanize man and make him a prey of fear. No season is as appropriate as Christmas to reaffirm in each of us the determination to carry on this struggle until true peace has been given to man.

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THE EVENTS IN THE CONGO

A PROOF OF WHAT COMMUNISM IS

Recent happenings in the Congo have rocked the civilized world, leaving in their wake a deep preocupation in the hearts of all who believed in even the most basic principles of humanity and who see in these acts a vengeful boast of cruelty against the most elemental principles of kindness and respect.

Those who struggle for freedom have always found in us the sympathy and understanding that only those who know full well that this struggle entails can give. We find, however, that in the case of the utterly misnamend "Congolese Troops of Liberation" we must (along with all civilized men) denounce this new and bloody contribution of international communism to the oppression and suppression of all peoples.

This movement has been, as others have been before, throroughly infiltrated by communists; and in this, as in other cases, the true goal of destruction and death sought by the International can clearly be seen.

The hearts of youth throughout the world have echoed in sympathy the cries, the tears, and the pain of Africa's birth. The growth of the Black Continent into a continent of republics is a symbol of the inconstable right of this Continent to a great destiny.

That is why the sincere struggles for freedom of African nations have met with our support as with that of all freedomloving peoples.

It is this love of true freedom that necessarily places us in a position of adversity towards this movement. The happenings in the Congo find their motivation not in a zealous search for justice and liberty but in the international policies Moscow and Peking seek to enforce in Africa by any and all means.

In the deaths, the rapes, the insults have greived and enraged then how must the attitude of the nations of the Communist Bloc and of those who, conciously or not, serve their interest rankle.



Without the slightest trace of scruple these nations have hurtled themselves into acrimonious abuse of the nations which took part in the rescue mission, whose only purpose was the humanitarian one of saving the lives of non-belligerents.

The attitude of these nations and the "student demonstrations" staged in communist countries to show approval of the Congolese rebels clearly show the direction they would have the Congo's liberation take. Where the Congolese struggle might have been a war of liberation, it has become instead a senseless war run by mercenaries and abetted by the Communist Powers.



When faced with the crimes in the Congo one Soviet official glibly dismissed the violence by stating that the rescuing nations had been warned it would happen if rescue was attempted.

We would ask this question of civilized men: By what Code of war can the slaughter of non-belligerents because of attempts to rescue them be justified? Since when has it been found permisible for an army to do its own ugly will in regards to old men, to missionaries, to women, and to children? Has racism suddenly found a moral justification?

Mass murder and rape can only find justification in those whose creed is hatred and whose aim is to divide.

Fortunately the Communists have not won this battle. Africa will have freedom, and it will not have the mauled, caged communist version of it. Those responsible for so much ugly violence in the Congo do not represent the spirit of the Congolese people and have received the condemnation of Africa and of the whole world.

Africa feels ashamed of what has happened, but this act will help her understand she has to face an enemy as dangerous, or more so, than colonialism.

The criminal actions of communism in the Congo have only one answer and the Africans themselves will give it: ITS REPUDIATION.



UNIVERSITIES STATUS

Before Communism

1.- There were 8 universities in Cuba.

2.- In 1959 there were more than 30,000 students in the 8 universities.

3.- The Constitution of 1940 stipulated that 1% of the national budget would go to the University of Havana.

4.- The Great Charter of Cuba guaranteed autonomy to the Universities, freeing them from interference by the government.

5.- There was a free and open exchange of ideas in the classrooms.

6.- Every year the students elected their own representatives in free elections.

7.- The universities served as spokenmen for the wishes of the Cuban people.

8.- To enter the Universities it was necessary to be 17 years of age and to have graduated from a secondary school or to have taken rigorous tests to prove knowledge equivalent to a secondary school education.

9.- Ninety percent of the University proffessorate is in exile or has retire, unwilling to have communist doctrines emposed upon it.

10.- Hundreds of university students are held in communist prisons, only because of their love for liberty. The lists of cuban martyrs, murdered by firing squads or killed by its rebelion, had been increased by the names of Cuban universities students such as; Juanin Pereira, Virgilio Campaneria, Julio A. Yebra, Tapia Ruano, Porfirio Ramirez, and so many others that had preferred to die than to submit to communism.

With Communism

1.- There are three universities.

2.- There are no more than 20,000 university students presently.

3.- The Constitution of 1940 has been abolished and the Communist regime has cut by 75% the funds destined for the University of Havana.

4.- The regime subjects the Universities requiring them to follow its dictates in all matters.

5.- Marxism Leninism is a required subject for all students and all other ideologies are forbidden.

6.- There have been no election since September 1959. At one point when an effort was made to have them held, the Communists arranged a so called "general assembly" where by, "popular acclaim", those who have since held control, were "elected".

7. Today, they are servile instruments of the regime.

8.- No requisites concerning age or previous education are set. There have been cases of fourteen-year old with little previous education studying at the universities.

9.- It is no longer a requisite to be a college graduate in order to be able to teach at the university. Second year students teach freshmen; third year students teach second year ones, etc.

10.- While real students left their classes, are held in prison, went to exile or fight communism, the Red Government uses uneducated young people as university students, with the only purpose to serve communist International Scene.

STUDENT NEWS SHEET

GUATEMALA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS START A "LITERACY DRIVE". The Association of University Students of Guatemala has pledged itself to undertake an alphabetization campaign on a national scale. It is expected that a good number of students from the two universities in the country will cooperate in this effort to teach the illiterate.

CHILE. The Federation of Students of the Catholic University (FEUC) held its Sixth Ordinary Convention of Students from September 30th. to October 3th. Among the topics discussed were: "The Idea of a University", "the nature and the Problems of Today's University", "The Development and actual Position, of Latin American Universities". These discussions culminated in a series of proposals which open the way for a effective, modern University Reform. The basic documentation has been condensed in book from under the title, "The University, Our Task" this book, edited by the Federation, is unique in its kind in Latin America.

ONE HUNDRED PANAMANIAN STUDENTS TO MOSCOW: According to Cesar Brugiatti, a student at Moscow's Potrice Lumumba University and President of the Association of Panamanian Students in that capital, there are thirty young men from Panama studying there but the number will soon be raised to one hundred. These students go to Moscow by way Mexico, Havana, Prague.

IN PROSPECT: AN UNION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: Student leaders from the Universities of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama are working - both locally and collectively - on plans to establish an Union of Central American University Students. Although the idea is not a new one it seems to have found a particularly favorable atmosphere at this time and it is highly probable that it will be carried out to completion.

THE PROGRAM OF POPULAR COOPERATION: A SOURCE OF DISCORD IN PERU. The opposition parties in Peru, while accepting as necessary the Popular Cooperation Program - technical asistance for communal projects promulgated by President Belaunde and backed in a mayor part by the students, are opposed to the centralization of its control entirely into the hands of the President.

The opposition coalition - headed by the APRA - asks that the Program be "municipalized" that is that each locality receive the necessary funds and administer them as it deems convenient. The APRA alleges that this would prevent communist infiltration to the program.

TO VISIT EAST GERMANY, ONE PREREQUISIT: AGE. In East Germany elderly people are allowed to visit their relatives in West Germany but young people are not permitted to make the trip. The excuse given by the government: "It is more likely that repressive measures will be taken in the West against the young". Then it adds, somewhat in the manner of a patch: "No one must think we do not trust our youth . . ."

A "NEW ROAD" FOR THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF CHILE
In a recent meeting, the students of the Catholic University analized "the necessity of adapting their studies and the University to the social demands of today's world".

Among the decisions approved: that the University act "with greater independence with regard to the ecclesiastical hierarchy" upon impressing that institution "the renovation spirit of the Church of John XXIII and Paul VI contained in the present Ecumenical Council".

Juanín Pereira Varela

Men who have attained a true understanding of the reason for their existence cannot be satisfied with mere subsistence. Their lives find meaning only in service. Service to God and to man. These words embody, to a large extent, the greatness of those men whom history has claimed for itself and whom huminity holds in admiration for the fruitful results of their endeavors. Their eagerness to service led to acheive for their fellows new horizons of material comfort, of intellectual satisfaction, of spiritual attainment. These same words are perhaps also the only ones which could make youths throughout the world visualize the profound meaning of the sacrifice of hundreds of Cuban Students and in particular of Juanin Pereira Varela.-

His life contemplated no ideal but to serve. To serve God, to serve his Land, to serve his countrymen by gining them an opportunity to live in a free and just land. His life from the moment the establishment of a dictatorial government in Cuba became an unquestionable reality, was dedicated to battle and to toil. From the ranks of the D.R.E., he struggled against the evil that had reduced to angry impotence the longigs for permanent peace and freedom in the hearts of our people. He fought the enemy that impeded the establishment of a Christian system and drowned the joy in the hearts of his countrymen. He toiled to ascertain that in the future that system, that joy, and that justice could exist.

His would not be the joy however of seing his labors bear fruit. It was his lot to die and by his death achieve what his hands could not.

His blood would reawaken in his countrymen the fervor of patriotism and he would stand as an example to the "Continent of Hopes" which more and more demands to be a continent of human realizations.

That was the life of Juanin Pereira. It was brought to an end by militiament's bullets given by the Soviet Union to strike down all who oppose the empire they seek to establish. But the bullet that struck him down on that October day of 1961 brought forth. A seed that now quietly germinates in every corner of his land, that cries out to the world that Cuba does not give up, does not submit, does not die. Inspite of some faithless sons, of foreign troops that tramp through our land, of opportunistic Western governments, the seed watered by Juanin Pereira's blood will bear fruit, it now grows and the land that holds it vibrates with its growth and the skies above it echo more loudly each day:

LONG LIVE CUBA! LONG LIVE CHRIST THE KING!

SECRET

"LIBERATED BY THE COMMUNISTS"

Graphic Evidence of Marxist Lies About the Actual Events in the Congo.

The missionary Paul Carlson lies dead with a card tied to his throat, assassinated by Congolese communists on a street in Stanleyville. Dr. Carlson, in long and difficult years full of sacrifice, brought a message of hope and encouragement to innumerable Congolese as well as help of all kinds and his personal collaboration. He was eliminated tragically, as shown in the photograph, because of the affection that the masses held for him, and because of his fame and prestige and the adverse influence that he signified for the Communists. He had committed the sin of doing whatever was necessary to help the sick and console the afflicted, and the Reds do not pardon such things. In their final orgy of blood the Communists respected neither women nor children. These were very dangerous "military spies" according to the Communists. These (photographs) are the facts that the propaganda of the (Castro) Government has suppressed in an attempt to present the assassins of missionaries, women and children as "heroes" and "champions of liberty".

SECRET

Translation of Attachment No. 2
UFGA 19,424

"Si nuestra tierra sufre, no hay mejor gozo que sufrir con ella. ¿Que es morir, si en la tumba comienza la vida verdadera?"
ALBERTO MULLER

TRINCHERA

TRINCHERAS DE IDEAS VALEN MAS QUE TRINCHERAS DE PIEDRAS

[illegible] "De ser siervo de si mismo, para ser siervo de su Patria." [illegible]
[illegible] Abril 1894

ORGANO OFICIAL DEL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL

NUM. 4

Diciembre 27, 1964

AÑO 1º

CUBA: RAICES DE UNA CRISIS POLITICA

En una situación difícil ha cobrado más vigencia que nunca la pugna interna que está teniendo lugar entre las esferas dirigentes del gobierno comunista cubano. Los antecedentes públicos de esta crisis política, comenzaron a desarrollarse con la expulsión de sus cargos dirigentes, del viejo comunista Aníbal Escalante, figura de gran importancia dentro del Partido. Mas adelante, y con el juicio de Marcos Rodríguez Alfonso, fueron colocados en el banquillo de los acusados, otros dirigentes de la llamada "vieja guardia", en una maniobra de Fidel Castro para colocar al Partido en una posición desventajosa ante la opinión pública. A partir de ese momento se podía adelantar [illegible] la sentencia sobre Joaquín Ordoqui.

No transcurrió mucho tiempo para que la decisión, que seguramente fue tomada desde el juicio de Marcos Rodríguez, fuese puesta en práctica. Joaquín Ordoqui era separado de su cargo dentro del Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas y además perdía su asiento dentro de la dirigencia del Partido Unico de la Revolución Socialista, organismo de máxima jerarquía dentro de Cuba comunista. A las pocas semanas se conocía la noticia del suicidio de Augusto Martínez Sánchez, Ministro del Trabajo y, aparentemente un gran amigo de Fidel Castro. Decisión tomada, según las propias declaraciones del régimen, al conocer la noticia de que sería destituido de su cargo, pero con el agravante de que para privarse de la vida deben haber, en este caso, razones de mucho peso y gravedad, que no se resumen exclusivamente en la pérdida de un puesto administrativo.

Esta crisis política, que se está desarrollando en Cuba, tuvo su inicio en los primeros meses del régimen. Lo que está ocurriendo en estos momentos no es más que la existencia latente de una lucha por el poder, de divergencias estratégicas y hasta ideológicas, de sus relaciones con el campo internacional y de las pasiones desbordadas de estos hombres. Son varias las causas que podemos señalar como fundamentos de esta crisis.

PUGNA NATURAL ENTRE LA VIEJA GUARDIA Y FIDEL CASTRO.

La participación de la vieja guardia del Partido Comunista en el derrocamiento de la dictadura de Batista fue nula. Los que llevaban el timón del carro triunfante de la Revolución, eran hombres nuevos, convertidos al comunismo por oportunismo, y guiados por un líder sumamente ambicioso que quiso vanamente convertirse en el redentor de América. Ya desde ese momento quedaban definidos los campos dentro de la dirigencia comunista. Uno disciplinado, tradicional y muy organizado. El otro, indisciplinado, nuevo, desorganizado, pero con las riendas del poder y el aparentemente apoyo popular en sus manos. Los orígenes del régimen, eran unos momentos muy poco oportunos para ninguna acción de la vieja guardia, mas sin embargo, ya comenzaba a trabajar la estructura del Partido, ocupando cargos de importancia dentro del nuevo gobierno.

Los hombres que ocupaban las principales responsabilidades, eran los comunistas del momento, las figuras representativas de la Revolución comunista, pero unos hombres que no lleva-

Pasa Página 3

LOS BECADOS: PARA QUE SERAN UTILIZADOS

Todo efecto tiene su causa. Ley física que rige [illegible] a todo. Siempre existe un motivo, una finalidad, un objetivo en cualquier paso que cualquier criatura se atreve a [illegible]. En el caso de los cientos de jóvenes cubanos que gozan de becas para estudiar, también podemos encontrar una causa.

Actualmente existen en los mejores edificios de [illegible] cientos de jóvenes cubanos que tienen el privilegio de estudiar, de comer, de vivir [illegible] preocuparse en absoluto por sus necesidades, pues todas absolutamente todas estas [illegible] el régimen que gobierna en Cuba.

Estos jóvenes se [illegible] en los [illegible] cual es la razón por la cual el gobierno invierte tal cantidad de dinero en su mantenimiento, y quizás piensen que todo consiste en la generosidad de una revolución "que se hizo para los humildes".

Para estos que aún se mantienen ciegos, [illegible] de algunas consideraciones:

1. El régimen de Cuba carece de recursos para mantener a su población.
2. El régimen de Cuba [illegible] gran cantidad de recursos para mantener a los estudiantes becados.
3. El régimen de Cuba no mantendría [illegible] solamente en aquello que constituye provechoso para el mantenimiento presente y futuro de su régimen.
4. El régimen de Cuba tiene muchas razones para mantener a los becados.
   a. Estos becados sirvieron para [illegible] la situación en las Universidades cubanas llenas de elementos contrarios al comunismo y a la tiranía.
   b. Un régimen para mantenerse necesita hombres. Los cubanos formados y maduros que no fueran oportunistas o [illegible] no estaban dispuestos a mantener ese régimen. Su única posibilidad era educar en sus conceptos y [illegible] a la nueva generación de jóvenes cubanos.
   c. Estos jóvenes educados en la teoría y práctica del marxismo serán los elementos utilizables para mantener la opresión y el terror, [illegible] para tratar de contener, sirviendo de mártires, una invasión o una guerra civil, etc.
   d. Estos jóvenes educados en el culto a la personalidad de Fidel serán los mejores elementos con los que este contará en caso de una pugna abierta con la vieja guardia comunista. Especialmen-

Pasa Página 3

La Situación de las Universidades

Para demostrar con datos concretos el fracaso comunista en el campo universitario, ofrecemos esta comparación de la situación de nuestra enseñanza de nivel superior antes del advenimiento de la dictadura roja y bajo la misma.

Antes del Comunismo	Con el Comunismo
1. Había 4 Universidades en Cuba.	1. Hay tres Universidades.
2. En 1959 había 30.000 estudiantes Universitarios en las 4 Universidades.	2. Actualmente no llegan a 20.000 los estudiantes Universitarios.
3. La Constitución de 1940, estipulaba que el 1% del Presupuesto Nacional sería entregado a la Universidad de la Habana, lo cual era el mínimum requerido para su desenvolvimiento.	3. Abolida la Constitución del 40 y según el Presupuesto Nacional del Gobierno Comunista, la Universidad de la Habana ha recibido una rebaja de un 25% de sus entradas.
4. La Carta Magna Cubana garantizaba la autonomía Universitaria lo que hacía que la enseñanza superior en Cuba no estuviera sometida a ningún gobierno.	4. El Gobierno comunista, proscribió la Autonomía Universitaria alegando que las Universidades deben marchar junto a la Revolución Roja, siguiendo los intereses del régimen.
5. En nuestras Universidades existía el ejercicio libre de las ideas, no coartándose ningún pensamiento. Ello le valió de inmenso prestigio internacional constituyendo un verdadero ejemplo.	5. El régimen Dictatorial de Fidel Castro impuso el Marxismo-leninismo, como asignatura obligatoria en todas las carreras y proscribió la enseñanza de cualquier ideología contraria al comunismo.

Pasa Página 3

Venezuela Junto al Pueblo Cubano

Una vez más ha quedado demostrado el repudio del [illegible] mundial al comunismo [illegible] a su título del Caribe. Esta vez han sido los trabajadores venezolanos, los que de una manera decidida y valiente, [illegible] se han colocado [illegible] totalmente [illegible] combaten por [illegible] justicia. Los [illegible] detallando [illegible] dé por el [illegible] de los trabajadores venezolanos a la causa de Cuba. El [illegible] congreso de la Confederación de trabajadores de

Pasa Página 3



Editorial

[illegible]

ubano:

ESCUCHA TODOS LOS LUNES

'RINCHERA,

[illegible] POR LA GRAN CADENA DE [illegible] LIBERTAD PARA NUESTRA PATRIA Y [illegible] EL CONTINENTE, DE MARTES A SA[illegible] POR LA [illegible], LLE[illegible] EL MENSAJE DE LIBERTAD QUE CU[illegible]

TRINCHERA

[illegible] oficial del Directorio Revolucionario Estu[illegible] se propone que llegue el ansia de Liber[illegible] el espíritu [illegible] del pueblo cubano que [illegible] por su independencia.

NOTICIAS

EN EL TERCER ANIVERSARIO DE LA MUERTE DE JUANIN PEREIRA VARELA

El [illegible] de Diciembre pasado fue el tercer aniversario de la muerte de Juanín Pereira Varela Coordinador Nacional del Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil quien fue asesinado por [illegible] de la tiranía que oprime a nuestra Patria mientras se en-

[illegible] de [illegible] en la [illegible] de [illegible] de Dio. [illegible]

●

INCIDENTE EN LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Durante la sesión de la tarde del día [illegible] de diciembre, se registró en el recinto de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, una alteración del orden cuando un grupo de exiliados cubanos lanzó desde la tribuna de los visitantes unos volantes en los que se pedía a [illegible] que salieran de Cuba y que terminara dicha ocupación militar [illegible].

●

CONTINUAN LOS SABOTAJES

En el curso del [illegible] de las [illegible] de [illegible], el gobierno [illegible] de [illegible] en Santiago de Cuba y los obligó a [illegible] el acuerdo de [illegible] a los elementos negativos que rompen y sabotean los equipos.

Se pronostica, sin embargo, que tales actos serán cada vez más frecuentes pues dicha resolución no representa el genuino sentimiento y disposición de la clase obrera.

●

MUEREN SIETE COMUNISTAS EN VENEZUELA DURANTE BOMBARDEO A UNA ZONA.

Siete guerrilleros resultaron muertos y varios soldados heridos recientemente en dos choques armados ocurridos en los montes de Santa Cruz de Bucaral y en los de Iracara y Caburé. Un encuentro se registró poco después en las montañas de la jurisdicción de Boconó, estado Trujillo, zona que fue rápidamente bombardeada al día siguiente por efectivos regulares. Los guerrilleros muertos no fueron identificados.

●

INCLUYEN FECHA DE VENCIMIENTO DE PAGO EN LOS RECIBOS TELEFONICOS

A fin de [illegible] actual caótica situación en los pagos y para tratar de combatir la resistencia y oposición del pueblo ocupado con todo lo que sea del gobierno, la Empresa Nacional Telefónica 13 de Marzo ha dispuesto que en los recibos aparezca bien clara la fecha de vencimiento de las cuentas.

●

DESESPERADO ACTO REALIZA UNA JOVEN CUBANA PARA NO REGRESAR

Desde la cubierta del barco [illegible] "El [illegible]" que pasaba cerca de la costa de Palm Beach en viaje desde el Canadá a Cuba una joven cubana de 19 años, desesperada por tener que retornar a la isla se lanzó al agua cuando [illegible] un guardacostas americano. Ana Olga Capestany nadó hasta cerca de la embarcación del Servicio de Guardacostas que la recogió y la llevó hasta Palm Beach y allí pidió asilo como refugiada que se le concediera en Miami. Según informó la joven Ana Olga, actuó por un impulso repentino cuando vio cerca al guardacostas, cayendo cerca de las hélices del barco cubano que por poco la destrozan y se decidió a todo porque prefería morir ahogada que retornar a Cuba. Uno de los tripulantes de la embarcación americana, expresó que estaban vigilando rutinariamente la nave cuando vieron a la joven saltar al agua. También, dice Ana Olga, la vieron saltar algunas de las personas que estaban en el barco cubano.



●

ROTUNDO EXITO EL VIAJE DE PAULO VI A LA INDIA

El recibimiento que más de dos millones y medio de indios le tributaron a su Santidad el Papa Paulo VI en Bombay fue [illegible]

[illegible] que se le tributó [illegible] en el mundo [illegible] demostrado una vez más en la lucha que se sostiene contra el materialismo [illegible].

●

BREVES

Sufren los Vietcong 155 bajas a manos de las fuerzas armadas de Vietnam del Sur. Se trataba de un escogido batallón del Vietcong que fue diezmado por las tropas anticomunistas, constituyendo una de las mayores victorias de las fuerzas gubernamentales en los últimos tiempos.

☆ ☆ ☆

Mientras la producción azucarera cubana se vio reducida a un mínimo en la pasada zafra y con perspectivas aún peores para la próxima, la producción azucarera mundial, en cambio ha aumentado a un total sin precedentes de 65,700.000 toneladas.

☆ ☆ ☆

Según la opinión de fuentes autorizadas y círculos diplomáticos, la división entre la China comunista y la Unión Soviética, lejos de disminuir, ha seguido aumentando.

☆ ☆ ☆

Por lo menos cuarenta y cuatro personas resultaron muertas cuando un avión de pasajeros DC4 fue derribado en el Congo por el fuego de los guerrilleros comunistas.

ESTUDIANTE CUBANO:

Tu, desde la patria esclavizada, puedes ayudar a la lucha de liberación.

Envía al P.O. Box 168 MIAMI 1, FLA., todo el material informativo que consideres útil, poniendo especial interés en noticias de las Universidades y demás centros de estudios, recortes de periódicos, etc.

ESTUDIANTE CUBANO: EL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL, QUE NO CEJARA EN EL COMBATE HASTA QUE CUBA SEA LIBRE, TE NECESITA.

VENEZUELA JUNTO AL PUEBLO CUBANO... Continuación

Venezuela decidió aceptar las mociones presentadas por los trabajadores portuarios en las que se decide el boycot a todos los barcos que comercian con Cuba, además de otras resoluciones. A continuación el texto de lo acordado:

EL V CONGRESO DE TRABAJADORES DE VENEZUELA

CONSIDERANDO:

Que en la reciente Reunión de Cancilleres de America, convocada por el Consejo General de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) se acordó decretar el rompimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas y Comerciales con el régimen comunista de Fidel Castro, ante la agresión comprobada de dicho gobierno, contra el gobierno constitucional de Venezuela,

CONSIDERANDO

Que mientras los países de nuestro continente cumplen a cabalidad con dicha Resolución, varios países de Europa y Canadá, han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba comunista, la cual de esta manera trata de evitar el Boycot y las sanciones impuestas por el Consejo General de la OEA.

CONSIDERANDO:

Que el comercio que se realiza con el régimen comunista de Fidel Castro, desde estos mencionados países, viene a fortalecer a ese gobierno, ya que de esta manera se burla, la sanción económica y moral impuesta por los Estados Americanos,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que la Federación de Trabajadores Portuarios de Venezuela, ha aprobado en sus Consejos Consultivos y en su reciente Convención Nacional, decretar el Boycot contra todos los barcos embanderados de dichas naciones, que han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba de Fidel Castro,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que la Federación de Trabajadores Portuarios, como filial de la Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, se ha dirigido a este organismo para que apoye esta determinación que redunda en defensa del sistema democrático americano,

ACUERDA:

Primero: Decretar el Boycot contra todos los barcos mercantes, que han intensificado su comercio con la Cuba comunista y los cuales están contribuyendo al fortalecimiento de ese sanguinario régimen,

Segundo: Solicitar la solidaridad del movimiento sindical democrático, para que haga extensivo este Boycot desde los puertos, donde se proceda al embarque de mercancía hacia la Cuba comunista,

Tercero. Dicho Boycot entrará en vigor cuando lo ordene la Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela, a su filial la Federación de Trabajadores Portuarios de Venezuela, como muestra de solidaridad con el pueblo democrático de Cuba, que en estos instantes lucha por liberarse de sus opresores.

Cuarto. Darle publicidad al presente Acuerdo, enviándolo a todas las Centrales Obreras democráticas, para su conocimiento y fines.

Dada en la Ciudad Vacacional de Los Caracas, a los 26 días del mes de noviembre de 1.964

LA COMISION DE ACUERDOS Y RESOLUCIONES

LOS BECADOS...

Continuación

te si esta pugna determina un desenlace violento de guerra civil.

- e. Estos jóvenes serán los más dispuestos para combatir y morir en países extraños sirviendo los fines de subversión y dominación del comunismo.
- f. Estos jóvenes becados significan la posibilidad de contar con fuerzas de fácil movilización para las tareas del corte de caña, la recogida del café etc.

En definitiva una conclusión. Los becados del comunismo son los instrumentos ciegos, los esclavos dóciles, los siervos disciplinados que sirven para cualquier cosa que necesiten los amos dirigentes. No existe ningún propósito humanitario, ni patriótico. Solamente llenan una necesidad más del régimen comunista. Quizás también con la esperanza de que después de la derrota servirán de elementos que mantengan la subversión y la anarquía en Cuba. Triste papel el de esa juventud. Y más triste en cuanto no han tenido oportunidad de conocer otra cosa, otra situación, otra alternativa que no sea lo que les imponen desde la mañana hasta la noche los monstruos comunistas.

JOVEN CUBANO: REBELATE CONTRA ESTE DESTINO QUE ATENTA CONTRA TU LIBERTAD Y CONTRA TU PROPIA VIDA, APROVECHA EL MOMENTO OPORTUNO PARA RENUNCIAR AL COMUNISMO. LUCHA POR HACERTE TU PROPIA VIDA EN UNA CUBA NUEVA EN QUE EXISTA LIBERTAD Y NUESTRA BANDERA NO SE MANCHE CON EL REFLEJO GROSERO DE LA HOZ Y EL MARTILLO.

CUBA: Raíces...

(Continuación)

ron a esos puestos por designio expreso de la Internacional comunista. Los peones del Partido, los hombres que siempre fueron comunistas, que obedecían al Partido, tenían que replegarse momentáneamente y aceptar, como rectores a los seguidores de Fidel Castro. Pero ya quedaban fijados los campos.

LA LEGALIDAD O CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DEL REGIMEN COMUNISTA CUBANO.

Uno de los logros básicos a los que desea llegar la llamada "Vieja guardia" es la legalidad o constitucionalidad del régimen comunista cubano. Por ello se entiende la creación de una constitución comunista que imprima un carácter legal, al estilo comunista, al gobierno de Cuba. Con ello, estarían alcanzando los comunistas viejos, una ambición necesaria para el buen desenvolvimiento administrativo y político dentro de las filas del régimen. Con ello, estarían garantizando la continuidad del sistema comunista, pese a las desapariciones accidentales o forzadas, de distintos dirigentes del gobierno.

Por ello, podrían en definitiva, sustituir al Presidente o al Primer Ministro, sin que se viese afectada de manera vital la regencia del país. Algo parecido a lo que existe actualmente en la Unión Soviética y que funcionó claramente en la reciente destitución de Nikita Kruschev. Y la vieja guardia lucha encarnizadamente por esta realización, ya que en este caso se trata de Fidel Castro el Primer Ministro, y existen serias diferencias de orígenes, de disciplina y de estrategia con el máximo dirigente del fidelismo comunista. El freno que se opone lo representa la vieja guardia, según fuentes, apartar a Fidel Castro o a cualquier seguidor del mismo, mediante el empleo de esa legalidad, o de esa constitución.

PUGNA RUSO-CHINA.

Los fundamentos ideológicos, que han mantenido unidos a los comunistas de todo el mundo, ya no son más que viejas expresiones o materias discursivas para los prohombres del mundo comunista. Lo que antes constituía una fuerza, robustamente unida, hoy se ha debilitado por la pugna interna de poder. Los Partidos comunistas, ya no siguen fielmente los dictados de la Internacional con sede en el Kremlin. Y por último, los dos colosos del comunismo, se enfrentan en una pugna ideológica y estratégica que alcanza dimensiones incalculables.

Lo que está sucediendo en Cuba tiene sin lugar a dudas muchas raíces en esa situación internacional del comunismo. Ha quedado demostrado fehacientemente que Fidel Castro [illegible] seguir la línea dictada por [illegible] de Revolución y [illegible]. Por su parte, la vieja guardia es fiel seguidora de Moscú y de la línea trazada por ellos.

Pero ante esta situación de divergencia, entra a jugar un factor determinante que se levanta como un obstáculo contra Castro y no es más que la situación económica. El asiento económico del régimen cubano está en la Unión Soviética y no en China. Cualquier movimiento político o estratégico adoptado por Fidel Castro puede significar la pérdida de la tan necesitada ayuda económica. Ello ha mitigado hasta cierto punto, este factor de pugna interna, mas sin embargo permanece vigente, pues son bien definidas la militancia internacional, tanto de Castro como la de la vieja guardia.

RUSIA ANTE EL FRACASO DE FIDEL CASTRO.

Es indiscutible que la Revolución comunista de Cuba ha fracasado. Ha fracasado dentro de Cuba y hoy más que nunca se hace más grave la crisis económica y administrativa. Ha fracasado en America, donde la subversión ya no puede llegar a donde ellos quisieran. Ante ello, a Rusia y por consiguiente a la vieja guardia le quedan dos caminos: Uno, mantener el status quo, el otro, acabar definitivamente con Fidel Castro y enton-
ces el fracaso no será
ta, y habrá suficientes
tos para demostrar qu
Castro no se ajustó a
plina y a los lineamien
Partido comunista. No
cuál de los dos comunis
ta Rusia, pero en ambos
ticia, pero para mantene
fue así, hace falta
el gobierno, quitar y po
bres, y a todo ello se
del Castro, mientras el
el que dicte las medidas.

Estos factores que h
tentado analizar, aunq
sea de manera general,
tuyen los fundamentos d
su política que hoy con
régimen comunista. Por
raleza y por sus orígen
puede ser solucionada,
lamente mitigada, aun
últimos acontecimientos
que va en aumento. Sus
consecuencias son im
bles y sólo puede deci
el momento que esta s
ha debilitado al régimen.
imagen reducida de lo
ocurriendo en el mundo c
ta y que lo conducirá
plazo a la muerte.

Tres hombres han sido
los máximos dirigentes
tido comunista cubano:
Ordoqui, Aníbal Esca
Blas Roca. Sólo queda
minar Blas Roca. Y en
tría quedan dos interrog
una conclusión. El pri
caer será Blas Roca o
él caerán otros?
¿O caerá Fidel Castro
La conclusión no puede
que una: nunca ha sido
mento tan propicio para
derrumbamiento del régim

Antes del [illegible]ismo... (Continuación)

	Antes del [illegible]ismo...		Con el Comunismo...
6.	Los estudiantes Universitarios elegían cada año sus representantes estudiantiles en libres elecciones, asistiendo los dirigentes a Congresos Internacionales de Juventudes en representación de los jóvenes cubanos. Ello contribuía a crear un ambiente de libertad y democracia en donde el estudiantado podía alcanzar sus aspiraciones.	6.	Desde Septiembre 1959, no se han c brado elecciones tudiantiles, ya que única vez que quis ron legalizar la rep sentación univers ria, los comunis celebraron una II da Asamblea Gene donde por "acl ción" se eligió la N va Directiva que pués de 3 años si rigiendo, salvo cre dos casos.
7.	Las Universidades como centros máximos de la Democracia servían de medio idóneo para plantear las mejoras que el pueblo cubano pedía.	7.	Actualmente las U versidades son or nismos serviles Gobierno comunist controlados direc mente por funcio rios de la Dictadu Roja.
8.	Era requisito para el ingreso en las Universidades el tener 17 años de edad y haber cursado el Bachillerato (enseñanza secundaria que requería 5 años de estudio) o aprobar severos exámenes de ingreso.	8.	No hay requisitos edad ni tampoco haber cursado es dios secundari Dándose el caso c jóvenes de 14 añ de edad realicen tudios universitar sin estudios prev actualmen
9.	*El 90% del profesorado Universitario existente en junio de 1959, ha marchado al exilio o ha renunciado a sus cátedras por no querer aceptar el comunismo o no querer doblegarse a su doctrina. Los catedráticos Universitarios antes del comunismo eran escogidos por su aptitud académica y la inmensa mayoría contaba con una amplia y profunda preparación.*	9.	[illegible] fualmente son grad de universitario p ejercer de profe en las Universida comunistas de Cu Alumnos que h aprobado asignatu del primer año y cursan el segund son profesores de [illegible] alumnos del 1er. son profesores 2do. y los del 4to. 1ro. etc.

"LIBERADOS" POR LOS COMUNISTAS

Pruebas graficas de las mentiras marxistas sobre los verdaderos sucesos del Congo



El misionero Paul Carlson yace muerto con una etiqueta amarrada al cuello, asesinado por los comunistas congoleses en plena calle de Stanleyville. El Dr. Carlson durante largos y penosos años de sacrificios había llevado un mensaje de esperanza y aliento a innumerables congoleses a la par que ayuda de todo tipo y colaboración personal. Por las simpatías de que gozaba en la masa, por su fama y prestigio, por la influencia adversa que representaba para los comunistas, fue eliminado trágicamente como prueba la foto. Había cometido el pecado de ayudar al necesitado, de socorrer a los enfermos y de consolar a los afligidos y los rojos no perdonan estas cosas.

En su orgía feroz de sangre los comunistas no respetaron a mujeres ni niños. Estos eran "aseinos militares" muy peligrosos según los comunistas. Estas son las pruebas y estos son los hechos que la propaganda del gobierno ha silenciado en su empeño de presentar como "héroes" y "campeones de la libertad" a los asesinos de misioneros, mujeres y niños.

LA VISITA DEL "CHE" A LAS NACIONES UNIDAS



La visita del comunista argentino, Ernesto Che Guevara a las Naciones Unidas, y sus posteriores pronunciamientos en la conferencia televisada, ponen de manifiesto la deplorable situación, tanto política como económica en que se encuentra el régimen comunista de Cuba. Su aspiración a la mejoría de relaciones entre los Estados Unidos y Cuba y la solicitud de que se reanuden las relaciones comerciales, son una prueba de que la llamada "economía socialista" ha fracasado, y de que quizás, y lo que es lo más importante, Fidel Castro teme ser abandonado a su suerte en cualquier momento por sus aliados comunistas.

Todos los observadores y hasta los representantes de numerosas naciones europeas y latinoamericanas estuvieron de acuerdo en que los pronunciamientos hechos por el detestable Che Guevara, constituía una de las acostumbradas diatribas de los personeros comunistas cubanos y carecían de importancia y valor.

Por otra parte, jamás la ciudad de New York había tenido que emplear tanta fuerza policial y había tenido tanta "actividad" como la de los últimos días. El repudio de todos los hombres civilizados al comunismo y especialmente al argentino Guevara se hizo patente en todas las demostraciones realizadas en esta ciudad. EL DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL organizó una imponente manifestación y asimismo sus declaraciones fueron publicadas por numerosos e importantes órganos de prensa de la ciudad de New York y de otras partes de los Estados Unidos.

En una parte de las declaraciones del DRE quedaba claro, que un extranjero, comunista y asesino, no podría representar al pueblo cubano, y que todos los pronunciamientos hechos por el Che Guevara no reflejaban los sentimientos de nuestro pueblo, sino de una minoría comunista que ha impuesto un régimen de terror y esclavitud a todo el pueblo de Cuba.

Mensaje de Navidad

Joven cubano: A ti van dirigidas estas palabras, motivadas por el más grande acontecimiento de la historia de la Humanidad: el nacimiento de Cristo Nuestro Señor.

Tú, quizás desviado por el constante adoctrinamiento comunista y por lo mismo, incapaz de comprender en toda su trascendencia este hecho, seguramente recuerdas, con un poco de escondida añoranza, las épocas pasadas en que reunida toda la familia, celebraba la Nochebuena feliz, alegre y dentro de un espíritu de amor.

Hoy, el odio, base y fundamento de la doctrina marxista, trata de anidar en tu pecho.

Para ti, joven cubana, eres de naturaleza buena y sincera formada en las mejores tradiciones de cubanía que convirtieron a nuestra patria en ejemplo para todo el Continente. Tú, tendrás mañana en Cuba libre la oportunidad de conocer la verdad y darte cuenta de la magnitud del engaño en que hoy estás sumergido.

Joven cubano: En estas Navidades, tus hermanos que luchamos por rescatar la patria de manos del imperialismo soviético, te deseamos que muy pronto puedas volver a celebrar cristianamente esta fiesta. Que en cercanos días puedas oír la verdad y juzgar por ti mismo con plena libertad para decidir entre el amor y el odio, entre Cristo y Lenin.

Joven cubano: Cristo nació y murió por nosotros y ésta es la única verdad. Es este acto de infinito amor el que debe darte la pauta para tu futura conducta. En estos días navideños, medita en tu posición y disponte a encaminarte por los senderos de la verdad que serán los únicos que conducirán a la salvación de Cuba.

DORTICOS EN RIDICULO

Cuando se planeó el viaje de Dorticós a la reunión de países no alineados en el Cairo, Fidel consideró aprovechar esta oportunidad para que visitara Moscú, abrazara a Kruschev y tratara de conseguir apoyo económico que le ayudara a mantener la situación y apoyo político contra la reciente maniobra de la vieja guardia comunista.

Dorticós se marchó al Cairo con todos los consejos castristas en la cartera. Pero en el camino se tropezó con el hecho de que Kruschev había caído y en su lugar aparecían nuevas figuras con las cuales no existían compromisos previos. Su labor diplomática había agravado su importancia y dificultad.

Durante el viaje se dieron gran cantidad de abrazos y de besos al estilo soviético. Se dijeron palabras muy agradables que no significaban apoyo alguno. Pero se negaron radicalmente las cantidades requeridas para mantener la situación. Al contrario se habló de disminuir la cantidad estipulada para pagar el azúcar.

Pero allí no para el fracaso de Dorticós. Los nuevos [illegible] mandatarios soviéticos le hicieron firmar un documento en que apoyaba la coexistencia pacífica, la paz entre los pueblos, el desarme (aun el parcial que antes se había negado Fidel a firmar en el caso del tratado de prohibición de pruebas nucleares en la estratosfera), la unidad del campo socialista sobre las tesis de Moscú (lo que implica cierto apoyo a Rusia contra China), etc. No había promesas de ayudas económicas, ni militares, ni políticas. No había planteamientos de compromisos entre los nuevos amos y el presidente títere. No había nada de lo que convenía a Castro y sí todo lo que convenía a Rusia. Y por último no dejaron que Dorticós saludara al viejo Kruschev al que Fidel había llamado humano, inteligente, brillante, personalidad fascinante, etc. En definitiva un fracaso. En consecuencia un nuevo paso al total descrédito de Fidel y de su régimen.

Quizás la respuesta de Fidel a estos planteamientos fue la destitución de Ordoqui. Pero ninguna maniobra puede paralizar su destino. Los nuevos pasos que dé solo servirán para lanzarlo más al abismo al que su maldad e incapacidad lo han llevado. Y mientras, la libertad de Cuba está tocando a las puertas de la Isla Mártir.

ESPERANDO SU TURNO...

*Aníbal Escalante primero, Marcos Rodríguez después, Joaquín Ordoqui prisionero, Augusto Martínez Sánchez "suicidado". ¿QUIÉN LE SIGUE? QUIZÁS BLAS ROCA

*Y Carlos Rafael Rodríguez de viaje por Rusia...

Fidel dijo que Suslov uno de los mandatarios del Kremlin mejor situado era un "trotskista trasnochado"... Y Suslov hizo caer a Kruschev...

*El Partido Comunista de Italia y el de Francia se separan cada día más de la línea de Moscú... La quiebra de la Internacional aumenta.

*Dorticós en su viaje a Rusia llevaba como petición la de un nuevo empréstito. Y le fue negado rotundamente...

*Se espera el "suicidio" de Lechuga que también fue sustituido de su cargo en la ONU.

*Revellón desesperado porque lo cambien de la FEU... Quizás tiene miedo a la responsabilidad del fracaso.

*Fidel quiere ir a Chile. Quizás Joaquín Mas le haya contado sobre las [illegible] de Viña del Mar.

*Los becados son como el antiguo lechoncito de Navidad (antiguo porque ahora no hay ni lechones). Los ceban para sacrificarlos. Y si no, que le pregunten a los miles de milicianos (becados) que murieron en Girón.

*Fidel culpa a la burocracia del fracaso del régimen. Pero lo que no dice al pueblo es que el "jefe máximo de la burocracia se llama Fidel Castro. En vez de quitar a Ordoqui o de llevar al suicidio a Martínez Sánchez debería hacerse un juicio a sí mismo...

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report - December 1964

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
FYI:

REF: UFGA 19,195, 28 December 1964

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General.

AMSPELL has so far survived the internal crisis brought about by the collapse of its military activity noted in the previous progress report. However, AMSPELL is still faced with a severe financial problem resulting from the termination of the military activity. AMHINT-2 states that AMSPELL has $12,000.00 in short-term loans which must be met shortly, and $20,000.00 in loans being paid off at the rate of $1,300.00 per month. AMHINT-2 is trying to sell the AMSPELL boats in order to liquidate these debts. So far he has had little success. AMHINT-2 has said that he does not intend to give up the idea of active participation in the liberation of Cuba but that AMSPELL will not conduct new military operations in the future without ODYOKE assistance and concurrence. According to AMHINT-2 lack of funds and intelligence information together with pressure by ODYOKE on Dominican authorities frustrated the AMSPELL military operation, and he has no intention of going through a similar disastrous experience again.

2. Propaganda.

a. 19,800 copies of the regular AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Latin America and AMSPELL delegations in the United States. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments: w/o
1 thru 6, As stated, u/sc

Distribution:
3 - DC/WH/SA, w/attachs, u/sc

19-124-26/3

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 Jan 65	JAN 18 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 19,393

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

b. 4,800 copies of the pony AMSPELL newspaper were mailed into Cuba (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) Both the pony and regular editions stress the conflict between the old-guard and the "new-guard" communists, the boycott declared by the Venezuelan trade unions, the confession of failure made by Castro in his speech at the University of Havana, and an analysis of the situation at the Cuban universities before and after Castro.

c. 2,900 copies of the December issue of the Spanish-language edition of the AMSPELL bulletin were mailed to Latin American recipients (Attachment No. 3, under separate cover.) Of particular interest is the article on page 2 which discusses the recent Congo atrocities.

d. 1,925 copies each of the November issue of the French and English editions of the AMSPELL bulletin were mailed to overseas areas. (Attachment No. 4, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda.

AMSPELL continued its regular radio operations consisting of a 10-minute program daily except Sunday on AMTHIGH, and a 10-minute program broadcast every Monday over WMIE and several Latin America stations. Representative themes were: Congo atrocities inspired by Communists, Venezuelan student support of the Cuban cause; Argentine trade union support of world boycott against Red Cuba; economic crisis in Cuba; factional struggle of the Cuban regime; desperate measures undertaken by the regime to prevent a disaster in the sugar industry; statement of a Venezuelan student regarding the training in Cuba of 1,500 Latin American youth in terrorist activities; more on the Congolese situation; transportation in Castro's Cuba; factional struggle in the Cuban regime; Che Guevara's speech in the United Nations creates tense situation between Cuba and the USSR; and Blas Roca working for the downfall of Castro.

4. Press Releases.

Miscellaneous press releases are included as Attachment No. 5 under separate cover.

5. Other Activities.

a. WAVE 5843 dated 8 December 1964 forwarded a candidate for an AMSPELL position in the Dominican Republic.

b. AMSPELL requested that AMBARB-58 be sent to Ecuador to replace AMBARB-28 who was resigning. (WAVE 5842 dated 8 December 1964) The Quito station replied that AMBARB-28 functions had been taken over by ECPLY-2, and that AMBARB-58's services were not required (QUIT 6805 dated 11 December 1964).

c. Attachment No. 6 is a copy of an English-language bulletin produced by AMSPELL without direct KUBARK support which is sent to recipients in the U. S. Pressure will be brought to bear on AMHINT-2 to drop this publication entirely on the grounds that it is not the purpose of AMSPELL to propagandize U. S. citizens.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

1. Salaries	$ 5,650.00
2. Operational Expenses	10,903.03
TOTAL	$ 16,553.03

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 19,393

C. FUTURE PLANS

1. 10,000 pamphlets on AMHINT-1 will be distributed to Latin America and Cuba during January. AMSPELL is planning a hemisphere-wide campaign in an attempt to obtain the release of AMHINT-1 from prison. This campaign will probably not achieve its stated aim but should result in considerable publicity on the nature of the Castro regime.

2. AMSPELL is preparing a draft leaflet illustrating the internal and international failures of the Castro regime during 1964. It is planned to mail this leaflet to Cuba and Latin America.

3. The AMSPELL newspaper both in its pony and regular edition has greatly improved in the past few months. Nevertheless, the large edition will be cut to 10,000 copies a month as this is considered a more realistic figure for distribution.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

19-124-26/3

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

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FROM
SANTIAGO
ACTION
WH/SA 8
INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, WE 6, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 1, DO/H 3, CI/IC 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

AN | ABSTRACT | ~~INDEX~~ | WH/SA/MP

13 JAN 65 IN 59284

S E C R E T 132203Z

WAVE INFO DIR MADR CITE SAGO 8582

REF: WAVE 6969 (IN 56947)
TYPIC PSYCH AMSPELL

SAGO ABLE PRESENT AMHINT-1 LETTER DIRECTLY TO FREI THRU FUBIAS-7, EXILED PBRUMEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT WHO HAS CONTACT CHILEAN PDC. OTHER POSSIBILITY EXIST F-7 CAN GIVE LETTER TO PDC CONTACT TO PASS FREI. HOWEVER SAGO REALIZES F-7 MAY LACK PULL AND WEIGHT ACHIEVE MAXIMUM ACTION FROM FREI. THEREFORE CAN WAVE RECOMMEND ANY HIGH LEVEL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PBRUMEN EXILE, WHO WAVE ASSET, AND WHO COULD TRAVEL CHILE EXPRESSLY FOR PURPOSE PRESENTING LETTER TO FREI. SAGO BELIEVES THIS WOULD OBTAIN BETTER PUBLICITY.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

19-124-26/3
13 Jan 65

FORM 1-64 1389

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

~~19-124-26~~

SECRET

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MICROFILMED JAN 22 1965

FROM JMWAVE

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INFO

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ABSTRACT INDEX ☒ DESTROY

CSM HCS

S E C R E T 100030Z

DIR INFO MADR SAGO CITE WAVE 6969

19-124-26

TYPIC PSYCH AMSPELL

2P

4

10 JAN 65 IN 56947

REF MADR 2750 (NOT SENT SAGO)

INDEXED AND CONTROL

Cit Cuba ΔNew York USA occ news

1. GUILLERMO PARA ONE REF PROBABLY GUILLERMO (MARTINEX) MARQUEZ (Sr) EDITOR NEW YORK EXILE NEWSPAPER AHORA AND MEMBER ADVISORY COUNCIL OF INTERAMERICAN PRESS SOCIETY (SIP), FORMERLY PUBLISHER EL PAIS HAVANA

Cit Cuba

MARINEZ SON, GUILLERMO MARTINEZ MARQUEZ (JUNIOR) CLOSE AMHINT-2 AND AMSPELL. MARTINEZ SENIOR EXPECTED WAVE AREA 12 JAN WITH LETTER RECEIVED FROM CUBA, PRESUMABLY REF DOCUMENT, TO DISCUSS WITH AMHINT-2 POSSIBILITE STARTING HEMISPHERE WIDE CAMPAIGN DESIGNED BRING PRESSURE CASTRO REGIME RELEASE AMHINT-1 AND OTHER PRISONERS.

Removed from Project
CS Classification
JOB # 69-77
Box # 11 Fold #

2. AMHINT-2 HAS LETTER DATED SEPT 64, RECENTLY SMUGGLED FROM ISLE OF PINES PRISON, ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI OF CHILE AND SIGNED

19-124-26/3
~~19-124-26~~
10 Jan 1965

BY AMHINT-1, AMHINT-3, AMHINT-4. AMHINT-4 REFERS TO PERSONAL INTERVIEW HE HAD WITH FREI 59, CONGRATULATES FREI FOR ELECTION VICTORY AND PREDICTS JUSTICE AND LIBERTY UNDER CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC GOVT, ASK CHILEAN GOVT AID LEGITIMATE FIGHT CUBAN PEOPLE AGAINST COMMUNIST OPPRESSION, EXPRESS WISH AMHINT'S PERSONAL FATE WILL SERVE AS EXAMPLE TO

JAN 21 8 52 AM '65

ALL LATIN AMERICA YOUTH IN FIGHT AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM AND FOR JUSTICE AND LIBERTY. AMHINT-2 NOW SEARCHING BEST CHANNEL PRESENT LETTER TO FREI OR CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT, AT SAME TIME ASKING FREI INTERCEDE WITH CASTRO GOVT ON BEHALF PRISONERS.

3. SUPPORT ABOVE CAMPAIGN AMSPELL PRINTING 10,000 COPIES PAMPHLETS ON AMHINT-1, CONSISTING CHIEFLY HIS LETTERS TO FAMILY AND FRIENDS WHICH REFLECT AMHINT-1'S IDEALISM AND COURAGE. PAMPHLET EXPECTED FROM PRINTERS .5 JAN.

4. FOR SAGO: REF REFERES TO PAGE 14 PAGE DOCUMENT DETAILING PRISON CONDITIONS AND DENOUNCING COMMUNIST REGIME SIGNED BY AMHINT-1 AND OTHERS SMUGGLED OUT ISLE PINES PRISON. RE PARA TWO ABOVE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOP GETTING LETTER PRESENTED FREI IN MANNER THAT WILL GET FREI'S FAVORABLE ATTENTION AND ACHIEVE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY. CAN SAGO RECOMMEND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT CLOSE FREI TO WHOM LETTER COULD BE PRESENTED.

19. 111.31

5. INDEX MARTINEZ SENIOR AND JUNIOR.

SECRET

* MADR POUCHING PHOTOCOPY OF 14 PAGE DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY FOUR ISLE OF PINES PRISONER LEADERS FOR PROP EXPLOITATION.

CFN

19-126-24/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

GROUP 1

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED PROD 10

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MADRID

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S E C R E T 081736Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MADR 2752

10 Jan 65 IN 58489

KEYWAY PBRUMEN

1. STATION POUCHING ADDEES 11 JANUARY PHOTOCOPY OF 14 PAGE DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY FOUR ISLE OF PINES PRISONER LEADERS, AMONG WHOM AMYUM 1 AND AMHINT 1. COVER LETTER SIGNED BY AMYUM 1 ADDRESSED ONLY TO "GUILLERMO" WHO UNIDENTIFIED, REQUESTING HE PRESENT IT TO INTERAMERICAN PRESS SOCIETY, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, OAS AND UN.

2. BELIEVE DOCUMENT CONTAINS EXTREMELY WELL WRITTEN, HIGHLY INFORMATIVE AND OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRISON CONDITIONS, REHABILITATION PLAN, MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PROBLEMS, ETC. ALSO STRESSES ITS INTENT "NOT A CALL FOR HELP, BUT A CRY OF DEFIANCE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENEMY". FEEL IT HAS CONSIDERABLE PROP POTENTIAL WORTHY OF HQS EXPLOITATION.

3. DOCUMENT PROVIDED BY QUGROWL 5 BORROWED FROM QUANTUM 51, WHO HANDCARRIED TO MADRID FROM CUBA.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

~~MOB~~	~~INT~~	SS	SB
	~~IOS~~	PERS	AR
COP	~~RPTS~~	LOS	CA
~~CI~~	SI	BF	HH
✓		SEC	NS

WE 5/Spain
Mr Wright
will call when
copies arrive

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOMP-LISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operations
- AMSPELL Progress Report, May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: UFGA 21738, 2 June 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General

During the month of May, AMSPELL carried on its normal propaganda activities. Major emphasis in AMSPELL propaganda was given to the Dominican crisis.

2. Propaganda Production

a. 4,800 copies of the small AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Cuba. The main themes of the issue were the Ninth World Festival of Youth in Algeria, the Dominican crisis, and the conversion of Cuban universities into centers of communist indoctrination by the Castro regime. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

b. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its usual recipients during May. (Spanish edition -- 2,900 copies; French edition 1,925 copies; English edition 1,925 copies). (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.)

c. Miscellaneous press clippings and press releases on the AMSPELL prisoners campaign are enclosed as Attachment No. 3, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda

AMSPELL continued its Monday programs on AMTHIGH and a local station. Major propaganda themes during the month were: The Dominican crisis with emphasis on Communist involvement; Cuban students in forced labor in the cane fields, differences among Communist student groups, the situation among foreign students in the Soviet Union.

/ Continued /

19-124-26/3

Attachments:
1.AMSPELL Newspaper, u/sc
2.Bulletin, u/sc
3.Press Material, u/sc

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/C,w/attachs, u/sc

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
21 June 65	JUN 2 3 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 22,100

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att-1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA 22,100

4. Other Activities

a. An AMSPELL member attended May 20 celebrations in Paraguay sponsored by a local anti-Communist organization. The AMSPELL representative also visited other countries in Latin America on his return from Paraguay to promote the AMSPELL prisoners campaign and to try to influence local student organizations on the Dominican crisis.

b. Two AMSPELL members attended a UOHART seminar beginning May 31.

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Salaries	$ 3,000.00
Operational Expenses	4,500.00
TOTAL	$ 7,500.00

C. FUTURE PLANS

A circular letter to organizations participating in the Communist World Youth Festival in Algiers is being prepared.The letter will cover the situation of political prisoners in Cuba, the lack of basic freedoms in Cuba with emphasis on the recent purge of "homosexuals and degenerates" in the universities and the armed forces.

for

PHILIP G. ELMARD

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 349

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSPELL/Operational
AMSPELL Progress Report, April 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI:

REF: UFGA 21,514, 20 May 1965

A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. General.

During the month of April AMSPELL carried on its normal propaganda activities. AMSPELL was also busy adjusting to the new reduced budget which went into effect on 1 April. AMSPELL moved to less expensive office space in April and dropped 10 people from the AMSPELL payroll. AMTHIGH broadcasts were reduced to one broadcast a week, and the large AMSPELL newspaper was eliminated. The prisoners campaign began to gain momentum in April but the crisis in the Dominican Republic made it very difficult to obtain publicity or maintain sustained interest in the campaign.

2. Propaganda Production.

a. 4,800 copies of the small AMSPELL newspaper were mailed to Cuba. This issue was dedicated mainly to the situation of prisoners in Cuba. (Attachment No. 1, under separate cover.)

b. The AMSPELL international bulletin was mailed to its normal recipients during April. The Spanish edition was produced in 2,900 copies (Attachment No. 2, under separate cover.) The English and French editions were produced in 1,925 copies each (Attachment Nos. 3 and 4, under separate cover.)

/ CONTINUED /

Attachments:
1 thru 10, u/sc

Distribution:
3 - WH/C, w/attachs, u/sc

CS COPY

19-124-26/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
26 May 65	JUN 2 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 21,738

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-26/3

att-1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 21,738

c. A document on political prisoners in Cuba was mailed to Latin American and other international addresses. The Spanish version was mailed in 10,000 copies and the English version in 5,000 copies (Attachment Nos. 5 and 6). An open letter to the President of Chile on the subject of political prisoners was disseminated in 5,000 copies (Attachment No. 7, under separate cover.) Press releases and news clips on the prisoners campaign are enclosed. (Attachment No. 8, under separate cover.)

d. Miscellaneous Press Releases and Clippings are enclosed. (Attachment No. 9, under separate cover.)

3. Radio Propaganda.

Beginning 12 April AMSPELL radio operations were reduced to a 15-minute program Monday on AMTHIGH and a local station. This program is also played on several Latin American stations.

4. Relations with Other Organizations.

AMSPELL received a number of letters from groups and individuals interested in information on Cuba. Some of the groups who wrote to AMSPELL were: Portuguese University Center, World Assembly of Youth, International Union of Young Christian Democrats, Bolivian Students Confederation, Union Civica Radical Youth of Argentina, Christian Social Democratic Party Youth of Colombia, International Institute of Social Studies (CLASC), Mexican Newsmen Association, National Union of Malaysian Students, and individual Mexican and Dominican Students. (Copies of these letters are forwarded in Attachment No. 10, under separate cover.)

B. FUNDS EXPENDED

Salaries	$ 3,250.00
Separation payments	2,700.00
Operational expenses	3,850.00
Extra WRUL payment	1,215.00
Extra mailing expense	903.08
TOTAL	$11,918.08

C. FUTURE PLANS

An AMSPELL member was invited by the Paraguayan group to visit them for May 20 celebrations.

AMSPELL was also invited by the International Student Association of Japan to participate at an International Students Conference to be held in Japan from July 12 to August 9, however, the station does not intend to encourage AMSPELL participation.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

CS COPY

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-26/3
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

34 SECRET

GROUP 1

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WHC 8

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INFO VR. FILE WH 7, CI/OA, CI/OPS, PC 2

R I COPY

S E C R E T 262157Z

DIR WAVE CITE SAGO 9475

TYPIC AMSPELL FUBIAS

26 May 65 IN 76722

REF A DIR 13438

B SAGO 9424 (IN 71039) *

FUBIAS-5 NOTIFIED HE BEING TERMINATED AS OF 30 JUNE. F-5 ACCEPTED NEWS CALMLY, SAID HE PLANNED REMAIN SAGO TO FINISH YEAR AND HALF REMAINING UNIVERSITY WORK TO RECEIVE DEGREE. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE ABILITY GET OUTSIDE JOB TO SUPPORT SELF THIS PERIOD. THUS REF ACTION TO PLACE HIM NOT NECESSARY. TERMINATION REPORT BEING PREPARED. POUCHING.

S E C R E T * RE FUBIAS PROJECT RENEWALS

CFN

SECRET

R I COPY

AN ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~ WH/C/ES

ABSTRACT

19-124-26/3

26 May 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY RI COPY (35)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

FROM:
Chief, Los Angeles Office
(AMWatson/bas)

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 29 September 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DCS Message Center				
1. International Div.				Attached obtained from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures? Encls: Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda History of Alpha 66 Picture of Vicente Mendez Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US. For retention.
2. R. Hiller	2 Oct	2 Oct		
3.				
4. OSS	1 Oct 70			
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				File: O'Donnell, Johnny
15.				

21477

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE [illegible] LETTER NO.
TO: Los Angeles Field Office ATTN: ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] Mrs.	FROM: George [illegible]/JS - [illegible]	

Subject: Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

Reference: [illegible] Routing and Record Sheet, with attachments, dated 29 Sep 7[illegible]

WH/Cuba Operations appreciates the information and attachments submitted under reference. They would be happy to receive any additional information which you may be able to collect in your routine contact with source. WH Cuba is interested in any activity [illegible] in by Cuban exile organizations particularly Alpha 66. Your source would have excellent potential for collection since Alpha 66 would be passing material to [illegible] who no doubt is happy to pass it to you for appropriate handling.

We thank you for keeping us in mind.

FILE: EX-21477

George [illegible]
SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

SIGNATURE

[illegible] 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE

FORM 5-61 1831

SECRET

21477

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

FROM:
DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2268 GSM

EXTENSION:

NO. DCS HH-21477

DATE 2 October 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. THRU: DO/DCSL	10/2	10/2	CC
2.			
3. WH/C/OP 3 D 30, Hqs.			
4.			
5. RR		8 Oct	J
6.			
7. SR- I plan to toss those portions of this in which I am not interested - any objections?			
8.			
9. ~~tJ~~		8 Oct	y
10. DO/DCSL	10/9	10/9	CC
11. DCS - 900 Key			GSM
12. George Musulin		10/13/70	
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

3. Attached obtained from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures?

Enclosures:

destroy Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda
History of Alpha 66 - filed in my Alpha 66 file
[illegible] - Picture of Vicente Mendez
Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US. filed in my Alpha 66 file

Please advise.

- Some of these we have retained for our files -- no matter [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

21477 FILE

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CUBANOS A LA GUERRA

EMPLEARE TODAS MIS ENERGIAS A FIN DE DESEMBARCAR EN TIEMPO PRUDENCIAL EN LA ISLA AMADA"

Capitan Vicente Mendez.-



VICENTE MENDEZ Y SUS HOMBRE
ESTAN PELEANDO EN CUBA

,a Promesa se ha Cumplido!

ALPHA 66 Convoca

al Magno acto de INFORMACION DE GUERRA a cargo de

ANDRES NAZARIO SARGEN

Secretario General de ALPHA 66

AGOSTO 30 • 1 p.m.

Embassy Auditorium

GRAND Ave. Y 9th STREET

GIL LOPEZ
PRESIDENT

Rome Interiors

ALFOMBRAS Y CORTINAS
COMPRE DIRECTAMENTE A LA FABRICA Y
!!! AHORRE DINERO!!!

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Las informaciones que llegan de nuestra Patría aseguran un estado latente de rebeldía, actividades de sabotajes violentos y pasivos, inconformidad en los miembros de las fuerzas armadas, grandes preocupac os en las esferas del gobierno y un malestar general en el pueblo cubano.

No hay dudas que el Plan de Alpha 66 contribuyo en alguna proporción a estos fenómenos. Primero anunciamos el desembarco de Vicente Méndez antes del 31 de diciembre con otros hombres, apesar de las dificultades conocidas, se cumplió en gran medida la promesa. Murió en el hecho el Capitan Julio Cesar Ramirez. Sin esperar mucho tiempo, se produjo la gran conmoción Mundial el 17 de Abril con la presencia y los combatientes del Coronel Vicente Méndez y el mayor contingente que llego a tierras cubanas, despues de 1961.

En mayo, hombres del Alpha 66 hundieron 2 embarciones cubanas e hicieron 11 prisioneros comunistas, repitiendo otra conmoción Mundial que motivó el escandalo mayor escenificado por el traidor Fidel Castro y su mayor derrota moral de los últimos tiempos. El gran triunfo lo consigna el pueblo de Cuba en distintos informes que poseemos de nuestras células clandestinas.

Otros movimientos positivos de distintas índoles se produjeron, unos con éxito y otros frustados por las autoridades norteamericanas; pero en fin todos destinados a golpear duramente al tirano y alentar y respaldar a los hombres de las montañas y los grupos clandestinos que se juegan todos los días sus vidas en aras de la libertad.

Con estos antecedentes de gran valor y valides, amén de mas de 20 acciones comandos y de infiltraciones realizadas por nuestros mas destacados hombres y por una pleyade de patriotas que combatieron y combaten en todos los frentes de accion cubana, nos sentimos moralmente respaldados para promover un llamamiento en general a los cubanos de la Isla y a los cubanos del destierro, a la guerra libertadora. No pretendemos convertirnos en sectaristas, sino que cada cual que empuñe el arma que tenga, la actividad que sea compatible a sus posibilidades, la colaboración economica y el apoyo moral, a los que combaten y sobre todo, a los que en la Isla dan la pauta y llevan el mayor peso en la contienda. Sin demora tenemos que acometer acciones vitales para que éste gran momento historico cuaje en la liberación definitiva de Cuba.

Ademas de coordinar las cuestiones internas con otros grupos clandestinos, Alpha 66 esta distrubuyendo cientos de millares de pequeños panfleticos convidando a las milicias,al Ejercito Rebelde y al pueblo a participar de la contienda en contra del Castro-Comunismo. Todos los cubanos que deseen cooperar a este llamamiento pueden pasar por nuestras oficinas para entregarles el material que deben enviar a Cuba. Cada cubano puede servir de puente entre los de dentro y de fuera.

Por último, demandamos de todos los cubanos y de las organizaciones que pasemos de las palabras a los hechos. Que las disputas, las divisiones y las querellas infecundas se eliminen y se convierta cada uno en un esforzado militante de la causa cubana. Lo requieren los hombres y mujeres que en las carceles sostienen la gallarda rebeldía nacional, los combatientes de todos los frentes y el pueblo esclavizado. Pongamos la tragedia de nuestro pueblo por encima de mezquinos intereses y demos cada cubano un impulso y el apoyo moral y guerrero a la epopeya libertadora. De este modo podemos regresar a nuestra Patria con la frente limpia y el corazón henchido de orgullo porque supimos conquistar el derecho a ser libres.

Fd EJECUTIVO NACIONAL "ALPHA 66"

21477

VICENTE MENDEZ

VIVO EN CUBA

ALPHA 66 INFORMA:

Reportes que nos llegan desde nuestras células militantes dentro de Cuba, determinan, que las acciones iniciadas por nuestra Organización, que en una de sus etapas culminó con el desembarco del Coronel Vicente Méndez el 17 de Abril en Oriente, estan teniendo repercusión en otras provincias de la isla.

No es sólo en Oriente donde las fuerzas internas han respondido al estímulo exterior representado por las acciones de Alpha 66; en Camagüey, por ejemplo, se han producido reiterados brotes de rebeldía traducidos en sabotajes, resistencia y en algunos casos enfrentamiento directo con el régimen.

La situación en Oriente, desde luego, es la que revela con mayor claridad la decisión del pueblo cubano de sacudirse el yugo que lo oprime. A tal extremo que los propios medios de publicidad del Gobierno comunista de Cuba han tenido que informar sobre "grandes concentraciones de las Fuerzas Armadas", en ésos sectores se debe a "movilizaciones para incrementar la producción", cuando lo cierto es que la fracasada zafra de los 10 millones, ya prácticamente ha terminado.

Las movilizaciones no han tenido otro objeto, según los reportes que hemos recibido, que frenar la ola de deserciones que se han venido produciendo en las filas de las Fuerzas Armadas y cubrir territorios en los que actúan eficazmente los patriotas cubanos.

Que el régimen de Castro está consciente de la gravedad del momento lo demuestra entre otras cosas, la intensa purga que se está llevando a cabo en las más altas esferas del Gobierno, y que comenzaron con la cesantía fulminante de José Llanusa, como Ministro de Educación y Francisco Padron, como Ministro de la Industria Azucarera. Los desplazamientos de distintos elementos de los importantes cargos que venían ocupando continúan especialmente en los "Estados Mayores" de las Fuerzas Armadas. A tal extremo, de que se da por segura la destitución del Comandante Guillermo García Frías, Jefe del Partido Comunistra en la provincia de Oriente, quien ha caído en "Desgracia" debido a su importancia para contener a los invasores de Alpha 66 y a los elementos que en ésa provincia se han sumado a las acciones.

Este estado de cosas ha llegado a tal situación explosiva, que se esperan en el curso de lo que resta de éste mes importantes acontecimientos que daran un giro favorable a la rebeldía cubana frente al régimen despótico que ocupa el poder.

Ese es en síntesis, el resúmen de los informes que hemos recibido donde figuran datos aún más concretos que de revelarse pormenorizadamente, pudieran acarrear graves peligros a elementos que actuan activamente en ésas dos provincias mencionadas.

Fdo. EJECUTIVO NACIONAL "ALPHA 66"

21477

[illegible]

BOLETIN MENSUAL

ORGANO OFICIAL DEL "CIRCULO CUBANO DE LOS ANGELES" CALIFORNIA, E. U. A.

"A NEW HOPE"

UNA NUEVA ESPERANZA

Por Esteban Fernández Gómez

[illegible] Vicente Méndez [illegible]ndez has publicly committed himself, and given his word that he will be fighting in Cuba in the next months to come. In a very emotive letter addressed to the National Council of Cubans Independence Veterans (in exile) he formally pledge himself to the nation and the people in exile by his honor to face all the responsibility of the war in Cuban soil. He goes on telling them in his letter full of courage, that he will face all the action in the just and necessary anti-Castro war in the [illegible] months. [illegible] counting on [illegible] [illegible] them, they [illegible] and valor [illegible] will never [illegible] question.

Vicente Mendez is only known in his fight against Castro but he has never been interested in seeing his name in the [illegible], or assuming the leadership of any group.

He has always chosen to be unknown, but being that so soon he will go back to Cuba, it is necessary that all Cubans who want to help for the freedom of Cuba know who this man is, and his merits and at least pray for his life.

Captain Vicente Mendez was the first [illegible] of the glorious [illegible] Escambray [illegible] to fight against the tyranny of Fidel Castro. On July 5, 1960 he saw the first signs of Communism in the Revolution that he helped so much.

The Rebel Headquarters of Cumanayagua in Las Villas Province was taken by Vicente Mendez and his followers, taking all the [illegible] into the Escambray Mountains where they fought for eleven long months.

During this time he [illegible] the rank of [illegible] for his [illegible] [illegible], killed in [illegible] was his chief commander at the time. [illegible] the very sad "closing [illegible]". He [illegible] of "[illegible]" and his [illegible] place [illegible] Las Villas [illegible] for [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] living [illegible] Vicente [illegible] back.

[illegible] Cuban [illegible] for the [illegible].

It is not [illegible], but [illegible] to [illegible] an [illegible] war.

All the Cubans have [illegible] Vicente Mendez, [illegible] will help him, [illegible].

21477

Latin America Report

Offices : 721 National Press Building, F at 14th St. N.W. Washington D.C. 20004 Phone: 783-7507
Editorial: 301 Langford Building, 121 S.E. First Street Miami, Fla. 33131 Phone: 373-0631.

Editor: Paul D. Bethel

Vol. 8 - No. 7 - July, 19

Latins Want U.S. Help in Ousting Castro

At least six Latin countries seem eager to dump the Red tyrant, but are hampered by State's 'non-policy' toward Cu

By PAUL BETHEL

Coast Guard Exhibits Arms Taken From Alpha-66. Exiles Say They Were Intercepted In International Waters.

On April 17 (the anniversary of the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco) the Cuban exile military organization Alpha-66 landed 13 commandos on the east coast of Cuba. They allegedly were captured, but if so only after Fidel Castro threw an estimated 25,000 troops into the fray. Castro lost several men as well.

Then on May 6, Alpha-66 "naval units" sank, in Cuban waters, two of Castro's high-seas fishing trawlers (used, as well, for spying and infiltrating guerrillas into Latin America).

These two actions set off a chain of events in Washington that would have done credit to the LBJ and JFK Administrations. With Castro massing his mobs for a circus of protest, the State Department hit the panic button and on May 13 called together representatives of federal law enforcement agencies to figure out ways to protect Castro from further forays of this nature.

What really teed-off the State Department was a momentary aberration by Alpha-66 to trade 11 crew members of the fishing vessels for the freedom of survivors of the April 17 landing. They soon thought better of it and sent a telegram to the Red Cross giving the location of the men and asking that they be returned to Cuba.

'CIA Invasion'

Meanwhile, Castro staged a demonstration in front of the former U.S. Embassy in Havana, which is now being used by the Swiss government. He charged the Swiss, who represent U.S. interests in Cuba, with complicity in what he called a "CIA invasion" by mercenaries.

Two Swiss employes were prevented from leaving the embassy for two days. The strategy was to mount Swiss pressure on Washington to crack down on the Cuban exiles. It worked, obviously, and the State Department again danced to a Castro tune.

The demonstration was also used to "welcome" the returning fishermen, who were soon to land at the airport in Havana. But the fishermen were late in arriving.

They were late due to an unforeseen need to change clothing. When Alpha-66 rescued the crews from the sinking vessels (turned around, Castro would have had them shot as he has ordered the shooting of thousands seeking to leave his island in small boats), they found them literally in rags.

Shoes were patched with palm bark; shirts and trousers were in tatters. So, before setting them free, Alpha-66 provided the men with shoes and new clothing. When the men arrived at the air in Havana, they were divested of t new goodies and forced to don old w clothing. Some, we are told, protes vehemently.

The bearded dictator took the casion of the "welcome" extended fishermen to announce that the 10-r lion-ton sugar harvest was a fail Despite closing down factories, sch and offices and marching the peo out to the fields, the harvest on wh Castro had placed "the honor of Revolution" failed to materialize 1952, 350,000 *guajiros* cut and grou 7.3 million tons in 100 days; Castro h had twice that many working and p duced about 8.5 million tons in days).

Back in Miami, federal agents acti on State Department interpretation antiquated neutrality laws entered Alp 66 headquarters. The search warra alleged that there was evidence th 1) Alpha-66 had launched its attac from U.S. territory; 2) Cubans we

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Back in Miami, federal agents acting on State Department interpretation of antiquated neutrality laws entered Alpha-66 headquarters. The search warrant alleged that there was evidence that 1) Alpha-66 had launched its attacks from U.S. territory; 2) Cubans were raising funds illegally for bellicose purposes; and 3) all of this was being done to attack a nation with which the U.S is "at peace, to wit: Cuba."

Of the 37 items impounded, those of military significance were "one large carton filled with military-type web equipment...one military-type field pack...and one large cardboard carton filled with plastic military-type canteens." With such evidence, Army-Navy surplus stores could be indicted.

Greater attention was given to files containing the names of contributors. These held special interest because the wording in the warrant found "financial contributions and disbursements to obtain boats and other supplies" possibly prosecutable.

Can the State Department be serious? If this section of the law were applied impartially, how many Jews would today be under indictment for openly soliciting funds for the purchase of bellicose materials for a foreign nation—Israel?

How many senators and congressmen would today have egg on their faces for participating in fund-raising functions, publicly organized and propagandized, for that very purpose? That is how he Cuban community sees the matter.

This author has no particular objecion to fund-raising by Jewish groups in he United States. Cuban exiles certainly io not. Indeed, Cuban Jews in exile have ontributed substantially to Israel's war hest. They are furious when they, as ubans, try to do the same for the liberaion of their country, only to find a double tandard raised against them. Nor are hey happy to see their contributions go own the drain when overzealous federal fficials seize equipment belonging to xile groups.

But what blew it for Miami's 350,00 Cubans was an "edict" read to them y the hapless State Department repreentative in Miami.

According to the heads of exile action roups called to his office, the reprentative stressed that "the spirit as ell as the law" will be upheld. He is id to have told them that fund-raising r a bellicose purpose is definitely outde the law and warned them not only ould they be prosecuted should they unch an attack from the U.S., but ould also be stopped from using anher Latin American country for that rpose.

The exact wording in the instruction from the State Department reads: "We would like to make it clear that if there is sufficient evidence of activity based in the U.S. for any such military expedition, then the fact that a third country is used as a staging area would not preclude the U.S. from proceeding to enforce its laws."

When the story of State Department policy hit the streets, the Cubans exploded. Cuban students from the University of Miami and Dade Junior College (Dade's 20,000 students comprise 8,000 Cuban students) marched on the Federal Building; 600 Cuban lawyers challenged the validity of the State Department position; doctors, dentists, educators, professional groups—57 of them—published a lengthy statement in the *Diario las Americas* newspaper. Part of that statement reads:

"Title 18, Section 960 of the U.S. Code [invoked against Alpha-66] prohibits certain actions from being taken against a nation with which the United States is at peace—'a friendly nation.' Clearly, Fidel Castro is not at peace with the United States or nations of the Western Hemisphere and, by breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba on Jan. 3, 1961, the United States recognized that Cuba is hardly a 'friendly nation.'"

REMINDER : We still have nearly 700 school libraries to go in filling our commitment to them for the fall. If you have not contributed in 1970, please do so now. Each of you have received a prepaid envelope. Place your contribution in it and mail today ! Time is getting short.

"We conclude," the signatories said, "that this part of the neutrality laws cannot be applied against Cubans who are fighting for freedom."

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) and Rep. William C. Cramer (R.-Fla.) strongly support the Cuban exiles in their interpretation of the law.

The most recent law outlining U.S. policy toward Cuba was promulgated and signed by President Kennedy on Oct. 3, 1962. It states that the United States is "to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination." Furthermore, the United States is signatory to four inter-American pacts and treaties which clearly are designed to combat Fidel Castro's Communist regime.

In any event, this most recent action by the Department of State finds relations between Cuban exiles and Washington at their lowest ebb since the Bay of Pigs failure nine years ago. Cubans are now thoroughly convinced that the State Department is out to "get" them and willing to employ any subterfuge to do so.

One of these subterfuges, say the exiles, is a recent indictment against Andrés Nazario Sargén, head of Alpha-66. Sargén is charged with having "conspired" to purchase arms allegedly stolen from a U.S. arsenal in Connecticut. His bail was set at $100,000, then inexplicably reduced to a mere $2,500 and Sargén asked to plead guilty to be let off on a light sentence.

These shenanigans, say the Cubans, mean that lacking proof that Alpha-66 launched its attacks from U.S. soil, the government will use other means to intimidate exile action groups. Legal action taken against Sargén, they argue, is simply the eager-beaverism on the part of what they believe to be pro-Castro functionaries in the Department of State.

On the other hand, the Department of State has its case. Many officials are only slightly less enthusiastic than Cuban exiles to see the end of Castro's Communist regime. But they argue that the half measures taken by Cuban exile groups are not effective and merely serve to embarrass the United States. Others claim that the Alpha-66 attacks were merely ill-timed, providing Castro with an "excuse" to lay the failure of his sugar crop at the feet of "CIA operatives" based in the United States.

As to this latter claim, those who know Fidel Castro also know that he needs no excuse to gather the mobs and denounce the United States. The history of his 10 years in power bears full witness to the truth of this view.

No Viable Policy

What really comes through in all of this is that Washington has yet to come up with a viable policy toward Fidel Castro to put a stop to his subverting Latin America and even the United States. The only absolute factor in the conduct of foreign affairs is the premium placed on initiative. We don't have it; Castro does.

The State Department cannot merely "wish" Castro out of power, and its policy of "economic denial and diplo-

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gate demonstration of America's willingness to resolve international disputes peacefully if the following specific steps could be taken this year:

First, a review by the Secretary of State of all disputes to which the U.S. is a party to ascertain which ones, or portions of them, might lend themselves to arbitration or adjudication. When this review has been completed, we would urge that the United States move to take the disputes that are determined to be justiciable to the International Court of Justice or other appropriate international tribunals.

Second, the employment of the provision of Article 96 of the United Nations Charter to seek advisory opinions of the World Court by the United Nations and the U.N. Specialized Agencies on issues where such an opinion would help to clarify the legal aspects of a dispute.

Third, the instructing of U.S. negotiators to seek inclusion of a provision in future treaties and agreements which provides for the World Court's adjudication of disputes arising under those treaties and agreements.

We believe that these steps, modest though they seem, would be favorably received by the international community and lead to an enhanced regard for the rule of law throughout the world.

As Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, we have devoted considerable time and attention to this question and have sought the advice of skilled international lawyers outside the Congress.

We welcome your comments and reactions to these suggestions and would be pleased to discuss them in greater detail with you or with members of your Administration.

LIST OF SIGNERS

Senators Edward W. Brooke, Alan Cranston, Charles E. Goodell, Philip A. Hart, Mark O. Hatfield, Harold E. Hughes, Gale W. McGee, George S. McGovern, Lee Metcalf, Walter F. Mondale, Frank E. Moss, Robert W. Packwood, Claiborne Pell, Richard S. Schweiker, Joseph D. Tydings, Harrison A. Williams, Jr., and Stephen A. Young.

Congressmen Thomas L. Ashley, Jonathan B. Bingham, Edward P. Boland, Richard Bolling, John Brademas, George E. Brown, Jr., Daniel E. Button, Silvio O. Conte, John Conyers, Jr., James C. Corman, John R. Dellenback, Bob Eckhardt, Don Edwards, Joshua Eilberg, Paul Findley, Donald M. Fraser, Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, Cornelius E. Gallagher, Jacob H. Gilbert, William J. Green, Gilbert Gude, Seymour Halpern, Michael Harrington, William D. Hathaway, Augustus F. Hawkins, Henry Helstoski, Robert W. Kastenmeier, Hastings Keith, Edward I. Koch, Robert L. Leggett, Richard D. McCarthy, Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., Abner J. Mikva, Patsy T. Mink, William S. Moorhead, F. Bradford Morse, Charles A. Mosher, John E. Moss, Richard L. Ottinger, Claude Pepper, Bertram L. Podell, Thomas M. Rees, Ogden R. Reid, Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Edward R. Roybal, William F. Ryan, James H. Scheuer, William L. St. Onge, Louis Stokes, Frank Thompson, Jr., John V. Tunney, and Morris K. Udall.

CUBAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

HON. WILLIAM C. CRAMER

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 20, 1970

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, May 20 is a very special day for Cubans and Americans. On that date in 1902, the Cuban flag was first raised at the city hall in Havana and at El Morro Castle. On that date Cuba became a free country.

Most Americans know about the sinking of the battleship which made the cry "Remember the Maine" a part of our history. Most Americans know that this country interceded on behalf of the Cuban people battling for independence from foreign domination.

Unfortunately, however, most Americans are not totally aware of the valiant fight put up by the Cuban people, alone and unassisted, for nearly a century.

The Cubans fought a 10-year war from 1868 to 1878 against a powerful Spanish Army. They have consistently sought freedom from oppression and their battle for independence from 1895 to 1898 found the United States fighting alongside of them.

But we cannot forget that the Cubans so loved liberty that the number of casualties in their two wars of independence mounted to a quarter of a million people. The total population of the island at that time was less that 2 million.

What this means is that one out of every four Cubans became casualties in their quest for liberty.

It is shameful to say that the United States seems to have turned its back on Cuba when it is suffering from the imposition of another foreign tyranny, international communism headed by the Soviet Union. Yet, State Department spokesman Robert McClosky, a holdover bureaucrat, threatens freedom fighters who wish to return and help their brothers throw off the yoke of this tyranny.

My colleague, Senator Strom Thurmond, has already brought this to the attention of the Senate. It is my wish to bring it to the attention of my colleagues in the House of Representatives and the American public.

The amount of sabotage being committed by Cubans inside Cuba is in line with the tradition of its people. Just a few days ago, on May 15, the Castro regime announced the execution by firing squad of a campesino who burned down a sugar warehouse at Isabela de Sagua.

This patriot lived in Cuba and gave his life in exchange for the destruction of 2,000 tons of sugar.

From all over Cuba come official admissions that the Cuban people are in massive resistance to the Communist regime of Fidel Castro.

It is fair to say that today resistance to Castro and communism is many times greater than the resistance which brought him to power in 1959. Yet, Cuban freedom fighters in exile are persecuted when their only purpose is to help their fellow man regain the liberty for which 250,000 Cubans fought and were wounded or gave their lives.

I should like to ask this question: Is it not in our own national interest that Cuba be freed from domination by a country a thousand times more powerful than the Spaniards of the 19th century? Does not the presence of a fleet of Soviet Navy ships anchored in Cienfuegos Harbor pose a threat to our own national security?

Among these ships are a missile firing cruiser and an atomic submarine. What is the practical difference between land base missiles which brought on the crisis of 1962 and Soviet ships with missiles now anchored in Cuba? ?

It is no secret that our intelligence community fears that the Soviet Union is now prepared to establish a Caribbean fleet based in Cuba, and surely this fact must relate to our own security. I say that official efforts to protect Fidel Castro by harrassing freedom fighters are dangerous and nonsensical.

True, the State Department apprehends Cuban exiles on the grounds that forays from the United States are in violation of our neutrality laws. But I would like to cite an interpretation of these neutrality laws as rendered by the late Robert Kennedy when he was Attorney General of the United States.

His ruling was that the neutrality laws were, and I quote:

> Among the oldest laws in our statutes books. They were not designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today.

The late Attorney General continued and I quote from his April 20, 1961 ruling:

> The neutrality laws were never designed to prevent individuals from leaving the United States to fight for a cause in which they believe. There is nothing in the neutrality laws which prevents refugees from Cuba from returning to that country to engage in the fight for freedom, nor is an individual prohibited from the United States, with others of like belief, to join others in a second country for an expedition against a third country.

I believe that ruling not only is just but also was made in the cause of our own security. Unfortunately, it has been all but forgotten by our State Department which continues to harass Cuban exiles and even instructs the U.S. Coast Guard to apprehend freedom fighters on the high seas—a form of official piracy, I might add.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Cuba is little more than a Soviet base dedicated to the destruction of our society, and that of free men everywhere. I should like to emphasize that our freedom is inextricably interwoven with the freedom of the Cuban people. The ominous presence of the powerful Soviet fleet based just off our shores underscores this fact.

KSU STORY ONE-SIDED IN TV REPORTING

HON. DONALD E. LUKENS

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, May 20, 1970

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Speaker, the event at Kent State are tragic enough withou having emotions aroused and magnifie by biased news coverage. Today I receive an article which appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 7, by Mr. William Hickey, which illustrates the irresponsible reporting of the deaths a Kent State.

Mr. Hickey, who is a TV and radi critic for the paper is well equipped t

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Alpha 66 Doings in Los Angeles as of September 1970

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2268

DCS HH-21477

2 October 1970

THRU: DO/DCSL

WH/C/OP
3 D 30, Hqs.

3. Attached obtain from Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter/writer, who has gained confidence of Alpha 66 members in Los Angeles. Is there any interest in this type of information, as noted in enclosures?

Enclosures:

Alpha 66 Notices of Meetings and Propaganda
History of Alpha 66
Picture of Vicente Mendez
Tape of Meeting/Interview with Los Angeles Leader Miguel Talleda/Press Interview with Andreas Nazario Sargent, Alpha 66 Secretary General in US.

Please advise.

T. 9 Oct

21477

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-108

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

LA-677-70

TO : Director, DCS
for OSS (Musulin)

DATE: 16 October 1970

FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

SUBJECT: Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

REF.: Your Speed Letter of 6 Oct 70, Same Subject

1. In a 13 Oct 70 interview with Johnny O'Donnell, free-lance reporter, he made the following information available regarding subject matter: The head man is Miguel Talleda, who is employed as an accountant at Hammer of California, Gardena. He has four daughters, two sons, and his wife baby-sits for neighbors in order to earn extra money. He receives about $1,000 a month. Talleda appears to be honest, hard-working, well disciplined and well organized, not overly emotional, strongly anti-Communist and anti-Castro. According to the Los Angeles Police Department, he has a P.O. Box in his name in Alhambra. The No. 2 man is Nextor Aranguren, also an accountant. He lives in Alhambra, and is believed to be the "bag man" who handles all money collected by the organization. It is the custom of Alpha 66 to inform their supporters how much money they receive. The rally in April 1970 at the Embassy Auditorium in Los Angeles netted them approximately $2,200.

2. One of the staunch supporters of Alpha 66 is a Dr. (fnu) DeCespedes, PhD, the granddaughter of Carlos Manuel DeCespedes, the Father of the Cuban independence who fought against the Spanish in 1868. She spoke at the Maywood American Legion Post Alpha 66 Rally in August 1970.

3. The following are Southern California city delegates: Eligio Vichot from Redondo Beach; Lorenzo Alfonso, from Fullerton, their most fiery speaker, who owns a janitorial service business; Pedro Sanchez from Culver City; Marcos Peralta, Huntington Park. Sanchez, Peralta, and Talleda flew to San Francisco with top man Andreas Nazario Sargeant of Miami when he visited Los Angeles in August 1970.

4. O'Donnell said the Alpha 66 training camp is somewhere in Mexico but they may move it to Central America as the Cubans are worried that the Mexicans might sell them out.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

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SECRET

LA-677-70

16 October 1970

5. From what O'Donnell has been able to piece together from meetings and discussions with Alpha 66 members, he believes another raid attempt into Cuba will take place in about four-five months. He will continue to apprise us of what he learns.

John L. Schubert

JOHN L. SCHUBERT

AMWatson/sg

File: O'DONNELL, Johnny

SECRET

21477

SECRET

Chief, Los Angeles Field Office 23 October 1970

ATTN : A. M. Watson

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

Rev. Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

REFERENCE: LA-677-70, dated 16 Oct 70

1. This is new case opened to your Office.

2. WH/Cuba/OPG has again expressed interest in referent activities and would appreciate any further elaboration and amplification of Paragraph four. Any possible additional data would be very helpful such as location of camps; how many men are involved in training; key personalities connected with training; funding channels; equipment or any other pertinent information would be most welcome.

JAMES R. MURPHY

CSMusulin/js
cc: Services Div. (Control)

SECRET

Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles Area

HH-21477

21 October 1970

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin - Ext. 2263

THRU: DO/DCSL

WH/COG
3 D 30 Hq.

Linda Jasper

3. Attached in line with your request to furnish additional coverage on Alpha 66 is copy of LA report (LA-677-70), for your retention. We will be glad to service any operational requirements which may be desired. Developments will be reported.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LA 1024-70

TO : Director, DCS

ATTN : OSS (Musulin)

FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office

DATE: 31 December 1970

SUBJECT: Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

REF : Your memo dtd 23 Oct 70, same subject

1. Subsequent interviews with Johnny O'Donnell resulting from reference, disclosed he has had no personal contact with the Alpha 66 group in the last two months due to personal financial reasons. He said his funds are depleted and he has had to spend all of his time looking for publishers that will pay for his contributions. He was unable to answer the questions posed in reference at this time. As soon as he gets on his feet financially he will again make contact with the group and try to learn more. He feels he has the complete confidence of the group; they are looking to him for publicity, i.e., "to tell it like it is."

2. O'Donnell said as far as "funding channels" are concerned, Alpha 66 does its own fund raising, such as with rallies, dinners, and "nickel and dime" contributors. He does not know of any single big money contributor.

3. Any information regarding Alpha 66 that comes to the attention of Mr. O'Donnell, will be passed along to us by him.

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE
Operational Support Staff, 900 Key
George S. Musulin, Ext. 2263

Dale Zenis
for JOHN L. SCHUBERT

AMWatson/vla

File: Case 55515
Johnny O'Donnell

[illegible] LA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LA 288-71

TO : Director, DCS
ATTN : OSS (Musulin)
FROM : Chief, Los Angeles Office
DATE: 25 February 1971

SUBJECT: Case 55515 - Alpha 66 Activities in Los Angeles

1. Periodic checking with Johnny O'Donnell regarding his contacts with Alpha 66 people has proved negative. O'Donnell is hurting financially, as reported in LA 1024-70, and he is trying to earn a living by writing articles for various publications. He feels his first concern is to his family (a pregnant wife), so he is devoting his time to anything that will pay off. He is not bitter, and said if he does learn anything in the future regarding the activities of Alpha 66, he will certainly pass it along, but he will not go out to get it at this time.

2. It is our belief that nothing more from O'Donnell will be forthcoming. Please close. We know of no other sources.

?

John L. Schubert
JOHN L. SCHUBERT

AMWatson/vla

File: C-55515
Johnny O'Donnell

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO DA YR (22-26)	REPORT NO. D C/N OTHER (27-33)	IUO (34-36)
X M I M				X	0 2 1 2 1	0 4 6 1 8 7 1	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Counter-Revolutionary Organization, Alpha 66, and its Activities (Cuba)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED MO. (40-41)	DA. (42-43)	YR. (44)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Raul GRANJA
1020 SW Fifth Street, Apt. #4
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45	TYPE OO-E	46	* NOT DISSEMINATED
S	GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER		

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
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7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA

51	52	53	54
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J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Please direct to:
OSS (GSMusulin)

Copy passed to JMCOBRA locally.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
MXCubria/css	JFGLEICHAUF		

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

SECRET

3

(20-41)

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mrs. Thayne	1-21	
2	Mr. Farrell	1/21 2/2	
3	Internl Div.	2/9	
4	↓		
5	O.S.S. ([illegible])		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FILE IN CASE

55515

→ ALTHAGE ACTIVITIES

IN LA.

Int Div. wants copies

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
M/C	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

SECRET
RYBAT

19 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ramparts: John Garrett UNDERHILL Jr.,
Samuel George CUMMINGS, and
INTERARMCO

1. Ramparts of June 1967, Vol. 5, No. 12, pp. 28-29, contains the following passages about Subjects:

> "The day after the assassination, Gary Underhill left Washington in a hurry. Late in the evening he showed up at the home of friends in New Jersey. He was very agitated. A small clique within the CIA was responsible for the assassination, he confided, and he was afraid for his life and probably would have to leave the country. Less than six months later Underhill was found shot to death in his Washington apartment. The coroner ruled it suicide.
>
> "J. Garrett Underhill had been an intelligence agent during World War II and was a recognized authority on limited warfare and small arms. A researcher and writer on military affairs, he was on a first-name basis with many of the top brass in the Pentagon. He was also on intimate terms with a number of high-ranking CIA officials--he was one of the Agency's 'un-people' who perform special assignments. At one time he had been a friend of Samuel Cummings of Interarmco, the arms broker that numbers among its customers the CIA and, ironically, Klein's Sporting Goods of Chicago, from whence /sic/ the mail-order Carcano allegedly was purchased by Oswald.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

"The friends whom Underhill visited say he was sober but badly shook. They say he attributed the Kennedy murder to a CIA clique which was carrying on a lucrative racket in gun-running, narcotics and other contraband, and manipulating political intrigue to serve its own ends. Kennedy supposedly got wind that something was going on and was killed before he could 'blow the whistle on it'. Although the friends had always known Underhill to be perfectly rational and objective, they at first didn't take his account seriously. 'I think the main reason was,' explains the husband, 'that we couldn't believe that the CIA could contain a corrupt element every bit as ruthlesc--and more efficient--as the mafia.'

"The verdict of suicide in Underhill's death is by no means convincing. His body was found by a writing collaborator, Asher Brynes of the New Republic. He had been shot behind the left ear, and an automatic pistol was under his left side. Odd, says Brynes, because Underhill was right-handed. Brynes thinks the pistol was fitted with a silencer, and occupants of the apartment building could not recall hearing a shot. Underhill obviously had been dead several days.

"Garry Underhill's chilling story is hardly implausible. As a spy apparatus the CIA is honeycombed with self-contained cliques operating without any real central control...."

2. A check of Agency records has yielded the following information about John Garrett UNDERHILL Jr.

a. DPOB: 7 August 1915, Brooklyn.

b. Attended high school in Brooklyn and was graduated from Harvard in 1937.

c. Died 8 May 1964.

d. Was a pictorial journalist for Life, 1938-1942.

e. Ordered to active duty with MIS, Washington, as a second lieutenant, on 8 July 1943. Served with MIS for 2-1/2 years, working on technical and photographic headings for MIS publications, evaluation of intelligence, and enemy uniforms, insignia, weapons, etc. On 9 October 1945 received a War Department staff citation for superior work in military intelligence. Left active duty in May 1946.

f. CIA memoranda of February and October 1949 show that there was interest by the New York office of OO, Contacts Division, in using Subject as a contact for foreign intelligence. Name checks were conducted with various military members of the intelligence community, but these yielded insufficient information, and OO was advised that contact should be developed with caution, on a limited basis, and that Subject was not to receive information classified higher than confidential.

g. On 12 March 1957 national agency checks were again requested on Subject because of interest by the Office of Security.

h. A UP article of unknown date cites an article written by UNDERHILL for Esquire. The article described the U.S. Army as shockingly weak. The UP piece stated that UNDERHILL served in military intelligence in World War II and Korea. UNDERHILL said that he had served as a consultant /probably in 1956/ to an Army coordinating group.

i. A report of 6 August 1954 from the Office of Security, Department of State, concerns contacts between UNDERHILL and one Herman AXELBANK, who was trying to sell photographs of Soviet military subjects. UNDERHILL reported these contacts to the FBI and to CIA. In November 1949

UNDERHILL visited Washington to call the attention of CIA to certain AXELBANK pictures and was advised that Colliers might be interested in some of them for an article on Russia. UNDERHILL discussed AXELBANK with "Ricky" Haskins of CIA.

3. On the basis of the foregoing an inquiry was made of director, Domestic Contact Service, whose office provided the attached reply.

4. The following information about Samuel George CUMMINGS, 201-178343, was compiled from his 201 file and from information provided by the Office of Security and by C/CI/SPG.

a. His date and place of birth are 4 February 1927, Philadelphia.

b. He entered on duty with CIA as a staff employee in December 1950. He was then a GS-9 assigned to Ground Branch, Weapons and Equipment Division, OSI. In January 1952 he was transferred to the Office of Procurement and Supply. During 1952/1953 he travelled abroad extensively, buying foreign weapons.

c. He married a German national and consequently resigned in November 1953, when he became a career agent in Guatemala.

d. Cables of the 1951-1952 period state that CUMMINGS was then buying arms for CIA and that the arms were intended for resistance elements behind the Iron Curtain.

e. On 17 August 1954 CUMMINGS became the principal agent of the CIA-owned companies known 24 as International Armament Corporation and Interarmco Lt., both incorporated in Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S. CUMMINGS engaged in sharp practises in his conduct of business and was also extremely difficult to control.

f. A 1957 cable states that a business man in Panama, an Agency source, knew CUMMINGS to be providing information to the FBI and also knew him to be "careful about keeping the appropriate U.S. Government agencies informed of his deals."

g. In early 1958 CUMMINGS assumed sole ownership of International Armament Corp. and of Interarmco. (An Agency audit established the net worth of these companies as $219,000.00.) 24 CUMMINGS bought them with a non-interest bearing promissory note in the amount of $100,000, payable in four annual installments of $25,000, and certain items of inventory which had a cost value of $67,000 and a market value of $250,000. [These items were to remain the property of CIA, and their cost was to be returned to the Agency after they were sold.] 24

h. On 28 June 1961 the West German publication Der Spiegel reported that CUMMINGS had been employed by CIA as an arms expert during the Korean War and that he had cooperated with CIA in "supplying arms to various trouble spots".

i. Shortly after CUMMINGS left his staff position for Interarmco, contact with him was established by the WH Division. This contact was taken over by C/CI/SPG in September 1954. (CUMMINGS knows him only by alias.) This contact is still maintained. Until recently the principal purpose was to dispose of arms, (and CIA made a sizeable profit on these transactions.) 24 The current contact is not operational. It is not based on a project, and no payments are made to CUMMINGS who volunteers information resulting from his extensive travels and high-level contacts. An operational clearance for CUMMINGS' use by the CI Staff as an informant was granted in March 1958.

3/PW

j. On 4 January 1962 the Rome periodical Vie Nuove stated that CUMMINGS was hired by CIA as an expert in arms and ballistics.

k. In December 1962 the Office of Security recommended against his use by Domestic Contact Service as a source, and in December 1964 the CI Staff advised that it had no operational interest in Subject. (Comment: As was noted above, this statement is correct, because Subject's activity is not directed by the Agency. He volunteers information.)

l. An Interagency Source Register memo to ACSI, dated 1 June 1965, stated that at that time there was "no record of a current operational interest in Subject."

m. An Agency report of 24 February 1966 cited CUMMINGS as trying to procure military equipment from Communist Bloc countries on behalf of DIA.

n. Agency reports of February and May 1967 stated that CUMMINGS had been in close contact with the BND (West German foreign intelligence service) for a year or more, that he had been given requirements by the BND, and that these included lists of Soviet and Bloc arms for procurement. It was also reported that he showed a BND representative a copy of a purchase order for the procurement of a Soviet T-54 tank, the order having originated with DIA. BND officials have often stated that CUMMINGS is a CIA agent.

o. A form dated 1 June 1967 was directed to the Interagency Source Register by "DA", presumably Department of the Army.

5. Agency records contain numerous references to INTERARMCO.

6. It is noted that UNDERHILL, CUMMINGS, and INTERARMCO have not appeared to date in any press or classified reports of the Garrison investigation in New Orleans, with the tenuous exception of the Ramparts article cited at the outset of this memorandum.

SECRET

WH/COG # 67-234

9 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Garrison Investigation
Emilio SANTANA Galindo 201-335856

REFERENCE : CI/R&A Memorandum, dated 22 June 1967, same subject.

1. In response to your request, Subject's file was reviewed and Station JMWAVE was asked to supplement the information in Headquarter's files with any additional information which would be of value in judging the effect on the Agency of Subjects' being investigated by Garrison and/or NBC.

2. Our review shows that Subject was recruited by the Agency in October 1962, not 1960 as was reported in an earlier memorandum. He was given limited training for use as an area guide on an infiltration operation in which he participated during the latter part of May 1963. Subject exfiltrated with his family about one week after being infiltrated and was subsequently terminated.

3. Listed below are the staff and agent personnel, in true name, who have been in contact with Subject and may be known to him by true name, alias or nickname.

A) STAFF

1. [Eugene E. Norwinski] 03
2. Robert G. L. Wall
3. [William R. Stegall] 03
4. [Vernon J. Goertz] 03
5. [Robert Clark Stevens Jr] 03
6. [Robert Charles Bachmann] 03
7. [Donald D. Wevor] 03
8. [Dewey A. Stinson] 03

B) AGENTS

1.	201-291237	Jose Enrique DAUSA Alvarez
2.	201-315825	Jose NUNEZ Paez
3.	201-310132	Alicio NUNEZ Paez
4.	201-320029	Raul QUESADA Freiro
5.	201-294451	Otto GINER Alonso
6.	201-341236	Alberto RUIZ Falcon
7.	201-294671	Joaquin POWELL Rubio
8.	201-739710	Jose Luis FORNELL Jacinto

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SECRET

9.	201-284925	Luis Albert BELTRAN Nodarso
10.	201-290305	Juan Luis COSCULLUEIA Iduate
11.	201-333832	Manuel VIERA Rodriguez
12.	201-298076	Juan Carlos JIMENEZ Jimenez
13.	201-313135	Diego Mario GIMENEZ Cadenas
14.	201-328507	Heriberto SARDINA Del Campo

4. Neither Station JMWAVE nor Headquarters have any record of Subject's whereabouts and activities between October and December 1963.

03

E. J. Williamson
Earl J. Williamson
AC/WH/COG

SECRET

1/90

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING
XXX

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE/KUDESK/KUWOLF/PM
G-2 Penetration Action Against AMSPELL Organization and "Other Groups" in PBRUMEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI

MICROFILMED
FEB 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References:
A. WAVE-3286, 14 January 1963
B. UFGA-7027, 28 December 1962 (RYBAT)
C. UFGA-7038, 20 December 1962
D. UFGA-7247, 12 January 1963 (RYBAT)
E. UFGA-7322, 17 January 1963
F. MEXI-2829, 13 December 1962

1. On 4 January 1963 AMHINT-27 met with QUANTUM-51 in New York City, and QUANTUM-51 advised him that Jorge *MEDINA Bringuier, the Secretary General of AMSPELL in PBRUMEN, is a G-2 agent. MEDINA and *AEDO (fnu), who was said by QUANTUM-51 to be on the AMSPELL National Executive, were actually G-2 penetrations. They planned to "roll up" the entire AMSPELL organization and "other groups" in one sweep and then escape by boat and contact AMHINT-53 in the JMWAVE area. MEDINA was in contact with AMHINT-53 while in PBRUMEN and planned to use AMHINT-53 to establish his bona fides with KUBARK.

2. QUANTUM-51 further advised that another mission of the two G-2 agents, MEDINA and AEDO, was to make contact with Iden A to determine what role it played in anti-CASTRO activities. The secretary of QUANTUM-51 had been a very close personal friend of AEDO's since childhood and AEDO feared she would be implicated, so he told her of his espionage mission. She informed QUANTUM-51 and then arranged a meeting between QUANTUM-51 and AEDO. AEDO told QUANTUM-51 of his mission and arrangements were then made to get all the AMSPELL leaders into asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy. On or about 10 December 1962 about 25 persons, including AEDO, went into asylum.

3. QUANTUM-51 further said that AEDO reportedly was arrested by G-2 a long time ago and then recruited to work for the PBRUMEN Government.

continued

Distribution:
③ - C/TFW w/atts

Attachments:
A. IDEN ~~u/s/c~~ h/w
B. Misc. material h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
22 Jan 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-7383

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-5-1-8 &
201-301693

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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9/30

4. Reference C is a chronological summary of AMHINT-33's activities subsequent to his infiltration in PBRUMEN, and his contacts with Chelin, the brother of AMFRET-7. AMFRET-7's arrest was reported in Reference B. The AMFRET-7 Case Officer states that both AMFRET-7 and his brother were arrested, after shooting it out with G-2 and being wounded. As noted in Reference D, AMFRET-7's arrest was made after QUANTUM-55 and Blanca *MARTINEZ de Hoya, aka "Cuca," aka "Cuchi," brought MEDINA, AMSPELL's National Military Coordinator for Reception and Supply, to Iden A where MEDINA recognized AMHINT-33. AMHINT-33 said MEDINA was an old friend of his and had lived near him. RE G-2 PENETRATION AGAINST AMSPELL

5. AMHINT-33 said further that his brother knows MEDINA, that MEDINA is the man whom AMHINT-33 used in 1961 to check up on *REBELLON (fnu), the FEU Secretary General in PBRUMEN. AMHINT-33 added in his S/W Message 11 of 10 December 1962 that "his friends" are still in jail.

6. Reference E transmitted a letter written by AMHINT-33 on 29 December 1962 in which he states that G-2 infiltration is so great that he considers it impossible to organize anything, and he indicates that some of the agents, as in this case, have been infiltrated for more than two years. He presumably means infiltrated into anti-CASTRO organizations and/or activities.

7. Relative to the "other groups" mentioned in para. 1 above, AMHINT-33's Case Officer believes that AMHINT-33 is probably referring to the MRR, the MRP, the MDC and the 30th of November groups. The "friends" mentioned in Para. 5 may be one Eduardo *BRINGAS, who is about 23 years of age, one *GOUMI (fnu), and others previously referred to but not identified by AMHINT-33; they may have worked for AMHINT-33. RE G-2 PENETRATION OF AMSPELL ORG JAN 63

8. JMWAVE traces on the individuals involved in this plot offer little concrete information.

a. It is noted that Jorge MEDINA Bringuier is listed on Page 13 of Attachment C to UFGA-4977 as an MRR member, with a listed aka of Carlos PRADO. JMWAVE tracing identifies one Carlos PRADO as "a brother of Raul, the head of G-2 in Las Villas Province," as reported in HAVA-6437, 5 October 1960; there is no further information on this Carlos PRADO. However, the original source of the information given in Attachment C of UFGA-4977 was a letter brought out of PBRUMEN by AMSTRUT-1 about early July 1962. Said letter contained a $25 money order, issued at Station No. 9, New Orleans, on 16 March 1962, for Jorge MEDINA Bringuier and purchased by Maria Teresa MEDINA. The envelope, addressed to Sra. Consuelo C. de RIVAS in Mexico City, bore the notation, "For Carlos PRADO," and contained a note, "This money order for $25 is for Carlos PRADO from his mother," in addition to the money order. There is one Carlos PRADO in Mexico. He is studying engineering and is the brother of Faustino PRADO Garcia, an engineer who works close to "Che" GUEVARA and is of current KUTUBE interest. Faustino PRADO is married to Clara ARTIME, a sister of Josefina ARTIME, who is a close friend of AMGLEN-9, and she is also of current KUTUBE interest. When AMSTRUT-2, who could have given this letter to AMSTRUT-1 to take out of PBRUMEN, was in Mexico City she called Carlos PRADO by telephone at 249769 and told him that she was a friend of his mother. This PRADO family is a large one, and includes another brother, Angel, who is in Spain, a sister who is a nun in Italy, and another brother who is a doctor in New York City. Additional data could be secured on this family from AMSTRUT-2 if desired. However, it seems probable that this money order may have been sold in Cuba by Jorge MEDINA and purchased, sooner or later, by the mother of the Carlos PRADO who is currently a student in Mexico. A copy of the material carried out by AMSTRUT-1 is being forwarded herewith. It will be noted that a part of the attachment was disseminated as UFG—1239, 13 July 1962.

201-350696 RR 201-337055

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-7383

b. It is further noted that JMWAVE files show one "Mongo" listed on Page 14 of Attachment C to UFGA-4977 as captured and sentenced to 30 years in prison. This information came from UFG-779, 12 January 1962, which was based on an AMCUTLER-1 intercept of a report from the MRR Acting Internal Coordinator in PBRUMEN to Hipolito LAZARO, the MRR Internal Coordinator temporarily in PBPRIME, sent via the Argentine Diplomatic Pouch. There was no further identification of this "Mongo." 24

c. It is noted that Reference F identifies Jorge HAEDO as a former anti-Castrista who was tortured and doubled by the PBRUMEN Government; HAEDO appears to be the correct spelling.

d. "Cuca" or "Cuchi" MARTINEZ, who has held the position of AMSPELL National Coordinator for Civil Resistance, is a personal friend of AMCOG-3 and family. She is believed to have taken asylum in the Mexican Embassy. SW Message 12 from AMCOG-3, dated 8 December 1962 and received 12 December, reported that QUANTUM-51 01 advised "Cuca" to hide or be cautious because MEDINA had turned out to be a G-2 member. The message said that this was learned from AMSPELL prisoners and that, during interrogation, they were asked many questions about "Cuca" and AMCOG-2.

9. When the AMHINT-53 security review mentioned in Reference A is received, additional investigation as necessary will be made at JMWAVE.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

IP

MICROFILMED
FEB 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Under Separate Cover Attachment to UFGA-7383, 22 January 1963

11,10

IDEN A [Spanish Embassy] in PBRUMEN.

[illegible]

#1
~~[illegible]~~ Att. UFGA 7383

28 JAN 63
19-124-26/3

1/820

Attachment B: UFGA-7383

F. 15

2 Jul

12 29

(13 Jul 1962)

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

ENVELOPE: Mrs. Consuelo C. de RIVAS
Xicotencalt #84
Coyoacan
Mexico, D.F.
(for Carlos PRADO)

This money order for $25.00 is for Carlos PRADO from his mother.

[One copy of money order for $25.00 for Jorge MEDINA Bringuier from Maria Teresa MEDINA]

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

98

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

MRR

28 JAN 63
19-124-26/3

CC: #2 to UFGA-7383

SECRET

ENV.LOPEZ Miss Maria Antonia LOPEZ
829 SW 11th Ave.
Miami, Fla.

/First page missing./

I am going to place the communication abroad in Sofi's hands; no one better. What I need is that you explain to us better how to make the contact from here over there, that is, how and where to see SARADIA, the contact which you said you had with him. Sofi knows him but doesn't know where she can see him. Remember that Sofi is already being checked because Esteban's wife knows her and asked about her. I am going to try to have the treasurer be a friend of Sofi's who knows where the money is. He is a fully trustworthy boy called Alejandro.

Tell Dr. LAZAGA that I don't write to him about the affair because it is easier for me to write to you, but that he and this boy should have relations, and I with Chichi and with you.

We give the support to LAZAGA together with the Executive, because it would be impossible to only one person, and for the case it was left in our hands. You see that the executive over there is fully answerable to us and that way there will be no problems.

We don't know anything about my namesake. So far all the contacts have failed. Let's see what we can clarify.

Tell Tomas that the news I sent him about Dos Rios was through a contact which I made with our brother-in-law D. He is willing to work and has people in his area, and also in the coast. I believe that a lot can be done up there. Besides, Soto left me a terrific contact also at that coast, whom we have to put in contact with D. Tell Tomas to let me work also in that area, which is mine and of my people, and that if he gives authorization that we can send a guerrilla band to work with that people. Of course, this guerrilla chosen by us to avoid their sending people of the Americans and have them take command away from us. You know how that is.

Write to our other brother-in-law in the embassy and find out when he leaves because I know that he is already leaving but to come back to me immediately. Let's see if he leaves, takes a fast training, and comes back. Have them get much map reading and man to man combat with bayonets which is very good at night and no one here knows anything about that.

You must explain the thing a bit to Soto so that he will gain enthusiasm. If he sees that the thing is serious and has real support he will come. The only thing that like Yayo, he needs support for his family. Explain everything to him and I think he will come. He leaves tomorrow and I gave him your phone. If he needs money for his

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

wife and for himself give it to him from mine. I authorized him to ask you for it.

If they would let me, in our province I would place 4 or 5 guerrillas with the contacts which I had before and have now, and we would fill that up for these people, that is, we would start a war in all the province, plains and everything.

Well, this letter is going with safe hands to Miami where it will be mailed, tomorrow. So the S.W. which I sent will arrive later if I can't get it taken with this one because I already gave it to have it mailed. Let's see if we can get it back in time to have it arrive soon.

I will write to Boba and Martha Elena another day with calm, and I don't have the details of your letters on hand.

Regards to all and you receive love from your brother,

Manolo.

SECRET

MINUTES

In the City of Havana, on 30 June 1962, the members of the NATIONAL EXECUTIVE of the "MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA" (M.R.R.), Rigoberto CASAS, Civilian National Coordinator, and Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE, Military National Coordinator, had a meeting and adopted the following agreements:

FIRST: That in view of the present situation of our movement andthe general situation of the country, we have decided to change the organization of the movement, which will now be composed as follows: (A) One Civilian National Coordinator, and (B) One Military National Coordinator. All previous Secretariats and denominations are annuled.

SECOND: To give full autonomy, with regard to functioning, to the Civilian and Military Coordinations. Thus, each will function separately.

THIRD: To give full support and recognition as GENERAL DELEGATE in exile of our movement, to Dr. Jose Ignacio LAZAGA and to the executive appointed by him with the authorization of the previous National Coordination.

FOURTH: As result of the SECOND agreement regarding autonomy in the functioning of the National Coordinations, we agree to accept the Hierarchy in the command of the full Executive of our Movement in exile, with the provision that the orders originating from this Executive will be complied with in accordance with our capabilities and taking into consideration that as we are in the National Territory we have better knowledge of the real situation which we are undergoing.

Signed by Rigoberto CASAS and Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE exclusively, as the rest of the members of the previous NATIONAL COORDINATION are in prison with the exception of Mr. [illegible]LLO, ex Coordinator of Civic Resistance who is in asylum.

/s/ Rigoberto CASAS
CIVILIAN NATIONAL COORDINATOR

/s/ Jose Antonio AGRAMONTE
MILITARY NATIONAL COORDINATOR

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

Carlos Prz

Sra Consuelo C. de Rivas
Xicotencatl #8d
Coyoacan
Mexico. D.F.

CORREO AEREO . VIA AIR MAIL

Este money order por $25.00 dls es para Carlos Prado de parte de su mamá —

United States Postal Money Order 11-47,272,045
MAXIMUM VALUE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS

PAY Twenty five DOLLARS
AND CENTS AS SHOWN IN AMOUNT BLOCK

$25.00

NOT VALID FOR MORE THAN [illegible] DOLLARS

PURCHASER-FILL IN INFORMATION BELOW

PAY TO

FROM Purchaser's name

Purchaser's street address

Purchaser's city and state

IF C.O.D. ENTER NO. HERE

PLEASE CASH PROMPTLY — VOID IF ALTERED
DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
MAR 15 1962
STA. NO. 9

Srta. María Antonia López
829 S.W. 11 Th Ave.
Miami, Fla

CORREO AEREO - VIA AIR MAIL

a.

comunicación al exterior la voy a poner en manos de [illegible] ti, nadie mejor que ella. Lo que yo necesito es que el contacto que tú me decías tener de Varabia, me expliques mejor como hacerlo de aquí para allá, o sea como y donde verlo a él. Sofi lo conoce, pero no sabe dónde está. Recuerda que a Sofi ya la están chequeando pues la mujer de Esteban la conoce y preguntó por ella. El tesorero voy a tratar que sea un amigo de Sofi que sabe donde está el dinero. Es un muchacho de toda confianza llamado Alfonso.

Díle al Dr. Zayaga que no le escribo sobre el particular porque a ti me es más fácil, pero que este muchacho y él son los que deben tener relaciones, y así con Chichi y contigo.

El apoyo se lo damos a Zayaga junto con el Ejecutivo porque a una sola persona sería imposible y para el caso se dejaba en nuestras manos. Uds. procuren que el ejecutivo en esa responda plenamente a nosotros y así no habrá problemas.

De mi tocayo no sabemos nada, todos los contactos nos han fallado hasta ahora. Vamos a ver que sacamos en claro.

Díle a Tomás que la noticia de Dos Ríos que le mandé fué por ese contacto que hice con nuestro cuñado I., este está dispuesto a trabajar y tiene gente en su zona, a mas de por la costa. Creo que por allá arriba se puede hacer mucho, además Tito me dejó un contacto formidable por aquella costa también, el cual pienso poner en contacto con [redacted] Díle a Tomás que me permita trabajar también para esa zona, que la mía, la de mi gente y que si él dá autorización se puede mandar una guerrilla a trabajar con esa gente. Desde luego esa guerrilla escogida por nosotros, no vaya a ser que manden gente de los americanos y nos quiten la jefatura, tu sabes como es eso.

Escríbele a nuestro otro cuñado en la embajada y averigua a ver cuando sale pues yo sé yá que él vá pero para volver conmigo enseguida. A ver si sale y coge un training rápido y vuelve. Que cojan mucho de lectura de mapas y lucha cuerpo a cuerpo con bayoneta que eso es una cosa buena de noche y aquí nadie sabe nada de eso.

A Beto le tienes que explicar la cosa un poco para que coja embullo, si él vé que es seria la cosa y con verdadero respaldo él viene, lo único que igual que Pepo necesita ayuda familiar, aclárale todo que yo creo que él viene. Mañana sale y le dí tu teléfono, si le hace falta dinero para la señora y para él dáselo del mío, yo lo autorizo a pedírtelo.

Si me dejaran en nuestra prov. yo metía 4 ó 5 guerrillas con los contactos que yo tenía antes y ahora, y le copábamos aquello a esta gente, o sea le metíamos guerra en toda la provincia, llano y todo.

Bueno, ésta vá en manos seguras hasta Miami donde la pondrán en el correo mañana así que el S.M que mandé llegará después que ésta si no logro que lo lleven junto con ésta pues lo dí yá para que lo echaran al correo, vamos a ver si se recupera a tiempo para que llegue pronto.

A Beba y Martha Elena les contesto otro día con calma y los pormenores de las cartas de Uds. que no las tengo a mano.

Recuerdos a todos, y Uds. reciban un abrazo de su hermano—

Manolo

ACTA

En la ciudad de La Habana, a los 30 días del mes de Junio de 1962, reunidos los integrantes del EJECUTIVO NACIONAL del MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (M.R.R.), señores RIGOBERTO CASAS, Coordinador Nacional Civil y JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE, Coordinador Nacional Militar, se procedió a discutir y llegar a los acuerdos que más abajo se expresan:

PRIMERO: Que debido a la situación actual por la que atraviesa nuestro movimiento, y la situación general del país, hemos acordado variar la estructuración del mismo, quedando compuesto de la manera siguiente: A) Un Coordinador Nacional Civil y B) Un Coordinador Nacional Militar, dejando sin efecto todas las anteriores Secretarías y demás denominaciones.

SEGUNDO: Acordamos darle plena autonomía en cuanto a su funcionamiento se refiere, a las Coordinaciones Civil y Militar, funcionando por lo tanto cada una por separado.

TERCERO: Darle pleno apoyo y reconocimiento como DELEGADO GENERAL en el exilio de nuestro movimiento, al Dr. JOSE IGNACIO LAZAGA así como al Ejecutivo por el nombrado, con la autorización de la anterior Coordinación Nacional.

CUARTO: Con motivo del acuerdo SEGUNDO en cuanto a la autonomía en el funcionamiento de las Coordinaciones Nacionales se refiere, acordamos aceptar la Jerarquía en el mando del Ejecutivo en pleno de nuestro Movimiento en el exilio, queriendo hacer la salvedad de que las órdenes emanadas de dicho Ejecutivo, serán efectuadas a la medida de nuestros esfuerzos y tomando en consideración que por estar nosotros en Territorio Nacional conocemos mejor la realidad de la situación por que atravezamos.

Y para constancia se firma la presente por los señores RIGOBERTO CASAS y JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE exclusivamente, debido a encontrarse el resto de los integrantes de la anterior COORDINACION NACIONAL presos excepto el señor BELLO, ex-COORDINADOR de RESISTENCIA CIVICA, que se encuentra asilado.--

Casas
RIGOBERTO CASAS
COORDINADOR NACIONAL CIVIL

José A. Agramonte
JOSE ANTONIO AGRAMONTE
COORDINADOR NACIONAL MILITAR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACTION PLANNED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/Operational—Transmittal of CKA Reports

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA 3787, 16 April 1962

ACTION : For your information

Transmitted herewith are CKA reports, numbers 134 through 149, and 156. An index is attached.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: (Herewith)
CKA-134 thru 149, 1 ea.
CKA-156 (1 copy)
CKA Index, in duplicate

Distribution:

3 - TF/W, w/atts. (h/w)

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
16 Apr 62

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 20 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3846/3

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

-845-563

CYA - 137
12 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
DRE, Santiago de Cuba

ATTENTION REQUESTED: PW/KUCAGE/KUTUBE. 06

1. On 9 April 1962, [Jose Antonio Sadurni Casas (aka "Che")], born 11 April 193[illegible], Santiago de Cuba; Miami address: [c/o Elisa Sadurni Casas,] 06 .08 [1619 Meridian Ave., Apt. C-10] Miami Beach, telephone: [JE 2-2641,] was interviewed. 08

2. Source said that during the revolution he was a member of the DR in the University of Habana. After the revolution he went to the University of Oriente, Santiago de Cuba, and eventually became the DRE chief for the city. In regard to his former DR association he had no operational leads, claiming that all contact with DR members terminated in 1959, and he knew no one who attained any stature in the Castro Government.

3. As DRE chief for Santiago, the source claimed that he had 50 members who he considered well organized and capable of any type of action. He said that there were, and are, other members, but he does not consider them in the same category with the 50 who are organized into cells. He said each cell has nine men. There are four cells in the University of Oriente and two in the high school.

4. He said that he left Santiago in March 1962 and turned the DRE over to his deputy. He then went to Habana and informed the DRE leadership that the second in command had taken over and he was told that Habana would initiate contact with the new leader. (Note: Since close relations are maintained by the JMWAVE Station and the DRE, no attempt was made to press the source for names and addresses, etc., as this information can be obtained in subsequent outside debriefings. The JMWAVE Officer responsible for the DRE operational matters was informed of the source's arrival and processing.)

5. Source said that at the time he left Santiago, the remnants of the Catholic student organization was trying to make contact with the DRE and he believes that by this time this contact has been made. He said that the DRE member who was following this matter, and who would follow through, was a blind person.

6. Listing the arms and supplies in the possession of the DRE in Santiago, the source said that it has about 5-6 pounds of plastic remaining out of a shipment of 20 pounds which was received from the DRE in Habana. He said the DRE in Santiago placed bombs in places where the explosion would not injure anyone. As far as arms are concerned the source said that the DRE in Santiago has ten 45 caliber pistols; five 38 caliber pistols; one M-3; and one Tommy gun.

7. The source furnished the following KUTUBE-type information:

4/90

14-00000

a. He said that his father is in jail in Puerto Boniato, and that in order to try and get him free, the source went to see Major Belarmino "Anibal" Castilla, the chief of training for the Palma Soriano Military Encampment, whom he knew from their days in the Santiago High School. Source made his plea and "Anibal" told him that before he could act upon it, he would have to talk to the source for five hours in order to determine his political orientation. The source replied that he did not come to talk politics but to plead for his father. "Anibal" answered that he would think about it and call the source one way or another, but he never called. Source thought that this story adequately demonstrated the (Communist) political orientation of "Anibal."

b. The brother of "Anibal" (para 6a above) is "Bertico" Castilla, first name possibly Alberto. He resigned from the army and is now living in Santiago, but the source is not clear on "Bertico's" political orientation.

c. Electra Fernandez, the wife of Mendez Cominche (the Santiago G-2 chief), is no longer the civil head (comisionado) of Santiago. She is now the president of the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas.

d. The source has given a complete military map of Oriente Province to the DRE member he left in charge of Santiago DRE (see para 4 above). Information is passed from Santiago to the DRE in Habana and the latter, in turn, is to forward the information to the States.

why didn't he
bring it
with him

e. Source said that his contacts who work in Nicaro report that the Nicaro-Mayari Arriba area is restricted and that unknown types of military installations are being constructed.

f. The foreign instructors in the University of Oriente consist of Czechs and Chileans. The Czechs have started a new medical school in the university and the Chileans have taken over the Business Administration Courses.

N.L.R.
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO: UFGA-3846 Dated 16 April 62

CKA 134: Arturo Inza Rodriguez: A 12 895 737 (SEE UFGA - 3846)

CKA 135: Jorge Masforroll Gomez: A 12 895 806 (SEE UFGA - 3846/1)

CKA 136: Omelio Julian Garcia Gonzalez: A 12 895 817 (SEE UFGA - 3846/2)

CKA 137: Jose Antonio Sadurni Casas: A 12 895 903 (SEE UFGA - 3846/3)

CKA 138: Raul Sanchez Rodriguez: A 12 895 874 (SEE UFGA - 3846/4)

CKA 139: Justino Pelayo Buncio Perez Fogueras: A 12 895 872 (SEE UFGA-3846/5)

CKA 140: Ramon Alonso: A 12 895 941 (SEE UFGA - 3846/6)

CKA 141: Emilio Alejandro Arrascaeta: A 12 895 866 (SEE UFGA - 3846/7)

CKA 142: Hector de la Penaranda Puentes: A 12 490 361 (SEE UFGA - 3846/8)

CKA 143: Manuel Ojeda-Castillo: A 12 895 866 (SEE UFGA - 3846/9

CKA 144: Benigno Soriano-Hernandez: A 12 895 880 (SEE UFGA - 3846/10)

CKA 145: Antonio Tomas Gonzalez Crespo: A 12 895 929 (SEE UFGA - 3846/11

CKA 146: Alejandro Profirio Camacho Gonzalez: A 12 895 939 (SEE UFGA - 3846/12)

CKA 147: Joaquin Antonio Jimenez Jimenez: A 12 895 933 (SEE UFGA - 3846/13)

CKA 148: Antonio C. Samper Herrero: A 12 903 024 (SEE UFGA - 3846/14)

CKA 149: Donald Arrowsmith Boudet: A 12 903 013 (SEE UFGA - 3846/15)

CKA 156: Alberto Hernandez Dolz: A 12 895 949 (SEE UFGA - 3846/16)

SECRET

UFGA 3513/27
15 Mar '62
per DRS

05,08
Source: Isidoro Esquerra Fernandez A1289162

Country Cuba

Subj (see below different reports)

Date of Info Prior to 7 Mar 62

Date place acq Prior to 7 Mar 62 Habana Cuba

~~Removed from Project~~ AMSPELL
CS Classification: ~~19-124-26/3~~
~~JOB #64-18/443~~
~~Box: 11 Folder: 1~~

Source descript. Cuban national who was student at the University of Habana

1. The student resistance organization in Habana is the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Student Revolutionary Directory). One of its leaders is 06 Lester García Rosales who is the chief of finance for Habana Province. ~~Xhm~~ 06 Roberto Quintairos Santiso is the general coordinator of the DRE. He has an external line of communication, running out of Cuba, through an official of the 11 Uruguayan Embassy in Habana. 06 Quintairos replaced 06 Ricardo ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Menendez, who is also known as 08 "El ~~XXXX~~ Chino" (the Chinaman). The latter was arrested by the Cuban security forces in January 1962 and is presently in prison.

2. The DRE has a clandestine propaganda newspaper called Trinchera, but~~xxxx~~ it is publish on a very irregular basis.

3. In order to finance its activities the DRE sells bonds in one and five peso denominations. However, because of the security conditions in Cuba, one must be very careful in selling the bonds or else he may sell one to a government agent who are constantly trying to provoke oppositionists to show themselves.

4. During the latter part of February 1962 two bombs exploded in the University of Habana. It was said that the bombing was done by the DRE.

NEW ~~XX~~ REPORT- SAME SOURCE

The section of Habana known as Alturas del Bosque (roughly, the Heights of the Woods) is being heavily fortified by the Cuban Government. This area is located on the north side of 23rd Stree~~t~~//// above the

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17-120-19
~~19-120-19~~

718R

western shore of the Almendares River. It is said that important government officials also live in this area. Nevertheless, ~~from~~ this section has a commanding view of the city of Habana.

NEW REPORT- SAME SOURCE

In all my time in Habana and until 6 March 1962, the date of my departure, I new saw more than 3 Cuban air force jet/ planes in the air at one time. I have talked to my friends, particularly one who lives near the airstrip at Campo libertad, an no one has seen more than this number in the air at one time. This leaves us to believe that the air force does not have as many jets as they say they have.

19-120-19
~~19-120-19~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE UFG

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Base, JMBAR

SUBJECT
JMZIP/KUTUBE/KUDESK/KUSODA
DRE Internal Codes/Sources and Companion

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

A. BARR-0270
B. WAVE-1220 (not sent DIR)

MICROFILMED
OCT 21 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[redacted]

1. Forwarded under separate cover per reference B request are Subject codes and related information. Please note that the second code does not contain the "ll" of the Spanish alphabet as does the first code. If accessable, sources should be contacted for code-check.

2. In submitting the information the three DRE representatives requested to be interviewed jointly. Spokesman for the group was Adolfo BARRO Garcia. 04 A fourth refugee, Rafael SANTANA lvarez, 04 entered PBPRIME with the DRE representatives.

04,08

[redacted]

a. Adolfo BARRO Garcia aka TITO. DPOB - 30 Sep 1943, Quemado de Cuines, Las Villas. Subject was a student until April 1961. He is a member of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas and is the regional coordinator for the DRE in the area comprised of Corralillo, Rancho Veloz, Quemado de Cuines, Isabela de Sagua, Sitiesito, Sitio Grande, Cifuentes, Amaro, En Crusijada, Calabasete de Sagua. The DRE has approximately 1000 men in this area but they lack arms and other equipment. A sending and receiving set (radio) has been installed at Isabela de Sagua, Las Villas. Bernardo la MADRID aka FAUSTINO 04,08 is the present coordinator in Sagua la Grande, Las Villas. The purpose of their trip to PBPRIME is to contact Manuel SALVAT in Miami, Florida. They plan to return to Cuba.

04,08

b. Fernandez ARCO Hernandez aka ADAN. DPOB - 21 Aug 1943, Sagua la Grande, Las Villas.

04,08

c. Manuel Antonio ALZUGARAY Perez aka HECTOR. DPOB - 18 Jan 1943, Santa Clara, Las Villas.

Attachments: 1 a/s, ~~u.s.c.~~ h/w

19-120-19

Distribution:
3 - JMWAVE w/1 att. ~~u.s.c.~~ h/w
3 - WHD w/1 att. u.s.c.

D 19-120-18
1 Attach h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY
19 - 120 - 18
19 - 120 - 33

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
7 Feb 1962	7 Feb 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
UFKA-1	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
19 - 120 - 19	

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6/6R

14-00000

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- 2 -

04

d. *Rafael SANTANA Alvarez DPOB - 7 November 1932, Las Villas. Subject ~~was a~~ chauffeur (taxi-driver) and plans to be at 7750 Normandy Drive, Apt. 2, Miami, Florida, while in PBPRIME. He stated that he resided 08 at Bernaza No. 210, Havana, Cuba. Though he was not a member of any clandestine group, he assisted the MRR group in Caibarien and just recently assisted others to leave the country. Subject and the aforementioned persons departed Cuba on board the Cuban M/V BLANCA ESTRELLA owned by INRA 08 but operated by Subject's brother Israel SANTANA Alvarez, who dropped them 06 at Anguila and returned to Cuba to bring others out that were supposed to meet them, but they missed their connections. Subject's group departed from Isabela de Sagua, Las Villas 24 January 1962 at approximately 2400 hours. On 22 December 1961 a group of approximately twenty militiamen and men from the ORI were drinking in various bars and displaying the Communist flag. Anyone who appeared to be unsympathetic was beaten. They also went to the homes of some who were suspected of being anti-Castroites and would beat them also. They beat up approximately twenty persons. This took place in Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject was one of many arrested between 22 and 26 December. When they were taken to a restaurant across from the G-2 office, Subject managed to escape. The other three men that came with him on the boat managed to hide him until they made good their escape by boat. Subject lists the following as G-2 agents:

Antonio OBREGON Correa, Mayor of Caibarien, Las Villas
One TOYO (nickname) is the head of the G-2 in Caibarien
(fnu) VILLASON is the assistant to TOYO
Evaristo HERRERA, who also works on a boat transhipping sugar from Cayo Frances to Caibarien, Las Villas
Roberto ROJOS aka ESPONJO
Luciano BENTAJA, Juanito BENTAJA and four other brothers
Guillermo SANTANA, Andres SANTANA, Lorenzo SANTANA

Cuban G-2

Subject further stated that Pedro MONTERO, Alejo MONTERO and Eduardo MONTERO are active members of the MRR group in Caibarien, Las Villas. 06, 06, 06
06 Francisco ROBLE is the active coordinator for the MRP in this area. Andres and Guillermo GONZALEZ (fishermen) are informers for the G-2 in Caibarien. They will propose that they help Cubans get out of the country. When all preparations are set up, the fishermen inform on those wanting to leave. The same applies to Jose (Pepe) MIRO, Evelio GARCIA and Lado COPA, all of Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject also stated that the 381st and 382nd Battalion of militia are presently in Caibarien, Las Villas. Subject states he is willing to return to Cuba and work for the underground. (Source Comment: If this subject is to be used in any manner, please be reminded that he claims to have escaped from the G-2. He may be trying to infiltrate the groups here or he may be trying to find out how the DRE operates in the Las Villas zone.

Andres Gonzalez

End of Message

MICROFILMED
FEB 9 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subj is an informer for G-2 in Caibarien

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7 Feb 62
19-120-19

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att. 1 to UFKA-1

MICROFILMED
OCT 21 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

DRE INTERNAL CODES

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~[illegible] 1966~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

4p

First Code they will use is the following:

Banda de 40 meters
7,500 kilocycles

Clave Leon
Agente - 13 (identified only as "Elidio"-
radio technician)

Broadcast time: 8:30 a.m. or 8:30 p.m. Las Villas

The code name to be used when transmitting will be GUERRILLERO

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
PES	185	ARADO	000-70	DIA	LIBRE	LOMA	90	000-22	LUZ	00-14	CAIMAN

M	N	Ñ	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
130-2	LUNA	0023	SAPO	CARRO	122-9	8-180	00-78	GATO	SILLON	51-3	614

X	Y	Z	LL
33-1	COTORRA	109-18	802-3

CODE FOR NUMBERS:

1. 345-20. 2. 893-104 3. CAÑON -00 4. 657-6 5. 00-2150 6. ALCATRAZ
7. SICLON 8. 2000-17 9. 56-00 0. 34-18

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Removed from ~~Project~~ Subj file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-604/61
Box: 11 Fold: 1

Second Code to be used---they will use one code one day and the other the next:

Same band
Same frequency
Same time

Code's name "FUEGO" to indicate which code is being used
Agente - 13
Las Villas

The same code name GUERRILLERO will be used when transmitting

A. 124
B. PEZ
C. LUNA-LLENA
D. CAIN
E. 172
F. BURRO
G. 840
H. PALOMA
I. 644
J. 35
K. 17-22
L. 43-4
M. 180-9
N. 14-63
Ñ. CIELO
O. RIO
P. 93.2
Q. 51-33
R. 125
S. CAMPO
T. 340-5
U. 419
V. 000-4
W. 00-61
X. 6790
Y. PIANO
Z. CAIMAN

att. 1 to UFKA-1
7 Feb. 1962

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

19-120-19

Places that they can deliver arms and equipment or other material:

CAYSAL - (ALACRAN)   ANGUILAS - (LUNA LLENA)   ROQUE KEY - (LOCOMOTORA)

Code for numbers:

1. TIBURON 2. 963 3. 1,500 4. 10,000 5. CAÑON 6. JOSE 7. FIERRO
8. RATON 9: MOTOR 0. 21

Whenever making any phone calls they will use the following code:

LLAMAR A SRA. MARGO - SALADO A ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS DE PARTE DE JUAN ANTONIO ORTEGA EN MIAMI--AL HABLAR: RECUERDOS A NIÑOS Y PADRE.

ESTOY HABLANDO - CAYO SAL
PINTANDO - ROQUE KEY
RECIBI CARTAS TAL DIA - PARA RECOJER

SECRET

DRE INTERNAL CODES

First Code they will use is the following:

Banda de 40 meters
7,500 kilocycles

Clave Leon
Agente - 13 (identified only as "Elidio"- radio technician)

Broadcast time: 8:30 a.m. or 8:30 p.m. Las Villas

The code name to be used when transmitting will be GUERRILLERO

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
PAZ	185	ARADO	000-70	DIA	LIBRE	LOMA	90	000-23	LUZ	00-14	CAIMAN

M	N	Ñ	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W
130-2	LUNA	0023	SAPO	CARRO	122-9	8-180	00-78	GATO	SILLON	51-3	614

X	Y	Z	LL
33-1	COTORRA	109-18	802-3

CODE FOR NUMBERS:

1. 345-20. 2. 893-104 3. CAÑON -00 4. 657-6 5. 00-2150 6. ALCATRAZ

7. SICLON 8. 2000-17 9. 56-00 0. 34-18

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Second Code to be used---they will use one code one day and the other the next:

Same band
Same frequency
Same time

Code's name "TURCO" to indicate which code is being used
Agente - 13
Las Villas

The same code name GUERRILLERO will be used when transmitting

A. 124
B. PEZ
C. LUNA-LLENA
D. CAIN
E. 172
F. BURRO
G. 840
H. PALOMA
I. 654
J. 35
K. 17-22
L. 43-4
M. 180-9
N. 14-63
Ñ. CIELO
O. RIO
P. 93.2
Q. 51-33
R. 125
S. CAMPO
T. 340-5
U. 419
V. 000-4
W. 00-61
X. 6790
Y. PIANO
Z. CAIMAN

PUNTO ENTRE PALABRA Y PALABRA

Places that they can deliver arms and equipment or other material:

CAISAL - (ALACRAN)   ANGUILAS - (LUNA LLENA)   ROQUE KEY - (LOCOMOTORA)

Code for numbers:

1. TIBURON 2. 963 3. 1,500 4. 10,000 5. CAÑON 6. JOSE 7. FIERRO
8. RATON 9. MOTOR 0. 21

Whenever making any phone calls they will use the following code:

LLAMAR A SRA. MARCO - SALADO A ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS DE PARTE DE JUAN ANTONIO ORTEGA EN MIAMI—AL HABLAR: RECUERDOS A NINOS Y PADRE.

ESTOY HABLANDO - CAYO SAL
PINTANDO - ROQUE KEY
RECIBI CARTAS TAL DIA - PARA RECOJER

19-120-19

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DRE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING

ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: JMZIP/Operational
Jose Maria LASA Urrutibeascoa 05

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: FYI

1. During your recent TDY to Headquarters, 05 you requested all available information regarding a young Cuban named LASA who talked to Identity 1.

2. Identity 2 met with 05 Jose Maria LASA Urrutibeascoa and Identity 1 on 2 October 1961. Identity 1, apparently, had been requested by Subject's uncle, a Cuban official in Switzerland, to meet with LASA who had recently departed from Cuba under a safe conduct agreement.

3. During the conversation 05 LASA 05 talked about his uncle, an old school friend of Identity 1 and, also, Subject's father, a minor Cuban Government official also stationed in Switzerland. Both the uncle and father were in disagreement with the CASTRO Government and there was some indication that one or both were willing to defect. Although this point was touched only obliquely, Identity 2 gathered that Subject wanted to get his father into this country with some assurance of support. The question was not asked directly and no commitments were made or implied.

4. After this relatively short talk in Identity 1's office, Subject and Identity 2 went into a conference room where he gave Identity 2 papers dealing with the organization and purpose of the DRE (which were already available) and said he would work with the students in the future. 05 LASA also expressed a wish to go to Switzerland for the purpose of informing the International Red Cross group there of the inhumane treatment of Cuban political prisoners.

5. In parting, Identity 2 had a distinct impression that Subject had not really accomplished the primary objective of his visit, and as he was returning to Miami, the foregoing was passed to Identity 3.

6. For further information on Subject refer to WAVE-8368, 9 Oct 61; DIR-17475, 12 Oct 61; and DIR-23974, 14 Nov 61. Also, see copy of GNVA-1631 (Attachment 2).

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE, w/att. 1 (U.S.C.) and
w/atts. 2 as stated para-6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
29 Jan 1962	2 FEB 19

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-787

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-308133

6/pd

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20 July 1962

CK - 175

Chief of Station, JMWAVE 4K

Chief, Task Force W

GYROSE/PW
Activities of the DRE (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil)

1. The source of the information contained in subsequent paragraphs is Jose Ricardo Rabel Ortega, A 12 821 451, Cuban national who is the oldest son of Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez, the present national director of "Viviendas Campesinas" in Cuba. Source was a Navy cadet at the Mariel Academy from February 1960 to November 1961. As part of the curriculum source spent two weeks in Minas del Frio, Oriente Province, during the latter part of 1960. From February to 12 July 1962, source worked for Viviendas Campesinas as a general office clerk. He may be reached at the following address: c/o Manuel Gomez, 539 NE 70th Street, Miami, Florida, USA.

2. Source gave the following information which is repeated verbatim herein.

08, 06

"In a conversation on 13 July 1962 in Havana, my brother-in-law, Fernando Gomez Fonseca, told me that the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) in Cuba had received 14 tons of arms and munitions to be used in the near future against the Communist regime of Cuba. He also told me that experts in the handling of explosives were entering Cuba for sabotage of bridges and railroads.

08, 06

My brother-in-law, Fernando Gomez Fonseca, is in charge of the DRE in Havana Province. I also know Laureano ("Lino") Pequeno (Jr), who is one of the most important DRE leaders in Cuba. 06

In the conversation, I learned also that the DRE is expecting another ship with arms and ammunition in the near future and a yacht which is now in a Latin American country. The yacht is for use in activities against the Castro government.

The activities against the Castro government to be carried out by the DRE are expected to start within a month or two months at the latest.

Note: This information is confidential, and I want it to be kept in the greatest possible secrecy. I have spoken with no one else of this matter, which I consider very delicate. I want held in complete

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CK - 175 20 Jul 62

08, 06

reserve the name of [my brother-in-law and that of Mr. Laureano ("Lino") Pequeno].

3. It is suggested that your Station may wish to establish contact with source for purposes of determining any operational potentialities that the source may have and/or to assess a possible breach of security.

Neil T. Pickworth

Neil T. PICKWORTH

1BR

1P

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MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

16 July 1962

CK - 167

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Chief, Task Force W

Chief of Station, [redacted] 9KR

GYROSE/Operational
DRE/Guerrillas-Havana and Las Villas

ATTENTION REQUESTED: PM, KUTUBE all → CIT: CUBA

F

DYCB 1. On 14 July 1962, Juan *Rodriguez Jomolca, A 12 821 206, born 19 November 1934, Rancho Veloz, Las Villas, last address, Havana; US address: c/o Jose Deetjen, 4746 East 57th Street, Apartment 3, Maywood, Los Angeles, California, telephone 581-5569, was interviewed.

Re interview fr 14 July 62

2. Source said he formerly belonged to the DRE, but after Playa Giron it disintegrated. Nevertheless, he said, he was able to keep in contact with a few DRE people who are in Havana. He said details on the DRE could be obtained from Manuel Salvat, but he did state that he belonged to the DRE group headed by a brother of Diaz Lanz. This brother is still in Havana. He said this group wants to engage in political assassination, and has repeatedly requested that pistols with silencers be sent from the United States.

F 06

3. Source said that his cousin, Salvador *Jomolca, is a guerrilla leader in Las Villas Province, more specifically, operating between Matanzas and Corralillo. He said that his cousin is a lieutenant about 30 years old. He has a small group, few arms, and very little ammunition. He is trying to get outside help but there is no method of communicating with him.

06, 08

4. Source said that Salvador Jomolca is married to a daughter of "Campito", the elder. (Comment: A previous source reported that there are two "Campito"s, a father and his son. The son is the most reported upon guerrilla leader, the father apparently only accompanying the son.)

Nelson L. Raynock
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

INDEX - F

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SECRET

19-120-19

21BR

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3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE/KUCAGE/AMHINT.
Debriefing of PBRUMEN Legal Travelers for PW Aspects

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI and files

Ref : WAVE 3748

MICROFILMED
JUN 11 1962

1. On 15 May 1962, at about 1730 hours local, JMWAVE conducted a PW debriefing of the following legal travelers:

F 05 09 08

a. Raquel LA VILLA Gonzalez, PDOB: 10 Jan 1940, Havana. Avenue 19 No. 3614, Marianao, Havana. Employed as clerk in Ministerio Comercio Exterior, Department of "Empresas y Alimentos", Foreign Exchange Section. Subject has been militant in the DRE since late 1960, working as a messenger and confidant for contacts in their legal apparat (not the clandestine net). Subject arrived in Miami on PAA Flight 422 on 15 May 1962.

SEE F 05 09 08

b. Cecilia LA VILLA Gonzalez, PDOB: 18 June 1943, Havana. Avenue 19 No. 3614, Marianao, Havana. Unemployed. Student. Subject is sister of a. above and has assisted her in a similar capacity.

SEE F 05 09

c. Miriam BARO Esteva, PDOB: 26 Oct 1937, Palma Soriano, Oriente Province. Calle 27 No. 906, Vedado, Havana. In Miami;

08

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW

Δ: Miami, Fla O.T. Cuba

RE PW debriefing of Subject 1962

19-120-19
~~19-120-19~~

INDEX

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 May 1962	JUN [illegible] 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO
RS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4211

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-19/3

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

9/BR

220 NE 26th Terrace, Miami. Subject was employed as receptionest in the office of her brother Carlos BARO, 06 a dentist in the L & 23rd Bldg, Vedado. Subject arrived in Miami on PAA Flight 422 on S May 1962.
08

2. Subjects a and b are sisters and were questioned together. On the topic of reception of radio programs in Cuba, both were agreed that the best reception was the "Voz de las Americas" which came in strong and clear with rarely any interference jamming. Program content was described as generally good, gave a morale boost to the audience and was becoming popular.

3. In commenting on Radio Las Americas, they pointed out that they had not heard it or attempted to tune in because they felt the quality was much the same as its predecessor, "Radio Swan" which lost its prestige prior to and during the April 1961 invasion attempt. Both declared this was a general opinion among their acquaintances.

4. Subjects commented very favorably on programs heard over station XEW, Mexico and WRUL, New York, describing reception and content as good and with large audiences in Cuba.

5. In referring to other programs, subjects reported that on 1 May, relatives in the Matanzas area telephoned them in Havana to tell them that the "students" (DRE) were on again (TV intrusion). Also, later in the day, friends in the Vedado area called to tell them to tune into Channel 2, that there was a program there(about 2115 hours local). Unfortunately, they had already sold their TV set since they were leaving soon. Both agreed that the system of announcing the TV intrusion broadcasts over CONTE Aguero's program on WRUL a few minutes prior to the intrusion was the key to large audiences. Almost all GOC oppositionists upon hearing this announcement, start telephoning their friends to tune into the TV channel announced.

6. Concerning the DRE internal organization, subjects reported that they had not been active recently and not witting to clandestine operations. They were aware, however, that the DRE internal net was waiting for the infiltration of AMHINT-53 or AMHINT-2 to brief them on the situation in exile and what support would be forthcoming. They reiterated the reports on two bombs set off in the university area by the DRE and burning of cane and henequen fields in Matanzas and Las Villas.

7. When queried on disturbances in Las Villas and/or Matanzas on or about 3 May, they replied that they heard the persistent rumor that a unit (company or regiment unknown) of militia had bolted and gone up into the Escambray Mountains. No further details were known.

8. When questioned on written propaganda such as flysheets or clandestine newsheets, both declared that the last propaganda seen was the clandestine issue on "Trinchera" (DRE organ), that no other propaganda sheets had been seen since before the April invasion.

9. When asked their impression on anti-CASTRO propaganda in general they felt that it was too negative; that while the exiles and opposition groups were busy tearing down the image of CASTRO, he was before the people with some proposal that was based either on truth, had a ring of truth in it, or at least appealed to the masses. That some of their contacts with young girls who served as "brigadistas" (rural tutors in the campaign for literacy) turned up interesting remarks. These girls claimed that many of the country folk would throw up their hands in dismay when Communism was mentioned to them, and [illegible] thing to do with communism, and yet

2188

10. Subjects also felt that propaganda should be directed more toward that sector of Cubans that are not fanatic Fidelistas or communists, and have not commited themselves to the opposition movement for such reasons as indolence, lack of courage, or economic docibility. Raquel remarked that our propaganda seemed to be divided into two broad categories, one directed at or attacking the hard-core Fidelistas and the other for opposition movement consumption.

11. Subject c above was debriefed for her report on reception of a FALCON broadcast in Havana on 1 May 1962. She stated that she was called by a friend at about 2100 hours on 1 May and told that the DRE Trinchera program was being broadcast over Channel 2 at that moment. Miriam turned on her TV and does not recall how high she had to turn up the volume, but to her recollection, not higher than normal. She heard very clearly, the monologue rebuttal of the CASTRO speech earlier that afternoon. She immediately called two of her friends and subsequently received calls from them and others on reception of the program. Her account of parts of the program and the times stated agree with WAVE' file copies of the program script.

END OF DISPATCH

11-120.19

(fi.C. D.RE)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/Operational—Transmittal of CAC Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: For your information

Transmitted herewith are fourteen CKA reports and an index of same.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments: (Herewith)
14 CKA Reports, 1 ea.
CKA Index, in duplicate

Distribution:
3 - TF/W, w/atts. (h/w)

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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Removed from ~~Project~~ Subj file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-604/61
Box: 11 Fold: 2

RIO/ACD

C S FILE COPY

CS COPY

19-120-19

DATE TYPED 1 May 62	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 19

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3938/3

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

1 att.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

Attachment to: UFGA-3930 dated 2 May 1962

(Number assigned: Subject: Source)

CKA 175: Office of the Secretary of the Presidency: A 12 903 388
(SEE UFGA - 3930)
CKA 176: Rescue at Sea: A 12 444 373
(SEE UFGA - 3930/1)
CKA 177: Clemente RODRIGUEZ Ramos: A 12 903 409
(SEE UFGA - 3930/2)
CKA 178: DRE/FOAC-Habana: A 12 903 419
(SEE UFGA - 3930/3)
CKA 179: Information on Bayamo, Oriente Province: A 12 903 404
(SEE UFGA - 3930/4)
CKA 180: UR/Habana to Guantanamo Navy Base: A 12 903 434
(SEE UFGA - 3930/5)
CKA 181: Legal Traveler: A 12 903 408
(SEE UFGA - 3930/6)
CKA 182: 30 November/Habana: A 12 903 426
(SEE UFGA - 3930/7)
04
CKA 183: Independent Operator/Miami to Matanzas: [Jesus Gregorio PEREZ]
(SEE UFGA - 3930/8)
CKA 184: List of Cubans Entering the U.S. with False Visas: Nelson L. RAYNOCK
(SEE UFGA - 3930/9)
CKA 186: OOA/Habana: A 12 903 501
(SEE UFGA - 3930/10)
CKA 187: Organizacion Autentico-Rescate/Matanzas: A 12 903 514
(SEE UFGA - 3930/11)
CKA 188: Beauty of Calabazar/Contact to Isle of Pines: A 12 903 509
(SEE UFGA - 3930/12)
CKA 194: List of Cubans Entering the U.S. with False Visas: Nelson L. RAYNOCK
(SEE UFGA - 3930/13)

SECRET

att. 1 UFGA-3930/3

19-120-19

1/BR

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

UFA - 179
26 April 1962

Chief, Task Force/W
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Operational/GYROSE
DRE/FOAC-Habana

ATTENTION REQUESTED: KUCAGE

1. On 24 April 1962, Ignacio Pla Martinez, A-12903419, born 10 December 1943, Habana; Miami address: 2015 SW 25th Street, was interviewed.

2. Source said that he was a member of the DRE and the FOAC in Habana. When asked what the FOAC is, he said that it is the Federacion y Organizacion Anticomunista Cubana. He explained that the DRE is trying to reorganize and that the FOAC, a large united organization, is trying to help the DRE. The FOAC, he said, is instructing the DRE in its reorganization.

06

08

3. Source said that his DRE contact is Manuel Somoza, Jr., living on Calle Milan number 330 entre Lourdes y Villoldo, Arroyo Apolo, Habana. He said that Somoza is in direct touch with an 06 FOAC coordinator and that his job is to organize student groups for passive resistance activities. This includes, he said, propagana work, distributing pamphlets and starting rumors.

4. Source said that the identity of FOAC members is kept quite secret, but he was aware that one Lazaro Hernandez is an 06 FOAC leader in Habana. He knew no other details.

Nelson L. Raynock Jr.
Nelson L. RAYNOCK

S-E-C-R-E-T

Removed from ~~Project~~ Subj. file
CS Classification: 19-120-19
JOB #66-004/61
Box: 11 Fold: 2

41BR

19-120-19

Save
for
DRE file

DRE

UFGA-3797/02,(CKA-123) 12 Apr 62, 19-9-9

05

One [Eduardo Tomas TORRES Ramos] said that the was (had been) Chief of Security for DRE in Sagua la Grande, and that for all practical purposes the resistance has been liquidadated in Sagua la Grande. As Chief of Security his job was to hide and exfiltrate people fleeing from Cuba which he said was the last remaining job that the resistance could do.

1/BR

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2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Acting Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
02 UNEB/PBRUMEN
Resistance Activity in Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: FYI

The following information was provided by Francisco Luis Rodrigues Gonzales (CC-1169), a Cuban refugee who arrived in Spain in early August 1962 and had been active in the Revolutionary Student Directorate, an anti-Government resistance group, while in Cuba.

a. Source has been opposed to the Castro regime ever since the defection of Díaz Lanz in May 1959, and was involved in sabotage activity with the Revolutionary Student Directorate. His immediate supervisor was Angel Fontanills, known as "Charles" in clandestine circles. Alberto Muller, the leader of this group, arrived clandestinely in Cuba in October or November 1960 and began to organize the various groups of the Directorate to bring about an insurrection in the Sierra Maestra area, in Oriente Province. These groups were mainly from the provinces of Las Villas and Havana, and received orders to unite with Muller who was already in the Sierra Maestra. The men went there in small groups, and had the seminary in the Santuario del Cobre as their destination. Once in that spot, they received final instructions and military equipment. Source's group, which consisted of two carloads, entered the Sierra Maestra through Bayamo. Source was riding in the first car. When they arrived on the outskirts of Bayamo, source's car was stopped by the militia, but the car was allowed to pass without any check. A few minutes later they realized that they were being followed and tried to escape. An alarm and shots went up, and they were finally captured and taken prisoner. The second car, which was following close behind them and was warned by the shots, was able to escape. 06

b. The prisoners were taken first to G-2 Headquarters in Santiago de Cuba and later to the Boniato Prison, where they were interrogated by the G-2. There were two American prisoners there, and although source did not know their names, he said that they were from the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. Muller was taken prisoner a few days later (shortly after the ill-fated invasion of Playa Giron). No arms were taken from him when he was arrested. Had this insurrection been successful, about 1,000 men would have risen up.

19-120-19

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 August '62	31 August '62

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-14,272

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
23 65-6-38/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

D 19-9-9

3/BR

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSLA-14,272

d. Of the Muller group, which was called the "127", about 60 prisoners were taken, five of whom, including source, were set free. One of these was an infiltrator called Flores, whom no one trusted since they knew that he was not "one of the group." Another of these was Rolando Valdés D'Wolf who is now in prison in the Fortaleza de la Cabaña serving a nine-year sentence. He was captured trying to escape in a car belonging to a militiaman and wearing a militia uniform. He defended himself bravely, but received five bullet wounds which incapacitated him. The other two who were released were Eduardo Díaz Lanz and Jorge Cruz Peña, a sergeant in the Rebel Army who was with Castro in the Sierra. The latter had actually not been involved in the group. Source thought that he (source) and Díaz Lanz were released so that they might be followed and lead the Government to other groups and individuals in Havana who might be involved in resistance activity. Source had been in prison six months before being released, and one thing which he could not explain was that on the paper that he was given which indicated his release, no mention was made of any sentence or penalty.

e. On several occasions, Muller had been subjected to false execution procedures, with the purpose of trying to make him talk, but he did not weaken. During the trial, "everyone remained firm," and source was told that Muller was very brave in his pronouncements against the Regime and, at every moment, abided by his principles. He presented a very brilliant self-defense.

f. When source was in the Boniato prison, he shared a cell with a Captain Aníbal Rodríguez, who belonged to the MRR. This officer, along with other rebel officers and soldiers, had staged an uprising in Imías, in Oriente Province. Later he was sentenced to death and shot.

g. During his last days in Cuba, source avoided all revolutionary activity, since he wanted to leave Cuba more than anything else. However he knew that the various resistance groups worked hard, carrying out a great deal of independent sabotage activity, although there was not much coordination among the various movements. One movement which had a large membership, especially in Oriente Province, was the M-30-II. This group was planning to launch an insurrection in Pinar del Río in January 1962, but they could not carry it out since the repression in the area was so great.

h. Hans, a member of the Revolutionary Student Directorate, was recently taken prisoner, and it seemed that he was tortured a great deal and talked. As a result of this, a house in Wajay, in Havana Province, was seized and arms and gelatina were found. The owners of the house and other persons were arrested.

Helen B. Caporla
Helen B. Caporla

PCH

Attachment: Spanish report - 1

Distribution:
2 - AC/WH, w/att.
2 - C/TFW

4 ICD Addresses
MEXI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 028
27 JAN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

19-9-11/1

ROUTING

1	Emi	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 28 0352Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 3066

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7200

JMZIP

REF BELL 0767 (out 7184) - See also Bell Mexi 7184
7186

04,10

1. FIFTH PO BOX FOLLOWS: ANTONIO GOMEZ DURAN, APARTADO 29976, MEXICO 18, D.F.

SW

2. TRYING OBTAIN THREE MORE PO BOXES 30 JAN 61. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS URGENTLY NEEDS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS BEING DISPATCHED CUBA PRIOR 1 FEB.

CR

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MD - addresses
14-9-1111 MEXI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 26 JAN 61
TO : BELL
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

QR

JAN 26 0722Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2831

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7184

JMZIP

REF: BELL 2767(our 7184 5*

1. THREE ADDRESSES FOLLOW:

A. [ARMANDO B. SANCHEZ, EL CENTRO COMMERCIAL, PALMA Y DONCELES], MEXICO, D.F. 04,10

B. [BERTA A. MARTINEZ, CALLE RHIN NO. 64], MEXICO, D.F. 04,10

C. [ANTONIO BUSTO, APARTADO POSTAL 13758], MEXICO 1, D.F. 04,10

2. WILL ADVISE REMAINING ADDRESSES SOONEST.

SW

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS NEEDED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSED MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS.

SECRET

S/BR

FK? address ...
19-9-/MEXI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 26 JAN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

CR Sun

JAN 26 0634Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2830

PRITY BELL CITE MEXI 7156

JMZIP

REF A BELL 8767 (OUT 71534)* – attached

B MEXI 7184 (IN **

04, 10

FOURTH ADDRESS FOLLOWS: [AURELIO A. MARTINEZ, CALLE EDISON, NUMERO 11], MEXICO 1, D.F.

SW

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 0415, 26 JAN.

**HQS NEEDED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESSES MEXI AREA FOR USE S/W AGENTS BEING DISPATCHED CUBA PRIOR 1 FEB.

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1/BR

NO. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

153

DATE : 6 OCT 60*

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 9

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
None required ☑
Signature:

FRD Mexi

OCT 8 1406Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 24498

TO DIR INFO WASH CITE MEXI 6502

1- (WARE ACTING)

JMNET

1. PROBLEM OF ROBERTO DE VARONA[1] BECOMING ACUTE AS INDICATED FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

Losada

[Julian Arias Prado] 03

2. ORRISON[2] REPORTED INFO FROM LITAINT-5[3] 29 SEPT 60 THAT VARONA RENTED AND FURNISHED INDEPENDENT OFFICE ON CALLE INDEPENDENCIA[4] HANDLE AMHAWK[4] AFFAIRS. L-5[3] SAID IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO WORK WITH VARONA, EVEN AMHAWK[4] HIMSELF, WHICH IS WHY AMHAWK[4] FUNDS HIM 2000 DOLLARS PER MONTH MEXI. WITH THESE INDEPENDENT FUNDS LITTLE CAN BE DONE MEXI RESTRICT HIS INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION AMHAWK[4] ALTHOUGH THIS PLUS HIS REFUSAL ADHERE DEMARCATION WIPES WORK MEXI DELEGATES MAKES FOR CONTINUAL DISSENSION. RECOMMENDS TWICKER[5] FRANK DISCUSSION AMHAWK[4] THIS PROBLEM DETERMINE IF AMHAWK[4] WILL AGREE SENDING ROBERTO EXTENDED LATIN AMERICAN TRIP WITH AMHAWK[4] FUNDING AND LEAVING ROLANDO ROJAS MEXI AS HIS DELEGATE. STRONGLY FEEL CAN WELD MEXI DELEGATION INTO STRONG VEHICLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AMCIGAR[6] OBJECTIVES IF ROBERTO REMOVED, IF HE REMAINS HERE, FEEL OVERALL EFFICIENCY MEXI DELEGATES WILL BE UNDERMINED BY DISSENSION.

[Jorge Antonio [illegible] Juan Rodriguez [illegible]] 06

3. LITELL-1[7] HAS CONTINUALLY POINTED OUT PROBLEM OF VARONA BROTHERS AS EFFECTS MEXI DELEGATION. SAYS ROBERTO CONTINUALLY CUTS ACROSS LINES AND RUNS PRACTICALLY INDEPENDENT OPERATION.

4. ON 28 SEPT 60 ROBERTO VARONA TOLD LIMASK[8] THAT FRD BIG PLAN SHAPING

S-E-C-R-E-T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 24498 MEXI 6502

TO INFO CITE

PRINCIPALLY IN MIAMI INVOLVING 1500-2000 MEN INCLUDING ARTILLERY, PLANES, LANDING CRAFT TO TAKE PLACE IN NOV OR DEC. SAID AMHAWK 4 TO TAKE PART IN INVASION. SAID IN MEXI THAT FRD RECRUITING SCREENING CUBANS FOR TRAINING IN CAMPS MEXI. USING MARIA ALFARO ABC ALVARADO, NICARAGUAN, AND LIMASK 8 SET UP BEGIN MILITARY TRAINING SMALL GROUP CUBANS MEXI. CAMP AT NINCA EL PENON OF TOLUCA ROAD PROPERTY OWNED BY JOSE PUEBLA. ABC

06

5. ON 5 OCT SHYROCK 9 AND GESTETNER 10 DEBRIEFED MR. [WILLIAM FELDER,] AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN MEXI, RE CONTACTS WITH ROBERTO DE VARONA AND AMHAWK 4. ROBERTO TOLD 06 [FELDER] AND 06 [HUGH MONTAGUE,] APPARENTLY BRITISH FRIEND 06 [FELDER,] HE WANTED TRAINING BASE MEXI FOR CUBAN EXILES. ABC

6. ON 6 OCT COL JOSE MARIA REGO RUBIDO TOLD STATION CASE OFFICER AMHAWK 4 HAD SENT HIM WORD VIA AMHAWK'S 4 BROTHERS TO ASSEMBLE GROUP 75 OR MORE RECRUITS FOR TRAINING AND TO PREPARE LANDING PLAN FOR VICINITY SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, INCLUDING TYPE NUMBER ARMS NECESSARY. 08

7. STATION COULD HAVE [GOBERNACION AGENT] ADVISE ROBERTO TO LEAVE COUNTRY OR WOULD BE SUBJECT ARREST AND DEPORTATION.

8. REQUEST HQS, MASH VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

5/810

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: International Rescue and Relief Committee
[File no: A-00-55-64]
Volume 3

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD/FIO/PAO
ROOM: 913 Key Bldg

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11:00 16 AUG 78		BETH LICKENFELS	

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5564

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES: 00 A: AB | 00 K | CO-B | OTHER

A. FIELD OFFICE / B. REPORT NUMBER / C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR / D. CASE NUMBER / E. S

DN-Y-08y630215D

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR / REPORT NO.

0219332 52418

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Suspicions Concerning Possible Castroite Mission in US for Salvador Rodriguez Santana

(Cuba)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR: 02208

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) A 27321
Charles Sternberg
International Rescue Committee
460 Park Avenue South
New York 16, N.Y.

5564 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) #102321
Cuba Lecours
International Rescue Committee
Miami, Florida

5564 OK

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address) S 102 321
Manuel de Jesus Rodriguez
Cuban refugee
Miami, Fla.

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K" →

1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES
4. USIA

K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED

CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE

L. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1	5	9
2	6	0
3	7	11
4	8	12

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

FLEX PA
CASE
X-REF PA
FILES AA

CI4 A

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Sent to Sam Halpern
Ex-off SAS
4 J 2708
Also to Jane Roman CI/LA
2C42

As WH 1119

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY):

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS):

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO

C/S WLFreund/lm
F. O. CHIEF JBLReeves
EDITOR
BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — SUGGESTED SERIES: OO A, OO-K, OO-B, OTHER — A. FIELD OFFICE — B. REPORT NUMBER — C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. — D. CASE NUMBER — E S

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — RECEIVED MO. DAY YR. — REPORT NO. A B C D OTHER

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
[illegible]	[illegible]	-	Y	-						0	5	2	5	5	5	[illegible]	2		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	/	2	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	/	/	/

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Four Photostats of Form 510 on CH[illegible], Pui Chuen / [illegible]

China/Hong Kong

V S I B	I U O	I D C	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD			RELEASED MO.		DAY		YR.
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44

TYPE OO-E — 45 — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED — 46

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)
CH[illegible], Pui Chuen, / [illegible]
c/o International Rescue Committee
460 Park Avenue
New York 17, N.Y.

A110680

S5564A

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

DOCUMENTARY

A 1271

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1	✓	E	R
1	S	C	I	2 ✓	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	D	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	10
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA ✓		4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS
Source attended the True Light Middle School from 19[illegible] to 1954 and completed one year at the ✓ Kwangsai Medical College (1954-55). Her parents are also parolees but we are not submitting forms on them at this time. We are submitting a name check on source to Index.

ATTACH. NOT RETURNED

TO CONTROL WITH P.S.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

FLEX RR
CASE
X-F
FILES

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
RPL[illegible]:fbd	Jay B. L. Reeves		

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

3 (20-41)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES OO-A	OO-B	OO-B	OTHER	A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10	C. FORWARDED NO. 11 12	DAY 13 14	YR 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	E.S. 21
		XX		B N Y	2 4 9 6 2	0 5	1 0	2		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO. 22 23	DAY 24 25	YR 26	REPORT NO. 27 28 29 30	OTHER 31 32 33
5	1 1	2	A 3 - 2 4	9 4 5

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Underground Student Movement in West Berlin to Aid Defecting East Berlin Students Escape

(East Germany/West Germany)

USIB. 34	IUO 35	FOC 36	EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39	RELEASED NO. 40 41	DAY 42 43	YR 44
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				

TYPE OO-E	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER			

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mr. William J. vanden Heuval
President, International Rescue Committee
New York, N.Y.

A101881

S5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
[✓ 9]	[✓ M]	[✓ I]	[✓ S]

AREA

51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	[✓ E]	[✓ E]	[✓ R]
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K" →	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE. L. O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2- OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	10
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA		4	8	12

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

For EE/USSR

FLEX EB

CASE

X-REF

FILES [illegible]

EDITORIAL COMMENT

[illegible]

~~1 [illegible]~~

~~3 [illegible]~~

EE/[illegible]

140A

AF/4

CA

/11-83 RJ

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
CCMajor/ha	Jay B. L. Reeves	Walt [illegible]	

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

F-5 [illegible]

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES 00-B	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
XXX	B N Y	2 4 9 7 2	0 5 1 0 2		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR	REPORT NO.
05 11 62	4 444

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Utilization of Medical Facilities Provided by Soviet Bloc to Win Sympathy of Angolan Refugees to MPLA/Poor Medical Facilities of UPA
(Republic of the)
(Angola/~~Belgium~~ Congo)

USIB	IUO	EDC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO. DAY YR
	12	9A		05 11 62

TYPE 00-E / NOT DISSEMINATED / GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) 1/10/3 81
William J. vanden Heuval,
President, International Rescue Committee
New York, N.Y.
5 5 5 64 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)
Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
O	E	C	O	1	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	0
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIP		4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS
For: NS/A and Scientific

18

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).
EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).
FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

EDITORIAL COMMENT
See for Sci

This information is known; however, we are issuing an 00-B to OSI for its corroborative value.

6 [illegible]

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
CCMajor/hs	Jay B. L. Reeves	JOHN F. LEE	[illegible]

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SECRET

2 (20-41)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. FORWARDED NO. (11-12)	DAY (13-14)	YR (15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. S. (21)
OO-A / OO-B / OO-D / OTHER: OOAS	B N Y	1 6 9 9 2	0 3	3 0	2	3 7 4 7 3	

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO. (22-23)	DAY (24-25)	YR (26)	REPORT NO. A (27)	B (28)	C (29)	D (30)	OTHER (31-33)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	X	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

USIB (34)	IUO (35)	EDC (36)	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED NO. (40-41)	DAY (42-43)	YR (44)
S	Y			0 4	0 2	2

TYPE OO-E (45): GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED (46)

F. SUBJECT AND AREA A 54180 INACTIVE (REMAINS)

Radovan HORACH, International Rescue Committee, Rome, Italy

(International)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue
New York 10, New York

5-5564 (OK)

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

A 87027

Mr. Charles Sternberg
International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue, New York 10, New York

5-5564

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	[✓ 6]	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	[✓ 7]	I	N	T
[✓ 7]	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE L. O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS		1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS		2	6	0
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES		3	7	11
4. USIA		4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS

For: Support (Travis)

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Fwd to WE/1/Sweden.

Copy of attach on #54180.

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S CCMajor/hs

E/O/CHIEF Jay B. L. Reeves

EDITOR

BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

55-64

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES: OO-A: AS | OO-B | OO-D | OTHER

A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5) · B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10) · C. FORWARDED: NO., DAY, YR (11–15) · D. CASE NUMBER (16–20) · E. S. (21)

3 - N - Y 4 7 5 9 0 1 2 0 2 0 3 3 8 3 6 X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED: NO., DAY, YR (22–26) · REPORT NO.: A, P, E, R, OTHER (27–33)

1 2 0 6 0 X 1 7 3 5 6 4

U S I O	I U O	E D C	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD			RELEASED NO.		DAY		YR.
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44
S	X					1	2	0	7	0

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER | 45 | NOT DISSEMINATED | 46

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Photographic Identification of Imre Nagy and His Entourage

(Hungary)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Charles Sternberg, Director
International Rescue Committee
255 Park Avenue
New York 10, New York

A-87027

5-5-5-64

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	S	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	W	T	O

AREA

51	52	53	54
1	E	E	E
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	C	B
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL THIS REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO 1, 2, 3, 4 BELOW UNLESS RESTRICTED IN SECTION "K"	K. MAY NOT BE RELEASED	L. CHECK THIS SECTION IF RELEASABLE: O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S.D.	DELETE ENTIRE S.D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF AGENCY CONSULTANTS	X	1	5	9
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	X	2	6	0
3. NON-USIB AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	X	3	7	11
4. USIA	X	4	8	12

FIELD REMARKS

This is supplemental to NY 4426-C.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Fwd to EE/H

Many thanks.

We are closing case

1/16

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S: JIBalog:aek

F. O. CHIEF: J. B. L. Reeves

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM 4-60 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

2 (20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR. (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. S. (21)
OO-A: A	B-M-Y-1		06 16 60	32455	

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED NO. DAY YR. (22-26)	REPORT NO. (27-33)
11160	3166636

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Hungary
Comments of Hungarian Chargé d' Affairs on US-Hungarian Exchange ~~[illegible]~~ Possibilities/U-2 Incident/Status of Khrushchev

I A C (34)	I U O (35)	E D C (36)	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)	RELEASED NO. DAY YR. (40-44)
				061160

TYPE OO-E 45 — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
NOT DISSEMINATED 46

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number) 7 66348

~~[illegible]~~
John Richardson, Pres.
International Rescue Committee 5-5564 (EE)

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1	F	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	M	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1 APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2 APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3 NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

To OCR

146

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).
EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).
FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C. S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED	D. CASE NUMBER	E.	FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY
XXX	BH-Y-	13290	05130	12655	X	053002157105

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Reaction of Officials to Increasing US-Hungarian Contacts/ ~~Criticism of US Official Attitude by Hungarian Politico and~~/ Indication of Professor Germanus Sympathy with the West/ Interest of Dr. Vilman in Medical Exchanges and Aid/Visit to Children's Orphanage in Pot (Hungary, Poland)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Mr. John Richardson, Jr., Pres.
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A. 66348

5564 ok.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

IAC	IUO	EDC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD	RELEASED MO.	DAY	YR.
34	35	36 37	38 39	40 41	42 43	44
	M			05	25	60

TYPE CODE	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46
GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER			

SUBJECT 47 48 49 50				AREA 51 52 53 54			
0	E	C	S	[✓ 1]	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
[✓ 2]	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	C	R
[✓ 5]	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	C	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO: ~~USIA~~

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR

mk

EDITORIAL COMMENT

no Eval

14

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY):
EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS):
FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

C/S CCMajor/mph

F. O. CHIEF JBLReeves

EDITOR

BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED NO. DAY YR.	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
XXX	DN	-Y-17790	05110	3-2655	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED / REPORT NO: 05/30/58 242

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Political Situation Stabilized for Time Being/No Positive Public Support of Regime/Desire of Regime for International Acceptance/ Suggestions for Increased Contact with Hungarian People

(Hungary)

RELEASED: 05/160

TYPE OO-E — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — NOT DISSEMINATED

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

John Richardson, Jr., President
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A 66343 ok
A 5564 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
[✓ 0]	E	C	O	[✓ 1]	E	E	R
1	B	C	I	2	F	E	P
[✓ 2]	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
[✓ 5]	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	F	G	P	7	I	N	T
7	D	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL
MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO: USIA

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR - Advance copy to DD/I.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Advance copy to Mr.
Hutton Baker [illegible]
18 May

146

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS
THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).
EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).
FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO

C/S. CCMajor/mph
CHIEF JJReeves
EDITOR
BRANCH/STAFF CHIEF

FORM 2-58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES | A. FIELD OFFICE | B. REPORT NUMBER | C. FORWARDED (MO, DAY, YR) | D. CASE NUMBER | E. S.

00-B 00-C

OOB BN-X-1464004190321 95X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED (MO, DAY, YR) | REPORT NO. (A, B, C, D, OTHER)

4 1 5 6

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Bio Data on Rumanian Jewish Emigres

(Rumania)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Charles Sternberg

International Rescue Committee

New York, New York

S-71 I~ A4 87027

C. 5564 JK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

IAC	IUD	EDC	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD			RELEASED MO		DAY		YR.
34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44

TYPE OO-E 45 — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED 46

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
✓ 1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED

1 ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN

2 TOO GENERAL.

3 TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES

4 OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.

5 COMBINED WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL

MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO: USIA

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1 APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2 APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3 NON IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

TO: EE/USSR (SPILLMAN)

Sorry this is so late.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

1 MAY 1950

Case Closed 11-30

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY).

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS).

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES NO

C/S

COMajor/mph

CHIEF

JBLReeves

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

3 (20-41)

FORM 2.58 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

5

CONN 733 otb/jc 3 Mar 58 5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES: XX

A. FIELD OFFICE / B. REPORT NUMBER (1–10): B N H A V - 9 1 5 8 0 3 0 3 8

E. X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED / REPORT NO. (22–33): 0 2 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 2 8

RELEASED (40–44): 0 3 0 6 8

F. SUBJECT AND AREA C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

International Society for Research on the Coagulation of Blood, Capillary Function and Practical Myology

(Hungary/UK)

A-61504

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

5-5564 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT				AREA			
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
0	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	1	E	E	R
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	2	F	E	P
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	L	A	
3	W	[illegible]	[illegible]	4	N	E	A
4	A	[illegible]	[illegible]	5	N	O	R
5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6	W	E	U
6	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7	I	N	T
7	[illegible]	[illegible]	9				
8	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				
9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]				

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. [illegible] SUFFICIENTLY [illegible]
2. TOO GENERAL
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. [illegible]/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. [illegible] WITH

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Is scientific from EE/USSR
To alien from [illegible] - [illegible]
To [illegible]

C/S ETBarnard/jc

F. O. CHIEF JAY B. L. REEVES

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 2 (20-41)

CONN 687 otb:jc 7 Jan 58 5364

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES 00-B	OTHER	A. FIELD OFFICE 1-5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6-10	C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. 11-15	D. CASE NUMBER 16-20	E. 21
XX		B H H A V	4 9 4 9 7	4 1 0 7 7		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR. 22-26	REPORT NO. 27-33
01 10 58	B 29 6 022

IAC 34	IUO 35	EDC 36	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37-39	RELEASED MO. DAY YR. 40-44
				01 1 58

TYPE OO-E 45: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED 46

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	[✓ 1]	E	E	R
1	S	C	I	2	F	E	P
2	P	O	L	3	L	A	
3	M	I	L	4	N	E	A
4	A	I	R	5	N	O	R
5	S	O	C	6	W	E	U
6	T	O	P	7	I	N	T
7	B	I	O				
8	N	U	C				
9	M	I	S				

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

S-E-C-R-E-T

Some Characteristics of Kosice

[illegible] (Czechoslovakia)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

A-61504

S-5364 OK

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. O.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH 13

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Route Via 1. Map Lib.
2. Graphics Register
Map Library please loan
map to GR with photos

No EV

C/S ETBarnard:jc

F. O. CHIEF B JAY B L REEVES

EDITOR

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

CONN 662-C-1 etb:jc 21 Nov 57

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE (1–5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6–10)	C. FORWARDED MO. DAY YR. (11–15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16–20)	E. S. (21)
OO-B XX	BHHAV	44437	112157	G-27	K

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. DAY YR. (22–26)	REPORT NO. A S (27–28)	REPORT NO. I A OTHER (29–33)
112157	✓	2 77

IAC (34)	IUO (35)	EDC (36)	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37–39)	RELEASED MO. DAY YR. (40–44)
				12137

TYPE OO-E (45): GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED (46)

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Questionable Medical Research Organization

(Hungary)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee, Conn. State Chapter
257 Church Street
New Haven, Connecticut

A-61504

B-5564 ok

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
[✓ 1]	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	[✓ S]	C	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	— 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	— 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	— 3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

If Headquarters has any info on subject outfit, collector would appreciate receiving it.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

In Scientific from EE/USSR pu

To M/S1
560 Paul
BR (Marr)

Photostats to BR (ATTN: Marr)

C/S ETBarnard:jc

F. O. CHIEF JAY B L REEVES

EDITOR Robert L. Gill

BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF West

FORM NO. 25 1 NOV 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONN 660 etb:jc 21 Nov 57 5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00-C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES 00-A	00-B	A. FIELD OFFICE 1	2	3	4	5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6	7	8	9	10	C. FORWARDED MO. 11	12	DAY 13	14	YR. 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16	17	18	19	20	E. S. 21
00-D: XX	OTHER:	B	N	H	A	V	4	4	4	2	7	1	1	2	1	7						X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. 22	23	DAY 24	25	YR. 26	REPORT NO. A 27	[✓ B] 28	C 29	D 30	OTHER 31	32	33
1	1	2	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	2	7	3

F. SUBJECT AND AREA C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Presence of Soviet Fighter Aircraft

(Czechoslovakia)

I A C 34	I U O 35	E O C 36	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37	38	39	RELEASED MO. 40	41	DAY 42	43	YR. 44
						1	1	2	7	7

TYPE 00-E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Mrs. Steven Magyar
International Rescue Committee
Connecticut State Chapter
257 Church Street, New Haven, Connecticut

A61504
5-5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
[✓ 4]		I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA

51	52	53	54
[✓ 1]	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	— 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	— 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

FIELD REMARKS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

No Eval

J9C

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH, STAFF CHIEF
ETBarnard:jc	JAY B L REEVES		

FORM NO. 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 56

2 (20-41)

5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY						FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
SUGGESTED SERIES OTHER	A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. FORWARDED MO. (11-12)	DAY (13-14)	YR. (15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E.S. (21)	RECEIVED / REPORT NO. (22-33)
OOE	BN-Y-	31787	08	19	7	25329	X	082073086564

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

S-E-C-R-E-T

Richardson Contacts in Poland

(Poland)

RELEASED (40-44): 08217

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number) NEW # A 66348

Mr. John Richardson
International Rescue Committee
New York, N. Y.

S-5564

TYPE OO-E (45): 0

SUBJECT (47): 9 AREA (51): 1

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

DOCUMENTARY

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J. EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:

	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
9. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

TO: ~~Support (Crowley)~~

Mail addressed to the IRC Office at Bosendorferstrasse 9, Vienna 1 will reach Richardson until 29 August 57. Names starred arethe ones he considers most important.

TWX

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Dissem To EE/P

NYFO

9 SEP 1957

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH - STAFF CHIEF
CCMajor:dbp	TJConnor:	E T Crowley	

F-5564

PROCESS SHEET FOR 00/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES: 00-A	00-B	00-C	OTHER	A. FIELD OFFICE 1	2	3	4	5	B. REPORT NUMBER 6	7	8	9	10	C. FORWARDED MO. 11	12	DAY 13	14	YR 15	D. CASE NUMBER 16	17	18	19	20	21	E. S. 22
		X		B	N	-	Y	-	3	3	0	7	5	0	9	0	9	5	0	1	9	0	0	6	X

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO. 23	24	DAY 25	26	YR 27	REPORT NO. SERIES: A. B. C. 28	29	30	31	32	33
C	11	2	5	0	8	8	1	1	1	

I A C 34	I U O 35	E D C 36	EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37	38	39	RELEASED MO. 40	41	DAY 42	43	YR 44

TYPE 00-A GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Progress Toward Stability/Present Greatest Needs/
Growing Influence of Diem

(Vietnam)

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

Mr. Angier Biddle Duke
International Rescue Committee
New York, New York

A-[illegible]

A-5564

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or "Y" Number)

as above.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	F

NOT DISSEMINATED /

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN.
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. CONVERTED TO

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O.K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	1	X 4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	2	X 5	8
3. NON - IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	3	X 6	9

FIELD REMARKS

same

MAJOR

EDITORIAL COMMENT

2 [illegible] 1955

C/S	F. O. CHIEF	EDITOR	BRANCH-STAFF CHIEF
CCH/mfd	CAL		

FORM NO. 25 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED
1 NOV 54

3

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIAL ONLY [illegible] 3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-5-30994

CD NO. 7615 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Josef Sarospataky

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Josef Sarospataky

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 August 1899 in Szekszard, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife, 47, housewife, son, 23, student.

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1923 as mechanical engineer from Technical University, Budapest, Hungary.

EXPERIENCE: Telephone engineer with United Incandescent Lamp & Electric Co, Budapest, Hungary, from 1924 to 1925; manager of all telephone exchanges in Hungary for communications system of Hungarian Post Office in Budapest, from 1925 to 1945; interpreter and translator for US Military Government in Germany during 1945; interpreter and translator in Germany for Vatican Mission from 1945 to 1948; chief of follow-up section of Resettlement Division, IRO, in Frankfurt, Germany, from 1949 to present.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fluently. Knows Hungarian, German and French

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Sarospataky is conversant with modern up-to-date automatic telephonic devices.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

CS-46:2 } [illegible] May 14 — 51 — —
00-47:7 }

FP
65-46:3 May-14 — 51 — —

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ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

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EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]
BR/CCD 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CIA

REPORT NO.: 00B 30994

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Nov 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in E.R.
Report is of interest here
from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE: B Campbell

DIVISION: BA/KD

DATE: 16 Nov 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

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F. 5574/S

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30993

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Austria

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Denes Szentkuti

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

DATE OF INFORMATION --

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Denes Szentkuti

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 2 June 1921 at Kormand, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Austria

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

PROCESSED

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1939 from secondary school in Szombathely, Hungary; attended Technical University at Sopron, Hungary, from 1939 to 1943, graduated in the latter year, majored in metallurgical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: From 1943 to 1945, worked for Hungarian Wagon & Machine Factory Ltd in Gyor, Hungary, as an engineer specializing in problems of forging and hardening steel; engineer in ordnance service for American Military Government in Austria from 1945 to 1946; consultant in construction and operation of chemical plants for Donau-Chemie Ltd Aluminum Works Ltd at Linz, Austria, from 1946 to 1948; technical and engineering consultant for Austria Oil Ltd Refinery at Grundlsee, Austria, from 1943 to 1949; metallurgical and construction engineer for TEAS Company in Grundlsee, Austria, from 1950 to February 1951.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Hungarian, German and French.

- end -

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					DISTRIBUTION
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB	
ARMY	X	AIR		FBI	

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EVALUATION SHEE.

18K/OCD 5561

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. [illegible] 36993	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 19 May 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR.
Report is of interest here
from biographic standpoint

SIGNATURE B Campbell   DIVISION BR/CD   DATE 16 Oct 1951

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FORM NO. 70-10 JUL 1950 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30992

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR (Latvia)/Germany

DATE DISTR. 11 Apr 51

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Zanis Perkons

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Zanis Perkons

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 21 May 1888 at Zemite, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Esslingen-Neckar, Pfaffstrasse 1, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Married (Wife and mother-in-law will temporarily not go to the US.)

EDUCATION: Attended elementary school in Irlava, Grenci, Zemite from 1895 to 1899; attended high school in Tukums, Latvia from 1900 to 1904; attended Polytechnical Institute in Riga, Latvia, from 1908 to 1914, graduated in latter year, majored in engineering technology.

EXPERIENCE: Chief of technical and supply department, cooperative of Latvian dairies in Riga, Latvia from 1928 to 1937; consulting engineer for the Baltic States "Alfra-Astra" from 1937 to 1940; engineer and dispatcher for "Machine Builder" Trust in Riga, Latvia, from 1940 to June 1941; director of the Riga Screw & Nut Works at Riga, Latvia, from July 1941 to October 1944; engineer for the German Central Association of Milk, Fat and Eggs at Hamburg, Germany, from December 1944 to August 1945; teacher of mathematics at Latvian secondary school at DP Camp Oxford Alt-Garge, Dedelstorf, Germany, from February 1946 to August 1949; teacher at IRO vocational training center at Ludwigsburg, Germany, from September 1949 to February 1950; deputy resettlement officer for Lutheran World Federation at Ludwigsburg, Germany, from February 1950 to present.

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ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

[redacted]

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Perkons acted as consultant on dairies and refrigeration problems to the Ministry of Agriculture of Latvia, 1937-1940, and as consultant on heating problems to the Riga town administration during the same period. He has an impressive employment record covering over 30 years; fuller record is included in files. Personal and business references were received from people in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium.

- end -

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EVALUATION SHEET

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☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☑ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No previous data. Report of value from biographic viewpoint

SIGNATURE John W. [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]	DATE 17 Apr 51

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JUL 1950

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30991

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Vilmos (William) Nerath

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

PROCESSED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

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A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X

SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Vilmos (William) Nerath

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 May 1900 at Bilak, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Elizabeth, age 29, daughter Catherine, age 6.

EDUCATION: Attended elementary school from 1906 to 1910 in Valaszut, Hungary; attended high school in Kolozsvar, Hungary from 1910 to 1918; attended Technical University in Budapest, Hungary from 1920 to 1928, graduated in latter year, majored in chemical engineering (inorganic chemistry).

EXPERIENCE: Assistant at Inorganic Chemical Institute, Hungarian Technical University, Budapest, Hungary, from 1928 to 1938; assistant professor and director of laboratory of Inorganic Chemical Institute, Hungarian Technical University, Budapest, from 1938 to 1944; assistant professor of electro-chemistry at Hungarian Technical University, Dresden, Germany, from 1944 to 1945; chemist and director of analysis, inorganic chemistry, at the analytical laboratory, USAF air base at Erding, Germany, from 1948 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Co-author of two textbooks on chemistry.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Nerath has high recommendations from the USAF Chief of Materials Testing Department.

- end -

65-46:2

65-49:2 } area 146

Hungary-146

CP: -

65-41:3 (area 146)

TYPE 1ST-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE ARC

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EVALUATION SHEET

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OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CIA

REPORT NO.: 00830971

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Apr 51

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EVALUATION OF CONTENT

- ☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
- ☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
- ☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
- ☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
- ☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
- ☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

COMMENTS:

No record of this individual in I.R. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

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DIVISION: SR/CD

DATE: 16 Apr '51

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30990

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Constantino Molodetsky

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Constantino Molodetsky

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1902 in Bychow, Ukraine

PRESENT ADDRESS: Pruefennigerstrasse, 27, Regensburg, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Olga (nee Kamychow)

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1925 from University of Saratov, Saratov, USSR, majored in political economy and law; attended Krishanovsky Planning Institute in Moscow, USSR until 1938, "candidate" for economics; Ph D in economics in 1942 from Institute for Finance and Economics in Leningrad, USSR.

EXPERIENCE: Taught economic geography at secondary school from 1925 to 1929; lecturer and senior scientific advisor from 1930 to 1935 at the Institute of Air Transport Engineers in Leningrad, USSR; lecturer from 1935 to 1937 at Technological Institute in Leningrad, USSR; head of the economic section of the association for scientific research at Leningrad Institute for Study of the North from 1938 to 1941; professor and dean of engineering and economic faculty at Leningrad Institute of Water Transport Engineers from 1941 to 1942; technical worker in agricultural library of University of Berlin, Germany, from 1943 to 1944; instructor--Soviet Arctic, political economy of USSR, Russian language--for US Army at Regensburg, Germany, from 1948 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Scientific papers, articles concerned with air transport, economics, etc, have appeared in various Russian scientific journals.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Molodetsky has gone on several expeditions to Siberia, the peninsula of Kola, Karolia and other parts of the Soviet Union.

TYPE ACT-DATE 1950-TFB-DATE AREA

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REPORT NO.: 00-B 30990

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Apr 51

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☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

Biographic data similar to that supplied previously by Molodchiky himself

SIGNATURE: Hermon Walpers

DIVISION: BR/CD

DATE: 17 Jun 51

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FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30989

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/France

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Frantisek Kovarna

PLACE ACQUIRED France

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

DATE OF INFORMATION --

DATE DISTR. 17 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Frantisek Kovarna

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 2 February 1905 in Krpy, Czechoslovakia

PRESENT ADDRESS: 11 bis, rue Jaques Coeur, Paris 4, France

NATIONALITY: Czech

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife Jarmila (nee Valeska), age 44; daughter Marie, age 15; son Jan, age 12.

EDUCATION: Attended Classical Lyceum in Prague, Czechoslovakia, from 1916 to 1924; attended Charles University from 1924 to 1930, graduated in latter year, majored in history and esthetics; received Ph D in art at Charles University in 1931.

EXPERIENCE: Assistant in Institute of History of Arts at Charles University from 1932 to 1935; held chair of lecturer in common esthetics, faculty of philosophy, at Charles University from 1935 to 1938; lectured on plastic esthetics, Faculty of Architecture, Czech High Institute of Tech., Prague, from 1938 to 1939; lectured on art and esthetics at Charles University from 1945 to 1947; professor of esthetics at Charles University from 1947 to 1948; lectured on history of Czech civilization at the Masaryk Adademy at Ludwigsburg, Germany during 1948; chairman of Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, Paris, France during 1949.

PUBLICATIONS: Has authored over 30 books on art and literature, including Contemporary Painting, [illegible] published in 1932. Collaborated with Encyclopedia Italian [illegible] branch of Czechoslovak plastics arts. Founded perio [illegible] Plans and Works to explain esthetics of production, [illegible] nthly review for esthetics of production, Tvar.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Czech, Italian, Russian, French and German.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Kovarna escaped in 1948 and crossed German border with family. He has been stripped of his posts and honors and sentenced to death by the Communist Government "for collaboration with American authorities".

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ANALYSIS REPORT

NAME International Rescue Committee

INDEX NO. 5564

ADDRESS

TYPE OF DOCUMENT OOB 30989

DATED 4-17-51

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SECONDARY NO.

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

ABSTRACT

Work Sheet

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SUBJECT	AREA	ACT.	DATE INFO.	TFR	DATE AREA
NATL'S OUTSIDE COUNTRY – 65.46:2	CZECH-132	–	51	–	
DP'S 65-46:3	FRANCE-138	-	61	–	–

FORM NO. 57-26
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EVALUATION OF CONTENT

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- ☒ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
- ☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
- ☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
- ☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

[illegible] 64

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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

According to CIA 00-B-654-49, 31 Jan. 1949 Confidential, Doc. Dr. Frantisek KOVARNA was purged in 1948 for a provoking article in "Free Tomorrow - Svobodny Zitrek" where he defended the Bulgarian "traitor", PETKOV, and slandered the "peoples democratic constitution of the Bulgarian Republic." And purged "finally for a series of declarations defending traitorous policies".

According to Army SPER # 122 USFA 21 July 1950 Secret, University Professor Dr. KOVARNA is listed among Czech "traitors" residing in Western countries on a Cominform circular from Prague which instructs all the various sections of the Cominform in all countries to furnish all possible information on these "traitors".

According to State, Information Report No. LAD-A22 December 1948 Confidential, University Professor Dr. Frantisek KOVARNA was listed as living in exile in Paris as of 10 December 1948.

No further information is available in OCD/BR.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30988

CD NO.

COUNTRY Austria/France

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Antonin Hruby

PLACE ACQUIRED France

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 12 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X

SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Antonin Hruby

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: ? June 1920 at Vienna, Austria

PRESENT ADDRESS: Paris, France

NATIONALITY: Austrian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife, Sarka, age 30, chemical engineer and micro-analyst.

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Vienna from 1926 to 1930; attended Vienna High School from 1930 to 1938; attended University of Prague, Czechoslovakia, from 1938 to 1946, received M A in German in 1942 and Ph D in Literature in 1946.

EXPERIENCE: Professor of German at secondary school in Prague from 1942 to 1945; manager of Borovy (publishers) during 1945 at Prague; professor in Institute of Slavic Studies and Faculty of Letters at Prague University from 1945 to 1948; director of Czech literature courses and German lecturer at Prague University from 1946 to 1948; director of Czech literature at Prague Technical High School during 1948; Professor of German at Colbert College in Paris from 1948 to 1949; Professor of German at Lycee of Clermont-Ferrand, Clermont-Ferrand, France, during 1949; broadcaster in Czech section of Radiofusion Francaise, Paris, from 1948 to 1949.

PUBLICATIONS: Regular contributor to literary magazines; Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der altesten deutschen Balladen published by Librairie Gyldendal, Copenhagen 1949; is preparing German grammar for foreigners and other works.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads, and writes some English.

W W education

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Austria - end -

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TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

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☑ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

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☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☑ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

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COMMENTS:

No information available in BR files.

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SIGNATURE	DIVISION BR/OCD	DATE 27 April '57

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30987

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 7572

COUNTRY Hungary/Germany

DATE DISTR. Guido 56 13 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Eduard G Von Roka

NO OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Eduard G Von Roka

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 25 April 1922 in Budapest, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: Göttingen, Germany

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated from gymnasium in Budapest, Hungary in 1940, with honors. Attended Technische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg, Germany from 1940 to 1945, physicist.

EXPERIENCE: Experimental work in research, laboratory work, from 1943 to 1945 at the Institute of Professor Geiger: worked in thermodynamics for Dr Pascual Jordan, Mathematical Institute, Göttingen, Germany, from 1945 to 1946; worked as nuclear physicist for Max Planck, Institut für Physik at Göttingen, Germany, from 1946 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has published various articles on nuclear physics; also wrote popular articles on physics for magazines and periodicals.

SPECIAL HONOR: Received scholarship from Hungarian Government in 1940 to study in Germany from 1940 to 1945.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: In two letters of recommendation forwarded by Von Roka's last two employers, he was described as exceptionally able and talented.

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TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-ITR-DATE AREA

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[illegible] -146

30-49:3 }
65-46:2 } area 146
65-46:3 ([illegible])

[illegible] -146

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☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT

EVALUATION OF CONTENT

☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

COMMENTS:

No record of this individual in BR. Report is of interest here for biographic data.

SIGNATURE: Campbell

DIVISION: CN/CD

DATE: 16 Apr '51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO 70-10
APR. 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30986

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Jaroslav Charles Kuril

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

DATE OF INFORMATION --

DATE DISTR. 14 Apr 51

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Jaroslav Charles Kuril

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 27 May 1896 at Kolin, Czechoslovakia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Bremen-Vegesack, IRO Camp Grohn, Germany

NATIONALITY: Czech

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Kolin, Czechoslovakia, from 1902 to 1907; gymnasium in Kolin and Prague from 1907 to 1914; Polytechnical College in Prague from 1914 to 1918, majored in chemical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: From 1916 to 1935, worked for sugar refineries, laboratories, chemical firms, etc. in Prague, Guadeloupe, France, Germany, etc. Worked both for Chinese government and private industry in Canton, China, from 1935 to 1939 as superintendent of sugar mills, refinery, alcohol distillery. Self employed as consulting engineer in Hong Kong China from 1939 to 1940. Chief engineer for Hong Kong Brewery & Distillery in Hong Kong, China, from 1 January 1941 to September 1945. Technical adviser to the Chinese government in Canton, China, in 1946. Engineer for the United Chemical & Metallurgical Works of Prague in Bad Sulzufeln, Germany, from August 1947 to September 1949. Barman for N.A.A.F.I. at Goslar, Harz, Germany from June to August 1950. Resettlement clerk for IRO at Munster, Germany, from 1 August to 31 October 1950.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fluent English. Fluent in Czech, French and German. Has good command of Spanish, fair command of Russian.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

(65-46:2 [illegible] 132) [illegible] - 132 — 51

65-46:3 [illegible] - 140 — 51

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

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STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

SECRET (CONFIDENTIAL) RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible]

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. 00-B-30974	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Apr. 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of this individual in ER. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE E Campbell	DIVISION OR/CD	DATE 16 Apr 51

DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES WILL RETURN THIS SHEET TO THEIR PROPER CIA LIAISON OFFICER.

FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30985

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Bulgaria/UK

DATE DISTR. 17 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Nicolas Dolaptchieff

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED UK

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

PROCESSED

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Nicolas Dolaptchieff

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1897 at Sliven, Bulgaria

PRESENT ADDRESS: 37 Clydesdale Avenue, Stanmore, Middlesex, England

NATIONALITY: Bulgarian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; son, 23, broadcasts for BBC

EDUCATION: Graduated from the University of Sofia (Bulgaria) in 1920, majored in law and social sciences and economics; attended the Universities of Berlin and Bonn (Germany) from 1923 to 1924, received degree Doctor Juris.

EXPERIENCE: University of Sofia, Bulgaria, as follows: assistant professor of law from 1921 to 1926; lecturer (law) from 1926 to 1929;. associate professor (law) from 1929 to 1931. On Fellowship, conducted research in criminal sociology and organization of juvenile courts from 1931 to 1932 for the Social Science Research Council, Rockefeller Foundation, in the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Austria and Belgium. Had private practice and was professor of law at the University of Sofia from 1933 to 1947. Representative of the Bulgarian Peasant Party in London, England, from 1947 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has written many scientific books and articles published in Bulgaria and abroad. Was editor-in-chief of the foremost Bulgarian journal on theory and practice of law, Judicial Thought. Is a regular correspondent of various foreign scientific periodicals in Germany, France and Italy.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fluent English. Knows Russian, German and French.

- end -

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DPS 35-4613

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CRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET. PR/OCD

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA

REPORT NO. [illegible]

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☑ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☐ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NY 478-1
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NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

Information previously received confirms the XXXXXX contents of attached report.

SIGNATURE [illegible]

DIVISION [illegible]

DATE 23 April 1951.

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FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

FORM NO. 51-4B
DEC. 1948

F- 5564

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. 00 -30984

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

DATE DISTR.

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Herrmann Buduls

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE --

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION --

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Herrmann Buduls

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 4 November 1882 at Pebalk, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Married; wife is 63, biologist and chemist, graduated from Petersburg University in 1917.

EDUCATION: Attended Pebalk primary school (Latvia) from 1895 to 1898; Riga Town College, Riga, Latvia, from 1898 to 1905; Dorpat University in Estonia (Section of Nervous Diseases) from 1905 to 1911, received M.D. (Psychiatry); took three months course in psychiatry in Berlin Hospital, Berlin, Germany.

EXPERIENCE: Head physician at Minsk & Smolensk Army Mental Hospital in Russia from 1914 to 1918; head of Neurological Society at Riga, Latvia, Professor of Psychiatry, Dean of Medical Faculty of Riga University, private and hospital practice and research work during the period 1918 to 1944; was responsible for the care of concentration camp inmates and deportees at the Repatriation Hospital at Wildflecken, Rudolstadt, medical officer of camp with capacity of 15 thousand at Wurzburg, Germany (for US Military Government), and medical officer and psychiatrist for IRO mental hospital at Wiesloch, Germany during the period from July 1949 to present.

PUBLICATIONS: Has written 26 books on psychiatric subjects; one of the latest is "Healthy Life - Memoirs of a Physician".

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks and writes English fairly well, reads it fluently. Knows German, Russian, Latvian and French.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00 -B-30682

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

DATE DISTR. 9 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Arthurs Kirulis

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Arthurs Kirulis

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 7 January 1907 at Aluksne, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: Berchtesgaden Camp "Orlyk", Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

RELIGION: Evan. Lutheran

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced. One dependent, mother aged 75, name Illse-Emilija, housewife.

EDUCATION: Attended primary school in Aluksne, Latvia, from 1916 to 1922; attended secondary school in Valka, Latvia, from 1922 to 1926; attended Latvian University in Riga from 1926 to 1939. Majored in plant physiology, received M.S. in natural sciences.

EXPERIENCE: Was laboratory technician for phytopathology at the Agricultural Society at Riga, Latvia, from 1931 to 1936; assistant of department for phytopathology at Latvian University at Riga from 1936 to 1939; assistant professor of plant physiology and agricultural botany at the Latvian Agricultural Academy at Jelgava, Latvia, from 1939 to 1944, chairman of the Latvian National Committee in Hersbruck, Germany, from 1945 to 1949; administrative assistant for IRO at Bad-Reichenhall, Germany, from 1949 to 1950.

PUBLICATIONS: Published nine articles on plant physiology and plant diseases and more than 20 popular-scientific articles on same matter.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Latvian, German and Russian.

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TEN-DATE [illegible]

- end -

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STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. OO-B-30631

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY USSR (Latvia)/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Ernest-Voldemars Dravnieks

PROCESSED

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Ernest-Voldemars Dravnieks

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 19 February 1892 at Riga, Latvia

PRESENT ADDRESS: 21-a Detmold/Lippe, 55-er Strassse No 2, British Zone of Germany (attached to DP Camp-Augustdorf b. Detmold)

NATIONALITY: Latvian

RELIGION: Lutheran

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended secondary school in Riga, Latvia, from 1901 to 1911, graduated that year; Attended Technical University at St. Petersburg, Russia, from 1911 to 1917, majored in civil engineering and railroad engineering; Attended Technical University at Brunswick, Germany until 1943 (entrance date not shown), studied railway shunting dynamics; Attended Baltic University at Hamburg, Pinneberg, from 1946 to 1949, majored in railway shunting dynamics.

EXPERIENCE: Employed by Latvian State Railways as follows: From 1925 to 1935 as District Engineer in Riga, Jelgava; from 1925 to 1940 as lecturer and professor of railroad engineering in Riga, Jelgava, from 1935 to 1940 as technical director and substitute for Director-General at Riga, Latvia. Did research in railway dynamic shunting at Riga/Brunswick from 1940 to 1944. Representative of Latvian Red Cross at Brunswick/Detmold from 1945 to present. Professor of Railroad Engineering at Baltic University, Hamburg/Pinneberg, from 1946 to 1949. Chief, IRO Trade Test Board, IRO, Field Office, Munster & Detmold, from 1949 to present.

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					DISTRIBUTION
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB	
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI	

PUBLICATIONS: "Essay on Theory of Car Collect Retarders on the Gravity Marshalling Yards"; "Prospects on the Automatic Car-Retarders on Classification Tracks of Marshalling Yards"; "Hand book for Motion-Dynamical Calculations of Shunting Plants, Resistance of Trains and Car-Cuts, Calculation of Car-Retarders, Design of Various Types of Shunting Yards Profile" etc (in process of completion); several short publications in different Latvian technical periodicals.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks and reads English fluently, writes it fairly well. He is fluent in French, German and Russian.

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65-4[illegible].2
[illegible] 65-47.5 } [illegible] 166

65-4613([illegible])

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Latvia
166 33.3

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TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA

— 51 — —

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30680

CD NO.

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Eugen Diakowski

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Eugen Diakowski

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 23 July 1891 at Kharkow, Ukraine

PRESENT ADDRESS: Muenchen 8, Kirchenstr. 13/0, US Zone of Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

RELIGION: Orthodox

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated in 1909 from secondary school at Kharkow (Ukraine), Russia

Attended the Imperial University at Odessa, Russia from 1909 to 1913; received law diploma.

Attended Military Law Academy at Petersburg, Russia until 1917; received diploma in military law.

Attended college at Kiev from 1925 to 1929; received diploma in biology.

EXPERIENCE: Was lawyer on legal board in Odessa, Russia, from 1913 to 1914. Served as officer in army in Russia from 1915 to 1918. Taught public school from 1924 until 1929 in Kiev; taught biology at college at Mirotsk, USSR, from 1930 to 1934; Professor of Biology (Biochemistry) at Pedagogical College at Gluchow, USSR, from 1935 to 1936; Biochemist at TBC Institute at Kiev from 1936 to 1938; Biochemist at Veterinary Institute, Bacteriological Laboratory at Kiev from 1938 to 1943; Chemist (forced labor) at German sugar plant in Regensburg, Germany, from 1944 to 1945; DP in Germany from 1946 to 1948; self-employed in Munich, Germany, from 1948 to 1950.

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

PUBLICATIONS: Hand-book of Poultry Breeding; Hand-book for Breeding of Rabbits.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks some English, reads and writes it fairly well. Knows Russian, Ukrainian and German.

- end -

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
— 31 — —
— 51 — —

65-4612 [illegible] — 166
[illegible] 166 [illegible] — 236
65-4613 ([illegible]) [illegible] 140

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CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL, US OFFICIALS ONLY S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. 00-B-30679

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Czechoslovakia/Austria

DATE DISTR. 5 Apr 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Otto Goebel

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Otto Goebel

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 July 1922 at Kosice, Czechoslovakia.

PRESENT ADDRESS: Grundlsee/Styria, Austria

NATIONALITY: Czechoslovakian

RELIGION: Roman Catholic

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Graduated from secondary school at Kosice, Czechoslovakia in 1939; attended Technical University at Budapest, Hungary, from 1940 to 1944, diploma for mechanical engineering.

EXPERIENCE: Mechanical engineer, director of truck production from 1944 to 1946 for Manfred Weiss, Budapest, Hungary; employed by Kittel Engineering Buro at Gmunden, Austria, from 1946 to 1948 in the preparation of designs for sulphuric acid and nitrogen plants; did research for aluminum industry at Grundlsee, Austria, for Karl Asboth from 1948 to present; worked for Austria Mineralol G. at Grundlsee from 1948 to 1950 in the planning of petrochemical plants; from 1950 to present has worked for TEAS (Planning Buro) at Grundlsee as chemical engineer--planning of refineries, construction works for gasification of coal.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes English fairly well. Knows Hungarian, Slovak, German, French and Russian.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject's work background and personal references indicate his competence in his chosen fields.

- end -

TYPE ACI-DATE INFO-ITA-DATE

— 51

(32)

132

134

— 51

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ARMY	X AIR	X FBI	

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-30673

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 9 Apr 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Borys Boschenko

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

PROCESSED

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E. b	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Borys Boschenko

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: June 25, 1886 at Sonshki, Ukraine
PRESENT ADDRESS: Neu Ulm, Ludendorff Kaserne, Germany
NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Married, wife's name not listed; son Swiatoslav is 21 years old, occupation, radio technician.

EDUCATION: Attended Primary School until 1897.

Attended secondary School in Kiev, Ukraine, from 1897 to 1905, graduated in the latter year.

Attended Polytechnical Institute in Kiev, Ukraine from 1905 to 1911, graduated as Dr. of Agron. Science

EXPERIENCE: Employed from 1911 to 1917 at the Ministry of Agriculture, Province of Poltawa as head of Entomological Office.

Also at the Polytechnical Institute from 1911 to 1917 as laboratory instructor and lecturer (Kiev).

Professor of Applied Entomology at the Polytechnical Institute at Kiev from 1918 to 1920.

Imprisoned by NKVD in Middle Asia from 1920 to 1922.

Entomologist at Government Plant Protection Station, Turkmenian Republic from 1922 to 1925.

Entomoligost for Kiev Sugar Trust from 1925 to 1926.

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						DISTRIBUTION					
STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB							
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI							

Teacher of Natural History, Mathematics and Physics at the Alexandria Institute in Rowno, Poland, from 1926 to 1939.

Did laboratory work at a dairy cooperative in Janow, Poland, from 1939 to 1944.

Was at forced labor in Germany from 1944 to 1945.

Professor, Chair of Zoology in the Ukrainian Polytechnical Institute at Neu Ulm, Germany from 1945 to 1950.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Knows Russian, Ukrainian and Polish.

SOURCE'S COMMENTS: Subject has done extensive work in field of micro-photography.

- end -

Subj [illegible] 65-4612
[illegible]
[illegible] 50-49[illegible]

[illegible]
USSR-166
[illegible] 23-6

Germany 140

TYPE ACQ-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
— 51 — —
— 51 — —

[illegible]
65-4613

A-5564

COPY NO. 3

ACCESS SHEET FOR OOB REPORTS

NOTE: [illegible] is to be completed by the [illegible] submitting report

FIELD OFFICE	REPORT NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.	CASE NUMBER	
C H A B	H 0 2 B	B 7 0 3 2 2 1	- - - - - -	Y

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE

RECEIVED MO.	DA.	YR.	OOB NUMBER
1	2 2	1 1	51 178

REQUIREMENT NUMBER

RELEASED MO. DA. YR.

EDITOR

DELAYED

NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

AREA

SUBJECT AND AREA OF REPORT

Public Opinion/Refugee Problem (Germany)

CONTACT (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS OR NUMBER)

Mr Henry Field A5320

SOURCE (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS OR NUMBER) B 0256[illegible]

Mrs Dorothea Greene
Chairman, Voluntary Societies Div
IRO, Munich
A5564

IF REPORT IS IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT WERE SOURCES RECOMMENDED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH CONTACTED? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

Not responsive to requirements

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

A Card

CONFIDENTIAL

DELAYED
1. Clarification by F. O.
2. Reproduction
3. Translation
4. Other/miscellaneous

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. Already sufficiently well known
2. Too general
3. Type data supplied regularly by other agencies
4. Other/miscellaneous
5. Forwarded to FDO
6. Forwarded to FBI
7. Combined with ____

FORM NO. 37-14 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
APR 1950

F.5534

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29448

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Poland/Italy

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Henryk Boguslawski

PLACE ACQUIRED Italy

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 19 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 2

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Henryk Boguslawski

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 5 May 1910 at Wilno, Poland

PRESENT ADDRESS: Via di Villa Buffo 31, Rome, Italy

NATIONALITY: Polish

RELIGION: Roman Catholic

MARITAL STATUS: Married to Halina Zawodzinska Boguslawski, age 40, occupation ceramic artist.

EDUCATION: Attended high school in Wilno, Poland, from 1921 to 1929, was graduated.

Attended Politechnika (Technical College) in Warsaw, Poland, from 1929 to 1935, obtained degree of Master of Sciences in Wireless.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as engineer and designer from 1935 to 1936 by the Polish Broadcasting Corp in Warsaw, and as technical manager for that company in Wilno from 1936 to 1939.

Was prisoner-of-war of Soviets from 1939 to 1942.

Served as Lieutenant in Polish Corps of British Army from 1942 to 1947 (Egypt, Italy).

Employed as collaborator with Italian National Council for Scientific Research from 1947 to 1948 in Rome.

Employed in Rome as Eligibility Officer with IRO from 1948 to 1950.

Is at present, and has been since 1950, employed at translation of technical magazines for the Italian Broadcasting Corp in Rome.

Subject is radio engineer and ceramic artist.

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STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI		

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject speaks, writes and reads English fluently. Knows French, Italian, German, Russian and Polish.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject is a man who can be expected to make an excellent adjustment. He has a good personality, speaks excellent English, and is very well integrated.

- end -

Displaced Persons: Italy:
65-46.2 (area 160) 148
65-46.3 (area 148) Poland:
160

TYPE	ACT-DATE	INFO-TFR-DATE	AREA
–	51	–	–
–	51	–	–

14-00000

CRET [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

EVALUATION SHEET

[illegible] 6751
[illegible]/ER 5564

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. [illegible] 29447	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION [illegible]

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

EE

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR files. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]	DATE [illegible]

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FORM NO. 70—10
JUL 1950

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F-5564

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00 -B-29447

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY Hungary/Austria

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Laszlo Beke

PLACE ACQUIRED Austria

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

PROCESSED

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED.	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Laszlo Beke

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 November 1904 at Felsodobsza, Hungary

PRESENT ADDRESS: IRO Camp Asten-Linz, Post Heinrichsdorf, Austria

NATIONALITY: Hungarian

RELIGION: Calvinist

MARITAL STATUS: Married, four dependents: Wife, Maria, age 27, occupation hand-weaving; daughter, Maria, age 11; son, Attila, age 10; son, Andreas, age 7.

EDUCATION: Graduated with degree in Electrical Engineering from Technological School, Budapest, Hungary, in 1923.
Taking refresher courses in Electrical Engineering at present at Technical School in Linz, Austria.

EXPERIENCE: Was supervisor for Hungarian Railroads in Hungary from 1938 to 1940.
Was supervisor for Institute for Industrial Planning at Budapest, Hungary, from 1940 to 1941.
Was chief engineer at hydraulic power plant at Haidunanas, Hungary, from 1941 to 1944.
From 1945 to 1950 has been employed as draftsman, mechanic and engineer with the US Army, the British Army, and firms including Brown-Boveri Company.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes some English. Knows Hungarian and German.

- end -

D.P.S.
65-46.2 (AAA 146)
65-46.3 (AAA 124)

Austria:
124
Hungary:
146

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-TFR-DATE AREA
- 51 - -
- 51 - -

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STATE	X	NAVY	X	NSRB						
ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI						

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EVALUATION SHEET

CD/ER 5567

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: C/4

REPORT NO.: C-29447

DATE OF DISTRIBUTION: 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

SE

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

No record of subject in BR files. Report is of interest here from a biographic stand-point.

SIGNATURE	DIVISION	DATE
B. Campbell	BR/CD	16 Mar 51

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FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

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S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29446

CD NO. 7613 Guide 40

COUNTRY Latvia/Germany

DATE DISTR. 19 Mar 1951

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Johan Bedrit

NO. OF PAGES 1

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

PROCESSED

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Johan Bedrit

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 30 August 1892 in Latvia.

PRESENT ADDRESS: Herzog Rudolfstr. 49 III, Munich, Germany

NATIONALITY: Latvian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended secondary school until 1910.
Attended Polytechnical School in Riga, Latvia, from 1913 to 1914. Took degree in Constructive Engineering in 1915.
Attended Oscar von Miller Polytechnical School in Munich, Germany, from 1947 to 1948, obtained degree in Mechanical Engineering.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as draftsman from 1910 to 1912 at the Volmar-Hainash Office of Railway Construction Office.
Employed as engineering supervisor from 1916 to 1918 at the Railway Building District Office, Batum-Trapezund, Caucasus.
Employed by Latvian Railway from 1918 to 1944 as engineer in Technical Department.
Employed in 1944 by State Railways, Cottbus, Germany, as laborer.
Employed as workman by the US Military Administration of Anorgana, Gendorf, Germany, from May to October 1946.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Not indicated.

- end -

Displaced Persons Germany
65-46.2 (auu 166) 140
65-46.3 (auu 141) Latvia:
166-33.3

TYPE ACT-DATE INFO-IFO-DATE AREA
— 51 — —
— 51 — —

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ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI				

4-00000

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EVALUATION SHEET

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OO/ER 5564

OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. OO B 29416	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 March 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
☐ A CONSIDERABLE VALUE	☐ 1 CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
☐ E ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY KNOWN	☐ 5 PROBABLY FALSE
☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

NOTE: IF FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT, OR IF SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION ARE SUGGESTED BY THIS REPORT, PLEASE INDICATE. FOR OUR GUIDANCE YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE YOUR COMMENTS AS COMPLETE AND DEFINITE AS POSSIBLE.

COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

BR has no record of this individual. Report is of interest here from biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE B Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Mar 51

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FORM NO. 70-10
JUL 1950

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29445

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Olexa Antypiv

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Olexa Antypiv

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 7 October 1895 at Kupiansk, Ukraine, USSR

PRESENT ADDRESS: Ludendorf Kaserne, Neu-Ulm, Germany

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended primary school at Kupiansk, secondary technical school at Rostov-on-Don and industrial school at Kupiansk.
Attended the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Czechoslovakia from 1923 to 1928, graduated as engineer-hydrotechnician.

EXPERIENCE: Was in Officers' Training Corps of Russian Army from 1915 to 1917.
Lectured on topography from 1918 to 1923, Army of Ukrainian National Republic.
Employed as District Instructor of Melioration Work at the Government Husbandry Office at Kielce from 1928 to 1931.
Held Chair of Hydrotechnics at the Ukrainian Academy of Husbandry in Czechoslovakia from 1931 to 1936.
Lectured on hydrotechnics and descriptive geometry at the Ukrainian Technical University in Podebrady from 1936 to 1945, and at the Ukrainian Technical University in Neu-Ulm from 1945 to 1950.

PUBLICATIONS: Text book on Descriptive Geometry and Engine Building published in 1937, reissued in 1942.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Subject is now learning English. Knows Ukrainian, Russian, Czech, Polish and German.

- end -

Displaced Persons: Germany 140
65-46.2(area 166)
65-46.3(area 140) USSR 166

TYPE	ACT-DATE	INFO-TFR-DATE	AREA
—	51		
—	51		

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EVALUATION SHEET

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OFFICE OF ORIGIN CIA	REPORT NO. OOB 57445	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION 14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
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☑ B OF VALUE	☑ 2 PROBABLY TRUE
☐ C SLIGHT VALUE ONLY	☐ 3 POSSIBLY TRUE
☐ D NO VALUE	☐ 4 DOUBTFUL
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☐ F NO DATA PERMITTING ASSESSMENT	☐ 6 CANNOT BE JUDGED

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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

BR has no previous record of subject. Report is of interest here from a biographic standpoint.

SIGNATURE C. Campbell	DIVISION BR/CD	DATE 16 Mar 51

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FORM NO. 70-10 JUL 1950 UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED [✓ CONFIDENTIAL] SECRET

F-5564

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. 00-B-29444

CD NO. 7618 Guide 40

COUNTRY USSR/Germany

SUBJECT Biographical Data - Boris Abramenko

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

DATE ACQUIRED BY SOURCE Up to Feb 51

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to Feb 51

DATE DISTR. 14 Mar 1951

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

GRADING OF SOURCE BY OFFICE OF ORIGIN						SOURCE'S OPINION OF CONTENT					
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	USUALLY RELIABLE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	NOT RELIABLE	CANNOT BE JUDGED	TRUE	PROBABLY TRUE	POSSIBLY TRUE	DOUBTFUL	PROBABLY FALSE	CANNOT BE JUDGED
A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F. X	1.	2. X	3.	4.	5.	6.

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SOURCE Foreign representative of a US resettlement agency which is interested in bringing the subject of this report to the US. The following information was forwarded to the headquarters of that agency to determine placement possibilities in the US. To date, no decision has been reached.

NAME: Boris Abramenko

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: June 22, 1907, at Krivy Rih, Ukraine, USSR

PRESENT ADDRESS: Buckenbergkaserne, Pforzheim, Germany

RELIGION: Orthodox

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

MARITAL STATUS: Single

EDUCATION: Attended elementary and high schools in Krivy Rih, Ukraine, in 1923.
Attended the Mining Institute at Yuzovka, USSR, from 1923 to 1927, graduated.
Attended the Scientific Institute at Yuzovka, USSR, from 1927 to 1929; majored in mathematics and mining, received degree of Doctor of Mathematics.

EXPERIENCE: Employed as research worker from 1927 to 1929 at the Yuzovka Scientific Research Institute, USSR.
Employed as mining engineer from 1929 to 1942 at the Donbas Mines in the USSR.
Employed at forced farm labor from 1944 to 1945 at Saalfeld, Germany.
Employed as a clerk in his own field by the US Army and IRO from 1945 to 1950 in Germany.

COMMAND OF LANGUAGES: Speaks, reads and writes fair English. Knows Ukrainian, Russian, German and Spanish.

COMMENTS BY SOURCE: Subject is an outstanding engineer and research worker.

- end -

(Info previously Indexed)

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ARMY	X	AIR	X	FBI									

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EVALUATION SHEET

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OFFICE OF ORIGIN	REPORT NO.	DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
O/A	00 B 29444	14 Mar 51

VALUE	EVALUATION OF CONTENT
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COMMENTS: (PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

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SIGNATURE	DIVISION	DATE
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COPY NO. 3

PROCESS SHEET FOR OO-B REPORTS

NOTE: Sections a through i to be completed by the Field Office originating report

(a) FIELD OFFICE					(b) REPORT NUMBER					(c) FORWARDED MO.		DA.		YR.	(d) CASE NUMBER						(e) X
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
N	Y	-	Y	-	2	6	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0							Y

(f) SUBJECT AND AREA OF REPORT

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Political Observations (Germany (Western Zones))

(g) CONTACT (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS; OR "Y" NUMBER)

David Martin A 25 203
International Rescue Committee A 5564
103 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.

(h) SOURCE (NAME, TITLE, ORGANIZATION AND ADDRESS; OR "Y" NUMBER)

As above

(i) IF REPORT IS IN RESPONSE TO A NUMBERED REQUIREMENT, WERE SOURCES RECOMMENDED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH CONTACTED? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

EDITORIAL COMMENTS

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JAN 3

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE

RECEIVED MO.		DA.		YR.	OO-B NUMBER					
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
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REQUIREMENT NUMBER					
34	35	36	37	38	39

RELEASED MO.		DA.		YR.	EDITOR
40	41	42	43	44	

DELAYED	45	NOT DISSEMINATED	46

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	C	I
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	A	I	R
5	S	O	C
6	T	O	P
7	B	I	O
8	N	U	C
9	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	E	E	R
2	F	E	P
3	L	A	
4	N	E	A
5	N	O	R
6	W	E	U
7	I	N	T

DELAYED
1. Clarification by F. O.
2. Reproduction
3. Translation
4. Other/miscellaneous

NOT DISSEMINATED
1. Already sufficiently well known
2. Too general
3. Type data supplied regularly by other agencies
4. Other/miscellaneous
5. Forwarded to FDD
6. Forwarded to FBI
7. Combined with ______

FORM NO. 57-14 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
APR. 1950

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA Air

DISPATCH NO. O?PA-105

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WE

DATE 5 February 1953

FROM Chief of Station, Paris

DOC. MICRO SER.

SUBJECT GENERAL
SPECIFIC Fritz (aka Fred) [illegible]

Reference: State Dept Control Cable 1437, 14 Nov 52, from Bonn

1. On 11 June 52, the Press Attache of the Paris Embassy wrote us the following memorandum:

> According to French records, Fred [illegible] was born May 31, 1903 in Berlin. He was trained as a lawyer, left Germany in 1931, and appeared in France in 1933. In 1939, he enlisted in the Foreign Legion. Some time in 1940, he was demobilized in Morocco. He fled to Switzerland in 1942, and returned to Paris in May 1945. Since that time, he has worked for "Die Tat" in Zurich, "Libera Stampa," a Socialist daily in Lugano, and other papers. In 1949, he went to work for "Die Welt," the British-controlled newspaper in Hamburg. In February 1951, he was replaced on that paper by a German. At the present time, he works for "Radio Sarrebrucken," as well as for "Der Bund." He was naturalized French in 1947.
>
> Recently, he was cleared by SHAPE to see everything from the Pyrenees to the Elbe. He did so and made a report on the Atlantic Forces. His articles were considered OK by the French, and even were translated in the press review bulletin, "Documentation."
>
> Some time after the articles had appeared, however, a French official expressed astonishment that [illegible] had been given such wide accreditation. Though he had no proof to offer, this same official made the statement that [illegible] was known to the French as an agent of the Cominform. He gave no further derogatory information.

2. We searched our files, found no previous record of Subject, and informed the Press Attache accordingly.

6 Feb 53

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY 201-04228-1

CARD. REPRODUCTIONS

3. On 17 Nov 52, the Press Attache called our attention to State Dept. Control cable 1437, from Bonn, dated 14 Nov 52, a copy of which is attached hereto for your convenience. Basing our request on the information contained in para 1 above, and on the attached cable from Bonn, we submitted queries concerning Subject to both UNION and UNBOUND.

4. On 28 Jan 53, we received the following reply from UNBOUND:

Fritz (aka Fred) SILSCH, born 31 May 1903 in Berlin, of German origin, the son of Willy and Bertha TU[illegible], acquired French nationality by naturalization on 1 April [illegible]. On 19 October 1933 in Paris 10e, he married his compatriot Edith STRIEM, born 24 August 1905 in Berlin. They have one child, born 25 May 1937, of French nationality.

SILSCH joined the Foreign Legion in 1940 and was demobilized in February 1941. In August 1942, fearing lest he be interned in a camp in the unoccupied zone, he decided to go with his wife to Switzerland. Upon his arrival in Switzerland, he was arrested for clandestine border-crossing and interned in a camp at Martigny, (Valais). Later, he was transferred to a labor camp at Sierre. During his stay in Switzerland, he allegedly wrote several articles under the pseudonym "Basal" in the Swiss socialist press, notably in the paper "Libera-Stampa."

In May 1945, he returned to France and settled at Montrouge (Seine), where he still resides at 211 Avenue Pierre Brossolette. Since 1945, he has had a legal office at 63 rue d'Hauteville, Paris 10e, where, according to a usually reliable source, he is reported to have held meetings with Konstantin [illegible] of the Soviet Commercial Mission (sic - see [illegible] 11555) and with LUCCHINI of the Soviet Information Bureau. The activity of this legal office is, in fact, almost negligible.

Since 1945, he also has operated an office for the settlement of disputed claims for the International Rescue and Relief Committee (I.R.R.C.), 35 Bvd. des Capucines, Paris. He equally is administrator of the firm "Vaak and Sluit" of Antwerp, Belgium.

S E C R E T
Security Information

SIMSON devotes the greater part of his activity, however, to journalism. He is a correspondent of various French and foreign newspapers, notably the Swiss paper "Der Bund." He is accredited officially to the French Ministry of Information. He has obtained numerous visas for foreign countries in order to fulfill his professional obligations.

He has never attracted attention from the political point point of view, but we suspect him of being identical with an individual of the same name who belonged to the Swiss "Rote Kapelle" network.

SIMSON is in contact with a man named BURCHARDT (sic - see para 5 below), now a correspondent of "Der Bund" in Paris, and who also is suspected of being identical with an ex-agent of the "Rote Kapelle."

We are continuing our investigation of Frits SIMSON.

5. With regard to the BURCKHARDT mentioned above by UNBOUND, we since have consulted with the Press Attache, who has been able to identify him as follows:

Hans BURCHARDT, born 9 September 1906 in Lahr, Germany, presently residing at 105 Bvd. Voltaire, Paris 11e, economic correspondent for "Der Bund," accredited as a journalist to the Presidence du Conseil on 10 February 1946, also works for the Vereinigten Wirtschafts Dienst of Frankfurt, is known as a serious journalist, but otherwise as a doubtful individual.

6. On 4 Feb 53, we received the following less complete reply from UNION:

Frits (aka Fred) SIMSON, formerly a German lawyer, took refuge in France in 1933. He has opened a legal office in Paris and also occupies himself with journalism. Until now, no unfavorable information has been obtained concerning him.

7. We are making all of the above information available to both the Embassy Press Attache and to SHAPE. We would appreciate receiving all possible further derogatory information concerning SIMSON, his various contacts, and his activities. We would be interested to receive, in particular, any information to confirm UNBOUND's suspicion that SIMSON, and/or BURCKHARDT, used to belong to the "Rote Kapelle" network.

Distribution:
Wash: 3   Brus: 1
Frank: 1   Bern: 1
Berl: 1   Regis: 5

Lloyd D. Lagger

201-24,225-1   D 2035

PICTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

ACTION: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

INFO: [illegible]

SENT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for [illegible]

I am informed that certain former German Army officers who are known to be friendly to the United States are concerned about military disclosures in book bearing title "Nicht Neues in Westen[illegible] Verteidigen Europe" written by Fred Simson, Paris correspondent for Bern Bund, and to be released shortly by publisher Paul Haupt. Book according to my informant refers to Simson's observations of our military installations and activities in France and Germany.

[illegible]

17 FEB [illegible]

SECRET SECURITY INFO

201-24226-6

VIA AIR

DISPATCH NO. HBR-A-1704

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 15 October 1954

TO Chief, WHD
ATTN: Chief, FE/2
FROM Chief of Mission, Rio de Janeiro
INFO: São Paulo

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational/DTADALIA
SPECIFIC: Interrogation of Russian Emigrants from China in Brazil

Transmitted herewith in triplicate is a memorandum prepared by William W. ABERNATHY concerning the interrogation of Russian emigrants from China in Brazil.

Merle G. Raffery

Attachment: 3-page memo, in triplicate

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters, w/att. as noted
2 - São Paulo, w/att. as noted
2 - Files, w/att.

GLA/gpc

HBR-A-1704

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REPRODUCTIONS

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37

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES   29 October 1954

SUBJECT: Passing of RR reports to Brasilian Authorities.

REF. : HEP-A-519

1. On 18 October, Marcos BASTOS, ABERNATHY's colleague in the Brazilian Federal Political Police, informed him that on 15 October he had submitted to the Chief of Police a translation of the reports he had received from ABERNATHY. (BASTOS had been given by ABERNATHY sterilized versions of RR-1 to RR-15, inclusive, and RR-17 to RR-29, inclusive, along with the biographical information of the sources of these reports. RR-16 and RR-30 were not passed to BASTOS because they had been obtained from ALLOPATHY.)

2. On 27 October BASTOS informed ABERNATHY that the translation of the reports had been forwarded by the Chief of Police to Colonel [illegible], the present head of the Federal Political Police in Rio de Janeiro, who, in turn, had forwarded it to José PICORELLI, head of the Political Division of the Political Police, for his recommendations. BASTOS stated that he believed PICORELLI would recommend that the reports be forwarded to the Foreign Office and the War Ministry. BASTOS also intends to give a copy of the translations to Ribeiro de ANDRADE, head of the Servicio de Vigilancia of the Department of Political and Social Order (D.O.P.S.), São Paulo, who has indicated an interest in receiving it.

3. As an introduction to the translation of the reports, BASTOS described briefly Brazil's Stateless refugee immigration problem and the voluntary welfare organizations which assist the immigrants in gaining entry to, and settling in, Brazil. The translation of this introduction is as follows:

> "The current immigration of White Russians into Brazil began in 1948. It has diminished since June 1954 in the face of the decision taken by the National Institute of Colonization and Immigration (Instituto Nacional de Imigração Colonização) (N.I.I.C.) on 16 June 1954. On that date, the Directorate of the N.I.I.C. decided to request that the Ministry of Foreign Relations take the necessary steps to stop the issuance of visas for stateless persons for a period of sixty days.
>
> "On 30 June, Vicente RAO, then Foreign Minister, sent a circular to all the consulates ordering a stoppage in the issuance of visas until a final decision could be reached.
>
> "On 22 September, the Foreign Office issued to the consulates new instructions, according to which, generally speaking, stateless immigrants are permitted entry to Brazil only if they have in Brazil relatives in the direct line of descent whose economic situation is such that they can guarantee the subsistence of the immigrants.

DUCTIONS

"Nevertheless, it may be noted that there are various stateless persons in Hong Kong, with their respective passports in order, awaiting accommodations on one of the five ships of the Hong Kong-Buenos Aires line: the "BOISSEVAIN", "RUYS", "TJISADANE", "TEGELBERG", and "TJALENKA".(1)

"The difficulties which the international organizations encounter in obtaining complete and reliable information on the immigrants are due to a large extent to the fact that these immigrants always reside in areas far removed from the locales of the organizations' offices. One must also recognize the fact that included among the stateless immigrants is a large number of persons useful to Brazil, such as the following types of workers: mechanics, engineers, electricians, chemists, etc.

"There are twelve international organizations who are responsible for preparing the immigrants for the journey - or better, the exit - of these stateless refugees from China and various European countries. They are:

1. A.J.D.C. - American Joint Distribution Committee, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
2. E.O.I. - Entr'Aide Ouvrière Internationale (International Workers' Mutual Aid)
3. H.I.A.S. - Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
4. I.C.M.C. - International Catholic Migration Commission, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
5. I.S.S. - International Social Service, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
6. I.R.C. - International Rescue Committee. Has no representatives in Brazil.
7. L.W.F. - Lutheran World Federation, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
8. N.C.W.C. - National Catholic Welfare Conference, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
9. S.A.E. - Swiss Aid to Europe. Has no representation in Brazil.
10. T.F. - Tolstoi Foundation, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.
11. U.U.A.R.C. - United Ukrainian American Relief Committee.
12. W.C.C. - World Council of Churches, with offices in Rio and São Paulo.

"Two of these organizations handle the largest number of arrivals. One is the W.C.C. whose office in Rio is located at Praia do Flamengo, 180, apt. 602; its office in São Paulo is at Rua D. Veridiana, 390. The São Paulo office is under the direction of Miss Rachel de CARVALHO.(2) The other organization is the N.C.W.C., whose office in Rio is at Avenida Churchill 60; its office in São Paulo is in the Church of Peace (Igreja da Paz) on Rua Glicerio. The São Paulo office is under the direction of Father Mario.(3)

"Since 25 April 1954, many stateless persons who have been unable to obtain a visa for Brazil, Canada or Australia have been repatriated to the U.S.S.R. As a result of this repatriation, it is possible, though not probable, that some elements may be sent from China to Brazil to engage in subversive activities here, while members of their families, who have been repatriated to Russia, are held as hostages there."

A... CARD REPRODUCTION

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[illegible] Comments:

1. RIOD-846 reported on 2 October 1954 that about 60 such stateless refugees with entry visas for Brasil issued prior to 30 June 1954 were in Hong Kong waiting for transportation to Brasil. [illegible]

2. The head of the W.C.C. office in Rio is André MOURAVIEFF, who is concurrently Delegate of W.C.C. for all Latin America and, in this capacity, is Miss CARVALHO's superior.

3. The head of the N.C.W.C. in Rio is Walter DUSHNYCK, who is the overall head of N.C.W.C. activities in Brasil, in which capacity he is Father Mario's superior. DUSHNYCK's chief assistant in Rio is Miss Adelaide da Costa AZEVEDO.

13P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

WFP 5929

FON	2341	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] - France 1 [illegible] [illegible] 1959 " [illegible] VL
[illegible]					
[illegible]			[illegible]	OK	
[illegible]					
[illegible]		[illegible]			
[illegible]			[illegible]	OK	
[illegible]					
[illegible]					

DISSEMINATED O.S.G

[illegible]

NOT DISSEMINATE
[illegible] SUBMITTED

14-00000

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

12 January 1952

From	France, Paris	Report No.	EFP 5929 Local File No.
No. of Pages	one	No. of Enclosures	
Report Made By	Gustav Peterson	Approved By	David C. Talbot

Distribution
By copy to
FDM - 3
Files: EFP
UNNECESSARY
FCP - 007

Orally to

Source Cryptonym: UNNECESSARY

References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject: Joseph LEGRAND Reassigned

Comment: For traces on the individuals named in the attached see the following:
LEGRAND - EFPA-7016 (01), and others
GARY, Emile - EFC-9, EFC-418
ROCHI, Emile - EFC-418, EFC-518
DELFOSSE, Leon - EFC-411, EFC-402, EFC-535
[illegible] (fnu) - EFC-1271 [illegible]
LEMOINE, Charles - EFPA-7968 and others

Classification SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

10077

FORM 53
FEB 1949 51-60

19-7-1 159

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CONTROL/US. OFFICIALS ONLY

Subject: Joseph LEGRAND

Report No: K/P 5929.

Date of Information: Current

Place Acquired: France, Paris

Date Acquired: 8 January 1952

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 12 January 1952

Source: Through a fairly reliable source from an informant with PCF contacts.

1. Joseph LEGRAND, involved in the "Pronnier affair" and as a result expelled from the Central Committee of the PCF in the Spring of 1951, was recently re-assigned the position as Administrative Secretary of the Regional Miners Federation (CGT) in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais regions. Auguste LECOEUR was instrumental in securing this reassignment for LEGRAND, according to source.

2. [illegible] (Leon) and [illegible] (Emile) who were in charge for two years of the reorganization of the Regional Federation have been placed under LEGRAND's orders and have been charged with "insufficient action".

3. LEGRAND has been given "full powers" to visit all syndicates and to eliminate those [illegible] elements judged unnecessary, reducing the directing organisms of the various syndicates. Source stated that LEGRAND's activities are partially dictated by financial necessity and that staffs will be reduced for economic reasons.

4. [illegible] (fnu), Secretary of the Miners' syndicate of Denain (Nord), has been charged with reorganizing the Valenciennes sector, in particular the [illegible]-sur-l'Escaut region, which "has fallen into lethargy as a result of the inertia of the traitor [illegible] (Emile)". According to source, [illegible], former Secretary General of the miners CGT syndicate in Anzin, has for some time been in line for dismissal as a result of lack of discipline and incompetence in syndicate affairs. However, no one wanted to take the responsibility for dismissing him. The first act performed by LEGRAND in his new position was to fire him.

5. [illegible] recently declared that he also has been given full power to purge miners syndicates and that [illegible] (Charles) will not be a CGT candidate in the next elections for miners' delegates.

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[illegible]

29-7-1-159

SIGNATURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH 3P

VIA: Air

DISPATCH NO. OFPW-412 (~~[illegible]~~)

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief of Station, Paris DATE

FROM: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Frederic SIEGG
SPECIFIC: Fritz SIEGG

REF: OFPA-[illegible], [illegible] February 1953

1. The following information on Frederic SIEGG, believed to be identical with your subject, has been translated from a raw report in German received from a "well-placed source in the West German Government", and transmitted to headquarters in MGLA-2606, 24 March 1952:

Name: SIEGG, Frederic (Fred)
Born: 31 May 1[illegible] in Berlin
Address: Montrouge s/Seine, 111 Avenue [illegible]
Profession: Journalist, currently correspondent of the Swiss newspaper "Der Bund", the German daily "Die Welt", and of "Radio Stuttgart".

A politically doubtful person who received an entrance visa for West Germany valid for six months on 22 January 1952. According to information from the French Ministry of Interior (the S. R.), SIEGG was working for the Communist paper "Die Zukunft" (Munzenberger) before the war and during the war for the Swiss Communist newspapers "Die Tat", "Volksstimme", and "Arbeiterzeitung". Allegedly not a Communist! At any rate so stated the present Press Attache of the Consul General (the German Consulate General, Paris) Alexander/EQ.[illegible]/[illegible], on his behalf when SIEGG applied for a visa. On 22 January SIEGG submitted a written invitation on behalf of the newspaper, "Die Welt", "Stuttgart" (Radio), Frankfurt a.M. Nationality: Formerly German. Emigrated (Jew) about 1934 to France where he acquired French citizenship. According to his own statement, ~~he was advised~~ by the West German Press Office in Bonn to apply again for German citizenship as he,

EE/Winsley
EE/CIP
EE/S/Germany

RELEASING OFFICER
Charles Whitehouse
Paul Birdsall

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
F. T. G. Coleman
Francis T. G. Coleman

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

FORM NO. 51-28 JUN 1949

REPRODUCTIONS

after all, was working for German newspapers. However, he declined, stating that he had a bad press in Bonn anyway. He further stated that he had serious differences of opinion with Paul BOURDIN, Adenauer's former press chief. When Adenauer was not yet Chancellor of West Germany, but only President of the Parliamentary Council, he was refused p permission to interview Adenauer during his Swiss conference. He had never forgiven him for this.

2. We note that there are several references to Alexander L.[illegible] (presumably, Alexander [illegible]) in [illegible]'s file (see [illegible], 12963, 12725, and 12741), and that [illegible] has been closely associated with William [illegible], Georg [illegible] and, probably, others of the [illegible] group. We are also interested in the fact that [illegible] was introduced to [illegible] by Alex [illegible] (see [illegible]). We wonder if Alex [illegible] (correct spelling probably [illegible]), is identical with Alexandre Alexandrovich [illegible], reported in [illegible]-5953 as a contact of Konstantin [illegible], Vice Consul at the Soviet Consulate in Paris, and a suspected [illegible] agent, and if [illegible] has been in contact with [illegible] as alleged.

3. The Hans BURCHARDT now in Paris as economic correspondent for "der Bund", probably is identical with the Hans BURCHARDT mentioned in the "Final EQUAL Report" ([illegible], Part III, Vol. I, p. 34), which states:

Name: Dr. Hans BURCHARDT
Address: Bern, 6 [illegible]
Nationality: German, born [illegible] September 1906 in [illegible]
Occupation: Journalist. [illegible] in Paris as representative of "Europa Presse" of Frankfurt-am-Main, and of "Presse Telegraphique Suisse" of Bern.
Espionage: Unknown, but contact of FOOTE (Alexander) during war.

Part III, Vol. II, P. 31 of the "Final EQUAL Report", of which you have a copy, lists a Charles [illegible], but there is no mention of Frederic (or Fritz) SIMON in the report, or in [illegible]'s study on the Rote Kapelle.

4. We are unable to identify the (fnu) [illegible] of the Soviet Information Bureau with whom SIMON and Konstantin [illegible] held meetings in 1945. The International Rescue (sic) and Relief Committee for which SIMON operates an office, is the International Rescue and Relief Committee which has offices at 103 Park Avenue, New York City, and 53 Boulevard des Capucines, Paris. The organization is an outgrowth of the former International Relief Committee and the Emergency Relief Committee. It was formed originally to assist refugees from Nazi Germany. Since 1945 it has functioned as an anti-fascist organization assisting refugees without regard to nationalities. Although not ostensibly a Communist organization, several Communists have been affiliated with it (see [illegible]) and, therefore, membership in the I.R.R.C. should be viewed with some suspicion.

5. We shall be most interested in any further information on SIMSON and his associates you develop, and in any information on Alex [illegible] you may be able to obtain through appropriate sources. A copy of [illegible], which had not come to our attention previously, is attached. Only the reference to SIMSON has been translated as we were unable to have the entire document translated for prompt transmittal to you.

Paul Birdsall
Paul Birdsall
By: Ann Egerter
Ann Egerter

Attachment - 1 (Orig. only)

CC Frankfurt
CC Berlin
CC Bonn
CC Brussels

201-24225-6

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET /1231 26615 1231

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM RI/AN				DOCUMENT NUMBER	OFPA-26615.
				DOCUMENT DATE	8 Jan 1957
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1 10/12-1600	T T-4				NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files of the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.
2					
3					
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11					FILE TITLE NCC
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13 CHARGED FILE ROOM					FILE NUMBER: 200 / 124 / 3/17 / 45
					ENCLOSURE
14 RI/FI					DATE PROCESSED 14 JAN 1957

FORM NO. 610a

SECRET

REPRODUCTIONS

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. OFPA 26615

[illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, IO

DATE: JAN 8 1957

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris - LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief, WE

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC DTJOUNCE

Forwarded herewith is a Foreign Service Despatch dealing with the IRC's program for Hungarian refugees. Your attention is called to the last sentence of the attachment to it.

Jan C Van Hook
JAN C. VAN HOOK

Enclosure: h/w
1 - Foreign Service Despatch (w/att.)

7 January 1957

Distribution:
✓ 3 - IO, w/encl.
1 - WE, w/o encl.
2 - Pipit, w/o encl.
1 - OFPA

200-124-3/17-45

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

ENCL. 1 [illegible]

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

864.49/11-2355

FROM AMEMBASSY, VIENNA

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

November 23, 1955

P.L. ICA-10 EUR-5

67 E-4 [illegible] SCA-2, SCS-2, USIA

12/7 [illegible] USIA-10, Army-4, Navy-3

SUBJECT International Rescue Committee's Program for Hungarian Refugees

During a recent luncheon conversation the Ambassador suggested to General Donovan and other officers of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) that this organization might investigate the advisability of devoting part of its funds and efforts on the student groups among the Hungarian refugees. General Donovan and other members of the Board of IRC have acted favorably upon this proposal. A memo of conversation attached as Enclosure 1 to this despatch indicates the general lines of action being followed by this organization.

General Donovan also discussed with Mr. R. R. Brown, OFC, Frankfurt, the question of [illegible] administrative support for IRC's HRP and student programs and was counseled to submit estimates of the costs prior to contract negotiations.

For the Ambassador:

Alfred Puhan
First Secretary of Embassy

Enc: Memorandum

REPRODUCTIONS

COPY

200-124-3/13-05

Page 2 of [illegible]
Copy [illegible]
From Vienna

[illegible]

[illegible]

To: The Ambassador November 23, 1956

From: A. P. [illegible]

Claiborne Pell reports the aims of the International Rescue Committee to be as follows:

1. Care and maintenance of and counseling and other assistance to 1000 students (predominantly university rather than high school) for one year. Although IRC will take care of the students whom they have ensured, wherever they may be, the Austrian Government has agreed to pay 18 shillings per day for all of these students who remain in Austria. IRC will endeavor to have some of its students qualify for scholarships offered by U.S. universities and others for 500 scholarships offered by the French Government, as well as any others which may be available. In the case of any student who obtains a full scholarship, IRC's assistance to him will consist primarily of counseling assistance and supplemental aid, if required.

This has been given up.

2. A hostel for 100 students is being established and will be operated near Paris by the French branch of IRC.

3. IRC is covering expenses of a student hostel in Vienna — estimated capacity 300 students.

4. IRC is covering the costs of a hostel for a reported 150 students on Wolfgangsee.

5. IRC has purchased a Volkswagen bus which starts operating as of today near Andau, shuttling refugees from the border to the collection station 6 kilometers away.

6. IRC will furnish 500 assurances under RRP for the U.S. 200 have already been covered. These assurances are not limited to students or intellectuals but the Committee would prefer to assist these types insofar as possible.

7. Some two weeks ago IRC offered the Ministry of Interior to cover the cost of 1000 beds. At the time no beds were available for purchase in Austria so the deal was called off by the Ministry. Since then the Ministry has not followed up IRC's proposal, (although I have personally suggested on occasion to Ministry officials that they should not let this opportunity drop) but IRC still stands ready to cover its commitment.

?

14-00000

OFPA-26615

[illegible]

Page 2
Enc 1
Desp [illegible]
From Vienna

Poll stated that he had passed along to New York your suggestion that the agency cover provision of clothing and glasses books in Camp Kilmer. However, he anticipates that most agencies will probably cover their own cases with regard to such needs and he does not expect IRC to undertake the entire burden. He did state, however, that the Committee was bringing in two or three more people to support the operation in Vienna. In France they are looking into the Free Europe University in Strasbourg but would prefer not to become associated with FEC because of its government connections.

. Flivinsack

[illegible]

200-124-3/[illegible]

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

Daily Telegraph & Morning Post, Saturday, September 2, 1950

REFUGEES MAY BE SENT TO U. S.

PROFESSIONAL MEN

By Our Diplomatic Correspondent

A thousand Eastern European anti-Communist refugees of the professional classes may be sent for employment to the United States by the International Rescue Committee. Mr. David Martin, the Committee's Executive Director, is in London on his way to Paris and other capitals to investigate the scheme's possibilities.

It is also proposed to establish, probably in London and Paris, European institutes for the study by refugee experts of every aspect of life in East Europe. Mr. Martin said yesterday:

"The time has come when the free nations must use this mass of human talent to record what is going on and to ensure there are groups available to revive culture in Eastern Europe when the time arrives. We are prepared to bring 1,000 intellectuals to the United States and could, I think, absorb 2,000 - 3,000.

200-7-2-63

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

2P

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2 Nov 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	TELEPHONE	NO.
RI/ANALYSIS		EGQA-51403
		DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2070	2 NOV		[illegible]		PLASILOVA, Vera Maria
2.						
3. EE/EI/[illegible]/oc			18 [illegible]	[illegible]		3406
4.						Anything on Nilly?
5. EE [illegible]			1954	[illegible]		
6. EE		NOV 2 3 1954		[illegible]		
7. EE [illegible]						
8. EE/FI G/CS	[illegible]	DEC [illegible] 1954	13 [illegible]	[illegible]		8-13: A 201 should be opened on subject.
9. [illegible]				RYD		
10. SR				[illegible]		Carded
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14. RI/CD		JUN 1 3 1955		[illegible]		
15. RI FI						

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2 N [illegible]

2 Nov 54

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DEC

INDEX

PROCESSED THRU I/C

JUN 1 3 1955

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DATE	9		

CS CARD REPRODUCTIONS

FORM NO. 51-10

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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Vera [illegible]

The attached [illegible] received through [illegible]

[illegible] (1 cy)

[illegible] copies

[illegible] 61-23A

SECRET

[illegible] OBTAINABLE
[illegible] CARD SUBMITTED

EOOR-5140.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OPERATIONS MISSION TO GERMANY

Office for Field Coordination
Escapee Program
c/o American Consulate General
Frankfurt/Main, Germany

CONFIDENTIAL

October 18, 1954

[redacted]
Frankfurt

Dear Mr. [redacted]

In June of 1954 this office received a case from ASCA for a woman by the name of PLASILOVA, Vera Maria, who was born in Teplice, Czechoslovakia, on March 01, 1927. At the time her case was submitted to this office she was a student in Geneva residing at 3 Avenue Calas, and she was being processed for immigration to South America.

During a routine check conducted on this individual this office learned that Plasilova was associated with one Siegfried Milly, a suspected espionage agent in Switzerland. The information did not indicate that Plasilova was implicated in Milly's activities. On the other hand, it was indicated that an entry visa to France was cancelled by the French authorities. It was indicated that our sources in Geneva did not have direct access to police files on Plasilova which are alleged to be voluminous. No attempt was made on the part of American personnel to analyze the case at that time. However, it was the opinion of a competent American officer in Geneva that Plasilova should have been questioned in detail about her background and activities for the past seven years.

Based on the above information, Plasilova was denied USEP eligibility. On August 24 I wrote to the American Consulate in Geneva advising them that Plasilova had left Switzerland and immigrated to Mexico on July 5, 1954. Her transportation was covered by a Revolving Fund Loan from the International Rescue Committee because USEP eligibility had been denied. I advised the Consulate that it was my opinion that this information should be brought to the attention of proper American authorities in Geneva, in that Plasilova's presence in Mexico might not be in the best interests of the United States.

INDEX

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ENCL 1

2 Nov 54

201-82306

CONFIDENTIAL

CARD REPRODUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

On October 1, 1954, I received a letter from the Consulate in Geneva. This letter stated that "If you would indicate the particular authorities here to whom the fact that this woman has proceeded to Mexico might be of interest, I shall be glad to communicate with them."

This office does not feel that we should tell the Consulate in Geneva which American officers would be interested in the type of information set forth above. It is felt that you might wish to transmit this information.

Sincerely yours,

Paul E. Kelly
Screening Officer

2 Nov 54

201-82216

[illegible]-548-143

CONFIDENTIAL

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6 P

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

20 FEB 1954

NOTE: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS

NO.: EGCA-12023 [illegible]

DATE:

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. [illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	
2.					[illegible]
3. [illegible]				[illegible]	[illegible]
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5. [illegible]	[illegible] 1954			[illegible]	GB [illegible]
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13. [illegible] RID		APR 1954		[illegible]	
14. RI/FI				[illegible]	
15. RI/FI	6400 L				

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☒

SE/[illegible] 87

DATE 2 MAR 1954

FORM 51-10 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD REPRODUCTIONS

VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. EGBA-[illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE

TO : Chief, EE
thru Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
FROM : Chief, Berlin Operations Base

SUBJECT: GENERAL— CADORY/Operational

SPECIFIC— Identity 1

REF: A. DIR 25707
B. [illegible] 1007
C. EGBA 5040

1. Synopsis: In accordance with the request contained in Reference A, a summarized evaluation of the potentialities of Identity 1 was forwarded in Reference B. This dispatch is prepared to record in greater detail the information forwarded in Reference B and to report the latest developments concerning Identity 1.

2. Several weeks following the 17 June 1953 demonstrations, a group of East German refugees, who identified themselves as "strike leaders", were reported as forming Identity 1. From several sources, it was determined that the group was receiving behind the scenes moral support, momentum and guidance from such persons as Edward S. Van Fine, Paul V. Boudreau and others who allegedly wished to create a roof organization for West Berlin resistance-type groups. It was previously known that Van Fine was very active for over six months attempting to establish a central file for information concerning East Germany to which all West Berlin organizations would be required to submit information. Publicly, his reason for this was to simplify coordination activities among the Berlin groups, but it is known that his real reason was to establish a personal measure of control over all of these organizations. In the past, his efforts had been unsuccessful due to, among other factors, the absence of a convenient "carrier" organization. The continuing efforts upon the part of Boudreau to regain the position he had prior to his dismissal from [illegible] are a matter of record.

3. It appeared that the creation of Identity 1 as a separate entity would not add anything of constructive nature to the general "cold war" front, and further, that its existence under the behind scenes guidance of the persons mentioned above would merely complicate the already complicated West Berlin scene. The BOB position was, therefore, to attempt to prevent the formation of Identity 1 and to recruit the assets available among the "strike leaders" upon an individual basis. Reference C contains a description of the activities of DILDEL in this regard.

4. On 10 July 1953, prior to the initial meeting of Identity 1, CADORY invited the "strike leaders" to visit the CADORY establishment to be briefed of the manner in which CADORY carries out its East German mission. During this visit, a number of the "strike leaders" discovered that the CADORY East German program encompassed

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE
3 - COM
1 - [illegible]
[illegible] 51-28A

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all of the points which were hoped to be obtained by the formation of Identity 1, and since this would constitute an obviously undesirable duplication of effort, approximately ten of the "strike leaders" indicated that they would give their support to CADROIT or other existing organizations rather than to the new group. (The German language report of the CADROIT meeting is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "A")

5. On 21 July 1953, a special meeting of various West Berlin government and resistance group representatives was called to discuss the feasibility and desirability of encouraging the formation of Identity 1. With few exceptions, all of the major organizations expressed the view outlined in paragraph 3 above. The suggestion was officially voiced that the members of Identity 1 should lend their support to existing organizations. (A German language report of this meeting prepared by the CADROIT representative is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "B")

6. On 12 August 1953, a meeting was called by HICOG-EAD of representatives of U.S. intelligence organizations in Berlin. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the possibility that the formation of Identity 1 might constitute a threat to the security of American forces in Berlin. HICOG had also received an erroneous report that DTLINEN and CADROIT were rendering Identity 1 financial support. The latter impression was corrected during the meeting, and it was determined that Identity 1 would probably not constitute a threat if it did not receive or develop financial backing. At the time of these discussions, it did not appear likely that Identity 1 would receive such support, and its assets would probably be absorbed in other West Berlin or West German organizations. There were indications that several of the "strike leaders," with the aid of ZRCODIFY, were gaining employment in the Federal Republic.

7. The only direct contact established by BOB with any of the "strike leaders" was with Identity 2, who was considered for employment with DTLINEN. The nature of this contact is essentially covered in the following correspondence: SBRLN 0063, DIR 18181 and EGP-A 6120. Identity 2 was not hired by DTLINEN.

8. On 17 October 1953, the Chairman of Identity 1, Identity 3, informed Nelson O. Henard that he (Identity 3) intended to resign from Identity 1 since he was receiving insufficient support to make a living. He stated that although he was receiving some support from Identity 4, it was not enough to maintain his organization upon a working basis. Identity 3 said that he had made several radio appearances, and that as a result of these, Identity 1 had been receiving up to one hundred visitors a day. He reported that he had attempted to gain financial support from the West German Ministry for All German Affairs and other organizations, but had been unsuccessful. He then suggested to Henard that Identity 1 and CADROIT could establish a covert working agreement with the latter organization furnishing the funds. The offer had one attractive aspect, namely, that CADROIT could, through the assets and name of Identity 1, broaden its present mission and expand into other fields of psychological warfare. However, for the reasons outlined in paragraph 3 above, Henard was instructed to sever all contact with Identity 3. After he was informed that CADROIT would not endorse the suggested working arrangement, Identity 3 admitted to Henard that there were undesirable elements within Identity 1 who would have to be removed before the organization could function effectively.

A-1140

9. In accordance with the request contained in Reference A that a study of Identity 1 be made, discussions have been held with Identity 5. He stated that he was well aware of the activities of Identity 1 and that they were closely associated with the development of the TPOCCULT Berlin office. Shortly following the Stockholm meeting of TPOCCULT, Grambo, Identity 6 and others met with Identity 5 in Berlin to discuss the advisability of increasing the activities of TPOCCULT in Eastern Germany. Identity 5 felt at the time that Grambo and Identity 6 appeared to be the force necessary to get TPOCCULT on its feet in West Berlin. It was decided that TPOCCULT would form a Berlin office which would be responsible exclusively for East German operations. Although the mission of this office was not initially established, discussion apparently centered about the formation of an underground trade union to oppose the East German FDGB. Identity 6 and Grambo indicated that funds in the amount of DMW 1,000,000 would be provisionally available.

10. Identity 7, an East German refugee who was an active labor leader and had worked with the SPD Ostbüro, was designated the chief of the new TPOCCULT office. He commenced work immediately, but it soon became apparent that he was not going to cooperate with either CADCNA or ZRCODIFY Berlin, other than to use the latter's offices. Identity 5 states that efforts were made by West German and Belgian representatives of TPOCCULT to bring Identity 7 into closer harmony with CADCNA, but these were fruitless. Identity 7 kept knowledge of his activities from ZRCODIFY members, and it also became apparent that he was not informing TPOCCULT of everything either. The latter has evidenced a growing distrust and dislike for Identity 7 which has almost approached the state of complete disassociation. (For recent evidence of TPOCCULT by-passing its own Berlin office, see EGD-A 11223 which describes a TPOCCULT overture to DTLINEN.)

11. Since the TPOCCULT Berlin office was more or less an outgrowth of the 17 June demonstrations, it was natural that Identity 1 would seek a close working association with that group. An attempt was made, but apparently Identity 7, as an individual, prevented the establishment of an effective working relationship. On the other hand, CADCNA looked upon the TPOCCULT office under the leadership of Identity 7 as an increasingly undesirable element in the Berlin and East German scene. According to Identity 5, it was about this time that Boudreau began making overtures to CADCNA, reportedly acting as an "unofficial" representative of Identity 1. Since then, CADCNA apparently has considered Identity 1 as an activity to offset the undesirable operations of Identity 7 and has reportedly been funneling some funds (amount unknown) to Identity 1, possibly through Boudreau. Identity 5 is aware that CADCNA speaks highly of Boudreau, an observation which has been reported by John H. Quintance also.

12. Identity 5 reported further that Boudreau has been quite active gaining publicity for Identity 1. He has, for example, coordinated with Identity 8 in the preparation of an article concerning 17 June for Identity 9. During the Fall of 1953, Identity 8 introduced Identity 5 to Boudreau, and since that time, the latter has frequently pressed Identity 5 for U.S. support of Identity 1. Identity 5 has always told Boudreau that Identity 1 is completely a labor matter and that proper liaison should be made with either TPOCCULT or ZRCODIFY. Identity 5 introduced Boudreau to an American representative of the AFL, but there was no indication of the amount of interest the latter organization showed in the affairs of Identity 1. Recently, Boudreau published a study of the events of 17 June (the source of funds for this venture is unknown, but Identity 5 suggested that they may have come from CADCNA). Boudreau, giving credit to Identity 1 for the material in the report,

has mailed copies of the booklet to prominent public figures throughout West Berlin, among them Identity 5 and CADONA. About one week after Identity 5 received his copy, Boudreau telephoned him requesting comment concerning the publication and reiterating his former requests for U.S. support of Identity 1. (A copy of Boudreau's booklet was given John H. Quintance by CADONA. This copy is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "C")

13. It was reported in Reference B that Identity 5 felt that a major portion of Identity 1's financial support stemmed from Identity 10 sources, however, he now feels that what little support Identity 1 is receiving comes from CADONA for the reasons outlined in paragraph 11 above. Identity 5 was aware that Identity 1 had received welfare items from Identity 4 for further distribution among the families of persons who had been arrested for taking part in the 17 June demonstrations. To his knowledge, however, no funds, as such, were ever given Identity 1 from this source.

14. Nelson C. Henard recently reported that Identity 3 has resigned from his position in Identity 1 and is now practicing law in Western Germany. Henard also stated that he has heard of no recent activity upon the part of Identity 1 and has heard of no replacement being named to fill the post vacated by Identity 3.

15. The membership list of Identity 1 as reported in EGBW-207 agrees in part with a list forwarded by Henard. For comparison purposes, the latter list is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "D".

16. Since it appears that Identity 1, although reportedly not very active, has been receiving a small amount of financial support from CADONA, it is possible that a continued investigation of its activities may be warranted. If so, it is suggested that future queries be directed to John H. Quintance, the BOQUANT Case Officer who has direct contact with CADONA. Since the attachments are forwarded in single copies, it is requested that they be forwarded to the Home Office following perusal.

Marvin L. Larrison
MARVIN L. LARRISON

APPROVED
KENNETH V. WRYLKOW

RALPH H. ROGALL

20 February 1954
Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE (Attn: Geoffrey B. Hageen) w/att. E (3)
3 - COB (Attn: Wallace R. Parlett) w/att. A thru D (1 ea); w/att. E (3)
1 - EOB/KUPIES w/o att.
Attachments: UNDERCOV
A thru D described above
E - Identity sheet

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CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

Attachment E under separate cover to EGB-A-12002

Identity 1 is "The Committee for 17 June"

Identity 2 is Werner Gohlke

Identity 3 is Karlheinz Oehler

Identity 4 is International Rescue Committee

Identity 5 is Herbert Baker, Labor Officer, HICOG, Berlin

Identity 6 is Walter Reuther

Identity 7 is Shilling (fnu)

Identity 8 is Norbert Muhlen

publication

Identity 9 is The New Leader, American

Identity 10 is "The League for Human Rights"

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EE (Attn: Geoffrey E. Magoon)
3 - CCI (Attn: Wallace R. Parlett)
1 - EOB/KUPEES

C/EE (Magoon) EGBA 12002 E

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

[illegible] February, 1952

TO: Chief of Station, Paris

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible] "[illegible] Concernant [illegible] Otto [illegible] International"

Louis FISCHER

Reference: [illegible] dated 31 October 1951

1. The files of this office reveal the following information concerning the subject:

(a) The name of Louis FISCHER appeared in connection with the Paul and Hede MASSING case. The FBI report on the interrogation of the MASSINGS dated 8 October 1947 stated that the MASSINGS have known Louis and Markoosha FISCHER over a period of many years. They first knew them very intimately in Moscow in the period [illegible]-1931. At that time FISCHER, who was foreign correspondent for the magazine The Nation, was very pro-Soviet. During this period Hede took the two FISCHER boys to Germany where she kept them for almost 2 years and acted as their governess and teacher. This report further stated that in 1937 after the MASSINGS had returned from Moscow having broken with the Russians, they saw the FISCHERS quite often, and they found that the FISCHERS were also breaking with the Soviets. As of 1947 the MASSINGS were still friendly with both of the FISCHERS and saw them from time to time.

(b) In a report dated 5 August 1950 reviewing his activities in Russia during the 1920s and 1930s, it was stated that FISCHER was well known to have enjoyed unusually close contact with Soviet officials particularly in the Soviet Foreign Office. He sometimes had direct contact with Maxim LITVINOV, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar, and was reputed to have something like a pipe-line to the Kremlin through the outstanding Bolshevik journalist, Karl RADEK. RADEK and most of FISCHER's well-placed contacts were liquidated in the Great Purge of 1937-38, and all this contributed, no doubt, to FISCHER's disillusionment and disenchantment with the Soviet Regime. In any event, he contrived with difficulty to get his Soviet-citizen wife and two sons, who had dual U.S.-Soviet citizenship, out of the USSR. Mrs. Eleanor ROOSEVELT was credited by FISCHER with having obtained the exit visas through personal intercession with Soviet Ambassador OUMANSKY in Washington for the Soviet authorities were well aware by this time of FISCHER's disaffection. This

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

report also stated that FISCHER was active during the Spanish Civil War in support of the Loyalists and was reputed to have had good contacts with the last Republican Prime Minister, NEGRIN, who was generally regarded as a Soviet stooge. However by this time FISCHER was regarded in Moscow as a "Trotskyist." The report continued by stating that FISCHER had been very active in supporting the Indian Nationalist cause and was on very good terms with GANDHI. At the same time he had become very critical of the USSR and Communists generally. During 1949 and 1950 he displayed some interest in the Russian emigres in Germany, those who were former Soviet citizens, and collaborated with Boris A. SHUB in publishing a book in the U.S. entitled Thirteen Who Fled which is a compilation of the reputed life stories of certain Russian emigres, mainly from the Vlasov movement.

In this report Markoosha or Bertha FISCHER, wife of Louis FISCHER, who was born in Latvia, was said to have written some books under the name of Markoosha FISCHER. At one time she was a secretary of CHICHERIN, the early Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar, and Louis FISCHER met her while she was working for CHICHERIN at the Rapallo Conference in the early 1920s. Although she had been very strongly pro-Soviet in Moscow, she reportedly was very bitterly hostile in her present anti-Soviet expressions and writings. Since the war she spent some time in Munich as the representative of the International Rescue Committee of New York. She was reported to have left Germany some time in 1949 to go to Italy where she was supposed to have worked on a book said to be a work of fiction. This document stated that Markoosha FISCHER was currently living at a farm which she owns at Keller's Church, Pa., near Quakertown, Pa., but that she was seeking employment again in work aiding DPs.

Another section of this report was devoted to George FISCHER, son of Louis and Markoosha FISCHER, who is sometimes known by the Russian diminutive, Yuri. He was educated in both Germany and Moscow and came to the U.S. at 14 years of age with his mother. He was graduated from the University of Wisconsin. Serving as a captain in Air Force Intelligence during the war, he was used on missions in USSR where his knowledge of Russian proved very useful. This report stated that following the war George FISCHER was at Harvard for several years on a Lowell fellowship and had been working on his thesis for his doctorate. He has done considerable writing on the origins and history of the Vlasov Movement, his output being probably the best material available. To obtain material for articles appearing in a number of American magazines, he made several trips to the Munich area and other DP centers in Germany. His most recent trips were on behalf of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, and he seemed to enjoy the confidence of Professors KARPOVICH and FAINSOD there. While in Germany in April, 1950, he was travelling on orders from the Air Force Intelligence. He is an officer of the Air

CARD REPRODUCTIONS

Force Reserve. This report further stated that in August 1950 he returned from another trip to Germany where he conducted negotiations for the Harvard Russian Research Center in connection with the establishment in Munich of a Russian Research Institute and also to arrange the details of the Harvard Russian Center's project of sending a group of students to Germany the autumn of 1950 to study the Russian emigration. He informed Professor FAINSOD that upon his return he was withdrawing from further work for the Harvard Russian Research Center in order to concentrate on his thesis. George FISCHER's principal contact in Germany was Boris YAKOVLEV, head of the Vlasovite group, Soiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narodov Rossii (Militant Union for Liberation of Peoples of Russia), the SBONR. On earlier trips he had been in touch with Philip LEGOSTAYEV, chief of SBONR's security section, but since LEGOSTAYEV was reported to be suffering from cancer and therefore not active, FISCHER's later contacts with him were second-hand. George FISCHER is reported to have talked with Col. POZDNYAKOV in connection with research which POZDNYAKOV was doing for Harvard, but FISCHER did not have close contacts with him.

(c) The FBI in an investigative report on Carol [illegible] BRANDT dated 4 January 1952 stated that an informant of known reliability advised that in October and December 1941 and also in January 1942 Louis FISCHER, who then resided at Hotel Duane, 237 Madison Avenue, New York City, was in contact with Carol HILL, literary agent, 22 East 40th Street, New York City. This report quoted a review of FISCHER's book Men and Politics in the 12 May 1941 issue of Time magazine. This review stated: "For 13 years Louis FISCHER was the journalistic delegate from New York's liberal Nation to the Russian Revolution. His two-volume The Soviets in World Affairs made FISCHER an authority on Russian foreign politics and brought him into close contact with Russian politicians." According to this review, while dispatches of their (Time's) correspondent in Russia were objective and full of hostility to Russia, FISCHER's reports were constantly favorable to Russia and he became the favorite Russian author of "Wishful Thinking U.S. Intellectuals." This report also stated that an informant of known reliability advised on 11 July 1941 that FISCHER, a well-known Communist writer, was leaving for England and that another informant of known reliability advised that in 1937 FISCHER was active with the Loyalist forces in Spain. In addition an informant of unknown reliability advised SA George J. [illegible] in February 1942 that he had no positive information but believed that FISCHER was working for the GPU.

(d) In an FBI report on Coleman A. [illegible] dated 21 February 1950, an informant of known reliability stated that he met [illegible], reportedly a member of the Soviet Intelligence organization in the U.S. engaged in industrial espionage, at the home of Louis and Markoosha FISCHER in Moscow in 1939. The report identified FISCHER as an anti-Communist writer, author of Gandhi and Men in Politics, who at that time was pro-Communist and was in Moscow for the magazine, The Nation.

(e) A CIC report on [illegible] and his wife dated 27 August 1950 included a list of names and addresses discreetly obtained from the subjects. The name of Louis FISCHER, 237 Madison Avenue, New York City 16, telephone no. MU-3-9500 appeared several times and the date 15 December 1947 mentioned. The name of FISCHER also appeared on a list headed "Letters".

(f) In a document from a usually reliable source dated 29 September 1951, Louis FISCHER, an American citizen born in Philadelphia 29 February 1896, was reported as staying at the Hotel Inghilterra in Rome from 3 April to 23 April 1951. He was accompanied by his alleged wife, Berta FISCHER born in Latvia on 2 January 1890. He was in possession of passport No. 35133 dated 1 November 1950 and his wife, No. 157303 dated 13 February 1948, both issued in Washington. Berta was reported as departing for Florence on 7 April 1951 where it seemed she was joined by him. According to personnel of the hotel, FISCHER was a homosexual. He claimed to be a journalist, but there were some doubts as to this claim. When leaving Rome, he left his trunk with hotel personnel, and it was later picked up by an unidentified friend. In Rome FISCHER had contacts with fellow-Americans. The purpose of his trip to Italy was unknown.

(g) A report dated 18 September 1951 stated that one GRAZIANI and wife, and CANVASI and wife spent the holiday of Easter, 1951, at Formia (near Naples) together with the "well-known anti-Stalinist newspaperman, Louis FISCHER." This report also stated that GRAZIANI had Communist affiliation but that CANVASI gave no indication of being aware of this.

(h) In a report dated 22 December 1949 Louis FISCHER was included among delegates to a conference of the International Labor Organization to be held 27 December 1949 in Mysore, India. The report also stated that it was presumed that FISCHER was from France but that this was not definitely known.

(i) In a document dated 18 January 1951, Louis FISCHER was reported to have made contributions to the SBONR, a political organization composed of the activist remnants of the wartime Vlassov movement. SBONR carries on both overt and clandestine activities aimed at the eventual overthrow of the Soviet dictatorship. The activities of this organization have been financed mainly by dues, contributions, and indirectly by Harvard University through the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union which is staffed wholly by SBONR personnel.

2. There is also a reference to Louis FISCHER in MFPA-8135 dated 28 May 1951.

3. In requesting information concerning subject, MFPA-9714 invited our attention to the following references: MFPA-6835 dated 14 December 1950, MFPA-6879 dated 23 December 1950, and B. C. Tyndall's memorandum of 5 January 1951. It is the opinion of Nicholas A. Renard, author of MFPA-6835, that Louis FISCHER described in these references is not identical with Louis FISCHER cited in the KATZ synthesis.

4. We have no information concerning the present whereabouts and activities of subject; however, we have requested this information from the FBI and will advise you upon receiving their report.

5. The information contained in this dispatch is not to be distributed outside your office in full; however, you may give [illegible] a brief outline of our findings in paraphrased form, and you may tell him that we shall forward any additional information which we may obtain in the future. In so far as hiring the applicant or subject is concerned, we feel that this decision should lie exclusively with [illegible]'s organization in view of the vacillating political attitudes assumed by FISCHER.

Winston M. Scott
Winston M. Scott
by/Ann Egerter
Ann Egerter

NOTE:
CIA- 45492.
21 February 1946,
contains info on
FISCHER which
may not be
distributed outside
headquarters.

201 [illegible]

20

Director, Central Intelligence   3 November 1950

Assistant Director for Operations

[illegible], Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee

~~[illegible]~~

1. Subject spent two hours in my office on Thursday, 2 November 1950, pointing out various ways and means whereby [illegible] could be of mutual benefit to each other. His proposals were that:

(a) IRC finds many valuable intelligence sources in Europe and that he should be able to contact CIA overseas personnel in order to pass such information and receive their aid in getting the sources to this country. I replied that this was impossible but that CIA's New York Field office, with which he has already been in contact, would be glad to forward any dossiers of candidates for admission under Section 8 of Public Law 110 to Washington for consideration.

(b) CIA intercede with the Department of Defense for IRC's use of some of its quota for entrance of DP's and refugees. I replied that I felt that he should deal directly with the Department of Defense on this.

(c) CIA should go to Congress and press for amendments to the McCarran Act in order to further its intelligence potential as well as assist in a mass defection movement. I replied that this was a policy matter for State Department to solve, that CIA in an effort to maintain anonymity was averse to getting into controversial public disputes but would undoubtedly state its position if called on by congressional committees to do so.

(d) CIA take up with CIC in Germany its inadequacies in the screening of DP's. I replied that this was none of CIA's business and that he should discuss this with HICOG on his next visit to Germany.

(e) CIA contribute to the support of a proposed Research Institute in Paris, Germany, Austria and Turkey which would provide employment for emigree scientists, journalists, etc., and result in a source of excellent intelligence. I replied that CIA had no funds for financing

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RID COPY

JUL 7 1953

SEPARATE CARD REPRODUCTION

[illegible]

such a project and suggested he discuss this problem with State Department as to the political problems involved as well as support. He stated he had done this and had got nowhere and had similar results in trying to get France to put up counterpart funds for the project.

2. I believe I was successful in guiding Mr. Martin elsewhere in his efforts to gain support but it is possible that he may approach you through Gen. Carl Spaatz who [illegible] is to be the new [illegible] campaign chairman replacing Adm. Richard Byrd.

[illegible]/bjo

cc: AD/OIC
AD/[illegible]
Contact Division

INDEX

3 Nov 60
[illegible]

20

Director, Central Intelligence 3 November 1950

Assistant Director for Operations

[illegible]

[illegible], Executive Director of [illegible] for [illegible] Rescue [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~

FR2-1647

1. Subject spent two hours in my office on Thursday, 2 November 1950, pointing out various ways and means whereby CIA and the IRC could be of mutual benefit to each other. His proposals were that:

(a) IRC finds many valuable intelligence sources in Europe and that he should be able to contact CIA overseas personnel in order to pass them information and receive their aid in getting the sources to this country. I replied that this was impossible but that CIA's New York Field Office, with which he has already been in contact, would be glad to forward any dossiers of candidates for admission under Section 8 of Public Law 110 to Washington for consideration.

(b) CIA intercede with the Department of Defense for IRC's use of some of its quota for entrance of DP's and refugees. I replied that I felt that he should deal directly with the Department of Defense on this.

(c) CIA should go to Congress and press for amendments to the McCarran Act in order to further its intelligence potential as well as assist in a mass defection movement. I replied that this was a policy matter for State Department to solve, that CIA in an effort to maintain anonymity was averse to getting into controversial public disputes but would undoubtedly state its position if called on by congressional committees to do so.

(d) CIA take up with CIC in Germany its inadequacy in the screening of DP's. I replied that this was none of CIA's business and that he should discuss this with CIC on his next visit to Germany.

(e) CIA contribute to the support of a proposed [illegible] Institute in Paris, Germany, Austria and Turkey which would provide employment for displaced scientists, journalists, etc., and result in a source of excellent intelligence. I replied that CIA had no funds for financing

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ABSTRACT X INDEX X

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- 3 -

such a project and suggested he discuss this problem with State Department as to the political problems involved as well as support. He stated he had done this and had got nowhere and had similar results in trying to get France to put up counterpart funds for the project.

2. I believe I was successful in guiding Mr. Martin elsewhere in his efforts to gain support but it is possible that he may approach you through Gen. Carl Spaatz who he states is to be the new [illegible] campaign chairman replacing Adm. Richard Byrd.

GGC/bje
cc: AD/OCI
AD/OSI ✓
Contact Division

INDEX

O.P.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 3 Mar 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment [redacted] and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer [redacted] before further routing. This Routing and R[redacted] should be returned to Registry. [redacted]

FROM: RI/AN [redacted]

NO. EGQA-36400

DATE 3 ?

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2058 D		1954	Zg	
2.					
3. SR/3	2044 D	12 Mar	WAC WL	BL	— J.G. pls note
4. SR/PP		13 Mar			— Suggest we pass to Mr Ward. See esp. par 7 of attachment.
5. PP/ICD		30 Mar	31 Mar		
6. SR/PP			13 Mar	WB	Note para 9 — How about a Kubark man to beef up this unit? Jg.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11. RI/C.I					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. CENT					
RI	1309C				

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See memo comment attached!

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ABSTRACT		INDEX	
ENCL			
DATE	9 MAR 1954		

FORM 51-10

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VIA:

DISPATCH NO. EGFA-06400

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

MAR 3 [illegible]

[redacted]

TO . Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR)

FROM Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: CS06

SUBJECT: GENERAL – REDSOX/AEPAW

SPECIFIC – Assistance to Soviet Escapees Through USEP

REF: EGQA-30572

ROUTING
1 [illegible]
2
3 [illegible]
4

1. In a recent conversation with Mr. Richard R. Brown, CFCEP, Frankfurt, he read several portions of a letter which he had just received from his Washington headquarters directing some fairly strong criticism to the German country unit in its handling of the program. Needless to say, Brown was considerably upset since it appears that much of the criticism stemmed from KUBARK. It was his impression that our conversations of last November and December and the remedial action taken by [illegible] at that time relative to the USEP German unit's handling of the Soviet program had indicated his willingness to do anything possible to correct deficiencies and to forestall just such criticism. In paragraph 1 of the reference we indicated that satisfactory answers to our questions had been received. In this connection we enclose as Attachment A a copy of Brown's written answers to our specific questions. (Attachment B is a criteria for USEP assistance.)

2. In regard to the criticism levelled at Brown and the German unit by the former's [illegible] office, the following pertinent excerpts were passed to the undersigned:

"At the third meeting a great deal of stress was laid on the question of the special interest cases of other Government agencies. I was able to dwell at some length on the special handling that we have given special interest cases, and to cite chapter and verse of our report to the OCB. Nonetheless, it was felt that we should very greatly intensify our efforts in this respect. It is clearly considered that the disposal of special interest cases on a very high priority basis warrants unusual effort, procedures, and expense on the part of the Program. Both Army and (KUBARK) attach very great importance to this, and some dissatisfaction was expressed with the manner in which the present procedures are being implemented by the Program. In Germany, specifically, it was felt that the Program has been reluctant to associate itself or its contractors with cases which might present insuperable difficulties in connection with the

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voluntary agencies, the Program should find other means through other contractors, or through its own offices, of arranging disposal on a top priority basis. I pointed out that the Program was better geared to such an effort than any other U.S. Government program, and that one of the most important yardsticks of its effectiveness must be its capacity to handle this type of case. In brief, the thought was expressed that we had perhaps been inelastic in our approach to this problem and predisposed to keep a snow-pure reputation at all costs.

......"I want to bring out one more point. At two of the three OCB meetings and from numerous other sources here in Washington recently, there has been severe criticism of the manner in which eligibility criteria are being applied by the German country unit. Criticism has been received on three occasions from (KUBARK), and is also included in the State Department report to the OCB group. The charge is made that the German country unit has been 'unnecessarily legalistic', has adopted overly restrictive measures, and has been hypertechnical. The statement was made in the OCB meeting that among the all-important Soviet escapees, cases had been turned down on the grounds of voluntary repatriation even though the escapees never got past Berlin. The statement was also made that among the Soviets, only diplomatic and military defectors had been granted eligibility."

3. We are assured by Brown and other USEP officials that the final charge made above relating to diplomatic and military defectors is entirely erroneous and this refutation is borne out by our own investigation. In the past, eligibility was withheld from certain "voluntary repatriates" who had in fact, got no further than Berlin on the trek back to the USSR and who later returned to West Germany. However, we are assured that this is no longer necessarily true and that each case is judged individually.

4. Finally, the German Mission feels that Brown's flat statement that any or all assistance can be rendered to any escapee without regard to past disqualification, provided KUBARK will designate those to receive such assistance, is evidence of his and his unit's desire to cooperate wholeheartedly. We wish to assure Headquarters that the field is now of the opinion that USEP is making a sincere and energetic effort to carry out a most difficult task. We have no complaints at the present time as to the handling of that part of the program which touches KUBARK interests. It will be appreciated if this can be made clear by the KUBARK official responsible for liaison with the Escapee Program in Washington.

James W. Marlatt

James W. Marlatt

2 att H/20

Dist:
3 - SR, w/att (2)
1 - CSOB, w/o att

N/S

2 Mar 54

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However, EPD Germany has advised OFC that a form has been devised to determine this information and that this form was presented to the agencies, for their use, on December 7. They have been asked to report on all persons assisted.

(b) Question: What, if any, project exists to relieve TB incidence among this group?

Supplemental aid is primarily designed to help escapees maintain or recover their health. All agencies know that evidence of poor health, supported by advice of a doctor, authorizes special food supplements. USEP funds can and have been used to provide better living conditions also. The Tolstoy Foundation and AFRF have spent $7,550.45 on supplemental food, including additional food at the three special installations. No figures are available as to the exact number of TB Soviet escapees who have been assisted.

(c) Question: How many people have received jobs through the efforts of the agencies?

(1) Through the Kaiserslautern project, 40 Soviet escapees have been placed in jobs and private housing found for 17 of this number.

(2) During the recent review of agency cases, about 50 Soviet escapees proved to be employed. In some cases, agency participation was apparent; in others, not. The degree of agency aid in finding these jobs would be difficult to pinpoint.

(3) There is also evidence that 20 to 30 escapees have enlisted in Labor Service Companies as "other nationalities". Here again, agency participation is difficult to determine.

(d) Question: How many have been emigrated through efforts of the agencies?

According to the October reports, the Tolstoy Foundation has obtained 94 visas for escapees, in addition to 432 visas under Section 3(c) of the DP Act. For the rest of the fiscal year they estimate that they will obtain 118 more 3(c) visas and 53 others. AFRF, which has just started resettlement activities, expects to obtain 15 visas under Section 3(c) and 15 others.

(e) Question: Is there any vocational training or other educational program?

(1) There are three vocational training schools available for escapees, with unused space in all three, at Munich, Ingolstadt and Berlin. Training expenses plus complete care and maintenance are paid

for ...

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for by the German Government and USEP. The Karlsfeld project, will, hopefully, attack the problem causing poor attendance, namely lack of interest and poor social adjustment.

(2) The World's YMCA conducts language training in Valka and Karlsfeld. Other classes were discontinued due to lack of attendance, but a campaign is now in progress to rebuild the program.

(f) Question: What housing projects have been projected?

No further housing projects are contemplated until:

(1) The agency counsellors visit each family and definitely determine the problems facing them, and

(2) The present 126 to 146 spaces are effectively utilized.

13. Question: What are future plans for the items listed in paragraph 12?

The fundamental shortcoming in the USEP program to assist Soviet escapees is the fact that the counselling program has not been completed. Once this has been done, EPD Germany and the voluntary agencies together will develop a comprehensive program for meeting all of the needs of the Soviet group. This plan will undoubtedly include inter alia:

1. Development, improvement and completion of the projects now in operation.

2. Increased supplemental aid as families are visited and their needs determined. Close supervision will be exercised to ensure that the agencies relate this aid to the solution of the families' problems, including health difficulties and housing.

3. All escapees will be registered for emigration, the employables among them will be trade-tested, and arrangements will be made to ensure that the proper vocational training is available to those requiring it. In addition, assistance will be extended in clearing up legal problems faced by escapees which might bar them from resettlement. The agencies will be required to submit special reports on their activities.

4. Special efforts are being made to revitalize the vocational training and language training programs. Past experience indicates that success in this endeavor will be limited. However, it is hoped that effective individual counselling will eventually induce the escapees to take proper training.

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ORT Union, the World YMCA, and the Lutheran World Federation. Without exception, these agencies have strong and reputable American affiliates which are accredited and recognized by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. In the case of WCC, the American affiliate is the National Council of the Churches of Christ, whose welfare organization is the Church World Service; it is accredited by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and is a member in good standing of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Incorporated. The specific requirements for qualification are not now available; however, it is believed that to be qualified for accreditation by the Advisory Committee, an agency must be supported by voluntary subscriptions, and humanitarian in character. It is believed that agencies wholly political are not eligible.

9. Question: What is the status of the proposal to form a Russian labor company which we understand has been approved in Washington?

General agreement on the formation by USAREUR of a Labor Service Unit comprised of Soviet escapees has been reached by US EUCOM and USAREUR. This project now only awaits final approval from the Department of Army as to certain details. (It is understood that the Army has already agreed to the proposal in principal.) It is anticipated that the project will be implemented in the near future.

The Unit, which will be assigned a guard mission, will comprise initially 100 officers and men. In addition, one man to act as staff adviser to USAREUR on matters affecting the Unit will probably be recruited. This position should have a field grade of perhaps a Lieutenant Colonel. The personnel ceiling of 100 may be raised to 200 should it appear desirable in the light of experience. In order to avoid the appearance of supporting Great Russian or minority national aspirations, the shoulder flash for members of the company would bear the name "ROSSISKIY" or Russian People, rather than "RUSSKIY" or Russians.

In the course of a recent discussion between representatives of CAS, U.S. EUCOM, and this office concerning this proposal, general agreement was reached on the following points:

a) Leadership in the company should be recruited from the more recent Soviet escapees or defectors, rather than from the older "emigre" group;

b) Efforts should be made to recruit the maximum possible number from the escapees registered with USEP; and

c) The TZOPE group should be strongly represented in the company.

10. Question: ...

10. Question: Have any steps been taken to get the Clemency Board of HICOG to pardon Soviet escapees sentenced for minor offenses committed in an attempt to survive, thus clearing their records? Do you want us to make any pitch on this?

In the past, petitions for clemency have only been presented to the Clemency Board of HICOG when a person was under active consideration for resettlement. The Clemency Board has usually acted swiftly with the best interest of the individual and of the U.S. Government in mind. Recently, however, steps were taken to initiate petitions for clemency on all cases of the types mentioned in Question 10. It is too early at the present time to foresee the result of this operation. However, it is believed that it is not yet necessary for CAS to approach the appropriate officials on this point.

11. Question: Is the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Program? If true, what are the reasons for this policy which appears on the surface to be a step backward from solving the problem?

It is not the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Escapee Program. As a matter of fact, the USEP caseload has continued to increase despite the fact that over 6,000 have been resettled, and many have been dropped for various reasons, including ineligibility, local integration, and death. It is true that the primary purpose of the Program is to resettle eligibles abroad, and to integrate locally those whose resettlement potential is low. This action, of and in itself, does tend to reduce the number of persons who can be subsequently helped under the Program. It is also the policy of the Program to create an atmosphere in which other programs which depend to a certain extent upon the psychological attitude existing in emigre circles can operate successfully. In furthering this particular objective, the Program has recently taken action to declare as eligible those persons who, although having records as minor criminals, are of interest to U.S. agencies, and have broadened the basis to accept any Soviet citizen as eligible if he has in any way been under discipline of the Soviet Government since January 1, 1945.

12. Question: What has the Escapee Program accomplished for Soviet escapees?

USEP's assistance to escapees is based primarily upon the needs of each individual registered with the Program. These needs are determined through a counselling program under which the voluntary agencies cooperating with USEP are supposed to send case workers to the field to interview each escapee family to determine their particular needs, background, problems, experience, ambitions, and general situation. Based upon this interview the agency is supposed to develop a specific

plan ...

plan of assistance for the family with the basic objective being their eventual resettlement in a country of immigration or, if this is not possible, re-establishment within the economy of their present country of residence. Although the Escapee Program Division of the U.S. Operations Mission for Germany has contracts with both Tolstoy Foundation and AFRF to carry out a counselling program for Soviet escapees, and has spent approximately $14,000 on each agency in this connection, to date the agencies have not completely counselled all of their caseloads. Accordingly, it is most difficult to make any kind of analysis of the amount of assistance rendered as compared to the extent of need. On December 7, representatives of both agencies were advised by the Escapee Program Division, that the counselling program must be completed in the near future, and that USEP will be in a much better position to evaluate the program of assistance to Soviet escapees.

Despite the admittedly unsatisfactory situation outlined in the previous paragraph, certain positive action has been taken by the EPD and the voluntary agencies to provide assistance to Soviet escapees. Reportedly, AFRF has distributed in the neighborhood of $13,000 in supplemental assistance in the form of food, clothing, lodging, etc., to escapees registered in their caseload. The Tolstoy Foundation has distributed in the neighborhood of $19,000. In addition, three special housing aid projects have been established in Germany: the Friendship House in Munich with a capacity of 10 persons, and the center in Kaiserslautern, with a capacity of 36 -- both sponsored by AFRF, and the Tolstoy home in Karlsfeld which has a capacity of 80 to 100. A word about each of the following installations:

The Friendship House in Munich is small and is always full. The length of stay varies per individual as its primary purpose is to furnish temporary housing for Russian escapees who come to Munich looking for work. In some cases these periods of residence have dragged out. At this home full care and maintenance is given, as the residents are mostly ineligible for relief grants in Bavaria.

The Karlsfeld house was opened on September 4 and has accepted 26 escapees to date. In addition to the fact that each applicant is screened by the agency and then by a consulate and USEP representative, the admission process is complicated by the need to transfer unemployment and relief benefits from other areas. While this installation is not meant to be a housing project of semi-permanent quarters, the type of aid needed by most persons selected will probably result in a fairly stable population, once the home is filled. The Kaiserslautern home reported, as of November 15:

19	current residents
11	persons moved to private quarters
3	persons moved to Labor Service Units
10	persons returned to former residence
5	dependents placed in jobs
48	

All ...

All these people, plus other dependents, passed through the center or were aided by the agency facilities there. (Dependents moved to Kaiserslautern only after private quarters were located.) Of the total, at least forty-three persons had, at one time or another, lived in the house. It must be emphasized that this installation is not regarded as permanent housing but was erected solely to house escapees temporarily for whom jobs had been found and who needed quarters until they could locate permanent billets. Therefore, escapees are referred here only when job opportunities exist and stay only until private housing is located. At one time, consideration was given to filling the house with employment potentials, but the agency demurred for fear the project would be ruined by insoluble morale problems and by the lack of available space to meet quickly employment requirements.

To summarize on the question of "housing projects", and apart from housing in the German economy, installations for special purposes were considered and these three subsidized: (1) the benefits derived from the Friendship House in Munich are being evaluated, and will be discussed at the forthcoming conference; (2) the Karlsfeld House has recently been opened and filling it is being delayed by a rather cumbersome screening process, but a process required to meet our security requirements and the requirements of the Munich Consulate General; and (3) the Kaiserslautern House has been rather effectively used, being limited by the numbers of job opportunities. Until we are convinced, however, that full or almost full benefits are being derived from these houses, USEP is reluctant to establish additional housing projects of a temporary nature and it is contrary to USEP policy to enter into long-term arrangements which would be entailed in provision of permanent housing.

Further, escapees generally are eligible for housing within the German economy. A search for this housing is made among that controlled by the Wohnungsamt or is earmarked in new refugee housing being built. Escapees are being included in a new FOA program of $15 million which is currently being discussed by FOA and the German Federal Republic (see DEPTEL to Bonn USFOTO 453, December 15, 1953.).

Additionally, 30 Soviet children were sent to Switzerland for rehabilitation and a vacation for eight weeks last summer at a cost of $3,907.

(a) Question: How many ex-Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance?

As pointed out above, the incomplete and unsatisfactory status of the counselling projects of the agencies, plus inadequate or unavailable files, preclude the possibilities of determining how many Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance.

However, ...

Text of January 9, 1953, cable. (Confidential)

"Local Units are advised that effective immed Soviet defectors who escaped since Jan 1, 1945 may be considered eligible for complete program assistance. Units shld complete registration of this group in each area and advise OFC of numbers registered. Every effort shld be made to create maximum program impact on Sov escapees in each area. It is realised that extension of eligibility to this group may cause some repercussion among other nationality groups and the agcies supporting them. It is pointed out however that great majority Sov defectors are eligible under provisions para 6 & 7 of Provisional Guide 01. Moreover Units shld take all feasible measures to minimize repercussions by exercising utmost discretion in implementation of this instruction e.g. by discussing it primarily only with agcies interested in this group."

Text of January 20, 1953, cable: (Confidential)

"Soviet defectors referred to in Frankfurt tel sent Vienna 83, Rome 87, Athens 102, Trieste 39, Istanbul 43, Geneva 21 for Carson shld be generally interpreted as those Sov citizens or Sov Ukranians who left Military or Govt service since Jan 1945, or their dependents (para 6 of Prov Guide #1). Local Units may also extend assistance to such other post Jan 1945 Sov escapees who qualify under Para 7 of Guide #1, excepting hard core DP's or persons who have been in refugee status prior to World War II."

Text of instructions issued to all field units December 1953:

"Regardless of his country of origin, any Iron Curtain escapee who, during the period 1945 to the present time, was voluntarily or forcibly repatriated, but who proceeded no further than the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria, and was detained in the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria under the discipline of the Soviet occupation forces or was employed in an official, semi-official, or any other capacity, regardless of the nature of his employment, by or for the Soviet occupation forces, and who subsequently defected, fled, escaped, or otherwise returned to the West, for any reason, should be considered eligible for USEP assistance, provided he is otherwise eligible."

Your attention is again directed to Section 7 of Guide #1 which authorises you to make exceptions in any individual case, regardless of eligibility criteria.

[redacted]

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ATTACH. "A"

108

1. Question: Does USEP plan to exert tighter and constant management control over this project, as against the present system of hands-off until end-audit, or is this impossible because of regulations? If the latter is true, who has the power to change the regulations, and is it possible for them to be changed within the context of overall USEP policy?

Short of involving itself or its staff in the actual implementation of projects or in voluntary agency operations, USEP maintains a continuing scrutiny and review of every project and contract into which it has entered. Information developed by field officers in the course of this review is passed to the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned, who evaluates the material and discusses it, where appropriate, with the local agency director. Subsequent to this evaluation and discussion with the agency, the material is forwarded to OFCEP which makes a second analysis and, if indicated, discusses it with the agency's European Director. There is no policy of hands-off until the end-audit is made. End-use-audits are an integral part of the review of projects in order to determine whether or not the supplies and services are reaching the escapees.

In the light of the preceding paragraph, the latter part of the question becomes academic; however, USEP policy in this respect is flexible and can be adapted to any situation warranting a modification of procedures.

2. Question: What is the interpretation of "local settlement"? If a man is earning a distinctly submarginal existence, which means an unhealthy and unhappy existence, is he automatically ruled out? Who calls the shots on this, USEP or the agencies?

Local settlement is not predicated solely on economic factors. Rather, local settlement depends upon a variety of conditions obtaining in the case of a particular family. Consideration must, of necessity, be given to the jobs of the principal wage-earners to determine whether or not they are working in an occupational area most suitable to their desires, background and ability; to their wages to determine whether or not their earnings are sufficient to meet the needs of their family; to their housing to determine if it is adequate; and other factors which must be considered in connection with a family's firm integration into the local community, including its own attitude toward such integration. It is not the policy of USEP to place a man or a family on an ineligible or inactive list as a locally settled case if he is earning a distinctly submarginal existence. The decision of local settlement is made by the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned and only after a careful analysis of the situation obtaining in each particular case. Usually the Division Chief's decision is based upon the recommendation of the voluntary agency as analyzed and evaluated by USEP officers in the field.

3. Question: ...

[illegible]

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3. Question: What is planned to eliminate the duplication in caseload of the two agencies?

Duplication in caseload between the various voluntary agencies participating in the Escapee Program has been eliminated to an appreciable extent. It has existed principally in the case of two agencies in Germany dealing with the Soviet problem -- Tolstoy Foundation and American Friends of Russian Freedom. This, however, was resolved on December 7, 1953 at a meeting of the two agencies with the Chief, Escapee Program Division/USCMA. At this meeting the Tolstoy Foundation was given principal responsibility for all cases which have a resettlement potential. AFRF was given all cases which had limited or no resettlement potential and must, of necessity, be settled locally in the German economy. The supplementary care and maintenance was divided after a thorough discussion with each agency by mutual agreement. This action resulted in establishing a caseload in Germany of 79 cases consisting of some 180 people for TF, and 102 cases with approximately 200 people for AFRF. New registrants by either agency will be referred to Escapee Program field representatives (in Germany, Munich) for a check against current card files. After a dossier has been fully developed on the case, a determination as to the appropriate agency will be made according to the case's resettlement potential.

4. Question: What are the criteria for accepting a Soviet escapee as a relief recipient and what office or regulations determine same?

There is enclosed the basic provisional guide concerning eligibility, together with subsequent clarifications issued to the field on the Soviets. This is the criteria under which a person is extended, and declared eligible for, Program assistance. These regulations were adapted from a general policy issued by the U.S. Department of State. Within the framework of these regulations, the Escapee Program conducts a security investigation which establishes a man's eligibility from a security point of view. Simultaneously the man is counselled in an effort to determine his needs from a sociological and economic angle. The results of these investigations determine the course of action upon which the Escapee Program proceeds. However, in the majority of cases, humanitarian assistance is extended to individuals pending the complete security investigation, or until material sufficiently derogatory to deny eligibility is discovered. (Attention should be directed to paragraph 7 of the eligibility guide, which enables USEP to confer eligibility on any individual or individuals of interest to other U.S. agencies, regardless of normal eligibility criteria.)

5. Question: What is the source of the policy which maintains that there must be a leaning-over-backward to avoid the risk of any political implication in applying the USEP program?

The Escapee ...

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The Escapee Program was originally outlined in DEPCIRTEL 676, January 29, 1952 (Top Secret) which indicated that the Program would be undertaken through contracts with voluntary agencies to provide certain supplies and services to escapees of recent date. Inasmuch as the largest and most important voluntary agencies operating in Europe are of religious nature and endeavor to stay clear of undertakings which have political implications, it was determined that the Escapee Program would suppress to the extent possible the political nature of its operations in order to secure and maintain the "good will" and cooperation of these agencies. In our relationships, however, with certain agencies of ethnic character (e.g. AFCR — American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees), especially when these agencies are directed by individuals in whom USEP has complete confidence, little, if any, action has been taken to suppress or disguise USEP political implications. There is, however, a tendency on the part of USEP officials to suppress political implications of the Program in their arrangements with several agencies -- due to their lack of confidence in the leadership of these agencies. Mrs. Schaufuss, Tolstoy Foundation; Sheba Goodman, American Friends of Russian Freedom; Max Braude, Organisation for Rehabilitation through Training; Anna Matson, International Rescue Committee; and Michael Rodyk, United Ukrainian American Relief Committee; are examples of Directors in whom USEP has little confidence. This lack of confidence arises from the fact that these personalities apparently have their own axes to grind. USEP has revealed, however, and will continue to reveal to a limited extent, the political nature of the Escapee Program to certain selected persons in the voluntary agencies who are subject to the necessary degree of direction, and in whom confidence may be maintained. This course of action is motivated primarily by the fact that political overtones of the Program cannot be wholly hidden from an intelligent person, yet it is not in the Program's best interest to advise officially the religious bodies of the political aspects. Although the major religious agencies undoubtedly are aware of the political aspects of the Program, they choose to ignore them so long as they are not involved directly into any political operations, and so long as they are not advised officially of them.

6. Question: Are there any means through which assistance to deserving members of TZOPE (already on the caseloads) can be speeded up?

USEP officials throughout the area are continually endeavoring to speed up Program benefits to the ultimate recipients. This is applicable to the entire caseload of all agencies and has not in the past been predicated upon membership in any organisation which may or may not be of interest to U.S. Government agencies. In this way, USEP endeavors to extend Program benefits to all those eligible without focussing unnecessary attention upon individual members of a particular organisation of interest to agencies of the U.S. Government. Further, USEP

officials ...

officials have no way of determining whether an escapee is or is not a member of TZOPS. However, if CAS desires to furnish USEP with a list of TZOPS membership, OPC will request the USEP Divisions in each country to confer eligibility on the individuals listed and to pay particular attention that such individuals may receive personal attention in the future.

7. Question: Is there any possibility of eliminating Tolstoy and AFRF altogether and doing this job through another agency or agencies?

In consideration of this question, USEP has reluctantly decided that it would not be possible to eliminate Tolstoy Foundation, since Tolstoy is an old, established agency with a name-known and respected within certain emigre circles. It may be possible, however, for CAS to undertake the elimination, although CAS relationships with TF and its Board of Directors are unknown to this office. Since AFRF is a relatively new organization, and the character of its European leadership is much more undesirable than that of Tolstoy, it is conceivable that AFRF could be eliminated from the Russian field considerably easier than Tolstoy. Moreover, as the Chairman of the Board of the AFRF is a retired U.S. Admiral, he would probably be inclined to go along with the wishes of Government officials if it could be shown that the elimination of AFRF was in the best interest of the U.S. Government. However, the elimination of ethnic type agencies in this respect would, perhaps, compel the Escapee Program to enter into relationships with a religious agency, e.g. the WCC, in their stead and the successful resolution of the Soviet problem would become automatically much more difficult.

8. Question: How does an agency qualify for a USEP contract? What are the requirements for qualification:

USEP currently has contractual arrangements with 22 voluntary societies representing the major religious bodies (i.e. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants) and the major ethnic groups represented in the population of the United States of America. To qualify for a USEP contract the agency, if it is wholly American in composition and incorporated under the laws of one of the 48 States, or the District of Columbia, must be accredited by what was known as the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, and which is now a part of FOA. The Executive Director of this Committee is Mr. William H. McCahon, who is also a staff member in the Office of the Assistant Director for Refugees and Migration, FOA. In addition to those agencies which have been incorporated in the U.S., USEP also enters into relationships with other organisations which are international in character and composition -- such as the World Council of Churches, the World

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RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1 July 17, 1952

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

1. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides the basic legislative authority for the Escapee Program and thus establishes the elementary criteria for extending assistance.

Section 101 (a)(1) of that Act authorizes the expenditure of a sum not to exceed $100,000,000 "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States".

2. Officials carrying out this program should not become involved in complex, time-consuming procedures in determining priority for assistance. It is expected that a positive approach toward priority will be taken and that criteria will remain as simple and broad as is consistent with U.S. interests. It follows that aid should be given immediately to persons who apparently meet the priority criteria outlined below and should be withdrawn only if reasonable evidence is brought forward which indicates that the person does not meet these criteria.

3. The intent and purpose of the program is to aid new escapees from communist oppression. Whatever the merits of aiding persons who were displaced before, during, or soon after World War II, such aid is not normally a proper concern of this program. Moreover, quite apart from any other considerations, the program does not have sufficient funds to assist many persons other than those who have recently escaped from behind the Iron Curtain. In the foregoing perspective, the following criteria will be utilized by the Missions in according priority for assistance.

4. Priority for assistance in resettlement and for supplementary care will be granted any person who escaped after January 1, 1948 from the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or Albania.

5. Within the broad confines of the above, there will be certain persons whom the United States obviously will not desire to assist and there will be others whose status in their country of residence after flight is such that they possess the rights and obligations of nationality of the country in which they have taken asylum.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

ATT 2 TO FGSW 31600

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. I (cont)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Assistance will thus be denied to or withdrawn from any person who:

A. Is a Communist agent.
B. Is a former Nazi or Nazi collaborator seeking to escape just punishment for crimes committed during World War II against Allied personnel or against civil populations.
C. Is a common criminal.
D. Has unreasonably refused resettlement opportunities.
E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria, are excluded from assistance under this paragraph.
F. Has been satisfactorily settled locally.

6. Assistance will be extended, however, to those persons otherwise eligible under the provisions of this circular who defect from diplomatic, other official or semi-official missions or delegations while abroad in the service of their country.

7. Missions are authorized to make individual exceptions, regardless of dateline, when such exceptions are in the interest of the U.S. or when such exceptions are requested by other U.S. Government agencies operating in related fields. When requested exceptions are not favorably considered by the Country Unit they must be referred to the Special Unit prior to final action.

8. A family group containing a person or persons who would not ordinarily be assisted due to nationality, e.g. Polish escapee and Austrian spouse and who are otherwise eligible should be considered eligible as a unit.

9. Basic responsibility for determination of eligibility will rest with the Local Units. However, it is expected that they will devise ways and means of utilizing local facilities and officials to a maximum extent in order to assist the Local Unit in discharging this responsibility. In the event the local unit requires further assistanse in reaching an eligibility decision, the Special Unit may be called upon by the Local Unit for information or advice.

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RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION

ADDENDUM
To
PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Text of tele-conference received from Department July 14, 1952 in amplification of criteria outlined under Provisional Guide #1:

"FEP Program is concerned with escapees from Soviet or Soviet dominated areas. In view fact FEP funds are limited and because of legislative history of program priority or preference must be given to more recent escapees such as those who escaped after January 1, 1948. Decisions as to application of fund must also be based on results which can be achieved in terms of basic objectives of program. In other words we are not distributing a limited relief fund equally among a designated number of people. We are more concerned with those who have escaped more recently than those who have been in the refugee state since World War I or those who were uprooted between September 1939 and January 1, 1948. The date January 1, 1948 is an administrative device which should not be rigidly applied unless later exhaustion of funds increasingly requires this action. Of equal concern to FEP are the results which can be achieved in terms of reestablishment, resettlement, better morale, etc., as between one project and another. We should seek self-liquidating, non-repetitive uses for FEP funds. Avoid to the extent possible acceptance of responsibilities which cannot readily be relinquished. As experience develops we shall make the foregoing more selective and specific."

RESTRICTED

Amendment No. 1

to

Provisional Guide No. I. (Cost)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Sub paragraph E of unnumbered paragraph following paragraph five of Provisional Guide No. 1 is amended to read:

> "E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides or other country outside of the area of Soviet domination as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria are excluded from assistance under this paragraph."

SECRET ATTACH. "A" 108

[illegible] Does USEP plan to exert tighter and constant management [illegible] over this project, as against the present system of hands-off [illegible] Or is this impossible because of regulations? If the latter is true, who has the power to change the regulations, and is it possible for them to be changed within the context of overall USEP policy?

Short of involving itself or its staff in the actual implementation of projects or in voluntary agency operations, USEP maintains a continuing scrutiny and review of every project and contract into which it has entered. Information developed by field officers in the course of this review is passed to the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned, who evaluates the material and discusses it, when appropriate, with the local agency director. Subsequent to this evaluation and discussion with the agency, the material is forwarded to CPUSEP which makes a second analysis and, if indicated, discusses it with the agency's European Director. There is no policy of hands-off until the end-audit is made. End-use-audits are an integral part of the review of projects in order to determine whether or not the supplies and services are reaching the escapees.

In the light of the preceding paragraph, the latter part of the question becomes academic; however, USEP policy in this respect is flexible and can be adapted to any situation warranting a modification of procedures.

2. Question: ~~What is the interpretation of "local settlement"?~~ If a man is earning a distinctly submarginal existence, which means an unhealthy and unhappy existence, is he not naturally ruled out? Who calls the shots on this, USEP or the agencies?

Local settlement is not predicated solely on economic factors. Rather, local settlement depends upon a variety of conditions obtaining in the case of a particular family. Consideration must, of necessity, be given to the jobs of the principal wage-earners to determine whether or not they are working in an occupational area most suitable to their desires, background and ability; to their wages to determine whether or not their earnings are sufficient to meet the needs of their family; to their housing to determine if it is adequate; and other factors which must be considered in connection with a family's firm integration into the local community, including its own attitude toward such integration. It is not the policy of USEP to place a man or a family on an ineligible or inactive list as a locally settled case if he is earning a distinctly submarginal existence. The decision of local settlement is made by the Chief of the Escapee Program Division concerned and only after a careful analysis of the situation obtaining in each particular case. Usually the Division Chief's decision is based upon the recommendation of the voluntary agency as analyzed and evaluated by USEP officers in the field.

3. Question: ...

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3. Question: What is planned to eliminate the duplication in caseload of the two agencies?

Duplication in caseload between the various voluntary agencies participating in the Escapee Program has been eliminated to an appreciable extent. It has existed principally in the case of two agencies in Germany dealing with the Soviet problem -- Tolstoy Foundation and American Friends of Russian Freedom. This, however, was resolved on December [illegible] at a meeting of the two agencies with the Chief, Escapee Program Division/USCMG. At this meeting the Tolstoy Foundation was given principal responsibility for all cases which have a resettlement potential. AFRF was given all cases which had limited or no resettlement potential and must, of necessity, be settled locally in the German economy. The supplementary care and maintenance was divided after a thorough discussion with each agency by mutual agreement. This action resulted in establishing a caseload in Germany of 79 cases consisting of some 180 people for TF, and 102 cases with approximately 200 people for AFRF. New registrants by either agency will be referred to Escapee Program field representatives (in Germany, Munich) for a check against current card files. After a dossier has been fully developed on the case, a determination as to the appropriate agency will be made according to the case's resettlement potential.

4. Question: What are the criteria for accepting a Soviet escapee as a relief recipient and what office or regulations determine same?

There is enclosed the basic provisional guide concerning eligibility, together with subsequent clarifications issued to the field on the Soviets. This is the criteria under which a person is extended, and declared eligible for, Program assistance. These regulations were adapted from a general policy issued by the U.S. Department of State. Within the framework of these regulations, the Escapee Program conducts a security investigation which establishes a man's eligibility from a security point of view. Simultaneously the man is counselled in an effort to determine his needs from a sociological and economic angle. The results of these investigations determine the course of action upon which the Escapee Program proceeds. However, in the majority of cases, humanitarian assistance is extended to individuals pending the complete security investigation, or until material sufficiently derogatory to deny eligibility is discovered. (Attention should be directed to paragraph 7 of the eligibility guide, which enables USEP to confer eligibility on any individual or individuals of interest to other U.S. agencies, regardless of normal eligibility criteria.)

5. Question: What is the source of the policy which maintains that there must be a leaning-over-backward to avoid the risk of any political implication in applying the USEP program?

The Escapee ...

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CXP Union, the World YWCA, and the Lutheran World Federation. Without exception, these agencies have strong and reputable American affiliates which are accredited and recognized by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. In the case of WCC, the American affiliate is the National Council of the Churches of Christ, whose welfare organisation is the Church World Service; it is accredited by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid and is a member in good standing of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Incorporated. The specific requirements for qualification are not now available; however, it is believed that to be qualified for accreditation by the Advisory Committee, an agency must be supported by voluntary subscriptions, and humanitarian in character. It is believed that agencies wholly political are not eligible.

9. Question: What is the status of the proposal to form a Russian labor company which we understand has been approved in Washington?

General agreement on the formation by USAREUR of a Labor Service Unit comprised of Soviet escapees has been reached by US EUCOM and USAREUR. This project now only awaits final approval from the Department of Army as to certain details. (It is understood that the Army has already agreed to the proposal in principal.) It is anticipated that the project will be implemented in the near future.

The Unit, which will be assigned a guard mission, will comprise initially 100 officers and men. In addition, one man to act as staff adviser to USAREUR on matters affecting the Unit will probably be recruited. This position should have a field grade of perhaps a Lieutenant Colonel. The personnel ceiling of 100 may be raised to 200 should it appear desirable in the light of experience. In order to avoid the appearance of supporting Great Russian or minority national asperations, the shoulder flash for members of the company would bear the name "ROSSISKIY" or Russian People, rather than "RUSSKIY" or Russians.

In the course of a recent discussion between representatives of CAS, U.S. EUCOM, and this office concerning this proposal, general agreement was reached on the following points:

a) Leadership in the company should be recruited from the more recent Soviet escapees or defectors, rather than from the older "emigre" group;

b) Efforts should be made to recruit the maximum possible number from the escapees registered with USEP; and

c) The TZOPE group should be strongly represented in the company.

10. Question: ...

10. Question: Have any steps been taken to get the Clemency Board of HICOG to pardon Soviet escapees sentenced for minor offenses committed in an attempt to survive, thus clearing their records? Do you want us to make any pitch on this?

In the past, petitions for clemency have only been presented to the Clemency Board of HICOG when a person was under active consideration for resettlement. The Clemency Board has usually acted swiftly with the best interest of the individual and of the U.S. Government in mind. Recently, however, steps were taken to initiate petitions for clemency on all cases of the types mentioned in Question 10. It is too early at the present time to foresee the result of this operation. However, it is believed that it is not yet necessary for CAS to approach the appropriate officials on this point.

11. Question: Is the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Program? If true, what are the reasons for this policy which appears on the surface to be a step backward from solving the problem?

It is not the USEP policy to reduce the numbers who can be helped under the Escapee Program. As a matter of fact, the USEP caseload has continued to increase despite the fact that over 6,000 have been resettled, and many have been dropped for various reasons, including ineligibility, local integration, and death. It is true that the primary purpose of the Program is to resettle eligibles abroad and to integrate locally those whose resettlement potential is low. This action, of and in itself, does tend to reduce the number of persons who can be subsequently helped under the Program. It is also the policy of the Program to create an atmosphere in which other programs which depend to a certain extent upon the psychological attitude existing in emigre circles can operate successfully. In furthering this particular objective, the Program has recently taken action to declare as eligible those persons who, although having records as minor criminals, are of interest to U.S. agencies, and have broadened the basis to accept any Soviet citizen as eligible if he has in any way been under discipline of the Soviet Government since January 1, 1945.

12. Question: What has the Escapee Program accomplished for Soviet escapees?

USEP's assistance to escapees is based primarily upon the needs of each individual registered with the Program. These needs are determined through a counselling program under which the voluntary agencies cooperating with USEP are supposed to send case workers to the field to interview each escapee family to determine their particular needs, background, problems, experience, ambitions, and general situation. Based upon this interview the agency is supposed to develop a specific

plan ...

plan of assistance for the family with the basic objective being their eventual resettlement in a country of immigration or, if this is not possible, re-establishment within the economy of their present country of residence. Although the Escapee Program Division of the U.S. Operations Mission for Germany has contracts with both Tolstoy Foundation and AFRP to carry out a counselling program for Soviet escapees, and has spent approximately $14,000 on each agency in this connection, to date the agencies have not completely counselled all of their caseloads. Accordingly, it is most difficult to make any kind of analysis of the amount of assistance rendered as compared to the extent of need. On December 7, representatives of both agencies were advised by the Escapee Program Division, that the counselling program must be completed in the near future, and that USEP will be in a much better position to evaluate the program of assistance to Soviet escapees.

Despite the admittedly unsatisfactory situation outlined in the previous paragraph, certain positive action has been taken by the EPD and the voluntary agencies to provide assistance to Soviet escapees. Reportedly, AFRP has distributed in the neighborhood of $13,000 in supplemental assistance in the form of food, clothing, lodging, etc., to escapees registered in their caseload. The Tolstoy Foundation has distributed in the neighborhood of $19,000. In addition, three special housing aid projects have been established in Germany: the Friendship House in Munich with a capacity of 10 persons, and the center in Kaiserslautern, with a capacity of 36 -- both sponsored by AFRP, and the Tolstoy home in Karlsfeld which has a capacity of 80 to 100. A word about each of the following installations:

The Friendship House in Munich is small and is always full. The length of stay varies per individual as its primary purpose is to furnish temporary housing for Russian escapees who come to Munich looking for work. In some cases these periods of residence have dragged out. At this home full care and maintenance is given, as the residents are mostly ineligible for relief grants in Bavaria.

The Karlsfeld house was opened on September 4 and has accepted 26 escapees to date. In addition to the fact that each applicant is screened by the agency and then by a consulate and USEP representative, the admission process is complicated by the need to transfer unemployment and relief benefits from other areas. While this installation is not meant to be a housing project of semi-permanent quarters, the type of aid needed by most persons selected will probably result in a fairly stable population, once the home is filled. The Kaiserslautern home reported, as of November 15:

19 current residents
11 persons moved to private quarters
3 persons moved to Labor Service Units
10 persons returned to former residence
5 dependents placed in jobs
48

All ...

All these people, plus other dependents, passed through the center or were aided by the agency facilities there. (Dependents moved to Kaiserslautern only after private quarters were located.) Of the total, at least forty-three persons had, at one time or another, lived in the house. It must be emphasized that this installation is not regarded as permanent housing but was erected solely to house escapees temporarily for whom jobs had been found and who needed quarters until they could locate permanent billets. Therefore, escapees are referred here only when job opportunities exist and stay only until private housing is located. At one time, consideration was given to filling the house with employment potentials, but the agency demurred for fear the project would be ruined by insoluable morale problems and by the lack of available space to meet quickly employment requirements.

To summarize on the question of "housing projects", and apart from housing in the German economy, installations for special purposes were considered and these three subsidized: (1) the benefits derived from the Friendship House in Munich are being evaluated, and will be discussed at the forthcoming conference; (2) the Karlsfeld House has recently been opened and filling it is being delayed by a rather cumbersome screening process, but a process required to meet our security requirements and the requirements of the Munich Consulate General; and (3) the Kaiserslautern House has been rather effectively used, being limited by the numbers of job opportunities. Until we are convinced, however, that full or almost full benefits are being derived from these homes, USEP is reluctant to establish additional housing projects of a temporary nature and it is contrary to USEP policy to enter into long-term arrangements which would be entailed in provision of permanent housing.

Further, escapees generally are eligible for housing within the German economy. A search for this housing is made among that controlled by the Wohnungsamt or is earmarked in new refugee housing being built. Escapees are being included in a new FOA program of $15 million which is currently being discussed by FOA and the German Federal Republic (see DEPTEL to Bonn USFOTO 453, December 15, 1953.).

Additionally, 30 Soviet children were sent to Switzerland for rehabilitation and a vacation for eight weeks last summer at a cost of $3,987.

(a) Question: How many ex-Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance?

As pointed out above, the incomplete and unsatisfactory status of the counselling projects of the agencies, plus inadequate or unavailable files, preclude the possibilities of determining how many Soviets have received what assistance and how much for Care & Maintenance.

However, ...

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

Text of January 9, 1953, cable. (Confidential)

"Local Units are advised that effective immed Soviet defectors who escaped since Jan 1, 1945 may be considered eligible for complete program assistance. Units shld complete registration of this group in each area and advise CFC of numbers registered. Every effort shld be made to create maximum program impact on Sov escapees in each area. It is realized that extension of eligibility to this group may cause some repercussion among other nationality groups and the agcies supporting them. It is pointed out however that great majority Sov defectors are eligible under provisions para 6 & 7 of Provisional Guide 01. Moreover Units shld take all feasible measures to minimize repercussions by exercising utmost discretion in implementation of this instruction e.g. by discussing it primarily only with agcies interested in this group."

Text of January 20, 1953, cable: (Confidential)

"Soviet defectors referred to in Frankfurt tel sent Vienna 83, Rome 87, Athens 102, Trieste 59, Istanbul 43, Geneva 21 for Carson shld be generally interpreted as those Sov citizens or Sov Ukranians who left Military or Govt service since Jan 1945, or their dependents (para 6 of Prev Guide #1). Local Units may also extend assistance to such other post Jan 1945 Sov escapees who qualify under Para 7 of Guide #1, excepting hard core DP's or persons who have been in refugee status prior to World War II."

Text of instructions issued to all field units December 1953:

"Regardless of his country of origin, any Iron Curtain escapee who, during the period 1945 to the present time, was voluntarily or forcibly repatriated, but who proceeded no further than the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria, and was detained in the Eastern Zones of Germany or Austria under the discipline of the Soviet occupation forces or was employed in an official, semi-official, or any other capacity, regardless of the nature of his employment, by or for the Soviet occupation forces, and who subsequently defected, fled, escaped, or otherwise returned to the West, for any reason, should be considered eligible for USEP assistance, provided he is otherwise eligible."

Your attention is again directed to Section 7 of Guide #1 which authorises you to make exceptions in any individual case, regardless of eligibility criteria.

C.P.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

3 Mar 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment [redacted] and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer [redacted] before further routing. This Routing and Record [redacted] should be returned to Registry [redacted]

FROM: RI/AN [redacted]

NO. EGQA-36400

DATE 38

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE/Reg	2058 J		4 1954	Zj	
2.					
3. SR/3	2044 J	[illegible]	WAC W1	BJL	J.G. pls note
4. SR/PP		13 [illegible]		[illegible]	Suggest we pass to our Head. See esp. par 7 of attachment.
5. PP/ICD		30/Mar	31/Mar	[illegible]	
6. SR/PP			13 [illegible]	WJ	Note par 9 — How about a Kubark man to develop this unit? J.g. -
7.					
8.					
9.					
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11. RI/CI					
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5-6

PROCESSED THRU RI/CO

See memo comments attached!

1952

ABSTRACT		INDEX	
ENCL			
DATE 9 MAR 1954			

FORM NO. 51-10

SECRET

VIA: ____________

DISPATCH NO. EGQA-36400

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

[illegible] 3 [illegible]

TO : Chief EE (Attn: Chief SR) [redacted] DATE:

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt [redacted] INFO: CSOB

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AEPAW [redacted]

SPECIFIC— Assistance to Soviet Escapees Through USEP

RE: EGQA-30972

ROUTING
1 3/PP/3
2 3/
3 8/PP/3
4

1. In a recent conversation with Mr. Richard R. Brown, OFCEP, Frankfurt, he read several portions of a letter which he had just received from his Washington headquarters directing some fairly strong criticism to the German country unit in its handling of the program. Needless to say, Brown was considerably upset since it appears that much of the criticism stemmed from KUBARK. It was his impression that our conversations of last November and December and the remedial action taken by OFC at that time relative to the USEP German unit's handling of the Soviet program had indicated his willingness to do anything possible to correct deficiencies and to forestall just such criticism. In paragraph 1 of the reference we indicated that satisfactory answers to our questions had been received. In this connection we enclose as Attachment A a copy of Brown's written answers to our specific questions. (Attachment B is a criteria for USEP assistance.)

2. In regard to the criticism levelled at Brown and the German unit by the former's home office, the following pertinent excerpts were passed to the undersigned:

> "At the third meeting a great deal of stress was laid on the question of the special interest cases of other Government agencies. I was able to dwell at some length on the special handling that we have given special interest cases, and to cite chapter and verse of our report to the OCB. Nonetheless, it was felt that we should very greatly intensify our efforts in this respect. It is clearly considered that the disposal of special interest cases on a very high priority basis warrants unusual effort, procedures, and expense on the part of the Program. Both Army and (KUBARK) attach very great importance to this, and deep dissatisfaction was expressed with the manner in which the present procedures are being implemented by the Program. In Germany, specifically, it was felt that the Program has been reluctant to associate itself or its contractors with cases which might present insuperable difficulties in connection with the

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74-126-5-6 [illegible]

voluntary agencies, the Program should find other means through other contractors, or through its own offices, of arranging disposal on a top priority basis. It was brought out that the Program was better geared to such an effort than any other U.S. Government program, and that one of the most important yardsticks of its effectiveness must be its capacity to handle this type of case. In brief, the thought was expressed that we had perhaps been inelastic in our approach to this problem and predisposed to keep a simon-pure reputation at all costs.

......"I want to bring out one more point. At two of the three OCB meetings and from numerous other sources here in Washington recently, there has been severe criticism of the manner in which eligibility criteria are being applied by the German country unit. Criticism has been received on three occasions from (KUBARK), and is also included in the State Department report to the OCB group. The charge is made that the German country unit has been 'unnecessarily legalistic', has adopted overly restrictive measures, and has been hyper-technical. The statement was made in the OCB meeting that among the all-important Soviet escapees, cases had been turned down on the grounds of voluntary repatriation even though the escapees never got past Berlin. The statement was also made that among the Soviets, only diplomatic and military defectors had been granted eligibility."

3. We are assured by Brown and other USEP officials that the final charge made above relating to diplomatic and military defectors is entirely erroneous and this refutation is borne out by our own investigation. In the past, eligibility was withheld from certain "voluntary repatriates" who had in fact, got no further than Berlin on the trek back to the USSR and who later returned to West Germany. However, we are assured that this is no longer necessarily true and that each case is judged individually.

4. Finally, the German Mission feels that Brown's flat statement that any or all assistance can be rendered to any escapee without regard to past disqualification, provided KUBARK will designate them to receive such assistance, is evidence of his and his unit's desire to cooperate wholeheartedly. We wish to assure Headquarters that the field is now of the opinion that USEP is making a sincere and energetic effort to carry out a most difficult task. We have no complaints at the present time as to the handling of that part of the program which touches KUBARK interests. It will be appreciated if this can be made clear by the KUBARK official responsible for liaison with the Escapee Program in Washington.

2 att. H/w

James N. Marlatt

Dist:
3 - SR, w/att (2)
1 - CSOB, w/o att

2 Mar 54

SECRET

ATTACH. 'B'

78

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1 July 17, 1952

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

1. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 provides the basic legislative authority for the Escapee Program and thus establishes the elementary criteria for extending assistance.

Section 101 (a)(1) of that Act authorizes the expenditure of a sum not to exceed $100,000,000 "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area and to the security of the United States".

2. Officials carrying out this program should not become involved in complex, time-consuming procedures in determining priority for assistance. It is expected that a positive approach toward priority will be taken and that criteria will remain as simple and broad as is consistent with U.S. interests. It follows that aid should be given immediately to persons who apparently meet the priority criteria outlined below and should be withdrawn only if reasonable evidence is brought forward which indicates that the person does not meet these criteria.

3. The intent and purpose of the program is to aid new escapees from communist oppression. Whatever the merits of aiding persons who were displaced before, during, or soon after World War II, such aid is not normally a proper concern of this program. Moreover, quite apart from any other considerations, the program does not have sufficient funds to assist many persons other than those who have recently escaped from behind the Iron Curtain. In the foregoing perspective, the following criteria will be utilized by the Missions in according priority for assistance.

4. Priority for assistance in resettlement and for supplementary care will be granted any person who escaped after January 1, 1948 from the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria or Albania.

5. Within the broad confines of the above, there will be certain persons whom the United States obviously will not desire to assist and there will be others whose status in their country of residence after flight is such that they possess the rights and obligations of nationality of the country in which they have taken asylum.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

ATT 2 TO EGGA 31100

REPRODUCTIONS

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. I (cont)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Assistance will thus be denied to or withdrawn from any person who:

A. Is a Communist agent.
B. Is a former Nazi or Nazi collaborator seeking to escape just punishment for crimes committed during World War II against Allied personnel or against civil populations.
C. Is a common criminal.
D. Has unreasonably refused resettlement opportunities.
E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria, are excluded from assistance under this paragraph.
F. Has been satisfactorily settled locally.

6. Assistance will be extended, however, to those persons otherwise eligible under the provisions of this circular who defect from diplomatic, other official or semi-official missions or delegations while abroad in the service of their country.

7. Missions are authorized to make individual exceptions, regardless of dateline, when such exceptions are in the interest of the U.S. or when such exceptions are requested by other U.S. Government agencies operating in related fields. When requested exceptions are not favorably considered by the Country Unit they must be referred to the Special Unit prior to final action.

8. A family group containing a person or persons who would not ordinarily be assisted due to nationality, e.g. Polish escapee and Austrian spouse and who are otherwise eligible should be considered eligible as a unit.

9. Basic responsibility for determination of eligibility will rest with the Local Units. However, it is expected that they will devise ways and means of utilizing local facilities and officials to a maximum extent in order to assist the Local Unit in discharging this responsibility. In the event the local unit requires further assistance in reaching an eligibility decision, the Special Unit may be called upon by the Local Unit for information or advice.

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RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFORMATION

ADDENDUM
To
PROVISIONAL GUIDE NO. 1

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Text of tele-conference received from Department July 14, 1952 in amplification of criteria outlined under Provisional Guide #1:

"FEP Program is concerned with escapees from Soviet or Soviet dominated areas. In view fact FEP funds are limited and because of legislative history of program priority or preference must be given to more recent escapees such as those who escaped after January 1, 1948. Decisions as to application of fund must also be based on results which can be achieved in terms of basic objectives of program. In other words we are not distributing a limited relief fund equally among a designated number of people. We are more concerned with those who have escaped more recently than those who have been in the refugee state since World War I or those who were uprooted between September 1939 and January 1, 1948. The date January 1, 1948 is an administrative device which should not be rigidly applied unless later exhaustion of funds increasingly requires this action. Of equal concern to FEP are the results which can be achieved in terms of reestablishment, resettlement, better morale, etc., as between one project and another. We should seek self-liquidating, non-repetitive uses for FEP funds. Avoid to the extent possible acceptance of responsibilities which cannot readily be relinquished. As experience develops we shall make the foregoing more selective [illegible]

RESTRICTED

Amendment No. 1

to

Provisional Guide No. I. (Cost)

CRITERIA FOR PRIORITY ASSISTANCE UNDER ESCAPEE PROGRAM

Sub paragraph E of unnumbered paragraph following paragraph five of Provisional Guide No. 1 is amended to read:

"E. Is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he resides or other country outside of the area of Soviet domination as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of citizenship of that country e.g. German refugees and expellees, persons of Turkish ethnic origin from Rumania and Bulgaria are excluded from assistance under this paragraph."

14-00000

SECRET

A000-55-61

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE & RELIEF COMMITTEE

STATUS:

#2 jacket contains miscellaneous correspondence for 1949-1952 [redacted]

#3 jacket contains reports & Process Sheets for 1950-

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F-55

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE - ORGANIZATION INFORMATION SHEET

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION (If a Subsidiary or Component Indicate also the Name and Address of the Parent Organization)

International Rescue Committee, Inc 5-5564 06
386 Park Avenue
New York, New York

2. LIST YOUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS. THEIR POSITIONS. DEGREE OF COOPERATION. SECURITY STATUS. ETC.

Charles Sternberg, Executive Director, very cooperative. Subject is in charge of the New York Office. Sternberg was Approved/SECRET in May 1971. (W. Freund of the NY Office has been in touch with subject for many years.)

Leo Cherne, Chairman. We have been in touch with Leo Cherne, but not in regard to IRC. Cherne is Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, Inc., 589 Fifth Avenue, New York, and was placed in Approved category in June 1967.

Mrs. Mary P. Lord, President, very cooperative, Approved/SECRET. She has provided valuable FPI regarding developments in Bangladesh where IRC is actively involved in relief operations.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

3. SUMMARIZE YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE ORGANIZATION AS A SOURCE OF FPI. INCLUDE THE TYPE OF BUSINESS (sales, Research etc.) IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION IS ENGAGED. THE SUBJECT AND COUNTRIES (or Areas) IT INVOLVES. AND ANY RESTRICTIONS ENCOUNTERED WITH REGARD TO ACCESS TO SOURCES (e.g., Through what method is policy toward our mission established within the organization)

This organization is not a source of FPI. It helps new immigrants to settle in the US. It is of value to us by helping us to locate East European and Soviet immigrants wanted for debriefing.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

4. RECEPTIVITY TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. LIST ANY INFLUENCING FACTORS (Restrictions, Policies, etc.)

Sternberg is likely to be receptive to operational requirements, but may not have the authority to commit the organization.

Mrs. Lord would probably be receptive to any reasonable operational requirements which would not jeopardize IRC's good name overseas. She has already been accused in "Communist New Age" of being a CIA operative.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

FIELD OFFICE NYFO	C/S XXGraber:dh	DATE 30 May 1973

FORM 12-67 2482a

SECRET

(11)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F-55-64

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE - ORGANIZATION INFORMATION SHEET

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF ORGANIZATION (If a Subsidiary or Component Indicate also the Name and Address of the Parent Organization)

International Rescue Committee Inc.
386 Park Avenue
New York, New York

55564 OK

2. LIST YOUR PRINCIPAL CONTACTS, THEIR POSITIONS, DEGREE OF COOPERATION, SECURITY STATUS, ETC.

Charles Sternberg, Chief of Office in New York A87027
Very cooperative.
Approved SECRET in May 1971.

(Walter Freund of the New York Office has been a long-time contact of Charles Sternberg.)

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

3. SUMMARIZE YOUR ESTIMATE OF THE VALUE OF THE ORGANIZATION AS A SOURCE OF FPI. INCLUDE THE TYPE OF BUSINESS (sales, Research etc.) IN WHICH THE ORGANIZATION IS ENGAGED, THE SUBJECT AND COUNTRIES (or Areas) IT INVOLVES, AND ANY RESTRICTIONS ENCOUNTERED WITH REGARD TO ACCESS TO SOURCES (e.g., Through what method is policy toward our mission established within the organization)

The Organization has no value as a source of FPI. It helps new immigrants to settle in the U.S.
It is of value to us by helping us to locate East European immigrants wanted for debriefing.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

4. RECEPTIVITY TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. LIST ANY INFLUENCING FACTORS (Restrictions, Policies, etc.)

Sternberg is likely to be receptive to operational requirements, but may not have the authority to commit the organization.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE

FIELD OFFICE New York	C/S Norman N. Graber/ewk	DATE 6 March 1972

SECRET

F-5564

Chief, New York Office

4 August 1964

CASE

[illegible]

New Case #4048
Photos of Zanzibar

A 99520

1. [illegible] Mr. Gilbert Jonas [illegible]

2. [illegible]

Harold L. Oram Inc. A 33841

[illegible]

3. [illegible]

International Rescue and Relief Committee 5564

[illegible]

4. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Copies filed in A 33841 + 99520

5564

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R 241500Z ZEA
BT
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SEP 2[illegible] 2 1 PM '6[illegible]

S E C R E T TDTG 241500Z
NYOR CITE WA 61404
FROM ALIEN BRANCH (SIVESS)
SUBJECT: CASE 41619 - JAROSLAV KREMEL

116139 ~~5564~~

1. CASE NUMBER 41619 HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THIS CASE.

2. NAGLE WAS MET AT AN ARRANGED RENDEZVOUS WITH NOT INCIDENT AND SUBJECT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSPORTED TO OUR FACILITY.

3. ARRANGEMENTS ARE UNDERWAY FOR SUBJECT TO UNDERGO A THORO GOING OVER. HE APPEARS PLEASANT AND OFFERS COOPERATION, SO AT THE MOMENT NO DIFFICULTIES ARE ANTICIPATED.

4 25573

4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE I&NS TRANSCRIPT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

5. WE CANNOT VENTURE A DEPARTURE DATE. PLEASE ADVISE IF THERE IS NEED FOR HIS PRESENCE IN NEW YORK AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME.

6. THE INTERESTED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT SUBJECT IS HERE TEMPORARILY, AND THAT IN DUE COURSE HE WILL BE RETURNED TO HIS SPONSORS, THE IRC. 5-5564

7. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY PERTINENT FACTS CONCERNING SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 61404 SIVESS 41619 JAROSLAV KREMEL 41619 NAGLE NOT INCIDENT A THORO NO DIFFICULTIES I&NS CANNOT VENTURE A NEW YORK IRC

BT

A 5564

PP RRR

DE [illegible] 164 2319553Z

P 231955Z ZEA

RT

ZZXXX ZEA

SEP 16 4 35 PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TDTG 231955Z

PRITY VA CITE [illegible] 9571

ALIEN ([illegible]) FROM [illegible]

A#116139

~~[illegible]~~

CASE 41,612 - JAROSLAV KRENEL

1. FROM SWORN STATEMENT TAKEN BY INS (ORIGINAL UNCLASSIFIED), USING INTERPRETER FOR GERMAN (NOT CZECH), SOME PERTINENT FACTS:

2. DR. JAROSLAV KRENEL, BORN 29 APRIL 1926 IN OSTRAVA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA; WIFE ZDENA NEE PUCHEROVA; MARRIED 23 JULY 1955; ONE DAUGHTER, 2-1/2 YEARS; FATHER (DENTIST), DR. LUDVIK KRENEL; MOTHER MARIE NEE HRUBA; ALL RESIDING OSTRAVA, ZDOROVSKA 22. SISTER, MILENA KRENLOVA, SAME ADDRESS. NO RELATIVES IN FREE WORLD.

3. AT HOSPITAL OF STEEL AND IRON WORKS, VITKOVICE, OSTRAVA, WAS CHIEF ANESTHETIST, HAD NO STAFF. GAVE INSTRUCTION WHEREVER ANESTHESIA USED, WHETHER IN DEPARTMENT GYNECOLOGY, NOSE AND THROAT, OR OTHER. ANESTHESIA NOT SO WELL DEVELOPED CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS U.S., OFTEN ADMINISTERED BY NURSES RATHER THAN M.D. TOOK STATE EXAMINATION IN SURGERY JUNE 1956; STATE EXAMINATION IN ANESTHESIA FEBRUARY 1959. AFTER RECEIVING DEGREE MEDICINE AT CHARLES UNIVERSITY 1951, WAS CITY HOSPITAL OSTRAVA NO. 1 AS INTERN 1951-52, CAME TO PLANT HOSPITAL 1952, WHERE HE WAS RESIDENT; SURGEON OF FIRST DEGREE 1956-59; ANESTHESIST AT SECOND DEGREE AFTER 1959

4. SUBJECT [illegible] COMMUNIST OR AFFILIATED PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, [illegible] STRANGE, [illegible] SCIENCE, WAS OPEN FOR NON-COMMUNISTS. TEN YEARS AGO, [illegible] ALSO FACED SOME [illegible] QUESTIONS.

5. TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS MANY USEFUL LEADS CONCERNING A FEW DOCUMENTS SUBJECT HAS (TSD), FATHER-IN-LAW (RETIRED CHIEF OF POLICE, OSTRAVA, DEDICATED COMMUNIST), ETC. DETAILS OF APPROACH TO "FRIENDS" IN NEW YORK ARE GIVEN. FRIEND IS PETER DANES, 2 HORATIO STREET, NEW YORK 14, N.Y. DANES EMIGRATED FROM CZECHO ABOUT 194[illegible]; SUBJECT WAS FRIENDLY WITH BROTHER OF DANES WHOSE NAME IS PAVEL TRENSKY (SIC), INSTRUCTOR OF SLAVONIC LITERATURE AT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, WHO EMIGRATED MORE RECENTLY. MOTIVATION FOR DEFECTION EXPLAINED AS COMING FROM DARKNESS INTO LIGHT. FEELING TOWARD FAMILY NOT EXPLAINED IN ANY WAY.

52837

51399

Charles 5564

87027

6. TRANSCRIPTS OF TSD UNDOUBTEDLY CAN SUPPLY USEFUL BACKGROUND. WHAT MORE DO YOU NEED THIS POINT?

CONFIDENTIAL

CFN PRITY [illegible] GIVES FRIEND AT [illegible] JAROSLAV KREMEL
TSD UNCLASSIFIED NOT CZECH DR JAROSLAV KREMEL 23 APRIL 1926
OSTRAVA [illegible] NEE PURCHARDOVA 23 JULY 1935 2-1/2 DR LUDVIK KREMEL
MARIE NEE [illegible] OSTRAVA [illegible] 22 MILENA KRIMLOVA
NO ADDRESS NO RELATIVES VITKOVICE NO STAFF NOT [illegible] M D 1956
FEBRUARY 1950 CHARLES UNIVERSITY 1951 NO. 1 1951-52 1952 1956-59
1959 NEVER COMMUNIST NON-COMMUNISTS TEN ETC NEW YORK PETER DANES
2 HORATIO STREET 14 N Y CZECHO 1945 PAVEL TRENSKY SIC SLAVONIC
UNIVERSITY ILLINOIS NOT EXPLAINED STRESSES [illegible] POINT?

BT

3C

Copy/ 87027
52837
1399

12/11/63

5564

CASE

10 July 63

Chief, Contact Division (FT/P Branch)

VIA : Chief, Houston Office

Resident Agent, Dallas

A-[illegible]

Case 4 151 - Hong Kong Parolee Chu (Lee) Wong York Ling (A-13-195-221)

REF : Headquarters Memorandum 7 June 63

1. The local office of the I&NS requested the file of Mrs. Chu from the Boston Office. This revealed the previously unreported information that Mrs. Chu's husband died in Hong Kong in 1958 where he had worked as Manager of the Pin Chong Food Company. The file further revealed that Mrs. Chu had come to the US under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee and was being sponsored by Manning [illegible] of 5131 Edmondson, Dallas, Texas.

S-5[illegible]

Use S-109939

2. Mrs. Chu was contacted at 4321 Travis Street where she is living with her six children. She corroborated much of the information contained in her I&NS file and advised that she was not in contact with anyone on the mainland of China but occasionally heard from friends in Hong Kong. She is looking for work and hopes to find a job as a waitress or possibly a filing clerk. She stated that she had left the mainland in 1949 and had no recent information on conditions in Communist China. Since her potential appeared extremely limited, she was not questioned on the checklist guides and it is suggested that this case be closed.

J. WALTON MOORE

JWM/rm

Copy filed In Joint #109939.

14-00000

F-5564

XXXXX ZEA
SECRET TDTG 121648Z
IA CITE NYOP 8745
SUPPORT (STUNTS) FROM ELLIFF
GROUP ONE EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
CASE 35654 WILLIAM DONALD HARRIS 210/17

1. WE SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH HARRIS ON MONDAY, 8 APRIL. HE HAS MADE SEVERAL TRIPS TO CUBA, THE LATEST IN JANUARY 1963 FOR TWO WEEKS. HE VISITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AREA WEST OF HAVANA. HIS OFFICIAL TITLE IS DIRECTOR, HISPANO-AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF NATIONAL MISSIONS (THE PRESBETRIAN WORK IN CUBA IS ADMINISTRATIVELY A PART OF THE NEW JERSEY PRESBYTERY). HE TOLD US THAT HE HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, ENCOUNTERED NO DIFFICULTY ANYWHERE AND WAS NEVER STOPPED OR QUESTIONED BY THE AUTHORITIES. HE SAID HE WAS OFTEN TAKEN FOR A SOVIET OR EASTERN EUROPEAN, PROBABLY BECAUSE NO ONE EXPECTED TO SEE AN AMERICAN.

2. HIS PLANS FOR FUTURE VISITS TO CUBA ARE A BIT INDEFINITE. HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE NEXT VISIT WITH SEVERAL OTHER CHURCHMEN FROM OTHER DENOMINATIONS. THERE IS AN INTERDENOMINATIONAL SEMINARY AT MATANZAS, WHICH HAS MANY PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE DISCUSSED. THE SEMINARY WOULD PLAN A BOARD MEETING TO COINCIDE WITH THE VISIT OF THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE ON THE BOARD. THE GROUP THAT WOULD GO INCLUDES DR. S-1329 STOCKWELL (METHODIST) BISHOP JOHN BENTLEY (EPISCOPAL), DR. LARSEN (BAPTIST) AND DR. F-5564 JOHN SINCLAIR (PRESBYTERIAN). THE ONLY MEMBER OF THIS GROUP KNOWN TO US IS BISHOP BENTLEY WHO HAS BEEN AN EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE. THIS TRIP HOPEFULLY WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE BUT THERE ARE NO DEFINITE PLANS AT THIS TIME.

3. HARRIS HAD A PROBLEM HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP WITH. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IS TO TAKE

PLACE IN DES MOINES, IOWA FROM 15-[illegible] MAY. THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE DELEGATES FROM CUBA ATTEND, BUT THEY HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS IN GETTING THE NECESSARY PAPERS. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY SEEMS TO BE FOR THE DELEGATES TO GET THEMSELVES TO MEXICO CITY AND TAKE A CHANCE THAT THE US EMBASSY THERE WILL GRANT THEM PERMISSION TO COME INTO THE COUNTRY. THE NAMES OF THE PROPOSED DELEGATES ARE SERGIO MANEJIAS, PASTOR OF THE CHURCH IN CARDENAS, AND HIS WIFE, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESBYTERIAN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION IN CARDENAS; ALSO DR. RENE CASTELLANOS, A LAYMAN FROM CARDENAS AND A FORMER UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR.

4. ON THE BASIS OF OUR RATHER SHORT VISIT WE CANNOT MAKE MUCH OF AN ASSESSMENT OF HARRIS. HE WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL, ENTIRELY SYMPATHETIC WITH OUR INTERESTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WANTING TO BE ASSURED THAT HIS CONTACT WITH US WOULD NOT BECOME KNOWN. HE SAID THAT NATURALLY MANY PEOPLE ASSUMED HE WAS CONNECTED WITH THE CIA BUT THAT IF THERE WERE ANY BASIS IN FACT FOR THIS ASSUMPTION HIS USEFULNESS WOULD BE AT AN END. THIS WOULD LEAD US TO THINK THAT HE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO DO ANYTHING ON OUR BEHALF DURING FUTURE TRIPS TO CUBA. WE ALSO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS ENOUGH OF A REALIST THAT HE WOULD NOT BE UNDULY UPSET BY THE REQUEST AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. WHETHER HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOMETHING COULD BE DONE TO ENABLE THE CUBANS MENTIONED ABOVE TO COME TO DES MOINES, WE DON'T KNOW. WE THINK HE WOULD TURN DOWN ANY REQUEST TO HELP DURING HIS NEXT TRIP SINCE IT WOULD BE MADE IN THE COMPANY OF OTHER CHURCH PEOPLE.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO TALK WITH HARRIS AT GREAT LENGTH. COULD YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE OF HELPING HIS CUBAN FRIENDS AND WE COULD THEN TRANSMIT THAT INFORMATION TO HIM AT THAT TIME. THANK YOU.

S E C R E T

CFN NYOR 3748 STUNTZ BLLIFF 39654 WILLIAM DONALD HARRIS HARRIS MONDAY 8 APRIL JANUARY 1953 WEST HAVANA DIRECTOR, HISPANO-AMERICAN DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF NATIONAL MISSIONS A NEW JERSEY PRESBYTERY NO DIFFICULTY NEVER STOPPED A SOVIET EASTERN EUROPEAN NO ONE A INDEFINITE. HE MATANZAS A DR. STOCKWELL (METHODIST) JOHN BENTLEY (EPISCOPAL) DR. LARSEN (BAPTIST) DR. JOHN SINCLAIR (PRESBYTERIAN) BENTLEY NO DEFINITE HARRIS A GENERAL ASSEMBLY DES MOINES IOWA [illegible] MAY MEXICO CITY

F5564

CONFIDENTIAL

A

Chief, New York Field Office

CASE [illegible] 1963

Chief, Contact Division (FE/P Branch)

37881 A108779 A108779

New Case [illegible] — Thomas Ching Lee/Thomas Li Ch[illegible]

[illegible] : Case 33,162

1. Subject case is opened for the exploitation of Thomas Ching Lee aka Thomas Li Ching-hua, a Chinese [illegible] who arrived in the US from Hong Kong in February 19[illegible] under President Kennedy's Emergency Program. Mr. Lee is [illegible] 5,000th Chinese refugee to come to the US and is [illegible] by his wife and seven children.

5-5564

2. His contact is the Resettlement Department of the International Rescue Committee, c/o 460 Park Avenue, [illegible], New York [illegible], New York.

3. Mr. Lee's arrival was given great publicity [illegible] San Francisco and New York Chinese communities. [illegible] formally welcomed at a dinner given shortly after his arrival in New York City by Mr. K. C. Lee, publisher of the [illegible] Journal.

S108779

4. We have submitted namecheck and approval [illegible] forwarded when received from security.

5. Suggest using the Checklist for Initial [illegible]. According to the Chinese newspapers Lee was graduated from the Tientsin-Tsinghua College but did not state what field he specialized in. After checking the [illegible] files in the New York [illegible], it may be possible to further determine his potentials.

E. H. ASHCRAFT

[illegible]:sd

jackets

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Case
1 - FE/P Chrono
1 - Index
1 - [illegible]

1 5564

XXXXX 7EA

096 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE WA 55582

MAJOR FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS)

CASE 37473

55564

APR 13 9 37 AM '62

REUR NYOR 6069 AND INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

THE SWEDISH DESK WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON BARBARA LISINSKI, THE SWEDISH GIRL WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE IRC OFFICE IN STOCKHOLM.

5564

COULD YOU PLEASE OBTAIN FROM IRC AS THE STATION MAY BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HER. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

CFN WA 55582 MAJOR TRAVIS 37473 REUR NYOR 6069 SWEDISH BARBARA LISINSKI IRC STOCKHOLM IRC

BT

13/1435Z

XXXXX 7EA

096 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE VA 55582

MAJOR FROM SUPPORT (TRAVIS)

CASE 37473

APR 13 9 37 AM '62

REUR NYOR 6069 AND INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

THE SWEDISH DESK WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON BARBARA LISINSKI, THE SWEDISH GIRL WHO WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE IRC OFFICE IN STOCKHOLM.

COULD YOU PLEASE OBTAIN FROM IRC AS THE STATION MAY BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HER. THANKS VERY MUCH.

SECRET

CFN VA 55582 MAJOR TRAVIS 37473 REUR NYOR 6069 SWEDISH BARBARA LISINSKI IRC STOCKHOLM IRC

BT

13/1435Z

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XXXXX 7EA

S E C R E T

A CITE NYOR 5801

SUPPORT (TPAVIS) FROM MAJOR

CASE 37473

5 5564

UCC 5-5564

SUBJECT - IRC REPRESENTATIVE IN SWEDEN

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE DOES NOT HAVE A PERMANENT RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN SWEDEN. DR. RADE KORACEX HAS REPRESENTED THEM THERE FOR THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF BUT DOES NOT LIVE THERE AND TRAVELS IN OUT AS REQUIRED. THE DR. IS A FORMER JUGOSLAV WHO HAS A PHD FROM ONE OF THE MID-WESTERN UNIVERSITIES. WE ARE OBTAINING FURTHER BIO INFORMATION AND WILL FORWARD. SINCE HE HAS BEEN REPRESENTING IRC FOR THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF HE IS FAR FROM NEW. WILL YOU PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS IS THE RIGHT PERSON. OUR CONTACT AT IRC KNOWS OF NO CHANGE TO TAKE PLACE. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN NYOR 5801 (TRAVIS) MAJOR 37473 IRC SWEDEN INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE NOT HAVE A DR. RADE KORACEK A NOT LIVE DR. A JUGOSLAV PHD BIO IRC A IRC NO CHANGE 374

F 5564

SEC

CASE

VA CITE NYOR 4652

NOV 21 12 17 PM '58

SUPPORT (CONNELL) FROM MAJOR

F 5564

CASE 28972 Y 28972

SUBJECT - MAREK HLASKO Y MAREK HLASKO TRIP SPONSORED BY INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

S/18471/

THROUGH MR. CHARLES STERNBERG Y CHARLES STERNBERG OF IRC Y IRC WE
HAVE LEARNED THAT THE MAN WHO WILL HAVE MOST TO DO WITH SUBJECT
WHILE HE IS IN THIS COUNTRY IS THE SECRETARY, A MR. MCALLISTER Y
MCALLISTER. SUBJECT WILL NOT Y NOT BE ARRIVING THIS COUNTRY AS PLANNED
SINCE HE HAS BEEN ILL IN BERLIN Y BERLIN. HE WILL NOT Y NOT ATTEND
THE DINNER ON 25 NOV Y 25 NOV AND IF HE DOES COME, AND THIS HAS NOT Y
NOT BEEN FIRMED UP, HE WILL BE COMING SOMETIME IN JANUARY 59 Y
JANUARY 59 FOR THE OPENING OF THE FILM BASED ON ONE OF HIS BOOKS.
INDIRECTLY WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THERE MAY BE SOME QUESTION
AS TO WHETHER THE FILM WILL ACTUALLY DISTRIBUTED IN THIS COUNTRY ON
ACCOUNT OF CENSORSHIP. EVIDENTLY IT IS LOADED WITH EROTICISM TO THE
POINT WHERE A BB FILM Y BB FILM WOULD LOOK LIKE A SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC.

S-5564

FILE - INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Copy filed # 18471 ([illegible])

SEC 6?V

CASE

NYCF CITE WA 37684

FROM SUPPORT (CONNELL)

Sauce

use S-5564

58 NOV 21 10 8 AM

THIS IS NEW CASE 28972 X 28972

POLISH DESK IS REQUESTOR OF FOLLOWING: MAREK HLASKO X MAREK HLASKO THE POLISH POET WHO DEFECTED TO WEST GERMANY LAST SPRING IS COMING TO THE US X US ON A VISITORS VISA AT THE INVITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE TO ATTEND AN IRC X IRC DINNER ON 25 X 25 NOV. IT IS NOT X NOT KNOWN HOW LONG HE WILL STAY HERE BUT WHILE VISITING, HE WILL PRESUMABLY ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH E. P. DUTTON X E. P. DUTTON, PUBLISHERS, WHO HAVE ALREADY PUBLISHED SOME OF HIS WORK. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF DD/P X DD/P INTEREST IN HLASKO, THEY HAVE BEEN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH HIM IN BERLIN AND HE HAS REQUESTED AN "ADVISOR" WHILE HERE TO KEEP HIM OUT OF TROUBLE. (ON THE BASIS OF HIS REPUTATION THIS COULD BE EITHER VERBAL INDISCRECTION, DRUNKEDNESS OR TROUBLE WITH THE LADIES).

S 5564

use S-5556

HE WILL BE TOLD THAT HE WILL NOT BE GIVEN AN ADVISOR BUT THE POLISH DESK WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD CONTACT THE IRC X IRC AND DETERMINE WHO WILL BE KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING HIS BEHAVIOR AND HIS WHEREABOUTS. THEN IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT IF ANYTHING DOES GO WRONG, WE WILL LEARN OF IT QUICKLY. ALSO, YOU CAN CALL EVERY WEEK OR SO TO SEE HOW THINGS ARE GOING.

NATURALLY IRC X IRC SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE ABOVE. WE THINK YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE A NATURAL INTEREST IN HIS WELFARE WHILE HERE. PLEASE ADVISE WHOM YOU SEE. THANKS.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

F 5564

Acting Chief, Security Division, I&SO   1[illegible] April 1953

Chief, Contact Division, CO

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]5-5564

WASSILIEW, Gisela - Concern About Physical Security Of

1. Enclosed is a copy of letter written by the subject which was transmitted by Mr. Abram J. Becker, (EE-8[illegible]-A) executive director of the International Rescue Committee, to a representative of this Division.

2. Subject has been the director of the Berlin office of the IRC for approximately three years. As you know, the IRC has been prominent for aid given to West Berlin and is currently in the midst of a campaign for aid to refugees arriving there in increasing numbers from the East. In her letter subject reports alleged attempts on the part of "the East" to kidnap her. In view of her activities and her connection with Rainer Hildebrandt's Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, Mr. Becker believes there may be some basis for her fears. He said he knows subject as a calm person not given to hysterics; he is therefore, concerned about subject's safety.

3. This information has been transmitted to Staff C, FI, for action.

4. Any inquiry concerning this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia L. Thorne, Extension 2202.

Security

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Enclosure

VThorne:ble

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
Security Information

alien C
247

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNM

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Chief, Index Branch (Thorne)
FROM : Chief, Pittsburgh Office

DATE: 11 Aug 52
PT 52-698

SUBJECT: Case 10978 - Source Leads from LIC Files

REF : TTY WA-8910

1. The full names of aliens mentioned in our Memo of 1 Aug 52, PT 52-672, are:

Tadeusz [illegible]
Tadeusz [illegible]
Josef [illegible]

2. Full names and biographic information concerning these men are contained in memo dated 18 Jul 52, Case 10978, by J S Littleford.

for B.K. Stewart Jr.
CHARLES B [illegible], JR

HD/aac

SECRET
Security Information

11 Aug 52
NY 52-698

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Chief, Index Branch (Thorne)
Chief, Pittsburgh Office

Case 10978 - Source Leads from IBC Files

REF : TTY WA-8910

1. The full names of aliens mentioned in our Memo of 1 Aug 52, NY 52-672, are:

Tadeusz Kmiecik
Tadeusz Kotas
Josef Loposzko

2. Full names and biographic information concerning these men are contained in memo dated 18 Jul 52, Case 10978, by J S. Littleford.

CHARLES B KAUFMANN, JR

ND/eac

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

INDEX
SECURITY

7 August 1952

x

W

VThorne:jmm

2202

CONFIDENTIAL

PITTSBURGH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO KAUFMANN FROM ASHCRAFT BY INDEX (THORNE) WA______ CK NR______

REUR MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST, HP 52-672, ADDRESSED TO MR. CZAJKOWSKI, ALIEN BRANCH, RE CONTACT OF ALIENS KMIECIK, KOTAS AND LOPOSZKO, PLEASE FORWARD FULL NAMES FOR FILING PURPOSES.

IT WILL BE APPRECIATED IF, IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL FORWARD NOTIFICATION OF CONTACT OF ALIENS PRIOR TO CLEARANCE TO INDEX. THANK YOU.

Hold
for
Kelly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX
SECURITY

7 August 1952

W

VThorne:jm

CONFIDENTIAL

2202

PITTSBURGH

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

TO KAUFMANN FROM ASHCRAFT BY INDEX (THORNE) WA______ CK NR______

REUR MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST, NF 52-672, ADDRESSED TO MR. CZAJKOWSKI, ALIEN BRANCH, RE CONTACT OF ALIENS KMIECIK, KOTAS AND LOPOSZKO, PLEASE FORWARD FULL NAMES FOR FILING PURPOSES.

IT WILL BE APPRECIATED IF, IN THE FUTURE, YOU WILL FORWARD NOTIFICATION OF CONTACT OF ALIENS PRIOR TO CLEARANCE TO INDEX. THANK YOU.

CONFIDENTIAL

Alien Contact
24963

SECRET
Security Information

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Anthony F Czajkowski
Chief, Pittsburgh Office

1 Aug 52
NY 52-672

Case 10978 - Source Leads from IRC Files

1. Contact with Sniecik, Kotas, and Loposzko on 31 Jul 52 indicates low foreign intelligence potential. They have been away from Poland for about ten years and get no pertinent information in letters from relatives remaining in Poland. They are better acquainted with persons and conditions around Bologna, Italy.

2. They are cooperative, but unless you have reason to believe that worthwhile requirements might result from a request, we do not intend to send in name checks.

CHARLES B KAUFMANN, JR

ND/eac

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Alien
Contact

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F-5-64

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn. : Index
FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

DATE: 5 August 1952

SUBJECT: Visit to Alien: FRANK HARASIN - Polish National

1. Mr. Harasin was interviewed on 1 August at his place of business, The Pioneer Coffee Company, where he is employed as a business administrator. He is presently residing at 5334 McDougall, Detroit 11, Michigan.

2. Subject was born 1 December 1894 in Goczalkowice, Poland.

1923-28	Polish Ministry of Commerce, Warsaw, Poland. Civil servant.
1928-34	Managed own firm in the corn and food trade. This was a very small concern.
1934-39	Silesian Steel Foundries & Mills (Pilsudski Foundry), located in Chorzow, Poland (formerly Koenigshutte, Poland).
1939-45	Polish Army - Mr. Harasin was taken a prisoner of war by the Germans. He escaped and joined the Polish Army in exile. His family disappeared during the war. His son is believed to be held in a Russian concentration camp, if he is still alive.
1945-48	Resettlement and Welfare Officer, UNRRA and IRO, Germany and East Africa. While serving in this capacity, Mr. Harasin travelled in the East African region of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya. His purpose was to resettle Polish refugees in camps in these areas. Subject knows this area well and could answer specific questions regarding roads, airdromes, settlements and cities.
1948-51	Social work in England
24 July 1952	- Entered the US at New York City.

3. As a reserve captain in the Polish Army, Mr. Harasin worked for the Ministry of Reconstruction of Administration, Polish Government in exile. He explained his duties as consisting of assisting in the complete administration and reconstruction, and helping to place Polish nationals in jobs to which they would be best suited.

4. Harasin's wife refused to leave Poland with her husband and she is still residing there. He has not corresponded with her since 1945. He does, however, conduct a correspondence with cousins living in Chorzow and other cities in Silesian part of Poland. He received a letter from one of his cousins three months ago, but said that it contained only family information. He will gladly turn over all future letters, if so desired.

Wallace W. Konicki
fo PAUL W. ICKE

WWKonicki:jd

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

Alien Contact
~~24763~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5-5-64

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn. : Index
FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

DATE: 5 August 1952

SUBJECT: Visit to Alien: Joachim KOWATSCHEFF - Bulgarian National

1. Mr. Kowatscheff was interviewed on 1 August 1952 at his place of employment, Byrne Doors Company, where he is working as a draftsman. He is presently residing at 1761 Seward Street, Apt. 105, Detroit 6, Michigan.

2. Subject was born 4 April 1923 in Nasalewzie, Bulgaria.

1939- 1940	Worked in an airplane factory in Sofia, Bulgaria, as an apprentice engineer.
1940- 1941	National Bulgarian Airplane Mfg. Plant, as an apprentice engineer.
1941 (8 mos.)	Attended a technical high school in Budapest, Hungary.
Dec 41 - Sep 44	Attended a technical university in Berlin, Germany, studying engineering and mechanics.
Sep 1944	Arrested by the Gestapo for refusing to enter military service. Was released in May 1945.
May 45 - 1948	US Military Police, Berlin Germany - Interpreter
1948 - Oct 51	US CID Div. of CIC - Subject was an investigator, and while serving in this capacity, he had the opportunity to interrogate about twelve Bulgarian delegates to the World Peace Conference held in the Soviet Zone of Berlin. He said he induced six of these delegates to escape, and they are still residing in Berlin. Their names and addresses may be obtained if so desired.
12 November 1951	- Arrived in New York City aboard the SS General Sturgis
Dec 1951-20 Jan 51	Turchon Follower Machine Co., Detroit, Michigan, as a draftsman.

3. Mr. Kowatscheff believes himself to be qualified to answer specific questions on certain Bulgarian economics and minor political questions. He could also describe in detail the city of Nasalweizie, Bulgaria, which is on the Yugoslavian border.

4. Subject conducts frequent correspondence with his family in Bulgaria through sources in the western and eastern zones of Berlin. The source in the Soviet zone is Mr. Kowatscheff's mother-in-law, from whom he last received a letter three months ago. He said it contained a description of the deplorable living conditions, but nothing else. He will turn over all future letters from Sov Zone of Berlin and Bulgaria for our scrutiny and retention.

5. We are submitting a name check for subject with the hope that requirements will be forthcoming based on the contents of this memo.

for Wallace W. Konicki
PAUL W. ICKE

WWKonicki:jd

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

SEC[illegible]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch ([illegible])
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 23 December 1957

SUBJECT: Possible Covert [illegible]
REF : NY[illegible] 647 dated [illegible] ([illegible])

1. On 6 December 1957, [illegible], as a representative of the International Rescue Committee, talked with [illegible] Gailis, a Latvian now residing in London, who expressed the desire to [illegible] the Soviet Union to [illegible] this anti-Communist activity. Gailis came to the United States with two purposes in mind. He wanted to [illegible] and receive financial backing for a [illegible], which he and a friend developed. He also wanted to explore the possibility of making contact with US intelligence agents with [illegible] of getting some type of assistance or encouragement to fulfill his [illegible] to penetrate the Soviet Union to destroy the Soviet system. [illegible] contact was through [illegible] of the International Rescue Committee [illegible] invited [illegible] representatives of [illegible] to talk with the man. Gailis stated that he had made previous approaches to the US Embassy in London where he was rebuffed. The Embassy told him to either associate with British intelligence or [illegible], which he could, of course, find no organization receptive to his ideas. The initial approach to the Embassy was made in 1950. The last approach was made in November, 1956, at the time of the Hungarian revolution. The London Embassy [illegible] had a pretty good biographical account of him. His contact in London was a Mr. [illegible]. Gailis did not know the spelling of the man's name.

2. Gailis' strong anti-Communistic feelings result from the destruction of his family by the Soviets, as well as his intense nationalistic or Latvian feelings. The secondary purpose of his visit to the United States was contact with [illegible], who has also publicly [illegible] played a [illegible] from control in the Soviet [illegible]. Gailis wanted to talk to Khrushchev in order to solicit [illegible] assistance. Gailis stated that he had met Khrushchev in Minsk during November, 1941. Gailis was associated with a German army unit, which had the responsibility of rounding up Soviet partisans and [illegible] who were working against the German occupation forces. Khrushchev was [illegible] at a [illegible] restaurant. The meeting was a very casual [illegible], and Gailis recalls having had a glass of beer with Khrushchev. [illegible] was then at [illegible] the uniform of a German officer. Gailis [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

SECRET

[illegible] 23 December 1977

3. Gailis also mentioned two other Latvians, now residing in Canada, who, he feels sure, would be able to [illegible] in [illegible] activities against the Soviet Union. These individuals are [illegible] and [illegible] Kinal. They were [illegible] of Gailis during the [illegible] Command. Gailis does not have the addresses of these two individuals but has advertised in Latvian-language newspapers published in Canada [illegible] Gailis in London. Gailis currently resides at 11 [illegible] Road, London, S 7. He has resided at this address for about five years. He is employed as a [illegible] at an old age home known as "[illegible]", which is located at 197 Jones Way, [illegible], N 19. This employment was obtained in July, 1977.

4. Valdemars Gailis was born in Petrograd, Russia, 27 July 190[illegible]. His family moved to Riga, Latvia in [illegible]. In Latvia, his principal occupation was that of a waiter at an officers' mess located in Riga. He held this employment from [illegible] to 1941. Initially, his employer was the Latvian Army. During this period he cooperated with Colonel Calnins, who was chief of the Information Office for the Latvian Army. In 1940, when the Russians took over Latvia, the Russian Army requested from Calnins the names of the individuals who cooperated with him. Rather than supply the information, Calnins went home and killed himself. Gailis continued as a waiter at the officers' mess, but for the Russians, until May, 1941. In May, 1941, a Russian, the mess cook, informed Gailis that Gailis, the head chef, and one other individual should escape, as the Russians were about to arrest them. Gailis went home to tell his wife and child to leave Riga and head for a sister's home in the hinterlands. Upon arrival at home, Gailis was told that the Russians had already been there looking for him. Gailis then left Riga and joined the partisans in [illegible]. When the German military forces entered Latvia, Gailis returned to Riga and learned that his wife and son had been deported by the Soviets on 13 June 1941. His wife had failed to head for the country but stayed in Riga, where she was arrested. He has not heard anything of either wife or son since then.

5. Gailis then returned to the Riga officers' mess as a waiter for the Germans. He was picked up by the German Army as a Russian interpreter on 4 November 1941 when he was sent to Leningrad for a few days. He then went to Minsk, where the supposed contact with [illegible] took place. Gailis was associated as an interpreter with the German anti-partisan group for about 2½ years. With the German Army he came to Germany on 1[illegible] October 1944. On 3 February 1945 he joined the Vlasov Army as an interpreter. On 22 May 1947 his associations with the Vlasov Army were terminated

SECRET

HH-379

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SECRET

-3-

Possible Covert Prospect

in Hamburg, Germany. In 1949 Gailis went to [illegible] he has since remained. On 15 September 19[illegible] Gailis [illegible] Estonian girl in Germany. He has no children [illegible] This marriage in no way diminishes his [illegible] activities within the [illegible]. [illegible] wife who was forcibly taken from him in Latvia, and the Estonian girl is a necessity to satisfy the natural desire for companionship. The previously mentioned retirement incentive [illegible] for the sake of the current wife, Gailis is [illegible] to undertake his anti-Soviet [illegible] it may mean the loss of his life. Destruction [illegible] and the rebirth of Free Latvia is the prime motive for his existence.

[illegible] was told that IRC has nothing to do with activities [illegible] Soviet Union; IRC deals only with escapees from [illegible]. Gailis stated that if it was at all [illegible] IRC to convey his desires to the appropriate [illegible] authorities, he certainly wants them to do so. No encouragement was offered to the man, and he was told that IRC has no knowledge or association with the type of contacts with whom Gailis wants to meet.

Jay S. L. Keeves

JGK
[illegible]inhos:ran

SECRET

HH-3291

HH 3689

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

HH 3689

14-00000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Div[illegible] [illegible]

FROM : Chief, Washington Office [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

ATTN: [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

3659

Chief, Contact Division [illegible]

[illegible] several [illegible] I have received [illegible] to Mr. [illegible]

[illegible] (1) general situation; (2) internal [illegible] (4) military [illegible] (5) [illegible]

[illegible] loyalty [illegible] him in question [illegible]

[illegible] Enclosed for your [illegible] detailed information [illegible]

[illegible] D. [illegible]

[illegible]
Attachment [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] 2887

14-00000

HH 3791

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

cc: [illegible]

HH-3791

14-00000

55-64

CONFIDENTIAL 162115Z NOV 76 STAFF

NOV 17 9 47 AM '76

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26449

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ETF (JOHNSTON) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE 61491, VALARIY VLADIMIROVICH MORDUKHOV A188624

REFS: A. HQS 17679, 5 NOV 76
B. HQS 17699, 8 NOV 76

A-5564

1. NEITHER HIAS NOR IRC IS ABLE TO FURNISH AN ADDRESS FOR A VALARIY VLADIMIROVICH MORDUKHOV. HE IS NOT LISTED IN ANY OF THE TELEPHONE BOOKS FOR NEW YORK CITY. A55403

2. WE ARE CHECKING THE LOCAL OFFICE OF ENERGO TO SEE IF THEY HAVE A CURRENT ADDRESS, AND WILL ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE A RESPONSE.

FILE: CASE 61491
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
CONFIDENTIAL

nc

55-64

NOV 17 8 [illegible] 1976

CONFIDENTIAL 162120Z NOV 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26450

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

ETF (O'TOOLE) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE 61491

REF: HES 17743, 10 NOV 76 A58403 A177472

1. OUR SOURCE AT HIAS INFORMS US THAT PAVEL GEIMAN IS NOW LIVING IN CLEVELAND AND CAN PROBABLY BE LOCATED THROUGH THE JEWISH FAMILY SERVICE, 2060 SOUTH TAYLOR ROAD, CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, 44118.

A5564

2. NEITHER HIAS NOR IRC CAN FURNISH AN ADDRESS FOR SOFIYA ZUBAREVA. THE REFERENCE MESSAGE GAVE HER DATE OF ARRIVAL AS NOVEMBER 1976. WE ASKED OUR SOURCES TO CHECK UNDER BOTH 1975 AND 1976. WE WILL CHECK THE LOCAL OFFICE OF LNERGO TO SEE IF THEY CAN FURNISH AN ADDRESS.

3. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION, INCLUDING DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH IS HELPFUL IN SERVICING REQUESTS OF THIS TYPE.

FILE: CASE 61491
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T 222035Z SEP 76 STAFF

55-64

SEP 23 [illegible] 1976

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 26155

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

OSS/ALIEN BRANCH (NIEMIEC) FROM BURDICK

WNINTEL

SUBJ: CASE SS372--CARLOS MANUEL /MOLINA/ ALVARAL

55-64

REF: ALN-234-76, 22 SEP 76

1. A COOPERATIVE SOURCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE INFORMS US THAT CARLOS MANUEL /MOLINA/ ALVARAL CHOSE NOT TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK AND TRAVEL TO MIAMI AFTER ARRIVING IN THE US. OUR SOURCE IS NOT SURE OF HIS ADDRESS, BUT BELIEVES MOLINA IS PROBABLY LIVING IN THE CABANA MOTEL, PONCE DE LEON STREET, CORAL GABLES, WHICH IS NEXT TO THE CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER. IF HE IS NOT AT THIS ADDRESS, HIS LOCATION SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AGENCIES IN MIAMI.

18-10-63

2. ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN MOLINA'S LOCATION THROUGH ROBERTO ALVAREZ WERE NEGATIVE SINCE THERE IS NO CITY CALLED CLIFFORD PARK, NJ. INFORMATION HAS NO LISTING FOR A ROBERTO ALVAREZ IN EITHER CLIFFSIDE PARK OR CLIFFWOOD PARK.

3. SORRY MOLINA GOT AWAY SO QUICKLY. WE WERE HOPING TO GIVE PEARL AUSTIN A CHANCE TO USE HER SPANISH. SHOULD WE CLOSE THIS CASE AND TRANSFER THE CORRESPONDENCE TO THE MIAMI FO?

FILE: CASE SS372
E2 IMPDET CL BY 013344
S E C R E T

1c

CONFIDENTIAL

9 April 1976 55-64

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
Office of the DCI

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : International Rescue Committee, Inc.

1. The following information on the IRC is for background only.

2. In August 1950, Outline for Project QKGAUNT was approved for the purpose of acquiring biographic information on top-level defectors/emigres from an official of the IRC. The sum of $2,500 was to be provided by covert means. A partial payment of $1,250 was advanced on 30 August 1950 but was refused by the IRC representative, who stated he would supply as much of the information desired as possible without cost. The project was closed as of 31 August 1950.

3. In November 1950, David Martin, Executive Secretary of the IRC met with George Carey, Assistant Director for Operations, with as many as five proposals for collaboration between CIA and IRC. One proposal was for the support of a European Institute which would provide employment for displaced scientists, journalists, etc. He was informed that CIA had no funds for financing such a project.

Charles A. Briggs

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

CONFIDENTIAL

9 April 1976
DRAFT

Mr. Charles Sternberg
Executive Director
International Rescue Committee, Inc.
386 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10016

Dear Mr. Sternberg:

As you might surmise, your organization is well known to the Agency. Following the receipt of your letter of 31 March 1976, a more definitive search for information pertaining to your request was conducted. No information was located which would indicate that CIA has ever provided funds to the IRC either directly or indirectly. I trust this letter will allay any apprehensions your organization has had in this matter.

If I can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

14-00000

F-55-64

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 151330Z JULY 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/NEW YORK 21618

DCD/WASHINGTON

TO: SUPPORT BRANCH/ALIEN SECTION (SPAGGY) FROM GRADEN

SUBJECT: CASE 62117 - BORIS R[illegible]

REF: YOUR WA 93189

1. [illegible] OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) INFORMED US IT [illegible] ALRIGHT [illegible] HIS VISA [illegible] TO [illegible] WITH [illegible] ABOUT THREE WEEKS. WE WILL SET THE APPOINTMENT THROUGH [illegible] WHEN WE KNOW THE DATE SET FOR THE [illegible].

2. IRC HAS NOT YET RECEIVED THE MONEY FOR R[illegible] FROM JAPAN. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT [illegible]'S STATEMENT. WE DO NOT INTEND TO QUERY IRC ANY MORE ABOUT THE MONEY UNTIL WE ARE READY TO SET UP THE APPOINTMENT.

3. IRC HAS FOUND A JOB FOR R[illegible] AS A TRANSLATOR. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT THAT MUCH EASIER TO INTERVIEW HIM ONCE THE FBI GIVES US THE GO-AHEAD.

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

FILE: INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE AND CASE 62117

C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

55-64

MAY 11 4 35 PM '73

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 111925Z MAY 73 STAFF
CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 19090
CONTACTS/WASHINGTON
SUPPORT DIV/ALIEN STAFF (NIEMIEC) FROM CARROLL
SUBJECT: CASE 59431 - ALEXANDRE MIZYUK A-173350

WE WERE ADVISED BY A TELEPHONE RECEPTIONIST AT LOGOS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION THAT MIZYUK QUIT HIS JOB THERE ON 4 MAY 1973 AND LEFT NO FORWARDING ADDRESS. ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) HE IS RELOCATING IN NEW YORK CITY. WE WILL OBTAIN MIZYUK'S ADDRESS DURING WEEK OF 14 MAY 1973. E2 IMPDET CL BY 073476

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~~5564~~
55564
OK

FILE: CASE 59431
CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

55-64

A-5564

International Rescue Committee, Inc.

DCS/SD/Alien Staff
George Neagoy
Room 814, Key Building

2775

5 June 1973

CDC
2 D 40
Headquarters

The attached copy of NY-603-73, dated 31 May 1973, is for your information and retention.

You will recall CDC interest in IRC. We are getting full support from IRC but it is made up of some strange individuals, nevertheless.

Would like to discuss with you sometime next week.

GNeagoy:ro

((

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

NY #603-73

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

DATE: 31 May 1973

ATTN: Support Division/Alien Branch (Neagoy)

FROM : Acting Chief, New York Field Office

SUBJECT: International Rescue Committee, Inc.

A-87027

1. We met Charles Sternberg, Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) on 10 May 1973. In the course of our conversation, Sternberg noted that we had shown quite a bit of interest in Soviet arrivals (defectors) recently and suggested that it would be of a great advantage to us if we were able to introduce ourselves as, for instance, representatives of a scientific institute rather than Agency employees.

2. We are quite certain that Sternberg meant well and had our benefit in mind when he made this suggestion. Sternberg has been cooperative and helpful to us over a number of years. His suggestion particularly aims to simplify our problem of making initial contact with USSR nationals. They are particularly sensitive and suspicious, and CIA has a very ominous meaning to them according to Sternberg.

3. We explained to Sternberg that we cannot do what he suggested, but in turn we suggested that in instances where a new arrival is ill at ease, we should wait a few weeks or months until the new arrival has settled down, found a place to live, and hopefully, a satisfactory place of employment.

4. We did, however, tell Sternberg that we will discuss his suggestion with our associates interested in this particular problem.

5. Do you have any advice or comment?

W. L. Freund

A/C WALTER L. FREUND

NNGraber:dh

FILE: International Rescue Committee

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5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL 33 67

NY #603-73
31 May 1973

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN: Support Division/Alien Branch (Neagoy)
Acting Chief, New York Field Office

55564 OK

International Rescue Committee, Inc.

A87027

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5. Do you have any advice or comment?

A/C WALTER L. FREUND

NNGraber:dh

FILE: International Rescue Committee

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55-64

MAY 11 2 [illegible] PM '73

C O N F I D E N T I A L 111737Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 19085

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SUPPORT DIV/ALIEN STAFF (SCHWEICH) FROM GRABER

SUBJECT: CASE 60138 - NIKOLAY RUDAKOV A-176258

REF: ALN-219-73 S-5564 OK

1. C/S GRABER MET RUDAKOV AT THE IRC (INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE) OFFICE ON 10 MAY 1973. RUDAKOV IS ABOUT TO GET A JOB AND LOOKING FOR A PLACE TO LIVE. HE WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO BE INTERVIEWED BY US, BUT WANTED TO GET SETTLED FIRST. HE PROMISED TO CALL US WEDNESDAY, 16 MAY, TO LET US KNOW IF HE FOUND A PLACE TO LIVE AND WHERE.

2. RUDAKOV TOLD US HIS FATHER WAS A WORKER IN THE SAME INSTITUTE WHERE HE WAS EMPLOYED AND NOT A FAMOUS PERSON AT ALL. HE DIED ABOUT FIVE YEARS AGO. WE COULD NOT GET ANY MORE DETAILS AT THE TIME. WHO IS THE FAMOUS RUDAKOV HE COULD HAVE BEEN RELATED TO?

3. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER PROGRESS. E2 IMPDET

CL BY 0C4476

FILE: CASE 60138; IRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L

55-64

JAN 15 3 21 PM '73

C O N F I D E N T I A L 151930Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 18535

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SUPPORT DIVISION/ALIEN STAFF (SCHNEICH) FROM GRABER

[illegible] 55564/OK

SUBJECT: CASE 59481 - ALEKSANDR [illegible]IZYUK

1. SUBJECT IS HADLED BY THE INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC) IN NEW YORK. A87027

2. CHARLES STERNBERG, HEAD OF IRC IN NEW YORK TOLD US THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT CASE AND WE SHOULD WAIT FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH BEFORE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS.

3. TO UNDERLINE THE DIFFICULT SITUATION, STERNBERG TOLD US THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PUT UP SUBJECT IN A HOTEL AND PLACED HIM WITH AN EMPLOYEE OF HIS ORGANIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY.

4. WHEN SUBJECT CAN BE CONTACTED, JOE CARROLL OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE WILL HANDLE THIS CASE. -END- E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]4476

FILE: CASE 59481 INTL RESCUE COMMITTEE

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CONFIDENTIAL

55-64

ALN-603-72
6 December 1972

Chief, Boston Office
ATTN: Ron E. Kelly

Director, DCS/Support Division/Alien Staff

Case 53450 - Anatoliy V. Tereshko

A 168499

REFERENCES: A. BOS-927-72, Same Subject, dated 29 November 1972
B. Niemiec-Kelly telecon, Same Subject, dated 5 December 1972.

1. This memo covers subjects discussed in references.

2. Since Tereshko came into this country as a refugee under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee in New York City we do not have any commitments to assist him in his resettlement problems whether they include job assistance or assistance in firming up his immigration status to this country. We, however, also realize that he has been a very cooperative and prolific reports producer for the intelligence components. We want to make clear that we have no commitments to help Tereshko.

3. Tereshko should find his own way to mail letters to Minsk through parties located in other cities. Subject mentioned that he has friends in New York City whom he could use for this purpose.

4. We contacted the office handling Tereshko's refund for his rubles and rupees and were informed that he will shortly receive a check for US$25.00 plus some gold rubles which could not be changed for him. When we receive the money in a week or two, we will forward it to you.

5. Apparently Tereshko feels an attraction to work for Radio Liberty in Munich, which was offered to him. This again is his own decision although he has a good position and a fine future with his present company.

6. We have found from experience that defectors generally blame us for decisions and actions which fail and credit their own astuteness for those developments which succeed. We would like, however, to point

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

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out that your handling of Tereshko has been excellent in serving requirements and in getting him to travel twice for debriefings in spite of his heavy work schedule with his company.

JAMES R. MURPHY

FJNiemiec/sa

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CONFIDENTIAL

NY-864-71

19 August 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

76447

SUBJECT: Contact with Mrs. Mary Lord

1. Mrs. Mary Lord will make two trips abroad in the near future. From 19 August to 7 September she will be in the Far East. She will travel to Calcutta in her capacity as interim president of the International Rescue Committee, and will also go to Saigon and Hong Kong. She hopes to visit Laos, but this had not been settled when we spoke with her early in August. Her visit would be in response to an invitation extended by Souvanna Phouma last winter (see oo-B-33171-70). If successful, she would attempt to get more information related to the requirements of Case 54,162.

2. On 9 September Mrs. Lord leaves for Europe on a trip connected with her duties with the Atlantic Treaty Association. We do not know how long she will be gone, but if prior trips are any indication it probably will be no longer than two weeks. She may learn more about Georges Pompidou, although she has not been briefed for this particular trip. We received requirements against a similar trip in June (See oo-B-17055-71 in response to cases 54,162 and 56,660 and she may remember some of those and attempt to obtain further data. We would recommend that she be debriefed on both trips shortly after her return from Europe. We have given her Mr. Lohmann's name, should she wish to contact the NYFO before a representative calls on her.

3. In June Mrs. Lord loaned us two books on Pompidou. Upon instructions from Chief, NYFO, we returned these to Mrs. Lord on 18 August since we had received no reply to our queries to headquarters (NY-636-71 of 24 June 197, Form 610 of 19 July 1971 and NY 16766 of 3 August 1971.)

Ruth Elliff

R.E/ewk

File: Mrs. Mary Lord

cc: International (Rinkus) ✓

cc: International (McHugh)

55564

SECRET

NY-297-71

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

73 A158419

SUBJECT: Call from Jack Cogswell, 22 March 1971

B 55564

Cogswell telephoned to inform that the International Rescue Committee planned to hold a Press Conference on 24 March 1971 in New York to discuss prisoners in Cuban jails. Cogswell voiced the hope that the conference would not have any adverse effects on attempts underway to obtain the release of Lawrence Kirby Lunt from a Cuban prison. He explained that "Pancho" ("who is known to your people, I am sure") is on his way to Mexico City with $3,500. He will contact a woman there who apparently knows who to pay off to arrange Lunt's release. Cogswell indicated that "they" hoped to pay no more than $10,000.

R. P. B. LOHMANN

RPBL:br

File: Jack Cogswell

✓ cc: International Division (Heller)

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[illegible]

14-00000

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MAR 4 10 32 AM '71

SECRET 041500Z MAR 71 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK 16133

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ALIEN STAFF (KOMICKI) FROM GRABER

SUBJECT: CASE 56074

REF: YOUR WA 58/39 AND OUR NY 16132

B5-5564 OK

1. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY CHECKED AND ARE CONTINUING TO CHECK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF MARININ. CHARLES STERNBERG, HEAD OF IRC, IS MAKING EFFORT TO LOCATE MARININ. WE ARE ALSO CHECKING WITH I&NS TO SEE WHETHER THE FILE HAS BEEN RETURNED FROM ROME, ITALY.

B 187027

2. ACCORDING TO STERNBERG, SEREGIN ON WHOM WE HAVE RECEIVED RID DATA AND FORWARDED A NAME CHECK REQUEST TO HEADQUARTERS, DOES NOT KNOW MARININ'S WHEREABOUTS.

3. YOU HAVE A-NUMBERS. SUGGEST CENTRAL FILES OF I&NS WASHINGTON BE CHECKED.

4. YOU MIGHT CONSIDER QUERYING ROME STAION CONCERNING MARININ.

FILE: IRC AND

CASE 56074 RP-1

SECRET

F55-64

MAR 3 4 14 PM '71

S E C R E T 031900Z MAR 71 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 88439

CONTACTS/NEW YORK

SPARE FROM ALIEN STAFF (KONICKI)

SUBJECT: CASE 56074 - G.A. MARININ AND ALEKSANDR IVANOVICH SEREGIN

REF: TELECONS BETWEEN V. FREUND AND W.W. KONICKI ON 17 FEBRUARY 1971 AND 3 MARCH 1971

B

PLEASE TRY THROUGH YOUR CONTACTS AT INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE REGARDING WHEREABOUTS OF MARININ AND SEREGIN. ALSO TRY I&NS AGAIN. GREAT PRESSURE HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LEADS INCLUDING IMMIGRATION FILE NUMBER, IF AVAILABLE. THANK YOU. CP-1

S E C R E T

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

55 64

NY#399-69

DATE: 12 June 1969

B S. 4416 o/C

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN: (Mr. Murphy)
FROM : Chief, New York Field Office

S.69-169 B

SUBJECT: Meeting with Edmund Cummings, Dept. of Immigration, US Catholic Conference.
Ref: Dept. of State memo of 12 May 69 from Wm. C. Trueheart, forwarded to NYFO on 16 May 69.

1. On 6 Jun 69 Deputy Chief, NYFO, accompanied by C/S Elliff, met with Edmund Cummings to discuss any aspects of the relationship between his office and the Agency that might be unsatisfactory to him. This appointment was requested by NYFO as a result of the comments made by Cummings in reference memo.

B L 5544

2. When we opened the discussion with the statement that we had heard indirectly that the question of cooperation with the CIA had arisen at the ACVA meeting, Cummings immediately stated that this was indeed the case, and for his part, he wished to have no contact at all with our Agency. Invited to elaborate on his reasons, Cummings said it could be very "embarrassing" were it to become known that he had furnished information on Czechoslovak refugees to the CIA. He later stated that it could be extremely dangerous for refugees to have contact with the Agency, since if this fact were known, it could bring harm to themselves or to their families still in Eastern Europe. If he had furnished the information about the location of a refugee to whom harm later came, it would cause him great anguish. He knew, he said, of an instance in Connecticut in which a refugee who had cooperated with the Agency was beaten up by Communist agents. Cummings did not respond to our invitation to elaborate on this incident, which we said was unknown to us. Cummings said that not only was he concerned about CIA activities involving refugees, but that if cognizant, the US bishops would be unhappy about CIA involvement with organizations such as the US Catholic Conference. Again, Cummings declined to elaborate. Cummings suggested that we get our information from the I&NS to whom the US Catholic Conference furnishes data and he was unsympathetic to our desire to have this information on a more timely basis than was possible with reliance on I&NS records. He also suggested that arrangements to see refugees in the US be made with the refugee in Europe and that the refugee be given a telephone number to call after his arrival. Responding to our direct question, Cummings said he viewed cooperation with the FBI in a different light and would not deny its agents information they requested.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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3. We wish to emphasize that Cummings made none of the statements to us that he did in paragraph two of reference memo. On the contrary, in response to our direct question, Cummings said that his objections were those of principle rather than of manner of approach by the NYFO. At no time during our conversation with him did he make any objection to the procedure set up between him and C/S Elliff to facilitate the acquiring of the information we requested. We do not have any doubts that Cummings did indeed make the statements attributed to him in reference memo, but it is at least interesting that he specifically refuted them in our presence. After displaying nothing but hostility toward the Agency during our entire meeting, he invited us to call upon him in the future if he "could ever do anything for us personally." Obviously we do not expect to contact him on any basis in the future and we are certain that he does not anticipate further inquiries from this office.

4. C/S Elliff reports as follows on her contacts with Cummings and other officials of the Dept. of Immigration, US Catholic Conference:

> "The first contact with Cummings was on 11 Sept 68 and the results of that meeting are contained in NY#677-68 of 11 Sep 68. This was a straight-forward request for information on how the US Catholic Conference would handle the influx of refugees. As can be seen from the memo, Cummings was cooperative and, in fact, offered more assistance to us than we later requested. We spoke on the telephone with Cummings a few weeks later to say that, in all likelihood, we would only be needing to ask for address information on selected refugees occasionally. For this information, he referred us to Mrs. Irene Bilinski. On 12 Dec we saw Mrs. Bilinski who ~~was cooperative in~~ furnishing information on a specific Czechoslovak refugee. Upon our return from Washington in late January 1969, a number of requests had piled up and we tried to obtain the needed information through Mrs. Bilinski. She pleaded that they were very busy, extremely behind in their filing and asked that we call on her later.

B

B-69-169

NY#399-69
12 June 1969

"Since it appeared in late March that Mrs. Bilinski would not be available in the foreseeable future, we called again on Cummings and explained the problem. We said we understood the problems involved for them in providing this information, in view of the fact that they were extremely busy, and said we would appreciate anything he could do to facilitate matters. There was one address we needed urgently and this Cummings obtained for us while we waited. We left with him about six three-by-five cards on other refugees, plus a stamped self-addressed envelope, and asked that he return the cards, with the address and employment data added, at his convenience. After that, we sent Cummings two letters requesting data on additional individuals and received replies in due course. After his receipt of the second letter, Cummings called Deputy Chief, NYFO (whose name he had obtained from Charles Sternberg of the International Rescue Committee) to check on Miss Elliff's bona fides. According to Deputy Chief, NYFO, Cummings was satisfied that our inquiries were legitimate and only expressed the hope that they could be kept to a minimum. We suggested the mail procedure agreed to by Cummings only in the interest of saving the time of an obviously overworked organization.

S-5564

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A 87027

"When the account of Cummings' complaints to the Department of State official reached us, we endeavored to set up an appointment for ourselves and Deputy Chief, NYFO, to see him. Our first call in this regard was on 19 May. He said it was a very busy week and asked us to call later. We called the following week and he again stated he was extremely busy. We said we did have one address to ask him about and asked if we might see him briefly. He invited us to write him for the information, and assured us that this would be entirely satisfactory. We wrote on 26 May and he replied the following day, much faster than he had previously. When we called him on 6 June, he invited us to meet with him that afternoon. We estimate that we have requested address and employment information on about 13 individuals. Since this is the only data requested from Cummings, we do not understand his statement in reference memo that he had "become concerned over the numbers and types of request." In addition to Cummings and Mrs. Bilinski, we have contacted Mrs. Olympia Boroni, whom we saw in 1967 in connection with Case 49,354. Although she could not furnish the current location of the individual in whom we were interested, she was extremely cooperative." B-67-167

C

W. L. Freund
JACKSON R. NORTON

WLFreund:kf

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A 5/

CONFIDENTIAL 211400Z MAY 69 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION (FARRELL) FROM FREUND

RE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON [illegible]

A 5544

A

1. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, INC., 200 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NYC, IS NOT ITSELF A CONTACT OF THIS OFFICE, BUT SOME OF ITS MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS ARE. A MORE OR LESS COMPLETE LISTING OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS FOLLOWS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, ORGANIZATIONS ARE HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK. ASTERISK INDICATES CURRENT NYFO CONTACT. (D) FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION TITLE INDICATES EXACT ORGANIZATION NAME NOT ASCERTAINED.

X AMERICAN FUND FOR CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES A 5550
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PHILADELPHIA
AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE A 8343
AMERICAN RELIEF FOR POLAND, CHICAGO S 66664 I
BRETHREN SERVICE (D) — S-5557 OK
4-5557
X CHURCH WORLD SERVICE
S-5544
HADASSAH (THE WOMEN'S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA)
F- X INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE S 5564 OK
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE INC. S 693 IN

all B

Copies F/ All Jackets!

LITHUANIAN RELIEF FUND OF AMERICA Tue 3-69-127
LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION SERVICE ✓ use B-69-127
NEAR EAST FOUNDATION —A 833
POLISH AMERICAN IMMIGRATION & RELIEF COMMITTEE -A-32117
SALVATION ARMY #1410 (ED)
SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS —A1336
X TOLSTOY FOUNDATION — A 5575
UNITARIAN (SC), BOSTON — A 2204
X UNITED HIAS SERVICE A 58403
UNITED UKRAINIAN AMERICAN RELIEF COMMITTEE (UUARC - A-5521 (ED)
WORLD UNIVERSITY SERVICE — A 5523
YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION. A 555

all B

2. ALTHOUGH NYFO HAS HAD CONTACT WITH SOME OF THE ORGANIZATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE GIVEN AN ASTERISK ABOVE, THIS WAS EITHER NOT RECENTLY OR DID NOT IN ANY WAY RELATE TO REFUGEES. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE CAME TO OUR ATTENTION OVER A YEAR-AGO IN CONNECTION WITH A COMPLAINT ARISING IN DETROIT, AND MR. MORTON DISCUSSED MATTER WITH ITS DIRECTOR: WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT CONTACT AND DOUBT ORGANIZATION'S INVOLVEMENT WITH CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES.

3. ALTHOUGH CHAIRMANSHIP OF ACVA THEORETICALLY ROTATES, IT HAS BEEN WITH THE REV. JOHN W. SCHAUER, JR., DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROGRAM, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, FOR AN ESTIMATED THREE YEARS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A REGULAR ATTENDEE AT SUCH MEETINGS THATACVA DOES NOT FORMULATE POLICY FOR MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS. THUS, DISCUSSION APPARENTLY INTENDED FOR THE NEXT SCHEDULED MEETING BY OUR COMPLAINANT (WHICH CLEARLY HAS NOT COME TO ATTENTION OF SOME KEY MEMBERS, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING JOHN SCHAUER) WOULD BE IN NATURE OF INFORMAL CONSULTATION ONLY.

4. THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER IN NYFO HAS NOT IDENTIFIED AN INCIDENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO THIS COMPLAINT. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER OFFICE WAS INVOLVED OR THAT LOCAL BASE OF [illegible] FAR, WHICH APPARENTLY IS IN TOUCH WITH REFUGEE ORGANIZATIONS HAS BEEN AGAIN MISTAKEN FOR CIA. CONVERSATION WITH TWO CLEARED AND THOROUGHLY SYMPATHETIC CONTACTS IN ACVA MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS INDICATES THAT THEY HAVE NOT HEARD OF THIS COMPLAINT AND THAT IF IT COMES UP IN DISCUSSION THERE WILL BE SOME FRIENDLY SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION. IT SEEMS TO US, HOWEVER, MOST DESIRABLE THAT IT NOT COME UP AND WE URGE, THEREFORE, THAT STATE BE ADVISED THAT THE COMPLAINAN

PAGE 4 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 1390 CONFIDENTIAL

(ASSUMING HE IS IN NEW YORK) SHOULD BRING HIS COMPLAINT DIRECTLY

TO THIS OFFICE FOR ANY DISCUSSION HE MAY WISH TO HOLD ON THE MATTER.

-END-

CONFIDENTIAL

CCC: PAGE 3. LINE FIVE BEGINNING OF LINE XXX THAT ACVA XXX VICE THA ACVA

ALSO PAGE EE E PAGE 3. PARA 4. LINE TEN WORD AFTER XXX THAT STATE BE
ADVISED XXX ETC VICE THAT STATE XORRY EE E SORRY

NOTICE: ABOVE "X" MINUS QUOTES REFERS TO ASTERISK

CIA Requests to Refugee Organizations in New York 55-60/

Soviet Bloc Division, DCS
Paul J. Leaden/amb

16 May 1969

Chief, New York Office

Jack,

Jim Murphy showed us the attached correspondence, which follow-up on his earlier discussion of the subject problem with you. He asked that we send you a copy, and would like your comments on it. Jim would be interested in the rational for going the mail route instead of personal visits by the CS's. As I mentioned during your brief visit on Wednesday, we are reviewing the entire DCS Czech refugee procedure, with an eye to cutting back our general effort.

cc: Director, DCS

B

A-5544

American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVA)

Copies: McC

SECRET

[illegible]

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14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Murphy, D/DCS		
2			
3			
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5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Jim:

I received the attached correspondence from Bill Trueheart this morning.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Thomas H. Karamessines, DD/P	14 May 69

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

GPO : 1968 O - 297-542

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SECRET

9-2072

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

May 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: CIA Requests to Voluntary Agencies in New York

With reference to our recent discussion of this subject, I am attaching a memorandum from Mr. Laugel of Ambassador Martin's staff on his meetings in New York with various representatives of the voluntary agencies. It would appear from his report that concern among the voluntary agencies over CIA approaches is more widespread than we had at first supposed.

Bill
William C. Trueheart
INR/DDC

Attachment:
As stated.

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : INR - Mr. William C. Trueheart

DATE: May 9, 1969

FROM : S/R:ORM - Raymond W. Laugel

SUBJECT: CIA Requests to Voluntary Agencies in New York

Mrc 6 69-169

Ambassador/Graham Martin has asked me to inform you of conversations which were held in my presence by certain voluntary agency representatives with regard to CIA requests for information on Eastern European refugees (primarily Czechs) who have been arriving in the U.S. as a result of the Czechoslovak-USSR crisis. The following information was obtained on a confidential basis while I was in New York this week to work on an unrelated project:

A-22572 A-41194

(1) On May 5, after concluding my own business discussions, Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc., expressed his deep concern over being asked to supply information on the whereabouts of his former countrymen. Dr. Papanek told me that the CIA is checking on a large number of Czech refugees, most of whom have no special experience or qualifications which would seem to be of particular interest to the United States. He knows that many of these people are being subjected to intensive interrogations which bewilder and frighten them. The procedure was initiated last October by a CIA man who identified himself as Norman N. Graber. Dr. Papanek receives his requests by letter (he showed me one sample) which simply lists the names and other basic data, either immigration number or date of birth. The return address used by the CIA is P.O. Box 1294 in Grand Central Station, to which Dr. Papanek is to send his reply that is, the latest U.S. address recorded in his files. Dr. Papanek did not mention a specific number of names or requests but he said they are growing and he is very uncomfortable about it; he does not want his good name or agency to become identified with the CIA. He indicated, in addition, that the method of operation seems heavy-handed in comparison to that of the FBI, whose agents present themselves in person, make their requests known

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

and are serviced to the extent permitted by Dr. Papanek. If this information is essential to U.S. interests, Dr. Papanek cannot understand why it is not handled on an intra-governmental basis -- namely have the CIA obtain its information from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is responsible for alien registration in the United States.

B 69-169 S 4416

(2) On May 6, after concluding my work with Mr. Edmund Cummings, Associate Director of the U.S. Catholic Conference, the question again came up. Mr. Cummings expressed his agitation over the seemingly amateurish and scattershot method by which the CIA is operating in this field. He also questioned the value of interrogating simple refugees who are not defectors with special qualifications or background. Mr. Cummings said the groundwork was laid sometime ago (no date mentioned) by a female officer of the CIA, and that he agreed to the exchange of mail procedure utilizing the P.O. Box at Grand Central. However, he has become concerned over the numbers and types of requests. He suggested, as did Dr. Papanek, that INS might be the proper contact point for CIA. Mr. Cummings also mentioned that the FBI agents appear in person and he indicated that their approach seems more professional.

S-5564 OK

(3) I was also informed by Mr. Cummings that the International Rescue Committee, Inc., whose Executive Director is Mr. Charles Sternberg, was somewhat alarmed by the same situation. I had previously consulted Mr. Sternberg on my own project but he did not raise the CIA matter with me.

A-87027

(4) On May 7 I attended (as an observer) a meeting of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Problems, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., which was called to discuss refugee and related matters. The meeting was chaired by the Rev. John W. Schauer of the Church World Service; in addition to

file B 69-169

Council officers, representatives of seven voluntary agencies were present. Those in attendance were:

Mr. Eugene Shenefield and
Miss Etta Deutsch of the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies

Mr. Edmund E. Cummings and
Mr. John McCarthy of the
United States Catholic Conference

Mr. Donald E. Anderson of the
Lutheran Immigration Service

Mr. Gaynor Jacobson and
Mr. Harry Freeuman of the
United HIAS Service

Mr. Charles Sternberg of the
International Rescue Committee

Dr. Jan Papanek of the
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees

A 41194

Mr. Teymouraz Bagration of the
Tolstoy Foundation

Chairman Schauer also represented the
Church World Service

A 5559

At one point the meeting went off-the-record to hear from Mr. Cummings of USCC, who had been assigned to study the "CIA problem." But Chairman Schauer opened the discussion by announcing rather mysteriously that he had been in touch "with Washington" at the appropriate level -- implying that the Council should at least table the matter for the time being. Mr. Cummings then moved that (a) there would be no further discussion of it, and (b) each voluntary agency should deal with the CIA as it sees fit on an individual agency basis. His motion carried and the Council proceeded to other business.

The above information was volunteered to me. During the individual discussions I expressed no opinion but did mention my general interest in overall problems the voluntary agencies are facing. At the Council meeting I said nothing on this subject.

55-64

S E C R E T [illegible] CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION [illegible]

CITE 51,19[illegible] (OPENED BY PHONE ON 5 SEP)

1. FOLLOWING IS RESULT OF ACTIVITY OF SEVERAL CONTACT SPECIALISTS. CLEARLY, ISSUE OF REFUGEES IS CONCERN OF VARIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, NONE OF WHICH AS YET HAS WAY OF SIZING IT UP WITH ANY DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE. FURTHER DETAILS EXPECTED.

#35923

2. COL HARRIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NY DISTRICT OF I&NS, URGES MATTER BE TAKEN UP WITH I&NS CENTRAL OFFICE. IF EXECUTIVE ORDER IS ISSUED AUTHORIZING PAROLE ENTRY OF CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES, I&NS IS LIKELY TO DISPATCH PERSONNEL TO VIENNA FOR PRE-SCREENING. CIA COULD ARRANGE TO MONITOR FINDINGS OF SUCH A GROUP AND PERHAPS OBTAIN ALL ESSENTIAL DATA ON PROSPECTIVE PAROLEES. IF DIC DATA NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH THIS CHANNEL, ARRANGEMENTS COULD PRESUMABLY BE MADE WITH NY DISTRICT. HOWEVER, THIS EFFORT SHOULD HAVE CENTRAL OFFICE BLESSING BECAUSE IT WOULD CONSTITUTE DRAIN ON AVAILABLE SLIM NY DISTRICT MANPOWER. IN PRINCIPLE, NY DISTRICT STANDS READY TO ASSIST IF ITS HQ APPROVES. (THIS IS LOOKING TO FUTURE.)

3. CHURCH WORLD SERVICE SITUATION REPORTED IN 00-B-321/28161-68.

S E C R E T

Msc B 68 250

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] SAID [illegible] ALLOCATED US 31 [illegible] THOUSAND TO [illegible] OF REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA. JDC ESTIMATES THERE ARE 16 THOUSAND JEWS IN COUN. UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS THINKS 10-12 THOUSAND MORE CORRECT FIGURE. DR. JAN PAPANEK, HEAD OF AMERICAN FUND FOR CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES INC., WILL PARTICIPATE IN STATE DEPARTMENT MEETING ON ISSUE 6 SEP; HE WILL BACK IRC EFFORTS TO PERSUADE STATE RE PAROLEE HANDLING. V. JERABEK, PAPANEK'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HAS ASSURED US OF COOPERATION IN POINTING UP GOOD SOURCES ONCE REFUGEES ARRIVE. - CHARLES STERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, LEFT FOR VIENNA TODAY, 5 SEP, BEFORE WE COULD RECONTACT HIM. AARONSOHN IS JUST NOW INTER-VIEWING HIS BOSS, LEO CHERNE.

5-5564/0K

-END-

S E C R E T

OCC : PLEASA EEE E PLEASE IN PAGE ONE END OF PAGE WD 3. DELETE THE "L"

ALSO IN PAGE TWO JUST BEFORE THE PAGE TWO E "PAGE TWO" DELETE THE WORD "-END-" MINUS QUOTES QUE E QUOTES SOARI AND THS

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SEP 3 11 28 AM '68

S E C R E T 031450Z SEP 68 CITE CONTACTS/NEW YORK [illegible]

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

SOVIET BLOC DIVISION (WELCH) FROM FREUND

SUBJECT: CASE 51,658 - CZECH CRISIS - NEW ASPECT: [illegible]

1. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC), HEADQUARTERED IN NY, WAS FIRST AND MAIN VOLUNTARY AGENCY TO MOVE DECISIVELY ON BEHALF OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN 1956 AND AGAIN SEEMS TO BE IN VANGUARD REGARDING CZECHOSLOVAKS. TOP MAN, LEO CHERNE, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM VIENNA, WHERE HE STUDIED DIMENSIONS OF PROBLEM AT PRESENT. CHARLES STERNBERG, RESETTLEMENT SUPERVISOR (NOT EXACT TITLE), IS HIMSELF OF CZECH JEWISH ORIGIN, SPEAKS CZECH.

2. AS OF LABOR DAY, SEVERAL THOUSAND CZECHOSLOVAKS IN AUSTRIA HAD INDICATED DESIRE TO SEEK PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT ABROAD. AS REPORTED IN PRESS, DEPARTURE FROM CSSR IS STILL LEGALLY POSSIBLE, AND UK EMBASSY HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIT APPLICANTS. SWITZERLAND ISSUES VISAS TO CZECHOSLOVAKS IN AUSTRIA (AND PERHAPS IN CSSR). CANADA ISEXPECTED TO ADMIT REFUGEES.

3. UP TO ONE-THIRD OF TOTAL OF [illegible] THOUSAND REFUGEES EXPECTED IN PIPELINE WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS ARE EXPECTED TO OPT FOR EMIGRATION TO U.S. IRC WILL HANDLE MANY CASES, MAY BE CALLED UPON TO COOPERATE IN SCREENING LISTS FOR DESIRABLE [illegible]

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/NEW YORK 3547 S E C R E T

SOURCES.

4. STERNBERG USED OCCASION TO URGE THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT SPEED

UP PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING VISAS. UNDUE DELAYS OF REFUGEES IN

AUSTRIA WOULD UNDERMINE MORALE BOTH OF THOSE ALREADY OUTSIDE CSSR

AND OF THOSE STILL INSIDE CONTEMPLATING FLIGHT.

5. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH IRC AND PASS ALONG DEVELOPMENTS.

6. PLEASE COORDINATE WITH ALIEN STAFF; [illegible] IS BELIEVED VERY

FAMILIAR WITH IRC SET UP.

S E C R E T

89-17-6

F-5564

20 July 1964
MIM - 257-64

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : CAC Staff

Chief, Miami Field Office

Arrivals of Cuban Refugees via Spain

1. We have made arrangements to receive periodic listings of Cuban Refugees who arrive in the US via chartered flights from Spain. The first list we have obtained is appended. All local arrivals are being sent letters instructing them to report to Opa-Locka.

S-5564

2. The flights are organized by the International Refugee Committee. No further information is available locally on any of the refugees listed. We will attempt to locate those settling in Florida. Please handle balance as you see fit.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:sb

Attachment:
List of Cuban Refugees

1c 5564

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ZEA

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] EIGHT TWO [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]

[illegible] CITE NYOR 0752

[illegible] FROM [illegible] 187027 S 5564

1. CHARLES [illegible] INTERNATIONAL [illegible] CONTACTED

US TO CALL OUR ATTENTION [illegible]

SL 11-4-76

VOJISLAV [illegible] [illegible] CITIZEN WHO [illegible]

[illegible] ASYLUM [illegible] THE [illegible]

[illegible] HAD A MEMBER [illegible] PARTY IN YUGOSLAVIA, [illegible]

AND BECAME [illegible] IN RECENT YEARS. [illegible]

MOVIE PRODUCER [illegible] HIS MOVIES [illegible] IN U.S. [illegible]

"THE MAGIC SWORD"), [illegible] OVERESTIMATED THE [illegible]

2. [illegible] MADE [illegible] IN U.S. [illegible]

MONTHS AGO, BUT HAS [illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT [illegible]

KNOWLEDGE OF YUGO PARTY [illegible]

EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT [illegible] LACK OF [illegible] HE [illegible]

SOMETHING TO SAY TO [illegible]

3. WE CAN [illegible]

CONTACT), BUT WOULD [illegible]

OBVIOUSLY, [illegible] ALSO.

ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN NYOR 0792 [illegible]

[illegible] A YUGOS[illegible]

NOT [illegible]

BT

5564

SECRET

ANALYSIS REPORT

NAME Dr. Jaroslav Kremel

INDEX NO. S-5564

ADDRESS

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Process Sheet

DATED 10/22/63

DATE FILED 2/7/64

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

F.O.

SECONDARY NO.

ABSTRACT

SUBJECT & AREA:
Dr. Jaroslav Kremel's (S-5564) Defection and Redefection.

SOURCE & CONTACT:
W. L. Freund (S-43525)
New York City

See P/Sheet for OOA(S) - 3278987 filed in Jacket # 43525 (W. L. Freund)

SUBJECT	AREA	ACT.	DATE INFO.	TFR	DATE AREA

FORM NO. 339 REPLACES FORM 57-28 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 54

SECRET

(12)

OC Ho 3,278,987
NY 47583

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~F-435-35~~
F 3 5564

DATE: [illegible] 1963

TO : Chief, Contact Division
FOR: Alien Branch (Givens)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

S-5564

SUBJECT: Case: [illegible] Dr. Jaroslav [illegible]'s Defection and Redefection.

---

1. Herewith a summary of this case, as requested in WA-61595.

2. The case was opened to this office by a telephone call from George Mucalin in mid-morning on 20 Sep 63. The only information available to us at that point was an account in the New York Times of 19 September. Freund of NYFO was instructed to contact Mr. Joe Schmit (Assistant Special Agent in Charge), New York FBI: the FBI had notified CIA through Washington Liaison that it would be ready to turn over subject to us for interrogation some time on this date, and the details were to be discussed with Schmit.

3. Schmit passed Freund along to the supervisor and special agent handling the case (both known to us), and we learned that the FBI had not seen the subject as yet because of unexpected delays at Immigration and Naturalization Services. The expected schedule was for subject to be fingerprinted and released by I&NS in the early p.m. The FBI estimated that its own interrogation could be accomplished within about 45 minutes. As envisaged, FBI interrogation would be carried out at International Rescue Committee office, where subject would be turned over to us at about 3 p.m.

4. Above information was phoned through to Alien Branch, which advised that two OSI representatives, Drs. Hopman and Huber, were to be dispatched to New York to conduct an interrogation that afternoon. Numerous telephone calls between this office and Alien Branch, the FBI, and IRC continued throughout the afternoon. The FBI very graciously agreed to make a staff translator of Czech descent available for our interrogation. Charles Sternberg of IRC agreed to stay in his office until we could take the subject off his hands when it became clear that the OSI representatives were late in arriving.

5. Dr. Hopman, OSI, and Dr. Huber, Medical Staff, in fact reached NYFO at 1:50. There was considerable misunderstanding between them and this office concerning the situation. They were unaware that subject had been interrogated until late the previous day by INS and was somewhat exhausted by interrogations and procedures on 20 Sep at INS and involving the FBI. They expected to operate under cover (to be furnished by FBI or this office), they expected to be provided with a secure interrogation facility wired for sound, they understood that Czechoslovak authorities had attempted to reach the subject. In the circumstances, they remained at NYFO in the care of the Field Office chief, while Freund proceeded to IRC.

6. Conversations at I&N with Sternberg, the FBI translator and subject revealed the following: subject had been led to expect two CIA men from Washington. He had been given Freund's true name, and he was not in the happiest mood after waiting for several hours. (Sternberg of INS had not made the above disclosures to subject.) Further discussion with Chief, NYFO, and with Sternberg led to the decision that subject was to remain in Sternberg's care over the weekend, that any interrogation in the circumstances would be unwise (particularly as the transcript of the exhaustive I&NS interrogation would be available early the following week), and that the suggestion of Alien Branch to bring him to its safe installation for detailed exploitation should be followed.

7. Freund took the FBI translator and subject out for supper and developed a few facts. Subject was overly optimistic about the results of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia and the current "non-[illegible]," which he hoped would insure his family's joining him within one to two years. He was staying with his friend, Danes, and felt confident that neither the other 24 physicians in his exchange group nor Czechoslovak security could trace him to Danes. Subject was very willing to leave New York for interrogation elsewhere. He spoke about his political convictions- anti-communist, pro- Czech- and his admiration for the US, although he did not particularly like New York. Freund thanked the FBI translator for his help, delivered subject to Danes' apartment (but did not enter it), notified Chief, NYFO, of developments, and reported to [illegible] at the earliest opportunity (about 2250 hours).

8. On Monday morning, 23 September, we received word that Alien Branch was ready to accept subject to its safe facility later that day. George Hagle, using a registered pseudonym, drove subject to Washington in the afternoon. An agreement reached earlier with Sternberg was reconfirmed in front of subject at the time that Freund picked up subject: the INS assumed full responsibility for subject's welfare, under procedures and considerations affecting aliens as promulgated by the I&NS. During the period (expected to be somewhere in the neighborhood of one week) that we borrowed subject, we obviously had to share this responsibility. We wanted to make clear, however, that CIA was not in any way involved in this matter other than to avail itself of the opportunity to interview a source with recent experience in Czechoslovakia. Sternberg clearly understood this, and his subsequent behavior vis-a-vis us appeared to be beyond reproach. On our part, we did not become involved with living arrangements in New York, job opportunities, and the like.

9. The record shows that subject was returned by car (Rosenbrook driving) to New York on 3 October and turned back to Sternberg by Freund at 1400 hours that day. We advised Sternberg of subject's interest in relocating in West Germany or Austria because of his expectation that he would be more readily admitted to medical practice in either country than in the US. Ultimately, he hoped to return to the US, with his family, if wife and child could join him in the West.

Sternberg was [illegible] a realistic plan. We understood from Sternberg that he planned to place subject in a hotel and that subject was to use his proper name [illegible] without the title of "doctor". We were fearful of Czechoslovak efforts to reach him and expressed our fears to Sternberg, [illegible] to influence him. In retrospect, Sternberg might wish to have [illegible] more [illegible] based on his dealings with other refugees, he doubted whether the Czechoslovak authorities would try very hard to run subject down.

10. Our next [illegible] came when we called Sternberg during the early afternoon of [illegible] October. We were in receipt of [illegible], which [illegible] us to ask subject some questions. When we learned from Sternberg that subject was due at IRC that afternoon, Sternberg promised to phone as soon as subject arrived there so that an appointment could be made. Since Major Pribram [illegible] had preliminary indications of job possibilities for subject, we mentioned this to Sternberg and found him appreciative. Later that afternoon, Sternberg phoned back, indicated subject had not shown up at IRC and that he (Sternberg) would go to subject's hotel (near IRC headquarters).

11. The following morning, Sternberg phoned and reluctantly indicated that something was amiss. He had not found subject in his room at the Hotel Le Marquis, 12 East 31st Street, (near IRC hq), on Monday afternoon; an IRC employee who had visited the hotel room on the morning of Tuesday, [illegible] October, established that subject had not been near his room at least since the day before. Subject's belongings, including the briefcase he took wherever he went, were in the room. Sternberg concluded that subject had left his hotel room Monday morning and had not returned since then. Sternberg invited us to inform the FBI. He had not expressed his suspicions to anybody but ourselves. We notified Sivess, who suggested Sternberg alert the FBI himself. We called Sternberg back and so advised him. Somewhat later, the FBI supervisor called us to pass the news to us. Around noon, Sternberg had a call from subject, who said he had chosen to return to Czechoslovakia. Subject answered in the affirmative when Sternberg inquired whether subject phoned from the Czechoslovak Mission to the U.N. The conversation was very short. Sternberg knew enough to inform INS and the FBI. He expressed the hope that the US Government would take steps to make sure that subject was exercising free choice. A number of telephone calls from INS and the FBI ensued, in which the latest developments were played back to us. This office notified Deputy Chief, Contact Division, by phone.

12. During the afternoon, INS advised that it had received an inquiry from the Hotel Le Marquis. Two Czechoslovak diplomats from the UN Mission were at the hotel and trying to claim subject's belongings. The hotel management wondered whether it should comply. INS already had checked with the FBI, which had expressed no interest. We thought that we might wish to go through his briefcase, but told the caller that we had to check with headquarters before giving him a reply. Our call reached Rosenbrook, but the reply (negative) came from McConnell. After some 20 minutes, we therefore advised INS that CIA had no special wishes with regard to subject's belongings. Our advice was that the hotel management treat him exactly as any other John Doe.

13. Charles Sternberg phoned Fremont at the latter's home during the early evening hours. Sternberg expressed considerable concern about the possibility that a member of the Czechoslovak U.N. Mission had successfully approached subject and brought a little pressure to bear on him by giving him a letter from home or painting a black picture about his family's future if he remained in the West as a defector. Sternberg wanted assurances that the US Government mobilize all resources to protect subject from such coercion. Fremont pointed out that CIA was not involved in this aspect of the case and that Sternberg should deal with the appropriate Department of Justice agency, INS or FBI. He indicated that he had already called Mr. Esperdy, District Director of INS, but had not received very reassuring information. He indicated that the IRC had a responsibility first of all to subject and next to all refugees under its care to make sure that they receive proper US Government protection. He might therefore turn to some one "topside" in Washington. He also requested, however, that Fremont communicate this concern to higherups in CIA, which was promptly promised. A phone call to McDonnell at the latter's home (about 2000 hours on 8 October) took care of the matter.

14. There were no further developments on this case during that week. An inquiry from Sivess on 14 October (based on a vague report that subject had been offered $2,000 for a TV appearance in the US) led to a call to Sternberg on that day. Sternberg had not heard of any such offer and felt confident that it had not been extended to subject. He then commented on the second article concerning subject written by Peter Kihss of the New York Times. Since the Late City Edition carried a longer version than the City Edition (which is ordinarily sold in Washington), we are forwarding a clipping of this article (which appeared in the 11 October issue of the New York Times). Sternberg told us that subject's Czech emigre friends, Danes and Vesely, were responsible for the article. They had phoned the Czechoslovak U.N. Mission and asked to speak to subject. They had phoned the various airlines at Idlewild and established the departure via Air France. Finally, they had talked to Kihss about CIA involvement. All that IRC then could do was to issue the statement which was reprinted.

15. Sternberg used this occasion to retrace his own steps for us. On 8 and 9 October, he had been in touch with Van der Heuvel, who was then in Washington. He had talked to Mr. Noto at the Central Office, INS, twice on the morning of [illegible] October.

During the first conversation, Mr. Hoto was not yet aware of subject's departure from the US. Sternberg said he would merely express the hope that subject was interviewed by a US Government official before his departure. It was academic now to worry about whether there had been any dirty tricks involved on the part of the Czechoslovak authorities in persuading subject to return. It was not completely impossible that subject himself took the initiative and called the Czechoslovak Mission to learn about his family.

for Jay [illegible].L. Reeves

WLFreund

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Chief, New York Office		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Parsons Brown sent a copy of the attached to me as a follow-up on our conversations in New York last week. Since Leo Cherne has been alerted, we recommend contact with him in the near future to discuss collection possibilities.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Deputy for Collection	23 Apr 63

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—587282

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153 NYOR

SECRET

NYOR CITE WA 57685

FROM SUPPORT (STETSON)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

A 101881 A 5564

SUBJECT: WILLIAM J. VANDEN HEUVEL, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

1. POLITICAL ACTION GROUP, COVERT ACTION STAFF HAS INITIATED A CLEARANCE REQUEST ON SUBJECT IN ORDER TO USE HIM AS A POLITICAL CONSULTANT. CA STAFF WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONCURRENCE IN THEIR CONTEMPLATED USE AND CONTACT WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL.

2. IN REPLY, PLEASE REFERENCE HH-8991.

SECRET

CFN WA 57685 STETSON 1 WILLIAM J. VANDEN HEUVEL A A CA HH-8991

Copy in jacket 101881

F 5564

[illegible] DEA

SECRET

VIA CITE NYOR 6372

SUPPORT (TRAVIS) FROM MAJOR

CASE 37,473

S- 5564 [redacted]

MAY 11 1 29 PM '62

SUBJECT--BARBRO LISINSKI, NEE LARSSON-LAGERKVIST, BARBRO, HILMA,
MARIA; INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE; STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN

AS PER REQUEST THE FOLLOWING IS BIO DATA ON SUBJECT.

DOB: 6 AUG 1918 POB: SURAHAMMAR, VASTMANLANDS LAN, SWEDEN

1925-29: ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, SURAHAMMAR, SWEDEN

1929-32: PRIVATE SECONDARY SCHOOL, SURAHAMMAR, SWEDEN

1932-36: HIGH SCHOOL "WHITLOCKSA SAMSKOLAN," STOCKHOLM

1936-39: PRACTICE AT DIFFERENT HOSPITALS, STOCKHOLM

1939-41: PRACTICE AS DENTIST ASSISTANT, STOCKHOLM

1941-43: "EASTMAN-INSTITUTET" SCHOOL FOR DENTIST ASSISTANTS,
STOCKHOLM; DIPLOMA

1943-44: EMPLOYED AS DENTIST ASSISTANT, OSTERSUND

1944-46: "SOPHIAHEMMET" NURSERY-SCHOOL, STOCKHOLM

S- 32770

8 JUN 46 MARRIED DR. MICHAL LISINSKI, JOURNALIST, RADIO FREE EUROPE,
STOCKHOLM

HOUSEWIFE WITH FOUR CHILDREN TO 1960.

JANUARY 1960 TO PRESENT, WITH INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, STOCKHOLM. HUSBAND IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF POLISH REFUGEE COUNCIL IN SWEDEN.

SUBJECT SPEAKS SWEDISH, ENGLISH, GERMAN AND SOME POLISH.

FILE-- CASE 37,473

SECRET

CFN 6372 SUPPORT (TRAVIS) MAJOR 37,473 BARBRO LISINSKI NEE LARSSON-LAGERKVIST BARBRO HILMA MARIA PER BIO DATA DOB 6 AUG 1918 POB SURAHAMMAR VASTMANLANDS LAN 1925-29 1929-32 1932-36 "WHITLOCKSA SAMSKOLAN 1936-39 1939-41 1941-43 "EASTMAN-INSTITUTET" 1943-44 OSTERSUND 1944-46 "SOPHIAHEMMET" 8 JUN 46 DR. MICHAL LISINSKI 1960 1960

37,473

32770

F5564

XXXXX 7EA

SECRET

PRITY VA CITE NYOR 6396

SUPPORT (FAUSEL) FROM MAJOR A101881

SUBJECT - HM-8582- WM. VANDEN HEUVAL

MAY 15 2 56 PM '62

SUBJECT NOT IN HIS OFFICE UNTIL 1600 BUT HAVE LEFT MESSAGE AS PER VA 55947. SHOULD THERE BE ANY CONFLICT WE WILL CALL YOU.

FILE- INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE S-5564

SECRET

CFN PRITY NYOR 6396 (FAUSEL) MAJOR HM-8582- WM. VANDEN HEUVAL NOT IN 1600 PER VA 55947 INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

BT

15/1844Z MAY ESG

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copy filed in jacket #

101881

F-5564

ZZYYY ZEA

CONFIDENTIAL

VA CITE NYCR 5947 A 48055

MCCONNELL AND CMP (YOUNG) FROM MAJOR S-5564 A3702

SUBJECT - LEO CHERNE, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMM AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA.

INFEUR VA 55377 AND DENIAL OF FBIS WHITE BOOK TO SUBJECT.

IF YOU CAN'T SHIP THE WHITE BOOK SEND THE OTHER. SURELY THERE ARE AVAILABLE.

FILE - INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CFN NYCR 5947 MCCONNELL CMP (YOUNG) MAJOR LEO CHERNE COMM VA 55377 DENIAL OF FBIS CAN'T SHIP

copy filed - all jackets

F-5564

15 September 1961

Chief Contact Division
ATTN : Support/EE/USSR

Chief, Los Angeles Office

International Congress on Education of the Deaf

A 70479 S 70479

1. Dr. Edgar Lowell, a contact of ours at the John Tracy Clinic, 806 W. Adams Blvd., Los Angeles 7, California, where a great deal of electronic research is carried on concerning deafness, has advised us that he has been nominated as the Program Chairman for the International Congress on Education of the Deaf, which will be held in June 1963. The host for this Conference will be the Council on Education of the Deaf and the Congress will be held at Gallaudet College, Washington, D.C. The Coordinator for this International Congress will be Dr. Powrie V. Doctor of Gallaudet College, who will be working with the State Department on this particular Congress.

Case 5-5564

5-5564 A-100782

2. As Chairman of the Program Committee, Dr. Lowell will be required to go to Europe to attend a meeting of a similar European group planning their annual congress for about the same time, and will visit Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, England and Scandinavia to check on attendees. There is a possibility that he will also go to Yugoslavia at the same time.

3. As a side-line it is also possible that Dr. Lowell will go to Moscow where he will visit Prof. E.N. Sokolov, Institute of Defectology, Pogodina Str 8, Moscow G-117, USSR. Prof. Sokolov is well-known and has been active in previous Macey Conferences in which Dr. Aldrich and Jack Ford have been interested. We have reported through Dr. Lowell on both Sokolov and Prof. A. R. Luriya, and continuing correspondence between Sokolov and Dr. Lowell has also been reported.

4. The Soviets will be invited to this Congress and if the present cordial relationship still exists unaltered by world events, no doubt Sokolov and/or others will certainly be interested if not attend this meeting.

5. Enclosed is a rough outline of the program Dr. Lowell is responsible for which, of course, is still in the formative stage. Also a copy of the original letter sent out announcing the Congress is attached.

5. We would be interested in knowing your degree of interest in this particular matter, and entertain any suggestions you might have towards working with Dr. Lowell.

[illegible] 70479, 100782

ERNST LEIBACHER

Attach: Outline of Program
Announcement letter

TBaldwin/bw

14-00000

SECRET

1/ 556

Chief, Washington Office

14 Feb 62

Chief, Contact Division (Support)

New Case 37308

55564

A-100782

~~55564~~

1. EE/YA is interested in (FNU) Masovic, Yugoslav member of the World Federation of Deaf. They ask you contact your sources at Gallaudet College in Washington for any information they may have on Masovic, who according to a Los Angeles memorandum of 14 November 1961, is Yugoslav and well-known as a Mohammedan working in the area of the deaf. He was apparently co-chairman on a committee with Dr. Bernard Tervoort, a Jesuit priest, who is a PhD and a linguist, and a Dutch national. The two, Masovic and Dr. Tervoort met together in mid-October 1961 in Italy, at which time Masovic expressed a desire to defect.

S70479

2. To assist you in the assignment, we are attaching copy of the EE/YA memorandum of request and a copy of the Los Angeles memorandum of 14 November 1961, giving more details about the meeting between Dr. Tervoort and Masovic.

3. Gallaudet College will be host to the International Congress on Education of the Deaf and sources there may have information on the Masovic in question.

4. Many thanks in advance for your cooperation in this assignment. Please furnish information responsive by OO-A series reporting.

E. H. ASHCRAFT

ARichardson/sm
CC: Index
Attachments

Copy filed in
jacket #
70479, A. 782

SECRET

F 5564

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 7719

SCIENTIFIC (WEST) FROM DANIELS

DEC 6 4 06 PM

5-5564

1. RE OUR TELECON WITH GUILL X GUILL,

A - 74734

PETER COMANDURAS X PETER COMANDURAS, SECRETARY GENERAL, "MEDICO" X "MEDICO" (DIVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE) WILL CALL ON YOU NEXT WEEK.

2. REPEAT FOLLOWING POINTS

A. HE ONLY WANTS ADVICE WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN FUTURE COOPERATION WITH US.

B. HE HAS ALREADY TALKED WITH TRACY BARNES X TRACY BARNES ALONG GENERAL LINES.

C. UNWITTING TO HIM, ONE OF HIS MEN, TOM REAGAN X TOM REAGAN, MAY BE USED BY DD/P X DD/P IN LAOS X LAOS (SEE GRANT, SUPPORT X GRANT, SUPPORT), AND

D. TOM DOOLEY X TOM DOOLEY IS ONE OF THEIR ACE MONEY-GETTERS IN HIS LAOS OPERATION, AND IS DISSAPPROVED BY SO X SO (SEE CROWLEY X CROWLEY FOR FILL IN.) THESE ARE THE GAPS IN OUR CONVERSATION EARLIER TODAY.

1C

Copy filed 74734

F 5564

CNF 703

NYOR CITE WA 40143

FROM EE/USSR (REAMS)

FEB 24 3 PM 63

FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

S-5564 A 55548

ELLIOTT BEACH MACRAE X ELLIOTT BEACH MACRAE, PRESIDENT OF E. P. DUTTON X E. P. DUTTON WAS BRIEFED ON 20 X 20 FEBRUARY IN THE DD/I'S X DD/I'S OFFICE BY WALTER PFORZHEIMER X WALTER PFORZHEIMER, MESSRS. LOWERY AND KOEHNE OF OCI X MESSRS. LOWERY AND KOEHNE OF OCI, SHRYOCK OF ONE X SHRYOCK OF ONE, AND REAMS FOR OO/C X OO/C. DD/I WAS NOT X NOT PRESENT. BRIEFING WAS RESULT OF LETTER FROM MACRAE TO DCI IN WHICH HE NOTED HIS PLAN TO LEAVE 13 X 13 MARCH FOR BOOK-HUNTING TRIP TO LONDON AND PARIS. FOLLOWING THIS BUSINESS TRIP, HE WILL SPEND THREE OR FOUR DAYS EACH IN BELGRADE, SOFIA, BUDAPEST, AND BUCHAREST, "JUST FOR FUN." IN LETTER TO DCI, MACRAE APPARENTLY SOLICITED GUIDANCE SO BRIEFING WAS NOT X NOT REALLY AN INTELLIGENCE ONE BUT A MATTER OF PROVIDING ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS:

(A) CAN I TAKE A TRANSISTOR RADIO AND A CAMERA INTO BULGARIA WITHOUT HAVING THEM APPROPRIATED?

(B) SHOULD I HAVE A TYPHUS SHOT?

(C) IS WATER IN BULGARIA AND RUMANIA POTABLE?

(D) WHO IS THE "SHAKESPEARE" OF BULGARIA (A TOUGH ONE, THAT)?

(E) WHAT IS THE USUAL ATTITUDE OF BULGARIANS AND RUMANIANS

TO US VISITORS?

PFORZHEIMER DID TELL MACRAE THAT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN INFO ON BULGARIAN AND RUMANIAN PUBLISHING BUSINESSES AND THEIR PERSONALITIES AND IN ANY POSTAL GUIDES OR BOOK CATALOGUES HE MIGHT COLLECT INSIDE IRON CURTAIN. AFTER MEETING, REAMS CANVASSED CONSUMERS RE INTEREST IN SUBMITTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESENTATION BY NYFO. IT WAS AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT NO Y NO INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WAS INDICATED, ALTHOUGH A DEBRIEFING ON HIS RETURN WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

copy filed # 55546

SECRET

F 5564

15 October 1958

Chief, Contact Division
For : Support Branch

Chief, New York Office

Resident of Vienna, Austria - Possible DDP Lead

A source of ours suggested that a Paul Heber, Vienna, Bosendorfer Strasse 9, who works for the International Rescue Committee, could be helpful to us.

55564

JAY B. L. REEVES

NHGraber:es

SECRET

F 5564

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Contact Division
Chief, Wilmington Office
Joseph Kovago, Ex-Mayor of Budapest
ATTN: EE/USSR Branch A66377

20 November 1957
NO: 57-402

1. Upon reading an article appearing in a Wilmington daily newspaper (copy attached), J. Jacobs visited ex-mayor of Budapest Joseph Kovago and got the following information:

A 19216

2. "Ex-Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was asked by the Free Europe Committee to form a new Hungarian Committee which will replace the two committees now in existence. The new committee is being formed because the Free Europe Committee wishes to economize and representation from several Hungarian political parties is wanted.

3. "Since I do not dare correspond with friends and relatives in Hungary and the US government is interested in current information on Hungary, I think I can give the name of an individual who is living in Vienna and is truly an 'operator.' His name is Dr. Thomas Pasztor. I believe he can be useful to the US because I recommended him for the purpose of gathering information on Hungary to Mr. David Martin of the International Rescue Committee. Most of the information gathered by Pasztor was used by IRC in reports on Hungary to the United Nations. S-5564

4. "Pasztor's address is I. Jakobergasse 4.III.18, Vienna, Austria, telephone 522-0-455. I am able to give the following biographic data on Pasztor: aged 46, divorced, official of the Pfeiffer Party after he was kicked out of the Smallholders Party, arrested for anti-Communist activities in 1948 or 1949, He was convicted and sentensed to death which was later commuted to life imprisonment. He was in the same political prisons with me at Vac and the Gyuto prison in Budapest.

5. "While in prison he was a 'double-dealer' and most prisoners liked him but distrusted him. He seemed to be able to find out about all news both inside and outside the prison. He was released from prison during the destalinization period and escaped to the West during the revolution.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy filed #19216 + 66377

6. "He has been sending typewritten news reports on Hungary to several individuals in the US and Europe. I have received copies in both Hungarian and English. I sent the English copy to Mr. David Martin, IRC in New York. He does not charge for the service, but I remember seeing some of his news items in Hungarian newspapers after receiving his report. Pasztor tells me that he is in financial straits and asked that I try to help him find someone who could use his service.

7. "The 15 June 1957 issue is titled 'Picture of the Hungarian Situation' and it covers information on (a) General Situation; (b) Internal Politics; (c) The Terror, Public Opinion, Resistance; (d) Military Situation; (e) Peoples Economy, Industry and Agriculture; and (f) Miscellaneous news.

8. "I cannot vouch for his sincerity or loyalty but I would say that about 95% of him is good and the remaining 5% of him is questionable."

9. Enclosed for your retention is the above-mentioned news issue and you can use it for what it is worth. We shall be glad to get more detailed information if you wish.

HUDSON D. DRAVO

JJacobs/lmc
Attachment: as above

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

COPY

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
255 Fourth Avenue
New York 10, N.Y.

5 64

October 4, 1957

Mr. James MacCracken
Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.
989 Eighth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. MacCracken:

I thought you would like to know that the International Rescue Committee has organized a Commission of distinguished Americans who will visit Europe to investigate the refugee situation and issue a report on their return. We envision that the Commission's report would highlight the following factors.

1. The conditions and needs of those Forgotten Men who have been sitting in refugee camps for years or who are inadequately resettled outside of camps. A portion of the report will be devoted to the Hungarian refugees who are still in camps.

2. Make specific and general recommendations as to what can be done in the future to meet the needs of the "Forgotten Men".

Aside from highlighting the factors just mentioned, we feel that the Commission's report can serve, among others, the following constructive purposes.

1. By dramatizing and humanizing the problems of European Escapees, we believe that the Commission can help to create a climate of public opinion conducive to:

    a. More generous support for U.S. programs concerned with the refugees, both private and governmental.

    b. More flexible immigration legislation.

2. The report of the commission will, of course, incorporate information from the survey now being prepared by the UNHCR. Indeed, we feel that the Commission can be of great assistance to the UNHCR by bringing his report and the refugee situation in general to the attention of the American

public. We believe that the commission is especially qualified to fulfill this function since they are a group of private Americans talking to fellow Americans.

The Commission will leave for Europe on October 15th and return on October 31st. Enclosed you will find their tentative schedule and a list of Commission members as of this date. In addition to the observations of the Commission, their final report will, of course, also represent intensive research on the part of our staff.

We have asked our overseas representatives, in the countries which the Commission will be visiting, to provide at least one opportunity for representatives of your organization to meet with the Commission if they wish to do so. If your representatives desire to meet with the Commission to discuss some specific aspect of the refugee problem, I suggest that they contact our representative in the country where they are stationed.

I have not been in a position to write to you about the Commission before this since the Commission plans have just been finalised. If you desire further information, I am at your service.

Sincerely yours,

s/ Robert J. MacAlister
Executive Director

RJM:mim
Enc.

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

THE ZELLERBACH COMMISSION OF THE I. R. C.

Mr. Harold Zellerbach, Chairman
Chairman, Executive Committee, Crown Zellerbach Corporation

The Honorable Angier Biddle Duke, Co-Chairman
President of the International Rescue Committee
Former Ambassador to El Salvador

The Honorable Eugenia Anderson
Former United States Ambassador to Denmark

Mr. Irving Brown
European Representative of the A.F.of L. - C.I.O.

Dr. Jane C. Carey
Political Scientist; Authority on refugee affairs

Mrs. David Levy
Member of the New York State Youth Commission

Mr. Eugene Lyons
Senior Editor, Readers Digest

The Very Reverend James A. Pike, D.D.
Dean of the Cathedral of St. John The Divine, New York, N.Y.

Commission Staff:

Mr. John Alexander-Sinclair
European Director of the International Rescue Committee

Mr. David Martin
Rapporteur

5564

FOR : Chief, Contact Division
Alien Branch (Stetson)

21 June 1957

NH-1119

BY : Chief, New York Office
New Haven Resident Agent

REF : Ferenc Zellesz (A-11-971-658) 560316
Guide 220, Operation Goulash

A 61504

1. Our attention was invited by Mrs. Steven Magyar, vice president and program director of the International Rescue Committee (Connecticut) to the fact that subject individual acted as secretary (sic) of propaganda at the factory known as Elektromos Keszulekek es Meromuszerek Gyara, and that he is now living somewhere in the Hartford area. She added that when he first got to Austria he was so frightened lest he be refused entry to the US that when he was asked whether he had any Communist connections he said he did not. 5-5564

2. A check with I & NS in Hartford indicated that this man was born 24 March 1923, had been under investigation back in February, that the case was closed, that the file indicated he was again under investigation as of April and that the case was evidently still open. It was also indicated that he was in the New Haven area, but there was no local address available.

3. FYI Mrs. Magyar opined that Zellesz might be deported, which indicates she knows he is being looked over. This information did not come from us.

CHARLES A. LEA

RTBarnard/jc

copy in above jackets

2

14-00000

F5564

[illegible]

[illegible] 4/30/67

[illegible]

[illegible]

John Gates S-5564

[illegible] SS

[illegible] 22870

SECRET

F 5364

21 FEB 1957

Chief, New York Field Office

Chief, Contact Division (Alien)

4554

John Alexander-Sinclair - European Director for Hungarian Relief for the International Rescue Committee 5564 5-5

REF: Your memorandum dated 14 January 1957; Subject: International Rescue Committee

In response to your request in the memorandum cited above, we initiated a name check on subject with Records Integration Division (RI), DD/P, hoping that you could tell your source we had no derogatory information on subject. As you know, any positive information of this type obtained from the DD/P cannot be disseminated outside the Agency. Although the attached reply, for the most part, is not derogatory, we regret that you cannot pass it on to your source. However, it is forwarded for your information.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Enclosure:
As stated above

SStetson:bls

Distribution:
2 - Addressee (w/encl.)
1 - Chrono (Alien)
1 - M/C
1 - Index

FILE: Leo Cherne A45058

SECRET

SUBJECT: ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, John

1. Reference is made to the name check request from your office dated 28 January 1957, for information concerning John ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR. The files of this office and those of a predecessor organization contain considerable information concerning Subject, the major part of which is not derogatory. This information includes reports of Subject's personal views as of January 1943 on political and economic conditions in Shanghai, China, which could be made available to your office upon request. Following is information which may be deemed derogatory in one case and of intelligence interest in the other.

2. A usually reliable source reported in September 1951 that Subject, then the director of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and an official at the British Foreign Office, accompanied the High Commissioner to Italy on his first unofficial trip in July 1951. Source stated that Subject was not at all tactful in his dealings with Italian officials and thus he met passive resistance. Furthermore, acting on behalf of the Commissioner and very eager to put at once as many British agents as possible into positions under the Commissioner's cover, Subject appointed Manuel DE BEAR, Chairman of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) Review Board, to the position of representative in Italy. According to Source, this annoyed Prince DEL DRAGO, Italian envoy to IRO in Geneva, Switzerland, who stated that as long as IRO was functioning, there would be no other refugee representative working in Italy and that, after all, the Commissioner had to be first recognised by the Government. DE BEAR was said to be "persona non grata" to the Italians.

3. According to a report dated 7 January 1954 from a fairly reliable source, it had been reported by various sub-sources that John ALEXANDER, British, Delegate to Italy of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, was a person to be considered rather politically dubious. According to Source, on several occasions he had been excessively interested in favoring foreigners in Italy who had received expulsion notices as a result of their commercial activity and political contacts with Iron Curtain countries. Source stated that Subject was further reported to be on very friendly terms with Italians and non-Italians who were clearly oriented toward the parties of the extreme left.

CS CI-3743231

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

5564

CITE NYOR 6111

SUPPORT FROM SNITZER

CASE [illegible]

FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST:

A-11 55534 A52346

A SHORT TIME AGO SOCONY PLEDGED $5,000 X $5,000 TO ANGIER B. DUKE'S X ANGIER B. DUKE'S INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE FOR ASSISTANCE OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES. AS A FOLLOW-UP THEY ADVISED THEIR AUSTRIAN AFFILIATE OF THE ACTION. THE REACTION FROM AUSTRIA WAS THAT THE PLEDGE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY OR IF THAT WAS NOT X NOT POSSIBLE, THE FACT SHOULD NOT X NOT BE PUBLICIZED. REASON FOR THIS WAS THE AN AD HAD APPEARED IN THE PARIS TRIBUNE SOLICITING FUNDS FOR THE IRC X IRC AND STATING THAT THE MONEY WAS TO BE USED FOR THE SUPPORT OF HUNGARIAN PARTISANS FIGHTING AGAINST THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT (NO X NO MENTION MADE THAT IT WAS FOR ASSISTANCE TO HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN AUSTRIA). THE AUSTRIAN REACTION TO THIS AD WAS THAT WHILE SUCH A CONTRIBUTION MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA THEY DID NOT X NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED BY THE SOVIETS OF ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING. SOCONY WITHDREW THE PLEDGE AND GAVE THE MONEY TO THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT FUND TO ASSIST THE REFUGEES.

SOCONY'S REACTION WAS THAT IRC X IRC SHOULD BE A LITTLE MORE ACCURATE IN THEIR SOLICITING CAMPAIGN.

2C

Cyrus in #11 & 52346

SEC

F 5564

11 FEB 1957

TO: OO/C
Attention: Miss Shirley Stetson

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, John S-5564

1. Reference is made to the name check request from your office dated 28 January 1957, for information concerning John ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR. The files of this office and those of a predecessor organization contain considerable information concerning Subject, the major part of which is not derogatory. This information includes reports of Subject's personal views as of January 1943 on political and economic conditions in Shanghai, China, which could be made available to your office upon request. Following is information which may be deemed derogatory in one case and of intelligence interest in the other.

2. A usually reliable source reported in September 1951 that Subject, then the director of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and an official at the British Foreign Office, accompanied the High Commissioner to Italy on his first unofficial trip in July 1951. Source stated that Subject was not at all tactful in his dealings with Italian officials and thus he met passive resistance. Furthermore, acting on behalf of the Commissioner and very eager to put at once as many British agents as possible into positions under the Commissioner's cover, Subject appointed Marcel DE BEAR, Chairman of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) Review Board, to the position of representative in Italy. According to Source, this annoyed Prince DEL DRAGO, Italian envoy to IRO in Geneva, Switzerland, who stated that as long as IRO was functioning, there would be no other refugee representative working in Italy and that, after all, the Commissioner had to be first recognized by the Government. DE BEAR was said to be "persona non grata" to the Italians.

3. According to a report dated 7 January 1954 from a fairly reliable source, it had been reported by various sub-sources that John ALEXANDER, British, Delegate to Italy of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, was a person to be considered rather politically dubious. According to Source, on several occasions he had been excessively interested in favoring foreigners in Italy who had received expulsion notices as a result of their commercial activity and political contacts with Iron Curtain countries. Source stated that Subject was further reported to be on very friendly terms with Italians and non-Italians who were clearly oriented toward the parties of the extreme left.

CS CI-3743231

-11

CIA [illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] January 1957

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : FS/P David Lu

Chief, New York Office

S-46083

S-5564

Herbert Partridge, 50 E. 56th Street, New York, N. Y.

46083

1. Peter White reports that subject has injected himself into the affairs of American Friends of Vietnam in a manner which he considers to be suspiciously like that of an intelligence agent. Since the subject is a former British subject but now a naturalized citizen, he poses the questions to whether he might not be a long-term British agent. Peter reports that subject is seeing Duc-Thonh regularly and is a close friend of Prince Buu-hoi. Subject was a friend of President Diem when he was in this country.

2. Subject has stated that he has money which he wants to invest in Vietnam. His present occupation is that of button manufacturer with which he has had considerable success.

3. We admit that this is a little bit like seeing a bogey-man behind every bush but are a little curious as to the prospects for button manufacturing in Vietnam. We are only passing this on for what it is worth, which is probably not much.

Charles A. Lee

CCMajor:dy

1c copy filed # 46083

d. A publication entitled "Livre Noir". This is a Dai Viet black book against Diem, a copy of which, according to du Berrier, was given to Vice President Nixon during his last visit to Saigon. du Berrier says that there is a third portion of the book which he does not have.

e. Press release, 25 September 1956, distributed by Dai Viet Party from Paris.

3. It is our impression that du Berrier has little to say by way of analysis that differs from the standard Dai Viet statements. du Berrier makes no effort to hide his admiration for Hoan and his people. He says that in time, either Hoan or the Communists will win out in Vietnam and that if Hoan wins, he will need a couple of friends in the US. The implication seems plain that du Berrier plans on being one of those "friends".

4. It seems to us that the best course on handling this material is to send the whole batch to you in order to determine whether or not any of it is worth reporting or placing on file. We will furnish report elements for any of this material which is found reportable. If you find that copies of Hoan's letters might be desired, they could possibly be obtained from du Berrier at such times as he is in New York.

Charles A. Lea

GPRoss:mmk

Enclosures as stated

F-5564

Chief, Contact Division
25 January 1957

ATTN : McConnell

Chief, New York Office

A68C14

Clandestine Operations in New York by Agency Personnel

S-55741

1. Our contact in the Harold Oram Agency public relations office advises that a Mr. Rufus Phillips who is connected with psychological warfare activities of the Agency, has been in contact with Oram and his agency for the purpose of arranging distribution of a film which was made in Vietnam and is concerned with the communist methods of operating in an agrarian community. Phillips was formerly in Vietnam under cover.

2. Our contact further advises that one John Gates, a former member of CIA in the Saigon station, was used by Oram as the narrator for the movie at a recent private showing. This same John Gates is reported by our contact to be extremely indiscreet insofar as security matters are concerned. Our contact is somewhat concerned that Gates will inadvertently reveal that he (Peter White) was connected with CIA while he was in Vietnam. Peter's experience with Gates' indescretion dates back to his visit in Vietnam at which time Gates told his girl friend about what Peter was doing. (This has been previously reported.)

A-46153 S-5564

3. John Gates is now working part-time for the International Rescue Committee?

[illegible]-5564

4. The film in question which now bears the title "The Fire and the Shadow" was in part or wholly financed by CIA. The Oram Agency has arranged distribution for showings in Formosa and Korea. The Oram Agency has had professional movie makers take a look at it for possible showing in the US. The professionals were highly critical and completely discouraged any attempt to have it distributed in the US.

5. We assume that Headquarters OO/C was not advised of this out of channels approach since the NYFO had not received any word of same. As you know Harold Oram and his Agency has been a contact of the NYFO for many years.

Charles A. Lea

CCMajor:mmk

14-00000

F-5564

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Alien and Support Branches

Chief, New York Office

14 January 1957

International Rescue Committee F-5564

A-48058

A-51202

1. We have just recently received a letter from Mr. Leo Cherne of subject committee, advising us that their European Director, Mr. Joseph Buttinger, is returning from Austria and will no longer be in charge of the Hungarian Relief. He also advises that they have just appointed Mr. John Alexander-Sinclair as European Director for Hungarian Relief. Attached please find photostat of the resumé of Mr. Alexander's experience and background. A-51202 F-5564

2. Will you please see that this information is made available to those persons in the Agency, who might be interested.

3. We quote one paragraph of Mr. Cherne's letter to us, and if it is within the realm of possibility, we would appreciate any advice you might have.

4. "Just as a matter of formality, however, and since the arrangement will be reviewed in a matter of months, I am anxious to know whether there may be any reason to feel that our haste was unfortunate. At the same time I do wish to advise you of his appointment and that his headquarters will be in Vienna. I am enclosing a copy of his summary of background and would appreciate hearing anything from you that seems relevant."

Charles A. Lea

CCMajor:dp
Enclosure

Copy in 48058 + 51202

2C

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

January 11, 1957

To: OO/C
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Mr. Carl Martin

Subject: Information on Defection of North Koreans in Hungary to the Side of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters

S-5564

The Department has received information from a source in the International Rescue Committee that some North Koreans resident in Hungary defected to and sided with the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. Three recent Hungarian refugees, reported eyewitnesses to these defections, are now resident in the United States, as follows:

~~S-5564~~ 1. Thomas Orley, who can be contacted through the International Rescue Committee, New York
S-48505 2. James Ambory presently studying at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York A-48505
3. Ssaba Gall, presently studying at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York ✓
S-48505

The Department is very much interested in additional information on this subject, for example: Who were those who defected? (Students, industrial trainees, members of government missions, etc.) How many defected? How many are known not to have defected when given the opportunity? (In other words, how widespread were defections?) If defectors had any important positions, information on persons and positions is desired. What were the circumstances of the defection? What appeared to be the motivations for defection?

The Department would also be interested in information, if procurable, on the number and type of North Koreans in Hungary or other Satellites.

We would appreciate your handling this on a priority basis.

Stanley E. Smigel
Chief, CIA Liaison Branch
Division of Acquisition and Distribution

copy filed # 48505

CONFIDENTIAL

5770

F 5 5564

ESE NR17 PRIORITY 161758Z

PRIORITY

CONF 082

HOUS CITE WA 12868

HAYNES FROM DELANEY

RE HOUS 851 X 851

Jan 16 12 [illegible] PM '57

BEN, WE HAVE TO TAKE THE SAME POSITION ON THIS REQUEST AS WE DO WITH ANY REQUEST TO PASS DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO SOURCES. AS YOU KNOW WE CAN'T PASS ALONG ANY INFORMATION THAT WE WOULD GET FROM SECURITY FILES BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT MUCH OF IT COMES FROM THE SECURITY OFFICES OF OTHER AGENCIES. ALSO A LOT OF THE DOPE IN SECURITY OFFICE FILES IS COMPLETELY UNSUBSTANTIATED AND ITS USE IN A CASE LIKE THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY DO A DISSERVICE TO AN ORGANIZATION. I SUGGEST AS WE DO IN ALL OF THESE CASES THAT YOU REFER YOUR LOCAL GROUP TO THE LOCAL FBI X FBI. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN GET BETTER INFORMATION THAN WE COULD SUPPLY, EVEN IF WE WERE ALLOWED TO PASS IT ALONG.

16/1753Z

International Rescue Committee, Inc. 5-55-64

1-5564

Hungary and North Korea [illegible] Foreign Students Participation in the Hungarian Revolution

The following three Hungarian students are reported to be able to furnish eye-witness information that North Korean students in Budapest joined the freedom fighters. USIA would appreciate any information that OO/C may be able to obtain from the students regarding this.

S-5564 MES-5564 S-5564 (Hk)

Thomas Orley, in care of Mrs. Anna Fulton, International [illegible] New York City, or through [illegible] to Leo Cherne, [illegible]

S-48505 A-48505 A 48038

James Amber, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson

~~S-48505~~

Csaba Gall, Bard College A-48505

These are not their real names but they will be recognized by IRC or Bard College by these names.

Hk in #7565

[illegible] USIA IRI/C

H. A. Caswell
Chief, Collection
Liaison Division

MC2

TO: MCKENANIE IPS WASH

FM: DAVY IPS NY

JAN 15 12 PM 57

///SORKIN ASKED///

ORLEY INTVW

NEW YORK JANUARY 15--ONE OF HUNGARY'S LEADING ATHLETES WHO FOUGHT IN THE FREEDOM REVOLT SAYS NORTH KOREAN, COMMUNIST CHINESE AND VIET MINH STUDENTS WERE AMONG THE SYMPATHIZERS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET INTERVENTION LAST FALL.

IN AN INTERVIEW HERE TODAY, FORMER FENCING CHAMPION THOMAS ORLEY RECALLED THAT "PRACTICALLY EVERYONE NOT INVOLVED IN THE ACTUAL FIGHTING" LENT SUPPORT BEHIND THE SCENES TO THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. HE COULD NOT RECALL SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THIS "PASSIVE RESISTANCE" BECAUSE AT THE TIME HE WAS "TOO BUSY FENDING OFF SOVIET TROOPS AND TANKS WITH SMALL ARMS." BUT ACCORDING TO THE 23-YEAR OLD REFUGEE ATHLETE AND STUDENT, THE TIDE WAS DEFINITELY FOR FREEDOM --ONLY THE OVERPOWERING FORCE OF SOVIET ARMOR AND ARTILLERY REINFORCEMENTS MANAGED TO HOLD UP THE COMMUNIST PUPPET REGIME.

WHEN THE FIRST WAVE OF THE REVOLT BROKE OUT IN BUDAPEST, ORLEY WAS ON LEAVE FROM THE UNIVERSITY AT AN OLYMPIC TRAINING CAMP IN TATA. HE SAID HE AND OTHER ATHLETES AT THE CAMP HEARD THE NEWS OF THE FIGHTING OVER WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS. IT CAME JUST BEFORE THEIR SCHEDULED RETURN TO BUDAPEST. ORLEY AND SOME OF THE OTHER ATHLETES JOINED THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS AS SOON AS THEIR OLYMPIC TEAM BUSES RETURNED TO BUDAPEST. THE ATHLETES WERE RETURNED TO THE CAPITAL TO PREPARE FOR DEPARTURE TO THE AUSTRALIAN OLYMPIC GAMES.

2

THE YOUNG HUNGARIAN SAID BOTH THE STUDENTS AND WORKERS ANTICIPATED THE SECOND ONSLAUGHT OF THE SOVIET TROOPS IN EARLY NOVEMBER, DESPITE OFFICIAL CLAIMS THAT THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT WAS NEGOTIATING FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL.

THE STUDENTS PREPARED FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF FIGHTING WITH SMALL ARMS COLLECTED FROM THE MILITARY ARMORY AND THE FACTORIES IN BUDAPEST. ONE MAJOR SOURCE OF SUPPLY, ORLEY NOTED, WAS A "SO-CALLED LAMP FACTORY" FROM WHICH THE WORKERS THEMSELVES TOOK THE ARMS THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS NEEDED.

IN THOSE FEW DAYS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 4 AND 6, ORLEY RECALLED, THE SHEER MIGHT OF WELL OVER A THOUSAND SOVIET TANKS TURNED THE TIDE. HE SAID "NO FIGHTERS, NO MATTER HOW BRAVE CAN WIN OUT WITH SMALL ARMS AGAINST HEAVY ARMOR."

BY NOVEMBER 10, THE YOUNG FREEDOM FIGHTER AND HIS CLASSMATES DISCOVERED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN OVER MANY OF THE RAILROAD STATIONS. HE SAID LONG EXPERIENCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS CONVINCED THEM THAT DEPORTATIONS HAD BEGUN, AND HE AND A FRIEND DECIDED TO TRY TO ESCAPE.

ORLEY SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR HIM BECAUSE OF HIS FAMILY. IT WAS ESPECIALLY HARD TO SAY GOODBYE TO HIS FATHER SINCE ORLEY'S TWO BROTHERS HAD ALSO FLED HUNGARY IN 1947--ONE TO BOLIVIA AND THE OTHER TO AUSTRALIA. THOMAS' FATHER WAS FORMERLY A WORLD CHAMPION SKEET SHOOTER, A PRE-WAR FIELD MARSHALL IN THE HUNGARIAN ARMY AND A LEADER IN THE NON-COMMUNIST FREEHOLDERS PARTY. BECAUSE OF HIS BACKGROUND, THE COMMUNISTS HAD FORCED HIM INTO A HARD FACTORY JOB DESPITE HIS ADVANCING YEARS.

NO MATTER WHAT HE DID AFTER THE REVOLT, THOMAS SAID, HE KNEW THE COMMUNISTS WOULD RETALIATE. DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF

REVOLT HE [illegible] A QUICK LOOK AT THE [illegible] AL RECORD COMMUNISTS HAD [illegible] ON HIM AT THE UNIVERSITY. THE YOUNG REFUGEE THE COMMUNISTS HAD FOUND "MANY BLACK MARKS" AGAINST HIM IN VEN-YEAR RECORD COVERING ALL PHASES OF HIS DAILY ACTIVITIES OM TRIPS ABROAD WITH THE FENCING TEAM TO CONVERSATIONS IN TAURANTS.

IN YOUNG ORLEY'S VIEW, IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE HE HAD WON THE WORLD ING CHAMPIONSHIP AT CREMONA, ITALY IN 1954 AND BECAUSE HAD KEPT UP HIS STUDIES AS A BADLY NEEDED STUDENT OF PHARMACY T ACTION HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN AGAINST HIM.

AT THE TIME ORLEY AND HIS FRIEND DECIDED TO HEAD FOR THE BORDER, SAID SOME 60,000HUNGARIANS ALREADY HAD FLED TO AUSTRIA. THOSE O HAD LIVED NEAR ENOUGH TO THE BORDER KNEW THE LAND AND MADE EIR WAY TO FREEDOM WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION. BUT OTHERS HAD TO KE THEIR WAY FROM BUDAPEST.

ON NOVEMBER 10, THOMAS AND HIS FRIEND DRESSED IN WORKERS OTHING AND MANAGED TO BOARD A TRAIN--ONE OF THE FEW STILL ADING TO THE WEST. THEY TRAVELLED TO THE FIRST TOWN OUTSIDE DAPEST WITHOUT BEING STOPPED. THERE, THEY HITCHED A RIDE WITH TRUCK DRIVER WHO WAS HEADED FOR THE BORDER AND ASKED NO ESTIONS. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE STOPPED "SIX OR SEVEN TIMES" BY E SOVIET SOLDIERS THEY TRAVELLED WITH THE TRUCK TO WITHIN 30 ILES OF THE BORDER.

FOR THE FINAL STRETCH THE TWO ESCAPING STUDENTS WERE JOINED Y A YOUNG COUPLE. ALL FOUR OF THEM TRAVELLED BY FOOT FOR TWO AYS TO COVER THEIR LAST 30 MILES.

YOUNG ORLEY SAID THE MINES HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE BORDER, BUT BETWEEN THE WATCH TOWERS OF THE [illegible] AND THE [illegible]

THERE WAS A DANGEROUS OPEN STRETCH OF LAND WITHIN [illegible] BY RIFLE SHOT. AS THE FOUR DASHED ACROSS THE LAST OPEN STRETCH, SHOTS RANG OUT. THE YOUNG WOMAN IN THEIR PARTY NEVER REACHED THE AUSTRIAN SIDE. ORLEY SAID THEY TRIED TO FIND OUT WHETHER SHE HAD BEEN KILLED. BUT WHEN THE AUSTRIANS RELAYED THEIR QUERIES, THE COMMUNIST GUARDS DENIED THEY HAD FIRED A SINGLE SHOT.

ALL ALONG THEIR ESCAPE ROUTE, ORLEY RECALLED, FARMERS AND WORKERS, VIRTUALLY WITHOUT EXCEPTION, TOLD THEM WHICH ROADS WERE SAFEST AND WHERE THE SOVIET SOLDIERS WERE STANDING GUARD.

THE YOUNG ATHLETE "WILL NEVER FORGET HIS FEELING" ON REACHING AUSTRIA ALIVE. "IT WAS AS IF A GREAT ROCK HAD FALLEN FROM MY HEART AND EVERYONE COULD HEAR THE THUNDER," HE SAID.

ORLEY CONSIDERS HIMSELF "LUCKY" TO HAVE A CHANCE TO BUILD A NEW LIFE IN THE U.S. ON HIS TRIPS ABROAD WITH THE OLYMPIC TEAM, HE SAID, HE HAD HEARD MUCH ABOUT THE MODERN, PROGRESSIVE UNITED STATES. BUT WHAT HE DID NOT KNOW BEFOREHAND, HE EXPLAINED, WAS "THE WONDERFUL FREEDOM OF LIFE HERE." "I CAN SAY WHAT I CHOOSE AND WORK AT WHAT I CHOOSE," ORLEY POINTED OUT. "IF I WANT TO TRY TO BECOME A RICH MAN, I CAN DO IT, IF I PREFER TO LIVE A QUIET MODEST LIFE, I CAN DO THAT TOO."

THOMAS IS TEMPORARILY WORKING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE ON ITS HUNGARIAN REFUGEE RELIEF PROGRAM. IN FEBRUARY, HE HOPES TO BEGIN STUDYING CHEMISTRY AT THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. MEANWHILE, HE HAS CONTACTED THREE OTHER HUNGARIAN OLYMPIC ATHLETES WHO ARE IN THE U.S. TOGETHER, THEY PLAN TO FORM A NEW FENCING TEAM FOR WHICH SPORT RATHER THAN IDEOLOGY WILL BE THEIR INSPIRATION. ITEM

F 5564

ESE NR16 ROUTINE 1117452

CONF 884

HOUS CITE WA 12910

MOORE FROM DELANEY

S-5564

RE HOUS 851 X 851 FURTHER INVESTIGATION HERE IN HEADQUARTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE DISCLOSED THAT THIS OUTFIT IS HEADED BY GENERAL WILLIAM DONOVAN X WILLIAM DONOVAN FORMER HEAD OF OSS X OSS AND HAS BEEN OF ASSISTANCE TO US IN SEVERAL RESETTLEMENT CASES. WHILE THIS DOES NOT X NOT ANSWER YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NOT X NOT CLEARED THE OUTFIT PER SE IT DOES INDICATE THAT THE IRC X IRC IS A RESPONSIBLE GROUP WITH WHOM WE ARE DOING BUSINESS. DELANEY SHOULD HAVE MADE THE CHECKS WHICH DISCLOSED THE ABOVE BEFORE SENDING OUT HIS INITIAL RESPONSE TO YOUR HOUS 851 X 851.

A-4871

11/1841Z

copy filed #4871

14-00000

F 5564

ESW NR08 PRIORITY GR71 101610Z HQ DTG...101530Z

PRIORITY

SEC

JAN 10 11 [illegible] AM '57

VA CITE HOUS 851

CORIDEN FM HAYNES

S-5564

CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER OR NOT THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC. X INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC., 62 WEST 45 STREET X 62 WEST 45 STREET, NEW YORK, HAS EVER BEEN CITED FOR, OR SUSPECTED OF, LEFTIST LEANINGS? LOCAL GROUP CONCERNED WITH HUNGARIAN RESETTLEMENT WANTS ADVICE AS TO HOW TO REACT TO PROPOSALS OF THE COMMITTEE.

HQ TOT: 10/1532Z
ESW TOT: 10/1612Z

CLR

Confidential

Memo to the files

Subject: State's memo of 11 Jan 57

~~Tmx~~ Practically the same requirement that is contained in the attached memo had previously been received from OCR as an USIA requirement. On the latter we told OCR (Sturbits) that since the names of the people given were not their correct names we could not take action on the requirement since we need the right names to get an FBI clearance. USIA later told OCR to consider the requirement withdrawn and USIA would contact the tree people. I told Smigel's office of the USIA business and suggested that they contact USIA since it woul d look bad for all of us to be contacting the three people about the same thing. Smigel's office will do so. I told Carl Martin of the above developments and he took an autostat copy of State's memo to Camp Kilmer.

1/14/57
Talked to Simmons in Smigel's office. He agreed that we could forget requirement

To [illegible]

12/8/05

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NAME (LAST, FIRST, M.I.): TAPAK, Gustav use S-5564

COUNTRY OF ASYLUM: Germany

AGENCY: IRC S-5564

PRESENT ADDRESS: Labor Service Co. 4203, Bruchmuehlbach/Pfalz, Germany

PLACE OF BIRTH: Liesek, Czechoslovakia

DATE OF BIRTH: Feb. 4, 1928

COUNTRY FROM ESCAPE: Czechoslovakia

DATE OF ESCAPE: June 29, 1952

DATE OF DEPARTURE FOR RESETTLEMENT: Dec. 29, 1955 MSTS "GENERAL LANGFITT" ex Bremerhaven/

COMPLETE RESETTLEMENT ADDRESS: Belvedere House, 536 West 112 Street
New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SPONSOR: Laura Wood Roper, 3405 O Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

LANGUAGE ABILITY: Slovak, Czech, German some English

OCCUPATION: Miller

DEPENDENTS: None

IS ESCAPEE PHOTOGENIC? YES ☒ NO ☐

MAY STORY BE PUBLICIZED? YES ☐ NO ☒

EDUCATION: Elementary school, professional school

INFORMATION ON ESCAPEE BEING RESETTLED:

Mr. Tapak's village was in the area which was completely destroyed during World War II by the Russian Army. His family lost the mill and the farm. At this time he was in the Czechoslovakian Army, because he did not want to be a farm worker at a "colchoz", so he decided in 1952 to escape. While he was on guard in a border battalion, he crossed the border and came to Bavaria.

Possible use HMP

14-00000

SEC

A CITE NYCR 350

SUPPORT (CONNELL) FROM MAJOR

A-46083

CASE 19830 X 19830 SUBJECT - PETER WHITE

SUBJECT ADVISES THAT ROBERT J. MCALLISTER IS LEAVING THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE COMMITTEE AND HAS BEEN GIVEN A FORD FOUNDATION GRANT. I.R.C. IS LOOKING FOR A REPLACEMENT. DOES GESSLER HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS?

5-5564

SUBJECT WAS ASKING THAT DAVE GESSLER RETURN THE LETTER HE LOANED TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SINCE HE HAS TO DELIVER IT. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE GESSLER TO RETURN THE TICKET STUB TO HIM AS SOON AS CONVENIENT AS HE HAS TO HAVE IT IN ORDER TO MAKE CLAIM FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION EXPENSE FROM THE VIETNAM GOVERNMENT.

A-4416

SUBJECT REPORTS THAT THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE ORGANIZATION IS STEPPING UP THEIR RELIEF ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM BEGINNING NEXT QUARTER. THEY PLAN TO DO AS MUCH IN ONE QUARTER AS THEY HAD DONE IN ONE YEAR PREVIOUSLY. SUBJECT STATED THAT MONSIGNOR HARNETT TOLD HIM THAT RAPPORT BETWEEN THE U.S. OPERATIONS MISSION AND THE MINISTER FOR REFUGEES IN THE VIETNAM GOVERNMENT WAS VERY POOR INDEED. HARNETT IS RETURNING TO VIETNAM EITHER NEXT WEEK OR THE WEEK AFTER.

file

6 AUG 1956

ESE NRS 17-18 ROUTINE 162044Z

SEC 046

LANC CITE WA 7521

KELLY FROM SUPPORT (CONNELL)

~~0-2-14~~ 5-5564

AUG 17 11 32 AM '54

REFERENCE YOUR 13 X 13 AUGUST MEMO RE POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH GEN. J.W O'DANIEL CHECK WAS MADE WITH THE RESPONSIBLE DD/P OFFICES. THEY APPRECIATE YOUR INTEREST BUT PREFER THAT YOU NOT DEBRIEF THE GENERAL ON HIS TRIP TO VIETNAM. THEY HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL GET A COMPLETE COPY OF HIS REPORT.

~~[illegible]~~

F 5564

SEC

WA CITE NYOR 3810

ALIEN (MUSULIN) FROM RINKUS

RE CASE 19289 X 19289

THEATER GUILD, WHICH PUTS ON THE US STEEL HOUR, SEEMS TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN PRESENTING A ONE HOUR TV X TV PROGRAM ON THE TAUPSE SAILORS. THEY HAVE MADE PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES WITH CHURCH WORLD SERVICES. THE INQUIRIES WERE MADE BY DICK SALZMAN X DICK SALZMAN WHO IS ON THE IRC X IRC STAFF. SALZMAN STATED THAT AN IRC MEMBER WHO IS ALSO ON THE THEATER GUILD BOARD IS THE ORIGINATOR OF THE IDEA.

A-5559

[illegible] S-5564

S-5564

THIS APPEARS TO BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROPAGANDISTIC DEVELOPMENT. PERHAPS SOMEONE FROM THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE SCRIPT MATERIAL WHICH WOULD BOTH ABSOLVE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES AND PROVIDE THE PROPER PROPAGANDISTIC SLANT OF SHOWING WHAT HEELS THE SOVIETS ARE. GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION MAY BE APPROPRIATE FROM ANOTHER ANGLE. IF THE IDEA IS ATTRACTIVE TO THEATER GUILD AND BEGINS TO SNOWBALL INTO A PROGRAM, NO X NO ONE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO STEER THEM. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD GET AS MUCH BENEFIT AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PROGRAM BY COOPERATION.

AT ANY RATE, LET'S MAKE PLANS AS TO HOW THE IDEA IS TO BE HANDLED IF IT IS FORMALLY PRESENTED TO US THROUGH CHURCH WORLD SERVICES. WE WILL HAVE TO HAVE QUICK ACTION IN ORDER TO KEEP UP WITH IRC X IRC AND THEATER GUILD WHEN THEY GET ROLLING.

1c Copy file A 5559

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

F5566

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 6 March 1956

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch
FROM : Chief, San Francisco Office
BY : Honolulu Resident Agent
SUBJECT: International Refugee Organization, (IRO) Shanghai

S-5764 A

The attached comments on the IRO in Shanghai may be of interest to the DD/P. They were addressed by Cecil Ewart, 159/3 Movming Lu(s), Shanghai, China, in a letter, dated 26 Feb 56, to his brother George Ewart, Kauai, T. H.

A 55375

M. C. CHEEK

Attachment

FLDaniels/js

AR 1055375

considers, not to mention your fondness for new gadgets and nick-nacks. Have you grown out of it? I always remember your weakness for them in the past. The I.R.O. will pay my passage to any part of the world if I can produce definite proof & documents enabling me to enter a country for resettlement, they don't care which or where, provided it is friendly and will accept me. I must tell you something about this quaint and powerful organization – The International Refugee Organization for Displaced People. I.R.O. for short is equipped & maintained for the support and resettlement of foreigners who have fled their own country on account of aggression resulting from political differences. These people (all gentiles the Jews have a better and richer organization of their own) termed and classified as D.P. under I.R.O. are accorded every facilities, they have a hostel of their own, received a living allowance every month for every member of the family, plus an extras allowance for milk etc. for children. Free hospitalization, doctors & medicines. The organization supply all that and also do their best for them by securing entry visa in different countries for their resettlement. All these privileged people do is to sit back and occasionally get drunk to celebrate their good fortune. Most of them are resettled one way or the other now. there are only very few remaining. The I.R.O started in 1946. When I first came across the name in 1950, I thought it was a Godsend as I also consider myself as a square peg in a round hole. Their registration were still open then. I went and interviewed their director, applying for resettlement not relief. imagine my surprise when he told me that I cannot qualify for a D.P. He pointed out that

I am an unrecognized citizen of the U.S.A. and as either myself nor my forebears can claimed to have fled from any kind of aggression, I am clearly not eligible for their legal assistance, and must therefore apply to the American authorities myself for reinstatement. This fine point delivered with much dignity and profundity left me more dazed than enlightened when I left their office. Last year however by careful observation and quoting precedent I managed to elicit a promise from them to pay for my passage aboard, when I receive my visa, but not being D.P. and registered with them I must arrange to get my own entry or destination visa for resettlement. I must also consider the passage money as a loan to be refunded when I am fully settled in a new country. I have agreed to all that George it will lessened the burden I am already puttin on you. but as I have said this organization will only start functioning for me when they received my destination visa for resettlement (damn that word and phrase) Once they have that in hand they will stand surety for me and my passage from Hong Kong, and the British Consulate here will issue me a transit visa for boarding a steamer in Hongkong. When I land in the colony, I will report to I.R.O. and apply for a change of destinatio if they feel that I have a good case they will appro ve it and still pay my passage to my new destinati This has been done before and are still being done now. There are at present quite a number of people waiting in Hong Kong, being processed for entry into the U.S.A. Do you think it neccessary to mention in your application that I was internee

SECRET

F5564

6 March 1956

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch
Chief, San Francisco Office
S-5564
BY : Honolulu Resident Agent
International Refugee Organization, (IRO) Shanghai

The attached comments on the IRO in Shanghai may be of interest to the DD/P. They were addressed by Cecil Evart, 159/3 Movming Lu(s), Shanghai, China, in a letter, dated 26 Feb 56, to his brother George Evart, Kauai, T. H.

M. C. CHEEK

Attachment

FLDaniels/js

SECRET

Central

F-5564

Chief, San Francisco Office

9 September 1955

Chief, Washington Office

Alien Lead - Eva Kralovensky [illegible] 5-5564

1. The Washington Office has received a routine alien lead on Eva Kralovensky, age 23, born in Czechoslovakia, 5-5564 "housewife", endorsed for US immigration by the International Rescue Committee. The Washington Office contacted one of its sources and learned that Miss Kralovensky was a stewardess on one of the three Czech airplanes which flew into West Germany (possibly West Berlin) about four or five years ago. We were also informed that she had been an employee of Radio Free Europe.

2. The Washington Office contacted Alien Branch (Sivess) and asked if there was any reason to proceed further in locating Miss Kralovensky on the assumption that she was probably well-known in the intelligence community. Mr. Sivess checked and informed the Washington Office that there would be covert interest in Miss Kralovensky, and requested that her address be obtained and the appropriate field office be alerted for an alien contact.

3. The Washington source finally determined that Miss Kralovensky moved to California but at the end of two weeks finally settled in Reno, Nevado. She can be contacted at 521 W 6th Street, Reno, Nevada.

ANALYSIS

W. J. DuBose

CC: Chief, Contact Division
Alien Branch (Sivess)

McCann/l

Source: W. H. Roper
3405 O Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

[illegible] 5-5564

14-00000

ATTN : Chief, Contact Division
FE/P Branch

5 August 1955

Chief, San Francisco Office

5564

Miss Lydia DIMOVA - 5564

REFERENCE: SF-11362

1. The name of the young woman of USSR nationality referred to in SF-11362, paragraph 10, and employed by the National Resources Bureau is Miss Lydia DIMOVA, age 30 years. Her mother, presently residing in Harbin, is Mrs. Clavdia Dimova. The Dimova family is well known to the source for more than 30 years and therefore the source feels that any information passed on to her by the young woman employee of the bureau might well be considered as reliable.

2. Prior to the departure of the source from Peiping, Miss Dimova visited her and pleaded with the source to assist in an effort that they might eventually get out of China. She begged her to register her name and the name of her mother with the United Nations, International Relief Organization, through the Reverend Stumf of the Lutheran Church, World Federation of Churches at Granville Road in Hong Kong. Miss Dimova is desirous of setting up arrangements through IRO so that she and her mother may gain entry into Brazil. The source completed the necessary application on behalf of the Dimovas during her stay in Hong Kong.

5564

5567 5564

Mrs. Kira Karpinsky 5291

M. C. CHEEK

copy filed in 5567, 5291

JJWaldron:rc

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

F 5564

Chief, FI/RQM/OIS

11 August 195[illegible]

Chief, Contact Division, OO

HD-1785

Miss Lydia Dimova ✓use S-5564

1. The attached preliminary copy of OO-B-87938 is forwarded as being of possible interest to your office.

2. The name of the young woman of USSR nationality referred to in paragraph 10 of the report is Miss Lydia Dimova, age 30 years. Her mother, presently residing in Harbin, is Mrs. Clavdia Dimova. The Dimova family is well known to the source for more than 30 years and therefore the source feels that any information passed on to her by the young woman employee of the bureau might well be considered as reliable.

3. Prior to the departure of the source from Peiping, Miss Dimova visited her and pleaded with source to assist in an effort that they might eventually get out of China. She begged her to register her name and the name of her mother with the United Nations, International Relief Organization, through the Reverend Stumf of the Lutheran Church, World Federation of Churches at Granville Road in Hong Kong. Miss Dimova is desirous of setting up arrangements through IRO so that she and her mother may gain entry into Brazil. The source completed the necessary application on behalf of the Dimovas during her stay in Hong Kong.

A5564

4. The above is forwarded for your information and whatever action you may deem appropriate. If you have any questions, please call Mrs. Carstens, extension 2268.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

SECRET

Encl.: 1

RCarstens/wh
cc Index

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F5564

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Mr. Anthony Czajkowski, Alien Branch

DATE: 4 October 1954

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Failure to Locate Source Leads

I have made numerous attempts to locate the following source leads you furnished this office some time ago and without any success:

Mr. Jan Kolar
22 Charlotte Street
Detroit, Michigan

S-5564

Mr. Stanislav Rehak
1800 Washtenaw
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

S-5564

Wallace W. Konicki
for JAMES R. MURPHY

WWKonicki/bn

File: Mr. Jan Kolar
Mr. Stanislav Rehak

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

F 5564

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Mr. Anthony Czajkowski, Alien Branch

DATE: 4 October 1954

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Source Leads - No Potential

I have contacted the following source leads, which were supplied by your office, and have found they do not have any intelligence potential:

Mr. Tadeusz Kowalsi S-5564
9035 Mc Clellan
Detroit, Michigan

Mr. Vainutis Vaitkevicius - S-5564
Grace Hospital
4160 John R.
Detroit, Michigan.

for Wallace W. Konicki
JAMES R. MURPHY

WWKonicki/bn

File: Mr. Tadeusz Kowaksi
Mr. Vainutis Vaitkevicius

source leads

CONFIDENTIAL

~~F5564~~
~~F62076~~
F5364

CBS NRS 35-36 ROUTINE 261418Z

CONFIDENTIAL CK NR 454 TO SAN FRANCISCO FROM WASHINGTON

TO CHEEK FOR OSTLER FROM ASHCRAFT BY NE/A BRANCH (FOY) - CITE WA-7397

CASE 15688 RPT 15688 YOUR REPORT SLC-9312 RPT 9012 (00-B 76250 RPT 76250) PARAGRAPH 3 RPT 3 LAST SENTENCE. DOES SOURCE MEAN THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE DOES THE CHECKING FOR THE SYNDICATE OR ONLY THAT THE SYNDICATE IS TACTFUL IN THE WAY IN WHICH IT CHECKS? WE SUSPECT THE LATTER IS THE CASE, BUT OUR CONSUMERS ARE CERTAIN TO WONDER. THIS IS A GOOD REPORT AND SHOULD BE OF VALUE HERE.

A-63298
5564
9-5564

FILE: FRANK CHRISTENSEN

14-00000

I - 5564

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Thru : Acting Chief, Detroit Office
FROM : John T. Hazen, Cleveland Office

DATE: 7 Jan 54

5564

SUBJECT: Visit to Mr. Tadeusz Stefan Kucner, 2434 Tremont St., Cleveland, Ohio

1. On 6 Jan 54, a visit was made to Mr. Tadeusz Stefan Kucner, a Polish displaced person who arrived in the US on 11 Jul 51. His alien registration number is 8 059 181.

2. Mr. Kucner was born in Lwow 6 Feb 1905. He attended the Polytechnical Academy of Lwow from 1925 to 1932 when he received his degree in architectural engineering.

3. From 1933 to 1939 Mr. Kucner worked for the city administration of Poznan as a building construction inspector for the Poznan building construction board of control. This was similar to a city planning commission in the US.

4. In 1940, after the German occupation, subject was sent by the Germans to Warsaw. He worked in Warsaw as a representative of the inspector of building construction board of control until 1944.

5. When the Germans evacuated the city Mr. Kucner was transported by freight car to Leipzig where he remained until the end of the war.

6. Subject resided in several DP camps in Germany from 1945 until his departure for the US in 1951. He was employed by IRO as a technical examiner.

7. During his years in both Poznań and Warsaw, Mr. Kucner was concerned only with residential buildings and was unable to supply information on industrial installations in these cities.

8. Some comments made by subject, which are not worthy of OO-A dissemination, are being forwarded for any interest they may have.

9. Since Mr. Kucner's arrival in the US he has been employed as a laborer in a foundry.

10. Mr. Kucner will not be visited again, therefore no name check data is being submitted.

John T. Hazen
JOHN T. HAZEN

JTH/ms

CO TIAL
ION

F-5564

Chief, New York Office

30 Sept 1953

Chief, San Francisco Office

A-~~35~~37422

American Committee for Emigre Scholars - Source Lead.

-55564

1. In the event that you are not already in touch with Otto Zoff of the American Committee for Emigre Scholars, Writers, and Artists, 62 West 48th Street, New York City, we believe that you may find him and/or his organization a useful contact. It has come to our attention that Zoff from time to time recommends Russian language instructors to the Army Language School at the Presidio of Monterey, California. It occurred to us that Zoff would be in a position to provide you with numerous source leads on well educated aliens in the US. These men would include engineers, scientists, and teachers. Not only should he be able to give you the names of DPs in your area, but also those who have moved to areas covered by our other field offices. We know nothing further in regard to the Committee for Emigre Scholars (its backing, orientation, reliability).

2. Incidentally, we have a verbal agreement with the Commandant of the Army Language School that we will not use our access to the files of his current language instructors as a means of "raiding" his faculty, i.e. offering CIA employment to them. Therefore, this memorandum is not meant as a source lead for potential employees! Also, we feel that it would be preferable that you do not indicate to Zoff that you know that he recommends personnel to the Presidio of Monterey.

M. . CHEEK

lfw/VSoumitza

cc: OO/C

Copy filed in #37422

ION

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Since the start of the Cold War the International Rescue Committee has organized voluntary American assistance to aid refugees fleeing from Communist oppression.

When the tide of persons fleeing Soviet dominated countries into the free city of West Berlin reached more then 3,000 per day during the Spring of 1953, the Committee successfully marshalled more than $700,000 in gifts and donations of clothing, drugs and other necessities. This earned the commendation of President Eisenhower and leaders throughout America.

As the historic emergency increases, the Committee's work continues to uphold America's belief in the indivisibility of freedom.

THE INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
Leo Cherne, *Chairman*
Admiral Richard E. Byrd, *Honorary Chairman*
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LEO CHERNE, *Chairman*
International Rescue Committee
62 West 45th Street, New York 36, N. Y.

I am glad to add my contribution to help refugees from Communism.

Enclosed please find check for $ .... as my subscription for the continuance of this vital work.

Name ....

Address ....

City .... Zone ...... State ....

Checks should be made payable to the International Rescue Committee

(All Contributions deductible from taxable income)

HE

stood between YOU and

THIS

The Turning Point

On June 17th, 1953 one of the most significant events of the 20th century took place. The inhabitants of the Soviet Zone of Germany rose in rebellion against their Communist overlords. For eight years they had been living under conditions of slavery and starvation.

The insurrection began in East Berlin on June 16th. It was begun initially by a few workers but within hours it had spread to every level of the population. By the 17th of June the uprising had spread throughout the East Zone — a completely unorganized, spontaneous revolt.

At 11:00 o'clock the morning of June 16th the workers in block 40, Stalin Allee, decided to organize a demonstration to protest the raising of the work norm by the regime. By 2:00 o'clock that same afternoon, the mob of people which had grown from 200 to over 20,000 became revolutionaries. Surging in front of the East Zone Government building in East Berlin, they demanded not only the lifting of the norms but free secret elections, the unification of Germany and the abdication of the East German government.

The stories contained here are the stories of a few of those brave men and women from East Germany who played leading roles in the revolt and had to flee to the West. They are representative of 4,000 leaders, many of whom have subsequently been sentenced to death by Communist courts. Some were intellectuals and professionals. Most of them were workmen: All are men who deserve the undying gratitude and support of free men everywhere.

Bare Fists Against Armed Might. Historical Proof of the Perennial, Inextinguishable Urge of the Human Heart for Freedom.

Stalin Allee Block 40 . . .

A CONSTRUCTION WORKER

*(*WOLFGANG THEURICH *was a building construction laborer working on Block 40, Stalin Allee.)*

"When the work norms were increased the men were furious. We began daily to gather in small groups before and after work. The fear that had made us so cautious gradually began to dissolve. There was, after all, little more to lose.

"By the morning of June 16 we were resolute. As always, we entered the building on which we were working and took our stations. But this day we sat down and refused to work. There was no organization, no leader, but each man knew what had to be done. The foreman dashed in gaping with disbelief. His eyes turned to the spot where the norm increase order had been posted. Two men walked in with a freshly painted sign — 'The Work Norms Must Be Decreased.' The courage of these men inspired the rest of us to action.

"A concrete worker leaped onto a heap of stones. 'I leave it to you as individuals!' Those who wish to demonstrate against the injustice of the norms, step to the right. Others go to the left!' All chose the right. One man was weeping with joy.

"Immediately we began to march in the street unafraid. We started out with 80 resolute men. By the time we arrived at the government building we were 6,000 strong. Over the tumult of the crowd, a man shouted into my ear, 'This is the most beautiful day of my life!'"

The "Free Youth" Revolt . . .

A 20-YEAR-OLD GIRL

*(*ELLA SARBE, *an instructress within the Communist Youth Movement [FDJ] is a dark haired girl of twenty with pert, intelligent eyes.)*

"As I stood in the crowd before the government building, a fellow instructor came up to me and told me to take careful note of the people sympathetic to the demonstration and give him a complete report that evening. I was embarrassed by his apparent hurry to leave the square and told him if he was so afraid for his life he had better jump on a tram in a hurry and get out.

"A few minutes later I forced my way through the crowd and jumped to the rostrum. Many people recognized me as a devoted member of the FDJ. They hooted and taunted me. Never before had I realized how hated the FDJ was. Infuriated by the refusal of the Communist leaders to appear and by the open cowardice of my male FDJ companion, I tore off my FDJ jacket and threw it to the ground. The jeers became cheers.

"I gathered my strength and shouted a warning to the crowd that members of the FDJ and SED were in the crowd and would not only try to dissuade them from the demonstration but also would report them. I shouted, 'Do not allow them to break you up! Stick together!' People began to examine their neighbors. Fist fights started as the hated Communists were spotted. I wanted to say more, but my strength was gone. A new life had begun for me."

The Revolt Spreads . . .

AN ENGINEER

(N.N., A Mechanical Engineer, Brandenburg.)

"There were only twenty in my group as we marched into the Brandenburg area. At that time we knew only that, according to a broadcast from West Berlin, the workers in East Berlin were on strike. Although we knew that strikes in the Communist Zone were considered political crimes and punishable by two years in prison, we marched on with a feeling of exhilaration. As we strode along we beckoned to the people on the pavement and in a few minutes our number had increased to about five hundred.

"As we approached a factory protected by high iron gates, we noticed employees shouting from the windows, 'We have been locked in. Come, help us. We will go with you.' A pile driver was found and we stormed the gates. The employees rushed out and embraced us.

"At this time, we still thought we were the only demonstrators in the city. As we neared the center of the city, we were amazed and overjoyed to find thousands of people converging from all directions. We had not fully realized that our people, constantly intimidated by spies and police controls, could rise up as one man without a strong central leadership, no weapons—nothing but determination and hope. We were overwhelmed at what we saw."

The Red Flag At Brandenburg Gate Comes Down . . .

A TRUCK DRIVER

*(*HORST BALLENTIN *is a 20-year-old truck driver of East Berlin.)*

"I looked down into the crowd and saw three Soviet officers looking helplessly upward as I climbed to the top of the tower and shinnied up the pole. I flung the flag to the ground with great contempt and watched the people tear it to pieces. They applauded and shouted in a way I had never heard before.

"Two hours later when I had the honor of installing the Bear Flag of West Berlin, the Russians had brought three tanks into the square. As I began pulling up the flag they began to fire. Somehow I was able to finish my task and jump to the ground. The flag of West Berlin was in its right place and, miraculously, I was safe."

At Magdeburg . . .

A BAND LEADER

*(*HANS HERZBERG, *band leader at the city theatre, was the strike leader under whose guidance the FDJ [Communist Youth Movement] other Communist Party Headquarters and the home of the Chief Commissioner of Police were stormed. No event of the day impressed Hans as much as the occurrence at Magdeburg station.)*

"After we disarmed the Vopos (People's Police) on duty at the station, we tore down the hated 'Passage of Interzone-Dispatching Sign.' As though this in itself could accomplish the task, the crowd began shouting, 'There are no borders anymore.'

"As the interzonal train arrived in the station, the frightened passengers locked the doors and windows, fearing an attack by Communist soldiers and police. As soon as they saw our sign 'The SED is beaten,' the windows and doors were opened and the people burst out, embracing each other, shouting, crying and some even giving away their possessions in celebration, assuming that the union of the East and West was an accomplished fact.

"We asked them to spread the word along on their way to Berlin. At this time we still thought that rebellions were taking place only in Magdeburg and Berlin. We were jubilant a few hours later when we learned from RIAS (Voice of America) and NWDR (West Berlin station) that uprisings were occurring all over East Germany.

"The next train to arrive contained a prisoner car. After a few tense moments we managed to gain control of the train and get the cells open. One of the prisoners was a 74-year-old farmer who was imprisoned a year before because he had not been able to meet his quota. He was speechless with fright and disbelief. When he was finally convinced that he was a free man, he broke down and wept, overcome with joy. I had to carry him away."

Prisoners Are Freed . . .

A LOCKSMITH

*(*WERNER MENGELSDORF *is a locksmith. He led the heroic liberation of 80 political prisoners in Magdeburg.)*

"A mob 3,000 strong stormed into the courtyard of the prison in Magdeburg. The prisoners pressed their worn, pale faces against the bars. A woman in the crowd started to scream as she recognized her husband who had been arrested only two days before.

"The wooden doors of the prison splintered under the weight of the surging crowd. The guards fled. The metal door to the cell block was pried open. Mengelsdorf called for the locksmiths and together they opened the cell doors. Indescribable scenes followed. One prisoner cried, 'Freedom! Freedom!', then fell to the floor crying. A young man sentenced to 25 years for crimes against the state stepped out of his cell into the arms of the girl to whom he had been engaged. Neither knew the other was there until the doors opened. They embraced, wordless.

"Soviet tanks rumbled into the prison yard before all the prisoners could be released. Mangelsdorf himself barely escaped with his life. His only route of escape lay in swimming the Landwehrcanal which separates East and West Berlin at certain spots. He waited until dark and then made it, narrowly escaping death from Soviet bullets which peppered the water around him. He is today in one of the camps in West Berlin, destitute but resolved that one day will come when all of East Germany as well as the satellite countries will again be free."

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INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
62 WEST 45th STREET
NEW YORK 36, N. Y.

Suite 600

I am glad to add my contribution to help those suffering from Communist oppression.

Enclosed please find check for $..

as my subscription for this vital work.

Name ____

Address ______________________________________

City______________________ Zone______ State..............

(Contributions are deductible from taxable income) 220

5564

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE
INCORPORATED
62 WEST 45th STREET, NEW YORK 36, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 2-4672 • Cable Address: INTERESCUE

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CHARLES S. ZIMMERMAN

ABRAM G. BECKER
Executive Director

September 22, 1953

Dear Mr. Fondiller:

I have just returned from Berlin. I am reporting to you as one of many observers who are agreed that the weaponless men and women of Eastern Germany stand as the first line of defense between us and the tyranny of Soviet Power. The entire world is now aware of what has been happening in East Berlin and East Germany since June 17, 1953.

But do you know why this most remarkable revolution occurred - how these people just like the young couple next door, the truck driver down the street, the band leader - have been able to rebel against overwhelming odds? It is not only out of sheer desperation because of the insufferable conditions under which they have been living. People in the other satellites are suffering. These are people who are desperately weary of tyrants of all political shades and colors. Through the window of West Berlin we gave them hope for a better world and they have become our allies. We cannot let them down. When we do we have lowered the first defense in the battle against tyranny over the minds, hearts and bodies of men.

The enclosed personal accounts of the June 17th rebellions are dramatic proof of man's invincible desire for freedom. The International Rescue Committee is doing everything possible to aid these brave men and women including some of the resistance leaders and proscribed members of their families. We need your help to continue this vital work.

We are asking you to send us your contribution so that we may continue to sustain the bodies of these brave men and women in whom the flame of freedom is burning. The aid we are extending to them is a message the whole world understands. A message which says that we believe in the dignity and goodness of people enough to help them survive their worst times so that they can fight for better times.

Sincerely,

A 3707

Leo Cherne

Leo Cherne
Chairman

Contributions deductible from taxable income.
Programs and financial statements filed with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Department of State

NEW YORK, N.Y.
SEP
PM
1953

IN THE SPIRIT OF

Mr Stanley Cieselski

~~Mr. William Fondiller~~
~~4801 Nebraska Ave., N. W.~~
~~Washington 16, D. C.~~

You may dispose of this.

Room 600
62 WEST 45th STREET • NEW YORK 36, N. Y.

I. R. O.
GENERAL HOSPITAL
AREA 7. MUNICH
SUB-AREA ROSENHEIM
Rosenheim, Mararier Straße 48
Telefon 451

„ 21th „ september 1949

Nr.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

S-5564

[illegible] S-5564

This is to certify that Dr. Kornilev Mykola has been employed with IRO General Hospital Rosenheim as the Chief Doctor of TBC Control since 1st of October 1948 till to date to our great satisfaction.

Dr. Kornilev Mykola has had a long practical experience, is very capable, and precise in his work.

He has a most pleasant manner at all times willing and well liked by patients and personnel.

Since Dr. Kornilev wants to imigrate shortly we wish him all the best for his future work and life .

(Dr. med. W. JAVORSKY)
GENERAL HOSPITAL DIRECTOR

bb. Dr., R'helm, Rathausstr. 4

file - NY League for the Hard of Hearing

17 July 1953

Chief, Contact Division

Deputy Chief, Foreign Documents Division

Case 12843

F 5' 5564

REFER : Your memorandum to Chief, FDD dated 8 July 1953, Case 12843

1. We appreciate the information you sent us on this case. It was requested cancelled by telephone some time ago, but we should have followed it with a memorandum.

2. For your information if you have similar inquiry in the future, we have found that the finest instruction in lip reading is available at the Audiology and Speech Correction Center of Army operated under Walter Reed Hospital at Forest Glen, Md.

BENJAMIN B. CAIN

SECRET
Security Information

/5064

SECURITY INFORMATION

6 July 1953

Chief, Foreign Documents Division

Chief, Contact Division, 00

Case 12843

REFERENCE: 00/C 2 June 1953 memorandum, Case 12843, in reply to Mr. Cain's 19 March 1953 request.

S 5564

Are you interested in having us obtain additional details on the New York League for the Hard of Hearing or was the information contained in reference sufficient for your needs? We should appreciate your comments.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

SECURITY INFORMATION

AWebster/wh

cc Index

F-5564

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, Foreign Documents Division   2 June 1953

Chief, Contact Division, [illegible]

Case 12843

[illegible] : Mr. Cain's 19 March 1953 conversation with Mr. Delaney

5564

1. We made an informal query of the New York League for the Hard of Hearing to determine (a) whether it would be possible to teach a [illegible] person to lip-read efficiently, (b) whether it would be possible to teach lip-reading to a person who is losing his hearing, and (c), if so, approximately how long it would take and how much such training would cost.

2. We have found that it is possible to teach both hearing persons and persons who are in the process of losing their hearing to lip-read proficiently. Without going into the problem more thoroughly the New York League could not tell us how long such training would take. We observed that simple phrases can be learned in a short time. Also, we found that the League has taught lip-reading to hearing persons in special cases which were described as "of a confidential nature". (We assume that the FBI has used agents as lip-readers in the past and it is possible that they were the "special cases").

3. As the New York League for the Hard of Hearing operates under the New York State Board of Education we were unable to determine the cost of lip-reading training in our informal inquiry. If we could have more details, we could try to obtain more definite information.

4. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Miss Webster on extension 2761.

F. W. ASHCRAFT

5564

AWebster: mrh

cc: Index
Delaney
File: Misc. Services N.Y.
League for the Hard of Hearing

14-00000

SECRET TO QASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

File: 5564

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA-SECURITY INFORMATION-CITE NY-7069

MAY 27 [illegible] PM '53

CASE 12843 RPT 12843

5564

SOURCE AT NY LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING STATES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO (A) TEACH A HEARING PERSON TO LIP-READ PROFICIENTLY AND (B) IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO TEACH A PERSON LIP-READING WHO IS IN THE PROCESS OF LOSING HIS HEARING. WITHOUT GOING INTO THE PROBLEM MORE DEEPLY SOURCE COULD NOT SPECIFY THE LENGTH OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO DEVELOP PROFICIENCY. LEARNING SIMPLE PHRASES SUCH AS A NURSE WOULD REQUIRE CAN BE DONE IN A SHORT TIME, HOWEVER. SOURCE SAID THAT THE LEAGUE HAD TAUGHT LIP READING TO HEARING PEOPLE IN SPECIAL CASES WHICH WERE OF A "CONFIDENTIAL" NATURE. AS THE LEAGUE OPERATES UNDER THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT THE COST OF SUCH A COURSE IN AN INFORMAL TELEPHONE INQUIRY. IF WE COULD HAVE MORE DETAILS WE COULD COME UP WITH MUCH MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION.

FILE: MRS. LEWIS, NY LEAGUE FOR HARD OF HEARING.

[illegible]

CCCC: THIRD WORD OF HEADING SHOULD READ "WASHINGTON"

14-00000

F-5564

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA - SECURITY INFORMATION -

CITE NY-6147

CASE 12,843 RFT 12,843 - YOUR W-6388 RPT W-6388.

WOULD APPRECIATE IN THE FUTURE IF YOU WOULD REFER TO ONLY ONE CASE IN
EACH DISPATCH. THIS WILL ASSIST US IMMENSELY IN LOGGING AND ROUTING OF
MESSAGES. WE ARE SURE THAT YOU APPRECIATE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT
LEAST TWO C/S'S ARE WORKING ON THE TWO CASES REFERRED HEREIN. WE SHOULD
ALSO LIKE TO SUGGEST TO YOU IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE THAT YOU ARRANGE
TO SPEND A COUPLE OF DAYS IN THIS OFFICE TO COORDINATE WITH YOUR OP-
POSITE NUMBER HERE AND TO SPIN A FEW OF THESE MINOR PROBLEMS. WE
SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOW THIS TO STAN. MAY WE HAVE HIS REACTIONS TO THESE
RECOMMENDATIONS?

FILE: NEW YORK LEAGUE FOR HEARING.

S-5564-126

SECRET CX NR 746 TO NEW YORK FM WASHINGTON F

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY SS (WEBSTER) - SECURITY INFORMATION - CITE W-6388

NEW CASE 12343 RPT 12343: FDD HAS REQUESTED THAT WE ASK THE NEW YORK LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING, 480 RPT 480 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, (A) WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TEACH A HEARING PEARSON TO LIP-READ PROFICIENTLY; (B) WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TEACH LIP-READING TO A PERSON WHO IS IN THE PROCESS OF LOSING HIS HEARING; (C) IF SO, APPROXIMATELY HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE AND HOW MUCH WOULD IT COST. FDD DOESN'T WANT YOU TO MAKE A BIG ISSUE OF THIS AND BELIEVES THAT INFORMAL TELEPHONE REQUEST MIGHT BE ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. H-100782 BACKGROUND: QUERIES HERE AT GALLAUDET COLLEGE (FOR THE DEAF) RESULTED IN OPINION THERE THAT A HEARING PERSON WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECT FOR SUCH TRAINING. FYI, THIS CASE IS TIED IN WITH CASE 12453 RPT 12453.

NEW SUBJECT: CLOSED CASE 3314 RPT 3314, NY-9354 RPT NY-9354 STATES THAT YOU GAVE "ROBINSON OF OPC ADEQUATE INFORMATION ABOUT ERNEST J-5564 TINSMITH". WE ARE TRYING TO TRACK DOWN ROBINSON (CAN YOU TELL US WHICH ONE HE WAS) TO SEE WHAT WAS DONE ABOUT TINSMITH. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT YOU TOLD ROBINSON ABOUT TINSMITH? PLEASE ADVISE.

FILE: ERNEST TINSMITH, NY LEAGUE FOR THE HARD OF HEARING

GRR3

GR200

20/1355Z MAR AF3

Copy filed H 100782

F-5564

6 MARCH 1953 X

W AFCaa[redacted]/esr 2775

SECRET
Security Information

NEW YORK

TO IRA FROM ASHCRAFT BY ALIEN W Callahan.

CASE 12,667. REUR NY-5913.

THANKS FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFO CONTAINED IN NY-5913. WE ARE CLOSING CASE AS SUCCESSFUL.

5564

cc: Index (Iron Curtain Refugee Comm.)

SECRET
Security Information

b

c/m filed # 37422

14-00000

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR ALIEN FROM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION --

CITE NY 5918

CASE 12667.

FURTHER TO NY 5811 AND NY 5824 RPT NY 5811 AND NY 5824, (PRESUMABLY NOT RPT NOT OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO REQUESTOR), WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY BECKER RPT BECKER THAT DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR RPT DR. REINHOLD NIEBUHR HAD BEEN CHAIRMAN OF THE RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGN FOR EXILED PROFESSIONALS, BUT THAT THIS POST HAS BEEN "DORMANT" SINCE NIEBUHR'S WITHDRAWAL FROM IRC RPT IRC FOR HEALTH REASONS. BECAUSE OF SMALLER INFLUX OF DP'S RPT DP'S (AND PERHAPS ALSO BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF FUNDS) THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC DROP IN THE RESETTLEMENT CASE LOAD. A THIRD DEPARTMENT OF IRC (IN ADDITION TO ICRC RPT ICRC AND RESETTLEMENT CAMPAIGN) USED TO BE WHAT IS NOW AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR EMIGRE SCHOLARS, WRITERS, AND ARTISTS, INC. THIS COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS A HISTORY SEPARATE FROM IRC, HAD BEEN MERGED WITH IRC BECAUSE THE COMBINED OPERATION WAS MORE LIK RPT LIKELY TO RECEIVE FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS THAN THE TWO COMMITTEES SEPARATELY A FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLAR GRANT BY THE FORD FOUNDATION WAS NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ADDITIONAL FUNDS, AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED, AND THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR EMIGRE SCHOLARS ETC. WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE-ESTABLISHED AS A SEPARATE ORGANIZATION. WITH ELSE STAUDINGER RPT ELSE STAUDINGER AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND NELSON P. MEAD RPT NELSON P. MEAD AS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, THE LAST-NAMED OUTFIT CONTINUES TO OCCUPY FACILITIES ADJOINING IRC'S AND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH IRC. FYI: WE HAVE A CONTACT AT THE SCHOLARS COMMITTEE SEPARATE FROM IRC (SEE ALSO CASE 12832 RPT 12832).

133

264

C 37472

A-39215

case 5-37422

CR-253

14-00000

SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO ASHCRAFT FOR SS (WEBSTER) FROM LEA-SECURITY INFORMATION-CITE NY-6150

CLOSED CASE 8744 RPT 8744 (NOT 8814 RPT 8814) - REUR W-6388 RPT W-6388.

S-5564 S-5564

WE DON'T KNOW WHICH ROBINSON RPT ROBINSON FROM OPC WE SAW BUT WE DID TELL HIM THAT ERNEST TINSMITH RPT ERNEST TINSMITH LIVES AT 25-71 35TH STREET RPT 25-71 35TH STREET, ASTORIA, LONG ISLAND, USES THE ALIAS OF ERNEST TOPOLCZY RPT ERNEST TOPOLCZY, CLAIMS HIS ANCESTORS ARE ENGLISH, COMES FROM NORTHERN HUNGARY, IS A TEACHER OF DEAF MUTES AND WAS DIRECTOR OF A DEAF MUTE SCHOOL IN AUSTRIA, HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FOLLOW OUT HIS PROFESSION HERE.

527429

WHAT WE DID NOT TELL ROBINSON, BECAUSE WE ONLY LEARNED OF IT YESTERDAY, IS THAT TINSMITH WAS RECENTLY M.C. AT A DINNER GIVEN BY GENERAL ZAKO'S RPT ZAKO'S MHBK RPT MHBK, AN EXTREME RIGHT-WING HUNGARIAN VETERANS' ORGANIZATION, AND THAT TINSMITH IS AN EXTREME RIGHT-WINGER.

WE ASSUME YOU WERE REFERRING TO CASE 8744 RPT 8744 ON TINSMITH TO WHICH OUR NY-9854 RPT 9854 IS TIED. WE DON'T KNOW HOW YOU GOT CASE 8814 RPT 8814 MIXED INTO THIS CASE.

GR-168

H

14-00000

F-5564

Security Information

26 March 1953

Chief, Staff C, FI
Attn: Miss Jane Winslow

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-5564

Concern about Physical Security of Gisela Wassiliow, IRC Representative in Berlin

1. A source of this division, who has been associated with Gisela Wassiliow in the IRC, has transmitted a letter, dated 23 Feb 53, written by her. She has been Director of the Berlin Office of the IRC for approximately three years. A copy of the letter is attached.

2. The source knows Wassiliow as a calm person not given to hysterics.

3. This information is being transmitted also to I&SO.

4. Any inquiry concerning this memorandum should be directed to Mr. A. F. Czajkowski, extension 2775.

G. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment

AFCzajkowski/cjg

cc: OO-1
Index-2
V. Thorne-1

APPROVED FOR TRANSMITTAL /s/ 30 Mar 53
Asst. Dir. for Operations

Copy filed 7-22290/F-Wassiliow

Security Information

F 5564

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
FOR : Alien Branch (Czajkowski)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 27 February 1953 [illegible]

S-37500
S-5564
A-5564

SUBJECT: Concern about Physical Security of Gisela Wassiliev, IRC Representative in Berlin
REF : Our TK NY-9780, dated 30 Nov 51 (to Alien Branch)

5564

1. In reference wire, David Martin recommended subject individual (whose name he spelled 'Wasiljev") for contact by this office. Martin described this German national, wife of a Russian DP then and now in the US, as"exceptionally capable, intelligent, with rare political understanding". She has been director of the Berlin office of the International Rescue Committee for some three years (perhaps longer). As you know, the IRC has been prominent for aid given to West Berlin and is currently in the midst of a campaign for aid to refugees arriving there in increasing numbers from the East.

2. Mr. Becker, present executive director of the IRC, has passed on to us a letter from Mrs. Wassiliew, dated 23 February 1953, in which she reports alleged attempts on the part of "the East" to kidnap her. In view of her activities and her connection with Rainer Hildebrandt's Kempfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, there may be some basis for her fears. Mr. Becker, who knows her as a calm person not given to hysterics, is deeply concerned about her safety and has stated that he would have replaced her with a U.S. citizen if it were not so difficult to find a qualified successor. He has requested that we communicate with any U.S. agency or department in a position to provide physical security for persons representing U.S. interests in Berlin.

3. We have promised Mr. Becker to pass on his request to our superiors, but we told him that we were not aware of CIA facilities abroad or of CIA responsibility for coordinating action abroad with other appropriate US Government agencies. We therefore suggested that Mr. Becker himself communicate with such agencies to the best of his ability and did not commit CIA to any action upon his request.

4. If, in your judgment, the covert staffs might be interested in this problem or a justifiable representation to other agencies (e.g. Defense or State) can be made, we feel that such action would serve U.S. security interests and, incidentally, benefit IRC in a measurable way. We are attaching Mrs. Wasiliew's letter for whatever use you care to make of it.

5. This office has had no contact with Mr. or Mrs. Wassiliew, and these individuals are not aware of any possible CIA interest, to the best of our knowledge.

6. Please advise whether there is anything you can do, whether Mr. Becker should approach another Government agency (if he has not done so in the meantime), and what reaction, if any, we may pass on to Becker.

Charles A. Lea

W.L.F.
WLFreund:mfd
ATT:

SECRET
Security Information

Date: Feb 23, 1953

Memo to: ABE (cc: Munich, Frankfurt)

From: Gisela (Wassiliew)
(3. Emserstr., Berlin Wilmersdorf
Germany)

Dear Abe:

I am sorry that I must bother you with my personal problems, but since I don't know what to do under the present circumstances I am begging you for understanding.

As you know I always had trouble with "the other side". If somebody works in this field he must be endangered after a certain time. I believe I told you about the calls in Russian and about the spies who are constantly around me since about 1951. I am used always to be on the alert and to look around me carefully, this is the only thing I can do. In addition to that I bought a dog in the summer of last year.

Since about four months the attempts of the East to get have increased. I had several rencontres with them and have informed the police. But since we have so many people here in Berlin who have good reasons to feel endangered they cannot watch everybody constantly and the person in question is more or less left to his own measures.

Last Wednesday night I ran into a situation which would have meant the end for me if a friend of mine had not happened to be with me. This way they did not dare to because they are accustomed to see me always walking alone; and cars and helpers disappeared (not around). I have reported my situation again to the police, they promised to do what they can, but it is so that I have to work out something that makes it a little more difficult for them to complete their plan.

With friends who work in the same field and who know about these things I have worked out the following: I must sell my dog and buy a sharper one. When I bought him in July last year the situation was completely different. I did it merely as a measure of precaution not because I had proofs of the danger I was living under. For this purpose he is good but not for the purpose for which I need him now; he is not sharp enough. They have already calculated my dog into the plan. I absolutely need another much sharper one. But I must tell you frankly that even if I sell my dog I would not be able to buy the new one, because they are terribly expensive. Then I have decided that I cannot go to the office and come home alone anymore. I can move from one of my friends to the other for a certain time but not constantly. A friend of the Committee will pick me up every morning and bring me home at night in his car. In the meantime I'll talk to Mrs. Wolff of Arbeiterwohlfahrt, who has an office car and arrange with her that her driver pick me up. But this will take some time until I have reached her and discussed the matter with her.

Please don't believe that I am hysterical, on the contrary. But now it is so that I not only feel endangered but I have knowledge of their intentions and I am sure I would not get out again, once they have had hold of me.

Cordially yours,

/s/ Gisela

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FM NEW YORK

TO ASRCRAFT FOR ALIEN FM LEA -- SECURITY INFORMATION

CITE - NY-[illegible]

[illegible]

F-5564

273423

CASE 12,667 RPT 12,667

[illegible] IRON CURTAIN REFUGEE CAMPAIGN OF INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE. RE- CZAJKOWSKI'S PHONE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ABRAM J. BECKER RPT ABRAM J. BECKER: (1) OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH BECKER: DAVID MARTIN RPT DAID RPT DAVID MARTIN, THEN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTRODUCED US TO BECKER - WHO HAD JOINED IRC RPT IRC STAFF IN APRIL 1951 RPT APRIL 1951 - SOME TIME IN AUTUMN 1951 RPT 1951 TO BPOVIDE PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE (ANNEL WITH THE IRC IN HIS OWN ABSENCE

. WE DID NOT RPT NOT , HOWEV AVE AY RPT ANY DEALINGS WITH BECKER UNTIL HE SUCCEEDED MARTIN AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR IN JUNE 1952 RPT JUNE 1952. AT THAT TIME, HE ASSURED US OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH US TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY SUPPLIED PROOF OF THIS BY FURNISHING DETAILED BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON 80 RPT 80 REFUGEES WHICH THE IRC BROUGHT TO THIS COUNTRY; HIS COOPERATION IN THIS PROJECT WAS SPLENDID. WE HAD PRACTICALLY NO RPT NO CONTACT I RPT WITH HIM SINCE SUMMER 1952 RPT SUMMER 1952 BECAUSE IASO PLACED HIM IN THE "DISAPPROVED" CATEGORY (ALTHOUGH A RE-EVALUATION IN DECEMBER 1952 RPT DECEMBER 1952 TRANSFERRED HIM TO "LIMITED" SECURITY STATUS). MR. BECKER HAS NEVER VOLUNTEERED INFORMTION RPT INFORMATION OF POTENTIAL INTEREST TO US, BUT THIS FACT MAY BE EXPLAINED BY (A) OUR OWN ATTITUDE OF ALOOFNESS TOWARD HIM AND (B) OUR FAILURE TO BRIEF HIM CONCERNING AREAS RPT AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. (2) OUR EVALUATION OF BECKER: IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE HAVE ONLY A LIMITED BASIS FOR JUDGING HIM. 3 APP RPT HE APPEARS HONEST, STRAIGHTFORWARD, DISCREET, INTELLIGENT, MORE FAMILIAR WITH SOCIAL WELFARE PRACTICES BUT CONSIDERABLY LESS KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING THE DP RPT DP COMMUNITY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR; WE HAVE HAD NO REASON OF OUR OWN (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM IASO, WHOSE JUDGEMENT APPEARS O BE BASED ON INFORMATION UNKNOWN TO US) TO QUESTION HIS CHARACTER OR LOYALTY. HIS REPUTATION AMONG OTHER RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES APPEARS TO BE GOOD. IT SHOULD BE RE-EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE I RPT WITH BECKER TO ARRIVE AT ANY CONCLUSIVE EVALUATION OF HIS PERSON.

[illegible]

14-00000

2

F-5564

27 FEB 1953
W

X
AFCzajkowski/acr

2775

SECRET
Security Information

NEW YORK

TO LEA FROM ASHCRAFT BY ALIEN W 6029.

SUBJECT: CASE 12,667. RE NY-5811 AND FREUND-CZAJKOWSKI TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS, 26 AND 27 FEBRUARY 53.

THANK YOU FOR QUICK ACTION ON OUR TELEPHONIC REQUEST FOR INFO ON IRON CURTAIN REFUGEE COMMITTEE. YOUR INFO WAS TRANSMITTED TO DD/P'S OFFICE, WHICH NOW REQUESTS ADDITIONAL DATA ON AND YOUR EVALUATION OF ABRAM J. BECKER.

THIS HAS BEEN SET UP AS CASE 12,667.

5564

cc: Case 12,667
Index (Iron Curtain Refugee Comm.)

SECRET
SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

Index
Iron Curtain
Refugee Comm.

Files 27 Feb 53

Alien Branch (AFCzajkowski/ecr)

F-5564.

Case 12,667

1. Info in Freund's TWX- NY-5811 was telephoned to Mr. Hulick in DD/P's office.

2. Hulick requested additional info concerning Abram J. Hecker and our relations with him.

3. Request was telephoned to Freund in New York.

Orig - Case 12,667
cc: Index ✓

SECRET
Security Information

Security Information

Files 26 Feb 1953

Alien Branch (AFCzajkowski/acr)

Iron Curtain Refugee Committee

1. On 24 Feb 53 Mr. Hulick in the DD/P's office requested information concerning the Iron Curtain Refugee Committee. Specifically he wished to learn:

1. What is relation between this & IRC?
2. Identity of new man who runs ICRC.
3. Do we have close relations?

2. Czajkowski telephoned New York Field Office and transmitted the request to Walter Freund.

3. This has been set up as Case 12,667.

Orig - Case 12,667
cc: Index ✓

Security Information

9 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Conversation between President Lopez Mateos of Mexico
and Mr. Winston Scott, Chief of Station, Mexico

REFERENCE : MEXI 5698 (IN-49514), dated 8 June 60

1. This memorandum contains a suggestion, in Paragraph 3, for the consideration of the DCI.

2. On the night of 7 June, President Lopez Mateos requested Mr. Scott to inform "his good friend, President Eisenhower," of the following:

A. That the President is a friend of the United States, "not only because of necessity but of genuine desire and ideology".

B. That the invitation to President Dorticos of Cuba was extended two weeks after it was indicated that Dorticos was going to Mexico "on his own", through the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba.

C. That he will not invite Fidel Castro to Mexico even though Cuban Ambassador Jose Antonio Portuondo told President Lopez Mateos that Dorticos will request an invitation for Castro.

3. President Lopez Mateos also asked that President Eisenhower be informed that he is delighted that a decision has now been made to get rid of Castro. The DCI may wish to inform the President of the above.

24

4. President Lopez Mateos was indirectly informed of CIA intentions in regard to Castro through a conversation between Mr. Scott and Jose Lorenzo Cossio, Advisor to the Mexican President, who informed Mr. Scott that President Lopez Mateos would not invite Castro to visit Mexico, even though Dorticos is going to ask him to do so. Mr. Scott suggested that if the Mexican President helped CIA to achieve the overthrow of Castro, he would not have to deal with the problem of inviting Castro to Mexico.

0608

24

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI
DDP

3/pJ

16-7

From: [Panama City, Panama] Report No: 23 [illegible]764 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 3 No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: Howard W. Antell Approved By:

Distribution: 10 Wash (2) ✓
By copy to: [Mexi] (1)
10 [Hava] (1)
Files (1)
Made available to the Embassy and G-2

Orally to: [illegible]

Source Cryptonym: Sources Identified References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments: [illegible]

23
[TNM-]415 indicated that the Headquarters of the Caribbean Legion were being transferred to Panama "where it could count on the aid of the ARIAS government", and that Julio LOPEZ Masegoza, active in the Caribbean Legion, would remain in Mexico dedicating himself to the purchase of gold and its clandestine exportation to Guatemala and Panama.

23
[TNM-R-]439 requested confirmation of the above information.

It is possible that the attached report may tend to confirm part of this information.

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Classification

FORM NO. FEB 1946 51-90

[illegible]

6/20

93

Subject: Gold Shipments

Report No: TZF-764

16-7

Date of Information: May-July 1950

Place Acquired: Panama City, Panama

Date Acquired: June-July 1950

Evaluation: B-C

Date of Report: 10 July 1950

Source:

t-2

1. G-2 reported that on 7 May 1950 a B-26 type bomber arrived in David, Panama, from Brownsville, Texas, due to a low gasoline supply. The plane was headed for Tocumen Airport in Panama City and carried as a crew the following according to G-2:

Frank ORGEL, U.S. Citizen, Pilot
O. MARTINEZ, U.S. Citizen, Co-Pilot
Steve MURRAY, U.S. Citizen, Mechanic
Mauricio CASTRO, Panamanian, Passenger

05

(A tire blew out at David, and Mr. John LERCH, Civil Aeronautics technician at Tocumen Airport was instrumental in getting a spare tire to them.

05

2. Mr. LERCH ~~advised this office~~ that he had met Steve MURRAY in Havana in April 1950 in company with a fellow named ZORILLO, who claimed to have some connection with the Secret Police in Mexico. LERCH described MURRAY as an adventurer who had been in the Philippines and the Far East and whom he suspected of gold smuggling activities. LERCH said that MURRAY was pilot of the plane and he thought it was unusual that ~~so~~ as fast a plane as this and as expensive to operate was being used when it had comparatively little cargo space. In May 1950, when MURRAY was in Panama, he told LERCH that he was buying orchid bulbs.

05

3. On 16 June 1950 the following information was received (from Civil Intelligence Section, Panama Canal,) regarding this matter:

"~~It has been reported that~~ Very frequently a B-26 airplane (N5546N - a Martin Marauder) makes trips between Tocumen and David, R.P. It is piloted by Steve MURRAY, and at least two other Americans ~~ride on the plane, which is~~ whom are sometimes met at Tocumen Airport by either Tito, Harmodito or Toni ARIAS. On landing at the airport it goes directly to a hangar, and allegedly the only ones who visit it are the ARIAS brothers, PASTOR Ponce, Chief of the Airport, and one (fnu) LINARES, Chief of Customs at Tocumen.

(2)

"Informant stated that it was believed at first that the plane was engaged in arms contraband, but later it appeared more logical to assume that it was involved in another type of smuggling, possibly drugs.

"Virgilio RAMIREZ, ~~then~~ Chief of the Control Tower, is said to have stated that the plane comes and goes without being registered at the airport under orders of PONCE, Airport Manager; that the plane lands without signaling

FORM NO. 51-60
FEB 1949

7/90

by radio or talking to anyone for fear of detection at Albrook Field, but that it is signaled by means of a light which indicates that the field is free for landing. According to informant, [illegible] and one Jimmy SMITH told above that Panama's air agreement with the United States regarding landing rules was thereby being violated, and that these two men were afterwards removed from their jobs.

"Informant adds that the above plane landed at Tocumen from David on 11 May at 5:45 p.m., on 12 May at 6:51 p.m., on 14 May at 6:29 p.m. and on 16 May at 9:26 a.m.

"The above information was allegedly given to President ARIAS by the Minister of Government and Justice, and he apparently showed little interest in the subject, merely stating that the matter should be investigated to see what there is to it."

Upon receipt of this information it appeared that Virgilio RAMIREZ might have been the source, since he was fired from his post at Tocumen Airport and was disgruntled about it. It was ascertained that the information contained in the above paragraph, in which RAMIREZ is mentioned, was reported by RAMIREZ but the other information came from other Civil Intelligence sources.

OS in the plane mentioned above,

4. On 6 July Mr. LERCH advised that the ~~above plane and~~ Steve MURRAY had returned to Panama and that the Minister of Government had ordered that the plane be dismantled and searched, but he could not ascertain the basis for the search. LERCH had talked to the Manager of the airport, Rafael PASTOR Ponce, and with Toni ARIAS, Director General of Civil Aeronautics, and a nephew of President Arias, who indicated that they were aware of the Minister of Government's order but did not know what was behind it. Both felt that it was an extreme measure, which should not be carried out.

DS

5. On 8 July 1950 Mr. MURRAY called at the Embassy to obtain assistance in securing the release of his plane. Briefly he stated that he had departed from Mexico City via Managua and arrived at Tocumen at 7:30 p.m. 5 July. His passport reflected the following:

Name: Steven T. Murray
Passport No.: 1824
Issued: Manila, December 2, 1946
Renewed: Manila, December 27, 1948
Expires: December 1, 1950

(5)

He furnished the following additional information:

Type of Plane: Converted B-26
U.S. Registry: N 5546 N
Pilot and Owner: Steven T. Murray
Co-pilot: Frank Oergel, U.S. citizen
Flight Engineer: Cristobal Martinez, Mexican citizen
Passenger: Mauricio DE CASTRO, Panamanian citizen (bearer of official passport), passenger from Mexico City to Tocumen
Destination: Brownsville, Texas
Purpose of Trip: Business

14-00000

Consequently.

He stated that he was in the export-import business and that he dealt in gold. He said that he had come to Panama to see a man by the name of SAS, a gold dealer from Buenos Aires, about gold shipments.

(6) 6. On 8 July, Minister of Government Alfredo ALEMAN reported the matter to the U.S. Ambassador stating that prior to arriving in Panama the plane had been signaled, that all was not well at the airport and that the crew had jettisoned cargo prior to arrival. (A check with the Air Force authorities does not confirm that any such message was sent and MURRAY denies that anything was jettisoned. He insisted that he was coming to Panama to discuss the gold business but that he had no cargo.) The Minister also advised the Ambassador that PASTOR Ponce had been ~~fired~~ removed as Head of the airport.

P leave out

discharged

OS

(7) 7. In a conversation with PASTOR Ponce and MURRAY on the night of 8 July [LIROM] was advised that PASTOR Ponce had, in fact, been fired and that he was determined to bump off Toni ARIAS. Both MURRAY and PASTOR Ponce claimed that Toni ARIAS was behind it all but that PASTOR Ponce was the fall-guy.

8. The Mexican referred to, Cristobal MARTINEZ, and the Mexican, ZORILLO, are believed to be identical. SAS has been identified as ~~Fernando SAS~~, a gold dealer, who operates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Civil Intelligence ~~Section has advised that SAS~~ was staying with Toni ARIAS and ~~that SAS~~ had departed from Panama hastily. ~~CIS also advised that~~ President ARIAS ~~at first~~ had given orders for the dismissal of both his nephew, Toni ARIAS, and PASTOR Ponce, but it was later agreed that Toni ARIAS would not be fired to avoid a public scandle involving the President's family.

discharged

P leave out

9. (The present status of the matter is that the plane has been searched with negative results, that the plane is still being held by the Panamanian authorities and that MURRAY and others are endeavoring by every means possible to secure the release of the plane. The head of the Tocumen Airport, PASTOR Ponce, has been dismissed and Toni ARIAS, the President's nephew, will probably be allowed to withdraw from his position gracefully.)

Distribution:

Wash (2)
10 Mexi (1)
Mana (1)
Files (1)

3/20

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			24 AUG 1959	
2.			28	
3. WH/III/Carib/RA				
4. Carib/FI				
5. PP				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. CI/ICD			22 SEP 1959	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/AN		13 MAR 1970		
15. RID/EDI				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19. WH/III/Carib/				
20. RID/FI	1400L			

RECORD COPY

COMMENTS

[illegible] reclassify.

Vivian G. Daily
WH/COG/PP

reclassify to 201-251853

cf-3/411,399

201-251853

Economic [illegible] -Cuba)

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER
	INDEX	

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	21 Aug 1959	HKH -02130

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

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14-00000

[redacted]

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM: Habana XLK
REPORT NO.: HKH-2130
REPORT MADE BY: Nelson L. Raynock/pse
NUMBER PAGES: 2
REPORT APPROVED BY: Woodrow C. Olien
NUMBER ENCLOSURES: None
DATE OF REPORT: 21 August 1959
REFERENCES: None

DISTRIBUTION:
By copy to: 3 - Headquarters w/mst
1 - Embassy (Economic Counselor)
Orally to: 1 - Legal Attaché
2 - Files

Field File No. 6-0-120

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: See Comments below
ID NO.:
IG NO.:
KRYPTON: ☐ Yes ☐ No

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA, AND COMMENTS:

SUBJECT: Cuban Economic Crisis

OPERATIONAL COMMENTS: 05 08

[Source Alberto FERNANDEZ Hechavarria] [the chief of the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Board who has the job of selling Cuba's sugar] A former active member of the 26 of July Movement during the revolution, he is now disillusioned, and reportedly is not going to last much longer in his job. He is wealthy and his family have lost through CASTRO's economic reforms. He appears to know a lot about the government and also seems to have an insight into CASTRO. He regards CASTRO as some type of a UNIVAC machine, his mind automatically photostating details which he can and will use in the future. He says that CASTRO is ruthless, and that nothing can stop him in his determination to do something, i.e., agrarian reform, and that he will sacrifice his friends, his family, his money, and his fortune to accomplish his purpose.

Again illustrating the present situation in Cuba, the source said that he cannot publicly have contacts with American officials—refusing to let the writer use his telephone—and he said that a record is kept of all his calls and that his movements are periodically checked.

The advisor who warned CASTRO in paragraph one of the attached report was the source.

As a possible reference to this report and particularly to field comment number two, see HAVA-2526. TDCS - 3/401,563

The second source referred to in Field Comment No. 2 was AMPACK-1 who obtained his information from the [president of the Banco Industrial de Cuba.]

08

[redacted]

HKH-2130

201-251853

FORM NO. 51-59 APR 1953 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

CS COPY

3/90

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE A. Completely reliable B. Usually reliable C. Fairly reliable D. Not usually reliable E. Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true 4. Doubtful 5. Probably false 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary. Based on original document.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Cuban Economic Crisis

REPORT NO. HKH-2130

DATE OF REPORT 21 August 1959

NO. OF PAGES 2

REFERENCES None

DATE OF INFO. July-August 1959

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Cuba, Habana (20 August 1959)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Cuban Government Official (F).
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Contrary to the reports which are issued by the Cuban Government, the financial status of the Cuban economy is rapidly deteriorating and becoming a serious problem. During July 1959 an advisor to Prime Minister Fidel CASTRO Ruz, warned him to proceed more slowly with the agrarian reform, because the Cuban treasury was running short of funds. It was pointed out that 57 sugar mills were bankrupt and had not paid the plantation owners for the 1959 sugar crop. CASTRO was told that if the reckless confiscation of agricultural properties continued, the Cuban Government would become obligated to assume even more debts in order to alleviate the hunger of farm workers.[1]

2. Another drain on the economy is government subsidies. For example, the Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social (BANDES, Social and Economic Development Bank) controls about U. S. $400 million in properties and investments such as the Compañia Cubana de Aviacion (Cuban Airline Company). The companies have been caught in the present contraction of capital and cannot survive without government subsidies. The subsidies paid by BANDES amount to U. S. $8 million a month, and this is only one exemple of the many payments which are draining the Cuban treasury.[2]

Field Comments.

1. ~~From the reports which have been received~~ It appears that there is growing unemployment of farm workers. This is the "dead season"—the period between sugar cane harvests—but it is reported that most plantation owners and ranchers are fearful of confiscation of their properties for the agrarian-reform program, and consequently are doing very little in the way of maintenance work. The latter provided at least a marginal field of employment, and this is now denied to the agricultural workers. ~~However,~~ In spite of this warning, the agrarian-reform program has not been slowed. In fact, it seems to have been intensified.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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201-251823

2. ~~The~~ S source thought that nothing could stop CASTRO in his determination to proceed with the agrarian reform program as fast as possible. Since the biggest obstacle to carrying out this program is the lack of money, the source was of the opinion that CASTRO would do anything to obtain this money and might even confiscate bank accounts and moneys and negotiable instruments held in safety deposit boxes. Carrying this one step further, ~~the~~ source thought such confiscatory tactics could only be a temporary saving device and that eventually it would be necessary for CASTRO to obtain a large loan from another country. He speculated that this would mean either the United States or the Soviet Union, and feared that if it were the latter, it would mean the end of friendly relations with the United States. In respect to CASTRO's possible need for a loan, another, fairly reliable, source reported on 18 August 1959 that CASTRO was trying to obtain a 30,000,000-peso loan from ~~local~~ Cuban banks.

201-251553

201-251553

201-251553

201-251553

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

458

DATE : 23 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADOP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL S/C

MAR 23 1522Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 4648

PRITY K'LA INFO BELL CITE WAVE 4795

JMZIP JEAN III

REF WAVE 4555 (IN 3731)*

1. WILL INFIL FOLL SEVEN INDIVIDUALS VIA OPN JEAN III NIGHT 23 MAR: 04,09

A) ALDO VERA SERAFIN, 2[illegible] FEB [illegible], CAIBARIEN, SANTA CLARA

04,09 B) BRAULIO CONTRERAS MACOT, 26 MAR 34, MANZANILLO, ORIENTE

04,09 C) ANGEL POSADA GUTIERREZ, 21 OCT 31, HAVANA, CUBA

04,09 D) RINALDO HERNANDEZ BLANCO, 26 FEB 25, PINAR DEL RIO

04,09 E) RAFAEL GARCIA RUBIO (T) CESAR RUBIO GOMEZ (A) TRAINEE 2621

04,09 F) BENIGNO PEREZ (T) PEDRO RODRIGUEZ (A) TRAINEE 2563

04 G) PEDRO SERGIO CUELLAR ALONSO (T)

04,09 2. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE, "LUCAS"; 13 MAY 15, SANTIAGO DE CUBA, RETURNED CUBA VIA COMMERCIAL AIR AFTERNOON 22 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED APPROVAL RUN OPN JEAN III.

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8/BR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : BELL
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADOP/A, WH 3, OC 6, BELL S/C

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

FEB 24 2313Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 1012

OPIM BELL RINH KOLA CITE WAVE 3959

JMZIP JEAN

REF WAVE 3515 (IN 4303)*

1. TEJANA DUE DEPART KEY WEST 251600Z RUN OPN JEAN.

2. WILL INFIL CARGO PER REF AND 4 PAX AS FOLLOWS:

TRAINEES 2521 [EMILIO MARTINEZ] 04 ALIAS [ERNESTO GUERRA VIDAL] 07
2634 [OLIVERIO TOMEU] 04 ALIAS [ANTONIO DEL MONTE CABALLERO] 07
2765 [RAFAEL ALVAREZ FERNANDEZ-GARRIDO] 04 ALIAS [MAXIMO ALONSO BERMUDEZ] 07
2585 [CARLOS POVEDA] 04 ALIAS [CALIXTO BERGNES BRAUDET]. 07

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* PLAN RERUN OPN JEAN PER FORMAT WAVE 2174.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

8/BR

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: GUITART CAMPUZANO, AGUSTIN, DR.
C-727418

INCLUSIVE DATES: /

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA
ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4:00 10 AUG 78		PAT ORR	PMOrr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER MUST NOTIFY CI/OA(5077) IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER GROUP WITHIN CI/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY BE RECHARGED TO THE PROPER PERSON, AND SO THAT THE FOLDER CAN BE READILY LOCATED AT ANY TIME AS NEEDED.

DATE

727418

SECRET

CI PROJECTS CARD MADE

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP: 19 June 1963 Jew

DATE ... REC: 18 June 1963

CP:

TRUE NAME: GUITART Campizano, Agustin, Dr.

201: 727418

VARIATIONS:

S.O.#:

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

PROJECT: JMATE

DATE OF BIRTH: 25 April 1910

PLACE OF BIRTH: Cardenas, Cuba

CASE OFFICER: Carl Trettin

DIVISION: SAS/OS

EXTENSION: 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.		SASKIS	8 Jul 63	Records on Former German Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 19 June 1963 Results: NR 19 Nov 63
O.A.				Nephew of 201-727417
C.N.C.				
OTHER APPROVALS				
PRO I	bio.			
PRO II				
138893 GREEN LIST	NPR	pie	26 June 63	
RI TRACES	NDI			
OPS & DIV. TRACES	NDI			
FIELD TRACES	Not Init: Subject residing in New Orleans			
S.O. INDICES	*	Coleman psc	27 June 63	* Subject of [illegible] to OO/E. Coordination must be effected. No other informat. in S.O. Files.
FBI INDICES	NIC - see memo			
ORAL NOTICE S.O. INVESTIGATION				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION				
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE: ~~13 Jan 1964~~ jo

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, SAS/OS

ATTENTION: Carl Trettin

C# 201-727418

The file on GUITART Campuzano, Agustin, Dr. is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 8.62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 10 JAN 1964	CASE NO. 201- 727418
	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES
	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
	DATE		
	SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY
	COVERT NAME CHECK		AREA

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR ___ DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR ___ DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
X	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE, ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER
	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
X	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

13 JAN 1964

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

/s/ Edward P. Brown

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS/OS - C. Trettin

NUMBER
201 - 727418

SUBJECT
GUITART Campuzano, Agustin

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
18 June 1963 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 JUL 1963

SECRET

DATE: 3 July 1 63 crm

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C#
SO#
201 - 727418

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

FBI from Jane Roman

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 8 JUL 1963	CASE NO. 727418

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET

JUN 26 1963

P.O.A.

18 June 1963

Operation Stateside No. 30

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Notification to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of CIA's Intent to Contact the Subject

Name : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

Based upon data submitted no identifiable information pertinent to your inquiry located FBI files. This is the result of a request for an FBI file check only ~~and is not to be considered as a clearance.~~

(T27418)

Jul 2 2 25 PM '63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

TO SAS/OS	ATTENTION Carl Trettin	ROOM 0 G 19	BLDG.
SUBJECT GUITART Campuzano, Agustin (Dr.)	CI/OA NUMBER C-201-727418	CCS FILE NO. 5-16 G	CCS CASE OFFICER Richard J. Bilad

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Staff to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Staff/Non-Official Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

JUN 3 10 41 AM '63

✓	COPY TO CI/OA	DATE 26 JUN 1963	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CCS/NC Thomas K Strange

FORM 12-62 1678 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. CCS CONCURRENCE SECRET (8)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 20 June 1963 cra
TO: SAS/OS - C. Trettin	C NO. 201 - 727415
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: GUITART Carrizano, Agustin DC

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please coordinate with FBI.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

[illegible]

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE 19 June 1963 jaw

PROJECT JMATE

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 201-727418

NO.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST ☒ POA ☐ CA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY
26 June 1963

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
SAS/OS New Orleans, La.

5. USE OF SUBJECT
cut-out in FI operation.

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	☒	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		☒
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	☒	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		☒

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES
NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES
NDI

9. FIELD TRACES
Not Init: Subject residing in New Orleans

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P. O. A.
C/CA [illegible]
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 19 JUN 1963	CASE NO. 727418

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☑	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE 26 June 63	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA	☐ SP INQUIRY	☐ GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:	

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Area - ~~New Orleans~~ New Orleans, La.

use - cut-out in FI operation

To SAS:

Please coordinate with FBI

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 18 Jun 63

TO:
- ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
SAS/IOS
G G 14

SUBJECT: (True name) Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano AK

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 727418

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: New Orleans, La.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI Asset - for use as cut-out to his uncle, Rene GUITART Rodriguez, (201-727417) who is residing in Cuba.

NOTE: OO/C has contacted Subject, but has no current interest.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 138893

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
X	NOT INITIATED (Explanation) Subject residing in New Orleans		

Jun 19 8 59 AM '63

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Carl Trettin | EXTENSION: 7646 | [illegible] 1123 [illegible]

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1-62

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

prq part I

NAME : Dr. Agustin GUITART Campuzano

DPOB : 25 April 1910, Cardenas, Cuba

RESIDENCE : 4009 Elba St., New Orleans 25, La.

OCCUPATION : Doctor of Science (Mathematics & Physics)

Presently teaching at Xavier University in New Orleans.

EMPLOYMENT HIST. : Formerly a Prof. at the Univ. of Havana

Served as Minister of Education during the early part of Carlos PRIO's tenure as head of the Cuban Gov't.

COURT RECORD : Was imprisoned on the Isle of Pines during MACHADO's term. (date unknown)

SPOUSE : Helena TORO

CHILDREN : Agustin, Jorge, Vilma Helena, William

CUBAN ADDRESS : Havana, Calle 64 No. 1502

NOTE : Subject arrived in the U.S.A. in Feb. 1962 thru Opa Locka, Fla. where he was debriefed by 00/C.

00/C has no current interest in Subject.

SECRET

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF [illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [illegible] 44:[illegible]
Vol. II
201-128561

INCLUSIVE DATES: Jan 57 - Dec 55

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/1/78	3/1/78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf
15 MAY	—	JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

LE

Vol II

14-00000

PERIN Maurice Hyman 201-128561

FBI +
misc other
3rd Agency Docs

SECRET

DCE-17437

Chief CI/SRS

22 September 1955

S. H. Johnson

James A. PERRY
#90178

James A. PERRY, Jr., mailed two letters from Washington, D. C., on 29 June 1955, one to his father, and another to Severino D. GOMEZ; however, in so doing, PERRY placed the letter to his father in the envelope addressed to GOMEZ, and the letter to GOMEZ in the envelope addressed to his father. When the letters were received by PERRY, Sr. and GOMEZ, both noting the error, they exchanged letters. However, GOMEZ considered the contents of the letter he had at first received important enough to turn over to his brother M. Leal GOMEZ, who in turn referred it to the Boston Office of the FBI.

The letter, in substance, indicated that while PERRY was serving in South America, under cover for this Agency, he had revealed his true status to his wife's father, Mr. GONSALVES, on a visit to South America, and who later had revealed this information to PERRY's father. In correspondence following PERRY's father having become knowledgeable of PERRY's true status, he indicates that therein he might have intimated that his work was not so hush-hush, and that on that basis PERRY's father "had dropped his guard" in effect, and had told others of PERRY's true status. This letter was a warning to PERRY's father that he should attempt to correct the indiscretion of revealing PERRY's status while he was in South America. The letter refers to other letters which PERRY indicates contained information revealed through indiscretion on his part, and which he asks his father to destroy.

According to our records, PERRY was granted an Operational Clearance on 22 May 1953, for use as a witting informant or as a contract agent on anti-Communist student activities. He was used as a contract agent from September 1953 to February 1955 in Brazil under IIS cover.

He is of Portuguese extraction, and he or his father had changed the family name from [illegible]A to PERRY; his wife's maiden name was GONSALVES. She was [illegible] married prior to attendance at Northwestern University.

He attended Northeastern University from 1947 to 1951 and received an AB Degree; Boston University from 1951 to 1952 where he received an MA Degree in Latin American Regional Studies; and at Vanderbilt University from 1952 to 1953 working toward a Ph.D. Degree.

[illegible] Boston University [illegible] under Professor Maurice [illegible]. The [illegible] described by most informants as no more than professor-student relationship, however Severino GOMEZ who received

SECRET file in 201-138567

the letter intended for PERRY's father, advised the FBI that he, GOMEZ, had attended Boston University during the period PERRY was studying under HALPERIN. GOMEZ was of the opinion that the HALPERIN-PERRY relationship was more than just the professor-student type because PERRY saw HALPERIN during the evenings, but never told GOMEZ what he discussed with HALPERIN.

GOMEZ also advised that about June 1953, just before PERRY's departure for Rio de Janeiro, PERRY called HALPERIN on the telephone and at that time HALPERIN was under investigation. PERRY told GOMEZ that HALPERIN was in a predicament, and that he, PERRY, felt sorry for him. Earlier PERRY had told GOMEZ that HALPERIN had a lot of influence in Washington, and was going to get a job for PERRY.

201-125561

According to the FBI, the HALPERIN mentioned above, appears to be identical with Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, former employee of OSS, who was identified in November 1945 by Elizabeth BENTLEY as having furnished information for transmittal to the Soviets.

PERRY recently contacted this Agency requesting permission to state that he had worked for the Agency in his application for employment with USIA. WH Division, to whom this request was forwarded, was advised that PERRY was not to disclose his past employment with this Agency. WH Division, in turn, informed Security of their desires that USIA be informed of PERRY's past connections with this Agency.

Security, on the basis of the above request by WH Division, contacted the appropriate person in USIA and advised them on a controlled basis of PERRY's former affiliation with this Agency.

S. H. Johnson

SRS/SHJ:pml

201-125561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
American Communists in Mexico and Their Contacts	RI FILE NO. 50 / 6 / 120 / 30
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMM-1300 — DATE 31 Oct 55
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM — DATE OF INFO. — EVALUATION B-Doc
ANALYST D Heron — DATE PROCESSED 13 Sept 57	DISSEMINATED IN — DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Report from Mexico City, Mexico
Source: LIFEAT/LITHOSPHERE
Date of Info: 12 Sept - 21 Oct 55

VERBATIM:

The following information concerning American Communists in Mexico and their contacts has been developed.

1. On 12 September a meeting was held of stockholders in the ice cream business which functions under the management of the American Communist, Robert STRAND. This business is believed actually to be owned by the leading American Communist, Frederick Vanderbilt FIELD. The meeting was held at the home of STRAND, and was attended by the American Communists Maurice HALPERIN and Noah SEBORER and possibly by other stockholders.

....

31 Oct 55

201-128561

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔	201	185053		

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 56

SECRET

559

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

EXT : 2356
DATE : 19 July 1955

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

6 Foreign Communists - Mexico

CONF : CI

INFO : COP, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, WH 4, S/C 2

DIR 14470 (OUT 57183) 1800Z 19 JUL 55 ROUTINE

Subj Personalities connected with Trotsky

TO: MEXI CITE: DIR

HOLD FOR IDEN D DIR 14150 (OUT 56504)

JAMES LEIGH WHITE BORN 1914 VERMONT NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT AND AUTHOR SINCE 1939, IN MEXICO CITY JUNE-AUGUST 1941. WIFE MARIA CRUZ CARROCERA WHITE BORN 1911 SPAIN; SYLVIA AGELOFF, MISTRESS OF JACQUES MORNARD AND REPORTEDLY IN MEXICO CITY AT TIME TROTSKY MURDER; SISTERS HILDA AND RUBY; CONSTANCIA DE LA MORA ALLEGEDLY KILLED IN GUATEMALA; FERNANDO DE LOS RIOS BORN SPAIN 1897, SPANISH REPUBLICAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. 1937-39, REPORTED RECENT YEARS REPRESENTATIVE SPANISH JUNTA OF LIBERATION MEXICO CITY; J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO BORN SPAIN 1891 WAS ACTIVE SPANISH REFUGEE ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK, SON JUAN IN LONDON WWII; JULIAN GORKIN PROMINENT TROTSKYITE IN U.S. AND SPAIN IN '40S. WRITER CLOSE TO TROTSKY PRIOR TO MURDER; NANCY JOHNSTONE REPORTED KEY CP OFFICIAL IN MEXICO

19 Jul 55

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

201-128561

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

ROUTING

UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM :

CONF :

INFO :

DIR 13470 (OUT 57188) 19 JUL 55 PAGE 2

1943 AND OPERATED HOTEL MEXICO CITY WITH HUSBAND ARCHIE JOHNSTONE WHO WAS FORMERLY WITH LONDON NEW CHRONICLE AND SAID TO BE IN RUSSIA AT PRESENT; MAXIM LEIBER ALIAS LIEBERMAN BORN 1897 WARSAW REPORTED LIVING CUERNAVACA, MEXICO IN 1951 WITH ALBERT MALTZ FORMERLY OF HOLLYWOOD, ACCUSED BY CHAMBERS OF SETTING UP SOVIET COVER COMPANY IN 1934, HAS HAD CONNECTIONS WITH ANNA SEGHERS AND BODO UHSE, FRANK JELLINEK AND HANS HOFFMAN WHO WAS REPORTEDLY TREATING LEIBER 1953 FOR PSYCHIATRIC DISTURBANCE. WIFE MINNA REPORTED TEACHING AMERICAN SCHOOL MEXICO CITY 1953, REPORTED IN CONTACT WITH MAURICE HALPERIN. WAS RECIPIENT [illegible] FROM POLISH BANK WARSAW 1953; VITTORIO VIDALI ALIAS CARLOS CONTRERAS HEAD OF CP TRIESTE. INTERMITTENTLY IN U.S. AND MEXICO DURING 1940'S. SUSPECTED DIRECTED MURDER TROTSKY; ROCHELLE MARIA [illegible] VILIACUD (OR aka ILLIACUD) ALLEGEDLY ONE OF CORRESPONDING SECRETARIES OF JUAN NEGRIN 1937-39. REPORTEDLY IN LONDON 1945

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DIR 14470 (OUT 57183) 19 JUL 55 PAGE 3

AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN MEXICO. RELATIVES INCLUDE (1) ATAIME VILLACID, (2) QUIN. VILLACID MARRIED TO FORMER SPANISH REPUBLICAN DIPLOMAT JOSE GARRACO; (3) PEPE VILLACID WHO XXX WAS REPORTED IN MEXICO CITY 1943; FRANK JELLINEK CORESPONDENT OVERSEAS NEWS AGENCY 1943 IN MEXICO.

(END OF MESSAGE)

DATE

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CHIEF, CI
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ORIG : [illegible]
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DATE : 24 November 1954

TO : [illegible]

FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA

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TO: [illegible] CITE DIR

RE: [illegible] 5755 (IN 23635)

[illegible]

1. [illegible] NO OTHER RECORDS [illegible] INTO [illegible] OF [illegible]. ONE [illegible] FBI APPEARED [illegible] CASE CANADA. VOLUMINOUS INFO [illegible] THROUGH [illegible] UPON THE ALLEGED RUSSIAN MILITARY ESPIONAGE CASE CANADA 1946. [illegible] [illegible] WHICH [illegible] FBI [illegible]. [illegible] CANADIAN told Smith [illegible] SCHOLARSHIP [illegible] HAVE BEEN [illegible]. [illegible] HE NO LONGER [illegible] STUDENT [illegible].

2. ALSO A [illegible] (US CITIZEN) [illegible] AS SOVIET AGENT.

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201-125564

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Noah SEBORER and Family	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO. 201 66549
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMM-1117
	DATE 6 June 1955
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITHOSPHERE
	DATE OF INFO.
	EVALUATION B-Doc
ANALYST D Heron	DISSEMINATED IN
DATE PROCESSED 9 Sept 57	DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

Report from Mexico City, Mexico
Date of Info: 12 Feb - 12 May 55

VERBATIM:

....

II. Contacts

Set out below is a listing of contacts known to have been made by Noah and Anne SEBORER during the period covered in this report:

....

Maurice HALPERIN was dismissed from Boston University because of refusal to answer questions before a Congressional Committee. With him in Mexico are his son, David, his wife Edith and, at least during part of April, his or his wife's father. Noah SEBORER supplied Yiddish newspapers for the father to read. The HALPERINS dined at the SEBORERS 14 May 1955. HALPERIN is believed to be engaged in the trucking transportation business in connection with the firm E.A. OJeda at Isabel la Catolica 38-610.

....

6 June 55
201-128561

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~201 185057~~

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 56
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN
201-128561
VOL. VI

INCLUSIVE DATES:

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23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

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THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS - 201-128561 (HALPERIN)

		Document Date
Vol. VI	FBI, New York Report on Jane Constance Kroll Rogers NY File #100-112730	8/3/55
	FBI, Boston Report on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN Bureau file #65-14303; BS 100-25501	17/3/59
	FBI, Washington Report on Halperin; File #65-14303	14/12/59
	FBI, Boston Report on Benjamin FASTOV; No file #	2/8/60
	FBI Report on David C. HALPERIN; No file #	6/2/60
	FBI Report on Halperin File #65-14303	7/8/60
	FBI report on Halperin	8/24/60
	FBI report on Halperin Boston #100-25501; &65-14303	2/8/61
	STATE, Amembassy Moscow Despatch #770, May 12, 1961 re Citizenship & Passports: Maurice HALPERIN	
	STATE, Amembassy Moscow Despatch #779, May 17, 1961	
	STATE Telegram fm Moscow (#12395, Aug 17, 1961	
	STATE Air	

To Microfilm
2 Mar 70

MEXI - 7055, 7 Jan 61	201-128561
DIR-18890, 30 Dec 60	201-128561

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERN, MAURICE
201-128561
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Δ USSR
RE NOV 25, 61 LETTER TO SUBJ FROM ALBERT MALTZ WITH COMMENTS ON SUBJS WORK IN USSR AND APPREHENSION RE THE MCCARRAN ACT DEC 61.

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15 Dec 61

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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3. WH/3/M Burton				
4. Grunwell				
5. O'Hara			23 Oct	PCH
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10. C/SIG		14-III-63		
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12. WH/3/M Burton				
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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT X	INDEX	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-128561 ✓ ~~50-4-3~~

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
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SECRET

	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
	SECRET	HMM-A-17988
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-4-3/5
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 20 October 1961
SUBJECT 0 Leftist Publication		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		

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Attached for your retention is a booklet published by the Universidad Obrera de Mexico (UOM - Workers' University of Mexico), which is controlled and operated by the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS - Popular Socialist Party), entitled Desarrollo Economico y Crisis en la America Latina (Economic Development and Crisis in Latin America). The booklet is written by Maurice Halperin, American Communist living in Moscow, and has an introduction by Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, secretary-general of the PPS.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment - 1, as noted

18 October 1961

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MAURICE HALPERIN

DESARROLLO ECONOMICO
Y CRISIS EN LA
AMERICA LATINA

Ediciones de la Universidad Obrera de México
1961

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201-128541

20 Oct 61

3

Encl To HMMA 17988

Presentación

El autor de este estudio, el Profesor Maurice Halperin, es uno de los investigadores y catedráticos más prominentes de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Nació en Boston en 1906. Obtuvo su bachillerato en la Universidad de Harvard en 1926 y la Licenciatura en Letras en la Universidad de Oklahoma en 1929. Dos años más tarde se doctoró en Letras y Ciencias Sociales en la Universidad de Paris y fue conferenciante en la Sorbona sobre la civilización de la América del Norte.

En los Estados Unidos fue catedrático de la Universidad de Oklahoma y Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Económicos y Geopolíticos Latinoamericanos en la Secretaría de Guerra y en la Secretaría de Estado en Washington, durante los años de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Como consejero técnico del Consejo Económico y Social de las Naciones Unidas trabajó durante tres años, de 1946 a 1949. Volvió a su Universidad de origen, la de Boston, como catedrático y Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Latinoamericanos en donde prestó sus servicios hasta 1953.

Interesado siempre en el estudio de los problemas de las naciones de la América Latina, fue a Brasil en 1952 y trabajó como conferenciante en la Universidad de San Pablo. Por su labor docente el gobierno del Brasil le otorgó la condecoración de "Oficial de la Orden do Cruzeiro do Sul". Posteriormente estuvo en México, siendo Profesor Extraordinario de la Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la Universidad Nacional de México, de 1954 a 1957. Cooperó también como Asesor Económico del Departamento de Promoción de la Nacional Financiera y en otras instituciones gubernamentales y privadas de nuestro país.

Ha publicado numerosos estudios, entre otros el titulado "La América Latina en Transición", que editó la Universidad Nacional de México en 1956, así como ensayos acerca de la economía y el desarrollo social en los Estados Unidos Francia, Alemania, Chile, Brasil y México durante el último cuarto de siglo.

El Profesor Maurice Halperin actualmente es un Profesor Visitante en la Academia de Ciencias de la URSS en donde está dedicado a investigaciones de carácter económico.

El estudio que tiene este pequeño libro, no obstante su brevedad es uno de los más completos sobre el actual panorama económico de la América Latina. Tanto las cifras como las observaciones y las inferencias lógicas que contiene, son de un inapreciable valor para los estudios de los problemas de nuestro Continente. Por eso pienso que prestará un gran servicio a quienes se dedican al examen de los grandes problemas de nuestro tiempo en el vasto territorio de los países semicoloniales del Hemisferio Americano.

México, D. F., agosto de 1961

VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

Introducción

La América Latina está atravezando actualmente su tercera gran crisis económica del siglo XX. En general, las dificultades actuales pueden ser atribuidas a la excesiva vulnerabilidad hacia factores externos de una economía que depende de la exportación de materias primas y de la importación de productos manufacturados. En este sentido es la clásica crisis del subdesarrollo neocolonial, como sucedió con el colapso del comercio internacional durante la guerra mundial de 1914 a 1918 —primera crisis— y con la depresión mundial al comienzo de la dácada del 30 —segunda crisis.

La disminución actual de la actividad económica asumió, sin lugar a dudas, proporciones de crisis a principios de 1958. Aunque en algunos aspectos aún no ha alcanzado la intensidad de la segunda crisis, persiste con tendencia a profundizarse al entrar en su cuarto año. Al mismo tiempo, algunos aspectos de la crisis actual la distinguen de las anteriores, imprimiéndole un sello especial.

En primer lugar, si bien como las crisis anteriores fue motivada por factores externos, esta crisis ha sido más sensible a los descensos y menos a las alzas de los movimientos cíclicos de las economías de los países capitalistas industrializados. El descenso de los precios de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica precedió a la recesión de 1957-58 en los Estados Unidos, y ésta condujo, a su vez, a nuevas mermas en las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones de América Latina. Sin embargo, la tendencia al descenso continuó después de la recuperación de los Estados Unidos (antes de la nueva recesión comenzada a finales de 1960) y a pesar del alto nivel constante de la actividad económica en los principales países industriados de Europa Occidental.

En segundo lugar, hay muy pocas perspectivas de que los mercados normales de Latinoamérica puedan proporcionar en un futuro próximo suficientes ganancias por concepto de exportaciones como para restablecer la economía al nivel anterior. Como después de un exhaustivo análisis a largo alcance, declara la CEPAL (excluyendo el factor de una depresión mayor en los Estados Unidos o en Europa Occidental): "La perspectiva de aumento de las exportaciones... es tan pequeña que apenas excede el crecimiento demográfico probable".[1] Este estudio prevó un ritmo de desarrollo que en el mejor de los casos sería un poco más de la mitad del registrado antes de la presente crisis y produciría extraordinarias presiones sobre la posibilidad de estructurar la economía y sus mecanismos de desarrollo.

En tercer lugar, el debilitamiento general de los sistemas mundiales coloniales y neocoloniales, combinado con la expansión económica del sistema mundial socialista, presenta nuevas oportunidades para contrarrestar las presiones externas, políticas y económicas, que se ejercen sobre Latinoamérica para impedirle tomar medidas en defensa de sus economías nacionales. De particular importancia es la disponibilidad de mercados y recursos económicos en los países socialistas, los cuales pueden ser utilizados para lograr una efectiva solución de la crisis económica presente.

De aquí que mientras la primera y la segunda crisis económicas latinoamericanas crearon la necesidad y las condiciones para cambios económicos y político-sociales limitados dentro del sistema existente de dependencia neocolonial, la crisis presente parece estar desarrollándose bajo condiciones que requerirán y, al mismo tiempo, permitirán la eliminación de la propia dependencia en un período de tiempo relativamente corto. Los acontecimientos recientes en Cuba apoyan estas perspectivas y nosotros estimamos que los factores que causaron el rompimiento de Cuba con el sistema de dependencia neocolonial no constituyen una excepción. Esto puede demostrarse examinando los antecedentes de la presente crisis, por ejemplo, la actuación global de la economía latinoamericana en el pasado reciente.

1.— El "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana

Por más de una década después del fin de la segunda guerra mundial (en términos generales, de 1945 a 1957), la actividad económica de Latinoamérica en su conjunto mantuvo el mayor ritmo de expansión registrado en la región.

Para situar este período en su marco propio, deben formularse dos observaciones preliminares. La primera es que el nivel de partida del movimiento ascendente de la economía era relativamente elevado en la región y sustancialmente más alto que el nivel de desarrollo existente en las áreas dependientes de Asia y Africa. No solamente había tenido lugar una recuperación sustancial, después de la catástrofe de comienzos de la década del 30, sino que también en las repúblicas de Latinoamérica más desarrolladas y pobladas y con mayor capacidad productiva, se produjo un proceso considerable de sustitución de importaciones. Así, la industria de elaboración que antes de 1930 representaba una pequeña proporción en la producción global de Latinoamérica, alcanzó a fines de 1945 una equivalente al 65% de la contribución de la agricultura al producto bruto y fue, a su vez, considerablemente mayor que la contribución de la industria minera.

El segundo punto, que debe ser señalado, es que durante el período que consideramos prevalecieron condiciones externas excepcionalmente favorables. El impulso inicial para la expansión económica fue la acumulación de divisas registrada en Latinoamérica durante la segunda guerra mundial.[2] Sin embargo, el auge económico fue estimulado principalmente por los gastos de reconstrucción, rearme y satisfacción de demandas pospuestas en los principales países capitalistas al final de la guerra. Los medios externos mediante los cuales Latinoamérica hubiera podido mantener su ritmo de expansión, se restringieron fuertemente al terminar los reajustes de postguerra y, a partir de ese momento, comenzó a manifestarse la crisis actual.

Desde este punto de vista, es particularmente interesante la evaluación de la experiencia económica de este período. Dado el nivel relativamente elevado existente al inicio del mismo y las oportunidades excepcionales de que se dispusieron, el desarrollo alcanzado puede representar algo así como el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana, funcionando de manera tradicional. Por tanto, la cuantía en que ese "florecimiento" de la economía dejó de satisfacer las necesidades de desarrollo de la región, nos permitirá estimar las dimensiones reales de la crisis actual.

De acuerdo con los datos recopilados por la CEPAL (ver el cuadro que sigue), el promedio acumulativo anual real de aumento del producto bruto de la región, fué de un 5% para el período de 12 años. Si excluimos los años de 1956 y 1957, durante los cuales la expansión de postguerra comenzó a ser menor, el índice fue de 5.2%. Para nuestros propósitos la diferencia no es importante: incluso el índice menor alcanza o excede los de un cierto número de países industrializados en Europa Occidental y ciertamente excede el de los Estados Unidos para el mismo período.

LATINOAMERICA: El producto bruto y otros datos, 1945-57 [3]

(miles de millones de dólares de 1950)
Cifras redondas.

Año	Producto Bruto	Consumo	Inversión fija bruta	Exportaciones bienes y servicios	Importaciones bienes y servicios	Población (millones)
1945	30.2	23.2	4.0	6.7	3.6	138.5
1946	32.8	25.1	5.0	7.4	4.8	141.6
1947	34.4	27.5	6.8	7.2	7.1	144.9
1948	36.4	28.7	6.8	7.5	6.6	148.2
1949	37.6	30.1	6.4	6.9	5.9	151.8
1950	39.8	32.1	6.6	7.2	6.1	155.4
1951	42.1	35.1	7.4	7.1	7.5	159.2
1952	43.0	35.5	7.6	6.7	7.0	163.0
1953	44.7	36.1	7.6	7.8	6.9	166.9
1954	47.3	39.1	8.2	7.7	7.8	170.9
1955	50.0	41.0	8.6	8.4	8.0	175.1
1956	51.4	41.4	9.1	9.2	8.2	179.4
1957	53.8	43.8	10.3	9.3	9.6	183.8

Es cierto que por haber aumentado la población de Latinoamérica a un promedio anual de 2.5%, el índice del aumento anual del producto bruto per capita fue de solamente 2.7% para la "década dorada" y de 2.5% para el período de doce años. Sin embargo, aún esta últims cifra es mayor que el histórico 2% de aumento anual del producto bruto per cápita en los Estados Unidos, aunque es a su vez varias veces menor que el de los países socialistas. [4]

Es más importante el hecho de que el 2.5% represente probablemente más del doble del promedio anual "histórico" de desarrolo en Latinoamérica. Aunque no existen datos suficientes para establecer esta última afirmación en cuanto al conjunto de la región, puede suponerse que de 1900 a 1929 ningún país de América Latina superó el ritmo de desarrollo de Argentina, pues se estimó, como promedio, en un 1.2% per cápita anual. [5] En el caso de México, por ejemplo, se cree que entre 1803 y 1934 no se registró prácticamente ningún incremento en los ingresos per cápita. [6]

De lo antes expuesto puede inferirse la conclusión de que para el conjunto de la región el período que estamos examinado fue un período de incremento poco corriente de la actividad económica, o, más precisamente, de un aumento poco habitual del PBN, concepto que, de acuerdo con los usos oficiales en Latinoamérica y en las Naciones Unidas, incluye la producción de bienes y la de servicios, cuyo ritmo de aumento es comúnmente definido como desarrollo. [7] Más adelante examinaremos hasta qué punto se puede confiar en este concepto para medir el desarrollo económico en Latinoamérica. Por el momento consideraremos los factores externos que estimularon durante este período la elevada producción de bienes y de servicios en esta región.

2.– Los estímulos externos en la expansión económica de Latinoamérica

El comercio exterior ha ejercido siempre una influencia predominante sobre las fluctuaciones cíclicas de la economía latinoamericana. Así en 1932, en el climax de la gran depresión, las exportaciones de la región disminuyeron en un 65% en relación con 1929, mientras las importacinoes disminuyeron en un 75%.[8] No obstante, una comparación entre el nivel del comercio exterior en este año de crisis y el período que estamos analizando, mostraría una cuadro deformado de su importancia en la expansión económica de 1945-57. De ahí que los datos de 1934-38, cuando se había producido un grado de recuperación aceptable, nos darán una base mejor para establecer comparaciones. Durante este último período el promedio anual de exportaciones e importaciones en conjunto llegaron a 3,500 millones de dólares, cifras redondas, o 5,250 millones en dólares de 1950.[9]

Si consideramos nuestra tabla estadística, podemos ver que hacia 1947, cuando la tendencia a la expansión del comercio exterior en el período de la postguerra ya se habia desarrollado completamente, el total de las exportaciones y de las importaciones llegó a poco más de 14,000 millones de dólares de 1950, o sea, un aumento de más del 170% sobre el promedio anual de 1934-38. Además, de 1945 a 1955, el poder adquisitivo de las exportaciones latinoamericanas aumentó en un promedio anual de 5.4%, o sea ligeramente más que el ritmo de crecimiento del producto bruto de la región.[10] Es evidente que habían llegado mejores tiempos para Latinoamérica.

Es necesario un análisis posterior sin embargo, para determinar el papel desempeñado por el comercio exterior en la experiencia económica de la región después de la segunda guerra mundial. Si retornamos al período relativamente preindustrial anterior a la gran depresión de 1925-29, nos encontramos con que el coeficiente de importaciones, es decir, el valor de las importaciones en tantos por ciento del producto bruto nacional, se mantuvo en un 30.2%. En el período correspondiente de 4 años en la década siguiente, cuando el comercio exterior de Latinoamérica había vencido los efectos de la depresión, el coeficiente de importaciones no alcanzó su nivel anterior y se mantuvo en un 16.6%. Esta nueva relación, mejor incluso desde el punto de vista del desarrollo económico, entre el PBN y el comercio exterior, reflejaba el progreso alcanzado en la producción local de bienes de consumo, especialmente en los países más avanzados como Argentina, Brasil, México y Chile.

Cuando durante la segunda guerra mundial las importaciones fueron de nuevo drásticamente reducidas, se registró un impetu adicional para la expansión de la industria ligera. Como consecuencia, al comenzar el período de la postguerra la estructura de la economía era tal, que a pesar de la extraordinaria mejoría del comercio exterior, en comparación con el período de recuperación posterior a la depresión de 1930, la relación entre el PBN y las importaciones no volvió al nivel de 1925-29. En su lugar, como indican las cifras de nuestra tabla estadística, las importaciones fluctuaron alrededor del 16% del PBN, manteniéndose, por tanto, al mismo nivel relativo de 1934-39.

A primera vista ésto pudiera indicar una disminución de la importancia del comercio exterior en la provisión de los medios para la reciente expansión de la actividad económica en la América Latina. No obstante, un examen más detenido nos demuestra que lo cierto es justamente lo opuesto. La evidencia más palpable se advierte en la adquisición de maquinaria y equipos capaces de producir una expansión en las exportaciones de materias primas, así como de aumentar la producción de la industria de elaboración. En este sector de inversiones, obviamente estratégico, que representa aproximadamente el 25% de las inversiones totales, la producción local suministró menos del 10% de los productos obtenidos. El resto fue comprado en el extranjero y representó cerca del 33% del valor total de las importaciones.

Asi es claro que el cambio en la estructura de las importaciones de Latinoamérica devino un factor nuevo y crucial tendiente a perpetuar su dependencia del comercio exterior. Antes de 1914, por ejemplo, los textiles solamente constituían más de la mitad de las importaciones.[11] Durante los años 30, aunque se produjo un aumento notable en la proporción de bienes duraderos y de capital, la mayoría de los bienes importados eran todavía bienes de consumo y materiales de construcción. Sin embargo, después de 1945 el balance cambió definitivamente. Si a la maquinaria y a los equipos añadimos productos semielaborados y materias primas industriales, como varios tipos de acero, productos químicos, caucho, etc., y combustibles, nos encontramos con que para 1955, cerca de las dos terceras partes de las importaciones totales de la región, consistieron en medios de producción y suministros para los mismos.[12] En resumen, las exportaciones de Latinoamérica, que básicamente determinan su capacidad para importar, fueran indudablemente el elemento decisivo para momover la expansión económica de 1945 a 1957.[13]

El carácter único de la situación externa favorable que influyó en la actividad económica de este período, requiere algunos comentarios adicionales para ser bien comprendido. El gran aumento de la capacidad de importación de Latinoamérica no se debió solamente a la demanda excepcional de postguerra de que disfrutaron sus exportaciones, sino también a otro factor relacionado con ello, aunque menos corriente.

En común con todas las otras regiones dependientes, el comercio internacional de Latinoamérica ha sido adversamente afectado por la tendencia histórica hacia una creciente diferencia entre el pequeño aumento de precio de sus exportaciones de materias primas y el aumento mayor de los precios de los productos elaborados que importa. Como resultado, con fluctuaciones considerables de año en año y de un país a otro, dependiendo de los productos de exportación y de la fluctuación de la estructura de las importaciones, para la región en conjunto, a largo plazo, las condiciones del comercio exterior se han ido deteriorando.[14]

Sin embargo, un extraordinario cambio de esta tendencia tuvo lugar para el conjunto de la región y en todas las repúblicas consideradas por separado, menos Cuba y Argentina, en la década siguiente a la segunda guerra mundial. En ocho de las repúblicas, incluyendo Brasil, Colombia y Chile, los términos del comercio exterior durante los perídos de 1947-1949 y 1954-56, mejoraron de un 45% a un 100%.[15] Como resultado, más de la mitad del aumento del poder adquisitivo de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica se debió a los efectos de las mejores condiciones del comercio exterior y el resto correspondió a un aumento en el volumen de las exportaciones.[16]

Saldría de los límites de esta discusión examinar en detalle las fluctuaciones y la complejidad de los factores que afectaron la evolución de los precios de las exportaciones y de las importaciones principales de la región. En el caso del café, por ejemplo, que para más de la tercera parte de las repúblicas es uno de los principales productos de exportación, una aguda, aunque pasajera disminución en la producción brasileña causada por condiciones atmosféricas adversas, elevó los precios y estimuló una serie de compras especulativas. Con respecto a las importaciones, la tendencia hacia la sustitución de bienes de consumo por bienes de capital jugó un papel importante, ya que los precios de estos últimos tendieron a aumentar más lentamente que los precios de los bienes de consumo.[17] Además, los precios de los productos elaborados de Europa Occidental tendieron a declinar durante cierto período debido a la devaluación de la libra esterlina y otras divisas y en algunos países tuvo lugar cierto cambio hacia fuentes de abastecimiento europeas.

No obstante, el factor principal en la mejoría de los términos del intercambio fue el aumento de precio de las exportaciones de Latinoamérica, motivado por la demanda extraordinaria causada por la situación de la postguerra a la cual nos hemos referido. De manera que fueron circunstancias especiales, en lugar de fuerzas económicas básicas, las que produjeron la variación en los términos del comercio y el mantenimiento de la tendencia durante un período tan largo. Cuando estas circunstancias desaparecieron, la tendencia histórica a la decadencia volvió a manifestarse[18] y llegó a su fin este período de "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía. En 1958 el aumento per cápita del PBN fue solamente de 0.5%, descendiendo a 0.3% y en 1959 y a un nivel probablemente aún más bajo en 1960.[19]

3.— Otras consideraciones acerca del tema principal

Examinando ahora la actividad económica propiamente dicha, recordemos que para Latinoamérica, en conjunto, el promedio anual de aumento del PBN per cápita, fue de 2.7% para la década posterior a la guerra y de 2.5% para los 12 años. Considerando las repúblicas por separado, la gran mayoría compartió esta expansión en un grado mayor o menor y relativamente se registraron pocas variaciones en los niveles comparativos de sus respectivos PBN per cápita, sin embargo debe examinarse la tendencia en algunos de los países más importantes.

El ritmo de desarrollo de México, aunque aminoró después de 1950, fue aproximadamente el mismo que el del conjunto de la región durante el período de 12 años. En 1957 el PBN per cápita de México alcanzó 280 dólares, siendo todavía menor que el nivel de 335 dólares registrado en ese año para el conjunto de la región.[10]

La marcha de la economía brasileña fue notablemente mejor que el promedio, con un incremento anual per cápita de cerca de 3.5%. Como resultado, durante los 12 años, el PBN per cápita relativamente bajo del Brasil mejoró suficientemente llegando a ser en 1957 aproximadamente igual al de México. El fenómeno brasileño refleja en parte la situación especiamente favorable de los países exportadores de café. Así, el aumento del per cápita de los países productores de café de Centroamérica y de Colombia fue mayor que el promedio de Latinoamérica. Esta última República, por ejemplo, registró un incremento anual per cápita de cerca del 3% entre 1945 y 1957.

En el caso de Argentina, se notó una desviación considerable del ritmo medio de desarrollo regional. Aunque de 1945 a 1948 se registró un extraordinario incremento anual per cápita de 6.4%, para el periodo de 12 años, el aumento promedio per cápita fue solamente de 1% anual. Un factor significativo de la decadencia posterior a 1948 fue la situación desfavorable de las exportaciones argentinas de carnes y granos. Como resultado se produjo un continuo empeoramiento en los términos del comercio exterior, tendencia excepcional en la América Latina, compartida solamente por Cuba como indicamos anteriormente. Sin embargo, con un PBN per cápita de 525 dólares en 1957, el nivel argentino se mantuvo muy superior al promedio latinoamericano y solamente detrás de Venezuela, país del que trataremos posteriormente[11].

La desviación chilena de la norma regional fue aún mayor que la argentina. De 1945 a 1955 el PBN prácticamente se mantuvo, mientras que en los años siguientes disminuyó alrededor de un 8%. En realidad, a partir de 1953 el ritmo de desarrollo no logró mantenerse al nivel del aumento de población. Así el PBN per cápita chileno que en 1945 era bastante más elevado que el promedio latinoamericano, disminuyó a menos de 300 dólares en 1957.

La experiencia chilena también es excepcional desde otro punto de vista. La economía del país se mantuvo estancada, aunque disfrutó de una mejoría sustancial en las condiciones del comercio exterior. Este fenómeno refleja en parte el fracaso de las ganancias posteriores a la segunda guerra al no lograr recuperar lo perdido después de la debacle del cobre en la depresión del 30, pero más aún refleja la disipación improductiva de los recursos adquiridos durante el período de bonanza posterior a la guerra[11].

Finalmente, Cuba, duramente afectada por la caída del precio del azúcar después de la guerra de Corea y a pesar del alza de 1956-57, tampoco logró elevar su PBN per cápita durante el periodo de doce años. El PBN per cápita de Cuba, que era de 485 dólares en 1957, se mantuvo considerablemente más elevado que el promedio de Latinoamérica.

De aquí que el desarrollo extremadamente lento de la Argentina y el estancamiento de Chile y Cuba(que juntas constituyen aproximadamente el 17% de la población de América Latina) representan tendencias no comunes y, por consiguiente, su situación excepcional debe ser tenida en cuenta[11]. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista global, el caso de estos países no invalida el significado, cualquiera que este sea, que pueda ser atribuido a los cálculos oficiales del desarrollo de Latinoamérica en conjunto.

4.— Perspectivas de aumento aparente del PBN

Ha llegado el momento de preguntarnos, ¿cuál es el significado de los cálculos oficiales mencionados anteriormente? ¿Qué desarrollo y que tipo de desarrollo fue el alcanzado durante este histórico "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía de Latinoamérica? Comenzaremos aceptando en su valor nominal la cifra de 2.5% como promedio anual de incremento per cápita del PBN de la región. Como ya vimos, el PBN alcanzó en 1957 su cifra más alta de todos los tiempos: 335 dólares. Si Latinoamérica pudiera recuperarse y mantener ininterrumpidamente su ritmo de desarrollo de 1945 a 1957, a partir del momento en que se produjera esta recuperación, tardaría alrededor de 55 años para alcanzar el PBN per cápita de Francia o Inglaterra en 1957 que fue de 1300 dólares. Alcanzar el PBN per cápita de los Estados Unidos en 1957, que era de 2600 dólares, demandaría cerca de 85 años.

Si consideramos las posibilidades hipotéticas de algunas de las repúblicas latinoamericanas por separado, el pronóstico no sería más alentador. Aunque Brasil, con su ritmo de desarrollo de 3.5% per cápita, estaría en condiciones más ventajosas que la mayoría de las otras repúblicas, desde el momento en que su economía se recuperara, le exigiría 45 y 65 años para alcanzar los niveles de 1957 antes mencionados. Argentina, con su ritmo de desarrollo menor que el promedio y a pesar de su base más alta, tardaría 90 años en alcanzar los niveles de 1957 de Francia o Inglaterra y 160 el de los Estados Unidos. Para alrededor de la mitad de las repúblicas, con un PBN per cápita inferior a 200 dólares y con un ritmo de desarrollo de 2.5% anual, el promedio sería de 80 y 110 años respectivamente.

Pero en este "alcanzar" a los países desarrollados debe considerarse otro aspecto. Mientras en 1940 el PBN per cápita de Latinoamérica era un sexto del norteamericano, en 1957 la proporción había descendido a un octavo. En el caso de Argentina, de la mitad descendió aproximadamente a un quinto del nivel de los Estados Unidos.

Así, desde el punto de vista de la satisfacción de las necesidades de desarrollo de Latinoamérica, al parecer la aceleración de la actividad económica del conjunto de la región alcanzada durante el período de 1945-57, deja algo que desear. Aun si el ritmo de desarrollo de este período pudiera ser revivido —lo que es el objetivo máximo propuesto por los economistas de la CEPAL[14], para unos pueblos donde las vastas mayorías no pueden satisfacer las necesidades mínimas de alimentación, vestido y alojamiento, sin hablar ya de las necesidades fundamentales de la vida civilizada, las pespectivas hipotéticas, sumamente difíciles de aceptar con ecuanimidad, aún en el más favorable de los casos, son de aplazar por medio siglo el logro del nivel de vida correspondiente a un PBN que represente solamente la mitad del actual de los Estados Unidos.

Todo esto se refiere al valor nominal del desarrollo alcanzado durante ese período de doce años. No obstante, las conclusiones reales que deben hacerse de este "florecimiento óptimo" son aún más desalentadoras. La razón es que el dispositivo convencional utilizado para medir el funcionamiento de la economía de Latinoamérica, es extraordinariamente engañoso. Exagera grandemente el nivel comparativo de desarrollo frente a los países altamente industrializados y el desarrollo real alcanzado en términos puramente regionales. Consideraremos ahora los dos aspectos engañosos en ese mismo orden.

5.— Comparación del Producto Bruto Nacional

Muchos economistas dedicados al problema del subdesarrollo, admiten que una comparación de la magnitud de los PBN de un país atrasado y de un país industrializado, es un cómputo sumamente inexacto de los niveles relativos de sus respectivas economías. No obstante, raramente se toman el trabajo de examinar cuán inexacto es este sistema. Consecuentemente, dejan de apreciar la diferencia real que los separa, que es significativamente mayor de lo que las estadísticas sobre el PBN indican.

En 1955, por ejemplo, el PBN per cápita de los Estados Unidos era ocho veces mayor que el de Latinoamérica, pero el consumo de acero per cápita, un indice básico del nivel de desarrollo económico, era dieciséis veces mayor en los Estados Unidos[25]. Una diferencia similar se observa comparando a Latinoamérica con otros paises desarrollados: El PBN per cápita de Inglaterra era cuatro veces mayor, mientras el consumo per cápita de acero era nueve veces mayor. En Francia las proporciones eran de cuatro y siete, en Austria de dos y cinco[26]. Otros indices significativos del desarrollo económico —el consumo per cápita de energía y de cobre— coinciden más o menos con el consumo de acero[27].

Ciertos economistas que pasan por alto este aspecto prefieren otro modo de tratar la cuestión. Afirman que la conversión de las unidades monetarias de los países subdesarrollados en dólares, exagera la diferencia real entre los niveles de las economías atrasadas y las economías desarrolladas. "Las cifras de los ingresos per cápita [el producto] de los países pobres, cuando son expresadas en dólares resultan demasiado bajas; ésto ayuda a explicar cómo algunas personas subsisten con un ingreso per cápita de 50 dólares al año..."[28]. Es indudablemente cierto que los individuos con ingresos de 50 dólares al año pagan menos alquiler y la ropa y la comida les cuestan menos, pero la razón es que probablemente estas personas viven en una choza hecha por ellos mismos, en terreno ajeno, sin agua y servicios sanitarios, estén subalimentadas, anden descalzas y sus únicas ropas sean los harapos que cubren sus espaldas. Por lo tanto, es un hecho que "subsiste" durante un período relativamente corto, ya que su cálculo de vida sería menos de la mitad del promedio para el habitante de los Estados Unidos.

La comparación del PBN de Latinoamérica y de los países desarrollados, también es afectada materialmente por el factor de las inversiones extranjeras. Las estadísticas de Venezuela ilustran muy bien este punto. Como lo expresa W. W. Rostow, sin darle gran importancia: "Venezuela ha sido por algún tiempo una "economía enquistada", con un índice alto de inversiones concentrado en un sector de exportación moderno, cuyó crecimiento no ha generado ningún impulso en la economía venezolana"[29]. Examinemos esta situación más detenidamente.

De acuerdo con las estadísticas publicadas, en 1957 el sector de la minería, que en la práctica quiere decir extracción extranjera del petróleo, representaba el 34% del PBN venezolano. La proporción real probablemente es aún mayor, pero es difícil determinar cuánto de lo que figura en los capítulos de construcción, transporte, comunicaciones y "otros", es una parte de las operaciones petroleras. Una prueba adicional de la importancia del petróleo la ofrece el hecho de que la agricultura y la industria de elaboración representen el 7% y el 11% respectivamente, en el PBN venezolano[30]. Simultáneamente, las compañías petroleras emplean menos del 2% de la mano de obra activa del país".

Las estadísticas sobre el desarrollo económico de Venezuela son de lo más impresionantes. En 1945-57 el aumento promedio del PBN per cápita fue de 4.5%, que con mucho fue el más alto de Latinoamérica. En 1957, el PBN per cápita en Venezuela era de aproximadamente 1,000 dólares, tres veces el de Latinoamérica en conjunto, incluyendo a Venezuela; dos veces el de la Argentina, que es el país más desarrollado de la región y considerablemente mayor que el de Italia. El consumo per cápita de acero de Venezuela era seis veces mayor que el promedio de Latinoamérica y aproximadamente igual al de Suiza. En 1958 el consumo per cápita de energía en Venezuela fue algo mayor que el de Francia[31].

Estas cifras reflejan, desde luego, las actividades de las compañías de petróleo estadounidenses y anglo-holandesas que operan en Venezuela, pero no nos dicen casi nada acerca de la economía nacional propiamente dicha. Harvey O'Connor describe algunas de las realidades de esa economía:

"Antes del petróleo, Venezuela se alimentaba a si misma de algún modo. Hoy produce solamente la mitad del maíz, la mitad de la carne, una tercera parte de los vegetales y los granos y la mitad de la leche que consume. Hay menos ganado que en tiempos de la Revolución de 1812... La fantástica prosperidad que ha descendido sobre Caracas es tan irreal como algo salido de Hollywood... Todo eso es solamente motivo de curiosidad para las 9/10 partes del pueblo, que vive fuera del mundo encantado del petróleo. Ahuyentados por la enfermedad y disgregados por el hambre... por lo menos 200,000 venezolanos han abandonado los campos para dirigirse a la dorada Caracas, en donde viven bajo los puentes, a lo largo de las cañadas, o en las laderas de los cerros en los irónicamente llamados 'ranchos', construidos con los desperdicios de la ciudad"[32].

De hecho, "la economía enquistada" en Venezuela falsca seriamente las estadisticas del desarrollo de toda Latinoamérica. Por ejemplo, durante el período de cinco años de 1953-57, a las compañías extranjeras que operan en Venezuela correspondió el 23%. aproximadamente de todas las exportaciones de Latinoamérica. En el año 1957 la cifra llegó casi al 28%[33]. Con respecto a los cálculos del PBN, si quitamos a Venezuela, que representa un poco más del 3% de la población de Latinoamérica, el promedio de aumento del PBN per cápita de la región durante el periodo de 1950-57, se reduce aproximadamente en una cuarta parte[34].

Si bien es la más sobresaliente, Venezuela no es la única "economía enquistada" en Latinoamérica. Honduras, dominada por dos compañías bananeras extranjeras que, como Robert Alexander describe, "equivalen a estados dentro de otro estado"[35], es otro ejemplo típico Cuba, antes de la Revolución, también lo era en un grado apreciable, como declaró públicamente un reciente Embajador de los Estados Unidos en Cuba, "...hasta la llegada de Castro al poder... el embajador americano era la segunda figura de importancia en el país; algunas veces más importante aún que el Presidente"[36]. En realidad no hay prácticamente ninguna república latinoamericana en donde falte un "sector moderno de exportación" de propiedad extranjera; algunas constituyen "enquistamientos económicos" más o menos grandes pero en todos los casos sus contribuciones a los ingresos y al desarrollo económico "pertenecen más propiamente a los

países en donde las campañías están domiciliadas", que a los países en dondé operan,,.

Unas cuantas cifras y hechos indicarán, de manera parcial, con qué estos "enquistamientos económicos" inflan el funcionamiento real de las economías nacionales de Latinoamérica. En 1957, por ejemplo, las empresas de inversión directa de Estados Unidos, que representan aproximadamente al 85% del total de las inversiones directas extranjeras, tuvieron una producción que ascendió a 8.000 millones de dólares dentro de la producción bruta de Latinoamérica, o sea más del 13% del PBN de 1957[38] y, sin duda, una proporción aún mayor en la producción de bienes materiales. Estas empresas exportaron fuera de Latinoamérica mercancías valoradas en casi 3.000 millones de dólares[39], o sea casi la mitad de todas las exportaciones de mercancías de Latinoamérica, sin incluir el comercio dentro de la región, y el 80% de las exportaciones de la región de los Estados Unidos[40].

Estas cifras, a su vez, indican un serio falseamiento de las ganacias reales de las economías nacionales, como resultado de los diversos tipos de utilidades extraídas por medio de las operaciones de las inversiones extranjeras. Muchas de estas remisiones de utilidades son difíciles de descubrir, pero podemos tener alguna idea de su importancia incluso si consideramos las remisiones de utilidades e intereses que se publican, por ejemplo, la salida de divisas, excluyendo amortizaciones, ascendió a 3,625 millones de dólares durante el periodo de 1955 a 1957, aparentemente una porción insignificante del PBN. Sin embargo, como constituyó un drenaje de divisas extranjeras, absorbió el 14% de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones durante este período de tres años. Más aún, el promedio de absorción de divisas aumentó de manera continuada después de los años inmediatos a la guerra, cuando dicho promedio era del 10%. En términos absolutos, el drenaje se duplicó durante el período comprendido entre los años 1947 y 1957[41].

En vista de la decisiva importancia que la capacidad de importar tiene en la economía de América Latina, especialmente para adquirir los medios de producción, esta pérdida de medios económices no es tan pequeña como parece. En 1957 equivalió aproximadamente al 70% del costo de toda la maquinaria industrial importada durante el año, solamente un poco menos del 70% de las inversiones de ese año en ese sector clave[42].

6.— Las realidades del desarrollo económico en Latinoamerica

Retornando al segundo aspecto de la disparidad entre las realizaciones aparentes y reales del desarrollo alcanzado por lo que hemos definido como el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana, recordemos que el concepto oficialmente empleado para el PBN en la apreciación del desarrollo, incluye bienes y servicios. Sin discutir si es un concepto válido en el caso de un pais altamente industrializado como los Estados Unidos, es sin lugar a dudas sumamente equívoco cuando se aplica a una economía subdesarrollada.

Por su misma definición, una economía tal es primaria y básicamente deficiente en producción, es decir, tanto en capacidad productiva como en la producción real de productos agrícolas e industriales, que combinados determinan la capacidad física de un país para mantener un determinado nivel de vida. Para una economía sudbesarrollada, sólo la producción de bienes materiales puede tener alguna significación en cuanto al desarrollo. Ciertamente, para una región como Latinoamérica, un aumento en el número de salones de belleza o cabarets o en la cuantía de la policía u otras actividades que se enmarcan como servicios —sin importar su contribución a las alegrías o las penas que proporcionen a uno u otro sector de la población— no puede representar desarrollo económico. En realidad, como Paul Baran sugiere con respecto a la mayoría de los países —y nosotros incluimos a Latinoamérica dentro de esos países— lo opuesto es lo indudablemente cierto. Los servicios absorben capital y otros recursos desesperadamente necesarios para la producción y de esa forma retardan el desarrollo económico".

El grado en que los servicios inflan el PBN de Latinoamérica se revela en un examen de sus componentes. En 1956-57, sus proporciones respectivas (en porcentajes redondeados) dentro del total fueron las siguientes:"

Agricultura	23.5	
Industria	20.0	
Construcción	3.5	
Minería	5.0	
(Sub-total de la producción)		52.0
Comercio y Finanzas	17.0	
Otros servicios	15.0	
Gobierno	7.5	
(Sub-total de servicios)		39.5
Transportes y Comunicaciones	8.5	8.5
	100.0	100.0

De manera que en números redondos, ligeramente más del 50% del PBN latinoamericano está claramente constituido por la producción de bienes materiales y alrededor del 40% por servicios. El resto —comunicaciones y transportes— está constituido por ambos y no puede ser clasificado sin un análisis más detallado. No obstante, para nuestro propósito no se requiere una apreciación más detallada. Es suficiente con hacer notar que los servicios problablemente constituyen casi la mitad del PBN de la región. Aún más, para toda la región y para la mayoría de las repúblicas por separado, durante 1945-57 hubo poca variación en la relación entre los servicios y la producción en el PBN". Los servicios per cápita aumentaron en un promedio anual prácticamente idéntico al del PBN. Consecuentemente, cerca de la mitad de la expansión económica de 1945-57 no contribuyó ni al desarrollo de Latinoamérica ni a su capacidad de desarrollo.

Volviendo a la producción de bienes materiales, se deduce que, en conjunto, también aumentó aproximadamente en el mismo nivel que el PBN. De aqui que pueda argumentarse que aunque el PBN exagera grandemente las dimensiones del desarrollo real en términos absolutos, en este sentido, indica de manera precisa los adelantos relativos en la producción material y, por tanto, es una apreciación razonable del índice real de desarrollo. Sin embargo, no solo el índice sigue siendo insatisfactorio, como ya hemos visto, sino que resulta mucho más inadecuado de lo que parece a primera vista.

Ello estriba en que la valoración del PBN en Latinoamérica, y en las regiones subdesarrolladas en general, es aún más complicada por el comportamiento desigual de los principales sectores de la producción y por consideraciones cualitativas especiales. Es fundamental saber no solamente cuánta producción, sino también qué clase de producción, para comprender el proceso de crecimiento de una economía débil y falseada. Por ejemplo, un aumento en la producción que refleje la expansión del monocultivo o la explotación extranjera de los recursos naturales o la elaboración de artículos de lujo para el consumo doméstico, figurarían siempre como contribuciones al desarrollo económico en cualquier cómputo estadístico. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de la única clase de desarrollo que tiene sentido para un país subdesarrollado, las resultantes principales de tal aumento pudieran muy bien ser desfavorables. Por esta razón debemos examinar algunos aspectos salientes del desarrollo en los principales sectores de la producción del PBN.

a. El sector agrícola.

El aumento promedio anual per cápita de la producción agrícola en Latinoamérica en 1945-57, fue solamente de 1.5%. El índice fundamental de desarrollo en este sector sería la producción de alimentos para el consumo, pero éste aumentó a un ritmo aún menor que los cultivos para la exportación. En todo caso, el promedio general de 1.5% no bastó para mantener el nivel per cápita de producción anterior a la guerra, tanto de la agricultura en su conjunto, como de la producción de alimentos considerada separadamente. La disminución per cápita de la producción fue sustancial durante la mayor parte del período. Solamente en 1956/57, el mejor año del período,el nivel se acercó al de 1933/34 — 1937/38[46].

Para una región en la que, como Preston James dice sin rodeos, "podemos afirmar que una gran parte de la población está sufriendo hambre"[47], este record no representa desarrollo en ningún sentido. Es más bien una afirmación de la agravación de la crisis permanente basada en el sistema conocido y profundamente asentado del monopolio feudal y neo-feudal sobre la tierra. Todas las estadísticas disponibles apuntan hacia una concentración continuada y probablemente ascendente de la propiedad sobre la tierra en los años recientes. Un estudio de Moacyr Paixao demuestra que en el Brasil, poco más del 3% de los propietarios están en posesión de más del 62% de la tierra arable, mientras que el 85% de los campesinos posee menos del 17% de la tierra. La situación en Cuba, antes de 1959, era parecida: menos del 1.5% de las empresas agrícolas poseían el 47% de las tierras, mientras el 70% de las propiedades ocupaban poco más del 11% de la tierra[49].

Aún en México, en donde una reforma agraria extensa; pero solamente efectiva en parte, había tenido lugar antes de 1940, un nuevo proceso de concentración de la tierra comenzó después de aquel año. De acuerdo con Luis Yáñez Pérez, hacia 1950 alrededor del 50% de las tierras cultivadas estaban en posesión del 13% de los cultivadores, mientras 708 grandes empresarios obtenían el 35% del total de los ingresos agrícolas de la república[50].

Hacia 1955, de acuerdo con un cálculo semiofical mexicano, el sector privado agrícola, en contraste con el sector comunal creado por la reforma agraria, se había expandido de tal manera que "podía ser aún mayor que las propiedades privadas en 1930"[51], es decir, antes de que se distribuyeran la mayoría de las tierras como consecuencia de la reforma agraria. El hecho de que muchas de las nuevas grandes propiedades sean empresas capitalistas relativamente eficientes, no altera el significado de la "contra-reforma" ya que éstas se han dedicado casi exclusivamente a producir productos de exportación, emplean mucho menos obreros de los que de otra forma pudieran subsistir de la tierra y de ahí resulta que retardan la producción desesperadamente necesaria de comestibles para el mercado interno y agravan la seria situación de desempleo agrícola.

Para el conjunto de Latinoamérica, Otto Feinstein resume de manera conservadora la situación actual de la posesión de la tierra y su utilización como sigue: "la distribución de la tierra está hecha de tal manera que una proporción infinitesimal de los clasificados como propietarios legales de la tierra posee una vasta mayoría de la misma. Menos del 5% de los terratenientes posee usualmente más del 50% de la tierra. Esto no sólo significa concentración de la tierra en grandes propiedades, usualmente incapaces de financiar su modernización, sino también que casi todos los otros propietarios poseen usualmente parcelas demasiado pequeñas para una producción racional".[52]

A esto hay que añadir solamente que sin una revolución agraria —no una mera reforma— que haga posible la asimilación de la técnica del siglo XX en la producción agrícola, cualquier florecimiento óptimo o de otro género de la economía latinoaméricana, es incapaz, por su índole, de satisfacer las necesidades de desarrollo de la región.

b. El sector industrial.

Aunque el estancamiento de la agricultura y, en particular, de los productos alimenticios, reduce considerablemente la significación del aumento total en la producción de bienes materiales, el hecho de que la producción de la industria de elaboración aumentó a un promedio anual de 3.2% per cápita —más del doble del aumento de la agricultura— el hecho aportó algo sustancial, tanto cualitativa como cuantitativamente al desarrollo material alcanzado durante este período.[53] Un resultado es el cambio que se operó en la distribución por sectores del PBN de Latinoamérica. En 1945 la industria de elaboración y la construcción representaban el 17% del PBN y la agricultura el 26%, mientras que en 1957, como ya hemos indicado, la participación de la industria de elaboración y de la construcción juntas igualaron la de la agricultura, representando cada una el 23.5%[54].

Si consideramos los países separadamente, encontramos que los incrementos relativos en el sector de la industria de elaboración, fueron relativamente más pronunciados en las repúblicas menos industrializadas, aunque al mismo tiempo, al fin del período, la agricultura aún mantenía su posición predominante. Así, en Colombia, por ejemplo, el sector agrícola descendió del 45 al 31% del PBN, y aún esta proporción superaba la aportación de la industria de elaboración. El modelo en Brasil, —que en este aspecto representó una excepción entre los cuatro países de mayor producción industrial— fue el mismo que en Colombia: en 1957 el sector agrícola aún era el predominante. En cuanto a Argentina, Chile y México, donde la industria había sobrepasado ligeramente a la agricultura en 1945, el cambio registrado en la importancia relativa de dichos sectores fue insignificante[55].

Mientras que para las economías subdesarrolladas del conjunto de Latinoamérica la relativa industrialización indicada por los cambios operados en esos dos sectores del PBN, tiene algunas implicaciones de desarrollo positivo, el grado de desarrollo industrial alcanzado es exagerado por muchos de los resúmenes estadísticos. Por ejemplo, nos encontramos que una proporción sustancial de lo que es clasificado como actividad industrial —aún en las repúblicas más desarrolladas— continúa técnicamente al nivel de las operaciones de una herrería rural.

La situación en Perú, sobre la cual pueden hallarse estadísticas recientes y bastante numerosas, puede ser considerada típica para la mayor parte de Latinoamérica. Desde el punto de vista del desarrollo industrial en general, Perú tiene una situación ligeramente mejor que la media entre las 20 repúblicas y su PBN y su desarrollo industrial en los últimos años se acerca al promedio de la región. Además, Perú posee una moderna fundición de hierro y acero.

En 1955, ligeramente más del 80% de la mano de obra industrial, incluyendo artesanos, trabajaba en talleres que, con un promedio de menos de 14 obreros, y probablemente la mitad de ese número, producían el 40% de los productos elaborados del país. En el caso del Perú es difícil hablar de progresos serios industriales por otra razón: de 1945-55 hubo una disminución en la participación relativa de la industria local en los suministros totales de productos elaborados.[56]

Si consideramos ahora el aumento de la producción de bienes de capital en Latinoamérica[57], aparece que ha sido más sustancial de lo que realmente fue, debido en parte, a la base tan baja de que se partió. En vista de la complejidad de la producción industrial y de las diferencias en terminología y otros criterios estadísticos usados por las distintas repúblicas, es difícil determinar la relación entre la producción de bienes de capital y bienes de consumo, elemento de bastante importancia para apreciar el nivel de madurez industrial. No obstante, podemos obtener un cálculo aproximado en el realizado por las Naciones Unidas de 1954. De acuerdo con este cálculo, basado en estadísticas de 6 países —Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, México y Venezuela— que representan el grueso de la producción industrial de Latinoamérica, "las industrias de bienes de capital... representan no más del 15% de la producción industrial total de Latinoamérica".[58] Probablemente este porcentaje fue mayor en 1957, aunque quizá no mucho.

Al mismo tiempo, una considerable disipación improductiva de la producción de bienes de capital limita su importancia como índice del desarrollo económico básico. En 1945-57 —para toda la región y prácticamente todos los países por separado—; más de la mitad de las inversiones fijas de capital se orientaron hacia "edificaciones y construcciones", el mayor porcentaje del cual se concentro en "residencias" que en Latinoamérica son en abrumadora mayoría casas muy lujosas, una importante mercancía de la lucrativa especulación urbana.[59]

Entre las repúblicas más activas industrialmente, se ha prestado una justificada atención al Brasil. En Brasil la producción de lingotes de acero se quintuplicó en 10 años y el valor de la producción de bienes de capital aumentó con una rapidez que casi triplica a la de bienes de consumo. No obstante, considerando la producción industrial en conjunto, los cambios estructurales resultantes no han sido tan espectaculares como los acontecimientos parecen indicar.

Aunque el valor de la producción de bienes de capital se elevó de alrededor de un cuarto a un tercio del total de la producción de la industria de elaboración, en menos de una década, este éxito está seriamente afectado por el hecho de que la producción de maquinaria, en 1959, representó menos del 3% del valor total de la producción industrial.[40] Operando en una economía plagada de persistentes y agudas deficiencias de energía y transporte —característica prácticamente común a toda América Latina— sin capacidad reproductiva, produciendo exclusivamente para el mercado interior y dependiendo de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones de café y de inversiones directas de capital extranjero, para obtener bienes de capital y varias materias primas, la industria brasileña ha aumentado la vulnerabilidad de la economía ante factores externos, sin lograr los medios para una industrialización básica.

La industria argentina, tradicionalmente la más fuerte de Latinoamérica en términos de producción per cápita, presenta características estructurales similares a las del Brasil. La producción de maquinarias y equipos aumentó en más del 300% entre 1937-38 y 1955, mientras su participación relativa en la producción industrial se elevó del 3.7 al 6.1%. Sin embargo, reparaciones y reposiciones de piezas representaron el 40% de este total, como resultado de lo cual sólo el 60% de la producción en este sector representó un incremento de las existencias de maquinaria y equipos, de lo cual, a su vez, el 60% se concentró en facilidades de transporte.[41]

La deficiencia fundamental del desarrollo industrial en Argentina y Brasil, prevalece sobre toda la región. Es resumida por el hecho, previamente señalado, de que al fin de un período de 12 años de intensificación de la actividad industrial —que culmina la fase moderna de un proceso que comenzó con la primera guerra mundial— Latinoamérica todavía dependía de las importaciones para más de 90% de sus necesidades en maquinarias y equipos.

Debe mencionarse también un factor adicional en relación con el problema de los "enquistamientos" que hemos abordado, pero que también complica la valoración del desarrollo de Latinoamérica. La gran mayoría de las empresas modernas de elaboración de la región son de propiedad extranjera. Las inversiones privadas directas de los Estados Unidos en este sector, más que se duplicaron durante el período 1945-57 y, en 1959, tenían un valor en contabilidad de aproximadamente 1.400 millones de dólares, mayor que la inversión en cualquier otro sector con excepción del petróleo, y representaban cerca de la sexta parte del total de las inversiones privadas directas de los Estados Unidos en Latinoamérica.

La mayor parte de estas inversiones se ha dirigido hacia la industria pesada y hacia la industria alimenticia, y el 70% se ha concentrado en Brasil, México y Argentina. Solamente Brasil ha recibido más del 30% del total.[42] Se estima que dentro de una persistente tendencia a la expansión, en 1957 la participación privada extranjera (Estados Unidos y Europa) en las inversiones en las industrias del Brasil, representó el 37% de total.[43]

El impacto de esta situación en el desarrollo industrial y económico de América Latina en términos generales es, por lo menos, contradictorio. De una parte, existe una producción nueva con sus correspondientes efectos multiplicadores. Al mismo tiempo, esto no se puede considerar completamente beneficioso ya que mucha de esta producción consiste meramente en el montaje de piezas importadas y también depende de materias primas del exterior.

De otra parte, la capacidad de expansión de las empresas extranjeras a través de la reinversión de los beneficios está limitada a largo plazo por las posibilidades de su remisión. De aquí que mientras mayor sea la expansión, mayor será la exportación eventual de capital e ipso facto la decapitalización creciente de las seriamente subcapitalizadas economías latinoamericanas. Como muy bien dice el economista brasileño Caio Prado (hijo), cualquiera que sea el estímulo inicial para el desarrollo provisto por las fábricas propiedad de extranjeros, "con el tiempo se transforma en una obstrucción".[44]

Una observación final puede ser hecha para confirmar las limitaciones del desarrollo industrial de Latinoamérica. Es bien conocido que en cualquier región subdesarrollada la capacidad de la industria para absorver mano de obra es de una importancia decisiva, tanto para la aceleración del desarrollo industrial como para el desarrollo económico en general. En este sentido anotemos que entre 1945 y 1955, la proporción de la mano de obra dedicada a la agricultura, decayó del 57.4 al 51.6%.[65] Esto representa una disminución apreciable en términos absolutos y un fenómeno asociado teóricamente con el desarrollo económico.

Para América Latina lo contrario es lo cierto. Como lo describió recientemente un funcionario de la Organización de Estados Americanos, es un circulo vicioso: la intensificación de la pobreza en los campos ha estimulado un éxodo creciente de la población rural hacia las ciudades; el nivel de la técnica agrícola ha sido demasiado bajo para compensar la péridida de mano de obra, y el desarrollo industrial muy lento para ofrecer empleo a los campesinos desplazados[66]. De este modo, la producción del total de trabajadores dedicados a la industria y a las construcciones aumentó solamente del 17 al 18.5% del total. Al mismo tiempo, la parte correspondiente al sector de los servicios aumentó del 23 al 27.4% o sea a más del doble del indice de la industria y la construcción.[67]

En otras palabras, el grueso de la mano de obra en éxodo de la agricultura, incrementó las filas de burócratas, limpiabotas, vendedores de periódicos, sirvientes domésticos y similares, para no mencionar los desempleados. Este fenómeno explica al mismo tiempo la disparidad entre el aumento sin precedente de la población en la América Latina y la industrialización de la región que avanza mucho más lentamente.

7.— Los ingresos personales durante el periodo de "florecimiento óptimo"

Para una apreciación general de la evolución de la economía de Latinoamérica, una última pregunta debe ser formulada: ¿Cómo fueron afectados los niveles de vida de las grandes masas de población? El primer punto en el que se debe hacer hincapié es el de que de 1945 a 1957 el consumo per cápita de la región en conjunto aumentó en un 40%, en comparación con un 31% para el PBN per cápita. Este fenómeno ha sido descrito como "alentador" por los economistas de la CEPAL.[68]

Sin embargo, un examen de la distribución de los ingresos creados por el PBN revela que el incremento del consumo privado —aldededor del 80% del consumo total— fue limitado estrictamente a una opulenta minoría y de ahí que, aparte de sus implicaciones sociales pueda ser caracterizado mejor como una deplorable disipación de la plus-valia. Aún aceptando que en el caso de Latinoamérica pueda ser justificado el debate entre teorizantes respecto de cuánto puede o debe ser "exprimida la población... a través de un aplazamiento de la elevación de los niveles de consumo... y utilizado para inversiones básicas, con el fin de... lograr un rápido aumento de la producción", como dice Gunnar Myrdal en otro texto,[69] existe muy poca justificación para este "exprimir el jugo" que tiene como consecuencia un superconsumo y una subinversión por parte de los que perciben las utilidades y que, consecuentemente, no ofrece ninguna persepectiva para un rápido aumento de la producción.

A pesar de que las estadísticas sobre ingresos personales están muy diseminadas y son relativamente poco exactas, todo evidencia que la significativa disparidad entre los ingresos de las clases poseedoras y la clase trabajadora en América Latina, se ha incrementado durante este período y, como resultado, los problemas materiales y sociales de la pobreza durante el periodo de bonanza han sido iguales, si no mayores, que antes.[70]

Esta situación la confirma la continua migración de campesinos desposeídos y la situacón de hambre a la cual ya nos hemos referido. Otros síntomas han sido las vastas luchas sociales y las salvajes represiones políticas que alcanzaron un grado de intensidad y una extensión geográfica probablemente inigualada en América Latina durante cualquier otro periodo de alto índice de actividad económica.

Un síntoma general es el agudo encarecimiento de la vida en la mayoría de los países, que aún de acuerdo con las cifras oficiales, alcanzó proporciones fenomenales en algunas repúblicas, a pesar de la subestimación habitual y notoria de los organismos que confeccionan las estadísticas en casi todos los gobiernos.[71] Los salarios normalmente se rezagaron y, aún en los casos en que las huelgas forzaron ajustes temporales más o menos correctos, el alza de los precios fue tan rápido, que siembre hubo un lapso de tiempo en el cual los ingresos reales de los asalariados disminuyeron.

Las tendencias fluctuaron en dependencia de los países y de los años. Las estadísticas de Argentina indican que un alza real en los salarios y los sueldos industriales durante los primeros años de la postguerra, fue seguida por una tendencia a la disminución después de 1949[72]. El record no es tan claro en Brasil y en Colombia, en donde en cualquier caso "los salarios reales per cápita en la industria disminuyeron algo en los últimos años, a pesar de un aumento en la producción per cápita".[73] En general y a largo plazo, la clásica "redistribución de la riqueza" característica de la inflación prolongada y rápida, impuso su tributo a los asalariados de América Latina.

Son dignas de consideración las estadísticas chilenas sobre este punto, porque son más completas y merecedoras de confianza que la mayoría de las otras. De 1945 a 1957, la proporción relativa de los gastos totales nacionales de los consumidores, representados por los salarios y los sueldos de oficina, disminuyó en un 10%, mientras que el consumo derivado de utilidades, intereses y rentas, aumentó en cerca de un 15%. Al mismo tiempo, el hecho de que el consumo per cápita de artículos tales como carne, patatas y especialmente trigo, disminuyera sustancialmente durante el período, sugiere que la mayoría de los chilenos se empobreció, tanto en términos relativos como absolutos.[74]

Aparentemente, en Perú, en donde una buena parte de los ingresos no se computan como salarios, las "características generales de la distribución de los ingresos no experimentó ninguna variación sustancial entre 1945 y 1955". Durante esta década, alrededor del 45% de la población total del Perú pudo satisfacer solamente las "necesidades mínimas para la subsistencia", lo cual convertido en términos monetarios, significa un consumo anual per cápita equivalente a no más de 50 dólares, menos de la tercera parte del per cápita promedio nacional.[75]

En Venezuela, la mayor parte de los datos conocidos señalan una mayor diferenciación entre los ingresos de las altas capas y los de la mayoría. De acuerdo con un análisis, alrededor de tres cuartas partes de la población venezolana percibe menos de un tercio del enormemente exagerado per cápita de ingresos nacionales.[76] En Cuba, una sola estadística nos dice lo suficiente acerca de la distribución de los ingresos; con anterioridad a la Revolución de 1959, el promedio anual de desocupados era de un 25%.[77]

Se puede argumentar que las estadísticas concernientes a Cuba, Chile e incluso a Argentina, carecen en cierto modo de relieve, ya que esas repúblicas experimentaron poco o ningún desarrollo en 1945-57. No se puede decir lo mismo sobre México, país sobre el cual recientemente se han publicado notables estadísticas acerca de la distribución de los ingresos.

De acuerdo con un análisis detallado y en general de orientación conservadora, de la economista mexicana Ifigenia de Navarrete, aparecen los siguientes datos reveladores:[78]

1º De 1940 a 1950, los ingresos personales de los empresarios se elevaron del 60% al 66% de los ingresos personales en la república, mientras los de los asalariados disminuyeron de la misma forma del 40 al 34% del total.

2º De 1950 a 1957 en términos de ingresos familiares, (a) el promedio de ingresos mensuales en las familias de las capas más humildes, que comprenden el 20% de la población mexicana, fue de 22.3 dólares en 1950 y de 19.8 en 1957 —computados en pesos de 1957 y convertidos en dólares de ese mismo año— representando una declinación relativa del 6% al 4.5% de los ingresos totales y una declinación absoluta del 11% (b) para la mitad de la población, incluyendo el 20% de las capas más humildes; el promedio de ingresos familiares reales fue aproximadamente el mismo en 1950 y en 1957, o sea alrededor de 28 dólares al mes —en dólares de 1957— lo cual representa, no obstante, una disminución relativa del 19 al 15.5% de los ingresos familiares totales; (c) mientras en 1950, el 70% de las familias recibieron el 31.5% de los ingresos familiares totales, en 1957 recibieron solamente el 28.5%.

Si existe alguna exageración en este estudio de la tendencia del ingreso de la mayoría de los mexicanos a permanecer estacionario o aún a disminuir, es en el sentido de subestimarla. Por ejemplo, de acuerdo con la profesora soviética M. V. Danilyevitch, los ingresos reales de los obreros industriales en México entre 1939 y 1952, mostraron una tendencia a la disminución después de 1940,[79] de donde se deduce la sospecha de que el empobrecimiento absoluto está más difundido de lo que demuestra el análisis de la economista mexicana. Esta sospecha es apoyada por las tendencias en el consumo de alimentos per cápita. De 1934-36 a 1952-56, de acuerdo con una encuestra de las Naciones Unidas, un análisis de la información obtenible "revela la existencia de varias tendencias importantes que se han reflejado en un descenso de los niveles de nutrición".[80]

En todo caso no hay probablemente ninguna exageración en la conclusión general propuesta por la señora Navarrete como resultado de su estudio, afirmando que del 65 al 70% de la población mexicana no tuvo ninguna participación en los "beneficios del desarrollo económico". No se pecaría de exageración si se afirmara que las privaciones sufridas durante este período de "florecimiento óptimo de la economía" por el grueso de la población mexicana, bajo las condiciones relativamente favorables de la economía de ese país, fueron más intensas en la gran mayoría de las otras repúblicas latinoamericanas.

8.— Conclusiones:

El camino hacia el desarrollo

Ciertamente muchos círculos se han percatado de la gravedad de la presente crisis en Latinoamérica, como un desastre económico y la agudización de los conflictos políticos y sociales. Tampoco han faltado los factores, reales o imaginarios, aducidos para explicar esta situación. Sin embargo, es muy frecuente la tendencia —aún entre especialistas de alguna competencia— a conceder verosimilitud a la noción de que el desarrollo económico ha sido "rápido" en Latinoamérica, o de que "el desarrollo de América Latina ha sido impresionante", o de que Latinoamérica "ha llegado a la edad de un desarrollo económico vigoroso".[81] Esto, como hemos tratado de demostrar, está lejos de ser cierto, de acuerdo con toda la evidencia obtenible. Lo que hemos llamado el "florecimiento óptimo" de la economía latinoamericana se ha confundido con un funcionamiento satisfactorio.

¿Cómo resumir la evidencia? Si existe una fórmula matemática para medir y apreciar el contenido del nodesarrollo y del antidesarrollo de las actividades económicas que hemos examinado y definir con precisión el FBN real de Latinoamérica, su magnitud relativa en una escala mundial y su índice temporal de variabilidad, el autor de este trabajo no la conoce ni tiene capacidad para inventar una. Pero quizás, pidiendo prestada una frase a Joan Robinson, "no tiene objeto encerrar algo en definiciones más precisas que el sujeto al cual se aplican".[82] Nosotros podemos añadir: más precisa que los datos estadísticos escasos e imperfectos con los cuales tenemos que trabajar.

De aquí que no intentemos formular más que una conclusión general: la de que el desarrollo, tal y como ha tenido lugar, ha sido sumamente exagerado y ha dejado de satisfacer en todos sentidos, sociales o económicos, las necesidades de desarrollo de la región. Para concretar, la característica decisiva de este desarrollo es que dejó de proporcionar o establecer las bases para un incremento suficiente y rápido en la capacidad productiva y reproductiva de las ramas de la economía cuyas deficiencias fundamentales son la causa principal de la perpetuación del subdesarrollo. Consecuentemente, la crisis actual de Latinoamérica no marca el fin de una era de progreso, sino la culminación de un proceso que agravó, en aspectos esenciales, los males crónicos internos y la vulnerabilidad externa de la economía subdesarrollada y dependendiente de la región.

Los factores que deforman la economía de Latinoamérica e impiden su desarrollo, están entrelazados tan estrechamente que no se pueden remediar por separado. Los problemas de la tenencia de la tierra y su utilización, de las industrias básicas y de la vulnerabilidad hacia factores externos, son facetas de un problema mayor: Las ramificaciones políticas y económicas de la función dominante en toda la región, que es la exportación de materias primas bajo términos y condiciones dictados desde el exterior.

El "florecimiento óptimo" que hemos estudiado y la crisis que engendró, indican con suficiente claridad que la economía latinoamericana ha llegado a la coyuntura donde la eliminación de la dependencia neocolonial debe ser situada en la agenda y con ello el abandono del tratamiento espontáneo del subdesarrollo. Sólo sobre esta base será posible adoptar los objetivos sociales y los métodos económicos racionales que requiere un ataque victorioso contra el subdesarrollo.[13]

Anotaciones

1.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano.** Naciones Unidas, 1959, pág. 51. Aparte del fin de la prosperidad de postguerra, otros factores son los cambios en la producción y en la técnica, que afectan el consumo de materias primas naturales, las distintas clases de discriminaciones y competencias en los países importadores de productos latinoamericanos, el Mercado Común Europeo, competencia africana, etc.

2.—Entre 1939 y 1945, la posesión de oro y valores extranjeros aumentó en cinco veces de acuerdo con **Post War Price Relations in Trade between Under-Developed and Industrialized Countries.** Naciones Unidas, 23 de febrero 1949, pág. 114.

3.—De **El Mercado Común Latinoamericano** pág. 46.

4.—A partir del 1955, en los Estados Unidos el ritmo de aumento medio anual del producto per cápita ha sido de alrededor del 1%. Para una mayor comprensión del ritmo de Latinoamérica, es interesante hacer notar que en el período que estamos considerando ha sido más elevado que en el conjunto de los países subdesarrollados del Sudeste de Asia, pero mucho menor que en los países socialistas del Este de Europa, en donde, según las apreciaciones más conservadoras, el aumento per cápita de los bienes materiales, con toda seguridad ha promediado más del 7% anual en todos los países y en algunos hasta el 10%. **Economic Survey of Europe, 1956.** Naciones Unidas, 1957, Capitulo II, pág. 2). De 1957 a 1959, cuando el desarrollo de Latinoamérica se paralizó, "el promedio anual del ritmo de desarrollo llegó al 17%" [15% per cápita] para todos los países socialistas y el 10% en la Unión Soviética [9% per cápita]" de acuerdo con un informe de N. S. Jruschov, **Kommunist,** No. 1, Enero de 1961, pág. 10.

5.—**Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico V. El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina** Naciones Unidas, 1959, vol. 1, pág. 15. El ritmo de expansión global fue de 4.5% por año, pero la inmigración elevó el aumento de la población a 3.2% anual. Ritmos de desarrollo elevados, por supuesto, se registraron en algunos países de tiempo en tiempo, pero solamente por breves períodos.

6.—Ifigenia M. Navarrete, **La Distribución del Ingreso y el Desarrollo Económico de México,** México, D. F., 1960, pág. 11.

7.—El PBN a precios de mercado, es uno de los dos sistemas más comprensibles para apreciar la actividad económica; el otro es la renta nacional, que estima la producción expresada en términos de ganancias derivadas del PBN. La CEPAL de la cual hemos obtenido la mayor parte de nuestras estadísticas, considera que para Latinoamérica "los cambios en el producto bruto **per cápita**, expresado por los precios constantes de un año específico, es el método más satisfactorio y práctico para apreciar el ritmo del desarrollo económico". La CEPAL define el "ingreso bruto" para la región como "equivalente al producto bruto... más o menos las ganancias o las pérdidas netas resultantes de cambios en los términos del intercambio" y, por tanto, menos revelador del "éxito de los esfuerzos constructivos". **Economic Bulletin for Latin America**, United Nations, Vol. 1, No. 2, Septiembre 1956, pág. 30. De 1945 a 1955, el aumento promedio anual per cápita de los ingresos fue cerca del 22% mayor que el del PBN; de 1955-58 fue un 50% menor.

8.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1948**, Naciones Unidas, 1949, pág. 190.

9.—**Study of Inter-American Trade**, Naciones Unidas, 1957 págs. 19, 22; los ajustes en dólares, de acuerdo con **Statistical Abstracts of the United States**, Washington, 1959, pág. 829.

10.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 47.

11.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1948**, pág. 45.

12.—**Ibid**, pág. 58

13.—Las importaciones son también financiadas con inversiones y préstamos extranjeros, pero aún durante el período en que el flujo de capital extranjero pueda temporalmente exceder el reflujo, bajo la forma de utilidades, intereses y amortizaciones, las existencias de divisas resultantes representan solamente una fracción de las divisas acumuladas mediante las ganancias de las exportaciones. Así, en el período de tres años, de 1954 a 1956, cuando el flujo de capitales extranjeros posterior a la guerra alcanzó su nivel máximo en Latinoamérica —flujo neto de aproximadamente 2,000 millones de dólares— constituyó el 8% del valor total de las exportaciones, 24,000 millones de dólares en cifras redondas.

14.—"...de fines del siglo XIX a las vísperas de la segunda guerra mundial... como promedio, una determinada cantidad de bienes primarios exportados pagarían, al final del período, solamente el 60% de la cantidad de bienes elaborados que ellos hubieran podido pagar al comienzo del período". (**Post War Price Relations**, etc., pág. 6).

15.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**. Naciones Unidas 1959, pág. 72 (cuadro 69).

16.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 47. En los principales países exportadores del Sudeste de Asia, en conjunto, las condiciones del intercambio por término medio mejoraron sólo ligeramente de 1948-54, después de lo cual se produjo una tendencia al empeoramiento (**Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1959**, Naciones Unidas, 1960, pág. 63).

17.—El nivel de precios de los bienes de capital refleja muy probablemente el hecho de que un número considerable de las importaciones correspondió a las empresas extranjeras que operan en Latinoamérica. "Los precios en las transacciones internas de las compañías no reflejan genuinamente los precios del mercado; el embarcador y el destinatario no tienen intereses opuestos. El único efecto de los débitos cargados a las subsidiarias que operan en el extranjero por concepto de equipos... embarcados a los mismos, es un débito en los libros de contabilidad; las utilidades se cambian entre la compañía matriz y sus subsidiarias en el extranjero... El lugar donde se percibe un balance ventajoso depende de... los índices relativos del impuesto de utilidades", derechos de importación, etc. (**Post-War Price Relations**, etc., pág. 126). Ya que las operaciones de las subsidiarias o ramas de compañías extranjeras de Latinoamérica están estadísticamente integradas en el conjunto de la actuación económica de la región, en este sentido, sus manipulaciones con los precios de las importaciones no alteran el significado de los términos fluctuales del intercambio. De otra parte, no se puede excluir el hecho de que en algunas de las repúblicas la mejoría de los términos del intercambio benefició más a los inversionistas extranjeros que a las empresas nacionales. Vea **Ibid**, pág. 111.

18.—Los índices siguientes, aplicados al conjunto de la región, muestran la evolución de los precios de las exportaciones y de las importaciones y las condiciones del intercambio (obtenidos dividendo los índices de los precios de las exportaciones entre los índices de los precios de las importaciones) de 1955-59:

1953=100

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	
exportaciones	101	102	101	95	90	(Oct.)
importaciones	100	104	107	106	107	(Sept.)
términos del intercambio	101	98	94	90	84	

Fuente: International Financial Statistics, Fondo Monetario Internacional, Marzo 1960, págs. 38-39.

19.—Para 1958, **Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**, Naciones Unidas, 1959, pág. 71; para 1959, los cálculos de la CEPAL publicados en Excélsior, México D. F., Julio 5, 1960; para 1960, cálculos preliminares de "South America Economic Review" y "Caribbean Economic Review", **New York Times**, Enero de 1961.

20.—De no indicarse lo contrario, las estadísticas concernientes a los países en particular, han sido tomadas o computadas de las ediciones anuales del **Economic Survey of Latin America** de las Naciones Unidas. Las cifras del PBN, convertidas por esta publicación en dólares de 1950, han sido reconvertidas en dólares de 1957, con un incremento del 14%. Todos los aumentos o disminuciones en los porcentajes del PBN han sido calculados sobre la base de dólares de valor constante.

21.—En 1957, en adición a la Argentina y Venezuela, PBN per cápita superiores al promedio de la región, se atribuyen a Uruguay, Cuba, Costa Rica y Panamá.

22.—Ver también la nota 17.

23.—Para los países más atrasados, como Haití, Bolivia y Paraguay, cuya población en conjunto es menos del 5% del total de Latinoamérica, irregularidades y deficiencias estadísticas hacen extremadamente difícil aún adivinar a cuanto asciende el PBN per cápita. En Bolivia, p. e., no se efectuó ningún censo entre 1900 y 1950. De acuerdo con el último, el PBN per cápita de Bolivia se estimó ligeramente superior a 80 dólares. Probablemente disminuyó algo durante los últimos siete años. Vea **Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico. IV. El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia**, Naciones Unidas, 1958, pág. 17.

24.—Al proponer el Mercado Común Latinoamericano como una solución urgente a los problemas de desarrollo posteriores a 1957, el desarrollo para 1975 se proyecta sobre las bases de dos ritmos de aumento anual alternativos del PBN per cápita: 2% y 2.75%. Estos ritmos, así como el papel asignado al Mercado Común, cuando se constituya, para promover el desarrollo, parecen muy poco reales. Véase **El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, Passim.

25.—La diferencia sería considerablemente mayor si las cifras de producción per cápita fueran comparadas. En 1955-56, la producción de acero en Latinoamérica fue un 40% menor que el consumo. Desde 1950, el consumo ha aumentado con mayor rapidez que la producción. (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**). Naciones Unidas 1959, pág. 81).

26.—**El Mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 62. El PBN per cápita de todos los países ha sido convertido en dólares de 1955 cuando fue necesario.

27.—Durante 1955-57, el promedio anual per cápita del consumo de cobre en Latinoamérica fue de 0.4 kilogramos; la cifra comparable para los Estados Unidos fue de 7.0 kilogramos; para Inglaterra 9.0, para Francia 4.3 y para Austria 3.5 (ibid). El consumo per cápita de energía, en el equivalente de millones de toneladas métricas de hulla (redondeadas) fue como sigue: América Latina 600; Austria 1.900; Francia 2.400; Inglaterra 4.700; y los Estados Unidos, 7.600. (**United Nations Statisticals Year-book 1959**, pág. 366 y siguientes).

28.—**Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States**, Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado de los Estados Unidos, Agosto de 1959, pág. 24.

29.—**The Stages of Economic Growth. Un Manifiesto No-Comunista**, Cambridge, Inglaterra, 1960, pág. 24.

30.—United Nations Statistical Yearbok, 1959, pág. 450 y siguientes.

31.—Cifras tomadas de las ediciones anuales de **Economic Survey of Latin America**, y las fuentes en las notas 26 y 27.

32.—**The Empire of Oil**, New York, 1955, pp. 266-67.

33.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**, pág. 48.

34.—Ibid, pág. 3.

35.—Citado por Preston James. **Latin America**, New York, 1959, pág. 690.

36.—Earl E. T. Smith, citado en "Monthly Review" New York, Diciembre 1960, pág. 432.

37.—Citado de una publicación de 1951 de la CEPAL sobre Venezuela, por Paul Baran en su libro **The Political Economy of Growth**. New York 1957, pág. 193.

38.—Survey of Current Bussneess, Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos, Septiembre de 1960, pág. 22.

39.—Ibid.

40.—En 1957, las exportaciones totales de mercancías fueron de 7,918 millones de dólares, (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1958**, pág. 37); las exportaciones totales a los Estados Unidos fueron de 3,765 millones, (ibid. pág. 15).

41.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**, pág. 66. Para un país dado y en un año determinado, la pérdida pudiera ser proporcionalmente mucho mayor, como en el caso del Ecuador, p. e., donde en el año 1957, el drenaje representó más del 20% de las ganancias por concepto de exportaciones. (Ibid, pág 76).

42.—Las remisiones brutas de intereses y utilidades fueron de 1.345 millones de dólares (Ibid. p. 66); las importaciones de maquinaria industrial se estimaron en 1940 millones de dólares (Economic Survey of Latin America 1958, pág. 52); el porcentaje de las inversiones se calcula aproximadamente igual al de 1954-56, según cálculos del Mercado Común Latinoamericano, pág. 60.

43.—The Political Economy of Growth — op. cit. pág. 19. Baran también cita la siguiente observación provechosa de Economic Survey of Europe since the War, 1953, pág. 25, publicación de las Naciones Unidas: "En los países del Este de Europa, los servicios no conectados directamente con la producción y el transporte de mercancías no se consideran como productivos y su valor se excluye de los ingresos nacionales [el producto]. Para un país pobre que está tratando de desarrollar su industria y de reducir el subempleo común en las ocupaciones de servicio, la definición marxista de renta nacional [producto] tiene naturalmente algunas ventajas sobre el concepto más amplio adaptado a las economías ricas, industrializadas, y que actualmente se aplica de manera común a los países subdesarrollados.

44.—Economic Survey of Latin America 1957, pág. 85.

45.—Ibid, y Economic Survey of Latin America 1955, Naciones Unidas, 1956, pág. 9.

46.—Economic Survey of Latin America, 1957, op. cit. pág 85. Desde 1957 la producción per cápita ha disminuido de nuevo.

47.—Latin America, New York 1959, pág. 870.

48.—"Elementos da Questao Agrária", Revista Brasiliense Río de Janeiro, No. 24, 1959, pág. 38 y sig.

49.—Report on Cuba. Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento, Baltimore, 1951, pág. 88.

50.—Mecanización de la Agricultura Mexicana. México, D.F., 1957, págs. 108, 375.

51.—La Agricultura, Nacional Financiera, S. A., México-Buenos Aires, 1957, pág. 77.

52.—"A Changing Latin America and U. S. Foreing Policy". New University Thought, Chicago, Primavera de 1960, pág. 56.

53.—El sector minero, que es manejado casi exclusivamente por extranjeros, registró un incremento aún mayor que la elaboración, pero ello se debió casi exclusivamente a la extracción de petróleo crudo de Venezuela. Excluyendo el petróleo, el promedio de aumento per cápita sería menor que el incremento del PBN en conjunto (Economic Bulletin for Latin America, CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, vol. 4, No. 1, Marzo de 1959, pág. 49). Incluyendo el petróleo, la participación de la minería en el PBN de Latinoamérica se elevó aproximadamente del 3.5% en 1945 al 5% en 1957.

54.—Con propósitos de comparación, es interesante hacer notar que durante el mismo período aproximadamente, en los países menos desarrollados del campo socialista, la proporción del PBN (bienes materiales) representada por la producción industrial, aumentó más rápidamente y alcanzó en general más altos niveles. Hacia 1958-59, se levó de 40.5 a 66.6% en Rumania; 24.8 a 70.6% en Bulgaria; 9.8 a 55.7% en Albania; 28 a 71% en la República Democrática Popular de Corea; 10 al 37.1% en la República Democrática de Viet-Nam (New Times, Moscú, Edición Inglesa, No. 51, 1960, pág. 6).

55.—Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 3 No. 2, Octubre 1958, págs. 46-47.

56.—Analyses and Projections of Economic Development. VI. The Industrial Development of Peru. Naciones Unidas, 1959, págs., 9, 41, 53.

57.—De 1948-57, los textiles y alimentos-bebidas-tabaco, aumentaron en conjunto en un 45%, mientras los metales básicos al igual que la química, registraron un aumento de más del 80%. La producción de lingotes de acero, ácido sulfúrico, alcalís sódicos y cemento, alcanzaron un aumento superior al doble durante el período 1950-57 (Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 4, No. 1, Marzo de 1959, págs. 51, 54).

58.—Estudio Económico de América Latina 1954. Naciones Unidas 1955, pág. 99.

59.—Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. 3 No. 2, Octubre 1958, págs. 48, 49.

60.—Estudio Económico de América Latina 1956. Naciones Unidas, 1957, pág. 86, y Anuário Estadístico do Brasil 1958, págs. 82, 94-95, 101.

61.—El Desarrollo Económico de la Argentina. vol. 2, págs. 165, 191, 225.

62.—Survey of Current Business. Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos, Septiembre de 1960, págs., 20,22.

63.—Economic Survey of Latin America 1957, pág. 142.

64.—"Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento", Revista Brasiliense. No. 24, 1959 pág. 15.

65.—Report on World Social Situation, Naciones Unidas, 1957, pág. 179.

66.—Armando Samper, según informó Política, México, D. F., Septiembre 1 de 1960, pág. 45.

67.—"A primera vista puede parecer que este incremento en los servicios personales es el mismo fenómeno que ocurre en los países más desarrollados, donde según aumentan los ingresos per cápita la demanda por servicios especializados altamente remunerados es muy elástica. Sin embargo, este no parece ser el caso de... [América Latina] donde los servicios personales pobremente remunerados prevalecen y el exceso de trabajadores que no puede ser absorbido por otras ocupaciones... se oculta de esta manera... En segundo lugar... la clase media, que no puede encontrar una ocupación productiva en actividades económicas privadas, ejerce una presión constante sobre el sector público, el cual evidentemente... debe cumplir una función de absorción de no poca significación social". (**Economic Survey of Latin America 1954**. Naciones Unidas 1955, págs, 26-27).

68.—**El mercado Común Latinoamericano**, pág. 45.

69.—**An International Economy**, New York, 1956, pág. 62. Como se indica en nuestro cuadro, de 1945 a 1957 el coeficiente de inversiones fijas brutas para el conjunto de Latinoamérica fluctuó alrededor de un promedio de un 17% del PBN. En algunos círculos se considera ésta una cifra respetable, especialmente cuando se compara con la gran mayoría de los países subdesarrollados del Sudeste de Asia, donde el coeficiente usualmente es menor del 10%. Esta comparación, sin embargo, lo que hace es señalar lo extremadamente bajo del promedio de formación de capitales en el Sudeste de Asia, en lugar de indicar que en América Latina es adecuado. En 1955, p. e., el coeficiente para ambos, los Estados Unidos y Latinoamérica, fue aproximadamente 17%. Esto significó un promedio de inversiones per cápita de 370 dólares en los Estados Unidos en comparación con 55 dólares en Latinoamérica, es decir, en proporción inversa a las necesidades relativas de desarrollo de las dos regiones. Debe notarse también que el coeficiente neto de inversiones en Latinoamérica ha sido de alrededor del 12%. Como sugiere Simon Kuznets (**Economic Growth: Brasil, India, Japan**, Durham, N. C., E. U. A. 1955, pág. 23)., en los países desarrollados la obsolescencia ejerce una gran función en el consumo de capitales, mientras el empeoramiento físico es el factor principal en los países subdesarrollados. De aquí... "que la comparación propia desde el punto de vista del desarrollo económico, puede establecerse entre la formación bruta de capitales en un país industrial desarrollado y la formación neta en un país subdesarrollado". Si consideramos también la dudosa contribución al desarrollo de Latinoamérica de las inversiones en actividades puramente extractivas y construcción de residencias de lujo, aparece claramente que el problema de formación de capitales en esta región es indudablemente formidable.

70.—Para una narración científica y al mismo tiempo vívida, de los aspectos materiales y humanos de estos problemas, consultar el tratado de Oscar Lewis, **Five Families, Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty**, New York, 1959.

71.—Indices (1950-100) de 1948-57; Argentina —61 a 326; Brasil— 90 a 329; Colombia —78 a 152; Chile— 73 a 1173; Bolivia—66 a 6,937. Del Cuadro 35, "**Cost of Living in Selected Countries**", **Economic Bulletin for Latin America**, vol. 3, Nº 2, Octubre de 1958, pág. 81. En la mayoría de los países, los índices han continuado en aumento. En Brasil, en Diciembre de 1960 el nivel fue más del doble del de 1957 (Monde, Febrero 2 de 1961).

72.—**Economic Survey of Latin America 1957**. Cuadro 115, pág. 115.

73.—**Report on the World Social Situación (1957)**, pág. 182. De acuerdo con Cleantho da Paiva Leite, en el Estado de Piauí, típico exponente de la depresión crónica del Noreste del Brasil los ingresos anuales per cápita se han promediado en alrededor de 45 dólares, o menos del 13% del promedio del estado de Sao Paulo, el más importante productor de café de Brasil y su centro industrial. Alrededor de una tercera parte de la población brasileña vive en el Noreste ("Brasilian Development: One Problem and Two Banks", **Inter-American Economic Affairs**, vol. 14, Nº 1, Verano de 1960, pág. 4.

74.—**Economic Survey Latin America 1957**, págs. 199, 206.

75.—**The Industrial Development of Peru**, págs. 10, 11.

76.—Carl S. Shoup, Director (citado por Otto Feinstein, **The Fiscal System of Venezuela**, Baltimore, 1959, págs. 29-34.

77.—Leo Huberman y Paul M. Sweezy, **Cuba Anatomy of a Revolution**, New York, 1960, págs. 6-7. Los autores observan que este promedio era el mismo que "en el peor año de la peor depresión en la historia de los Estados Unidos", y refleja el hecho de que la economía cubana" se encontraba en un estado de crisis permanente".

78.—**La Distribución del Ingreso y El Desarrollo Económico en México**, México, D. F., 1960, págs. 65, 85.

79.—**Rabotchii Klass V Osvoboditelnom Dvizhenii Narodov Latinskoy Ameriki.** (La clase obrera en el Mvimiento de Liberación Nacional de América Latina). Disertación académica mecanografiada. Academia de Ciencias de la URSS, 1960, vol. I. pág. 233. La fecha de publicación no ha sido anunciada.

80.—**Economic Survey of Latin Aerica 1957**, pág. 292.

81.—Op. cit., pág. 90.

82.—En el orden citado: James (Op. cit., pág. 880); Feinstein. (op. cit., pág. 52) Navarrete (op. cit., pág. 11).

83.—**The Acumulation of Capital**, Londres, 1956, pág. 8.

84.—Otto Feinstein (op. cit., pág. 76) mantiene que América Latina "es la región subdesarrollada que ofrece mejores posibilidades al capitalismo". Aparte de perspectivas mundiales a largo plazo, las posibilidades no son brillantes en ninguna parte del mundo y son particularmente reducidas en América Latina. En las regiones que emergen de una dominación colonial directa, los poderes coloniales frecuentemente se ajustan al cambio manteniendo sus posiciones económicas principales bajo la forma de arreglos neocoloniales; este factor desalienta los experimentos no capitalistas. Además, dada la base económica extremadamente baja, puede operarse algún desarrollo inicial, aunque lento, a través de una combinación de capitalismo privado y capitalismo de Estado. En el conjunto de Latinoamérica el colonialismo directo pasó hace mucho y un desarrollo apreciable del capitalismo nativo, incluyendo el de Estado, se ha operado bajo condiciones neocoloniales. Sectores capitalistas decisivos en manos de inversionistas nacionales, como la banca y la gran industria, el comercio y el transporte, dependen en un grado significativo de las importaciones y del financiamiento extranjero. También dependen del aparato neocolonial de gobierno para defender sus intereses de clase frente a los asalariados. Sus prerrogativas económicas, políticas y sociales, aunque limitadas por el neo-colonialismo, se basan en el mismo. La crisis del neocolonialismo en Latinoamérica es también le crisis del capitalismo nacional y consecuentemente la eliminación del primero, especialmente si resiste tozudamente, como el caso de la experiencia cubana predice, produciría la eliminación del segundo, por lo menos en los sectores básicos de la producción. Tales perspectivas son, desde luego, alentadas por el hecho de que en la sexta década del siglo XX demasiadas personas en América Latina conocen que existe una alternativa mucho más expeditiva y rápida que el desarrollo capitalista.

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14-00000

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	3. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 6. DATE OF INFO. / 7. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

716336

DATA

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-17609
18 AUG 61

CIT ?
OCC ?
Δ KUTULOBSKIY PR. D 13, APT. 127, MOSCOW
G-248
RE-CORRESPONDENCE OF ALBERT MALTZ /201-005239/
AUG 1961.

18 Aug 61

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 / 128 / 561

867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

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HALPERINMPAFR

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?

201-128561

PRESENTLY RESIDING IN MOSCOW

RE ACTIVITIES OF SON DAVID

201-280321

HMMA-16328

25 JAN 61

PAFR

15.

25 Jan 61

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 | 128 | 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

670

ORIG: LESLIE S. BATY
UNIT: WE-1/SWEDEN
EXT: 2619
DATE: 19 JANUARY 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: STOCKHOLM

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. WE 6

INFO: COP, C, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, FE 4, SR 4, WH 4, S/C 2

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2		
3		

SIG

20 JAN 61 00 03Z

PRECEDENCE			
		DEFERRED	
	X	ROUTINE	
		PRIORITY	SIG CEN INITIALS
		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT65055
OUT 65055

TO STOC INFO CITE DIR 21607 21607

[redacted]

REF STOC 1757 (IN 29212)*

1. CAN NOT CONFIRM REPORT. KNOW INTERNATIONAL CP COMMITTEE FOR COOPERATION DISCUSSED AT MEETING BUT DROPPED. DOUBT REPORT FOUNDING PEIPING OFFICE BECAUSE WOULD INDICATE LARGE REPAIR CPSU AND CCP BREACH. WOULD APPRECIATE FURTHER INFO SOURCE AND ACCESS INFO TO DETERMINE IF REPORT COULD BE PLANT.

2. MAURICE HALPERIN, FORMER OSS OFFICER LATIN AMER AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, AND MARTHA DODD STERN, FORMER RESIDENT MEXICO, BOTH PREVIOUSLY IMPLICATED SOV ESPIONAGE IN PBPRIME. BOTH NOW IN BLOC. POUCHING INFO HALPERIN AND STERN AND REPORT LONG HISTORY CHINESE INVOLVEMENT LATIN AMER AFFAIRS. PASS ABOVE TO TIERAB 8.

END OF MESSAGE

*WE COMMENT: REPORTED ORGANIZATIONS FORMED AT CP MEETING IN MOSCOW DEC 1960.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-012 8561
DO NOT DESTROY

[redacted]

c/WE/

CI/ICG/[redacted] JOHN [redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

C/WE-1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

01/51
Halperin

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Copy No.

Go. c 4J

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB 60

Dq 238

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

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PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

1 copy GE/G

1 cc. to CI/SIG for retention

Copy detached for 100-6-113

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/3		30 JAN	30/1/61	
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3. SR/3/CE				
4.				
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17. RID/FI				

AN
AB
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FI
RI/CI/FIP

[illegible] INDICATE DISPOSITION
ATTACHED MATERIAL
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TO RID/DU: ☐ DESTROY
☐ FORWARD DOCUMENT
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FOR DESK WORKING FILE
APPROVED
☑ RETAIN-PLEASE SPECIFY CS FILE NO.
201-128561

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE: Maurice Halperin

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-128561
201-128561

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 18 Jan. 1961

RECORDED DEFERRED

DOCUMENT NUMBER: EGBA 67119

FORM 11-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGBA 67119

TO
Chief, EE (ATTENTION: Chief, SR)
INFO
Chief of Station, Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
Unknown
BOB File 1273

FROM
Chief of Base, Berlin

DATE
18 January 1961

SUBJECT
REDWOOD REDSKIN LCIMPROVE
(Fnu) HALPERIN

RE: "43.3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None. For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

1. In studying routine air travel reports, we have noted that, on 16 January 1961, a Mr. and Mrs. HALPERIN arrived in Berlin from Dusseldorf and proceeded on the same day to Warsaw via Lufthansa Ost. (The booking had been changed from 15 January).

2. It occurs to us that this may be the Latin American specialist HALPERIN who was the subject of recent publicity in connection with work in the Soviet Union, and that this item may be of interest to Headquarters and/or ODENVY.

Dorothy C. Glodeen
DOROTHY C. GLODEEN

APPROVED :
ARTHUR L. HCFSCOS

Distribution:
✓2 - SR
2 - COS, Germany
1 - EE

ehn

201-128561

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~~DEFERRED~~

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ SECRET NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	USSR/CHINA	REPORT NO.	TDCS 3/46[illegible],130
SUBJECT	FOUNDING OF TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS DURING MOSCOW NOVEMBER 1960 CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS	DATE DISTR.	13 JANUARY 1961
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1960	REFERENCES	IN [illegible]
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	SWEDEN, STOCKHOLM (10 JANUARY 1961)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL SWEDISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS USUALLY RELIABLE AND WHO IS A POLISH OFFICIAL WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS.

TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS WERE FOUNDED DURING THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST LEADERS, ONE OF WHICH IS TO BE AN OFFICE DEALING WITH COUNTRIES FORMERLY INCLUDED IN THE FRENCH COLONIAL SYSTEM. THE OTHER IS TO BE AN "OFFICE FOR PERMANENT STUDIES AND COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES" AND IS TO BE ORGANIZED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CUBA. IT WILL BE LOCATED IN PEIPING. THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE IS TO BE DR. [illegible] HALPERIN, FORMER UNIVERSITY OF BOSTON PROFESSOR AND IDENTIFIED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT THE / US IN 1960 AND IS NOW IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR IS TO BE MRS. MARTHA DODD STERN, WHO IS UNDER INDICTMENT BY THE US GOVERNMENT FOR ESPIONAGE

201-166598

201-128561

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	FBI

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

13 Jan 61

201-128561

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

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10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14\.

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-16269
13 JAN 61

PAFR

CIT ?
201-128561
Δ IN CARE OF M. MENDELSON USSR WRITER'S UNION
52 VOROVSKY ST., MOSCOW USSR
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING ALBERT MALTZ AND/OR
MBRS OF HIS FAMILY
NEW YEAR GREETINGS

13 Jan. 61

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

68-105[illegible]

181

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

JAN 11

DATE 11 JANUARY 1961

TO DIRECTOR

FROM STOCKHOLM

ACTION WE 6

Bill Rizon
DC/WE

INFO DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMG, IOC 4
CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2
IW 2, CE 4, FE 4, SR 4, WH 4, S/C 2 (SUSPENSE DD/I)

IN 2921

TO DIR INFO

CITE STOC 1757

62-2-5/3

LCHARVEST

1. TIEBAR[1] 8 MEMO PASSED TO STATION 1[illegible] JAN STATES USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE (IDENTIFIED ORALLY BY T[1] 8 AS [illegible] OFFICIAL WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS) REPORTS TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDED DURING COMMIE MEETING MOSCOW DEC 60. ONE IS OFFICE DEALING WITH COUNTRIES FORMERLY INCLUDED FRENCH COLONIAL SYSTEM. OTHER IS "OFFICE FOR PERMANENT STUDIES AND COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES (PORTION MISSING BEING [illegible]). LATTER TO BE ORGANIZED BY COMMIE PARTIES ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CUBA, LOCATED PEIPING. HEAD OFFICE TO BE DR. M HALPERIN, ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR MRS. HARTA STERN. HALPERIN, FORMERLY [illegible] PROF BOSTON, FORMERLY OSS EMPLOYEE, IS PRESUMED HAVE LEFT PBPRIME[2] 60. STERN ALSO PBPRIME[2] CITIZEN.

2. T[1] 8 STATED ONE MRS. STERN, PBPRIME[2] CITIZEN, WAS IN SWEDEN IN EARLY 50. NO STATION TRACES STERN OR HALPERIN.

3. T[1] 8 ANXIOUS HAVE REPORT CONFIRMED AS [illegible] SOURCE; WOULD LIKE HQS COMMENTS HALPERIN AND [illegible] INVOLVEMENT AND WHETHER LATTER WAS IN SWEDEN; BELIEVES IMPORTANT DETERMINE IF OFFICE ACTUALLY LOCATED PEIPING AND NOT MOSCOW, FOR TO HIM THIS WOULD MEAN MAJOR ALLOCATION RESPONSIBILITY.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-0134561
DO NOT DESTROY

CI SI
file re
Maurice HALPERIN

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 11 JANUARY 1961

TO

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING

1

2

3

4

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6

IN 29212

STOC 1757

PAGE TWO

TO

INFO

CITE

4. PLS ADVISE INCLUDING BACKGROUND CHICOM LATIN AMERICAN ACTIVITY FOR T 8. PARA 1 ABOVE MAY BE DISSEMED IF WORTHWHILE.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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FILE NO. 201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

612

DATE : 6 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/SI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☑ Name required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING	
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JAN 7 0220Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 27546

DIR CITE MEXI 7055

REF DIR 18890 (OUT 58500)

IP

1. DAVID HALPERIN, FX son of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN (201-128561) IN LIFEAT SEBORER TRAFFIC 22 DEC 60. ON 23 DEC LIFEAT INFORMED HE AT NUEVO HOTEL WALDORF in Mexico City WITH TWO UNNAMED CLASSMATES AND WIFE OF ONE CLASSMATE. PLANNED SEE ANNA SEBORER 23 DEC 60 AT LATTER'S HOME.

Re surveillance of subject

2. LIFEAT TAKE ABOVE DATES GIVEN LOCAL ODENVY 23 AND 27 DEC 60.

3. PER REF STATION ASKED LOCAL ODENVY IF PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER STATION SUPPORT DESIRED. ODENVY SAID NO. STATION OPINION ODENVY HAS SURVEILLANCE SUBJECT.

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED ODENVY ENDEAVORING DEVELOP MORE INFO ON ITINERARY RE TRAVELS OF DAVID HALPERIN.

MICROFILMED
MAR 16 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	BR
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DESTROY	
RI/FI	

FORM 1389a

SECRET

7 Jan 61

201-128561 ✓

675

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: BIRCH D. O'NEAL
UNIT: CI/SI
EXT: 2356
DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1960

TO: MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/SI
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☑ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
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PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 30 DEC 60 23 29z
ROUTINE
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 58500
OUT 58500

TO PRIORITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 18890

Halperin (201-128561)

1. ODENVY ADVISES DAVID HALPERIN SON OF MAURICE HAS SCHEDULED ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 29 DECEMBER BY CAR. IS ENROUTE EUROPE WHERE WILL MEET FATHER. ODENVY ENDEAVORING DEVELOP MORE ON INTINERARY AND HAS NOT AS YET MADE SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR COVERAGE.

Re surveillance

2. DESIRE YOU COORDINATE WITH LOCAL ODENVY REP AND OBTAIN ANY COVERAGE POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH ODENVY INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	8573
RI/TY	683
~~[illegible]~~	
RI/FI	

30 Dec 60
201-128561

CHIEF, WH
RELEASING OFFICER

CHIEF, WH/3/MEXI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

ACTING CHIEF, CI STAFF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 1389a

HALPERN

A# 03314

Maurice HALPERN (201-

American born expatriate, went to Moscow ca 1958-59. Writes propaganda articles for the Sovs. is economist. Father lives New York City.

Is his sister Leontina Rizhik? A# 27771
201-761615

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman
Traveled to the USSR in
October 1958

Prepared by CI Staff
for State Nov. 60

The following is SECRET:

On 15 July 1960 Maurice Hyman HALPERIN and his wife, Edith Frisch HALPERIN applied at the United States Embassy in Moscow, USSR for a renewal of their passports. HALPERIN is reported to have stated that he had been in the USSR since December 1958 as a visiting professor of the Social Sciences Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences on a contract which expires in 1961. In 1948 Elisabeth BENTLEY, an admitted former Soviet espionage agent, stated that she had become acquainted with HALPERIN in the latter part of 1942 through arrangements made by Jacob GOLOS, a known Soviet espionage agent. She further stated that during the time HALPERIN was employed by the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D. C., he supplied GOLOS with information to which he had access in his office. In late 1953 HALPERIN left the United States for Mexico after refusing on constitutional grounds to tell the U. S. Senate Internal Sub-Committee whether he was ever a member of the Communist Party. In 1958, following the efforts made by the Government of Mexico to deport a number of American Communists, HALPERIN and his wife went to the USSR where they now reside.

— Nov 60

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

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HALPERIN, MAURICE /PROF./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?

201-128561

CORRESPONDENCE FROM MARGARET MALTZ RE NEWS NOVY MIR TO PUBLISH SEVEN SHARES IN A GOLD MINE 20 SEP 60.

201-005239
HMMA-15870
28 OCT 60

570789

PAFR

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28 Oct 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

NEW AGGRESSION C[illegible]--The Cubans consider as a [illegible] aggression against Cuba, by the United States, the measure taken by the Inter-American Defense Board preventing the Cuban delegate on the board to visit U.S. bases. (Ciudad Trujillo, Radio Caribe, Oct. 13, 1960, 10[illegible] GMT--P)

CUBAN-SOVIET COMMITTEE--In Moscow the Cuban-Soviet Committee was formed, which is sponsored by the Soviet Association for Friendship and Cooperation with the Latin American countries. Cuban Ambassador Faure Chaumon and several other Cubans attended the installation ceremony. (Ciudad Trujillo, Radio Caribe, Oct. 13, 1960, 1000 GMT--P) (UNCLASSIFIED)

BOGOTA POLITICAL CONFERENCE--Capt. Antonio Nunez Jimenez, director of the Cuban National Institute for Agrarian Reform, has been invited to attend the meeting of Latin American political leaders which will begin on Oct. 22 in Bogota, Colombia. So far 23 persons from nine Latin American countries have said they will attend the meeting. (Havana, PRENSA LATINA, Oct. 7, 1960, 1705 GMT--E)

STUDENTS TO GDR--Three Cuban students on scholarships will study economic sciences and medicine at the Leipzig and Karl Marx Universities in the GDR. The students, Angel N. Alfonso, Consuelo Mesa, and Juan P. Oliva, will leave for the GDR Oct. 14 to begin the university course which will last a year. (Havana, PRENSA LATINA, Oct. 13, 1960, 1553 GMT--E)

7-13 oct 60

201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

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11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

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[illegible]

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561

201-005239
HMMA-15715
23 SEP 60
0P-974

PAFR

28 Sep 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

6 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
(201-128561)

1. On 5 September 1960 an article appeared in The Washington Post and Times Herald in which Maurice Hyman HALPERIN was quoted as saying that the statement issued by the United States Department of State concerning his employment by the Soviet Government was a "deliberate and malicious distortion". HALPERIN was also quoted as saying that he was associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics from 1945 to the "crisis" in 1958. HALPERIN added that he is "not working for the Soviet Government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government owned concert hall".

2. According to Mr. Lloyd Frank JORDAN, Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), 2618 Barton Hall, extension 4201, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is directly subordinate to the USSR Council of Ministers and it receives broad directive for work to be undertaken by the Academy from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. Mr. JORDAN stated that anyone associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR would be in the employ of the Soviet Government. Mr. JORDAN said that there are two studies showing the relationship of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to the Soviet Government; one is OCI-5613/59 which is classified, and the other a study issued by the U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations on "National Policy Machinery in the USSR" which is unclassified.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
Chief, CI/SIG

cc: Chief, CI Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI/SIG c/ [illegible] 50 9/7/60
1 - RID (201-128561)

SECRET

CI/SIG:AFgerter:rel

WASH DC STAR 5 Sept. 60

Halperin Denies Giving Reds Advice on Latins

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (AP)—Maurice H. Halperin, former United States Government official who now lives in Moscow, yesterday accused the State Department of issuing a "deliberate and malicious distortion" about his status here.

In a typewritten statement, Mr. Halperin said:

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow . . . I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it."

Last week Senator Keating, Republican of New York, read into the Congressional Record a State Department document which said Mr. Halperin is now in Moscow and is "working for the Soviet government."

Headed OSS Unit

The document said there were indications Mr. Halperin is giving the Soviet government advice on Latin-American affairs. During World War II, Mr. Helperin was head of the Latin American division of the United States Office of Strategic Services, an intelligence organization.

After the war, Mr. Halperin got a job with Boston University as a professor. He lost this job in 1953 because he refused to tell congressional investigators whether he ever had been a member of the American Communist Party.

The bald, mustached 54-year-old Mr. Halperin was located Sunday in a Moscow apartment house by a newsman and was asked to comment on the State Department's document.

Declines to Elaborate

(Moscow reported there were "technical difficulties" in moving the story until Monday. The newsman apparently was cut off while trying to telephone the story.)

Mr. Halperin first declined to admit the newsman into his apartment, but agreed to meet him later in the lobby of a nearby hotel where he promised to give a written statement.

Mr. Halperin appeared punctually at the agreed hour. He carried the following statement, on which he declined to elaborate:

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are scraping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this stale red herring.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two United States income tax returns, listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn (an American pianist) when he performs in a government-owned concert hall.

"I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it, as some of our leading scientists can testify. My appointment and my Soviet visa expires in July, 1961, as the United States Embassy here very well knows.

"My teaching and resource activities involve theoretical problems related to the economic growth of underdeveloped areas. For the State Department to say that I am 'advising the Russians on Latin-American affairs' is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin-American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958. When my book is published it will be available to the State Department and anybody else willing to purchase a copy."

The United States Embassy declined to comment on the statement or on Mr. Halperin's status. It did say he appeared at the embassy in July and asked to have his American passport renewed. The request was granted, an embassy official said.

Washington Post
5 Sept. 1960

Halperin Says Reds Not Not Employ Him

MOSCOW, Sept. 4 (UPI) Maurice H. Halperin today branded a reported State Department statement that he is working as an adviser to the Soviet government on Latin American affairs as a "deliberate and malicious distortion."

In a statement to reporters, Halperin said he is a professor associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics, and, he explained, the American authorities know all about it.

(A State Department document in Washington last week said Halperin, a former Boston University professor and World War II intelligence specialist on Latin American affairs, was working for the Soviet government.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N. Y.), had the document entered in the Congressional Record.)

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are sweeping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this red herring," Halperin said.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival, I have filed two U. S. income tax returns, listing my salary and employer.

"I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government-owned concert hall," he continued.

"I am a visiting professor in the USSR Academy of Sciences, and not the first American to be associated with it. For the State of Department to say that I am an adviser to the Russians on Latin-American affairs is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin American economy from 1945 to the crisis of 1958."

Washington Post

5-Sep 60

201-128561

File in 201

The New York Times
1 September 1960

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Ex-Boston U. Professor Was in O.S.S. in World War II

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 31 — The State Department has disclosed that a former United States Intelligence official is in Moscow working for the Soviet Government.

He is Dr. Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University professor who was head of the Latin American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

Dr. Halperin was dismissed from Boston University in 1954 after he refused to say whether he was a Communist. He has been linked in testimony before Senate investigators to a Soviet spy ring.

The State Department's disclosure was contained in a memorandum in support of a proposed law to deny passports to persons supporting international communism.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1958 that passports could not be denied to Communists or others because of their political beliefs.

Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, were then in Mexico City, the State Department noted. They had been linked to the escape behind the Iron Curtain of Alfred K. and Martha Dodd Stern, who were under Federal indictment for espionage.

After the Supreme Court ruling, the Halperins applied to the United States Embassy in

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

Mexico City for passports and left Mexico Oct. 13, 1958. At the time, the State Department noted, they were about to be deported from Mexico for Communist activities.

Reports that Dr. Halperin was working for the Soviet Government in Moscow were confirmed last July 15, the State Department memorandum went on, when he and his wife appeared at the embassy to renew their passports.

Embassy officials reported that they had been told by Dr. Halperin that he and his wife had been in the Soviet Union since December, 1958, and that he was working for the Soviet Academy of Sciences "doing research in the foreign field, especially relating to underdeveloped countries."

The State Department, recalling that Dr. Halperin was an authority on Latin-American affairs, added that "our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

State Department officials have repeatedly called attention to the Soviet trade and cultural offensive in Latin America.

Referring to Dr. Haleprin's employment by the Soviet Academy, the State Department observed that it was directly subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Requested by Keating

The memorandum was prepared at the request of Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Republican of New York. He and Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, are sponsoring a bill that seeks to restore some of the State Department's authority to deny passports.

Senator Keating, who entered the memorandum in The Congressional Record of Aug. 16, expressed regret at the time that his bill was not likely to be passed in this session of Congress. President Eisenhower and State Department officials have backed the purpose of the measure.

Meanwhile, Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activity, said he had ordered a month-long preliminary investigation into the case of two missing employes of the National Security Agency.

The two employes of the top-secret coding agency, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, are alleged to home taken valuable secrets to the Soviet Union.

Representative Walter said that he understood that one of the missing men had made enquiries in their agency about the U-2 reconnaissance plane flight over the Soviet Union before it took place on May 1.

Mr. Walter said that he was convinced that the Soviet had had advance knowledge of the flight. Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, was downed in the Soviet Union and subsequently sentenced to ten years detention.

Refused to Appear

BOSTON, Aug. 31—Dr. Halperin was officially dismissed from the faculty of Boston University on Jan. 6, 1954. He had refused a summons to appear before a university committee of review to discuss his case.

Dr. Harold C. Case, president of the university, telephoned Dr. Halperin in Mexico City offering to pay his expenses to Boston and return. But the professor declined. He had been chairman of the university's Latin-American regional studies.

201-128561

Washington Post
1 Sept. 1960

Thursday, Sept. 1, 1960 THE WASHINGTON POST

Halperin, U. S. Ex-Aide, Is Now a Soviet Official

Associated Press

The State Department says that Maurice H. Halperin, a former United States Government official linked by Senate investigators to Soviet espionage activities, apparently is serving now as a Latin-American adviser to the Russians.

Halperin was head of the Latin-American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during the latter part of World War II and later an associate professor at Boston University. Before the war, he had been on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma.

In 1954 he was dismissed by Boston University after Senate investigators received testimony linking him to a Soviet spy ring and he refused to answer a question as to whether he was a Communist.

The latest information on Halperin's whereabouts is contained in a report compiled by the State Department about persons to whom it has been compelled to issue passports under a 1958 decision of the Supreme Court.


Associated Press

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
... believed Soviet employe

The Court held that the Department lacks authority to deny passports to Communists or to other persons because of their political beliefs.

After the ruling, Halperin applied for a passport at the American Embassy in Mexico City, where he had gone after being dismissed by Boston University, and used it to leave Mexico on Oct. 13, 1958.

The State Department said that shortly after Halperin and his wife departed from Mexico it received information that he was employed in Moscow by the Soviet Union.

"This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their U. S. passports for renewal," the Department's report said, adding:

"Halperin stated that he had been in the U.S.S.R. since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences where he is doing research in the foreign field, specially, relating to undeveloped countries."

The Department recalled that Halperin was something of an authority on Latin-American affairs and said, "Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

1 Sep 60
201-128561

14-00000

Ex-OSS Official Works For Reds in Moscow

WASH DC
STAR
31 Aug 60

By VICTOR LASKY
North American Newspaper Alliance

A former Boston University professor, who once was a high official in the OSS, has turned up in Moscow working for the Soviet government.

The professor, Dr. Maurice H. Halperin, fled this country seven years ago after an inquiry into his Communist background.

According to the State Department, he probably is advising Soviet officials on Latin American affairs, an area in which he is expert.

Prof. Halperin was suspended by Boston University in 1953 after he refused, on constitutional grounds, to tell a Senate subcommittee whether he had ever been a Communist Party member.

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
—AP Photo

According to the State Department, he had previously been involved in Soviet espionage in wartime Washington. He had been named by Elizabeth Terril Bentley, admitted former spy courier, as one of her sources of supply among Government officials.

Intrigue in Mexico

And since 1953, Dr. Halperin has been involved in still more intrigue as an "exile" in Mexico. It was he, for example, who assisted two suspected spies in their flight from Mexico to Czechoslovakia to avoid United States extradition proceedings.

On July 15, 1960, Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow to present their United States passports for renewal.

All this was disclosed in a State Department memorandum prepared for Senator Keating, Republican of New York, who has been urging the passage of Eisenhower-supported legislation empowering the department to deny passports to active participants in Soviet skullduggery.

The memorandum, citing "cases where passports have had to be issued to known Communists," devoted considerable attention to the case of Dr. Halperin. It was obvious on the basis of the information contained in his dossier that the State Department had been keeping an eye on the former professor's movements for some time.

Fired in Oklahoma

From 1931 to 1941, Dr. Halperin—a Harvard University graduate—had been a professor at the University of Oklahoma. According to the record, it was in this period that he directed Communist activities in Oklahoma and, on repeated visits to Mexico, conferred with Mexican Red leaders. On one visit to Cuba in 1935, he and other leftwingers had been arrested by Cuban authorities and expelled from the country.

In 1941, much of this was disclosed in an investigation conducted by an Oklahoma State legislative committee. The committee, investigating subversive activities in Oklahoma, produced information that in 1940 Dr. Halperin had cashed a check for $436 drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade in Moscow. As a result, Dr. Halperin was dismissed from the University of Oklahoma.

Despite this record, Dr. Halperin managed to enter Gov-

See HALPERIN, Page A-6

HALPERIN

Continued From First Page

ernment service. Employed as chief of the Latin American division of the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was then the United States Civilian Intelligence-Gathering Agency), he later was transferred to the State Department. In both agencies, according to the Elizabeth Bentley testimony, he transmitted confidential documents to a Soviet spy ring.

Linked to Spy Ring

In 1949, he became head of the Latin American regional students section at Boston University's College of Liberal Arts.

A year later, he was first publicly identified as a member of a Soviet spy ring. This came about when Vice President Nixon, then a California Congressman, made known a top secret memorandum on espionage transmitted by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House on November 8, 1945.

In March, 1953, in Boston's Federal Building, Dr. Halperin repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when—in a hearing conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—he refused to reply to

[illegible]

various questions concerning his alleged Communist activities.

In November, 1953, Dr. Halperin and his wife, without notifying the university, left their home in the middle of the night never to return. Turning up in Mexico, they became members of the American Communist group in Mexico.

Like most ACGM members, the Halperins did well. They invested in an ice cream company, dabbled in real estate, and obtained jobs. Dr. Halperin was employed by the Mexican government as a financial consultant and his wife taught in the American School Foundation.

They also became friendly with Alfred K. Stern and his wife, the former Martha Dodd, daughter of a former United States Ambassador to Germany. The fact the Sterns had been implicated in Soviet espionage came out with the arrest in New York of Jack Soble, a Soviet agent. To avoid being extradited to the United States to testify before a special grand jury on their associations with Soble and "the double agent Boris Morros," the Sterns fled to Czechoslovakia in July, 1957.

Dr. Halperin, described as being "intimately involved in their plans for escape," had obtained airline reservations for the Sterns under other names. As a result, the Mexican government was considering his case for deportation. On October 12, 1958, the Halperins left Mexico, having obtained plane reservations in the names of other persons.

In Russia Since 1958

The State Department memorandum concludes:

"We received information shortly after Halperin's departure from Mexico that he was employed in Moscow by the USSR. This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their United States passports for renewal.

"Halperin stated that he had been in the USSR since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences where he is doing research . . . relating to underdeveloped countries.

"It will be recalled that Halperin is something of an authority on Latin American affairs. Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time.

"The Soviet Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers."

31 Aug 60

201-128561

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561.
LETTER TO SR. SRA, ALBERT MALTZ /RE FAMILY MATTERS, COMMING VISIT OF HALPERIN CHILDREN, MALTZ VISIT.

201-005239
HMMA-15425
03 AUG 60
P-974

PAFR

3 Aug 60

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
9-57

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/An

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. 046 WHD Bastin			5 APR 1960	
4.				
5. Hyn			16/IV	
6. King		18 Apr	18	mck
7. Hughes				EHH
8.				
9. CI/SID/Geller		25-IV-60	29 APR 1960	
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20. RID/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

credit

Copies detached

RECORD COPY

X REF 201-5239

Per DDF-45587, 24 Mar 60, Hqs not required to pass to FBI these ltrs which were passed to FBI in [illegible] mak

Copy filed 100-6-113

HALPERIN, MAURICE H.

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT INDEX	FILE NUMBER 201-128561 AK
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE 5 APR	DOCUMENT NUMBER MA-14789

FORM 4-60 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14789

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-128561

P-1115

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 8 April 1960

SUBJECT: Maurice H. HALPERIN

RE "143" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

REFERENCE(S):

SOURCE: LIE[illegible]/LIMUD

1. Attached for your information and retention are two items of correspondence sent from Moscow by Maurice H. HALPERIN and/or Edith HALPERIN to the Albert MALTZ(201-5239) family in Mexico.

2. Copies of this correspondence have been given to ODENVY locally for their information.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments

1- negatives, 1 letter, 1 post card

2- prints 3 negatives

6 April 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS w/atts

8 Apr 60

CS COPY H-ENCL 201-128561

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

negatives, HMMA-14789

Att. 1 to HMMA-14789 (negatives)

8 Apr 60
201-128561

NDAY, JULY 1

HOLIDAY THRILLERS

PATRICK QUENTIN
his 'Shadow of Guilt'
'Enthrallingly readable'—S. Times

ELIZ. FENWICK
her 'A Long Way Down'
'Brilliant'—Western Mail

EDWIN LANHAM
his 'Double Jeopardy'
'A great climax'—L'pool Post

JEAN POTTS
her 'Blood Will Tell'
'First-rate'—Sphere

DESMOND O'NEILL
his 'Life Has No Price'
'Unusually good'—Spectator

"GOBBLING BILLY"

Dyneley James novel about a VETERAN CAR that they are calling "as good as Genevieve"

"7 SHARES IN A GOLD MINE"

This astonishing real-life crime story by Margaret Larkin has created an immediate sensation

"Fascinating, enthralling"

Mrs. E. Halpern
Kutuzovsky Prospect 13
Apt 127
Moscow G.245
U.S.S.R.

PAR AVION

МОСКВА

МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ

Mrs Margaret Maltz
Yaxle 14
San Angel
Mexico City

МЕКСИКА

201-128??1

Att #2 to HMMA-14589

August 6, 1959.
Kutuzovsky Prospect 13
Apt 127
Moscow G 248.
U.S.S.R.

Dearest Margaret & family,

We missed all of you when you left. Even now we often look up at your window hoping you still may be there.

Thanks for thinking of David. He bought a guitar - has been playing folk tunes since.

We are well. It's hot and dusty here now, but we manage. Our apt's fine. Our trip of 7 days at Leningrad was most delightful. It's a real interesting city and the Hermitage comes real close to the Louvre.

David got notice to day he passed the first half - 6 - all he took - of his National Medical Board exams. He made 78 - 75's passing, we are pleased.

What's new with all of you. How's the weather? How did you enjoy Paris. We did get your book from London & gave it to the Doctor. Saw the clipping in London Paper. Congratulations!!

Love from all of us -

Edith.



ION

Leningrad
29/7/59

This is the view from our hotel window. You mustn't miss this town next time – it's a city in the grand tradition: palaces, parks and wonderful people.

Elia David [illegible]

Familia MALTZ
Yarto 14
México 20, D.F.
MEXICO



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/SID

NO. CSCI-3/759,324

DATE 1 Apr 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WE/3			JC	For Coordination
2.				
3. Chief, CI Staff			SHB	
4.				12856
5. CI/LSN	31 MAR 1960			
6.				
7. RID/AN		4/4	Lac	
8. RID/MIS				°HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman 201-128561 ✓
9. RID/AN		7/4	Lac	~~201-[illegible]~~
10. RID/MIS				ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE 1 APR 1960
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RI/FI				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

1 APR 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-14303

1. This office has learned through a sensitive source of known reliability that, for many years, Maurice Hyman HALPERIN has been acquainted with a Dr. Marc JAIMA who had an office at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15, France.

2. On 12 February 1960 we learned through a delicate source who has provided reliable information in the past that Marc JAIMA, M. D., a naturalized French citizen, born on 29 December 1906 in Ismail, Rumania, resides with his family at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15. His wife, Ernestine Monique JAIMA, nee SEGAL, was born in Paris on 30 January 1913. A son, Serge JAIMA, was born on 7 October 1940 in Charenton-le-Pont, Seine, France. This source had no derogatory information on JAIMA.

3. According to our records, a Dr. M. JAIMA, living at 55 bis rue de la Convention, Paris 15, was a member of the "Comite d'Initiative" (organizing committee) of MRAP (le Movement Contre le Racisme, l'Anti-Semitisme et Pour la Paix - Movement Against Racism, Anti-Semitism and for Peace), a Communist front organization formed in 1949 to promote Communism among Jewish elements. However, our records fail to show any continued record of activity in this organization on the part of JAIMA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: S. H. Horton
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/759,324

COPY FILED IN 201-272727

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
CS COPY

201-128561
~~201-155653~~

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WE/3
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SIG
√1 - RID (201-272727 re JAIMA)
1 - RID (201-185053 re HALPERIN)

Dossy cys:
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A

CI/SIG:AEgerter:das (28 March 1960)
A Egerter

Based on UFPA-50546, dated 12 February 1960, Source: UNKAVE

201-128561
~~201-185053~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION		
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)



HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-271376
HMMA-14482
10 FEB 60

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP IN MEXICO. CONTACT OF ADOLFO RUDICH GOLDBERG 201-271376 10 FEB 57.

CORR CARD

R 7302220210

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 128561			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(7-46)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM
CI/SID

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief, CI				
2.				
3. CI/CPS/Evans		4	4	
4. SR/COP/CE		1959		
5. ~~Selma~~ WH/3		9 1959	9 1959	
6.				
7. Dulin Collins WE/3 Clarke				
8.				
9. Chief, WE/3			14 Nov	
10.				
11. RI				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/AN				
15. RI/FI				
16.				
17.				
18.				

COMMENTS

Halperin, Maurice
Lyman

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS	
NAME	OFFICE
J. Evans Jean Evans	CI/CPS
	WH/3
	WE/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
J. Angleton James Angleton	Chief, CI Staff

RELEASING OFFICER	
NAME	TITLE
	C/WE/3 ~~Chief, WE Division~~

ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER
201-128561 ✓

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
		CFN-[illegible]

FORM 3-58 610b

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
NOFORN [illegible] CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OFPW-26192

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-128561

DATE
[illegible]

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM
Chief, WE Division

SUBJECT
General - LCMAYFOWL
Specific - Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Born 3 March 1906, Boston, Mass.

ACTION REQUIRED
See Paragraph 3

REFERENCE(S)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. It has come to our attention through a sensitive source of known reliability that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, a former member of our predecessor organization, apparently has known the following individual for a number of years:

Dr. Marc *JAINA
74 Avenue Gastob Boissier
Viroflay (Seine et Oise), France

Office address c 1945
55 bis rue de la Convention
Paris 15, France

2. HALPERIN, who is residing in the USSR at the present time, is of continuing interest to us because of his prior connection with our predecessor organization and the Department of State and because of his association with known Soviet agents including Martha Dodd STERN and her husband, Alfred K. STERN. In the summer of 1959 HALPERIN's son, Charles (Carlos) David *HALPERIN, who is generally known as David HALPERIN (born 5 May 1937, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), visited the JAINA family in Paris en route to and from the USSR to see his parents. It is believed that he was in Paris c 25-30 June 1959 and again in the latter part of August 1959.

3. We would appreciate having you attempt to obtain information on JAINA through your independent sources. We prefer not to disclose to your liaison services our knowledge of HALPERIN's connection with the JAINA family because of the sensitivity of our source. However, we would have no objection to your querying your liaison services for information on David HALPERIN based upon the attached newspaper clipping. David HALPERIN is now in Chicago, Illinois where he is studying medicine. Maurice HALPERIN attended the Universite de Paris c 1929-1931.

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - WE/3 w/att.
1 - WH/3 w/att.
1 - RID (201-128561) w/att.
3 - CI/SID w/3 atts.

CI/SID:AEgerter:lac/2356

A. Egerter

14 Dec 59
201-128561

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
☐ CONTINUED
PAGE NO.

14-00000

The Washington Post
6 December 1958

6 Dec 58

Red Asylum in Mexico . . *By Roscoe Drummond*

Foreign Communists Find It a Safe Operating Base

MEXICO CITY—Foreign Communists continue to find Mexico an easy and valuable base from which to operate—and they are operating on a large scale today.

Drummond

Mexico provides not only a welcome haven when things get too hot at home—there are at least 100 Communist families from the United States here right now—but also a strategic spot from which to mount subversive activities throughout the western hemisphere.

For years the Mexican government has given safe harbor for foreign Communists—as well as revolutionaries of the extreme right—on the theory that it was applying the respected and humane concept of asylum for those suffering political persecution.

Mexican leaders and intellectuals greatly pride themselves that their country offers asylum so freely and so unquestioningly and there is no evidence that the new government will change this policy in any important particular.

What Mexican leaders do not choose to recognize is that there is a vast difference between providing asylum for those who are persecuted and providing asylum for those who use this privilege to prepare persecution against others.

THIS IS the way the great [illegible] tradition of political asylum is being abused here today. The record is perfectly clear on that.

For five years Mexico harbored some 100 to 150 Venezuelan Communist leaders assembled under the direction of the Soviet Embassy. They carried on subversion against their country from within Mexico and the dangerous rise of communism in Venezuela came from services rendered while Mexico was making it safe for them to operate. They have now made their way back to Venezuela.

There is a group of at least 80 Guatemalan Communists who are doing the same thing and are waiting only the timely moment to return.

Occasionally a foreign Communist violates his "asylum" so blatantly that he runs afoul of the law here or elsewhere. This is what happened to Jose Manuel Fortuny, the Secretary General of the Communist Party in Guatemala, who has been operating freely here for some time. He obtained a false Mexican passport to go to Moscow a few weeks ago, but this became known and had to be discarded. He started his return trip by way of Rio de Janeiro and was picked up by the alert Brazilian police for presenting another false passport.

THE ADULT United States Communist population here hovers around 200 most of the time. Once in a while a U. S. Communist, as in the recent case of Gus Hall, is given over to U. S. authorities. But this is a rarity. When Communist Albert S. Stern whose wife is Communist Martha Dodd Stern, was wanted to testify in the Soble Soviet spy case, he was sheltered safely here. They both made off for Prague, where they were lately joined by Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University teacher who was also living here—and now all three are ready for future assignments.

Moscow maintains a busy and bulging embassy in Mexico City, one of its largest in the western hemisphere, to direct and energize subversive operations. There are 128 adults on the embassy list and 48 children. Wives do their embassy chores whether they are accredited or not.

The clandestine character of much of the Soviet embassy's role here is illustrated by its extremely tight operations. It does not permit itself to employ a single Mexican national to do even the most menial caretaking work. A Mexican isn't allowed even to polish the knob on the outside of the front door. It uses only ten non-Soviet employes and these are Communists imported from Spain. All ten speak Russian fluently.

Even the education of the children of the embassy staff is carried on inside the embassy walls and no Mexican teachers are employed.

The Soviet embassy has ten officers on its military staff among whom are three naval captains—this in a country whose navy is virtually nonexistent. This staff is obviously more concerned with what military secrets it can procure from the United States than from Mexico, particularly since the border is so easy to cross by agents who serve the Soviets here in Mexico.

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201-128561

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14

CSCI-3/757639

8 DEC 1959

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Albert MALTZ

REFERENCE: CSCI-3/755,300, dated 26 June 1959

Listed below are the names of persons or companies with whom Subject and/or his wife have been in correspondence during the period 17 August to 23 October 1959. For your information only, a photocopy of each item is attached. Since the following correspondence was obtained from a highly sensitive source, information contained herein should not be disseminated outside of your Bureau.

1. Correspondence with Ed MALTZ, 27 E. 72th Street, New York 21. (Attachment I)

   a) In a short letter postmarked 14 September 1959 the writer asks Subject and his wife to send a note to "Aunt Marg", at Forest Hills Nursing Home, Yellowstone Blvd., Forest Hills, N.Y. Enclosed with the letter is a small newspaper clipping, apparently to point out that Paul NEWMAN will do *Exodus*.

   b) A personal letter from "Ed", with no return address, is postmarked New York City. Enclosed with the letter is a copy of the first page of the Sports Section from the 27 September 1959 issue of the *New York Times*.

   c) An unsigned personal letter, bearing no return address, is postmarked New York City and addressed to Miss Kathy MALTZ. Ed MALTZ is apparently planning to visit Mexico during December. He enclosed a newspaper clipping, concerning actors who are taking part in the film production of *Exodus*, for delivery to Subject.

Card as correspondent of Albert Maltz 201-5239

air Poland

CA

2. Correspondence with Maxim [illegible], Marszalkowska 10/16 m 71, Warsaw, Poland. (Attachment 2)

see p. 2

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CONTINUED CONTROL

201-5239

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a) In a personal letter dated 17 August 1959, addressed to Margaret MALTZ and signed by "Maxim," one paragraph reads: "You may have been joking when you spoke of 'delirious crowds who greeted Nixon.' The fact, alas, is that the crowds were less [illegible] enthusiastic, DESPITE THE FACT THAT [illegible] IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE RADIO ANNOUNCED THE HOUR OF THE ARRIVAL AND THE ROUTE TO BE TAKEN. The Poles still feel closer to the USA than to the USSR. After all, they have millions of kinsfolk in the States who send them food or clothing or money."

b) MALTZ forwarded a letter dated 14 September 1959, which had been addressed to [illegible], at Apartado 21378 in Mexico City, from Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., publishers, 750 Third Ave., New York. The letter, signed by Lisa M. MAYER, of the School Textbook Department, requests LIEBER's permission to reprint "A Shipment of Mute Fate" by Martin STORM, adapted for radio by Les CRUTCHFIELD.

c) A letter dated 24 September 1959 from "Maxim" is addressed to Subject's wife. LIEBER is glad to learn that Bart FLES, New York literary agent, has no objection to LIEBER's handling [illegible] [illegible] in a Cold [illegible] for possible Polish publication. [illegible] cannot understand why Subject's wife should wish to disguise herself by using the pen name "Eugenio Pol[illegible]sky." "Unless in selecting a Russian pseudonym you wished in this subtle fashion to cast aspersion on the Russian character." LIEBER has just returned from Bulgaria, where he had spent fifteen days "on a perfectly glorious beach on the Black Sea .... we have little to complain about, especially since Khrushchev is strengthening the peace front." LIEBER had received a letter from Phil [presumably Philip STEVENSON] and also a card from "Jerry, who seems to be enjoying Moscow. His wife, Alice, returned to the states. Question: Will Jerry follow?" Toward the end of the letter LIEBER thanks his correspondent for the greetings from Salvador OCAMPO and Berta. "What, I wonder, is Salvador doing since the dismal failure of that bandit? It may interest you to know that Alice MILVY, the widow of the lawyer who had set up that scoundrel with a substantial sum, told us that her husband had also been victimised, and he had been one of [illegible]'s closest friends." LIEBER's letter also indicates that Margaret MALTZ stayed at the Grand Hotel while in Warsaw.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

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d) Note from Subject to LINDER, dated 7 October 1959. Subject has mailed a check to LINDER's account in [illegible] and will continue to transfer the interest, apparently on some investment, about every two months.

e) Letter from LINDER, addressed to Subject and dated 7 October 1959. LINDER will have a statement notarized by a [illegible] officer to indicate MALTZ is holding "[illegible] funds" for the LINDERs. LINDER mentions "the various reverential references to 'God' that Khrushchev has been making on his transcontinental tour. Rather [illegible] for the kind of atheist K. insists he is. But I'm sure that a good part of the American people are [illegible] impressed ... I personally feel convinced that Khrushchev's visit to the U.S.A. is going to compel a relaxation of tensions." In this letter LINDER says he was down on the Black Sea coast in Bulgaria for the first twenty days of September. In expressing sorrow over the death of Dr. Ernesto [illegible], LINDER writes, "I even have a sense of guilt and complicity in his tragic and untimely end (Ursula [Dr. [illegible]'s wife], by the way, indicated that this wasn't normal, but of course this remains between us) because while he was still in Mexico Ernesto had written us to say how anxious he was to get to one of the people's democracies where he could make a contribution; and we pulled a number of wires here and in Berlin to achieve this for him."

3. Correspondence with Maurice HALPERIN, Kutusovsky Prospect, 13, Apartment 127, Moscow G-151. (Attachment 3)

Dump of Albert Maltz 74-5239

a) In a letter from HALPERIN, dated 26 September 1959, the writer emphasizes the importance of addressing his mail correctly, as captioned above. On 25 September HALPERIN received a letter dated 15 September from the MALTZes; however, pictures were not enclosed, and HALPERIN wonders whether this happened through error or pilferage. He is pleased with clippings Margaret has sent him and thanks Albert for the UN materials. HALPERIN is stunned by the death of Narciso BASSOLS, with whom he had had a "stimulating conversation" last February in Moscow. The HALPERINs expect to get a telephone soon; next week HALPERIN will have a full-time research assistant. In the postscript, he adds, "Any news about the little business matter of ours we asked you to handle?" He offers to see [illegible] about a Russian edition of Seven Shares ... [See references to Helen [illegible] under 4 - e, below]

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b) Another letter from HAITRIN dated 14 October 1959 acknowledges receipt of the UN "Ec Survey of LA 1957" and a registered package containing clippings.

4. Correspondence concerning Seven Shares in a Gold Mine. (Attachment 4)

a) Subject's wife, in several letters dated 23 September 1959, wrote persons listed below that she was asking her English publishers, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., to send each a copy of her book entitled Seven Shares in a Gold Mine, obviously to promote its sales and to seek its publication in Soviet✓ Satellite countries. In two of the letters, addressed to the first two persons listed below, she enclosed copies of a review of the book, written by Viola Brothers [illegible], which appeared in Mainstream, an American magazine.

Mr. Alexei KRASILNIKOV, Publishing House for Foreign Literature, 52 Novo Alexeyevskaya, Moscow, USSR

Mr. Miodrag STAMATOVIC, Jugoslovenska Autorska Agencija, Marsala Tita 16, Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Mr. Edmund SEHIL, Nowotki 25 m 363, Warsaw, Poland

Mr. Adam TARN, Sandomierska 21, Warsaw, Poland

Miss Raya [illegible], Foreign Literature, Piatnitskaya 41, Moscow, USSR

Miss Oxana [illegible]KAYA, Foreign Commission of Union of Soviet Writers, 52 Ulitsa Vorovskogo, Moscow, USSR [see 4 - e, below]

Miss [illegible] [illegible]; Literaturnaya Gazeta, Tsvetnoi Bulvar 30, Moscow, USSR

b) In another letter dated 23 September 1959, and addressed to Mr. Hilary [illegible], Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 14 Henrietta St., Covent Garden, London, W.C. 2, Subject's wife requests that the names and addresses of [illegible]L and TARN, two literary people in Poland, be added to the list she had sent the publishers a day or two ago.

c) A letter from Victor Gollancz Ltd., signed by Hilary RUBINSTEIN and dated 29 September, is in answer to an order placed by Subject's wife.

d) A letter from Dilia, Czechoslovak Theatrical and Literary Agency, Prague, dated 26 September 1959, acknowledges receipt of reviews of Seven Shares in a Gold Mine, which have been sent on to a publishing house for consideration.

e) A letter from Tamara KUGERSKAYA dated 21 October 1959 acknowledges receipt of book and letter, noted in 4 - a, above. KUGERSKAYA passes on greetings from Helen KOMLEVA.

f) On 20 October 1959, a check, drawn on the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles and signed by Margaret MALTZ, is sent to Simon and Schuster, Inc., 136 West 52nd Street, New York 19, N.Y.

CIT Spain?

5. Correspondence with Pilar de AMANN, Tomas Breton 9, Madrid, Spain. (Attachment B)
[illegible] Albert Maltz 201-5237

a) A handwritten letter in Spanish from "Pilar" to the MALTZes is dated 20 September 1959. Pilar has just received MALTZes' letter telling her of the death of Dr. Ernesto AMANN, her former husband, and now requests details as to the circumstances. She writes that their son Dickie had not heard from his father since September 1958, nor has the last letter AMANN had written his son via the MALTZes been received.

b) An answer to the foregoing, written in Spanish by Subject's wife, on 1 October 1959, reveals that a letter which Dr. AMANN had written on 27 July had been forwarded to Pilar de AMANN for delivery to their son Dickie. Although Subject's wife, at Dr. AMANN's request, had read the letter and had forwarded it to Pilar at the above address, she cannot understand why it was not received. Subject's wife relates what was in the letter to Dickie. Suffering from encephalitis, Dr. AMANN died in a German hospital after his return there for the third time. The MALTZes visited Dr. AMANN during their recent European trip.

6. Correspondence with Ben MARGOLIS, Attorney, 112 West 9th Street, Los Angeles 15, California. (Attachment C)

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201-5239

a) In a letter dated 16 September MARGOLIS asks MALTZ to give his preference for attorneys to consult with respect to the possibility of litigation against the Immigration Service.

b) Subject's answer to the foregoing is dated 23 September. Since Rabinowitz and Boudin had represented him previously, Subject writes, he would be reluctant to hire any other law firm unless there were a "solid reason" to do so.

7. Correspondence with Bernard SKAURON, Public Accountant, Business [illegible], P.O. Box [illegible], Studio City, California. (Attachment 7)

a) Four pieces of correspondence, dated early October 1959, concern Subject's finances.

b) A letter from SKAURON, dated 22 September 1959, deals with real estate investment opportunities as well as with Subject's finances.

c) With a letter dated 13 October 1959 SKAURON sends Subject a copy of Waldo FRANK's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an earlier judgment preventing his travel to China.

d) In an envelope postmarked 22 October 1959 SKAURON mailed Subject his check book analysis for September. cif - U.S.

8. Correspondence with Philip and Janet STEVENSON, 2101 Stanley Hills Drive, Los Angeles 46, California. (Attachment 8) 201-57339

a) In an envelope postmarked 16 September 1959 Philip STEVENSON sends Subject a copy of a memorandum dated 14 September 1959 which STEVENSON had sent to Hy ANZEL. STEVENSON is sending ANZEL "the finished screen treatment of Albert MALTZ's novel, The Cross and the Arrow, under the working title of The Hill under Storm." The memorandum concerns financial agreement for this under contract.

b) A letter dated 13 September 1959 sets forth STEVENSON's ideas for writing a screenplay, presumably based on La Rosa Blanca. STEVENSON may go to Mexico for a few days on 25 September to discuss the book.

c) Personal thank-you note, dated 3 October 1959, from Janet STEVENSON to Margaret MALTZ, following Philip STEVENSON's return from a visit with the MALTZes.

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d) A paper, presumably prepared by Subject, presents the factual errors in The Cross and the Arrow and is addressed to Philip [illegible].

e) A personal letter from STEVENSON to the MALTZes is dated 7 October 1959. With thanks, STEVENSON acknowledges receipt on 6 October of the material on The Cross and the Arrow. The writer is apparently working on a story, probably La Rosa Blanca, an outline of which he will send the MALTZes.

f) In a letter dated 20 October 1959 Subject writes his comments and criticisms of STEVENSON's screenplay outline of La Rosa Blanca.

9. Correspondence with Mrs. Laurie BLANKFORT, 504 North Bedford Drive, Beverly Hills, California. (Attachment 9)

a) In a letter dated 22 September 1959 and addressed to Margaret MALTZ, Laurie BLANKFORT discusses plans for placing one [illegible], a Mexican girl, in the home of a certain PATTEN family in California.

b) Margaret MALTZ, in a personal letter dated 9 October 1959, acknowledges receipt of the foregoing letter by thanking Laurie for visiting Mrs. PATTEN. Subject's wife tells her correspondent that she (Margaret) is going to be interviewed on television in Spanish in a couple of weeks. As indicated in this letter, Mrs. BLANKFORT has visited Mexico.

10. Correspondence with 530 N. Fuller Avenue, Los Angeles 36, California. (Attachment 10)

a) A personal letter dated 24 September 1959 and signed "Miriam" is addressed to Subject's wife. The envelope bears the above return address.

b) In an unsigned letter bearing the above return address, dated 2 October 1959, the writer asks whether Subject has received the Merry Go Round renewal Assignment. (see paragraph 15 - 1)

11. Correspondence with Mr. Adia [illegible], Government Press Office, Tel Aviv, Israel. (Attachment 11)

3

a) In a letter dated 22 September 1959 FRENKEL acknowledges receipt of two letters, dated 31 August and 3 September, from Subject. The writer gives background information on the formation of the State of Israel, obviously at the request of MALTZ.

b) Apparently in answer to a request by letter dated 1[illegible] September from Subject, FRENKEL, in a letter dated 2[illegible] September, describes medical practices among the Druse. In a handwritten postscript the writer notes he will devote his time, as Subject requested, to PREMINGER while he is in Israel, only however if the writer is given notice of PREMINGER's arrival date well in advance.

c) A letter dated 9 October from FRENKEL acknowledges receipt of two cables from Subject and encloses a summary of security measures in Famagusta, Cyprus, during the Aliya-Beth era, presumably as background information for Subject's writings.

d) Three letters, dated 13, 15, and 19 October 1959, from Dr. Adia FRENKEL provide Subject with additional background information and research analyses. The letter dated 13 October includes photostats of identity cards issued in 1946, 1947, and 1948.

e) In a letter dated 20 October 1959 Subject poses to FRENKEL a series of questions concerning the Haganah leaders and Irgun members. Subject indicates that "Otto" /probably PREMINGER/ was in Mexico the previous week, working with Subject on the story. "Otto" will be arriving at the Hotel Dan between November 15 and 18 for a five-week stay in Israel.

/In view of information contained in these letters, as well as in other pieces of correspondence noted herein, it would appear that Subject is working on a screenplay for the movie to be based on Leon URIS' best seller, _Exodus_. Otto PREMINGER, well-known Hollywood movie director, is scheduled to direct the film version of _Exodus_./

12. Correspondence with Larry Edmunds Bookshop, 6658 Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood 28, California. (Attachment 12)

a) A letter from the bookshop dated 23 September 1959 is signed "Milton." Milton sent Dr. AMANN "the Casserole Cooking" the day he received MALTZ's letter but neglected to bill Subject. Books for Subject have been ordered from England.

3

b) Subject's check payable to Larry Edmunds Bookshop is enclosed in an envelope addressed to the bookshop and postmarked 3 October 1959. Also enclosed is the letter listed above, on which MALTZ has added his comments, noting that AMANN has died and that Subject will await delivery of the books ordered.

c) Letter dated 28 October 1959, addressed to Subject's wife, is signed "Milton." Apparently in answer to a request made by Subject's wife, the letter lists works by CHEKHOV which the book shop has in stock.

13. Correspondence with Seven Seas Books, Glinkastrasse 13 - 15, Berlin, Germany. (Attachment 13)

a) A letter dated 22 September 1959 and signed by Kay PANKEY tells Subject that Seven Seas Publishers is sending him thirty copies of The Cross and the Arrow in care of Larry Edmunds Bookshop in Hollywood.

b) Letter from Seven Seas Books, dated 5 October 1959, is signed "Gertrude" (Gertrude GELBIN, chief editor). Gertrude has been and continues to be in poor health. She writes about what appears to be sales figures for a particular publication, perhaps one of Subject's books.

14. Correspondence with Dilia, Czechoslovak Theatrical and Literary Agency, Prague, Czechoslovakia. (Attachment 14)

a) Letter from Dilia, dated 24 September 1959, is signed by Dr. Vojtech STRNAD. Subject is requested to send another copy of his play Black Pit for the Slovak translation.

b) Letter from Dilia, dated 29 September 1959, is signed by "Barmon." The writer acknowledges receipt of signed copies of an agreement for the Czech edition of The Cross and the Arrow. The last paragraph of the letter concerns stories by one Mr. ROBERTS, Penitenciaria 469-8, Guadalajara, Jalisco, which Dilia has forwarded to publishers for consideration.

c) A letter from Dilia dated 9 October 1959 informs Subject that an advance on the Czech edition of The Journey of Simon McKeever, to be published by the State Publishing House of Political Literature of Prague, has been transferred to Subject's account with the Banco Nacional de Mexico.

15. Correspondence addressed to Subject at Yarto 14, San Angel, Mexico 20, D.F. (Attachment 15)

a) Letter from Kindler Verlag, Lucile-Grahn-Strasse 37, Munich 8, Germany, dated 15 September 1959 and signed by Dr. F. J. RADDATZ. RADDATZ acknowledges receipt of a letter dated 22 August from Subject. The writer has obtained a copy of The Cross and the Arrow and will inform MALTZ should he decide to publish a West German edition.

b) In a letter dated 17 September 1959 from Ingo PREMINGER, of Preminger/Stuart Agency, Inc., 8462 Boulevard, Hollywood 36, California, the writer discusses financing arrangements for a film production.

c) Letter from Adrian SCOTT, 13341 Wyandotte St., Van Nuys, California, dated 22 September 1959, in which the writer encloses a check, signed by Robert A. Scott for 350 dollars, for payment on a loan MALTZ made to the writer, apparently several years ago.

d) Letter from Jewish Currents, 22 East 17th Street, New York 3, N.Y., dated [illegible] September 1959 and signed by Morris U. SCHAPPES, editor. The writer acknowledges receipt of a contribution Subject had made while abroad. The editor suggests Subject might write for publication in Jewish Currents an article or travel letter about any one of the countries he visited recently.

e) Letter from Science & Society, 30 East 20th Street, New York 3, N.Y., dated 28 September 1959 and signed by T. E. HALTON, secretary. Swedish press cuttings will be held until the return of Henry MINS, who will be abroad until the middle of November.

f) Letter from Dr. Harold LEVINE, Room 1324 Karl Meyer Hall, Cook County Hospital, Chicago 12, Illinois, dated 1 October 1959. The writer makes reference to A Long Day in a Short Life and The Journey of Simon McKeever and suggests Subject may one day visit Cook County Hospital in Chicago, a place filled with "humanist literature."

g) Circular from the Committee to Secure Justice for Morton SOBELL, 940 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y., postmarked 7 October 1959 and entitled Toward Freedom for Morton Sobell, Next Steps in our Program.

h) Letter from Avraham [illegible], Ben-Shemen Youth-Village, Near Lod, Israel, dated 7 October 1959. The writer thanks Subject for his books and offers help in supplying material Subject may wish for his "book about Israel." [illegible] describes his work among the children, adding that he will leave Ben-Shemen during the summer of 1960 to complete his studies in the field of education for a year or two in either England or the United States.

i) Letter from the legal department of Universal Pictures Company, Inc., Universal City, California, dated 12 October 1959 and signed by Joseph S. DUBIN, chief studio counsel. Enclosed with the letter is an Assignment, giving exclusive motion picture rights for Merry Go Round, a play written by Subject (under pseudonym of Eric [illegible]) and George SKLAR, to Universal Pictures. Since Subject is in Mexico, the writer requests that the enclosed Assignment be executed by Subject before a consular officer or notary of the American Embassy.

alias of Albert Maltz XI-5739

j) Another letter from Universal Pictures, dated 28 October 1959, encloses a second copy of the foregoing Assignment, to be executed in New York.

k) Although Camille (Mrs. Jean) PARIS, of 4 Francis Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, writes on 13 October 1959 she would be happy to translate one of Subject's novels, she must first be certain a publisher wants it. She does not want to repeat the unfortunate experience of Black Pit, which she had translated into French only to find no one would produce it. The writer suggests that Subject send his "three books" to Miss Monique NATHAN, les Editions du Seuil, 27 rue Jacob, Paris 6, a house "open to progressive ideas." Mrs. PARIS is planning a trip to Mexico "either in spring or later on."

l) Personal letter dated 16 October 1959 from Alvah BESSIE, 6437 A Geary Boulevard, San Francisco 21, California.

m) Letter dated 18 October 1959 from Lawrence LYNTON, 3470 Cannon Place, New York 63, N.Y. The writer, an admirer of Subject's books, was recently graduated from the Manhattan School of Music. He asks Subject to consider writing the libretto for an opera LYNTON plans to compose on Uncle Tom's Cabin.

e) Note dated 10 October 1959 from Eberhard [illegible] ([illegible]), Wilhelm-[illegible]-Str. 34, Leipzig N 22, deals with a contract and a letter dated 26 September which had been "erroneously sent through ordinary mail." [see 18 - d, below]

16. Correspondence addressed to Subject's wife, Margaret Larkin Maltz, at the same address. (Attachment [illegible])

a) Letter dated 11 September 1959 from Morris GOODMAN, 1119 No. Wexford Drive, Los Angeles 35, California. The writer thanks Subject's wife for a contribution she had made to a committee of which GOODMAN is chairman. GOODMAN has given a check on behalf of Mrs. MALTZ to Frank WILKINSON.

b) Letter with no return address, dated 28 September 1959 and signed "Charlie." The writer mentions a book which he hopes will be placed "east of West Berlin" and notes his regret over the death of Dr. AMANN. After expressing dissatisfaction over his present job, apparently with some magazine in New York City which also employs one Phil [illegible], the writer adds, "Nevertheless, the KHRUSHCHEV visit makes up for almost everything, and so on this bright note, I'll sign off." The writer, in a postscript, asks that his name not to be put on the envelope, "just Mimi's, she knows it's for me."

c) Personal letter from Clarice CHAPMAN, 7728 Kraft Ave., North Hollywood, California, dated 28 September 1959.

d) Letter dated 4 October 1959 from Ray SPENCER, 6917 Pacific View Drive, Hollywood 28, California. The writer thanks Subject's wife for Seven Shares ..., which he and Helen enjoyed reading while in "Valle" [possibly Valle del Bravo, Mexico]. He is saddened by the death of Ernesto [AMANN] and adds the postscript: "Mr. K. was absolutely sensational... There is a definite change of atmosphere for the better, we believe."

e) Letter from Barthold Fles, Literary Agent, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, New York, dated 6 October 1959 and signed "Bart." The writer is flying to Germany on 6 October and will ask Gollancz [Victor Gollancz Ltd., London] "for your statement when I come to England." Before returning to the United States in three weeks, the writer also intends to see Gertrude GELBIN and Stefan HEYM in Berlin.

201-5239

17. Correspondence addressed to Mr. and Mrs. Albert MALTZ. (Attachment 17)

a) Letter dated 23 September 1959 from Ethel ELLIS, 36 W. [illegible] Street, New York 24, New York. The writer thanks the MALTZes for a gift, apparently money, to help "Fred" with medical and nursing expenses. "Fred" is recovering from paralysis.

b) Personal bread-and-butter letter, postmarked 16 September 1959, Santa Monica, California, is signed "Frances." In the letter Frances writes that "Fernie" will take Kenneth MacKENNA's job at Metro after the first of the year, under a three-year contract.

c) Letter from Jane Farth LOW, 11490 Laurel Crest Drive, Studio City, California, dated 27 September 1959. The writer discusses plans to visit Mexico, where she expects to arrive between mid-November and Christmas.

d) Envelope bearing return address of Jane ROGERS, 56 Seventh Ave., New York 11, New York, postmarked 6 October 1959, forwards an invitation and request for contribution to a birthday purse honoring the 85th birthday of A. A. HELLER of New York.

e) In a note postmarked 21 October 1959 Jane ROGERS and A. A. [HELLER] thank the MALTZes for their "donation," undoubtedly to the birthday purse listed above.

f) Personal letter dated 24 October 1959 from Max and Helen SHLAFROCK, 148-09 Huxley Street, Rosedale 22, New York.

18. Letters from Albert MALTZ. (Attachment 18)

a) In a letter dated 28 September 1959 to Mr. John M. Calder, Messrs. John Calder, Ltd., 17 Sackville Street, Piccadilly, London W. 1, England, Subject orders twenty-five copies of the cheap edition of A Long Day in a Short Life.

b) Bill and check sent to Copley's, Pipe Purveyors and Smokers' Supplies, 5409 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 36, California.

c) Letter dated 9 October 1959 is addressed to Mr. Harry Elmer BARNES, 31509 West Pacific Coast Highway, RFD 2, Malibu, California. Subject thanks Mr. BARNES for a letter he had written on 10 April, in which BARNES praised Subject's book and suggested he send a copy of it to Mr. Howard GILL. Subject, in addition, describes an investigation he had made of the Czech [illegible]

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SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

d) An envelope addressed to Dr. Eberhard BRUNING, Englisches Institut - Der Universitat Leipzig, Universitatstr. 3 - 5, Leipzig, C 1, encloses a document in the German language. The document concerns an amendment to a publishers' agreement, dated 15 May 1959, between Aufbau-Verlag, a publishing house in Berlin, and Albert MALTZ, for the printing of three of Subject's works. [see 15 - a, above]

CSCI-3/757,639

Attachments: 18 (as described above)

WH/3/Mexico/MAbdella:as

2 December 1959

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
  - 1 - RI (201-5239)
  - 1 - CI/LIA
  - 1 - CI/R&A
  - 1 - CI/SID
  - 1 - WH/3/Mexico
  - 1 - WH/R
  - 1 - WH/Hold

BASED ON:
HMMA-13705 (11 Sept 59)
HMMA-13790 (25 Sept 59)
HMMA-13864 (2 Oct 59)
HMMA-13892 (9 Oct 59)
HMMA-13909 (9 Oct 59)
HMMA-13957 (23 Oct 59)
HMMA-14064 (13 Nov 59)

PROJECT: LIBIGHT

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

③

201 - 5239

201-128561

CSCI-3757704

SECRET

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED: 2 JUN 1960

4 DEC 1959

A MOSCOW

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : Maurice Bryan HALPERIN
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-14303

1. It has come to our attention through a sensitive source of known reliability that Maurice Bryan HALPERIN, who is residing in Moscow, USSR, is known to the following individuals:

Benjamin FASTOV, and wife, "Freddie" FASTOV

2. It is believed that Benjamin FASTOV is connected with the Colonial Brush Manufacturing Company, Inc., located at 170 Washington Street North, Boston, Massachusetts.

RID/CE TRACE REPLY Dated 4 Dec 1959

3. This office has no information identifiable with either Benjamin or "Freddie" FASTOV. We would appreciate being furnished any pertinent information on the FASTOVs that may be contained in your files.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/757,704

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - WH/3
1 - RID (201-128561)
3 - CI/SID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A

CI/SID:AEgerter:lac (3 December 1959)

INDEX

4 Dec 59

CS COPY

SECRET

100-2-92

4 Dec 59

201-128561

S-E-C-R-E-T

Attached copy of letter taken from HMM-A-13957 dated 23 Oct 59 (has been CSCI'd to FBI)

source: LIBIGHT/LIMUD

Attachment gives address of HALPERIN as

Kutuzovsky Prospect, 13
Apt. 127
Moscow G-248

Letter dated 26 Sep 59 and addressed to Albert and Margaret MALTZ in Mexico.

Note: re first para of letter, LIBIGHT/LIMUD has not shown that any clippings or pictures were enclosed in earlier correspondence to HALPERIN

LCMAY ([illegible] Maurice) (Halperin)
26 Sep 59
201-128561

[illegible]
Apt. 1[illegible]
Moscow [illegible]

Sept. [illegible]

Dear Margaret and Albert,

First let me point out that your letter of Sept. 15 (delivered yesterday) was sans pics. The envelope did carry double postage. So what happened - error or pilferage? Sure would like to know and, of course, get the original or duplicate sets of pics for the Hermitage. Also, IMPORTANT - the envelope was not entirely correctly addressed (Apt. 13 instead of 127, an understandable slip). Please note simplified correct address above (house no. not required).

And now to tell you Edith and I were very happy to get your letter. We can see Granny-elect Margaret and Gramp-elect Albert knitting away at the sweaters and booties. We shall want to hear when the big events take place. Again, our best wishes to Peter and spouse.

I can't get too many slips, Margaret, so full speed ahead. And one tiny reminder - the date on each slip, please. Your score with respect to choice of slips is very high --I'd say about 95% of what you send is of top interest.* An afterthought that troubles me --I've reckoned up the postage spent and it's running mighty high.

Albert, many thanks re the UN materials. The 1957 Survey has not yet arrived, but I'll let you know. And I shall be on the look-out for 1958.

So much appreciate the Novedades supplement re [illegible]. Still feel stunned by his death. I had such a stimulating conversation with him here last February, and we were to continue on his next visit.....

Little by little, we're getting better organized. We are due a telephone shortly, which will improve living efficiency enormously. Also, next week I shall have a full time research assistant, at last! No need to tell you what that will mean. So, while we don't ~~[illegible]~~ move ahead at the pace of the moon rockets, we're not standing still either.

The music season is on - went to our first concert day-before-yesterday. This is one department that is on the level of Soviet rocketry as far as quality is concerned. We've never had it so good before....

Wish you'll give our very best regards to all our good friends.

Muchos abrazos from Edith and

P.S. Any news about the little business matter of ours we asked you to handle? Any news about a Russian edition of "Seven [illegible]"? I could see Romanova — she still has my copy of the book.

* including, of course, the info[illegible] - what it [illegible] [illegible] is always as interesting as what I [illegible]. Also, who is [illegible]. [illegible] of the PP [illegible].

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH/3 - Mex

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, EDITH
DOB ?

201-000066
HMMA-13175
19 JUN 59

PSFR

CIT ?
201-128561

MOTHER OF DAVID HALPERIN. SUBJ AND HER HUSBAND ARE NOW LIVING IN USSR CONTACT OF INSTEREST OF THE SEBORERS.

CORRECTION CARD
FORMERLY 201-66459

19 Jun 59

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➩ 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

MAAZ 9/2

Memo No. 112/P

17 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Moscow Addresses Found in Pocket Notebook of
Anna Sparer SEBORER (201-665498)

REF : OMHA-15692, 10 April 1959

1. The following Moscow addresses were found in the pocket notebook of Anna Sparer SEBORER; photocopies of Subject's effects were made on 8 April 1959 and were transmitted to headquarters under reference.

a. Prof. Maurice HALPERIN
Kutuzovskiy Prospekt 13
House #4, Apt 127
Moscow G-248

b. R. KATZIN
Furmannyy Pereulok
House 24, Apt. 21
Moscow; Tel. No. K 7-2663

c. Ana TELEPNEVA
Maslovka Verkhn. ulitsa 7
Apt. 53
Moscow
(Enrique de los RIOS)

A flagging request on the above individuals has been placed with SR/6/FOS for mail coverage, with the understanding the undersigned will be notified of any letter intercepts.

201-128561

2. The last known residence of Maurice HALPERIN (~~201-185053~~) and his wife was Czechoslovakia. MEXI 3532 (IN 34979), 21 March 1959, Source: LIFEAT, reports that "on 18 March Anna told Mrs. Albert MALTZ that she had written Mrs. Maurice HALPERIN telling her not to bother answering but 'just to leave the information for me.' MALTZ had heard from HALPERIN and had 'the address' for Anna." This would indicate that Anna SEBORER planned to get in touch with the HALPERINs on her recent visit to Moscow, 24 March - 8 April 1959.

17 June 59
201-128561

3. There is no identifiable trace on R. KATZIN.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL XAAZ 912

4. Enrique de los RIOS may be identical with Enrique de los RIOS Lavin (201--109936) of the ALTO Case. HMMA-12013, 28 January 1959, Source: LIFEAT, reports that de los RIOS "was apparently recently in the USSR."

5. For a possible trace on Ana TELEPHEVA see OSMA-6782, 21 May 1957 which refers to a Miss A. TELEPHEVA, resident of Moscow who had written to a Spanish repatriate, one Juan DIEZ. According to WE/5 a copy of this letter intercept was forwarded to SR/6. An attempt is currently being made to find this letter.

GERALDINE GARRITY
SR/CE/P

Distribution:
1 - CI/SID
1 - ~~[illegible]~~ SR/CE/P
1 - 201-66549 (Anna Sparer SEBORER)
1 - 201-185053 (Maurice HALPERIN)

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

17 June 59
201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
DOB ?

CIT ?
201-128561*

201-005239
HMMA-12965
29 MAY 59

PAER

CONTACT OF MARGARET MALTZ AND ROBERT ROGERS, '59.

15.

24 May 59

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: ROME, FRANKFURT, [illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SID, FI, EE 4, SR 5, [illegible]

DEFERRED [illegible] 59

☒ ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INITIALS

OUT 99321

ROME, FRAN, BRLN INFO CITE DIR 24356

[illegible]

REF DIR 20532 (OUT 90668) (NOT SENT FRAN, BRLN)

(201-[illegible])

1. ALBERT MALTZ, WRITER AND MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP MEXICO CITY, ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN AND MAY CONTACT ALFRED KAUFMAN STERN AND HIS WIFE MARTHA DODD STERN AND MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN AMERICAN COMMIES WHO FLED BEHIND IRON CURTAIN DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

2. SUBJECTS ARRIVE ROME 3 MAY 1430 HRS FROM TEL AVIV, TWA FLT 741. LV FOR FRAN 3 MAY 1630 HRS ITALIAN AIRLINES FLT 416. ARRIVE FRAN 2115 HRS, LV FOR BRLN 4 MAY 1350 HRS, BRITISH EUROPEAN GIBRALTAR AIRLINES FLT 57. ARRIVE BERLIN 1510 HRS. BRLN TO PRAGUE 19 MAY POSSIBLY VIA RUSSIAN JET LINE.

3. IF POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE, REQUEST LIAISON CONDUCT BAGGAGE SEARCH AND DISCREET SURVEILLANCE.

4. MALTZ BORN 28 DEC 1908 NEW YORK. IN 1954 DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: FIVE FEET SIX ONE HALF INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 155, STOCKY, BLACK HAIR, GREY EYES, DARK COMPLEXION.

30 apr 59

w/13/m[illegible]

FILE IN 201-128561

ORIGINAL FILED IN ____

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

TO:

PRECEDENCE	
DEFERRED	
ROUTINE	
PRIORITY	INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE TWO

OUT 99321

DIR 24356

INFO

CITE DIR

5. ROME: NOTE ITINERARY CHANGE FROM REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Stated MALTZ would be in ROME 4 days. Requested baggage search and surveillance.

EE/W7/MR. DUNWOODY (BY PHONE)

WE/ITALY

SR/CI/P/MR. POTOCKI (BY PHONE)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Robert E.

AC/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

J. C. King

C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ONHA-15692, 10 Apr 59; [redacted]/SYMPATHIZER/LCMAYFOWL; Anna SEBORER - transmittal of photocopies of passport, pocket notebook, letters, photographs, etc.

The notebook belonging to Anna Sparer SEBORER was photographed as of 8 April 1959 and contained the following address:

Prof. Maurice Halperin
Kutuzovsky Prospect 13
House #4 Apt 127
Moscow G-248

10 Apr 59
201-128561

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-5237

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : T.A. WOODS
UNIT : WE
EXT : 2555
DATE : 6 APRIL 1959

TO : THE HAGUE, ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SIG, FI, FI/INT, WE 4, WC 4, S/C 2

RE FILING (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☒ Name required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	APR 7 19 04 Z 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 20608

TO HAGU, ROME INFO MEXI CITE DIR 20532
LCDU ROVE

20532

1. ALBERT MALTZ, WRITER AND MEMBER OF AMERICAN COMMUNIST GROUP MEXICO CITY, ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN AND MAY CONTACT ALFRED KAUFMAN STERN AND HIS WIFE MARTHA DODD STERN AND MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN AMERICAN COMMIES WHO FLED BEHIND IRON CURTAIN DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

2. DEPARTING MONTREAL FOR AMSTERDAM 15 APRIL AND WILL REMAIN UNTIL 20 APRIL.

3. ON 3 MAY WILL ARRIVE ROME FROM TEL AVIV AND REMAIN UNTIL 7 MAY.

4. IF POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE, REQUEST LIAISON CONDUCT BAGGAGE SEARCH AND SURVEILLANCE.

5. MALTZ BORN 28 DEC 1908 NEW YORK. IN 1954 DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: FIVE FEET SIX ONE HALF INCHES TALL, WEIGHT 155, STOCKY, BLACK HAIR, GREY EYES, DARK COMPLEXION.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATION:
WE/2 DJ
WE/4
CI/SCV/SAT
CR/CO CE MR. KNOWLES (BY PHONE)
CI/[illegible] (BY PHONE)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	[illegible]
RI/TY	[illegible]
DESTROY	—
RI/FI	

R. Burr Anderson
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

KING, C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

7 Apr 59
201-128561

WH/3/Mex

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. HALPEDIR

PCFR

HALPERIN, MAURICE
DOB ? .

201-005239
DIR -20532
06 APR 59

PCFR

CIT USA
201-128561*

AMERICAN COMMIE.
MAY BE CONTACTED BY ALBERT MALTZ /201-5239/ WHO IS ON TOUR OF EUROPE WITH WIFE AND TRAVELLING BEHIND IRON CURTAIN.

6 Apr 59

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➩ 201 128 561

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

MEXI 3532 (IN 34979), 21 MARCH 1959

On 18 March 1959, Anna Sparer SEBORER told Mrs. Albert MALTZ that she had written Mrs. Maurice HALPERIN telling her not to bother answering but "just to leave the information for me." MALTZ had heard from HALPERIN and had "the address" for Anna. SOURCE: LIFEAT (B), 23 Feb to 18 Mar. ODENVY dissem.

21 Mar 59
201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/R

NO.
CSCI-3/753,028

DATE
28 JAN 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CRO			WJ	0 HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman
2. WH/3/Mexico/PNelson		21 Jan	pgn	
3. C/WH/3/Mexico			JB	
4. C/WH/3			JB	
5.				
6. WH/CE/Sims	22 Jan.	22	RBS	
7. CI/Brown			JB	thermofax copy attached for your retention - SID pgn
8. CI/LIA	27 JAN 1959		AM	
9.				
10. RID/AN			dc	
11. WH/3/my				
12. 2/14 B.H				
13.				
14. RID/TY			Cm	
15. RID/FI				

Dr D

28 JAN 1959

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ✓
201-128561
DATE

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
3 DEC 56

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476732

SECRET NOFORN

CONTINUED CONTROL

[illegible]

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our teletyped message of 24 November 1958 and to previous correspondence concerning Subject's travel with his wife from Mexico, through western Europe, to Prague, Czechoslovakia.

2. Enclosed for your information is a copy of a report, from an official Swiss source, of Subject's activities in Switzerland from 15 October 1958 to 10 November. Also enclosed are photocopies of letters from Subject and his wife to members of the family in the United States.

3. The David EFRON mentioned in both the official Swiss report and Subject's letters was described by a usually reliable source on 18 August 1947 as an Argentine citizen who was a Communist Party member of long standing; under cover of his International Labor Organization (ILO) assignments EFRON was touring Latin America to assess the Communist position and strength within the labor framework of each country visited. Another usually reliable source reported in February 1951 that EFRON had been a specialist in Latin American affairs for the ILO until the fall of 1947, and that he had been repeatedly reported as a Communist and closely associated with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, president of the Confederacion de los Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) and secretary-general of the Partido Popular (PP - Marxist Party of Mexico). A David EFRON, mentioned in your reports of 23 June 1952 and 21 January 1952, appears to be identical with EFRON.

4. This information is from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/753,048

Enclosures:
1 - Report
2 - Photocopies of letters

SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

201-127561

Rep Wilson

WH/3/P. G. Nelson:as 14 January 1959

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
~~1~~ - RI w/att.
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/ICD CI/SID
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/CIA
1 - WH/3/MEX
1 - WH/3/MEX/Subject

Based on: ESBA-7838
ESBA-7766
TPL-137 (Aug '47)
HSBW-2697 (Feb '51)

Project Cryptonym: INANITION

SECRET NOFORN

CONTINUED CONTROL

Attachment to CSCI-3/753,048

As a supplement to bits of information hitherto orally transmitted here is a summarized account on the movements and activities of

HALPERIN Maurice, alias PASTOR Daniel,
born 3.3.1906, US citizen, economist,
married to Edith; domiciled Medellin 36-9,
Mexico 7, D.F.

during his sojourn in Switzerland from 9 October to 10 November 1958:

On 15 October subject and his wife arrived by air from LISBON at the Hotel "Schweizerhof" in ZURICH. On 18 October he and his wife took the 1320 H. train to GENEVA, where they stayed at the Hotel "Bernina". On 19 October, 1700 - 1900 H., he visited

EFRON David, born 1.9.1904, citizen of ARGENTINE,
Consellor with the ILO in GENEVA, domiciled
Avenue Andre Gide 2, CHENE-BOUGERIES/GENEVA.

On 20 October at GENEVA he inquired at a local travel agency for the possibilities of a flight from ZURICH to PRAGUE. On that day the HALPERIN's traveled by train (leaving GENEVA at 1245 H) to ZURICH, where they occupied a room at the "Schweizerhof" again. At 1830 H. subject visited the information office of the Zurich main station to learn about train connections for PRAGUE and for LUGANO. On 21 October, in answer to a telephone call, he visited the Czech Consulate General in ZURICH, where he stayed from 0940 - 1115 H. At 1630 H. he went to consult the "Swissair" information desk at the main station. He stated that he possessed a flight-ticket Mexico-Lisbon-Zurich-Tel-Aviv, but had no definite booking so far and wanted his luggage to be stored at Kloten airport for the time being. He then mailed letters to

1) Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO/ Ill.;
2) Mr. Theodore HALPERIN & family, 22, Kahler Ave., MILTON/ Mass.;
3) Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANCRAN, 4 de Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN/ New Jersey;
4) Mrs. Annie FRISCH, 17 Beach Road, LYNN/ Massachusettes;

Letters 1 - 3 are of similar contents. Photostat copies of Nr. 1 & 4 are attached.

At 1930 H. he inquired at the "Swissair" office for any communication that may have come in for him.

On 22 October Subject negotiated with the KLM airtravel office for cancelling of his 2 flight tickets to Tel-Aviv and refunding.

On 23 October at 0925 H. he inquired at the information office of the Federal Railways about train connections to PARIS and fares. At 1025 H. he entered the Czech Consulate General, but reappeared in the street 3 minutes later.

SECRET NOFORN

CONTINUED CONTROL

As of 23 October HALPERIN had made three telephone calls: one to GERTUR, Arlesheim/Basel, [illegible]str. 14, one to Carlo IGELI A.G., Zurich, home in Kuesnacht; and one to SCHMID, Zurich. All of the above are either timber and lumber importers or dealers.

On 24 October the couple visited the Czech Consulate General at 1025 H. where they remained for 25 minutes. At 1110 H. they went to the snack bar of the Zurich University. HALPERIN then visited for 30 minutes the Seminary for social economics, commercial sciences and statistics. At 1515 H. HALPERIN went to a travel agency to cash a cheque of 50 $.

On 25 October HALPERIN inquired for trains departing for LUGANO and obtained various prospectus of this town. From 1025 - 1055 H. the couple called at the Czech Consulate General. On the way back they changed 200 $; at 1311 H. they left by train for LUGANO.

Up to this date the couple had not received any visitors and as far as could be ascertained had no suspicious telephone calls while staying in ZURICH. They ostensibly endeavored to cut down expenses to a minimum, taking meals in cheap restaurants or buying food to be eaten in their room at the hotel. The luggage deposited at Kloten airport was discreetly searched. The personal belongings were of rather poor quality. A list showed that they had sold furniture and household goods prior to their departure from Mexico. Amongst various articles there were also two pocket editions of dictionnaries in Chinese and Russian. All this and their demeanour seemed to indicate that the couple plan to settle definitely in the East.

At 1625 H. of 25 October the couple arrived at LUGANO, where they rented a room at the hotel garni "LUX" for 3 or 4 days.

On 26 October they went on an excursion to the Monte Bre. At 1730 H. of that day HALPERIN inquired at the main post office for the telephone number of a certain Alfred STERN in PRAGUE. No such extension was found in the directory, however.

On 27 October they made an outing to Cassarate and Campione and back to LUGANO.

On 28 October HALPERIN again went to the telephone exchange at 0915 H. where he asked to be connected with Lazaro PENA in PRAGUE, Nr. 67856. The partner in PRAGUE being absent, the call was postponed to the afternoon; it went through at 1640 H. and a certain Mr. STEIN answered the call on the number indicated. HALPERIN talked in Spanish, announcing himself as Professor Maurizio HALPERIN from Mexico. He explained that he was a friend of LOMBARDO, with whom they (the partners on the phone) had accidentally met last year at the shop of Dr. Berta ARENARES. At present he (HALPERIN) was staying in LUGANO and waiting for the visa to go to PRAGUE. There he would like to find his American friends, the STERN family, whom his partner should also know. He then wanted to know when LOMBARDO would arrive in PRAGUE from MEXICO.

(probable identities:
[illegible], Lazaro: Trade Union Secretary of [illegible]: vice-president
of Cuban C.P. & member Executive Council of WFC.
LOMBARDO, Vincente, b. 16.7.1894, Mexican citizen, dom.
Mexico-City, Artistas, Villa Obregon 51;
Trade Union leader; member of WFC; member of presidium
Dr. [illegible], Berta: no record.)

On 29 October the HALPERIN's left LUGANO at 0904 H. by train for ZURICH. During their sojourn at LUGANO no contacts of the couple with strangers were made; they went for walks at random in town or in the vicinity, bought papers and periodicals by the dozen, but did not receive any mail or telephone calls.

At 1253 H. of 29 October they arrived in ZURICH, went to the Hotel "Schweizerhof" and later to the Czech Consulate General. At 1550 H. subject inquired at the KLM airline agency about refunding for the tickets to Tel-Aviv, but the agency had not received directions from Amsterdam yet.

On 30 October the couple again went to the Czech Consulate General at 1035 H. and remained there for 75 minutes. At 1215 H. HALPERIN inquired at the Kuoni Travel Agency about tourist visas to Prague and was given the necessary forms to fill in. These he returned to the agency at 1410 H. together with the passports. At 1715 H. he mailed two letters to

Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO/ Ill.
Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CAHGRAN, 4 de Falb Place, MORRISTOWN/ N. J.

Photostat copies (numbered 5 & 6) of the contents are attached.

On 31 October the HALPERIN's moved from Hotel "Schweizerhof" to the cheaper hotel "Limmathof". On this day they finally received the requested refund by the KLM airline's office.

Monday, 10 November the requested tourist visas were issued to the HALPERIN's, valid for 6 days and including Hotel reservations for 5 days at Sw.Frs. 23.- per person. They immediately departed by train and left Switzerland via Buchs/rail at 1524 H. for Austria, traveling on 2nd. class tickets ZURICH-PRAGUE return.

In the period of 31 October to 10 November the couple did not make or receive any telephone calls and had no visitors, nor did they call on anybody.

19 November 1958.

23 Jan 59

201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/3

NO. CSCI-3/752,786

DATE ~~[illegible]~~ 14 Jan 59

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CNO				
2. WH/3/P.Nelson		6 Jan		
3. WH/CA				[illegible] HYMAN
4. ~~C/WH/3~~	7 JAN 19			
5.				
6. WH/FI/Sims	7 Jan.	7		
7. CI/Brown				
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	12 JAN 1959			
9.				
10. RID/AN			dec	
11.				D&D 14 JAN 1959
12.				
13.				
14. RID/TY				ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☐ DATE
15. RID ~~FI~~				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1 [illegible] 1959

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/752,585, dated 16 December 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist who was living in Mexico, but who is, with his wife, now in Prague, Czechoslovakia.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to him at his home: Medellin 636, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.:

a. Letter, dated 5 August 1958, from Maurice H. SAVAL, of the Maurice H. SAVAL Insurance Company, 22 Batterymarch Street, Boston 9, Massachusetts, in which SAVAL renews what was evidently an old friendship.

b. Letter, postmarked 18 August 1958, from Subject's mother, in Boston, which contains family news.

c. Letter, postmarked 24 August 1958, from Ted HALPERIN, at 22 Kohler Avenue, Fulton 87, Massachusetts, in which he mentions family matters, his father's illness, and that Subject's son, David, will be visiting them soon.

d. Letter, postmarked 25 August 1958, from RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN, Attorneys at Law, 25 Broad Street, New York 4, New York, reducing Subject's fee due for professional

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

services to $300.00. (It is probable that those professional services dealt with Subject's United States passport.)

e. Letter, postmarked 27 August 1958, from Paul BARAN, Stanford University, Stanford, California, commenting on an economic study of Latin America which Subject is preparing.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau.

CSCI-3/752,786

5 Enclosures, as noted

[illegible]
WH/3/Mexico/P.Nelson: kc   31 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/LIA
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/3/Mex/Subject

Based on: HMMA-11731 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Maurice HALPERIN

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO. 68 | 2 | 5/3

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ESZA-1611

DATE 2 Dec 58

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

DISSEMINATED IN

DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Three memoranda re HALPERIN stay in Switz., dated
23 October 1958
27 October 1958
6 November 1958

ESZA-1611 classified to: 68-2-5/3

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 | 128 | 561

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 58 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3	NO. CSCI-3/752,587 DATE 16 December 1958

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/CRO				
2. WH/3/Mex/P.Nelson		9 Dec		
3. WH/CA				
4. ~~C/WH/3~~	10 DEC 1958			
5.				
6. WH/FI/Sims	10 Dec	10		
7. CI/Brown				
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	15 DEC 1958			
9.				
10. RID/AN			dec	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RID/TY				
15. RID/FI				

D.L.
16 DEC 1958

201-128561

ABSTRACT
DATE

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

[illegible] DEC 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Jane Constance ROGERS

Correspondence From Jane Constance Rogers to Maurice Halperin

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,016, dated 12 August 1958, and to previous correspondence concerning Subject and her correspondence with American Communists living in Mexico.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of an envelope from Subject, 56 Seventh Avenue, New York 11, New York, addressed to Maurice HALPERIN, Medellin 36-9, Mexico, D.F.; and a letter, contained in the envelope, bearing the salutation, "Dear Celia." ("Celia" is probably Celia OPPENHEIM, wife of Kurt Leopold OPPENHEIM, who, as was reported to your Bureau in our teletyped message of 12 September 1958, was hiding out in a hotel during the wave of arrests of American Communists living in Mexico.) The contents of the letter are summarized as follows:

> Subject mentions that she is glad that Celia saw "Tess and Bruno," and discussed with them the hardships and worry suffered "by you and all our friends." She says that A.A.'s main interest has to do with Sr. PONTON. ("A.A." probably refers to Abraham Aaron HELLER, who visited Mexico with Subject for three months during the winter of 1957-58. "Sr. PONTON" possibly refers to Luis SANCHEZ Ponton, a Mexican lawyer concerned with the Morton SOBELL case.)
>
> Subject also mentions that her planned trip to Mexico during the coming winter is not certain unless they (she would probably be traveling again with HELLER) could find an inexpensive apartment.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

CS COPY

8201-231257.

201-128561

SECRET/CONTINUED CONTROL

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City, with a request for any information available on "Tess and Bruno."

CSCI-3/752,587

Enclosures: 1 envelope containing photocopies of the envelope and letter, as described above

WH/3/Mexico/P.Nelson: kc 8 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/LIA
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-11627 — Can not locate 19 Dec 75

Project cryptonym: LIBIGHT NOT in 201-231257.

SECRET/CONTINUED CONTROL

201-128561
16 Dec 58

~~201-231257~~

14-00000

Addressed to [illegible]
[illegible]-Celia

14 Oct 55

Dated: 14 Oct 5

Att CSCI-3752587

201-128561

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY wH/3/M ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET [illegible] [illegible]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3

NO. CS CI-3/752,585

DATE 16 Dec 58 ~~December 1958~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/CRO			
2. WH/3/Mexico/PNelson		9 Dec	
3. C/WH/3/Mexico			
4. C/WH/3	10/	-/58	
5.			
6. WH/FI/Sims	10 Dec	10	
7. CI/Brown			b
8. CI/Liaison 1028 J	15 DEC 1958		
9.			
10. RID/AN			dec
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RID/TY			
15. RID/FI			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN.

16 DEC 1958

201 | 129 | 561 ✓

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☐

DATE 16 Dec 1958

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] Continued Control

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

1[illegible] DEC 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/752,072, dated 30 October 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to him:

a. Letter, postmarked 29 September 1958, from Ted HALPERIN, at 22 Kohler Avenue, Fulton 87, Massachusetts, concerns family matters, including the illness of his father (Subject's brother), and mentions anticipation over the visit of Subject's son, David, in December.

b. Letter, postmarked 1 October 1958, from the Maurice H. Saval Insurance Company, at 22 Batterymarch Street, Boston 9, Massachusetts, concerns the renewal of Subject's life insurance policy #996864, of the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

16 Dec 58
201-128561

CONTINUED CONTROL

correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City.

CS CI-3/752,565

Enclosures: 2 letters, as described above

WH/3/PNelson: mif 8 December 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/LIA
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/3/Subject

Based on: HMM-A-11553 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-11731

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-128561

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 10 December 1958

SUBJECT: American Communists in Mexico,
Maurice HALPERIN

ACTION REQUIRED:

RE "43-1" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

MICROFILMED
DEC 15 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

1. Forwarded herewith to complete Headquarters and ODENVY records on subject are one photocopy each and film of the following letters addressed to him in Mexico City.

A. Ltr. of 25 Aug 58 from Leonard B. BOUDIN of RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN, New York attorneys, cutting HALPERIN's fee due for professional services to $300.00. (Comment: Professional services probably dealing with HALPERIN's U. S. passport.)

B. Ltr. of 27 Aug 58 from Paul BARAN, Stanford University, Calif., commenting on an economic study of Latin America which HALPERIN is preparing.

C. Ltr. of 5 Aug 58 from Maurice H. SAVAL, insurance man in Boston, Mass., who is apparently a long lost friend of Subject's. (No film)

D. Ltr. of 23 Aug 58 from Ted HALPERIN in Milton, Mass.

E. Ltr. of 18 Aug 58 from HALPERIN's mother and father in Massachusetts.

2. Source is LIBIGHT/LIMUD. No local dissemination.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

FID
FID/vps ASM
9 December 1958

Distribution
3 Headquarters

CSCI-3/752776

10 Dec 58
201-128561

1 Att.

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

10 Dec 58

Att. 1 To HMMA-11731 (NSM)

201-128561

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL

RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN
25 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7, D. F.
Mexico

RABINOWITZ & BOUDIN
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
25 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

August 25,

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico 7, D. F.
Mexico

Professional services $300.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
[illegible] STREET
NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

August 25, 1958

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7, D. F.

Dear Dr. Halperin:

In view of your general financial situation, I have revised downward my original estimate to you. Hence the enclosed bill. We shall ourselves pay out of this money the local counsel fee.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard B. Boudin

Leonard B. Boudin

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-209
México 1, D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36-9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL

letter from Paul BARAN

Dr. Maurice Halperin,
Medellin 36 - 9
Mexico 7, D.F.

VIA AIR MAIL

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. Maurice Halperin
Medellin 36 - Dp. 9
Mexico

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL

Bureau de Peritajes S. de R. L.
Balderas No. 31-208
México 1, D. F.

Dr. M. Halperin
Medellin 3.6.9
México

PAR AVION CORREO AEREO VIA AIR MAIL

9[illegible]7 Mercedes Avenue,
Los Altos, California,

August 27th, 1953

[illegible],

I am sorry [illegible] tardy in answering your letter of August [illegible]. [illegible] only yesterday [illegible] returning from Lake Tahoe where I took [illegible] for a 10 days vacation.

[illegible] project looks to me eminently [illegible]ible. To be sure, outlines give usually only a very tenuous idea of what eventually comes out, but with that reservation, I think, [illegible] outline promises a useful treatise. What would seem to me to be in order is [illegible] tightening up of the [illegible] theoretical framework. In the first place, I would [illegible] ought to be broken down [illegible] number of groups: those countries that experience a certain degree of [illegible] economic advancement (Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, [illegible]); those that [illegible] markedly stagnant (Central America, Peru and [illegible]); those that have [illegible] bourgeois revolutions (Mexico); those that [illegible] form or another (Argentina, Venezuela?); [illegible] semi or entirely feudal state (Peru?), etc. etc. In other words, [illegible] "ideal type" treatment which would [illegible] elucidate the stage of development reached by individual countries. The role of imperialism in all of them has to be clearly worked out: both economically, and politically. Secondly, when it comes to strictly economic analysis, I don't believe that much is gained by talking about "crisis-breeding printing press money" (V, p. [illegible]). This puts the critique of inflation on a wrong track, and relates to what I would consider "old-fashioned" economics. The trouble with inflation is not that it is intrinsically "crisis-breeding". After all, Soviet industrialization was financed to a considerable extent by inflation! The trouble with inflation is that it puts the burden of capital accumulation upon lower income groups; in capitalist countries, furthermore, it channels the accumulated capital into wrong, undesirable investments, creates opportunities for vast speculative profits, promotes luxury consumption, etc. etc. In other words, under capitalism, inflation tends to add [illegible] to injustice. If inflation, then at least it should promote useful capital [illegible] relatively modest inflation (a few % p.a. [illegible]) inflation of the German 1920' variety. The [illegible] which need not occupy us in the [illegible] low inflation (accompanied by devaluation) [illegible] tax" on the underlying populations, [illegible] results in lopsided development.

[illegible] impression that you should concentrate on assembling as much as possible material on the volume and mode of utilization of accumulated capital, and show [illegible] how these accumulations are being misused. This would permit you to analyze both the domestic structure of the economies under consideration as well as to show the impact of capital outflows due to imperialism etc.

These are my first reactions. I will be glad to go into all of [illegible] once I have more stuff to look at. You are obviously most welcome to [illegible] (for what it's worth) as a reference. If the Committee chooses to consult me, I would suggest that the accent be placed on the empirical aspect of the study with the analytical part made subject to further discussion and clarification.

I will write to Bravo very soon; I was absolutely sn ed under by various and
undry committments, and am struggling now to finish ings up before school starts
end of September. And then I have a book to finish (th Sweezy) and deadlines
surround me on all sides.

With very best wishes,

Yours,

Paul Baran.

BOSTON
AUG 18
7:30 AM
1958
MASS. 21

SAVE THE EAS WAY
BUY U.S. BO
PAYROLL SAVINGS

Air mail

Dr. M. Halperin
Medellin 3.6-9
Mexico 7, D. F.

[illegible]

[illegible] boiling fine [illegible]
[illegible] merchant [illegible] to
[illegible] and Ethel ([illegible]
good to us) took us to [illegible]
Point.
I am not boiling since we
[illegible] Came [illegible] mission [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Thanks [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] again [illegible]
I feel guilty, [illegible]
the trouble I have [illegible] my
[illegible] know, [illegible]
[illegible], Mother [illegible]
[illegible] Ps [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] much [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Regards from [illegible]

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: BSBA-7838

TO: Chief, WH THRU: Chief, EE

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

FROM: Chief of Station, Bern

DATE: 28 November 1958

SUBJECT: INL/INANITION/Operations
Maurice HALPERIN

INDEXING (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☒ XX INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES: MEXI-2596

Attached is the final summary report of the INANITIONS on the stay in Switzerland of Maurice HALPERIN and wife, who departed for Prag on 10 November 1958. Copies of letters written by HALPERIN while here are forwarded to Headquarters only.

GEORGE J. POMFRET

Enclosures:
A - INANITION Report
B - Letters written by HALPERIN

27 November 1958

Distribution:
3 - WH
2 - EE w/encls. A and B
2 - Mexico City w/encl. A
2 - Bern w/encl. A

C2C1-

28 Nov. 58
201-128561

Attachment "A" to EGBA-7838

Ad y/ memo & oral of 18 Oct.58 509/XI/58

As a supplement to bits of information hitherto orally transmitted here is a summarised account on the movements and activities of

HALPERIN Maurice, alias PASTOR Daniel,
born 3.3.1906, US citizen, economist,
married to Edith; domiciled Medellin 36-9,
Mexico 7, D.F.

during his sojourn in Switzerland from 15 October to 10 November 58:

On 15 October subject and his wife arrived by air from LISBON at the Hotel "Schweizerhof" in ZURICH. On 18 October he and his wife took the 1320 H. train to GENEVA, where they stayed at the Hotel "Bernina". On 19 October, 1700 - 1900 H., he visited

EPRON David, born 1.9.1904, citizen of ARGENTINE,
Counsellor with the ILO in GENEVA, domiciled
Avenue André Gide 2, CHENE-BOUGERIES /GENEVA.

On 20 October at GENEVA he inquired at a local travel agency for the possibilities of a flight from ZURICH to PRAGUE. On that day the HALPERIN's traveled by train (leaving GENEVA at 1245 H) to ZURICH, where they occupied a room at the "Schweizerhof" again. At 1830 H. subject visited the information office of the Zurich main station to learn about train connections for PRAGUE and for LUGANO. On 21 October he visited the Czech Consulate General in ZURICH, where he stayed from 0940 - 1115 H. At 1630 H. he went to consult the "Swissair" information desk at the main station. He stated that he possessed a flight-ticket Mexico-Lisbon-Zurich-Tel-Aviv, but had no definite booking so far and wanted his luggage to be stored at Kloten airport for the time being. He then mailed letters to

1) Mr.David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave., CHICAGO /Ill.;
2) Mr. Theodore HALPERIN & family, 22, Kahler Ave., MILTON / Mass.;
3) Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANORAN, 4 De Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN /New Jersey
4) Mrs. Annie FRISCH, 17 Beach Road, LYNN /Massachusettes;

./. Letters 1 - 3 are of similar contents. Photostat copies of Nr. 1 & 4 are attached.

At 1930 H. he inquires at the "Swissair" office for any communication that may have come in for him.

On 22 October subject negotiates with the KLM airtravel

./.

office for cancelling of his 2 flight tickets to Tel-Aviv and refunding.

On 23 October at 0925 H. he inquires at the information office of the Federal Railways about train connections to PARIS and fares. At 1025 H. he enters the Czech Consulate General, but reappears in the street 3 minutes later.

On 24 October the couple visit the Czech Consulate General at 1025 H, where they remain for 25 minutes. At 1110 H. they go to the snack bar of the Zurich University. HALPERIN then visits for 30 minutes the Seminary for social economics, commercial sciences and statistics. At 1515 H. HALPERIN goes to a travel agency to cash a cheque of 50 $.

On 25 October HALPERIN inquires for trains departing for LUGANO and obtains various prospectus of this town. From 1025 - 1055 H. the couple then calls at the Czech Consulate General. On the way back they changed 200 $; at 1311 H. they leave by train for LUGANO.

Up to this date the couple has not received any visitors and as far as could be ascertained had no suspicious telephone calls while staying in ZURICH. They ostensibly endeavored to cut down expenses to a minimum, taking meals in cheap restaurants or buying food to be eaten in their room at the hotel. The luggage deposited at Kloten airport was discreetly searched. The personal belongings were of rather poor quality. A list showed that they had sold furniture and household goods prior to their departure from Mexico. Amongst various articles there were also two pocket editions of dictionnaries in Chinese and Russian. All this and their demeanour seem to indicate that the couple plan to settle definitely in the East.

At 1625 H. of 25 October the couple arrived at LUGANO, where they rented a room at the hotel garni "LUX" for 3 or 4 days.

On 26 October they went on an excursion to the Monte Bré. At 1730 H. of that day HALPERIN inquired at the main post office for the telephone number of a certain Alfred [illegible] in PRAGUE. No such extension was found in the directory, however.

On 27 October they made an outing to Cassarate and Campione and back to LUGANO.

./.

On 28 October HALPERIN again went to the telephone exchange at 0915 H. where he asked to be connected with Lazaro PENA in PRAGUE, Nr. 67634. The partner in PRAGUE being absent, the call was postponed to the afternoon; it went through at 1640 H. and a certain Mr. STEIN answered the call on the number indicated. HALPERIN talked in Spanish, announcing himself as Professor Mauricio HALPERIN from Mexico. He explained that he was a friend of LOMBARDO, with whom they (the partners on the phone) had accidentally met last year at the shop of Mr. Borta ARENARES. At present he (HALPERIN) was staying in LUGANO and waiting for the visa to go to PRAGUE. There he would like to find his friends, the STERN family, whom his partner should also know. He then wanted to know when LOMBARDO would arrive in PRAGUE from MEXICO?

(probable identities:
PENA Lazaro: Trade Union Secretary of CUBA; vice-president
of Cuban C.P. & member Executive Council of WFU.
LOMBARDO Vicente, b. 16.7.1894, Mexican citizen, dom.
Mexico-City, Artistas, Villa Obregon 51;
Trade Union leader; member of WFU; member of presidium of Executive Committee & General Council of WFTU.
Dr. ARENARES Borta: no record.)

On 29 October the HALPERIN's left LUGANO at 0904 H. by train for ZURICH. During their sojourn at LUGANO no contacts of the couple with strangers were made; they went for walks at random in town or in the vicinity, bought papers and periodicals by the dozen, but did not receive any mail or telephone calls.

At 1253 H. of 29 October they arrived in ZURICH, went to the Hotel "Schweizerhof" and later to the Czech Consulate General. At 1550 H. subject inquired at the KLM airline agency about refunding for the tickets to Tel-Aviv, but the agency had not received directions from Amsterdam yet.

On 30 October the couple again went to the Czech Consulate General at 1035 H. and remained there for 75 minutes. At 1215 H. HALPERIN inquired at the Kuoni Travel Agency about tourist visas to Prague and was given the necessary forms to fill in. These he returned to the agency at 1410 H. together with the passports.

./.

At [illegible] h. he mailed two letters to

Mr. David C. HALPERIN, 5411 South University Ave. CHICAGO/Ill.
Rabbi & Mrs. Hillel CANCRAB, 4 de Kalb Place, MORRISTOWN /N.J.

Photostat copies (numbered 5 & 6) of the contents are attached.

On 31 October the HALPERIN's moved from Hotel "Schweizerhof" to the cheaper hotel "Limmathof". On this day they finally received the requested refund by the KLM airline's office.

Monday, 10 November the requested tourist visas were issued to the HALPERIN'S, valid for 6 days and including Hotel reservation for 5 days at Sw.Frs. 23.- per person. They immediately departed by train and left Switzerland via Buchs/rail at 1824 H. for Austria, travelling on 2nd.class tickets ZURICH-PRAGUE return.

In the period of 31 October to 10 November the couple did not make or receive any telephone calls and had no visitors, nor did they call on anybody.

19 November 1958.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

219[illegible]/DLD[illegible]

DATE : 22 NOV 58

ROUTING

1 MEXICO

2 [illegible]

NOV 22 1736Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 29931

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

Copy [illegible]

TO DIR INFO CITE VIEN 4104

GROOVY GRENGULF

1. GRENGULF REPORTS THAT A MORICE (SIC) HALPIN, DOB 3 MARCH 1906 AND HIS WIFE EDITH, NEE FRISCH, DOB 6 JULY 1907, BOTH CARRYING U.S. PASSPORTS, ENTERED AUSTRIA FROM SUISSE ON 10 NOV 1958. PASSPORTS HAD CZECH VISAS. ACCORDING GRENGULF, THIS COUPLE REPORTEDLY BELONG TO CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES OF ATOM SPY KLAUS FUCHS AND DURING THEIR STAY IN SUISSE WERE UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE.

2. GRENGULF REPORT, SOMEWHAT CURIOUSLY WORDED, SAYS AUSTRIAN SURVEILLANCE OF COUPLE NOT CARRIED OUT HERE SINCE THEY CROSSED BORDER INTO CSR ON 11 NOV WITH U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118070, ISSUED MEXICO, IN NAME OF MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN, SAME BIRTH DATE AS ABOVE.

3. VIEN HAS NO TRACES, NO KNOWLEDGE THIS CASE. POSSTJTY (AS RECEIVED) ODENVY REQUESTED AUSTRIAN SURVEILLANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

X 2003
EE/[illegible] Nelson Pere[illegible]

X8743

OUT-97882 to FBI
24 Nov 58

22 Nov 58
201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

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16 MJ/SW/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 22 NOV 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	MEX	5	
3		6	

NOV 24 1851Z 58
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

VIEN 4104 IN 29931 A

TO INFO CITE

GROOVY GRENGULF

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO WH BY MR CLARK JUNG, EE, EXT 8743, IN COORDINATION WITH MR. TOM OGDEN, WH, EXT 2555.

File:- Halperin 15201

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/ RI/AN

DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA-11553

DOCUMENT DATE 19 Nov 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH	046 Barton		25 NOV 1958	
2. Mexi/PS		16 Dec	28 Nov 16	pqu mk
3. Brady				jf
4.				
5.				
6. OS/FSS		12/29/58		NC
7. OS/SRS/Carrier			12/23/58	JRC
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

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Ce Sub

Copy Detached

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CSCI-3/752,585
to FBI

FILE TITLE
HALPERIN, MAURICE

FILE NUMBER
201 128561

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X
0531

DATE PROCESSED 19 Nov 1958

INDEX

FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-A-11553

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-128561

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 19 November 1958

SUBJECT: American Communists in Mexico/Maurice HALPERIN

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

SOURCE: LIBIGHT/LIMUD

1. Attached are the negatives and one set of prints of each of two letters which were addressed to Maurice HALPERIN in Mexico.

2. One letter is from a "Ted HALPERIN" and appears to be a personal, family-type letter. The second letter is from Maurice H. SAVAL and concerns an insurance policy carried by HALPERIN.

3. ODENVY has been furnished copies of this correspondence locally.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

GFB/cps

Attachment - as stated above

17 November 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs w/att
- 2 - Files

Att: [redacted] (negatives to 201[illegible])

19 Nov 58

CS COPY

201-128561

FORM 10-57 53

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

negatives

Att to HMMA-11553

CS COPY

19 JAN 58

201-128561

14-00000

693 JW/WS

Halperin, Dr. 201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : M.King
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : 4456
DATE : 6 November 1958

693

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BUENOS AIRES, ///MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No RS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED NOV 6 23 32:58
☒ ROUTINE REC'D CABLE SECT.
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT92043

TO BUEN INFO MEXI CITE DIR 49353

REF: BUEN-3666 (IN-22713) (NOT SENT MEXI)

DO NOT PASS TO BIOGENESIS INFO IN HABW-5114 THAT DORFMAN IN COMMUNICATION WITH HALPERIN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED WHETHER FACT THAT DORFMAN IN COMMUNICATION HALPERIN COULD BE PASSED BIOGENESIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	✓
~~DESTROY~~	
~~RI/FI~~	

Return to 11/3M

f/ J. C. King, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/Arg:
COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~R. K. [illegible], C/WH/3~~
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
6 Nov 58

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-128561

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : M 300 RLG/BM
1 NOV 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, S/C 2 , WE 4

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 2 0114Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 21415

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE BERN 3133

RE BERN 3096 (IN 17033) **
MAURICE HALPERIN + wiFE

1. SUBJECTS TRAVELLED ZURICH TO LUGANO 29 OCT, MADE PHONE CALL 28 OCT FROM LUGANO TO PRAG WHERE SPOKE IN SPANISH WITH FNU STEIN (PHON) AT TEL NUMBER LAZARO PENA 67856. NOT CLEAR IF PENA TEL EXCHANGE OR NAME SUBSCRIBER.

2. IN PHONE CONVERSATION IDENTIFIED SELF TO STEIN AS FRIEND OF PROB VLT LOMBARDO. SAID HAD MET STEIN IN SHOP OF DR. BERTA ARENARES. prob identical w DR. BERTA ARENAL BASTAR DE OCAMPO SAID HE WAITING IN SUISSE FOR CSR VISA, WISHED SEE STERNS IN PRAG. WHEN STEIN VAGUE ABOUT KNOWING STERNS, SUBJ ASKED IF HAD NOT SEEN THEM IN INTRAYA (PHON). THEN ASKED WHEN LOMBARDO WOULD ARRIVE PRAG, WAS TOLD HE STILL MEXICO. SUBJ PROMISED CONTACT STEIN ON ARRIVAL PRAG. ACCORDING INTERPRETERS NOTE ON PHONE TRANSCRIPT STEIN VERY GUARDED, NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PHONE CALL.

3. SUBJ RETURNED ZURICH 29 OCT, GOT PASSPORTS BACK FROM CSR CONSULATE WITHOUT VISA. NOW ATTEMPTING GET TOURIST VISAS THROUGH TRAVEL AGENCY. MOVED TO CHEAPER HOTEL, SPENDS MUCH TIME IN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. INANITIONS STATE SUBJECTS RUNNING LOW ON FUNDS, MANY INDICATIONS PLAN REMAIN CSR INDEFINITELY, BELIEVE LOMBARDO MENTIONED ON PHONE IDEN WITH VINCENTE TOLEDANO LOMBARDO.

4. WILL POUCH DETAILED REPORTS.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.
** ITINERARY MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS.

ORIG filed in 201-3704

2 Nov 58
201-128561

CI/ICD could not identify STEIN.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

EE/[illegible] could not identify INTRAYA

CVT-40113 X. FBI EE/5-[illegible] mk

14-00000

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,683, dated 2 October 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D. F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to Subject:

a. Letter, dated 10 August 1958, from Jane Constance ROGERS, at Mill Valley, California, mentions that she and Abraham Aaron HELLER have been at Mill Valley since 1 August. She also mentions that Albert MALTZ is in Los Angeles and that she and HELLER planned to travel through there in late August. She refers to two "youngish" lawyers from Los Angeles who came to San Francisco for a breath of "fresh air." She mentions Tim KELLY's kindness to her and HELLER at Mill Valley and that KELLY sends his love to Pablo [O'HIGGINS]. She also encloses six photographs of herself and HELLER. (CSCI-3/751,016, dated 12 August 1958, reported that ROGERS had asked HALPERIN to look for an apartment in Mexico City for her for the winter of 1958-59.)

b. Letter, dated 2 September 1958, from Martin Robert ROGERS, The Bell, Hume, Virginia, (son of Jane Constance ROGERS) queries HALPERIN about effects to be shipped when the ROGERS family goes to Mexico as immigrants. ROGERS mentions that he and his family hope to be in Mexico by 1 December "unless HASSAUSEN doesn't perform." ROGERS adds that "as a matter of fact,

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

CS COPY

we have to come anyway, and we'll enter as tourists if we can't get ready as immigrants." (Evidently a lawyer named HAMHAUSEN is arranging the entrance of the ROGERS family to Mexico. There are two brothers named HAMHAUSEN who are practicing lawyers in Mexico.)

c. Letter, dated 4 September 1958, from Martin Robert ROGERS, The Dell, Hume, Virginia, requests HALPERIN to open a box in the main post office in Mexico City for him effective 1 November.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated outside your Bureau. Photocopies of this correspondence have been furnished the representative of your Bureau in Mexico City.

CSCI-3/752,072

Enclosures: 3 letters, as described above

mk
WH/3/Mexico/M.King: kc 24 October 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/Lia
1 - RQM/RE
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R
1 - WH/3/Subj: HALPERIN
1 - WH/3/Subj: ROGERS

Based on: HMMA-11113 ✓

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/

DOCUMENT NUMBER DBF -12369

DOCUMENT DATE 29 Oct 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF		31 OCT 1958		
2. DC/CI				
3. CI/SID				
4. WH/FI/CE		8 Dec	8	
5. Mexico		9 Dec	9	
6.				
7. SPS		11 DEC 1958		
8. WE/2		7 JAN 1959	8 Jan 59	
9. CI/ICD		JAN 8 1959	JAN 16 1959	
10. CI				
11.				
12.				PM
13. RI/AN		20 JAN 1959		
14. RI/FI	1400L			

COMMENTS

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FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT 8451

DATE PROCESSED

INDEX

FORM NO. 610a
1 OCT. 55

SECRET

DBF / 2369

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-424134

Date: October 28, 1958

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN
SECURITY MATTER - C

Records of the Passport Division, Department of State, revealed that captioned individual was issued a passport in August, 1958, at the American Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. Regarding her travel plans, she had previously stated she intended to depart from Mexico on July 12, 1958, for proposed travel to Europe and the Middle East for the purpose of business and pleasure. However, on August 27, 1958, the American Embassy advised the Department of State that at the time a passport was issued to the subject she refused to give specific travel data but stated she expected to travel to Israel, returning via Belgium to visit the World's Fair at Brussels and would probably stop at intervening points.

Information concerning Halperin has previously been furnished to the recipients of this letter. No investigation is requested since this matter is being handled through the appropriate Legal Attaches. It

DBF 12369

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

would be appreciated, however, if this Bureau is furnished any pertinent information concerning Halperin which may come to the attention of the Department of State or the ~~Central~~ Intelligence Agency while she is outside the United States.

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

165 JB/SW/GT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 22 OCT 58

ROUTING			
1	S	4	BO
2	C-B	5	
3		6	

OCT 22 1528Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 17033

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5 *

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C2

TO (PRIORITY) MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3096

RE BERN 3089 (IN 16287) **

LIAISON REPORTS SUBJECTS RETURNED ZURICH 21 OCT. SPENT HOUR AND HALF CSR CONSULATE ZURICH, CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAG VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT. LIAISON PLANS EITHER SEARCH EFFECTS CLANDESTINELY IN HOTEL OR THROUGH CUSTOMS CHECK AT BORDER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST OF FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT. TRAVELLED GENEVA 15-18 OCT. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. SUBJECTS UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

To FBI as OUT-86967

22 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

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501/RLG/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : M.King
UNIT : WH/3/M
EXT : 4456
DATE : 21 October 1958

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED ☐ PRIORITY ☐ INITIALS
☒ ROUTINE ☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 86432

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : PORTUGAL, LISBON; SWITZERLAND, BERN

DATE OF INFO: 15 - 20 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 18 OCTOBER 1958

1. THE PORTUGUESE INTERNATIONAL POLICE HAVE REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT LISBON FOR ZURICH ON 15 OCTOBER 1958 VIA SWISSAIR AND INDICATED THAT THEIR DESTINATION WAS TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRIED U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118071, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN MEXICO ON 26 AUGUST 1958.

2. AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE REPORTED THAT HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE ARRIVED AT ZURICH FROM LISBON ON 15 OCTOBER AND STAYED AT THE HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF UNTIL 18 OCTOBER, WHEN THEY TRAVELED TO GENEVA. THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO ZURICH ON 20 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

(END OF MESSAGE)

WE/Portugal (by telephone)
EE/Switzerland (by telephone)

22 Oct 58
201-127561 ✓

ABOVE INFO BASED ON:
LISB-1333 (IN-16129)
BERN-3089 (IN-16287)

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

WH/R/CE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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662 ER/.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : Charles W. [illegible]rson
UNIT : WH/FI
EXT : 3255
DATE : 21 October 1958 662

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 22 22 3[illegible] 58
RECD CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT55697

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

46933

REFS MEXI 2592
MEXI 2596

1. PLEASE NOTE DEPARTURE OF KEY AMERICAN COMMUNIST HALPERIN RAISES QUESTION RE DATE OF PROCUREMENT OF INFORMATION.

2. TO MEET ANY POSSIBLE CRITICISM HERE PLEASE ADVISE WAS LOCAL ODENVY TARDY IN PROCESSING? WHY WAS LIFEAT CONTACT OF 29 SEPTEMBER NOT REPORTED PRIOR 17 OCTOBER?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * IN 15827, STATED THAT MAURICE HALPERIN WAS CONTACTING ANN SEBORER RE KLM FLT TO LISBOA VIA SAN JOSE, CURACAO, CARACAS. INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF RESERVATIONS COULD BE OBTAINED WITH SHORT NOTICE.
** IN 15475.

C/CI

22 Oct 58

WH/III/MEXICO

201-128561

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J C King

J. C. KING, CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R N Dahlgren

R. N. DAHLGREN, CWH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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000 ER/WSM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 20 OCT 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

OCT 21 0338Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 16287

TO MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3089

RE MEXI 2596 (IN 15475)***

SUBJECTS ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT, STAYED ZURICH HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF 15 TO 18 OCT, WHEN TRAVELLED GENEVA. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. THEY UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS:

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DTVOUR USED.

**RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

***REQUESTED SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CURACAO LISBON ON 13 OCT.

21 Oct 58
201-128561 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

293 DMCL/RCB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 20 OCT 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LISBON

ACTION : [illegible] (MR. SULC WH DIV NOTIFIED 1900-20 OCT 58)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRIORITY

IN16129

TO DIR BERN TELA* INFO CARA MEXI CITE LISB 1333
ZURI

LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 2596 (IN 15475) **

MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, EDITH DEPARTED FOR ZURI FROM LISB 15 OCT. VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRYING AMERICAN PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUGUST 58.

END OF MESSAGE

*WASH S/C NOTE: RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: **HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT.

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

20 Oct 58
201-128561

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

Halperin Maurice

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

~~OCT 22 15282 58~~

ROUTINE

IN 17933

DATE : 22 OCT 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5 *

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C2

TO (PRIORITY) MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3096

RE BERN 3089 (IN 16287) **

LIAISON REPORTS SUBJECTS RETURNED ZURICH 21 OCT. SPENT HOUR AND HALF CSR CONSULATE ZURICH, CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAG VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT. LIAISON PLANS EITHER SEARCH EFFECTS CLANDESTINELY IN HOTEL OR THROUGH CUSTOMS CHECK AT BORDER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST OF FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT. TRAVELLED GENEVA 15-18 OCT. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. SUBJECTS UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

HALPERIN, Maurice
22-[illegible]

[illegible]
ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 22 October 1958

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : ~~[illegible]~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, S/C 2
NEA 4, SR 4

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	[illegible]
X ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	[illegible]

OUT 86867

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : SWITZERLAND, BERN

DATE OF INFO : 21 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 21 OCTOBER 1958

AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, RETURNED TO ZURICH FROM GENEVA ON 21 OCTOBER 1958, SPENT AN HOUR AND A HALF AT THE CZECH CONSULATE IN ZURICH, CANCELLED THEIR RESERVATIONS TO TEL AVIV, AND WERE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE ZURICH FOR PRAGUE VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL ON 23 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

END OF MESSAGE

ABOVE INFO BASED ON: BERN-3096 (IN-17033)

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION [illegible]

Copy No.

HALPERIN Maurice

22-10-58

592 SD/ATF/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN MILLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD
EXT : 2831
DATE : ~~22 OCTOBER 1958~~ 592

TO : TEL AVIV
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/CI/SP 3
INFO : COP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE			
☒	DEFERRED	OCT 22 21 00 56Z	
☐	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT86312

TO TELA INFO CITE DIR 46863

RYBAT ~~[illegible]~~

REF DIR 46607 (OUT 86097) *

21 OCT SUBJ CANCELLED RESERVATIONS TO TELA. NOW ~~[illegible]~~ SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR PRAGUE VIA AUSTRIA BY RAIL 23 OCT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HALPERIN HAD ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISB 15 OCT VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TELA.

Mary Pinck
NE/ISR

Stephen Millett
STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201/REG

ORIG : M.King
UNIT : WH/3/M
EXT : 4456
DATE : 21 October 1958

S-E-C-R-E-T

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☒	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86432

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

TO INFO CITE DIR

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FROM : PORTUGAL, LISBON; SWITZERLAND, BERN

DATE OF INFO: 15 - 20 OCTOBER 1958

SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

REFERENCE : OUR TELETYPE MESSAGE OF 18 OCTOBER 1958

1. THE PORTUGUESE INTERNATIONAL POLICE HAVE REPORTED THAT MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, EDITH FRISCH HALPERIN, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT LISBON FOR ZURICH ON 15 OCTOBER 1958 VIA SWISSAIR AND INDICATED THAT THEIR DESTINATION WAS TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRIED U.S. PASSPORT NO. 118071, WHICH WAS ISSUED IN MEXICO ON 26 AUGUST 1958.

2. AN OFFICIAL SWISS SOURCE REPORTED THAT HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE ARRIVED AT ZURICH FROM LISBON ON 15 OCTOBER AND STAYED AT THE HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF UNTIL 18 OCTOBER, WHEN THEY TRAVELED TO GENEVA. THEY EXPECTED TO RETURN TO ZURICH ON 20 OCTOBER.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: NONE

(END OF MESSAGE)

WE/Portugal (by telephone)
EE/Switzerland (by telephone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ABOVE INFO BASED ON:
LISB-1333 (IN-16129)
BERN-3089 (IN-16287)

CI
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

WH/R/CE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

565 BD/ATF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : STEPHEN MILLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD
EXT : 2331
DATE : 21 OCTOBER 1958

565

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 21 19 19 56
OCI CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : COS TEL AVIV

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/CI/SP 3

INFO : COP, S/C 2

OUT86097
OUT 86097

TO ~~XXXXXXX~~ TELA INFO CITE DIR

46607

RYBAT RHYTON

REF DIR 46465 (OUT 85727) *

SCM SUBJ~~XXX~~ ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISB 15 OCT VIA SWISSAIR.

SCM INDICATED DESTINATION ~~XXXXXXX~~ TELA. SUBJ~~XXX~~ CARRYING PBPRIME PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUG 1958.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:

*HQS FORWARDED INFO RE MOVEMENTS OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENTS.

NE/ISR

Stephen Millett

STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 2

Halperin, Maurice

000 ER/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	21-10-58
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 20 OCT 58

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION: WH 5*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SP, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

OCT 21 0338Z 58

ROUTINE

IN 16287

TO MEXI INFO DIR TELA LISB CARA CITE BERN 3089

RE MEXI 2596 (IN 15475)***

SUBJECTS ARRIVED ZURICH FROM LISBON 15 OCT, STAYED ZURICH HOTEL SCHWEIZERHOF 15 TO 18 OCT, WHEN TRAVELLED GENEVA. EXPECTED RETURN ZURICH 20 OCT. THEY UNDER DISCREET INANITION SURVEILLANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS:

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DTVOUR USED.

**RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

***REQUESTED SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE AND REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT WHO LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CURACAO LISBON ON 13 OCT.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No

14-00000

4

Halperin, Maurice

293 DMCL/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	20-10-58
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 20 OCT 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LISBON

ACTION : * WH 5 (MR. SULC WH DIV NOTIFIED 1900-20 OCT 58)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/SPS, FI, FI/OPS, EE 5, SR 5, WE 5, S/C 2

PRIORITY

IN16129

TO DIR BERN TELA* ZURI INFO CARA MEXI CITE LISB 1333

LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 2596 (IN 15475) **

MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, EDITH DEPARTED FOR ZURI FROM LISB 15 OCT. VIA SWISSAIR. INDICATED DESTINATION TEL AVIV. HALPERIN CARRYING AMERICAN PASSPORT 118071 ISSUED MEXI 26 AUGUST 58.

END OF MESSAGE

*WASH C/C NOTE: RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

C/S COMMENT: **HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT.

*ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

603 GD/ATP/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN MILLETT
UNIT : CI/SPD 6 3
EXT : 2831
DATE : 20 OCTOBER 1958

TO : TEL AVIV
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/CI/SP 3
INFO : COP, S/C 2

Mary Boeck
NE/ISR

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	OCT 20 20 5 56	
	ROUTINE	RECD CABLE SECT.	
XX	~~PRIORITY~~	INITIALS	SCM
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT85727

TO TELA INFO CITE DIR 46465

RYBAT RHYTON

KKCOOT RJ-1340

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT.

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICAN TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELA.

4. PROBABLY HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED ~~KAUFMAN~~ KAUFMAN Stern AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : **TEL AVIV**
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	OCT 20 70 5 2:58	
	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

DIR 46465
OUT 85727

TO INFO CITE DIR

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCE AND REPORT IF SUBJ ARRIVES TEL AVIV.

END OF MESSAGE

Stephen Millett
STEPHEN MILLETT, C/CI/SPD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 3

025/ER/08

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 17 OCT 1958

25

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

(MR. BRADY AND MR OGDEN WH DIV NOTIFIED 0115 18 OCT 58)

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/SP

PRIORITY

IN 15475

TO PRITY DIR BERN INFO CITE MEXI 2596

* TELA LISB CARA ZURI

Daniel

aka Pastor

Subject: Edith Frisell Halperin

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT. in name of Daniel Pastor; then cancelled use of Pastor inquiry made of trip Zurich to Tel Aviv;

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

prob. plan join

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELAVIV.

4. FC. PROBABLE HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

May be joined by Maurice Halperins in Prague

Stern

may be joined by Maurice Halperins in Prague

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE, REPORTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

HALPERIN, Maurice
aka FASTOR, Daniel

SUBJECT FOLDER 201-128561

IN 15475, Mexi 2596, 18-10-58 (subj fldr) Subj & wife American Communists suspected Soviet Agent left Mexico City for Curacao Lisbon on 13 Oct in name of Daniel FASTOR; then cancelled use of PASTOR; inquiry made of trip Zurich to Tel Aviv; prob. plan join Alfred KAUFMAN and Mrthan Dodd STERN in Prague. Subj's wife's name - Edith Frish HALPERIN

HMMA-12338, 11-3-59 (MALTZ, Albert subj fldr)

OVER →

HALPERIN, Edith Frisch
aka HALPERIN, Maurice Mrs.

IN 15475, Mexi 2596, 18-10-58 (Maurice HALPERIN subj file) Subj is wife of Maurice HALPERIN

IN 34979, Mexi 3532, 21-3-59 (SEBORER, Max subj fldr)

RJ-1471, 27-3-59 (SEBORER, Max subj fldr)

NE/ISR desk cards

201-128561

14-00000

542 LS AIR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : JERRY C GLASS
UNIT : WH/3/GUATEMALA
EXT : 2860
DATE : 18 OCTOBER 1958. 542

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FROM : DIRECTOR , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, SR 4. S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

35330

TO INFO CITE DIR

FROM : MEXICO, MEXICO CITY
DATE OF INFO: 13-15 OCTOBER 1958
SUBJECT : TRAVEL OF MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, COMMUNISTS

1. ACCORDING TO A PERSON WITH ACCESS TO TRAVEL RECORDS, WHO IS A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, MAURICE HALPERIN AND HIS WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SOVIET AGENTS, LEFT MEXICO CITY VIA KLM FLIGHT 968 FOR CURACAO, AND LISBON VIA KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCTOBER.

2. THE RESERVATIONS WERE MADE IN THE NAME OF MR. AND MRS. DANIEL PASTOR. ON 11 OCTOBER A CALL FROM THE MEXICO-AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISED KLM THAT THE PASTORS HAD CANCELLED THEIR TRIP AND REQUESTED THAT KLM SUBSTITUTE MR. AND MRS. MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. THE HALPERINS ARE ON A WAITING LIST OF SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCTOBER. A TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY " MR. PASTOR" ASKED THE PRICE OF A ROUND TRIP TICKET FROM ZURICH TO TELAVIV. (FIELD COMMENT. PROBABLY THE HALPERINS PLAN TO JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. THE RESERVATION TECHNIQUE IS THE SAME AS THE ONE HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE

14 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO : FBI

FROM : DIRECTOR , CIA

CONF :

INFO :

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 85330

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE 2

PLANS FOR THE STERN'S FLIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION.)

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: LEGAL ATTACHE

END OF MESSAGE

ABOVE BASED ON MEXI 2596 IN 15475

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-128561

546 LB/ATB/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Secret

546

ORIG : JERRY G CLARK
UNIT : WH/3/Guatemala
EXT : 2060
DATE : 18 OCTOBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
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3	6

Oct 18 [illegible] 1958
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 85327
OUT 85327

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 46321

HQS PASSED MEXI 2596 IN 15475 TO ODENVY. PLEASE PASS ODENVY LOCALLY.

END OF MESSAGE

18 Oct 58
201-128561

Robert N. Dahlgren
for C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Robert N. Dahlgren
C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

345 WCJ/W[illegible]/WCJ

DATE : 17 OCTOBER 1958

SECRET

ROUTING

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6

OCT 19 16 15z 58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 15827

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2592

1. MAURICE HALPERIN CONTACTING ANN SEBORER RE KLM FLT TO LISBOA VIA SAN JOSE, CURACAO, CARACAS. INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF RESERVATIONS CAN BE OBTAINED WITH SHORT NOTICE. ANN SEBORER ALSO CHECKED FOR CANPAC WITHOUT STOP IN UNITED STATES FOR TRIP TO LISBOA. (LIFEAT 29 SEPT DOC).

2. ANN SEBORER TELLING FRIENDS OF FURNISHED APT ON CALLE MEDELLIN FOR RENT FOR 6 MONTHS-YEAR. FC: HALPERIN LIVES AT MEDELLIN 36 APT 9. ALSO TELLING OF GOOD BUY ON STUDEBAKER 50 VINTAGE AT 12,000 PESOS WHICH HAS HAD ONLY 1 DRIVER. FC: HALPERIN OWNS 50 STUDEBAKER. BOTH MAY BE MERE COINCIDENCE. SOURCE LIFEAT DOC.

3. HALPERIN SEEING ANN SEBORER PERSONALLY ON ARRANGEMENTS ALTHOUGH PHONING FOR APPOINTMENT WITH HER. LIFEAT 8 DOC.

4. HALPERIN STILL IN MEXI 8 OCT WHEN EDITH ASKED MGT MALTZ OVER FOR COFFEE. LIFEAT 8 DOC.

END OF MESSAGE

14 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

025/ER/DE 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 17 OCT 1958

25

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY
(MR. BRADY AND MR OGDEN WH DIV NOTIFIED 0115 18 OCT 58)

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, EE 4, NEA 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/SP

PRIORITY

IN 15475

TO PRITY DIR BERN INFO CITE MEXI 2596
TELA LISS CARA
ZURI

1. MAURICE HALPERIN AND WIFE, AMERICAN COMMUNISTS SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT LEFT MEXICO CITY KLM FLIGHT 988 FOR CURACAO LISBON KLM FLIGHT 722 ON 13 OCT.

2. KLM ADVISES RESERVATIONS MADE IN NAME MR AND MRS DANIEL PASTOR AND LATE ON 11 OCT CALL FROM MEXI AMERICA TRAVEL AGENCY ADVISES PASTORS HAD CANCELLED REQUESTED SUBSTITUTE MR AND MRS MAURICE HALPERIN.

3. HALPERINS ON WAITING LIST SWISS AIR FROM LISBON TO ZURICH FOR 15 OCT AND KLM ADVISES TELEPHONIC REQUEST BY "MR PASTOR" ASKED PRICE ROUND TRIP TICKET ZURICH TO TELAVIV.

4. FC. PROBABLE HALPERINS PLAN JOIN ALFRED KAUFMAN AND MARTHA DODD STERN IN PRAGUE. RESERVATION TECHNIQUE SAME AS HALPERIN USED WHEN HE MADE PLANS FOR STERNS FLEE TO SOVIET UNION.

5. REQUEST SURVEILLANCES WHERE POSSIBLE, REPORTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO TELA HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIGNAL CENTER. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

[illegible] - 85 330 to FBI

12 Oct 58

201-128561 ✓

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]
HALPERIN

CONTINUED CONTROL

7 October 1958

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Woodrow Wilson BORAH

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,004, dated 14 August 1958, concerning Subject, former OSS employee and a contact of Maurice HALPERIN, American Communist in Mexico City. Subject is now employed at the University of California.

2. Forwarded for the information of your Bureau is a photographic copy of a letter, dated 6 June 1958, from Subject to HALPERIN, which mentions that the BORAH family planned to leave Berkeley on 30 June to go to Europe, via Washington D.C. and New York City. BORAH also says he has recommended HALPERIN to the Encyclopedia Britannica as an expert on Mexican statistics and economy.

3. The letter was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/ 51,777

Enclosure: One letter as described above

WH/3/Mexico/L.Washinko: kc 30 September 1958

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - RI (201-223839)
- 1 - CI/Lia
- 1 - [illegible]
- 1 - [illegible]
- ✓1 - WH/3/Mexico
- 1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-10532

Project Cryptonym: LIHIGH

CONTINUED CONTROL

7 Oct 58
201-128561
751,777

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,349, dated 4 September 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist in Mexico.

2. On 19 August 1958 an appointment HALPERIN had with Narciso BASSOLS, known Soviet agent, was changed from 21 to 22 August, since BASSOLS would not be in Mexico City on 21 August. On 22 August HALPERIN was informed that BASSOLS could not see him until 25 August.

3. The above information was passed to your representative in Mexico City. It was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/751,633

WH/3/LWashinko: mln

22 September 1958

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- ✓1 - RI (201-128561)
- 1 - CI/Lia
- 1 - RQM/RE
- 1 - CI/R&A
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico
- 1 - WH/R

Based on: HMM-3680

Project Cryptonym: LIFEAT

SE
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/751,165, dated 26 August 1958, and to other correspondence concerning Subject, an American Communist living at Medellin #36, Apartment 9, Mexico, D.F.

2. Enclosed for your information are photocopies of the following correspondence sent to Subject:

a) Letter, postmarked 28 April 1958, from David HALPERIN, Subject's son, a medical student in Chicago, Illinois, concerns David's studies and his health, and mentions that he was elected to the student government on the Student Representative Party ticket.

b) Note, dated 3 May 1958, from Subject's mother, at 824 Bluehill Avenue, Dorchester, Massachusetts, concerns purely family matters.

c) Letter, dated 9 May 1958, from Sadie F. BIRNBAUM, 8 Chase Street, Lynn, Massachusetts, gives news of friends and relatives of the HALPERINs, including one Elinor GOLSMAN.

d) Letter, postmarked 18 May 1958, from David HALPERIN, concerns his studies and living arrangements.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

2 Oct 58
201-128561

CS COPY

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

e) Letter, dated 29 April, from A. DORFMAN, in Santiago, Chile, indicates that HALPERIN may have asked the writer for help, possibly in finding a job. (A. DORFMAN is believed identical with Adolfo DORFMAN, a suspected Communist and former employee of the United Nations who is now in Argentina DORFMAN and Fanny, his wife, were both born in the Soviet Union, but DORFMAN is believed to be a citizen of Argentina now.) The writer describes himself as a "well-known and uncompromising" supporter of (President) FRONDIZI (of Argentina) and says that since the latter's election triumph he (the writer) has been "practically snowed under with requests for assistance, advice, etc." (It is believed that DORFMAN did, in fact, accept a position as an adviser in the FRONDIZI government.) The letter also enclosed a hand-written note, signed "Fanny."

f) Letter, dated 9 May 1958, from Bob and Terry ROGERS (aka Martin Robert ROGERS and Teresa Soracco ROGERS), in Venice, Italy, describes the Italian part of the ROGERS' European tour. Two parts of the letter may be of significance. First, ROGERS' comments on the Italian elections: "The CP is campaigning vigorously and spending a lot of money. They and the Christian Democrats are the only ones you seem to feel. The local papers seem resigned to leftist gains, so the immediate future of Italy will depend in large part on the coalitions that NENNI may be willing to form." Second, his "few random notes": "Just as many cops as in Benito's (MUSSOLINI's) day. U.S. missile base straddles industrial Italy. U.S. army vehicles constantly on highways in this region (Turin-Milan-Venice)." The letter also mentions the fact that the ROGERS were going on to Austria and Brussels after completing their tour of Italy.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

SECRET
CONTINUED CONTROL

g) Letter, dated 14 May 1958, from Oscar LEWIS, at the University of Illinois, concerns some translations HALPERIN was doing for LEWIS. LEWIS says that he has overdrawn his research account and asks HALPERIN to take this into account when computing his bill for the translations. LEWIS also says that he is hoping to be able to visit Mexico the first two weeks in June.

3. This correspondence was obtained from a usually reliable and highly sensitive source and should not be disseminated further.

CSCI-3/751,683

Enclosures: 7 letters as described above

WH/3/Mexico/L.Washinko: kc   24 September 1958

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI (201-128561)
1 - CI/Lia
1 - CI/ICD
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - WH/R

Based on: HMMA-10320
HMMA-10321

Project Cryptonym: LIBIGHT

SECRET
CONTROL

201-128561

201-12856

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMM-A-11154

50-4-120-1

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 1 October 1958

SUBJECT American Communists in Mexico

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

MEXI-2334
MEXI-2342

LIFEAT

1. Following an order issued by the President of Mexico on 6 September 1958 for enforcement of Article 33 of the Constitution a round-up was made in Mexico City of American Communists and other foreigners, allegedly Communists, currently residing here both as tourists and inmigrantes or inmigrados.

2. Among the first Americans to be picked up and who were the only ones actually to leave due to this order were: Bernard BLASENHEIM, John BRIGHT and Allen LEWIS.

(201-39727)

3. Bernard BLASENHEIM entered Mexico in 1950 with "Inmigrante" status and currently enjoyed status as an "Inmigrado" here. U. S. Ambassador Robert C. Hill received a call on 7 September 1958 from former Senator George BENDER of Ohio requesting that he intercede for Mr. BLASENHEIM who was being detained by Mexican authorities. According to local newspapers William O'DWYER, former U. S. Ambassador to Mexico, was requested by a phone call from New York to intercede for BLASENHEIM with local authorities. O'DWYER's office was unable to secure an "amparo" for BLASENHEIM. BLASENHEIM was deported from Mexico, arriving in San Antonio, Texas on American Airlines flt. 690 on 11 September 1958. (ODINCH) Ambassador Hill advised (former) Senator BENDER that he could not intercede that the procedure was completely legal (by Mexican law) and advised Mr. BENDER to check into BLASENHEIM's background. Mr. BENDER withdrew his request, said he did not know BLASENHEIM; had had a call from New York

201-12559

4. John BRIGHT, entered Mexico as a student immigrant originally but in March 1955 his status was changed to that of a "technical immigrant" retroactive to October 1954. BRIGHT had not yet attained "inmigrado" status. When picked up BRIGHT was incarcerated at Miguel Schulz 135 in solitary confinement (LIFEAT). He was deported from Mexico on the same flight as BLASENHEIM.

201-47451

5. (Dr.) Allen LEWIS, who has been an instructor at the National University of Mexico, had "inmigrado" status in Mexico. He was picked up by persons claiming to come from Gobernacion during the night of 6 September 1958 and taken from his home in Coyoacan to the Detention Center at Miguel Schulz 135. Mrs. Brooke LEWIS, wife of Dr. LEWIS contacted the U. S. Embassy in an effort to ascertain the reason for his deportation on 9 September 1958. Dr. LEWIS called his wife from San Antonio on 9 September and stated that he and Mr. BLASENHEIM had been brought to San Antonio by the Mexican authorities. (Interview with Mrs. LEWIS by a U. S. Embassy official, 9 September 1958).

6. During the drive by Mexican authorities the following Americans were picked up, held and released after period varying from several hours to several days:

201-128561

A. Noah SEBORER - authorities went to his home on 7 September but were unable to locate him there. He appeared voluntarily for a check of his documents and was detained at the Detention Center on 8 September. As a naturalized citizen of the U. S. he could not be returned to the U. S. without documentation and no documentation other than his Mexican "red book" was provided to the Mexican authorities. He was released on 12 September 1958. (LIFEAT)

201-163487

B. Elizabeth Catlett de MORA - picked up but released after short detention. She is married to a Mexican citizen.

201-52557

C. Lan ADOMIAN - picked up on 9 September 1958 (LIFEAT). ADOMIAN is a Russian-born naturalized American who entered Mexico as a U. S. citizen but ught Immigration papers in Mexico as a Spaniard in view of his claim to Spanish tizenship, having been a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade during the

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28 AND 51-28A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

50-4-

1 Oct 58

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201-128561

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-A-11154
TO INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-120-1
FROM		DATE 1 October 1958
SUBJECT		RE "RI" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)		

Spanish Civil War. He enjoys immigrant status in Mexico.

201-2653

D. Martin *OVERGAARD, who was deported from the U. S. in 1950 as an undesirable alien, was another of the group who was picked up during this drive. He is listed by the Mexicans as a Dane.

7. It is interesting to note that Excelsior, a reputable Mexican newspaper, commented that the major portion of group being detained were "pro-Soviet U. S. citizens, Europeans now naturalized Americans and some from Central and South America."

8. LINEB-1 reported that as of 11 September 1958 the American Communists in Mexico expected the arrests to cease very shortly. From LIFEAT it was learned that consternation existed among the group and that they had scattered to various places, in and around Mexico, after the first onslaught by the local authorities.

9. According to various newspaper articles the following persons were marked for detention if they could be located:

A. Ralph *SCOTT, former Alfred K. *STERN chauffeur and currently handling the STERN residence in Cuernavaca (LIMOUSINE reported that SCOTT was in Cuernavaca) on 21 September 1958. This station is not aware SCOTT a Communist but he is loyal to the STERNs - see various letters to and from Alfred K. and Martha Dodd STERN (in Prague)).

201-102553

B. Max *SHLAFROCK - he and his family are in New York City now and have been there for several months.

201-5557

C. Paul *STEVENSON (aka Pablo *O'HIGGINS), lover of Martha Dodd STERN and painter. Known to associate with members of the Satellite diplomatic installations as well as with the Soviets. Has been attempting to regularize his status in Mexico.

201-125767

D. Frederick Vanderbilt *FIELD - "inmigrado" in Mexico and presently married to Nieves *TILLETT (former wife of James TILLET) by whom he has a child born in summer 1958.

201-28561

E. Maurice *HALPERIN - he and his wife left their residence on first hearing of the pick-ups. His son, David and family remained in their residence however. (LIFEAT)

F. Gray Dayton *BEMIS - has small chicken farm in Ixtapalapa, suburb of Mexico City at last report. An American by birth and married to a Guatemalan Communist who was active in organizing canneries on West Coast of U. S. BEMIS reportedly is ill. Has been "inmigrante" since April 1955 in Mexico.

G. Albert *MALTZ, one of the "Hollywood Ten." Local authorities are aware that MALTZ and family are in the United States at this time but were afraid that subject should re-enter Mexico under an assumed name. MALTZ is an "inmigrado." The papers also mentioned that Helen *SOBELL, wife of Morton *SOBELL, of the Rosenberg case, who is now in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, had been staying at the MALTZ residence during the time she was in Mexico (She departed Mexico on 10 September 1958 voluntarily.)

H. John *ARUCOCK (believed to be identical with Joseph *RASKOB, painter). "Inmigrante" in Mexico. If Joseph RASKOB is the one meant, he is believed to be in the U. S. A. exhibiting paintings. Reported as detained but no information that this was so.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-11154

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-4-120-1

FROM

DATE: 1 October 1958

SUBJECT

RE: "X" (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

201-44515

I. Lini Fuhr STOUMEN - reported to have been detained but this was never verified.

J. Felix SAUNDERS (husband of STOUMEN) - reported to have been detained but this never verified.

10. During all the time that the pick-ups were occurring Carmen CARRASCO Molino, who acted as intermediary for Helen SOBELL with Lic. Luis SANCHEZ Ponton was busy at the MALTZ residence making attempts to gather funds with which to force the Mexican authorities to rescind the pick-up orders and to help the American Communists as a group in efforts to solidify their status in Mexico.

11. Apparently the papers of the people who were deported as well as those who were picked up were correct so far as technicalities were concerned.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

gfb

GFB/cps

26 September 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
5 - Files

50-4-20

1 Oct. 58

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

104-10172-10112

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HALPERIN, MAURICE HYMAN
201-128561
(VOL. VII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN 62 — 76

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
19 MAY	—	JOHANNA SMITH	Johanna Smith
23 MAY	23 MAY	"	"

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman

201-128561

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS - 201-128561 (HALPERIN)

Vol. VII FBI (Boston) 2/6/62; File 100-25501 & 65-14303

FBI (Boston) 1/25/63; Files as above

FBI (Washington) 2/26/63; re HALPERIN

FBI (Washington) 2/26/63

FBI (Boston) 1/13/64; File #BS 100-25501 & 65-14303

FBI (Washington) 1/18/65

FBI (Boston) 3/25/66; File #100-31726 & 100-424134
re Edity Evelyn HALPERIN

FBI (Washington) 6/14/66; File # (S) 65-14303

FBI (Boston) 12/15/66

FBI (Washington) 10/10/67

FBI (Washington) 4/30/68

FBI (Boston) 7/14/72 re Maurice

FBI (Boston) 7/14/72 re Edith

HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman 0023944 ✓
DOB: 3 March 1906
POB: Boston, Massachusetts
Wife: Edith Frisch HALPERIN 225361

128561 (3)
201-[illegible]
[illegible] Case
LCHAYFOWL

Subject is a U.S. citizen and a former OSS employee. Subject has been closely associated with Martha Dodd and Alfred K. STERN in Mexico, and he handled some of the STERNs' business affairs. As of April 1959, Subj believed to be in Moscow. EIS INPUT NO. 53

SEE: SR/CI/B dossier (Also see LCHAYFOWL Case files.)

[illegible] reported Subject's return address (received on a Christmas card (1960), as Apt C-2, Calle 12, no [illegible], Miramar, Habana, Cuba; first time that Subject has given a [illegible] address on a greeting card.

201-128561

OUTGOING MESSAGE

12-2

ROUTING			
1		4	7
2		5	8
3		6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE OF PAGES
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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
132130Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
683288

CONF: C/CI3 INFO: FILE DDO3 ADO/DO OGC C/S5
C/EUR3

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER C1
☐ IP FILES # 2 (S.O.)

EYES ONLY

TO: LONDON INFO OTTAWA.Y

RYBAT PLMHBLANKET Y

REF: LONDON 74209 |IN 971297| {RELAYED OTTAWA}Y

1. PER REFERENCE REQUEST FOR TRACES ON MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN {201-128561}, WE ARE FORWARDING VIA TM FIVE 1960 NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS AND A RECENT ARTICLE FROM THE SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, BRITISH COLUMBIA, ALUMNI MAGAZINE FOR PASSAGE TO JAGUAR. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED PURSUANT TO OUR SERVICE TO SERVICE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON PERSONS OF COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST.Y

2. MAURICE HALPERIN HAS TWO CHILDREN: DAVID CARLOS BORN 5 MAY 1937 IN OKLAHOMA CITY AND JUDITH YVONNE BORN 1 SEPT 1931 IN BOSTON. {SOURCE: DBD-43144, 25 MAR 1966} LNERGO APPROVES PASSING TO JAGUAR. AGENCY RECORDS ON MORTON HALPERIN DO NOT REFLECT ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH MAURICE HALPERIN. HALPERIN IS A COMMON NAME.Y

3. PUBLICATIONS SINCE 1957: "GROWTH AND CRISIS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: 1961, "CONFERENCIAS SOBRE GEOGRAFIA ECONOMICA" 1964, "HACIA UN NUEVO SISTEMA DE PLANIFICACION Y DIRECCION

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PAGE OF PAGES

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE 883288

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0 IP FILES #

ECONOMICAS EN LA UNION SOVIETICA" 1964, AND "THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO - AN ESSAY IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY", UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS.Y

4. THE FOLLOWING IS FROM FHABOVE AND NEEDS THEIR CONCURRENCE TO PASS TO JAGUAR. MAURICE HALPERIN IS CURRENTLY TEACHING AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA AND EXPECTS THAT THE UNIVERSITY WILL EXTEND HIS TEACHING APPOINTMENT TO AUGUST 1977. HALPERIN TOLD FHABOVE THAT HE AND HIS WIFE TOURED ISRAEL, ITALY, GREECE, SPAIN, AND ENGLAND IN THE SUMMER OF 1975. HE IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE SECOND VOLUME OF HIS BOOK ON CUBA. HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION WITH FHABOVE THAT WHEN IT IS FINISHED HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY. (SOURCE: OCOA-19102, 22 JAN 76)Y

5. FOR OTTAWA: JAGUAR HAS REQUESTED TRACES ON MAURICE HALPERIN. PLS NOTIFY LONDON IF FHABOVE APPROVES PASSING INFO FROM PARA FOUR ABOVE TO JAGUAR.Y

6. FILE: 73-6-46/3. E2 IMPDET.H

DDO/AGC - A. E. GOLDIN (IN DRAFT)

EUR/BC

DATE: 12 JUL 76
ORIG: PATSY WOLF
UNIT: CI/OG
EXT: 1117

C/E/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. Wall

AC/CI/OG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

WASH DC
STAR
31 Aug 60

Ex-OSS Official Works For Reds in Moscow

By VICTOR LASKY

North American Newspaper Alliance

A former Boston University professor, who once was a high official in the OSS, has turned up in Moscow working for the Soviet government.

The professor, Dr. Maurice H. Halperin, fled this country seven years ago after an inquiry into his Communist background.

According to the State Department, he probably is advising Soviet officials on Latin American affairs, an area in which he is expert.

Prof. Halperin was suspended by Boston University in 1953 after he refused, on constitutional grounds, to tell a Senate subcommittee whether he had ever been a Communist Party member.

According to the State Department, he had previously been involved in Soviet espionage in wartime Washington. He had been named by Elizabeth Terrill Bentley, admitted former spy courier, as one of her sources of supply among Government officials.

Intrigue in Mexico

And since 1953, Dr. Halperin has been involved in still more intrigue as an "exile" in Mexico. It was he, for example, who assisted two suspected spies in their flight from Mexico to Czechoslovakia to avoid United States extradition proceedings.

On July 15, 1960, Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow to present their United States passports for renewal.

All this was disclosed in a State Department memorandum prepared for Senator Keating, Republican of New York, who has been urging the passage of Eisenhower-supported legislation empowering the department to deny passports to active participants in Soviet skullduggery.

The memorandum, citing "cases where passports have had to be issued to known Communists," devoted considerable attention to the case of Dr. Halperin. It was obvious on the basis of the information contained in his dossier that the State Department had been keeping an eye on the former professor's movements for some time.

MAURICE H. HALPERIN
—AP Photo

Fired in Oklahoma

From 1931 to 1941, Dr. Halperin—a Harvard University graduate—had been a professor at the University of Oklahoma. According to the record, it was in this period that he directed Communist activities in Oklahoma and, on repeated visits to Mexico, conferred with Mexican Red leaders. On one visit to Cuba in 1935, he and other leftwingers had been arrested by Cuban authorities and expelled from the country.

In 1941, much of this was disclosed in an investigation conducted by an Oklahoma State legislative committee. The committee, investigating subversive activities in Oklahoma, produced information that in 1940 Dr. Halperin had cashed a check for $436 drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade in Moscow. As a result, Dr. Halperin was dismissed from the University of Oklahoma.

Despite this record, Dr. Halperin managed to enter Gov-

See HALPERIN, Page A-6

HALPERIN

Continued From First Page

ernment service. Employed as chief of the Latin American division of the Office of Strategic Services (the OSS was then the United States Civilian Intelligence-Gathering Agency), he later was transferred to the State Department. In both agencies, according to the Elizabeth Bentley testimony, he transmitted confidential documents to a Soviet spy ring.

Linked to Spy Ring

In 1949, he became head of the Latin American regional students section at Boston University's College of Liberal Arts.

A year later, he was first publicly identified as a member of a Soviet spy ring. This came about when Vice President Nixon, then a California Congressman, made known a top secret memorandum on espionage transmitted by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the White House on November 8, 1945.

In March, 1953, in Boston's Federal Building, Dr. Halperin repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when—in a hearing conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee—he refused to reply to various questions concerning his alleged Communist activities.

In November, 1953, Dr. Halperin and his wife, without notifying the university, left their home in the middle of the night never to return. Turning up in Mexico, they became members of the American Communist group in Mexico.

Like most ACGM members, the Halperins did well. They invested in an ice cream company, dabbled in real estate, and obtained jobs. Dr. Halperin was employed by the Mexican government as a financial consultant and his wife taught in the American School Foundation.

They also became friendly with Alfred K. Stern and his wife, the former Martha Dodd, daughter of a former United States Ambassador to Germany. The fact the Sterns had been implicated in Soviet espionage came out with the arrest in New York of Jack Soble, a Soviet agent. To avoid being extradited to the United States to testify before a special grand jury on their associations with Soble and "the double agent Boris Morros," the Sterns fled to Czechoslovakia in July, 1957.

Dr. Halperin, described as being "intimately involved in their plans for escape," had obtained airline reservations for the Sterns under other names. As a result, the Mexican government was considering his case for deportation. On October 13, 1958, the Halperins left Mexico, having obtained plane reservations in the names of other persons.

In Russia Since 1958

The State Department memorandum concludes:

"We received information shortly after Halperin's departure from Mexico that he was employed in Moscow by the USSR. This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their United States passports for renewal.

"Halperin stated that he had been in the USSR since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences where he is doing research . . . relating to underdeveloped countries.

"It will be recalled that Halperin is something of an authority on Latin American affairs. Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time.

"The Soviet Academy of Sciences is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers."

Washington Post
1 Sept. 1960

Thursday, Sept. 1, 1960 THE WASHINGTON POST

Halperin, U. S. Ex-Aide, Is Now a Soviet Official

Associated Press

The State Department says that Maurice H. Halperin, a former United States Government official linked by Senate investigators to Soviet espionage activities, apparently is serving now as a Latin-American adviser to the Russians.

Halperin was head of the Latin-American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during the latter part of World War II and later an associate professor at Boston University. Before the war, he had been on the faculty of the University of Oklahoma.

In 1954 he was dismissed by Boston University after Senate investigators received testimony linking him to a Soviet spy ring and he refused to answer a question as to whether he was a Communist.

The latest information on Halperin's whereabouts is contained in a report compiled by the State Department about persons to whom it has been compelled to issue passports under a 1958 decision of the Supreme Court.

The Court held that the Department lacks authority to deny passports to Communists or to other persons because of their political beliefs.

After the ruling, Halperin applied for a passport at the American Embassy in Mexico City, where he had gone after being dismissed by Boston University, and used it to leave Mexico on Oct. 13, 1958.

The State Department said that shortly after Halperin and his wife departed from Mexico it received information that he was employed in Moscow by the Soviet Union.

"This was confirmed on July 15, 1960, when the Halperins appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow and presented their U. S. passports for renewal," the Department's report said, adding:

"Halperin stated that he had been in the U.S.S.R. since December, 1958, and that he is employed by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences where he is doing research in the foreign field, specially, relating to undeveloped countries."

The Department recalled that Halperin was something of an authority on Latin-American affairs and said, "Our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

Associated Press

MAURICE H. HALPERIN

. . . believed Soviet employe

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Ex-Boston U. Professor Was in O.S.S. in World War II

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 31—The State Department has disclosed that a former United States intelligence official is in Moscow working for the Soviet Government.

He is Dr. Maurice Halperin, a former Boston University professor who was head of the Latin American Division of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

Dr. Halperin was dismissed from Boston University in 1954 after he refused to say whether he was a Communist. He has been linked in testimony before Senate investigators to a Soviet spy ring.

The State Department's disclosure was contained in a memorandum in support of a proposed law to deny passports to persons supporting international communism.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1958 that passports could not be denied to Communists or others because of their political beliefs.

Dr. Halperin and his wife, Edith, were then in Mexico City, the State Department noted. They had been linked to the escape behind the Iron Curtain of Alfred K. and Martha Dodd Stern, who were under Federal indictment for espionage.

After the Supreme Court ruling, the Halperins applied to the United States Embassy in

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

NYT
1 Sept 60

FORMER U. S. AIDE AT WORK IN SOVIET

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

Mexico City for passports and left Mexico Oct. 13, 1958. At the time, the State Department noted, they were about to be deported from Mexico for Communist activities.

Reports that Dr. Halperin was working for the Soviet Government in Moscow were confirmed last July 15, the State Department memorandum went on, when he and his wife appeared at the embassy to renew their passports.

Embassy officials reported that they had been told by Dr. Halperin that he and his wife had been in the Soviet Union since December, 1958, and that he was working for the Soviet Academy of Sciences "doing research in the foreign field, especially relating to underdeveloped countries."

The State Department, recalling that Dr. Halperin was an authority on Latin-American affairs, added that "our information indicates that this probably is the field in which he is working at the present time."

State Department officials have repeatedly called attention to the Soviet trade and cultural offensive in Latin America.

Referring to Dr. Haleprin's employment by the Soviet Academy, the State Department observed that it was directly subordinate to the Soviet Council of Ministers.

Requested by Keating

The memorandum was prepared at the request of Senator Kenneth B. Keating, Republican of New York. He and Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, are sponsoring a bill that seeks to restore some of the State Department's authority to deny passports.

Senator Keating, who entered the memorandum in The Congressional Record of Aug. 16, expressed regret at the time that his bill was not likely to be passed in this session of Congress. President Eisenhower and State Department officials have backed the purpose of the measure.

Meanwhile, Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania and chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activity, said he had ordered a month-long preliminary investigation into the case of two missing employes of the National Security Agency.

The two employes of the top-secret coding agency, Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, are alleged to have taken valuable secrets to the Soviet Union.

Representative Walter said that he understood that one of the missing man had made enquiries in their agency about the U-2 reconnaissance plane flight over the Soviet Union before it took place on May 1.

Mr. Walter said that he was convinced that the Soviet had had advance knowledge of the flight. Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, was downed in the Soviet Union and subsequently sentenced to ten years' detention.

Refused to Appear

BOSTON, Aug. 31—Dr. Halperin was officially dismissed from the faculty of Boston University on Jan. 6, 1954. He had refused a summons to appear before a university committee of review to discuss his case.

Dr. Harold C. Case, president of the university, telephoned Dr. Halperin in Mexico City offering to pay his expenses to Boston and return. But the professor declined. He had been chairman of the university's Latin-American regional studies.

STAR 5 Sept 60

Halperin Denies Giving Reds Advice on Latins

MOSCOW, Sept. 5 (AP) — Maurice H. Halperin, former United States Government official who now lives in Moscow, yesterday accused the State Department of issuing a "deliberate and malicious distortion" about his status here.

In a typewritten statement, Mr. Halperin said:

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow . . . I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it."

Last week Senator Keating, Republican of New York, read into the Congressional Record a State Department document which said Mr. Halperin is now in Moscow and is "working for the Soviet government."

Headed OSS Unit

The document said there were indications Mr. Halperin is giving the Soviet government advice on Latin-American affairs. During World War II, Mr. Halperin was head of the Latin American division of the United States Office of Strategic Services, an intelligence organization.

After the war, Mr. Halperin got a job with Boston University as a professor. He lost this job in 1953 because he refused to tell congressional investigators whether he ever had been a member of the American Communist Party.

The bald, mustached 54-year-old Mr. Halperin was located Sunday in a Moscow apartment house by a newsman and was asked to comment on the State Department's document.

Declines to Elaborate

(Moscow reported there were "technical difficulties" in moving the story until Monday. The newsman apparently was cut off while trying to telephone the story.)

Mr. Halperin first declined to admit the newsman into his apartment, but agreed to meet him later in the lobby of a nearby hotel where he promised to give a written statement.

Mr. Halperin appeared punctually at the agreed hour. He carried the following statement, on which he declined to elaborate:

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are scraping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this stale red herring.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two United States income tax returns listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn (an American pianist) when he performs in a government-owned concert hall.

"I am a visiting professor at the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it, as some of our leading scientists can testify. My appointment and my Soviet visa expire in July, 1961, as the United States Embassy here very well knows.

"My teaching and research activities involve theoretical problems related to the economic growth of underdeveloped areas. For the State Department to say that I am 'advising the Russians on Latin-American affairs' is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

"Specifically, I am making a study of the Latin-American economy from 1943 to the crisis of 1958. When my book is published it will be available to the State Department and anybody else willing to purchase a copy."

The United States Embassy declined to comment on the statement or on Mr. Halperin's status. It did say he appeared at the embassy in July and asked to have his American passport renewed. The request was granted, an embassy official said.

Washington Po
5 Sept. 1962

Halperin Says Reds Not Not Employ Him

MOSCOW, Sept. 4 (UPI) Maurice H. Halperin today branded a reported State Department statement that he is working as an adviser to the Soviet government on Latin American affairs as a "deliberate and malicious distortion."

In a statement to reporters, Halperin said he is a professor associated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, working on a book on Latin American economics, and, he explained, the American authorities know all about it.

(A State Department document in Washington last week said Halperin, a former Boston University professor and World War II intelligence specialist on Latin American affairs, was working for the Soviet government.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N. Y.), had the document entered in the Congressional Record.)

"It seems to me that the State Department and Senator Keating are sweeping the bottom of the barrel to come up with this red herring," Halperin said.

"There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival, I have filed two U. S. income tax returns, listing my salary and employer.

"I am not working for the Soviet government any more than Van Cliburn when he performed in a government-owned concert hall," he continued.

"I am a visiting professor in the USSR Academy of Sciences and not the first American to be associated with it. For the State of Department to say that I am an adviser to the Russians on Latin American affairs is a deliberate and malicious distortion.

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[illegible]

"COMMENT", Dec 75 issue
(alumni magazine of
Simon Fraser University
in British Colombia.)

By Nick Hyde

Fortune, or chance, has played a major role in Simon Fraser Political Science professor Dr. Maurice Halperin's nearly seventy years of life.

It was chance that compelled him to seek employment with the National University of Mexico. It was chance that earned him a three-year post in Moscow. It was chance that led him to a teaching stint in Cuba. And it was chance that brought him to Simon Fraser seven years ago.

In fact, fortune began wielding its capricious influence over his life even before Dr. Halperin was born.

"I might have been born in Canada," he says. "My father sailed from Liverpool to the New World at the turn of the century, with Montreal as his destination. However, he decided to move on to Boston."

This was a "rather fortunate circumstance over which I had no control," since Montreal at the time was still a provincial city while Boston was "a metropolis, a great centre of culture and learning and all its splendid facilities were available to me."

Among those facilities which he made use of were the Boston Latin School — a secondary school which boasts such luminaries as Benjamin Franklin and Ralph Waldo Emerson among its alumni — and Harvard University.

He completed his postgraduate work in Paris at the Sorbonne which, at that time, was the most prestigious university in the world and "the impact it had on my way of life and thinking was a permanent one."

While attending the Sorbonne, Dame Fortune stepped in and "I was appointed to the faculty as a Reader in North American Civilization. Even though I came from Harvard, the level of competence and sophistication of the French students was much higher and I had to work very hard to keep up with them."

After completing his doctorate, Dr. Halperin joined the faculty at the University of Oklahoma and found that midwestern state to be "like another country. Boston and Paris were much closely related than were Boston and Oklahoma."

However, chance intervened to rescue him from what could have been a number of indifferent years in a then small and remote university on the American Prairies, turning them into years spent in "an oasis of high culture."

Dr. Halperin explains:

"It was during the Depression and jobs were scarce, so the university attracted a number of bright teachers and researchers whose first choice might not have been Oklahoma.

"And when you have a group of people like that, in addition to the opportunity of understanding and learning to appreciate the virtues of middle America, well, it was something that stayed with me for the rest of my life."



Maurice Halperin, Simon Fraser's oldest professor, is a keen musician who has played with the New Westminster Symphony Orchestra.

The Second World War interrupted Dr. Halperin's sojourn at the University of Oklahoma and he joined the Office of Strategic Services, a special research and intelligence agency attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"I had a front row seat in the planning of some of the most interesting operations of the war," he says. "I consider my experiences there were at least the equivalent of a second PhD because I was associated with a whole group of social scientists in different disciplines.

"Through this, I had the realization that we had practical matters to consider in the social sciences, as well as theoretical ones. And I learned the value of co-operative effort, the value of getting work done on time, and the value of efficiency in research.

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14-00000

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It was then that chance interfered again, this time in a most malicious way.

"My stay at Boston coincided with the most intense period of McCarthyism and this raised problems for a great number of people at the time. In my own case, I was given the choice of co-operating with the Inquisition or, as it turned out, losing my job.

"Among other disagreeable aspects of co-operating, it would have turned me into an informer against people who, as far as I know, had committed no crime. I just couldn't think of facing my students with their knowledge that I was an informer."

Leaving Boston University, he went to the National University of Mexico City where he remained for six years. While working there, he did some consulting work for the Mexican government, thereby gaining further practical experience on the problems of underdevelopment in Latin America.

This experience led directly to his next position — a three-year appointment at the Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Halperin explains:

"At that time, the period when Kruschev was trying to loosen up some of the rigid controls of Stalin's dictatorship, there was a desire at the Academy to have some western expertise on Latin American developmental problems. In other words, my Mexican experience was a direct prerequisite for the Moscow invitation.

"It's strange how, in retrospect, what seemed to be a rather difficult choice in 1953 turned out to be very lucky. You never know. Something happens that can crush you or, on the contrary, can make you healthier and more robust than you've ever been before.

"And, when the invitation came from Moscow, I was footloose and free. My status in Mexico was always that of a visiting professor, so I had no problems of security — tenure or pension, for example — to tie me down when it came. I had nothing to lose and everything to gain."

Dr. Halperin spent three years at the Academy and found it to be an extraordinary experience. "I wasn't there as a tourist; neither was I there as an outside researcher. I was actually in the machine, with no permanent ties to it. I was working in the factory, rather than just studying it."

Fate once again intervened in his life, this time in the form of the celebrated Latin American guerrilla leader, Che Guevara.

"Late one night, there was a knock on my door and I opened it and there stood Che with a couple of his Cuban friends. He had been told about me by mutual friends in Mexico and they suggested that, in view of the need for competent educators and social scientists in Cuba, I might be interested in accepting an invitation to teach at the University of Havana."

As it happened, Dr. Halperin was interested. He spent the next six years in Cuba, and after leaving, produced a book on the country — *The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro: An Essay in Contemporary History*. It was published by the University of California Press and a second edition, in paperback, has recently appeared. (Incidentally, Dr. Halperin's published work spans 45 years and "several thousand pages.")

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"And it was troubling, you know, when neighbors would knock on our door to see if we could spare a thimbleful of salt or a tablespoon of cooking oil and there we were, sitting with everything at our disposal."

And a further quirk of fate, naturally, brought him to Simon Fraser in 1968. He'd met a Canadian while in Havana and one day, about a year later, he received a phone call "from a place called Burnaby." It was the same Canadian, inviting him to participate in a seminar on Latin America, with "all expenses paid."

When he received the invitation, in the spring of 1968, he had already resigned his position in Havana and was planning to return to the United States the following September. "When the invitation came, I thought, 'Two weeks? Why not?', so I accepted and came up here and, like the man who came to dinner, they couldn't get rid of me.

"I never dreamed I would end up in Canada, three-quarters of a century after my father left it, but I now feel thoroughly assimilated to the Canadian environment." In fact, he's so well assimilated that he is now listed in the Canadian edition of *Who's Who*.

During his well-travelled life, Dr. Halperin has had the opportunity to teach at a number of reputable institutions in North America, Europe and Latin America but he says that he's "never been in a more congenial place than Simon Fraser, never in my life.

"It's the best place, all in all, that I've ever been. Students and faculty have it very good here and I'm not talking only about the splendid scenery and the mild climate. The facilities for learning, teaching, research and recreation — I'm a steady customer at the swimming pool and the [illegible] you know — are magnificent."

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
LOND 74209	6 July 1976	73	6	46	/3

DOC. SUBJECT

PLMHBLANKET

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution. Dissem. No., etc., if applicable)

JAGUAR HAS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING:

1. MAURICE HALPERIN. BORN BOSTON, MASS. 3 MAR 1906. WIFE EDITH NEE FRISCH, BORN 6 JULY 1907, WABASH, INDIANA. TWO CHILDREN BORN 1939 NAD 1934, NAMES UNKNOWN. SUBJ IS IDENTIFIED AS A COMMUNIST. FROM 1931 TO 1941, HE WAS PROFESSOR OF LANGUAGES AT UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA. 1941 HE WAS SOCIAL SCIENCE ANALYST, OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION AND IN 1945 WAS IN THE RESEARCH SECTION OF OSS. IN 1953 HE LEFT THE USA FOR MEXICO. ON 10 NOV 1958 HE WENT TO AUSTRIA FROM SWITZERLAND WITH HIS WIFE AND CROSSED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN DEC 58 HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE IN MOSCOW. IN 1960 HE WAS IN MOSCOW WORKING FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS AN AUTHORITY ON LATIN AMERICA. IN 1962 SUBJ AND HIS WIFE WERE IN CUBA REPRESENTING "NATIONAL GUARDIAN". RIS CONNECTIONS: IN 1942 HE WAS EMPLOYED BY THE LATIN AMERICA BRANCH. HE PROVIDED OSS AND STATE DEPT REPORTS TO THE RIS THROUGH MARY PRICE AND ELIZABETH BENTLY. JAGUAR SAYS THEY HAVE ADDITIONAL ESPIONAGE INFO IN THEIR FILES.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.	201-128561			

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	
HALPERIN, Maurice Hyman	201- 128561

FORM 12-72 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(7-46)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Incoming Pouch Message

FROM: CHAMBERS LUI GC-596
IP/ANSF 4F01
EXT. 9149 TUBE BU3

NO. 00OH-19102

DATE 22 Jan 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

TO	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SE/X/EU				[illegible]
2.				
3.				
4. SE/CI/X	6 FEB 1976			
5.				
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8.				
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11.				
12.				
13.				
14. IP/Files				
15.				201-128561

FORM 6-75 610A USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

CAUTION – THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief, SE

INFO.
Chief, EUR Chief, LA Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
CKTOP FHABOVE KMSTONE/ FHABOVE Comments and Transmittal of Magazine Article on Soviet Agent Maurice Hyman HALPERIN (201-0128561)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
Action: FYI

1. FHABOVE reports that on 13 January 1976 it again spoke to Subject who, although remains approachable, declined to elaborate on previous comments concerning the 1940's. Concerning himself, Subject said that he and his wife toured Israel, Italy, Greece, Spain and England in the summer of 1975. Work on the second volume of his book on Cuba has fallen behind. HALPERIN left the impression that once the Cuba book is out of the way, he will commence his autobiography. He also expects that Simon Fraser University will extend his teaching appointment to August 1977.

2. Transmitted herewith as received from FHABOVE is an article on Subject taken from the December 1975 issue of "COMMENT", the alumni magazine of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia.

Adrian O. Baghurst
Adrian O. BAGHURST

Attachment:
As stated h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SE w/att. h/w
2 - C/LA w/att. h/w (LA/C)
2 - C/WOMUSE w/att. h/w (CI/Reg)
2 - C/EUR w/att. h/w (E/BC/C)

E2, IMPDET

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OCOA-19102	22 January 1976
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-0128561

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(alumni magazine of
Simon Fraser University
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

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H/W RIT OCOA-19102

H/wat 1-OCOA-19102

SCI-128561

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201-128561

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

8 [illegible] 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on [illegible] (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

☐ **unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.**

Signed [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
(name) (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ________ ________ 197__
(initials) (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-________

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In
SECRET

C7

14 JAN 1975 197

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on HALPERIN (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

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☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed J Carroll (name) Op Officer (title) CIRA/CA (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______ (initials) 24 1975 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-0128561

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECRET

14-00000

THE NEW REPUBLIC
10 MARCH 1973

Independence Entangled

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro

by Maurice Halperin

(University of California Press; $12.95)

At the end of a passage describing the euphoric early days of the Cuban Revolution, Maurice Halperin laments: "Alas, it was destined to change." In effect, this attitude symbolizes his reaction and assessment of Castro and Cuba in this first volume of a two-part study of the revolution from the first days of Fidelismo to the present. A note of frustration which occasionally marks his narrative of the first five years of the revolution undoubtedly comes from his sense of the unfulfilled promise of the July 26th Movement. For a great many Western intellectuals (including Halperin), this has been a characteristic reaction. In the first exuberant months, it seemed as if Cuba might become the first Socialist revolution to rise spontaneously out of historical circumstances, not led by a rigid party structure, and the first to proclaim a "joyous socialism," rather than the tortuous necessities of work norms, ideological conformity and sacrifice. After several years of living in Cuba, through its best and bleakest moments, Halperin feels that this possibility is extinguished. One feels that he wanted very much for it to succeed. His book is an explanation of why the revolution failed.

Although the current volume only covers the first five years of the revolution, the author breaks into the chronology to keep the next years' events in mind. Everything about the revolution was in flux as he sees it, but at the same time Castro's bungling, bravado and adventurism made surrender to a rigid, bureaucratic socialism almost inevitable. Nothing, from Halperin's point of view, could be a sadder reflection of this devolution than the support Cuba lent to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Halperin's basic argument is that Castro's "rise and decline" must be seen as an international event. For this reason he writes primarily about the foreign policy of the revolution (the only pictures in the book show Castro during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union). If it is accurate to say that the revolution was pushed leftward and finally into an alliance with the Soviet Union by the inept and hostile policy of the United States, then it is also true that Cuba's fate has continued to depend upon the international struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. While Castro may have been committed to Cuban nationalism and social reform at home, he could, ironically, only achieve these goals by means of an aggressive foreign policy.

Castro remains a vague and blustery figure while Che Guevara figures hardly at all. By placing his emphasis elsewhere, Halperin tells the story of the revolution through the events which touched it from the outside, particularly those which effected its ties to the Communist world. Most important were the Sino-Soviet struggle, the world price of sugar, the internal bureaucratic struggle of the USSR, the changing American presidency, the role of the Cuban Communist Party, the CIA, and so on. Gathering his facts primarily from magazine and newspaper articles, plus his own first-hand knowledge of events, he pieces together a fascinating reading of Castro's speeches, policy changes and their context. The shifting and rather indecisive attitude of the revolutionary leadership toward artistic and intellectual liberty, for example, has stemmed from Castro's need to balance conflicting demands: for orthodoxy by Cuban and Russian Communists, and for greater freedoms by Western intellectuals.

Castro's dilemma has always been to assert Cuban independence, and yet retain alignment with the USSR. Perhaps this contradictory policy was doomed, if for no other reason than Cuba's enormous dependence upon other nations to absorb her products and provide her with energy. In any case, when Castro opted to exploit the Cold War and let Khrushchev foot the bill, he created the crisis which Halperin pinpoints. He made the economic success of the revolution at home an absolute necessity, yet a necessity that could only be met with outside help. Castro's own impatience, inefficiency and indecision made matters worse. From the early attempts to industrialize to the abrupt and devastating decision to produce a mammoth sugar crop in 1970, the Cuban economy, the author argues, has continually sunk to lower levels. The result is Castro's dependence upon the Soviet Union, an admission of failure.

Halperin's emphasis on foreign affairs makes good sense, but leaves little room for discussion of the internal dynamics of the revolution and of the impact of social reforms on the population. It makes what Castro said and did, and the revolution itself, explicable only in a sort of code of international affairs. However, given the volatile nature of Cuban politics and the Cold War, it still seems too early to write off the revolution.

James Gilbert

201-128561

14-00000

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973

Fidel Castro

Gifted demagogue

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro — An Essay in Contemporary History, by Maurice Halperin. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. $12.95.

By Philip W. Bonsal

Maurice Halperin has been forced out of two teaching positions at American universities because of his political beliefs. He spent three years on the faculty of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, went to Cuba in 1962 at the invitation of Che Guevara and, though his relations with Guevara quickly deteriorated, spent six years at the University of Havana.

Though one might expect from such a background that dreary mix of the stuffy and the shrill so often associated with the polemics of the far left or right, Professor Halperin's book is a work of insight, wit and understanding.

In this book he concentrates on the first five years of Castro's rule, through 1964, with a sequel to come. However, this volume contains enough about the later years to warrant the use of the word "decline" in his title.

After stressing the pride and optimism of the revolution's fifth anniversary, he writes that none of those present at its celebration "could remotely imagine the disappointments and failures that lay ahead, and that on the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, there would be only bitter austerity and hard work — and the tarnished but unflinching charisma of Fidel — to arouse their enthusiasm."

Professor Halperin's account of Castro's first two years in power (when the author was not yet in Cuba) does not give due credit to the United States. After all, initially the United States did make efforts to find an accommodation with Castro, despite the latter's vicious anti-Americanism and his plundering of American properties in ways not even provided by Castro-dictated legislation.

Nor does he adequately explain how, after the policy of accommodation had been abandoned, injudicious American economic sanctions plus the Bay of Pigs failure left the presumably reluctant and sceptical Russians no choice other than massive support for Castro and Guevara.

But when Castro and Khrushchev had become masters of the Cuban people's destiny, Professor Halperin comes into his own. His description of the relations between those volatile and voluble rulers is a delight. The Chairman's surrender over the missiles in his October, 1962, confrontation with President Kennedy, without informing Castro first, much less consulting him, was deeply humiliating to his Cuban ally.

Yet by April of 1963 the sulks and strains of the previous fall had been banished. With uncontested rhetoric the two autocrats bemused their peoples and themselves into the spectacular euphoria that surrounded Castro's visit to Russia. How this was done is but one engaging example of Professor Halperin's analytic and narrative talents.

This exuberant reconciliation did not prove lasting. Khrushchev was overthrown — perhaps partly because of his unprofitable strategic involvement in Cuba. Castro's export of subversion and insurrection to other American republics was considered tactically undesirable by the Kremlin.

Guevara's fatal campaign in Bolivia and other setbacks, combined with the failure of grandiose but unsound schemes for industrialization and agricultural diversification at home, considerably diminished Castro's stature.

His downward curve was further accelerated by failure — after six years of preparations and exhortations — to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970 and by the disruption of the Cuban economy that effort had caused. Castro's later reconciliations with his Russian patrons smacked more than a little of submissions.

Professor Halperin also describes the Washington-initiated exploration during the final weeks of President Kennedy's life, of a basis for discussions between the Cuban and American governments. He believes that if Kennedy had lived something constructive might have evolved from the effort. His conclusion is debatable, since nine years have now elapsed without any significant positive development.

During those nine years there has indeed been a cooling down of American attitudes toward Cuba.

But Castro's attitude toward the United States has not changed. His concept is still that his people, armed to the teeth and knowing only what he chooses to tell them, must remain blindly united around their Maximum Leader, ready to thwart the plots of the once defeated but still wickedly unrepentant imperialists.

This is unfortunate. Although a return to the old association between the two countries is neither desirable nor possible, the people of both would profit from a rational relationship. This will not be easy to establish even when both governments are truly ready to face the task. Meanwhile in the light of Professer Halperin's brilliant account of contemporary Cuba, it seems reasonable to speculate that increasing numbers of Castro's subjects are less willing now to entrust their lives to the phenomenally gifted orchestrator of mass emotions — politically often astute yet repeatedly incompetent in so many fields — who has been their absolute ruler since 1959.

Philip Bonsal was American Ambassador to Cuba, 1959-1960, the first two years of Castro's rule. He is the author of "Cuba, Castro, and the United States" (University of Pittsburgh Press).

Old "Fainting Phil"

201-128561

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973

Fidel Castro

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Philip Bonsal was American Ambassador to Cuba, 1959-1960, the first two years of Castro's rule. He is the author of "Cuba, Castro, and the United States" (University of Pittsburgh Press).

201-128561

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CALIFORNIA
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA PRESS
FALL BOOKS 1972

The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro

Maurice Halperin

The author of this unusual book was twice forced out of teaching positions at American universities because of his political beliefs. He spent three years on the faculty of the USSR Academy of Sciences and five years, from 1962 to 1968, at the University of Havana. He went to Cuba in 1962 on the invitation of Che Guevara, who had visited him in Moscow, and there gathered the materials for this intimate portrait of the Castro regime.

Mr. Halperin concentrates his attention on Castro's foreign policy, placing it in the context of domestic policy and conditions. Obviously skilled in reading the new socialist rhetoric, Professor Halperin guides the reader through the maze of documents, speeches, and propaganda which constitute the record of the Castro regime during the sensational events involving Kennedy, Khrushchev, missiles, and the CIA. Although the main narrative is concerned with the years 1959-1964—primarily the period of the rise of Fidel Castro—it contains digressions into events of the following years when, according to the author, Castro's great utopian dreams turned into nightmares. A second volume, carrying the story down to the present, is in preparation.

Maurice Halperin is Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, B.C.

"A brilliant contribution to the literature on contemporary Cuba and perhaps even more a remarkable series of insights into the new politics of mass society."
—*Woodrow Borah*

October *LC 77-182794* *ISBN 0-520-02182-7*
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Documentation
Mary Pecock
NE/ISR

544 — ~~CI/FS~~ —

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DIRECTOR

6 JUL 71 372102

~~RYBAT RNYTON~~

T

NO. 2796

REF NFVW-2965

1. AFTER LENGTHY HIATUS KKCOMPOUND HAS PROVIDED A/544 DATED 24 JUN 1971 (RECEIVED 1 JULY) RE SUBJECT REF. REPORT NOTES FOLLOWING TWO PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT:

A. MORRIS H. ALPERN
FATHER'S NAME SOLOMON
BORN 1886, POLAND
HOLDER OF US PASSPORT NO. B-246607
VISITED ISRAEL FROM 20 MAY - 22 JUNE 64.

B. MORRIS HYMAN HALPERIN
FATHER'S NAME HENNY
BORN 1886, POLAND
HOLDER OF US PASSPORT NO. A-1735875
ENTERED ISRAEL ON 13 OCTOBER 70.

2. REPORT ASKS FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONAL DETAILS ON SUBJECT ESPECIALLY DATE OF BIRTH AND QUERIES IF EITHER OF

Talked to Al Kergel who says (a) it obvious that neither is our man, and (b) since our original data gave date of birth, see nothing to be done with this. Will check again with Kergel after receipt of A/544, if it contains more than this cable

SECRET

Dick –
has this been
in your books?

16 JUL 1971

SECRET

JX-53066

24th June 1971

A/544

from Israeli
liaison

Dear RJ,

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

Reference John W.'s memorandum to Joseph H. dated 4 November, 1969.

1. Unfortunately in your letter under reference you did not mention Subject's date of birth. Our inspection of Border Control lists show that two people have entered ISRAEL who might possibly be identical with Subject:

    a. Morris H. ALPERN
    Father's name Solomon
    Born 1886, POLAND
    Holder of United States passport no. B-246607
    Visited ISRAEL from 20 May, 1964 - 22 June 1964.

    b. Morris Hyman HALPERIN
    Father's name: Henny
    Born 1886, POLAND
    Holder of United States passport no. A-1735875
    Entered ISRAEL on 13 October, 1970.

2. Is Subject identical with either of the two above?

3. We should be most grateful for additional personal details on Subject.

SECRET

→ Cabled TEL Aviv 16247

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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file HALPERIN

S E C R E T 100826Z NOV 69 CITE TEL AVIV 4933 10 Nov 69 IN 82952

DIRECTOR

RYBAT RHYTON

NO. 1685

REF: NFVW-2965

Pls show me ref

1. KKCOLLAR STUDIED REF WITH GREAT INTEREST. REQUESTED ANY INFO THAT MIGHT BE AVAILABLE OR COULD BE OBTAINED ON POSSIBLE RELATIVES KKCOLLIER AND ASSOCIATION KKCOLLIER CULTURAL OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS IN WOLADY.

2. DIFFICULT FOR HIM FIND PEG ON WHICH TO HANG APPROACH WITHOUT SOME KKCOLLIER MOTIVATION WHICH BOTH KKCONCERTMASTER AND SUBJECT RJ-2365 HAVE EXHIBITED.

S E C R E T

will have the SCH A
who has originated
[illegible] on file on Subject
[illegible] relatives (other than
son & daughter) and
no association
cultural
financial
organization
perhaps Kensel
will have to
be generated.

11 Nov. 69

Talked with Keeghal.
He will query Bureau for any
possible info re (1) relatives in
IsuC (2) any connection with
Zionist organization.

RLP

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

RLP ① Yes. Pls have Kensel [illegible].

Committee

Please ② Send cable to effect that
we have no access to info
on relatives other than
son and daughter
nor on possible association
with Zionist groups.
We would hope they
could come up
with some.
③ Include anything Kensel
may have.

Mary Brook

NE/ISR

Geo Halperin's

SECRET

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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4			
5	C/CI/SPG		J
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
XX	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE	XX	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

File this w/
HQs copy

ok

J.
If we decide to go
ahead, then we might
want to coordinate
with the RCMP.
J

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
John D. Hadden, C/CI/SPG	16 Oct

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

DISPATCH

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SECRET

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO THEODORE G. TOMAZIN
INFO
FROM WARREN H. TIBBENHAM
SUBJECT Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It is requested that you take up the case of HALPERIN with KKCOWBELL. Attached for your information and background is some biographic data and information concerning his activities on behalf of Soviet Intelligence.

2. We would like you to explore with KKCOWBELL the possibility of sending one of his officers here to debrief HALPERIN along the lines of the Milton SCHWARTZ case. The fact that he has been unwilling to tell us anything and is yet now anti-Soviet indicates that a KKCOLLIER officer might have much better entree. Give KKCOWBELL as much of the attached information as he seems to need to make a decision.

3. Subject is probably still in British Columbia at the university mentioned, but in any case the KKCOLLIERs should be able to locate him precisely through Subject's son and/or daughter at the addresses given. It is known that he is quite close to his children.

4. In any event, we are interested in any comments or traces KKCONCOCTER may have concerning him.

John L. Hadden
Chief, CI/SPG

Attachment:
Bio sheet, h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER NFVW-2965
DATE 21 October 1969
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER

File: Subject

ORIGINATING
OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: C/CI/SPG:JLHadden/dek
EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

EYES ONLY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

1[illegible] OCT 1969

15 OCT 1969

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/CI		
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OK / Pass to Holden for the [illegible]

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☒	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: 1. Attached is a memorandum on Maurice HALPERIN for possible investigation along the lines of Milton SCHWARTZ case.

2. The RCMP interviewed HALPERIN in early 1969. He was friendly and indicated he is now anti-Soviet but was reluctant to talk about the past. He said he wants to write a book "setting all the past into proper perspective."

BY HAND

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
CI/SI/Kenzel	15 Oct '69

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

15 October 1969

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
DPOB: Boston, 3 March 1906

1. The source for the following information is a highly-sensitive, thoroughly-tested informant with knowledge of KGB activities in North America during the Second World War:

A. Source knew that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN, Chief of the Latin American Division of O.S.S., was a valuable KGB agent while he was in O.S.S.

B. Source knew three KGB officers who at various times during the Second World War were responsible for directing HALPERIN and other penetrations of the U. S. Government - Vasilij Mikhailovich ZUBILIN aka ZARUBIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York City; Pavel Panteleymonovich KLARIN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York and Stepan Zakharovich APRESYAN, Soviet Vice-Consul in New York.

2. It is known from several other sources, including Elizabeth BENTLEY, that HALPERIN had been involved in communist activities since the late 1920's and had worked for the KGB during World War II.

3. HALPERIN refused to tell a U. S. Senate committee if he had been a CP member and in 1953 he fled from the U.S. to Mexico. In 1958 he went to the USSR and allegedly worked for the Academy of Science and Moscow University. In 1962 he left Moscow and went to Cuba. He aided Alfred Kaufman STERN and Martha Dodd STERN to escape from the U.S.A. to Czechoslovakia in 1957.

4. HALPERIN's career can be divided into the following periods:

1931-1941	Professor at the University of Oklahoma
1941-1945	C.O.I. - O.S.S.
1945-1946	Department of State
1946-1949	American-Jewish Conference, handling minority groups and acting as a liaison official with the U.N.
1949-1953	Boston University
1953-1958	Mexico
1958-1968	U.S.S.R. and Cuba
1968-1969	Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia.

5. If HALPERIN agreed to cooperate, he would be an extremely valuable source on a number of topics, as is indicated by the outline of his career. One of the most important topics, and the one in which we are

SECRET

in the best position to check the validity of his information, is that of KGB penetration of the U. S. Government, especially O.S.S. and the State Department.

6. HALPERIN has indicated that he is now anti-Soviet.

7. HALPERIN's son, Dr. David HALPERIN, lives at 5309 South Harper Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

8. HALPERIN's daughter, Judith GAMORON, and his son-in-law Rabbi Hillel GAMORON, reside at 617 North Witcomb Drive, Palatine, Illinois.

9. HALPERIN is quite deaf.

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ORIG: Robert L. Pendley/dek
UNIT: DC/CI/SPG
EXT: 7992
DATE: 7 July 1971

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TO TEL AVIV

RYBAT ~~RHYTON~~

NO. 2111

REF: TEL AVIV 16247 (IN 372102) Maurice HALPERIN

1. ATTACHMENT TO NFVA-2965 GAVE DPOB OF SUBJECT AS BOSTON, 3 MARCH 1906, AS WELL AS CONSIDERABLE BIO INFORMATION. SEEMS CLEAR THAT NEITHER MAN LISTED IN REF IS IDENTICAL WITH SUBJECT.

2. WILL AWAIT RECEIPT OF A/544 FOR FURTHER COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

Desensitize

Mary Pocock
NE/ISR

Robert L. Pendley
ROBERT L. PENDLEY
DEPUTY CHIEF, CI/SPG

RELEASING OFFICER

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ORIG: Birch D. O'Neal
UNIT: C/CI/SIG
EXT: 6331
DATE: 3 December 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER

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05 16 39 Dec 68 CITE DIRECTOR 56296

TO OTTAWA

KEYWAY WOMUSE

REF: OCOA 13668

1. INTERPRETATION WHICH WE SHOULD PLACE ON THE LEAD PARA IN CONTEXT OF INFO PROVIDED BY WOFIRM LEAVES US IN DOUBT. HOWEVER, WOFIRM POSITION FOLLOWS:

A. OUR REF TO SUBJECT AS RIS AGENT IN SUMMARY OF TRACES (SEE PARA ONE DIR 87411) WAS BASED ON BENTLEY BOOK AS SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT IN PARA ONE DIR 09956.

B. ALLEGATIONS IN BENTLEY BOOK AND INFO NEWSPAPER ITEMS ARE IN PUBLIC DOMAIN. WE, OF COURSE, HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SMABOVE USING IN ANY MANNER IT CHOOSES INFO APPEARING IN PUBLIC DOMAIN ALTHOUGH CALLED THEIR ATTENTION BY US. WE AGAIN EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, NO WOFIRM ATTRIBUTIONS AT ANY STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS.

C. PROPOSED "SOLEMN DECLARATION" THAT THE OFFICER IS "VERITABLY INFORMED" SUBJECT (1) "HAS BEEN AND (2) IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED TO BE AN AGENT OF RIS", IF USED, WE FEEL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS SPECIFICALLY AND FULLY

AN
AB
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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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5 Dec 68
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DATE:

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BY ______ PER ______ #
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SECRET (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO 75629 6

SUPPORTED BY WOFIRM DATA. WE DO FULLY ACCEPT ALLEGATION SUBJECT (1) HAS BEEN AN AGENT OF RIS, AND HAVE NO INFO WHICH WOULD INDICATE HE HAS HAD A BREAK IN FEALTY TO SOVIETS. NEVERTHELESS, WE MUST ADVISE WE HAVE NO CURRENT INFO FROM WHICH A SPECIFIC CONCLUSION COULD BE REACHED THAT HE IS (2) "CURRENTLY" ACTIVE AS AN AGENT OF RIS. SMABOVE IS BETTER QUALIFIED THAN WOFIRM TO COMMENT ON "CURRENT" RELATIONSHIP AS HE IN THEIR JURISDICTION.

2. SUGGEST INFORMAL RESPONSE TO SMABOVE CONSISTENT WITH ABOVE. HQS APPRECIATES THAT SMABOVE IS FACED WITH TOUGH PROBLEM IN SEEKING PROPER MEANS OF RESPONDING TO MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION DEPT ON MATTERS AFFECTING POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE SMABOVE INFO (INCLUDING INFO FROM SMABOVE "FRIENDLY LINKS"). HOWEVER, SMABOVE (AND STATION) SHOULD REALIZE THIS IS NOT GOOD "TEST CASE" OF WOFIRM ABILITY OR WILLINGNESS TO RELEASE INFO IN SUPPORT OF SMABOVE OBLIGATIONS VIS A VIS CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (IN THAT OVERT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 75629 67

TO [

ATTRIBUTION IS POSSIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE). SMABOVE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT NORMALLY HQS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAKE ITS DEROG INFO AVAILABLE FOR PURPOSES OF PUBLIC USE BY IMMIGRATION DEPT.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BC/C James Howley

EUR/BC
RELEASING OFFICER

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Birch D. O'Neal
CI/SIG
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201-128561

DISPATCH

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MARKED FOR INDEXING

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO
Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT
KEYWAY/SMADOVE
Maurice HALPERIN (201-128561)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below

References: A. OTTAWA 5447, 10 June 1968
B. DIRECTOR 09956, 20 June 1968

The following is a SMADOVE request for approval to disseminate WOFIRM derogatory information concerning Subject. SMADOVE/26 hand-carried the request to us and made the comment that SMADOVE hoped that WOFIRM would refuse the request since the derogatory information could have come only from one or two sources and SMADOVE is generally opposed to making public information that has been acquired by covert means. Although the following does not mention it, a similar request has been sent to LNERGO and SMORANGE:

1. "In order to acquaint you and your Agency with the reason for our request in paragraph 6 below, we would explain that recent changes in the regulations of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provisions of the Immigration Appeal Board Act have created certain problems.

2. "When a Special Inquiry is held by an Immigration Officer at a Canadian Port of Entry to enquire into a persons admissibility, if information is available to the SMADOVE prohibiting the immigrant's entry under the provisions of the Immigration Act, and this information cannot be released for security reasons, SMADOVE is required by Immigration Regulations to issue a "Solemn Declaration" for use at the Inquiry. Should such an Inquiry result unfavorably for the immigrant, he has the right of appeal.

3. "In issuing the first "Solemn Declaration", in order to provide protection for our sources, we only made a declaration that we were in possession of information making the subject ineligible for entry to Canada under Section 5 of the Immigration Act. However, the Immigration Appeal Board has since ruled that a "Solemn Declaration" should contain sufficient information to enable the individual, against whom action is being taken, to have a reasonable opportunity of knowing the nature of the allegations.

- continued -

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OCOA-13668

DATE
15 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-128561

4. "Therefore, in consultation with our legal branch, we have drawn up the attached draft "Solemn Declaration" which we feel satisfies the conditions set out by the Board and which we propose to use in the case of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN. As you will note, we ha provided information which in the opinion of our legal branch will be the minimum requirement if our declaration is to be found valid.

5. "We would therefore request that you ascertain if consideration can be given to have your Agency authorize us to include the information contained in lines nine, ten and eleven of the attached draft "Solemn Declaration". The decision of your Agency should be made with the understandings that the declaration would be available to HALPERIN and his counsel at both the Immigration Special Inquiry and the Immigration Appeal Board Hearing.

6. "Our case against HALPERIN rests on whether or not we receive approval for the use of the information furnished by your Agency, since we have to show that HALPERIN was ineligible for admission at the time he entered Canada. We appreciate the problems inherent in a request of this nature and if after weighing all the considerations your Agency finds it impossible to authorize release, we intend to advise the Department of Manpower and Immigration that we are unable to issue the required "Solemn Declaration" and will study other ways and means of overcoming our problems in cases of this nature."

for Henry D. MC CLACKION

Attachment: H/W
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - Chief, EUR w/att h/w
2 - Chief, WOMUSE w/att h/w

SOLEMN DECLARATION

I, , an officer of SMABOVE, do solemnly declare,

THAT I am veritably informed that

Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
born March 3, 1906 at
Boston, Massachusetts,
United States of America,

last reported residing at 600 Smith Avenue, Apt. 131-H, Coquitlam, New Westminster, B.C. has been and is currently considered to be an agent of the Russian Intelligence Service. Based upon this information I believe that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN is a member of a class of persons described in Section 5, paragraph (n) of the Immigration Act, Chapter 325, R.S.C. 1952.

I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true, and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

Declared before me)
at ________________)
this _____ day of)
__________, A.D. 19__)

(Sgd.) ________________

INSTRUCTIONS

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TO: ALL ADDR

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2cc w/att

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1. E/BC/C		20 NOV 1968			
2. JH					Can we task this
3.					
4.					
5. CI/SIG					Z-6: Would discuss this you. Refs are J. Ho
6. Mr. Birch O'Neal					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11. CI/SIG		11 XI 68			For file
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RID/FI					

Input to
24 Apr 70

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | X
INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-128

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

15 NOV 1968

DOCUMENT

OCOA 1

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

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MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO

Chief, European Division

INFO

Chief, WOMUSE

FROM

Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT

KEYWAY/SMABOVE
Maurice HALPERIN (201-128561)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below

References: A. OTTAWA 5447, 10 June 1968
B. DIRECTOR 09956, 20 June 1968

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1. "In order to acquaint you and your Agency with the reason for our request in paragraph 6 below, we would explain that recent changes in the regulations of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provisions of the Immigration Appeal Board Act have created certain problems.

2. "When a Special Inquiry is held by an Immigration Officer at a Canadian Port of Entry to enquire into a persons admissibility, if information is available to the SMABOVE prohibiting the immigrant's entry under the provisions of the Immigration Act, and this information cannot be released for security reasons, SMABOVE is required by Immigration Regulations to issue a "Solemn Declaration" for use at the Inquiry. Should such an Inquiry result unfavorably for the immigrant, he has the right of appeal.

3. "In issuing the first "Solemn Declaration", in order to provide protection for our sources, we only made a declaration that we were in possession of information making the subject ineligible for entry to Canada under Section 5 of the Immigration Act. However, the Immigration Appeal Board has since ruled that a "Solemn Declaration" should contain sufficient information to enable the individual, against whom action is being taken, to have a reasonable opportunity of knowing the nature of the allegations.

- continued -

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OCOA-13668

DATE

201-128561/

15 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-128561

4. "Therefore, in consultation with our legal branch, we have drawn up the attached draft "Solemn Declaration" which we feel satisfies the conditions set out by the Board and which we propose to use in the case of Maurice Hyman HALPERIN. As you will note, we have provided information which in the opinion of our legal branch will be the minimum requirement if our declaration is to be found valid.

5. "We would therefore request that you ascertain if consideration can be given to have your Agency authorize us to include the information contained in lines nine, ten and eleven of the attached draft "Solemn Declaration". The decision of your Agency should be made with the understandings that the declaration would be available to HALPERIN and his counsel at both the Immigration Special Inquiry and the Immigration Appeal Board Hearing.

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Henry D. MC CLACKION

Attachment: H/W
As Stated

Distribution:
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2 - Chief, WOMUSE w/att h/w

SOLEMN DECLARATION

I, , an officer of SMABOVE , do solemnly declare,

THAT I am veritably informed that

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born March 3, 1906 at
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United ~~States~~ of America,

last reported residing at 600 Smith Avenue, Apt. 131-H, Coquitlam, New Westminster, B.C. has been and is currently considered to be an agent of the Russian Intelligence Service. Based upon this information I believe that Maurice Hyman HALPERIN is a member of a class of persons described in Section 5, paragraph (n) of the Immigration Act, Chapter 325, R.S.C. 1952.

I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing it to be true, and knowing that it is of the same force and effect as if made under oath and by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act.

Declared before me)
at ________)
this _____ day of)
________, A.D. 19__)

(Sgd.) ____________

Input to US Defector
Machine Program
24 Apr 70 [illegible]

H/WaH 1-CCOA-13668

CS COPY

201-128561

14-00000

[redacted]

118C

RETURN TO: LYNCH
DATE: 9/16/68
File # 100-21511

NAME: HALPERIN, EDITH
NEE: FRISCH

Born: 7/6/07
Indiana

INS # AS 332 326

ADDRESS: Medellin, 36, Apt. 9, Col. Roma, Mexico

1/9/68

NAI & FBI info

11 OCT 1968

PP

201-128561

3P

SEP 1968

19 SEP 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: James Hosley:cs
UNIT: E BC/C
EXT: R-1106
DATE: 19 June 1968

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER Sp # 109

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INFO: FILE, VR W48; W4/0098. C/ops. C/IC2, C/SI. FI/INT2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 22 25z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 09956

TO OTTAWA

KEYWAY WOMUSE

REF: A. OTTAWA 5447 (IN 27838)
B. DIRECTOR 87411

1. CONCUR PASSAGE PARA ONE REF B INFO AS PROPOSED REF A. BASIS FOR "RIS AGENT" IDENTIFICATION IS INFO FROM ELIZABETH BENTLEY AS REFLECTED IN HER BOOK "OUT OF BONDAGE," THE DEVIN-ADAIN COMPANY, NEW YORK 1951, PAGES 200, 210, 261 AND 263 THROUGH 266.

2. EMPHASIZE NO WOFIRM ATTRIBUTION.

3. FYI. LAUCHLIN CURRIE REFERRED TO ON PAGES 172 AND 263.

END OF MESSAGE

Birch D. O'Neal
CI/SIG

ACELR(EC)

20 Jun 68 E/BC/C

201-128501

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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FI/INT 2, SB 8, CI/IC 2

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S E C R E T 101415Z JUN 68 CITE OTTAWA 5447
OTTA

10 Jun 68 IN 27838

AN/LE	FI
PS/2	~~CI~~
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 87411

1. PER RELIABLE AND DELICATE SMABOVE SOURCE, MAURICE HALPERIN (201-128561) HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY ASSURED AN APPOINTMENT AT SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY, VANCOUVER. LAUCHLIN BERNARD CURRIE (OCOA-12472) LOBBIED VERY HARD TO HAVE HALPERIN ACCEPTED BY UNIVERSITY. CURRIE WAS AWARE OF HALPERIN'S BACKGROUND AND "WATERED IT DOWN" TO GET HIM POSITION.

FP 201-058657

MAURICE (201-128561)

201-128561

2. SMABOVE WOULD LIKE TO BLOCK HALPERIN PERMANENT ADMISSION TO CANADA AND REQUESTS PERMISSION TO PASS DEROG INFO IN PARA ONE OF REF TO DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION AND PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE. WOFIRM WOULD NOT BE NAMED AS SOURCE. PLS ADVISE.

3. TAKE NO ACTION WHICH MIGHT COMPROMISE SOURCE OF PARA ONE ABOVE.

SECRET

BT

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

10 Jun 68
201-128561
10 ~~Jun~~ 1968

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INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible]

13702

25 APR 68 IN 97805

S E C R E T 250516Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 475[illegible]

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

KEYWAY PBRUMEN MHAPRON

1. US CITIZEN MAURICE HELPERIN PP-TII-57 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 APRIL IBERIA FLT 942. PLEASE PASS INFO LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

AN:	~~PI~~	
FS:	~~PES~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

A
1P

ZZ

INDEXED 14 MAY 1968 R

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MAY 21 1968
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201-123561
25 April 1968

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FILE. VR. WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI,

FI/INT 2 MAD

24 APR 68 IN 97282

S E C R E T 241247Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4773

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

MAURICE HALPERIN PP-USA-TIT-37 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 APRIL IBERIA FLT 942.

S E C R E T

BT

AN | FI
TBS | DESB
APSTR

ZZ

ZZ PROCESSED
30 APR 1968

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201-125561
24 Apr 1968

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DATE: 28 MAR 68

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87411

CITE DIRECTOR

AN/	FI	
FS	DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

TO OTTAWA

TYPIC

REF: OTTAWA-5310 (IN 77494)* 201-128561

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY HQS TRACES SUBJ REF:

MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN DPOB: 3 MAR 06 BOSTON, MASS. USM ~~ALLEGED~~ RIS AGENT. ~~EMPLOYED OSS [illegible]~~ USM ~~[illegible] ACTIVITIES~~ LATE 1953 SUBJ LEFT US FOR MEXICO IN ORDER TO AVOID TESTIFYING BEFORE US SENATE INTERNAL SUB-COMMITTEE. IN 1958 MEXICAN GOVT BEGAN DEPORTING US COMMUNISTS AND SUBJ WENT USSR AS VISITING PROF UNDER USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. MOVED CUBA OCT 62 AS PROF OF ECONOMICS HAVANA UNIV. SUBJ TRAVELLED FROM CUBA TO CANADA 1964 AND AGAIN LATE 1966.

2. HQS FILES CONTAIN VOLUMINOUS LNERGO REPORTING ON SUBJ WHICH ASSUME THEY WILL PROVIDE.

3. POUCHING COPIES NEWSPAPER ARTICLES PROVIDING GOOD BACKGROUND DATA.

END OF MESSAGE 201-128561 ✓
201 [illegible]

CONTINUED

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FILE , VR

PAGE 2
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 90411

TO

WH/COG COMMENT: *Requested derog traces on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN.

C/WH/COG Earl J. Williamson
E/BC/C
EUR/CUBA ✓
CI/SIG

AC/EUR/BC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

[redacted] K

S E C R E T 251515Z MAR 68 CITE ~~NOPFF~~ OTTAWA 5310

25 MAR 68 IN 77494

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

ANAL	PI	
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. SENSITIVE SMABOVE SOURCE SAYS PROFESSOR MAURICE HALPERIN OF UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING TEACHING POSITION IN CANADA. PER SOURCE, SUBJ IS ABOUT 60 YEARS OLD, ORIGINALLY FROM U.S., AND FORMER MEMBER OSS.

2. SUB 2..5-4 S$3,58:-) 285 .-745:3 6.-, -30348, APPEARS IDENTICAL WITH MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN 201-128561

BORN 3 MARCH 06 IN BOSTON, SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT.

3. REQUEST SUMMARY DEROG WOFIRM TRACES FOR SMABOVE. LNERGO ALSO BEING QUERIED.

SECRET

LLLBT

[redacted]

201-128561
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

XAAZ
~~XX~~ - 27046
1 Oct 1967

201-12 561

0 **MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN** [illegible], 1127 (AS)

Occupation: Professor of Economic Geography.
Home Address: Calle 12, No. 1012 Apt. C-2, Marianao, Cuba.
Office Address: Escuela De Geografía, Universidad De La Habana, Havana, Cuba.
Married: Edith Frisch (Univ. of Oklahoma '32), Sept. 5, 1926, Nahant, Mass.
Child: Judith Yvonne (Oberlin '53), Sept. 1, 1931.
  Married: Hillel Gamoran (Univ. of Cincinnati), June, 1953.
  Offspring: Adam, 1957; Saul, 1959; Reuben, 1961; Miriam, 1963.
Child: David Carlos (Universidad Nacional Autónoma De México '56), May 5, 1937.
  Married: Cecily Sharp (Chicago Art Inst. '60), 1963.
  Offspring: Joshua, 1965.
Publications Since 1957: *Growth and Crisis in the Latin/American Economy,'* Science and Society, N.Y., Vol. 25; No. 3, 1961; *Conferencias Sobre Geografía Económica*, Universidad De La Habana, 1964; *Hacia Un Nuevo Sistema De Planificación Y Dirección Económicas En La Unión Soviética*, Comercio Exterior, La Habana, No. 4, 1964.

AN ek	FI	
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ABSTRACT X		~~[illegible]~~

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Pd [illegible] - 3331

SECRET

1 Oct 67
201-125567 ✓

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4. WH/COG/FI/IO		30 DEC 66	31 DEC 66	RH
5.				
6. WH/COG/RR				
7.				
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17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	1
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
JCCA 11338

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, [illegible]

INFO: Chief, European Division
Chief, [illegible]

FROM: Chief of Station, Ottawa

SUBJECT: TYPIC
[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

REF: OCOA-11131, 6 October 1966

SHADOVE has furnished the following additional information regarding Subject.

1. On 5 July 1966, Maurice HALPERIN advised a reliable source that he and his wife were in Montreal to visit their children. HALPERIN stated he has a daughter residing in the United States but would not be entering that country. HALPERIN stated to source that they would remain in Montreal, Quebec, as he had to purchase a hearing aid and obtain additional medical attention. HALPERIN went on to state that he and his wife are American citizens and plan to eventually return to the United States. Maurice HALPERIN concluded by stating he is teaching economics at the University of Havana, Havana, Cuba.

2. The HALPERINS did not otherwise come to our attention during their stay in Canada.

3. The foregoing may be disseminated for official purposes, providing SHADOVE is not named as the source.

H. D. McClain
Henry D. MC CLACKION

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
3 - C/Eur [illegible]
2 - C/JMWAVE

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OCOA-11733	5 December 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-128567

SECRET

4C2294

EX - 786
5 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: "American Defectors to the USSR"

1. The attached material was part of a soft file entitled "American Defectors to the USSR", which was set up by SR/6 (Support) around 1960 and maintained by various SR components until ca. 1963. The compilations were derived from a variety of sources, and contain both classified and overt data.

2. In the fall of 1966, the files were turned over to CI Staff. In most instances, basic information was then abstracted for the US Defector Machine Program. In all instances in which the material was unique, or represented a valuable collation effort, it has been incorporated into the appropriate 201 file, along with a copy of this memorandum.

3. It is suggested that any dissemination of this data should be coordinated with SB Division and with CI Staff (CI/MRO), in view of the frequently inadequate sourcing and of the fact that disseminations have already been made through the US Defector Machine Program.

JLBender

JLBender

Orig - CI/MRO
1 - RID/FI
1 - SB/RMO
1 - CI/R&A/JLBender
1 - CI/R&A/chrono

sent RIS
13/II/67

5 Dec 66
201-128561

SECRET

SECRET

HALPERIN Maurice Hyman, ~~—~~ 201-125561

A# 00094

3 March 1906, Boston
Professor and long-time communist

1931. Already a Harvard graduate and communist, he became a professor at Oklahoma University. (OO files)

1935. He made a trip to Cuba, where he and other left-wingers were arrested and expelled. During this period he continued to direct communist activities in Oklahoma and made ~~[illegible]~~ many trips to Mexico to confer with Mexican communist leaders. (OO files)

1940. He cashed a check drawn on the Bank of Foreign Trade, Moscow. [This was not discovered until 1941; see next item.] (OO files)

1941. Congressional investigation of ~~xxxxx~~ subversive activities in Oklahoma uncovered the check-cashing, his 1935 visit to and expulsion from Cuba, association with leftist individuals, articles to left-wing publications, membership in left-wing groups like Civil Liberties Committee, etc. (SRS, memo from Herman Horton to Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 10 August 1960)

8 September 1941. Dismissed from Oklahoma U. while on sabbatical. Reinstated 11 Feb 1942 but with understanding he would resign at termination of sabbatical. (SRS, Herman Horton memo)

1942. Late in the year, Elizabeth Bentley was introduced to him by Jacob GOLOS, according to her 1948 testimony. (CI/SIG, OO, SRS)

1943. As of this time he worked for OSS in Washington D.C., despite his known communist activities and sympathies. He was (or became before the end of the war) head of the OSS Latin American Division. (Washington Post, 1 Sept 1960, attached). According to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony and book ("Out of Bondage"), he supplied Golos and the communist apparat with information from his OSS office. (SIG,SRS)

1948. Elizabeth Bentley testified that she had met him in late 1942 through Jacob Golos (known Soviet agent) and that while Halperin was employed by the OSS in wartime Washington he gave information to Golos. (SIG)

Autumn 1949. He began teaching at Boston University. (SRS, Horton memo)

Late 1952 or early 1953. By this time he was director of Latin American Regional Studies at Boston University. He was summoned to testify before the Jenner Committee in Boston, since Bentley had named him as one of her sources. He refused to say whether he was a communist. (OO files)

RIS 13/11/67

Later in 1953. He was suspended by certain B.U. authorities in disagreement with an impartial B.U. committee which had decided not to fire him for the time being. (OO files)

28 November 1953. The Halperins took off for Mexico. (SRS, Horton memo)

6 January 1954. He was formally dismissed from B.U. (SRS, Horton memo)

A# 00784

20 July 1957. Date of a State Department memo on the case of Martha Dodd and Alfred STERN. ~~xxxxxxx~~ The Sterns had just fled from Mexico to Czechoslovakia (to avoid extradition to the U.S. to testify before a grand jury

201-166595

A# 11037 201-003704

SECRET

201-125561

SECRET

about their association with Jack Soble and Boris Morros. Halperin was very closely associated with them and instrumental in their getaway plans - he got their plane reservations without saying they were for the Sterns until the last minute, etc. (SRS; NY Herald Trib 1 Sept 60)

A# 25361

Later in 1957 or the first half of 1958. Public disclosure of his role in the Stern affair caused him and his wife (Edith nee Frisch) to lose their jobs. She was a teacher at the American School Foundation, while he worked in a Mexican Government bank and at the Mexico University National School of Political and Social Sciences. (SRS, Horton memo)

26 July 1958. They applied for US passports at the American Embassy in Mexico City. (SRS, Horton memo)

26 August 1958. Their passports were issued. (SRS, Horton memo). This followed a 1958 Supreme Court decision that the State Department could not deny a passport because of communist or other political beliefs. (Wash Post, 1 Sept 60)

25 September 1958. Their passports were visaed by the Mexican authorities "to travel in Mexico in the status of immigrants," valid till 25 Sept 59. (SRS, DBF-56611. By this time the Mexican Government had begun deporting US communists. (SRS, Horton memo)

13 October 1958. They departed Mexico. (Horton memo and Wash Post, 1 Sep 60)

✓ 11 November 1958. They arrived in Czechoslovakia. (SRS, DBF-56611)

3 December 1958. They arrived in the USSR on tourist visas to firm up tentative job offer (the Soviets wouldn't commit themselves before he actually in USSR.) Job was visiting professor under Social Sciences Division of USSR Academy of Sciences, on contract till July 1961; no teaching, but research and handling student theses. Salary unfavorable since in rubles, but he hoped to compensate by getting experience and material for book; also use rubles for grand tour of USSR before departure. (CI/SIG and SRS, DBF-56611)

13 December 1958. They in Moscow as of this date but must have gone to Leningrad soon after, since he said his job was there at first. They moved to Moscow some time before July 1960. (SRS, DBF-56611)

15 July 1960. He and wife appeared at the American Embassy Moscow to renew their passports. No excuse for not having reported in earlier. The passports were renewed for two years, to expire July 1962. They gave their legal address as Medellin 36, Mexico City, and their current address as Kutuzovski Prospekt 13, apt 127, Moscow. Halperin gave them the job information reported above under 3 December 1958 and indicated that they intended to leave the USSR upon expiration of the contract in July 1961. Both were frank about the shortcomings of Soviet life. When asked if they would return to the States in July 61, he said that their permanent address was Mexico. A daughter and her husband and children were visiting then until 3 July. (SRS, DBF-56611) 24 August 1960)

[illegible]

October 1960. The American Embassy requested that he appear for an interview about just what his job was. He wrote on 30 October saying that they were just leaving on vacation and swearing that his job was not in conflict with his US citizenship. A certain Max Berger [not further identified] reported that Halperin was getting higher-than-usual salary and his passport should be revoked. (SRS, DBA-1753, 6 February 1962)

SECRET

November-December 1960. Halperin, "an identified Soviet agent who left the US in 1960 [sic] and is now in the Soviet Union," was to be head of one of the two new organizations founded during a Moscow conference of communist leaders: "office for permanent studies and cooperation with Latin American parties" to be organized by the Communist Parties of Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, and to be located in Peiping. [This presumably never happened.] (SRS, TDCS-3/462,130, 13 January 1961, info Nov-Dec 60, from an official Swedish service from usually-reliable source who Polish official with high-level contacts)

As of February 1961. He was reported as a US national lecturing in economics at Moscow U. Helped gather data for Che Guevara's Punta del Este speech. The Halperin's son in US was planning visit them in 61 but canceled to their great disappointment. Halperin seemed to regret having gone to the USSR and said on several occasions he would like to return to the US; always "joking" about the unpleasant aspects of life in the SU. Had been offered job in Cuba and was trying decide whether accept. (SRS, CSCI-3/772,459, 7 Sept 1962, from Cuban refugee who was Economic Counselor at Cuban Embassy Moscow Oct 60 - Feb 61)

July 1962. Their passports would have expired, requiring issuance of new ones. (Only passports actually issued - not renewed - after September 1959 had the new three-year validity instead of the old two-year validity, according to Central Processing.) We have no record of ~~xx~~issue of new ones, but it seems to have been done, because at the end of 1962 Halperin spoke of keeping his US citisenship after moving to Cuba.

1 October 1962. They moved to Cuba. He was already working in a textile factory and would start teaching at Havana University on 8 October. (SRS; copy of a glad-to-be-back, pro-Cuban propaganda-like ~~letter~~ personal letter written by Halperin). They got a big welcome in Cuba because they came from Moscow, but it soon wore off and the Cubans considered him cold and pedantic. (SRS, DBA-62084, 13 January 1964)

21 January 1963. Elizabeth Mora (long-time communist) returned to Mexico from a women's congress in Havana, where she had seen the Halperins. They had a mansion and servants because of his "important job," but he had aged greatly, looked old, had to do without such amenities as underwear and socks, was rationed to one tube of toothpaste every six months, etc. Wife said it was Soviet treatment that had broken him, not Cuban. They intended to stay in Cuba because of the friendlier climate and his feeling more useful there. She wanted to become a Cuban citizen so that she could visit her son and his family in Mexico, but he planned to keep his US citizenship. (SRS, DBA-34390, 26 Feb 63)

17 June 1963. Date of VIEN 3538, IN 61623,: a VIEN case officer, JOANNESS, in touch with Halperin who in Vienna writing a book on the Castro impact on South America. Joanness rated him "sound non-communist leftist without party ties or extremist dogmatism" - ! (SRS)

October or November 1963. Published article about damage to Cuba from hurricane Flora in October. He reportedly an economist employed by Cuban Government. (SRS, DBA-62084, 13 Jan 64)

16 August 1960. On this date, according to NYT article of 5 Sept 60, he called on the US Emb for renewal of his American passport. (Reproduction of article is in with Martin and Mitchell material in Kay Grady's NSA file.) Renewal was apparently being delayed, possibly because of renewed attempts within the US Govt to deny passports to commie sympathizers.

5 Sept 60. The same NYT article reported just above said that he had just assailed a State Department report that he was working as an advisor to the Sov Govt on Latin American af~~fairs.~~ Said he was professor associated with Academy of Sciences, writing book on Latin American economy 1945-58. "There is nothing mysterious or dubious about my being in Moscow. Since my arrival I have filed two US income tax returns, listing my salary and employer. I am not working for the Soviet Govt any more than Van Cliburn was when he performed in a Govt-owned concert hall. I am a visiting prof in the USSR AS and not the first American to be associated with it. My appointment and my Soviet visa espire in July 1961."

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

By 8

ACTION WH/C 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

4

S E C R E T 221525Z CITE OTTAWA 3605

~~22 Aug 66~~ 80841

DIRECTOR

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. MAURICE HALPERIN, DPOB 3 MARCH 06 IN BOSTON, AND WIFE, EDITH ERISOCH NEE FRISCH, DPOB 6 JULY 08 IN WABASH, INDIANA, ARRIVED MONTREAL 5 JULY ON CUBAN SHIP FRUCUBA. PLANNED STAY MONTREAL SIX WEEKS FOR VISIT WITH U.S. RELATIVES. SEE OCOA-11071.

2. WILL SEND SMABOVE COVERAGE OF VISIT, IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

RID/Files

201 — 128561

22 Aug 66

201-128561

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

EXTENSION:

NO. CSCI-316/[illegible]-66

DATE 3 Jun 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Ann Egerter CI/SIG 2 B 14		1 · VI · 66		
2. Seymour Young CI/Ops/EUR 2 B 46	1 JUN 1966			
3. CI/Liaison 2 C 35		2 JUN 1966		
4. RID/AN		4/6		
5. RID/MIS				
6. RID/FI				
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AB FI

ABSTRACT X

201-128561

3 JUN 1966

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

3 JUN 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman HALPERIN and wife Edith Evelyn (nee FRISCH)

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum, dated 18 January 1965,
Subject: Maurice HALPERIN; Edith Frisch HALPERIN

B. Report of Darrel B. CURRIE, Boston, Massachusetts,
Title: Edith Evelyn HALPERIN, dated 25 March 1966;
Field Office File 100-31726; Bureau File 100-424134

This Agency requests permission to discuss the contents of reference memorandum and report with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to elicit from the RCMP information concerning the HALPERINs' visit to Montreal, Canada in August-September 1964. This Agency is particularly interested in the HALPERINs' whereabouts and activities from 18 August to 26 September 1964 and the possibility of their having been in contact with Canadian Communists at that time.

CSCI - 316/02762-66

Distribution:
Original and 1 - FBI
1 - CI/SIG
1 - CI/Ops/EUR
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - 201-128561
2 - E/BC/Canada

DDP-E/BC/Canada-RNJoyner:rnj 31 May 1966

SECRET

CS COPY

201-128561

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-000212
EX -00816
07 MAR 66

CIT USA
OCC ?
< USA
NAME MENTIONED IN CI STUDY ON NICOLAS KAGAN
/201-000212/. SEE INDEX FOR PAGE NUMBER.

R 6707251917

7 Mar 66

FILE IN 201-128561

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ROME

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/SI, FI, EE 4, SAS 8, RF 2

[illegible]

0 JUL 63 IN 75202

S E C R E T 081641Z

DIR INFO PARI BERN GNVA MADR HAGU CITE ROME 9612

KEYWAY PBRUMEN LCMAYFOWL

REF DIR 52321

IF ANY INDICATION SUBJ REF COMING ITALY REQUEST FULL DETAILS THIS CASE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *PRESUMED THAT HAGU AWARE (FNU) HALPERIN IS ID/W MAURICE HYMAN HOLPERIN KNOWN KGB AGENT INVOLVED LCMAYFAWL PENETRATION KUTWIN.

File CI/SIG ↑ folder on HALPERIN

File in 201-128561

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : A. POTOCKI
UNIT : SAS/CI
EXT : 4422
DATE : 5 JULY 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278371

ROUTING
4
5
6

TO : THE HAGUE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/SI, FI, RI/AN, EE 4, WE 4, SR 6, WH 7, RF

5 JUL 63 23 17z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO HAGU (PRTY) INFO PARI, BERN, GNVA, MADR, ROME (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 52321

KEYWAY PBRUMEN LCHAYFOWL

REF: A. HAGU-4136 (IN-71802)
B. HAGU-4038 (IN-62856) (NOT TO INFO ADDRESSEES)

1. PRESUME HAGU AWARE THAT (FNU) HALPERIN OF REF B PARA 6,B, IS ID/W MAURICE HYMAN HALPERIN (201-128561) KNOWN KGB AGENT INVOLVED LCHAYFOWL XXXXX PENETRATION KUTWIN. HALPERIN AND WIFE ARRIVED HABANA FROM MOSCOW CA SPRING 1961 AFTER RECEIVING JOB OFFER FROM FAURE (CHOMON) MEDIAVILLA (201-270370) THEN CUBAN AMB. TO MOSCOW. HALPERIN REPORTED TOTALLY DEAF AND EMBITTERED RE EXPERIENCES USSR, WHICH DOES NOT WANT DISCUSS, PER INFO FROM ELIZABETH XXXXX CATLETT MORA (201-103989) WHO VISITED HIM AND WIFE JAN 63 IN HABA.

2. ED BORSTINE OF REF B PARA 6,B, ID/W EDUARDO BOORSTEIN aka EDDIE BURSZTYN (201-170429) US NATIONAL AND AIDE TO CHE GUEVARA. BOORSTEIN IS SUSPECT KGB AGENT AND OF CURRENT INTEREST ODENVY.

3. BALANCE OF SUBJ'S CONTACTS REPORTED REF B APPEAR OF SIMILAR ILK. THEREFORE SUGGEST HIS MOVEMENTS AND CONTACTS ON CURRENT TRIP BE CLOSELY MONITORED AND INFO DEVELOPED BE CABLED.

4. IN LIGHT FACT AS OF MAR 61 ODENVY HAD ESPIONAGE CASE

RELEASING OFFICER 5-17 COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

File: 201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE 2.

TO
INFO
CITE DIR

RUNNING AGAINST SUBJ, SUGGEST HAGU MAY WISH BRIEF LEGAL ATTACHE BONN OR PARI ON DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE AND POSSIBLY TURN OVER TO LEGAL ATT FURTHER FOLLOW-UP, PARTICULARLY IF SUBJ GOES SUISSE.

END OF MESSAGE

for C/SAS/CI
C/SAS/EOB
for C/CI/SIG
for C/WE/2 - Walker
CI/OPS Tenney

Thomas F. Thiele
for W. O'RYAN
Chief, WE
RELEASING OFFICER

5-17

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Desmond Fitzgerald
Chief, SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : VIENNA

ACTION: CA/O 4

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, EE 4, SAS 8, S/C 2

SIG-Egerton

S E C R E T 171604Z

IN51623

DIR INFO BERN CITE VIEN 3538

17 JUN 1963

DTDORIC QRMUSIC

Victor S

Ernst

Swiss National

VIEN OFFICERS INCLUDING JOANESS IN CONTACT HALPERIN REGARDED AS SOUND NON-COMMUNIST LEFTIST WITHOUT PARTY TIES OR EXTREMIST DOGMATISM. SUBJ WHILE IN VIEN WAS WRITING BOOK ON CASTRO IMPACT ON SOUTH AMERICA. ALSO TOLD JOANESS ABOUT VISIT TO HUNGARY 1962 AND UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OBTAIN INTERVIEW NOEL FIELD. SUBJ OPEN AND FRANK IN HIS DISCUSSIONS. NO NEW INFORMATION VIEN FILES.

S E C R E T

Thomas POLGAR

Currently with Center of International Studies at MIT - Not writing in late 50s

Copy to SP. 18.VI.63

File CI/SIG folder re HALPERIN

File 201-12856

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	
[illegible]	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Maurice Hyman Halperin

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a copy of DBA 34398, dated 26 February 1963, concerning Maurice Halperin and his activity in Cuba.

2. The Station's attention is drawn to page two which states that Subject's wife hopes to obtain Cuban citizenship so that she can come to Mexico to see her son and grandchildren. On the same page, there is an interesting, yet vague, reference to his treatment in the USSR.

3. Headquarters is still most interested in Subject, and the Station should be alert to any information it can gather on HALPERIN, or on his wife's travel to Mexico, which might be used for KUDESK or KUWOLF purposes.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att

201-128561 ✓

DATE TYPED: 8 April 63
DATE DISPATCHED: 12 APR 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11472

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-128561

1 - RI W/XXXO Att
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
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RID/[illegible]	Y
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI ~~RID/[illegible]~~	
~~[illegible]~~	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mex/	Charlotte Bustos	ds	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/WH	8 April 63	E.W. Hughes

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WHD	9 APR 1963	Raford W. Herbert

FORM 8-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 61(a) WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/772,459, Subject: "Contact with U.S. Defectors Abroad," dated 13 September 1962.

2. Sub-paragraph (e) of referenced CSCI reported that at sometime during the period October 1960—February 1961 Maurice HALPERIN had stated several times to a CIA source in Moscow that "he would like to come back to the U.S., and once asked the source if he should accept a position in Cuba which he had been offered by Faure CHOMON."

3. This office has received the following additional report concerning HALPERIN from the CIA office which contributed the original report:

a. "On 27 December 1962 another source of this office advised that he received a 1962 Christmas card from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as 'Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Havana, Cuba.' The only message on the card was one of Christmas greeting. Halperin and the source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards, but this is the first time Halperin's greeting has borne a Cuban address."

b. "The last time that the source saw Halperin was in Moscow when source was visiting in the USSR during August—September 1961 as a member of an official U. S. delegation."

4. There is no record of the Habana return address in the intelligence files of this office.

CSCI-3/774,170

cc: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

RID/EI/PS

CS COPY

201-128561

201-128561

SECRET

CSCI-3/774,170
SR/CI/DML 3 January 1963
Source: WH-729 (00-A/S/ 3,246,933 from 00/C
Distribution: orig & 1 - addressee
1 - State
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/OG/SS
1 - TFW/CI, Attn: Lois Frederickson, GH-5509
1 - SR/CI chrono
1 - RID/AN for 201-128561
1 - Comeback
Coordinated with: TFW/CI

201-128561

201-128
3 Jan 63
201-128561

00A(S) 3,246,933

27 December 1962

Subject: Current Address of Maurice Halperin

1. A source of this office has just advised us that he received a Christmas card (1962) from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as: "Apt C-2, Calle 12, no 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba." The only message on the card was one of Christmas greetings. Halperin and our source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards. This is the first one Halperin has sent with a Cuban address on it. The last time that our source saw Halperin was in Moscow when he (the former) was visiting in the USSR during August-September 1961 as part of an official US delegation.

2. In view of Halperin's past activities and associations, we are making this information known to you. Our source comments that Halperin always seems to show up wherever there is some sort of activity going on.

-end-

Disseminated:
CSCI-3/774,170
3 Jan 63

27 Dec 62
201-128561

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

201-005239
HMMA-20077
24 OCT 62
E01 P1

PAIR 1210691

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CIT ?
OCC ?

LETTER DATED 2 OCT 62 FROM SUBJ APT. C-2 CALLE 12, NO. 103 MIRAMAR, HAVANA TO MARGARET MALTZ.

1 210 691

24 Oct 62

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 128 561

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-128561

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : M. Patte[illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 Oct 1962 1562

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

5 Oct 62 19 19z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM : XXXXXXX CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: M. Patten

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT87268

TO INFO CITE DIR XAAZ-13491
~~15999~~

SUBJECT: MAURICE AND DAVID HALPERIN

1. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ON 2 OCTOBER 1962 MAURICE HALPERIN WROTE MARGARET AND ALBERT MALTZ, GIVING HIS NEW ADDRESS AS APT C-2, CALLE 12, NO. 103, MIRAMAR, HABANA. HE WAS WORKING IN A TEXTILE FACTORY BUT PLANNED TO TEACH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HABANA BEGINNING 8 OCTOBER.

2. HIS SON DAVID HAD A RESIDENCY IN SURGERY IN A VETERANS' HOSPITAL IN CHICAGO BUT WAS DISCHARGED LAST MONTH FOR "REASONS THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HIS COMPETENCE".

3. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	L
RID/MIS	(
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

Based on MEXI 2188 (IN 38214)

J. Kenn[illegible]
CI/Liaison
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3/Mexico
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/R
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5 Oct 62

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-128561 ✓

039

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 201-128561

201-128561

DATE : 11 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: Martin Patten

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 12 0247Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 38214

DIR CITE MEXI 2188

1. MAURICE HALPERIN WROTE LETTER 2 OCT MARGARET AND ALBERT MALTZ GIVEING NEW ADDRESS APT C-2, CALLE 12, NO. 103, MIRAMAR, HABANA. WORKING IN TEXTILE FACTORY BUT PLANS TEACH AT UNIVERSITY HABANA BEGIN 8 OCT. SON DAVID HAD RESIDENCY SURGERY IN VETERANS HOSPITAL CHICAGO BUT FIRED LAST MONTH FOR "REASONS THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HIS COMPETENCE".

2. SOURCE: LIMUD. PASSED TO ODENVY MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	L
RID/MIS	W
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

12 Oct 62

201-128561 ✓

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

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Copy No.

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Maurice Lyman HALPERIN

1. Reference is made to our CSCI-3/772,459, Subject: "Contact with U.S. Defectors Abroad," dated 13 September 1962.

2. Subparagraph (c) of referenced CSCI reported that at sometime during the period October 1960—February 1961 Maurice HALPERIN had stated several times to a CIA source in Moscow that "he would like to come back to the U.S., and once asked the source if he should accept a position in Cuba which he had been offered by Faure CHOMON."

3. This office has received the following additional report concerning HALPERIN from the CIA office which contributed the original report:

a. "On 27 December 1962 another source of this office advised that he received a 1962 Christmas card from Maurice Halperin on which the return address was given as 'Apt C-2, Calle 14, No 103, Miramar, Habana, Cuba.' The only message on the card was one of Christmas greeting. Halperin and the source have known each other for a number of years and they always exchange Christmas cards, but this is the first time Halperin's greeting has borne a Cuban address."

b. "The last time that the source saw Halperin was in Moscow when source was visiting in the USSR during August—September 1961 as a member of an official U.S. delegation."

4. There is no record of the Habana return address in the intelligence files of this office.

CSCI-3/774,175

cc: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

13 Sep 62
201-128561

CSCI-3/774,170
SR/CI/RR 3 January 1963
Source: SR-729 (OO-[illegible] 3,246,933 from OO/C
Distribution: orig & 1 - addressee
1 - State
1 - CI/ISG
1 - CI/P&A
1 - CI/IC/CS
1 - TFW/CI, Attn: Lois Frederickson, GR-5509
1 - SR/CI chrono
1 - RID/AN for 201-126561
1 - Comeback
Coordinated with: TFW/CI - + SR/CI/Red/Weaver

cc: Joe Evans, SR/CI/P

cc: OO/C if desired

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-128561

ORIG. : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/1/Mexico
EXT : 3940
DATE : 2 Aug 1962

1578
1578

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

3 AUG 62 19 25z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF. : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
[illegible] indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 62026
OUT62026

TO INFO CITE DIR

SUBJECT: MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

1. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, ON 25 JULY 1962 NOAH SEBORER WROTE ROBERT, HIS SON, IN CALIFORNIA THAT MAURICE AND EDITH WHO ARE IN EUROPE ARE PLANNING TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES SOON.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MAURICE AND EDITH REFERRED TO ARE MAURICE AND EDITH HALPERIN.

3. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Based on MEXI 1569 (IN 37788)
classified to 201-[illegible]

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

Aug 8 4 52 PM '62

3 Aug 62
201-128561

C.W. Tenney
RELEASING OFFICER
CI/Liaison

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WH/B

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HALPERIN, MAURICE
201-128561
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE LIFE OF SUBJ IN USSR.

200-005-031
DCE -15041
03 JUL 62
OOA-3217235
P1

628388

PAFR

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3 Jul '62

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201- 128 561

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba [illegible]

SUBJECT Contact with Defectors

REPORT NO. [illegible]

DATE DISTR. [illegible] July 1962

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES C-313

DATE OF INFO 1962 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Moscow/1960-61

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 12 170 210, who arrived in the US in June 1962 as a political refugee.

Source is a graduate engineer who served for a year in the Ministry of Public Works following the advent of the Castro regime, and then was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Relations and went to the USSR as Economic Counselor. He was in the USSR from October 1960 to February 1961. Shortly after his return to Cuba he took asylum in the Argentine Embassy where he remained more than a year until his safe-conduct was arranged. This is one of several reports from source.

[This report emanated from the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka, Florida.]

1. From October 1960 to February 1961 I served as Economic Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in the USSR. During my stay I met and became fairly well acquainted with a number of defectors from the West, including Douglas McLean, who defected from the UK, and Maurice Halperin from the US. I did not meet Guy Burgess, because I was told that he is in bad physical condition due to excess drinking. McLean, who is now known as Frazier, likewise drinks heavily, and at a party the hostess cut down on his liquor saying, "If he drinks too much, he gets in bad shape."

2. McLean and his family are living in Soviet Government-furnished quarters in a new, but not elaborate, apartment building near the Ukraine Hotel. His wife made a number of remarks to my wife about how far it is necessary to walk to get food, or anything else, in the USSR. Otherwise she did not complain. McLean made numerous jokes about shortcomings of living in the USSR, including comments about the elevator in his apartment building never working. He also made some half-hearted jokes about the Soviets always spitting when they spoke.

3. At the time I knew him he was on the staff of an English language publication, "Economic Affairs."

4. Maurice Halperin was a US national, and I believe taught economics at a US university. He subsequently worked at the National Bank of Mexico, but was expelled about 1956 and went to the USSR. Halperin is now a lecturer in economics at Moscow University. Halperin assisted in gathering data used by "Che" Guevara in his speech at Punta del Este, and commented about it when the speech was published.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201-128561
3 Jul 62
~~100-929~~

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN
LIMITED

NO DISSEM ABROAD

LIMITED

Dissemination limited to full-time employees of CIA, AEC and FBI; and within State and Defense, to the intelligence components, other offices producing NIS elements, and higher echelons with their immediate supporting staffs. Not to be disseminated to consultants, external projects or reserve personnel on short term active duty (excepting individuals who are normally full-time employees of CIA, AEC, FBI, State or Defense) unless the written permission of the originating office has been obtained through the Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA.

5. Halperin, I believe, is of English-Jewish background. He still has a son in the US and was happily anticipating a visit from the son [illegible]. The son cancelled the trip for unspecified reasons, and Halperin became extremely depressed.

6. Halperin mentioned on a number of occasions that he would like to come back to the US, and at one time asked me if he should accept a position in Cuba which had been offered to him by Fidel CASTRO. I believe he has regretted his going to the USSR. He is always "joking" about unpleasant aspects of life in the Soviet Union.

-end-

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/SIG Don

NO. CSCI-3/770,537

DATE 18 May 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CI	17 MAY 1962	18 MAY 1962	JJ	
2.				OSI copy should be passed by Mr. Flynn, as the Air Force has an interest in the Rand

~~c/TFW~~

c/TFW/CI

5 Jun

1.

in re attached, B. C, Neal said this is indeed a sensitive source. He said that no control ~~was~~ is held over it and no reqms could be levied.
201-120561 Halperin, former OSS, is now in the USSR and is known to be interested in Latin American affairs but it is not firmly known whether or not this includes Cuba. He is now a trusted member of the RIS.
Note. There is more to this but I will have to tell you as further putting on paper was specifically denied me.

2. in re the Rand Corporation, It is a West Coast Co. under contract to the Air Force. It is in fact a prporiety company conducting research on all manner of subjects, mostly scientific and mostly long range. Thaé material contained in the attached was verbally passed to the AF by Tony Flinn.

3. CIA contact with Rand Corp. is Ed. Giller who now works with Scoville. I have not as yet contacted him.

JS

14. [illegible]				
15. [illegible]		[illegible]		

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

[illegible]

16 MAR 1962

[illegible] 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. [illegible] J. Papich

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN
Espionage - R
Bureau File No. 65-14,[illegible]

ROSENFIELD

1. From a sensitive source of known reliability, it has been learned that Mr. William [illegible], 71 [illegible] Little Road, Stamford, Connecticut, a cousin of Maurice HALPERIN, on 3 March 1962, attended a seminar for high school students of the New England area at the Teacher's Meeting House, Stamford, Connecticut. A discussion about Latin America was led by Professor [illegible], a young, Italian-American professor from Wesleyan College. [illegible] allegedly stated that the professor was a liberal, extremely well-informed, and that he "thrilled" [illegible] with statements like: "More people are killed in violent outbreaks in Venezuela than in Cuba"; and "At least something is happening for good in Cuba; nothing in Venezuela."

EDWARD

2. According to source, the previous week Professor [illegible] had lectured on Cuba for seven hours at Columbia University. Source further reported that Professor [illegible] is going to work for the RAND CORPORATION to help plan policy for Latin America. [illegible] is quoted as saying there are almost no experts on Latin America in the U. S. A., so, despite his youth (about 30), he is considered to be one.

3. According to source, Mr. ROSENFIELD is submitting his views on Professor [illegible] to Maurice HALPERIN in Moscow, USSR.

4. It is requested that information contained in this communication receive no further dissemination without prior coordination with this office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Signed: James Angleton

James Angleton

CSCI-3/770,237

cc: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

Director of Special Investigations
Inspector General, USAF

CS COPY

SECRET

201-128561

SECRET
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Department of State
1 - USAF
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SIG
1 - CI/Merte
1 - WH/4
1 - RID (201-128561)
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/LIA

CI/SIG/RAEgerter:jm(17 May 1962)

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NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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201-128561

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CI/SIG

NO. CSCI-3/769,721

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/CI				
2.				
3. CILSN	7 MAR 1962		don	
4.				
5. REDLAN				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. Bir/MIS				
11.				DAD 7 MAR 1962
12.				
13.				
14.				201-128521 ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE 7 March 62
15. RID/Filin				

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GPO 1961 O-593044

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: Maurice Hyman HALPERIN 201-128561
Espionage - R
Bureau File Number 65-1[illegible]

1. Reference is made to your report on Maurice Hyman HALPERIN made by Special Agent Edward J. [illegible], Jr., at Boston, Massachusetts, on 6 February 1962. Your report indicates that HALPERIN, who is residing in Moscow, USSR, was preparing a book on Latin America.

2. In the event your Bureau has not obtained a copy of the publication Science & Society, Vol. XXV, No. 3, Summer 1961, we are enclosing a copy of this issue. It will be noted that this publication contains an article by HALPERIN entitled, "Growth and Crisis in the Latin American Economy", which is stated to be a chapter from his forthcoming book on Latin America.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Signed: James Angleton
James Angleton

CSCI-3/769,721

Enclosure: a/s

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
3 - CI/SIG
1 - WH/3
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A

CS COPY

201-128561

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO : DOP, CI/OA, OC 8, S/C 2

JAN 16 0015Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE WAVE 3341

IMMEDIATE ACTION

GYROSE COMMO AMDENIM

REF A. WAVE 3340 (IN 50541) IN50537

B WAVE 2246 (IN 32888)*

SUBJ REF A IS RADOP CANDIDATE PROVIDED BY AMDENIM-1 FOR INFILTRATION INTO PBRUMEN. TO REPLACE SUBJ PARA B REF B WHO FAILED COMMO ASSESSMENT TEST.

END OF MESSAGE ~~03~~ 04

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED POA ON BENICIA (GONZALEZ) GOMEZ.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

/ AMDENIM 2

/ [illegible] 201

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OC 8, S/C 2

ROUTING

DEC 10 2352Z 62

ROUTINE

DIR CITE WAVE 2246 IN32888

GYROSE COMMO AMDENIM

REF: A. WAVE 2242 PARA 2 (IN 32911)

B. DIR 24518

Au

REQUEST PRITY POAS ON FOLLOWING

A. [EDDA (HERNANDEZ) GONZALEZ] CUBAN BORN [31 AUGUST 32] LA VILLAS CUBA. LIVES [65 PUTNAM ST PATTERSON, NEW JERSEY]. SINGLE. FATHER [MIGUEL (HERNANDEZ) PEREZ] BORN [25 FEB 06] REMEDIOS, LA VILLAS, CUBA. MOTHER [ESTELVINA (GONZALEZ) ZAYAS] BORN [31 JULY 03] AREMEDIOS LA VILLAS. WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES ARE NEGATIVE.

B. [BENICIA (GONZALEZ) GOMEZ] CUBAN BORN [23 AUGUST 33] SAN FERNANDO DE LOS CAMARONES. LIVES [331 NE 24TH ST] MIAMI, FLORIDA. SINGLE. FATHER [DAMASO (GONZALEZ) FERNANDEZ] BORN [11 DEC 62] SAN FERNANDO DE LOS CAMARONES. MOTHER [SUSANA (GOMEZ) AQUAIO] BORN [11 AUGUST 11] CIENFUEGOS, CUBA. WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES NEGATIVE.

C. [ADELAIDA (MARTINEZ) ANDREADES] 201-320691. POA WAS FORMERLY GRANTED PER REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

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1 - AMDENIM 93

3 (201)

SECRET

GROUP 1
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15/ØP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE qkR

SUBJECT GYROSE/Operational
AMDENIM-1 Progress Report - 13 August 1962

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: UFGA-4425 dated 19 June 1962

1. SUMMARY: In the period since ref progress report AMDENIM-1 has been primarily engaged in keeping his fences mended with the various exile groups in the area in anticipation of moving into a position in the AMBUD-1 organization in which he will be responsible for coordinating the selection of paramilitary candidates from these groups. In addition to this he has prepared a number of reports providing background information, ~~and~~ on current activities in the local PBRUMEN community and mounting Operation Antonico I, an effort to establish contact with PBRUMEN fishermen thru his own fisherman contacts. Details follow:

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. In response to a Station request subject provided an estimate of the current situation in PBRUMEN. This report stressed the points that the farmers and the fishermen in PBRUMEN are the most willing and capable of providing support to resistance activities as a result of their having suffered the most at the hands of the current administration after being largely responsible for its obtaining power. He also provided a general strategic plan of Oriente Province in which he defined the main areas in which guerrilla elements can survive and how they can be reached from coastal resupply points. His ability to do this is based upon his being a native of the area and one who has been primarily interested in its geography due to his former large agriculture holdings there.

3. He has had one meeting with AMBUD-1 for the purpose of maintaining contact. His main question to AMBUD-1 was with regard to the latter's ability to actually control the people on his staff. He was disappointed by the reply which though positive could not be supported with an example of where AMBUD-1 had actually brought

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
13 Aug. 62

DATE DISPATCHED
AUG [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-5212

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-251853
201-251853

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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about the dismissal of anyone who had proved to be ineffective. AMDENIM-1 is a good friend of AMBUD-1 as a result of his father's long standing relationship with him, but at this point has very little respect for him as a result of, as he says, AMBUD-1's failure to actually make his organization into an effective body and to engage in activities which actually detract from the success of the current PBRUMEN regime. It remains that he is willing to join AMBUD-1's organization and attempt to create unity among the military sections of the member groups at such time as KUBARK gives him the go ahead.

4. Following his belief that the most important job at hand is the development and maintenance of maritime reception points along the north coast of PBRUMEN, AMDENIM-1 has devoted considerable time to readying assets among his exiled fisherman friends to make contact with their former fisherman associates still based in PBRUMEN. The foundation for this activity is quite tenuous as a result of a variety of factors which make it difficult to arrange sea rendezvouses in the absence of radio contact. Several trips have been made to the Anguila Key area for this purpose, the last of which was supported by KUBARK and was called Operation Antonico I. This attempt was unsuccessful due to the failure of the inside contact to appear. It developed that the woman and child who were to be exfiltrated on this operation appeared in the JMWAVE area two days later, having obtained permission to leave PBRUMEN by air. They carried the message that someone had stolen the port chief's personal boat as a result of which the inside contact was unable to depart on schedule due to the implementation of temporary restrictions until the theft had been investigated. She said the next rendezvous was scheduled for 12 August, however imminent bad weather forestalled any chance of making this rendezvous. The effort to establish contact continues on the basis that, once a commo system can be set up, it will be comparatively easy to establish further rendezvouses and thus develop ratlines into the north coast.

5. Coincidentally with the above AMDENIM-1 is continuing his efforts to come up with radio operator candidates and to obtain candidates for infiltration. Based upon past experience this effort is being made more selective in that the need for more self sufficient personnel is greater than ever. The increasing difficulty of covering people inside makes it necessary to reduce the size of the infiltration parties and to have people who can withstand the rigors of existing on minimum supplies until they can establish themselves with natives who are willing to provide them with a base of operations. Most of the people who are willing to infiltrate at this point are of the type who want immediate action and are unwilling to take the time to establish a clandestine base from which they can methodically develop the assets in place who are essential to the growth and refinement of a resistance base. He has a number of people on tap who are qualified as candidates for small guerrilla teams, but who are not capable of maintaining themselves clandestinely until the time for guerrilla action arrives.

6. FUNDS EXPENDED:

04

a. $200. was given to Heriberto SARDINAS Campo as maintenance until his 04 clearance comes through. It is intended that SARDINAS will be an investigator of operational leads and an assistant to AMDENIM-1 in the handling of his fishermen and operational candidates.

b. $300. was given to AMDENIM-1 for passage to the widow of AMGLAD-1. He is the channel for this payment until such time as HQs arrives at a settlement figure and this obligation can be disposed of.

7/970

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-5212

c. $325. was given to AMDENIM-1 in support of Operation Antonico I, which operation is described under paragraph 4.

7. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: AMDENIM-1 has provided a number of memoranda on developments within the various exile groups in the JMWAVE area, none of which qualify as intelligence information but all of which contribute to the Station's better understanding of the local politics. Specifically, he has provided info on the political beliefs and background of most of the PBRUMEN exiled labor leaders and the activities of the Bequer group. He has also been helpful in clarifying the picture as to the movements within the UR at this time while the Station is trying to determine how best to organize this group in order to be able to take over its more worthwhile features without becoming unduly committed to giving it special prominence in the exile community. He is being counted on to help bring the UR into the AMBUD-1 organization as a means of creating the appearance of greater unity among the exile community.

8. COMMENTS AND PLANS: While no spectacular achievements are resulting from AMDENIM-1's efforts at this point he is steadily becoming more and more susceptible to KUBARK control and more professional in his efforts. A recent example is the critique he gave his fishermen for not realizing more information out of the refugees they met at Anguila Key while waiting for their inside contact. They had failed to adequately debrief two young men, who had succeeded in surviving in PBRUMEN for over two months on their own, on the basis that they were too young to be knowledgeable. As it turned out the two refugees had used the cover of sponge salesmen and had been able to travel from Havana to Santiago de Cuba without being stopped once. On learning of this, AMDENIM-1 was reminded of a good cover he has heard about, namely fighting cock fanciers, which activity seems to be on the increase as a result of the greater amount of spare time available to the people. The sport is actually becoming a year around proposition rather than being restricted to the winter months as in the past. It is planned to have AMDENIM-1 continue his present pursuits on the basis that he is free to move as the Station desires and can have an overall constructive effect on the AMBUD-1 organization at the time desired. He will continue his efforts with the fishermen and will provide candidates for infiltration as they become available and can be accepted by the Station. Operation Antonico III is scheduled for 27 August using a Magnolia (boat) to establish contact with fishermen living on a key in the Caibarien area. There is a possibility that he will journey to Jamaica to make contact with an old associate who is now a prominent member of the PBRUMEN government as a means of eliciting information on current regime policy and plans.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

57i

DATE : 24 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMBAR

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : ~~COP,~~ WH 5, S/C 2

PA

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 25 0309Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 27533

DIR INFO WAVE CITE BARR 0184

IN27533

JMZIP KUSODA KUDESK

REF A. DIR 25431 (OUT 72120)*

B. BARR 0173 (IN 23609)

1. ONE OF [MRS GEDDES] 06 ASSOCIATES PER REF B, ONE ANTONIO CUESTA, FORMER CREWMEMBER TEJANA III FRIEND OF AMDENIM-1.

2. SOURCE OF INFO REF B IS [GEORGE ROPPINO,] 05 LOCAL BUSINESS CONTACT. BELIEVE VERY RELIABLE.

3. [MRS GEDDES] 06 HAS NOT RETURNED HOWEVER CUESTA CONTINUES TO MAKE INQUIRIES RE BOAT.

4. FYI AMDENIM-4 REPORTS CUESTA MAY RETURN PBRUMEN SOON.

5. A-4 NOT AWARE BARR INTEREST [MRS GEDDES.] 06

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FULLEST DETAILS RE AMBEND-2 CONTACTING BOAT DEALER AT BARR ON BEHALF TWO CUBANS IN ATTEMPT PURCHASE HIGH SPEED BOAT.

SECRET

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4/00

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) AELADLE

FROM: SR/CI/K -[Cu:ls]03	EXTENSION	NO.	
		DATE 15 Nov 65	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/R and A				For your retention.
2. TRHall	[illegible]		[illegible]	
3. RGRocca	17/11	17/11	2	
4.				
5. C/CI	18 NOV 1965			
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. CI/SIG	10 Jan		Sm	
10. Mrs. E ___				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

201-99,788

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

1/pl

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: 02 [AESTORAGE No. 1060
AELADLE

DOI : 1961 - 1963 or 1964

NOTE: 02 [AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. 02 [AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. 02 [AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

1. Source transited Helsinki in May 1961, at which time he obtained a visa at the Soviet Embassy from one KLIMOV. Beginning shortly after Christmas 1961 and continuing on and off for the next three months, Source was interrogated by the KGB in Moscow about his contacts with the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki. Source prepared a written report giving in detail the physical description of all KGB officers who had met him in Helsinki.

2. In 1963 or 1964 Source was told by the KGB that it was unlikely he would ever be assigned to the United States as a Soviet who had defected in Helsinki could personally identify Source.

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - AELADLE
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/X
1 - SR/CI/I

03
SR/CI/I:[HIMason]:mjc 2

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISS

Frank,
After further research + lengthy discussions, AESTORAGE + AESAMSHU, PROTECT the "AE" Digraph only-
21 Apr 98

5/pv

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : BONN
ACTION: C/EE 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/SR 3, S/C 2

(EYES ONLY)

S E C R E T 251550Z IN66996 25 JUN 1963

DIR INFO MUNI FRAN BRLN CITE BONN 4798

RYBAT [UPHILL] [UJRANDOM] AELADLE

REF A DIR 48717 Being cabled

B EGOV 3194

RE PARA 3 REF A, SINCE [UPHILL] ALREADY AWARE EXISTENCE THIS CASE THROUGH SUMMARY BASED ON REF B AND JOINTLY PASSED [UPHILL/CAVATA,] SUGGEST IT MORE APPROPRIATE TO REFER [UPHILL] DIRECT TO [CAVATA/ASBV] ON BASIS LATTER [SERVICES] INTERROGATED AELADLE IN DETAIL ON BACKGROUND. DO NOT FEEL KUBARK SHOULD MIDDLEMAN EXCHANGE OF INFO BETWEEN [GERMAN SERVICES] IN CASE AFFECTING GERMAN SECURITY AND INVOLVING INFORMATION OBTAINED BY [BFV] FROM AELADLE.

S E C R E T

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

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9/rd

SECRET

WHEN FILLED IN

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

MAY 31 4 15 PM '63

TO ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EE/G/CE	3E19	6 JUN 1963	18/6	
2.				
3. C/CI/SIG			19 June	BDG
4. Evans			26	e
5. Egerter			7. VII 63	age
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

1. X copy to DC/CI; C/SR/CI, to be initialed, on 4 June 63

MICROFILMED
JUN 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1-3: I understand you are collecting such items against the day we may have access to AELADLE again.

RETURN TO CIA
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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-99285

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

1177-555/W-5'. 551/FRAN EGNA 25631 FOLLOWS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO CHIEF, EE

INFO COS/G, SR, FCB

FROM CHIEF OF BASE, BONN

SUBJECT REDCAP LCIMPROVE AELADLE
AELADLE LEAD

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 4 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. DURING A MEETING WITH 06 WEYDE ON 21 MAY 63 HE REFERRED TO HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO 06 DEBRIEF AELADLE . HE STATED THAT ON ONE OCCASION, WHILE HE AND DR. MEIER WERE RIDING IN A CAR WITH AELADLE, AELADLE CASUALLY REFERRED BY NAME TO A KGB OFFICER PRESENTLY ASSIGNED IN GERMANY, COMMENTING THAT HE KNEW THE INDIVIDUAL VERY WELL AND KNEW THAT HIS POLITICAL VIEWS WERE THE SAME AS HIS OWN, BUT THAT WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SHOULD LEAVE THE INDIVIDUAL ALONE AS HE WOULD PROBABLY ONE DAY MAKE THE SAME DECISION AS AELADLE ON HIS OWN.

2. BY THE TIME 06 WEYDE REALIZED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT AELADLE WAS SAYING THE NAME HAD SLIPPED BY AND NEITHER HE NOR 06 DR. MEIER WAS ABLE, OR FELT 06 HE 06 COULD, ASK FOR THE NAME AGAIN. AFTER LEAVING AELADLE BOTH WEYDE AND MEIER TRIED TO RECALL THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL BUT COULD ONLY AGREE THAT THE NAME BEGAN WITH AN ''A''. IN REVIEWING THE PRESENT SOVIETS ASSIGNED IN THE GFR WHOSE NAMES BEGIN ~~WITH~~ ''A'' 06 WEYDE TENDS TO THINK THE NAME MENTIONED MIGHT HAVE BEEN AKHLUYEV (201-294348), ALTHOUGH HE IS FAR FROM CERTAIN ON THIS POINT.

3. WE HAVE VERY LIMITED INFORMATION IN OUR FILES ON AKHLUYEV AND NONE INDICATING KGB AFFILIATION. HE ARRIVED AT THE STM ON 16 FEBRUARY 61 ALONG WITH HIS WIFE, IS CARRIED BY THE BFV AS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE TRADE MISSION, AND RESIDES WITHIN THE 29 TRADE MISSION BUILDING.

4. THE ABOVE LEAD, ALTHOUGH VERY SKETCHY, APPEARS DEFINITELY WORTH PURSUING AND WE WONDER IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO QUERY AELADLE SOME MANNER. 06 WEYDE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT AELADLE DESIRED TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL FROM ANY INTELLIGENCE APPROACHES BASED ON HIS INFORMATI SO HE HAS PROBABLY NOT SUBMITTED ANY DETAILS. IT MAY, HOWEVER, PROVE PROFITABLE TO REVIEW WITH AELADLE AGAIN SOME OF THE SOVIETS ASSIGNED IN WEST GERMANY AND WORK IN ALL THE ''A'' NAMES. AELADLE MIGHT THUS GIVE SOME INFORMATION WHICH WOULD HELP US TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL HE MENTIONED IN THE CAR. PLS ADVISE IF THIS IS POSSIBLE

INDEX

Lester S. Redmiles
LESTER S. REDMILES

201-99733

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION
3 EE
1 SR
2 COS/G
2 FCB
BY POUCH
1 EE

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
24 MAY 63 TCR-	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
EGNA-25831

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

8/PV

OUTGOING MESSAGE

30-1

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SECRET

STAFF 212013Z DIRECTOR 931493

CONF: SE8 INFO: FILE (MN) EUR8, C14, 056, 056/IC2, SIA2, PS/EG2, C/OPS

14-3

0 DISSEM BY: 27

0

0 PER

0 #

TO: [STOCKHOLM.Y]

UNINTEL CKTOP TIBLOCK Y

14-3

REF: [STOCKHOLM] 19576 (IN 067262)

03

1. WE HAVE BEGUN CHECKING WITH NOSENKO, [PD]DIPPERS 19 AND 20, AND [PD]LADLE RE WALLENBERG AND WILL CABLE OR TELEPOUCH RESULTS AS RECEIVED. WE EXPECT TO BE FINISHED BY MID-NOVEMBER.Y

02

2. FILE: 201-5935. E2 IMPDET.d

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SE/CI/X

C/CI/RA/E

E/SC/S SN

CI/RA/I, OS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 201-099788
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DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1976
ORIG: [BARBARA BRYAN]EW
UNIT: SE/X/EU 03
EXT: 1049

DC/E/NW

C/SE/X/EU 03

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET

4/820

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, SR

FROM
Chief of Station, Helsinki 14-1

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/AELADLE - Tabe Maria Ingeborg SLIOOR (201-768030)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
19-1 HELS-3059, 2 June 65
REF: OPHA-7261, 4 June 65
22
ACTION: FYI

1. Subject was interviewed for an immigrant visa on 7 July 65. Unfortunately Clastonbury could not be present because of other business. The interviewing officer was briefed prior to the meeting and faced the applicant with a series of questions regarding her association with Soviets and any approaches that may have been made to her in light of her unusual life. In response to these questions, we are told that SLIOOR gave thoughtful consideration to each question and probably truthfully replied that although she has met several Soviet diplomats, no approaches for cooperation were made to her. She realized the full implication of the questions and made no attempts to be evasive. Subject was given her visa immediately after the interview.

2. Attachment 1 is a translation of the 01 VALTYK traces on subject. As noted in the traces SLIOOR was an acquaintance of Grigoriy GOLUB (201-150156) and Georgiy *STENING born 29 June 1913 in Moscow (aka Georgi STEINING, 22 OPHA-1807, 30 July 56 and OPHW-1456, 9 October 56). These names were not used in the interview. 22

3. Attachment 2 is a thermofax copy of SLIOOR's visa; Attachment 3, birth record; Attachment 4, marriage certificate.

4. From subject's visa application her address in the U.S. is listed as Fort Hood, Texas.

WALTER R. CLASTONBURY

Attachments:
as stated

Distribution:
3 - WE w/atts
2 - SR w/atts
2 - Hela w/atts
14-1

d/c copy filed 201-768030

201-150156

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	22 OPHA-7329	14 July 65
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
201-150156	SECRET	201-768030

8/BR

DISPATCH

TO: Chief, SR via Chief, [illegible]

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, [Helsinki] 14-1

SUBJECT: Ivan Yefimovich [illegible] (201-259447)
- Petr Nikitovich SAVELYEV (201-[illegible])

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

22

REF: [OFHA]-4656, 18 June 1965

1. Appearing as part of Section 12 of the SPR on Mikhail Vasilyevich MURASHOV (201-205139), forwarded with reference, are the following entries. [Helsinki] Station would like to clarify some of the information previously reported by the Station which undoubtedly has led Headquarters to the conclusion contained in the second paragraph immediately below.

When told that Subject (Mikhail Vasilyevich MURASHOV 201-205139) has been posted to Finland, Source (a Soviet defector) commented that Subject (MURASHOV) would probably be responsible for penetrating the police.
(This speculation by Source is probably not correct since this responsibility belongs to Peter Nikitovich SAVELYEV, who arrived in Helsinki about the same time that Subject did, to replace Ivan Yefimovich [illegible].)

2. Petr Nikitovich SAVELYEV (201-140400), Counsellor of Embassy and Head of the Press Section. SAVELYEV filled the Counsellor slot vacated by Vasiliy [illegible]vich SOLOMKO (201-142338) who dealt with trade. We do not recall the Chief of the Press Section prior to SAVELYEV's arrival. However, SAVELYEV was NOT the replacement for Ivan [illegible] (201-259447) as stated in [OFHA]-5447, 13 February 1962.

22 3. We doubt very much that SAVALYEV was involved in police penetration. His contacts in Finland (also in Norway) were for the most part with the press 22 ([OFHA]-6610, 22 May 1964, etc.) and he circulated freely in that media. SAVALYEV did not speak Finnish, despite the fact the [VALINKS] informed us he spoke fairly good Finnish ([OFHA]-5447) which was probably an initial assessment on their part. 22

4. Although a GRU suspect during his tour in Norway, his

DATE TYPED 16 July 65	DATE DISPATCHED 16 July 65
CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-259447	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 22 [OFHA]-7331
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-140400

Galub Grigoriy Ye.

815R

RETURN TO CIA
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activities in Helsinki at first appeared to be those of a KGB co-optee, and later more obviously those of a KGB officer in the CA field. Walter R. CLASSONBURY's contacts with SAVALYEV took place either in press circles or in the presence of Aleksey SHUMAKOV (201-203095) whom we suspect of being the deputy resident in Helsinki. Thus the milieu in which SAVALYEV operated, we tend to place him in the KGB category rather than GRU.

5. SAVALYEV, who left for home leave on 10 July 1964 and never returned, was replaced by KGB officer Albert AKULOV (201-232590), first secretary and press attache.

6. Concerning Ivan Yefimovich SERGEYEV (201-259447), SERGEYEV replaced KGB officer Grigoriy Ye. GOLUB (201-150156), Chief of the Consular Section. After the defection of AELADLE/1, this Section was in confusion and the exact slot-for-slot replacements are not known. In our best judgment, SERGEYEV was replaced by Anatoliy PAVLOV (201-331811) who departed 2 March 1963 because of ill health. PAVLOV was temporarily replaced by KGB officer Boris Vasilyevich PERELETOV ostensibly assigned to the Cultural Section (22 OFHA-6483, 6 March 1964) who departed 31 March 1964 also because of ill health. PERELETOV was replaced for consular responsibilities by KGB officer Feliks Dmitryevich KARASEV (201-736991).

OLIVIA R. CLERICK

Distribution:
3 - WE
2 - SR

21BR

U

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

23 December 1927   41 Yrs old   Born Moscow

Stationed in Havana from September 1960 until September 1963. Attache. In 1961 he toured Latin America with the Soviet Soccer team as escort and interpreter (probably with security functions as well). He arrived August 1965 as Third Secretary. He replaced NECHIPORENKO. His Spanish has been described as fluent with hardly any accent. His English is fair and he is studying it now.

In March 1966, XX LICOZY/5 was told he would be handled in the future by L.

In response to L's claim that a radio had been stolen from him, a policeman was sent to his aprtment and L. ended the conversation by recruiting the policeman at the rate of 5000 Pesos per month. The policeman reported the incident and the Metropolitan District Police sanctioned a D/A op. The first and only recorded requirement given the policeman by L was for some Bio data on a Venezuelan who spent time in USSR.

L is friendly with YATSKOV, replaced him (he claims) as Consul General, (1966)

Shortly after Arab-Israeli War L tacitly XXXXXXXX admitted he believed that Egypt's charges of U.S. involvement on Irael's XXXX side were false. contrary ~~to~~ U.S. (announced) st.

Then there's the one about Miss Elizabeth Duncan Wilde. L told her that he was ready to "go to the other side". He stated that he was afraid because the phones in both U.S. and Soviet Embassies were bugged. He asked if she would go to U.S. Embassy with his story. She consented and reporting stops here. UNRESOLVED [illegible]

Paul Dillon observed L and BARANOV in the area of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX a hotel where a meeting with Uriy DRUSS was to have taken place one night ago, taking pictures with an 8mm camera. BARANOV is a Soviet tech.

L pursued AMSLOUCH/3, daughter of a Finnish agent, both in Havana and in Moscow. His intentions XXXXXX were unknown, but could have been romantically XXXXXXX inclined rather than professional.

L is an aggressive personality. With his fellow workers he is dictatorial and disdainful. He has been known to XXXX return to the Embassy thoroughly gassed, yelling and shouting and resulting in an altercation with the guard on duty. Other times he won't finish one drink. He is chauvinistic XXXX to his own race and deprecatory to other nationalities. A sneering attitude, boisterous and arrogant at times. He can be gentle at othertimes, has frequently labeled intelligent, XXXXXXX He is definitely crafty, although not particulary subtle. works fast, doesn't appear to try hard at cloaking his true intentions, either in conversation with others or in a recruitment attempt. He is tough as nails. His build is athletic, his appearance is ruggedly handsome. He appears confident, self-assured in relations with non-Soviets.

201-285412

The file is very difficult to follow. Items appear with ~~XXXXXXX~~ no further mention. AMOUR?

Salient feature of file is that LOGINOV was never the object of ~~XX~~ consistent concentrated attention by anyone. There is virtually no reporting on the LICOZY/5----LOGINOV relationship. What there is implies that L/5 is uncooperative and nearly refuses to work with L.

SUMMARY

SUSCEPTIBILITY: Nothing in the conventional sense. If he is trying to tell us anything he is obviously trying to get our attention via a CI ploy with the intention of bringing us to him. He moves with confidence and near-impunity--certainly not like one who might be in trouble.

PROFESSIOANLISM: Not smooth and subtle nor particularly secure. But crafty, fast on his feet, makes fast decisions and then acts on them. Aggressive and ubiquitous. Socially active. Woman-chaser.

PERSONALITY: See above.

Should be leaving before another year and one-half. Has been there for three and one-half years.

See other similar cases.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

32 ~~SECRET~~

☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR8, CI/IC2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 071903Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5837

7 Jan [illegible] 29099

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE LICANNY-1

REF A HMMW 12821 AUG 64 filed 201-327137

B MEXI 5372 NOV 65 (IN 99634) *

1. DURING ROUTINE CONTACTS WITH PBSWING OFFICER DURING JAN SUBJ ADVISED HE IN CONTACT PAVEL YATSKOV (201-120123) AND VALENTIN LOGINOV (201-285412), BOTH SUSPECT KGB. SOVS ASKED HIM PREPARE TRAVEL INFO ON TRAINS AND SHIPS BETWEEN MEXICO, NEW YORK AND EUROPE. LOGINOV APPEARS FRIENDLY AND TOLD SUBJ HE HOPES THEY WILL BE FRIENDS.

2. PBSWING OFFICER TURNED SUBJECT OVER TO STATION OFFICER TO WHOM AGREED ACT AS ACCESS AGENT LOGINOV. REQUEST HQS REPROCESS HIS POA.

S E C R E T * REF., LAURICLE

CFN 5837 -1 HMMW-12821 65 5372 65 PBSWING PAVEL YTASKOV 201-120123 VALENTIN LOGINOV 201-285412 KGB SOVS NEW YORK EUROPE LOGINOV PBSWING LOGINOV HQS POA

BT

~~SECRET~~

201-285412

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO Chief, SRD

INFO Chief, WHD

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDWOOD
Unidentified Visitor to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. LICALLA and LILYRIC reported an unidentified visitor to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City between 29 November and 3 December 1965. The visitor appears to be a Soviet; however, LIFIRE has not reported any unaccounted for Soviet to have visited Mexico during this period, nor was the presence of a Soviet visitor reported to the Station by any other source. He has not been seen since 3 December 1965.

2. According to LICALLA, the visitor was principally in contact with the cook, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich MUKHIN (201-293944), administrative assistant Stanislav Sergeyevich SILNIKOV (201-271103), guard Nikolay Ivanovich ZAKHAROV, code clerk Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265), Third Secretary and known KGB officer Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (201-343894), First Secretary and known KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) and Press Attache and known KGB officer Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139).

3. According to LILYRIC, the visitor was seen leaving the Soviet Embassy with MUKHIN, and later with Third Secretary and suspect KGB officer Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) on 30 November 1965. On 1 December he was seen leaving with MUKHIN and his wife, Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602) and chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHUKIN (201-735052) in the car normally driven by Pravda correspondent Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (201-763035). On 2 December he was seen leaving with MUKHIN and his wife, ZAKHAROV, visitor Ferdinand Robertovich GINNO and

(continued)

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - SRD w/att hw
1 - WHD w/o/att
2 - File

Orig filed 50-8-10

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28001

DATE
5 January 1966

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
201-4-64

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-23001

Attache and suspect KGB officer Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) in KORMUSHKIN's car. On 3 December he was seen leaving with MAHIN and PRASHCHIKIN.

4. Attached is a photograph of the visitor taken by LILYRIC.

5. Station Mexico would appreciate it if the attached photograph could be circulated at Headquarters for possible identification.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT
REDWOOD
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965

Forwarded herewith is paragraph 9 (PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS) of summary traces in SPR format on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) as promised to you in the above reference.

BHG
BRUCE H. GINTALAS

ATTACHMENT:
Paragraph 9 as stated above.

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 2-Chief of Station, Mexico City (w/att)

1-RID (w/att)
1-SR/O/WH (wo/att)
WH/1 (wo/att)

201-285412 ✓
~~1 NOV 1965~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 14087
CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE: 28 October 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-285412

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/O/PA	JOHN CARLSON	C vib	6213

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	28 Oct 65	Wendell L. Lyon

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

b. Height: 6' tall.

c. Build: strong build; ca. 185 lbs. in Havana.

d. Hair: blond wavy hair.

g. Shape of Face: concave forehead.

[illegible]OV, [illegible]TIN SERGEYEVICH	A-1[illegible]721	S010107
DPOB: 2[illegible] D[illegible]C 27 [illegible]	201-285412	PFT
WIFE: [illegible]	REF: [illegible]-20557 14 [illegible] 61	


S010107


S010107

att #1 - HMMW-14057 201-285412

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

XXX

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SR Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - John - STRATOS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LICOZY/5 reported that on 12 October 1965 Subject visited his place of business and said that he had been referred to LICOZY/5 by the Soviet Embassy. He said he was interested in a one-way ticket to the Soviet Union. Subject furnished the following information to LICOZY/5 : He was born on 19 August 1942 in Michigan. He is a student at U.C.L.A. and wanted to visit the USSR as a tourist. Subject held U. S. passport number C 530394 issued 29 August 1962. His permanent address was given as 19222 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California. His tourist card showed that he entered Mexico by bus at Sonoita, Sonora on 9 October 1965. Subject paid for 15 days in the Soviet Union but said that he planned to stay longer.

2. He left Mexico via Air France flight 702 on 16 October (confirmed by flight manifests). His plans call for him to depart Paris for Moscow via Air France flight 724 on 17 October.

3. During a routine visit to the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Valentin S. LOGINOV thanked LICOZY/5 for "taking care" of Subject but, in the presence of both PRIKHODKO and Consular officer Vladimir S. KORMUSHKIN, LOGINOV admonished LICOZY/5 for asking for more biographic data than he needed to fill out the necessary papers. LICOZY/5 denied that he had asked for more information than he needed. (Subject apparently reported LICOZY/5's actions in obtaining the above biographic data (or was debriefed by LOGINOV, a suspect KGB officer).

4. It seems unusual for an American student to travel from the U. S. to Mexico in order to travel to the Soviet Union since he is automatically increasing the cost of his travel by a considerable amount. Since Subject crossed into Mexico on 9 October, only a week before his departure for the USSR, it would appear that he came to Mexico exclusively for this purpose. It thus appears that the purpose of travelling via Mexico was to conceal this trip from the U. S. authorities.

5. Local ODENVY not advised.

Irving A. Orowsky for
Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
2 - CWH
1 - CSR

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-111/9

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 27467

DATE
20 OCTOBER 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-51203 201-215712
FFN: P -2712

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

LIFIRE reported the arrival on 10 October 1965, via Sabena flight 555, of Subject's wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, and his son Dmitriy. Travelling on the same flight were Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975) and his wife returning to Mexico from home leave.

HMMA 27425

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - C/SR
1 - C/WH

CS COPY

201-285412.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-27420

DATE
14 October 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT
REDWOOD
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201 285412)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI 4363, 7 August 1965

1. Forwarded herewith are summary traces in SPR format on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, reflecting a digest of available information in Headquarters files.

2. Paragraph 9 of the above attachment (PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS) will be forwarded to you at a later date under separate dispatch as soon as the photos have been processed here at Headquarters.

3. Forwarded under separate cover is Paragraph 21 (IDENTITIES).

BHG

BRUCE H. GINTALAS

ATTACHMENTS: A. Summary traces in SPR format (h/w)
B. Paragraph 21 (IDENTITIES) (u/s/c)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 2-Chief of Station, Mexico City (w/att A, h/w; w/att B, u/s/c)

1CH

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
CS COPY
HMMW 13985

DATE
23 SEP 1965
16 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 285412

1-RID(w/att A & B)
1-SR/O/WH (w/att A & B)
1-WH/1

ABSTRACT INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/O/PA	JOHN CARLSON	vjb	6213

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	20 Sept 65	Kendall G. Lyon
WH/1	9/21	JT

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/21	

ATTACHMENT A TO h d 13985

SECRET

SUMMARY TRACES IN SPR FORMAT

PREPARED BY. BRUCE H. CINTALAS
DATE : 8 September 1965
201 NUMBER . 201 285412
A NUMBER : 18721

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927, Moscow

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

   a. USSR citizen.

   b. Passport D016993, issued 24 August 1960.

   c. Passport D010264, issued 1965

6. CURRENT POSITION:

   Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

7. RELATIVES:

   c. Spouse: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, born 20 August 1928, Moscow. Worked in the Consular Office in Havana. Speaks poor Spanish.

   d. Children: Son - Dmitriy Valentinovich, born 1959.
   Daughter - Irina Valentinovna, born ca. 1952.

8. LANGUAGES:

   Subject speaks fluent Spanish with a slight accent.
   Subject spoke some English while he was in Havana.

RIS INPUT NO. I

CS COPY

att. #1- HMMW-13985 SECRET 201-285412

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

A February 1960 Diplomatic List from Argentina lists Subject as a new Soviet Military Attache due to arrive in Buenos Aires in the near future. There is no indication that Subject ever filled that post.

From September 1960 to September 1963, Subject and family were in Havana where Subject served as an Attache at the Soviet Embassy. In December 1961, he accompanied the Soviet DYNAMO soccer team on a Latin American tour as their escort and interpreter.

Subject arrived in Mexico City on 3 August 1965 to replace known KGB officer Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201 305870), as a Third Secretary.

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION:

Subject is listed as probable RIS, probably KGB on the basis of his activities while stationed in Havana and by virtue of his replacing a known KGB officer in Mexico City. Per HMMA-28390, 3 Mar 66 Subject considered known KGB.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

While Subject accompanied the DYNAMO soccer team through La Paz in December 1961, he became acquainted with KISHIN-1 (Identity 1), a KUBARK Bolivian security service penetration and later a low level Bolivian university-cell CP penetration. It is not recorded upon whose initiative the contacts were made. However, by KISHIN-1's admission he had several informal and friendly meetings with Subject during which Subject encouraged KISHIN-1 to accept a Cuban student grant. In fact he specifically expressed an eagerness to be of any assistance in helping KISHIN-1 to get to Cuba. KISHIN-1 never went to Cuba, although he did

13. (CONTINUED)

correspond with Subject on the matter on at least one occasion. KISHIN-1 was terminated as an agent in July 1963 for security reasons and because it was believed that he was a fabricator. No further developments in his association with Subject were noted.

On the same trip through Latin America in December 1961, Subject was observed to have in his possession some $2,000 in United States currency. After sending the soccer team back to Moscow from Quito, Subject continued alone through Panama City, where he was seen in contact with a Mexican citizen with whom he flew on to Mexico City. In Mexico City Subject reported to known KGB officer Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHOV (201 227418) at the Soviet Embassy. From a sensitive source it was learned that GARMASHOV had been instructed to look into the matter of Subject's four-day delay in returning to Havana from Quito and that Subject's superiors in Havana were concerned. It is not known what relationship, if any, these circumstances have to each other.

In Havana early in 1963, Subject befriended and apparently attempted to cultivate VASLOUCHs 1, 2, and 3 (Identities 2, 3, and 4). The association was discouraged by KUBARK because VASLOUCH-1 and 2 were performing important functions in connection with Cuban FI activities and contact with a possible RIS officer was not thought desireable.

In September 1962 at the invitation of Senhor Vazco Leitao de CUNHA, Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba and newly appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union, VASLOUCH-3 traveled to Moscow and accepted a clerical position at the Brazilian Embassy where she remained for approximately two years. A year later, in September 1963, Subject returned PCS to Moscow. Between December 1963 and February 1964, Subject made three attempts to see VASLOUCH-3. According to VASLOUCH-3, the contacts were by telephone only

SECRET

13. (CONTINUED)

and she did not meet with Subject personally while in Moscow.

15. CONTACTS:

In December 1961 in La Paz, Bolivia, Subject was in contact with KISHIN-1. See paragraph 13 above and Identities.

Subject was in contact in Panama City and on a flight from Panama City to Mexico City in December 1961 with Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez, a Mexican citizen who had been traveling around Latin America. The nature of this contact has not been determined.

Subject befriended and apparently attempted to develop in Havana VASLOUCHs 1, 2, and 3. See paragraph 13 above and Identities.

20. TRACES FOR LIAISON:

See first page following.

21. IDENTITIES:

See second page following.

SECRET

SECRET

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DPOB: 23 December 1927, Moscow

PASSPORTS: D016993, issued 24 August 1960

D010264, issued 1965

POSITION: Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

WIFE: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna, born 20 August 1928, Moscow. Worked in the Consular Office of the Soviet Embassy in Havana. Speaks poor Spanish.

SON: Dmitriy Valentinovich, born 1959.

DAUGHTER: Irina Valentinovna, born ca. 1952.

LANGUAGES: Subject speaks fluent Spanish and poor English.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: He is 6' tall, weighs 185 lbs., has a strong build, blond wavy hair, and a concave forehead.

TRAVEL: In 1960 Subject was designated to the Soviet Embassy in Argentina as a Military Attache, however, there is no record that Subject ever filled that post.

From September 1960 to September 1963, Subject and family were in Havana where Subject served as an Attache at the Soviet Embassy. In December 1961 he accompanied the Soviet DYNAMO Soccer team on a Latin American tour as their escort and interpreter.

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER
ATTACHMENT B TO HMM 3955

SECRET

IDENTITIES

IDENTITY ONE	DELGADILLO Menacho, Adalid, formerly a Captain on the Bolivian Police Force. KUBARK agent from 1960 to 1963.
IDENTITY TWO	MATIKAINEN, Lauri Olavi, Honorary Finnish Counsel in Havana and KUBARK contact since 1962.
IDENTITY THREE	MATIKAINEN, Estrella, wife of IDENTITY TWO.
IDENTITY FOUR	MATIKAINEN, Anneli, daughter of IDENTITIES TWO and THREE.

SECRET

CSR

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		XXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SR Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
6 REDWOOD - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI 4363, 6 August 1965

Subject's arrival in Mexico was reported in Reference. Attached are copies of Subject's passport, obtained through LITEMPO, no. D-010264, issued 24 June 1965 in Moscow and valid for five years.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Copies of Passport

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att., as stated, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-285412

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26881	12 AUGUST 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412 FFN - P-11712



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 010264

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № [illegible]

Предъявитель сего, гражданин Союза Советских
Социалистических Республик

ЛОГИНОВ Валентин Сергеевич,

третий секретарь Посольства СССР в Мексике

[illegible]

[illegible] Союза
Советских Социалистических Республик

[illegible]

[illegible] 1963

24 июня 1963 года



Le titulaire du présent citoyen___ de l'UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Valentin LOGUINOV,

Troisième Secrétaire de l'Ambassade de l'URSS

au Mexique,

[illegible] à l'étranger

AU NOM DE L'UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères prie toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le titulaire du présent passeport et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Valable pour ___ cinq ans

26 Juin [illegible]

[illegible] au Mexique
[illegible] Étrangères de l'URSS
Pour [illegible]

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№ 512504

Москва

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА [illegible] СССР

[illegible] 65



ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

через любой пограничный пункт

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ ВИЗА

№

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНА для выезда из СССР

через любой пограничный пункт

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO en la U.R.S.S.

VISA DIPLOMATICA No. 216

VALIDA por

Deberá utilizarse antes

del día :

Moscú,

EMBAJADA DE MEXICO MOSCU U.R.S.S.

1601

VISA

12.07.1965

23 VIII 1965

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-285412
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. John P. Colson

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION SR-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, WH/C-8

AN ✓	FI	~~SR/CI/K~~
~~PS~~	~~DEO~~	~~SR/O/FA~~
ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

SECRET 070010Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4363

REDWOOD

7 AUG 65 IN 27561

1. LIFIRE REPORTS ARRIVAL 3 AUG VIA SABENA FLIGHT 555 OF VALENTIN LOGINOV, AGE 38 PPT D-010264, NEW THIRD SECRETARY SOVIET EMB MEXICO.

2. PRESUMABLY IDEN VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV 201-285412. REQUEST SUMMARY TRACES.

3. BELIEVED REPLACING NECHIPORENKO 201-305870.

SECRET

CFN 4363 3 AUG VIA SABENA 555 VALENTIN LOGINOV 38 PPT D010264 IMI D-010264 SOVIET EMB MEXICO IDEN VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV 201-285412 NECHIPORENKO 201-305870

BT

SECRET

201-285412

7 Aug 65

201-285412

SR/CI/K

MESSAGE FORM 4

ORIG. : ELISABETH GRISSO/pjk
UNIT : WH/C/FI/IO
EXT : 6172
DATE : 29 MARCH 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 28-6-33

SECRET

TO : RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR 71465

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: FI, RF, DDP, C/WH 3, SC 7, CI/OA, CI/PS, C/WC 2

TO RIOD INFO WAVE CITE DIR

95920

TYPIC VASLOUCH

REF ~~WAVE~~ RIOD 7701 (IN 30193)

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN A) IS VASLOUCH-3, DAUGHTER V-1 (IDEN B) AND V-2, (IDEN C). V-1 AND V-2 CURRENTLY RESIDE PBRUMEN AND HAVE BEEN HQS REPORTING ASSETS SINCE FEB 63.

2. V-2 WORKED APPROX 12 YEARS BRAZILIAN EMBASSY PBRUMEN. WAS QUITE CLOSE TO ALSUPER AND FAMILY WHEN HE HAD EMB THERE AND TOURED FJSTEAL WITH HIM FOR MONTH IN 63. V-3 CLOSE FRIEND ALSUPER DAUGHTER.

LOGINOV

3. EARLY 63 LOCAL SOV KGB TYPE WHO HAD PREVIOUS BUSINESS CONTACTS WITH V-2 MADE SOCIAL CONTACT WITH V-1 AND V-2 IN RELATIVELY CLUMSY EFFORT DEVELOP THEM. V-1 AND V-2 WERE INSTRUCTED BY HQS TO AVOID FURTHER CONTACT. KGB OFFICER RETURNED PCS MOSCOW LATE AUG 63. BETWEEN DEC 63 AND FEB 64 HE MADE THREE MILD ATTEMPTS CONTACT V-3 IN MOSCOW. EFFORT CONTACT VASLOUCHES APPARENTLY DROPPED WITH NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. HQS HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFO TO CONFIRM OR DISPELL ALSURAHS SUSPICIONS V-3 SOVIET PENETRATION.

4. V-3 HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT WORRY TO PARENTS AND HQS THROUGHOUT OUR ASSOCIATION. PARENTS DESIRE SEE V-3 LOCATED SAFELY SOME WESTERN CITY WITH GOOD JOB AND SECURE INCOME MATCHES HQS WISH ELIMINATE HER

RELEASING OFFICER 27-30 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF:

INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR 96720

AS SOURCE CONCERN HER PARENTS.

5. REQUEST STA TAKE NO ACTION THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME. HQS CONCERN PRIMARILY THAT WORRY ABOUT V-3 NOT BE ALLOWED JEOPARDIZE FUNCTIONING V-1 AND V-2. V-3 MAY EVEN AGREE SOME FUTURE DATE ACT AS SW LINK BETWEEN V-1 AND HQS IF SUCH CHANNEL EVER NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/MO Walter Cini (in draft)

WH/5 Larry Sulk (by phone)

SR/CI/KGB Tom Ryan (by phone)

for

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

for

JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG. : ELISABETH GRISSO/pfg
UNIT : WH/C/FI/IO
EXT : 6172
DATE : 29 MARCH 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 28-6-33

MESSAGE FORM 19

SECRET

ROUTING

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TO : RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

29 MAR 65
2241Z

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, WH 7, SR 7, C/OA, C/OPS, CI/IC 2

TO : RIOD INFO: WAVE CITE DIR 96921

TYPIC VASLOUCH

REF DIR 96920

IDEN A: ANNELI MATIKAINEN
FORMER SECRETARY IN BRAZILIAN EMBS
HAVA AND MOSCOW. (IN MOSCOW SEPT 62 - SEPT 64)

IDEN B: LAURI MATIKAINEN
FINNISH BUSINESSMAN
HON. FINNISH CONSUL
IN HAVANA

IDEN C. ESTRELLA TOINI MATIKAINEN
FORMER SECRETARY IN
BRAZILIAN EMB HAVA

END OF MESSAGE

for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/MO Walter Cini (in draft)
WH/5 Larry Sulk (by phone)
SR/CI/KGB Tom Ryan (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for
JOHN L. HART
DCWHD/C

RELEASING OFFICER

29-39

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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UNIT

TIME

BY

1 S 5 B
7 WE/PC

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR-7

S E C R E T 241902Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE RIOD 7701

24 Mar 65 30193

REF HBRA 11170 25 JUNE 1963 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. ON 23 MARCH MERCEDES MAGALHAES LIRIO, PERSONAL SECRETARY ALSUPER-2, INTRODUCED MYLKES TO ANNELI MATIKAINEN, WHO VISITING RIO FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH. MATIKAINEN SAID ALTHOUGH HER FUTURE PLANS INDEFINITE, SHE HAD NO INTENTION RETURNING PBRUMEN, WHERE HER PARENTS ASSIGNED. SAID SHE MIGHT ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT IN NEW YORK CITY OR WOULD RETURN TO EUROPE. HOWEVER, LIRIO IS ATTEMPTING TO INTEREST MATIKAINEN IN REMAINING RIO AND ASKED MYLKES IF MATIKAINEN DID STAY, COULD HE DIRECT HER TO SOME AMERICAN COMPANY OR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR EMPLOYMENT. MYLKES LEFT MATTER OPEN SAYING HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE MORE INFO ON MATIKAINEN'S QUALIFICATIONS.

2. ONLY INFO RIO STA RE MATIKAINEN CONTAINED IN REF SUPPLIED BY ALSURAH, WHO NOW ON TWO YEAR LEAVE FROM HIS SERVICE AND ONLY IN RIO ON INFREQUENT VISITS. WILL ATTEMPT TO ELICIT MORE DETAILS FROM ALSURAH AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

3. APPRECIATE HQS FORWARDING ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON MATIKAINEN WHICH WOULD TEND TO CONFIRM ALSURAHS DOUBTS ABOUT

SECRET

E
FS
LL
KA
LS

201-350670

Action

John Sears [illegible] with Matikainen.

RID [illegible] initiated 25 MAR 1965

201 available.
1 copy filed ALSURAH 201.

201-285412

SECRET

IN 30193 Pg 2

HER AS NOTED REF.

4. INFO WAVE: ALSURAH REPORTED IN REF HE SUSPECTED MATIKAINEN AS BEING SOVIET PENETRATION HIS EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. SHE ~~WAS~~ CURIOUS BEYOND NORMAL BOUNDS AND WANTED TO SEE EVERYTHING. SHE WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING AN AFFAIR WITH ONE OF THE BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW WHO HAD RAISED HER EMBASSY PAY TO $300 DOLLARS A MONTH. SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED WITH ALSUPER-1 IN PBRUMEN

SECRET

CFN.

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO: DIRECTOR

20 JAN 1964

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, CSR 3, CE/H, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

CL — (HOLD for Finney)

TDCS

SECRET 172002Z

IN 08922

[illegible] CITE WAVE 0731

INTEL

TYPIC

SUPDATA: PARA. 1: AMTAUP-5 FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT.

PARA. 2: AMTAUP-5. RID: NO INDEX. FILED 172002Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: CUBA/USSR

SUBJ: 1. PASSPORT ACTIVITY AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN HABANA

2. CONTINUED ABSENCE FROM CUBA OF SOVIET VICE CONSUL LOGUINOV

DOI: 20 DECEMBER 1963

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (14 JANUARY 1964)

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON: 501-385412

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1		4	
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TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

IN 00925

TDCS

UFG-4450

SOURCE: A CUBAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATE AND PART OWNER OF A FARM IN CAMAGUEY. SOURCE TRAVELS OCCASIONALLY BETWEEN CAMAGUEY AND HABANA, AND HAS REPORTED MILITARY INFORMATION WHICH, FOR THE MOST PART, HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY PERSONAL OBSERVATION. THE INFORMATION IN PARA. 1 WAS OBTAINED FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED INFORMANT AND THAT IN PARA. 2 FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATIION.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 00925

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

[illegible] ON 20 DECEMBER 1963, THERE WAS A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE AT THE SOVIET CONSULATE AND EMBASSY IN THE VEDADO SECTION OF THE CITY OF HABANA WHO WERE APPARENTLY MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTING FROM CUBA. SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS PRESENTED A BOOK WITH A RED COVER BEARING THE CYRILLIC LETTERS "CCCP RPT CCCP" IN GOLD AND RECEIVED A FORM TO FILL OUT AND RETURN. OTHERS RECEIVED A WHITE CARD WITH A PHOTOGRAPH. ONE SOVIET ASKED FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF HIS TRIP, SAYING THAT HE WAS MARRIED TO A CUBAN GIRL WHO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAND THE COLD. A HIGH DIPLOMAT, WHO WORE GLASSES AND WHO WAS ABOUT 60 YEARS OLD, ANGRILY EXPRESSED HIMSELF TO THE CUBANS IN

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 00925

PAGE 2

SPANISH. (FIELD COMMET: NEITHER LOCATION NOR CIRCUMSTANCES RELATIVE TO THIS EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE HIGH DIPLOMAT AND THE CUBANS WERE REPORTED.)

2. AS OF 20 DECEMBER, SOVIET VICE CONSUL VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV HAD NOT RETURNED TO CUBA FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (MIAMI).

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

Embassy offices. LICALLA thinks that Subject left the Embassy at 1115, having put his luggage in the car with license plates 19-DA. (This is the car regularly driven by LOGINOV.) A LICALLA photograph of Subject is forwarded as Attachment B (Headquarters only).

4. From LIENVOY it appears that LOGINOV was principally responsible for Subject's travel arrangements. LOGINOV probably met Subject at the airport, since LIMITED reported that LOGINOV left the Soviet Embassy in 19-DA at 0535 and returned at 0658 on 20 March 1966, apparently having dropped Subject off at the Hotel Agnes. Subject's wife was not reported to have visited the Embassy.

5. The Station had not believed that Subject would be able to take the 21 March flight to Havana, since there had been no record of his having requested a Cuban visa; however, a LIONION photograph subsequently received showed that Soviet Vice Consul Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) had visited the Cuban Embassy in person on 16 March 1966, at which time he probably arranged for Subject's visa.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE - Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1P

1. Subject has been identified as a KGB officer based on the following incidents :

2. On 12 February 1966 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379), KGB case officer, during a meeting with LICOZY-5, told LICOZY-5 that he would bring Subject to their next meeting and that Subject would be LICOZY-5's new case officer.

3. During January 1966 Cristobal TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the American Embassy in Mexico City, made several trips to the Soviet Embassy in regard to a Soviet visa for one of the American Embassy officials. TORRES spoke with Subject, who, after asking whether it would get TORRES in trouble if he went to dinner with Subject, ended up by inviting TORRES to dinner on 24 January 1966. TORRES did not meet Subject that date, and on 8 February 1966 Subject called TORRES at the American Embassy to ask why he had not shown up. TORRES replied that he had had to work. Subject asked whether TORRES had located a person who could teach him English. TORRES replied that one person whom he had asked had not been interested, and Subject asked him to keep looking for someone. Subject again called TORRES on 9 February 1966, but TORRES was out. (It is noted that Subject's calls to TORRES have not appeared on LIENVOY and were therefore presumably made from a pay station.)

ATP

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution: [illegible] with Valentin S [illegible] 201-285412
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

MICROFILMED
MAR 1 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 28390	3 MARCH 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

SECRET

☐ RID COPY

☐ ☐ ☐

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T [illegible]Z CITE MEXICO CITY [illegible] 30[illegible] 7532

DIRECTOR

REDBLOCK LCIMPROVE

1. PER LIENVOY 25 JUNE SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE AND KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV 201-[illegible] HAS TO BE IN MOSCOW BY 4 JULY FOR A CONFERENCE. VICE CONSUL VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV ALSO TOLD LICOOKY-5 ON 24 JUNE THAT LEONOV HAD TO BE IN MOSCOW ON 4 JULY. SOVIETS TRIED SEVERAL AIRLINES TO GET RESERVATION FOR LEONOV, WHO NOW BELIEVED LEAVING VIA SABENA ON 29 JUNE.

2. FROM LIFEAT AND LIENVOY IT APPEARS THAT LEONOV WAS PREPARING TO LEAVE SOON PCS. HE NOW LEAVING WITHOUT FAMILY APPARENTLY ON SHORT NOTICE.

3. DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INDICATIONS OF WHAT CONFERENCE LEONOV MAY BE ATTENDING?

4. HOWEVER LIREALM-1 REPORTED 25 JUNE THAT LEONOV HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE LEAVING 2 JULY AND WOULD ONLY STAY 2[illegible] DAYS. ALSO SAID HIS WIFE SO SICK THAT SHE COULD NOT ACCOMPANY HIM. REPORTING LIREALM-1/LEONOV RELATIONSHIP BY POUCH.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 291945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8081

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

29 Jun 66 IN 66625

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF DIRECTOR 23746*

PLS INCLUDE LIAISON TRACES.

SECRET

* REQUESTED TRACES ON NICOLAS JOHN BOSTROEN.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Loginov

201-285412

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

[redacted]

ORIG: Bill Frederick/nd ☐ FILE RID
UNIT: WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT: 3654 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 28 JULY 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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1	CI	5	SI
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[redacted]

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[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) SECRET [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

28 20 51Z CITE DIRECTOR

23746

TO CARACAS INFO MEXICO CITY

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

MEXICO CITY 8020 (IN 62261)* NOT SENT CARACAS

1. REQUEST STATION TRACES FOR MEXICO CITY ON:

A. NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN, BORN 1915 IN ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. EMPLOYED AS "DIRECTOR OF PROJECT" BY STEPHENS-ADAMSON DE MEXICO. FORMERLY SERVED IN U. S. NAVY.

B. VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BORN BRESLAU, GERMANY, 41 YEARS OLD, WENT TO USSR WHEN SMALL CHILD, WAS IN STALINGRAD IN 1942, WENT TO VENEZUELA POST WWII, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. BOTH BOSTROEN'S NOW LIVE CALLE CHRISTIAN ANDERSON 419, MEXICO CITY.

2. FYI CARACAS: MEXICAN OFFICIAL ADVISED STATION THAT VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, KNOWN KGB STAFF OFFICER MEXICO CITY, APPARENTLY DEVELOPING POLICEMAN WHOM HE ASKED TO PROVIDE BOSTROEN HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELEPHONE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT.

CONTINUED.../

201-285412

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Loginov

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[redacted]

ORIG: W. F. Frederick
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

PAGE 2

ROUTING			
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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 23746

TO

3. ~~FBI~~ MEXICO CITY: NO TRACES HQS. NOTIFY CARACAS IF LIAISON TRACES DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reported LOGINOV recruitment pitch to unnamed LITEMPO-8 policeman to report on Nicolas Juan and Valentina Grusdow de Bostroen. Requested additional data these individuals to assist in providing LIRAMA info for PNG of LOGINOV.

WH/3/V/D. Venute (in draft)
SB/O/WH/T. Cormier (in draft)
SB/CI/K/T. Ryan (in draft)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Information on Local Soviets passed to LIRAMA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY - 8020

1. Transmitted herewith are a list of Soviet intelligence personnel assigned to Mexico and a note on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) which were given by Chief of Station on 22 July to LIENVOY-2 for passage to LITEMPO-8 and LIRAMA. The circumstances were explained in Reference.

2. Please note that the following items in the LOGINOV note are fictions of the Station:

a. that LOGINOV joined the KGB in 1955.
b. that he attended the KGB school from 1955 to 1957.
c. that he was an officer in KGB Headquarters from 1957 to August 1960
d. that the money found in his suitcase in Panama in December 1961 was for Latin American Communist Parties (it probably was).
e. that we have known LOGINOV as a KGB officer since 1958

Francis J. Cogne
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
List of Soviet intelligence personnel
and note on LOGINOV

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2 - CWH, w/att (1 copy), H/W
1 - CSB, w/att (1 copy), H/W

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201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 29626	27 JULY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

SECRET

Att. 1 - HMMA-29626
31 July 66

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DOB: 23 December 1927
Position: Third Secretary in the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico D. F.

Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1, Colonia Tacubaya

Automobile: 1965 Chevrolet Impala, license 19 DA.

Languages: Fluent Spanish, fair English

Career:

1955: Joined the KGB
1955-57 Attended the KGB training school

1957 - August 1960: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow

Sept 1960-Sept 1963: Attache in Havana, Cuba

December 1961: Travelled to Panama and Equador with a Soviet soccer team. On this trip he carried a large sum of money for the Communist Parties of Panama and Equador.

17 May 1962: Transited Mexico en route to the USSR for leave.

9 September 1963: Left Cuba to return to the USSR

September 1963 - July 1965: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow.

3 August 1965: Arrived Mexico

In Mexico LOGINOV replaced Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO, another KGB officer and took over all of NECHIPORENKO's intelligence agents and duties. In January 1966 he attempted to cultivate and recruit a chauffeur at the American Embassy in Mexico. LOGINOV is an unusually active and capable intelligence officer. Since he has almost no overt duties he is able to spend about 95% of his time on intelligence activity. We have known that he is a KGB officer since 1958. His immediate KGB chief in Mexico is Pavel A. YATSKOV.

SECRET

ATT. 1

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HMMA 29626

201-285412

SECRET

Soviet Intelligence Officers Stationed in Mexico

1. KGB (Committee for State Security)

Chief: Sergey S. KONSTANTINOV
Deputy Chief: Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO

OFFICERS:

Yevgeniy I. BEDRIN
Ivan A. BEKETOV
Aleksandr M. BROVKIN
Vladimir A. DOLGOV
Yevgeniy N. GORLITSYN
Boris A. KAZANTSEV
Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN
Valentin I. KUCHEROV
Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
Nikolay S. LEONOV
Valentin S. LOGINOV
Vasiliy S. MIROSHNIKOV
Leonid V. NIKIFOROV
Aleksandr A. NIKITIN
Vladimir N. RADVANSKIY
Vladimir I. SHPAKEVICH
Georgiy S. VISKO
Pavel A. YATSKOV
Yuriy ZHURIN
Boris S. ZOBNIN

2. GRU (Military Intelligence)

Chief: Vladimir N. SOKOLOV
Deputy Chief: Georgiy A. SHCHUCHKIN

OFFICERS:

Aleksandr M. DENISOV
Petr F. GORELOV
Vladimir P. GORODETS
Yuriy N. ISAYEV
Anatoliy V. KARABACH
Viktor L. KHUKHOREV
Yuriy A. MITROPOLSKIY
Valeriy V. SOKOLIN
Ruslan A. TUCHNIN
Konstantin F. VORONKOV

Ivan V. YELFIMOV

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10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-008-010
HMMA-29544
20 JUL 66
P1

R 6607281146

FILE IN 201-285412

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MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Edward WEBELMAN Preminger

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LICOZY-5 reported that on 24 June 1966 his KGB case officer, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), stopped by his office on legitimate business, then said he had some (operational) business for him. LICOZY-5 demurred, but LOGINOV went ahead, took a piece of paper out and began reading from it, asking LICOZY-5 if he knew "Eduardo WEBELMAN." LICOZY-5 interrupted, saying he did not know the man and did not want to do anything about him. LOGINOV said he did not want LICOZY-5 to do anything, it was just that he did not know who he was. LICOZY-5 refused to discuss it further. When LOGINOV left LICOZY-5's office he left behind a piece of paper with the following written on it in Russian:

> Eduardo Vebelman, about 55 years old, Mexican of Jewish extraction, owner of a steel plant and a firm which sells photographic equipment. Came to Mexico during World War II. Lives in the Pedregal at Teololco 320. His son is Mauricio Vebelman.

2. Station files had no traces on anyone named WEBELMAN. The 1965 Mexico City Telephone Directory lists the following:

Arno WEBELMAN, Arts Fotograficos, Uruapan 7, tel. 11-44-77
Eduardo WEBELMAN, Teololco 320, tel. 48-57-17
WEBELMAN Hermanos, S. A., Paseo de la Reforma 308, 1st floor, tel. 11-41-90 and 11-43-79.

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
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1 - CSB

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 29477

DATE 201-285412 14 JULY 1966

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

3. The Mexican Gobernacion file on Subject (apparently identical with LOGINOV's "Vebelman") was reviewed on 11 July 1966. It shows that Subject was born on 7 October 1917 in Warsaw, Poland, is Jewish, and came to Mexico on 8 December 1939 as a student. In 1942 he had received "Immigrante" status and was working for Adolfo *WEBELMAN Coskpe (?), manager of WEBELMAN y Cia., a firm then located at Aluminio 192 in Mexico, D. F. (Comment: Adolfo WEBELMAN is presumably a relative of Subject's but not his father, who is given as Szymon WEBELMAN.) The last entry in the file is dated 1944.

4. Headquarters traces on Subject are requested.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division
INFO: Chief, WH Division
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE - Vitaliy *BOYAROV
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

D
CIT
OCC
Δ

REFERENCE: HMMA-29198, 16 June 1966

1. Reference reported on the visit of Subject (probably identical with Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV, 201-355606) to Mexico from 27 May to 9 June 1966.

2. In regard to Para. 3 of Reference, [illegible], Jr. has now positively identified Subject's passport photograph as the "Viktor" [illegible] fishing on 3-5 June 1966.

3. The following LILYRIC surveillance reports on Subject have subsequently been received:

31 May 0931 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy alone.
1023 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1411 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy together with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123) and Lyudmila Vasilyevna [illegible] (201-790795) in YATSKOV's car.

1 June 1037 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1145 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) in YATSKOV's car.
1606 hrs: Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV and LOGINOV.

2 June 1056 hrs: Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
1437 hrs: Subject left the Soviet Embassy with Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794) in the latter's car.

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
2 - C/SR
1 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO:
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 29323
DATE: 30 June 1966
CLASSIFICATION
HQS FILE NUMBER

201-285412

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible] - 20528

3 June	1021 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car.
6 June	1040 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet Embassy alone.
	1415 hrs:	Subject left the Soviet Embassy with Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) in the latter's car.
	1551 hrs:	Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with PRIKHODKO.
	1658 hrs:	Subject left the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car. [illegible]
7 June	0932 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car. (Was not seen leaving.)
	1033 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet ~~Embassy with~~ with Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046) in the latter's car. [illegible]
8 June	0945 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with YATSKOV in the latter's car.
9 June	1130 hrs:	Subject entered the Soviet Embassy with KONSTANTINOV and Semen Tarasevich BAZAROV (201-049257) in KONSTANTINOV's car.
	1200 hrs:	Subject left the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV in the latter's car.
	1356 hrs:	Subject returned to the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV.
	1408 hrs:	Subject again left the Soviet Embassy with MIROSHNIKOV and KONSTANTINOV.

4. The following information is available on the persons mentioned above as being with Subject :

a. KONSTANTINOV is known to be the KGB resident.

b. YATSKOV is a known KGB officer, probably in CI.

c. LOGINOV is a known KGB officer who works for YATSKOV.

d. PRIKHODKO is a known KGB officer and probably the deputy resident.

e. MIROSHNIKOV is probably the KGB chauffeur.

f. BAZAROV is the ambassador, no known intelligence affiliation.

g. SOKOLINA is the wife of an Assistant Military Attache.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

CSB

DISPATCH | SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

file
Loginov

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7688

1. Transmitted herewith is the local ODENVY report on Subject which was promised.

2. ODENVY still has not been able to contact Subject in order to put him in touch with the Station but hopes to do so during the week of 4 July.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
ODENVY Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/encl. (2 copies), H/W
1 - CSB, w/encl. (1 copy), H/W

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 29325

DATE
30 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
FFN: P-12818

FBI REPORT (ATTACHMENT TO HMMA 29325)

DATE: 27 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: ERNESTO CHAZARO PEREGRINO
134-815 (6-27-66)

FROM MEXICO CITY

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
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	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB, IN CONTACT WITH V. BOYAROV,
201-355606 ?, 1 JUN 66, MEXICO CITY,
MEXICO.

201-355606
HMMA-29198
16 JUN 66
P2

R 6606240887

FILE IN 201-[illegible]

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE - KGB and GRU Residencies in Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are analyses of the KGB and GRU residencies in Mexico City. Included are only those officers who are probably or known to be intelligence officers. Of the 52 Soviets currently assigned to Mexico City, 22 are identified intelligence officers and 13 probably intelligence officers, i.e. roughly 67% of the total Soviet colony.

2. The case officers have not been divided into separate target groups, with the exception of KGB S & T, since the Station's information is too fragmentary for a realistic breakdown. With the exception of S. S. KONSTANTINOV, who is known to be the KGB resident, the positions of resident and deputy resident are unconfirmed, but represent the Station's best guess.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

LOGINOV

Attachment:
KGB and GRU Residencies

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

28 April 1966

201-265412

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MAY 4 1966
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SECRET

2P

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA - 28808
DATED 28 APRIL 1966

KGB Residency in Mexico City   April 1966

Resident: S. S. KONSTANTINOV (known) [illegible] KGB

Deputy: A. V. PRIKHODKO (known) [illegible] KGB

CP Liaison: B. A. KAZANTSEV (known intelligence officer, possibly now responsible to CPSU rather than KGB). [illegible] Mexico

Case Officers: [illegible] KGB [illegible], Mexico

V. I. ANDREYEV (suspect) [illegible]
A. M. BROVKIN (suspect) [illegible]
V. A. DOLGOV (suspect) [illegible]
Y. N. GORLITSYN (suspect) [illegible]
V. S. KORMUSHKIN (suspect) [illegible]
V. I. KUCHEROV (suspect) [illegible]
S. F. KUZNETSOV (known) [illegible]
N. S. LEONOV (known) [illegible]
V. S. ~~LOGINOV~~ (known) [illegible]
L. V. NIKIFOROV (suspect) [illegible]
V. I. SHPAKEVICH (known) [illegible]
G. S. VISKO (known) [illegible]
P. A. YATSKOV (known) [illegible]

S & T Case Officers

A. A. NIKITIN (suspect)
B. A. ZOBNIN (known)

Referentura

V. P. GULIN (suspect)
V. N. RADVANSKIY (known)

Chauffeur

V. S. MIROSHNIKOV (suspect) [illegible]

Known KGB: . . . .
Suspect KGB . . . .

Diplomatic Cover:
Commercial Cover:
Press Cover:
Embassy Employee

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA - 28808

DATED 28 APRIL 1966

GRU Residency in Mexico City April 1966

Resident: V. N. SOKOLOV (known [illegible] = Resident GRU

Deputy: G. A. SHCHUCHKIN (known) 201 [illegible] - Deputy GRU Resident

Case Officers: GRU, USSR Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico >

I. A. SEKETOV (suspect) [illegible]
A. M. DENISOV (known) [illegible]
P. F. GORELOV (known) [illegible]
Y. A. TSAYEV (known) [illegible]
A. V. KARABACH (suspect) [illegible]
V. L. KHUKHOREV (known) [illegible]
Y. A. MITROPOLSKIY (known) [illegible]
V. V. SOKOLIN (known) [illegible]
R. A. TUCHNIN (suspect) [illegible]
K. F. VORONKOV (known) [illegible]

Code Clerk:

I. V. YELFIMOV (known) [illegible]

Chauffeur:

V. P. GOROBETS (known)

Known GRU: 11
Suspect GRU: . . . .

Military Cover: . . . .
Diplomatic Cover: . . . .
Commercial Cover : . . . .
Press Cover: . . . .

14-00000

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 192250Z

SJOS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7025

Loginov

20 APR 66 00064

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: DIR 95441

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 18 APR, IVAN A. BEKETOV CITED REF, CONTACTED COSTA RICAN EMBASSY MEXI AND INQUIRED RE STATUS HIS VISA. HE TOLD CHECK LATER SINCE COSTA RICAN EMB STILL HAD NO WORD.

2. A FEW MINUTES LATER VALENTIN S. LOGINOV (201-285412) ALSO CALLED COSTA RICAN EMB AND SAID HE WANTED VISA FOR HIMSELF. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD DIP OR OFFICIAL PASSPORT HE SAID HE HELD OFFICIAL PASSPORT. HE THEN TOLD TO BRING PASSPORT TO EMBASSY.

3. VISA PROBABLY FOR BEKETOV SINCE LOGINOV HOLDS DIP PASSPORT. LOGINOV VICE CONSUL AND SUSPECT KGB OFFICER.

S E C R E T

CFN 7025 95441 LIENVOY 18 APR IVAN A. BEKETOV REF COSTA RICAN E EMB NO WORD A VALENTIN S. LOGINOV (201-235412) EMZ DIP BEKETOV LOGINOV DIP KGB

BT

SECRET

201-285412

SECRET

Chief, SR Division

Chief, WH; COS, Montevideo

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDWOOD - Rustem O. * BAKHITOV (201-783564)

REFERENCES: A. MEXI-6621
B. BUEN-5339
C. CIR-90901

1. As reported in Reference A., Subject and his wife arrived in Mexico City at 0550 hours on 20 March 1966 via Canadian Pacific flight 421 from Buenos Aires. They departed Mexico City at 1300 hours on 21 March 1966 via Cubana flight 465 for Havana. Cf. also the mention of their departure from Mexico City in the newspaper clipping forwarded as Attachment A.

2. According to LIENVOY, on 19 March 1966 Soviet Vice Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412, known KGB) made reservations at the Hotel Agnes in Mexico City (frequently used by Soviets) for a couple with a child for the night of 20 March 1966. This reservation was undoubtedly for Subject; however, there has been no other mention of the child. At 0830 on 21 March 1966 [Subject] called the Soviet Embassy from the Hotel Agnes and said he would like to come over to pay [perhaps for the room and the Cubana tickets].

3. LICALLA reported seeing Subject at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at 1015 hours on 21 March 1966. Subject was seen talking principally with Embassy Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975), suspect CPSU representative), and also briefly with Second Secretary Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491) known GRU), Ambassador Semen Tarasovich BAZAROV (201-049257) and Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123, known KGB). At 1040 Subject was seen entering the Embassy building with KAZANTSEV through the entrance which leads to the Referentura but also connects with other

- continued -

Attachments:
A. Newsclip
B. LICALLA photos

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att., as stated, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o atts.
1 - COS/Montevideo, w/o att.

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file Loginov 201

X-ref sheets made for all Dons mentioned

HMMA - 28591

28 MARCH 1966

201-285412

SECRET

200-4-64

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-14816, 25 August 1966

The Station's final report on Subject was forwarded in HMMA-29714, 9 August 1966.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-800412

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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE - Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-29325, 30 June 1966

1. On 7 July 1966, Irving A. ORONSKY and a local representative of LNERGO interviewed Subject in Veracruz, Mexico. It became obvious at that time that Subject had fabricated most of his story as will be shown in the attached memorandum to local LNERGO.

2. The Station has no plans for using Subject in any capacity whatsoever.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Copy of Memo to LNERGO

Distribution:
2 - CWH, w/att (1 copy), H/W
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	HMMA - 29714	9 AUGUST 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-255412 FFN: P-12818

SECRET

21 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 June 1966 and to the interview with Subject conducted in Veracruz on 7 July 1966 by of your office and a representative of this office. We wish to make the following observations regarding Subject's statements in connection with his encounters with Soviet Embassy Third Secretary, Valentin S. LOGINOV.

2. Regarding Subject's claim to have visited Mexico City on or about 16 May 1966 and to have contacted the Soviet Embassy on or about 18 May 1966, this office has established the fact that a contact as described by Subject did not take place at any time during the period 10 through 30 May 1966.

3. Subject made statements to the effect that he had met LOGINOV and a second Soviet at an unknown restaurant at 1800 hours on or about 18 May. He claimed to have talked to these two Soviets for approximately one hour (i.e. until about 1900 hours) after which they left the restaurant, walked to and entered LOGINOV's car, drove to an unknown apartment near the Soviet Embassy, parked the car and entered the apartment and then phoned three call-girls who arrived within 20 minutes. Following the arrival of the girls Subject excused himself and left the apartment about 1900 or 1930 hours. To our knowledge there is no precedent for the KGB using call-girls for the purpose and in the manner described by Subject.

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downgrading and
declassification

HMMA - 29714
9 Aug 66

SECRET

4. Subject stated that he believed that the automobile driven by LOGINOV, an automobile that he had seen several times, bore the license number "67." Our records show that no Soviet Embassy official or employee drives an automobile with the number 67 or 76. LOGINOV drives an automobile with Mexico City diplomatic license 19 DA.

5. Subject's statements to the effect that LOGINOV deposited 50,000.00 Mexican pesos to Subject's account in the Banco de Londres in Veracruz as a "gift . . . for nothing" and then took the money back when Subject refused it, is not in keeping with our experience with regard to KGB modus operandi. Also, information available to this office indicates that according to established Mexican banking practices it is not possible to set up a checking account without the presence of the owner of the account who must sign signature cards for comparison with the signatures on checks.

6. Subject's general vagueness as to dates, times, addresses and locations in connection with his encounters with LOGINOV, in addition to those points cited above, leads us to the conclusion that Subject has fabricated a large portion of what he has stated. This office has little doubt that he did meet LOGINOV in Veracruz during early May 1966 in connection with the missing Soviet sailor, but we consider his account of contacts with LOGINOV subsequent to this occasion as fabrication.

7. In view of the above and in view of Subject's statements on 7 July to the effect that he had absolutely no desire to become involved with personnel of either the Soviet or American Embassies and wished to remain completely "neutral," this office is not considering using Subject as an informant of any kind.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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~~[illegible]~~ DSCE 111 BY 10/55

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, SB 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/OA, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 230020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8020

DIRECTOR

2 Aug
~~22 Jul 66~~ IN 62261

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

1. EARLY MORNING 22 JULY LITEMPO-8 CALLED COS AT HOME AND IN EXCITED MANNER SAID HAD URGENT REQUEST. HE SENT LIENVOY-2 TO SEE COS TO ASK FOR INFO ON VALENTINS. LOGINOV PROVING HE A "SOVIET SPY" AND FOR LIST OF " ALL SOVIET SPIES IN MEXICO." LITEMPO-8 VIA LIENVOY-2 SAID REQUEST COMES FROM LIRAMA WHO PERSONALLY INTERESTED AND INTIMATED "WE MAY HAVE SAME SITUATION AS 1959" (WHEN GOM EXPELLED TWO SOVIETS FOR CONTACTS WITH LEADERS OF RAILROAD STRIKE).

Логинов

Loginov

2. SAME MORNING COS PASSED A PAPER " PROVING" LOGINOV IS ACTIVE AND DANGEROUS KGB OFFICER AND A LIST OF 35 SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN MEXI TO LIENVOY-2 FOR PASSAGE TO LITEMPO-8/LIRAMA. SEE HMMA 28390 OF 5 MARCH FOR REFERENCE TO LOGINOV APPROACH TO CHAUFFEUR.

SECRET

3. LATTER SAME DAY COS RECEIVED PERSONAL

201-285412 8

LETTER FROM LITEMPO-8 VIA LITEMPO-4 STATING LOGINOV HAD BEEN COMPLAINING FOR SOME TIME ON LACK OF POLICE ACTION ON RADIO ALLEGEDLY STOLEN FROM HIS (COMMENT: NO CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION/SOURCES). FINALLY CHIEF OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICT POLICE, GEN. LUIS CUETO RAMIREZ SENT OUT AN UNNAMED POLICEMAN TO INVESTIGATE. ON 19 JULY POLICEMAN CONTACTED LOGINOV WHO ENDED DISCUSSION BY OFFERING THE POLICEMAN 5,000 PESOS PER MONTH " TO WORK FOR HIM ON CERTAIN MATTERS." POLICEMAN TEMPORIZED AND ASKED HIS SUPERIORS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. MATTER CALLED TO LITEMPO-8 ATTENTION BY GEN. CUETO. LITEMPO-8 INSTRUCTED THE POLICEMAN TO GO AHEAD. ON 21 JULY POLICEMAN RECONTACTED LOGINOV AND RECEIVED FIRST "ASSIGNMENT:" TO DETERMINE HOME ADDRESS, HOME TELPHONE AND PLACE OF EMPLOYEMENT OF NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN AND WIFE VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BOTH VENEZUELAN CITIZENS.

4. LITEMPO-4 OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION

SECRET

2861

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 8022 S E C R E T

ON BOSTROENS FROM GOBERNACION FILES:

A. NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN, 1915 IN ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA, VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. EMPLOYED AS " DIRECTOR OF PROJECTS" BY STEPHENS-ADAMSON DE MEXICO. FORMERLY SERVED IN US NAVY.

B. VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, BORN BRESLAU, GERMANY, FORMERLY WAS TRANSLATOR OR TEACHER OF RUSSIAN AT UN, NOW TEACHER OF RUSSIAN AT IBERO-AERICANO UNIVERSITY, MEXI, VENEZUELAN CITIZEN.

5. STATION TRACES:

ON 18 FEB 1965 DR. RICHARD L. POTTS, AMERICAN GENERAL PRACTICIONER MEXI AND STATION CONTACT WHO RECENTLY RETURNED US REPORTED FOLLOWING ON MRS. BOSTROEN WHO HIS PATIENT: MRS. VALENTINA BOESTROEM, 41 YEARS OLD, RESIDES CALLE CHRISTIAN ANDERSON 419, MEXI. WAS BORN VENEZUELA, WENT USSR WHEN SMALL CHILD, WAS IN STALINGRAD IN 1942. RETURNED VENEZUELA AFTER WW II, NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, HAS RESIDED MEXI SEVERAL YEARS WITH

SECRET

HUSBAND NU WHO FORMER SOV CITIZEN NOW VENEZUELAN CITIZEN. COUPLE HAS TWO TEENAGE DAUGHTERS. HUSBAND WORKS FOR AMERICAN COMPANY MEXI. NEITHER HAS CONTACT WITH LOCAL RUSSIAN COLONY (SIC) SINCE DONT WANT JEOPARDIZE HUSBAND'S JOB. BOTH SPEAK SEVERAL LANGUAGES. WIFE APPEARS NEITHER PRO OR ANTI SOVIET. POTTS REPORTED ABOVE INFO BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT STRANGE DUE AGE DIFFERENCE AND NO OBVIOUS CONNECTION THAT MRS. BOESTROEM RECOMMENDED AS PATIENT BERTHA DAVILA MOLINA DE OSEGUEDA, AGE 64, WIFE OF DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA PELALA (201-88003).

6. REQUEST HQS TRACES ON BOSTROEN/BOESTROEM COUPLE, ESPECIALLY ANYTHING WHICH COS COULD USE TO ENCOURAGE LIRAMA TO EXPELL LOGINOV WHICH IMMEDIATE STATION OBJECTIVE.

SECRET

BT

①

SECRET

~~Files 24~~

Date: November 24, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Henry C. Johnson
Legal Attache

Subject: Travel of Soviet to Mazatlan
Your file #9808

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 2, 1965.

A reliable source at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, has informed that the Soviet scientific ship LIRA, of 2,435 tons and carrying a crew of 76, was at Mazatlan from October 23-28, 1965.

Another reliable source advised that a person believed to be from the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, D.F., visited this ship while it was in port; however, he was not identified.

cy to LOGINOV
P-11712

SECRET

Files

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200-1-79

P-11712

①

~~1. White~~
~~2. Dillon~~ (assistance [illegible]?)
~~3. Joan~~
~~4. Scott~~
5. File

Reply?

(P-11712

005

25 October 1965

Valentin S. LOGINOV

In their reply to a request we sent them for traces of subject, our headquarters have replied as follows:-

"Valentin S. LOGINOV was Assistant Naval Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in BUENOS AIRES in 1960, and was listed as Attaché in HAVANA in 1961-63, where his exact duties were not known. If he now assumes NECHIPORENKO's post of Vice-Consul, his career appears to be an unusual one, and he must be presumed to be an intelligence officer".

2. Does this check with your own information?

Answered 2 Nov

Rec'd from Smith 27 Oct. 65
(Reply on sterile bond
w/ copy to 50-2-6.)

Copy to 50-2-6

P-11712

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5 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry C. Johnson,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets to Mazatlan

1. This office has received a report that two members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN, planned to travel by air to Mazatlan on 2 November 1965. The length of their stay and the purpose of their travel was not reported, but it may well be connected with the docking of a Soviet ship.

2. This office would appreciate receiving any information available to you on the trip of these Soviets.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

9833

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1 - P-11163
1 - Ruth Leach

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

3 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

4

FROM: ORONSKY

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

Cys. 6

P-8451
P-8588
P-11767
P-11712

Below is a summary of the noteworthy items from Subject during meetings with him in September and October.

1. During September the meeting site was changed to the streets between Merida and Morel on Puebla street in Colonia Roma. Subject walks along Puebla street and I pick him up in the car and drive elsewhere for the meeting. I attempted to change the time of the meeting as well but Subject does not close his store until just before 2100 hours each day and feels that it would appear odd if he were to close the store at various times of the evening on different days of the week. His wife is not always in the store and he would have to close the store in order to meet me. He closes at 1400 hours on Sundays. I also instructed him to change the speed of the recorder from 1 7/8ths to 3 3/4ths. We have no recorders in the Station that will take a large reel at 1 7/8ths and this extremely slow speed is not necessary.

2. During early September Subject commented that there is a new apartment building being constructed on the corner of Gelati and General de los Santos, across the street from the Soviet Embassy. (This is our new basehouse). I took considerable notes on this as though I had never heard of the

P-8764

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COPIES MADE

P-11712

place before and asked several questions about it. He said that the owner of the building is Sr. VILLAGRAN and that VILLAGRAN has the reputation of being an anti-Communist and a loyal Mexican citizen. He said that the building would probably be completed by March 1966 and that it will have about six floors. Several Soviets have mentioned to Subject that they would like to rent apartments in the building since it is so close to the Embassy.

3. Subject said that ISAYEV had been in his store about the last week in September. (As far as I can tell this is ISAYEV's first visit to Subject's store.) ISAYEV made a great many anti-U.S. remarks during his visit to the store and blamed the U.S. for most of the world's troubles. At one point he said that the Soviets made much better cars than the U.S. and that Soviet cars were built like "tanks". Subject laughed at this remark because the thought crossed his mind that only a soldier would like to drive a "tank" and from where Subject was standing at the time he could see the Soviet's new fleet of American Fords and Chevys.

4. I again asked Subject why the Soviets had not been visiting his store in the evenings as they had in the past and he insisted that it was because most of his "friends" at the Embassy had returned to the Soviet Union beginning in July and their replacements had not warmed up to him yet.

I asked him if a small fiesta might not help this situation and he said that he thought that it might help. I told him to make plans for a fiesta in honor of Mexican Independence Day and to invite as many of the new Soviets as possible. He said that he would probably give the party on Friday, 17 September. I suggested that he invite Yuriy ANDRIANOV (the GRU chauffeur) first and tell ANDRIANOV to invite several of his friends. At the next meeting with Subject he reported that NIKIFOROV, LOGINOV and KORMUSHKIN were the only Soviets who came to the fiesta on the 17th. They arrived, had a few drinks, danced to some Russian records which they had brought with them and then left. (All are KGB types). They told Subject that the other Soviets could not attend because they had to attend a Czech Embassy reception that same evening. /I can find no record of such a reception either at the Czech or Polish Embassies and there is no indication on the Soviet lines that they had anything planned for that evening. A Soviet from Cuba arrived on the 17th but we have no idea how many Soviets were at the airport to greet him./ I questioned Subject about the Soviets who had appeared at the fiesta and he gave me a little information about them. They visited his store several times in the next few weeks and I showed him photographs of the men and he expanded on his previous information. He had the following to say about them (he has previously reported on NIKIFOROV).

LOGINOV: Subject said that he believes LOGINOV replaced

NECHIPORENKO (correct). Subject calls him "the Bull" and described him as being vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short tempered and a tyrant. He is a person who thinks that he is some sort of a "big shot" and when he sits down he spreads his legs and arms and takes up a space big enough for two men. His Spanish is very bad and he smokes "Fiesta" cigarettes. At the fiesta LOGINOV told him that he was from the northern part of the Soviet Union, is married and has children. He claimed to have served in the Red Army.

KORMUSHKIN: Subject likes KORMUSHKIN who is friendly, well mannered and outgoing. He speaks good Spanish and told Subject that his wife likes Mexico. Although KORMUSHKIN was wearing glasses in the photo shown to Subject, he commented that he often sees KORMUSHKIN without his glasses. He smokes "Record" cigarettes and Subject calls him "El Jovencito".

5. Subject said that ISAYEV had dropped by his store during the week of 18 October and spent some time making fun of the King and Queen who were visiting Mexico at the time. ISAYEV felt that the very existance of a King and Queen in 1965 was silly. He also claimed that the Soviets had discovered the Comet that was then in the sky. (The Comet had actually been discovered by two Japanese and bears their names.) He bragged about the great advances in the Soviet Union in all fields and told Subject with great pride that the ruble was worth more than the dollar. He commented

that the U.S. was a waring nation while the Soviet Union sought only peace and that the United States would change to something similar to the Soviet system in the near future.

6. The rest of the meeting and the next two, were spent discussing Stanislav SILNIKOV and his request that Subject act as "fiador" on an apartment for him as well as supply him with a prostitute. (see HMMA-27568 of 4 Nov.)

7. In addition, Subject said that ANDRIANOV had asked him to get Viktor KALININ some aphrodisiac pills. ANDRIANOV said that they were "for Viktor KALININ in Moscow" but Subject thinks they are "for Yuriy ANDRIANOV in Mexico". Subject said he hasn't the slightest idea where to buy such a thing.

8. I told Subject to test the recorder by speaking into the microphones both in the upstairs room as well as in the main part of the store and then to play back the tape. Although RESCIGNO has explained the workings of the recorder to Subject several times, he claimed that he did not know how to do this. I then instructed him to disconnect the recorder and to deliver it to me at 2100 hours on Friday, 5 November. I said that I would test the recorder myself. He asked why RESCIGNO could not come to the store and test it and I told him that RESCIBNO was away. He then asked if RESCIGNO was a Mexican or an American. He said that RESCIGNO speaks Spanish like a Mexican and looks like a Mexican but that he (Subject) is sure that he ~~was~~ is an American. I told him

that I really didn't know since I had never asked him. I changed the topic of conversation by saying that if he reported that SILNIKOV wanted a girl for this Sunday, I would return the machine to him on Saturday, 6 November. If not, he would get it back at the next regular meeting which I would set on Friday when I meet him.

SECRET

2 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Henry C. Johnson,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviet to Mazatlan

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice-Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV planned to travel to Mazatlan from 26 to 28 October 1965 by plane. The purpose of the trip was to take mail to a Soviet ship which was in port in Mazatlan. The name of the ship is believed to be "Lira."

2. This office would appreciate any information available to you concerning LOGINOV's trip.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - Ruth Leach

9808

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

16 August 1965

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ [illegible]
15 August, [illegible] Restaurant

1. The C.O. resumed acquaintanceship with Subject, and in the immediate and sizable vacuum left by Gerald F. Costetner's departure, tried to establish a friendly rapport with Subject. For this reason the C.O. gave Subject a more "friendly" name to know him by, Mel Berger- it being explained to Subject that Mel was the C.O.'s true first name. Subject thought the choice of Berger was good, because he knows several people of that name, and it would occasion no surprise at his office. Subject will continue to use his normal manner of telephoning in, and asking for Monroy.

P-11712

2. Subject reported that he had come back to Mexico from a trip on 10 August. Nechiporenko was at the airport to greet him. Nechiporenko had visited his office previously, and brought along his replacement "Valentin", and at that time had found out when Subject was expected back. Nechiporenko was invited by Subject to visit him at his home for breakfast on 11 August. He showed up alone. The only business discussed was that Nechiporenko said that Subject would be contacted by "Sasha" (Alexander Prikhodko). Subject was not to contact the Soviet Embassy, or in any other way try to reach Sasha. Subject had a souvenir pistol which he had obtained from some Gauleiter (presumably during WWII), and Nechiporenko asked if he might have it. Subject gave it to him. Nechiporenko evidently asked Subject to arrange for a one day trip to Paris for him while he was en route to the Soviet Union from his stopover, Brussels. (Subject complied, and notified his agent abroad. Subject received a wire a few days ago that Nechiporenko was "no show" in Paris). Nechiporenko was not interested in Subject's observations of U.S. attitudes toward the Viet Nam and Dominican situations, although Subject had been asked to note such attitudes while he was on his trip. Nechiporenko mentioned, without Subject knowing why, that Catalina Torres, who had worked previously in Subject's office, who had attended the Mexican Soviet Cultural Institute, who had as boy friend the American who was giving English lessons to Nechiporenko (Gary Hodges ?), and who had married some Mexican and was now in Acapulco with her husband (works at Las Brisas)- would be able to contact Nechiporenko by mail to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

P-7442

P-2570

will open new P.

3. Subject is to call in when he is contacted by Sasha. His line to the Sovs about the travel agency in New York will be that he hasn't the time to select

Nechi volunteered this info out of thin air so completely out of context. Subject did not follow up. P-11712

P-11712

the manager or complete the study of the office's requirements, but that he is ~~having~~ going to have it done. On his personal affairs, Subject said he was going to move in December to the Lomas, to a condominium apartment.

PRM

Attention "Paul": the C.O. would appreciate knowing any collateral info about Nechiporenko's departure, the identity of "Valentin", and a brief precis of Subject's former associations with Prikhodko.

~~Cynthia - pull together what little we have on LOGINOV for passing to Marheim.~~

I will have Marheim review the entire LICOZY-5 file and write a summary, evaluation and suggestions for further handling.

Cynthia - traces on Catalina Torres, please. Especially any association with Gary Hodges or any other Cuban.

LAVAS



SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT: Ernesto Capuano del VECCHIO and Mario Manteforte Toledo LIENVOY Take

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201 068 248

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HGMA 30432

4. DATE 1 Nov 66

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LIENVOY

8. DATE OF INFO. 18-27 Oct 66

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Millie Rodriguez

6. DATE PROCESSED 25 Nov 1966

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich (201-285412)

Dr. Alfonso MARTINEZ ALVAREZ (a guatemalan) calls Soviet Consul LOGINOV to invited him to a cocktail party to be him at Martinez' hom. Martinez has invited some of the Russian athletes participating in some of the Pre-Olympic games and wishes Loginov to attend also, as well as the Ambassador.

(all the info found on Loginov in this document)

file 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 285 412

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/LCIMPROVE - Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. LITEMPO reported the return of Subject, his wife and daughter Nataliya to Mexico on 21 September 1966 via Sabena flight 555 from Brussels (and Moscow). (Note that Subject's daughter Nina has remained in the USSR.) Subject and his wife were still travelling on the same passports used when they left Mexico in August 1966 (copies have been forwarded to Headquarters) and Subject is still listed as Second Secretary in his passport. The only addition to the passports is a Mexican entry visa valid for sixty days issued on 30 August 1966 in Moscow.

2. Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) has been reported telling LICOZY-5, LICOWL-1 and LICANNY-1 that he is now the Consul General, replacing Subject. When LICOZY-5 asked LOGINOV what he was then going to do with Subject, LOGINOV said that it was not his decision, but that Subject would probably be put in charge of some department in the Embassy as First Secretary. The Station will keep Headquarters advised of any indications of the nature of Subject's present duties and status within the KGB hierarchy.

3. During Subject's absence on home leave, LILYRIC reported that suspect KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046) was seen driving Subject's car a few times. LICOWL-1 also reported that MIROSHNIKOV was driving a car with diplomatic plates 26-DA, which is Subject's car.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSB
1 - CWH

CS COPY FILED
IN 201-120123

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 30213

DATE
5 OCTOBER 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-120123

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; 1964 BLUE FORD
FAIRLANE, UTAH LICENSE AB 1966 AT
SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, MAR 30, 66

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SALT LAKE CITY)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M COB ?

201-773422
HMMA-29920
31 AUG 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB, SEEN DRIVING Y.N. GORLITSYNS
201-773422, CAR JUL 66

R 6609080429

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-48)

7. Mrs. MUELLER recently inherited some money from an uncle, VARROS said, and this is one of her ways of spending some of it.

8. MUELLER's daughter is studying (third-year of college) in Vienna. She is majoring in Russian language and Russian history there. That is where the "great interest" in Russia comes from, VARROS said. This daughter hopes to teach when she finishes school.

KUBARK ONLY

Distribution:
Orig: Charles G. MUELLER P-
~~1:~~ Valentin LOGUINOV P-
1: 50-2-4/E

②

6 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

FROM: Oronsky

SUBJECT: LICANNY-1 (P-8415)

1. Subject is an official of Garza-Lopez Tours which is a representative for Inturist in Mexico City. We have had no contact with him since July 1964. At one time he had given the Station reports on various Soviet tourists and had been recruited prior to a trip to the Soviet Union in connection with Inturist. During the past few months he has been giving Don Lautz reports on various Soviet tourists such as the Soviet Orchestra which visited Mexico and Cuba recently. Lautz passed these reports on to me and Cynthia sent them home. Subject sees Lautz once or twice a week in connection with visa matters. He told Lautz that he had been contacted by KUBARK some years ago but that due to the pressure of his business he did not have time to write reports or to act as some sort of Double Agent. He said he was willing to pass along information on Soviet tourists but did not wish to become an agent for both the Americans and the Soviets. About a week ago Lautz told me that Subject had reported that Valentin LOGINOV, Vice-Consul at the Soviet Embassy, had asked Subject to supply him with information on boats and trains between Mexico and New York. Subject wanted to know what he should do. I asked Lautz if Subject wanted to talk to me and Don said that he did. I then arranged to meet him in Lautz's office at 1430 hours on 6 January.

cy to ✓P-885
P-11712

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✓P-8415

(P-11712)

2. Subject appears to be about 40-45 years old, 170 lbs., thinning redish hair, blue eyes, small brown mustache. He is well dressed and speaks native American English. I asked him about his contacts with the Soviets and he said that he had not had any extended contact with the Soviets for some time. During August 1965 he was approached by YATSKOV whom he knows as the Soviet Consul and was asked by him to prepare a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York City "for the month of September". He also wanted the costs of travel and baggage. Subject has not given this report to YATSKOV. (A copy is attached.) During December he met LOGINOV for the first time at the airport while Subject was attending to the Soviet Orchestra. LOGINOV did not know Subject and was very cool toward him until YATSKOV came by and greeted Subject warmly. LOGINOV then became very friendly and asked Subject's name. LOGINOV subsequently visited Subject's place of business and told him that he was the replacement for Oleg NECHIPORENKO (KGB Officer) and that Oleg ~~ax~~ had sent regards to Subject. He said that he hoped that he and Subject would be as friendly as Subject had been with Oleg. (Subject commented that he had not been especially friendly with NECHIPORENKO.) Subject said that LOGINOV's Spanish is almost native and that he (Subject) was shocked to learn that he was a Soviet. LOGINOV referred to YATSKOV's request and added that he also wanted Subject to include rail travel in the chart and he was especially interested in the cost of "excess baggage" by rail. He also wanted to include sea travel from Veracruz to Europe.

3. Subject said that he did not want to become a D/A but that he would be willing to supply ~~xxx~~ whatever information he could concerning the Soviets he dealt with and the Soviet tourists. I asked if he would be ~~[illegible]~~ willing to supply personality data on LOGINOV including LOGINOV's background, education, family etc. He said that he would be glad to do this. He said that he would not be able to meet me on street corners or in restaurants and preferred to talk to me after he had finished his business with Don Lautz. I instructed him not to discuss his relationship with me with Don Lautz or with anyone else for that matter. ~~axdxthxt~~ He said that he would call LOGINOV and arrange to give him the report and perhaps have lunch with him.

4. Subject will never be anything exceptional in the way of an Access agent but I have asked Headquarters to renew his POA.

CONFIDENTIAL

January 6, 1966

Mr. Boonstra
Minister-Counselor

A. Jay, C/VIS
Thru : A. Certosimo, C.G.

Soviets desire for Travel Data.

LICANNY-1

A representative of Garza Lopez Tours, S.A. who has furnished reliable information in the past called on me today to report that Mr. Loguinov of the Soviet Embassy has requested his agency to provide data on train schedules from Mexico to New York City and boat schedules from New York City to Europe. The Soviets were particularly interested in the train baggage allowance and the cost for excess baggage, he said.

Loguinov is a replacement for Oleg Neciporenko who was recently transferred from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. My informant described him as tall, blond, blue-eyed, about thirty years of age, and as a person who speaks fluent Spanish without any accent.

cc: P/R

C/VIS:DCLautz:de

P-11712

CONFIDENTIAL

alice 3

notes

25 NOV

KADIDDLE might have been at Perla's Thanksgiving party. I know PRIKHODKO and KONSTANTINOV were invited, possibly KUCHEROV but I can't find the names of the others.

The description of the tall brunette sounds like LOGINOV. The other one sounds like PRIKHODKO I will get out photos to show DIDDLE.

ch

cy to Gonzalez P-11420
Andreyev P-8624
Loginov - P-11712
Prikhodko P-2210

29 Dec 1965

pls try to identify the two sons possibly Perla's [illegible] [illegible] — Get pins for Stan

cc: [illegible] Gonzalez [illegible]

29 December

Contact Report: Meeting between Edgebrook and Kadiddle, 28 December

COS

On 28 December I called on Kadiddle at his residence, primarily for the purpose of setting up an elementary commo system ~~[illegible]~~ and to arrive at salary arrangemnets with him. Salary was fixed at £50 per month, (slightly above what Accra had suggested) ~~and~~ plus £100 allowance during the duration of his tour here as Ambassador. As he had previously requested, I returned to him his receipt for 35,000 pesos, which he instantly burnt in an ashtray, with obvious relief. He commented that he hoped he would never have to sign another, and it is clear that there may be some problem in working out a paid acknowledgement. I will leave it for later; will certify the 1 Jan payment, and try it on the following month. I asked him if he had been having problems with his conscience about taking money from the Americans, and he replied that he had not been able to sleep the night after our first payment, but after talking the whole matter over with his wife (the stronger personality of the two) he had finally resolved it in his mind: friends had to help one another, and if accepted the Americans as such - which he has always done - he should not be too proud to let them bail him out of a tight spot. "They were going to turn off the electricity, and there was only a thousand pesos left in our bank account".

For commo, we agreed to call in his wife and consult together. She was more than sensible about helping, recognized both the uses and dangers of the telephone, and made some useful suggestions. Personal contact, based on social relationship, is the basic arrangement, either at his house or mine. Telephone contact to be only between his wife and mine; if either of the two women call and suggest seeing one another at any hour between five and six, it means that either I am to call on Diddle at that ~~[illegible]~~ time or he on me, depending on the context of the conversation. Any other hour mentioned signifies social contact between the women themselves, who are, of course, available to pass written messages. Emergency contact

R-2270

can be made by Diddle himself, calling only from a pay telephone, never from his house or office.

In regard to CE affairs, Diddle made two comments which he suggested I might want to [illegible] up with Easby:

a. He asked me if I had met or talked with Noel Lindsay ~~at~~ (Vice President of Grant Advertising S A) at the dinner ~~hxxgxx~~ Diddle gave Christmas night, and on learning that I had, he commented that Lindsay's cultivation of him had been so assiduous that he was beginning to wonder if he was not dealing with someone who might be visualizing himself as his future British case officer. There was something about Lindsay, he said, that made him feel that he was assessing Diddle quite carefully. He asked if we could run a file check on Lindsay himself and on Grant Advertising. I said I would check.

b. Pearl Gonzalez has been pursuing him much too actively; asking him to her house out ~~of turn~~, wanting to do a profile on him for the English language News, of which she is the Society Editor. What a perfect cover for acquiring bio data, he explained, and what odd friends she had for an American, (she is listed as a US national in the Anglo-American directory, and is, according to Diddld, either separated or divorced from a Mexican husband) newspaper woman or not. One evening a month or so ago, he had gone to dinner at her house, found most of the other guests sped on ~~thxxx~~ their way rather unceremoniously, and was left with only Mrs Gonzalez and ~~two~~ men, who~~m~~, he found to his surprise, were both Russians (names not recalled, and never very clearly given during the initial flurry of introductions). These two engaged him in serious conversation:

Russians: How do you feel about Communism?

Diddle: There is something to be said for many if not all the important systems under which various countries are governed; however my primary concerns is not with Communism in the abstract, but with the best way for Ghana to be governed. We must take the best of all, and fit ~~them~~ it to our country.

Russians: No, no, the question is what do you think personally about Communism? What are your own beliefs?

Diddle: (getting the wind up at this point) Primarily, I must be described as a nationalist.

LOGINOV

PRIKHODKO

One of the Russians was very tall, brunette, wavy thick hair, aged about 38 not obviously Russian in appearance, very good-looking. The other was middle height, deep lines running from the corners of his nose vertically down his cheeks, not so handsome, age about 42. Diddle has not seen them since, although he has kept an eye out for them, cursing himself for not having their names. Conversation in English - which is about all Diddle has, other than Fani and some German. He believes he would be able to identify them from photographs.

Diddle's point in reviewing this was not to let me know that there were Russians looking him over-we both well aware of that - but to point up Mrs Gonzales's role as a spotter. He does not think that she could have been unwitting of the role she was playing, and has avoided her since.

Regarding Andreyev, he suggested that I cultivate him, and on being told that I plan a dinner on 8 Jan (to which Diddle invited) for about 18 people, he commented that it would be an excellent opportunity to ask Andreyev as well. Doubtful, of course, that he would accept, but no opportunity to continue his exposure to us should be overlooked. He made the usual comments concerning Andreyev's differences from his colleagues, adding only that A had told him that he was basically internationalist in outlook. As others, he senses something wrong in A's relationship with his wife. (Comment: I ~~did~~ do not, as yet. She did not appear comfortable in a large group of people she did not know, dancing to music she clearly did not like: twist, frug & cetera, but they seemed to be on good enough terms. He was pushing her join in, but not impatiently)

Diddle asked for EEI's on the tri-continental congress; a number of Ghanians will be transiting Mexico on their way to and from Havana; he specifically mentioned Dendorkenoo, whom he described as an anti-alice 3

Nkrumah Ghanian employed as a civil servant at the UN, and not someone he would have expected to be named as a delegate to the Conference, and John Tettegah, whom he said was a "crypto-democrat" at heart, and not the anti-westerner he is usually described as being. What Tettegah used to be, and what he really is at the present time are two quite different things. He has become a friend, says Kw-b, although he cannot appear as such.

I told him that Rattesey would be coming on the sixth, more or less, and that I would get him a list of requirements for the Conference.

Cys Musgrave
White
Dillon ✓
files: P- 11070

SECRET

Date: December 21, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

Dillon (file?)

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: TRAVEL OF SOVIETS TO MAZATLAN
105-4900 (12/21/65)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Ann E G

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 5, 1965, your #9833, and my memorandum dated November 24, 1965.

A reliable source stated that Vice Consul VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy, had been at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, to bring mail to the Russian ship ISKATEL and had left Mazatlan on December 8, 1965, on CMA jet flight #911 at 3:45 p.m., en route to Mexico, D. F.

This same source stated that the above person had been at Mazatlan to visit a Russian ship, believed to have been the VENUSHTYELNYI, in November, 1965.

copy to CP

File

SECRET
Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: December 21, 1965

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: Russian Ship ISKATEL
105-4976 (12/21/65)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents may be further disseminated without prior authorization.

A confidential source at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, advised that the Russian ship ISKATEL arrived at Mazatlan on December 3, 1965, and departed on December 9, 1965. This ship was listed as being a scientific motor ship and carried a crew of 32.

The above source made available a copy of the crew list of this vessel, which is enclosed.

A second confidential source at Mazatlan stated that Vice Consul VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, Third Secretary of the Russian Embassy, had been at Mazatlan to bring mail to this ship and had left Mazatlan on December 8, 1965, on CMA jet flight #914 at 3:45 p.m., en route to Mexico, D. F.

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

14 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

FROM: Oronsky

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

1. I met Subject on Friday, 11 February at 1900 hours. The meeting was a very short one since I only wanted to determine if he had found a girl for SILNIKOV to "paint". He said he was still looking.

2. The boy who watches Subject's store at night did not show up on 7 February and Subject was forced to sleep above the store himself. At 0300 hours on Tuesday (8 February) he was awakened by the noise of a car horn and looked from the window to see Valentin S. LOGINOV and Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN blowing the horn of their car in the driveway of the Embassy. Both Soviets were drunk and were yelling for the gate guard (who happened to be SILNIKOV) to open the gate for them. They were driving car 337-D (LEONOV's) or 336-D (KORMUSHKIN's). Subject returned to his bed and did not see them leave the Embassy.

3. Since both LOGINOV and KORMUSHKIN live in apartments outside the Embassy and since they would not willingly go to the Embassy at 3 a.m. while drunk, it is likely that they were working when they got drunk and therefore had no fear of being reprimanded for it. They may have returned to the Embassy to make a report or to secure some classified materials before going home. Both men replaced known KGB officers and both work under Pavel YATSKOV.

4. I set our next meeting 24 February.

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[illegible]

LIMITED, 7 Feb 1966

Man driving black Opel with plates 22-82-62 of DF was at Soviet Embassy 1707-1740 hours this date. LOGINOV saw him to the gate. (re visa???)

(woman sat in car)



Placa Nº 22-82-62-Expediente Nº M/552/421521-Opel-170394385-Sedán modelo 1962 dado de alta en Marzo 10 de 1965 a nombre de CELIA BAYARDI TORRES con domicilio en las calles de Arquitectos Nº 46 de la colonia Escandón en Tacubaya D. F.

P-11712

SECRET

3 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviet

1. This office has received a report that the Soviet Vice-Consul in Mexico City, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, planned to fly to Mazatlan, Sinaloa on 1 February 1966 and remain there until 5 February 1966 in order to attend to the Soviet ship "Vnushitelnyy," which was scheduled to dock in Mazatlan at 0800 hours on 2 February 1966.

2. Any information available to you on LOGINOV's trip would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

10097

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1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - Ruth Leach

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AP

[illegible]
file

1

27 Jan 1966

MEMO FOR RECORD

FROM: Marvin A. Cibot

SUBJECT: Soviet Attendance at PRI Lecture.

1. On the evening of 26 Jan 1966 the following Soviet Embassy officers were identified as attending xs a lecture given by Prof. Jose VAZQUEZ Amaral on the subject of "The Experiences of a Mexican Professor in a University in the United States"; Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV. KUZNETSOV was seated on the dais behind the principal speaker. LOGINOV was seated in the rear portion of the audience. There were six U.S. Embassy officers present.

P-11712
P-8102

P-11712

SECRET

21 January 1966

White

Declared [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : COS

SUBJECT : Valentin LOGUINOV

1. On 21 January 1966 Mr. George VARROS, Security Officer, U.S. Embassy, allowed me to make copies of the attached documents.

2. VARROS said he would, unless we asked the contrary:

a. Tell Cristobal TORRES Ponce not to show up for the meeting on 24 January with LOGUINOV.

b. Ask TORRES Ponce to report any and all subsequent approaches.

Would the hand-writing specimen be sufficient to send to HQS for analysis? W

Distribution:
~~Orig~~ w/att: Valentin LOGUINOV P-
1 w/att: Cristobal TORRES Ponce P-
1 w/o : 50-2-4/E

On basis this contact we can now ~~saf~~ Safely list LOGINOV as KGB

no, not sufficient

~~Scott~~

SECRET

Files P-11712

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Regional Security Officer DATE: January 21, 1966

FROM : Francisco Díaz Gómez, Sr. Security Assistant

SUBJECT: Cristobal TORRES Ponce - Embassy Chauffeur

Yesterday noon Mr. TORRES came up to my office and reported that he was sent to the Russian Embassy in order to pick up Miss. MUELLER's passport and that he was approached by Valentin S. LOGUINOV, 3rd. Secretary, who asked him if he would like to go to Russia and that if he would like to receive Russian magazines and that if the U.S. Embassy uses to send somebody to follow its employees when they go some place in town , and that this individual finally invited Mr. TORRES to have supper with him next Monday, January 24, 1966, and that they will meet one each other at the corner Insurgentes Sur with Baja California, under big advertisement "CANADA", at 1830 hours.

Mr. TORRES also commented that this individual told him that in order to get a Visa for Russia, takes time, because they have to call Russia in order to get authorization, same process the U.S. Embassy does when the Russian Embassy requests a visa for one of the members of its Staff.

fdg/-

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Valentin S. Loguinov

- Lunes: 24 -

Insgtos y Baja California
Comida
6 1/2 pm.

SECRET

17 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD KUBARK ONLY

FROM : COS

SUBJECT : Charles G. MUELLER, U.S. Embassy (Economics Section) Officer

1. Reference is made to LIENVOY (three conversations on 12 and 13 January 1966) reports of conversations of Subject with Valentin LOUGINOV, Soviet Embassy Officer, and conversations of Mrs. Edith STENSBY (Citizenship, U.S. Embassy) with Soviets concerning a proposed visit by Subject's wife and daughter to the USSR.

2. Paul Dillon and I advised Minister Boonstra (who was Acting Charge) on 14 January 1966 of this proposed visit and of the conversations we had learned about.

3. Mr. Boonstra had not previously heard of this proposed visit of Mrs. MUELLER to the USSR. He said he would (without divulging CAS as the source) look into this.

4. Later on 14 January 1966, Mr. George VARROS told me of the proposed trip. He said the Ambassador had personally approved it (Mr. Boonstra later also confirmed this).

5. VARROS also said he thought it "not good" for Mrs. MUELLER to make such a trip. He said (Confidentially) that she gets really drunk quite often and she talks about anything and everything she knows about. For example, she told at a party (when she was practically "blotto") about MUELLER's "taking pictures all over Mexico for CIA!"

6. VARROS will give Mrs. MUELLER a pre-briefing (defensive briefing) just prior to her departure. She will (and VARROS thinks this is wrong) be travelling on a diplomatic passport.

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

4. ANALYST

5. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTINE S.	
201-285412	050-008-010
SEX M DOB ?	HMMA-28372
	24 FEB 66
CIT ?	A01 P1
OCC ?	
3RD SECY, VICE CONSUL.	

R 6603082384

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-285412

Wednesday, 6 April: SILNIKOV arrived about 1330 hrs and had a drink of tequila. While there, a high level Soviet came into the shop and after he had left SILNIKOV told him that the Soviet is studying Spanish in the Embassy. (This followed Subject's comment to SILNIKOV that the Soviet spoke very good Spanish). SILNIKOV said that each Wednesday all the Soviets must speak Spanish and those who refuse to do this must pay a fine. With the fine money they buy more Spanish booklets and records. SILNIKOV said that there are some Soviets who simply refuse to learn Spanish or Mexican customs and that these people will probably not be sent abroad again. Commented that this would be a shame since Mexico has such excellent beaches, weather and everything is so inexpensive here. He left the shop about 1430 hrs. Subject was about to close his shop at 2100 hrs when Valentin S. LOGINOV came into the store. He asked if he could use Subject's phone and then made a long distance call to Cuernavaca and spoke to someone in Spanish. Subject could not hear what was being said but got the phone number - Cuernavaca 2-30-65. (I told Subject to bring me the phone bill when it arrives so that I can double check the number.)

Source: LICOWL-1
Contact report 12 April 66

P-11,712

SECRET

25 March 1966

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Dr. Ernst GOEBEL

1. Subject called me on 23 March to report that he had learned a little which might interest me. We made an appointment to meet in his office at 1700 the same day. The meeting lasted for 20 minutes.

2. Subject stated that at 1200 hours on Sunday, 20 March, LOGINOV came to the French Club. He was accompanied by his wife whose salient features were redish hair which could be died and very generous proportions, "a typically stout Russian woman." There was also another Soviet couple with them. The man was described as very blond, boyish haircut with a part, not quite as tall as LOGINOV (ca 5'9"), with a solid muscular build, like a weight lifter. His apparent age was 25 to 35. His wife was dark haired, normal figure and also young. The two couples had three children with them all in the 4-6 bracket. Subject did not remember their sexes since he was concentrating on the adults. (COMMENT: I first thought that the second Soviet would be KORMUSHKIN but Subject insisted that he did not wear glasses (KORMUSHKIN always wears glasses). However, Subject's description fits GORLITSYN and wife perfectly. I will take pictures to the next meeting for confirmation.

3. Subject stated that upon arrival the two men went into the locker room and emerged in shorts. The women were already dressed in shorts. They had their own badminton rackets and repaired to a side lawn where they played badminton until Subject left at 1330. During the period 1200 to 1330 they did not contact anybody but simply played badminton among themselves.

4. Upon leaving Subject spotted LOGINOV's car in the parking lot noting the make, color and license plates.

5. Subject was apologetic about the paucity of his information but I encouraged him and told him it was a fine start. Subject said that he had briefed his wife on LOGINOV and she will be on the lookout for him during the week. Subject appeared to be very much interested in pursuing this subject for me and gave every indication that he will keep working on it.

Paul Dillon

File: P-12330
P-11712
P-11163

SECRET

SECRET

22 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Soviet Intelligence Services
65-465

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning the captioned subject.

2. A sensitive and reliable source advised that on Tuesday, 1 March 1966 an unidentified young girl who appeared to be an American visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1202 to 1218 hours. Source advised that the girl spoke to Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, First Secretary of the Embassy and with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Third Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy. Both are KGB officers. While talking to these two Soviets she was seen to write something in a notebook which she carried inside a folder. Attached is a photograph of this girl.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

10263

Attachment: Photo
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1 - Memo Chron

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declassification

SECRET

1 LOGINOV w/o att.

file P-

18 March 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOOKY-5
18 Mar 1730, Subj's office

[illegible] Copenhagen & Paris

1. Subj reported that on 16 Mar he was called at his office by Valentin Loginov, who said he just wanted to have lunch with Subj and talk. Loginov wanted to set the luncheon for 17 Mar, but Subj demurred and the meet was set for 18 Mar. They went to the Meson La Borda Restaurant on Bolivar Calle (incidentally, Loginov paid the check, being more prone to take the tab than his predecessor Aleksandr Prikhodko).

They talked for two hours, most of that time taken up by Loginov in a review of the world situation for Subj. Loginov intimated to Subj that he wanted Subj to be au courant and in the know on political events. He spoke of the Sino-Soviet split, mentioning the widely known reasons for the split but commenting specifically from the Soviet viewpoint on the Chinese hero-worship of Mao Tse Tung, the impulsiveness and belligerency of China as compared with the Soviet Union's genuine policy of seeking peace. He mentioned that China had had a break in the past two years by having abundant harvests. He said that hardly a Communist Party in the world now supports Red China, mentioning specifically as those that do the Australian, New Zealand and Viet Nam parties.

He commented at length on the Indonesian situation, blaming the Chinese for having reduced Communist strength in that country. He said that a hundred thousand Communists in Indonesia had been killed since last October.

In like vein he commented adversely against the Chinese in the recent overthrow of Nkruma in Ghana.

He spoke of the upcoming Congress of the CPSU at which he said would be announced a program for more consumer goods, lower prices, etc. for the Soviet people. In this connection he made certain comments about Khrushchev, stating that Khrushchev had done many good things for his country but that he was a man who relied too much on his fallible judgment.

He commented about France. He said nothing about the U.S. /Comment: The C.O. asked Subj to prepare a precis on the topics covered and the main points that Loginov made about them/.

2. Re operational matters Loginov asked Subj if he had prepared the answers about the personalities in the Foreign Office and the Registro Civil. Subj said he hadn't, and Loginov asked him to have them ready for their next meet.

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CARDED

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P-11712

Subj told Loginov about an upcoming trip to Copenhagen, which he is to undertake in behalf of the Chief of Mexican Tourism, Agustin Salvat (see attached letter). Loginov asked Subj, if he were in Paris, to look up Ginette Palacci Porter, wife of the British NATO official. Subj said he wasn't sure of being in Paris, but he would try to see her if he goes there. /Comment: Subj plans to leave Mexico on 23 Mar, travel to Brussels and Amsterdam, be in Copenhagen for the Congress on Congress Organizations from 30 Mar to 2 Apr, continue on business to Vienna and Paris. There is no set date for his return/.

Loginov inquired if any of the employees of Subj's office spoke English, indicating that if they did they might be able to gain employment at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Subj volunteered nor ready information to Loginov about his employees.

Loginov said he would call Subj for their next meet.

3. The C.O. told Subj to prepare a superficial personality resumé on the persons wanted by Loginov (this for prior submission to the Station). Also, while in Paris, if it is not too much trouble, try to see Ginette Palacci for the purpose of having some little to report to Loginov (naturally pre-checked by the Station) and also for the Station's benefit to discern if the Soviets abroad had made any overtures to her.

4. Subj parenthetically remarked to the C.O., in a loosely defined manner of showing the activity of the Israeli Embassy in Mexico, that there was to be a Congress of Intellectuals in Mexico with about fifty participants from all over Latin America. The major theme of the Congress was to be The Situation of the Jews and Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, but the theme was being held under cover as far as all advance publicity was concerned. (Attached is the announcement card for the Congress). Subj's firm is handling the arrangements.

5. The C.O. will contact Subj on 22 Mar prior to his departure abroad.

CARDED

PSM

Addendum: Subj remarked to the C.O. after his long talk with Loginov that he regarded Loginov as a better intelligence official than Prikhodko, much more savvy, and that he must have been in the intelligence game longer than Prikhodko. Subj said that Loginov had told him that he would show Subj pictures of the places he had been in Latin America.

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16 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Dr. Ernst GOEBEL

1. Upon receipt of POA on Subject, I called him at his office (Auxiliar de la Construccion, SA, Holbein 168, tel: 43-31-36) on 11 March 1965 and made an appointment to see him at 1800 on 14 March at the office. Since I had met him socially in the fall of 1965, he remembered me which facilitated the contact.

2. I met with him from 1800 to 1835 at his office. He took me to a back office where we conducted the conversation. I stated my business briefly - that I knew LOGINOV was a member of the French Club and I desired information about his activities and contacts at the club. He was in immediate agreement to help me in any way he could. I have him LOGINOV's full name, physical description, type and license plate of his car and showed him pictures of LOGINOV and his wife.

3. Subject said that he had not seen LOGINOV at the club nor heard his name. He is sure that LOGINOV is not a tennis player which is Subject's only occupation at the club. Subject said he only goes there on Saturday afternoons and Sunday mornings to play tennis. However, his wife often goes during the week with the children. Subject agreed that both he and his wife would look out for LOGINOV. At my suggestion he agreed to make inquiries about LOGINOV from Club employees such as the manager or the bar tender who know everybody. He agreed to mask his interest by stating only he had heard that a Russian was a member and to express normal curiosity about this unusual fact.

4. Subject immediately agreed to my request that this subject be a matter of strictest confidence between himself, his wife and me (his wife is an American citizen whom I have met and on whom we also have a POA). As I was leaving and thanking him for his cooperation, he expressed his appreciation in the confidence that I had in him in a matter of this nature.

5. Towards the end of the conversation he asked if I worked with Al White at the Embassy. I said "no, but I know him." He answered, "of course, you would be with counter-

intelligence and he is in political work." I agreed with this. He did not appear to be the least suspicious about Allan. He said he knew him through their wives (cancer work) and the children and remarked that Allan speaks pretty good German. Other than his telling me that I work in counter-intelligence, he did not ask any questions about my position in the Embassy.

6. Subject made a very good impression; direct, businesslike and no nonsense. He said that he would call me in tow or three weeks to advise the results of his investigation.

Paul Dillon

~~[illegible]~~ B. (2

Dillon files?

~~[illegible]~~

WCB

Cynthia

Rec'd: 9 March

SECRET

ABSTRACTED

Date: March 7, 1966

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: N. L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: SOVIET SHIPS VISITING MEXICAN PORTS
105-5156 (3/7/66)

Reference is made to your memorandum entitled "Travel of Soviets," dated February 3, 1966, your number 10097.

Enclosed herewith for reference are copies of the crew list of the Soviet ship "Vnushitelnyi."

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the above ship arrived in the harbor at Mazatlan, Sinaloa, on February 2, 1966, and remained there until 3:30 P.M., on February 5, 1966.

According to this source, VALENTINE S. LOGINOV, a Third Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, visited the ship, arriving by air from Mexico City and was staying at the Hotel Freeman in Mazatlan. According to this source, national intelligence operatives in Mazatlan reported LOGINOV had no contacts while in the city except with the ship's crew. No attempt was made by the Soviets to introduce propaganda material from the ship.

Enclosures (2)

Copy to 11712

INDEX

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200-4-79

P-11712

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SECRET

On February 21, 1966, PEDRO ZARATE MARMOLEJO, Commandant of the Customs Guard, Maritime Customs Office, Mazatlan, Sinaloa, advised that his men have been carefully watching the elements of the Soviet whaling fleet that are currently visiting Mazatlan. They have been alerted to the importation of any propaganda or contraband, but, as yet, nothing has transpired. When the flagship of the Soviet whaling fleet arrived recently, there was no one aboard who spoke Spanish or English, and the Captain seemed to be completely lacking in instructions about documents in order to enter the harbor. He did not have the necessary papers prepared. A Soviet Embassy official was sent from Mexico City in order to straighten matters out.

ZARATE said that the purpose of the visit of the whaling ships was to take on fresh water and supplies. The crews were also given liberty.

Also enclosed herewith for reference are copies of the crew list of the Soviet vessel "Iskatel" which visited Mazatlan on January 9, 1966.

In connection with the visit of the "Iskatel," it is noted that a Soviet Embassy car, believed to contain Soviet Commercial Consul GEORGIY STEPHANOVICH VISKO and USSR Embassy chauffeur VASILIY STEPHANOVICH MIROSHNIKOV, was observed on the highway leading to Mazatlan on January 11, 1966, and was subsequently observed on January 14, 1966, in Mazatlan.

This office is attempting to obtain the crew list of the Soviet whaling vessels that have visited Mazatlan during February, 1966, and will make them available when obtained.

1 cc - Naval Attache
(Enclosure 1)

P-6518

Copies to P file

P-8017

SECRET

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2717

3 March 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ [illegible]-5
3 March 1966, Subject's office

1. Subj reported that on Tuesday, 22 Feb, he was visited by Valentin Loginov, his new case officer, who dropped in without prior notification to arrange [illegible] accommodations for Nicolai Khlebnikov and for Prigova and daughter for [illegible]. Loginov wanted to talk, but Subj said he had to make an appointment and hastily arranged a luncheon meet for 23 Feb 1400 at the La Borda Restaurant on Bolivar Street. /Comment: Subj stated that he called in to the Station on 23 Feb after the luncheon. Had the C.O. ~~been apprised~~ of this call, the Station probably would have received the advance notice re Khlebnikov and his Soviet flight companions/

2. Loginov came to Subj's office on 23 Feb and together they went to the La Borda Restaurant.

Loginov repeated Aleksandr Prikhodko's interest in Subj's health and offered to send the report on Subj's condition from the Temple Clinic to Moscow. Subj asked Loginov why he wanted the report, and Loginov answered "we want to take care of your health." /Comment: Subj will not comply/.

Loginov startled Subj by asking what he knew about the super-secret Jewish organization "Pluga" /Comment: Subj explained to the C.O. that "Pluga" was formed all over Latin America after the arrest of Eichmann had caused Nazi-like anti-Semitic organizations to spring into being in the Latin countries. Jews formed "Pluga" (which is a Hebrew word meaning some kind of military unit) in order to receive military training. Subj knows about the organization through his contacts in the Israeli Embassy in Mexico although he is not a member. He gauges the Mexican contingent at about 25 to 30. The Israeli Govt sent an organizer and instructor to Mexico. Members have gone from Mexico to Israel for training (Subj knows because he handled their travel arrangements)./ Loginov stated that he would like to know about the members of "Pluga", because "it would be interesting if this organization could work for them (the Soviets)". Loginov was pleased with Subj's remark that the organization was militantly anti-Nazi. Subj indicated without too much enthusiasm that he would do what he could.

Loginov put another request to Subj in a rather desultory manner, asking Subj's cooperation if Subj " wants to, can or will" comply. Loginov remarked

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that "We know that you have friends among the French officials in the French Embassy" and wanted Subj to find out the reaction of these officials to a) De Gaulle's declaration against the U.S. in Viet Nam b) De Gaulle's views on French withdrawal from NATO and c) a third point that Subj could not recall. Subj said he would try. /Comment: Subj does know well the French Press Attache, but he didn't tell that to Loginov/.

Loginov told Subj that the Soviets were anxious to recruit someone in the Secretariat of Gobernación, some "small guy", and that Subj should spot the person for them. Subj said he would think about it.

Loginov requested information about the employees who worked for Subj. Subj named most of the employees in his office, and gave the briefest of details about them. Subj was nonplussed by the question, but he did not ask Loginov why he wanted the information. /Comment: Subj expressed to the C.O. his fear that the Soviets might try to recruit someone in his office, and for that reason thought it best for the C.O. to limit his personal calls to the office. The C.O. agreed on the need for caution on general principles, but thought it unlikely that Loginov would so blatantly advertise his intentions of subverting Subj's personnel. Nevertheless, the C.O. suggested to Subj that this might constitute a "sore point" in Subj's relations with Loginov and be exploited as an irritating factor for the future/. Loginov did not write down the names of the employees.

Loginov brought up the answers to Prikhodko's questions. Subj said they weren't ready. Loginov asked if Subj could have them by next time. Subj said he would try.

/Comment: For all the above requests the C.O. instructed Subj to do nothing, explaining that we were awaiting definitive word from Washington on the course of the operation. Subj is prepared for the eventuality that we may wish to break off his relation to the Soviets/.

3. Subj asked Loginov directly if this were his first job abroad. Loginov replied that he had been in Latin America for a couple of years, and mentioned specifically Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Chile. When Subj remarked that the Soviets didn't have official representation in these countries, Loginov answered that he had been in commercial missions and other missions. Subj stated it as his impression, because Loginov mentioned having been in the jungles and in provincial towns, that Loginov had been on special missions of sabotage.

Subj [illegible] asked Loginov if he knew about "the plans" (for the [illegible] [illegible]). Loginov said he did, and that "we are [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] — in very near future to have a [illegible] [illegible] from home."

The C.O. asked Subj how he sized up Loginov. Subj said he wanted more time to formulate his impressions, but noted that Loginov is not "tonto", speaks slowly, and uses the soft approach.

4. Subj moved to his new condominio apartment on 26 February. The telephone is [illegible]-14-40. The address, already reported to the Station, is Av. Cumbres de Acultzingo 20 Dep. 602, Lomas Altas, Mexico 10 D.F.

5. Subj was annoyed that at his last call-in on 3 March to ext. [illegible]70 he was asked his name. He refused to give it, believing he was sufficiently identified by asking for Herb. The C.O. recommends that the latter be accepted to designate the caller in this instance.

Machine. 1126[illegible]
Typed: [illegible]

FMM

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P 11712

11712 19 February 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5
18 Feb 1230, Subject's office

1. At the time of delivering to Subj on the evening of 15 Feb a case of wine that he had requested, the C.O. permitted Subj, at the latter's suggestion, to make a "rush-in" show for his meet with Aleksandr Prikhodko on 16 Feb at Sanborns Restaurant, Insurgentes, at 0900.

2. Subj reported on 18 Feb the story of his brush-off meet with Sasha on 16 Feb. He told Sasha, whom he found standing to the side of the restaurant in Sanborns, that he was sick, and had got up out of a sick bed against his wife's instructions, just to show Sasha that he wasn't trying to avoid a meeting - but, he was too sick to stay. Sasha accompanied Subj outside and walked with him toward Subj's home. Sasha told Subj to submit to him the findings of the Temple Clinic on Subj's illness, and he would forward them to Moscow (for medical advice). /Comment: Subj has no intention of doing so/.

Subj told Sasha that he had spoken to Jacobo Zabludovsky about Sasha's questions on U.S. nuclear policy, and that Zabludovsky had just laughed at him for putting such naive, silly questions. Zabludovsky had said that everyone knows of U.S. interest in curbing the spread of nuclear power. Sasha laughed, and said that was only newspaper talk.

Subj expressed concern to Sasha as to why he had been turned over to Valentin Loginov. Sasha repeated his previous statement that Loginov had more opportunity for outside contact, even visits to Subj's office as part of his natural consular duties. Further, the changeover had been ordered by their superiors. Sasha said that Loginov would get in touch with Subj.

3. The C.O. found out that when Subj had mentioned Echeverria to Sasha at an earlier meet as being a seeker for the presidency of Mexico, Sasha had shown great interest.

The C.O. asked Subj if there were any activity on travel to the Soviet Union (for the purpose of discovering if Subj would bring up the name of Maria de la Paz Cervantes, a Sabena airline employee interested in travel to the Soviet Union). Subj replied that some members of the Jewish community in Mexico were inquiring about a trip to the Soviet Union.

4. Subj is to call in whenever he hears from Loginov about a meet.

PRM

Note: Subj, in anticipation of his housewarming of his new apt, requests that by April (or during April) we procure for him 1 case of Scotch, 1 case of Cognac, a case of White Wine, and a case of Red - if it is possible. The C.O. suggests gradual accumulation of this lot over the next two months.

P-11712

15 February 1966

SUBJ: Contact Report/ [illegible]-5
8 Feb, Subj's office; 14 Feb, La Pergola Restaurant 2000

1. On 8 Feb the C.O. visited Subj's office briefly to advise him how to [illegible] with the next meet with Aleksandr Prikhodko, when the latter had initiated their meeting. Basically, Subj was to give Sasha a "hard time."

2. On 10 Feb in a telephonic double-talked conversation Subj advised the C.O. that Sasha had called his office on 9 Feb, asked if he were going to be brushed off further, and insisted on a meet for 11 Feb 0900 breakfast at Sanborns [illegible]. The C.O. told Subj to go ahead with the meet, and follow the line agreed upon.

3. On 14 Feb Subj reported to the C.O. the results of his meet with Sasha on 11 Feb at Sanborn's Restaurant. Subj found Valentin Loginov, the Soviet Consul, with Sasha. The latter told Subj that since he has little work that takes him outside of the SovEmb, he is turning Subj over to Valentin who will henceforth be Subj's contact. Subj, who had met Valentin once before at the SovEmb, jokingly replied that that was all right with him, Valentin was a nice guy- much better than Sasha. Sasha, however, carried the ball for most of the balance of the meet.

Sasha complained because Subj had not yet brought the answers to his questions. Subj replied by ripping into Sasha in turn with complaints of why he hadn't done the answers- his sickness, his visit to Temple, Texas clinic, the findings of the clinic, his business at the office, etc.

Subj followed this with the burden of his complaints about the Soviets, which was that while he was willing to do services for the Soviets, he was fed up with the "junk" assignments they were handing him; he wants to do what is concrete and important. Sasha started to soothe him in the same old way about how important the little things were, etc., but Subj cut him off. At about this time, Valentin chimed in by saying that he and Sasha just pass along to Subj the tasks they receive from higher up, and that it is up to Subj to tell them if he will or will not accomplish them. Subj agreed to that principle.

Sasha then startled Subj by asking directly why it was that Subj was working for the Soviet Union. Subj answered candidly that he didn't really know why- and said the Soviets knew he was not ideologically with them. Sasha seized on that to say that was just the way the Soviets wanted it- Subj was right not to

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P-11712

show any enthusiasm for the Soviet Union or Communism, etc. Subj continued, however, to state that he felt a comradeship with the Soviets because of their past association during the toughest part of his life when they faced a common enemy (referring to his Partisan fighting days against the Germans). He said also that it looks as if the Soviets are going to win out in the future, and he wants to be on the side of the victors.

Sasha then went on to ask Subj to do certain things for him. He would like the answers to the questions at the next meeting. He asked Subj to check with his friend, Jacobo Zabludovsky, the newspaperman, why it is that the U.S. is supporting Mexico's stand on de-nuclearization, and why the U.S. is for control of nuclear power at Geneva. Also, he was to sound Zabludovsky out on who was lining up as candidate for the next President of Mexico. ~~XX~~ Re the latter, Subj told Sasha and Valentin the story he had already turned in to the Station: that Echeverria, of Gobernación, was trying to line up five Jews in the Jewish Community of Mexico to support his candidature for the presidency.

Sasha set the next meet for 15 Feb 0900 again at Sanborns Restaurant on Insurgentes, and said that Valentin would not be there because he was going to be in Veracruz on that date.

4. Subj told the C.O. that some time ago when Sasha agreed to get Cuban cigars for Subj he told Subj that Soviet couriers no longer transit Mexico to Havana, but that they go direct from Moscow.

Subj also mentioned that Pavel Yatskov had booked passage at Subj's office last week for a trip to Mazatlan and Manzanillo.

5. The C.O. at first okayed the meet with Sasha set for 15 Feb, and instructed Subj not to bring the answers. Further, he was to throw the Zabludovsky bit right back at Sasha as being too ridiculous to put to a knowing newspaperman what was common knowledge about U.S. policy on nuclearization. Then, in Valentin's absence, Subj was to express concern to Sasha about being given a contact who probably didn't know what the score was on everything that had gone before in Subj's work, etc. Lastly, Subj could mention to Sasha that he was reading the Penkovskiy Papers, and he couldn't see how a Soviet so high up in Intelligence could turn sour.

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After checking with Francis Coyne, it was decided to continue on the tack of annoying Sasha and therefore have Subj miss his next meeting. Subj was later apprised of the change in plans, and will not show up on 15 Feb or 16 Feb.

6. Subj advised the C.O. on 15 Feb that Sasha had called to find out why Subj had missed his meet, and put the screws on for 16 Feb. The C.O. told Subj to be no show on 16 Feb. Subsequently summoned to a "crash-in" meet.

PRM

Source: LICOWL-1
Contact Report 24 June 66

Monday, 6 June. Subject visited the Embassy twice this day but nothing of interest occured. LOGINOV came in and made a phone call and talked to someone about volleyball. LOGINOV spoke in Spanish and told the other party that he would be over to "the house" in half an hour. Subject saw him drive away in his car.

P-11,712

23 June 1966

35-71-30 is listed to Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Butrago
Chiapas 130-A

No Station traces on above name or on Gloria ALFARO.

ch

Request visa trace:

Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Butrago
(lives at Chiapas 130-A)
If possible, also Gloria ALFARO at same address.

C

NO RECORD
23 June 66

CARDED

index

index MOP

668- Entrada.- 1319 hrs.- MF por LOGUINOV. KARZHIN dice que espere un momento. Despues MF señora ALFARO recuerda a LOGUINOV que ella lo conoció en la noche de la Navidad pasada en casa de la señora SOTO. LOGUINOV la recuerda, apesar de que ha pasado tiempo. ALFARO lo quiere invitar a una reunión el sabado próximo. LOGUINOV no podrá aceptar porque es dia que ellos organisan ... ... una velada dentro de la embajada entre los compañeros. ALFARO que es una lastima. LOGUINOV pregunta su nombre completo. MF que es GLORIA ALFARO y que ella quiere platicar al menos mañana por la mañana y poder saludarlo. LOGUINOV dice que podrá ser el viernes porque mañana tiene por la mañana sus clases de ingles; asi que podrá ser el viernes en algún lugar de la ciudad para tomar un café y en todo caso le puede llamar por teléfono para presisar mas tarde. GLORIA que es el 35-71-30 que es de su casa. LOGUINOV le llamará entonces despues para fijar una cita. GLORIA que ella trabaja doce horas al día pero casi nunca está en su casa; asi que mejor le llamará mañana mismo. LOGUINOV que está bien y que si entonces mañana mismo el puede rechazar su clase de ingles y verla. GLORIA que no es necesario...

SE TERMINA EL ROLLO.- 808-

LIENVOY

Possibly identical with Eng. Gloria CACERES Pizaña, Secretary of Technical Affairs of the National Syndicate of Social Security workers [illegible] 1959

See also two previous calls to Loguinov from Sra. Alfaro on 5 Feb 66 and from Sra. FLORES about their friend Gloria on 15 Mar 66 [illegible] probably pertain to Gloria Alfaro

CACERES Barragán
Yolanda Alfaro
Vda de
Chiapa [illegible]

15 60 55
22 JUN 1966

P-11712

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: AEGELATIN, Jr.

DATE OF MEETING: 16 June 1966

1. I had lunch with Subject at the Reforma Club from 1330 to 1500 on 16 June 1966.

2. Subject immediately identified the passport photo of BOYAROV as the "Viktor" he had met on 4 June.

3. He said that our picture of LOGINOV was not "Vasilio" whom he described as younger and not as heavy as LOGINOV's picture.

4. Subject reported that on 13 June ISAYEV called him at home and asked to come by that evening. (Confirmed by LIENVOY). ISAYEV arrived about 1930 and stayed to about 2030. Subject suggested that they have a Martini. ISAYEV said that he had never had one and was interested in the ingredients and how it was put together. However, after he had drunk half, Subject noted that he obviously did not like it. Therefore, Subject offered him a Cuba Libra which he accepted and drank. The result of this combination was the first time Subject has seen ISAYEV a bit tipsy.

5. ISAYEV said that he had heard that Subject had had a successful weekend fishing 3-5 June. Subject admitted this and then sounded off about how rude YATSKOV had been (drinking Vodka in front of Nick and his friend, refusing to come to Nick's for a drink or inviting Nick and his friend in, anger at Nick's success, etc). ISAYEV merely shrugged this off. Nick then mentioned that he had met the new man "Viktor," (BOYAROV), had spoken a few words of English with him and thought he was very nice. ISAYEV answered that although "Viktor" was not a fisherman, he had enjoydd seeing the Mexican countryside and particularly the scenery at Pucuato. They did not discuss the third Soviet, "Vasilio."

FILE: P-3776 P-8588 P-11712

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GROUP 1
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6. ISAYEV asked what his fishing plans were. Nick said that he was so busy with his many problems at the new plant that he would not be going fishing during June. Nick then suggested that they go on the weekend of 1 July. However, he added "but just you and me. Don't bring any of your friends like that rude Pablo (YATSKOV)." ISAYEV answered "Not even Anatoliy (KARABACH?" Nick answered that Anatoliy was okay and he could come. This date is tentative and will be confirmed.

7. ISAYEV remarked zhat his wife and child were in Cuernavaca and that KARABACH's wife would go down on the weekend of 18 June leaving them both bachelors. Nick facetiously remarked that he would have to organize some wemen for them.

8. Nick asked ISAYEV about the Soviet volleyball team. ISAYEV said that he had been heavily engaged in working with them. He was with the team for each game, then went out with them to dinner, took them to the hotel, etc. and didn't get home nights until 1 am.

9. Nick brought up the point that ISAYEV had never invited him to his house. ISAYEV, definitely uncomfortable and searching for words, said that he hadn't invited them because his wife thought that there was too big a contrast between Nick's home and theirs. That Nick was "rich" with lots of beautiful things - that they lived very modestly having inherited undistinguished furniture from his predecessor, etc. Nick pooh-poohed this stating that friendship is what counts and the circumstances of one's home meant nothing. ISAYEV ended by saying rather lamely that he would invite Nick to his home. Nick said that from ISAYEV's words and discomfiture, it was obvious that he is ashamed to invite anyone to his house.

10. Finally, Nick said that it was his impression that ISAYEV had absolutely no immediate plans to return to the USSR and Nick feels that he will be here until November or December.

Paul Dillon

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Nick KOURCHENKO, Jr.

DATE OF MEETING: 7 June 1966

1. I met Nick at his apartment from 2030 to 2200 in order to debrief him on the fishing weekend of 3-5 June.

2. Nick reported that when he and his Mexican friend arrived at Pucuato at 1845 on Friday, 3 June, YATSKOV and two other Soviets were already there fishing in front of the cabins. They had come in ISAYEV's VW. Shortly thereafter the Soviets came to the cabins and Nick greeted YATSKOV and introduced his Mexican friend to him. YATSKOV did not introduce the other two Soviets by name but they all did shake hands. Nick invited them all into his room but only YATSKOV came. He accepted a drink and left with it. Later outside Nick asked one of the new Soviets his name and got the answer, "Vasilio." The other one then used an English word and Nick asked if he spoke English. This Soviet said his name was Viktor and that he spoke a little English. Nick then asked YATSKOV which of the other two was the newly arrived Soviet. YATSKOV said that it was Viktor. Nick then lent them his extra lantern and that ended things for the night.

3. The next day both groups fished separately at Sabanita. About noon YATSKOV came by and noticed that Nick was having luck so he brought the other two Sovs to a spot immediately adjacent. They stayed about an hour, didn't have any luck and left. They met again that evening at the cabins. Nick and his friend had caught 28 trout and the Soviets none. YATSKOV was upset, jealous and even angry. Nick then invited Viktor in for a drink. Viktor did the same as YATSKOV, took the drink with him. YATSKOV said that the Soviets would leave Sunday morning since they had no luck. Nick left early Sunday morning for fishing. He later learned from the owner that the Soviets had left fairly early Sunday morning.

FILE: P-3776 P-8588 P-885 P-11712

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4. Although all the Soviets were pleasant and correct there was absolutely no socializing or extended conversation. They did not accept Nick's invitations to come in for a drink, except for the above noted occasions when they accepted a drink and left taking it with them.

5. "Viktor:" Nick described him as an older man, 36 to 42, medium height, 82-85 kilos, heavy but not fat build, roundish, boyish face, looked like an American in general appearance. Does not speak Spanish. Said he spoke a little English. However, their conversation was so limited that Nick couldn't determine his fluency. He obviously understood everything that Nick said but his answers and comments were short and simple. As noted above, YATSKOV said that he is the newly arrived Soviet. He did not do any fishing himself but simply watched YATSKOV and the other Soviet.

6. I showed Nick a picture of BOYAROV. Nick couldn't positively identify it. Our picture has sunglasses. During the day Viktor had on a white towel protecting his neck and a wide hat but no sunglasses. At night Nick saw very little of him and it was dark. However, Nick did say that our photo was not at all incompatible with Viktor. Also showed him a photo of GAZIYEV and he said that this was definitely not Viktor. (COMMENT: Since GAZIYEV and BOYAROV are the only new Soviets in town, and Viktor spoke English, he has to be BOYAROV. But why did he use the name Viktor when his name is Vitaliy?'

7. "Vasilio": About 28-32 years old, medium to dark blond curly hair, medium height, very good athletic build, tough and strong appearance, the all-American boy type. Speaks pretty good Spanish but not as well as ISAYEV or YATSKOV. There are only two Vasiliys at the Embassy, BUTSEV and MIROSHNIKOV, but neither comes any where near the above description. (COMMENT: Nick's description of"Vasilio" fits LOGINOV to a "T." However, his name is Valentin and not Vasiliy. I will show Nick pictures at the next meeting.)

8. Previously Nick has met 8 Soviets, all in true name (mostly by first name only). Thus it is strange that BOYAROV and LOGINOV should use phony names.

Paul Dillon

of 16 June memo

not LOGINOV

7 June 1966

SUBJECT: Requirement for LIREALM

It is requested that the attached information on Soviets Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN be given to LIREALM. Both of the Soviets are known to frequent the French Club. It is requested that LIREALM report on any activities of the Soviets' at the Club, or any other Club members with whom they associate.

FJC

P-11185
P-11712
P-11163

Valentin S. LOGUINOV
Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy
Born in 1927
Wife Alexandra, born in 1928
Son Dmitry, born in 1959

+ photos

LOGUINOV is tall and has very curly, light brown hair. He speaks fluent Spanish and some English. He drives a green 1965 Impala with diplomatic tags 19-DA.

Contact Report of 3 June 66
Source: LICOWL-1

In the contact report of 12 April, Subject reported that LOGINOV had visited his store during the evening of 6 April and made a long distance phone call to Cuernavaca. At our meeting on 1 June he produced the phone bill with the phone number on it. According to the bill, the call was made to phone number 2-30-65 which agrees with the number given to us by Subject in April. Mike F. checked this number and found it listed to

Moises Gamero de la Fuente
Callejon H. Preciado Numero 4
Cuernavaca, Mor.

We have no traces of this man and are not sure that LOGINOV talked to him since people often have a phone in someone else's name. LOGINOV talked for 3 and a half minutes on 6 April.

P-11,712

SECRET

31 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice-Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV travelled to a Mexican port ca. 27 May 1966. He expected to be back in Mexico City ca. 1 June 1966. He is believed to have gone to Veracruz.

2. Any information available to you on LOGINOV's travel would be appreciated.

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# 10525

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② cc - LOGINOV
P-11712

12 May 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5 — cc P-2712
11 May 1200, Subj's office

1. By telephone an attempt was made to line Subj up for an LCFLUTTER. But the time Subj was able to allot for "meeting the representative from Washington" was too limited for the operator, and thus the examination was postponed to some later date.

The C.O. wants to go on record, in any event, for believing that the timing was not appropriate for subjecting Subj to the LCFLUTTER. Subj had been led over a period of months up to the point where he carried out a break-off from the Soviets re clandestine work for them. Just the same day he had been scheduled for the examination, 3 May, he had a scene with his old Soviet case officer, Prikhodko, and no matter what aplomb Subj has (and he has plenty) Subj finds the break-off scenes emotionally wearing. Hence, to have sprung an LCFLUTTER on him at this time, he may have been inordinately sensitive to a feeling that we mistrusted him - coming as it did after our adamant stand that he cut loose from the Soviets. The risk of affronting Subj by an LCFLUTTER was not, in the C.O.'s opinion, worth it at this particular stage of relationships in the operation.

2. On 11 May Subj reported that on 10 May at about 1630 Valentin Loginov, P- came to his office. Loginov asked Subj if he knew anything about the Congress of Intellectuals that was going to take place in Mexico. Loginov said that the Congress, whose topic was Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, was really anti-Soviet. He brought Subj a pamphlet in Spanish "The Jews in the Soviet Union" (printed by the Soviet Embassy in Mexico) - (attached). Subj did some fast thinking, because he in reality had booked the hotel reservations for the group that was to attend the Congress. He told Loginov that he had handled the hotel reservations at the Hotel Del Prado. When Loginov asked for the names of the delegates, Subj said he didn't know them.

Earlier that day Subj had seen Israeli Amb Arad, and the Congress had been a topic of discussion between them. Arad had said that some news media, specifically El Dia, Politica, and Siempre, had criticized the Congress as being anti-Soviet. The Israeli Embassy actually was supporting the Congress, but for policy reasons, had to remain in the background. An Israeli, named Tov, was in Mexico promoting the Congress, but he was not associated with the Israeli Embassy. Arad feared there might be leftist interruption of the Congress, scheduled to take place at

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perhaps what MAGIDIN was working on - cy to P-203

P-11712

6

the Hotel Del Prado on 13, 14 and 15 May, and he had asked Gobernación for Secret Service protection. Arad told Subj that eight persons had come to Mexico, brought by the Soviets. He didn't know where they came from or who they were. Arad was happy that some newspapers were defending the Congress.

attempting [illegible]

After Loginov's visit Subj called Arad to advise him of the Soviet's interest in the Congress. Subj said that Arad would be dining at his home that evening (11 May).

3. Loginov also told Subj that he had been in Veracruz because of the seaman that had jumped ship there. He said that he had found the seaman, and returned him to his ship. There had been a fight aboard ship, the seaman who fled had fled-had hit a companion with a bottle and thought he had killed him. The man had not been killed.

4. Subj said he would be going to New York for five days on 15 May. He stays at the St. Regis Hotel.

PHM

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SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

DATE OF MEETING: 2 May 1966

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

1. On 2 May 1966 Subject called me and asked for a meeting which took place at his office from 1530 to 1600 the same day.

2. Subject reported that on Saturday, 16 April he saw LOGINOV with his wife and son leaving the French Club at ca 1500. He noticed that another car, 25 DA (GORLITSYN's) was parked next to LOGINOV's. A half an hour later 25 DA was still there, which meant that its owner had something to do with the Club independent of LOGINOV. I showed Subject pictures of GORLITSYN which he immediately identified as the Soviet who was with LOGINOV the first time Subject saw him at the Club. (comment: Since this makes two times that GORLITSYN has been at the Club, perhaps he is also a member.)

3. Subject reported that on Sunday, 24 April he and another member, Antonio SARMIENTO, were looking for a fourth to play doubles. Subject noticed LOGINOV standing beside the tennis court and asked SARMIENTO to invite LOGINOV to join them. However, LOGINOV declined and said that he was going to have a swim with SARMIENTO's wife. After lunch Subject saw LOGINOV and SARMIENTO playing chess together and overheard that they are on a first-name basis. From the above Subject commented that LOGINOV and the SARMIENTOs have a close social relationship.

4. Subject knows SARMIENTO casually as an occasional tennis companion. SARMIENTO owns a plastic factory which makes airline bags and similar items. He is about 35. His wife's name is Violeta and she is in her late 20s. Subject looked them up in the phone book and got the following listing: Violeta SARMIENTO, Manuel M. Ponce 143, Guadalupe Inn, tel: 24-21-58.

5. We have several LIFEAT traces on the SARMIENTOs in social contact with NECHIPORENKO at the French Club. Evidently LOGINOV took them over from him.

6. Now that Subject has found a link, I told him to try to engage LOGINOV in conversation, have a drink with him, etc. in order to establish a direct line to him.

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1 - P-11163
1 - P-11712
1 - P-12703

SECRET

P. Dillon

(15)

p 1. 0724

LICALLA

Reporte de las Actividades en el Club, correspondiente a Abril de 1966

Sa.

Las actividades en el Club durante el mes de Abril, fueron normales en general, sin embargo observé que con mucha frecuencia estuvieron llegando al Club grupos de 4, 5 o 6 Hombres jovenes con tipo de estudiantes, estos en el Recibidor tuvieron a veces cortas entrevistas con algunos de los Hombres del del Club.

Creo que durante este mes dejó de ver en mayor cantidad con relación a otros meses, a varios sujetos del Club los cuales a continuación Cito:

8177 9774
DEN y DON dejó de verlos el Domingo 3 volvieron el Lunes 11
829 11712 9026
BROV, LOG y NIKI 2 " " Jueves 7 " " Miércoles 13
3329
MUK y MUKA " " " Miércoles 13 " " Martes 19
11163
DEN y GOAT " " " Sábado 16 " " Jueves 21
3102 880 8642
KOOK, KIM y CHIK " " " Lunes 18 " " Viernes 22
2270
PRIK y DOG " " " Sábado 16 " " Lunes 25 (PRIK)
Viernes 29 (DOG)
10732
GOR y GORA " " " Domingo 17 " "
3396 12009
TUCH y TEN " " " Miércoles 20 " " Martes 26
12170
KARB " " " Martes 26 " " Sábado 30

NOTA No observé ningún cambio en las actividades, no obstante hay algunas mujeres que las dejo de ver en algunas ocasiones hasta 2 semanas, entre estas reporto a las siguientes: BROVA, GOATA (away), IZZYA, KARBA, LEONA, LUDA, MITA, PIGA (away), PRIKA,

Los Hombres que reporté el Lunes 25 entre los cuales creo que venía MIK, los ví solamente 2 días. [illegible]

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P-11712

SECRET

27 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris,
Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. This office has received a report that Soviet Vice Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV planned to travel to Guadalajara on 25 April 1966 in order to attend the Congress of Mexican Travel Agencies (AMAV) there. Also planning to attend the Congress are four visitors from the USSR: Viktor BOYCHENKO, Lev MIKHAYLOV, Lyudmila KUZNETSOVA and Asam AKHMEDOV.

2. Any information available to your office on the activities of the above Soviets in Guadalajara would be appreciated.

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#10401

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(2)

25 April 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 -felip-
25 Apr 1000; entrance to Zoo below Arquimedes, in cars

1. Subj reported that he was at the airport the night of 23 Apr to receive the INTURIST delegation. AMAV representatives Ibarguien and Romero were also on hand. Boichenko was much put out because their arrival had been delayed over the matter of obtaining Mexican visas. He told Subj he would be in Mexico only for the first day of the AMAV conference in Guadalajara, because he was going on to Montreal on 28 Apr to inaugurate Soviet ship service direct between Montreal and Leningrad. The others would remain in Mexico for the conference.

2. The delegates were taken to the Hotel Reforma. Subj, who brought Lev Mikhailov to the Reforma, asked how it was that Mikhailov had left the Foreign Office to be in INTURIST. Mikhailov said he had a 15 year old daughter, in Moscow, and wanted to remain there. His card read "Director of International Organizations", INTURIST.

P-11712 P-8017

3. Subj had coffee at the airport with Valentin Loginov and Visko. Nothing was said of Subj's break-off from Loginov.

4. Subj will await overtures from the Soviets. He said he was not planning to be out of Mexico until 15 May.

PTM

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SECRET

25 April 1966

SUBJECT: Hair color report of Soviets

SOURCE: LICALLA

LOGINOV	Brown	P-11712
Wife	Brown	
ZHEVTUN	Dyed brown	P-8954
MALAKHOVICH	Dark brown	P-9772
Wife	Brown	
MIROSHNIKOV	Brown with gray	P-6518
Wife	brown	
MITROPOLSKIY	Black	P-8770
Wife	Brown	
MUKHIN	Blond	P-7220
Wife	Platinum	
NIKIFOROV	Brown	P-9026
Wife	Dark brown	
SHPAKEVICH	Dark brown	P-8167
Wife	Dark brown	
PRYGOV	Brown	P-10011
Wife	Black	
PRIKHODKO	Brown & very gray	P-2270
Wife	Dyed dark brown	
RADVANSKIY	Blond & very thin	P-9289
Wife	Dark brown	
BEDRIN	Dark brown	P-9037
Wife	Blond	
STRIZHOV	Brown	P-11579
Wife	Dark brown	
ROMANCHENKO	Blond	P-8609
Wife	Platinum	
SILNIKOV	Brown	P-6414
Wife	Platinum	
SOKOLOV	Brown with gray	P-810
Wife	Platinum	

SECRET

~~Scott~~ White & Index ② cc - LOGIN.

Paul Cynthia [illegible] alice

20 April 1966

P-11712

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5
20 Apr, 1300, Subj's office

1. When the C.O. arrived at Subj's office, one of the male employees of Subj evidently advised him that "Mr. Ferger" was there. Subj came from his inner office to advise the C.O. that (Leonid Vasilyevich) Nikiforov was in his office making travel arrangements. /The C.O. remained in the outer office, but with his back to the passageway and his face buried in a magazine/. P-9026

Subsequently, Subj told the C.O. that Nikiforov was leaving for vacation to the Soviet Union on 21 Apr via Air France. He was due to return to Mexico on 24 May.

Subj also mentioned that the INTURIST delegation coming to the AMAV meeting in Guadalajara (27-30 Apr) had not arrived in Mexico as scheduled (on 19 Apr) because there had been a delay in their receiving Mexican visas. The delay was occasioned by Mexican demand for minimal biographic information in order to process the visas. The group of four has been re-scheduled to arrive in Mexico on 23 Apr via Sabena.

The C.O. saw the exchange of telegrams re the information required for visa issuance, and noted the following:

Viktor Boichenko, born 21 July 1925 in Aktyubinsk; president of INTURIST; Passport D 01155 B, issued 6 Oct 1965.

Lev Mikhailov, born 11 May 1924 in Moscow; chief of the International Department; Passport C 065257, issued 25 Sept 1965.

[illegible]
Assam Ahmedov (sic), born 24 June 1924 in Tashkent; chief of the Uzbekistan Tourism Directorate; Passport 069757, issued 24 Dec 1965.

Lyudmila Kuznetsova, born 5 Mar 1923 in Moscow; Latin American Department; Passport C 065784, issued 6 Oct 1965.

Subj mentioned that at the Copenhagen Congress on Congress Organizations that he attended 30 Mar to 2 Apr 1966, he met two Soviet "scientists" and the INTURIST rep for Denmark. The " representatives from the Academy of Sciences" were Gennadiy Andreyevich Mozhaev and Timur T. Timofeiev (cards attached).

2. The C.O. who had heard from Subj on 19 Apr by telephone that he had had his confrontation with Valentin Loginov last week requested a full account of that meeting. Subj reported that Loginov had called him on 15 Apr requesting a meet somewhere outside; Subj insisted that Loginov come to his office.

Confirmed by KIENJOY

COPIED

CARDED

P-2712

P-11712

The following day, 14 Apr, Loginov came to Subj's office. He asked Subj how his trip (to Europe) had been and specifically asked if Subj had seen Ginette Palacci Porter. Subj replied that he had found out that Ginette and her husband were vacationing in Italy.

Loginov asked what impressions Subj had received in Europe on France's backing out of NATO. Subj answered that he had spoken to some Frenchmen, including George Laguero of Air France, who considered in general that de Gaulle was not wrong, but that his way was too drastic, that he was annoying everyone, and that France could not be isolated.

Then Subj made his break-off announcement to Loginov, saying But- I'm sorry to tellx you that I'm not going to be able to work with you any more. There are several reasons. Loginov asked if anything had happened. Subj replied he had reasons. Loginov asked what they were. Subj said he was tired; he had a lot to do; and frankly he was plain disappointed- there had been big deals planned, nothing happened, and he was doing just junk. Loginov asked if that was Subj's final decision. Subj said yes. The Soviet then asked if they could talk it over. Subj said certainly, any time. Thereupon it was agreed between them that they would meet half an hour before the expected arrival at Mexico Airport of the INTURIST group coming to Mexico. They would meet in the restaurant.

Subj told Loginov he had traveled with Amb Bazarov, and that they had become very friendly. And he asked Loginov if he minded that he saw the Amb again. Loginov said not at all- but not to call the Amb at the SovEmb or use the phone for any calls to the SovEmb.

As stated in para. 1 above, the INTURIST delegation did not arrive on 19 Apr, and Subj who knew of the postponement did not go to the airport, and consequently missed his meet with Loginov.

3. Subj, in his customary way asked "did I do right?" The C.O. said it was fine if Loginov got the no-nonsense idea that Subj was through. The C.O. told Subj to wait until the Sovs get in touch with him again, and to have their second meet, at which Subj again makes perfectly clear that he is through. He is to remain friendly though, and is free to do anything he wishes re establishing contact with the Soviet Ambassador. Subj said he would under any circumstances postpone his meet with Loginov until at least the night of 23 Apr when the INTURIST delegation is scheduled to arrive.

COPIES MADE

END

Dillon/rd

S E C R E T

cc LOGINOV

Mexico, D.F.
22 July, 1966

CARDED

~~Sent~~

Re: VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV

Rec'd: 22 July 1966
(13:00 hrs)

Source: L/8 (via L/4) (FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION COS)

Date: 22 July, inst.

Some time ago subject's radio was stolen from his home. He reported it to the police and nothing happened. He has continued to request police assistance in this matter, until the robbery and subject's complaining about lack of police attention was brought to the attention of Gen. C~~O~~UETO, who assigned, or requested that an agent be assigned to go out and calm down the irate Soviet. The agent went out on 19 July, last. Policeman ~~Who is agent?~~

Luis CUETO Ramirez

On 20 July, last, the agent reported back to Gen. C~~O~~UETO that he had talked to subject for some time about the stolen radio, but that following the discussion the subject had asked the agent "to work for him on certain matters", offering him 5,000.00 pesos per month. Agent requested instructions. Gen. C~~O~~UETO contacted L/8, discussed the matter and told the agent to accept the offer. Agent again saw subject on 21 July, last, and was given his first "assignment" by subject.

This was a request for agent to locate one NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN and latter's wife, VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN, both described as Venezuelan citizens, and to advise subject soonest as to street address and telphone number of residence, as well as place of employment.

Indx

cc: 50-6-91/4
P-12893

S ECRET

Files
Valentin LOGINOV
(P) 11712

2

L/4 made a quick check of the Gobernación files on the BOSTROENs, with following results:

NICOLAS JUAN BOSTROEN: P/12893

Born St. Petersburg, Russia in 1915. Indication that at one time he served in U.S. Navy. Presently employed as "Director of Projects" by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., Calle Norte 65 #1058, Z.P. 16, México, D.F.; tel. 47-67-89, 47-42-22. He is listed as Venezuelan citizen.

VALENTINA GRUSDOW DE BOSTROEN:

Born Breslau, Germany; worked as translator or teacher of Russian at U.N. Presently employed as teacher of Russian at the Ibero Americana University. Presently a Venezuelan citizen.

The Gen. Mgr. of Stephens-Adamson de Mexico is RICHARD SEYMOUR BAKER, a U.S. citizen.

L/8 suggests that we may desire to contact BAKER, to get a line on the BOSTROENs, and, if that source and others available to us give them a clear bill, that we may desire to contact them and start a little backfire. L/8 will cooperate fully with us. He would like to know your reaction. (He is personally intrigued by the case and will be anxious to hear from you via the same route back.)

COPIES MADE

CARDED

JKB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

(1) [illegible] — RI (5)

~~(2) [illegible]~~

TO : The Files

FROM : WMS

~~Scott~~ DATE: 22 July 1966

(4) file

SUBJECT: U.N.A.M.

1. At 08:00 hours I had a telephone call from the Secretary of Gobernacion, Lic. Luis Echevarria. He said that he had an urgent matter in which he needed my help. He added that this was a matter that President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was personally very interested.

2. Echevarria sent Lienvoy/2 to see me and gave me the following information and aske d the following help of me.

a). President Diaz Ordaz is personally very "upset" by certain recent actions by some Soviets in Mexico. (Note: I believe, but do not know this, that some Soviet has tried to "recruit" a source close to the President and that this has "backfired").

b). Valentin LOGUINOV, Soviet (Known KGB) is of particular and urgent interest interest to the President. I was told by Echevarria on the telephone that the top name on the list he would send by Lienvoy/2 would "probably get the same treatment that some others got in 1959". This refers to PNG actions taken in March 1959 against two Soviets caught with Demetrio VALLEJO Martinez and the Railroad Strikers. I was asked if I could send two things to Echevarria urgently: These are: A Summary of data on LOGUINOV, particularly saying what there was to show him a "Spy"; and, secondly, a list of know Spies in the Soviet Embassy. (Note: These requests were given to me orally and on a card by Lienvoy/2, when I saw him at 08:40 hours on 22 July 1966).

c). Data on two "Trouble-Makers": Felix ALVAHUANTE and Lenin ALVAHUANTE. These two are known and a file resume will be made and sent to Echevarria. This request was sent by a card from Echevarria which Lienvoy/2 gave me.

done 22 July 66

3. I asked Echevarria for his personal assistance in getting the data on Soviets which the Mexican Foreign Office has. I told him that this data, with photographs particularly, would help us. He promised to get this data for us; and I intend to push for it on a continuing basis.

Distribution : Valentin LOGUINOV (P 11712 ; [illegible]; Soviet Embassy/Pers. (1-12888)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

cc: Liempo/8 (P - 5530 ; Lirama (P-3634); ALVAHUANTE (P - 2120)

20 July 66

[illegible] D:

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

1. [illegible] o meetings with Subject on 11 and [illegible] [illegible] sted from 1930 to about 2045 hours. [illegible] introduced Francis J. COIGNE to Subject as Pablo [illegible]. The next meeting was set for Wednesday 27 July [illegible] at the corner of Puebla and Jalapa streets at [illegible]). Subject claimed that he had relatives in town and [illegible] keep his notes up to date. He had very litte in [illegible] and was instructed to make every effort to keep his notes on a daily basis. During the meeting on [illegible] told Subject that I was leaving and that Pablo would be meeting him in the future. Subject said absolutly [illegible] continued talking about another topic. I was not [illegible] he had understood me and repeated that I was leaving [illegible]. He said that he understood. My impression was [illegible] that I was leaving and his reaction to my bit of news [illegible] totally unexpected. (Or rather his lack of reaction). I might note that when Subject enters the car he begins talking at once. I felt this a very strange way to begin any kind of meeting and suspected that he might be repeating a prepared [illegible]. Once or twice I asked him the same question in [illegible] ways to see if he would give me the answer in the [illegible] he originally but he always changed it enough so [illegible] appeared that he was telling me something in his own words. Nevertheless, it was a point that always bothered me [illegible] to make it a matter of record.

[illegible] from his written notes)

[illegible], 24 June. Subject saw the short American woman (previously reported as phoning from Subject's store to a tourist agency) leaving the Soviet Embassy about 1130 hours. He did not see her enter. She came into the shop to use Subject's phone but the phone was out of order. About the same time he saw two men who appeared to be Americans enter the Embassy. One was white and the other a negro. Subject went to pick up some bottles and heard them speak to each other in English. According to Subject, [illegible] told him that two Americans had visited the Embassy to [illegible] visas because they did not want to fight in Viet Nam. (We have not been able to identify the woman but the Americans are [illegible]. LICOWL said they left the Embassy at 1157 hours.) They [illegible] made two visits to the Embassy. Once in the morning [illegible] once in the early afternoon. Subject [illegible] that SILNIKOV told him that they wanted visas. [illegible] clear how SILNIKOV knew anything about these visitors [illegible] SILNIKOV is no longer on the main gate of the Embassy.

3. Later in the day SILNIKOV dropped by (and made the comments above). He also told Subject that Viktor KALYGIN had been placed on the main gate once more (confirmed by the basehouses) and that he (SIL) was "officially" the administrative officer. He said he can now find time to eat Mexican food with Subject and said he would be by the following day about 0900 hours.

Saturday, 25 June. SILNIKOV came in about 0900 hours and [illegible] wife, Carmelita, fixed him some special Mexican food [illegible] of her Saint's Day. He was there for about a half [illegible]. Valentin LOGINOV came in and ordered 75 pesos [illegible] of [illegible] drinks to be delivered that same day by 1500 hours. Subject delivered the drinks and at 1900 hours LOGINOV [illegible] [illegible] three more cases of coke. [illegible] [illegible] tion is already there" and asked Subject [illegible] ly to the Embassy. On his arrival at [illegible] noted that there were groups from all the [illegible] and that each had brought wine and food representative of their country. There was so much food and

SILN[illegible]

SILNIKOV

SIL

LOGIN[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

index

464.- Entrada.- 1140 hrs.- MF por LOGUINOV. KARZHIN dice que espere un momento. Despues HF JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GAYOU saluda a su amigo LOGUINOV. Este pregunta si se divertió y si descansó bien. JOSE LUIS dice que si y que ya despues le platicará y que solo le llama para avisarle que está de regreso y que tambien es para avisarle que no han tenido noticias de TUCHA o TYCHA y por eso quiere platicar por si LOGUINOV se interesa en seguir las clases. LOGUINOV está de acuerdo y mañana a las once de la mañana pasará a visitarlo para platicar de eso.- 515-

LIENVOY

possible traces att.

CARDED

15 60 55
12 JUL 1955

P-11713

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis
(Michoacan)

50-6-5/9(p. 64)
REPORT/ L A
30 Nov. 61

ALVAREZ, JCSE LUIS

SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?

050-004-034
HMMA-27516
27 OCT 65
A01

Δ MEXICO, MICHOACAN
ON A LIST OF NAMES OF ACTIVE MBRS OF THE NATL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN THE VARIOUS MEXICAN STATES.

ALVAREZ, JOSE LUIS (2 de Jesus ?)

SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?

050-009-005/9
HMM -06018
17 NOV 61

Δ MEXICO, MICHOACAN
RE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT COMMITTEE NOV 61. SUBJ IS MBR OF MLN COMMITTEE WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MORELIA.

* HMY

FLD INDEX ONLY

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis

50-6-92/3
CONTACT REPORT/
LITE[illegible]-1(Attach)
28 June 61

(Attends IICMR Russian Language classes)

ALVAREZ, Jose Luis

Att to HMMW 27516
27 Oct 65
50-4-34
Page 20

Active member MLN, Michoacan

ALVAREZ, JOSE LUIS

SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO?
OCC ?

050-008-004
HMMA-20810 A02
01 MAR 63
P1

SOME CONTACT WITH CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO - NOV-DEC 62. WORKS ON PERIODICO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AND VOZ DE LA UNIVERSIDAD. UNAM? KUBATA /201-04167/ PRAISED REPORTS SUBJ WROTE FOR THESE MAGAZINES AND SAID HE WOULD GIVE THEM MONEY AND MATERIAL TO HELP SUPPORT THE MAGAZINE, MEXI.

*

CARDED
1 417 889

June 66

Paul:

1. I have reviewed the entire LOGINOV file and have made copies of all pertinent LIENVOY clips for the following P files and have included a note to that effect in each of these files:

Miriam AVILA Katz	P-581
Socorro FLORES	P-12259
Salvador PAZ Plata	12775
Erika KAMMERMAN	P-12843

2. Attached hereto are copies of all the clips I found on the other people included on the list you gave me.

a. Besides the 11 April clip on Dr. Juan Luis ALVAREZ Gallou I found a 12 Jul 66 call from Jose Luis ALVAREZ Gayou, probably at least related if not the same person. This is the only name on which there are any/other possibly identifiable traces:

(1) According to a 28 June 1961 LITEA Contact Report, Jose Luis ALVAREZ was one of the students in the Tuesday and Thursday, 7 to 8:30 p. m., Russian language classes at the IICMR during the months of February and March.

(2) HMM-6018, dated 17 November 1961, based on information from LIENVOY Unit C, reported that one Jose Luis ALVAREZ was a member of the MLN Committee of Michoacan.

(3) In a 30 November 1961 Legal Attache report one Jose Luis ALVAREZ of Morelia, Michoacan, was named as one who assisted the National Liberation Movement in Mexico.

(4) HMMA-20810, dated 1 March 1963, included the following information from LIBRIFORM: "One Jose Luis ALVAREZ (matronymic unknown) is putting items in the 'Voz de la Universidad' (Universidad Autonoma Nacional de Mexico) for the Czechs. KUBATA, the Charge d'Affaires in the Czech Embassy praised ALVAREZ for his reports and said 'we will give you money and material to help support the magazine'. ALVAREZ also works on the University's 'Periodico de la Universidad' (newspaper).

(5) HMMA-27516, dated 27 October 1965, provided an 11 October 1965 listing, again based on LIENVOY information, on

2/11/72

which the name of Jose Luis ALVAREZ was again included as an active member of the MLN and a member of the State Committee of Morelia, Michoacan, which had its general offices at Guillermo Prieto 35-10 in Morelia.

b. About Gloria ALFARO, I wonder if she may not be related to Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), teacher at the UNAM Economics School and friend of Antonio SARMIENTO (P-12703) and his wife, Violeta. Both Ofelia ALFARO and LOGINOV attended a Christmas party at the SARMIENTO's last year (pertinent clips included with the Gloria ALFARO material attached). In the 22 June 66 conversation Gloria ALFARO had with LOGINOV she mentions having met him at Christmas time.

c. Copies of all of LOGINOV's contacts with the Instituto de Interpretes-y-Traductores, including the one which mentioned Senorita HARNANDEZ, are attached. Other people connected with that outfit are:

Lio KELSIN
Sarita lnu
Jacobo Chensinski

3. Besides the names on your list I also found two clips on Margaret (Magre) FEDOR who seems to be on quite familiar terms with LOGINOV. I have included copies of them also.

4. Note that all of the calls in question are incoming calls. Also to each of these people something is mentioned about classes.

/ Dillon Cyn - extract some present

Reportable ?

Indexing ?

Reports

George - this is just routine propaganda so don't think it is worth reporting. Agree?

ASUNTO: CONFERENCIA EN EL INSTITUTO DE INTERCAMBIO CULTURAL MEXICANO-RUSO.-

México, D. F. Junio [illegible] de 1966.-

C. DIRECTOR FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD.
P R E S E N T E.

De las 20:15 a 21:30 horas, se llevó a efecto el día de la fecha en el Auditorio del Instituto antes mencionado, sito en [illegible] No. 275, de la Col. [illegible], una Conferencia sustentada por el Sr. [illegible], 2o. Srio. de la Embajada [illegible] en México, bajo el tema del "DESARROLLO DE LA ECONOMIA SOCIALISTA EN LA U. R. S. S.".-

En el presidium, además de se encontraban la Conferencista y el Lic. [illegible] CORDOBA, Director de la [illegible], quien presentó además de la conferencista, a los siguientes funcionarios de la misma Embajada: [illegible], Consejero Comercial, [illegible] 2o. Srio., [illegible] 2o. Srio. y [illegible] 3o. Srio., ante una asistencia aproximada de 75 personas.

Dió principio la Conferencia que fué leída por el conferencista y sus principales aspectos fueron los siguientes:

Empezó diciendo, que el pueblo ruso cansado [illegible] por la explotación y la dictadura de que era objeto por parte del zarismo, de los terratenientes y los capitalistas, en octubre de 1917, tomó las armas y se lanzó a la lucha, para derrocar [illegible] la burguesía que [illegible] entonces y establecer la nueva República bajo el sistema comunista. Una vez que hubo triunfado la Revolución, se organizaron los sindicatos de obreros, empleados, profesionistas así como los [illegible] en el campo, y las cooperativas de producción de [illegible] y de consumo, poniendo las bases para el desarrollo político, económico, intelectual y social de la nueva República; quedando [illegible] en manos del pueblo y de las grandes masas del poder político, los instrumentos de producción y de consumo, con lo que [illegible] la explotación del hombre por el hombre y el enriquecimiento de unos cuantos a costa de la explotación, de la miseria y del sacrificio de todo el pueblo, como sucede en la actualidad en los países capitalistas, en donde se encuentran el poder y la riqueza, en manos de un reducido grupo de explotadores, y cada día acumulan más riquezas a costa de que las grandes masas populares cada día acumulan más pobreza.

Dijo a continuación, que en la actualidad en la URSS cuentan con 1,'00 diputados que proceden de las fábricas, de los talleres, del campo, de los empleados, de los profesionales, [illegible] que en su carácter de diputados y [illegible] del [illegible], tienen una [illegible] dentro de la [illegible], ya que en cada uno de ellos, [illegible] y [illegible] por los intereses del sector que representan...

Amy 9

P-11712 Index

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE: 28 June 1966

1. I called Subject at his office on 28 June. He said that he hasn't seen or been able to do much lately because he has been travelling almost constantly. (COMMENT: I tried to get him twice during the last two weeks and he was out of town both times).

2. However Subject has seen LOGINOV with wife or child at the club two or three times. He was never with Antonio SARMIENTO. He has not seen GOLITSYN.

3. I will call Subject again in mid-July and see him at that time.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12703 P-11712 P-11163 P-12330

SECRET

26 June 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5
25 June 1130-1215, Subj's office

1. In response to a call-in by Subj, the C.O. went to see Subj on Saturday morning 25 June.

2. Subj reported that Valentin Loginov had dropped in to the office on 24 June to make arrangements for a return trip to the Soviet Union for (Nicolai) Leonov, who, Loginov said, had to be in Moscow at the latest 4 July. Subj said he would try to handle. /Comment: Loginov said he would come by the office on 27 June with Leonov's passport, because there was the liklihood that Subj would attempt to get a KLM flight for Leonov via Houston (requiring a U.S. visa for Leonov). In any event, Subj told the C.O. that he was not going to the U.S. Embassy to request the visa, but would buck the whole problem to KLM who would have to make any visa arrangements that were required/.

3. Interestingly enough, Loginov took the opportunity to bring up operational matters again to Subj, and Subj used the ensuing discussion to make his stance utterly clear to Loginov. The conversation went more or less as follows: Loginov said: "You're mad at me." Subj said: "Why should I be mad at you?" Loginov said: "Because of Majestic" (referring to the fact that the Sovs had first given a travel request to Viajes Majestic to be serviced). You know we have to spread it around among friends." Subj shrugged this off. Then Loginov asked: "Are you still mad?"

Subj replied: "I'm not mad, and I never was. Look, Valentin- " (and then he made his first attempt at clarification, saying in effect that in normal friendly matters they were like brothers; Subj exaggerated as is his manner- mentioning intimate matters like "marriage" and "even unto death (hasta la muerte)" but saying that that was the culmination point- "anything else" was finished). Loginov said (without batting an eye): "I had some business for you." Subj cut him short: "Don't bring me anything- important or not important- you can keep it. You want to go for coffee; you want to go out with girls; - with much pleasure; anything up to that point. And I want you to understand that clearly. Don't force me; and let's be good friends." Loginov said: "You're getting difficult."

Subj replied: "No, I'm not difficult. And there's no damage. I made my decision - and your chiefs will understand my position."

CARDED P-2712

GUIDRY

Loginov tried again: "A good friend of yours was appointed Chief of the U.S. Travel Service - Paul Giedro- he's a friend of yours?"

Subj became a little heated in reply: " Yes, he's a good friend. I will always be close to him. But you get this very clear- any plans you have for Paul Cicaro, forget about them, is that clear? I won't do a goddam thing. I hope you understand that. We're friends (you and I), but beside being friends- period!"

Loginov took out a piece of paper and started to read from it, asking Subj if he knew the man "Eduardo Vetelman- approximately 55 years old- a Mexican Jew." (Attached is a photocopy of the piece of paper Loginov had been reading, and which he left behind on Subj's desk apparently by mistake. It's in Russian, and Subj was not able to translate completely at first glance. Subj plans to return the original to Loginov when he comes by on 27 June.) While Loginov was reading, Subj said insistently: " I don't know the man, and I'm not going to do anything ..." LOginov replied: "I'm not asking you to do anything - it's just that I don't know (about him). About Paul Giedro, he's a good friend of yours..." Subj said: "Forget it."

4. Subj asked the C.O. - "did I do wrong?" The C.O. replied that Subj had done beautifully- but he has to expect that the Sovs will keep up all kinds of pressures- subtle, small, or even great, and not so subtle. But the way is clear- all he has to do is say "no."

Subj said that Loginov had brought him a box of "Punch" cigars (Cuban), and Subj as usual offered to pay, but Loginov pressed them on him. Subj then said to the C.O. he wanted an expression of policy on how he should handle that kind of thing from the Sovs- take the gifts, after offering to pay? refuse outright? The C.O. said we would give the guidance he needed for that situation.

5. The C.O. will drop around to Subj's office early next week.

Addendum: the C.O. told Subj that there was a rumor that Oleg Nechiporenko was seen around town. Subj said he knew of nothing on that score, but doubted it strongly- since he was sure Oleg would have contacted him. The C.O. underscored that Subj do nothing about the rumor.

PRM

[illegible]

Эдуардо Вейнмейер, около
55 лет, мексиканец еврейского
происхождения, является
владельцем Сталелитейного
завода и фирмы по
продаже фотоматериалов.
Немецкий эмигрант во
время II мировой войны
Проживает по адресу:
Pedregal Tecoloco 320.
Сын — Маурисио [illegible]

CARDED

Eduardo Webelman about 55 years old Mexican of European descent. Owner of a steel plant and a firm which sells photo equipment. Came to Mexico during WW II. Lives in the Pedregal at Teoloco 320. His son is Mauricio WEBELMAN.

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P-11712

1963 phone book lists

Eduardo WHEELMAN
Tecoloco 320
tel 48 57 17

No Station traces.

No Station traces Paul GIDRES. GUIDRY

CARDED

14-00000

25 July 1966

SUBJECT: [illegible] office

1. Subj rep[illegible] Valentin Loginov had dropped in at his office on 20 July. (Loginov had other business in the office too). Loginov told Subject that he had received [illegible] Moscow pertaining to Subj- that "they" were very disappointed, because they had [illegible] Subj. and they had hopes that Subj would cooperate. Subj answered (in what must sound like a broken record by now) that he still was a friend to the Soviets, that he was on their side, he was their man - but he can't do anything for them. He hoped they wouldn't try to force him- because he just can't do anything for them. P-555

Loginov didn't give up: he told Subj that Pavel Yatskov was leaving for Moscow on 4 August (he was in Subj's office to make the arrangements)- and would be returning in a month. He asked what word Yatskov can bring back to Moscow. Subj said he had already told him: nothing- he can't do anything for them. Loginov then asked what [illegible] Yatskov could bring back to Subj- and Subj said not a thing. He jokingly told Loginov if they can bring "Tamara" (a Soviet actress who had attended one of the [illegible] film festivals) that would be fine with him. Loginov appreciated the joke, and parted from Subj cordially.

/Comment: Loginov did not ask for the piece of paper he had left in Subj's office - re some man he had started to inquire about, and Subj left it at that- he didn't bring the subject up, although he has the piece of paper to return to Loginov/.

2. In response to the C.O.'s inquiry Subj mentioned the names of some applicants for travel to the Soviet Union.

Apparently for a [illegible] Congress to take place in Moscow in August 1966 Loginov had referred several applicants to Subj's office: Julieta Fernandez de [illegible]chen and her sister(Dr. Fernandez' card attached) and two friends. Dr. Fernandez made inquiries about travel arrangements. She has not come back yet.

Licenciado Luciano Lara had come to the office (?) on 21 July to arrange travel to the Soviet Union. Subj said that his employee, Miriam Avila Katz, who handles [illegible] matters, had told him that [illegible] had been invited by the Soviet Ambassador and also that he was a close friend to the Mexican Amb to Moscow.

The Montfort Travel Agency in Tijuana had transferred a request to Subj to handle the travel to the Soviet Union as tourists for two "Señoras": Maria Jesus de Abakian and Estela Castro.

/Comment: the C.O. told Subj we wanted more info about these applicants/

Cy to P-555 P-11712 P-2712

P-11712

①

3. The C.O. reminded Subj that we would like additional information about the individuals who had left to attend the Microbiological Congress in Moscow. The C.O. suggested that Subj have someone in his office extract from the folder Subj has all extra information that can be adduced; such as, address, age, profession, etc. Subj said he would try to have it done before he leaves on his trip (on 31 July).

4. Subj asked if there was anything new about "Herb" (Gestetner). The C.O. said he had word from Washington about the ground rules in case he (Subj) were to go to Santiago de Chile. What he does about seeing Herb is his own affair - but if he does see Herb Subj is to omit reference to our "business" in Mexico as far as volunteering information is concerned. What Herb does vis a vis Subj is Herb's business.

5. The C.O. will get to see Subj before he leaves for Europe on 31 July.

[illegible]

Copy [illegible]
2

25 July 1966

~~Dillon~~

~~Watson~~

~~Anne~~

~~Scott~~

Note: This is a translation (By Lienvoy) of the brief report we sent to Litempo/8 (via Lienvoy/2) for Lirama...... MS

Files: Valentin LOGUINOV (P -- 11712)

Done pd

We should send copy (in English) to Washington MS

Copy made for 50-6-75/3

VALENTIN SERGEYEVIC LOGINOV

Fecha de nacimiento: 23 diciembre 1927.

Empleo: Tercer Secretario en la Sección Consular de la Embajada Soviética en México.

Domicilio: Ignacio Esteva, 18-1 Col. Tacubaya.

Automóvil: Chevrolet Impala 1965, licencia 19 diplomática.

Idiomas que habla: español con fluidez y regular inglés.

Carrera:

En 1955 se unió a la KGB.
De 1955 a 1957 concurrió a una escuela de entrenamiento de la KGB.
De 1957 a agosto de 1960, funcionario en el Cuartel General de la KGB en Moscú.
De septiembre de 1960 a septiembre de 1963, Agregado en La Habana, Cuba.
Diciembre de 1961: Viajó a Panamá y Ecuador con el equipo soviético de Soccer. En este viaje llevó una gran suma de sinero para los Partidos Comunistas de Panamá y Ecuador.
17 mayo 1962: Pasó por México en tránsito para la URSS en uso de licencia.
9 septiembre 1963: Partió de Cuba para regresar a la URSS.
Septiembre 1963 a julio de 1965, estuvo como funcionario en el Cuartel General de la KGB en Moscú.
3 agosto 1965: Arribó a México.

En México LOGINOV reemplazó a OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO, otro elemento de la KGB, haciéndose cargo de todas sus funciones y de los agentes de inteligencia. En enero de 1966 intentó influenciar y reclutar a un chofer de la Embajada Norteamericana en México. LOGINOV es un agente de inteligencia muy capacitado y demasiado activo. Debido a que no tiene otras responsabilidades extras, puede dedicar el 95% de su tiempo a la actividad de inteligencia. Tenemos conocimiento de que es funcionario de inteligencia de la KGB desde 1958. Su jefe inmediato de este organismo, en México, es PAVEL A. YATSKOV.

SECRET

22 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information on Local Soviets Passed to LIRAMA

In response to LITEMPO-8's urgent request for certain information on certain local Soviets, COS on 22 July passed the attached information to LIENVOY-2. LIENVOY-2 will translate it into Spanish and give it to LITEMPO-8 who will in turn pass it to LIRAMA :

Paul Dillon

Attachments

FILE: P - 3634
P - 11712
P - 885
P - 5530
P - 5683
50-6-72-2

SECRET

[illegible]
Alice

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

DOB: 23 December 1927
Position: Third Secretary in the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, D.F.

Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1, Colonia Tacubaya

Automobile: 1965 Chevrolet Impala, License 19 DA.

Languages: Fluent Spanish, Fair English

Career:

1955: Joined the KGB

1955-57: Attended the KGB Training School

1957-August 1960: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow

Sept 1960-Sept 1963: Attache in Havana, Cuba

December 1961: Travelled to Panama and Ecuador with a Soviet soccer team. On this trip he carried a large sum of money for the Communist Parties of Panama and Ecuador.

17 May 1962: Transited Mexico en route to the USSR for leave.

9 September 1963: Left Cuba to return to the USSR.

September 1963-July 1965: Officer in KGB Headquarters, Moscow.

3 August 1965: Arrived Mexico.

In Mexico LOGINOV replaced Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO, another KGB officer and took over all of NECHIPORENKO's intelligence agents and duties. In January 1966 he attempted to cultivate and recruit a chauffeur at the American Embassy in Mexico. LOGINOV is an unusually active and capable intelligence officer. Since he has almost no overt duties he is able to spend about 95% of his time on intelligence activity. We have known that he is a KGB officer since 1958. His immediate KGB chief in Mexico is Pavel A. YATSKOV.

Dist
Orig: Sitempo/14 (Because of his request) on 22 July (via Benadum
~~cc: LOGINOV CP~~
cc: 50-6-91/2

Soviet Intelligence Officers Stationed in Mexico

1. KGB (Committee for State Security)

Chief: Sergey S. KONSTANTINOV
Deputy Chief: Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO

OFFICERS:

- Yevgeniy I. BEDRIN
- Ivan A. BEKETOV
- Aleksandr M. BROVKIN
- Vladimir A. DOLGOV
- Yevgeniy N. GORLITSYN
- Boris A. KAZANTSEV
- Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN
- Valentin I. KUCHEROV
- Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
- Nikolay S. LEONOV
- Valentin S. LOGINOV
- Vasiliy S. MIROSHNIKOV
- Leonid V. NIKIFOROV
- Aleksandr A. NIKITIN
- Vladimir N. RADVANSKIY
- Vladimir I. SHPAKEVICH
- Georgiy S. VISKO
- Pavel A. YATSKOV
- Yuriy ZHURIN
- Boris S. ZOBNIN

2. GRU (Military Intelligence)

Chief: Vladimir N. SOKOLOV
Deputy Chief: Georgiy A. SHCHUCHKIN

OFFICERS:

- Aleksandr M. DENISOV
- Petr F. GORELOV
- Vladimir P. GOROBETS
- Yuriy N. ISAYEV
- Anatoliy V. KARABACH
- Viktor L. KHUKHOREV
- Yuriy A. MITROPOLSKIY
- Valeriy V. SOKOLIN
- Ruslan A. TUCHNIN
- Konstantin F. VORONKOV

Ivan V. YELFIMOV

20 July 66

~~Scott~~ -

In discussing LOGINOV with LIRANA you might wish to point out that the reason he can devote 85% of his time to intelligence work is that there are 3 KGB Consuls but no consular work:

✓ 4 hours a week office hours
✓ average 6 visas a month.
✓ USSR has less ~~con~~ consular work in Mexico than any other major country, most minor ones
✓ Consular work could be handled by 1/3 of the time of the most junior officer,

✓ etc.

Will do
S

Files: Valentin LOGINOV
P-11712
pet

P.S. Same applies to the 7 intell officers whose cover is commercial 4 whose cover is cultural and about 8 or 9 who don't even have nominal cover, ie specified duties. Pet

But more interesting was that at 1730 Sr. Valentin "el Toro" (LOGINOV) came in to make a telephone call. Apparently it was with some Mexican woman since he was quite happy (contento). Among other things that I was able to hear was that he wanted to see her that night, that at night he dreams that she is in his arms and that tomorrow (Sunday) they could go swimming together. They talked for quite a while and he seemed quite gallant. He told her that he would take care of everything if she wanted to go to his country (USSR). I went outside the door of the store in order to afford him more liberty. When he finished talking, he wanted to justify himself to me by saying that he is a batchelor because his wife is in Cuernavaca.

Sunday, 21 August 1966

Today everything is normal since I know that my friends won't come to my house to eat. I had made my program for today, Sunday, that is to say to leave, to take my wife and grandchild to the country and eat outside the house.

But at 1330, which is the hour to close, my wife and grandchild were already there. Then SILNIKOV arrived to drink a beer. He was feeling pretty bad from last night's "drinking bout" at the fiesta celebrating the Ambassador's return. He told me that they were drinking all night. But at this time it was raining quite hard so that I couldn't close up and leave the store. My wife asked him why he had always thought differently (sic) in not coming to eat at our house. And on the moment he said that he would come. My wife shot me a questioning look and finally SILNIKOV broke the silence saying; "wait here, I will be back in a minute". Then he left in the rain which had abated a little. It then started to rain harder and a car left the Embassy driven by the Ambassador's chauffeur Sr. Viktor (STRYZHEV). He didn't park in front of the store but in Gelati, the street running parallel to the store. Then SILNIKOV came in to tell me he was ready. We shut up the store, got into the car and drove to my house. We parked the car in the street and entered my house. Once inside the first thing they did was to inspect the house in great detail even the "azotea". I think that the house pleased them. They made me show them everything including the bathroom and bedrooms. Then we sat at the table to drink tequila (la copa) and beer. My wife served barbecued chicken, una sopa, and a guisado which they ate with relish, or so it seemed to me since they ate everything served them accompanied by pleasant chatter. But he didn't even mention

Extract from Licowl/1 Notes
dated 26 Aug 66 attached
to Licowl. Contact Report
dated 23 August 1966

4. I asked Subject if he had mentioned SILNIKOV's pornographic negative to the latter. At first Subject said no, then yes; that he had asked Silnikov about it but Silnikov said that the negative didn't belong to him but to Vasiliy who took it back to Moscow with him. Subject added that Vasiliy had returned to the USSR about two weeks ago. (Comment: This is most probably BUTSEV whom Subject calls Vasiliy and who returned to the USSR on 24 July.) (Second Comment: This is another example of one of Silnikov's vulnerabilities evaporating into thin air).

5. Concerning the item in the notes for Saturday, 30 July, in which Silnikov hid in the ballroom for twenty minutes because two other Soviets came in, Subject had the following to say about these two Soviets:

a. Valentin (El Torro), then follows a perfect description of LOGINOV.

b. Vladimir: here follows a good description of KORMUSHKIN including the fact that he replaced KOSTIKOV. Only KORMUSHKINS name is Vladislav, not Vladimir.

6. I asked Subject about the discrepancy in the 19 July meeting when he said that SILNIKOV and PRASHCHIKIN had come to the store on Saturday 16 July but his notes said that PRASHCHIKIN and his replacement had come. Subject said that he doesn't know who PRASHCHIKIN's replacement is. He also couldn't explain the discrepancy, stating that he couldn't remember the incident now.

7. I also asked him about his item of 21 July in which at the request of VALENTIN he had delivered two cases of refrescos to General Cano 32. (We have no Soviets at this address). He changed it to General Leon 32 (MIKITIN's home and the film office). The VALENTIN noted above is LOGINOV. When Subject delivered the two cases only a Soviet woman was at home. He described this address as a single house which is undergoing renovation inside.

8. In discussing SILNIKOV's recent work fixing up the Embassy I asked who actually did the work. Subject said that the Soviets do not like to deal with established firms for repairs to the Embassy because they charge too much. They prefer to deal with small independent people whom they can beat down on the price. Subject knows of two such individuals:

Licoal Contact Report, 17 August 1966

P-11712

16 August 1966

There is no derogatory information on the BOSTROEM couple in the United States or Venezuela. However, we have obtained the following biographic information on them from Venezuela.

a. Nicholas Juan BOSTROEM Schreiber, born 23 January 1915 in St. Petersburg, Russia. Cedula #983566. Venezuelan Passport #207100. Travel: 17 December 1957 left Maiquetia for Miami; 30 October 1961 entered Venezuela from Mexico; 22 November 1961 left Venezuela for Mexico; 26 December 1961 entered Venezuela; 6 January 1962 left Venezuela for Mexico; 5 December 1964 entered Venezuela; 19 December 1964 left Venezuela for Mexico; 16 March 1966 left Venezuela for Mexico.

b. Valentine GRUSDOVLAVRIK de BOSTROEM, born 2 October 1923 in Breslau, Germany. Cedula #983567, Venezuelan Passport #151884. Travel: 3 March 1962 left Maiquetia for Mexico; 25 June 1965 left Venezuela for Mexico.

Distribution:
Orig: LITEMPO/8 via BENADUM on 17 Aug 66
1: v. LOGUINOV P-
1: 50-6-91/2
1: Nicholas Juan BOSTROEM Schreiber P-

P-11712

11 Aug 66

MEMO FOR RECORD

In his monthly report for August 1966, LICALLA said YATSKOV seemed to have taken PRIKHODKO's place. When I asked why he thought that, he answered:

PRIKHODKO is not here (he left 28 June on home leave). PRIKHODKO had been entering the Embassy through the main door and was seen working in window # 22. Now YATSKOV is entering through the main door and was seen working at this window. YATSKOV also had the same contact with NIKIFOROV which PRIKHODKO had previously had. Now that YATSKOV has also left (4 Aug), LICALLA thinks that LOGINOV is probably taking his place. (This last statement is not clear: whether LOGINOV is taking YATSKOV's place in YATSKOV's old job, which would be most logical. Or whether LICALLA thinks LOGINOV may now be in the PRIKHODKO job. In any case, PRIKHODKO himself should be back momentarily.)

oh

P-685
P-2270
P-9026
P-11712

Cyp 01

On Sunday 7 Aug 66 at 09:30 I saw Loginov's car, with several people in it enter the Cuota road for Cuernavaca. I couldn't identify any of the occupants

R/

4

30 July 1966

SUBJECT: [illegible] / [illegible]
[illegible] 's office
[illegible], Subj's office

1. On [illegible] of the following Soviet travel arrangements: Sergey Konstantinov, [illegible] Konstantinov, and child, Nikita, confirmed on Sabena for 24 August, [illegible]/Brussels, Brussels/Moscow, 26 August.
Vladimir Goncharenko, [illegible] (wife), children, Marina and Vladimir, Sabena, 7 August. Brussels/Moscow, 9 August.

Re Licenciado Luciano Lara- dropped into Subj's office 28 July (?) and was very officious. When Subj did not have confirmed travel to Satellite countries (including Rumania and Czechoslovakia) ready, Lara fussed and said he would go to Moscow and make his arrangements from there. Plans stay in Moscow a month. Has free ticket on Aeronaves Mexico to Madrid. Subj booked him for travel from Madrid to Moscow, via Amsterdam, and return.

Valentin Loginov had dropped in to Subj's office on 27 July but Subj was too busy to see him. Loginov called Subj on 28 July and made an appointment to see Subj at 1200 on 29 July at the Flor de Mexico Restaurant near Subj's office.

The C.O. stressed to Subj that he continue to play the same tune with Loginov of friends, yes- work, no.

2. On 30 July the C.O. saw Subj briefly in his office; Subj's wife had accompanied him to the office because she will be managing it while Subj is away on his European trip starting 31 July. According to Subj, his wife is not witting of the C.O. except as a friend of Subj. With the wife Esther, around, Subj was able to manage only a brief account of his meet with Loginov on 29 July. The expected power play by Loginov did not take place- he met with Subj just to confirm Pavel Yatskov's travel arrangements and to ask Subj again if they could bring Subj anything from Moscow. Yatskov dropped in to the Flor de Mexico too, but contributed nothing to the conversation. Subj said he didn't want anything from Moscow (he had given Prikhodko fifty dollars to bring him back two kilos of caviar).

For the promised additional information on the group who were going to the Microbiological Congress in Moscow (see previous Contact Report for complete list), Subj turned over to the C.O. the attached list which gives only telephone numbers of the professionals going to the Congress, and in some cases the positions.

The C.O. told Esther that he might drop in to the office, if he could do anything for her. Note: Subj not due back until the end of August.

Cy. to P-853 P-9137
P- 11712 P-9371

CO

P-2712

P 11712

[illegible] hard to [illegible] which had to be sent that same day in a truck. And [illegible] permission to have a soft drink, since [illegible] I am watching to see what would come out [illegible], but I did not see anything. I think that [illegible] taken out what they had been preparing, because I noticed a pick-up truck from Servicio Publico going out with [illegible] about 150 cm long and 60 cm wide.

[illegible]

Today [illegible] friend Estanislao ([illegible]) came in at 1110 AM for a cup of "tea" and [illegible] to give him some chicharron as every Saturday, since it goes with tequila, and out talk started. He told me that in his country (USSR) they have some very large museums where they have the carriages of the [illegible], also the crown and precious objects covred with jewels of incalculable value, as well as their fine robes. While the people xx are dying of hunger. Also they have a grain, small as a grain of rice, engraved with a message to the people saying that every difficulty can be overcome with a will and with calmness and finally you can win. He had a hard time explaining all this to me, since his Spanish is not very good, but I could understand, and what he meant for me to understand was that they would finally overcome all difficulties, and thus his value would be greater in the hour of triumph. These friends (Sovs) are very obedient to their superiors - they will even stay 20-25 minutes in the bathroom of my store so they would not be discovered by their superiors. This is what happened to my friend Estanislao (SILNIKOV) today and he xxxxxxxxx came out (of the bathroom) at 1140 h because two friends (Sovs) came in and one of them is none other that the Second Secretary of the Ambassador, Although he (the Ambassador) is not in Mexico, xxxxxxxxxxx

still rebuke

xxxxxx his secretaries xxxxxx have a lot of power to xxxxxxxxx those who do [illegible] discipline of the State.

Translation of
Licawl/1 notes
30 July 1966

very [illegible] something which had to be sent that same day in a truck. [illegible] been given permission to have a soft drink, since the [illegible]. Afterwards I was watching to see what would come out [illegible] i.e. [illegible], but I did not see anything. I think that at about [illegible] they must have taken out what they had been preparing, because I noticed a pick-up truck from Servicio Publico going out with some wooden boxes about 150 cm long and 60 cm wide.

Saturday 30 July [illegible]

Today [illegible] Estanislao (STLNIKOV) came in at 1110 AM for a cup of "tea" and also [illegible] to give him some chicharron as every Saturday, since it goes with [illegible], and our talk started. He told me that in his country (USSR) [illegible] very large museums where they have the carriages of the [illegible], also the crown and precious objects covered with jewels of incalculable value, as well as their fine robes. While the people ~~xx~~ are [illegible]. Also they have a grain, small as a grain of rice, and [illegible] to the people saying that every difficulty can be [illegible] with a will and with calmness and finally you can win. He [illegible] explaining all this to me, since his Spanish is not very good, [illegible] understand, and what he meant for me to understand was that [illegible] overcome all difficulties, and thus his value would be [illegible] in the hour of triumph. These friends (Sovs) are very [illegible] their superiors - they will even stay 20-25 minutes in the [illegible] so they would not be discovered by their superiors [illegible] happened to my friend Estanislao (STLNIKOV) today and he [illegible] came out (of the bathroom) at 1140 h because two friends (Sovs) [illegible] one of them is none other that the Second Secretary of the Ambassador, Although he (the Ambassador) is not in Mexico, ~~thxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxx~~ [illegible] ~~xxxxxx~~ still have a lot of power to ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ rebuke those who do [illegible] submit to the discipline of the State.

[illegible]

LICOWL Notes

30 July 1966

3

copies made for [illegible] files

27 July 1966

CONTACT REPORT - ORONSKY

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

1. I met LICOWL-1 on 27 July at 1930 hours (COIGNE was sick). The meeting lasted until 2015 hours and I set the next meeting for COIGNE for the same time and location Wednesday, 10 August. Tell COIGNE he will owe LICOWL-1 $800 pesos for salary for the month of July and at the end of August he will owe him another 800 pesos for August. I always pay him at the end of the month.

2. He turned over two audio microphones and I gave them to Feldmann. The microphones were installed in his shop and we have taken the recorder out. The brown paper attached was found in LICOWL's notes (Written) for the 25th of June. He said he did not recall how it had gotten there and did not know who had written and drawn on the paper - it's very odd since the word written on the piece of brown paper and the last entry in LICOWL's notes are the same - but the handwriting is definitely different. Only LICOWL should have access to his notes.

LICOWL's written notes from 27 July meeting (translated by WEENING:

SILNIKOV P/

Wednesday, 20 July: Today my friend Estanislao (SILNIKOV) came to drink a Tecate beer at about 11 am, and I asked him about the photographs which he had told me he wanted me to make from a negative which he has. He answered that he was going to look for the negative and bring it to me. Then he told me that another one of his friends (i.e. Soviets) was leaving on 24 July and that now it was Vasiliy's turn (BUTSEV did leave on 24 July), since he has a son about 9 years old and now it is time to teach him how to be a good comrade," . . ."since for thoseof us who live in a free country, this life of this people seems bad to us because everything is different from what we do. They teach us to love our Progress (?), to live well with our neighbors, to help the poor, to give food to beggers. While they come to our country to create disorder and create distance within our families and in our work, and they infiltrate themselves everywhere in order to sow hatred. They show us everything which is produced in their country and how much they have. But they import things from our countries through their embassies. Daily, their sedition movements can be seen. In fact, a month ago a group of Mexicans (in name) obtained visas for Moscow and in the (Soviet) Embassy they were given a "blast" with as much vodka as they could drink. A good start in getting to know the country which so "foolishly" hopes to improve its mentally backward who cannot realize the evil they do in supporting those who sow desolation wherever they go. After seeing people come every day to the Embassy to get propaganda we can only think that their work is (valid).

?

LOGINOV P/

Thursday, 21 July: Today at 1045 Sr. Valentin (LOGINOV or. KUCHEROV) came in to use the telephone and asked someone to wait for him at General Cano 32, and as he was about to hang up he stressed that they be sure to wait for him at 7:30 pm. After talking to whoever it was, he asked me to send him, at the same address on General Cano, two cases of quinine water and gingerale by 7 pm. without fail. I delivered them in person and took them into the kitchen and I noticed that the house was being repaired and that they were getting ready for oompany, since there were several bottles of liquor there. (COMMENT: No Soviets live at General Cano 32. NIKITIN lives at General Leon 32 and,

[illegible] Leon 32

2 5 July 1966

Dillon
~~Watson~~
[illegible]
Scott

Note: These are traces from the Lienvoy Listening Post on Loguinov, who is of interest to Lirama and Litempo/S.

Files : Valentin LOGUINOV (P-11712)

X-Ref to Lienvoy/Production 50-6-~~71~~ 75/4

done

Nombre: VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV
Domicilio: Ignacio Esteva 18-1
Esposa: ALEXANDRA D. DE LOGUINOV
Acreditado como Tercer Secretario en funciones de Vice-Cónsul substituto de OLEG NETCHIPORENKO.
Auto Chevrolet Impala Mod.1965 placas D-335 (datos de Dic.1965)

3 Ago.65 De Sabena confirman su llegada procedente de Moscú en el vuelo de las 23:10 hrs.

7 Ago.65 JORGE ROJAS MENDOZA de Cubana de Aviación, pregunta por LOGUINOV porque quiere saber que hacer sobre la llegada del Ballet Ukraniano que actualmente están en Venezuela, pero llegan via La Habana el próximo dia 10.

10 Ago.65 ADELARDO CURBELO Cónsul Cubano, saluda a su colega LOGUINOV y comunica que el Ballet Ucraniano no va a necesitar de visas, ya que del vuelo de Viasa de Venezuela pasan al vuelo de Cubana, y aquí unicamente se harán bajo la presentacion de pasaportes.

6 Sep.65 VAN-DICK de Air France, le pide la documentación para el guatemalteco ROLANDO CASTILLO SEGURA y otros para que puedan llegar a Moscú a Estudiar en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba.

12 Sep.65 SOCORRO FLORES de Viajes Mex-América, solicita visas. (constantemente ésta mujer en forma familiar es atendida por LOGUINOV)

13 Sep.65 VAN-DICK avisa que tiene problemas con los señores PLUTARCO HERNANDEZ, BARRANTES y GONZALEZ que van a Moscú.

27 Sep.65 Es invitado a reunión-coctel del Cuerpo Consular para el próximo día 30.

6 Oct.65 JORGE ROJAS MENDOZA avisa la llegada de 40 deportistas rusos. LOGUINOV se encarga de atender dichos jugadores.

25 Oct.65	Hace reservaciones para ir al puerto de Mazatlán.
28 Oct.65	Es avisado por HEBERTO JORRIN de la Embajada Cubana, que en Yucatán se encuentran los barcos rusos "Zhafiro" y otro; en el que hay un lesionado por explosión de una caldera.
1o.Nov.65	Se reune con CARLOS BLANCO. JULIO PLATAS de la C.T.M., se pone a su disposición. Reserva por Mexicana de Aviación pasajes para él mismo y para EUGENIO GORLYTZINE.
4 Nov.65	MARIANO GARCIA Cónsul Cubano en Mérida, informa incidente del barco donde salió lesionado VICTOR MOROSHOV.
8 Nov. 65	MARIANO GARCIA nuevamente informa estado de salud del lesionado MOROSHOV, quién es transladado a la ciudad de México para ser atendido por los doctores CONCHA y CARDENAS de Mérida, y el Dr. EMILIANO SORIANO de México.
10 Nov.65	Reserva pasaje a Cuba para el lesionado MOROSHOV.
15 Nov.65	ALEXANDRO PRIJHODKO ofrece a EMILIA AROSAMENA Cónsul de Panamá, presentarle a LOGUINOV.
17 Nov.65	Frecuentemente del Club France le hacen cobros por adeudos.
19 Nov.65	Comenta con el Consejero de Panamá Ing. JOSE B. CALVO las buenas declaraciones de su Presidente publicadas hoy en Excelsior.
30 Nov.65	El Dr. EMILIANO SORIANO le informa la salud de un marinero ruso, a quien posteriormente operó de apendicitis.
13 Ene.66	CHARLES G.MUELLER de la Embajada de Estados Unidos, solicita la visa para su esposa ELAINE.
18 Ene.66	Reclama a su amiga SCHERRO FLORES que la otra ocasión que fué invitado a su fiesta asistieron unos norteamericanos. Esta se disculpa y lo invita solo.

21 Ene.66 EUGENIO BEDRIM pide a RITTER de Tecnica Electro-Mecánica cintas magnéticas para la grabadora DK-6 de LOGUINOV.

Es atendido por el Dr. SORIANO y operado el lo. de febrero en la Central Quirurgica.

lo.Feb.66 Reserva pasajes a Mazatlán.

11 Feb.66 Avisa a GONZALEZ de Villasana y Compañia, que sale a Coatzacoalcos a vigilar la carga del barco y pide lo conecten con alguna persona de ese puerto.

21 Feb.66 ERICKA, Corresponsal de The News, se pone de acuerdo para hacer una reunión.

Por indicaciones de PRIJHODKO, llevará a SARITA ROSSENFIELD y PERLA GONZALEZ de The News invitaciones para la recepción del día 23 en la Embajada.

22 Feb.66 SANTIAGO RICO de Agencias Generales Marítimas, informa a LOGUINOV que los barcos rusos "Thulomalés" y Shelengalés" que en dias pasados estuvieron cargando en Coatzacoalcos, donde estuvo LOGUINOV; regresarán en cuatro dias más por lo que quiere saber si es posible que un barco que sale el día 18 con destino a La Habana regrese el 26..? a cargar 5,300 toneladas de maíz. LOGUINOV no comprende como sea posible eso y cree que sea otro barco el que venga a cargar. RICO ratifica que se trata del "Thulomalés" cuyo Capitán informó a STETLER de Dreyfus que regresaría para esa fecha, y quiere recordar que debe darse aviso a la Capitanía del Puerto con tres dias de anticipación.

28 Feb.66 ERICKA lo invita a cenar a su domicilio y pregunta si ya tiene listos sus papeles para poder viajar.

lo.Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ de Representaciones Marítimas quien acompañó a LOGUINOV en su último viaje a Mazatlán, informa familiarmente la llegada de dos barcos rusos el "Ortlán" y el "Venusterly" que próximamente llegarán a Acapulco, pidiendo que una persona de la Embajada vaya a ese puerto para que sirva de interprete.

3 Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ nuevamente informa a LOGUINOV que de Acapulco el barco que llegó necesita para gastos 10,000 dolares, para combustible, gastos de puerto y provisiones. LOGUINOV informa que los dará hasta el lunes, cuando regrese el Consejero VISKO de Veracruz donde está atendiendo el barco "Thulomaléo".

4 Mzo.66 ABELARDO CURBELO Cónsul Cubano, lo invita para el próximo lunes a la Feria del Hogar.

7 Mzo.66 De Mazatlán el Capitán del barco "Lyra" se comunica en ruso con LOGUINOV.

17 Mzo.66 Se reunirá mañana con MARGARET FEDOR para que le dé los documentos que LOGUINOV necesita.

23 Mzo.66 SALVADOR PAZ quiere mostrarle las disposiciones respecto al arribo de barcos mercantes a puertos nacionales y ver que opinión "tienen ustedes sobre eso y ver si ustedes como embajada pueden tomar cartas en el asunto".

11 Abr.66 El Dr. JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GALLOU se reporta. LOGUINOV le reclama haberlo dejado plantado ayer en Cuernavaca. JOSE LUIS ofrece invitarlo para su cumpleaños el dia 21.

21 Abr.66 Se hace cargo de la reservaciones durante la permanencia en México del señor BOITCHENKO Vice-Presidente de Inturist en Moscú y demas acompañantes a la conferencia de Agencias de Viajes.

22 Abr.66 CURBELO lo invita al igual que a IATZKOV y MIROSHNIKOV y KORMUSHKIN a la recepción del dia 25 en la Embajada de Cuba en despedida del Lic. CARLOS GONZALEZ PARRODI y organizada por el Cuerpo Cónsular.

23 Abr.66 Convina con MERCEDES TREVIÑO de la Asociación Mexicana de Agencias de Viajes, sobre las actividades de los delegados rusos a la convención de turismo en Guadalajara.

26 Abr.66 Dr. AMARAL que dijo ser perseguido político de su país natal Brasil, pide a LOGUINOV asilo dentro de la embajada, porque en la de Cuba se lo han negado. LOGUINOV recuerda que hay un tratado ...

	.. y recomienda vea la embajada de algún otro país Latino - Américano.
3 May.66	Se pone en contacto con el capitán del barco "Volchovik" en Veracruz y pregunta si ya apareció el marinero ruso. (Posteriormente se supo que dicho marinero había faltado a su barco por cuestiones de faldas)
10 May.66	El Dr. JUAN MANUEL FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ que dijo ser representante del Gobierno del Estado de México, le solicita visa. LOGUINOV lo invita a que pase mañana a la embajada.
11 May.66	ERICKA KAMERMAN insiste en tener sus documentos para poder aprovechar su viaje a Europa y visitar Moscú. LOGUINOV ofrece hablar con el embajador si es necesario " por la simpatía que siento por ella".
13 May.66	Llama la atención al gerente de la Agencia Vagon & Cook porque siempre que mandan pasaportes para sus visas no van bien requisitados.
20 May.66	Comisionado por KAZANTSEV, comunica al Lic. FERNANDO FLORES TEJEDA de Relaciones Exteriores el constante robo y extravió de placas en los autos diplomáticos.
24 May.66	DAVID ORNELAS de Mundos Tours, agradece el obsequio de folletos y revistas de la embajada.
26 May.66	SOCORRO FLORES suplica dé visa al pasaporte que no tiene fecha de vencimiento. LOGUIÑOV manifiesta que solamente dá visas a los pasaportes en regla y que no le importa que esa persona vaya en visita oficial.
30 may.66	Reserva pasajes para Veracruz.
1o.Jun.66	BERTA GONZALEZ PADILLA reclama el incumplimiento del contrato de arrendamiento de la casa en Cuernavaca para el personal de la embajada.

4 Jun.66 SALVADOR PAZ PLATA pide le ayude para obtener la representación de los barcos rusos que llegan al puerto de Veracruz, porque se recibió un telex en que dicen que Rusia va a importar un cargamento de tuberia. LOGUINOV lo ayudará pero no lo pueden discutir por teléfono.

13 Jun.66 El Dr. JOSE LUIS ALVAREZ GALLOU del Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, le pide lleve el proyector de cine, "porque esos señores tienen deseos de ver sus peliculas".

22 Jun.66 GLORIA ALFARO quiere reunirse para platicar con algunos funcionarios de la embajada. LOGUINOV está de acuerdo en que sea el viernes "despues de las clases de ingles".

29 Jun. 66 La señorita HERNANDEZ del Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, le avisa que sus clases serán hasta la próxima semana porque SARITA sigue enferma.

3 Jul.66 De la agencia Morris Hermanos, informan sobre el cheque del auto Chevrolet Impala placas 19-DA y que robaron el radio. LOGUINOV tramitará lo del seguro en La Provincial.

6 Jul.66 ERICKA KAHERMAN a su regreso de Europa se reporta. LOGUINOV le reclama que no se despidió e informa que tiene mas de un mes con sus documentos para que pase a recogerlos.

7 Jul.66 MIRIAM de la Agencia Mundos Tours, despues de tratar sobre visas, reclama el mal humor de LOGUINOV el día que estuvo en su casa, pues hasta su familia se molestó. LOGUINOV recomienda lea mas novelas de amor que policiacas, porque le hace preguntas que no puede contestar.

13 Jul.66 Pregunta al Lic. MORA PLANCARTE Oficial Mayor de la Cámara de Diputados, el motivo del viaje a Rusia del Diputado JESUS SANCHEZ, para poderle otorgar la visa.

Gestiona visa para Estados Unidos a nombre de VLADIMIR SHELANYEV corresponsal ruso de Izvestia en La Habana, actualmente en México.

14 Jul.66 El Ing. MANUEL ANAYA de la Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos le solicita la visa, para asistir a un congreso.

15 Jul.66 El Embajador de Cuba HERNANDEZ ARMAS, pide se ayude a "un gran amigo nuestro" el Dr. ALFONSO MARTINEZ ALVAREZ quien desea asistir al Congreso de Microbiología en Moscú e inclusive está invitado para los festejos del 26 de Julio en La Habana.

19 Jul.66 El Ing. MANUEL ANAYA agradece la visa otorgada y a su regreso se reunirán para un cambio de impresiones. LOGUINOV lo espera.

21 Jul.66 El Lic. LARA FLORES informa haber recibido cable del Embajador JOSE ITURRIAGA en donde ratifica su invitación, por tal motivo solicita la visa, y poder platicar con los Agregados Cultural y Comercial rusos. LOGUINOV dará gustoso la visa y en la embajada los pondrá en contacto con esas personas.

NOTA: Frecuentemente es buscado LOGUINOV en la embajada rusa, sin que se encuentre éste.

Julio 22 de 1966.

P-2712 25 September 1966 4

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOOKY-5
20 Sept, evening, Subj's home
23 Sept, [illegible], Subj's office

1. The C/O and his wife went to Subj's home the evening of 20 Sept for dinner. We established a first name relationship with Subj's wife, thus avoiding use of the C/O's alias, Mr. Jenner. No others were present beside us, and Subj and his wife. Subj's son did not join at the dinner table. A bright touch on the part of Subj was that we were served the cavier that Prikhodko had recently brought to Subj.

Subj's wife, Esther, is an intelligent and charming person. She spoke with great perception of her experiences in the Soviet Union, when she had accompanied her husband there a few years ago. Although Subj has told the C/O that his wife does not know of the Intelligence relationship between them, it appeared evident to the C/O that Subj's wife considers the C/O in some kind of special relationship to her husband.

During the evening Subj reported to the C/O something that Prikhodko had said at their meet on 7 Sept, which he had omitted in reporting their meet. In speaking about the Mexican travel agents attending the INTURIST conference in Moscow in October 1966, Prikhodko stated: "We are interested that as many travel agents as possible go to the convention. Maybe we could later on use one of them. But the problem with the Mexicans is this- they are very affable and simpatico- but when it reaches the point of a straight proposition, they are all "chicken.""

2. On 23 Sept Subj reported about the visit of Valentin Loginov to his office on 21 Sept. They went to the nearby Flor de Mexico for coffee. Subj, who had been instructed to probe further re Pavel Yatskov's probable assignment when he returns to Mexico, didn't have to. Loginov burst out to Subj; "You have to congratulate me - I am the Consul General." Subj asked who's going to be Loginov's assistant. Loginov answered, but Subj does not recall the name. Subj asked "What job are you planning to give Yatskov?" Loginov asked "Why me?" Subj said "You're a big shot". Loginov stated "He'll get a job. He will be some First Secretary of some Department."

The reason that Loginov came by to Subj is that he wants to investigate the shabby treatment that had been accorded the delegates to the Microbiological Congress in Moscow (Subj had told the C/O that the attendees to the Congress didn't even

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have hotel accommodations, but had to be put up in beds at Moscow University). Loginov was evidently investigating on complaint of the Mexicans who had attended. Subj asked if Loginov was going to write his report to INTURIST. Loginov said "No - higher - to the Ministry of Tourism."

Subj asked if there was any word about his trip (to the INTURIST convention- about which [illegible] was supposed to let him know if he could attend). Loginov answered "Not yet. [illegible] there's no problem."

Loginov said to Subj "You are unable to do anything now. Maybe you can recommend someone [illegible] - maybe a Mexican that would be able later on to get a job in the American Embassy." /Comment: Despite the way Subj reported Loginov's phrasing of the question, Subj said he had the impression that Loginov was asking Subj to recommend someone who could take Subj's place. At any rate, Subj had the latter in mind when he answered Loginov/. Subj replied: "You have more contacts than I have- all kinds of people. It's not necessary for me to recommend anyone to you."

Subj changed the subject and asked: "What should I take to the "boys" (of INTURIST)?" Loginov said "Don't make the same mistake you made last time - you brought English suiting materials. That's not the custom in our country. Bring something Mexican- that doesn't cost more than two or three dollars." X

3. Subj also reported that on 22 Sept he had lunch with Fernanda and Juan Saldania. Subj told the C/O that at one time in the past when our office had asked Subj for recommendations of Mexicans in government, Subj had given Saldania's name. At that time in the Lopez Mateos administration Saldania had worked as assistant to Dr. [illegible] in Cultural [illegible] of the Secretariat of Public Education. Now Saldania is a private secretary in the Sub-Secretariat of Education. When Subj had [illegible] to the Soviet Union, Saldania had been instrumental in getting him an official passport. Saldania's wife, Fernanda, works in the Pedagogic Museum of the Education Secretariat.

Fernanda arrived at Subj's office before her husband came (they were to proceed to [illegible] Restaurant for lunch). Fernanda told Subj that maybe she would be going to Europe - to attend a "tribunal" being convoked by Bertrand Russell. They had tried to get the tribunal in France, but that was turned down by the French government. So, there are going to be two meetings, in November in Stockholm, and in March, probably in London. Then Fernanda showed Subj an article in [illegible] "To the Soldiers in Viet Nam" which she said she had translated. She started talking about a group

Who is the hers?

Berrueto (Ramon)

[illegible] is a high aide, NOT private secretary (was [illegible]) to Prof Federico Berrueto Ramon, [illegible] of Education

[illegible] should have his [illegible] in this!

3

called Mexican Youth for Vietnam, whose purpose it was to publish the truth about Vietnam and collect money to send to Vietnam via France. On weekends the group visits villages (colonias proletarias) and talks to the workers and peasants. Fernanda mentioned to Subj that there was a small similar group in the Jewish community, and she wanted to know about it so they could join forces. Subj said he knew of no such group in the Jewish community. Then Fernanda asked Subj to join the group and support it with money. Subj turned the proposition down. He said the Viet Cong weren't victims - they were dupes of the Communist Chinese and North Vietnam. In reply, Fernanda called Subj "a bourgeousie".

Subj said that although Juan was not present for the discussion, he knows of his wife's activities.

4. Subj also mentioned again that he had found out that ~~[illegible]~~ Edmundo Garza of Garza Tours and Rhino (phonetic) of Garza Lopez Tours were definitely going to attend the INTOURIST convention in Moscow. /Comment: If memory serves Rhino was LICA[illegible]-1/.

Rafael Rayn

P-8415

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4. I then asked him how the purchase of the watches was coming along. He told me that the morning after our last meeting (this would have been on 10 September, a Saturday) at about 0930 he went to the Trade Delegation building and asked for his good friend Yuriy (ISAYEV). ISAYEV said they are fresh out of watches but that they expect some more in 15 days at which time Subject should come back and ISAYEV will sell him all he wants. (COMMENT: In his notes for 12 September Subject says that SILNIKOV had come in to say that Subject's Soviet friends had wanted to give him a watch for his saints day on 11 September but that the Soviets are not out of them but that some would come in in fifteen days).

5. We then reviewed his notes. From now on I am not going to reproduce them in todo but only do certain items in brief form since they are tiresome, repetitious and now largely proven to be gross exaggerations plus fabrication.

6. General Notes:
11 September: STRIZHOV tells Subject that he has to drive the Ambassador every Sunday morning to play golf. Then follows Subject's account of the non-existent party.

12 Sept:

KOSTIKOV comes by at 1145 to offer regrets for not having come to yesterday's party and to say that Soviet cyclists will come to Mexico for the forthcoming winter olympics. Later three new Soviets who don't speak Spanish come in. SILNIKOV said that they will leave (Mexico) soon. (COMMENT: probably the two audio techs.)

13 Sept.

At 1145 STRIZHOV and GOROBETS come in to say that SILNIKOV had an accident in his car on Marina Nacional that morning. (COMMENT: Accident confirmed by LIENVOY)

14 Sept.

The three new Soviets came in and brought a supply of mejoral, alka seltzer, razor blades, etc. For this reason Subject thinks they are on TDY from Cuba and are stocking up for return to this paradise.

15 Sept.

Description of "atentado" described above.

16 Sept: Nothing

17 Sept:

LOGINOV tells him that he is now Consul in place of YATSKOV. Tells Subject he is looking for a 3 bedroom house with garden near the Embassy and not more than 4,000 MN per month. Asks Subject to look for one.

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18 Sept:

Subject takes off on bicycle and finds a house at Avenue Chapultepec 180 with six bedrooms but renting at 5,000. Subject suspects that LOGINOV won't like the 5,000 rent nor the fact that there is a vacant lot next door.

19 Sept.

LOGINOV comes in at 0930 and Subject describes the house. LOGINOV will go by to look at it.

7. Special Notes on SILNIKOV

10 Sept (Saturday): SILNIKOV is alone from 1045 to 1110. Says he, STRIZHOV and ~~SHE~~ GOROBETS will come to party next day after seeing KALYGIN off at airport. (Both LILYRIC and LIMITED have him leaving at 1012 in car and not returning by 1400)

11 Sept (Day of party): SILNIKOV comes in from 1100 to 1120. Says Soviets will have to leave the party a little early since they have to show a film to the Soviet kids in the Embassy that evening. KORMUSHKIN then comes in and says can't come. At 1428 SILNIKOV, GOROBETS and STRIZHOV come in and all go to party, etc.

12 Sept: 1020 to 1040 SILNIKOV, GOROBETS and STRIZHOV come in to thank Subject for the party. 1450 SILNIKOV comes in alone for a quick tequila. 1510 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV drop by to make small purchases.

13 Sept: 1130 to 1200 SILNIKOV comes in. Is looking for empty 1/2 liter jars. 1510 comes in agains and tells about his car accident yesterday.

14 Sept: 1020 to 1100 - SILNIKOV comes in and explains the damage to his car. 1520 to 1535 was in again.

15 Sept: 1130 to 1205 SILNIKOV comes in. 1400 in again.

16 Sept: Nothing.

17 Sept: 1010 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV come in. 1450 SILNIKOV in alone.

18 Sept: 1100 SILNIKOV and STRIZHOV come in. Subject invites them home for lunch. They can't because STRIZHOV had to drive Ambassador to a conference with Chilean Ambassador. 1400 SILNIKOV in alone.

19 Sept: SILNIKOV comes in 3 times: 1100 to 1122; 1420 to 1440; 1830 to 1900 with STRIZHOV to eat tacos.

20 Sept: 1400 SILNIKOV, STRIZHOV and GOROBETS drop in for a drink.

(COMMENT: As usual LILYRIC and LIMITED do not support these times).

Francis J. COIGNE

The C/O reminded Subj of what he basically was in Soviet eyes - an Eastern European refugee and a Jew. And more, he had never professed to them any ideological sympathy to the Communist cause. The most he had done was to declare that the Soviets represented the wave of the future, and he wanted to be on the winning side. But he must recognize that such sentiment coming from a Jew could hardly have convinced the Soviets.

b) Next stage of approach to Soviets in Mexico:

The C/O suggested to Subj as an effective way to break off from the Soviets that he should drop completely all affirmations of "friendship" - cut out the "hasta la muerte" bit. Subj, in turning down any and all Soviet requests for information or assistance, should couple it with the open declaration that he has quit.

Subj agreed to follow this line, except for the qualification pertaining to his presence in Moscow.

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c) Clarify status of Loginov as "Consul":

Subj said that during his meet with Prikhodko and Loginov on 8 September 1966 while they were talking about Pavel Yatskov, whom Prikhodko said he had seen in Moscow, Subj addressed the following question to Loginov: "When is your boss coming back?" Loginov replied: "You're talking now to the Consul."

3. The C/O wished to clarify or reaffirm his understanding of Subj's response to Prikhodko on 8 September when the Soviet asked about legalizing a tourist in Mexico(reported in paragraph 4 of the Contact Report of 8 September). First, the C/O paraphrased for Subj the way he had reported Subj's reasoning process about Prikhodko's question (see Comment in paragraph 4 of the Contact Report) - Subj said that it was essentially correct.

Then the C/O related the way he had reported Prikhodko's question and Subj's reply. Subj said that that was not exactly how the conversation had taken place. He restated the conversation as follows:

Prikhodko: "Which will be the best way to legalize (a tourist in Mexico)?
Subject : "You know the answers."
Prikhodko: "If you would have to put (a man in your office), would you be able to?"
Subject : "It would be difficult- necessary to consult Gobernación, because the company had to have the required capitalization to place a foreigner

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Licalla

SEPTIEMBRE DE 1966

Liempty #9

OBSERVACION ESPECIAL.

Sa.

Martes - 13

Este día a las 1920 Hs. Yó transitaba por la Avenida Universidad, sobre esta calle y a la altura de Pilares, se encuentra un Café que lleva por nombre " IPOCAMPO ", en dicho lugar observé que en el interior se encontraba LOG platicando con una Mujer con tipo de latina, la filiación de la mujer mencionada, es aproximadamente la siguiente:

Edad 28 o 30 años, altura 1.58 m., complexión ligeramente gruesa, piel morena, cabello negro y rizado, cara redonda, ojos cafés, nariz ancha, boca regular de labios gruesos. Esta mujer vestía de color verde seco.

13 Si

P-11

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE OF MEETING: 8 September 1966

1. I met with Subject at his office on 8 September 1966 from 1730 to 1800. Next meeting is in about two weeks to be arranged by phone.

2. Subject reported that LOGINOV still comes fairly regularly to the French Club on weekends. Occasionally he brings his wife. Once or twice he brought two young Soviet men in their early twenties. He has also brought a Soviet woman ca 25 who has played tennis with two other women (club members) whom Subject doesn't know. Subject hasn't seen GORLITSYN since our last meeting.

3. Since LOGINOV doesn't play tennis but only sits around outside or in the bar, Subject doesn't see him for sustained periods. Subject has seen LOGINOV talking to SARMIENTO or his wife two or three times. From observing him in the bar, Subject saw that LOGINOV is on speaking terms with several members.

4. I asked Subject if he knew Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), a good friend of the SARMIENTOs and also in contact with the Soviets. He didn't recognize her name as a club member. When I told him that she teaches at the School of Economics, he remembered that at a dinner party at the home of Henry *SIEGMANN, an American and local head of Continental Oil Co., a Mexican woman was present who was a professor of Economics. She speaks excellent English and is in her thirties. He thinks this is ALFARO but is not sure. He will check his wife who is the name rememberer in the family.

5. Subject remarked that he found the above dinner strange for its odd mixture of solid business types and a few off-beat "beatnik" Mexican types including the female professor. He hastened to assure me that SIEGMANN was a sterling character.

6. For the next meeting Subject will attempt to confirm ALFARO's identity and also to spot likely club members who appear to be on close terms with the SARMIENTOs with the view of getting an assessment of the latter.

7. Subject is interested and willing. However, he does not appear to be very much interested in people. Thus he has played tennis with SARMIENTO for years and hasn't a thing to say about him except that he is a pleasant tennis companion. Similarly SARMIENTO's wife is good looking and a good tennis player.

8. I haven't had an opportunity to talk to Subject's wife yet because Subject says that she does not know the SARMIENTOs. I met his wife last fall and noted that she is much more alert, interested and lively in social relations than he is. Therefore I bet that she knows a lot more than he gives her credit for. I intend to invite them to dinner soon in order to talk with the wife and explore possibilities.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12330 P-11712 P-11163 P-11339 P-12703

CAP [illegible]

[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~

Alice

8 September 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 — P-2712.
7 Sept, a few minutes, Sears Ejercito Nacional
8 Sept, 1100-1200, Subj's office

1. On 7 Sept at about 1100 the C/O made a routine call to Subj's office to determine if Subj would be available that day. Subj responded that he was glad that the C/O had called because he had to see him urgently. In characteristic manner Subj trying doubletalk told the C/O that he had received a telegram, that his old friend (Prikhodko) was back, and that he was going to see the "two of them" (Prikhodko and Loginov) at 1500 that day at the Flor de Mexico. The C/O was puzzled by the reference to the telegram, and asked incredulously if the telegram had anything to do with setting up the meeting with his friends. Subj's answer was ambiguous, and the C/O let it go at that because he arranged a brief meet with Subj for 1230 at Sears Restaurant, at Ejercito Nacional, where Subj was to be on his own business at that time.

2. Nevertheless, in considering the briefing instruction to give to Subj the C/O had to allow for the fact that there might have been special circumstances in the Soviets' arrangement for their meet with Subj. Further, this was Prikhodko's first meet with Subj after return from Moscow, where it is presumed he had taken up Subj's case with his superiors and the line ~~was~~ decided on how to deal in the future with their flagging, non-cooperative "agent." A reasonable contingency expectation was that the Soviets might have a "hot" proposition to make to Subj, and the C/O decided to brief Subj to the extent that if the Soviets broached a really important operational assignment, which Subj was to judge, Subj would conduct himself so as to draw out the Soviets but stall on acceptance. If nothing of overriding importance came from the Soviets, Subj was to continue his "friends-yes; work-no" stance.

At 1230 the C/O saw Subj for just a few minutes, during which the telegram was explained: it was from Moscow, inviting Subj's travel agency to participate in a seminar in Moscow 24-29 Oct 1966, detailed letter to follow. Further, Subj had learned from Prikhodko when the latter had called earlier in the morning to make the appointment for the meet that afternoon that Prikhodko was aware of the invitation and would talk to Subj about it at their meet. The C/O imparted to Subj the briefing outlined above, stressing that Subj must judge whether the Soviets were proposing something that was so important that he couldn't dismiss it out of hand - in which case he was to be non-committal and stall on a decision.

3. The C/O had communicated to the Station the tack he was going to take, and was later informed by the Station to reverse the planning of Subj's attitude toward a contingency proposition of the Soviets to a flat, unconditional "no."

Did he have telegram — Prik do see it?

File in P-11712 P-2270 P-885 (p. 2) P-7442 (p. 2)

4

Accordingly, the C/O tried to reach Subj at his office. Subj was not there so the C/O left a message to be given to Subj if he should arrive before 1500. The message was: " En el negocio con sus amigos deberia usted decir "no" a todo." The message purported to come from "Señor Berger."

In a telephone call to Subj at 1800 that evening the C/O learned from Subj that nothing of transcending importance had occurred at his meet with the Soviets, and so the C/O arranged to meet with Subj the following day 8 September. Subj not received the message in time.

4. On 8 Sept Subj reported that he had met Prikhodko and Loginov at 1500 the preceding day in the Flor de Mexico Restaurant. Prikhodko did most of the talking. He brought Subj the two kilos of caviar that Subj had requested (and paid for). He said he had had a good leave in the Soviet Union, and that the wedding (of his son) had gone off all right. He had spoken with (Clev) Nechiporenko (who is still in Moscow and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who sent his regards to Subj and also four Russian records. He had seen Pavel Yatskov in Moscow who told him that he had met Subj in Paris. Yatskov would be returning to Mexico about 17 September 1966. Either Prikhodko or Loginov told Subj that Loginov was now the Soviet Consul in Mexico. Loginov told Subj that he would pass by Subj's office on Monday (12 Sept).

They discussed the invitation to the travel agents to come to Moscow. Prikhodko said that twelve INTURIST representatives in Mexico had been invited, that he had the telegram and that he was going to coordinate the arrangements for the travel agents to attend the conference. /Comment: The telegram sent to Subj in Spanish on 6 September 1966 said: "there will be a conference 24- 29 October in Moscow of travel agencies that collaborate with INTURIST dealing with international tourism; we invite your agency; a reduced price for the stay will be afforded; a detailed letter follows."/ Prikhodko asked Subj if he thought of attending the conference. Subj said he would like to go (and added with a twinkle) - "only from a business standpoint."

7 Prikhodko, for his part, in thin reference to Subj's uncooperative attitude said that Subj had put him into a hard spot with his superiors in Moscow. And now he would have to consult with Moscow to see whether Subj can attend the travel agent conference. Subj asked archly "By letter?" Prikhodko replied "You're crazy- everything goes by cable." Subj stated "You can refuse me a visa." Prikhodko dismissed that, saying that if Subj goes to Moscow he will ~~hx~~ meet Prikhodko's colleagues, and that if Subj is in Moscow the doctors there would be happy to check into Subj's health (a matter mentioned previously with both Loginov and Prikhodko). Subj, responding somewhat mockingly to this expression of concern by the Soviets, said he was still their friend and one of them.

2

Prikhodko then remarked something to the effect that Subj now didn't want to do anything for them -what with his bad health and being tied up in business- but that maybe in the future..... and then got very much into the present by sliding easily into the old groove: he said " I talked/to you several times about a man coming tourist to Mexico - what is the best way to arrange legal residence- could it be done through your office - he could be attached to your office- he doesn't have to work there."

/Comment: Subj explained to the C/O that he sensed the trap immediately, recognizing that this was the old bent of the Soviets on which he had furnished a wealth of information in the past. Subj reasoned that if the Soviets were fishing with the old bait, he would not rise to it eagerly because in view of his recent non-cooperative behavior it would only confirm to the Soviets that he was being controlled (by the AIS). He would not reject the insinuation of his cooperation out of hand and categorically, because that would not be consistent with his posture of remaining on friendly terms with the Soviets. Therefore he took the middle road, that of being non-committal or uncommitted, where the initiative of compliance was always in his hands. Parenthetically, Subj told the C/O that if the "policy" is that of complete rejection of the Soviets he should not have even met them; but following the policy of "hasta la muerte- amigos; pero hacer nada" he felt he was doing the right thing in stringing them along a barren path. Thus, without batting an eye he simply repeated what he had already told them./ Subj said he would have to consult Gobernación- because he didn't know if his company had the required capitalization to place a foreigner in a job - but this being Mexico, anything could probably be done. /Comment: Subj remarked to the C/O at this point that the Soviets could not seriously consider using Subj's firm to "legalize" their man, because it would be a patent fraud to the employees in his firm, and he did not think the Soviets were stupid about such things/.

wd

The C/O's summary comment to Subj's unspoken plea for criticism of his course of action was that under the concept of a "friends, yes; work, no" policy toward the Soviets he was doing a fine job of walking the tightrope.

5. The C/O asked Subj if there had been any travel arrangements for non-Soviets to the Soviet Union. Subj replied that Julio Rothenstreich, whom Subj characterized as a German Jew, and his wife, a Russian Jew, had left 5 Sept to New York en route to the Soviet Union. Subj said Rothenstreich had told him that he was friendly with the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico and represented "Russian firms" (sic). He was to remain in the Soviet Union 15 days and visit a few cities, Moscow, Kiev and Volgograd- and then some cities in Europe, Vienna and Paris. Subj said that Rothenstreich's

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own firm was making the hotel reservations in the Soviet Union for him. Subj said he had met once before with Rothenstreich years ago, but didn't know anything about him.

Subj also mentioned a widower in his sixties, David Nosofsky, who left for the Soviet Union on 1 Sep - Nosofsky has a brother in Kiev.

6. The C/O had noticed a new face among Subj's employees and asked Subj who the girl was. Subj explained that he had taken on the new girl, Leticia Cisneros, the daughter of one of Subj's guides in Mexico, as possible replacement for Miriam Avila Katz, who has an offer to work for the Israeli Embassy in Mexico. Subj said he would not want to lose Miriam because, even though she is a slow worker, she is capable and also a nice girl. If Miriam should leave, Leticia would take over her work (which includes the responsibility for non-Soviet travel to the Soviet Union).

7. The C/O questioned Subj about his attitude toward attending the travel agent conference in Moscow. Subj said that from a business standpoint he would want to attend, or if not him personally someone from his firm, like Miriam. He was interested in INTURIST business, and felt that he should know what plans INTURIST will be formulating inasmuch as his competitors will be there. He is interested to know what percentage he gets of INTURIST business. He believed that INTURIST would foot 50% of the costs of staying in the Soviet Union during the conference. The C/O asked if Subj knew the other travel agencies that were to be invited. Of the twelve from Mexico Subj felt that the following were included: Garza, Garza Tours, De Carlo Tours, Viajes Melia, Cook's, MexAmerica, Pegaso, Excursiones y Viajes (EVISA), American Express, and possibly Autoviajes Internacionales. Subj knew the "jefes" of all these.

Subj plans to attend the International Congress and Convention Association meeting in Israel on 30 October 1966. He is considering the possibility of going to Moscow for the travel agent meeting 24-29 Oct and then going on to Israel.

The C/O told Subj to let him know Prikhodko's results re permission for Subj to attend the Moscow meeting.

8. Subj requested the C/O to obtain one case each of Red, White and Rosee French wine, the "best" available.

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S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5 Meeting with PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV on 7 September 1966

1. LICOZY-5 reported that he had a meeting with PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV at 1500 on 7 September at a Restaurant in town.

2. LILYRIC reports that on 7 September LOGINOV left the Embassy alone in his own car at 1405 going north on Tacubaya. PRIKHODKO left alone on foot to the east at 1416. They both returned together in LOGINOV's car at 1720.

3. Thus LOGINOV picked up PRIKHODKO somewhere and took him to the LICOZY-5 meeting. This is not only a good anti-surveillance device but also helps to prevent us associating the two.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-2712 P-2270 P-11712

S E C R E T

[illegible] files

Valentin S. Loguinov
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Vice-Cónsul de la U.R.S.S.

Bob Shaw met Loginov at a Consular ~~Corp~~ Corps [illegible] luncheon on 6 Sept 1966 at the American Club. They exchanged pleasantries + cards.

P-11712
Sept. 6, 1966

14-00000

31 August 1966

SUBJECT:

[illegible] office

1. [illegible] trip on 25 August. He said nothing [illegible] had occurred on his trip, except for his meeting Pavel Yatskov [illegible] August. Before Subj had left for his trip he [illegible] Yatskov [illegible] to his agent in Paris for Yatskov to get some free [illegible] Paris. [illegible] mentioned to Yatskov that Subj had arrived in Paris. Yatskov contacted [illegible] and they had a short talk about inconsequential matters. [illegible] that Yatskov would be returning to Mexico.

2. The C/O asked Subj if there had been any Soviet travel booked through his office during his absence. Subj said there had, and called in his employee who took care of such matters, David Ornuelas. Ornuelas brought Subj the reservations for: [illegible] departing 1 Sept 1966 Mexico/Paris via Air France, [illegible] through to Moscow. Subj was about to ask Ornuelas [illegible] but the C/O told him to let it pass for the [illegible] Ornuelas to associate the C/O with requests concerning [illegible].

[illegible] reminding Subj that Loginov had asked at some previous time about the employees in Subj's office, and asked Subj if there had been any continuing interest by the Soviets in his employees. Subj said he knew of none. The C/O re-stated what he already knew: that Ornuelas handled Soviet travel, and Miriam Avila handled non-Soviet travel to the Soviet Union - and asked Subj if both were trustworthy employees. (Note: Subj has a file on Ornuelas, but none on Avila - the C/O [illegible] did not want at that time to call for Ornuela's file asked Subj just a few questions respecting both employees, and said we would want to [illegible] at a later date - giving as reason that we wanted file information on [illegible] dealing with the Soviets.) The facts adduced on each employee at this meeting were:

David Ornuelas: worked for Subj about 5 years; Subj acquired David from another travel agency because he was efficient in tariffs. Subj called him a bit mixed up because [illegible] was "left" and other times "to the right."

Miriam Avila Katz (see Report this Subj 13 July 1966): worked for Subj about 2 years. Mother is American, family from Akron, Ohio. Miriam had worked for Aeronaves at the New York World Fair, after which she applied for a job to Subj. Subj commented that Miriam is very Jewish - minded, and intensely interested in Israel, to which she has traveled twice.

3. The C/O reminded Subj that if he is contacted by the Soviets he maintains his no-work stance with them. Subj nodded agreement.

PRM P-2712

P-2717

5. Concerning the big day, 21 August, Subject had the following to say in addition to the information in his notes. This information was in response to my questions :

a. They left the store at ca 1410 and stopped off to get barbecued chicken (COMMENT: they didn't actually arrive at LICOWL's until 1507.)

b. They went in a blue Station wagon (COMMENT: this is 17 DA).

c. The Soviets left at ca 1800 (COMMENT: correct).

d. Besides LICOWL and his wife and the two Soviets, only LICOWL's daughter and son-in-law were present.

6. Later on in the meeting Subject volunteered the information that SILNIKOV had told him that he had obtained permission to come to LICOWL's home (COMMENT: Strange conduct for someone who is playing the part of a case officer.) Subject also volunteered that he had told SILNIKOV that LOGINOV had called a girl from the store on Saturday (See Subject's notes for 20 August). SILNIKOV's reaction was one of approval, noting that LOGINOV was a bachelor now. I asked Subject if he didn't think his statement was a bit indiscreet since he could have burned LOGINOV, especially since SILNIKOV has now shown an interest in security measures. He said I was right but it was obvious that this aspect didn't bother him in the least either before or after my question.

7. I asked Subject what he thought about SILNIKOV's erratic behavior about wanting women, pornographic material, etc. in that he raises and drops the subject without any sense of continuity. Subject answered this by proposing that we send a girl under our control to visit his store and he would introduce her to SILNIKOV (COMMENT: Exactly what we are trying to do with LIRUSTIC-1). I pointed out that such a girl would have to live in the neighborhood or her presence in the store would be suspect. He then said that the girl could be invited to his home at a time when SILNIKOV was there. Subject would introduce her as a friend from Jalisco and let nature take its course. I told him that his idea has basic merit but could be quite difficult to implement in a secure manner. I remarked that it was a shame that he had been unable to come up with suitable candidates in his neighborhood. He said that he had many suitable friends in the neighborhood but that none were suitable since they weren't the types to whom he could suggest such an idea. I told him that he couldn't but we could, if he would spot suitable candidates.

Licowl Contact Report

23 August 1966

and that his "maybe" was just a way of joshing Loginov. Subj then asserted to the C/O that he felt strong in his capacity to deal with the Soviets, and that his joking remarks in now way vitiated that strength.

The C/O brought up the matter of Subj's having told Loginov he would supply his personal documents to Loginov, and (solely with the design of reaching for Subj's motive) stated that we thought it would be better if Subj did nothing to pass these documents to the Soviets and held them off indefinitely. Subj appeared a bit chagrined at the C/O's request, and told the C/O why: he wanted to give those "bastards" his documents to show them he had nothing to hide, and that he was not afraid of them; if he didn't give over his documents they might think they had something on him. Further he felt that he was buying insurance by handing them over openly, and gave as an example that he might be flying in Europe and might find himself diverted or force-landed in a place like Prague or Warsaw - and it would be a comfort to him to know that he had nothing to be afraid of concerning any irregularities in his past.

Therefore, Subj asked the C/O to check with his "bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on handing over his documents. Subj said if the answer is "no" he will comply, but his pleading to the C/O appeared as if Subj thought his was the wiser course. /Comment: Despite the C/O's method of challenging Subj on specifics, like the "maybe" and the passing of the documents, the C/O's own opinion is that Subj has achieved a very satisfactory status in his dealings with the Soviets, satisfactory in the sense that it is in accord with the Station's objectives in the case and equally important that it can be maintained because it is consistent with Subj's personality and outlook./

7. Subj expressed a desire for another get-together with the C/O and his wife. The C/O explained that his wife would be leaving Mexico by mid-January - and Subj, who doesn't need any pictures to be drawn for him, immediately hazarded the opinion that that meant that the C/O would be leaving not too long after. The C/O acknowledged this possibility, but said he had no idea of when it would take place. Subj wanted to know if there would be someone to take the C/O's place when the time came, and the C/O answered that of course there would.

The time for the get-together is left for some indefinite date before the C/O's wife departs.

PRM

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14 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328)

SOURCE: LITEMPO-12

1. Following is Source's report on Subject which wasgiven to COS on 13 December 1966 in response to the attached requirement.

2. "Carlos BLANCO works in the judicial police as a confidant of Carlos CASAMADRID (P-10968). Earlier he worked in the DFS and later worked with Carlos MADRAZO (P-5193) in the PRI. When MADRAZO left the PRI BLANCO continued as his aide. Later he went to work with CASAMADRID. In the DFS he never worked on investigations but was assigned to the secur ity of visiteng foreigners. I met him last Saturday. (COMMENT: 10 December, evidentally in response to our requirement which Source received on 9 December). He said that he is a friend of (Vladimir) LOGINOV of the Soviet Embassy and he had one of LOGINOV's cards. Attached is BLANCO's card. I will submit a photo later. CASAMADRID's office number if 10-33-62. A Sr. SANTOS of the American Embassy."

3. Source submitted BLANCO's car. On the back is written Atenor Sala # 110-7, Col. Narvate (BLANCO's home address) and the telephone numbers 10-33-62 (CASAMADRID's offico) and 28-57-40 (to leave messages). Evidently, BLANCO does not have a home phone.

4. The street, Atenor Sala is not in the 1965 plan of the Federal District.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-9328 P-11712 P-8756 P-5193 P-10968

SECRET

Dillon id
~~Scott~~
~~White~~ b

Smith

Alice

13 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ LICOZY-5 - P-2712
13 Dec 1930-2000, Hotel Reforma

1. The C/O arranged to deliver some liquor to Subj at the time he was hosting an Air France cocktail at the Hotel Reforma. After the liquor was transferred to Subj's car in a nearby parking lot, Subj recounted to theC/O the story of a visit he had had from Valentin Loginov that day.

2. Subj reported that Loginov came to his office unannounced and prevailed on Subj to step down to the street to have a coffee with him. Loginov presented Subj with four bottles of vodka for Christmas, and then started to ask Subj some personal questions.

1) How had Subj left Poland (after WWII) for Paris- had his documentation been legal or illegal. Subj answered that it was legal.

2) How was he able to enter Paris- did he have a valid French visa. Subj said he did. How long did he stay in Paris. Subj said a few months.

3) Was he released from service with the (Polish) UB? Subj said yes. Were there any conditions to this release. Subj said no. XXXX Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles. Subj said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March 1955) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subj's old boss in the UB, Stanchuk (phonetic), and how Subj answered that letter. /Comment: Believe the story given in some detail in debriefing of Subj on his experiences in UB and WWII/. Loginov wanted to know if Subj's response to Poles had been positive or negative. Subj said it had been neutral. Asked why, Subj replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "You are right."

4) Loginov asked Subj how he was getting along with the American airlines he deals with. Subj said "fine", and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subj has the chance, he can learn the name of " the director of the CIA in Mexico". Subj told Loginov he was crazy, or couldn't be serious; he couldn't get that information. Loginov asked Subj if he could, would he tell the Soviets. Subj said "maybe."

Subj said to Loginov that he would show Loginov the documents that back up his answers to Loginov's questions, but that he was busy through Christmas, but could possibly see him after Christmas and before New Years.

3. The C/O asked Subj if he had inquired of Loginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subj said he did not, even though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subj felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O told Subj that we would discuss this matter further.

LICOZY-5 is not telling
to me [illegible]!

PRM

File
cc. P-11712

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CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 13 December 1966

1. I met Subject on 13 December 1966 at the corner of Nazas and Melchor Ocampo at 1400. The meeting was held in my car and lasted until 1515. I paid him 800 MN salary for December and 800 MN Christmas bonus for 1966. Next meeting is for Tuesday, 3 January 1967 at 1500 at the same place.

2. Subject started out by showing me 4 pieces of paper he had picked up near the incinerator. They were worthless and I later told him not to attempt to pick up any more paper since it is not worth the risk.

3. I then reviewed the SGSWIRL examination with him. I told him that because of his lies and exaggerations, none of his previous information was considered valid and that rather than "being more useful to us" his material had meant a lot of work for nothing. I told him that I would give him another chance and that we were starting a new operation. Throughout my talk he was quite uncomfortable. He did not try to defend himself but simply agreed to whatever I said. Although he thanked me for the second chance he did not appear to be too contrite.

4. Following are the few interesting items from his notes :

a. On 12 December at ca 1700 KORMUSHKIN came in with another Soviet. KORMUSHKIN asked Subject when he was going to invite him to his home for a drink. Subject suggested Sunday, 18 December. They agreed to meet at the store at 1500. Subject described the other Soviet as a young diplomat ca 29-30 with a thin build who comes in only seldom. He was a friend of Oleg NECHIPORENKO (was already here when NECHIPORENKO was here) and went to the fiesta at Subject's home which was attended by NECHIPORENKO and KOSTIKOV and wives. (COMMENT: I remember a report on this fiesta but can't find it anywhere). Subject asked me for instructions, dinner, girls, etc? I told him to go along with it, have them to his house without other guests and offer them only liquor and snacks. Subject is to determine KORMUSHKIN's motive in asking himself to Subject's home. By the way whenever Subject has mentioned KORMUSHKIN in the last few months he has invariably remarked that he is a very heavy drinker.

b. On 6 December LOGINOV came in from 1230 to 1242. He had previously asked Subject about helping the Soviets to find a house for their school. This time he asked about the new (LILYRIC) building - how much an apartment costs (1500 MN), who lives there (chemical engineer in penthouse (LILYRIC), a German family on the second floor, etc. LOGINOV's questions were general and so were Subject's answers.

c. On Saturday 3 December 1966 SILNIKOV came in from 1412 to 1430. He asked for two receipts of ca 5 MN each for bread, saying that he had lost the real ones. Subject thinks he uses these small sums to buy beer and girlie magazines. SILNIKOV then leafed through a girlie magazine and then said he wants Subject to find him a girl for whose favors he is willing to pay 100 MN. (COMMENT: chiseling 10 MN in false receipts and in the next breath offering 100 MN for a girl?)

FILE: P-8764 P-11707 P-11712 P-6414

1. Concerning the telephone call of 6 December 1966 from Carlos BLANCO to Valentin S. LOGINOV at the Soviet Embassy in which BLANCO told LOGINOV that "El comandante Carlos" (Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda) wanted to see Pavel A. YATSKOV on an urgent matter, the following information may pertain to this discussion :

a. On 11 October 1965 at 2200 hours Pavel A. YATSKOV was seen having dinner with an unidentified Mexican male at the "La Tablita" Restaurant on the corner of Ejercito Nacional and Gutenberg. At the end of their meal the Mexican pushed a small object across the table towards YATSKOV. YATSKOV covered this object with his napkin and then put the object in his pocket. It was obvious that this object was passed in a clandestine manner. They then left the restaurant together and separated. The Mexican then went to a jeep with DF license 11-63 (1964-1965 issue) and drove off alone. This jeep had a seal reading "Procuraduria General de Justicia del Distrito y Territorios Federales - Policia Judicial." Thus, it can be assumed that the person is an employee of the Judicial Police.

b. The unidentified Mexican male was described as about 35 years old, about 170 cm tall, 70 kilos in weight, slight build, dark complexion, dark eyes, black moustache, and he was dressed in a conservative business suit.

2. It is noted that both Carlos CASAMADRID and Carlos BLANCO are similar in appearance to the above described person.

3. Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda called Oleg M. NECHIPORENKO at the Soviet Embassy on 10 March 1965 and on 16 March 1965. On 10 March 1965 CASAMADRID called to confirm a dinner with NECHIPORENKO on the same day. On 16 March 1965 NECHIPORENKO was not in.

4. Carlos BLANCO called Valentin S. LOGINOV on 1 November 1965 and 10 November 1966. In addition Graciela SOTO (a friend of BLANCO's) called LOGINOV on behalf of BLANCO on 8 September 1966 and 9 November 1966. All of the above calls were to arrange social meetings between BLANCO and LOGINOV.

5. All of the above named Soviets are KGB officers. LOGINOV took the place of NECHIPORENKO when NECHIPORENKO left Mexico. LOGINOV arrived in Mexico on 3 August 1965. According to the telephone conversation he was already a good friend of BLANCO's on 1 November 1965. Thus it would appear that LOGINOV

FILE: P-885 P-7442 P-10968 P-11712 P-3634 P-9328

50-6-73/2

Orig: Lirama (via Seinroy), 9 Dec 1966

was put into contact with BLANCO by another Soviet, probably NECHIPORENKO or YATSKOV. It is interesting to note that, although CASAMADRID has been in contact with NECHIPORENKO and BLANCO has been in contact with LOGINOV, there is no pervious indication that either knew YATSKOV. YATSKOV is the KGB chief of both NECHIPORENKO and LOGINOV.

6. Attached is a copy of a memorandum concerning LOGINOV.

1. In July 1966 when you and George were discussing Carlos CASAMADRID as a possible choice for the person who had a secret meeting with Pavel YATSKOV at "La Tablita" Restaurant in October 1965, you told George that CASAMADRID's assistant or man of confidence, NU, fitted the description of the person even better than CASAMADRID did.

a. What is the name of this person and his official title?

b. What are his business and home addresses and telephones?

c. Can you provide us with a photo of him?

d. Can you give us a resume of his professional career and an evaluation of him as a person?

2. Do you know a fnu BLANCO who works with CASAMADRID. Details on him please as above.

Carlos

Dest

Orig: Litempo/IV (9 Dec 1965)

cc: 50-6-91/4

cc: Carlos CASAMADRID (P-1096[illegible]

cc: Carlos BLANCO (P-9328

cc: Pavel YATSKOV (P-88[illegible]

cc: LOGUINOV (P-11712

El Cónsul de Mónaco Ofreció una Recepción

LUDMELA VASILIEVA, Galia Soloviena, Ksenia Riaven kina y Galina Sokolova, Valentina S. Loguinov y el señor Barrelet, cónsul de Mónaco y su señora esposa. (Foto de Garza Noble)

En la residencia del consul de Mónaco, en las Lomas de Chapultepec, se ofreció un coctel para celebrar su fiesta nacional. Gentil anfitriona fué la distinguida señora de Barrelet. Finos vinos y deliciosos bocadillos fueron servidos a los muchos invitados.

Entre los asistentes se encontraban Alfonso de Rosenzweig Díaz y señora, Carlos González Parrodi y señora, don Luis de Alva y Cejudo y señora, Gustavo Cosío Villegas, don Agustín Salvat y señora, los embajadores de Francia, Grecia, Haiti, Holanda; URSS, el señor Abelardo Gurbelo, y los cónsules de Francia, Suiza, Ecuador, Estados Unidos, Grecia, Haiti, Islandia, Marruecos, Nicara-

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA DOS

Excelsior 22 Nov 66

f 11712

SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 21 November 1966

1. I picked Subject up at the corner of Nilo and Melchor Ocampo at 1100 on 21 November 1966. The meeting was held in my car on a side street and lasted 50 minutes. I paid Subject 800 MN, his salary for November 1966. Next meeting is for 1100 on 1 December at the above place. Subject will be given an SGSWIRL examination at this meeting.

2. Subject didn't have a word to say about LOGINOV's attempt to recruit him. When I asked about it, he said he thinks that LOGINOV is out of town since he hasn't seen LOGINOV since his last meeting with me. His notes for 17 November say that at 1210 Yuriy (ISAYEV) came in with another "diplomat" and both bought cigarettes. ISAYEV told Subject (apparently out of the blue) that LOGINOV had been very busy and therefore hadn't been able to see Subject. ISAYEV then added Subject shouldn't forget about what LOGINOV had asked him. Subject answered that he didn't know what ISAYEV was talking about. ISAYEV simply answered, "Good, he will come to see you). I asked Subject why ISAYEV would be discussing LOGINOV's business with him. Subject had no idea, except that he thinks, because of this, that they are connected professionally. (COMMENT: GRU and KGB?)

P- 11712

14-00000

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOWL-1

DATE OF MEETING: 10 November 1966

1. I picked Subject up on the corner of Nazas and Melchor Ocampo at 1100 on 10 November. The meeting was held in my car and lasted an hour. Next meeting is for 21 November at 1100.

2. Subject started things out by saying that LOGINOV is trying to recruit him to report on LIEMPTY-6. Review of his notes and discussion revealed the following: On 5 November LOGINOV came in. Subject told him he had found a house on Juanacatlan. LOGINOV said that he's looking for one on the Chapultapec Park side of Talz. Tacubaya and for Subject to keep looking. Then LOGINOV said that he would like to rent an apartment at P.A. de los Santos 104. Subject told him they are all occupied. LOGINOV said Subject must know these apartments well. Subject admitted that he did and began to sketch them by/LOGINOV didn't seem to be interested in his efforts. LOGINOV then asked how many apartments there were in the building. Subject answered, 16. LOGINOV then said that since Subject knows the apartments so well he must also know the people who live there. Subject admitted that he did. At this point some other Soviets came in and the conversation was terminated. On 6 November LOGINOV dropped by for some small talk and left some Soviet chocolate (which Subject showed me) for Subject's grandchild. On 9 November LOGINOV came in at 1230 and asked Subject to go to a restaurant with him. Subject countered by saying his wife was home sick and he had no one to leave the store with. Subject then invited LOGINOV to his house but LOGINOV insisted on a restaurant. Subject agreed to go on 12 or 13 November.

3. From the above Subject concludes that LOGINOV wants to recruit him to report on LIEMPTY-6 (who lives in P.A. de los Santos 104). I asked why LOGINOV would be interested in LIEMPTY-6 (there is nothing about him in the notes). Subject answered that he finds LIEMPTY-6 very suspicious because in the 5 years that he has known him, Subject doesn't know what he does for a living. He thinks he writes novels. In any case he is home all day long. In addition he lies. Example: He told Subject that he owns the new (LILYRIC) building. He is also eccentric. Besides his windows face on the Embassy. LIEMPTY-6 has apartment 17. The apartment directly below his, number 13, (probably old LILYRIC) is empty. Subject went to see the owner having LOGINOV in mind. The owner said that the apartment had been rented by LIEMPTY-6 which Subject also finds surprising. The whole theme was that he is suspicious of LIEMPTY-6 and that LOGINOV wants to recruit him to report on him. All of the above on LIEMPTY-6 and his apartment was verbal. There was not a word about him in his notes.

4. I told Subject that if LOGINOV tries to recruit him for any purpose, he is to cut him short and to indignantly refuse. He is also to tell LOGINOV that SILNIKOV had tried the same thing two months ago.

P-11712

14-00000

money. He is 28-30 years old, married and has worked for Nicolas for 2 or 3 years. (COMMENT: Colonia Pensil is in the western part of Tacuba and is full of Lagos, but nothing anywhere near Lago Coni). I told Subject to go ahead and get me the information on Nicolas LNU anyway. His notes on this are in the entry for 26 October.

5. With this Subject ran out of volunteered information and we attacked his notes which contained the following items worthy of note :

a. On 11 October LOGINOV came in and asked Subject to keep looking for a house near the Embassy. He said they want it for a school to which the children can walk since driving them back and forth to the present school is proving cumbersome. He also suggested that Subject sign the rental contract since many people are unwilling to rent to Soviets. When I expressed surprise about Subject signing a contract for 5,000 pesos a month he said that he had done it before for a Soviet Colonel in 1953 (the year Stalin died). This house was at Chicontepec 70 and rented for 4,000 pesos. (COMMENT: That Subject could sign a contract for 5,000 pesos a month is ridiculous. That the Soviets are looking for a new school just after moving into the new one is strange).

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usual effervescent self, asked immediately if I had gotten the papers he left for me, stated that he had decided to go to Moscow, rattled off his schedule, gave me the names of the only other two travel agents he knew were going, repeated several times he'd be happy to give me a report when he returned, and asked, as if he hoped I didn't, if ~~there~~ was anything I wanted to tell him before he left. I got the floor about this time and proceeded to backtrack over some of the ground just covered. As for his schedule and itinerary, he plans to leave for Moscow on 23 October via Air France, stopping over briefly in Paris; to make a side trip to Kiev on 27 and 28 October; and to leave Moscow for Paris via Air France on 30 October. He will fly from Paris to Genoa for a day on travel business and then return to Mexico from Paris on Air France via New York, where he plans to pick up a couple of suits and take in "Superman" on Broadway. He will arrive back in Mexico on 3 ~~October~~ November.

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3. Subject said that in addition to the other three agents whom he had mentioned last time as having been invited to the Intourist Conference--Moises SCHUSTER of Mundos Tours, Carlos IBARGUEN of De Carlo Tours, and Edmundo *GARZA ofGarza Travel Service--he had learned that Isaac BULAEVSKY of Jet Travel Agency had also received an invitation. Besides himself, however, only SCHUSTER and BULAEVSKY are going, the other two having decided against the trip for unknown reasons. Subject mentioned that SCHUSTER is going to take his son, who is in his early teens.

orig filed P-8415

4. I asked Subject if he had been in touch with anyone at the Soviet Embassy about the trip or if anyone there seemed to be responsible for lining up pa_rticipants

LICANNY-1 Contact Report 18 Oct 66

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for or to have any special interest in the Conference. Subject replied that he had been at the Soviet Embassy about the middle of September on visa business and had seen the Soviet he always deals with on visa matters, but that this individual seemed surprised to hear Subject had been invited to Moscow and claimed to know nothing--or at least none of the details--about the Intoruist Conference. Subject claimed not to be able to remember the Soviet's name, hunted around in his wallet unsuccessfully for the Soviet's card, and then said, well, in any case it was the individual he had mentioned last time as having just gotten a promotion to Consul. I finally asked him if he meant LOGINOV--whose name he had given me last time--and after thinking for a moment, he rolied that yes, that sounded right. I then asked him if LOGINOV had shown any more interest in him or in any way been more friendly toward him in the last couple of months or since he had received the Intourist invite. Subject replied that he had not.

5. Subject seemed a little sensitive to this question, and I stated that I was sure he understood why I was asking, since I knew he had been thoroughly briefed by one of my predecessors prior to his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union on Soviet interest in visitors to the USSR. I explained that we had no intention to ask him to do what he had agreed to do on his last trip to the USSR (accept recruitment if offered) and that we did not want to burden him with any instructions on how to behave or respond while there. However, I said, we continued to feel he was of potential interest to the Soviets and wanted to make sure he was aware of this when he went over, had a healthy respect for the leverage the Soviets have on their home ground, and

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LICAVN-1 Contact Report 18 Oct 66

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14 October 1966

Index names in attachments

SUBJECT: CONTACT Report/ LICOOKY-5 - P-2712
14 Oct 1200-1245, Subj's office

1. Subj reported that Valentin Loginov had dropped by the office during the week and went to have coffee with Subj (Subj remarked that Loginov doesn't seem to want to talk in the office). Loginov had brought along visa application forms for Subj, and Subj filled them out for himself and his son, Marcos, and turned them over to Loginov along with the passports (attached are copies of the visas- note: the visas are good for over 20 days in the Soviet Union, although the INTURIST conference is from 24 Oct to 29 Oct).

Loginov told Subj that Pavel Yatskov wanted to see him (presumably Yatskov has brought something back for Subj). Subj asked Loginov what Yatskov is doing. The Soviet replied that Yatskov has a job in the Embassy. Subj pressed: "What kind of a job. It's worthwhile that you gave him a good job." Loginov replied: "You want to know too much."

2. The C/O asked Subj what decided him to go to the Soviet Union. Subj replied that he had a commission from the Petroleum Congress (Subj is involved in organizing the Congress for Mexico for 2 to 8 April 1967), actually in behalf of KLM and his own interests, to persuade the Soviets that they use some other airline than Aeroflot to transport the Soviet delegates to Mexico. /Comment: the C/O saw a confidential letter from KLM which set out the probability that the Soviets would want to use Aeroflot but that they had not committed themselves as yet as to number of delegates that would attend or the means by which they would transport delegates; attached is a copy of a letter to Dr. N.S. Namotkin appointing Subj in his visit to Moscow to talk to Dr. Nametkin - the letter states that "the future visit of Subj is exclusively connected to assist the National Committee" which is patently not the case since Subj is attending the INTURIST conference/.

At any rate Subj has decided to go to Moscow, and is taking his sons along. Subj repeated his tactic in Moscow as far as contacts with the Soviets are concerned. He will not seek them out, not even Nechiporenko, and if contacted by them he will be affable and non-committal, and not put the sharp issue to them that he is through. He said the latter remains his position in Mexico, or anywhere else but in the Soviet Union.

3. The attached booklet of the World Petroleum Congress contains the names of the National Committees of the Iron Curtain countries. Attached are listings of the Czechoslovak delegates and a letter detailing the Hungarian delegates along with financial arrangements for them.

4. The C/O will see Subj before he leaves Mexico on 22 October.

Note. also attached is a letter appointing Subj as personal representative of [illegible] to 5th International Congress of [illegible]

P-7442 (w/attachments)

P-11712 (w/attachments)
P-8357 (w/attachments)
Files
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7 October 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5 – P-2712
7 Oct 1145-1230, Subj's office

1. Subj had been to Los Angeles, California for a few days and had returned to Mexico on 5 Oct. Evidently he had accompanied a Puebla delegation that visited Douglas and Lockheed aircraft factories in California. He mentioned that Aeronaves had purchased two DC-8's from Douglas, and ordered some DC-9's. At the Lockheed plant they saw the new super-sonic airplane.

2. Subj had received on 6 Oct a confirmatory telegram from INTURIST, for Subj and his son (copy attached), re attendance at the INTURIST conference in Moscow. Also, in the mail of 7 Oct Subj had received INTURIST releases on travel regulations for tourists to the Soviet Union, promotional plans, tours, etc. (Subj will make copies of these for turnover to the C/O).

Subj reported that Valentin Loginov came by the office on 29 Sept. Subj was with a friend, Peter Parr, of New York, so he went to have coffee with Loginov, taking along his friend. The discussion was innocuous, but Loginov asked Subj if he would be going to see his friends, which Subj took to mean that all was O.K. as far as Subj's attendance in Moscow for the INTURIST conference. Subj answered "yes". Loginov jokingly asked Subj whey Rusk had come to Mexico. Subj bantered a reply that the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was going to serve some rare Champagne that Rusk liked. Loginov pressed Subj for the real reason. Subj said cagily that he knew, but he wasn't going to tell Loginov. /Comment: This banter is included in the report to demonstrate the type of relationship that exists between Subj and Loginov. Anything from Loginov that borders on a desire for information or involving Subj, the latter turns away with a joking answer. Loginov accepts this fending off good-naturedly, jokingly calling Subj "a son of a bitch" or worse./

3. Subj discussed with the C/O the prospect of his going to the Soviet Union. He was debating in his own mind the advisability of it. The C/O probed to see how Subj regarded it from a business standpoint, putting the question "if you shouldn't go, do you think it would hurt you from the standpoint of business." Subj said he just didn't know. The C/O asked if others went (Subj had just said that possibly Garza, Rhine and Akov (phonetic) would go- although they were not certain) did Subj think the Soviets might throw the bulk of the business their way. Again Subj said he didn't know. The C/O then said that unless there were some overriding business reason, Subj should take into account our view that there was a margin of hazard

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Files [illegible] P 2712
[illegible] Katz (Barry) P-581

2

to Subj's being inside the Soviet Union. Subj said that personally he had no great desire to go to the Soviet Union, on three counts: 1) the climate 2) "the pleasant atmosphere" (his way of saying that if he was out of grace with the Soviets they wouldn't put out the red carpet for him as they did previously) and 3) he was plain afraid.

The latter admission apparently touched some hidden spring in Subj. Heretofore Subj had limited himself to calling the Soviets "bastards" etc. and anti-semitic. Now, Subj chided himself for doing so little to alleviate the lot of the Jews in the Soviet Union. He declared that the Soviet Union was the worst offender against the Jews, because they were eliminating the race, not through physical extermination, but through forcing assimilation. His own view was that the Soviets were more dangerous to the Jews and Israel than were the Arabs, for instance Lebanon or Jordan, who if it weren't for fear of Nasser would make their peace with Israel.

The C/O tried to counter the self-recrimination of Subj by telling him that he had accomplished a superb job in the duel of the West with the Soviets through his cooperation with us. That, in view of his real feelings about the Soviets, his dealing with them had been masterful. Subj shook off the C/O's optimistic view of Subj's contribution to the "cause."

4. The C/O brought up the request to get full details on the travel of all non-Soviets to the Soviet Union - and suggested that Subj automatically have duplicates made of the visa requests for such people. Subj said that would be simple - and he would instruct "Miriam" (the employee who handles INTURIST travel) to make copies of all applications for visas./ Comment: the C/O asked Subj if Miriam TK (Avila Katz) P-581 were going to remain in his employ, not taking a job at the Israeli Embassy - and Subj replied that she was going to stay on in Subj's firm/.

Subj had remarked that he was going to discuss the matter of making the Moscow trip with his wife. The C/O asked that Subj advise us as soon as he had come to a decision- either for or against going to the Soviet Union.

The C/O told Subj that he would pass by his office next week to pick up the copies of the INTURIST material.

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PRM

COPIES MADE Licozy-5 CR-P-3713
7 Oct 66

SECRET

LICOWL General Notes Turned in on 6 October 1966

22 September 1966 (Thursday)

(LOGINOV) came in for cigarettes. He said that there are 52 Mexicans studying at Lumumba. These students are going to be the directors in the schools of the Politechnico Nacional since one of them has come back well prepared in physics. (There follows a diatribe against those bad Mexicans who want to make Mexico another Cuba.)

23 September 1966 (Friday)

The "Spanish type" came in with a briefcase and bought Raleighs with filters. He had the same type of billfold as the other Soviets. He then went directly to the Embassy. (I asked if he had a moustache; he said, yes. This is probably GAZIYEV).

24 September 1966 (Saturday)

In the afternoon SILNIKOV was there when (ISAYEV) came in. I asked the latter about the watches and he said that they wouldn't arrive until the end of the year. SILNIKOV left at 1620.

25 September 1966 (Sunday)

Unimportant

26 September (Monday)

A useless blurb about an unnamed Soviet who came in and discoursed on MADRAZO, saying that he will set up a new party and an anti-Soviet blast.

27 September (Tuesday)

(DENISOV) came in at 1210 and made a phone call. I heard him mention Delicias and del Rio. Since these towns are near the border near San Diego, I think he was talking about smuggling arms to Guatemala (sic). Afterwards I asked after his wife. He said that she and their daughter are in Moscow and that he is a batchelor. I asked if he was able to find a girl. He answered, of course, but they all want a house. He left at 1230.

28 September 1966 (Wednesday)

An account from a friend that a Soviet will be PNGed for being involved with the Guatemalan arms smuggling.

Attachment to LICOWL Contact Report, 6 Oct 66

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P-11712

I'd get info he offers para 8

2

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICANNY-1 — P-3415

DATE OF MEETING: 28 September 1966

1. LICOZY-5 reported on 20 September that LICANNY-1 of Garza-Lopez Tours was one of those invited to attend the 24-29 Intourist Conference in Moscow. This was confirmed by LIENVOY on the same date. Since the Station had had no contact with Subject sine 6 January 1966, I contacted Don Lautz of the Visa Section on 27 September to see if Subject was still coming into the Embassy regularly ~~on~~ on visa business. Lautz said that Subject had for some time now been sending an agent to the Embassy rather than coming himself. Lautz readily agreed to give Subject a call, however, and reached him late that afternoon. He told Subject that the "people" at the Embassy whom he had introduced Subject to earlier were interested in talking with him and asked if he could drop into the Embassy in the next few days. Subject immediately recognized which "people" Lautz was referring to, said that as a matter of fact he had something to discuss with "them," commented that it probably in fact involved the same matter, and agreed to come to Lautz's office at 11:00 the next day. As he had done with Irving A. Oronsky, Lautz agreed to let me use his office to talk to Subject.

2. I went to Lautz's office at 11:00 on the 28th, but when Subject had not appeared by 11:15, Lautz agreed to call me in my office when Subject arrived. Lautz called about 11:30, and I went right down. By the time I got there, however, Subject had already explained to Lautz that he was sure I wanted to talk about his invitation to

Files: cc P-2712 with attachment A only; P-11712 without attachments; P-11990 ([illegible]) without attachments the USSR and had given Lautz a list of three other invitees to the Intourist conference. Lautz introduced me by true name as Oronsky's replacement. Subject, in what Lautz had forewarned me was his usual over-enthusiastic manner, greeted me with a "believe me, it is my pleasure" salutation and, upon confirming that it was the Intourist conference I was interest in, took off from there. Without the slightest prompting, he rattled off the following:

a) He had received a telegram from Moscow on 6 September inviting him to an Intourist conference in Moscow from 24-29 October. He had immediately thought of informing the Embassy, but because of the pressure of business simply hadn't gotten around to it. When Lautz called him, he knew immediately what we were interested in.

b) He had prepared a Xerox copy of the telegram for us, which he gave to me. He has not yet definitely made up his mind about attending the conference, but thinks he probably will go. At the moment, he was still awaiting the detailed letter on the conference which, according to the telegram, was to follow. (LICOZY-5 has already received his letter.) In reply to my question as to whether he was sending enough people to the USSR to make the trip really worthwhile, he said that he had sent only five people there so far this year, but that he thought travel to the Soviet Union was definitely going to pick up. He said that LOGINOV , who has been the Soviet official he has been dealing with about visas,

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to Moscow could consequently be made at relatively little additional expense.

c) Subject continued that if he did go to Moscow, he would be glad to submit a report on his trip when he got back, get (group) pictures, if we wanted them, of other travel agents who attended, and generally keep his eyes open. However, he said, as he told Oronsky, he is not interested in working for us on a permanent basis, meeting clandestinely with us, or taking any money. He was willing to help, he explained, because he believed basically what we did about current world problems and, after all, had lived in the States for many years and regarded it as his "second home." He said he liked the arrangement of meeting in Lautz's office because it made clandestine meetings unnecessary and because he had a perfectly legitimate reason for being there.

d) Subject stated that he had already given Lautz the names of the other travel agents in Mexico whom he had heard had been invited to Moscow and said that once he received the Intourist letter giving the details on the conference he would begin calling around to see exactly who was going.

3. Since a) Subject had already volunteered to do primarily what I intended to ask him, b) had not yet definitely decided to make the trip, c) Lautz gave no indication of preparing to leave us alone, and d) I clearly could not get any farther with Subject on a personal level with Lautz present, I brought the meeting to an end with a request to see Subject again after he had received the Intourist letter, obtained the names of those of his colleagues who were going, and decided definitely whether or not he was going to go. Subject said he would be happy to talk with me again, get the

information I wanted, and, " if I liked," "be briefed" on the trip. It was agreed he would call Lautz to set up the meeting. (The situation was such that I do not blame Lautz for apparently thinking it unnecessary to leave us alone this time, but I made a special point of requesting that he leave us to ourselves next time. Lautz, who seems to be thoroughly friendly and accommodating, readily agreed.)

4. Subject impresses me as a very sharp, shrewd, cool-headed, but probably basically sincere individual. He had the situation figured perfectly when he arrived in Lautz's office, had decided precisely what he would be willing to do, knew exactly what he was going to say, and wasted no words in saying it. I plan to try to get to know him a little better next time, give him a defensive briefing as well as one on what to keep his eyes open for, and also explore his attitude toward a possible recruitment pitch from the Soviets. (Prior to his trip to the USSR in May 1963, Subject agreed to accept Soviet recruitment if approached and to serve as a DA. Upon his return, however, he reported that the Soviets made no approach to him.) I also want to ask him about LOGINOV, ~~loginov,*~~ on whom he agreed to supply personality data to Oronsky, but evidently never did. Subject mentioned that LOGINOV had told him about ten days ago that he had been promoted to Consul. Subject did not say if he had been in touch with LOGINOV or anyone else at the Soviet Embassy about the Intourist conference. I will get this from him next time.

5. Subject told Lautz that the following individuals had been invited to the Intourist conference:

(a) Moises Schuster of Mundos Tours.

(b) Carlos IBARGUEN of De Carlo Tours (IBARGUEN is also the president of the Mexican Travel Agents' Assoc.).

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(c) Someone from the Garza Travel Service.

Subject also gave me an Air France tourist pamphlet on the USSR in Spanish for my information.

6. Subject mentioned in passing that he would be glad to furnish us (presumably on a regular basis) with the names of those people who book travel to the Soviet Union through his Agency, but said Oronsky had previously shown disinterest in such information. In view of Oronsky's alleged disinterest, I let the subject pass without comment, but I see no reason not to take up his offer. Besides furnishing us with a few more names, it would give us a reason for continuing contact with Subject.

KRL

Keith R. Levenderis

LOGINOV, Valentin Sergeyevich
DOB 2? Dec 22
Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna
Son: Dmitriy

1-11712
201-295412

Career:

Attache, Sovemb, Havana

?Aug 63- 7/24/69 3rd Secy, Sovemb, Mexico (vice [illegible] KK[illegible])

Residence:
Car:
Overt duties:

RIS: [illegible]





LOGINOV - Photographs



Valentin S. LOGINOV (P-11712) with Boris A. CHMYKHOV (P-6235) SOURCE : LICALLA 2 August 1968.

P-11712

[illegible] 13 Sept 67

Valentin [illegible]

with Boris [illegible]

P 11712



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



VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV

P-11712

SOURCE: LILYRIC, 25 SEPT 1968



Valentin S. LOGUINOV
Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy
Born in 1927
Wife Alexandra, born in 1928
Son Dmitry, born in 1959

LOGUINOV is tall and has very curly, light brown hair. He speaks fluent Spanish and some English. He drives a green 1965 Impala with lomatic tags 19-DA.







Valentin S. Loguinov
Cónsul de la U.R.S.S.
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.

15-60-35



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meeting [illegible]



Chmyzkhon & Lagenon

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Mealla - 22 April 68

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

Contact reports, photos, etc., forwarded from the field.

SECRET

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Prepared by
LIREALM-7

FORM 12-67 2825

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(4)

LOGINOV-P-11,712

~~[illegible]~~

Feb 69

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires far less essay-type reporting than the previous form.

2. For a number of years, our operational psychologists have been developing a system for indirect assessment of target personalities. The system employs—in lieu of psychological tests and interviews—observations of appearance, manner, and style of behavior. Such observations are used as if they were items in a psychological test, and like test items, are weighted and analyzed to yield a personality profile. Working from the profile, operational psychologists describe the target personality's basic aptitudes, attitudes, motives and susceptibilities. The goal of the assessment is to identify feasible means of influencing the target person.

3. Reliability is vastly increased when two or more observers complete this questionnaire independently. All items need not be completed; in fact, it is a rare case where contact is sufficient to complete it fully. You are encouraged to guess where complete information is lacking. Mark such items with a "G," instead of the customary check mark or "X." Thus, an observer with very limited contact can be expected to enter more "G's" than "X's."

4. Before completing the enclosed PAQ form, please provide the following information about *yourself*:

Age 39 Sex M Nationality US

Social-cultural background:

Middle-class

How often have you observed the target individual?

3 to 4 times per month over two years.

When did you last observe the target individual?

Last week. (week of 2 Feb 1969)

What is the nature of your contact? (direct acquaintance, embassy receptions/parties, informants, debriefing of others, etc.)

Tennis club.

5. Can you supply a specimen of the target individual's handwriting?

Yes ____ No X

6. Please supply the name(s) of any person you believe qualified to provide information about the target person, that is, anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to complete this form at least in part.

Gloria Pinto

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. DESCRIPTION

1. Overall Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

1.01	Virile, athletic, practical, and socially facile ("Hail fellow")	___
1.02	Virile, rugged, practical, but socially guarded (authoritarian)	X
1.03	Rather soft and sensuous but socially pleasant and appropriate (good guy)	___
1.04	Rather soft and sensuous but socially guarded and moody (a possible whiner)	___
1.05	Manly, clean-cut, professional, and socially smooth (executive type)	___
1.06	Austere, precise, and businesslike (dedicated worker type)	___
1.07	Cultured, neat, artistic, and socially smooth (diplomatic type)	___
1.08	Sensitive, intense, and self-preoccupied (artistic or absent-minded professor type)	___
1.09	None of these fit. I would describe him as:	___

2. Dress. (Check the most appropriate.)

2.01	Well-groomed (natty)	
2.02	Neat (well-kept)	X
2.03	Fastidious (fussy)	___
2.04	Overdressed (prissy)	___
2.05	Nondescript (bland)	___
2.06	Underdressed (informal)	___
2.07	Casual (indifferent)	___

4.01.04 Does he have a nickname: Yes ___ No X

If Yes, does he object to being addressed by his nickname? Yes ___ No ___

4.01.05 Is he addressed by a diminutive? (Johnny, Jack, Hank, etc.) Yes X No ___

4.01.06 Does he have any scars or other distinguishing marks? Yes ___ No X

If so, please describe:

4.02 Hair:

4.02.01 Color Very light ___ Light ___ Medium X
Gray or white ___ Dark ___ Very dark ___

4.02.02 Waviness Curly X Average ___ Straight ___

4.02.03 Amount Thick ___ Average X Sparse ___
Balding ___ Bald ___

4.02.04 Grooming Well-groomed ___ Unruly ___
Average X Unkempt ___

4.02.05 Is there anything unusual about his hair or hair style? ___
If so, please describe:

4.03 Eyes:

4.03.01 Color Gray ___ Green ___ Blue ___
Yellowish ___ Hazel ___ Light brown ___
Brown ___

4.03.02 Wears eyeglasses
Always ___ To read ___ Never X

4.03.03 Eyeglass lens Thick ___ Average ___ Bifocal ___

4.03.04 Eyeglass style Heavy frame ___ Rimless ___ Average frame ___ Contact lens ___

4.03.05 Is there anything unusual about his eyes that requires special mention. If so, please describe: ___

4.03.06 Does he take off glasses when he speaks? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.07 Does he use glasses to gesture? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.08 Does he ever wear sunglasses indoors? Yes ___ No X

4.04 Complexion:

4.04.01 Coloring Ruddy ___ Dark ___ Tan ___ Light X Pale ___

4.04.02 Face (a) Scarred ___ Lined ___ Smooth ___
(b) Beard ___ Clean-shaven X Mustache ___ Unshaved ___

4.04.03 Describe type of mustache or beard:

4.04.04 Body hair (arms, legs, chest) Heavy ___ Medium ___ Light X

4.04.05 Hair visible on nose? ___

4.04.06 Hair visible on ears? ___

4.04.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his skin or skin coloring? If so, please describe: ___

4.05 **Face:**

4.05.01 Expressiveness Expressive ___ Average X Inexpressive ___
Very expressive ___ Very inexpressive ___

4.05.02 If expressive, is face Natural ___ Tense ___

4.05.03 If inexpressive, is face Relaxed ___ Deadpan ___

4.05.04 In general, are facial responses Inappropriate ___ Appropriate X

4.05.05 Is there anything unusual or striking about his facial expressions? If so, please describe: when tense, he arches both eyebrows and tilts his head back.

4.06 **Lips:**

4.06.01 Type Protruding ___ Pursed ___ Thin X
Full ___ Loose ___

4.06.02 Smiles (a) Spontaneously ___ Tensely ___ Mechanically ___
(b) Very frequently ___ Frequently ___ Average X
Infrequently ___ Never ___

4.06.03 Have you ever seen him smile to himself? Yes X No ___

4.06.04 If you have seen him having his picture taken,
can he smile on command? Yes X No ___
Or is he wooden and rather ill-at-ease? Yes ___ No ___

4.06.05 If you have not seen him having his picture taken, what kind of a picture do you think he would prefer? Serious ___ Smiling ___

4.06.06 Is there anything about his lips or smile that is unusual or striking? If so, please describe:

4.07 Teeth

4.07.01 Shape Regular X Average ___ Protruding ___ Unusual ___

4.07.02 Do you get the feeling he clenches his teeth? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, under what circumstances?

4.07.03 Does he have any gold teeth or unusual dental work? Yes ___ No X

4.07.04 When he smiles, does he
Show his teeth? Yes ___ No X
Purse his lips? Yes ___ No ___
Put hand over mouth? Yes ___ No ___

4.07.05 Does he put his hand over his mouth when talking?
Never X Frequently ___
Occasionally ___ Always ___

4.07.06 Color of teeth White X Dull ___ Stained ___

4.07.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his teeth?
If so, please describe:

4.08 Posture:

4.08.01 Straightness Round-shouldered ___ Slumped ___ Erect X Stiff ___

4.08.02 Is posture maintained? Consistently X Variable ___

4.08.03 Shoulders Broad-shouldered X Sloping ___ Average ___ Narrow ___

4.08.04 Body build Skinny ___ Average ___ Heavy X Obese ___

4.08.05 When conversing, in what direction does he primarily lean in relation to the other person?
Towards ___ Away X Neither ___

4.08.06 Does posture, when listening, differ from posture when talking? NO
If so, please describe:

4.08.07 Sitting Posture (a) Relaxed ___ Average ___ Stiff ___
(b) Erect X Average ___ Slumped ___

4.08.08 When in a group, is he inclined
To stand still X
Move about in one place ___
Lean against the wall ___
Sit down even though others are standing ___
Place his arms on others ___

4.08.09 If taller than average, does he bend over to come down to the group? Yes ___ No X

4.08.10 If shorter than average, does he stand up to the group?
Yes ___ No ___

4.08.11 When listening to a lecture (or watching a play or movie) does he
Sit still, stare at the speaker X
Move about, fidget, change position ___

4.08.12 Is there anything about his posture, carriage, or bearing that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.09 Hands:

4.09.01 Dominance Right-handed ___ Left-handed X

4.09.02 Is he inclined to use his less dominant hand?
Frequently ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

4.09.03 Size of hands Very large ____ Large X Average ____
Small ____ Very small ____

4.09.04 His use of his hands is Graceful ____ Average X Awkward ____

4.09.05 In normal situations, his arms hang Loose ____ Stiff ____
Average X

4.09.06 When standing (talking or listening) he has a tendency
To open and close his hands ____
Put hands in pocket ____
Run hand over face or hair ____

4.09.07 If he puts hands in pockets, he is more likely to put them in
Pants ____ Coat ____

4.09.08 Nails Clean, not manicured X Manicured ____ Average ____
Ragged ____ Dirty ____ Bitten ____

4.09.09 If nails are bitten, to what extent?
Barely ____ Average ____ Deeply ____

4.09.10 Are fingers Blunt ____ Average X Long ____

4.09.11 Are hands Callous ____ Rough ____ Average X
Smooth ____ Soft ____

4.09.12 In public, does he
Pull, rub, or pick nose ____
Rub back of neck ____
Run hand over face or mouth ____
Scratch any part of his body ____
Pull at his clothes ____
Never do any of these things X

4.09.13 Does he put his arms on the table? Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.14 Does he put his elbows on the table? Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.15 When sitting at a table or desk, does he talk ____ or listen ____ with his head in his hands?
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

4.09.16 When talking, does he tend to
Close his eyes ___
Put his hand over his eyes ___
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never X

4.09.17 If he closes or covers his eyes, is he more inclined to do it
When trying to make a particular point ___
When listening to someone else ___

4.09.18 Does he tap fingers on table?
Never ___ Occasionally ___ Often ___

4.09.19 Is he more inclined to do this when
Talking ___ Listening ___ Thinking ___

4.09.20 Does he
Rattle change in his pocket ___
Toy with some object ___
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never X

4.09.21 Is there anything unique about his hands or arms worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.10 Feet:

4.10.01 Does he tend to show foot preference? Left ___ Right ___

4.10.02 Does he work to keep in step when walking with someone? Yes ___
No ___

4.10.03 Does he cross feet at ankles when seated?
Yes ___ No ___

4.10.04 If so, which foot is over the other? Left ___ Right ___

4.10.05 Does he cross legs Only when he faces in a new direction ___
As soon as he sits down ___
Shortly after he sits down ___
Occasionally ___
Never ___

4.10.06 If he crosses legs, which leg is on top? Left ___ Right ___
Depends on how he is sitting ___

4.10.07 Does he change his crossed leg Depends on how he is facing ___
Frequently ___ Occasionally ___ Never ___

4.10.08 Compared to most people, does he walk
Faster ___ Slower ___ Same speed ___

4.10.09 If he is out of step with you, does he notice it and get in step?
Yes ___ No ___

4.10.10 In conversation when he becomes intense, does he
Uncross his legs and lean forward ___
Uncross his legs and lean backward ___
Cross his legs and sit upright ___
Shift to a more erect position X
Shift to a more relaxed position ___
Make little change in position ___

4.10.11 Are his feet Large ___ Average X Small ___

4.10.12 Are his shoes (a) Pointed ___ Average X Blunt ___
(b) Highly polished ___ Average X Not well kept ___

4.10.13 Is there anything about his feet or legs that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.10.14 When his legs are crossed, does he
Sit quietly ___ Move his foot ___ Swing or wiggle his leg ___

4.10.15 Does he ever tap his foot? No ___ Yes ___

4.10.16 Does he swing back and forth on his feet when standing and talking in a group?
Often ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

4.10.17 When walking, are his steps Long ___ Normal X Short ___

4.10.18 When he walks, do his arms
Hang loose ___
Swing with his stride X
Swing, but out of rhythm ___
Hang tense ___

4.10.19 When he walks, do his toes
Turn out ___ Stay straight X Turn in ___

4.11 Voice:

4.11.01 Is his voice pitched Low ___ Medium X High ___

4.11.02 Does he speak Quietly ___ Average X Loudly ___

4.11.03 In his native language, is his tone quality noticeably
Louder ___ Quieter ___ About the same X

4.11.04 Does he have a speech impediment? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, please describe:

4.12 Use of Language

4.12.01 Does his native language vocabulary seem Rich ___ Limited ___
Average X Poor ___

4.12.02 In his best language, other than native, is he
Fluent ___ Barely fluent ___
Moderately fluent X Poor ___

4.12.03 Does he pick up idioms Quickly ___ Slowly ___
Average X Not at all ___

4.12.04 Does he learn foreign languages easily Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, does he
Learn primarily by "feel" and by "trial and error" ___
Learn primarily from textbooks ___

4.12.05 In his best second language, can he switch from his native language
Smoothly with little hesitation X
Effectively with average hesitation ___
Slowly with considerable hesitation ___
Awkwardly with considerable embarrassment ___

4.12.06 When he misuses language, does he ordinarily appear
Oblivious of it ___
Aware of, but indifferent to it X
Aware of, and anxious about it ___
Very aware of it and quite embarrassed ___

4.12.07 In general, would you characterize him as
Laconic ____ Average X Garrulous ____

4.12.08 In ordinary conversation, does the content tend to be primarily
Personal ____ Impersonal ____
Interpersonal ____ Guarded ____

4.12.09 In ordinary conversation, is the content
Precise and to the point ____
Relevant ____
Average ____
To the point but rambling ____
Irrelevant ____

4.12.10 Does he
Often discuss personal problems ____
Rarely discuss personal problems X

4.12.11 Does he use profanity in his native language?
Occasionally ____ Frequently ____ Never X

4.12.12 Does he use profanity in an acquired language?
Occasionally ____ Frequently ____ Never X

4.12.13 Is there anything about his manner of speech or conversational style that is unusual. Yes ____ No ____
If Yes, please describe:

4.13 Gestures:

4.13.01 Does he gesture when he talks? Always ____ Sometimes ____
Never X

4.13.02 His most characteristic gesture is.
Pointing with finger ____
Waving one hand ____
Sweeping both hands ____
Chopping both hands ____

4.13.03 When he gestures, the motion is
Graceful ____ Average ____ Mechanical ____

4.13.04 When engaged in conversation, does he tense up
Often ____ Rarely ____
Sometimes X Never ____

4.13.05 It is relatively easy to tell when he is really interested in a subject
Always X Rarely ____
Sometimes ____ Never ____

4.13.06 His eyes are very expressive Always ____ Sometimes X Rarely ____

4.13.07 Most people would find his eyes Beautiful ____ Average X
Pleasant ____ Unpleasant ____
Sinister ____

4.13.08 He maintains eye contact Always ____ Frequently X
Sometimes ____ Rarely ____ Never ____

4.13.09 In a group, have you ever seen him stare repeatedly at a person who seemed to interest him? Often ____ Sometimes ____ Never X

4.13.10 When he admires (follows with eyes) an attractive girl, he is Obvious ____ Average ____ Subtle X
I have never seen him do it ____
Have you ever seen him blush? Yes X No ____
If Yes, describe the situation:
His political comments were successfully changed at a party. All present, including himself, were embarrassed by the confrontation

4.13.11 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the movements he makes with his body, eyes, or head and the way he behaves in a group? If so, please describe: Yes

See 4.05.05

4.14 **Sleep**

4.14.01 Does he Enjoy sleep and fall off easily? Yes___ No___
Read or walk to prepare himself for sleep? Yes___ No___

4.14.02 Does he Rise easily? Yes___ No___
Prefer to remain abed until the last moment? Yes___ No___

4.14.03 Is he An early starter? ___
A late starter? ___

4.15 **Impressions:**

4.15.01 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most women would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average___
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___
Sexually attractive X

4.15.02 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most men would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average X
Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___

4.15.03 Without prior knowledge, if you saw him on the street, would he impress you as Nondescript___ Average X Striking___

4.15.04 Without prior knowledge and on the basis of looks alone, which of the following do you think he might be?
Peasant___ Executive___
Worker X Professional___
Merchant___ Military Officer___
Artist of some type___

4.15.05 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the overall impression he gives? Yes
If so, please describe:

Conspicuously athletic.
Looks like boxer.

II. BACKGROUND

5. General

5.01 Ethnic Background:

5.01.01 Please describe his ethnic background.

Slavic - blond

5.01.02 How does he compare with others of this background?

[✓ Like most]
A stereotype
Not like most
I would never guess his background

5.02 Cultural Background:

5.02.01 If he had his personal choice, do you think he is the kind of person who, living in a foreign culture would

Never change his accustomed way of living
Maintain his accustomed way of living but show some interest in the local culture
[✓ Show some interest in the local culture and adapt his ways]
Go native if he had his chance

5.02.02 Compared with his own group, he is

[✓ just like all the rest of them]
Somewhat different than most of them
Unique

5.03 Educational Background:

5.03.01 What is his educational background? Please describe:

5.03.02 In your opinion, compared to most people in his culture with a similar background he
Is as well-educated ____
Is better informed ____
Appears better educated than he claims ____
Appears less educated than he claims X
I cannot conceive of him having the background he claims ____
If you doubt his background, please comment:

6. General Impression of Background (Check the most appropriate)

6.01 Strong and rugged (a man's man) X

6.02 Strong, rugged, but independent (a self-sufficient loner) ____

6.03 Compassionate, sensual and understanding (a woman's man) ____

6.04 Moody, emotional, and sometimes bitter (the "misunderstood" man) ____

6.05 Forthright, intelligent, and responsible (the professional man) ____

6.06 Proficient, intelligent, and intense (the technical man) ____

6.07 Sensitive, cultured, and sophisticated (the "Madison Avenue" man) ____

6.08 Sensitive, temperamental, and unconventional (the Bohemian man) ____

6.09 None of these. ____
I would describe him as:

III. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

7. General Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

7.01 The kind of a man who is usually punctual, inclined to greet everyone informally and who appears to be comfortable with himself when he enters a room. ____

7.02 The kind of a man who is always punctual, inclined to greet everyone somewhat awkwardly and who appears to be uncomfortable when he enters a room. X

7.03 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be very warm and friendly with everyone he knows, and who appears confident when he enters a room. ____

7.04 The kind of man who is punctual when he makes a date, but who is inclined to cancel engagements rather often, inclined to greet only those people he has met before and is somewhat retiring or standoffish when he enters a room. ____

7.05 The kind of man who is inclined to keep you waiting but is gracious and attentive when he arrives, inclined to be precise and proper as he greets everyone and can be quite impressive when he enters a room. ____

7.06 The kind of man who is always punctual, inclined to be very formal in his greetings and is most often stiff and unbending when he enters a room. ____

7.07 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be charming and sophisticated as he greets everyone and is quite socially poised when he enters a room. ____

7.08 The kind of man who is often quite late—and indifferent about it—inclined to be short and curt in his greetings and is sometimes awkward when he enters a room. ____

7.09 None of these. ____
I would describe him as:

8. Meeting People:

8.01 When he shakes hands Does he move toward you ____
or Do you most often have to move toward him X

8.02 When he shakes hands, is his grip Very firm ____ Average ____
Firm X Weak ____
Limp ____

8.03 When he shakes hands, does he Pump your hand ____
Squeeze your hand X
Let you do all the work ____

8.04 Is there anything about the way he shakes hands worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ____

8.05 When he is first introduced, does he
Look the person in the eye to whom he is being introduced X
Cock his head toward the introducer but look at the person to whom he is being introduced ____
Cock his head and look at neither ____

8.06 When he first hears a name, he
Does nothing obvious to remember it ____
Repeats it as he acknowledges the introduction ____
Asks the introducer to repeat or verify it ____
Asks the person to whom he is being introduced to repeat the name ____

8.07 If calling cards are exchanged, does he
Read the card and carefully put it away X
Read it and stick it in his pocket ____
Carefully put it away without reading it ____
Stick it in his pocket without reading it ____

8.08 When introducing someone, does he do so
With ease and grace ____
With some slight embarrassment or hesitation X
With considerable awkwardness ____

8.09 To what extent is his manner different when he is being introduced to women? Not at all ____ Normal X Marked ____

8.10 If he shows a difference, which of the following describes it?
Uses both hands when he takes her hand ____
Moves in closer when acknowledging the introduction ____
Becomes more formal and distant ____
Becomes warm and effusive ____
Becomes warm and effusive only with pretty girls ____
Is very courteous and gracious to older women ____
Varies, depending on the woman ____
If so, please explain:

8.11 When introduced to a fair number of people at the same time, does he
Linger a bit with each person to whom he is introduced ___
Acknowledge the introduction quickly and wait for the next ___
Look toward the next person almost at the same time he is shaking hands with the person whom he has just met ___

8.12 In general, does he strike you as the kind of person who will
Always remember a name ___
Remember names in an average manner X
Have difficulty remembering names ___
Be very poor at remembering names ___

8.13 Has he ever asked you to re-identify someone to whom you had previously introduced him? No ___ Yes X

9. Smoking and Eating:

9.01 Smoking:

9.01.01 Does he smoke?

Cigarettes ___	Cigars ___	Pipe ___
Regularly ___	Regularly ___	Regularly ___
Occasionally ___	Occasionally ___	Occasionally ___
Never X	Never X	Never X

9.01.02 How much does he smoke? Heavy ___ Light ___ Average ___

9.01.03 Does he use his own Lighter ___ Matches ___

9.01.04 Is he the kind of person who
Is always asking for a light ___
Frequently asks for a light ___
Usually has his own light ___
Always has his own light ___

9.01.05 Does he use a holder?
Cigarette ___ Cigar ___
Always ___ Always ___
Sometimes ___ Sometimes ___
Never ___ Never ___

9.01.06 Does he clip cigars? Always ___ Sometimes ___ Bites off end ___

9.01.07 Does he care for his pipe? Fastidiously ___ Average ___
Neglects ___

9.01.08 When lighting a cigarette does he
Obviously duck his head and cup his hands ___
Light it casually while talking ___

9.01.09 Have you ever seen him hold an unlighted cigarette and wait for a pause in the conversation before lighting it? No ___ Yes ___

9.01.10 Have you ever seen him put a cigarette in his mouth and pause, match poised, waiting for the appropriate time to light it?
No ___ Yes ___

9.01.11 Have you ever seen him chew on an unlighted cigar, pipe, or cigarette? No ___ Yes ___

9.01.12 Is he a chain smoker who
Lights one cigarette from another ___
Smokes his cigarette down to the nub and then lights another ___
Always keeps a cigarette going even though he may not smoke it very much ___

9.01.13 Does he smoke
Only after meals ___
Only when offered a cigarette by someone ___
Between the entree and the dessert when others do ___

9.01.14 Is the presence of tobacco stain on his fingers
Very marked ___
Noticeable ___
Barely noticeable ___
No stain ___

9.01.15 When smoking, does he

(a) Allow a long ash to accumulate on his cigarette ____
Flick off ashes in a normal manner ____
Become unusually preoccupied with the ashtray ____

(b) Let ashes fall to the rug ____
Cup his hand under his cigarette ____
Always use an ashtray ____

9.01.16 Does he Put out a cigarette with elaborate ashtray ritual ____
Seem to put out cigarettes in a normal manner ____
Seem careless about how he puts out a cigarette ____

9.01.17 Does he Show obvious enjoyment when smoking ____
Show average satisfaction ____
Smoke perfunctorily and mechanically ____

9.01.18 Is he the kind of person who offers a light to others
Always ____ Seldom ____
Frequently ____ Never ____

9.01.19 Is he the kind of person who
Will walk across a room to offer a light to a lady ____
Is conventional in how he offers a light to a lady X
Will seldom offer a light to a lady ____

9.01.20 To your knowledge, has he given up smoking for reasons of health?
Yes ____ No ____

9.01.21 Have you ever heard him mention that he should give up smoking
But cannot ____
Has tried to stop but could not ____

9.01.22 Have you ever heard him mention that he is bothered by the smell of
Cigars ____ Pipes ____ Cigarettes ____
Never heard him mention any of these ____

9.01.23 Is there anything about his smoking habits that requires special mention or special description? If so, please describe:

9.02 Eating:

9.02.01 Is his mode of eating
Typical of most of his colleagues X
Somewhat different than most of his colleagues ___
Markedly different than most of his colleagues ___

9.02.02 Is he a Hearty eater ___ Average eater X Light eater ___

9.02.03 Is the fact that he has marked food preferences
Very noticeable ___
Not particularly noticeable ___
Not at all noticeable ___

9.02.04 Does he
Eat with relish ___
Enjoy his food in a conventional manner ___
Seem indifferent to food X

9.02.05 Does he eat Quickly ___ Average X Slowly ___

9.02.06 Is he generally inclined
To take second helpings ___
To take all he wants the first time around X
Often leaves some of his food untouched ___

9.02.07 Does he
Dwell on how much he misses his native foods ___
Show conventional interest in local foods X
Indicate considerable interest in new and unusual foods ___

9.02.08 (a) He does not eat while Talking ___ Listening ___

(b) He does eat while Talking X Listening X

9.02.09 Does he show a tendency to adapt to the table etiquette of the people with whom he is dining?
Marked ___ Average X
Maintains his familiar style of eating at all times ___

9.02.10 When given a chance, does he, for other than business reasons, suggest a preferred place to eat?
Always ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely, if ever X

9.02.11 When eating out
It is very difficult for him to select his meal ___
Waits to hear what his companion orders and orders same thing ___
Always knows what he wants very quickly ___

9.02.12 When eating out, he is
Somewhat extravagant when he knows you are paying ___
Very cost-conscious when he knows he is paying ___
Very cost-conscious no matter who is paying ___
Generally indifferent about cost no matter who is paying ___

9.02.13 Is he the sort of person who

Usually wants to check the bill regardless of who is paying ___

Is indifferent about the bill when someone else is paying ___

9.02.14 When he is paying, he checks the bill

Unobtrusively ___

Very carefully (and rather obviously) ___

9.02.15 When he pays his check, does he

Obviously count his change ___

Show indifference when accepting his change ___

Take his change in a normal manner ___

9.02.16 When he deals with headwaiters, is he

Aggressive ___

Normal and conventional ___

Somewhat ingratiating ___

Brusque X

9.02.17 Is he prone to complain when service does not suit him?

To his companion ___ Directly ___ Not at all ___

9.02.18 He handles waiters

In a conventional way

Over friendly ___ Unusually polite ___

9.02.19 Is there anything about his eating habits or manners that requires special mention ? If so, please describe:

9.03 Overall impression of eating and smoking behavior. (Check the most appropriate description.)

9.03.01 A hearty eater with well-defined preferences. He eats and smokes with considerable gusto but tends to be a little on the coarse and boorish side. It is rather easy to imagine him eating huge sandwiches and drinking beer with the boys at the neighborhood bar. ___

9.03.02 A heavy eater with limited preferences. He eats and smokes with gusto but his manners are definitely coarse and boorish. It is rather easy to imagine him becoming quite sharp with a waiter who serves him unfamiliar food or a dish prepared in an unfamiliar way. ___

9.03.03 A sensual eater who knows all the restaurants and their native specialties. He is very anxious to have others try dishes he has discovered. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes, and though rarely gauche, he is more aware of his food than his manners. It is easy to imagine him cooking and serving special dishes to his friends. ___

9.03.04 A sensual eater who tends to eat by himself when possible. He seems to eat all types of food and has something of the air of a glutton about him. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes and afterwards will linger alone at a table with self-satisfaction. It is easy to imagine him hovering alone over the buffet at a cocktail party savoring the tidbits. ____

9.03.05 A conventional eater who usually goes along with the crowd. He probably has food allergies that prevent him from eating certain foods. He gives the impression of enjoying smoking more than eating but his table manners are adapted to whatever situation he is in. It is easy to imagine him taking an indigestion pill in the privacy of his room. ____

9.03.06 A conventional eater who always goes along with the crowd. He eats with little relish and rarely mentions anything about his likes or dislikes. He smokes at every opportunity, but more mechanically than with pleasure. He usually tries to adapt his manners to the situation but may be a little awkward and obvious in doing so. It is easy to imagine him grabbing a bite at a sidewalk stand at any time of day. ____

9.03.07 A gourmet eater who has marked and varied sophisticated food tastes. Dining is quite a ritual with him, and atmosphere and service are almost as important as the food. He is graceful and cultured at table and smokes in the same manner. It is easy to imagine him dressing for dinner, enjoying fine wines and food by candlelight. ____

9.03.08 An unconventional eater, a man who "eats like a bird." He eats in a preoccupied way, obviously indifferent to his food and surroundings. It would not be surprising to learn he was a food faddist (vegetarian, health foods, etc.). ____

9.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit. ____
I would describe him as:

9.04 Drinking:

9.04.01 Does he drink? Not at all ___ Average X
A little ___ Heavily ___

9.04.02 Does he drink alone (solitary drinker) ___
with others mainly for sociableness ___
on formal occasions only ___
after work, at home ___

9.04.03 Does he appear to drink primarily for the taste ___
primarily for the effect ___
for both ___

9.04.04 His favorite drink is Beer ___ Wine ___ Whiskey ___
Vodka ___ Gin ___ No preference ___

9.04.05 He prefers Cocktails ___ Highballs ___ Short drinks ___
Straight shots ___

9.04.06 He drinks Slowly ___ Average X Quickly ___

9.04.07 Does he Gulp his drink ___ Sip his drink X

9.04.08 Does he Go out of his way to get a refill ___
Usually wait until asked ___
Always wait until asked X

9.04.09 Attitude toward wines? Very knowledgeable ___
Enjoys but not particularly knowledgeable ___
Indifferent about wines ___
Knows nothing, couldn't care less X

9.04.10 Does he Talk at length (and obviously get pleasure from talking) about his liquor preferences ___
Talk about his liquor preferences no more than anyone else ___
Never talk about his liquor preferences X

9.04.11 Is he openly proud of his native drinks and does he urge others to try them? Yes ___ No X
Is he conventionally aware of his native drinks and offer them when appropriate? Yes ___ No ___
Does he rarely mention his native drinks and not "push" them? Yes ___ No ___

9.04.12 Does he Pay little attention to the drinking needs of others ___
Serve drinks in a socially appropriate manner ___
Tend to force drinks on others ___

9.04.13 Compared with his colleagues, what are his drinking habits?
Markedly different ___ Very similar ___ Just the same ___
If markedly different, please explain:

9.04.14 When he has had a few drinks, his behavior shows
No noticeable change X
Some change ___
A definite change ___

If a definite change, please describe:

9.04.15 Does his manner of speaking change when he drinks?
Becomes quite slurred ___
Shows little change ___
Does not change at all X

9.04.16 When he drinks, his voice becomes
Louder ___ Quieter ___ No change X

9.04.17 Have you ever seen him truly drunk? No X Yes ___
If so, was he Socially active ___ Well-controlled ___
Boisterous ___ Poorly coordinated ___
Hostile ___ Depressed ___
Quiet, withdrawn ___ Sexually aroused ___

9.04.18 If you have not seen him drunk, would you predict that when drunk he would become

Very active___ Very passive___
Very unpleasant___ Rather pleasant___
Never become drunk X
I cannot imagine how he would act when drunk ___

9.04.19 Have you ever seen him with a hang over? No___ Yes___
If Yes, is he the kind of purson who
Obviously looks hung over but functions fairly well ___
Looks somewhat hung over but shows it mainly in his eyes and general manner ___
Obviously looks hung over and is quite vocal about how bad he feels ___
Does not look hung over in spite of what he says ___

9.04.20 Is there anything special about his drinking habits that requires mention? If so, please describe:

9.05 Overall impression of drinking behavior: (Check the most appropriate)

9.05.01 A hearty, heavy drinker who holds his liquor well. He is always rather boisterous, and when he drinks, there is little change in behavior. ___

9.05.02 A heavy drinker who often gives the impression he can drink others under the table. When he drinks, there is little change in behavior, but there is a hint that he could get quite mean if provoked. ___

9.05.03 A steady drinker who obviously enjoys being "tight." In a way he can be somewhat charming when drunk and can get away with a bit of the "life of the party" routine. ___

9.05.04 A steady drinker who becomes somewhat more maudlin when drunk or tight. Tends to tell people how much he likes them and sometimes asks others whether they like him. Gives an impression that he could become quite disgusting if he got very drunk. ___

9.05.05 A steady drinker who holds his liquor very well. He always remains quite dignified and usually maintains his poise even though others are becoming quite drunk or tight. He still remains part of the crowd, however—that is, he gives few signs of being disgusted or bored. ____

9.05.06 A light drinker who paces his drinks. He seems to drink only because it is socially necessary. As a party progresses he tends to become aloof and distant. Is likely to continue to talk about his work even when it is inappropriate. ____

9.05.07 A light drinker who tapers off as the evening progresses. Usually manages to keep a sophisticated aloofness from others. Often singles out and associates with someone rather like himself. As the party progresses, he shows obvious distaste for anything he considers crude or boisterous. Often becomes quite sarcastic about others' behavior. ____

9.05.08 A very light drinker who either drinks only because he has to or refuses to drink at all. Is usually not really a part of the party and is obviously annoyed when others bring him in against his wishes. Tends to be solitary and sometimes will leave unobtrusively when the opportunity presents. X

9.05.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10. Driving and Walking

10.01 Driving Behavior:

10.01.01 He drives a car in an
Unusually adept manner ____
Average or conventional manner ____
Unusually inept manner ____
He does not drive ____

10.01.02 He drives Very fast ____ Average ____ Very slow ____

10.01.03 When he drives and talks, you get the feeling
He pays little attention to his driving ____
He pays average attention to his driving ____
His driving is obviously more important than his conversation ____

10.01.04 Compared with his colleagues, his interest in foreign cars is
About the same ____ Definitely different ____

10.01.05 His interest in the care and maintenance of automobiles is
Unusual ____ Average ____ Little or none ____

10.01.06 His road courtesy is Equivalent to most of his colleagues' ____
Equivalent to the courtesy of most people I know ____
Unusual in that he is very courteous and cautious ____
Unusual in that he is rude and demanding ____

10.01.07 To the best of your knowledge, he is the kind of person who
Can learn how to get around a strange city very quickly ____
Can follow a road or city map with relative ease ____
Gets around by asking lots of questions ____
Almost always depends upon others to get him where he is going ____

10.01.08 When riding with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very much aware of the driving and responds with the driver—(goes through motions of braking, braces with changing traffic)?
No ____ Yes ____

10.01.09 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who seems to adapt to the style of driving in an average or appropriate manner? No ____ Yes ____

10.01.10 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very relaxed and relatively indifferent to the driving?
No ___ Yes ___

10.01.11 Is he the kind of person who
Would never drive when drinking ___
Is inclined to be aware when he should not drive ___
Would always insist on driving, even when drunk ___

10.01.12 Will he offer someone a lift?
When it is appropriate ___
Almost always ___ Never ___

10.01.13 Is there anything about his manner of driving that requires special mention? If so, please describe:

10.02 Walking:

10.02.01 Is he the kind of person who
Does a great deal of walking ___
Walks an average amount ___
Never walks if he can help it ___

10.02.02 When he walks, his pace is Fast ___ Average ___ Slow ___

10.02.03 When you walk with him, he most often
Keeps pace with you ___
Forces you to keep up with him ___

10.02.04 When he walks, do his feet
Swing to the right and left (outwards) ___
Maintain a fairly parallel motion ___
Swing inward ___

10.02.05 Does he walk
Erect with head up ___
Erect with head down ___
Bent forward but eyes up ___
Bent forward with eyes down ___
In a very stooped manner ___

10.02.06 When he is walking, he looks around
A great deal ___ Average ___ Never ___

10.02.07 When he greets someone he knows on the street, his face
Lights up ___
Shows average or appropriate expression ___
Rarely changes expression ___

10.02.08 Is there anything unusual or striking about his gait or manner of walking? If so, please describe: ____

10.03 Overall impression of driving and walking behavior: (Check the most appropriate description.)

10.03.01 An active, alert individual with a purposeful stride who appears to have a very practical mind. He enjoys "fixing things," appears to have sound knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a relaxed efficient manner. ____

10.03.02 An active individual who is somewhat standoffish (or negative) toward others. His stride is fast and intent. He appears to have a practical mind, is quite possessive and protective and is reluctant to share his possessions with others. He "fixes things" in a matter-of-fact way, appears to have good knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a determined (sometimes even hostile) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.03 An active, alert individual with a free-and-easy stride who appears most of the time to be in good humor. Seldom tries to fix things, but is often quite good at getting others to fix things for him. He appears to have little knowledge of automobiles but drives in a relaxed, efficient manner. ____

10.03.04 An active individual who has a cautious tinge to his walk as though he is easily embarrassed or easily startled. He appears rather helpless and awkward when he has to "fix things." He evidently has little knowledge of automobiles and drives in a careful (sometimes tense) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.05 A well-controlled and attentive individual who walks in something of a clipped, formal manner. Although generally practical, he seldom will do anything by "feel." He must read up and prepare himself when required to "fix things." He appears to have acquired considerable knowledge about automobiles but drives in a somewhat mechanical or highly controlled manner. ____

10.03.06 A well-controlled individual who is often somewhat preoccupied even in his walk. When he takes time to "fix things" he does so with intensity and precision. He is often very well read about automobiles and cares for his car or sees that it is cared for meticulously. However, when involved in conversation or otherwise preoccupied, he can sometimes be quite a dangerous driver. ____

10.03.07 A well-controlled individual who has a glide (or grace) in his walk. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" but usually knows the best places to get things done and is inclined to be quite particular in how things are done for him. He appears to have relatively little knowledge of the mechanics of an automobile, but appreciates and takes good care of a good automobile. He drives with confidence, but usually at a fast pace with not too much awareness of others. ____

10.03.08 A rather nervous and temperamental person who walks rapidly and rather awkwardly. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" and is inclined to ignore or throw away things that do not work. He appears to have little interest in or knowledge about automobiles and his driving shows it. It is sometimes frightening to ride with him. ____

10.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10.04 Hobbies and Sports

10.04.01 Does he have any hobbies? Yes X No ____ Don't Know ____
If Yes, describe his hobbies:
Tennis

If No or Don't Know, what is your best guess on the hobby most likely to interest him?

Can't imagine him having any kind of hobby ____

Collecting (What does he collect? Guns, stamps, coins, books, butterflies, etc.)

____

As a collector, is he Avid ____ Moderately dedicated ____ Only casual ____

Artistic (painting, ceramics, etc.) ____
Mechanical (motors, hi-fi building, etc.) ____
Skill (woodworking, model building, etc.) ____
Intellectual (special periods in history, philosophy, etc.) ____
Active (group dancing, such light sports as ping pong, bowling or volleyball) ____
Outdoor (hunting, fishing, golf, etc.) ____
Social (chess, poker, bridge, etc.) ____
Vicarious (listening to music, attending plays, ball games, etc.) ____
Mental amusement (crossword puzzles, anagrams, cryptograms) ____

10.04.02 Has he ever mentioned having had hobbies in the past? Yes ____
No ____

If Yes, give details:

10.04.03 How well does he dance? unusually good ____ good ____ average ____
poor X does not dance ____
do not know if he dances ____

10.04.04 Describe the kind of dancing you have seen him do:

Foxtrot, cumbias

10.04.05 Does he play chess? Yes ✓ No ___
If Yes, do you know he is good ___ believe he is probably good ___
know he is an average player ___ believe he is probably average ___
know he is a poor player ___ believe he is probably a poor player X

10.04.06 If you are a poker player, describe the kind of poker player you think he would be:

Fair

10.04.07 Is he the kind of person with whom you would like to play poker? Yes ___ No ___
If No, explain:

10.04.08 Have you heard him sing? Yes X No ___
If Yes, is his voice good ___ average ___ poor X

10.04.09 Does he seem to know many songs? Yes ___ No X

10.04.10 In group singing, does he often lead off with a song ___ sometimes lead off with a song ___ always follow someone else's lead X

10.04.11 Does he play a musical instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, which instrument:

10.04.12 Has he ever mentioned having played an instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, give details?

10.04.13 Does he participate in an active sports? Yes X No ___
If yes, describe:

Tennis, embassy volleyball

If No, what is your guess regarding the kind of sport that would interest him most:
He definitely is not the sports type ___
Body contact sports (football, rugby, soccer, etc.) ___
Skill sports (tennis, handball, volleyball, etc) ___
Individual skill sports (swimming, archery, skeet, etc.) ___
He is likely to be interested in all kinds of sports ___

10.04.14 Does he play golf? Yes___ No_X_
If Yes, does he take golf very seriously___ take golf in an average way___ take golf indifferently___

10.04.15 As a golfer, do you know he is good___ believe he is probably good___
know he is an average player___ believe he is probably average___
know he is a poor player___ believe he is probably a poor player___

10.04.16 If you are a golfer, is he the kind of person you would like to play with? Yes___ No___

If No, explain:

10.04.17 Does he: hunt a great deal___ fish a great deal___ do some hunting___
do some fishing___ never hunt___ never go fishing___

10.04.18 Do you have information on how seriously he takes hunting or fishing? Yes___ No___

If Yes, explain:

10.04.19 Has he ever mentioned participating in sports in the past? Yes_X_ No___
If Yes, give details (include any mention he may have made of medals, trophies, team membership, etc.):

Boxing

10.04.20 Have you ever heard anyone describe him as an athlete? Yes X No ___
If Yes, give details:
everyone

10.04.21 Is he the kind of person who:
is very much preoccupied with keeping in shape X
works at keeping in shape to an average degree ___
shows little interest in keeping in shape ___

10.04.22 Has he ever indicated an interest in weight lifting? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, explain:

10.04.23 He is best described as:
a muscular, athletic type X
a strong, well-built type ___
a somewhat flabby type ___
a flabby, unathletic type ___
an effeminate type ___

10.04.24 Is he mechanically inclined? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, does he
Prefer to follow instructions in books ___
Ignore instructions and try to figure it out for himself ___

10.04.25 If it were possible to provide American magazines or periodicals for him, which of the following do you think he would really enjoy:
The New York Times ___ Saturday Review ___ Newsweek ___
Playboy X Sports Illustrated X Life ___ Atlantic ___
Field and Stream ___ Popular Mechanics ___ New Republic ___
Better Homes and Gardens ___ Readers Digest ___
Kenyon Review ___ Ramparts ___ Scientific American ___
Christian Science Monitor ___

Can't imagine him reading an American magazine ___

10.04.26 What books, if any, have you heard him mention as having read and enjoyed?

10.04.27 What movies, if any, have you heard him mention as having seen and enjoyed?

10.04.28 If he had his choice, would he most likely attend:
a movie ___ the theater ___ the ballet ___
a soccer match X a bull fight ___ a concert ___

10.05 Office Behavior

10.05.01 General Information (Check where applicable)

Informal ___
Formal ___
Follower of rules and regulations ___
An innovator ___
Doer ___
Practical ___
Procrastinator ___
Big memo writer ___

Delegates work ___
Can't delegate ___
Productive ___
Thinker type ___
Organized ___
Disorganized ___
Feels work is not appreciated ___

10.05.02 Reaction of Other Workers

Subordinates	Yes	No	Don't Know
Like him			
Dislike him			
He is courteous to them			
Worries about them			
Couldn't care less			
They fear him			
Believe he is just			
He takes credit for their work			
Gives credit where due			
See him socially			

Superiors			
Trust his judgment	___	___	___
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
Delegate responsibility to him	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

IV. EMOTIONAL SET

11. Temperament and Humor

11.01 Temperament:

11.01.01 In his relations with others would you consider him
Shy ___
Guarded X
Conventional and correct ___
Outgoing ___
Warm ___

11.01.02 Is his conversational style
Awkward ___ Comfortable ___
Hesitant X Easy ___
Contrived ___ Conventional ___ Voluble ___

11.01.03 His manner of relating to women is
About the same as with men ___
More correct and controlled than with men ___
More warm and relaxed than with men X

11.01.04 In general, do you think he is a person who
Loses his temper easily ___
Has a quick temper but holds it well ___
Has a normal temper X
Has an even temper and is rarely ruffled ___
Has an unusual amount of tolerance and would almost never lose his temper ___

11.01.05 Have you ever seen him lose his temper? No ___ Yes ___
If Yes, give a short description of the incident, including how he reacted.

11.02 Humor:

11.02.01 Is he a person whom you
Have never seen tease anyone ___
Have frequently seen tease someone ___
Cannot imagine ever teasing anyone ___
Consider his tendency to tease like that of most people X

11.02.02 Is he a person
Who obviously cannot take teasing ___
Whom most people enjoy teasing ___
Whom most people would never consider teasing ___
Who obviously likes to be teased ___

11.02.03 His sense of humor is
About like that of most people ___
Notably absent ___ Clever ___ Subtle ___
Dry ___ Heavy X Crude ___

11.02.04 Does he tell jokes and anecdotes?
Never ___
Sometimes ___
Frequently X

11.02.05 As a story teller, he is Very good ___ Average ___ Poor X

11.02.06 Is he more inclined to tell a story
To a group of people X
Quietly to a friend or acquaintance ___
Only when encouraged ___

11.03 Overall impression of temperament and sense of humor:
(Check the most appropriate description.)

11.03.01 He is a hearty, hale fellow who laughs with gusto and pleasure. His humor is forthright, not subtle, and although he is sometimes loud, he is rarely unpleasant or objectionable. Most of the time, his good humor is contagious. ___

11.03.02 He is a hearty fellow who, when he laughs, does so with considerable gusto. However, he is frequently dour and sometimes intolerant and somewhat humorless. His humor is direct, even crude, and at times, inappropriate. He tends to be the kind of person who laughs more at people than with people. X

11.03.03 He is a good-humored fellow who sometimes can be considered jolly and carefree. His humor is clever and well timed. He is quite sensitive to the moods and feelings of others and often can do a good job appropriately livening up a party. Although something of a tease, he is never cruel or insensitive. ___

11.03.04 He is generally a rather quiet and somewhat complacent person who, at times, can be surprisingly gay and carefree. However, when gay, he sometimes overdoes it and causes some strain for those around him. His humor is often clever but he can be quite sarcastic and even biting on occasion. ___

11.03.05 He is an urbane fellow, generally quite conventional and appropriate. He does not necessarily appear to be a humorless person, but he seldom displays his sense of humor. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is in a good humor, because of the way he covers or controls his feelings. His humor is more studied than spontaneous yet it is never crude or inappropriate. ___

11.03.06 He is a dour and humorless person, always serious and intense. It is difficult to joke around him partly because he is not responsive and partly because he seems to disapprove. ___

11.03.07 He is a sensitive, sophisticated fellow with a subtle wit. He can be quite charming and amusing in the right sort of setting. However, there is something of an aristocratic quality to his sense of humor and he can be quite condescending towards people who do not understand or appreciate his sense of humor. ___

11.03.08 He is an arty, somewhat cynical person who can be quite flippant at times. His humor tends to be a bit far out. He seems to have private jokes he shares with intimates. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is being amusing or subtly hostile. ___

11.03.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

12. Sexual Attitudes

12.01 General:

12.01.01 Are his attitudes about sex
Very obscure ____
Difficult to determine ____
About average for his culture and background ____
Clearly uninterested ____
Indifferent ____
Clearly interested X

12.01.02 In the presence of women, he is
Stilted ____ Conventional ____
Flirtatious X Vulgar ____
Hostile ____ Indifferent ____

12.01.03 Does he go to "girlie" shows
Often ____ Never ____
Sometimes with a group ____
Can't imagine him ever going ____
I have no idea what he thinks of "girlie" shows ____

12.01.04 Does he, in the presence of male companions, talk about sex?
Often X Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

12.01.05 Is there any change in his sexual behavior and/or attitudes after he has been drinking? Yes ____ No ____ Have no idea ____
If Yes, describe the change:

12.01.06 Do you have any idea how he feels about prostitutes?
Yes ___
No ___

12.01.07 If No, do you think he is the type who would go to a prostitute ___
Cannot imagine him visiting a prostitute ___
Have nothing to base an opinion on ___

12.01.08 If Yes, is he
Obviously negativistic toward prostitutes ___
Indifferent toward prostitutes ___
Interested in prostitutes ___

12.01.09 In his relations with women, does he
Generally act in accordance with his age and experience ___
Generally act somewhat immature and inappropriate for his age and experience ___
Show considerable facility and poise X
Show considerable uneasiness or awkwardness ___

12.01.10 In describing an attractive woman, is he most likely to mention
Her hair ___ Breasts ___
Eyes ___ Clothes ___
Figure X Personality ___
Legs ___ Have no idea ___

12.01.11 Have you ever heard him described in any way by a woman? Yes X
No ___
If Yes, what did she say?

athletic, virile, manly.

12.02 Overall impression: Which of the following best describes him?

12.02.01 He is an earthy, lusty man who shows little embarrassment about sex. He treats women appropriately, but makes little effort to conceal his admiration and attraction. He appears virile and self-confident with women, and most women seem to like it. X

12.02.02 He is an earthy, lusty man who on occasion can be crude or even vulgar. He treats women rather harshly, and can become quite pushy when attracted to a woman. He seems to be very proud of his virility. Many women would be offended or rebuffed by his aggressiveness, but this does not seem to bother him. ___

12.02.03 He is a somewhat sensual, rather soft man who is very considerate of women. He is prone to hold a woman's hand overly long when talking to her and frequently puts his arms around women he admires. He often uses flattery and compliments but does so rather graciously. Most women usually like his attentiveness.

12.02.04 He is a sensual person, but is embarrassed and insecure about it. He is a rather soft man who tries hard to be inoffensive. However, he will frequently follow attractive women with his eyes when he thinks no one is looking. He is also prone to brush against or touch women "accidentally" whenever he gets a chance.

12.02.05 He is a self-confident, rather polished person who is proper and conventional with either men or women. He is always considerate and polite with all women and it is difficult to ascertain what his sexual attitudes and interests might be. In a group, he always behaves according to protocol and usually can be quite efficient in doing so.

12.02.06 He is a self-confident and precise person who has something of the air of a professional man about him. He is polite, almost to a fault, and is inclined to go out of his way to light a woman's cigarette or see that she is properly taken care of. Nevertheless, he shows considerable distance in his relations with women. Sometimes his formality is out of place, but he will rarely, if ever, change his manners or procedures to fit the situation.

12.02.07 He is a charming, urbane person and both friendly and sophisticated. He deals with women in a cultured way but shows little sensuality or sexual inappropriateness. He is neat, even dapper, and can be quite fastidious. Most of his relations with women appear to be quite platonic. He is the kind of person who likely has several very close friends who are women.

12.02.08 He is a somewhat shy and indifferent person whom some people consider odd or unusual. He shows little or no interest in women in public. In general, he is a preoccupied person who only seeks out people with similar interests. There is an ascetic, asexual air about him most of the time.

12.02.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

V. FAMILY SET

13. Marital Status

13.01 Is he married? Yes_X_ No___

13.01.01 Is his wife with him? Yes_X_ No___

13.01.02 Does his wife go out socially with him:
Never___ Seldom_X_ Average___ Often___

13.01.03 Is his wife: older than he_✓_ about his age___
younger than he___ can't tell___

13.01.04 Is his wife: unusually attractive___ attractive to an average degree_✓_
unusually unattractive___

13.01.05 Generally speaking, is his wife: socially poised___
socially adequate_X_
socially gauche___

13.01.06 What languages other than her native language does his wife speak? Spanish

13.01.07 Is his wife: better educated than he _X_
educated about the same ___ less educated ___

13.01.08 Has he been married before: Yes___ No___
If yes, give details if known: Can't tell _X_

13.02 Does his wife seem to: have many friends ___ a few friends ___
almost no friends _X_

13.02.01 In public, is he: very attentive to his wife ___
appropriately attentive to his wife ___
indifferent towards his wife _X_

13.02.02 In public, is his wife: very attentive to him ___
appropriately attentive to him ___
indifferent to him _X_

13.02.03 Would you characterize his wife as:
aggressive___ domineering___ independent___
complacent___ submissive_X_ dependent___

13.02.04 In the area in which she lives, does she appear to be:
very satisfied_____ normally satisfied X____ very dissatisfied______

13.03 Have you been to their home? Yes_____ No X____
If Yes, how often?

13.03.01 Are their living quarters: unusually nice for the area _____
typical of the area _____
unusually poor for the area _____

13.03.02 Are they, as a couple: unusually good hosts______ good hosts _____
adequate hosts______ somewhat inadequate hosts______
unusually poor hosts ______

13.03.03 Does the wife seem: very comfortable as a hostess______
adequate as a hostess_____ somewhat tense as a hostess______
very uncomfortable as a hostess______

13.03.04 Are their living quarters: a reflection of his personality _____
a reflection of both their personalities _____
a reflection of neither of their personalities _____

13.03.05 In general, their furnishings are: unusually drab _____
conventional______ Unusually nice ______

13.03.06 Is his wife: obviously very interested in her home _____
about as interested in her home as most women in the area _____
obviously very uninterested in her home _____
cannot really tell whether she is interested or not _____

13.03.07 Is her social behavior at home:
about the same as when away from home _____
more comfortable than away from home _____
less comfortable _____

13.03.08 Under ordinary circumstances, are they:
the kind of people who entertain often and like it _____
the kind of people who meet their social obligations and rather enjoy it _____
the kind of people who enjoy entertaining only close friends _____
the kind of people who entertain only when they have to _____
the kind of people who really dislike to entertain _____

13.04 Does he ever criticize his wife: Yes______ No______
If so, what is he most likely to criticize:

13.04.01 In general, as a couple are they: obviously very compatible ____ as compatible as most ____ obviously not very compatible X

13.04.02 Is he inclined to: never appear jealous of her ____
rarely appear jealous of her X
often appear jealous of her ____

13.04.03 Is she inclined to: never appear jealous of him ____
rarely appear jealous of him X
often appear jealous of him ____

13.04.04 Is there anything about his wife that deserves special mention or description?

13.05 As a husband, he is best described as:

____ An outgoing man who obviously is the dominant partner in the marriage. He is protective of his wife and always includes her when possible in his social activities.

____ An active man who is authoritarian and dominant as a husband. He is possessive of his wife and tends to be demanding in their relationship.

____ An outgoing man who is quite dependent upon his wife. She tends to be the more dominant partner and he seems to like it and expect it.

____ An active but somewhat surly man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife but will rarely admit it. He may have some tendency to be jealous and possessive about his wife.

____ A conventional husband who treats his wife with respect. He rarely shows his feelings in public. It is difficult to tell how he really feels about her.

____ A conscientious husband who takes his marriage quite seriously. His wife is obviously part of the team and they both take family and social responsibilities seriously.

____ A socially active man who can be quite charming with the ladies even when his wife is present. They both seem to lead separate but quite compatible lives.

____ A quiet man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife. She looks after him rather unostentatiously but it is obvious that she has considerable influence on his behavior and attitudes.

X None of these fit, he is best described as:
dominant partner. Independent of wife. Indifferent to her needs

13.06 Household:

Is he concerned about the appearance or functioning of the household? Yes ___ No ___

Does he make minor repairs himself? Yes ___ No ___

If Yes, Fairly competently ___ Awkwardly ___

14. Children

14.01 Does he have any children. Yes X No ___

14.01.01 How many 2 What ages 10+18 Sex of children male + fem.

14.01.02 Are all the children with him? Yes ___ No X

If not, where are they?

girl / moscow

14.01.03 Does he:
- pay unusual attention to his children ___
- pay normal attention to his children X
- pay little attention to his children ___

14.01.04 Is his wife:
- an unusually attentive mother ___
- an average mother X
- an unusually unattentive mother ___

14.01.05 Are the children:
- unusually well behaved ___
- normally well behaved X
- unusually rowdy or difficult ___

14.01.06 Does he:
- never talk about his children ___ rarely talk about his children ___
- talk about his children as normal and appropriate X
- frequently talk about his children ___
- seem quite preoccupied about his children ___

14.01.07 Are any of his children unusual in any way (frequent illness, allergies, mentally defective, crippled or deformed, unusually bright, etc.) Yes ___ No X

If yes, describe circumstances:

14.02 When his wife and family are away, he is:
obviously very lonely and at loose ends ____
unlikely to vary his routine ____
likely to become more active and socially aggressive X
have no idea ____

14.03 As a father, he is best described as:
____ An active, happy family man who is proud of his family.
____ An active family man who is inclined to be strict and demanding with his children.
____ An active family man who spends a great deal of time with his family. He tends to spoil his children.
____ An active but insecure family man who worries a good deal about his children.
____ An active, responsible father, but has a no-nonsense attitude. His work comes first and his family knows it.
____ A careful, responsible father who is conscientious about his family but not particularly warm or demonstrative.
X A carefree father who takes his family for granted. Most of the time they fend for themselves and do a pretty good job of it.
____ An indifferent father, who sometimes seems oblivious of his family.
____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

14.04 Does he carry pictures of his family____ wife____ children____ himself____

14.05 In his office or room, does he display pictures of his family____ wife____ children____ himself____

14.06 Is there anything about his relations with wife or family that requires special mention or description?

VI. IDEOLOGICAL SET

15. General

15.01 In general:

X He is a man with forthright and obvious opinions. He is capable of expressing these opinions with little apparent regard for the feelings and attitudes of others.

___ He is a man with many prejudices and dogmatic ideas. He can express them with heat and determination when necessary.

___ He is a man who is likely to turn aside controversial opinions with flippancy or humor. It is sometimes difficult to determine his opinions because it is hard to get him really serious.

___ He is a man who may have many strong opinions but it is difficult for him to show them. He is apologetic, diffident and often uncomfortable when an argument is in the offing.

___ He is a man whose true opinions are difficult to determine. He is usually diplomatic and conventional when controversial subjects or taboo subjects are discussed.

___ He is a man who is serious and determined to be proper and conventional. He has the manner of a well disciplined person who only says what he is supposed to say or expected to say.

___ He is a man who has quite sophisticated opinions. He is well read, capable of considerable articulate argument, but at times can be quite cynical or subtlely sarcastic.

___ He is a man who is shy or taciturn about his opinions. It is very hard to get him to open up on any subject, particularly if it is controversial.

___ Noreof these fit, he is best described as:

15.01.01 Is there any subject that tends to get his dander up? Yes____ No____
If so, what is it?

15.02 Is he a man whose patriotism:
- is obvious and intense X
- is like that of most of his colleagues ____
- is guarded and not too intense ____
- is difficult to determine ____

15.02.01 On general political issues, is he:
- unusually well informed on his country's position and attitudes ____
- as informed as most of his colleagues X
- unusually poorly informed ____

VII. MEDICAL

16. State of Health:

16.01 To your knowledge, does he have any sort of health problem? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.02 Does his wife or children have any sort of health problem? Yes X No ____

If Yes, please explain:

wife = ?

16.03 Has he ever indicated that he had health problems in the past? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.04 To your knowledge, does he regularly take pills or medication of any kind? Yes ____ No X

If Yes, please explain:

16.05 Is he the kind of person who: Never talks about his health or how he feels ____ Talks about his health and feelings to an average degree X Frequently talks about his health and feelings ____.

16.06 When he feels bad: It is obvious to others ____ It is obvious to an average degree ____ Most people would never know it X Have never known him to feel bad ____

16.07 In appearance, he looks Robust and healthy X Essentially like most people his age ___ Unhealthy ___

16.08 Does he have A flushed face ___ A pot belly ___ A tendency to breathe hard with exertion ___ Cold clammy hands ___ A tendency to sweat to any unusual degree ___ Foul breath ___

16.09 To your knowledge, does he adhere to a special diet or health regimen?
Yes ___ No ___

If Yes, please explain:

16.10 As an overall impression, does he strike you as a person who is
Highly energetic and tireless X
Energetic, but in spurts ___
Moderately energetic ___
Lethargic, listless ___

16.11 Is there anything about the state of his health or his family's health that warrants further comment?

ic/ Sen


Gloria Pinto
Valentin

Gloria Pinto + Valentin LOGINOV

Source: LIREALM-1

File
P-11712 (photo file)



...atalia de
de 1968
V. Leginov.
11.7.69.

...

julio de 1968
Consul V. Leginov.
11.7.69.

СССР в Мексике
...ский отдел

— 23 —

Valentin Loginov
Handwriting
Sample. Taken
from Passport.
Date of signature
is 11 July 1969
file SPR side
MP-11,712

[illegible] files

Valentin S. Loguinov
Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Consul de la U.R.S.S.

15-60-55

Given to LICOWL-1 on ca 27 Dec 1966 by LOGINOV - Loginov was trying to get LICOWL-1's full name.

P-11712

~~[illegible]~~ Feldman file
~~[illegible]~~ Cpy of Alice ~~Index~~
-P-2712

(5)

8 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact/Report/ LICOZY-5
8 Dec 1300- 1345, Subj's office

1. The C/O arrived at Subj's office while Subj was on his way down to the street to meet Valentin Loginov who had called by phone to ask Subj to step down to the street. It turned out that all Loginov was interested in was to give Subj two tickets for the Ballet for 9 December. Loginov jokingly asked Subj if he had gone to the meeting of the two presidents at the border- and Subj rejoined that he didn't make that meeting but would be on hand for the turning over of the Chamizal. /Comment: the C/O was not aware of any Soviet loitering about as he entered Subj's building/.

2. Subj reported that Alexandr Prikhodko had dropped in to the office unexpectedly on 9 Dec, but was prevented from talking to Subj because Subj's wife and son were there. Prikhodko asked when he could have lunch with Subj, and Subj told him to call next week, but that he was terribly busy during the Christmas rush.

The C/O took the opportunity to impress on Subj again that he was to do nothing, absolutely nothing, for the Soviets. Even if the Soviets only wanted to know about changed visa requirements for travel in Latin America - Subj was not to give them the time of day.

3. The C/O brought up the subject of Jacobo Zabludovsky's mention to Subj of Luis Echavarria's interest in enlisting the support of influential Jews in his bid for the Presidency, and asked if Subj had heard anything further on this. Subj said "no."

But he related the story again for the C/O:

Back in October 1965 Echevarria was attending a conference at which Subj was present. Echevarria came down off the presidium directly to Subj's table and greeted him.

Subj related this to Zabludovsky, and it was then that Zabludovsky told Subj that Echevarria had spoken to him and said he feels he is a strong candidate for the Presidency, and would like to have a committee of five people in the Jewish community to coordinate with him. Zabludovsky told Subj he was intending to propose Subj. Zabludovsky did not name any others.

The C/O asked Subj who he thought some of the other likely Jewish leaders might be. Subj said it was hard to say, but he named two: Mickey* Feldman, a banker and Fernando* Jena, the head of B'nai B'rith.

The C/O asked Subj to check with Zabludovsky on the whole matter again, when he had the opportunity. Subj said he would do so.

[illegible]

4. Subj is intending to take a two day trip to Colombia, either 9 or 10 Dec, in connection with the Petroleum Congress.

PRM

File cc (P-11712) P-2270 P-7924
P-5530

cc: P-5530

CARDED

P-2712

(4)

Source: Lienvoy/2
Rec'd: 8 9 Dec. 1966.

Dillon: 24

This was sent to Lirama by Lienvoy/2. The last comment pertains to Casamadrid's (former) association with the Legal Attache's Office, possibly; but I don't know how Lienvoy/2 knew of this.

Interesting, no? Win

~~Anne G.~~

~~White~~ to

~~Scott~~

in 1960-61 Blanco had something to do with embassy when [illegible] cultivating [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Files: Carlos CASAMADRID (P - 10968

Pls. send copies to →
cc: Carlos BLANCO (P - 4320
cc: LOGUINOV (P - 11712 -
cc: 50-6-75/2
cc: 50-6-75/4

[illegible]

El 1o. de noviembre de 1966, CARLOS BLANCO reclama a su amigo el Vice-Cónsul LOGUINOV de la Embajada Rusa; que hace tiempo no se ven para platicar. LOGUINOV informa que acaba de regresar de un viaje a Mazatlán. BLANCO tiene a su esposa todavía un poco delicada y también estuvo fuera de la ciudad; pero el miercoles próximo por la noche tiene tiempo para verse y para ello le puede llamar al 47-26-01 que es un negocio de su hermano y allí puede dejar el recado o bien en su oficina que es el 35-11-27 ext.112. LOGUINOV ofrece llamarle el miercoles por la mañana.

(NOTA: El teléfono 47-26-01 corresponde a una tlapalería ubicada en la Calzada Nonoalco #338-D.
El teléfono 35-11-27 es el conmutador del edificio #110 de la avenida Morelos.)

This from Lienvoy Convers 1 Nov 1966 + 6 Dec 1966

El 6 de diciembre de 1966, CARLOS BLANCO saluda a LOGUINOV y dice que: "El comandante CARLOS, tiene urgencia por localizar a PAVEL IATZKOV". LOGUINOV informa que no está, pero que dejó dicho donde poderlo llamar. BLANCO que al 10-33-62 o a la Guardia de Agentes que son el 21-28-09 y 21-28-10 y que le diga que es urgente y que pueda llamar a la hora que guste, pues "vamos a estar de guardia". LOGUINOV se lo dirá para que los llame a las ocho y media de la noche. BLANCO está de acuerdo y pregunta: .. " que pasó..con el asunto ese de coronas de .l. Bellas Artes..?" LOGUINOV contesta: " si..! si.." BLANCO guarda silencio y despues dice: " ! okey.. entonces adios.."

(NOTA: Los teléfonos mencionados corresponden al Segundo Comandante y Guardia de Agentes de la Policia Judicial del Distrito Federal, respectivamente.)

7 diciembre de 1966.

CARLOS BLANCO SOLANO puede ser la misma persona quien estuvo comisionado por la Dirección Federal de Seguridad junto con CARLOS CASAMADRID MIRANDA en un servicio en la Embajada de los Estados Unidos.

P-10968

Alice

22 December 1966

SUBJECT: Contact Report/LICOZY-5 — P-2712 3
22 Dec 1155-1245, Subj's office

1. The C/O dropped by Subj's office on 22 Dec, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subj's home the previous day.
Subj was very appreciative of the gift.

2. Subj showed the C/O the reservation card for travel of Soviet Georgi Visko and his family, Nina, Irina and Marina. They're booked for departure from Mexico for 25 Dec by Air France, for Paris. Paris to Brussels, where Visko has four days of business, and continuing flight Brussels to Moscow on 30 December.
Visko had visited Subj in company with another Soviet who Subj was told was Visko's successor: (from the latter's card) - Victor M. Ivanov, Consejero Comercial de la Embajada Sovietica.

3. Subj stated that he had received a letter [The invite was contained in a Season's Greetings card was in the form of a] from Sidney Weintraub, U.S. State Department official now in Chile, inviting Subj to visit him. /Comment: Weintraub formerly stationed in Mexico and later in Washington was the subject of interest by the Soviets in Mexico, who had Subj try to maintain contact on his Washington trips/. Please forward this information to Gerald F. Gestetner in Santiago.

"love to see you sometime" type of statement.

4. Subj said he had received a firm invitation from Mr. Hawkins (phonetic), Mgr. of Air France in Mexico, to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to Red China, possibly in April 1967. Subj was completely neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if we had any interest in his taking the trip to Red China. The C/O said we would let him know about that.

COPIES MADE

5. The C/O asked Subj to have the door to his office closed, so that we might discuss a serious matter. The C/O said he wanted to explore frankly the status of Subj's relationship toward the Soviets. The C/O stated bluntly that there was a feeling "higher up" that Subj had not achieved a sufficient degree of cut-off from the Soviets, and that his posture of friendly compromise weakened his stance. In reply, Subj mentioned the two elements that went into his attitude toward the Soviets:
a) re the financial gain from associating with them, Subj said that had fallen to such an insignificant level that it had no effect in his dealings with the Soviets. And he said that level would sink even more when the Soviets inaugurate Aeroflot flights from Montreal and New York (the Soviets do not handle bookings on Aeroflot through agents).
b) his personality (the C/O had asked if it were possible for Subj to become cool or even unfriendly toward the Soviets); Subj said he could not change his personality. In the past year he had cooled off noticeably, having resisted all cooperation with them, avoided them, put difficulties in the way of meetings, etc. But it was against his grain to be unfriendly toward people with whom he might be thrown into association. He cited proudly that he was not beholden to the Soviets for anything, and never went out of his way to seek anything from them; for instance, he had been told that Pavel Yatskov had brought back caviar for Subj on his return from the Soviet Union - but Subj made no move to call Yatskov (when and if Yatskov calls him, he will see him and cannot understand how he could be unfriendly to Yatskov under such circumstances).

6. The C/O mentioned to Subj the latter's equivocal reply of "maybe" when Loginov had asked if Subj would report the name of the CIA chief in Mexico if he knew it. Subj replied that he had told Loginov that the latter was crazy

File: cc: P-8017 (p.1) P-11712 P-11668 (p.1)

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
~~(When Filled In)~~

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT LOGINOV, Valentin		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO.	
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Lista del Cuerop Diplomatico, Abril 1963, (Cuban) Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Attache, Sovemb Havana-- Valentin S. LOGINOV (LOGUINOV)
Aleksandra LOGINOVA, wife (DE LOGUINOV)

Address: Havana-Vedado, Paseo # 309, apto 4-B

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 7 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ~~SECRET~~ (7-46)

SECRET

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said that we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down Hunt's activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed Hunt was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as the predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington field office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of DO Division and now DCOS Bonn, might be in a position to give a few groups on what Hunt was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the Iberian desk when the Hunt assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when Hunt went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Karamessines at Helms' direction. His recollection would give leads. I told him that Coleman became COS Madrid later, after Hunt left Spain, and could provide information on what Hunt did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that Hunt was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Spain after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the PLMHPLANK for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

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S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

9 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OPS/RMO

SUBJECT : Watergate File Research - Final Report

1. The files of the immediate office of the Chief, OPS/OSG have been checked for material relevant to the subject of this memorandum. The check included chronological files of communications of which I was the author while assigned to Madrid, Spain in the period July 1970 to July 1973. Nothing pertinent was found.

2. I have attempted to recollect any other details which conceivably could be pertinent and which relate to the period of my assignment to Madrid. The only points which I recall but on which I have no documentation are these:

a. There were occasional joshing inquiries made of me by American residents of Madrid about the reported presence in Spain of E. Howard Hunt in 1972. My standard reply was that I knew only what I had heard rumored. For the record, at no time did Hunt contact me, and I have never known of his having tried to contact any Station personnel in Spain during the period 1970-73. I made no effort personally to ascertain whether or not Hunt was in Spain, and I had no effort made by any Station member.

b. A Station officer, possibly Richard Ouderkirk, now assigned to Guatemala, was given some information by an informant in 1972 concerning reported activities in Spain by Robert Vesco. I suggested that the information be given informally to the Embassy's Economic Section chief, John Oliver. That officer was charged with keeping abreast of developments related to Vesco. The Station did not pursue that subject, as I recall, because it was not a topic of reportable interest, according to requirements of the period.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056759

SECRET

SUBJECT: Watergate File Research - Final Report (cont'd)

3. There is no other employee assigned to my immediate office who has relevant personal knowledge of events and personalities.

Robert E. Owen

Robert E. Owen
Chief, OPS/OSG

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director of Finance
1212 Key Building

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge			—	
3. Rubarth			R	
4. ~~[illegible]~~				
5. Sandy-Arudel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567

SECRET

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I spoke with Fig Coleman about Hunt's assignment to Spain. I had spoken with him back in August when we were inquiring into reported activities involving Mrs. Hunt.

2. Coleman said that he got out of the War College in May 1964 (by which he fixed the time), and took over the Iberian desk. Bill Ryan was C/EUR (or was it WE Division at the time). In early autumn Ryan said that he had just been informed by the DDP (Karamessines) that Hunt was to be assigned to Madrid as DCOS, as a directed assignment by Helms. A memo was prepared and sent to the COS, Jim Noel (now retired). There was nothing further for about a month when Ryan called Coleman in and showed him a RYBAT letter from Noel stating that Ambassador Stanley J. Woodward would not have Hunt in the Embassy.

3. Woodward had been the Ambassador to Uruguay when Hunt was COS Montevideo. He had a low opinion of Hunt and was counting the days until Hunt left. The President of Uruguay visited President Eisenhower in the States, at which time he requested a personal favor--that Hunt be reassigned to Montevideo. So Hunt took another tour. Woodward was outraged, and had his revenge in 1964 when Hunt was to be sent as DCOS to Madrid.

4. After a couple of months--early 1965--Ryan called Coleman in and, observing that there was more than one way to skin a cat, told him that Hunt was going to Spain under nonofficial cover. This didn't require anything special, Ryan saying that he didn't know much about it. It came to him from Karamessines on Helms' order. Hunt was to have the telephone number of the COS, but he would do nothing for the station. Hunt was to submit administrative vouchers for reimbursement of his expenses and they were to be paid. Coleman said he never saw Hunt before he went out. He knows that there was no operational reporting, to indicate that Hunt was doing anything.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

The vouchers were not large, although the documentation was poor. Coleman raised the question with Ryan about his signing off, and Ryan said he could talk to Karamessines if he wished. Because Coleman had a close personal association with Karamessines he did just that. He was told by Karamessines that he didn't know much about it either--"Helms said send him out." He was instructed to go ahead.

5. In early July 1966 (4 July) Coleman went to Madrid. He had a ten day turnover with Jim Noel. Hunt had already gone and he did not see him. Noel said he didn't know what Hunt did, but that Coleman need not worry because he was gone.

6. Several months ago Noel was at a seminar at which Ambassador Woodward was also present. At the time he asked about Hunt. Woodward said it might still be dragged into the press. Tad Szulc had been after Woodward about the Hunt assignment to Spain. Coleman observed that Szulc did have a long article on Hunt in the New York Times, and the Spain assignment was mentioned, but without any conclusions as to its significance.

7. Coleman said the RYBAT file of C/EUR may have something on the event, but not much. A letter out and the reply, but not much more.

S. D. Breckinridge

CONFIDENTIAL

22 February 1974

26 Feb 11; Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt--Madrid Assignment

1. On 22 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and the undersigned interviewed Mr. Edward Ryan, Chief, Staff D, Deputy Director for Operations, on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. During the period of Mr. Hunt's assignment as a Contract [redacted] A agent to Madrid between July 1965 and September 1966, Mr. Ryan had been the Deputy Chief of the Western European Division, Deputy Director for Plans. The purpose of the interview was to determine if Mr. Ryan had any information bearing on the matter of the operational assignment of Mr. Hunt during this period.

2. Mr. Ryan stated that the assignment of Mr. Hunt both to the European Division and to Madrid was handled without benefit of the routine processing procedures through the Western European Division. Mr. Hunt's assignment was coordinated and directed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. With regard to operational duties, Mr. Ryan was unaware of any specific project or target for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Ryan made the specific observation that if Mr. Hunt produced positive intelligence on the Iberian target during this period the officials responsible for this effort within the Western European Division were totally unaware of it.

3. Mr. Ryan stated that most of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's activity and the nature of his assignment during this period came more through hearsay than direct official knowledge. For example, he cited the comment made by a mutual acquaintance of his and Mr. Hunt's to the effect that Mr. Hunt stated that while in Madrid he was going to "play golf and write books." Mr. Ryan was asked specifically whether or not he was

under the impression that Mr. Hunt's writing activities were either being encouraged or subsidized directly by this Agency in any official effort. Mr. Ryan responded that he was personally not aware of any such arrangement. He added as an expression of personal opinion that Mr. Hunt had no operational function and was simply granted the opportunity to write books for his own personal gain at Government expense during this period.

Lawrence J. Howe

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ FIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Howe		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	XX	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/IG/2E24 Hqs./5527	22 Feb 74

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

14-00000

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SECRET

16 Feb 10, Tab 32

22 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Sam Halpern

1. I met with Sam Halpern for about 20 minutes this morning in GG10, where he is cleaning up some details before he goes to his new assignment as DC/DCD. I told him generally about our attempt to reconstruct Howard Hunt's assignments and financial transactions, and asked him particularly for recollections he may have of Hunt's assignment in Spain in mid-1965 to the fall of 1966.

2. Halpern said that he has no recollection about such an assignment. In June 1965 he moved from WH Division with Des FitzGerald when he became the DD/P. At about that time Halpern's father died and he was in New York for the funeral and ten days of religious observations following that. He was back in mid-June and in and out from then on as he got ready to attend the National War College which began in August. He did not return to that office until the end of June 1966.

3. Halpern observed that during this period Karamessines was ADDP with Helms moving up to be DDCI. He thought it entirely possible that Helms and Karamessines could have handled this on their own.

4. Halpern said that Evan Parker had come into the office of the DD/P shortly before Helms became DDCI, and had returned from Honolulu for that purpose. He stayed on for FitzGerald until Halpern returned from the National War College. He suggested someone might talk to Evan Parker who may have known something about it (although he may not). He also suggested talking to Georgia.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 0:3/96

14-00000

#6 File 12, Tab 54

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Watergate--Frank A. O'Malley

1. At 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 19 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Mr. Frank A. O'Malley at his residence, 6419 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. O'Malley retired from this Agency in June of 1972. Prior to retirement Mr. O'Malley was an officer in the External Employment Assistance Branch, Retirement Activities Division of the Office of Personnel. It was Mr. O'Malley's function to assist personnel retiring from this Agency in finding post-retirement employment. In this capacity Mr. O'Malley had been instrumental in the placement of Mr. E. Howard Hunt in the Robert R. Mullen public relations firm. The purpose of this interview was to attempt to determine if additional information could be developed from Mr. O'Malley with regard to the placement of Mr. Hunt with the Mullen Company.

2. Mr. O'Malley began the interview by recalling the nature of his past Agency associations both with Mr. Hunt and the Mullen Company. Mr. O'Malley stated that prior to assuming his responsibilities in the Office of Personnel he had served with Central Cover Staff in the area dealing with the funding of covert action projects. In this capacity he had become familiar with the activities of Mr. Hunt while Mr. Hunt functioned on the Covert Activities Staff primarily in the propaganda field. Mr. O'Malley stated that he first came in contact with the Mullen Company when he was attempting to find an organization to handle the public relations effort of a covert Agency activity known as the Free Cuba Committee. Mr. O'Malley related that he had arranged this cover through the Christianform Organization and that his duties involved all aspects of the funding of this activity. Mr. O'Malley described the nature of his working relationship

with Mr. Robert R. Mullen as being close and cordial. Mr. O'Malley stated that Mr. Mullen was in the habit of confiding to him information concerning other Mullen business contacts and projects. In response to a specific question, Mr. O'Malley stated that during the period of his contact with the Mullen Company dealing with the Free Cuba Committee, Mr. Mullen told him the Howard Hughes Organization was a client of the concern.

3. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his previous statements that Mr. Hunt was referred to his office for placement assistance through the Office of the Executive Director, then Colonel L. K. White. Mr. O'Malley stated that in view of Mr. Hunt's interests in the public relations field, it was thought advisable to put Mr. Hunt in touch with Mr. Robert Mullen for the purpose of gaining the benefit of Mr. Mullen's guidance. Mr. O'Malley recalled, after the initial meeting, Mr. Mullen mentioned having met Mr. Hunt some years previously in Paris, France. Mr. O'Malley's office arranged interviews with various organizations including Reader's Digest and the Kennecott Copper Company. Through the offices of the Mullen Company an interview was arranged with the General Foods Corporation, a Mullen client. Mr. O'Malley stated there was disappointment that Mr. Hunt had been unsuccessful in "selling himself" during any of these interviews and that no job offers had resulted. In response to a question as to whether or not executive level interest was still being shown in Mr. Hunt's post-employment placement, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, was listed as a character reference on Mr. Hunt's resume and that Mr. Helms signed a letter of recommendation to the Kennecott Copper Company on Mr. Hunt's behalf. Mr. O'Malley recalled being contacted in the last month of Mr. Hunt's Agency service by Mr. Mullen, who stated that a decision had been made to expand their operations. In view of this expansion, Mr. Mullen had decided he would himself offer Mr. Hunt a job. Mr. Mullen had stated that he was interested in having Mr. Hunt begin work immediately. However, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt completed retirement formalities and actually started work for the Mullen Company approximately a week to 10 days later.

4. Mr. O'Malley stated that contact was maintained with Mr. Hunt while at the Mullen Company on a continuing basis, because Mr. O'Malley was interested in Mr. Hunt for possible referral of other Agency retirees. Mr. O'Malley also understood that there was Cover and Commercial Staff interest in the Mullen Company, and that Mr. Hunt became instrumental in discussing several aspects of the cover operations in his capacity as an officer of the company. Mr. O'Malley recalled referring various Agency officers to Mr. Hunt for guidance when these individuals expressed an interest in entering the public relations field. Mr. O'Malley did recall disappointment in feeling Mr. Hunt had generally been less helpful on these occasions.

5. Mr. Hunt contacted Mr. O'Malley on several occasions requesting referral of retiring Agency employees with specific qualifications. These instances occurred apparently after Mr. Hunt had assumed his responsibilities with the White House. In one instance Mr. Hunt requested referral of a recently retired Agency secretary. As in previous memoranda and discussions, Mr. O'Malley was unable to recall the name of this individual. He did, however, state that he is quite certain Mr. Hunt turned down the individual whom he referred. As a point of clarification, Mr. O'Malley said that this individual had not previously been known to Mr. Hunt, nor had she previously worked for him in any capacity. Mr. O'Malley also recalled a request from Mr. Hunt for an individual having skills in the area of locks and surreptitious entry. A resume of Mr. Thomas C. Amato was provided to Mr. Hunt at that time. It is Mr. O'Malley's recollection that Mr. Hunt specifically stated that a person with Mr. Amato's qualifications was needed in connection with a requirement of the Howard Hughes Organization in Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. O'Malley stated the opinion that it was his impression that the duties involved would include the monitoring of a listening device in an undisclosed location. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his understanding that Mr. Amato did not accept Mr. Hunt's offer of employment.

6. Mr. O'Malley then recalled request from Mr. Hunt for a recommendation of a security service organization to carry out an electronic countermeasures "sweep." Mr. O'Malley recommended the Wackenhut Corporation. Mr.

O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt expressed dissatisfaction with that suggestion in part because of what Mr. Hunt viewed as that firm's political orientation. Mr. O'Malley did not elaborate further on that remark. Mr. O'Malley then suggested the use of Anderson Security Consultants, Incorporated, a commercial cover entity of the Office of Security. Mr. O'Malley stated that insofar as this organization was advertised in the yellow pages and that Mr. Hunt could be assured of the reliability of the services, he felt this to be a reasonable suggestion. Mr. O'Malley stated that during a subsequent phone call when Mr. O'Malley asked how his suggestion had worked out, Mr. Hunt responded, "Yes, they had done a fine job." At this point Mr. O'Malley was asked whether or not from his associations with Mr. Hunt he felt Mr. Hunt was in the habit of making glib comments which were not necessarily accurate in order to pass over a subject. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was categorically so. He said he was sure that Mr. Hunt had lied to him on a number of occasions and that,therefore, he was in no position to be sure that Mr. Hunt had actually, in fact, used the services of Anderson Security Consultants. Mr. O'Malley volunteered the opinion that he suspected the electronic countermeasures "sweep" was to be carried out in the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

7. In response to a question as to whether he had ever referred anyone to McCord Associates, Mr. O'Malley replied that he remembered having referred Walter Brayden. Mr. Brayden for a time acted as bodyguard to Mrs. Martha Mitchell. As an aside Mr. O'Malley mentioned that Mr. Brayden had refused to carry a firearm in spite of the fact that Mr. McCord told him he could do so on the authority of the Attorney General. Asked specifically if he had ever referred either William Shea or Teresa Shea to Mr. McCord, Mr. O'Malley stated that he did not recall specifically referring Teresa Shea and that he was sure that he had not referred William Shea to him. So, contrary to previous statements, it is now Mr. O'Malley's belief that in all probability Mrs. Shea was not referred by this Agency to Mr. McCord.

8. Returning to Mr. O'Malley's previous responsibilities in coordinating funding for the covert action activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt, the issue was raised as to whether or not the funding of Mr. Hunt's projects continued between July 1965 and September 1966 while Mr. Hunt was a contract employee stationed at Madrid, Spain. Mr. O'Malley recalled that at the time of Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid the statement disseminated for consumption within the Agency was that Mr. Hunt was retiring. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was not generally believed. Mr. O'Malley was quite certain that during this period his office handled no project funding for Mr. Hunt. In response to specific question Mr. O'Malley stated that on Mr. Hunt's return to staff employment the projects and funding which stopped in July 1965 were again resumed. Mr. O'Malley was not aware of any project names or funding mechanisms or post-assignment accountings in connection with Mr. Hunt's activities in Madrid.

Frederick N. Evans

Frederick N. Evans

Lawrence J. Howe

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET SENSITIVE

Indexed
IG #11
Sub #38

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Finance Records - E. Howard Hunt

1. On the instruction of Mr. Steven L. Kuhn, Chief of Operations, PSI, the undersigned made an appointment for the afternoon of 20 February 1974 to interview Mr. William Caufield, Chief, Certification and Liaison Division, Office of Finance, and Mr. Joseph Hudson of Finance on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. At the outset of the interview Mr. Caufield advised the undersigned that instruction had been received from the Director of the Office of Finance, Mr. Thomas Yale, that discussion on the subject of Mr. Hunt was to be carried out only with the Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Caufield stated that he had informed Mr. Yale of the requested interview and had received this instruction with the suggestion that the undersigned contact Mr. Yale directly with any inquiry.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Caufield, the undersigned briefed Mr. Yale on the nature of the request and identified the "Task Force" effort being undertaken by the Office of Security in concert with the Offices of the Inspector General and Legislative Counsel. Mr. Yale responded that he recognized the legitimacy of the inquiry. Mr. Yale explained that subsequent to initiation of the complete audit being undertaken by Mr. Quinn of the Audit Staff, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Mr. Harold L. Brownman, had requested the Office of Finance to discontinue their investigation of Mr. Hunt to avoid duplication. Mr. Yale added parenthetically that it was the nature of Finance Officers not to leave a job half done and that an "informal" inquiry into Mr. Hunt's financial records had nevertheless continued at a more subdued pace.

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SECRET SENSITIVE

3. A review of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hunt's conversion to Contract Type A employment and assignment was then undertaken by Messrs. Yale, Caufield, Hudson and the undersigned. The contract and payroll files of Mr. Hunt were reviewed for possible indications of the nature of the operational activity undertaken in Madrid. A review of travel vouchers indicated that Mr. Hunt and his family made accountings indicating departure from Washington, D. C., on 5 August 1965 with an arrival in Madrid, Spain, on 16 August 1965. The costs of this travel were charged to the budget of the Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans, Madrid Station Support account. A subsequent accounting summarized PCS travel expenses and included a payment for apartment rental for 16, 17 and 18 August 1965 with a payment in the amount of $125 to Mr. F. Reid Buckley for this purpose.

4. It was determined that an allottee bank account in Mr. Hunt's name had been established at the Riggs National Bank of Washington. All salary and other non-operational reimbursements were made to Mr. Hunt through sterile check to this account. An operational account was established for Mr. Hunt with the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. A review of all payments made to Mr. Hunt through the Chase bank account through Mr. Hunt's operational advance subsidiary account, or 1442 account, had been made. There was no record of any operational accounts or advances being processed through this channel. Mr. Yale stated that this fact defined his concern. He felt that it was inconceivable that Mr. Hunt could have undertaken operational activity without some transfer of or accounting for funds. To date, no such records have been developed. No reference to a project or project digraph or operational FAN number has been located. Al expenses connected with Mr. Hunt identified to date were charged to the Madrid Station Support. A review made of Madrid Station records has not indicated any "Developmental and Target of Opportunity (D&TO)" funds or "Other Operational Activity (COA)" funds expended by or on behalf of Mr. Hunt. These two accounts would normally be the source of operational funding not charged against a specific project activity.

5. A review of all of the travel vouchers on record for Mr. Hunt during this period also failed to identify a project. In addition to the PCS and return vouchers, two other accountings are on record. One accounting covered a trip by the entire Hunt family to Paris "for the renewal of visas." A second voucher covered a TDY trip from Madrid to Washington with return to Madrid made by Mr. Hunt from 5 January to 3 January 1966. The voucher states in the space provided for the citation of the travel order number - "no travel order." The accounting was approved and signed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director for Plans. No justification or statement of purpose for this TDY was given on the accounting.

6. Mr. Yale determined that further review of possible sources or identification of operational funding was in order. Mr. Yale gave instructions that the entire 1442 advance account of Mr. Hunt be reviewed for other possible channels of funding outside of the New York Chase account. After discussion, it was agreed that particular attention be taken to any items connected with publishing or book royalties. Mr. Yale noted that the royalty offset waiver provision ammended to Mr. Hunt's contract was, in his experience, somewhat unusual.

7. Mr. Yale was informed by the undersigned of the intention to interview Mr. Edward Ryan, currently Chief, Division D, who was at the time of Mr. Hunt's Madrid assignment, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. Mr. Yale suggested that Mr. Davis Powell also be interviewed. The undersigned informed Mr. Yale that this had been done and briefed Mr. Yale on the generally negative results of the interview. Mr. Yale then recommended that Mr. Sam Halpern be interviewed. Mr. Yale noted that Mr. Halpern had been an assistant to Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald when the latter was Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and had accompanied Mr. Fitzgerald when he became Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale recalled that subsequent to Mr. Fitzgerald's passing that Mr. Halpern remained on the staff and acted as an Executive Officer for Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Mr. Yale stated that from his experience, Mr. Karamessines would have delegated all the arranging of "details" surrounding an assignment such as Mr. Hunt's to Mr. Halpern. Mr. Yale offered the parenthetical observation of his surprise at what he interpreted to be reticence to date to interview Mr. Halpern.

8. The undersigned assured Mr. Yale that he would be informed of any information identifying any possible project activity developed in subsequent investigation. Mr. Yale stated that any information in this area would greatly facilitate the job of checking computorized financial records.

Lawrence J. Howe

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK ACCOUNT

Check No.	Date	Payee	Amount
8	20 October, 1965	Unknown	$ 1,650.00
		(2 months rent as deposit plus 1 month in advance at $550 per month. Substantiated by lease)	
9	26 November, 1965	Casa Guggenbuhl	$ 69.34
		(for storage of trunks during 3 mos. temporary housing)	
10	10 December, 1965	Security Storage Co.	$ 1,070.82
		(final destination charges per attached invoice. Insurance charge of $1.00 is personal expense.)	

# # # # # #

Expenses

November 18, 1965	Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell	Ptas. 150	$ 2
December 20, 1965	Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. (Per my letter of 21 December, 1965)	Ptas. 2250	3
			$ 4

Howard Hunt

SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL | Terence S. CRABANAC | [illegible]

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS | AMOUNT

18 Nov 1965 Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell. Pesetas 150 @ 60/$1.00 - $2.50
20 Dec 1965 Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife.
Pesetas 2250 @ 60/$1.00 - $37.50 *

40.00

* For operational security reasons a receipt was not obtained.

(Credit the 144.2 advance account.)

RTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE; THAT I HAVE NOT NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

(See true name attachment)
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ______ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my responsibility therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

REF. NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.	APPROVED DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
-2282	6136-1347 (code 3)	15 Feb 66	ADDP
Feb 66	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE Charles E. Sater WE/BF	CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT DATE 2/25/66	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $ ~~40.00~~ n/r

DATE | SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION - ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE REC. RPT. NO. PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. ADVANCE ACCT. NO. EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL FUNDS	61-66 CA. NO. X REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS 68-70 OC OR DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
RBANAC OPS ENT			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2551	37 50	
ABANAC OPS			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2555	2 50	
BANAC T.S.				136100			144.2		50	125		40 00
								[illegible]				

PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY		TOTALS	DEBIT	CREDIT
3/4 Mr E Doherty		JW	68-858	15	40 00	40 00

264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET 312393

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

OVER

PCS to Madrid -	Per diem/misc exp	$ 998.30	
	Air fare (self & family)	2,257.50	
	HHE, POV, etc	7,547.76	
	TLA, quarters, etc	6,662.00	
	Education allowance	1,440.00	$18,905.56
TDY Madrid/Paris -	reentry visa Air fare only for self & family		384.61
PCS to Hqs -	Per diem/misc exp	$ 178.82	
	Air fare (self & family)	1,394.55	
	HHE, POV, etc	10,731.97	
	TLA	599.34	12,904.68
Operational entertainment - Madrid Nov 65			40.00
Approved expenditure - LKD - Madrid 1 July 1966			1,600.00
Total expenditures			$33,834.85
Less advances received (bank deposit, $30,000; cash $3,500)			33,500.00
Cash settlement to close A/C			$ 334.85

15 February 1974.

IG Feb 11 Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Davis Powell
on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Davis Powell, currently a Budget Officer on the staff of the Deputy Director for Management and Services. Mr. Powell is located in Room 7C18. During 1965 Mr. Powell was Chief of Support of the then designated Western European Division. In July 1965 a contract was written authorizing salary and benefits to Mr. E. Howard Hunt for an assignment under non-official cover to Madrid, Spain. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Powell had any information on Mr. Hunt's activities during this period.

2. Mr. Powell responded that from his recollection it was Mr. Hunt's habit to deal only with the most senior officer available. In this case Mr. Hunt dealt directly with the then Chief of Western European Division, Mr. Rolf Kingsley. Mr. Powell states that, in his capacity as Chief of Support, any activity undertaken to support Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid was undertaken second and thirdhand on receipt of instructions from Mr. Kingsley's office. He further stated that he was never briefed on the purpose of Mr. Hunt's mission and could add little in terms of speculation. Mr. Powell recommended that Mr. Edward Ryan, who was then Deputy Chief of Western European Division, be contacted. Mr. Powell also suggested that Miss Martha Seville be interviewed. Miss Seville was the Executive Secretary in Western European Division during the time that Mr. Hunt's contract was written and Miss Seville subsequently served in Madrid herself. Mr. Powell understands that Miss Seville is currently assigned to the office of the Chief, European Division.

Lawrence J. Howe

15 February 1974

IG File 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Rogers Brooks
on the David St. John Novels

1. At 0930 on the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Rogers Brooks, Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Brooks had any information not contained in the Contract Personnel file of Mr. E. Howard Hunt on the latter's activities while a Contract Type A employee.

2. Mr. Brooks summarized his recollections by saying that, although it was not common practice it was not entirely unusual for highly sensitive contracts to be administered without the contracting officer being made aware of the operational objective involved. Mr. Brooks stated that he recalls some of the controversy involved in preparing the contract dealing with the question of offset and housing allowance, but he was unable to recall any of the details. It was Mr. Brooks' suggestion that the Office of Finance be contacted and that their contract personnel records on Mr. Hunt be checked for information.

Lawrence J. Howe

14 February 1974

IG Feb, 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Raymond A. Rocca
on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 14 February 1974 Messrs. Frederick Evans and Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Raymond A. Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations. The purpose of the interview was to follow up on information contained in Office of Security files which stated the belief that individuals in the Counter Intelligence Operations office had knowledge of the writing activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This belief was a matter of record in the files of the former Security Research Staff and was attributed to Mr. Paul Gaynor, now retired, and Mr. Edward Sayle.

2. During this interview Mr. Rocca was specifically asked whether or not he had knowledge of the existence of any form of official sponsorship or encouragement to Mr. E. Howard Hunt to write novels to improve the image of this Agency. Additionally, Mr. Rocca was asked whether or not any assistance was ever requested of the Counter Intelligence Operations office to be provided to Mr. Hunt or whether or not that staff had ever had any relationship with Mr. Hunt whatsoever. In response to these questions Mr. Rocca responded "on the record" that he has no knowledge of any such arrangements nor at any time was he party to any assistance or any requests for assistance to Mr. Hunt. Mr. Rocca stated that the particular section which he had been most actively concerned in the past years was responsible for handling a variety of tasks categorized under the area of "setting the record straight." In this sense, the "image" mission of the office was to counter misinformation currently in the media or otherwise believed to be part of an effort to discredit the Agency. Mr. Rocca feels that any assumption that Mr. Hunt was engaged in any form of Agency sponsored image activity would have probably lead to the conclusion that it was done under the Counter Intelligence Operations. However, Mr. Rocca emphatically stated that this was not the case.

3. Mr. Rocca was thoroughly candid and cooperative during the course of this interview. He was unable to suggest alternate means of attempting to determine if any official Agency sponsorship of Mr. Hunt did in fact exist. Mr. Rocca did venture the opinion that he felt that in all probability an official acquiescence on the part of senior officials ~~might~~ have been involved rather than an official sponsorship. It was agreed by all in this discussion that the nature of any informal support given to Mr. Hunt would be far more difficult to define in the absence of any formalized agreements.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Sponsorship of the
David St. John Novels

1. The details summarizing an interview on 4 February 1974 with Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, were set forth in a memorandum addressed to Mr. Steven L. Kuhn dated 6 February 1974. Mr. Kuhn was briefed by the undersigned on this information during the afternoon of 5 February 1974. Later the same afternoon, at Mr. Kuhn's direction, a conference was held with Messrs. Scott Breckenridge and John Richards of the Office of the Inspector General.

2. During this conference the speculation was entertained that Mr. E. Howard Hunt had, in fact, been under Agency sponsorship with the knowledge of Mr. Richard Helms in his preparation of a series of spy novels under the pseudonym, David St. John. If it can be accepted as a reasonable supposition that Mr. Hunt had some highly compartmented financial arrangement authorized by senior Agency officials to write these books, then it is likely that this relationship continued after Mr. Hunt officially retired. It is specifically noted that Mr. Hunt retired 30 April 1970. Subsequent to the retirement, a David St. John book appeared in print in 1971 and another in 1972. These manuscripts were apparently prepared during the time that Mr. Hunt was employed by the Robert R. Mullen Company.

3. Minutes from the Office of ~~General~~ Legislative Counsel make references to a concern of Senator Baker over an alleged financial relationship between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hunt which continued subsequent to Mr. Hunt's formal retirement. Senator Baker has reportedly made reference to a payment of some thirty thousand dollars with the parenthetical comment that Mr. Helms would not have that amount of money

to provide Mr. Hunt from his private funds. Mr. Richards of the Inspector General Staff opinioned that if the Agency had sponsored the St. John books, it was likely that Mr. Hunt had so informed Senator Baker.

4. Adding possible weight to this line of speculation is the fact that subsequent to publishing the last St. John novel, Mr. Hunt published a novel entitled, Eduardo, using his old Agency issued alias, Edward J. Hamilton. The suggestion is that this writing effort was done by Mr. Hunt free of any fiduciary relationship with the Agency involved in the use of the St. John pen name.

5. Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, was briefed on the above by the undersigned in the presence of Mr. Kuhn on the evening of 5 February 1974.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

IG-9
Tab 35

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steven L. Kuhn

SUBJECT : The David St. John Novels

1. On 4 February 1974, Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, was interviewed by the undersigned concerning his knowledge of a series of novels written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This interview was undertaken at your request in an effort to determine if Mr. Hunt had acted in any capacity in cooperation with Counter Intelligence Operations. It has previously been alleged in Office of Security records that Messrs. Paul Gaynor and Edward Sayle of Security Research Staff, believed that Mr. Hunt had written novels at Agency request and that this effort had been known to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Operations.

2. Mr. Pforzheimer provided a verbal summary of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's fictional writings under the pen name, David St. John. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that when the first St. John book, On Hazardous Duty, appeared in 1965, he undertook to identify the true name of the author. Mr. Pforzheimer related that he checked with a source in the copyright office only to find out that the true name was not given on the copyright application. The mailing address given for the author was checked against a telephone cross reference directory. The address on the copyright application was identified with Mr. E. Howard Hunt. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that after making the identification, he called Mr. Thomas Karamessines and related his discovery. Mr. Pforzheimer recalled from the nature of Mr. Karamessines' reaction that he had uncovered a sensitive matter of senior officer concern. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that he then recommended to Mr. Karamessines that "if the Agency is involved in this thing why not see to it that Hunt leaves his address off the copyright applications in the future." Mr. Karamessines reportedly

accepted the suggestion and Mr. Pfortzheimer recalls that subsequent copyright applications were submitted without [illegible] the address. Within five minutes of the conversation with Mr. Karamessines, Mr. Pforzheimer recalls being called by Mr. Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Pforzheimer recalls the substance of the conversation as being, "for Christ sake Walter, this is the first book to come along and say something good about the Agency." "Why not leave the Goddamn thing alone."

3. The undersigned asked Mr. Pforzheimer, who to his knowledge, would be in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. Hunt was under any form of Agency sponsorship in his writing of the David St. John novels. Mr. Pfortzheimer replied that he was never officially briefed on the matter and that only Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamessines could provide the answer. Mr. Pforzheimer was then asked if either Mr. Angleton or Mr. Rocca of Counter Intelligence Operations would have any knowledge of this activity. Mr. Pforzheimer replied that he doubted it seriously.

4. Mr. Pforzheimer went on to relate that he was occasionally tasked to do research for Mr. Hunt. He recalled on one occasion being asked to research the Indian religious rites involving use of funeral pyres. Mr. Pforzheimer remembered that this theme figures significantly in Mr. Hunt's subsequent novel Tower of Silence which appeared under the St. John pen name in 1966. Mr. Pforzheimer parenthetically pointed out the origin of the pen name as being the names of Mr. Hunt's two sons--David and St. John.

5. Tracing Mr. Hunt's career assignments, it is noted that he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations then designated, the DDP/Operations Group, in February 1965. The first David St. John book was published during 1965. From June 1965 through September 1966, Mr. Hunt was assigned to Madrid, Spain as a Contract Agent. During 1966, three St. John books appeared in print, the highest output for any year. Mr. Hunt published one book under the St. John pseudonym in 1967, and one each in the years 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972. Mr. Hunt officially retired as an Agency Staff Employee effective 30 April 1970.

6. A check of Office of Security records did not develop any indication that any of the David St. John manuscripts were ever submitted for review in accordance with Agency regulations. There is no documentary evidence currently available to the Office of Security to either confirm or deny possible Agency sponsorship of the books written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt under the pen name, David St. John.

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET

Copy one of one copies

7 February 1974

2C Feb 9, Tab 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kuhn

SUBJECT: General Gaynor's Recollections

1. This date, at your instruction, I called Gen. Paul F. Gaynor to seek his recollections regarding his knowledge of the writings of Mr. Hunt and any official who might be aware of the circumstances of any Agency involvement in that effort.

2. Gen. Gaynor advised that his memory is not altogether clear on the matter, and that he was "reaching," but stated that has he reconstructs the matter:

a. He became aware that Hunt, while in WH, was accomplishing a steady flow of spy books, and that security approval was not being requested on the manuscripts before submission to publishers. (He stated that this activity continued later, as he recalls it, in CI Staff, and agreed with idea that the volume of writings was sufficient to indicate that a great of time was involved in Hunt's writing.) Gen. Gaynor advised that he raised the issue "up front" on several occasions. The reaction he recieved to his raising the issue was that "keep your stinking nose out of this business." He stated that he was lead to believe that Mr. Helms desired to improve the image of the intelligence profession and the Agency and that Hunt's books were a part of the program to do so. He stated that he was never told outright that this was the case, but the responses he recieved lead him to believe this was the case.

b. He suggested that two people might be able to assist in clearing the issue, Ray Rocca and Walter Pforzheimer, both of whom were involved in the "image" materials. He stated that Pforzheimer seemed to be aware of all the details - on an up to date basis - of Hunt's departure from the Agency to join the public relations firm, to the degree that Gen. Gaynor gained the belief that Hunt was merely moving his desk outside the building, but being paid by the same source as before. He also advised that he kept Miss Ethel Mendoza fairly current on what he was learning about Hunt's activities because she followed the case for him, and suggested that her recall about what he had learned and when and what resulted, might be better than his at this date. (He also mentioned an incident in which Morse Allen while on a TDY was told by a COS to ask Headquarters to remove Hunt from the Area because of his direct liaison with the president of the country, and other activities which were confounding station operations. Later, the COS told Morse to forget about relaying the message, with the implication that Hunt was being directed by higher authority in the Agency and the COS did not wish to get in the middle by complaining. He said Morse would probably

c. He also suggested that another person--definitely no friend of Hunt--who might have some recall or have picked up information about the book-writing matter might be Anita Potocki of CI Staff, formerly of Division D. (I gather that she did not have official knowledge, but because of her dislike for Hunt, she made it somewhat her business to follow his career.)

Edward F. Sayle

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-105 — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,830.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $3,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $8,800.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 150 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-105. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 30 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles N. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/3189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BP
1 - WE/5

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division
ATT : Support Staff

13 October 1965

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(c) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance
ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood
FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

/s/
David S. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

5 NOV 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an amendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

No action taken on
this basis.

[illegible]

14-00000

OGC 65-2476a

12 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block

NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

4 July 65

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,830 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable law and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS:

/S/

APPROVED:

/S/

SECRET

NOTED
DFC

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I phoned Paul Burns, Special Assistant to the DDO, and said that we had some leads that could be followed by whoever has the action in the DDO in tracking down Hunt's activities during the fall of 1964, when he was alleged to have been engaged in surveillance activities of Barry Goldwater.

2. I said that our files showed Hunt was in DO Division (Burns was not familiar with that title, but recognized it as the predecessor of FR Division) and in August 1964 was assigned to the Washington field office. I suggested that Stan Gaines, who was Deputy Division Chief of DO Division and now DCOS Bonn, might be in a position to give a few groups on what Hunt was supposed to be doing then. I suggested that he be queried by cable. Burns said Gaines is staying on under contract for a while, so would continue to be available.

3. I said that Fig Coleman was on the Iberian desk when the Hunt assignment to Madrid was brought up in 1964 and when Hunt went to the field in 1965. He could give the background on the assignment, which seems to have been through Karamessines at Helms' direction. His recollection would give leads. I told him that Coleman became COS Madrid later, after Hunt left Spain, and could provide information on what Hunt did not do for the Agency during that period. I suggested that both Helms and Karamessines should be queried. I gave as a possible press treatment that Hunt was engaged in domestic operations (something Senator Baker is pursuing) and that his assignment to Spain after the election could be presented as giving him time to cool off. I thought we had to pursue the matter to be sure we know the facts.

4. I asked Burns to be sure that we are on information distribution of cables to the field on this, given our assigned responsibility for keeping files on Watergate. He said we are on the PLMHPLANK for messages to Helms. He would advise the action officer. I said we are available for any help we can give.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

[illegible]

9 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OPS/RMO

SUBJECT : Watergate File Research - Final Report

1. The files of the immediate office of the Chief, OPS/OSG have been checked for material relevant to the subject of this memorandum. The check included chronological files of communications of which I was the author while assigned to Madrid, Spain in the period July 1970 to July 1973. Nothing pertinent was found.

2. I have attempted to recollect any other details which conceivably could be pertinent and which relate to the period of my assignment to Madrid. The only points which I recall but on which I have no documentation are these:

a. There were occasional joshing inquiries made of me by American residents of Madrid about the reported presence in Spain of E. Howard Hunt in 1972. My standard reply was that I knew only what I had heard rumored. For the record, at no time did Hunt contact me, and I have never known of his having tried to contact any Station personnel in Spain during the period 1970-73. I made no effort personally to ascertain whether or not Hunt was in Spain, and I had no effort made by any Station member.

b. A Station officer, possibly Richard Ouderkirk, now assigned to Guatemala, was given some information by an informant in 1972 concerning reported activities in Spain by Robert Vesco. I suggested that the information be given informally to the Embassy's Economic Section chief, John Oliver. That officer was charged with keeping abreast of developments related to Vesco. The Station did not pursue that subject, as I recall, because it was not a topic of reportable interest, according to requirements of the period.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056759

SUBJECT: Watergate File Research - Final Report (cont'd)

3. There is no other employee assigned to my immediate office who has relevant personal knowledge of events and personalities.

Robert E. Owen

Robert E. Owen
Chief, OPS/OSG

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Director of Finance 1212 Key Building	EXTENSION	NO.
		DATE 27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~[illegible] W/file~~				
5. Sandy-Aradel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

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SECRET

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

Account opened: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

20 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt

1. I spoke with Fig Coleman about Hunt's assignment to Spain. I had spoken with him back in August when we were inquiring into reported activities involving Mrs. Hunt.

2. Coleman said that he got out of the War College in May 1964 (by which he fixed the time), and took over the Iberian desk. Bill Ryan was C/EUR (or was it WE Division at the time). In early autumn Ryan said that he had just been informed by the DDP (Karamessines) that Hunt was to be assigned to Madrid as DCOS, as a directed assignment by Helms. A memo was prepared and sent to the COS, Jim Noel (now retired). There was nothing further for about a month when Ryan called Coleman in and showed him a RYBAT letter from Noel stating that Ambassador Stanley J. Woodward would not have Hunt in the Embassy.

3. Woodward had been the Ambassador to Uruguay when Hunt was COS Montevideo. He had a low opinion of Hunt and was counting the days until Hunt left. The President of Uruguay visited President Eisenhower in the States, at which time he requested a personal favor--that Hunt be reassigned to Montevideo. So Hunt took another tour. Woodward was outraged, and had his revenge in 1964 when Hunt was to be sent as DCOS to Madrid.

4. After a couple of months--early 1965--Ryan called Coleman in and, observing that there was more than one way to skin a cat, told him that Hunt was going to Spain under nonofficial cover. This didn't require anything special, Ryan saying that he didn't know much about it. It came to him from Karamessines on Helms' order. Hunt was to have the telephone number of the COS, but he would do nothing for the station. Hunt was to submit administrative vouchers for reimbursement of his expenses and they were to be paid. Coleman said he never saw Hunt before he went out. He knows that there was no operational reporting, to indicate that Hunt was doing anything.

The vouchers were not large, although the documentation was poor. Coleman raised the question with Ryan about his signing off, and Ryan said he could talk to Karamessines if he wished. Because Coleman had a close personal association with Karamessines he did just that. He was told by Karamessines that he didn't know much about it either--"Helms said send him out." He was instructed to go ahead.

5. In early July 1966 (4 July) Coleman went to Madrid. He had a ten day turnover with Jim Noel. Hunt had already gone and he did not see him. Noel said he didn't know what Hunt did, but that Coleman need not worry because he was gone.

6. Several months ago Noel was at a seminar at which Ambassador Woodward was also present. At the time he asked about Hunt. Woodward said it might still be dragged into the press. Tad Szulc had been after Woodward about the Hunt assignment to Spain. Coleman observed that Szulc did have a long article on Hunt in the New York Times, and the Spain assignment was mentioned, but without any conclusions as to its significance.

7. Coleman said the RYBAT file of C/EUR may have something on the event, but not much. A letter out and the reply, but not much more.

S. D. Breckinridge

14-00000

22 February 1974

IG File 11 Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: E. Howard Hunt--Madrid Assignment

1. On 22 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and the undersigned interviewed Mr. Edward Ryan, Chief, Staff D, Deputy Director for Operations, on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. During the period of Mr. Hunt's assignment as a Contract Type A agent to Madrid between July 1965 and September 1966, Mr. Ryan had been the Deputy Chief of the Western European Division, Deputy Director for Plans. The purpose of the interview was to determine if Mr. Ryan had any information bearing on the matter of the operational assignment of Mr. Hunt during this period.

2. Mr. Ryan stated that the assignment of Mr. Hunt both to the European Division and to Madrid was handled without benefit of the routine processing procedures through the Western European Division. Mr. Hunt's assignment was coordinated and directed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. With regard to operational duties, Mr. Ryan was unaware of any specific project or target for Mr. Hunt. Mr. Ryan made the specific observation that if Mr. Hunt produced positive intelligence on the Iberian target during this period the officials responsible for this effort within the Western European Division were totally unaware of it.

3. Mr. Ryan stated that most of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's activity and the nature of his assignment during this period came more through hearsay than direct official knowledge. For example, he cited the comment made by a mutual acquaintance of his and Mr. Hunt's to the effect that Mr. Hunt stated that while in Madrid he was going to "play golf and write books." Mr. Ryan was asked specifically whether or not he was

under the impression that Mr. Hunt's writing activities were either being encouraged or subsidized directly by this Agency in any official effort. Mr. Ryan responded that he was personally not aware of any such arrangement. He added as an expression of personal opinion that Mr. Hunt had no operational function and was simply granted the opportunity to write books for his own personal gain at Government expense during this period.

Lawrence J. Howe

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS[illegible]TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]FIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Howe		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	XX	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/IG/2E24 Hqs./5527	22 Feb 74

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

SECRET

26 Feb 10, Tab 32

22 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Sam Halpern

1. I met with Sam Halpern for about 20 minutes this morning in GG10, where he is cleaning up some details before he goes to his new assignment as DC/DCD. I told him generally about our attempt to reconstruct Howard Hunt's assignments and financial transactions, and asked him particularly for recollections he may have of Hunt's assignment in Spain in mid-1965 to the fall of 1966.

2. Halpern said that he has no recollection about such an assignment. In June 1965 he moved from WH Division with Des FitzGerald when he became the DD/P. At about that time Halpern's father died and he was in New York for the funeral and ten days of religious observations following that. He was back in mid-June and in and out from then on as he got ready to attend the National War College which began in August. He did not return to that office until the end of June 1966.

3. Halpern observed that during this period Karamessines was ADDP with Helms moving up to be DDCI. He thought it entirely possible that Helms and Karamessines could have handled this on their own.

4. Halpern said that Evan Parker had come into the office of the DD/P shortly before Helms became DDCI, and had returned from Honolulu for that purpose. He stayed on for FitzGerald until Halpern returned from the National War College. He suggested someone might talk to Evan Parker who may have known something about it (although he may not). He also suggested talking to Georgia.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 013186

IG File 12, Tab 54

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Watergate--Frank A. O'Malley

1. At 3 p.m. on the afternoon of 19 February 1974, Mr. Frederick N. Evans and Lawrence J. Howe interviewed Mr. Frank A. O'Malley at his residence, 6419 Lakeview Drive, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. O'Malley retired from this Agency in June of 1972. Prior to retirement Mr. O'Malley was an officer in the External Employment Assistance Branch, Retirement Activities Division of the Office of Personnel. It was Mr. O'Malley's function to assist personnel retiring from this Agency in finding post-retirement employment. In this capacity Mr. O'Malley had been instrumental in the placement of Mr. E. Howard Hunt in the Robert R. Mullen public relations firm. The purpose of this interview was to attempt to determine if additional information could be developed from Mr. O'Malley with regard to the placement of Mr. Hunt with the Mullen Company.

2. Mr. O'Malley began the interview by recalling the nature of his past Agency associations both with Mr. Hunt and the Mullen Company. Mr. O'Malley stated that prior to assuming his responsibilities in the Office of Personnel he had served with Central Cover Staff in the area dealing with the funding of covert action projects. In this capacity he had become familiar with the activities of Mr. Hunt while Mr. Hunt functioned on the Covert Activities Staff primarily in the propaganda field. Mr. O'Malley stated that he first came in contact with the Mullen Company when he was attempting to find an organization to handle the public relations effort of a covert Agency activity known as the Free Cuba Committee. Mr. O'Malley related that he had arranged this cover through the Christianform Organization and that his duties involved all aspects of the funding of this activity. Mr. O'Malley described the nature of his working relationship

with Mr. Robert R. Mullen as being close and cordial. Mr. O'Malley stated that Mr. Mullen was in the habit of confiding to him information concerning other Mullen business contacts and projects. In response to a specific question, Mr. O'Malley stated that during the period of his contact with the Mullen Company dealing with the Free Cuba Committee, Mr. Mullen told him the Howard Hughes Organization was a client of the concern.

3. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his previous statements that Mr. Hunt was referred to his office for placement assistance through the Office of the Executive Director, then Colonel L. K. White. Mr. O'Malley stated that in view of Mr. Hunt's interests in the public relations field, it was thought advisable to put Mr. Hunt in touch with Mr. Robert Mullen for the purpose of gaining the benefit of Mr. Mullen's guidance. Mr. O'Malley recalled, after the initial meeting, Mr. Mullen mentioned having met Mr. Hunt some years previously in Paris, France. Mr. O'Malley's office arranged interviews with various organizations including Reader's Digest and the Kennecott Copper Company. Through the offices of the Mullen Company an interview was arranged with the General Foods Corporation, a Mullen client. Mr. O'Malley stated there was disappointment that Mr. Hunt had been unsuccessful in "selling himself" during any of these interviews and that no job offers had resulted. In response to a question as to whether or not executive level interest was still being shown in Mr. Hunt's post-employment placement, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence, was listed as a character reference on Mr. Hunt's resume and that Mr. Helms signed a letter of recommendation to the Kennecott Copper Company on Mr. Hunt's behalf. Mr. O'Malley recalled being contacted in the last month of Mr. Hunt's Agency service by Mr. Mullen, who stated that a decision had been made to expand their operations. In view of this expansion, Mr. Mullen had decided he would himself offer Mr. Hunt a job. Mr. Mullen had stated that he was interested in having Mr. Hunt begin work immediately. However, Mr. O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt completed retirement formalities and actually started work for the Mullen Company approximately a week to 10 days later.

4. Mr. O'Malley stated that contact was maintained with Mr. Hunt while at the Mullen Company on a continuing basis, because Mr. O'Malley was interested in Mr. Hunt for possible referral of other Agency retirees. Mr. O'Malley also understood that there was Cover and Commercial Staff interest in the Mullen Company, and that Mr. Hunt became instrumental in discussing several aspects of the cover operations in his capacity as an officer of the company. Mr. O'Malley recalled referring various Agency officers to Mr. Hunt for guidance when these individuals expressed an interest in entering the public relations field. Mr. O'Malley did recall disappointment in feeling Mr. Hunt had generally been less helpful on these occasions.

5. Mr. Hunt contacted Mr. O'Malley on several occasions requesting referral of retiring Agency employees with specific qualifications. These instances occurred apparently after Mr. Hunt had assumed his responsibilities with the White House. In one instance Mr. Hunt requested referral of a recently retired Agency secretary. As in previous memoranda and discussions, Mr. O'Malley was unable to recall the name of this individual. He did, however, state that he is quite certain Mr. Hunt turned down the individual whom he referred. As a point of clarification, Mr. O'Malley said that this individual had not previously been known to Mr. Hunt, nor had she previously worked for him in any capacity. Mr. O'Malley also recalled a request from Mr. Hunt for an individual having skills in the area of locks and surreptitious entry. A resume of Mr. Thomas C. Amato was provided to Mr. Hunt at that time. It is Mr. O'Malley's recollection that Mr. Hunt specifically stated that a person with Mr. Amato's qualifications was needed in connection with a requirement of the Howard Hughes Organization in Las Vegas, Nevada. Mr. O'Malley stated the opinion that it was his impression that the duties involved would include the monitoring of a listening device in an undisclosed location. Mr. O'Malley reiterated his understanding that Mr. Amato did not accept Mr. Hunt's offer of employment.

6. Mr. O'Malley then recalled request from Mr. Hunt for a recommendation of a security service organization to carry out an electronic countermeasures "sweep." Mr. O'Malley recommended the Wackenhut Corporation. Mr.

O'Malley recalled that Mr. Hunt expressed dissatisfaction with that suggestion in part because of what Mr. Hunt viewed as that firm's political orientation. Mr. O'Malley did not elaborate further on that remark. Mr. O'Malley then suggested the use of Anderson Security Consultants, Incorporated, a commercial cover entity of the Office of Security. Mr. O'Malley stated that insofar as this organization was advertised in the yellow pages and that Mr. Hunt could be assured of the reliability of the services, he felt this to be a reasonable suggestion. Mr. O'Malley stated that during a subsequent phone call when Mr. O'Malley asked how his suggestion had worked out, Mr. Hunt responded, "Yes, they had done a fine job." At this point Mr. O'Malley was asked whether or not from his associations with Mr. Hunt he felt Mr. Hunt was in the habit of making glib comments which were not necessarily accurate in order to pass over a subject. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was categorically so. He said he was sure that Mr. Hunt had lied to him on a number of occasions and that,therefore, he was in no position to be sure that Mr. Hunt had actually, in fact, used the services of Anderson Security Consultants. Mr. O'Malley volunteered the opinion that he suspected the electronic countermeasures "sweep" was to be carried out in the offices of the Committee to Re-elect the President.

7. In response to a question as to whether he had ever referred anyone to McCord Associates, Mr. O'Malley replied that he remembered having referred Walter Brayden. Mr. Brayden for a time acted as bodyguard to Mrs. Martha Mitchell. As an aside Mr. O'Malley mentioned that Mr. Brayden had refused to carry a firearm in spite of the fact that Mr. McCord told him he could do so on the authority of the Attorney General. Asked specifically if he had ever referred either William Shea or Teresa Shea to Mr. McCord, Mr. O'Malley stated that he did not recall specifically referring Teresa Shea and that he was sure that he had not referred William Shea to him. So, contrary to previous statements, it is now Mr. O'Malley's belief that in all probability Mrs. Shea was not referred by this Agency to Mr. McCord.

8. Returning to Mr. O'Malley's previous responsibilities in coordinating funding for the covert action activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt, the issue was raised as to whether or not the funding of Mr. Hunt's projects continued between July 1965 and September 1966 while Mr. Hunt was a contract employee stationed at Madrid, Spain. Mr. O'Malley recalled that at the time of Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid the statement disseminated for consumption within the Agency was that Mr. Hunt was retiring. Mr. O'Malley stated that this was not generally believed. Mr. O'Malley was quite certain that during this period his office handled no project funding for Mr. Hunt. In response to specific question Mr. O'Malley stated that on Mr. Hunt's return to staff employment the projects and funding which stopped in July 1965 were again resumed. Mr. O'Malley was not aware of any project names or funding mechanisms or post-assignment accountings in connection with Mr. Hunt's activities in Madrid.

Frederick N. Evans
Frederick N. Evans

Lawrence J. Howe
Lawrence J. Howe

14-00000

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Indexed
IG #11
Sub #3[illegible]

21 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Office of Finance Records - E. Howard Hunt

1. On the instruction of Mr. Steven L. Kuhn, Chief of Operations, PSI, the undersigned made an appointment for the afternoon of 20 February 1974 to interview Mr. William Caufield, Chief, Certification and Liaison Division, Office of Finance, and Mr. Joseph Hudson of Finance on the subject of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. At the outset of the interview Mr. Caufield advised the undersigned that instruction had been received from the Director of the Office of Finance, Mr. Thomas Yale, that discussion on the subject of Mr. Hunt was to be carried out only with the Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Caufield stated that he had informed Mr. Yale of the requested interview and had received this instruction with the suggestion that the undersigned contact Mr. Yale directly with any inquiry.

2. Accompanied by Mr. Caufield, the undersigned briefed Mr. Yale on the nature of the request and identified the "Task Force" effort being undertaken by the Office of Security in concert with the Offices of the Inspector General and Legislative Counsel. Mr. Yale responded that he recognized the legitimacy of the inquiry. Mr. Yale explained that subsequent to initiation of the complete audit being undertaken by Mr. Quinn of the Audit Staff, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, Mr. Harold L. Brownman, had requested the Office of Finance to discontinue their investigation of Mr. Hunt to avoid duplication. Mr. Yale added parenthetically that it was the nature of Finance Officers not to leave a job half done and that an "informal" inquiry into Mr. Hunt's financial records had nevertheless continued at a more subdued pace.

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3. A review of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hunt's conversion to Contract Type A employment and assignment was then undertaken by Messrs. Yale, Caufield, Hudson and the undersigned. The contract and payroll files of Mr. Hunt were reviewed for possible indications of the nature of the operational activity undertaken in Madrid. A review of travel vouchers indicated that Mr. Hunt and his family made accountings indicating departure from Washington, D. C., on 5 August 1965 with an arrival in Madrid, Spain, on 16 August 1965. The costs of this travel were charged to the budget of the Western Hemisphere Division, Deputy Directorate for Plans, Madrid Station Support account. A subsequent accounting summarized PCS travel expenses and included a payment for apartment rental for 16, 17 and 18 August 1965 with a payment in the amount of $125 to Mr. F. Reid Buckley for this purpose.

4. It was determined that an allottee bank account in Mr. Hunt's name had been established at the Riggs National Bank of Washington. All salary and other non-operational reimbursements were made to Mr. Hunt through sterile check to this account. An operational account was established for Mr. Hunt with the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York City. A review of all payments made to Mr. Hunt through the Chase bank account through Mr. Hunt's operational advance subsidiary account, or 1442 account, had been made. There was no record of any operational accounts or advances being processed through this channel. Mr. Yale stated that this fact defined his concern. He felt that it was inconceivable that Mr. Hunt could have undertaken operational activity without some transfer of or accounting for funds. To date, no such records have been developed. No reference to a project or project digraph or operational FAN number has been located. Al expenses connected with Mr. Hunt identified to date were charged to the Madrid Station Support. A review made of Madrid Station records has not indicated any "Developmental and Target of Opportunity (D&TO)" funds or "Other Operational Activity (OOA)" funds expended by or on behalf of Mr. Hunt. These two accounts would normally be the source of operational funding not charged against a specific project activity.

5. A review of all of the travel vouchers on record for Mr. Hunt during this period also failed to identify a project. In addition to the PCS and return vouchers, two other accountings are on record. One accounting covered a trip by the entire Hunt family to Paris "for the renewal of visas." A second voucher covered a TDY trip from Madrid to Washington with return to Madrid made by Mr. Hunt from 5 January to 8 January 1966. The voucher states in the space provided for the citation of the travel order number - "no travel order." The accounting was approved and signed by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director for Plans. No justification or statement of purpose for this TDY was given on the accounting.

6. Mr. Yale determined that further review of possible sources or identification of operational funding was in order. Mr. Yale gave instructions that the entire 1442 advance account of Mr. Hunt be reviewed for other possible channels of funding outside of the New York Chase account. After discussion, it was agreed that particular attention be taken to any items connected with publishing or book royalties. Mr. Yale noted that the royalty offset waiver provision ammended to Mr. Hunt's contract was, in his experience, somewhat unusual.

7. Mr. Yale was informed by the undersigned of the intention to interview Mr. Edward Ryan, currently Chief, Division D, who was at the time of Mr. Hunt's Madrid assignment, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. Mr. Yale suggested that Mr. Davis Powell also be interviewed. The undersigned informed Mr. Yale that this had been done and briefed Mr. Yale on the generally negative results of the interview. Mr. Yale then recommended that Mr. Sam Halpern be interviewed. Mr. Yale noted that Mr. Halpern had been an assistant to Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald when the latter was Chief, Western Hemisphere Division and had accompanied Mr. Fitzgerald when he became Deputy Director for Plans. Mr. Yale recalled that subsequent to Mr. Fitzgerald's passing that Mr. Halpern remained on the staff and acted as an Executive Officer for Mr. Thomas Karamessines. Mr. Yale stated that from his experience, Mr. Karamessines would have delegated all the arranging of "details" surrounding an assignment such as Mr. Hunt's to Mr. Halpern. Mr. Yale offered the parenthetical observation of his surprise at what he interpreted to be reticence to date to interview Mr. Halpern.

8. The undersigned assured Mr. Yale that he would be informed of any information identifying any possible project activity developed in subsequent investigation. Mr. Yale stated that any information in this area would greatly facilitate the job of checking computorized financial records.

Lawrence J. Howe

CHASE MANHATTAN BANK ACCOUNT

Check No.	Date	Payee	Amount
8	20 October, 1965	Unknown	$ 1,650.00
	(2 months rent as deposit plus 1 month in advance at $550 per month. Substantiated by lease)		
9	26 November, 1965	Casa Guggenbuhl	$ 69.34
	(for storage of trunks during 3 mos. temporary housing)		
10	10 December, 1965	Security Storage Co.	$ 1,070.82
	(final destination charges per attached invoice. Insurance charge of $1.00 is personal expense.)		

# # # # # #

Expenses

November 18, 1965	Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell	Ptas. 150	$ 2
December 20, 1965	Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife. (Per my letter of 21 December, 1965)	Ptas. 2250	37
			$ 40

Howard Hunt

14-00000

SERVICES OTHER THAN PERSONAL | Terence S. CRABANAC

36-332

DESCRIPTION OF EXPENDITURE - ATTACH RECEIPTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS | AMOUNT

18 Nov 1965 Flowers for Sra. de Max Borrell. Pesetas 150 @ 60/$1.00 - $2.50
20 Dec 1965 Dinner at House of Ming. Ex-Bolivian Ambassador and wife.
Pesetas 2250 @ 60/$1.00 - $37.50 * | 40.00

* For operational security reasons a receipt was not obtained.

(Credit the 144.2 advance account.)

RTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL, EXTRAORDINARY, OR EMERGENCY NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT ... NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND AT- HMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

(See true name attachment)
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT

I authorize my agent, whose signature appears below, to receive currency amounting to ________ of official funds on my behalf and acknowledge receipt of such funds and my accountability therefor, when paid to my agent.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF AGENT

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

REF. NO.	CHARGE FAN ACCOUNT NO.
6-2282	6136-1347 (code 3)
DATE	AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE
14 Feb 66	Charles E. Sater WE/BF

APPROVED

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
15 2 66	ADDP

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF CERTIFYING OFFICER
2/25/66	

RECEIPT FOR FUNDS RECEIVED

PAYMENT RECEIVED IN THE AMOUNT OF $ ~~40.00~~ N/A

DATE	SIGNATURE OF ☐ PAYEE ☐ AGENT

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF OFFICE OF FINANCE

DESCRIPTION-ALL OTHER ACCOUNTS 13-33 / DESCRIPTION - ADVANCE ACCOUNTS 13-27	28-33 T/A NO. / SHIP. DOC. NO.	34-39 STATION CODE / REC. RPT. NO. / PROJECT NO.	40-41 EXPENDED	42-47 OBLIG. REF. NO. / ADVANCE ACCT. NO. / EMP. NO.	48-49 PAY PER. LIQ. CODE	50 CA OR COST YR.	51-54 GENERAL LEDGER ACCT. NO.	55-66 COST - FAN ACCOUNT SYMBOL	61-66 CR. NO. / REF. NO.	67-70 OBJECT CLASS / 68-70 CC OR DUE DATE	71-80 AMOUNT DEBIT	CREDIT
CRABANAC CPS ENT			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2551	37 50	
CRABANAC CPS			88	2282		3	601.0	61361347		2555	2 50	
CRABANAC T.S.				136100			144.2		50	125		40 00

DATE	PREPARED BY	DATE	REVIEWED BY	TOTALS	DEBIT	CREDIT
2/23/66	W. E. Dokerty		JW 68-858	15	40 00	40.00

FORM 264 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET 312393

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(48)

OVER

PCS to Madrid -	Per diem/misc exp	$ 998.30	
	Air fare (self & family)	2,257.50	
	HHE, POV, etc	7,547.76	
	TLA, quarters, etc	6,662.00	
	Education allowance	1,440.00	$18,905.56
TDY Madrid/Paris -	reentry visa Air fare only for self & family		384.61
PCS to Hqs -	Per diem/misc exp	$ 178.82	
	Air fare (self & family)	1,394.55	
	HHE, POV, etc	10,731.97	
	TLA	599.34	12,904.68
Operational entertainment - Madrid Nov 65			40.00
Approved expenditure - LKD - Madrid 1 July 1966			1,600.00
Total expenditures			$33,834.85
Less advances received (bank deposit, $30,000; cash $3,500)			33,500.00
Cash settlement to close A/C			$ 334.85

15 February 1974

16 Feb 11 Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Davis Powell
on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Davis Powell, currently a Budget Officer on the staff of the Deputy Director for Management and Services. Mr. Powell is located in Room 7C18. During 1965 Mr. Powell was Chief of Support of the then designated Western European Division. In July 1965 a contract was written authorizing salary and benefits to Mr. E. Howard Hunt for an assignment under non-official cover to Madrid, Spain. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Powell had any information on Mr. Hunt's activities during this period.

2. Mr. Powell responded that from his recollection it was Mr. Hunt's habit to deal only with the most senior officer available. In this case Mr. Hunt dealt directly with the then Chief of Western European Division, Mr. Rolf Kingsley. Mr. Powell states that, in his capacity as Chief of Support, any activity undertaken to support Mr. Hunt's assignment to Madrid was undertaken second and thirdhand on receipt of instructions from Mr. Kingsley's office. He further stated that he was never briefed on the purpose of Mr. Hunt's mission and could add little in terms of speculation. Mr. Powell recommended that Mr. Edward Ryan, who was then Deputy Chief of Western European Division, be contacted. Mr. Powell also suggested that Miss Martha Seville be interviewed. Miss Seville was the Executive Secretary in Western European Division during the time that Mr. Hunt's contract was written and Miss Seville subsequently served in Madrid herself. Mr. Powell understands that Miss Seville is currently assigned to the office of the Chief, European Division.

Lawrence J. Howe

15 February 1974

IG File 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of Mr. Rogers Brooks
on the David St. John Novels

1. At 0930 on the morning of 15 February 1974, the undersigned interviewed Mr. Rogers Brooks, Chief, Contract Personnel Division, Office of Personnel. The purpose of this interview was to determine if Mr. Brooks had any information not contained in the Contract Personnel file of Mr. E. Howard Hunt on the latter's activities while a Contract Type A employee.

2. Mr. Brooks summarized his recollections by saying that, although it was not common practice it was not entirely unusual for highly sensitive contracts to be administered without the contracting officer being made aware of the operational objective involved. Mr. Brooks stated that he recalls some of the controversy involved in preparing the contract dealing with the question of offset and housing allowance, but he was unable to recall any of the details. It was Mr. Brooks' suggestion that the Office of Finance be contacted and that their contract personnel records on Mr. Hunt be checked for information.

Lawrence J. Howe

14 February 1974

IG Feb, 11, Tab 38

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Raymond A. Rocca on the David St. John Novels

1. On the morning of 14 February 1974 Messrs. Frederick Evans and Lawrence Howe interviewed Mr. Raymond A. Rocca, Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Operations. The purpose of the interview was to follow up on information contained in Office of Security files which stated the belief that individuals in the Counter Intelligence Operations office had knowledge of the writing activities of Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This belief was a matter of record in the files of the former Security Research Staff and was attributed to Mr. Paul Gaynor, now retired, and Mr. Edward Sayle.

2. During this interview Mr. Rocca was specifically asked whether or not he had knowledge of the existence of any form of official sponsorship or encouragement to Mr. E. Howard Hunt to write novels to improve the image of this Agency. Additionally, Mr. Rocca was asked whether or not any assistance was ever requested of the Counter Intelligence Operations office to be provided to Mr. Hunt or whether or not that staff had ever had any relationship with Mr. Hunt whatsoever. In response to these questions Mr. Rocca responded "on the record" that he has no knowledge of any such arrangements nor at any time was he party to any assistance or any requests for assistance to Mr. Hunt. Mr. Rocca stated that the particular section which he had been most actively concerned in the past years was responsible for handling a variety of tasks categorized under the area of "setting the record straight." In this sense, the "image" mission of the office was to counter misinformation currently in the media or otherwise believed to be part of an effort to discredit the Agency. Mr. Rocca feels that any assumption that Mr. Hunt was engaged in any form of Agency sponsored image activity would have probably lead to the conclusion that it was done under the Counter Intelligence Operations. However, Mr. Rocca emphatically stated that this was not the case.

3. Mr. Rocca was thoroughly candid and cooperative during the course of this interview. He was unable to suggest alternate means of attempting to determine if any official Agency sponsorship of Mr. Hunt did in fact exist. Mr. Rocca did venture the opinion that he felt that in all probability an official acquiescence on the part of senior officials might have been involved rather than an official sponsorship. It was agreed by all in this discussion that the nature of any informal support given to Mr. Hunt would be far more difficult to define in the absence of any formalized agreements.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Agency Sponsorship of the David St. John Novels

1. The details summarizing an interview on 4 February 1974 with Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, were set forth in a memorandum addressed to Mr. Steven L. Kuhn dated 6 February 1974. Mr. Kuhn was briefed by the undersigned on this information during the afternoon of 5 February 1974. Later the same afternoon, at Mr. Kuhn's direction, a conference was held with Messrs. Scott Breckenridge and John Richards of the Office of the Inspector General.

2. During this conference the speculation was entertained that Mr. E. Howard Hunt had, in fact, been under Agency sponsorship with the knowledge of Mr. Richard Helms in his preparation of a series of spy novels under the pseudonym, David St. John If it can be accepted as a reasonable supposition that Mr. Hunt had some highly compartmented financial arrangement authorized by senior Agency officials to write these books, then it is likely that this relationship continued after Mr. Hunt officially retired. It is specifically noted that Mr. Hunt retired 30 April 1970. Subsequent to the retirement, a David St. John book appeared in print in 1971 and another in 1972. These manuscripts were apparently prepared during the time that Mr. Hunt was employed by the Robert R. Mullen Company.

3. Minutes from the Office of ~~General~~ Legislative Counsel make references to a concern of Senator Baker over an alleged financial relationship between Mr. Helms and Mr. Hunt which continued subsequent to Mr. Hunt's formal retirement. Senator Baker has reportedly made reference to a payment of some thirty thousand dollars with the parenthetical comment that Mr. Helms would not have that amount of money

to provide Mr. Hunt from his private funds. Mr. Richards of the Inspector General Staff opinioned that if the Agency had sponsored the St. John books, it was likely that Mr. Hunt had so informed Senator Baker.

4. Adding possible weight to this line of speculation is the fact that subsequent to publishing the last St. John novel, Mr. Hunt published a novel entitled, Eduardo, using his old Agency issued alias, Edward J. Hamilton. The suggestion is that this writing effort was done by Mr. Hunt free of any fiduciary relationship with the Agency involved in the use of the St. John pen name.

5. Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, was briefed on the above by the undersigned in the presence of Mr. Kuhn on the evening of 5 February 1974.

Lawrence J. Howe

6 February 1974

IG-9
Tab 31

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Steven L. Kuhn

SUBJECT : The David St. John Novels

1. On 4 February 1974, Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, was interviewed by the undersigned concerning his knowledge of a series of novels written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt. This interview was undertaken at your request in an effort to determine if Mr. Hunt had acted in any capacity in cooperation with Counter Intelligence Operations. It has previously been alleged in Office of Security records that Messrs. Paul Gaynor and Edward Sayle of Security Research Staff, believed that Mr. Hunt had written novels at Agency request and that this effort had been known to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Operations.

2. Mr. Pforzheimer provided a verbal summary of his knowledge of Mr. Hunt's fictional writings under the pen name, David St. John. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that when the first St. John book, On Hazardous Duty, appeared in 1965, he undertook to identify the true name of the author. Mr. Pforzheimer related that he checked with a source in the copyright office only to find out that the true name was not given on the copyright application. The mailing address given for the author was checked against a telephone cross reference directory. The address on the copyright application was identified with Mr. E. Howard Hunt. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that after making the identification, he called Mr. Thomas Karamessines and related his discovery. Mr. Pforzheimer recalled from the nature of Mr. Karamessines' reaction that he had uncovered a sensitive matter of senior officer concern. Mr. Pforzheimer stated that he then recommended to Mr. Karamessines that "if the Agency is involved in this thing why not see to it that Hunt leaves his address off the copyright applications in the future." Mr. Karamessines reportedly

accepted the suggestion and Mr. Pfortzheimer recalls that subsequent copyright applications were submitted without [illegible] the address. Within five minutes of the conversation with Mr. Karamessines, Mr. Pforzheimer recalls being called by Mr. Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Pforzheimer recalls the substance of the conversation as being, "for Christ sake Walter, this is the first book to come along and say something good about the Agency." "Why not leave the Goddamn thing alone."

3. The undersigned asked Mr. Pforzheimer, who to his knowledge, would be in a position to confirm or deny whether Mr. Hunt was under any form of Agency sponsorship in his writing of the David St. John novels. Mr. Pfortzheimer replied that he was never officially briefed on the matter and that only Mr. Helms or Mr. Karamessines could provide the answer. Mr. Pforzheimer was then asked if either Mr. Angleton or Mr. Rocca of Counter Intelligence Operations would have any knowledge of this activity. Mr. Pforzheimer replied that he doubted it seriously.

4. Mr. Pforzheimer went on to relate that he was occasionally tasked to do research for Mr. Hunt. He recalled on one occasion being asked to research the Indian religious rites involving use of funeral pyres. Mr. Pforzheimer remembered that this theme figures significantly in Mr. Hunt's subsequent novel Tower of Silence which appeared under the St. John pen name in 1966. Mr. Pforzheimer parenthetically pointed out the origin of the pen name as being the names of Mr. Hunt's two sons--David and St. John.

5. Tracing Mr. Hunt's career assignments, it is noted that he was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations then designated, the DDP/Operations Group, in February 1965. The first David St. John book was published during 1965. From June 1965 through September 1966, Mr. Hunt was assigned to Madrid, Spain as a Contract Agent. During 1966, three St. John books appeared in print, the highest output for any year. Mr. Hunt published one book under the St. John pseudonym in 1967, and one each in the years 1968, 1969, 1971 and 1972. Mr. Hunt officially retired as an Agency Staff Employee effective 30 April 1970.

6. A check of Office of Security records did not develop any indication that any of the David St. John manuscripts were ever submitted for review in accordance with Agency regulations. There is no documentary evidence currently available to the Office of Security to either confirm or deny possible Agency sponsorship of the books written by Mr. E. Howard Hunt under the pen name, David St. John.

Lawrence J. Howe

SECRET

Copy one of one copies

1 February 1974

IG File 9, Tab 35

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kuhn

SUBJECT: General Gaynor's Recollections

1. This date, at your instruction, I called Gen. Paul F. Gaynor to seek his recollections regarding his knowledge of the writings of Mr. Hunt and any official who might be aware of the circumstances of any Agency involvement in that effort.

2. Gen. Gaynor advised that his memory is not altogether clear on the matter, and that he was "reaching," but stated that has he reconstructs the matter:

a. He became aware that Hunt, while in WH, was accomplishing a steady flow of spy books, and that security approval was not being requested on the manuscripts before submission to publishers. (He stated that this activity continued later, as he recalls it, in CI Staff, and agreed with idea that the volume of writings was sufficient to indicate that a great of time was involved in Hunt's writing.) Gen. Gaynor advised that he raised the issue "up front" on several occasions. The reaction he recieved to his raising the issue was that "keep your stinking nose out of this business." He stated that he was lead to believe that Mr. Helms desired to improve the image of the intelligence profession and the Agency and that Hunt's books were a part of the program to do so. He stated that he was never told outright that this was the case, but the responses he recieved lead him to believe this was the case.

b. He suggested that two people might be able to assist in clearing the issue, Ray Rocca and Walter Pforzheimer, both of whom were involved in the "image" materials. He stated that Pforzheimer seemed to be aware of all the details - on an up to date basis - of Hunt's departure from the Agency to join the public relations firm, to the degree that Gen. Gaynor gained the belief that Hunt was merely moving his desk outside the building, but being paid by the same source as before. He also advised that he kept Miss Ethel Mendoza fairly current on what he was learning about Hunt's activities because she followed the case for him, and suggested that her recall about what he had learned and when and what resulted, might be better than his at this date. (He also mentioned an incident in which Morse Allen while on a TDY was told by a COS to ask Headquarters to remove Hunt from the Area because of his direct liaison with the president of the country, and other activities which were confounding station operations. Later, the COS told Morse to forget about relaying the message, with the implication that Hunt was being directed by higher authority in the Agency and the COS did not wish to get in the middle by complaining. He said Morse would probably

c. He also suggested that another person--definitely no friend of Hunt--who might have some recall or have picked up information about the book-writing matter might be Anita Potocki of CI Staff, formerly of Division D. (I gather that she did not have official knowledge, but because of her dislike for Hunt, she made it somewhat her business to follow his career.)

Edward F. Sayle

26 Feb 72, tab 2
19 Jun 72

EVERETTE HOWARD HUNT, JR.

1. Subject, a former GS-15 Operations Officer assigned to DDP/Europe, is 53 years of age and married. He served with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, and was employed by this Agency from November 1949 until his voluntary retirement on 30 April 1970. In 1971, Subject served as an advisor to President Nixon in relation to his trip to China. Subject is of current interest to the Central Cover Staff.

2. Subject graduated from Brown University in 1940. He served with the United States Navy from early 1941 until late 1942. After a year with Time, Incorporated, he entered the Air Force, where he was detailed to the Office of Strategic Services. He served in the Far East until January 1946. Subject engaged in writing, and then from May 1948 until February 1949 was employed by the Economic Cooperation Administration, serving in Paris, France, as an aide to Avarell Harriman.

3. A background investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in July 1949 revealed no indication of instability on Subject's part, but it was later learned that Subject had been refused an increase in salary with the Economic Cooperation Administration and had been permitted to resign. He was described as highly intelligent, but blindly selfish and egotistical.

4. Subject's wife, Dorothy Louise Goutiere Hunt, was investigated for Agency employment in 1948. Her former husband was described as a habitual drunkard, and Subject's wife was described as slightly unstable and not inclined to remain in one place for any length of time. She did not enter on duty, having accepted a position with the Economic Cooperation Administration in Paris. Our Paris sources later reported that Subject's wife was formerly his mistress and was openly flouted as such for several months. She was then described as an amoral and dangerous individual who underhandedly attacked those persons who incurred her enmity.

5. Subject entered on duty as an Intelligence Officer, GS-13, on 3 November 1949. In December 1950 he was assigned as Chief of Station, Mexico City, and then served as Chief of Mission there until August 1953. He served in Tokyo, Japan, from June 1954 until February 1957. He was then assigned as Chief of Station, Montevideo, Uruguay. Subject was Chief of Station in Montevideo until early 1960. There were indications that Subject attempted to use his personal influence with the President of Uruguay to have his assignment there extended, but he returned to the United States in June 1960 and was assigned to Mexico City on Project JMARC.

6. A cable from Montevideo, dated 6 November 1960, indicates that Subject had written former Uruguayan contacts commenting that he was working on the Cuban problem and publishing an anti-Castro newspaper in Miami. It was recommended that Subject be warned about such indiscreet remarks, but apparently no action was taken.

7. In November 1961, Subject was reassigned to the DDP/Covert Action Staff, and in January 1962 to the Office of the Chief of the same Staff. In July 1962 Subject was transferred to the DODS Research and Publications Section in Washington, and in July 1964 to the DODS Covert Action Staff. In February 1965 he moved to the Office of the DDP/Operations Group. From June 1965 to September 1966 Subject served as a Contract Agent in Madrid, Spain, after which he served in the DDP as Chief of European Covert Operations until his retirement on 30 April 1970.

8. On 26 January 1970 a source of the Office of Security learned that Subject was circulating through the publishing community "Give Us This Day," a manuscript written under his former operational alias and dealing with the events of the Bay of Pigs. Investigation disclosed that the manuscript had been in the possession of Tom Wallace, of Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc. as early as 9 July 1968 and that it was sent on that date to William F. Buckley, Jr., of the National Review. The manuscript was sent to the Arlington House and Walker and Company as well. Both rejected it as too controversial, as had Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

9. Subject was interviewed regarding the manuscript on 17 February 1970 by the DDP. He at first professed ignorance, but when told the title admitted he had written it for his own benefit as a historical record. Subject said he had shown the manuscript about two years ago to his agent, Max Wilkinson, and to William F. Buckley, Jr. He said he had only wanted an opinion from these gentlemen, and added that the manuscript had been returned to him. He had, he said, not wanted it published. Subject was instructed as to the danger of such a manuscript being published, and was to attempt to determine how many copies of it might be in circulation. He was not to contact Walker and Company, who were the source of the original information.

10. A reinvestigation of Subject was conducted by the Office of Security in July 1970. Subject and his wife were described by six neighbors acquainted with them for up to nine years, as excellent parents, good neighbors, and fine community citizens.

11. On 19 July 1971, Subject was reported by the Jersey City, New Jersey, Journal to have joined the White House Staff as a Consultant to President Nixon preparatory to the President's visit to the Peoples Republic of China.

12. On 6 November 1970, Subject was granted a Covert Security Approval for use by Central Cover Staff with Robert R. Mullen and Company, a Public Relations firm with offices at 1729 H Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. Inquiry of the Central Cover Staff on 19 June 1972 revealed that this is a current relationship. Subject, as principal officer of Robert R. Mullen and Company, is witting of cover arrangements for two Agency assets, James Everett in Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Arthur Hochberg, in Singapore.

13. Subject's security file reflects that Subject has, in the past, been of operational interest to Mr. James Angleton, Chief, CI Staff/DDP, in connection with an operational matter. On 19 June 1972, Mr. Fred Hubbard, CI Staff, advised that he will provide information as to the nature of Mr. Angleton's utilization of Subject.

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-10b — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,330.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $3,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $6,600.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-10b. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles N. Davis
Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/6189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BP
1 - WE/5

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division 13 October 1965

ATT : Support Staff

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(c) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE F. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood

FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

/s/
David S. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

5 [illegible] 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is recommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on this memo.

[illegible]

OGC 65-2476a

22 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block
NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

4 July 65

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac: :

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable law and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS:

/S/

APPROVED:

/S/

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ISAACS, HAROLD
201-18446

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:2 15AUG78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

AACS, HAROLD ROBERT

LE

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOLDE
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDE

201 No. 18446

SECRET
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

D

9 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ISAACS (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☒ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barbara Booth (name) CH/FCCI (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KAM (initials) 24 JAN 1975 (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-18446

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

SECRET

4 October 1974

XAAZ-35686

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Former Records of Ray Murphy

1. The attached documents are part of a large collection of records held by Ray Murphy during his tenure as an official of the Department of State. He transferred all of his records to CIA upon his retirement in the mid-1960's. The documents of that collection which did not meet the retention criteria of the DDO or the Office of Security were destroyed. While those which were of utility have been retained and accessioned as appropriate to the DDO records system.

2. The attached records concern Harold ISAACS, who is the subject of 201-0018446 and should be classified to that file.

M. Paul Hartman

M. Paul Hartman
C/CIRA/RS

Attachment

4 Oct 74
201-18446

RECORD COPY

07 att # 11/W

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 006593

Copy: [illegible]
Class: [illegible]

9: 7 - Isaacs, Harold

SOURCE: NEW MASSES, New York City,
October 22, 1936 - Page 12

EUROPE'S CRISIS; JAPAN PREPARES

By Hansu Chan

... There are numerous American journalists of different political color and shades of opinion who are "cooperating" in this way with Japanese imperialism, but whoever has followed the writings of Harold Isaacs, Alexander Buchman, Frank Glass and Wilbur Burton in The China Press, The China Weekly Review, Asia, Pacific Affairs, New International, etc., realizes that these American Trotskyist journalists are the most vicious and most dangerous of the whole lot of reactionary journalists.

Hiding behind a barrage of Marxist phraseology (which none of them has yet learned to manipulate with facility), these people are energetically conducting a campaign of lies against the Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Soviets and the Chinese Red Army, a campaign which aims to undermine the confidence of the outside world in the Chinese Soviet movement and the Red Army.

...

RECORD COPY

Harold Isaacs
201-18446

H/W ATT C1 To XAA2-35686

201-18446

EUR COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES

Date ..Oct. 23: 1957

SOURCE: DAILY WORKER

File No. ..9100....Isaacs

X 4202 China

TROTZKYITE BOOK MOURNS OVER CHINESE REVOLUTION

THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By Harold D. Issacs. Stanford University Press. 352 pp. $5.

By ROBERT FRIEDMAN

The presses are spewing forth anti-Chinese books these days at a pace which bids to match the anti-Soviet torrent. All the 'old China hands' who served Western imperialism as banker, soldier, spy, or whatever in the Orient are now busy at the typewriter, engaged in profitable vilification of 450,000,000 people because they decided to take their fate in their own hands and build for themselves.

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One book which deserves, even under the cynical and opportunist reign of capitalism, some special prize for adaptability is Harold D. Isaacs' "Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution."

Published first in 1938 as an avowedly Trotskyite tract (complete with introduction by Trotsky) calling the defeat of the Chinese workers in 1927 a "betrayal" by Stalin and the Chinese Communists, the same book emerges now, refurbished, to mourn the victory of the very same Chinese workers a generation later!

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Filled with the murky intricacies of devious Trotskyite polemics, Isaacs book has been reissued, partly to cash in on the hate-China racket, and partly because any stick is useful to Big Business against the liberation - bound masses.

Isaacs now says he no longer loves Trotsky, whose introduction has been dropped as a liability. Instead, he is an open defender of imperialist intervention against the people of the Far East.

But typical of his Trotskyite weaseling is Isaacs' attack on the Chinese Communists of the 1920's, first because they supported Chiang Kai-shek despite the fact that he was to become the butcher of the Chinese revolution, and second because they allegedly cringed before Chiang when he turned on the workers in 1927.

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This nonsense, which would rule out every political alliance in history on the chance that today's ally might be tomorrow's enemy, is ironic in view of the fact that Chiang sits today on Taiwan, a discredited gangster save only in the eyes of Isaacs' political mentors.

Meanwhile, the Chinese people will go about their business building socialism, unconcerned by Isaacs' tears for the tragedy of 1927 or 1951.

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Enclosure No. 1
To De[illegible]tch No. 3317

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2100-Isaacs, Harold & 1/30/35

1 Ta Yong Yi Ping Hutung
Peiping, China.
Oct. 5, 1934.

Mr. T. A. Bisson
136 Claremont Avenue
Mount Vernon, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Bisson:

I have seen the correspondence exchanged between Mr. Glass and yourself regarding the contributions you collected for the China Forum. A draft for the sum in full will be sent to you this week.

I do not know in the name of whom or what Miss Smedley speaks of the China Forum. Since she was not in China at the time the Forum suspended, nor has she corresponded with me on the subject, I consider it necessary to place before you and the other contributors an account of the circumstances in which the Forum ceased publication. Since you apparently gathered the contributors together in a meeting to hear what Miss Smedley had to say, I would appreciate it deeply if you would gather them once more to hear my account. The enclosed is a copy of a letter sent by me last May to the Chinese Communist Party. It has been published in China in a Chinese translation and copies have been sent abroad but has not been published in English as far as I know. I do not know the names of the people who were good enough to contribute to the Forum but their interest in the matter warrants placing before them the story of what happened to the magazine. I trust, out of simple fairness to me, you will be good enough to give them this opportunity.

I greatly regret any inconvenience or embarrassment to which you have been put in this matter. I do hope, however, that my letter will enlighten you and your friends and enable you to appreciate the difficulties which have arisen. I know of no project to revive the China Forum at the present time. Should such occur, the resultant publication would be of a considerably different character from the one I edited, as will be obvious from the facts given in my letter to the C. P. I think people who are interested in supporting the revolutionary movement here should know these facts.

Once again, I appreciate all the trouble you have gone to in this matter.

Did you ever, incidentally, receive the article "Fascism in China" and the newsletter which I mailed to July 13 last?

811 50 34 (China) / Searchlight Pub. Co./58

Yours sincerely,

encl. (Harold R. Isaacs)

(Copied by RD)

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C O P Y

Letter of H. R. Isaacs to the C.C.P. concerning the China Forum

To the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party:

The two-year period of my extra-organizational collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party has come to an end and the China Forum which I founded and edited during that time has been forced to suspend publication. In the interest of our whole movement as well as in my personal interest, I consider it necessary to record here and publish the history of the China Forum and the circumstances of its suspension. You refused me the opportunity to lay the matter before the membership of the party even when I offered to do so in your own organs and not through the columns of the Forum. When, wrongly, I permitted the Forum to go down in silence, you turned around and in your organs and near organs in China and abroad you proceeded with the usual slanders of "betrayer" and "counter-revolutionary". In so doing you didn't have the courage or the simple honesty to state that you presented the China Forum with an ultimatum and forced its suspension because in reply its editor raised questions which are being placed before the whole movement today by the International Left Opposition. Nor did you state that you deliberately smashed the Forum for this reason despite my repeated and extended offers to continue publication as before on a straight anti-Kuomintang, anti-imperialist basis, leaving these various problems to be thrashed out first privately among ourselves. In other words, you deliberately forced suspension of the China Forum despite the fact, on your own admission, that its loss was a serious blow to the revolutionary movement in China, that it meant the disappearance of an organ which for two years you had considered an extremely valuable instrument in the hands of the movement. Here, as in the broader issues which led to our differences, your blind adherence to false policies was once more demonstrative of your readiness to place your factional interests above the interests of the Chinese Revolution.

In going back over the history of the Forum, I think the vicious character of your action becomes even more evident when I start with the fact that from beginning to end I functioned not as a member of the party but as a willing sympathizer who was prepared to throw all his energies into a job he saw he could do - edit and publish an organ in China which could help mobilize the forces of this country for struggle against the Kuomintang and the imperialists by exposing the regime of terror and privation which they have in common imposed upon the masses of the Chinese people. Permit me to recall at this point that I never accepted any personal remuneration for time or labor. You gave the Forum financial aid but I never received a dollar from you that was not put into the paper. I refused your offers of compensation and earned my living elsewhere. Your only claim on me was my full-hearted loyalty to the Communist ideal and

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our common dedication to the struggle against a regime of hate and misery and oppression. In the end you forfeited this claim by ceasing any longer to be in my eyes honest or effective leaders of this struggle.

Although you helped the Forum financially, the part you played in building it up from the day it started in January, 1932, to the day of its last appearance in January 1934, was insignificant. My repeated requests for cooperation in matters of circulation and material for publication went largely unsatisfied throughout that time. You never supplied me with the reports I so frequently and urgently sought, particularly on trade unions, strike struggles, the Red Armies, the Red districts, etc. Everything the Forum did and became was the fruit of the work of a tiny group of devoted collaborators (the most important of whom had no connection with you whatever) and myself who had to depend almost entirely on our own resources for everything we did and published. At every crisis in the Forum's existence, when it was banned by the French authorities in Shanghai at the very outset; when it was hounded and persecuted by the American and Chinese authorities in the summer of 1933, when through British police pressure it was thrown out of every available printing ship in the city; when the pseudo-Fascist Blue Shirts again and again threatened the printing plant which I built up partially through personally contracted loans -- it was invariably through my own initiative, with the help of the little Forum staff, that we pulled ourselves up by the bootstraps every time and carried on to a point in January this year where the Forum was flourishing and growing daily in circulation, prestige, and influence despite the many formidable obstacles in its way. The formation of the China Forum Readers Association, which in the brief space of three months spread to eleven cities in five provinces, developing into a mighty potential weapon for the revolutionary movement, was the product of spontaneous action on the part of the Forum's readers, later sponsored and led by the paper itself. All these were the Forum's own achievements, not yours. By your arbitrary and criminal action you shattered them in the full stride of their growth. Because to my bitter disappointment I had not nor could I secure the resources to carry on myself - owing largely to the difficult conditions of work and the impossibility of getting revenue from the paper itself - all that had been achieved and was to be achieved was ground into the dust.

II.

From almost the very beginning of my active work - which I date from the time I began reporting events in China in a Communist way - a number of questions presented themselves to me in increasingly forcible form. These arose originally from my discovery of the gross distortions and exaggerations which I found to be characteristic of Communist propaganda in China and abroad. I define propaganda as the skilful, clear, accurate and wholly truthful reporting of the facts linked to an incisive,

purposive

purposive interpretation and a plan of action for dealing with the facts in a revolutionary way. I learned this from the life and work of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades who taught us that the truth comes from the masses themselves and that only disaster can result from telling them lies. I have never learned to the contrary that it was my revolutionary duty to work in any other way although I soon found that the present day Communist Party press makes a practice of distinguishing between propaganda and truth.

Examples of exaggeration and distortion most striking to me were naturally those which applied to China, because here I could check allegations with known facts. I first wrote these down to the ignorance or incapacity of individuals. I felt that Communist editors abroad would publish accurate facts about China if they could get them. Accordingly with a friend I tried to set up an independent mail news service and sent weekly bulletins to papers all over the world giving brief, sharp, factual accounts of what was going on. This was in the fall of 1931 after my return from the area of the great Central China floods of that summer. I scarcely understood then why this service failed to secure any response from the Communist press abroad. After about three months I had to suspend it for lack of support. It simply didn't get published except in a few organs which were not official Communist Party papers, including the New York Militant.

It wasn't long before I began to perceive, with a deeper study of international events and the history of the Chinese Revolution, that a consistent thread ran through the distortions and exaggerations which I found not only in brief casual reports of current events but in the solemn pronunciamentoes made by delegates before plenums of the E.C.C.I. I discovered that these departures from the truth were made necessary by the official premise that ever since the catastrophe of 1927 a mighty, upsurging revolutionary movement has been marching forward in China to the very brink of seizure of power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. I discovered that these exaggerations were necessary because the premise was false and along with it all the basic tenets of the policies being pursued by the Communist International and the Communist Party in China. I cannot begin here to give a summary of some of these distortions (which I verbally cited to you by the dozen) ranging from particular incidents (the wilfully false picture given of the cotton mill strike in Shanghai in January, 1932, even to the point of transposing it to February to heighten the impression given of the workers' role in the Shanghai war) to high flown generalizations like the statement recently made before the Plenum of the E.C.C.I. that the C.C.P. has won over the majority of the Chinese working class and the peasantry.

In denying the factual truth of this premise, whence flows the whole policy of the Communist Party in China, I deprecate not a whit the magnificent militancy and courage of Chinese workers, striking again and again and fighting

against

against terrific odds in defense of their very lives; nor the heroic struggles waged by peasants all over the country; nor the fight of the Red Armies against the Kuomintang. I merely respect the cold, indisputable fact that these struggles are defensive, not offensive, that they are isolated, desperate and unorganized. With very few exceptions - a few small strikes here and there and the larger exception of the Red Army - they are without organized revolutionary leadership. Moreover the development of this leadership, the task of the C.P., is proceeding at a tragically retarded pace owing to the false policies and inept tactics of the party.

In denying the presence of a mighty revolutionary upsurge (i.e., a vast, organized march toward the seizure of power) I respect facts made still clearer perhaps when compared to the facts and figures of the monster mass movements of the 1925-27 period. The tragic errors of the Communist leadership in 1927 were primarily responsible for the decapitation of that great movement and because no lessons have been drawn from those events to this very day, these errors, monstrously accumulated, are still responsible for the tragedies of today. But for the purpose of our comparison here, let us for example take the single fact that in 1926 in Greater Shanghai there were 257 strikes. In 1933 there were 82. Let us remember that on the eve of the workers' seizure of power in Shanghai in March, 1927, there were more than 800,000 workers, handicraftsmen and petty traders out on the streets fighting with arms in hands for demands of a far-reaching political character. A close check for the entire country in the latter half of 1933 showed me that less than one-thirtieth of that number were engaged in strikes and other disputes during any given month and that almost invariably the demands were defensive demands against wage cuts and lockouts. Moreover, the lack of cohesive leadership - often in departments of the same factory or in one or more of a group of factories - or even sometimes lack of even the most elementary organization - has in almost every case led to deadening failure and relatively easy betrayal by the yellow "labor leaders" and "mediators" of the Kuomintang. In 1925 the shooting of thirteen students by British police in Shanghai was the touch-off for a general strike which paralyzed the city and which was seconded by vast sympathy strikes which broke like a series of tidal waves over the entire country. In January, 1932, when the Japanese imperialists used the Shanghai International Settlement as a base for operations which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese, not a single strike interrupted the normal course of the public or other services in that settlement. In the factories there were no strikes but a large scale lockout to which the overwhelming majority of Shanghai's workers submitted without protest.

The dogged, persistent struggle carried on by small sections of the rank and file workers in isolated instances in recent years is tribute to the magnificent fibre of

Chinese

Chinese workers. It is not evidence that a revolutionary seizure of power is on the order of the day. It is evidence, along with the heroic sacrifices of thousands who have lost lives and liberty in Chinese revolutionary struggle during the last seven years of Kuomintang reaction, that it is possible to fight the monstrous white terror which Chinese Communists frequently cite as a reason for the insufficiency of their work. Yet it is largely because this terror has not been fought effectively that the Kuomintang regime, despite the fact that it is rotting and crumbling, can still keep the lid down on the boiling, simmering hatred of the people it rules. Unless the martyrdom of thousands of China's finest workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals is to be in vain, we must turn resolutely away from the folly of calling to insurrection when what is needed is painstaking education, organization and the sponsorship of day-to-day struggles of the masses for democratic demands, the slow building up of a party and mass organizations and a movement which will be able to command the forces capable of carrying out an insurrection.

In the case of the widespread but isolated and individual cases of peasant uprisings, and this includes the Red Armies in Kiangsi, these struggles await the leadership of a strong working class movement before they can have a successful issue. The Red Armies in their restricted and surrounded areas and with their meagre resources have fought heroically against the Kuomintang attacks upon them. But until the Kuomintang is shaken from its bulwarks in the imperialist controlled working class centres, their prospect of revolutionary triumph remains necessarily dim. No revolutionary purpose is served by taking refuge in the fiction that these armies have proletarian leadership because individual workers, undoubtedly leaders of superior quality and courage, have been torn from their factories and their fellow-workers and sent down to occupy key positions in the Red Army districts and in the Red Armies themselves. Indeed, this common practice of extracting the most conscious and progressive working class elements from their working class environment and sending them down to the Red districts is a good index to the criminal transposition of emphasis which has helped paralyze the working class movement in the cities. If the White Terror doesn't carry off the workers' leaders as they arise, the C.P. does and has done so in hundreds of cases. This helps in no small part to explain why it has also been impossible to mobilize a genuine mass anti-Japanese movement in the fact of military aggression and why the White Terror of the Kuomintang has succeeded, by filling mass graves and innumerable prisons with the martyred dead and living, in downing the anti-imperialist movement or efforts toward the organization of such a movement and paving the way for the ever increasing encroachments of the imperialists. The party has not yet gripped and directed the deep and bitter and often inarticulate hatred of the masses of the people for their oppressors and this includes large sections of the lower petty bourgeoisie who could be won by successful mass pressure from below. This is because the

Party

Party has failed to translate the realities of everyday events into its program and tactics.

I cannot here go into the many-faceted problems and issues which flow from these facts with regard to the policies and tactics of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Nor extending to the international scene need I go into the terrific effects of the German catastrophe nor the storm of questions which has been directed at the C.I. leadership whose responsibility in the disaster has become nakedly clear to unnumbered Communists and Communist sympathizers the world over. Nor into the whole set of implications which arise from the policies of the C.I., with particular reference to the late developments in Soviet foreign policy, the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement, the forthcoming mooted entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations and in a smaller but equally characteristic way, the forthcoming association of the U.S.S.R. with the Institute of Pacific Relations which hopes to hold its next talkfest in Moscow. These problems, with their many specific links to the Chinese questions, were the basic questions over which I soon began to take issue with the official views of the Party and the International.

III.

But precisely because at all costs I desired to carry on the Forum's open struggle against the common enemy - against the Kuomintang and the imperialists - I sedulously avoided bringing these issues into the columns of the paper, increasingly against my better judgment. I leaned over far backward in this respect. This expressed itself in many of the current issues with which we had to deal.

I ask you to recall the whole uphill fight which the Forum waged on behalf of Paul and Gertrud Ruegg in the spring and summer of 1932 during which time I repeatedly warned against the emphasis which was being placed on the "legal" aspects of the case and the "negotiations" with the Kuomintang to the detriment of mass pressure and the capitalization of the case for political purposes. You paid lip service to the need for mass pressure - particularly here in China - but in fact the "legalities" and futile negotiations remained the major pillars of the defense. Until in the very end I finally rebelled, I wasn't even permitted to give Ruegg his honourable and rightful title - secretary of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Yet, although I felt the struggle for the Rueggs was being seriously handicapped by the tactics being pursued, I carried on the fight with all the energy at my command and you will recall that it was I who created the local defense committee and was chiefly responsible for the widespread press propaganda and the considerable sympathy which we aroused. Yet the strictly non-political attitude which Ruegg was forced to assume at the trial (in contrast to the highly political attitude of his prosecutors) was in my opinion one of the major reasons

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for the fate to which he and his wife were condemned.

I ask you to recall the whole period of the organization and activities of the China-League for Civil Rights, from December, 1932, to June, 1933, in which I took an active part. I gave full play to this hybrid League and its work without once publishing the basic criticisms which I often voiced to you and which in the end were wholly confirmed by what happened after the Kuomintang murdered Yang Chien in June that year.

I ask you to recall the views I set forth in August and September, 1933, on the subject of the "anti-War Congress" which at your specific request I did not publish. Instead, to my regret, I published the foul rot of Marley & Co., without freely giving play to the true facts about that farcical junket which had convinced me that the policies which gave it birth do not one single whit advance the international struggle against imperialist war.

On one occasion - and this at least I can take comfort in - I passively resisted when you requested me to write and publish a slanderous attack on Chen-Tu-hsiu when he was condemned to 13 years imprisonment by the Kuomintang. Your request was specific. I was not to deal with the issues which had brought Chen Tu-hsiu from being the leader of the C.P. in 1927 to being leader of the Chinese Opposition in 1933. I was only to string together a vile series of labels in an effort to explain why the Kuomintang even imprisoned the leader of the Left Opposition. As you know, that attack was never written or published.

Again in December, 1933, upon my return from Fukien, you specifically demanded that I set aside the results of my own personal investigations in Foochow in order to write on your behalf (but over my signature!) an utterly baseless and slanderous attack on the Left Opposition. You will recall that you charged at that time that the "Trotskyists" were prominently identified with the new government set up in Fukien by Chen Ming-shu and Tsai Ting-kai. You lumped the Left Opposition with the Third Party and the so-called Social Democrats among the petty bourgeois satellites of the Fukien militarists. It was as much to satisfy myself on this very point as to perform a mission for you that I went down to Foochow and spent two weeks there and learned through direct contact with dozens of people prominently concerned that the Left Opposition were stoutly and clearly opposed to the Foochow regime. I haven't place here to discuss the relations of the C.P. to the short-lived Fukien Government or the character of the "negotiations" which were going on down there. The important thing here is that on my return you demanded that I write slanders which flew in the face of everything I myself had learned. It is interesting, as a sidelight on your methods in factional strife as you conceive it, that your representative in Foochow sent back a report, through me, ironically enough, that one of the most prominent of the youthful pseudo-radicals in Foochow, Wu

Chi-yuen

Chi-yuen to be exact, was a leading "Trotskyist". It so happened that I had met and had several lengthy interviews with Wu and by the time I left Foochow I understood his position and his personality exceedingly well. He was as much a Trotskyist as Mei Lan-fang is! Yet you actually demanded that I ignore my own knowledge of the man and in my article on Fukien set him down as a "Trotskyist". I was faced on the one hand by your demands that I write falsehoods to suit your policies and on the other by my deep desire to set forth the actual facts about the Opposition's attitude towards the Fukien regime. But once more, to preserve the shreds of our relationship, I drove a middle course and did neither, leaving the whole question out of my article.

Despite the facts that these issues weighed more and more heavily upon me, despite the fact that events in China and abroad were pressing themselves more and more imperatively on the concerns of every sincere revolutionary, I still tried to keep the Forum balanced on its ribbon-like path, concentrating on the anti-Kuomintang, anti-imperialist struggle, and in so doing fulfilling at least a partial function as a revolutionary organ. I deeply felt, however, that I was betraying my readers by avoiding these issues. How could I write of Germany and avoid all the implications of that disaster? How could I write of America's recognition of the U.S.S.R. and still fail to say that the Communist International had virtually been murdered at Washington? How could I warn against the dangers of imperialist intervention in the U.S.S.R. and still not point out that Soviet foreign policy was in fact daily heightening the danger of such intervention? Yet I somehow did so and sought in whatever way possible to retain some basis for our continued collaboration.

IV.

Nevertheless, abruptly in January of this year you forced an ultimatum upon me and subsequently forced the break in our relationship because I could not and would not, at your demand, devote the China Forum to policies which I could not and do not believe compatible with the interests of the Chinese Revolution and the international proletarian revolution. I could not, at your demand, set aside the convictions to which I had literally been driven by the stinging lash of catastrophic events in China, Germany and the world over. Particularly my deep interest in Chinese events during the last three years made it impossible for me, finally, to give active support to policies and tactics whose disastrous effects were being a thousandfold confirmed for me by the tragic events of every swiftly-passing day. I could not ignore questions which strike at the roots of our work and the whole structure of our hopes for a revolutionary future.

Despite the fact that these questions are rocking the entire International today, you denied my right to

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raise them in print. You demanded more. You demanded that I attack anybody who did so - primarily the people you call "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists" - the only people who are facing these problems today in a fearless, revolutionary way. You demanded that the China Forum become a stereotype for the policies and vulgar factional slanders which I could neither then nor now be party to. In reply to my questions on China you simply quoted back to me the lies and half-lies I've been so used to reading in Inprecorr. You even declared: "For propaganda purposes a certain amount of exaggeration is necessary..." and went on amazingly to say: "but we know the true facts and we base our policies on them, not on these exaggerations!" A new slant on modern-day C.I. tactics! Facts, you said, are curious things. They have to be turned around and around and around and examined closely until their true nature becomes apparent. The trouble is you turn them so far and so quickly that they turn into something like a dizzily turning top of fancy - or at best wish - fulfilling misrepresentations.

To my questions on Germany you quoted Heckert, Piatnitsky, and the E.C.C.I.'s famous resolution declaring that the collapse of the German party and the slaughter of the German workers were based on the past, present and future correct policies of the C.P.G.! You declared I had no right to offer critical comment on the dangerously opportunistic foreign and domestic policies of the U.S.S.R., most notably on the entry of the U.S.S.R. on a straight nationalist basis into the disgusting corridors of imperialist intrigue. To the contrary, I was to lovingly fawningly fondle and hail the policies which have meant disaster in China, Germany and elsewhere and are rapidly leading the U.S.S.R. into the vacuum of nationalist isolation from the world wide proletarian movement. This I was to do, to begin with, by publishing Stalin's face on the front page and columns of the customary panegyrics to his infallibility. Above all and before all, I was to take up cudgels against "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism". That was to be the main point of my reformation - to raise no questions myself and slander anybody else who did so.

In reply to your demand that I submit to an editorial board in order that these editorial policies should be effectively put into practice, I offered (1) to continue publication strictly as before, meanwhile arguing out my differences with you in discussions on the side; (2) to throw the columns of the Forum open to a general discussion of all basic revolutionary question, with free play to unorthodox as well as orthodox views. If your views were correct, I argued, it would be a distinct advantage to you to have such an opportunity to display their brilliance alongside the puny efforts of your critics; (3) to publish orthodox news and views but to reserve for myself the right to comment and criticise.

These repeated offers you repeatedly refused. You offered to discuss these questions with me verbally __if__ in

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the meanwhile I throw the Forum open to your editorial board. My other proposals were unthinkable! Give the Forum's readers a chance to hear "counter-revolutionary" viewpoints? Never that! I could only display my revolutionary purity by acceding to your demands. We would talk things over until Spring, then if all went well (i.e., if I showed a satisfactory adaptability to your viewpoint) I could pack up for an educational trip to the Soviet Union where I would certainly become convinced of the error of my ways. In other words you wanted my signature on a promissory note with the amount left blank for you to fill in. You put this in the form of an ultimatum and you told me that if I did anything but accept I would forthwith enter the camp of the "counter-revolution".

I had to refuse these terms. I had to refuse to lend myself to a slanderous and baseless struggle against the International Left Opposition. I had to refuse to lend space to the nauseatingly fawning praise of Stalin and uncritical reception of Stalinist policies which characterize the Communist Party press the world over. I had to refuse to take shelter in the cold and draughty empty spaces which stretch behind the impressive facade and early tradition of the Communist International. I would like to go to the Soviet Union for a vist someday - but I had to refuse your offer on your terms. I had to refuse, in short, to become a hack prostitute in the name of the Revolution.

In the end, too, I had to refuse to turn over to you the printing plant I had built up with so much pain and struggle because I considered it not your property but the property of the working class movement. Because I could not carry on the Forum myself, for lack of financial resources and because of heavy debts contracted, I disposed of the plant and turned every farthing of the proceeds over to where I now consider the true interests of our movement lie. It was with a deep and abiding bitterness that I had considered comrades, when for two years it had fought off all its many enemies on the outside.

Yet with it came the realization that we have to build anew over the ruins you have wrought. The revolution and the building of our future moves forward and when we trample down the defenses of our enemies we shall crush underfoot everything and everybody that stands in our way. No sycophantic, blind allegiance to a name, an empty facade, a torn and shredded prestige can lead us forward. Only unswerving fidelity to our goal and active struggle towards this end with the weapons of a correct and tested political line will lift us from defeat to ultimate victory. To this struggle I shall continue to dedicate all my energies.

Harold R. Isaacs.

Peiping, China
May 20, 1934.

(Copied by RD)

201-13441

EUR COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES

SOURCE: DAILY WORKER

Date: July 6, 1950

File No. 9100 Isaacs

POST WRITER ADMITS ALL KOREA OPPOSES INVASION

The Korean people are united behind the Liberation Armies from the North and are hostile to the American troops sent there by Truman's interventionist order, the New York Post's Far East expert, Harold R. Isaacs, admitted yesterday.

Isaacs' article gave the lie to the Post's own editorial line of support to the police-state regime of Syngman Rhee and the Truman attack on Korea as an act to defend "democracy."

Isaacs declared that the U. S. has "much more reason to count on general Korean hostility than on heroic support." He admitted that "South Korean civilians have been infinitely harder hit by the American action so far" than by their fellow-Koreans from the north.

The South Korean government was an "unpopular one in the election held only four weeks ago," Isaacs said, "the regime of President Syngman Rhee was decisively repudiated."

Isaacs declared that the guerilla movements in South Korea "could have operated only with a considerable measure of popular support," and he acknowledged the "intense desire of all Koreans for reunification of their dismembered country."

To top this story, bristling with exposure of the imperialist nature of the Truman attack on Korea, and with evidence of the Korean people's awareness of their real enemy, the Post concocted the dishonest headline: "S. Koreans Don't Know Why Help Has Come."

(In late editions the Post indicated its own awareness of the phoniness of this headline by dropping it. The new one complained: "Weak S. Korean Regime Hampers GIs at Front.")

But Isaacs made clear that "if in China during the Japanese war the Americans had a friendly population on their side, this is by no means the case now in Korea."

He concludes: "Even if the war remains localized, even a victory won in due course will be a temporary one, and such a victory will not be easily won."

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H/W ATT 05 To 35516

201-15446

7100 - Isaacs, Harold

December 2, 1932.

No. 1480.
SECRET:

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to R.A. memorandum No. 1305 of December 4, 1931, regarding Harold ISAACS and his connection with Hilaire NOULENS, it has just been learned that one Viola ROBINSON arrived in Shanghai on August 28, 1932, by the C.P.R. s.s. EMPRESS OF ASIA. On August 29, Miss ROBINSON, together with Harold ISAACS of the CHINA FORUM, gave notice to the United States Consulate General of their intended marriage, which actually took place on the 14th September. In his marriage application, ISAACS particularly requested that no publicity be given to the forthcoming ceremony. It appears that Miss ROBINSON is a follower of the Suffragette, Lucy STONE, who, some fifteen or twenty years ago, advocated among American women the retention of the maiden name after marriage. According to officials of the United States Consulate General, Viola ROBINSON, therefore, will not be known as Mrs. ISAACS.

In connection with Viola ROBINSON's activities in China, in a letter, dated Szechuen, July 24, 1931, Harold ISAACS wrote to Viola ROBINSON as follows:

> "You are in the swim, Viola. I'm coming back to dive in and swim alongside. What do you think? It is all extremely fortuitous from our standpoint that I should have seen the light at last. Your work with HUOG and the future in it is far more important than anything you could do out here or anywhere else for that matter. I'll get back - no matter a possible delay - no matter how - there will be a job to be done and by our gods I'm going to get into it..."

Attention is called to the name HUOG mentioned in the above extract.

A TRUE COPY
OF THE SIGNED
ORIGINAL

RECORD COPY

1442 -
H/W ATT CC TO 35256

201-18446

No. 5019

9 M Isaacs, Harold

Confidential.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, December 16, 1931.

Subject: Harold R. Isaacs.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that an American citizen named Harold R. Isaacs has been reported to this office by the police of the International Settlement as a communist suspect. The facts regarding Mr. Isaacs are briefly as follows:

Mr. Harold R. Isaacs called at this office in December, 1930, and stated that he would be for a few months in Shanghai; at that time he exhibited passport No. 177026, issued by the Department of State on March 17, 1930. He stated that he expected to leave Shanghai in June, 1931; that his home was in New York City and that his local address was in care of the American Express Company.

According to Police reports Isaacs arrived in Shanghai from Manila as a first-class passenger on the S. S. PRESIDENT JEFFERSON on December 17, 1930. He was employed by the SHANGHAI EVENING POST AND MERCURY and later by the CHINA PRESS but apparently lost both

positions.

8-20-66-13

H/W ATT 07 To XAA2-35656

RTC

201-15446

positions. He has resided with a British subject named C. Frank Glass at 123 Weihaiwei Road and made a trip with Glass to Szechuen during June, 1931. The police file contains a copy of a letter written by him to a Miss Viola Robinson, care of the American Consulate, Dresden, Germany, dated July 24, 1931, at Chengtu, Szechuen. This letter, it is stated, was returned unopened to Shanghai from Dresden, addressed to Harold R. Isaacs in care of the American Express Company, Shanghai, and was opened by the Post Office Censor at the request of the Commissioner of Posts. The letter is very long and shows that Isaacs, although previously holding communistic views, only decided definitely to turn "Red" during July of this year. He states that he was influenced in this decision by certain conversations with C. Frank Glass, above referred to, during their trip to Szechuen.

In connection therewith it may be of interest to state that according to a police report dated October 17, 1931, information regarding this letter was given by the Shanghai Municipal Police to an officer of the local British Consulate General, who apparently cabled information regarding it to London. The police report states that a reply was subsequently receive the gist of which is as follows:

> "Viola Robinson arrived in the United States about the middle of September. The whole family are communists in touch with Isaacs' family."

The police state that Harold R. Isaacs in November, 1931, established a news agency under the name of the

"Far

"Far Eastern Press Correspondence," cable address Fenprecop, P. O. Box 1926. On October 8th Isaacs and C. Frank Glass moved from 128 Weihaiwei Road to House No. 6, Passage No. 177, Avenue Dubail. The police state that this address was formerly known as Number 25 Avenue Dubail and is the boarding house at which Agnes Smedley resided from May, 1929, to May 1930. The police report that Agnes Smedley frequently visits Isaacs and Glass at this address.

In my monthly political report for November, on page 15 it was stated that the bodies of numerous members of the family of a certain Kou had been murdered, allegedly by communists in retaliation for Kou's turning traitor to the communist cause. In connection with this matter Isaacs addressed an open letter to the various newspapers of Shanghai, under date of November 24, 1931, in which he scored them for branding these alleged murders as "horrible" and "dastardly," while at the same time they did not raise their editorial voices against the wholesale murders committed by Chiang Kai-shek, the Garrison Commander of Shanghai and other Chinese militarists. None of the papers saw fit to publish this letter but I 1/ have received a copy thereof, and copies are enclosed. I have also received a photostatic copy of the last page containing the signature of Mr. Isaacs.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

[illegible]

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of open letter from Harold R. Isaacs, dated November 24, 1931.

A true copy of
the signed orig.
B

PHJ:MB
GCCB

__In Quadruplicate__

__No Copy to Location.__

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8019 of Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated December 16, 1931, on the subject: "Harold R. Isaacs."

COPY

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS OF SHANGHAI.

Your publication of the "ghastly" (Shanghai Times), "horrible" (China Press), "dastardly" (Evening Post and North China Daily News) murders allegedly committed by Chinese Communists in the French Concession brings forcibly to mind certain other aspects of the Chinese scene whose ghastliness and barbarity find their way into your columns only at rare intervals - and then only in brief cool paragraphs.

There can be no attempt to "justify" these alleged murders, if the tale be true. We all hate the guts of a traitor. But we cannot all condone a system of vendetta which exacts as the price of betrayal the innocent lives of a traitor's family. That, however, involves the question of differing social customs to which no abstract moral a solute can possibly be applied.

Betrayal has its price under any social norm, whether we turn the dirty work of vengeance over to the ineffable mercies of the Lord or employ the less aesthetic but more effective instruments of the gallows, electric chair, lethal chamber, the guillotine or the more refined weapons of social ostracism; whether we consider the traitor himself responsible for his actions - or exact retribution from his blood relations as well. (Jehovah, too, visits the sins of the father upon his children, yea, even unto the third and fourth generations!)

But you reporters, whose typewriters quivered with the horror of these alleged deeds of murder in Frenchtown can still without a qualm condone and even express satisfaction at mass murders a thousand times more revolting, a thousand times more barbarous - but less so in your journalistically judicious eyes only because officially perpetrated.

You city editors - at the moment sending your men out to run down the last threaded folds to this particular story - why don't you send them out to Lunghua some fine sunny morning? Why don't you give them an opportunity to witness the torture and murder of young men and women whose only crime is a realistic appreciation of the social and economic factors at work in the world and a demand for their readjustment?

You editors, who wield your editorial powers so self-righteously, why don't you consistently examine and logically expose a government that maintains itself largely by desperately slaughtering the flower of its protesting youth and the backbone of its peasant masses who attempt protest against its venality and corruption?

Only

Only when it is convenient for your foreign interests, however, do you find it politic to trot out some of your favorite blasts against the Nanking regime, attacks which are almost always immediately offset by the nauseating eulogies and blatant lies that follow.

Considered from your own point of view, Messrs. Editors, the murderers of these Frenchtown people should be brought to justice and made to pay for their crimes. But similarly from your own point of view, to what bar of justice should Chiang Kai Shek be brought, before what tribunals can we arraign the garrison commanders of Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, the warlords of Shantung, Szechuen, Kwangtung and Manchuria for the lives they have taken in the perpetual wars they have waged on the people of China? On any principles of abstract justice, is the mass murder of thousands by the machine gun, the bomber, the rifle, the sword, the axe any more just than the furtive strangulation of nine hopeless relatives of a self-branded yellow cur? This perpetual warfare has been waged on the pretext of suppressing "banditry." If this be so, we are confronted with the startling fact, vouched for and advertised by the government boasting the recognition of all foreign powers, that vast portions of the Chinese population are criminal! On this premise, Chiang Kai Shek & Co. backed by the cohorts of the Soong Menage swoop down on whole provinces, massacre thousands, take heavy tolls from the meagre life earnings of peasants and workers. And with all their guns and planes and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, they still fail to eradicate the "bandits."

Who are the bandits, the robbers, the murderers? Answer this question, Messrs. Editors - and answer it honestly if you dare!

Japan, in violation of so-called principles of justice, but in full accord with the lessons of history, is helping herself to a good slice of Continental Asia, allegedly part of the Nanking Government's domain. Lacking the courage, the ability, the inclination to turn its guns on the invader, the Kuomintang sits in solemn conclave at Nanking and discusses further measures which, it hopes, will permit the extermination of new portions of China's vast "criminal" population to progress more effectively.

Let us take some of the facts sporadically reported by your own and the Chinese press during May-December, 1930. You reported 4,749 executions. From other, more meticulous sources are derived statistics which show that no less than 96510 were executed during the last four months of 1930 alone! This figure sounds globular, doesn't it? Yet for every digit there is somewhere in China a rotting corpse.

During the period following the close of the so-called "military" period of the Kuomintang in 1928

to

to the opening of the Third Plenary Session of the Party in 1929 approximately 450,000 workers, peasants, and students met death at the hands of China's "revolutionary" armies. One Shanghai daily (Chinese) late the next year editorialized as follows:-

"All China's problems could be satisfactorily settled if the good work of the past few months can be continued. From August to October (1930) alone 140,000 Communists were killed and 450,000 people starved to death in the famine regions."

And if the dimensions of these figures are not ghastly enough to move you, shall we engage in a bit of felicitous description of the tortures applied by these righteous saviors of China? Shall we speak of the burnings in oil, the burying alive (as were five young men and women at Lunghua on Feb. 7 last) the strangulations, the unspeakable mutilation of human bodies before death? These aren't wild nightmares. You have all seen and shuddered at the photographs which can still be bought here and there in Shanghai depicting these processes in all their grisliness.

And at these, Messrs. Editors, do you raise your editorial hands in saintly horror? Do you splash your columns with the adjectives "dastardly, horrible, ghastly?" Hardly. That would offend your Nanking friends. If you do not maintain silence that bespeaks contentment, you brazenly applaud. For this we can quote you chapter and verse from your own editorials.

There are no organs, no publications here that dare look these facts boldly in the face. Your mastheads all carry boasts of your impartiality. Here is at least one opportunity to invest them with some quality of verisimilitude.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Harold R. Isaacs
177 Avenue Dubail,
House 6.

November 24, 1931.

Copied by LB
Compared with MH

EE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES FILES [illegible]-Isaacs, Harold R.

FILE NO.

SOURCE: D.W.

DATE: 8-4-32

EDITOR OF CHINA PAPER IN DANGER

Threat to Turn Isaacs Over to Nanking

SHANGHAI, Aug. 2.—The Wall Street government, supporting its Nanking butcher agents, has threatened to turn over Harold R. Isaacs, American editor of the "China Forum," to the Nanking hangmen.

As editor of the 'China Forum," Isaacs has committed the crime against imperialism of supporting the Chinese Revolution and ruthlessly exposing the mass murder of revolutionary Chinese workers and peasants by the Nanking regime and the United States and other imperialist brigands. He has exposed the shameful sell-out of the Chinese masses by the Nanking traitors to the Japanese, American and other imperialists.

The United States government has warned Isaacs that it will withdraw the protection of extra-territorial rights unless the "China Forum" changes its editorial and news policies. Under the extra-territoriality treaties imposed upon China by the imperialists, American and other citizens of the imperialist powers may not be tried in the Chinese courts. Because Isaacs is an American citizen the Nanking government has not been able to wreack its vengeance on him for his exposure of their bloody terror and betrayal of the Chinese masses. The Wall Street Government, which protects its business agents in looting China now proposes to throw Isaacs to its Nanking lackeys for trial in the Chinese courts on charges carrying life imprisonment or the death penalty.

Isaacs has categorically refused to concede to the demands of the United States government that he change the policies of the "China Forum." He is closely associated in the anti-imperialist, anti-Kuomintang fight with Madame Sun Yat-sen, who is chairman of the committee leading the fight to save Paul and Gertrude Rueggs from a death sentence in the Chinese courts.

American workers and intellectuals and their organizations should at once send vigorous protest to the State Department at Washington against its attempt to railroad Isaacs to death in the Nanking Courts.

RECORD COPY

H/W ATT [illegible]

201-[illegible]

Press Conference
7/30/32.

9000 Isaacs

direct to Paris for three or four days before proceeding to London. His visit to Paris is, therefore, strictly unofficial.

FRANCE

A correspondent asked if the French Government had asked the State Department for an agrément for a new Ambassador in Washington, M. Germaine-Martin. Mr. Rogers replied in the negative.

CHINA

A correspondent asked if Representative La Guardia of New York had asked the State Department to intervene in the case of an American named Harold Isaacs who is now editing a newspaper in China, which, according to press despatches, is a Communist organ. The correspondent continued by saying that according to stories the American diplomatic officers in China warned Mr. Isaacs that he would be likely to lose his extraterritorial status because of hisactivities. Furthermore, his father, who is in New York, wants the Department of State to get Mr. Harold Isaacs back and have him deported. In reply, Mr. Rogers said that he knew nothing of any communication from Mr. La Guardia on the subject. In regard to the story, it is not true that this Government has threatened to deprive Mr. Isaacs of his extraterritorial rights in Shanghai.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

A correspondent asked if the State Department had received any reports to the effect that the Bolivians had captured two Paraguayan forts. In reply, Mr. Rogers said that he understood that Assistant Secretary White talked with the correspondents last night concerning the situation and that Mr. White might possibly be able to see the correspondents again today.

H/w ATT 09 To [illegible]42 - 3516

RECORD COPY

201-15446

FBI REPORT
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1953
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 - BUREAU
105-1247 - NEW YORK

Secret

JAN 9 72

ZOTOV, IVAN PAVLOVICH S211600/1970 WEST GERMANY 1970

19 MORDOVIAN REPUBLIC ASSR



[redacted]

201-254377

25 Jan 19

MD

018446

201-018446

Secret

FBI REPORT
DATE: 6 AUG 1952
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)
105-1247 (NEW YORK)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ISAACS, HAROLD R.
201-018446
SEX M DOB 13 SEP 10
USA, NY, NYC
CIT USA
OCC JOURNALIST
@ LO, SEN
NEWSWEEK CORRESPONDENT IN SHANHAI IN 30S.
INVOLVED IN CP FRONT ACTIVITIES. CONTACT
OF SMEDLEY AND NOULENS. POSS IDEN W/ALIAS
JACOB, A MBR OF SORGE GRU RING IN SHANGHAI.

201-000415
XAAZ-24958
13 APR 67
P4

R 6707240926

FILE IN 201-018446

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM
WOMACE Representative, Boston

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/WUSPARROW/Operational
Dr. Harold R. ISAACS, Professor of Political Science at M.I.T.

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. On 12 July 1967, WUSPARROW/1 renewed his old friendship with Subject at the MIT Faculty Club. Subject is now a senior research associate at MIT's Center for International Studies and has recently been named a Professor.

2. For the past few years Subject has been working on an international study series involving minority racial groups. His reports have been published in the New Yorker magazine and as books, The New World of Negro Americans and India's Untouchables. Subject plans to publish in August 1967 a book on the American Jews in Israel and is working on another on the Philippines.

3. WUSPARROW/1 first met Subject in 1946 after he had just completed a long and friendly interview with Ho Chi Minh as Far East correspondent for Newsweek. At that time, Subject felt that the United States was making a mistake in not accepting Ho as the leader of a united Vietnam, feeling that Ho was independent enough of China to make him at worst a sort of Tito.

4. Subject presently is despairing of United States foreign relations in that our people from Washington, or elsewhere, seldom seem to establish a deep rapport with Asian or African nationals. Subject feels that such relations as do exist never reach more than an ineffective superficial level.

5. Subject first went to the Far East about 1930 when he was a crew member of the Matson Line's Malolo and disembarked at Honolulu to work for the Honolulu Advertiser. (WUSPARROW/1 went to work for the same paper two years later.) Subject went next to the Philippines where he worked on a Manila daily. While in Manila he was offered the editorship of the Bangkok Royal Mail, to fill in for St. Clair McELWAY, now of the New Yorker.

CONTINUED . . .

Distribution:
2 - C/DO

CS Copy filed 200-6-360/3 File in 201-12446

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UTBA - 543	DATE 11 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-360/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UTBA - 543

6. Subject's mind was set on China and in late 1931 he went to Shanghai and joined The China Press, working alongside Tiliman DURDIN, now of the New York Times. Subject lost his job with The China Press after a flare-up with Hollington TONG, part-owner of the paper. Subject then joined the Newsweek foreign staff. Subject was in and out of Bangkok after World War II and WUSPARROW/1 became friendly with him. According to WUSPARROW/1, many people regard Subject's Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution as a significant work and a recent writer on China, Dennis BLOODWORTH, holds a good view of Subject's Scratches on the Mind.

7. Subject now seems permanently settled with MIT, having bought a home at 96 Farlow Road, Newton. Subject hosts there at pool-side "seminars" on Saturday afternoons, with MIT faculty friends and journalist friends such as Bob SHAPLEN coming by. Subject invited WUSPARROW/1 to participate as well.

8. However, as WUSPARROW/1 ascertained, Subject has little contact with foreign students save for an occasional adult foreign graduate student. We hope, considering Subject's background, that he will prove with WUSPARROW/1's guidance to be a profitable unwitting spotter and assessor of foreign graduate students.

LOUIS K. ROLLOFIER

N/C Traces?
1-6347
DW-7

US

S E C R E T

2nd tracer

Priority Urgent

RECEIVED

T. lephone Request for Name Check For Use of RI Name Check Control Office

FROM PSB/FBI DATE 24 NOV 1965

TAKEN BY Gerry F. CHECKED BY ____ REPLY ____

ROBINSON, Viola
NAME ALIAS AND SPELLING VARIATIONS

U. S. 6/20/10
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

REFERENCES NA1 to CSCI 316/04352-65
dated 26 Oct. 65
subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert
per Trace by Diann
on 10 Nov. 65

24/11/65

26 NOV 1965 IN 201-18446

Special

RETURN TO: Tainor
10/14/65 caw
FILE #151-1423
PC
BUDED: 11/11a

eII

HSC

See CSC #5.22.66.2153
+ ~~[illegible]~~ Rep 10·13·65

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

BORN: Sept. 13, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932
Isaacs

ADDRESSES:
Aug., 1965 to present, 96 Farlow Rd., Newton, Mass.
July, 1953 to Aug., 1965 Mass.
Feb., 1944 to July, 1953, 333 Central Pk. West, NYC, NY
Sept., 1941 to Feb., 1944, 4938 Newport Ave., Friendship Hts., Md.
1940 to Sept., 1941, 72 Pk. Terrace West, NYC, NY
1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

EDUCATION
George Washington H. S., NYC, 1923 to 1926

SSN: 082-03-4029

EMPLOYMENT:
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writer,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor
1930 to 1931, Shai Evening Post, Shanghai, China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, reporter

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, Travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, 1944, to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 1949 to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 1957 to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, 1960 to 1960, academic research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 1963 to 1964,

R 65

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Isaacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Dorlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

1/11/65 mb.

FILE IN 201 - 18446
(husband's 201)

REFERENCE:
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

NAI to information furnished in
~~[illegible] 1965~~ - possible source
OSCI-316/04352-65 dated 26 October 1965
subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert.

10 NOV 1965
Dms

- 1 NOV 1965

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: 07 RID/CE US UNITED STATES	EXTENSION	NO. CSCI 316/04352-65 DATE 25 October 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	26 OCT 1965			
2.				
3. RID/CE GA-10 Attn: Sarah Marmaduke	26 OCT 1965		ER	
4. [illegible]				
5. RID/AN GA 50				
6.				
7. RI/TY				TO: PSB/FBI
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE TITLE
12.				
13.				FILE NUMBER 201 184 46
14.				ENCLOSURE ABSTRACT X
15. RID/FI 1B 4003				DOCUMENT DATE 26 OCT 1965 INDEX

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OP-98 9-64

14-00000

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

26 OCT 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Special Agent in Charge of
Washington Field Office

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

Reference is made to the request dated 14 October 1965 concerning Subject. Attached for your retention is a copy of our CSCI-316/04169-65, dated 13 October 1965, subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert. It is noted that a portion of the information appearing in said CSCI was previously forwarded to you in our SODB 20568, dated 2 December 1949, subject: Harold Robert ISAACS.

CSCI-316/04352-65

Encl. 1 name check
1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/CPL/ell

Based on: CSCI-316/04169-65

CS COPY

201-18446

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IN 201-18446

Special

OCT 15

U8T

RETURN TO: Tainor
10/14/63 caw
FILE #151-1423
PC
BUDED: 11/11a

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

BORN: Sept. 13, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932

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1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

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SSN: 082-03-4029

EMPLOYMENT:
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writer,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor
1930 to 1931, Shai Evening [illegible], China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advertiser, [illegible], reporter

JH 10/13/65

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, 19[illegible] to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 194[illegible] to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 195[illegible] to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, 1960 to 1960, academicX research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 19[illegible] to 1964,

[illegible]
Date 22 OCT 1965
INITIALS
RI ANALYST
BRANCH
RI FILES

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Isaacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Dorlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

FILE IN 201-[illegible]

CS COPY

REFERENCE: ICE ICA 20
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

18 OCT 1965

14-00000

RETURN TO: Taisor
10/14/65 caw
FILE #151-1423
IC
CODED: 11/11a

C. A.

OCT 21

NAME: ISAACS, HAROLD ROBERT

BORN: Sept. 13, 1910, NYC, NY

MS: married Viola Robinson, Isaacs dob June 20, 1910, NYC, NY
married Shanghai, Sept. 14, 1932

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Sept., 1941 to Feb., 1944, 4933 Newport Ave., Friendship Hts., Md.
1940 to Sept., 1941, 72 Pk. Terrace West, NYC, NY
1937 to 1940, 40 Monroe St., NYC, NY

EDUCATION
George Washington H. S., NYC, 1923 to 1926

SSN: 082-03-4020

EMPLOYMENT: 1935-1940 Havas News Agency
1950-1953 Self-employed - writer NYC
1953 , Mass. Inst. of Technology, Camb, Mass., academic, research
1943 to 1950, Newsweek, WDC, CBI, Pacific, SE Asia, NYC, reporter, war corres. assoc. editor
1943, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., WDC, radio writer,
1940 to 1943, Columbia Broadcasting Co., NYC, WDC, writer
1934 to 1935, self employed, Peking, China, writer
1932 to 1934, Havas News Agency, Shanghai, China, news editor
1931 to 1932, China Press, Shanghai, China, city editor (CHINA FORUM)
1930 to 1931, Shai Evening Post, Shanghai, China, reporter
1930, Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, reporter
1928-1930 New York Times - Reporter

FOREIGN TRAVEL:
China, 1930 to 1935, Travel, work, writing
China, Burma, India, 1944, to 1945, war corres. Newsweek
PI, India, Indonesia, 1949 to 1949, Newsweek assignment
Phillippines, 1950 to 1950, cover Baguo conference
Europe Mainly UK, 1957 to 1957, travel, visit university
Czech., Israel, India, 1960 to 1960, academicH research project
Malaya, PI., etc., 1963 to 1964,

RELATIVES:
Father, I. Robert Isaacs, deceased
Mother, Sophie Berlin, deceased
Wife, Viola Robinson Isaacs, dob 1910, same

REFERENCE:
Sargent Shriver, Peace Corps., WDC, known 17 yrs.

22/10/65

FILE IN 201-12446
(Husband's 201)

possible Scief

22 OCT 1955

NAI to information forwarded in CSCI-316/04352-65, dated 26 October 1965, subject: ISAACS, Harold Robert.

DMS

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE US	EXTENSION	NO. CSCI 316/ 04169-65 DATE 11 October 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	12 OCT 1965		C6	
2.				
3. RID/CE GA-10 Attn: Sarah Marmaduke	13 OCT 1965		EK	
4.				
5. RID/AN GA 50				
6.				
7. RID/MIS				
8.				TO: PSB/CSC
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE TITLE
12.				
13.				FILE NUMBER
14.				201-18446
15. RID/FI 1B 4003				ENCLOSURE ABSTRACT X DOCUMENT DATE 13 OCT 1965 INDEX

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-58 9-94 ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

13 OCT 1965

TO: United States Civil Service Commission
Attention: Mr. Joseph G. Campbell

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

1. Reference is made to your request dated 14 September 1965. The files of this office contain considerable information concerning Subject., the salient elements of which are summarized below.

2. According to undated information from a reliable source, Subject born 13 September 1910 in New York City, arrived in Shanghai, China, from Manila, Philippine Islands, in December 1930. First employed in Shanghai by the English language daily, Evening Post and Mercury, Subject became associated a few weeks later with the China Press, with which he remained until May 1931. In June 1931 Subject traveled up the Yangtze River with the British Communist, Cecil Frank GLASS, a suspected agent for the Third International in China. Also in 1931, Subject became the Shanghai secretary of the Comite Internationale Pour la Defense de Paul et Gertrude RUEGG (NOULENS), a committee, with Headquarters in Berlin, formed to aid the defense of the NOULENS against charges of espionage perferred by the Chinese Government. Subject was in correspondence with Willi MUENZENBERG, President of the Committee and an active agent in Germany for the Third International. Subject was also known to be in contact with Agnes SMEDLEY in Shanghai during the same period. On 14 September 1932 in Shanghai, Subject married Viola ROBINSON, an American citizen born 10 June 1910 in New York City. Miss ROBINSON was believed to have been connected with Communist activities in the United States and in China. Correspondence between her and Subject prior to their marriage indicated that they were both sympathetic to activities being conducted by the Communists in China.

FILE IN 201-18446

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-18446

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. According to predecessor organization information, Subject was also employed as a staff writer for the Havas News Agency in Shanghai during the period 1930-1935 and was a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR and of the China League for Civil Rights.

4. An undated report from an unknown source indicated that Subject had turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, and had become a Trotskyite (probably during the mid-1930's). Friends of Subject stated that even during the height of his Trotskyist career he never accepted money from any group, that he was open and above board, and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They also indicated that Subject was attracted to communism by sheer idealism. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Subject broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

5. According to Source of paragraph 2, Subject was a war correspondent in China during World War II for Newsweek. In July 1945 he was refused entry into China by Chinese Nationalist authorities, presumably as a result of anti-Nationalist articles he wrote for Newsweek. In 1949 Subject was Special Features Editor for that magazine, at 152 West 42nd Street, New York City. He was the author of several books, including No Peace in Asia and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution.

6. Subject's present political beliefs are unknown to this office.

CSCI-316/04169-65

Encl. 1 name check

RID/CE: JMA/DS/lpm

Based on: SODB-20568
CSCI-3/778,850

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

#451

14 SEP 1965

HUNT 9-14-65

H.R.
H

ISAACS, Harled Robert 9-13-10
NewYork

ISACKS

ISAAKS

N USA

11/9/65

Mass

possible 50 ref 52473

DD 10-5

MEMORANDUM C[illegible]		
[illegible] 05Oct65		[illegible]
RI ANALYST		DMS
DIV	BRANCH	
FE /	COOS	
FE /	JKOJO	
RI EDITOR		
RI TYPIST		

FILE IN 201-18446*

15 SEP 1965

201-18446

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Suspected Soviet Agents domiciled in Shahghai

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CI AOP-L

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP-D 4718 Box 193

4. DATE

5. ANALYST JEP

6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 1963

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Interested parties in the subjcet of HAROLD ISAACKS ~~are~~ referred to this document The bulky nature of this document plus numerous refs to other individuals and the poor quality of paper this makes it necessary to leave the file in its present classification.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 27 Nov 63

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/CE FE Japan

NO. CSCI-3/ 778,850

DATE 22 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	[illegible]	[illegible]	
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. RID/AN GA 50			
6. Rid/MIS			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. RID/FI 1B 4003			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: ACSI (Telephonic)

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER 201- 18446

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT X

DOCUMENT DATE 27 NOV 1963

INDEX

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-56 5-62

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

27 NOV 1963

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence
Branch Security Division

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: ISAACS, Harold Robert

1. Reference is made to the request received on 14 October 1963 from Lt. Whipple concerning Subject. With respect to the specific questions posed in the request, Subject is the author of a number of books, including No Peace in Asia, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. The files contain no information concerning Subject's teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; however they do contain the following summary of unevaluated information based on several predecessor organization reports. Additional information concerning Subject is contained in our SODB 20568, dated 2 December 1949, subject: Harold Robert ISACCS, a copy of which is attached for your retention.

a. Subject was employed as a staff writer for the Havas News Agency in Shanghai from 1930-1935. He was also editor and publisher of the China Forum, a communist periodical, from January 1932 to an unspecified date. In July 1932 ISAACS wrote and published the above-cited Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, a 136-page illustrated book of Communist nature. While in Shanghai he was a member of The Society of Friends of the USSR (Shanghai Branch) and The China League for Civil Rights.

b. In 1933 Shanghai authorities listed Subject's wife, Viola ROBINSON, as a suspect Soviet agent residing in Shanghai. Prior to their marriage on 14 September 1932, ISAACS stated in a letter to Miss ROBINSON that he had definitely turned "Red." All the members of the ROBINSON family were described as Communists.

201-18446

1 Encl

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

FILE IN 201-18446

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

c. In July 1933 the Nanking Government ordered the Municipality of Greater Shanghai to take drastic measures to stop the propaganda appearing in a number of publications including the China Forum, published by Subject. Subject's magazine allegedly published Communist propaganda; in this connection a protest was to be lodged against him with the American Consulate.

d. Subject was described as a "self-confessed Communist" in 1933. The following year he wrote an article entitled "I Break With The Chinese Stalinists" which appeared in the September-October 1934 edition of The New International, a Communist propaganda organ published in New York.

2. An undated report from an unknown source indicated that Subject had turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, becoming a Trotskyite(probably during the mid-1930's). Friends of Subject stated that even during the height of his Trotskyist career he never accepted money from any group, that he was open and above board, and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They also stated that Subject was attracted to Communism by "sheer idealism." Immediately after Pearl Harbor, ISAACS broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

3. According to a report dated 25 June 1951 from a fairly reliable source, Subject served at that time as a Ford Foundation advisor on Far Eastern Projects.

4. For additional information concerning Subject you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Department of the Navy (no documentation available).

CSCI-3/778,880

Encl: 1 attachment as stated above.

RID/CE: JHA/MI/dcl

Based on: FE/1, 201-18446*
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 2713, 10-11-32
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 4606, 16-5-33
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 4718
CHINA CIA OP1, SMPD 4685 & 4685/C
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 5454-8,21-12-33
CHINA CIA OP 1, SMPD 6628
FDZ, 201-488-8
SO for NAVY referal.

CS CO

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

CSCI-3/778,850

DW-1

A404
A404

16633

S E C R E T

FE

FILE IN 201

TELEPHONE REQUEST FOR NAME CHECK. FOR USE OF RI NAME CHECK CONTROL OFFICE.

FROM ACSI - Lt. Whipple via Jane Roman DATE 14 Oct 63

TAKEN BY Moran Checked By ______ Reply ______

ISAACS, Harold Robert
NAME ALIAS AND SPELLING VARIATIONS

born 1910
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA

REFERENCES

Author of many books on China - S. E. Asia

Harold R.Isaacs authority on China

Harold R. Isaacs teaches at MIT

are all the names the same person?

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION		
9 NOV 1963		INITIALS
RI ANALYST		mz
DIV.	BRANCH	
FE	China	mw
FE	Japan	GB
RI EDITOR		
RI IPSI		

Summary of DCI info

Reproduction, Rec.

Cy,

End# 1

15/10/63 37N5067

201-18446

S E C R E T

CS COPY

FILE IN 201 18446 *

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE ~~PROCESSED~~ 10 Sep 58

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CI 5237

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 - 18 446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Dutch Consul General
Reports, Shanghai

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 16-5-16

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ONHA-12913

4. DATE 6 Jun 58

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM [illegible]

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST GS

6. DATE PROCESSED 20 OCT 1965

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

H. R. ISAACS

American Communist, Suspected of working for the Komintern and the RIS.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

175

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. J0 - 5237	SOURCE CI/OA	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
SUBJECT ISAACS, HAROLD R. Born - 1910 - nationality - American			DATE 26 JUN 1956

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD IN RI/AR FILE, WASH-CIA-PERS-4.

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
		1	11446	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 38-34
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(35)

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL **SECRET**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 5 May 1956

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/ANALYSIS
TELEPHONE:
NO. NPK-A-4384
DATE:

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. NE	109	7 MAY	1956	[illegible]		Gov. Ofs. Mtgs. Pakistan
2.						
3. NE/5		18 [illegible]		[illegible]		
4. CTK				CTK		Netra
5. PP				[illegible]		[illegible] as [illegible] Subj. [illegible] from Barbara Wendt on 28 May 56 [illegible]
6.						
7.						
8.						
9. Dat		20 AUG 1956			LU	
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15. RI/FI	1409 L					

CARDED BY Kelley
FILED BY

CHECKED ✓ PROJ
OTHER
RI/AN PLEASE NOTE

70	6	2	94
ABSTRACT	☒	INDEX	✓
DATE	14 MAY 1956		

FORM NO. 610 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED. **SECRET** CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HPK-A-4284

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, NEA

DATE 5 May 1956

FROM Chief of Station, Karachi LWB

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/INTEL
SPECIFIC Far Eastern Association 8th Annual Meeting, Request for Background and Operational Information

1. The program of the 8th Annual Meeting of the Far Eastern Association, held in Philadelphia 3 - 5 April 1956, has just arrived here. It indicates that the association has already taken decided steps towards its announced expansion into the South Asian field. The station assumes that Headquarters covered the meeting and can get access now or later to copies of monographs, notes on proceedings, and so on.

2. The following items, keyed to the program, would seem to be of interest to this station if Headquarters can get them:

A. On 3 April, Zakye Eglar: "The World View of the Punjabi Villager".
(Note: This is quite likely the East Punjabi, but it should have some validity for Lahore as well as for Delhi.)

B. On the same day, a Pakistan Studies Organization Meeting was held at 1700. It would be useful to know who is interested in Pakistan studies (both individuals and organizations) and what lines they are thinking of working on.

C. On 5 April, all the items of a "South Asian Miscellany" should be of considerable interest, particularly Stanley Maron's "The Future of East Bengal". Hydecker has some early drafts of the Harold Isaacs study, but they are too early to provide any useful material; this project (at CENIS, MIT) is one that Headquarters should monitor closely, however.

NEIL R. HYDECKER

2 May 1956
NRH/wrg

Distribution:
5 - NEA
2 - Karachi

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

RI COPY 78-62-21

TOP SECRET

DEC 5, 1955

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Fernando SEGUERRA, also known as Fernando [illegible] ROMES

1. Reference is made to a communication from this Agency dated 30 August 1955, captioned as above, our reference CS CI-2542.

2. Attached for your information is a copy of a letter written by subject and addressed to the post office box mentioned in the referenced memorandum. The letter was signed by subject as FELY, his feminine pseudonym. It should also be explained that English is not subject's native language; therefore, the grammar and spelling used by subject in his letters are to be expected.

3. This office interprets subject's letter as follows:

a. Aunt Josephine is Jose LANSANG, with whom subject has been in contact the past several months and who has been indoctrinating subject with leftist ideology. LANSANG has not admitted to subject that he is a Communist, although in his conversations with subject he sticks very close to the current line of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP).

b. Harold ISAACS (FBI File No. 100-256243) is well known to the Bureau.

c. Uncle MANUEL is probably the late Philippine President Manuel QUEZON, who sponsored Jose LANSANG's entry into the United States in 1937 when LANSANG studied at Columbia University. William CARTER, Jr. has not yet been identified by this office.

d. PANLILIO, fnu is probably Dr. Filadelfo PANLILIO, former Associate Professor of Mechanics at the University of the Philippines. PANLILIO received his BSME from the University of the Philippines and his M.S. and Ph.D. at the University of Michigan.

Sent

3 COPY OF [illegible] COPIES

TOP SECRET

21-18446

TOP SECRET

According to a usually reliable source of this Agency, PANLILIO was never able to completely readjust to Philippine life after having lived in the United States. He is known for his strong pro-American views and according to source probably his greatest desire is to reside permanently in the United States. Although it is known that PANLILIO was on friendly terms with Jose LANSANG there is no record that he shared LANSANG's political views.

e. Fr. [illegible] is probably Father DELANEY, Jesuit Chaplain at the University of the Philippines.

f. Cypros or Cyprus University may possibly be Syracuse University.

g. [illegible] is probably Ricardo LABEZ, Philippine newspaperman who was allegedly associated with Harry BRIDGES in the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) in Honolulu. LABEZ was born on 3 April 1915 in Manila; however, most of his life has been spent in Hawaii. He was naturalized a U.S. citizen in 1948 and returned to the Philippines in 1949, where he lost his U.S. citizenship in 1952. There is no information in the files of this office which indicates that LABEZ has returned to Hawaii. For additional information concerning LABEZ, reference is made to a memorandum to the Bureau, dated 23 November 1949, subject: "Ricardo LABEZ (aka Ricardo LAVEZ)", our reference SO DB-20307.

h. Uncle NOR is Nor CUYUGAN, Uncle BENTING is Baltasar CUYUGAN with whom the Bureau is familiar as a result of previous correspondence concerning his daughter, Carmen Jane CUYUGAN (FBI File No. 105-52561). From the wording of subject's letter this office assumes that Baltasar CUYUGAN is aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating Nor CUYUGAN. It also appears that Baltasar CUYUGAN gave subject a letter to deliver personally to his brother Nor CUYUGAN, possibly to avoid a mail intercept by the Bureau. It should be noted that subject stated that he mailed the letter instead.

4. In view of the sensitiveness of the source of the above information, it is requested that no further dissemination be made of the information without prior clearance with this Agency.

CS CI-2768
[illegible] (CUF-[illegible]715), [illegible] September 1955
Attachment - A copy of a letter (To Addressee Only)
[illegible] September 195[illegible]
[illegible]
Distribution:
[illegible]

[illegible] COPY OF 7 [illegible]

TOP SECRET

201-18446

FBI DOCUMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE: 26 MAY 1955
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

DATE: 19 MAR 1954
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU

~~DATE: 27 JAN 54~~

DATE: 27 JAN 54
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LIU TSUN-CH'I (M) AKA
T.C. LIU, LAU CHIN-KI
FBI FILE #: 100-365280 (BUREAU)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

x LIU TSUN-CH'I

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-41745

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB--30147

4. DATE 24 Sept.53

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JP

6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE xxxx

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Comments made by Francis McCracken Fisher

Fisher also recalled that sometime after the subject had gone ovor the Communists after 1950, he Fisher, met Harold Isaacs, a writer who formerly was a Trotskyte in His views, at which time Isaacs advised Fisher thaht he had known that subject was a Communist as early as the 1930's in Peking, China. Isaacs stated that the subjcet had worked for the Tass News Agency in Peking after having graduated form coleege and had evern bbeen senm to jaol due to his communist activies.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

DATE: 26 MAY 1953
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAAC
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 9 (BUREAU)

DATE: 18 FEB 53
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

DATE: 12 NOVE 52
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS
FBI FILE #: 100-286243 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: General Willoughby's Files - Documents Pertaining to Sorge, and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 200-7-212-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 25

4. DATE 31 Oct 52

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Diane Chevrier

6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sept 65

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

Shanghai MP, Special Branch, S-2, report of interception of propaganda-type letter to Harold R. ISAACS and of Volume 3, No. 18, 31 Oct 32 Issue of "The Chinese Worker's Correspondence" addressed to the China Forum.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-82446*

FORM 8-51 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
General Willoughby's Files - Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files	2. RI FILE NO. 200-7-212-1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 23
	4. DATE 31 Oct 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Eleanor Cheriner	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sep 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Photo copy of Special Edition of China Forum called "Five years of Kuomintang Reaction" plus correspondence concerning it.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446 ✱

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT General Willoughby's Files — Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge, and the Shanghai Municipal Police File	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 200- 7- 212 -1 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 18 4. DATE 31 Oct 52 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST Diann Sherwin 6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sept 65	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. ~~Shanghai Municipal Police Report.~~

Report by D.I. Ross 19 April 34.

CWC, Vol. 4, No. 13, 13.4.34

Addressed: Mr. H.R. ISAACS, Embankment Building,
North Soochow Road, Local

forwarded extracts of Chinese Workers Correspondence relating to labour disputes in Shanghai during March 1934 —

The publication which was obtained from a confidential source was delivered through the post, addressed to ISAACS as above.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1952
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: JOHN KING FAIRBANK
FBI FILE #: 77-24341 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
General Willoughby's Files - Documents Pertaining to Richard Sorge and the Shanghai Municipal Police Files	1. RI FILE NO. 200-7-212-1
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. RI Encl. 8
	4. DATE 31 Oct 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST [illegible]	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 29 Sept 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. Photographic copies of letters from Willi MUENZENBERG to ISAACS regarding International Committee for defense of Paul + Gertrude RUEGG.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 26 MAY 1952
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: GEORGE HERRING, WAS:
RING, PAUL RUEGG
FBI FILE #: 100-344906 (BUREAU)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Gunther Bruno Arnold STEIN	2. RI FILE NO. 201-391-87
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HKB-17243
	4. DATE 15 Apr. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM encl. 1
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST jik	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 2 Oct 65	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. H. R. ISAACS, and others, among American newspaper correspondents in Shanghai around 1930 to 1932.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Agnes Smedley, was.	2. RI FILE NO. 201-414
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB-16151
	4. DATE 5 Mar. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST jep	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

h

According to cojfidential informant T-17, of unkomwn reliability, Agnes smedley attempted to ovtain from the American Express Co. in Shahghai certain mail addressed to Harold R. Isaacs while Isaacs was avsent from the city. One of the return addresses on this mail was Smith and Isaacs, 344 East 149th Streed Bonnx , New York. Harold R. Isaacs, mention above, was identified by T 17 as an American Journalist of Communist sympathies who resised in Shahghai in the Early thirties.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT AGNES SMEDLEY,	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-414 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB-16129 4. DATE 14 Feb. 52 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XXXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Subject of the document is mentioned as having visited the residence of Harold R. XXXXXXX Isaacs and C. ?R Frmank Glass, two notorious local Communits sympathisers.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 31 JAN. 52
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: TILLMAN, DURDIN
FBI FILE #: 105-15218 (BUREAU)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
IDA FRANCES TREAT BERGERET	2. RI FILE NO.	201-~~XXXX~~ 6209		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFB—24411		4. DATE 12 Feb. 52	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	

5. ANALYST JEP	6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXXX	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Subject remembers meetint HAROLD R. ISAACS, an American Jounnalist, at a party at the home of Madame SUN YAT SEN.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED FREE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. DCE 4385

DATE

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. ete	1603			U	[illegible]
2.					
3. FE/50				J	
4. China			29 Feb		routed
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9. STC/SIB		MAR 10 1952			CONSOLIDATION EFFECTED BY [illegible]
10.					
11. STC/ICB				m	
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. F.I					

16 7 [illegible] 109

[illegible] 12 1952

FORM 51-9 FREE RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL

sec 4355

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, St [illegible], OSO
Attn: Mr. [illegible] Bigelow

DATE: 7 February 1952

FROM : Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: CS Information—Pro-Communist Sentiment of US Nationals in China

1. Enclosed is a copy of an article prepared for publication in the Christian Science Monitor by a former editor of the Shanghai English-language newspaper. It has not yet been published and probably will not be published because of its length.

for [illegible]
E. W. A[illegible]

ENCLOSURE (A) as listed above.

INDEX

COPY

[illegible]

[illegible] - 7 - [illegible] - 1[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL [illegible]

SECURITY INFORMATION

1. A happy ending has been written in the case of Morris L. Appelman, former Communist who is now secretary of the General Rose Memorial Hospital of Denver. He has been praised in Washington for "disclosing his Communist past", and his board of directors has voted confidence in him and continued him in his job.

2. No doubt all this is fitting and proper but it doesn't answer the question of why nobody in Denver seems to have known anything about Appelman's Red-tinged past, or why there was anything sensational about his revelation of it in Washington. While the police state is rightly anathema to American citizens, it seems remarkable that official records should not be in existence and reasonably accessable to people with reason to check up on such a point as past Communist service.

3. The point about Appelman is not that he did anything particularly reprehensible, but that what he did was quite in the open. According to the Washington testimony he served the Communist party, apparently without special concealment, in Russia, Germany and other points in Europe, going around the world between 1924 and 1938. He sought to relieve Max and Grace Granich in the editorship of a Shanghai English-language Communist magazine, "The Voice of China", in 1937, he testified, but didn't get off his ship in Shanghai because of the hostilities there at the time.

4. This sheds something of a light on the supposedly fearless and ruthless Communist operations throughout the world. I was in Shanghai when fighting broke out there between Japan and China on Aug. 13, 1937, and can testify that we had three months of ding-dong warfare before the campaign moved inland. During that period a good many people left for obvious reasons, but some came in, and it might be presumed that an accredited agent of international Communism would at least have paused in nearby Kobe or Hongkong till things calmed down a little. Possibly the Communists are as subject to qualms about personal safety as anyone else—or more so.

5. About "The Voice of China" there could hardly be any illusion in the mind of anyone who had cared to pay the slightest attention to it. Each issue bore a virtual advertisement of its Communist allegiance on its front cover, to those familiar with methods of converting Chinese into English. The name "Voice of China" appeared in both English and Chinese, and in the Chinese a peculiar Soviet-originated system of Romanization was used so that what is ordinarily, by conventional Wade system, written "Chung Hwa" for China was spelled "Chung Xua"— an extraordinary effect frankly explaining the publication's ownership.

6. But what was more, Harold Isaacs, the editor who preceded the Graniches, had done considerably more than was conveyed by press dispatches from the Washington hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee. These said he was "believed to have deviated from Communist policy" whereas in fact he challenged with the Chinese Communists and their Moscow patrons

CONFIDENTIAL

4355

completely with an article headed "I Break With Stalinism." This gave a candid elucidation of the Communist financial backing of the "Voice of China" and if anyone either in or out of official life had previously suffered any illusions as to its nature, Isaacs' article—published elsewhere than in the "Voice", of course—certainly should have dispelled them.

7. The Granichs seem to have lived quietly in Shanghai and were little known, which under the circumstances was hardly surprising since they were running an obviously Communist organ. Chiang Kai-shek's forces could not meddle with them openly, for at that time Shanghai was an international city operated under extraterritoriality. But the Nationalist secret police did create some trouble for the "Voice" and then Consul-General Clarence E. Gauss was allegedly reprimanded by the State Department in 1937 for not doing more to help them as Americans. Technically they were entitled to full American protection but Gauss, now with the Import-Export Bank in Washington, D. C., was a sort of Old Curmudgeon of the Shanghai American community and it seems that he thought it his moral obligation to let them fry in any trouble they might get into as Communist agents. Gauss can't have suffered greatly for this in the eyes of his superiors, for he was later promoted to ambassador both to China and to Australia.

8. This background has some present importance since an American magazine is being operated today in Communist Shanghai, which tolerates no criticism or opposition. Originally pro-Nationalist under the late J. B. Powell, it has been friendly toward the Communists under his son, John William Powell, and it stayed on after most other American enterprises—including the daily Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, edited by myself—had shut down and American officials had left Red China.

9. Before they departed, these officials had reason to compile an extensive file on what is now the China Monthly Review. One incident which is known to have irked them was the Review's treatment of the case of William Olive, American consular official, in the summer of 1949 soon after the Communists had taken over. Olive blundered into a traffic conflict with the Communist police, was taken to first one and then a second police station, and in the course of several days' imprisonment he was severely beaten with fists and gunbutts, kicked and otherwise maltreated. Powell's Review blandly professed to have little information on the matter but gave an account unfavorable to Olive. When consular officials asked Powell to come to the consulate and look Olive over and get the full story, he failed to show up. This and other matters were recorded in some detail but in view of the background of American intelligence operation, one may question whether these details will ever be hauled out of the files.

10. More recently, copies of the Review have been slanted strongly against the Americans and the United Nations cause in Korea and one issue editorially spoke of the United States as "the enemy." It should not be difficult to preserve continuity in following such a case of American pro-Communist activity abroad, though nothing could be done to Powell unless

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SECURITY INFORMATION

or until he decided to return to his own country—and even then, the complex nature of American laws on this general subject make it hard to tell what could be done aside from perhaps denying another passport to go abroad again.

11. The important thing, as shown by a long list of cases gravely investigated by congressional committees, is to have the postwar Central Intelligence Agency or some comparable group such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation keep track of the wealth of information available. Too much waste effort goes into the many duplications of inquiry.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] 107

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

DCE 4355

Chief, Staff C, OO
Attn: Miss Jane Winslow
Chief, Contact Division, OO

7 February 1952

CS Information—Pro-Communist Sentiment of US Nationals in China

1. Enclosed is a copy of an article prepared for publication in the Christian Science Monitor by a former editor of the Shanghai English-language newspapers. It has not yet been published and probably will not be published because of its length.

S. M. ASHCRAFT

ENCLOSURES (A) as listed above.

COPY

[illegible]-169

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DISPATCH NO. LJW-

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 6 February 1952

TO : Chief of Mission, FEB/FES

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Counter-espionage
SPECIFIC- Transmittal of CE Study on "The NOULENS Case"

Attachments: (1) Subject CE Study (4 copies)

The attached study entitled "The NOULENS Case", compiled by our CE office, is forwarded for your information and for retention in your CE files.

COPY

BERNHARD VON AMMON

Originator: John L. Witzleben

RELEASING OFFICER
LLOYD GEORGE
Chief, FE

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
John Chrislaw
FE/B/SO

CLASSIFICATION

17891

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

ZCS 1811, Shanghai Muncipal Files, filed 16-4-2-37

ISAACS, Harold Robert

Born 13 Sept 1910, NYC
Nat'l American

DESCRIPTION
Height 5'9"
Build medium
Hair black, wavy, brushed back
Eyes brown

DOCUMENTATION
In 30s was traveling on passport # 177026

Arrived in China from Manila on 10 Dec 1930
Upon his arrival joined the editorial staff of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury.

Was a secretary of the NOULENS Defense Commitee and a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR

to Szechwan acc to FBI

On 12 June 1931, ISAACS and his friend GLASS took a trip up the Yangtse. During this trip ISAACS wrote his fiancee, Viola ROBINSON, that he had decided to turn " Red" as a result of conversations with GLASS.

The two returned to Shanghai in Aug 1931 and took up residence at # 128 Weihaiwei Road.

ISAACS later started and became the editor and publisher of the " China Forum" which at first was job-printed but from Oct 1932 on was printed by the Level Publishing Co. INC, # 33, Lane 478 Tiendong Road, Shanghai. ISAACS openedly stated he was manager of the printing co and owned 40% of its shares.
On 7 Aug 1933, ISAACS and his wife Viola ROBINSON whom he had married in Sept 1932 left Shanghai for Japan on the SS Nagasaki Maru. On 16 Aug, they proceeded to Japan, returning to Shanghai on Aug 26th.

Inaddition to his other activities, ISAACS was also employed with the Havas News Agency. He severed connection with this Agency around Dec 1933.

In Dec 1933, ISAACS was in Foochow to gather 1st hand info re the newly formed "Peolple's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China."

In the spring of 1934, ISAACS and his wife left for Tientsin en route to Peking at which city he resided at # 2 T'ung Fu Chia Tao, East City. Peking mailing address was c/o Mr. UHLMANN, Grand Hotel.

On 3 January 1934, ISAACS visited Mr and Mrs. NOULENS while they were on a hunger strike in prison

On 14 January 1934, the parents of ISAACS, Mr and Mrs I.H. ISAACS arrived in Shanghai from Los Angeles. During their stay in Shanghai they resided at the Metropol Hotel Annex. On 20 February they left Shanghai for Port Said en route to Marseilles on the SS Rawalpindi.

On 4 April 1936, ISAACS under the pen name of Lo Sen had an article published in the New Militant, the organ of the NY District Worker's Party. The article was an attack on Stalin and was entitled " Stalintern ready to embrace Chian Kai Shek. [illegible] Officer Chinese Red Army in return for resurrection of disasterous 1927 bloc!"
At this same time, ISAACS was also lecturing on Japan, China, and the USSR and the War Crisis in the Far East.

5 Jul 49

GLASS

1 Shanghai Muni Polic e Files, filed, 16-4-2- 37, p 2

In Shanghai GLASS made the acquaintance of one Damaree C.BASS, American from Kansas City, born 1893.This was some time after April 1932.

Name C.F. GLASS = Cecil Frank GLASS
Born 25 March 1901, Birmingham,England

Passport British passport, # 94153, issued 5 Jan 1931 in Pretoria,South Africa
Pol Affiliation-Member of the CP
Overt Profession-Journalist

Believed to have left England in the early 1920s for South Africa where he resided at Johannesburg for many years.

Arrived in Shanghai from Durban May 1931

On 12 June 1931 made a trip ~~through~~ up the ~~Yangstoe~~ Yangtaze with Harold ISAACS American Communist and ~~writer for the~~ editor of the China Forum. A letter written by ISAACS to his fiancee, Miss Viola ROBINSON, during this trip contained information that ISAACS had decided to turn " Red" as a result of his conversation with GLASS.

In Sept 1931, GLASS became a member of the "NOULENS Defense Committee" and two months later was appointed Shanghai Representative of the Anglo-Asiatic Telegraph Agency(Angasta) a news agency with HQ in Harbin, which position he held until 1933.

In Aug1933, he was living in Room 510,# 1276,North Szechuen Road,Shanghai

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ECS 1811; Shanghai Municipal Files, file: 16-4-2-37

ROBINSON, Viola
@ MRS. H.R. ISAACS

Born 10 July 1910, NYC
Nat'l American

Description
Height 5'5"
Build slim
Complx fair

Documentation
In 1932 holder of US passport # 382046 issued NYC 14 May 1931

History
In 1931 known to have visited Germany

Known Communist and follower of Lucy STONE

Arrived in Shanghai on 23 Aug 1932

14 Sept 1932 married Harold Robert ISAACS. She had been engaged to ISAACS for some years before her arrival in China, and it has been stated that the letters between the two indicated ~~that~~ Communist sympathies on the part of both and of ISAACS' intention of joining the CP

After her arrival in China was employed at the Dah Chung Middle School, Shanghai as a teacher.

She lived in the Embankment Building Bldg, North Soochow Road

On 7 August 1933, the ISAACS left Shanghai for Japan and on 16 Aug 1933 proceeded to Dairen, returning to Shanghai by rail on 26 August 1933.

In Nov 1933, info was received to the effect that Miss ROBINSON was a teacher at the Comparative Law School, Shanghai.

15

AUG 14 1951

Harold Robert ISAACS with aliases

LO SEN (penname used in China)

Harold Robert ISAACS was born in New York City on 13 September 1910 of American parents. His father has been reported as " decidedly of the commercial type." . ISAACS has been described as intelligent, critical, ~~nervous~~ and nervously organized.

Little is known concerning the activities of ISAACS prior to his arrival in China from Manila on 10 December 1930; however, Mr. I. H. ISAACS who visited ISAACS ~~[illegible]~~ in January & February [illegible] date in Shanghai, is reported to have embarrassed his son in the presence of friends by " kidding" the latter about trying to make money on real estate while in Los Angeles before going to China.

The actual date when Cecil Frank GLASS and Harold ISAACS met? is not known, but it must have been shortly after the arrival of GLASS in Shanghai in May 1931, for in June 1931, ISAACS and GLASS made a trip up the Yangtsze together.

It has been stated that ISAACS became interested in Communism with specific relation to China, but it has been stated that letters written by ISAACS to his fiancee, Viola ROBINSON, ~~are stated to~~ on his trip with GLASS, ~~are stated to indicate~~

It has been stated that ISAACS became interested in Communism with ~~in~~ specific relation to China; it has also been stated that letters between ISAACS and his fiance, Viola ROBINSON, which were written during the Yangtsze trip indicated Communist sympathies on the part of both, and one of the letters contained the information that ISAACS had decided to turn " Red" as a result of his conversations with GLASS. As you are aware, ISAACS and GLASS returned to Shanghai in August 1931 and took up residence at 128 Weihaiwei Road. In September 1931, both men are reported to have become members of the NOULENS Defense Committee, ISAACS being the Secretary.

ISAACS is also reported to have been a member of the Society of Friends of the USSR.

Upon his arrival in China, ISAACS joined the editorial staff of the Shanghai Evening Post and the Mercury. ISAACS was also employed with the Havas News Agency, which connection he is reported to have severed around December 1933.

ISAACS also started and later became editor and published of the " China Forum." It is believed to have been ~~It was~~ a monthly English language paper issued at first as a commercial job from the Mercury Press. From October 1932 on it was printed by the Level Publishing Company Inc., 33, Lane A78, Tiendong Road. ISAACS is reported to have openly stated that he was manager of the pringting company, owing 40% of the shares.

It has been stated that those who knew ISAACS in Shanghai found no reason to think he was a " pay off" man for American Communists, and that during the first part of his stay in China, he was not a follower of Trotsky. However, he is reported to have finally become convinced that the tatics of the Chinese Communists were wrong and that Trotsky was right in criticising them, and the Soviet Government under Stalin. He therefore wrote an article entitled, " I Break with ~~Stalin~~ the Stalinists," in which among other things, he is reported to have stated that the expense of publishing the magazine had been borned by the Chinese Communists. He is then reported to have discontinued the magazine and to have sold the printing equipment, the sum being realised from the sale not being turned back to the Chinese Communists but to have been given to the Trotsky cause.

ISAACS had been engaged for several years to Viola ROBINSON who arrived in Shanghai on 28 August 1932. On 14 September 1932, she and ISAACS were married and took up residence in Apt 204, the ~~the~~ Embankment Building on North Soochow Road. Prior to the fall of 1933, Irene WEITMEYER or WEIDEMEYER ~~of the~~ a subject in the SORGE Case is reported to have lived in the Embankment Building with one Renee HOLZEL. Rold AUDOUARD and his wife who have been reported as Soviet sympathisers and ~~were~~ who were known to have been in close contact with E E KISCH when the latter was in China also lived in this building in the early 1930s in Apartment 509.

After her arrival in China, Viola ROBINSON ISAACS was employed at the Dah Chung Middle School, and by November 1933 was reported as a teacher at the Comparative Law School in Shanghai.

On 7 August 1933, the ISAACS left Shanghai for Japan, and on 16 August 1933 proceeded to Dairen, returning to Shanghai by rail on 26 August 1933. In ~~November~~ December 1933 ISAACS left Shanghai for Foochow to gather first hand information on the newly formed " People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China." [redacted]

In January 1934, ISAACS is reported to have visited Mr. and Mrs. NOULENS while they were on a hunger strike in prison. In the spring of 1934, ISAACS and his wife left for Tientsin en route to Peking at which city, they resided at 2 Tiung Fu Chia Tao, East City. His mailing address was % of one Mr. UHRMANN, Grand Hotel, Peking.

As has been set out heretofore, ISAACS is reported to have turned against the Stalinist Government of the USSR, becoming a Trotskyite. During this period he wrote the " Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution," allegedly as a single gesture of interpretation and protest to show how, in his opinion, both the Kuomintang and the Communists had gone wrong in China. Also in April 1936, under the pen name of Li Sen, ISAACS had an article published in the " New Militant," the organ of the NY District Workers Party. The article ~~is~~ was reportedly an attack on Stalin and was entitled, " Stalinists ready to embrace Chiang Kai Shek: C.P. Offices Chinese Red Army in Return for resurrection of disastrous 1927 bloc."

It has been stated by friends of ISAACS even during the height of his Trotskyist career, he never accepted money from any group; that he was open and above board; and that he never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. They are also reported to have stated that ISAACS was attracted to Communism by Shaheer idealism."

It has been further reported that immediately after Pearl Harbor, ISAACS broke with the Trotskyite group as he had broken with the Communists", and began writing propaganda for the United States Government.

Sometime in the late 1930s, ISAACS returned to the United States. ~~By the fall~~
Until the fall of France, he was employed by the Havas News Agency. In October 1943,
of 1943, he was working for Newsweek Magazine in Washington, D.C. His address at that time was Friendship Heights, Newport Ave., 4938.

By late 1944 or early 1945, ISAACS was in Chungking as a representative of Newsweek. During this period, he had a great deal of trouble about censorship, and reportedly was deined permission to visit Communist areas. It has been stated that actually he was merely unfortunate in that he applied just after the government had restored its ban on journalistic travel in that direction. At the time he ~~had~~ was denied permission, "Teddy" WHITE of Time had just been allowed to go, and ISAACS felt that he was being discriminated against. It has been stated that WHITE, upon his return gave such a good account of administration in the Red areas that this, added to other similar experiences, solidified the government's determination no to let any more American newspapermen " go up and become Communist converts." In March 1945, ISAACS was reported as about to leave Chungking permanently.

The following descriptions of Harold and Viola ISAACS are set out for your information:

	Harold ISAACS	Viola R. ISAACS
Born	10 July 1910, NYC	13 Sept., 1910, NYC
Nat'l	American	American
Height	5'9"	5'5"
Build	medium	slim
Hair	black, wavy, brushed back	
Eyes	brown	
Complx		fair
Passports in early 1930s	US Passport # 177026	US passport # 382046, issued NYC 14 May 1931

In addition to Agnes SMEDLEY and Frank GLASS, ISAACS is known to have been in contact with the following while in China:

William DURDIN. For a time during his stay in China, ISAACS is reported to have lived with DURDIN, then correspondent of the NY Times and ~~some~~ at one time, managing editor of [illegible] China Press."

John M. MURRAY, Shanghai representative of the Pacific News Agency in Vancouver. MURRAY is also known to have been in contact with E.E. KISCH, Agnes SMEDLEY, Irene WEITEMEYER or WEIDEMEYER and one [illegible] BOVER during his stay in China.

AUG 14 19[illegible]
INTEGRATION [illegible]

ISAACS

PUBLICATIONS

Wrote an article entitled " I Break with the Stalinists" which allegedly among in
other things, that the expenses of publishing a magazine which he was putting out
had been borned by the Chinese Communists.

At one time, ISAACS published a monthly English language magazine, issued first
as a commercial joy(sic) from the Mercury Press and later printed from a small printing
outfit purchased by ISAACS. It has been stated that after publishing the article "I
Break with the Stalinists," ISAACS discontinued the magazine and sold its printing
equipment. It has been stated that the small sum realised from the sale was not turned
back to the Chinese Communists but was turned over to the Trotsky Cause.

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: Irene Emma Ida WEITEMEYER

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-9846-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. LCB-14423

4. DATE 20 Dec 51

5. ANALYST MS

6. DATE PROCESSED 20 Oct 65

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 19.5

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. In Sept. 1931 it was reported that an 'Aid Committee to the Secretary of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (Noulens) had been formed in Shanghai, and that in addition to WEITEMEYER its members included HAROLD ISAACS and others, - all well known local radical journalists.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Alexander Hassler Buchman	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-67S3
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SODB-45339
	4. DATE d 5 Dec. 51
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST James . Plaugher	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXI 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning the captiondd subject
and in particular to your communication of 10 July 51, your file number 105—11929
in which it was requested that Tilman Durdin be interviewed regarding his knowledge
of the backgpound, beliefs and ~~mm~~ activities of the individuals named below. Durdin,
who travels continously and extensively in the Far East, was finally located in Djakarta
Indonesia, and on 14 Nov. 51 was interviewed, in accordance eith your request, and the
following information elicited.

2. Durdin stated he knew nothing definite regarding the present activities and alleded
communist connection of Frans Joseph WEISBLATT, Harold ISAACS, Frans GLASS, ALEXANDER
BASSLER BUCHMAN and George Alexander Kennedy, and that he could furnish info on their
early activities only.

~~[illegible]~~

3. DURDIN said that he knows Harold Isaacs well and that he last saw him at the conference
in Baguido in the Philippines, which was held in November 1947. He stated that ~~IXXXXS~~
ISAACS was formerly with NEWSWEEK but that he now believes he is a gree lance lecturer
and writer. He gave his opinion that Isaaxs, althought left wing, is not necessarily
a communist.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI REPORT
DATE: 5 DEC. 51
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: PAUL RUEGG, WAS: HILAIRE NOULENS, AND OTHERS
FBI FILE #: 100-344906 (BUREAU)

14-00000

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

From: [illegible]

To: [illegible]

Action: [illegible]

Information: [illegible]

15 NOV 51

IN 40810

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51(1) of AR 380-5

JAKA-588

[illegible]

RE [illegible] (OUT 31393 [illegible]).

1. SUBJECT VISITED CONSUL'S OFFICE [illegible] ACCORDING APPROACH PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON. SUBJECT QUITE [illegible] ABOUT THESE PERSONS EARLY ACTIVITIES [illegible] THEIR PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND [illegible]

2. HAS ONLY HAZY RECOLLECTION MEETING WEISBLATT [illegible] ABOUT 193 (AS RECEIVED). DID NOT LIVE WITH WEISBLATT ALTHO POSSIBLY OCCUPIED SAME BACHELORS MESS SHORT PERIOD. NO INFO PRESENT [illegible]. SUBJECT KNOWS ISAACS WELL. SAW HIM LAST [illegible] 1950, [illegible] WITH NEWSWEEK BUT BELIEVES ISAACS NOW [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

[illegible] YEAR OLD [illegible]

[illegible] LATE 30'S [illegible]

[illegible] ATION LOS ANGELES. [illegible]

[illegible] INVESTIGATORS. SUBJECT BELIEVES [illegible]

[illegible] SYMPATHIES [illegible] MAY HAVE HAD [illegible]

[illegible] YALE UNIVERSITY AS [illegible]

[illegible] PEKING ABOUT 1948. [illegible]

[illegible] SHANGHAI DURING 30'S BUT SUBJECT KNOWS

NOTHING HIS [illegible] IDEOLOGY.

[illegible] SECRET

COPY

SECRET

7 November 1951

Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Attention: Security Officer
Chief, Special Security Division

Harold R. Isaacs

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from your office dated 3 July 1951 in which you requested that a Special Inquiry be conducted to resolve information concerning an allegation that Subject is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities.

2. On 31 August 1951, Mr. Kenneth Patrum of the Security Office was advised that partial results have been received as a result of inquiries at several national agencies. The partial information reflected that Subject had been connected with at least two factions of the Communist Party while living in the Far East. It was suggested that extreme caution be used in contacting or associating with the Subject.

3. This office has completed the investigation of the Subject, which includes a check of records of the appropriate Federal agencies. As a result of this investigation, the files of this office contain a great deal of information concerning Subject's association with questionable organizations and individuals. Although Subject has denied any current activities with the Communist Party, his associations and activities are highly questionable and his political sympathy has not been unqualifiedly resolved at the present time.

4. In view of the information as set forth above, it is recommended that extreme caution be exercised in dealing with the Subject. Under no circumstances should Subject be contacted with regard to possible use by this agency prior to receiving a final security determination by this office.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

SECRET

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] 1100

CLASSIFICATION

TO: [redacted] Chief of Station, Hong Kong

DATE: 25 September 1951

FROM: Chief, Foreign Division B

SUBJECT: GENERAL: CI Information

SPECIFIC: Request for Interview [redacted] Tillman Durdin.

1. In connection with a current investigation, ZACKRAB has requested that Tillman Durdin be interviewed along the lines set out below. It is requested that if Durdin is not now in Hong Kong or is not expected to be there for some time you advise headquarters so that a copy of this dispatch can be sent to the proper station. It is not deemed desirable for you or any member of your staff to undertake this interview personally. It is suggested, therefore, that a precis of this dispatch be made available to a suitable ZACKRAB officer (a representative of the [illegible] Security Office, if one is available), and that he interview Durdin and inform you of the results.

2. A reliable ZACKRAB informant has stated that in 1933 Durdin was in Shanghai, acting as city editor of the "China Press." At that time he was said to have shared an apartment with Frank Joseph [illegible], who is described as an American citizen then in China as a news reporter. According to the informant, [illegible] was at that time a close associate of Harold ISAACS, who was said to have been employed in Shanghai in 1933 as editor of the "China Forum", described as a Communist publication. A ZACKRAB source of unknown reliability has stated that in 1933 ISAACS was a "notorious radical sympathizer" and was suspected of being an agent for the Third International.

3. In 1949, ZACKRAB representatives interviewed one Morris Louis APPLEMAN in Denver, Colorado. APPLEMAN admitted having been a CP member from 1924 to 1937. He stated that in 1933 and 1934 he knew Durdin in Shanghai, and that during that period, he, Harold ISAACS, Frank GLASS and Alexander BUCHMAN, frequently held meetings at the home of Tillman Durdin in Shanghai. Frank GLASS is a British subject presently living in Los Angeles. BUCHMAN is an American who also lives in Los Angeles. APPLEMAN described ISAACS and GLASS as Trotskyites in 1933-34, and described BUCHMAN as a former member of the Communist Youth League in the U.S. A ZACKRAB informant of unknown reliability has reported that during that period GLASS and ISAACS were suspected of being

RELEASING OFFICER
LLOYD GEORGE
CHIEF, [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
GEORGE H. MALLORY

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
[illegible]

agents for the Third International in Shanghai.

4. In addition to the above individuals, Durdin is also reported to have been an acquaintance in Shanghai about 1932-33 of George Alexander KENNEDY, who is presently employed at Yale University. KENNEDY was an acquaintance of ISAACS and was also reported to have been associated with "Leftwing groups" [illegible]hanghai at that time.

5. In view of the above ZASSRAFE desires that Durdin be interviewed as soon as possible relative to the [illegible]his acquaintance and association with: WEISBLATT, ISAACS, GLASS, BUCH[illegible]NEDY. Durdin is requested to comment particularly concerning any ac[illegible] these individuals on behalf of the CP or the Third International, [illegible] they may have been engaged in espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, either during the early 1930's in China, or at any subsequent period.

GEORGE W. MALLORY

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. 105-15219

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DFB-11880
201-6556
Sept 14 1951

Date: September 11, 1951

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Major General W. G. Wyman
Office of Special Operations

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: TILLMAN DURDIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

In connection with an official investigation being conducted by this Bureau, we are desirous of obtaining certain information from Mr. Tillman Durdin, who is presently located c/o Hong Kong, Tiger Standard, 108 Windsor House, Victoria, Hong Kong. It would be appreciated if you would have one of your representatives interview Mr. Durdin in Hong Kong along the lines set out below.

For your information, Durdin is a foreign correspondent for the New York Times newspaper. He is an American citizen born March 30, 1907, at Elkhart, Texas, and has been employed as a foreign correspondent for the New York Times for many years, possibly since at least the early 1930's.

A reliable informant has advised that in 1939 Durdin was in Shanghai, China, acting as City Editor of the newspaper "China Press." At that time Durdin was said to be sharing an apartment with Franz Joseph Weisblatt, described as an American citizen then in China as a newspaper reporter.

According to our informant, Weisblatt was at that time a close associate of one Harold Isaacs. Isaacs, an American citizen presently living in New York City, was said by our informant to have been employed [redacted] in Shanghai in 1933 as Editor of the "China Forum," described as a Communist publication. A source of unknown reliability has stated that in 1933 Isaacs was a "notorious radical sympathizer" and was suspected of being an agent of the Third International. Isaacs was said to have organized the Shanghai Committee for the Defense of the Rueggs. Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were convicted in China in 1932 for Russian espionage activities.

In March, 1949 [redacted] this Bureau interviewed one Morris Louis Appleman, an American citizen presently living in Denver, Colorado, and Appleman admitted having been a member of the Communist Party from 1924 to 1937. Appleman stated that in 1933 and 1934 he knew Durdin in Shanghai, and that during that period, he, Appleman, Harold Isaacs, Frank Glass and Alexander Buchman, frequently held meetings at the home of Tillman Durdin in Shanghai.

Frank Glass is a British citizen presently living in Los Angeles, California. Buchman is an American citizen also presently living in Los Angeles. Morris Appleman described Isaacs and Glass as Trotskyites in 1933-34, and described Buchman as a former member of the Communist Youth League in the United States. An informant of unknown reliability has also reported that during that period Glass and Isaacs were suspected of being agents for the Third International in Shanghai.

In addition to the above individuals, Durdin is also reported to have been an acquaintance in Shanghai in about 1932-33 of George Alexander Kennedy, an American citizen presently employed at Yale University. Kennedy was an acquaintance of Harold Isaacs at that time, and was also reported to have been associated with "left-wing groups" in Shanghai at that time.

In view of the information indicating that Mr. Durdin was acquainted with these individuals during the early 1930's, it is desired that he be interviewed relative to the extent of his acquaintance and association with the following: Frans Joseph Weinblatt, Harold Isaacs, Frank Glass, Alexander Buchman, and George Alexander Kennedy.

It is requested that Durdin be questioned particularly as to any information he may possess concerning any activities of these individuals on behalf of the Communist Party or the Third International. Durdin should also be asked whether he has any information indicating any of these individuals may have engaged in espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union, either during the early 1930's in China or at any subsequent period. It is desired that full details be obtained from

Mr. Durlin relative to any information he may furnish concerning possible subversive activities on the part of any of these individuals.

It would be appreciated if you would endeavor to have Mr. Durlin interviewed at the earliest possible date.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 2 Aug 51

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IR

NO. 2FK-89

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FDZ	2006	[illegible] 51			Logged
2. REPORTS			[illegible]		COPY RETAINED FDZ/BR.2
3. Br.2				JC	
4. Connell		7 Aug	7 Aug		
5.					
6.					
7. M. Morris					No Dissem - inaccurate Paris queried re recent whereabout Figueres.
8.					
9.					
10.					X ref filed 1[illegible]-4-21-6
11.					
12.					201-18446
13.					
14.					
15. IR	1409				

INTELLIGENCE
RI/16 Aug 51
RECORDS

ABSTRACT
INDEX

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET

From: Hanoi

Report No.: ZFH-89

No. of pages: 1

Enclosures: None

Report Made by Walter J. Ingold

Approved by James M. Lanier

Distribution: None

Reference: HANO 242 and WASH 01125

Source Cryptonym: Tunic-2

Remarks:

1. In our last message to Tunic-2 on 30 July we used the discrepancy concerning Leo Figueres' visit to NVN as an example in a gentle lecture on the virtues of accurate reporting. By 1 August Tunic-2 answered back. The man obviously takes pride in his work.

2. An ops comment relating to this report will be sent in another pouch or via cable.

SECRET

[illegible]-1177-3

HS COPY

14-00000

SECRET

Subject: Leo Figueres

Report No.: ZFH-89

Date of Info: as indicated

Place Acquired: Viet Nam, Hanoi

Date Acquired: 1 August 51

Evaluation: B-3

Date of Report: 2 August 51

Source:

1. According to Hoang Mui, who works in the Viet Minh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leo Figueres was in Saigon in early 1950. The French did not allow him to remain in Saigon and he was forced to return to France. Figueres later went to Hong Kong in late August 1950, and then proceeded to the Viet Bac via the Hoa Nam (F.C.: South China ?) road to attend the Third Congress of the PCI held in early October 1950.

2. There had been several previous cases of individuals who were unable to reach Viet Minh territory from Saigon because of French interference. In July 1949 Mr. A. Roth, Editor of the Sunday Tribune, arrived in Saigon and obtained all necessary papers; the French did not allow him to proceed because of his pro-Communist articles. Others were Walter Briggs of the Christian Science Monitor, Harold Isaacs from Newsweek, and S. J. Perelman (because he criticized Bao Dai in Westward, Ho!).

SECRET

FBI REPORT
DATE: JULY 51
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJ: UNKNOWN
FBI FILE #: 100-68282 (NEW YORK)

John, Pls. make a file & index only on this

25 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: PI/CS

SUBJECT : Harold R. Isaacs, Request for an information namecheck on.

1. It is requested that a namecheck for information be conducted on Subject for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subject is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities.

2. We have been informed unofficially that Subject is currently employed by the Ford Foundation as an adviser on Far East projects. When one of our covert agents was recently called upon by the Ford Foundation to present some suggestions for a Far East program, the agent found that Subject was interested in and was to be closely connected with this program. It is planned that the Ford Foundation remains unaware of the CIA connection with this covert agent.

3. When the report is completed, the information should be routed to J. Bruce Amstutz, FE-1/OPC.

DOUGLAS D. PIRNIE
Deputy Chief, FE-1

FE-1/JBA/ph

Dist: Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Registry
1 - FE-1 files ✓

SECRET

SECRET

NAME: Harold R. Isaacs

ADDRESS (last known - '48): 333 Central Park West, N.Y.C.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1910

NATIONALITY: American

BUSINESS CAREER: (a) Staff writer for Havas News Agency (1930-1935)

(b) Editor of China Forum

(c) City Editor for China Press, Shanghai, China

(d) Far Eastern War Correspondent for Newsweek - (1944-1945)

(e) Special Projects Editor for Newsweek (1947 - ?)

(f) Advisor to Ford Foundation

PUBLICATIONS:

1. Contributed to Harper's Magazine and Toronto Star Weekly.
2. Books: (see attached)

SECRET

SECRET

1. Two-Thirds of the World: Problems of a new approach to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin-America. - 1950

2. New Cycle in Asia: Selected documents on Major International developments in Far East. 1943 and 1947 - notes and introduction 1947.

3. No Peace for Asia - 1947

4. Tragedy of Chinese Revolution - 1938

5. Five Years of Kuo Min Tang Reaction - 1932

6. Whither France - 1936 - Leon Trotsky wrote the book and Isaacs translated it.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Sorge Espionage Case	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 200-6-7-55
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DAR-137
	4. DATE 28 Dec. 1950
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
	10. DISSEMINATED IN
	11. DATE
5. ANALYST James E. Plaugher	6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 1963

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XX	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. 1. Inclosed is Consecutive Exhibit No. 32 in the documentation of the Sorge Espionage Case. This ?Exhibit consists of two related parts: I and II. The second part is divided into two sections, A and B, because of its bulk. Part I is an index of each personality and organization listed in Part II. Part II consist of a resume of the contents of each Shanghai Municipal Police file, followed by a aabular listing of the contents of the files, with page references.

Page 24.

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Anti-War Congress report, mentioned in	10	8-9
Burton report, mentioned in	65	1
"China Forum"editor of		
"Chinese Workers' Correspondence":	32	4
Investigation re	94	1-2
Received by	45	6
Envelope addressed to	65	1
"Fiev Yaars of Kuomintang Reaction"	4	107
Granich, "Evidently another Isaacs"		
"I Break with the Chinses Saalinists" author of	16	2-7

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

SECRET

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
8-57
(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT AGNES SMEDLEY, WAS.	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-4[illegible] 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DFS-1461 4. DATE 28 apr. 50 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP 6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 1963	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE ~~xxxxx~~

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

page 69

The July 30, 1932 issue of the "New York Times", under a Shahghai Dateline of Jule 29, 1932 , sates that Harold R. Isaacs, an American citizen., was warned by the U. S. consul in Shahghai that the U. S . may with draw ~~xxx xxx~~ its extra territirial rights and allow him to be tried in a Chinese Court. Isaacs, then editor of the "China Forum", had violently attacked Chiang Kai-Shek, calling him among other things, a butcher. The article further stated that issacs was as associate of Agnes Smedley, a correspondedt for American newspapers.

page 73. The March 7, 1946 issue of the New York Times reflects an article captioned "Group of Americans, including writers and journalists announced that they had sent aletter to Chaing Kai Shek concerning the death of Yang Chao, OWI employee, who was arrested by the Nationalists and ided in prison. The sighers were critical of the treatment recieved by CHAO. THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS signed the letter: Maxwell S. stewart. Elizabeth Ames, Maroline Slade, Alfred Kazin , Eric Severeid, Richard Watts, jr. H. R. Isaacs, Agnes Smedley and Theordore White.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT AGNES SMEDLEY was. Ayoo, Yahoo	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 201-414 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. EEDFB--854 4. DATE 24 Jan 1950 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JEP 6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 1963	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxx	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Passport files of State Dept. also indicate passport renewal application dated June 23, 1932 in which the subject listed as identifying witnesses ----subject mentioned Harold R. Isaaks , who according to information possessed by T--1 as 'RED'

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-13446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

2P

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ADSO SODB-20568

DEC 2 1949 via ADSO 2 Dec 49

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Attention: Mr. Ross N. Ingersoll

Subject: Harold Robert ISAACS

MICROFILMED
FEB 3 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. This is in reply to Mr. Jack D. Neal's request for information concerning Harold Robert ISAACS, made by telephone on 29 November 1949.

201-18446

2. According to information obtained from a source considered reliable, Harold Robert ISAACS was born in New York City on 13 September 1910. He arrived in Shanghai from Manila in December 1930 and was in possession of American passport 177026. ISAACS was first employed in Shanghai by the Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury, an English language daily published in Shanghai. After a few weeks, he became associated with the China Press, another English-language daily published in Shanghai, and was with this paper until May 1931. In June of the same year ISAACS made a trip up the Yangtze River with Cecil Frank GLASS, a British subject and member of the British Communist Party, suspected of being an agent for the Third International in China.

3. On 15 June 1931, Hilaire NOULENS, with aliases, was arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Police on charges of espionage in behalf of the Third International. ISAACS became the Shanghai secretary of the Comité Internationale Pour la Défense de Paul et Gertrude Ruegg (NOULENS), a committee formed to aid the NOULENSs in their defense against charges of espionage preferred by the Chinese government. Our files reflect that ISAACS was in correspondence with Willi MUNZENBERG, the President of the Committee with headquarters in Berlin. MUNZENBERG was an active agent in Germany for the Third International. ISAACS is also known to have been in contact with Agnes SMEDLEY in Shanghai at this time.

MUENZENB

(MRS) HAROLD R. ISAACS
SEX F CIT: USA OCC: COMMUNIST AGENT? WIFE OF HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS (201-18446)

4. On 29 August 1932, ISAACS gave notice to the American Consulate General in Shanghai of his intended marriage to (Miss) Viola ROBINSON, an American citizen born 10 June 1910 in New York City. Miss ROBINSON arrived in Shanghai on 26 August 1932 from Vancouver, Canada, aboard the S.S. "Empress of Asia", and was in possession of American passport 382046 issued in New York on 14 May 1931. The wedding was held on 14 September 1932 at the American Consulate General. Miss ROBINSON was believed to

NEE

DPOB→

Δ CHINA

201-18446

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201-18446

SECRET

have been connected with Communist activities in the United States and China. Correspondence between ISAACS and Miss ROBINSON prior to their marriage, indicates that they were both sympathetic to activities being conducted by the Communists in China. On 2[illegible] November 1932, Miss ROBINSON was entrusted by Mr. Jacob Lana [illegible], the [illegible] defense attorney, with teaching the English language to Jimmy [illegible], the four-year old son of Hilaire and Gertrude NOULENS.

5. On 4 April 1936, ISAACS, under the pseudonym of LO SEN, published an article in the New Militant, organ of the Socialist Workers' Party in New York, entitled "Stalintern Ready to Embrace Chiang Kai-shek --- Offer Red Army in Return for Resurrection of the Disastrous 1927 Bloc." It is believed that ISAACS later joined the Fourth International, organized by Trotsky subsequent to the latter's exile from Russia.

6. During World War II ISAACS was a war correspondent for Newsweek in China. In July 1945 he was refused entry into China by Chinese Nationalist authorities, presumably as a result of anti-Nationalist articles written by ISAACS for Newsweek.

7. Harold Robert ISAACS is currently Special Features Editor for Newsweek, 152 West 42nd Street, New York, New York. He is the author of several books, including No Peace In Asia and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. ISAACS' current political beliefs are unknown to this Agency.

8. Should ISAACS leave this country, this Agency would appreciate being advised of his intended destination, date of departure and any other pertinent details.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director

SO DB-20568

cc Federal Bureau of Investigation

PF
bdo

REGISTRY COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Shanghai Municipal Police Files. American Citizesns Suspected of Commie Connections.	2. RI FILE NO. 16-7-24-7y 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ZCSA-746 4. DATE 24 Feb. 49 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST James Y E. Plaugher 6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov . 1963	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE [illegible]	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Para. 17

Harold "obert Isaacs was born in New Y rk City on 3 Sept. 1910 and held USA passport 177026. He was the editor and Publisher of the China Forum. a Shanghai Communist periodical first published in 1932: the secretary of the Nuolens Defense Committee; a member of the Shahghai branch of society of Friends of the USSR and of China League for Civil Rights. He arrived in Shanghai from Manila in Dec. L930 and worked for Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, swithing after a few weeks to the China Press ehere he was employed until ,931 (May). In June 1931 Isaacs took a trip up the Yangtze with . Erank Glass, a Brigish Communist and suspected Third International agent. A ~~lxxxxxx~~ x letter wiritten by Isaacs to his fiance, Viola Robinson stated that he was turning "Red" as a result of conversations with GLASS. Ather atatements indicated athat Miss Robinson an American then in Germany, was an active member of the communits Party. Isaacs used the pseddonym of Lo Sen and published in the Mew Militantm organ of the New York Dist. Workers Party, an attack on Stalin entitled Stalintern Ready to Embrace Chiang Kai shek. In 1949 Isaacs was in the employ of the ?American magazine NEWSXXXX, New York City, as special projects editor.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-48)

X-2 BRANCH
REPORT

ZCS-1811

Report No.	Date	Period Covered	[illegible]

Subject

Status

Classification

References

Source:

Details:

REGISTRY COPY

B375C

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT 404-A
STRATEGIC SERVICE UNIT
BATAVIA, JAVA

SN: ZM2477

REPORT NO: ZB-10 REPORT DATE: 8 Dec 45

TO : CAPT. BLUECHELL, ATTN: LT BARKETTE INFO DATE : 7 Dec 45

FROM : GRABILL NO. PAGES : 2

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW BETWEEN MR. HAROLD ISAACS,
MR. CHARLES TAMBU, AND MR. DIAH.

SOURCES: Mr. Harold Isaacs, correspondent for Newsweek magazine.
Mr. Charles Tambu, Malaya born Tamil, formerly employed on Singapore newspapers, newscaster for Singapore radio, English-speaking announcer on Batavia Radio during occupation, and presently editor of newspaper Independent.
Mr. Diah, editor of Merdeka, nationalist newspaper, Batavia.

EVALUATION: B-3, except as noted.

The subject interview was held at the request of Mr. Isaacs in line with his desire to talk with leading figures of Indonesian nationalist movement who held no official government position.

CIRCULATION OF MERDEKA

Asked about present circulation of MERDEKA, Mr. Diah replied with the following; MERDEKA is the largest Indonesian newspaper on the island of Java. At present it is printed only in Batavia, with a daily total circulation of about 18,000 copies. Of this number, approximately 6,000 copies are sent out of the city by train to Bandoeng, Soerakarta, and Djokjakarta, leaving a Batavia circulation of between 10,000 and 14,000 copies. Source expressed the opinion that while the Indonesian population of Batavia is in the neighborhood of 500,000 persons, the literacy rate is perhaps only twenty percent of this figure. Thus, he admitted, MERDEKA is probably reaching less than four percent of the total Indonesian population of Batavia, despite the fact that Batavia is probably the most literate area on the island of Java because of concentration here of all the governmental functions, prewar and present.

When questioned as to why his circulation was so inconsistent with the potential reading population, source replied that he was handicapped by lack of paper. He expressed the opinion that a circulation of 50,000 would be assured, and a circulation of as high as 100,000 possible, were sufficient paper available. At the present rate of consumption, he estimates that sufficient paper is on hand from prewar stocks to continue publication of MERDEKA for one year.

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CONFIDENTIAL

THE INDEPENDENT

On December 7, 1945, the MERDEKA press commenced publication of a daily English language newspaper entitled INDEPENDENT. The masthead of this paper states also that it incorporates the INDONESIAN NEWS BULLETIN, a former English language newspaper published by ANTARA news agency.

The INDEPENDENT is at present being edited by Mr. Tambu, with some assistance from Mr. Diah, and using the paper and facilities of MERDEKA.

The first issue of INDEPENDENT was remarkable only for its avoidance of any discussion of local affairs, only two articles having anything whatsoever to do with Java. Questioned about this, Tambu admitted that, while his ultimate ambition was to reach foreign and troop (British) readers, he was hesitant about entering headlong into discussion of local affairs and the Nationalist cause, because, (C-3), the British are unfavorably disposed towards MERDEKA already, and would use his venture as an excuse to confiscate the entire printing plant, were he too openly partisan in his early issues. Within a week or two he hopes to be secure enough in his position to start laying more stress on local news and editorials.

The first issue of INDEPENDENT was printed in 400 copies, most of which were given away, although the stated price is 1 Japanese guilder the copy.

27 March 1945

To: Lieutenant Colonel ROGER A. PFAFF

From: John I. Coddington

Subject: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS

Mr. GEORGE N. KATES of OSS, R&A, has just returned to the United States from Chungking. He reached Washington yesterday. He claims to have known HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS quite well in Chungking, and has the following observations to make concerning Mr. ISAACS:

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS is about 35 years of age. He attended Columbia University, and received the degree of A.B. there in 1930. He is the son of an orthodox Jewish merchant, who is very wealthy, and who has always supported HAROLD, even though he did not approve of the radical views that HAROLD expressed in the 1930's.

HAROLD went to China immediately after graduation from Columbia, partly, atleast, out of a desire to see strange parts of the world and to experience "adventure." He went out by way of Hawaii, and stowed away for part of the voyage -- either between San Francisco and Honolulu, or between Honolulu and Shanghai -- Mr. KATES does not remember which. Anyway, this was part of the "adventure."

In China, HAROLD met a South African named FRANK GLASS, who was an "intellectual" and a very interesting person. GLASS was a Leftist, but not at all a Communist. HAROLD took a trip up the Yangtse with GLASS in 1930 or 1931. At about this time, HAROLD became a convert to Trotskyism, partly, at least, under GLASS's influence. He felt that "suffering humanity" required a "revolution" to set things straight. Communism was too organized, and HAROLD was a complete individualist, and reacted strongly against the organizational set-up of Communism, and so espoused Trotskyism.

He returned to Shanghai from the western part of China, and went to work for

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS, continued

THE HAVAS News Agency. Shortly after this, in Shanghai, he married VIOLA ROBINSON, who was, like HAROLD, a wide-eyed intellectual. This marriage probably took place in 1932. VIOLA was a great friend of AGNES SMEDLEY, the author of the Battle Hymn of China and of other books dealing with the Chinese Revolution.

An organization called the China League for Civil Rights was formed about 1932. YANG CH'IEN was the head of this for Central China, and Dr. HU SHIH (later Chinese Ambassador to Washington) was the head of it for North China. YANG was at that time Secretary-General of the Academia Sinica. YANG was soon assassinated by the Blue Shirts (at that time CHIANG KAI-SHEK's bodyguard). HAROLD ISAACS had been an enthusiastic member of the China League for Civil Rights, and in the atmosphere of turmoil, after the killing of YANG, when all leftists were under attack by the Kuomintang, HAROLD became the editor and publisher of the China Forum, a magazine that published a number of controversial articles. The magazine was protected by the fact that the editor was an American, and therefore had extra-territorial rights. Yet the magazine was regarded as a "thorn in the flesh" by Mr. CUNNINGHAM, who was at that time American Consul-General in Shanghai. There were various controversies -- the printing shop was broken up by Kuomintang strong-arm men; the mails were refused to the magazine; but he continued publication for some time, and smuggled the copies out to the subscribers.

In 1933 or 1934, ISAACS had a fight with AGNES SMEDLEY. It was an ideological fight, and therefore especially bitter. ISAACS and his wife left Shanghai after this, and moved to Peking. There he acquired a Chinese translator named LIU, and there he settled down to write his book, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. This book "nails the Stalinists to the mast" and shows that they were messing around with a situation in China which they did not understand. Very many people who have read the book consider it excellent.

The book was completed, and ISAACS and his wife returned to the United States about April or May 1935. Immediately after this, ISAACS made a rapid trip to Oslo, Norway, to see his hero, LEON TROTSKY, who was living there at that time. It was on this occasion that he must have undertaken to translate TROTSKY's book, Whither France ? ISAACS then returned to New York, and went to work for the HAVAS News Agency once more.

At some time in the late 1930's, he became interedted in New York politics, and he worked hard for NORMAN THOMAS.

By 1940, however, he became disgusted with New York politics, and became interested in the war, and in "bourgeois life." He and his wife had a baby at about this time (their first), and ISAACS found he could write radio scripts and get good money for them. Up to 1940, he had been living chiefly off his father, but from 1940 on, he began to make money. In 1942, he did a "Report to the Nation" for CBS.

Soon after this, he joined the Staff of News-Week, and in 1944 was sent to Chungking by that magazine. There must have been a certain amount of trouble in convincing the Chinese Central Government that ISAACS had really changed since the old days in Shanghai; but this convication was evidently accomplished, or ISAACS would not have received permission from the Chinese Government to go to China.

ISAACS is a very smart man indeed. He knows a lot about China, and he knows a lot about people in general. Moreover, he is a great deal "smoother" and more diplomatic now than he was ten years ago.

13 March 1945

To: Lieutenant Colonel ROGER A. PFAFF

From: John I. Coddington J.I.C.

Subject: HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS

ISAACS, Harold Robert

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS is now the correspondent of Newsweek magazine in China. His headquarters are in Chungking, but he evidently travels to Kunming, Kweiyang, and other places in the course of his duties. He seems to have arrived in China in his present capacity during the summer of 1944, probably in July.

Subject was born in 1910, and is a member of a wealthy family. He became a firmly convinced Trotskyist in his youth, and remained one till the time of PearlHarbor. He is now regarded as a renegade by his former Trotskyist colleagues, because he has disavowed the principles of world revolution, turned away from Trotsky's teachings, and since 1939 has been writing patriotic propaganda for the United States Government.

He went to China about 1930, and wrote two books dealing with Chinese politics, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction (1932), and The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (1938). Both of these volumes expressed the author's Trotskyist point of view. The first was published in Shanghai, and the second in London. Neither was ever published in the United States, and ISAACS said that the Stalinist Communists were so powerful in this country that they were able to prevent the publication of the Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution here. This book received high praise from many serious students of Far Eastern affairs, including G.F. Hudson, Fellow of All Souls College at Oxford, and author of The Far East in World Politics, who said that ISAACS' book was the best one ever written on the Chinese Revolution. Hudson is now an official of the British Ministry of Information.

ISAACS' non-Communist and non-Trotskyist friends say that even during the

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height of his Trotskyist career, ISAACS never accepted money from the group. He was always open and above-board, and never engaged in any conspiracies to overthrow established government. He was attracted to the movement, they say, by sheer idealism.

For a time in China, ISAACS lived with Tillman DURDIN, the China correspondent of the New York Times, who was then the managing editor of the China Press. ISAACS returned to the United States in the late 1930's, and was for a time employed by the havas News Agency, until the fall of France in 1940. In 1943, he was employed by Newsweek magazine in Washington, D.C., and resided at 4938 Newport Avenue, Freiddship Heights.

Publications

(a) Books

Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction (Shanghai, China Forum Publishing Co., 1932), 136 pp. Library of Congress Call No.: DS 777.47.C45

The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (London, Secker & Warburg, 1938) 501 pp. Library of Congress Call No.: DS 774.I7

(b) Translations

Lev Trotskii (Leon Trotsky), Whither France, translated by John G. Wright and Harold R. Isaacs (New York, Pioneer Publishers, 1936). Library of Congress Call No.: DC 398.T7

(c) Articles in Periodicals

"Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution: a Marxist View," Pacific Affairs, vol. 8, pp. 269-283, Sept. 1935.

"Job by Experts," Newsweek, p. 30, 7 Aug. 1944.

"Surprising the Japs," Newsweek, pp. 35-36, 7 Aug. 1944.

"Blowing the Top," Newsweek, pp. 45-6, 4 Sept. 1944.

"Last night in Kweilin," Newsweek, pp. 31-32, 25 Sept. 1944.

HAROLD ROBERT ISAACS, continued

"One Man's Fight against Corruption: the Story behind the Stilwell Incident," Newsweek, p. 44, 13 Nov. 1944

"Troupers of the CBI," Newsweek, p. 100, 13 Nov. 1944

"Ignorant Men and Modern Weapons: Inside Story of the Chinese Army," Newsweek, p. 44, 20 Nov. 1944

"Death for Kweiyang," Newsweek, p. 36, 18 Dec. 1944

"Dorn of the Salween," Newsweek, pp. 26-27, 1 Jan. 1945

"First Truck to Kunming," Newsweek, p. 34, 29 Jan. 1945

"Ting Hao: Shouts of Welcome met First Convoy to Kunming," Newsweek, pp. 35-36, 12 Feb. 1945

Bibliography

SI Files #25,443: 6 October 1943

Books and Periodicals in Library of Congress

14-00000

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16 402

[illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

10 March 1945

#78324

To	Major General William J Donovan
From	John C Hughes
Subject	Harold R Isaacs

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I asked Mr DeVecchi of this office to check with Alan Grover, Vice President of "Time and Life". One of the men with whom Grover works very closely knows Isaacs intimately. In this man's opinion, Isaacs is a very solid and substantial citizen, knowledgable, hard working and an able correspondent of good character. He states that he has recently had occasion to communicate with Isaacs and that his address is:

Harold R Isaacs
War Correspondent
U.S.F. CT
APO 627
c/o Postmaster, New York

JCH
J C Hughes

[illegible] 221

[illegible]

~~[illegible] 221~~

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

H Hughes

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1945

File
X78278

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR. SPENCER PHENIX

FROM: ROBERT DeVECCHI aov

Alan Grover, Vice-President of TIME, LIFE, at my request checked with one of the men in his organization who knows Harold R. Isaacs personally.

He told Mr. Grover that Mr. Isaacs, in his opinion, is a very solid and substantial citizen, knowledgable, hard working, good character, and an able correspondent.

Mr. Isaacs can be reached at the following address:

HAROLD R. ISAACS
War Correspondent
U.S.F. CT
APO 627
c/o Postmaster New York, N.Y.

NY-SI-Pers-3
f/4 Box 1

201-18446

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Various reports and newspapers clippings relating to operations.

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. China CLA-OP-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP-D-5760 "Box 203

4. DATE 26 Aug. 35

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JEP

6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxx 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THE NORTH-CHINA Daily NEWS Saturday 6 July 35

~~Mr. Harold R. Isaacs~~, an American and Publisher of the communist Publication "China Forum. YUAN Hsueh editor of the chinese section. of the "China Forum.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
VICTOR MUSSIK's visit to AMOY.	3. RI FILE NO.	CHINA CIA OP-1		
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. D 4429		4. DATE 26 Jan. 34	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	

5. ANALYST JEP	6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Dec. 63	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxx	12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The Japanese Consular Authorities at Amoy are of the belief that H. R. Isaacs went Amoy between Dec. 24 xx1933 and Jan 3, 1934, under the name of Victor Mussik, the local Jananese authorities, therefore, request for infc regarding the movements of Victor Mussik during the afore mentioned period to ascertain if He actually visited amoy during this period

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18448

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Attack on Bookstores

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. China-cia-op-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMP--5454-8 box 200

4. DATE 21 Dec 33

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JAMES E. Plaugher

6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Nov. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE XXXXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The second incidenh was seen in the entry by persons unknown on the night of November 14 of premises of the Lev el Printing Co., incorporated in New York printers and publisher of the "China Forum" a bi-lingual magazine under the ~~at~~ editorship of an American named Harold R. Isaacs, which has dicided communistic sympathies.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-18446

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DISTRICH KUOMINTANG ISSUES SECRET ORDER FOR ANTI JAPANESE MOVEMENT.

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. CHINA-CIN-OP-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 4685&SMPD 4685c Box 193

4. DATE 22 July 33

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST JAMES. E. Plaugher

6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Dec. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

The transportation of the China Rorum has already been prohibited by the Nanking Govt. because the magazine had been publishing propaganda for the reds as well as attacks on the National bovt, that the publisher being an American citized named Isaac the measures taken against the peper had no effect. This time a strong protest will bw lodged with the American Consulate against Isaac.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-18446

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-60)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
List of correspondents in Shanghai	2. RI FILE NO. CIHINA-CIA CP
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 4528
	4. DATE 23 Feb. 33
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST JPE	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Dec. 63	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XXXX 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

among the correspondents listed one H.R. ISAACS (American) address 509 Embankment Apartments. Repr. of the HAVAS News Agency.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Copy of report by D. S. PITTS
Copy of China Workers' Correspondence,
Addressed to Harold R. Isaacs

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. CHINA CIA OP1
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. SMPD 2713 BOX-179
4. DATE 10 Nov. 32
5. ANALYST JEP
6. DATE PROCESSED 23 Dec. 63
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE xxx
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

This document contains numerous references to Hanold R. Isaacs and his wife. For further information the interested parties are requested to see the document itself due to bulky nature the poor quality of paper reporduction is virtually impossible.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-15446

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: NEW YORK"NATION"

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.: CHINA-CIA-OP-1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.: SMPD 4014

4. DATE: 17 Sept 32

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM:

8. DATE OF INFO.:

9. EVALUATION:

5. ANALYST: JAMES E. Plaigher

6. DATE PROCESSED: 3 Dec. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN:

11. DATE:

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE: XXXX

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.:

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

In contimuation of a previous report on the subject of the New York "Nation", I have to state that further efforts to pu rchase this publication have proved successful, and I attach herewith three copies, respectively dated July 6, Aug. 10 and Aug. 24,1932.

From a cusory perusual of these editions, the "Nation"s political policy appears to bd a socialistic nature, openly professing oppositon to the Republican and Democratic doctrines prevailing throughout the United States, and advocating support for the Cocialist Party's candidate--Norman Thomas at the forth coming Presidetial elections.

Further articles appearing in these editions are nothing more nor less that scurrilous attacks on the Republican President of The USA.-Herbert Hoover.

Harold R. Isaacs mailing list has been carefully persudd, but no mention is made of the "Nation" or any of the Poeple connected with it.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-18446

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 8-57

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(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: John M. Murray

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.: CHINA-CIA op 1

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.: SMP-D 3703

4. DATE: 2 June 32

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM:

8. DATE OF INFO.:

9. EVALUATION:

5. ANALYST: JEP

6. DATE PROCESSED: 3 Dec. 63

10. DISSEMINATED IN:

11. DATE:

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

xxxxx 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

During the Summer of 1932 Murray is known to have been associated with the following local communist sympathizers: H.R. ISAACS.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

D-6628

POLICE REGISTRY.
File No. S.B. 6[illegible]

SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL POLICE.

Special Branch S.5. D ~~xxxx~~

REPORT

Date April 4, 1935.

Subject The New International - Extract.

~~[illegible]~~

SMPD-6628

Made by and Forwarded by D.S.I. Golder.

Magazine [illegible] by [illegible] returned to [illegible] [illegible]

I forward herewith as directed by the D. C. Special Branch 12 copies of an extract from "The New International", a Communist propaganda organ published in New York, U.S.A.

Em Golder
D. S. I.

D. C. (Special Branch).

S2,

Please let me know what has happened to *Isaacs. Is he still detained by the Chinese Police at Peking?

D.S. Larson
4/4/35.

* See File D 2713/36

200-7-212-1

18446

EXTRACT FROM THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1934 (PUBLISHED IN NEW YORK).

I Break with the Chinese Stalinists

To the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: The two-year period of my extra-organizational collaboration with the Chinese Communist party has come to an end and the China Forum which I founded and edited during that time has been forced to suspend publication. In the interest of our whole movement as well as in my personal interest, I consider it necessary to record here and publish the history of the China Forum and the circumstances of its suspension.....

XXXXX

From almost the very beginning of my active work - which I date from the time I began reporting events in China in a communist way - a number of questions presented themselves to me in increasingly forcible form. These arose originally from my discovery of the gross distortions and exaggerations which I found to be characteristic of communist propaganda in China and abroad. I define propaganda as the skillful, clear, accurate and wholly truthful reporting of the facts linked to an incisive, purposive interpretation and a plan of action for dealing with the facts in a revolutionary way. I learned this from the life and work of Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades who taught us that the truth comes from the masses themselves and that only disaster can result from telling them lies. I have never learned to the contrary that it was my revolutionary duty to work in any other way, although I soon found that the present-day Communist party press makes a practise of distinguishing between propaganda and truth.

Examples of exaggeration and distortion most striking to me were naturally those which applied to China, because here I could check allegations with known facts. I first wrote these down to the ignorance or incapacity of individuals. I felt that communist editors abroad would publish accurate facts about China if they could get them. Accordingly with a friend I tried to set up an independent mail news service and sent weekly bulletins to papers all over the world giving brief, sharp, factual accounts of what was going on. This was in the fall of 1931 after my return from the area of the great Central China floods of that summer. I scarcely understood then why this service failed to secure any response from the communist press abroad. After about three months I had to suspend it for lack of support. It simply didn't get published except in a few organs which were not official Communist party papers, including the New York Militant.

It wasn't long before I began to perceive, with a deeper study of international events and the history of the Chinese revolution, that a consistent thread ran through the distortions and exaggerations which I found not only in brief casual reports of current events but in the solemn pronunciamentoes made by delegates before plenums of the E.C.C.I. I discovered that these departures from the truth were made necessary by the official premise that ever since the catastrophe of 1927 a mighty, upsurging revolutionary movement has been marching forward in China to the very brink of seizure of power under the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. I discovered that these exaggerations were necessary because the premise was false and along with it all the basic tenets of the politics being pursued by the Communist International and the Communist party in China. I cannot begin here to give a summary of some of these distortions (which I verbally cited to you by the dozen), ranging from particular incidents (the wilfully false picture given of the cotton mill strike in Shanghai in January 1932, even to the point of transposing it to February to heighten the impression given of the workers' role in the Shanghai war) to high-flown generalizations like the statement recently made before the plenum of the E.C.C.I. that the C.C.P. has "won over the majority of the Chinese working class and the peasantry".....

In denying the presence of a mighty revolutionary upsurge (i.e., a vast organized march toward the seizure of power), I respect facts made still clearer perhaps when compared to the facts and figures of the monster mass movements of the 1925-27 period. The tragic errors of the communist leadership in 1927 were primarily responsible for the decapitation of that great movement and because no lessons have been drawn from these events to this very day, these errors, monstrously accumulated, are still responsible for the tragedies of today. But for the purposes of our comparison here, let us take for example the single fact that in 1926 in Greater Shanghai there were 257 strikes. In 1932 there were 82. Let us remember that on the eve of the workers' seizure of power in Shanghai in March, 1927, there were more than 800,000 workers, handicraftsmen and petty traders out on the streets fighting with arms in hands for demands of a far-reaching political character. A close check for the entire country in the latter half of 1933 showed me that less than one-thirtieth of that number were engaged in strikes and other disputes during any given month and that almost invariably the demands were defensive demands against wage cuts and lockouts. Moreover, the lack of cohesive leadership - often in departments of the same factory or in one or more of a group of factories - or even sometimes lack of even the most elementary organization - has in almost every case led to deadening failure and relatively easy betrayal by the yellow "labor leaders" and "mediators" of the Kuo Min Tang. In 1925 the shooting of thirteen students by British police in Shanghai was the touch-off for a general strike which paralyzed the city and which was seconded by vast sympathy strikes which broke like a series of tidal waves over the entire country. In January 1932, when the Japanese imperialists used the Shanghai International Settlement as a base for operations which cost the lives of tens of thousands of Chinese, not a single strike interrupted the normal course of the public or other services in that settlement. In the factories there were no strikes but a large scale lockout to which the overwhelming majority of Shanghai's workers submitted without protest....

In the case of the widespread but isolated and individual cases of peasant uprisings, and this includes the Red armies in Kiangsi, these struggles await the leadership of a strong working class movement before they can have a successful issue. The Red armies in their restricted and surrounded areas and with their meagre resources have fought heroically against the Kuomintang attacks upon them. But until the Kuo Min Tang is shaken from its bulwarks in the imperialist-controlled working class centers, their prospect of revolutionary triumph remains necessarily dim. No revolutionary purpose is served by taking refuge in the fiction that these armies have proletarian leadership because individual workers, undoubtedly leaders of superior quality and courage, have been torn from their factories and from their fellow workers and sent down to occupy key positions in the Red army districts and in the Red armies themselves. Indeed, this common practise of extracting the most conscious and progressive working class elements from their working class environment and sending them down to the Red districts is a good index to the criminal transposition of emphasis which has helped paralyze the working class movement in the cities. If the White Terror doesn't carry off the workers' leaders as they arise, the C.P. does and has done so in hundreds of cases. This helps in no small part to explain why it has also been impossible to mobilize a genuine mass anti-Japanese movement in the face of military aggression and why the White Terror of the Kuo Min Tang has succeeded, by filling mass graves and innumerable prisons with the martyred dead and living, in downing the anti-imperialist movement or efforts toward the organization of such a movement and paving the way for the ever-increasing encroachments of the imperialists. The party has not yet gripped and directed the deep and bitter and often inarticulate hatred of the masses of the people for their oppressors and this includes large sections of the lower petty bourgeoisie who could be won by successful mass pressure from below. This is because they party has failed to translate the realities of everyday events into its program and tactics.....

x x x x x

But precisely because at all costs I desired to carry on the Forum's open struggle against the common enemy - against the Kuo Min Tang and the imperialists - I sedulously avoided bringing these issues into the columns of the paper, increasingly against my better judgment. I leaned over far backward in this respect. This expressed itself in many of the current issues with which we had to deal.

I ask you to recall the whole uphill fight which the Forum waged on behalf of Paul and Gerturd Ruegg in the spring and summer of 1932 during which time I repeatedly warned against the emphasis which was being placed on the "legal" aspects of the case and the "negotiations" with the Kuo Min Tang to the detriment of mass pressure and the capitalization of the case for political purposes. You paid lip service to the need for mass pressure - particularly here in China - but in fact the "legalities" and futile negotiations remained the major pillars of the defense. Until in the very end I finally rebelled, I wasn't even permitted to give Ruegg his honorable and rightful title - secretary of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat! Yet although I felt the struggle for the Rueggs was being seriously handicapped by the tactics being pursued, I carried on the fight with all the energy at my command and you will recall that it was I who created the local defense committee and was chiefly responsible for the widespread press propaganda campaign and the considerable sympathy which we aroused. Yet the strictly non-political attitude which Ruegg was forced to assume at the trial (in contrast to the highly political attitude of his prosecutors!) was in my opinion one of the major reasons for the fate to which he and his wife were condemned.

I ask you to recall the whole period of the organization and activities of the China League for Civil Rights, from December 1932 to June 1933, in which I took an active part. I gave full play to this hybrid League and its work without once publishing the basic criticisms which I often voiced to you and which in the end were wholly confirmed by what happened after the Kuo Min Tang murdered Yang Chien in June that year. I ask you to recall the views I set forth in August and September 1933, on the subject of the "Anti-War Congress" which at your specific request I did not publish. Instead, to my regret, I published the foul rot of Marley & Co. without freely giving play to the true facts about that farcical junket which had convinced me that the policies which gave it birth do not one single whit advance the international struggle against imperialist war.

On one occasion - and this at least I can take comfort in - I passively resisted when you requested me to write and publish a slanderous attack on Chen Du Hsiu when he was condemned to 13 years imprisonment by the Kuo Min Tang. Your request was specific. I was not to deal with the issues which had brought Chen Du Hsiu from being the leader of the C.P. in 1927 to being leader of the Chinese Opposition in 1933. I was only to string together a vile series of labels in an effort to explain why the Kuo Min Tang even imprisoned the leader of the Left Opposition. As you know, that attack was never written or published.

Again in December 1933, upon my return from Fukien, you specifically demanded that I set aside the results of my own personal investigations in Foochow in order to write on your behalf (but over my signature!) an utterly baseless and slanderous attack on the Left Opposition. You will recall that you charged at that time that the "Trotskyists" were prominently identified with the new government set up in Fukien by Chen Ming-shu and Tsai Ting-kai. You lumped the Left Opposition with the Third Party and the socalled Social Democrats among the petty bourgeois satellites of the Fukien militarists. It was as much to satisfy myself on this very point as to perform a mission for you, that I went down to Foochow and spent two weeks there and learned through direct contact with dozens of people prominently concerned that the Left Opposition was stoutly and clearly opposed to the Foochow regime. I haven't place here to discuss the relations of the C.P. to the short-lived Fukien government or the character of the "negotiations" which were going on down there. The important thing here is that on my return you demanded that I write slanders which flew in the face of everything I myself had learned. It is interesting, as a side-light on your methods in factional strife as you conceive it, that your representative in Foochow sent back a report, through me, ironically enough, that one of the most prominent of the youthful pseudo-radicals in Foochow, Wu Cui-yuen to be exact, was a leading "Trotskyist". It so happened that I had met and had several lengthy interviews with Wu and by the time I left Foochow I understood his position and his personality exceedingly well. He was as much a Trotskyist as Mei Lan-fang is! Yet you actually demanded that I ignore my own knowledge of the man and in my article on Fukien set him down as a "Trotskyist". I was faced on the one hand by your demands that I write falsehoods to suit your policies and on the other by my deep desire to set forth the actual facts about the Opposition's attitude toward the Fukien regime. But once more, to preserve the shreds of our relationship, I drove a middle course and did neither, leaving the whole question out of my article.

Nevertheless, abruptly in January of this year you forced an ultimatum upon me and subsequently forced the break in our relationship because I could not and would not, at your demand, devote the China Forum to policies which I could not and do not believe compatible with the interests of the Chinese revolution and the international proletarian revolution. I could not, at your demand, set aside the convictions to which I had literally been driven by the stinging lash of catastrophic events in China, Germany and the world over. Particularly my deep interest in Chinese events during the last three years made it impossible for me, finally, to give active support to policies and tactics whose disastrous effects were being a thousandfold confirmed for me by the tragic events of every swiftly-passing day. I could not ignore questions which strike at the roots of our work and the whole structure of our hopes for a revolutionary future.

Despite the fact that these questions are rocking the entire International today, you denied my right to raise them in print. You demanded more. You demanded that I attack anybody who did so - primarily the people you call "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists" - the only people who are facing these problems today in a fearless, revolutionary way ! You demanded that the China Forum become a stereotype for the policies and vulgar factional slanders which I could neither then nor now be party to. In reply to my questions on China you simply quoted back at me the lies and half-lies I've been so used to reading in Inprecorr. You even declared: "For propaganda purposes a certain amount of exaggeration is necessary...." and went on amazingly to say: "but we know the ture facts and we base our policies on them, not on these exaggerations!" A new slant on modern-day C.I. tactics! Facts, you say, are curious things. They have to be turned around and around and around, and examined closely until their true nature becomes apparent. The trouble is you turn them so far and so quickly that they turn into something like a dizzily turning top of fancy - or at best wish-fulfilling misrepresentations.

To my questions on Germany you quoted Heckert, Piatnitsky and the E.C.C.I.'s famous resolution declaring that the collapse of the German party and the slaughter of the German workers were based on the past, present and future correct policies of the C.P.G.! You declared I had no right to offer critical comment on the dangerously opportunistic foreign and domestic policies of the U.S.S.R. most notably on the entry of the U.S.S.R. on a straight nationalist basis into the disgusting corridors of imperialist intrigue. To the contrary, I was livingly, fawningly to fondle and hail the policies which have meant disaster in China, Germany and elsewhere and are rapidly leading the U.S.S.R. into the vacuum of nationalist isolation from the world-wide proletarian movement. This I was to do, to begin with, by publishing Stalin's face on the front page and columns of the customary penegyrics to his infallibility. Above all and before all, I was to take up cudgels against "counter-revolutionary Trotskyism". That was to be the main point of my reformation - to raise no questions myself and slander anybody else who did so.

In reply to your demand that I submit to an editorial board in order that these editorial policies should be effectively put into practise, I offered (1) to continue publication strictly as before, meanwhile arguing out my differences with you in discussions on the side: (2) to throw the columns of the Forum open to a general discussion of all basic revolutionary questions, with free play to unorthodox as well as orthodox views. If your views were correct, I argued, it would be a distinct advantage to you to have such an opportunity to display their brilliance alongside the puny efforts of your critics; (3) to publish orthodox news and views but to reserve for myself the right to comment and criticise.

These repeated offers you repeatedly refused. You offered to discuss these questions with me verbally if in the meanwhile I threw the Forum open to your editorial board. My other proposals were unthinkable! Give the Forum's readers a chance to hear "counter-revolutionary" viewpoints ? Never that ! I could only display my revolutionary purity by acceding to your demands. We would talk things over until spring, when if all went well (i.e. if I showed a satisfactory adaptation to your viewpoint) I could pack up for an educational trip to the Soviet Union where I would certainly become convinced of the error of my ways. In other words, you wanted my signature on a promissory note with the amount left blank for you to fill in. You put this in the form of an ultimatum and you told me that if I did anything but accept I would forthwith enter the camp of the "counter-revolution".

I had to refuse these terms. I had to refuse to lend myself to a slanderous and baseless struggle against the International Left Opposition. I had to refuse to land space to the nauseatingly fawning praise of Stalin and uncritical reception of Stalinist policies which characterize the Communist party press the world over. I had to refuse to take shelter in the cold and draughty empty spaces which stretch behind the impressive facade and early traditions of the Communist International. I would like to go to the Soviet Union for a visit one day - but I had to refuse your offer on your terms. I had to refuse, in short, to become a hack prostitute in the name of the revolution.

In the end, too, I had to refuse to turn over to you the printing plant I had built up with so much pain and struggle because I considered it not your property but the property of the working class movement. Because I could not carry on the Forum myself, for lack of financial resources and because of heavy debts contracted, I disposed of the plant and turned every farthing of the proceeds over to where I now consider the true interests of our movement lie. It was with a deep and abiding bitterness that I had to see the Forum go down under the blows of those whom I had considered comrades, when for two years it had fought off all its many enemies on the outside.

Yet with it came the realization that we have to build anew over the ruins you have wrought. The revolution and the building of our future moves forward and when we trample down the defenses of our enemies we shall crush underfoot everything and everybody that stands in our way. No sycophantic, blind allegiance to a name, an empty facade, a torn and shredded prestige can lead us forward. Only unswerving fidelity to our goal and active struggle toward this end with the weapons of a correct and tested political line will lift us from defeat to ultimate victory. To this struggle I shall continue to dedicate all my energies.

Peiping, China, May 20, 1934.

Harold R. ISAACS.

ISAACS COUNTRIES

1931-1936 China(DFB 7864)

1954 Harold Robert Isaacs working MIT, Center for Internat'l Studies. (dossier)

"Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction", a 13[illegible] page pamphlet published in 1932 at Shanghai, lists ISAACS as Editor. The pamphlet consists of reprints of articles which appeared in the "China Forum" by "anonymous authors and collaborators". The pamphlet denounces the Kuomintang and CHIANG Kai-shek for alleged massacre of its political opponents, chiefly Communists, in order "that the bourgeoisie might continue to rule and the imperialists to draw their tribute from the capitalization of human misery". Chinese Communists are seen as the hope of the future. ISAACS continues to reside at 333 Central Park West, NYC, and is employed as free lance journalist, as of 12 May 53. DFB-27426.

ISAACS REFERENCES

Dossier
201-18446

Shanghai Muncipal Police Files, ZCS 138, Photo # 177. File 16-4-2-y5

DFB 1461, 11 May 1950. Agnes Smedley file, 201-414

DFB 7864, 28 Feb 1951. Enclosing info re Richard SORGE gathered from FBI interview with ISAACS in April 1950.

DFB 11880, 11 Sept 51, 201-6556-1 Presently living in NYC
DFB-15017, 15 Jan. 52; 201-6556-4; no new info.
DFB-14423, 20 Dec 1951, 201-[illegible]-1, Subj member of an Aid Committee to the Secy. of the Pan Pacific Trades Union Secretariat (NOULENS) in Shanghai along with Agnes SMEDLEY, Irene [illegible], J. POWELL, Edgar SNOW, Frank GLASS.
Shanghai Municipal Police Files, ZCS-1811, 16-4-2-37, 5 Feb 49.

DFB-[illegible]3, 14 August 1952, 201-[illegible]-1

DFB-14747, 8 Jan 1952, 201-[illegible]-1 re APPLEMAN, Morris Louis
DFB-27426- 12 June 53, 201-18446-4.

ISAACS, H

Probably Harold ROBERT

@ JACOB. FBI think that there is a possibility that the JACOB, an unidentified young Amer journalist in Shanghai in 1931, 32 who was a member of the SORGE network in China might possibly be identical with ISAACS. ISAACS himself has advised that he does not believe that he could have been the indiv to whom SORGE gave the covername JACOB (DFB 7864)

171

Addresses: May 1953 - 333 Central Park West, NYC.
DFB-27426.

(over)

(200-1211, 10-4-2-37, 5 Feb 59: Shanghai Municipal Pol Files.)

(over)

show anything on the guy so that [illegible] can — to them.— Collins called Parsell again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see Parsell tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some time. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at Hdqs Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in I&S

ISAACS

The July 30 1932 issue of the NY Times under a Shanghai dqteline of 29 July 1932, states that Harold R ISAACS, an American citizen was warned by the US Consul General in Shanghai that the US may withdraw its extra-Territorial rights and allow him to be tried in a Chinese court. ISAACS then the editor of the " China Forum," had violently attacked Chiang Kai Shek, calling him, among other things, " a butcher." The article further stated that ISAACS was an associate of Agnes SMEDLEY, a correspondent for American newspapers(DFB 1461)

Preceded the GRANICHES, as editor of"The Voice of China". Wrote an article "I Break With Stalinism".-which gave a candid elucidation of the Comm. financial backing of the "Voice of China". DCE-4385, 7 Feb. 52

One Harold Robert ISAACS was born 13 Sept 1910 ; 5'9" tall, med build, br eyes, & blach wavy hair brushed back. Born in NYC, Am citizen. Editor & publisher of the China Forum. Was secy of NOULENS Defense Committee & member of Society of Freinds of USSR Arrived in China from Manila on 10 Dec 30 & joined editorial staff of Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury. On 12 June 31, took trip on Yangtsze with C.F.GLASS, susp Sov agent, & wrote his fiancee he decided to turn "Red" as a result of talking with GLASS. The 2 returned in Aug & took up residence at #12S Weihaiwei Road. Started printing Forum later. Manager of Level Printing C., Inc in NY State & owned 40% of its shares. Employed with Havas News Agency. ISAACS married Miss Viola ROBINSON Sept 32. Lived in Apt 204, Embankment Bldg., Shanghai. In 3 Jan 34 Subj visited NOULENS who were on hunger strike in prison. Subj's parents arrived in Shanghai 14 Jan 34 & left 20 Feb for Marseilles. Subj. published art in New Militant, organ of NY Districts Worker's Party attacking STALIN. ISAACS was also lecturing on Japan, China, and USSR & War Crisis in Far East. (ZCS-1811, 16-4-2-37, 5 Feb 59: Shanghai Municipal Pol Files.)

([illegible])

show anything on the guy so that permission can-
to them. — Collins called Russell again to see if ISS would release
this info now. He will see Russell tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some more.
Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins
said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it.
Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in ISS

ISAACS, HAROLD O.G. 5237 **FE-1 Amstuts**

File in "Memo Chart" file

26 June 1951 - Memo dated 25 June to PT/CS requesting informational namecheck on subj. for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subj. is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities. See file for rest of memo.

14 Aug 51 - ~~Carroll~~ Ozorin (PT/CS) advised he may have poor info. on China. Keep away for time being. Amstutz not in. Notified F. Collins who is quite anxious to know. Wants to try to get Subj. and [illegible] where he is.

29 Aug 51 - Found Collins had been talking to Carroll & also been up to I&S. Carroll said bad info. Sorge Ring, Smedley et al. DO NOT TOUCH. - Notified Collins who said this isn't what he wants. Wants to get Isaacs eased out as [illegible] without betraying OPC interest.: Needs to know if House Records (Afon) show anything on the guy so that [illegible] can be referred to them. - Collins called Carroll again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see Carroll tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins had talked to Brewer about this some time. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in I&S

Confid Informant advised that Subj[illegible] in China in [illegible] as a correspondent for the mag
NEWSWEEK and was expelled from [illegible] because of [illegible] bitter attacks on the Nationalist Govt
of China in the [illegible]. According to Informant Subj thereafter traveled
to French Indochina and [illegible]
of the French Colonial Govt in Indochina. Informant also reported [illegible] severe criticism
of an independent movement led by HO CHI MINH, a former Comintern agent; this group desired [illegible] ardent supporter
only the independence of Indochina from the French and was non-Communist, according to propaganda,
but it received a great deal of help from local Communist forces and from Chinese Reds. Informant
further stated that in US Subj was member of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association which
Informant characterized as a propaganda outlet in US for the Viet Minh Movement. Subj has
advised that he was acquainted with Walter DURANTY, NY TIMES correspondent, in MOSCOW in early
1930s. Subj has advised that he is presently employed as a free lance writer.
DFP-16313

According to APPELMAN, Subj is author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" and
APPELMAN met Subj thru Alexander BUCHMAN; Subj wa the first editor of the CCP paper of which
APPELMAN lter was to become editor. DFB-14747
//
The book "New Cycle In Asia" by ISAACS, pub in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties and agreements among South Asian and Western powers during the perild of WW II and later. ISAACS supplies a brief editorial introduction to these taxts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "kKorea and American World Policy" appears in the August 7, 1950 issue of the "New Republic". The article advocates withdrawal of US support from French colonial forces in Indochina and recognition of Red China in hope of driving a wedge between Russia and Chinese Communists. DFB 25069, 12 March 1953, 201-18446-3.

ISAACS, HAROLD 0 [illegible] 5237 FE-1 Amstutz

File in "Name Check" file

26 June 1951 - Memo dated 25 June to PT/CS requesting informational namecheck on subj. for the purpose of determining the validity of charges that Subj. is sympathetic to and/or connected with Communist activities. See file for rest of memo.

14 Aug 51 - ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] (PT/CS) advised he may have poor info. on Subj. Keep away for time being. Amstutz not in. Notified F. Collins who is quite anxious to know. Wants to try to get Subj. and [illegible] where he is.

29 Aug 51 - Found Collins had been talking to Carroll & also been up to I&S. Carroll said bad info. [illegible], Smedley et al. DO NOT TOUCH. - Notified Collins who said this isn't what he wants. Wants to get [illegible] [illegible] out of foundation, without betraying OPC interest. ∴ Needs to know if House Records (Open) show anything on the guy so that foundation can be referred to them. - Collins called Carroll again to see if I&S would release this info now. He will see Carroll tomorrow.

11 Sept 51 - Collins has talked to Brewer about this some more. Brewer said Collins couldn't get at House Records. Collins said Brewer promised him report & he now wants it. Asked Brewer & found he hadn't seen file in I&S

Confid Informant advised that Subj was in China in 19[illegible] as a correspondent for [illegible] and was expelled from China because of his bitter attacks on the Nationalist Govt of China in the [illegible]. [illegible] Subj thereafter traveled to French Indochina [illegible] of the French Colonial Govt in Indochina. Informant also reported that Subj was ardent supporter of an independent movement led by the HO CHI MINH, a former Comintern agent; this group desired only the indep of Indochina from the French and was non-Communist, according to propaganda, but it recd a great deal of help from local Communist forces and from Chinese Reds. Informant further stated that in US Subj was member of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association which Informant characterized as [illegible] outlet in US for the Viet Minh Movement. Subj has advised that he was associated with Walter DURANTY, NY TIMES correspondent, in MOSCOW in early 1930s. Subj has advised that he is presently employed as a free lance writer. DFB-16313

According to APPELMAN, Subj is author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" and APPELMAN met Subj thru Alexander BUCHMAN; Subj was the first editor of the CCP paper of which APPELMAN later was to become editor. DFB-14747

~~New Cycle in Asia~~///

The book "New Cycle In Asia" by ISAACS, pub in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties and agreements among South Asian and Western powers during the perild of WW II and later. ISAACS supplies a brief editorial introduction to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "kKorea and American World Policy" appears in the August 7, 1950 issue of the "New Republic". The article advocates withdrawal of US support from French colonial forces in Indochina and recognition of Red China in hope of driving a wedge between Russia and Chinese Communists. DFB 25069, 12 March 1953, 201-18446-3.

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yet, called Collins to come up to OO/SP/SEC. to discuss, but he wasn't there. Brewer says cannot give info out if it is going to be passed on. If high level man involved in passing info., Col. Edwards' Office will have to give it out. Collins called Brewer & they made some arrangement.

13 Sept. - Brewer, Collins & I talked over case. Brewer told Collins that House files don't contain particularly derog. info. It is in other files tho, & Brewer refused to divulge info to Collins. Said that any contact with Ford Foundation must be made by high-level CIA man (like Dulles) and that Collins' man — ([illegible]) could not tell Ford Foundation anything about Subj. - Collins agreed & the case is considered CLOSED.

13 November 1951 - ~~Undated~~ 7 Nov. 51 memo from OO/OP advising that "under no circumstances should Subject be contacted with regard to possible use by this agency prior to receiving a final security determination by this office."
Copy to FG-1 Collins.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION
DATE: 26 Aug. 57
ACTION: ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM: FE/2/CE
ROOM NO.: 2507-J
TELEPHONE: 8574

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☒ NONSENSITIVE
201 NO. (1.): 18446
SOURCE DOCUMENT:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): ISAACS, Harold Robert
SEX (3.): M

NAME VARIANT
TYPE NAME (2.) (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title):

RECORD COPY

PHOTO (4.): ☐ YES ☒ NO
BIRTH DATE (5.): D ___ M ___ Y 10
COUNTRY OF BIRTH (6.):
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH (7.):
OTHER IDENTIFICATION (8.): 1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION: Correspondent of Newsweek magazine in China (1945)
OCC/POS. CODE (9.): NEWS

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:
PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (10.): CHIN ~~(1945)~~
ACTION DESK (11.): FE/2/CE
SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST (12.):
THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST (12a.):

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 18446

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
SIGNATURE: Shirley D. Gundlach

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

ISAACS, Harold Robert
√ = ISAAC, Harold

Westerners connected with the Far East
201-18446

INDIA

201-18446

[illegible]
8 July 1948

American war correspondent for Newsweek; arrived in New Delhi en route to China after [illegible] months vacation in USA, on [illegible] orders to return to [illegible] theatre; applied to [illegible] in China for permission to return to Chungking but was refused by Chungking government. [illegible] correspondent and news editor of New York Post also refused two weeks previously. In USA Isaacs wrote articles calling [illegible] government "govt in exile." Apparently new policy of blacklisting foreign journalists who write unfavorably to CHIANG govt.
________ jf

See also dossier: A [illegible] L. [illegible], memo to Col. [illegible] and [illegible]-244; dossier: [illegible] - [illegible], [illegible]-430 (now in [illegible] dossier).

Moscow agent; USA; Jewish; arrived in Shanghai Dec 1930, worked for Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, later for China Press (qv); as journalist often visited communist districts of China, actually as Communist agent (with Cecil GLASS, qv); active member of [illegible] (sic) Defense Committee; in close contact with Agnes SMEDLEY, other Soviet representatives; later married Lucy [illegible] (qv). See dossier: SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CHINA (1).
________ pfh

[illegible]-1000
London
16 Dec 1948
no eval.

US citizen; born 1910; came to Shanghai from Manila Dec 1930, joined Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury; few weeks later, worked for China Press, till May 1931 traveled up Yangtze with Frank GLASS, lived with him; Sept 1931 friendly with [illegible] and Agnes SMEDLEY; became editor of China Forum and worked with GLASS;

[illegible]-633
Shanghai
8 Oct 1947
B-3

over

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2. ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued)

1932 married Viola [illegible], reported active member of [illegible]; also reported to have married Lucy [illegible] in 1934 (probably confusion of names in reports).
________ jh

Classed as suspected Comintern agent. See SMP Files, [illegible]-301-23, rpt of 20 May 1933
________ wen

Has been in this country since 1947. Now (Feb 49) Special Features editor for Newsweek magazine. After communist phase in 20's and early 30's wrote a bitter and brilliant critique of Moscow direction of the Chinese Communist Party from 1926-28 (The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, London, 1938) from a Trotskyite viewpoint. Now claims to be completely disillusioned with the communist movement (Stalin or Trotsky branch). Lives in New York with wife and two children. wen
________ wen

Carried on SMP suspect list of foreign agents; see [illegible]-1811 in dossier: S.M.P. [illegible]; see also [illegible]-766, same dossier, for details.

For connection with Hilaire NOULENS, was, and the III rd International, Agnes SMEDLEY, et al, see following files: [illegible] — S.M.P. [illegible]
S.M.P. [illegible] ASSOCIATION — D.2527/34 and D.2527/40

See memo to FBI, prepared 25 August 49, subj.: Cecil Frank GLASS, was, in dossier: FBI CORRESPONDENCE — Cecil Frank GLASS.

In response to State Dept. name check, see memo to State and copy to FBI, prepared [illegible] Nov 49, in file CORRESPONDENCE with DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (continued)

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3 ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued) WESTERNERS CONNECTED WITH THE FAR EAST

See DB-6962, dated 15 December 1947 in Dossier: MISCELLANEOUS-OUTGOING.

See SO DB-24928, 31 May 1950, in Doss.: THIRD (COMMUNIST) INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL.
________ bde

See DFB-7864, FBI investigative report, 28 Feb. 1951 (IID).
________ bde

A Leading Trotskyite in Shanghai area in 1932 Doc in Reg.
________ bdm

DFB 10604 10 July 51
201-6783-1

Mentioned as having publicly broken with Communist backing of the "Voice of China" publication and having denounced such backing. As former editor of Shanghai newspaper in article for the Christian Science Monitor.
________ dr

DCT 4388
From Contacts Division;
7 Feb. 52 Doc in Reg.

Subject alleged to have been expelled from China in 1945 for attacking Nationalist Govt, and to have been an active propagandist for the Viet Minh Movement in Indochina. Alleged to have been on membership list of Viet Nam-American Friendship Association. Text of article by subject attacking French rule in Indochina set forth. Subject advised that he was acquainted with Walter DURANTY, "New York Times" correspondent in Moscow during early 1930s. List of persons and organizations corresponding with subject set forth. See ref. doc. in RI.
________ rdb

DFB-20343
14 Aug. 1952

(over)

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4. ISAACS, Harold Robert (cont'd)

DFB-14747
8 Jan. 1952

Author of "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution" whom Morris L. APPELMAN (qv) met through Alex BUCHMAN (qv) in Shanghai. Believed to be foreign correspondent for "News Week". First editor of CCP paper of which APPELMAN later was to become editor. See ref. doc. in RI.
________ boj

Patrick J. HURLEY advised that subject told him that John King FAIRBANKS (qv) is a Trotzkyite Communist. See ref. doc. in RI-201-19078.
________ rdb

DFB-21896
20 Oct. 1952

Subject's book, "No Peace for Asia", published 1947, summarized. See ref. doc. in RI 201-18446-2.
________ boj

DFB-22751
26 Nov. 1952

See DFB-24411, 11 Feb. 1953, subject: Ida TREAT (qv) (RI 201-6205-7).
________ boj

"New Cycle in Asia" by subject published in 1947 by the Institute of Pacific Relations as a collection of the official texts of various treaties & agreements among South Asian and western powers during the period of World War II and later. Subj. supplies a brief editorial introduction to these texts which is apparently non-political in nature. His article "Korea & American World Policy" appears in the Aug. 7, 1950 issue of "New Republic". See doc. in (RI).
________ lmm

DFB-25069
12 March 53

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5. ISAACS, Harold Robert (continued) WESTERNERS CONNECTED WITH THE FAR EAST

Editor of New Cycle in Asia; selected documents on major international developments in the Far East, 1943-1947. (1947). In dossier : CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1947 List.
________ wo

Author of No Peace for Asia (1947). In dossier: CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1947 List.
________ wo

Author of The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Rev. ed. In dossier : CHINA BIBLIOGRAPHY-1951 List.
________ wo

"Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction", a 136 page pamphlet published in 1932 at Shanghai, lists subject as editor. The pamphlet consists of reprints of articles which appeared in the "China Forum" by "anonymous authors and collaborators". The pamphlet denounces the Kuomintang and CHIANG Kai-shek for alleged massacre of its political opponents, chiefly Communists, in order "that the bourgeoisie might continue to rule and the imperialists to draw their tribute from the capitalization of human misery". Subject continues to reside at 333 Central Park West, NY, and is employed as a free lance journalist. See ref. doc. (RI).
________ lmm

DFB-27[illegible]
12 June 53

Subject's book "The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution", first published 1938 in Great Britain, issued in a revised edition 1951 by Stanford Univ. Press. Thesis of book is that revolution in China, 1925-1927, could have resulted in a democratic socialist state, but was perverted to serve the needs of Russian diplomacy. In revised edition subject stated his opinions have changed in intervening [illegible] and that the base of his view can be described as "democratic socialist". See doc. in (RI 201-18446-5).

DFB-29131
21 Aug 53

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6. ISAACS, Harold Robert

Subj is a writer and former Trotskyite. Stated that LIU, Tsun-ch'i (0491/1415/2759) was a Communist as early as 1933 in Peking, China and had worked for Tass News Agency in Peking after graduating from college and had even been sent to jail because of his communist activities.

An article by ISAACS "The Dimensions of the Crisis" in the "Saturday Review", 4 August 1951, states, "The Asian crisis is not created by Russian totalitarianism, but is exploited by it" and makes the point that revolt of colonial peoples in Asia is essentially nationalistic, that the U.S. should "move along with" and help guide these revolutions into democratic channels. His article "The Blind Alley of Totalitarianism" in "Annals of the American Academy", July 1951, states that past activities of the Western nations in Orient bred fear and hatred, were mainly responsible for rise of totalitarianism. In the "Saturday Review of Literature" of 14 July 1952, ISAACS reviewed "Journey to the Far Pacific" by Gov. Thomas E. DEWEY. Criticized book for superficiality and for recommending only military solutions to problems of Orient. See DFB-30860 dated 2 November 1953 in RI (201-18446).

Subject presently resides at 92 Varick Road, Waban, Mass., and is employed as a full time Research Associate in the Center for International Studies, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. Subj. does not have access to any classified information.
________ jal

DFB-33974
6 Apr 54
201-18446

201-0018446

Joey's Count

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LOGANOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

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LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH 201-285412

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Contact Reports, etc., forwarded from the field.

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C/SB
RYE:
SR/Sec

Index (p.5)

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LIROCKET-1 — P-12,244

DATE OF MEETING: 27 June 1967

1. I met Subject from 1300-1430 on 27 June at the Capistrano Restaurant. I paid him $2,000 M.N. as his salary for May and June. The next meeting is set for 25 July at 1300 at the Capistrano.

2. Subject conducted 14 classes at the Soviet Embassy during the reporting period:

1 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO. Subject asked if KAZANTSEV had gone out of town, as he had told Subject he would probably do. BEDRIN replied without hesitation that KAZANTSEV had gone to Moscow and wouldn't be back until about 15 June.

6 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO. Toward the end of class, BEDRIN said there were two men who wanted to speak with Subject after class. Following class, two men Subject didn't recognize came in and GONCHARENKO and ROMANCHENKO left. The two men were introduced as Vladimir SOKOLOV and Pavel KOVALEV. BEDRIN explained briefly that they also were interested in taking English lessons, and thereupon left with the comment that he didn't believe he was needed. SOKOLOV was the first of the twosome to speak, repeated that he and KOVALEV wished to take lessons, and then turned things over to KOVALEV, who, he said, spoke better English than he. KOVALEV proceeded to state that he had served in Washington, D.C. for three years, had served an earlier tour in Mexico, and had been back in Mexico for about a month. (KAZANTSEV later said he and KOVALEV had served in

P-11712 (p.6)

Files: Copies

P-9037 (pp. 1-4)
P-9379 (pp. 1-4)
P-8607 (pp. 1-4)
P-830
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P-810 (pp. 1-4)

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Washington at the same time.) At one point KOVALEV referred to SOKOLOV as his "chief." SOKOLOV interjected that he was leaving Mexico "sometime this year" and wanted to brush up on his English in preparation for the 4th year English proficiency test he would have to take when he returned to the USSR. Subject said that on the whole, he got the impression that KOVALEV was replacing SOKOLOV. A schedule of two classes a week, from 1800-1930 on Tuesdays and Thursdays, was agreed upon. One of the two Soviets mentioned that the funds for their lessons would come out of the military department.

1715-1830 -- SOKOLOV and KOVALEV asked when Subject would suggest they have their first lesson, and Subject replied that since KAZANTSEV was away, they might as well begin immediately. The Soviets readily agreed. Subject described KOVALEV's English as good. His grammar is a little better than KAZANTSEV's, but he is not quite as fluent as KAZANTSEV. SOKOLOV's English is [illegible] fair, but he is decidedly behind KOVALEV and KAZANTSEV in both grammar and fluency. Nevertheless, Subject feels SOKOLOV is good enough to be in the same class as KOVALEV.

8 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

13 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

15 June

1520-1700 -- Subject arrived at the Embassy early. BEDRIN came into the Reception Room about 1520 and took Subject to the classroom (in which there has always been a TV set). Three of the guards were sitting around the TV watching the Salazar fight when Subject and BEDRIN entered. GONCHARENKO

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came in about 1530 and ROMANCHENKO about 1540. All watched the fight until it ended about 1550, after which the class began.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

20 June

1530-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO.

1700-1800 -- KAZANTSEV. KAZANTSEV began talking about his trip on his own initiative. He said he left Mexico City on 30 May and arrived in Moscow on 3 June. (He did not say when he returned to Mexico.) He gave no reason for the trip, but said he had "several conferences and meetings" in Moscow. Subject interjected that he thought the trip might have had something to do with the Middle East crisis, since it broke out just about the time KAZANTSEV left. KAZANTSEV laughed spontaneously at this idea and replied that what he knew about the Middle East wouldn't do anyone any good. He then went on to say he had spent his first weekend in Moscow with his son, who shortly thereafter left for his summer job in "Siberia." He said he spent the second weekend (10-11 June) with his daughter. The daughter, according to KAZANTSEV, had planned to go "south" for a 2-3 week vacation in early June, but postponed the vacation when she learned her father was coming. (The implication, according to Subject, was that KAZANTSEV's trip came about fairly suddenly.) What KAZANTSEV was most interested in talking about, however, was the fact he had unexpectedly had had to take his English proficiency test in Moscow. He consequently set aside the last three days of his stay for the test, which can often take that long. The first day is taken up by an oral test, and if one passes that, he goes on to the written test, which can take up to two days. KAZANTSEV, however, did so well on the oral test that he was exempted from the written test. He said his examiners gave him a "4" (on a 1-5 scale) and would have given him a "5" except for the fact he hadn't read any books in English since his last test. One is supposed to read four or five books a year in English, according

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to KAZANTSEV. In any event, KAZANTSEV was very happy with the outcome and with Subject's work in preparing him for the test. In fact, he said that although he had originally started taking lessons from Subject only to prepare for the test, he was so satisfied with his progress that he intended to stay on with Subject despite the fact the test was behind him.

1800-1930 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLOV.

22 June

1530-1700 -- KAZANTSEV took the first hour and a half. He merely said BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, and ROMANCHENKO would not attend class that day.

1700-1830 -- KOVALEV and SOKOLIN.

3. KOVALEV and SOKOLOV. SOKOLOV is the more simpatico of the two. While KOVALEV can be very pleasant, he seems to have an antagonistic strain and occasionally challenges Subject's teaching with: "That isn't the way we do it in our courses," etc. Sometimes, in fact, the disputes on methods, points of grammar, etc. have become rather heated. On these occasions, SOKOLOV has usually stepped in more or less on Subject's side and cooled things off. At their second meeting, KOVALEV asked Subject directly what his views were on the Middle East crisis. Subject turned the question back on KOVALEV by saying he would frankly be more interested in KOVALEV's ideas, as he was sure KOVALEV was much better informed about the situation than he. KOVALEV backed away this time, claiming he didn't have much information either, but at a later class both he and SOKOLOV parroted the Soviet line about the crisis--Israel was the aggressor, etc. On another occasion when the Middle East was again the topic, Subject referred to (what he recalled as) President Truman's post-World War II proposal to internationalize both the Suez and Panama canals. KOVALEV immediately objected to this idea, although he gave no indication of ever having thought about it before.

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4. KOVALEV. Subject said he mentioned KOVALEV and SOKOLOV to his wife, and she immediately recalled KOVALEV as one of her students at the Mexican-North American Institute back in the late 50's or early 60's. She told Subject that he had been friendly with a number of people at the Institute (students and teachers). One of these, she recalled, was Bill *CASTELAZO, a U.S. citizen who then and still teaches English and Spanish at the Institute. CASTELAZO is about 35. He was among [illegible] 20-25 persons who 7 or 8 years ago studied Russian at the Institute when it was taught for a brief time by a Russian woman. [illegible] Subject's wife told Subject that KOVALEV and CASTELAZO had been very friendly and that KOVALEV had invited him to the Soviet Embassy at least twice. CASTELAZO told Subject's wife that after one of his visits to the Soviet Embassy, he was approached by someone from the American Embassy and asked to inform on the Soviets. CASTALAZO said he was repelled by the idea of being a n informer and implied that he hadn't cooperated with the American. Subject said he had not known about CASTELAZO's acquaintance with KOVALEV, but had known that CASTELAZO had studied Russian and had had him to his apartment along with ROMANCHENKO, BEDRIN, and GONCHARENKO for his 1 July 1966 [illegible] Dominion Day party.

my recall
CASTELAZO
KOVALEV
of
file JC

5. Subject subsequently mentioned to KOVALEV that his wife remembered having him as a student during his previous tour. Subject also remarked that his wife had mentioned that KOVALEV and his (Subject's) friend CASTELAZO had been friends. KOVALEV replied without any embarrassment that he didn't remember Subject's wife, but did remember CASTELAZO. KOVALEV asked Subject to give CASTELAZO his regards the next time he saw him.

6. Other than a 1960 reference to "Guillermo CASTELAZO" as a 30-33 year old teacher at the Mexican-North American Institute and an author of one of the Institute's text books, there are no Station traces on

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the CASTELAZO in question. (See 50-6-55/3, CR of 13 Sept. 1960.)

7. LOGINOV. When Subject was leaving the Embassy on 15 June (about 1835), he met LOGINOV in front of the Reception Room. They talked, chiefly about sports, for about 15 minutes. LOGINOV said skiing and speed skating were two of his favorite sports, and that his greatest sporting interest in Mexico was playing tennis. Subject said that LOGINOV seemed to be an avid sportsman. LOGINOV said that he was going to Moscow on vacation toward the end of July. No reference was made to Subject teaching LOGINOV's son English when the LOGINOVS return from vacation, but Subject assumes this is still LOGINOV's wish.

8. Subject to [illegible] Make Tapes At Embassy Prior to Class. At one of their classes after KAZANTSEV's return from Moscow, Subject and KAZANTSEV discussed Subject's making tapes for use in connection with his three Embassy classes. It was agreed that Subject would come to the Embassy half an hour or so early once a week to make the tapes. He was to begin on 27 June (the day of our meeting). Subject did not yet know where he was to do the recording, whether he would be left alone, etc.

9. Subject said he was considering having another Dominion Day Party on 1 July to which he would invite his Soviet students. I encouraged the idea and told him I'd pick up the tab.

10. The week of 19 June the wife of President DIAZ Ordaz called the Director of the Instituto Irlandes and asked if he could recommend a tutor for a nephew of hers. The director replied that the Instituto had a good English teacher and that although he was very busy, he would ask him if he would be willing to take on the nephew. The director communicated the above to Subject, and Subject gave the Director a list of the few hours he had free. The director told Subject he would call Mrs. DIAZ Ordaz back and would inform Subject if any of the hours were suitable. As of 27 June, Subject hadn't heard further from the Director. SB/L L.

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~~Sec 5003 441~~
c/SB 17 L

Index to P-11712
CA

①

27 June 1967

MEMO OF CONVERSATION

Leila BELAVAL, Visa Officer of U.S. Embassy

1. I talked to Leila today about her contact with the Soviet who brought BAZAROV's passport in for a visa yesterday. She identified the Soviet from a photograph as Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, and said that he is always the one who comes to the U.S. Embassy for visas. She did not recognize the photograph of Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, the Vice Consul. Actually, Leila believed that LOGINOV was a Vice Consul, said she always asks for him as such when she has to call the Soviet Embassy.

2. Apparently yesterday was not the first time that LOGINOV has tried to make a date with Leila. She says that he always asks her what she does in her free time, and that she has put him off by saying that she is very busy. Once ~~shexx~~ he asked her whether she spent her free time with other people ~~ax~~ from the Embassy and was surprised to hear that she usually spends her off hours with non-Embassy friends. Yesterday LOGINOV again asked her what she did in the evenings, and she said she was especially busy now because she has started taking guitar lessons. He mentioned some Soviet dance group that was coming to Mexico in a month or so and said he would like to invite her to go to see them with him. He also told her he was not married. Leila said she did not refuse the invitation outright but said that she did not know whether she would be free when they came or not.

3. I told Leila a few of the facts of Soviet life: that all Soviets have to be married in order to go overseas, that LOGINOV is a KGB officer and was obviously trying to get his foot in the door of the U.S. Embassy through her, that he was undoubtedly disappointed to hear that she did not spend all her free time with other Embassy people, etc. Leila has evidently been unsure about how to react to LOGINOV's advances, has not wanted to be rude to him, and seemed relieved when I suggested that she simply decline his invitations by always being busy. She says she does not like his slick manner at all, and I gather that she has felt uneasy in having to deal with him, but now that someone has told her how to react she will have no problem.

4. Leila mentioned that LOGINOV knows English but is reluctant to use it. He once read off the visa stamped in a passport in perfect English, and he also read a copy of the new visa regulations in English (to himself, but evidently understanding it all). According to the new regulations, Soviets no longer need visas for continuous transit of the U.S. (i.e., on the same flight), but LOGINOV insisted on getting a visa for BAZAROV in spite of this. (This is confirmed in LIENVOY.)

J.L. WEENING

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cc: Serrian
BAZAROV
(P-7759)

(Loginov)
file: P-11712

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentín Loguinov
15·60-55
Consul

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S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 15 June 1967

1. I met with Subject at the Del Paseo from 0900 to 1000. The next meeting is for 18 July at 0830 at the same place.

2. On 8 June LOGINOV dropped by Subject's office to leave two tickets for the Bolshoy Ballet performance on 11 June. Subject invited LOGINOV and his wife for dinner and LOGINOV accepted for 13 June. (COMMENT: LIENVOY reports their confirming this date on 12 June). Subject said the tickets were used by his wife and son.

3. The guests on 13 June were LOGINOV and wife, William de Mier (P-5552), manager of KLM in Mexico and Gustavo ORTIZ Hernan (P-10971). ORTIZ was Mexico's first Ambassador to Israel and is very pro-Israel. He recently retired from the Mexican Foreign Service. His last job was Ambassador to Chile. He is 57 years old and apparently a good friend of Subject's. Subject invited ORTIZ because he knew that LOGINOV has been interested in public opinion in Mexico about the recent Israel-Arab war. Subject had been only able to give LOGINOV the opinions of Mexican Jews and he wanted LOGINOV to talk to a real Mexican. The deck was slightly loaded since Subject knew that ORTIZ is an Israeli partisan. Subject purposely avoided the subject but it was not long before ORTIZ asked LOGINOV about the Soviet position on the matter. LOGINOV answered with a banality about the USSR only wanting peace. ORTIZ then unloaded on LOGINOV for about half an hour. He told him that he had been in Israel as ambassador and had seen both sides. If the Soviets were interested in peace, why didn't they help the miserable and diseased Arabs with medicine, hospitals, job training, agricultural aid, etc? This is what they need, not tanks and jets. The Soviets are the real aggressors by arming the Arabs and egging them on. And what fools the Sovs are since the Arabs will never learn to operate any equipment, much less sophisticated stuff. Soviet hypocrisy is obvious to everybody. FEDORENKO's performance at the UN was shameful, etc. LOGINOV never answered a word. Subject later reported the above to the Israeli Ambassador who was pleased since ORTIZ is not a Jew and he is sure the above would be reported to Moscow.

4. LOGINOV said he will leave on 23 July for vacation in the USSR. Subject saw Mrs. LOGINOV for the second time. Since her Spanish is extremely limited, she did not participate in general conversation. However, she handled herself well and did not seem in the least ill at ease. In a side conversation she told Subject that they have a fifteen year old daughter who is living with her mother. She said that she has known LOGINOV since the age of six as neighbors in Moscow. Finally, she said that she is a chemical engineer.

5. I asked if Subject had talked to Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581) again about her contacts with our Embassy. He said he hadn't. I asked what advice he had given her. He said that he had told her to be truthful with the Americans and to be careful with LOGINOV.

Francis J. COIGNE

FILE: P-2712 P-11712 P-5552 P-10971 P-581

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(1)

LITENSE-1
14 JUN 67

On the 9 May I went with my wife to the reception given by the ambassador of Checoslovaquia on the occasion of their ~~htier~~ National Day. The party took place in the garden where there were a couple of tables seating about ten persons each. Most of the people seating at the tables were from embassies behind the Iron curtain, or local supporters of the extreme left such as Cordero Amador, the painter Marin-Busqued, the art critic Margarita Nelken, Ruth Rivera etc. The Soviets were there headed by ~~ambassador~~ Bazarov and Kazanteev, present also by the name of Boris Tchmikov, Valentin Loguinov, Tchmikov is a young man, about thirty five, speaks very good Spanish and has a rather nice wife. He invited us to attend the exhibition of a film, a russian film at the embassy the next day, he also when ~~whhh~~we were leaving said that we had to go to his house soon and have a real russian dinner. This kind of invitation is most unusual. I do not remember any other sovietico suggesting such a thing.

In the party there were the usual diplomatic crowd which attends parties of representations behind the Iron Curtain, Max Wery, the Belgian ambassador and his wife, the French ambassador and his wife, the French Counsellor la Tour du Pin and his wife, the architect Lopez Malo who is one of the directors of the Comité Organizador de los Juegos Olimpicos, the italian ambassador and one of his daughters, the Uruguayan ambassador, the Chilean ambassador and Enrique Cobo del Campo the couseller of the same embassy, the cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas with whom we talked about Venezuela and told me that it was an stupid thing to accuse a country of trying to invade another country with half a dozen men. The chechs had plenty of beer brought from checoslova-

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21

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quia but mixed it with just as much mexican beer if you were not careful. The Brazillian ambassador was there, Guillermo Gimenez Ramirez the charge of Costa Rica, Gonzalo Almeida Urrutia, the ambassador from Ecuador, from the Foreign Office, Muñoz Zapata and Flores Tejada. I do not remember seing anybody from the US, but I arrived somewhat late, Kai Somerto the ambassador from Finland was present and so was the mayor general Natahn Aferi from Ghana, the ambassador was most friendly as well as Jan Hant the commercial counsellor and Jiri Svestka the second secretary in charge o the consulat.

Next day we went to the Soviet embassy for the exhibition of a fil whose title I think was the Father of the Soldier, a rather childish film but that brought tears to the eyes of some of the embassy wives who attended. There was an small group of people, including tomse army officers from the Secretary de la Defensa, and amiral Azanar Cetina, subsecretario de marina, and amiral Otal Briceño, who after a long illness has now some new post in Marina. All the Soviet staff was present, there were two or three cuban including Curvello. There was a change, the doors of the embassy were wide open and there was no question asked by the people at the outside door, inside Frygov and other fellow received the visitors. There was as usual plenty of vodka, small eats but no caviar, both thing were served before and after the exhibition of the film.

On the 17th of may we went to a reception for the National day of Noruega. They have a beautiful house in Monte Cárpatos which had been built for the embassy along their norweigian style; the new ambassador is a tall gaunt, strange man, there were not many people because there was a diplomatic lunch at Relaciones and

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white film of the Opympics to Ramirez Vasquez. No Indian around. No Greek neither. Chacha Valdes, formerly de Lanz Duret, with her new husband, licenciado Lozano. She if the owner of Universal. He was nobody until he married, now he is a well known jurist. Francisco Agüera Cenarro, the director of Revista Internacional, trying to impress the French ambassador with the fact that he had printed an editorial on Israel if his magazine. Revista Internacional has a circulation of about fivehundred copies, but gives Agüera a good ten thousand pesos a month.

It was a fairly good party as far as diplomatic parties go, but sterile in results. Nobody appeared to worry very much about the war in the East, and some ~~epple~~ people like the Paraguayn and the Tobias Eguizabal had the idea that everything had been prepared in advance by the United States and the URSS.

That there had been a meeting in which the question had been ~~atteled~~ settled.

Loguinov called me to the office to tell me he had tickets for me and my wife for the Bolshoi ballet for Sunday night. We had been unable to secure anything at the office.

five

On Sunday 11 June, Valentin Loguinov was able to obtain for us two good tickets for the Ballet Bolshoi at Bellas Artes and afterwards we went to have something to eat at Lady Baltimore in Madero Street. Very few people were there, which is not surprising in view of the bad quality of their food and poor service. But it was the nearest spot for a quick bite.

Loguinov was very much interested in knowing what my US friends thought about the situation in the Middle East and what they would do about it. He was insistent about the possible help that the US would give to Israel, he said that the US had already given Israel a considerable amount of ammunition and planes, and specially money, the URSS had to give some help to the arabs in view of the help given to Israel. According to him there was not the slighest doubt that Israel had been the agresor. The URSS would never consent to any territorial gains by Israel.

During our conversation about food, specially about seafood he let it be know that he had been in Mazatlán several times.

He said that everything which had taken place in the Middle East had been plotted in advance by the US and Israel.

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S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 3 June 1967

1. After a long hiatus, I called Subject on ca 14 May and learned he was out of the country. I called him again on 6 June and we made a date for 8 June. The meeting was in the breakfast room of the Del Paseo Hotel from 0810 to 0915. The next meeting is at the same place at 0830 on 15 June.

2. Subject was all excited about the Israel/Arab conflict and we spent the best part of the meeting discussing it.

3. He said that LOGINOV called him on 5 June and pressed for a luncheon date the same day. Subject put him off until 8 June. LOGINOV wanted news on the local Jewish reaction, was everybody behind the Jews, was money being contributed, etc. Subject who was madder than hell about Soviet support of the Arabs gave him hell and to direct questions got the admissions from LOGINOV that the Israelis were acting in self-defense and that the Americans and British were not providing the Israelis air cover. LOGINOV mentioned that he would go to the USSR on home leave in July.

4. On 6 June Miriam AVILA Kats, who is also very excited about the war and who told Subject that she had gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel, told Subject that when she returned home on the evening of 5 June, LOGINOV was waiting for her on the street. His purpose was the same as wanting to see Subject, to pump her on local reactions to the war. She also gave LOGINOV hell.

5. She then told Subject that in Holy Week she had been called to the American Embassy and had been asked about her contact with LOGINOV. She said that she had seen the same American (no name given) about two weeks ago. She then told Subject that LOGINOV had asked her to introduce him to "one of her progressive friends" or "someone in the U.S. Embassy" as a return for the favor of issuing a visa to Dr. Yuriy KUTLER.

6. The above is a capsule account of her relationship with LEVENDERIS. I played innocent until I got the whole story but finally admitted that we had talked to her when he asked, "if it wasn't you, who?" I told him that AVILA had notidea that Subject was in contact with us and had in fact worried that her activities (future) might hurt him which she was definitely against.

7. It appears that AVILA told Subject about us because of LOGINOV's appearance on 5 June and her emotional state about the war. I will discuss this further with Subject at the next meeting, particularly what advice he has or will give her about cooperating with us.

Francis J. COIGNE

FILE: P-2712 P-11712 P-581

S E C R E T

17

DOI 14 June 1967

SOURCE: LIHABIT

LOGINOV (P-11712) visited the Czech Embassy this 14 June 67 day. He was driving diplomatic license plate car 19 DA. He was there from 1214 to 1238 hours.

gbf

file P-11712

18

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with BESABER, 24 May 1967

1. Operational - Per telcon arranged meet at BESABER's hotel room at Del Paseo (204). Met from 1830-2030, 24 May. BESABER will call 30 May or 1 June to arrange next meet.

2. Finances - Replenished BESABER's revolving fund.

3. Substance

a. Re SGSWIRL - As requested at last meet BESABER turned in bio data on girlfriend he had talked to SGSWIRL operator about. (See attached note from operator). No traces. He will turn in at next meet his version of what he told her. He is most upset by this matter, particularly since I had told him that Headquarters wanted to drop him. I reiterated that he was on probation.

b. CHMYKHOV and LOGINOV
(P-6235) (P-11712) -

1). On 20 May CHMYKHOV and LOGINOV arrived at BESABER's plant at about 1400. L was driving a brownish Chevy Impala, 34-DA. L was interested in seeing the house that BESABER had located for the Soviets. He said they wanted a house for three, possibly four months (starting 1 June) and could easily spend up to $6,000 MN per month.

2). BESABER could not leave the plant, but put them in touch with a Sra. LARA who took them around to seven houses, one of which they liked. They returned to BESABER's plant at about 1700, sat around for about an hour, leaving because they said the couriers were coming in that night and they had a lot of work to do. (Couriers did arrive that night).

3). CHMYKHOV drank heavily (scotch) but did not show any effect; LOGINOV didn't even finish one Scotch and water.

4). L said he would probably return to Cuernavaca in a few days to sign the lease on the house and would look BESABER up. BESABER told L that he had a friend with a tennis court and in a few weeks when the friend returned to Mexico he (BESABER) would arrange a day of tennis.

5). L did most of the talking although C was pleasant, told a number of good jokes (in poor Spanish) and generally impressed BESABER as beinga pleasant type, not "pesado," as he assesses L.

c. Re COIGNE's request and as a follow-up to LIKAYAK/2's report of 28 April 1967 re Lorenzo CARDENAS (P-5409), I asked BESABER if he knew of a house of prostitution at Dr. Manuel Ugarte 1C3 A. He did not, but will check it out through the doormen of several hotels.

COPIES MADE

Phineas F. SLINKARD

FILE: P-8777 P-5409 1 - SB

LOGINOV P — 11712

cc: CHMYKOV P — 6235

SECRET

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Gloria *PINTO
Contact and apparently good
friend of 8 XXXXXXXX LOGINOV
of Soviet Embassy.

CARDED

/NT

75- Entrada.- 1231 hrs.- MF GLORIA PINTO pregunta por LOGUINOV. HD dice que no está. GLORIA pide le digan que le llame al 23-62-85.- 93-

93- Salida al 23-62-85.- 1239 hrs.- LOGUINOV saluda a GLORIA PINTO. Esta dice que lo llamaba hace rato para darle las gracias de parte de su cuñada por la visa que le dió. LOGUINOV que está bien. GLORIA tambien le llama porque RUTH va a ir a fin de semana a Valle de Bravo y lo invitan a ir. LOGUINOV no puede porque el domingo sale un compañero a Moscú y lo tiene que ir a despedir, pero puede ser para la otra semana. GLORIA que para el día 27 es la Copa Davis, y tal vez no puedan ir. LOGUINOV que entonces ya será despues. GLORIA comenta que ALFONSO va a estar a las cinco en el café "El Jujuy". LOGUINOV va a tratar de estar allí un rato para saludarlos. - GLORIA pide pase por ella y de allí se van juntos. LOGUINOV no tiene mucho tiempo porque está haciendo las 50 visas de .. .. la Selección Mexicana de Futbol, pero va a tratar de estar a las cinco en el café. GLORIA que está bien.-144-

LIENVOY

156055

17 MAYO 1967

P— 11712

14-00000

20

~~[illegible]~~ C/SB-[illegible] SB/Sec [illegible]

①

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Miriam AVILA Katz — P-581

DATE OF MEETING: 11 May 1967

1. My last meeting with Subject was on 23 March, at which time she agreed to provide information on LOGINOV obtained during their normal business contact and any further social contact initiated by him. She was to call me after their next date or any other significant contact she had with him. Since I had not heard from her, I called her at her apartment about 2115 on 11 May. I apologized for calling so late, but said I had just got out of work and had a package for her I had brought back from the States which I wanted to deliver before the contents got stale. Could I drop over that night or perhaps another evening. Subject immediately recognized the "package" as the Benson and Hedges cigarettes I had promised her, gently protested, and then told me she was not feeling well, but the doctor had told her she had to eat, and it so happened she was just going out for a bite when I called. I consequently suggested we have dinner together, which we did from 2145-1215 at the Gondola. Afterwards, we went around the corner to her apartment for a nightcap until 0200.

2. Subject had lost 8 or 10 pounds and looked a bit thin and not as attractive as I had remembered her. She told me she was simply working too hard and not eating and sleeping properly. I had some fear that she might have had some second

Files cc: P-11712 P-1573 (pp. 2-4) P-2712 (pp. 4-5) thoughts in the seven weeks since she had agreed to cooperate, but it proved unfounded. She this time was relaxed from the start, was very friendly, and seemed to enjoy the opportunity to get out. (She later told me in her apartment that she didn't go out much, liked to spend her evenings at home ~~reading~~, listening to records, tending to her dwarf trees, etc.) She made it clear from the start that she hadn't changed her mind by warning me half-seriously and half-playfully that I shouldn't think I could "buy" her with gifts. "You've bought me up here," she said, tapping her head with her forefinger. "That's the only way you'll get anywhere with me." Most of the evening was spent in general and (especially back at her apartment) increasingly fuzzy discussion of Israel, the Jews, her job, the Russians "as people," her very humanistic philosophy about life, and I don't exactly remember what else. She is definitely a smart girl, but I think less profound and sophisticated than she tries to appear. Otherwise, she seems to be a very sincere person, and she has given me no reason to doubt or suspect anything she has told me.

3. Contact with LOGINOV. Subject said she hadn't been out with LOGINOV since our last meeting and had had only one face-to-face contact with him. She said this was a little over a month ago (early April) and was occasioned by her efforts to help a client by the name of Dr. Yury KUTTLER get a Soviet visa. She said KUTTLER is a dentist and definitely a Communist sympathizer, if not a Communist. (KUTTLER has P-File 1573.) KUTTLER evidently thought he was liked by the

Russians in return, as he initially told Subject he was expecting an official Soviet invitation to visit the USSR. As it turned out, however, he had a hard time even getting a Soviet visa. Subject finally called LOGINOV herself to try to push things along, but LOGINOV showed no willingness to facilitate things. (LIENVOY has Subject on the phone to LOGINOV on 5 April. After discussing KUTTLER's case, Subject remarked to LOGINOV that she understood that "you (ustedes) must have some reason not to want to give him (KUTTLER) the visa." LOGINOV replied that there were "reasons enough.")

4. A day or two after her telephone conversation with LOGINOV, Subject said she went over to the Soviet Embassy personally to see if she could get anywhere with LOGINOV. LOGINOV received her cordially, and for the first time asked her into his office (she said it was the first office off the outside Reception Room). She again asked LOGINOV to try to ~~[illegible]~~ speed up the granting of KUTTLER's visa. LOGINOV hemmed and hawed, indicating that he wasn't even sure the visa would be granted. He finally told Subject that look, he had gone to KUTTLER for dental work once, and KUTTLER had charged him much too much. Consequently, he said, he wasn't going to give him a visa. Subject said she could not tell if the destist bill was the real reason for LOGINOV's negative attitude, but when she persisted, LOGINOV finally relented and the following exchange ensued:

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③

LOGINOV: "All right, Miriam, I'll do it for you (i.e., give KUTTLER the visa). But you know, a favor must be repaid by a favor."

Subject: "All right....in that case, let me in the name of the company invite you to dinner."

LOGINOV: "No, Miriam, I don't mean that."

LOGINOV then went on to say that as he had mentioned to her before, he would like her to introduce him to "someone who would be sympathetic to us" (i.e., to the Soviets). LOGINOV emphasized that he realized Subject might not agree with this "someone's" ideas, but stated that he knew Subject was the type of person who "had respect for other people's views." Subject said that she replied in a casual, almost flippant manner that "well, sure, if she met such a person, she'd introduce them." With this the subject was dropped and Subject left.

5. LICOZY-5. Subject on her own initiative began telling me what a terrific guy her boss is. He according to her, has one of the most winning personalities of anyone she has ever met. At the same time he is extremely intelligent and shrewd. "If he can't get what he wants through charm, he does it by pure shrewdness." This is why he is such a successful businessman. In reply to a question about LICOZY-5's background, Subject said he had been born in Poland, was imprisoned by either the Poles or Germans just before or during World War II (she was rather vague on this point, and I confined myself to listening), somehow got out and joined the Russians, taking part in the Soviet invasion of Germany. Somehow he had survived all this, made his way to Mexico, where he arrived penniless, and now

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(9)

must have a small fortune in the bank. He vividly remembers his former hardships, however, is a very generous and humane person, and every year sends clothes to people in Poland and Russia. He also has a very strong feeling for Israel. Obviously he couldn't have survived a life like this if he weren't shrewd. He has no love for the Russians, but was not above joining them to assure his own survival in World War II and can be agreeable enough toward them to retain their travel business. Subject gave absolutely no indication that she had said anything to LICOZY-5 about me.

6. The conversation was the most relaxed as well as the fuzziest back at Subject's apartment, where we finished a bottle of vodka LOGINOV had given LICOZY-5 and LICOZY-5 had given her. Back on the subject of LOGINOV, Subject said she "supposed" he had tried to cultivate a lot of girls like herself..."hadn't her?" (I had told Subject at our last meeting that young women were among LOGINOV's favorite targets, but hadn't been able to tell what effect this "revelation" had on her. Now it appeared that it had hit home and that it had wounded her pride to think he not only had had ulterior motives in dating her, but had dated other girls the same way.) I didn't reply directly, but said something about LOGINOV being as smooth as they come. Subject wasn't satisfied with this, however, and pressed me: "He has tried the same thing with other girls, hasn't he?" "Yes, Miriam, several," I finally said. This seemed to satisfy her.

7. Shortly thereafter, I asked Subject if LOGINOV were

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~~Checked~~ ✓

Indexed

NT - Wiltshire

No Traces on Wiltshire or variants Welcher

Douglas H. WILTSHIRE
SERVISA Travel Agency
in Air Directory
~~[illegible]~~, fm

(norteamericano)

480- Entrada.- HP ~~WELCHER~~ (?) pregunta por LOGUINOV para si puede pasar a verlo, pues se trata de la agencia de vi Servisa. VALA dice que espere. Despues WELCHER comenta co LOGUINOV que el estuvo en el año de 1945 cuando la caida de Berlín y conoce un poco la historia de la victoria rusa s los nazi-fascistas. LOGUINOV cambia de tema y pregunta si tiene algunas visas pendientes. WELCHER dice que tiene alg pasaportes que pasar a recoger y sirve que lo invita a su LOGUINOV lo espera.- 521-

LIENVOY

480: Subject (giving name as WILSHER), an American asks for LOGINOV and tells him that he just wanted to be sure that LOGINOV would be in as he had called yesterday (9 May) and he had not been in. LOGINOV tells WILSHER that 9 May is a Holiday and commemorates the Russian Victory in Berlin, Germany on 9 May 1945. WILSHER says he remembers that as he was in the war in that area at the time and remembers that. WILSHER wants to go by to see LOGINOV to pick up some passports. WILSHER also would like to invite LOGINOV out to his house. LOGINOV says he can come by to pick up the visas.

~~[illegible]~~ works for Lima Tours

Wiltcher

150055
10 MAY 1967

P- 11712

14-00000

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ASUNTO: EMBAJADA SOVIETICA EN MEXICO.

México, D.F., 3 de mayo de 1967.

C. DIRECTOR FEDERAL DE SEGURIDAD
Presente.

(?)

A las 10.45 horas del día de la fecha se presentó en la Cruz Roja Central el Sr. [illegible] Consejero Comercial de la Embajada Soviética en México a bordo del automóvil Chevrolet modelo 1965 placas [illegible] en el cual viajaba así mismo el [illegible] Sr. [illegible], llevando consigo al menor [illegible] y solicitando se le proporcionara atención médica en virtud de que el menor [illegible] a bordo de una bicicleta se estrelló en la parte posterior del vehículo diplomático antes citado causándole algunas lesiones que según el parte médico sanarán en 5 días aproximadamente.

Los funcionarios mencionados se hicieron cargo ante el Agente del Ministerio Público en turno y la madre del menor de sufragar cualquier gasto extraordinario que originara la atención del lesionado.

Se hace notar que el accidente antes descrito se registró frente a la Embajada de Cuba.

Respetuosamente.

CORL. [illegible]

O.C. P-11712

P-9026

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C/S 8/10
(Portillo?)

P-11712

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3 May 67

COS

LIREALM's account of his first two meetings with LOGUINOV. It appears to me that at the second meeting, 26 April, he moved in a lot faster than is customary with the Sovs. For this reason I wonder if possibly the Soviets are deliberately trying to get a look at him independent from LEONOV, who may well have been reporting regularly his meetings with LIREALM.

He understands he is not to be dangled in front of Sovs, and I told him that after today's tennis match, he is to make himself unavailable for two or three weeks for tennis (or the movies) and see what kind of initiative L is prepared to take.

This would, however, allow us to plant an American girl at the French Club if we wished and play her into L's hands. Will discuss with Paul when he returns.

rle

I agree

DCOS

Did show to Paul + Cynthia

File [illegible] LOGUINOV (P- [illegible] [illegible]

CC:

14-00000

28

VALENTIN S. LOGUINOV

1. Contact. First met April 22, 1967. He asked my wife and I if he and an American born Mexican friend could join us in doubles. Saturdays the tennis courts are filled. I was reluctant at first until I recognized his accent and suspected that he was one of two persons for whom I have pictures on file.

me

2. Utility. Consul of the USSR embassy.

3. Susceptibility. Eager to visit the U.S. Possibly interested in the material things of life, possibly overly interested in girls. Seems convinced of the value of Marxism.

4. Personality. Very friendly and direct. Wishes his embassy enjoyed club privileges such as the U.S. at the Reforma Club. He likes caviar, vodka, and drinks several beers quickly. He is a little demonstrative in gestures of head and hands. It is too early to equate his gestures with his attitudes or the topics being discussed.

5. English. He is eager to improve his English, which he speaks rather poorly. His son Dmitry speaks only Russian, no Spanish or English.

6. Bio-data. His daughter, 14, is in an English school in Moscow.

7. Chess. Plays, but not a fan.

8. Athletics. He plays excellent tennis for someone who claims he has played less than a year and never more than once a week. He has the face, build, and carriage of a trained athlete. He has the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler. He has the grace of a natural athlete. I would guess him to be unusually strong. He boxed when younger, plays basketball and volleyball.

9. Spanish. Speaks good Spanish. Studied for one year in Moscow.

+ 3 years in Cuba!

10. Desire for contact. Val proposed that we meet regularly for tennis at 1600 hours every Wednesday. He asked if it bothered me to be seen with a Soviet. He said many U.S. diplomats seemed to shun him. He also suggested that we not limit our contacts to tennis but that we go to a movie sometime with our wives.

11. Bio-data. Apparently has limited income. He has no servant, no TV, no telephone.

12. Leonovs. Val seemed somewhat cool about the Leonovs. Naturally he knows them, but doesn't seem to consider them friends.

13. Personality. Does not smoke. he did before

14. U.S.Trip. Val is going to Moscow in July. He wants to spend 2 to 3 days in New York. He said he had read much about New York but wanted to see it for himself.

April 23, 1967. P.M.

1. Contact. Upon leaving the club, we saw and greeted Val at poolside watching his son swim. He reminded me about our Wednesday date.

April 26, 1967. 1600 hours

1. Contact. Our tennis date.

2. Information.

A. My access? Val asked if I had occasion to go to the U.S. embassy and if I knew anyone in the embassy. I answered no to both.

B. FBI. Val was still concerned about my innocence and lack of fear in being seen with a Soviet. I joked about not seeing any FBI in the area. He blushed and said he really knew that there were very many FBI agents here.

C. Embassy telephone. Val requested that I not use his embassy phone number on his calling card. He explained that he is all over the embassy and that it is difficult to locate him.

D. American girls. Val asked me if I knew any American girls here. He suggested I bring two for our tennis date. He wants to meet U.S. girls to practice his English. He said that in one year here he has failed

[illegible] U.S. [illegible]

to make a friend of any U.S. girls. He did pay one girl to give him lessons, but he felt she lacked background in grammar. I kidded him and implied that he was looking for something more than English lessons and that Mexican girls struck me as being far sexier. He accepted the innuendo that his interests in girls was more broad than just language training, but he insisted on U.S. girls.

E. Svetlana defection. Val said that the Svetlana defection bothered him. He feels the U.S. bought Svetlana, that she is crazy and that her defection will hurt U.S.- USSR. relations. I offered to be bought by the USSR to balance the defections. He said I wasn't worth anything to the USSR.

F. Trips. Val is going out of town this weekend. He was in Acapulco recently.

G. Known at club. Many people greeted Val at the club.

H. Embassy holidays. Val said the embassy would be closed May 1-4 and that no receptions were planned. This contradicts Nick.

3. Susceptibility. ~~Nick~~ Val is anti-Viet-Nam. He believes that U.S. politics are in the hands of 16 men, the Rockefellers, etc. These men make fortunes off military armaments and want the war to continue. He claimed that Viet-Nam is a civil war fostered by the U.S. The U.S. cannot win because the U.S. has formed an artificial barrier dividing one people. I suggested that it was not unlike Germany which is ~~xx~~ one people divided. He seemed annoyed at the comparison and tried to explain it in complex terms which I chose not to debate. I told him politics discouraged me since I know from history that the actions of today are governed by secret agreements which we will not be privileged to learn of for another 50 or 100 years. Val hastened to say that he did not insist on talking about politics. If at any time I should like to discuss politics he is at my disposal, but is willing to discuss anything at all.

4. Houston. Val has always wanted to visit Houston. He regrets the U.S. restrictions on travel there. He supposes the U.S. has many secrets there to hide. I said that he was obviously a dangerous person.

5. Girl-friend. Val spoke of his girl-friend in Moscow whose sister is dying of cancer. He used the word "girl-friend", but his English might be weak here. He might have meant a female acquaintance of his wife and him.

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6. "Dialectics". Dialectics is the law, according to Val, which proves that the U.S. cannot win in Viet-Nam--a people defending its own land against invaders.

5. Personality. Val plays better tennis than I. He drank three beers after our tennis. It was he who insisted that we go to the bar after tennis. He told several jokes, some mildy dirty, some fairly good. He will get me a copy of Soviet Life which discusses Soviet tennis. He paid for the ball-boys and for the drinks. His investment was about 16 pesos.

6. Bio-data. His wifes name is Alexandra. She is bothered by the altitude. He drives a green Chevy, 19 D\ His wife speaks little Spanish or English, and some French. He is third secretary in charge of visas to the USSR.

COMMENTS

1. Trying to recruit U.S. secretary. I would guess that Val is trying to state the requirements for his U.S. girl-friend in such a way as to exclude all but secretaries at the U.S. embassy. He wants someone with culture, good knowledge of the language. He did not deny, nor confirm, that his interests might be amorous, but he rejected the idea of anyone but a U.S. type.

April 27, 1967. Telephone

1. Movies cancelled. Val had suggested that we go to the movies together. When he learned that my wife enjoys Soviet movies, I cited several we had seen, he suggested that we all see the movie now at the Versaille. We agreed. He then called saying his wife was sick. Suggested we wait until next week. Reminded me of our tennis date next Wednesday.

May 2, 1967.

1. Contact. I played tennis with a client. My wife played with an instructor. She mentioned to me that while we were still playing she saw Val who had dropped off his wife, another woman and Dmitry. Val was very friendly, but neglected to introduce his wife or her friend. The wife nodded. On leaving the club Val was returning. we spoke for several seconds confirming our date for Wednesday. He made no effort to introduce the man with him.

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SECRET

Date: April 26, 1967

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Nathan L. Ferris
Legal Attache

Subject: BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH KAZANTSEV; ET AL
105-407 (4-26-67)

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated February 28, 1967, # 11,513, captioned "Travel of Soviets".

No specific information has been received concerning the travel of the individuals mentioned in referenced letter.

Reliable sources, including Vice Consul Richard Booth, American Consulate, Veracruz, have advised that Mexican authorities are exercising strict control over visits to Soviet vessels and trips ashore by members of the crews. Loginov recently met Booth at Lopez Hermanos, shipping agents, and asked Booth if he could do something about the refusal of Mexican officials to permit crew members to come ashore.

You will be advised when additional information is received concerning this matter.

cc (P — 11718

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

file
1880

SECRET

33

LILYRIC, 18 April 1967, 1018 hours this woman entered SovEmb, came out with LOGINOV at 1036 hours and they walked off together.

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photo



14-00000

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photo

[illegible]

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36

Not sure

37

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LICOOL C/R - 128764
17 April 67

Pages 37+38
Dup page

4. AEKITE: Subject reported that AEKITE was in the store from 1200 to 1215 on 14 April. AEKITE told him that he would come to Subject's home on Sunday, 23 April, for dinner. AEQUALITY came in later and Subject related the above to him. AEQUALITY suggested that Subject call AEKITE at the Embassy on 22 April to confirm the dinner so that Subject would not waste money by preparing a dinner to which AEKITE did not come. I told Subject to call AEKITE on 21 April since 22 April is a Saturday and AEKITE might not be at work. (COMMENT: There was no call on LIENVOY).

5. On 12 April 1967 at ca 1130 4 young Mexican males arrived in a new VW with temporary permit 1091021. They entered the Embassy and talked to LOGINOV.

6. Subject's notes for the period 31 March to 15 April 1967 are attached.

Francois J. COIGNE

S E C R E T

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LICOOL C/O – P-8764
17 April 67

4. AEKITE: Subject reported that AEKITE was in the store from 1200 to 1215 on 14 April. AEKITE told him that he would come to Subject's home on Sunday, 23 April, for dinner. AEQUALITY came in later and Subject related the above to him. AEQUALITY suggested that Subject call AEKITE at the Embassy on 22 April to confirm the dinner so that Subject would not waste money by preparing a dinner to which AEKITE did not come. I told Subject to call AEKITE on 21 April since 22 April is a Saturday and AEKITE might not be at work. (COMMENT: There was no call on LIENVOY).

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6. Subject's notes for the period 31 March to 13 April 1967 are attached.

Francis J. COIGNE

S E C R E T

P-11712

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(4) CARDED

Kodak to give English lessons. It was agreed they'd discuss the matter further when Subject (not to be left out of a good thing) visited TROCONIS at Kodak to take advantage of that 30-40% discount. Subject even wanted to get me some film at these fabulous prices, but I said I didn't need any at the moment. I did say, however, that any relationship that developed between TROCONIS and the Soviets would naturally be of interest to us and I'd like to have Subject remain alert to anything he heard from either the Soviets or TROCONIS. Subject said he would.

COPIES MADE

4. LOGINOV. As previously reported, Subject has seen LOGINOV on numerous occasions on the Embassy grounds and in the first office off the Reception Room. They usually exchange greetings in English. On 30 March, LOGINOV came up to Subject in the Reception Room and said that he'd like to speak to Subject about English lessons for his 8-year-old son. Subject said fine, and it was agreed Subject would drop into LOGINOV's office (i.e., off the Reception Room) when he was through with his classes that afternoon. When Subject returned about 1830, however, LOGINOV was just getting ready to leave and it was agreed they'd try to get together another time. They finally did so on 11 April. Subject went to LOGINOV's office about 1830 and stayed 15 or 20 minutes. LOGINOV in a very relaxed and casual manner, explained that he had an 8 year old son whom he wanted to learn English. He said the boy knew no English and very little Spanish. He stated that they were going to Moscow on vacation in July and would be back in August, and he consequently didn't want to begin the

LIROCKET C/R (R 12244)
13 April 67

R-11712

14-00000

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CARDED

lessons until they returned, but he wanted to tentatively explore the matter with Subject now. He stated--in English--that he would like Subject "to go to teach" the boy, the implication being, according to Subject, that the lessons were to be given at LOGINOV's home. If Subject couldn't give the boy lessons when it came time, LOGINOV said he hoped Subject would be able to recommend someone else. Subject said he'd be happy to teach the boy if he had time, but that it was of course too early to know whether he would be able to fit him into his schedule in August. LOGINOV said he understood and they could talk in specifics in August. LOGINOV added only that he planned to pick up a special text (or set of texts) for teaching children English when he was in Moscow.

5. Subject said that LOGINOV had a pile of perhaps 30-35 passports on his desk on 11 April. Subject commented on LOGINOV's apparently heavy work load, and LOGINOV replied casually: "Well, you know there are a lot of people who want to visit the Soviet Union." He continued that most of the passports on his desk were Mexican, but "several" were American. He then began shuffling through the pile until he came to one belonging to an American girl. He opened the passport to her picture and showed it to Subject as an illustration. Subject said he couldn't make out the name, but the picture was of a good-looking, blondish girl who appeared to be 23 or 24 years old. This was the only passport LOGINOV showed Subject, and the ~~conversat~~ topic was thereupon dropped. At the end of the conversation, LOGINOV stated that he certainly would appreciate it if Subject could teach his son and he'd

10 (6) CARDED

get together again with Subject in August.

6. I asked Subject if he thought he would have time to teach the boy. Subject said it was impossible to tell, but he could probably make time if we considered it important enough. I told Subject there was a good chance we would and in any case not to give LOGINOV a negative answer before consulting me. I explained that LOGINOV was KGB and one of the most able men in the Embassy, and warned Subject to be on his toes in his relations with him.

7. Subject conducted 11 classes at the Soviet Embassy during the reporting period.

COPIES MADE

28 March

1545-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO

1700-1815 -- KAZANTSEV. BAZAROV and his wife were supposed to have their first class from 1700-1830, but KAZANTSEV said the Ambassador was too busy. No mention was made of his wife. (The BAZAROVS' classes are scheduled for Tuesdays and Fridays from 1700-1830. Classes for KAZANTSEV, BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, and ROMANCHENKO are scheduled for Tuesdays and Thursdays.)

30 March

1545-1700 -- BEDRIN, GONCHARENKO, ROMANCHENKO

1700-1800 -- KAZANTSEV. KAZANTSEV said that BAZAROV expected to be tied up with the Soviet Petroleum Congress delegation and probably would not be able to make his 1700-1830 class on Friday, the 31st. If not, KAZANTSEV said, GONCHARENKO would use the time, since he was somewhat behind BEDRIN and ROMANCHENKO.

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SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Ernst GOEBEL

DATE OF MEETING: 10 April 1967

1. I met Subject at his office from 1845 to 1915 on 10 April 1967. My purpose was to see if he knew Herbert Adolf PELKA (P-). Subject said that he didn't know either PELKA or the two German witnesses to his marriage. However he does have a friend, a secretary at Telefunken where PELKA works. He will check this girl and elicit information on PELKA.

2. Subject reported that he had noticed that Ralph WIEGANDT has become quite friendly at the French Club as a tennis partner of LOGINOV. (COMMENT: Per LIENVOY WIEGANDT and wife invited LOGINOV to dinner in March 1967). WIEGANDT is a German who came to Mexico after WW II. He formerly worked for Rieboldt Chemical in Germany. His wife is from a well-known German-Mexican family from Guadalajara, nee BAHNSEN. His father is a Dr. of chemistry from Stuttgart who recently came to Mexico. WIEGANDT owns or has a controlling interest in Barnices Aislantes, S.A., located at Avenida Tolteca 176. This company manufactures plastic foam insulating materials. He lives in Coyoacan in a house which he recently had built, Europa 26. Subject dislikes WIEGANDT whom he describes as a pushy, ambitious businessman. The implication is that he is unscrupulous and would do anything for a buck. Subject doesn't know anything about his politics. Subject will obtain more background information on him.

Paul Dillon

FILE: P-12330 P-11712 New P for PELKA
New P for WIEGANDT

SECRET

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[illegible] index
Source: LIFIRE

MEXICO .F. A 9 DE ABRIL DE 1967.

AL SR. ADOLFO BUCIO Guzmán LO CONOCIMOS EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DE TRAFICO DE LA CIA. LINEAS AEREAS BELGAS EN EL PUERTO CENTRAL AEREO EN EL AÑO DE 1959. DONDE OCUPABA EL CARGO DE EMPLEADO DE MOSTRADOR.

EN EL AÑO DE 1963 LO TRASLADARON A LAS OFICINAS DE SABENA EN EL CENTRO EN LAS CALLES DE , PASEO DE LA REFORMA # 52 OCUPANDO EL CARGO DE EMPLEADO DE VENTAS. EN EL AÑO DE 19[illegible]4 FUE NOMBRADO JEFE DE DICHO DEPARTAMENTO. EN ENERO DE 1966 RENUNCIO A LA CIA.

EL SR. ADOLFO BUCIO TRABAJA ACTUALMENTE EN LA CIA. DE AVIACION " AIR INDIA" EN LAS CALLES DE PASEO DE LA REFORMA # 116 CON TELEFONO 46-67-69 EN EL DEPARTAMENTO DE VENTAS.

EL SR. BUCUI ESTA CASADO CON UNA SEÑORA DE NACIONALIDAD FRANCESA MAESTRA EN DECORACION DE CASAS Y MODISTA. TIENEN SU DOMICILIO PARTICULAR EN LAS CALLES DE BAHIA DE DESCANSO # 10 COL. VERONICA ANZURES.

EN EL TIEMPO QUR TRATAMOS AL SR. BUCIO EN EL PEURTO CENTAL AEREO NUNCA HABLO DE POLITICA DESCONOCIENDO SU IDEOLIGIA.

EL SR. BUCIO HABLA INGLES ESPAÑOL ITALIANO Y ACTUALMETE ESTUDIA FRANCES.

used to be quite friendly with LOGINOV - less contact since B. moved to Air India.

CARDED

P-11712

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SECRET

30 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Unidentified Visitor to the Soviet Embassy

1. Reference is made to our memorandum on the same subject, dated 17 March 1967.

2. Attached are two photographs of the man who visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on 9 March 1967 driving a car with Florida tags # 10-W-7776.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11617

Attachment:
 Photos
Distribution:
 Original - Addressee, w/att., H/W
 1 - 50-2-4/A, w/o
 1 - 50-8-10/11, w/att.
 1 - P-11712, w/o
 1 - Memo Chron, w/o
 2 - Wash pouch, w/att.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
30 March 1967

SECRET

14-00000

45

Dillon's

Cyn—cj

~~Whitten to~~ Alice

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CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Miriam AVILA Katz — P-531

DATE OF MEETING: 23 March 1967 (La Pergola Restaurant, 1400-1615)

1. Subject works at Mundos Tours, where she is in charge of travel to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In this job, she deals with LOGINOV on visa matters. However, as far back as June 1966, LIENVOY indicated the existence of something more than simply a business relationship between them. Then in January 1967, Paul Dillon elicited from LICOZY-5 the information that Subject definitely had a social relationship with LOGINOV, as well as some basic biographic data: she was about 25 or 25 years old, a Mexican citizen with a Mexican father and "Jewish" mother, intelligent, definitely not pro-Soviet, and had gone to college for two years in the United States. The problem in arranging a meeting with her was to do so in such a way that she would be either disinclined or unable to say anything to LICOZY-5 or anyone else about the meeting before it took place. It was hoped that at the meeting she could be persuaded to keep the contact to herself.

2. Learning on 23 March that Mundos Tours was closed that day and that LICOZY-5 was out of town, I called Subject at her apartment that morning about 1115. I identified myself as an officer at the American Embassy, stated there was a matter on which I thought she might be able to be of some help to the Embassy, and asked if she by any chance were free to have lunch with me that day, or, if not, ~~if we could arrange another~~

Copies: P-11712 P-2712

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if we could arrange something else. Subject professed dismay that the American Embassy even knew she existed, let alone that she could possibly be of any help to the Embassy. She then became very defensive and only reluctantly agreed to meet me for lunch at the Pergola Restaurant at 1400. The Pergola is just a few blocks from her apartment.

3. Subject was waiting for me in front of the restaurant when I arrived a couple of minutes before the hour. I found a trim, stylishly dressed young woman with glasses and long, dark hair pulled straight back from her forehead. The glasses, exposed forehead, and hair style gave her a sophisticated look which turned out to perfectly express her personality. She did not at first strike me as particularly attractive, but this was probably because she was tensed up to the point that she was pale and expressionless and actually trembled slightly when we first spoke. I later found her, especially when she took off her glasses, to be quite attractive, and it is reasonable to assume that LOGINOV is attracted by more than her personality.

4. The first 15 minutes were tough going. Subject was defensive to the point of hostility and totally unresponsive to efforts to break through to her on a personal level. Fortunately, she agreed to a drink before asking flatly what it was I wanted. I replied directly but in a friendly manner that through routine investigation, it had come to our attention that she had a social relationship with Valentin LOGINOV. I continued that while her personal life normally wouldn't be of any concern to the American Embassy, the fact was that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was a major base for espionage and subversion against both

COPIES MADE

2

Mexico and the United States and that LOGINOV was one of the Soviets' most able and active intelligence officers. One of the areas where he was most active, I continued, was in establishing relationships with young women like herself. For this purpose, I said, he used various lines, alternatively telling girls he was unmarried, divorced, or that his wife was in the Soviet Union. (This brought the first expression of any kind from Subject, who smiled faintly when I mentioned his using the line that his wife was in the USSR. According to LICOZY-5, this is what LOGINOV had told Subject.) Encouraged by the fact that Subject was at least listening, I went further into the seriousness of the Soviet presence in Mexico, hitting hard the fact that the Soviets treatened the security of both the U.S. and Mexico, individually and collectively. When I finished, I told Subject that I was telling her all this both so that she would know whom she was dealing with in LOGINOV and because I frankly hoped that understanding the situation, she would be willing to discuss LOGINOV with me.

5. To my disappointment, Subject replied with undiminished defensiveness that all right, she had gone out with LOGINOV a few times. Because of her job as head of East European travel at Mundos Tours, she had met and had to deal with LOGINOV on visa matters. One day he had casually asked if she were free that night and had invited her out. He had always been helpful to her and she felt it was good business to accept the invitation. In all, she had gone out with him "three or four times"--usually to dinner, the movies, a coffee nightcap, and then "always

COPIES MADE 2

straight home." She admittedly enjoyed his company. She considered herself "an intelligent person," and wouldn't go out with just anybody. He too had to be intelligent and had to be an enjoyable companion. LOGINOV fit this bill. He was "extremely intelligent," very considerate, an interesting conversationalist, completely unlike the usual ill-mannered, boorish Soviet. But that's all there was to their relationship. That's absolutely all there was to it. They never discussed politics, and even if LOGINOV wanted to do so, she'd refuse, because she had absolutely no interest in politics. She had her own life to lead, and what one side said made no more dent in her than what the other side said. Reflecting for a moment on the above, Subject then added almost disgustedly that when she began seeing LOGINOV she had more or lessed expected that her name would wind up in the American Embassy's files.

6. Subject said all of the above as though she were on the stand and showed no intention of volunteering any more. I consequently felt there was not much more I could do with her and that I had foreclosed any possibilities there might have been with the wrong approach, whatever the right one may have been. Moreover, at this moment, a well-dressed Mexican who looked to be in his early 30's came up to the table, greeted Subject, and invited himself to sit down. Subject, apparently as surprised as I, introduced him as Alejandro ALVAREZ (no Station traces) of ALVAREZ AUTOMOTRIZ, a local firm which makes springs for Volkswagens. Subject told me later that his father owns the business. Alejandro, according to Subject, had once been her professor in an accounting course at business school

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here in Mexico City. Subject also said that Alejandro and his firm were good customers of Mundos Tours, and that Alejandro had in fact just recently returned from a three week trip to Germany. He spoke some English.

7. The appearance of ALVAREZ, who by now was ordering his first of two martinis, seemed to end any remaining chances of getting anywhere with the girl. As it worked out, however, his appearance had just the opposite effect, because it provided more than an hour of conversation on an increasingly friendly and personal level. By her second drink, Subject was even managing a few laughs. Eventually we got onto the subject of Israel, which, thanks to the information supplied by LICOZY-5, I knew she had visited and had become romantically involved with, she herself being half Jewish. I expressed considerable interest in her trip and Israel in general, and she seemed delighted to tell me about both. It then turned out that her mother--who Subject said is a U.S. citizen--had lived in Moldavia, had told her daughter vivid stories of pogroms carried out by the Russians against the Jews, and had fled Rumania before the invading Russians (evidently during World War II.) The fact that I had been in Rumania and Moldavia was good for another ten minutes of conversation and seemed to impress Subject far beyond its worth. In any event, by the time ALVAREZ left, Subject and I were on a first name basis and she was telling me how glad she was she had met me--all of which I attribute to luck (ALVAREZ, who even quietly paid the check when leaving) and dubonnet cocktails.

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8. During the above conversation, we also discussed the United States, including President Kennedy, whom both Subject and ALVAREZ claimed greatly to have admired, and Subject's experience in the U.S., where she attended Kent State University in Ohio. She stated at this time that she regarded the U.S. as a second home. She also expressed love for Mexico and together with ALVAREZ, took pride in pointing to Mexico's progress.

9. Following ALVAREZ's departure, Subject looked at me as though I were a bad dog or something and asked in a scolding tone how I could have ever suspected her of cooperating with LOGINOV. No, she just couldn't understand it. I replied that I hadn't suspected her and reminded her that I hadn't said I did. I then said more seriously that there was one thing tha t bothered me, however. On the one hand, she told me she loved Mexico and regarded the U.S. as her second country; yet on the other, she claimed to be totally apolitical. The Soviets in Mexico, I repeated, were working to undermine both countries, and proceeded to go over again much of what I had said earlier. I stated that it was incredible to me that Soviet activities in Mexico didn't make any difference to her. I had contacted her, I said, not because I had any suspicion of her, but because from the little I knew of her I had hoped she'd cooperate in helping us learn more about LOGINOV and his activities in Mexico. Subject thereupon protested that there was nothing more she could tell me. She had told me everything worth telling about their association. Moreover, she hadn't seen him since Christmas time. LOGINOV was smart, never talked about anything sensitive, and could probably never be induced to do so. The only thing

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he had ever asked her of an even remotely suspicious or interesting nature was whether she had any friends at the American Embassy. She said she had replied tartly that she had friends everywhere, and that LOGINOV hadn't bothered her with such questions since. In short, she didn't see how she could be of any help. I replied that since it was I who need the help, this was for me to ~~decide, that~~ whether she liked it or not she was in contact with an important Soviet intelligence officer who was of great interest to the United States, and that now that I knew her better, I was confident she had the intelligence and judgment to help us. I did not want to interfere in any way in her personal life. Nor did I really want her to do anything in the sense that she would have to go out of her way. All I wanted was that she be as observant as possible during her normal contacts and dates with LOGINOV, to try to see into the man, what made him tick, what his problems were, whether he was satisfied with his work, how he liked to relax, what did he enjoy, what did he want, etc. Then after each substantial contact, most probably a date, I'd like to have the opportunity to sit down with her over lunch or wherever it be and discuss her observations. This was all I was asking. All right, if that's all I wanted, she'd do it.

10. There was, I said, one thing I wanted to impress on her: if we were to obtain any worthwhile results, one thing was essential... Subject nodded at this point and interrupted: "I know...keep quiet." I emphasized that this meant with everyone, indluding her family, her friends, her boss and her co-workers. Subject assured me that she could be relied upon.

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11. Contact Arrangements. Subject agreed to call me to set up a luncheon date after her next date with LOGINOV. We will meet at the entrance to the Pergola at the time and date specified. I gave her the 870 extension and asked that she use the name "Mary" when calling.

12. There are clearly two essentials if Subject is to develop into a worthwhile asset. First she is going to have to come up with more interesting observations than simply that LOGINOV is smart. She may be able to do this by becoming a more diligent and careful observer--which I think she is capable of--or it may require an effort on her part to develop a closer relationship with LOGINOV. One possibility in the latter direction is to prevail upon her to become more intimate with LOGINOV than she now appears to be. On the basis of LICOZY-5's opinion that she probably sleeps around, this might be possible, although it is much too early to say. Second, Subject must prove cooperative. She strikes me as a very independent and strong-willed person, and there is no guarantee she won't change ~~herein~~ her mind or do only what she feels like doing. It is also possible that in a moment of reconsideration, she might confide in LICOZY-5, in which case her credibility would become tangled with his.

RS
Robert Steele

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SECRET

17 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Unidentified Visitor to Soviet Embassy

1. A sensitive, reliable source has reported that on 9 March 1967 a man who appeared to be an American stopped at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to talk with Soviet Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV. The man did not enter the Soviet Embassy. He was driving what appeared to be a late model Buick Electra with Florida tags # 10-W-7776.

2. A photograph of the above man will be furnished to your office when prints are available.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11581

P-11712

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
  1 - 50-2-4/A
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  1 - Wash pouch
  1 - P-11712

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
17 March 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

54

~~Jomme~~ R

Raymond PATUEL
Francis L. PATUEL, nee Smith.

Citizenship check, please

~~fnt~~
Paul A.

RECORDED

attached

R. L.

15 Mar 67

P-11,712

From Citizenship Office - 15 March 1967

Ramon PATUEL

DPOB: 28 July 1926, Madrid, Spain

Date of Naturalization - 11 April 1956, Supreme Court of N. Y. at Rochester, N.Y.

Naturalization Certificate #7457155

Emergency Addressee and Address: Mrs. Frances L. Patuel, wife, same add in Mex.

Local Address: Sierra Grande 907, Lomas, Mexico 10, D. F.

Address in U. S. - 23 River Meadow Drive, Rochester 23, N.Y.

Occupation - Manager

Full name of father, date and place of his birth: Enrique PATUEL,
Valencia, Spain Nationality - Spanish

Mother: Eulalia Sanchez de Molina Patuel, Madrid, Spain - Spanish

Name of Spouse: Frances L. Patuel, Madrid, Spain, 4 Dec. 1922 (US father) US Cit

Date and place of marriage - 18 March 1950

Wife native born

Date of last arrival in country - 20 Feb. 1961

Pp #524029 issued 15 May 1957, Wash.

Names of children, dates and places of birth:

Raymond J. 13 February 1951, Rochester, N. Y.

U.S. Residence since Natz.		Residence outside U.S. since Natz.		
From	To	Country	From	To
1956	1957	Spain	1957	1959
1959	1961	Mexico	2-20-61	Present

Date card initially typed - 1 March 1962

Action taken:

1 Mar 51 Appl for ppt & reg

3 Mar 61 Ppt #Z042590 iss valid to 3-2-64 reg. to same date. Wife included in reg only

27 Feb 64 Ppt Z042990 iss 3 Mar 61 ren to full validity

25 Feb 66 Issued Ppt Z522118 valid to 24 Feb 69, reg. Prev. ppt. can. & ret.

Frances L. PATUEL   4 Dec. 1922, Madrid, Spain

Father - XXXXX Austin Rodger Smith, Rochester, N. Y. 8 Aug. 1892   Cit: USA

Mother - Mercedes Semprun Smith, Valladolid, Spain

Father native born

Date of last arrival in country - 20 Feb 61

Ppt #524029 iss 15 May 57, Wash. (incl. in husband's ppt.)

Action taken:

3 Mar 61 - Ppt #Z042588 iss valid to 3-2-64 reg. to same date

27 Feb 64 Ppt #Z042588 ren to full validity

25 Feb 66 Issued Ppt #Z522119 valid to 26 Feb 69, Reg. Prev. ppt. can. & ret.

Date card initially typed - 1 Mar 62

There is also a card on the son, Raymond J. PATUEL, born 13 Feb 51, Rochester, N.Y. with same info as above.

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SECRET

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: BESABER

DATE OF MEETING: 7 March 1967

1. Operational: Met BESABER at his hotel room in Del Paseo for breakfast. Meet lasted from 0800-0920. Next meet will be after Easter.

2. Substance

a. BEWEEP: BEWEEP phoned BESABER on Friday, 3 March 1967 to invite himself, his wife and the RZADZINSKI couple down for the day on 5 March. They arrived on 5 March at about1100, stayed until 1700.

b. BESABER reported that Mrs. RZADZINSKA is three months pregnant (by her admission) and that he, BESABER, thinks that BEWEEP is the father. He cited the following as evidence :

(1) The RZADZINSKIs admitted they they had been married for over five years, yet this is her first pregnancy.

(2) Mr. RZADZINSKI was totally unattentive to Mrs. R. BESABER and his wife assume that after so many years of waiting for a child, Mr. R. should have shown more concern for and interest in his wife.

(3) Likewise, Mr. R. was totally disinterested in the fact that he is about to become a father.

(4) BEWEEP, on the other hand, showed concern for Mrs. R. when she went to sleep in the sun. Twice he suggested that Mr. R. wake her up so she would not get burned. He didn't.

(5) Mrs. R. appeared interested in BEWEEP. When he went swimming Mrs. R followed, proceeded to jump on him and frolic in the water. Mr~~s~~. R. paid no attention at all.

(6) Mrs. R. sat next to BEWEEP at lunch (on purpose), kept looking at BEWEEP lovingly.

(7) BEWEEP, possibly embarrassed by all the attention Mrs. R. was showing him, made some very complimentary remarks about his wife. Mrs. BEWEEP, who apparently was completely oblivious to what BESABER and his wife thought was so obvious in the BEWEEP/Mrs. R. relationship, was obviously very pleased

[illegible]

Lerner

FILE: P-8777 P-9097 P-453 P-11712 P-5183

P-11712

SECRET

but surprised, to hear her husband speaking about her in such a complimentary way. She asked incredulously whether he really meant what he said and when BEWEEP reiterated with some embarrassment that he thought she was the best wife in the world, Mrs. BEWEEP, covered with confusion but happy said that this was the first time he had ever said such kind things about hter, the first time she had been aware that he really did think she was a good wife.

(8) BEWEEP seemed relaxed enough, but different. On several occasions when political matters came up, usually raised by Mr. R., he changed the subject, once asked Mr. R. almost rudely, "Don't you have anything better than politics to talk about."

(9) Mrs. BEWEEP said that the two couples had been in the habit of going off on weekends together. BESABER supposed that BEWEEP may have done the deed during one of their outings.

c. In private conversation with BESABER, Mrs. BEWEEP asked if BESABERhad heard from BESETON. When BESABER said he had not, Mrs. BEWEEP said that her husband had told her BESETON was in Colombia (SLINKARD had told BEWEEP this). She then went on to say that BESETON was the nicest man in the world. "I don't know what he is, but he's the nicest man in the world." "He introduced us to another American (obviously SLINKARD) whom we see often, but it's not the same."

d. Mrs. BEWEEP, still alone with BESABER, was very complimentary towards the U. S. She said the U. S. was made for women, the merchandise, the packaging, the stores, etc. Moreover, the people are all nice.

e. Joined by BEWEEP, Mrs. BEWEEP got off on the Russians. She explained that it was difficult to understand the Russians since she, as a Pole, belonging to the Western Cultural traditions, held so many different views about life in general. She was apparently particularly thinking of the sense of distrust in the Russian mentality. She said that the Russians here in the Embassy simply could not believe that the two daughters of the former Polish Ambassador, Jerzy GRUDZINSKI, had been permitted to stay on in Mexico after their XXXXXX father's recall last year.

f. Mrs. BEWEEP told Mrs. BESABER that she was not teaching geography at the Embassy to the children of the officials.

g. BEWEEP told BESABER that he thought he would remain in Mexico until the first few months of 1969, but certainly until after the Olympics of the fall of 1968.

h. Tenon RZADZINSKI and wife - In addition to the information above noted regarding R. and his wife, the BESABERs picked up the following :

(1) RZADZINSKI was previously stationed in Vietnam as a member of the ICC (interpreter). He speaks good English and his Spanish, although not as good, is understandable.

(2) R. doesn't understand why the Americans are carrying out the war the~~y~~ way they are. Without in any way criticizing the American position, he did say that he found it unbelievable that they did not destroy the port of Haiphang.

(3) R. had contact with Amercans in Vietnam. ~~XX~~ He spent one month at the Danang air base, apparently anjoyed it.

(4) R. did not get off on politics, possibly because BEWEEP apparently did not want to talk about such subjects.

3. Comments

We have no information to substantiate the BESABERs supposition that BEWEEP is the father of Mrs. R's expected child. I told BESABER this. It may be true, but to have any operational significance, we would almost have to prove it.

4. Plans

a. I asked BESABER to arrange a lunch with BEWEEP in the near future to try to see if there was anything more to the above supposition. (Lunch now set up for 4 April).

b. Tentatively, BESABER will invite LOGINOV to Cuernavaca for 8 or 9 April to look at houses (for Sov Embassy retreat) and play tennis at Colonel Higgins (whom I will brief as soon as I can get hold of him).

Phineas F. SLINKARD

60

CPS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Pepper
files? 50~~...~~ ok
~~Dalton~~
files? ①

Amconsul VERACRUZ February 28, 1967

OCEAN SHIPPING: Communist Ships

C-RAA-50783; Veracruz A-35, 2/15/67, same subject

1. EAST GERMAN SHIPS AT VERACRUZ.

The HEINRICH HEINE (11 photos enclosed) arrived as expected on February 15, (see referenced airgram, pgh. 1) direct from Le Havre, and left for Habana February 21 in ballast. The ship had planned to take a Canadian passenger (Alexander John BLANCHARD; ppt # BE-602204, issued Toronto, 12/18/64; age: 35, professor, address: 256 Glen Manor Drive, Toronto 13), but he disappeared at the last minute. Blanchard planned to return to Mexico City from Cuba via the CUA flight, and then come back down to Veracruz to get his wife Mary Ann, who was to remain here. The Mexican tourist cards of Mr. & Mrs. Blanchard expired February 12, 1967. The local agent for the East German line stated that, recently, the honorary Consul of West Germany (a rival shipping agent) has been going aboard each East German ship to offer all possible assistance; on looking into this, said the agent, he discovered that West Germany's representatives throughout the world, wherever East Germany is not represented, have been ordered to act discreetly in representation of East German interests as well as West German interests.

did not sail

cc:
ARA/MEX
AMEMEXICO
P
E
CCA
NAVY
~~USIA~~
P/R
+ legal

2. RUSSIAN SHIPS AT VERACRUZ.

The KOMSOMOLETS TADJIKISTANA (see referenced airgram, pgh.2) sailed February 21, saying she was bound for Hamburg. The oceanographic

Enclosures: 1. 11 photos of the HEINE
2. 3 photos of the M. LOMONOSOV
3. Crew lists of the LOMONOSOV, VETLUGALES and KIROVSK

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MAR 0 1 1967
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MEXICO, D. F.
MEXICO

RTBooth: mdb 2/28/67

Index
cy to
P-11712
file 200-4-79

P-11,712

research vessel MIKHAIL LOMONOSOV (5 photos enclosed) arrived February 26, giving Cristobal as her last port, and is expected to leave late February 28. On February 25, the merchant vessels VITLUGALIS and KIROVSK arrived in ballast from Nuevitas, Cuba, and Habana, respectively. The former is to load an estimated 5,000 metric tons of corn and the latter an estimated 11,000. Crew lists of the three ships last mentioned are enclosed. Mexican authorities mounted a guard around the LOMONOSOV and refused to let anyone on or off. Soviet Consul and Third Secretary Valentin L. LOGUINOV, in town in connection with the visiting Russian ships, called the Consulate on February 27, wanting to talk to the Consul, who was out of town, but showed no interest in talking to the Vice Consul. On February 28, a local shipping agent introduced Loguinov to the Vice Consul. Loguinov complained of the lack of hospitality shown to the Soviet scientific ship by Mexican authorities, comparing this with the magnificent reception the ship had received in San Francisco; he even asked if the American Consulate didn't have some relationship with Mexican immigration authorities, implying that we might be able to help them. Loguinov, who was very cordial, said he had been in Mexico City a year and half and lived there with his family. He seemed about six feet tall, with short, reddish-blond hair, and spoke fluent Spanish with Russian accent.

3. COATZACOALCOS.

No Communist ships are known to have entered Coatsacoalcos harbor since those mentioned in pgh. 3 of the referenced airgram. Further information is not yet available on those ships.

BOOTH

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact with BESABER

DATES OF MEETINGS: 23 and 28 February 1967

A. Operational

1. As arranged by phone CO met BESABER in latter's room at the Hotel Del Paseo, dates 23 and 28 February. Mrs. BESABER was present at the second meet. BESABER plans to be in Mexico City on 9 March and will call to arrange meet.

B. Finances

1. CO picked up BESABER's accounting for revolving fund. I'll reimburse him at next meet.

C. Substance

1. Soviets - At about 1000 on 18 February Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (P-8167) phoned BESABER from Cuernavaca. BESABER had never met him before. S explained he friend of Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (P-11712), that L unable to make it because some people had arrived in town. S showed interest in buying some of BESABER's products, therefore BESABER asked him to come to factory. S arrived with wife and young girl who works in the Embassy (18-19 years old, tall, good figure, dark brown hair, spoke Spanish, she wore kerchief) - this probably Tatyana MARKINA (P-12945).

2. S brought almost 2000 pesos worth of stuff including two large screens. BESABER opines that this was not personal purchase, but rather either for the Embassy or operational expense deal. S also insisted that purchases be delivered to Embassy, not his house.

3. S invited BESABER and wife to Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy (28 Feb 1967), saying that he had forgotten to bring written invitation but that it would be at the gate of the Embassy (BESABER was reluctant to go and I thought it better for him to not appear overly eager so he did not go.)

4. Before leaving (they stayed about 45 minutes) S told BESABER that ~~he~~ LOGINOV would probably come to Cuernavaca the following day, Sunday about noon. (he didn't.)

FILE: P-8777 P-8167 P-11712 P-5183 P-12019 P-885

P-9772

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

5. After S, XXX wife and M had left BESABER picked up a girl and drove to the Arosena (phonetic) hotel in downtown Cuernavaca. Sitting in the garden of the hotel at about 1300 he spotted S(with his shirt off) sitting at another table conversing with a man who looked Russian, apparent age 25, thin, wavy dark brown hair. S's wife also present, but M not. BESABER left after about 15 minutes without talking to S although S must have seen him.

6. Per CO instructions BESABER phoned L on 24 February to apologize for not making it to the reception. During this conversation (LIENVOY intercepted) L said he would come to BESABER's house for lunch on Saturday, 25 February with about five other people. He showed up at about 1545, stayed until 1830 with :

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (P-829) and wife
Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (P-9772) and wife
Mrs. Pavel YATSKOV (P-885)
Mrs. LOGINOV (P-11712)
8 assorted children of above.

7. They arrived in two cars, BROVKIN driving a 2-year old light blue Ford Falcon, LOGINOV a blue-gray Chevrolet, license plates 19-DA. (BESABER may be color blind - our records show both cars as being green.)

8. The conversation was characterized by a lot of propaganda on BROVKIN's and LOGINOV's part. Although Vietnam was not mentioned, L boasted several times that the Soviets would get to the moon first, complained about the Kennedy murder scandal, and generally spoke in an anti-American vein. BESABER and his wife tried to laugh them out of this theme, but with little success.

9. At one point BESABER mentioned an article he had recently read in Business Week about the Soviet car industry. When he told LOGINOV that the article purported to be based on CIA information, L would not leave him alone until he found the article and gave it to him.

10. LOGINOV was obviously the superior of the three men. Neither MALAKHOVICH nor his wife said a word. BROVKIN, after a few drinks (but not drunk) started moaning about the problems of life, mentioned that the only thing that kept him going was his good wife and children. At this point LOGINOV walked up behind BROVKIN'sXXXXXXXXX chair, practically lifted BROVKIN, chair and all, and said, "We must go."

S E C R E T

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SECRET

11. As far as the BESABERs could make out the only purpose of the visit (other than to get a free meal) was to invite the BESABERs to come to the Embassy to see Soviet films. Not knowing how he should react BESABER was non-committal, although he couldn't resist asking BROVKIN if they had any Westerns in color. (I told BESABER he should not go to movies and if the subject came up again to tell the Sovs that while he liked them as people, he didn't want to hear their propaganda either orally or from the sound track of some lousy movie).

12. BESABER is less impressed by LOGINOV's intelligence than heretofore. Between L's and B's heavy-handed propagandizing (especially in the capptalistic "ambiente" of the BESABERS) BESABER was less than impressed with their tact.

13. Mrs. BESABER reported that of the three women Mrs. YATSKOV was by the far the most presentable. She learned that the YATSKOVs were on their second tour in Mexico, that they liked Mexico (Mrs. BESABER is Mexican). Mrs. BROVKIN related that they had one daughter (age 14) in Moscow besides the two children with them in Mexico.

14. Plans for future get-togethers include only LOGINOV. Mrs. BESABER will look for some housing for the Sovs in Cuernavaca; when she has found something, they'll invite LOGINOV down to have a look at them. There is also the possibility of tennis, although both BESABERs are loathe to take any Sovs to Mrs. BESABER's tennis club, practically all the members of which are Americans. I agree.

15. The BESABERs proposed and I second the motion that I contact Laurence Higgins, a long-time Station contact and personal friendof the BESABERs and tell them that the BESABERs are cultivating Sovs in our behalf, ask him to let BESABERs bring LOGINOV, and possibly others to Higgin's court in Cuernavaca.

16. Attached are signatures of the Sovs who visited BESABER.

17. Raul Morales Montoya - At 23 Feb meet BESABER handed over the attached postcard from RMM, dated 14 Feb from Colima. At the 28 Feb meet BESABER reported that PMM had phoned him from Colima on 24 Feb, reporting among other things that he would be in Colima for another month or so. He said he was working in the office of Secretaria Particular of the Governor of Colima (tel: 2-04-11) and staying at the Motel Costeno (tel: 2-00-35).

Phineas F. SLINKARD

SECRET

Can't tell who signed what.

65

Sov/Unc

Source LITAMIL-7 1 Feb 67

On Saturday 28 I went to a party at the house of the Greek Consul General Leander Vourvoulias, and I saw there Vladimir Loguinov engaged in a heated discussion with an american consul whose name is Sherry. Sherry was arguing that there were a lot of Chinese in North Viet Nam, and Loguinov was saying that it was a pity that such a big nation as the US should be fighting an small and poor nation like Viet Nam.

I had a talk with Loguinov, who I think now is in charge of consular affairs and he told me that he thought that negociations for the cultural agreement with Mexico were still going on, but that those boys who had been awarded the fellowships had already gone. But according to what he said there were quite a few more then ten.

Loguinov was with his wife and talking about the Bolshoi ballet he told me that I should have rang him up and he would have taken us, me and my wife, to see the ballet and to see the dancers behind the stage. He said that the ballet was coming to Canadá for the fair and probably would come again to México.

The Russians will give a party for the consuls, film and drinks, sometime during February.

Loguinov asked me if I thought that some consuls would not show up at the Russian embassy as they did when they were invited by the Cubans. I told him that the position was entirely different because most countries had diplomatic and consular relations with the URRS.

LOGINOV P-File

P-11712

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Martes 3 LICALLA	A las 1114 Hs. llegó al Club una mujer de poco más de 50 años, misma que pasó al interior del Recibidor en el cual tuvo contacto con LOO, dicha mujer se fué a las 1242 Hs. photos in Y-2174 (no car)

I thought this might be Tatiana RAKOFF de MARCHAND, but she must be older.
ch

3 Jan 67

P-11712

6.7

LILYRIC 9 Jan 57
in 1112 R out ~~1344~~ R

68



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

photo!

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SECRET

7 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Dr. R. W. JUDD

1. Reference is made to your memorandum on Subject dated 27 February 1967.

2. This office has photographs of three American-looking people who visited the Soviet Embassy from 1320 to 1336 hours on 26 January 1967, and who are probably identical with Subject, his wife and associate, Clyde WHITWELL. They were driving a Tourism car from Zacatecas, license plates 8133-H.

3. It is believed that the Soviet who talked to Subject was the Consul, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11547

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Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
  1 - 50-2-4/A
  1 - 50-8-10/11
  1 - P-11712
  1 - Memo Chron
  2 - Wash pouch (HMMA-31524, 7 March 1967)
Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
7 March 1967

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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(4)

LIROBBIN-2 Contact Report, 28 Feb 1967 Orig filed: P-11665

recently rejoined RAY'S firm after previously leaving it and working for another firm in Mexico City. (The man is undoubtedly John G.* PAGE, who is listed in the 1966-67 Anglo-American Directory as Sales Manager for Tele-Revista, S.A. The 1961-62 Anglo lists a John G. PAGE as being with Richard K. TOMPKINS y Assoc.--i.e., clearly the predecessor of "TOMPKINS, RAY, MARTEL.") According to Subject, Mrs. PAGE's mother is Dr. Anita BRENNER, an American and the editor of "Mexico This Month." Mr. PAGE looks to be 35-40 years old and his wife about 30. PAGE is half Jewish and one of his parents was born in Russia. PAGE consequently speaks some Russian and spoke a little with KUCHEROV. LIROBBIN-1 saw RAY a few days after the film showing, and RAY mentioned that PAGE had told him that KUCHEROV had made a definite effort to make friends with him (PAGE), but that he (PAGE) had no interest in making friends with Communists.

CARDED

4. As it turned out, Gulliver's Travels wasn't shown after all, as the film turned out to be in very poor condition and kept breaking when run on the projector. In its place, the Soviets showed a Soviet film about a poor young woman in 19th or early 20th century Russia who marries a wealthy old man and is corrupted by her new found riches. The kids and everyone else were disappointed, but Subject found some consolation in the fact that the flick at least was clean.

5. 15 February. On this date Subject and LIROBBIN-1 attended an evening reception at the Indian Embassy at the invitation of their friend K.D.* PARASHAR, the Indian Consul. LOGINOV and SOKOLOV were also there, both without wives. Subject at first

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(4) COPIES MADE

LIROBBIN-2 Contact Report, 23 Feb 1967 Orig filed: P-11665

and unfortunately really didn't know of any. LOGINOV said that he probably really ought to take English lessons from a Britisher. He added that he had once taken a few lessons from a "girl from Texas," but he had had to stop because of her "Texas accent." LOGINOV finally said that well, look, he was having " a little party" the next evening and would like Subject and her husband (whom he eventually met in the course of the evening) to attend, as he would like to have her become acquainted with the Soviet Embassy, too (i.e., in addition to the Indian Embassy). LOGINOV added that perhaps she could even put something in THE NEWS about the affair. Subject accepted the invitation, although without LIROBBIN-1, who was about to leave for the States, and said ~~he~~ she'd see if she could get a photographer to the Embassy.

6. 16 February. On this date Subject attended the Consular Corps gathering at the Soviet Embassy. She went with the PARASHARS. LOGINOV was the first Soviet to greet her, but within a few moments PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV came hustling up. Subject said that LOGINOV seemed genuinely surprised that his colleagues already knew her, but he did not ask for an explanation of how. On their parts, PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV seemed equally surprised, but also avoided asking any questions. In the course of the evening, Subject talked with PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, DOLGOV, Mrs. PRIKHODKO, and Mrs. SOKOLOV. LOGINOV made no effort to search her out, and she did not talk with him again until leaving, at which time she thanked him for the invitation and apologized that the NEWS photographer she had asked to come to the Embassy had not shown up. However, she said she'd try to put something in "Around the Town."

CARDED

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(5) COPIES MADE

gone and spend and/or make some time with her. She said she actually felt sorry for KUCHEROV, because he just wasn't cut out for the role and she thought he probably dreaded it.

8. 23 February. On this date Subject attended the Soviet Army Day reception at the Soviet Embassy. She went with Pearl GONZALEZ and an American named Bill SOLEMNE, whom Pearl brought along as her escort. (KUCHEROV left an invitation for Pearl with Subject on 17 February.) According to Subject, SOLEMNE is about 35 and is in "publicity" work here. (According to the A-A Directory, William A. *SOLEMNE is an executive in the International Department of Walter Thompson de Mexico.) Subject did not notice any other Americans at the reception. She talked with PRIKHODKO, Mrs. PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, DOLGOV, and, briefly, LOGINOV. DOLGOV said he had been with PRAVDA for six years. Subject had put a blurb about the 16 February Consular function in THE NEWS on 19 February and brough along a clipping for LOGINOV. LOGINOV said he hadn't seen it, seemed pleased, and thanked her. He then asked if she were going on the Consular Corps tour of the Mexican Home Show on 3 March. Well, no, Subject replied, why would she be, she wasn't a consul or married to one, and consequently hadn't been invited. LOGINOV replied that he thought she should go and therefore he was making her an honorary Soviet consul. Subject said that was fine with her and she'd see him at the Home Show. (I told Subject on 28 February to be careful with LOGINOV, because he was an experienced KGB officer and one of the most able men in the Soviet Embassy. This seemed to delight as much as concern Subject.)

CARDED

LIROBBIE-2 Contact Report, 23 Feb 1967 Orig. filed: P-11665

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9. 3 March. Subject did not at first see LOGINOV on the Home Show tour, but mid-way through the tour she felt a tap on her shoulder, turned and saw LOGINOV. They then walked along together for the last 25 minutes ~~of~~ or so of the tour. Subject said that nothing of interest was said and they parted without any specific mention of getting together again. Subject said LOGINOV spent most of the time criticizing the U.S. on everything from its foreign policy to its treatment of the American Indian.

10. Pearl GONZALEZ. Subject told me on 8 March that Pearl had just received permission ~~for this~~ from the Cuban Government to visit Cuba as a journalist. Subject said U.S. foreign correspondents in Mexico had applied for permission to visit Cuba many times in the past, but had all been turned down. Pearl and Harold JONES of the Copley News Service, according to Subject, were the two most recent American applicants. JONES, according to Subject, was turned down. Subject said she thought Pearl was probably given permission because the Cubans believe they can lead her a round by the hand and get some useful publicity out of her. Subject noted that Pearl believes Castro has done a lot of good for Cuba and that he has been unfairly treated by the U.S. press. Moroever, Subject observed, Pearl is by no means a full-fledged or experienced newspaper woman, as her only experience consists of writing society articles in THE NEWS for the last year. Subject said Pearl planned to visit the American Embassy on 8 March in order to get permission from the State Department to make the trip.

CARDED

11. Antonio *HALIK. I asked Subject if she knew HALIK, who according to the Foreign Correspondents' Assoc. handbook, is a

[illegible]-3 Contact Report, 28 Feb 1967 Orig filed: D-11663

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SECRET

28 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Nathan L. Ferris, Legal Attache

FROM: Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT: Travel of Soviets

1. A sensitive, reliable source has reported that Soviet Minister Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV went to Veracruz on 25 February 1967, and that Soviet Consul Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV and Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV planned to go on 26 February 1967 in order to attend to three Soviet ships there in port. It has also been reported that Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV planned to be in Queretaro on 27 February 1967 to attend a ceremony at the university there.

2. Any information available to your office on the activities of these Soviets in Veracruz and Queretaro would be appreciated.

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

11513

Distribution:
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1 - 50-2-4/A
1 - P-11712
1 - P-1612
1 - P-8102
1 - P-880
1 - Memo Chron

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

Jonathan L. WEENING/fkm
28 February 1967

SECRET

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S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 22 February 1967

1. I had breakfast with Subject at the Hotel Del Paseo from 0900 to 1000 on 22 February 1967. Next meeting is at the same place at 0900 on 8 March 1967.

2. Subject reported that he had had lunch with LOGINOV as planned. LOGINOV brought up the following topics :

a. LOGINOV brought up the Ramparts article about CIA. Subject hadn't read or heard of it. LOGINOV then said this proved that CIA was very active and said they were active in Mexico. He again asked Subject if he had any friends at the American Embassy. Subject for the nth time told LOGINOV that he hadn't been in the American Embassy and that an office boy takes care of visas, etc. at the Embassy.

b. LOGINOV then said that he was going to explain to Subject the line of the CC of the CPUSSR on China. Then followed an harangue against the Chinese which Subject stated contained nothing that hasn't been in the newspapers.

c. LOGINOV said that he has a Mexican girl whom he didn't identify and asked if Subject would give her a job or find her a job. Subject asked about her qualifications, English, typing, etc. LOGINOV answered that he didn't know. Subject said to send her around and he would see. To date she has not appeared. (COMMENT: Subject said he has no intention of hiring her, if she comes, but thought we would be interested in her identify. I told him to find out as much about her as possible. However since LOGINOV didn't say what kind of a job she wanted or what she could do, I will be surprised if she comes.)

d. LOGINOV went into some detail explaining to Subject about the party he was giving at the Soviet Embassy on 16 February. for the Consular Corps. He then invited Subject.

S E C R E T

P-11712

e. LOGINOV said that Aeroflot service would be inaugurated between New York and Moscow in May. Once it is instituted local Soviets will fly to New York and catch Aeroflot there. Subject asked about U.S. visas which the Soviets have always complained about in the past. LOGINOV said that the Soviets will be travelling from Mexico to New York on Air France and Air France has agreed to handle the matter of transit visas with the U.S. Embassy. LOGINOV added that the local Soviets are looking forward to the stop off in New York which is much more interesting than Montreal. (COMMENT: If this works out we will have good advance notice of Soviet travel from Mexico and excellent passport photos).

3. Subject went to the party on 16 February 1967 with his secretary and his friend, Sinai Rome, First Secretary and Consul at the Israeli Embassy. He saw PRIKHODKO briefly and PRIKHODKO's wife attached herself to him and took care of him for the evening. He noted that YATSKOV wasn't at the party.

4. Rome introduced Subject to Jan JAKOWIEC. The minute JAKOWIEC heard Subject's name, he asked if he were from Mundus Tours. They then conversed in Polish. JAKOWIEC told Subject that the Polish delegation to the Olympics will come on the Batory and that the Poles are building a ship twice the size of the Batory which will be put on the Poland-New York City run next year. JAKOWIEC suggested that they get together for lunch and Subject agreed. JAKOWIEC said he would call Subject in about a week. Subject remarked that he is a sharp guy and speaks very good Russian. I told Subject that JAKOWIEC is the UB resident and instructed him not to go beyond a social relationship in any manner. Subject agreed.

5. Subject still has not heard anything on the ZABLUDOWSKIY-ECHEVARRIA dinner.

6. Subject is travelling to Los Angeles on business for two days on 24 February. On 27 April he will go to Israel for 10 days to conduct a group of Mexicans who are going to the opening of the Mexican Pavillion at a university which was paid for by Mexican Jews.

7. Per LIENVOY, NIKIFOROV called Subject on 20 February 1967 and made an appointment to come to Subject's office at 1100 on 21 February. Subject did not mention this to me. I will bring up the Subject of NIKIFOROV in an innocuous way at the next meeting.

Francis J. COIGNE

14-00000

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(12) COPIES MADE

LIROCKET-1 Contact Report, 16 & 18 Feb 67, filed: P-12244

(d) LOGINOV -- Subject has frequently seen LOGINOV in the first office off the Reception Room. LOGINOV has received the majority of the 8-10 visitors who have come into the Reception Room while Subject has been there during the last year.

(e) STRIZHOV -- Subject has frequently seen STRIZHOV jockeying cars around. He has also seen STRIZHOV go in and out of the gatehouse on numerous occasions.

(f) SILNIKOV -- Up to several months ago, SILNIKOV used to occasionally be on guard duty when Subject entered and exited the Embassy. He has also seen him jockeying cars around.

(g) SOLOMATIN -- Since Subject has been holding afternoon classes at the Embassy (since mid-January 1967), he has seen SOLOMATIN on guard duty every Tuesday and Thursday afternoon. He saw SOLOMATIN on duty only once in a while before this.

(h) TUCHNIN -- Subject has seen TUCHNIN in the second office of the Reception Room two or three times. He has never seen him receive a visitor.

(i) YATSKOV -- Subject has frequently seen YATSKOV in both the first and second offices off the Reception Room. He has seen YATSKOV receive visitors on a couple of occasions. YATSKOV has been ~~on duty~~ present with about half the frequency as LOGINOV.

(j) ZAKHAROV -- ZAKHAROV used to be frequenly on ~~duty~~ guard duty in the morning.

CARDED

3. Subject conducted 13 classes at the Soviet Embassy during the reporting period.

17 January

1545-1630 -- KAZANTSEV suggested that Subject give NIKITIN a call to check on whether or ~~whetherorn~~ not he planned to resume classes. KAZANTSEV implied he had no idea what NIKITIN's plans

P-11712

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17 FEBRERO DE 1961
Licalla

NOTAS.

Viernes	17	A las 1242 Hs. entró al Club por la reja principal, una mujer extranjera (al parecer norteamericana) afuera de la Portería habló un momento con SOLO y pasó al interior del Recibidor en el cual a las 1250 Hs. tuvo contacto con LOU, se fué del Club a las 1303 Hs. La mujer mencionada vestía un traje de 2 piezas de color azul claro, era rubia, alta y delgada, usa lentes (cristales transparentes).

LILYRIC 17 Feb 1967
in 1241 a, out 1303 a



P-11712

Zacarbaza 204

2/14/63

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files

Cuerpo Consular en Mexico
Mexico, D. F.

40 centavos

Honorable
Valentin Longuinov, Secretario
Embajada de la U.R.S.S.
Calzada de Tacubaya No.204
Mexico, D.F.

rec'd 17 Feb 67
P-11712

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BOLETIN CONSULAR

Organo del Cuerpo Consular de México
Plaza de la República # 9-105 México, D. F.

No. 1 Enero 1967 Vol. I

Fiesta Típica Griega. Hemos recibido numerosas felicitaciones por la fiesta ofrecida por el Hon. Consul General de Grecia y Pres. del Cuerpo Consular, en honor de los miembros de esta organización que ha sido atendida — por más de cien personas. Desde temprano, el día 28 de enero, la residencia de nuestro Presidente en Paseo de la Reforma No. 2485, Lomas, lugar de tan agradable reunión, ha sido colmada de gentes que han venido a gozar de los platillos griegos y de los bailes y música típicas de este país hermano que fueron presentados por un grupo de jovenes del Club Juvenil Heleno-Mexicano de esta ciudad. Hubo derroche de alegría y buen humor. Se sirvieron "bourekakia", "dolmadakia", "kioftedakia", "spanakoita", "kourabiedes" y varias otras especialidades griegas y se sirvió "ouzo", "Metaxa brandy" y otras bebidas internacionales para el deleite de los presentes entre los cuales citemos al Sr. Director General del Servicio Consular Exmo. Sr. Luis Alva Cejudo y su distinguida señora, y al Sr. Sub-Director del mismo servicio Consular Lic. Raúl Valensuela y señora, además de numeros Consules con sus consortes y Agregados y Secretarios de las Embajadas Extranjeras en este país. La casa y jardín del Presidente señor Vourvolias, debidamente iluminados para esta ocasión, presentaban un panorama muy bello, así como las caras alegres y felices de sus invitados que con su entusiasmo y alegría contribuyeron al éxito de esta reunión.

Fiesta Típica Rusa. Nuestro Honorable Colega Don Valentín Longuinov, Secretario de la Embajada de la U.R.S.S., nos informa que se está organisando una fiesta típica Rusa para el día 16 de febrero próximo, de las 19 a las 21 horas, en la cual tendremos la oportunidad de admirar los conocidos bailes y bebidas de origen Ruso. Se está preparando un nutrido programa en esta ocasión y esperamos que un gran número de nuestros asociados y sus señoras podrán atender a la invitación del Colega Longuinov, que será recibida por ellos oportunamente. Damos las gracias de antemano a nuestro querido compañero Longuinov por su gentileza e interés en la organisasión de este acto que seguramente será uno de los más interesantes de la temporada.

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Visita a la Planta Seagram's. Debido a nuestro programa de actividades en el mes de febrero, ésta visita a la muy importante Fábrica de Licores "Seagram's", se ha nuevamente aplazado hasta el 17 del próximo marzo, día en que esperamos será posible que un mayor número de Cónsules podrán hacer honor a la invitación que nos ha extendido la Dirección de esta Empresa.- La visita será con señoras y nos será servido un suculento ambigú por los anfitriones.

Cuota Trimestral 1967. Los recibos para el primer ~~se~~trimestre de este año, valor $ 150.00, se están presentando para su cobro. En caso de que nuestro Cobrador no le encuentre en su despacho, le rogamos se sirva dejar con su Secretaria un cheque por este valor, o enviarlo al Sr. Tesorero Honorable Françoise Barrolet, Cónsul de Mónaco, cuya dirección es: Paseo de la Reforma No. 156, 16o. Piso, México D.F., Mil Gracias.

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IV CONVENCION CONSULAR INTERAMERICANA (Abril 11 - 15 en Panamá, Rep. Panamá)

Nuestro estimado Colega, Honorable Emilia Arosemena, Consul General de Panamá en México, ha recibido una comunicación del del Honorable Sr. Andrés H. Ordaz G. Consul de Venezuela en Colón, Panamá, quien a la vez es Presidente del Comité Organizador de la IV Convención Consular Interamericana, invitando a los miembros de nuestro Cuerpo a estar presentes en esta Convención Consular Interamericana que tendrá lugar en la ciudad de Panamá los días 11 al 15 de Abril próximo.

Se ha preparado un interesantísimo programa que abarca además de las recepciones oficiales, actos culturales y sociales en éste maravilloso país, de manera que esperamos poder informar al Sr. Presidente del Comité Organizador que un buen número de nuestros asociados y sus dignas señoras podrán asistir a este evento.

Serán tratados varios temas de gran interes y se sugiere que cada uno de nuestros Consules someta al estudio de ésta Directiva, la ponencia o ponencias que desea presentar, sobre temas de interes común. Favor de indicarnos a la vez sí Usted y su señora va a asistir, para hacer las reservaciones del caso.

Oportunamente avisaremos a cada uno de los miembros de éste Cuerpo del Costo de pasaje y del Hotel. La cuota del registro se ha fijado en $25.00, Moneda Americana, por persona (la señora no paga). Hijos menores a razón de $10.00 M.A. Hijos y personas mayores a razón de $25.00 M.A., cada uno.

Favor dirigir cualquier pregunta sobre el anterior al suscrito (Tel. 35-70-15) o al Sr. Rafael Fusoni, (Tel. 46-50-80), quien ha sido nombrado Secretario para ésta Convención.

Leander P. Vourvoulias
Presidente.

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S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: LICOZY-5

DATE OF MEETING: 15 February 1967

1. I met and had breakfast with Subject at the Hotel Del Paseo from 0900 to 0950 on 15 February 1967. The next meeting is at the Del Paseo on 22 February at 0830.

2. Subject reported that after a hiatus of no contact with any Soviet since the end of December, LOGINOV called him on 13 February and asked him for lunch on the 14th. Subject was busy on the 14th but agreed to meet him on the 15th at the Cafe Escla, near Subject's place of work. Subject chose a cafe rather than a restaurant in order to keep the meeting brief. He assured me that, other than being pleasant, he wouldn't accept any assignments or requests for information.

3. Subject said that the private dinner for influential Jews to talk to ECHEVARRIA at Jacobo ZABLUDOWSKI's house had not taken place. Subject will check with ZABLUDOWSKI. He said he also intends to make a courtesy call on ECHEVARRIA soon since he is a very influential man, may become President and it wouldn't harm Subject to keep his oar in.

4. Subject heard from Pedro Ferriz, a partner of ZABLUDOWSKI on TV, that USIA in Mexico had payed for the TV transmission time of the recent KOSYGIN interview from London. Asked why, Ferriz answered that USIA wanted the Mexican public to know the Soviet position on Vietnam and China.

5. Subject reported that the Air France inaugural flight to Red China had been cancelled due to the situation in China. I told Subject that Headquarters had expressed no interest in any case.

6. I asked Subject for the details on being representative for LUEXINSHE, the Red Chinese equivalent of Intourist. He said that in 1960 he attended the American Society of Travel Agents convention in Honolulu. On the way back he took a tour of the FE and NE with a group of travel agents. In Hong Kong the Hong Kong Tourist Board had a cocktail party for them. A representative of LUEXINSHE was at the party and invited the group for lunch. At this lunch he offered to make them agents for his company. Everybody signed up since there was no contract involved; they were just appointed. Since then he has been on

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S E C R E T

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their mailing list. He never has processed a traveller to China. He thinks that Cooks is also an agent but is not sure.

7. Subject said he is processing several people as tourists to the USSR in the spring and summer. No visas have been issued yet. He promised me thermofax copies of all visas.

Francis J. COIGNE

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SECRET

30 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cocktail Party with Official Bloc Representatives

1. At a party given by the local head of the Consular Corp. Association on 28 June, the undersigned met and again chatted with Valentin S. LOGINOV of the Soviet Embassy. He also met for the first time Jan Jakowiec of the Polish Embassy who was introduced to undersigned by LOGINOV.

2. As usual LOGINOV spent most of the time conversing with undersigned provocating him on a number of issues. The undersigned answered, making a few similar comments about the Chinese Civil War. When LOGINOV mentioned Vietnam, undersigned felt it would be nice if the Soviets helped the U. S. to bring peace to that area so they could concentrate more on the Chinese Communist danger. At one point in the conversation undersigned jokingly asked LOGINOV if there were Soviet nationals in North Vietnam. The latter said, "sure, we have many advisors there." The undersidnged said, "no, what he meant was behind guns or in the seats of airplanes." LOGINOV said absolutely not. It also seems that LOGINOV has been keeping track of the people he sees undersigned talking with at cocktail parties. For example, LOGINOV was curious to know if undersigned has seen "his Haitian friends." Undersigned asked which one - the black one or the white one. LOGINOV said the [illegible] ~~white~~ one, referring to the Haitian Vice Consul whom undersigned occasionally talks to. Undersigned said he had seen the Haitian at the Haitian National Day about a month ago but noted that the only Soviet present at that party was ANDREYEV, not LOGINOV. The latter, incidentally, corners the Haitians anytime he has a chance to, although he officially poo poos the Haitian regime. LOGINOV once more asked undersigned when he would come play tennis with him (this is about the fourth or fifth time). Undersigned told him he would do so after he gets invited by LOGINOV as the latter has often promised to do. One of the topics that LOGINOV mentioned was the Protection Section of the Embassy. "Protection against whom," he asked. The undersigned gave him the usual lowdown on the number of tourists to Mexico and their problems. LOGINOV must have been interested in the section as he mentioned that a U. S. Vice-Consul working in that section whom he had met recently will be transferring to another post.

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3. JAKOWIEC appears to be a man who likes to talk. His Spanish is quasi bi-lingual and JAKOWIEC says, by the way, that he learned it in Brazil. His wife is a plump, very Polish-looking woman. Her ~~initial~~ conversation was to laugh at some of the exchanges between LOGINOV and the undersigned. Both Mr. and Mrs. JAKOWIEC appear to speak fluent Russian. At one point in the conversation undersigned mentioned there is hardly a Pole in Poland who does not have a relative in the United States; JAKOWIEC agreed and commented that while the Poles are close to Americans in many things they are not so pleased at other things that the U. S. does. Undersigned deferred this discussion of this point for another meeting. As many of the Consular Corps members know that undersigned served many years in Vietnam, the latter felt that he should not hide this fact to the official bloc representatives as they would find out about it anyway. This came out for the first time on the occasion of this cocktail party when JAKOWIEC somehow mentioned Vietnam and the efforts of the Polish members of the Armistice Commission there. The undersigned, who has known a number of these people quite well, told JAKOWIEC that they speak French better than Polish as they were sons of Polish emigrants to France who returned to Poland after Gomulka took power. When JAKOWIEC started to imply that this indicated how wonderful things were in Poland, undersigned pointed out that the parents of the returnees, many of whom worked under very difficult conditions in France in the coal mines, preferred the hard work to the chance of working in Communist Poland.

4. The next cocktail party held by the Consular Assn. will probably be held at the Soviet Embassy. The President of the Association told undersigned that LOGINOV had asked him for his agreement to hold the next party at his Embassy. A large attendance of official bloc representatives can therefore be expected at the next get-together.

[illegible]

Francis Sherry

SECRET

14-00000

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P-2712

January 1967

SUBJECT: Progress Report/LICO[illegible]-5 (1 November 1966 - 15 January 1967)

REFERENCE: HMMA-[illegible], 1 December 1966

1. The last Progress Report (see Reference) reported developments in [illegible] operation through 31 October 1966; but not included were Subject's activities at the INTURIST Conference in Moscow to which Subject traveled on 22 October 1966. These [illegible] will be reported below.

2. Contacts

A. Subject and KGB Case Officers

Apart from Subject's frequent visits in Moscow during October 1966 from a former KGB case officer in Mexico, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject since his return to Mexico from his [illegible] and Israel trip in mid-November has seen KGB officers on four occasions for a total time of less than an hour.

In Moscow, where Subject was attending the INTURIST Conference, Subject was visited briefly every day in his room at the Hotel National by Nechiporenko, from 24 October through 28 October.

First contact by the Soviets on Subject's return to Mexico was effected by KGB case officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich Prikhodko (201-202379) on 3 December in Subject's office for a few minutes. On 8 December, Valentin Sergeyevich Loginov (201-[illegible]), Subject's regular KGB case officer, called Subject down to the street outside Subject's office to present him with Bolshoi Ballet tickets. On 13 December, Loginov visited Subject's office and spent no more than half an hour there. And on 30 or 31 December, Subject was paid a brief visit by [illegible], KGB officer (and possible candidate for resident) (201-120123) at Subject's office.

B. Subject and Mexico City Station Case Officer

In the two months since Subject's return from Europe in mid-November 1966, the C/O, [illegible], has seen Subject six times for an approximate total of nine hours.

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November for two hours.

In December, the C/O met Subject three times, on 8 December at his office for almost two hours, on 13 December at the Hotel Reforma for a half-hour, and on 22 December at Subject's office for an hour.

On 7 January 1967, the C/O and his wife took Subject [illegible] for dinner at the [illegible] Room of the Hotel Continental Hilton, to repay [illegible] for a former invitation to Subject's home. On 12 January, the C/O met Subject at the latter's office for one hour.

3. Operational Developments

A. Subject/KGB

Subject arrived in Moscow on 23 October 1966 to attend the INTURIST Conference

Filed in P-7442 P-2270 (pp. FB 1-3) P-11712 ([illegible])

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to which travel agents on a world-wide basis had been invited. On Subject's arrival in Moscow, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject's former Soviet C/O in Mexico, came to visit him at the Hotel National. Subject deliberately kept his son at his side so that Nechiporenko would find it difficult to have private words with him. However, Nechiporenko came to visit Subject every day thereafter until Subject's departure, bringing gifts of records, caviar, etc. When Nechiporenko found the opportunity the first thing he told Subject was that he heard Subject had been a "rebel" and had been difficult in Mexico. Subject, in his half-serious manner, pooh-poohed the idea that he was a rebel and told Nechiporenko earnestly that he didn't have the time, effort or inclinition to indulge in the cooperation that was expected of him. He gave Nechiporenko the old line about friends "hasta la muerte" but that he couldn't and wouldn't put out the old effort. Nechiporenko said that was too bad, because he had wanted to present Subject to his chief- and now there was no point to it. Subject shrugged this off. Nechiporenko asked Subject if he would be willing to use his office as a letter-drop. Subject said, reasoningly, that that was not a very smart idea- since agents writing to his firm and to him would then know of Subject's connection with the Soviets and he would thus be exposed. Nevertheless, Nechiporenko told Subject to think it over and talk to Valentin (Loginov) in Mexico about it. Also, Nechiporenko told Subject that they hadn't forgotten about the "branch office" and that Subject shouldn't feel bad about the delay in getting it up. Subject ridiculed that idea, saying that it was the Soviets who should feel bad; as for him, he couldn't be bothered in the future with the trips and time involved. Nechiporenko, still not chastened, asked if Subject would provide information on all changes in visa regulations for travel in Central and South America. Subject ~~kz~~ said he had given this information to the Soviets in the past. Nechiporenko then asked Subject to continue to give such information to Valentin.

Subject elicited from Nechiporenko that he was working in the Latin American Section of the Foreign Ministry, and that he was allowed to come and go as he pleased to visit Subject. In the context of telling Subject that he saw that Subject was not getting along with his Soviet friends, Nechiporenko said that he would be coming back to Mexico next year.

One day while Nechiporenko was in the hotel room, the phone rang and Subject picked up the phone. A female voice asked for "Givy." Subject banteringly replied in Russian that "Givy" wasn't around, but wouldn't he do. In the ensuing conversation Subject found out that the caller was a 25 year old student, her address and telephone number, and made a date to meet her the following day at the Lenin Station exit of the Metro. Nechiporenko was all in favor of Subject making the date, and as a matter of fact came the next day to take Subject's son to the circus so that Subject would be free. /Comment: Subject said that he never did go to meet the ~~xxx~~ girl, but told Nechiporenko that he had gone and the girl had not shown up. Subject was of the opinion this was not a provocation by the Soviets, but he shied away because he did not want to be involved in anything indiscreet./

When Aleksandr Prikhodko dropped in unexpectedly at Subject's office on 8 December, while Subject's wife and son were present, the Soviet asked when he could have lunch with Subject, and the latter put him off telling Prikhodko to call next week. /Comment: Prikhodko did not call/.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

On 8 December, Valentin Loginov, who had called Subject's office by phone to have Subject come down to the street, saw Subject for just a minute to present him with two tickets to the Bolshoi Ballet for 9 December. /Comment: Subject attended./

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On 13 December, Loginov came unannounced to Subject's office and prevailed on him to have coffee with him nearby. The Soviet presented Subject with four bottles of [illegible] for Christmas, and began to ask Subject a series of personal questions:
1) How had Subject left Poland for Paris after WWII - had his documentation been legal or illegal? Subject answered that it was legal.
2) How was he able to enter Paris - did he have a valid French visa? Subject said he did. How long did he stay in Paris? Subject said a few months.
3) Was he released from service with the Polish UB? Subject said yes. Were there any conditions to this release? Subject said no. Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles? Subject said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March [illegible]) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subject's old [illegible] in the UB, and how Subject answered that letter. Had Subject's response to the Poles been positive or negative? Subject said neutral. Asked why, Subject replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "You are right."

Loginov asked how Subject was getting along with the American airlines he deals with. Subject said fine, and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subject has the chance, he can learn the name of " the director of the CIA in Mexico.". Subject told Loginov he was crazy to think Subject could get that information. When Loginov persisted in knowing whether Subject would tell the Soviets if he did get that information, Subject dismissed the topic with a coy "maybe."

Subject promised to show Loginov the documents that backed up his answers to Loginov's questions.

On either 20 or 21 December, Pavel Yatskov dropped by Subject's office to give him some gifts he had brought back from Moscow. /Comment: Subject had done Yatskov a favor during the latter's travel to Moscow by arranging for Subject's travel agent in Paris to assist Yatskov./ Yatskov expressed gratefulness to Subject and presented him with a bottle of Caucasian wine, some vodka, a decorative box and a [illegible] of caviar. Yatskov (who no longer holds the post of Soviet Consul in Mexico, and is a possible candidate for KGB resident) told Subject that he is also grateful for what Subject has done for "them", and he is sure that Subject will not leave "them" alone in the realization of their common ideals. And Yatskov further stated that he and Subject have very much in common, and that they should meet. It was left that Yatskov would call Subject.

F. Subject/Mexico City Station

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November 1966 to debrief him on the results of his trip to Moscow (see paragraph 3 A. above). In addition to providing information on his contacts with Nechiporenko, Subject gave incidental information concerning a female Soviet Jew he met, and the anti-American attitude of a [illegible] agent from Chile.

On 8 December, in Subject's office, Subject reported to the C/O [illegible] contacts he had had with Prikhodko and Loginov on 3 and 8 December. [illegible] in response to a Station request, re-opened with Subject the topic of [illegible] community support that Secretary of Gobernación Echeverria is [illegible] in his candidacy for next president of Mexico. Subject related [illegible] how Jacobo Zabludovsky had come to mention the matter to Subject. [illegible] the fact that Subject was being proposed as one of the five influential members of the Jewish community for Echeverria's approval (Zabludovsky did not mention any others). The C/O requested that Subject check further with Zabludovsky when he has the opportunity.

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On 1[illegible] Subject reported to the C/O about Leginov's [illegible] questions asked of Subject [illegible] same day (see paragraph 3 A. above). The C/O [illegible] Subject if he had [illegible] of Leginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subject said he had not, even though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subject said he felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O dropped by Subject's office on 22 December, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subject's home the previous day. Subject reported:
1) on Soviet travel for Georgi Visko, and said he had met Visko's replacement– Victor [illegible].
2) Subject reported that he had received a holiday-season letter from [illegible], U. S. State Department official now in Chile. /Comment: [illegible] had been a target of the Soviets in Mexico through Subject. Nothing ever came of it./
3) Subject reported that he had received a firm invitation from the [illegible] Air France in [illegible] to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to [illegible], possibly in April 1967, to which Subject had replied that he "would love to go." To the C/O Subject expressed himself as neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if [illegible] had any interest in his taking the trip. The C/O replied that Subject would be advised.
The C/O then discussed seriously with Subject the question of how complete his break-off from the Soviets really was, inasmuch as there was some scepticism about his conduct ([illegible] told Subject that the scepticism came from [illegible], which incidentally [illegible] did not share). The C/O asked Subject to [illegible] equivocal [illegible] Leginov's request to report the [illegible] and his [illegible] turn his personal documentation over [illegible]. [illegible] rarely called [illegible] that he was convinced that his [illegible] because he [illegible] the control to deny the Soviets anything [illegible] (the Station's [illegible]); even though he might jokingly [illegible] being friendly was consistent with his personality. He explained his willingness, even more his desire, to pass his documentation to the Soviets, because he wanted to show those "bastards" he wasn't afraid of them. Subject asked the C/O [illegible] "his bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on passing the documentation if the Soviets come after it.

On 1[illegible] January 1967, the C/O (having received the Station's expression of interest in having Subject follow up the invitation from Air France) asked Subject for more details concerning the invitation from Air France, and gave him the go-ahead to pursue the matter.

4. The current C/O, Prentice R. Varheine, will turn Subject over to [illegible] Coigne before [illegible]'s departure from Mexico the end of January 1967.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X (Attachment)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 1P

TO: Chief, SB

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP/Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

CI-CK

REFERENCE: HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965

Attached in draft form is an SPR on Subject, which is supplemented by information in the Reference concerning Subject's activities before coming to Mexico.

Jonathan L. Wee...g
for/Willard C. CURTIS

MIC~~ROFILMED~~
~~DOC. MICRO. SER.~~

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 4 1971
MICROFILMED

S/C ATT'D
4 Sept. 67

Attachments:
A. Draft SPR, herewith
B. Photographs, herewith
C. Sections 16 and 19 of Draft SPR, under separate cover

Distribution:
~~1~~2 - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

RIS INPUT NO. 92

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

att 1 NSM
att 2 + 3 HW

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32872	24 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-285412

SPR PREPARED BY: Jonathan L. WEENING

DATE: 14 August 1967

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (3, 5).

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927 in Moscow (28).

Subject has stated that he ~~came~~ comes from Moscow (1), and his wife said they grew up together in Moscow (6). He once told another source, however, that he came from the northern part of the USSR (8), but this source is not known for accurate reporting.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 16993, issued 24 Aug 1960 (3).

Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 010264, issued 24 Jun 1965 (5), used currently (4).

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: Unknown.

5. OTHER NAMES USED: Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION: Third Secretary and Consul General at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, ~~xirsx~~ (1).

7. RELATIVES:

Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna LOGINOVA (20= (28). Known as "Shura" (1).

DPOB: 20 Aug 1928 in Moscow (28).

Passports: D-16094, used in 1962 (4).

D-~~101~~ 010265, issued 24 Jun 1955, currently used (4).

Description: Plump, has reddish hair (15). Photographs are attached.

Languages: LOGINOVA has been studying Spanish with Carmen ROURE Canosa, a local employee of the Soviets, since at least June 1966 through May 1967 (1), but her Spanish is still said to be very limited (6, 25). She is said to speak a little English (25), and claimed she had studied English in Moscow (1). She is also said to speak some French (25).

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

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ATT #1 to NMMA 32872

CS COPY

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(wife, cont.)

Miscellaneous: LOGINOVA has said that she has known her husband since age six as neighbors in Moscow (6). She claims to be a chemical engineer (6). During Subject's tour in Havana, 1960-63, LOGINOVA worked in the Soviet Consulate (28). She arrived in Mexico on 10 Oct 1965, two months after her husband (4). Since Feb 1966 she had been reported as chairman of the zhenkom (Soviet women's organization), and as such has had to persuade the Soviet women to do various administrative chores, as well as being involved with running the dacha that the Soviets have had in Cuernavaca in the summers of 1966 and 1967 (1).

Family: In June 1967 LOGINOVA asked the wife of Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV (201-245651) to call her mother when she got to Moscow, saying that her family lived at the Botanical Gardens (1).

Daughter: Irina, born ca. 1952 (28).

In June 1967 ~~LOGINOVxsaidxhax~~ Subject said he had a fifteen-year-old daughter, who was living with LOGINOVA's mother (in Moscow) (6). In April 1967 LOGINOVA said her daughter was in an English school in Moscow (25 Irina was reportedly with her parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28); however, she did not travel with them from Havana to Moscow on 11 May 1962 ~~xxxx~~ (4) and therefore may have been in Havana for only a part of Subject's tour. She has not been in Mexico.

Son: Dmitriy (4).

DOB: 1959 (28), birthday probably 6 August (1).

Dmitriy was with his ~~paxxxxx~~ parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28), and ~~haxxbxx~~ arrived in Mexico City with his mother on 10 Oct 1965 (4). Subject has expressed interest in having his son take English lessons when the family returns from home leave in August 1967 (21).

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8. LANGUAGES:

Spanish: Subject speaks fluent Spanish with very little accent (11, 24).

English: Since 1966 Subject has been reported taking English lessons, apparently at the Instituto de Traductores e Interpretes in Mexico City (1). In April 1967 he said that he had been paying a girl American for lessons in English, but that she ~~taxx~~ did not have enough background in grammar (25). (Comment: Subject was probably more interested in meeting American girls than in studying English in this case.) Subject's English is believed to be fair at present.

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

One source described Subject as tall, blond and blue-eyed (11). Another source said that he was six feet tall and had short, reddish-blond hair (24). Photographs are attached.

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

All sources agree in describing Subject as smooth and completely self-controlled. He is an aggressive conversationalist. One source described him as vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short-tempered and a tyrant, who thinks he is a big shot (8).

Subject seems to have made a play for every girl he has met. In at least one instance he has claimed to be unmarried when inviting a girl out (27). When his wife was staying at the dacha in Cuernavaca he reportedly ~~called~~ made dates with other women (8). On ~~18~~ 13 Sep 1966 he was seen in a cafe with a Mexican-looking woman (18).

Subject is interested in sports and is good at them. In Sep 1966 it was reported that he did not play tennis (15), and by Apr 1967 he was said to be a good tennis player, claimed that he had been playing for less than a year and never played more than once a week (25). He is said to have the build of a trained athlete, the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler, and the grace of a natural athlete (25). He has said that he boxed when he was younger, and that he plays basketball and volleyball (25), also that his favorite sports are skiing and speed skating (21). He also plays chess but is not an addict (25). He has belonged to the French Club in Mexico City since ca. November 1965 (1) and has been seen there frequently on weekends, sometimes with his wife and child (15). One Sunday (20 Mar 1966) Subject and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN were seen playing badminton with their wives at the French Club (15).

One source reported that Subject smoked "Fiesta" cigarettes (8), and another source reported in Apr 1967 that Subject did not smoke (25). One source has reported that Subject downs several beers after playing tennis (25), but another source reported that on a social occasion Subject did not even ~~fin~~ finish one Scotch and water (19). On ~~one occasion~~ 8 Feb 1966 Subject and Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN reportedly drove into the Soviet Embassy at 0300 hours roaring drunk (8), which may or may not be accurate reporting.

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Subject has apparently been taking English lessons since early 1966 at the ~~Int~~ Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, which is located at Tiber 113 very near the U.S. Embassy. He seems to have made friends with a number of people through these classes. (1). (Cf. under Contacts.)

In February 1966 it was reported that Subject's wife had bought a tape recorder (1). In June 1967 Subject ~~himself~~ ~~as~~ ordered a Grundig tape recorder (1).

Subject was reported having an operation on 1 Feb 1966 (17); no further details are available.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Subject claims that he has served in the Red Army (8).

(Subject's name was reportedly listed in Feb 1960 as about to be assigned to Buenos Aires as Soviet Military Attache; it would appear that either this was another person with the same name, or that Subject was being considered for assignment there as diplomatic attache.)

14 Sep 1960 ~~xSepx1960~~	Subject and his family arrived in Havana, where Subject was assigned as Attache at the Soviet Embassy (3, 28).
December 1961	Subject toured Latin America as escort and interpreter for the Dynamo soccer team (28).
~~Sepx1962x~~ 11 May 1962	Subject, his wife and son transitted Mexico City travelling from Havana enroute to Montreal (4), presumably on their way to Moscow on home leave.
Sep 1963	Subject and his family left Havana PCS (28).
3 Aug 1965	Subject arrived PCS in ~~Maxxx~~ Mexico as Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy (4). Subject replaced Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO as Vice Consul (1).

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10 Oct 1965	Subject's wife and son arrived in Mexico (4).
August 1966	Subject was apparently promoted to Consul General after Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV left Mexico on 4 Aug 1966 for home leave. In Sep 1966 Subject was telling everyone in town that he was now the Consul (1, 6, etc.)
16 Jul 1967	Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, left Mexico for Moscow via Paris (4). Also travelling with them on LOGINOVA's passport was Tatyana, the daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (4). Subject has told several people that this is home leave and that he will be returning to Mexico (1, 6, 21, 22).

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM
Cyd

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, based on his having taken over an agent previously handled by known KGB officers Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO 01-OK (201-305870) and Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379), 01-OK as well as his other intelligence activities given below.

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~~12.~~ 13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

(Cf. also information under Contacts, below. Subject has undoubtedly been developing contacts, particularly with American girls, with a view toward intelligence possibilities.)

In December 1961 while travelling with the Dynamo soccer team, Subject met a Bolivian security service official in La Paz, Bolivia and reportedly tried to persuade him to study in Cuba. The source, however, is believed to be a fabricator. (28).

After Subject saw the soccer team off, he continued to Panama, where he met with a Mexican citizen, Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez (P-2818) on 16 Dec 1961.~~and~~ On 17 Dec 1961 Subject and ZORRILLA travelled to Mexico City on the same plane. Subject ~~[illegible] (US) $2,000~~ had ca. (US) $ 2,000 with him in Panama. (29).

On 14 Feb 1966 KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379) turned an agent over to Subject. (The agent had previously been handled by Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO.) On 14 Apr 1966 the agent attempted to break his intelligence relationship with the Soviets, although he has remained in business and social contact with them. Subject, occasionally joined by PRIKHODKO, has continued to give intelligence requirements to the agent, ~~and~~ who questioned him particularly about his access to the U.S. Embassy and tried to persuade him to continue cooperating with the KGB. On 24 Jun 1966 Subject asked the agent for information on Eduardo WEBELMAN and his son Mauricio. On 13 Dec 1966 Subject asked the agent to try to find out who the WOFACT chief in Mexico was. (6). (Comment: Mauricio WEBELMAN was subsequently reported to be a friend of suspect KGB officer Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN's.) CI-CK 201-773422

(1105/1-5 [illegible]

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(~~12~~ 13 cont.)

On 20 Jan 1966 Cristobal TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to pick up the passport of the wife of a U.S. Embassy official who was planning a trip to the USSR. Subject talked to TORRES, asked him if he would like to visit the USSR or receive Soviet magazines, and if he knew anyone who would be willing to give him English lessons, and finally made a dinner date with TORRES for 24 Jan 1966. When TORRES did not keep the date, Subject called him on 8 and 9 Feb 1966 in an attempt to keep the contact alive. (12, 14).

Subject dealt with the Federal District police several times in July 1966 in regard to a radio that had been stolen from his car. On 20 Jul 1966 the policeman (LNO) who had been handling the radio case reported to his superior, General Luis CUETO Ramirez, that Subject had offered him 5,000 pesos (400 ~~4,000~~ dollars) a month if he would work for him. After consulting with the Minister of Interior, CUETO told the policeman to accept Subject's offer, which he reportedly did ~~as~~ on 21 Jul 1966. Subject's first assignment to the policeman was to locate Venezuelan citizens Nicolas Juan BOSTROEM and his wife. (16). (Comment: Nothing further has been learned about this case. BOSTROEM is a native Russian employed by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, his wife teaches Russian at the Ibero-American University.)

Pesos = .08
or $400

Subject has occasionally been reported visiting the small general store located across the street from the Soviet Embassy. On 5 Nov 1966 Subject reportedly questioned the store owner about occupants of one apartment building in the same block as the store, and on 6 Dec 1966 he asked general questions about the new apartment building at the end of the block. (8). (Comment: Both of these buildings contain base houses for the fixed surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

In Mexico, Subject has consistently been reported performing consular duties. He issues visas and sees visitors to the Soviet Embassy in one of the reception rooms (21). He makes travel reservations for PCS and visiting Soviets. He is responsible when either PCS or visiting Soviets become ill and have to be sent to a hospital. He has often attended to the needs of Soviet ships in Mexican ports. He has done considerable house-hunting for the Soviets, such as looking for a new school building and for houses in Cuernavaca that would be suitable as a dacha. Subject had to sign the dacha ~~xxxxx~~ contract in both 1966 and 1967. Subject also regularly attends the ~~xxxxx~~ functions of the Consular Corps Association, and on 16 Feb 1967 he had the Association to the Soviet Embassy for a Russian evening. (1). In Sep 1966 Subject was reported as having become the Consul General (6, 8, 1, 11), having replaced Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, who left Mexico for home leave on 4 Aug 1966. On 21 Feb 1967 Subject tried to get Panamanian visas for himself and Soveksportfilm representative Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (known KGB) to attend a Consular Congress to be held in Panama 11-15 Apr 1967 (1). The visas were refused.

01-0K

On 26 Jan ~~196x~~ 1966 Subject attended a lecture given by a Mexican who was an exchange professor at a U.S. university. The lecture was sponsored by the PRI. Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV ~~xxxx~~ also attended the lecture and sat on the platform, whereas Subject sat at the back of the room. (13).

Subject is reported to have taken the following trips in Mexico:

26-28 Oct 1965	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship)1).
2-4 Nov 1965	To Mazatlan ~~xxxxxx~~ with Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN to attend to Soviet ship (1).
4-8 Dec 1965	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship (1, 9).
2-5 Feb 1966	To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship (1).

13-20 Feb 1966	To Coatzacoalcos to attend to Soviet ships. Soviet Embassy chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHIKIN went with Subject but returned to Mexico City earlier. (1).
25-28 Apr 1966	Possibly to Guadalajara with Soviet Inturist visitors attending a travel conference there (1).
4-9 May 1966	To Veracruz to attend to the matter of a missing Soviet sailor (1).
27-30 May 1966	To Veracruz to attend to Soviet ship (1).
26 Feb - 2 Mar 196~~6~~7	To Veracruz with Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV to attend to Soviet ships(1) While in Veracruz, Subject asked the U.S. Vice Consul, Richard BOOTH, if he would intercede with the Mexican authorities to get shore leave for the Soviet crew (24).

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15. CONTACTS.

a. Soviet Contacts:

Subject has been seen coming and going at the Soviet Embassy most frequently with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV 01-OK (201-120123, known KGB), whom Subject replaced as Consul. Since Subject's departure ~~on~~ for home leave on 16 Jul 1967, YATSKOV has been ~~xxxx~~ regularly using Subject's car. Subject has also been observed leaving the Soviet Embassy fairly often with Ivan Konstantinovich BARANOV 01-OK (201-~~27783~~ 277838, known KGB sweeper) and Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH 01-OK (201-767974, suspect KGB technician). ~~(7)x~~ Subject has also borrowed the cars of YATSKOV and known KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV 01-OK (201-273046). (7).

In May 1966 Subject reportedly gave the wife of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917, known KGB) 01-OK a hard time when she wanted to send her son to the USSR with another Soviet wife. NIKITIN then complained to Aleksandr ~~Aleksandrovich~~ ~~Vladx~~ Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO 01-OK (201-202379, known KGB), who reportedly ordered Subject to get a ticket for the NIKITIN child. (1). Cf. also above, where PRIKHODKO seems to be the senior case officer for an agent currently being handled by Subject.

In May 1967 LOGINOVA mentioned that she had known Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV 01-OK (201-268115, known GRU) for years. (1). (Comment: CHMYKHOV was stationed in Havana 1960-62, at the same time that Subject was there.) Cf. below for report of Subject's having taken CHMYKHOV with him to Cuernavaca to meet ZAREBSKI.

Subject has also been reported in contact with the following Soviets not stationed in Mexico:

Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV 01-OK (201-355606, known KGB), visited Mexico 27 May - 9 Jun 1966. On 1 Jun 1966 Subject and P. A. YATSKOV were absent ~~withxBOYAROV~~ from the Soviet Embassy for four hours with BOYAROV (7).

Vasiliy Vasilyevich GRIGORYEV, member of petroleum delegation that visited Mexico 31 Mar - 14 Apr 1967. While GIRGORYEV was in Mexico he was reported in contact with Subject several times, once making plans to go to the movies together, also to ask Subject whether he should attend a French reception and to report the illness of one of the other Soviet delegates. (1).

01-0K

Boris Semenovich IVANOV (201-078078, known KGB), visited Mexico 8 - 22 Feb 1967. Subject made reservations for IVANOV in Mexico City and probably saw him off at the airport (1).

Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (201-213261), Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. On 7 Feb 1966 Subject was reported sending something to LEBEDEV with a Soviet professor who was travelling back to Moscow via Havana (1).

15. b. Non-Soviet Contacts:

1). Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde (P-2152, 201-334259), active Marxist intellectual.

On 28 Jun 1967 AGUILAR reminded Subject that they and their wives were invited for Saturday evening to the home of Alberto PENICHE (1). (Alberto PENICHE Blanco, P-12294, manager of ~~Ek~~ centrist newspaper El Heraldo de Mexico, ~~and reported as minor~~ contributor to the PCM in 1964.)

2). (Mrs.) Gloria *ALFARO, no other traces.
[illegible] MEXICO [illegible]

On 5 Feb 1966 Mrs. fnu ALFARO(~~probably~~ possibly Gloria) wanted to talk to
[illegible] OF VALENTIN LOGINOV 201-285412

Subject to congratulate him on a Soviet moon probe (1). On 22 Jun 1966 Gloria ALFARO reminded Subject that they had met at thehouse of Mrs. SOTO (~~probably~~ possibly Graciela, q. v.) on Christmas Eve 1965 and invited Subject to a party. Subject was unable to go but said he would call Gloria for coffee. Gloria gave her telephone as 35-71-30 (listed in 1964 to Yolanda ~~[illegible]~~ ALFARO Vda de CACERES Buitrago, Chiapas 130-A, current telephone 25-10-24). (1). ~~Qx~~ Also on 22 Jun 1966 Gloria ALFARO told Subject she would like to talk with some of the Soviets, and Subject suggested getting together on Friday "after English class" (17). (Comment: ~~x~~ ALFARO may have been studying English with Subject at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.) On 3 Aug 1966 Gloria and Subject tried to agree on a date to get together, and she said she would like for him to meet a friend (female) of hers who was visiting Mexico from Central America (1).

3). Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), professor of economics at UNAM, good friend of the wife of Antonio SARMIENTO (q. v.), social contact with several Soviets.

On 30 Aug 1965 ALFARO invited Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV to her ~~also~~ house and included Subject and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV (1).

4). (Dr.) Juan Luis *ALVAREZ Gayou, teacher at UNAM and Deputy Director
[illegible]
of Instituto de Interpeetes y Traductores.

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Subject presumably met ALVAREZ at the Instituto, where Subject is believed to have studied English. The first reported contact was on 11 Apr 1966, when they spoke to eachother, using the familiar form of address, about having missed eachother in Cuernavaca. Subject was invited to ALVAREZ' birthday party. Subject said he would see ALVAREZ the following day when he was going to have class with a new teacher. (1). On 13 Jun 1966 Professor fnu ALVAREZ, Juan Luis' father, asked Subject if he would bring the projector to the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and Subject said he would. On 12 Jul 1966 ALVAREZ, who had been out of town, asked Subject if he wanted to continue taking lessons, and Subject said yes, he would go there the following day. On 19 Nov 1966 ALVAREZ left a message for Subject to call him at 35-68-96 (listed to Natividad GAMERO de la Fuente, Hamburgo 25). On 22 May 1967 ALVAREZ asked Subject for help in typing a letter in Russian (cf. VIDIELLA). (1).

5). (Ing.) Manuel *ANAYA S., employee of Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, visited the USSR in summer 1966.

On 19 Jul 1966 ANAYA thanked Subject for his visa and said he would get together with Subject when he got back in order to discuss his trip (1)(17).

6). Emilia AROSAMENA Vallarina (P-10933, 201-771073), Panamanian Consul General in Mexico, in contact with several Soviets.

On 15 Nov 1965 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO said he wanted to introduce Subject to AROSAMENA, because Subject had some questions to ask her. Presumably related is a report that the Panamanian Counselor, Jose B. CALVO, told Subject on 19 Nov 1965 that he had no answer for Subject yet. (1).

7). Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581, 201-814144), employee of Mundus Tours travel agency, about to leave Mexico to marry an American and live in New York.

Subject was first reported in contact with AVILA in April 1966 in connection with travel booking Subject made (1). On 2 Jun 1966 Subject flirted with her, and said he would invite her to a volleyball game (1). During the rest of 1966 Subject invited her out a few times, told her he was married but that his wife was not in Mexico, asked her [illegible] to introduce him to some of her friends and especially wanted to know, if she knew anyone in the U.S. Embassy. In April 1967 Subject reluctantly agreed to issue a visa to Dr. KUTTLER (q.v.), whose travel AVILA was arranging, and asked as a return favor that she introduce him to some of her friends. (26). In June 1967 Subject reportedly stopped AVILA coming out of work to ask her about the Israeli War (6).

8). Celia BAYARDI Torres, no traces.

On 7 Feb 1966 an unidentified man visited Subject at the Soviet Embassy. This man came to the Embassy in a car driven by a woman, who remained in the car, with license plates registered to Celia BAYARDI Torres, Arquitector 46, Colonia Escandon, telephone 15-34-02. The phone is listed to Francisca TORRES Vda de BAYARDI. (7).

9). Leila S. BELAVAL, visa officer at U.S. Embassy.

In June 1967 BELAVAL reported that she had been in contact with Subject over visa matters, that Subject had asked her what she did in the evenings, whether she spent her off hours with other U.S. Embassy employees, and had said that he was unmarried. In June 1967 he offered to take her to the Ukrainian Ballet when it came to Mexico. She has refused his invitations. (27).

10). Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328), former Federal Security (DFS) agent, now with Judicial Police. In 1960-61 BLANCO invited several U. S. Embassy girls out and offered his services to the U.S. Embassy. BLANCO works for Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda, who is suspected of having a clandestine relationship with KGB officer Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.

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On 1 Nov 1965 BLANCO called Subject at the Soviet Embassy and remarked that they had not seen eachother for a long time. Subject said he would call BLANCO to get together the following Wednesday. (1). On 8 Sep 1966 Graciela [illegible] (q.v.), who described herself as BLANCO's friend, invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child and mentioned that BLANCO's wife Magdalena was going (1). On 10 Nov 1966 BLANCO invited Subject to a party for BLANCO's daughter, said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. ~~On~~ (1). On 6 Dec 1966 BLANCO told Subject that "Comandante Carlos" (presumably CASAMADRID) urgently wanted to see YATSKOV (1), and Subject said he would have YATSKOV call him (1).

11). Lubomir BLAZIK (P-1730, 201-206043), former Czech Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

On 28 Dec 1965 P. A. YATSKOV left a message for BLAZIK that Subject's wife was sick and could not attend the dinner to which the BLAZIKs had invited her (1).

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12). Rosa Martha BRACHO Sanchez (P-12038), left in November 1965 on
[illegible]
a scholarship to study ballet in the USSR.

On 21 and 22 Sep 1966 Rosa's mother (fnu) was in contact with Subject in order to talk to him about visa problems of her two daughters who were both studying dance in the USSR (1). (Name of other daughter is unknown.)

insert

13. ~~Er~~ Erica CAMERMAN ~~Erika KAMMERMANN~~ (P-12843), said to be a reporter with The News (17), but this seems unlikely, no other traces.

On 21 Feb 1966 CAMERMAN ~~KAMMERMANN~~ told Subject that she was going out of town the next day but when she got back she wanted to invited Subject and his wife to her house. Subject said he had no word on her papers yet. On 28 Feb 1966 she said she had been in Cozumel. Subject said he still had no word on her papers. She invited Subject to dinner with his wife, and he said he would call her back. On 10 May 1966 she tried to call Subject, who was out, saying that she wanted to know about the arrival of a man from Russia. On ~~1p~~ 11 May 1966 Subject told her he still had no answer on her papers. She said she planned to take a business trip to Brussels and Paris in June and mentioned that Elke (LNU) was in Paris visiting her son. On 10 Jun 1966 Subject asked for ~~KAMMERMANN~~ CAMERMAN at 18-65-61 and was told she was in Europe for a month (phone listed to importing firm Incomex, S.A. at Isabel la Catolica 45-914). On 6 Jul 1966 Subject called her at 12-78-32 (listed to the Banco de Mexico at Cinco de Mayo 2) and told her he had a document for her. On 11 Jul 1966 she told Subject that she needed his signature on the document, also sent regards to Subject's wife and children. (1).

~~CAMERMAN~~ 14. ~~15).~~ Ernesto ZR CHAZARO Peregrino (P-12818, 201-800412), assistant security chief of Astilleros de Veracruz, S.A., a shipyard in Veracruz. Said to be the adverturer-type, once worked for the Federal Security Police but was fired because of involvement in arms contraband.

CHAZARO probably did meet Subject on 5 May 1966 in Veracruz. CHAZARO undoubtedly fabricated his story that VALENTIN LOGINOV (201-285412) ~~Subject~~ tried to recruit him after that and set up a 50,000 peso bank account in CHAZARO's name. (30).

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15. (Lic.) Jacobo *CHENCINSKY, director of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, located at Tiber 113.
CIT MEXICO \ L MEXICO SUBPROJ

Subject's ~~pr~~ contact with CHENCINSKY has presumably been connected with Subject's taking English at the Instituto. On 24 Mar 1966 CHENCINSKY tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 4 Jul 1966 CHENCINSKY told Subject that Janet (LNU, apparently Subject's teacher) had been unable to fix her working papers and had had to leave Mexico and asked if Subject's classes could be postponed. Subject agreed and said he would like to talk to CHENCINSKY. (1).

16. David F. COOLBAUGH (P-12579, 201-796142). American employed with United Nations in Mexico, co-director of geological project that two Soviets were also assigned to.

In 1966 Subject was in contact with COOLBAUGH several times in regard to documenting the two Soviets working on the UN project (1).

17. Ana Maria *ESCOBAR (P-11858), In 1965 reported to be a student and also working as private secretary to the PRI chief for the Federal District.
[illegible] OCCUPACT L MEXICO

On 11 Oct 1965 ESCOBAR tried unsuccessfully to reach ~~xx~~ Subject. On 12 Oct 1965 she told Subject she had wanted to invite him to the theater the previous day because she had been given free tickets. She sent regards to Pablo (presumably Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). (1).

No 201

18. Margaret (aka Magre) FEDOR (P-12967), no other traces.
USC X F CIT MEXICO \ L MEXICO

On 17 Mar 1966 FEDOR invited Subject to go on a Sunday outing with a group of friends whom Subject also knew. She mentioned that she was studying French in the evenings and was about to begin Russian classes at the United Nations. Subject said he would call her at home later. On 28 Mar 1966 Subject told FEDOR that he had stopped by her house with theater tickets but she had been out. Rebeca (LNU) had told FEDOR that the play was good. FEDOR told Subject that on Saturday there would be a discussion with Jose *CORNEJO (no identifiable traces), who had been in South America,
CIT MEXICO L MEXICO
and Subject said he would go. On 8 Jun 1966 FEDOR told Subject that she

was going to go to the U.S. on vacation and mentioned that Daniel *SEIN [illegible] MARGARET FLOR[illegible] (no traces) had asked about Subject. Subject said he would call her later. On 24 Aug 1966 FEDOR told Subject that there would be a discussion about India at her house on 26 Aug, and Subject said he would try to go. ~~Sxx~~ Subject asked her whether she knew the Soviets working on a United Nations project, but she said she did not. (1). (Comment: FEDOR may work at the United Nations in Mexico City.)

19. ~~18~~). fnu FLORES, man employed at Mex-American travel agency.

On 15 Mar 1966 FLORES, who described himself as a friend of Gloria's and the others', asked Subject for visa information (1). (Gloria might be Gloria PINTO, cf. below.)

20. ~~19~~) Socorro FLORES (P-12259), no 201 formerly employed at Mex-Americana de Viajes travel agency, no other traces.

Subject was first reported in contact with FLORES in Sep 1965 in connection with travel reservations, and for about a year Subject continued to discuss travel arrangements and at the same time flirt with FLORES and also send regards to Susana LNU, who worked with her. ~~On 8 Sep 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater~~ On 18 Jan 1966 FLORES invited Subject to dinner with some of her friends. Subject was very interested in knowing who the friends were, but FLORES said they were not the Americans, because she hadn't seen them. On 8 Sep 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater. Then there was no report of contact between them, until on 13 Jun 1967 FLORES told Subject that she had a new job and asked him to call her at 27-85-50, extension 18 (no Station listing of this number). She mentioned that she had not seen him for a while. (1).

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21.20). Rafael *FUSONI Alordi (P-5119, 201-237904), Argentine diplomat, former KGB agent, in occasional social contact with Soviets, primarily through diplomatic functions.

Subject met FUSONI at a consular corps ~~supxx~~ function in January 1967 and again at a Czech Embassy reception in May 1967. Subject later called FUSONI and offered him tickets to a Bolshoy Ballet performance, and on 11 Jun 1967 they attended the Bolshoy performance together and went to supper afterwards. (23).

22.21). Moises *GAMERO de la Fuente, no other traces.
[illegible] [illegible]

On 6 Apr 1966 Subject reportedly called telephone number 2-30-65 in Cuernavaca from a pay phone (8). (This number is listed to GAMERO.)

23.22). Pearl GONZALEZ (P-11420), society editor for The News, Mexico City English language newspaper, in social contact with several Soviets.

On 25 Nov 1965 GONZALEZ gave a party and invited several Soviets. Subject was one of those who attended. (10).

24.23). Alfonso *GUZMAN and Carlos *SANDOVAL, of Servicio Diplomatico in
[illegible] [illegible]
the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

Since Aug 1966 (i.e. when Subject became Consul General), Subject has been reported dealing with GUZMAN and SANDOVAL in regard to Soviet visas. In Oct 1966 Subject had tickets for GUZMAN to a sports event, but GUZMAN was unable to go. Subject also invited GUZMAN to the Soviet Embassy reception on 7 Nov 1966. (1).

25.24). Abdel Rahman *HASSAN Abdel-Rahman, ~~First Secretary and~~ Consul
[illegible] AP [illegible] D. Mexico
at the UAR Embassy in Mexico.

On 1 Jun 1967 Subject and HASSAN discussed consular affairs and also talked about getting together for tennis the following week (1).

secretary at
26.25). (Miss) fnu HERNANDEZ, of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, probably identical with Gabriela *HERNANDEZ Elizalde, who in 1967 was
[illegible] [illegible]
the secretary at this Institute.

14-00000

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On 29 Jun 1966 HERNANDEZ told Subject that his class would be postponed for a week because Sarita (LNU) was sick (1).

27.). Lee *HIGGINS, male, no traces.

On 19 May 1966 HIGGINS tried unsuccessfully to call Subject (1).

28.). Vincent *HODGINS, British citizen, sales manager of Canadian Pacific Airlines in Mexico City.

[illegible]

On 28 Oct 1966 HODGINS contacted Subject, saying that BRADLEY (J. E. Ralph *BRADLEY, regional sales manager of Canadian Pacific) had met Subject the night before, and HODGINS wanted to discuss business with Subject. ~~HODGINS~~ Subject offered to visit HODGINS in his office. (1). (Comment: The Soviets began flying with Canadian Pacific when a new Aeroflot flight was put in service to Canada.) On 3 Nov 1966 HODGINS ~~gave~~ gave Subject information on flights and Subject said he would stop by his office the next week. On 24 Feb 1967 Subject was reported to have an appointment with HODGINS. (1).

[illegible]

29.). Jan ~~JAKOQIEC~~ JAKOWIEC (P-9097, 201-250618), Polish Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

Subject and JAKOWIEC seem to be good friends, in addition to being in contact with eachother through consular duties (1, 19).

30.). Karen *JOFFER, no other traces.

SEX F [illegible]

On 16 Aug 1966 Subject apologized to JOFFER that he had been busy the week before but said he could see her at 1630 hours that day (1). (Comment: This could well be a routine visa request.)

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31). (Dr.) Yury K ITTLER (P-1573), dentist, Sov contact, Communist sympathizer.

In Apr 1966 Subject was reported making a dental appointment with KUTTLER (1). In Apr 1967 when the tourist agency representative, Miriam AVILA Katz, was trying to get a visa for KUTTLER, Subject spoke scathingly of him and said he would not give him a visa unless he fulfilled all the requirements (1). Subject explained that he had once gone to KUTTLER to have some dental work done and that KUTTLER had charged him too much, and that this was why he did not want to issue him the visa (26).

32). Jacques *LEMAIRE, represent~~ative of French steamship~~ company in [illegible] A MEXICO Mexico, scheduled to leave Mexico soon, member of French Club, where he probably met Subject.

On 14 Jul 1967 LEMAIRE invited Subject to the French Embassy reception that day, but Subject was unable to go. LEMAIRE sent regards to Subject's wife. (1).

33). Yuliya *LIPOVSKAYA, probably identical with the Julia *YASCHIN [illegible] listed in the telephone book as living at Mexicali 175, phone 15-35-47, presumably the wife of ~~Sak~~ Solomon (aka Julio) YASCHIN. PROBABLY IDENT WITH YULIYA LIPOVSKAYA

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On 30 Nov 1965 LIPOVSKAYA contacted Subject and told him a long, rambling story about her relatives. Subject was evidently interested, urged her to visit the USSR and suggested she come to the Soviet Embassy to talk to him. On 24 Dec 1965 LIPOVSKAYA tried to call Subject but was referred by mistake to another Valentin. On 8 and 20 Jan 1966 she asked Subject if he had heard from her relative, the soccer player Lev YASCHIN, but Subject still had no news for her. (1).

201-558505

34). Tatiana RAKOFF Vda de MARCHAND (P-370), widow of Rene MARCHAND Boisselet, former professor at UNAM and director of the Jugoslav Cultural Institute. She is evidently a native Russian, but French citizen.

Tatiana was seen visiting Subject at the Soviet Embassy on 3 Jan and 18 Apr 1967; Subject seemed very friendly with her, and on 18 Apr 1967 left the Embassy together with her. (7). On 9 Jan 1967 it appeared that she had asked Subject for a visa. She also told him she had the information on the man who had been consul, but Subject cut her off and said that it would be better for them to get together to discuss it. On 25 Feb 1965 she told Subject she would help him join a club. On 16 May 1967 she asked Subject if he had called the Poles, but he said he had forgotten and would do it right away. (1).

35). (Dr.) Alfonso MARTINEZ Alvarez (P-1799), Guatemalan leftist doctor, has house at Lake Tequesquitengo to which he often invites groups of Soviets.

MARTINEZ was reported in contact with Subject in fall 1966 and January 1967 inviting Subject and other Soviets to his house on the lake. Subject was also in contact with his son, Eduardo *MARTINEZ (no identifiable traces) (1).

AT GUATEMALA [illegible]

36). (General) Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero (P-5700), deputy chief of the Federal District Police.

On 27 Oct 1966 Subject called the police to ask what MENDIOLEA's rank was (1).

37). William de MIER (P-5552), British citizen, general manager of KLM airline in Mexico.

In May 1967 Subject was reportedly discussing Soviet travel via KLM with de MIER x(6)x (1, 6).

38). xkkx (Lic.) Oscar *OBREGON, Jr., not further identified.
A MEXICO

On 2 Jun 1967 OBREGON, who appeared to be a friend of Subject's, told Subject he would like to invite the Bolshoy troups to his house, but Subject said they would have little time in Mexico City. OBREGON also asked Subject if he could get him some caviar, and Subject said he would bring him some back from Moscow after his vacation. (1).

39). David *ORNELAS, of Mundus Tours.
CIT MEXICO? A MEXICO [illegible]

ORNELAS has been Subject's principal contact at Mundus Tours in regard to making travel bookings. There has been no indication of anything more than a business relationship between them, except that in June 1966 Subject gave ORNELAS some magazines. (1).

40). Salvador PAZ Plata (P-12775), shipping agent with Representaciones Maritimas, Soviet commercial contact.

On 1 Mar 1966 it was reported that Subject had met PAZ in Mazatlan, and they used the familiar form of address with eachother. During 1966 they were occasionally reported making luncheon dates or planning to get together after work. There has been no record of recent contact. (1).

41). Gloria *PINTO, located at telephone 23-62-85, listed to Dr. Jose Maria *PINTO Ancira, Tajin 592, no traces on either name.
[illegible] CIT MEXICO? A MEXICO
CIT MEXICO [illegible] A MEXICO

On 17 May 1967 Gloria thanked Subject for giving a visa to her sister-in-law. She said that Ruth (LNU) was going to Valle de Bravo on the weekend, but Subject said he would not be able to go. She added that Alfonso (LNU) would be at the Cafe Jujuy that afternoon at 1700, and Subject said he would try to go and would see Gloria there. On 13 Jun 1967 Gloria told Subject that her daughter did not want to work for Ralph (LNU) any more, because they wanted to send her to Pittsburgh. Subject said he could not go to the party Saturday that was to be held at the home of Ernesto *ACEVEDO (no xxxxxx identifiable traces). On 12 Jul 1967 Gloria told Subject that she had everything
CIT MEXICO. A MEXICO

ready and that she would stop by the Embassy to say goodbye (perhaps going to the USSR). (1).

42). (Miss) Mercedes *PINTO, no identifiable traces.

On 2 Mar 1967 Mercedes PINTO called Subject, who was out of town (1). ~~(Mercdex~~ (Comment: Mercedes could be the sister-in-law of Gloria PINTO mentioned above.)

43). Julio PLATAS Urbina (P-6948, 201-300319) claims to be a Soviet courier, has been in contact with the KGB, may be a provocation agent.

On 29 Oct 1965 PLATAS called, but Subject was out. On 1 Nov 1965 PLATA told Subject he had changed jobs, HE SAID HE no longer worked for Mex Hogar but was now with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (labor union). Subject said he would call him. (1).

44). Rafael Alfredo RAYN (P-8415, 201-357138), manager of Garza Lopez Tours.

Subject has been in contact with RAYN in 1966-67 on routine travel matters. In Aug 1965 Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV asked RAYN for a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York for the month of September 1965, including the cost of travel and baggage. In December 1965 Subject reminded RAYN of YATSKOV's request and asked him to include rail travel to New York and sea travel to Europe on the chart. RAYN never provided the chart. (11).

45). Sara ROSENFIELD and husband Loyd ROSENFIELD (P-11665, 201-789388), both writers for The News.

Both ROSENFIELDs met Subject at a reception at the Indian Embassy given by the Indian Consul, K.D. PARASHAR. Subject invited them to Soviet Embassy receptions of 16 Feb and 23 Feb 1967, and invited Sara to attend the Home Show with the consular corps, which she did. On 11 Jul 1967 ~~Saxax~~ they again met briefly at an Indian Embassy reception. (22).

46). Fernando ~~SALOMON~~ Jose *SALOMON Vallecillo, from Nicaragua.

On 24 Oct 1966 SALOMON told Subject that he had a letter from the Socialist Party of Nicaragua addressed to the Soviet Consul and that he had come specially from Nicaragua to deliver it. Subject said he would talk to SALOMON the next day at the Soviet Embassy. (1). (SALOMON also made an appointment to see the Cuban Ambassador the same day.)

47). Antonio SARMIENTO de la Barrera (P-12703), businessman who belongs to the French Club and has been reported friendly with several Soviets, particularly Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, and currently Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV.

On 24 Apr 1966 Subject was seen playing chess at the French Club with SARMIENTO and then went swimming with his wife. As of Sep 1966 Subject was reported still very friendly with the SARMIENTOs at the French Club. (15).

~~48)~~xx On 17 Dec 1965 Mrs. SARMIENTO invited NIKIFOROV to a Christmas party and said to bring Subject and Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV along (1).

48). Francis S. SHERRY, consular officer of the U.S. Embassy.

Subject has met SHERRY at consular corps functions. On 28 Jan 1967 they discussed playing tennis together. (20).

49). (Dr.) Emiliano SORIANO Ariz (P-6741), doctor frequently consulted by the Soviets in Mexico.

In Nov 1965 Subject took a sick Soviet sailor to be treated by SORIANO. In Dec 1965 and Jan 1966 Subject himself was being treated by SORIANO. (1).

50). Graciela *SOTO, no traces.

On 8 Sep 1966 Graciela, who described herself as Carlos BLANCO's friend (q. v.), invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child, also mentioned Rosita, who may be Rafael's wife (no traces on Rafael or Rosita SOTO). On 9 Nov 1966 Graciela called Subject, started to chat about having a toothache and that she had tried to call him before, but Subject cut her off and said he would call her the next day and to say hello to everyone. On 10

Nov 1966 Carlos BLANCO invited Subject to a party and said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1). (One Alfredo SOTO, no traces, is listed at Tamaulipas 115.)

2K

51). Jiri SVESTKA (P-7111, 201-285441). Czech Second Secretary and Consul, suspect Intelligence officer.

Subject and SVESTKA seem to be quite friendly, plan dinner together as well as discussing consular business (1).

F

52). Leopoldo *VAN DYCK, employee of Air France, said to be a homosexual, [illegible] has been friendly with other Soviet consular officers.

On 6 and ~~12~~ 13 Sep 1965 Subject was reported in contact with VAN DYCK in regard to visas for Air France passengers (17). On 5 Jul 1966 Subject told David ORNELAS of Mundus Tours to give VAN DYCK his regards, adding that VAN DYCK would know what kind of regards they were. (1).

53). Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943), came to Mexico in 1956 with his mother, Lucia RUIZ Garcia (P-4413), who lived in Moscow for 17 years and taught Spanish there - KGB officer Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN was reportedly one of her students. In 1958-59 Rafael translated for the Soviet TASS correspondent in Mexico, in 1961 he was teaching Russian at the IICMR (Soviet Cultural Institute), and he is currently teaching at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores. His current address is Romero de Terreros 922-1, telephone 43-80-16.

On 19 May 1967 VIDIELLA's wife tried to call Subject, saying that she was calling on behalf of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores and that her husband had written a letter in Russian about some tourists and she ~~[illegible]~~ wanted a Russian typewriter to have it typed up on. (1).

54). (Col. and Lic.) Rafael *VILLAURRUTIA Lopez, also reported in [illegible] contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

On 30 Jan 1967 VILLAURRUTIA said that he had to go out of town and could not keep his appointment with Subject (1).

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55). Ralph WIEGANDT (P-2254). German who came to Mexico in 1955 and has paint factory, member of French Club.

On 13 Mar 1967 Mrs. Ruth WIEGANDT, using the familiar form of address with Subject, invited Subject and his wife to Sunday dinner (1). In April 1967 it was reported that Subject was quite friendly with the WIEGANDTs at the Franch Club (15).

56). Douglas H. F *WILTSHIRE, American employed with SERVISA Travel [illegible] Agency.

On 10 May 1967 WILTSHIRE planned to pick up some passports from Subject at the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that he would like to invite Subject to his house (1).

57). Maxx Michael ZAREBSKI (P-8777, 201-744856), businessman from Cuernavaca, Canadian citizen.

On 11 Oct 1966 Subject reminded the Polish Consul, JAKOWIEC, that ZAREBSKI was going to sell [illegible] some of his items to the Soviets. On 13 Oct 1966 JAKOWIEC said he could introduce Subject to ZAREBSKI, or Subject could call him directly. (1). Subject had originally met ZAREBSKI at a Polish Embassy reception on 14 Dec 1965, and ~~they finally did get together~~ at another on 4 Oct 1966, and they finally did get together on 12 Jan 1967. Subject asked ZAREBSKI to help the Soviets find a house for a dacha in Cuernavaca, which he eventually did. On 24 Feb 1967 Subject and several other Soviets visited ZAREBSKI's factory and had lunch with him in Cuernavaca. On 20 May 1967 Subject and Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV visited ZAREBSKI in connection with the dacha, and on 15 Jul 1967 Subject and CHMYKHOV visited the factory. (19). (Comment: Subject and CHMYKHOV had known eachother before in Cuba, and both had mestkom responsibilities for the dacha, so their going to Cuernavaca together is not remarkable, although CHMYKHOV is a GRU officer.)

17.
~~16~~. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. Current Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1 (has lived at this address during his whole tour in Mexico) (1).

b. Telephone: None at home.

c. Car: 1965 green Impala, diplomatic tags 19-DA (7).

d. Office: Soviet Embassy, Tacubaya 204, telephone 15-60-55 (1). Often uses one of the reception rooms near the gate (21).

e. Handwriting samples attached (the one in Russian was in Subject's possession, but it is ~~kxx~~ not known whether he himself actually wrote it).

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18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

The Station is reviewing all of Subject's known contacts in a search for access agents. The case of Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez is currently being investigated as a possible Illegals lead.

125

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentin Loginov
15-60-55
Consul.

126

Эдуардо Вебельман, около
55 лет, мексиканец еврейского
происхождения, является
владельцем сталелитейного
завода и фирмы по
продаже стройматериалов.
В Мексику приехал во
время II мировой войны.
Проживает по адресу:
Calzada Teololo 320.
Сын – Маурисио Вебельман

~~Source~~ (6).

CARDED

- Lunes: 24 -

laigtos y Baja California

Cinoda

6½ pm.

Source (12)

128

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 4 1971
MICROFILMED

a 2- HMMA- 32132

CS COPY

129

MICROFILM
[illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

XSC
3P

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

In addition to routine coverage of Subject's activities in Mexico, the following has been done:

a. Surveillance of Subject in Panama in Dec 1961.

b. In July 1966 information was passed to LITEMPO-8 "proving" that Subject was a dangerous KGB officer in an attempt to have him declared PNG, without success.

c. LICOZY-5 continues to be debriefed on his contacts with Subject, although LICOZY-5 has told Subject he will no longer act as an agent for the Soviets.

d. Briefing of U.S. Embassy chauffeur whom Subject ~~xx~~ tried to develop.

e. Debriefing of LICOWL-1 on his contacts with Subject.

f. Station Panama City helped block visas for Subject and A.A. NIKITIN in Feb 1967.

g. ~~Rsen~~ Recruitment of Subject of 201-814144, whom Subject was cultivating. Contact now dead.

h. Briefing of U.S. Embassy visa officer whom Subject tried to develop.

i. Debriefing of Subject of 201-800412, who claimed Subject had tried to recruit him but who appears to be a fabricator.

j. Debriefing of LITEASE-1 on his contacts with Subject.

k. Debriefing of LIROBBIN-1 and 2 on their contacts with Subject.

l. Briefing of LIROAN-1 as access to Subject's friends at the club he belongs to.

m. Direction of BESABER in his contacts with Subject.

n. debriefing of LIREALM-1 on his contacts with Subject.

o. debriefing of LIROCKET-1.

p. debriefing of ~~R~~ LICANNY-1.

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OCT 4 1971
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19. SOURCES.

1. LIENVOY, passim.
2. PACY-7280, Dec 1961
3. HZPA-11914, 11 Jan 1962, passport photographs.
4. LIFIRE travel reports.
5. HMMA-26881, 12 Aug 65, LITEMPO passport photographs.
6. LICOZY-5 case file, passim.
7. LILYRIC + LIMITED surveillance.
8. LICOWL-1 case file, passim.
9. LNERGO report, 21 Dec 1965.
10. Contact report of meeting with KADIDDLE, 28 Dec 1965
11. LICANNY-1 case file, passim.
12. LNPURE memorandum, 21 Jan 1966
13. Station memorandum, 27 Jan 1966
14. LNPURE memorandum, 11 Feb 1966
15. LIROAN-1 information.
16. Station memorandum, information from LITEMPO-8, 22 Jul 1966.
17. Summary on Subject prepared by LIENVOY, 22 July 1966.
18. LICALLA surveillance, passim.
19. BESABER information.
20. Station memorandum, 30 Jan 1967.
21. LIROCKET-1 information.
22. LIROBBIN-2 information.
23. LITEASE-1 information.

24. LNPURE memorandum, 28 Feb 1967
25. LIREALM information.
26. Info from ~~[illegible]~~ Subject of 201-814144.
27. Station memo of 27 Jun 1967, info from LNPURE officer.
28 HMMW-13980, 16 Sep 1965, Hqs traces on Subject.
29 HZPA-11859, 22 Dec 1961.
30 Information from Subj of 201-800412.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Personality Assessment Questionnaire on Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

(201-285412)

1. Forwarded herewith is a Personality Assessment Questionnaire on LOGINOV prepared by LIREALM-1 in February 1969.

2. By virtue of membership in the same club in which they are both active participants in the same activity, LIREALM-1 has known LOGINOV for a little over two years. In this club they have several mutual contacts. As a result LIREALM-1 has met LOGINOV several times at social activities in the homes of these contacts. Although LOGINOV has never been a formal target for LIREALM-1, the relationship has been close enough and of sufficient duration for LIREALM-1 to fill out a meaningful Personality Assessment Questionnaire.

Francis J. Coyne
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Personality Assessment Questionnaire h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att h/w
2 - C/WH w/o att

1 Att (h/w)

CS COPY

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[redacted]	HMMA-36581	25 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-285412

133

SECRET

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM 12-67 2825

SECRET

(4)

w/att #1 to HMMA-36581

CS COPY

201-285412

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SECRET

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. This is a new, experimental version of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire (sometimes informally called the PRQ III) which has been in use for several years. This new form is largely a checklist and thus requires far less essay-type reporting than the previous form.

2. For a number of years, our operational psychologists have been developing a system for indirect assessment of target personalities. The system employs—in lieu of psychological tests and interviews—observations of appearance, manner, and style of behavior. Such observations are used as if they were items in a psychological test, and like test items, are weighted and analyzed to yield a personality profile. Working from the profile, operational psychologists describe the target personality's basic aptitudes, attitudes, motives and susceptibilities. The goal of the assessment is to identify feasible means of influencing the target person.

3. Reliability is vastly increased when two or more observers complete this questionnaire independently. All items need not be completed; in fact, it is a rare case where contact is sufficient to complete it fully. You are encouraged to guess where complete information is lacking. Mark such items with a "G," instead of the customary check mark or "X." Thus, an observer with very limited contact can be expected to enter more "G's" than "X's."

SECRET

4. Before completing the enclosed PAQ form, please provide the following information about *yourself:*

Age 39 Sex M Nationality US

Social-cultural background:

Middle-class

How often have you observed the target individual?

3 to 4 times per month over two years.

When did you last observe the target individual?

Last week. (week of 2 Feb 1969)

What is the nature of your contact? (direct acquaintance, embassy receptions/parties, informants, debriefing of others, etc.)

Tennis club.

5. Can you supply a specimen of the target individual's handwriting?

Yes____ No X

6. Please supply the name(s) of any person you believe qualified to provide information about the target person, that is, anyone sufficiently knowledgeable to complete this form at least in part.

Gloria Pinto

PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

I. DESCRIPTION

1. Overall Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

1.01	Virile, athletic, practical, and socially facile ("Hail fellow")	
1.02	Virile, rugged, practical, but socially guarded (authoritarian)	X
1.03	Rather soft and sensuous but socially pleasant and appropriate (good guy)	
1.04	Rather soft and sensuous but socially guarded and moody (a possible whiner)	
1.05	Manly, clean-cut, professional, and socially smooth (executive type)	
1.06	Austere, precise, and businesslike (dedicated worker type)	
1.07	Cultured, neat, artistic, and socially smooth (diplomatic type)	
1.08	Sensitive, intense, and self-preoccupied (artistic or absent-minded professor type)	
1.09	None of these fit. I would describe him as:	

2. Dress. (Check the most appropriate.)

2.01	Well-groomed (natty)	
2.02	Neat (well-kept)	X
2.03	Fastidious (fussy)	
2.04	Overdressed (prissy)	
2.05	Nondescript (bland)	
2.06	Underdressed (informal)	
2.07	Casual (indifferent)	

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2.08 Sloppy (poorly kept) ___
2.09 Unkempt (bizarre) ___
2.10 Style of dress

2.10.01 Conventional for his culture
2.10.02 Cosmopolitan ___
2.10.03 Outdated ___
2.10.04 Extreme or unique ___

3. Head Characteristics.

3.01 Skull measurements:

3.01.01 Side to side Wide ___ Average X Narrow ___
Front to back Wide ___ Average X Narrow ___

3.02 Forehead: High ___ Average X Low ___

3.03 Eyes: Wide-set ___ Average X Close-set ___

3.04 Eyebrows: (a) Arched ___ Average X Straight ___
(b) Bushy ___ Average X Sparse ___
(c) High ___ Average X Low ___

3.05 Is there anything about his head or head structure that requires special mention?

—

4. General Characteristics.

4.01 Age, weight, height:

4.01.01 How old is he? ~~40 ± 2~~ 40 ± 2

4.01.02 His apparent age is Much younger ___ Younger ___
About the same X Older ___
Much older ___

4.01.03 How tall is he? ~~5'10"~~ 5'10"

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4.01.04 Does he have a nickname: Yes___ No X
If Yes, does he object to being addressed by his nickname? Yes___ No___

4.01.05 Is he addressed by a diminutive? (Johnny, Jack, Hank, etc.) Yes X No___

4.01.06 Does he have any scars or other distinguishing marks? Yes___ No X
If so, please describe:

4.02 Hair:

4.02.01 Color Very light___ Light___ Medium X
Gray or white___ Dark___ Very dark___

4.02.02 Waviness Curly X Average___ Straight___

4.02.03 Amount Thick___ Average X Sparse___
Balding___ Bald___

4.02.04 Grooming Well-groomed___ Unruly___
Average X Unkempt___

4.02.05 Is there anything unusual about his hair or hair style?___
If so, please describe:

4.03 Eyes:

4.03.01 Color Gray___ Green___ Blue___
Yellowish___ Hazel___ Light brown___
Brown___

4.03.02 Wears eyeglasses
Always___ To read___ Never X

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4.03.03 Eyeglass lens Thick ___ Average ___ Bifocal ___

4.03.04 Eyeglass style Heavy frame ___ Rimless ___
Average frame ___ Contact lens ___

4.03.05 Is there anything unusual about his eyes that requires special mention. If so, please describe: ___

4.03.06 Does he take off glasses when he speaks? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.07 Does he use glasses to gesture? Yes ___ No ___

4.03.08 Does he ever wear sunglasses indoors? Yes ___ No X

4.04 Complexion:

4.04.01 Coloring Ruddy ___ Dark ___ Tan ___
Light X Pale ___

4.04.02 Face (a) Scarred ___ Lined ___ Smooth ___
(b) Beard ___ Clean-shaven X
Mustache ___ Unshaved ___

4.04.03 Describe type of mustache or beard:

4.04.04 Body hair (arms, legs, chest)
Heavy ___ Medium ___ Light X

4.04.05 Hair visible on nose? ___

4.04.06 Hair visible on ears? ___

4.04.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his skin or skin coloring? If so, please describe: ___

4.05 Face:

4.05.01 Expressiveness Expressive ____ Average X Inexpressive ____ Very expressive ____ Very inexpressive ____

4.05.02 If expressive, is face Natural ____ Tense ____

4.05.03 If inexpressive, is face Relaxed ____ Deadpan ____

4.05.04 In general, are facial responses Inappropriate ____ Appropriate X

4.05.05 Is there anything unusual or striking about his facial expressions? If so, please describe: when tense, he arches both eyebrows and tilts his head back.

4.06 Lips:

4.06.01 Type Protruding ____ Pursed ____ Thin X Full ____ Loose ____

4.06.02 Smiles (a) Spontaneously ____ Tensely ____ Mechanically ____
(b) Very frequently ____ Frequently ____ Average X Infrequently ____ Never ____

4.06.03 Have you ever seen him smile to himself? Yes X No ____

4.06.04 If you have seen him having his picture taken, can he smile on command? Yes X No ____
Or is he wooden and rather ill-at-ease? Yes ____ No ____

4.06.05 If you have not seen him having his picture taken, what kind of a picture do you think he would prefer? Serious ____ Smiling ____

4.06.06 Is there anything about his lips or smile that is unusual or striking? If so, please describe:

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4.07 Teeth

4.07.01 Shape — Regular X Average ___ Protruding ___ Unusual ___

4.07.02 Do you get the feeling he clenches his teeth? Yes ___ No X
If Yes, under what circumstances?

4.07.03 Does he have any gold teeth or unusual dental work?
Yes ___ No X

4.07.04 When he smiles, does he
Show his teeth? Yes ___ No X
Purse his lips? Yes ___ No ___
Put hand over mouth? Yes ___ No ___

4.07.05 Does he put his hand over his mouth when talking?
Never X Frequently ___
Occasionally ___ Always ___

4.07.06 Color of teeth — White X Dull ___ Stained ___

4.07.07 Is there anything unusual or striking about his teeth?
If so, please describe:

4.08 Posture:

4.08.01 Straightness — Round-shouldered ___ Slumped ___ Erect X Stiff ___

4.08.02 Is posture maintained? — Consistently X Variable ___

4.08.03 Shoulders — Broad-shouldered X Sloping ___ Average ___ Narrow ___

4.08.04 Body build Skinny ___ Average ___ Heavy X Obese ___

4.08.05 When conversing, in what direction does he primarily lean in relation to the other person?
Towards ___ Away X Neither ___

4.08.06 Does posture, when listening, differ from posture when talking? NO
If so, please describe:

4.08.07 Sitting Posture (a) Relaxed ___ Average ___ Stiff ___
(b) Erect X Average ___ Slumped ___

4.08.08 When in a group, is he inclined
To stand still X
Move about in one place ___
Lean against the wall ___
Sit down even though others are standing ___
Place his arms on others ___

4.08.09 If taller than average, does he bend over to come down to the group? Yes ___ No X

4.08.10 If shorter than average, does he stand up to the group?
Yes ___ No ___

4.08.11 When listening to a lecture (or watching a play or movie) does he
Sit still, stare at the speaker X
Move about, fidget, change position ___

4.08.12 Is there anything about his posture, carriage, or bearing that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ___

4.09 Hands:

4.09.01 Dominance Right-handed ___ Left-handed X

4.09.02 Is he inclined to use his less dominant hand?
Frequently ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never X

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4.09.03 Size of hands Very large ___ [✓ Large] Average ___
Small ___ Very small ___

4.09.04 His use of his hands is Graceful ___ [✓ Average] Awkward ___

4.09.05 In normal situations, his arms hang Loose ___ Stiff ___
[✓ Average]

4.09.06 When standing (talking or listening) he has a tendency
To open and close his hands ___
Put hands in pocket ___
Run hand over face or hair ___

4.09.07 If he puts hands in pockets, he is more likely to put them in
Pants ___ Coat ___

4.09.08 Nails [✓ Clean, not manicured] Manicured ___ Average ___
Ragged ___ Dirty ___ Bitten ___

4.09.09 If nails are bitten, to what extent?
Barely ___ Average ___ Deeply ___

4.09.10 Are fingers Blunt ___ [✓ Average] Long ___

4.09.11 Are hands Callous ___ Rough ___ [✓ Average]
Smooth ___ Soft ___

4.09.12 In public, does he
Pull, rub, or pick nose ___
Rub back of neck ___
Run hand over face or mouth ___
Scratch any part of his body ___
Pull at his clothes ___
[✓ Never do any of these things]

4.09.13 Does he put his arms on the table? Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.14 Does he put his elbows on the table? Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.15 When sitting at a table or desk, does he talk ___ or listen ___ with his head in his hands?
Often ___ Sometimes ___
Rarely ___ Never ___

4.09.16 When talking, does he tend to
Close his eyes ____
Put his hand over his eyes ____
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never X

4.09.17 If he closes or covers his eyes, is he more inclined to do it
When trying to make a particular point ____
When listening to someone else ____

4.09.18 Does he tap fingers on table?
Never ____ Occasionally ____ Often ____

4.09.19 Is he more inclined to do this when
Talking ____ Listening ____ Thinking ____

4.09.20 Does he
Rattle change in his pocket ____
Toy with some object ____
Often ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never X

4.09.21 Is there anything unique about his hands or arms worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ____

4.10 Feet:

4.10.01 Does he tend to show foot preference? Left ____ Right ____

4.10.02 Does he work to keep in step when walking with someone? Yes ____ No ____

4.10.03 Does he cross feet at ankles when seated? Yes ____ No ____

4.10.04 If so, which foot is over the other? Left ____ Right ____

4.10.05 Does he cross legs
Only when he faces in a new direction ____
As soon as he sits down ____
Shortly after he sits down ____
Occasionally ____
Never ____

4.10.06 If he crosses legs, which leg is on top? Left ____ Right ____
Depends on how he is sitting ____

4.10.07 Does he change his crossed leg
Depends on how he is facing ____
Frequently ____ Occasionally ____ Never ____

4.10.08 Compared to most people, does he walk
Faster ____ Slower ____ Same speed ____

4.10.09 If he is out of step with you, does he notice it and get in step? Yes ____ No ____

4.10.10 In conversation when he becomes intense, does he
Uncross his legs and lean forward ____
Uncross his legs and lean backward ____
Cross his legs and sit upright ____
Shift to a more erect position X
Shift to a more relaxed position ____
Make little change in position ____

4.10.11 Are his feet Large ____ Average X Small ____

4.10.12 Are his shoes (a) Pointed ____ Average X Blunt ____
(b) Highly polished ____ Average X Not well kept ____

4.10.13 Is there anything about his feet or legs that warrants special mention? If so, please describe: ____

4.10.14 When his legs are crossed, does he
Sit quietly ____ Move his foot ____ Swing or wiggle his leg ____

4.10.15 Does he ever tap his foot? No ____ Yes ____

4.10.16 Does he swing back and forth on his feet when standing and talking in a group?
Often ____ Rarely ____
Sometimes ____ Never X

4.10.17 When walking, are his steps Long ____ Normal X Short ____

4.10.18 When he walks, do his arms
Hang loose ____
Swing with his stride X
Swing, but out of rhythm ____
Hang tense ____

4.10.19 When he walks, do his toes
Turn out ____ Stay straight X Turn in ____

4.11 Voice:

4.11.01 Is his voice pitched Low ____ Medium X High ____

4.11.02 Does he speak Quietly ____ Average X Loudly ____

4.11.03 In his native language, is his tone quality noticeably
Louder ____ Quieter ____ About the same X

4.11.04 Does he have a speech impediment? Yes ____ No X
If Yes, please describe:

4.12 Use of Language

4.12.01 Does his native language vocabulary seem Rich ____ Limited ____
Average X Poor ____

4.12.02 In his best language, other than native, is he
Fluent ____ Barely fluent ____
Moderately fluent X Poor ____

4.12.03 Does he pick up idioms Quickly ____ Slowly ____
Average X Not at all ____

4.12.04 Does he learn foreign languages easily Yes ____ No ____
If Yes, does he
Learn primarily by "feel" and by "trial and error" ____
Learn primarily from textbooks ____

4.12.05 In his best second language, can he switch from his native language
Smoothly with little hesitation X
Effectively with average hesitation ____
Slowly with considerable hesitation ____
Awkwardly with considerable embarrassment ____

4.12.06 When he misuses language, does he ordinarily appear
Oblivious of it ____
Aware of, but indifferent to it X
Aware of, and anxious about it ____
Very aware of it and quite embarrassed ____

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4.12.07 In general, would you characterize him as
Laconic ___ Average X Garrulous ___

4.12.08 In ordinary conversation, does the content tend to be primarily
Personal ___ Impersonal ___
Interpersonal ___ Guarded ___

4.12.09 In ordinary conversation, is the content
Precise and to the point ___
Relevant ___
Average ___
To the point but rambling ___
Irrelevant ___

4.12.10 Does he
Often discuss personal problems ___
Rarely discuss personal problems X

4.12.11 Does he use profanity in his native language?
Occasionally ___ Frequently ___ Never X

4.12.12 Does he use profanity in an acquired language?
Occasionally ___ Frequently ___ Never X

4.12.13 Is there anything about his manner of speech or conversational style that is unusual.
Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, please describe:

4.13 Gestures:

4.13.01 Does he gesture when he talks?
Always ___ Sometimes ___
Never X

4.13.02 His most characteristic gesture is
Pointing with finger ___
Waving one hand ___
Sweeping both hands ___
Chopping both hands ___

4.13.03 When he gestures, the motion is
Graceful ___ Average ___ Mechanical ___

4.13.04 When engaged in conversation, does he tense up
Often ___ Rarely ___
Sometimes X Never ___

4.13.05 It is relatively easy to tell when he is really interested in a subject
Always X Rarely ___
Sometimes ___ Never ___

4.13.06 His eyes are very expressive Always ___ Sometimes X Rarely ___

4.13.07 Most people would find his eyes Beautiful ___ Average X
Pleasant ___ Unpleasant ___
Sinister ___

4.13.08 He maintains eye contact Always ___ Frequently X
Sometimes ___ Rarely ___ Never ___

4.13.09 In a group, have you ever seen him stare repeatedly at a person who seemed to interest him? Often ___ Sometimes ___ Never X

4.13.10 When he admires (follows with eyes) an attractive girl, he is Obvious ___ Average ___ Subtle X
I have never seen him do it ___
Have you ever seen him blush? Yes X No ___
If Yes, describe the situation:

His political comments were successfully changed at a party. All present, including himself, were embarrassed by the confrontation.

4.13.11 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the movements he makes with his body, eyes, or head and the way he behaves in a group? If so, please describe: Yes

See 4.05.05

4.14 **Sleep**

4.14.01 Does he Enjoy sleep and fall off easily? Yes___ No___

Read or walk to prepare himself for sleep? Yes___ No___

4.14.02 Does he Rise easily? Yes___ No___

Prefer to remain abed until the last moment? Yes___ No___

4.14.03 Is he An early starter? ___

A late starter? ___

4.15 **Impressions:**

4.15.01 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most women would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average___ Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___

Sexually attractive X

4.15.02 To the best of your knowledge, do you think most men would find him Charming___ Pleasant___ Average X Unpleasant___ Very unpleasant___

4.15.03 Without prior knowledge, if you saw him on the street, would he impress you as Nondescript___ Average X Striking___

4.15.04 Without prior knowledge and on the basis of looks alone, which of the following do you think he might be?

Peasant___ Executive___

Worker X Professional___

Merchant___ Military Officer___

Artist of some type___

4.15.05 Is there anything particularly striking and worthy of further explanation about the overall impression he gives? Yes

If so, please describe:

Conspicuously athletic.

Looks like boxer.

II. BACKGROUND

5. General

5.01 Ethnic Background:

5.01.01 Please describe his ethnic background.

Slavic - blond

5.01.02 How does he compare with others of this background?
Like most X
A stereotype ____
Not like most ____
I would never guess his background ____

5.02 Cultural Background:

5.02.01 If he had his personal choice, do you think he is the kind of person who, living in a foreign culture would
Never change his accustomed way of living ____
Maintain his accustomed way of living but show some interest in the local culture ____
Show some interest in the local culture and adapt his ways X
Go native if he had his chance ____

5.02.02 Compared with his own group, he is just like all the rest of them X
Somewhat different than most of them ____
Unique ____

5.03 Educational Background:

5.03.01 What is his educational background? Please describe:

5.03.02 In your opinion, compared to most people in his culture with a similar background he

Is as well-educated ____

Is better informed ____

Appears better educated than he claims ____

Appears less educated than he claims X

I cannot conceive of him having the background he claims ____

If you doubt his background, please comment:

6.	General Impression of Background (Check the most appropriate)	
6.01	Strong and rugged (a man's man)	X
6.02	Strong, rugged, but independent (a self-sufficient loner)	____
6.03	Compassionate, sensual and understanding (a woman's man)	____
6.04	Moody, emotional, and sometimes bitter (the "misunderstood" man)	____
6.05	Forthright, intelligent, and responsible (the professional man)	____
6.06	Proficient, intelligent, and intense (the technical man)	____
6.07	Sensitive, cultured, and sophisticated (the "Madison Avenue" man)	____
6.08	Sensitive, temperamental, and unconventional (the Bohemian man)	____
6.09	None of these. I would describe him as:	____

III. SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

7. General Impression. (Check the most appropriate.)

7.01 The kind of a man who is usually punctual, inclined to greet everyone informally and who appears to be comfortable with himself when he enters a room. ____

7.02 The kind of a man who is always punctual, inclined to greet everyone somewhat awkwardly and who appears to be uncomfortable when he enters a room. X

7.03 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be very warm and friendly with everyone he knows, and who appears confident when he enters a room. ____

7.04 The kind of man who is punctual when he makes a date, but who is inclined to cancel engagements rather often, inclined to greet only those people he has met before and is somewhat retiring or standoffish when he enters a room. ____

7.05 The kind of man who is inclined to keep you waiting but is gracious and attentive when he arrives, inclined to be precise and proper as he greets everyone and can be quite impressive when he enters a room. ____

7.06 The kind of man who is always punctual, inclined to be very formal in his greetings and is most often stiff and unbending when he enters a room. ____

7.07 The kind of man whose punctuality is unpredictable, who is inclined to be charming and sophisticated as he greets everyone and is quite socially poised when he enters a room. ____

7.08 The kind of man who is often quite late—and indifferent about it—inclined to be short and curt in his greetings and is sometimes awkward when he enters a room. ___

7.09 None of these. ___
I would describe him as:

8. Meeting People:

8.01 When he shakes hands
Does he move toward you ___
[✓ or Do you most often have to move toward him]

8.02 When he shakes hands, is his grip
Very firm ___
[✓ Firm]
Average ___
Weak ___
Limp ___

8.03 When he shakes hands, does he
Pump your hand ___
[✓ Squeeze your hand]
Let you do all the work ___

8.04 Is there anything about the way he shakes hands worthy of special mention? If so, please describe: ___

8.05 When he is first introduced, does he
[✓ Look the person in the eye to whom he is being introduced]
Cock his head toward the introducer but look at the person to whom he is being introduced ___
Cock his head and look at neither ___

8.06 When he first hears a name, he
Does nothing obvious to remember it ____
Repeats it as he acknowledges the introduction ____
Asks the introducer to repeat or verify it ____
Asks the person to whom he is being introduced to repeat the name ____

8.07 If calling cards are exchanged, does he
Read the card and carefully put it away X
Read it and stick it in his pocket ____
Carefully put it away without reading it ____
Stick it in his pocket without reading it ____

8.08 When introducing someone, does he do so
With ease and grace ____
With some slight embarrassment or hesitation X
With considerable awkwardness ____

8.09 To what extent is his manner different when he is being introduced to women? Not at all ____ Normal X Marked ____

8.10 If he shows a difference, which of the following describes it?
Uses both hands when he takes her hand ____
Moves in closer when acknowledging the introduction ____
Becomes more formal and distant ____
Becomes warm and effusive ____
Becomes warm and effusive only with pretty girls ____
Is very courteous and gracious to older women ____
Varies, depending on the woman ____
If so, please explain:

8.11 When introduced to a fair number of people at the same time, does he
Linger a bit with each person to whom he is introduced ___
Acknowledge the introduction quickly and wait for the next ___
Look toward the next person almost at the same time he is shaking hands with the person whom he has just met ___

8.12 In general, does he strike you as the kind of person who will
Always remember a name ___
Remember names in an average manner X
Have difficulty remembering names ___
Be very poor at remembering names ___

8.13 Has he ever asked you to re-identify someone to whom you had previously introduced him? No ___ Yes X

9. Smoking and Eating:

9.01 Smoking:

9.01.01 Does he smoke?

Cigarettes ___	Cigars ___	Pipe ___
Regularly ___	Regularly ___	Regularly ___
Occasionally ___	Occasionally ___	Occasionally ___
Never X	Never X	Never X

9.01.02 How much does he smoke? Heavy ___ Average ___
Light ___

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9.01.03 Does he use his own Lighter ____ Matches ____

9.01.04 Is he the kind of person who
Is always asking for a light ____
Frequently asks for a light ____
Usually has his own light ____
Always has his own light ____

9.01.05 Does he use a holder?
Cigarette ____ Cigar ____
Always ____ Always ____
Sometimes ____ Sometimes ____
Never ____ Never ____

9.01.06 Does he clip cigars? Always ____ Sometimes ____ Bites off end ____

9.01.07 Does he care for his pipe? Fastidiously ____ Average ____
Neglects ____

9.01.08 When lighting a cigarette does he
Obviously duck his head and cup his hands ____
Light it casually while talking ____

9.01.09 Have you ever seen him hold an unlighted cigarette and wait for a pause in the conversation before lighting it? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.10 Have you ever seen him put a cigarette in his mouth and pause, match poised, waiting for the appropriate time to light it?
No ____ Yes ____

9.01.11 Have you ever seen him chew on an unlighted cigar, pipe, or cigarette? No ____ Yes ____

9.01.12 Is he a chain smoker who
Lights one cigarette from another ____
Smokes his cigarette down to the nub and then lights another ____
Always keeps a cigarette going even though he may not smoke it very much ____

9.01.13 Does he smoke
Only after meals ____
Only when offered a cigarette by someone ____
Between the entree and the dessert when others do ____

9.01.14 Is the presence of tobacco stain on his fingers
Very marked ____
Noticeable ____
Barely noticeable ____
No stain ____

9.01.15 When smoking, does he

(a)
Allow a long ash to accumulate on his cigarette ____
Flick off ashes in a normal manner ____
Become unusually preoccupied with the ashtray ____

(b)
Let ashes fall to the rug ____
Cup his hand under his cigarette ____
Always use an ashtray ____

9.01.16 Does he
Put out a cigarette with elaborate ashtray ritual ____
Seem to put out cigarettes in a normal manner ____
Seem careless about how he puts out a cigarette ____

9.01.17 Does he
Show obvious enjoyment when smoking ____
Show average satisfaction ____
Smoke perfunctorily and mechanically ____

9.01.18 Is he the kind of person who offers a light to others
Always ____ Seldom ____
Frequently ____ Never ____

9.01.19 Is he the kind of person who
Will walk across a room to offer a light to a lady ____
Is conventional in how he offers a light to a lady X
Will seldom offer a light to a lady ____

9.01.20 To your knowledge, has he given up smoking for reasons of health?
Yes ____ No ____

9.01.21 Have you ever heard him mention that he should give up smoking
but cannot ____
Has tried to stop but could not ____

9.01.22 Have you ever heard him mention that he is bothered by the smell of Cigars ____ Pipes ____ Cigarettes ____
Never heard him mention any of these ____

9.01.23 Is there anything about his smoking habits that requires special mention or special description? If so, please describe:

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9.02 Eating:

9.02.01 Is his mode of eating
Typical of most of his colleagues X
Somewhat different than most of his colleagues ____
Markedly different than most of his colleagues ____

9.02.02 Is he a Hearty eater ____ Average eater X Light eater ____

9.02.03 Is the fact that he has marked food preferences
Very noticeable ____
Not particularly noticeable ____
Not at all noticeable ____

9.02.04 Does he
Eat with relish ____
Enjoy his food in a conventional manner ____
Seem indifferent to food X

9.02.05 Does he eat Quickly ____ Average X Slowly ____

9.02.06 Is he generally inclined
To take second helpings ____
To take all he wants the first time around X
Often leaves some of his food untouched ____

9.02.07 Does he
Dwell on how much he misses his native foods ____
Show conventional interest in local foods X
Indicate considerable interest in new and unusual foods ____

9.02.08 (a) He does not eat while Talking ____ Listening ____
(b) He does eat while Talking X Listening X

9.02.09 Does he show a tendency to adapt to the table etiquette of the people with whom he is dining? Marked ____ Average X
Maintains his familiar style of eating at all times ____

9.02.10 When given a chance, does he, for other than business reasons, suggest a preferred place to eat? Always ____ Sometimes ____
Rarely, if ever X

9.02.11 When eating out
It is very difficult for him to select his meal ____
Waits to hear what his companion orders and orders same thing ____
Always knows what he wants very quickly ____

9.02.12 When eating out, he is
Somewhat extravagant when he knows you are paying ____
Very cost-conscious when he knows he is paying ____
Very cost-conscious no matter who is paying ____
Generally indifferent about cost no matter who is paying ____

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9.02.13 Is he the sort of person who
Usually wants to check the bill regardless of who is paying ___
Is indifferent about the bill when someone else is paying ___

9.02.14 When he is paying, he checks the bill Unobtrusively ___
Very carefully (and rather obviously) ___

9.02.15 When he pays his check, does he Obviously count his change ___
Show indifference when accepting his change ___
Take his change in a normal manner ___

9.02.16 When he deals with headwaiters, is he Aggressive ___
Normal and conventional ___
Somewhat ingratiating ___
Brusque X

9.02.17 Is he prone to complain when service does not suit him?
To his companion ___ Directly ___ Not at all ___

9.02.18 He handles waiters In a conventional way
Over friendly ___ Unusually polite ___

9.02.19 Is there anything about his eating habits or manners that requires special mention ? If so, please describe:

9.03 Overall impression of eating and smoking behavior. (Check the most appropriate description.)

9.03.01 A hearty eater with well-defined preferences. He eats and smokes with considerable gusto but tends to be a little on the coarse and boorish side. It is rather easy to imagine him eating huge sandwiches and drinking beer with the boys at the neighborhood bar. ___

9.03.02 A heavy eater with limited preferences. He eats and smokes with gusto but his manners are definitely coarse and boorish. It is rather easy to imagine him becoming quite sharp with a waiter who serves him unfamiliar food or a dish prepared in an unfamiliar way. ___

9.03.03 A sensual eater who knows all the restaurants and their native specialties. He is very anxious to have others try dishes he has discovered. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes, and though rarely gauche, he is more aware of his food than his manners. It is easy to imagine him cooking and serving special dishes to his friends. ___

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9.03.04 A sensual eater who tends to eat by himself when possible. He seems to eat all types of food and has something of the ~~air of a~~ glutton about him. He eats with obvious pleasure, savors his smokes and afterwards will linger alone at a table with self-satisfaction. It is easy to imagine him hovering alone over the buffet at a cocktail party savoring the tidbits. ____

9.03.05 A conventional eater who usually goes along with the crowd. He probably has food allergies that prevent him from eating certain foods. He gives the impression of enjoying smoking more than eating but his table manners are adapted to whatever situation he is in. It is easy to imagine him taking an indigestion pill in the privacy of his room. ____

9.03.06 A conventional eater who always goes along with the crowd. He eats with little relish and rarely mentions anything about his likes or dislikes. He smokes at every opportunity, but more mechanically than with pleasure. He usually tries to adapt his manners to the situation but may be a little awkward and obvious in doing so. It is easy to imagine him grabbing a bite at a sidewalk stand at any time of day. ____

9.03.07 A gourmet eater who has marked and varied sophisticated food tastes. Dining is quite a ritual with him, and atmosphere and service are almost as important as the food. He is graceful and cultured at table and smokes in the same manner. It is easy to imagine him dressing for dinner, enjoying fine wines and food by candlelight. ____

9.03.08 An unconventional eater, a man who "eats like a bird." He eats in a preoccupied way, obviously indifferent to his food and surroundings. It would not be surprising to learn he was a food faddist (vegetarian, health foods, etc.). ____

9.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit. ____
I would describe him as:

9.04 Drinking:

9.04.01 Does he drink? Not at all ___ Average X
A little ___ Heavily ___

9.04.02 Does he drink alone (solitary drinker) ___
with others mainly for sociableness ___
on formal occasions only ___
after work, at home ___

9.04.03 Does he appear to drink primarily for the taste ___
primarily for the effect ___
for both ___

9.04.04 His favorite drink is Beer ___ Wine ___ Whiskey ___
Vodka ___ Gin ___ No preference ___

9.04.05 He prefers Cocktails ___ Highballs ___ Short drinks ___
Straight shots ___

9.04.06 He drinks Slowly ___ Average X Quickly ___

9.04.07 Does he Gulp his drink ___ Sip his drink X

9.04.08 Does he Go out of his way to get a refill ___
Usually wait until asked ___
Always wait until asked X

9.04.09 Attitude toward wines? Very knowledgeable ___
Enjoys but not particularly knowledgeable ___
Indifferent about wines ___
Knows nothing, couldn't care less X

9.04.10 Does he Talk at length (and obviously get pleasure from talking) about his liquor preferences ___
Talk about his liquor preferences no more than anyone else ___
Never talk about his liquor preferences X

9.04.11 Is he openly proud of his native drinks and does he urge others to try them? Yes ___ No X
Is he conventionally aware of his native drinks and offer them when appropriate? Yes ___ No ___
Does he rarely mention his native drinks and not "push" them? Yes ___ No ___

9.04.12 Does he Pay little attention to the drinking needs of others ____
Serve drinks in a socially appropriate manner ____
Tend to force drinks on others ____

9.04.13 Compared with his colleagues, what are his drinking habits?
Markedly different ____ Very similar ____ Just the same ____
If markedly different, please explain:

9.04.14 When he has had a few drinks, his behavior shows
No noticeable change X
Some change ____
A definite change ____

If a definite change, please describe:

9.04.15 Does his manner of speaking change when he drinks?
Becomes quite slurred ____
Shows little change ____
Does not change at all X

9.04.16 When he drinks, his voice becomes
Louder ____ Quieter ____ No change X

9.04.17 Have you ever seen him truly drunk? No X Yes ____
If so, was he Socially active ____ Well-controlled ____
Boisterous ____ Poorly coordinated ____
Hostile ____ Depressed ____
Quiet, withdrawn ____ Sexually aroused ____

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9.04.18 If you have not seen him drunk, would you predict that when drunk he would become

Very active ___ Very passive ___

Very unpleasant ___ Rather pleasant ___

Never become drunk X

I cannot imagine how he would act when drunk ___

9.04.19 Have you ever seen him with a hang over? No ___ Yes ___

If Yes, is he the kind of person who

Obviously looks hung over but functions fairly well ___

Looks somewhat hung over but shows it mainly in his eyes and general manner ___

Obviously looks hung over and is quite vocal about how bad he feels ___

Does not look hung over in spite of what he says ___

9.04.20 Is there anything special about his drinking habits that requires mention? If so, please describe: ___

9.05 Overall impression of drinking behavior: (Check the most appropriate)

9.05.01 A hearty, heavy drinker who holds his liquor well. He is always rather boisterous, and when he drinks, there is little change in behavior. ___

9.05.02 A heavy drinker who often gives the impression he can drink others under the table: When he drinks, there is little change in behavior, but there is a hint that he could get quite mean if provoked. ___

9.05.03 A steady drinker who obviously enjoys being "tight." In a way he can be somewhat charming when drunk and can get away with a bit of the "life of the party" routine. ___

9.05.04 A steady drinker who becomes somewhat more maudlin when drunk or tight. Tends to tell people how much he likes them and sometimes asks others whether they like him. Gives an impression that he could become quite disgusting if he got very drunk. ___

9.05.05 A steady drinker who holds his liquor very well. He always remains quite dignified and usually maintains his poise even though others are becoming quite drunk or tight. He still remains part of the crowd, however—that is, he gives few signs of being disgusted or bored. ____

9.05.06 A light drinker who paces his drinks. He seems to drink only because it is socially necessary. As a party progresses he tends to become aloof and distant. Is likely to continue to talk about his work even when it is inappropriate. ____

9.05.07 A light drinker who tapers off as the evening progresses. Usually manages to keep a sophisticated aloofness from others. Often singles out and associates with someone rather like himself. As the party progresses, he shows obvious distaste for anything he considers crude or boisterous. Often becomes quite sarcastic about others' behavior. ____

9.05.08 A very light drinker who either drinks only because he has to or refuses to drink at all. Is usually not really a part of the party and is obviously annoyed when others bring him in against his wishes. Tends to be solitary and sometimes will leave unobtrusively when the opportunity presents. X

9.05.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10. Driving and Walking

10.01 Driving Behavior:

10.01.01 He drives a car in an

Unusually adept manner ____
Average or conventional manner ____
Unusually inept manner ____
He does not drive ____

10.01.02 He drives Very fast ___ Average ___ Very slow ___

10.01.03 When he drives and talks, you get the feeling
He pays little attention to his driving ___
He pays average attention to his driving ___
His driving is obviously more important than his conversation ___

10.01.04 Compared with his colleagues, his interest in foreign cars is
About the same ___ Definitely different ___

10.01.05 His interest in the care and maintenance of automobiles is
Unusual ___ Average ___ Little or none ___

10.01.06 His road courtesy is Equivalent to most of his colleagues' ___
Equivalent to the courtesy of most people I know ___
Unusual in that he is very courteous and cautious ___
Unusual in that he is rude and demanding ___

10.01.07 To the best of your knowledge, he is the kind of person who
Can learn how to get around a strange city very quickly ___
Can follow a road or city map with relative ease ___
Gets around by asking lots of questions ___
Almost always depends upon others to get him where he is going ___

10.01.08 When riding with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very much aware of the driving and responds with the driver—(goes through motions of braking, braces with changing traffic)?
No ___ Yes ___

10.01.09 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who seems to adapt to the style of driving in an average or appropriate manner? No ___ Yes ___

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10.01.10 When driving with someone else, is he the kind of person who is very relaxed and relatively indifferent to the driving?
No ____ Yes ____

10.01.11 Is he the kind of person who
Would never drive when drinking ____
Is inclined to be aware when he should not drive ____
Would always insist on driving, even when drunk ____

10.01.12 Will he offer someone a lift?
When it is appropriate ____
Almost always ____ Never ____

10.01.13 Is there anything about his manner of driving that requires special mention? If so, please describe:

10.02 Walking:

10.02.01 Is he the kind of person who
Does a great deal of walking ____
Walks an average amount ____
Never walks if he can help it ____

10.02.02 When he walks, his pace is Fast ____ Average ____ Slow ____

10.02.03 When you walk with him, he most often
Keeps pace with you ____
Forces you to keep up with him ____

10.02.04 When he walks, do his feet
Swing to the right and left (outwards) ____
Maintain a fairly parallel motion ____
Swing inward ____

10.02.05 Does he walk
Erect with head up ____
Erect with head down ____
Bent forward but eyes up ____
Bent forward with eyes down ____
In a very stooped manner ____

10.02.06 When he is walking, he looks around
A great deal ____ Average ____ Never ____

10.02.07 When he greets someone he knows on the street, his face
Lights up ____
Shows average or appropriate expression ____
Rarely changes expression ____

10.02.08 Is there anything unusual or striking about his gait or manner of walking? If so, please describe: ____

10.03 Overall impression of driving and walking behavior:
(Check the most appropriate description.)

10.03.01 An active, alert individual with a purposeful stride who appears to have a very practical mind. He enjoys "fixing things," appears to have sound knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a relaxed efficient manner. ____

10.03.02 An active individual who is somewhat standoffish (or negative) toward others. His stride is fast and intent. He appears to have a practical mind, is quite possessive and protective and is reluctant to share his possessions with others. He "fixes things" in a matter-of-fact way, appears to have good knowledge of automobiles, and drives in a determined (sometimes even hostile) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.03 An active, alert individual with a free-and-easy stride who appears most of the time to be in good humor. Seldom tries to fix things, but is often quite good at getting others to fix things for him. He appears to have little knowledge of automobiles but drives in a relaxed, efficient manner. ____

10.03.04 An active individual who has a cautious tinge to his walk as though he is easily embarrassed or easily startled. He appears rather helpless and awkward when he has to "fix things." He evidently has little knowledge of automobiles and drives in a careful (sometimes tense) but efficient manner. ____

10.03.05 A well-controlled and attentive individual who walks in something of a clipped, formal manner. Although generally practical, he seldom will do anything by "feel." He must read up and prepare himself when required to "fix things." He appears to have acquired considerable knowledge about automobiles but drives in a somewhat mechanical or highly controlled manner. ____

10.03.06 A well-controlled individual who is often somewhat preoccupied even in his walk. When he takes time to "fix things" he does so with intensity and precision. He is often very well read about automobiles and cares for his car or sees that it is cared for meticulously. However, when involved in conver-

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sation or otherwise preoccupied, he can sometimes be quite a dangerous driver. ____

10.03.07 A well-controlled individual who has a glide (or grace) in his walk. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" but usually knows the best places to get things done and is inclined to be quite particular in how things are done for him. He appears to have relatively little knowledge of the mechanics of an automobile, but appreciates and takes good care of a good automobile. He drives with confidence, but usually at a fast pace with not too much awareness of others. ____

10.03.08 A rather nervous and temperamental person who walks rapidly and rather awkwardly. He has little or no interest in "fixing things" and is inclined to ignore or throw away things that do not work. He appears to have little interest in or knowledge about automobiles and his driving shows it. It is sometimes frightening to ride with him. ____

10.03.09 None of these descriptions really fit.
I would describe him as:

10.04 Hobbies and Sports

10.04.01 Does he have any hobbies? Yes X No ____ Don't Know ____

If Yes, describe his hobbies:

Tennis

If No or Don't Know, what is your best guess on the hobby most likely to interest him?

Can't imagine him having any kind of hobby____

Collecting (What does he collect? Guns, stamps, coins, books, butterflies, etc.)

As a collector, is he Avid ___ Moderately dedicated ___ Only casual ___

Artistic (painting, ceramics, etc.) ___
Mechanical (motors, hi-fi building, etc.) ___
Skill (woodworking, model building, etc.) ___
Intellectual (special periods in history, philosophy, etc.) ___
Active (group dancing, such light sports as ping pong, bowling or volleyball) ___
Outdoor (hunting, fishing, golf, etc.) ___
Social (chess, poker, bridge, etc.) ___
Vicarious (listening to music, attending plays, ball games, etc.) ___
Mental amusement (crossword puzzles, anagrams, cryptograms) ___

10.04.02 Has he ever mentioned having had hobbies in the past? Yes ___ No ___

If Yes, give details:

10.04.03 How well does he dance? unusually good ___ good ___ average ___ [✓ poor] does not dance ___ do not know if he dances ___

10.04.04 Describe the kind of dancing you have seen him do:

Foxtrot, cumbias

10.04.05 Does he play chess? Yes X No ___
If Yes, do you know he is good ___ believe he is probably good ___
know he is an average player ___ believe he is probably average ___
know he is a poor player ___ believe he is probably a poor player X

10.04.06 If you are a poker player, describe the kind of poker player you think he would be:

Fair

10.04.07 Is he the kind of person with whom you would like to play poker? Yes ___ No ___
If No, explain:

10.04.08 Have you heard him sing? Yes X No ___
If Yes, is his voice good ___ average ___ poor X

10.04.09 Does he seem to know many songs? Yes ___ No X

10.04.10 In group singing, does he often lead off with a song ___ sometimes lead off with a song ___ always follow someone else's lead X

10.04.11 Does he play a musical instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, which instrument:

10.04.12 Has he ever mentioned having played an instrument? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, give details?

10.04.13 Does he participate in an active sports? Yes X No ___
If yes, describe:

Tennis, embassy volleyball

If No, what is your guess regarding the kind of sport that would interest him most:

He definitely is not the sports type ____
Body contact sports (football, rugby, soccer, etc.) ____
Skill sports (tennis, handball, volleyball, etc) ____
Individual skill sports (swimming, archery, skeet, etc.) ____
He is likely to be interested in all kinds of sports ____

10.04.14 Does he play golf? Yes ____ No X
If Yes, does he take golf very seriously ____ take golf in an average way ____ take golf indifferently ____

10.04.15 As a golfer, do you know he is good ____ believe he is probably good ____
know he is an average player ____ believe he is probably average ____
know he is a poor player ____ believe he is probably a poor player ____

10.04.16 If you are a golfer, is he the kind of person you would like to play with?
Yes ____ No ____

If No, explain:

10.04.17 Does he: hunt a great deal ____ fish a great deal ____ do some hunting ____
do some fishing ____ never hunt ____ never go fishing ____

10.04.18 Do you have information on how seriously he takes hunting or fishing?
Yes ____ No ____

If Yes, explain:

10.04.19 Has he ever mentioned participating in sports in the past? Yes X No ____
If Yes, give details (include any mention he may have made of medals, trophies, team membership, etc.):

Boxing

10.04.20 Have you ever heard anyone describe him as an athlete? Yes X No ___
If Yes, give details:
everyone

10.04.21 Is he the kind of person who:
is very much preoccupied with keeping in shape X
works at keeping in shape to an average degree ___
shows little interest in keeping in shape ___

10.04.22 Has he ever indicated an interest in weight lifting? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, explain:

10.04.23 He is best described as:
a muscular, athletic type X
a strong, well-built type ___
a somewhat flabby type ___
a flabby, unathletic type ___
an effeminate type ___

10.04.24 Is he mechanically inclined? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, does he
Prefer to follow instructions in books ___
Ignore instructions and try to figure it out for himself ___

10.04.25 If it were possible to provide American magazines or periodicals for him, which of the following do you think he would really enjoy:
The New York Times ___ Saturday Review ___ Newsweek ___
Playboy X Sports Illustrated X Life ___ Atlantic ___
Field and Stream ___ Popular Mechanics ___ New Republic ___
Better Homes and Gardens ___ Readers Digest ___
Kenyon Review ___ Ramparts ___ Scientific American ___
Christian Science Monitor ___

Can't imagine him reading an American magazine ___

10.04.26 What books, if any, have you heard him mention as having read and enjoyed?

10.04.27 What movies, if any, have you heard him mention as having seen and enjoyed?

10.04.28 If he had his choice, would he most likely attend:
a movie___ the theater___ the ballet___
a soccer match _X_ a bull fight___ a concert___

10.05 Office Behavior

10.05.01 General Information (Check where applicable)

- Informal ___
- Formal ___
- Follower of rules and regulations ___
- An innovator ___
- Doer ___
- Practical ___
- Procrastinator ___
- Big memo writer ___
- Delegates work ___
- Can't delegate ___
- Productive ___
- Thinker type ___
- Organized ___
- Disorganized ___
- Feels work is not appreciated ___

10.05.02 Reaction of Other Workers

Subordinates	Yes	No	Don't Know
Like him	___	___	___
Dislike him	___	___	___
He is courteous to them	___	___	___
Worries about them	___	___	___
Couldn't care less	___	___	___
They fear him	___	___	___
Believe he is just	___	___	___
He takes credit for their work	___	___	___
Gives credit where due	___	___	___
See him socially	___	___	___

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Superiors			
Trust his judgment			
Like him			
Dislike him			
Delegate responsibility to him			
See him socially			

IV. EMOTIONAL SET

11. Temperament and Humor

11.01 Temperament:

11.01.01 In his relations with others would you consider him
Shy ☐
Guarded ☒
Conventional and correct ☐
Outgoing ☐
Warm ☐

11.01.02 Is his conversational style
Awkward ☐
Hesitant ☒
Contrived ☐
Conventional ☐
Comfortable ☐
Easy ☐
Voluble ☐

11.01.03 His manner of relating to women is
About the same as with men ☐
More correct and controlled than with men ☐
More warm and relaxed than with men ☒

11.01.04 In general, do you think he is a person who
Loses his temper easily ☐
Has a quick temper but holds it well ☐
Has a normal temper ☒
Has an even temper and is rarely ruffled ☐
Has an unusual amount of tolerance and would almost never lose his temper ☐

11.01.05 Have you ever seen him lose his temper? No ☐ Yes ☐
If Yes, give a short description of the incident, including how he reacted.

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11.02 **Humor:**

11.02.01 Is he a person whom you
Have never seen tease anyone ____
Have frequently seen tease someone ____
Cannot imagine ever teasing anyone ____
Consider his tendency to tease like that of most people X

11.02.02 Is he a person
Who obviously cannot take teasing ____
Whom most people enjoy teasing ____
Whom most people would never consider teasing ____
Who obviously likes to be teased ____

11.02.03 His sense of humor is
About like that of most people ____
Notably absent ____ Clever ____ Subtle ____
Dry ____ Heavy X Crude ____

11.02.04 Does he tell jokes and anecdotes?
Never ____
Sometimes ____
Frequently X

11.02.05 As a story teller, he is Very good ____ Average ____ Poor X

11.02.06 Is he more inclined to tell a story
To a group of people X
Quietly to a friend or acquaintance ____
Only when encouraged ____

11.03 Overall impression of temperament and sense of humor:
(Check the most appropriate description.)

11.03.01 He is a hearty, hale fellow who laughs with gusto and pleasure. His humor is forthright, not subtle, and although he is sometimes loud, he is rarely unpleasant or objectionable. Most of the time, his good humor is contagious. ____

11.03.02 He is a hearty fellow who, when he laughs, does so with considerable gusto. However, he is frequently dour and sometimes intolerant and somewhat humorless. His humor is direct, even crude, and at times, inappropriate. He tends to be the kind of person who laughs more at people than with people. X

11.03.03 He is a good-humored fellow who sometimes can be considered jolly and carefree. His humor is clever and well timed. He is quite sensitive to the moods and feelings of others and often can do a good job appropriately livening up a party. Although something of a tease, he is never cruel or insensitive. ____

11.03.04 He is generally a rather quiet and somewhat complacent person who, at times, can be surprisingly gay and carefree. However, when gay, he sometimes overdoes it and causes some strain for those around him. His humor is often clever but he can be quite sarcastic and even biting on occasion.

11.03.05 He is an urbane fellow, generally quite conventional and appropriate. He does not necessarily appear to be a humorless person, but he seldom displays his sense of humor. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is in a good humor, because of the way he covers or controls his feelings. His humor is more studied than spontaneous yet it is never crude or inappropriate. ____

11.03.06 He is a dour and humorless person, always serious and intense. It is difficult to joke around him partly because he is not responsive and partly because he seems to disapprove. ____

11.03.07 He is a sensitive, sophisticated fellow with a subtle wit. He can be quite charming and amusing in the right sort of setting. However, there is something of an aristocratic quality to his sense of humor and he can be quite condescending towards people who do not understand or appreciate his sense of humor. ____

11.03.08 He is an arty, somewhat cynical person who can be quite flippant at times. His humor tends to be a bit far out. He seems to have private jokes he shares with intimates. It is sometimes difficult to tell whether he is being amusing or subtly hostile. ____

11.03.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

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12. Sexual Attitudes

12.01 General:

12.01.01 Are his attitudes about sex

Very obscure ____
Difficult to determine ____
About average for his culture and background ____
Clearly uninterested ____
Indifferent ____
Clearly interested _X_

12.01.02 In the presence of women, he is

Stilted ____ Conventional ____
Flirtatious _X_ Vulgar ____
Hostile ____ Indifferent ____

12.01.03 Does he go to "girlie" shows

Often ____ Never ____
Sometimes with a group ____
Can't imagine him ever going ____
I have no idea what he thinks of "girlie" shows ____

12.01.04 Does he, in the presence of male companions, talk about sex?

Often _X_ Sometimes ____
Rarely ____ Never ____

12.01.05 Is there any change in his sexual behavior and/or attitudes, after he has been drinking? Yes ____ No ____ Have no idea ____

If Yes, describe the change:

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12.01.06 Do you have any idea how he feels about prostitutes? Yes ___
No ___

12.01.07 If No, do you think he is the type who would go to a prostitute ___
Cannot imagine him visiting a prostitute ___
Have nothing to base an opinion on ___

12.01.08 If Yes, is he Obviously negativistic toward prostitutes ___
Indifferent toward prostitutes ___
Interested in prostitutes ___

12.01.09 In his relations with women, does he
Generally act in accordance with his age and experience ___
Generally act somewhat immature and inappropriate for his age and experience ___
Show considerable facility and poise X
Show considerable uneasiness or awkwardness ___

12.01.10 In describing an attractive woman, is he most likely to mention
Her hair ___ Breasts ___
Eyes ___ Clothes ___
Figure X Personality ___
Legs ___ Have no idea ___

12.01.11 Have you ever heard him described in any way by a woman? Yes X
If Yes, what did she say? No ___

athletic, virile, manly.

12.02 Overall impression: Which of the following best describes him?

12.02.01 He is an earthy, lusty man who shows little embarrassment about sex. He treats women appropriately, but makes little effort to conceal his admiration and attraction. He appears virile and self-confident with women, and most women seem to like it. X

12.02.02 He is an earthy, lusty man who on occasion can be crude or even vulgar. He treats women rather harshly, and can become quite pushy when attracted to a woman. He seems to be very proud of his virility. Many women would be offended or rebuffed by his aggressiveness, but this does not seem to bother him. ___

12.02.03 He is a somewhat sensual, rather soft man who is very considerate of women. He is prone to hold a woman's hand overly long when talking to her and frequently puts his arms around women he admires. He often uses flattery and compliments but does so rather graciously. Most women usually like his attentiveness. ____

12.02.04 He is a sensual person, but is embarrassed and insecure about it. He is a rather soft man who tries hard to be inoffensive. However, he will frequently follow attractive women with his eyes when he thinks no one is looking. He is also prone to brush against or touch women "accidentally" whenever he gets a chance. ____

12.02.05 He is a self-confident, rather polished person who is proper and conventional with either men or women. He is always considerate and polite with all women and it is difficult to ascertain what his sexual attitudes and interests might be. In a group, he always behaves according to protocol and usually can be quite efficient in doing so. ____

12.02.06 He is a self-confident and precise person who has something of the air of a professional man about him. He is polite, almost to a fault, and is inclined to go out of his way to light a woman's cigarette or see that she is properly taken care of. Nevertheless, he shows considerable distance in his relations with women. Sometimes his formality is out of place, but he will rarely, if ever, change his manners or procedures to fit the situation. ____

12.02.07 He is a charming, urbane person and both friendly and sophisticated. He deals with women in a cultured way but shows little sensuality or sexual inappropriateness. He is neat, even dapper, and can be quite fastidious. Most of his relations with women appear to be quite platonic. He is the kind of person who likely has several very close friends who are women. ____

12.02.08 He is a somewhat shy and indifferent person whom some people consider odd or unusual. He shows little or no interest in women in public. In general, he is a preoccupied person who only seeks out people with similar interests. There is an ascetic, asexual air about him most of the time. ____

12.02.09 None of these fit. I would describe him as:

V. FAMILY SET

13. Marital Status

13.01 Is he married? Yes X No ___

13.01.01 Is his wife with him? Yes X No ___

13.01.02 Does his wife go out socially with him:
Never ___ Seldom X Average ___ Often ___

13.01.03 Is his wife: older than he ✓ about his age ___
younger than he ___ can't tell ___

13.01.04 Is his wife: unusually attractive ___ attractive to an average degree ✓
unusually unattractive ___

13.01.05 Generally speaking, is his wife: socially poised ___
socially adequate ✓
socially gauche ___

13.01.06 What languages other than her native language does his wife speak? Spanish

13.01.07 Is his wife: better educated than he X
educated about the same ___ less educated ___

13.01.08 Has he been married before: Yes ___ No ___
If yes, give details if known: Can't tell X

13.02 Does his wife seem to: have many friends ___ a few friends ___
almost no friends X

13.02.01 In public, is he: very attentive to his wife ___
appropriately attentive to his wife ___
indifferent towards his wife X

13.02.02 In public, is his wife: very attentive to him ___
appropriately attentive to him ___
indifferent to him X

13.02.03 Would you characterize his wife as:
aggressive ___ domineering ___ independent ___
complacent ___ submissive X dependent ___

13.02.04 In the area in which she lives, does she appear to be:
very satisfied____ normally satisfied X very dissatisfied____

13.03 Have you been to their home? Yes____ No X
If Yes, how often?

13.03.01 Are their living quarters: unusually nice for the area ____
typical of the area ____
unusually poor for the area ____

13.03.02 Are they, as a couple: unusually good hosts____ good hosts ____
adequate hosts____ somewhat inadequate hosts____
unusually poor hosts ____

13.03.03 Does the wife seem: very comfortable as a hostess____
adequate as a hostess____ somewhat tense as a hostess____
very uncomfortable as a hostess____

13.03.04 Are their living quarters: a reflection of his personality ____
a reflection of both their personalities ____
a reflection of neither of their personalities ____

13.03.05 In general, their furnishings are: unusually drab ____
conventional____ Unusually nice ____

13.03.06 Is his wife: obviously very interested in her home ____
about as interested in her home as most women in the area ____
obviously very uninterested in her home ____
cannot really tell whether she is interested or not ____

13.03.07 Is her social behavior at home:
about the same as when away from home ____
more comfortable than away from home ____
less comfortable ____

13.03.08 Under ordinary circumstances, are they:
the kind of people who entertain often and like it ____
the kind of people who meet their social obligations and rather enjoy it ____
the kind of people who enjoy entertaining only close friends ____
the kind of people who entertain only when they have to ____
the kind of people who really dislike to entertain ____

13.04 Does he ever criticize his wife: Yes____ No____
If so, what is he most likely to criticize:

13.04.01 In general, as a couple are they: obviously very compatible ______
as compatible as most: ______ obviously not very compatible __X__

13.04.02 Is he inclined to: never appear jealous of her ______
rarely appear jealous of her __X__
often appear jealous of her ______

13.04.03 Is she inclined to: never appear jealous of him ______
rarely appear jealous of him __X__
often appear jealous of him ______

13.04.04 Is there anything about his wife that deserves special mention or description?

13.05 As a husband, he is best described as:

______ An outgoing man who obviously is the dominant partner in the marriage. He is protective of his wife and always includes her when possible in his social activities.

______ An active man who is authoritarian and dominant as a husband. He is possessive of his wife and tends to be demanding in their relationship.

______ An outgoing man who is quite dependent upon his wife. She tends to be the more dominant partner and he seems to like it and expect it.

______ An active but somewhat surly man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife but will rarely admit it. He may have some tendency to be jealous and possessive about his wife.

______ A conventional husband who treats his wife with respect. He rarely shows his feelings in public. It is difficult to tell how he really feels about her.

______ A conscientious husband who takes his marriage quite seriously. His wife is obviously part of the team and they both take family and social responsibilities seriously.

______ A socially active man who can be quite charming with the ladies even when his wife is present. They both seem to lead separate but quite compatible lives.

______ A quiet man who is obviously very dependent upon his wife. She looks after him rather unostentatiously but it is obvious that she has considerable influence on his behavior and attitudes.

__X__ None of these fit, he is best described as:
dominant partner. Independent of wife. Indifferent to here needs

13.06 Household:
Is he concerned about the appearance or functioning of the household? Yes ___ No ___
Does he make minor repairs himself? Yes ___ No ___
If Yes, Fairly competently ___ Awkwardly ___

14. Children

14.01 Does he have any children. Yes X No ___

14.01.01 How many 2 What ages 10+18 Sex of children male + fem.

14.01.02 Are all the children with him? Yes ___ No X
If not, where are they?
GIRL/MOSCOW

14.01.03 Does he:
pay unusual attention to his children ___
pay normal attention to his children X
pay little attention to his children ___

14.01.04 Is his wife:
an unusually attentive mother ___
an average mother X
an unusually unattentive mother ___

14.01.05 Are the children:
unusually well behaved ___
normally well behaved X
unusually rowdy or difficult ___

14.01.06 Does he:
never talk about his children ___
rarely talk about his children ___
talk about his children as normal and appropriate X
frequently talk about his children ___
seem quite preoccupied about his children ___

14.01.07 Are any of his children unusual in any way (frequent illness, allergies, mentally defective, crippled or deformed, unusually bright, etc.) Yes ___ No X
If yes, describe circumstances:

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14.02 When his wife and family are away, he is:
obviously very lonely and at loose ends ____
unlikely to vary his routine ____
likely to become more active and socially aggressive X
have no idea ____

14.03 As a father, he is best described as:
____ An active, happy family man who is proud of his family.
____ An active family man who is inclined to be strict and demanding with his children.
____ An active family man who spends a great deal of time with his family. He tends to spoil his children.
____ An active but insecure family man who worries a good deal about his children.
____ An active, responsible father, but has a no-nonsense attitude. His work comes first and his family knows it.
____ A careful, responsible father who is conscientious about his family but not particularly warm or demonstrative.
X A carefree father who takes his family for granted. Most of the time they fend for themselves and do a pretty good job of it.
____ An indifferent father, who sometimes seems oblivious of his family.
____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

14.04 Does he carry pictures of his family ____ wife ____ children ____ himself ____

14.05 In his office or room, does he display pictures of his family ____ wife ____ children ____ himself ____

14.06 Is there anything about his relations with wife or family that requires special mention or description?

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VI. IDEOLOGICAL SET

15. General

15.01 In general:

[✓ He is a man with forthright and obvious opinions. He is capable of expressing these opinions with little apparent regard for the feelings and attitudes of others.]

____ He is a man with many prejudices and dogmatic ideas. He can express them with heat and determination when necessary.

____ He is a man who is likely to turn aside controversial opinions with flippancy or humor. It is sometimes difficult to determine his opinions because it is hard to get him really serious.

____ He is a man who may have many strong opinions but it is difficult for him to show them. He is apologetic, diffident and often uncomfortable when an argument is in the offing.

____ He is a man whose true opinions are difficult to determine. He is usually diplomatic and conventional when controversial subjects or taboo subjects are discussed.

____ He is a man who is serious and determined to be proper and conventional. He has the manner of a well disciplined person who only says what he is supposed to say or expected to say.

____ He is a man who has quite sophisticated opinions. He is well read, capable of considerable articulate argument, but at times can be quite cynical or subtlely sarcastic.

____ He is a man who is shy or taciturn about his opinions. It is very hard to get him to open up on any subject, particularly if it is controversial.

____ None of these fit, he is best described as:

15.01.01 Is there any subject that tends to get his dander up? Yes____ No____
If so, what is it?

15.02 Is he a man whose patriotism:
[✓ is obvious and intense]
is like that of most of his colleagues ____
is guarded and not too intense ____
is difficult to determine ____

15.02.01 On general political issues, is he:
unusually well informed on his country's position and attitudes ____
[✓ as informed as most of his colleagues]
unusually poorly informed ____

VII. MEDICAL

16. State of Health:

16.01 To your knowledge, does he have any sort of health problem? Yes___ No_X_

If Yes, please explain:

16.02 Does his wife or children have any sort of health problem? Yes_X_ No___

If Yes, please explain:

wife=?

16.03 Has he ever indicated that he had health problems in the past? Yes___ No_X_

If Yes, please explain:

16.04 To your knowledge, does he regularly take pills or medication of any kind? Yes___ No_X_

If Yes, please explain:

16.05 Is he the kind of person who: Never talks about his health or how he feels ___ Talks about his health and feelings to an average degree _X_ Frequently talks about his health and feelings ___

16.06 When he feels bad: It is obvious to others ___ It is obvious to an average degree ___ Most people would never know it _X_ Have never known him to feel bad ___

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16.07 In appearance, he looks Robust and healthy __X__ Essentially like most people his age ____ Unhealthy ____

16.08 Does he have A flushed face ____ A pot belly ____ A tendency to breathe hard with exertion ____ Cold clammy hands ____ A tendency to sweat to any unusual degree ____ Foul breath ____

16.09 To your knowledge, does he adhere to a special diet or health regimen? Yes ____ No ____

If Yes, please explain:

16.10 As an overall impression, does he strike you as a person who is

Highly energetic and tireless __X__
Energetic, but in spurts ____
Moderately energetic ____
Lethargic, listless ____

16.11 Is there anything about the state of his health or his family's health that warrants further comment?

14-00000

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DISPATCH | SECRET | HMMA-36439

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO : Chief, SB Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT

SUBJECT: Subject of 201-238943

References: A. MEXICO CITY 8281
B. MEXICO CITY 8545

1. On 29 January 1969, Samuel J. KARTASUK met with Subject to deliver the recruitment pitch as advised by Refs. Subject initially refused to cooperate on the grounds that he does not want to get involved in this type of business and that he had given the same answer to "the other side." He readily admitted that he has been under intensive development by Valentin LOGINOV (201-285412) to spot Mexican students who eventually may go to WOLADY; he denied, however, that he has ever accepted the money LOGINOV continually offers him. Subject volunteered that Yuriy CHERNYSH (201-825743) is currently developing one of Subject's students (which we knew), and that Subject would like to foil CHERNYSH's attempt.

2. In spite of Subject's expressions of reluctance to be recruited he answered a number of questions put to him by KARTASUK and he agreed to a follow-up meeting on 7 February. At that meeting, he submitted to more intensive questioning about his background, family, and his association with the FJSTEAL community. There were no attempts at evasion and many of his answers were corroborated by information that was already known from other sources. Subject agreed to continue meeting clandestinely with KARTASUK and to provide additional information on his contacts with LOGINOV and other members of the KGB.

3. Subject's activities immediately following the pitch were monitored closely by LIEMBRACE and by LIFEAT for the week between the two meetings. The second meeting was counter-surveilled with negative results. Although the recruitment is still tenuous, we believe that it can be firmly cemented and that Subject is committed whether or not he is ready to admit it to himself at this point.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

201-285412
201-825743

CS COPY

HMMA-36439

12 February 1969

SECRET

201-238943

201-285412

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Valeri V.Kostikov, I have met him but I do not know him much.

Valentin Longuinov, in charge of consular affairs, his wife Alexandra has been an skating star, both and friendly very nice, speak very good Spanish and fair English. Their daughter Kirina, sixteen years old, very sophisticated, came here for a holiday. The only child of that age we have ever seen here. They have another child, who is in Moscow. Both have been at our house for a party. In general soviet people come alone, leaving the wives behind. Longuinov's wife an exception.

Dmitri Prygov, wife Natalia, have an small child born here, he has been writing a book on the Mexican revolution. We are fairly good friends. He was introduced to me by Boris Kazantsev who invited me for lunch for the ocasion. When we go to the Soviet embassy both he and Tchmykhov are always very attentive.

I know several other people from the Soviet embassy but really I could not place them together with their names.

Extract from HMMA-36436, 12/2/69 (Redtop Ops)

201-285412

191

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478

INFO. FILE, VR. RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

S E C R E T 300030Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8912

DIRECTOR

REDTOP

30 JAN 69 IN 82257

REF: DIRECTOR 69779

1. RAISA KISELNIKOVA WORKS AND LIVES AT THE SOVIET COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHICH IS ALSO THE RESIDENCE OF THE COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR, VIKTOR M. IVANOV. PER LILYRIC SHE ONLY VISITS THE SOVEMB ABOUT ONCE A WEEK DURING WORKING HOURS. HOWEVER, SEVEN TIMES SINCE HER ARRIVAL SHE HAS COME TO THE EMBASSY DRIVING THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE'S DUTY VEHICLE, NORMALLY DRIVEN BY THE MEXICAN CHAUFFEUR. WE CONSIDER IT MOST UNUSUAL FOR A SECRETARY TO DRIVE.

2. SHE SPEAKS GOOD SPANISH AND INVARIABLY KNOWS MEXICAN CALLERS AND THEIR BUSINESS AT THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE. SHE USUALLY HAS IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS INCLUDING ADDRESSES OF VARIOUS SOVIET TRADE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE USSR. WITH SOVIETS SHE IS USUALLY PLEASANT BUT IS CURT AND SHARP WITH ANYONE WH WHO NSXTROXPXCXXX TRYS TO PUSH HER AROUND. TWO MEXICAN CONTACTS OF THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE HAVE ASKED HER ~~STO PUSHE~~ XXXXXXX FOR DATES. SHE REFUSED THEM BOTH. ONE PERSUSTED WITH SEVERAL CALLS. SHE FINALLY TXXNXNIXXSNXX TOLD HIM SHE PREFERRED TO SPEND HER TIME WITH HER SOVIET FRIENDS. A FEW OF THE SOVIET MALES, PARTICULARLY VALENTIN S. LOGINOV, FLIRT

SECRET

201-385412

192

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FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8912 SECRET

WITH HER WHEN CALLING FOR OTHER PURPOSES. SHE IS PLEASANT BUT UNENCOURAGING. SHE DOES NOT TALK WITH THE OTHER FEMALE SECRETARY, LYUDMILLA SHAPOVALOVA WHICH IS UNUSUAL SINCE THE TWO FEMALE SECRETARIES HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN FRIENDS. SHAPOVALOVA WAS VERY FRIENDLY WITH KISELNIKOV'S PREDECESSOR. HER ONLY CONVERSATION WITH ANOTHER SOVIET, OTHER THAN ROUTINE ADMINSTRATIVE MATTERS, WAS TO MAKE A DATE WITH THE WIFE OF THE COOK, ALEKSEY M. KUZNETSOV, TO GO TO THE MOVIES ONCE. THERE IS NO GOSSIP ABOUT HER AMONGST SOVIET WIVES. SOURCE: LIENVOY AND LIFEAT.

3. SHE IS FAIRLY ATTRACTIVE WITH A STATUESQUE FIGURE WHICH EXPLAINS WHY MEXICANS WOULD WANT DATES AND LOGINOV FLIRTS WITH HER.

4. PER CURRENT INFO ONLY ACCESS TO HER WOULD BE LEGITIMATE CONTINUOUS VISITOR TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHICH IS NOT ENCOURAGING SINCE TWO HAVE ALREADY STRUCK OUT. SINCE CURRENT ASSETS TELL US NOTHING ABOUT HER CONTACTS OR PERSONAL LIFE, STATION WILL PUT SPORADIC LIEMBRACE COVERAGE ON COMMERCIAL OFFICE AFTER WORKING HOURS IN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE HER ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE WORK. HOWEVER, SINCE OFFICE IS ON QUIET STREET WITH SOVIET SCHOOL NEXT DOOR AND SEVERAL SOVIET FAMILIES IN NEIGHBORHOOD, LIEMBRACE COVERAGE CANNOT BE CONTINUOUS.

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PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8912 S E C R E T

5. FILE: 201-835670.

SECRET ← SVC'D for possible missing portion.

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194

ORIG: ;Chas. V. ~~B~~lt/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 31 December 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 3122 30 DEC 68 CITE DIRECTOR 62610

TO MEXICO CITY

REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 8545 (IN 61160)*

1. SUBJECT'S LONG RESIDENCE IN SOVIET UNION AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH SOVIET OFFICIAL CONSTITUTES UNRESOLVED DEROGATORY INFORMATION AND IS DISQUALIFYING FOR ~~CLEARANCE~~ POA PURPOSES.

2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SUBJECT BE CONTINUED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CSI-F 10-5, PARA 18, WHICH PROVIDES FOR USE AS HOSTILE UNTIL BONA FIDES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE. REQUEST PROGRESS REPORTING ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THESE ASPECTS.

3. SUGGEST ~~THERE~~ THESE CONSIDERATIONS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE AS STATION PURSUES ITS PROGRAM OF EXPANSION OF ACCESS AGENTS

4. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

END OF MESSAGE

201-285412

WH COMMENT: *Priority POA requested in order to permit continued development toward recruitment. Subject is being considered for use as access agent to Valentin LOGINOV, Soviet Embassy Officer and known member of KGB.

CI/OA
CI/OPS/WH F. [illegible]
SB/X/WH L. [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFM
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATI
OFFICER

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Loginov

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OA,

#968

S E C R E T 262202Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8545

DIRECTOR

26 DEC 68 IN 61160

REDCOAT

REFS A. HMMA 35717

B. MEXICO CITY 3281 (IN 46766)

C. HMMA 36050

1. REQUEST HQS EXPEDITE PRIORITY POA FOR SUBJECT 201-238943 PER REFS A AND B.

2. LIOVAL-1 ADVISES SUBJECT RAPIDLY APPROACHING MARTIAL CRISIS REPORTED REF C. STATION WOULD LIKE TO REINTRODUCE SAMUEL J. KARTASUK FOR RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT BEFORE HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT COOLS AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LOW POINT WHICH SHOULD APPEAR ON LIFEAT.

3. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

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201-285412

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LUGINOV -

DISPATCH

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MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO. Chief, SB Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (201-238943)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. MEXICO CITY 8281
B. HMMA-35717, 28 October 1968

Summary

1. As reported by Ref A, Samuel J. KARTASUK succeeded in meeting with Subject in Acapulco and in spending nearly a full week with him for the purpose of establishing rapport and assessing him for possible recruitment per Ref B. Assessment by both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1 indicates that Subject is essentially apolitical with attitudes as pro-West as pro-Soviet. KARTASUK believes, however, that he could be recruited to work against FJSTEAL intelligence if he were made to believe that he is not working against the FJSTEAL people.

2. Recent LIFEAT reveals that Subject is having marital problems and that he consented to see a psychiatrist after his wife made good her threats to leave. According to Subject, he was diagnosed as "psychopathic" with problems stemming from his mother's possessive attitude. The character assessment by KARTASUK agrees with that of LIOVAL-1 but neither has called Subject "psychopathic."

3. While we recognize possible problems, we feel that a recruitment attempt should be made by KARTASUK. Following the recruitment we plan to have KARTASUK sever further relationship with Subject and to handle the case from inside where it can be monitored more closely.

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

LOGINOV

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36050

DATE
17 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-136/3 201-285412
201-238943

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36050

Meeting

4. As reported previously, KARTASUK went to Acapulco in early November and succeeded in meeting Subject, whose plans for a vacation there with his family were confirmed by LIFEAT. The "chance meeting" came about naturally in the hotel lobby when Subject's precocious four year old daughter approached KARTASUK on the morning of 5 November.

5. KARTASUK used an alias and played the role of a successful public relations man from WOLADY who was recently widowed. He had come to Mexico as a long-term tourist to help piece together his shattered world. There was instant rapport between KARTASUK and both Subject and his wife which permitted him to spend almost the entire week alone with them. As a result, KARTASUK got to know them intimately and to probe naturally into Subject's character, politics, and family relationship.

Assessment

6. To both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1, Subject appears to be essentially apolitical or, at least, politically naive. He expresses simultaneously admiration for both FJSTEAL, where he lived for 17 years, and for WOLADY, where he would like to live. He believes that the political system in each is right for each and that neither system would work for the other. He feels that both the FJSTEAL and WOLADY citizens want peace and are basically good but that both are victims of their political systems. Although Subject wanted at one time to return to FJSTEAL, he knows that he has a better life in Mexico.

7. Subject is an easy-going, extremely pleasant extrovert with a wide circle of friends whom he sees frequently. He has few scruples in regard to marital fidelity and, while his wife isnot happy with his affairs, they have apparently arrived at some sort of working agreement on the subject.

8. Subject has told both KARTASUK and LIOVAL-1 that he earns about $4000 (MN) per month and is, therefore, forced to live on a modest scale. While he would like to live better, he is not ambitious and does not let work interfere with pleasure. LIOVAL-1 feels that Subject would find easy money a great temptation, that Subject could be influenced fairly easily, and that principles would not stand in his way.

9. With KARTASUK, Subject spoke of his mother on several occasions. He accuses her ofpossessiveness and claims that it is for this reason that he rebels against anyone's possessing him, including his wife. This problem is apparently genuine as confirmed by LIFEAT in recent take. Subject consented to psychiatric treatment when his wife made good her threat to leave him (though she returned after several days). Per LIFEAT, Subject said that he has been diagnosed as psychopathic and that the psychiatrist lays the blame at his mother's feet.

Conclusions

10. LIOVAL-1 has assessed Subject since early March 1968 and KARTASUK assessed him during a week of uninterrupted close association. Both assessments are virtually identical in all major respects. There is little doubt that Subject does, indeed, have some personality adjustment problems and that, if he is recruited, he will require firm handling. Neither KARTASUK nor LIOVAL-1, however, describes Subject as "psychopathic."

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36050

11. KARTASUK believes there is a reasonably good possibility that Subject would consent to recruitment, if the approach were made in such a way as to make him believe that he is working against FJSTEAL intelligence meddling and not against the FJSTEAL people and system. Additionally, we believe it may be possible to introduce stability into Subject's life, to give him firm direction and goals, and to turn some of his liabilities into assets.

12. Following successful recruitment by KARTASUK, the case will be handled by an inside case officer so that developments can be monitored more closely through other assets and the risk reduced.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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#128

SECRET 032345Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8281

4 DEC 68 IN 46766

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

REF: HMMA-35717

1. DURING WEEK OF 3 NOVEMBER, SAMUEL J. KARTASUK ARRANGED CHANCE MEETING IN ACAPULCO WITH SUBJECT OF REF WHOSE VACATION PLANS WERE CONFIRMED BY LIFEAT. USING ALIAS AND PLAYING ROLE OF LONG TERM WOLADY TOURIST WITH SIMILAR SPANISH BACKGROUND. KARTASUK SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING SOLID FRIENDSHIP AND OBTAINED FAVORABLE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT DURING NEARLY FULL WEEK WITH SUBJECT AND WIFE.

2. PLAN HAVE KARTASU ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT SUBJECT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT ON SUBJECT OF 201-285412 (LOGINOV), HIS OTHER FJSTEAL CONTACTS AND SPANISH COMMUNIST COMMUNITY IN MEXICO. FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL RECRUITMENT, CASE WILL BE HANDLED BY INSIDE CASE OFFICER.

3. REQUEST STATUS OF POA FOR SUBJECT REF AND THAT IT BE HANDLED ON PRIORITY BASIS WITH CABLE NOTIFICATION TO STATION.

4. FILE: 201-238943 AND 201-285412.

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201-285412
Loginov

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DISPATCH

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB

INFO.: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK - Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is a report prepared by Keith R. LEVENDERIS which details how LOGINOV used Erast G. GAZIYEV (201-795374) to spot and set up a meeting for assessment purposes with Jorge *ARIAS Buerba, a teacher at the Mexican North American Cultural Institute in Mexico City. The Soviets have long had an interest in the Institute and its personnel because most of newly arrived Americans study Spanish there. GAZIYEV has attended the Institute since his arrival in Mexico, first studying Spanish and then English.

2. We are forwarding this report because it is a typical illustration of LOGINOV's modus operandi and because it clearly shows that GAZIYEV at least has the status of a KGB cooptee.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Report

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
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CROSS REFERENCE TO: 201-795374 w/att.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-35846

DATE: 18 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-285412

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Index

13P

12 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CARDED

SUBJECT: Jorge ARIAS Buerba

DOB 42 CIT MEXICO B MEXICO, MEXICO City

1. Subject is a ~~26~~ year old Mexican citizen (although he looks to be in his 30's). He is a occ Spanish teacher at the Mexican-North American Institute and since the fall of 1967 has held a second job as the director of the Community Services Program at the American School. In April 1967 he married an American citizen from the Chicago area named Donna WEINTHALLER (phonetic). They live at Juanacatlan 15, which is just around the corner from the Soviet Embassy. Home phone is 15-28-49.

teaches at the Mexican-

2. Subject was recommended as a Spanish tutor in August 1966 by Enrique GUTIERREZ Martinez (P-12667), who was then C/SB's Spanish tutor. GUTIERREZ was subsequently recruited by C/SB as a utility agent, but has since been dropped because he is related to other Station assets. On GUTIERREZ's recommendation, I began taking private Spanish lessons from Subject in August 1966. I found Subject an excellent teacher and continued taking lessons from him until December 1966. In March 1967, my wife and I had Subject as a teacher in Spanish courses we took at the Mexican-North American Institute. I have maintained intermittent social contact with Subject since March 1967, and my wife has become friendly with Subject's wife, having visited her at her apartment two or three times and having had her to our home during the day an equal number of times. I have also

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Files: P-12671 · P-117[illegible]

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201-285412

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kept informed to some extent about Subject through his younger brother, Javier ARIAS Buerba, from whom I have been taking Spanish lessons since July 1967.

3. Subject was a casual contact of Station officer Olivia C. RAGNITY in 1965 and 1966. Other than a file card noting this contact, there are no Station traces on either Jorge or Javier ARIAS Buerba.

4. Subject and I from the beginning have had a very friendly and informal relationship. He is an intelligent person with a friendly, open personality and a good sense of humor. Politically, he is pro-American to the point that he magnifies our strengths and positive qualities and tends to minimize or overlook negative factors in our society. Subject knows I am with the Political Section of the Embassy and that I have been in the Soviet Union. We have consequently gotten onto the topic of Russians and Communism several times, and he has always come out a strong anti-Communist. He has one brother and two sisters living in the United States. The brother is married to an American and lives in Virginia, where he is in the construction business. One of the sisters is also married to an American and lives in California (I believe San Francisco). The second sister is married to a Polish immigrant and lives with him in Chicago. The sister in California is a naturalized American citizen. The brother and the sister in Chicago are not.

5. On 24 April 1967, LIENVOY reported the following call from GAZIYEV to LOGINOV:

GAZ: "I saw him, he arrived yesterday."

LOG: "Excellent. Then I'd like to see you to discuss certain things."

GAZ: "Then I can come there tomorrow?"

LOG: "No, better Wednesday."

GAZ: "All right. He usually comes there at 6 o'clock. He got married and came here with his wife. Now they look for an apartment. I'll go there on the 10th, because I want to attend courses in English. This week I'll be busy."

LOG: "OK, until the next then."

6. From this conversation, it appeared that GAZIYEV was probably talking about Subject, since:

(a) GAZIYEV had been taking Spanish at the Mexican-North American Institute and I knew from Subject that Subject had had GAZIYEV in one of his classes, that Subject occasionally chatted with GAZIYEV after class, and that GAZIYEV had once given Subject an invitation to a Consular night at the Soviet Embassy (although Subject told me he had not gone).

(b) Subject had gotten married that month.

(c) Subject had just returned to Mexico with his bride.

(d) Subject and his wife were looking for an apartment.

(e) Subject normally arrived at the Institute at 1800 to teach evening Spanish classes.

7. Prior to this reported telephone conversation, I had considered using Subject as an access agent against GAZIYEV, but had decided not to approach Subject on the matter unless there was evidence that his relationship with GAZIYEV was developing into something more than occasional chats between classes. I did not see much potential in approaching Subject before this with ~~theide~~ the idea of having him deliberately cultivate a friendship with GAZIYEV, as I felt Subject was living

such a busy and hectic life that I would get very little out of him. Prior to his marriage, he was keeping such a hectic schedule between his Institute and private classes that he wasn't sleeping or eating properly and was having increasing problems with his health. If anything, his pace and health problems increased after his marriage and his taking of the job with the American School (although he gave up most of his private classes).

8. Since the GAZIYEV-LOGINOV conversation made Subject's relations with the Soviets look much more interesting, I attempted to find out what I could about them from Subject. For a number of reasons, however--including my going to the States in June--we were not able to get together until 11 July. On that date I took Subject to a belated "bachelor's lunch" at a little Spanish restaurant downtown.

9. The lunch was disappointing and, for me, misleading. I was certain that if given the opportunity, Subject would voluntarily tell me if his relationship with GAZIYEV had developed any further. When I casually brought the conversation around to GAZIYEV, however, Subject simply told me that GAZIYEV was still studying at the Institute and that he still occasionally chatted with him in the halls or over a cup of coffee in one of the near-by coffee shops during the 20-minute break between the two evening classes. Subject commented that he enjoyed talking with GAZIYEV, as he was a simpatico, interesting guy, as well as an outstanding Spanish student. He also added that they never talked politics. In reply to an offhand question about whether he had met any other Soviets through GAZIYEV, Subject

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said that he had not. My inclination was to believe Subject, and I went away thinking that either GAZIYEV and LOGINOV had been talking about someone else over the phone or that they had never gone beyond the stage of simply talking about Subject.

10. On 1 November 1967, I ran into Subject and his brother Javier in Sanborns-Insurgentes. They were about to have a quick lunch and insisted that I join them for a cup of coffee. As soon as we sat down, Subject told me he had a problem and would like my advice. He said GAZIYEV had given him an invitation to the 7 November celebration of the Revolution at the Soviet Embassy, and although he would like to go for the experience, he was very concerned that his name would be put on "the black list" at the U.S. Embassy if he went. He said that he had tried to call me at the Embassy after he got the invitation to ask my advice, but had been told I was out of town. (I was in El Paso from 25-29 October.) He stated that if he had not been able to reach me in the next day or two, he was going to simply walk into the Embassy and ask to see someone from the "security department" about his predicament. What did I think he should do?

11. I told Subject to relax and forget about going to the U.S. Embassy, as the Embassy would not give him any advice other than to tell him that it was entirely his own business whether he went to the Soviet reception or not. Besides, I asked, what made Subject think his name would be put on a "black list" if he went. Subject replied that he didn't know how the U.S. Embassy did it, but "everyone knew" the U.S. Embassy obtained the names of everyone who went in and out of

201-285412

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the Soviet Embassy. Moreover, he said, even if the U.S. Embassy refused to give him any advice, at least it would make a record of his visit and anyone who was ever interested would know his heart was in the right place. He simply did not want and couldn't afford to get into any trouble with the U.S. Embassy, he said. After all, he had an American wife, he might want to go to the States to study sometime, and they might even want to go to the States to live someday. Seeing that Subject was indeed very serious, I became more serious myself and told him that just so he wouldn't worry, I'd write a memo to the proper Embassy department stating for the sake of the record that Subject had told me he planned to attend a Soviet Embassy reception, but wished the U.S. Embassy to know he was doing it solely out of curiosity and was in no way in sympathy with the Soviet Union. Subject seemed greatly relieved and thanked me very much.

12. Seizing of the fact that GAZIYEV had given Subject the invitation, I asked if Subject saw much of him anymore. Subject replied that yes, he still saw him occasionally, as GAZIYEV was now studying English at the Institute. Subject added, on his own initiative, that he had also been to GAZIYEV's apartment twice and had met another Soviet there on one occasion. He said that the first time he went to GAZIEV's was shortly before he (Subject) got married (Subject was married about mid-April 1967) and the second time was shortly after his marriage, as he and his wife had gone to dinner at the GAZIYEVS'. Subject finished eating about this time, and since he was in a hurry and had his brother with him, I didn't try to question him any further, but decided to wait and have a second go at him alone another

201

time.

13. My wife and I entertained Subject and his wife at our home on 27 November, but the evening was not meant to and did not afford an opportunity to discuss the Soviets any further. Subject did tell me, however, that he had not gone to the 7 November Soviet reception afterall, because, despite by assurances that there was no reason for him not to go, he felt it was simply safer to stay away from the Soviet Embassy altogether. At my suggestion, we agreed to get together for lunch sometime in the near future.

14. For various reasons, including the poor state of Subject's health when I called him one day in January, we did not get together for the lunch until 7 March. This time, I played it straight with Subject, told him that I was interested in anything he could tell me about GAZIYEV and the otherSoviet he had met, and questioned him closely regarding the details. Subject was completely cooperative, and I am satisfied he answered my questions to the best of his ability. It seemed to me, and still does, that there was only one possible reason why Subject had not told me on 11 July what he subsequently told me on 1 November (i.e., that he had been to GAZIYEV's home twice and on one occasion had met another Soviet there). This was that he felt somewhat guilty about going to GAZIYEV's and meeting the other Soviet there, and as long as I didn't push him too hard (which I didn't on 11 July), he felt more comfortable ignoring it. The reason he so readily mentioned the two visits and the other Soviet on 1 November was, I think, that he was genuinely concerned not to "get into any trouble" with the U.S.

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Embassy over attending the Soviet Embassy reception, wished to impress me with his sincerity about whose side he was on, and felt obliged to completely clear the record by mentioning the visits to GAZIYEV's home and meeting the other Soviet there.

15. Subject stated that GAZIYEV had invited him to his apartment for dinner about a month before he (Subject) went to Chicago to get married. This means that the dinner took place about mid-March 1967. Subject said he had expected to find only GAZIYEV and his wife in the apartment, but that a third person was there when Subject arrived. Subject said GAZIYEV introduced the third person as Valentin "something." When I asked if the last name were LOGINOV, Subject immediately reacted and said he was almost positive that was it. Subject's description of the Soviet also fit LOGINOV. GAZIYEV stated that LOGINOV was with the Embassy (Subject couldn't remember in what capacity) and described LOGINOV as a good friend. Subject said that the evening started off very casually, with LOGINOV expressing interest in the Spanish courses at the Mexican-North American Institute. LOGINOV, who Subject noted spoke almost as good Spanish as most of the Spanish teachers at the Institute, said he'd like to get a certificate in Spanish from the Institute and asked Subject if he could help him enroll, choose the best course for him to start with, etc. Subject replied that he'd be happy to, although it didn't seem to him that LOGINOV needed much instruction in Spanish. LOGINOV simply laughed this off, and it was agreed LOGINOV would drop around to the Institute sometime soon. LOGINOV, who took the lead in the conversation most of the evening, then began to ask Subject questions which left Subject

with "no doubt" that he (LOGINOV) was trying to feel Subject out on his political views. Subject said that he couldn't remember most of LOGINOV's questions, but he did recall that LOGINOV began the feeling-out procedure by asking Subject if he didn't find that the Americans were much poorer at learning Spanish than other nationalities. He also made various derogatory remarks about the extent of American influence in Mexico. Subject said that after about ten minutes, LOGINOV's purpose became so blatantly obvious, that he (Subject) stopped the conversation and told LOGINOV that before they went any farther, he thought LOGINOV should know that he was talking to someone who was "100% capitalist," completely pro-American, and had absolutely no sympathy with Communism. (While this sounds awfully blunt and Subject was unquestionably trying to make himself look good in my eyes, the fact of the matter is that Subject does tend to be ##* a bit blunt at times, and knowing his ideological leanings, I would not put it past him to have said exactly this.) Subject said that LOGINOV tried to backtrack a bit after this, but the conversation heated up again a few minutes later when Subject commented that he had a pretty good idea of what the Soviets were up to in Mexico. When LOGINOV asked what Subject meant, Subject related the story he once told me about having been in Veracruz a few years ago when a Soviet ship was actually or virtually put under arrest there. Subject told LOGINOV that "everyone knew the ship was loaded with Communist propaganda."

16. After about twenty minutes, according to Subject, politics were dropped and the conversation turned to more innocuous topics.

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Subject said that LOGINOV seemed somewhat irritated with him, but on the whole kept his composure very well and treated Subject politely for the two hours or less Subject remained. As Subject was leaving, LOGINOV again said he'd come by the Institute to see Subject in the near future, but he never did. One day in late 1967 Subject saw LOGINOV at the gas station on the corner of Tacubaya and Juanacatlan, and LOGINOV greeted Subject by name. However, they did not converse with each other.

17. Subject said that GAZIYEV left most of the politically related part of the conversation to LOGINOV and never referred to the evening again. However, a few weeks after Subject returned to Mexico with his bride, GAZIYEV had Subject and his wife over to dinner (this would place the second dinner in about mid-May). This time GAZIYEV and his wife were the only others present, and the evening passed without any reference to politics. Subject stated that he still occasionally goes across the street for a cup of coffee with GAZIYEV between evening classes at the Institute, but that he has not been to GAZIYEV's apartment again and has never had GAZIYEV to his home.

18. Although Subject was very aware that LOGINOV's purpose in meeting him was to assess his exploitability, he did not seem to fully appreciate that GAZIYEV had both fingered him for LOGINOV and set up the situation for LOGINOV to meet him. I spelled this out for Subject and also informed him that LOGINOV was an exceptionally capable Soviet intelligence officer. I also explained that it was very possible GAZIYEV was using the Institute to spot other candidates for interviews with Soviet

201-285412

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intelligence officers, and questioned Subject about GAZIYEV's activities and contacts at the Institute. However, Subject said that as far as he could tell GAZIYEV pretty much stuck to himself at the Institute and did not have any particular friends there whom Subject knew about. Subject said he would keep his eyes open for the type of thing I was looking for, however, and would let me know if he came onto anything interesting. Subject also offered to "play up to" GAZIYEV and/or LOGINOV under my guidance if I wished, but I declined the offer with appropriate expressions of appreciation.

19. The question that remains unanswered after all this is, of course, why LOGINOV and GAZIYEV were talking about Subject over the phone on 24 April 1967. According to Subject, the dinner which LOGINOV attended took place in March 1967, while LOGINOV did not attend GAZIYEV's second dinner, which took place about mid-May. Since I am satisfied Subject told me the truth, it would appear that the "certain things" which LOGINOV told GAZIYEV on 24 April he wished to discuss with GAZIYEV concerned how to handle Subject in the light of the LOGINOV-Subject encounter in March. Whatever LOGINOV had in mind on 24 April, it would appear that it was finally decided that GAZIYEV and his wife should simply have Subject and his wife over to a peaceful dinner in order to at least partially erase the memory of the first dinner.

SB/L

212

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION A. C.

JORGE ARIAS BUERBA

COMMUNITY SERVICES PROGRAM

PROGRAMA DE EDUCACION PARA ADULTOS

CALLE SUR 138 NUM. 138
TACUBAYA 18, D. F.

18-78-14

2. [illegible]

[illegible] GUTIERREZ [illegible]

[illegible] Spanish tutor. GUTIERREZ [illegible]

[illegible] a nullity agent, but [illegible]

[illegible] introduced to other Mexican agents. [illegible]

[illegible] I began taking private Spanish lessons [illegible]

[illegible] 1955. I found [illegible] an excellent [illegible]

taking lessons from him until [illegible]

[illegible] with and I had subject as teacher in Sp[illegible]

[illegible] at the Mexican-North American Inst[illegible]

intermittent social contact with [illegible]

[illegible] friendly with [illegible]

[illegible]

201-285412

14-00000

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C/K

(19)

S E C R E T 080010Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7994

DIRECTOR

IN30215

REDCOAT

8 Nov 68 IN 30215

M

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7965 (IN 28451)

B. DIRECTOR 48427

1. REVIEW OF LIENVOY TAPES REVEAL NAME OF SUBJECT CALLING PROVOROV IS DOUG~~AL~~LAS PATILLO. PATILLO SPEAKS GOOD SPANISH WITH DEFINITE AMERICAN ACCENT. CONVERSATIONS ARE IN SPANISH. ON 5 NOVEMBER PATILLO CALLED PROVOROV AT SOVIET EMBASYY TO ASK WHY PROVOROV HAD NOT GONE TO SEE HIM EVENING 4 NOVEMBER PROVOROV STATED HE WOULD GO EVENING 5 NOVEMBER 68.

2. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE DOUGALS PATILLO INITIATED MORNING 6 NOVEMBER. HE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS PATILLO TO LIEMBRACE TEAM MEMBER WHO KNOCKED ON HIS DOOR LOOKING FOR SOMEONE ESLE. ON AFTERNOON 6 NOVEMBER LIEMBRACES FOLLOWED PATILLO TO SOVIET EMBASSY. PATILLO WALKED UP TO SOVIET EMBASSY AND SPOKE TO THREE SOVIETS AT GATE, ONE OF WHOM WAS VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV (KNOWN KGB). PATILLO SHOWED LOGINOV SOME PAPERS HE HAD IN HIS SUIT JACKET THEN ENTERED SOVIET EMBASSY GROUNDS AT 1311 HOURS. HE EXITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY AT 1351

201-285412

Loginov ✓

SECRET

Provorov

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214

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7994 SECRET

HOURS. SUBJECT THEN WALKED BACK TO THE HOTEL. VERYY ✓ SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS IN AREA OF EMBASSY COMING AND GOING.

3. IN 5 NOVEMBER CONVERSATION WITH PROVOROV, SUBJECT STATED THAT PERHAPS HE WAS GOING TO OAXACA (CITY IN STATE OF OAZACA ABOUT 300 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF MEXICO CITY) AFTERNOON OR EVEING 6 NOVEMBER, THAT HE HAS TO LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR LOS ANGELES ON MORING OF SATURDAY, 9 NOVEMBER.

4. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL SUJBECT LEAVES MEXICO. LIEMBRACE PHOTOS AS WELL AS RESUEM ME OF SURVEILLANCE WILL BE POUCHED HQS.

5. LILYRIC PHOTOS WILL BE CHECKED FOR SOVIET EMBASSY VISIOTRS TO ON 6 NOVEMBER. LIENVOY TAPE WILL BE POUCHED HEADQUARTERS.

6. IF LNERGO UNABLE TO RESOLVE ADDRESS REPORTED PARA 2 RE (A) SUGGEST LNERGO COVER ALL FLIGHTS ARRIVING LOS ANGELES FROM MEXICO CITY ON 9 NOV, DATE PATILLO SAYS HE HAS TO RETURN TO LOS ANGELS. STATION WILL CABLE IMMEDIATE, IF ABLE LEARN TRAVEL PLANS IN ADVANCE.

7. PATILLO DESCRIPTION FROM LIEMBRACES CA 30 YEARS OLD, CA 18 CM, CA 176 LBS, REDDISH BLOND HAIR, PALE COMPLEXION,

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215

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXIO CITY 7994 SECRET

WEARING SUN GLASSES IN PHOTOS.

8. FILE: 50-8-21

SECRET

SECRET

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SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division
REDTOP AEKICK
Vladimir Ivanovich Silantyev (201-770128)

Reference: Mexico City 6054 (IN 39508)

Forwarded under separate cover is a LNERGO report concerning Subject. Persons mentioned by surname on page six of the report are identified at Headquarters as the subjects of 201-205304, 201-132139, 201-763035 and 201-285412 respectively. Can the Station identify any of the other persons mentioned on pages five and six?

Ambrose T. SIBARICH

Attachment:
as stated u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
w/attachments w/
u/s/c

[illegible]

201-132139, 201-205304, 201-763035, 201-285412

HMMW-16779

18 October 1968

SECRET

201-770128

Internal Dist:
1 - 201-770128
1 - 201-205304
1 - 201-132139
1 - 201-763035
1 - 201-285412
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/K
1 - C/WH/1

SB/CI/K F. Walters rah 6991

C/SB/CI

SB/X/WH

C/WH/1

Lopez
201-285412

217

DISPATCH

SECRET RYBAT

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XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Headquarters has carefully considered the case of LIREALM-1 from the standpoint of ramifications of the compromise of January 1968 and of his operational utilization by the Station. With regard to the compromise, Headquarters tends to believe that the damage done by that occurrence is somewhat greater than the Station estimates. It is obvious, however, that no one now or probably even in the future can arrive at a hard estimate of the degree to which LIREALM-1 was blown. We can all agree and must assume that he has been compromised to some degree. The minimum degree of compromise would presumably be a listing of LIREALM-1's name in local Soviet files, and presumably also in the Moscow headquarters central registry, as "possible A. I. S." While such a label is unfortunate, could affect future assignments, and will limit his sphere of activity in Mexico, there remains a wide area of operations in which he can be employed. The Mexican authorities are, to the best of our knowledge, unaware of LIREALM-1's activities and sponsorship. Given the improved operational security patterns and overall professional handling which must accompany LIREALM-1's future use in the light of the unfortunate flap, we feel that he can continue to be of service at his present post. In spite of the obvious special need for a more careful weighing of operational risk versus gain factors (even more important here than in the case of the usual presumably "clean" non-official agent), we feel that neither the flap nor his LPGLOBE status should inhibit the Station in the energetic use of his not inconsiderable talents. Headquarters can appreciate the necessarily slow pace of the developmental activity to which he has been assigned, as well as the required alterations of his targets - both of which factors have been largely beyond Station control.

(continued)

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

RI
CHRONO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMW-16197

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET RYBAT DESENSITIZED

DATE

22 July 1968

XXXXXXXXXXX

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-285412

201-773337

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/Nancy Perkins/lq			6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/FI	16 JUL 1968	
CCS/LPGLOBE	17 JUL 1968	
CCS/DFB	17 JUL 1968	Edward Mullet

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	15 July 68	W. J. Kaufman W. J. Kaufman

2-58

2. In a written report on his visit to Mexico in December 1967, the visiting LIGLOBE case officer recapitulated the Station's Operational Plan for LIREALM-1 which included the following points:

a. "Penetration, monitoring, analysis and study of the PRI are to be LIREALM-1's first objective".....

b. (FRADYER) "urged LIREALM to spot and assess potential legal travellers to Cuba."

c. "A strong tertiary target is the (HBFAIRY) Embassy."

d. "Indonesians, Egyptians and Soviets have been discarded as targets."

When talking to members of the Branch, Lewis W. BEAUCHAMP confirmed the above and said that the Station was considering giving LIREALM-1 a going Cuban operation to handle. Has he yet been assigned any contacts which bear on the Cuban target? LIREALM-1 was quoted as saying that he feels he can handle a heavier operational load, and so we are hoping that you have or will soon be able to turn over to him one or more established operations from which he can see tangible return, thus broadening his experience and increasing his self-confidence. Since LIRELIC-1 has been terminated we assume Subject is exploring new areas against the LIOGLE/LIRELIC target and we would appreciate advice on this.

3. We recognize that very often one-time tasks, spotting, and research are performed by agents in the field without Headquarters' specific knowledge. Increased reporting on this kind of activity, which is valuable and necessary even though much of it may lead to dead ends, would give us a better understanding than we now have of the contribution which LIREALM-1 is making to the Station. Headquarters appreciates the operational reporting which the Station has been providing on LIREALM-1 and urges that it be continued on the same frequent basis.

Thomas W. LUND

14-00000

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMSLOUCH
AMSLOUCH/1 Debriefing on Soviet Officials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. During the April 1968 debriefing of AMSLOUCH/1 in the JMWAVE area, AMSLOUCH/1 provided the following information on Soviet officials with whom he is, or has been, acquainted:

a. Valentin LOGINOV (201-285412): Assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana several years ago. He pursued AMSLOUCH/3 (daughter of AMSLOUCHes 1 and 2) when stationed in Havana, and later in Moscow. AMSLOUCH/1 described LOGINOV as a rough peasant type. AMSLOUCH/1 when in Mexico about a year ago was looking at the Mexico Diplomatic List and noticed that a LOGINOV was assigned to Mexico. AMSLOUCH/1 asked a girl working at a foreign consulate in Mexico (identity) if this was the same LOGINOV who had been stationed in Cuba. The girl replied in the affirmative, and stated the LOGINOV worked in the Soviet Consulate handling business dealings between her consulate and the Soviet Consulate. The girl described LOGINOV as "a very nice fellow."

b. Colonel Fedor V. DREMOV: Military Attache, Soviet Embassy, Havana. AMSLOUCH/1 reported that he has conversed with DREMOV on several occasions, the last one being when Cosmonaut GUGARIN was killed. AMSLOUCH/1 described DREMOV as alert, smart, speaks good Spanish, charming and very proud that he is the son of a Cossak. DREMOV told AMSLOUCH/1 during one of their conversations that he had been a member

Attachment:
Identity (USC)

CONTINUED. . . . .

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file in 201-285412

JUN 11 1968

CS filed in 355911

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30172

DATE
7 June 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
28-6-33/3

220

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-30172

of a Soviet PW camp where German soldiers were held during World War II, during which time he claimed to have learned the German language.

2. A photograph of DREMOV, provided by AMSLOUCH/1, was sent to Headquarters in UFGA-29721, 13 March 1968.

Hilda G. VAGIONAS

14-00000

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-30172

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
LOGINOV, Valentin			285412

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
	Soviet Consulate, Mexico	Mexico

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana.

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
DREMOV, Fedor V. (Colonel)			

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
	Military Attache (Soviet Embassy Havana)	Havana

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-63 53d OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CLASSIFICATION ☐ CONTINUED

SECRET

Under Separate Cover

Attachment to:

UFGA-30172

IDENTITY: Lisa HAGELBERG, employee of Finnish Consulate, Mexico City

SECRET

cc filed 201-355911

file in 201-285412

14-00000

223

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1
Progress Report - 20 October 1967 to 1 May 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-33516, 17 November 1967
B. HMMW-15670, 1 August 1967
C. HMMA-34538, 26 April 1968
D. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968
E. HMMA-34570, 30 April 1968

1. As reported in reference A, LIREALM-1 joined the PBRUMEN Section of this Station on 20 October 1967. It was decided that LIREALM-1 should drop further efforts against the Soviet, U.A.R., and Indonesian targets. The decision to discontinue efforts to develop contacts among Mexicans, also made at that time, was later amended and LIREALM-1 was entrusted with the handling of LIRELIC-1 along the lines of the recommendation made in reference B. Thus, by November 1967 LIREALM-1 had two main responsibilities: a) the French target, against which he already had devoted considerable time and effort, and b) the handling of LIRELIC-1.

Continued......................

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CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 34668

DATE: 15 May 1968.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-285412
201-773337

224

2. LIREALM-1's efforts against the local French target have produced some notable results. First, through detailed analysis of personality and other data provided by LIREALM-1, the Station selected an access agent to the official French community who was later successfully contacted and was offered a contract (see reference C). The Station is already at work on what appears to be a good lead provided by the access agent spotted and developed by LIREALM-1. It should be emphasized that LIREALM-1 was in no way connected with the approach made to the French access agent. The second item on which LIREALM-1 has made progress has been the development of a Mexican ~~employee of~~ the French Embassy who is used as a general courier inside the Embassy. This development, for security reasons, has been slow. LIREALM-1's "line" has been that a person with "the ability" of the courier can and should expect a better paying job than the one he currently holds. The courier ended up taking that line as his own to "protect" him (as he probably would have some trouble if the Embassy discovered he was looking for another job). LIREALM-1 started meeting the Mexican courier outside the French Embassy. This gave LIREALM-1 the opportunity to talk to his prospect at some length without attracting the attention of the members of the Embassy. This is as far as the Station will allow LIREALM-1 to go in this case, which is currently being reviewed to decide who will continue the development of the Embassy courier and how. LIREALM-1 will not, in any case, have any connection with the person selected for this task. He will continue to maintain contact with the courier but will start to see him less often and will admit, in the end, that finding a job for him turned out to be more difficult than expected.

3. LIREALM-1 meanwhile is continuing to cultivate a number of selected members of the French Embassy and reports on their activities as a matter of routine. He has also maintained contact for some months with a wealthy Mexican businessman who is a good friend of DEVOSJOLY, the ex-French intelligence officer who provided the material for Leon URIS' best seller Topaz. LIREALM-1, in fact, had established DEVOSJOLY's identity as coauthor of the book long before this became known publicly. He was shown by DEVOSJOLY's friend a safe at the latter's house in Mexico City full of documents probably belonging to DEVOSJOLY. This information was reported to Headquarters via "special" channels.

4. LIREALM-1's handling of LIRELIC-1 encompasses two targets. By far the more important one is LIOGLE. The goal here is hopefully to turn LIRELIC-1 into a penetration of LIOGLE using several good contacts he has in this organization as a stepping stone. Some steps have been taken in this direction. LIRELIC-1 has addressed personal requests for assistance to current key LIOGLE personalities. He has also submitted his curriculum vitae in the hope of landing a job in LIOGLE. This has so far failed to produce any concrete LIOGLE job offer. LIRELIC-1 realizes, of course, that he is of no value to LNHARP unless he obtains a job giving him access to hard information on LIOGLE plans and activities. The promise of a regular salary, as a matter of fact, is completely dependent on LIRELIC-1's ability to penetrate LIOGLE. In an effort to maintain interim contact, however, and help LIRELIC-1 liquidate some personal debts, the Station, via LIREALM-1, made him a loan of 3,000 pesos. Further details on the LIOGLE aspects of the LIRELIC-1 operation will be covered in the forthcoming LIOGLE/LIRELIC progress report. In addition to

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the above, the Station made an effort to explore the possibility of using a contact which LIRELIC-1 had with a PBRUMEN citizen in Acapulco to gain another window into LIRING. This PBRUMEN citizen owns a small hotel in the Mexican resort occasionally visited by LIRING personnel. Although LIRELIC-1 himself once delivered a package sent by his Acapulco friend and managed to have one or two meetings with representatives of the LIRING Commercial Section (to discuss the possibility of "trading" with PBRUMEN), it was decided in the end that LIRELIC-1's access to LIRING was too superficial to be of any great benefit. This decision was bolstered by the departure for PBRUMEN in April 1968 of LIRELIC-1's PBRUMEN friend, who left for what appears to be an extended visit to try to solve complicated personal problems. Thus, with the "shelving" of possible operational activities against LIRING, LIOGLE became LIRELIC-1's only target in April of this year.

5. Unlike his contacts with the French, LIREALM-1's dealings with LIRELIC-1 have been completely clandestine. LIREALM-1 meets LIRELIC-1 under alias in out of the way restaurants and other public places. A drop constituted by a P. O. box rented by LIRELIC-1 under alias (to which both he and LIREALM-1 have keys) was set up for LIREALM-1 to receive operational messages.

6. References D and E reviewed an incident which occurred on 16 January and had a direct bearing on LIREALM-1's security. It is the opinion of this Station that the person who saw LIREALM-1 talk with Raymond A. FRADYER and Wallace B. ROWTON did not positively identify either of them. References stated that this person could not have been Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, who claimed to have observed the meeting. Reference E pointed out that before joining the PBRUMEN Section in October 1967 LIREALM-1 had for some time interested himself in the activities of the Soviets at Station request. He first made contact with LOGINOV, for example, in April 1967 and met with him on the average of once a week until October 1967. Reference E also pointed out that LIREALM-1 only had four meetings with the Soviet from October 1967 to January 1968. The Station wants to emphasize once more that these were all at LOGINOV's initiative. LIREALM-1 had discontinued his efforts to maintain contact with the Soviet at Station's directive. As pointed out above, one of the main targets now handled by LIREALM-1 is the French. One of the best places to meet Frenchmen is the French Club. Station would be very reluctant to have LIREALM-1, a long-time member of that club, terminate his membership. Neither does the Station want him to be too obvious in giving the cold shoulder to the Soviet. The Station does not believe, knowing what it knows of LOGINOV, that serious and permanent damage has been done to LIREALM-1's security and believes that he can continue to provide valuable services to this Station.

Raymond A. Fradyer
for Willard C. CURTIS

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968
B. HMMW-16364, 25 April 1968

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to provide Headquarters with additional information requested in reference B in the hope that it will assist the interested components in formulating a clearer picture of the reference A incident. The Station has consulted at length with Wallace B. ROWTON on the details that are provided below as well as, of course, with LIREALM-1 himself.

2. First, with regard to paragraph 2b of reference B, a fuller account of the FRADYER/ROWTON/LIREALM-1 meeting at Sanborns will, it is felt, shed more light on the impressions that Headquarters had formed of the probable identification of ROWTON as LIREALM-1's "boss." The following chronological account has been prepared by ROWTON from his reports and memory in consultation with LIREALM-1 (the numbers in the left margin refer to the time at which the events mentioned below took place):

1610 (January 16) LIREALM-1 met with ROWTON at the latter's home as planned. ROWTON informed LIREALM-1, much to the latter's disappointment, that unfortunately he had not as yet received the reimbursement for operational expenses ($2,357.35 MN) requested by LIREALM-1 on 10 January 1968, nor had he received from the

Continued......................

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2 - C/LPGLOBE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
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Station any contract or other document that LIREALM-1 might present to LIRELIC-1 as he had proposed. ROWTON explained to LIREALM-1 that he had hoped to be able to see Raymond A. FRADYER before his meeting with LIREALM-1, but that this had been impossible.

[illegible]

1620 ROWTON then telephoned FRADYER's office (in alias, open code, and double talk) and this time managed to reach FRADYER himself. FRADYER told ROWTON that he had the money and could pass it to ROWTON that same afternoon if he felt it necessary. ROWTON replied that he preferred to pick it up as soon as convenient for FRADYER and made a date for 1630 in the corridor outside the Koala Restaurant, about three or four minutes by foot from Sanborns. ROWTON then asked LIREALM-1 to wait for him in the downstairs bar of Sanborns, where he would join him with the money. LIREALM-1 left ROWTON's home alone, and ROWTON followed about five minutes later and proceeded (by taxi) to the Koala Restaurant. ROWTON distinctly recalls waiting for FRADYER for some 15 minutes.

1645 ROWTON spoke with FRADYER for about two minutes in the corridor after receiving the envelope containing the money. In reply to FRADYER's queries, ROWTON stated that LIREALM-1 was somewhat disappointed that he could not provide him with some sort of written contract for LIRELIC-1 and also because of the delay in reimbursing him for operational expenses (some of which had been disallowed). ROWTON then revealed to FRADYER that LIREALM-1 was waiting for him at the Sanborns bar so that he could pass him the money without further delay. FRADYER then regretted that he had been unable to see LIREALM-1 personally to explain the disallowance of some of the expenses. ROWTON suggested that FRADYER might take this opportunity to say a few words to LIREALM-1, especially since the latter knew that ROWTON and FRADYER were meeting at that moment somewhere nearby. FRADYER agreed but said that he preferred the gift section of Sanborns to the bar.

1655 ROWTON then proceeded alone to the downstairs bar of Sanborns and found LIREALM-1 waiting. ROWTON explained that he was late because of a last-minute arrangement with FRADYER for a brief meeting in the gift shop. LIREALM-1 then paid the bill and accompanied ROWTON up the stairs in the rear to the gift section, where they found FRADYER looking over the silver display in the shop.

1700 An apparently casual conversation then took place, with FRADYER and LIREALM-1 doing most of the talking and with ROWTON occasionally examining the silverware on display.

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1720 When the conversation ended, ROWTON and LIREALM-1 moved to the men's room, where LIREALM-1 was able to check the amount of money for him and sign the enclosed receipt.

3. It will be noted from the above that the ROWTON/LIREALM-1 meeting with FRADYER was not planned in advance (as pointed out in reference A), but was a hasty recommendation made to FRADYER by ROWTON and an equally hasty decision taken by FRADYER on the spot. ROWTON and LIREALM-1 had met previously only in ROWTON's home, except on two occasions when ROWTON picked up LIREALM-1 in his car in the Ciudad Deportes (near the main Mexico City bull ring) between regular meetings to pass him funds. ROWTON had never met with LIREALM-1 at Sanborns or in any other public place prior to this meeting.

4. LIREALM-1 also amplified his written report subsequently in one significant detail. In reference to the remark of LOGINOV to the effect that he had seen him with his boss at Sanborns two Wednesdays previously when "you had a drink in the bar and then talked to your boss," LIREALM-1 told ROWTON on reflection that LOGINOV had also stated that "you were having a drink at the bar and a man came up to you and brought you to your boss." This indicates that FRADYER was meant as the person described as LIREALM-1's boss.

5. With regard to where and how often ROWTON and LIREALM-1 have had operational meetings in the past, as requested in paragraph 3 of reference B, Station files show that between 20 October 1967 and 16 January 1968 ROWTON met with LIREALM-1 at his home ten times. Besides these meetings with LIREALM-1 at his home, ROWTON recalls only two other meetings with LIREALM-1, when he picked up LIREALM-1 in his car for brief meetings to pass him funds. Since the LOGINOV/LIREALM-1 episode, ROWTON has met with LIREALM-1 at obscure bars to avoid possible positive identification of ROWTON in the event LIREALM-1 was under surveillance. LIREALM-1 has passed his reports to ROWTON between their weekly meetings via a P.O. letter drop taken out previously by LIREALM-1 under alias. The only telephone contact that has existed between them has been brief calls to ROWTON's home by LIREALM-1 alerting ROWTON, in double talk, that he has left an envelope at the drop.

6. With regard to the frequency of LIREALM-1's meetings with LOGINOV, mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference B, LIREALM-1's contact reports list only four meetings during the same period, all of which occurred at the French Club, and one of which, on 2 November 1967, was a casual encounter at which very few words were exchanged. It is significant to note, however, that at the 12 November 1967 meeting, while LIREALM-1 and LOGINOV were chatting in the showers after the match, the latter "joked that (LIREALM-1) should bring some of his friends from the Embassy" to join them in playing tennis. LOGINOV added, also apparently with a slight grin, "all of them are WOFIRM." FRADYER, to whom this remark was promptly reported, did not consider it to have any special meaning since he knew from personal and direct experience that LOGINOV is a born provocateur who cannot resist needling people (Mexicans and foreigners) with whom he comes into contact. WOFIRM often comes up in LOGINOV conversations, not only with FRADYER, but with persons of other nationalities. It was decided, however, to again warn LIREALM-1 at his next meeting with ROWTON on 16 November, when LIREALM-1 submitted his report, not to involve himself with LOGINOV. LIREALM-1 assured ROWTON that

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his continuing contacts with LOGINOV were at the latter's initiative and that LIREALM-1 would not make any attempt to follow up or show any unusual interest. LIREALM-1 did not report seeing LOGINOV again until 13 January 1968 (two months later), this time, as usual, on the tennis court.

7. Headquarters will recall that the LIREALM-1 relationship with the Soviets dates back many months prior to the date ROWTON took over his handling. The file reveals that LIREALM-1 first met LOGINOV on 22 April 1967, and that at that time LOGINOV proposed to LIREALM-1 that they meet regularly, every Wednesday, for tennis and occasionally take in a movie with their wives. This leaves no doubt that the pace was set by LOGINOV himself since he undoubtedly saw in LIREALM-1 a potential target. The situation was further complicated by the character and modus operandi of LOGINOV, as well as the limitations of LIREALM-1's cover situation at the time.

8. A principal dilemma facing the Case Officer with regard to LIREALM-1's exposure to the Soviets has been his regular attendance at the French Club. Since the French target has been one of the main ones left to LIREALM-1 after the elimination of the Soviet, Indonesian, and UAR operations, it was considered necessary for LIREALM-1 to continue his normal contacts with the French. He could have dropped his membership in the club to avoid further involvement with the Soviets, but this would have broken a long-established pattern and deprived him of his principal access at that time. It was therefore ruled out as counterproductive.

9. Subsequent developments appear to confirm the Station's view that LOGINOV based his provocative remark on a hunch or, at most, on a strong suspicion concerning LIREALM-1. As mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference B, such prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet "is almost inevitably construed on both sides to have intelligence connotations." The Station wishes to emphasize, however, that whatever suspicions were aroused in the mind of LOGINOV concerning LIREALM-1 were already generated months before he joined the PBRUMEN Section in late October 1967.

10. In conclusion, the Station feels that nothing has been noted in the subsequent operational activity of FRADYER or ROWTON to indicate that either of them has been identified as an intelligence operative. ROWTON has had no contact of any kind with Soviets in this area, nor has he detected any surveillance, either physical or technical, of his person or home. Both he and FRADYER, however, will continue to maintain maximum security to avoid any further exposure to such persons as LOGINOV. LIREALM-1, on his part, has been able to improve his cover by opening an office and making his overt activity as plausibly commercial as possible.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

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DISPATCH

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MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-34393, 3 April 1968

1. Reference caused deep concern in Headquarters -- concern which we know you share. To hold any agent meetings in that particular Sanborn Cafeteria is unorthodox enough, but to meet there with someone in the category of LIREALM/1, whose cover is of special importance, suggests an unawareness or disdain of basic operational security which merits reprimand.

2. We appreciate your candid account of the LIREALM/1-LOGINOV episode, and have several comments to make:

a. Why LOGINOV would have said, "I saw you talking with your boss the other day" we do not know, but the fact that he made such a banal remark with a slight grin certainly implies that he did not have ordinary commercial business in mind.

b. In the context of the dispatch it sounds rather as though LOGINOV was referring to a meeting between LIREALM/1 and one other man, not two, in which case it was probably ROWTON and not FRADYER whom he identified as the boss. (We assume that ROWTON and LIREALM/1 had been together in the downstairs cafeteria before the brush meeting with FRADYER took place, but this may be incorrect.)

3. In order to shed some additional light on the matter, we would like to know even more about this particular Wednesday meeting and the pattern of meetings which have preceded and followed it. Were ROWTON and LIREALM/1 meeting together in the bar or cafeteria? What was the appearance of the later three-way, fifteen-minute conversation upstairs in the silver shop (i.e., casual, serious, intense, sotto-voce, conspiratorial? Was any pretense made of "shopping"?) Our feeling is that ROWTON is as much compromised as

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DATE 25 April 1968

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201-285412

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1 - WH/1 Chrono
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OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	NPerkins	jmw	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman
CCS/Milligan		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		W. J. Kaufman fo William V. Broe

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LIREALM/1, but in ROWTON's case the loss is less because of accepted risks in his style of operating and since we have always assumed that his cover was thin . . . what is important to know in this case is where and how often ROWTON and LIREALM/1 have had operational meetings in the past. Considering this we had assumed the ROWTON-LIREALM/1 meetings were truly clandestine.

4. Another point to be resolved is the frequency of LIREALM/1's meetings with LOGINOV -- from the Reference we infer that the tennis games were a frequent occurrence, although LIREALM/1 had been told almost a year ago to break contact. Even if these meetings could not have been avoided as the Station claims, why were they not reported? The issue takes on even added significance as we understood the Station and Headquarters had been in agreement for some time that LIREALM/1 was to avoid any continuing contact with Soviets. Hindsight in this case certainly proves the correctness of the earlier judgment. (Experience shows that prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet is almost inevitably construed on both sides, and with reason, to have an intelligence connotation.)

5. The fact that LOGINOV did not mention the Sanborn's meeting to FRADYER can hardly be read to mean that LIREALM/1 is clean in LOGINOV's eyes, although FRADYER would naturally have been anxious to see what, if anything, would happen when he next saw LOGINOV face to face. It is true that we have no evidence that LIREALM/1 has been "definitely branded as a WOFIRM operator" but if he is even highly suspect there is still cause for deep concern.

6. Various levels and components at Headquarters are trying to evaluate and debate this episode, and we would like to have your recommendations as an aid to our decision. From the few facts that we have we believe we must proceed under the assumption that LIREALM/1 is suspect or possibly compromised in the eyes of the Soviets. Accepting this, do you consider LIREALM/1 has further utility in Mexico? If so, we would like your views as to his proposed targets and handling procedures. After receiving further details as requested in paragraph 3 and your recommendations, Headquarters will advise you its decision.

7. We recognize the Station is as disturbed about this breach of basic operational judgment as Headquarters and do not wish to belabor the point. We trust however that this experience will be a lesson well learned and that in the future the Station's clandestine operational procedures will be truly clandestine and professional in style for all of the Station activities, not just LIREALM/1.

Ernest A. LUSBY

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, LPGLOBE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational/LIREALM-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Since joining the staff of the PBRUMEN Section of this Station in October 1967, LIREALM-1 has been handled by Wallace B. ROWTON under the over-all supervision of the undersigned. His three main activities have been 1) to handle LIRELIC-1, an asset who we hope will turn into a penetration of the Mexican PRI, 2) to continue to develop rapport with and report on the local official French community, and 3) to determine the degree to which LIRELIC-1 can develop access to LIRING and its personnel. LIREALM-1 has continued to see a number of contacts he had developed before joining the PBRUMEN Section, either at Station directive or by social encounter. One of these contacts has long been Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy and known KGB officer whom LIREALM-1 first ran into while playing tennis at the French Club, where both LIREALM-1 and LOGINOV are members. Station several times asked LIREALM-1 to break contact with LOGINOV, but this has not been possible since LIREALM-1's continued membership at the French Club is desired for operational reasons and LOGINOV, who probably joined the club for similar reasons, has continued to be one of its active members.

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2. In January 1968 LIREALM-1 presented an accounting for reimbursement by the Station to which the Station took exception. Some of the entertainment of marginal assets involved totals which the Station found to be excessive. The result of this was that after some deliberation LIREALM-1 had to pay for part of these expenses out of his pocket. On 17 January 1968 ROWTON called the undersigned to ask about reimbursement of those expenses allowed by the Station. A brush contact was arranged for this purpose in the passageway leading to the Koala Restaurant, as ROWTON indicated that LIREALM-1 needed the money as soon as possible. At the agreed time the undersigned passed an envelope to ROWTON, who informed the undersigned that LIREALM-1 was waiting in the downstairs cafeteria of the Sanborns building. The undersigned, who had not seen LIREALM-1 at Christmas time and genuinely regretted the fact that the latter had to pay for operational expenses out of his pocket, agreed to see LIREALM-1 for a few minutes. When the undersigned refused to go to the downstairs Sanborns cafeteria, ROWTON suggested that he fetch LIREALM-1 and bring him to the silver shop upstairs in the same building. A 15-minute meeting (longer than expected) ensued between ROWTON, LIREALM-1, and the undersigned in a corner of the Sanborns silver shop. The meeting started a few minutes before 1700 hours.

3. On 28 January LIREALM-1 saw LOGINOV at the French Club. The following is a verbatim extract of the report written by LIREALM-1 on this meeting.

> I had joined Val and my wife on her side of the court for small talk with Val. He apologized for interrupting our game and suggested we go back to playing and he would watch us. We had made a date for tennis Wednesday. He would call me if his leg still bothered him or for any other reason he was unable to play. Now he said he wanted to study my game so that he could beat me Wednesday. Val walked with me as far as the net where he stopped me and the following conversation took place.
>
> "I saw you talking with your boss the other day," Val said with a slight grin.
>
> "My boss?" I asked. I suspected nothing and seriously considered the question. I began to search back in my mind if my cover boss had ever met Val. I recalled that I had once pointed Val out to him. The conversation proceeded too rapidly for me to answer my own question. The fact is that Val has never met my cover boss.
>
> "Yes. At Sanborns two Wednesdays ago. You had a drink in the bar and then talked to your boss."
>
> "Two Wednesdays ago... At Sanborns? No. You're mistaken. My boss left about six weeks ago--almost two months ago. No. I don't think I was at Sanborns." I answered Val honestly confused. I began to wonder who I had been with. I've often met people in the various Sanborns. I was trying to think who Val was confusing with my boss.
>
> "Yes. Your boss. You and your boss were talking together at the Sanborns next to your embassy."
>
> "No Val. My boss left at least two months ago. I can't recall the particular meeting at Sanborns that you are referring to, but I'll drink with anyone, anywhere, anytime." Val and I laughed. Until this moment I was answering him honestly and sincerely and might have been very convincing.

As it began to dawn on me what Val was driving at I turned my back and started for the baseline. It was then that I felt weak and my face would have betrayed me if I had still been facing Val. By the time I reached the baseline I was composed. We spoke no further except to comment on good shots by me or my wife during the next five or ten minutes that he stood watching us.

4. The undersigned reported the above to his superiors as soon as he received LIREALM-1's report. A check of the LIEMPTY log for 17 January showed that LOGINOV had left the Soviet Embassy at 1404 and had returned at 1708 hours. This made his presence at Sanborns at the time of the meeting between LIREALM-1, ROWTON, and the undersigned impossible, as it would have given him about 10 minutes to leave the site of the meeting, get into his car, and drive to the Soviet Embassy, an impossible feat even in light traffic. It is clear then that LOGINOV was not present at the time of the meeting but was told that LIREALM-1 met with two Americans. It was and still is the undersigned's conviction that whoever saw LIREALM-1 was unable to positively identify ROWTON or the undersigned. The undersigned reasons that had LOGINOV known that he, the undersigned, had talked to LIREALM-1, LOGINOV would have mentioned his name after failing to obtain any reaction from LIREALM-1 from mentioning the latter's "boss." The undersigned believes that LOGINOV, who is not completely stupid, would have either said nothing or would have gone all the way in his statements to LIREALM-1 had he known the undersigned's name. By the same token it appears that LOGINOV failed to identify ROWTON. The undersigned had only met with one other Soviet besides LOGINOV at the time of the meeting, and that only once; and that Soviet was no longer in Mexico City when the meeting with LIREALM-1 took place. ROWTON has never had any contact, social or otherwise, with any of the Soviets.

5. The undersigned is the first to recognize that meeting with LIREALM-1 at the Sanborns silver shop was a thoroughly unwise move. He wishes to emphasize that this was the only meeting at the time that he had held with LIREALM-1 outside of a safehouse. All meetings between the undersigned and LIREALM-1 have since been held under the most secure conditions on the edge of the Federal District and, in one case, beyond. While this does not make this decision any wiser, he also wants to emphasize the fact that it was made on the spur of the moment, to quote the old cliche, because the undersigned "felt sorry" for LIREALM-1 because of the latter's financial difficulties with the Station over his last accounting. The undersigned unwisely put LIREALM-1's morale for a brief moment over basic security considerations. He is not in the habit of doing this as a matter of course. The day before his next scheduled tennis meeting with LIREALM-1 the following Wednesday, LOGINOV called LIREALM-1 and asked to be excused as his leg had worsened. The week after that LOGINOV showed up for his regular tennis game with LIREALM-1 but made no mention of his previous conversation with him two weeks before. The undersigned waited to complete a review of this case until he met LOGINOV face to face at one of the Consular Association functions. Because of the visits of Soviet athletes and artists which kept LOGINOV busy, however, this meeting did not materialize until 28 March. Although the undersigned and LOGINOV talked to each other off and on for more than two hours on this occasion during a visit to the local Home Fair, LOGINOV never mentioned anything about the Sanborns meeting. He has never brought LIREALM-1's name to the attention of the undersigned.

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6. During a recent visit to the Station, a representative of the LPGLOBE staff at Headquarters was given the complete details of the above incident by LIREALM-1. He also reviewed the same incident with the undersigned and the Deputy Chief of Station. The LPGLOBE representative mentioned on this occasion that in his opinion the above incident should have been reported by cable. The undersigned stated then and wants to repeat now that this was not done because 1) it would have served no purpose to alert Headquarters without giving all the facts, which were not known at the time, and 2) the Station wanted to review all elements of this case to report the incident objectively, fairly, and completely. The undersigned told the LPGLOBE representative that he would consider documentation of this case complete after having the opportunity of meeting LOGINOV face to face again. As pointed out above, this did not occur until 28 March. Nothing in the operations conducted by the undersigned, LIREALM-1, or ROWTON has indicated that the Soviets positively identified either the undersigned or ROWTON so as to definitely brand LIREALM-1 as a WOFIRM operator.

Raymond A. Fradyer
for Willard C. CURTIS

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CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, SB Division

INFO Chief, WH Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDTOP LCIMPROVE - Identification of KGB Officers Who Participated In Counter-Surveillance of 201-827966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-16090, 15 January 1968
(B) MEXICO CITY 4777, 9 March 1968
(C) HMMA-34264, 11 March 1968

1. On 8 March 1968 after 201-827966 failed to show for two scheduled meetings (on the previous evening he had agreed to submit to a debriefing), the area of his hotel was checked by the undersigned. On a main street near the hotel the undersigned almost bumped into Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-~~138129~~ 285412). A few minutes later Ivan K. BARANOV (201-277838) was observed photographing the area (including the undersigned) with an 8mm movie camera. LOGINOV was standing near BARANOV observing the undersigned. LILYRIC reports that LOGINOV and BARANOV were absent together from the Soviet Embassy during the period in question.

2. Another meet with 201-827966 was arranged by telephone for 12:30 on 9 March. From 12:28 to 12:48 the entrance to the hotel where the meeting took place was staked out by BARANOV and Vladimir A. DOLGOV (201-763035). BARANOV was carrying a 35mm camera with a larger telephoto lens. Visual identification of DOLGOV was tenative. However in view of LILYRIC reports that DOLGOV was absent from the Soviet Embassy for the period in question and that all other possible candidates were accounted for, the identification has been confirmed. In addition we have photos of DOLGOV wearing sunglasses identical to the ones he wore during the counter-surveillance.

3. Although we have had previous indications that DOLGOV is probably a KGB officer the Station feels that his participation in this counter-surveillance is sufficient to list him as known KGB.

4. We can also add photographer to BARANOV's technical duties.

Francis J. Coyne
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
2 - C/WH

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

[illegible]

201-763035

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-277838 201-763035 201-285412 ✓ B-201-827966 D-50-5-3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34271	DATE 12 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-5-3 201-285412

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: HMMA-32872, 24 August 1967

Enclosed is a finished copy of the SPR on Subject forwarded in draft under Reference dispatch.

Monroe B. DIFFENDAL

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/atts

CS COPY

201-285412 ✓

Attachments: A 1 - 15 and 17 and 18 herewith
B 16 and 19 Under Separate Cover

15 FEB 1968

1 att/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-16150	DATE 8 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412

1-SB/O/WH w/atts
1-SB/CI/K w/atts
1-WH/1 w/o atts
1-RID w/atts

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/WH	Jonathan Hanke	law	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/O/WH		
C/SB/CI/K	08 Feb	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		

WMb

AN	20	SB/O/WH
~~PE~~		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

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SECRET

SPR PREPARED BY: JONATHAN L. WEENING
DATE : 14 August 1967
201 NUMBER : 201-285412
A-NUMBER :

1. NAME: Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (3, 5)

2. DPOB: 23 December 1927 in Moscow. (28)

Subject has stated that he comes from Moscow (1), and his wife said they grew up together in Moscow. (6) He once told another source, however, that he came from the northern part of the USSR (8), but this source is not known for accurate reporting.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

a. Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 16993, issued 24 August 1960. (3)

b. Soviet Diplomatic Passport # 010264, issued 24 June 1965 (5), used currently. (4)

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: Unknown

5. OTHER NAMES USED: Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION:

Third Secretary and Consul General at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (1)

7. RELATIVES:

c. Wife: Aleksandra Dmitriyevna LOGINOVA. (28) Known as "Shura". (1)

DPOB: 20 August 1928 in Moscow. (28)

Passports: D-16094, used in 1962. (4)
D-010265, issued 24 June 1955, currently used. (4)

Description: Plump, has reddish hair. (15) Photographs are attached.

Languages: LOGINOVA has been studying Spanish with Carmen ROURE Canosa, a local employee of the Soviets, since at least June 1966 through May 1967 (1), but her Spanish is still said to be very limited. (6, 25) She is said to speak a little English (25), and claimed she had studied English in Moscow. (1) She is also said to speak some French. (25)

Miscellaneous: LOGINOVA has said that she has known her husband since age six as neighbors in Moscow. (6) She claims to be a chemical engineer. (6) During Subject's tour in Havana, 1960-63, LOGINOVA worked in the Soviet Consulate. (28) She arrived in Mexico on 10 October 1965, two months after her husband. (4) Since February 1966 she had been reported as chairman of the Zhenkom (Soviet Women's Organization), and as such has had to persuade the Soviet women to do various administrative chores, as well as being involved with runing the dacha that the Soviets have had in Cuernavaca in the summers of 1966 and 1967. (1)

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7. RELATIVES: Continued

d. **Family:** In June 1967 LOGINOVA asked the wife of Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV (201-245651) to call her mother when she got to Moscow, saying that her family lived at the Botanical Gardens. (1)

e. **Children:**

1) **Daughter:** Irina, born ca 1952. (28)

In June 1967 Subject said he had a fifteen-year-old daughter, who was living with LOGINOVA's mother (in Moscow). (6) In April 1967 LOGINOVA said her daughter was in an English school in Moscow. (25) Irina was reportedly with her parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28); however, she did not travel with them from Havana to Moscow on 11 May 1962 (4) and therefore may have been in Havana for only a part of Subject's tour. She has not been in Mexico.

2) **Son:** Dmitriy. (4)

DOB: 1959 (28), birthday probably 6 August. (1)

Dmitriy was with his parents in Havana, 1960-63 (28), and arrived in Mexico City with his mother on 10 October 1965. (4) Subject has expressed interest in having his son take English lessons when the family returns from home leave in August 1967. (21)

8. LANGUAGES:

a. **Spanish:**

Subject speaks fluent Spanish with very little accent. (11, 24)

b. **English:**

Since 1966 Subject has been reported taking English lessons, apparently at the Instituto Interpretes Traductores in Mexico City. (1) In April 1967 he said that he had been paying a girl (American) for lessons in English, but that she did not have enough background in grammar. (25) (COMMENT: Subject was probably more interested in meeting American girls than in studying English in this case.) Subject's English is believed to be fair at present.

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9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

One source described Subject as tall, blond and blue-eyed. (11) Another source said that he was six feet and had short, reddish-blond hair. (24) Photographs are attached.



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

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10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

a. All sources agree in describing Subject as smooth and completely self-controlled. He is an aggressive conversationalist. One source described him as vulgar, crude, ill-mannered, short-tempered and a tyrant, who thinks he is a big shot. (8)

b. Subject seems to have made a play for every girl he has met. In at least one instance he has claimed to be unmarried when inviting a girl out. (27) When his wife was staying in the dacha in Cuernavaca he reportedly made dates with other women. (8) On 13 September 1966 he was seen in a cafe with a Mexican-looking woman. (18)

c. Subject is interested in sports and is good at them. In September 1966 it was reported that he did not play tennis, (15) and by April 1967 he was said to be a good tennis player, claimed that he had been playing for less than a year and never played more than once a week. (25) He is said to have the build of a trained athlete, the brutish look of a boxer or wrestler, and the grace of a natural athlete. (25) He has said that he boxed when he was younger, and that he plays basketball and volleyball (25), also that his favorite sports are skiing and speed skating. (21). He also plays chess but is not an addict. (25) He has belonged to the French Club in Mexico City since ca. November 1965 (1) and has been seen there frequently on weekends, sometimes with his wife and child. (15) One Sunday (20 March 1966) Subject and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN were seen playing badminton with their wives at the French Club. (15)

d. One source reported that Subject smoked "Fiesta" cigarettes (8), and another source reported in April 1967 that Subject did not smoke. (25) One source reported that Subject downs several beers after playing tennis (25), but another source reported that on a social occasion Subject did not even finish one Scotch and water. (19) On 8 February 1966 Subject and Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN reportedly drove into the Soviet Embassy at 0300 hours roaring drunk (8), which may or may not be accurate reporting.

e. Subject has apparently been taking English lessons since early 1966 at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, which is located at Tiber 113 very near the U.S. Embassy. He seems to have made friends with a number of people through these classes. (1) (Cf. under Contacts)

f. In February 1966 it was reported that Subject's wife had bought a tape recorder. (1) In June 1967 Subject himself ordered a Grundig tape recorder. (1)

g. Subject was reported having an operation on 1 February 1966 (17); no further details are available.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Subject claims that he has served in the Red Army. (8)

(Subject's name was reportedly listed in February 1960 as about to be assigned to Buenos Aires as Soviet Military Attache; it would appear that either this was another person with the same name, or that Subject was being considered for assignment there as D diplomatic attache.)

14 September 1960: Subject and his family arrived in Havana, where Subject was assigned as Attache at the Soviet Embassy. (3, 28)

December 1961. Subject toured Latin America as escort and interpreter for the Dynamo soccer team. (28)

11. CURRICULUM VITAE: Continued

11 May 1962: Subject, his wife and son transited Mexico City travelling from Havana enroute to Montreal (4), presumably on their way to Moscow on home leave.

September 1963: Subject and his family left Havana PCS. (28)

3 August 1965: Subject arrived PCS in Mexico as Third Secretary assigned to the Soviet Embassy. (4) Subject replaced Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO as Vice Consul. (1)

10 October 1965: Subject's wife and son arrived in Mexico. (4)

August 1966: Subject was apparently promoted to Consul General after Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV left Mexico on 4 August 1966 for home leave. In September 1966 Subject was telling everyone in town that he is now the Consul. (1, 6, etc.)

16 July 1967: Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, left Mexico for Moscow via Paris. (4) Also travelling with them on LOGINOVA's passport was Tatyana, the daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH. (4) Subject has told several people that this is home leave and that he will be returning to Mexico (1, 6, 21, 22).

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Known KGB, based on his having taken over an agent previously handled by known KGB officers Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) and Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379), as well as his other intelligence activities given below.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:

(Cf. also information under Contacts, below. Subject has undoubtedly been developing contacts, particularly with American girls, with a view toward intelligence possibilities.)

a. In December 1961 while travelling with the Dynamo soccer team, Subject met a Bolivian security service official in La Paz, Bolivia and reportedly tried to persuade him to study in Cuba. The source, however, is believed to be a fabricator. (28)

b. After Subject saw the soccer team off, he continued to Panama, where he met with a Mexican citizen, Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez (P-2818) on 16 December 1961. On 17 December 1961 Subject and ZORRILLA travelled to Mexico City on the same plane. Subject had ca. (US) $2000 with him in Panama. (29)

c. On 14 February 1966 KGB officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODO (201-202379) turned an agent over to Subject. (The agent had previously been handled by Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO.) On 14 April 1966 the agent attempted to break his intelligence relationship with the Soviets, although he has remained in business and social contact with them. Subject, occasionally joined by PRIKHODKO, has continued to give intelligence requirements to the agent, who has questioned him particularly about his access to the U.S. Embassy and tried to persuade him to continue cooperating with the KGB. On 24 June 1966 Subject asked the agent for information on Eduardo WEBELMAN and his son Mauricio. On 13 December 1966 Subject asked the agent to try to find out who the WOFIRM chief in Mexico was. (6) (COMMENT: Mauricio WEBELMAN was subsequently reported to be a friend of suspect KGB officer Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN's, 201-773422).

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: Continued

d. On 20 January 1966 Cristobal TORRES Ponce, chauffeur employed by the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to pick up the passport of the wife of a U.S. Embassy official who was planning a trip to the USSR. Subject talked to TORRES, asking him if he would like to visit the USSR or receive Soviet magazines, if he knew anyone who would be willing to give him English lessons, and finally made a dinner date with TORRES for 24 January 1966. When TORRES did not keep the date, Subject called him on 8 and 9 February 1966 in an attempt to keep the contact alive. (12, 14)

e. Subject dealth with the Federal District police several times in July 1966 in regard to a radio that had been stolen from his car. On 20 July 1966 the police an (LNU) who had been handling the radio case reported to his superior, General Luis CUETO Ramirez, that Subject had offered him 5,000 pesos (4,000 dollars) a month if he would work for him. After consulting with the Minister of Interior, CUETO told the policeman to accept Subject's offer, which he reportedly did on 21 July 1966. Subject's first assignment to the policeman was to locate Venezuelan citizens Nicolas Juan BOSTROEM and wife. (16) (COMMENT: Nothing further has been learned about this case. BOSTROEM is a native Russian employed by Stephens-Adamson de Mexico, his wife teaches Russian at the Ibero-American University.)

f. Subject has occasionally been reported visiting the small general store located across the street from the Soviet Embassy. On 5 November 1966 Subject reportedly questioned the store owner about the occupants of one apartment building in the same block as the store, and on 6 December 1966 he asked general questions about the new apartment building at the end of the block. (8) (COMMENT: Both of these buildings contain base houses for the fixed surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

a. In Mexico, Subject has consistently been reported performing consular duties. He issues visas and sees visitors to the Soviet Embassy in one of the reception rooms. (21) He makes travel reservations for PCS and visiting Soviets. He is responsible when either PCS or visiting Soviets become ill and have to be sent to a hospital. He has often attended to the needs of Soviet ships in Mexican ports. He has done considerable house-hunting for the Soviets, such as looking for a new school building and for houses in Cuernavaca that would be suitable as a dacha. Subject had to sign the dacha contract in both 1966 and 1967. Subject also regularly attends the functions of the Consular Corps Association, and on 16 February 1967 he had the Association to the Soviet Embassy for a Russian evening. (1) In September 1966 Subject was reported as having become the Consul General (6, 8, 1, 11), having replaced Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV, who left Mexico for home leave on 4 August 1966. On 21 February 1967 Subject tried to get Panamanian visas for himself and Soveksportfilm representative Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (known KGB) to attend a Consular Congress to be held in Panama 11-15 April 1967. (1) The visas were refused.

b. On 26 January 1966 Subject attended a lecture given by a Mexican who was an exchange professor at a U.S. university. The lecture was sponsored by the PRI. Soviet Cultural Attache Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV also attended the lecture and set on the platform, whereas Subject sat at the back of the room. (13)

c. Subject is reported to have taken the following trips to Mexico:

26-28 October 1965: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

2-4 November 1965: To Mazatlan with Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

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14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: Continued

4-8 December 1965: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1, 9)

2-5 February 1966: To Mazatlan to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

13-20 February 1966: To Coatzacoalcos to attend to Soviet ships. Soviet Embassy chauffeur Anatoliy Pavlovich PRASHCHIKIN went with Subject but returned to Mexico City earlier. (1)

25-28 April 1966: Possibly to Guadalajara with Soviet Inturist visitors attending a travel conference there. (1)

4-9 May 1966: To Veracruz to attend to the matter of a missing Soviet sailor. (1)

27-30 May 1966: To Veracruz to attend to Soviet ship. (1)

26 February-2 March 1967: To Veracruz with Soviet Commercial Counselor Viktor Mikhaylovich IVANOV to attend to Soviet ships. (1) While in Veracruz, Subject asked the U.S. Vice Consul, Richard BOOTH, if he would intercede with the Mexican authorities to get shore leave for the Soviet crew. (24)

15. CONTACTS:

a. Soviet:

1) Subject has been seen coming and going at the Soviet Embassy most frequently with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123, known KGB), whom Subject replaced as Consul. Since Subject's departure for home leave on 16 July 1967, YATSKOV has been regularly using Subject's car. Subject has also been observed leaving the Soviet Embassy fairly often with Ivan Konstantinovich BARANOV (201-277838, known KGB sweeper) and Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (201-767974, suspect KGB technician). Subject has also borrowed the cars of YATSKOV and known KGB chauffeur Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV (201-273046). (7)

2) In May 1966 Subject reportedly gave the wife of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917, known KGB) a hard time when she wanted to send her son to the USSR with another Soviet wife. NIKITIN then complained to Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO (201-202379, known KGB), who reportedly ordered Subject to get a ticket for the NIKITIN child. (1) Cf. also above, where PRIKHODKO seems to be the senior case officer for an agent currently being handled by Subject.

3) In May 1967 LOGINOVA mentioned that she had known Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKOV (201-268115, known GRU) for years. (1) (COMMENT: CHMYKHOV was stationed in Havana 1960-62, at the same time that Subject was there.) Cf. below for report of Subject's having taken CHMYKHOV with him to Cuernavaca to meet ZAREBSKI.

Subject has also been reported in contact with the following Soviets not stationed in Mexico:

4) Vitaliy Konstantinovich BOYAROV (201-355606, known KGB), visited Mexico 27 May - 9 June 1966. On 1 June 1966 Subject and P.A. YATSKOV were absent from the Soviet Embassy for four hours with BOYAROV. (7)

5) Vasiliy Vasilyevich GRIGORYEV, member of petroleum delegation that visited Mexico 31 March-14 April 1967. While GRIGORYEV was in Mexico he was reported in contact with Subject several times, once making plans to go to the movies together, also to ask Subject whether he should attend a French reception and to report the illness of one of the other Soviet delegates. (1)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

a. Soviet:

6) Boris Semenovich IVANOV (201-078078, known KGB), visited Mexico 8-22 February 1967. Subject made reservations for IVANOV in Mexico City and probably saw him off at the airport. (1)

7) Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV (201-213261), Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. On 7 February 1966 Subject was reported sending something to LEBEDEV with a Soviet professor who was travelling back to Moscow via Havana. (1)

b. Non-Soviet:

1) Alonso AGUILAR Monteverede (P-2152, 201-334259), active Marxist intellectural.

On 28 June 1967 AGUILAR reminded Subject that they and their wives were invited for Saturday evening to the home of Alberto PENICHE. (1) (Alberto PENICHE Blanco, P-12294, manager of centrist newspaper El Heraldo de Mexico and reported as minor contributor to the PCM in 1964.)

2) (Mrs.) Gloria *ALFARO, no other traces.

On 5 February 1966 Mrs. fnu ALFARO (Possibly Gloria) wanted to talk to Subject to congratulate him on a Soviet moon probe. (1) On 22 June 1966 Gloria ALFARO reminded Subject that they had met at the house of Mrs. SOTO (possibly Graciala, q.v.) on Christmas Eve 1965 and invited Subject to a party. Subject was unable to go but said he would call Gloria for coffee. Gloria gave her telephone as 35-71-30 (listed in 1964 to Yolanda ALFARO Vda de CACERES Buitrago, Chiapas 130-A, current telephone 25-10-24). (1) Also on 22 June 1966 Gloria ALFARO told Subject she would like to talk with some of the Soviets, and Subject suggested getting together on Friday "after English class". (17) (COMMENT: ALFARO may have been studying English with Subject at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.) On 3 August 1966 Gloria and Subject tried to agree on a date to get together, and she said she would like for him to meet a friend (female) of hers who was visiting Mexico from Central America. (1)

3) Ofelia ALFARO Lopez (P-11339), professor of economics at UNAM, good friend of the wife of Antonio SARMIENTO (q.v), social contact with several Soviets.

On 30 August 1965 ALFARO invited Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOVI to her house and included Subject and Leonid Vasilyevich KNIKIFOROV. (1)

4) (Dr.) Juan Luis ALVAREZ Gayou, teacher at UNAM and Deputy Director of Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores.

Subject presumably met ALVAREZ at the Instituto, where Subject is believe to have studied English. The first reported contact was on 11 April 1966, when they spoke to each other, using the familiar form of address, about having missed each other in Cuernavaca. Subject was invited to ALVAREZ' birthday party. Subject said he would see ALVAREZ the following day when he was going to have class with a new teacher. On 13 June 1966 Professor fnu ALVAREZ, Juan Luis' father, asked Subject if he would bring the projector to the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and Subject said he would. On 12 July 1966 ALVAREZ, who had been out of town, asked Subject if he wanted to continue taking lessons, and Subject said yes, he would go there the following day. On 19 November 1966 ALVAREZ left a message for Subject to call him at 35-68-96 (listed to Natividad GAMERO de la Fuente, Hamburger 25). On 22

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

5) (Ing.) Manuel ANAYA S., employee of Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, visited the USSR in summer 1965.

> On 19 July 1966 ANAYA thanked Subject for his visa and said he would get together with Subject when he got back in order to discuss his trip. (17)

6) Emilia AROSAMENA Vallarina (P-10933, 201-771073), Panamanian Consul General in Mexico, in contact with several Soviets.

> On 15 November 1965 Aleksandr Vladimirovich PRIKHODKO said he wanted to introduce Subject to AROSAMENA, because Subject had some questions to ask her. Presumably related is a report that the Panamanian Counselor Jose B. CALVO, told Subject on 19 November 1965 that he had no answer for Subject yet. (1)

7) Miriam AVILA Katz (P-581, 201-814144), employee of Mundus Tours travel agency, about to leave Mexico to marry an American and live in New York.

> Subject was first reported in contact with AVILA in April 1966 in connection with travel bookings Subject made. (1) On 2 June 1966 Subject flirted with her, and said he would invited her to a volleyball game. (1) During the rest of 1966 Subject invited her out a few times, told her he was married but that his wife was not in Mexico, asked her to introduce him to some of her friends and especially wanted to know, if she knew anyone in the U.S. Embassy. In April 1967 Subject reluctantly agreed to issue a visa to Dr. KUTTLER (q.v.), whose travel AVILA was arranging, and asked as a return favor that she introduce him to some of her friends. (6) In June 1967 Subject reportedly stopped AVILA coming out of work to ask her about the Israeli War. (6)

8) Celia BAYARDI Torres, no traces.

> On 7 February 1966 an unidentified man visited Subject at the Soviet Embassy. This man came to the Embassy in a car driven by a woman, who remained in the car, with license plates registered to Celia BAYARDI Torres, Arquitector 46, Colonia Escandon, telephone 15-34-02. The phone is listed to Francisa TORRES Vda de BAYARDI. (7)

9) Leila S. BELAVAL, visa officer at U.S. Embassy.

> In June 1967 BELAVAL reported that she had been in contact with Subject over visa matters, that Subject had asked her what she did in the evenings, whether she spent her off hours with other U.S. Embassy employees, and had said that he was unmarried. In June 1967 he offered to take her to the Ukrainian Ballet when it came to Mexico. She refused his invitations. (27)

10) Carlos BLANCO Solano (P-9328), former Federal Security (DFS) agent, now with Judicial Police. In 1960-61 BLANCO invited several U.S. Embassy girls out and offered his services to the U.S. Embassy. BLANCO works for Carlos CASAMADRID Miranda, who is suspected of having a clandestine relationship with KGB officer Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV.

> On 1 November 1965 BLANCO called Subject at the Soviet Embassy and remarked that they had not seen each other for a long time. Subject said he would call BLANCO to get together the following Wednesday. (1) On 8 September 1966 Graciela SOTO (q.v), who described herself

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

10) Carlos BLANCO Soloano Continued

as BLANCO's friend, invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child and mentioned that BLANCO's wife Magdalena was going. (1) On 10 November 1966 BLANCO invited Subject to a party for BLANCO's daughter, said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1) On 6 December 1966 BLANCO told Subject that "Comandante Carlos" (Presumably CASAMADRID) urgently wanted to see YATSKOV, and Subject said he would have YATSKOV call him. (1)

11) Lubomir BLAZIK (P-1730, 201-206043), former Czech Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

On 28 December 1965 P.A. YATSKOV left a message for BLAZIK, that Subject's wife was sick and could not attend the dinner to which the BLAZIKs had invited her. (1)

12) Rosa Martha BRACHO Sanchez (P-12038), left in November 1965 on a scholarship to study ballet in the USSR.

On 21 and 22 September 1966 Rosa's mother (fnu) was in contact with Subject in order to talk to him about visa problems of her two daughters who were both studying dance in the USSR. (1) (Name of other daughter is unknown.)

13) Erica CAMERMAN (P-12843), said to be a reporter with The News (17), but this seems unlikely, no other traces.

On 21 February 1966 CAMERMAN told Subject that she was going out of town the next day but when she got back she wanted to invite Subject and his wife to her house. Subject said he had no word on her papers yet. On 28 February 1966 she said he had been in Cozumel. Subject said he still had no word on her papers. She invited Subject to dinner with his wife, and he said he would call her back. On 10 May 1966 she tried to call Subject, who was out, saying that she wanted to know about the arrival of a man from Russia. On 11 May 1966 Subject told her he still had no answer on her papers. She said she planned to take a business trip to Brussels and Paris in June and mentioned that Elke (LNU) was in Paris visiting her son. On 10 June 1966 Subject asked for CAMERMAN at 18-65-61 and was told she was in Europe for a month (phone listed to importing firm Incomex, S.A. at Isabel la Catolica 45-914). On 6 July 1966 Subject called her at 12-78-32 (listed to the banco de Mexico at Cinco de Mayo 2) and told her he had a document for her. On 11 July 1966 she told Subject that she needed his signature on the document, also sent regards to Subject's wife and children. (1)

14) Ernesto CHAZARO Peregrino (P-12818, 201-800142), assistant security chief of Astilleros de Veracruz, S.A. a shipyard in Veracruz. Said to be the adventurer-type, once worked for the Federal Security Police but was fired because of involvement in arms contraband.

CHAZARO Probably did meet Subject on 5 May 1966 in Veracruz. CHAZARO undoubtedly fabricated his story that Subject tried to recruit him after that and set up a 50,00 peso bank account in CHAZARO's name. (30)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

15) (Lic.) Jacobo CHENCINSKY, director of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, located at Tiber 113.

Subject's contact with CHENCINSKY was presumably been connected with Subject's taking English at the Instituto. On 24 March 1966 CHENCINSKY tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 4 July 1966 CHENCINSKY told Subject that Janet (LNU, apparently Subject's teacher) had been unable to fix her working papers and had had to leave Mexico and asked if Subject's classes could be postponed. Subject agreed and said he would like to talk to CHENCINSKY. (1)

16) David F. COOLBAUGH (P-12579, 201-796142), American employed with United Nations in Mexico, co-director of geological project that two Soviets were also assigned to.

In 1966 Subject was in contact with COOLBAUGH several times in regard to documenting the two Soviets working on the UN project. (1)

17) Ana Maria ESCOBAR (P-11858), in 1965 reported to be a student and also working as private secretary to the PRI chief for the Federal District.

On 11 October 1965 ESCOBAR tried unsuccessfully to reach Subject. On 12 October 1965 she told Subject she had wanted to invite him to the theater the previous day because she had been given free tickets. She sent regards to Pablo (presumably Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). (1)

18) Margaret (aka Magre) FEDOR (P-12967), no other traces.

On 17 March 1966 FEDOR invited Subject to go on a Sunday outing with a group of friends whom Subject also knew. She mentioned that she was studying French in the evenings and was about to begin Russian classes at the United Nations. Subject said he would call her at home later. On 28 March 1966 Subject told FEDOR that he had stopped by her house with theater tickets but she had been out. Rebeca (LNU) had told FEDOR that the play was good. FEDOR told Subject that on Saturday there would be a discussion with Jose CORNEJO (no identifiable traces), who had been in South America, and Subject said he would go. On 8 June 1966 FEDOR told Subject that she was going to go to the U.S. on vacation and mentioned that Daniel SEIN (no traces) had asked about Subject. Subject said he would call her later. On 24 August 1966 FEDOR told Subject that there would be a discussion about India at her house on 26 August, and Subject said he would try to go. Subject asked her whether she knew the Soviets working on a United Nations project, but she said she did not. (1) (COMMENT: FEDOR may work at the United Nations in Mexico City.)

19) Fnu FLORES, man employed at Mex-American travel agency.

On 15 March 1966 FLORES, who described himself as a friend of Gloria's and others', asked Subject for visa information. (1) (Gloria might be Gloria PINTO, cf. below.)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

20) Socorro FLORES (P-12259), formerly employed at Mex-Americana de Viajes travel agency, no other traces.

> Subject was first reported in contact with FLORES in September 1965 in connection with travel reservations and for about a year Subject continued to discuss travel arrangements and at the same time flirt with FLORES and also send regards to Susana LNU, who worked with her. FLORES invited Subject to dinner with some of her friends. Subject was very interested in knowing who the friends were, but FLORES said they were not the Americans, because she hadn't seen them. On 8 September 1966 Subject arranged to meet FLORES in front of a movie theater. Then there was no report of contact between them until on 13 June 1967 FLORES told Subject that she had a new job and asked him to call her at 27-85-50, extension 18 (no Station listing of this number). She mentioned that she had not seen him for a while.

21) Rafael FUSONI Alordi (P-5119, 201-237904), Argentine diplomat, former KGB agent, in occasional social contact with Soviets, primarily through diplomatic functions.

> Subject met FUSONI at a consular corps function in January 1967 and again at a Czech Embassy reception in May 1967. Subject later called FUSONI and offered him tickets to a Bolshoy Ballet performance and on 11 June 1967 they attended the Bolshoy performance together and went to supper afterwards. (23)

22) Moises GAMERO de la Fuente, no other traces.

> On 6 April 1966 Subject reportedly called telephone number 2-30-65 in Cuernavaca from a pay phone. (8) (This number is listed to GAMERO.)

23) Pearl GONZALEZ (P-11420), society editor for The News, Mexico City English language newspaper, in social contact with several Soviets.

> On 25 November 1965 GONZALEZ gave a party and invited several Soviets. Subject was one of those who attended. (10)

24) Alfonso GUZMAN and Carlos SANDOVAL, of Servicio Diplomatico in the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

> Since August 1966 (i.e. when Subject became Consul General), Subject has been reported dealing with GUZMAN and SANDOVAL in regard to Soviet visas. In October 1966 Subject had tickets for GUZMAN to a sports event, but GUZMAN was unable to go. Subject also invited GUZMAN to the Soviet Embassy reception on 7 November 1966. (1)

25) Abdel Rahman HASSAN Abdel-Rahman, First Secretary and Consul at the UAR Embassy in Mexico.

> On 1 June 1967 Subject and HASSAN discussed consular affairs and also talked about getting together for tennis the following week. (1)

26) (Miss) fnu HERNANDEZ, of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, probably identical with Gabriela HERNANDEZ Elizalde, who in 1967 was the secretary at this institute.

> On 29 June 1966 HERNANDEZ told Subject that his class would be postponed for a week because Sarita (LNU) was sick. (1)

27) Lee HIGGINS, male, no traces

> On 19 May 1966 HIGGINS tried unsuccessfully to call Subject. (1)

15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

28) Vincent HODGINS, British citizen, sales manager of Canadian Pacific Airlines in Mexico City.

On 28 October 1966 HODGINS contacted Subject, saying that BRADLEY (J.E. Ralph BRADLEY, regional sales manager of Canadian Pacific) had met Subject the night before, and HODGINS wanted to discuss business with Subject. Subject offered to visit HODGINS in his office. (1) (COMMENT: The Soviets began flying with Canadian Pacific when a new Aeroflot flight was put in service to Canada.) On 3 November 1966 HODGINS gave Subject information on flights and Subject said he would stop by his office next week. On 24 February 1967 Subject was reported to have an appointment with HODGINS. (1)

29) Jan JAKOWIEC (P-9097, 201-250618), Polish Second Secretary and Consul in Mexico.

Subject and JAKOWIEC seem to be good friends, in addition to being in contact with each other through consular duties. (19)

30) Karen JOFFER, no other traces.

On 16 August 1966 Subject apologized to JOFFER that he had been busy the week before but said he could see her at 1630 hours that day. (1) (COMMENT: This could well be a routine visa request.)

31) (Dr.) Yury KUTTLER (P-1573), dentist, Soviet contact, Communist sympathizer.

In April 1966 Subject was reported making a dental appointment with KUTTLER. (1) In April 1967 when the tourist agency representative, Miriam AVILA Katz, was trying to get a visa for KUTTLER, Subject spoke scathingly of him and said he would not give him a visa unless he fulfilled all the requirements. (1) Subject explained that he had once gone to KUTTLER to have some dental work done and that KUTTLER had charged him too much, and that this was why he did not want to issue him a visa. (26)

32) Jacques LEMAIRE, representative of French steamship company in Mexico, scheduled to leave Mexico soon, member of French Club, where he probably met Subject.

On 14 July 1967 LEMAIRE invited Subject to the French Embassy reception that day, but Subject was unable to go. LEMAIRE sent regards to Subject's wife. (1)

33) Yuliya LIPOVSKAYA, probably identical with the Julia YASCHIN listed in the telephone book as living in Mexicali 175, phone 15-35-47, presumably the wife of Solomon (aka Julio) YASCHIN.

On 30 November 1965 LIPOVSKAYA contacted Subject and told him a long rambling story about her relatives. Subject was evidently interested, urged her to visit the USSR and suggested she come to the Soviet Embassy to talk to him. On 24 December 1965 LIPOVSKAYA tried to call Subject but was referred by mistake to another Valentin. On 8 and 20 January 1966 she asked Subject if he had heard from her relative, the soccer player Lev YASCHIN, but Subject still had no news for her. (1)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

34) Tatiana RAKOFF Vda de MARCHAND (P-370), widow of Rene MARCHAND Boisselet, former professor at UNAM and director of the Jugoslav Cultural Institute. She is evidently a native Russian, but French citizen.

Tatiana was seen visiting Subject at the Soviet Embassy on 3 January and 15 April 1967; Subject seemed very friendly with her, and on 18 April 1967 left the Embassy together with her. (7) On 9 January 1967 it appeared that she had asked Subject for a visa. She also told him she had the information on the man who had been consul, but Subject cut her off and said that it would be better for them to get together to discuss it. On 25 February 1965 she told Subject she would help him join a club. On 16 May 1967 she asked Subject if he had called the poles, but he said he had forgotten and would do it right away. (1)

35) (Dr.) Alfonso MARTINEZ Alvarez (P-1799), Guatemalan leftist doctor, has house at Lake Tequesquitengo to which he often invites groups of Soviets.

MARTINEZ was reported in contact with Subject in fall 1966 and in January 1967 inviting Subject and other Soviets to his house on the lake. Subject was also in contact with his son, Eduardo MARTINEZ (no identifable traces). (1)

36) (General) Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero (P-5700) deputy chief of the Federal District Police.

On 27 October 1966 Subject called the police to ask what MENDIOLEA's rank was. (1)

37) William de MIER (P-5552), British citizen, general manager of KLM airline in Mexico.

In May 1967 Subject was reportedly discussing Soviet travel via KLM with de MIER. (1, 6)

38) (Lic.) Oscar OBREGON, Jr., not further identified.

On 2 June 1967 OBREGON, who appeared to be a friend of Subject's, told Subject he would like to invite the Bolshoy troups to his house, but Subject said they would have little time in Mexico City. OBREGON also asked Subject if he could get him some caviar, and Subject said he would bring him some back from Moscow after his vacation. (1)

39) David ORNELAS, of Mundus Tours.

ORNELAS has been Subject's principal contact at Mundus Tours in regard to making travel bookings. There has been no indication of anything more than a business relationship between them, except that in June 1966 Subject gave ORNELAS some magazines. (1)

40) Salvador PAZ Plata (P-12775), shipping agent with Representaciones Maritimas, Soviet Commercial contact.

On 1 March 1966 it was reported that Subject had met PAZ in Mazatlan, and they used the familiar form of address with each other. During 1966 they were occasionally reported making luncheons dates or planning to get together after work. There has been no record of recent contact. (1)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

41) Gloria PINTO, located at telephone 23-62-85, listed to Dr. Jose Maria PINTO Ancira, Tajin 592, no other traces on either name.

On 17 May 1967 Gloria thanked Subject for giving a visa to her sister-in-law. She said that Ruth (LNU) was going to Valle de Bravo on the weekend, but Subject said he would not be able to go. She added that Alfonso (LNU) would be at the Cafe Jujuy that afternoon at 1700, and Subject said he would try to go and would see Gloria there. On 13 June 1967 Gloria told Subject that her daughter did not want to work for Ralph (LNU) any more, because they wanted to send her to Pittsburgh. Subject said he could not go to the party Saturday that was to be held at the home of Ernesto ACEVEDO (no identifiable traces). On 12 July 1967 Gloria told Subject that she had everything ready and that she would stop by the Embassy to say goodbye (perhaps going to the USSR). (1)

42) (Miss) Mercedes PINTO, no identifiable traces.

On 2 March 1967 Mercedes PINTO called Subject, who was out of town. (1) (COMMENT: Mercedes could be the sister-in-law of Gloria PINTO mentioned above.)

43) Julio PLATAS Urbina (P-6948, 201-300319), claims to be a Soviet courier, has been in contact with the KGB, may be a provocation agent.

On 29 October 1965 PLATAS called, but Subject was out. On 1 November 1965 PLATA told Subject he had changed jobs, no longer worked for Mex Hogar but was now with the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (labor union). Subject said he would call him. (1)

44) Rafael Alfredo RAYN (P-8415, 201-357138), manager of Garza Lopez Tours.

Subject has been in contact with RAYN in 1966-67 on routine travel matters. In August 1965 Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV asked RAYN for a chart of all commercial passenger ships operating between Veracruz and New York for the month of Sepetember 1965, including the cost of travel and baggage. In December 1965 Subject reminded RAYN of YATSKOV's request and asked him to include rail travel to New York and sea travel to Europe on the chart. RAYN never provided the chart. (1)

45) Sara ROSENFIELD and husband Loyd ROSENFIELD (P-11665, 201-789388), both writers for The News.

Both ROSENFIELDs met Subject at a reception at the Indian Embassy given by the Indian Consul K. D. PARASHAR. Subject invited them to Soviet Embassy receptions of 16 February and 23 February 1967, and invited Sara to attend the Home Show with the consular corps, which she did. On 11 July 1967 they again met briefly at an Indian Embassy reception. (22)

46) Fernando Jose SALOMON Vallecillo, from Nicaragua.

On 24 October 1966 SALOMON told Subject that he had a letter from the Socialist Party of Nicaragua addressed to the Soviet Consul and that he had come specially from Nicaragua to deliver it. Subject said he would talk to SALOMON the next day at the Soviet Embassy. (1) (SALOMON also made an appointment to see the Cuban Ambassador the same day.)

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

47) Antonio SARMIENTO de la Barrera (P-12703), businessman who belongs to the French Club and has been reported friendly with several Soviets particulary Subject's predecessor, Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, and currently Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV.

On 24 April 1966 Subject was seen playing chess at the French Club with SARMIENTO and then went swimming with his wife. As of September 1966 Subject was reportedly still very friendly with the SARMIENTOs at the French Club. (15) On 17 December 1965 Mrs. SARMIENTO invited NIKIFOROV to a Christmas party and said to bring Subject and Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV along. (1)

48) Francis S. SHERRY, consular officer of the U.S. Embassy.

Subject has met SHERRY at consular corps functions. On 28 January 1967 they discussed playing tennis together. (20)

49) (Dr.) Emiliano SORIANO Ariz (P-6741), doctor frequently consulted by the Soviets in Mexico.

In November 1965 Subject took a sick Soviet sailor to be treated by SORIANO. In December 1965 and January 1966 Subject himself was being treated by SORIANO. (1)

50) Graciela SOTO, no traces.

On 8 September 1966 Graciela, who described herself as Carlos BLANCO's friend (q.v.), invited Subject to the baptism of her son Rafael's child, also mentioned Rosita, who may be Rafael's wife (no traces on Rafael or Rosita SOTO). On 9 November 1966 Graciela called Subject, started to chat about having a toothache and that she had tried to call him before, but Subject cut her off and said he would call her the next day and to say hello to everyone. On 10 November 1966 Carlos BLANCO invited Subject to a party and said they would first go to the church near Graciela's house on Tamaulipas. (1) (One Alfredo SOTO, no traces, is listed at Tamaulipas 115.)

51) Jiri SVESTKA (P-7111, 201-285441), Czech Second Secretary and Consul, suspect intelligence officer.

Subject and SVESTKA seem to be quite friendly, dan dinner together as well as discussing consular business. (1)

52) Leopoldo VAN DYCK, employee of Air France, said to be a homosexual, has been friendly with other Soviet consular officers.

On 6 and 13 September 1965 Subject was reported in contact with VAN DYCK in regard to visas for Air France passengers. (17) On 5 July 1966 Subject told David ORNELAS of Mundus Tours to give VAN DYCK his regards, adding that VAN DYCK would know what kind of regards they were. (1)

53) Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943), came to Mexico in 1956 with his mother, Lucia RUIZ Garcia (P-4413), who lived in Moscow for 17 years and taught Spanish there - KGB officer Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN was reportedly one of her students. In 1958-59 Rafael translated for the Soviet TASS correspondent in Mexico, in 1961 he was teaching Russian at the IICMR (Soviet Cultural Institute), and he is currently teaching at the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores. His current address is Romero de Terreros 922-1, telephone 43-80-16.

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15. CONTACTS: Continued

b. Non-Soviet:

53) Rafael VIDIELLA Ruiz (P-4805, 201-238943) Continued

On 19 May 1967 VIDIELLA's wife tried to call Subject, saying that she was calling on behalf of the Instituto de Interpretes y Traductores, and that her husband had written a letter in Russian about some tourists and she wanted a Russian typewriter to have it typed up on. (1)

54) (Col. and Lic.) Rafael VILLAURRUTIA Lopez, also reported in contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

On 30 January 1967 VILLAURRUTIA said that he had to go out of town and could not keep his appointment with Subject. (1)

55) Ralph WIEGANDT (P-2254), German who came to Mexico in 1955 and has paint factory, member of French Club.

On 13 March 1967 Mrs. Ruth WIEGANDT, using the familiar form of address with Subject, invited Subject and his wife to Sunday dinner. (1) In April 1967 it was reported that Subject was quite friendly with the WIEGANDTs at the French Club. (15)

56) Douglas H. WILTSHIRE, American employed with SERVISA Travel Agency.

On 10 May 1967 WILTSHIRE planned to pick up some passports from Subject at the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that he would like to invited Subject to his house. (1)

57) Michael ZAREBSKI (P-8777, 201-744856), businessman from Cuernavaca, Canadian citizen.

On 11 October 1966 Subject reminded the Polish Consul, JAKOWIEC, that ZAREBSKI was going to sell some of his items to the Soviets. On 13 October 1966 JAKOWIEC said he could introduce Subject to ZAREBSKI, or Subject could call him directly. (1) Subject had originally met ZAREBSKI at a Polish Embassy recepiton on 14 December 1965, and at another on 4 October 1966, and they finally did get together on 12 January 1967. Subject asked ZAREBSKI to help the Soviets find a house for a dacha in Cuernavaca, which he eventually did. On 24 February 1967 Subject and several other Soviets visited ZAREBSKI's factory and had lunch with him in Cuernavaca. On 20 May 1967 Subject and Boris Aleksandrovich CHMYKHOV visited ZAREBSKI in connection with the dacha, and on 15 July 1967 Subject and CHMYKHOV visited the factory. (19) (COMMENT: Subject and CHMYKHOV had known each other before in Cuba, and both had mestkom responsibilities for the dacha, so their going to Cuernavaca together is not remarkable, although CHMYKHOV is a GRU officer.)

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

Under Separate Cover

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17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. Current Residence: Ignacio Esteva 18-1 (has lived at this address during his whole tour in Mexico). (1)

b. Telephone: None at home.

c. Car: 1965 green Impala, diplomatic tags 19-DA. (7)

d. Office: Soviet Embassy, Tacubaya 204, telephone 15-60-55. (1) Often uses one of the reception rooms near the gate. (21)

e. Handwriting samples attached (the one in Russian was in Subject's possession, but is not known whether he himself actually wrote it.

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

The Station is reviewing all of Subject's known contacts in a search for access agents. The case of Edmundo Fausto ZORRILLA Martinez is currently being investigated as a possible Illegals lead.

19. SOURCES: Under Separate Cover.

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMW-

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

In addition to routine coverage of Subject's activities in Mexico, the following has been done:

a. Surveillance of Subject in Panama in December 1961.

b. In July 1966 information was passed to LITEMPO-8 "proving" that Subject was a dangerous KGB officer in an attempt to have him declared PNG, without success.

c. LICOZY-5 continues to be debriefed on his contacts with Subject, although LICOZY-5 has told Subject he will no longer act as an agent for the Soviets.

d. Briefing of U.S. Embassy chauffeur whom Subject tried to develop.

e. Debriefing of LICOWL-1 on his contacts with Subject.

f. Station Panama City helped block visas for Subject and A.A. NIKITIN in February 1967.

g. Recrutiment of Subject of 201-814144, whom Subject was cultivating. Contact now dead.

h. Briefing of U.S. Embassy visa officer whom Subject tried to develop.

i. Debriefing of Subject of 201-800412, who claimed Subject had tried to recruit him but who appears to be a fabricator.

j. Debriefing of LITEASE-1 on his contacts with Subject.

k. Debriefing of LIROBBIN-1 and 2 on their contacts with Subject.

l. Briefing of LIROAN-1 as access to Subject's friends at the club he belongs to.

m. Direction of BESABER in his contacts with Subject.

n. Debriefing of LIREALM-1 on his contacts with Subject.

o. Debriefing of LIROCKET-1.

p. Debriefing of LICANNY-1

SECRET

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMW-

19. SOURCES:

1) LIENVOY, passim.
2) PACY-7280, December 1961
3) HZPA-11914, 11 January 1962, passport photographs
4) LIFIRE travel reports
5) HMMA-26881, 12 August 1965, LITEMP passport photographs.
6) LICOZY-5 case file, passim.
7) LILYRIC & LIMITED surveillance
8) LICOWL-1 case file, passim.
9) LNERGO report, 21 December 1965
10) Contact Report, of meeting with KADIDDLE, 28 December 1965
11) LICANNY-1 case file, passim.
12) LNPURE memorandum, 21 January 1966
13) Station memorandum, 27 January 1966
14) LNPURE memorandum, 11 February 1966
15) LIROAN-1 information
16) Station memorandum, information from LITEMPO-8, 22 July 1966.
17) Summary on Subject prepared by LIENVOY, 22 July 1966.
18) LICALLA survellance, passim
19) BESABER information.
20) Station memorandum, 30 January 1967
21) LIROCKET-1 information
22) LIROBBIN-2 information
23) LITEASE-1 information
24) LNPURE memorandu, 28 February 1967
25) LIREALM Information
26) Info from Subject of 201-814144,
27) Station memo of 27 June 1967, info from LNPURE officer
28) HMMW-13985, 16 September 1965, Hqs traces on Subject.
29) HZPA-11859, 22 December 1961
30) Information from Subject of 201-880412.

SECRET

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Эдуардо Вебельман, около 55 лет, мексиканец еврейского происхождения, является владельцем сталелитейного завода и фирмы по продаже фотоматериалов. В Мексику приехал во время II мировой войны. Проживает по адресу: Pedregal Teololco 320. Сын Маурисио Вебельман

Source (6).

CARDED

LOGINOV handwriting sample, received 16 June 1967, from LIRENO

Valentin Loginov
15.6.0-55
Consul.

- Lunes: 24 -

Insgtes y Baja California
[illegible]
6 1/2 pm

Source (12)

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Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT/Termination of Contact with Subject of Reference

REFERENCE: HMMW-15980, 7 December 1967

1. A draft dispatch on Subject of Reference was prepared in August, but through an oversight, was never typed and sent out. As stated in that draft, Mexico City Station no longer has any operational interest in Subject and does not plan to seek an Operational Approval for her. We regret this delay in reporting. The text of the draft dispatch follows.

2. Subject advised on 2 August 1967 that she planned to leave for the United States within the next two weeks to marry an American citizen and would thereafter settle in New York City. She identified her fiance as:

Marty HARRIS
Age 35
152 E. 35th St.
New York, N.Y.
Tel. 686-0544

She said he is a textile engineer, but that she did not know the name of the firm he worked for. HARRIS, according to Subject, is Jewish. She said they will be married in early September in a

......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
2 - C/SB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

201-285412

HMMA-33769

29 December 1967

CS copy Filed in

201-814144

201-51203

S E C R E T

synagogue in Philadelphia, which is HARRIS's parents' home. They will thereafter take up residence at HARRIS's current New York address.

3. Subject said that she had originally met HARRIS while he was vacationing in Mexico and had maintained a correspondence with him. In July of this year, he called her from New York and asked her to meet him in Cozumel the week of 24 July. During a week together in Cozumel, they decided to get married. Subject said she thought that one day she would like to return to Mexico with her husband to live, but that their present plans were to remain in New York indefinitely.

4. In view of Subject's plans to leave Mexico indefinitely, we no longer have any operational interest in her and do not plan to seek an Operational Approval for her.

5. Subject stated she had had no social contact with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-255412) since December 1966, although she had seen him several times on business since then. She reported on 11 May that her only noteworthy encounter with him since December took place in April in connection with efforts on her part to secure a Soviet visa for a leftist client of hers. LOGINOV balked at granting the visa because of alleged personal dislike of the applicant, but finally gave in as a "personal favor" to Subject. He stated bluntly, however, that Subject should realize "a favor must be repaid by a favor" and renewed in much more direct terms a prior request that Subject introduce him to someone among her friends who was or was inclined to be sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. Subject replied somewhat flippantly that she'd keep the request in mind in case she met or thought of anyone in this category. (Subject had earlier reported that LOGINOV had once specifically asked her if she had any friends in LNPURE, but that she had dodged the question and he had not pursued it.)

6. LICOZY-5 told Francis J. COIGNE in June 1967 that on 5 June LOGINOV had pressed him for information on the local Jewish reaction to the Arab-Israeli war. LICOZY-5 also stated that on 6 June Subject, who was very excited about the war and had even gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel, had told him that when she returned home from work on the evening of 5 June, LOGINOV was waiting for her on the street and tried to pump her for information on local Jewish reactions to the war. LICOZY-5 stated that Subject told him she gave LOGINOV hell for the Soviets' support of the Arabs.

7. LICOZY-5 stated that Subject told him that in March she had been called to LNPURE and had been asked about her contact with LOGINOV. She added, according to LICOZY-5, that she had seen the same LNPURE officer (no name given, according to LICOZY-5) a couple weeks earlier. LICOZY-5 said that she also told him that LOGINOV had asked her to introduce him to "one of her progressive friends" or "someone in LNPURE."

8. The above represented a capsule account of Subject's relationship with her case officer, Keith R. LEVENDERIS. COIGNE played innocent until he got the whole story, but finally admitted that we had talked to the girl. COIGNE told LICOZY-5 that Subject had no idea that he was in contact with us and had in fact worried that her activities in our behalf might create trouble for him. Asked by COIGNE what advice he had given Subject, LICOZY-5 said that he had told her to be truthful with the LNPURE officer and to be careful with LOGINOV.

9. On 2 August, during a very friendly "farewell" lunch, LEVENDERIS asked Subject both about her most recent contacts with LOGINOV and whether anyone knew of her contact with LNPURE. (She had previously given the strongest assurances that she could be counted on to keep this contact confidential.) With respect to

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the first question, she stated that LOGINOV had come to her office a couple of times on visa and Soviet travel business, but that she otherwise had not seen him. Although given ample opportunity, she said nothing about LOGINOV having waited for her in front of her apartment or about his questioning her about local reaction to the Israeli-Arab war. As for the second question, she assured LEVENDERIS that she had told no one of her contact with him or LNPURE.

10. We are inclined to believe that Subject lied about not telling anyone of her contact with us because it would have been extremely embarrassing for her to admit that she had failed both to follow instructions and to keep her promise. While it is uncertain exactly why she did tell LICOZY-5, the apparent timing (the second day of the Israeli-Arab war) suggests it was the result of her agitated state of mind, her anger at the Soviets for their support of the Arabs, her possible imminent departure for Israel and the uncertainty of her fate, and her warm regard and respect for LICOZY-5 as a fellow pro-Zionist. (Subject, whose mother is Jewish and who became romantically involved with Israel and Zionism after visiting Israel a couple of years ago, told LEVENDERIS on 2 August that she had indeed gone to the Israeli Embassy to volunteer to serve in Israel and had been immediately accepted because she had had training in nursing. She said she had been told to stand by for transportation to Israel and had expected to be called literally at any minute. She said that the brevity of the war had made her services unnecessary, however.)

11. While it is clear Subject lied about not having revealed her contact with LNPURE to anyone, we are inclined to believe that LICOZY-5 made up the story of LOGINOV waiting for Subject in front of her apartment and questioning her about local reaction to the war. Knowing LICOZY-5, it seems very possible that he invented the story in order to explain why Subject confided in him - i.e., she was already emotionally upset about the war and when LOGINOV contacted her she understandably told Subject, which led to her revealing the whole story. In any event, we consider the case closed and do not intend to pursue the question of who is telling the truth with LICOZY-5.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KAPOK REDTOP LCIMPROVE - Elizabeth Duncan WILDE (201-)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 3524, 17 November 1967

1. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing of Subject on her contacts with Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412).

2. The Station intends to recontact Subject upon her return to Mexico in order to assess her short-term possibilities against LOGINOV.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/att.

COPY ROUTING
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GROUP 1
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C.S. Copy Filed 201-828021

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-285412

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-33764

DATE
28 December 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

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SECRET

Att. to:
HMMA-33764

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT : Elizabeth Duncan WILDE

DATE OF MEETING : 12 December 1967

1. A Headquarters officer made arrangements by telephone for me to interview Subject on 12 December. She was told that I would arrive at Toledo at 10:30 and call her. However, my plane developed mechanical trouble and I called her from Pittsburg to advise that I would be 3 hours late. I arrived at Toledo at 13:30 and called her. We agreed that I would come to her mother's apartment at 14:30. The interview lasted from 14:30 to 18:30. During the last hour we were joined by her mother but, since she is senile and hard of hearing, we were able to continue talking without interruption.

2. I introduced myself as Peter Clark from the Embassy in Mexico. Subject accepted me without question and immediately began telling her story which was about the same as we had received from the political officer. The telling took only 10 minutes. I had considerable difficulty in taking her through a chronological account and holding her to one subject. It became obvious that she is a very self-centered person who is not interested in others unless they make a strong impression on her which LOGINOV obviously did. She is impossible on names, dates or times, asking me at least three times during the interview to repeat my name. On the other hand she was completely cooperative and did not appear to be withholding or distorting information.

3. The following account of her contacts are pieced together from her chaotic account and, thus, is by no means perfect:

a. She was in Mexico about 10 days on her most recent trip and met LOGINOV about a week before she left (ca 10 November). She met him at a party given by a Spanish couple (names forgotten) at their home in the southern part of the city to which her host, Dr. Frederico MARIN (see below) had been invited. It was a large party which included Mexicans, foreigners and diplomats. She met LOGINOV through a German man whom she had just met (van Henrichs or Kendrichs, no meaningful traces.) She talked to LOGINOV on and off for an hour. After an exchange of amenities she remarked that he spoke good English. He said it needed improvement and asked if she would be willing to give him lessons. She would like to but must leave in a week. He asked if she had any American friends who could teach him. She explained that she had friends when she lived in Mexico from 1954 to

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201-285412

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1956 but they are all gone now. However she offered to make inquiries and suggested that he go to the American Embassy to find a teacher. He answered that both the American Embassy and his own would frown on the idea and would not think well of it. Later she asked what he would do with his English once he had learned it. He answered that he would like to go to the United States. What would your government think of that? He answered, "Well we all have to better ourselves". During this discussion he got the story of her life including the fact that she has written a book which is still in manuscript (see below). He expressed interest and asked to read it. She said she had a copy and he asked her to drop it off at his embassy. He also said that he doesn't like Mexicans but prefers the company of Americans who are more like Russians. Upon parting it was agreed that she would drop by his embassy to give him the manuscript.

b. Two days later she dropped by his embassy and he talked to her in the outside reception area. She left him the manuscript and told him that he could keep it until she returned to Mexico. He gave her his card. He told her that she shouldn't call him because his phone was always tapped (she assumed he meant it was tapped by his own people). He added that he supposed the same thing happened at the American Embassy and asked, if she went there often. She answered that she had only been there twice in her life. He again inquired about her American friends in Mexico and she answered that she had no current ones. He again said he would like to meet Americans and asked her again to look for an American who could teach him English. On parting he said he would call her before she left (he knew that she was leaving in a few days to take care of her sick mother).

c. He called a day or so later and came over at ca 10:00 to Dr. MARIN's house where she was staying (not on LIENVOY). He asked when she would be back and how could he contact her in the United States. She gave him her mailing address and promised to answer if he wrote. He again asked her to find him an English teacher. She asked him, if he ever thought of going to the United States. Smiling, he answered, "Yes, who doesn't dream of going." He added that he can't go anywhere until he learns the language. She asked, if he would like to make a change. He answered that he has to be careful because he has a mother and family in the USSR. (From this Subject inferred that he would like to change and is only afraid of penalizing his family). He left on the note that she would try to find him a teacher and would contact him upon her return to Mexico.

d. Subject and Dr. MARIN agreed that LOGINOV was a fine person and they should help him get a teacher. Dr. MARIN suggested that Subject go to the American Embassy since they give English classes.

(Comment: Mexicans still commonly believe that the Mexican - North American Cultural Institute is part of the Embassy). Therefore Subject went to the Embassy on the morning of 16 December and was referred to a Mexican girl on the second floor (USIS). Subject told this girl her story and received the names of several teachers at the Institute. As she was leaving she thought that the Embassy would be interested in her story and thus fell into the hands of the political officer. She then went back to the Soviet Embassy but LOGINOV was not in so she left the list of teachers with the guard for him. She left Mexico the next day, 17 December.

4. LILYRIC photo coverage shows that Subject was at the Soviet Embassy from 13:35 to 13:42 on 16 November (after leaving the American Embassy). She arrived and departed in a taxi. LILYRIC also reports that LOGINOV was out from 13:14 to 13:52 on that date which confirms Subject's statement that he was not there. LILYRIC photo coverage also shows that Subject visited the Soviet Embassy from 11:20 to 11:54 on 10 November 1967, arriving and departing by taxi, (her first visit to the Embassy). Again, LILYRIC has LOGINOV in the Embassy from 09:07 to 13:45 on that date, thus confirming that Subject actually did see him. Thus her first meeting with LOGINOV at the party was probably on 6 or 8 November 1967. On 7 November LOGINOV was at the reception in the Embassy. LIENVOY has no information on a social engagement for LOGINOV at this time.

5. From her account it was obvious that she was extremely impressed with LOGINOV both physically ("he is such a handsome man") and as a person. From her conversations she concluded that he liked Americans and was interested in meeting them, that he is really interested in learning English so that he can go to the United States and that, somehow, he didn't want his own people to know about these interests and intentions. In fact, LOGINOV, did a fine job in debriefing her and in keeping the contact open. This type of activity has become standard for him in Mexico.

6. Although the subject of his marital status never came up, Subject assumes that LOGINOV is single. "He acts like a single man". He loves parties and dancing and sports. (Again, standard behavior for him.)

7. BIOGRAPHIC DATA:

Elizabeth Duncan WILDE was born Elizabeth DUNCAN on 28 December 1918 in Tallahasse, Florida. Her parents were prosperous farmers outside Tallahassee who lost everything in the depression. They then moved to Toledo where her father and brothers gradually built up a successful construction business. Her father died about 10 years ago. Her mother is 81 and is expected to live two or three months. In 1942 she married Elliot H. JACKSON in Dallas, Texas.

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They were divorced 4 years later. In 1946 she married William P. STORY III in California. They divorced in 1948. In 1954 she came to Mexico and opened the Scientific Institute for the Correction of Obesity located at Reforma 376. At this time she met and became friends of Dr. MARIN and his wife. On 11 December 1956 she married Russel H. WILDE in Norwalk, Conn. They have been separated for seven years. WILDE who is 15 years her senior was for 37 years a member of the New York law firm, Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton and Garrison. He left this firm 4 years ago and now is associated with the firm Shelleck, at 485 Madison Ave. He lives at the Yale Club in NYC. In 1957 she sold her institute to her employers. She has been in and out of Mexico ever since, always staying with Dr. MARIN. She also travels regularly to Europe. Her current address is 2024 New Bedford Rd., Spring Lake, N.J. Telephone 449-4230 (unlisted). She is currently living with and caring for her mother at 2829 North Kendale Dr., Apt. 101, Toledo, Ohio. Telephone 419-474-0348. She has no children. She has a generous allowance from her current husband.

8. ASSESSMENT:

Subject was obviously a very handsome woman who appears to have spent her better years running through a series of wealthy husbands and lovers. As noted above, she is extremely self-centered and is uninterested in other people as people. Thus she is a poor observer and reporter. She has a "bug" on Jews and Negroes. She went into great detail on how American "ZIONISTS" control all the information media in the United States and even influence government policy. This is a "conspiracy" which is currently engaged in supporting the Negro movement, especially moving into white housing. This is the subject of her book, noted above. She has also had 4 accidents in the last four years (two fires in her home and two automobile accidents) which she considers a plot against her. She suspects an old, vindictive lover from whom she broke when she discovered that he was a Jew. Although Subject is not nearly as bad as the above distillation would suggest, she is slightly unstable. She is very much interested in helping us against LOGINOV and stated several times that she would cooperate completely. She is clearly not suitable for a long-term or complicated relationship with LOGINOV but could be used on a short term basis to introduce another person or to be an instrument in a provocation.

9. At the conclusion of the interview, Subject was told that, although she had every reason to interpret events as she did, LOGINOV specializes in contacting and developing Americans as he did her. From her story, there was no reason to believe that he was displaying vulnerabilities. Therefore we have no reason for her to attempt to prolong the relationship or cultivate him. On the other hand she has to contact him in order to get back her manuscript. She is not to suggest further contact but is to report to us any further contact

initiated by LOGINOV. Obviously disappointed, Subject agreed to obey instructions. After she has reobtained the manuscript she is to call the Station (x870, Betty calling for Bill Smith) and set a time for the meeting "at the house" (Dr. MARIN's) or at "the Cafe" (Cafe Mississippi). Subject expects to return to Mexico sometime in the spring of 1968.

10. Dr. Frederico MARIN is Subject's host in Mexico. He is a pediatrician who owns a hospital or sanitorium (name and location unknown) in Mexico City. He served as a medical officer with the U.S. Army in World War II. Subject first met him and his wife in 1954 when she opened her institute. They have been close friends ever since. His wife died a year ago. She gave his address as Rio Duero 54, telephone 11-63-60 (no Station traces but checks out in the telephone book). She made me promise that I would not contact him because, as a Mexican, he wouldn't want to get involved between Soviets and Americans. However, when Subject returns we intend to meet him through her to investigate his possible usefulness and as a means of further assessment of Subject.

11. PLANS:

Debrief Subject after her next contact with LOGINOV and meet and assess Dr. MARIN for possible use.

Francis J. COIGNE

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
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INFO	Chief, SB	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDCOAT
LIROCKET-1 Progress Report, 1 August - 8 December 1967

Tono 18

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-32760, 10 August 1967

Monroe S. Reidemann took over the handling of LIROCKET-1 from Keith R. Levenderis on 25 July 1967. There has been no change in the objectives of the operation, and meetings with LIROCKET-1 have continued to be devoted largely to debriefing him on his sessions with the Soviets. Forwarded herewith is Reidemann's progress report for the period 1 August through 8 December 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Progress Report

Distribution:
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GROUP 1
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cc copy filed in 201-788767.

LOGINOV

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33739	DATE 26 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-788767

501-285412.

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PROGRESS REPORT

1. This report covers the activities of LIROCKET-1 in the period 1 August to 8 December 1957. During this period, with the exception of a summer break, LIROCKET-1 maintained his role as a teacher at the Soviet Embassy. In an effort to summarize the more salient occurrences during this period, we have endeavored to present it, as far as possible, in a chronological manner under the name of the individual to whom the material is related.

2. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-038975). On 1 August, KAZANTSEV verbally admonished Vladimir Maksimovich GONCHARENKO (201-760865) for arriving at the class some 15 minutes late and for having neglected to pay LIROCKET-1 on this date. KAZANTSEV, quipped to LIROCKET-1 that "these young men are becoming more irresponsible." Pavel Fedorovich KOVALEV told LIROCKET-1 that he was preparing invitations for the departure of one of LIROCKET-1's previous students and that he would put one aside for LIROCKET-1. KAZANTSEV interrupted and stated, "I'm inviting the teacher and I will give him the invitation." KOVALEV made no further comment on the subject. Later, when alone, KAZANTSEV told LIROCKET-1 that he was the "number two man in the Soviet Embassy" even though he holds the number three position. He referred to himself as the Charge d'Affaires. This was the first time that KAZANTSEV had ever spoken of his rank or position to LIROCKET-1.

3. On 17 August KAZANTSEV studied for one hour with LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 commented that KAZANTSEV's level of fluency exceeded all of his other students. According to KAZANTSEV, upon his return home in June, he was required to take his English language examination and scored a final mark of 4.5 out of a possible 5. KAZANTSEV lost the 1/2 point only because he had not read any English language books during the previous months.

4. On 24 August, KAZANTSEV stated that his wife had been having stomach trouble of a undisclosed origin. She had just returned from the hospital where she underwent tests to determine the nature of her illness.

5. During the class of 29 August, KAZANTSEV read an article in the English language newspaper, The News, pertaining to the diminuition of the male sex drive among heavy smokers. This triggered a long monologue by KAZANTSEV on the evils of pornographic literature. KAZANTSEV found this aspect of western society distasteful and serving no useful purpose.

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6. On 31 August, KAZANTSEV told LIROCKET-1 that Semen Tarasovich BAZAROV (201-049257) was again interested in taking English lessons from LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 commented that he might be able to accomodate BAZAROV only from mid-September to the end of November. KAZANTSEV left the room and contacted BAZAROV. Upon returning KAZANTSEV stated that BAZAROV would have pressing obligations in connection with the forthcoming anniversary and Olympics and could not begin classes until sometime thereafter.

7. On September, KAZANTSEV commented that he would like to continue studying English because he expected to return PCS to his country at the end of 1967 or early 1968. KAZANTSSV acknowledged that he might be asked to stay on during the Olympics. However, he indicated that this was unlikely to prevent him from returning. KAZANTSEV reiterated his desire to depart Mexico in the near future.

8. On 10 October, KAZANTSEV received several pocket books in English which he had requested LIROCKET-1 to pick out for him. LIROCKET-1 selected them from his own library. KAZANTSEV stated that he did not care what subjects were chosen; he wanted them only to improve his reading ability. He did mention, however, that he preferred not to read books which had either violence or pornography as their central theme. LIROCKET-1 brought a book on science fiction which did not particularly interest KAZANTSEV, a book on ballet, and a book on the FBI in which KAZANTSEV seemed very interested. KAZANTSEV stated that he would have to discontinue all of his classes from 10 October to 16 November as he was scheduled for vacation during this period.

9. On 16 November, KAZANTSEV interrupted a class containing Vladimir Maksimovich GONCHARENKO (201-760865) and Yevgeniy Ivanovich BEDRIN (201-760220) to announce that he would not study that day. Immediately, BEDRIN wheeled around and told KAZANTSEV very explicitly that he should remain and study. To this KAZANTSEV replied in English, "See the pressure my chief puts on me". It was quite apparent to LIROCKET-1 that BEDRIN was in charge of the language lessons and that KAZANTSEV was seemingly very hesitant to defy BEDRIN's challenge. KAZANTSEV stated that he had wanted to take a weeks leave, but in deference to BEDRIN's wishes, KAZANTSEV remained during the rest of the class, although his presence was somewhat of a disruptive factor. Later during the class, LIROCKET-1 had KAZANTSEV and BEDRIN ask each other questions in English - an exercise which KAZANTSEV enjoyed in that his English is superior to BEDRIN's. However, BEDRIN rose to the occasion, comported himself in a fine manner, and there ensued a lively exchange of questions and answers on non-controversial topics.

10. GONCHARENKO was absent from class from 10 August to 19 September. During this period he was on home leave.

11. On 19 September GONCHARENKO returned to class and LIROCKET-1 complimented him on his improved English facility. GONCHARENKO stated that he had worked diligently on his English during this summer vacation. During the period 19 September to 7 December, GONCHARENKO did not attend classes regularly.

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12. BEDRIN was absent from class from 10 August to 19 September. During this period he was on home leave.

13. On 19 September, BEDRIN returned to class and commented that he had not looked at his English lessons since August. BEDRIN related that he had spent most of his vacation in the Leningrad area which is his home as well as his wife's.

14. On 21 September the subject of conversation turned to alcoholic beverages. BEDRIN stated that he couldn't drink vodka like he used to as it gives him too much of a hangover the following day. BEDRIN stated that he preferred whisky (Canadian Club and Seagrams) to any other drink.

15. During the classroom discussion of books on 10 October, LIROCKET-1 noted that BEDRIN has somewhat of an obsession with books of a pornographic nature. BEDRIN had previously remarked to LIROCKET-1 that he enjoys a good spicy story and that during a 1966 layover in Brussels, he sought out and enjoyed viewing a number of sex movies.

16. On 12 October, LIROCKET-1 commented that he might visit the States during the last of October. BEDRIN, privately, asked LIROCKET-1 to purchase for him two 7 inch reel recording tapes and two 5 inch reel tapes. BEDRIN said that "another friend" had brought him some tapes in the past. This was the first time BEDRIN had ever requested LIROCKET-1 to perform any personal favor. On 31 October BEDRIN canceled the order relating that he did not need the requested tapes inasmuch as a "friend" had purchased some Grundig tapes for him while in the US.

17. On 16 November, BEDRIN strongly advised KAZANTSEV to remain for his class rather than skipping it. (See KAZANTSEV, 16 November incident).

18. Valentin Mikhaylovich KORNYUKHIN (201-374727) began classes on 21 November, in the company of KAZANTSEV. KORNYUKHIN possesses good, fluent English although his grammar is somewhat unpolished. He speaks with a decidedly British accent. KORNYUKHIN stated that he had been in Mexico for approximately five months and had served previously in Burma from approximately 1962-65. After his assignment in Burma, KORNYUKHIN had worked in Moscow (1965-67). KORNYUKHIN appears to be between 35 and 40 years of age, blonde hair, trim, athletic appearing approximately 6 feet tall and weighing between 165-170 pounds.

19. On 23 November, KAZANTSEV and KORNYUKHIN studied together. During the lesson a slight difference of opinion arose between the two over what their government's position was during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. The exchange reflected the obdurate, somewhat dogmatic character of KORNYUKHIN. LIROCKET-1 characterized KORNYUKHIN as

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possessing very strong and fixed ideas. KORNYUKHIN did not appear to be awed by KAZANTSEV's official position and spoke openly and forcefully to him.

20. On 29 November, during the course of a discussion, KAZANTSEV and KORNYUKHIN again became embroiled in an animated debate. KORNYUKHIN debated KAZANTSEV in an effective and energetic manner seemingly unafraid of correcting or disputing KAZANTSEV. The argument was not personal nor was there any apparent evidence of rancor between the two.

21. On 7 December, KORNYUKHIN studied along with LIROCKET-1. LIROCKET-1 soon discovered that KORNYUKHIN was somewhat of a chameleon in his personality in that he was completely difference without the presence of KAZANTSEV. KORNYUKHIN manifested a friendly, affable, and responsive manner, gratefully accepting any criticism from LIROCKET-1 regarding his use of the language and giving up all pretensions of being a hard-nosed personality. LIROCKET-1 garnered the impression that KORNYUKHIN wants to be liked and that his character ambivalence may be a front in order to impress KAZANTSEV. During their conversation, KORNYUKHIN commented that he was having some difficulty in adjusting to Mexico and its weather. In discussing India, KORNYUKHIN stated that India was better off than China, but that the Indians were unmanageable, unorganized, and uncontrollable. KORNYUKHIN stated that he was more impressed with Burma than either India or Mexico.

MISCELLANEOUS

22. During the 28 September class, LIROCKET-1 was sought out by Yevgeniy Nikolayevich GORLITSYN (201-773422) who began talking to LIROCKET-1 in fairly adequate English, capable of making a conversation. GORLITSYN commented that he preferred to study his English along rather than in a class with a tutor. GORLITSYN also stated that he would be required to take his English exam in the near future and that he would hermetically seal himself off for one week while he prepared for it. GORLITSYN stated that he wanted "to maintain his 20% bonus" by passing the English exam. LIROCKET-1 views GORLITSYN as somewhat of a bumpkin; not particularly intelligent, but a plodder. He appears to be a loner in his relationships with others of the same nationality.

23. During this same class, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412) spoke briefly with LIROCKET-1. LOGINOV asked LIROCKET-1 if he would have time to teach English to his eight year old son. LIROCKET-1 stated that the hours requested by LOGINOV for lessons would be impossible to accommodate. LOGINOV then began talking of his love for sports and his background as a former judge in Olympic skiing as well as refering to various other sports including tennis. LOGINOV's English is good, although not as fluent as KAZANTSEV's. LOGINOV's problem seems to be a lack of practice. LIROCKET-1 characterized LOGINOV as a highly perceptive individual with a keen sense of intelligence.

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FUTURE PLANNING

24. Future planning: LIROCKET-1 will continue to teach at the Soviet Embassy, Mexico two days per week for a total of five hours. His work appears to be quite satisfactory and he is apparently well regarded as a teacher by the Soviet Embassy. LIROCKET-1 assesses KORNYUKHIN as the most interesting pupil with whom he is in contact and, accordingly, intends to concentrate his efforts toward establishing a social rapport with KORNYUKHIN which will lead to an exchange of visits. LIROCKET-1 has been given several Personality Assessment Questionnaires for use in recording observable behavioral patterns in his students.

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REF MEXICO CITY 3785 (IN 11828) -

1. LIENVOY COVERAGE SOVIET EMBASSY PRODUCED SEVERAL ITEMS IN LAST FEW MONTHS SHOWING THAT EMPLOYEE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY LATER IDENTIFIED AS CARLOS SANDOVAL Y NUCINO WHO TOOK CARE OF MEXICAN VISAS FOR COMMUNIST NATIONALS WAS ON VERY FRIENDLY PERSONAL TERMS WITH SOVIET DIPLOMATS PAVEL A YATSKOV AND VALENTIN S LOGINOV BOTH KGB. ALTHOUGH SANDOVAL MUST HAVE DEALT WITH CUBANS, THERE NO INDICATION HE DEVELOPED FRIENDSHIP WITH LOCAL CUBAN OFFICIALS.

2. STATION WAS BECOMING INTERESTED IN SANDOVAL AS POSSIBLE ASSET AGAINST LOCAL SOVIETS WHEN SANDOVAL, PER LIENVOY, INFORMED LOGINOV 24 NOV HE WAS BEING TRANSFERRED TO MEXICAN EMBASSY, HAVANA. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE ON LIRING-2 SPOTTED LATTER AT CHURCH CEREMONY (HE STOOD OUTSIDE) AND RECEPTION SANDOVAL'S WEDDING 5 DEC TO LUCIA BLAKELEY. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, DID NOT APPEAR IN ATTENDANCE. SANDOVAL LEFT FOR HAVANA WITH WIFE 11 DEC.

3. STATION SOMEWHAT PUZZLED AT SUDDEN APPEARANCE LIRING-2 AND ABSENCE OF SOVIETS AT SANDOVAL WEDDING. LIFEAT COVERAGE

SECRET

201-285412

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SEC

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 3872 S E CSA E T

SANDOVAL HOME 4 TO 14 DEC SHOWED HIS PARENTS VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THOROUGHLY UNHAPPY AT SON'S CUBAN ASSIGNMENT, HOPING HE WILL NOT BRING BACK "THOSE CUBAN IDEAS."

4. BECAUSE OF LISAGA OPERATION, STATION WILL MAKE NO EFFORT ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH SANDOVAL FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL EXPLOITATION. AS IT POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT SANDOVAL WAS BEING DEVELOPED OPERATIONALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO MAY CONTINUE DEVELOP HIM IN CUBA, PLAN BRIEF LISAGA ON SANDOVAL AFTER CHECKING WITH LIELEGANT.

S E C R E T

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WH 2 "EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 171740Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3524 17 Nov 67 IN 55634

DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED [illegible]OP AERONAUT LIMPROVE

1. SUBJECT IS ELIZABETH DUNCAN WILDE, LATE FORTIES, PO BOX 425, SPRING LAKE, NEW JERSEY. NO STATION OR EMBASSY TRACES.

2. ON 16 NOV SUBJECT WALKED INTO EMBASSY AND WAS INTERVIEWED BY POLITICAL OFFICER. SUBJECT SAID SHE IN CONTACT VALENTIN LOGINOV (201-285412) WHOM SHE MET DURING LAST 3 OR 4 WEEKS FOR FIRST TIME. SAID SHE MET HIM SOCIALLY THROUGH A FRIEND WHO SHE SAID WAS GERMAN WRITER AND REFUSED ~~RXO~~ TO NAME HIM. LOGINOV SAID HE WANTED TO TAKE ENGLISH LESSONS FROM SUBJECT (A STANDARD PLOY WITH HIM WHEN MEETING AMERICANS). LATER LOGINOV TOLD HER HE WANTS TO "GO OVER TO THE OTHER SIDE". SHE SUGGESTED HE CONTACT THE EMBASSY. HE ANSWERED HE AFRAID TO AND DOESN'T KNOW HOW. SHE ASKED ~~TOM~~ HIM IF HE WANTED HER TO CONTACT EMBASSY FOR HIM. HE SAID YES, IF SHE COULD DO IT TACTFULLY. SHE CLAIMS SHE WALKED IN WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE. HE ALSO MENTIONED HAS A PROBLEM WITH HIS MOTHER AND SISTER IN THE USSR. SUBJECT SAID SHE LEAVING MEXICO

SECRET

201-285412

17 NOV BY AIR FOR SAN ANTONIO TO PICK-UP HER CAR AND PROCEED TO NEW YORK. SAID SHE WAS IN SAN FRANCISCO ONE MONTH AGO AND UPON RETURNING LEFT CAR IN SAN ANTONIO AND FLEW TO MEXICO. SHE SAW LOGINOV LAST AT PARTY ON 15 NOV. DOESN'T KNOW IF WILL CONTACT LOGINOV BEFORE LEAVING. ALTHOUGH SHE HAD HIS CARD WITH EMBASSY PHONE NUMBER, SHE SAID LOGINOV TOLD HER NOT TO CALL HIM THERE SINCE BOTH AMERICAN AND SOVIET EMBASSY PHONES ARE BUGGED. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET EMBASSY BUGS ITS OWN PHONES. THUS CONTACT TO LOGINOV HAS TO BE THROUGH MUTUAL FRIENDS. SHE STATED SHE RETURNING MEXICO 13 DEC AND PROMISED TO RECONTACT THE POLITICAL OFFICER.

3. SUBJECT WAS RELUCTANT TO START TALKING ABOUT LOGINOV, REFUSED TO NAME GERMAN AND OTHER MUTUAL FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY ARE MEXICAN LEFTISTS AND DIDN'T WANT TO RAT ON THEM. SHE REFUSED TO STAY LONG ENOUGH FOR POLITICAL OFFICER TO CONTACT STATION. SHE APPEARS TO BE CONVINCED THAT LOGINOV IS SERIOUS ABOUT DEFECTING. POLITICAL OFFICER DESCRIBED HER AS RATIONAL PERSON.

4. ABOUT HERSELF SUBJECT SAID SHE LIVED IN MEXICO FOR TWO YEARS (NO DATES) WHEN SHE RAN A CLINIC FOR OBESE PEOPLE

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WHICH FOLDED. THEN RETURNED US WHERE MARRIED FOR SECOND TIME. SHE COMES TO MEXICO OFTEN AND ALWAYS STAYS WITH A MEXICAN DOCTOR, NAME FORGOTTEN BY POLITICAL OFFICER. THUS NO WAY TO CONTACT HER HERE. THIS DOCTOR IS WIDOWER AND OWNS A HOSPITAL. POLITICAL OFFICER SUSPECTS THEY LIVE TOGETHER. SHE INTIMATED SHE IS WEALTHY AND LOOKS AND ACTS LIKE SHE IS.

5. LOGINOV'S ONLY GERMAN CONTACT KNOWN TO STATION IS RALPH WIEGANDT, 19 MARCH 1931 IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, GERMAN CITIZEN. WORKED RIEBOLT CHEMICAL IN GERMANY PRIOR TO ENTERING MEXICO IN MAY 55. NOW MANAGER AND AT LEAST PART OWNER OF FIRM MANUFACTURING PLASTIC FOAM INSULATING MATERIAL. CONTACT APPEARS TO BE SOCIAL AND BEGAN AT SPORTS CLUB WHERE BOTH MEMBERS. SOURCES LIROAN-1, LIENVOY AND GOBERNACION FILE.

6. STATION HAS ARRANGEMENTS WITH POLITICAL OFFICER TO INTERVIEW SUBJECT AS SOON AS SHE REAPPEARS. ALTHOUGH ABOVE SKETCHY AND VERY INCOMPLETE AND LOGINOV IS ONE OF LAST LOCAL SOVIETS STATION WOULD EXPECT TO DEFECT, STILL SOVIETS IN TROUBLE HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO TAKE MORE UNORTHODOX STEPS. WOULD ALSO NOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THIS IS PROVOCATION ON

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PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 3524 SECRET

LOGINOV'S PART. WHATEVER HIS MOTIVE, IF SUBJECT'S STORY HOLDS WATER, FEEL CONTROL OVER HER ASAP MOST DESIRABLE. SINCE THERE ARE SEVERAL FLIGHTS TO SAN ANTONIO A DAY, IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMPANY HER FROM MEXICO AND FEEL IT UNADVISABLE TO TRY TO INTERCEPT AND DEBRIEF HER AT AIRPORT. THEREFORE HQS MAY WISH TO CONSIDER CONTACTING AND DEBRIEFING HER AT HER HOME. SHE SAID WILL DRIVE FROM SAN ANTONIO TO NEW YORK. PLS ADVISE.

7. REQUEST TRACES ON SUBJECT AND WIEGANDT.

SECRET

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 24

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FROM WH

ACTION SB-8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT 3 TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2

S E C R E T 190043Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3201 19 Oct 67 IN 75783

DIRECTOR

REDTOP LCIMPROVE

1. PER LIENVOY ON 17 OCT FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL TOLD LOGINOV HE RECEIVED A CABLE FROM MEXEMB IN MOSCOW ASKING FOR VISA FOR OLEG M. NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) WHO IS REPLACING YATSKOV. LOGINOV ASKED HIM TO EXPEDITE VISA SINCE "WE HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR IT FOR SEVERAL DAYS". OFFICIAL ASKS WHEN YATSKOV IS LEAVING. LOGINOV ANSWERS HE CAN'T LEAVE UNTIL AFTER NECHIPORENKO ARRIVES.

2. BOTH LOGINOV AND PRIKHODKO ON RETURN FROM RESPECTIVE HOME LEAVES TOLD LICOZY-5 THAT NECHIPORENKO WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO IN OCTOBER. BOTH SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RETURN TO CONSULAR WORK BUT WOULD BE GIVEN OTHER WORK IN THE EMBASSY. NOTE THAT YATSKOV ON RETURN FROM HOME LEAVE IN SEPT 66 QUIT HIS CONSULAR JOB AND "WAS GIVEN OTHER WORK IN THE EMBASSY" PER LOGINOV TO LICOZY-5.

3. IN VIEW ABOVE AND ABSENCE OTHER CANDIDATES, IT APPEARS NECHIPORENKO WILL TAKE OVER YATSKOV'S KGB JOB.

S E C R E T

201-285412

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SECRET X

Chief, SB Division

Chief, WH Division; COS, Caracas

Chief of Station, Mexico City
REDTOP
Nikolay Dmitriyevich *CHERNYSHEV, Repatriate from Venezuela

1. According to LIENVOY on 4 September 1967, Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), Consul of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City placed a call to Havana, Cuba stating that he had in Mexico a family of 5 persons that had to be sent from Cuba to Odessa by boat. LOGINOV said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had ordered that their passage be paid to the border of the USSR. The family name was given as CHERNYSHEV. According to LOGINOV the family had been given permission to live in Groznyy in the USSR by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. On 7 September 1967, LICOZY-5 reported that LOGINOV had booked passage to Cuba for a Russian emigre, Nikolay CHERNYSHEV and his family. CHERNYSEV's wife was born in Italy and his three children Igor, Nataliya and Sergey were all born in Venezuela. LOGINOV also stated to LICOZY-5 that the CHERNYSHEVs were repatriates from Venezuela.

3. Plans to send the CHERNYSHEV family to the USSR via Cuba were apparently changed because LIFIRE reported their departure for the USSR via Montreal via Canadian Pacific Airlines Flight 582 on 25 September 1967. The following information on the CHERNYSHEV family was available from the LIFIRE report:

......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/SB
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2 - COS, Caracas

GROUP 1
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HMMA-33265

11 October 1967

201-285412

SECRET

200-4-64

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Nikolay Dmitriyevich °CHERNYSHEV Nikolayev, Age given as 48. Venezuelan Citizen since 1958. Born in Yunaburgo, Estonia. His occupation was given as Mechanic. His address in Caracas, Venezuela was given as La Costanera Caraballeda. He travelled on Venezuelan Passport 287722. He and his family had been issued Mexican visas (valid for 180 days) in Caracas, Venezuela on 6 September 1967.

Laura °FERRARA Striazi Chernyshev, wife of Subject. Age given as 42. Citizenship given as Italian and apparently travelling on Italian Passport 1091.

Igor Nikolayevich °CHERNYSHEV, son, 12 years old, travelling on his father's passport.

Nataliya Nikolayevna CHERNYSHEV, daughter, 11 years old, travelling on father's passport.

Sergey Nikolayevich CHERNYSHEV, son, 8 years old, travelling on father's passport.

Citizenship for all three children was given as Venezuelan.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO: Chief, SB Division
INFO.: Chief, WH Division
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: REDTOP
Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-32616, 25 July 1967

Subject and his family returned to Mexico City from home leave in the USSR on KLM Flight 684 arriving 27 August 1967 (Source LIFIRE). The LOGINOV family travelled on the same flight as the Mikhail Mikhaylovich DYAKONOV (201-793094) family and Lyudmila Aleksandrovna KARABACH (wife of 201-787785). Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-010264 and his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna and son, Dmitriy travelled on Soviet Diplomatic D-010265. Per reference the LOGINOV family departed Mexico on home leave 16 July 1967.

Grace U. Farmilant
for/Willard C. CURTIS

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

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201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33028	11 September 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
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14-00000

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ORIG: D. Novak
UNIT: SB/CI/P
EXT: 6508
DATE: 11 September 1957

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SECRET

SEP 12 17 00 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 34784

TO RIO DE JANEIRO INFO: BUENOS AIRES

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REF: DIRECTOR 34352*

1. INITIAL PRESS RELEASE NAMES VICTOR VIZGUNOV AS KGB OFFICER WHO MET LOGINOV (SUBJ OF REF) WHILE LATTER CAIRO. AIRMAILING CLIPS TO RONALD WARNER SOON AS RECD FROM PRETORIA.

2. IF STATION CONCURS, SUGGEST HINT TO ALAGORAS SINCE VIZGUNOV EXPOSED, WOULD BE EFFECTIVE PROP PLAY, IF THEY WOULD CONTACT ~~DE SAMPAIO~~ ALMITTEN/1 AND SUGGEST HE "REVEAL TO PRESS" HIS EXPERIENCE WITH VIZGUNOV WHILE IN CAIRO.

3. RIO DE JANEIRO: ABOVE SUGGESTION ~~DEPENDENT WHAT~~ SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN TERMS EFFECT STATION FEELS SUCH EXPOSE ~~WOULD~~ MIGHT HAVE ON CURRENT WOFACT RELATIONSHIP ~~DE SAMPAIO~~ ALMITTEN/1.

END OF MESSAGE

*Spy story broke in So African press 9 Sep 67.

C/SB/CI/P: T THIELE
SB/CI/K:
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WH/5:
WH/4:

SB/CI/I

201-285412

WH/~~COPS~~ FI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1967

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Character Sketches of Three Soviet Consular Officers

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are character sketches prepared by Douglas J. FEINGLASS on the following Soviet consular officers stationed in Mexico City:

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)
Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341)
Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH (201-343894)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Sketches

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B-201-744341	HMMA-32952	31 August 1967
B-201-343894	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-285412 201-744341 201-343894

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MICROFILMED
SEP 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9P

THE CONSULAR SECTION OF THE USSR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

The consular section consists of three persons:

Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV - consul (third secretary) [redacted] 201-285412
Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN - vice consul (Attache) [redacted] 201-744341
Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH - vice consul (third secretary) 201- [illegible]

With such a seeming-scarcity of work for the Consulate, it would be sufficient to have only one man for it. But the Soviet Embassy has to have three men handling consular duties. The Consulate is open to visitors twice a week and only two hours a day. Even that is too much for an occasional person who desires a visa for visiting the USSR. However, in addition to their regular duties, the consuls have to arrange various matters relating to visiting Soviet cargo vessels, artistic and cultural groups, etc. On several occasions, they had to do ~~xxx~~ errands outside of their overt field of activity. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, in many instances, they cannot be reached on the telephone. All three of them speak fluent Spanish and have no difficulty in getting around and acquiring Mexican friends. Given below are their respective character sketches.

[redacted]

Consul LOGINOV is a rather recent arrival (two years in Mexico) and not very experienced in his job. However, he is learning the ropes quite rapidly and carries a lot of weight among the Embassy staff. LOGINOV is the one who orders cars

CS COPY

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to be sent for any visiting dignitary or a performer. He, apparently, scrutinizes and approves the names of doctors and dentists patronized by the Embassy personnel. Recently a Man on Duty said over the phone that LOGINOV had forbidden to be given out the address of a German dentist, whom the Soviets visited quite frequently before.

LOGINOV is also in charge of making up a duty roster for appointing a Man on Duty who would be responsible for anything that took place at the Embassy on that particular day. No one, except the ambassador, seems to be exempt from that duty. On a few occasions LOGINOV encountered hostility to his arbitrary manner of making up the duty roster. Thus, when a Man on Duty called Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Press Attache and a (former?) Cultural Officer, and told him that LOGINOV put his name down as the responsible Man on Duty for the Embassy for that day, LEONOV said that he was very busy and let LOGINOV do it himself.

Obviously LOGINOV had made a number of secret enemies with his dictatorial manners and his disdainful, monotonous, and slow way of talking. His medium- to high-pitched voice sounds as if he is extremely bored with the world and does his inter-locutor a favor just be talking to him.

His physical appearance seems to confirm that impression A few newspaper photos show him as a youngish and rather good-looking individual with curly light-brown hair and with a contemptuous smile on his lips. Unquestionably, his type of charm appeals to elderly ladies and LOGINOV is quite aware that he is attractive to the other sex. Without a doubt, he tries to capitalize on it and with his fluent Spanish probably tries to ensnare Mexican females. There is no indication that LOGINOV has tried anything of the sort with the Soviet wives. One of the reasons may be that he would not like his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyeva, a very formidable woman indeed, to get wind of it. On the other hand, the Mexican women may seem to be more exotic and attractive to LOGINOV than his own countrywomen, in especial his wife, who is a large unattractive female.

Nevertheless, LOGINOVA seems to be quite pleasant, with a nice cultured voice, and gets along with her husband well thanks to her good humour and social activity. She has been quite prominent in Mestkom work and in the children's summer camp. Shortly after their arrival, LOGINOV bought a tape-recorder for his wife for 115 dollars. Whether it was to be used for music, or other purposes, has not been determined.

Once in a while, LOGINOV goes on drunken sprees. Thus, on 12 February 1966, he and KORMUSHKIN drove up to the Embassy gate at three a.m., pounded on the gate, blew their horn and had altercations with Stanislav Sergeyevich SILAINOV, who was on duty at that time.

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Another very prominent trait of LOGINOV'S character is his extreme chauvinism, bordering on jingoism. In reference to other nationalities, LOGINOV uses such deprecatory epithets as: "Amerikashki", "Zhidovka", "Nemchura", etc.

It is doubtful if LOGINOV has any true friends. His sneering attitude is probably the reason for it. Although he made several errors in judgement in his work and social behaviour, LOGINOV by no means is a fool and should be kept in mind for any possible developments.

(201-11[illegible])

Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, vice consul (Attache), is a young man about thirty-three years of age, rather stocky, with blond wavy hair over a high forehead. A pair of heavy-rimmed glasses gives him the appearance of a very intellectual person. On the whole, KORMUSHKIN has the air of an easy-going fellow, who can make friends almost overnight. KORMUSHKIN and his wife are exceptionally close friends with Anatoliy Vladimirovich KARABACH, employee of the Commercial Office, and his wife. Both families visit each other quite frequently.

Besides occasional drinking bouts, KORMUSHKIN has not been known to practice any skirt-chasing, since his wife, Inna Nikolayevna, is not a bad-looking woman herself, and both seem to be getting along smoothly. KORMUSHKINA is a practicing physician at the Embassy and is quite in demand

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whenever any of the Soviets or his family is ill. KORMUSHKIN is also quite active in consular affairs and does most of the leg work for LOGINOV. He is also very active in Mestkom functions, where he is in charge of the Children's section. KORMUSHKIN is quite an xxxxxxxxx energetic and pushy individual and can be quite rude and nasty at times. Undoubtedly, he is looking forward to being a full-fledged consul in time to come. The impression of KORMUSHKIN'S ambition and pushy trait in his character is intensified by the sound of his rapid and energetic but pleasant baritone voice.

A curious fact should be cited here. Shortly after his arrival, KORMUSHKIN purchased a tape-recorder for 185 dollars or 70 dollars more than the one bought by his "boss" LOGINOV. Why?

It seems that in the future, KORMUSHKIN may slow down somewhat, but his inner drive and energy will nevertheless make him a more adroit and skillful individual. His further progress should be watched with interest and caution.

([illegible])

Vladimir Ivanovich SHPAKEVICH, vice-consul (third secretary) seems to be able to handle any job that comes along. Previously he was mentioned as an assistant Cultural Attache, then substituted for the Press Attache, while that position remained vacant, and quite recently, while the two consuls are on leave, he has started calling himself "consul".

SHPAKEVICH is of very ordinary appearance, of slight build and dark complexion and is unmarked by any outstanding features, with the exception of a noticeably receding hair-line. He wears glasses sometimes. His voice is even plainer than his looks. It has the unusual chameleonic peculiarity of sounding like someone else's. Even SHPAKEVICH'S closest friends cannot recognize his voice at times and he delights in taking advantage of it. Occasionally SHPAKEVICH would call a friend on the phone and start talking in rapid Spanish. When the friend is duly confused and does not know what to say, SHPAKEVICH breaks into an explosive guffaw that somehow lacks true merriment. Since SHPAKEVICH repeats this crude joke time after time it is obvious that his sense of humour is quite rudimentary.

Ordinarily SHPAKEVICH is a cautious individual who dislikes making decisions of importance. He said that he was getting clobbered whenever a decision was wrong. However, SHPAKEVICH can be quite importunate at the wrong moment and with the wrong person. Thus, when attached to the dancer, PLISETSKAYA'S group as an interpreter in Puebla, SHPAKEVICH called the Embassy about some trivial matter and wanted to talk to ambassador BAZAROV. A Man on Duty told him that BAZAROV was taking his mid-afternoon rest and was not to be bothered. But SHPAKEVICH persisted in his desire to talk to BAZAROV. Finally BAZAROV took the phone and when he found out what SHPAKEVICH wanted to tell him, BAZAROV gave him a verbal lashing that actually sizzled. Nevertheless, later SHPAKEVICH called again and asked for the ambassador. The Man on Duty, Ivan Fedorovich SOLOMATIN, told SHPAKEVICH, "Aha, he roasted you and me before for xxx disturbing his rest and now you want some more of it?" But SHPAKEVICH was not to be put off and SOLOMATIN with a sigh buzzed BAZAROV again. At first BAZAROV was angry but later calmed down and discussed with SHPAKEVICH the well-being of PLISETSKAYA and her group. The above incidnet may chatacterize SHPAKEVICH in American vernacular as a "pest" and a "jerk". Both expressions describe his true nature quite well.

It is doubtful if this one-time assistant of the cultural attache had any extensive schooling. Such inadmissible expressions as, for instande, "Ya khochu dolozhitsya" is a clear indication of his low educational level.

But with all his shortcomings, SHPAKEVICH is probably well liked by the majority of the Soviets. He is easy to get along with, especially with his friends. His closest friends are the families of the Soviet correspondents, the KUCHEROVS and the DOLGOVS, and he is also very intimate with Leonid Vasilyevich (Losnka) NIKIFOROV, Intourist representative. xxx On a few occasions both of them got together with the aim of draining a bottle of cognac. However, there was no indication that SHPAKEVICH was ever riotous or dead drunk. He is neither a skirt-chaser, although with his fluent Spanish and a human tank for a wife, SHPAKEVICH would be justified in investigating greener pastures among the Mexican women. But he is decidedly devoid of any imagination.

Despite her great bulk, SHPAKEVICH'S wife, Tatyana Ivanovna, seems to be a very amiable person and all the Soviet wives agree that she is very "nice". Tatyana is two years SHPAKEVICH'S junior, but she acts like a protective mother-hen towards him. She has high blood pressure and that was probably why she left for Moscow over a month ago. Consequently SHPAKEVICH is here all by himself for the present and some of his friends, who refer to him simply as "SHPAK", invite him occasionally for dinner or lunch.

Yet SHAPKEVICH can also hurt some people's feelings with his callous indifference. Once, when Nina Atanasyevna NIKITINA, wife of the films representative, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, begged SHPAKEVICH to drive her home from the Embassy, since she was dead tired after running errands for the Nestkom, SHPAKEVICH told her in an indifferent manner that he had no desire to do so and walked away. NIKITINA was so hurt by SHPAKEVICH'S attitude that she cried in the street on her way home. Acts of this nature cannot endear him to some people and by all indications, SHPAKEVICH does not seem

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to be a very bright individual. Thus, he is being used for any conceivable job that presents itself, but only in the capacity of a temporary stop-gap, as an interpreter, or even as an errand-boy.

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201-285412

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S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LIROBBIN
LIROBBIN-1 and -2 Progress Report, November 1966 - July 1967

1. The Station continued to maintain contact with the LIROBBINs during the reporting period for the dual purpose of monitoring their relations with the Soviets and using them as sources of information on their heterogeneous social circle. Dwindling contact between the Soviets and the LIROBBINs since March suggests, however, that the Soviets may have lost their earlier interest in the couple.

2. LIROBBIN-1 and -2 had the following contact with the Soviets during the reporting period:

7 November:	LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended the 7 November Soviet Embassy celebration at the invitation of Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO (201-202739).
20 November:	LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended a Soviet film showing at the Foreign Press Club put on by PRIKHODKO and Vladimir A. DOLGOV (201-763035).
24 November:	LIROBBIN-1 and -2 and PRIKHODKO were among the guests at a Thanksgiving dinner given by Pearl GONZALEZ.

.......continued

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
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GROUP 1
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201-285412

HMMA-32761

10 August 1967

201-789387
201-789388

S E C R E T

1 December: LIROBBIN-1 bumped into PRIKHODKO in a coffee shop in the vicinity of several boys' schools. PRIKHODKO appeared to be deeply engaged in conversation with an unidentified Mexican boy who appeared to be about 20 years old and a student. PRIKHODKO greeted LIROBBIN-1, but neither introduced the boy nor asked LIROBBIN-1 to join them. PRIKHODKO was still talking with the boy when LIROBBIN-1 left.

Early December: At the invitation of PRIKHODKO and Valentin I. KUCHEROV (201-758017), LIROBBIN-1 and -2 attended a reception in honor of the Bolshoi Ballet at the Soviet Embassy.

2 February: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 and their daughter attended a dinner and film showing at the Soviet films office along with another American couple the LIROBBINS had introduced to PRIKHODKO. PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV were the hosts.

15 February: LIROBBIN-1 and -2 met Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412), for the first time, at an Indian Embassy reception.

16 February: At LOGINOV's invitation, LIROBBIN-2 attended a Consular Corps gathering at the Soviet Embassy. LIROBBIN-1 had left for the United States that morning. PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV both appeared genuinely surprised at seeing LIROBBIN-2 and learning that she knew LOGINOV. LOGINOV, for his part, also seemed surprised that PRIKHODKO and KUCHEROV knew LIROBBIN-2.

17 February: KUCHEROV came over to LIROBBIN-2's apartment during the afternoon with an invitation to the Soviet Army Day reception which he had promised on 16 February to deliver personally. As KUCHEROV knew, LIROBBIN-1 had left for the U.S. KUCHEROV invited himself in for several drinks and stayed for two hours talking about nothing. At one point he noticed a scratch on LIROBBIN-2's knee and used the opportunity to administer a sympathetic caress which wound up going down the length of her leg. He did not attempt to follow up this amorous gambit, however, and finally left with nothing more than a good-by bear hug.

23 February: LIROBBIN-2 attended the Soviet Army Day Reception at the Soviet Embassy, where she talked primarily with PRIKHODKO, KUCHEROV, and DOLGOV. She also spoke briefly with LOGINOV, who invited her to go along on a Consular Corps tour of the Mexican Home Show.

3 March: LIROBBIN-2 went on the tour of the Home Show, during which she talked with LOGINOV for about 25 minutes.

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31 March: LIROBBIN-2 telephoned PRIKHODKO about a week in advance and invited him to dinner on this date. He accepted, but failed to show up and never called to apologize.

12 July: LIROBBIN-2 met LOGINOV at an Indian Embassy reception. During a brief conversation with him he told her he was about to leave for the USSR on vacation and that PRIKHODKO would be doing the same later in the month.

3. As can be seen from the above run down, none of the LIROBBINs' Soviet contacts have made any effort to see them since early March, and PRIKHODKO even missed a dinner party without so much as calling to apologize. It therefore appears that the LIROBBINs have at least temporarily been put on the shelf by the Soviets, if not dropped altogether. We expect to get a more definite reading in the fall, when the large number of Soviets now on vacation, including PRIKHODKO and LOGINOV, have returned and the Soviets have resumed their normal routines.

4. In the course of the reporting period, the LIROBBINs also provided information on 14 non-Soviet acquaintances of interest to the Station.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] COPY

NO: 5

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300

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
JUL 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A 18721

23 Dec 27 20 Aug 28

1. LIFIRE reports the departure for Moscow via New York and Paris of Subject, his wife, Aleksandra Dmitriyevna and their son, Dmitriy, 59 aboard Air France Flight 700 on 16 July 1967. Subject traveled on Diplomatic Passport D-010264. Subject's wife and son travelled on Diplomatic Passport D-010265. Also travelling with the LOGINOV family was Tatyana Borisovna MALAKHOVICH, eight-year-old daughter of Boris Aleksandrovich MALAKHOVICH (201-767974), Employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who travelled on LOGINOVA's Diplomatic Passport D-010265.

2. Sources indicate that the LOGINOVs departed on home leave. On 12 July 1967 LIROBBIN-2 reported that LOGINOV mentioned that he was going on vacation in the USSR on 16 July. On 15 June 1967, LICOZY-5 reported that LOGINOV had also mentioned to him that he was going on vacation in the USSR in July. LIENVOY indicated that Subject and his wife were leaving on 16 July 1967 with a three-day stopover in Paris, France.

Joyce H Fairmilant
for/Willard C. CURTIS

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

03 AUG

03 AUG

1967

Distribution:
12 - C/SB
1 - C/WH

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

201-285412

CROSS REFERENCE TO
B201-767974

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32616

DATE
25 July 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412

14-00000

301

Subject chrono
201-314144

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, WH Division

REDCOAT/POA for Subject of Reference

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference : MEXICO CITY-1638, 3 June 1967

A Provisional Operational Approval was granted for use of Subject of reference as an access agent to the Subject of 201-285412 (KGB Officer in Mexico City). Please submit PRQ Parts I and II in order that a full Operational Approval can be requested.

Laura J. UTSTIRE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

13 JUL 1967

201-285412

10 JUL 1967

HMMW - 15623

10 July 1967

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-314144

WH/1 J. Zerance jkf 4167

1 - RI
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/O/WH

SB/O/WH

Subject of ref: Miriam AVILA-Katz

C/WH/1 W. J. Kaufman

302

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	
PROCESSING ACTION	
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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MICROFILM	
TO	[illegible]
INFO	[illegible]
FROM	[illegible]
SUBJECT	[illegible] [illegible] of Bulgarian Nationals to Mexico, April - May 1967
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

1. LIFIRE reported the travel to Mexico of the following Bulgarian nationals:

*DIVITCHEV-G[illegible] [illegible], Dimitar, born 19[illegible], Ppt. [illegible], [illegible]

*[illegible]NA-[illegible]VA, Sonja, born 19[illegible], [illegible]

Both arrived on [illegible] April via CUBANA from Havana, with [illegible]-day [illegible] Mexican visas, and returned to Havana on [illegible] April 1967, visit to Mexico apparently connection with 7th World Petroleum Congress.

*A[illegible]VA, Tsvetana, born 19[illegible], Ppt. [illegible], arrived [illegible] April 1967 via CUBANA.

*[illegible]OVSKI, Angel [illegible], born 19[illegible], Dipl. Ppt. [illegible], Cultural Attache/[illegible] Sec, Bulgarian Embassy.

*[illegible]OVSKI, Mrs. born 19[illegible], Dipl. Ppt. 478, wife of Angel [illegible]OVSKI in Havana. Arrived and departed via CUBANA, to and from Havana, 14-21 April 1967.

(NOTE: Per LIENVOY/[illegible] April 1967, [illegible]OVSKI contacted the Soviet [illegible] office, identified himself, and indicated he wanted to get in touch with Vladimir [illegible], [illegible], and Valentin [illegible], [illegible], whose names he had been given in Havana, adding that his wife is Russian; he left his hotel number and room number, asking that the Embassy officers contact him that evening). Forwarded herewith is a photocopy of the passports of [illegible]OVSKI and his wife, photographed by the LIT[illegible] airport camera.

.........continued

CS COPY

Attachment:
A - LIFIRE reports, [illegible], h/w
B - Photocopy of [illegible]OVSKI passport, h/w

Distribution:
2 - SB, w/att.; 1 - [illegible], w/att.; [illegible] files

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		[illegible]

201-285412

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

2. [illegible]/12 reported the arrival on 7 May 1967 via [illegible] from Havana of:

[illegible], Carmela, Professor, no passport number recorded; local address: Malintzin 37, Mexico, D.F.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

304

Nombre (s) ATTEHEVA (u.p.) [illegible] DIMITROV) Ppte. [illegible]

Edad Nacionalidad Pasaporte

3P

alias [illegible]

Dimitri DIMITROV — Ingeniero, Ppte. 3529
GUEORGUIEV

Llegada

Aerolinea

JUN 30 1967

Salida | Aerolinea | Punto de Desembarque

14 ~~Ab~~ April 1967 | Cubana 465 | Havana

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

"Tránsito"

c/o Congreso Patristico

CS COPY

HMMA 32280

305

Nombre (s)

Edad

Nacionalidad

Pasaporte

Llegada

Aerolinea

Salida

Aerolinea

Punto de Desembarque

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

14-00000

306

PRECEDENC

HMM-11.179
TDCS-314/08252-67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT SDD TIME BY

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S E C R E T 081940Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1707

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

8 JUN 67 IN 85325

SUPDATA: SOURCE RAYMOND A FRADYER FROM SUBJECTS DURING CONSULAR OFFICERS MEETING 7 JUNE. NO LIASON. RI INDEX. REF DIRECTOR 07730.

FILED: 081940Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

Logenor

201-285412

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307

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN-85325

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

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GROUP 1
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-314/08252-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 082205Z

DIST 8 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: USSR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA/EGYPT/ISRAEL

DOI: 7 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: DISBELIEF EVIDENCED BY SOVIET AND CZECH OFFICIALS OF EGYPTIAN CHARGES OF UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN NEAR EAST CRISIS

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (7 JUNE 67) REPORT NO. HMM-11,179

SOURCE: COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATION WITH THE COMMUNIST OFFICIALS IN QUESTION.

1. DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION ABOUT THE NEAR EAST CRISIS ON 7 JUNE 1967 VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV, SOVIET CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY AND KNOWN KGB MEMBER, AND JIRI SVESTKA, CZECH CONSUL AND IDENTIFIED MEMBER OF THE CZECH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, EXHIBITED EVERY INDICATION OF DISBELIEF OF EGYPTIAN CHARGES THAT UNITED STATES' AIRCRAFT HAVE PROVIDED SUPPORT TO ISRAELI FORCES. IN WHAT CAN BE INTERPRETED AS TACIT ADMISSION OF THE FALSITY OF EGYPT'S CHARGES, SVESTKA SAID, "WELL, ANYTHING GOES DURING WAR."

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

308

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T

XXX

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AETARGET/LIROCKET-1 - Gatehouse and Outside Reception Room and Offices at Soviet Embassy/Control of Routine Visitors to the Embassy during Business Hours

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-30795, 8 December 1966

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of (a) a sketch of the interior of the gatehouse just inside the front gate of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and (b) a sketch of the interior of the Reception Room and offices adjoining the gatehouse. Both sketches were prepared by LIROCKET-1 and are current as of May 1967. LIROCKET-1 has been in the Reception Room approximately 55 times, the gatehouse about 15 times, and the first office twice.

2. Control of Routine Visitors to the Embassy during Business Hours. According to LIROCKET-1, traffic through the front foot gate is essentially controlled by a single guard who operates the gate latch electronically by means of a release button inside the gatehouse. In the course of approximately 125 visits to the Soviet Embassy from January 1966 to the present, LIROCKET-1 on occasion has seen as many as three guards in the gatehouse at one time, but there has usually been only one guard present when he has entered and exited the gate (usually about 0915 and 1145, respectively, on Mondays and Fridays prior to mid-January 1967, and about 1530 and 1800 on Tuesdays and Thursdays from mid-January to mid-May 1967). Even when more than one guard has been present, it has appeared that only one of the guards has actually been on duty and that the others have simply been lounging in the gatehouse for want of anything better to do. LIROCKET-1 has never seen any of the guards carry arms and has never seen weapons of any kind in the gatehouse. He has seen the following five persons on guard

- CONTINUED -

Attachments:
(a) Sketch - Interior gatehouse
(b) Sketch - Interior Reception Room

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/atts., H/W
1 - CWH, w/atts., H/W

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32172	DATE 7 JUNE 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-8-10/3

201-285412

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duty (identified from mug shots): Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (201-782164), Valentina Georgiyevna MUKHINA, wife of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich MUKHIN (201-293944), Stanislav Sergeyevich SILNIKOV (201-271103), Ivan Fedorovich SOLOMATIN (201-307933), and Nikolay Ivanovich ZAKHAROV (201-779285).

3. To gain entry through the foot gate, the would-be visitor presses the white doorbell button to the left of the foot gate. This button rings a buzzer inside the gatehouse. The guard on duty promptly looks through the observation window which directly faces the footgate. If, presumably, the guard is satisfied that the caller or callers do not look dangerous or suspicious, he disengages the gate latch electronically by pressing one of the two release buttons inside the gatehouse. After the gate latch disengages, it is up to the caller to push (or, when the caller is leaving, pull) the gate open and then close it behind him. The gate locks automatically when closed. According to LIROCKET-1, there is a keyhole on the inside of the gate, but there definitely is no keyhol on the outside. LIROCKET-1 has never seen anyone open the gate with a key.

4. LIROCKET-1 has been present in only about five instances when non-Soviets in vehicles have sought admittance through the vehicle gate, which is adjacent to the foot gate. In each of the five instances, the callers have been delivery men whose trucks have apparently been recognized by the guard. In each instance, the truck has pulled up with its nose to the vehicle gate and the guard has walked to the gate and opened it manually. The vehicle gate consists of two doors which open inward. It is secured by one dead bolt from one door to the other. LIROCKET-1 has never noticed a padlock on the gate. After being admitted to the Embassy grounds, the trucks in each case have driven unaccompanied to and parked under the portecochere on the north side of the main Embassy building. After closing the gate, the guard has returned to the gatehouse, where - although LIROCKET-1 has never actually observed a guard doing so - he has evidently telephoned someone inside the main building to give notification of the truck's arrival.

5. LIROCKET-1 has been present perhaps 25 times when pedestrian callers (delivery men, students, persons on visa business) have rung the foot gate buzzer, and in each instance the guard has routinely let them in without going to the gate to question them or observe them more closely. On one occasion, as many as four young Mexican males who appeared to be university students rang the buzzer while LIROCKET-1 was inside the gatehouse, and the guard let them in in the routine manner.

6. Once inside the gate, the pedestrian caller is expected to present himself at the gatehouse door, which is usually left open, and state his business. The guard then either goes next door to summon an Embassy official from one of the two offices off the Reception Room, or, as in Subject's case, uses the interphone to call someone inside the main building. (In LIROCKET-1's case, the guard calls one of his Soviet students.) If instructed to have the caller wait, the guard shows him into the Reception Room. LIROCKET-1 himself has been asked to wait in the Reception Room about 55 times. On approximately 15 occasions, he has been invited into the gatehouse by the guard on duty to chat. On the latter occasions, he has either remained in the gatehouse until one of his Soviet students has appeared to escort him into the main building or has left the gatehouse after a few minutes and gone to the Reception Room to continue waiting for one of his students to arrive. On approximately 60 of LIROCKET-1's visits to the Embassy,

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the guard has been instructed by the person on the other end of the interphone to show LIROCKET-1 to the classroom. (Except for two occasions, the Soviets have always used the first room on the left just inside the main entrance to the main building for Subject's classes.) When the guard does show LIROCKET-1 into the classroom, he leaves the gatehouse for between 1 and 3 minutes (depending on whether he opens the classroom windows). The guard has been alone in the gatehouse about half of the 60 times he has shown Subject into the classroom, and has consequently left the gatehouse unattended for 1-3 minutes on approximately 30 occasions.

7. Offices Off the Reception Room. There are two offices off the Reception Room. The first office is known from other sources to be used for visa interviews. The second office is presumably used for the same purpose. The first office opens directly into the Reception Room. The second office is at the back of the first office and is entered either through the first office or through an outside door. (LIROCKET-1 has never seen the outside door used, however.) One or both of the offices were occupied by Soviets about 20 of the roughly 40 times LIROCKET-1 was in the Reception Room prior to mid-January 1967 (usually on Monday and Friday mornings between 0915 and 0930). The Soviets frequently left the door to the first office, and somewhat less frequently to the second office, open when they were present. The first door or both doors were sometimes also left open when no Soviet was present. When the door to the first office or the doors to both offices were open and LIROCKET-1 sat opposite the door to the first office he could see about a quarter of the interior of the first office and a small part of the interior of the second office. Although official Soviet visa hours are only on Tuesdays and Fridays (from 1100-1300), LIROCKET-1 saw Soviets in both offices with about equal frequency on Monday and Friday mornings. From what LIROCKET-1 could see, the Soviets rarely seemed to be busy with desk work, but confined themselves to looking over newspapers, opening mail, chatting with each other, etc. Frequently Soviets went into one of the offices for just a moment and then left. Since LIROCKET-1 has begun going to the Embassy about 1530 on Tuesdays and Thursdays, however, he has always found the door to the first office shut and both offices evidently empty. (COMMENT: This is probably explained by the fact that the Embassy lunch break is from 1400-1600).

8. LIROCKET-1 recently had occasion to visit Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), the Soviet Consul, in the first office from approximately 1830-1900 on a Thursday. At this time he found LOGINOV doing paper work and a stack of 30-35 passports on his desk. LIROCKET-1 also recently stepped into the first office to see LOGINOV at 1830 on a Tuesday, but LOGINOV was just leaving and LIROCKET-1 did not stay. LIROCKET-1 has never been inside the second office. His sketch of the second office is based on what he has been able to see from the Reception Room and the first office. In order not to seem curious, he purposely did not look around the first office when he was in it and consequently does not know what kind of furnishings, if any, are on the far side of the first office.

9. From January 1966 to January 1967, LIROCKET-1 was in the Reception Room on 8-10 occasions when other non-Soviet visitors came in. The Soviet interviewer ushered the visitors into one of the offices and closed the door to the first office on about four of these occasions. On two occasions, the Soviet interviewer ushered the visitor into the first office and did not bother to close the door. On four or five occasions, the Soviet interviewer came out into the Reception Room to talk with the visitor in LIROCKET-1's presence. In each of the six or seven cases in which Subject was able to hear the conversation, the Soviet and the visitor were discussing visa matters.

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10. LIROCKET-1 estimated that while he was present in the Reception Room between January 1966 and January 1967, he observed Soviets in the first office about four times as often as in the second office. From mug shots, he identified the following Soviets as having been the primary users of the two offices during the times he was present:

(a) LOGINOV, one of the two Soviet Vice-Consuls until he became Consul in September 1966. LOGINOV is known KGB. LIROCKET-1 frequently saw him in the first office and saw him receive several visitors.

(b) Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123), Second Secretary and the Consul until September 1966. YATSKOV is known KGB. LIROCKET-1 saw YATSKOV with about half the frequency of LOGINOV. YATSKOV used both offices. LIROCKET-1 also saw YATSKOV receive visitors.

(c) Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341), Vice-Consul and probably KGB. LIROCKET-1 saw him walk in and out of the first office several times, but never saw him receive visitors.

(d) Ruslan Aleksandrovich TUCHNIN (201-205304), the Radio and TV correspondent and suspect GRU. LIROCKET-1 saw him in the second office two or three times, but never saw him receive a visitor.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

312

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB8, Ciclops, CI/IC2, G

S E C R E T 081600Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1036 8 Apr 67 [illegible] 689

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

REF DIRECTOR 90320

APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKE IN LILYRIC LOG. ACTUAL LILYRIC PHOTO SHOWS CAR HAD FLORIDA 66 TAGS 10-W-6776.

S E C R E T

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Legnor

201-285412

14-00000

313

N. Perkins
WH/1
6954
6 April 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 7 00 09Z CITE DIRECTOR 90320

MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0699 (IN 22585)*

FLORIDA 66 TAGS 10-W-7776 ISSUED TO NEGRO LABORER FOR 59 OLDSMOBILE. VIEW DISCREPANCY, CAN YOU PROVIDE YEAR OR COLOR OF TAGS MENTIONED REF.

END OF MESSAGE

*Man in late model Buick Electra with Florida tags 10-W-7776 stopped at Soviet Embassy.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

201-285412

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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FROM 23

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB 8 ci/ops, ci/oa

4 APR 67 37176

S E C R E T 041925Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8972

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

Loginov

REF: DIRECTOR 11WW0

1. STATION OFFICER HAD LUNCH WITH SUBJECT REF 23 MARCH. AFTER INITIAL RELUCTANCE, SHE AGREED REPORT PERSONALITY DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION RE LOGINOV ACQUIRED DURING NORMAL BUSINESS AND SOCIAL CONTACT WITH HIM. STATED SHE HAD GONE OUT WITH HIM SEVERAL TIMES, USUALLY TO DINNER, MOVIES, COFFEE NIGHTCAP AND THEN "ALWADI STRIGHT HOME." DESCRIBED LOGINOV AS VERY INTELLIGENT AND INTERESTING, UNLIKE USUAL BOORISH SOVIET. SAID HE ONE ASKED HER IF SHE HAD ANY FRIENDS IN LNPURE, BUT THAT SHE HAD AVOIDED QUESTION AND LOGINOV HAD NOT PURSUED MATTER. STATED THEIR CONVERSATION OTHERWISE STRICTLY SOCIAL.

2. SUBJECT IMPRESSED AS INTELLIGENT, SOCIABLE, ATTRACTIVE AND ON SOPHISTICATED SIDE. ALTHOUGH INDEPENDENT-MINDED, APPEARED RATIONAL AND PRO-WOLADY. SITUATION NOT OPPORTUNE TO GET BIO REQUESTED REF, BUT SUBJECT AND LNPURE CITIZENSHIP SECTION PROVIDED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO:

A. SUBJECT H155,835/(3,5 5-53 7,8;64056.8, 9 39.

SECRET

201-285412

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2972 S E C R E T SECRET

B. MOTHER IS SARA LOUISE KATZ DE AVILA, U.S. CITIZEN BORN 26 NOVEMBER 1914 TOLEDO, OHIO. MOTHER HAS RESIDED MEXICO SINCE CA 1939. NO STATION TRACES.

3. SUBJECT TO CONTACT C/O AFTER NEXT DATE WITH LOGINOV. WILL GET SUBJECT'S DPOB AND DATA ON MEXICAN FATHER AT THAT TIME.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

316

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LICANNY-1 -- Status Report on LICANNY-1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
REFERENCE: A. HMMA-30292, 11 October 1966
B. HMMW-14988, 4 November 1966

1. Subject was recruited in May 1963 to accept Soviet recruitment if approached during a visit to the USSR in May-June 1963. Following his return to Mexico, he reported that no effort had been made to recruit or, to his knowledge, cultivate or compromise him. The Station maintained sporadic contact with Subject between June 1963 and August 1964, during which time he furnished limited information on Soviet travelers to and from Mexico and on Soviet interest in increasing tourist traffic between Mexico and the USSR.

2. The Station was notified in August 1964 that Subject's POA had been cancelled. There was then no further contact with him until January 1966, although during the latter part of 1965, Subject on his own initiative gave the LNPURE officer with whom he regularly dealt on visa matters information on Soviet visitors to Mexico, as well as on the visit of the Moscow Symphony to Mexico. The LNPURE officer passed this information on to the Station. In January 1966, Subject advised the LNPURE officer that he was in contact with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV (201-120123) and Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412), both of whom had asked him for information on sea and rail travel between Mexico, New York, and Europe. At this time, the LNPURE officer turned Subject over to a new Station case officer who debriefed Subject and obtained his agreement to supply personality information on LOGINOV. Subject stipulated at this time, however, that he did not want to become involved in clandestine meetings or take money, and expressed the desire to meet the case officer in the LNPURE officer's office following the conclusion of Subject's visa business.

(CONTINUED)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WH
1 - C/SB

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31572

DATE
15 March 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412
201-357138

The LNPURE officer also informed the case officer that Subject had previously mentioned that he had once been "approached" to supply information on Soviet travelers on a regular basis and had refused to do so. Subject evidently did not specifically say that he had been approached by WOFACT, but this was clearly the implication. Subject told the LNPURE officer that he was willing to supply information he considered unusual or especially interesting, but was not willing to supply information on a routine basis.

3. The Station had no contact with Subject between 6 January and 28 September 1966. On 20 September, the Station learned from LICOZY-5 that Subject had been invited along with several other Mexican travel agents to attend an Intourist conference in Moscow from 24-29 October. A meeting was consequently arranged with Subject for 28 September through the LNPURE officer.

4. Subject told the Station officer who met him that he had been meaning to contact the Station about his forthcoming trip, which, he said, he assumed was what the case officer wanted to talk about. He gave the case officer a copy of his invitation to the Intourist conference and on his own initiative offered to provide the Station with a full report of the conference when he returned. However, he stated that he was not interested in working for the Station on a permanent, "agent" basis, in meeting under clandestine circumstances, or taking money. He was willing to help to the extent he was, he explained, because he believed basically what we did about current world problems and, after all, had lived in WOLADY for many years and regarded it as his "second home". On the basis of this interview and a review of Subject's file, Subject impressed the case officer as a somewhat disingenuous egoist who, despite a genuine sympathy for WOLADY, regarded his cooperation with the Station primarily as a means of insuring his business contacts with LNPURE and as something which had to be kept to a minimum lest it limit his independence or detract him in any way from his business and personal interests. This impression served as the basis for the evaluation of Subject contained in Reference A.

5. The case officer's impression of Subject changed considerably with the next meeting, which was held on 18 October. At this meeting, the case officer gave Subject a defensive briefing for his trip and went over general reporting requirements. Subject surprised the case officer with his friendliness and cooperativeness, and went to great pains to explain that he was more than willing to cooperate with the Station as long as he did not become so deeply involved in intelligence work that his business or personal life was adversely affected. The case officer was impressed by Subject's apparent sincerity and got the definite impression that ever since receiving the Intourist invitation, Subject had been fearful he was again going to be asked to accept a double agent role which, if it materialized, would require him to become far more deeply involved in intelligence work than he wished. Sensing both Subject's relief at not being asked to undertake a more demanding assignment and his concern to make it clear that his heart was nevertheless in the right place, the case officer used the opportunity to again pose the question of whether Subject would be willing to report on a routine basis on persons who booked travel through his agency to the USSR. The case officer told Subject that this information could be forwarded to the Station through the LNPURE officer and assured him that his cooperation in supplying such information would not involve him in a series of escalating intelligence assignments. Evidently satisfied that his role would remain a limited one, Subject agreed to report the desired information on a regular basis. Moreover, he volunteered to check with other travel agencies in order to fulfill specific requirements for information on travelers to the Soviet Union who did not book their travel through his agency.

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6. Subject was thoroughly debriefed upon his return from the USSR in early November 1966, at which time he continued to exhibit the same friendliness and cooperativeness noted in paragraph five. He reported that he was aware of no effort to assess, cultivate, or compromise him in the USSR. He provided information both on the formal proceedings of the conference and on individual Soviet and foreign participants, as well as on a Spanish businessman he met in Moscow. This information resulted in three Field Information Reports (HMM-10,870, 30 November 1966, HMM-10,871, 30 November 1966, HMM-10,875, 30 November 1966), one dispatch to Madrid (HMMA-30725, 1 December 1966), and a second to Santiago (HMMA-30749, 2 December 1966). Since furnishing information on his trip to the USSR, Subject has provided information on the travel of the Bolshoi Ballet in Mexico, on a Mexican traveler to the USSR, and on a Soviet student group which was slated to visit Mexico, but which for unknown reasons failed to arrive at the last minute.

7. The only Soviet Subject has recently been in contact with is LOGINOV, whom he occasionally sees on visa matters. According to Subject, their relationship during the past year has been strictly of a business nature and LOGINOV has shown no interest in extending it beyond this. Subject consequently appears to have little to offer in the way of an access agent to the Soviets in the foreseeable future. However, as the manager of one of five Mexican travel agencies representing Intourist and because of his apparently excellent contacts with key personnel of the other four travel agencies, he promises to be a useful referent on persons who book travel in Mexico to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

8. Despite the regularization of our relationship with Subject and his increased cooperativeness, we do not feel we are currently in a position to ask him to undergo an SGSWIRL interview. The relationship between the case officer and Subject at this time is essentially one of equals in which Subject is voluntarily assisting LNFORT out of ideological motivation. It is true that his strong business interest in maintaining friendly relations with LNFORT and LNPURE provides us with a degree of control, but we feel that at present it is better left as a form of tacit control than brandished even subtly. It is our opinion that Subject would regard an SGSWIRL interview as an effort both to increase our control over him and to draw him deeper into the intelligence business. Such a reaction would in all probability undo much of our recent progress with Subject. Consequently, we would prefer to postpone an SGSWIRL interview until either we further solidify our relationship with Subject or we wish to use him in more sensitive work.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

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DOWNGRADING AND
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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1	WH	5	151
2	CI	6	AC
3		7	
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FROM 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 152330Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0699 15 MAR 67 22585

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. PER LILYRIC ON 9 MARCH A MAN DRIVING WHAT APPEARS TO BE LATE MODEL BUICK ELECTRA WITH FLORIDA TAGS 10-W-7776 STOPPED AT SOVIET EMBASSY AND TALKED WITH CONSUL VALENTIN S. LOGINOV. MAN DID NOT ENTER EMBASSY.

2. INFORMING
~~U-E2C RIBFORMI~~NG LOCAL LNERGO.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

Logina

201-285412

14-00000

320

ORIG: C. Bustos/pem
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167
DATE: 14 March 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

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1		6	
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3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

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BY 60 PER ______ # ______

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR . SB 8, C/OA, C/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 83389

14 23 20 52

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0653 (IN 20404) *

REDCOAT

NO HQS TRACES MISS MIRIAM AVILA KATZ. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY, WILL INITIATE POA.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH Cormier (phone)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-385412

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

321

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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FROM 15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE VR, SB 8, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 131810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0653 13 MAR 67 IN 20404

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. REQUEST HQS TRACES ON MISS MIRIAM AVILA KATZ, MEXICAN CITIZEN BORN CA 1941. ATTENDED COLLEGE IN OHIO FOR TWO YEARS, PROBABLY ABOUT 1959-1960. CURRENTLY EMPLOYED MUNDOSHTOURS TRAVEL AGENCY, MEXICO CITY.

2. PER LIENVOY AND LICOZY-5, SUBJECT IS IN SOCIAL CONTACT WITH VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV, 201-285412. ACCORDING LICOZY-5, SUBJECT IS INTELLIGENT AND DEFINITELY NOT PRO-SOVIET.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-285412

14-00000

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONSUL, KNOWN KGB.
IN CONTACT WITH BORIS SEMENOVICH IVANOV
/201-078078/.

201-078078
HMMA-31474
02 MAR 67
PI

R 6703080821

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

201-285412

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 092 - 58 [illegible] AT 1502 24 Feb By 53

1	CI	5	[illegible]
2	WH	6	[illegible]
3		7	[illegible]
4		8	

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/IC-2, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4 - ADDED: SB 8, VR

S E C R E T 231725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0469

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

23 Feb 67 IN 07314

REF: A. HMMA 31376

B. MEXICO CITY 8463 (IN

C. PANAMA CITY 0983 IN 95834

D. EZP 8730

1. PER LIENVOY VALENTIN S. LOGINOV 201-285412 TOLD PRESIDENT OF ASSOCIATION HE WANTS TO GO TO REF A CONVENTION AND BRING FRIEND ALEKSANDR A. NIKITIN, SOVEXPORT FILM REP "WHO WENT TO FILM FESTIVAL IN PANAMA LAST YEAR." LOGINOV ASKED PRESIDENT TO ARRANGE VISAS FOR BOTH "IN ORDER TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES." PRESIDENT CONTACTED LOGINOV LATER AND SAID HE HAD CHECKED WITH PANAMANIAN CONSUL IN MEXICO, EMILIA AROSEMENA, WHO TOLD HIM THERE NO PROBLEM IN VISA FOR LOGINOV AS CONSUL ATTENDING CONVENTION BUT THAT NIKITIN MUST MAKE FORMAL VISA APPLICATION WHICH SHE MUST SUBMIT TO HER GOVERNMENT.

Nikitin

Loginov

2. PLEASE ATTEMPT BLOCK NIKITIN'S VISA. YOU MAY TELL LIAISON HE IS KGB OFFICER WHO AS SOVEXPORTFILM REP

SECRET

201-285412

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0469 S E C R E T **SECRET**

HAS NO CONSULAR OR DIPLOMATIC STATUS, AND THUS DOES NOT HAVE LEGITIMATE REASON TO ATTEND CONVENTION. S BLOCKING LOGINOV'S VISA MAY BE AWKWARD SUGGEST YOU INFORM LIAISON HE IS NOTORIOUS KGB OFFICER. PER PACY 7280, 19 DEC 61 LOGINOV TRANSITED PANAMA 16 AND 17 DEC 61 ESCORTING SOVIET FOOTBALL TEAM. HYPOTHESIS COVERT BAGGAGE SEARCH REVEALED ENVELOPE CONTAINING LARGE SUM AMERICAN BILLS. IF THIS INFO USABLE LOCALLY SUGGEST YOU SAY MONEY UNDOUBTEDLY WAS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO A LA COMMUNIST PARTY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

325

[illegible]
Loginov

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LOGINOV, VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH
201-285412
SEX M DOB ?

CIT USSR
OCC ?

050-005-000
HMMA-31376
14 FEB 67
P1

< MEXICO REF FACT THAT CUBAN AND SOVIET MBRS OF MEXICO CONSULAR ASSOCIATION MAY SEIZE OPPORTUNITY GIVEN THEM BY INVITATION TO ATTEND FOURTH INTERAMERICAN CONSULAR ASSO TO SEEK PANAMANIAN VISAS.

HZP

R 6702280348

FILE IN 201-285412

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

201-285412

14-00000

326

DISPATCH

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDTOP BESABER contact with Soviet Officials

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMW-15222, 1 February 1967

B. MEXICO CITY 0117 (in 87362)

1. In accordance with Reference B, Russell K. MUCHANE (alias Ted KELLY) joined Willard C. ABSALOM for a meeting with BESABER on 28 January (see Reference A) and met the latter alone for 45 minutes on 2 February.

2. After determining that BESABER has had social contact with Subject of 201-285412 (Iden A), Subject of 201-116900 (Iden B), and AEJUNGLE, the discussions with respect to Soviet officials in Mexico were limited to these three officials. In the course of the conversations, we told BESABER that Iden A is a known KGB officer and Iden B, a known GRU officer, but that we have no hard evidence to identify AEJUNGLE as an intelligence officer. He was told that our principal objective in his contact with Soviet officials is to obtain personality data and operational ~~information~~ recruitment for use against such Soviets to effect their ~~defection~~ in place or outright. Since BESABER has been working with us extensively on the Polish target for over two years, none of the above was new to him.

3. Subject had the following to say about each of the Soviets mentioned above:

a. Iden A--This Soviet is just learning to handle himself well in the social situations demanded by his position in the Embassy. BESABER believes he can be brought into a social relationship and could be induced to "let his hair down" under a given situation sufficiently permissive. He would be an easy target for a reasonably pretty and well dressed female. During the one social function (at the Polish Embassy) at which BESABER had an opportunity to observe this Soviet showed deference to AEJUNGLE, whether because of the latter's social grace and high diplomatic standing or because of possible intelligence affinity between the two could not be determined.

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-285412
201-116900

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-[illegible]

DATE
[illegible] February 1967

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-285412

1-C/WH [illegible]
1-[illegible]
1-201-285412 w/a
1-201-116900 w/a
1-[illegible]
1-[illegible]
1-[illegible]

201-285412

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b. [illegible] [illegible] he had been [illegible] with [illegible] on only [illegible] occasions in the last two years, [illegible] said that [illegible] "has some kind of problem; something is bothering him". After some thought, [illegible] said that he [illegible] [illegible] may be homosexual, basing this statement on nothing more than "feel". Later in the conversation, BESADER said that he would be able to test his belief eventually by use of his New York designer (Iden C-- Headquarters traces to be forwarded) who is known to BESADER as a homosexual. BESADER believes that time and patience will provide the opportunity. It was suggested that [illegible]'s penchant for tennis (of which BESADER was earlier advised) might provide the entree since BESADER's wife is an avid tennis player. Aside from the above, BESADER's assessment of [illegible] emphasized everything we already know concerning the latter's talents, abilities, social charm, etc.

c. [illegible]--BESADER emphasized [illegible] man's military bearing, whether in or out of uniform, and his ability to remain cool and in control of every social relationship in which he finds himself. BESADER said [illegible] and [illegible] are very close, even intimate, friends. [illegible] speculates that [illegible] are close friends from the days when [illegible] was in the Soviet Army. (Since this statement concerning [illegible]'s background was new to Headquarters, Station comment would be appreciated. We did not indicate to BESADER that we were not aware of [illegible]'s service in the Soviet Army.)

4. BESADER was given the following requirements with respect to the above Soviets and asked to discuss them with [illegible] (alias [illegible]) in Mexico City after his return:

a. [illegible]--Develop a social relationship and attempt to [illegible] Subject involved in local (non-official) social activities, including involvement with women. To look for an opportunity to force Subject to extend an invitation for BESADER (with or without wife) to visit him at his apartment (this to give BESADER an opportunity to see every side of Subject's life in Mexico). To attempt to determine whether Subject's deference to [illegible] is personally motivated or possibly in connection with mutual [illegible] responsibilities.

b. [illegible]--Be alert to any possibility of establishing a social relationship and of furthering his belief that [illegible] may be homosexual. Plans for the use of Iden C or any other individual in this regard are to be discussed with [illegible] and handled under [illegible]'s close guidance.

5. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] attempts to [illegible] [illegible] Subject on with respect to [illegible] [illegible] Soviets. [illegible] is clearly [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] seems to be that [illegible] overly-enthusiastic, but [illegible] sufficient [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in anything he may [illegible]. We have requested that [illegible] be broadened to include assessment of [illegible] and other [illegible] officials as well as Poles since the present [illegible] is [illegible] too narrow for us to take advantage of his obvious [illegible], ability, and willingness to do more. It seemed rather clear from our conversation with [illegible]

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CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

that [illegible] ([illegible] his theoretical financial worth, business acumen, and future business potential) is considerably worried about his lack of working capital. His suggestion that, with our help, he could expand his business into several countries and, thus, provide us with extensive cover possibilities (even in Warsaw!) and the image of a man aware of a potential financial coup but hesitant to take the risk without assurance that his losses, should any occur, will be completely covered through his association with us.

Russell K. MUCHARE

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/atts/USC

Attachments:
Identity Sheet

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IDENTITY SHEET

IDENTITY A Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV

IDENTITY B Col. Vladimir Nikolayevich SOKOLOV

IDENTITY C Mr. Tom TARAN

330

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

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ACTION SB-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 270?50Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0117 27 JAN 67 87362

DIRECTOR

REDTOP REDOX

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 9937 (IN 78000)

B. DIRECTOR 69153

1. FOLLOWING ARE CHANGES TO PLAN MEET BESABER WASH:

A. BESABER BOOKED AT SHERATON PARK HOTEL, 2660 WOODLEY ROAD N.W., NOT SHOREHAM AS STATED REF A.

B. DUE ETA (VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 53) BESABER WILL STAND BY IN HOTEL FOR CALL PER REF B BETWEEN 2000 AND 2130, 28 JAN.

2. DURING RECENT TDY MEXICO MUCHANE TOLD STATION HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO BESABER RE SOVIET MATTERS, LOGINOV IN PARTICULAR.

S E C R E T

BT

201-285412

331

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SB; Chief, WOMUSE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/LICOZY-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-30722, 1 December 1966

1. Transmitted herewith is a Progress Report on LICOZY-5 for the period 1 November 1966-15 January 1967.

2. We are having LICOZY-5 check further into the details of and his own prospects for making the Air France inaugural flight to Shanghai referred to in paragraph 3 B. According to the local Air France manager who suggested that LICOZY-5 participate in the flight, the flight is scheduled for late April or early May 1967. According to the Air France manager, although the Air France Route to Shanghai has been operative since the fall of 1966, it is customary to have an official inaugural flight in which specially invited travel agents take part.

3. In view of LICOZY-5's long-time double agent role and his poor reporting in the past, we doubt there is much to be gained from having him make the proposed trip. Consequently, unless FE Division has particular interest in LICOZY-5 making the trip, we plan to tell him that we have no interest in his doing so. Please advise us by 20 February of any FE interest.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Progress Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/att., H/W
1 - C/SB, w/att., H/W
1 - C/WOMUSE, w/o att.

Logan

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 31187

DATE: 25 JANUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-31203 201-285412

33a

January 1967

SUBJECT: Progress Report/ LICOZY-3 (1 November 1966 - 15 January 1967)

REFERENCE: HMMA-30722, 1 December 1966

1. The last Progress Report (see Reference) reported developments in the operation through 31 October 1966; but not included were Subject's activities at the INTURIST Conference in Moscow to which Subject traveled on 22 October 1966. These activities will be reported below.

2. Contacts

A. Subject and KGB Case Officers (201-305870)

Apart from Subject's frequent visits in Moscow during October 1966 from a former KGB case officer in Mexico, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject since his return to Mexico from his European and Israel trip in mid-November has seen KGB officers on four occasions for a total time of less than an hour.

In Moscow, where Subject was attending the INTURIST Conference, Subject was visited briefly every day in his room at the Hotel National by Nechiporenko, from 24 October through 28 October.

First contact by the Soviets on Subject's return to Mexico was effected by KGB case officer Aleksandr Vladimirovich Prikhodko (201-202879) on 3 December in Subject's office for a few minutes. On 8 December, Valentin Sergeyevich Loginov (201-285412), Subject's regular KGB case officer, called Subject down to the street outside Subject's office to present him with Bolshoi Ballet tickets. On 13 December, Loginov visited Subject's office and spent no more than half an hour there. And on 30 or 31 December, Subject was paid a brief visit by Pavel Yatskov, KGB officer (and possible candidate for resident) (201-120129) at Subject's office.

B. Subject and Mexico City Station Case Officer

In the two months since Subject's return from Europe in mid-November 1966, the C/O, Prentice R. Marheine, has seen Subject six times for an approximate total of nine hours.

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November for two hours.

In December, the C/O met Subject three times, on [illegible] December at his office for almost two hours, on 13 December at the Hotel Reforma for a half-hour, and on 22 December at Subject's office for an hour.

On 7 January 1967, the C/O and his wife took Subject and his wife out for dinner at the Belvedere Room of the Hotel Continental Hilton, to reciprocate for a former invitation to Subject's home. On 12 January, the C/O met Subject at the latter's office for one hour.

3. Operational Developments

A. Subject/ KGB

Subject arrived in Moscow on 23 October 1966 to attend the INTURIST Conference

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to which travel agents on a world-wide basis had been invited. On Subject's second day in Moscow, Oleg Nechiporenko, Subject's former Soviet C/O in Mexico, came to visit him at the Hotel National. Subject deliberately kept his son by his side so that Nechiporenko would find it difficult to have private words with him. However, Nechiporenko came to visit Subject every day thereafter until Subject's departure, bringing gifts of records, caviar, etc. When Nechiporenko found the opportunity the first thing he told Subject was that he heard Subject had been a "rebel" and had been difficult in Mexico. Subject, in his half-serious manner, poohpoohed the idea that he was a rebel and told Nechiporenko earnestly that he didn't have the time, effort or inclination to indulge in the cooperation that was expected of him. He gave Nechiporenko the old line about friends "hasta la muerte" but that he couldn't and wouldn't put out the old effort. Nechiporenko said that was too bad, because he had wanted to present Subject to his chief - and now there was no point to it. Subject shrugged this off. Nechiporenko asked Subject if he would be willing to use his office as a letter-drop. Subject said, reprovingl that that was not a very smart idea- since agents writing to his firm and to him would then know of Subject's connection with the Soviets and he would thus be exposed. Nevertheless, Nechiporenko told Subject to think it over and talk to Valentin (Loginov) in Mexico about it. Also, Nechiporenko told Subject that they hadn't forgotten about the "branch office" and that Subject shouldn't feel bad about the delay in setting it up. Subject ridiculed that idea, saying that it was the Soviets who should feel bad; as for him, he couldn't be bothered in the future with the trips and time involved. Nechiporenko, still not chastened, asked if Subject would provide information on all changes in visa regulations for travel in Central and South America. Subject xx said he had given this information to the Soviets in the past. Nechiporenko then asked Subject to continue to give such information to Valentin.

Subject elicited from Nechiporenko that he was working in the Latin American Section of the Foreign Ministry, and that he was allowed to come and go as he pleased to visit Subject. In the context of telling Subject that he saw that Subject was not getting along with his Soviet friends, Nechiporenko said that he would be coming back to Mexico next year.

One day while Nechiporenko was in the hotel room, the phone rang and Subject picked up the phone. A female voice asked for "Givy." Subject banteringly replied in Russian that "Givy" wasn't around, but wouldn't he do. In the ensuing conversation Subject found out that the caller was a 25 year old student, her address and telephone number, and made a date to meet her the following day at the Lenin Station exit of the Metro. Nechiporenko was all in favor of Subject making the date, and as a matter of fact came the next day to take Subject's son to the circus so that Subject would be free. /Comment: Subject said that he never did go to meet the xxx girl, but told Nechiporenko that he had gone and the girl had not shown up. Subject was of the opinion this was not a provocation by the Soviets, but he shied away because he did not want to be involved in anything indiscreet./

When Alexandr Prikhodko dropped in unexpectedly at Subject's office on 3 December, while Subject's wife and son were present, the Soviet asked when he could have lunch with Subject, and the latter put him off telling Priknodko to call next week. /Comment: Prikhodko did not call/.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

On 8 December, Valentin Loginov, who had called Subject's office by phone to have Subject come down to the street, saw Subject for just a minute to present him with two tickets to the Bolshoi Ballet for 9 December. /Comment: Subject attended./

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On 23 December, Loginov came unannounced to Subject's office and prevailed on him to have coffee with him nearby. The Soviet presented Subject with four bottles of vodka for Christmas, and began to ask Subject a series of personal questions:
1) How had Subject left Poland for Paris after WWII - had his documentation been legal or illegal? Subject answered that it was legal.
2) How was he able to enter Paris - did he have a valid French visa? Subject said he did. How long did he stay in Paris? Subject said a few months.
3) Was he released from service with the Polish UB? Subject said yes. Were there any conditions to this release? Subject said no. Was he supposed to be contacted by the Poles? Subject said yes, and related the story of how he was contacted in Mexico (in March 19[illegible]) by a Polish diplomatic courier who brought a letter from Subject's old boss in the UB, and how Subject answered that letter. Had Subject's response to the Poles been positive or negative? Subject said neutral. Asked why, Subject replied that he believed that eighty percent of the Poles were anti-Soviet. Loginov said "you are right."
Loginov asked how Subject was getting along with the WOFACT American airlines he deals with. Subject said fine, and asked why. Loginov said that maybe, if Subject has the chance, he can learn the name of "the director of in Mexico." Subject told Loginov he was crazy to think Subject could get that information. When Loginov persisted in knowing whether Subject would tell the Soviets if he did get that information, Subject dismissed the topic with a coy "maybe."
Subject promised to show Loginov the documents that backed up his answers to Loginov's questions.

On either 30 or 31 December, Pavel Yatskov dropped by Subject's office to give him some gifts he had brought back from Moscow. /Comment: Subject had done Yatskov a favor during the Soviet's travel to Moscow by arranging for Subject's travel agent in Paris to assist Yatskov./. Yatskov expressed gratefulness to Subject and presented him with a bottle of Caucasian wine, some vodka, a decorative box and 150 grams of caviar. Yatskov (who no longer holds the post of Soviet Consul in Mexico, and is a possible candidate for KGB resident) told Subject that he is also grateful for what Subject has done for "them", and he is sure that Subject will not leave "them" alone in the realization of their common ideals. And Yatskov further stated that he and Subject have very much in common, and that they should meet. It was left that Yatskov would call Subject.

B. Subject/Mexico City Station:

The C/O met Subject at his office on 22 November 1966 to debrief him on the results of his trip to Moscow (see paragraph 3 A. above). In addition to providing information on his contacts with Nechiporenko, Subject gave incidental information concerning a female Soviet Jew he met, and the anti-American attitude of a travel agent from Chile.

On 8 December, in Subject's office, Subject reported to the C/O about the brief contacts he had had with Prikhodko and Loginov on 2 and 8 December. The C/O, in response to a Station request, re-opened with Subject the topic of the Jewish community support that Secretary of Gobernación Echeverria is alleged to have sought in his candidacy for next president of Mexico. Subject related again the story of how Jacobo Zabludovsky had come to mention the matter to Subject, including the fact that Subject was being proposed as one of the five influential members of the Jewish community for Echeverria's approval (Zabludovsky did not mention the others). The C/O requested that Subject check further with Zabludovsky when he had the opportunity.

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On 13 December Subject reported to the C/O about Loginov's personal questions asked of Subject that same day (see paragraph 3 A. above). The C/O asked Subject if he had inquired of Loginov why the latter was asking such questions. Subject said he had not, even though he was completely puzzled by this tack on the part of the Soviets. But Subject said he felt perfectly at ease in telling the truth to the Soviets, and had no hesitation in showing them his documentation.

The C/O dropped by Subject's office on 22 December, after having delivered a Christmas gift of liquor to Subject's home the previous day. Subject reported 1) on Soviet travel for Georgi Visko, and said he had met Visko's replacement-Victor M. Ivanov.
Dec 66
2) Subject mentioned that he had received a holiday-season letter from Sidney Weintraub, U.S. State Department official now in Chile. /Comment: Weintraub had been a target of the Soviets in Mexico through Subject. Nothing ever came of it./
3) Subject remarked that he had received a firm invitation from the manager of Air France in Mexico to go on the inaugural flight of Air France to Red China (Shanghai) possibly in April 1967, to which Subject had replied that he "would love to go." To the C/O Subject expressed himself as neutral about his going, but asked the C/O if "[illegible]" had any interest in his taking the trip. The C/O replied that Subject would be advised.

The C/O then discussed seriously with Subject the question of how complete his break-off from the Soviets really was, inasmuch as there was some scepticism about his conduct (the C/O told Subject that the scepticism came from "higher up", which incidentally the C/O did not share). The C/O asked Subject to explain his equivocal "maybe" to Loginov's request to report the name of the [illegible] chief in Mexico, and his willingness to turn his personal documentation over to the Soviets. Subject's reply boiled down to this: he was convinced that his break-off was more than adequate because he had achieved the control to deny the Soviets anything and everything (the Station's objective), even though he might jokingly stall them. Being friendly was consistent with his personality. He explained his willingness, even more his desire, to pass his documentation to the Soviets, because he wanted to show those "bastards" he wasn't afraid of them. Subject asked the C/O to check with "his bosses" to see if he could get the go-ahead on passing the documentation if the Soviets came after it.

On 12 January 1967, the C/O (having received the Station's expression of interest in having Subject follow up the invitation from Air France) asked Subject for more details concerning the invitation from Air France, and gave him the go-ahead to pursue the matter.

5. The current C/O, Prentice M. Lartaine, will turn Subject over to Francis J. Coigne before Lartaine's departure from Mexico the end of January 1967.

PRN

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9/4

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, SB Division

INFO Chief, WH Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDTOP/Operational
BESABER contact with Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-285412)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY-9930.

1. BESABER first met LOGINOV casually on 14 December 1965 at a Polish Embassy reception for a visiting Parliamentary delegation. No plans were made for recontact, although cards were exchanged and BESABER reported that LOGINOV was quite friendly.

2. It was not until 4 October 1966, almost a year later, that BESABER again ran into LOGINOV at another Polish Embassy reception, this one in honor of the departing Polish Ambassador. On that occasion LOGINOV expressed an interest in buying some of the mosaics that BESABER produces. When LOGINOV found out that Mrs. BESABER was an avid tennis player, he let it be known that he was too, and would enjoy getting together for a game. (Parenthetically, he mentioned that he played regularly at the French Club, but that he did not enjoy the atmosphere there because there were too many Germans.) Finally, when BESABER mentioned that he very much liked Russian vodka, LOGINOV said he would sell him some at Embassy discount prices.

3. On 13 October 1966 LOGINOV tried unsuccessfully to contact BESABER by phone to purchase some mosaics for the Russian athletes who were in town in connection with the "Little Olympics." BESABER unfortunately never got the message that LOGINOV left (although we picked it up on LIENVOY).

4. The Station decided at this point to have BESABER wait for LOGINOV to make the next move, but when by 15 December

- CONTINUED -

Distribution:
2 - CSB
1 - CWH

CS COPY FILED IN 201-744856

[illegible]

File in 201-285912

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-285412	HMMA - 31099	17 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-744856

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there had not been any signs of action, BESABER was instructed to try to get in touch with LOGINOV regarding the purchase of vodka (for Christmas). When Christmas passed without any luck in contacting LOGINOV (BESABER was extremely busy during this period) we decided to change tactics a bit.

5. Per Station instructions BESABER phoned LOGINOV on 12 January 1967 and made arrangements to drop by the Embassy the following morning to show LOGINOV the catalogs of his mosaic-ware. BESABER was instructed to take advnatage of this meet to try to establish some kind of reason for continuing the relationship (tennis and vodka buying were suggested.). As it turned out LOGINOV gave BESABER the necessary opening. After a cursory, but polite look at BESABER's catalogs he LOGINOV dismissed this subject by saying that he was not in the immediate market for any of BESABER's merchandise, but might be in the future. He then changed the subject, mentioned that he was in charge of looking for a house in Cuernavaca to be used by Embassy personnel (LIENVOY confirms that LOGINOV has the responsibility for renting a house in Cuernavaca as a summer retreat for wives and children.) LOGINOV told BESABER that he was prepared to pay 5,000 MN ($400.00 U.S.) per month for June, July and August 1967. He wants a four-bedroom (or more) house with a heated swimming pool and garden. LOGINOV mentioned that in 1966 the Embassy had rented a house on Calle Humboldt, that they had liked it, but that he was not sure they could get a lease again this year. He several times asked BESABER, who lives in Cuernavaca, to help him in locating a suitable house. BESABER of course said he would be delighted to assist LOGINOV and promised to phone him as soon as he found something. On this note the meeting ended.

6. BESABER will be out of town for two weeks (on vacation in Acapulco and in the U. S., as set forth in reference.) In the meantime, he will get one of his employees to look for housing for LOGINOV in Cuernavaca. Shortly after his return to Mexico (about 6 February) he will contact LOGINOV with a suggestion that he come down to look at whatever housing leads have been developed and/or to play tennis and enjoy a day in Cuernavaca.

7. The purpose of this exercise is to establish a familiar social relationship between BESABER and LOGINOV, one that will permit the Station to further assess LOGINOV. To date BESABER's first impressions were not particularly enlightening other than his feeling that LOGINOV is susceptible to further social development. The Station will encourage this activity with BESABER and it will be helpful if Headquarters personnel, if they see BESABER during reference trip, also encourage him.

8. One further matter for the record; BESABER was first introduced to LOGINOV by BEWEEP. They again were together at the Polish Embassy on 4 October 1966. Although BESABER has not told BEWEEP of his meet with LOGINOV on 13 January it is only because BESABER has not seen BEWEEP since before Christmas. BESABER has been instructed to be perfectly open with BEWEEP about having seen LOGINOV and in fact it may turn out that LOGINOV and BEWEEP will visit BESABER together. (LOGINOV referred to the possibility in his 13 January meet with BESABER).

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HHMA - 31099

9. The Station sees no reason why BESABER cannot handle the development of BEWKEP and LOGINOV at the same time. Where possible we will try to have BESABER arrange to cultivate them separately, but since the two targets are personal friends and see each other quite frequently, we plan to have BESABER be quite candid in admitting his relationship with one to the other.

10. Finally, we are well aware that since BESABER may well be compromised to the Poles, his relationship with LOGINOV will have to be considered in this light. On the other hand there seems little to be lost, and possibly a great deal to be gained by having BESABER continue to try to develop a close relationship with this Soviet target.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

~~GROUP~~ DISSEM BY 33 / M PER RYBAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO 7, C/WH 6, C/CI

S E C R E T 140045Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9930

DIRECTOR 14 J[illegible] 78000

REDTOP BEDOX DYVOUR BESABER

1. BESABER FLYING WASHINGTON AT OWN EXPENSE TO ATTEND CONVENTION OF SOCIETY OF PLASTIC INDUSTRIES, PLASTICS DIVISION. WILL ARRIVE 28 JAN, STAY SHOREHAM HOTEL. CONVENTION STARTS 31 JAN, ENDS 3 FEB, AT WHICH TIME BESABER PLANS GO NEW YORK FOR FEW DAYS, THEN RETURN MEXICO.

2. STATION BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HQS PERSONNEL INTERESTED IN CASES OUTLINED PARA 3, BELOW, TO MEET BESABER FOR DISCUSSIONS. IT WOULD ALSO BE GREATLY APPRECIATED IF HE WERE TAKEN OUT FOR AT LEAST ONE MEAL AND GIVEN PAT ON BACK FOR HIS EFFORTS WOFACT'S BEHALF.

3. CASES IN WHICH BESABER ACTIVELY ENGAGED AT PRESENT ARE:

A. REWEEP.

B. SUBJ MEXICO CITY 9820 (IN 71248)

C. SUBJ 201-285412. STATION WILL PROVIDE DETAILS THIS RECENT LEAD BEFORE BESABER'S ARRIVAL WASH.

4. BESABER HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY INSTRUCTED STANDBY HIS **SECRET**

LOGINOV 201-285412

14-00000

310

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG : J. CARLSON JC
UNIT : SB/O/WH
EXT : 6412
DATE : 11 JAN 67

☐ FILE RID
☒ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	WH	5	CI
2	WH	6	CA
3	C	7	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	8	

DISSEM BY 30 PER ____ # ____
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CA2, CA/PROP, FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

[redacted] SECRET [redacted] 12 00 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 65031

TO PRIORITY SAN JOSE INFO: ROUTINE MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA

AN
AB X
IN
CS
EX
[redacted]
FI

REDTOP

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 9862 (IN74189) NOT SENT BOGOTA

B. SAN JOSE 9061 (IN 75041) NOT SENT BOGOTA

C. SAN JOSE 9063 (IN75195) NOT SENT BOGOTA

D. DIRECTOR 64371 (BEING RELAYED SAN JOSE)

1. SEE PARA C REF D FOR TRACES KACHATUROV. ALL INFO ON SUBJ AND TRACES OTHER TWO SOVS IF APPROPRIATE MAY BE PASSED LIAISON. JC

2. LIAISON MAY ALSO BE TOLD VALENTIN SERGEYEVICH LOGINOV (201-285412) OF REFS A AND B IS KNOWN KGB.

3. STATION MAY WISH USE ABOVE TO BLOCK ISSUANCE OF VISA AND, OR IF TOO LATE, ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT SUBJ AND NOVOSTI (IN VIEW REF C) THRU CONTROLLED STATION PRESS ASSET. FOR THIS PURPOSE POUCHING MATERIAL ON NOVOSTI UNDER TM 964310. ALSO HQS [redacted] PLANS DISCUSS ~~[redacted]~~ MATTER WITH HUEDGE-2 DURING HIS VISIT. JC

4. REQUEST STATION POUCH ANY POSSIBLE COVERAGE SUBJ ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS SAN JOSE AS HQS INTERESTED EXPLOITING SOV INTELL USE OF PRESS COVER.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

12 Jan 67

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201-285412

14-00000

34P

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ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
SEP 10 4 06 PM '66

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR RECEIVED
RID/EDI

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 65831

TO

5. FOR BOGOTA: KACHATUROV HAS APPLIED COSTA RICAN VISA FOR PRESS EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/O/WH ______
SB/CA/S T. THIELE IN DRAFT
SB/CI/K ______
WH/1 ______
WH/3 ______
WH/4B ______
WH/2/CR PHYLLIS EDWARDS IN DRAFT
C/WH/2 ______

C/WH ______
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ADC/SB/AO ______
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KING, MARTIN LUTHER, JR.
201-760966

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 APR 78	20 Apr 78	ROBIN LINDLEY	
22 Sept 78	22 Sept 78	William A. Webb	
2:20 22 Sept 78	22 Sept 78	Kenneth S. McHargh	

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King, Martin Luther (SE)

201-760966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT RECEIPT

NOTICE TO RECIPIENT
[illegible] and Return as Shown on Reverse Side

COURIER [illegible]				DATE SENT
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S) Deputy Director for Plans	ROOM	BLDG.	DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT	

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT

CIA NO.	DOCUMENT DATE	COPIES	DOCUMENT TITLE	ATTACHMENTS	CLASS
	2 MAY 1968	O & 1	CSCI 316/01702-68	3	S

RECIPIENT

ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT S.J. Papich Federal Bureau of Investigation Room 845, Riddell Bldg. 1730 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.	SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)) /S/ SJ Papich
	OFFICE
	DATE OF RECEIPT 2 MAY 1968

FORM 1-61 615 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (33)

2 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

1. Reference is made to this Agency's out message number 94270 dated 23 April 1968 concerning the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

2. On 16 April Roderick Claflin BROWN, a Panamanian national born 1 July 1917 in British Honduras, voluntarily appeared at the Department of National Investigations (DENI) of the Republic of Panama and signed a deposition, the highlights of which are as follows:

(1) On 26 October 1962 he served as cook/seaman aboard the Texaco S.S. Southhampton which docked at Mobile, Alabama.

(2) While on a shore visit to the Mobile airport on the morning of 26 October 1962 in the company of two fellow Panamanian seamen, he was approached by Marvin P. LITTRELL, owner of LITTRELL Motor Co., 921-25 South Clinton Street, Athens, Alabama, who after ascertaining BROWN was a Panamanian seaman, asked if he knew of Dr. Martin Luther KING, Jr.

(3) LITTRELL inquired whether BROWN was interested in employment, the details of which were unspecified. He went on to describe Dr. KING as "Our greatest problem who is causing us much trouble." He gave BROWN a business card to use in the event he was interested in pursuing the employment offer.

(4) On 28 January 1963 BROWN wrote LITTRELL from New York City, stating he was interested in a job and

[illegible] King
cc [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

requested $75 for travel from New York City to Mobile. On 2 February 1963 BROWN received a reply from LITTRELL, restating that he had a job waiting for BROWN in Alabama, but questioning why $75 was needed since the fare was less than $40 by bus.

(5) After discussions with a relative and friends in New York City, BROWN suspected that the LITTRELL job offer was related with assassination plans for Dr. KING. Therefore he did not respond to the LITTRELL letter and dismissed the incident until the death of Dr. KING in April 1968. BROWN returned to Panama in 1964.

3. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the LITTRELL letter and the Spanish language deposition made by BROWN, as well as an English translation of the deposition as described in paragraph 2 of the referenced out message.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: James R. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

[illegible]/2
CSCI-316/01702-68

3 Enclosures

WH/2/Panama/G. Hodges:cib   2 May 1968

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/atts
1 - CI/R&A (Dummy)
1 - CI/LIA (Dummy)
2 - CI/OPS/DO, w/atts ✓
1 - WH/2/Panama

Based on: PANAMA CITY 6180 (IN 97566)

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/AN

KGB

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

2 cc to CI/FROI
3 cc to C/WH

	FILE PROCESSED
P/TR	~~ABSTRACT~~
	~~INDEX~~
P/TS	PREPARE FOR FILMING
P/TM	FILE
	CROSS REF (2, 3, 4)
	CROSS REF-CODE
RI/DCS	CABLE REF (11)
	INFO (8)
P/TRES	FOR FILING

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REGC		15 APR 1968	15 APR 1968	
2. C/WH/COG		15 Apr		
3.				
4. WH/C/PP				
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6. WH/COG/EXO				
7.				
8.			15 apr	
9.				
10. CI/OPS/IC (Ms. [illegible])		16 APR 1968		
11.				
12. RI/AN/[illegible]		23 APR 1968		
13. RID/EDI CLOP/DO				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

8-6 - 1 c.c. routed to C/WH/FI for retention
1 cc retained for WH/COG file

2cs reclassify into 201-760966 and X-ref into 19-4-105.

~~AN~~	RI	
PS	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT ✓		~~INDEX~~

Reclassify 19-4-105

FILE TITLE 019-004-105

TRACE REQUEST ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) ~~19-4-105~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

14-00000

3P

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29884
FILE NO - NONE
DATE - 11 QQ APRIL 1968
INDEXING - NONE
MICROFILM - NONE
TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION
INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME
FROM - COS, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 8-9 IAO APRIL 1968
REFERENCE - UFGA-29877

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE AMOTS -

QM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 TROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE DISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT NON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN A VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK REPLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

19-4-105

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

MARK F. EFFIELD

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SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

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DISP NO - UFGA-29877

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - ~~00~~ 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

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THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE AMOTS-

~~QM~~ 1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~I~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

~~WM~~ 2. GRANMA, ~~X~~ Y APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN./

~~EM~~ 3. GRANMA, ~~I~~ 5 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ~~//~~ ((THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

019-004-105

4. GRANMA, 8 ~~1~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE VIOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE DEACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE MENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE /SCLC/.

5. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO BLAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~YM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO AND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~UM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - '' ~~JJ~~THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, 8 ~~I~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO STRUGGLE.''

9. ~~OM~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, 6 APRIL, 7:10 ~~UWP~~ A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER KING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS OF THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN HAVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - " ~~44~~STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - ~~4~~WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. ~~QQM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, 5 ~~7~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ " ~~JJ~~HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~7~~ APRIL, 550 ~~11P~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ " ~~JJ~~CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST THE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – "JUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - 'DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' "

14. ~~QRM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – "THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A 'WE BEG YOU TO EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A TOTAL CONFRONTATION.' "

15. ~~QTM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – "AGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE OF THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED WITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' "

16 ~~QXM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – "REVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN NEGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT THEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN CRUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

WILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' " ~~JJ~~

17. ~~QUM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 6 ~~Y~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. " ~~JJ~~MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

18. ~~QIN~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL 68, 530 P.M. – ~~A~~ ''JOHNSON POSTPONED HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' " ~~JJ~~AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' " ~~JJ~~THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

MARK F. EFFIELD

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo SKP

SUBJECT
Communist Comments on the Death of Martin Luther King/
Reference to "Black Power" Concept

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

1. Attached for Headquarters retention are one copy each of statements on the death of Martin Luther King by the Dominican Communist Party (PCD), the Communist 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4), and various trade unions. All appeared in the 7 April 1968 issue of El Nacional.

2. The text of the PCD statement makes reference to the visit of Stokely Carmichael to the Latin American Solidarity Organization Conference (LASO), quotes a statement by Fidel Castro on Carmichael and the concept of "Black Power," and expresses the solidarity of the PCD with the struggle of North American Negroes. The MR-1J4 statement, only available in gist, says that King's death reveals the profound crisis existing within US society and shows that for the "racist forces," violence is the only law and is applied to internal and external enemies alike.

3. Neither statement issues a call to violence on the part of US Negroes.

for Stewart R. PATAKER

ATTACHMENT:

As Stated Herewith

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Condenan Asesinato De Martin Luther King

Dos organizaciones izquierdistas condenaron hoy la muerte del reverendo Martín Luther King.

En comunicados separados el Partido Comunista Dominicano y el Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio dicen solidarizarse con el movimiento negro de los Estados Unidos.

El PCD señala que el asesinato del líder pacifista ha tenido "justa respuesta" en la violencia desatada en las ciudades más importantes de los Estados Unidos que ha obligado a que el presidente Johnson cancelara su viaje al exterior para conversaciones de paz en Vietnam.

Dice respaldar la rebelión, y los pronunciamientos del líder negro Stokely Carmichael "ya que el único camino en los Estados Unidos para librarse de la violencia de los males que padece ese pueblo es la violencia revolucionaria que derrumbará el sistema imperialista".

El PCD demandó de las organizaciones políticas y sindicales desarrollar actividades en apoyo a la lucha de los negros norteamericanos.

Por su parte el 14 de Junio consideró que el asesinato del Premio Nóbel de la Paz revela la profunda crisis en que ha entrado la sociedad norteamericana.

Demuestra, según el 14 de Junio, que para las fuerzas racistas la única ley es la violencia y que ésta es aplicada a todo enemigo interno o externo" que se revele contra el imperio brutal".

Entiende la organización política que la muerte del reverendo Luther King es una gran enseñanza para los de su raza que sufren la opresión racista.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA DOMINICANO (PCD)

¡Nuestra solidaridad plena con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos, como parte que es de la lucha de todos los oprimidos de la tierra!

El régimen de los monopolios imperialistas norteamericanos se conmueve por la acción de los pueblos desde fuera con Vietnam al frente, y desde dentro con el gran movimiento por los derechos civiles y por la paz. El asesinato de Luther King, será presentado como la obra de la mano fanática de un racista; pero queda clara la responsabilidad de los interesados en liquidar la acción civil por la violencia, de los interesados en imponer la mordaza a los reclamos del pueblo que cada vez más lucha organizadamente y que comprende los objetivos de esa lucha, de los monopolios imperialistas.

La violencia engendra violencia. Muchos siglos de explotación y de represión han pasado hasta que en los últimos años el negro norteameric[illegible] comienza a organizar su resistencia; y en ello el papel de [illegible]her King es innegable, de los más altos méritos, de la más encomiable abnegación, aunque su prédica de paz no haya sido comprensible por todos los oprimidos ni la más apropiada como lo demuestra su su propia muerte.

Los negros constit[illegible]n en los Estados Unidos el sector más explotado de la clase obrera en el nivel de sueldos, en la discriminación social que asume formas raciales, en la proporción de los que participan en el ejército, en los planes de seguros sociales; por lo que la discriminación y su respuesta en la lucha por los derechos civiles tiene características esencialmente clasistas aunque asuma formas raciales, y por lo que crecientemente este fenómeno es comprendido por las propias masas blancas que apoyan los reclamos civiles de la población de raza africana marginada de la sociedad.

Creen Disturbios Influiran en Dolar

'ARIS, 6 de abril. (AFP).. El allido de los disturbios raciales Estados Unidos, cuya primera al ha sido el asesinato del pas. Martin Luther King, repercu. l en una nueva crisis del dólar, iman hoy aquí los observado.

n efecto, el desencadenamiento la violencia va a obstaculizar saneamiento presupuestario,

También se comprueba ese retraso en las escuelas y centros sociales, así como la estrecha correlación que existe entre el subempleo de una inmensa masa juvenil y su disponibilidad para los disturbios raciales, agrega el ex ministro francés.

Por ello, Washigton proyecta hacer adoptar rápidamente un proyecto de ley al que Martin Luther

---

(ESPACIO PAGADO)

Fidel Castro dijo en la clausura de la Conferencia de la Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad, donde Stokely Carmichael representaba a los norteamericanos organizados en el 'Poder Negro'.

' ...Y es que de ese sector negro, por ser el sector más explotado y reprimido, más brutalmente maltratado en Estados Unidos; surgirá la vanguardia revolucionaria en el seno de los Estados Unidos; y alrededor de ese movimiento revolucionario, que no surge en ese sector por problemas de raza, sino que surge por el problema social, por problema de explotación y opresión, y porque constituye ese sector el más sufrido, por la ley de la historia igual que en todas las épocas de la historia: como ocurrió con los plebeyos en Roma, con los siervos de la gleba en la Edad Media, con los obreros y los campesinos en los tiempos contemporáneos., en la sociedad americana, de ese sector oprimido surgirá el movimiento revolucionario'.

Tan sólo unos días han pasado desde el momento en que Johnson anunciara el retiro de su candidatura presidencial, para fomentar la ilusión de que los políticos llamados liberales llegarían al poder en los próximos meses con su programa de Paz en Vietnam y de respeto a los derechos civiles, cuando la bala disparada contra Luther King colocara su silbido de violencia como la tónica de la política norteamericana inmediata. Los que tienen el poder, los monopolios armamentistas, no lo dejarán pacíficamente, no permitirán la suspensión y la derrota en la guerra de Vietnam sin resistir por todos los medios, sin plantear su propia salida de violencia a todas las masas del mundo.

La muerte de Luther King no es la obra de un fanático, sino que significa la política de un grupo social poderoso. La muerte de Kennedy en poco tiempo se indentificó con una nueva política. La muerte de King es un rasgo más de la inminencia de nuevas y más feroces acciones del imperialismo, de un entronizamiento de la violencia en el poder estatal, que sólo será vencida con el triunfo de los pueblos; y en esa lucha el pueblo negro norteamericano tendrá un importante papel que jugar, juega ya un importante papel, del lado de todos los pueblos del mundo.

¡Nuestra solidaridad plena con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos, como parte que es de la lucha de todos los oprimidos de la tierra!.

Secretariado del Comité Central del Partido
Comunista Dominicano.

Santo Domingo, 6 de abril de 1968.

(ESPACIO PAGADO)

¡PROTESTAMOS POR EL ASESINATO DE MARTIN LUTHER KING!

¡SOLIDARIDAD CON LOS NEGROS EN LUCHA!

Martin Luther King, líder pacifista del movimiento negro norteamericano, Premio Nóbel de la Paz, ha sido asesinado por los opresores de su pueblo y de todos los pueblos explotados del Mundo.

SU DELITO: Luchar por la liberación de los negros, contra la discriminación racial, contra las vejaciones y la explotación que sufren sus hermanos de raza en los Estados Unidos. Es el "delito" que le cargan quienes gobiernan para el mal a todos aquellos que se rebelan, que luchan por la libertad.

La muerte de King ha conmovido al Mundo porque evidencia en forma alarmante hasta dónde pueden llegar los ricachones racistas que controlan el poder en los Estados Unidos.

La violenta rebeldía de los negros y de todos los demócratas comienza de nuevo a estremecer la sociedad norteamericana.

La solidaridad internacional con su causa se expresa en múltiples formas.

Y nosotros, los obreros dominicanos, elevamos nuestra voz de protesta y llamamos a la solidaridad activa con toda manifestación de lucha, que dentro y fuera de los Estados Unidos, exprese el repudio a ese hecho bochornoso.

Adoptamos esta actitud conscientes de que al sumarnos a la protesta mundial nos colocamos junto al sector más oprimido y vejado de la clase obrera norteamericana: los trabajadores negros. Y de que nos situamos de frente a los poderosos que con hipocresía unos y con cinismo otros, dicen lamentar la muerte del líder negro, mientras preparan las bayonetas para tratar de aplastar la lucha desencadenada.

Nada han hecho los gobernantes y oligarcas de nuestra tierra en protesta por el asesinato de Luther King. Duelos interminables hubieran realizado si la acción justiciera de los pueblos hubiera terminado con la vida de Johnson o de otro magnate de la explotación imperialista. Pero Luther King era un representante de los negros explotados, un luchador por los derechos civiles de los negros que a su entender no merecía homenaje alguno.

Sin embargo, Luther King tiene en nosotros a sus representantes dominicanos, a los que encarnamos en esta tierra los intereses del trabajo y del progreso de toda la humanidad. Y por eso, en esta ocasión, también damos un paso al frente:

Llamamos a todos los hombres honestos de nuestra Patria a manifestar su solidaridad con la causa de los negros norteamericanos.

Llamamos a las demás organizaciones de trabajadores a repudiar el asesinato de Luther King y a solidarizarse con la lucha de los negros norteamericanos.

Llamamos a la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo y a los ayuntamientos democráticos del país, para que, amparados en su autonomía, declaren tres días de duelo por el asesinato de Luther King.

Que en las fábricas, en las escuelas, en las oficinas y en todos los centros de trabajo se rinda homenaje al líder asesinado y se exprese nuestro apoyo al pueblo negro de los Estados Unidos que es criminalmente colocado en la primera línea de fuego en Viet-Nam, al mismo tiempo que en su propio país se le somete a la más cruel explotación.

¡MANTENGAMOS LA SOLIDARIDAD ACTIVA HASTA QUE NUESTROS HERMANOS NEGROS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS CONQUISTEN TODOS SUS DERECHOS!

FEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES REVOLUCIONARIOS UNIDOS DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL (FETRUDISNA)
FEDERACION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES PORTUARIOS
FEDERACION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES DE LA INDUSTRIA DE LA CONSTRUCCION Y SUS AFINES (FENATRAICA)
SINDICATO PORTUARIO DE LOS MOLINOS DOMINICANOS
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES PORTUARIOS DE ARRIMO (POASI)
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES DE LOS MOLINOS DOMINICANOS
SINDICATO DE LA SOCIEDAD INDUSTRIAL DOMINICANA (MANICERA)
ASOCIACION DE CHOFERES INDEPENDIENTES (ASOCHOIN)
ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE SANTO DOMINGO
SINDICATO DE TRABAJADORES TELEFONICOS
SINDICATO DE COBRADORES DE AUTOBUSES DE SANTO DOMINGO
SINDICATO DE OPERARIOS SASTRES DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL
SINDICATO DE OBREROS Y EMPLEADOS DEL AYUNTAMIENTO DEL DISTRITO NACIONAL
SINDICATO DE LA PAPELERA INDUSTRIAL
SINDICATO NACIONAL DE CARPINTEROS

022-004-016

022-004-016

El Nacional
7 April 1968

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
KING, MARTIN LUTHER                    201-811911
201-760966                             DBC -09700
SEX M DOB ?                            11 MAR 68
                                       FBI
CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE PLANS FOR A MASSIVE CIVIL DIS-
OBEDIENCE DEMONSTRATION IN THE NATIONS
CAPITAL THIS SPRING
```

R 6803140388

FILE IN 201-260966

201 811911

PCS/ITG
GB0704
1758 ES2

I FILE NO.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief/Kusoda

INFO.
Chief/TH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

33467

SUBJECT RYBAT/FJDUST/PBRUMEN/AMFRISK
Surveillance on IDEN C

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

15 July '66

1. IDEN A, a cleared and witting contact, provided the following information which was obtained during a surveillance of IDEN C. The surveillance was a joint effort of IDEN A and local ODENVY. ODENVY is not aware that IDEN A has passed the information to JMWAVE.

2. On Thursday, 19 May 1966, a surveillance was instituted from Room 618 of IDEN B on adjoining Room 620, which was occupied by IDEN C and his aide IDEN D. The surveillance was initiated at 11:00 a.m. and terminated at 5:15 p.m. During the conversation between IDENS C and D and another unknown Negro male, believed to be IDEN E, references were made to the Florida Gubernatorial Race; a trip to Bimini; and several miscellaneous sex experiences.

3. On 20 May 1966 a search was made of rooms 620 and 622 after IDENS C and D moved out. Forwarded under separate cover are copies of items found in the waste baskets and dressers; a hotel bill, and a list of telephone numbers which were called on 18 - 19 May 1966.

4. Of special interest among these items was a note which stated, IDEN F, please call Long Distance Operator IDEN G. IDEN H, according to IDEN A, is an identified member of the Communist Party. Also, an envelope of IDEN B with the name IDEN I. This person may have been one of the occupants of the room who remained in the company of IDENS C and D overnight.

5. JMWAVE traces were negative on all personalities mentioned above as well as those names appearing in the date forwarded under separate cover. JMWAVE has carded only those personalities who reside in the JMWAVE area.

Attachment:
A. IDENS A-I u/s/c
B. ITEMS u/s/c

PHILIP G. ELMARD

DISTRIBUTION:
③- Chief/KUSODA w/att
1 - Chief, WH Division w/o att

DATE TYPED 15 July 1966	DATE DISPATCHED JUL 18 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT - 16828	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT - 16828

Separate Cover Attachment A to UFGT - 16828

IDEN A	Lt. Leslie J. Van Buskirk Chief, Criminal Intelligence Dade County Public Safety (Metro) Miami, Florida
IDEN B	Miami International Airport
IDEN C	Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr Carded
IDEN D	Bernard Lee Carded → This no doubt is Bernard S. Lee, Jr SCLC Executive [illegible] [illegible] Assistant To Rev. M. L. King, Jr. [illegible] 5/7/68
IDEN E	Dr. Brown
IDEN F	Dr. King, Jr.
IDEN G	#71, Hemstead, N.Y. Telephone # 487-5199 Mr. Harry Wachtell and signed Lillian
IDEN H	Mr. Harry Wachtell
IDEN I	Miss Maxine Thurston

Distribution:
(3)-
1 - Chief, WH Division

ROBERT S. BROWNE, ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY
TEANECK, NEW JERSEY
RESIDENCE: 214 TRYON AVE., TEANECK, N. J.
TELEPHONE: 201 - TE 3-1716

Robert S. Browne

PHONE: 880-0411
"JURIS"

MICHAEL ANTHONY GLEAN
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW

LLOP & LONG
ATTORNEYS

100 MITCHELL STREET, S. W.
LEGAL ARTS BUILDING
COURTHOUSE SQUARE
ATLANTA, GA 30303

Motto: "God First, Others Second, Ourselves Last"

Rev. Wm. Lee Lambert, B.Th., D.D.
PASTOR, GREATER MOUNT HOPE BAPTIST CHURCH
6034-40 S. Princeton Ave. - HYde Park 3-4708
Pres., Interdenominational Ministers Civic League of Ill.
Chairman, Exec. Board, Good Citizenship Org.
Chicago, Ill. 60621

Res. 5676 Normal Blvd. HUdson 7-1195

PHONE RADCLIFFE 3-6798
OR 224-3710

St. Stephen's Evangelical Lutheran Church

HARRY S. ANDERSEN
PASTOR

8500 MARYLAND AVENUE
CHICAGO 19, ILLINOIS

PHONE MO 5-5116 DAY OR NIGHT

Noah Sarvis
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR

1951 S.W. 64 COURT
MIAMI 55, FLORIDA

INSURANCE
INVESTIGATOR

홍 용 기
외신부장
중 앙 일 보 사

Hong, Yong Ki
FOREIGN EDITOR
JOONG-ANG ILBO
SEOUL, KOREA
NEWS COMMENTATOR FOR:
JOONG-ANG RADIO-TV (JBS)
KOREAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM (KBS)

THE TEACHER'S VOICE
36th YEAR OF SERVICE
CTA

MEMBERSHIP
CARD AND
DUES RECEIPT
1965-1966

NAME Ronald R. Young

№ 4273

Pat L. Tornillo, Jr.
PAT L. TORNILLO, JR.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Re 9-4000
44 366

RUTH V. WASHINGTON
REFEREE

STATE OF NEW YORK
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BOARD

50 PARK PLACE
NEW YORK CITY

Au 1-7123

Separate Cover Attach to UFGT-

Separate cover att to UGFT-16828

FRONT

14-00000

6PP23164

A41100
333914

(Ouida Stewart)
LL-08146

Have Dr. Martin 665-5116
Luther King
call this number
tomorrow.
Very important!

Bill + Elaine Calloway
40 W 135th ST
NY, NY
Office AU69593
Home TO29861

Dr. K....
PL 77971
Please Call

CORRECTED ADDRESS

If and when your address and/or school changes after joining CTA, please correct on post card or phone CTA (373-7535). This will insure services.

32 W. 55 St
Advisor to the
Governor for
Women's Special
Events

BACK SIDE of CARDS.

5

FRIDAY

MAR. 1966						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

29

APR. 1966

MAY 1966						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

–APPOINTMENTS–

8:00
8:30
9:00 Dr King Jr.
9:30
10:00 Please Call
10:30
11:00 Long Distance
11:30
12:00 Operator 71
1:00
1:30 Hemstead New York
2:00 487-5199
2:30
3:00 Mr. Harry Wachtell
3:30
4:00
4:30
5:00 Lillian
5:30

Called

Airport Men's Shop, Inc.

MIAMI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

NILS KRUPP

JERRY GALINDO

MIAMI 59, FLORIDA

PHONE NEWTON 5-[illegible]

AIRLINE UNIFORMS & ACCESSORIES ● LUGGAGE ● SHOES

Customer's Order No. Phone No. Date 5-20 1966

Sold To

Address

Sold by	Cash	C.O.D.	Charge	On Acct	Mdse. Ret.	Pd. Out
[illegible]						

QUAN.	DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMOUNT
	Cabana set		1?.95
	Jockeys		4.17
	[illegible]		5.95
	SW Trunks		4.95
	[illegible]		2.50
	Lifter		3.00
			31.35
			3.10
			[illegible]
		TOTAL	[illegible]

THANK YOU

Please keep this copy for reference

No. 122912 Rec'd by [illegible] 24.10

UARCO INCORPORATED

MEMORANDUM

: MARTIN L. KING JR — From:

ubject: PHONE CALLS - — Date:

5/18/66

- 696-8521 ||| - (*) CORA M. KINSEY 1405 NW 51 ST. ✓
- NE-4-4842 — (*) ALICE FRANCIS - 4731 NW 15 Ave
- 758-7650 ||| - MAXINE THURSTON + 2 line Rotary phone
- NE-5-1275 (*) GEORGE A. MILLER 2535 N. RIVER DR., MIA.
- NE-5-2058 (*) PATRICIA D. REEVES (*) GOLDIE JACKSON 5001 N.W. 12 AVE, M.
- NE-5-4949 (*) MRS. MARY J. McCOY 4950 N.W. 15 COURT, MIA MIA
- 888-5211 SEE OTHER SIDE
- NE-3-3311 NATIONAL AIRLINES

5/19/66

- 661-2511 U. OF MIAMI ASHE MEMORIAL BLDG.
- MO7-0006 (*) W. IVAN HOY, 5881 S.W. 52 TER. ✓
- ? 377-3681 GREATER MIA. URBAN LEAGUE
- 758-7659 (*) MAXINE THURSTON, 1302 N.W. 81 TERR. ✓
- 374-4212 | CHALKS FLYING SERVICE, MACARTHUR CAUSEWAY
- 377-9445 MACKEY AIRLINES, FORT LAUD.
- 635-1275 SEE (*) GEORGE A. MILLER ABOVE ✓
- 751-6692 | WCKT TELEVISION STATION
- ? 691-3311 - NAT. AIRLINES
- NE-4-4842 (*) ALICE FRANCIS 4731 NW 15 AVE

duplicate

Cancelled

14-00000

888-5211

AIRWAYS HOTEL
" MOTEL
~~LENNYE~~
LENNYS HIDE A WAY
L.A. WIEN INVESTMENTS
MIAMI AIRWAYS HOTEL
MIAMI AIRWAYS MOTEL

5055 N.W. 36 ST.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

Diners' CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER
03 7906 9 NOV68
[illegible] KING JR

ESTABLISHMENT
[illegible] CLUB
[illegible]

DATE 12/23/65

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS' CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE
X Martin L. King Jr.

SERVICES OTHER THAN RESTAURANTS, HOTELS & MOTELS USE SPACE BELOW FOR CREDIT APPROVAL, LICENSE & SA NUMBERS, WHEN APPLICABLE.

CHECK OR BILL NO. 17027

RECORD OF CHARGE		
17	00	AMT FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE.
	51	TAXES
2	75	TIPS AND MISC.
20	26	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
FORM DC 200 [illegible]
MADE IN U.S.A.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

DINERS CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

CARDHOLDER
DC2203 7906 9 NOV68
DR MARTIN L KING JR

ESTABLISHMENT
THE DINERS CLUB
3212113884
SHERATON CHICAGO HOTEL
CHICAGO ILL

DATE

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE

SERVICES OTHER THAN RESTAURANTS, HOTELS & MOTELS USE SPACE BELOW FOR CREDIT APPROVAL, LICENSE & SA NUMBERS, WHEN APPLICABLE.

CHECK OR BILL NO.

RECORD OF CHARGE		
18	[illegible]	AMT FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE.
[illegible]	[illegible]	TAXES
		TIPS AND MISC.
[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS CLUB.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
FORM DC 200 REV. 9/65
MADE IN U.S.A.

S. Nelson
2345044

Henry
7239125

14-00000

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

CARDHOLDER · EXPIRES

[illegible]03 7906 9 NOV65
DR MARTIN L KING JR

The Diners' Club
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK N. Y. 10019

ESTABLISHMENT

[illegible] CLUB
[illegible]

DATE 12/23/65

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE
X Martin L. King Jr.

11027

CHECK OR BILL NO.

RECORD OF CHARGE	
17 00	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE.
51	TAXES
2 75	TIPS AND MISC.
20 26	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

FORM DC 200 [illegible]
MADE IN U.S.A.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

CARDHOLDER · EXPIRES

DC2203 7906 9 NOV66
DR MARTIN L KING JR

DINERS CLUB
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

ESTABLISHMENT

THE DINERS CLUB
3212113884
SHERATON CHICAGO HOTEL
CHICAGO ILL

DATE

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB, INC. ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE
X

CHECK OR BILL NO.

RECORD OF CHARGE		
18	50	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE.
1	72	TAXES
		TIPS AND MISC.
21	[illegible]	TOTAL

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

FORM DC 200 REV. 9/65
MADE IN U.S.A.

J. Nelson
234-5044

3267 N. [illegible]
[illegible]
2349

Mar Lu King
Thursday
8:30 P.M.
Univ. of Miami
Dean Hines —
8:30
at 1 Miller Dr.
by girls Dorm.

MIAMI International
AIRPORT HOTEL
DIRECTLY ATOP THE NEW MIAMI AIRPORT TERMINAL
P. O. BOX 2094 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33159

Miss Maxine Thurston

Dup.

SECRET

THE Diamond MENS SHOP

AMERICANA HOTEL
7th Ave. & 53rd. St.

NEW YORK CITY
LT 1-7200

Customer's Order No. 231541 Date 3/16 1966

M. Dr. K. Lee

Address Room 2225

SOLD BY	CASH	C.O.D.	CHARGE	ON ACCT.	MDSE RETD.	PAID OUT

QUAN.	DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMOUNT
2	Ties		20 —
4	Hankies 1.50		6 —
			26 —
			1.30
	Room Chg		27.30
	# 22640		

ALL claims and returned goods MUST be accompanied by this bill

37471 Rec'd by

TAX
TOT.

SHELBY BUSINESS FORMS INC. SHELBY OHIO NCR PAPER PATD & O

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT - SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR EXPENSE RECORD

CARDHOLDER
C. 2203-7906-9
DR MARTIN L. KING JR
EXPIRES NOV 66

ESTABLISHMENT
310-910-102-6
AIRPORT MENS SHOP
MIAMI 59, FLA.

DATE 1/20/66

THE AMOUNT OF THE CHARGES RECORDED HEREON WERE INCURRED BY ME AND I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH AMOUNT TO THE DINERS CLUB INC ONLY.

CARDHOLDER'S SIGNATURE
X

The Diners' Club
10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

RECORD OF CHARGE

16.95	AMT. FOR PURCHASE OF SERVICE OR MDSE
.51	TAXES
	TIPS AND MISC.
17.46	TOTAL

CHECK OR BILL NO.

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT
REMIT ONLY TO THE DINERS' CLUB

CARDHOLDER'S RECEIPT

FORM DC MADE IN U.S.A.

ANALYSIS OF CHARGES

FILE NO.

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

APR 7 1 12 PM '66

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/AN

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WE/1/R			12/4	MJ
2.				
3.				
4. WE/1/CE				
5.				
6. WE/BC E. Biller		13 APR 1966	13 APR 1966	
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

WE/1 CHRONO - [illegible]

IP/[illegible]	X	[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
IP/FILES		[illegible]

FBI Request

Reclassify
100-2-18

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE: 100-002-018

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): ~~201-760966~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 30 MAR 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER: OWOA 19623

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London
INFO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of Station, Oslo
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache, London
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Leon S. TOZALL

201-760466

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

Distribution:
2 - COS, London w/att
2 - Chief, WE w/att

CS COPY

100-003-018
~~201-760466~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GROUP 1
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OWOA-19623
DATE: 30 March 1966
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY

100-002-018

~~201-260966~~

att #1 to OWOK 19623

SECRET

att to OWCA-19621

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

30 NOV 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Martin Luther KING, Jr.

1. Reference is made to a communication from your Bureau dated 28 August 1964 concerning proposed travel to Western Europe of Martin Luther KING, Jr. Reference noted that subject planned to visit Rome, Italy, on 18 and 19 September 1964.

2. This Agency has received the following information on subject from a source who is considered unreliable. Dr. Martin Luther KING met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September 1964 in Rome. He discussed with these Italian politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead. Dr. KING reportedly conferred with PCI Senators Velio SPANO and Ugo BARTESAGHI, with PSI Senator Paolo VITTORELLI, and with Deputy Lucio LUZZATO of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP).

3. This Agency is unable to evaluate the above report.

4. The information in paragraph two has been made available to your Bureau's representative in Rome.

CSCI-316/02051-64

WE/4/CE/ R. Brockmeyer: ams (24 November 1964)

100-2-4

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - RI (201-760966)
2 - WE/4/CE
Based on: OIRT-6733 dated 20 October 1964

100-2-4

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CS COPY

201 760 966

30 Nov 1964

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [illegible]

EXTENSION:

NO. [illegible]

DATE: 23 NOV 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/Support			RC	23 NOV 1964 orig WE/4 WAT
2.				
3. WE/4	25 NOV 1964		[illegible]	CHRONO
4. Gore		27/11	RCG	
5. Thoenen			dt	
6. Brizzetti			EMB	
7. CE		30 Nov 64		
8. DC/WE/4				
9.				Gelbroth 201-760966 used last [illegible] [illegible] Pinasacita
10. CI/ICG/R	Direct Call			Could your office forward the Correct file for this, or other disposition. Thank you WE/4/CE/h x1794
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RI/FI				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

VIA COURIER POUCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Rome

SUBJECT: KEYWAY/Support
PCI Publication of Articles by Martin Luther KING

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OIRT-6733, 20 October 1964

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information.

Forwarded herewith is a memorandum prepared for PRESLAND's information concerning an article attributed to Martin Luther KING that appeared in the 22 October issue of the PCI organ, Vie Nuove. Also forwarded is a copy of the 24 October issue of Rinascita which reprints on its last page an article by KING that, according to an editorial note, was originally published in The Nation.

Kenneth L. Pettijohn
KENNETH L. PETTIJOHN

Attachments: as stated.

Distribution:
3-C/WE, w/atts.

NOV 17 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

DATE TYPED
16 Nov 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRT-06783

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
100-2-4

Attachment to: OIRT-06783
16 Nov 64

SUBJECT: Article by Martin Luther King in Vie Nuove,
22 October 1964.

1. The article entitled "What We Negroes Ask of the President" and attributed to Martin Luther King, published on pages 15 and 17 of the 22 October 1964 issue of the Italian Communist Party organ Vie Nuove, is a straightforward expression of the hopes and aspirations of the American Negro population and of its determination to continue the struggle by non-violent means until full social and economic equality has been obtained. The article does not contain anything which could be considered as typical communist propaganda nor anything that seems to be directed specifically to a communist audience. The article, under King's byline, would be perfectly proper for any American publication.

2. At the beginning of the article, Vie Nuove includes the following editorial comment:

> The racial problem is one of the subjects that most divides the American states in this presidential election. This article, by Martin Luther King, that we published exclusively, illuminates its most dramatic aspects and expresses the requests that the colored population advances to the entire nation. It is a denunciation of the inequality of rights that goes beyond the secular racial question. The "you must respect my person" is a request that the problem of Democracy poses for everyone.

3. Despite the date of its publication the article appears to have been written some months ago. This is evident from King's reference in the article to the fact that the Civil Rights Bill was before Congress at the time he was writing the article. The Bill, it will be recalled, was enacted into law on 2 July 1964. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the article's appearance in Vie Nuove or at least, its composition by King, is not the direct result of any contacts that King may have had with PCI officials during his visit to Rome in mid-September.

attachment to -
OIRT-06783
16 Nov 64

pag. 3 Rinascita

100-3-14

Rinascita

Settimanale fondato da Palmiro Togliatti

N. 42 - anno 21 Sabato 24 ottobre 1964 L. 100

Lotta
di classe
riunificazione
olitica

Interviste con
ecchietti
ombardi

La politica del Ventesimo

Le decisioni di Mosca, per l'importanza dell'avvenimento, per il peso che esso è chiamato ad avere nelle prospettive della vita sovietica e del movimento operaio internazionale, non potevano non suscitare interrogativi, non diventare argomento di riflessione e di dibattito ben oltre le frontiere dell'Unione Sovietica. La procedura di quelle decisioni e il modo contraddittorio, tale da lasciare ancora vaste zone d'ombra, col quale sono state comunicate, hanno certo determinato [illegible] è che l'affanno della crisi del centro-sinistra e del naufragio delle sue prospettive politiche impedisce a certi democratici e a taluni socialisti di guardare al di là dei voti delle prossime elezioni municipali, anche quando si tratta della prospettiva mondiale. Con il risultato, crediamo, di non veder chiaro nè quello che può accadere nel mondo, nè quello che accadrà nel municipio.

A noi spetta ribadire, anche in questa occasione, una [illegible] che ci pare fondamentale [illegible]

Carri armati a Jackson

di Martin Luther King

Martin Luther King jr., leader del movimento integrazionista antirazziale è stato insignito del premio Nobel della pace. Dall'ultimo dei suoi rapporti annuali sullo stato della lotta delle popolazioni americane di colore, pubblicato da The Nation *stralciamo la parte centrale in cui vengono affrontati i problemi di tattica e strategia della battaglia ancora in corso. Anche i disegni che illustrano la pagina sono ripresi da* The Nation.



Per molti anni, nel passato, la lotta per i diritti dei negri è stata ostacolata da una confusa molteplicità di tattiche. Nel primo periodo del governo Kennedy, si è sostenuto che l'azione governativa era uno strumento più efficace di quella legislativa; si affermò che le leggi esistevano ma non erano applicate, e che pertanto un più energico intervento governativo sarebbe bastato a determinare profondi cambiamenti.

Prima ancora che il movimento per i diritti civili impostasse una seria campagna in quella direzione, l'emergenza di un movimento rivoluzionario di massa concentrò di nuovo l'attenzione sull'iniziativa legislativa; e da allora l'istanza fondamentale cui l'opinione pubblica guarda è il Congresso.

Gli atti legislativi, come le sentenze dei tribunali, affermano un diritto, ma non lo attuano automaticamente: in ultima analisi, sarà l'azione governativa a determinare l'effetto pratico delle leggi. Quanto possano essere illusori gli effetti benefici dei provvedimenti legislativi è esemplificato dal fatto che, da molti anni, una legge federale ha autorizzato la creazione di uffici elettorali federali per l'iscrizione degli elettori in quelle zone in cui il diritto di voto è violato: eppure, ancor oggi nessuno di quegli uffici ha iscritto un solo elettore negro. Un esempio ancor più clamoroso di carenza governativa, come ha messo in rilievo il dottor Howard Zinn, è che nemmeno la legislazione sui diritti civili approvata nel 1866 è stata mai applicata nel Sud. Il codice penale americano, al titolo 10, sezioni 241 e 242, stabilisce che un funzionario il quale neghi a un cittadino l'esercizio dei suoi diritti costituzionali, o chiunque agisca con questo obiettivo, commette un delitto, ma le violazioni di questo articolo sono ben più numerose dei rari casi in cui il ministero della Giustizia ne ha invocato l'applicazione.

Il fatto è che la legislazione federale è violata nel Sud in modo così massiccio che non è esagerazione affermare che l'unità federale del paese è poco più di un'illusione. Per il negro del Sud è solo un tragico mito: è stato sfruttato, imprigionato o assassinato, e sebbene la legge federale avrebbe potuto raggiungere i colpevoli non è stato fatto nulla per diminuire l'oppressione di cui il negro è vittima.

Le violazioni più tragiche e frequenti si verificano nelle zone in cui la brutalità della polizia non ha un freno, e in cui sono in vigore leggi statali chiaramente illegali contro i negri. Molti americani bianchi del Nord non si rendono conto di quanto sia brutale il comportamento della polizia, e di quanto questo stato di cose sia generalizzato. Il Comitato per i diritti civili, dopo aver compiuto uno studio molto attento e scrupoloso, ha dichiarato che questo è [illegible] avverte questa realtà solo quando si svolgono manifestazioni negre non violente, e quindi è convinta di aver assistito a un episodio sporadico di repressione eccessiva: non si rende conto, invece, che quel tipo di comportamento da parte della polizia è abituale, e non eccezionale.

La brutalità poliziesca con la connivenza o, nel migliore dei casi, tra l'indifferenza della comunità, è una esperienza quotidiana dei negri in troppe zone del Sud. I negri vivono in uno stato di polizia che, paradossalmente, prospera in seno a una repubblica democratica. In tale situazione, un'occasionale denuncia del governo federale, seguita da un processo che si trascinerà per anni, non può essere certo ritenuta un freno efficace e anzi, spesso, è ancor peggio della rinuncia ad agire, perchè dimostra la futilità e la debolezza del potere federale.

Molti si domandano come mai le dimostrazioni e le lotte nel Sud tendono a estinguersi rapidamente dopo un avvio vigoroso e una somma di eroici sacrifici: la risposta è che i negri sono stati sconfitti dalla forza bruta. Un apparato statale abituato da generazioni ad agire nella più assoluta impunità, può ricorrere all'impiego di qualsiasi strumento di potere incontrollato: un'azione legale federale, o le sporadiche e spesso inutili crisi di coscienza federali, non aiutano i negri in questa impari battaglia più di un amichevole colpetto sulla spalla.

I negri hanno trovato nell'azione diretta non violenta uno strumento miracoloso ~~contro~~ l'impiego della forza bruta, ma non è uno strumento risolutivo. Quando la luce di migliaia di riflettori è puntata sulle violenze della polizia del Sud, pistole e manganelli vengono temporaneamente rinfoderati, ma l'impudenza del costume imperante nel Sud è tale che, nonostante sia osservata dagli occhi di milioni di testimoni, la polizia continua a impiegare contro i negri strumenti barbarici come i bastoni elettrificati per il bestiame e gli idranti ad alta pressione. E quando il delitto può essere compiuto con il favore della notte, la criminalità tocca il fondo, come testimonia la uccisione con una bomba di quattro bambini di una scuola domenicale. Assassinii, mutilazioni, fustigazioni e lancio di bombe sono altre testimonianze eloquenti.

Quando i *carri armati della polizia di Birmingham apparvero alla ribalta; sembrò una manifestazione grottesca ma rara di furia poliziesca* locale. Nelle settimane scorse, il sindaco di Jackson, Mississippi, si è vantato delle ingenti forze armate preparate per la prossima estate: un carro armato « Thompson » di 13.000 *pound*, con dodici uomini a bordo armati di fucili, mitragliatori e bombe lacrimogene, tre autocarri per il trasporto di truppe, tre autoblindo con riflettori, tre autocarri pesanti con rimorchio e circa 500 uomini, oltre a una forza di riserva di truppe statali, di impiegati dell'amministrazione comunale e di pattuglie di civili. Questo esercito locale attende le manifestazioni non violente con evidente ostilità e con la consueta facilità a far uso delle armi.

Non si può non concludere che i negri, i quali hanno dimostrato un coraggio eccezionale nella loro azione diretta non violenta, sono stati abbandonati dal più potente governo del mondo. Hanno subito la violenza per rivelare quanto profondo sia il loro dramma e per elevare la loro protesta: il governo non ha saputo invece venire in loro aiuto che con il minimo di coraggio e di decisione.

Questa contraddizione deve essere assolutamente risolta. Leggi e comitati inter-razziali non possono trasformare una comunità quando coloro i quali detengono il potere locale sanno di poter ricorrere all'uso della forza mentre il potere centrale temporeggia. Nel mondo esistono governi i quali non sono in grado di controllare alcune zone del paese, così come il governo americano di cent'anni or sono non controllava le zone abitate dalle tribù indiane. Oggi siamo vicini all'anno 2000, e la nostra potenza nazionale è quasi senza limiti: eppure, il governo non è in grado di far applicare la legge nemmeno in un piccolo, polveroso villaggio del Sud.

Il governo non ha oramai altra alternativa che affrontare in modo del tutto nuovo il problema. Il vigore del movimento per i diritti civili non è destinato a estinguersi, perchè i negri conoscono ora la loro forza reale e non rinunceranno a ricono-



14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID/DEP
[illegible]

EXTENSION

NO. 01RT-6733

DATE 29 OCT 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. We/Support			ae
2.			
3.			
4. we14	29 OCT 1964		
5. [illegible]			RLy
6. ~~CI~~ CE		2 Nov 64	S
7. C/WE/4/RE	8 NOV 1964		[illegible]
8. C/WE/4/CE			[illegible]
9. WE/4/CE/rb		1 Dec 64	rb
10.			
11. CI/OPS/WE	6	6	CG
12.			
13. WE/4/CE		30 Nov 64	rb
14.			
15. RID/ ~~[illegible]~~ Files			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

29 OCT 1964

orig +1 we14

[illegible]

T CHRONO

5-6: We should anticipate FBI wanting to know more about the content of these reported meetings? It makes a world of difference in interpretation.

Info in attached 01RT-6733 being forwarded to FBI in CSCI-316/02051-64.

---

drafted 6 Nov 64. rt

Please file in ~~[illegible]~~ 100-2-4

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

VIA COURIER POUCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE Attn: Chief, WE/4

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Rome

SUBJECT
KEYWAY
Meeting of Dr. Martin Luther KING with Italian Leftist Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For Your Information.

1. Following is a translation of a report on the subject: "The Mission of Luther KING with the Italian Left", dated 28 September 1964 and attributed to DEPLENARY/7, from Luigi PINTOR, from information coming into the editorial offices of L'UNITA. The Station received the report on 1 October 1964. PSIUP

> "Luther KING, noted Protestant negro Pastor and 'leader' of the anti-racist movement in the United States, met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September in Rome. In particular, KING conferred with PCI Senators Velio SPANO and Ugo BARTESAGHI, with PSI Deputy Lucio LUZZATO, and with Senator Paolo VITTORELLI of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity. KING discussed with the above-named politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States, which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead." ? PSI

2. The same report was also received from DEDICATOR/4 who has access to the DEPLENARY establishment and thus it is not considered as confirming the DEPLENARY/7 information.

(Continued)

Attachment: h/w.
Copy of a report passed to local ODENVY rep.

Distribution:
3-C/WE, w/att.

OCT 20 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
16 Oct 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRT - 06733

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
100-2-4
~~201-760966~~

3. Given the source of the above report, we view it with some reserve. In this connection, we noted the 19 September issue of L'UNITA, which reflected an article on KING's private audience with Pope Paul held the preceding day. According to L'UNITA, immediately after the audience, in St. Peter's Square, KING stated that "Pope Paul was most clear on the fact that both he, personally, and the Catholic Church support the cause of civil rights". The article also states that in a press conference held at Fiumicino Airport after the audience KING said, "The Pope will shortly make a public statement on racial segregation". We have no other information at this time.

4. Attached is a copy of the report which we have passed to the local ODENVY representative.

RANDOLPH A. MEDFORD

Attachment to OIRT-06733

16 Oct 1964

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Italy/USA

REPORT NO. CS

SUBJECT Meeting of Dr. Martin Luther King with Italian Leftist Personalities

DATE DISTR

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 28 September 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Italy, Rome (1 October 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. OIRT-06733

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An unwitting leftist oriented journalist (F) with contacts in Italian Communist Party (PCI) circles in Rome from information that was available to editorial offices of L'Unita, the PCI daily newspaper. Reports from this source over the past few years have varied from mediocre and below in quality and in accuracy. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Luther King, noted Protestant negro Pastor and "leader" of the anti-racist movement in the United States, met with various leaders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) on 18 September in Rome. In particular, King conferred with PCI Senators Velio Spano and Ugo Bartesaghi, with ~~PSI~~ Deputy Lucio Luzzato, and with Senator Paolo Vittorelli of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). King discussed with the above-named politicians the program of demonstrations against segregation in the United States, which are to be organized in Italy during the months immediately ahead.

Field Comment: Given the source of the above report, we view it with some reserve. In this connection, we noted the 19 September issue of L'Unita, which reflected an article on King's private audience with Pope Paul held the preceding day. According to L'Unita, immediately after the audience, in St. Peter's Square, King stated that "Pope Paul was most clear on the fact that both he, personally and the Catholic Church support the cause of civil rights". The article also states that in a press conference held at Fiumicino Airport after the audience King said, "The Pope will shortly make a public statement on racial segregation". We have no other information at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	

(Note Field distribution indicated by "•".)

TOTALS

LIAISON

COORDINATING RELEASING

Attachment to ORT-6733
16 Oct 64

Pruland
Pettyohn
Medford

S. DEDICATOR/4

recd 15/10/64 evening

Luther King,noto pastore protestante negro,e leader del movimento antirazzista degli Stati Uniti,si è incontrato il 18 settembre u.s. a Roma con diversi esponenti del PCI e del PSI.In modo particolare egli ha conferito coll'on Velio Spano,del PCI,coll'on Ugo Bartesaghi(PCI),coll'on Lucio Luzzatto del PSIUP e col senatore Paolo Vittorelli del PSI.Il Pastore King ha discusso con loro le manifestazioni contro il segregazionismo negli Stati Uniti,che si dovrebbero organizzare nei prossimi mesi in Italia.

Attachment 6 - DIRT-6733
16 Oct 64

SEGRETO
28 SET. 1964

OGGETTO: La missione di Luther King presso le sinistre italiane
VALUTAZIONE: Ottima
FONTE: Attendibile/UU

S: Deplenary 17
R: 1 Oct 64

Luther King, noto pastore protestante negro, è "leader" del movimento antirazzista degli Stati Uniti, si è incontrato il 18 settembre u.s. a Roma con diversi esponenti del P.C.I. e del P.SI.

In modo particolare il King ha conferito con il Sen. Velio Spano, della vice presidenza della Commissione Centrale di Controllo del P.C.I., con l'On. Ugo Bartesaghi (P.C.I.), con l'On. Lucio M. Luzzatto del P.S.I.U.P. e con il Sen. Paolo Vittorelli del P.S.I.

Il pastore King ha discusso con i predetti unmini politici il programma di manifestazioni contro il segregazionismo negli Stati Uniti, che si dovrebbero organizzare nei prossimi mesi in Italia.

Riferita da Luigi Pintor. Notizie affluite alla redazione de "l'Unità".

100 - 2 - 4

SECRET

10 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payment to Edward G. Tichborn (P)

1. On 9 May this office received a telegram (in the file) from Tichborn (P) dated 5 May 1960 in which he stated that he had not yet received his check for $650.00 from (Ashmead, Hanniford 24 Associates)

2. The undersigned contacted Mr. Thomas Strange, Cover Division, to find out the reason for this delay. After following up this request he informed me that said check had cleared Tichborn's (P) California bank on 27 April, the Federal Reserve on 29 April and is now in Cover Division as a cancelled check.

3. I tried to phone Tichborn (P) late Monday afternoon (9 May) but he was not in his office. I reached him this morning and advised him that the money had been deposited in his bank on the date noted above. Tichborn (P) said he had not checked with the bank but would do so.

Evalena S. Vidal
Political Action Division

SECRET

08

(G33203)

2/nd

SECRET

DOCUMENT

Box Number: JFK64-10
Source Number: 104-10174-10031
CADRE Ref ID: C00556281
Pub Date: 05/05/1960
Pages: 1

C00556281

104-10174-10031

SECRET

CLASS OF SERVICE
This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM
W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS
DL = Day Letter
NL = Night Letter
LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

LLF429 OB154 LA610

L LLJ201 PD LOS ANGELES CALIF 5 250P PDT

[illegible] MAY 5 PM 6 02

HENRY DARKIN
PO BOX 8105 SOUTHWEST STATION WASHDC

NO WORD FROM (ASHMEAD) YET. PLEASE CHECK. MAY HAVE MISMAILED.
24
BEST REGARDS
(HENRY LOPEZ.)
08

201(253203)
08

3/p

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payment to Bivard G. Tichborn (P)

Tichborn's (P) accountings for the advance given him in connection with his Cuban trip were processed and found in order. The remaining half of his salary ($650.00) which was to be paid upon the completion of his assignment was then processed through the appropriate Finance and Cover channels (hand-carried). The check, drawn on Ashmead, Haniford Associates in the amount of $650.00 was cleared and left with Cover Division late Friday afternoon 22 April 1960. Cover Division said it would be forwarded that day to Ashmead, Haniford Associates in Philadelphia who would then mail it to Tichborn's (P) California bank, on the following Monday - 25 April 1960.

Evalena S. Vidal

Orig. - Subject File
1 - Chrono

~~SECRET~~

201-(253203)
08

5/N

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

4 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with 05 Henry P. Lopes at Carleton Hotel. PP/PA representatives were Horace Davis and Eveline Vidal. 03 WH representatives were Robert Reynolds (Pitcher) and Philip Toomey (Thompson). The meeting took place 15 January 1960 1200 hours to 1540 hours.

He read the PP staff report on opposition groups (sanitized) and the report (sanitized) on the Indian political action operation. 24

05 Lopes was briefed by Mr. 03 Reynolds on the current situation in Cuba. He was given a check for $1300 and instructions to call Benjamin Evans at the Embassy and use the name Fred Morse.

Mr. 05 Lopes stated that he foresaw no problems in getting around in 08,06 Cuba. He mentioned that one of his friends in the Harvard Graduate School, Regino Boti Leon, was now in the Castro 08 Cabinet and that he and Boti had dated the same girl who was now in New York. He intended to phone 06 the girl on his stop-over in New York to renew acquaintance.

05 Lopez was told about security precautions and that Mr. Evans would brief him further on contacts to be made. Mr. Davis asked when he would be back here and 05 Lopes said about the second of February. Davis said that we would tape his remarks at that time. 05 Lopes was asked to keep accurate account of his arrivals and departures for accounting purposes.

03
(P. TOOMEY)
WH/4/PP

08

SECRET

1 February 1960

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with 05 (Henry P. Lopez) at the Statler-Hilton Hotel on 1 February 1960 from 1000 hours to 1530 hours.

1. Those present were Mrs. Vidal PP/PA, 03 (Alexander Hunter) (Williams) PP/EAD, Charles Penney (Twiss) WH/PW, and (Philip Toomey) (Thompson) WH/4/PP.

2. Mr. 05 (Lopez) gave a report of his 03 contacts 03 in Cuba after 05 receiving his notes which were brought up by Mr. (Noel) and given to Mr. (Lopez) by Mr. 05 (Toomey). Mr. 05 (Lopez) said that he had given biographical sketches of Echevarria, Rasco, Laureano Batista, Martinez Fraga, Ruben de Leon and Sanchez Arango to the Station representative. He had also turned over a report of Martinez Fraga on the aims of the Recuperacion de la Revolucion.

3. Mr. 05 (Lopez') report was taped and a transcript will be forwarded to WH by PP/PA.

4. Specific recommendations made by Mr. 05 (Lopez) included having Herbert Matthews go to Havana and try to influence Castro. Matthews has a good reputation throughout the 26th of July Movement and could help in an approach to Castro. A visit by Ed Murrow to do a broadcast on Cuba was also recommended. Mr. 05 (Lopez) feels that Castro will be in power for a long time to come and that we should try to influence him. He is seriously affected by any defections and these might be encouraged. Castro can be hit by defections of overworked and countermanded officials. Two men who were mentioned as ripe for defection are Rufo in Hacienda and Cepero in Comercio. Mr. 05 (Lopez) also recommended contact with Padre Alberto de Castro in Caracas. This padre was formerly Fidel's instructor. When Fidel was in Caracas he was scolded by Padre Castro whom Fidel treated with great respect according to Bosco. The Padre and Fidel spent about one and one half hours alone together at this time. This priest should be checked as a possible influence on Fidel. The possibility of a split between Fidel and Raul should be exploited. Raul is cold and mean and the fact that he is Fidel's brother does not carry too much weight.

03 (P. TOOMEY)
WH/4/PP

SECRET

08

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DRAFT

2 February 196

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Edward G. Tichborn(P)

1. Edward G.Tichborn(P) arrived in Washington from his trip to Cuba during the night of 31 January 1960/. He was debriefed at the Hotel Statler from about 1000 to 1530 hours on 1 February. Those present at the debriefing were Messrs. 03 Phil Toomey and Charles Penney from WH Division, Mr. 03 Alexander Hunter PP/EAD, and the Undersigned. This debriefing was very interesting and resulted inx a good deal of pertinent information. The three and a half reels of tape derived fxxx therefrom are now being transcribed by this office. Some of the more salient points are noted below.

XX

2. Some of the operational information and suggestions offered by Tichborn are the following:

a. There appears to be little chance of a coalition of the opposition groups at this time or in the near future since they are not well organized and each group xxxx would want to be the leader of such an effort. Also, according to the members of the opposition to whom Tichborn talked, it is the general consensus of opinion that Fidel Castro is in no danger of loosing his grip or the devotion of his followersx for some time to come.

b. Fidel Castro seems to become most xt upset and almost paniced by defections. Possessing a "Messiah-type complex" he cannot bear the thought of someone leaving the fold. Rather than to let such defections pass on unnoticed, he feels compelled to give reasons and make excuses. This then blows the matter up perhaps out of proportion and quickly becomes a matter of public knowledge. Tichborn feels that the inducement of defections could perhaps have more effect on Castro than any other single, rational action we might undertake.

c. There appears to be a relatively long-standing schism between the brothers Fidel and Raoul Castro. Raoul is the more cold individual. As an example, Fidel once ordered some 400 prisoners to be returned safely to their homes, but Raoul had a number of them killed. The general feeling in Cuba is that Fidel is not a Communist, but that Raoul is undoubtedly at least a fellow-traveller. Developing or exploiting this schism could therefore, be operationally advantageous. (The fact that they are brothers would probably have little effect on Fidel who has already reduced hixxxxx the land holdings of his mother and another brother in conformity with the agrarian reform program and who jailed his sister, and fired a Minister, over a shake-down on an insurance deal.)

3. Of special operational interest were several individuals Tichborn mentioned who might have some influence on Fidel Castro and hence might be of

(5323)
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operational interest. They are:

a. Father(Padre) Alberto de Castro: he is a Jesuit priest presently located in Caracas, Venezuela, who had been a teacher of Fidel Castro during his youth. Castro was in Venezuela and saw Father de Castro there during which time the latter criticized Fidel for some of his actions. In spite of the fast that this remonstration occured in front of some of Fidel's men, and they later chatted alone for an hour. the latter treated him with great respect. It was felt by Tichborn's source of this information, and by Tichborn, that Father de Castro undoubted has some influence over Castro. Tichborn suggested that it would be of value to determine whether or not Fidel has any regular contact with Father de Castro and if so, what operational potential he might have.

b. Herb Mathews: he is a journalist with the N.Y.Times and was the only American newspaperman covering the Castro story prior to his final success. While Tichborn was in Cuba, a front page article ~~px~~ appeared in Revolucion (the regime's press spokesman) on Mathews. It was a sort of editorial and praised Mathews as a "real man" and one who understood the revolution and its aims. Tichborn feels that it might be to our advantage to get into contact with Mathews since he appears to have the confidence of the administration.

c. Professor José Rosco: Subject is on the faculty of the Universidad de Villanueva and is a contemporary of Fidel Castro. They were classmates and both were debators although according to Rosco, Castro did not make the Debating Society of which he(Rosco) was the presidentOnce after the revolution, Rosco attended a speech Castro made and after the oration, the latter asked Rosco what he thought of it. Upon hearing some criticism, he wanted to know how it could have been improved. Since Castro was leaving for Venezuela and the United States he asked Rosco to accompany him in order that they could discuss the matter further. Tichborn feels that Rosco (a member of the opposition) ~~hxx~~ probably has more influence on Castro than Rosco realizes and that this possibility would be worth looking into.

d. Edward R.Murrow: he produced a TV program on Castro and Tichborn feels that he might have established a rapport with Castro during this period.

4. One of the contacts Tichborn made in Cuba (the Director of Tourism) asked him if he knew of anyone who would be interested in coming to Cuba on an all-expenses-paid visit in order to write articles (or other similar propaganda) on present day Cuba. Tichborn mentioned Clete Roberts, a popular radio and TV commentator in Los Angeles as a possible candidate. (Tichborn also discussed this matter with Horace W. Davis.) Tichborn will mention this possibility to Roberts upon his return to California.

5. While in Cuba, Tichborn accidently met a young lady who later revealed to him that she was "an agent for the ~~$\emptyset$~~State Department". He felt that this was a security matter and that it should be brought to our attention for that purpose. Mr.05 (Toomey) did not recognize the name; it is being further checked out with WH Division. The incident and the details will be made the subject of a separate memorandum for CI Staff.

IPJ

6. On the administrative side, Mr. Tichborn will forward by mail his financial accounting, one copy to the cover company and the other to Henry W. Darkin(P). The cover letter which was provided him ihw the event that he came to the attention of the Cuban authorities was returned to us and is now in his file. (There was no necessity for its use.) Tichborn inquired as to the possibility of receiving reimbursement for medical expenses which will undoubtedly be incurred upon his return to California due to a possible hernia which developed in New York on his return trip en route to Washington. This is being checked out by this office. Tichborn departed for Los Angeles (having been taken to Fraindship International Airport by ~~Henry W. Darkin~~) at about 1800 hours on 1 February 1960.

Evalena S. Vidal

RETURN TO CIA
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Edward G. Tichborn's bank is as follows:

08

Bank of America
Wilshire-Sweetzer Branch,
6507 Wilshire Blvd.,
Los Angeles 48, California

The check for the $2,000 operational advance was drawn on a check of the cover company. It was mailed from Washington with an accompanying letter written by Tichborn stating that it should be deposited to his Commercial Account. Date of writing and forwarding was 15 January 1960.

The $650 check for ½ of his total salary, should be mailed to the same bank and credited to his Commercial Account.

E.S.V.
19 Jan 60

(25322-3)
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2/pd

14-00000
104-10174-10043 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

120

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

The following is set forth as clarification of your present mission, and the procedures which will be followed in the conduct of it. Please indicate your agreement by signing below.

A. Operational

1. You will be briefed generally on some aspects of the Cuban situation while in Washington on this date.

2. The major briefing to be given you concerning the local political situation, security precautions, and more detailed instructions on your present mission will be undertaken upon your arrival in Havana.

3. Upon arrival in Havana a tourist card will be issued by the Cuban Immigration authorities. You will give your true name and occupation in the United States and state that you are in that area as a "tourist".

4. Your initial contact in Havana will be with IDEN A (name and telephone number attached hereto). When making this call, you will identify yourself as Fred Morse.

5. IDEN A will then give you the briefing mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

6. IDEN A will also arrange to put you in contact with about two individuals for the purpose of starting you on your assignment. It is anticipated that other leads and contacts will result from these introductions, both in Havana and the interior.

7. When talking to any local contacts you make while in Cuba, your cover story will be the following: that you are talking to them on the behalf of some (unnamed) American businessmen and investors in order to assess discreetly their position and legal resources as concerns the revolutionary laws and to determine the possibility for future financial development and investments.

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8. We are providing you with a letter from a cover company (attached hereto) which you will use only in the case of extreme emergency in the event that you come to the attention of the Cuban authorities. This letter states that you are there on a vacation and that this company has asked you to get some first-hand information on the subjects mentioned in paragraph 7 above while there if you are so inclined. This will provide you with a plausible excuse for being both a tourist and one interested in talking with local personalities.

9. Your mission generally is to talk with as many knowledgeable persons as possible regarding the political situation in Cuba, with special emphasis on the opposition, its strengths, weaknesses, plans and programs. Of particular interest is the possibility or feasibility of a coalescence of these opposition groups.

B. Administrative

1. While on your present assignment you will keep a record of your expenses which will enable you to submit the required accounting for funds upon your return. In keeping the accounts you should note times of arrival and departure, detailed notation of expenses incurred, and the rate of exchange obtained when exchanging U. S. dollars into local currency.

2. Upon your return you will submit two accountings. One will include your salary under "services rendered", and also your expenses and will be in true name to the following company:

Ashmead, Haniford Associates
1615 Spruce Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

24

3. The second accounting will also include salary and operational expenses and will be submitted in pseudonym to:

Henry W. Darkin
P. O. Box 8105
Southwest Station
Washington, D. C.

[illegible]
signature

[illegible] 1960
date

1/PV

RETURN TO CIA
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27 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Strange (x-8264)

SUBJECT: (Henry P. Lopez) 05

03

1. To confirm your conversation with (Barnes Sprague) on 26 October 1959 we request that backstopping facilities be provided for Subject by the following organization:

Ashmead, Haniford Associates
1615 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
24

2. Subject will send a true name copy of his expenses to this organization and at the same time he will submit to PP/PAD, via a post office box address, a detailed accounting in accordance with Agency regulations.

3. For your information Subject's address is:

6505 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California
08

4. Subject's pseudonym is forwarded under separate cover.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

BS:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - addressee
1 - chrono
1 - Subject file

08
([illegible])

5/IN

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LUCE CLAIRE BOOTH
[illegible] DOCUMENTS
(ARCHIVES)

INCLUSIVE DATES: ________

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ________

ROOM: ________

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ________

335

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
28 JUL 1978	11/25/78 4:30	Palmer	Betsy Palmer

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14-00000

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3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

DUE DATE

FORM 3-77 1790 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. IP/EIS GA-10 J. Corbit			✓
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15. IP/ARD Rm ~~GE-56~~ GA-50			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

FILE NO. Wash-Dir-OFF-OP-Info

DOCUMENT: #9109

FOLDER:

PAGE:

BOX: 64

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Luce Clare 9107
Middle East
Auchinleck

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

By Courier

November 14, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

You may have heard already about Mrs. Luce's campaign of political warfare in respect of the British Empire, but it's so interesting and so relevant to our operations that I am taking a chance on boring you with a repetition:

When Mrs. Luce went to the Middle East some time ago she had an interview with Auchinleck, among others, and obtained from him some extremely important and previously confidential information. According to one account, she even learned the date on which the British offensive in North Africa was due to begin. She wrote this information down in her notebooks -- and also inscribed her opinion of Auchinleck and of the British Administration in that part of the world and elsewhere, all of this in extremely uncomplimentary terms.

Previous to her return to America, she persuaded Monckton to put her notes under some kind of an official British seal with the idea that this would clear them without inspection through any British posts she might be passing on her way home. In addition to these notes under seal, Mrs. Luce also had further notes in her possession which she wrote after the earlier material was sealed. When she arrived at the British censorship in Trinidad, a British official looked through her unsealed papers and found among them the notes in which she had expressed herself with considerable feeling on the British. The official was moved by this discovery to break the seal which Monckton had placed on the earlier material, and read that too. Mrs. Luce felt very strongly about this action, and protested with great feeling, but the official at Trinidad was not deterred.

So grave a view was taken in Trinidad of Mrs. Luce's notes, and most particularly of the information she had obtained from Auchinleck, that all the papers were sent to London. According to one version, they even went to Mr. Churchill himself. They were then sent to Washington—apparently to the White House. It was only after these several examinations that they were returned to Mrs. Luce.

This history is supposed to explain the disciplinary action taken against both Monckton and Auchinleck some time ago, and it's firmly believed in at least some quarters that Mrs. Luce's experience was not altogether unconnected with the "Open Letter" to the British people recently published in Life Magazine.

Shortly after Mrs. Luce's return to this country, she spoke at an off-the-record meeting of the Overseas Press Club in Washington about her travels and took a very strongly anti-British-Empire position. The meeting was more or less informal, and the atmosphere was friendly to her, so there seems to be no reason to suppose that she was provoked into saying anything she did not really mean. Among other things, she said at this meeting that the Suez Canal should be turned over to the Egyptians.

"When do you think this should be done?" she was asked.

"Right now," she replied.

"Does that go for the Panama Canal too--do you think that ought to be given back to Panama?" another correspondent present asked.

"Yes," Mrs. Luce replied. "It goes for Panama too."

I cannot guarantee this account of the latest stages in Mrs. Luce's political career, but it comes from extremely well informed and sober minded persons who are without prejudice.

Hope to see you again soon.

All the best.

Yours,

Wallie Deuel

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OFFICE

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9-11-78
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FORM 3-77 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. JTK-3, Ext 10			ok
4. IP/EIS GA10 Stella Corbat			✓
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IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
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SPACE NO. 324138
324138

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E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

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FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (41)

3. Rid/ce Julius Edwards	2306 L		✓
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8. CI/RA 2C29 Paul Hartman	4 Oct 72		G
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MUTILATE FOLDER.

D-1

DE-INDEXED

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FILE NO. Wash Reg INT 178

DOCUMENT: YKX 850

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PAGE: ________

BOX: ~~#~~ 13

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 7-56 (OP-8)

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
X-2 Branch
[illegible]

Office of Origin: Kunming			Report No: KUX- 850
Report Made At: Kunming	Date: 9 January 45	Period Covered:	Case File No:
Subject: APPEARANCE OF COMMUNIST NEWSPAPER IN KUNMING			Made By: [illegible]
Classification: (Subversive Activities)			Status: ~~XXXXXX~~ Pending
Reference:			

Approximately four days ago one of the U. S. Agencies in Kunming managed to pick up a copy of THE UNDERGROUND, a Communist paper. It was the first time, as far as we could learn, that this paper had appeared. Nothing is known about where it is printed or how it is distributed.

The month is marked but no date, altho it appears quite regularly. During this past ten days three different editions have been picked up. These editions have been taken to the Intelligence Division of the OWI and there translated.

UNDEVELOPED LEAD: This office is making every endeavor, in cooperation with the Office of War Information in Kunming, to locate the source of this paper and also its backers. Further information will be reported as soon as had.

BH/023

[illegible]RIFIED

Evaluation:

Distribution: 2-Washington (1 Copy of translations attached) ✓
1-Det. 202
1-Repro
1-New Delhi
1-[illegible]

Approved by: BH/015
Officer in Charge

SECRET

[illegible]報，當地[illegible]，本[illegible]能話。

戰

[illegible]新加坡和近東所必經之路，石油、橡皮、蔗糖和其他以百計的各種原料品，都要通過這路運往日本。本十三年以來，因爲日本的一個內湖。敵人已經不能在空中和水面上控制它了，[illegible]，而且不全[illegible]間的[illegible]航線和北部更大的[illegible]一隊，都在我們的八艘，可能[illegible]。其中兩艘[illegible]打沉的[illegible]，[illegible]受[illegible]中，[illegible]一艘[illegible]小型[illegible]公報[illegible]

[illegible]十四日討論所[illegible]的結論說：[illegible]地問題，所得的結論[illegible]界安全計劃中，應包括[illegible]，使各國[illegible]的發展，同時[illegible]各附屬國[illegible]展成獨立國。出席[illegible]代表[illegible]人[illegible]，對太平洋[illegible]一個國[illegible]，因此[illegible]上述的[illegible]民族[illegible]，[illegible]以實現[illegible]民族[illegible]國家[illegible]民[illegible]，以[illegible]公報[illegible]，[illegible]一[illegible]門報告，[illegible]

到各附屬地考察，[illegible]附屬地的[illegible]結論公布世界。[illegible]世界安全會議接受這項[illegible]的規定，那麼法國[illegible]對殖民地[illegible]、[illegible]施行政策，[illegible]界的監督。這一非官方[illegible]（設定太平洋學會）[illegible]長不久受這項[illegible]。

[illegible]存在，[illegible]列。[illegible]：未來保[illegible]不受侵略，[illegible]因政府的政策，[illegible]的責任，[illegible]各島嶼[illegible]不容許其他干[illegible]勢力存在。（又十六日電）[illegible]出席太平洋學會[illegible]首席代表[illegible]今日[illegible]：自[illegible]接受[illegible]提交[illegible]日本等[illegible]的[illegible]七

三艦隊飛機

襲香港汕頭廈門

台灣前日大半天在空襲中

[illegible]十五日電）[illegible]十三日[illegible]香港、汕頭、廈門，[illegible]，共打沉日船（十[illegible]十艘，打傷二十八艘，計[illegible]，毀日機一百十二架，美機損失十[illegible]

）同盟社十五日廣播：台灣軍事當局本日午後發表公報：「敵一[illegible]）從十五日晨八時三十分至午後一時先後襲台灣各部，除[illegible]外，並轟炸台灣中南守卡、高雄和其餘各地，我損失和交通工[illegible]尚未有很大。

）同盟社十五日廣播：中國戰區日方[illegible]：據[illegible]中國[illegible]上[illegible]的[illegible]門機七十架，今日上午九時三十分起，襲中[illegible]各[illegible]之久。

監院大批彈劾案

如此人事 [illegible]行

包括：中茶公司、長沙市[illegible]局、[illegible]局、三家銀行[illegible]、市公用事業和公共汽車管理局[illegible]管和[illegible]

（中央社訊）監察院公布消息：本年九月間[illegible]，[illegible]大會[illegible]，已經分送[illegible]各重要案件，[illegible]依法提出糾舉和彈劾者：㊀中茶公司[illegible]，[illegible]，分別公司經營無方，自[illegible]，[illegible]，對主管人員[illegible]，[illegible]。㊁[illegible]，[illegible]大，分[illegible]，[illegible]，[illegible]。㊂[illegible]，[illegible]行，[illegible]，[illegible]不能[illegible]，分向[illegible]。㊃[illegible]，中國[illegible]，[illegible]。㊄[illegible]公用[illegible]，不[illegible]，[illegible]大，[illegible]，[illegible]各[illegible]主管部門分別查辦。

貴州省政府改組

政院任楊森爲省主席，吳鼎昌調任國府文官長。

（中央社[illegible]）[illegible]日[illegible]會，[illegible]：㊀[illegible]，[illegible]。㊁[illegible]。[illegible]

運輸隊每月可運物資七八萬噸來華

（中央社[illegible]十五日合衆電）[illegible]：[illegible]十五英里的[illegible]公路[illegible]，[illegible]一段公路，[illegible]中[illegible]。[illegible]，[illegible]人。[illegible]可[illegible]，[illegible]，[illegible]中國十六、[illegible]，[illegible]。

央打字機行

本行擇於一月十五正式開幕專爲各機關學校團體試貨服務修理工精配件迅速如蒙賜顧無任歡迎

（地址新街中三路一〇七號（兩路口郵局對面））

LOG DATE

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13/5/78

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FORM 5-77 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. Stella Corbat IP/E15 GA10			✓
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To Requester:

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JOB NO. 57-75

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E2 IMPDET CL BY: 062147

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OUT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SECRET

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd SA ....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dep Dir		5/13	5/12	[illegible]	1. Routing for info.
2. Far East		5/14		[illegible]	
3. [illegible]		5/15	5/1[illegible]	[illegible]	
4. N. East		5/15	5/1[illegible]	[illegible]	
5. W. Eur.		5/16	5/18	[illegible]	Jm
6. Afr.		5/18	5/20	[illegible]	
7. [illegible]			5/21	FC	
8. Files					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 7735

Date Rec'd SA 5/29/42

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Cfr	1281		1-8	JB	
2. Registry					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

Mr. Shapiro.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5/18/42 DW

May 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: David Williamson

From: W. J. D.

Please have your people read the attached memorandum from Dr. Mason. What I am interested in is the suggestion from Perry Jester that we might win over various Vichy agents in Africa. I would like to have your views as to whether Jester should be talked with and that suggestion of his explored.

Please return the enclosure, after it has served your purpose.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

May 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM Edward S. Mason

SUBJECT J.I.C. Sub-Committee Meeting, May 12, 1942 (W.W. Rostow attending)

The Sub-Committee is undertaking three new papers:

German Manpower Losses

French Capabilities as an Active Axis Ally

Russian Capabilities

The first paper is assigned to COI for preparation. Responsibility for the preparation on Russian Capabilities is also assigned to this office, it being understood that the military section on the Western front will be undertaken with the cooperation of Colonel Montague and that the military aspects of the Siberian area will be covered by Commander Kenney. A Sub-Committee consisting of Commander Foskett, Dr. Hornbeck, Col. Meloy and Col. Fortier will undertake the preparation of the paper on French Capabilities as an Active Axis Ally.

Mrs. Clare Luce then addressed the meeting and a report of her remarks is appended.

E. S. M.

cc with enc.: Dr. Baxter
Major Bruce

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

J.I.C. Meeting, May 12, 1942 - Statement of Mrs. Clare Luce

I Background

Mrs. Luce travelled to the Middle and Far East via the Trans-African ferry route, visiting Burma, India, and the Middle East. She had extensive opportunities for formal and informal conversation with the major military and political figures, as well as various operating airmen, soldiers, and correspondents. She carefully distinguished the quality of her sources, indicating where her views were based on observed facts, official statements, or gossip.

II Burma and China

Mrs. Luce arrived at Lashio at the time of the visit of Chiang and Madame Chiang. Their intervention was required not only to facilitate cooperation between the British and General Stillwell's Chinese forces, but also to enforce discipline on the Chinese generals nominally under Stillwell. It was rumored that a major opportunity to defeat the Japanese was lost at Tongou due to the unwillingness of the Chinese generals to obey Stillwell and attack. The arrival of the Chiangs was immediately known to the Japanese who bombed the Headquarters area for the first time in force. Mandalay, which Mrs. Luce saw immediately after the main bombing attack early in April, was leveled and deserted, with two to five thousand dead left in the ruins.

In a long conversation with Madame Chiang great bitterness was expressed against the British. Madame Chiang went back to Hong Kong, the Treaty Ports, and the Opium War, ending up with Wavell's failure to accept Chinese assistance in Burma. Madame Chiang indicated, however, that she would not accept a negotiated peace under any circumstances with the Japanese, recalling the Japanese occupation of Nanking. Under questioning Mrs. Luce stated that she did not believe the Japanese would move in force against China. All Intelligence sources in Chungking believe that the Japanese will move against Russia before June of this year. As for India Mrs. Luce stated that a full-fledged invasion by land forces seemed unlikely in the immediate future, but that bombing attacks on the Calcutta area were very likely -- these designed to exploit the political instability there and the concentration of Indian industrial strength.

In general Mrs. Luce believes that the British in Burma fought as well as their resources permitted. The R.A.F. was bombed out of Magwe early, leaving the main operations without air protection. The British claim that their radio directional finders were sabotaged by the Burmese Fifth Column; elsewhere gossip stated that the finders had been withdrawn prior to the Japanese attack. The one hundred British tanks proved ineffective as the main highway, on which they could operate, was flanked by forests through which the Japanese filtered. The presence of American technicians in the Burma oil fields probably guaranteed thorough destruction. Elsewhere there was "no earth worth scorching". The British General Alexander expressed the general belief that the failure in Burma was, in the long run, unimportant; that after the defeat of Hitler the Japanese could easily be driven out. This blandness seemed to characterize the view of almost all Britishers in the Far East, although the Viceroy of India expressed regret that, for the sake of the Indians, British control in India would "not survive another fifty years".

Mrs. Luce visited the headquarters of the A.V.G. She expressed the hope that they would not be kept alive as a unit, but that their experience in fighting Japanese planes would be transferred to American pilots in training, especially at Karachi. She felt that neither the A.V.G. nor General Stillwell should return to China, despite their obvious value in maintaining and American link and American prestige. General Stillwell has apparently distinguished himself, under most trying circumstances, by his comradeship with the Chinese and his willingness to share front-line dangers and hardships. At a time when the Chinese are extremely sensitive, General Stillwell's attitude and action were of great importance.

III India

Indian morale is extremely low, lower in fact than before the Cripps Mission. The net result of the Mission appears merely to have strengthened Gandhi and the policy of passive resistance. Mrs. Luce believes, however, that, in a short run at least, there is nothing wrong with the morale of the Indians and the Chinese that could not be corrected by a couple of substantial victories. Wavell, in a letter to Mrs. Luce expressed himself as more concerned about Indian morale and possible military consequences of that situation, than with the strictly military aspects of defense. Mrs. Luce spoke very highly of General Brereton as a member "of that new race, the air man". It is Brereton's view that no important action should be taken by the air force under his command until they are in a position of local superiority; he did, however, "leak a little", by bombing the Andaman Islands and Rangoon. Mrs. Luce believes that a first-line air force maintained at 300 planes in India could defeat the Japanese in any move in that direction.

IV Middle East

General Maxwell is reported to be extremely popular in the Middle East; while General Adler was unpopular, possibly due to his forthrightness in criticising the British methods. Mrs. Luce visited the most advanced tank station in the British controlled desert area. She found numerous complaints, not specified, about American equipment. In general, however, she holds that the British have done a good job in the desert.

The British in Cairo have had extensive and chronic difficulties with their various allies. A Jugoslav revolution almost took place in Cairo while she was there. The Poles, Jugoslavs and French appear unwilling to enter British air units but hold out for independent air squadrons. The one hundred thousand Poles, "dumped across the border by Russia" were reported by gossip to have been turned down by Wavell and Auchinlech, successively, and then shipped to Britain. Mrs. Luce stated that the

British have been trapped by their own propaganda on behalf of their minor allies; and that the allies now overestimate their contribution to the war effort and steadily make trouble.

The biggest problem, however, throughout Africa and the Middle East, is that of inducing a shorter turn-around for shipping. At every port the complaint is the same, the blame being distributed between British administrators and the American Maritime Unions. The flow of planes over the Trans-African route was, at the time of Mrs. Luce's passage, very thin. She reported heavy fighter plane losses by crack-up; and a total lack of preparedness against air attack (in Liberia, Takoradi, Lagos, Fort Lamy, etc.).

Mrs. Luce passed along a statement from a Free French administrator in Lagos that extensive air preparations are under way in Morocco; and she quoted Perry Jester, American Consul at Lagos, now in the United States, as believing that it would still be possible to win over various Vichy agents and territories in West Africa.

W. W. Rostow

R. Boulton May 5, 1942

Maj. David Bruce

Report by Mr. Jester, Consul at Lagos

In the early part of April the attached abstract of file 1896 (accessioned about April 1) was prepared at the request of Mr. Shapiro. There subsequently came to the attention of the African Section the attached memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Mr. Gimbel on the same subject. It would appear that (1) Colonel Donovan must have seen Mr. Gimbel's memorandum of March 12 already and (2) that the present abstract of file 1896 is now possibly inappropriate.

Lest this very important matter may have become sidetracked or mislaid through some accident of routine, I send you herewith all the pertinent data of which I have knowledge.

R. B.

ABSTRACT OF FILE 1896

Subject: Report of Perry N. Jester re Organization of Consular Service in West Africa

To: Frank Mauran

1. Mr. Mauran believes that "American activities (resumably all activities besides shipping) must be coordinated."

2. Mr. Jester believes his reports and recommendations to the State Department are filed without adequate study.

3. Mr. Jester remarks that "one of our most important and urgent needs....is a better set up of our consular representation (in West Africa)". He is "firmly convinced" that:

a. The Lagos office should be a Consulate-General.

b. That other consular representatives in British West Africa should report through and coordinate with the Lagos office.

c. That independently reporting consuls at other posts in British West Africa should not be appointed.

d. That the Consul General should be a ranking Foreign Service Officer (of Class 4) middle-aged and experienced.

e. That the U. S. Consular organization in West Africa should be set up in accord with the controlling economic and political factors on the coast.

f. That the best organization would be as follows:

Lagos - Consul General (to be concerned with "larger issues of our over-all policy, our trade policy, our relations with West African governments, the effect of British Colonial policy on our interests and the relations (in cooperation with an independent American Consul at Dakar) of British and French colonies and policies."

Two Consular officers (to be concerned with Nigerian problems alone.)

Accra - One Consul (to be concerned with Gold Coast problems, Accra being the military center of B.W.A. and of importance principally for the shipment of bauxite, mahogany and manganese).

Freetown - One Consular Agent (because of the Naval importance of Freetown).

Bathurst - One Consular Agent (because of the importance of this point to air communications). This would be welcomed by the Governor of Gambia.

These recommendations and opinions and the irregular method used of bringing them to attention are arrived at from a consideration of the following points:

a. Mr. Jester has no personal interest since his tour of West Africa is almost finished.

b. Lagos is the political and economic center of British West Africa with a larger territory, larger population, and larger commerce than any other colony.

c. Lagos is the seat of the British West African Governor's Conference and this arrangement after the war is believed certain to continue anddto develop into a Governor Generalship of British West Africa.

d. The headquarters of the principal oil, shipping and trading companies is at Lagos.

e. Lagos was the site of headquarters of the Franck Economic Mission.

f. Not only now but after the war West Africa will be of increasing importance to the U.S. since British discrimination against U.S. trade will nevitably decline and development of our opportunities could now be implemented by strong and efficient consular representation.

4. "The official U.S. activities in the Gold Coast are in an uncoordinated mess", as a result overlapping of function and activities and division of authority of the
1. U.S. War Shipping Administration
2. U.S. Military Observer
3. U.S. Ferry Command
4. Barber West African Line

Abstracted by R.B.

14-00000

IP/AR
GA-50

TUBE GT-7

26 Aug 78	76-1491	76	2
DOCUMENT FILE NUMBER	DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DOC. DATE (mth-day-yr)	
Wash-CA-PRO	-385	24	

FROM:

[illegible]
REQUESTER'S OFFICE & STAFF & BRANCH

CA [illegible]
ROOM NO. BUILDING TELE. EXT.

[illegible] Corbit
REQUESTOR'S NAME - PLEASE PRINT

SUBJECT OR TITLE Luce, Clare Boot h

ACTION REQUESTED

☒ TEMPORARY CHARGE ☐ WILL RETURN IN 30 DAYS ☐ INDEFINITE ☐ PERMANENT RETENTION ☐ INFORMATION ONLY

TYPE REQUEST

☐ NO TIME ☒ TELEPHONE PRIORITY (next available run see no. 1 below) ☐ SPECIAL PRIORITY (Requires exclusive run see no. 2 below)

TIME NEEDED DATE (day-mth) TIME

RMO OR AUTHORIZED DESIGNEE SIGNATURE

MATERIAL TO BE USED FOR (✓ check one)

☐ FOIA ☐ PRIVACY ACT ☐ OTHER (specify)

REMARKS:

OGC

SP.

NOTE

1. MATERIAL IS RECEIVED IN IP/AR AT 12:30 AND 4:30.
2. SPECIAL PRIORITY REQUESTS MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY RMO OR AUTHORI

IP/AR USE

RESTRICTED TO

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3

CONFIDENTIAL CL. BY: 062147

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7. [illegible] C [illegible]			
8. E [illegible] / [illegible] Puchnick 4C44			
9. RID/CLR Reedy, Elli 9E10			
10. CHSI 2B1405 Hays, Ruth	7 June 71		
11. CI/SIG 2B1405 [illegible]	1 July		
12. C/RQA [illegible] 2E17		✓	
13. [illegible] GA-10 S. Corbit			
14. RETURN TO			
15. CA-50 RID/ARD Rm ~~GE-50~~			

John ~~[illegible]~~
Opal 319424

FILE NO Wash-CA-PRO-385

DOCUMENT: __________

FOLDER: [illegible] 10

PAGE: __________

BOX: [illegible] 1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-81 9-64 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Nov. 17 Munson phoned from N.Y. (see Memo). He had a long phone conversation with Shub that p.m., and hopes [illegible] in person Nov. 21. They both seem to want Suren to do the book.

Nov. 20 Sims saw Munson at hotel. Munson expects to see Shub tomorrow. Suren is going to do the book.

Dec. 14 Letter from Shub. "My collaborator is one of the top lay-out men on Life...." Munson will fill in on the details. Phoned Munson: will see him tomorrow morning. He said he was "reassured by developments last week & thinks things will work out OK."

Jan. 8, 1951 Munson told Sims "Shub should be moving soon".

Jan. 15 MEMO to LST on status of Photo-book, by request.
" " X SHUB phoned: text of book is completed. See above Memo.

Jan. 16 Phoned MUNSON. He will fly later today to see Bob Winston, who will return to him several papers on behalf of Bob Humberstone.

no TS

SECRET

Continued in

folder #2

no TS

SECRET

22 May 1951

Ray Millard says B. Shub is a Covert **Staff** Agent.

ASS.

Boris told me 25 May '51 this is incorrect; he is a covert **contract** agent.

SECRET

21 May 1951

If you decide you really need any of these, please let me know promptly, citing the XYZ number, so I can get the necessary permission. It shouldn't be too difficult to get permish, especially for ##2, 3, 6, and 7.

There are some dozen other 1941 Lithuania photos, but (a) some are very blurred; (b) they aren't dated nor located more closely than "victims of NKVD Lithuania 1941", i.e. it might be corpses or torture chambers anywhere. So you don't want them do you?

Am searching for the other items you asked for on the phone.

Bill

Sending photos ##XYZ—1 to 7 to Shub this afternoon.

SECRET

21 May 1951

file "STALIN- PHOTO-ROCK

RE: Reproductions of CIA Graphics photos, given to WSS by DCS 17 May 1951. DCS requested them from Graphics several weeks before. Sent to him with a covering note from Dick Cornish, saying that Graphics forgot to omit the CIA captions. Cornish cut out the CIA numbers, but left the captions.

I have filed most of these in my folder PHOTOS.

The following I am sending to Shub, having cut out the CIA-typed captions and written same, in sterilized form, with tho XYZ numbering, on the back. ~~[illegible]~~

I am reminding Shub that they can't be used without clearance by Graphics.

XYZ—1...USSR Asiatic RSFSR Primorsk Region VLADIVOSTOK 43 08 N 131 54 E
SECOND RIVER CONCENTRATION CAMP. 1946. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—2...Germany, Brandenburg near Oranienburg 52 45 N 13 15 E
Sachsenhausen, former Nazi Concentration Camp, now used by Soviets. It is reported that there are 14,500 men and 1,500 women, mostly political prisoners, confined in this camp. June 1949. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—3...LATVIAN SSR RIGA 56 56 N 24 41 E
Soviet Deportation Car. 1941. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—4...Hungary Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun Budapest 47 30 N 19 02 E
Hangman loops strangling noose about neck of enemy of Communism in courtyard of old Marko Jail. 1948. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—5...Hungary Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun Budapest 47 30 N 19 02 E
Enemies of Communism are strangled in courtyard of old Marko Jail. 1948. CONFIDENTIAL.

XYZ—6...USSR Lithuanian SSR
Corpse of the rector of Lankeliskiai tortured to death by the NKVD. 1941. RESTRICTED.

XYZ—7...USSR Lithuania SSR
Row of corpses of Lithuanian workers in sugar refinery murdered by the NKVD. 1941. RESTRICTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 May 1951

PHONED SHUB

Lou Scherer ([illegible]) phoned to say that he had to see Levitas, editor of New Leader, in connection with a new project, and with several other matters. Would like to see him for about an hour. CSP had suggested I ask Boris Shub to arrange the appointment.

I phoned Boris Shub, and phoned Scherer back that Shub would meet him at 10.50 a.m. tomorrow in the bookstore below (?) the NL office at 7 E. 15 St. Shub will introduce Scherer to Levitas at 11.

Re PHOTO BOOK

Boris said there are 3 matters which "we can live without, but it would distinctly strengthen the book if you could perhaps get them at the Library of Congress."

(1) It is conceivable that there exist photos of crowds being fired upon in Nov.—Jan. 1917-1918, in connection with rioting on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. (See Shub's Lenin).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917 (There was no fighting in Petersburg).

(3) Collectivization. Some think it is conceivable there exist photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization.
Cf. CIA Graphics?
Cf. Library of Congress.

Maj Journal

Re RUSSIANS AS ALLIES

Boris has just heard from a Russian friend, and has sent to London for confirmation —seen nothing in the papers about it here— that there has been formed in London a BRITISH SOCIETY FOR A FREE RUSSIA, with Major Wilton (author and ex-military attache in Moscow) as president and the Duchess of Atholl as vice-president. Encouraging, he thought.

He also mentioned the FREEDOM UNION FOR GERMAN-RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP reported in the May 11 NY Herald-Trib, with Mayor Reuter and some Russians among the members.

Re PHOTO BOOK

LAY-OUT of the book received from Munson in SP/PW today.

SECRET

19 May 1951

DICK

Our man "can live without, but it would help greatly to tie the book together."

(1) Photos of crowds being fired upon during rioting, Nov. 1917—Jan. 1918, in connection with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

Page 282 of Lenin by David Shub says: "The Assembly was scheduled to open on the morning of January 18, 1918. In anticipation of the long-awaited event, Lenin ordered a detachment of Lettish sharpshooters to PETROGRAD (St. Petersburg, now Leningrad; might be listed under any one of these names in Graphics files?).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917. (There was no fighting in Petrograd, he says).

(3) Photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization. Some think it "conceivable" they may exist. That would be around 1932, 1931 I guess.

He suggests trying:

1. CIA Graphics, Bldg 14. (Mr. Kessinger; used to be ext-2657
Mr. Beattie too).

2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

You could ask Chuck Vetter whether he could arrange for you, without too much trouble to get into the place and borrow any photos they have, in the name of CIA, for a month or a couple of weeks (longer, if possible of course) for our man to make copies of.

I think it really would improve the book if you could get #(1) for them.

Many thanks.

WSS

14-00000

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* 55-59

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

SECRET

26
Action

Control: 11327
Rec'd: April 23, 1951
4:51 p.m.

IE
Info

P
GER
OLI
CIA
DCR

FROM: Frankfort

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 8583 April 23, 8 p.m.

Recent discussions with Lunt, INP, pamphlet with comic, Soviet combative possibilities proposed, with thought giving publication attribution to local group to be determined. Urge INP's publications branch dummy up along following lines for production here: pocket size format, eight pages. Cover to carry photograph Stalin in friendly greeting with high-ranking, current party boss in good standing from one satellite countries. Title to reflect theme "Stalin's friends". Each page of inside book to carry photograph Stalin in friendly pose with such fallen, one-time heroes or friends of Sov Union as Trotsky, Hitler, Bucharin, Tito, Clementis or others dependent on existence pictures in archives.

Captions for pictures can be taken from one of two sources or both. Either original photo caption or quotation from that era when "friend" was in favor, or a later quote from a denunciatory statement concerning the fallen man. Possibly both quotes could be used, the former above, the latter below the pictures. Suggest most careful research be made for most succinct quote to carry off this idea. Request reaction soonest.

MCCLOY

PAF:DES

Copy for SP/PW
files.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

SECRET

18 May 1951

SECRET

RE "STALIN" PHOTO BOOK

(also KMFUNNY "Communist Zoo)

We saw layout in [illegible] 17 May.

SDS saw MUNSON from 11 to 12.40

A thorough review of the whole set-up. Munson stressed two points:

(1) "The book must be locked up by July 31." Otherwise it couldn't be printed in September. And in that case it might be necessary to wait till about next March.

(2) "It must be ~~x~~ the sort of book that Doubleday might be putting out." Firstly, because if it is "too propagandistic" the retailers just won't handle it (cf details re C.Zoo). Secondly, "Swen is still secure, stands up well under Dun & Bradstreet examination, and has been a great success in the FE. It has the NY reputation of a Far Eastern firm which does unusual things in the US. Swen as a going concern is more important than any one book: the book shouldn't be allowed to jeopardize Swen by being too obviously propaganda."

I returned the layout to him. (He has not seen the text either, nor I think the other 60-odd pages). He doesn't plan to tell Shub we've seen it. He recommended that we give Shub another week to continue on it. Then that, about Monday, May 28, Sims and/or Brynn go down to NY for 2 or 3 days and work with Shub on it.

NB: He said that, later, it might be possible for Shub to introduce me to his collaborator as an informal consultant whom he'd called in. In other words, in attempting to sell our views of it to Shub, we have also the problem of whether Shub could sell them in turn to his collaborator. And Security.

We both gave our views of the book at length.

Lyle's views included: that with the text it may be better than it looks; that there's 66 pages to come; that it is better to get out something than nothing; that we can always do a 2nd or revised version; that we must face facts and not put out a book which a high percentage of retailers simply won't handle; He also, at the start, said something along the lines of what I regard as Shubian erroneous doctrine: that we should show the responsibility that the USA and Germany (Hitler?) had for the state of affairs in the USSR; I said all such things might be sub-themes, if they could be tucked in without detracting from the main themes, but that I thought they were very dubious: 172 pages isn't enuf to show what a bad man and regime it is.

Omit all this

My views, agreeing with much he had said, included: that we ought to put out something that the man in the barber-shop, anywhere in the world, would leaf through and couldn't turn over more than 3 or 4 consecutive pages without beginning to think: "This really must be a bad man, killing that many of his own cabinet." That we should not attempt either an exhaustive or even consecutive chronological treatment of the 71 years since 1879 or even since 1905 or 1917. Just hammer home main points, such as that they had a Constituent Assembly, until Lenin killed it by force and fraud, etc.

[illegible]

SECRET

That the main themes should be such as: SECRET anti-Christianity + all other religion

He kills & kills & kills
He lies & lies & lies
They defect & defect & defect
The worshippers return disillusioned, in droves
The top CP men get liquidated as soon as Stalin takes over, in:
Bulgaria
Hungary
Czechoslovakia (Clementis trial coming up), etc etc

That what we should include is the things that differentiate them from us, after everything that can be said against us has been said: The things they DO DO, that we don't do.

That we are putting ourselves behind the 8-ball, to invite interminable arguments in re diplomatic history. Historians are still arguing about whether England, Austria or Russia was most responsible for W W I. It is folly to waste space attacking Stalin because he fought the Finns in order to get better defenses for Leningrad, —as we might fight anyone who threatened the Panama Canal. Or even to try too hard to pin WW II on him. (It is still at least arguable that it wd have taken place, in some form, even if Russia had still been Tsarist. After all, there has been much carnage long before Stalin was even born.)

We should, to be sure, touch the War and Peace theme, which means so much the world over. But the way to do it is to establish beyond doubt that the man is and always has been bad, ditto the regime; they both tolerate no opposition: therefore they are, in "self-defense" expansionist. But let us do this with broad, repetitive strokes, not get bogged down in the details of Munich, the Finnish War, Pearl Harbor.

We agreed that the best we can do, in all the circs, is to ~~xx~~ try once more to sell this view to Shub, and content ourselves with whatever result we can get.

NO

In view of past failures to sell Boris on the subject (at least on many points), I'm not too optimistic. I think we should:

(1) Devil's advocate him on the pictures we think should be scrapped;

(2) Get a promise from him that he will give some space to certain topics such as the SLAVE LABOR MAP and a display of, say, a dozen of the "11 Years in Soviet Camps" type of authors; a display of the "God That Failed" ~~man~~

I stressed that JBIII and self would be only too delighted if Boris can convince us it is better than we fear.

RE $90,000. I asked what about this figure, which I had heard mentioned yesterday. Lyle said that Swen's investment in it would be amounting to about that. I asked if FE or SP would have to produce that sum. He said NO, Swen's budget is sufficient to cover it, as is.

Dele

RE ROYALTIES FOR SHUB. He said the collaborator would be getting 7½%, which he thought might bring him in $60,000. He thought it might be justifiable —"discuss it with Legal and Joe"— that Boris's contract should be amended so that he would get a portion of the royalties that nominally come to him, insofar

SECRET

as they exceed his annual salary. I asked "What portion?" and Lyle said "oh, perhaps ¼ or 1/3," which, if the excess were $12,000 —a figure Lyle suggested as possible— would bring him in an extra $4 or $6,000.

Shub's contract with CIA expires 31 Dec. 1951. His contract with Swen, Lyle pointed out, would still be in effect after that. / But his contract with Xxxx CIA would still no doubt obligate him to return royalties to CIA, i.e. Swen, even after 31 Dec. 1951./

I said this mightn't be a bad idea, as Shub may tend to go somewhat sour, seeing his collaborator getting his much larger salary and 7½% royalties on top of that. On second thoughts, however, it is doubtless a very poor precedent —and we could perhaps obtain and quote to Shub CIA Legal's opinion to that effect— that OPC employees should take royalties from commercial enterprises with which they happen to be connected.

I believe he is paid quite a generous figure, which ought to keep a married man with no dependents ahead of the Collector of Internal Revenue. If not, or if it is thought he is really worth more, the possibility of suggesting to him a salary raise, when his contract as Agent comes up for renewal, could be considered. At any rate, in the interests of keeping his morale up during the final phases of work on the book, I suggest the whole matter should be handled not too brusquely.

RE "COMMUNIST ZOO", and refusal of many US retailers to handle it, see attached Memo of Record of what Munson told me.

Munson: "We have to face plain facts. My experience with "CZ" shows that we have to mix in glasses of orange juice with the castor oil. "CZ" is about as vicious as the traffic will bear. If the "Stalin" photo-book smacks too strongly of propaganda, a lot of retailers just won't even handle it."

CONCLUSION. We should stay in NY long enuf to

✓ (a) Hear everything Shub can say in defense of his version;

✓ (b) Do a strong debil's advocate job against the pages we think he should delete

✓ (c) Insist that, in the remaining 66 pages, certain topics must be adequately dealt with: Slave Labor, Defections, Cultural Purges, Purges of top Communists in Iron Curtain countries.

Hm (d) Hope for the best and be prepared to accept what may be a not too satisfactory bargain, —especially in view of what Lyle says about retailers, and about maintaining Swen's reputation.

WSS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17 May 1951

PHONED SHUB

Lou Scherer (WE) phoned to say that he had to see Levitas, editor of New Leader, in connection with a new project, and with several other matters. Would like to see him for about an hour. CSP had suggested I ask Boris Shub to arrange the appointment.

I phoned Boris Shub, and phoned Scherer back that Shub would meet him at 10.50 a.m. tomorrow in the bookstore below (?) the NL office at 7 E. 15 St. Shub will introduce Scherer to Levitas at 11.

Re PHOTO BOOK

Boris said there are 3 matters which "we can live without, but it would distinctly strengthen the book if you could perhaps get them at the Library of Congress."

(1) It is conceivable that there exist photos of crowds being fired upon in Nov.—Jan. 1917-1918, in connection with rioting on the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. (See Shub's Lenin).

(2) Fighting in Moscow, Nov. 1917 (There was no fighting in Petersburg).

(3) Collectivization. Some think it is conceivable there exist photos of peasants being shipped north to Siberia during Collectivization.
Cf. CIA Graphics?
Cf. Library of Congress.

Re RUSSIANS AS ALLIES

Boris has just heard from a Russian friend, and has sent to London for confirmation —seen nothing in the papers about it here— that there has been formed in London a BRITISH SOCIETY FOR A FREE RUSSIA, with Major Hilton (author and ex-military attache in Moscow) as president and the Duchess of Atholl as vice-president. Encouraging, he thought.

He also mentioned the FREEDOM UNION FOR GERMAN-RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP reported in the May 11 NY Herald-Trib, with Mayor Reuter and some Russians among the members.

Re PHOTO BOOK

LAY-OUT of the book received from Munson in SP/PW today.

SECRET

SECRET

re STALIN PHOTO-BOOK

From CFW's Log for 17 May 1951

This morning I spent an hour and a half with Lyle Munson and Mrs. ~~Sherry?~~ Vinson (FE), going over Boris Shub's narrative-in-pictures of the career of Stalin. Lyle showed us 114 finished layoutx / i.e. 57 two-page spreads_/ of an eventual 172 or 174 and told us that the remainder would be finished in about 3 weeks. He also said that 60 pages of the text were now finished, and the rest would be done in about 6 weeks. He has asked us to provide him with the following material:

a. A memorandum from Bob Winston about the Finnish Air Force's 60 to 1 preponderance in its war with Russia. } JBIII sent to Lyle. Log 18 May.

✓ b. A memorandum from Harold Gosnell tracing US aid to Russia.

✓ c. A set of photos of the Katyn Massacre and a copy of John Broderick's summary. / I sent Shub Katyn photos several weeks ago /.

SECRET

SECRET

File STALIN PHOTO-BOOK

From CPW's LOG, 2 May 1951

Bill Kintner has suggested that Mr. Burris-Meyer consult with Boris Shub in New York tomorrow on themes for black PW against the USSR. Pinky and I see no objection to this meeting, and I have notified Shub to expect a call from Burris-Meyer.

Shub told me that his Stalin picture-book now promises to run to 172 pages, or about 80 double-~~[illegible]~~ page spreads, comprising some 500 photographs. He expects the layouts to be completed by 20 May, and the text by mid-June. Its price will be $2 or thereabouts.

SECRET

Mailed to SH'B, May 3, 1951.

LITHUANIAN DAYS, Vol. 2, No. 2, March 1951, published at 9204 S. Broadway, Los Angeles 3, California. With note:

"FYI, page 5 / rather blurred photos of Lithuanian resistance fighters and bodies of Soviet victims / and elsewhere as marked."
Note there is no indication that any of the material is copyrighted.

/Page 19: "Lithuanian Genocide Show in Waterbury.

Two American newspapers, the WATERBURY SUNDAY REPUBLICAN and the AMERICAN carried two long articles on Feb. 11 and 12 marking the opening of a genocide exhibit organized by Waterbury, Conn., Lithuanians.

The exhibit, the first of its kind in the U. S., has on display Soviet deportation orders, documents on confiscation of farms, actual photographs of atrocities committed by the Soviet Union in Lithuania, and other evidence. We reprint here a portion of the article which appeared in the WATERBURY AMERICAN."

Page 20: Poem, LITHUANIA CRUCICIFIED, by Nadas Rastenis; 6 verses in English. _?

WBS

"STALIN PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT (for Monthly Report, 27 April '5.)

Publication of a book of photos with text exposing evils of Stalin and his regime throughout his career.

a. Great progress has been made in assembling the book, by ROBERT H. HEADLEY and a collaborator. They are planning on a book of 175-195 pages, with some 600 photos.

b. The publisher is pressing for a September 10 press date, and has lined up a Chicago press.

W. S. Sims

SECRET

Mailed to Shub

21 April 1951

Concluding paragraph of Melvin J. Lasky's article "Did Hitler Help Stalin in the Frame-up?" in NEW LEADER, 25 Dec. 1948:

"Those were awful and terrible years. Years of intrigue and deceit, of betrayal and calculated evil-doing. Hitler and Stalin were at once creators and products of this epoch. From these new glimpses into the secrets of their political affairs we see once again Adolf Hitler, single-purposed and resourceful, and Josef Stalin, ruthless, perhaps for a moment gullible, but in the end unswervable. And what a dark witches' brew emerged from all of this— the German militarists trained and equipped a Soviet Army which was later to destroy them and annex a third of Germany— the Soviet rearmed the German military power which was later to lay waste to all of European Russia."

Rather vividly put; some such phrases might be useful in your text? Whole article, with which you're doubtless familiar, of interest in re the biography.

Best regards,

Fred

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

12 April 51

DATE

TO: MR. ~~[illegible]~~ Sims

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

FYI: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

Excellent information.

Encouraging. Etc.

Thanks

FROM: WSS

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

file "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

SECRET

MUNSON saw Sims, Smith, Loebs at his hotel 16 April 1951

Munson went through the complete book last Wednesday and Thursday evenings, April 11 and 12. He is sure it will be "one of the really important books of 1951."

He has asked for 3 photostat proofs of the layout, which we can look at down here. He agrees with me that no useful purpose would be served by my going to NY to see it, as B Shub had suggested. He thinks it inadvisable that "a stream of people" should go to Shub's collaborator's apartment.

They are now aiming at a book of 175 to 195 pages, the pages to be of Vogue size; which, on an average of 7 to 8 photos per double-page, will come to some 600 or more photos.

It is more than the personal career of Stalin; it could better be called something like "The Rise and Rule of Stalinism."

He is pressing for a SEPTEMBER 10th PRESS DATE. That may be too optimistic, but he has located a Chicago press which prints either Vogue (Conde Nast) or a Vogue-size magazine, and which, if they stick to that format, can handle it with dispatch. Munson will be going to Chicago to investigate.

PRICE. "I could be 100% wrong on this estimate," but: it should cost a minimum of $1.25 to print, and, if we want to make 25¢ net, $2.95 or $3.00 would be the minimum at which Brentano could retail it. / I'll bet it will come to more than this. WSS /

Shub's collaborator, "absolutely wonderful; the book is now 75% his", will get 7½% royalties. Shub's nominal royalties will revert to Swen.

Munson feels strongly that it is very bad policy to sell a book at less than obvious cost. He says he is completely certain that this is true in the Orient, and gave us a chapter-and-verse example (which escapes me) to illustrate it.

By "obvious" cost he means that it may be OK to count on the public's not guessing how much it may have cost you to pay a Barnes and to do, e.g., seven prints of some of the "C.Z." photos; but it is bad to price a book at less than what the physical components must obviusly have cost.

He is dead sure this applies to the Orient, and strongly suspects that it would hold good for Western Europe also.

* [illegible]

[illegible]

W.S.S.

SECRET

"Excellent. Information. Encouraging. Thanks.
JB III"

13

File "STALIN"

SECRET

17 April 1951

SECRET

FOR QUARTERLY REPORT

Please change part on "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT as follows:

a. Swan Publishing Company will publish and is meeting expenses. / Delete the rest of this para. /

c. Book will consist of some 175 to 195 Vogue-size pages, about 600 photos with text, and several who have seen it are certain it will be one of the important books of 1951, a devastating expose, suitable for world-wide circulation. ~~[illegible]~~

Change d. to read:

d. The publisher is pressing for a September 10 press date, and has lined up a Chicago press.

e. All rights in the book, and the royalties nominally paid to HEADLEY, will revert to CIA (Swan).

SECRET

147

SECRET

16 April 1951

DRAFT FOR QUARTERLY REPORT

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT: publication of a book of photos with text exposing the treacheries, brutality, etc., of Stalin and his regime throughout his career.

a. Swen Publishing Company will publish and is meeting expenses; there~~fore project~~ has ~~is not been formally written up; this will be done shortly.~~

b. Great progress has been made in assembling the b ook, by ROBERT H. HEADLEY and a high-level layout collaborator who draws on the photo files of a national picture magazine.

c. Book will consist of some 500 or more photos with text, and several / JHIII and Munson / who have seen it are sure it will be a devastating expose, suitable for world-wide circulation.

d. The authors have estimated publication in August, 1951 as a possibility; but this may well prove over-optimistic.

e. All royalties and rights in the book will be turned over to CIA (Swen Publishing Company).

WSS

See revision of this, above

SECRET

MEMO OF RECORD

SECRET

SIMS saw MUNSON in his hotel 19 March 1953

In addition to the details which he gave about "Communist Zoo" and the "Stalin" photo-book, Munson said:

Re Swen. "Tell Joe I need a man who knows the book publishing business, as a "consultant" or part-time helper. To be paid something like $300 to $400 a month, for which he would gige, say, a week of his time each month."

I asked if he would like to have any CIA man detailed to do liaison with and be part-time helper of Swen; Munson said he didn't think a staff man would be very secure. He'd need to travel, deal with other publishers, etc.

Swen offices are established in Taipei, Tokyo, Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok.

Swen will reproduce material in any language, in any format. If anybody wants him to do a job, let them contact him.

I asked how about getting material translated; he said you can always get it done in New York.

The finished product would be cargoed out to the field.

Re ROCKPORT, the artist. Munson has been paying him ($350 a month I think), and now feels he has gotten about as much material out of him as he will need. "Why not suggest to SCHILLER that The Challenge employ him on a regular basis?"

I said that the editors of The Challenge (all Russian-speaking) must already know him, since they have used his drawings. That when he finds himself unemployed he can, and quite likely will, approach them anyway. Why not let them decide whether they want to employ him, rather than for us to complicate matters, through SCHILLER, by forcing this extremely "difficult" man on them? Munson agreed we should let it ride.

If the editors themselves want to employ him, we can then decide whether and how much of the DTEXCISE funds should be used to pay him. As he is very difficult and dilatory it might be better to stipulate that he be paid on a piece-work basis.

Re "Great Swindle" and Swen's distribution problem in general.

Munson said that, while the photo-books should pay their own way, it was never contemplated that The Great Swindle would be a commercial success. Distribution of such material is Swen's great problem.

SCHILLER wrote Munson that he (FTUC) couldn't use The Great Swindle. Munson thinks professional jealousy entered into this. SCHILLER made some criticism to the effect that the booklet bears no Trade Union logotype, whereas he should know perfectly well that lithographed material never does.

SCHILLER should simply be told: "Put out so many copies of the Great Swindle." Alternatively, the geographic Divisons should give indigenous Anti-Communist groups $25,000 or $2,500 and say: "This is yours if you mail out umpteen thousand copies of the booklet with it."

Re State Dept. and Great Swindle. Munson suggested my giving a copy of the Great Swindle to Mrs. Crosswell or Col. Stubbs and asking them to recommend it to MacKnight as something they had come across, with the suggestion that the State Department buy copies of it for all their Reading Rooms.

SECRET

I asked whether MacKnight or anyone in State knew of CIA's connection with Swen. He said he did not know, though he dared say MacKnight might. He said he would be willing to call on MacKnight to discuss State Dept. assistance in getting Swen stuff disseminated, representing himself merely as a private citizen.

I said I hadn't and wouldn't make any mention of Swen to anyone at State.

Horace Eng is as much [redacted] as anyone Munson's main CIA contact, but, he said, Horace of course doesn't have time to concern himself actively with dissemination outside the FE area.

I told him about recent State publications, in their "gray" program, such as "Glossary of Soviet Terms", and pointed out that State and Swen are now putting out similar material.

I said I hoped some sort of set-up might be arranged whereby State would help disseminate some of Swen's publications.

Suggest that the initiative towards any such set-up has to come primarily from Munson himself, but that it will be potentially an important matter requiring careful working out by CPW, Col. Stubbs, Munson and State Dept.

WSS

CC – SP/Labor
SP/Bruskin
Sims/Swen file

Thanks JB

SECRET

SECRET.

B[illegible]
6. max. 9 500

file: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK SECRET

SDS saw MUNSON in his hotel 19 March 1951

Munson said they are now planning in terms of a book of "up to 220 pages, between 1,000 and 1,500 photos" (some of which might be two or four photos to a page. "It will cost a lot of money."

I mentioned again that we have $40,000 appropriated under KUFUBY for "similar photo-books at the discretion of CSP", but Munson said there was no need to spend the taxpayer's money: as many as possible of these books should be made to pay their own way.

cc: Mr. Bryan

SECRET

SECRET

30 March 1951

MR. EASTON--

I have just phoned Boris Shub, AC-2-0164. He will expect Jack Morgan to get in touch with him. 510 West 110th St., NY 25.

Shub can be reached there any time any morning. In the evenings he is working in the apartment of a collaborator, and prefers not to be phoned there.

He expects to be in town both Tuesday and Wednesday.

WSS

Shub and his collaborater work all Sundays and Mondays at the latter's apartment. Therefore if Morgan wants to phone him Monday he had better catch him at breakfast.

SECRET

SECRET

30 March 1951

SIMS phoned SHUB, 1200

To ask him to see Jack Morgan (LA) (on an LA job). Shub said he will be in town both Tuesday and Wed., and that Morgan can always reach him in the mornings, anytime.

In the evenings he is working at his collaborator's apartment, and prefers not to be phoned there.

I told him I would phone him on the 16th, so that we can get together. He wants me to see the lay-out, which should be pretty complete at that time, "minus the final text". They were working on it till 4 a.m. last night; evenings are the only time his collaborator can work, except Mondays which he has off; they work on it all day Sundays and Mondays.

They have looked over 6,000 photos.

I told him Dawson wd be sending him a couple of dozen photos.

SECRET

26 March 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: File, STALIN PHOTO-BOOK

SHvB, [illegible]

Sending Subj 12 photos captioned as follows:

1. Papers from body of Polish army chaplain.
2. One of the mass graves.
3. Before he was murdered his hands were lashed behind his back...
4. Thousands of the corpses show the four-edged wounds.
5. 2. This is the certificate authroizing them to wear...
6. Arch Deacon JASINSKI picks his way...
7. A former major.
8. 4. And this is SMORAWINSKI again.
9. 3. This is his cigarette case.
10. Map showing location of Katyn.
11. 12 layers of Polish officers.
12. This family photograph survived.

This leaves just 8 photos remaining in our JBEXTRA files.

lg — ?

26 March 1951

Dear Boris,

Thanks for y ours of the 22nd, reached me Saturday evening, crossing mine of the 23rd to you.

It is all wonderful news, and the more you think about it the more amazing it is that "nothing even remotely resembling it has ever been done—anywhere in the world". And I know what a hell of a lot of work and worry it is, and what a relief it will be when it is safely done.

Twelve [Katyn] pix go to you this morning by registered mail. These are my all at the moment. You will find them a great deal better than none. In fact, you may think they are enough to do the trick. Reflect that no one of them—fakery in photos having a long history since WW I— can in itself constitute conclusive proof, nor any photo that could be.

For that, your text will carry more weight: the undisputed facts of geography and chronology; the depositions; the TACIT ADMISSION OF GUILT IN THE DAMNING FAILURE OF THE USSR TO RAISE THE MATTER AT NUREMBERG (here see Churchill's last volume, and perhaps quote a sentence or two from him; "names make news"; see also Mikolajczyk, from whom you may cull a juicy quote or two.)

It seems that "about a dozen" photos were given to all who attended the 21 Nov. 1949 press conference. So you may find Ep and/or the NL has one or two more. But there is not much more. Just one or two others of layers of corpses.

Your impact will come from the skilfull addition of citation of facts to the pix I'm sending, don't you think?

On your second request I'll do what I can. But you know one of the main reasons why it may not be much. My friend who will know returns from out of town tomorrow.

"Baltic Review" has no pix. "Estonian Magazine" has only scenic. However I may be able to do something tomorrow.

Here again I suggest you consider capitalizing on the very absence of pictures, remembering that y ou have a great gift for the trenchant phrase. E.g., life in Riga pre-1939 was not too bad; now, as you can quote from the press, there is deportation after deportation; partisans; exploitation; almost universal hatred of the "people's democratic" regime. Edmund Stevens in This is R, Uncensored you'll recall said nothing so gave him the impression of the living-death-under-Stalin as Riga, which he revisited. Therefore, just show a RIGA PEOPLE-IN-MARKET SQUARE SCENE, PLUS QUOTE FROM STEVENS, and a bit of biting Shubian prose contrasting 1939 and 1949. Don't you think there is a place for a few "peaceful" pictures of this sort? Pix of partisans in action are few and far between, and often fuzzy. and there can anyway be, as you were saying, such a thing as too many atrocity pictures.

Pari passu, why not use some ordinary, peaceful UKRAINIAN scenes, plus RECENT QUOTES FROM PRAVDA, repeat PRAVDA, OFFICIALLY ADMITTING ACTIVE RESISTANCE THERE. I can't give you said quotes, but you or some of your friends very likely can lay hands on them.

After all, no "resistance" photo, what with fakery, will carry conviction to those who won't be convinced. But a PHOTO OF THE FACE OF PRAVDA, with the sentences underlined, must shake even the faithful.

On Lubianka I can't help. If the *NY Times* won't help, and there is nothing in any agency files —can this be?— I guess you've had it. Here again you might capitalize on the absence: can they be *ashamed* of this historic edifice, which plays so vital a role in the national life? E.g., Herblock today has a "cartoon" which has merely a black border around a white space, with the masthead of *La Prensa* above. Needless to say, it is eye-catching in the extreme. Why not do the same with Lubianka?

Alternatively, you might have a photo of 60 Andrassy Ut, and perhaps combine same with the above "empty space" treatment.

I grant you that if this technique were carried to the extreme, you would be making history with a photo-less photo-book; but rest assured the Herblock cartoon *is* a 100% attention-catcher.

Couldn't agree more with your last paragraphs. However, there *has* been marked progress.

I expect, d.v., at long last to be absent from Friday the 30th till Monday the 16th, and mail probably won't be forwarded. Therefore please write J if need arises.

Best regards,

Bill

(W J Sims)

Sent
Special Delivery

510 West 110 Street
New York 25, New York
March 22, 1951

Dear Bill:

Picture book now in high gear as layout is beginning to take shape. New pictures of both historical and photographic pricelessness still coming in (e.g. a shot showing a wildly cheering crowd of Russian peasants greeting first German troops---before latter went in for mass murder) This picture never used in this country. Could multiply by many examples but prefer to have you come down and see for yourself. If you could be here about three weeks from now, you could get a fairly good notion of what the finished product will look like (although there will still be a lot of polishing, caption writing and final checking to do). I am now certain that the book will be a major political event. Nothing even remotely resembling it has ever been done--anywhere in the world.

Need help on two sectors promptly:

1. Katyn massacre pictures. Saw lots of them your neck of the woods. Please send them soonest, properly packed in cardboard to prevent folding or cracking. This is a must, since for some odd reason this is missing from the otherwise bottomless archives which we've unearthed.

2. Any decent shots of anti-Communist resistance behind the Iron Curtain. We have a few of the East German things with the "F" painted on walls. But Joe mentioned others. Cant have too much of this, since it constitutes an essential element in the closing part of the story.

Will be difficult to incorporate such stuff unless we get it fast, because would mean dislocating the layout, which is now designed toflow like a motion picture recording of the whole big story. Hope this presents no obstacles. Joe thought your end could send stuff to me. Registered mail sufficient precaution, it seems to me.

The Acheson letter in today's NY Times re friendship with the Russian people a step in the right direction though still a long way even from the speech delivered at Town Hall by McMahon day before yesterday. But somehow, someone must teach Acheson to cut out this sort of humbuging:

> "If the Men of the Kremlin could but conquer their inward fears and resolve their contradictions, if they could but bring themselves to the comity which is the foundation of peace, great burdens would be lifted from the shoulders of people everywhere."

What is the purpose of this rubbish? I know lots of professional diplomats think this is very "cute" and arch stuff, really meant to "embarrass" people like J.Stalin and G. Malenkov. Actually, the only thing it can arouse, bothnamong the Kremlin war criminals and among their victims is ---utter contempt. If anybody in Moscow takes that drivel at face value, they conclude that the U.S. is still too frightened of the boogey man in the Kremlin to call a spade a spade. That silly stuff must end! Please end it. The inward fears of Stalin-Malenkov-Beria will only be resolved on the gallows. Best regards.

[MARCH 22, 1951] Boris

Puckett (x3144 ~~[illegible]~~) phoned. 24 March 1951

"Estonian Mag", in English
published in germany (available from London)
29 Ashburn Pl., London SW7

have only one copy
has only some pix — only scenery.

"Baltic Review" has no pictures.

Tabard Inn
1739 N St., NW
Washington 6, DC

March 23, 1951

Dear Boris,

Thanks for the clippings. All to the good.

Will do what I can to help, but, for reasons that will re-occur to you, you shouldn't bank on its being a great deal.

Suggest you might well get excellent results by following the trail, via phone and taxi, of the AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KATYN MASSACRE, INC., which was, at the time of its founding circa Nov. 1949, at Room 1209, 470 Fourth Avenue, NY 16, LU-6-4468.
Chairman, Arthur Bliss Lane. Vice-chairmen: Max Eastman, Dorothy Thompson, Treasurer: Montgomery M. Green. Executive Secretary: Julius Epstein.
Why not contact Lane, or Epstein? Why shouldn't they be glad to help with their material, both textual and photographic.

Others listed as Committee Members: Constantine Brown, G. Creel, W. J. Donovan, A. W. Dulles, Farley, B. F. Gunther, Sol M. Levitas, [illegible]. B. Luce, Charles Rozmarek, Sokolsky, V. S. Freedon, Jas. A. Walsh.

I mailed him some of our Katyn photos.

New Leader, 30 Sept. 1950, had an article "New Light on Katyn Massacre."
"The Defense Dept.'s release of a top-secret report on the mystery-shrouded Katyn massacre has shed new light.....The release of the Van Vliet report, written by an American Lt.-Col. held captive in Germany who reluctantly fixed the guilt on Moscow after a Nazi-sponsored visit to Katyn is the first major break in the conspiracy of silence which has surrounded the affair ever since.

"In 1943..the NL carried an exclusive article by Kerensky..directly charging the Kremlin..Last year the NL published a special 4-page supplement on Katyn by Julius EPSTEIN. (See your local phone-book)....
"It was only as a result of the Committee's persistent efforts that the long-suppressed Van Vliet report was finally released..."

If you haven't you should glance at Mikolajczyk's account in The Rape of Poland. Because it contains a verbatim alleged account of "how it came about" by a shame-faced Russian officer in London, which you might find quotable. "So they asked 'Father' (Stalin) and 'Father' said..etc.."
/Churchill in his latest volume, in an oddly restrained account, makes it clear he knows Stalin was responsible, and refers to the books by M. and Anders./

Photos. The NY Times, serializing Churchill, 9 Nov. 1950, had, if you are interested in irony or impudence or whatever, a rather blurred photo, "released at the time by SOVFOTO," which Sovfoto described as showing members of the Polish Corps of the USSR holding memorial services at "the common grave of the Polish officers and men brutally shot by the Germans."
Some of the corpses show marks made by the four-sided, peculiarly Russian bayonet, and others had hands tied with the MVD-type knot. Surely Epstein can help you here?

Please let me know how you make out with Epstein and/or others, and don't hesitate to ask me again. I just think he's a better, quicker bet. I'll do what I can re the other pix and let you know. It sounds a masterpiece.

Sincerely,

Bill.

SECRET

CPW log. New York, 17 March 1951

1. I spent three hours with Boris Shub today, two of them in looking over his collection of photographs with his associate, Mr. Quint, of Life. Boris and Quint hope to have their book ready for publication by the end of May, when they will have reduced their collection to 500 photographs, which they estimate will fill about 200 pages. I have no doubt that the book will be a commercial success; my only wonder is why it has not been done before. Boris asks our help in obtaining certain photographs. (Bill Sims please note.) He wants all procurable photos of the Katyn Massacre, all resistance photos (Bill: Is there a magazine called the Estonian Review, which prints a good many of these?) and a certain photo of Lubianka prison, in Moscow. The New York Times had a photograph of Lubianka in its issue of Saturday, 12 November 1949, to illustrate installment 7 of General Smith's Memoirs, and ISB should be able to discover where the original came from. Boris has a letter from the Vanguard Press expressing hope that his biography of Stalin would be ready by 1 May; he will notify Vanguard that it cannot possibly be ready for another seven months. Finally, he told me that he was meeting Colonel Kintner on 20 March, for several conferences on BRAINWAVE. He signed his secrecy agreement, which I will deliver to John Shields on my return.

No!

2. a. Corey Ford informed me that his story about General Smith (originally written for Flair) had been rejected by both Look and This Week and is now awaiting a decision from Harper's. (I reported

SECRET

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

12-3-50

DATE

TO: MR ~~BRYAN~~ SIMS

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Re ~~SHOB~~. last ¶. What do you suggest?

FROM: 1055

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

SECRET

12 March 1951

CSP

SP/OPW

Re: ROBERT H. HEADLEY

At lunch today Munson said that HEADLEY has finished his part of the work on the photo-book on the career of Stalin; he has completed the text part; his collaborator is "1000%" better qualified to select the photos and do the lay-out.

/ Re security the collaborator's employers told Munson "brutally" firmly that while the collaborator's name can appear on the book (along with HEADLEY's) and it will be revealed that that magazine was the source of the pictures, and they may help "syndicate" it, if it is blown that they are making the pictures available free, the deal is off.

Munson thinks the book will be a world-beater, but that it may take till August to have it ready.

I said that we have $40,000 still untouched in KUFUNKY, which was appropriated for "similar photo-books at the discretion of CSP", and suggested helping Swan out with some of that. He said he wasn't worried about money; that he thought OPC was if anything too ready to spend the taxpayer's money; that Swan's products should be able to pull their own weight. The book might have to sell for $3.50 or more in the US; in Hong Kong it would be a $1 or $2.

He will pay both HEADLEY and the collaborator royalties. HEADLEY's will be returned to Swan. /

TS copy initialed by LST 9B II

SECRET

SECRET

KNACLAY wrote me recently that the book was now at a stage where most of the work had to be done by his collaborator. Since his name is to appear on it, I imagine he will still have to put in quite a bit of time on it, from time to time. He is also —or was when I last heard— doing "part-time" work on loan to HB in connection with BRADEWAVE.

Conclusion: except for the above, he is not occupied, and Munson suggests we should give him another job to do.

WSS

cc: "Stalin" photo-book file.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SP/Sims

NO.

DATE 6 March 1951

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CSP					Excellent news from Shub re the photo-book on the career of Stalin.
2. SP/DCPW					
3. SP/CPW					
4. SP/Sims				WSS	I have written him for an appointment on the 17th.
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

March 3, 1951

Dear Bill:

Good to hear from you, even though your letter, as usual, too brief for my appetite. From "our mutual friend William" you know more about my activities than I do about yours.

My collaborator [a top Life lay-out man] is working like a fiend, with the assistance of a sub-fiend (female) who digs up pictures by the hundreds (literally). Last night I worked with him until 2 o'clock in the morning (with a brief intermission for a prize fight on his television set). In that long stretch we went through over 400 pictures which he had just combed out of various labyrinths. Out of this batch we discarded about one-third, tossed away a couple of dozen poor substitutes for the real thing which the new haul corrected, and filled the present 40-odd chapter folders (provisional) with the cream of the crop.

As you will gather from the above paragraph, the illustrated book on the man and his international network --and the forces all over the world arrayed on his side and against him--- ain't no ordinary picture album. It will be, I am quite certain, a major work. There is little point my attempting to describe it in a letter, but I am quite confident that it will be read xxxx--and even more important-- looked at, with absorbed interest this year, next and ten years from now. What is more important, it will make convincing, I am certain, what no words, written or spoken, can ever make completely convincing.

As far as the "date when it will be wrapped up"--- I can only say that I am acting the role of the slave-driver and the speedup man right now. It is, however, a ticklish role, which would have undesirable results if overdone. [illegible] Both my main collaborator, who is certainly one of the best men in the country in the field--and the best man for this particular book, is giving it every free moment, as is his fantastic research assistant. But a good picture book--as I told you xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx when we discussed the idea originally, is as much of a job as any good book. I think we have broken the back of the job, and I am confident that the product will excel your fondest dreams. As far as pinpointing the date, I think I'll be in a better position to do that in about three weeks, when the haul will be substantially in, xxxx and when we will have pared down our present mountainous collection to the essence. I should imagine that xx when our friend the publisher [Swan] returns from his present jaunt, my collaborator and I will be able to give him a fairly full draft. At that point we'll have to settle with him the major technical questions in connection with the actual printing job. The largest single question we see is this: Price of book versus quality and lasting value. What I mean is that the book as it now shapes up is a major work--a complete pictorial history not only of the man, but of the setting that produced him, the international ramifications that are so much a part of his life, his intrigues and his machinations. Yo~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ But what is even more intriguing, we are reaching the stage where the pictures illustrating all this will be of thrilling pictorial quality. ~~How is we do all this and still turn out a book that~~ is [illegible] to ~~[illegible] yet [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]?~~ When we have that question licked, the rest will move fast.

We are agreed that it would be a serious mistake to sacrifice either quality or essential elements of the over-all story. The trick now is to do all that and yet turn out a book that, by ~~xxx~~ one means or another, will sell at a price likely to make it a mass-circulation job.

For further details, please board first available train or plane and join me over a drink at 510 West 110 Street. Perhaps I've already put too much of this on a typewriter. I wish you could have seen the pictures we worked on last nite. You ~~xxxx~~ would then realize that the original stuff you saw was so much fourth rate stuff by comparison.

(I guess the last two sentences are really intended as a lure. But I really would like to see you soon)

Best regards to the gang. Will give you a more exact timetable as soon as it is feasible.

Doris

SECRET

8 March 1951

STATUS OF W.S.S. PROJECTS

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT.

This has not yet been formally written up as a project, because it has been being implemented, de facto, by our salaried contract agent HEADLEY in conjunction with the publisher Swen Publishing Co., who has been meeting the bill and will continue to do so.

Nevertheless I think it will shortly prove desirable for me to write it up, since (a) it may prove desirable for SP (under KMFUNNY) to subsidize Swen on it, in order to make possible a somewhat lower selling price, and (b) it will be more convenient to have it wrapped up as a named project, which can be referred to by name, and for which SP can have credit in its status reports.

HEADLEY has completed the text part of the book. He and a top-flight Life lay-out man, of whom he has a very high opinion (and an assistant who helps the Life man dig up photos) have been through a very large number of photos. HEADLEY is confident that the book will be a first-class job.

If all continues to go well on the Life front, —i.e. if they make no objection to the use of pictures from their files— the main remaining problem will be: how to combine retention of high quality, i.e. adequate reproduction of as many photos as they need to tell the story the way they feel it should be told, with quantity, i.e. sale at a low enough price to make possible wide dissemination.

Too heavy a subsidy (by OPC) would blow the Government-inspiration of the book. Perhaps, if the book proves to be as good as we feel it should, the State Department's III Information Program or Book Translation Program might get behind it in a big way?

We should go energetically into this problem of selling it at a low enough price as soon as Swen's president returns. In the meantime HEADLEY and I are of opinion that quality should not be sacrificed. If it is of really first-class quality and PW effectiveness, quantity can be achieved, somehow, by subsidy.

HEADLEY will appear overtly as the author. Possibly the A. F. of L. might help give it world-wide distribution, as they have done in the case of the maps of the Slave Labor Camps in the USSR.

If all continues to go well, it looks as though the book might be getting into shape for the printer in April or May.

When this is written up as a Project, it will be a Sub-project under KMFUNNY. KMFUNNY, approved long ago, includes a Recommendation (para 5) "...that...the sume of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of simiolar photo-books at the discretion of Chief, SP." The Sub-project requires only the signature of Chief, SP, as I understand.

EXPENSES. Small sums were paid to HEADELEY, summer 1950, duly recorded in Ray Millard's office, for payment in connection with photos obtained from New

SECRET

York agencies. These sums were charged either to KMFUNNY, or to DGHOUSE, to be transferred to KMFUNNY when KMFUNNY should be approved, or when the "STALIN" SUB-PROJECT under KMFUNNY should be written up and approved.

Tabard Inn
1739 N Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

March 6, 1951

Dear Boris,

Delighted!

And I have circulated the good news around.

Yes, when our pal returns —which I gather should be xxxxxxxx somewhere round about March 15— we will have to address ourselves in a big way to the problem of achieving both quality and quantity. As time goes on, I imagine he will get better and better able to cope with that problem, and I think he should be helped in a big way to do so. In the meantime, I agree with what I'm sure is your view (your letter is not at hand at the moment) that any conflicts between q. and q. should be resolved in favor of quality. The quantity can follow. (Build the really quality mouse-trap, and sooner or later, preferably sooner, the world will beat the path).

Just a detail: you've undoubtedly seen the De Custine in the March 5 LIFE. Could you use:

> "To live in the Kremlin is not to live; it is to protect onself; oppression creates revolt; revolt necessitates precautions; precautions increase the danger; and of this long series of actions and reactions is born a monster, despotism which has built itself a house in Moscow —the Kremlin!" (p. 124) ?

I still agree with you the thing as a whole is marred slightly by the phrase "..this essentially aggressive nation.."

I haven't any immediate plans to go to N. Y., but we must certainly foregtaher before long.

Best regards,

Bill

Tabard Inn
1739 N Street N W
Washington 6, D. C.

Feb. 26, 1951

Dear Boris,

Glad to hear from Dee-dee that you are still alive and kicking. And, especially, that there is some prospect of your getting down this way. I sure hope you do.

Also glad to hear from our mutual friend William that He's seen you, and to get some news of you from him; and that you will have got some news in general from him.

How *is* your collaborator coming, and is he squared away with his bosses? What is your best current guess as to the date when it will be wrapped up?

Jee got generally overworked and came down with grippe, and left for two or three weeks or more to recuperate. A lot of people round here have been or are laid up; I was for a couple of days and am still somewhat under the weather. However, even if I haven't written I've thought of you often.

Drop a line, and don't delay your visit to the Nation's Capital too long.

Best regards,

Bill

SECRET

file "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK

20 Feb. 1951

Re SHUB and BRAINWAVE

At request of Mr. Winston I phoned Shub (AC-2-0164) to ask about progress on the Photo-book, and what is the earliest date at which he may be thru with it. No answer.

RAW says Kintner is asking for him for BRAINWAVE. I suggested not interrupting him till he has finished the photo-book. RAW consulted LST, who said to say Shub might be made available on a part-time basis. RAW understands he would do his work for BRAINWAVE in NY. I said this seemed OK, if it were to be only part-time.

21 Feb. 1951

I phoned Kintner re Shub. He has recently seen Shub in NY. Shub said he had reached the stage in his work (on photo-book) for us where his collaborator wd hv to do most of the work for about a month. Kintner said the work Shub wd do for him wd be in NY, and only part-time. I said this all sounded OK. /Shub not referred to by name over the phone/.

WCS

SECRET

16 Feb. 1951

MUNSON left about Feb. 7th for 4 or 5 weeks.

Due back about March 14th.

SECRET

5 Feb. 1951

"Every 'peace program' is a deception of the people and a piece of hypocrisy, unless its princip~~le~~al object is to explain to the masses the need for a revolutionary struggle of the masses."

From Lenin, April 1916, selected works, International Publishers, New York, 1943, Volume V, page 237, —taken out of context.

SECRET

SECRET

MR. FIRSTON:

30 Jan. 1951

Re: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, tie-in with *Life*.

H.'s DAILY DIARY of Jan. 27: "Piernie of FE-1 [illegible] informed me that he understood that *Time* and *Life* absolutely did not want any of their people connected with any intelligence organization and that Allen Dulles had given instructions that none of them were to be approached without Mr. Wisner's written approval. On the assignment in question, Piernie gave up any attempt to utilize the man they have on *Life's* staff and has sent another man to cover the assignment instead."

Shub, who is preparing a photo-book on Stalin's career for Swan, is getting (or hopes he is getting) the help of "one of *Life's* top lay-out men" (only Shub knows his name; Munson didn't want to ask him), Who is it at $35 per diem.

Shub, of course, is doing the book ostensibly as a private citizen, so if security is maintained it doesn't seem to involve a *Life* man's being "connected with any intelligence organization."

As they get ready to publish (perhaps April), the *Life* man will have to decide whether he wants his name to appear on the book as collaborator, in which case he will probably have to (a) get *Life's* permission. And (b) if they use any photos from *Life's* files, as well as from agencies, he will have to get permission for that too.

It should all be OK if Shub keeps up his cover as private citizen.

HSS

CC: Mr. Winston
"Stalin" photo-book file.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

23 January 1951

Mr. Richards (Legal) phoned, on behalf of Mr. Kelley, re the contract between HEDLEY & CIA re disposition of royalties.

He said Mr. Kelley had referred it to him, with some such message as: "OK to let it stand as it is, if appropriate documentation of the records there [Swen?] and here can be provided."

Mr. Richards asked if doing the photo-book was to be HEDLEY's main activity. I said yes, for a month or two, after which he would have some new assignment. He said all the better.

I said the only problem had seemed to be whether there was any legal objection to having Swen hold the rights to the book instead of "the Government" and Swen receive back the royalties instead of "CIA". Mr. Richards seemed to agree there was no substantial difficulty there, and ended: "Ok, Joe or I will let you know if there seems to be any difficulty there or need to amend the contract", or words to much that effect.

WSS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

KMFUNNY = #2 = "Stalin" photo-book = for PRB 17 Jan '57

Personnel = Manson (Swen) & Shub, & *Life* collaborator

Security = OK = Shub = covert contract agent

Materials = ± 150 sterilized photos from CIA Graphics
± 75 photos obtained by Shub
more photos will be got by Shub & *Life*

Spent = ± $172 for photos obtained by Shub
and for services in obtaining them.

Swen will meet expenses
" has advanced $ to Shub for expenses
" has authorized Shub to pay *Life* man not more than $35 per day.

SECRET

[Were not called to the meeting]

SECRET

12 Jan. 1951

QUESTION for Munson:

Re the second photo-book: Stalin Biography

Any dates or figures that could go in a progress report? Pub-April

What does he estimate will be total number of photos? 150

Any tentative estimate on the selling price? No.

Has his collaborator gotten permission from his employers to use their files and/or to sign the book as collaborator? Unknown

Re first photo-book:

What is best estimate of date it should be on sale? April-1

RW showed this to Munson Jan. 16

Munson wrote the above answers.

3

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SL.

17 Jan
DATE

TO: BILL SKAS

BUILDING
ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Noted with interest
Many thanks.

Show to JBIII

FROM:

BUILDING
ROOM NO.
EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

15 January 1951

15 Jan. '51

MR. THOMPSON

SUBJECT: Shub's work for SP.

1. He is a covert "contract agent", contract expiring 1st Dec. 1951.

2. As far as I know, he is working only on the "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, a book of probably some 150 photos-cum-text on the career of Stalin exposing, mostly out of his own mouth, his duplicity and ruthlessness to his own colleagues, etc., etc. This is to be published by Swan Publishing Co. There will be master negatives, and it should be good for publication in every country.

3. "The Choice" was published October 29, and after giving him a week to recover from the excitements of first-time authorship (he had a good many radio and TV interviews),

4. J[illegible] needled him November 9:

> "We are very anxious to have the photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most effective shots that can be fired and we need it quick.
>
> "My understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. Is that also your understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date.
>
> "Again let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for the photo-book, and our complete confidence that it will have your own brilliant, informed and incisive touch when completed."

5. Shub replied November 13:

> "I am anxious to get the picture book rolling and done as quickly as possible. The loose ends connected with THE CHOICE (radio appearances, sticking pins and needles into Donothing, Sloth and Fierce, etc.) while nerve-racking, do not take so much of my time any longer, so that I am in a position to devote my full time to the picture book....
>
> "I'm partially stymied, however, by your cryptic series of notes and instructions regarding a publisher. Thought the thing was pretty well settled when your note was given to me at the lunch at

SECRET

Biltmore recently / with LST /. But your letter of November 8, 1950 had this footnote:

> 'Please be sure not to say anything at all to anyone about the mutual friend who was mentioned at lunch / Munson /; very important; he'll explain why when and if he sees you, perhaps within a week or two.' / This was just that Munson was anxious about security for Swen /.

"Without a final decision on type of publisher it is exceedingly difficult to determine character, size, tone and scope of the book. It would help me a great deal to know what's up on that score. Simon & Schuster presents one type of problem — and suggests one kind of approach. The mutual friend, who I assume (without being 100% sure) is the publisher you referred to in the note you sent to the Biltmore— suggests something quite different — perhaps much simpler and direct— and more outspoken.

"If this question cannot be clarified by mail, please arrange for us to get together soonest. Once this is out of way, I hope to move fast. I'd be a four-flusher and liar if I pretended that I had made notable progress until now. I've been held up not only by the above, but — being painfully human— by a lingering desire to keep THE CHOICE from being embalmed in the Donothing, Sloth & Pierde Funeral Parlors. I've now given it about all I've got and will do my darnedest not to allow it to cause me any further loss of sleep or diversion of energy from the job on hand.."

6. Munson had a long phone conversation with Shub November 17, at Sims's request, and planned to see him November 21.
November 20 Munson told Sims that Swen will publish the book.

7. A Contract between Shub and CIA was drawn up by Joe Kelley and Sims, and signed Sept. 16, 1950, whereby "the Government" will own all rights to the book, and Shub will return his royalties "to CIA".
Now that Swen is to be the publisher, I have asked Joe Kelley whether it will be OK that the rights should be owned by Swen (a CIA-controlled corporation) and the royalties returned to Swen; or whether he wants to amend the contract.

8. Progress on the book. Last summer Shub and I got some 150 photos from CIA Graphics, of which I sent him sterilized duplicates to New York. He also got 75 excellent ones from New York photo agencies. I have from time to time sent him a lot of suggestions for photos and captions, and if he wants anything done down here he will let me know.

Shub wrote me, December 14:

> "This is just a brief note to give you the latest on the picture front. I won't fill you in on the details because our mutual friend / Munson / will be in Washington early next week and will give you all the dope. ~~Sufficeittosay~~
>
> "Suffice it to say that my collaborator / whom Swen has authorized him to pay $35 per diem / is one of the top lay-out men on

at Life, one of those $25,000 per annum men. For the present he doesn't want his association with the picture book known to his employer for several good and compelling reasons. (Including the fear that they would plagiarize the idea). But in the final stages he'll have to tell them in order to get their cooperation on digging into their files as well as their official permission for the use of his name as a collaborator.

"Needless to say, all of the above is a deep dark secret, but then what isn't these days? More important than all of the above is the fact that the gentleman in question / Munson purposely didn't ask Shub who his collaborator is /, in addition to being a top-flight picture man, is deeply interested in the subject and— miraculously— knows a great deal about it.

"I hope nothing happens to make him back down on his decision. Impossible to get anybody nearly as qualified. Our friend will fill you in on the rest: what remains to be done, how to do it, etc.

"Of one thing you may be sure: If my collaborator stays with the project and if no act of God intervenes, the final product will be the picture book of all time. He wants to see it sold on newsstands among other places.."

9. Munson told me January 8 he had seen Shub about a week before, and "he should be rolling pretty soon."

10. FLASH! Shub just phoned. He said I had proved correct on the point that "Having the book all pictures, without words, is rubbish." He has found it necessary to do a brief written Life of Stalin, bringing in all his major misdeeds, and keeping it as simple & clear-cut as possible.

The MS of that is now being typed. That was the hardest part of the job. Now it should go fast, if the mechanics can be done fast. Namely, the Life collaborator will get the extra pictures from the files needed to fill in the story.

Shub thinks it is really pretty good.

I asked if the Life man's name will appear on it. We both agreed there is no reason why it shouldn't. It will depend on whether the Life man wants it, and whether he thinks it would go down with his bosses.

I told Shub Munson was planning to be away 3 to 4 weeks from about Jan. 28, possibly earlier. Shub will contact Munson before then. We agreed Shub should be able to carry on with Munson's printer in Munson's absence.

11. CONCLUSION. Depending on (a) how much time the Life man can give to it, and (b) how fast Munson's printer can handle it / he is just starting in on the printing of [illegible] Animal photo-book / the book should, with luck, be ready about 6 or 8 weeks from now, —say about March 15.

12. Re Shub & other SP work. JBIII, a week or two ago, was about to phone Shub about some job he wanted him to do. I suggested he leave him to concentrate on the photo-book.

13. Re Boris Shub's & David Shub's "BIOGRAPHY OF STALIN". Last summer, OLMSTEAD having raised the matter, I was told to draw up a project to give David Shub $3,000 for 6 months leave-of-absence from his job, to complete the biography. This was killed because, I was told, you had instructed Shub to work on it himself, during working-time.

Shub and his father had a contract with a publisher for this biography, on which they were already overdue. When JBIII wrote to needle Shub about the picture book, I wanted to clear up the status of the biography, —how they stood with their publisher now that we had instructed Shub to work on the photo-book instead. JBIII said, "Leave Shub to raise the matter if he wants to;" this turned out fine, as Shub's enthusiastic reply of November 15, above, didn't mention the biography.

If there is nothing more pressing for him to do, perhaps Shub might be asked to work again on the biography when he has wrapped up the photo-book. Or the project to subsidize his father for 3 or 6 months work on it might be revived. Judging from the 18 Chapters that were seen here, it should be a very good book, highly readable and fit to give pause even to fellow-travellers and Stalinists.

WSS.

[redacted] Shub

3 Dec. 1951

He never made any mention of it then or since then. Nov. 29, 1951 he told me he told Vanguard he wanted to work on the photo-book for S— first, and that the photo-book would be a quickie.

W.S.S.

Noted with interest by R. Winston, 15 Jan.

SECRET

SECRET

16 Jan. 1951

MUNSON has an appointment to see Shub in NY tomorrow. I told him Shub had phoned yesterday, reporting progress.

MUNSON said he doubted Shub would be fully ready for the printer before Munson's return, and didn't want him to try to handle it with the printer in Munson's absence.

MUNSON will try to see Bob Winston later this afternoon.

He will return from NY Friday evening, Jan. 19.

WSS

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

12 Jan. 1951

Mr. KELLEY

RE: Agreement (16 Sept. 1950) between CIA and HEADLEY re production of photo-book.

You will recall that in the agreement, which you drew up and which was signed 16 Sept. 1950 by Mr. Echols and ROBERT M. HEADLEY, it is provided that HEADLEY "will be required to transfer the gross royalties to CIA."

Swan Publishing Co. is now to be the publisher of the book. I saw Munson Dec. 19, who told me he has already advanced money to [illegible] HEADLEY for expenses, and has authorized him to pay his collaborator (a Life lay-out man) on a fixed fee basis, i.e. not more than $35 per diem.

Swan plans to pay all the expenses of production. It is his understanding that

(a) Swan will, on paper, pay HEADLEY standard royalties, which HEADLEY will return to Swan, and that

(b) Swan will own all rights in the book (which will facilitate Swan's putting out foreign editions).

In other words, it is Munson's hope, and mine, that, as he put it, Swan, being a wholly CIA-controlled corporation, "will simply step into the shoes of 'the Government' and 'CIA' in the agreement."

Munson said you had drawn up the papers for Swan. We both hoped this way of handling the matter, whereby the financial details would all be handled in Swan's books and not occupy the time of OPC personnel, will be legally acceptable?

When I mentioned the matter to John Bischoff, Jan. 5, he said he thought we should check with you whether:

(a) we can simply let the 16 Sept. 1950 agreement stand as is, or

(b) whether the agreement should be amended to read "to Swan" instead of "the Government" and "CIA".

SP/H. S. Sims

To
Kelley

SECRET

SECRET

Daily Diary, Jan. 7, '51

JB lunched Munson.

Munson going on a trip

("roughly 22 Jan. to 10 March").

SECRET

SECRET

Re: KMFUNNY........and "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK;

SIMS saw MUNSON in his hotel, Dec. 19, 1950

Munson leaves for NY this evening. OK to leave messages for him to phone.

Re JOKE-BOOK. He mentioned a contemplated pocket-size book, collecting anti-CP jokes. I said I would contribute what we had in PB II and add from time to time. For further details see my folder JOKES.

He gave me post-card (Sw) by Rockport illustrating joke about "Who Owns the Automobiles". (He got this from a 13-yr-old boy in Germany in 1947, and he and an Army man each put $20 of their own into having it ~~xxx~~ printed and spread).

Re KMFUNNY. Barnes was to have met him Friday (Dec. 15), but had to go out of town to a funeral.

He expects to see Barnes tomorrow (Dec. 20), when Barnes is to deliver about 60 of the photos with his own captions. Munson will then let CHAPPELL look it over for a couple of days. He will then bring it down here and ask Messrs. Bryan, Nadler and Sims look at it. (I told him not to hesitate to leave me out).

Barnes has been OK. I said I would check how his clearance is coming. It was requested Nov. 2 and should be ready, says John Shields, about 3½ months from Nov. 2

Re "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK. See Shub's letter to Sims, Dec. 14, in file. Munson also thinks it is coming well, and should be good, if the Life man continues to prove a good collaborator.

Munson does not know the name of Shub's Life collaborator: he did not encourage Shub to tell him. [Munson says he is sure SWEN is still secure, and there is no reason why it shouldn't continue to be, "if everyone in CIA will keep their big mouths shut; too many know about it"). SWEN may be suspected of Government-inspiration, but it should not be blown.]

Munson has advanced Shub money to pay expenses, and has authorized him to pay his collaborator not more than $35 a day. The collaborator will definitely be paid on a fixed fee basis, i.e. per diem, no royalties.

SWEN can pick up the tab for Shub's expenses in procuring photos, etc That will appear in Swen's accounts, but, happily, there is no need for KMFUNNY's files to be cluttered up with the details.

Re Contract

MUNSON knows of the agreement, re disposition of royalties, which SHUB (HEADLEY) signed with CIA. He "has seen" it; i.e., presumably has seen the sterilized notes Shub made of it, —since Shub retained no copy.

MUNSON understands that SWEN will own all rights to the book. I.e., "SWEN will simply step into the place of CIA in the above agreement." I.e., SWEN, on paper, will be paying Shub standard royalties, but Shub will return them to SWEN.

I said that, as far as I could see, this sounded OK, SWEN being 100% a CIA corporation. Munson said that Joe Kelley had helped draw up the papers setting up SWEN, and was therefore fully cognizant of it and sympathetic to it. Only an excessively legal-minded bureaucrat would quibble over having the royalties re-absorbed by SWEN, rather than disposed of according

SECRET

to para. 4 of the above-mentioned agreement (16 Sept. 1950), according to which "You will be required to transfer the gross royalties to CIA..." (This agreement was also drafted by Mr. Kelley). There doesn't seem to be any difficulties of substance there.

There has been no decision on the size, format, etc. of the book. I mentioned that I had written Shub, mentioning that Simon & Schuster is able to offer its $3.95 FDR a Pictorial History —"260 photos with commentary"— at only $1.50 in cloth.

I said Shub had written some time ago that it would be a help to know the approximate number of photos as soon as possible, and Lyle said he of course agreed. He thought Shub and his collaborator should have something to show in, say, 30 days.

I mentioned that the "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK, when written up, which I will do shortly, will merely be a sub-Project of KMFUNNY, and will therefore require only Mr. Thompson's signature. Lyle queried whether it was necessary to make a formal project of it at all. I said that, for purposes of Status Reports, etc., it would be more or less necessary to have a formal title for it, and he agreed.

Shub has about 150 sterilized CIA Graphics photos, which we selected last summer. None of them could actually be printed, published, without a release from CIA Graphics. I therefore urged Munson to urge Shub to work up a good cover story about them, vis-a-vis his collaborator. Munson said he would advise him not to use them at all. (They are run-of-the-mine; they could all be duplicated with ease from agencies).

I told Munson that Mrs. Poland, of CIA Graphics (of whom he knows) had personally made an arrangement with Roy Larsen, whereby he supplies them with photos from Time-Life files, but not for publication. And that she had told me she is particularly anxious to do nothing that would undermine her relations with Time-Life.

We agreed that, if Shub's collaborator gets permission to use photos from Life's files in the book, it will still be a book being prepared for the overt SWEN Company, and that Life will not know the Government is involved. Munson thinks Shub is being very circumspect about all this.

WSS

JB III read fine!

Dec. 18, 1950

Dear Boris,

Swell!!

I've phoned our friend and will be seeing him tomorrow morning.

I do hope something or other may bring me to New York —though there's no immediate prospect of it— as it would be great fun to foregather.

Incidentally, I expect to be in Boston the 4 days after Xmas, to get the benefit of the two Monday holidays.

Incidentally also, re sale on newsstands (which sounds fine) did you notice that S&S are able to offer FDR, a Pictorial Biography, which is 260 photos with captions and commentary, and is $3.95 in cloth, at only $1½ in paper?

J much pleased too.

Best regards,

Bill

December 14, 1950

Dear Bill:

This is just a brief note to give you the latest on the picture front. I won't fill you in on the details because our mutual friend will be in Washington early next week an d will give you all the dope. Suffice it to say that my collaborator is one of the top layout men on Life; one of those $25,000 per annum men. For the present xxxx he doesn't want his association with the picture book known to his employer for several good and compelling reasons. (Including the fear that they would plagiarize the idea). But in the final stages he'll have to tell them in order to get their cooperation on digging into their files as well as their official permission for the use of his name as a collaborator. Needless to say, all of the above is a deep dark secret, but then what isn't these days? More important than all of the above is the fact that the gentleman in question, in addition to being a top flight picture man, is deeply interested in the subject and--miraculously--actually knows a great deal about it. I hope nothing happens to make him back down on his decision. Impossible to get anybody nearly as qualified. Our friend will fill you in on the rest: what remains to be done, howxto do it, etc. xxxxx Of one thing you may be sure: If my collaborator stays with the project and if no act of God intervenes, the final product will be the picture book of all time. He wants to see it sold on newsstands among other places. xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Are you planning to visit New York one of these days? If you do, please let me know. Very anxious for a chance to chew the fat in a leisurely fashion. Am losing touch with the mythical world in which you live. Best regards to the gang.

Boris

P.S. The $.35 edition of Lenin is ready. Goes on sale officially on Dec 22, but I notice that Columbia U. bookstore is already selling it. ("Mentor Book", New American Library)

[illegible] 36 III

SECRET

Nov. 17, 1950

MUNSON PHONED FROM NY. , 10 a.m.

He will phone Shub now. Perhaps they can lunch together. Munson "definitely wants" the photo-book. Is agreeable to whatever size, etc., we think it should be. Told him I had suggested to Shub that he proceed on an estimate of about 150 pages.

I forgot to mention Joe's suggestion that Simon & Schuster (which Joe says would be better than Doubleday, probably) might do the book in the US, with Swen to have the foreign rights. Will tell Lyle about thqt this weekend.

Munson comes to Washington this afternoon or evening. I will give him the KUFUNNY pictures this weekend.

WSS

See log-sheet, Nov. 17

SECRET

Letter from Shub to Sims, Nov. 13, '50

filed in folder "SHUB, THE CHOICE"

See copy of it, above, in Memo of 15 Jan. '51 to LST.

96 III

C-O-P-Y SECRET

1739 N St NW
Nov. 13, 1950

Dear Boris,

Many thanks for your excellent letter of the 13th, which I got this evening, and all the good news about "The Choice", which I'll share.

I'll try to clarify about our mutual friend / Munson / just as soon as I possibly can. Couldn't reach him all this evening. Maybe I can get him tomorrow morning. Will urge him to see you at the earliest and get it all clarified, as that will —as you say— be a great help. Meanwhile why not go ahead on an estimate of say 150 pp. Hope he can see you by Tuesday or at earliest thereafter.

Best regards
hastily

P.S.

Good about "Lenin" too.
And the Navy!
And the dual German edition!
And how right Matthew xiii, 57
was about prophets.

SECRET

Retain or Destroy

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

9 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: ~~A. R. Bryan~~	
BUILDING	ROOM NO.
REMARKS: OK	
FROM:	

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 12-2

CONF.

SECRET

9 Nov. 1950

RE

I queried Ray about how to send your letter to Shub, and he sterilized it and said it could go as sterilized. I will mail it this evening. Ray changed no matters of substance. (But the sentence about "we are pressed for full weekly reports" had to go out; the sterilized version of it wouldn't do the trick).

Re communicating with Shub. Ray says there is no OPC man in NY/OO. There may be one ~~letter~~ later. That NY/OO are not supposed to know SP details, and that, failing the OPC man there, the only means of regular communication with Shub are:

(1) fully sterilized letters thru ordinary mail
(letters via OO would equally have to be sterilized)

(2) hand-carried letters

(3) personal contact

WSS

SECRET

1698 32nd St., N. W.

Nov. 9, 1950

Dear Boris,

We are very anxious to have the photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most effective shots that can be fired and we need it quick.

My understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. Is that also your understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date.

Again let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for the photo-book, and our complete confidence that it will have your own brilliant, informed and incisive touch when completed.

Joe
per
Bill

P.S.

Joe left town (till evening of the 12th) before I could discuss this with him. Please note his new address, as above.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

9 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: Ray

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Could this letter, to Shub, signed "Joe" be sent thru the ordinary mail? I imagine not. Who should I see here re arrangements for communicating with Shub via NY/00? Carpenter? Dixon? WBS

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

9 Nov. 1950

We are very anxious to have the photo-book finished as fast as possible. Handled as you alone can do it, this book will be one of the most effective shots that ~~we~~ can fire for ~~the Country~~ the Better and ~~we need it right quick~~. ~~My~~ understanding is that you are now engaged full time on it. ~~this project as your present assigned job with the~~ corporation. Is that also your understanding? If so, please let me know (1) that the photo-book is ~~now~~ your first concern, and (2) what progress you have made to date. [We need this information to study our financial needs in relation to the project.] ~~We are pressed for full yearly reports of all jobs now on foot, we must include a report on your progress to justify & and continue the present financial arrangement.~~

Again, let me emphasize the great enthusiasm we have for ~~the product~~ ~~Photo~~ photo-Book, and our complete confidence that it will have your own brilliant, informed and incisive touch when completed.

[illegible]

No OPC man in NY/00 now: trying to get one

Ray says only way to handle it is

(1) fully sterilized, as above

OR

(2) hand-carry

NY/00 are not supposed to know SP details, so anything sent via 00 [pending getting an OPC man up there] would have to be sterilized anyhow.

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

8 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: Mr. Bryan

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

FF:

FROM: WBS.

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

R-E-D-R-A-F-T

6 Nov. 1950

TO SHUB

via NY/OO, hand-carried; who can keep this and any later
letters for Shub to consult from time to time
if necessary.
He can transmit periodic reports of progress
via NY/OO. sterilized ones direct.

Dear Boris,

Re your book. I went fully into the question of ordering copies, and it is clear that it is not policy anywhere to do anything official to promote the distribution of it. There is just nothing in the charter that would authorize officially promoting a book of that very wide scope, —except for limited internal circulation.

That leaves it, as I imagine you gathered at lunch the other day /with IST/ that you should work on it only during weekends and other free hours.

That in turn leaves the question of the current status of the "Stalin" biography and of the Stalin photo-book.

Re the photo-book. On the one hand, (1) Joe is very keen to get the photo-bock finished as fast as possible, and (2) the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch the other day /Munson/ is interested in it, and (3) we have already got a good deal of it done, —the some 225 photos already on hand, etc. and (4) perhaps most important: it could be completed in less time than would be required to complete the biography.

Shubs [illegible]

/JBIII: I wrote him yesterday, when sending him the Poole paper, to be particularly careful not to say anything at all to anyone about "the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch" (Munson)/

/JBIII: Please note the security angle in what follows. Also, the project to have one or both Shubs complete the "Stalin" biography, in re which I have the full file, has been batted around from Olmstead to Kelley

SECRET

to LST, and there is or was a contract with Vanguard.

First, I was instructed to draw up a Project to subsidize David Shub to complete the biography. Later I was told that Boris had been sent to NY, with instructions to complete it himself.

LST, a few days ago, told me he was under the impression that you had worked out arrangements with Boris in re the biography. But you haven't. Neither has Kelley, nor Kramer. And Bill Rowland (to whom LST referred me) knows of no one else in OPC from whom Shub should be receiving directives.

Therefore, let's take time to get it cleared up, on paper, what _is_ the status of Shub _pere et fils_ re "Stalin".

Re "Stalin" Biography. On the other hand, we are not clear what is the current status of the biography, (1) do you have any written directives from us about it, and (2) what are your and your father's current obligations to Vanguard as to completing it?

An important question is: if you complete the photo-book first, are your obligations to Vanguard such that you would have security difficulty in explaining to them why, and on whose behalf, you were delaying two months (more or less) to finish it, before resuming work on the biography?

(esp. if Swen were to be the publisher)

deal with
Since the photo-book and the biography have the same subject-matter, I suppose there is a bare possibility that you could work on the photo-book during "office" hours, while collaborating with your father on the biography evenings and weekends. But that does not seem a happy arrangement. We are called on for weekly Progress Reports, and Vanguard would be wanting to know what gives, and why. Much better to concentrate on one job at a time, and be under obligations to only one crowd at a time.

Status of the biography. As far as anyone here knows, you have only oral instructions to complete it. According to my rough notes of a talk we had July 31, you had a contract with Vanguard, July '49, calling for a book "by David & Boris Shub" to be completed March 1, 1950. And as of June 10, your father had had a $900 advance on it.

Would the copyright be in your name, or both? I think it would be

SECRET

simplest to have the actual copyright in your name alone (he could assign his share to you), so that any arrangements for foreign publication could be made with the minimum delay over the legal and security aspects.

If I got it right, as of July 31 you had about 100 pages in pretty much finished form, about 70-80 pages in rougher draft, plus Chapters IV & V the typescript of which was circulated here (and which I mailed back to you Oct. 5). Anyway, you thought there would have been an absolute minimum of 3 solid months more ~~xxxx~~ full-time work in it for your father. All in all, if you were working on it whole-time and your father part-time, would a minimum of 3 and maximum of ~~8~~ 6 be about the right estimate?

(It's so much better, and better reading, than the Deutscher, it ought to come out as soon as possible. Incidentally, have you considered that the "Atlantic" or "Harper's" might print chapters of it in advance? Chapters IV & V are certainly highly readable.)

Re completing photo-book. What time do you estimate it would take you, whole-time, to do a photo-book worth doing? (Say between 100 and 200 photos?). I should think an absolute minimum of a month, and much more likely 2 or 3 months in actual practice, wouldn't you?

You probably noted that "Life's WW II Picture History" occupied "the fused talents of 'Life's' entire photographic and editorial staff." ~~XXXX~~ But yours would be only 150 or 200 photos, and you have almost all the caption material in your head or on your desk, so perhaps, with a cooperative publisher and cooperative photo agencies, 2 or 3 months full-time work would do it?

Please give all these details in writing, so we can make a decision. You could leave your carbon with NY/CO for safe-keeping, and arrange with them to consult it when and if necessary. Fully sterilized letters, about details of work-in-progress, we can exchange direct.

The friend who was mentioned at lunch said he may be free to come and see you in a week or two. But please be extremely careful about mentioning him to anyone. He'll explain why that's important.

Best regards,

Bill

two carbons

SECRET

41

Bill: This is not what I want. I want Shub to be told that we are paying him to complete his picture book,* but we hear that he is merelym promoting The Choice. What are the facts? When will the picture book be finished? I also want you to devise a system whereby we can check Shub's progress. Lastly, we could never allow a letter like this one to go through the mails. In the wrong hands, it would be TNT.

JB3

*What about Stalin biography?

No. NY/00 1655.

8 Nov '50

SECRET

42

D-R-A-F-T

7 Nov. 1950

To SHUB

ny/00 w383

c/O LITTAUER, who can keep this and subsequent letters in his safe, filed under HEADLEY, for Shub to consult from time to time, if necessary.
Sterilized letters, dealing with details of his work, I can exchange with him direct.

D-R-A-F-T

~~Dear Headley (pseudonym),~~

Dear Boris,

Re "The Choice". I hope the Overseas Press Club panel was a success. Nothing in the "NY Times" about it, but they don't usually write up those affairs. —I've seen nothing further in the "Post", ~~xxxx~~ since the mention in the ed I sent you; will send you anything I see.

I have a complete file, "The Choice", here, with all the reviews, etc. in it. I went fully into the question of ordering copies, and it is clear that it is not policy anywhere to promote the distribution of it (or for that matter, equally clearly, any other book). After all, if the head man himself / Bedell Smith / had written "The Choice", there is nothing in his official charter that would authorize him to promote it in his official capacity; on the contrary. Nothing anywhere against you personally or the book; it's just that there is no policy to promote any book of that wide scope.

Therefore, as I imagine you gathered at lunch the other day / with IST / work in connection with "The Choice" should be during weekends and other free time.

I hope Winchell's mention of it, and the good "NY Times" review, etc., will help sales, and that if it hasn't gotten off to a fast ~~step,~~ start it will develop as a ~~"creeper".~~ "sleeper"

SECRET

4

Re "Stalin" biography and/or Stalin photo-book.

That leaves the question whether you are supposed to be working on completion of the "Stalin" biography or on the Stalin photo-book, or on both. What is your own preference?

On the one hand, (1) Joe is anxious to get the photo-book done, and (2) the friend who was mentioned to you at lunch the other day ⌊ Munson ⌋ is interested in it, and (3) we have already made a beginning on it, and, perhaps most important, (4) it could be completed in less time than would be required to complete the biography.

(Incidentally, please be particularly careful not to say anything to anybody about the publisher who was mentioned at lunch. ⌊Swen⌋. It could raise a really first-class stink. ⌊ Munson thinks other publishers would raise hell if they found out the Government had gone into competition with them⌋. Very important).

On the other hand, what are your and your father's current obligations to Vanguard, in re the Stalin biography, and would you have security difficulty in explaining to Vanguard why and on whose behalf you were taking two months (more or less) to do the photo-book, before resuming work on the biography? If so, that might be an argument for completing the biography first.

Please give me all relevant details as to the current status with Vanguard. As far as anyone here knows, you have only oral instructions to complete the biography. According to my rough notes of a talk we had July 31, you had a contract with Vanguard, July '49, calling for a book "by David & Boris Shub" to be completed March 1, 1950. And as of June 10, 1950 your father had had a $900 advance on it.

The copyright would be in your name, or in your father's also? I think

SECRET

it would be simplest to have ~~them~~ it in yours alone from the start (or he could assign his to you), so that arrangements for foreign publication ~~/ perhaps by Swan /~~ could be made with the minimum delay ~~[illegible]~~ over the legal and security aspects.

If I got it right, as of July 31st you had about 100 pages in pretty much finished form, about 70-80 pages in rougher draft, plus Chapters IV & V the typescript of which was circulated here (and which I mailed back to you Oct. 5). Anyway, you thought there would have been an absolute minimum of 3 solid months more work in it for your father. All in all, assuming you were working on it whole-time, would a minimum of 3 and maximum of 8 months be about right? (It's so much better, and so much better reading, than the Deutscher, I think we ought to get it out as soon as possible. Incidentally, have you considered that the "Atlantic" or "Harper's" might print chapters of it in advance? Chapters IV & V are certainly highly readable).

What time do y ou estimate it would take you, whole-time, to do a photo-book worth doing? (Say between 100 and 200 photos?). I should think an absolute minimum of a month, and much more likely 2 or 3 months in actual practice, wouldn't you?) I have been keeping a file of everything done in the photo-book line, such as "Life's Picture History of World War II" and "The Life of F.D.R. in Pictures", and note that/to produce ~~[illegible]~~ the 1,000 photos of the former occupied "the fused talents of Life's entire photographic and editorial staff". Yours would be only 150 or 200 photos, and you have almost all the caption material in your head or on your desk, so perhaps, with a cooperative publisher and cooperative photo agencies, 2 or 3 months hard work would do it?

SECRET

I have written you care of Littauer, whom we have asked to keep a file for you, of letters of this sort — and you could deposit carbons of your replies if necessary with him — which you could consult when and if necessary.

Sterilised letters, about details of work-in-progress, we can exchange direct.

The friend who was mentioned at lunch said he may be free to come and see you in a week or two. But please be extremely careful about mentioning him to anyone. He'll explain why that's important.

Best regards,

Bill

two carbons

Has Littauer a safe?

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SL

6 Nov. '50
DATE

TO: ~~CSP~~ [illegible]

BUILDING | ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

F.Y.I.

JBIII and I are writing to him.

FROM: W. S. S.

BUILDING | ROOM NO. | EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

6 Nov. 1950

MR. THOMPSON.

Re: Boris Shub

(1) Bill Rowland says that, as far as he knows, Shub is not under the direction of anyone except CSP.

(2) Shub is a covert "contract agent". His contract runs until 1st Dec. 1951.

W.S.S.
WSS

cc: Mr. Thompson
for file "Stalin photo-book"

SECRET

3 Nov. '50

"L'URSS EN CONSTRUCTION", #12

~~xx~~ WSS wrote on cover sheet of date 30 Oct. '50, from I/IS: "SF/TW/Sims would like to see material such as this, and if possible would like to have a copy of "L'URSS en Construction". #12, 1949.

The latter is the handsomely got out, printed in Moscow, #12, 1949 issue, dealing with the ~~xx~~ 70ty bday of Stalin. A lot of idealized paintings of Stalin with Lenin et al; the house where he was born, his activs in 1905, in Georgia ; in 1917, etc.

(We cd live without it, however).

The mags were shipped to the Sov Legation in Havana. It may be possible to get similar publications in the future. Request interest be indicated. SP/IS also expressed interest.

Attachments must be returned to OSO by 17 Nov.

The other attachment is big mag "SOVIET UNION", #5, July '50.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 Oct. '50

SECRET

MR. THOMPSON

(1) I just phoned Shub and asked him to got in touch with you at the Biltmore around 9 a.m. Thursday, in re having lunch with you.

(2) His phone is Academy 2-0164, 510 West 110th St.

(3) re "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK. I wrote him Oct. 18: "Please don't approach any publishers until you hear more. Another very helpful possibility has come up."

He was understandably puzzled, and I couldn't explain it over the phone. Could y ou please explain to him it means: Don't approach Simon & Schuster or other publishers because SWEN PUBLICATIONS, INC. is much interested in doing the book.

WSS.

SECRET

Books of The Times

19 Oct. '50.

By CHARLES POORE

"LIFE'S Picture History of World War II"* is detonated with salvos of interpretative prose by John Dos Passos. "The Prospect Before Us"† is a wide-ranging, deeply pondered discussion of what's going on in the world and what may loom, by John Dos Passos. Our main guide this morning, then, is Mr. Dos Passos, as we look at the embattled present, future and past.



John Dos Passos

In ordinary life when you are being shown through picture galleries, you sometimes get so interested that you lose sight of your guide. And much the same sort of thing happens while Mr. Dos Passos is leading you through "Life's Picture History of World War II." There are fields and towns and seas and beaches that may interest you, for personal reasons, far more than they can ever interest many other people. You stop and look again and again at these, in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic or the South Pacific, say, and let the rest of the party, guided by Mr. Dos Passos, go on.

The whole book, though, is a magnificent and impressive performance. It will probably become our day's equivalent of the Brady Civil War albums, unless someone finds a better way to keep a planetary conflict in human scale. Hundreds of black and white prints are supplemented with maps and color plates of photographs—and dozens of those curiously immaculate war paintings.

The seas churn, the continents blaze, the new, improved, economy-size superhomogenized Bikini bomb raises its cauliflower head. But the measure of it all is man. The measure of it all is a submariner reporting by intercom from the engine room. An American citizen dead on a Leipzig balcony where he fell covering the Second Infantry's advance across a bridge. An Englishman called Tedder giving a light to an American called Spaatz. A German called Rommel who hit our side so frequently and so hard in North Africa that we are apparently hell-bent on endowing him, posthumously, with supernatural powers.

Pictures Not to Be Forgotten

There is a picture of the beaches of Namur on Kwajalein atoll that you won't soon forget. The air seems to be made of the substance of death. There is a picture of Nazi troops—garrison troops, at that—goose-stepping through the Arc de Triomphe that you won't want to remember. There are pictures of Japanese suicide planes, late in the war, coming in on American ships that should be printed with all articles explaining how completely we had beaten the enemy long before the Enola Gay sailed over Hiroshima.

One of the most dramatic pictures in the book shows half a page of a typewritten letter. Man named Einstein is writing a man named Roosevelt, on Aug. 2, 1939. The letter begins: "Sir: Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to expect that the element uranium may be turned into a new and more important source of energy in the immediate future. * * *" The free world's "immediate future" has been immeasurably lenghtened because Einstein wrote that letter.

Winston Churchill, who is writing the greatest continued story of our day, said in THE NEW YORK TIMES last Thursday that "it is easier to infuriate Americans than to cow them." He was speaking of the havoc the U-boats made along our coasts in 1942, when the war came very close to America, as you can see by this book's picture of an American tanker torpedoed off the Jersey shore. You can also apply Churchill's observation to many other pictures, particularly those of the black days after Pearl Harbor. The book's last shot shows a combat veteran who might be in Korea today. The final text by Mr. Dos Passos is: "The Pacific phase of the second of the world wars of the bloody twentieth century had ended, but its ending brought no peace."

In his own new book, "The Prospect Before Us," which contains stuff he first wrote for Life and for Harper's Magazine, Mr. Dos Passos expands on that. He takes us all over the wartime and post-war map, to Akron and Argentina, England and Brazil, Lima and Kansas City. He arranges his bursting briefcases full of material into a series of lectures complete with hecklers and other askers of penetratingly troublesome questions, that become light-heavyweight bouts with the leading problems of the world. What shall we do about capitalist cartels and Communist trusts? How can the institutions of democracy be safeguarded in a world where security is in short supply? What must we do to be saved? Little man, little world, there's little time. The battle is still on.

Lessons at Hand Everywhere

If we want to get a notion of the price of failure, Mr. Dos Passos says, "all we have to do is to visit the ruins of Berlin or to imagine the lives men live in Prague or Bucharest or Moscow." If we want to get an inkling of the cost of survival, all we have to do is to read Mr. Dos Passos' recollections of his wartime experiences in Britain. And now they've passed from their ordeal by fire to what Mr. Dos Passos calls their "ordeal by government." At all points he maintains his faith in man. Free man.

All over the world he chats easily with men and women of all degrees. There seems to be a breezy and unconstrained flowering of Mr. Dos Passos when he leaves New York. In Coon Rapids, Iowa, he drops into a coffee shop and finds that "Bob Garst was sitting in his accustomed corner laughing like he'd split about the difficulties of getting seed corn detasseled." In Peru, a puffing fellow says: "A curious thing about Lima * * * the only history that has remained in our minds * * * is that candlelit colonial romance of the aged viceroy and the actress La Perrichole."

That "candlelit" romance, as a matter of fact, had such far-reaching influences that it eventually led to the broadening of the Pulitzer Prize conditions, so the 1928 decoration could go to Thornton Wilder's novel about La Perrichole, "The Bridge of San Luis Rey."

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*LIFE'S PICTURE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II. Edited by Arthur B. Tourtellot. Picture editor, Francis Brennan. Text by John Dos Passos and others. [illegible] pages. Simon & Schuster. $10.

†THE PROSPECT BEFORE US. By John Dos Passos. Illustrated by [illegible]. [illegible] pages. Houghton Mifflin. [illegible]

18 Oct. 1950

Air-mail to SHUB

Please don't approach any publishers until you hear more. Another very hopeful possibility has come up. #

Adele is here and says to send you her love.

As D-day approaches we trust you are taking aspirin every hour on the hour. Best regards and sympathy to Libby.

Bill

# Possibility that Swen publications will publish the "Stalin" PHOTO-Book, initially in the U.S. and/or in the foreign editions.

SECRET



16 Oct '50

THE fused talents of LIFE'S entire photographic and editorial staff have gone into this superb new kind of history book. It contains nearly 1000 photographs, paintings, maps, many in color, and 75,000 words of brilliant narrative by John Dos Passos, Robert Sherrod, and others. Foreword by Henry R. Luce.

The first printing of this monumental book is one half million copies; the size 10" x 14"; the weight, approximately 6 lbs. Each copy comes in its individual carton. Price $10 a copy; deluxe edition $12. At all bookstores.

—SIMON AND SCHUSTER

LIFE's Picture History of World War II (Time, Inc.; Simon & Schuster, $10; de luxe edition $12). A thousand pictures and 80,000 words of text.

Year: Mid-Century Edition, 1900-1950 (Year, Inc., [illegible]). A record of fifty years in 2,000 pictures and 100,000 words.

Oct. 16, '50

for QUARTERLY REPORT SECRET 6 Oct. '50

KMFURRY: This project is to produce a book of animal photos with satirical anti-Communist captions for publication in France. It is being developed with the assistance of Clarence A. Barnes, author of the best-selling "Home Sweet Zoo" and other photo-books. Twenty-one captioned photos have been submitted to a French publisher, who has indicated willingness to ~~[illegible]~~ publish. These photos have been recalled, so that a final selection may be made from among them and 59 further photos ~~[illegible]~~ supplied by Mr. Barnes. If the French edition is successful, editions in other areas are contemplated. $6,000 has been allotted to publishing this book, with approximately $600 obligated to date; and an additional $40,000 has been set aside for publishing similar books. ~~[illegible]~~ / Earliest publishing date 6 weeks; latest estimated at Jan. 1, 1951/. If there are editions in other countries, this project will be active for more than one year, and it may be necessary to subsidize the publishers in order to obtain the desired distribution.

1685

KM
KNOT

SECRET

SECRET 6 Oct. '50

for QUARTERLY REPORT

RE [illegible] "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT

This project, which will be a sub-project of [illegible], has not been formally drafted, but is being developed. The project is to prepare and publish in the U.S. a book of photos and text on the career of Stalin, with the expectation of very widespread foreign distribution to follow. Mr Robert M. Headley, CIA contract agent, is at work on the book; more than 200 photos have been assembled; a legal agreement concerning copyright and royalties between CIA and Headley was signed Sept. 16. Cost of 150 photos at $6 would be $900; any profit in the form of royalties will be returned to CIA.

~~John~~ Shields: there has already been some expense for (a) travel by Snowden to NY to take contract to Headley for signing, and (b) about $150 paid to Headley's agents to pay the agencies for photos obtained, and (c) $100/down payment to them for their services in obtaining.

1588

SECRET 41

SECRET 6 Oct. 1950

for QUARTERLY REPORT (?)

Re; the bit listed as #5 (No name).

As far as I know this is not, and probably never will be, technically a Project.

As far as I know Headley is just under instricitions from LST, —as soon as he has finished work on the Stalin photo-book— to complete his biography of Stalin.

W88

SECRET

SECRET

secret

For Dawson, for
QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT

5 Oct. '50

"STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK PROJECT (to be named KMKNOUT)

Is a project for preparation of a book of photographs-plus-text on the career of Stalin.

When formally written up, it will be titled KMKNOUT, and will be a sub-project of [illegible], requiring only the approval of LST.

Some photographs have been assembled, from CIA Graphics and from agencies in N.Y., and a legal agreement has been drafted and signed, between ~~[illegible]~~ CIA and Robert H. HEADLEY (pseudonym for B.S.), who will prepare the book for publication in the U.S. under his own name, retaining the copyright, which (together with royalties) he will assign to CIA.

Mr. Headley is now working on the book. It is planned that, after publication in the U.S., there will be editions (some perhaps subsidized) in many foreign areas.

[illegible]

I assume you have the details on this.

EXRADIO

I am listed as responsible for this, but know nothing about it. (I am going to look at the file today). Ray Millard and LST know about it.

"STALIN" BIOGRAPHY

This, I believe, is not technically a project. But I understand that Robt. H. HEADLEY, ~~[illegible]~~ contract agent, has instructions from LST, after finishing the "Stalin" photo-book, to complete a biography of Stalin, for publication in the U.S. under his own name; with the expectation of foreign editions to follow.

WSS

SECRET

51

6 Oct. 1950

Re PHOTO: of a panel of distinguished literary figures, artists, musicians, etc., who have been banned in USSR, are exiles, and/or became disillusioned with the "Soviet experiment".

Dateline Berlin, Aug. 16, '50. The West Berlin "Volksblatt" reports that the SED has forbidden the works of the following to appear in official entertainment programs or in public libraries in the East Zone:

Andre GIDE: "an enemy of the Soviet Union"

Ignace PADEREWSKI: "a Polish reactionary chauvinist and enemy of the Soviet Union"

Igor STRAVINSKY: "implacable enemy of the Soviet Union"

Arturo TOSCANINI: "rootless, with Western tendencies" (!!)

R. M. RILKE: whose work is "sterile and unpopular"

Stefan GEORGE: "a decadent dreamer and champion of the Germanistic infallibility myth"

Jean-Paul SARTRE

Musicians

To what extent any or all of them left the USSR for primarily political reasons I don't know (do you), but taken in all, with the caption pointing out "It can't be a coincidence that all these men preferred to get away from and stay away from the USSR", they wd make an impressive gallery:

STRAVINSKI
HOROWITZ
ELMAN
HEIFETZ
GOLSCHMANN?(b.Paris)

RACHMANINOV
KOUSSEVITSKY
BARER
BRAILOWSKY
GARBOUSOVA

KOSTELANETZ
KURTZ
MEDTNER (?)
MILSTEIN
MOISEIVICH

PIATIGORSKY SEVITZKY STERN ZIMBALIST

ETC. ETC.

Photo: of MVD officer, or   6 Oct. 1950

Photo: PIROGOV (as on the cover of his book; Duell, Sloan)

Caption: a quote from him, such as (from the jacket of the book):

"The Soviet major and the American colonel personified two worlds, two worlds between which I was to choose.

"One was my country where everything was infinitely dear to me: her breadth, her limitless abundance, her simple, kindly folk who can sing in times of sorrow as in times of joy.. Scores of friendly faces flashed across my mind, scores of people I should never see again.

"But then all of that was blanketed in mist and all I saw was the sleek mask of the Soviet major sitting across from me. The cold, rigid features expressed all I detested: cruelty, contempt for the sufferings of others, the fear and sham of everyday life, the cheerless toil, and the perennial threat of tyranny..

"The alternative was an alien ~~land~~ America where I should be a stranger,.. but where I should at least be free..

"But I did know that I could no longer live in the land of my birth, live as a slave among slaves, conscious of my impotence to help them or myself.."

Comment: this quote could of course be pruned, retaining little more than the underlined bits.

Here is text which, joined to a photo of a particularly repellent MVD type, will do something to put across how the MVD is detested.

/ Sure, he's an anti-Stalinist, but that's Stalin's fault, not ours, You could add, if it seems necessary, as he and Ada Siegel point out, that there are thousands like him, and the only reason we don't hear from them is that it's a rare & lucky & plucky man who has a plane handy for escape./

6 Oct. 1950

?? Photo of TROTSKY and/or LENIN

Caption: quote from Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913, describing Lenin as "this professional exploiter of all the backwardness in the Russian working class movement." (BS manuscript, p. 120).

Comment: several photos and quotes of this sort to expose the myth of one-big-happy-family life among the Communists, whole-souled in their adoration of Big Brother. A Trotsky quote such as the above could be used in conjunction with the Stalin quote on the "ordinariness" of Lenin, and the Lenin quote on the "roughness" of Stalin. And throw in two or three more and you have a striking (and amusing) little

Section on: the Politburo as just a Band of Brothers, happy home life among the Communists; the CC (circa 1924, anyway) a snake-pit; band of backbiters and backstabbers

3 x 2 equals 6 photos would give an exhibit of each of the three Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky backbiting each of the others.

Then these could be followed with the photo of Trotsky ~~xx~~ dead after stabbing bt Stalin's assassin, which in turn could be followed (or the whole preceded by) photo of Dostoevsky with the quote:

"Brothers will begin to cut each other's heads off in order to obtain brotherhood".

6 Oct. 1950

?? Photo of DOSTOEVSKY

Caption: an appropriate quote from him.

Orville Prescott reviews "Fyodor Dostoevsky" by R. Fulop-Miller, 137 pp., $2., Scribners, in "NY Times", Oct. 6, and quotes:

> "Brothers will begin to cut each other's heads off in order to obtain brotherhood... It is madness to want to bring about a new era and a new humanity by sacrificing a hundred million heads..."

He says there are "many amazing prophecies...of the tyranny of the totalitarian state."

I imagine you have read most of Dustomoffsky, and would know other quotes as good as or better than the above.

14-00000

6 Oct. 1950

In re: How many pictures?

"NY Times" b ook page says "THE PICTURE STORY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT" By Gene Schoor, which will be issued Nov. 7 by Frederick Fell, will contain

125 illustrations with
20,000 words of text.

This is evidently a second FDR photo-book, and will be competing with the SLAN & SCHUSTER (Simon Legree & Schuster) one by Stefan Lorant, "The Life of FDR in Photographs and Text".

55

Letter from Shub to Sims, 26 Sept. 1959:

"...On the picture book: I am following your idea of trying to get a working draft done myself, with a clear story and a tentative arrangement of pictures, before calling in a collaborator. I am going to need many more pictures than I now have to do a real job. Please continue to forward any suggestions you may have, as well as any picture material you encounter."

SECRET

File [illegible]



A third volume of Rooseveltiana will be published in a period of a month when Frederick Fell will issue on [illegible] "The Picture Story of Franklin Delano Roosevelt," by Gene Schoor. It will contain 125 illustrations with 20,000 words of text. On Sept. 29 Duell, Sloan & Pearce published Frank Kingdon's "As F. D. R. Said: A Treasury of His Speeches, Conversations and Writings." Beacon Press issued on Sept. 27 "The Wit and Wisdom of Franklin D. Roosevelt," edited by Maxwell Meyersohn with the collaboration of Adelle Archer.

To Boris SHUB

28 Sept. 1950

Just FYI

"As Russia Sees It", MARCH OF TIME, Aug. 1950

Presents an analysis of the world situation today, from the viewpoint of the Kremlin. It evaluates the opportunities for conquest as Stalin and his henchmen see them, and shows why the Soviets chose to take action now in Korea rather than elsewhere.

It also shows how the U.S. is meeting the challenge in Korea: the mobilization of manpower and industry; the reactivation of planes, tanks, and ships laid up since the end of WW II; and the actions which the US is taking with other members of the UN to check permanently the aggressions of Stalin and his Communist satellites.

Running time about 22 minutes.

Of course through someone such as Jensen, *Time* and/or *Life* could provide stills from this.

25 Sept. 1950

[To Shub]

As you probably saw in yesterday's "N. Y. Times Book Review", SIMON & SCHUSTER will be the publishers this fall of "The Life of FDR in Photographs and Text" (sic) by Stefan Lorant, and of "LIFE's Picture History of World War II".

Also Boris Shub has a book coming out on "the cold war and propaganda".

Are you sending complimentary copies to Drew Pearson and to Bernard Baruch? The latter's recent article in "Look" had a sentence or two faintly, but only faintly, along the lines of "the choice."

If you have a copy to spare, why not send one to Gen. Wedemeyer, c/o Pentagon; he's the one who maintains the first sine qua non is to have a political policy.

[Simo]

19 Sept. '50

Re your MS. P is in bed with some kind of fever. He got Dick today to take the MS to Floyd McCaffery, chief of research for Republican Nat'l C'ee, who will give it to the Col. Fellers who wrote the "How to Beat the Russians" article in the current "Colliers".

Elliston (Washington Post) has had the MS, at any rate of the last chapter. P rang Kay Halle, his sec'y, to ask her to tell him it should get all possible publicity.

Don't worry too much (except in your capacity as a tax-payer, etc.!) about the sales. One Elliston reading it means more than the thousands reading the "Worlds in Collision" tripe,—which even Churchill can't dislodge from #1 on the Best Seller list.

Re photo-book. Please keep such screeds as I sent, for any possible future cross-reference.

They are mainly grains of sand dropped in to contribute to the production of the pearls. (That simile seems better, the more you think of it, don't you think?).

Re Slave-labor: J suggests possible use, lacking photos, of drawings such as the enclosed from Sept. 18 NY Times Book Review by Korolkov (Stalin Prize Winner!) and said to be artist of very high calibre. Don't throw it away. Wait & see. A number of his drawings appeared in Life a year or two ago; I've seen them, but there is no clue to the date, so you'd have to ask Life.

Important: J says "Ask Littauer to tell Jenson about it". Of course Littauer will know to what extent you can sound out two different publishers simultaneously, should you already have approached Doubleday or another.

Jensen's still being on Life ("leave of absence") sounds fine, but Littauer will know whether he (Picture Press) could handle production & advertising as well as Doubleday?

Scratch my stuff about a possible Hiss photo in my screed of Sept. 15; had no time to proof-read it.

Enclosed what look to me offhand 3 or 4 highly possible quotes from Kamenev & Zinoviev, from frontispiece of Murder in Moscow.

Think that Korolkov idea is worth keeping in mind. You could play up the angle: there are no photos, and they bleat about the "worker's paradise" and refuse all UN inspection committees, make survivors swear to say nothing about the camps. It is Joe's fault there are no photos on this page, but this gives an inkling of what it's like, etc.

Korolkov being a Stalin prize-winner adds greatly, it seems to me.

Item. Photo of SHOSTAKOVICH, name familiar in every country, with just as caption the three lines of his abject, comical recantation. Bedell Smith's book, p. 298. You could also quote PROKOFIEV.

Thanks for postcard. Best regards.

19 Sept. '50

Photo DMITRI SHOSTAKOVICH

Caption: "I know that the party is right, that the party wishes me well, and that I must search for and find creative paths which lead me to Soviet realistic popular art."

Why shouldn't there be photos also of PROKOFIEV and KHACHATURIAN, world names, much more living than Zinoviev et al, with as captions quotes from the incredible "resolution" by the Central Committee, condemning the "degenerate, formalistic, bourgeois" music, Bedell Smith pp.296-8.

If you were given complete license to invent anti-Stalin material on the fate of the Arts in the USSR, how could you better this?

Will send brief suggested quotes from those pages shortly.

Excerpts from "Murder in Mexico" by General Leandro A. Sanchez Salazar, Ex-Chief of Secret Service of the Mexican Police with the collaboration of Julian Gorkin, London, Secker & Warburg, 1950.

XX

"To choose the victim, carefully prepare the blow, satisfy an implacable vengeance, then go to bed. . . There is nothing sweeter in the world."
(Stalin to Dserjinski and Kamenev in the course of a conversation held in the spring of 1923.)

"You think that Stalin is worrying himself trying to find a reply to your arguments? You are mistaken. He is only considering in what manner he can suppress you without danger to himself."
(Kamenev to Trotsky in 1923.)

"He would have got rid of you at any moment since 1924 if he had not feared reprisals from the youth section in the form of terrorist activities. That is why Stalin has decided to start by destroying the framework of the opposition and then to kill you afterwards, when he is sure of being able to do so with impunity."
(Zinoviev to Trotsky in 1925.)

"If we die suddenly, let it be known that it is the work of Stalin."
(Zinoviev and Kamenev in letters placed in safe keeping after their rupture with Stalin in 1925.)

123

Lev Davidovitch invited Joe, who was near to me, to write in his notebook what was, I learned later, his farewell to life: "I am sure of the triumph of the Fourth International. Forward!"

207

The working-class writer, Ciliga, after having worked several years in the U.S.S.R., has called it "the country of the great lie."

Time, Sept. 11, 1950

"...interpretation of Stalin's personality, doctrines and aims are pregnant with tragic misunderstandings between Americans and the Russian people— the best potential ally in the struggle for freedom.

"The Russian people were the first victims of the totalitarian yoke. They dream not of expansionism but only of the restoration of human freedom...As to Stalin, he "spits" as Lenin once said, on Russian interests, because Russia must merely be "used as a base for world revolution."

"Stalin...and all his international henchmen fanatically believe that 'the capitalist system as a whole is already ripe for revolution.' They fanatically believe, as Lenin proved, that 'the importance of war as a midwife of Revolution can scarcely be exaggerated'..."

Alexander Kerensky

I imagine the "spits" is a correct quote from Lenin, but referring to someone else (perhaps himself) rather than to Stalin. J. was wondering.

6

15 Sept. 1950

TO BORIS SHUB.

Just thinking out loud. If you care to call it thinking. Call it "revolt in the provinces", "Trotskyist deviationism" if you like. But don't let it upset your digestion.

This will be a wonderful book. Really well done, it should sell several hundred thousands in the U.S. alone (and Canada). At $1 the 3 "Zoo" books sold 700,000-plus. Even at $2.50 or $3., —I very much doubt that you could do the job as it should be done for $1— it should have a big sale. There is a crying need for it, in the U.S. alone. It is almost fantastic that there hasn't long since been a "Stalin-in-pictures" book. (But then there was no "Life", to parallel the "London Illustrated News" until circa 1932). There is a great thirst for really readable, believable information on what makes Stalin and the USSR tick. You are ideally set to fill it.

Just tell the story of "Stalin" (the biog) in pictures, —with as much wordage as is necessary and no more. The sovereign virtue of photos is that people who wouldn't crack a book of solid print will read a page or half page of print, if need be, if there's a photo alongside it. (Cf. the book "The Photographs of Lincoln", where I found myself reading the entire printed parts, which I wouldn't have bought nor read without the photos). Let's add to your favorite axiom, "The Best Photograph tells its Own Story" the corollary "An arresting photo will carry reader-interest for quite a bit of caption".

"THE STORY OF JOSEPH STALIN". Just tell the story. What he did. What he is doing. Properly done, that will leave the reader with the feeling of revulsion & distrust as to what he will do next; "Who sups with the devil must have a long spoon".

All the world loves a story. And what a story this is. As a reviewer of Deutscher said (the "NY Times", I think) "After all, it's the 'success' story of the 20th Century. From cobbler's cottage xxx to the Kremlin where he is still pulling the wool over the eyes of an aimed-at 400 million signers of a Petition in the name of "peace" (with the largest standing army in the world's history) and mouthing "democracy" (while holding down more than 15,000,000 slave laborers in his own country alone). And your readers won't learn (millions of 'em don't know) he has more than 15,000,000 slave laborers unless you tell them. Not screaming at the top of your voice, —but tell them. And no harm in giving the figure "15,000,000" more than once, if it proves convenient. Repetition is no sin.

In fact repetition can be dandy. Witness the world-wide best seller (second only to the Bible, (a mighty repetitive book itself) Andersen's fairy tales. Plenty of repetition in them. If the story is good, the theme gripping, the reader laps up the repetition: if the Wicked Uncle is wicked, it's more than OK to keep on saying (or, in your case, showing) it. And you've certainly got a story, and the Uncle is wicked. Let's show it, by any and every truthful means that doesn't detract from readability.

Re Repeition. I'm sure there is a lot in what J says. That when you are writing for mass readership, you ought to use a good deal of repetition: "I am going to tell you the story of how.......So here is the story.....So that was the story." After all, that is the time-tested fairy story technique, and they are the world's best sellers.

So why should we shy away from (a) repetition, or (b) calling the spade the spade, dotting the i's and crossing the t's. ⌈If you don't cross your t's pretty vigorously & regularly, a lot of woolly-minded readers are going to have a breathing space in which to say: "Still, he had his dear old mother up to stay with him in the Kremlin, so there must be some good in the man; and Byrnes (a Catholic) writes that he is undeniably a 'likable' fellow." Of course, you will anticipate & counteract that with photos of Big Brother accepting bouquets from schoolgirls, juxtaposed with photos showing Big Brother in a much less happy light.

The Uncles were Wicked, and Grimm said so. Stalin is history's greatest slave-master. Say so. It's not an adjective. It's a fact. Throw the book at him. Dallin. Kravchenko. Pirogov. Anything and/or everything that it takes to ram home the fact. If you can do it without Kravchenko or any other "avowed anti-Stalinist" so much the better, I entirely agree. But let's do it. Stalin keeps the 15,000,000 hidden, so we've got few photos. So if you have to use a photo of a few slave-laborers and caption that "there are millions like them", OK. Or use a "There is all this smoke, and it's because there is all this fire" argument, OK. I.e., if you have to use the cumulative technique of quoting a few sentences from Tchernavin and Dallin and Kravchenko and any others, let's do it. The fact of the slave-camps has got to be in there. If it isn't made credible you haven't told the story.

For example, re-read "Seeds of Treason". Chambers says that what made the scales fall from his eyes was "I SPEAK FOR THE SILENT" by Tchernavin. (I've never read it, and had forgotten it; you'll do no harm if you mention it somewhere. Of course Tchernavin is an anti-Stalinist). If that was good enuf for Chambers, it should be good for other CP readers, even, too.

What I'm getting at is: I DON'T ~~XXXXXXXX~~ CRAMP YOUR STYLE BY ARBITRARILY RULING OUT THE USE OF "ANTI-STALINIST" WITNESSES. Let the motto be: ANY truthful means that tell's Stalin's story is OK. He made the story, we didn't. It's his fault if you have to say: Pirogov was only one airman who escaped, and a mere lieutenant, but there are thousands like him.

PIROGOV. Just a random suggestion, but I see no reason of principle why you shouldn't have, say: Photo of Stalin, sounding off about the worker's paradise, juxtaposed with Photo of Pirogov (a nice clean-cut looking type, smiling), and a quote from Pirogov (he's definitely eloquent, as you say) to the effect that he didn't like to leave his native land, but couldn't stick it living "as a slave among slaves". Cf. Ada Siegel, to the effect (in Preface) that there are thousands like him ("The Choice") and he is unusual only in that he had few close living relatives, and a plane, and enterprise.

If it could be done without the Pirogovs & Kravchenkos, fine. But I'm sure you'll find when you chain yourself to your desk and start sweating blood over it that you just can't do justice to (a) SLAVE-LABOR and (b) MVD's EVERYBODY-AN-INFORMER with just a photo of Beria, —even if he looked like a two-headed baby in a bottle. I just don't see how it can begin to do justice to the subject. It wasn't any photo (though his first sight of Bykov in the flesh shook him badly) that took the scales from Chambers eyes, but the Tchernavin story.

Also he was shaken by (a minor news item in the New Masses) the proof that the Kremlin were liars, bent on systematic, petty denigration of Trotsky. Anything —preferably out of their own mouths, as you say— that builds the THEY ARE LIARS theme is good.

There is so much to choose from, and it seems to me that repetition is so good and, probably, so necessary, that I should say, as you do, that a $1 book couldn't do the job. "White Collar Zoo" is 80 pages in all, of which 74 pages have photos. 74 photos won't be enuf, by a long shot. The story is so absorbing, properly told, that 150 or more photos wouldn't be a bit too much. Ask K what about the economics of "The Cardinal", where Simon & Schuster got out more than 400 pages of close print for only $1, with paper cover. Perhaps we could get by for $2.50, if they felt assured of a large sale. And why shouldn't there be a large sale. You've got the real dirt on Stalin, and the prestige of "Lenin". Give them "Stalin" in pictures, with the minimum wordage, but enuf wordage. It will make Deutscher (and Prof. Carr) look like moral lepers.

The quote from Lenin, "any dodge, ruse, etc", should definitely be in there, and I should think offhand would be an excellent one as a frontispiece. Right out of his own mouth.

Just another offhand suggestion: buy "Why I Escaped" and ask I. to re-
read it, and see if she doesn't think there are some good brief anecdotal
quotes in it. I.e., you could have a photo of a couple of ordinary USSR air-
men, sitting at mess-table, or what have you, and a few sentences of CONVER-
sation from Pirogov, —where the SMERSH man tells him he'd better inform on
his pals, or else, —with the subscript: —Peter Pirogov, "Why I Escaped",
page so&so. It wouldn't do any harm to advertise Pirogovs & Kravchenkos &
Tchernavins anyway; all in the same good cause.

Item. On the left-hand page a photo of Alger Hiss montaged (or alongside)
one of Mrs. Hede Massing (cf. her book)(she's quite photogenic I think) with
caption quoting her on how Hiss & she agreed, after squabbling good-naturedly
about interfering with each other's apparatuses, "We're both working for the
same boss". Then on the right-hand page, a photo of Roosevelt, Stalin, and
Hiss, with quote from "Seeds of Treason" on how, at Yalta, at one point FDR,
JVS and Hiss (and one interpreter) were closeted together in the same room.
(Roosevelt allegedly emerging saying, "I don't know how they persuaded me to
give in, but I did"). There is probably a Yalta photo showing Hiss standing
behind some of the others. Just an idea, but when you stop to think what may
have been passing thru (a) Hiss's and (b) Stalin's mind at that little tete-a-
tete, it might make a dramatic set of photos. But perhaps wouldn't really
buttress any of the main themes.

"VERDICT OF THREE DECADES". I'm getting it today. There may be some good
caption material in it.

ILLUSTRIOUS DEFECTEES. No one of them, perhaps, is important enuf to de-
serve a photo. But how about devoting two or three pages to photos of the
2 or 3 dozen most illustrious figures who have been admirers of the Soviet
system & then become disillusioned? Taken all together, they ought to make
a pretty impressive gallery: Gide, Koestler, Mann(??), Silone, etc. etc. etc.,

and you could have a quarter-page of caption giving a one-sentence quote from each of them (..."a spy-ridden slave-camp"...."more totalitarian than any Hitler"...etc), or a single caption to the effect ex-admirers of "The Light that Failed". After all, when one Gide "defects" it may not be much, but when they all do, sooner or later, it makes a pretty telling point, and a point which will have a multi-national and racial appeal (Silone, Gide, Richard Wright, etc). Throw the book at the bastards. Don't miss any trick. If you have a good brick right at hand, why not throw it. ("Any stigma is good enuf to beat a dogma", as someone erroneously said).

"LENIN": a wonderful book, and perfect for selling by the thousands to the Karnoviches & Bullitts & Bedell Smiths. But remember the photo-book editions should total in the millions, for the ordinary reader everywhere. That's why, if I may harp on it, I think it should lean towards the tone & style of Grimm's fairy tales, where you don't read very far before you know the Uncle is Wicked, or strongly suspect it. Therefore the photo of Lenin with the quote "use any dodge, ruse or deception" would be an excellent frontispiece. Offhand I should say "YOU CAN NEVER AFFORD TO TRUST, BELIEVE THIS MAN" is the main theme, with "The more people let this man dupe them, the more this man means slavery and WAR" perhaps a close second. It's their propaganda you're combatting, and if you can show the reader "HE'S NEARLY ALWAYS LYING, and for his sake not yours" you've just about done it.

Re "The STORY of Joseph Stalin". Got to tell it. There's got to be a story, a more or less chronological narrative. But I don't see, do you, how you can begin to tell the whole story! there's too much of it; you could put the war against Finland in, or you could leave it out; there are too many areas and episodes of that order to put them all in. At any rate not with photos; i.e., if you decided to mention Finland at all, it might have to be just with literally 2 or 3 words sandwiched in somewhere in a caption, where (and if) they would heighten the effect. E.g., you might show photos of the taking over ("welcoming back") of Latvia and/or Est. & Lit., and then add that "..since 1945 the USSR has been expanding at the rate of 65 sq. miles (or whatever it is) per day." (Since 1939, I think it is 65 sq. m per day. Can dig it up, —and let me know any other research you might want to have done). Then juxtapose it with Stalin's statement (1942) about "not wanting an inch of anyone else's territory". / And throw in "This is my last territorial demand" of Hitler, if it wouldn't clutter things up /.

Item. Alongside the frontispiece quote from Lenin, re "any deception", underneath it you could put Hitler's famous quote about the "big lie". Just because the idea of making the whole book a Hitler-Stalin parallel has been shelved, is no reason why you shouldn't draw the parallel wherever you see fit, if it heightens the effect.

More re: not telling the whole story, namely:

The Problem of the BIG FAMINE. Your telling the story of the Wicked Uncle, and heaven knows this is an important "episode" in it. Hard to see how it could be omitted entirely. And yet to deal with it is a problem. It is just the sort of problem that has been leading me to think you've got to lean on Text to do part of the job. I.e., the book is a PHOTO-book, and the pictures are the piece de resistance. But the beauty of really effective photos is that they heighten the effect, and carry you through patches where, unavoidably, no really arresting photo is available, —in which patches, I'd say, you're going to have to be content with an ordinary photo and lean at that point on your caption. Which doesn't worry me too much, because, after all, anti-Stalinist literature (and your own malicious mind) are ~~[illegible]~~ not lacking in pithy & sizzling texts, such as alone will make the given page readable and memorable. (E.g., to pick at random a mediocre sample: "If the U.S.S.R. is a democracy, then Leavenworth Prison is a democracy"; nothing to write home about, but, with brevity, it paints a picture, after a fashion.) After all, words alone can paint pictures, and evoke emotions, and as your basic aim is to evoke an emotional response, there's no need to cramp your style with a self-imposed restriction banning the use of words. I should think the test would be: If the reader wants to stop reading it in the middle, the caption, however true, is bad; if you've held his interest to a pitch where he really wants to read on, and is painting pictures in his own mind as he reads, then it's OK. E.g., if you have the photo of the three purgees Rykov, K., & Z., and then continue in your caption to the tune "there was a bullet in the back of the head for X, and for Y, and for Z too" it will be, faute de mieux, OK if the reader is already gripped to the point of picturing to himself all these Comrades being ground thru the mill of "opposition"—demotion—arrest—"confession"—death.

E.g. also, I'd strongly recommend, offhand, inclusion of the striking photo of Mindszenty, circles under his eyes, at the trial, and then you could add to the effect that he is merely the highest-ranking of the.e.g., more than 12,000 Catholic clergy who have been imprisoned in Czechoslovakia since 1948. (I have the figures).

Re THE FAMINE, to get back to it. The best I can suggest is that you could have either (a) one of the rare, if existing at all, photos, of a famine scene or (b) a photo of a normal Village Scene, Harvest Scene, with the caption: It could have been like this, but Big Brother wanted an ORGANIZED FAMINE, plus the most devastating quote you can get from the highest-ranking non-anti-Stalinist source; and/or plus brief but human-interest quotes from Pirogov and/or Kravchenko, whereby you translate into human-interest terms the cold statistics of several million dying of famine.

More re FAMINE. It's a problem, how to do it justice, and I'd suggest you have to do at least two things: (a) make it believable & believed, and

SECRET

(b) heighten the emotional effect. If you succeed in (a), it will automatically help with (b). And I should think it would help toward (a) to put in the points you were mentioning. Namely, to make a flat, quiet, sober statement to the general effect; "At first glance it passes credibility that the rulers of a great country would deliberately plan the mass-starvation of several millions of their fellow-citizens and potential arms-bearers. But this is exactly what they did, and they did it for two reasons (1) to break the political power of the peasants, and (b) to get grain for valuta for machine tools."

The same method would be good (I think almost obligatory) in doing justice to SLAVE LABOR. I.e., you just quietly state that, whereas it may seem too nightmarish that a regime could keep 15,000,000 slave-laborers [illegible] like cattle, it's not the nightmarish product of an Orwall's imagination, it's a fact, and it is done for the following cooly thoughout reasons...." Then quote, either in substance or, preferably, verbatim, from I Chose Justice, bottom p. 238, where Kravchenko's NKVD school-mate gives the [illegible] reasons for segregating potential trouble-makers and working them to death to get their products for 1/5 the cost in the free market. A verbatim quote is by no means essential (though I think quotation marks always liven a page) but I think the EXPLANATION, unblushing proffered by you, the author of the photo-book, is an almost essential ingredient. When you explain how the FAMINE and the SLAVE-LABOR go make sense, to the Kremlin mind, you have (a) enhanced the credibility, (b) gratified your reader, to them, in many cases, [illegible] one or more of these things (the TRIALS,e.g) may for years have been a source of puzzlement, and (c) heightened the horror and the emotional response.

Cf. how "1984" builds up to quite a pitch of nightmare, but it is only by dint of a good deal of explanation and repetition. (There is a great deal more artistic [illegible] economy in "Animal Farm", of course, and if you can make use of it and/or its technique, more power to your elbow.) N.b., how "Animal Farm", perhaps the best *brief* anti-Stalin literary effort (isn't it?) is just a fairy tale, and yet has a good deal of repetition in it.

Sorry to go on at such length. Luckily the postman knocketh now. Hope there is some value in it. Let me know anything I can do to help.

W.S.S.

8 Sept. 1950

ROBERT M. HEADLEY

is a contract agent; the effective date of his contract with CIA is 1st Dec. 1949, for two years.

Fred Richards (CFD) says the agreement with him re royalties, etc., should be signed by Mr. Eccles, as contracting officer.

General Counsel's office informed of the above today, on their inquiry.

W85

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19

LETTER TO BORIS SHUB Sept. 11, 1950

Dick hopes to see you in person next weekend. Meanwhile entirely OK to go ahead. The copyright should be all in your name. Lay-out assistant should be offered only a fixed fee, —half down, half on publication. Also credit line as collaborator if you think he deserves it. Consult Ken as to what would be a reasonable fee to offer him.

J suggests as possible publishers in approximate order of preference Doubleday; Picture Press (270 Park Ave., J. J. Thorndike, Jr., former m.e. of "Life" and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from "Life"); Simon & Schuster.

Best to Libby.

S

Letter to Boris Shub, 510 W. 110th.
non-watermark paper.

223..Painting of Stalin & Red Army General Staff, in Red Army Hall, Pyongyang, Korea (?)

226..East German People's Police march in Red-sponsored torchlight parade celebrating Stalin's 70th b'day, 1949.

224..East German People's Police in Lustgarten Sq. during CP youth demonstration, 28/5/50

225..People's Police, Lustgarten Sq., May Day 1950

214..East German Police (left) & W.G. Police as buffer on Berlin border 1950.

54...Students vote for Moscow People's Court, Feb. '49; Soviet source.

55...Voting for Moscow People's Court, Feb. '49; Soviet source.

216..Russians (left) take over guard duties from US, 1949, at Spandau Prison, where many former top Nazis are serving sentences.

227.."Frankfurter Allee" in East Sector renamed "Stalin Allee" , 70th b'day.

53...Army personnel get ballot for election of Moscow People's Court, Feb. '49; Soviet source.

229..Front page of anti-C underground paper, 1949.

228..Part of rev'y pamphlet from anti-C u'ground press "somewhere in Russia". The "fork of freedom" is u'ground symbol. 1949.

141..general view of Moscow.

22...Stalin accepts flowers from Russian kids, 70th b'day.

21...Moscow univ. students being examined in math.

104-5-6..Stalin, 1943.

98...Head of statue of Stalin placed on snapped off light pole by German soldiers, 1941.

97...Stalin; no date.

2.3..no data

1...Opening of XI Olympiad, Lustgarten, 1936.

6...Nazi Party Day, Berlin, 1938.

8...Labor Day demonstration, Tempelhof Field, 1934.

7...Marching for Hitler, Adolf Hitler Platz, Berlin, Party Day '38.

9...Opening of 1941-2 War Winter Relief Drive, Sportspalast, Berlin.

10...Hitler reviewing German Youth, 1939.

5...Nazi Party Rally, Berlin, 1938; Hitler.

47...Moscow, Fourth Kantemirovka Tank Division of Guards mechanized unit. 1949.

37...Red Army commanders stand review by Stalin; Moscow, 1945.

35...Troops in Palace Square, Leningrad, May Day 1948.

36...Red Army in Red Square with Nazi & Wehrmacht flags, 1945.

41...Soviet air force cadets, May 1949, Moscow.

43...T-34 medium tanks (foreground) and SU-100 self-propelled 100 mm guns moving up Gorky Street toward Red Square; 1949.

44...Infantry at May Day parade, Moscow, 1949.

45...Red Army parading, Moscow, 1945.

40...Zhukov gallops into Red Square, 1945

38...All Union Physical Culture parade in Dynamo Stadium, 1947.

39...Students of Zhukovsky Military Aviation Academy passing thru Red Square during parade of Moscow Military Garrison, 1949.

30...Peter Kapitsa in Institute of Physical Problems, Moscow; he is director, at left; 1945.

29...Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, 3 Heroes of the S.U., l. to r.
Colonel of the Guards A. Pokryshkin, Marshal G. Zhukov; Major of
Guards I. Kozhdub; in the Kremlin Palace. Acme Newspics 805096

27...Workers celebrating 32nd anniv. of Rev., 1949. "May it live and flourish—a united, independent, democratic peace-loving Germany"; Moscow.

24...FDJ members march to Russian War Memorial; Treptow, Berlin, '49.

23...Col. Serge Tulpanov, chief of Propaganda Dept of Sov Mil Admin in Berlin, addresses second annual Parteitag of the SED; calls "fascist" US Europe's foe.
Acme Newspictures NYC, #BER(lin) 848674, 9-24-47

111..Moscow; anti-religious campaign; century-old bells crashed down from tower, to be melted for farm machinery.

107...Bogayavlensk Cathedral, Moscow.

128...Ribbentrop signing German-Russian pact, 1939.

177...no data

150...Stal, Mol, Rib signing pact, Aug '39.

136...Mol & Rib, Aug. '39; Moscow.

17...Grave of S's wife Nadyezhda Alliluyeva, Moscow '37.

149..Malenkov; Acme Newspictures, NYC, 8/4/46; SOV300930

165..Yezhov, '38
167..Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov, '47
168..Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, born 1889, Min of State Control; '47

79...Library, Moscow Univ., 1942.
81...Woman conductor, Moscow streetcar; before 1936.
84...Workers on Moscow-Rostov railway.
78...Women cleaning loco of Northern Line after overhaul at Moscow Depot; Oct. '34
76...Grocery store with home delivery service in Bauman district, Moscow; bef. '37
71..Chaplin, "City Lights" Metropole theater, Moscow.
72...~~[illegible]~~ unloading sausages from truck for market.
74...Women selling food in city market; 1935
68...Collective farm girls with primitive implements; Moscow oblast, July '46
83...Soccer team, Moscow, Feb. '49.
14...Lenin Institute, Moscow.
58...Red Army men inspect English-language books in Moscow shop. 1942.
85...Soldiers visit a farmer, Feb. '49, Moscow
65...Woman readying bricks for bricklayers, Moscow, '47.
77...Moscow (State) Univ., 1944.
69...American bean seed being distributed to collective farmers of Ystra
District, Moscow oblast, 1945.
66...Women carry girder to job manned mostly by women; Moscow '47.

86...no data
96...Boy drummers, Red Sq., '46; appears in Bedell Smith's book.
89...Girls saluting Big Brother's bust in young pioneers "House of Children",
in Eastern Sector, Berlin, 1950.
88...Lenin Hills, looking n.e. across Moscow River, 1947.
92..."Children's Town" at Park of Culture and Rest, Moscow; before 1939.
94...All Union Physical Culture Parade at Dynamo Stadium, 1947
95...Members of 11th Congress of Lenin Young Communist League greet members
of Congress, Moscow, 1949.

120..Stalin smiles as Churchill takes out cigar; Yalta, Feb. '45.

7 Sept. 1950

CIA GRAPHICS' NUMBERS FOR ABOUT 82 PHOTOS, OF WHICH STERILIZED DUPLICATES ARE TO BE SENT TO SHUB SEPT. 8

223..CIA 36685 Confidential
226..CIA 36892 Conf.
224..CIA 36751 Restr.
225..CIA 36786 Restr.
214..CIA 36899 Conf.
54...CIA 30018 Secret. Soviet source.
55...CIA 30002 Secret. Soviet source.
216..CIA 36897 Conf.
227..CIA 36893 Conf.
53...CIA 30023 Secret. Soviet source.
229..CIA 28023 Restricted.
228..CIA 28024 Restricted.
141..OSS 969039 APL 347289
21...CIA 28508 Conf.
22...CIA 32340 Restricted.
106..OSS-P-11061 Press Assoc. Photo
195..OSS-P-11060 Press Assoc. Photo
104..OSS-P-11062
97...CIA Not for release
98...CIA 28453 Conf.
2....no description; nothing on the back
3....same as 2
1....26586 82 (nothing else)
6....26586 82
8....26586 82
7....ditto
4....25090 0
9....26586 82
10...26586 82
5....25090 0
47...CIA 28020 Restr.
37...CIA 27124 Conf.
35...CIA 27118 Conf.
36...CIA 27123 Conf.
41...CIA 30050 Secret
43...CIA 28021 Restr.
44...CIA 28022 Conf.
45...CIA 27119 Conf.
40...CIA 25472 Conf.
38...CIA 28792 Conf.
39...CIA 34475 Restr.
29...Acme newspictures, 8th Avenue, NYC
30...CIA 26005 Conf.
23...Acme Newspictures, BER(lin) 848674, NY Bureau
27...CIA 28018 Restr.
24...26586 82
107..27060 82
111..27060 82
128..CIA 28039 Restr.
127..CIA 28454
130..CIA 26946 Restr.
136..CIA 26947 Restr.

—17...27986 82
169..Acme Newspictures, SOV300930, NY Bureau; 8/4/46
165..CIA-P-2958
168..CIA-P-4010 Secret
167..CIA-P-4003 Secret
—79...CIA 25716 Conf.
81...OSS 771112
84...OSS.969079
78...OSS 771093
76...OSS 771238
71...OSS Pictorial Records Division; 473.23
M891

B 915 USSR Moskva 22480
72 ~~71~~...OSS Pict. Records Div. 473.23 M891 B 915 USSR; 22639
74...OSS Pict. Records Div. 473.23 M891; b 915 USSR 22505
68...CIA 2506 Graphics Donor #6, Restr.
83...CIA 30047 Secret
14...CIA 25686 Conf.
58...CIA 28941 Conf.
85...CIA 30034 Secret
65...CIA 28797 Conf.
77...CIA 25717 Conf.
—69...CIA 26017 Conf.
66...CIA 28789 Conf.
86...no description
—96...CIA 28441 Conf. (also in Bedell Smith's book).
—89...CIA 32617 Conf.
88...CIA 2166
Restr. Graphics Donor #6
92...OSS 771227
94...CIA 27996 Secret
95...CIA 17361 Restr.
120..OSS-P-11172 Signal Corps Photo.

82 total

64

SECRET SECRET

5 Sept. 1950

RE: AGREEMENT TO BE MADE BETWEEN OPC and ROBERT M. HEADLEY (pseud.) in re publication of a book.

(1) Headley is a covert OPC employee. He is either a staff agent or a contract employee; Mr. Millard (ex-2798) can verify which.

(2) Headley —who is now engaged in preparing the book— is to approach a publisher in his own name, and as a private citizen.

(3) The book to be published under Headley's real name; with perhaps the addition of "...in collaboration with Blank / Headley's lay-out man, yet to be selected, if Headley feels the lay-out man deserves such credit/"

Copyright to be held by Headley, both US and foreign.

Royalties to be received by Headley.

(4) Headley to have discretion in selecting a lay-out assistant, whom he will offer to pay either

(a) a fixed fee, half down and half on publication; or
(b) the fixed fee, plus a percentage of royalties; or
(c) a percentage of royalties.

Probably Headley will offer (a).

(5) The book to be published initially in the U.S. It is hoped that there will later be editions in many foreign languages, possibly subsidized.

(6) Royalties over a given period will be either smaller or larger than Headley's salary.

Headley is to turn over the gross royalties to OPC —submitting the royalty statements or copies thereof— less the difference between Headley's income tax including royalties and the tax as it would have been if he had not received royalties.

Headley should submit also a copy of his Income Tax return(s).

(7) Copyright to be assigned by Headley to OPC.

(8) Arrangement re royalties to be terminable. Royalties might continue to dribble in for several years, after Headley might have severed his connection with OPC.

Therefore a clause is suggested to the effect: "at such time as the Government in its discretion may decide, the obligation on the part of Headley to turn over royalties may be cancelled, and thereafter any royalties shall be received by Headley for his own use."

(9) Headley should submit/itemized written statements of all expenses chargeable to the project; receipts from his collaborator for payment of fixed fee; etc; cy of the contract with the publisher

(10) Headley to submit the final dummy for approval by an OPC representative.

Saw Mr. Joe Kelly, 224 Admin.
about this Sept. 6th. He will call Sept. 8th

SECRET

5 Sept. 1950

To Boris Shub
510 W. 110th St.

Thanks for receipt.

They expect to have the photos ready tomorrow.

Other arrangements are proceeding apace and in the simplest manner.

Thought you'd like to see this editorial.

non-watermark

66

5 Sept 50

5 Sept. 1950

L-1030 Mr. Eccles, Ray, WSS.

Ray artist fixed fee, or.
ff + royalties, or.
% of royalties.

Ray Regs suppose smaller
" larger

EE: there was a similar book; published in US (OPC)

REM: BS = is staff agent (thinks) or contract employee

EE. * highly impt =
written assignment of rights (copyright) & royalties to US
BS turns over gross royalties
less increased tax

WSS "

EE "at such time as the Govt may decide
the obligation to pay royalties may be ~~terminated~~ cancelled".
dribs & drabs

EE Tax returns will be identical
few minutes work

BS give certified copy of return...
1) his actual tax return
2) statement of his royalties... END

COPY

September 2, 1950

Received from Robert M. Headley the sum of one hundred (100) dollars ~~in~~ as part payment for services in procuring photographs for the Stalin picture book project.

W. J. Green

original given to
John Bischoff
5 Sept. 50.
W. S. S.

61

Re "STATION" PHOTO . 31 Aug 50

31 Aug. '50.

BS

If NCFE must be used as cover, make sure it is spelled out ~~that their~~ role is confined merely to vouching for the cover story, and ~~that they have~~ no say over the contents of this book, ~~that they~~ don't even see it.

SECRET

30 Aug. '50

Gave SHUB Amson's file of magazije articles on Stalin (which he doesn't want returned), and Crankshaw article of 25-6-50 in Sunday "NY Times" magazine "AGAIN THE BATTLE FOR LENIN'S MANTLE", marked "Please return to WSS when & if you can spare it".

WSS

SECRET

14-00000

copy to Shute 30 Aug 50

MR. BRYAN: FYI
cc given to Jim Mason.

FROM "New York Times", Sunday, 25 June 1950:

"PICTURE PRESS" is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant.

WSS

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30 Aug '50

BS will send rcpt to me
, to give to John B., .. for $100 cash
"rec'd from RM Headley by "wf green"
-- composite name for his
2 "N.L." friends, —— suggested
by JBritt

COPY

30 August 1950

Received from W. S. Sims $100 cash, for services in obtaining photographs to be used in a photo-book, under project SGHOUSE, later to be charged to KMFUNNY.

Robert M. Headley

Robert M. Headley

R

A

29 Aug. '50

Mr. Kessinger called. (x-2657).
They will try to get the 82 photos done within a week.

Will send the originals back to me, for me to make a sterilized list.

To Shub

29 Aug. '50

LITTAUER & WILKINSON
200 Madison Avenue
See Kenneth Littauer

SIMON & SCHUSTER published "The Baby" & "The Frenchman" & "Happy Holiday"

DOUBLEDAY & CO. published the "Zoo" books

+ Box 1901 address

OWI Book "I am not crazy enuf to want a war"

"STALIN'S PUBLIC INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS" 1936-48.
Sov Affairs Notes #35

"Sov. Imperialism Poland 1939-48" Sovaff Notes #38

Th Sub

~~Mr. Bryan~~

~~Top copy~~

~~given to Mr. Thompson~~

Bill: Excellent! Pick a name for the project (KMKNOUT?) for file purposes & let me know. Thx

MR. BRYAN.

25 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference of JBIII, Shub and Sims, Aug. 25, re "STALIN" photo book.

(1) Some 202 photos were examined; the best, about 67, obtained by Shub in NY, the others furnished by CIA Graphics; plus some magazine articles with photos, supplied by Jim Williamson.

(2) Sims is to do utmost to get clearance by CIA Graphics for maximum use of their photos by Shub; clearance, if possible, for Shub to take the photos to NY (probably not possible); and/or duplicates minus CIA markings; and/or lists of the sources from which CIA got them.

/ Failing these, I can make descriptive list of the CIA photos. It should not be difficult to duplicate most of them in NY agencies, and the Shub pictures are in any case the kernel of the book //.

(3) Length of book. Not much discussed. More important to set the tone and decide the main theme. Thirty-five pictures would amost certainly be too few; 150 might be OK.

(4) KMFUNNY? Sims to clear with Mr. Thompson and Millard whether the "Stalin" photo-book could be done under KMFUNNY, which reads:

"5. b. That the purposes of this project / animal photos, with satirical captions, in many languages / be approved in principle and a sum of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of similar photobooks at the discretion of Chief, SP."

/ Anyhow, let's get on with the book and, if necessary, amend KMFUNNY or write up a new project, later /.

(5) Book to be prepared by Shub, working in NY. Period of 6 months work by Shub, as co-author with David Shub of biography of Stalin, to begin after completion of work on photobook.

(6) Shub to approach publisher as private citizen; to hold copyright, take royalties, for transmission to the account of KMFUNNY presumably. / Presumably CIA's legal eagles are equipped to handle the income-tax angles of this overt-covert set-up /.

Book to be published under signature "Boris Shub".

(7) Collaborator for Shub in lay-out. JBIII will give Shub a list of possible helpers. JBIII: mentioned Dick Lyon; "See Littauer; ask him for a good layout man; the best is the New Yorker's man, but he doesn't specialize in photo media; you want a Life-type man, they have better layout than Look.

"Pay him on a one-shot basis, a fixed fee. Tell him he gets a certain amount down, and the same again if the book is published."

/ Jim Williamson says he would be glad to help on layout, if there is difficulty getting anyone else /.

SECRET

3 carbons

(8) Publication to be in the US first, with a view to subsidisation (if necessary) of editions (possibly abridged) in Western Europe and elsewhere.

(9) Publisher. JBIII: "Duell would be lousy. You'd get no advertising. Simon & Schuster would be excellent if you can get them to do it. Ask Littauer to shop it around."

Sims mentioned Picture Press, which was described in the "NY Times" of 25 June 1950:

> "PICTURE PRESS is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant."

JBIII to Shub: "Ask LST what he thinks about Jensen"."

(10) What type of book? Shub: It should be called "Joseph Stalin", and to the casual reader it should look, at first glance, non-propagandistic. Then, as you look more closely at it, you see the degeneration of the system in the faces, down to its present "tertiary phase", —the evolution from the early revolutionary dream of a better life for Russia to the present monster regime. The less captions in it the better.

JBIII: The main theme should be "Where are they now?", —all those individuals and countries that have been outmanoeuvred and taken over and liquidated by Stalin.

When you are writing for mass distribution, your technique should be: "I will tell you this, I am telling you it, I have told you it".

Sims: The thread running through it, starting with Lenin, could be: Cunning, plus "Ruthlessness" (one of Lenin's favorite words), plus complete Intolerance of any opposition to a very narrow and constantly-being-purged Kremlin clique. Moral: (1) "Nobody can trust these people", and (2) "Because they tolerate no opposition, they mean War".

/ A possible title, or sub-title might be "Half slave, half free?", the quotation from Lincoln, which would tie in with the campaign to expose the USSR as the true "reactionary" and the US as the true "revolutionary" champion of freedom. /

Shub: As far as possible, the photos, and the sequence in which they're arranged, should tell the story. OWI's war-time, 32-page photobook on Hitler ("I am not crazy enough to want a war") relies too much on captions. We should make a book that Molotov & Stalin would squirm when they read it, and have no answer to. Then it will be good for publication anywhere."

(11) Shub to move to NYC September 1.

WSS

W.S.S.

his sources in obtaining

(12) Shub to pay NYC associates $100 for the photos they have already obtained, plus $200 on publication of the book.

SECRET

✓To Shab 29 Aug '50

22-7-50

Cover of book:

photo of

STALIN

~~as in Room 2412~~

or) cover of NY Times BkReview on Deutscher.

Caption: JOSEPH STALIN

1917—195?

Comment: The "195?" (a) arouses curiosity;

(b) suggests he, —and to that extent the Stalin regime— will come to an end in the 1950's;

(c) carries the implication(?): Couldn't his regime be overthrown?

Alternative cover: might be, tp put on the cover whichever photo proves most telling; the same photo to be printed also in its proper sequence in the book, at which point its meaning will become clear; e.g. the splendid photo of Stalin walking with, but apart from, Rykov, Kamenev & Bukharin, with its message: "this man bides his time, then treacherously strikes down all these 'comrades' who have ceased to be useful to him".

22-7-50

the weird photo of
LENIN'S FIGURE SILHOUETTED
OVER THE RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE

Caption: "The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable.. A series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

To which might be added: (1) Stalin's statement, circa 1945 that the bourgeois & Soviet states can co-exist, and

(2) Stalin's statement of 9 April 1947 to Stassen: "Lenin is our teacher, and we Soviet people are Lenin's disciples".

Comment: Somebody's lying.

Photo suggests the peaceful Russian landscape, dominated by this founder (Lenin) of a dictatorial clique, whose dogmatism, intolerance and bellicosity are suggested by such words as "unthinkable", "inevitable", "frightful clashes".

photo of LENIN:
just any ordinary photo;
seated at his desk, or
in any inactive pose.

Caption:

"I had...fancied Lenin as a giant, stately and imposing.

"How great was my disappointment to see a most ordinary-looking man, below average in height, in no way, literally in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals."

—Stalin.

Comment: Crankshaw says: "This impression of a man so great that he could afford to appear ordinary was one which Stalin found it necessary to obliterate from the consciousness of Soviet citizens.

Therefore let's revive it.

This will tie in, of course, with Lenin's Testament: "find a way to remove this man.."

photo of

PLEKHANOV

(we haven't got; can be obtained)

Caption: to the effect: "Georgi Plekhanov, one of Lenin's oldest disciples and collaborators, of whom Lenin said in 192_ 'No one is a true Bolshevik who does not know Plekhanov' (or words to that effect which I've read somewhere), and who told his wife, when the Red Guards forced their way into his house, November 13, 192_:

> 'How little you know these people! They are capable of hiring an assassin to kill me and shedding crocodile tears after my death to arouse people's emotions.'"

Comment:

We want to drive home the fast, unknown to most readers, that Lenin was bitterly opposed by some of his oldest collaborators; that there were (and are?) schisms even in the inner core; that what fastened itself on the back of the Russian people was a clique that was "capable" of all "ruthlesseness"; ~~[illegible]~~ of anything that would serve its main end: to remain in power.

The quotation also brings out Soviet "crocidile" hypocrisy.

photo of KRONSTADT

(we haven't; can be got)

Caption: to the effect: this is the island fortress off Petrograd, from which the Bolshevik's own creme-de-la-creme marched against Kerensky in July 1917; stormed the Winter Palace in November to put Lenin in power.

Here, on March 1, 1921, 15,000/Bolshevik sailors and soldiers revolted against Lenin's regime, and dispatched a radio message to the world:

> "The first shot has thundered. But the entire world knows of it. The bloody Field Marshal Trotsky who stands up to the waist in the fraternal blood of the workers was the first to open fire against revolutionary Kronstadt, which rebelled against the government of the Communists in order to re-establish the real power of the Soviets. We will rise or fall under the ruins of Kronstadt, fighting for the bloodstained cause of the laboring people. Long live the power of the Soviets! Long live the world Socialist Revolution!"

Marshal Tukhachevsky described the outcome:

> "I was in the war for five years, but I cannot remember such a slaughter. It was not a battle; it was an inferno.. The sailors fought like wild beasts. I cannot understand where they found the might for such rage. An entire company fought for an hour to capture one house and when the house was captured it was found that it contained two or three soldiers at a machine-gun. They seemed half-dead, but they snatched their revolvers and gasped, 'Too little did we shoot at you scoundrels.'"

Comment: shows it has been done, —a revolt of 15,000, nearly four years after Lenin came to power.

The average reader knows nothing of the fact this revolt occurred, and should be reminded.

Tukhachevsky, incidentally, adds an item of "continuity" to the story, since further on there is a photo of him, as one of those executed.

Note: the above would admittedly make a lengthy caption; but a vivid one; and necessary, because there is no photo (presumably) in existence of the actual revolt; and the fact it occurred should be driven home.

Fri. 25 Aug. 50

(non-labelled)

TAKING FOR REPRINTING ON MONDAY:

Soviet militarism	11	
Nazism	10	2 very big
Personalities	2	
Soviet Germany	3	
Stalin alone	5	
Lenin	1	
Stalin's inner circle	4	
Daily life	17	
Religion	2	
Stalin & Churchill	1	
Nazi-Soviet pact etc.	4	1 dupl.
Stalin's wife's grave.	1	
Children: war or peace?	7	1
Big brother	2	
Other "yes"'s	12	
	82	

47

28 August 1950

Please retrun these 82 original photos, along with the sterile duplicates of them, so that we can make a sterile list of captions, and a list of the original CIA numbers.

W. S. Sims/SP
K-2410
ext-569

28 Aug. 1950

BORIS

Mrs. Poland is going to get the 82 duplicates made just as fast as she can. She couldn't give a time limit on it this a.m.

Incidentally, re the 68 photos for which you got the agencies' bill of about $150 this morning, she says agencies like those often sell you photos for a dollar or two for your own private use, but that the usual fee for use for publication is $6 or more. So you'd better make sure when on the point of publishing whether you've paid for the publishing right.

(The photo we were in doubt about is one of CIA's)

WSS

Paul Breitweiser is charging the $150-odd temporarily against SGHOUSS

They were billed at $6.–

SECRET

SIMP

Mr. Thompson

Shab is going to NY to start work on this Sept. 1st.

Do you want to take up any points with him before he leaves?

OK

WBS

MR. THOMPSON

25 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference of JBIII, Shub and Sims, Aug. 25, re "STALIN" photo book.

(1) Some 202 photos were examined; the best, about 67, obtained by Shub in NY, the others furnished by CIA Graphics; plus some magazine articles with photos, supplied by Jim Williamson.

(2) Sims is to do utmost to get clearance by CIA Graphics for maximum use of their photos by Shub: clearance, if possible, for Shub to take the photos to NY (probably not possible); and/or duplicates minus CIA markings; and/or lists of the sources from which CIA got them. / Failing these, I can make descriptive list of the CIA photos. It should not be difficult to duplicate most of them in NY agencies, and the Shub pictures are in any case the kernel of the book //.

(3) Length of book. Not much discussed. More important to set the tone and decide the main theme. Thirty-five pictures would almost certainly be too few; 150 might be OK.

(4) KMFUNNY? Sims to clear with Mr. Thompson and Millard whether the "Stalin" photo-book could be done under KMFUNNY, which reads: "5, b. That the purposes of this project / animal photos, with satirical captions, in many languages / be approved in principle and a sum of $40,000 be appropriated for the development and distribution of similar photobooks a t the discretion of Chief, SP."

/ Anyhow, let's get on with the book and, if neces sary, amend KMFUNNY or write up a new project, later /.

(5) Book to be prepared by Shub, working in NY. Period of 6 months work by Shub, as co-author with David Shub of biography of Stalin, to begin after completion of work on photobook.

(6) Shub to approach publisher as private citizen; to hold copyright, take royalties, for transmission to the account of KMFUNNY presumably. / Presumably CIA's legal eagles are equipped to handle the income-tax ~~xx~~ angles of this overt-covert set-up /.

Book to be published under signature "Boris Shub".

(7) Collaborator for Shub in lay-out. JBIII will give Shub a list of possible helpers. JBIII mentioned Dick Lyon; "See Littauer; ask him for a good layout man; the best is the New Yorker's man, but he doesn't specialize in photo media; you want a Life-type man, they have better layout than Look.

"Pay him on a one-shot basis, a fixed fee. Tell him he gets a certain amount down, and the same again if the book is published."

/ Jim Williamson says he would be glad to help on layout, if there is difficulty getting anyone else /.

SECRET

(8) Publication to be in the US first, with a view to subsidization (if necessary) of editions (possibly abridged) in Western Europe and elsewhere.

(9) Publisher. JBIII: "Duell would be lousy. You'd get no advertising. Simon & Schuster would be excellent if you can get them to do it. Ask Littauer to shop it around."

Sims mentioned Picture Press, which was described in the "NY Times" of 25 June 1950:

> "PICTURE PRESS is the newest shingle on Publishers' Row, hanging from 270 Park Avenue. Editors are Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., former managing editor of "Life", and Oliver Jensen, on leave of absence from the magazine. The firm will concentrate on serious, inexpensive photo-text books with a general interest and news slant."

JBIII to Shmb: "Ask LST what he thinks about Jensen"."

(10) What type of book? Shmb: It should be called "Joseph Stalin", and to the casual reader it should look, at first glance, non-propagandistic. Then, as you look more closely at it, you see the degeneration of the system, in the faces, down to its present "tertiary phase", —the evolution from the early revolutionary dream of a better life for Russia to the present monster regime. The less captions in it the better.

JBIII: The main theme should be "Where are they now?", —all these individuals and countries that have been outmaneuvered and taken over and liquidated by Stalin. When you are writing for mass distribution, your technique should be: "I will tell you this, I am telling you it, I have told you it".

Sims: The thread running through it, starting with Lenin, could be: Cunning, plus "Ruthlessness" (one of Lenin's favorite words), plus complete Intolerance of any opposition to a very narrow and constantly-being-purged Kremlin clique. Moral: (1) "Nobody can trust these people", and (2) "Because they tolerate no opposition, they mean War".

/A possible title, or sub-title might be "Half slave, half free?", the quotation from Lincoln, which would tie in with the campaign to expose the USSR as the true "reactionary" and the US as the true "revolutionary" champion of freedom./

Shmb: As far as possible, the photos, and the sequence in which they're arranged, should tell the story. OWI's war-time, 32-page photobook on Hitler ("I am not crazy enough to want a war") relies too much on captions. We should make a book that Molotov & Stalin would squirm when they read it, and have no answer to. Then it will be good for publication anywhere."

(11) Shmb to move to NYC September 1.

W.S.S.
W.S.S.

(12) Shmb to pay NYC associates $100 for the photos they have already obtained, plus $100 on publication of the book.

3 carbons

25 Aug. '50

Re "Stalin" Photos

Shub's returned to him = highest # = #68

102 photos winnowed out for return to CIA Monday.

CIA has sent us

202 - 68 shubs =	134
+ ## 203-227	25
+ ## 228-235 rec'd Aug. 1, '50	8
TOTAL:	167
Returning	102
should leave	65

Actually taking 83 "yes"'s to Mrs. P. Monday

27 June '50

Re: "STALIN" PHOTO-BOOK.

Target: Stalin.

Basic theme: Stalin means WAR.

For publication in: to be suitable for publication in any country. France to start with.

Item: BS: "It should be so good that Stalin himself couldn't answer it. Captions to be as far as possible genuine quotes from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Molotov, under photos showing undeniable facts such as the assassination of Trotsky. Nothing phoney. If we have a book that no one in the Kremlin can pick holes in, it will be good for publication anywhere in the world."

Item: BS: Target is Stalin and his regime. "It should not contain a line that would offend any non-Communist Russian".

Item: BS: "Don't use any quotes from avowed anti-Stalinists such as Kravchenko."

Title? "Joseph Stalin", "This Man Wants 'Peace'", "This Man Talks Peace" "Thirty-three Years of Peace", "The Trojan Dove".
BS: Don't let's worry about the title now.

Item: BS: K says there is a very striking contrast between photos of the Politburo leaders in the 20's and unretouched photos of them now, e.g. in the official 20-minute news-reel of May Day 1949 in Red Square, bloated fatcats. WS: It looks (28 June) as tho this news-reel, and stills from it, may be available. ~~WS~~ gw: If it's technicolor, so much the better.

Item: ~~WS~~ gw: "Pictorial History of Russia" by John Stuart Martin.

CONTENTS, suggested by BS:

(1) Photo of Tsar & Kaiser together.
Be-medalled.
(There are many of these "Willy—Nicky" photos).

(2) Photo showing Devastation of World War I.
Corpses, refugees.
BS: preferably in what area? France?

(3) Photo: Lenin (genuinely) urging Peace.
Lenin on soap-box, with crowds carrying banners "Peace"
Caption indicating translation of Russian for "peace".

(4) Close-ups of Lenin & his Politburo in power.
Including one of Lenin & Trotsky (& Stalin?) together.
They wanted peace; what became of them? Followed by:

(5) Trotsky reviewing troops.

(6) Trotsky dead, with head bandaged.

Caption: quotation from Stalin to the effect "We owed much in 1917-18 to the organising genius of Comrade Trotsky".

(7) /or (4)?/

Lenin "a most ordinary-looking man".

Caption: Stalin's "How great was my disappointment to see a most ordinary-looking man, below average in height, in no way, literally in no way, distinguishable from ordinary mortals." (From Crankshaw article, "The Battle for Lenin's Mantle", in NYTimes mag., 25/6/50).

(7½) Photo Stalin.
Perhaps the unshaven one in Deutscher, or the one from his/ Tsarist police dossier.

Caption: Lenin's 4 Jan. 1923 postscript to his Testament: "Stalin is too rough...Therefore I propose that the comrades find a way to remove Stalin..." (Crankshaw article).

Title for BOOK?: "FIND A WAY TO REMOVE STALIN"—V.I. LENIN

(8) "Photo of USSR being put on a war footing"

I.e., photo of ____________? a collective farm?
photo of famine during the enforced collectivization?
photo of liquidated kulaks?
photo of a mass of tractors?

ES: the argument here is: The real purpose behind Collectivization was (a) to break the peasants as a political force, and (b) to put the country on a war footing: to get the grain, in order to get foreign exchange, in order to get war machinery.

ES: this will need a cogent caption, to make the argument convincing.

(9) Photo of Tukhachevsky & generals shot in '37

1. Tukhachevsky
2. Gamarnik (had a beard)
3. Yakir
4. Yegorov
5. Feldman
6. Kork

Caption?
How does the fact Stalin shot them prove "Stalin means War"?

(10) Stalin with Ribbentrop, after signing Pact 1939 (Aug).

Caption: birthday greeting telegram from ______ to ________:
"Our friendship is cemented in blood"

(11) Moscow airdrome decorated with the Swastika.

(12) Stalin & Matsuoka together after signing neutrality pact, April '41.

(13) Left page: Red Army marching into Poland, 1939
Right " : Nazis marching into Poland, 1939

Caption: "...With one blow the so-called State collapsed"
(See quotations from "Rape of Poland" by Mikolajczyk; ES has)

(14) Red Army meeting Nazis at Lwow, about Nov. 1939.

(15) Scene from Russo-Finnish war.

emphasis on Russian soldiers dead.

Caption: quote Stalin on Finnish independence, 1917; he signed
the decree;
WS: who has the text of the decree on hand? "Deutscher"?

(16) Stalin makes war on his native Georgia; Feb. 1921

??But any photo hard to come by?

Caption: quote Lenin: "I am outraged by the arrogance of Ordjonikidze and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky". (Crankshaw article).

For photo: use shot of Stalin's birthplace, or of Tiflis, or
something like that?

JH has read Chavchavadze's book.

(17) Photo of invasion of Russia, June 1941.

Caption:

ES: I can turn this to good account.

(18) Stalin with Churchill & Roosevelt, posing as one of the champions of "Democracy".

Caption: ES "I have millions of captions for this in
'Stalin's War-time Speeches'".

(19) Meeting on Elbe of USA & USSR soldiers.

Caption: this time people thought peace had really come (in Europe)

(20) Red Army display of tanks & men in Red Square

from some Nov. 7 or 1st May photo.

(21) Beria & Malenkov looking "loathsome"

unretouched stills from news-reel of May 1, '49 in Red Square.

Caption?

(22) Hitler's Chancellery in ruins.

(23) Nuremberg War Criminals lying in a row after being hanged.

(24) Anti-CP peace-rally in W. Berlin

Caption: "the people still want peace".

(25) Eisenhower & Zhukov together (in uniform), 194 5

(26) Eisenhower as Columbia president (in civilian clothes)

Caption: "Where is Zhukov now?"

Item: "They bungled their way into helping destroy the German Republic and bringing on Hitler. They raised up Hitler to invade them." —BS.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: W. Sims

NO.

DATE 21 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. B. Shub					① Don't sign any author's name on this ② Don't have any group known to be hostile to Russia as the sponsors ③ A Russian edition is essential, therefore it should contain nothing that will offend Russian (as distinguished from Stalinist) sensibilities ④ Would suggest the new anti-Communist World Trade Union Federation as the sponsor — if one is needed. ⑤ Main political objective is not Stalin's cruelty or his power, But:— He is planning aggressive war which would destroy mankind therefore its necessary to destroy him first
2.					
3.					
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13.					
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15.					

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SECRET

20 June 50.

MR. SHUB--

(1) Re "STALIN IS HITLER" PHOTO BOOK, suggested by you 16 June.

→ "Flattery will get you [illegible]"

(2) I have asked ISB to supply us with all available personality photos of Hitler & Stalin, i.e. "photos in which they appear in close-up /—we might also have one of Red Square & Nuremberg?/ receiving bouquets from little girls, visiting wounded soldiers, voting, pinning medals on generals, receiving visiting statesmen from dominated areas, —with emphasis on photos showing the two dictators engaged in similar activities."

I have my doubts as to whether they will come up with a large number. It will probably also be necessary to draw on the big New York photo agencies.

(3) THE PROJECT. The book to be published, first, in France; then in other countries: Italy, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, etc.

Russian edition essential (for DP campaign first)

(4) OBJECT. Discredit Stalin. Reveal him as the ruthless master of a "spyridden slave-camp". Show him as worse than Hitler. More dangerous, because his poison is more exportable; more ruthless; more cunning. Much more important to show he is planning aggressive war

(5) BOOK TO BE COMPILED BY Williamson, in conjunction with SP. Williamson to be paid his fully daily rate, to enable him to neglect his regular work. 4

(6) BOOK TO BE SIGNED BY? Howard Hunt suggests, in France, some organization such as the Polish National Liberation Committee, or Federation of Iron Curtain Journalists; or NCFE? or Force Ouvrière? (the last is the best)

N.

It might be signed with some pan-European pseudonym such as "Stefan Mueller"?

No! —

(7) IS AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE BOOK TO BE CONCEALED?

No German [illegible]

(8) TO BE PUBLISHED BY? In France, a French publisher.

An excellent literary agent might be Gérard Boutelleau, Kravchenko's literary agent, described on page 22 of "I Chose Justice".

(9) SUBSIDY. Estimates of production costs for this type of book have been made in connection with KM FUNNY. To insure widespread sale, a considerable subsidy would be necessary.

But with no author

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(10) SIZE OF BOOK? A maximum of 75 pages of photos. This would give some 36 or 37 two-page sets of Hitler-Stalin photos.

(11) CAPTIONS? I think we will need them, and should have them; at least for a good many of the photos. (I think this will prove to be the case when you come to make up any actual dummy).

(12) Something a good deal more eye-catching and forceful, as a TITLE than the tentative "Stalin Is Hitler" should be forthcoming?

"Your Leader?" "Do you want this man?" No "Slave-master", No "Man of Steel, —and Blood", No, "This Man Wants War!!"?

(13) CAN 36 SETS OF PHOTOS SHOWING PARALLELS BETWEEN H & S BE PRODUCED? Undoubtedly yes. But:

(14) HOW MANY PARALLEL CLOSE-UP PHOTOS CAN YOU SUGGEST?

I.e., we can have parallels showing each dictator receiving a bouquet from an awe-struck child; parallels of each of them "voting", — with suitably biting captions under each; parallels of Hacha on the carpet at Berchtesgaden, alongside some Satellite minister summoned to Moscow.

Hitler and Himmler = Stalin and Beria (Gestapo & MVD parallel)

But how, with any close-up photos of H & S can you deal with such matters as Slave Labor, the Gestapo, the MVD. For these, it seems to me, it will be necessary to have non-close-up photos, i.e., photos in which H & S do not appear. But the parallel between the two regimes can be emphasized (a) in the Captions, and (b) by some such typographic device as:

(15) OVER-PRINT A SWASTIKA & HAMMER-SICKLE in the upper corners/of each set of non-close-up photos.

(16) TEXT? Captions, it seems to me, will be found necessary, and perhaps even some inter-leaved pages of parallel texts. E.G., you can have, on a left-hand page, a photo of Witzleben (and/or some of the other bomb-plot German Generals being executed in 1944) and on the right-hand page photos of Tuchachevsky and the 6 other Red Army generals who were executed along with him (with no photographers present) in 1937. But how can any photo of Tuchachevsky et al. begin to do justice to the subject of the Purge-as-a continuous-featureeof-Soviet-life-ever-since-1917????

"The first & greatest misunderstanding about the Purges has to do with their duration. To most Americans / also Western Europeans, he says elsewhere: Kravchenko, "I Chose Justice", p.145 /, a Soviet purge is something

ECRET

exceptional, a violent phenomenon which they vaguely understand has happened once, or several times perhaps, but is then over and done with. This is a basic error. Purges are part of the permanent machinery of the Soviet regime. They are continuous and never-ending. There have been periods of intensification....But there has never been a period free of purging..."

How can we possibly do justice to Purges-under-Stalin, as described by Kravchenko in the ten pages 145-155, with a few photos? (Even more so, how do justice, with photos alone, to what it is like to live under a regime where "one person in every 7" is an MVD informer"?) — [illegible] — if we don't want to [illegible]

Therefore why not something such as:

(17) PURGE PHOTOS PLUS TEXT?

Have one or two good, gruesome gallows photos: plus photos (perhaps a half-dozen or more to a page) of several dozen major figures who have been killed: Tuchachevsky, 6 out of 7 of the 1924 (wasn't it) Politburo itself, the Jan. 1937 purgees ("all shot except Radek"), the Trial of the Twenty-one (March 1938: "all shot except Rakovski"), etc etc., plus Kostov, Rajk, etc.

Then, between pages of photos, have a page of text, to drive the Purging-is-continuous point home.

We could, e.g., reprint the above-quoted paragraph from Kravchenko (whose name every French reader would recognize), and some of the lists of purgees he gives on p. 148-9.

Then the gruesome photo (available?) of Trotsky sprawled across his desk after Stalin's assassin had been at him with the meat-cleaver, which would lead the reader on to perhaps one more page of text. And eye-catching text, not hard to read, in display form:

Yes

Need not be gruesome. Much more effective picture – the corpse with bandaged head.

POLITBURO
Pyatakov..........................shot
Rykov.............................shot
Bukharin..........................shot

Trotsky...........................assassinated

Kostov............................"deviationist": shot.
Rajk..............................."deviationist": shot.
Dimitrov.......................... ?
Voznesensky....................... ?

Thorez............................ 195? ? ETC ETC ETC.

(18) A "SPY-RIDDEN" REGIME.

To put this point across, in photos, seems offhand difficult. However, it might be possible simply to have an ordinary photo of an ordinary citizen, looking somewhat apprehensive, with underneath it a Caption consisting of a single sentence from, e.g., Kravchenko:

"....Finally Donenko escaped. He found his wife and three children living in the Donets Basin under a false name.

"'No one except my wife,' Donenko said, 'could know who I really was. I took lodging in their house as a stranger. My own children called me uncle, and grew up without knowing that the man who boarded in their house was in reality their own father.'" (I Chose Justice, p.506).

(19) KATYN & OSWIECIM, etc. We can of course have parallel photos here.

But a map of the USSR with a large black dot for each place where there is a labor-camp, with Caption underneath in very large type, "15,000,000 and more!" might help to drive home the extent of slave labor under Stalin. I can't see how any single photo of slave-laborers can make the point.

There is such a map of the labor-camp locations in Dallin, but it is typographically a very poor one, and it is devoutly to be hoped that CIA Cartographic can come up with a better one.

(20) TUESDAY, June 27. WILLIAMSON is making a trip to Washington, and should be in the office early in the morning. Could you meet with him then?

Yes

In preparing these photo books there seems to be nothing like actually getting down to the preparation of a dummy. Could you prepare some sort of rough Dummy or List of Contents to submit to Williamson, indicating the Themes ~~in~~ which you would like to have the photos illustrate?

War is The MAIN Theme

WSS
W. S. Sims

(19½) My tentative view in re this Photo Book might be summed up as the "Seydlitz powder" theory. I.e., (1) a page of printed statistics of purgées, alone, is no good; (2) a page with a ~~gruesome~~ gallows photo alone is not good enuf, but (3) put the two together, and you have something "graphic" to bring home to the reader what it would be really like to live under Stalin.

Not Horror or Gruesomeness

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-3 Jan 76
(Lee)

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NOTICE

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NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-66 2593

(7-13)

See IO for any additional information on PDQUICK.

Most of the people mentioned came to a conference in Berlin (1st Congress for Cultural Freedom) - arranged by PDQUICK, an EE/PPG Project.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lindsay, CEB

THROUGH: Mr. Schreyer, EE III

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

Attached is an interim report. A considerable amount of material, including American and foreign press cuttings, a photographic exhibit and full text of speeches, will be available within the next few days and can, at that time, be made the subject of an additional report.

LOUIS GLASER
German Desk, EE III

1 Attachment
Report described above

EE III/LG/fdr
cc:

SECRET

SECRET

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Berlin, Germany
26 to 30 June, 1950

I. Origin and Purpose

Early in 1950 a plan was conceived to gather together in Berlin, in the heart of Soviet Germany, a representative group of the Western World's intellectual leaders and to provide them with an instrument to repudiate the totalitarian concept of intellectual subservience to the state. OPC planned to convene the Congress of Cultural Freedom in June 1950 at a moment most advantageous to counteract the psychological effect of the Soviet-sponsored Whitsuntide Youth Rally. The meetings and pronouncements of the Congress were to be widely publicized by press, radio and printed material not only to the Western World but by sustained clandestine distribution in communist-controlled areas.

II. Development

To achieve maximum effect and credibility, it was apparent from the outset that the actual sponsorship of such a convention should not be permitted to appear. Accordingly, the Congress for Cultural Freedom ostensibly sprang into being as the inspiration of a meeting between Ernst Reuter, Lord Mayor of Berlin; Dr. Otto Suhr, Rector of the Berlin College of Political Science, and Dr. Redslob, Rector of the Free University of Berlin. Melvin J. Lasky, HICOG editor of the intellectual periodical, Der Monat, was introduced into the formative committee and nominated Acting General Secretary to steer the operation for OPC.

SECRET

In the name of an international sponsoring committee(1), invitations to the Congress were extended to prominent intellectual, cultural and labor figures of the Western World or in exile from communist-dominated Eastern countries. The complicated task of gathering together these widely-scattered individuals at the site of the Congress required the closest coordination with and cooperation of official and private United States agencies and individuals of many nationalities. The delicate matter of covertly financing the travel and expenses of delegates for example, had to be accomplished with the assistance of three American committees with established interests in international affairs. An enormous amount of organizational detail was handled in Berlin and elsewhere on the continent and in the U. S. under OPC sponsorship and direction. Provision of interpreters, press and radio coverage, an elaborate book display, accommodations for personal comfort and security of the delegates and facilities for the official business of the Congress, were among the problems which had to be solved.

OPC is particularly grateful to the State Department which, through the office of Mr. Bruce Buttles, rendered exceptional and sympathetic cooperation throughout the progress of negotiations and arrangements. This cooperation extended to letters from the State Department to invitees, backing up Committee invitations, a general to be supported by funds of CIC and delegates were characterized as American police spies and war mongers. In the U. S., considerable coverage was given by the N. Y. Times, N. Y. Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, Washington Star and other papers. Additional coverage is expected in periodicals in the form of reviews and feature articles. In recording the opening of the Congress, the Christian Science Monitor referred to the fact that it was being held just one month after the Communists had staged the greatest totalitarian youth meeting ever held in Europe. The Monitor went on to say:

---

(1) The Committee included such names as:

Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler, Great Britain; Charles Plisnier, Belgium; David Rousset, Andre Gide, and Andre Malarux, France; Haakon Lie, Norway; Ignasio Silone, Italy; John Dewey and Arthur Schlesinger, U. S.; Carlo Schmid, Germany; Dennis Rougement, Switzerland.

> "There is as much difference between these gatherings as can be imagined. The one emphasized numbers and blind obedience to collectivism. The other will be composed of a select company of noted public leaders and scholars from the Western World and will stress the all-importance of freedom of expression and of human rights."

In its deliberations, the cultural and intellectual slavery imposed by the Soviet Union and her satellite states was emphatically and repeatedly denounced. The attack by North Korea was immediately seized upon by delegates and made the subject of vigorous repudiation. In this connection, it is significant that the delegates were not bound, limited, or instructed in any way.(1) It was well known that one delegate, Dr. Hans Thirring, Austrian atomic scientist, had prepared a speech which contained a considerable amount of criticism of the Western democracies. The speech had been printed and distributed to delegates in advance of the session. When the Korean news broke, he stood before the Congress and, amidst cheers, openly repudiated his prepared document, stating that in view of the cynical Korean aggression he would confine himself to a denunciation of communist despotism.

---

(1) While no control was exercised over papers and statements of delegates, it was necessary that the general course of business and tenor of the Congress be held within the bounds of the original concept. This was accomplished by an informal steering committee the key member of which was a highly respected, internationally famous delegate, who was also an OPC agent.

The Congress delegates represented many divergent backgrounds and philosophies. They were free to express any opinion. Yet at no period during the five days of discussion, debate and oratory was there any critism of the U. S. or of its policy in the Far East. U. S. policy was, in fact, vigorously defended by a number of delegates, including Haakon Lie, noted Norwegian labor leader.

The Congress unanimously approved the following "Letter to the East", a message to writers, authors and scientists behind the Iron curtain:

> "The great conflict now raging in the world is not a conflict between East and West. It is not a conflict between peoples. We definitely reject the accusation that we who have come together from many countries and different parts of the world are hostile to the peoples of Russia and the countries subjected to the domination of the Stalin dictatorship. Quite the reverse: we have amongst us representatives of those peoples.
>
> "We are deeply convinced that the problem of the freedom of the peoples who are today enslaved under the Stalin dictatorship and the problem of ensuring freedom and peace throughout the world are inseparably linked.
>
> "All those who fight for freedom against oppression can be assured of our unlimited solidarity."

Deliberations of the Congress concluded with a unanimous manifesto (see Tab A) in which the delegates rejected the idea of neutrality in the struggle between freedom and tyranny and stated that intellectuals should not stand silent on the sidelines but should adhere to the defense of freedom and indeed to the expansion of freedom.(1) Acting on a joint proposal of the Congress, and the Assembly of the City of Berlin, Lord Mayor Reuter announced a resolution to establish a memorial in honor of all those who have fallen under totalitarian tyranny, the monument to be erected in the British sector near the Brandenburg gate.(2)

The final action of the Congress was self-perpetuation in the form of a Standing Continuation Committee which in turn selected an Executive Committee, consisting of:

Ignazio Silone
David Rousset
Arthur Koestler
Irving Brown
Carlo Schmid

Francois Bondy was elected Field Secretary of the Executive Committee, which will maintain offices in Paris and Berlin.

---

(1)Among the supporting statements were those of:

Arthur Koestler:	"The Congress has unified all intellectuals who are not communists around a program for cultural freedom. We are prepared to take the offensive."
Ignazio Silone:	"We men of the resistance propose to form a new league of resistance to totalitarianism everywhere."
Robert Montgomery:	"There is no neutral corner in the field of freedom. If an artist shrinks from the fight for freedom he dies twice. For he dies as an artist before he dies as a man.

---

(2)The idea of a permanent monument was "suggested" to Mayor Reuter by one of the delegates. Reuter, himself a victim of totalitarian oppression, pushed it through enthusiastically.

IV. Future Plans

The first meeting of the Executive Committee, which will be controlled by OPC, is scheduled for Paris, in September, at which time arrangements will be made for future sessions of the Congress and the continued exploitation of its activities and the anti-communist declarations of its members.

OPC plans for the exploitation of this operation called for clandestine dissemination of the output of the Congress, especially its resolutions, speeches and manifestos, throughout East Germany and the Soviet satellites. East Germany has already been covered once, through a special edition of the Neue Zeitung and reports carried by other papers which the OPC mission subsidizes and secretly distributes in Soviet Germany.

Plans are now being perfected for circulation, in a number of languages, of millions of copies of the speeches, declarations and resolutions of the Congress. Much of this material has already been carried by the Voice of America and by Radio RIAS. Since the Congress has determined to perpetuate itself through a Continuation Committee, OPC will encourage additional statements and declarations by key persons, these also to be distributed throughout the satellite area. Many millions of people, some of them cut off from any news of resistance to communist tyranny over the thoughts of men, will be informed that not only are the philosophers and scientists and cultural leaders of the world outraged at the attempted obliteration of intellectual freedom, but that they propose to fight it.

The project is a continuing one. There will be other sessions of the Cultural Congress and further dissemination of the voices of men who are free to say what they think and thus bring to those still enslaved the message that they too may hope to be free.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: III/RE - D & P

Date Received: DEC [illegible]

NO. 323 - CF6WU

DATE 8 Dec 1950

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. C/EE			SAS [illegible] on 13 June		DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1 of 3 ☑ ~~Attachments~~ ____ 1____ 3____ 2____ 4____ Copy 2 of 3 ☐ Attachments ____ 1 C/EE 4____ 2 EE-2 5____ 3____ 6____ Copy 3 of 3 ☐ Attachments ____ 1 C/EE 2 EAD 3 III/RE-file
2.					
3. Farmer	Read & have filed PDQUICK			T.F.	
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FIELD DISPATCH

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10-61136-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

State telegram requesting priority cooperation of all Consular officers in providing entry permits for delegates, several cables expressing overall interest and extraordinarily complete arrangements to cover the Congress by VOA. To accomplish this latter mission, VOA's special representative in Berlin made elaborate arrangements for re-broadcasting from New York.

III. The Sessions of the Congress

The Congress convened in Berlin on 26 June 1950 and consisted of more than 100 representatives of 16 nations.(1) It was officially welcomed by the City of Berlin and was greeted with an outpouring of publicity in the European and American press.

The impact of the Congress on the press of Europe cannot be recorded fully at this time. Clippings and a complete operational report have not yet been received from the field. There are many known indications, however, that it was furiously opposed by the communist press. Soviet-sponsored papers and Radio Berlin denounced delegates as the hounds of Wall Street and even accused Congress members of setting fire to the House of Soviet Culture. The Congress was said

---

(1) Among the leading delegates: Great Britain - R. H. S. Crossman, MP, author, editor of New Statesman and Nation; Arthur Koestler, author; Herbert Read, art critic, poet, novelist. France - Henri Frenay, editor; Suzanne Labin, author; Andre Malraux, author; Gabriel Marcel, philosopher; Andre Philip, professor of economics; Jules Romains, novelist. Germany - Franz Borkenau, historian and journalist; Anna Siemsen, educator, Carlo Schmid, political scientist, educator. USA - Sidney Hook, educator and philosopher; Irving Brown, labor leader; George Schuyler, editor; H. J. Mueller, Professor of Biology, Nobel prize winner; A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of History. Switzerland - Francois Bondy, editor; Wilhelm Roepke, Sociologist and economist. Norway - Haakon Lie, labor leader. Italy - Ignazio Silone, Novelist; Franco Lombardi, philosopher. Russia - Nicolai Andreyev, literary critic, lecturer; Boris Nicolaevsky, historian. Holland - Hendryk Brugmans, Professor. Turkey - Aslan Humbaraci, Journalist. Czechoslovakia - Karel Kupka, Professor. Sweden - Ture Nerman, poet and editor.

SECRET

~~11~~ 8 December 1950

325-C:GMU

SUBJECT: American Ballet

TO: Chief, FJCAPE
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief, DTRAPID

ATTN: Joseph K. Stribling

1. For the reasons outlined below, we have been forced to take emergency action on the following matters.

2. During the period of preparation for FDQUICK, Mallison had in hand a project which involved bringing the American Ballet to Berlin for a brief series of performances in both the east and west sectors of the city. We encouraged him in this idea, since the performance dates coincided with FDQUICK, and would have added substantially to the culture surrounding the central event. Mallison, however, was faced with a complicated financing problem, since the business manager of the ballet company wouldn't accept marks, and Mallison had no dollars for such purposes. At that time we indicated, because of the advantage to FDQUICK, that we would resolve his difficulty by exchanging his money for him.

3. For a variety of reasons, the ballet was delayed and couldn't include Berlin during the period in question. We regarded the deal as dead and put it out of our minds, but not Mallison. He chose to regard our commitment as open, and without consulting us until today, has obligated himself to pay 3050 green dollars to the ballet company, which is arriving in Berlin tomorrow, and whose business manager expects to be paid immediately on arrival. Both Mallison, and indirectly Balster, have appealed to us to take him off the hook. We have informed him that such deals are contrary to FJCAPE policy, and anyway our original reason for considering such assistance is no longer operative. But because he and his shop are extremely useful to us in a variety of ways, we have told him we might perform the service of exchanging his marks on the open market, citing a six-to-one rate as probably the best obtainable.

4. Regardless of what Mallison has been told, we do not wish to involve this mission in local open market transactions. We are, therefore, exchanging from our funds here 3050 green dollars for 18,300 Deutsche marks from Mallison. He will, of course, obtain a mark receipt from the ballet company's business manager in order to keep his books straight, and no paper outside FJCAPE files referring to this matter will exist. We believe this operation secure and not disadvantageous to FJCAPE from either a financial or influence standpoint.

Gearing saw & approved this dispatch
in Draft prior to his departure

S. SPAETH

SECRET

SECRET

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NO. 323-CF6100

DATE 8 Dec. 1950

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COMMENTS

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1 C/EE
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FIELD DISPATCH

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

KMIXON

11 December 1950

323-CFOWU

SUBJECT: American Ballet

TO: Chief, FJCAPE
Washington, D. C.

INFO: Chief, DTRAPID

ATTN: Joseph K. Stribling

1. For the reasons outlined below, we have been forced to take emergency action on the following matters.

2. During the period of preparation for PDQUICK, Mallison had in hand a project which involved bringing the American Ballet to Berlin for a brief series of performances in both the east and west sectors of the city. We encouraged him in this idea, since the performance dates coincided with PDQUICK, and would have added substantially to the culture surrounding the central event. Mallison, however, was faced with a complicated financing problem, since the business manager of the ballet company wouldn't accept marks, and Mallison had no dollars for such purposes. At that time we indicated, because of the advantage to PDQUICK, that we would resolve his difficulty by exchanging his money for him.

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HERBERT S. SPAETH

KMIXON

Subject

cc primer, 7 June 51

Ragsdale to Hambly

Letter of Instructions

Date

26 Feb 51

14-00000

SECRET

11 September 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

VIA: EE

SUBJECT: Unclassified HICOG report on Congress of Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: ADPC memorandum of 21 August, same subject

1. In regard to the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of reference memorandum, an inquiry was sent to the Chief of the German Mission to determine the author of subject report and the circumstances surrounding its preparation. On 6 September the German Mission Chief replied as follows:

a. Subject report was one of three requested by Mr. Shepard Stone from Mr. Kenneth Downs, Mr. Melvin Lasky, and Mr. Ralf Von Eckart, the latter being Deputy Chief of the Editorial Projection Branch, ISD. Subject report, sent to State Department, is verbatim as prepared by Mr. Von Eckart.

b. Mr. Von Eckart was present throughout the Congress and required no assistance or guidance in preparation of this report. It is considered unlikely that he had in mind promoting the interests of Mr. Lasky, with whom he had a sharp disagreement concerning press relations. Mr. Von Eckart originally went to the Congress expecting to handle the press but was abruptly cut off by Lasky to make way for another individual.

c. The document was not classified by HICOG because it was considered to contain nothing of a classified nature; there was no internal HICOG distribution of it outside of Mr. Stone's Public Affairs Division.

d. The original report bears a notation by Mr. William J. Egan, Chief of ISD, to the effect that he considered it "relatively objective". The Chief of our German Mission himself considers the report a fair summary of HICOG's quite enthusiastic reaction to the Congress as a whole.

e. It is known to the Chief of the German Mission that Lasky is not aware of the existence of subject report.

2. This report was handled in a quite routine manner upon receipt by the State Department here, getting neither highly limited nor highly wide-spread distribution. In addition to the Office of German Affairs, it went also to United Nations Affairs, Office of Libraries and Institutions, Mr. Barrett's division, and the division concerned with international organizations and conferences. So far as Mr. Bruce Buttles, who has been most discreet and helpful to us throughout the Congress matter, has been able to find out the report created no particular stir one way or the other.

PDCWICK

3. There have been no recent incidents involving Mr. Lasky, and it appears at this point that control of him is well in hand.

4. Mr. Lasky's own report of the Congress is written in narrative rather than editorial style. It emphasizes primarily the favorable aspects of the Congress but does not go completely overboard and makes no mention whatever of Lasky's own part in it. It does not appear at all to be an ax-grinding document but simply one which was written in a flush of enthusiasm.

5. EE-3 is retaining subject report in the PDQUICK file.

John E. Baker

JEB/njh
cc: CFC File
CFC Chrono
SP
EE-3 Chrono
EE-3 PDQUICK file

14-00000

K-2455 486418

FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13

RETAIN OR DESTROY

SECURITY: SECRET PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

761.00/7-2650

TO: Department of State

FROM: HICOG Frankfurt 260, July 26, 1950 1 Enclosure

REF: Dept Cable Srl No. 1509, 13 Sep 49, to USPOLAD Frankfurt

SUBJECT: PERIPHERAL - ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY OF BORIS IVANOVICH NIKOLAEVSKI.

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12917

(1)

Enclosed is a memorandum describing the activities of Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevski, head of the socialist League of New York, who has been in Germany for the past six weeks. It will be noted that Mr. Nikolaevski has been endeavoring to establish a bloc of left and center groups within the Russian emigration and that he is hopeful of obtaining the support of the executive committee set up by the recent Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin for a congress to be held in Paris attended by representatives of so-called "democratic" groups within the Russian emigration and by democratic figures from Western Europe and the United States.

XR 861.411

It is recommended that the Department give serious consideration to the position which it should take with respect to Nikolaevski's proposal. If plans are proceeding to create a unified front within the Russian emigration which would receive American support in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Kelley report, it would appear inadvisable at this stage to give any official encouragement to a congress of Russian groups which would not be fully representative and would therefore tend to emphasize divergent trends within the emigration rather than minimizing differences and endeavoring to enlist broad support within the emigration for a program of anti-Communist activity.

B. R. Shute
Director
Office of Intelligence

Enclosure:
Memorandum

Distribution:
American Embassy, Paris
HICOG Eastern Element, Berlin

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THIS IS NOT A PERMANENT RECORD COPY.

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Enclosure [illegible] to HICOG Frankfurt
Despatch [illegible], July 26, 1950

ACTIVITIES IN GERMANY OF BORIS IVANOVICH NIKOLAEVSKI

Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevski, the well-known Russian historian and journalist and head of the New York socialist League, has been in Germany for the past six weeks attempting to line up support for a bloc of Russian groups of the left and center and to promote a congress of "democratic" elements within the emigration which he hopes to convene in Paris in the fall under the sponsorship of the executive committee created at the recent Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Nikolaevski is a man of great energy and of very considerable stature among the Russian refugees in Germany. By virtue of his long-standing record as a social democrat he has excellent contacts with German social-democratic and trade union circles and has been personally acquainted with many of the present leaders of these organizations since his residence in Berlin in the early 30's. He also enjoys wide confidence among Russian refugees by virtue of the fact that he was the first old Russian emigre of any stature to come to Germany after the war in an effort to give encouragement and assistance to members of the new Russian emigration.

Nikolaevski has divided his time between Munich, Berlin and Frankfurt and has talked with a constant stream of visitors.

He has also made numerous side trips to seek out refugees in whom he is interested. His principal objective has been to unite as many of the progressive or, as he calls them, "democratic" Russian groups as possible in an organization which will concentrate on the struggle against Communism. He has succeeded in establishing close personal relations with Boris Aleksandrovich Yakovlev, head of SBONR (Fighting Union for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia), and has also interested SVOD, the military twin of SBONR, and the Solidarists (NTS) in his plan. As far as I have been able to discover, however, no agreement has been reached between these groups for the formation of a united organization, and NTS, following its customary practice, has indicated a willingness to cooperate but has not committed itself beyond that point. Nikolaevski anticipates some opposition to his project from the left wing of the New York League by virtue of the Vlasovite antecedents of these organizations, but feels that he can eventually gain the support of his own organization. It is presumed that final negotiations for the establishment of the new organization will take place only after Nikolaevski returns to New York and gains League endorsement of his activities in Germany.

SECRET

After the Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom, in which Nikolaevski played a prominent and enthusiastic role, he conceived a new project, namely the convocation of a conference in Paris under the sponsorship of the permanent executive committee created at the Berlin Congress. The Paris congress would be attended by "democratic" Russian emigres, both old and new, as well as by "democratic" leaders and intellectuals from Western Europe and the United States, including a number who attended the Berlin conference. The principal purpose of the Paris congress would be propagandistic; it would, in Nikolaevski's words, constitute a demonstration of the solidarity of anti-Communist sentiment among the Russian emigration and the democratic forces of the Western world.

Nikolaevski is a convinced and doctrinaire socialist and is firmly opposed to cooperation with or apparently even exposure to those groups within the emigration which are not ideologically sympathetic to him. His particular antipathy is directed toward the Supreme Monarchist Council (VMS) and its president, Yuri Meyer, who, he claims, is manipulated by the sinister behind-the-scenes figure of Colonel Baranovski. He can produce no evidence beyond rumor to support his allegations regarding the role of Colonel Baranovski who himself has personally denied to me in the most emphatic terms that he plays any political role whatsoever. It is a striking coincidence that Colonel Neryanin, the head of SVOD, one of the organizations which Nikolaevski includes in his proposed union, is one of the principal assistants in the intelligence network of Colonel Baranovski, who expresses the highest regard for him.

I suggested to Nikolaevski, and discussed with him at considerable length, the desirability of broadening the proposed Paris congress to include representatives of all the principal groups represented in the emigration. I pointed out that the propaganda value of a congress in which the principal elements in the emigration were represented would be substantially greater than that of a meeting with only fragmentary representation; that a meeting from which certain influential groups were excluded might result in a rival congress which would merely underline the diversive trends within the emigration and tend to crystallize them; that a congress meeting under the banner of democracy should be prepared to permit a democratic expression of opinion; and that participation in a meeting of this kind with rival groups would in no sense constitute endorsement or approval of their programs. To these arguments Nikolaevski turned a deaf ear. He stands firmly on the position that the social democrats, whom he consistently refers to as "democrats," cannot afford to compromise themselves or endanger their standing with the Russian people by the slightest evidence of cooperation with the right wing.

Nikolaevski is extremely anxious to gain the blessing of the United States Government for his Paris venture. I told him frankly that while I was in no position to express an official opinion and could not venture a guess as to Washington's' reaction, it seemed unlikely to me that the American Government could afford to take sides in the internal political struggle within the Russian emigration, and that until the emigre groups succeeded in reconciling their own differences and were prepared to concentrate their efforts against the Soviet regime rather than against each other, the American Government would hardly be in a position to associate itself in any way with them. Nikolaevski replied that the anti-Communist struggle itself was an inadequate program and that something positive must be offered to the Russian people. I agreed to this position but suggested that a united program on which the emigration could agree would probably have much greater impact than a variety of programs offered by competing groups. Nikolaevski, however, stuck to his ideological guns.

Nikolaevski was considerably perturbed by news he received just before his departure from Frankfurt to the effect that Yakovlev had been approached by Colonel Kromiadi, who is nominated in the Kelley memorandum as the leader of the united front organization, to lend the support of SBONR to an emigre congress to be convened in Munich. Yakovlev had gained the impression that this project had American support, although Kromiadi had apparently made no explicit statement to this effect. He had based his arguments on the broad concept of united emigre effort against the Soviet regime and had indicated that it would be a congress of Russian patriots rather than of representatives of emigre organizations. This appeal had obviously made a considerable impression on Yakovlev, who is much less ideologically minded than Nikolaevski and much more inclined to ally himself with any activity which he feels can effectively bring pressure against the Soviets. Nikolaevski, while expressing high personal regard for Colonel Kromiadi, immediately attributed this project to the machinations of Meyer and Baranovski and adopted a completely negative attitude toward it. I told him that I had had no previous knowledge of the project and that I felt reasonably sure that it did not enjoy American support.

Nikolaevski plans to proceed to France and attend the first meeting of the executive committee established at the Berlin Congress in an effort to interest them in his project for a congress of Russian emigres.

COMMENT

If Nikolaevski in his intransigent position is supported by his organization, which I assume will be the case, it will present a serious obstacle to any plans for uniting the forces of the Russian emigration in the anti-Communist struggle. Nikolaevski's ideological principles are so firmly enrooted that it appears unlikely that anything will shake them or that he can be persuaded to cooperate with groups whose political views differ markedly from his own. Nikolaevski's name and pen carry great influence among Russian emigres and it is most desirable that they be utilized to the utmost. It would be neither realistic nor practical, however, to accept Nikolaevski's position and thereby eliminate other influential groups within the emigration. One solution for this dilemma might be to ignore the extremist groups, right and left, which refuse to participate in the common effort and concentrate primarily on the new emigration who are more flexible in their political ideas and whose understanding of the Soviet regime is more recent and more profound. The extremists will then be faced with the alternative of carrying on alone or of making peace with their conscience and joining the common cause.

Francis B. Stevens

Francis B. Stevens

CONFIDENTIAL

14 August 1950

Q2/224

The following views of LEIGOUNOV on the Berlin Congress have been reported as of interest to the sponsors of the Congress.

1. The Berlin Congress is regarded in France as a movement exclusively of the extreme left, of former Communists and present non-Stalinite Marxists. Observers regard with disfavor the fact that the Congress was extremely mild in its attack against the Soviet regime. They point out that:

   (a) The Soviet regime as such is not mentioned in a single resolution, which limited themselves to the condemning "totalitarian regimes."

   (b) The issuance of an anti-Franco resolution in the absence of an anti-Stalin resolution is significant.

   (c) The refusal to recognize the representatives of the Russian NTS group present at the Congress as "listed delegates" confirms the extreme leftist nature of the Congress.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE-3

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CEE		2	21 aug	eBB	to 1:
2. EAD		22 Aug	22 Aug		FGW/ may wish to see this. Please return for ref 4.
3.					
4. EE-3		AUG 22 1950			
5. WE-III					1 To 2: This reports Baker's conversation with Hambley re Berlin Cultural Congress. This conversation had pursuant to ADPC instruction. ~~Do you~~ Think ADPC wants to see this? OBB
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					Filed
14.					
15.					File: PD3 [illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1948

SECRET

EE-801

18 August 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

1. On 15 August, I discussed the Berlin Cultural Congress with Kenneth H. Hambley, with particular emphasis on the problem of bringing the continuing Congress organization under control and, at the same time, expanding it into an effective anti-communist weapon.

2. I expressed to Hambley our concern over the manner in which Charles A. Skeggs had conducted himself during the Congress, and Hambley replied that he had been equally concerned. He said, however, that while Skeggs activities had caused an unfavorable reaction on the part of a number of the delegates, that reaction had been more directed against Skeggs personally than against him as a representative of the government. Hambley agreed with my suggestion that two bits of silver lining could be found in the Skeggs cloud, namely that he had taken most of the opposition heat himself, thus sparing some of our other people, and that he had conducted himself like anything but the "Polizeispitzel" the communist press of Germany made him out to be. In fact, said Hambley, Skeggs general attitude was such as to cause some of the delegates to disremember that Skeggs was attached to the government in any fashion or presumably subject to any discipline at all.

3. Hambley said that most of the delegates with whom he had talked were perfectly willing to accept the explanation that the Congress was smiled upon by the United States Government to the extent that some official funds were supplied for the physical staging of the meeting (as indeed they were) but that the rest of the money came from somewhat vague unofficial sources in the United States. Those who suspected something more, with the exception of the Trevor-Roper group, were generally happy that the United States was doing something of this kind and were in no mood to ask any embarrassing questions or raise any delicate points.

4. I asked Hambley what he thought his future role in the Congress should be. He replied that he was perfectly willing to undertake any activities we asked him to undertake but personally felt he should retire into the background as rapidly as possible.

SECRET

I told him that feeling coincided entirely with our own views and that we would expect him to conduct himself in that fashion. It was agreed that he should continue as a member of the International Committee of Twenty-five but should take no active overt part in organizational or policy matters and would operate behind the scenes only when so directed.

5. I discussed with him the problem raised by the presence of David Rousset and Ignazio Silone on the Executive Committee. Hambley agreed that neither of these individuals could be considered fully reliable but explained it had been impossible to exclude them from the Committee because of their prominence and the interests which they represented. He said he ~~liked~~ thought of Rousset as a person who considered himself basically on the American side even though from time to time he had to make noises of a sort to satisfy his leftist constituents. He also described Rousset as a bit of a bluffer who could be handled by a combination of firmness and tact, particularly so long as he continued to desire to be an American ally. Hambley described Silone as a more complex case--a vain, egocentric person of strong intellect but weak will and an inept politician who insisted on engaging in politics solely to satisfy his ego. Hambley said Silone probably would have been lost to the cause entirely had he not been given a prominent role including a position on the Executive Committee but that, as it was, he appeared on the surface now to be a convert, albeit a dubious one. Hambley expressed belief, however, that Silone could be controlled if handled expertly and that, if worst came to worst, he could be separated from the Committee without disastrous effect. Hambley said that in his opinion Arthur Koestler and Carlo Schmid were altogether reliable politically and could be depended upon to counterbalance Silone and Rousset even though it would be unwise to take them fully into confidence as to the nature of the Congress' backing. Irving Brown, of course, is considered completely reliable.

6. Inasmuch as the Executive Committee is a creature of the Committee of Twenty-five and draws its membership from that Committee, the latter constitutes the real point of control in the Congress organization. The Committee of Twenty-five, as it stands, is reliable on balance. If necessary, it could be weighted more heavily in our favor by exercise of the privilege of co-opting additional members on whom we could depend, Hambley said. He suggested that it might be well to establish a principle either of rotating members of the Executive Committee or of conducting regular elections of the parent Committee of Twenty-five, probably preferably the latter. This mechanism would provide means whereby obstreperous Executive Committee members might be sidetracked. Hambley agreed that this might prove a workable scheme.

SECRET

John E. Baker

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: ADPC

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Acting CEE		Aug	8 aug	eBOB	1 & 2: Please talk to me about this very promptly. eBOB
2. Baker EE III					
3. WE-III					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

File this on [illegible]
Something [illegible]
to measure it [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

EE 7 17

8 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRECKINRIDGE

SUBJECT: Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom; activities of Melvin Lasky.

REFERENCE: Memo fr EE-3/Glaser to CEE dtd 4 Aug 50 w/atts (TSL2928).

1. I continue to be very disturbed about the manner in which this entire matter has been conducted, including the non-observance of my original memorandum of 7 April 1950, in which I approved this project, subject to the condition that Lasky would not be permitted to figure publicly in this operation. The memorandum of Mr. Glaser and the conversations which I have had with Messrs. Lindsay and Baker have done very little to relieve my apprehension on the score that no effective action to exclude Lasky from continuing to play a blatantly conspicuous role either has or will be taken by us.

2. I submit that paragraph six of the reference memorandum, in both tone and content, is entirely unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

a. It fails to reveal any appropriate acknowledgment or comprehension of the damage which has resulted from Mr. Lasky's conduct. This was a major blunder, has been branded as such by our best friends in the State Department, has been revealed as such by the publicity which is analyzed in the reference memorandum itself and must be acknowledged by the responsible members of our staff both here and in Germany.

b. It betrays an unfortunate tendency, apparently more deeprooted than I had suspected, to succumb to the temptation of convenience (doing things the easy way) and irrespective of security and other technical considerations of the utmost importance.

3. I have stated to Mr. Lindsay orally and I want to make myself completely clear on this point that unless means can be found to sanitize this operation by the removal of Lasky, Burnham and other persons of known or traceable official significance from overt roles in the proposed continuing organization, then I am unwilling to have OPC

continue

continue its backing. I repeat my request that this be delivered to the field as an instruction and that it be so regarded and acted upon within this headquarters. I do not wish to create the impression that I am in any way opposed to the continuation of the operation, provided it can be sanitized and handled with a greater degree of sophistication and technical expert-ease than has characterized our performance up to date. However, I do not wish to be associated with any repetition of what we have seen thus far.

FGW

F.G.W.

FGW:lgw

P.S. Since dictating the foregoing, I have just learned from General Magruder that he showed our report on this Congress to Secretary Johnson, together with his own very complimentary appraisal of the operation. Secretary Johnson was so favorably impressed with this report and General Magruder's comment that he took the papers over and showed them to the President, who expressed himself as being very well pleased. I can only hope that the very rough edges which have recently appeared are not brought too sharply to the attention of these lofty officials. In any case this development underscores in red everything which I have said about the necessity for tidying up this operation and eliminating all of the "Irish pennants".

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: [illegible]

NO. 23549

DATE AUG 14 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr. Baker				[illegible]	Chief =
2. EE		2	11 Aug	[illegible]	Do you think FGW would like to see this?
3. Baker					
4.					
5. ADPC		11 Aug	14 Aug	FGW/w	Hand-carry
6. EE-III	[illegible]	AUG 14 1950		[illegible]	
7.					
8.					2 to 5: I think you will be interested in reading this - particularly in the light of our recent conversations.
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					5 to 2 and 6:
14.					Please see marginal notations and underlinings. What are we doing to strengthen and build on this guidance along sound lines? FGW
15.					

EE-120

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BAKER

SUBJECT : PDJUICK; Conference with Mr. Burnham

1. In the first of a series of talks with Mr. Burnham, following his return from Europe, a broad coverage of the Cultural Congress was explored as well as post-Congress plans and proceedings.

2. I went into very little detail with Mr. Burnham as to the eventual setup of the Congress as a permanent institution except to suggest that it had very broad and far-reaching implications and would be carefully studied and pursued within the next few weeks. Mr. Burnham, however, expressed his point of view (which is to be further explored in other meetings this week) as follows:

a. The continuation of the Congress as a going concern of intended permanence is now a fact. (We know that there is an executive committee, an operating committee and that the institution of a Paris Office has been authorized.) Overtly, a permanent Congress for Cultural Freedom can vastly improve the climate of opinion throughout Europe, at least, to the extent that it may considerably counter Soviet propaganda and may very well affect large groups of people far beyond the point of neutrality, perhaps to resistance. Also overtly, the Congress can utilize its participants in various forms of writing, speaking, and political action. Covertly, the Congress can perform a number of useful functions, including maintenance of contact with various resistance groups, forwarding money to such groups, spreading of clandestine propaganda and other purposes. No great pretentions are necessary in connection with the establishment of the Congress as a permanent institution, though a small office in Paris and another in Berlin are indicated. The sponsorship of a French Intellectual Periodical seems to be one of the most pressing and one of the best ideas, and Aron is enthusiastic about it and is willing to work for such a magazine as editor. Other members of the Congress, Yakevlev, for instance, are willing to work on Congress publications and both Koestler and Buber-Neuman are very anxious to take part in the literary and political activities. Bondy is a very useful man, apparently entirely reliable and a good writer and organizer; he knows languages and knows European politics.

yes

I [illegible] doubt very much this [illegible]

SECRET

b. The impact of the Congress on Berlin was terrific and Reuter's part magnificent. The whole city was very eager and receptive and paid an extraordinary amount of attention to all of the Congress activities. The book display at the Congress itself was only fairly effective, but was extremely telling in the book stores throughout Western sectors, which made special displays of the books and photographs of the authors. Broadcasting by radio RIAS seems to have been more or less nominal, although RIAS cut tapes of all of the Congress speeches, but the Voice of America team did a first-class and absolutely outstanding job. The Congress was given big coverage by VOA in several languages. In addition to the records of European publicity that are on hand, a considerable additional amount was produced. For instance, there was daily broadcasting of a French radio station and sporadic broadcasting coverage by other stitions. There was a large amount of publicity in France and England and a substantial amount in Italy, Sweden and other countries. Special articles are still appearing in the European press and periodicals. The influence of the Congress on a number of important literary and political leaders appears to be very significant. This was especially true in the case of Frenay and Silone, both of whom under-went an apparent conversion due to the operations of the Congress. On the other hand, the composition of the Congress was unbalanced nationally and also because it was too leftist, too radical.

c. The irritation caused by the Trevor-Roper article in the *Manchester Guardian* was a reflection of the attitude of three members of the British delegation, Trevor-Roper, Ayer, and Peter de Mendelssohn. Actually, Mendelssohn (an old buddy of Lasky's) was the cause of the trouble. He is a second-rate writer, a neurotic, frustrated intellectual, who had a chip on his shoulder and unquestionably inspired Trevor-Roper and Ayer with his spirit of antagonism. Another complication was the fact that Ayer and Koestler have been intellectual rivals and bitterly dislike each other. Ayer was infuriated by Koestler's prominence and communicated this antagonism to Trevor-Roper. The letter is an excessively conceited man (Burnham added at this point that almost all intellectuals are excessively conceited) and was openly annoyed because he did not figure in the proceedings with sufficient prominence. ("Incidentally," says Burnham, "Trevor-Roper's description of Koestler as a 'rootless European' follows Pravda, which uses that term as a general description for Jews.") The annoyance felt by Trevor-Roper and Ayer at their relegation to minor roles in comparison to Koestler found its outlet in articles which both of these men have written, (Note: We have only seen the one by Trevor-Roper.) and the situation was complicated by the desire of Trevor-Roper to maintain a high and academic objectivity in relation to world affairs, whereas the delegates to the Congress insisted on making it a realistic denunciation of the Communist strangle-hold on culture and intellectual freedom. Koestler epitomizes the lofty philosophical viewpoint by saying, "Do you want partial liberty or total slavery?" Lasky has written a reply, over his name, to Trevor-Roper.

d. Melvin Lasky is granted the qualities of ability, courage, hard work and political intuition but he is, at the same time, the most vain and egocentric individual imaginable. In addition to which, he is an intellectual snob and a publicity hound. Also, he definitely is not reliable, cannot be counted upon to do things that he should do unless they work in with his own ideas. He has the Russian Menshevik point of view which is simply that of useless intrigue for the sake of intrigue. His intellectual snobbery was indicated in his process of meeting delegates. If they were very important, he went to meet them with his personal car and driver--along with newspaper photographers. If they were reasonably important, a private car was sent for them. If they were ordinary delegates, they was given transportation on a bus. At least one delegate was contacted by Burnham and arrangements were made with Lasky to invite him but no invitation was sent. In the case of Max Yergin, Lasky succeeded in humiliating him and in the case of Yakevlew, Lasky at first refused to print his name on the program at all. Lasky has done a wonderful job with Der Monat and there is no question as to his natural ability and capacity for hard work but it is difficult to see how he can be used in any outstanding position in connection with a continuation of the Congress unless it is in an advisory capacity, possibly in charge of the Berlin office and with a strong hand to subdue his self-advertising proclivities.

3. The above represents Burnham's general views, in some cases expressed spontaneously, in others drawn out by questions, and it is now proposed to have a further meeting and ask him to talk about the development potentialities and techniques.

Glaser
LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/mk
cc: EIII Chrono
EIII Subject File
Mr. Schreyer

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WISNER

SUBJECT: FDQUICK - Existing Organization

1. Pursuant to your oral request of this morning, there are set forth below the elements of subject organization. As you are aware subject is in a fluid stage but, as of 7 July 1950, the following steps had been taken (except that the action described under "a" was taken at the end of the month of July):

a. A small Paris office was opened with M. Louis Gibarti as Secretary, on trial for a two-month period.

b. Letters had been sent out to the honorary Chairmen requesting them to continue to serve in that capacity. These chairmen are: Croce, Dewey, Maritain, Jaspers, and Russell. This action was taken by the Congress in session.

c. An Executive Committee of five had been nominated. This committee consists of Ignazio Silone, David Rousset, Arthur Koestler, Irving Brown and Carlo Schmid. This action was likewise taken by the Congress in session.

d. Also at the Berlin session of the Congress an International Committee of twenty-five was nominated. All but the last five of these were also confirmed. The last five had not been confirmed as of 7 July 1950. The names of these twenty-five individuals follow:

✓ Ignazio Silone
✓ David Rousset
Arthur Koestler
Carlo Schmid
Irving Brown
Julian Amery
Haakon Lie
James Burnham
Sidney Hook
Nicolas Nabokov
Eugen Kogon
Theodor Plievier
Herbert Read
Denis de Rougemont
Lionello Venturi
Boris Nicolaevsky
Karel Kupka
Josef Czapski
Margarete Buber-Neumann
Andre Philip
Richard Crossman
Francois Mauriac
Pablo Casals
Thornton Wilder
Oskar Pollak

C. D. G. B.
EX/EE

CDGB:T
DISTR:
Orig. - ADPC
EE Chrono & subject - 1
Registry - 2

SECRET

News and publicity accomplishments of N.Y. office

=

News coverage out of Berlin by U.S. Correspondents

=

News coverage and ensuing publicity by Messrs. Montgomery and Conant

=

What news coverage in Western Europe?

=

Delegates from Middle East?

=

Last minute invitations issued by Lasky — including more wives?

==

Did Mehring have a press conference in Berlin? Was Grosz mentioned in publicity at all?

=

What happened to the book displays? (There were no photographs)

What was distributed to East Germany in the form of propaganda, during the Congress?

=

Accounting.

Harkey

Montgomery had [illegible]

Also French [illegible] very [illegible]

Complication — understood emotionally,

B. Too little to [illegible]

[illegible] not too [illegible]

Influence upon Freeman (Contact) and [illegible] ([illegible] over this [illegible])

Peter de Mendelssohn — source of trouble

Trevor-Roper

Green

[illegible] meanwhile [illegible] around [illegible] write

cf. Buddy of Harkey

[illegible] not [illegible]

Relationship with Koestler quite close [illegible] — [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Example / [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] — [illegible]

political ability

[illegible] [illegible] intellectual [illegible] not reliable

[illegible] first attain [illegible]

Important on Books [illegible]

Contact part magazine

which they are eager and receptive

Book display was fairly effective
2nd monthly in bookstores

Continuation

Overt

improve climate for opening in Cuba to [illegible] Soviet propaganda

— to

utilize participants
writing,
operations,
[illegible] action

Covert

producing projects to [illegible]

establishing contact publishing, etc.

Aron ready to work on magazine as editor

Yakovlev — with Cuban
with [illegible] group [illegible]

Bondy — very useful man
knows languages
knows European politics
good contact man — write — organize

Koestler
[illegible] Neuman — prepared to work
decision required as to magazine

SECRET

9 August 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RAKER

SUBJECT : PDJICK; Conference with Mr. Burnham

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SECRET

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LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/mk
cc: EIII Chrono
EIII Subject File ✓
Mr. Schreyer

~~TOP~~ SECRET

4 August 1950

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: CEE

THROUGH: MR. SCHREYER, EE 3

SUBJECT: Activities of Mr. Melvin Lasky in connection with Congress for Cultural Freedom (Project PDQUICK)

[illegible] FE/C [illegible] May 1957

1. This is in response to your request that we examine our files and submit a statement concerning the undue prominence given to Mr. Melvin Lasky in connection with the Cultural Congress.

2. Lasky was publicly identified, early in the preparations for the Congress, as the spark plug and leading light. This unsatisfactory position was anticipated by Mr. Wisner, who, in his approval of Project PDQUICK, cautioned against emphasis on Lasky's participation. (Attachment A).

3. From the beginning, the home office was cognizant of the danger of a spotlight being thrown on any overt U. S. employee, and, in addition to previous warnings, on 7 April cabled specific instructions for the retirement of Lasky to the background. This and other admonitions, from the home office and the OPC German Mission chief, will be found at attachment B.

4. However, a review of the publicity which the Congress received shows an unfortunate amount of concentration on Lasky. In Berlin, for instance, where the Congress received its greatest publicity output, out of 180 newspaper clippings which are available, approximately 15 specifically featured Lasky, some of them photographically. Of the U. S. and British press clippings which were available, several featured Lasky prominently. In a feature article in the New Leader, the subject of which was the Cultural Congress, Lasky was referred to as the initiator of the Congress and he was featured in at least two of the formal press releases which were given out in Berlin. Of the 73 photographs which covered the Congress and which were released for press and historical purposes, Lasky is prominently featured in 6. (a large amount of this publicity material, including photographs, press cuttings and press releases, is available in our files.) While Lasky's part as General Secretary was over-emphasized in a number of newspapers and periodicals, the most damaging article appeared as a review of the Congress in the Manchester Guardian, written by the prominent historian, Mr. H. R. Trevor-Roper in which Lasky was described as connected with American Information Services and the organizer of the Congress. The statement was unfortunate because this was the only critical article of the Congress known to have appeared in the Western press. In passing, it might be mentioned that the London Economist also picked up Lasky's appointment as General Secretary, as suggesting U. S. sponsorship. Its review,

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COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES
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however, was laudatory and pointed up the sincerity and usefulness of the gathering. The holding of the Congress in Berlin was described as "a gesture of defiance"; the meeting was called an event of "considerable significance" (strong words for the London Economist) and it was referred to as marking, or at least reflecting "a turning point of the western counter-attack in the cold war." "Korea," said the Economist, "made the fortune of the Congress and crystallized the real issue before the delegates." Trevor-Roper, in a letter to the Economist, commenting on its article, was much more temperate than in his article in the Guardian. For example, in the Economist he declared, "We were almost all united against Communism from the start."

5. At this point, it should be specified that from the time the Congress was first discussed, it was recognized that the Communist press would indict it as a fascist, war mongering, propaganda group operating under the intelligence auspices of the U. S. and that this accusation would be broadcast by the Communist machine (as it was) whether or not, in fact the Congress had been under any external controls. It was also recognized that the General Secretary of the Congress would inevitably receive a certain amount of attention from the press. It seems to be clear, however, that this amount of attention was unnecessarily large.

6. Notwithstanding the undue personal publicity achieved by Mr. Lasky, it is significant that:

a. He played a most important role in the conception, development, organization and control of the Congress. Without his active interest and support the launching of the Congress would have been most difficult.

b. The Congress was a highly successful operation. In its stand against intellectual neutrality in the struggle against Communism, its "Letter to the East," its final "Manifesto," and its deliberations and intellectual discussions, the Congress has proven its propaganda value which will be extended and expanded to a greater degree in the future.

LGlaser
LOUIS GLASER

EE 3/LG/fdr

cc: CPC registry - 3 and 4 of 6
EE - 2 of 6
EE 3 - 5 and 6 of 6

Attachments a and b
See description above

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COPY 1 OF 6 COPIES

SECRET

C O P Y

7 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. FRANK
LINDSAY
OFFIE

SUBJECT: Project PDQUICK

1. With reference to my conversation with Mr. Baker concerning the project outline covering the subject project, I have approved this project subject to the following condition. It makes no sense to me that we should state in paragraph 6 under the heading of security that all practicable measures will be taken to disguise the official U. S. interest, financial and otherwise; and at the same time to provide that one of the two active sponsors will be Mr. Melvin J. Lasky, editor of the overt HICOG monthly magazine "Der Monat." I understand that Mr. Lasky is needed as one of the principal organizers and operatives but I think it quite unnecessary for his name to be flourished about as a sponsor. After all, he is officially employed by HICOG--he is, therefore, an acknowledged member of the U. S. apparatus in Germany. Why then should his name be used? Reuter is an excellent sponsor and surely it will be possible to find one or more others--non-American or at least non-official American--to serve as sponsors.

2. Generally in the same connection I assume that our consultant, Mr. Burnham, will operate in the wings and that his name will not be too prominently displayed. As the result of his recent book and the furor of communist commentary, he is a "sitting duck" for hostile propaganda in my opinion. I am entirely in favor of his participating extensively in the arrangements, but the more his participation can be in the form of "off-stage whispers" the better.

/s/ F. G. W./w

FGW:lgw/fdr

Attachment: Subj. Proj. (38294)
(Not attached to this copy)
Distribution:
1 of 2 - CEE
2 of 2 - CEE-3

CLASS[illegible]
Secret
BY A[illegible]
Eric Jones
FE/E aux 10
15 May 58

COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

41040 | Series 6

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE 3

NO.:

DATE: 4 August 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE 3 (Schreyer)					Attachment B contains the following:
2. EE					WASH 3291 (OUT 52862) FRAN 139 (IN 22622)
3. Return to EE 3					WASH 2884 (OUT 53482) 945-CWUFG
4.					FRAN 233 (IN 25106) FRAN 451 (IN 30207)
5.					BRLN 3033 (IN 31100)
6.					
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13.					
14.					
15.					

B

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

28 July

Ref. PDQUICK

T. S.

The decision on this is not up to me. I will appreciate opportunity to discuss it with you.

My point of view is that ALL of this current PDQUICK stuff is premature and a case of a lot of hungry actors smelling easy money and wanting to get into the act and get the show on the road.

We have no budget for PDQUICK for this period - and literally are living on borrowed funds. We can't make up a budget because we have no accounting from the field, do not know where we stand.

Here are some other questions in my mind:

What were the publicity accomplishments of the relatively expensive NY office?

What happened to the Berlin news coverage by US correspondents?

What happened to the bright and sanguinary forecasts of tremendous amounts of publicity, special magazine articles, radio broadcasts, etc. which were to emanate from the attendance at the Congress of Messrs. Montgomery and Conant - a little matter which cost the US about two thousand pieces of lettuce ? (It seems clear that their attendance was absolutely worthless otherwise.)

What happened to their efforts to obtain delegates from the Middle East?

Why did Lasky proceed with a dozen last minute invitations to innocuous persons (these were supposed to be 'a few' and to extremely important people) including several wives.

A cablegram was sent urging that a press conference be arranged for Franz Mehring? Did it take place?

There were no photographs of the book displays. This book display was an expensive item. Did it take place?

Now with all these questions in my mind, adding up to a realization that if the Congress was a success, it was only a success as far as it went, and it has a long way to go to completely justify itself - the next steps NOT being spending a lot of dough for the support of deserving intellectuals who have no other source of income, but in getting a distribution of a million pieces of literature, and other publicity, in Satellite areas - I would hesitate (which is a euphemism for blankly object) to blandly appropriating an extra ten thousand bucks to support an innocuous group of Russian exiles who want to air their grievances, NOT under our control.

LG

Glaser

File
PDQUICK

20 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: CXX 3

SUBJECT: 229-[illegible]U, Special Report on PDQUICK

Glaser and Droller have discussed the attached paper and are agreed as follows:

a. We think that in the preparation of the paper, Josselson was acting as a reporter rather than fundamentally expressing his own ideas.

b. In our opinion, the whole scheme, as described in the special report, is much too grandiose, ambitious and cumbersome.

c. We agree that the Congress should continue in existence but we do not think that it has to have any legal establishment.

d. We see the functioning of a continuing organization as providing the basis for future Congress meetings, providing members with a focus of interest, providing a logical source of information, propaganda, publications, and publicity, and as a cover for certain PP operations.

e. We think the organization of the Congress could follow the outline in paragraph 4 of the Reference down to, and including, the General Secretary, with the addition of an Executive Assistant, a stenographer, and a typist, and elimination of the rest of the suggested personnel.

f. We think it advisable that the Congress have one office, possibly, though not necessarily, in Paris, and that its other "offices" (which in actuality need be little more than letter drops) would require no personnel and no administrative machinery except arrangements for the forwarding of mail. Any other sporadic use to be made of such "offices," such as localized press releases, for instance, could be accomplished through a resident member of either the Executive Committee or the International Committee.

g. We think that it need not cost more than $25,000 for the next year to maintain the Congress organization, pay for administration, traveling expenses, including the salaries of personnel, which would assume a General Secretary who would be an OPC agent. (This latter concept may not be absolutely necessary; but if not, then provision should be made for OPC contact some other way.) In addition to the $25,000, specified above, there should be an allotment of $50,000 for the holding of the next Congress. Another $25,000 should be added for special purposes largely connected with publicity. The major part of the expenditures for the next year for collection, printing, and dissemination of Congress material and which could conceivably amount to as much as $250,000 as a top figure, would be provided, it is hoped, by ECA funds.

h. The activities mentioned in Part II of subject report could very well be handled under the setup outlined above with certain exceptions which seem to be too broad in scope to be justified at all.

GERALD DROLLER

LOUIS GLASER

Encl.
  Special Report

EE 3/LG/fdr
cc: Glaser
    Droller
    Chrono

Attachment to 229-C

SPECIAL REPORT: Situation and Perspectives.

I ORGANIZATION

1. At the conclusion of the Berlin sessions of the CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM, the basis for continuing work was created by the appointment of several committees. Some confusion and uncertainty reigned at this period; these need to be clarified. The following is suggested:

a. Honorary Chairman: Letters will go out this week to the Five Philosophers -- Croce, Dewey, Maritain, Jaspers, and Russell -- requesting them to honor the CONGRESS by continuing to serve with the permanent commission.

b. Sponsors: A great many distinguished men in the field of art and science had given their support to the Berlin Congress, although they were unable to come. Their names would be most useful in the Congress' continuing activities. If, as seems only appropriate, the final International Committee of 25 should consist only of "active members", then some of the nominations originally included should be transferred by the working Executive Committee to this special list of Sponsors. These (before the Congress) included -- and permission here will also be requested -- Andre Gide, Ralph Bunche (important, for no Negro was nominated in Berlin), Carl Zuckmayer, Salvador de Madariaga......among many others.

c. International Committee of 25: At the Berlin sessions the following were nominated -- (1) Ignazio Silone; (2) David Rousset; (3) Arthur Koestler; (4) Carlo Schmid; (5) Irving Brown; (6) Julian Amery; (7) Haakon Lie; (8) James Burnham; (9) Sidney Hook; (10) Nicolas Nabokov; (11) Eugen Kogon; (12) Theodor Plievier; (13) Herbert Read; (14) Denis de Rougemont; (15) Lionello Venturi; (16) Boris Nicolaevsky; (17) Karel Kupka; (18) Josef Czapski; (19) Margarete Buber-Neumann; (20) Andre Philip..... These were all present and are confirmed. The following were nominated and still have to be informed, and confirmed; (21) Richard Crossman; (22) Francois Mauriac; (23) Pablo Casals (for the "Sponsors"?); (24) Thornton Wilder; (25) Oskar Pollak; and (26) Salvador de Madariaga ("Sponsor"?).

d. Executive Committee of 5: This consists of the first five named above -- Silone, Rousset, Koestler, Brown, and Schmid (who has definitely accepted, and thus taken the place of Kogon).

2. It was decided to hold the first meeting of the CONGRESS Executive Committee during the first week in September in Paris. It will probably be desirable to hold several informal meetings before then in order to work out the outline and details of a functioning CONGRESS plan.

3. Urgent problem facing the CONGRESS by September is the working out of a legal or constitutional basis of the permanent CONGRESS organization. Who are "members"? How is the International Committee to be maintained; how are additions, substractions, changes in this and the Executive Committee to be made? Who invites to the next Congress, and who "votes"? A number of proposals should be considered before a final Memorandum is presented. This should be done in conjunction with the man who will probably be General-Secretary and/or Executive Director of the CONGRESS.

4. It is suggested that the original title be kept and made permanent — namely, CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM/KONGRESS FUER KULTURELLE FREIHEIT/CONGRESS POUR LA LIBERTE DE LA CULTURE. The use of the word "CONGRESS" in such connection has its parallel both with the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) in the USA, and with the Congress Party in India.

5. A provisional plan for the organization of the CONGRESS should be worked out, less in the expectation that it will be immediately set up than in the hope that within the next six months it can be more and more realized. The following sketch is submitted:

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Honorary Chairman
Sponsors

International Committee of 25

Executive Committee of 5

General Secretary

Executive Director
Editorial Director
Research Director
Paris Bureau Director
Berlin Bureau Director

Exec. Asst.
Edit. Asst.
Research Asst.

Stenographer
Translator

Typist

In the light of this table of organization, several provisional appointments could be made in order to get CONGRESS activities working immediately, e.g. appointment of Frau Buber-Neumann as executive of the Berlin bureau; appointment of Francois Bondy as Editorial Director; appointment of somebody like Richard Loewenthal as Research Director. The urgencies will become clearer below.

II ACTIVITIES

1. Publications Project: the immediate editing of a volume on the founding Berlin CONGRESS. Most of the material is already available in three languages: French, English, and German. This will be completed in the next month by the transitional CONGRESS Bureau in Berlin. Norbert Muhlen is assisting in putting out the special double number of "Der Monat" on the Congress, which may be a kind of "experimental model". Francois Bondy is returning to work out a table of contents and an editorial approach to the Congress volume.

2. Pamphlet Project: the immediate preparation and publication in many languages of a simple straight forward brochure (12-24) pages on "What is the Congress for Cultural Freedom?" It should be illustrated; should tell the story of the Berlin sessions; should print the Manifesto of Intellectual Liberty (and possibly a revised improved Message to the East); should outline a plan of Congress work to be followed and point to the future. This is essential for CONGRESS sympathizers, for the press, for the public in general. The Editorial Director (Bondy) can be assigned to prepare a draft for revision and approval in September.

3. Investigation Project: the first of a series of White Book reports on the situation of cultural freedom. Silone has recommended, and the CONGRESS has announced, a documented account of the Writer, Artist, and Scientist in the countries behind the Iron Curtain (an account which the UNESCO, because of its governmental connections, cannot do). An immediate beginning should be made with the appointment of a Research Chief for this project, responsible for working out an editorial plan, contacting sources for information; this project chief should have the sociological and journalistic qualifications of men like Loewenthal and Muhlen (and Peter de Mendelssohn).

4. Protest Project: the CONGRESS should, with the specific signatures of its leading supporters, keep in the forefront of public attention by taking up via the press, open meetings, debates, etc., cases of flagrant violations of the principles of the CONGRESS as stated in the Manifesto and other documents. The CONGRESS cannot, to be sure, become an international civil-liberties union, but it can speak out on special issues (purge of a University, liquidation of a scientist, arrest of a writer, etc.).

5. Break-Away Project: the CONGRESS should by means both of information and agitation keep alive the difference between those who are choosing freedom and those who are willingly or unknowingly supporting totalitarianism and its deceptions. The dramatic defection of Prof. Alfred [illegible] during the Congress Berlin session from the Soviet-controlled Academy of Science is an example of what can be done; this specific German movement is gathering strength; there have been another half-dozen resignations, and the news is spreading in Eastern Germany. This has also involved the world-famous

Charite hospital in Eastern Berlin, almost 3/4 of the distinguished medical specialists are ready to break away, and we are now hoping to reach some constructive arrangement by which they can maintain themselves in West-Berlin. This type of activity — ranging from welcoming prominent individuals from the East, to sheltering groups and institutions, and beginning with initial private contact — can transform the CONGRESS from a group of spokesmen for the libertarian ideal into "activists for freedom".

6. Radio-Broadcasting Project: inaugurating a special series of radio programs to be prepared by the CONGRESS. Liaison should be established with RIAS, the Free Europe network, the French, Austrian, German and British stations, including the Voice of America. Plans have been started for the first series — namely, "Dialogues Across the Curtain"; a dozen 'open-letters' — Koestler to Seghers and Brecht, other to Becher, Eisler, Lukacs, Lysenko, Tarle, Ehrenburg, et. al. — personalized messages of five-minutes (less in hateful opposition, more in open-hearted pity). This would be a practical follow-up to the CONGRESS' "Message to the East". These could be published in various newspapers; later in small book-form.

7. Annual Prize-Award Project: the CONGRESS should award each year a number of CONGRESS prizes to various personalities for distinctive services and contributions to the cause of Cultural Freedom. This could be given on the basis of a new book, a career, or some special activities. Two types can be distinguished: the Nobel-Prize model, and the University Stipend. The latter would enable the recipient (an American, a Frenchman) to spend four weeks in Berlin, giving a series of 5 CONGRESS lectures at the Free University, later to be printed as a special CONGRESS volume. (This is equally true of an English recipient at Heidelberg, a German at the New School in N.Y.C., a Frenchman at the London School of Economics, etc.)

8. Publishing-House Project: this could be a modestly-conceived annex to the CONGRESS Berlin-Bureau, which would actually bring out the CONGRESS volumes (indicated above). It would also publish the pamphlets and brochures mentioned. It would consider the popular cultural-political library (the Birkenfeld proposal). It could be the house to which "Der Monat" would go, if and when this monthly becomes completely independent. It would gradually build up its own list of authors from among prominent CONGRESS writers (Koestler, et. al.) The Publishing-House could be started from the existing transitional CONGRESS bureau now functioning in Berlin; the Bureau-Director, or the Executive Assistant, could be charged with the responsibilities of a normal international Publisher in Germany (incorporation as a G.m.b.H., and the like).

9. News-Letter Project: immediate plans for a fortnightly communication to all CONGRESS sympathizers, the press, etc. should be started, completed. A 2-4 page mimeographed information-bulletin will keep alive CONGRESS interest.

III SOME LARGE-SCALE LONG-RANGE PROPOSALS

1. Film Proposal: a series of CONGRESS documentary films, possibly produced in connection with other organizations. Suggestion for a first film: a full-length feature on World-Communism, a script for which (The Hammer & The Sickle") has been outlined by M.J. Lasky and Stuart Schulberg (one of the leading U.S. documentary-makers, who would most probably be available in Europe for it). These could have normal commerical distribution, special schools, and universities distribution.

2. Lecture-Tour Proposal: building up a circuit throughout western-Europe, the United States, and elsewhere, for political and cultural CONGRESS speakers.

3. Research-Institute Proposal: this could be a normal and logical outgrowth of the first CONGRESS research activities. It would mean the establishment of a "Chatham House" on an international basis for serious studies of the cultural-political problems of our day. Scholars and journalists, on the basis of specific assignments and awards, could be associated with CONGRESS activities. This would be linked with the Paris and Berlin bureaus of the CONGRESS, with such international reviews as are affiliated with the CONGRESS (Der Monat", etc.), and with the CONGRESS Publishing House.

4. University Proposal: a centre for Eastern exile professor and students, either in the form of an independent academic institution (the Czapski resolution) -- or perhaps in the more practical form of scholarships for the exiled students, and university chairs for the scholars — both is existing European and American academic institutions (Berlin Free University, Sorbonne, Zurich, Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, etc.).

5. School-for-Freedom Proposal: the organization, at first on a very modest summer-school-type basis, of a "George Orwell School for Freedom" (Hochschule fuer Freiheit), in which special courses and seminars in the political and cultural problems of our day could be given. Students could be invited (and thus give the youth some measure of intellectual training): leading publicists and officials could participate. This could be associated with the Research Institute (whose researchers become teachers and participants in the School Sessions), and with the University Project. "Congress cadres" could be developed here.

6. Proposal for Other National Bureaus: expanding into other European capital cities -- Stockholm for Scandinavia, Vienna for the Balkans, Rome for the Mediterranean, New York and Havana for North and South America. It will, in any case, probably become imperative to establish a sub-Bureau in New York City for the next period, so that American public opinion is not neglected.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

17 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSRS. LINDSAY
BAKER

SUBJECT: Berlin Congress of intellectuals (Congress for Cultural Freedom).

1. Thank you for obtaining the attached copy of General Magruder's estimate of the above mentioned operation which I note was given in a memorandum of transmittal to Secretary Johnson. I have furnished a copy of this estimate to Mr. Joyce who I understand will show it to certain significant people in the State Department.

2. I think that all persons concerned with this operation are entitled to the heartiest congratulations and if you have not already done so, I should appreciate your passing on the substance of General Magruder's appraisal to the field. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Thompson, who I assume will pass on the word to the members of his staff who played a role in this operation.

F.G.W.

FGW:lgw
Att:
TS 42664

Distribution:
#1 - EE & EE-3
#2 - SP
#3 & 4 - III/RE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION ~~[illegible]~~
CHANGED TO Secret
BY Eric Jones
EE/[illegible] and 10
12 May 58

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~~42666~~
1 of 4

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C
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom - an OPC
organized accomplishment.

This is an Operational Report of an actual accomplishment. It is a subtle covert operation carried out on the highest intellectual level. It is unconventional warfare at its best in which the objectives are men's minds. It is the opening operation of a continuing campaign.

The origin and purposes are stated in Section I. The details in organizing a delicate operation of this nature are only hinted in this report, but enough is expressed to arouse admiration for the principal operatives.

The report is already too condensed for briefing. I urgently recommend that you scan the whole of it.

John Magruder

C
O
P
Y

Secret
For Jones + IOA
CE/G
15 May 58

~~[illegible]~~
Series 6

sanitized
C O P Y

SECRET

12 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Bumstead, Stribling, and Ragsdale

FROM : Charles Olmstead

SUBJECT : Confidential Report Received By Schiller on Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

1. When Mr. Stribling's shop requested me, at the behest of a cable request of Mr. Hambley, to attempt to appease Schiller in connection with his indignation for the manner in which Max Yergin, the American Negro, had been handled in Berlin, Schiller reacted in the manner described in my earlier memorandum on this subject, which was on the whole satisfactory. He has since received a complete report from a reliable and competent observer at the Berlin Congress which I am quoting below:

> "On the whole, the Congress has achieved some useful results. In my opinion, the best thing about the Congress was that it was held in Berlin. A Congress in Paris, in Switzerland or in any other place would have had neither the same political significance nor would it have received the same publicity. For the Berliners, the fact that Berlin was chosen as the meeting place was renewed proof of Western solidarity with their resistance against the Russians. They need such proof again and again, especially in view of the fact that they have a definite and justified impression that the Bonn Government is not inclined to manifest any particular fervor as far as help for the Berlin population is concerned.
>
> "The Congress, moreover, has been a success inasmuch as it showed the determination of an important group of intellectuals, scholars, and artists to leave no longer unchallenged Communist attempts to dominate the scene through their various "cultural" front organisations. The permanent machinery established by the Congress for the purpose of continuing its work may be of great importance provided that certain conditions are observed in its activities.
>
> "The following critical remarks regarding certain phases and features of the work of the Congress should not be construed as an attempt to deny the fact that the Congress has achieved a useful purpose. Nor is this criticism made from a perfectionist point of view. However, while it is admitted that in a gathering of artists, scholars, and writers, many of whom tend to display prima-donna attitudes and a spirit of coterie, a certain amount of friction is inevitable, it cannot be said that everything was done to reduce such frictions to a minimum. As a result, many delegates whom I had an opportunity to ask for their impressions of the Congress, left Berlin with mixed feelings, some of them not without a certain amount of disappointment.

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[illegible] 2 - [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] file

"While the organisation of the Congress was excellent as far as the technical side was concerned, (hotels, public meetings, receptions, press interviews, etc.), the debates of the Congress took place under conditions which showed a considerable lack of imagination and ignorance of parliamentary procedure on the part of those responsible for the way in which the business of the Congress was transacted. Skeggs, Muhlen, and Bondy are certainly nice fellows with the best intentions. However, they seem to have had no previous experience at all on how to run a conference.

"All delegates had been asked to prepare papers on various subjects. It was obviously impossible to have all those papers read in the public meetings of the Congress (they were mimeographed and will be distributed). It was necessary to make a selection of topics and speakers. The best method would have been to appoint a steering committee which would have made this necessary selection with the maximum of objectivity. Unfortunately, this was not done. Instead, the question of who was to speak and how long was decided by Skeggs and his associates who did it in a rather arbitrary and haphazard manner. To explain what I mean let me cite a few examples: First, the case of our friend, Max Yergin. Together with Max we worked rather hard on his paper (one night we had no more than two hours sleep). The final product received rather favorable comments from Hambley and Arthur Schlesinger. I tried to make Skeggs understand the importance of having Communist propaganda regarding the Negro problem answered and refuted by a competent person who is a Negro himself. Skeggs first promised me that Yergin would have fifteen minutes speaking time. When we arrived at the meeting where Max was scheduled to speak, he was told that he would not get more than ten minutes. We went to work again, and deleted some passages so as to have a ten-minute text. However, when Max was about to take the floor, he was informed by Bondy that he should not speak longer than five minutes. As a result, Max got confused and delivered a completely inadequate version of what he originally wanted to say. Similarly, Sascha Schwarz was prevented from making a report on the situation of the working class in Russia. Nor did the delegate from Spain and the one and only representative of Latin-America to the Congress have a chance to speak.

"On the other hand, Koestler spoke four or five times and there was generally a marked tendency to build him up as a kind of praeceptor mundi. He seems to have enjoyed himself in the role of a task-master censoring and lecturing the delegates. As far as I gathered from a conversation with Skeggs, Koestler was given this prominent place because, due to the fact that as a well-known writer, his pronouncements were supposed to attract public attention in a greater measure than speeches by other delegates. The same consideration was evidently applied in the case of Silone. However, Silone seemed to be anxious to be as non-committal as possible, quite in line with his ambiguous political attitude. While Skeggs' preoccupation with problems of publicity is understandable, I do not think that the method of treating authors according to the sales of their books is apt to promote a lasting cooperation among writers, scholars, etc. For once, scholars will never be able to sell as many copies of their books as Koestler.

"At a certain moment, the debates took a very unfortunate turn. On one of the frequent occasions, when Koestler was given the floor, he read a paper wherein he attacked Socialism in general and the British Labor Government in particular. Considering 1) that about 70% of the delegates were people who professed socialist opinions; 2) that the purpose of the Congress required that a unity of all democratic intellectuals, both socialists and non-socialists in the struggle against totalitarianism be emphasized and 3) that the chairman of the Congress was Ernst Reuter, head of the social-democratic city government of Berlin -- Koestler's attack was absolutely out of place and should not have been made regardless of whether he was right or not. As a matter of fact, the paper in question proved that Koestler is mistaken in assuming that a brilliant journalist and a successful novelist is eo ipso qualified to play the role of a philosopher, historian and sociologist. In addition, mistaken statements by British Labor regarding the problem of European unity do not justify in my opinion the kind of vitriolic all-out attack against the British Labor Government which was made by Koestler who seems to have forgotten, that, regardless what one may think of some of its policies, British Labor is today one of the principal pillars of the world democratic front.

"Evidently Koestler's attack provoked immediate reaction on the part of the Socialist Congress delegates, beginning with Reuter who was in the chair. In my opinion, this entire discussion was completely unnecessary. The British conservative M. P., Amery, showed much better judgment than Koestler by studiedly avoiding in his pronouncements, any criticism of the Labor Government. If an attitude similar to that of Koestler would have been adopted in the trade union field, the I.C.F.T.U. could not have been created. As in the labor movement, the organization of intellectuals for the defense of democracy cannot be successful unless it is understood that democratic socialism is a powerful influence among the best intellectuals of Europe and Asia and that, therefore, everything should be done to secure cooperation of all democratic forces in spite of all ideological differences. I was rather astonished to find that Irving seemed to like Koestler's discourse on socialism. I spoke with quite a number of delegates and found that they didn't like it at all.

"Instead of appointing on the first and second days of the Congress a resolution Committee which would have been able to work seriously on any draft resolutions, proposals and suggestions made by the delegates, a draft manifesto and draft resolution were submitted to a plenary meeting which had to decide on them within a few hours. That meeting appointed some committees who had exactly one hour's time to amend the resolutions. Of course, no serious work of re-writing and completing the resolutions could be done under such circumstances. You will notice that the manifesto treats the question of cultural freedom principally from the point of view of the journalist and less from that of the scholar and the artists. At least this is my opinion. A draft appeal to the intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain, which was submitted by Skeggs, evoked an immediate sharp criticism on the part of the Polish and Russian delegates. The committee on which they were represented, amended it. However, later on not the amended text which was adopted by the Congress but the original draft was released to the press, thus creating additional resentment.

"Yergin was not in a happy mood when he left. A public meeting had been arranged for him and Schyler where they read their papers in full. However, they did not like the way they were treated insofar as speaking time at the Congress meetings was concerned and Max made remarks to the effect that now the Communists will say they had been jim-crowed since they had to present their case in a special meeting. They also resented the fact that the permanent committee elected by the Congress does not contain any representative of the colored race. It would, of course, have been difficult to appoint one of them to the committee since the representation of the United States was limited on purpose so as not to create the impression of American domination. However, the right of cooptation granted by the Congress to the permanent committee should be used to introduce as soon as possible in the committee intellectuals from India, Japan and other non-white areas.

"Some of the papers read at the Congress were excellent, for instance those of Prof. Muller (Schiller's man) and Arthur Schlesinger to name only a few. As far as the future work of the movement initiated by the Congress is concerned, certain things should be taken into account to make possible the full use of existing possibilities which are quite favorable. 1) Representatives of Asia and possibly Africa should be drawn into the work of the committee. 2) All due respect for literary fame, the organs of the new movement should not become a platform for the peculiar ambitions of certain individuals whatever their gifts and talents. 3) While among the intellectuals it will probably be impossible to avoid discussion of so-called ideological problems, the purpose of such discussions should not be the struggle of rival ideologies, but the finding out of the points and areas where advocates of different ideologies may meet for cooperation in the defense of democracy against totalitarianism. 4) Establishment of contacts with other movements engaged in the struggle against totalitarianism, especially in the labor movement. 5) Better organization of the work of future congresses and conferences.

"The Congress undoubtedly reflected the progress made during the last year as far as the attitude of European intellectuals is concerned. There is no trace of neutralistic attitudes in the resolutions of the Congress. The same cannot be said of all the speeches. However, no openly neutralistic speech was made at the Congress. The only paper advocating a neutralist attitude was withdrawn by its author, the Austrian physicist, Thirring, when he heard of the Russian attack on Southern Korea. I wouldn't say that people like Rousset and especially Silone are quite clear about the present world situation, particularly as far as military defense against Russia is concerned, however, they wisely refrained from any openly neutralistic statements.

SECRET

"On the whole, it can be said of the Congress that all is well that ends well. The criticism made above is not intended to contradict this general favorable impression."

2. I find on reading and rereading this criticism, that it is, in general, sound and sensible. I should like to request that particular attention be paid to the latter part of the memorandum in which five recommendations are made with regard to the future work of the movement initiated by the Berlin Congress. I should also like to draw particular attention to the reaction to the behavior of David Rousset and Ignazio Silone. This is one further indication for justification that Rousset must be constantly and thoroughly watched with a critical eye.

2

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SP/Kelley 12 July 50

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. SP/NV		14 July	19 July	TBV	
2.					
3. Thompson		7/17	7/20	SPK/LT	
4.					
5.					
6. Glaser					
7.					
8.					
9. SP/NV					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

10 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Thompson and Glaser

FROM: Charles Olmstead O.

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Congress

1. I wish to refer to Mr. Glaser's informal memorandum with regard to the mishandling of the American Negro, Max Yergin, at the Berlin Intellectual Congress.

2. When I informed Schiller that I wished to discuss this matter with him he proceeded to read to me a letter which he had just received from Berlin giving a rather full report on the Berlin Congress and which contained a great deal of information. Among the items reported on therein was the incident regarding Max Yergin. I explained to Schiller that it was a most difficult task to control the group of assorted Europeans who attended the Berlin Congress and sufficient time was not given, therefore, to United States delegates, but that Yergin's excellent speech, which had been cut off the radio at the microphone, was being widely used in press, radio, book and pamphlet form.

3. Schiller accepted this explanation, but in closing our discussion of this subject, wise-cracked that our boys in Berlin did not include Yergin on any social doings and closed his remarks with the statement that "even intellectuals like Burnham don't like to sit down and eat with Negroes." I chided him briefly and there the matter was closed.

SECRET

SECRET

[redacted]

Informal memo.

Can you communicate this information to C.C. - as soon as practicable? (I will do so, if you prefer.)

A cable from Jim Burnham, states that Max Yergin was not satisfied with the way he was handled at the Cultural Congress in Berlin.

His complaints:

His speech - described as "excellent" - was cut off at the microphone.

He did not, apparently, receive the kind of attention he thought was due him.

He is expected to make an adverse report to Schiller.

Burnham would like Offie to appease Schiller by assuring him that the staff of the Congress had their hands full trying to control the bunch of assorted Europeans there, and could not give sufficient time and attention to US delegates. And that they intend to use Yergin's excellent material in press, radio, book and pamphlet form, giving it wide distribution. In comparison to this, Burnham considers the actual promulgation at the sessions of the Congress a minor matter.

[redacted]

SECRET

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:
BENEDETTO CROCE
JOHN DEWEY
KARL JASPERS
JACQUES MARITAIN
BERTRAND RUSSELL

GENERAL SECRETARY:
Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:
Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 29, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Thanks for the testimonial. I am enclosing a copy of our financial statement to date. You will note that our expenses, exclusive of the books, were $917.05. However, this does not include our June telephone bill for phone calls and cables. I am skipping town tomorrow before the laurel wreath turns into a brickbat.

The files and left-over stationery are being stored at Freedom House pending our decision on future activities. Mr. Beichman has the check book and will pay the telephone bill and refund the balance when Jim returns.

My summer address will be 115 East Chester Street, Long Beach, L.I. Jim may want to contact me. I hope somebody will send me copies of the resolutions passed at the Congress. Will you please remind Jim for me?

Sincerely,

Pearl Kluger

Pearl Kluger

CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

Statement

As of June 30, 1950

Income					
Melvin J. Lasky				$200.00	
James Burnham	5/25	$500.00			
	6/ 8	500.00			
	6/12	218.36			
		4.82			
	6/20	300.00		1,523.18	
Total Income					$1,723.18
Expenses					
Clipping Service				30.60	
Printing - stationery				42.33	
Rent - Freedom House				150.00	
Salary				400.00	
Books - University Pl. Bookshop		263.53			
(Parcel Post) " " "		128.00	391.53		
- Pearl Kluger		4.82			
(Parcel Post "		14.70	19.52	411.05	
Multigraphing and Mimeographing				40.80	
Telephone - June 1 bill				20.75	
Telegrams and Cables (paid in Cash)					
To Newspapers for press conference			38.00		
To Lasky			2.87	40.87	
Military Permits (Muller, Stone, Schlesinger)				11.00	
Postage (incl. mailing photographs, clippings, etc. to Berlin)				51.35	
Western Union - Messenger Service				4.35	
Arnold Beichman - Expenses				100.00	
Miscellaneous - Phone calls, taxis, fare, office supplies, etc.				25.00	
***Total Expenses** as of June 30, 1950					1,328.10
Balance in Bank					$ 395.08

*This does not include the June telephone bill

TO: MR. GLASER

FROM: MR. MILLARD

28 June 1950

"I talked with Allen ~~Douglas~~ dulles who stated that he knew nothing of this man's executive ability, that he does not know of any position he has held where that might have been exerted and added that he might be wrong on this factor. Stated further that he knew him as a very brilliant writer. With reference to his political idealism, ~~Douglas~~ Dulles stated that he believed he was a Socialist and a little to the left; however, this factor was temperate with the statement that with regard to Fascist or Communist, he was definitely anti-Nazi and he believed that he was anti-Communist. He continued by saying that he was a man of high character and that he personally liked him but that he would not consider him for an executive secretary's position. With further reference to the last point, he mentioned that he was basing this on the fact that he did not know of any executive position that the individual had held."

File ~~[illegible]~~ copy with m[illegible] cable referring to the 'Berlin 3019' [illegible] 30500

(WASH 8258 - Out 59168)

PDQUICK

VE 3

Taken verbatim - [illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE III

NO.

DATE 28 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Mr Ellis ~~2706~~	2415			WR	The cable substance: attached was sub-
2.					mitted 27 June by your office
3.					Mr. Schreyer, combining your cable with one
4.					prepared by EE III [illegible] the attached
5.					cable to persuade
6.					and [illegible] [illegible] subject
7.					to your agreement.
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

1. JONATHAN S. GEARING HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED COORDINATE DETAILS OF PDQUICK. NO FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY YOUR STATION.

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:
Benedetto Croce
John Dewey
Karl Jaspers
Jacques Maritain
Bertrand Russell

GENERAL SECRETARY:
Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:
Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 27, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Walter Mehring finally got off last night. There was no room on Saturday's plane for which he stood by, but he was scheduled to take a Sunday morning plane. Due to some mechanical difficulty, that plane did not leave until last night. The American Express Co. was unofficially informed that as a result of President Truman's intervention all other planes were chartered for the stranded students. I even spoke to Mr. Buttles about getting Mr. Mehring on one of the chartered planes if the scheduled flight did not get off last night. If Mehring, too, did not turn up our counter-Grosz campaign would have looked bad. I therefore felt that he mustleave even if it meant being present at only part of the Congress.

I received a letter from George Grosz which I requested when I spoke to Mrs. Grosz:

"Here is my statement:
I regret not to be able to attend the Congress for Cultural Freedom. My reasons are entirely personal. I am delighted with your efforts to mobilize Art and scientists of the world for Freedom and Peace."

I cabled the text of the statement, signed with his name, to Berlin; and airmailed the letter and envelope to them.

Unfortunately Middleton of the Times is on vacation from Berlin. We seem to be getting better coverage in the Herald-Tribune, which has a by-line correspondent on the job.

Adolph Berle, as Chairman of the Liberal Party, cabled greetings to the Congress.

If anything goes wrong with the fruit crop in Berlin or anyplace in Europe for that matter, they'll probably blame it on Muller's fruit flies.

Sincerely

Pearl Kluger
Pearl Kluger

X D9118

x

CONFIDENTIAL

HICOG,

FRANKFORT.

PEPCO.

Since material upcoming from Berlin Cultural Congress likely have great propaganda value in combatting SOV peace campaign and other SOV efforts in psychological field, DEPT desires arrangements be made for complete photo and literary coverage with view obtaining manuscript and pictorial files basic to PUB in major languages not only in GER but other countries.

Suggest Dalcher now on TDY from DEPT with ISD, OPA, visit Berlin during Congress to study Congress output for PUB possibilities in US. To coordinate with ECA on PUB in other EUR countries, Lasky, Josselson or other qualified officer SHLD confer with Waldemar Nielsen Hotel Talleyrand, Paris after WED June 21.

CODE ROOM: Repeat HICOG, BERLIN, PEPCO, as_______.

GER:GAI:[illegible] 6/19/50 P - MacKnight

CONFIDENTIAL

June 21, 1950

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I am enclosing herewith two letters received from American Express and copy of answer as per our telephone conversations.

R. M. Woods
Rose Mary Woods

FOREIGN SERVICE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

June 14, 1950

American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York, New York

ATTENTION: Mr. C. J. Gilmore

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Thank you for your letter of June 13, 1950. This will authorise you to arrange for the side trip to Stockholm as requested by Mr. Burnham and charge same to our account.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Watts
Vice President

rw

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

TRAVEL DEPARTMENT
B. E. WHITE
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER
W. F. FOX
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND
PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER
GERARD J. GILMORE
ASSISTANT PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER

AMERICAN EXPRESS

TRAVELERS CHEQUES
MONEY ORDERS FOREIGN REMITTANCES
TRAVEL AND FOREIGN SHIPPING

65 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 6, N. Y
CABLE ADDRESS: TOURAMEX

June 13, 1950

Mr. Philip H. Watts, Vice President
Foreign Service Educational Foundation
1906 ~~Florida Avenue~~, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Mr. Watts:

Re: Congress for Cultural Freedom

In connection with the travel to the Congress for Cultural Freedom which you are sponsoring for Mr. and Mrs. James Burnham, the servicing office has advised us that Mr. Burnham has requested a side trip to Stockholm.

Will you kindly advise us whether this additional transportation is for the account of the Foreign Service Educational Foundation or for the account of the passengers.

Sincerely yours,

G. J. Gilmore
Ass't. Passenger Traffic Manager

GJG:BP:ret

6/16/50 [illegible] 9376) [illegible] letter [illegible] charge it [illegible] trip [illegible] Stockholm [illegible]

FOREIGN SERVICE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION
1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

June 21, 1950

Mr. G. J. Gilmore
Assistant Passenger
Traffic Manager
American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York 6, New York

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Re: CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM
Mr. Elliot Cohen, Editor
Commentary Magazine

Your letter of June 16th with regard to the above matter was on my desk upon my return to the city this morning.

Mr. Cohen is entitled to transportation and if you have not supplied him with any other transportation then we have no objection to your reimbursing Mrs. Cohen for Mr. Cohen's ticket on the S. S. Queen Elizabeth.

Sincerely yours,

Philip H. Watts
Vice President

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY

TRAVEL DEPARTMENT
R. E. WHITE
VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER
W. F. FOX
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT AND
PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER
GERARD J. GILMORE
ASSISTANT PASSENGER TRAFFIC MANAGER

AMERICAN EXPRESS
TRAVELERS CHEQUES
MONEY ORDERS - FOREIGN REMITTANCES
TRAVEL AND FOREIGN SHIPPING

65 BROADWAY,
NEW YORK 6, N.Y.
CABLE ADDRESS: TOURAMEX

June 16, 1950

S P E C I A L D E L I V E R Y

Mr. Martin K. Williams
Foreign Service Educational Foundation
1906 Florida Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Mr. Williams:

Re: CONGRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM
Mr. Elliot Cohen, Editor
Commentary Magazine

On May 22 the Foreign Service Educational Foundation authorized American Express to provide round trip transportation between New York City and Berlin to Mr. Cohen. The delegate advised us that air transportation would be unacceptable and that, because of commitments in New York, the only steamship sailing to which he could agree was the S. S. QUEEN ELIZABETH due to leave New York after last midnight.

Space on eastbound sailings at this season is at a premium, and on this particular one has been sold out for a considerable time, being actually under ticket. We exerted our best efforts in behalf of Mr. Cohen, but were unable to come up with the desired space. Mr. Cohen, on the recommendation of the line, we understand, attended the departure of the ship in the event that a passenger would be unable to sail and space be made available at the last moment.

An odd berth did become available in this manner and it was allotted to Mr. Cohen. The passenger borrowed from accomodating friends and made payment directly to the line. Will you authorize us to reimburse Mr. Cohen for funds he expended for his eastbound passage?

It would be of great assistance if we could have your reply on Monday.

Sincerely yours,

G J Gilmore

G. J. Gilmore
Asst. Passenger Traffic Manager

please turn over

P. S. Since dictating the foregoing letter, I have been advised by Miss Kluger of the local New York office of the Congress for Cultural Freedom that it is Mr. Cohen's wish that reimbursement be made to Mrs. Cohen. I presume this arrangement will be agreeable to you should you find the reimbursement in order.

Congress for Cultural Freedom

Congrès pour la liberté de la culture ★ *Kongress für Kulturelle Freiheit*

Berlin, Germany—June 26-30, 1950

International Committee:

BENEDETTO CROCE
JOHN DEWEY
KARL JASPERS
JACQUES MARITAIN
BERTRAND RUSSELL

GENERAL SECRETARY:

Melvin J. Lasky
Hotel am Steinplatz,
Berlin-Charlottenberg,
Germany

PUBLIC RELATIONS:

Arnold Beichman
20 West 40th St., New York City
CHickering 4-3060
LOngacre 5-3344

June 23, 1950

Colonel Louis Glaser
3051 Idaho Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Glaser:

Report from Berlin: The story is Groszly exaggerated. The Stalinists have not even mentioned the Congress for the last two weeks. Berlin is seething over the Congress; the city is plastered with it.

Report from New York: Harold Lavine of Newsweek, at our instigation, spoke to Grosz who said that he is an artist, that he received numerous communications from the Eastern section of Germany about the Congress; that he is an artist and that he can't be bothered getting involved in so much correspondence. Newsweek will carry the story next week. Will Lissner of the Times is also interested.

Kempton did not carry the story; he was sidetracked by the distressing tale of the young girl Progressive Partyite who discovered the PP is not exactly democratic (her branch refused to hear Rogge on Tito). But the fruit flies made Lyons' column (enclosed). Did you see yesterday's N.Y. Herald-Tribune? There was a good story on the Congress by Joseph Newman from Berlin. I have only one copy; if I can get another, I will forward it.

Walter Mehring has his military permit for Berlin; I hope that by this time he has cleared his income tax statements for the last three years with the Treasury Dept. (he is an alien), but as I haven't heard from him for the last three hours, presumably things are going well. The American Express Company is working on his ticket.

Tomorrow the last of the delegates are off. I will be around to answer any press inquiries during the week of the Congress and then will close the office. I think the delegates can do their own worrying about the rubbers they left in Berlin.

I feel just like Cinderella — who never got to the ball.

Sincerely,

Pearl Kluger
Pearl Kluger

SECRET

23 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

SUBJECT: OPC Operations in Connection with Whitsun Communist Youth Demonstration in Berlin

1. At the request of the Departments of State and Defense, we had asked the Chief of the OPC German station to obtain a statement from General Maxwell D. Taylor, U. S. Commandant in Berlin, as to the effectiveness of the subject operations.

2. The cablegram from Lawrence De Neufville, Chief of OPC German Mission, dated 22 June, stated that General Taylor had asked Mr. De Neufville to convey his appreciation in the following terms:

a. "It has been of most positive value to my headquarters to know that lines of action outlined by our propaganda authorities have been disseminated throughout the Soviet Zone by a group such as yours. The success of the OPC mission in distributing over one million pieces of propaganda material before and during the Deutschlandtreffen is an achievement upon which the organization should be congratulated.

b. "Your mission is a delicate one in that you are specifically charged with avoiding attribution of your activities to any U. S. Government source or agency. This you have evidently succeeded in doing and it has been a matter of satisfaction to me to know that various matters that it was in our interest to accomplish could be performed by OPC without disclosing American interest or activity.

c. "If judgment from Berlin is of value to your organization, let me say that OPC work has proved its value during the Deutschlandtreffen. We are relying on similar or increased help from OPC in the future."

3. The German mission has advised that the original communication from General Taylor was pouched on 22 June 1950.

LOUIS GLASER
Executive for Germany, EE III

JUN 23 4 03 PM '50

EEIII/LG/far
cc: OPC Registry (2)
EEIII Chrono
EEIII Subject ✓ PD Quink
EEIII Glaser File

SECRET

File with Project

Congress for Cultural Freedom

AP Berlin June 23

While the Communists planned their youth peace rally, the Soviet-controlled press railed at a western-sponsored International Congress for Cultural Freedom assembling in this city 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain.

A vanguard of more than 100 anti-Communist intellectuals arrived today for the five-day congress which is to open Monday. Writers, scientists and political and trade-union leaders are to attend from a score of countries.

Called "Center Of Spies"

The Communist press called the delegates "chained dogs of Wall Street," "an elite of renegades and Trotskyites," and said the congress was a "center of spies" and a "congress of warmongers."

Communists [illegible] claimed supporters of the congress were to blame for a fire which swept an East Zone Communist clubhouse yesterday.

James Burnham, American author, said the congress "must proclaim positively that the Kremlin-controlled 'partisans of peace' movement, which met at Stockholm, is a gutter fraud. It must show that there is only one way to peace, [illegible] the 'freedom road.'"

Barge Detention Denounced

Other Americans coming are David Lilienthal, former chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Tennessee Williams and Carson McCullers, playwrights; Robert Montgomery, actor, and Irving Brown, trade-union leader.

Meanwhile, the Russians accused British occupation officials of apparently trying to stoke up the cold war by "aggressive provocations" in the detention of 76 barges on canals in West Berlin.

~~[illegible] 24 June 50~~

Baltimore SUN 24 June 50

with [illegible] Project file

CON GRESS FOR CULTURAL FREEDOM

U.S. Group Set For Culture Role

By Reuters

Berlin

Eight Americans distinguished in the fields of arts, science and letters will represent the United States at the "Congress for Cultural Freedom" to be held in Berlin from June 26 to 30.

They are: David Lilienthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., author and Harvard University professor of history; Robert Montgomery, motion picture actor; Tennessee Williams, playwright; Guiseppe A. Borgese, author; James T. Farrell, novelist; and James Burnham and Sidney Hook, authors of political and philosophical works.

Delegations from Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries also will attend the Congress.

Monitor 21 June 50

File
PDQUICK

ITINERARY

June 10 to 18	Kent, Connecticut Kent 78, ring 1, 2
18 June	Leave New York
19 June	Arrive Berlin (Kongress fur Kulturelle Freiheit) Hotel am Steinplatz Berlin Charlottenburg 2 Berlin, Germany Chase National Bank Frankun am Main Taunas Anlage 11
5 July	Leave Berlin
5 July	Arrive Stockholm (Grand Hotel)
11 July	Leave Stockholm
11 July	Arrive Brussels (Hotel Metropole)
13 July	Leave Brussels
13 July	Arrive Paris (Hotel de la Tremoille) Chase National Bank 41 rue Cambon Paris
24 July	Leave Paris
24 July	Arrive Shannon ???
29 July	Leave Shannon
30 July	Arrive New York

File PDQuick

C O P Y

June 11, 1950

Dear Doctor,

Very happy news given in your call of yesterday. I found when I got here confirmation of our room at Hotel de la Tremoille, 14, rue de la Tremoille, scheduled for July 13-24. (The rue de la Tremoille is a short street off Ave. Francois 1er.) We shall expect to see you there and then.

I enclose from yesterday's H-T an item that you may not have seen. Our man seems to be doing just right so far.

I had last night a lengthy telephone call from William Phillips (the editor of Partisan Review who was in Paris last autumn and who was concerned in the plan for a French edition). When Mel Lasky was here, Phillips was ill; and Mel invited Philip Rahv (his co-editor) to go to Berlin, more or less as representing Partisan Review. Rahv later turned the invitation down. An official invitation was never given to Phillips, but he had been approached informally, I believe. Last night Phillips was concerned both with Berlin and (especially) with the French magazine setup. He understands that the original idea for a French edition of P R is out, but that there is now in process a French magazine which would have a special relation to P.R. (He made a few points, in confidence, about who is supposed to be concerned in this magazine - and I, for one, am not altogether easy in my mind on the matter.)

In any case, Phillips thinks that if a special P R connection is thought of, he probably ought to be involved a bit. Specifically, if the French magazine affair is going ahead, he would like to be in Paris; and he would also like to be in Berlin. He evidently thought that if he were officially invited to Berlin, then he could go afterwards to Paris on the magazine, and he suggested that if something were going on, I could also work on it when in Paris in July.

I bring this to the attention of you and your friends. (I told Phillips that I would see in Berlin as soon as I got there how things stood. He said that he would be ready to leave at once if he were invited.)

My own opinion tends to be: 1) Phillips should not be invited merely for Berlin, since there are enough Americans; and if there are to be more, another type is more important; 2) however, Partisan Review - that is, the American connection - should be in the French magazine setup thoroughly from the beginning; 3) if, therefore, the French magazine is now going ahead, then P R should be represented before these unreliable French characters twist matters up; 4) a combination trip of Berlin and the French magazine might justify an invitation for Phillips - I gather that if he is invited to Berlin, he will finance the Paris part of his trip; 5) it may, however, be that I, as a member of P R's Advisory Board, can sufficiently represent P R at this stage, if it be in order for it to be represented.

Well, I bring this to your attention, and through you to whomever else's relevant. You might see that a comment on the matter reaches me next week in Berlin. My own hesitation in giving a definite opinion on it comes from the fact that I have not heard for many months anything about the French magazine prospect and plan.

Our friend whom Dawson saw in New York seems worth pursuing at least a step or two farther. I have more or less arranged to get together with him in Paris. He apparently has one quite precise idea that, in the not too much I know about it now, sounds useful and possible.

We were delighted that Katherine and John were here.

We shall see you.

/s/ Jim

14-0000

National Pre[illegible]
Washington

JEB 16 June

Present at conference in office of Asst. Secretary of State McKnight at conference today:

Messrs: McKnight
Grundahl
Kalorek
Buttles
Huddle
Neilson
Glaser

I have a complete, practically verbatim record of the meeting, but am setting down an extract of what took place.

Mr. McKnight stated that the meeting had been called to discuss ways and means of taking advantage of the Cultural Congress in Berlin by widespread dissemination of the product of the Congress, speeches, declarations, etc. Why would it not be a good idea to have Buttles communicate with Lasky and have latter send the material to Paris for publication in France, as well as here.

Mr. Neilson (ECA) said that speaking for ECA, they have a liberal view as to spending ECA funds and are anxious to cooperate with State, subject to limitations which are relevant to the present case, which are (a) expenditure to be approved on a project basis (b) a finger to be kept on the progress of expenditure (c) within certain totals (d) keep away from the flamboyant and spectacular. (For instance, no large gobs of ECA money to send US symphony orchestras touring through Europe.) Said Mr. Neilson, the Cultural Congress would fall within the zone of probable acceptability and should be a cooperative enterprise with State, to be cleared with ECA financial and legal advisers, but do not anticipate difficulty because the Cultural Congress is clearly related to the approved ECA policy of countering the Soviet peace offensive.

Mr. Buttles suggested that the best thing to do with product of Congress was to get local people to publish it; we furnish translations, paper, ink, etc.

The above suggestion led to one by Neilson that a Dissemination Committee might be formed, backed with our money. Buttles added that in addition to a more profound type job, there might be one for the unwashed public with

SECRET

illustrations - and extracts of speeches.

Mr. McKnight concurred, thought we needed to work out the distribution problem by use of a committeewhich would take charge of publication and distribution - in many languages. Buttles added that we should use Germans and German facilities to see that manuscripts and photos are made available.

(At this point I suggested to Buttles that there would be a question of sponsorship of material.)

McKnight and Buttles agreed that Lasky should be contacted and put in a position of discussing the matter with Neilson who is returning to Paris tonight,

Neilson added he would like to get together with Cody and other State people in Paris.

At McKnight's suggestion, Buttles said he would communicate with Lasky and ask him to come to Paris to talk about the matter with Neilson.

Following are actual quotes:

Neilson: "I don't know a great deal about this Cultural Congress, is it apt to produce a major offensive against the USSR and against the peace offensive?"

McKnight: "Yes, I think so. They are a very important bunch of people."

Kelorek: "They are big names. Very high calibre, very impressive; their discussions could be dynamite in putting over telling ideas."

Neilson then pointed out that ECA was going to be in the business of using very important organizations of all kinds in Europe (gave some Italian references) but thought that because of the temporary character of ECA such a thing as develmopment of the Cultural Congress should be turned over to State or CIA to handle and continue. (Somewhere previously I had asked Buttles, in order to make a point, whether the Congress was going to be self continuing - Bruce said he thought so.) Neilson said we should develop a full head of steam on the proposition and then should not drop out, should be continued by State through Lasky, or by CIA. (Actually was a plea for CIA to take notice of the Congress and take it over.)

McKnight then asked me if CIA was interested in the proposition as a whole. I replied it seemed very interesting. He then said if a conference was arranged in Paris would we like to have a CIA representative there, I answered I thought we might like xx to have someone. I then asked Buttles if he was sure Lasky would go to Paris - Buttles said he would try to arrange to have either Lasky or Josselson (which was the reply I hoped for.) He said they were both State department people, both familiar with the Congress.

In effect, that was the end of the conference. McKnight agains said that CIA should certainly be cut in on the proceedings from now on because of their future interest in the Congress.

Neilson's name: WALDEMAR NEILSON

Paris address: HOTEL TALLEYRAND

Time of meeting: NEILSON REQUESTS THAT IT TAKE PLACE AFTER WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK.

I suggest that a cable be sent to Mike explaining exactly what is in the wind (info to Larry.) Personally I would decide to send either Lasky AND Mike, or Mike, or Lasky and Larry, or Larry alone. Th y wought to be advised at once. That ECA is willing to provide funds for production of a million copies of the speeches of the Congress and other publicity. Neilson said that labor committees and other cooperative groups might be used for dissemination. However, the greatest caution must be exercised to see that a committee on publications, or words to that effect, is appointed during the sessions of the Congress, and in my opinion it should be an unwitting group, except for one member; it should NOT have more than one US representative. It MIGHT be entirely German. Again it looks as though Lasky might have to be the secretary of such a group. I think all they have to do is start a quick 'fund raising campaign' for publications - and won't they be surprised at the

National Press Club
Washington

speed with which French, Italian, British and US organizations respond with lots of money for the purpose! Buttles and I had a quiet talk after the conference this afternoon and he is entirely in sympathy with my point of view, anxious to cooperate and not entirely sure that Lasky is the right man to go single handed to Paris. This guy Neilson is a peach. Sharp, keen, responsive and a worker - sticks out all over him.

I feel like a sheep killing dog not to stay on the job and see this through, but I've only got one son and I hope he'll only be married once. Please let me know if you need me; I will be at Hotel Fensgate, Bay State Road, Boston.

L. G.

Also — I think we should see that Burnham — or some other delegate — or several — touch on the Peace Offensive, exposing it as a swindle — which would endear the Congress all the more to State and ECA — and is well worthwhile in itself,

Tom

File PDQUICK

Memo of telephone conversation with Jim Burnham in New York

10 a.m. Thursday morning 15 June, 1950.

a. Contact with Burnham. In reply to my suggestion that I stop in New York Sat. morning to see him, discuss Congress affairs and deliver a pistol, Burnham replied that he was leaving this afternoon for his camp in Connecticut, would not return until Saturday night, was flying on Sunday morning. He suggested that there was little necessity for additional discussion of the Congress, that if any papers or articles (the pistol) were to be delivered to him, they could be sent by mail or otherwise to his NY address, care of Mrs. Claude Burnham, 3 E 69 St., telephone Rhinelander 47890; the address is a safe one, he says, with a trusted doorman on duty and a maid in the residence. (Not safe from our point of view - but presumably nothing classified is to be transmitted.) Discussed this with Smith who says he will arrange to get pistol to Burnham.

b. Between now and Sat. night, Burnham will be at his camp in Connecticut, telephone: Kent 78, Ring 1 - 2 .

c. Matter of extra expense to be allowed Pearl Kluger for gather signatures for cablegram to Congress, and for certain other incidentals connected with travel of delegates, Burnham's estimate this would not amount to more than $100. I authorized him to spend up to $150 for this purpose.

d. Matter of closing N.Y. office. I authorized continuation after July 1st only in form of one week's part time employment of Kluger, couple of hours a day and use of telephone.

e. Matter of permanent continuation of Congress office (presumably in Berlin); I said this should be discussed in Berlin, that we would expect a cablegram of recommendation before first of July, would immediately respond with a decision, possibly as to project amendment calling for funds for support of continuing office. (Impossible, I think, to anticipate decisions now as they would depend on success of Congress in attracting world publicity, furnishing base for continuing propaganda and arousing communist opposition.)

L. G.

COPY

Berlin-Charlottenburg, 12 June 1950

Dear Jim,

Thanks for letter of the 6th. Good to know that you and Marcia are due here so nice and early. Four more shoulders on which to unload the awful burden of this hard world.

What's this about not accepting the brilliant Aron-Koestler-Burnham Memo? That is now our working gospel. The International Committee lives on? No, no. It's been killed, it's dead. The five philosophers reign. The alphabetical order has come into new glory. Under separate cover you will receive the latest news from A to Z. New Correspondence paper is being printed. The program of the Congress will be the revised printed booklet which you already have.

As for the names, pretty kettle of fish you chaps fished together. We extended invitations. A few came up with affirmatives. Ayer from England, etc. Also--Jules Romains. Now that he's coming, Koestler -- via telephone yesterday -- says, oh, oh. Well, why in the world was he put on the list when he's so wishy-washy? You can't have him without letting him speak. And he's tentatively scheduled for about 10 minutes on the opening Monday program. Also, by the way, Koestler informed he won't be able to turn up even for a day before the Congress. I am writing today to ask him to plan a short opening address to round off the somewhat too ceremonial opening program with a political-keynoting speech. You might write him too, if it won't be overdoing it.

Also under separate cover, some papers that we have been sending out.

See you soon.

Yours,

MELVIN J. LASKY

Inc.

from Hotel
in Paris

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Louis Glaser

NO.

DATE 12 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. MR. BAKER					PD Quick File
2.					
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FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

SECRET

13 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, EE III

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction for Kenneth H. Hambley

1. Accompanying the approval of subject letter of instruction, it was requested by AIFC that I prepare a memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Richards covering arrangements for the travel of Hambley's wife.

2. On 31 May I saw Mr. Richards of Confidential Funds Division and explained the situation to him. Mr. Richards gave the following opinion:

> Mrs. Hambley may travel to the Cultural Congress, at the invitation of the Congress, in her own right, drawing money from the travel fund for the purpose of such travel without consideration of Hambley's status vis-a-vis CIA. This on the theory that whether or not Mrs. Hambley is a delegate to the Congress, her travel may be considered necessary because of services she will be expected to render, and also because her presence will protect her husband's cover. The Cultural Congress is ostensibly financially independent. It would, therefore, make any such arrangements without consideration of CIA rules regarding the travel of employees and agents.

LOUIS GLASER

EIII/LG/fdr

cc: EIII (2)

Noted
CDJ 13 June 50

SECRET

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: E III

NO.

DATE 7 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE					
2. W.E.					
3. ADPC		8 June	8 June	CDH	To Ch. EE (Lindsay)
4. Ch. EE		8 June			ADPC approves the last sentence of par 1 of the attached Memo of instr. on the understanding that it is understood by Hambley and all concerned that this action is not to be considered as establishing a precedent and that it is done solely because of the operational usefulness of the individual (Mrs H) over
5.					
6.					
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11.					
12.					
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14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

in this operation.
ADPC also requests
that Mr. Glaser
prepare a memo of his
Conversation with
Mr. Richards Covering
this arrangement
in which Richards
is understood to have
stated that there was
no objection to this
from the point of
view of CFD

SECRET

7 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kenneth H. Hambley

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 19 June 1950 to Berlin, Germany, reporting upon your arrival there to the Chief of VLKiva Mission through arrangements of which you have been advised orally. En route to Berlin you are authorized to stop over in Paris if you deem such a step advisable in the furtherance of your mission. You will leave Berlin, Germany, on or about 29 June 1950 and return to the home station. En route to the home station you are authorized to stop over in Stockholm, Brussels and Paris for such amounts of time as may subsequently be approved by the home office upon your recommendation. In your visits to these European cities carefully refrain from establishing or indicating any official contact with representatives of this agency or other U. S. officials. You will be furnished travel facilities to Berlin and from Berlin to U. S., in advance, but you will be responsible for procuring all of your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations in cities which you visit en route. Authorization for this travel also extends to your wife, who has been briefed as to her operations in Berlin and also will accompany you as a matter of cover.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a free-lance writer and lecturer visiting Berlin as a delegate to the Cultural Congress. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material with you while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. You will not attract attention to yourself either by acts uncharacteristic of your cover or by the absence of actions consistent with your cover.

3. Duties and Responsibilities

a. Operational

You have been thoroughly briefed on Project PBQUICK, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with this project as fall within the instructions you receive

SECRET

from the Chief, VLKiva Mission or his authorized representative. These operational activities will be in addition to your cover responsibility as a delegate to the Cultural Congress.

b. **Security**

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W. Ragsdale
DAVID W. RAGSDALE

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

NO. 5-25-784

DATE 7 June

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. EE-III	2204	JUN 12 1950			
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15.					D. Zusick

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

JUN 9 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT : Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

1. Referring to your communication of 29 May, with enclosures, we are retaining the brochure and reports concerning lectures at the Berlin House of Soviet Culture.

2. This material has value for our work, but its value is somewhat vitiated by being more than two months late.

3. In reply to your further question we are interested in receiving such schedules of Soviet-sponsored lecture series, and summaries of principal lectures as you are able to supply conveniently.

4. It would be desirable to receive schedules of lectures and other cultural events as far in advance of the projected dates as possible.

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

EIII/CTC/mc
cc: CSO
OPC Log (2)
EIII Chrono
EIII File

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

5-44980

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	AD DPC-"K"	CAH	31 May
2	EE 31 May	MG.	3,
3	E III		
4	EE-III		
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	ADSO		
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: 2 - For info

3 - For app. action

[illegible] 5 June 50

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAY 29 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

1. Attached are reports and a brochure concerning lectures at the Berlin House of Soviet Culture.

2. May we ask you to inform us if this material is useful to you and if you are interested in receiving any other material of the sort that we may obtain.

ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-25432

Encl: Two

1. A Brochure Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture
2. Reports Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

SECRET

MAY 29 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

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ROBERT A. SCHOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

SO DB-25432

Encl: Two

1. A Brochure Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture
2. Reports Concerning Lectures at Berlin House of Culture

Bibliothek

(30 000 Bände, der größte Teil in deutscher Sprache)

Öffnungszeiten: täglich von 12.00 bis 20.00 Uhr (außer mittwochs), sonntags von 16.00 bis 20.00 Uhr.

Die Bücher können im Lesesaal eingesehen bzw. für die Dauer von 10 Tagen entliehen werden.

Dem Leser stehen zur Verfügung:

Werke des Marxismus-Leninismus, Werke über die politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Entwicklung der Sowjetunion (Standardwerk: Große Sowjetische Enzyklopädie in 64 Bänden) und Werke der fortschrittlichen Schriftsteller der ganzen Welt.

Es liegen aus: 100 sowjetische und 90 deutsche Zeitschriften. Entsprechende Zeitschriften- und Buchkataloge ermöglichen den Zugang zu den wichtigsten und aktuellsten Fragen auf jedem Gebiete.

Ausstellungen

Öffnungszeiten: täglich von 12.00 bis 19.00 Uhr (außer mittwochs), sonntags von 16.00 bis 19.00 Uhr.

Die Sowjetarmee — das Bollwerk des Friedens und der Sicherheit in der ganzen Welt

Lenin-Ausstellung

Stalin-Ausstellung

Fünfjahrplan
(Diagramme und Bildberichte)

Die Geschichte der KPdSU (B)

Das Kinderbuch

Reproduktionen der Tretjakow-Galerie

RUSSISCHE SPRACHKURSE werden ständig durchgeführt, Neuanmeldungen für Anfängerkurs, der im März beginnt, Zimmer 229.

Zum Besuch unserer Veranstaltungen wollen Sie folgendes beachten:

Für Vorträge, Musik- und Literaturabende werden in der Organisationsabteilung unseres Hauses (Zimmer 15, Tel. 42 50 51, App. 157 und 250) Eintrittskarten kostenlos ausgegeben. Wegen der starken Nachfrage empfiehlt es sich, die Kartenbestellungen rechtzeitig vorzunehmen. Betriebe werden bei Sammelbestellungen bevorzugt.

Die Kinoveranstaltungen um 19.00 Uhr sind für die berufstätige Bevölkerung reserviert. Kinder unter 14 Jahren haben zu diesen Vorstellungen keinen Zutritt. Für Kinder können in Vereinbarung mit den Schulen dienstags und donnerstags in der Zeit von 10.00 bis 14.00 Uhr Sonderveranstaltungen eingelegt werden.

Es wird gebeten, die Plätze rechtzeitig einzunehmen, da nach Beginn der Veranstaltung die Karten ihre Gültigkeit verlieren und die freien Plätze von Besuchern ohne Karten benutzt werden.

Fahrverbindung: U- u. S-Bahn Friedrichstraße, Straßenbahnen 1 u. 46, Omnibus 9.

Druckerei 36

SECRET DB-25432

HAUS DER KULTUR
DER SOWJETUNION
BERLIN C 2, UNTER DEN LINDEN, AM FESTUNGSGRABEN 1

Veranstaltungen

VOM 15. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

15. Mittwoch — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**

FESTVERANSTALTUNG: „Die Wahlen in der SU — ein Fest des Sowjetvolkes". Mitwirkende: die Solistenvereinigung des Berl. Rundfunks unter Leitung von Nationalpreisträger Helmut Koch, Robert Trösch und das Ballett: „Das verlorene Tuch".

16. Donnerstag — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Wilhelm Koenen: „Die Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschlands im Tageskampf". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

12.00 Uhr, Eichensaal

VORTRAG: Oberstleutnant Simonenkow: „Was bringen die neuen Preissenkungen dem Sowjetvolk?" Anschließend Diskussion.

17. Freitag — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Heinz Abraham: „Die ideologischen Grundlagen der bolschewistischen Partei" (W. I. Lenins Werk „Was tun?"). Anschließend Diskussion und Dokumentarfilme über die Wahlen in der SU.

18 Uhr, Eichensaal

VORTRAG: A. Primerow: „Der Sport in der SU". Anschließend Sportfilmprogramm.

18. Sonnabend — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**

Festlicher Abend anläßlich des Tages der Jugend: „Die Jugend der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik — eine Jugend mit einer großen Zukunft". Es spricht: Paul Verner. Mitwirkende: Robert Trösch und Tanz- und Chorgruppen der Jugend.

20. Montag — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**

VORTRAG: Oberstltn. Naliwaikow „W. M. Molotow — ein hervorragender Staatsmann der SU".

SECRET

21. **Dienstag** — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**
VORLESUNG: Major Plotnikow: „Die Partei der Bolschewiki in der Periode des Überganges zur friedlichen Arbeit an der Wiederherstellung der Volkswirtschaft". Anschließend Diskussion und Film: „Stürmischer Lebensabend".

19.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal
VORTRAG: Stefan Heymann: „Die nächsten Perspektiven des kulturellen Lebens im demokratischen Deutschland". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

24. **Freitag** — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**
VORTRAG: Hanne Wolf: „Der Block der Kommunisten und Parteilosen — Ausdruck der Sowjetdemokratie". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.
BUCHDISKUSSION: N. D. Schtscherbow u. Hans Siebert über das Werk: „Der Weg ins Leben" von A. S. Makarenko.

25. **Sonnabend** — **19.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**
Mussorgskij-Klavier-Abend. Es spielt und spricht: Günter Hunold.

26. **Sonntag** — **19.00 Uhr, Theater**
LITERATUR-ABEND: „Gorki — Kämpfer für den Humanismus — Kämpfer gegen die Weltreaktion". Es spricht: Achim Wolter. Es rezitieren namhafte Künstler der Berliner Bühnen. Es spielt: Willi Niggeling.

27. **Montag** — **12.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**
VORTRAG: Hermann Matern: „Unser Kampf um die Festigung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

28. **Dienstag** — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**
VORLESUNG: Major Plotnikow: „Die Partei der Bolschewiki im Kampf für die sozialistische Industrialisierung des Landes". Anschließend Diskussion und Films „Donezbecken" und „Ural".

18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal
VORTRAG: Siegbert Kahn: „Das labouristische England — Anhängsel des amerikanischen Imperialismus". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

29. **Mittwoch** — **19.00 Uhr, Theater**
VORTRAG: Arnold Zweig: „Die Aufgabe des Schriftstellers im Kampf der Nationalen Front um die Einheit und Unabhängigkeit der deutschen Nation". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

30. **Donnerstag** — **18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal**
VORTRAG: Hermann Axen: „Was ist die amerikanische Lebensweise?" Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

18.00 Uhr, Theater
VORTRAG: Kurt Heiß: „Die Wahlen in der SU — Ausdruck der Sowjetdemokratie".

31. **Freitag** — **18.00 Uhr, Theater**
VORTRAG: Prof. Gerhart Eisler: „Der Kampf der Sowjetdiplomatie um den Frieden". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

18.00 Uhr, Marmorsaal
VORTRAG: Dozent Glaschkin: „Die sowjetische Staatsordnung". Anschließend Diskussion und Film.

Theaterveranstaltungen

VOM 20. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

Lustspiel

„INSEL DES FRIEDENS"

von I. Petrow, deutsch von Georgia Tanewa
Regie: Eduard Matzick

Premiere am Montag, 20. März, um 19.00 Uhr im Theater. Weitere Vorstellungen finden am 22., 23., 24. und 27. März jeweils um 19.00 Uhr sowie am 25. um 20.00 Uhr im Theater statt. Eintrittspreise von DM 1,— bis DM 3,—.
Karten an der Theaterkasse in der Zeit von 11 bis 19 Uhr erhältlich oder Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

Filmveranstaltungen

VOM 17. MÄRZ BIS 31. MÄRZ 1950

Kinosaal

17.—23. März	„Die Csardasfürstin"
24.—26. März	„Kunst in der Sowjetunion"
27. u. 28. März	„Unter fremden Menschen"
30. u. 31. März	„Meine Universitäten"

Täglich 17.00 und 19.30 Uhr, freitags und sonnabends nur 17.00 Uhr.
Sonntags 14.30, 17.00 und 19.30 Uhr.
Karten erhältlich im Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

Kinderveranstaltungen im Theater:

19. März	„Der Zauberfisch" und „Der erste Unterricht"	11.00 u. 14.00 Uhr
26. März	„Die Kinder des Kapitän Grant" „Gesetz der großen Liebe"	11.00 u. 14.00 Uhr

Die Veranstaltungen um 11.00 Uhr sind nur für die Kinder aus den Westsektoren Berlins. Die Karten werden durch die Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft ausgegeben.
Karten für die 14.00-Uhr-Vorstellung kostenlos: Haus der Kultur der Sowjetunion, Zimmer 5, Telefon 42 50 51, Apparat 175.

"Cuno" 14.3.50. DO-20932

Bericht Nr.12.

Die Veranstaltungen im Haus der Kultur der S.U. zeigen eine aufsteigende Linie. Den Gästen wird ein immer vielseitigeres Programm dargeboten. Immer mehr Besucher, davon viel Stammgäste, stellen sich ein. Damit steigt auch die Wirkung, der Einfluß im Sinne der sowjetischen Gastgeber bei deutschen breiten Volksmassen.

Anläßlich des dreijährigen Bestehens des Hauses gab die Geschäftsführung auf großen dekorativen Wandtafeln bekannt, daß 1947 105 Vorträge stattfanden; 1948 waren es 197 und 1949 schon 328 geworden. Gegenwärtig gibt es in einer Woche mitunter etwa zehn Vorträge, meist mit anschließendem Film, daneben zahlreiche musikalische und künstlerische Vorstellungen und die eigentlichen Filme, im Monat annähernd zehn verschiedene. Berücksichtigt man dazu noch die ständigen Ausstellungen, die stets lebhaft besucht werden, und häufige festliche Versammlungen, so kann man schätzen, daß mindestens zweitausend Menschen täglich (mit Ausnahme eines Ruhetages in jeder Woche) das Haus der Kultur betreten. Sie werden auch durch die repräsentative äußere Aufmachung und die kostenlose Betreuung beeindruckt. Solche Räume kennen manche (wohl die meisten) Besucher nur aus Film oder Bildern, und auf seidendamastbespannte Polstermöbel aus Schloß Sanssouci können sie sich sonst auch nicht setzen.

Die Vorträge kann man ihrem Inhalt nach in einige Kategorien aufteilen. Da gibt es solche, die das Grundsätzliche und Dogmatische der Parteilehre erläutern. Hierzu gehört etwa "Die marxistisch-leninistische Lehre vom Staat" oder "Klassen und Klassenkampf" oder "Materialismus oder Idealismus"; ferner Vortragsreihen über Lenins Werke oder über die Geschichte der Partei der Bolschewiki.

Andere Vorträge haben außenpolitische Fragen zum Gegenstand, z.B. ein Vortragszyklus über die Außenpolitik der UdSSR, ferner über den "Sieg der Volkskräfte in China", über den "Freiheitskampf der kolonialen Völker" oder die "Hintergründe der amerikanischen Außenpolitik".

Weitaus die meisten Vorträge befassen sich mit inneren Zuständen der UdSSR. Es ist selbstverständlich, daß alle Einrichtungen der Sowjetunion im günstigsten Lichte dargestellt werden. Der Hörer erfährt von Macht und Reichtum, Fortschritt und Rekorden der Sowjetunion und von den vorbildlichen Leistungen ihrer Einwohner. Einige charakteristische Themen lauteten: "Bodenschätze der S.U.", "Der Nachkriegs-Fünfjahrplan", die "Stachanow-

Bewegung" und "Der Plan zur Umwandlung der Natur". Auch über den "Lebensstandard der Werktätigen" wird berichtet, über den Staatshaushalt der UdSSR, über Volksbildung, Sport, Leben der Frauen und dergleichen mehr. Das Programm ist vielseitig und findet immer eine interessierte Hörergemeinschaft.

Hieran reihen sich auch deutsche Themen. Während die vorgenannten Vorträge vorwiegend von sowjetischen Offizieren oder Funktionären gehalten werden, holt man zur Behandlung der Deutschland betreffenden Fragen meist "prominente" Persönlichkeiten der S.E.D. und der ostdeutschen Regierung oder solche, die bekanntermaßen mit deren Ideen sympathisieren (z.B. Minister Rau, Prof. Gerhart Eisler, Dr. Kurt Fischer, Wilhelm Koenen, Arnold Zweig u.s.w.). Gegenwärtig steht die Politik der "nationalen Front" im Vordergrund. Soweit Musik von hervorragender Qualität geboten wird, ist sie meist auf die gleiche politische Tendenz abgestimmt. Auch den verschiedenen volksdemokratischen Ländern sind bestimmte Vorträge und Filme gewidmet.

Die Ausstellungen gehen ständig nebenher. Jetzt gibt es u.a. eine solche über sowjetische Architektur, die meisterhafte Riesenphotos der größten und schönsten modernen Bauten der UdSSR enthält, Regierungspaläste, Theater, Arbeitergroßwohnhäuser, Sanatorien, Bahn= und Hafengebäude, Parks. Eine über die sowjetische Armee steht vor der Eröffnung. Andere Ausstellungen zeigten oder zeigen Leistungen der sowjetischen Malerei, Graphik, Plakatkunst, Bücher und Kinderbücher, Bühnenbilder, Material zum Leben von Lenin, Stalin, Gorki und Puschkin, Filmwesen, 800 Jahre Moskau, Fünfjahrplan, Geschichte der kommunistischen Partei/ und Kampf um den Frieden u. dgl.

Stets gewinnt man den Eindruck, daß der Betrieb im Hause mit Hilfe reichlichen Personals sorgfältig organisiert ist.

16. März 1950. DB-25832

"Cuno"

Bericht Nr.13.

Über die "Nationale Front" des "demokratischen" Deutschlands im Tageskampf sprach Wilhelm Koenen am 16.3.50. im Haus der Kultur der S.U. Der Theaterrraum war voll; viel Polizisten als Zuhörer. Koenen, prominenter SED-Bonze, linientreuer Mann des "Volksrats", ist ein typischer Agitator und Demagoge. Er spricht mit lauter, geschulter Stimme, lebhaft und einprägsam. Dabei reiht er Phrasen und Schlagworte aneinander, ohne eigene Ideen zu entwickeln. Aber der kritik- und urteilslose Hörer erliegt leicht seinem Wortschwall. Scharf und heftig sind seine Ausfälle. Adenauer ist der "skrupellose Vertreter amerikanischer Monopolinteressen" und nebenbei ein "~~zweiter~~ Schwager zweiten Grades von Mac Cloy" und hat Westdeutschland leichtsinnigerweise mit mindestens 35 Milliarden Westmark Schulden belastet, während die "Deutsche Demokratische Republik" schuldenfrei dasteht. Elend, Verfall und Hoffnungslosigkeit herrschen in Westdeutschland. "Bei uns (d.h. im glücklichen östlichen Teil Deutschlands) geht es schrittweise voran, während es im kolonialen Deutschland (gemeint ist der Westen) sprungweise zurückgeht!", rief Koenen aus.

Der Redner forderte, daß die politische Agitation in ganz Berlin sowie in der Ostzone planmäßig verstärkt werden solle. Überall sollen Agitationstrupps geschult werden. Sie sollen z.B. in kleinen Gruppen in den Berliner S- und U-Bahnen durch laute Gespräche im Sinne der "nationalen Front" die Öffentlichkeit "aufklären". Im Ostsektor und in der Ostzone sollen sie Verständnis wecken für die (von der SED und ihren Auftraggebern) geforderte vorfristige Erfüllung des Zweijahrplanes sowie für ein neues Gesetz, das die Ablieferungspflicht der Landwirtschaft erhöht. Auch das Einsammeln von "Buntmetallen" soll durch die politische Organisation bis herunter zu den Hausobleuten gründlicher betrieben werden. Daneben soll die "Wachsamkeit" (auch ein Wort typisch moskauer Prägung) gegenüber den Lauen und Widerspenstigen verschärft werden. Zur Erläuterung, wie und wo die Gefahr von "Saboteuren" droht, wurde anschließend der Defa-Film "Der Auftrag Hoegners", der schon oft im Hause gelaufen ist, nochmals gezeigt.

Die deutsche Bevölkerung steht, wie Koenen ausführte, vor einem entscheidenden inneren Kampfabschnitt. Es gilt, die Schranken zu beseitigen, welche die "nationale Front" noch von ihrem Ziel trennen, ihre Grundsätze auf ganz Deutschland auszudehnen. In diesem Sinne soll das Pfingstreffen der deutschen Jugend zu mehr als einer Demonstration werden. Ganz Berlin soll damit gewonnen werden.

Vortr W. Koenen am 16.3.50., Blatt 2. UB - 55432

"Cuno" - Bericht Nr.13. /Fortsetzung/

Berlin ist (laut Koenen) [illegible] der Mittelpunkt nicht nur Deutschlands, sondern des Blocks der Volksdemokratien und ganz Europas! Ohne Berlin kein Friede, keine "Freiheit", keine Einheit Deutschlands. Der jetzige Zustand, daß Westberlin sich dem Herrschaftsanspruch der "nationalen Front" entzieht, muß beseitigt werden.

Etwa die zweite Hälfte des Koenenschen Vortrags beschäftigte sich mit den Vorgängen bei der Demontage in Watenstedt-Salzgitter und enthielt drastische Kommentare zu den Pressenachrichten der letzten Tage. Koenen schilderte den erfolgreichen Widerstand der deutschen Arbeiterschaft gegen die Zerstörung ihrer Arbeitsstätten, gegen aggressive Pläne der Westalliierten. Am Schluß des Vortrags meldete sich zur Diskussion nur ein Mann aus dem Publikum mit dem Vorschlag, der Belegschaft in Watenstedt-Salzgitter die Sympathie aller Versammelten telegraphisch auszusprechen. Die Resolution wurde in Abstimmung einstimmig angenommen.

"Cuno" **Bericht Nr.14.** NB-03432

" Die Sowjetarmee – das Bollwerk des Friedens und der Sicherheit in der ganzen Welt "
ist das Motto einer Ausstellung, die am 17.3.50. im Haus der Kultur der Sowjetunion eröffnet wurde.

In einer blumengeschmückten Vorhalle und drei Räumen sieht man Bilder, Landkarten mit Erläuterungen und großplakatierte Zitate. Das ganze könnte man als einen kriegsgeschichtlichen Schnellkursus der sowjetischen Armee bezeichnen. Waffen, Uniformen und dergleichen, was sonst in Heeresmuseen zu finden ist, werden hier nicht gezeigt. Auch technisch ist über den heutigen Stand der Armee nichts Neues zu entnehmen. Die Ausstellung trägt mehr ideologischen Charakter und eine bestimmte politische Tendenz. Die äußere Ausstattung ist dekorativ sehr sorgfältig und künstlerisch gemacht.

Die Bilder beginnen zeitlich mit Gemälden aus der Revolutionszeit im Oktober 1917, als die ersten Trupps bewaffneter Arbeiter sich zur "Roten Garde" zusammenschlossen. Stets stehen schon hier Lenin und Stalin Seite an Seite.

Auf mehreren Landkarten werden sodann die Feldzüge des Bürgerkrieges illustriert, in deren Verlauf die Rote Armee nacheinander die fremden Invasionstruppen sowie ihre inneren weiß=russischen Gegner besiegte. Von März bis Oktober 1019 ging es gegen die von Osten anrückenden Truppen Koltschaks, nachdem schon 1918 britische Expeditionstruppen von Murmansk aus vergeblich ins Land einzudringen versucht hatten. Bedrohlicher für die junge Sowjetmacht wurden damals (1919/20) die Vorstöße Denekins von Süden her, die jedoch Ende 1920 mit einem vollen Sieg der Roten Armee und Vertreibung der Gegner aus der Krim endeten. Auch des polnischen Angriffs erwehrte sich die Rote Armee. Schließlich gelang es ihr auch, in Kämpfen, die sich bis Oktober 1922 hinzogen, ihre Macht von Irkutsk bis Wladiwostok im Fernen Osten wiederherzustellen. Die Rolle Stalins bei der Leitung dieser Unternehmen wird besonders hervorgehoben. Eine auf einem großen Tisch montierte Kartenskizze zeigt z.B. durch Fähnchen und Daten Stalins Fahrten durch das ausgedehnte Operationsgebiet zwischen Nordrußland und Kaukasus.

Der größte Raum wird durch Bilder aus dem letzten Krieg gefüllt. Darunter ist kaum Material, das nicht schon durch Zeitschriften früher bekannt geworden wäre. Wieder zeigen große Lage= und Bewegungs=Skizzen die Zerschlagung der Hitler=Armeen in groß=

angelegten, für die Sowjetarmee siegreichen Schlachten. Man kann sich deutlich vorstellen, wie die Schlachten vor Moskau Dez. 1941, bei Stalingrad Sept.-Dez. 1942, bei Kursk und Charkow im Sommer 1943 und schließlich im Raum um Berlin sich abwickelten. Unter einem Bilde von einer sowjetischen Waffenfabrik steht: " "Die sowjetische Armee errang ihre Erfolge mit Waffen, die von sowjetischen Konstrukteuren gebaut sind." In einer Inschrift zu 10 großen strategischen Bewegungen der Armeen im Jahre 1944 heißt es: "In der so entstandenen Situation war es klar, daß die Sowjetunion auch ohne Hilfe der Verbündeten im Stande ist, ganz Deutschland zu besetzen und auch Frankreich zu befreien".

Auf diese eigentlichen Kriegsbilder folgt eine Serie unter dem Leitspruch "Befreiung der Völker". Man sieht, wie einrückende sowjetische Truppen in Prag, Budapest, Bukarest und auch im Fernen Osten von der einheimischen Bevölkerung jubelnd begrüßt worden, und gewinnt aus Bildern von der Parade im Jahre 1947 vor dem Kreml einen gewissen Eindruck von der heutigen Stärke und Einsatzbereitschaft der Armee. Bilder von besonders verdienten Militärs finden sich in allen Abteilungen.

Im Moskau und in anderen sowjetisvhen Städten gibt es auch besondere Armee-Theater, deren Aufführungen Themen von Siegen, Feldherren und Heldentaten der sowjetischen Armee verherrlichen. -

In diesem Rahmen mögen noch zwei Filme erwähnt sein, die kürzlich im Haus der Kultur der S.U. gezeigt wurden.

Der eine behandelt den 2. Teil der Stalingrad-Schlacht. Kein eigentlicher Kriegs-Dokumentarfilm, d.h. keine im Kriege an der Front gemachten Aufnahmen, sondern später mit Schauspielern und Statisten-Truppen gestellte filmische Handlung. Die Persönlichkeit des Generalissimus Stalin steht im Vordergrund der Idee. Der deutsche Beschauer erfährt, in wie sinnloser Weise der wahnsinnige Hitler Hunderttausende deutscher Soldaten in aussichtsloser Lage dahin opferte. Das Publikum nahm den Film mit Ernst und Ergriffenheit auf.

Ein anderer Film "Die von Kronstadt" heroisiert den erfolgreichen Widerstand Roter Marinetruppen im Jahre 1919 vor Leningrad im Kampf gegen weißrussische Judenitsch-Truppen. Je heftiger gekämpft und geschossen wird, desto lebhafter reagieren die zahlreichen Jugendlichen unter den Zuschauern. Der Film läuft in russischer Sprache mit deutschen Unterzeilen.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: III/RE

NO. NO.NO(See ZRPacer Manifest #153)

DATE Rec'd. 9 June 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE 3					Copy 1 and 2 of letters a/e manifest. FIELD DISPATCH PLEASE EXPEDITE
2. [illegible]					
3.					Copy 3 of 3 TO: EE III/RE
4.					
5.					File
6.					
7.					
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9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					File PD [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

SECRET

POUCH MANIFEST

TRUE NAME POUCH

5 June 1950

[illegible] POUCH No. 153

TO: Chief, VLKiva
Washington, D. C.

ATTN: Joseph F. Stribling

1. Two letters (each in trip) from the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Julia F. Boary

Received:

Date: JUN [illegible] 1950

SECRET

accompanied by invitation to Max Yergen and Prof. Spero

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Olmstead Rm 2223

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

* 7500 ([illegible]

~~* 10000 ([illegible]~~

200 ([illegible]

200 [illegible]

1000 [illegible]

* 10000 [illegible] 270

1.2 [illegible]

FROM:

BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

14-00000

SECRET

8 June 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE

SUBJECT: Status of Advanced Accounts (PDQUICK)

1. With reference to advances of money for FDQUICK, referred to in memorandum of 7 June signed by Chief, Staff III, ~~four~~ of these advances, involving participation of Mr. Carmel Offie, are itemized as follows:

$12,000 delivered to Mr. Offie on 26 April 1950 for which a receipt was obtained dated 27 April 1950 from Mr. Jay Lovestone of the Free Trade Union Conference.

$10,000 advanced to L. Glaser on 18 May for which a receipt is on file signed by Jay Lovestone dated 19 May.

$7,500 delivered to Mr. Offie about 20 May for which receipt is on file, this money delivered to National Committee For Free Europe.

2. The first two items referred to above report a duplication. This was called to Mr. Offie's attention on 26 May, again on 31 May, and again on 7 June. On these occasions, Mr. Offie stated that he was aware of the situation (that FTUC had received an extra $10,000 for PDQUICK) and that he would either have the money returned or would see that it was designated for another project. This adjustment is now in process ~~for~~ of handling.

LOUIS GLASER
EE III

EE/III/LG/fdr
cc: EIII - 3

SECRET

File
PD[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] to [illegible]
7 June — [illegible]
and [illegible] Reichmann

Dedicated to the cause of Peace Through Freedom — NOT "Peace Through Slavery" — We, as citizens both of free countries and of countries suffering Soviet tyranny,

Hereby hail the initiative of the Berlin Congress For Cultural Freedom in joining together intellectual leaders who cherish the freedom of the republics of the West, and seek the freedom of the peoples of the East;

And declare our hope that those nations which now temporarily endure Kremlin-imposed spiritual and physical bondage shall soon, by man's unquenchable love of liberty, be restored to the fellowship of free men, free thought, and free expression; [and that the cultural leaders of those nations will, after their liberation, take upon themselves the responsibility of enlightening their fellow citizens so long held in darkness.]

The Warden of St. Antony's

One bright afternoon in the fall of 1948, a big car made its way through the streets of Oxford, England, bearing a tubby little old man with a scraggly mustache, who had come to take his first look at the university. At that time few Oxonians had ever heard of 70-year-old Antonin Besse. Nor did they know that he was the mysterious, anonymous French millionaire who had just given Oxford one of the biggest gifts in its history—$6,000,000 for a new college (TIME, Jan. 31, 1949). But by last week, the whole university was buzzing with preparations for Oxford's first new college in 13 years.

To house the students of the newest college, Oxford authorities had acquired a small group of buildings once used as an Anglican convent. These they renamed St. Antony's, in honor of Benefactor Antonin Besse. Then they began laying plans for the curriculum which St. Anthony's students would follow.

Explosion in Yugoslavia. Antonin Besse had laid down only one stipulation. He wanted both Frenchmen and Englishmen to be admitted, to study in an atmosphere of Anglo-French cooperation. To create that atmosphere, Oxford picked as St. Antony's first warden just the sort of independent-minded, well-educated Englishman Besse had learned to admire during the years he had traded and trav-

Reference WASH 6049 Out 56805
and cable written 5 June WASH Out

14-00000

The Warden of St. Antony's

[illegible] afternoon in the fall of [illegible] made its way through the streets of Oxford, [illegible] bearing a [illegible] little old man with a scraggly mustache, who had come to take his first look at the university. At that time few Oxonians had ever heard of [illegible]-year-old Antonin Besse. Nor did they know that he was the mysterious, anonymous French millionaire who had just given Oxford one of the largest gifts in its history—$6,200,000 for a new college (TIME, Jan. 31, 1949). But by last week the whole university was buzzing with preparations for Oxford's first new college in 13 years.

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OXFORD'S DEAKIN
"Just six files and me."

A Fellow and tutor of history at Oxford's Wadham College, he had worked with Winston Churchill on Churchill's monumental life of Marlborough. Right after Munich, he joined the army. He was the first officer to parachute into Yugoslavia,* worked so closely with Tito that the two were once wounded by the same bomb explosion. After the war, a lieutenant colonel with a D.S.O., he returned to Wadham, also began helping Churchill with his famed war memoirs. Last week 36-year-old Bill Deakin took over as Warden of St. Antony's.

Trouble in the Drains. So far, Warden Deakin had neither staff, students nor furniture—"just six files and me." He still had a great deal of remodeling to do to get ready for Michaelmas term in October. Then, "after getting all the drains

Reference
and cable

Cut

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* Under the command of cloak-&-dagger [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] (TIME, May [illegible]).

[illegible] 22, 1950

(OVER

Miss

Metro-Goldwyn-
filmed at Sun
Van Johnson and

settled," he would have to pick a permanent committee of British and French scholars to select his students.

As Besse had suggested, a third of those 50 students will be French. Though their pattern of study will be much the same as that of other Oxonians, its emphasis will be on European history and economics. And now & then, after things get started at St. Antony's, M. Besse himself will drive up in his big car to offer his advice. "I shall welcome it," says Warden Deakin. "He's an extraordinary man . . . a genius."

Right at Home

When pretty, brown-haired Martha Lucas, 37, resigned as President of Sweet Briar College for women (TIME, Oct. 17), she caught the colonnaded Virginia campus a bit off guard. Nevertheless, the trustees set right to work hunting for a successor. Judging by their choice last week, they had apparently kept as their model Martha Lucas herself.

Walter McCardell

ANNE PANNELL
Women and the world.

The new president is pretty, brown-haired Anne Gary Pannell, 39, the mother of two sons. Southern-born (in Durham, N. C.), like her predecessor, she went to Oxford for her doctorate in history (Martha went to the University of London), eventually became academic dean of Baltimore's Goucher College for women (Martha was a dean at Radcliffe). In recent years, while global-minded Martha Lucas became a UNESCO delegate and started a Junior Year Abroad program for Sweet Briar, global-minded Anne Pannell has spent much of her time arranging international student scholarships.

Incoming President Pannell will take over her new post July 1. For the 450 girls at fashionable, forward-looking Sweet Briar, her appointment meant that everything would go right on running just smoothly and amiably as ever.

2 June 1950

American Express Company
65 Broadway
New York, N. Y.

ATTENTION: Mr. Gerard Gilmore

Dear Mr. Gilmore:

Please add the following two names to the list of authorized delegates to the Congress for Cultural Freedom:

Professor German Arciniegas (now at Columbia University) who will require transportation either from Ann Arbor, Michigan, or New York City -- whichever he selects.

Mr. George Schuyler (Editor)
270 Convent Ave.
New York, N. Y.

Sincerely yours,

FOR MR. PHILIP H. WATTS:

MARTIN K. WILLIAMS
(Louis Glaser)

1 Jun

JEE:

Re - Schlesinger.

He is a German Jew, US citizen, lives in New York, in construction business, makes trips to Germany, knows German industrialists and politicians. About 55.

Offie kept his paper - is having it copied, will send us a copy.

S. was in Germany five or six weeks ago and was commented on critically and unfavorably in HICOG cables. Offie says this is because S. is disgusted with entire State and HICOG handling of German affairs, says people are either uninformed or incompetent or vicious, meaning by vicious the group of German Jews who were disciples of the Morgenthau plan, who hate Germany and Germans. He has let his antipathy to the HICOG crowd be seen and has avoided them. Offie suggested that Kellerman and Rheinstein probably were examples of the type that S. referred to.

L. G.

Re - Yergin (and Spero)

C.O. was under some misapprehension as to the formula for drawing funds for delegates. He is now straightened out and has agreed that he will advise JL to add Yergin's name to his list and notify Am. Express. Yergin then simply draws his money from Am. Express. CO was under impression that the amount would be designated and Yergin given an order for it, or words to that effect. Spero also will be on FTUC list.

Re - paras. 4 and 5 of Brln. 2887.

Para. 4 does not require answer - though Hambley and I think they are wrong in rejecting Thompson.

I would like to send attached draft in answer to para. 5. Had to consult Hambley before I could prepare this.

Re: HJ Mueller. He will be added to NCFE list.

Re: Robt. Montgomery. He has been pressuring Hambley for more funds, wants to take assistant along. Hambley will advise him no dice. (Lasky evidently painted glowing picture to Montgomery of valuable reporting and press relations services.)

31 May 1950

MEMO: PDQUICK

Conversations with Mr. Carpenter (25 May) and with Mr. Richards (31 May

with reference to attendance at Cultural Congress of Mrs. Burnham:

Both Carpenter and Richards agree that Mrs. Burnham may travel to the Congress, at the invitation of the Congress, in her own right, drawing money from travel fund for that purpose, without consideration of Burnham's status vis-a-vis CIA. This on the theory that the travel is desirable because of services she may render to the Congress (not as a delegate necessarily) and because of the protection of Burnham's cover. The Congress, as ostensibly independent financially, would make any such arrangements without consideration of rules of CIA regarding travel of employees and agents.

L. C. Glaser

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: E II	NO. 5-44989
	DATE 29 May

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. EE		24 May	29 May	MV	[illegible] circulated the report.
2. EE III X					
3.					[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~
4.					~~[illegible]~~,
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FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

2[illegible] May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lindsay

SUBJECT : Report on May Day Counter-propaganda in the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the East Zone of Germany.

REFERENCE : Memorandum from Mr. Lindsay of 3 May, requesting special reports on successful operations for Mr. Wisner.

In compliance with your request of 3 May, I submit a report on May Day counter-propaganda in the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the East Zone of Germany.

John E. Baker

EIII/ADR/mc
cc: O C Regs (2)
EIII Chrono
EIII File

SECRET

File PDQuick

02.179

23 May 1950

To: Colonel LOUIS GLASER

Subject: Information From Mr. MELVIN LASKY Concerning the Berlin Congress

1. I attach (a) a copy of the letter received from MELVIN LASKY, (b) a list which he prepared of the expected American delegates at the Congress, (c) together with three additions to the British list.

2. LASKY evidently means the American list to be definite as of this date. However, according to my information, at least two or three of the delegates whom he lists are still uncertain; for example, SIDNEY HOOK and DAVID LILIENTHAL.

3. The idea of a strong Soviet delegation, gathered from Western Germany seems to me excellent, and capable of major exploitation as we noted yesterday. However, it does not seem to require SHUB's presence in Germany.

4. I don't know exactly what arrangements LASKY has in mind for continuing the payments necessary to maintain the New York office. One sentence in this letter suggests that he plans to make payment from Berlin. This matter ought to be clarified immediately.

5. You will note in the LASKY letter the address and telephone number of the New York office.

KBH

Copy of letter from MELVIN LASKY dated 21 May 1950, New York City

"Dear Jim,

"I have just finished with the press conference here at Freedom House. I think Beichman managed a nice turn-out — Hartrich of the Herald-Tribune, David Anderson of the Times, Henry Beckett of the Post, et.al. I won't be able to see the clippings tomorrow; doubtless much will be asked. But publicity won't hurt, and may do much much good. I have given Beichman two hundred dollars for now; another two hundred has already gone in phone calls, telegrams and the like. Spoke to Upton Sinclair again; can't come. Silone is writing the piece for the Times. Hook is doing an opening piece in the NL; with Levitas promising a nice spread. Beichman is writing letters, sending out releases. Pearl Kluger is working in the little office, hired out from George Field of Freedom House (20 West 40th Street, Tel: Chickering-4-3060). I have instructed him to consult you and refer all problems to you. I think he can do a most useful job with the press. I have done my best to keep all such expenses down, but in the end this job will be more important than the expensive presence of many of the delegates in Berlin. Do keep in touch with him until your departure.

"On the Russian matter, I think it would be an almost criminal waste of opportunities if there weren't the strongest possible Iron-Curtain delegation there on the platform in Berlin. Nicolaevsky and Shub have come up with the proposal to smoke out the professors, deans, scientists, poets now secluded in Western Germany; five or six of these worthies (Russians, Ukrainians, Asiatics) would indeed be a most appropriate bombshell. If they — Nicolaevsky to give them Russian-political-confidence, Shub to give them American-diplomatic assurances — could have a week together working out from Frankfurt and Munich ten days or so before the Congress begins, this might turn the trick. I think that's the way, and probably the only way to do it. God knows I won't be able to round them up. In any event, — although I have been reluctant to raise the issue for fear that my motives might be misinterpreted -- I think that Shub's presence in Berlin would be of immeasurable value, handling the radio and Russian angles; and he's not considered there another "American outsider". Which is important.

" On the book matter, it would be wonderful if we could go ahead with our project of book exhibitions of all works of Congress authors. I have asked Pearl Kluger -- she can be reached at the above number in Freedom House -- to go ahead with a limited amount of orders from the publishers. I trust there will be money to cover it; although some of the bills will go out to me in Berlin.

" I am leaving tonight for Westover Field. It was a big mistake not to get commercial air travel on my orders. No planes to London, none to Paris. First stop tomorrow -- Frankfurt! And there I turn around again. But then my contract calls for no breakdowns until the first of July. See you in the sanitorium at that time.

" Best regards to you and Marcia, and remember me to your children, who fascinated me.

"Yrs,

s/MELVIN J. LASKY "

USA (Revised Listing)

Name	Coming From	Address
James Burnham, author	Washington	1327 33rd St., N.W.
Irving Brown, labor man	Paris	Brussels, Belgium
Sidney Hook, philosopher	Santa Barbara	New York University Un of Calif., Santa Barbara
Elliot Cohen, editor	NYC	Commentary Magazine, NY
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.	Cambridge, Mass.	Department of History Harvard University
Robert Montgomery film & radio	NYC	NBC, 30 Rockefeller Pl. NY
S.M. Levitas, publisher	NYC	The New Leader, 7E.15th
Prof. Carl J. Friedrich	Heidelberg	Harvard University
James T. Farrell, novelist	Zurich/or Paris	...E.58th St. c/o American Express Par.
X Prof. Franz L. Neumann historian	Berlin	Columbia University
George Grosz, artist	NYC	The Cottage, Hilaire Farm, Huntington, L.I.
Prof. G.A. Borgese	Chicago	University of Chicago
George Schuyler, Negro editor	NYC	270 Convent Avenue, NYC
Tennessee Williams, playwright	Paris	Hotel Sherry Netherland in NYC; c/o American
Carson McCullers, novelist	Paris	Express Company in Paris
Boris Nicolaevsky Russian historian	NYC	417 West 120th Street NYC
David Lilienthal, public figure	Paris	c/o Hotel Bellman Rue Francois I, Paris
Prof. George S. Counts educator	NYC	Columbia University Morningside, NYC

Additions:

From England:

Peter de Mendelsohn, novelist	London	c/o The New Statesman and Nation, London
Sebastian Hafner, editor	London	The Observer, a publicat. London, England
Prof. D.W. Brogan political scientist	London	Cambridge University England

Copy of letter from Melvin J. Lasky, Tuesday a.m. (5-23-50)

"Tuesday a.m.
Westover Air Field

"Dear Jim:

"I spoke to Prof. GERMAN ARCINIEGAS last night. He is probably the best known South American literary critic - now at Columbia University (N.Y.C.). He has agreed to come - writing a paper on 'Literarian Ideals in South American Literature'. ROMWALDI of the AFL in Washington tells me he is very sound politically. ARCINIEGAS should be added to the list - giving us at least one non-North American.

"Best

/s/ MELVIN J. LASKY

"P.S.

"ARCINIEGAS is also having a little trouble with summer session committments. Could you ask BRUCE BUTTLES to have 'standard' State Dept. letter go out in ARCINIEGAS' behalf (release for about 10 days a la HOOK) to Prof. I. LEONARD, Romance Languages Dept., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor... "

23 May 1950

To: Colonel LOUIS GLASER

Subject: Information From Mr. MELVIN LASKY Concerning the Berlin Congress

1. I attach (a) a copy of the letter received from MELVIN LASKY, (b) a list which he prepared of the expected American delegates at the Congress, (c) together with three additions to the British list.

2. LASKY evidently means the American list to be definite as of this date. However, according to my information, at least two or three of the delegates whom he lists are still uncertain; for example, SIDNEY HOOK and DAVID LILIENTHAL.

3. The idea of a strong Soviet delegation, gathered from Western Germany seems to me excellent, and capable of major exploitation as we noted yesterday. However, it does not seem to require SHUB's presence in Germany.

4. I don't know exactly what arrangements LASKY has in mind for continuing the payments necessary to maintain the New York office. One sentence in this letter suggests that he plans to make payment from Berlin. This matter ought to be clarified immediately.

This has been clarified by [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

5. You will note in the LASKY letter the address and telephone number of the New York office.

KBH

Copy of letter from MELVIN LASKY dated 21 May 1950, New York City

"Dear Jim,

"I have just finished with the press conference here at Freedom House. I think Beichman managed a nice turn-out — Hartrich of the Herald-Tribune, David Anderson of the Times, Henry Beckkett of the Post, et.al. I won't be able to see the clippings tomorrow; doubtless much will be askew. But publicity won't hurt, and may do much much good. I have given Beichman two hundred dollars for now; another two hundred has already gone in phone calls, telegrams and the like. Spoke to Upton Sinclair again; can't come. Silone is writing the piece for the Times. Hook is doing an opening piece in the NL; with Levitas promising a nice spread. Beichman is writing letters, sending out releases. Pearl Kluger is working in the little office, hired out from George Field of Freedom House (20 West 40th Street, Tel: Chickering-4-3060). I have instructed him to consult you and refer all problems to you. I think he can do a most useful job with the press. I have done my best to keep all such expenses down, but in the end this job will be more important than the expensive presence of many of the delegates in Berlin. Do keep in touch with him until your departure.

"On the Russian matter, I think it would be an almost criminal waste of opportunities if there weren't the strongest possible Iron-Curtain delegation there on the platform in Berlin. Nicolaevsky and Shub have come up with the proposal to smoke out the professors, deans, scientists, poets now secluded in Western Germany; five or six of these worthies (Russians, Ukrainians, Asiatics) would indeed be a most appropriate bombshell. If they — Nicolaevsky to give them Russian-political-confidence, Shub to give them American-diplomatic assurances — could have a week together working out from Frankfurt and Munich ten days or so before the Congress begins, this might turn the trick. I think that's the way, and probably the only way to do it. God knows I won't be able to round them up. In any event, — although I have been reluctant to raise the issue for fear that my motives might be misinterpreted — I think that Shub's presence in Berlin would be of immeasurable value, handling the radio and Russian angles; and he's not considered there another "American outsider". Which is important.

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✓	Sidney Hook, philosopher	Santa Barbara	New York University Un of Calif., Santa Barbara
✓	Elliot Cohen, editor	NYC	Commentary Magazine, NY
✓	Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.	Cambridge, Mass.	Department of History Harvard University
✓	Robert Montgomery film & radio	NYC	NBC, 30 Rockefeller Pl. NY
✓	S.M. Levitas, publisher	NYC	The New Leader, 7E.15th
	Prof. Carl J. Friedrich	Heidelberg	Harvard University
	James T. Farrell, novelist	Zurich/or Paris	...E.58th St. c/o American Express Par.
	Prof. Franz L. Neumann historian	Berlin	Columbia University
	George Grosz, artist	NYC	The Cottage, Hilaire Farm, Huntington, L.I.
✓	Prof. G.A. Borgese	Chicago	University of Chicago
	George Schuyler, Negro editor	NYC	270 Convent Avenue, NYC
✓	Tennessee Williams, playwright	Paris	Hotel Sherry Netherland in NYC; c/o American Express Company in Paris
✓	Carson McCullers, novelist	Paris	
✓	Boris Nicolaevsky Russian historian	NYC	417 West 120th Street NYC
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Additions:

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✓	Sebastian Hafner, editor	London	The Observer, a publicat. London, England
	Prof. D.W. Brogan political scientist	London	Cambridge University England

14-00000

TOP SECRET

Secret

[illegible]

23 May 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Patrick J. Mc Feily

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 24 May 1950 to Frankfurt, Germany, reporting by telephone upon your arrival to the Chief of the VIKIVA Station. From Frankfurt you will proceed to Berlin in accordance with orders of Chief of Station. You will procure your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations at the cities in which you stay.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a student and tourist visiting Europe to improve your language proficiency and for summer travel. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. While in Germany you may be asked to volunteer to work on the staff of the Berlin Cultural Congress. Acceptance of such an offer by you is considered to be in keeping with your cover. Permission will be requested of Home Office for any type of duty required of you which would tend to break your student-tourist cover.

3. Duties and Responsibilities

You have been thoroughly briefed on projects PDQUICK and FJMAYBE, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with these projects as fall within the instructions you receive from the Chief VIKIVA Station. In carrying out these operational activities you will avoid drawing public attention to yourself to the maximum possible extent.

4. Security

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W. Ragsdale

DAVID W. RAGSDALE

4

TOP SECRET

COPY 1 OF 4 COPIES

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SI

DATE

TO: L9 2

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Suggest discreetly
query Jim about
[illegible] then [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

17 May 1950

Subject: Report on Distribution of Der Monat through an Exemplary Outlet

While in Berlin I acquired a copy of the report dated March 13, 1950. I do not know whether it has been made available. The information in it seems to me interesting in itself and valuable for what it suggests in terms of further activities.

KBH

13 March 1950

Report on Distribution of Der Monat through an Exemplary Outlet

1. This describes the distribution activities of a single outlet, with connections primarily but not exclusively to students in the Soviet Zone. Since December 1949 the outlet has been supplied 1115 single copies and several hundred separate articles. At first single issues were supplied in numbers of 100, but because of rapidly increasing demand was later increased to 150 copies. However, the popularity of Der Monat has spontaneously led to a broader range of possibilities and a total of at least 300 copies per issue has been requested. To provide a total of so many copies from number 8/9 to 16 inclusive will mean a further delivery of 1575 copies. A few copies of numbers 5, 6 & 7 have been delivered as well as stapled single copies of George Orwell's "Animal Farm" and other articles taken by breaking up these same issues. Distribution has been free of charge and this has been emphasized to the contacts. It has been decided, however, to permit contacts to ask a nominal East Mark price when distributing a copy to an employed person. This would help cover the travel expenses of contacts to and from Berlin.

2. Reactions to Der Monat delivery through this outlet has been overwhelmingly encouraging. Each copy is said to change hands "at least" eight or nine times and as many as twenty times is considered usual. The result is that Der Monat has become widely known among students in the Eastern Zone. It is reported that it is even read openly in the mess-halls; SED students procure it and read it, although when on their own they are said to be more secretive than the non-communist organized student. Certain articles have become widely known, particularly Orwell's "1984". An explanation of where the magazines come from is given in the following terms: they are bought for SOVZON students by the Free University. It is generally accepted in the Soviet Zone that the Free University is the source of "anti-communist student agitations" etc. Persons connected with the Free University who come in contact with East Zone students state that they are being continuously asked for copies of Der Monat, in the sense of "I've been getting it seventh hand; I'd like to get it first hand."

3. Attention was continuously drawn to the popularity of Orwell's "1984". Hence the outlet asks whether it would be possible to make-up from broken numbers single stapled copies of "1984" - recalling that this had been done for them in the case of "Animal Farm" and other articles.

4. The outlet operates through an apparatus of couriers to all universities of the Soviet Zone. Universities are supplied by as many as four and an average of three different couriers, unknown to one another. Leipzig, Halle, Jena, Greifswald, Dresden and Rostock are thus covered. There are a large number of delivery contacts at the Humboldt University. Also there are contacts to the "Landes Hochschule" in Potsdam which is designed especially for training SED functionaries, teachers, and key occupations. Couriers from other academic institutions and circles are also supplied, as well as to a number of non-academic circles of significant strategic value, as described below.

5. The following examples are cited:

a) At a recent four-zonal meeting of evangelical student-ministers from all zones fifteen copies were distributed to several SZ delegates. More could not be furnished because of lack of supplies at that time. The recepients subsequently expressed such interest that regular delivery with a large number of copies has been established. The Karl Jaspers article was considered popular in this circle, and strong curiosity was expressed regarding "1984" which was being discussed in the zone.

b) A professor of journalism at one Soviet-Zone university approached a contact for two copies, promising to make good use of them. He asked that they be supplied regularly and sent a student from Leipzig to confirm this and pick them up. Both students and professor were checked upon and the delivery made.

c) A group of liberal and social-democratic students organized in the SED cooperate in a closed working-committee is recognized by the university as an academic activity of the faculty to which these students and professor belong. Monat articles are read and discussed and then translated into non-German languages and passed on as reading matter to trusted students in other sections of the Philosophical Faculty.

d) The CDU executive in a city in Saxony receives the magazine, using it as discussion material regularly at closed educational forums for training party functionaries. Three weeks ago the article Tito contra Stalin was discussed.

e) Until recently a FDJ school for higher functionaries in Mecklenburg near the zonal border was supplied with copies of *Der Monat* which were read officially as the basis for working out counter-arguments. The connection was broken by the arrest of the courier, who was carrying *Telegraf* leaflets.

f) Twenty copies are regularly supplied for distribution to and through a Volkspolizei unit in Thuringia.

6. The outlet expresses great satisfaction with Monat distribution, considers it the ideal kind of reading for equiping oppositional students in the Soviet Zone with relatively safer and strategically suitable weapons, e.g. "ideas" and the "spirit of Europe". Der Monat is often contrasted with the Telegraf in this sense: Der Monat is not considered to exaggerate, is not the other pole, "with the truth somewhere between", but is respected and trusted for itself.

FDQUICK 15 May 1950

Notes of conference at the home of Mr. Burnham. Present: Messrs. Baker, Burnham, Lasky and Glaser.

1. Attention called to article in current issue of LIFE, mentioning the Cultural Congress in Berlin.

2. Memo from Stone states that JJ McCloy is not going to write special letter of invitation to Eleanor Roosevelt - apparently because of press release in which she stated she had changed her mind about attending. Lasky will take up with State the matter of special letters going to Roosevelt, Lilenthal and Conant, attempt persude them attend.

3. Some kind of pressure to be used to insure attendance Sidney Hook, possibly letter from Asst. Secy. of S. to Chancellor of U of C requesting leave of absence for 10 days.

4. Discussion of centralizing publicity releases from US. Lasky of opinion that Pitzele and Beichman would handle, requiring only small amount for expenses; decided to authorize this and Lasky will be given $200 to add to $200 which he already has (not having delivered same to Hook because Hook did not require it) with which he is sure he can lay proposition on.

5. Discussion of Am. Express technique of handling transportation. Agreed that interest of Foreign Service Ed. Foundation, FTUC and NY Com. should not be emphasized or revealed unless necessary.

6. Recital of steps being taken currently in Berlin.

7. List of delegates left with Burnham and Lasky in order that addresses may be filled in and returned. Will then be compared with list expected from Berlin. And final lists (up to this point) organized for delivery, through money sponsors, to Am. Express.

SECRET

A.

Publicity,

Interpreters.

Delegates

Am. Ex. techniques

Brief (current)

Letter Eleanor from FJ [illegible] — out

Pressure for Hook? U of C To Chancellor

EB — State advise that Hook [illegible] permanent; — McC has requested

Discussion of Publicity releases from US for PR — [illegible]

[illegible]

Leave

[illegible]

get 1/2 [illegible]

Hansen for travel only if questions asked

Trans

(Movies?) [illegible] by A.F.

Chin [illegible] (Lilienthal) Current

List Bill + Will Burnham and Easby for simplification

Ray M. / 2798
off: 2034

Aides Memoire for F.S.E.F. and
N.Y. Com. respectively

MEMORANDUM

1. The American Express Company will be informed that the ~~School of Advanced International Studies~~ Foreign Service Educational Foundation will sponsor and pay for the travel to Berlin and return of a number of persons, the names of whom will be furnished at a later date to the American Express Company.

2. At the same time that this notification is given to the American Express Company, the sum of ten thousand dollars will be turned over to them from which travel expense may be taken.

3. The clearing house for this business with the American Express Company will be the office of Mr. Gerard J. Gilmore, Assistant Passenger Traffic Manager of the Travel Department, 65 Broadway, New York, N. Y. When the names of the persons who are sponsored are furnished to the American Express Company, all data will be forwarded to the office of Mr. Gilmore, though the persons may be located anywhere in the world. The Company will cable instructions to their branch offices.

4. The actual furnishing of transportation will be effected as follows:

a. The American Express Company will have the name and address of the person, furnished by you.

b. The person will be instructed to present himself at a specified office of the American Express Company and identify himself.

c. He then will be given his choice of transportation by rail or air, will be given the requisite documents, will be authorized to spend up to 10% of the cost of travel, for incidental expenses.

5. The American Express Company will furnish to you a list of all persons to whom such transportation and expense money actually is provided. In the unlikely event that more money is needed than is covered by your deposit of $10,000, arrangements will be made for you to deposit additional money with the American Express Company. Any unexpended funds left in the hands of the American Express Company will be returned to you at the time a final accounting is rendered.

6. Arrangements will be made with the American Express Company, in your name, by Mr. Martin K. Williams, of Kingston, Penna.

12 Mar

[illegible] dollar check for
Transmitted by Williams to Gilmore
[illegible] will be sent direct to Gilmore by [illegible]

May Program for the Congress:

1. Printing of 4-page program, with special 4-page French and English translated supplement.

2. Cover letter to all delegates who have accepted; enclosures of program; ask what discussions most interest them; what they would be prepared to give, a formal 20-30 minute paper; or shorter comment; but there will be both semi-formal and informal discussion, so that all would have chance to participate. Mention matter of Europa-Union meeting (see von Trotha) other meetings (Civil Liberties Committees), University lectures, etc.

3. Problem of approaching "key men" to take over papers for main discussion. Also: problem of collecting as many papers for printing, if not to be delivered at Congress. Messages.

4. Check with M.J. about progress in getting art-exhibition of Berlin masters into town for June.

5. Ordering of books for (a) Taberna book-stalls, (b) special book-store show-window exhibits during Congress week, (c) special collections in British-French-American information centers. Should include original French, German, Italian, etc. editions — plus as many translations of Silone, Koestler, Burnham, et.al. as can be gotten. Get Scandinavia through Copenhagen bookstore? Italian editions through Frankfurt International (Koch GmbH.). British volumes through Libris (this time not paid via Peter Hart). French through Frohnau or Maison-de-France. To be checked with Frau Marga Schoeller. Special problem of reduced rates to facilitate sales. Include books of Orwell (also Russian ed.).

6. The ordering of photos of all relevant personalities: News and Art-style.

7. Kubicek to whip up with books and photos some special book shows for stores, windows, Taberna, etc.

8. Arrangement to have a "court photographer" at the Congress; weekly fee, plus expense-payment for film costs. Also: cartoonist for sketches.

9. Color banners with "Kongress", also French-English, for Titania, Tabernica, and Sporthalle.

10. Problem of Printed Invitations. Also cards for the Press. Cards for Taberna guests. Preparation of Berlin Guest List — Key people for Titania Invitation, and special invites to Heger-Eberlein-Scholz-Lemmer-Montijo-Hera et.al.-crowd in town.

11. Preparation of political-historical introduction to post-war Berlin. Simple, non-propagandistic, somewhat factual, possibly illustrated. (After fashion of excellent Breslau-Polish material)

12. Publishing of Congress Program booklet, Index to Sponsors, delegates. Photographs. To be finished last fortnight before Congress.

13. Purchase of heavy folder-portfolio to hold Congress materials for all delegates. Purchase of notebook, with Congress named, etc.

14. Finishing up of Placard design for Berlin and Western Germany.

15. Setting up of finance and especially Travel Buro with Travel personnel for all Congress return-trips.

16. Checking to see whether Visa or Military Entry Permits are moving easily; possibly free issuance. Intervention when difficulties arise. Mention this in letter to all delegates.

17. Check with RIAS for complete tape coverage of Congress; sections to be given to other German and foreign-language stations.

18. Approach BBC for British coverage. See Patrick Smith.

19. Preparation of page for feuilleton pages — series of photographs of key people coming to Congress, plus sketches.

20. Stenographic account of all discussions.

21. Mimeograph staff — allied with translation group — for papers, resolutions, special messages. Office space.

22. Publicity material for all literary editors in Western Germany, Austria (send through Dr. Liebl), Switzerland, Italy, France, England. Preparation of list of leading dailies, weeklies. Hiring of a Publicity man.

23. Check with Stadtrat May and Tietjen about "Fidelio" performance.

24. Check with Niklas about the Steinplatz park.

25. Complete arrangements for Steinplatz and Am Zoo Hotel rooms.

26. M.J. and the question of "Security" at the Hotels and Taberna.

27. Contract for Titania on Monday afternoon, and the Sporthalle for public meetings.

28. Arrangements for City-Congress reception on Monday evening — most preferably on the Wannsee, at the Gästehaus.

29. Arrangement for a dozen taxis or so -- hired for the week -- with "motor pool dispatcher" — each cab marked "Kongress" — cutting down use of cruising cabs (security).

30. Bus arrangements (who as guides?) for tour of city on a free morning (Monday, Thursday), or other times -- not into Soviet sector, but along border points, Brandenburger Tor, etc.

31. Collecting vague thoughts about place and character of final reception party. Congress, commandants? where (Lakeside? Pfaueninsel?)

32. Problem of Congress meals and Congress expenses for Delegates. Austrians (among others) are broke. Usual Congress custom of meals.

33. Completion of several Monat reprints for the Taberna book-stall and Congress material. Silone, Koestler, among others. Monat exhibition. Bound volumes? Order fifty more.

34. Ticket and Information Bureau -- facilitate to theater performances, concerts, restaurants, and the like.

35. Arrangements about at least two good interpreters -- one to be native in German language. Translators into French and English should be native-in-language; also checkers. Allied liaison.

36. Press Facilities arrangements: telephone, cable.

37. Check on improved Buffet at Taberna.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EAD

NO. 5-22911

DATE 26 April

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBB		26 Apr		JL	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					File
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					File: PD [illegible]
15.					[illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

25 April 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: OPC Liaison with the Department of State

PARTICIPANTS: CPP, DS-II, Chief ABB, Chief FEB, and SAD

1. Mr. Frank stated that recent cables from the OPC representative in Germany concerning the Berlin rally in May and the Congress in June had raised policy questions which required State Department coordination. He stated that as a result of these cables he had requested Mr. Harrison to discuss these policy questions with Mr. Joyce and had requested Mr. Joyce to arrange for the necessary liaison with the Office of German Affairs.

2. Mr. Harrison stated that Mr. Joyce had arranged a meeting in his office where Mr. Batirbov and Mr. Baker of OPC had discussed these problems with Mr. Kellerman and Mr. Strauss of the Office of German Affairs, together with Mr. Schwinn. As a result of this meeting, the Office of German Affairs dispatched a State Department telegram to Hicog indicating that the Department was coordinating with CIA on a program designed to combat the effectiveness of the Berlin rally in May. This telegram received a wide distribution in Washington as well as in the headquarters of Hicog in Frankfurt.

3. Mr. Frank said that although he recognized the insecurity of the Office of German Affairs as evidenced by this telegram, he felt that it was essential for OPC to maintain liaison with the Office of German Affairs on policy matters. He proposed to recommend to Mr. Joyce that either Col. Byroade or Mr. Geoffrey Lewis be designated as the liaison officer for the Office of German Affairs to deal with OPC on policy matters subject to clearance in each instance with Mr. Joyce.

4. The undersigned agreed with Mr. Frank's proposal subject to the understanding that such liaison would be exercised under the existing policy laid down by ADPC, namely: that OPC liaison with the Department of State will be conducted only by ADPC, SADO, or CPP, and that if this authority is delegated it will only be done so when the individual authorized is satisfied that it is essential and can be controlled, and subject to the further understanding that such liaison will not involve operational details of OPC plans and operations.

C. V. H.

CVH/abf

cc: SADO
CPP
DS-II
Chief, FEB ✓
Chief, ABB

SECRET

SECRET

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FROM:

CRDS

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. FB-III					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					File PD [illegible]

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

4 15 63 SECRET

SECRET

26 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS K. STRANGE, PSD/OSS

SUBJECT: Slow-Burning Fuse

1. It is requested that one crate of fifty units of slow-burning fuse be procured for OPC. This fuse is a Barium Selenium Oxide mixture, made up in a quarter-inch lead tube, with a burning time of 279 seconds per unit.

2. It is further requested that Mr. John H. Jeffries, Consultant, PDC/OPC, be authorised to purchase this fuse, for which he will be reimbursed. (The estimated cost of one crate will be $46.56.) Charges for this procurement should be made against Project SOHOUND.

3. The above-mentioned fuse is to be delivered to CRDS on 27 April 1950 by Mr. Jeffries. After sufficient testing and formulation of instructions, CRDS will turn the fuse over to Mr. John Baker, FB-III, Operations Division, OPC.

L. R. DAILEY
Acting Chief
Research and Development

APPROVED:

John E. Baker

Chief of Operations

cc: FB-III ✓
COS

LRD/dr

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL

4/27
DATE

TO: Mr. Richard Baker	
BUILDING	ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Let's discuss.

FROM: C.O.		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET

April 24, 1950

Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom, June 26-30, 1950.

Professor Sidney Hook, Head, Department of Philosophy,
New York University.

Mr. Bruce Buttles, GAI.

GER - Mr. Henry A. Byroade
S/P - Mr. Robert P. Joyce

The undersigned called upon Professor Hook at his home, 606-A Third Street, Brooklyn 15, N. Y., at 3:00 o'clock on April 22, 1950 to discuss domestic arrangements in support of the Congress, for which Professor Hook has been designated American representative. There were no other persons present.

Professor Hook opened the conversation by emphasizing the need to minimize the Government's interest in the Congress. He felt that it was essential to retain the appearance of a completely private venture. I assured him this was also the Department's view. Referring to the status of Melvin J. Lasky, secretary of the Congress in Berlin, as an employee of HICOG, Professor Hook then said he thought Mr. Lasky should be given a leave of absence in order to carry through the project in a private capacity. I promised to look into this problem, and commented that it could not be done readily without Mr. Lasky's cooperation. I also suggested that since Mr. Lasky to my knowledge was spending some of his personal funds on preparations for the Congress, it would only be fair to look for some other source of income for Mr. Lasky during such time as he might be on leave from Government service.

On continuing

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On continuing the discussion, it was clear that in working alone Professor Hook had as yet been unable to make any considerable progress on behalf of the Congress, and that there was urgent need for (a) a minimum staff to handle the program in this country and (b) a small allocation of funds to pay for telephone, stationery, publicity, etc. Until the present time, Professor Hook has been carrying the entire expense and work himself, and apparently has had to be extremely careful about such items as long distance telephone calls. For example, he felt he could afford to telephone Professor John Dewey in Florida and ask him to sponsor the Congress (which invitation Professor Dewey accepted,) but he hesitated to put out the larger funds to telephone Upton Sinclair in California. He would also like to call the Congress headquarters in Berlin, but felt that the transatlantic toll charge was quite beyond his means.

In reply to my query as to what sort of budget would be necessary, Professor Hook suggested that he would need a secretary-typist for two months and a public relations man on a part-time basis for the same period. He thought the secretary could be obtained for $250 a month and the publicity man for less than $500. In addition, $500 would be sufficient for such items as rental of typewriters, stationery, telephone calls, postage, etc. This would make a total budget of $2,000. The rental expense could be reduced, he thought, by using the offices of The New Leader, a Socialist publication of which he is one of the editors. He did not think it advisable to have a pretentious office, since obvious affluence would incite suspicion. The activity could be organised by Americans for Intellectual Freedom, of which he is the founder. This group staged the anti-Communist program in New York in March 1949 for less than $25.00.

As to the expenses of American representatives going to Berlin, Professor Hook hoped that it would not be necessary to use military transportation, since that would create the impression of Government sponsorship. He thought commercial transportation would definitely be preferable, and added that he would like to be in a position to give cash grants to the delegates of about $700, that is, the round-trip fare plus a few dollars over for incidentals. He felt it would be undesirable for too large an American representation to be sent. Probably six or seven people would be enough. This would mean a transportation budget of less than $5000.

Several times during the conversation, Professor Lasky stressed that it was not necessary to have a large sum of money. For what was needed, he said, the right people could hardly be paid; it was essential, he said, to have "dedicated personnel" who were willing if necessary to make personal sacrifices.

On the other hand, he thought it vital to have the right sort of publicity. The press arrangements should be carefully made. He hoped that someone in Washington could ask Mr. Henry Luce of Time and Life and Mr. A. H. Sulsberger of the New York Times to arrange the right sort of coverage, that is, by the right people, such as Anne O'Hare McCormick

of the

of the Times. He would like to invite Luce himself, but doubted if it would be politically desirable. At this point, I suggested inviting Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, and Professor Hook thought that might be the answer to his dilemma.

To handle the publicity Professor Hook thought he might hire Arnold Beichman (20 West 84th Street, New York), who is editor of a trade union paper in New York. Beichman handled press matters successfully for the anti-Communist demonstration last March. Professor Hook could make the first necessary arrangements himself, but would be glad to have any offer of assistance come to him through the offices of the New Leader, at 7 East 15th Street, New York 3. Telephone: SPring 7-8260.

I suggested that there was some indication that the Advertising Council might be able to find some space or other publicity assistance, and Professor Hook said he would be most grateful for that type of help. He hoped that the people concerned would approach him in the near future.

GER:GAI:BButtles:es

[illegible] Jim Henry Luce Tel. 85401

SECRET

14 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SADO

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

One of the most pressing problems in connection with the proposed Intellectual Peace Congress to be held in Berlin is the matter of providing funds for transportation of delegates. We have conceived the possibility of two or three organizations overtly financing trips for cultural and intellectual leaders from various countries. The money thus provided might be deposited with the American Express Company with instructions to honor transportation requests from persons holding bona fide invitations to the Congress endorsed by one of the sponsoring organizations.

It is expected that there will be a total of approximately 60 delegates. At this date, the following persons have been invited:

England
- Bertrand Russell, Philosopher
- Julian Huxley, Biologist
- R.H.S. Crossman, M.P. and Author
- Victor Gollancz, Publisher
- Barbara Ward, Editor

France
- André Gide, Author
- Arthur Koestler, Author
- David Rousset, Editor

Germany
- Karl Jaspers, Philosopher
- Alfred Weber, Sociologist
- Carlo Schmid, Politician
- Eugen Kogon, Editor

Italy
- Benedetto Croce, Author and Politician
- Ignazio Silone, Novelist
- Carlo Levi, Author

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United States
John Dewey, Philosopher
Reinhold Niebuhr, Theologian and Publicist
Sidney Hook, Philosopher and Writer

Also the following:

Herbert Read
Raymond Aron
Remy Roure
Hendryk Brugmans
Frode Jakobsen
David Williams
Irving Brown
Francois Bondy
Edouard Roditi
Norbert Muhlen
Alexander Mitscherlich
Dolf Sternberger
William Phillips
Franz Borkenau
Peter de Mendelssohn
David Rousset

J.E.B.

FBIII/IC/an
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FBIII Chrono
FBIII File

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:	NO.
	DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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File PP guide, Nobody has room,

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

SECRET

12 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kenneth H. Hambley

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

1. Departure and Arrival

You will proceed on or about 13 April 1950 to Frankfurt, Germany, reporting upon your arrival there to the Chief of the VLKiva Mission through arrangements of which you have been advised orally. From Frankfurt you will proceed to Berlin in accordance with further arrangements of which the Chief of VLKiva German Mission will apprise you. En route to Frankfurt you are authorized to stop over, for a period not to exceed 4 days, in Paris if you deem such a step advisable in the furtherance of your mission. You will leave Berlin, Germany, on or about 7 May 1950 and return to the home station. En route to the home station you will be authorized to stop over at such other European cities, and for such amounts of time, as may subsequently be approved by the home office upon your recommendation. You will be responsible for procuring all of your own travel facilities and hotel accommodations at the cities in which you stay.

2. Cover

Your cover is that of a free-lance writer and lecturer visiting Europe to procure material for future publications. Your general appearance and conduct at all times must be in keeping with this cover. You will not carry any classified material with you while traveling. You are not to recognize other employees of this agency unless arrangements have been made in advance or unless you can do so in full keeping with your cover. You will not attract attention to yourself either by acts uncharacteristic of your cover or by the absence of actions consistent with your cover. While in Germany you may be asked to act for a period as a special consultant to the Office of the High Commissioner. Acceptance of such an appointment by you is considered to be in keeping with your cover. Within your cover you are authorized also to accept invitations to lecture on subjects not directly related to your primary mission.

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3. Duties and Responsibilities

a. Operational

You have been thoroughly briefed on projects SGHound and PDQuick, and you will undertake such operational activities in connection with these projects as fall within the instructions you receive from the Chief of the VLKiva Mission and his authorized representative. In carrying out these operational activities, you will avoid drawing public attention to yourself to the maximum possible extent, and you will in particular avoid, for the purposes of this trip, publicly associating yourself with project PDQuick. This injunction, however, will not prevent your meeting privately with any other individuals concerned with either the overt or covert - phases of the project. You will, in addition, act as consultant to the Chief of the VLKiva Mission and his authorized representatives on such other matters as they may wish to bring to your attention.

4. Security

You are specifically charged with both physical and operational security in connection with matters which you handle and for which you are given responsibility.

David W. Ragsdale
DAVID W. RAGSDALE

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FROM: OPC Reg

NO. BNCF-30

DATE 12 April 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBB		12 Apr			1 of 3 copies
2.					FIELD DISPATCH PLEASE EXPEDITE
3.					
4.					2 of 3 copies to: SADO ~~ABB/III-Denby~~ PB II
5.					3 of 3 copies to: COP Reg
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FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

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BNCP-30

4 April 1960

SUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom

TO: Jonathan S. Gearing

1. Berlin newspapers have recently carried a dpa announcement of a Congress for Cultural Freedom to be held during the last week of June 1950. The notices in DER TAGESSPIEGEL and DER TAG of 2 April and in DIE NEUE ZEITUNG and TELEGRAF of 4 April were all similar and brief - about one inch in length. DAS BERLINER STADTBLATT (Social Democrat) of 2 April, however, carried a large (2¼"x 7"), front-page article.

2. The dpa text of the former newspapers was generally as follows:

> A Congress for Cultural Freedom will be held in Berlin during the last week of June. The Berlin Committee which is preparing the Congress consists of Ernst Reuter, Lord Mayor of Berlin, Professor Edwin Redslob, Rector of the Berlin Free University, and Dr. Otto Suhr, Director of the Berlin Hochschule fuer Politik. Melvin J. Lasky, Editor of the international review DER MONAT, will act as General Secretary to the congress.

3. The article in the Berliner Stadblatt contains the information of the dpa release and adds the following:

> It is believed that a large number of prominent writers and men of learning will attend the Congress. Among others, the following men are expected to participate: Author Ignazio SILONE (Italy), Professors Julian HUXLEY (England) and Sidney HOOK (USA), Poet Arnulf OVERLAND (Norway) and Ture NERMAN (Sweden) as well as David ROUSSET and Arthur KOESTLER.

MATTHEW T. CHRISTIE

Dist:
cc: B.O. (3)
Bingham (1)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

Staff II, [illegible]

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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1. Mr Baker	2202				File
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FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

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11 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BAKER

SUBJECT: FDQUICK and TPPIKER

1. I refer to the attached memorandum of 7 April 1950 addressed to you by Mr. Glaser.

2. I refer particularly to paragraph 4 sentence 2 of the above memorandum and to FRAN 117 paragraph 1, B.

3. My suggestion in this regard is as follows:

I suggest that we do not desire for FDQUICK a Rhino Circular to Embassies similar to the circular supporting QKIVORY, because a circular of that sort is not essential and would unnecessarily invite attention to the U. S. interest in FDQUICK.

4. A copy of the QKIVORY circular is attached for your information.

J. C. DENBY

JCD/aef

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C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR AIRGRAM
21 June 1949

TO: Certain American Diplomatic Officers

The Formation of National Committee for Free Europe, Inc., with headquarters in New York, was announced on June 1, 1949. This Committee is a private organization concerning itself with democratic leaders and scholars who are exiled from the following countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The Committee will be financed by private contributions.

The following is quoted from a statement issued by Joseph C. Grew, Chairman of the Committee in announcing its formation:

> "Our program begins with the tangible fact of the presence here of these exiles and refugees. There is an American tradition of hospitality to political refugees. The promise which we gave at Yalta remains unredeemed. More than that we have a definite self-interest in helping to keep alive, and in full vigor political leaders who share our view of life--leaders who have refused to knuckle under, men who have not hesitated to risk their lives for their democratic faith. As item No. 1 in our immediate program we propose--have in fact already begun--to find suitable occupations for these democratic exiles... We are setting out to find suitable positions for them in colleges and universities. We are proposing to ask others of them to prepare studies on topics for which they are especially equipped... At the same time we are encouraging each national group of exiles to draw together politically--all democratic elements, that is, those other than Fascists or Communists--in order to form in their temporary American haven National Committees which can stand as symbols of democratic hope for their countrymen in Eastern Europe.... We look forward to the day when there will no longer be an Iron Curtain....and these six nations which we helped liberate from the Nazi oppression will be free from the Communist oppression and once more can organize their existence in their own way. When that time comes there will be something close to social chaos and political vacuum, for the first effort of totalitarian regimes is to destroy all constructive elements which might build anything different from themselves. Looking forward to that historic and critical time we have in mind that, if meanwhile democratic leaders have been helped to keep alive and in vigor in the democratic havens to which they have been driven we can hope that, returning, they will have parts in a democratic reconstruction. Our second purpose will be to put the voices of these exiled political leaders on the air, addressed to their own peoples back in Europe, in their own languages, in the familiar tones. We shall help them also if we can to get their messages back by the printed word. . . Of course we are not going to compete with the Voice of America. We shall en-

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deavor to supplement the Voice of America, for the Voice is under restrictions by reason of its official character. It is our American habit not to leave everything to government. In the field of the contest of ideas there is much which private initiative can accomplish best. The third and final point in our immediate program is to set out at once to bring the exiled leaders into a broad contact with American life. . . Our idea is to enable these proven champions of democracy to see with their own eyes how freedom and democracy are working out in the United States . . . I have no doubt that as we go along other activities will be added to our program . . ."

Members of the Committee, as of 1 June 1949 were: Frank Altschul (Treasurer), Hamilton Fish Armstrong, A. A. Berle, Francis Biddle, Robert Woods Bliss, Hugh A. Drum, Allen W. Dulles, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mark Ethridge, James A. Farley, William Green, Joseph C. Grew (Chairman), Charles R. Hook, Arthur Bliss Lane, Henry R. Luce, Arthur W. Page, DeWitt C. Poole (Executive Secretary), Charles H. Spofford, Charles P. Taft, DeWitt Wallace, Matthew Woll.

For your information, the Department has been continually informed of the process of formation of the Committee, although the Department has no active concern with the Committee's activities, it has given its unofficial approval to the Committee's objectives. Because of the implicitly political nature of the Committee's work, there will be coordination between it and the Department. We expect that the Committee will cooperate in every way toward the accomplishment of our objectives in Eastern Europe and of the general aims of our foreign policy.

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MINUTES OF MEETING

DATE : 9 April 1950

SUBJECT : PDQUICK and TPPINER

PRESENT : Messrs. Glaser, Denby, Chester, Droller, Smith.

1. Discussion of arrangements made for departure and cover for James Burnham. Mr. Smith will handle details.

2. It was agreed that a recommendation be made to COP that two members of this committee, representing COP and CPP, respectively, be given authority to take emergency action on cables received out of normal hours of work requiring emergency handling; it being anticipated that such emergencies may arise in connection with projects TPPINER and PDQUICK over any of the weekends between the present date and 1 June.

3. FRAN 113 (IN 21895) was considered in detail and all items in paragraph 1 and 2 were approved. With reference to item F of paragraph 2, project LCNCETH FRAN 111 (IN 21715), Mr. Denby assumed the responsibility for clearing this matter with the State Department through Mr. Offie, and if a favorable response is received, a cable of concurrence will be sent to the field.

With reference to paragraph 3, it was proposed by Mr. Droller that items A and B be combined. That is, that no scare be created with reference to bubonic plague or other serious diseases but that a campaign be instituted to the effect that the water of East Berlin is seriously contaminated and is causing dysentery, that warnings be issued and published in the press sympathetically urging the populace of East Berlin, including the FDJ participants, not to drink the water without boiling it, not to drink it under any circumstances except from paper cups, not to wash clothes in such water nor to bathe or shave with it and to take every precaution to protect themselves. Then proceed with item A and doctor the soup with a strong but harmless laxative which would not only serve a purpose in itself but would tend to bear out the rumor contained in item B.

The committee was not in favor of item D unless it could be justified more logically and did not understand the [illegible] of item C. Dispatch 57-C[illegible] was examined and read with much gratification. The lists of names are being compared with lists which have been gathered here and recommendations will be sent to the field

4. FRAN 117 (IN 21944) was examined and it was decided to refer item 1A to Mr. Baker to be taken up with Mr. Wisner as a recommendation beyond the competence of this committee to handle. Item 1B was referred to Mr. Denby for analysis and report. With reference to item 1C it is not understood why interpreters of this caliber will not be available in Berlin and cable will be sent to the field. With reference to paragraph 1 D, this was referred to Mr. Froller who will discuss it with Mr. Bryan for the [illegible] of specific suggestions. In this connection, the suggestion was offered by Mr. Froller that a cash award should also be included.

L.G.

LC/nc

cc. Mr. Baker

14-00000

7 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Dawson Smith

SUBJECT : Travel arrangements concerning Kenneth P. Hambley

1. In connection with PDQUICK and TPPIKER, it is now proposed that Hambley shall leave the U.S. on or about 17 April, proceed to Berlin, remain there approximately two weeks (rendering assistance in preparations for PIKER affair, also in preparations for QUICK) and shall then leave Berlin to return to the U.S. En route, on return, he will, if indicated by the course of affairs in Berlin, make calls on prominent people in Western Europe who are to be present at the PDQUICK meeting, in order to confirm their acceptances or induce them to accept if they have not already done so. He is expected to return to the U.S. approximately between 5 and 10 May. He is scheduled to return to Berlin sometime between 5 and 15 June to help in completing arrangements for QUICK including his own participation.

2. Arrangements in prospect:

a. Hambley will attend to renewal of passport and obtaining entry permit to Germany (as author interested in details concerning publication of his book in Germany.)

If there are delays in obtaining passport or entry permit, Carpenter will expedite.

If, for any reason, entry permit becomes impracticable from Washington, Hambley will go to Paris where, by cooperation with Carmel Offie, he will apply for entry permit to Germany which will be made immediately available.

b. Hambley will go directly to Frankfurt where he will get in touch with de Neufville, and arrangements made to put him under HICOG cover as consultant to _Der Monat_. Lasky may be in Frankfurt at time - in any event Hambley will proceed to Berlin where Lasky will be his cover for contact with others in Berlin.

c. A covert travel order is being prepared which will authorize advance to Hambley of $1500. Hambley will buy his own transportation.

3. All

3. All of these matters will have to be ironed out and coordinated. Routine matters will be in hands of Miss Johnson, FBIII. She will be in contact with Carpenter and will know all details concerning travel order, advance, entry permit, and passport, so far as necessary cooperation from Carpenter's office is concerned. Arrangements should be completed, if practicable, on Monday 10 April.

Louis Glaser

LG/mo

cc: Miss Johnson

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION [illegible]
Secret
BY A[illegible]
[illegible]
15 July 58

6 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

COP

VIA:

SUBJECT: OPC Plans for Counter-Action against the Deutschlandtreffen.

1. In compliance with your request, there is submitted herewith a report on OPC covert operations, in progress or under consideration, to counter the Communist-sponsored Free German Youth rally, (Deutschlandtreffen), scheduled for 27-28-29 May in Berlin.

2. The initial objective of OPC counter-action is to so harass, hinder and frustrate the Deutschlandtreffen that it cannot be used as a weapon to oust the Allied Powers from the Western Sectors of Berlin. If a substantial degree of success is achieved in that phase, major effort could then be directed toward instigating anti-communist demonstrations in the Soviet Sector, thus turning the rally entirely to Western advantage.

3. The OPC program for this event is designed to supplement and reinforce overt activities planned by occupation authorities to achieve the same objective. All OPC operations directed against the Deutschlandtreffen either have been or will be cleared with appropriate civilian and military officials, with whom high level liaison is maintained in the field.

4. A major criterion of OPC activities is that they not be directly attributable to the U.S. government. Hence they fall into two classes:

a. Those conducted by entirely clandestine means and not attributable to any actual source, and

b. Those attributable to indigenous individuals and groups, with official U.S. instigation or support concealed.

In view of the strongly pro-Western and anti-Soviet orientation of the Berlin population generally, the second type of activity offers exceptional opportunities to inspire, guide and covertly assist actual German resistance to the rally.

5. Activities

Copy #2

5. Activities in various stages of planning or implementation by OPC include the following:

a. Propaganda:

Preparation of 750,000 anti-communist leaflets by the Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit, an indigenous German organization sponsored by OPC, to be distributed during the rally;

Staff preparation of at least two counter-rally pamphlets, to be distributed by clandestine networks into the Soviet Zone prior to the event;

Preparation by a controlled German attorney of indictments stressing illegal aspects of the rally, including the matter of parental responsibility for minors;

Instigation of letters of warning from West Berlin students to acquaintances in the Soviet Zone;

Planning for special editions of one or more West Berlin newspapers to be distributed free during the rally;

Subsidizing distribution of 150,000 extra copies of the magazine Freundschaft, organ of a West Berlin anti-communist youth group;

Consideration of publishing fake editions of Communist newspapers, containing propaganda of deception and confusion;

Preparation of a letter, addressed to Soviet Zone clergymen, asking them to use their influence to keep young people out of Berlin during the rally;

Inspiring West Berlin newspapers and the U.S.-licensed radio station, RIAS, to carry material favorable to U.S. aims before, during and after the rally.

b. Harassment and Deception:

Promotion of a rumor campaign to the effect that Communists are eager to have German young people killed and injured during the rally, to provide martyrs for the Moscow cause;

Promotion of another rumor campaign to the effect that Communists plan recruitment of rally participants for labor in Russia;

Circulation

Copy #2

Circulation of a forged order, indicating that the rally actually is a device for recruitment of German youth into the Soviet Zone People's Police;

Planting a news story to the effect that the rally came about as the result of direct orders issued by Moscow to Walther Ulbricht, German Communist leader, on the occasion of his recent visit to the Russian capital;

Faking offers to provide billeting for rally participants in ruins, unsavory hotels or other undesirable space;

Consideration of disrupting transportation and other rally plans by issuance of false orders and proclamations;

Obtaining FDJ uniforms for possible use by agents of disruption;

c. Counter-Attractions:

Sponsorship by the Kampfgruppe of a fireworks display the evening of 29 May;

Covert guidance and encouragement of West Berlin merchants to prepare attractive displays of merchandise, illustrating the relatively high standards of Western living;

Covert sponsoring of free, or low-priced motion picture shows, featuring especially interesting films;

Covert sponsoring of sports events or other mass attractions, designed for the double purpose of maintaining West Berlin morale and distracting rally participants;

Approximately three weeks after the rally, covert sponsorship of a cultural and intellectual congress in Berlin—one of its objectives being to unmask the hypocrisy of communist intellectual appeals to youth.

d. Counter-Violence:

If, and only if, high policy considerations require, covert organization, support and guidance of pro-Western indigenous street-fighting units to meet a display of force with greater force.

6. In

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Copy #2

6. In addition to the foregoing plans, further opportunities unquestionably will arise for CPC direct activities or support to indigenous German groups with plans of their own to counteract the rally.

7. CPC is reinforcing its German staff with all available qualified personnel, and is prepared to set aside such sums of confidential funds as may be required to provide effective financial support for approved activities.

John H. Baker
FDE

SECRET

Copy #2

SECRET

4 April 1950

REPORT

SUBJECT : TPPIKER

TO : John E. Baker, Chief, FEB

1. Background

a. The communist youth mass meeting planned for Berlin during the Whitsun holidays, 27, 28, and 29 May, has been and is the subject of a major propaganda offensive by the Russians and by German communists. It has followed the characteristic Soviet pattern of creating confusion and tenseness on the part of the propaganda targets achieving this objective by alternating belligerent threats with peaceful platitudes. The threats have ranged from declarations that the communist youth would drive the Western imperialists out of Berlin to outright statements that they would seize the Western Berlin government and restore the city to a unified, peaceful capital of Germany. The peaceful declarations have stated that the demonstration of 500,000 boys and girls (from all over Germany, and from other countries) will chiefly take place in Eastern Berlin and will consist of rally-marching, sports events, fireworks, and huge peace meetings. Permission was requested by the FDJ, of Oberburgermeister Reuter, to march in a body to the Olympic Stadium (in the British Sector) but Reuter briefly and emphatically refused.

b. Three groups are officially dealing with the situation.

(1) The Berlin Allied Kommandatura

(2) A committee under Oburgermeister Reuter

(3) A special HICOG committee.

These groups have coordinated their plans and accordingly reasonable precautions ~~should~~ are expected to be taken to protect vital installations in West Berlin. The police force has been augmented and provided with riot equipment.

c. It is now estimated that it is not the intention of the communists to make a serious effort to drive the Western occupying forces out of Berlin, or to seize the West city government. However, their campaign has succeeded to this extent, that it is not known whether or not they will attempt an actual putsch, or if they will adopt a policy of opportunism and probe-and-thrust at West Berlin defences with the determination to advance as far as they can; or if they will, in fact, confine themselves to meetings and demonstrations in East Berlin. The possibility exists that their demonstrations may get out of hand or go beyond the intention of the impressarios of the show. Whether or not they attempt a coup d'etat, they assuredly will press every propaganda advantage.

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d. The

d. The situation has been regarded as serious and potentially dangerous. Even as a propaganda triumph it might serve to strengthen communist drives all over Europe, especially in Germany, and if there was any manifest weakness or temporizing on the part of forces in West Berlin, the Deutschlandtreffen might serve as a springboard to huge gains.

2. Purpose of OPC plan

OPC operations against the Deutschlandtreffen are intended to oppose, harrass and attempt to turn to U.S. advantage the communist FDJ rally; also to render cooperation with other elements of resistance. To achieve this purpose, it is contemplated that a number of propaganda and psychological warfare activities will be utilized; it may also be necessary to provide specific support for resistance groups prepared to use physical violence to prevent FDJ demonstrations in West Berlin.

3. Plans

Since January, the German Mission, OPC, has been planning a counter-attack. On 31 January, a field dispatch outlined steps to be taken and this has been amplified considerably in the last two months. At the present time, plans to neutralize or defeat the psychological and physical attack of the communists, contemplate the following:

a. Clandestine propaganda, distributed throughout East Germany, in advance of the Deutschlandtreffen, intended to break down desire to participate and exposing the militaristic and totalitarian character of the affair. Included:

a pastoral letter, addressed to all clergymen in the East Zone, entreating that young people be kept out of Berlin during the FDJ rally, to prevent damage to their souls and bodies;

spreading of rumors that large masses of young Germans are to be rounded up and shipped elsewhere for forced labor, and that numbers of them will be killed (with the murders charged to the Americans) in order to create martyrs for the cause;

special editions of Berlin papers (distributed in East Germany) emphasizing the spectacle of Soviet Russia driving German youth into militarism.

b. Organized radio, press and other forms of publicity, during the Deutschlandtreffen, distributed throughout East Berlin and East Germany, featuring positive achievements of the West as contrasted to negative achievements of the East.

c. The staging of counter attractions, intended to reveal to large numbers of communist youth the better, unregimented life of

Western

Western Germany as exemplified in West Berlin. In connection with this campaign, the illumination of West Berlin shops with display of luxury merchandise, special theatrical and movie attractions, sports events, possibly an automobile show.

d. Neutralization of possible communist propaganda claims of abuse and martyrdom, by discounting claims in advance and ridiculing the purpose.

e. Preparation to support groups of street fighters organized to resist attempts on the part of the FDJ to seize or damage installations in West Berlin and to meet any demonstration of force with greater force - if high policy approves such defense operations.

f. A plan (subject of project PDQUICK) to hold, shortly after the Deutschlandtreffen, an Intellectual and Cultural Peace Congress in Berlin, bringing together a number of leaders of German, American, British, French, Russian, Czech, Italian, and other nationalities, representing high achievement and international reputation in fields of labor, philosophy, politics, literature, art, music, education, and science. The Congress, held on the borderline between free and slave Europe, will concern itself with denouncing and exposing the swindle of communist peace propaganda, will beam its message to the satellite states to the effect that only intellectual and cultural slavery is possible in the Soviet system. Arrangements will be effected for broadcasting and publicizing the meetings of the Congress and a large distribution of its deliberations throughout East Germany and satellite Europe. Arrangements also will be made for worldwide publicity and follow-up. It is expected that the Congress will be self-perpetuating and will hold further meetings.

4. Headquarters action

Following Mr. Lindsay's memorandum of 25 January and the field dispatch of 31 January, headquarters action with reference to the Deutschlandtreffen - and the Cultural Congress, as tied in - has taken the following course:

(a) A conference was held in FE-III on 7 February at which the basic idea of PDQUICK was approved by representatives of Staffs II and III, SADO, and FE-II. Based on this approval a cable of authorization was sent to field the same date.

(b) During February a committee was organized consisting of Messrs. Glaser (Chairman), Chester, Droller, and Denby, to act as an expediting and coordinating group. At this date, the committee has had two formal and a number of informal meetings. Members of the committee have also met twice with Dr. Hilger and four times with Mr. Burnham.

(c) Arrangements

(c) Arrangements were completed to send a 'task force' to the field, consisting of two senior propaganda consultants and four junior assistants. At this date one of the juniors is on duty in Berlin, three others are ready to depart this week; the two senior consultants are expected to be in Berlin during this month.

(d) Approval of initial propaganda operations, involving mailing of approximately 100,000 pieces to East Germany, was cabled.

(e) Various suggestions have been sent to the field, including recommendation that a complete documentary and photographic record be made.

(f) A dossier of information, with reference to the Deutschlandtreffen, has been collected, including record of a State Department conference (by teletype) and summary of plans approved by the Allied Kommandatura.

(g) A project has been prepared (SGHOUND) allotting $35,000 for emergency support of activities in connection with resistance to the Deutschlandtreffen.

(h) Discussions have been held, ideas formulated and support research accomplished, most of this material held in suspense awaiting reports from the field as to current and planned requirements.

Louis Glaser
FE-III

FEIII/LG/mc

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: LG —

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:
Burnham has some solid views contra Reichstag promotion. Suggest you talk over with him. How is his baseball coming?

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP. 1946

1 April May?

JEB: This idea sounded as though it might have mischief-making potentialities; I have discussed it with Shub and Droller.

The last time a group of Germans met before the Reichstag (which is 100 yards from the Soviet Sector of Berlin) was the 9th of September 1948 - the occasion on which Reuter make his ringing declaration of defiance of the Russians, and ALSO defied the Western Powers, saying: "You cannot buy us or sell us into slavery" by which he warned them not to make any deals with the Russians that would deliver Berlin to the communists. After that meeting, at which 23 were shot, one killed, the British Commandant denied the use of the Reichstag Platz for any future meetings. Gen. Bourne has changed his mind for the 1st of May, will permit a great anti-communist mass meeting (probably several hundred thousand people) which will again be addressed by Reuter. Anything can happen, because West Berlin police and West Allied troops will be on one side of the Brandenburg Thor facing East Berlin police and Russian troops on the other side. The 9th of September 1948 was historical, I have a hunch the 1st of A~~pril~~ 1950 will be also.

Would that be a good time for Reuter to lay the foundation of establishment of the Reichstag as a 'House of European Peace?' If it is, a cable along the following lines might be sent:

I, APPRECIATE YOUR OPINION OF APPROACHING REUTER WITH REFERENCE MAY FIRST REICHSTAG MEETING WITH SUGGESTION HE INCORPORATE IN HIS REMARKS DECLARATION TO FOLLOWING EFFECT:

THIS BUILDING, SYMBOL OF FAILURE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, DESTROYED BY NAZIS IN CAMPAIGN TO IMPOSE POLITICAL AND MORAL SLAVERY ON WORLD, STANDS ON PRECISE BORDER OF TWO WORLDS, ONE FREE OTHER SLAVE. WE REDEDICATE BUILDING AS HOUSE OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM, SYMBOL OF OUR PURPOSE AND PURPOSE OF ALL LIBERTY LOVING PEOPLES OF EUROPE NEVER TO LAY DOWN ARMS IN STRUGGLE AGAINST DESPOTISM. WE INVITE ALL FREE MEN AND WOMEN TO JOIN IN OUR DECLARATION THAT PEACE AND FREEDOM SHALL NEVER PERISH, WE ESPECIALLY INCLUDE THE COMMON PEOPLE OF RUSSIA AND THOSE COUNTRIES UPON WHOM THE BITTER COMMUNIST YOKE HAS BEEN imposed ~~THRUST~~, WE KNOW IF THOSE PEOPLE COULD THROW OFF THE MERCILESS, FASCIST TRYANNY OF THE POLITBURO, THEY WOULD BE THE FIRST TO JOIN US. THIS BUILDING SHALL BE RESTORED, SHALL ARISE FROM ITS ASHES AS MONUMENT TO DETERMINATION OF FREE MEN THAT THEY

NEVER SHALL SUBMIT TO CHAINS OF POLITICAL SLAVERY. AS MEETING AFTER MEETING IS HELD HERE, THE VOICE OF FREE EUROPE SHALL BE HEARD IN SLAVE EUROPE. ONE DAY THE PEOPLE OF ALL EUROPE SHALL BE UNITED IN DECENT, HAPPY LIFE PLANNED FOR THEM BY THE GREAT REVOLUTIONISTS OF HISTORY, BY HEINE, GARIBALDI, MAZZINI, VOLTAIRE, DANTON, VERA FIGNER. FREEDOM BELONGS TO ALL MEN AND CONCERNS ALL MEN, IT BELONGS TO RUSSIANS, GERMANS, FRENCHMEN, CZECHS, POLES, IT IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE.

2. obtaining complete coverage IN EAST GERMANY WILL GUARANTEE INFILTRATION INTO BORDERING SATELLITES. THESE CAN BE DEVELOPED IS OUR VIEW. ANXIOUS HAVE YOUR OPINION AND IF YOU AND REUTER THINK SOUND PROCEDURE ~~ALSO REUTERS~~.

21 March

JEB: Spent an hour and a half this morning at the home of James Burnham; present - Burnham, Denby, myself and Col. Lansdale from Chester's office.

COVER. Burnham says that the matter of his going over as attached in any way to McCloy was brought up because he wanted to have an opportunity to meet and talk with McCloy. In the meantime, McCloy came over here and Burnham saw him three times (we have one memorandum of conversation.) He added that cover has never been a serious point with him, that he has travelled a number of times in various parts of the world pursuing his profession as a writer and lecturer, furnishing his own cover. The last time he went to Germany he was attached as consultant to ISD. He is willing to go over without any cover at all, or as consultant to Der Monat, if that seems indicated. I told him I believed something like that was indicated as giving him a base of operation and rationalizing his contacts. Therefore, I shall prepare the memo. for Garland on the 'open' basis I had previously suggested but with Der Monat in mind.

TIMING. Burnham is disturbed at the prospect of going to Europe for as long as sixty days and is quite reluctant to consider a longer period. This brought up the entire matter of the Congress and its juxtaposition to the FDJ Deutschland Treffen. All of us evidenced some despair over the fact that obviously we cannot mastermind either project without further advices from the field which seem to have been suspended.

The question was raised as to whether or not the Congress actually could be held in June, considering the lateness of the present date. Burnham brought up for consideration the possibility of his going to Berlin about the first of May, or the last week in April, staying over the end of May, then returning to the United States - on the theory that the Congress might not be held until August or September. He proposed the 23rd of August (date of the Nazi-Russian pact) as an appropriate date. He then would start out again, presumably in the middle of August; in the meantime, he would establish contact with people in England, France and the US who might need pressure brought to bear upon them to attend the Congress.

If the Congress is to be held about the 20th of June, he suggests that he might go to Berlin about the middle of April, accomplish all he can in the way of advice as to the Deutschland Treffen, leave Berlin very early in May, travel through France and England back to the US, building up acceptances for the Congress, returning to Berlin on the 25th of May and staying over for the Congress.

CONSIDERATION OF REICHSTAG PROPOSAL. He does not favor the idea of proposing the Reichstag building as a symbol of European Freedom, and thinks that the other European nations would shoer away from the whole concept. He says that even to Germans the wretched building is only a symbol of the failure and futility of the Weimar Republic.

LISTS. We again went over lists of proposed delegates.

BOLESLAW WIERZBIANSKI. This gentleman has been in Washington and will be here again, Burnham thinks he has been in touch with the New York Committee. He is head of the International Federation of Free Journalists of Eastern Europe and Baltic and Balkan Countries, headquarters: 10 Stanhope Place, London W2. According to Burnham the outfit represents 1200 journalists scattered over Western Europe, the USA, Australia and South America. They are said to be publishing 170 papers of varying degrees of importance. Burnham says that the services of the organization are being offered - presumably for propaganda use - and that their first objective is to establish a New York office, for operation and liaison, and that they need $42,000. Burnham thinks someone here should explore the potential usefulness of the group and I suggested that if they had been in contact with the NY Committee they probably were being explored.

LG

SECRET

16 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: PCS

THROUGH: COP

SUBJECT: Gerard DROLLER

1. It is requested that arrangements be made with State Department for subject to depart for Berlin on or about 25 April 1950 as a WOC Consultant. This is a temporary duty assignment for thirty days plus air travel time.

2. Subject's application for Foreign Service employment is attached herewith in duplicate.

3. It would be appreciated if you would keep us advised of the progress of this action.

J.L.B.
FB3

Enc: FSS Appl. (2)

cc: OPC Reg (2)
PB-III Chrono
PB-III Subject ✓

SECRET

March 8, 1950.

REICHSTAG PROJECT

(To be broadcast over worldwide radio network in all languages in collaboration with Radio Free Europe, RIAS, the various European networks, BBC, CBS-NBC and the Voice of America).

I) Purpose

To re-assert the universal fight for freedom in simple dramatic terms which men everywhere will understand. ~~includingx~~

II) Occasion

The opening session of the Berlin cultural Freedom Congress, now scheduled for late June 1950.

III) Sponsor

The Congress. Its executive body should include spokesmen for all leading countries. Most specifically, it should include at least two outstanding Russians of world reputation and no minor ax to grind. The Russian nobel prize winning novelist Ivan~~k~~ Bunin (living in Paris, I believe), Igor Stravinsky, Serge Koussevitsky are names that suggest themselves. ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ If the Congress itself includes a larger delegation from the leading European countries, then several Russian scholars and scientists now in U.S. or in DP camps should be included. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ All delegations, from countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, should be made up entirely of men of unimpeachable moral stature and real reputation. Professional politicians, even when they're good democrats, should be restricted to the rock-bottom ~~minimum~~ minimum and must be of the moral stature of Mayor Ernst Reuter of Berlin. Petty, self-seeking politics must be kept out. Would kill the whole show.

IV) GENERAL STAGING AND PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE

The general treatment will flow from the moral and political tone of the production. The two are inseparable.

~~Nothing~~ in this show must be cute or clever. Sincerity and moral conviction ~~xx~~ must dominate the proceedings. From beginning to end, the ~~whole Cong~~ress and the ceremony at the Reichstag must be treated as an organic whole: the rededication of a historic building ~~into~~ a House of European Freedom or House of Free Europe.

Why the Reichstag?

1. It stands on the precise frontier of two worlds, one

free, the other slave. It is within a few feet of the Soviet flag on Brandenburg Gate and the warlike Soviet memorial within the British sector. It is the most dramatic spot for a visible answer to these two symbols of despotism and force that exists anywhere in the world. It is the only place to dedicate a palace of freedom which will be clearly visible to soldiers and officers of the Soviet army.

2. The Reichstag earned this rededication on September 9, 1948 when 300,000 Berliners flocked before its steps to defy the Kremlin during the grim days of the Berlin blockade.

3. It was set on fire by Hermann Goering and Josef Goebbels, who then presented the world Communist movement with undeserved martyrs and heroes in the person of Dimitrov and his co-defendants. Its rebirth as a meeting place for free men of all nations is a more than fitting historical answer to the Reichstag fire.

4. As long as the Reichstag stands in its present ruined condition it is a cancer feeding on the offended national pride of most Germans. This is particularly true because it is within sight of the strident Soviet war memorial. Even the best German democrat cannot pass this building without being mad at most of the world. In the normal course of events, the building would probably be restored for some narrow German purpose. By making it the House of European Freedom we kill ~~two~~ several birds with one stone:

a) We give normal, healthy German and Berlin pride (as distinguished from its morbid, resentful and chauvinistic manifestations), a positive outlet. This is reeducation through dramatic action instead of Sunday school moralising which registers with nobody. All Berlin will be tremendously ---and healthfully---proud of itself on this day.

b) We strike a blow for freedom everywhere.

c) We deal an effective blow to resurgent German nationalism in Western Germany and in the Soviet zone, by making both its forms seem low, provincial, stupid, and bush league compared to the Reichstag rising like phoenix out of the ashes in the cause of European freedom.

d) We give West Berlin an enormous morale boost and forcefully remind them that (i) Berlin is a great metropolis (Weltstadt) and (ii) that it remains part of the free world---in fact one of the great bastions of that free world.

B) The Stage Sets

No attempt should be made to prettify the Reichstag for the ceremony. Reconstruction will proceed later, with pennies collected from people all over the world. (A top limit should be placed on contributions to prevent men of wealth and power from contributing more than simple plain folks everywhere).

At the unveiling, there should be temporary name plaques or plaster-cast bas-reliefs of the Great Men of Freedom who will adorn the building. Perhaps their names---done in big bold strokes in the two leading alphabets of Europe (the Latin and Cyrillic)-- is enough for the opening ceremony. Two names and/or busts for each country will suffice. A great quote from each should go with it. Examples:

1. France: Voltaire (I disagree with everything you say but will defend to the death your right to say it-- words to that effect)
Danton

2. Germany: Goethe
Heine (There is a Heine quotation which Mayor Reuter (as the host of the Congress) could well use in his opening remarks. It would set the right tone for all that follows. Heine says somewhere that when the black-red-gold flag of 1848 becomes the flag of European freedom, he will gladly subscribe to it. I need not belabor the point. If the Germans can be sold on this approach, it is the most devastating answer to nationalism, to the resurgent neo-fascist groups who are now flying the black-~~white-red~~ of Imperial Germany. Heine's words offer to the Germans their only chance of return to greatness which the non-German world can ever respect. (Note that the black-red-gold is the present flag of West German Republic)--without, however, the freedom-loving European content that Heine wanted to give it.

3. Italy--- Garibaldi
Massini (?)

4. If we want to include the U.S. despite the fact that this is house of European freedom, there are two great names that will sell without causing any negative reaction anywhere.

a) Jefferson (The most effective answer to the Communist charge that we are reactionaries are his words on the revolutionary right to overthrow a bad regime. I see no reason why the dictators of the Kremlin and the NKVD should steal the revolution from the men of Lexington and Concord, Valley Forge and the Declaration of Independence. The fact that a few lost souls in this country are afraid of Jefferson's great words, is also no reason not to use them.

b) Lincoln.

5. Russia: The Decembrists. These are the men who returned to Russia from the Napoleonic wars imbued with western ideas and attempted to challenge the Tsarist autocracy with a revolutionary democratic program. They were hanged in 1825. A famous plaque showing the profiles of the five leaders has been reproduced very widely in the Soviet Union and is known to practically every Russian school child. In fact, the Russians know everything about these men, except the ideas and ideals they represented. These have been carefully suppressed or rendered false through Soviet Newspeak. For the Reichstag unveiling, I'd have this plaque reproduced--large enough to be seen across the street in the Soviet sector. It should face the Soviet side of the street and have the word "DECEMBRISTS" in the Russian language as well as English, German, French.

5. Russia (continued)

Vera Figner: A great Russian revolutionary and a militant fighter for freedom. Also a woman of extraordinary beauty and moral integrity. She was known in the Tsarist fortress prison where she spent most of her life, as the "Madonna of the Schluesselburg."

When President Garfield was assassinated, Vera Figner and her prison comrades addressed an open letter of sympathy to the American people in which they condemned this act of terrorism. They said that the use of terror against the elected representative of the people was just as immoral and wrong as absolutism's use of terror against the Russian people. They explained that they were forced--against their will--to combat despotism with force, but intended to discontinue its use as soon as a representative democratic government existed in Russia.

Vera Figner lived to be liberated by the democratic revolution of March 1917. She delivered a great speech in a Petrograd theatre on the meaning of freedom, shortly after the fall of the Tsar. Because of her age and exceptional moral prestige in Russia, the Soviet government let her die in peace. Her name stands for all the noble ideals that the Soviet dictators seek to eradicate from the Russian conscience and consciousness. Yet her name as such---robbed of its moral content--is known to most Soviet Russians. Soviet textbooks never speak badly of her---nor do they tell her great story. Here is an opportunity to restore her name to the Russians --along-side of the Decembrists. Would be difficult indeed to find a better symbol to stand together with such names as Danton, Jefferson, Garibaldi, Heine.

This is not dramatic corn; it is psychological warfare with atomic power. By restoring Vera Figner to the Russians, from the steps of the House of European Freedom in Berlin, we start the chain reaction. Whether this becomes an atomic explosion of test-tube or of operative intensity, depends on how much is done ~~on other fronts~~ to win the Russian people. But clearly here's a way of reaching them ~~within~~ (and the "them" includes high officers of the Soviet army and officials of the Soviet government as well as the rank-and-file) through a POSITIVE APPROACH to which they are acutely susceptible after over 30 years of spiritual and moral starvation.

C) ACCOMPANYING MUSIC, THEATRE, ETC

1. Music for the Congress should be of two general categories (a) a special concert by the Berlin Philharmonic, if possible with an outstanding conductor. The ideal would be Arturo Toscanini (he practically spit in Mussolini's eye). If Toscanini is not available, the next best would be Serge Koussevitsky or Igor Stravinsky. The reason is obvious. I think that of the German conductors, only Bruno Walter would be right for our broader moral purposes. To use Furtwaengler would be a mistake. If we did, we'd no longer be on the side of the angels. I think the Beethoven Ninth with its closing hymn on the brotherhood of man (Schiller's Ode to Joy) is just right. Could be preceded by the Prometheus or Egmont Overtures, both of which are perfect in political content--and are exciting music to European ears as well. This concert could be given in a hall, broadcast and then portions of the tape recording could be used again at the Reichstag. The concert should precede the Reichstag ceremony.

b) More popular stuff, including the stirring folk songs and revolutionary music which neither Communism nor Nazism have polluted (e.g. the Marseillaise, Serbian chetnik songs, Brüder zur Sonne zur Freiheit, whose Russian version was sung by generations of revolutionists and illegal words of which are still ~~songxtxdrgx~~ disseminated today among Soviet troops--I've seen an actual leaflet). These songs need not be in the least provocative or an incitement to anything--except to a deep feeling that freedom is one and indivisible. These songs can be recorded in RIAS or ~~xxxx~~ Free Europe studios well in advance of meeting, and can be piped over loudspeakers at Reichstag meeting, with the crowds joining in. This technique was successfully used with the ~~lastxxxxx~~ last of the abovementioned songs at the Reich tag rally of September 9, 1948. It is very simple and effective. Radio listeners get the impression that several hundred thousand people are singing, if the acoustics are handled right. No songs should be used to which exce tion can be taken on the ground that it is aimed against any particular existing regime. There is no reason to do so. ~~Thexoxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ The good old stuff applies by implication-- and it is an implication which the adversary ~~xxxxxx~~ cannot admit. Can only shut its ears. ~~Thexrightxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

The ~~rightxxxxx~~ right use of music at the Reichstag is essential to the success of the whole. It is a vital part of the over-all production. Its importance for broadcasting purposes can scarcely be overestimated. Gives the whole show the lift and the universal lilt that is needed.

V) THE POLITICAL LINE

1. Freedom is one an d indivisible. It concerns all men everywhere. EVERYBODY DESERVES IT. THERE ARE NO CHOSEN PEOPLES, NATIONS OR CONTINENTS. THERE IS ONLY MAN.

2. This is NOT Europe defying Russia. On the contrary, it is Europe reaching out north, south, east and west to all its children, including the Russians, and summoning them in the great crusade which must go on until all are free. ~~xxxxx~~ If the Soviet rulers want to turn their backs on Europe, that's their business. The ~~cxxxxxx~~ Freedom Congress and Mayor Reutor of Berlin will assume that the Russians want very much to be ~~x~~ part and parcel of Free Europe. This is the only approach which divides the Politburo not only from the common people, but from a decisive segment of the upper party, intellectual and army command of Russia. ~~x~~

3. ~~Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Free Europe Versus Slave Russia is the sure road to World War III. Let's stay away from this at all times

4. Free Europe, including the Russians, versus the Politburo and the Cominform, is the only way to make the Burnham thesis work---or at least give it a fighting chance. ~~Thisxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ It is at last worth a good test run from the Reichstag steps in connection with ~~xxxx~~ this project. Involves no risk, except the use of a little imagination, and its cost is very slight indeed.

VI) SECURITY AND SURPRISE

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Most of the impact will be lost if the approach leaks out ~~xxxxx~~ through press conferences or other channels. There should be no press conferences until the actual curtain goes up in Berlin. In no event should the Russians be tipped off as to the approach. Let them assume that the Congress intends to conduct a Europe versus Soviet Union Congress. ~~[illegible]~~ Let them gear their propaganda accordingly, fill their broadcasts, etc with vituperation aimed at the wrong targets That will make this show doubly effective. Therefore, the working details should be made known to as few people as possible.

The National Committee for Free Europe should assist in all technical preparations, furnish the necessary language announcers for broadcasts of the proceedings in the appropriate languages. ~~[illegible]~~ But it is essential that the contents remain secret until the show goes on the air. This is not only security in the ordinary sense; it is also a matter of delivering the blow with maximum effect.

2. Adequate/U.S. guards should be posted at all ~~[illegible]~~ broadcasting and transmitter facilities in Berlin. I am thinking particularly of the transmitter in the Brits section of Berlin, which is far too close to the Soviet line for comfort. While I am convinced that the Russians would make no attempt to ~~[illegible]~~ start a disturbance at the Reichstag (if we take normal security precautions), I think they may well attempt to sabotage some of the radio installations. I would not trust any except proper American and/or British public safety officers and guards to protect these.

Alternate transmitting and broadcasting units should be held in readiness in case of sabotage against Britz installations or elsewhere. I believe RIAS has two transmitters, but I dont know whether they are both in Brits or not. ~~[illegible]~~

3. The number of persons at the Berlin end to be informed of the project should be kept as small as possible and ~~[illegible]~~ transmitted at last possible date consistent with an effective production job. Everything which can be recorded at the New York end should be taken along on ~~[illegible]~~ unbreakable platters and put on German tape ~~[illegible]~~ at the Berlin end when operation is in final phase. This is a simple matter. ~~[illegible]~~ It ~~[illegible]~~ is done regularly with VOA transcriptions sent to Germany.

4. No one in RIAS ~~need~~ should know of this operation until final preparatory stage.

5. All policy considerations must be cleared in such fashion as to prevent any form of bureaucratic sabotage ~~[illegible]~~ or buck-passing at the Berlin end of the operation.

6. One American, thoroughly familiar with the aims, large and small, of this project, should maintain close personal liaison with Mayor Ernst Reuter of Berlin. That ~~he~~ REUTER is in agreement with the general aims and objectives formulated above---and that he is precisely the man to present these aims in terms which all Berliners, decent Germans, and the rest of the world will understand and admire, I know is the case. He is the perfect host and master of ceremonies. He speaks German, English, French, Russian, Turkish ---and believes that freedom is indivisible.

Please excuse excess wordage. ~~[illegible]~~

Boris Shub

ADDENDUM; AFTER THE CONGRESS IS OVER

On pp. 1-6 supra, I indicated the general lines that would make the Reichstag dedication as a House of European Freedom effective. This ceremony, together with the other events of the ~~xxxx~~ Berlin cultural Congress of June 1950, will be broadcast--as indicated supra--over a world-wide network. That is the dramatic spectacle where everything worth saying on the subject of freedom and the dignity of man will be compressed into a few good days. (Another event ~~might~~ during Congress week could be a special performance of Buechner's play Dantons Tod at the Hebbel Theatre. If possible get Vladimir Sokoloff from Hollywood for the Robespierre role. He did it for Max Reinhardt. I trust he's still alive). Assuming that the show is a success, that only discharges half the mission. The other half is to gradually build up the Reichstag structure, stone by stone, in line with the political and moral ideals indicated above. The Reichstag as House of European Freedom:

THE HOUSE OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM (or Free Europe).

1. The general spirit has already been indicated above. The great names and words should be presented in simple dramatic terms, designed by an artist with the talent and moral fibre to understand what this is all about. The aesthetic problem is a rather tricky one. The Reichstag is hardly the most beautiful structure in the world, yet it would be a mistake to depart from ~~xx~~ its basic style in the course of reconstruction. To reconcile these two problems--the greatness of simplicity, with the stuffiness of the existing structure, is a problem for some contemporary Michelangelo or a pint-sized version of same, to solve. It can be done.

The exterior should not contain more than a dozen or so names of the calibre indicated on pp 2-4 supra(Jefferson, Danton, Voltaire, Vera Figner, Garibaldi). But we should never lose sight of one objective without which the rest is largely wasted effort: the Russians. If we leave them out, the whole thing is a boomerang and nothing more, which will furnish grist for the anti-American, anti-western propaganda mill. It is also essential that the Russian names and busts or bas reliefs face the Russian side of the city ---where the Russians can gaze on them with wonder and admiration--and go home to think about the meaning of things in the present world.

Inside the building, there could be an international hall of fame--in the same spirit --selected by peoples throughout the world. Here we could have the great scientists, writers, philosophers, etc of Europe and perhaps the rest of the world, placed in simple niches. The busts should avoid the hollow heroic style that the Nazis and Soviets perfected. ~~It~~ They should be in exactly the opposite spirit, presenting the great as they were-- human beings with all the weaknesses and contradictions of the human race. ~~Naturally~~ The sculptors or sculptors for this job should be selected by an international board, including French, German, Russian, Italian, etc experts who are fully cognizant of the spirit of the thing

2. ~~Contribut~~ Contributions should come from people all over the world, with the emphasis on pennies not dollars. The longer it takes to complete the job--within limits of course--the better for political purposes. Enough if one segment is finished ~~xxxx~~ fairly soon, with an auditorium ~~xx~~ and/or exhibition hall. The prolonged fund-raising drive will supply Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America, BBC and lots of other agencies with a steady flow of good, positive copy with the theme

of freedom running through it all the time. Contributions coming from DPs individually, and from special fund-raising events in DP camps, would have an obvious dramatic value.

3. As the structure begins to become usable, it should feature all the type activities that make Europe and European civilization worth saving. The emphasis should be on things of lasting value rather than refrigerators, Coca Cola and such. In other words, the best in European films—whether these be French, German, Italian, etc. Some of the old Soviet films, since withdrawn from circulation because they dont fit the line, should also be shown. The best (repeat best) in American pictures could also be shown. By best is meant that which Europeans would respect for its artistic or spiritual content, not those which make the most money—they can be seen elsewhere in Berlin.

Exhibitions of painting, lectures on current trends in literature, lectures in political science, history and contemporary politics, by outstanding artists, scholars, etc., should be part of the feature of the House of European Freedom, insofar as possible. The building should house a library, and even if it isnt very large, it should include the Great Books in the leading languages, as well as current periodicals, etc to keep the intellectuals of Berlin—and any other callers—on their toes. There is no such library in Berlin today.

Symposia, Town-Hall-Meeting of the Air, etc events could also be held here from time to time. The important thing is to keep the building, its reconstruction, and the events it presents, as close to the spirit of the opening ceremonies as possible.

4. All of the above is far simpler than it sounds. Europeans love to be given such projects. And I rather suspect that Americans would take to it too, if the broadcast account of the Congress proceedings properly presents the issue to them.

E.C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Baker

FROM : JE

DATE: 2 March 1950

SUBJECT: Clearance status - Melvin J. Lasky

1. Regarding Provisional Clearance - Mr. Garland has informed me that the CIA indices check has revealed derogatory information (in part the derogatory information concerns the fact that OSS would not utilize services of subject). Mr. Garland stated Provisional Clearance would be considered only if there is a written statement concerning status of employment, ~~that is:~~ exactly how subject will be utilized, will Gov't or CIA interest be shown, with whom will he be working and will that person be under cover?

2. Regarding Operational Clearance - Mr. Garland advised that investigation of subject cannot be initiated at least for another month as subject is currently being investigated by FBI for Voice of America.

SECRET

8 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEC

THROUGH : COP, CSE

SUBJECT : Melvin J. LASKY

1. It is requested that a provisional security clearance be initiated for subject individual whom it is proposed to employ in Germany on a one-time operation involving his arranging for and participation in a public demonstration in Berlin. He will not have access to classified information.

2. LASKY is editor of Der Monat, a U. S. sponsored German-language intellectual monthly published in Berlin. When additional background information is available, it will be forwarded to your office in order that full operational security clearance may be secured.

J.E.B.
FBIII

FBIII/JEB/mo
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FBIII Chrono
Subject File /

PHS given to
SEC - 11 Feb 50
in this provisional
clearance.

SECRET

[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

[illegible]

APPLICATION No.

1. Name of examination or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement).

3. Place of employment applied for.

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Melvin J. Lesky

5. Street and number or R. D. number
US Press Center, BNP

City or post office (including postal zone), and State.
APO 742

ANNOUNCEMENT

6. Legal or voting residence (State): New York
7. Office phone No.:
Home phone:

8. Place of birth (city and State, if born outside U. S. name city and country): New York City

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 15 Jan 1920
10. Age last birthday: 30
11. ☒ Male ☐ Female

SELECTION No.

12. ☐ Married ☒ Single
13. Height without shoes 5 feet 8 inches
Weight 170 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.
Notice of: ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered register:

Notations:
App. Review:
Approved:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		
3 to 6 months?		
6 to 12 months?	X	
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $ 8000 per year.

You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☒ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year): From: 1948 To present time

Exact title of your present position: Information Specialist

Salary or earnings: Starting, $8000 per An
Present, $ per

Place of employment (city and State): Berlin, US Sector

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Dept of Army/ State Dept

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): US Information

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 10 German Editors

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alfred V. Boerner Deputy

Reason for desiring to change employment:

Description of your work: Edit and publish a monthly political and cultural magazine (In the German language which is distributed for sale in Germany and Austria and neighboring countries

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

[illegible]

18. CONTINUED

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 1947 To 1948

Place of employment (city and State): Berlin, Germany

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Newsleader Publ Assoc.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Newspaper

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

S.V. Levitas, Publisher

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving: Another offer

Exact title of your position: Foreign Correspondent

Salary or earnings Starting $ 5000 per Final $ per

Description of your work: Regular European dispatches on political situations for publication for news weekly.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 1943 To 1946

Place of employment (city and State): E/I, ETO

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: US Army

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for leaving: Honorable Discharge

Exact title of your position:

Salary or earnings Starting $ per Final $ per

Description of your work:
Enlisted man 1943-1944
Officer, Military Intelligence, Historical Division (1944-1946
Active duty, France and Germany

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 1941 To

Place of employment (city and State): New York City

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: New Leader Publ. Assoc

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Newspaper

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: 3 Asst. Editors

Name and title of immediate supervisor: S.N. Levitas

Reason for leaving: US Army

Exact title of your position: Assistant Editor

Salary or earnings Starting $2500 per Final $3000 per

Description of your work: Edited manuscrips, wrote articles for the weekly news-political magazine.

Dates of employment (Month, year) From 1940 To 1941

Place of employment (city and State): New York City

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Dept. of Interior Nat'l Pk Serv.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfg. of locks, etc.): Federal Monuments

Number and kind of employees supervised by you: --

Name and title of immediate supervisor: Geo. Palmer, Superintendent

Reason for leaving: Newspaper offer

Exact title of your position: Historian

Salary or earnings Starting $1500 per Final $2000 per

Description of your work:
Historical research into American past.
Lectures on American History.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 56) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE — [illegible] write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all important changes in duty assignment, showing dates of each assignment.

(a) First special service school attended:
OCS

Location:
Camp Lee, Virginia

Dates attended (months, years):
From June 1944 To Oct 1944

Rating received at end of this training:
2nd Lt. Aus

(b) What were you taught in first special service school?
Officers Training

(c) Duty assignment (or duties) after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):
From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?
Military Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
Historical Division, France, Germany

(a) Second special service school attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):
From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in second special service school?

(c) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):
From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION — Circle highest grade completed:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:
☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(b) Give name and location of last high school attended:
DeWitt Clinton H.S. New York City

(c) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:
General

(d) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
				Day	Night			
City Coll. NYC	Hist	~~1935~~	1939	4		B.S.S.	1939	120
Univ. of Mich	"	1939	1940	1		M.A.	1940	30
Columbia Univ.		1940	1942			Phd cr		30

(e) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
US & European His	40	US and European Hist	25
Literature	25	Literature	15
Philosophy	15	Sociology	10

(f) Other training such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of schools), or "in-service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair
German	x			x			x		
French		x				x			x

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?
Study-residence abroad

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries indicate (1) names of countries, (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e.g., business, education, pleasure).
1944-46 France & Germ. USArmy
1946 50 Journalist and US Service

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of electronic, radio, aircraft, comptometer, key punch, [illegible] scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing ...... shorthand ......

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)
☐ Yes ☒ No Give kind of license and State:
First license or certificate (year):
Latest license or certificate (year):

22. Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application such as
(a) your most important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

23. REFERENCES: List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item [illegible]

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Sidney Hook	New York University	Prof.
2. S. M. Levitas	7 E. 15th St. New York City	
3. James Burnham	New York University NYC	Author

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative: (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous break-down? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full-time basis with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service:	Date of separation or separations:
1943	1946
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	**Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)**
[illegible] Army	Capt. [illegible]

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. **IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY,** OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES," AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19....

Agency:

Title

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Date ....

Signature of applicant

(Sign your name in the same form as it [illegible] If a woman, please give name as Mrs. [illegible] if married use your own given name [illegible] Mrs. Mary L. [illegible])

GPO [illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ______ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: 42669
Ext. ______
Home: 804603

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Mrs~~ Mr. ~~Miss~~ Melvin (First) J. (Middle) Lasky (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS US Press Center, Berlin, APO 742 (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC, NY (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ______

______ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ______

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______ (Where?) ______ (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Jan 1920 PLACE OF BIRTH New York (City) N.Y. (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ______ ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City) ______ (State) ______ (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS: ______

______

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? ____ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ____

LAST U.S. VISA NA (Number) ____ (Type) ____ (Place of Issue) ____ (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 30 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 8" WEIGHT 170

EYES Brown HAIR Black COMPLEXION Ruddy SCARS None

BUILD Stocky OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES None

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE X MARRIED ____ DIVORCED ____ WIDOWED ____

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT

NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NA (First) ____ (Middle) ____ (Maiden) ____ (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ____

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ____ (St. & No.) ____ (City) ____ (State) ____ (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED ____ DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ____ (St. & No.) ____ (City) ____ (State) ____ (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____ (City) ____ (State) ____ (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____ (City) ____ (State) ____ (Country)

OCCUPATION ____ LAST EMPLOYER ____

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ____ (St. & No.) ____ (City) ____ (State) ____ (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ____ (Date) TO ____ (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ____

COUNTRY ____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

____

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

---

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Samuel (First) (Middle) Lasky (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, New York City (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4 July '91 PLACE OF BIRTH Lods, Poland (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 11 March 1911, NYC

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? 10 Aug '18 WHERE? US Dist. Ct, Augusta GA. (City State Country)

OCCUPATION Manufacturer LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 279 West 39th St. NYC (St. & No. City State Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM May '18 (Date) TO Dec. '18 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army

COUNTRY US DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN. ______

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Esther (First) (Middle) Lasky (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 24 Mar. '99 PLACE OF BIRTH Lods, Poland

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Dec. '18 WHERE? NYC (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NYC, 18 Sept 1911

OCCUPATION NA LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

____

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME Floria (First) (Lasky) (Middle) Altman (Last) AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC (St. & No.) (City) ________ State ________ Country ________ Citizenship
2. FULL NAME Joyce (First) ________ Middle Lasky (Last) AGE 19
   PRESENT ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, NYC (St. & No.) (City) ________ State ________ Country ________ Citizenship
3. FULL NAME ________ First ________ Middle ________ Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
4. FULL NAME ________ First ________ Middle ________ Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship
5. FULL NAME ________ First ________ Middle ________ Last AGE ________
   PRESENT ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NA (First) ________ Middle ________ Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

____

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________ City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME ______________________________
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED __________ DATE OF DECEASE __________ CAUSE __________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______________________________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH __________ PLACE OF BIRTH ______________________________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY __________

CITIZENSHIP __________ WHEN ACQUIRED? __________ WHERE? __________
City State Country

OCCUPATION __________ LAST EMPLOYER __________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State Country
2. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State Country
3. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______________________________
2. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______________________________
3. NAME ______________________________ RELATIONSHIP __________ AGE _____
   CITIZENSHIP __________ ADDRESS ______________________________
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______________________________

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ________ ADDRESS NYC Bronx (City) New York (State) ________ (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1932 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL De Witt Clinton ADDRESS Bronx, NYC (City) ________ (State) ________ (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1932-1935 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE City College of NY ADDRESS NYC (City) ________ (State) ________ (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1935-1939 DEGREE B.S.S.

COLLEGE Univ. of Michigan ADDRESS Ann Arbor, Mich. (City) ________ (State) ________ (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1939-1940 DEGREE M.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

US (Country) US Army (Service) Capt. (Rank) 1943-1946 (Dates of Service)

U.S.F.E.T. (Frankfurt (Last Station) B-013470 0-[illegible]7 (Serial No.) Hon. (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: ________

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER #88 ADDRESS NYC (Bronx)

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON ________

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 1948 TO Present

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Department of the Army (Mil. Govt)

ADDRESS Occupation Force, Germany (St. & No.) ________ (City) ________ (State) ________ (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Government ISD NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col. Textor

TITLE OF JOB Editor & Publisher SALARY $ 6000. PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Editing and publishing a German-language monthly magazine (Der Monat), Berlin

REASONS FOR LEAVING ________

FROM 1946 TO 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY New Leader Publishing Association

ADDRESS 7 E. 15th St. New York City
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Newspaper NAME OF SUPERVISOR S.M. Levitas

TITLE OF JOB European Editor SALARY $ 5000 PER An

YOUR DUTIES Correspondent in Europe

REASONS FOR LEAVING Offer to publish "Der Monat" in Berlin

FROM 1943 TO 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Army

ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES Active duty France, and Germany

REASONS FOR LEAVING Hon. Discharge

FROM 1941 TO 1943

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY New Leader Publishing Association

ADDRESS 7 E. 16th St. New York City
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Newspaper NAME OF SUPERVISOR S.M. Levitas

TITLE OF JOB Asst. Editor SALARY $ 3000 PER An

YOUR DUTIES Writing for and editing "The Newleader weekly newspaper

REASONS FOR LEAVING US Army

FROM 1941 TO 1941

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Dept. of Interior

ADDRESS National Park Service, Bedloes Island, New York
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS National Monument NAME OF SUPERVISOR Geo. Palmer

Historian

TITLE OF JOB ~~[illegible]~~ SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES Historical research and lecturing

REASONS FOR LEAVING Newspaper (New Leader) Offer

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Sidney Hook	BUS. ADD.	Washington Square Col.	New York City	
	RES. ADD.			
2. James Burnham	BUS. ADD.	New York Univ.	N.Y.C.	
	RES. ADD.			
3. Merle Curti	BUS. ADD.	Univ. of Wisconsin,	Madison,	Wisc.
	RES. ADD.			
4. Charles A. Pearce	BUS. ADD.	Duell, Sloan & Pearce Publishers		
	RES. ADD.	Madison Ave.,	NYC	
5. Wm E. Bohn	BUS. ADD.	7 E. 15th St.	New York City	
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. Lionel Trilling	BUS. ADD.	Columbia Univ.	NYC	
	RES. ADD.			
2. Richard Hofstadter	BUS. ADD.	Columbia Univ.	NYC	
	RES. ADD.			
3. Max Eastman	BUS. ADD.	Readers Digest,	Pleasantville,	NYC
	RES. ADD.			
4. Edgar S. Mooney, Jr.	BUS. ADD.	Bates Manuf.	80 Work St.	NYC
	RES. ADD.			
5. S.M. Levitas	BUS. ADD.	7 E. 15th St.	NYC.	
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. See Note 2.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
2.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			
3.	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? no
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	NAME	ADDRESS (St. & No. / City / State)
1.	Sam Lasky	719 Avenue Y. NYC
2.	S.M. Levitas	7 E. 15th St. NYC
3.	E. B. Mooney Jr.	80 Work St. NYC

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No. / City / State / Country
1946	Present	US Sector, Berlin, Germany
1943	1946	US Army
1941	1943	1465 Townsend Ave. NYC
1940	1941	278 East 171st St. NYC
1939	1940	Michigan Univ. Campus, Ann Arbor USA
1932	1939	1465 Fulton Avenue NYC

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	1945	1946	European Command, USArmy		
	1946	1948	Europe, West		Journalism
	1922	1923	Eruope		Child accompanied parents on tour.

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: 64174 Paris, France 16 July 1946, Issued at US Embassy, Paris

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NA GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. See Note No. 1 ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
2. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
3. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
4. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
5. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
6. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________
7. ________ Name and Chapter ________ St. & No. ________ City ________ State ________ Country
   DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE German SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE French SPEAK Fair READ Fair WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE ____ SPEAK ____ READ ____ WRITE ____

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Tennis (College Varsity)

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Historian - Research

Editor - Journalism

University - Lecturer

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

Dept of Interior (Nat'l Park Service) 1940

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: No

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? No IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Samuel Lasky RELATIONSHIP Father

ADDRESS 719 Avenue Y, (St. & No.) New York City (City) New York (State) (Country)

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

14-00000

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Berlin, Germany (City and State) DATE 25 Jan 1950

_______________ (Witness)

Melvin J. Lasky (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Note 1. (Sec.22)

I may have been a member of
(a) American Newspaper Guild
(b) American Historical Assoc.
but I do not definitely recall whether membership had been completed.

Note 2 (Sec 18)

Inasmuch as I have not been "resident at home" in seven (?) years I am unable to give names of neighbors.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: JDent

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

How is Brer Lasky getting along!

jeb

Mr. Baker

Mr. Garland's office advises Provisional Clearance will come thru 23 or 24 February.

JED

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: LG

BUILDING

ROOM NO

REMARKS:

Herewith project with comments:
Believe we should advise commo that increased traffic expectable in Germany in May (SO may expect same thing).

Think this generally excellent job so far and we can proceed to put in shape for final ok.

jeb

FROM:

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

7 Feb 50

DATE

TO: Mr. Baker

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS: Ennis Hollings.

OSE advises papers on subject are en route to that office — clearance should be effective by week's end. Will follow-up!

Michael Fodor

FROM: Gale

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

W. Germany Trade Show

U.S.
Berlin
Paris
} Symphony Orchestra
Educational Exhibit
Ballet
open air band concerts

Special lighting of W. Berlin streets.

(Candles in windows)

Suggest Conf. technique for getting this up

TO: OD

RE: PBQUICK

Please print up the simplest form of light board megaphones (perhaps five inches deep), in West German colors and printed:

DEUTSCHLAND, FREI U. UNABHAENGIG

For distribution to street crowds.



5 in deep

Black/white/Rot

~~Frei~~

Deutschland Frei

Berlin ist keine Soviet Kolonie

SECRET

1 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]
ATTN: Mr. Garland

SUBJECT: James Burnham

REFERENCE: Project PDQUICK

1. The project is a proposal to hold an Intellectual and Cultural Congress in Berlin, Germany, to be sponsored by leading German intellectuals, notably Dr. Redslob of the Free University of Berlin. The object is to establish a base of freedom in political, cultural and social thought, established where it may serve as a springboard for propaganda infiltration into the Iron Curtain countries including East Germany. At the same time, and perhaps of even greater importance, the Congress will be held either immediately preceding or immediately following the Communist Youth Rally to be held in Berlin the last three days of May - serving to offset considerably the influence of the Communist rally and as a basis for counter propaganda and counter action.

2. The Berlin OPC field office has urged the sending of two propaganda experts to the field as special consultants. James Burnham fits the requirement, is under contract, and we have proposed in a cablegram to send him during the month of April for a period of from 30 to 60 days. While in the field he will serve in approximately the same capacity and perform the same functions as when on duty in Washington. The second propaganda expert is a staff employee.

[illegible]

PBIII/LG/ms
cc: OPC Reg (2)
PBIII Chrono file
Subject file ✓ [illegible]

SECRET

Dear ...

This letter will serve as an official invitation and credential as a delegate to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The passport and visa authorities know about the Congress and will extend all facilities to delegates. When you have secured your passport, you can obtain your Berlin visa from the Allied High Command Permit Office, 42 Broadway, New York City. The American Express Company, through its foreign travel section, will arrange for air-travel bookings. We will inform you when your ticket is available and all further details of transportation.

We are enclosing a copy of our first New York release. It contains a copy of the proposed program of the Congress and the names of many of our international delegates and supporters. The details of the program are now being worked out in Berlin. As soon as we receive them, we shall be happy to send you a copy.

Copies of your books are being ordered and will be sent to Berlin where they will be on public display. We would appreciate your sending us a negative of your photograph for use in connection with this display.

If there is any other information you require, or any way we can be of help to you, please feel free to call upon us at our New York office.

Sincerely yours,

20 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR Chief, I & S - Attention: Mr. George Laker

THROUGH: COP and SEC/OPC

SUBJECT: Franklyn A. Johnson

1. Subject is being sent to Germany for a period of 90 days TDY, beginning on or about 10 March 1950, to take part in the activation of an approved FB-III project. He is an OPC intelligence officer assigned to FBA/OPC, but is being detailed to FB-III/OPC for this particular assignment. The project will be a propaganda warfare operation.

2. For travel to and from Germany and during his sojourn there, Mr. Johnson will use Department of Army cover; his orders will show him to be a civilian employee of the Department of the Army and he will have a special passport. He will report to the Chief of Operations of the OPC German Mission who has offices in Heidelberg. The cover designation of this unit is Documents Disposal Unit, Department of Army. Mr. Johnson's activities in connection with his TDY assignment in Germany will take him also to Frankfurt and Berlin, where he will use the same cover.

3. Mr. Johnson has been briefed on the cover used by the station to which he will report and on the measures to be taken to conceal his connection with CIA during his sojourn in Germany.

John E. Baker
Chief, FB-III

cc: OPC File
OPC Chrono
FB-III Chrono
FB-III subject (FD Quick) ✓

KISLIN, Patricia A.   FB-II   GS-5, $3100. p/a

Washington, D. C., to Heidelberg and Berlin, Germany, for 90 days TDY, and return to Washington, with no leave enroute.

Requested TDY is considered essential. Subject will report to Chief, JEDICT field station as clerical assistant in connection with approved operations requiring immediate activation. Project 9-56-JEDICT (8 November 1949)

Has been assigned by FB-II to FB-III for this special, temporary duty.

66   10 March 1950   X

X   X

X

Maximum allowable   9-34-JEDICT

Travel advance of $300.00 requested.

20 February 1950

John E. Baker, FB-III

24 Feb

Take up with
Garland after
seeing Joe Bryan
who will not
return until 27th
Lg

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE	
TO: L.G.	
BUILDING	ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Assume you
will fix him
up.
JCB

FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

24 February '50 DATE	
TO: Mr. Baker	
BUILDING	ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

Herewith is Mr. Hobbing's clearance!

Clearance is covert security type which, I believe, puts this individual in category of staff agent and, therefore, under Peg Johnson's jurisdiction.

No? He will be contract - part-time agent.
JCB

FROM: JED		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ADPC Attention: Security Officer DATE: 20 February 1950

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: J.G. - 273
#36778

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 February 1950 concerning the subject.

This memorandum requested change in status for the subject from an operational clearance to that of a covert consultant for the purposes as outlined in the memorandum of 16 February 1950.

In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances", a covert security clearance as requested in the memorandum of 15 February 1950 is granted for the use of the subject.

This covert clearance as granted does not always constitute complete compliance with the provisions of AI 10-2. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, please advise Inspection and Security sufficiently in advance so that no delay is caused in the transition.

This Office would further appreciate being advised when the contemplated use as set forth in your memorandum of 15 February 1950 for the subject has been completed, so that the files of this Office may be kept up to date.

FOR THE CHIEF, INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF

George P. Loker Jr.
GEORGE P. LOKER, JR.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

17 February 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: CPB II

SUBJECT: Meeting with Kenneth B. HAMBLEY and Messrs. Williams, Droller, Glaser, and Smith re Berlin Conference

1. Direct action is imperative in Berlin.

a. Organize groups to beat the Commie opposition in street fighting.

b. Carry the counterattack into the Soviet Sector.

c. It is not undesirable to have Soviet's fire on German citizens.

2. Fighting, against the background of the Peace Conference, with the general population and the conference participants in the streets, would have tremendous and desirable effect.

a. To be beaten in the streets would be defeat complete.

b. A fight is important. A successful fight is imperative. It would cause good publicity, instill confidence in the Berlin population and insure major victories for our side.

c. If no Commie fighting group plans to start the fight, create one and beat it up.

3. A head-on challenge — rioting and perhaps shooting — is inherent in the streets as it is now conceived.

4. HAMBLEY thinks that the Soviet authorities plan control of the streets.

5. What would mass effect be of a background of American tanks?

a. If it is necessary to prevent defeat — do it.

b. It would be far better, however, to have force exercised by the Berlin population — with no American military force in sight.

CENTRAL [illegible]
CLASSIFICATION [illegible]
Secret
Eric Jones [illegible]
EE/G
15 [illegible] 57

TOP SECRET

~~385~~0
COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES

TOP SECRET

6. According to political reliability, the participants' names fall in the following categories:

a. Black

b. Gray

c. White

7. Eliminate the blacks. We can keep the gray if the white list is long enough.

8. Jean Paul Sartre is a type which should be excluded. He has fixed political ideas of the wrong sort. If our people discuss Soviet labor camps, he will bring up Spanish camps, Greek islands, South Africa, etc. He would only be an obstructionist.

9. Eliminate Plievier.

10. Eliminate Julian Huxley.

11. Include Czapski on the sponsoring committee.

12. A delegate from South America should be selected.

13. It is recommended that Sidney Hook go to Berlin within two weeks to organize the whole affair.

Dawson Smith
DAWSON SMITH
per mw

PB II: DS/mw

cc: #1 JBIII
#2 GDroller Chrono
#3 DSmith-HAMBLEY File
#4 DSmith Chrono
#5 PB II Chrono
#6 OPC Registry Chrono
#7 OPC Registry File

TOP SECRET

~~38280~~
Copy 1 of 2 copies

[illegible]

SECRET

16 February 1950.

Suggestions for Mr. Baker

Re: Project Memorandum No. 35.

1. I would suggest that the following person and organizations be invited to attend and participate in the May meeting:

a. Dr. Reinhold NIEBUHR (USA)
presently at the Union Theological School, Columbia University he is a member of the Commission on the Occupied Areas and past chairman of the General Committee of World Student Service Fund.

b. International Student Service (ISS)
an outstanding international cultural exchange medium of the university community (ie. both professors and students are included) with headquarters in Geneva. This organization was formed after the first world war and in addition to its conference and tour activities it has been primarily responsible for the relief work done throughout the world in the colleges and universities. This organization is the most prominent existing opponent of the International Union of Students (IUS) in which the FDJ holds membership.

c. World Assembly of Youth (WAY)
organized recently (1948) in London this is an international youth organization formed to counter the influence and activities of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) The WFDY is communist dominated and controlled. The FDJ is a member of the WFDY.

2. With reference to the Project Memorandum dated 31 January 1950.

6. a. The facilities of the World Radio University (WRUL) a non-governmental short-wave radio station in NYC and Boston might be used in connection with pre-publicizing the May meeting. USA participants could be interviewed and the day-to-day activities of the meeting presented via the air waves.

6. c.d. This should be encouraged.

6. d. An anonymous publication of COLLOQUIUM might be useful here. This student magazine at the University of Berlin (as opposed to the Free University) prior to April 1948 acted as a spokesman of the student opposition to the Soviet.

SECRET

9. Why are we apprehensive? Is there a possibility that the west German youth would follow the cp line?

11. Considering (9) in the light of (11) I would think that it would serve US interests to fly into Berlin students now in the western zones who have fled their former eastern German homes. These students, oriented towards the West, might best serve our propaganda interests. Dialect speaking to dialect, etc.

P.K.

Memo: 10 Feb.

8 Feb. Discussion with Williams reference theme of congress and PW possibilities.

Talk with Denby reference project - he produced outline draft.

9 Feb. Met Dr. Hilger, preliminary talk reference personalities involved in Congress, plan for future meetings.

Conference at home of Jim Burnham (Williams, Droller, Smith, Burnham, Glaser.

At this meeting Mr. Burnham, in response to questions, stated his enthusiasm for the idea. He proposed that Sidney Hook be sent over to Germany for a few weeks on an exploratory mission - and to render what assistance he may in connection with planning. He expressed his willingness to go over to Berlin sometime in advance of the congress (under cover of an invitation he has received from the Free University) to actively assist in planning the agenda and other details. He is making up a list of proposed delegates to be invited; thinks it important someone from S.America be included. He is particularly opposed to the inclusion of Sarte in the list of delegates; is not sure of Plievier but not opposed. Arrangements made to continue conferring, probably next week.

10 Feb. 1st draft of Project completed.

13 Feb. idea of money compensation — money could come from [illegible], sponsored by ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] in [illegible] "if your university is not prepared to finance your travel — etc." let us know as we may be of [illegible]

(Steinplatz hotel suggested) (Taberna)

[illegible] say ~~Hook~~ desirable

14 Feb. [illegible] to send [illegible] and Lawrence to Berlin. Hook? Postpone next talk with Burnham until date settled.

16 Feb. [illegible]

17 Feb. [illegible] (OVER)

see Burnham with some [illegible] questions.

His answers:

1. The whole question of the title of the Congress has been giving him some concern. Held at any other time than in immediate juxtaposition to the Communist Youth Rally, it would be OK. Held at that time it is inevitably going to be regarded as a counter attack and in those terms a 'Congress of Culture' is not adequate. He wants to broaden the base - perhaps label it a political Congress. (My own idea, at the moment, is opposed to a political label; but I agree that a Congress for Intellectual Freedom - which could take in political aspects - might be better than restricting it to culture.)

2. He suggests June as a date - unless we can turn out this affair in a BIG and SIGNIFICANT enough fashion to really offset the communist convention. I don't know his arguments for June but I can imagine that they would take the line that instead of being lost in the world wide attention and publicity for the communist deal, it would come as the last shot, after the communists had exposed themselves as slaves of Moscow, and might make a ringing effect. Also June would be the right time for college people to get away from their universities, might be very difficult in May.

3. He is anxious to have labor represented and suggested a big representation from labor groups, including Dubinsky. Also certain leading political figures.

21 Feb. [illegible]

22 Feb. Project put in circulation for coord.

23 " Cable to field (held until 27 for coord.)
27 " [illegible] Holbling (though Time)
" " Muller
Arrangements with Chester, Muller, [illegible] - to meet
([illegible])
[illegible] talk Hilger
28 " [illegible] Chester!
[illegible] Chester [illegible] - [illegible] talk
[illegible] for Committee [illegible] on Monday
Prepared draft of dispatch to field

Am. Express.

Interview under name of Martin H. Williams, of Kingston, Pa., with Mr. Gilmore, Asst. Passenger Traffic Manager of Trav. Dept.

Am. Ex. will accept money (check, draft or cash) in one place - N.Y. office - or in several places (Paris, for instance) provided one central office knows details and can coordinate.

Will then write to all offices involved, authorizing transportation, etc., for list of persons (which may be added to at last moment). We specify what credentials persons must present. We also specify whether transportation is to be by air, steamship, rail, etc.; first class or otherwise; whether or not 'expenses' are to be allowed - in this connection they suggest that travelling expenses be allowed (for meals, etc.) not to exceed 10% of transportation. They suggest that we act as soon as practicable because of rush for travel to Europe but Mr. Gilmore says they can be reasonable certain of providing air transportation.

They will render a complete accounting of transportation and expense money provided, and remit unexpended balances.

Meeting [illegible]

Burnham/[illegible]

Skeggs.

Samples of material so far issued.

They are working on the matter of satellite representation. Examples: Ceidrovich and Chapski from Poland; Porutka from Czechoslovakia; Nocolievsky and Yakofleff from Russia. Several others.

Eleanor Roosevelt had accepted, but after appearance of NY Times story she was seen by a reporter and was said to have stated that she had changed her mind. Hook is also doubtful because of his commitment to U of Cal. However, a personal letter is going to these three, from McCloy, urgently asking them to attend. Helen Douglas and Robt. Montgomery are both regarded as excellent prospects.

Skeggs expressed dim view of Buttles' activities and is anxious US interest and US releases be played down. However, he is anxious that there should be great deal of publicity as time approaches. Furthermore, I got impression that he had inspired Buttles, to some extent at least, to take the action in approaching Hook. For instance, Skeggs is anxious that we consider suggestion that about the 1st or 2nd of June an advertisement appear in NY Times and Wash. Post, signed by large number of organizations and persons, calling attention to Congress. He suggested this could be organized by Sidney Hook which gave me idea that he may have suggested some such activity to Buttles, which may have resulted in Buttles' trip.

Details in Berlin are being crefully worked out. Delegates will stop either at the Steinplatz or Amzoo hotel - obvious reasons for having them all together. They will have official taxis for their use, corridors and entrances will be guarded by plain clothes German and US personnel, some of them will be inconspicuously guarded personally. Meeting place * Taberna Academica - will be well guarded.

Matter of interpreters being worked upon, report later.

There will be press delegates from all countries, in addition radio RIAS will tape the entire proceedings and will furnish cuttings to individual radio stations, for instance - if the Vienna radio wants the speech of one of the Austrian delegates, it can be provided. Rias also will be on air with reports of proceedings, but they may need some pressure later on.

He will deliver the $200 to Hook and thinks that will be sufficient. He and Hook and Burnham will try to work out methods of definitely signing up certain doubtful prospects. He will report to Marian Saunders and when he comes to Washington, to Kollerman. On my advice, he will play it straight with both - as though he had no contact with us, says he will listen rather than talk, but I regard that as impossible. Will assure State that everything is going well, is completely in hands of committee and that all action should stem from Berlin in order to have central control and full coordination.

Was delighted at plans for financing travel of delegates.

8 February 1950

MEMORANDUM

REF: PDQUICK

1. All of the names suggested so far are listed. Suggestions are needed for additions.

Frau Luise Schroeder
Dr. Klaus Mehnert 201-17292
Frieda Utley
A. Rossi
Dorothy Thompson
Ruth Fischer
Sperber
Lin Yu Tang
*Aver
*Barankovic
*Tonvonlovic
*Iovanic
*Gabrilovi
*Babette Gross – 201-3892 (see Peter – DOB 1923)
Ralph Bunche
Walter White
Max Yergin
Rector – Frankfurt University
Hu-Shih

L. G.

for main Committee
Schmenicke
von Dahn-Haimacke

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FB-III

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. SADO			✓/1	e.o.	
2. PB-II		2/3		Pm	
3. Staff II				W	
4. SOP					
5. DDPC					
6. FB III					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: Dispatch No. 131-CEGWU, dated 6 January 1950
Matthew T. Christie memorandum dated 29 December 1950

1. A conference to discuss subject project was held 6 Feb 1950 in the office of Mr. John E. Baker, Chief FB-III. Present were:

Mr. Carmel Offie, SADO
Mr. John Harrison, Chief Staff II, PPD
Mr. James O. Denby, Staff II, Area Branch B
Mr. Joseph Bryan III, Chief FB-II, PPD
Mr. Fred W. Williams, FB-II
Mr. Gerald Droller, FB-II
Mr. Louis Glaser, FB-III
Mr. Baker

For the purpose of this conference, Mr. Harrison acted as the personal representative of CPP, and Mr. Baker as the personal representative of CCP.

2. Reference communications concerning subject project were read and discussed. There was unanimous agreement upon the following points:

a. That the project was feasible, worthy and particularly valuable as a partial counter to the Communist German youth rally scheduled for 27 May in Berlin;

b. That it could not be staged successfully for less than $40,000, but that an allocation of $50,000 should be made to insure fully adequate financial support;

c. That approval of the French and British High Commissioners for Germany should be obtained to insure tri-partite support of the Congress, and that French and British material aid should be forthcoming, at least to the extent of providing transportation for delegates from their countries.

3. It was agreed also that an effort should be made to arrange the attendance at the congress of representative refugee intellectuals from curtain countries, but that these should not

include members of the various national committees.

4. The question of using NYLON funds for this project was not discussed, but will be considered in due course.

5. Therefore, it was decided to draft a cable to the German mission granting approval to the project, subject to the stipulation concerning French and British participation, and authorizing the field to proceed with preliminary contacts and organizational work. Immediately thereafter, it was agreed, appropriate representatives of CPD and PPD would proceed with the drafting of a project plan in official form, together with appropriate operational annexes to guide implementation of the project.

6. Draft of proposed cable to the German mission is attached hereto.

John E. Baker
FB-III

Concur:

Mr. Offie ______
Mr. Harrison ______
Mr. Denby ______
Mr. Bryan ______
Mr. Williams ______
Mr. Droller ______
Mr. Glaser ______

JEB/njh
cc: OPC Reg (2)
FB-III (2)

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom

REFERENCE: Dispatch No. [illegible], dated 6 January 1950
Matthew T. Christie memorandum dated 28 December 1950

1. A conference to discuss subject project was held 6 Feb 1950 in the office of Mr. John E. Baker, Chief FB-III. Present were:

Mr. Carmel Offie, SACO
Mr. John Harrison, Chief Staff II, PPD
Mr. James G. [illegible], Staff II, Area Branch D
Mr. Joseph Bryan III, Chief PB-II, PPD
Mr. Fred F. Williams, PB-II
Mr. Gerald Droller, PB-II
Mr. Louis Glaser, PB-III
Mr. Baker

For the purpose of this conference, Mr. Harrison acted as the personal representative of [illegible], and Mr. Baker as the personal representative of [illegible].

2. Reference communications concerning subject project were read and discussed. There was unanimous agreement upon the following points:

a. That the project was feasible, worthy and particularly valuable as a partial counter to the Communist German youth rally scheduled for 27 May in Berlin;

b. That it could not be staged successfully for less than $40,000, but that an allocation of $50,000 should be made to insure fully adequate financial support;

c. That approval of the French and British High Commissioners for Germany should be obtained to insure tri-partite support of the Congress, and that French and British material aid should be forthcoming, at least to the extent of providing transportation for delegates from their countries.

3. It was agreed also that an effort should be made to arrange the attendance at the congress of representative refugee intellectuals from curtain countries, but that these should not

include members of the various national committees.

4. The question of using STLOS funds for this project was not discussed, but will be considered in due course.

5. Therefore, it was decided to draft a cable to the German mission granting approval to the project, subject to the stipulation concerning French and British participation, and authorizing the field to proceed with preliminary contacts and organizational work. Immediately thereafter, it was agreed, appropriate representatives of OPC and PPD would proceed with the drafting of a project plan in official form, together with appropriate operational annexes to guide implementation of the project.

6. Draft of proposed cable to the German mission is attached hereto.

JEB

John E. Baker
EE-III

Concur:

Mr. Offie________ CO

Mr. Harrison______ EH

Mr. Denby________ TCD

Mr. Bryan________ EE III

Mr. Williams______ FW

Mr. Droller_______ GD

Mr. Glaser_______ LG

JEB/ajh
cc: OPC Reg (2)
EE-III (2) SADO STAFF II STAFF II/AREA BRANCH B
EE-II

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: CPB II

NO. [illegible]7708

DATE 7 Feb. 1950

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
TO	**ROOM NO.**	**REC'D**	**FWD'D**	**OFFICER'S INITIALS**	**COMMENTS**
1. FBB III (Mr. Baker)		2/8			LGK: Suggest we talk also with [illegible] would be good — but [illegible] have to [illegible] out of sight, [illegible] B 9 Feb.
2. LG					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					Memo by L.G.: Droller could be of extreme value, not as contributing anything substantial to the Congress (which he is qualified to do, but which would not be necessary) but because the follow up will call for intensive P.W. planning — and seeing and hearing the Congress and discussions with the people met there, would make ~~Ca~~ PB II follow up work much more efficient and effective.
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. 29-4					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET (Me Too!)

7 February 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: COP

VIA: DS III, CPP

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Congress

REFERENCE: COP's memo to FB II, 25 January 1950

1. FB II agrees that the proposed congress deserves thorough support.

2. We would like to send Gerald Droller to Berlin, to arrive a few days before the congress opens and to remain a few days after it closes. Mr. Droller is a native of the city and is specially qualified to represent FB II's interests.

3. Our substantive recommendations have already been expressed to Mr. Baker.

J. BRYAN, III

FB II/JBIII/cm

cc: FBS III (Mr. Baker)
FBA III (Mr. Miller)
DS II (Mr. Harrison)
FB II Branch Chrono
JBIII Chrono
OPC Registry Chrono
OPC Registry File

For Mr. Glaser

JB

IEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: Mr. Glaser	NO.
	DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Mr. Baker					
2. Mr Glaser					Lou I have asked Nancy to make 5 copies of project for our conference. JB
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 61.10
APR 1966

SECRET

What started out to be a hope was that it would be [illegible] to [illegible] this particular [illegible] of the general idea of a Congress to [illegible]. She is only one of numerous people, including [illegible] Josselson, who have [illegible] the idea [illegible] it [illegible] last spring [illegible]

SECRET

3 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: M. Baker

1. I first heard of this proposal at a de-briefing of Ruth Fischer, which took place about three months ago. I first took a negative view of the proposal, which seemed to be in danger of loose and ineffective handling; however, I have an entirely different opinion of such a conference as outlined by Josselson and under his guidance. It could, if very well handled, furnish an opportunity for creation of morale, basis for propaganda and a spring-board for continuing effort.

2. Berlin not only is the obvious place for the conference, it is the only place where the impact could immediately be felt in Satellite countries. (Berlin radio, press and personal contact with East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.)

3. Should the sponsoring committee include a woman? Possibly Louise Schroeder or Frau von Zahn-Harnack or Jeanette Wolf? I also suggest Karl Arnold. And would like you to consider the inclusion of a known anti-Soviet intellectual who also is anti-U.S.

4. I think the budget should be expanded to cover the possibility that the City of Berlin may not, or perhaps should not, provide the various halls and opera houses free of charge; also a "convention" in Germany involves more flowers and music (usually a 100-piece symphony orchestra) than a Vanderbilt Wedding. I think the over-all Berlin expense of M 10,000 should have a reserve of at least an additional M 10,000

5. I think this proposal should, in the interest of speed, be implemented as follows:

a. A conference of representatives of CCF, CPF, SADC - for quick (24-hour) agreement in principle, so that a cable may be sent to the field.

b. Preparation of a Project Plan and procurement of special assistants.

c. Preparation of a subsidiary propaganda plan - to insure adequate reporting of the conference and adequate circulation of its deliberations, in several languages, behind the curtain..

6. Even with the method proposed in paragraph 5, unless a cable of basic approval can go out of here before the 9th of February - and the Project can be prepared, coordinated and fully approved prior to 21 February,- I do not believe we can count on the timing suggested by Mike which, incidentally, is excellent coming as it does prior to the big presumptive explosions of 1 May and the Communist Youth Conference. I, therefore, propose that the suggestion in 5 (a) [illegible]ed on 6 February.

SECRET

L.G.

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: C O P

NO. 5-16228

DATE 26 Jan.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Baker		1/27			
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					File 15 Jan
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1949

SECRET

25 January 1950

MEMORANDUM TO: BAKER
MILLER
HARRISON
BRYAN

SUBJECT: Berlin Intellectual Conference

1. A proposal for the support of an Intellectuals' Conference in Berlin has been pouched in by Gearing. He asks that this be given urgent consideration and that a decision should be made as quickly as possible. If the operation is undertaken, Josselson will need the assistance of two or three people in Berlin. These people might be the same as those mentioned in relation to the Communist Youth meeting in Berlin this Spring.

2. Arrangements for the organization of a political and psychological coordinating group in HICOG have been completed and are awaiting McCloy's approval. The purpose of this group is to coordinate the activities of the various staff sections in McCloy's office in these fields, and to develop a more intensive program of action.

3. Gearing will sit as a member of the Committee representing SHUTE. This will give him the opportunity of being acquainted with all overt action planned in Germany so that covert operations can be properly coordinated with them.

F.

FAL:mt

14-00000

COPY

January 11, 1950.

Your letter of December 29 was late in arriving and I am replying by hand to save delay.

(a) The idea of a "[illegible]" Congress is an excellent one! But should it be a "[illegible]" Congress or something undertaken under the auspices of a non-government, especially a non-occupying government group. Perhaps the Free University can be nominal sponsor or some European Fed for Cultural Freedom ad hoc.

(b) Spring is too soon to organize such a conference properly. Suggest late summer or fall.

(c) To be effective conference must be tied in with some concrete issue of a cultural character in which all delegates can agree despite their difference on other things. What specific issue positive or negative is shaping up in Germany today in which leading intellectuals can take a position? The differences among the participants, if not as great as at Paris, will certainly be considerable, and this is not at all a bad thing if things don't end up as they did in Paris. The main thing, however, is to see that there is at least one major practical issue on which everyone can agree independently of differences in fighting Stalinism.

(d) I assume you can arrange to cover expenses for Reise and Unterkunft of all delegates.

(e) Suggest the following be united from this country: Edmund Wilson, Dos Passos, Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, William Faulkner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Philip Rahv, William Phillips, Lionel Trilling, Farrell, perhaps me. If you can get 5 from the U.S. to attend, it would be enough.

(f) Koestler was planning something similar to this. My suggestion would be to get in touch with him at once to see whether anything has come of his plans. He would also be a good man to draft the statement of the call which should be signed by one person from England (Orwell or Russell), France, Netherland, Germany, Italy, Belgium and US, perhaps some Spanish exile.

The suggestion to set up an International Committee for Cultural Freedom may serve as the least common denominator of the varying interests. Careful preparation, of course, is necessary but if you can get 50 to 60 people together of outstanding stature, we can do the trick.

In conclusion, timing is important and the few people in this part of the world can get away in the S[illegible].

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LYNCH, GRAYSON
DCD FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: ____

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ____

ROOM: ____

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ____

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:15 22 Aug 78		PAT ORR	
6 P.M. 22 Aug '78	SAME	JAMES P. KELLY	James P. Kelly

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

A-19-44-94

GRAYSTON LYNCH

8709 Bay Point Drive
Tampa, Florida

BUSINESS:

Subject is a retired CIA employee.

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-399/78
10 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations Request (OLC 78-1035)

1. I have searched DCD's records on the individuals listed in subject request with the following results:

a. Carlos Quiroga - negative

b. Pedro Diaz Lanz - Two documents for your retention. Please note that the teletype of 6 February 1977 also includes the names of several other individuals of interest to the committee.

c. Roland Masferrer - File A-16-88-46 on loan and documents for retention. (Masferrer is a subject of a recent FOIA request, F-77-260.)

d. Manolo Rey - DCD case 42315 on loan (also contains references to Manuel Artime). Retention copies of additional documents also included.

e. Antonio Cuesta Valle - Documents for retention.

f. Antonio Veciana - Documents for retention (please note that the documents also contain references to Antonio Cuesta Valle).

g. Edward L. Freers - negative

h. Mrs. G. Stanley Brown - negative

i. David E. Murphy - negative

j. Aline Mosby - Documents for retention.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 386090

WARNING NOTICE
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

DCD-399/78
10 April 1978

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request (OLC 78-1055)

k. Abraham Isaac Goldberg - One document for retention.

m. Robert J. Korengold - negative

n. Marita Lorenz - File A-20-44-72 on loan. Please note that Ms. Lorenz recently filed a request under the Privacy Act (P-77-2794).

o. Evelio Alpizar Perez - Documents for retention.

P. Antonio Soto Vazque - negative

2. With regard to the four names listed together on page two of subject memorandum, I am forwarding documents dealing with Justin McCarthy and a Robert M. Moore. It is uncertain whether or not these individuals are the ones of interest to the HSCA (our files contain references to at least 15 other individuals named Robert Moore; without considerable additional information, we cannot make any positive identification). I am forwarding, on loan, our file on Grayson Lynch (A-19-44-94). You may wish to consult with DCD later with regard to releasing this individual from his obligation of secrecy.

Ruth Elliff
Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
0 - Addressee
1 - DCD Chrono
1 - Staff A
3 - RElliff
5 - Control

19-44-94

27 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

A194494

1. John Greaney called on 26 February to advise that in his judgment DCD's roll in this matter is finished. Greaney has sent this material to John Kennedy, NARCOG, who has advised John Werner, Drug Enforcement Agency, who will contact Lynch directly.

2. Mr. Greaney has contacted Lynch directly and notified him that Mr. Werner will be calling him. We, therefore, see no further action by DCD in this matter, and Mr. Knaysi has been so advised.

E. H. WATTS
Deputy Chief of Operations, DCD

EHW:jt

Distribution:
  Orig. - OC/DCD Chrono
  ✓1 - Control

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 018877

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NFL-002-76

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)
Chief, Miami Field Office

14 January 1976

IDEN A, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

1. We met with IDEN A, a retired BKHERALD staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. IDEN A had requested the meeting through contact with an attorney in IDEN B. IDEN A spoke for several hours about his life since retirement in 1971. What follows is a long summation of his comments, and at the memo's conclusion his reasons for bringing this situation to our attention. [Forwarded under Separate Cover].

2. IDEN A, who had a major role in the Bay of Pigs activities, and who was associated with JMWAVE during the period 1961-68, has maintained many contacts within the Cuban community in Florida. LNCOLLAR, which was aware of the involvement of some ex-BKHERALD assets (Cubans) in the drug importation business, had been unable to penetrate this group in the period to late 1973. IDEN A, in the meantime, had moved to Key West, Florida, purchased a lobster fishing boat and equipment, and become a respected member of the community.

3. In late 1973, a former BKHERALD asset (AMTABY Project) who had been terminated in 1963, IDEN C, came to IDEN A in Key West, claimed he had escaped from jail in Cuba in 1970 (where he had been jailed for drug running between Cuba and WODUAL), and said he had information on drug traffic. He asked IDEN A to contact someone in LNCOLLAR and indicate IDEN C's willingness to be of assistance. IDEN A replied he was retired and could not help. A few months later, IDEN D (AMTABY-27), another former asset, flew to Key West from Miami. He met IDEN A and informed him LNCOLLAR had sent him down to check on IDEN C. IDEN D identified his LNCOLLAR contact as IDEN E, an ex-BKHERALD asset and former BKHERALD contract employee. At about this time IDEN F, a former BKHERALD staff employee, moved to Key West and informed IDEN A that LNCOLLAR was being staffed with BKHERALD employees in its Intelligence Division, and that the leader of the division was IDEN G, another BKHERALD staffer.

4. A few months later, IDEN A received a call from IDEN H, another BKHERALD retiree, who asked about IDEN A's access to boats IDEN H wished to purchase for a relative of his wife, the relative residing in Venezuela. He photographed every boat in the Key West harbor, and it was apparent to IDEN A he was LNCOLLAR-involved. Later, IDEN F approached IDEN A and said

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

two BKHERALD people in Miami wanted to meet with IDEN A. IDEN A agreed to a meeting, and IDEN F introduced IDEN I and IDEN E. IDEN A knew IDEN I, but was aware of IDEN E only by reputation, which was unsavory. IDEN E claimed to be a BKHERALD employee, as did IDEN I. IDEN A, of course, knew otherwise, but said nothing. In March 1974, IDEN A got a call from IDEN J of the IDEN K, Miami. He was an ex-BKHERALD officer, and he said IDEN G wished to speak with IDEN A in Miami on an urgent basis.

5. IDEN G told IDEN A that he wanted the latter to work for LNCOLLAR to establish intelligence networks in the Cuban community in Key West. He said no one else could do it, and he promised to provide at the start US$100/week plus expenses plus money to pay IDEN A's agents. He said this money would not be reportable as income. When IDEN A asked about the effect of his own ex-BKHERALD status, IDEN G replied BKHERALD does not want or need to know of this arrangement. IDEN G acknowledged that US$100/week was a small payment, but said any information resulting in a seizure of drugs, the arrest of drug traffickers, or damage to drug rings will be assessed by a board within LNCOLLAR, and money (thousands of dollars) rewarded for this assistance. IDEN A would then be free to split the money with his agents. IDEN J, who was at the meeting, added that within a year IDEN A should be able to afford the best and largest lobster boat available.

6. IDEN G and IDEN J impressed IDEN A with the dangerous nature of his assignment. They stressed cover as the most important consideration, and IDEN G said, "I don't want to go to any more funerals". They added that if IDEN A got into trouble, there were 150 LNCOLLAR agents in Miami who would come to his aid instantly. IDEN A was given emergency telephone numbers and code names, and was told LNCOLLAR would arrange for his airlift out (through the LNTUCK Air Station) if needed. If his LNCOLLAR affiliation was blown, IDEN G said there would be compensation provided up to US$40 thousand, as well as relocation assistance. The relocation assistance was not specified, but IDEN A assumed this meant six months living expenses and assistance in job search activities, as well as reimbursement for moving expenses. IDEN J and IDEN L, another ex-BKHERALD official, were to come to Key West one week later to brief IDEN A on the local situation. In the meantime, IDEN A was to prepare a report on what he knew about drug traffickers in the Key West area. Two weeks later, the two did appear in Key West. The little they knew about Key West drug activities was included in IDEN A's report, which also contained much additional data.

7. IDEN A subsequently set up an intelligence net, and began sending back reports. IDEN A was frequently summoned to Miami for meetings with IDEN G. Often these meetings were a waste of time, and on occasion IDEN G

would not even show up. At one point IDEN J asked IDEN A to write a paper on the capability of ex-BKHERALD assets who were drug traffickers, and who had been trained in infiltration and exfiltration, to penetrate WODUAL coastal defenses with drugs. IDEN A showed how the assets could circumvent any government effort to stop the drug traffic. The paper "scared LNCOLLAR to death," according to IDEN A. At the end of June 1974, IDEN J asked IDEN A to journey to Washington to brief top LNCOLLAR officials on his conclusions. It was to be an all expense paid trip, and IDEN A flew up and stayed one week. Total remuneration received for the journey was only US$150. During the week, IDEN A had many meetings with IDEN G and his deputy, IDEN M, a former IDEN N staff employee. IDEN G indicated at that time he was impressed with IDEN A's reports and access in Key West.

8. Later, IDEN A told IDEN G he had sent lots of reports, but there had been no arrests, and therefore no bonuses. IDEN A said he would no longer work for just US$100/week. IDEN G replied he might be able to make IDEN A a LNCOLLAR consultant to protect his retired status. He also promised IDEN A a large lobster boat (taken from those confiscated in LNCOLLAR raids), and an additional US$500/month to meet expenses and agent payoffs. IDEN G also spoke of using IDEN A in LNCOLLAR activities in Jamaica and South America. Nothing ever was forthcoming on any of these matters. During this period, IDEN A also provided LNCOLLAR (at its request) with the names of potential sources of information in the Miami area. Several persons were approached by LNCOLLAR using IDEN A's name, and a number of former BKHERALD assets were picked up in this manner. Included in this group are IDEN O, IDEN P, and IDEN Q.

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14. IDEN A, desiring to keep a low profile, could not talk to many of his agents in Key West, but the few he did reach were expecting a portion of the reward money since the ring that was rolled up was one the agents had reported on for many months. IDEN A checked with LNCOLLAR on this, and was informed his net's information was not used as the basis for the arrests. IDEN A learned that IDEN F had passed the word around Key West that IDEN A was not an LNCOLLAR staff employee, which made IDEN A fair game for removal. He also learned plans had been made locally for his murder. At that point, IDEN A then made his escape with his wife. In Miami, he met with IDEN M. IDEN M claimed IDEN E had not caused any of the problems IDEN A had experienced. Concerning money assurances, IDEN M first denied any promises had been made. Later he said any that had been made (by IDEN G) were unauthorized. He reiterated IDEN A's reporting, although accurate, was not used in the arrests. LNCOLLAR agreed to provide IDEN A with US$1800 for all his problems, and raised the sum later to US$3 thousand. IDEN A accepted the money, but did not indicate he was satisfied with this sum.

15. IDEN A snuck back into Key West and packed his household goods in one evening. His boat was given to a fish supply house to sell. Since he owed the company money for supplies he had purchased, the fish house

sold the boat for a sum equal to his debts. IDEN A's wife quit her job without notice, and he estimates his actual financial losses are US$25 thousand. LNCOLLAR has indicated the US$3 thousand payment is "all IDEN A will get", and he is determined to get more.

16. IDEN A believes many of his agents think he did receive a payoff from LNCOLLAR following the arrests, and that he took all the money and ran, leaving them exposed in Key West. The cars of two of his agents were burned, and IDEN D, IDEN P, and others in the Miami area quit working for LNCOLLAR when they learned of the treatment he had received and/or received death threats themselves. IDEN T. As a result, IDEN A cannot return to Key West, and his lobster business no longer exists.

17. The purpose of IDEN A's contacting the BKHERALD is first to let us know what has happened to many of its former employees and assets. IDEN A believes BKHERALD should know of the false promises that were used to lure some BKHERALD employees to work at LNCOLLAR. As documentation, he provided IDEN I's grievance letter to LNCOLLAR which is attached* and for retention. IDEN I has, incidentally, been taken out of the Intelligence Division of LNCOLLAR and placed in enforcement work in Miami. IDEN I is currently seeking to return to BKHERALD employment, and IDEN A says IDEN I will verify his statements on the treatment of BKHERALD personnel who transferred to LNCOLLAR. (IDEN I's home phone in Miami is IDEN I.) He and the other ex-BKHERALD employees working at a lower level are fed up with LNCOLLAR, and are convinced they will never receive fair treatment in that organization. Since IDEN A believes the recruitment of BKHERALD officers to switch to LNCOLLAR will be a continuing thing, he feels we should know the realities of life in LNCOLLAR.

*[Forwarded Separately]

18. In addition, he notes LNCOLLAR is using many retired BKHERALD people and former BKHERALD assets in its activities. IDEN A believes these persons, in many instances, are being both used and abused. Any flap which occurs as a result of LNCOLLAR mismanagement will bounce back on BKHERALD, since it appears BKHERALD is involved in the LNCOLLAR operation. Indeed, IDEN G has given the impression his activities have been cleared with and approved by BKHERALD. Those assets who are being turned off by LNCOLLAR mismanagement are going to be lost to BKHERALD as well as to LNCOLLAR. Some of these persons could be significant assets in years to come.

19. A flap may not be so far off. In recent weeks IDEN U, who is writing a book about the role of the Cubans IDEN V and IDEN W in the IDEN X affair, called IDEN A and said he has information that IDEN G's wife and IDEN Y's business manager made a trip to Florida recently. Also IDEN U said he has learned that a former BKHERALD man who is a

LNCOLLAR agent is a homosexual, and that US$15 thousand in LNCOLLAR funds were given to someone in Miami to bail out a Puerto Rican drug dealer. The investigation of IDEN E by LNCOLLAR internal affairs did reveal, according to IDEN A, that US$15 thousand could not be accounted for by IDEN E, whose career appears to have been unaffected by the investigation. IDEN U, who obviously has a source within LNCOLLAR, also told IDEN A about many of the individuals (by name) in LNCOLLAR who are formerly BKHERALD employees.

20. IDEN U's information appears to be accurate, according to IDEN A, who recalls receiving a telephone call from IDEN G in July 1975. IDEN G was agitated, and asked IDEN A to handle a matter for him quickly and quietly. He said his wife, children, and the business agent of IDEN Y were in Key West, and were supposed to stay in the apartment of a retired BKHERALD employee named IDEN Z (formerly with IDEN AA). IDEN Z, a friend of IDEN F, had left the area and gave his apartment key to IDEN F. When IDEN G's wife and the others arrived in Key West, theyccould not locate IDEN F to get the key. IDEN G asked IDEN A to find out what they were doing, "and just how far my neck is stuck out". IDEN A learned they had checked into a local motel. He called IDEN G and passed on this information. IDEN G was relieved, but asked IDEN A to keep an eye on them and report their movements to him. Subsequently, while on a trip to Miami, IDEN A was approached by an LNCOLLAR officer in Internal Affairs. This individual said the episode was under active investigation, and asked IDEN A what he knew about it.

21. Finally, IDEN A is giving BKHERALD an opportunity to provide whatever advice, guidance, and assistance it wishes to furnish before he takes further action to obtain just compensation from LNCOLLAR. He is thinking in terms of possible BKHERALD intervention on his behalf with LNCOLLAR. He recognizes BKHERALD may wish to let him fend for himself. In that event, he plans to approach IDEN BB in Tampa to reveal the above story, and seek IDEN BB's assistance in petitioning LNCOLLAR fof financial relief. He will not take any action with IDEN BB until he has heard from BKHERALD. Since he is anxious to get started on this matter, a speedy reply to his request for assistance will be appreciated.

22. IDEN A, incidentally, has decided to remain in Tampa, and has obtained a job as chief investigator for a local private security service. We indicated a reply would be forthcoming either through us or directly to IDEN A. His phone number is IDEN A. He resides at IDEN A.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

EJKnaysi:paw

Separate Cover Attachment to Follow

C O N F I D E N T I A L 161470Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13376

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

SUBJ: IDENTITIES IN MFL-[illegible]-76 DATED 14 JANUARY 1976 FORWARDED
IN POUCH NO. 234

A194494

IDEN A - GRAYSTON LYNCH, 8739 BAY POINT DRIVE, TAMPA, FLORIDA
PHONE NUMBER: 813-884-6618

IDEN B - OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL

IDEN C - GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ

IDEN D - AMADO CANTILLO A182529

IDEN E - ROBERT MEDELL

IDEN F - GEORGE SOIL (NICKNAME ''JERRY'')

IDEN G - LUCIEN CONIEN

IDEN H - BENEDICT MANDICH

IDEN I - GARY MATTOCKS, PHONE NUMBER 279-3945

IDEN J - WILLIAM LOGAY

IDEN K - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IDEN L - MIKE BRUN

IDEN M - BUD FRANKS

IDEN N - BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

IDEN O - RAFAEL GARCIA

IDEN P - GONZALO HERRERA A86966

IDEN Q - JULIO PESTONIT

IDEN R - [illegible]

(C)

14-00000

IDEN S - (GRAY GHOST)

IDEN T - THE DRUG RING THAT WAS ROLLED UP WAS A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR OPERATION. THE GROUP HAD A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OF ABOUT US$ONE MILLION ANNUALLY, AND INCLUDED (EITHER AS ACTIVE RING MEMBERS OR WITTING OF ITS ACTIVITIES) THE SON OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN KEY WEST, THE STATE'S ATTORNEY, THE SHERIFF AND CHIEF OF POLICE, THREE MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, THE ENTIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, OVER HALF OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, THE FIRE CHIEF, AND VARIOUS CITY AND COUNTY OFFICIALS. THE RING ALSO RAN THE PROSTITUTION, NUMBERS, AND THEFT RINGS IN THE AREA. WHILE SOME OF THESE PERSONS WERE ARRESTED (THE FIRE CHIEF, FOR ONE), OTHERS WERE NOT, AND ALL ARE FREE ON BAIL AT THIS TIME.

IDEN U - GEORGE CRILE

IDEN V - BERNARD L. BARKER A181871

IDEN W - EUGENIO R. MARTINEZ A181872

IDEN X - WATERGATE

IDEN Y - MADAM NHU

IDEN Z - RALPH JOHNSON A194000

IDEN AA - VNO

IDEN BB - CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS E2 IMPDET CL BY 011663

C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

ORIGINATOR AND FIELD NO. Knaysi/NFL 2-76	DATE OF MATERIAL 14 Jan	CLASSIFICATION Conf	DATE RECEIVED 16 Jan 76
XX DIVISION SOURCE AND CHRONO. FILE		NO COPIES RETAINED	
SUBJECT FILES AND CHRONO. FILE			

SUBJECT
Memo: Grayston Lynch, ex-BKH~~A~~ERALD Staff Employee

19-44-94

ROUTING	DATE	INITIALS	REMARKS
1. Mr. Watts	2 Feb	WW	20 Feb 1976: John Greaney has passed to John Kennedy - D/ARCOG who in turn will inform DEA, where in JOHN Greaney's view, it belongs. When he hears from DEA we will inform LYNCH. ~~[illegible]~~
2. C/OPS		JA	
3. C/DCD			
4. Jeane	27 Feb	jt	
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. Central	3/2	PC	

FILES DISPOSITION

FILE THIS COPY WITH DOCUMENT

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

NFL-002-76

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division

ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

DATE: 14 January 1976

SUBJECT: IDEN A, ex-BKHERALD Staff Employee

1. We met with IDEN A, a retired BKHERALD staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. IDEN A had requested the meeting through contact with an attorney in IDEN B. IDEN A spoke for several hours about his life since retirement in 1971. What follows is a long summation of his comments, and at the memo's conclusion his reasons for bringing this situation to our attention. [Forwarded under Separate Cover].

2. IDEN A, who had a major role in the Bay of Pigs activities, and who was associated with JMWAVE during the period 1961-68, has maintained many contacts within the Cuban community in Florida. LNCOLLAR, which was aware of the involvement of some ex-BKHERALD assets (Cubans) in the drug importation business, had been unable to penetrate this group in the period to late 1973. IDEN A, in the meantime, had moved to Key West, Florida, purchased a lobster fishing boat and equipment, and become a respected member of the community.

3. In late 1973, a former BKHERALD asset (AMTABY Project) who had been terminated in 1963, IDEN C, came to IDEN A in Key West, claimed he had escaped from jail in Cuba in 1970 (where he had been jailed for drug running between Cuba and WODUAL), and said he had information on drug traffic. He asked IDEN A to contact someone in LNCOLLAR and indicate IDEN C's willingness to be of assistance. IDEN A replied he was retired and could not help. A few months later, IDEN D (AMTABY-27), another former asset, flew to Key West from Miami. He met IDEN A and informed him LNCOLLAR had sent him down to check on IDEN C. IDEN D identified his LNCOLLAR contact as IDEN E, an ex-BKHERALD asset and former BKHERALD contract employee. At about this time IDEN F, a former BKHERALD staff employee, moved to Key West and informed IDEN A that LNCOLLAR was being staffed with BKHERALD employees in its Intelligence Division, and that the leader of the division was IDEN G, another BKHERALD staffer.

4. A few months later, IDEN A received a call from IDEN H, another BKHERALD retiree, who asked about IDEN A's access to boats IDEN H wished to purchase for a relative of his wife, the relative residing in Venezuela. He photographed every boat in the Key West harbor, and it was apparent to IDEN A he was LNCOLLAR-involved. Later, IDEN F approached IDEN A and said

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two BKHERALD people in Miami wanted to meet with IDEN A. IDEN A agreed to a meeting, and IDEN F introduced IDEN I and IDEN E. IDEN A knew IDEN I, but was aware of IDEN E only by reputation, which was unsavory. IDEN E claimed to be a BKHERALD employee, as did IDEN I. IDEN A, of course, knew otherwise, but said nothing. In March 1974, IDEN A got a call from IDEN J of the IDEN K, Miami. He was an ex-BKHERALD officer, and he said IDEN G wished to speak with IDEN A in Miami on an urgent basis.

5. IDEN G told IDEN A that he wanted the latter to work for LNCOLLAR to establish intelligence networks in the Cuban community in Key West. He said no one else could do it, and he promised to provide at the start US$100/week plus expenses plus money to pay IDEN A's agents. He said this money would not be reportable as income. When IDEN A asked about the effect of his own ex-BKHERALD status, IDEN G replied BKHERALD does not want or need to know of this arrangement. IDEN G acknowledged that US$100/week was a small payment, but said any information resulting in a seizure of drugs, the arrest of drug traffickers, or damage to drug rings will be assessed by a board within LNCOLLAR, and money (thousands of dollars) rewarded for this assistance. IDEN A would then be free to split the money with his agents. IDEN J, who was at the meeting, added that within a year IDEN A should be able to afford the best and largest lobster boat available.

6. IDEN G and IDEN J impressed IDEN A with the dangerous nature of his assignment. They stressed cover as the most important consideration, and IDEN G said, "I don't want to go to any more funerals". They added that if IDEN A got into trouble, there were 150 LNCOLLAR agents in Miami who would come to his aid instantly. IDEN A was given emergency telephone numbers and code names, and was told LNCOLLAR would arrange for his airlift out (through the LNTUCK Air Station) if needed. If his LNCOLLAR affiliation was blown, IDEN G said there would be compensation provided up to US$40 thousand, as well as relocation assistance. The relocation assistance was not specified, but IDEN A assumed this meant six months living expenses and assistance in job search activities, as well as reimbursement for moving expenses. IDEN J and IDEN L, another ex-BKHERALD official, were to come to Key West one week later to brief IDEN A on the local situation. In the meantime, IDEN A was to prepare a report on what he knew about drug traffickers in the Key West area. Two weeks later, the two did appear in Key West. The little they knew about Key West drug activities was included in IDEN A's report, which also contained much additional data.

7. IDEN A subsequently set up an intelligence net, and began sending back reports. IDEN A was frequently summoned to Miami for meetings with IDEN G. Often these meetings were a waste of time, and on occasion IDEN G

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would not even show up. At one point IDEN J asked IDEN A to write a paper on the capability of ex-BKHERALD assets who were drug traffickers, and who had been trained in infiltration and exfiltration, to penetrate WODUAL coastal defenses with drugs. IDEN A showed how the assets could circumvent any government effort to stop the drug traffic. The paper "scared LNCOLLAR to death," according to IDEN A. At the end of June 1974, IDEN J asked IDEN A to journey to Washington to brief top LNCOLLAR officials on his conclusions. It was to be an all expense paid trip, and IDEN A flew up and stayed one week. Total remuneration received for the journey was only US$150. During the week, IDEN A had many meetings with IDEN G and his deputy, IDEN M, a former IDEN N staff employee. IDEN G indicated at that time he was impressed with IDEN A's reports and access in Key West.

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12. IDEN I and IDEN A decided to approach IDEN F to learn more about IDEN E. During a one hour discussion, IDEN F said he had been appointed the recruiting officer within BKHERALD for persons who would go to LNCOLLAR. IDEN F said he had known IDEN E for a long period of time, and had brought him along in BKHERALD hierarchy. IDEN A believes IDEN F also engineered the absence of a security check on IDEN E by LNCOLLAR since he did not want his homosexual relationship with IDEN E revealed. At that point IDEN A called IDEN G and filled him in on what had been learned, including IDEN F's admission that IDEN E had told him IDEN A was an LNCOLLAR asset. IDEN G denied knowing IDEN F, but said he would check on IDEN E. IDEN A met with IDEN G the next day in Miami to fill him in further, and IDEN G ordered a full investigation. In the meantime, IDEN F told IDEN E of his meeting with IDEN I and IDEN A, and IDEN E wrote a memorandum saying a fellow LNCOLLAR officer (IDEN I) had overstepped the bounds of propriety in his relationship with an LNCOLLAR asset (IDEN A), and that IDEN I and IDEN A were running an investigation on IDEN E. IDEN E described the situation as "intolerable". The LNCOLLAR inquiry, then, turned from IDEN E to improper actions by IDEN I in discussing an LNCOLLAR employee with an asset. The Internal Affairs section of LNCOLLAR did continue the IDEN E probe and concluded by May 1975 that the charges against IDEN E were accurate. In the meantime, IDEN I was interrogated by IDEN M on his relationship with IDEN A.

13. In August 1975, IDEN G informed IDEN A that control of his operation was being transferred to the Miami regional office, and that his financial relationship with LNCOLLAR would be terminated and then re-established locally following 1 September 1975. On 9 September 1975, a state-federal task force arrested 39 persons in Key West. IDEN A knew nothing about the arrests in advance. He called IDEN G to find out what was happening, and IDEN G said he also was unaware of them. He asked IDEN A to continue reporting on these developments. The next day IDEN A met with a source who told him someone had blown IDEN A's LNCOLLAR affiliation to the drug ring. He described the leak as coming from an ex-BKHERALD officer who hated IDEN A. IDEN A's source, who was in touch with drug ring members, told IDEN A the codename of his LNCOLLAR operation (IDEN S), and IDEN A learned IDEN F had spread this word all over town. IDEN A subsequently received telephone death threats (one of the ring member's girl friend called to tell him a white LNCOLLAR informant (IDEN A) would not get out of town alive). There had been eight informant deaths in Monroe County (Key West) in 1975, all unsolved murders. There was every reason, then, to take the threats seriously. IDEN A informed LNCOLLAR about the threats. LNCOLLAR replied that IDEN A was pushing the panic button, and asked for more information. IDEN A requested that the emergency evacuation apparatus be used, but LNCOLLAR refused. Finally, LNCOLLAR said "We don't know what you expect us to do since you've been terminated". IDEN A, who had been terminated by LNCOLLAR/Washington, had not been picked up subsequently by the Miami Regional Office.

14. IDEN A, desiring to keep a low profile, could not talk to many of his agents in Key West, but the few he did reach were expecting a portion of the reward money since the ring that was rolled up was one the agents had reported on for many months. IDEN A checked with LNCOLLAR on this, and was informed his net's information was not used as the basis for the arrests. IDEN A learned that IDEN F had passed the word around Key West that IDEN A was not an LNCOLLAR staff employee, which made IDEN A fair game for removal. He also learned plans had been made locally for his murder. At that point, IDEN A then made his escape with his wife. In Miami, he met with IDEN M. IDEN M claimed IDEN E had not caused any of the problems IDEN A had experienced. Concerning money assurances, IDEN M first denied any promises had been made. Later he said any that had been made (by IDEN G) were unauthorized. He reiterated IDEN A's reporting, although accurate, was not used in the arrests. LNCOLLAR agreed to provide IDEN A with US$1800 for all his problems, and raised the sum later to US$3 thousand. IDEN A accepted the money, but did not indicate he was satisfied with this sum.

15. IDEN A snuck back into Key West and packed his household goods in one evening. His boat was given to a fish supply house to sell. Since he owed the company money for supplies he had purchased, the fish house

sold the boat for a sum equal to his debts. IDEN A's wife quit her job without notice, and he estimates his actual financial losses are US$25 thousand. LNCOLLAR has indicated the US$3 thousand payment is "all IDEN A will get", and he is determined to get more.

16. IDEN A believes many of his agents think he did receive a payoff from LNCOLLAR following the arrests, and that he took all the money and ran, leaving them exposed in Key West. The cars of two of his agents were burned, and IDEN D, IDEN P, and others in the Miami area quit working for LNCOLLAR when they learned of the treatment he had received and/or received death threats themselves. IDEN T. As a result, IDEN A cannot return to Key West, and his lobster business no longer exists.

17. The purpose of IDEN A's contacting the BKHERALD is first to let us know what has happened to many of its former employees and assets. IDEN A believes BKHERALD should know of the false promises that were used to lure some BKHERALD employees to work at LNCOLLAR. As documentation, he provided IDEN I's grievance letter to LNCOLLAR which is attached*and for retention. IDEN I has, incidentally, been taken out of the Intelligence Division of LNCOLLAR and placed in enforcement work in Miami. IDEN I is currently seeking to return to BKHERALD employment, and IDEN A says IDEN I will verify his statements on the treatment of BKHERALD personnel who transferred to LNCOLLAR. (IDEN I's home phone in Miami is IDEN I.) He and the other ex-BKHERALD employees working at a lower level are fed up with LNCOLLAR, and are convinced they will never receive fair treatment in that organization. Since IDEN A believes the recruitment of BKHERALD officers to switch to LNCOLLAR will be a continuing thing, he feels we should know the realities of life in LNCOLLAR.

*[Forwarded Separately]

18. In addition, he notes LNCOLLAR is using many retired BKHERALD people and former BKHERALD assets in its activities. IDEN A believes these persons, in many instances, are being both used and abused. Any flap which occurs as a result of LNCOLLAR mismanagement will bounce back on BKHERALD, since it appears BKHERALD is involved in the LNCOLLAR operation. Indeed, IDEN G has given the impression his activities have been cleared with and approved by BKHERALD. Those assets who are being turned off by LNCOLLAR mismanagement are going to be lost to BKHERALD as well as to LNCOLLAR. Some of these persons could be significant assets in years to come.

19. A flap may not be so far off. In recent weeks IDEN U, who is writing a book about the role of the Cubans IDEN V and IDEN W in the IDEN X affair, called IDEN A and said he has information that IDEN G's wife and IDEN Y's business manager made a trip to Florida recently. Also IDEN U said he has learned that a former BKHERALD man who is a

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[illegible]-76
PAGE 7

LNCOLLAR agent is a homosexual, and that US$.5 thousand in LNCOLLAR funds were given to someone in Miami to pay off a Puerto Rican drug dealer. The investigation of IDEN E by LNCOLLAR Internal Affairs did reveal, according to IDEN A, that US$15 thousand could not be accounted for by IDEN E, whose career appears to have been unaffected by the investigation. IDEN U, who obviously has a source within LNCOLLAR, also told IDEN A about many of the individuals (by name) in LNCOLLAR who are formerly BKHERALD employees.

20. IDEN U's information appears to be accurate, according to IDEN A, who recalls receiving a telephone call from IDEN G in July 1975. IDEN G was agitated, and asked IDEN A to handle a matter for him quickly and quietly. He said his wife, children, and the business agent of IDEN Y were in Key West, and were supposed to stay in the apartment of a retired BKHERALD employee named IDEN Z (formerly with IDEN AA). IDEN Z, a friend of IDEN F, had left the area and gave his apartment key to IDEN F. When IDEN G's wife and the others arrived in Key West, they could not locate IDEN F to get the key. IDEN G asked IDEN A to find out what they were doing, "and just how far my neck is stuck out". IDEN A learned they had checked into a local motel. He called IDEN G and passed on this information. IDEN G was relieved, but asked IDEN A to keep an eye on them and report their movements to him. Subsequently, while on a trip to Miami, IDEN A was approached by an LNCOLLAR officer in Internal Affairs. This individual said the episode was under active investigation, and asked IDEN A what he knew about it.

21. Finally, IDEN A is giving BKHERALD an opportunity to provide whatever advice, guidance, and assistance it wishes to furnish before he takes further action to obtain just compensation from LNCOLLAR. He is thinking in terms of [illegible] BKHERALD intervention on his behalf with LNCOLLAR. He recognizes BKHERALD may wish to let him [illegible] for himself. In that event, he plans to approach IDEN BB in [illegible] to reveal the above story, and seek IDEN BB's assistance in [illegible] LNCOLLAR for financial relief. He will not take any action with IDEN BB until he has heard from BKHERALD. Since he is anxious to get [illegible] on this matter, a speedy reply to his request for assistance will be appreciated.

22. IDEN A, incidentally, has decided to remain in [illegible], and has [illegible] a job as chief investigator for a local private [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. We indicated a reply would be forthcoming [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] to IDEN A. His phone number is IDEN A. [illegible] of IDEN A.

[illegible]

E2 IMPDET

Separate Cover Attachment to Follow

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: NFL-002-76
[The "Informal Grievance" was written by IDEN I]

SUBJECT : Informal Grievance

1. This written informal grievance is being submitted in order that it may be passed to higher authority for resolution. It is anticipated that final action will be required by top echelon DEA officials in order to satisfactorily resolve all or part of the issues.

2. I wish to file a grievance on the following subjects which constitute commitments made to me by representatives of DEA at the time of my recruitment from CIA into the DEA Narcotics Intelligence Division.

a. I was specifically told by DEA representatives at the time of my initial recruitment interviews that the retirement plans were the same in both agencies and that my previous time in government would transfer with me with no break in service. I am now informed that my previous service will not count toward retirement under section 8336(c), title 5, USC Law Enforcement Retirement. This leaves me with no chance to accumulate the required time for retirement.

b. I was told by the DEA representatives that in order to expedite my transfer from CIA it would be necessary to bring me on duty in schedule "A" status, however, action would be initiated shortly after my EOD to place me in competitive career status. I have now been on duty with DEA for two years and three months, and I am still on schedule "A" status.

c. As a recruitment enticement the DEA representatives stated to me that after two years of satisfactory service with DEA I would be a grade GS-13. No promotion is forthcoming after 27 months of satisfactory service.

d. DEA representatives stated to me that I would be coming to DEA as part of the "ground floor" personnel of trained and experienced intelligence officers to staff the newly formed intelligence division of DEA and that I could expect rapid upward movement on the career ladder. At this point there is no apparent intelligence career ladder in DEA

3. The minimum action that would satisfy my grievance is complete fulfillment of items a-d above. DEA should take whatever action necessary to credit my previous service for retirement under 8336(c), and career status should be established with the CSC. If DEA cannot fulfill the commitments made to me when it's representatives recruited me from CIA in 1973, then the highest echelons of the Justice Department should expedite my transfer back to CIA as soon as possible.

14-00000

C O N F I D E N T I A L 161400Z JAN 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13076

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

SUBJ: IDENTITIES IN NFL-002-76 DATED 14 JANUARY 1976 FORWARDED IN POUCH NO. 234

IDEN A - GRAYSTON LYNCH, 5709 BAY POINT DRIVE, TAMPA, FLORIDA
PHONE NUMBER: 813-884-8618

IDEN B - OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL

IDEN C - GUSTAVO FERNANDEZ

IDEN D - AMADO CANTILLO

IDEN E - ROBERT MEDELL

IDEN F - GEORGE SOHL (NICKNAME ''JERRY'')

IDEN G - LUCIEN CONIEN

IDEN H - BENEDICT MANDICH

IDEN I - GARY MATTOCKS, PHONE NUMBER 279-0945

IDEN J - WILLIAM LOGAY

IDEN K - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IDEN L - MIKE BRUM

IDEN M - BUD FRANKS

IDEN N - BUREAU OF NARCOTICS

IDEN O - RAFAEL GARCIA

IDEN P - GONZALO HERRERA

IDEN Q - J[illegible] PEST[illegible]I

IDEN R - ING[illegible]LL

JAN 16 11 10 AM '76

IDEN S - (GRAY GHOST)

IDEN T - THE DRUG RING THAT WAS ROLLED UP WAS A MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR OPERATION. THE GROUP HAD A COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE BUDGET OF ABOUT US$ONE MILLION ANNUALLY, AND INCLUDED (EITHER AS ACTIVE RING MEMBERS OR WITTING OF ITS ACTIVITIES) THE SON OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN KEY WEST, THE STATE'S ATTORNEY, THE SHERIFF AND CHIEF OF POLICE, THREE MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, THE ENTIRE POLICE DEPARTMENT, OVER HALF OF THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, THE FIRE CHIEF, AND VARIOUS CITY AND COUNTY OFFICIALS. THE RING ALSO RAN THE PROSTITUTION, NUMBERS, AND THEFT RINGS IN THE AREA. WHILE SOME OF THESE PERSONS WERE ARRESTED (THE FIRE CHIEF, FOR ONE), OTHERS WERE NOT, AND ALL ARE FREE ON BAIL AT THIS TIME.

IDEN U - GEORGE CRILE

IDEN V - BERNARD L. BARKER

IDEN W - EUGENIO R. MARTINEZ

IDEN X - WATERGATE

IDEN Y - MADAM NHU

IDEN Z - RALPH JOHNSON

IDEN AA - VNO

IDEN BB - CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS E2 IMPDET CL BY 011663

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NFL-003-76

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Deputy Chief of Operations (Watts)

13 January 1976

Chief, Miami Field Office

194491

Publication of Items Relating to Cuban Operations

1. We met with Grayston Lynch, a retired Agency staff employee, on 7 January 1976 at his home in Tampa, Florida. Lynch had requested the meeting through contact with OGC. One item of interest to Lynch concerns a book he wishes to write on Cuban operations during the period 1961-67. Lynch currently is in the process of preparing one book (on the Bay of Pigs) for publication. Recently, however, he spoke with George Crile, who is writing a book on Watergate burglars Eugenio Martinez and Bernard Barker. Crile indicated he and co-author Taylor Branch plan to follow that book with one on the Agency's Cuban operations, and focus on Lynch and William Robertson, two major figures in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Since Martinez was deeply involved with Lynch as a ship captain during the Bay of Pigs and in subsequent operations against Cuba, he will be the primary source for the book.

2. Lynch believes the story Martinez will provide will be somewhat inaccurate because he only saw developments from the vantage point of a ship captain. Lynch (whose cohort Robertson is deceased) believes only he can provide an accurate recounting. The Martinez book is scheduled for printing in the summer of 1976. Lynch would like to beat Crile and Branch to the punch. Indeed, he believes they will not publish their book if they know he is going to publish one on the same subject. What Lynch wishes is an indication of general Agency reaction to any manuscript he might write on the period.

3. Lynch wishes to write about the operations of the AMLILAC group (Commandos Mombisei) during the period 1961-67, when Lynch conducted about 100 infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba. Any manuscript he drafts will, of course, be submitted to the Agency for review. He does not wish to get into the writing job, however, if there is a blanket prohibition on describing Agency operations which occurred in that period and place. He notes that Martinez, not fettered by Agency restrictions, will provide Crile and Branch with his recollections. Lynch believes he can cover the material in a way which will not hurt anyone or expose anything. He had no intentions of getting into the commando raid recounting business until he heard from Crile recently.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

4. Since time is important on this matter, Lynch shall appreciate a fairly quick response on this question. He recognizes no final decision on his manuscript can be made until Agency officials review it. At the same time, however, it may not be too difficult to ascertain the presence or absence of a blanket restriction on writing about this era.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

EJKnaysi:ljh

19-44-94

DEC 16 3 29 PM '75

CONFIDENTIAL 162000Z DEC 75 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13034

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (WATTS)

FROM: CHIEF, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

SUBJ: GRAYSTON LYNCH, TAMPA, FLORIDA

REF : TELECON OF MAINWARING/WATTS, 16 DECEMBER 1975, SAME SUBJECT.

I TALKED WITH SUBJECT BY TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON. HE WILL BE INTERVIEWED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A FULL REPORT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

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Control

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DIARY, 16 December 1975

194494

1. John Greaney, OGC, called this date to advise that ex-CIA employee (now retired) Grayston Lynch told John over the telephone that he wants to consult with a CIA officer on some undefined problems concerning other ex-CIA employees. It seems that Lynch, who was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation and is an open protagonist of CIA, is writing a book. He is in contact with Greaney with respect to OGC's need to review the book before it is published.

2. Greaney, who believes that Lynch may be connected with Dave Philips' Ex-CIA Employees Association, asked if we could have a DCD officer from the Miami Field Office visit Lynch in Tampa, where he is now living, and listen to his story. Greaney attached some importance and urgency to his request and indicated that it would be advantageous for the Agency to remain on good terms with Lynch.

3. I told him I would pass his request on to higher DCD authority and let him know what is decided. Lynch's address is: 8709 Bay Point Drive, Tampa, Florida, telephone: 813-884-8610.

CSmyth/pk

Former Employee

CONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

10-42-94

OCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLEC S

SECTION 1. To be completed by the field

1. METHOD OF COLLECTION

INTERVIEW	TRIP REPORT	OTHER DOC.	OTHER (Specify)
X			

2. DIRECTED TO: Group/Desk Officer
DCD/ICG/AMA (Hunter/Budelier)

3. SUBJECT AND AREA
Recruitment of Cuban Exile Aircrews

(Zaire)

4. FIELD COMMENTS
INTERNAL USE ONLY

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

5. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Grayston Lynch
8709 Bay Point Drive
Tampa, Florida

6. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

7. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
None

8. REPORT SERIES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 / A B ☒ K T S Y	9. REPORT NO. 1-7	10. CASE NO. 8-12	11. DATE FWD'D MO. 13-14	DA. 15-16	YR. 17-18	12. FO/RO 19-22	13. EXCHANGES 23: 1. Exchanges	2. Bilateral	3. Commercial	4. Article IV
E(R)	07314-77	64,954	03	31	77	XMIM				

14. OBJ. 24-26	15. KIQ. 27-29	16. JOINT 30	17. MILITARY 31	1. Air Force 2. Army 5. Navy	18. I/O (32-43)	19. F.O. CHIEF
Kla	11				BMainwaring	BMainwaring

SECTION 2: To be completed by Headquarters

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS (Do not reveal source indentities)

Process sheet and report was typed in Headquarters/International Collection Group, AMA Section from Miami teletype 13953. ZIBET VIA USG (Foster)

Coordinated w/ ZIBET -
made IUC at ZIBET request

ORPA - 6G05   NIO/AF 7E47
CRG - 7G50
CPS - Rbt Foster 7F24

SECTION 3: To be completed by ICB

SUBJECT 44-47	NO DISSEM. 48	49	50	DATE RELEASED MO. 51-52	DA. 53-54	YR. 55-56	57	GRADE 58-59	E(GAMPOR) 60	CNTRY CODE 61-64	MAJOR AREA CODE 65	TYPE REPORT 66	IUO/REST. 67
				04	01	77		05	R	190	5	E	X

SUBJECT	NO DISSEM.	49	50
0 ECO	1. Sufficiently well known	0	0
1 S&T		1	1
2 POL	2. Too general	[✓ 2]	2
[✓ 3] MIL	3. Data supplied by other agencies	3	[✓ 3]
4 ---		4	4
5 SOC	4. Other, Misc.	5	5
6 GEO	5. Combined with	6	6
7 BIO		7	7
8 ---	6. Insufficient interest	8	8
9 TOS		9	9

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM:

DESK OFFICER
NBudelier for MHunter:djm

BRANCH SECTION CHIEF
Nomie Budelier

	INDIVIDUAL NO. 68-73	ORGANIZATION 74-79
CONTACT		
SOURCE		
SUB-SOURCE		

FORM 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITION   CONFIDENTIAL   E2 IMPDET CL BY 010650   (20-41)

CONFIDEN. . AL

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Domestic Collection Division
Foreign Intelligence Information Report

COUNTRY Zaire

SUBJECT Recruitment of Cuban Exile Aircrews

DCD REPORT NO. OO- E 324/07314-77

DATE DISTR. 1 April 1977

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES DCD Case 64,954

DATE OF INFO. March 1977

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, a former professional intelligence officer. He received this information from a long time acquaintance who was invited to participate in the project discussed in this report.

1. An individual described as chief pilot to Zaire President Sese Seko Mobuto has been attempting to recruit pilots and ground crews from among Cuban exile groups to counter invading forces. Especially desired are members of the former Cuban Congo brigade.
2. Active in this project is an individual named Rene Garcia.
3. According to prospective participants, two qualified pilots may have recently left for South Africa, presumably in connection with this project.
4. Zaire is also seeking to purchase skyraider aircraft.

- end -

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Classified by 011668 [illegible]

THE DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS CONTROLLED BY DCID 1/7.

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

19-04-94

PROCESS SHEET FOR DCD COLLECTIONS

FIELD RESIDENT OFFICE: X N F L

ORGANIZATION NUMBER:

CASE NUMBER:

FORWARDED MO. DAY YR: 0 1 1 3 6

REPORT SERIES & NO.: ~~A~~ 0 0 2 7 0 7 6

3

SUBJECT AND AREA
Eulugio Cantillo/Claim of High Quality Uranium Deposits in Cuban Mine

(Cuba)

RELEASED MO. DAY YR: 01226

CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Grayston Lynch
8790 Bay Point Drive
Tampa, FL

INDIVIDUAL NO.

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

* NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	[✓ M]	[✓ I]	[✓ S]

*
1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC.
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

NO. PROCESSING ELEMENT 51	52
1	1
2	2
[✓ 3]	[✓ 3]
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9

SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

METHOD OF COLLECTION
X INTERVIEW
OTHER DOCUMENT
TRIP REPORT
OTHER (Specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

EXCHANGES (COL. 35)
1-EXCHANGE
2-BILATERAL
3. COMMERCIAL
4. ARTICLE IV

DIRECTED TO: CSG X | SREE | ICG | ETF | DESK OFFICER

FIELD COMMENTS
We decided OO-A(S) would be the most appropriate format for this information since AKULE has (according to Source) had a long relationship with the general. Any follow-up request for verification would likely go through that route. Source has not previously passed the information to an Agency representative.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS
AKULE

HH 27779

MBO: C I A | KIQ: XX | GRADE: OX | INDIVIDUAL NO. | MA: 7 | TR: A | COUNTRY: 014A

EJKnaysi:ljh

F BEMAINWARING

DESK OFFICER: C. Murphy

BRANCH/SECTION CHIEF: CSG

FORM 7-75 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 006697

(20-41)

1

CLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

REPORT NO. OO-A(S)-322/00270-76

DATE 13 January 1976

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Eulugio Cantillo/Claim of High Quality Uranium Deposits in Cuban Mine

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report is believed to contain information of operational interest and may not be disclosed to personnel outside the Directorate of Operations without the prior permission of the Domestic Collection Division.

US citizen, individual with longtime relationship with Eulugio Cantillo. Source is a retired Agency staff employee.

1. Eulugio Cantillo, a Cuban national who resides at 6791 S.W. 2nd Street, Miami, Florida, is a former Cuban general. In 1956, when he was the Chief of the Cuban Air Force under Cuban dictator Batista, Cantillo's uncle came to him with an ore sample the uncle had uncovered in an abandoned former Spanish mine in Cuba. The uncle suspected the ore was uranium. Cantillo brought the specimen to the US, where it was assayed by an unnamed US survey company as being the richest uranium sample the firm had ever tested. Cantillo and the uncle, who were the only individuals aware of the location of the mine, recognized archaic Cuban laws did not protect their find, so the general attempted to get Batista to change the mining statutes. Batista suspected the general had come across something significant, andhhe sent a team of men to the Pinar del Rio area for six months on a search. The team uncovered nothing. Batista also tried to work out a deal where he would be a partner in the venture as a pre-condition to changing the mining laws. He was unsuccessful in convincing Cantillo to permit him to become a partner. At that time, the revolution reached full intensity, and Batista left the country.

2. Cantillo's uncle is still in Cuba. Despite Cantillo's imprisonment by the Fidel Castro regime for nine years, he has never told anyone about his uncle's find. Approximately one year ago, Cantillo approached a retired Agency staff employee and informed him of the uncle's find. He did so after all these years because of the developing relations between the US and Cuba. Cantillo feels the US may be able to make use of information that Castro does not possess about the riches that exist in his own nation, and that Castro and the USSR would capitalize on the find if they were to become aware of it. In his view, the US should know of this potential before it conducts negotiations with Castro. The general is willing to provide the name of the assay company, so that documentation can be obtained on the purity of the uranium.

3. The general's US contact notes Cantillo is not the sort of man who speaks inaccurately about things such as this. He described Cantillo as a "solid guy", and says the information Cantillo has provided probably is reliable.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Classified by 007622
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification

3216 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-1552

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 29 June 1954

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Mission, Mexico City

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Subject of HMM-W-1507

REFERENCE: HMM-W-1507, 18 June 1954

TKVW-975
976

1. Subject is contacted by a member of this Mission about twice a month usually on a semi-social basis. Subject is quite familiar with the workings of the organization based on his experience in Panama, his frequent visits there, and his contacts with this office during the past four years. From time to time subject provides bits of information or opinions on local affairs which he thinks may be of interest. Ways in which he could be of further operational use have also been discussed with him in general terms. Subject has provided his name for use in registering a station automobile and for obtaining postoffice boxes.

2. Subject appears to be well versed in some of the operational methods of the organization and has always expressed a willingness to assist in any way possible. This might include acting as a cut-out, furnishing general political and Communist information, setting up cover establishments, and the development of informants in several fields. To date, no specific opening for his services has been evolved but it is highly likely that such a spot will appear in the future.

3. This Mission foresees no strong obstacle or reason against subject's being contacted by KUJUMP again but feels that if subject had any information of possible interest to this organization he would immediately contact the writer. In addition, such a contact might possibly re-kindle subject's previously expressed feeling that at times it appeared that "the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing". It is suggested that if KUJUMP has any specific type of information in mind, questions indicating the line of interest could be forwarded to this Mission and placed before subject for his comment. If KUJUMP particularly desires to interview subject it is suggested that this Mission be authorized to so inform subject so that the matter will appear completely coordinated in subject's mind.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201 30999

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

RI COPY

HMMA-1952
29 June 1954
Page two

4. This Mission appreciates the receipt of reference as an excellent example of such coordination.

GMRyerson

Gordon M. Ryerson

GMR/crt

29 June 1954

Distribution:
✓3-Wash
2-Files

SECRET

201 [illegible]0000

~~50-5-2-259~~

AIR HMM-A-1547

JUN 18 1954

: Chief of Mission, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD

- Operational
- Subject of TMM-A-775

REF: TMM-A-976

1. A representative of KUJUMP recently contacted subject, a U.S. manufacturers' representative, who lives in Mexico City. After KUJUMP made its standard explanation of KUBARK interests, the subject said that he felt that he should make it clear that he worked for KUBARK in Mexico. He qualified this statement by saying that his extensive background and experience in Mexico enabled him to set up meeting places and front offices as well as other cover projects for KUBARK, ODACID and ODENVY.

2. Subject seemed quite candid and KUJUMP had no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. Subject doubted that he could give KUBARK a great deal of information which was not available through official agencies operating in Mexico. However, he seems to be generally knowledgeable on the situation there and KUJUMP feels that he might be a source of some interesting information if their contacting him would not interfere with arrangements which your Mission might have made with him.

3. Headquarters requests your comments regarding subject. Please advise as soon as possible, since KUJUMP would like to contact subject again when he returns to this country in July.

11 June 1954

J. C. KING
C/WH

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI
✓1 - Subj.

WH/III/MJOgden/jw

J. C. KING

O. M. DOERFLINGER

201 30999

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE APR 2 1955

14-00000

Boston 8266

Chief, FI/Plans/Cover

11 May 1954

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Alfonso R. Wichtrich (HH-1265)

1. A representative of this Division recently contacted subject, a US manufacturers' representative, who lives in Mexico City. Wichtrich was visiting representatives of the Nehi Corporation which is one of his accounts in Mexico City. After our representative made his standard explanation of Agency interests, Wichtrich said that he felt that he should make it clear that he worked for the Agency in Mexico. He qualified this statement by saying that his extensive background and experience in Mexico enabled him to set up meeting places and "front" offices as well as other "cover" projects for this Agency, the State Department and the Bureau.

2. He seemed quite candid and our representative had no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. Wichtrich doubted that he could give us a great deal of information which was not available through official agencies operating in Mexico. However, he seems to be generally knowledgeable on the situation there and we believe that he might be a source of some interesting information if our contacting him would not interfere with arrangements which the covert offices might have made with him.

3. We should appreciate your comments. If you prefer, we shall not see him again. On the other hand, if you have no objection, we should like to contact him when he returns to this country in July. Please advise.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

HMM-w.

201 30999

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TMM-W-916

SE[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 1 February 1950

FROM : FDT

o WICHTRICH, ALPHONSE R,

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Operational
SPECIFIC. Subject of TMM-W-975

1. Subject was engaged by our field station, Panama, in October 1947 with the thought that he was qualified to organize a net directed against a target of high priority interest. His services were terminated in April 1949 when he took residence in Mexico for business reasons.

2. The Chief of Station, Panama, described this man as having great singleness of purpose which produces superior results in the field of his primary interest. But the experience in Panama revealed that the subject's primary interest - his business - was such that he gave little time to work as an agent.

3. The Subject organized an intelligence net for the U.S. Army in China during World War II and, therefore, understands covert operations. Despite his capabilities, proven reliability, and his expressed desire to be of service in Mexico, Headquarters does not recommend that the subject be engaged by field station, Mexico, unless there is unusual need for a man of his background.

COPY

RECLASSIFIED
~~RI/[illegible]~~
RI/[illegible]
EWR:gee
RI/Files

[illegible]
per [illegible] 43-28

Wm. M. Wheeler
Wm. M. Wheeler
[illegible] L. Dean

201 30999

ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 2[illegible] '55

STC
John P. Gleason
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

Wm. M. Wheeler by
Wm. M. Wheeler
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FDT

KAPOK

NO. RPA-690

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Connally		16 Jun		re	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8. Reid					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					201 30999
14.		45-28			ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX
15.					DATE APR 21 55

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TTP-A-690

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 January 1950

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- Subject of TTP-A-689

The address of subject is:

Royal Crown, S. A.
Dante #4
Mexico, D. F.

Howard W. Antell
Howard W. Antell

HWA:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2✓
Files 1

SECRET - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

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FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

14-00000

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

NO. TZPA-689

DATE 16 Jan 50

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FDT	2014	[illegible]		[illegible]	
2. Rodriguez					File attached. [illegible]
3. Dean		25 Jan 25		[illegible]	[illegible] 3 & 4 Please discuss this disp.
4. Rastetter				[illegible]	with Vandervoort re a recommendation to mission Field Station Mexico
5. Reid					advised of Hydrol's
6.					recent arrival in
7.					Mexico. Dispatches written by RWR TMM-W-97
8.					
9. Connally		26 Jan		rc	
10. Reid					
11.					201 - 30999
12.					ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~ DATE APR 21 1955
13.					OSO Registry
14.					JAN 23 1950
15. SOR	1514				10

FORM NO. 51.10
APR 1949

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 January 1950

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- HIDRCL

The services of subject had been terminated prior to my arrival at this station and, in fact, subject has not been residing here since my arrival.

He was recently in Panama on a business trip and was introduced to me by HIDRACID. In the course of the conversation, subject indicated a desire, after he becomes more settled in Mexico City, to have contact with our office there.

Since Headquarters and particularly Grover J. WARING are in a better position to judge subject and whether he might be of assistance to our station in Mexico City, no recommendation is being made.

The address of subject will follow in a separate dispatch.

Howard W. Antell
Howard W. Antell

HWA:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2 ✓
Files 1

REGISTRY COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

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FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: FDI

ACCESSION NO. DI-A-607

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Rd		17 Mar		[illegible]	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5. Reis				JP	copy detached for Gen Files.
6.					
7.					
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9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

707.999

201 30999

ABSTRACT

DATE APR 21 1955

FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946

SECRET

(1333)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-607

S E C R E T - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 4 November 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- HYDROL

For the completion of Headquarters' records, advice is herewith furnished that subject's services are not being utilized by the Panama City station. This fact was made known to Headquarters under date of April 12, 1949 in TZP-A-454.

No further action is contemplated in connection with this project.

Bruce O. Sturgess
Bruce O. Sturgess

BOS:rtp

Distribution: Wash 2
Files 1

[illegible]

201 30999

S E C R E T - KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Chief, Registry Division DATE: 15 June 1949

FROM Chief, FBT

SUBJECT: Hydrol
File No. 202-999

1. Subject file is transmitted herewith for retention in Registry. The project has been terminated.

2. Appropriate indexing has been completed.

3. Access to subject file must be cleared with the Chief of FBT.

Note - carded in RI/CO
7 Oct 54

SECRET

201 30999

SECRET

Date 8 June 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

SUBJECT: Authorization of Field Project Expenditures for Panama City, Panama.
(field installation)

1. This will inform you of the authorization of the following Field Projects and my approval of the expenditure of special funds for the following:

PROJECT	AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED		1949		TOTAL
Name or Symbol	1 July-30 Sep.	1 Oct-31 Dec.	1 Jan-31 Mar.	1 Apr-30 Jun	
HYDROL				Terminated 1 April 1949	
TOTAL					

2. The project expenditures herewith [illegible] Panama City, Panama charged against the appropriate quarterly Operating Expenses of ______.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.
Chief, Foreign Branch

cc: IOPF

SECRET

201 30999

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-A-454

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 12 April 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- HYTROL - Operational Review

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY: [illegible]. PERIOD COVERED: October 1946 - March 1949.
[illegible]: [illegible].

1. Subject is no longer an active operative of this station. He was forced to discontinue his activities on our behalf because of the press of personal business. [illegible] is now in contact with HYACID and HYTROL I has been taken over by [illegible].

2. During the period of his connection with this station, HYTROL failed to submit any informational report which in itself merited transmission to the Home Office. None of his operations were clean in the sense that a U.S. Government influence had to be introduced into the actual activation of each of his sources. This coupled with the fact that he lacked follow-through has given a slightly sour aspect to all of his operations. We intend to discontinue our connections with Subject.

Grover J. Waring
Grover J. Waring

25 Jan 1950
Were this man to apply for a staff position I would recommend that he be employed. He is a man of great singleness of purpose and gets enthusiastically in ~~[illegible]~~ the fulfillment of his primary interests. On the other hand this quality which would be an asset to a staff employee proved a drawback to his ability to perform as agent while engaged in [illegible] his mission. I would ~~not recommend him~~ [illegible] as an agent for another country unless they needed such a man very badly.
[illegible] Waring

GJW:emh

Distribution:

Wash (2)
Files (1)

REGISTRY COPY

CLASSIFICATION

201-306[illegible]

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

DOCUMENTS IN DOSSIER

TZP-A-102
TZP-A-381
TZP-A-454
A-690
A-689

TZP-151

TZP. W. 975
TZP. W. 976

Name check

Project terminated, April 1949

201 30999

6 January 1949

Memorandum for Chief, Special Funds

Hydrol $150 for second quarter 1949

Terminated

201 30988

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM: FBI

ACCESSION NO. TZP-A-381

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Payton	2216		9/12	P.P.	Field informed by despatch on 9 Dec. that the project is not to be activated as requested here. Directed to allot $50.00 per month for Hydrol and an additional $50.00 for salary and expenses of his sub-agent.
2.					
3.					
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13.					
14.					

201 30999

ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~

DATE APR 21 1955

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ____________ DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-321
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET — Kapok
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT DATE: 22 November, 1948

FROM : Chief of Station
Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC- HYDROL Operational Review and Project Report

Ref: FM No. 51
TZP - 151
TZP - A - 102
TZP - W - 321

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY: YAWNER PERIOD COVERED: 20 October, 1947 to present.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

Subject's original assignment was the establishment of an intelligence net for the Republic of Panama with a view to developing information on our various YAWNER objectives. The assignment was too broad because subject is establishing a new business and has not had sufficient time to devote to our work. His activities were redirected along the lines of cultivation of specific individuals. His cultivation and recruitment of the informant HYDRACID was excellent. His handling of the subject of TZP-A-260 was excellent. His handling of HYDRAMANIAC has been unsatisfactory in that he has not spent sufficient time on the project. He states he will correct this deficienty. His latest assignment is the penetration of communist circles in the National University of Panama. He has recruited an excellent individual for this purpose who will be employed at a salary of one Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per month. This project is approximately one year old.

SALARY

To date subject has not received a salary, but has been compensated socially and by

SECRET — Kapok
CLASSIFICATION

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APR 1947

making purchases for him in the government commissaries. We plan to place him on a salary status in the future. When this is done we intend that his salary be One Hundred Dollars per month ($100.00) per month. He no longer has cover in his activities as concerns the U. S. Army in this area. This is due to the fact that Gen. Sibert USARCarib attempted to recruit him as an army informant after subject had performed two week's active duty with Army Intelligence. To avoid refusing the General's request, subject informed him that he was processing his information through [illegible]. Since that date, army CIC men have called at subject's place of business inquiring for information. However, we seem to have his real loyalty and we are the ones who can provide him with funds to cultivate sub-agents.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

As stated above subject has performed excellent services but has not devoted a great deal of time to our work. His interest has greatly increased since you permitted HYDROL to receive home office training. He has fairly good contacts and is capable of cultivating almost any one we might wish. His services should become more valuable in the immediate future.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

To date subject's intelligence information has only been valuable as a supplement to other sources. His operational information has been excellent and is of real value. He is more interested in the operational side of our activities than in reporting.

OTHER FACTORS:

This agent has been handled as outlined in TZP-151 subject to the modifications of increased social contacts necessitated by the fact that subject's wife is interested in the social advantages to be gained from her husband's activities.

COMMENTS:

We plan to continue using this agent to cultivate other potential agent personnel. His primary continuous project will now be the penetration of communist activities in the National University of Panama. We may rearrange the relationship between HYDROL, HYDRACID and HYLITE in view of HYDRACID's current schooling. This project is still in the development or probationary stage in that HYDROL's background is such that he regards the sky as the limit in the expenditure of Intelligence funds and is inclined to commit himself financially without real assurance that we will receive full value for the funds expended. Realizing that time is an important factor in the development of high level operations we hope this will prove to be the most efficient expenditure of our funds. If not we will convert the funds to other projects. As a matter of operational organization we feel our ultimate objective in this area should be to ferret out and operate with a minimum number of skilled American resident agents. Offsetting the criticism mentioned above are the facts that subject is a man of real integrity and definitely a high level operative.

REQUEST: It is requested that Project HYDROL be approved to permit an expenditure of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per quarter.

Grover J. Waring

Grover J. Waring

Interview with Alfonso Rudolf Wichtrich by Paul P. Paxton

1. On 17 November 1948, the subject called at Que Building and was interviewed by Paul P. Paxton. He had been advised to pay his respects to Harry A. Real by the Chief of Station, Panama City. The subject ~~was~~ [illegible] to learn what the procedure would be if he wished to offer his services with CIA at a future date. At the present time he is managing the Royal Crown Bottling Works in Panama City and is negotiating for a franchise to distribute a milk product in that area. His primary purpose in coming to the United States at this time was to make arrangements for this latter business venture. The subject has been aiding the Chief of Station in Panama for the past year in a manner that has been extremely helpful to our operations. During the war he was a Lt. Col. in United States Army Intelligence serving for a considerable time in China in an undercover capacity. He gives evidence of being very well versed in intelligence matters and shows a keen appreciation for security matters.

2. He stated that within six or eight months his private business affairs in Panama would be developed to the point where he could accept a position with this Agency in a full-time capacity. He evidenced interest in either the Latin American area or in the Far East, preferably China. I made no commit~~e~~ments as far as future employment is concerned but I did suggest that ~~you~~ he visit this headquarters on his next visit to the United States providing he is in a position to accept full-time employment. I recommend that his application be given serious consideration in the light of his past intelligence experience and by virture of his valuable assistance to our operations in Panama.

201 30999

MR 25963—Panama Canal—1-29-48—1,000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-151

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 9 July 1948

FROM : Chief of Station AJW
Panama City, Panama

SUBJECT: GENERAL Agents and Informants
SPECIFIC Operational Data - HYDROL

Ref - TZP-A-102, WASH/F 8786 and PACY 188

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. HYDROL.

2. Subject's background has been with the U. S. Army in China, where he organized a complete intelligence net. He is an organizer and planner and best qualified for the supervision of intelligence nets and informants, and intelligence operations in general.

3. He is a very personable individual and has the facility for getting along with Latins. He is very well accepted even though he has been here only a little over a year.

4. In Latin America because of his knowledge of Spanish. He is also well qualified to operate in the China Theater in view of his past experiences, although he has no knowledge of the language.

5. Subject makes frequent business trips to Mexico.

6. Subject has discussed plans for expanding his business into South America.

7. Subject has five people working for him. (a) HYDRACID; HYDRAMATIC; and the subject of TZP-A-269. He has also cultivated two unwitting informants, one of whom is a fairly prominent Arnulfista and the other is a socially prominent Panamanian and businessman on whom we will submit biographical data at a future date. (b) None of the people are paid. The subject of TZP-A-269 has been informed that we will defray any expenses which he may have incidental to our operations. HYDRACID has expressed a desire to have a savings or retirement fund opened for him in the United States. This we have agreed to do and estimate that the cost will be about $100 to $150 per month.

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201 309-95

(780)

8. No.

9. In view of the fact that subject contacted the Home Office prior to his departure from the United States, he is thoroughly cognizant of the ultimate destination of his information.

10. Yes. In view of HYDROL's experience in the intelligence field he has been given the assignment of supervising and controlling the activities of HYDRACID who has an excellent knowledge of the local situation but lacks experience as an intelligence operative. This also serves to maintain HYDRACID's cover.

11. Through letter drop. In addition frequent personal contacts take place between HYDROL and the Chief of Station. These are usually at night at the homes of the individuals concerned. Cover is provided in that the Chief of Station and HYDROL both have children attending the same school and the wives are acquainted socially.

12. Subject usually reports orally, accompanying his oral reports with brief notes. He is training the subject of TZP-A-269 and HYDRACID to report in writing.

13. During the 1½ years subject has been in Panama, he has been principally concerned with establishing his own business. He has devoted only a small percentage of his time to our work to date, however, since he is now better established and better oriented, it is contemplated that he will become more active.

14. Contract with subject is oral. A written contract will be prepared at the time he is placed on our payroll.

15. Yes. He is attempting a high-level penetration of the Partido del Pueblo. At the present time, a foreign national who has been approached by HYDRACID is attempting to buy one of the Directors of the Partido del Pueblo.

16. Subject is quite capable of using his own judgment on the sort of work he is to do. Since his time has been limited in the past, he has confined his activities to projects specifically requested by this Station.

PAYMENT

17. Subject is a volunteer informant who is rewarded for his services by the occasional presentation of exchange commodities. Since subject does not have U. S. Government Commissary privileges, purchases on his behalf are made by the Station. This results in approximately 60% reduction in the cost of necessities purchased in this manner.

18. Yes. Salary arrangements have been discussed between HYDROL and the Chief of Station. We both agree that no salary should be paid until such time as he becomes more productive. It is contemplated that when we actually

start payment the figure will be something less than $150.00 a month and it will probably be placed into some sort of a savings account. This plan may be placed into effect at any time.

19. Subject has been informed that we will defray all expenses incurred by him on our behalf.

20. No cost of purchase of information is involved but he is authorized to engage in this practice.

EVALUATION OF SUBJECT'S WORK

21. Subject appears to be a highly dependent individual. (a) The accuracy of his reports have been good. (b) From a security angle he is excellent.

22. In view of subject's previous intelligence background, it is believed he is only suitable for semi-covert work.

23. Subject is unquestionably a high-level operative and quite possibly might penetrate any of the local social or government circles, but again his background from China is such that it would probably be impossible for him to accomplish a penetration of any leftist organizations or foreign intelligence agencies.

egW

[illegible]

YAGUAZA

Panama

IN 38550
PACY 183
29 Mar 48

201 30999

WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph

Panama

IN 38550
PACY 188
29 Mar 48

201 30999

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FBI

DATE: December 23, 1947

FROM : CSB

SUBJECT: WICHTRICH, Alfonso R.

Reference is made to your memorandum of October 31, 1947, wherein you request that this office conduct a four way name check relative to the above-entitled subject.

This is to advise that a four way check was instituted concerning the subject, with the following results:

L-5 Nothing identifiable
L-3 No record
L-1 Nothing derogatory.

There is transmitted herewith a copy of a report obtained from the files of Confidential Government Agency L-2; it is requested that this report be returned to this office when it has served its purpose.

The above completes our action in this matter unless advised to the contrary.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM
Chief, Security Branch, OSO

1 Incl.
L-2 Report

Info sent to field
on 26 December 1947.
R.R.

T20- a-102

SECRET

201 30999

CONFIDENTIAL

WICHTRICH, Alfonso Rudolph 4 December 1947

On December 3, 1947 the investigative files of Confidential Government Agency (L-2) were examined and disclosed the following:

Included in the file is an investigative report dated June 25, 1943 regarding one Captain Al. R. Wichtrich, Army Serial Number 0377220, which revealed no adverse information regarding Subject. It was mentioned, however, by four informants that Subject's father was suspected of having pro-German leanings during World War #1, but these suspicions were not verified by the informants. Persons interviewed vouched for Subject's father's loyalty at the time of the investigation.

It was noted that Subject's Personal History Statement dated February 16, 1943 indicates that he was born on October 30, 1915 at Willcox, Arizona. The investigation verified the fact, however, that Subject was born in Chihuahua, Mexico on October 30, 1915.

In a casual conversation with another officer, Subject volunteered the following information with respect to records of his birthplace. Subject stated that he had no birth certificate and had moved from Chihuahua Mexico to El Paso, Texas, with his parents, when he was one or two years of age. Subject stated that he had never inquired about, nor realized that he was born in Chihuahua until he was in high school, having previously presumed that he was born in the locale in which his childhood was spent, Viz; Willcox, Arizona.

Subject stated further that he gave his birthplace as Willmox, Arizona on his application for enlistment in ROTC to eliminate conflict with any previous records which would then require a lot of "red tape" in making what he considered then a minor discrepancy of no consequence, inasmuch as his father's naturalization automatically made him (Subject) a citizen of the United States.

It was the opinion of the officer making the above report on Subject's birthplace; that any conflicting records of Subject's birthplace was not due to any motives of subterfuge, but was most probably due to Subject's desire to expedite his entrance into college without encountering

CONFIDENTIAL

the difficulties of time required and uncertainty of results in procuring certain papers which might be required if Subject were to indicate Chihuahua, Mexico, as his birthplace.

The file indicates further that records of the Superior Court, County of Cochise, Bisbee, Arizona, disclose that Subject's father, Gustave Wichtrich, was naturalized at Tombstone, Arizona, September 15, 1923; Certificate Number 1735933; Port of Entry, El Paso Texas, June 19, 1916. On his petition for naturalization, Subject's father gave as one of his several sons, Alfonso Wichtrich who was born at Chihuahua, Mexico, on October 30, 1915. Subject's family was residing at Willcox, Arizona, on May 15, 1920. Subject's father was born in Germany.

The above-mentioned Personal History Statement indicates that Subject's mother is Fermina Esparza Wichtrich who was born in Mexico of Spanish National origin. As of February 16, 1943, her application for U. S. citizenship was in process.

JEB:mcm

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:
FBT

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. CIC	221 Adm.		28/11		① Re par 4 basic [illegible], no derogatory information is contained in MID files on this individual. The files are not made available to this office, but were searched by responsible individual in [illegible].
2.					
3.					
4. Paxton [illegible]	[illegible]		26/12	P.P.	
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					201 30999

FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946

SECRET

(1333)

SECRET

5 November 1947

TO: Chief, Liaison Control
Att: Mr. Gaynor

FROM: Chief, Foreign Branch T for R. G. Ledig

SUBJECT: Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH

Your attention is directed to paragraph 4 of the attached dispatch which mentions a document in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. This office would like to obtain the information contained in this document and is forwarding this request for the appropriate action you deem necessary.

SECRET 201 30999

1106V03

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

SECRET

Dispatch No. TZP-19-102

VIA: Air Classification Date 20 October 1947

TO : FBT

FROM : TZP

SUBJECT: General -- Operations

Specific -- Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH
alias Al WICHTRICH

1. Subject is a United States citizen born 30 September 1915 in Mexico. He is a Catholic and the owner of a house located near Radio Station HOX in Golf Heights, R. de P. which he purchased from Jack Fidanque. His business partner in the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. is George M. ARIAS, who is Secretary and Manager of the company. Other key men are Enrique Lefevre, Vice-President; and Amadeo Lupi, Treasurer. He speaks fluent Spanish and appears to be getting along very well with the more influential Panamanians. The telephone number of the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. chartered for bottling Royal Crown Cola where WICHTRICH has his office is Panama 3490-A, located at Calle 30 y Justo Arosemena. His office hours are 0900 to 1200 and 1430 to 1730. His post office address is Box 1121 Ancon, Canal Zone. It is believed he was decorated by the Koumentang government for his service in China.

2. His wife is Rachel E. WICHTRICH also a U. S. citizen. She was born 13 February 1917 in Avoca, Texas. She is the bearer of U. S. passport #146432. Her brother is believed to be employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. WICHTRICH is the father of two children, a girl approximately age 7 and a boy of about 4. He is planning a business trip to Mexico City, Mexico on 2 November 1947. He will be accompanied by his wife and remain in Mexico until 15 November at which time he will return to Panama.

4. Subject states there is a complete file concerning him in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. It would be appreciated if you would obtain their file and forward all pertinent information to this station.

SECRET

ABSTRACT INDEX

201 36989

56-6-4
110600

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: 30 Oct 47

ACCESSION NO TSP. 4-102

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A. OCT 30 1947

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. FBT	2211	30/10			
2. Easton			30/10	RP.	Carbon copy furnish Security Results of check sent to [illegible] on 26 Dec. 1947 Nothing derogatory.
3. [illegible]					
4.					
5.					30/10
6. Geary					4-way name check requested. BG
7.					c Red.
8.					
9.					4-way name check attached BG.
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.	INDEX		CS COPY		
15.					

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201 30999
ABSTRACT ✓ ~~INDEX~~
DATE APR 21 1955

FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946

SECRET

(1333)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

SECRET
Classification

Dispatch No. TZP-A-102
Date 20 October 1947

VIA: Air

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO : FBT

FROM : TZP/[illegible]

SUBJECT: General -- Operations

Specific -- Alfonso Rudolph WICHTRICH
alias Al WICHTRICH

1. Subject is a United States citizen born 30 September 1915 in Mexico. He is a Catholic and the owner of a house located near Radio Station HOX in Golf Heights, R. de P. which he purchased from Jack Fidanque. His business partner in the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. is George M. ARIAS, who is Secretary and Manager of the company. Other key men are Enrique Lefevre, Vice-President; and Amadeo Lupi, Treasurer. He speaks fluent Spanish and appears to be getting along very well with the more influential Panamanians. The telephone number of the Pan American Industries Co. Inc. chartered for bottling Royal Crown Cola where WICHTRICH has his office is Panama 3490-A, located at Calle 30 y Justo Arosemena. His office hours are 0900 to 1200 and 1430 to 1730. His post office address is Box 1121 Ancon, Canal Zone. It is believed he was decorated by the Kuomintang government for his service in China.

2. His wife is Rachel E. WICHTRICH also a U. S. citizen. She was born 13 February 1917 in Avoca, Texas. She is the bearer of U. S. passport #146432. Her brother is believed to be employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

3. WICHTRICH is the father of two children, a girl approximately age 7 and a boy of about 4. He is planning a business trip to Mexico City, Mexico on 2 November 1947. He will be accompanied by his wife and remain in Mexico until 15 November at which time he will return to Panama.

4. Subject states there is a complete file concerning him in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army. It would be appreciated if you would obtain their file and forward all pertinent information to this station.

21 Oct 47

INDEX

SECRET CS COPY

201 30999

14-00000

OSS Form 2242a

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

ADO

Accession No. ....

[illegible] 3 07

Date Rec'd SA ....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. PPS	103				Request that subject be called in for interview with Mr. Leddy.
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

201-30999

(20640) **CONFIDENTIAL** ~~202-1663~~

Interviewer's Report

SOURCE: [illegible] Field__ Casual ✓

Referred by____________

DATE: 8 Nov 46 RECOMMENDED FOR BRANCH:________ CONTROL NO:________

1. NAME: WICHTRICH AL R GRADE:________ BRANCH:________
(last) (First) (middle)

2. SERIAL NUMBER:________ ORGANIZATION:________ DATE OF BIRTH:________

3. ADDRESS:________________ Tel. No.:________
Business or Military

4. 3444 GUNSTON RD ALEX VA Tel. No.: AL 8357
Home

4. CITIZENSHIP: (how acquired) RELIGION:
~~U.S. Birth~~ ~~Parents in~~ Born in Mexico - naturalized by parents naturalization in 19[illegible]

5. EDUCATION: (schools, degrees, dates, majors, grades, extra curricular activities)
AB - 1939 - UNI. OF ARIZ - Range ecology, animal husbandry

6. LANGUAGES: (degree of fluency, how acquired)
SPANISH - FLUENT

7. FOREIGN EXPERIENCE: (extent, purpose)
CHINA - 2 YRS WITH MIS-X. CPM BRANCH, MIS, WDG-2

8. PRINCIPLE CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: (main occupation, special skills, accomplishments, elective offices)
RANGE ECOLOGIST - DEPT OF AGR -

NOW MEMBER OF FIRM ESTABLISHING BOTTLING PLANTS THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

9. MILITARY EXPERIENCE: (principal duties, service schools, physical profile, If Officer: Manner of performance rating; If EM: AGCT score, Spec Nos, degree of Skills, MOS and MCO Nos, and titles)
Entered Army, Jan 41 - MAR 46. - LT. COL.
SERVED AT FT. RILEY - CRTC
COMPLETED G-2 COURSE AT LEAVENWORTH. PLUS MIS-X COURSE IN WASHINGTON.

10. ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES: (civil or military)

201-30999
202-1323 no record.

11. REMARKS: (any additional pertinent information)

Not personally interested in a spot- but he and other officials of the corporation (ex-officers) are interested in being of any assistance they can.

12. CLEARED AS AVAILABLE BY:

13. SERVICE RECORD CHECKED: Form 66-1 Form 20

14. RATINGS:

Motivation - Energy, effort, initiative, interest in assignment.	
Practical Intelligence - Judgment decisiveness, alertness, perception.	
Stability - Emotional control and maturity, absence of nervous symptoms.	
Ability to work with Others - Tact, absence of annoying traits.	
Leadership - Organizing ability, ability to win cooperation.	
Physical Ability - Appearance, presence, vigor, stamina.	

(Interviewer's Signature) (Rank and Br. of Service) (CIG Branch)

5704

August 30, 1946

MEMORANDUM TO Mr. Lightsey

Subject: Lt. Colonel Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)

Some months ago, Lt. Colonel Al R. Wichtrich, 3444 Gunster Road, Alexandria, was recommended to me as a possible candidate for service in China.

During the war he headed up the AGAS in China for G-2.

He was recommended to me by Colonel Edward R. Johnston formerly of G-2.

KINGMAN DOUGLASS
"B" Deputy
Office of Special Operations

CONFIDENTIAL 201-3886
202-1833 [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Byron C. Sarvis
Chief, Procurement Section

DATE: 6 September 1946

FROM : Personnel Officer, CIG

SUBJECT: Memorandum re - Lt. Col. Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)

The attached memorandum of 30 August 1946 from Kingman Douglass, with regard to Colonel Wichtrich, is referred to you for consideration.

Since it would appear that Colonel Wichtrich would be of more value to S.O., it is forwarded for consideration by officials in that Branch.

This correspondence has been recorded in the Central Records of CIG and I should be advised if you desire to retain it in your files.

Judson H. Lightsey
JUDSON H. LIGHTSEY
Personnel Officer, CIG

Attachment

cc: Central Records, CIG (2)

Mrs. Waller -

CONFIDENTIAL

201-30999
202-18 [illegible]

14-00000

File

5 November 1946

Lt. Col. Al R. Wichtrich (Inactive)
3444 Gunster Road,
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Sir:

Your name has been referred to us by Colonel Edward R Johnston as a person who might be interested in a possible assignment with this organisation.

Although we are not presently engaged in a general recruiting program, we are always interested in specially qualified personnel.

If you are interested in exploring the possibilities of employment with this organisation, it is requested that you call at this office for interview. We are located at the South Building, 2430 E St. N.W.

Thank you for your cooperation.

BYRON C. SARVIS Chief,
Personnel Procurement Section
Project Support Division

201-38999
201-1833 [illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

057 1 FEB 63 C/S

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WE 4, FI, S/C 2

ADDED: WH 8, WE 4

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 24 0253Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 55255

DIR CITE MEXI 3133

REF A. DIR 09718

B. DIR 12178 *

IN55255

05, 08

1. ON [illegible] DEC 62, 01[SMOTH]REP MEXI TOLD ODC "OFF RECORD" THAT [JOHN RETTIE, BRITISH B.B.C. NEWSMAN, WHO IN PAY SECRET SERVICE]IN CONTACT LICOOKY-1. 06[RETTIE]ACCORDING 01[SMOTH]REP READS AND WRITES FLUENT RUSSIAN AND FINNISH, ALSO SPEAKS SPANISH AND FRENCH. FORMERLY MARRIED FINNISH WOMAN. 06[RETTIE]NOW LIVES WITH LICOOKY-1 GREAT DEAL TIME. HE IS HER PRESENT LOVER ACCORDING 01[SMOTH]REP. 06[RETTIE]REPORTED THAT L-1 NOT COMMUNIST, VERY INTELLIGENT, EXCELLENT "MISTRESS" AND CLOSE JUAN JOSE AREVALO. 01[SMOTH]REP ALSO SAID 06[RETTIE]TRYING MAKE CONTACT WITH MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO.

2. STATION AWARE 06[RETTIE]LICOOKY-1 RELATIONSHIP THROUGH L-1. L-1 INTRODUCED 06[RETTIE]TO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO ON 3 JAN 63. MEXI SUGGESTS HQS TELL 01[SMALTITE]THAT STATION IN INDIRECT CONTACT L-1 RE GUAT EXILE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED REPLY RE 11[BRITISH]INQUIRY RE LICOOKY.

Licooky-1

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

13/BR

SECRET

29 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/CA

SUBJECT : Response to Memo on "Council for Latin America"

The activities of WH/1 touch upon four organizations listed below. There are no other activities as they may concern organizations listed on the CA memo (attached).

29

1. [illegible]. The [illegible] project, currently budgeted at $60,000 annually, supports in part this organization, which also receives funds (some $750,000 yearly) 08 from MISEREOR, a German Bishops' fund with headquarters in Aachen, Germany. The objective of this effort is to help establish model or prototype agrarian organizations designed to alleviate and hopefully to advance the social and economic status of the Mexican campesino.

2. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicas - 29 The executive director of this organization was formerly associated with the LIEFF project, but he is no longer an active member of this project which is funded at the current rate of $4,300 annually and supports LIEFF-1, the Station's only agent with access to rightist political organizations.

29

3. Centro Nacional de Estudios Sociales - The director of this organization (LISIREN-3) is no longer an active WOFACT agent. The LISIREN project was terminated in 1965 and had been funded at an annual rate of some $65,000. The project supported a mass media propaganda effort directed at the middle and lower classes of Mexico and sponsored by a front group of conservative Mexican businessmen.

29

4. American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico - The vice president of this organization is a current Station asset, LIEFF-1. No money is provided from WOFACT sources to this organization, although LIEFF-1 receives monthly $300.00. The duties of this agent do not directly relate to his 08

SECRET

6/RJ

29

Chamber of Commerce responsibilities. LIHUFF-1's principal duty is to gather material on rightist political organizations.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Attachment:
Memorandum

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
cc - LIMOOZE Project
cc - LIHUFF-1 201
cc - LISIREN-3 201
cc - WH/1/Cr

1/RS

SECRET

19 AUG 1964

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Lyle STUART

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 1 June 1964,
in which you provided this office with several questions you
wished to have passed to Miss Viola June COBB regarding
Lyle STUART. There follows the information provided by
Miss COBB in answer to your inquiry:

1. Regarding Lyle STUART, Juan Jose AREVALO, and
Antikomunismo en America Latina:

Early in the spring of 1962, in Mexico, AREVALO told
me that STUART was prodding him about getting another of his
books translated, to take advantage of the publicity around
The Shark and the Sardines. I was already far beyond
speaking terms with STUART and therefore declined to have
anything further to do with him. About three months later,
AREVALO told me that STUART was going to publish
Antikomunismo en America Latina and that a young American
student, married to a Mexican, Angela delli SANTE ARROCHA
(who had written Arevalo, pensador contemporaneo, published
by Costa Amic, 1962, financed by Als Radical Revolucionario
de El Salvador) was doing the translation into English.
Early in 1963, AREVALO told me that the translation hadn't
been satisfactory and therefore STUART had obtained a re-
translation, by Charleton BEALS.

When STUART was here in Mexico in June, he told
Dr. OSEGUEDA that he was very happy about the way the book
was selling.

Inasmuch as STUART has paid AREVALO only 10 per cent
of moneys received by STUART on the Shark and the Sardines
sales (in contrast with some book contracts in which the author
receives 10 per cent of the money represented by number of
copies sold multiplied by the retail sales price) I would
assume he is no more generous with Antikomunismo.

CS COPY

SECRET

201-27884

I know of no affiliations of STUART with foreign political parties of government. His attempts to get close to Fidel CASTRO in 1960 were motivated by a desire to exploit the journalistic advantages of an interview. His original interest in The Shark and the Sardines was apparently motivated by money-making interests and by the hope that he might spark a sensation - exactly what he did manage to do with his outrageous advertising. He seemed to calculate that there might be libel suits possible against the firms and the newspapers he could provoke to attack him.

The original contract of AREVALO with STUART was superseded by another in November of 1961, granting STUART certain rights with regard to other foreign language editions of The Shark and the Sardines and, I believe, establishing that STUART should have first option on other AREVALO books translated into English.

Information about STUART's dealings with AREVALO and whatever others, could be obtained (with guile) from Eileen BRANT, who was his editor at the time of the first contact with AREVALO. She subsequently broke with him because of deep and bitter resentment against him, then returned not too long ago to collaborate with him. She is his wife's sister. She is certainly working with him now only because he finally offered her a little better pay. For her to have changed her mind about him would be almost impossible, I believe, in view of the long history of incidents that had brought her to have contempt for him, at the time I knew her in 1961. She knows his operation inside-out. In order to get information from her, it would be absolutely necessary to approach her from some angle that would give no hint of government investigation. She is very gregarious. She is a fortyish medium-attractive, lonely, New York single woman (unless her status has changed since I knew her). If contacted by somebody she would assume to be a writer, and who would be a bit friendly with her and see her off-hours, she would probably talk freely about STUART. But she is quite clever and rather worldly in some respects, so that must be kept in mind in case she is contacted. SHE HAS A VERY DEEP AND LONGTIME NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION. She was active in liberal activities in Chicago, and if I remember correctly, although she is certainly not communist, she considered herself a little jeopardised by the Mc Carthy period.

Angela Delli SANTE-ARROCHE could also be contacted, of course.

SECRET

2. Regarding Lyle STUART, Dr. Raul OSEGUEDA, Bartolome COSTA Amic, and Mario MONTEFORTE Toledo:

Dr. OSEGUEDA apparently has had a secret longing to get something of his own printed in English. He seized upon the opportunity of commenting BEALS' introduction to Antikomunismo in order to write to STUART this spring. STUART wrote very cordially back to OSEGUEDA, hoping to meet him on a trip to Mexico in June. When OSEGUEDA confessed to me his correspondence with STUART, he sought to make me see it as an attempt to speak with STUART about the royalties STUART has never paid me.

When Dr. OSEGUEDA finally did see STUART here in Mexico during the book congress in June, he only very timidly and very, very briefly touched upon the royalty problem, and indeed went to a great deal of trouble to serve STUART by introducing him to COSTA Amic and to Mario MONTEFORTE Toledo. (STUART had expressed interest in getting in touch with some publishers and writers.) OSEGUEDA bustled about, taking OSEGUEDA and MONTEFORTE Toledo to lunch with STUART, even managed to get the MONTEFORTE Toledos to invite STUART to dinner at their apartment. There were tentative discussions of collaborating in the distribution of COSTA Amic books in the United States and of publishing some book of MONTEFORTE Toledo's.

However, both COSTA Amic and the MONTEFORTE Toledos told me that they found STUART offensively vulgar and were not at all enthusiastic about having anything to do with him.

Two weeks ago, OSEGUEDA sketched the outline of a book (contemporary history of U.S. and Latin American relations) he hopes STUART will want to publish, and sent the outline up to him.

CSCI-316/00789-64

WH/1/C. Bustos:chk

18 August 1964

BASIC: HMMA 24092

PROJECT: NONE

LIAISON: NONE

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - RI (201-278841)
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/PO/A

201-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

33 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : VR

CP

14 Aug 64 IN 51668

SECR0ET 141643Z

DIR CIT8 MEXI 0582

LICOOKY

REF A. DIR 40439

B. HMMA 012641

LICOOKY/1 ANSWERS TO REF B SENT IN HMMA 24392 ON 11 AUG.

SECRET

Licooky-1

SECRET

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Answers to Inquiries Submitted in Reference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMW 12641

Forwarded herewith are answers to the inquiries forwarded in reference dispatch submitted by subject of 201-278841 on 6 July 1964.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CS COPY

2 att

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 24092

DATE
11 August 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

SECRET

July 6, 1964

LYLE STUART
AREVALO
"ANTIKOMUNISMO EN AMERICA LATINA"

Early in the spring of 1962, here in Mexico, Arévalo told me that Stuart was prodding him about getting another of his books translated, to take advantage of the publicity around "The Shark and the Sardines". I was already far beyond speaking terms with Stuart and therefore declined to have anything further to do with him. About three months later, Arévalo told me that Stuart was going to publish "Antikomunismo en America Latina" and that a young American student, married to a Mexican, Angela delli Sante Arrocha (who had written "Arevalo, Pensador Contemporaneo")* was doing the translation into English. Early in 1963, Arévalo told me that the translation hadn't been satisfactory and therefore Stuart had obtained a re-translation, by Charleton Beals.

When Stuart was here in Mexico in June, he told Dr. Osegueda that he was very happy about the way the book was selling.

Inasmuch as Stuart has paid Arévalo only 10 percent of moneys received by Stuart on "The Shark and the Sardines" sales (in contrast with some book contracts in which the author receives 10 percent of the money represented by number of copies sold multiplied by the retail sales price) I would assume he is no more generous with "Antikomunismo". I can ask Dr. Osegueda the exact terms, but I haven't been able to see Osegueda this week.

I know of no affiliations of Stuart with foreign political parties of government. His attempts to get close to Fidel Castro in 1960 were motivated by a desire to exploit the journalistic advantages of an interview. His original interest in "The Shark and the Sardines" was apparently motivated by money-making interest and by the hope that he might spark a sensation - exactly what he did manage to do with his outrageous advertising. He seemed to calculate that there might be libel suits possible against the firms and the newspapers he could provoke to attack him.

I am sure you have it on file, but I will enclose a copy of Arevalo's original contract with Stuart. It was superceded by another in November of 1961, granting Stuart certain rights with regard to other foreign language editions of "The Shark and the Sardines" and, I believe, establishing that Stuart should have first option of other Arévalo books translated into English.

Information about Stuart's dealings with Arévalo and whatever others could be obtained WITH GUILE from Eileen Brant, who was his editor at the time of the first contact with Arevalo, subsequently broke with him because of deep and bitter resentment against him, then returned not too long ago to collaborate with him. She is his wife's sister. She is certainly working with him now only because he finally offered her a little better pay. For her to have changed her mind about him would be almost impossible, I believe, in view of the long history of incidents that had brought her to have contempt for him, at the time I knew her in 1961. She knows his operation inside-out. In order to get information from her, it would be absolutely necessary to approach her from some angle that would give no hint of government investigation. She is very gregarious. She is a fortyish medium-attractive, lonely, New York single woman (unless her status has changed since I knew her). By somebody she would assume to be a writer, and who would be a bit friendly with her and see her off-hours, she would probably talk freely about Stuart. But she is quite clever and rather worldly in some respects, so that must be kept in mind in case she is contacted. SHE HAS A VERY DEEP AND LONGTIME NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION. She was active in liberal activities in Chicago, and if I remember correctly, although she is certainly not communist, she considered herself a little jeopardized by the Mc Carthy period.

---

* Published by Costa Amic, 1962. Financed by Als Radical Revolucionario de El Salvador.

CS COPY

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declassification

SECRET

att 1 to HMMA 24092

201-278841

Angela Delli Sante-Arroche could be contacted, too, of course. I will look for her address at Costa Amic's office and pass it along.

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June 6, 1964

Lyle Stuart
Dr. Raul Osegueda
Bartolome Costa Amic
Mario Monteforte Toledo

Dr. Osegueda apparently has had a secret longing to get something of his own printed in English. He seized upon the opportunity of commenting Beals' introduction to "Antikommunismo" in order to write to Stuart this spring. Stuart wrote very cordially back to Osegueda, hoping to meet him on a trip to Mexico in June. When Osegueda confessed to me his correspondence with Stuart, he sought to make me see it as an attempt to speak with Stuart about the royalties Stuart has never paid me.

When Osegueda finally did see Stuart here during the book congress in June, he only very timidly and very, very briefly touched upon the royalty problem, and indeed went to a great deal of trouble to serve Stuart by introducing him to Costa Amic and to Mario Monteforte Toledo. (Stuart had expressed interest in getting in touch with some publishers and writers.) Osegueda bustled about, taking Osegueda and Monteforte Toledo to lunch with Stuart, even managed to get the Monteforte Toledos to invite Stuart to dinner at their apartment. There were tentetive discussions of collaborating in the distribution of Costa Amic books in the United States and of publishing some book of Monteforte Toledo's.

However, both Costa Amica and the Monteforte Toledos told me that they found Stuart offensively vulgar and were not at all enthusiastic about having anything to do with him.

Two weeks ago, Osegueda sketched the outline of a book (contemporary history of U.S. and Latin American relations) he hopes Stuart will want to publish, and sent the outline up to him.

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SECRET

att 2 to HMMA 24092

201-278841

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

33
SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 6 AUGUST 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	FI
3		7	D
4		8	Reg

6 Aug 64 23 08z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO VR

TO MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 40489

LICOOKY

REF: HMMW-12641*

PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *FBI requested that certain questions be given to LICOOKY by us concerning Juan Jose Arevalo and Lyle Stuart, and the book Shark and the Sardines. Justice is thinking of prosecuting Stuart.

Licooky-1

W Hood

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6 FI

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 7, VR

File LICOOKY-1

SECRET 232241Z

24 Jul 64 IN 41824

DIR INFO MANA GUAT TEGU SALV CITE MEXI 3449

REF SJOS 6916 (IN 39629)*

1. NIGHT [illegible] JULY LICOOKY-1 SPENT SEVERAL HOURS COMPANY MARIO SOSA NAVARRO AND DIANA GAMES. LATTER IS HONDURAN AND FIANCE HONDURAN COMMIE RODIL RIVERA RODIL. GAMES NOW DIVORCING MEXICAN DIPLOMAT WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED TEGU AND PLANS MARRY RIVERA.

2. ACC L-1, WHEN ISABEL GUILLEN DE ZELAYA, AT WHOSE HOUSE L-1 AND SOSA MET, ACCUSED SOSA OF BEING A "RUSO" LATTER MADE MILDLY DEROGATORY REMARKS ABOUT SOVIET UNION. SAID HIS WIFE AND SMALL SON IN GUAT AND WIFE NOW DIVORCING HIM.

3. L-1 INSTRUCTED MAINTAIN CASUAL CONTACT SOSA IN ORDER KEEP TABS HIS WHEREABOUTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *MARIO SOSA NAVARRO ARRIVED IN SAN JOSE 22 JULY.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and

24

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

[illegible]

File LICOOKY-1

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : SR 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

SECRET 031759Z

3 AUG 64 IN 41779

DIR CITE MEXI 0444

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF A DIR 39266*

B MEXI 9796 (IN 01559)

1. APPRECIATE REF A APPROVAL USE LICOCKY-1 AGAINST KUKHARENKO. HOWEVER HAVE RECENTLY LEARNED FROM LIENVOY AND SUBJ REF B (REQUEST CRYPTO) THAT K DEPARTING EARLY AUG HOME LEAVE. WILL TRY INJECT L-1 AFTER K'S RETURN.

2. REPORTING BY DISPATCH SUB
BREF B RECENT NEGOTIATIONS
WITH K EXCHANGE VODKA FOR TRANSISTOR RADIOS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * LICOOKY-1 OA AMENDED PERMIT HER USE TO DEVELOP AND ASSES KUKHARENKO.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

ORIG : Terry Ward
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 31 JULY 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-260831

27 S-E-C-R-E-T

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

31 JUL 64 22 01z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO SR7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 39266

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 0306 (IN 30508)*

1. LICOOKY-1 OA AMENDED PERMIT HER USE TO DEVELOP AND ASSESS KUKHARENKO. SHOULD NOT BE USED MAKE RECRUITMENT SINCE B NOT EXPERIENCED RECRUITER, FAILURE WOULD COMPLETELY BLOW HER TO SOVS AND SINCE HER RELATIONSHIP WITH LINLUCK KNOWN, COULD BE UNFAVORABLE BLOWBACK ON LINLUCK.

~~2. SINCE SOVS COULD PRESUMABLY COME IN CONTACT WITH LINLUCK THROUGH LICOOKY-1, STATION MAY CONSIDER TIPPING OFF LINLUCK AT OPPORTUNE TIME TO BE CAREFUL OF LICOOKY-1'S DOINGS AS CONTINUING STATION INVESTIGATION OF HER DISCLOSES SHE ASSOCIATING WITH SOVS.~~

[illegible] by phone

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested permission use LICOOKY-1 to develop high priority SOV target.

CI/ICG/Burke (in draft)
CI/OA/Lally (in draft)
SR/O/WH Kasparovich
WH/POA/Priest

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C /WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

27 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH8

INFO : DDP, WH/SA8, RI/AN, SI, SI/INT, CI/OPS, CI, VR

S E C R E T 282313Z

TEGU INFO DIR GUAT SALV CITE MEXI 0431

28 JUL 64 IN 37910

REF TEGU 5547 (IN 36159)

1. LICOOKY-1 SAID 27 JULY ISABEL A. GUILLEN ZELAYA, SISTER OF LORENZO ZELAYA'S WIFE, TOLD HER MARIO SOSA NAVARRO AND SON, CARLOS, WHO SECOND YEAR MEDICAL STUDENT AT UNAM IN MEXICO CITY, CAME BY TOKIO NO. 35 NIGHT 26 JULY. ISABEL RUNS BOARDING HOUSE THIS ADDRESS AND L-1 NOW LIVING THERE.

2. SWLUCK-1 SAID 27 JULY RICARDO FREIJI, PCH MEMBER NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY, TOLD HIM HAD TALKED WITH SOSA ABOUT 20 JULY

3. INDEX.

SECRET

x c/s comment: Security measures taken by PCH to protect party members returning from Cuba.

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
2
3
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5
6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 242337Z

25 JAN 64 IN 35904

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8374

DESENSITIZED

~~[illegible]~~

REF [illegible]A 4985 (IN 33739)

1. MEXI WILL ASK LICOOKY-1 MAKE DISCREET INQUIRIES TO DETERMINE IF NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO STILL MEXI AND PRESENT ADDRESS.

2. LATEST MEXI INFO ORLANDO QUANT QUINTANA IS HMM-376 12 DEC 63 WHICH STATES HE TRYING COME TO MEXI, BUT NO INFO HIS ACTUAL ARR. STATION DID NOT RECEIVE HMMW 1082.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 24 July 1964 dlr

TO: WH/1/Mexico - W.J. Kaufman

C NO. C - 83492

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

I have discussed with Paul Burke, DC/CI/ICG, Mexico's request for amendment of OA to use LICOOKY-1 against the Soviet official. We both are of the opinion that she can be used for development of the target to determine his susceptibility to recruitment, but that she should not be used to make the actual recruitment should the matter develop to that point, due to these considerations: (1) She is not a recruiter, never has made a recruitment. (2) Odds are she would be blown to the Soviets, since we must consider that the odds for successful recruitment of a Soviet official are not favorable. (3) Her relationship with LINLUCK in Mexico is fairly well known, so that there could be an unfavorable blow back on LINLUCK.

In authorizing her use in the developmental role, Burke would like for Station to be informed that it should tell LINLUCK that Station's continuing investigation of LICOOKY-1 discloses her association with Soviets; therefore, he should be very careful in his relationship with her.

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declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (20)

35

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

45 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SR 7, VR

S E C R E T 222322Z 23 Jul 64 IN 34008

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 0348

REF A MEXI 0288 (IN 29790)

B TEGU 5531 (IN 30664)

C DIR 36752 *

D MEXI 0347 (IN 33998)

1. DUE POSSIBLE USE LICOOKY-1 IN REDCOAT OP, HER FRIENDSHIP WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ AND WIFE, AND HER MANY CONTACTS AND USEFULLNESS AMONG CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMIES AND LEFTISTS MEXICO, STATION DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE HER IN OP AGAINST LUIS MANUEL ZUNIGA SARAVIA PER REFS.

2. RE PARA 4 REF C AGREE COLD APPROACH HAS LIMITED CHANCE SUCCESS BUT APPEARS HE MOST SUSCEPTIBLE NOW AND DOUBT THAT OP SUGGESTED REF B WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. VIEW HIS DECISION REMAIN MEXI AND POSSIBILITY HE MAY ATTEMPT WREST CONTROL PCH FROM BEJARANO, PROBABLY UNSUCCESSFULLY, HE MAY WELL TAKE SOME ACTION NEAR FUTURE MAKING REHABILITATION IN FUTURE IMPOSSIBLE.

LICOOKY-1

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED MEXI CAREFULLY REVIEW LICOOKY ROLE REDCOAT AND ZUNIGA OPS

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

ORIG: C. Bustos
UNIT: WH/2 1
EXT: 4507
DATE: 20 July 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
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21 ROUTINE 11z

SIG CEN

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: TEGUCIGALPA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ~~WH 8~~

INFO: SR 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

TO MEXI INFO TEGU CITE DIR 36752

REF A. MEXI 0288 (IN 29790)

B. TEGU 5531 (IN 30664)

1. TEGU SUGGESTIONS REF B RE USE LICOOKY IMPLY HER INVOLVEMENT IN BUILDUP OF ZUNIGA TO POINT OF RECRUITMENT. (FOR INFO TEGU, LICOOKY HAS LIMITED CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL AMENDMENT TO PERMIT HER BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN SUCH OP).

2. MEXI HAS ALSO REQUESTED SPECIAL PERMISSION USE LICOOKY IN REDCOAT OP OUTLINED MEXI 0306 (IN 30508) AND HDQS HAS RESERVATIONS INVOLVING HER ANY MORE THAN MERE INFORMANT IN ZUNIGA OP.

3. REQUEST MEXI CAREFULLY REVIEW LICOOKY ROLE REDCOAT AND ZUNIGA OPS AND ADVISE ITS DESIRES.

4. HDQS AGREES REF B THAT COLD APPROACH ZUNIGA AT THIS TIME NOT ~~BEE~~ DESIRABLE, AND THAT ANY APPROACH IDEALLY SHOULD BE MADE AFTER INFO COLLECTED AND ASSESSMENT MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-1

C/WH/2

WH/Honduras

CI/ICG E.L. Whiteside

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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20 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Amendment of the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 (201-278841)

1. It is requested that the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 be amended to include authority for Mexico City Station to utilize her as an access asset against a Soviet Press Attache and Soviet Information Bulletin Representative.

2. It should be noted that the 29 June amendment of LICOOKY-1's OA was not implemented since that target's visit to Mexico City never materialized.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : *SR 7

INFO : CI/CA, WH 7, VR

Tell [illegible] when OA oked

S E C R E T 171724Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2326

REDCOAT

REF DIR 31925

17 JUL 64 IN 30508

1. HAVE COMPLETED STUDY ON ONE OF STATION'S PRIME SOV TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT, PRESS ATTACHE AND SOV INFO BULLETIN REP, SERGEY SEMYONOVICH KUKHARENKO. SEE NO OPPORTUNITY UTILIZE LATTER'S LOCAL CONTACTS FOR ACCESS SINCE ALL DECIDEDLY LEFTIST OR COMMIE.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL DIRECT LICOOKY-1 AGAINST K, FOR SAME REASONS AND POSSIBILITIES CITED MEXI 002[illegible] (4 APR) AFTER APPROVAL OBTAINED, MEXI WILL DEVELOP SPECIFIC PLAN TO FACILITATE HER INITIAL ACCESS.

3. FYI L-1 WAS NOT ADVISED OF AECOTTAGE OP.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR REDWOOS USED.

**AMENDED LICOOKY-1 OA FOR USE AGAINST KOBYSH.

Terry - Call [illegible] on this

X 1315

[illegible] OA

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

ROUTING
1
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SR 7, SI, SI/INT 2, RI/AN, VR

SECRET 151822Z

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 0288

[illegible] IN 2979

REF MEXI 0015 (IN 17863)

1. LICOOKY-1 SAID 15 JULY DIONICIO BEJARANO RAMOS AND RIGOBERTO PADILLA RUSH TOLD HIM AND OTHER HONDURAN [illegible] EXILES THAT LUIS MANUEL ZUNIGA SARAVIA, WHO RETURNED MEXI 24 JUNE FROM SOVIET UNION, DISCIPLINED AT RECENT PCH CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM HELD MEXI AND REDUCED TO SIMPLE CELL MEMBER. PADILLA SAID THIS DONE BECAUSE OF MANY ERRORS ZUNIGA HAS MADE. MRS ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ, ZUNIGA'S MOTHER, TOLD LICOOKY-1 RECENTLY ZUNIGA HEALTH FINE BUT HE HAVING SERIOUS "PROBLEMS" WHICH WORRY HER.

2. JULY 15 L-1, WHO ORDERED BY DOCTOR MOVE FROM APT SHE RENTED RECENTLY BECAUSE IT DAMP AND COLD, SAID ZUNIGA AND WIFE MOVED INTO APT L-1 VACATED WHICH LOCATED CALLE RIO TAMESSES 14, APT 3, MEXICO CITY 1, TELEPHONE 46-33-88. THIS ARRANGED BY MRS CUENCA WHEN SHE LEARNED L-1 MOVING. ACC MRS CUENCA, ZUNIGA AND WIFE PLAN LIVE MEXICO CITY AND HE LOOKING FOR WORK. ZUNIGA'S WIFE NOW TAKING IN SEWING HELP DEFRAY FAMILY EXPENSES, AND S-1 SAYS ZUNIGAS TRYING SELL

file LICOOKY-1

SECRET

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BUSINESS THEY OWN IN SAN PEDRO S.L.A.

3. JULY 13 L-1 HAD DINNER WITH MRS CUENCA, ABEL CUENCA, ZUNIGA
AND WIFE. L-1, WHO HAD SEEN ZUNIGA BRIEFLY AT CUENCA HOME JUST BEFORE
ZUNIGA LEFT FOR SOVIET UNION ON 31 JAN 64, SAYS HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARD HER HAS CHANGED. HE NOW FRIENDLY, TALKATIVE AND APPEARS
WANT BE FRIEND, BUT HAS NOT MENTIONED PCH OR ANY DIFFICULTIES TO
L-1.

4. BELIEVE ZUNIGA, AS RESULT PCH ACTION AND NEED FOR MONEY, MAY
BE SUSCEPTIBLE RECRUITMENT APPROACH. COULD PROVIDE
VALUABLE INTEL AND OP INFO ON PCH AND PCH LEADERS AS OF PRESENT
TIME, AND IF RESPONSIVE TO GUIDANCE COULD PROBABLY REGAIN HIGH LEVEL
POSITION WITHIN ONE YEAR OR SO.

5. IF TEGU INTERESTED BELIEVE APPROACH COULD BE MADE WITHOUT
UNDUE RISK L-1 SECURITY. USING LIRICE TEAM, APPROACH COULD BE MADE
ON STREET OR AT OR NEAR CUENCA HOME WHERE ZUNIGA AND WIFE TAKING MANY
THEIR MEALS. CUENCA HOME WELL KNOWN, AND IN VIEW APPROACH TO PCH MEMBER
IN JAN 64 DOUBT ZUNIGA WOULD CONNECT APPROACH WITH LA-1.
IF APPROACH MADE COULD USE OLIVER Q. WIMPHEN BUT DUE HIS DEEP
INVOLVEMENT RECRUITMENT OPS AGAINST PCH TARGETS WOULD PREFER TEGU
OR HQS PROVIDE RECRUITER.

6. INDEX.

SECRET

YC/S COMMENT: ACCORDING SWLUCK/1 LUIS MANUEL ZUNIGA SARAVIA ARRIVED MEXI 26 JUNE FROM USSR.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C.Finney:bc
UNIT : SR/O/[illegible]
EXT : 6412
DATE : 26 June 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-286805

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1
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29 JUN 64 22 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY RIO DE JANEIRO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 7
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, VR

CP

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO RIOD CITE DIR 31926

REDWOOD AECOTTAGE

REF: A. MEXI 0021 (IN 14984)*
B. RIOD 5073 (IN 12837)**

1. OA FOR LICOOKY/1 AMENDED TO AUTHORIZE ONE TIME USE AGAINST KOBYSH AS PROPOSED PARA ONE REF.

2. Vitaliy Ivanovich KOBYSH BORN 27 JULY 28 POLTAVA OBLAST. WIFE EMMA. SON SERGEY AGE ABOUT 6. FROM PHONE TAP INFO LEARNED SUBJ HAS OCCASIONAL DISAGREEMENTS WIFE. SHE ACCUSES HIM INFIDELITY. WIFE ON BAD TERMS OTHER SOVS RIO BECAUSE SON SUFFERS UNDERTERMINED AMOEBA DISEASE WHICH OTHER SOVS FEAR COMMUNICABLE. HENCE THEY HAVE THEIR CHILDREN SHUN SON KOBYSH. ALSO AGGRAVATING SITUATION IS WIFE SUFFERING HEPATITIS.

3. CAREER SUBJ: MEMBER RADIO DELEGATION NORWAY 54. ASSIGNED MOSCOW 55. ALSO 55 VISITED SWEDEN AND DENMARK WITH SOV PIANIST. RETURNED NORWAY 56. ASSIGNED NEW YORK SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 60. MEMBER KRUSHCHEV PARTY MEETING KENNEDY VIENNA JUNE 61. ASSIGNED BRAZIL CIRCA AUGUST 62.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

22-62

ROUTING	
1	4
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[illegible] 04z

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 31926

PAGE 2

4. RE PARA 3 REF B: FYI ONLY FROM SENSITIVE HQ SOURCE UNDER KGB CONTROL IT LEARNED SUBJ WAS RECALLED FROM USA TO USSR BECAUSE OF INDISCREET PHONE CALL TO MOSCOW WHICH RIS HAD RECORDED AND CRITICIZED ON GROUNDS SECURITY. ALSO WHILE DUTY OFFICER RADIO MOSCOW INADVERTENTLY PERMITTED BROADCAST OLD TAPE RECORDING LAUDING HAMMARSKJOLD AT TIME OFFICIAL SOV LINE JUST OPPOSITE. (NO CONFIRMATION INFO THIS PARA RECEIVED THUS FAR.)

END OF MESSAGE

*Basis Ref B info, believe LICOOKY-1 would be excellent logical and feasible access to Subj . . . . ** (Subj) is Izvestiya and Radio Moscow representative . . . .

C/SR/ODB

CI/OA Mr. Brown (by phone for para 1) CW

SR/CI/K

WH/1 Mr. Spera (draft)

WH/PO/A

WH/5 Mr. Sulc (draft)

C/WH W Hood

C/SR/O/WH

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
4
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SR 7

INFO : CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, [illegible], FI, CCC, [illegible] 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 252225Z

DIR INFO RIOD CITE MEXI 2221

26 [illegible] 14934

REDWOOD AECOTTAGE

REF DIR 32675

RIOD 5273 [illegible]

1. BASIS REF B INFO, BELIEVE LICOOKY-1 WOULD BE EXCELLENT LOGICAL AND FEASIBLE ACCESS TO SUBJ. SHE HAS LEFTIST JOURNALIST CONTACTS TO FACILITATE ACCESS, IS ATTRACTIVE AND COULD BECOME AS INTIMATE WITH SUBJ AS NECESSARY.

2. DESPITE LIMITATIONS L-1 OF WHICH HQS AWARE, REQUEST HQS APPROVAL USE L-1.

3. DIR: PLS PROVIDE MORE INFO SUBJ'S BACKGROUND, HIS VULNERABILITIES,

4. RIOD: PLS SEND RECENT PHOTO, PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ADVANCE TRAVEL NOTICE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * GAVE B/D DATA OF [illegible], IZVESTIYA AND RADIO MOSCOW REP WHO POSSIBLE DEFECTION TARGET.

[illegible] x 1956

SECRET

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Copy No.

SECRET

Scott
S
B
Bustos

C No.83492

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/Mexico W.J. Kaufman

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LICOOKY/1

________________________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 26 June 1964.

Operational Approval for LICOOKY/1 is amended to include authorization for her use on a one-time basis for the purpose set forth in your memorandum dated 26 June 1964.

file [illegible]

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 26 June 1964 dlr

file Licooky-1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

FORM 7-60 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (8)

Buslos [illegible]

26 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Amendment of LICOOKY-1 Operational Approval

It is requested that the Operational Approval for LICOOKY-1 be amended to include authority for Mexico Station to use her on a one-time basis as an access asset against a Soviet newspaperman, who will be visiting Mexico and who has been a target for defection of Rio de Janeiro Station. (See MEXI 0021 (IN 14984) and preceding traffic.)

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

DDP/WH/WJK/ASpera:kte (26 June 1964)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - addressee
1 - LICOOKY-1 201 file

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Progress Report for Project LINLUCK for April and May, 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is a progress report for Project LINLUCK for the period specified. This report was prepared by Leo C. HEDLICH, the outside case office.

2. LINLUCK/1 has provided information for operational purposes on a number of subjects and/or individuals in which the Station has an interest or some sort of requirement from others (i.e., Mario Monteforte Toledo). Also, he sent a bundle of papers left by Major Alfonso Prera Sierra, one of Yon Sosa's followers, at the time of their Guatemala revolt effort in 1962. Lee E. MILECHEAINE has gone through the papers and has had about 170 frames made. The negatives will be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. The affair between LINLUCK/1 and LICOOKY/1 is, temporarily at least, suspended. Undoubtedly, the return of LINLUCK/1's wife had a good deal to do with this plus the fact that pressure was being put on the two principals by the Station. Whether this separation can be maintained permanently is difficult to say, but LINLUCK/1 has been put on notice that he is going to be subject to penalty if it isn't. Outside of that, LINLUCK/1 has been quite responsive to any requirements imposed on him; on the other hand, he has not been reporting on his personal situation and contacts as fully as he should. This will shape up however.

Willard C. CURTIS

File

Attachment:

Rpt, h/w

Distribution:

3 - WHD, w/att
3 - Files, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-23070

DATE
15 June 1964

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-50/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 29 May ODENVY asked KUDESK whether KUBARK had a current interest in LICOOKY as they had questions concerning Juan Jose AREVALO and Lyle STUART which they wanted passed to her. If we had no current contact they wanted to know whether we had any idea of her present whereabouts.

2. KUBARK orally told ODENVY that we formerly utilized her as a sub-source and we believed we could reestablish contact with her in order to pass to her the ODENVY questions. ODENVY was told that she was in Mexico.

3. ODENVY subsequently furnished the attached list of questions. It is requested that the Station pass this list to LICOOKY-1 and obtain from her, answers to be forwarded to Headquarters for passing to ODENVY. The Station is asked to comment on whether her testimony in court might be prejudicial to any KUBARK operations, or whether the Station can see no objection to such a court appearance.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Attachment:
1 u/s/c

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-278841/R

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-12641	DATE 3 June 1964
	CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY SECRET	~~HQS FILE NUMBER~~ 201-278841 201-6803

OS COPY
10 JUN 1964

Distribution:
1-RI w/att.
1-Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/~~	
WH 3/MEX	
DESTROY	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/LIA		Roman J. Roman
CI/OPS		Hughes (draft)
WH/CAN/GUAT		Carley (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 JUN 1964	Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

June 1, 1964

RE: LYLE STUART

This Bureau currently is conducting an investigation in order to determine if the subject has violated the Registration Act. His firm published the 1964 American edition of the book entitled, "Anti-Communism in Latin America," written by Juan Jose Arevalo, former President of Guatemala. The nature and extent of subject's relationship with Arevalo is therefore pertinent to our investigation.

As you know, Viola June Cobb, known to your agency, personally knows Arevalo and worked with him on the translation of his book, "The Shark and the Sardine." It is therefore possible that Cobb may be in a position to furnish some information which can be of assistance to this Bureau. We would appreciate if your agency would interview Cobb and endeavor to obtain answers to the following:

(1) What information does she have concerning the relationship between the subject and Arevalo regarding the book, "Anti-Communism in Latin America"?

(2) Does she have any information indicating that subject is in any way affiliated with foreign political parties or governments?

(3) Does she know of any contractual agreement existing between subject and Arevalo or between subject and any other foreign principals?

(4) Does she know of anyone else who may be in a position to furnish information concerning subject?

(5) In the event that Cobb is in a position to furnish information concerning any of the above points, we desire to be informed if she would be willing to testify in court.

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, VR

Licooky 201

SECRET 212234Z

22 [illegible] IN 08379

DIR INFO MANA CITE MEXI 9565

REF DIR 19514 *

1. LICOOKY-1 SAID MATILDA DE CUENCA, WIFE ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ, WHO CLOSE FRIENDS WITH EDELBERTO TORRES ESPINOZA FAMILY, TOLD HER 19 MAY TORRES SHARE PANAM AWARD WAS 83,000 DOLLARS BUT BECAUSE CURRENCY RESTRICTIONS HE HAS BEEN ABLE WITHDRAW LESS THAN HALF SO FAR.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE SETTLEMENT GUAT LAW SUIT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT :
DATE : [illegible]

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

21 SECRET

1242
ROUTING

1		4	
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5 MAY 61 22 16z

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 19165

201 file

REF MEXI 9238 (IN 73285) (NOT SENT GUAT)

1. HDQS FULLY SHARES MEXI CONCERN OVER LICOOKY AND LINLUCK PROBLEM. WE SUGGEST THAT PERHAPS ARRIVAL OF WIFE FROM PARIS MAY SOLVE PROBLEM OF LINLUCK'S RESIDENCE LICOOKY APARTMENT. STATION CAN QUERY LINLUCK ROUTINELY AS TO HIS FUTURE PLANS FOR WIFE WITHOUT THUS REVEALING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LICOOKY. PRESUMABLY HE WILL RESPOND THAT HE HAS SENT WIFE FUNDS TO JOIN HIM MEXICO. IF SHE PLANS STAY WITH HIM PERMANENTLY, THEN LICOOKY PROBLEM WILL BE ALLEVIATED. IF HER STAY ONLY TEMPORARY, THEN CORRECTIVE ACTION (AS SUGGESTED IN REF) COULD BE TAKEN IF NECESSARY. FEEL THAT THIS COULD BE EASIEST SOLUTION TO PROBLEM AS NEITHER AGENT WOULD BE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN OTHER OR KUBARK.

2. WIFE'S ARRIVAL MEXI OF INTEREST IN ITSELF TO HDQS AS THIS WILL HAVE EFFECT ON LINLUCK MOBILITY. WE ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING PLAN FOR FUTURE ROLE OF AGENT AND WILL ADVISE SOON.

3. FYI: WE HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED MEXI STATION TO BE MERELY CUTOUT TO LINLUCK. YOUR OFFICERS HAVE SAME AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH HIM AS YOU DO WITH YOUR OTHER AGENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

DEFERRED

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 19165

WH Comment: Ref related Mexi concern at LICOOKY/LINLUCK relationship, and asked for authority to pressure them apart.

DC/CI/ICG Paul J. Bw

WH/3/Mexico

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

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SECRET

ROUTING

	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI/CPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

for LICOOKY-1 201 file

SECRET 321830Z

DIR CITE MEXI 9238

LINLUCK

REF DIR 14975

[illegible]

1. LICOOKY TOLD CASE OFFICER 23 APRIL THAT LINLUCK TOLD HER 20 APRIL OF ARREST OF PACO AMADO ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE IN GUAT WHERE ALLEGEDLY STILL HELD. ALSO OUT OF LAST PAYMENT SENT THOUSAND DOLLARS TO HIS WIFE FOR PASSAGE MEXI. NEITHER FACT REPORTED REDLICH.

2. STATION IN AWKARD SITUATION ACTING AS COMMO CHANNEL AT DISCRETION AGENT WHO NOT PLAYING BALL ESPECIALLY RE REPORTING INFO OF OBVIOUS KUBARK INTEREST. FEEL REDLICH CAPABLE DEALING WITH LINLUCK IF GIVEN AUTHORITY. VIEW APPARENT DELAY IN HQ DECISION RE LINLUCK FUTURE. STATION REQUESTS AUTHORITY LAY DOWN LAW TO HIM ABOUT MOVING OUT OF LICOOKY APARTMENT OWING "CURRENT GOSSIP RE LICOOKY WHICH POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS HIS FUTURE USEFULNESS". WISH USE 30 DAY CLAUSE IN REF CONTRACT AS CLUB TO ENFORCE ORDER. ALSO REQUEST AUTHORITY BRIEF HIM ON HIS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. REGRET NECESSITY THIS REQUEST, BUT LICOOKY SEEMS INCAPABLE INITIATING DISENGAGEMENT DESPITE FACT SHE HIGHLY OVERWROUGHT AT HIS TOTAL MONOPOLY HER TIME AND RESULTANT INABILITY DO HER KUBARK

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

JOB. COULD RIDE WITH PRESENT SITUATION IF CERTAIN HQ PLANS WOULD REMOVE HIM MEXI BY SPECIFIC DATE. OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS OFFER LICOOKY CHOICE BETWEEN LINLUCK AND KUPARK. UNABLE PREDICT RESULT.

SECRET

DISPATCH

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SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1/Comments on Meeting with Joel N. HIEBECKER on 26 February 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None, for information only.

Attention: Joel N. HIEBECKER

1. Joel N. HIEBECKER, while in Mexico City during the week of 24 - 28 February 1964, met with LICOOKY-1, from 1500 to approximately 1600 hours on the afternoon of 26 February 1964, in connection with his review of the [illegible] operation. Upon leaving the meeting site HIEBECKER noted two unidentified young men who may have been conducting a surveillance of him. Later, at about 1630 hours, HIEBECKER saw LICOOKY-1 on Avenida Madero, about one mile from the meeting site. The case officer was requested to query LICOOKY-1 on any significant remarks LIELUCK-1, who lives with LICOOKY-1, might have made to LICOOKY-1 before and/or after the meeting with HIEBECKER, and to report same to Headquarters.

2. The next meeting with LICOOKY-1, as scheduled, was held on Friday afternoon, 28 February. LICOOKY-1 said that she did not see HIEBECKER on Avenida Madero on 26 February, and added that she did not have her glasses with her and without them cannot identify anyone more than 20 feet or so away. LIELUCK-1, she said, wanted to know with whom she spoke at noontime on 26 February (the meeting was arranged by the C/O via telephone and LIELUCK-1 answered the telephone), and later queried her regarding where she met and what had been said. He was satisfied, however, that she had been talking to a PBPRIMEr and did not press the matter further. She did not tell him where, or with whom, or what had been said. According to LICOOKY-1, LIELUCK-1 has no objections to her seeing and talking to PBPRIMErs, but he objects violently to her having anything to do with any non-PBPRIME leftists or Communists.

(continued)

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA- 23027

DATE
5 March 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA- 23027

5. On 2 March 1964 LICOOKY-1 reported that she had decided to visit her brother in PBPRIME for two weeks or so, and will take advantage of the trip to renew her tourist documentation. She said that LIHUACK-1 has become extremely difficult to live with since HEIBECKER was here, and that she must get away from him for awhile. He objected to her leaving, but acquiesced when he became convinced that she intends to return to Mexico. LICOOKY-1 plans to leave on 4 March 1964, and will return on or about 20 March 1964.

Willard C. CURTIS

GROUP 1
[illegible]

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. TWO

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station Mex. City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-22258

1. LICOOKY-1 was granted an OA on 27 January 1964 for use as outlined in the PRQ II forwarded with HMMA-22258. The OA as granted, however, was restricted to approval to use LICOOKY-1 in such a manner that information is taken from her, but that as little classified information as possible is to be passed. Specific requirements should be passed only when necessary, and should be made in such a manner that sensitive operational or ODYOKE programs, plans, and objectives are not revealed. The office granting the OA also indicated that the limitations proposed in the Station's comments in Section XVI of the PRQ II should be implemented.

2. If LICOOKY-1 is ever to be used as a directed and fully controlled asset, without the limitations expressed above, an amendment to the OA will be necessary.

3. Reference is made to Section X, para 1 of the PRQ II forwarded in ref, which indicates that LICOOKY-1 may be given a bonus for a particularly outstanding job. The Station is reminded that since LICOOKY-1 is a Contract Agent, and PBPRIME citizen, her contract must be amended each time a bonus payment is contemplated.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
O&1-COS, Mexico City

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12327

DATE
10 February 1964
10 FEB 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk

EXT.
5940

~~Distribution:~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
1-Chrono RID/~~AN~~ CI/OA	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/ES~~	
RID/FI[illegible]	
[illegible]	
DESTROY	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	12 FEB 1964	Lolly

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	1964	J. C. King

DISPATCH

SECRET

10 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CCG/NC

SUBJECT : LICOOKY-1

LICOOKY-1 was granted an OA on 27 January 1964. She was recruited in June 1960 and has been utilized by SAS and WH Division since that time.

J. M. Whitten
C/WH/3

'ili
Licooky-1

SECRET

DISPATCH

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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIHUFF/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: A. HMMW-11321, 13 Feb 1963
B. HMMA-20931, 22 Mar 1963

1. Transmitted under separate cover truename attachments are the following forms to complete Headquarters' records on subject:

a. Personal History Statement
b. Personal History Statement (Appendix I)
c. Report of Medical History

2. Subject was originally recruited as a cutout for the LIHUFF/2 organization. However, his actual duties for KUBARK entail far more than contact and communication with LIHUFF/2. He is an outside agent. In addition to acting as the contact between the Mexico Station and the LIHUFF/2 Institute, LIHUFF/1 is responsible for organizing and directing the KUWOLF student groups in the LIHUFF/2 project; printing and distributing of propaganda; planning and initiating student harrassment activities. Since LIHUFF/1's duties are those of an outside agent, his salary was established to reimburse him for the amount of time it is necessary for him to spend on LIHUFF activities. In this regard, it is felt that the sum of $500. monthly is not an excessive amount. Headquarters is requested to process a contract for subject in this amount.

OK

3. Subject's social security number is 255-58-5834.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23
201-309999

Enclosures:
as stated above (UNDER SEPARATE COVER)

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encls

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
29 Apr 63

DATE DISPATCHED
30 Apr 63

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21166

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-309999 23

3/RS

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY	18. [illegible] 6741

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 255-58-5884 08	IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.	20. CITIZENSHIP USA

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD *(In U.S.)* none	22. ADDRESS *(Foreign)* Mexico City, Mexico

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

1/Rs

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE *(Fill In)*

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Wichtrich, Alfonso Rudolph 03
2. AGE: 47
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT: 6'3"
5. WEIGHT: 185
6. COLOR OF EYES: Brown
7. COLOR OF HAIR: Brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: Light
9. TYPE BUILD: Med.

10. SCARS *(Type and Location)*: None

11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: None

12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)*:
Toluca Highway - Kim 19-1/2 10
El Magueyito, Cuajimalpa
Mexico, D. F., Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO.:
Same as (12)-
Phone 20-77-47 08

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: 20-77-47 08
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: 35-96-53 08
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)*: Mexico

17. NICKNAMES: Pancho - Al 08
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: None

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
OK Pancho - through college - Willcox & Tucson Ariz. Al - Used to date.
08

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)*

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary).* $

3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check "X" each item applicable)*:

☐ WASHINGTON D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify)*:

☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

8/RS

09, 10

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: Oct. 30, 1915
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Chihuahua, Chih., Mexico.
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER (Specify): derivirive.
5. DATE NATURALIZED: N.A.
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: N.A.
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: N.A.
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): N.A.
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: N.A.
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

N.A.

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: N.A.
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? N A
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: 1916
16. PORT OF ENTRY: El Paso, Texas
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: Unknown
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): N.A.
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: N.A.

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: Willcox Grammar School 05
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Willcox, Arizona 10
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1922-1930
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: Willcox Union High School 08
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Willcox, Arizona 10
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1930-1934
4. GRADUATE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
University of Arizona Tucson Arizona 08	Range Ecology	Animal Husb.	34	39	Bachelor	May 1939	10 Sem-

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

6/es

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

N.A.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
N.A.				
N.A.				
N.A.				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
Cav. School - Basic Ft. Riley, Kansas	Troop Duty Horse & Mechanized		1941	3
Cav. School - Advanced Ft. Riley, Kansas	" " "		1942	3
Command & General Staff, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan	G-2 - C&GS		1943	3

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

War Dept. Mis-X - Intelligence
Fort Hunt, Washington, D.C. 1943 - 6 months

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Spanish	x	x	x														x	x	x

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

4 years high school
2 years college

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

N.A.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

Business terminology - write - speak - read & translate.
Socio-Economics - write - speak - read & translate.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Mexico -	Industrial - Bus. Socio-Economia Politics	1949- Present	N.A.	X	X	X	X
Panama 10	Business Terrain - R.R.	1946-1949	N.A.	X	X		X
China	Terrain Local Conditions	1943-1945	N.A.	X	X	X	X
Central Amer.	Terrain Local Conditions	1946-Present	N.A.		X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Mexico - Business - Work Assignment
10 Panama - Business - Work Assignment
China - Army.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE IF ISSUED.

98 #118056 - Expired August 20, 1962

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
		GREGG	SPEEDWRITING	STENOTYPE	OTHER (Specify):
x Unknown	No				

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

None.

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Major Athletics - Good
Riding Horseback - Good
Horse shoes - Good
Gardening - Fair
Bridge - Fair

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

3/RS

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

N.A.

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* N.A.	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)* N.A.

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

N.A.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

N.A.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Throughout College and business career.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Alpha Zeta - Honorary)
Bob Cats) University of Arizona 08
Scabbard & Blade)

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* 1/1/63 - Present	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY American Chamber of Commerce 27	
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* 16 Lucerna 78 - Mexico D. F.		
4. KIND OF BUSINESS 08 Promote trade & good will	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Executive Committee 08	
6. TITLE OF JOB 08 Executive Vice President	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 9600. per annum	8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
27
Management & direction of Chamber. P.R. Defend free enterprise system. 08
Coordinate committee work. Promote trade develop good will. 08

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

N.A.

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

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SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Sept. 1949 - Dec. 31, 1962
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: R.C. Cola Company 29
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Columbus, Georgia
4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Soft Drink 08
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: T.H. Stanley 06
6. TITLE OF JOB: Gen. Mgr. Royal Crown, S.A. 08
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ 12,000 PER year
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Direction of manufacturing concentrates. Marketing. Advertising. Development of sales. Franchising. Mexico and C. America. Supervision of all franchised bottling plants 08
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING: Transfer to States - Preffered Mexico.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Dec. 1946 - Sept. 1949
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: R.C. Bottling Co. of Panama 29
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Panama - Rep de Panama 10
4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Bottling & Sales - Soft drinks 08
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Board of Directors
6. TITLE OF JOB:
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $19,000. PER year
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Direction of Company.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING: Unfavorable climatic conditions.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.):
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY:
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
4. KIND OF BUSINESS:
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB:
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING:

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.):
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY:
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
4. KIND OF BUSINESS:
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB:
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

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SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X — MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS N.A.

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)* YES / NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*:
HAVE SERVED ←	XX								
NOW SERVING ←									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S): Cavalry - MIS

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)*: 6-46

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)*: 6 years

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE: Jan. 1941 — CURRENT SERVICE:

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE: Lt. Col. O8 — CURRENT SERVICE:

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)*: 0-377220 O8

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: MIS — CURRENT SERVICE:

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: G-2 Cav. — CURRENT SERVICE:

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)* Past.

Troop duty - troop and squadron - horse and mechanized cavalry.
Military Intelligence - War Dept. Assigned CBI (MIS-X)

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

HONORABLE DISCHARGE	X	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE		UNDUE HARDSHIPS
RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	X	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY		OTHER:
RETIREMENT FOR AGE		RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

REGULAR	X	RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)*	X	OTHER *(Including AUS)* AUS

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? X YES / NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? YES / X NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? YES / X NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

X	ARMY	MARINE CORPS	NATIONAL GUARD	COAST GUARD	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER	
	NAVY	AIR FORCE	AIR NAT'L.GUARD	ARMY ROTC	AIR FORCE ROTC		

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: Lt. Col. O8

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: 1944

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY — READY RESERVE — STANDBY *(Active)* X — STANDBY *(Inactive)* — RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE: MI

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE: Unknown

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

N.A.

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT: YES / X NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? YES / X NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY — YEARS / MONTHS: Unknown

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Unknown

3/RS

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES [✓ NO] X

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Investments.

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Falls Church Bank	Falls Church, Virginia
Banco Nacional de Mexico	Mexico, D. F.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES [✓ NO] X

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Falls Church Bank	Falls Church, Virginia
R. C. Bottling of Baltimore 29	401 East 30th St. 10 , Baltimore Md.
Popular Dept. Store	El Paso, Texas.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES [✓ NO] X

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☒ YES ☐ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

N.A.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Rachel (Middle) Esther (Maiden) Williams (Last) Wichtrich 06

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE Dec. 23, 1938

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country) Tucson, Arizona - Pima County 10 U.S.A.

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country) 10 3300 Hawthorne St., Tucson, Ariz., U.S.A.

7. LIVING XX YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10 CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased) 10

Toluca Highway, Klm. 19 1/2, El Maguevito, Cuajimalpa, Mexico, D.F., Mexico

11. DATE OF BIRTH 2/13/1917 09

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Avoca, Texas, U.S.A.

13. CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.

10 *SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10*

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SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY N.A.
15. PLACE OF ENTRY N.A.

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)) N.A.
17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N.A.
18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) N.A.

19. OCCUPATION Housewife
20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers) N.A.

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) N.A.

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo and Yr) N.A.

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE N.A.
24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED N.A.

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
B N.A.

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
John Allen Wichtrich 06	Son	8-14-40 09,10 Tucson, Arizona	U.S.A.	Navy OCS Newport, R.I.
Janet Rae Wichtrich 06	Daughter	3-5-1943 09	U.S.A.	Univ. of N. Mex. Albuquerque, N.M.
Ellen Anne 06	Daughter	6-28-1948 09 Panama R.P. 10	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.
William Gus 06	Son	6-8-1950 09 Mexico, D.F. 10	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.
Patricia Jean 06	Daughter	3-17-1955 09 Mexioo, D.F.	U.S.A.	Mexico, D.F.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 4

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 5

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Wichtrich, Gustaf 06
2. LIVING YES X | NO
3. DATE OF DEATH Feb. 1950?
4. CAUSE OF DEATH Pneumonia

5. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country) Willcox, Arizona 10

6. DATE OF BIRTH 1864
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Germany
8. CITIZENSHIP U.S.

9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY Unknown
10. PLACE OF ENTRY Unknown 10

11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)) German
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED 9-15-23
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Tombstone, Cochise Co., Arizona

14. OCCUPATION Owner, Sheetmetal Shop
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) N.A.

16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED. Willcox Arizona 10

17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) N.A.
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE N.A.
19. COUNTRY N.A.

20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN N.A.

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SECTION XV **MOTHER** *(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Esparza Fermina 06
2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: Feb. 1951
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Pneumonia
5. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: Willcox, Arizona 10
6. DATE OF BIRTH: 1874
7. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Chihuahua Mexico, D.F.
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: Unknown 10
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: El Paso, Texa
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*: Mexican
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 11-24-1941 09
13. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*: Bisbee, Arizona
14. OCCUPATION: Housewife
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)*: N.A.
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: N.A.
17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*: N.A.
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE: N.A.
19. COUNTRY:
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: N.A.

SECTION XVI **BROTHERS AND SISTERS** *(Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)*

	1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*	4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*	5. LIVING	6. AGE
1	Mrs. Margaret Anderson 06	Sister	U.S.	1037 Olson St., El Paso, Texas 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	54
2	Mrs. Charlette Edelman 06	Sister	U.S.	N.A.	☐ YES ☒ NO	
3	Mrs. Mary Thanna Pauer 06	Sister	U.S.	228 Nogales, Santa Barbara, California 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	52
4	Mrs. Sherman Dent 06	Sister	U.S.	3228 East Almeria Rd., Phoenix, Arizona 10	☒ YES ☐ NO	51
5	Frank Wichtrich 06	Brother	U.S.	Los Angeles Area (Address Unknown)	☒ YES ☐ NO	50
6	Gus Wichtrich 06	Brother	U.S.		☐ YES ☒ NO	
7					☐ YES ☐ NO	
8					☐ YES ☐ NO	
9					☐ YES ☐ NO	

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SECTION XVII FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williams, John Newton OC
2. LIVING: YES X NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1944
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Stroke
5. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Deming, New Mexico
6. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Rome, Georgia
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
14. OCCUPATION: cotton ginner
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): self

SECTION XVIII MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Williams, Lucy OC
2. LIVING: YES X NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1918
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Flu
5. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Tempe, Arizona
6. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Virginia
8. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
10. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) [Country(ies)]: N.A.
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: N.A.
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): N.A.
14. OCCUPATION: House wife
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): N.A.

SECTION XIX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

N.A.

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

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SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

Any relatives I might have in Mexico or Germany are unknown.

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street City and State)
Stanley T. Hiram 06		501 Look-Out Drive 10 Columbus, Georgia
Franklin, William C. 06	401 East 30th St. 10 Baltimore, Md.	
Teeter, Carl 06		521 West Lewis 10 Phoenix, Arizona
Harvil Richard 06	Pres. Univ. of Arizona 08 Tucson, Arizona 10	
Pistor, William 06	Univ. of Arizona Animal Science	

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street, City and State)
Bechtold, Edward 06	29	1514 Conrad Sauer 10 Houston, Texas
Raven, William 06	P.A.A. - Miami, Florida	Rt. 2 - Box 307 10 Homestead = Florida
Scott, Bil 06		705 16 St N.W. 10 Albuquerque, N. Mexico
Pearson, George 06		8524 Carlsbad Way 10 Riverside, California
Alt, Ed 06		71 Silver Ridge Rd 10 New Caanan, Conn.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No. Street, City and State)
Pawley, Ted. 06		3468 Gunston Rd. 10 Alexandria, Va.
Aurand, Peter 06		219 Orchard Drive 10 Fairfax, Va.

24/RJ

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP TO
Sigma Chi	08, 10 Univ of A., Tucson, Ariz	1935	1939
Alpha Zeta	" " " "	"	"
Bob Cats	" " " "	"	"
"A" Club	" " " "	" "	"
American Club	Mexico, D.F.	1950	1955
American Club	" "	1963	
29 American Chamber of Commerce	" "	1950	1963
Knights of Columbus	" "		
St. Pa[illegible]'s Council	" "	1958	1963

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES FROM	INCLUSIVE DATES TO
Mexico, D.F., Mexico - 655 Sierra Leona 10	1949	1952
Mexico, D.F., Mexico - Toluca Highway, Klm 19 1/2 10 Cuajimalpa, D.F. 10	1952	1963
Panama Rd. P. Golf Heights 10	1946	1949

4/R5

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Moderate

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

None.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Mrs. Rachel Esther Wichtrich 06

2. RELATIONSHIP Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* Toluca Highway, Kim 19 1/2 Cuajimalpa Mexico D. F. 10

4. HOME PHONE NO. 20-77-47 06

5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico
Lucerna #78, Mexico, D. F. 29, 10

6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. 35-96-53 06

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr or Mrs Ellen Claridge - 619-16th St., N. W. 06, 10
Albuquerque, New Mexico - (Sister in law)

6/RS

SECTION XXVI CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 8 May 1963	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Mexico City, Mexico	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Dorothy J. [illegible]

02

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. Sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Section XI - (9) - Shares in Ron Castillo S.A. - Mexico, D.F.
Shares in Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.

Section XXI (3) Only neighbors - remaining in area.

1/Rs

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT — (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General, under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 10450, dated 27 April 1953, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted or having shown a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant or employee and spouse (if any) must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and sign on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
Alabama People's Educational Association (see Communist Political Association)
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
American Christian Nationalist Party
American Committee for European Workers' Relief (see Socialist Workers Party)
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American Jewish Labor Council
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
American Nationalist Party
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Crusade
American Peace Mobilization
American Poles for Peace
American Polish Labor Council
American Polish League
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
American-Russian Fraternal Society
American Russian Institute, New York, also known as the American Russian Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
American Slav Congress
American Women for Peace
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Associated Klans of America
Association of Georgia Klans
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organisation der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party

Baltimore Forum
Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee
Black Dragon Society
Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee
Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America

California Emergency Defense Committee
California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California
Carpatho-Russian People's Society
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
Cervantes Fraternal Society
China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
Chopin Cultural Center
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Emergency Defense Conference
Citizens Protective League
Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including:
  Civil Rights Congress for Texas
  Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
Civil Rights Congress for Texas (see Civil Rights Congress)
Columbians
Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola
Comite Pro Derechos Civiles (See Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles)
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom
Committee for Nationalist Action
Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia
Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six
Committee for the Negro in the Arts
Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights
Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange
Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland (See Congress Against Discrimination; Maryland Congress Against Discrimination; Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland)
Committee to Aid the Fighting South
Committee to Defend Marie Richardson
Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners
Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates

Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, including:
  Alabama People's Educational Association
  Florida Press and Educational League
  Oklahoma League for Political Education
  People's Educational and Press Association of Texas
  Virginia League for People's Education
Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Congress of the Unemployed
Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council for Jobs, Relief and Housing
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Council of Greek Americans
Council on African Affairs
Croatian Benevolent Fraternity

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Daily Worker Press Club
Daniels Defense Committee
Dante Alighieri Society (between 1935 and 1940)
Dennis Defense Committee
Detroit Youth Assembly

East Bay Peace Committee
Elsinore Progressive League
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War

Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims
Families of the Smith Act Victims
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A. Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d'America)
Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society
Florida Press and Educational League (see Communist Political Association)
Frederick Douglass Educational Center
Freedom Stage, Inc.
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union

Garibaldi American Fraternal Society
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Guardian Club

Harlem Trade Union Council
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Heimusha Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hellenic-American Brotherhood
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society — a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoko Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Hungarian Brotherhood

Idaho Pension Union
Independent Party (Seattle, Washington)
  (See Independent People's Party)
Independent People's Party
  (See Independent Party)
Industrial Workers of the World
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Culture Society
Jewish People's Committee
Jewish People's Fraternal Order
Jikyoku Iinkai (The Committee for the Crisis)
Johnson-Forest Group
  (See Johnsonites)
Johnsonites
  (See Johnson-Forest Group)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Wedemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri

Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)

Labor Council for Negro Rights
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League
League for Common Sense
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)

Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination
  (See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.)
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Michigan Council for Peace
Michigan School of Social Science

Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Association of Mexican Americans (also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana)
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942)
National Committee for Freedom of the Press
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Labor Conference for Peace
National Negro Congress
National Negro Labor Council
Nationalist Action League

Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
North Philadelphia Forum
Northwest Japanese Association

Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Oklahoma League for Political Education (see Communist Political Association)
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Palo Alto Peace Club
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peace Information Center
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas (see Communist Political Association)
People's Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Peoples Programs (Seattle, Washington)
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Pittsburgh Arts Club
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee
Polonia Society of the IWO
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland
(See Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland)
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC)
(See Comite Pro Derechos Civiles)
Puertorriquenos Unidos (Puerto Ricans United)

Quad City Committee for Peace
Queensbridge Tenants League

Revolutionary Workers League
Romanian-American Fraternal Society
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association — composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Santa Barbara Peace Forum
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian-American Fraternal Society
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples (limited to State Shinto, abolished in 1945)
Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slavic Council of Southern California
Slovak Workers Society
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Southern Negro Youth Congress
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles)
Syracuse Women for Peace

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Trade Union Committee for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Trade Unionists for Peace
(See Trade Unionists for Peace)
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council

Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union
Union of American Croatians
Union of New York Veterans
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Defense Council of Southern California
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York (see Civil Rights Congress)
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Virginia League for People's Education (see Communist Political Association)
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance (since April 1936)

Yiddisher Kultur Farband
Young Communist League
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc.

14-00000

CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have read the names of the above listed organizations.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, I am not, nor have I been a member of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any organization listed above, or any organization outside the United States espousing Communist, Fascist, Totalitarian or Nazi causes, except as noted below.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, none of my close relatives are, nor have ever been members of, contributed to, received literature from, signed petitions of or in behalf of, or attended meetings of any such organizations, except as noted below.

INSTRUCTIONS

For the purpose of this certification, if an applicant or employee is completing this form, the term "close relative" will include spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts. "Close relatives" of the spouse, for this purpose, will include children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts.

If there are exceptions to this certification, set forth below under Remarks all pertinent information concerning the nature and extent of your activities or those of your close relatives in such organizations, including the names of the organizations, dates of membership, meetings attended, titles of positions held, amounts and dates of contributions, nature of petitions signed falling within the meaning of the above certification and circumstances thereof, titles and authors of literature received, and dates on which received.

In exceptions concerning relatives, include only such information presently known to you or available from your own records.

If necessary, use additional sheets and sign each sheet. Write none if there are no exceptions.

REMARKS: To be completed by Spouse	REMARKS: To be completed by Applicant or Employee
None	None
Date 2-17-63	Date 2-17-63
Signature of Spouse 06	Signature of Applicant or Employee 03
Address — City and State Same	Address — City and State [illegible] 06
Witness	Witness Dudley J. Kennick
Address — City and State	Address — City and State Mexico, D.F. Mexico

3/Rs

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

LIRING-3
NEXT 286.3 B IV

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3 VOL IV
201-0798301

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 Aug 1967 - 28 Nov 1968
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO
ROOM: 3D57
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DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
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DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PERUMEN LIRING-3

MERTZ

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 3159 (1*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMEY. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1732 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

*NO RECORD IN C/S 28 NOV 68 0300Z.

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FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6228 S E C R E T

MEN (MEANING ULVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9.

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

D. LIRING-9 MADE VAGUE PROMISES HELP LIRING-3 IN CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION ALTHOUGH NO FINANCIAL HELP MENTIONED.

E. LIRING-3 WAS REQUESTED TO RETURN TO LIRING [illegible] DEC SECOND FOR FUTHER TALKS. LIRING-9 WAS SHOWN LETTERS REVENTLY RECEIVED BY LIRING-3 FROM FAR CONTACTS IS GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DECLINEDO HOWEVER TO LET HIM KEEP THEM AND LIRING-9 MADE NO ATTEMPT COPY THEM.

3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

LIRING/3

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PERUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

23Nov68 IN 40612

B. DIRECTOR 55469

1. LEONARD S. TORMEI (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMEI ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301

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INFO
FILE, VR, C/CI/SO, CS/DC, C/WH/COG, C/CS2, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 232215Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9748

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612) 23Nov68 IN 40611

IDEN: BARRY G. ROYDEN.

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INFO FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3, C/CS/SCO

SECRET 232321Z NOV 63 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PERUMEN/LIRING-3

22 Nov 63 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN*

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBILY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 63 0400Z.

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

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PRECEDENCE SS

ACTION C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR C/CI/SD CS/DO C/WH/COG 5 C/CI, C/FI 2

359

S E C R E T 230230Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 25 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WOING~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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RAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

1. ILEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

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UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

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BY 41 PER

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01 Z6 12Z [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 47408

TO MEXICO CITY [redacted] INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25221)*

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin M. Smyth
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS

WH/2/G Dus Burns

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: M. Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 6 November 68

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	SA c		COG/REG

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CITE DIRECTOR 48471

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

~~File~~
File LIRING/3

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)*

1. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE RE RAFAEL ARGUETA AND ENRIQUE PUENTE.

2. FILE 201-248917, 201-798301 AND 50-9-11.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LIRING/3 received brief typewritten unsigned letter which expressed happiness his release from Guatemala jail. Envelope was from Enrique Puente Men's Store in Guatemala City and writer identified self as Rafael Argueta.

WH/COG/OPS

WH/2/G

Calvin M. [illegible]
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EV	TC
PP	SS
RR	
SA	COG REG

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FILE

FI 6 LIRING/3

SECRET 252255Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 7345

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5Nov63 27533

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7303 (IN 25321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE PUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6A AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1963 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7945 SECRET

ADDRESS TO USE IF ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HIM.)

3. LIRING-3 COMMENTED LETTER PROBABLY SIMPLY DESIGNED CHECK NEW COMMO CHANNEL. STATED HE HAS NEVER HEARD OF NAME RAFAEL ARGUETA A AND ASSUMES IT ALIAS OR NOTIONAL LETTER DROP. PLANS REPLY IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT AND ASKING "ARGUETA" WRITE NEXT LETTER DIRECTLY TO APARTMENT LIRING-4 RENTED DURING LIRING-3 ABSENCE. LIRING-3 WILL ASK FRIENDS TO EXPEDITE CONTACT "SINCE HE PLANNING TRAVEL".

4. IS THERE SOME WAY GUATEMALA CITY STATION CAN CHECK ON PARA 1 ADDRESS WITHOUT AT LEAST FOR MOMENT MAKING ON SPOT CHECK OR USING LIAISON?

5. FILE 201-248917, 201-792331.

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S E C R E T 041649Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] IN 27296

4 NOV

9650 d/

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIR-47428

B. MEXICO CITY-7923 (425321)

f, 6 Liring-3

1. AGREE REFERENCE A.

2. TRACES ON PERSONS MENTIONED REF B AS FOLLOWS:

A. JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ, AKA JORGE HERNANDEZ RIVAS, AKA "CEBOLLA" - FAR MEMBER ARRESTED 9 MARCH 1968 AND EXECUTED LATE APRIL 1968.

B. JUAN JOSE AND MIGUEL ANGEL DE (LEON) BARRIOS, BOTH WITH VARIOUS ALIASES, BROTHERS WHO TRAVELED SOVIET UNION 1964, MEMBERS OF FAR, ARRESTED LATE MARCH 1968, BELIEVED SENT TO PAVON PENAL FARM 26 APRIL 1968 AND STILL SERVING SENTENCE.

C. FRANCISCO (RAMIREZ) CORADO - PGT LEADER ARRESTED MAY 1967 AND RELEASED LATE AUGUST 1968.

D. JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA, AKA "CESAR MONTES" - FAR LEADER WHOSE CURRENT LOCATION UNKNOWN.

E. "PAVEL" - NO TRACES.

3. STATION WILL DISCUSS LIRING-3 CASE AT ANYTIME CONVENIENT

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6 · 7 · 8 CS · 9 TC · 10 · OPS · EV · PP · SS · RR · SA · CS/REG

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S E C R E T 012132Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7922

Fi6 LIRING/3

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 68 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEDGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

2. LIRING-3 HAS BEGUN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ARREST, DETENTION AND CONTACTS ESTYLISHED DURING AND AFTER RELEASE. ASKED ROWTON KEEP SENSITIVE POINTS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. PARTICULARLY FROM LIRING-4, WHOM FEELS WOULD NOT APPROVE HIS CONTINUED POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN ON BEHALF ROWTON. HIGHLIGHTS DEBRIEFING FOLLOW:

A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA". FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 402 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

Javier contreras

Lopes [illegible]

CARLOS RAUL GONZALEZ
mexi 7890

Hector Sanchez Gonzalez
mex 7744
22 Oct 18686

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7922 S E C R E T

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HDQS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

B. BROTHERS JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE G-2 FAR, WHO ALSO SHARED CELLBLOCK AND REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGHOUT HIS DETENTION, SHOWED LIRING-3 REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED JULY FROM "RELIABLE FAR SOURCES MEXICO" DESCRIBING LIRING-3 AS "ANARQUICO, SIN PARTIDO, CONDUCTA BUENA, CONFIABLE, RESPONSABLE PERO DIFICIL CONTROLAR." FOLLOWING THIS GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPORT JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS DISCUSSED FAR SITUATION FREELY WITH LIRING-3 AND ARRANGED FOR SECRET CONTACT WITH FAR REPRESENTATIVE MEXICO "PAVEL". ALSO TOLD LIRING-3 MONTES COMPLETELY STRIPPED OF POWER SINCE HAD IN FACT DESERTED REVOLUTION BY REMAINING OUTSIDE COUNTRY FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. MONTES CURRENTLY MEXICO WHERE EXPECTED REMAIN. FAR HAS COMPLETELY BROKEN WITH GUAT CP. THIS ACCORDING LIRING-3 REFLECTED IN COOLNESS EVIDENT BETWEEN LEON BROTHERS AND FRANCISCO CORADO, CP RESPONSIBLE IN PAVON PRISON. FAR HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVING FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM PBRUMEN FOR PAST SIX MONTHS SINCE REFUSAL FAR ACCEPT PBRUMEN TERMS (SUPERVISION PBRUMEN EXPERTS, FAVORED POSITION

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FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7922 S E C R E T

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS (IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING -3 TOLD ROWTON HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA" WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (DONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING -3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL (LIRING 10) HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO "PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY (AND IN PBRUMEN.) PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7922 SECRET

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-[illegible].

SECRET

Guat

LIRING/3

ASSUME THAT HE will NOT ALLUDE method of Release & Routons Alleged aid.

As Cubans can check on everything prefer he not hold back any info

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, RI/AN, PI, CI/OPS, FI 2

SECRET 241826Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY Mexi 9614

1P

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

24 OCT 68 IN 20246

PBRUMEN LIRING/3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7775 (IN 19623)

1. ESMICA/13 REPORTED LIRING/3 AND COMPANION DEPARTED GUATEMALA 18 OCTOBER 1968 VIA TACA FLIGHT 210 FOR MEXICO CITY. THEY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ESCORT DIRECTLY FROM PRISON FARM TO AIRPORT.

2. FILE: 201-248917.

SECRET

AN
AB X
IX
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FI

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B 201-248917

SECRET CS COPY

Liring-3
24 Oct 68
201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS

OPS	DS
EW	FC
FP	SS
RR	
SA	COG REG

S E C R E T 242228Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

[illegible] LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN 06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 16895)

File LIRING-3 soft file

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET EFFORT DETERMINE WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION ROWTON (UNDER PSEUDONYM UNDERSTANDABLE TO LIRING-3) UNABLE CONTACT LIRING-3 WIFE [illegible] FOR [illegible]. LETTER WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND ASK LIRING-3 PHONE ROWTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: ROWTON WHO RELUCTANT AT THIS POINT RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH LEFTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. FILE 201-[illegible]

S E C R E T

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DISSEM BY 49 PER RYBAT

ACTION C/WH/COPS ☐ RID COPY

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INFO FILE VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH/6, C/CI, C/FI

1		6	
2		7	CS
3	OPS	8	
4	EW	9	TC
5			SS
	PP		
	RR		
	SA		CS REG

SECRET 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486 File LIRING-3

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Oct 68 IN 06501

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35.22 PARA 5

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 SECRET

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PBRUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798321.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: ETsikerdanos/jmw
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375
DATE: 26 Sept 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

3E SECRET

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INFO: FILE , VR c/wh/cog 5, c/ca, c/fi 2, c/ri/rd

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 26 22 37 z Sep 68 CITE DIRECTOR 36584

File [redacted] LIRING 4 or 3

TO ~~MEXICO CITY~~, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT FEEL GUAT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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S E C R E T 252131Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7335

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC 25 SEP 68 IN 39476

1. LIONION MONITORING LISAMPAN REPORTED LIRING-4 ENTERED LIRING MORNING 25 SEPTEMBER. REQUESTED LIRING FURNISH PLACE TO STAY BECAUSE SHE UNABLE FIND WORK THIS NOT ABLE PAY FOR LODGING. SAID WOULD STAY LIRING UNTIL PROBLEM SOLVED.

2. WISH BRING ABOVE ATTENTION ROWTON. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ROWTON TRAVEL PLANS AND ETA STATION.

3. FILE 201-798301

S E C R E T

File LIRING-4

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INFO FILE, C/WH 6, C/RI/SD, C/CI, FI/T2

SECRET 301842Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6517 IN 02560 Cuino

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

1. GUATEMALA CITY STATION IS WILLING TO USE ITS LIAISON RELATIONSHIP IN ANY WAY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT UNILATERAL WOFIRM OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT AFTER 6 MONTHS, REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST IN LIRING-3 IS SOMEWHAT AWKWARD. WHILE GUATEMALAN CITY STATION IS NOT FULLY COGNIZANT OF ALL OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS LIRING-4 OPERATION AND ITS VALUE TO WOFIRM, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BY ALLOWING MORE TIME LIRING-3 AND COMPANION WILL BE RELEASED WITHOUT NEED INDICATE WOFIRM INTEREST. THIS APPEARS MORE IN LINE WITH MEXICO CITY STATION POSITION THEY DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET (MEXICO CITY 5954).

2. IF MEXICO CITY HAS CHANGED ABOVE POSITION AND NOW AGREES WOFIRM INTEREST CAN BE INDICATED, SUGGEST FOLLOWING APPROACH: STATION WILL ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 THAT MEXICO CITY HAS DEVELOPED AN OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN LIRING-3'S WIFE BUT UNABLE PROCEED WITH OPERATION BECAUSE OF HER CONCERN OVER FATE OF HER HUSBAND. WE CAN THEN ASK ESMAJOR-20 ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHEN TRIAL

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9517 S E C R E T

SCHEDULED AND INDICATION WHAT SENTENCE MAY BE. BELIEVE ANY INTEREST

SB ESMAJOR-20 MAY REVEAL TO THE COURTS WILL DEVELOP RESPONSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST DIRECTLY IN LIRING-3, THE STATION CAN SO ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 AND REQUEST HIS HELP.

3. FILE: 201-248917.

SECRET

BT

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18 Feb 67 Julian Lopez Diaz states in
mexi 0426 HAVANA that L-3 has contacts
w/mexi police

3 MAR 67 L-3 relation w/cubans
HMMA 31493 has deteriorated for
unknown reasons.

LIRING-4
ACCESS → 4 JAN 68 L-4 going to cuba for 3 months
mexi 3994 to separate* from husband becaus-
of his affairs with carmen
Lozada.

carlos Persaval
mexi 3985 MARCUE - solicited signatures
TDCS-314/00124 to doc protesting
4 JAN 68 against the cuban
cultural congress
4-11 JAN 68

ERNESTO CAPUANO - suspicion ~~that~~ L-3
mexi 4314 works for WOFIRM -
31 JAN 68 HAVANA evidently did not
believe this

Francisco LARA
~~Rodolfo SANDOVAL~~
carlos JURADO
carlos ~~Jurad~~ Persaval

2 1/2 Preston recruited 43
under false flag

Mexi - 5375 Mexi gov intervention
25 April 68 on behalf LIRING-3

Mexi 5540 (85701) L-3 sentenced
to 6 month minimum
term

L

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT: PERUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-818842

MICROFILMED
OCT 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace D. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PERUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: 12 reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

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LIRING-3

201-818842

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35502	26 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also re-enforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals, it would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON.

[illegible] GOYM

[illegible]

[illegible]

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

for Willard C. CURTIS

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S E C R E T 271602Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9511

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

27 SEP 68 IN 01147

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 36584

1. MEXICO CITY 7335 NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375
DATE: 26 Sept 68

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 26 22 37 Z SEP 68 CITE DIRECTOR 36582

TO MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL. AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT FEEL GUAT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

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SA	COG/REG

S E C R E T 252131Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7335

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

25 SEP 68 IN 39476

1. LIONION MONITORING LISAMPAN REPORTED LIRING-4 ENTERED LIRING MORNING 25 SEPTEMBER. REQUESTED LIRING FURNISH PLACE TO STAY BECAUSE SHE UNABLE FIND WORK THIS NOT ABLE PAY FOR LODGING. SAID WOULD STAY LIRING UNTIL PROBLEM SOLVED.

2. WISH BRING ABOVE ATTENTION ROWTON. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ROWTON TRAVEL PLANS AND ETA STATION.

3. FILE 201-798301

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S E C R E T 231854Z AUG 68 CITE ~~GUATEMALA~~ CITY 9326

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

8 Aug 68 IN 67011

REF A. MEXICO CITY 6658 (IN 66274)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9242 (IN 49331)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 9138 (IN 35920)

1. STATION POSITION ON LIRING [redacted]/3 CASE CONTINUES BE SAME AS THAT REPORTED REF B.

2. DURING LAST QUERY OF LIAISON RE STATUS OF CASE (REPORTED REF C), LIAISON OFFICER SAID SINCE CASE IN HANDS OF COURT THEY UNABLE PROBE FURTHER RE OUTCOME. BELIEVE ANY ADDITIONAL QUERY OF LIAISON WOULD BE CLEAR INDICATION OF SPECIFIC STATION INTEREST IN LIRING/3.

3. DIRECTOR 16024 (REF B OF MEXICO CITY 6658) NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

File LIRING/3

4072

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216

S E C R E T 072243Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6658

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

8 Aug 68 IN 66274

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)

B. DIRECTOR 16024

wife of Jurado

1. ROWTON SO FAR UNABLE LEARN MORE FROM LIRING-4 ABOUT HOW JUDGE SCHEDULED TRY CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR COULD BE BRIBED OTHER THAN STATEMENT BY ARTURO (SERRANO) BEREA TO EFFECT THIS TO BE ARRANGED BY GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY AT REQUEST MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. PERSON TO MAKE ACTUAL BRIBE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE KNOWN AS LEFTIST.

LIRING-3

2. MEXICO CITY ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "THE NEWS" 5 AUG CARRIED ARTICLE TITLED "MEXICAN ARTIST TO BE EXECUTED". ARTICLE QUOTED GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS INCLUDING PAINTERS, WRITERS, POETS AND SCULPTORS TO SAY GUAT GVT PLANNING EX ~~25 0) ,,2,3 5~~/ECUTE JURADO BECAUSE HE ENTERED GUATEMALA IN HIS CAR FOUR MONTHS AGO AND PICKED UP SOME HITCHHIKING YOUTHS WHO LATER TURNED OUT BE CONNECTED WITH GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. ARTICLE OBVIOUSLY PLANTED BY LOCAL LEFTISTS IN EFFORT SPREAD NEWS JURADO ARREST AND DETENTION TO FORCE OFFICIAL GVT INTERVENTION. ROWTON TRYING ESTABLISH FROM LIRING-4 WHO PLANTED ARTICLE.

File LIRING/3

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6658 SECRET

3. BELIEVE NEWS ARTICLE COULD BE USED TO APPROACH LIAISON AND ASK FOR DETAILS ON JURADO CASE WITHOUT INDICATING ANY SPECIAL CONNECTION TO JURADO. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT SENTENCE CAN BE EXPECTED IN JURADO CASE AND WHEN?

4. FOR DIRECTOR: DESPITE SOMEWHAT COOLER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AT THIS POINT BECAUSE JURADO SITUATION, LIRING-4 STILL WILLING GO PBRUMEN AS SOON AS JURADO FUTURE SETTLED, PARTICULARLY IF HE DEPORTED OR SENTENCED RELATIVELY SHORT JAIL SENTENCE.

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INFO FILE VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA

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S E C R E T 121716Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

12 JUL 68 IN 48331

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

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11 July [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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11 22 06z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3.

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~[illegible]~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

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CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

WH/2/G:

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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S E C R E T 202236Z JUNE 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 5934 20 JUN 63 IN 35210

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

KAPOK

file LIRING 3

1. LIRING-4, WHO POSTPONED DEPARTURE TO CUBA IN HOPE HELPING LIRING-3, HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL DISTRESSING NOTES FROM LATTER WHO, CONTRARY TO PREVIOUS INFO, STILL AWAITING SENTENCE IN JAIL. LIRING-3 COMPLAINS ABOUT VERY MEAGER FOOD, UNSANITARY QUARTERS AND CONSTANT FEAR OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE.

2. IN ONE NOTE LIRING-3 STATES MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY ABLE DO VERY LITTLE FOR HIM AND HINTS HE MAY RECEIVE SEVERE SENTENCE UNLESS SOME EFFORT MADE INFLUENCE JUDGE DECISION. JUDGE TO BE "INFLUENCED" MENTIONED AS JUAN SANCHEZ, OFICIAL TERCERO DEL JUZGADO CUARTO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA. IN OPEN CODE LIRING-3 REQUESTED LIRING-4 APPEAL TO ROWTON (IN ALIAS) IN CONNECTION WITH ABOVE AS EXPECTS HIS TRIAL AND SENTENCING EARLY JULY.

3. MEXICO CITY STATION DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH COULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET. IS THERE SOME WAY, HOWEVER, GUAT CITY STATION COULD DISCREETLY ASCERTAIN PROBABLY SENTENCE GIVEN LIRING-3 AND ADVISE.

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S E C R E T 211830Z JUN 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9138

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

21 Jun 68 IN 35920

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY-8996 (IN 12603)

B. MEXICO CITY-5984 (IN 35210)

SITUATION UNCHANGED FROM THAT REF A. LIAISON CONTINUES OPINE THAT SENTENCE WILL BE LIGHT VIEW ONLY KNOWN CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTION COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.

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[illegible]
LIRING-3
201

S E C R E T 252165Z MAY 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5598 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 13507)

23 MAY 63 IN 13245

WR

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 S E C R E T

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

S E C R E T

BT

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Activities of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4
1 April to 10 May 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-34484, 16 April 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover are eleven contact reports on the activities of LIRING-3 and -4 for the period 1 April to 10 May 1968 prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON.

2. The main points covered in ROWTON's reports are:

a. LIRING-3's association with Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City, his departure for Guatemala and his arrest and sentencing there;

b. The reaction of friends of LIRING-3's and LIRING contacts to the news of his arrest;

c. LIRING-4's efforts to "case" the offices of the LIRING Consulate, particularly the "safe room", and;

d. The obvious provocations of LIRING-4 by Sergio VALDEZ.

Continued.....

Attachments:
Reports (under separate cover)

MICROFILMED
MAY 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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17 May 1968

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3. The product of LIRING-4's efforts to case the LIRING consulate will be reviewed in a separate dispatch which will also transmit floor plans and drawings of that LIRING component. There is little question that the news of LIRING-3's arrest in Guatemala gained LIRING-4 the sympathy of various members of LIRING including LIRING-3, -9 and -16. They seem to understand LIRING-4's desire to postpone her departure for PBRUMEN after having received her long awaited PBRUMEN visa. The problem now is to have LIRING-4 leave for PBRUMEN while LIRING-3 is still incarcerated in Guatemala. As mentioned in a recent cable, BOWTON has encouraged LIRING-4's plans to try to visit LIRING-3 in jail in Guatemala City as BOWTON feels that LIRING-3 will probably urge LIRING-4 to spend in PBRUMEN at least some of the time he has to spend in jail. As for the conduct of Sergio VALDEZ (see BOWTON's reports dated 19 April and 6 May), it appears that the latter has deliberately been provocating LIRING-4. As this Station sees it, VALDEZ's purpose was to try to "shake up" LIRING-4 in the absence of LIRING-3 to test her reactions. It is doubtful that he acted as he did strictly for his own account. There is so far no solid indication that he may have been doing this for the PBRUMEN's (although this is no doubt a possibility). The Station is looking into the desirability, at this point, of placing VALDEZ under surveillance. The claim that BOWTON in alias offered Carmen LOZADA a certain sum of money for intelligence information in PBRUMEN has no foundation.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
MAY 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

16 April,1968

18P

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Diana Restaurant (Calle Mississippi) from about 1815 until 1900 on 15/4/68. L/4 asked Rowton whether he had heard anything from LIRING/3 and stated that she was beginning to worry since he had promised to let her know of an address in Chiapas to which she could write. Rowton pretended not to know precisely where and for how long L/3 intended to be away, commenting that he felt it unfortunate that he had been out of town three days before L/3 had left and did not have the benefit of a final discussion. Rowton alleged that L/3 had not told him very much in the letter he had left with L/4 for him just before leaving, and, in fact, had not mentioned anything about Raúl Moreno driving him and Francisco Lara to Chiapas in his car. In a further effort to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ dissuade L/4 from believing subsequently (when she finally learned of his arrest) that Rowton was responsible for the tragic development, Rowton alleged that he had urged L/3 not to cross the border but only to guide Lara to a safe crossing point and return immediately to San Cristóbal.

2. L/4 stated that unfortunately she herself knew very little of the final arrangements. She explained that L/3 had told her that he had persuaded Raúl Moreno to drive him and Lara to Chiapas because of the self-inflicted leg wound that prevented Lara from walking any great distance. She added that L/3 in his last telephone conversation with her told her that Raúl Moreno had finally "chickened out" and returned to Mexico City. (L/4 made no mention of Carlos Persaval and Rowton assumes that after Raúl Moreno backed out of his previous commitment, probably even before they left Mexico City, L/3 turned to Carlos Persaval and persuaded him to drive them to Chiapas in his car, and subsequently to accompany them across the border). L/4 continued that she was happy that Rowton had dissuaded L/3 from crossing the border becasue she was well aware of the dangers involved if he fell into a trap or was picked up by the Guatemalans. She added that she didnot particularly like Francisco Lara anyway and felt that he was too well known to escape detection.

3. In reply to Rowton's query, L/4 stated that Sandoval of the "thirteenth" (Yon Sosa Group) had telephoned her several times to ask if he could help her in any way, but did not apparently have any news. Rowton suggested that L/4 keep in touch with Sandoval just incase he might have learned something from FAR or Yon Sosa contacts. L/4 gave Rowton Sandoval's address as Lerma 54, apt N, but commented that she felt a little embarrassed to see him alone in the absence of L/3. Rowton then suggested that perhaps it might be more discreet

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to send I/3's 16-year-old son (who was staying with her at the time) around to enquire. L/4 agreed that this would be best and indicated that she would do so the next day. L/4 also stated that she felt she could get in touch more or less naturally with Raúl Moreno through Sergio Valdez to determine what had happened during the trip to Chiapas.

4. Rowton then asked L/4 to revisit the LIRING offices the following morning to study the lay-out of the back room (LIRING/9's office) and to use the typewriter again. L/4 stated that she finally found out that the typewriter in the main office was a German one but had not as yet been able to determine the exact name. She added that the one in the Mexican/Cuban Cultural Relations Office on Calle Hamburgo was a Remington and not the same as the one in the LIRING office. Rowton also asked I/4 to pick up as many blank forms and letterhead paper as possible.

5. L/4 commented that she had become quite close to Catalina Cepero during the past month and could count on her as a pretext for future visits to the office. I/4 added that on the previous afternoon Catalina had told her that the salaries of Cubana de Aviación personnel had been reduced and that her husband's salary had been cut from 450 dollars per month to 300 and that the LIRING office informed her that gasoline was being rationed for all mission personnel. Catalina also told her that packages destined for Cuba were not being delivered by Cubana de Aviación and that the backlog was so great that two officials had just arrived from Havana to attempt to resolve the problems involved. Catalina also complained that she was "sick and tired" of working in the office without pay and had tried to quit but was told by LIRING/9 that she must continue to help since the workload was so great. L/4 also told Rowton that Catalina had complained of money problems because of the cut in her husbands salary and hinted that she could use any money I/4 could loan her until next payday. Rowton suggested that I/4 lend Catalina 100 or 200 pesos in view of the usefulness Catalina might provide in I/4's continued access to the LIRING offices. L/4 added that Catalina had apparently become so attached to her that she was asking L/4 to move into the apartment across the hall from her which had become vacant (Cepero's apartment is 204 at Calle Juanacatlán 169).

6. L/4 also reported that Catalina had told her that a new directive had come out prohibiting all employees of the mission from carrying back to Havana any packages of personal items whatsoever. Catalina commented that for that reason Echemendía (Suarez de la Paz) who left the previous week could not take an ostraciser back with him to her family.

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[illegible]

Wallace B Rowton

17 April,1962

Subject: LIRING/4 Report on Visit to LIRING Offices.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Mississippi Restaurant from about 2035 until 2115 on 17/4/63 to debrief her on her visit to the LIRING office earlier that day. LIRING/4 was obviously worried, and said so at one point, about LIRING/3 in view of the total absence of any news or communication from him. Rowton pretended to be even more ignorant of L/3's current whereabouts than L/4 herself, and asked anxiously whether she had learned anything from Sandoval or Sergio Valdez. L/4 replied that Sergio had told her that Raúl Moreno while driving L/3 and Lara to Chiapas had had an accident in the car that had proved very costly to him, although fortunately no injuries resulted to anyone. Valdez continued that Raúl had to appeal to his father for money to cover the expenses involved in getting the car running again. Valdez did not know what had happened to L/3 and Lara after Raúl Moreno left them (apparently enroute to Chiapas) and could not provide any further information.

2. As to Sandoval, L/4 told Rowton that the latter had again telephoned her to offer any help she might need but did not have any news from Lara or L/3. L/4 gave Rowton the home address of Francisco Lara as care of Martha I. Lara de Rodriguez, 16 Avenida 20-74, Zona 12, Guatemala, Guatemala, tel: 48-17-17.

3. L/4 then reported that she had visited LIRING/9's office as requested by Rowton and managed to get another look at the book-case cabinet in the corner of the room. She commented that on entering the premises she was surprised to find that the typewriter (German make) previously located in the middle office (that used by Mirabal) had been moved into the back office of L/9 and that Rosita, the wife of Luna, was struggling with two fingers to type out something as she entered. L/4 said that L/9 was quite cordial to her and invited her in for a coffee and presenting her with five tickets to the ballet performance that evening. When L/4 asked him whther anything had come in re her re-entry permit, the latter immediately began opening the mail on his desk with the comment that perhaps a reply had arrived that morning and he would check at once. After looking through the mail he replied in the negative but did not discourage L/4 from hoping that the reply would be in soon.

4. L/4 then stated to Rowton that she noticed that the cabinet in the corner of the room was bigger and lower than she had recalled from previous visits and had legs about two inches high. She added that the cabinet which was divided into two sections, the one to the left containing a shelf on which there was nothing but cigars and cigarettes and the right half consisting of a compartment with a door covered with sack cloth (costal) and possibly locked by key.

She stated that the cabinet was placed catty-cornered and that in the rather spacious~~xx~~ triangle behind it she could see many rolls of paper, which she assumed were discarded posters apparently placed there at random. L/4 then made the attached sketch on a napkin stressing the difficulty she had in providing Rowton with exact measurements. She added that there were two windows facing the street, one in the reception room and one in the middle room, but the only window in the back room faced on the inside patio and had a venetian blind and a gauze curtain but no drape.

5. L/4 then told Rowton that she had learned from Jorrín that he would be returning PCS very soon since his replacement had already arrived. He gave L/4 his home address as Velasquez 94 Altos, e/Infanta y Cruz del Padre, Barrio Villa Nueva. Habana. L/4 commented to Rowton that she would take advantage of his return (possibly on 22/4/63) to send another letter to Abreu asking for a definitive reply to her re-entry request. She added that she felt she could count on Jorrín for this service, she her relations with him had always been very cordial.

6. L/4 also mentioned that she had seen and greeted Cepeda who had just returned from Havana (apparently without his wife). L/9 told L/4 that he himself had been in Havana the preceding week on a regular courior run.

7. L/4 also turned over to Rowton several publications which she had received from Catalina Cepero and the press office. She commented that the wife of Cruz was working as secretary to the Chief LIRING in addition to her duties as responsible for confidential documents.

Wallace B. Rowton

19 April,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with Sergio Valdez re LIRING/3 Alleged WOFACT Affiliation.

1. LIRING/4 met with Rowton at the new safehouse room Rowton rented for security reasons under the alias Jean Mercier at the Suites Marne. Rowton had given L/4 a key and she entered the building and proceeded directly to the apartment, arriving at about 1700. Rowton posed as a French businessman and introduced L/4 to the owner(and his sister) as his secretary.

2. LIRING/4 stated that she was glad to have some time alone with Rowton since she had received a disturbing report from Sergio Valdez again revealing that reports of LIRING/3's alleged affiliation with WOFACT were circulating in leftist circles. She explained that Sergio Valdez had talked with her at her apartment (Atoyac) ~~Monday~~ Monday evening (15 April,1968) far into the night about two reports he had received about LIRING/3. Sergio Valdez explained that about three weeks previously his father (who works on the staff of "Siempre" told him that he should be careful in his dealings with LIRING/3 since the latter was a WOFACT agent. Sergio Valdez told L/4 that he became indignant at this telling his father that he had known L/3 for the past ten years and considered L/3 as his mentor in revolutionary philosophy and had absolutely no reasons to distrust him in his current activities. Sergio Valdez added that he threatened to break with his father unless the latter revealed to him the source of his information. His father finally confessed that he learned this from Alberto Dominguez, his boss in Siempre, but he could not say from whom Dominguez had received the report.

3. Sergio Valdez continued that in addition to this report he had also been told some time ago by General Heriberto Jara (now deceased) that he should be careful in his dealings with LIRING/3 since the latter was known to be a "traitor to the revolution". Sergio Valdez added that General Jara did not specify any reason for his allegation or give details.

4. Sergio Valdez, according to L/4, stated in reference to these allegations that he was quite naturally very disturbed and had hesitated to mention them to LIRING/3 before his departure in order not to upset him. He stated that he had given the matter a great deal of thought and had come to the conclusion that Orozco was the person passing out this scurrilous report and that he intended to get to the bottom of the whole business himself without involving LIRING/3. He explained that he was planning to organize a group of four or five armed men to kidnap Orozco and interrogate him until he confessed everything. He added that if Orozco finally confessed that he had passed this

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calumny to Alberto Dominguez they would assassinate Orozco on the spot. If, however, it became clear that Orozco was innocent they would look for some one else who might have been the source.

5. LIRING/4 stated that this whole conversation had shaken her badly since it was again an indication that L/3 was through no fault of his own accused of betraying the revolution and she was well aware of the drastic action that the Guatemalan revolutionaries as well as the Cubans were willing to take again persons accused even on slim evidence of being traitors. She asked Rowton under no circumstances to reveal this latest report to LIRING/3 since she knew such reports might drive him to do something drastic.

6. LIRING/4 also reported that in the course of conversation Sergio Valdez had brought up the name of Mr. Harris, but not in connection with the above-mentioned report against L/3. She explained that Sergio Valdez said that he knew of L/3's business relations with Harris in the past and that he himself hoped some day to be able to meet Harris so that he might interest Harris in his own commercial ventures. I/4 told Rowton that she pretended not to have much direct dealing with Harris and alleged that as far as she knew he was currently in Canada.

Wallace B Rowton

14-00000

22 April,1968

Subject: Rolando Mendez Aguilar, Guatemalan Rebel Contact in Mexico City.

1. LIFEAT coverage of the home telephone of LIRING/3 has revealed Subject to be a contact of Francisco Lara of FAR and Rodolfo Sandoval of the Yon Sosa group of Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City.

2. On two occasions in early April,1968, Francisco Lara, during a visit to LIRING/3's apartment, made telephone calls to 45-60-30 (listed as Publicaciones e Impresiones Mexicanas S.A. - Diario Ovaciones, Calle Lago Sinahuán 297) and asked for Sr. Mendez Aguilar on extension 27. It is apparent from the context of conversation that Subject is a close friend and possible collaborator of Lara's. LIRING/3 reported the telephone call to Rowton, which he stated was made in his presence in an effort by Lara to locate Rodolfo Sandoval. According to L/3, Lara asked the person whom he telephoned (L/3 could not identify this person since Lara did not use his name while talking) where "their fine friend" was. L/3 continued that Lara did not mention Sandoval's name, apperently for security reasons, but he had previously told L/3 that he was calling to determine the whereabouts of Sandoval. L/3 also reported that he heard Lara refer to a certain "El Gato" and to "El Gordo". L/3 told Rowton that he could not identify the former, but it appeared that "El Gordo" referred to the young friend of Lara's whose photograph L/3 had previously given to Rowton for copying and who was named only "Roberto" in conversations with Lara.

3. The LIFEAT intercept reveals that Francisco Lara told Mendez Aguilar that he had been with Sandoval early the preceding evening but that the latter had not shown up for the meeting arranged for that same morning. When pressed Mendez confessed that Sandoval had returned home drunk and was probably sleeping off the effects of the previous evening. This would indicate that Sandoval probably lived with Mendez Aguilar, or at least maintains close contact with him.

4. The Station is attempting to determine the home address of Subject in the hope that further specific information can be uncovered concerning his relationship with FAR.

Wallace B. Rowton

24 April, 1968

1. LIRING/4 informed Rowton 24 April, 1968, that she received telegram from Mexican Consulate Guatemala City advising her "Consulate intervening in case her husband; will continue to keep informed". LIRING/4 on her own initiative (before she able meet with Rowton) asked advice Sergio Valdez and Manuel Marcué Pardiñas (of defunct Politica).

2. On recommendation Valdez, LIRING/4 telephoned Mexican Consulate Guatemala City and spoke at some length with Consul Octavio Serrano. Latter assured her LIRING/3 well and that he taking personal interest since he ~~personal~~ old friend LIRING/3's father. He explained that initial hearing would take place next day and that judge would have eight days in which decide disposition of the case. He gave LIRING/4 his home telephone and promised to keep her informed.

3. No mention made either in conversation with Serrano or in local press of simultaneous arrest of Francisco Lara, although arrest of Carlos Persabal Marcué ~~xxxx~~ reported, ~~simultaneous~~. Charge listed as "distributing communist propaganda".

4. LIRING/4 also reported that in her hurried meeting with Manuel Marcué Pardiñas latter at first took "it-served-them-right-approach" but confided that he had learned of arrest preceding day and immediately appealed to Carrillo Flores. According Marcué, Flores sent telegram in his presence to Mexican Consulate instructing it to bring matter to diplomatic level if necessary.

5. LIRING/4 also showed Rowton note from LIRING/3 in pencil on brown paper apparently/hastily torn from paper bag which she stated she received that day in plain envelope with typed address and apparently notional return address. She assumes this sent at request LIRING/3 by Octavio Serrano. Note reassure LIRING/4 that LIRING/3 in good health and that he can handle matters on his own. He states "Persabal is to blame" and instructs LIRING/4 to warn wife of Francisco Lara not to talk to anyone. Also to urge mother of Lara not to come Guatemala City in attempt help him.

6. Rowton instructed LIRING/4 give maximum play this development to LIRINGs in hope that this might wipe out adverse reports circulating against loyalty LIRING/3. LIRING/4, who expects re-entry permit PBRUMEN momentarily, will ask LIRINGs for extension in view developments.

25 April, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Visit to LIRING Offices.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 25/4/68 at the hotel saferoom that she had visited the LIRING establishment that morning to inform everyone of the news concerning LIRING/3. She stated that on entering her friend (LIRING/9's secretary) informed her that her re-entry permit had come through the preceding evening. L/4 explained at once that unfortunately she could not leave on the next flight becasue of LIRING/3's arrest. She then, despite the fact that his secretary told her that LIRING/9 was in a nasty mood, went into the latter's office and told him what had happened. LIRING/9 was very sympathetic, telling her that he also read the article in the paper. When L/4 showed him the hasty note [illegible] to her by L/3 which contained the sentence "Persabal tiene la culpa", LIRING/9 became very agitated and exclaimed that he would immediately "make out a card" (ficha) recording this treachery of Persabal. L/9 agreed that L/4 could not possibly leave for PEKING as planned and felt it would not be difficult to get an extension over the usual twenty-day limit of the re-entry permit.

2. LIRING/4 continued that she then went to see LIRING/2 and recounted the whole story to him, including L/3's involvement with FAR and the 13th of November movement. She noted that when she casually commented that Rodolfo Sandoval had told her that Yon Sosa had returned from PEKING via Mexico City about a month previously, LIRING/2 pretended not to be aware of this, exclaiming, "Imagine, they don't tell us those things!" LIRING/2 then said that he was leaving for a week TDY in PEKING the next day and would be happy to take along any letters L/4 might wish to send to their mutual friends explaining why she could not leave for PEKING at that time.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that while she was in the office of LIRING/9 she met Leo Deven who runs a hotel in Acapulco and whom she remembered from occasional visits he made to the LIRING offices while she was working there She described Deven as an obvious homosexual, well dressed and patronizing in his manners. He told her that he planned to travel to PEKING "on Friday" (whether 26 April or 3 May was not specified) to see his son who was studying there. L/4 commented that everyone at the LIRING office appeared to treat Deven with respect and confidence.'.

4. Re the layout of the office of LIRING/9 (backroom) LIRING/4 said she noted the addition of the typewriter table (formerly in the middle room) against the left wall with a portable Olympia typewriter on it. The German typewriter was still on the big desk. Also behind the small coffee table in the corner she noted that the rolled up posters were gone and in their place were two or three packages of books.

[illegible].B. Rowton

24 April,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Telephone Conversation with Yolanda Díaz.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton on 22 April,1968, that she received a telephone call from her negro doctor friend, Yolanda Díaz from PBRUMEN, on the evening of 19 April,1968, advising her that her re-entry permit had been approved. Yolanda added cheerfully, according to LIRING/4, that she would be expecting her on the 22 April flight.

2. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she telephoned her friend, LIRING/9's secretary, early on 22 April, to find out whether the LIRING office locally had received the approval. She was told that no word had as yet been received. LIRING/4 repeated the request for confirmation that same afternoon in the presence of Rowton but again received a negative reply.

Wallace B. Rowton

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27 April, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Meeting with Manuel Marcué Pardiñas.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 for lunch at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo at 1300 on 27/4/68. Rowton had given up the safe-room in the Hotel Suites Marne earlier that morning since he felt it was not longer necessary.

2. LIRING/4 reported that Manuel Marcué Padiñas, the uncle of Carlos Persabal Marcué, had telephoned her the previous evening "fromthe street" and arranged to see her privately at the Koala Restaurant (Maria Isabela hotel) later in the evening. According to LIRING/4, Marcué told her that through his appeal to Carrillo Flores the case of LIRING/3 and his nephew was now in diplomatic channels and he hoped that both prisoners would be simply deported after a summary trial. He could not, however, guarantee anything, especially the length of time involved, and asked LIRING/4 to refrain from any activity that might prejudice the case. Specifically he instructed LIRING/4 to break off all contact with the Guatemalan revolutionaries in Mexico, the LIRING establishment, and all communication with the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City. He ~~sxxxke~~ stressed that any false move on LIRING/4's part might cause Carrillo Flores to withdraw his intervention. Marcué promised to keep in touch with LIRING/4 so that she would not feel completely helpless. He added that the mother of Carlos Persabal Marcué (supposedly Manuel Marcué Pardiñas' sister) would be traveling to Guatemala City in the next few days so that she could visit her son and follow the case at first hand.

3. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that Rodolfo Sandoval of the Yon Sosa group had promised to visit her at her apartment the previous evening at 2200 in the company of Sergio Valdez to discuss matters further. H ad informed her on the phone in making the date that "El Gordo" had returned from Guatemala City - implying that the latter had news concerning the fate of Francisco Lara (whose arrest was not reported in the press, nor by Octavio Serrano, the Mexican Consul, to LIRING/4). LIRING/4 surmised that Francisco Lara had escaped arrest and his involvement with LIRING/3 was not known. She therefore agreed with Marcué that she should not see Sandoval and the other Guatemalans in public, and especially not at her apartment.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had asked her not to call him at his home again to ask for news, or as a matter of fact discuss in any way the case by telephone. He stated that he felt the phone of LIRING/4 as well as his own phones were tapped and that possibly LIRING/4's apartment was being watched. He did not specify by whom or for what purpose, but LIRING/4 told Rowton that she assumed it would be either by the Mexican Government or the Mano Blanca of Guatemala or both. Rowton again encouraged LIRING/4 to move out of the Atoyac apartment and back into the less conspicuous calzada Tacubaya place, commenting that this would not only prevent future security risks but also convince the LIRINGs that she was suffering financially because of LIRING/3's plight (she stated that she has already intimated this inconversations with the wife and secretary of the LIRING Chief, as well as with LIRING/2). LIRING/4 agreed but expressed regret that the Tacubaya apartment did not have a phone and that she might miss important mail addressed to the Atoyac apartment and arriving after her departure. Rowton suggested one last letter to the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City simply advising him of the change of address.

5. LIRING/4 also showed Rowton the return address typed on the envelope in which the note from LIRING/3 to her had been forwarded. The address, which Rowton supposes is notional, placed on the envelope by Otavio Serrano at the suggestion of LIRING/3 for security reasons, is as follows:

Carlos Rodriguez
35 Avenida 20-67, Zona 5
Guatemala C.A.

6. Rowton concluded with the comment that he felt LIRING/4 need not take Marcué's instruction not to visit the LIRING offices too seriously, since it was a well known and easily ascertainable fact that LIRING/4 had a logical reason for going there occasionally. Rowton did not wish LIRING/4 to break off relations at this critical time, expecially since LIRING/2 had commented to her on her last visit that she should feel free to come in at any time she needed help or consolation during the crisis.

Wallace B. Rowton

29 April, 1968

SUBJECT: LIRING/4 Report of Contact with Sandoval and Marcué.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 for late lunch at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo on 29/4/68. She had to bring her child along since the 16-year-old son of LIRING/3 was not at her apartment at the time.

2. LIRING/4 reported that Sandoval of the 13th of November Group of Yon Sosa had again visited her and shown great concern for her welfare. He again offered her some money, such as he had, but LIRING/4 refused in view of his simultaneous complaints of the financial crisis he himself was undergoing. He explained that since Francisco Lara left he had been supporting Lara's entire family consisting of Lara's wife, mother, and their two young children. LIRING/4 said Sandoval reached a point in emotional frustration during the conversation that he exclaimed that he would have to resort to robbery or a hold-up in order to get the necessary money not only to support Lara's family but to send someone to Guatemala City to see LIRING/3 and procure a good lawyer for him. LIRING/4 told Rowton that this upset her so that she spent the rest of the evening pleading with Sandoval not to commit any criminal act. Sandoval then revealed that he and his friends had held up a policeman during the Humphrey visit and taken his gun, since they were short one weapon.

3. LIRING/4, commenting that Sandoval's only income was from selling language records for the Cortina Instituto Linguistico, told Rowton that she promised to contact all her friends in an attempt to help him sell the records and thus raise some money legally. L/4 explained to Rowton that Sandoval's commission is about 350 pesos per set of records, which is actually the down payment made by the customer (the remainder being paid in weekly or monthly instalments of about 165 pesos). L/4 asked Rowton's help in finding customers among his business contacts to help Sandoval.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had visited her at her apartment late the previous evening. He told her that Carlos Fersabal's wife, Teresa Lozada, would be accompanying her mother-in-law to Guatemala City. He also stated that he was optimistic since Carrillo Flores had instructed the Mexican Consul to appeal to the Guatemalan Minister of Foreign Affairs. Marcué commented that unfortunately the Mexican Consul could not reach this official himself since he was currently in New York. He hoped however that the Consul would see the Minister's secretary to arrange direct intervention. L/4 commented to Rowton that Marcué seemed very curious about

the LIRING office, but she fended off his questions by alleging that she had little or no contact with it. L/4 also commented that Sergio Valdez, who was being particularly helpful to her at this time, warned her sternly against accepting any money from Marcué in light of his reputation as an unscupulous Lothario. L/4 added that Marcué promised to see her again the following evening to keep her informed.

5. When Rowton again suggested that LIRING/4 move from the Atoyac apartment back to the Tacubaya place despite its dreariness and lack of telephone, she presented no objection, commenting that with all the traffic in and out of her Atoayac apartment at all hours of the night her reputation is probably in jeopardy, especially with her immediate neighbors and the cleaning women and maids. She promised Rowton to move out the following day since it was the end of the month and a logical time. She also promised when revisiting the LIRING office the next morning to make this known, stressing her financial plight.

6. LIRING/4 then appealed to Rowton to help her establish some sort of contact with LIRING/3, if for nothing else than to find out how he was and whether he needed anything . L/4 felt that Rowton might send some business contact of his to visit L/3 on Rowton's behalf, giving some recognition signal to LIRING/3. When Rowton pointed out the danger in this of possibly making things worse for L/3, LIRING/4 commented that Sandoval had told her that visitors were not required to sign a register or give lengthy explanations. L/4 added that she might find someone, including Sergio Valdez or Raúl Moreno or one of their friends who might make a short trip to Guatemala City to see LIRING/3. In reply to Rowton's query, L/4 commented that she did not expect anything from the wife or mother of Carlos Iersabal since they had not even bothered to telephone her since the arrest became known.

7. Rowton promised to give the matter some thought and discuss it further with LIRING/4 the following afternoon.

Wallace B. Rowton

6 May ,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Contacts with LIRING Office.

1. On 3 May,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Boston that she had revisited the LIRING offices the preceding day and noticed that the black telephone was replaced in the middle office (where she herself used to work). She stated that she could not be certain that it was the same instrument and that it was replaced by one of the LIRING employees,but it appeared that way since she had not seen the instrument there on her visit on the previous Friday (26/4/68) and LIRING/9 had commented that the telephone would be replaced in the middle room.

2. With regard to LIRING/3's current situation, LIRING/4 reported that she had again talked to the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City by telephone on 2 May,1968, and was reassured that LIRING/3 was in good health. The Consul informed her that he could visit L/3 on Thursdays and Sundays, and would be glad to pass any letters that L/4 might send to him for L/3. The Consul also commented that the Mexican Relaciones Exteriores had instructed him to take up L/3's case with the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He added that he hoped with this pressure to persuade the Guatemalan government to deport L/3 within the next ten days.

3. LIRING/4 then reported what she described as a very disturbing conversation on 3 May,1968, with Sergio Valdez. She related that Valdez had come to see her in the morning to apologize for not having any money to lend her to help her meet expenses. He explained that he had not been paid by the Revista¿Porque? and was very short of funds himself. L/4 continued that she would have to appeal to all her friends and those of L/3 for some money to tide her over until L/3 returned. She then regretted that she had not been able to locate "Sr. Harris" but if and when he came to Mexico again she would have to "renew diplomatic relations" with him. Sergio Valdez then, according to LIRING/4, laughed and said that this reminded him of another nasty rumor that he had heard. He then revealed that Raúl Moreno had recently told him that a certain Gonzalez of the Spartaco Club had told him (Moreno) that LIRING/4 had been fired from the LIRING offices because she had been providing information to the PBPRIME Embassy and that he had learned this from the LIRING "service" officer. Sergio Valdez also mentioed that a "girl who worked in the zona rosa" who knows Teresa or Carmen Lozada had mentioned that Sr. Harris had offered Carmen Lozada the sum

CS COPY

of $4,000.00 for information on the situation in PBRUMEN. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she was badly shaken by these comments but attempted to assume as non-chalant an air as possible and did not question Sergio Valdez to determine the exact source. She noted that Sergio Valdez had mentioned Rowton several times to her, always apparently in passing, with the obvious hope that LIRING/4 would reveal his presence in Mexico and arrange an introduction to him for Sergio Valdez. LIRING/4 agreed with Rowton that Valdez was probably provoking her since at all times he appeared to be well disposed toward Sr. Harris from what he knew of him from LIRING/3. Rowton commented to L/4 that the last report concerning Carmen Lozada appeared to have been fabricated either by Sergio Valdez or one of his friends, simply on the basis of the fact that Sr. Harris had been in touch with Carmen Lozada while she was in Mexico.

4. LIRING/4 then stated that she felt she had to continue to impress Sergio Valdez with her desperate need for money and accordingly telephoned the LIRING gatekeeper in his presence and asked for a loan. When the gatekeeper responded favorably, she left Sergio Valdez waiting in the apartment and went to the LIRING Offices at once to collect the loan. The gatekeeper gave her 100 pesos on the spot, fortunately in the presence of LIRING/13. L/4 told Rowton that she promised to return the money in the next week, as soon as she received money promised to her by her father.

5. LIRING/4 added that as she was leaving the LIRING office she ran into the leftist writer, Jaime Labastida, who expressed his sorrow at the arrest of LIRING/3. Labastida commented that someone had told him recently that a cartoon of some kind had appeared in a Tapachula newspaper "against LIRING/3". When L/4 pressed him he gave a description of the "someone" that definitely identified him as Sergio Valdez. L/4 continued that when she confronted Sergio Valdez with this upon her return to the apartment, he hotly denied it, much to L/4's mystification.

6. LIRING/4 also commented that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas continued to telephone her at very late hours of the night in the hope (she assumed) that she would invite him up. She called him a "viejo verde" and added that she had no intention of seeing him alone at her home at night.

Wallace B. Rowton

8 May,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report Concerning Sentencing of LIRING/3.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at the Punto Blanco restaurant on Melchor Ocampo at 1300 on 8/5/68 that Manuel Marcué Pardiñas had informed her at 0100 that same day that he had just learned that LIRING/3 and his nephew had been sentenced to prison, with a minimum term of six months. Marcué added that his sister and her daughter-in-law would be returning to Mexico City by the end of the week and should be able to supply details of the trial and prospects for the immediate future of having the prison term reduced. LIRING/4 explained to Rowton that she had accepted a dinner invitation at Sanborns extended to her by Aguirre Jerjes, a professor at UNAM with whom she had studied at the University of Havana, and arrived at the home of Gilberto and Blanca Amant (Blanca Peña de Amant), wxith whom she was staying, rather late and found Manuel Marcué waiting for her. After apologizing profusingly for his previous rude conduct with L/4, he reported the latest news concerning L/3 to her.

2. LIRING/4 agreed with Rowton that although the prison sentence was probably definite, she should check it out with the Mexican Consul personally. She stated that fortunately she remembered a certain Josefina Rodriguez who worked in the Larga distancia service of Telefonos de México whom she had originally met as a friend of LIRING/2. L/4 commented that Srta Rodriguez whom she described as "muy fea" was enamored of LIRING/2 some years ago but stopped seeing him (to her knowledge) when she found out that he was married. L/4 continued that Srta Rodriguez had already promised to put through long distance calls to Guatemala for L/4 without charging the calls, if they could be arranged during her shift at the switchboard.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that she had again visited the LIRING offices at 1345 on 7/5/68 and again about 1130 that same morning. At Rowton's request she again checked the phone in the third office. On the first visit the office had already been closed but she ran into LIRING/13 at the gate and accepted a ride home (she felt this fortunate since he dropped her at the Tacubaya apartment at her request). On this occasion during a brief exchange of comments with the gatekeeper and L/13, LIRING/4 learned that LIRING/2 will return from ABRUKEN on 10/5/68. CS COPY

4. On visiting the LIRING offices on the morning of 8/5/68, LIRING/4 told Rowton that fortunately only her friend Catalina and Rosita (secretary of LIRING/9) were present. When she went into the third office where Rosita was working she asked to use the phone and approached the instrument. She

was able to note that the name "Oki Electric,Tokyo,Japan" was marked on the instrument. She also noted the word "Gall" but could not tell whether it was part of the manufacturer's name or a Mexican or U.S. subsidiary. She also noted that below the receiver were four switches (like the ordinary push light switches) unmarked or unnumbered. When she exclaimed to Rosita: "How do you dial on this phone", Rosita replied:"But it's not a phone,it's an intercom". LIRING/4 told Rowton that she then commented:"But how come, the intercom is in the first office." Rosita then, according to L/4, stated: "But that's a special intercom." (L/4 explained that she was referring to the phone she had in her hand).

5. LIRING/4 continued that when she passed through the second office, she noted that the phone which had been replaced in that room was of Ericsson manufacture and was the same instrument previously there when she worked in that office. She assumes that the LIRINGs replaced the phone themselves.

6. LIRING/4 also told Rowton that she had located an excellent apartment in the Edifico Condesa (Matzatlán and Veracruz) through her friend Blanca Peña who lives in the same development. LIRING/4 added that she had given the administrator 300 pesos to hold the apartment for her until she could arrange a fiador. She also stated that she could obtain a telephone eventually since the former tenant had applied and received approval just before he left. LIRING/4 reassured Rowton that she was telling everyone, particularly the LIRINGs, that she was living at the Tacubaya apartment and temporarily staying as a house guest at the home of Blanca Peña de Amant. She also reassured Rowton that she had informed the LIRING gatekeeper when she returned the 100 peso loan that she had received money from her father in New York. LIRING/4 added that several friends, including the well-known writer Revueltas, had offerred to find her some sort of work. She stated that if she could find suitable employment in the mornings she would accept the offer, if only for appearances.

Wallace B. Rowton

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

SECRET

BT

Branch file

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S E C R E T 301612Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5423

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIREC~~TR~~ TOR

30 APR 68 IN 01169

PBRUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

1. RETURN ADDRESS OF ENVELOPE IN WHICH NOTE FROM LIRING-3 SENT LIRING-4 IS

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ
35 AVENIDA 20-67 ZONA 5
GUATEMALA C.A.

2. ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE NOTIONAL ADDRESS WOULD APPRECIATEM

STATION CHECK.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3 201
WC

SECRET

SECRET
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DEL MAR, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN PASSPORT ONE ZERO THREE THREE EIGHT EIGHT
ARRESTED BY GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES ON APRIL ONE THREE, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, WHEN ATTEMPTING TO INTRODUCE INTO GUATE- MALA COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA WHICH HAD BEEN CONCEALED IN THE SIDE PANELS OF THEIR AUTOMOBILE

035-004-017
DBC -15440
26 APR 68
FBI CABLE
P2

R 6805270834

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 6-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

3 P

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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MICROFILMED
APR 30 1968

TO
Chief/WHD

INFO.
COS/Guatemala City INFO HGG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

201-798301

SUBJECT
Review of Events Leading to LIRING-3's Arrest in Guatemala

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

201-832457

1. The purpose of the present dispatch is to summarize the developments leading to the trip made by LIRING-3 to Guatemala in the company of FAR member, Francisco Alalberto LARA Barrios, and Carlos Manuel PERSAVAL Marcue, Mexican national and nephew of Manuel Marcue Pardinas, ex-director of the now defunct Politica. This trip, as the Guatemala City Station has advised, resulted in the arrest of all three persons in Guatemala just over the Mexican border on the weekend 13-14 April, and their current imprisonment in Guatemala City in the custody of the Guatemalan army.

continued.......

Distribution:
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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
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201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO B 201-832457	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34531	DATE 25 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

2. According to reports submitted to Wallace B. ROWTON by LIRING-3, the latter met Carlos Manuel Persaval Marcue originally through the latter's sister-in-law, Carmen Lozada de Ramirez, who had been carrying on an extra-marital affair with LIRING-3 since early November 1967. On the evening of 3 March 1968, Persaval approached LIRING-3 in connection with the difficulties that a young Guatemalan woman living in Mexico City was having in obtaining false documentation to enable her to travel to Guatemala to recontact her husband, whom Persaval described as "an important guerrilla leader". Persaval revealed to LIRING-3 that he had been assisting the FAR in propaganda work in Mexico for some time and gave LIRING-3 several copies of a pamphlet entitled "Violencia en Guatemala" which Persaval said had been published on one of his uncle's presses and was being sold at the nominal price of three Mexican pesos to help raise money for the FAR.

3. When LIRING-3, under ROWTON's direction, responded favorably to this initial approach, Persaval pursued the matter and finally, on 8 April, revealed that he was in touch with two "important guerrilla leaders" who needed help in returning clandestinely to Guatemala. Persaval asked LIRING-3 to arrange to guide these persons across the Guatemalan border south of Chiapas, an area LIRING-3 had previously told Persaval he was very familiar with from his previous residence in San Cristobal. Persaval made no further reference to the "young Guatemalan wife of the FAR leader". LIRING-3 surmised to ROWTON that this person might actually have been the wife of Francisco Lara Barrios, but that plans for her return were discarded in favor of the trip by Lara himself.

4. At ROWTON's urging, LIRING-3 insisted on meeting the two Guatemalans involved and in talking to them before undertaking such a mission. Persaval finally introduced LIRING-3 to Francisco Lara Barrios on 17 March 1968, and the latter presented LIRING-3 to a certain "Rodolfo", who LIRING-3 ascertained subsequently was a member of the 13th of November group headed by Yon Sosa by the name of Sandoval. Francisco Lara Barrios confided to LIRING-3 that he had in his possession a false Guatemalan passport in the name of Jose Maria Oliva Carranza and that he had obtained legal residence in Mexico with his wife and children through the efforts of ex-Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas. He also named a certain Eskenazi and LIREBEL-1 as persons who assisted Guatemalan exiles in Mexico. Station believes Eskenazi may be identical with Luis David Eskenassy Cruz, a former agent of the Guatemala City Station.

5. With the approval of ROWTON, LIRING-3 agreed to help the above-mentioned persons to cross the Mexican/Guatemalan border and to accompany them to Guatemala City. This latter extension of the original trip was made by Lara at the suggestion of LIRING-3 so that the latter could meet with the FAR woman responsible for logistics. LIRING-3 reported to ROWTON subsequently that just before their departure, Lara also offered to arrange for LIRING-3 to travel clandestinely to the Sierra de las Minas to meet directly with FAR and 13th of November leaders to discuss further support that LIRING-3 might be able to provide through his commercial contacts in Chiapas and northern Mexico.

6. LIRING-3 fabricated a false Mexican identity document (Secretaria de Education) for Francisco Lara Barrios in the name of Jacinto Rangel Cervantes with Lara slightly disguised so that the latter could move about more unobtrusively on the Mexican side of the border just prior to crossing. On 3 April 1968, just prior to their scheduled departure date, Francisco Lara

informed LIRING-3 that their mutual friend Rodolfo Sandoval would not be accompanying them since he was too well known and his mission was not important enough to justify the risk and the expense involved.

7. LIRING-3 did not depart as he had hoped on 5 April 1968, because Lara unfortunately accidentally shot himself in the ankle on the morning of that day while cleaning his gun and had to be given medical attention before he could make the trip. LIRING-4 told ROWTON that LIRING-3, Francisco Lara and Raul/Moreno, a friend of LIRING-3, finally left Mexico City in the personal car of Raul Moreno on 10 April 1968, but that Moreno had returned to Mexico City two days later as a result of an accident that disabled the car somewhere in Chiapas. LIRING-4 did not report anything concerning the subsequent involvement of Carlos Persaval Marcue, stating that she had not received any communication from LIRING-3 after his telegram of 12 April, in which he reported the return of Raul Moreno. ROWTON surmises that when Raul Moreno had to return to Mexico City, LIRING-3 and Lara asked Carlos Persaval Marcue to join them and drive them to the border in his own car, and that Persaval continued on with them toward Guatemala City.

8. Guatemala City Station advised on 22 April 1968, that the story of the arrest of Lara, Persaval and LIRING-3 had reached the local press and that they would be turned over to the appropriate courts for trial. This indicates that LIRING-3 may eventually be released and hence be available to ROWTON for complete debriefing.

9. The only significant name that had surfaced as a result of LIRING-3's involvement with the Guatemalan rebels in Mexico City is that of Rolando/Mendez Aguilar, whom Francisco Lara Barrios contacted on 45-60-30 extension 27, in early April from the home telephone of LIRING-3. (This number corresponds to the "Publicaciones e Impresiones Mexicanas, S.A. - Diario Ovaciones, Calle Lago Sirahuen 297, Mexico City). From the LIFEAT coverage on LIRING-3 it is apparent that Mendez is a close contact of both Lara and Sandoval and may be providing or have provided employment for them in Mexico. The Station is attempting to determine the home address of Mendez in the hope that further details of his possible collaboration may be uncovered.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 252105Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5375

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

PERUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4

25 Apr 68 IN 98384

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 8935 (IN 95701)

1. LIRING-4 RECEIVED CABLE FROM MEXICAN CONSULATE GUATEMLA CITY 24 APRIL STATING CONSULATE INTERVENING ON BEHALF LIRING-3. LIRING-4 PHONED CONSULATE, WAS TOLD BY CONSUL OCTAVIO SERRANO THAT LATTER CLOSE FRIEND LIRING-3 FATHER. SERRANO SAID LIRING-3 "ALL RIGHT," WOULD HAVE INITIAL COURT HEARING 25 APRIL AFTER WHICH JUDGE WOULD HAVE EIGHT DAYS DECIDE DISPOSITION OF CASE. CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTION COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. NO MENTION MADE BY SERRANO OR PRESS OF FACT FRANCISCO (LARA) BARRIOS ARRESTED WITH TWO MEXICANS.

2. LATE 24 APRIL LIRING-4 RECEIVED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 HASTILY SCRIBBLED ON BROWN PAPER, AND PROBABLY MAILED TO HER BY SERRANO. LETTER IN DOUBLE TALK SAYS LARA "ALL RIGHT" AND WARNS AGAINST HAVING HIS WIFE TALK TO THE PRESS OR HIS MOTHER COME GUATEMALA TO TRY HELP HIM. GOES ON TO SAY "THINGS MAY TAKE A WHILE" AND BLAME PERSAVAL FOR ARRESTS.

3. LIRING-4 CONTACTED MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS AFTER RECEIVING

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5375 S E C R E T

CABLE. MARCUE SAID HIS NEPHEW PERSAVAL "ALWAYS IN TROUBLE AND DESERVED BE LOCKED UP" BUT ADMITTED CALLING ON MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANTONIO (CARRILLO) FLORES ON BEHALF PERSAVAL WITH RESULT THAT MINISTER SENT MEXICAN CONSUL GUATEMALA CITY INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVENE.

4. PER STATION BRIEFING LIRING-4 TAKING LIRING-3 LETTER TO LIRING 25 APRIL WITH VIEW ASK AID LIRING-2 AND LIRING-9 AND USE LIRING-3 ARREST TO TRY CORRECT ADVERSE REPORTS CIRCULATING RE HIS LOYALTY. LIRING-4 RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM GIRLFRIEND IN PERUMEN CAPITAL 19 APRIL SAYING LIRING-1 WHO ASKED GIRL TO CALL HAD SUCCEEDED OBTAINING PERUMEN ENTRY VISA FOR LIRING-4. IF NEWS VISA GRANTED ALREADY A LIRING, LIRING-4 TO STATE SHE DOES NOT WANT LEAVE UNTIL LIRING-3 FREED OR HIS FATE CLEARLY SETTLED. STATION NATURALLY HOPING ARREST OF LIRING-3 IN GUATEMALA WILL HELP LIRING-4 POSITION DURING VISIT PERUMEN. IN REPORT ANNOUNCING LIRING-3 ARREST IN GUATEMALA PASSED STATION 23 APRIL LITEMPOS BRANDED LIRING-3 AS "COMMUNIST."

SECRET

SECRET

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: LIRING-3 Visit To Guatemala With Guerrillas
FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARRA BARRIOS and CARLOS
MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE

1. On 5 March 1968, LIRING-3 had dinner with CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCUE, nephew of MANUEL MARCUE PARDINES, director of the now defunct magazine "POLITICA", a Communist bi-monthly publication. During the dinner PERSAVAL queried LIRING-3 if he could obtain a false passport for the wife of an important Guatemalan guerilla leader so that she could travel from Mexico to Guatemala. LIRING-3 replied that he would do his utmost to assist.

2. On 8 March 1968 PERSAVAL told LIRING-3 that two(2) Guatemalan revolutionaries had need to travel to Guatemala by mid-March. LIRING-3 commented that there was limited possibility of obtaining false documents, but that he could brief the Guatemalans so as to facilitate their illegal crossing of the Mexican/Guatemalan border, or if they desired, he would guide them.

3. On 9 March 1968, PERSAVAL again discussed the matter with LIRING-3, saying that one of the two travellers possessed legal travel documents. Since the other person has no such legal documents, they should enter Guatemala illegally.
[MEXI-4790]

4. LIRING-3 reported on 27 March 1968, that one of the traveller to Guatemala is FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS. The group is of the opinion that LIRING-3 should also go to Guatemala in order to meet an unidentified woman, described as the FAR logistics officer, to discuss FAR support from Mexico.
[MEXI-5000]

5. Departure was delayed because LARA sustained a self-inflicted gun shot wound while cleaning a weapon. On 10 April LIRING-3, LARA, and another person--described as a member of the YON SOSA Faction--departed en route to Guatemala. LIRING-3 was informed that the FAR and the YON SOSA group are now working together, but that a certain amount of compartmentation exists.
[MEXI-5205]

SECRET

6. During the 14-15 April week-end, Guatemalan authorities arrested three individuals near the Mexican border. They were brought to Guatemala City where they are being held for interrogation.
The persons arrested are:

a. FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS (Guatemalan)
b. CARLOS JURADO DEL MAR (Mexican)
c. CARLOS MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE (Mexican)

When arrested LARA admitted that he is a Communist, and that he is returning to Guatemala to renounce his affiliation.
/GUAT-3880 7

7. The G-2 of the Guatemalan military was not successful in its interrogation of the Subjects. Liaison attempted it but was compelled to conduct its interrogation in the presence of G-2 officials who continually interrupted. Liaison was attempting additional interrogation under more favorable circumstances. Meanwhile G-2 is considering turning over the Subjects to the "Army Special Unit" for further interrogation.
/GUAT-88907

LIKING-3

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S E C R E T 222145Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5308

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

22 APR 68 IN 95857

REF: GUATEMALA CITY -8906 (IN 95701) (IN 95626)

1. ALL INFO IN MEXICO CITY-5301 MAY BE PASSED LIAISON.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE COPY OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON [illegible] AND JURADO.

S E C R E T

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LIRING-3

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22 Apr 68 IN 95701

REF A GUATEMALA CITY 8880 (IN 91436)

B. MEXICO CITY 5301 (IN 95626)

1. PRESS OF 21 APRIL 1968 REPORTED THAT PERZABAL AND JURADO HAD BEEN CONSIGNED TO THE GUATEMALAN COURTS. LARA STILL BEING HELD BY THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. CONSIGNMENT MEANS THE END TO INTERROGATION AND HAS, IN THE PAST, RESULTED IN A SPEEDY TRIAL AND LIGHT SENTENCING, IF AT ALL. OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVERNMENT INTEREST HAS NOT YET SURFACED. CHECKING MILITARY SOURCES IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. WILL ADVISE.

2. PLS ADVISE WHAT PORTIONS REF B CAN BE PASSED LIAISON.

S E C R E T

BT

Copy should be filed LIRING-3 201.

Vince

SECRET

14-00000

14915

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FILE. VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

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ACTION

SECRET 221620Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5301

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

22 APR 68 IN 55026

REF GUATEMALA CITY 8887 (IN 92664)

1. TELEPHONE NUMBER 48-44-97 IS REGISTERED TO ELGA SOBERON, MOTHER IN LAW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS. LATTER LIVES IN HOME WHICH LOCATED AVENIDA DE LAS FUENTES 616, COLONIA JARDINES DEL PEDREGAL. THIS TELEPHONE HAS BEEN TAPPED BY MEXICAN FEDERAL SECURITY FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

2. TELEPHONE NUMBER 32-02-18 (UNLISTED) REGISTERED TO FNU GARZA, CALLE SUR 71 NUMBER 427, COLONIA BANDIJAL. STATION CANNOT IDENTIFY THIS PERSON.

SECRET

file
201- LIRING-3

Vince

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 26 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 151625Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5223

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR , TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

16 APR 68 IN 91979

REF: MEXICO CITY 5221 (IN 91482)

ACTION

TWO CORRECTIONS IN REFERENCE. PARAGRAPH TWO: MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS IS A COMMUNIST NOT A LEFTIST; HIS MAGAZINE NAMED "POLITICA" NOT "PERIODICA".

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

karbe

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 22 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY LIRING-3

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INFO. FILE. VR. CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

S E C R E T 172146Z APR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8890

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

17 Apr 68 IN 93083

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8887 (IN92664)

1. ACCORDING TO LIAISON, G-2, BECAUSE OF LACK OF ABLE INTERROGATION OFFICERS HAS BEEN UNABLE OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION OF VALUE FROM TWO MEXICAN PRISONERS. LIAISON FORCED INTERROGATE (LARA) BARRIOS IN PRESENCE TWO G-2 REPRESENTATIVES WHO CONTINUALLY INTERRUPTED EFFORT. PRIMARY INTERROGATION LARA ADMITTEDLY NOT COMPLETE. ESMICA WILL TRY ARRANGE FURTHER INTERROGATION IN MORE FAVORABLE SURROUNDINGS.

2. BECAUSE G-2 HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS INTERROGATION OF MEXICANS, THEY ARE CONSIDERING TURNING BOTH OVER TO "ARMY SPECIAL UNIT" FOR INTERROGATION.

3. WILL ADVISE DETAILS AS AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

035-004-017
GUAT-08880
16 APR 68

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MEXICAN CARRYING PP NO. 103388.
CAPTURED BY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES NEAR MEXICAN BORDER OVER PAST WEEKEND. ITEMS TAKEN FROM PRISONERS WAS MESSAGE FROM /OR TO NESTOR VALLE /FAR PSEUDO OF NERY DE LEON LICARDIE, FAR LEADER/, GUERRILLA TRAINING MATERIAL AND THREE SMALL STONE BELLS

HMM

R 6805160769

Liring-3

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

LIRING-3

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION

S E C R E T 160402Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5221

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

REF A MEXICO CITY 5285 (IN 91298)

B GUATEMALA CITY 8832 (IN 91436)

15 APR 68 IN 91802

1. DESPITE DESIRE HELP LIRING-3 WHO DEPARTED FOR GUATEMALA AS PART STATION EFFORTS AGAINST GUAT REBELS, MEXICO CITY DOES NOT WANT LIAISON MADE WITTING LIRING-3 WAS STATION CONTACT. LIRING-3 HANDLED BY ROWTON UNDER FALSE FLAG AND NEVER MADE WITTING ROWTON CONNECTION WITH WOFIRM. BELIEVE DISCLOSURE LIRING-3 CONNECTED WITH WOFIRM AT THIS TIME WOULD CREATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR STATION WITH MEXICAN GOVT WHICH COMPLETELY UNWITTING STATION ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO DIRECTED AT GUAT REBELS. IT WOULD CREATE SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES FOR LIRING-3 IN EYES CUBANS AND MEXICAN LEFTISTS NOT TO MENTION LIRING-4 WHO CURRENTLY AWAITING CUBAN VISA.

2. CARLOS MANUEL PERSAVAL MARCUE IS NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS, IMPORTANT MEXICAN LEFTIST AND EX DIRECTOR MEXICAN PERIODICAL WHICH RECENTLY DISCONTINUED PUBLICATION ALLEGEDLY, AMONG OTHER REASONS, AS RESULT WITHDRAWAL CUBAN SUBSIDY. PERSAVAL WHO MARRIED TO SISTER LIRING MISTRESS ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED LIRING-3 TO GUAT REBEL

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO

FILE. VR.

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5221 SECRET

EXILE GROUP MEXICO CITY. ALTHOUGH ROWTON LACKS LATEST DETAILS, IT PROBABLE PERSAVAL WAS PERSUADED ACCOMPANY LIRING-3 AND LARA AT LAST MINUTE SINCE HE HAD CAR AND LARA GUN WOUND MADE BUS TRAVEL IMPOSSIBLE. SUGGEST GUATEMALA CITY INFORM LIAISON MARCUE WELL KNOWN MEXICAN LEFTIST RELATED TO EX DIRECTOR PERIODICA AND LARA GUAT LEFTIST EXILE BUT INDICATE IT HAS NO TRACES LIRING-3.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS LIRING-3/LARA/PERSAVAL ARRESTS AND SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATION AS BECOME AVAILABLE. IS THERE CHANCE ARRESTS LIRING-3/PARSAVAL MAY LEAK TO PRESS OR LOCAL MEXICAN AUTHORITIES? PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

967 EDITIONS

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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INFO FILE VR CS/DO, SOD6, [illegible]

16 APR 68 IN 91436

S E C R E T 152357Z APR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8838

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE TEGUCIGALPA

LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5285 (IN 91298)

B. SCGUATEMALA CITY 521 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

1. ON AFTERNOON 15 APRIL 68 LIAISON REPORTED THAT FRANCISCO ADALBERTO (LARU) BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST WHO CARRIED MEXICAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN NAME JACINTO (RANGEL) CERVANTES; CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR, MEXICAN CARRYING PASSPORT NO. 103388; AND CARLOS MANUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, MEXICAN CARRYING PASSPORT NO. 38171, WERE CAPTURED BY GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES NEAR MEXICAN BORDER OVER PAST WEEKEND (EXACT DATE NOT AVAILABLE). ALL THREE WERE BROUGHT TO GUATEMALA CITY AND ARE BEING HELD FOR INTERROGATION.

2. AMONG ITEMS TAKEN FROM PRISONERS WAS MESSAGE FROM (OR TO "NESTOR VALLE" (FAR PSEUDO OF NERY DE LEON LICARDIE, FAR LEADER), GUERRILLA TRAINING MATERIAL, AND THREE SMALL "STONE" BELLS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT BELLS (EACH OF PRISONERS CARRIED A BELL) INTERROGATORS GOT THREE DIFFERENT STORIES. DURING INITIAL INTERROGATION BY ARMY, LARA ADMITTED HE COMMUNIST, BUT CLAIMED HE RETURNING TO GUATEMALA

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 5880 S E C R E T

TO RENOUNCE HIS AFFILIATION.

3. LIAISON REQUESTED STATION FOR TRACES ON THREE PRISONERS. ADVISE INFORMATION MEXICO CITY WISHES PASS LIAISON.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

5P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
Operations Against PBRUMEN Targets Involving LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and Their Contacts - January to 31 March 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMW-16222
B. HMMA-33842

1. The development, handling, and exploitation of any asset under false pretenses by someone operating under false flag has and will continue to have many drawbacks. In the case of LIRING-3/LIRING-4 the situation is further complicated by the fact that PBRUMEN nationals at home and in LIRING (the main target against whom the two have been directed) have long suspected their motives for maintaining contact and wanting to cooperate with them. The ups and downs of the LIRING-3/LIRING-4 marital relations have from time to time further complicated the conduct of operations involving them. The Station can understand that Headquarters has some reservations on the conduct of these operations. They have been complicated, time consuming, and have blown hot and cold depending on the state of mind of the PBRUMENers at the time and the difficulties between LIRING-3 and LIRING-4. Because of incomplete control, an almost inescapable feature of this type of operation, a considerable effort was made to check the reliability of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4. This involved LIFEAT coverage, audio monitoring (LIROSIN), and occasional

Continued....................

Attachments:
A. Reports (15), u/s/c
B. Identity Sheet, u/s/c

Liring-3

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy att A; 3 copies att B)

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~~201-~~ 201-818842

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-798301	HMMA - 34484	16 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

surveillance by the LIEMBRACEs. The results, at least in the PBRUMEN phase of this operation, have been unspectacular so far. The main usefulness of LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 has been a) as access agents to LIRING, (although this has been largely reduced to the LIRING Consulate), and b) to introduce Wallace B. ROWTON to visiting PBRUMEN officials and members of the local leftist community with access to PBRUMEN and LIRING. A major effort was started recently to take this operation up one more notch and, taking advantage of a recent crisis in the relations between LIRING-3 and LIRING-4, send the latter to PBRUMEN on a mission to assess and hopefully recruit new sources of information. The exploitation of LIRING-3's contacts with representatives of the Guatemalan FAR rebel movement was the object of separate correspondence. LIRING-3's renewed contacts with these representatives do not at this time involve PBRUMEN, although the latter clearly supports at least some of their activities.

2. Forwarded under separate cover are fifteen reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and some of their contacts from late January to 31 March 1968. The Station has noted Headquarters' desire for more frequent progress reports per reference A. It felt, however, that in this case partial reporting of LIRING-4's difficulties in obtaining a PBRUMEN visa (by far the most important aspect of this operation during the period under review) could have been misleading, as the situation changed several times and LIRING-4 did not really know what to expect from LIRING from one meeting with its representatives to the next, not to again mention the ups and downs of the LIRING-3/ LIRING-4 relationship, which hit a new low during this period. The Station would like to point out in passing that, in addition to cable reporting and dispatches transmitting ROWTON's contact reports, the operations in which LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 are involved in are reviewed in some detail in the over-all monthly report submitted by the PBRUMEN Section of this Station.

3. The last time LIRING-4 accompanied LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN, she obtained an entry visa in a few days. LIRING-4 thus felt that as an ex-employee of LIRING with good connections in PBRUMEN and LIRING she would obtain a new PBRUMEN entry visa fairly easily. Entry visas are now quite a bit more difficult to obtain, however, for PBRUMEN nonofficial citizens abroad. It also appears that the LIRING staff did not really know what to make of LIRING-4's stated desire to return to PBRUMEN for an extended period of time, as this was obviously based on a domestic quarrel. LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 have had other quarrels, and the LIRING staff may have thought that this last one would subside and that LIRING-4 would postpone or cancel her plans for going to PBRUMEN. It was to convince the LIRING staff that the difficulties with his wife were serious that LIRING-3 first went to LIRING. In a maneuver to further convince the LIRING employees, particularly LIRING-2 and LIRING-9, that LIRING-4 seriously wanted to go to PBRUMEN as a result of domestic problems, ROWTON decided to have LIRING-3 openly question LIRING-4's right to take their child with her. It must be remembered that, in Mexico, a wife cannot leave the country, and especially take a child with her, without the express and official consent of the husband. This little scenario appears to have been well played. On the other hand, it did not help LIRING-4 obtain a visa any faster. LIRING-2 appeared to be waiting, among other things, for LIRING-3 to arrive at a decision regarding their child acceptable to his wife. LIRING-3 finally "agreed" to let LIRING-4 take the child at his 26 February meeting at LIRING. Two days before, LIRING-4 had been told by LIRING-2 that the

"consejo superior" of LIRING, of which he said he was a member, had not yet taken up her case. This was indirectly confirmed by LIRING-16, who told LIRING-4 the same day that nothing about her visa case had yet been sent to PBRUMEN as he would otherwise know it, since he handled all visa correspondence.

4. There is naturally the possibility that LIRING-4's visa request was handled by LIRING via classified correspondence not seen by LIRING-16. This channel may have been used because LIRING-4's visa request brought out the old problem of LIRING-3's reliability in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. Although LIRING-2, LIRING-9, and Identity appeared sympathetic toward LIRING-4 and her projected visit to PBRUMEN (to the point where they advised her on more than one occasion not to come back to Mexico), they, at the same time, sought to clarify two things. They first made another attempt to throw some light on the sources through which LIRING-3 had obtained information of particular interest to LIRING. Secondly they brought up the question of "the Greek" (ROWTON) and tried to obtain answers to pertinent questions. LIRING, as mentioned by both LIRING-2 and Identity, is not used to being given sensitive information without at the same time obtaining good source description. Specifically, how did LIRING-3 hear of the arrest of the LIRING member involved in a subversive case in 1966, how did he learn of its proposed publication in the press of a Central American country, how did he obtain the report on Rico GALAN which he passed to LIRING, and how could he have learned of certain of the activities of Moises OROZCO Leal? To all these questions LIRING-3 replied by saying that he had good sources in Mexico and Central America and that he was not about to divulge them to the PBRUMENers. Both LIRING-2 and Identity in their conversations with LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 took pains to say that LIRING-3's conduct in his dealings with LIRING and PBRUMEN was "above reproach." They wanted to be sure, however, that he "had not fallen victim to unscrupulous elements constantly surrounding the revolution." To quote the old cliche, LIRING-3 "got their message."

5. ROWTON's introduction to LIRING-2 and other LIRING members by Rodolfo REYES Cortes and his subsequent meetings with LIRING-2 were bound to make the latter somewhat curious about this wealthy Greek businessman and proclaimed friend of "the revolution" who seems to travel extensively and appears to have well-informed and influential friends in many parts of the world. LIRING-2 was apparently ruffled by ROWTON's criticism of the LIRING efficiency (see ROWTON's report dated 1 January sent as an attachment to reference B) since he finally phoned ROWTON's "office" after the incident described in ROWTON's 1 January report. For some reason LIRING-2 made the call on a legal holiday when offices are usually closed, and the operator of ROWTON's answering service answered "Mr. ROWTON's (in alias) office." This apparently made LIRING-2 even more inquisitive. During a one hour meeting at LIRING on 15 February LIRING-2 asked LIRING-4 about her relationship with "the Greek." LIRING-2 wanted to know where and for whom he worked, et cetera. ROWTON's report of 17 February covers this conversation in detail. LIRING-2 appeared to suspect ROWTON may have been one of the sources of the information passed LIRING by LIRING-3 and warned LIRING-4 "to go easy with the Greek," if not for her sake, at least for LIRING-3, who "has not always treaded on firm ground." LIRING-4 provided some "information" on her Greek acquaintance on 24 February. ROWTON, who had briefed her in detail on what

she should tell LIRING-2, felt, after listening to LIRING-4's report, that the latter had at least partly succeeded in lessening LIRING-2's suspicions. These suspicions may have been further reduced after LIRING-3's discussion with LIRING-2 on 26 February. ROWTON did expect LIRING-2's questions and felt in the end that he had "passed the test."

6. The Station does not know at this point whether LIRING-4 will get a PBRUMEN entry visa but is still optimistic that she will. The PBRUMENers appear convinced that there is serious trouble between her and LIRING-3, and LIRING-1, to whom LIRING-4 wrote for help recently, asked her to be patient, pointing out that red tape in PBRUMEN takes time. The possibility that the PBRUMENers may allow LIRING-4 in their country to interrogate her about the activities of her husband and some of her friends has occurred to ROWTON and the Station. Such a possibility is, however, most unlikely as the object of the PBRUMEN suspicions is LIRING-3 and not LIRING-4, who has several times told them that she knows little of what LIRING-3 does. The most important consideration, however, is that LIRING-4 is married to a Mexican citizen, and as suspicious as they may be of the latter's doings, the PBRUMENers have, to the best of our knowledge, no proof that this Mexican has done anything against their regime. On the contrary, LIRING-3 has time and again warned them of impending difficulties or problems. The fact that LIRING-4 is married to a Mexican and that she enjoys the status of immigrant in Mexico is also the best assurance that she would be allowed to return to Mexico, as the PBRUMENers want no trouble with the Mexicans. The SGSWIRL examination recently given LIRING-4 has cleared the air at least on two points. First, that LIRING-4 is not an enemy penetration, and, second, that she has not revealed the nature and extent of her contacts with ROWTON to anyone else than LIRING-3. The Station agrees with ROWTON that LIRING-4 would, if given a chance, prove herself to be a good asset. As for the question of being left with continuing obligations in this operation, both LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 know that there is little ROWTON could do beyond providing legal-type advice to bring LIRING-4 back to Mexico if the PBRUMENers refused to allow her to return to her husband, an unlikely possibility as mentioned above in view of current Mexican/PBRUMEN relations. The letter of understanding signed by LIRING-4 specifies the extent of ROWTON's commitment and leaves no doubt as to the extent of his obligations. The Station hopes that LIRING-4's relationship with LIRING-3 will not improve with time to the point where she will lose the proper motivation and cover to undertake the mission to PBRUMEN for which she has been trained and briefed.

7. The attempt made to exploit Carmen LOZADA's trip to PBRUMEN to obtain assessments and vulnerability information on a number of persons she knows who have operational potential turned out to be a complete failure. LOZADA ran into such difficult family problems in PBRUMEN that she had no time (or, as it turned out, desire) to obtain the information requested of her. The strain of her personal problems was such that she nearly had a nervous breakdown after returning to Mexico City on 16 February. Not even LIRING-3 could get anything out of her. The victim of a type of family blackmail by her pro-AMTHUG husband, LOZADA returned to PBRUMEN on 15 March. ROWTON did not fare much better with Rodolfo REYES Cortes, who returned to Mexico City in early March. REYES, who is preparing to go to Chile to put on a ballet performance, has been extremely busy since his return with private and professional matters. ROWTON nevertheless managed to debrief

CI: Indonesia
[illegible]
Occ: Dipl

him at least partially on his contacts in PBRUMEN. The only concrete result of REYES' trip to PBRUMEN so far is the contact which he made with Sukendah*HANAFI, the ex-Ambassador of Indonesia in Havana. According to REYES, HANAFI expressed interest in meeting ROWTON to "work something out" to the mutual advantage of both the Greek and Indonesian revolutions. After a couple of phone calls, it turned out, however, that HANAFI would probably be unable to obtain a Mexican entry visa. The Station believes, anyway, that little would be gained by a meeting. From the information at hand, HANAFI is a convinced leftist who does not lack for money and seems to have an enjoyable life in PBRUMEN. The Station is finally not interested in the Indonesian "revolution" or in what HANAFI could do to help the Greek leftists.

8. If she does not go to PBRUMEN an effort will be made to further exploit the antagonism LIRING-4 has developed for the personnel of LIRING in the course of her attempts to obtain a PBRUMEN visa to obtain additional operational information on LIRING and its employees. LIRING-4 has been so humiliated and angered that she is willing to do literally anything against LIRING. She told ROWTON that she would put a time bomb in the building if he asked her to do so. LIRING-4 has already been used unwittingly for MECREDO purposes. It may be possible if she stays in Mexico City to use her in connection with an audio operation against the "safe room" of the LIRING Consulate.

for Willard C. CURTIS

11P

SECRET

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Separate Cover Attachment B to
HMMA-34484

Identity Sheet

Identity: Ismael SUAREZ de la Paz

S/c att: 2
HMMA-34484

SECRET

CS COPY

201-778301

14-00000

31 March,1968

Subject: SGSWIRL Examination of LIRING/4. NOT SUITABLE FOR [illegible]

1. LIRING/4 was given an SGSWIRL examination from about 1030 until 1300 on 31/3/68 at room 602 of the Hotel del Bosque on Calle Melchor Ocampo. Rowton rented the suite in the name Nicolas Spyropoulos and no security problems were encounted in using this site.

2. Rowton first proposed the examination to LIRING/4, after discussing it briefly with LIRING/3, at 1600 on 30/3/68 in the coffee shop of the Hotel Bosque in the presence of the examiner. L/4's initial reaction was almost identical to that of LIRING/3 - one of shock, indignation, and outright refusal on the ground that it was "servil" and beneath her dignity at any price. She made it clear that she felt she had been and was taking all the risks and consiered it completely unfair that she should have to subject herself to such a "police" interrogation when she had done nothing wrong and in fact knew nothing about Rowton. At one point she commented that this whole thing made her think that Rowton was an agent of WOFACT. She did not dwell on this point, however, or return to it subsequently.

3. In view of this unfavorably turn at the initial session Rowton agreed with the examiner that the latter should gracefully bow out and give Rowton a chance to soften L/4 up by a more thorough explanation,especially since L/4 refused flatly to accompany Rowton and the examiner to the safehouse room upstairs. Rowton then spent the next two hours explaining the test emphasing that it would not include any indiscriminate frivolous questions and that L/4 would know beforehand what the precise questions were. Rowton made it clear that he was interested mainly in determining whether L/4 had betrayed him to her LIRING contacts and had any sort of secret agreement with PBRUMEN to work against him. L/4 finally agreed to take the examination the following morning since as she stated her conscience was clear.

4. The responses appeared favorably on pertinent questions and the control question on any theft of money (suggested by Rowton on the basis of the report given to him in confidence by liring/3 that L/4 had taken 2,000 pesos from the LIRING safe which she almost immediately replaced on his insistence) proved to be excellent. L/4 did not reveal the specific theft but she was evidently thoroughly convinced after the test that the SGSWIRL is reliable and cannot be beaten Rowton and the examiner felt it unwise to break her on this control question since it would prove counterproductive and would probably expose L/3 as the source. The test will proably serve as an excellent deterrent and additional control for future assessment of L/4 and evaluation of her reporting.

S/c att:1
HMMA-34484

CS COPY

201-798301

Wallace B. Rowton

2

24 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Status of Request for Re-entry Permit.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at her request at 1630 on 23/3/68 at the Denny's Restaurant (Reforma & Diana) to discuss the status of her visa (re-entry) request. She stated that she had just received a letter from her friend Doctor Yolanda Díaz, transmitted through Jorrín and given to her by the latter that same morning. The translation of the text of the letter is as follows:

"Año del Guerrillero Heróico"
La Habana.Febrero 9/68

Sra.
México,D.F.

~~Quer~~ Dear As I explained to you last night when we spoke (on the telephone) the processing of your entry is being held up because of a number of things that have to be done which in ~~the~~ view of the priorities you know exist result in its not being done as rapidly as one would wish.
I don't think you should be discouraged and rest assured that as soon as it comes through, we'll advise you, especially since Abreu is going to follow it through. Kisses to your child and regards to Carlos.

/s/ Yolanda

2. The letter, a copy of which was made by Rowton, also contains a P.S. from Abreu, a translation of which follows:

> I'm taking an interest in your matter. As Yolanda explains red tape takes time. I received your cable and letter.
>
> Fondly,
>
> /s/ Abreu

3. LIRING/4 called to Rowton's attention the length of time (almost six weeks) for the letter to reach her dispite the fact that Abreu himself most probably forwarded it through the pouch. L/4 commented that when she remarked this to her friend Catalina Cepero, the latter stated that she had received a ltter in the pouch the same day but it was dated in December,1967, and another from Yolanda dated February 9,1968.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had finally managed to talk with her father on the telephone, and,although he appeared uneasy and somewhat abrupt (seco), she was reassured that he was in reasonably good health. She finally assured Rowton that she no longer suspected him of any foul play and agreed that her father was apparently acting on the advice of his lawyer in connection with the visa reuqest of her brother (to emigrate to the U.S.) that was being processed in New York.

WB Rowton

22 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of News Concerning her Father in New York.

1. At 1600 on 22/3/68 Rowton visited LIRING/4 at her residence to discuss with her a report she had received from a mutual friend concerning her father. Earlier in the day LIRING/3 had informed Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a disturbing piece of news to the effect that someone had approached her father in New York City and told him to break off all contact with LIRING/4 in order to avoid jeopardising his residence in the U.S. According to LIRING/3, LIRING/4 was convinced as a result of this report that Rowton, and possibly with the knowledge of LIRING/3 himself, had arranged this approach to preclude any ~~xxx~~contact L/4 might have had with her father that might jeopardise her mission to Havana. Rowton assured LIRING/3 that he had take no such action and agreed to talk to LIRING/4 to reassure her also since according to LIRING/3 she was very upset and her confidence in both Rowton and LIRING/3 himself shaken.

2. Rowton reassured LIRING/4 when he saw her but, of course, could not furnish proof of any kind that he had not intervened. He asked several times the identity of the source, but LIRING/4 seatfastly refused to divulge it, saying only that a lawyer friend of her father had written to her stating that the reason her father had not communicated with her over ~~that~~ the past three months and had not answered her letters and telephone calls was that "they" had told him not to maintain any contact with his daughter at the risk of losing his residence in the U.S. Rowton asked whether the lawyer's name was Portuondo (a lead furnished by LIRING/3) but L/4 would not confirm or deny this, syaing simply that she would look into the matter herself. She said that she suspected Rowton since he was the only person to whom she had given her father's address in New York and she could not imagine why any other person would have a motive to contact her father in that way. She added that if her father had just given her some sort of explanation she could understand, but acting the way he did indicated that someone had terrorized him into complete silence. Rowton again insisted that he did not in any way contact her father, and would never have done so without first consulting her. He surrised that possibly her father's lawyer had counseled him to break off contact in connection with the application her father was making ~~fr~~ for a visa for LIRING/4's brother on the ground that the American authorities might deny the visa if they knew of LIRING/4's previous employment in the LIRING offices.

Wallace B. Rowton

4

12 March,1968

1. Rodolfo Reyes Cortes informed Rowton 8/3/68 that while in Havana he discussed with his friend Sukendah Hanafi, ex-Indonesian Ambassador to Cuba, possibility of collaboration with his Greek leftist businessman friend both in international commercial deals and politically. According Reyes, Hanafi expressed immediate interest, accepting Reyes' word that he could place full trust in Rowton. Hanafi stated that he felt something could be worked out to their mutual advantage of both the Greek and the Indonesian revolution, since he had contact himself with the liberation army of Indonesian.

2. Hanafi asked Reyes to set up a meeting for him with Rowton upon his return to Mexico City, perferably in Mexico City where Reyes could make the introduction personally, but indicating that he might run into difficulty in obtaining a visa. He added that if Mexico City not possible he would travel to Paris where he has never had visa trouble.

3. Reyes reported to Rowton on 11/3/68 that he had talked to Hanafi on telephone asking him arrange trip soonest to Mexico City, but Hanafi had replied that his initial check had revealed Mexicans would insist on clearance with Indonesian Embassy Mexico City prior to issuance of visa. Hanafi added, however, that he taking matter up with Raúl Roa and might be able arrange some sort of official travel to facilitate issuance of visa. He promised advise Reyes soonest since he aware that Reyes must leave for Chile by end March (as soon as his wife, Tatiana, obtains Chilean visa).

WBRowton

LIRING/4 reported also that L/2 told her that Ramiro Abreu's home address is

CalleHerrería 41
esquina Lacret
Santo Suarez
La Habana

9 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Contact with LIRING/2 and LIRING/9.

1. At 0930 on 9/3/68 LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had again on 8/3 visited the LIRING establishment to check on the status of her re-entry permit. She stated that LIRING/2 was cordial but politiely passed the buck on her re-entry permit to LIRING/9, stating that it was a matter for L/9's office and that in any case he himself was so busy looking for a house for the Chief that he could not do anything else at the moment. He said in passing that he had to go to Acapulco that evening and would be there until Sunday night (10/3/68). He jokingly invited L/4 along for the ride. He also commented that he himself would be back in Havana about June and why didn't L/4 wait to go back with him. He added that in any case he hoped to see her there.

2. LIRING/4 also reported that Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz),who happened to be present when she was talking to L/2, commented that his wife would be leaving on the 11 March flight and that he himself expected to be returning in about two weeks. L/4 then commented sarcastically that at the rate things were going with L/2 she would probably be still waiting for her entry permit when he left and in that case he could personally expedite it. L/2 then by way of apology stated that the mother-in-law of the Swiss Ambassador had been waiting for over three weeks for her entry visa and there was nothing he could do to speed things up from this end. L/4 replied that this was after all little consolation for her, although she felt very sorry for the Swiss mother-in-law.

3. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she then spoke briefly with LIRING/9 who greeted her cordially and asked her to take a coffee with him in his private office. On entering this office L/4 noted that the plaster had fallen from the ceiling just above the desk and L/9 commented that ~~kexpt~~ it had just happened the day before and that he hoped to have it repaired soon. He added that he would also be getting better furniture and some pictures to decorate the bare walls. L/4 noted that the phone was still attached to the wall and no lamp of any kind was in the room.

4. According to L/4, LIRING/9 is still waiting for a reply from Havana re her re-entry permit, and hoped to have some reply by 11/3/68. His secretary privately assured L/4 that she would let her know at once if anything came in. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that she talked to her fitend

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Yolanda Díaz on the telephone as a follow-up on her telegram to ask Ramiro Abreu to expedite her request for the re-entry permit. L/4 told Rowton that Yolanda explained that she had been unable to contact Abreu at first but finally got to him on 8/3/68 and he promised to do what he could soonest, although he commented that it would be impossible to do anything over the week-end.

5. LIRING/4 also reported to Rowton that she had talked briefly with srta Esperón of L/2's office and was surprised to hear her complain of the "insupportable" conditions under which she had to work. Srta Esperón said that she had been employed in the LIRING offices for the past 38 years and prior to the revolution had been relatively happy. Lately, however, everything was full of mystery, all doors and cabinets locked up, and nobody trusting anyone. She confided in L/4 that she had had enough ("harta") and was afraid that she would have to leave, abandoning any hope she still had of getting her pension after so many years.

Wallace B. Rowton

6

1 March,1968

Subject: Miscellaneous Information Furnished by LIRING/4.

1. At his meeting with LIRING/4,on the morning of 1 March,1968, Rowton asked L/4 for various miscellaneous information that might be of use to the Station. L/4 recalled that when she worked in the Consulate office, the combination of the safe was as follows:

4 times to right,stopping at 10,
3 times to left, stopping at 65,
2 times to right, stoppingat 75,
then turn to left until one can feel tumbler drop in place.

2. L/4 also furnished Rowton with information for the attached sketch of the consular office where she formerly worked, indicating the location of the safe (in the corner concealed behind a wooden door locked by key). Likewise L/4 gave details of the office of Abelardo Curbelo which she stated he sheared with his new secretary,Conchita - the wife of the Olympic Attaché.

3. L/4 also told Rowton that she learned recently from Jorrín that all confidential papers are now handled and processed by one person. L/4 added that she learned from conversation with MercededMartinez Moreno de Gonzalez that she is in fact the person handling the confidential documents. She stated to L/4 that she has to process the confidential papers of all the offices, specifically Curbelo, Cicard, Luna, as well as her husband's,(Crux) and Martinez'. L/4 explained to Rowtonthat previously each office handled its own confidential documents, and filed them in their respective safes.

4. L/4 also gave Rowton the form given her by the Consulate to be filled in for the "Registro de Ciudadanos Cubanos". L/4 explained that she alleged that she had lost the original form give n to her and thus obtained another so that she could provide Rowton with a sample of the form(attached herewith).

5. L/4 also reported that,as Rowton had requested,she typed out a letter to her father (given to the Station) at 1330 on 1 March,1968, on the consulate typewriter. She regretted not having been able to obtain the name of the typewriter since it was not visible on the case. When she asked Adia E. Lopez de Valdes the name the latter surprised her be saying that L/4 was the second person to ask for such information that day. In view of that comment, L/4 felt she could not press for the information desired.

WBRowton

Wallace B. Rowton


BATH
PATIO
BOOKS
Papers
lower section
DESK
RECEPTION
Typewriter on stand
DESK
Book shelves
Safe (3-way)
BOOKS
Papers
Telephone
Archives
File Cabinet
wooden cabinet with key
Telephone.

LIRING/4 1 March, 1968


Olga Martinez' office
Sofa
Ambassador's Office
Section where pouch made up
Sito Esperón's office
Curbelo's office (shared by Conchita

LIRING/4

1 March, 1968

27 February,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. At 0930 on 27/2/68 LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had spoken briefly to Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz) on 24/2/68 and to LIRING/2 at some length on 26/2/68 in the LIRING offices. L/3 explained to Rowton that Echemendía had passed a message to him through L/4 that he wanted to talk to him and that he would telephone himto arrange a meeting. L/3 continued that Echemendía finally contacted him by phone at about noon on 24/2/68 and asked him to come to the LIRING office that afternoon. L/3 told Rowton that when he finally saw Echemendía the latter was very vague and general in his statements and that all he could gather from his statements was that Echemendía was apologetic for the "misunderstanding" that had arisen as a result of L/4's request for a re-entry permit. Echemendía stated that "we" are concerned that L/3, whom they considered honest and above reproach in his dealings with PBRUMEN, might have fallen victem to unscupluous elements who constantly surround the revolution. L/3 confessed to Rowtn that this vague and almost incoherent line of Echemendía annoyed him to such an extent that he felt it useless to continue his conversation with him and as a result terminated it at the first opportunity.

2. LIRING/3 continued thathe met with LIRING/2 on 26/2/68 at the latter's office with much more fuitful results. According to L/3, L/2 began by stating that "they" appreciated the information L/3 had passed to them at various times in the past, specifically the report of Julian Lopez' arrest, the proposed publication of the arrest in the Guatemalan press, the report concerning the letter of Rico Galán and the Crozco afair, but they were frankly perflexed with regard to the source of such sensitive information. L/3 told Rowton that he explained to L/2 that he had excellent Central American contacts,as well as Mexican sources in good positions, who could furnish such information witout naming anyone. He told L/2 that he had no intention of jeopardising his business contacts by revealing their identity, and he felt that what he had done was in the interest of PBRUMEN and the revolution and that L/2 and his friends should not look a gift horse in the mouth and see spies behind every blade of ~~xxixx~~ grass, just becasue they themselves had no capability to check out his reports.

3. L/3 then told Rowton that L/2 asked directly aboot "el Griego" and his relationship to L/3. L/3 stated that he feigned surprise and asked "What Greek", adding that he knew several Greeks in Guatemala, Venezuela and Mexico. L/2 clarified by stating that he meant the Greek introduced to him

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by Rodolfo Reyes. L/3 then exclaimed: "Oh, you mean señor Harris." to which L/2 replied in the affirmative. L/3 then explained that he felt that sr. Harris was a high-minded revolutionary with high level contacts throughout the world developed through his business xxxxxxxx relationships who had helped him a great deal over the past two years both financially and morally He then asked L/2 what he knew about international business, to wich L/2 repiled that he knew practically nothing, L/3 told Rowton that he then closed in with a somewhat elaborate explanation of how international businessmen acquire valubable bits of inteeligence with trying as a result of the sensitive relationship they develop with political personalities in various governments. L/3 stated to Rowton that he felt L/2 was impressed favorably with his explanation, since he finally stated that in reality "they" (meaning himself, Sergio Martinez, Ismail Suarez de la Paz and Cepeda), the Consejo Superior de la Embajada" had nothing against sr. Harris but simply that they did not know enough about him. L/2 then stated that L/3 must realize that the revolution was surrounded by provocateurs and that when they have the least suspicions that they must put on "the amber light" of caution. L/3 then stated that his dealings with sr. Harris were sensitive high-level business negotiations for the procurement of sulphur and that he could produce documents to prove this. L/2 replied thatthis was not at all necessary and that it was simply just a question of knowing a little more about the sources available to L/3 and about the "Greek". L/3 conluded with a statement that L/2 must in the last analysis weigh the entire affair in terms of whether L/3 in fact had ever done anything against the revolution. L/2 replied without hesitation that everyone felt that L/3 had always acted in good faith and h-d the best of intentions. It was simpl that they felt that L/3 might have become a victim of a provocateur without realizing it.

4. L/2 then stated that he had no objection to giving L/4 an entry permit but he hoped that L/3 was not just trying to solve a domestic problem by sending her back to her mother. L/3 replied that there was in fact a serious domestic problem and confessed th t he had had an affair with another woman which L/4 had discovered but he felt this was a very personal problem about which L/2 should not be concerned. L/2 replied that he agreed with this and was concerned simply about the child which he felt L/4 should be permitted to take with her. L/3 told Rowton that he finally conceded to L/2 that perhaps he was right and that he should be more considerate of L/4 and permit her to take the child to Havana. L/3 told Rowton that the meeting with L/2 ended on a rather cordial note and that he had the impression that L/2 would grant L/4 the re-entry permit without further delay.

8

25 February, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1045 on 24 February, 1968, that she had again spoken to LIRING/2 about her entry permit to return to Havana. She appeared depressed and began the conversation stating that she was "fed up" (harta) with the LIRING office, explaining that she felt that she had been treated very unfairly and shabbily, particularly by LIRING/2. She stated that she had waited for several hours to see LIRING/2 on the mroning of 23 February inside the premises of the LIRING offices but had finally to leave after only a few words of conversation with him. She related that LIRING/2 and LIRING/9 were occupied in conversation with Eugenia Olguin(who had recently returned from a three-months stay in Havana with her sister Marcela) and she did not feel it proper to interrupt to ask about her permit to return to Cuba. When she finally buttonholed LIRING/2, he said that he would rather talk to her the following morning - about 1000, since it was Saturxday, explaining that he was very busy with a number of difficult cases.

2. LIRING/4 continued that when she returned to his office about 1015 the following morning (24 February) she again had to wait about 15 minutes before finding LIRING/2 alone. To her annoyance he again brushed her off, stating that he still did not have a final answer since the matter had not as yet been taken up by the "consejo superior" of the establishment. L/2 continued that he hoped to have some sort of decision by Monday and asked L/4 to see him again. L/4 stated to Rowton that she could not contain her feelings any longer and exploded in a burst of invective again the LIRING office, accusing them among other things of giving visas to all sorts of hippies and delinquents and making her wait on pins and needles when she had a right to return. L/4 then stated that just as she was leaving, she turned to L/2 and said:"Oh, I forget to tell you, but I managed to see the 'Greek.'" L/4 told Rowton that at this L/2 came suddenly back to life and invited her into his office again, closing the door and ushering her to a chair. She then stated that she had telephoned "the Greek" (Rowton) on the pretext that she wanted him to buy some jewelry for her on his next trip to Switzerland and succeeded in having coffee with him at Sanborns. She continued that in the course of conversation she learned that his telephone is actually an answering service and hence operates 24 hours per day, and that he is interested in buying sulphur in Mexico and that his principal client is the Greek shipowner, Niarchos. She then showed L/2 a matchbox on which the Greek had written the name Niarchos in both Greek and English

script, since she pretended to be curious about the spelling of the name. According to L/4, L/2 snatched up the match-box with expressions of appreciation, and continued to listen with interest. L/4 continued that the Greek explained to her the difficulties and complexities of working with the Mexicans in procuring sulphur and other critical products, but she confessed to L/2 that she knew nothing about such matters and felt very confuded. She commented, however, that the Greek appeared quite relaxed and willing to answer her questions. She added that when she turned the conversation on Cuba, the Greek replied that he was interested naturally as a good revolutionary, but frankly was very disappointed ("decepcionado") at the treatment received by the LIRING officials he had met, including L/2. L/4 continued that the Greek had commented that he had many dealings with foreigg officials in his normal business operations but had never encountered the discourtesy shown by LIRING officers, who did not even answer his telephone calls. L/4 conluded with a statedent that she felt the Greek was no longer interested in Cuba and assumed that he had obtained whatever information he needed from other sources.

3. LIRING/4 then asked L/2 whether he needed any more information since she might be seeing the Greek once more before he left for Europe again. L/2 replied that he appreciated what she had already obtained and added that he felt it wise in these cases to get to know the person "more and more" before making a judgement. L/4 told Rowton that at this point she could not refrain from the outburst:" But you have known me for several years, and you still can't make up your mind. How much time do you need to figure things out". She told Rowton that L/2 just smiled at this and again asked to be given until Monday for the final answer re the permission to return.

4. LIRING/4 then told Rowton that as she was leaving the premises,she stopped briefly to chat with Jorrín. The latter appeared genuinely surprised that LIRING/4 had not as yet been granted her permit. When she commented that probably L/2 had to wait for a reply from Havana, Jorrín exclaimed:" No, that's not probable, since he did not send any cable on you; otherwise I would know". He added as an afterthought that possibly he could have sent a dispatch which he would not know about, but he doubted that in view of the time element involved. Jorrín then commented that"everything"had changed since L/4 had left her job, explaining that now all confidential papers, not only from L/2's oofice but also from L/9, the Commerical Section, and from "Luna's office" were handled by one person rather than as previously by each office, (L/4 commented to Rowton that she had never heard of a person by the name of Luna) and that things in generals had been tightened up from a security standpoint.

9

20 February,1968

Subject: Carmen Lozada Statments to LIRING/3 re trip.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Newton at 2130 on 19/2/68 that Carmen Lozada had telephoned him about 0930 that morning and that he had seen her again at her request. On this occasion he found her relatively composed and quite coherent as compared to their first meeting since her return.

2. L/3 reported that she stated that the situation in Havana was "chaotic" -- economically a disaster with no rice on the market, gasoline rationing (8 gallons per month for ordinary cars and 20 for larger) strictly enforced and police control "brutal". She stated that at the Havana airport everything is searched even of Mexicans as herself and what can be taken for personal reasons is removed on the pretext of having it "checked".

3. Carmen Lozada stated specifically to L/3 that she had heard strong rumors in Havana that Fidel Castro would be replaced by Dorticós mainly because of the failure of Fidel's economic policies. It was also rumored that sugar productions would fall far below last year's figure, possibly exceeding 4,000,000 tons by only a fraction. Bad fertilizer xxxxxxxxxx xxxx is blamed but the general feeling is that it is rather bae management and Fidel's advisors are taking the blame.

4. Carmen also reported that she had heard "confirmed" reports that César Montes is no longer leader of the Guatemalan revolucion, although she could not say who had replaced him.

19 February, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with Echemendía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz).

1. LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 19/2/68 at the Duca d'Este café that she had met with Echemendía for about one hour on 17 February at a small coffee shop off calle Pachuca in Colonia Condesa. She explained that she had telephoned Echemendía fromthe home of her friend Blanca Peña de Amand and arranged to meet him about 1730 at a nearby corner.

2. LIRING/4 stated that Echemendía was cordial as usual and told her that he hoped - looked forward- to seeing her again whenever she felt she could go out with him for lunch or dinner. He asked her again about her trip to Havana and she informed himthat she hoped to leave on the 23 February flight. Echemendía asked if she thought she might have difficulty returning to Mexico, to which L/4 replied in the negative, commenting that in the past neither the Mexicans nor the Cubans had given her any trouble.

3. According to L/4, Echemendía then queried her in some detail about how LIRING/3 was doing, his business in Chiapas, where they were living, and what his plans were. She replied in as matter-a-fact way as possible, alleging that L/3 was selling his paintings and doing well in business.

4. Echemendía then commented that the LIRING office locally had commented re L/3 that although they appreciated the information he had passed to them they did not have the sources and details and hence had to view them with suspicion. Echemendía apologized to ~~L/3~~ LIRING/4 for having to say this (me da mucha pena) but he felt obliged to pass it along to her. He added that both Havana and LIRING are accustomed to get sources along with the reports turned in to them and always are uneasy when these are lacking. He agreed with L/4 that L/3 had acted in good faith, but also defended the position of the LIRING office which he said was surrounded by provactions and infiltrations.

5. L/4 told Rowton that she did not tell L/3 about this rendevous with Echemendía (whose attentions to L/4 in the past have made L/3 particularly jealous and annoyed) since she did not want to disturb him. LIRING/3, however, reported to Rowton at about 2100 the previous evening (18/2/68) in an obviously irritated tone that by pure chance he had seen Echemendía and LIRING/4 together at a coffee shop about 1800 on 17/2/68. When Rowton explained that he had known of and approved of the meeting beforehand, LIRING/3 calmed down and shrugged it off.

Walla B. Rowton

4 February,1968 11

1. LIRING/4 signed contract with Rowton (alias) effective 15 February through 30 April,1968, providing payment for information and services. No obligations specified other than financial(total $750.00 for period specified). LIRING/4 also signed acknowledgement of alias "María Barragán" which was used in contract and receipts for funds.

2. L/4 departure which originally scheduled for 16 February,1968, will be delayed until following Fridgx to permit intensive commo and security training, and strengthen backstop for objective of trip. On 12 February LIRING/2 told L/4 that he would issue permit to return and, in expression apparently genuine sympathy, urged her take trip and remain "where she belonged". On morning 13 February Echemandía (Ismail Suarez de la Paz) who met L/4 by chance inside LIRING compound remarked he happy to learn she going back home for a trip and then added "go back and stay2. He then invited her to lunch or dinner but L/4 felt it wise to turn him down first time. They had lunch in~~xxx~~ LIRING dining room. On Rowton suggestion she will, however, accept for outside lunch so sound him out further on his reaction to her return.

3. Simultaneously in order build up conviction in minds LIRING officials that L/4 returning becasue of marital problem with LIRING/3 (which she herself stated to Rowton that she hesitated to reveal to anyone), LIRING/3 talked with LIRING/2 in his office 13 February (at moment L/4 elsewhere in LIRING offices) and pretended to have just learned of L/4's request for permission to return. L/3 in angry tone alleged that he could not understand why L/4 would want to return, that he had treated her as well as he could, and that in any case he would not permit her to take their daughter. LIRING/2 although obviously somewhat embarassed took L/4's part and urged L/3 to reconsider and give permission to L/4 to take daughter along since she would be reluctant to leave as a "good mother". L/2 went so far as to state that if L/3 insisted it would be tantamount to "blackmail" against LIRING/4. L/2 continued that he felt obliged as a LIRING official to grant LIRING/4 permission to return but he did not want to oblige her to depart without her child. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not give in and left LIRING/2 with the impression that his mind was made up regarding the child.

CS COPY

4. LIRING/4, who was not witting of the above action of LIRING/3, accepted

it later when informed by Rowton as being in her best interest. She agreed that child would not be properly taken care of at mother's home in Santiago becasue of short supply of essential food with neither parent present, that her departure without child would permit frequent correspondence with L/3, and provide excellent pretext for return to Mexico (to convince L/3 to permit her move child to Havana with her once she established.

5. For hdqtrs info, Rowton convinced that LIRING/3 wants permanent separation from LIRING/4 feeling that situation has become "intolerable", whereas LIRING/4 still hoping against hope that their domestic difficulties can be patched up and that when she returns they can resume normal marital relations. She insisted to Rowton that she would remain loyal to him and do nothing to increase his antipathy for her. (Rowton feels this is probably best control that can be hoped for in her operational work).

6. Following lengthy meetings with L/4, Rowton has evolved following operational plan with her approval:

(a) LIRING/4 on arrival will re-establish contact with and assess the following contacts:

(1) Ramiro Abreu
(2) Arnol and Ruby (wife) Rodriquez
(3) Caribel Guilfrido
(4) Capt Luis Carballo and wife
(5) Loló de la Torriente
(6) Mercedes Morales Lereverent.

These persons will be referred to in S/W messages by number only for security reasons. L/4 knows that numbers three and five have already expressed strong anti-revolutionary sentiments and will attempt discreetly to determine present attitude and access.

(b) Discreet efforts will be made learn of efficiency and modus operandi of DSE. LIRING/4 insisted on this for her own protection since Rowton alleged that he could not provide her with necessary briefing. She feels confident that she can get at least some basic data from Ramiro Abreu. L/4 commented that she almost certain the DSE is manipluated by a "foreign service" since she certain that Cubans themselves incapble of efficient and secure operations.

(c) When L/4 feels she has reached point with any of above that she can make some sort of "deal" (for instance assistance to them from outside in exchange for help to her in finding "interesting position" during her forced stay there) she will notify Rowton by S/W and proceed further or withdraw as per instructions.

(d) In event L/4 meets other persons who might prove recruitable she will mention their names xxx address and position in text of open letter to LIRING/3 adding that they send their regards and need something no available in Cuba. The persons thus mentioned will be referred to in S/W by next consecutive number in subsequent message. Rowton has stressed that he interested only in persons in excellent positions and conceivably recruitable. the list should therefore not be exhaustive.

(e) LIRING/4 will have two channels for S/W. First to "Lic. Antonio Ponce " with false return a dress and sent through open mail, and second to LIRING/3 sent by hand through Ramiro Abreu to LIRING office and delivered by hand by Jorrín to Tacubaya apartment, or given by L/4 to some friend traveling to Mexico. In first case all letters mailed, except the frist, will contain S/W message; In second case all letters with envelope bearing "Colonia Condesa" after address will be for Rowton and have S/W. L/4 promises sent several letters to L/3 without messages as soon as she arrives to test channel.

(f) Only channel for incoming messages for L/4 will be letters from LIRING/3 containing words" Chiapas" and "arte" and either hand carried, sent through pouch, or through open mail.

(G) The following signals have been agreed on for purpose specified:

(1) Danger signal will be absence of name Zinzuni in open text to L/3. In all other letters L/4 will mention name. In event hostile control child will be referred to by nickname, or endearing expression but not by name.

(2) "All my B-12 complex vitamins are gone" indicates need for new carbon. "I have no more cologne that everyone liked so much" indicates need for developer.

(3) New carbon sent to LIRING/3 will be recognized by simple drawing xxxxxxxx attributed to daughter and sent as expression of sentiment by LIRING/3.

7. In reply her query re best course of action in event she has reports DSE planning arrest, Rowton advised LIRING/4 destroy S/w supplies, and take refuge in Mexican Embassy in hope that she would be able communicate with LIRING/3 (she did not ask nor did Rowton volunteer how she could notify him since she assumes Rowton would remain in continuing contact LIRING/3).

8. LIRING/4 encouraged by attitude and sympathy shown by LIRING/2 and Echemandía re her remaining in Cuba, but she made it clear to Rowton that she would not do anything jeopardize her residence permit in Mexico or forfeit the time accumulated,unless Rowton could arrange have Mexican Ambassador in Havana renew her xxxxxxx visa and assure her. She added that best approach would be return after time up to attempt bring child back and at that time make new contract with Rowton providing for guarantees. Rowton agreed stating that he not in position for many reasons,including security, to make such commitments at this time. L/4 made it clear to Rowton also that she realizes that he probably operating in an alias and is affiliated with some sort of service or organization (this came out during discussion of contract and acknowledgement of pseudonym which she did not want),but she stated bluntly that she did not want to know any more about Rowton than the little she already knew since "it would be easier to face an interrogation without betraying him completely".

12

17 February,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Questioning by LIRING/2 re Rowton
("The Greek").

1. at 1030 on 17 February,1968, LIRING/4 informed Rowton that she had dropped into the LIRING offices at about 1230 on 15 February and again on the morning of the following day to check with LIRING/2 concerning her entry permit for travel to Havana. On the first occasion LIRING/2 asked her casually whether she had seen anything of the "Greek friend" lately. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she replied that she and LIRING/3 heard from him from time to time, mainly by telephone, and that he had invited her out occasionally, but she,LIRING/4, had turned him down.

2. On the second occasion, during the late morning of 16 February,1968, LIRING/2 saw L/4 again on the premises and asked to not to leave until she had seen him, since he wanted to discuss something with her. When she finally saw him in his office some 30 minutes later, he again asked whether she had seen the "Greek", not mentioning Rowton by his alias (Harris). Since L/2 had mentioned L/4's Greek friend whom he had met through Rodolfo Reyes on a previously occasion, LIRING/4 felt she could not pretend not to know about whom he was talking. She therefore replied again that occasionally she heard from him when he was on a trip to Mexico. LIRING/2 asked what L/4 thought of him (the Greek), to which she replied that she found him pleasant and very generous (bondadoso). L/2 replied, "Yes, but what does that generosity come from?" He then added that he had many question-marks concerning that person. He gave as an example the fact that when he telephoned his number on a holiday, 31 December or 1 January, his "secretary" replied. It seemed very strange, continued L/2, that the Greek's telephone was manned at all times, night and day, and even on holidays. He then further expressed doubts about where this person lived and how he earned his money, and why he was so interested in Cuba.

3. LIRING/4 stated to Rowton that she was at first quite taken aback by this direct "interrogation", even though it was made in a friendly tone, and replied as best she could by ear. She stated that she assumed the Greek was carrying on lucrative business and lived in Europe although she could not supply any specific answers. She was aware that he had brought some of LIRING/3's paintings at an excellent price and took hisgenerosity for granted since she enjoyed living from the good business LIRING/3 gained through him. LIRING/4 then asked L/2 why he himself didn't do some checking of his own, since she assumed the that LIRING office was capable of such

activity when the occasion called for it. LIRING/2 replied that he had too many other things to do, and anyway, when something smelled bad ("apesta") he keeps away from it. LIRING/4, continuing to take the offensive, stated that on several occasions inthe past the Greek had invited her out but she had not accepted, but that she easily could accept on the next occasion and possibly even obtain a photo of some kind for LIRING/2. L/2 replied that a photo would not be of any use, all he could do with it being to send it to Havana. He added that he had many suspicions, particularly as a result of the telephone, but had nothing concrete "in his hands", and that what he needed was "datos".

4. LIRING/2 then asked L/4 whether she knew when Rodolfo Reyes was returning and where he would be living? She told Rowton that she replied in the negative, commenting simply that she had heard that he would be moving to Chile to work in the national ballet there. L/2 returning again to the Greek wondered why he was so generous with gifts and entertainment. L/4 stated that she never looked a gift horse in the mouth, to which LIRING/2 replied that she must be careful, if not for her own sake at least for the sake of LIRING/3 who, he felt, was not treading on firm ground("terreno firme"). L/4 admitted that she was often worried about L/3's activities, about which he told her almost nothing. L/2 then commented "Inveisitigate the Greek and you'll feel better." (Averigua lo del Griego). He then added that that supposed letter from Rico Galán was not considered authentic, and also the case of Orozco definitely involved the police. LIRING/4, since she was aware that L/3 had discussed both these cases with L/2, except that L/3 had not to her knowledge mentioned the arrest of Orozco, stated that she felt L/3 had acted in completely good faith, even though he might have been somewhat impulsive ("precipitado").

5. LIRING/2, continuing the conversation, which according to L/4 lasted over one hour, stated that both she and L/3 must be careful of their contacts. He commented that he could not even go out on a date with a girl without thinking of the consequences. He could go out once maybe, but he felt it wiser to drop the contact for security reasonsL/4 told Rowton that she concluded the conversation with a promise to elicit as much data from the Greek as possible as soon as she could get in touch with him.

6. Rowton then told L/4 that he felt relieved in fact that L/2 had brought this whole matter up, since it was better to face such an interrogation here in Mexico rather than in Havana without the benefit of Rowton's advice and briefing. He then stated that he felt it essential that L/4 provide L/2 with much-heeded answers to his questions. To avoid the impression of

collusion, Rowton suggested that L/4 see L/2 again and ask for Rowton's telephone number, which she could alleged she could not find at home and which she preferred not to ask L/3 for, in order not to arouse his suspicions. Once she obtained the number she could allege that she telephoned Rowton on some pretext (provided if possible by LIRING/2 himself) and managed to see him at lunch a few days later. She could then report to L/2 that Rowton had told her that his telephone was actually an answering service and hence only messages were taken around the clock. He had no need of an office since he traveled in and out so often and his business did not require an office with the accompanying headaches. L/4 would continue that Rowton confided that he was working on sensitive deals to purchase Mexican sulphur (an expensive and difficult item to procure anywhere in the world at this time) and that his principal business connection was with Stavros Niarcos,the wealthy shipowner. His interest in Cuba stemmed from Niarcos' desire to study the shipping possibilities there in the event the Northamerican embargo was lifeted.

6. Rowton instructed L/4 to commented to L/2 that when she spoke of the LIRING office, Rowton appeared very irritated and remarked that he was "decepcionado" with the tre tment he had received from both L/2 and the commerical office. If L/2 appeared surprised and curious about this, L/4 could continue that Rowton commented to her that he could not understand the cavalier manner in which the LIRINGs did business. He cited the example of at least three telephone calls he had made some weeks previously to both L/2 and the commercial office, leavinf his name and telephone, and that no one had had the courtesy to reply. L/4 could then added that as a result Rowton was annoyed andhad decided to go directly to Havana to get the infomation he needed on prospective business on behalf of Niarcos.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

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13

10 February, 1968

Subject: Briefiing in Communications and Security of LIRING/4.

1. During the past four days Rowton has had daily meetings with LIRING/4 to give her initial training in S/W and discuss channels of communication that might be used securely and logically by LIRING/4 and Rowton. A "contract" to serve as a letter of understanding for both Rowton and LIRING/4 was drafted as a basis for present and future colaboration. No reference to WOFACT was made or implied, but Rowton made it clear that he had "firends and colleagues" who were interested in intelligence coverage of PBRUMEN and who would carry on his collaboration with LIRING/4 in the event of Rowton's death or unavailability.

2. The first item discussed was a simple open code to designate persons of interest either as targets or possible hostile elements, so that L/4 could mention these persons in the text of her S/W correspondence without compromising herself. A list of the persons concerned with the code names is attached herewith. LIRING/4 understands that these code names will not be used in open letters to LIRING/3 under any circumstances.

3. As far as letter drops are concerned, Rowton instructed LIRING/4 to send her S/W messages with innocent text cover to the following address:

Lic. Antonio Ponce Cortés
Multifamiliar Miguel Alemán C-326
México 12, D.F.

using a notional return address that could not be easily traced, and dropping the letter in a public mailbox in the center of town. Rowton did not give LIRING/4 an indicator for the cover text since it was understood that all messages, except the first, would contain an S/w message. LIRING/4 promised to mail an innocent text letter as soon after arrival as possible so that Rowton would have a good idea of the lenth of time involved in his receiving future letters.

4. LIRING/4 was advised that she would receive S/W messages from Rowton on the paper backing of seriographic designs (Aztec seals) being produced by LIRING/3. The designs, prepared in the form of greeting cards, would be addressed to a third party and contain a brief message of greeting in the handwriting of LIRING/3 and would be sent as an attachment to a routine letter from LIRING/3 sent by hand or through the LIRING pouch. Both LIRING/4 and Rowton agreed that open mail, since it would have to bear her true name and address, would be both too risky and too slow. In the unlikely event of discovery, L/4 would have some way out, alleging that she

had nothing to do with the message and placing the blame on LIRING/3.

5. At subsequent meetings, however, LIRING/4 accepted the probable long delays in receiving messages, both to and from her, involved in the open mail and agreed that it would be necessary to take the risk involved in sending at least some of the messages under cover of normal correspondence to LIRING/3. She also agreed with Rowton that sending S/w on the back of seriographic designs would constitute a pattern and might attract undue attention.

6. It was therefore agreed that LIRING/4 would also write S/w in letters to LIRING/3 that would be hand-carried to Mexico by a friend or sent in the pouch and delivered by Jorrín to her Tacubaya address. Rowton structed LIRING/4 to insert "Colonia Condesa" in the address on the envelope if the letter contained S/w, otherwise leave out this addition. Since Rowton would have a key to the Calzada Tacubaya apartment he could check regularly for any letters that Jorrín might have slipped under the door during periods when LIRING/3 might be absent from Mexico City.

7. At his meeting with LIRING/4 on 14/2/68 the following additional signals were agreed on:

(a) Danger Signal : Omision of name Zinzuni from open text. The child would always be referred to in regular correspondence with LIRING/3 by name. In event of hostile control, LIRING/4 would refer to child as "hijita" or by some other endearing name, but refrain from using her first name.

(b) New Carbon Needed: to be indicated by the phrase "I need more vitamin B-12" or "I have run out of my B-12 complex vitamins".

(c) New Developer Needed: " I have run out of that nice cologne I brought with me".

8. As far as incoming S/W was concerned, Rowton stated that if a cover letter from LIRING/3 contained the words "Chiapas" and "arte" it would indicate that an S/W message was being forwarded in that letter.

14

19 February, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with Carmen Lozada.

1. At 2100 on 18/2/68 LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had met with Carmen Lozada at about 1130 on 17/2/68, at the square in Coyoacán. He explained that on 15/2/68 their mutual friend, Carmen Molina, had contacted Carmen Lozada by telephone and had learned that the latter planned to return to Mexico the following day (Friday, 16/2/68). Carmen Lozada had told her on the phone to give her regards to her friend (LIRING/3) but to ask him not to meet her at the airport since she would be accompanied by her daughter and would be met by her parents on arrival in Mexico. LIRING/3 therefore contacted her through Carmen Molina on the morning of 17/2/68 and made the date to meet her near her parents home.

2. L/3 continued that as soon as he saw Carmen Lozada he knew at once that something unpleasant had happened during her visit to Havana. He told Rowton that she had apparently lost five or six pounds, was dressed in a slovenly manner and gave of appearance of a distraught person, almost on the verge of insanity. Her manner and subsequent conversation, often incoherent and half hysterical, confirmed in L/3's mind that she was suffering from severe strain and depression. L/3 told Rowton that he understood from her remarks that she had found the Havana airport, Havana, Cuba and the Cubans in general "detestable". She exclaimed at one point: "Odio a esa isla maldita!' She added that she was on the point of becoming an enemy of Cuba (volverse gusana). In the next breath, however, she stated that she had to return "en pocos días" as soon as treatment had been arranged for her daughter (suffering from asthma). L/3, pretending to think that she had patched up things with her husband, Enrique, asked whether she had been reconciled and found that she really loved her husband after all. She exclaimed, according to L/3, in a half hysterical voice that she hated her husband and everything her represented.

3. L/3 continued that despite his repreated questions Carmen Lozada refused to give him details of what actually had happened to her. She repeatedly stated that she was under "intense, horrible pressure" that she could not explain. When L/3 commented that L/4 was preparing to return to Havana, Carmen Lozada burst out again with "Qué horrible!" but again did not explain. In view of Carmen Lozada's obvious state of psychological and physical disintegration, LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt it best to terminate the meeting at the first opportunity (about 1630) and leave as gracefully as he could. He added that when he left he looked back to see her standing in a daze for a full five minutes before walking off.

30 January,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of letter from Maceiro, Vice Minister of Education.

1. At 1000 on 30 January,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had seen Jorrín the previous afternoon and that he had told her that he had been to her apartment the previous evening but had failed to find her or LIRING/3 in. He explained that Dr. Marinelo,who was visiting Mexico City, had asked him to deliver to LIRING/4 ax letter from their mutual friend, Dr. Maceira. Jorrín then gave LIRING/4 the letter.

2. LIRING/4 stated to Rowton that the letter was simply a request for shoes for Maceira's child which could not be obtained in Cuba. LIRING/4 commented that this was only another of a series of such requests that Maceira and Figueroa of the Ministry of Education had been making to her since their last visit to Mexico. She had in the past ignored the requests since she felt she had done enough and could see no useful purpose in running around town as a purchasing agent, particularly when there was no guarantee that they would reimburse her.

3. Rowton suggested that on this occasion, however, it might prove worthwhile, in view of Marinelo's apparently important position in Havana and LIRING/4's forthcoming trip. He suggested that LIRING/4 purchase the shoes (about 60 pesos) and attempt to deliver them personally to Marinelo; she could then invite him to lunch or dinner in the hope of assessing his present feelings toward the regime. LIRING/4 recalled that Marinelo had been Rector of the University of Havana and was a member of the old guard communist party. She added that Jorrín had mentioned that Marinelo held Ambassadorial rank and was serving at the present time in some sort of international delegation.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had run into an old Cuban friend, Aralia Arizmendi, on the street, and that the latter had given her her home phone as 23-79-95. LIRING/4 explained that Arizmendi had married a Mexican psychiatrist and left Cuba some years back. As far as she knew Arizmendi was sympathetic with the Castro regime and on more or less friendly terms with LIRING. On this occasion Arizmendi joked with L/4 about the inefficiency of the LIRING offcials, saying that the only person she felt was doing a decent job was Cepeda.

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5. LIRING/4 also reported that she had written a short letter to her negro medical student friend, Yolanda, and dropped the letter, as requested by Rowton, in the open mail (to ascertain the time taken to deliverrthe letter to Havana. LIRING/4 gave Yolanda's full name and address as:

Yolanda Diaz
Porvenir 112 - Depto 12,
entre Aguilera y Bouza
Lawton

Tel: 99-46-88.

Wallace B. Rowton

CS COPY

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment B to
HMMA-34484

Identity Sheet

Identity: Ismael SUAREZ de la Paz

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOACRE

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/LIRING-3 - LIROSIN Deactivation of Audio Installation.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None

Reference: HMMA-31821, dtd 3 April 1967.

1. On 15 April 1968, circa 1410 hours, the audio installation described in reference was deactivated. The SPT-2A was recovered by Walter W. CORNBURY and returned to Station stock. The LP equipment, an SPR-2A and UHER 4000 L, will also be returned to Station stock.

2. Inasmuch as LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 were terminating their "lease" on the target apartment, it was felt the SPT-2A carrier current transmitter would have to be removed because of its shallow concealment. To continue the assessment of target personalities however, we wanted to wait until almost the last minute. The week of 15 April 1968 was selected as an appropriate time by Wallace B. ROWTON, who is in contact with the targets.

3. At about 1300 hours, 15 April 1968, Walter W. CORNBURY and Oliver D. CIMOCH entered the LP and were greeted by LIROSIN who knew we were coming but did not know why. A check of the audio device revealed that LIRING-4 and a young (teen-age) male relative were in the target. This was as expected. At 1330 hours, LIRING-4 left the apartment, alone, for a luncheon date with ROWTON. She returned a few minutes later and made the male relative accompany her. (This was obviously at the insistence of ROWTON.) The telephone number of the target apartment was tried a few minutes after their departure and was not answered, again as expected. At 1400 hours a telephone call was received in the LP from the Station as a relay from ROWTON that the targets were safely ensconsed for at least the next hour. (It was known that LIRING-3 was out of the city.) Another telephone call to target with no answer, and CORNBURY entered the target

-continued-

Distribution:
2 - C/WOACRE cs copy IN 50-6-18
② - C/WHD

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3
201.
WC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-34491

DATE
16 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-18/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34491

apartment using keys provided by ROWTON. The wall plate was removed, the AC lines to the SPT-2A clipped off close to the plug, the SPT-2A easily removed, the wall plate refastened, and the target apartment vacated. Total time about two minutes. CORNBURY and CIMOCH left the area immediately. There were no security problems noted at any time.

4. The LP equipment will be removed by LIROS15 and returned to stock on 17 April 1968.

5. Please note that no ADP sheet has been submitted with this report.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/OPS, C/CA, FI

S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5225 15 APR 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROBION WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5225 SECRET

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

LIRINE-3

DIS

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

LIRINE-3 Contacts with Guatemalan Revolutionaries in Mexico

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5600, dated 28 March 1968

1. On 23 and 25 March 1968, the Mexico City Station placed photo coverage on Rio Lerma 54, the address where several Guatemalans, including Francisco LARA Barrios, were staying in Mexico, according to LIRINE-3. Coverage of this address led to photo coverage of [illegible], another address where Guatemalans appeared to congregate.

2. Since LIRINE-3 is not available at the present time to identify any of the persons in the photographs, the Station decided to make them available to the Guatemala City Station for possible identification.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
 Photos

Distribution:
 2 - COS, Guatemala City w/att
 2 - C/WHD wo/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34413	8 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	35-0-8

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

TOTAL COPIES 18

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BY _____ AT _____ Z

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DISSEM BY 26 PER _____

ACTION

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 260232Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5141 [illegible] 86253

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

1. ON 5 APRIL 68 STATION RECEIVED PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF GUATEMALAN PASSPORT WHICH LIRING-3 SAID FRANCISCO LARA WOULD USE TO ENTER HONDURAS FROM GUATEMALA. COPIES INDICATE THERE WAS DISCREPENCY IN NAME ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN REF AND NAME ON PASSPORT. CORRECT NAME IS JOSE MARIA OLIVA CARRANZA, ORDINARY GUATEMALAN PASSPORT NUMBER 134825 SERIES D REGISTRY NUMBER 02743 ISSUED 27 MAY 1963 IN GUATEMALA CITY. OLIVA BORN SAN FELIPE, RETALHULEU ON 9 FEB 1935.

2. OTHER DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED INCLUDE MILITARY INSCRIPTION IN GUATEMALAN ARMY, CARD NUMBER 49059, BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER 2825671, CEDULA DE VECINDAD 287165 AND ELECTIRON CARD 107817.

3. THESE DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED BY LIRING-3 WHEN THEY PASSED TO HIM BY FRANCISCO LARA TO USE IN MAKING FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO ADDRESSEES.

S E C R E T

BT

Daly

SECRET

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG

INFO.

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa HHT

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

201-799391 201-832457

Carlos JURADO Delmar and Francisco Adalberto LARA Barrios

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

CIT: Mexico
A: Mex Co

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5111, dated 4 April 1968

1. Attached for the Addressees' information and retention are copies of the documentation cited in the reference above.

2. Please note that Francisco Adalberto LARA Barrios uses the aliases of Francisco Lara, Miguel Angel OLIVA Castaneda and Jacinto RANGEL Cervantes, according to LIRING-3.

CIT: Guatemala
A: Mexico
CCC: Professor

for/Willard C. CURTIS

re: documentation received on subj.

MICROFILMED
APR 16 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LIRING-3

HMMA 34404/1
Francisco Adalberto LARA Barrios
(201-832457)

Attachment:
As stated in Paragraph 1

CS COPY

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2 - COS, Guatemala City w/att
2 - C/WHD w/att
h/w atts: 2 1 - COS, Tegucigalpa w/att

201-799391

~~35-9-8~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMA-34404

DATE

4 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

35-9-8

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MICROFILMED
APR 16 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2P



SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA
DIRECCION GRAL. DE ADMON.
DEPARTAMENTO DE PERSONAL

Nº 127999
SERIE "C"

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y suya la firma que aparece al reverso

México. D. F., a [illegible] de 196[illegible]

El Jefe del Depto. de Personal.

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HMMA-34404

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BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

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ACTION: WH 8

☑ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR. CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI

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S E C R E T 041950Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5111 4 Apr 68 IN 88151

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

1. AFTERNOON 3 APRIL 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE PLANS DEPART FOR GUATEMALA CITY VIA LAND IN COMPANY GUATEMALAN CITIZEN FRANCISCO LARA CIRCA 4 APRIL 68. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION AND LARA HAS FALSE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION, THEY WILL ATTEMPT ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY.

2. IN GUATEMALA CITY, LARA PLANS INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO WOMAN WHO LOGISTICAL OFFICER FOR FAR IN GUATEMALA CITY. TRIP WILL THEN BE ARRANGED FOR LIRING-3 TO VISIT FAR SIERRA DE LAS MINAS HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE SUPPORT OF FAR FROM MEXICO CITY.

3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN GUATEMALA, LARA AND LIRING-3 WILL TRAVEL TEGUCIGALPA TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES OF SETTING UP PRINTING PRESS UNDER LIRING-3'S TRUE NAME.

4. LARA'S FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION IS IDENTITY CARD FROM SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA UNDER NAME JACINTO RANGEL CERVANTES. FOR IDENTITY CARD PHOTOGRAPH, LARA WORE GLASSES, HAIR DYED GREY AND NO MUSTACHE. LARA TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FOR TRAVEL TO TEGUCIGALPA FROM GUATEMALA CITY, HE WILL USE GUATEMALAN PASSPORT UNDER NAME

Vince

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5111 S E C R E T

MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA. LIRING-3 WILL PROBABLY USE VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF LARA AND LIRING-3 DOCUMENTATION.

5. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: LIRING-3 (IDEN) IS STATION PENETRATION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN MEXICO CITY. FRANCISCO LARA IS FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAS RESIDED IN MEXICO FOR PAST YEAR AND WHO CLAIMS TO BE FAR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

6. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND POST OFFICE BOX IN MEXICO CITY FOR STATION CONTACT, DO NOT BELIEVE STATION WILL BE ABLE SUPPLY ADDRESSEES WITH INFO ON HIS TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS UNTIL HE IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AFTER HIS RETURN TO MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

035-009-008
HMMA-34404
04 APR 68

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
RE DOCUMENTATION RECEIVED ON SUBJ.

HGGHHT

R 6804180322

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

LIRING-3

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INFO FILE VR. CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, WH/COG 8,

S E C R E T 282327Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8822

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5822 (IN 80219)

29 MAR 68 IN 80308

1. RE PARA 4 REF: DUE 28 MARCH CHANGES WITHIN GUATEMALAN ARMY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAFAEL (ARRIAGA) BOSQUE, STATUS OF "OPERATION AZTECA" UNCERTAIN. CONSEQUENTLY STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY TYPE PROTECTION FOR LIRING-3 IN CASE HE CAPTURED. ALSO NOTE THAT MEXICAN BORDER AREA BEING HEAVILY PATROLLED.

2. ESMOOSE-1 REPORTED THAT ON EARLY MORNING 28 MARCH ESMARVEL-1 ALERTED SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF GUAT ARMY (SCUGA) TO BE PREPARED FOR IMPORTANT OPERATION. HE SAID INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT GROUP OF THIRTY CASTRO CUBANS PLANNED ENTER GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND THEIR ARRIVAL TIED IN WITH WAVE OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WHICH REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE 31 MARCH. ESMARVEL-1 DID NOT INDICATE SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. HE SAID THAT REINFORCED SCUGA TEAMS WOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MARCOS AND HUEHUETENANGO ON MEXICAN BORDER, WITH A BACK-UP TEAM IN DEPARTMENT OF QUEZALTENANGO. SCUGA UNIT WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHEN WORD RECEIVED OF REMOVAL OF ARRIAGA. ESMOOSE-1 SAID AS RESULT OPERATION CANCELLED. POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SAME

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 8822 S E C R E T

INFO HAS BEEN PASSED TO MILITARY UNITS AT BORDER WHICH MIGHT MAKE LIRING-3'S CROSSING INTO GUATEMALAN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

3. FOR HQS: PARA 2 INFO HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMED DUE LACK OF CONFIRMATION AND SCARCITY OF DETAILS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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INFO
FILE, VR, FI, CI/OPS, CI/ICA, CI/IC 2, CI/PS,
TSD6, FI, FI/INT2, SOD6, ADDP, DDP

S E C R E T 282120Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5083 28 MAR 68 IN 80219

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4828 (IN 70689)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 5551 (IN 41009)

C. MEXICO CITY 4486 (IN 50312)

1. ON 27 MARCH 68 LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT GUAT FAR MEMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA IS ACTUALLY FRANCISCO LARA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, AKA CARLOS LARA (REFS B AND C). LARA INADVERTENTLY GAVE HIS TRUE NAME WHILE DISCUSSING WITH LIRING-3 THE PLANNED TRIP TO GUATEMALA.

2. AT PRESENT, LIRING-3 MAKING FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS HE TO LEAD INTO GUATEMALA. THEY PLAN TRAVEL SOMETIME BEFORE 31 MARCH. LIRING-3 TO ENTER GUATEMALA WITH GROUP IN ORDER MEET UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO IS FAR LOGISTICAL OFFICER. GROUP BELIEVES LIRING-2 SHOULD TALK TO HER TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPLIES HE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE TO FAR (COULD UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN BE DIAN ADELA JIMENEZ OR BRENY HOSEL CUENCA?)

3. LIRING -3 IS NOW ATTEMPTING DETERMINE TRUE NAMES OF OTHER PERSONS HE TO TAKE TO BORDER AND EXACT DEPARTURE DATE. STATION

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5000 SECRET

WAS ABLE TAKE PHOTO OF PERSON LIRING-3 IN CONTACT AND LIRING-3 IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIED THIS PERSON AS FRANCISCO LARA. STATION HAS ALSO TAKEN PHOTOS OF ADDRESS WHERE GUATS BELIEVED BE STAYING AND FILM BEING DEVELOPED. WILL PRIORITY POUCH PHOTOS AND LIRING-3 REPORTS.

4. LIRING-3 WILLING ENTER GUATEMALA WITH FAR MEMBERS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW IF OPERATION AZTECA STILL IN FORCE. IF NOT, COULD STATION GUATEMALA ARRANGE ANY TYPE OF PROTECTION FOR HIM IN CASE HE IS CAPTURED BY MILITARY OR POLICE?

SECRET

BT

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		X MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT LIRING-3 Reports		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

Action Required: None; FYI

Reference : Mexico City-5000

#CIT: Guatemala
A: Mexico

Attached are the LIRING-3 reports on the meetings he has held with the Guatemalan FAR members as reported in the reference above. Also attached are photos of Carlos *Percabal Marcue and his wife, Teresa nee *Lozada de *Percabal, a blown up copy of the documentation LIRING-3 is falsifying, and several shots of AKA Francisco *Lara who is probably identical with Francisco Adalberto *LARA Barrios, also known as AKA: Carlos *Lara.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Reports
Photos

MICROFILMED
APR 8 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
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② - C/WHD w/att
h/w atts: 2

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201-799301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34367	28 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

HQS

8P

27 March 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Identification of FAR Memeber.

1. At 1130 on 27/3/68 L/3 told Rowton that at last he had obtained the true name of the FAR member he had met through Carlos Persaval and who had previously identified himself to L/3 under the alias Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda. LIRING/3 said he learned that the ~~xxx~~ true name of this person is Fancisco Lara and that he and some 14 other Guatemalans are here in Mexico City legally as exiles. L/3 added that he met "Rodolfo", the older and apparently more important FAR member, yestereday (26/3/68) but as yet has not been able to learn his true last name.

2. LIRING/3 also immediately idenditied the surveillance photo (clipped portion sh returned herewith) as that of Francisco Lara. FAR Commandante

3. The other surveillance photos, as follows he identified as of Carlos Persaval b Marcia and his wife Teresa Lozada de Persaval respectively.



WBR
Wallace B. Rowton

MICROFILMED
APR 8 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Francisco Adalberto
LARA Barrios

h/w
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CS COPY

201-798301

22 March, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Guatemalans in Mexico City.

1. At a brief meeting with Rowton at 1700 on 22/3/68 at bhe Diana Restaurant LIRING/3 reported that he was working on the fabrication of identity documents for the two FAR representatives (Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda and Rodolfo) through his seriographic process and that he hoped to have the pictures of the persons concerned the following day. He asked Rowton to bring along his copying kit so that he could quickly copy the pictures just before LIRING/3 put them on the identity cards. Rowton promised to bring the kit to the Atoyac apartment at 1600 on 23/3/68.

2. LIRING/3 also reported that he had learned from the Guatemalans that a certain Esquenasi or Eskenazi, a Guatemalan who has resided for many years in Mexico and who owns or operates a factory called "Cromos de México", has been very helpful to the FAR members in Mexico. Likewise a doctor by the name of Jorge Flesch has been of service when needed.

3. In reply to Rowton's query LIRING/3 stated that all the seven Guatemalans he had recently met (four of whom live at 54 Río Lerma) appeared to be FAR adherents, except one, who he had learned in passing was a follower of Jan Yon Sosa. L/3 also stated that he had learned that the one who worked in the photo shop on San Juán Latrán street was an accountant rather than a photographer.

Wallace E. Rowton

20 March,1968.

Subject: LIRING/3 Contacts with FAR Guatemala in Mexico City.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1600 on 20/3/68 that he had again met with Miguel Angel Oliva Castañeda, this time at about 1930 in front of the Chapultepec movie and went with him to the Café Literario on Calle Lieja. L/3 told Rowton that Oliva confided to him that he had just learned from four Guatemalan comrades who lived together in an apartment on Calle Lerma that their residence was being surveilled by what they felt was the Mano Blanca. He explained that they had noted several fairly well-dressed men hanging around the apartment house and had tried to follow one of them but he had run off. This all indicated to them that the surveillance was not being carried out by the Mexican Police, but by some private group. Oliva then stated that they knew that the deputy chief of the Mano Blanca organization Oliverio Castañeda, was currently in Mexico City, and assumed that he had organized the surveillance. Oliva then mentioned that one of the four living at Calle Lerma was the well-known Guerrilla leader who had recently sought sanctuary in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City and was granted asylum to Mexico through the intervention and influence of Lazaro Cárdenas.

2. In order to determine the exact location of the Lerma apartment, LIRING/ told Rowton that he offered to help identify the surveillance by conducting a countersurveillance himself the following evening. He also offered the use of his Tacubaya studio, recommending that in any case the four should disperse at least temporarily.

3. L/3 also reported to Rowton that he again met with Oliva at 1015 that same morning and that the latter had taken him to a printing shop on Calzada Tlalpan near Calle José T. Cuéllar, named "Regia", as L/3 recalled. (The Mexico City telephone directory lists "Resca-Impresos y Rayados, Calle J.T. Cuéll 57, tel: 78-05-01). Oliva told L/3 that this shop produced various ID papers for them in the past but unfortunately was not able to fabricate a good Mexican ID card because of the unavailability of the special type used. L/3 said that he was confident that he could make the reproduction through his seriographic process. In the course of conversation Oliva confided to L/3 that the Guatemalan lawyer, Capuano, had provided blank Guatemalan ID cards in the past and in general had been very helpful. He added that Capuano had succeeded in getting all the Guatemalans released from prison after their arrest in the Julian López case.

4. Oliva also stated that he felt it possible and advisable that L/3 travel

with him to the FAR headquarters in the Sierra Mina on his forthcoming trip so that L/3 could get first-hand requirements from the FAR supply responsible (whom Oliva referred to as a woman). Oliva also mentioned that FAR was hoping to obtain a lathe to permit the manufacture of weapons locally (in the mountains).

5. Oliva also stated that the principle purpose of the visit of his comrade "Rodolfo" was to obtain funds and to return to Mexico. Oliva added that in the event L/3 could make the trip he could also return with Rodolfo to Mexico. In reply to L/3's query, Oliva stated that the funds Rodolfo would be given in Guatemala were from various robberies carried out by Far for the purpose of raising its own funds. Oliva commented that they could not count on the Cubans or the CPG for financial support when it was needed. He added that the sale of the booklet "Terror in Guatemala" (of which L/3 had obtained a copy from Carlos Persival) had helped to supply some of the money to be used for the trip. Oliva indicated that he himself planned to remain in Guatemala with the FAR forces in the mountains.

Wallace B. Rowton

19 March, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Memebers of FAR, Guatemala.

1. At 0945 on 19/3/68 at the Robbins Restaurant, Calle Leibnitz and Melchor Ocampo, LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had again met the FAR member whose sketch he had given Rowton the previous day and whom he had met thru Carlos Persaval on 17/3/68. He explained that Persaval had finally contacted him by phone late Sunday afternoon (17/3/68) and introduced him to one of the two Guatemalans who wanted to return clandestinely to their country. L/3 described this man, who later showed him/Guatemalan identification papers in the name of Miguel Angel Oliva, aged 33, as short, stocky, with black hair trimmed short and rather thick prominent eyebrows. L/3 estimated his age as 35 and said there was no doubt in his mind that he was a native-born Guatemalan. He added that this person wore a thin moustache. L/3 then drew Rowton a sketch of the person concerned which Rowton passed in to the Station the same day.

2. LIRING/3 continued that he conversed with the Guatemalan, Oliva, in the presence of Carlos Persaval and his wife Teresa Lozada de Persaval at the Miss restaurant on Reforma for about 45 minutes, taking the line that he was willing to help the cause as he had done in the past, but he wanted to be certain of the exact affiliations and bona fides of the persons with whom he was dealing. When this apparently surprised and somewhat shocked Carlos Persaval and Teresa, L/3 explained that he had had some unpleasant experiences with such persons as Orozco and was aware that many FAR desertors were circulating around Mexico these days. The Guatemalan, Oliva, however reacted favorably saying that he understood L/3's position and did not blame him. He added that he would furnish proof of his FAR affiliations and indicated that there were two other comrades, one much more important than himself, who also needed help in returning. L/3 told Rowton that he stressed to all present the risks involved in providing false documentation and acting as a guide for them to cross the border illegally and his original commitment to help only two persons. In reply to L/3's query, the Guatemalan Oliva stated that their destination would be Guatemala City itself and they hoped that L/3 would be able to accompany them there since they were not familiar with the countryside betweenthe border in the Comitán area and Guatemala City.

3. According to LIRING/3 the latter insisted that he meet the other, more important Guatemalan, and be given an opportunity to make carfeful plans before attempting the journey to Chiapas and Guatemala City. Oliva then made a date with Persaval and L/3 for the next evening at 2300 at the corner of

San Juán Latrán and Madero at which time he would try to arrange a meeting with his comrade.

4. LIRING/3, at his meeting with Rowton the following morning (19/3/68) reported that when he arrived at the place designated he found the Guatemalan Oliva waiting with neither of them saw Perseval. Oliva, after a wait of about 45 minutes, suggested that they give up and go to a cafeteria, Copa de Leche, on San Juán Latrán. L/3 stated to Rowton that while they were waitin they were joined by another Guatemalan, a young man of about 22 years of ag and rather stout, who accompanied them to the cafeteria. The older Guatemal then showed L/3 a Guatemalan passport in the name of Miguel Angel Oliva Castañada which he said was false but which enabled him to travel in Mexico. The younger man stated that he had legal documents but did not volunteer his name to L/3. In the course of conversation L/3 learned that the older Guatemalan, Oliva, formerly worked in the advertising business in Guatemala City and that the younger man was familiar with electronic equipment and radio communications problems. The older Guatemalan apologized to L/3 for not having been able to bring along the other FAR comrade, to whom he referred as "Rodolfo" and again promised to introduce him to L/3 the following evening. He promised to telephone L/3 at 1400 the next day to confirm the meeting.

5. LIRING/3 then told Rowton that the two Guatemalans then escorted him to the Hotel del Valle on Calle Independencia (Rowton recalls that Dr. Bustamante resided there during his stay in Mexico City several months ago). L/3 told Rowton that he met two other Guatemalans there in the lobby and comment that they talked rather freely in front of him, discussing at one point even the illegal acquisition of a revolver needed by one of them. In the course o conversation L/3 stated that he learned that César Montes is now back in Guatemala and that the FAR is planning an April offensive. All the Guatemalans expressed concern over the increase in the power of the "Mano Blanca" and blamed it for the kidnapping of the Guatemalan Archbishop. They also commented that the military in Guatemala were disenchanted with the "puppet president", Montenegro, and could be expected to increase the terrorism from the right in order to place Montenegro in an impossible position and eventually justify his removal.

6. L/3 commented to Rowton that he noted that at no time did any of the Guatemalans mention Cuban aid or assitance. In fact one of them at one point said that he had tried unsuccessfully to obtain a visa for travel to Cubasome thirty days previously.

Wallace B. Rowton

17 March,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with Carlos Persaval.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1115 on 16/3/68 at the restaurant Hiss on Reforma and Calle Mississipi that unfortunately his meeting with the two Guatemalans scheduled for the previous evening at 2230-2300 in Danny's restaurant (Reforma at Diana Circle) did not come off. He stated that he arrived at the restaurant at 2230 and waited until about 2315 without seeing either Persaval or being approached by any Guatemalan. He continued that just as he was about to leave, he heard a tap on the window behind him and turned and saw Teresa Lozada de Persaval on the street. He wnet out and accompanied her to a car where Carlos Persaval was waiting. He was then driven to Sanborn's Angel and remained there with Carlos and Teresa for some thirty minutes.

2. According to LIRING/3,Carlos Persaval explained that he had been stood up by the Guatemalans and had been unable to get in touch with them to introduce them to L/3 as he had hoped. He added that one of the persons xxx had been in Cuernavaca two or three days previously and perhaps had not been able to return in time for the meeting. Persaval,who appeared to L/3 to be quite nervous in Sanborn's, suggested that they go elsewhere to continue their discussion and LIRING/3 invited him and Teresa to his Tacubaya studio.

3. They then proceeded there to continue the discussion. Teresa excused herself on arrival saying that she was very tired, and promptly fell asleep in one of the bedrooms. Carlos Persaval then continued talking with L/3 until about 0300. He mentioned that one of the Guatemalans he hoped to introduce to L/3 was well-known and important in FAR,while the other(who had documents) was relatively unimportant and could probably get by the police checks without as much risk. In reply to L/3's queries, Persaval stated that both men wanted to travel to Guatemala City and that one (the important one) would probably be returning to Mexico after a short stay. Persaval revealed that as far as he knew the purpose of their trip was to obtain much-needed funds to continue their work in Mexico.

4. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he again promised to guide the Guatemalans across the border south of San Cristóbal but insisted on meeting them in Mexico City prior to escorting them over the border. Persaval then asked L/3

whether he was in a position to obtain a radio transmitter for the FAR friends, stating that he was certain that they had the financial means necessary to pay for such equipment. L/3 stated that he felt he had a good source in his brother and various other contacts up north, including Archi who worked for the radio station and had access to technical equipment.

5. At the conclusion of the meeting Pesaval promised to telephone L/3 again at 2200 the following night (16/3/68) in the hope of being able to set up a meeting that night or the following. L/3, however, reported to Rowton by telephone that as of 2300 on 16/3/68 no one had telephoned him to set up the meeting.

Wallace B. Rowton

GHAMA 34867

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Departamento de Relaciones Públicas

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
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





c. LIRING-3: From recent activity it appears that the Guatemalan FAR may have renewed its interest in LIRING-3. In late January, an emissary of FAR representatives in the PBRUMEN capital traveled to Mexico and contacted the person who had carried to PBRUMEN the letter sent by LIRING-3 in the summer of 1967 denouncing Moises OROZCO Leal. The emissary brought the word that the FAR had much appreciated LIRING-3's letter on OROZCO and warned that the FAR organization in Mexico City was infiltrated by a WOFIRM operator. Try as he might, however, LIRING-3 failed, at least by the end of this period, to meet with the FAR man.

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AN [illegible]

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

S E C R E T 141942Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4823

GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 MAR 68 IN 70689

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4792 (IN 68111)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 6733 (IN 68957)

1. FOLLOWING CABLED IN ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 3 REF B:

A. FAR KNOWS LIRING-3 HAS CAPABILITY OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTATION. LIRING-3 FOR EXAMPLE OBTAINED FALSE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND MILITARY REGISTRATION CARD FOR JACOBO PADILLA.

B. LEFTIST CONTACTS LIRING-3 INCLUDING GUATS KNOW HE FAMILIAR WITH GUAT BORDER AREA IN CHIAPAS. LIRING-3 WORKED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS IN CHIAPAS FOR MEXICAN EQUIVALENT INDIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. IT ALSO WELL KNOWN TO FAR THAT LIRING -3 HAS BUSINESS LOCATED IN BORDER AREA IN ST CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS SINCE THIS BUSINESS WAS TO BE USED AS COVER FOR ARMS SUPPLY TO GUAT REBELS.

MICROFILMED MAR 26 1968 DOC. MICRO. SER.

C. AS GUAT CITY STATION WILL REMEMBER LIRING-3 WAS TAKEN BY FAR TO HIDEOUT IN GUAT WHERE HELD TALKS WITH FAR MEMBERS. LIRING-3 EVEN SUPPLIED FAR SOME MEDICINE AND COGNAC FOR WHICH INCIDENTALLY HE NEVER PAID.

D. IN LIRING-3 OPINION, FACT FAR REPS IN CUBA RECENTLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR HIS DENUNCIATION MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL IN

LIRING-3

~~235-4-17~~

201-798361

14 MAR 68

235-4-17

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4828 SECRET

SUMMER 67 AND SENT WARNING THAT FAR "PENETRATED BY WOFIRM AGENT" (SEE MEXICO CITY 4314) (IN 40487) CONSTITUTES INDICATION HE STILL IN GOOD GRACES OF AT LEAST SOME OF FAR RANK AND FILE.

E. REQUEST LIRING-3 HELP FAR REPS OVER GUAT BORDER CAME FROM CARLOS (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINES, VIA CARMEN (LOZADA) DE RAMIREZ, PERSAVAL SISTER IN LAW * AND RECENT MISTRESS LIRING-3. ANF 4513,5 ~~8543 1848, & 3.~~ AS FAR AS STATION KNOWS PERSAVAL, MARCUE OR LOZADA HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO AND OTHER GUAT LEFTISTS WITH WHOM LIRING-3 PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT.

2. LIFEAT ON LIRING-3 CONFIRMED PERSAVAL SCHEDULED PHONE LIRING-3 14 MARCH TO SET UP 15 MARCH MEETING WITH TWO MALE AND ONE FEMALE GUAT REBELS LIRING-3 AGREED GUIDE OVER GUAT BORDER. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, STATION KNOWS GUATS MAY PHONE LIRING-3 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING. TO FACE SUCH POSSIBILITY LIEMBRACES STARTED SURVEILLANCE LIRING-3 MORNING 14 MARCH, WILL TRY OBSERVE MEETING WITH GUATS, TAKE PHOTOS OF THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTUAL RESIDENCE THROUGH TAILING EXERCISING UTMOST CAUTION.

3. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

SECRET * SERVICED

BT

CS 68

SECRET

LIRING-3

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 122147Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8733

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 MAR 68 IN 68951

REF MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

1. ALTHOUGH SPECULATION ONLY, POSSIBLE THAT YOUNG ROMAN WOMAN WHO TO RETURN GUATEMALA COULD BE CLEMENCIA (PAIZ) CARCAMO (AKA "LUISA"), SISTER OF MIRNA (PAIZ) CARCAMO WHO RECENTLY RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO FEMALE INFORMANT OF GUAT ARMY, CLEMENCIA IS WIFE OF JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA (AKA "CESAR MONTES"). ALSO REPORTED THAT CLEMENCIA WAS TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO IN MID-DECEMBER 1967 TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO FAR, AND WAS POSSIBLY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY DINGRDELA (JIMENEZ) MUNOZ AND HILDA (SOSA) ALDANA. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE WOMEN TRAVELLED, BUT PRESENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. STATION DOES NOT HAVE BIO DATA OR PHOTOGRAPHS CLEMENCIA, AND ESLAIR TEAM HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE ENTRY FOR HER IN FILES OF CIVIL REGISTRY. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN FROM ESMICAS, AND WILL SEND TO MEXICO CITY IF SUCCESSFUL.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY COMMENTS ON WHY LIRING/3 APPROACHED TO OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR RETURNEES AND WHY HE MIGHT BE SELECTED

SECRET

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FILE VR.

PAGE TWO GUATEMALA CITY 8733 SECRET

TO SERVE AS GUIDE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT MEMBERS OF PGT SUPPORT NET IN MEXICO--SUCH AS ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, MAY BE UNWILLING ASSIST FAR MEMBERS IN VIEW RUPTURE PGT/FAR RELATIONS, WOULD SEEM THAT FAR WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ENTRUST DELICATE MISSION OF THIS NATURE TO LIRING/3 WHO RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

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FORM 3020 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

4

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SECRET 122255Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4798

Mexi 4798

12MAR68 IN 68111

CIT: Mexico
A: Mexico

2P

HGG

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

1. ON 5 MARCH 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD DINNER WITH CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCOS, NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCOS PARDINES, DIRECTOR OF THE NOW DEFUNCT MAGAZINE "POLITICA", COMMUNIST BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION. PERSAVAL ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD OBTAIN A FALSE PASSPORT FOR WIFE OF IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER IN MEXICO WHO MUST TRAVEL GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS.

re: involvement with

2. ON 8 MARCH, PERSAVAL SAID TWO IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES HAD TO TRAVEL TO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO BY MID MARCH AND ASKED IF LIRING-3 STILL WILLING TO HELP. LIRING-3 ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THERE WAS LIMITED CHANCE OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTATION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, BRIEF THESE REVOLUTIONARIES ON GUAT/MEXI BORDER IN ORDER MAKE ILLEGAL CROSSING EASIER. IF THEY DESIRED, HE COULD PERSONALLY GUIDE THEM ACROSS BORDER.

3. ON 9 MARCH, PERSAVAL CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH LIRING-3 ON GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES WHO HAD TO TRAVEL GUATEMALA URGENTLY. HE SAID ONE OF THEM HAS LEGAL DOCUMENTATION BUT OTHER DOES NOT. HE

ASPW	
CS Am	WH/1
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

cus

12 Mar 68
201-798301

050-9-11

FORM 3020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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5 14 PM '68

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4798 S E C R E T

THEREFORE DECIDED BOTH SHOULD ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY. THEY CANNOT ENTER THRU TAPACHULA, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN THERE. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED SAN CRISTOBOL AREA WHICH NOT SUBJECT TO MEXICAN OR GUATEMALAN SURVEILLANCE. THE PERSON WITHOUT DOCUMENTS IS WOMAN 28 YEARS OLD. PERSAVAL NOT WILLING GIVE LIRING-3 NAMES OF REVOLUTIONARIES BUT PROMISED ARRANGE FOR CONTACT BETWEEN THEM EVENING 15 MARCH.

4. STATION HAS NO INFO ON IDENTITIES OF MAN AND WOMAN WHO MUST RETURN GUATEMALA MID MARCH. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

FILE LIRING-3

Vince Daly

ORIG: Vince Daly/bb
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

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CITE DIRECTOR 71522

TO MEXICO CITY FEB 1 23 26Z

INFO: GUATEMALA CITY JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 4314 (IN 40487)* 201

NO OBJECTION TO ENCOURAGING LIRING-3 TO RENEW CONTACTS IN GUAT FAR CIRCLES. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE SOME DOUBT WHETHER LIRING-3 IN FACT ABOVE SUSPICION OF FAR, SUGGEST HIS ACTIVITIES BE CLOSELY MONITORED DURING NEXT FEW MONTHS. IF HE UNABLE SHOW TANGIBLE EVIDENCE DURING THIS PERIOD THAT HE IN FAR GOOD GRACES SUGGEST CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 BE PHASED OUT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Request Addressees comments on continued use of LIRING-3 as contact of FAR in Mexico.

WH/2/GUAT

WH/COG/OPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T 310120Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4314

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 2331 (IN 23361)

B. MEXICO CITY 2363 (IN 25077)

C. MEXICO CITY 2438 (IN 29707)

D. MEXICO CITY 2564 (IN 37717)

E. MEXICO CITY 1930 (IN 00593)

F. MEXICO CITY 3581 (IN 99801)

G. HMMA-33842 (NOT SENT GUATEMALA CITY)

RCH/7 | WH/1
ESTRACT | INDEX

3P

31 JAN 68 IN 40487

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. ON 31 JULY 1967 LIRING-3, PER REF A, OBTAINED CONFESSION FROM GUATEMALAN LEFTIST MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL THAT LATTER TRIED BETRAY FAR GUERRILLAS. LIRING-3 SUBSEQUENTLY DENOUNCED OROZCO AS FAR TRAITOR TO LIRING-2 (WHO SUPPOSEDLY RELAYED DENUNCIATION TO CUBAN AUTHORITIES) AND PER REF C TO ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, CLOSE CONTACT OF FAR IN MEXICO. HE ALSO SENT LETTER DENOUNCING OROZCO TO ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS IN HAVANA FOR PASSAGE TO FAR REPS THERE. LETTER, SEALED, WAS GIVEN ALBERTO (DOMINGO) OF MAGAZINE SIEMPRE WHO THEN TRAVELING CUBA BY SERGIO (VALDEZ), LEFTIST FRIEND OF LIRING-3. LIRING-3 NEVER HEARD CUBAN OFFICIAL REACTION. PER

LIRING-3

SEC

B. 201-812145

201-798301

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4314 SECRET

REF D CAPUANO DECIDED LIRING-3 WAS WOFIRM PROVOCATION, DISCUSSED WITH LIREBEL-2 INVESTIGATION OF OROZCO AND ORDERED FAR CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 DISCONTINUED. "GARCIA" WHO CLAIMED BE FAR REP ASSIGNED MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH LIRING-3 HAD HIS LAST MEETING WITH LIRING-3 IN JUNE 67. LIRING-3 H~~ER~~AD NO OTHER MEETING WITH FAR REPS SINCE THAT TIME.

2. ON 23 JANUARY 1968 SERGIO VALDEZ TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FAR REP HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO FROM HAVANA WITH MESSAGE FOR ALBERTO DOMINGO THAT THREE UNIDENTIFIED FAR REPS IN HAVANA WANTED EXPRESS THEIR THANKS FOR LETTER CONCERNING TRAITOR OROZCO. FAR REPS ALSO WANTED "PERSONS CONCERNED" TO BE WARNED THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER FAR TRAITOR, A GUATEMALAN WORKING FOR WOFIRM. DOMINGO WHO NOT AWARE OF CONTENTS LIRING-3 LETTER TO FAR PASSED MESSAGE ON TO VALDEZ. AT SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH VALDEZ FAR VISITOR IDENTIFIED TRAITOR AS ONE CARLOS (SALAZAR). VALDEZ EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SALAZAR AS WELL AS PROOF HE FAR TRAITOR SAYING DID NOT PERSONALLY KNOW GUAT BY THAT NAME. VISITOR PROMISED CHECK AND PASS ON FURTHER INFO.

3. CARLOS SALAZAR PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR WHO TALKED TO LIRING-4 AT CUBAN EMBASSY 22 JUNE 67 (SEE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 4314 SECRET

REF D. AS NOTED THIS REF CUBANS GAVE THIS GUAT COLD SHOULDER. LIRING-3 DID NOT SUCCEED IN CONTACTING SALAZAR AFTER LATTER VISIT TO EMBASSY. INTERESTINGLY, CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR PER REF F WAS REPORTED BY CUBAN CITIZEN OTONIEL (PENA) ENTENZA (MADE CONTACT WITH STATION IN MAY 65) TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO. PENA STATED THAT SALAZAR BELONGED TO PRO-COMMUNIST GROUP DESIGNED SUPPORT YON (SOSA) REBEL FACTION IN GUATEMALA. IT WAS PROBABLY TO CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR THAT LIRING-9 REFERRED TO WHEN PER PARA 5 REF G AND ATTACHMENT HE WARNED LIRING-4 NOV 67 TO BE CAREFUL AS GUAT WHO WAS WOFIRM AGENT HAD MENTIONED HER NAME AS REFERENCE.

4. IT APPEARS FROM ABOVE THAT LIRING-3 MAY BE ABLE TO RENEW CONTACT WITH GUAT FAR. AS FIRST STEP, HE ENDEAVORING MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH FAR VISITOR WHO TALKED TO SERGIO VALDEZ. IT ALSO APPEARS FAR IN HAVANA DID NOT TAKE ERNESTO CAPUANO SUSPICION THAT LIRING-3 WORKING FOR WOFIRM SERIOUSLY. IT WOULD APPEAR IN FACT FROM ABOVE THAT CAPUANO IS NOT TRUSTED BY FAR IN HAVANA.

5. REQUEST ADDEE COMMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

ACTION

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

32

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CA5, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2,

S E C R E T 172155Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4171

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

17 JAN 68 32328

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 64232

B. JMWAVE 0805 (IN25903)

C. MEXICO CITY 4119 (IN29292)

WH/1 file

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT ON EVENING 15 JANUARY HE ATTENDED MEETING OF MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS AT HOME OF LUIS CARRION VILLA; WAS DISAPPOINTED TO FIND ONLY FOUR OTHER PERSONS PRESENT. THE TWENTY OR SO OTHER MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS WHOM HE WAS LED TO BELIEVE WOULD BE PRESENT DID NOT SHOW UP. (LIEMBRACES OBTAINED SOME PHOTOS OF PEOPLE ATTENDING MEETING.)

2. CARRION DID MOST OF THE TALKING, INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS A TRUE REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE CAUSE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, COMPROMISING HIMSELF ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS IN THE PAST, AND HE TRUSTED THAT EVERYONE PRESENT FELT THE SAME. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO STRONG ATTACK AGAINST CASA DE LAS AMERICAS FOR HAVING INVITED THE "MAFIA" OF MEXICAN INTELLECTUALS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY JUAN VICENTE MELO, JUAN GARCIA PONCE, EMANUEL CARBALLO AND , PARTICULARLY, CARLOS MONSIVAIS. HE CHARACTERIZED THESE AS "OPPORTUNISTIC" AND WITHOUT THE TRUE IN-

SECRET

WH

cc Rpts

TEREST OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AT HEART.

3. CARRION SAID HE FELT THAT ALL "TRUE REVOLUTIONARIES" SHOULD MAKE STRONG PROTEST TO CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND REST OF THE WORLD THAT WOULD FORCE CASA DE LAS AMERICAA TO "CORRECT ITS POSITION" AND ALIGN ITSELF PROPERLY TO THE PERSONS WHO TRULY REPRESENTED MEXICAN REVOLUTIONARY THINKING. HE PRPOSED THAT ALL STATEMENTS MADE BY THE MEXICAN DELEGATION BE STUDIED CAREFULLY TO GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO THE PROTEST, THAT HE HOPED TO OBTAIN FULL PRESS RELEASES FROM PRENSA LATINA SINCE HE DID NOT EXPECT MUCH TO APPEAR IN MEXICAN PRESS.

4. CARRION MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PROTEST WOULD NOT INCLUDE CRITICISM OF DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS OR JESUS SILVA HERZOG, WHOM EVERYONE RESPECTED AND WHO WERE CONSIDERED ABOVE ANY SPECIFIC GROUP.

5. CARRION REQUESTED THAT GROUP MEET AGAIN AS OFTE~~R~~N AS NECESSARY TO FORMULATE THE PROTEST AND ASKED EACH PERSON PRESENT TO BRING SUBJECT OF THEIR MEETING TO ATTENTION OF OTHER INTELLECTUALS WHO MIGHT BE WILLING SIGN PROTEST ONCE IT IS WRITTEN.

6. LIRING-3 WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT OBTAIN COPY OF FINAL DRAFT.

7. INASMUCH AS STATION HAS ALREADY DISSEMINATED TWO INTEL

SECRET

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 4171 S E C R E T

REPORTS THIS SUBJECT, AND AS YET NOTHING HAS MATERIALIZED, STATION RELUCTANT DISSEM THE ABOVE AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT INASMUCH AS EARLIER REPORTS CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT MEXICAN PROTEST WAS AGAINST THE CULTURAL CONGRESS PER SE. PROPOSE DISSEM BE WITHHELD PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. IF PROTEST DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, WILL DISSEM GIST OF ABOVE.

S E C R E T.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LIRING /3/
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE FUTURE USE OF SUBJ.

201-8[illegible]
HMMA-33842
12 JAN 68

UFG

R 6801261736

FILE IN 201-798301

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-00)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached for Headquarters information is a memorandum prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the SGSWIRL examination of LIRING-3.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Memorandum (1 copy)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD, w/att

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 33579

DATE
1 December 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

H/W ATTACHMENT
HMMA-33579

2 October,1967

Subject: SGSWIRL Examination of LIRING/3.

1. From about 1330 until 1530 on 29 September,1967, LIRING/3 was given an SGSWIRL examination. Rowton arrived at the safehouse (Tacubaya) with the SGSWIRL operator at 0930 that morning and remained with the operator until the examination was completed. He had not given LIRING/3 any previous notice of the nature or extent of the examination, but simply asked him,on 27 September, to keep the entire day of 29 September free for a lengthy dicussion with Rowton. Rowton introduced the SGSWIRL operator as señor Albertini, a trusted "socio", and spent the first hour or so reviewing his relationship with LIRING/3, ostensibly for the benefit of Albertini. Rowton then,introducing the subject of certain doubts that he had in the past concerning LIRING/3's reporting, stated that Albertini had a means of checking scientifically the truthfulness of LIRING/3's statements. Rowton explained that he was particularly concerned about the possiblity of LIRING/3 having doubled back with LIRING and maintaining with them a secret agreement of some sort to report on Rowton and his activities.

2. LIRING/3 went into a state of visible shock at this and stated that even the thought of betraying Rowton had never occurred to him at any time. When the SGSWIRL operator explained the scientific means he was to use on LIRING/3, the latter stated that he could not possibly accept this humiliating means of testing him since it was diamentrically opposed to his principles. He pointed out that he had accepted Rowton at his word and he could not see or understand why Rowton could not do the same for him, adding that the whole thing smacked of methods used by LCFACT and LIRING. He added that if this meant that he would have to break with Rowton, then regretfully he would have to accept this alternative. He explained that submitting to the SGSWIRL examination would inevitably destroy the idealistic and profound relationship which he had previously felt he enjoyed with Rowton.

3. Rowton and the SGSWIRL operator spent the next two hours calming LIRING/3 down and finally convincing him that he would not be compromising with his deeply-felt principles by taking the test. He at last consented to be questioned on his loyalty to Rowton and insisted that he be asked,"Do you believe in Rowton?"

4. After a brief break for lunch the examination was given inone of the bedrooms of the apartment while Rowton waited in the living room. LIRING/3

ATT #1 HMMA 33579 ES COPY 201-779830

appeared to be in reasonably good spirits after the test, although he was obviously emotionally strained by the experience. Rowton made a date to see him again that evening at 2100 to talk things over in a clamer atmosphere.

5. At that meeting with LIRING/3 Rowton explained that he had felt it necessary to ascertain as objectively as possible the extent of LIRING/3's loyalty to him and he was happy to have scientific proof that LIRING/3 had not berayed him to the LIRING's. LIRING/3 stated that after it was all over he felt better and admitted that he agreed with Rowton on the necessity for such an examination, humiliating as it might at first have appeared to be. He confessed that any "errors" (fabrications and ommissions) that he had made in the past, were due to his intense desire to produce for Rowton, since he still felt very sensitive about having to accept money from Rowton without being able to render commensurate services. He stressed, however, that at no time had he ever been disloyal to Rowton or done anything against Rowton's interest, as señor Albertini could prove with the results of the SGSWIRL. LIRING/3 promised in the future to follow Rowton's direction scrupulously and assured Rowton that he no longer felt under any compulsion to exaggerate or fabricate anything to impress Rowton.

6. Headquarters and the Station may find the SGSWIRL examination disappointing in its limited coverage, but it must be realized that LIRING/3's initial reaction was entirely negative and at one point he threatened to break off completely with Rowton because of the insult to his "dignity". Although the SGSWIRL operator felt that from a professional standpoint it would be better to administer the examination at another time when LIRING/3 was less emotionally upset, Rowton asked both him and LIRING/3 to go thru with it on the spot, feeling that psychologically it was essential to make LIRING/3 submit, even for a limited test. Rowton also feels that the test did serve as a very favorably deterrent over LIRING/3 in the future, when a second one can be more painlessly administered, in a calmer atmosphere. It, of course, also covered the very pertinent question of whether LIRING/3 had been an LIRING double agent or betrayed Rowton in any way.

Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: SGSWIRL Report on LIRING/3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached herewith is the SGSWIRL report (Idens u/s/c) on LIRING/3.

2. Please note that the SGSWIRL interviewer has made the point that the principal misfortune in this interview probably was that LIRING/3 was not tested on the fabrication of contacts with the IDEN D's, which was thought to be the most probable area of deception.

3. In view of LIRING/3's threat to quit working for ROWTON, we would be interested in hearing of any repurcussions or change in attitude that may have resulted from LIRING/3's having taken the test. We also are interested in the Station's comments and recommendations as to the continued use of LIRING-3, bearing in mind ROWTON's recent report of LIRING suspicions that L-3 may be working for WOFIRM.

Chester R. HENDRICK

Distribution:
Orig. & 1-COS, Mexico City

Attachments:
Report - u/s/c - 2 cys.
Idens. u/s/c - 2 cys.

LIRING-3
201-798301

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15966	DATE 30 NOV 1967 22 Nov. 67
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

RI
CHRONO

ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	W. Kerbe	sl	6955

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OS/IRD	11/27	J.B. Bednar

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W.J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

IKD 16-915

IDENTITY SHEET

IDEN A	Carlos JURADO Del Mar
IDEN B	artist
IDEN C	Greek businessman interested in selling arms to the communist-oriented rebels in Guatemala
IDEN D	Guatemalan revolutionary
IDEN E	Cuban Government

SECRET

ATT #1 to HMMW 15966

CS COPY

201-798301

14 November 1967

SUBJECT : LIRING-3 (IDEN A) ERD #69719

Subject was interviewed and tested with SGSWIRL on 19 September 1967 in a Mexico City safe site. The interview was requested by Raymond A. FRADYER.

The interview was conducted in Spanish by the examiner. Wallace A. ROWTON, Subject's principal agent, was present during substantially all of the interview except for the testing period.

Subject has not previously been tested, and has had no contact with any WOFIRM representatives other than ROWTON.

Subject is a married male Mexican citizen, an IDEN B by profession. Prior to recruitment his apparent political sentiments were somewhere in the far left, but he was not believed to be significantly involved in intelligence activities or organized political activities. He was recruited by ROWTON under the cover of a IDEN C. Subject has since his recruitment had contact with IDEN D elements and with IDEN E elements in his efforts to insert himself and ROWTON into the desired position. The initial goal of this operation was to monitor such traffic and pick up whatever additional intelligence information might be incidentally encountered. As Subject was and is, in his own idiosyncratic way, a communist sympathizer, ROWTON has not indicated any anti-communist, anti-IDEN E, or anti-revolutionary aims.

Subject was known to have lied and concealed information on numerous occasions, and it was presumed that considerably more lies were not yet known to WOFIRM. On this basis, SGSWIRL coverage was to have covered numerous issues, centered on other intelligence involvement, fabrication of contacts with significant IDEN D and IDEN E figures, and revelation of his association with ROWTON. The issue of revelation of association with ROWTON was rather complex in that ROWTON never revealed his true name, nationality, or interests to Subject, and also he instructed Subject to reveal certain ostensible facts to various specific individuals.

The examiner was presented to Subject as an associate of ROWTON of Italian extraction.

ATT #2 TO AMMW 15966 CS COPY 201-778301

PROCEDURE

Subject first refused to take the test, basically on the grounds that in his estimation his relationship with ROWTON, as well as his whole way of life, were at variance with any such procedure. In the three or four hours that this was being discussed, Subject also decided to quit working for ROWTON.

Eventually, over a specific matter of hurt pride, Subject agreed, or rather demanded, to be tested on "two questions--whether (he) was betraying ROWTON to IDEN E intelligence and whether (he) trusted ROWTON," following which he would break off contact with ROWTON. Under the circumstances ROWTON judged that the best course would be to follow this lead and attempt no more than a clarification of Subject's relationship with IDEN E intelligence. The examiner was not optimistic about the possibility of getting a valid test under these circumstances, but after talking with Subject for a time it was possible to develop what the examiner considers a reasonable and technically acceptable test covering unreported involvement with any intelligence service.

The above procedure might be visualized more accurately if it is mentioned that once having met with Subject, ROWTON and the examiner had almost no time together without Subject being present, and it was not possible for them to converse in any language other than Spanish without damaging their cover.

RESULTS

Subject has no connections or commitments unknown to ROWTON with any government or intelligence service. He has no involvement with the IDEN E's that he wishes to conceal from ROWTON, and he has no dealings with the IDEN E's which are contrary to what he believes to be ROWTON's interests.

Concerning revelation to the IDEN E's of Subject's association with ROWTON, the issue itself was, not unexpectedly, a cloudy one. In brief, Subject stated that he could not really recall the exact extent to which he might have revealed the fact that he was backed by a IDEN C or that the IDEN C's name was (ROWTON's alias). Subject himself suggested that he be asked if he was "informing the IDEN E's of ROWTON's movements," Subject's way of expressing the idea of "reporting on" ROWTON. The examiner used this question, and Subject appears to have been truthful in his negative answer to this question.

NOTE

1. By the end of the interview, ROWTON and Subject had made an appointment for a meeting that same evening, indicating that it is quite unlikely that Subject will break contact with ROWTON.

2. It was not really possible for the examiner to determine the extent to which Subject believed the story of the IDEN C and the Italian SCSWIRL examiner. The examiner feels that there were no real flaws in the maintenance of this cover and that the cover's only real weakness is its inherently shaky plausibility. Subject appeared to accept the alias used by the examiner and even made passing references to Italy; whether this was done because he believed what he was told or because he just thought it was the most courteous way to handle the situation is not known. He did make several "hurt" references to the injustice of ROWTON and the examiner demanding to use a SCSWIRL on him when he did not even know for sure who ROWTON was. On at least one occasion he mentioned that for all he knew ROWTON might even be working for WOFIRM. This reference did not seem strained, although it is conceivable that its purpose was provocation; ROWTON has told the examiner that Subject recently hypothesized out loud that ROWTON might be a Soviet.

3. The principal misfortune of this interview is probably that Subject was not tested on fabrication of contacts with IDEN D's. This was thought to be the most probable area of extensive deception. It should be pointed out, however, that the Station already knows that Subject has fabricated such contacts, and the most likely contribution of SCSWIRL would have been merely a further accumulation of examples of this same basic vice. It might also be pointed out that Subject's "reporting" to date has dealt almost exclusively with his own activity, hence his fabrication has been more an irritation than a threat.

Paul I. NAPOLILLI

14 November 1967

SUBJECT : LIRING-3 (IDEN A) IBD #69919

Subject was interviewed and tested with SGSWIRL on 29 September 1967 in a Mexico City safe site. The interview was requested by Raymond A. FRADYER.

The interview was conducted in Spanish by the examiner. Wallace A. ROWTON, Subject's principal agent, was present during substantially all of the interview except for the testing period.

Subject has not previously been tested, and has had no contact with any WOFIRM representatives other than ROWTON.

Subject is a married male Mexican citizen, an IDEN B by profession. Prior to recruitment his apparent political sentiments were somewhere in the far left, but he was not believed to be significantly involved in intelligence activities or organized political activities. He was recruited by ROWTON under the cover of a IDEN C. Subject has since his recruitment had contact with IDEN D elements and with IDEN E elements in his efforts to insert himself and ROWTON into the desired position. The initial goal of this operation was to monitor such traffic and pick up whatever additional intelligence information might be incidentally encountered. As Subject was and is, in his own idiosyncratic way, a communist sympathizer, ROWTON has not indicated any anti-communist, anti-IDEN E, or anti-revolutionary aims.

Subject was known to have lied and concealed information on numerous occasions, and it was presumed that considerably more lies were not yet known to WOFIRM. On this basis, SGSWIRL coverage was to have covered numerous issues, centered on other intelligence involvement, fabrication of contacts with significant IDEN D and IDEN E figures, and revelation of his association with ROWTON. The issue of revelation of association with ROWTON was rather complex in that ROWTON never revealed his true name, nationality, or interests to Subject, and also he instructed Subject to reveal certain ostensible facts to various specific individuals.

The examiner was presented to Subject as an associate of ROWTON of Italian extraction.

PROCEDURE

Subject first refused to take the test, basically on the grounds that in his estimation his relationship with ROWTON, as well as his whole way of life, were at variance with any such procedure. In the three or four hours that this was being discussed, Subject also decided to quit working for ROWTON.

Eventually, over a specific matter of hurt pride, Subject agreed, or rather consented, to be tested on "two questions--whether (he) was betraying ROWTON to IDEN E intelligence and whether (he) trusted ROWTON," following which he would break off contact with ROWTON. Under the circumstances ROWTON judged that the best course would be to follow this lead and attempt no more than a clarification of Subject's relationship with IDEN E intelligence. The examiner was not optimistic about the possibility of getting a valid test under these circumstances, but after talking with Subject for a time it was possible to develop what the examiner considers a reasonable and technically acceptable test covering unreported involvement with any intelligence service.

The above procedure might be visualized more accurately if it is mentioned that once having met with Subject, ROWTON and the examiner had almost no time together without Subject being present, and it was not possible for them to converse in any language other than Spanish without damaging their cover.

RESULTS

Subject has no connections or commitments unknown to ROWTON with any government or intelligence service. He has no involvement with the IDEN E's that he wishes to conceal from ROWTON, and he has no dealings with the IDEN E's which are contrary to what he believes to be ROWTON's interests.

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Paul I. NAPOLILLI

LIRING-3

SECRET

Chief, WOACRE

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

AQUATIC/Documentation

Action Required: See Par 2.
Reference: HMMW-5614, 12 October 1967.

1. Returned herewith is one signed receipt as requested in Reference, Par 3.

2. Per Par 4 of Reference, Wallace B. ROWTON has stated that LIRING-3 could get backstopped documents at a cost of 1,000.00 M.N. ($80.00 US) plus travel expense. These are regional type "Passports." Something above an identity card. ROWTON suggests that two or three identifications be provided of such general terms that substitution would be fairly easy. What he needs for each document are six photographs full face and full profile, both left and right, along with a complete physical description. The subject should be 45-50 years old and have a Mexican or Latin appearance.

3. Blank Mexican Passports seem unlikely at this time because of our limited dealings with the Foreign Office. We suggest you talk with the Mexican desk on this point.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1 Receipt H/W

Distribution:
2 - C/WOACRE, w/att
2 - C/WHD, w/o att

HMMT-8462

16 November 1967

50-6-18/8

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
**
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
31

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE (UFG)

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM 201-143711

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3/Rodolfo REYES-Cortes, Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO and Carmen LOZADA de Ramirez.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Addressees' comments - (see para 5)

MEXICO CITY 3351

1. Forwarded attached are three reports dated 23, 28 and 30 October written by Wallace B. ROWTON on his contacts with Rodolfo REYES-Cortes, Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO and Carmen LOZADA de Ramirez. ROWTON first met these three persons when he accompanied LIRING-4 to a party given by Carmen MOLINA on 27 October, passing himself as a wealthy Greek client of LIRING-3 who had called at the latter's house to pay for a painting he had ordered but had been invited by LIRING-4 to come to the party. As previously agreed with the Station, ROWTON directed his main attention to REYES. The latter has resided in Havana since 1960 when he founded the Cuban Ballet Folklorico. Until recently REYES has received the monthly salary of one thousand pesos from the Cuban government, and, according to LIRING-3 is well acquainted with political and government personalities in Cuba. As pointed out in Reference, ROWTON found REYES to be apolitical, a superficial sympathizer of the Cuban revolution and a great admirer of American choreography (he told ROWTON he would very much like to go to New York to see some of the shows there.) REYES complained about the relatively low salary he is currently receiving from the Mexico City Belles Artes for organizing a Cuban Ballet Folklorico show to be held in Mexico City next December. He readily agreed to ROWTON's offer

(CONTINUED)

MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
1 photo
3 contact reports

See HMMW-15995

Distribution:
0&1 - CWHD, w/1 cy ea att 1 cc w/o ATT to WH/Reg
1 - JMWAVE, w/1 cy ea att

201-798301

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33442	6 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

to be his patron (to "help him out financially") if this could be done on a very discreet basis. He said he hoped to put on another Cuban show in Chile, before returning to his family in Havana. LIFEAT coverage of LIRING-3's apartment for 26 October showed, incidentally, that REYES maintains close enough relations with Silvia DURAN (of Lee Harvey OSWALD fame) to be invited by her to her house for lunch.

2. Carmen MOLINA de CARRASCO is the leftist wife of a prominent local neurosurgeon, Juan CARRASCO with whom she spent some years in Cuba. Both are Mexican citizens. According to what she previously told LIRING-3, Carmen MOLINA helped gather some of the information used to defend both Victor RICO-Galan and the ROSENBERGS. With the help of Alicia ECHEVERRIA and the latter's uncle (who is the current Mexican Minister of Interior) Carmen obtained a prominent position on the Mexican Olympic Committee in the publication department. She is a close friend of Carmen LOZADA who is planning to divorce her husband, Enrique RAMIREZ, a rabid pro-CASTRO Mexican chemical engineer who is still in Cuba. Carmen LOZADA's father, Armenegildo LOZADA, a noted Mexican physician is married to a pro-CASTRO Cuban. According to information made available to LIFTER-1, in early 1967 both he (Armenegildo) and his second and present wife are hard core Marxists. This wife, Dra Maria Victoria de la CRUZ, a Cuban, still according to LIFTER-1, is a personal friend of several Cuban leaders including the CASTRO brothers. Husband and wife maintain a close relationship with the local Cuban Ambassador, Joaquin HERNANDEZ-Armas. Carmen LOZADA apparently also started out as a hard line Marxist. Information dated 1961 from RNLABILE indicates that she was active in Communist organizational work at UNAM and participated in Cuban led activities directed against ex-Peruvian President PRADO. Although she is still clearly a leftist, Carmen may not be quite as red now. She told ROWTON, for example, that she felt nothing but disgust for her fanatically pro-CASTRO husband and had strong resentment toward her step-mother. Per LIENVOY, July 1961, Carmen was in contact with Teresa PROENZA when the latter was at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

3. At a private lunch with Carmen MOLINA, 28 October, ROWTON explained that he was a Greek leftist (although not a KKE member) involved in lucrative international business. He said that because of the current situation in Greece, it was difficult for him to operate in Mexico as openly as he would like. He could thus use MOLINA's help in obtaining certain types of information and making discreet contacts with Mexican government and business circles. MOLINA agreed to do what she could. She stated that she was not a member of any Mexican or any other Communist organization, but merely a leftist sympathizer. She also stated that she currently maintains little or no contact with the Cuban Embassy. LIONION-1, to whom a photograph of MOLINA, REYES and LOZADA (copy of which is forwarded attached) was shown stated he had never seen these three persons enter the Cuban Embassy.

4. Following the developments described above, Station plans to:

a. Continue to develop REYES to the point where, per Reference, he may be recruited by ROWTON either under false flag as a Greek leftist or in alias as a WOFIRM member to become a reporting source in Havana. Primary motivation in REYES' case would almost certainly be financial.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-33442

b. To continue social development of MOLINA as access agent to Carmen LOZADA (the two women are planning to live together) and a possible entree to the Mexican Olympic Committee and foreign olympic delegation.

c. To attempt operational development of Carmen LOZADA directly via ROWTON or indirectly via LIRING-3 in the hope that we can play on her "disgust" for the fanaticism of her husband and her dislike of her mother-in-law to elicit information on the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and its personnel, and, hopefully to attempt her recruitment.

5. Station would welcome addressees' comments on the above. Headquarters attention is attracted to ROWTON's report of 30 October which quotes REYES' statements to the effect that some members of the Mexican colony in Havana believe that LIRING-3 may be working for WOFIRM (or for the CASTRO government.)

for Willard C. CURTIS

201-798301

28 October,1967

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Contact with Rodolfo Reyes Cortes(Subject).

1. Rowton met Subject on the evening of 27 October,1967, at a small party at the home of Carmen Molina de Carrasco, Calle Amsterdam 252/6. The only other persons at the party besides LIRING/3 and /4 and the son and daughter of Carmen Molina were Carmen Lozada and Enrique Canudas, the latter two of whom had returned from Havana some 30 days previously. All the above are Mexicans who have spent several years in Havana and are social acquaintances of LIRING/3 and LIRING/4.

2. ROWTON crashed the party in the company of LIRING/4 according to a previously agreed plan. LIRING/3 arrived at about 2030 alone, explaining that he had had to leave LIRING/4 at home to wait for an important client who was making a payment on one of LIRING/3's paintings that he had recently purchased. LIRING/3 was to add that LIRING/4 would try to persuade this client to accompany her to the party so that he could meet everyone, and have a drink. LIRING/3 told Rowton he was certain that Carmen Molina would have no hesitation in inviting Rowton to stay once he got into the apartment.

3. Rowton and LIRING/4 arrived about 2130 and found the party in full swing with LIRING/3 and Eduardo Canudas struggling to get the phonograph operating (they eventually borrowed another and played several Cuban revolutionary records.). Rowton was introduced as Sr. Harris,a Greek businessman and long-standing client, and felt at the end he was able to convince all present that he actually was not from WOLADY (although most apparently had that impression at the outset). Rowton managed to toss out a few phrases of Russian at the right time in the direction of Carmen Molina to impress her (fortunatly her Russian is weaker even than Rowton's) Rowton spoke some English with as good an accent as he could manage. Carmen Molina volunteered to him privately that she had a great many "progressive" friends in the U.S. Rowton was able to insert several comments about the current political situation in Greece that was forcing him into a virtually clandestine existence in Mexico, as well as elsewhere. Everyone appeared to sympathize with Rowton and ceased asking any personal questions.

4. Rodolfo Reyes Cortes, apparently the guest of honor, arrived at about 2300, apologizing for being late and explaining that he had to attend a memorial service (un acto) for Che Guevara. He refused all offers of liquor

insisting on a Coca Cola. He appeared genuinely happy to meet Rowton and explained in quite serious tones that he was engaged in the training of a Mexican ballet group under the auspices of Bellas Artes to present a performance of the Folklorico Cubano in the near future. He added that he had been the founder of the Folklorico Cubano in the early 60's in Havana and had a wife (ballerina) and young daughter in Havana whom he was anxious to return to.

5. Since Rowton felt that Rodolfo was at the moment the best target for assessment he invited him to join him in visiting the Señorial night-club to see the Greek dances put on by a group of Greek musicians. Rodolfo accepted eagerly and they both left the party at about 0030. Rowton had perviously obtained the office telephone of Carmen Molina (34-60-32,ext 38) at the office of the Olympic Committee where she was working and had promised to take her to lunch the following day. Rowton had also gotten in a few private comments (i.e. compliments) to Carmen Lozada so that he could follow up at a later date if this was considered desirable. He found Carmen Lozada in excellent spirits and at times definitely provocative, despite her current marital situation (she had that same day notified her husband, Enrique Ramirez, a civil engineer working in Havana, that she had begun divorce prodeedings).

6. When Rowton and Rodolfo Reyes arrived at the Señorial, they were refused entrance into the main room since Rodolfo was not wearing a tie and jacket. Fortunaeely however, the Greek musicians, in their native costumes, were relaxing in a corner of the entrance lobby and Rowton was able to introduce Rodolfo Reyes to them and speak enough Greek to convince Reyes that he knew them well and was himself a Grrek. The musicians, who probably assumed Rowton was a Greek-American, did not speak enough Spanish to talk directly to Rodolfo. They invited Rowton and Rodolfo to return on 31 Oct when they expected fewer people in the audience and when they could show Rodolfo some of the most popular Greek dances.

7. Rowton then invited Rodolfo Reyes to the Kinneret Restaurant for a late supper (no food was served at the Carmen Molina party) and he was able to continue his conversation with him there. Rodolfo revealed that he plans to visit Chile in mid-December,1967, to organize a Folklorico Cubano group there, and then return to Havana. He said Rowton could contact him daily at the Ballet Folklorico de Mexico from 1100 until about 1300 and gave the telephone as 21-04-18 or 21-16-09. He appeared from his conversation to be a n admirer of the Cuban revolution and Castro although

201-798301

at no time did he express and strong anti-[illegible]CLADY sentiments. He complained at one point of the meager compensation he received for his services at the Folklorico in Mexico City and said that he had just about enough money to live on and help support his parents (he remarked that his family comes from San Cristóbal in Chiapas). Rowton, explaining that he had brought a number of LIRING/3's paintings to help him with his living expenses as well as because he liked the style, stated that he had once aspired to be an artist but had drifted off into business and somewhat regretted this abandonment of art, despite his lucrative dealings in international trade. He took this opening to offer to help Rodolfo financially from time to time, but on a very confidential basis. Rodolfo reacted spontaneously with great expressions of gratitude, assuring Rowton that no one would learn of Rowton's interest in him and his family. Rowton made no commitment but indicated that he would consider helping Rodolfo with his living expenses while he was still in Mexico.

8. Rodolfo Reyes is obviously dedicated to his art and appeared to Rowton to be a seriousminded choreographer. He showed a certain effeminite manner in his gestures and remarks (speaking only in Spanish) characteristic of many persons in his profession. He accepted an invitation to meet again with Rowton at 2300 at the Kinneret Restaurant on 31 October, 1967, so that Rowton and he could revisit the Señorial night-club to see the Greek musicians perform.

W B Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

Sra. Carmen Molina

Enrique Camotes

Carlos Jurado

Sra. Carmen Lozada

Sra. Enriqueta Jurado

1P

Att. HMMA 33442

CS COPY 201-288301



MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC MICRO SER.

14-00000

EP

23 October,1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton 23/10/67 that Carmen Lozada, neurologist, and Canudas (fnu), chemical engineer, visited his home evening 21 October in company Carmen Carasco. LIRING/3 and /4 state they knew both Carmen Lozada and Canudas in Havana since 1961 (both are Mexicans) under contact with GOC and were surprised to learn from them that they will not return to Cuba because of disillusionment.

2. Carmen Lozada stated that she will divorce her husband. Enrique Ramirez, a civil engineer, still in Havana and resume work in Polytecnico in Mexico City.

3. Canudas informed L/3 that mutual friend Rodolfo Reyes of the ballet folklorico, much to everyone's surprise, will return to Cuba next month. LIRING/3 promised Rowton to get in touch with Reyes to determine motivation for return. L/3 surmises that real reason may be Reyes disgust with family in Mexico and desire to be reunited with his Cuban wife who, according L/3, is talented and very attractive.

4. Carmen Lozada informed L/3 that her ~~fxxily~~ parents who very close to Ambassador ~~xxxxx~~ Hernandez Armas(who frequent guest at their home) will be disappointed to learn of her decision divorce her husband and remain in Mexico.

WBRowton

MICROFILMED
NOV 24 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

ATT #1 HAMA 33442

201-798301

30 October,1967

Subject: Report of LIRING/3 Suspect Affiliation with WOFIRM.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 0900 on 30 October,1967, that he had finally manged to have a private talk with Rodolfo Reyes Cortes, his Mexican chereographer friend, on the afternoon of 27 October,1967; and that, in the course of conversation, Rodolfo Reyes had revealed to LIRING/3 in confidence ~~that~~ the reason why the LIRINGS had assumed a rather cool attitude toward LIRING/3 over the past year. Rodolfo Reyes explained that the last time he was in Havana he had heard rumors, among his friends in the Mexican colony, that LIRING/3 was working "either for WOFIRM or the Cubans". Rodolfo went on to say that the origin of this rumor, as far as he could ascertain, was the fact that LIRING/3 had made two trips into Havana for no known specificreason and at his own expense. Rodolfo Reyes, indicating that he himself did not believe the rumors or, at least, did not care whether they were true or not, commented to LIRING/3 that other members of LIRING/3's profession were naturally jealous of the success of anyone of their group and were always quick to draw their own conclusions.

2. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that, although this news had shaken him and LIRING/4 badly at the time, neither of them cared particularly what the LIRINGs thought of them, since their own conscience was clear. LIRING/3 added that it was important, however, to continue to develop his commercial activity in Chiapas (especially since Rodolfo Reyes' home is by coincidence located in San Cristóbal) so that word would gradually filter back to the LIRINGs that he actually did have financial resources outside his art production. LIRING/3 continued that obviously the LIRINGs did not have any specific proof or they would long ago have cut off all contact with him as well as LIRING/4. He concluded that since the LIRINGs had certain suspicions, they naturally warned all his friends and former contacts (including, of course, Arnol Rodriquez) to avoid close contact with him until their doubts could be resolved.

3. In reply to Rowton's query LIRING/3 stated that Rodolfo Reyes and Carmen Molina (separately) had commented to him that they were favorably impressed by Rowton and did not voice any suspicion of Rowton's bona fides (as a Greek leftist businessman). Carmen Molina, in fact, had gone so far as to show some irritation that LIRING/3 had not introduced her to Rowton previously since she was anxious to develop some sort of lucrative business

dealing with him. Carmen Molina commented to LIRING/3 that she felt sure she could help Rowton in his business and political problems and at the same time make a little much-needed money for her own living expenses.

4. LIRING/3 continued that he had been maintaining discreet personal contact with Carmen Lozada over the week-end (he commented that LIRING/4 has already shown some signs of jealousy and therefore he had to be careful not to give her cause to distrust him). LIRING/3 stated that Carmen Lozada had told him that her father, a well-to-do Mexican doctor residing in Coyacań, had remarried tand that her step-mother was a Cuban sicentist who had lived many years in Mexico. She added that both her father and step-mother were on excellent social terms with Ambassador Hernández Armas. She revealed that she had already notified her husband, Enrique Ramirez, that she intended to divorce him, and she expected a storm of protest both from him (in Havana) and her father and step-mother, both of whom were "puritanic" despite their "progressive" convictions. She added that she expected Enrique Ramirez to rush over from Havana as soon as he received her letter and to appeal to her father and step-mother to save his marriage. She, however, insisted to LIRING/3 that she had made up her mihd that she would go through with the divorce. She added that for this reason she did not wish to live with her father and had decided to stay with her friend, Carmen Molina, until the divorce papers were through and the storm had blown over. She added that she did not particularly like being a house-guest in the small aprtment of Carmen Molina, but at the moment she had no choice.

Wallace B. Rowton

Wallace B. Rowton

1P

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.: Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Letter received by LIRING-3 for Mailing to Rene OCHOA Funez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover is a letter and photograph received by LIRING-3 on 2 October 1967 from the mother of Rene OCHOA Funez in Honduras for remailing to her son in Havana, CUBA. OCHOA is a Honduran revolutionary.

OCT 31 1967

Raymond A. Frady
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above, u.s.c. S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WHD w/att 1 cy, u.s.c.
1 - COS/Tegucigalpa w/att 1 cy, u.s.c.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33278	13 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS

SEP 30 1967

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

Don
Carlos Jurado
Calzada de Tacubaya
172.- apto.- 6-D.
Mexico. 11. D.F.

Rte. Camila Fienes b.
19 calle. #507.- 5a y 6a Avenida
Bo. Villa Adela
Comayaguela

CORREOS
7:00
ADMON.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

38

Comayagüela, 28 de septiembre 1967

Querido hijo: ojalá que estén bien, todos que Katy y mis nietos, todos estén buenos, y que no hayan problemas, por aquí estamos regulares. no te había escrito porque mi salud no a andado bien; pero todos los días pienso en en el hijo ausente, y en su familia, quizá no esté lejano el día que nos volvamos a reunir— cuando no lo esperes recibirás las rosquillas, las tengo encargadas, para que con el viaje no se vayan a arruinar, no se puede mandar cantidad porque iran certificadas. Por aquí, ya están sintiendo la venida de los exámenes finales, Rigo con demasiado trabajo a veces no duerme, con los estudios y las clases, Avencio, lo mismo, pero dice que este año es el mas difícil, si logra pasarlo, ya los siguientes son mas fáciles", yo creo que cuando Rigo y Avencio ya no estudien estarán mejor, te mandan las fotos de los hijos de Avencio, Elsa Lorena los saludan, Rigo y en fin toda la familia, y de mi recibe en unión a Katy y los nietos un fuerte abrazo de tu madre. Camila Turcios

Los hijos de Avencio encima pintados.

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 22

4-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

49

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2.

S E C R E T 152022 CITE MEXICO CITY 2476

MEXI

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN 31615

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA ~~CITY~~

PERUMEN

1. IN INITIAL TALKS WITH LIRING-3 IN LATE JULY MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL MENTIONED MERCEDES PEREIRA (WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN HAVANA 1962-64 AS SPANISH REVOLUTIONARY INVOLVED IN SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION) NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY. (DOI 13 AUG 67) LIRING-3 OBTAINED HER ADDRESS FROM ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO.

SEX: F

2. LIRING-3 SPENT FOUR HOURS 13 AUG WITH PEREIRA AND 17 YEAR OLD ARMANDO PEREIRA WHO CLAIMED HE RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING CUBA. DOB CA 1950. PEREIRA STATED HER SISTER SOFIA PEREIRA CURRENTLY WORKING CZECH EMBASSY HAVANA EXPECTS TRANSFER CZECH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY IN "NEAR FUTURE". (DOI 13 AUG 67) PEREIRA WHO IN PROCESS BECOMING MEXICAN CITIZEN SAID SHE STILL IN CONTACT WITH GUAT REVOLUTIONARIES AND HOPES CONTINUE SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION FROM MEXICO AS "MATTER OF CONSCIENCE". SHE FELT LIRING-3 SHOULD MEET GUAT FRIENDS WHOM PLANNING INTRODUCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

SEX: F

3. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS AND TRACES. STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED ONLY 1962 LIFEAT INFO TO EFFECT PEREIRA (THEN LIVING MEXICO CITY) WAS IN CONTACT WITH NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST EDELBERTO (TORRES) ESPINOZA (201-252680?).

S E C R E T

BT

AN ✓	FI	
PS ✓	~~DESS~~	
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX X

201-
15 AUG 67

SECRET

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

38

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION WH/8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 3, CI, C/OPS, C/FI 2, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 122025Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3121

LIMA DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

12 OCT 67 IN 71[illegible]

PBRUMEN

1. DURING VISIT TO CUBAN CONSULATE 11 OCT WHEN SHE FOUND ALL OFFICERS OUT, LIRING-4 WAS TALKING WITH CONSULATE SECRETARY WHEN MAN ABOUT 22 CAME IN, SAID HE WAS PERUVIAN, HAD JUST ARRIVED MEXICO, AND URGENTLY WANTED SPEAK WITH "SOMEONE" AS HE WANTED COMMUNICATE WITHOUT DELAY WITH COMPANERO IN HAVANA. WHEN TOLD ALL OFFICERS OUT, PERUVIAN WAITED FOR LIRING-4 OUTSIDE AFTER HEARING FROM SECRETARY THAT LIRING-4 PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN CONSULATE. PERUVIAN EXPLAINED TO LIRING-4 THAT COMPANERO IN HAVANA WAS ABOUT TO RETURN PERU AND THAT HE WOULD WALK INTO POLICE TRAP UNLESS WARNED AS POLICE SURVEILLING HIS HOUSE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO MEXICO BY COMPANEROS IN LIMA TO CONTACT CUBAN WHOSE NAME WRITTEN ON PAPER HE SHOWED LIRING-4 WAS GARBLED VERSION LIRING-9'S NAME (IDEN FOR LIMA).

SECRET

WH/1
file 201-798301
K.

COMPANEROS IN LIMA HAD BEEN ABLE COME UP ONLY WITH PRICE ONE WAY TICKET TO MEXICO AND PERUVIAN NOW WITHOUT A CENT AND COUNTED ON CUBAN EMBASSY TO PAY HIS RETURN TRIP LIMA. PERUVIAN HINTED THAT ARREST OF COMPANERO NOW IN HAVANA COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IN PERU. AS HE AFRAID RETURN CUBAN EMBASSY BY HIMSELF, HE ASKED LIRING-4 MEET HIM NEXT MORNING AT NEARBY SMALL CAFE SO THAT HE COULD GIVE HER WRITTEN MESSAGES HE CARRYING APPARENTLY FOR LIRING-9 (WHO KNOWN IS).

2. LIEMBRACE TEAM WHICH COVERED AREA OF CAFE INDICATED BY LIRING-4 DID NOT SPOT HER NEXT MORNING, POSSIBLY BECAUSE, ACCORDING LIRING-4, SHE ONLY SPENT FEW MINUTES INSIDE WITH PERUVIAN. LATTER HANDED HER FOUR PIECES OF PAPER WHICH HE INDICATED CONTAINED BONA FIDES AND REQUEST FOR CUBAN HELP, WHICH HE WANTED LIRING-4 TAKE TO CUBAN EMBASSY RIGHT AWAY. LIRING-4 ASKED THAT PAPERS BE PLACED IN SEALED ENVELOPE WHICH SHE PROPOSED OBTAIN AT NEARBY POST OFFICE. BY COINCIDENCE LIRING-4 SPOTTED OTHER LIRING MEMBER AT TELEGRAPH OFFICE NEAR POST OFFICE AND REFERRED PERUVIAN TO HIM. PERUVIAN WAS TOLD BLUNTLY TO COME IN TO EMBASSY IF WANTED ANYTHING AS HIS ATTITUDE SUSPISCIOUS. LIRING-4 LATER SAW PERUVIAN AT CUBAN EMBASSY BUT DOES NOT KNOW OUTCOME

HIS REQUEST FOR HELP.

3. WILL TRY HAVE LIRING-4 IDENTIFY PERUVIAN IN TALK WITH CUBAN CONSULATE SECRETARY. ABOVE INDICATES ONCE MORE POOR STATE OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CUBAN SUPPORTED SUBVERSIVES IN LATIN AMERICA AND CUBANS. CAN LIMA THROW ANY LIGHT ON ABOVE?

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment A to HMMA-32989 dated 6 September 1967

AUDIO

1. Special COS operations No. 1 and No. 2 have functioned satisfactorily with no calls for assistance.

2. LIRING-3/LI[illegible]: A UHER-4000L has been installed for this operation in lieu of a Revere. There was a slight problem at first when the LP operator recorded too loud and distorted the tape. The UHER uses batteries and the quality has greatly improved by getting off the AC line. CORNBURY has come to the conclusion that Mexico City does not have a good earth ground. Consequently, great adjustments must be made with any equipment that needs an earth ground.

3. DISPERSE: A separate report is being prepared on this operation. To date, we are not too happy with the results. There is an intermittent buzz which we cannot identify and the present switching arrangement makes it hard to follow Subject from room to room. More details will be included in a separate dispatch.

4. LISAMPAN: We now feel that this operation is beginning to shape up, thanks to the expertise of Peter J. DEYRUP. Inasmuch as DEYRUP will provide a technical report, and presumably is still working on some of the problems, the details will not be repeated here. It is too soon to say, but we hope to be able to have the LP keepers move defective [illegible]-1's out and replace them with operating units whenever there is a failure. A problem might be having to adjust each unit on the target line. Time will tell.

5. Plans for LISAMPAN are to activate the CCT of LISAMPAN/BAKER early in September using LI[illegible] as the LP. When we have reliable switching on LISAMPAN/DOG, this, too, will be piped to LI[illegible] via CCT from LISA[illegible].

6. There were a few other miscellaneous AUDIO chores. Three duplicate tapes had to be made for the COS, three Revere tape recorders had to be cleaned and repaired, and one UHER 4000-L was cleaned and repaired.

LIRING-3
201-798361

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI
Reference : HMMA-38250, 28 August 1967

Headquarters notes that on 9 August 1967 LIRING-3 was in contact via LIFEAT with one Electa LNU. Given LIRING-3's artist background and the subject of conversation - the visit of Rodolfo Heisler, a Swiss artist, to Cuba - it is suggested that Electa LNU might be Electa ARENAL (201-173795), the mother-in-law of David ALFALO Siquieros the well-known Mexican Communist artist.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO
B 201-173795

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15790

DATE
21 SEP 1967
12 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	sas	6954

RI
Chrono

AU
WH/1
ABSTRACT X

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/12	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Reference: HMMA 32778

1. Forwarded under separate cover are six reports dated 31 July, 5, 11, 14 and 17 (two reports) August 1967 concerning the LIRING-3 Operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON.

2. The first three reports 31 July, 5 and 11 August deal with the recent Moises OROZCO Leal "affair" (see reference) and it's aftermath. The 17 August report, which is a review of the [illegible] coverage on LIRING-3, also deals with this subject. LIRING-3's conversation with Mercedes *PEREIRA (report dated 14 August 1967) was reported in MEXICO CITY 2476.

3. ROWTON's report dated 17 August 1967 is of some interest.

A. The departure of the secretary LIRING-4 previously filled in for reopens the possibility that LIRING-4 may, again, work at LIRING. LIRING-4, in fact, recently received a necklace from this secretary (a rather unespected gift at this juncture).

B. The report indicates that LIRING personnel have doubts about some of LIRING-3's activities (this is not too surprising).

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Reports a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att USC
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
4 - FILES

s/c att'd by RID/AN
6 Sep 67

S COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32850	28 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-7983CL

MICROFILMED
SEP 8 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

14P

17 August, 1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Conversation with

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1100 on 17 August, 1967, that he had had a pleasant chat with ______ the previous day in the latter's office. Among other things revealed that Araceli ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] and her husband had been recalled to Havana unexpectedly and would probably be leaving for good in about 7-10 days. did not provide LIRING/3 with any explanation, but L/3 surmises that the recent inspection uncovered the fact that Araceli is a chronic complainer and performs relatively little work, and her husband is virtually superfluous at Cubana de Aviación since he never has been able to take over the management from Rojas as originally planned. LIRING/3 commented that this might be the much-hoped-for chance for LIRING/4 to resume work in LIRING/9's office. Rowton asked L/3 to encourage L/4 to accept the offer if it should be made. He added that the last time he talked with L/4 she appeared a little reluctant to get involved again, explaining that she commented when discussing the shortage of funds (2-3,000 dollars) that she was glad that she wasn't still working and hence not subject to any investigation. L/3 promised to put pressure on L/4 to accept the job. He noted with satifaction that L/4 had recently received a message from Araceli Cepero that she had a gift (neclace) for her. L/3 added that L/4 has not rushed over as yet to pick up the gift, but feels it better to wait until Mati has departed in the hope that Araceli might talk more freely at that time.

2. LIRING/3 zalso reported that ______ commented in the course of conversation that his colleagues did not believe that Rico Galán had broekn down and talked to the Mexican police, despite the letter (furnished by L/3) to the contrary. L/3 suggested that they check out the letter with Elena Garro, since he understood that she was the one who hand-carried it to the Gobernación. L/3 commented with some bitterness to that it seems that every time he tries to help the revolution by pass on bits of information (Julian Lopez case in particular) it turns out prejudicial to him in the eyes of the superiors of . At this smiled and asked L/3 to have patience and try to understand their point of view. He reiterated that they had doubts but felt sure it would be straightened out eventually.

3. At the end of the meeting L/3 promised Rowton that he would try his best to "lie low" during Rowton's absence. He agreed with Rowton that

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Liring-2

LIRING-2

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it would be a good idea to visit San Cristóbal to show some sign of life at the "Florimex" factory and to reassure the land-lady that he is still interested in using the house but has had unexpectedly delays in obtaining the license. L/3 also agreed to go to Havana in the event he received an invitation and could not stall long enough to consult with Rowton after the latter's return to Mexico City. He stated that he assumed that the invitation would come from the "Casas de las Americas" and might concern some sort of art exposition with fixed dates.

4. Rowton gave L/3 his New York City P.O. Box (in alias) and requested L/3 to drop him a line between 25-31 August, when he expected to be passing through New York from Montreal enroute to Europe. L/3 stressed again that he hoped to cash in on Sergio Valdés' [illegible] venture in Venezuela, especially in the eyes of the Cubans, since it was a bona fide effort that could easily be checked out with favorable results.

Wall B Rowton

Wallace B. Rowton

17 August,1967

Subject: Review of LIFEAT Traffic Relating to LIRING/3 and LIRING/4 for the period 2-14 August,1967.

1. A review of the LIFEAT intercepts for the period 2-14 Agust,1967, reveals confirmation of the following points previously reported to Rowton:

(a) Commercial (cover) activities of LIRING/3. SAN-28([illegible].2) confirms that srita Guadalupe Vasquez, the friend of Sergio Valdez, was working on the license (as of 2 August) for the importation of the plastic flowers from Guatemala for L/3. She states that she is going to court with the petition "right now". In another intercept on [illegible] August Sergio Valdez tells L/3 that he and Alejandra (Urbina Torres) will make up their legal and personal agreements the following week (with regard to "Colorlux",the glass factory located at Plaza Miravaille). They expected to assemble the samples (for Venezuela) the following day.

(b) LIRING/3 conversations with his Honduran friend, René Ochoa, in Havana. SAN-41 (7.7) reveals that Ochoa is anxious to talk seriously with L/3 and wants to get to Mexico City soonest. He states that the only problem is the visa and promises to send L/3 data so that L/3 can attempt to expedite a Mexican visa.

(c) LIRING/4's social contacts with the LIRING personnel. With regard to L/4's general feeling toward the LIRING establishment, L/3 tells Rojas (of the Cultrual office) that L/4 visits LIRING "only occasionally", and adds that "those people were very hard to get along with and she no longer has anything to do there.. Only goes by once in a while to say hello."

(d) LIRING/3's contacts with Ernesto Capuano during the week of 7 August, although the substance of the conversations with him is not confirmed. SAN-44(5.0) indicates that Sergio Valdez assisted L/3 in his attempts to locate Capuano and make the first appointment.

(e) LIRING/3's contact with César Tejeda Fonseca and sra. Merceded Pereira on 10 and 13 Agust,1967.

2. The review likewise reveals that the following information not previously known by Rowton or passed to him by LIRING/3:.

14-00000

(a) In general the extent of the participation of both Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno in LIRING/3's operational as well as commercial efforts. L/3 has told Rowton repeatedly that Valdez and Moreno are aware of L/3's relationship in the plastic flower business with certain Czechs but that they are not witting of Rowton's alias or of the true nature of their relationship. LIFEAT intercepts, however, reveal that L/3 keeps Sergio Valdez informed of his meetings with Rowton (and it must be assumed) of the general content of their conversations. During this period, Rowton is referred to once as "Zorba" and several times as "Polaco", whereas previously he was referred to simply as "that person". L/3 has stated to Rowton that Sergio Valdez believes that he, L/3, is a high-level PBRUMEN agent and that his Czech contacts are purely commercial.

(b) L/3's relationship and rendezvous' with Silvia Durán and Marta Wigisser. In DAN-40(44.5) Silvia Durán invites L/3 to her home between 1530 and 1730 on 7/8/67 when she will be free. She calls and talked to L/4 for the first time on 10/8/67. L/4 says that she has heard of Silvia from L/3 and Silvia replies that she hopes they will meet someday soon. DAN-40(5.5) indicates that L/3 is using Rowton as an excuse to stay at the Tacubaya apt (probably during a tryst with either of the above women). He saw Rowton from 1730-1900 on 4/8/67 but called L/4 at about 1915 to say the the "matter with Harris is not finished yet", and later to add that "the thing is dragging out".

(c) L/3's telephone contact with a certain Electa on 9/8/67 who tells him that the Swiss artist, Rodolfo Heisler, is visiting from Cuba. L/3 comments that he has known Heisler since 1961 - since L/3 first went to Cuba.

Wallace B. Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

!! not Electa ARENAL mother in law of David Alfaro Siqueiros -?

14 August,1967 1

Subject: LIRING/3 Meeting with Mercedes Pereira.

1. At his meeting with Rowton at 1100 on 14 August,1967, LIRING/3 reported that he had learned from Ernesto Capuano that sra Mercedes Pereira, his Spanish revolutionary friend, was living at Diagonal San Antonio 4, in apartment 6. (According to L/3, his interest in Pereira was revived by a comment made to him by Moisés Orozco Leal on 31 July,1967, to the effect that Mercedes Pereira was in Mexico).

2. LIRING/3 continued that upon learning her address he called on sra. Pereira unannounced at 1030 on 13 August with LIRING/4 and fortunately found her in with her 17-year-old son, Armando. He found the apartment almost completely unfurnished, except for a table and several chairs and a minimum of bedroom furniture. According to L/3, Sra. Pereira explained that she and her son had just returned to Mexico and were organizing their household on their very limited resources. She added that her son had found work in a factory and that she hoped to locate a job as soon as her Mexican immigrant papers came through.

3. She and her son welcomed LIRING/3 and /4 after so many years, but sra. Pereira confessed later in the conversation that she was expecting L/3 to visit her since she had already received word from Ernesto Capuano. She then recounted to L/3 and L/4 the vicissitudes and turmoil of her life since she had last seen them in Havana(in 1964). She stated that her very confused citizenship status had continued to plague her in Havana and ,when she finally decided to leave in order to settle the inheritance left by her/deceased Spanish husband in Spain, she had great difficulty in leaving Cuba. She explained that many obstacles were put in her way, despite all the work she had done for the revolution, and she was forced to leave in effect as a "gusanita". She said that her mother and sister, Sofia, were still in Havana, and added that her sister is still working at the Czech Embassy. She also stated parenthetically that her sister, Sofia, was hoping to be transferred to the Czech Embassy in Mexico City in the near future, where she had worked prior to going to Havana.

4. Sra. Pereira stated that she was greatly disillusioned with the Cubans and felt that the Tricontinental had done more harm than good by trumpeting its intention of helping all Latin American revolutions. She commented that the situaton in Guatemala, which she had recently visited as a tourist with Spanish documents, was very bad for the revolutionaries. She explained that not only were there many factions in the movement -

FAR, Jan Cisa, the Primero de Mayo, the "Cravos" and other splinter groups - but there were recently, during the last six months many deserters filtering into Mexico and that LIRING/3 would have to move with extreme caution in his contacts with the revolutionaries. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt this an opportune opening to relate his story of Moisés Orozco Leal and he did so briefly. Sra. Pereira commented that she first met Orozco in Havana when she was very much involved there with Guatemalans revolutionaries. She added that she was favorably impressed with Orozco and was surprised to learn recently that he had deserted from FAR. She added that there was another FAR deserted in Mexico City even more important than Orozco, by the name of "El Gallo" or "El Gallito", whose true name she did not know. Salvador Quilava Morales

?

5. According to L/3, sra. Pereira commented that she thought LIRING/3 had acted properly with regard to Orozco and agreed with him that he shoudl attempt to retain friendly contact with Orozco until he recieved a definitive reply from FAR as to the best course of action to take with him. She offered to introduce L/3 to several Guatemalans she knew well in Mexico City - not directly involved in the revolution but useful contacts in any case. In reply to L/3's query, she stated that Ernesto Capuano was a reliable and intelligent person, but so exposed in Mexico City that he could not operate as freely as he would like. She stressed to L/3 that Capuano was closely watched and could be a contact that might conceivably compromise L/3 in his future travels to Guatemala. She stated that she herself was being extremely cautious because of her past history in Guatemala as well as Havana, and had even gone to the length of paying a considerable sum to have her file removed from Gobernación, so that there would not be a trace of her travels to Cuba and Guatemala. She explained that after leaving Havana, she and her son went to Spain and managed to collect a small inheritance (about 7,000 pesos in value) and at the same time took out Spanish papaers and was issued a Spanish passport, as a refugee. LIRING/3 explained to Rowton that sra. Pereira had been born in Spain, but moved to Mexico many years ago, married a Guatemalan doctor, accompanied him to Guatemala where he worked under the Arbenz regime, sought refuge in Mexico with him after the overthrow of the government. After her husband (either legal or common-law) died she left for Havana, in 1962, as L/3 recalls, with her son, Armando, who had been born in Guatemala City about 1950. L/3 continued that she became closely connected with the Guatemalan revolutionaries in Havana and represented Guatemala at the Tricontinental. L/3 stated that sra. Pereira is a well educated woman of about

forty-six years of age, and that her son, aged about 17, is a very husky teen-ager who was trained in guerrilla warfare by the Cubans. L/3 also recalled that Sra. Pereira's mother's name is Isabela, and will probably resettle in Spain, once she leaves Cuba with her other daughter, Sofia Pereira.

6. LIRING/3 stated that he hoped to see Sra. Pereira again within the xx week since he was quite certain that she could put him in touch with the [illegible] people in Mexico City and possibly act as a liaison herself in the future.

Wallace E. Rowton

11 August, 1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Moisés Crozco Leal.

1. At 1100 on 11 August, 1967, at hte safehouse Rowton learned from LIRING/3 that Moisés Crozco Leal telephoned him the previous afternoon to thank him for the letter and the interest he has shown in him. L/3 stated that he told Crozco that his main concern was what if anything the Mexicans had asked him about L/3 and whether he had been forced to reveal any of L/3's business (in Guatemala). According to L/3, Crozco assured him that, although the Mexican police had asked him "many and repeated questions" about his travels, he revealed nothing about L/3. One of the questions asked repeatedly by the Mexicans was what he knew about the husband of a certain Aura Marina. Crozco claimed that he knew nothing of this person and so replied in the negative to the police. Crozco continued that he could not let L/3 know where he was at the moment but would get in touch with him in a short time, as soon as the heat was off, through his mother. According to L/3, Crozco's mother's home has been searched several times since Crozco's release on 4 August, 1967.

2. LIRING/3 then explained that after he learned of Crozco's arrest and release (through Ernesto Capoano) he felt it urgent that he communicate with Crozco to determine what Crozco had revealed to the Mexican police and how he was treated. He therefore sent a telegram to Crozco addressed to Crozco's mother at her home address (Calle Tennis 408, Col. Country Club on 6 August, simply asking Crozco in double talk to get in touch with him When nothing happened, L/3 continued, he sent LIRING/4 around to Crozco's mother's home about 1030 on 9 August with a short note, the text of which is as follows:

> Valentín:
>
> We have learned of late about your mishap. We want to give you the help we can, since, apart from everything, we understand the human problems (invloved).
>
> We want to see you to find out what we can do for you, but we'll leave it to your discretion as to the contact.
>
> I enclose some money, which we know is only a small thing but we hope that it will be of some use to you.
>
> Cordial greetings from all.

3. L/3 stated that he enclosed 200 pesos in the note, and that the envelope

was personally delivered without difficulty to Orozco's mother by L/4. (This was confirmed to Rowton by LIRING/4, whom he met with privately at 1630 on 9 August at the restaurant of Sear Roebuck, Insurgentes).

4. LIRING/3 also reported that he hoped to receive a message from his friend René Ochoa through Aurelio Alonzo (Comercio Exterior) who, according to Ochoa, was due in to Mexico City that same day (11/8/67). L/3 added that he expected a telephone call from Ochoa the preceding evening and, although the phone rang several times, he did not receive any communication from him.

5. L/3 also reported that thus far his efforts to locate Dr. Mercedes Pereira through her son Armando have been unsuccessful. L/3 said that he still had not given up hope that Capcano would get the word to Pereira and that she would eventually contact him.

6. L/3 asked Rowton to meet him again at 1000 the following day so that he could report on whether he had received word from René Ochoa on the flight from Havana.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

5 August, 1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1700 on 4/8/67 that he informed by Sergio Valdez that morning that Alberto Domingo of Siempre was taking plane to Havana that afternoon. L/3 stated that he took this opportunity write a hasty note to Arnol Rodriguez explaining recent developments in Moisés Orozco Leal affair and asking Arnol to expedite new contact for L/3 with FAR either in Havana or Guatemala City. L/3 explained to Rowton that in order put heat on Arnol and FAR he wrote that if he not invited to Havana within next two weeks he will definitely be in Guatemala City staying at hotel Florida from 20-22 August and that new FAR liaison should identify himself as "José Luis". He added that Arnol should cable him using code "La medicina está en mal estado" in event FAR wished him keep out of Orozco affair.

2. L/3 stated that Sergio Valdez personally asked Alberto Domingo deliver sealed envelope containing this letter to Arnol Rodriguez. Valdez feels that Domingo will not read letter, although it mentions him as person who (unwittingly) originally referred Orozco to ~~Valdez~~ LIRING/3/

3. L/3 also reported that he spoke with Ernesto Capoano by phone and has appointment to meet with him at 1000 on 7/8/67. Capoano cautioned L/3/ who did not identify himself on phone not to state names by give some indication of nature of business. L/3 stated it concerned "the medicine" and it was then that ~~Mr~~ Capoano gave him appointment.

LB Rowton

31 July,1967

3

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/3.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at 1700 on 31 July,1967, at the safehouse. L/3 reported at once that he had moved his family into the safehouse and that L/4 and their child were out at the moment so that he and Rowton could talk privately. He explained that things were moving very rapidly and that Mosés Crozco Leal was in fact staying at his apartment (Tacubaya) in preparation for the trip they were to take to Tapachula. He stated that he had met with Crozco as planned at 2200 on 29 July and, after a lengthy talk, Crozco had asked to be put up in L/3's apartment for the night, since it was late and it would be better in view of the trip that they planned to take together. L/3 commented that Crozco appeared quite nrevous and was particularly concerned about answering the door in the event someone knocked while L/3 was away. It was agreed that he would answer the door only in the event that there were three knocks, indicating that the person was LIRING/3 himself. According to L/3 Crozco stated that he had at all costs to get to Tapachula within the next two or three days to meet FAR contacts that were expecting him there. He expressed fear of traveling by plane or even train and welcomed the suggestion of L/3 that the latter's friend Raúl Moreno drive himand L/3 to Tapachula in Moreno's car. L/3 commented to Rowton that he was amazed at the knowledge Crozco had concerning him and his activities, including the dates of his (L/3's) trips to Guatemala and Cuba.

2. Rowton then realizing that L/3 had probably walked into a dangerous trap, queried him very carefully concerning the origin of his contact with Crozco. Rowton explained that he was certain that L/3's story of the trip to Tapachula and the meeting with the Guatemalan woman there wasuntrue and that he assumed that L/3 had a good reason for distorting the truth. Rowton continued that he had come tothe conclusion that L/3 had had a domestic crisis again and had decided to disappear for a few days and had told his wife that he had to go out of town on business for Rowton. He was therefore forced to lie to Rowton also for fear that Rowton might disclose the truth to L/4. Rowton stressed that it was essential that he know the true facts surrounding the first contact with Crozco, since, as L/3 would see later, it might be a matter of life and death for him.

3. LIRING/3 then confessed that he had not actually made the trip but not for the reason Rowton supposed. The real reason he explained was that when Crozco contacted him he saw Sergio Valdez shortly thereafter and the latter to his amazement commented:" I have been contacted. Have you been

contacted also?" According to L/3, he asked Valdez how it was possible that he knew of any new contact that he had, and Valdez replied:"I'm in this thing also." LIRING/3 continued that this statement of Valdez so surprised and disturbed him and he decided to investigate to what extent Valdez was involded in the whole affair of the Guatemalans. In the absence of Rowton he had no resources other than his own ingenuity. He decided to disappear so that he could investigate more securely and he informed L/4 that he had to make a trip to Chiapas. He then telephoned Valdez several times, disguising his voice, and pretending to be "Valentin" in the hope of eliciting some sign of recognition from Valdez. L/3 continued that this, however, did not work and he failed to prove any connection between Valdez and Crozco. L/3 explained then that he did not want to reveal this to Rowton, first because he was afraid that Rowton would consider him stupid or unbalanced and secondly because he was afraid Rowton might tell L/4. He added that he hoped Rowton could understand the terrible pressure he was living under from all sides, with people contacting him, surveilling his movements, controling him. In fact he felt trapped by unknown force . He stated that for instance he was certain that he entrance of Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno on the scene was not coincidental but was part of some larger picture that he could not understand. He added that this time he was determined to find out how Valdez was linked with Crozco.

4. Rowton then asked L/3 what he knew about Crozco. L/3 replied that he knew only what Crozco himself had revealed to him, viz.,that his mother was living in Mexico City, that his father had ~~kxxx~~ never been progressive and had in fact been arrested by the government (presumably Arbenz) but had not been harmed since he had been so"honest" and his reputation was above reproach. Orozco also informed L/3 that he had been to Cuba several times and recently was in touch with Montes in Guatemala and up to recently had been doing propaganda work for the FAR.

5. Rowton then stated that he had been doing his best to collect as much information on Crozco as possible and that he was far from happy with what he had managed to uncover to date. He explained that he had verified the address given to him by L/3 (Calle Tenis 38/5) but discovered that it was the home of Crozco's mother and that Crozco was not actually residing there. He added that he had also learned that Crozco's father was probably unstable mentally and that his brother worked in Politica,and this ~~mmg~~ might account for Valdez' connection wtih him (Valdez' working for Rafaga) Rowton then stated that he had a report that he had not as yet been able

to check out to the effect that Crozco had been in Guatemala in May 1967 assigned to some guerrilla activity in the Cobán area but had unexpectedly disappeared and returned to Mexico, probably because he was afraid of capture. L/3 exclianed in evident surprise: "Then he's a deserter!" Rowton agreed that this might be the case and added that this would explain why he wanted to hide out in L/3's apartment. L/3 then agreed that this probably was the case and exclaimed again:" But then it's very dangerous for hix me to be sheltering him!" Rowton agreed but urged L/3 to keep calm and exploit the opportunity to learn from Crozco the true facts of his present relationship to FAR and how he came to use L/3 unwittingly as a refuge. L/3 asked Rowton how he could confront Crozco with his suspicions and get him to reveal what Rowton wanted to know. Rowton then suggested that L/3 drop casually the name of Ernesto Capoano, saying that he had to see this lawyer the next day on some business. Rowton explained that he thought this would force Crozco to talk since he would naturally be fearful of L/3's revealing his whereabouts to Capoano. L/3 replied that he would willingly do this but unfortunately he did not know Capoano. He suddenly thought, however, of a ruse that might work. He could get in touch immediately with Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla, who would certainly know of Capoano, and get as much information on Caponano from Jacobo before springing the name on Crozco. Rowton agreed and stressed that it was essential that L/3 get as much of the true story from Crozco that night as possible. He urged L/3 to pose as a friend and offer to put up Crozco in some other safe place, explaining that his continued presence would jeopardize his own position vis-a-vis the FAR.

6. During the meeting L/3 positiviely identified the photograph (Pasaport) that Rowton showed him of Moisés Crozco Leal. L/3 commented that Crozco now was wearing glasses and a moustache and had shaved his head, giving himself the appearnace of a person of at least 45 years of age (his true age is 37,according to his own statement). L/3 recalled that Crozco informed him in passing that Leonardo Castillo of FAR had been killed in action recently.

7. In view of the urgency of the developemtns Rowton arranged another meeting with L/3 that same evening (31 July) at midnight at Sanborns Reforma.

Wallace B Rowton
Wallace B Rowton

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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ACTION

26 AUG 67 IN 39473

S E C R E T 260100Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2605

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REFS A DIRECTOR 30629

B MEXICO CITY 2564 (IN 37717)

1. AFTERNOON 25 AUGUST 67 LIREBEL-2 REPORTED THAT MEETING HELD ON 23 AUGUST TO DISCUSS CARLOS JURADO CASE AND OTHER ITEMS PROVED TO BE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE. ERNESTO CAPUANO SAID AN INVESTIGATION HAD TO BE MADE BUT HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE MOISES OROZCO LEAL WHO PRIME WITNESS. IN MEANTIME, CAPUANO WILL CONTACT CARLOS NAVARRETE TO REVIEW HOW JURADO ORIGINALLY MADE CONTACT.

2. PER SUGGESTION REF A THAT STATION SHOULD NOT FEED INFO TO LIREBEL-2 IN ORDER PROTECT JURADO, LIREBEL-2 TOLD ONLY THAT CASE SOUNDS INTERESTING AND STATION WOULD LIKE BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS. STATION ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST EXILE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND CAPABILITIES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

file

6

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

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ORIG: JACK STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 24 AUGUST 1967

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3	8
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5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 27 PER ____ # ____

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CONF: c/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR c/WH/COG5 c/CI c/FI2

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 30629

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2564 (IN 37717)

HEADQUARTERS WOULD PREFER SIMPLY HAVE LIREBEL-2 CONTINUE REPORTING ALL INFO RECEIVED RE LIRING-3 RATHER THAN TRY FEEDING INFO DESIGNED PROTECT LIRING-3. THIS DISCUSSED WITH ROWTON WHO IN AGREEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref advises info given LIREBEL-2 by Ernesto CAPUANO de Vecchio, Guatemalan Communist exile in Mexico, concerning suspicions of LIRING-3. Station waiting until results meeting Guat Commie exiles concerning LIRING-3 prior considering possibility carefully feed info via LIREBEL-2 designed protect LIRING-3.

WH/COG/CICS
WH/2/GUAT

for JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

J.H.V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ACTION
clwh 6 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ☐ ☒ UNIT CS/DC TIME 2:25 BY D

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DC, DDP, ADDP, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/CA, CI/R&A, clwh/cog 5

SECRET 231912Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2564

23 AUG 67 IN 37717

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

PS ABSTRACT

1. AFTERNOON 22 AUG 67 LIREBEL-2 REPORTED FOLLOWING STORY HE RECEIVED FROM ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO ON 19 AUG:

FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, MEXICAN PAINTER CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR HAS ATTEMPTED MAKE CONTACT IN MEXICO WITH TOP LEADERS FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES (FAR) TO OFFER SALE OF MEDICINE AND ARMS. HE FIRST MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS NAVARRETE (KNOWN TO ADDRESSEES) AND EXPLAINED HE HAS GREEK FRIEND WHO SELLS ARMS ALL OVER WORLD. GREEK BECAME INTERESTED IN SELLING ARMS TO FAR AND ASKED JURADO TO MAKE NECESSARY CONTACTS. NAVARRETE FOUND JURADO TOO EAGER AND TOO INSISTENT ON MAKING CONTACT WITH FAR AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO SUSPECT HIM AS CIA OR MEXICAN SECURITY SERVICE PROVOCATION. NAVARRETE DID NOT HELP HIM AND JURADO SOMEHOW MADE CONTACT WITH MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL. CAPUANO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT RELATIONSHIP OROZCO HAD WITH JURADO EXCEPT THAT LATTER OFFERED HIM ARMS, MEDICINE AND MONEY (300 DOLLARS) THE LATTER OF WHICH OROZCO DID NOT ACCEPT. RECENTLY, JURADO CALLED CAPUANO AND ASKED TO MEET WITH HIM. SHOWED CAPUANO LETTER WRITTEN BY OROZCO WHICH CLEARLY INDICATED OROZCO WAS TRAITOR

SECRET

TO "CAUSE" (SENT ADDRESSEES IN HMMA 32[illegible] AND 32807[illegible]. AFTER SPEAKING SECURITY PROVOCATION BASED ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. JURADO TOO EAGER AND INSISTENT ON CONTACTING FAR LEADERS.

B. JURADO, WHO SUPPOSEDLY IN ARMS BUSINESS TO MAKE MONEY, OFFERED OROZCO MONEY FOR FAR (300 DOLLARS). ACTUAL ARMS SELLER WOULD MAKE NO SUCH OFFER.

C. JURADO WANTED TO MAKE FAR LEADERS AWARE OF OROZCO'S TRAITOROUS ACT AND ARMS SELLERS USUALLY TAKE NO INTEREST IN INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THEY SELL TO.

D. CAPUANO DOES NOT BELIEVE "GREEK" EXISTS AND JURADO USED THIS AS "COVER" TO PENETRATE FAR MOVEMENT.

2. CAPUANO ASKED LIREBEL-2 TO AID IN INVESTIGATION OF JURADO. FIRST PHASE WILL BE TO INTERROGATE OROZCO ON HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH JURADO TO DETERMINE HOW FAR JURADO HAS PENETRATED THE FAR. CAPUANO SAID THERE IS NO PLAN TO DO JURADO BODILY HARM FOR THE PRESENT, BUT HE WILL BE IGNORED BY GUAT EXILES.

3. LIREBEL-2 SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH JURADO, A GUAT WHO HAS LIVED IN CUBA FOR SEVERAL YEARS RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO

WITH WIFE. THIS PERSON, ARMANDO PEREIRA, MET JURADO IN CUBA (NO DATE) AND WAS TOLD BY CUBANS THAT JURADO ACTS VERY SUSPICIOUSLY AND IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.

4. ON 23 AUG LIREBEL-2, CAPUANO, JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL AND LUIS CASTILLO RALDA WILL HOLD MEETING TO DISCUSS GUAT COMMUNIST EXILE LEADERSHIP IN MEXICO AND JURADO CASE.

5. IT OBVIOUS FROM ABOVE THAT CAPUANO DOES NOT HAVE FULL STORY JURADO'S ACTIVITIES AND HAS MANY OF HIS "FACTS" BADLY MIXED UP. FOR ONE THING CAPUANO MADE NO MENTION OF JURADO'S TRIPS TO GUATEMALA WHERE HE ACTUALLY CONTACTED FAR NOR OF HIS MEETINGS WITH "GARCIA" IN MEXICO CITY. IF JURADO'S STATEMENTS TO WALLACE B. ROWTON CAN BE BELIEVED, IT WAS FAR WHO ASKED HIM ABOUT POSSIBILITY TRANSPORT TO BORDER AREA WEAPONS PURCHASED BY FAR PROCUREMENT MECHANISM SOME OF WHICH WAS IN TEXAS. IT WAS ALSO FAR THAT ASKED FOR MEDICINES. DO NOT BELIEVE JURADO OFFERED FAR MONEY, ON CONTRARY HE REPEATEDLY ASKED FOR PAYMENT OF MEDICINE AND OTHER ITEMS "SOLD" FAR. EITHER CAPUANO MISUNDERSTOOD JURADO OR LATTER DID NOT REPORT HIS CONVERSATION WITH CAPUANO ACCURATELY TO ROWTON. JURADO WAS INSTRUCTED TO POINT OUT TO CAPUANO HE TOOK DIM VIEW OF BEING USED BY OROZCO TO DOUBLE CROSS FAR EMPHASIZING THAT, HAD HE

SEC

Page 4

SECRET

HAD ARMS TO GIVE OROZCO (WHICH HE DOD NOT) HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE RECEIVED HIS PAYMENT IN LEAD SINCE OROZCO COMPLETELY BROKE. THUS IN OROZCO "AFFAIR" IT WAS FINANCIAL AND PERSONAL SECURITY ANGLES WHICH OSTENSIBLY BOTHERED JURADO AND NOT HIS INTEREST IN FAR INNER POLITICS. HE FURTHERMORE LOANED OROZCO 322 PESOS AND NOT THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS.

6. WHATEVER HOLES AND CONFUSION EXIST IN CAPUANO'S STATEMENTS RE JURADO'S ACTIVITIES HE NEVERTHELESS HAS GUESSED BASIC TRUTH AND IS APPARENTLY DETERMINED TO MAKE FULL INVESTIGATION. THAT JURADO MAY HAVE EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND NOT REPORTED HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR AND CAPUANO ACCURATELY TO ROWTON MAY BE CAUSE OF CURRENT TROUBLE. ROWTON SEVERAL TIMES CAUGHT HIM IN FABRICATIONS WITH HELP EXTENSIVE STATION MONITORING HIS ACTIVITIES. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DIFFICULT TO PREVENT HIM FROM BEING OVERACTIVE IN HIS DESIRE PRODUCE VALID FAR CONTACT. STATION HAS ALREADY TOLD LIREBEL-2 THAT IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH JURADO. WILL WAIT FOR RESULTS FAR 23 AUG MEETING MEXICO CITY CITED ABOVE BEFORE EXPLORING POSSIBILITY CAREFULLY FEED INFO VIA LIREBEL-2 TO PROTECT JURADO. BELIEVE WARNING JURADO VIA LETTER SENT BY ROWTON OR OTHER MEANS WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2564 S E C R E T

7. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

SECRET

ORIG: ~~J. Stewart/sas~~
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 21 August 1967

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG8 CI/OPS, CI/IC2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 29467

TO MEXICO CITY 21 22 23 Z

INFO GUATEMALA CITY

[illegible]

REF MEXICO CITY 2476 (IN 31815)

1. FOLLOWING HQS TRACES POSSIBLY IDEN OR RELATIVES PEREIRAS REF:

A. MERCEDES LLANOS DE PEREIRA, CUBAN WHO TOOK REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY IN GUATEMALA CITY AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA 4 SEPT 1954 FOR MEXICO (HGGA-1434, 12 NOVEMBER 1954).

B. SOFIA PEREIRA MARTIN, SISTER MERCEDES (HGGA-1434, 12 NOVEMBER 1954).

C. AUGUSTO PEREIRA LLANOS, SPANIARD WHO TOOK REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY XXXX AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA FOR MEXICO 4 SEPTEMBER 1954 (HGGA-1434).

D. AMADOR PEREIRA REDONDO, SPANIARD WHO TOOK XXXX REFUGE MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY AFTER FALL ARBENZ. LEFT GUATEMALA FOR MEXICO 4 SEPTEMBER 1954 (HGGA-1434); DOCTOR AMADOR PEREIRA, PERSONAL FRIEND AND POSSIBLE BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF EMILIO ROSENSTEIN STEN, POLISH-BORN COMMUNIST MEXICO AND SUSPECT SOVIET AGENT. PRACTICING PHYSICIAN WITH OFFICE AT CALLE MONTERREY 122-17. MAY BE IDEN WITH

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 29467

TO DOCTOR AMADOR PEREIRA REDONDO, SPANISH REPUBLICAN IN MEXICO WHO HAS LONG BEEN ACTIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND IS MEMBER OF SPANISH COUNCIL FOR PEACE (HMM-1501, 29 MARCH 1956).

E. AMADA ENRIQUEZ PEREIRA, SISTER MIRNA TORRES, PGT MEMBER (GUATEMALA CITY 3625, 8 JANUARY 1964).

2. ALSO PROCESSING TRACES MERCEDES AND ARMANDO PEREIRA, WILL ADVISE POSITIVE RESULTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: LIRING-3 in touch with MERCEDES and ARMANDO PEREIRA.

WH/2/Guat
C/WH/2
WH/COG/CI6S

for Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

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DO NOT MUTILATE

Contents: LETTER FROM LIRING-3 TO ROUTON ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] IN NEW YORK 20 AUG 67.

2 XEROX COPIES SENT MEXI VIA NON ACCT POUCH TM 121646 21 SEPT 67.

File WH/1
LIRING-3
201-798301

Correo Aereo

CORREOS—MÉXICO
TARJETA CARTA

REMITENTE E. Jurado
DOMICILIO Calzada Tacubaya 172-5
POBLACION Mexico 11, D.F.
ESTADO

CORREO AEREO

40 CTS CORREOS
40 CTS CORREOS

Sr.
Nicolas Harris
P.O. Box 63
Grand Central Station
Lexington Avenue & 45th Street
New York, City.
U. S. A.

CORREO AEREO

...A FORMA TIENE UN VALOR ADICIONAL DE $0.05

MEX. AGOSTO 20 - 67

Estimado Sr. Harris:

Estas líneas para saludarlo y decearle buen viaje.

Hasta ahora no tengo noticias importantes. Chichay está yendo al Consulado pero no todos los días. No recibo todavía la carta de Venezuela ni tengo noticias de abajo. Creo que en esta semana sabré algo. Estoy trabajando con lo de las flores y si tengo algo concreto posiblemente a principios de otra semana iré a San Cristóbal.

Reciba nuestros saludos

Carlos Jurado

Mex. Agosto 20-67

Estimado Sr. Harris:

Estas líneas para saludarlo y desearle buen viaje.

Hasta ahora no tengo noticias importantes. Chichay está yendo al Consulado pero no todos los días. No recibo todavía la carta de Venezuela ni tengo noticias de abajo. Creo que en esta semana sabré algo. Estoy trabajando con lo de las flores y si tengo algo concreto posiblemente a principios de otra semana iré a San Cristóbal.

Reciba nuestros saludos

Carlos Jurado

CORREO AEREO

CORREOS-MEXICO

TARJETA CARTA

CORREO AEREO

40 CORREOS CTS MEXICO

40 CORREOS CTS MEXICO

REMITENTE C. Jurado
DOMICILIO Calzada Tacubaya 132-51
POBLACION Mexico 11 D. F.
ESTADO

Sr.
Nicolas Harris
P.O. Box 63
Grand Central Station
Lexington Avenue & 45th Street
New York City.
U. S. A.

ESTA FORMA TIENE UN VALOR ADICIONAL DE $0.05

CORREO AEREO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City W

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/False Documentation Obtained by LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded under separate cover in single copy is a false driver's license recently obtained by LIRING-3 via the corrupt judge in the state of Coahuila who is also helping him obtain a false passport.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos a/s UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att usc
1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
2 - FILES

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 22/[illegible]/67

1cc TO WH/REGC

LIRING-3
201-798301

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32814

DATE
17 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-793301

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-32814 of 17 August 1967

TO: CHIEF/WH DIVISION

FM: COS/MEXICO CITY

COPY

201-778301

SECRET



GOBIERNO DEL ESTADO
DE COAHUILA
DIRECCION DE POLICIA Y TRANSITO.

LICENCIA No. LE 15171

CLASE CHOFER

NOMBRE ALBERTO ZARATE VIDAL

1966 1967

SABINAS Coah. 14 de Julio de 1967

El Delegado de Tránsito

27-41-L E



Nota: Esta Licencia es indispensable para manejar.

PROHIBICIONES:

1.- Manejar en estado de ebriedad.
2.- Hacer señales innecesarias.
3.- Rebasar por la derecha.
4.- Cambiar de carril sin hacer la señal debida.
5.- Manejar con exceso de velocidad.
6.- Descender de un vehículo por el lado de la circulación.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 17 AUGUST 67

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INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/CPS, C/OB, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 28757

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2479 (IN 32323)

REGRET HAVE BEEN UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE INTERIM HANDLER FOR LIRING-3. SUGGEST ROWTON SET UP PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT BY "TRUSTED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE WHO MAY BE COMING THROUGH AREA." WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH ROWTON DURING LATTER'S TDY HQS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: ROWTON going on home leave 18 August. Station feels it most desirable keep direct contact with LIRING-3 during ROWTON's absence.

Jacob D. Esterline
JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

WH/COG W. CINI (IN DRAFT)

J. H. V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: Chief of Station, Tegucigalpa

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Rene *OCHOA Funez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

ct Honduras

Cuba

Forwarded as Attachment One, herewith, is a report written by Wallace B. ROWTON dated 5 August 1967 about a letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Rene OCHOA Funez, the Honduran revolutionary in Havana. Forwarded as Attachment Two, under separate cover, are photocopies of this letter. It does not look, from the sound of the letter, that OCHOA's morale is too high.

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Raymond A.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
- # I - Report [redacted]
- # II- Copy of Letter UNDER SEPARATE COVER

2 atts

s/c fwd by RB/kw

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD w/atts #I & #II use
- 1 - COS/Tegucigalpa w/att #II only use
- 2 - FILES

w/atts

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-32815

DATE: 17 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

GROUP 1

14-00000

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5 August, 1967

three page typewritten letter dtd 27/7/67

1. LIRING/3 received/~~letter~~ from René Ochoa Funez ~~delivered 27/8/27x~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ mailed in Mexico City 2/8/67 by "N.C., Carrada Rio Janeiro 122, Mexico 7, DF" after having been hand-carried from Havana by the wife of a "compañero de trabajo" of Ochoa. Copy being pouched.

2. In letter Ochoa states he understands L/3's situation "since it is necessary to move ahead with one's own resources and to prove with deeds". He addes that he hoped to send ~~xxxxxx~~ "concrete and complete news" but he still laboring under difficulties known to L/3. He assures L/3 that he has delivered L/3's last letter to ~~xxxxxx~~ the "compañero" (Arnol Rodriguez) but could not talk with him privately because of the many visitors who had arrived that day. Arnol's wife Ruby told him that they had received L/3's letters and had answered them (L/3~~x~~ told Rowton that he has never received these replies from Arnol). Ruby Rodriguez also informed Ochoa that the "organismos corres calientes" were going to invite L/3 to Havana. Ochoa promised L/3 that he would do whatever he could to expedite this trip (hacer nuevas gestiones).

2. Ochoa complains of the "realidades que me han tocado vivir aquí" ~~xxx~~ but indicates that he has no intention "resign himself" to bureaucracy commenting that it is necessary "provocar la ruptura, aprediendo a rascarse con las propias uñas", taking the initiative and not expecting anything from anyone. He adds that he has finally cut the "ties which have bound" him to Cuba and although he feels that he can do a great deal there, but it is "infinitiely small in comparison with what he must do ~~xx~~ outside". He assures L/3 that he is serious and that it concerns a "planteamiento serio".

3. Ochoa also cautions L/3 against loosing sight of the ultimate objective in his commercial activity, indicating that he has discussed this aspect of L/3's plans with "a friend" who knows some of these questions better that L/3. He adds that L/3's "asuntos y actividades" interest him intnsely, and that their situation is similar.

WBRowton

att 1 to
HMMA 32815

CS COPY

201-798301

201-798301

HMMA 32512

S/c at 270

RE:

[illegible] Camilo [illegible]
15 calle, 559 [illegible] 507
[illegible] C. A.

A: Carlos Jurado Delmar
Calzada de Tacubaya 172 - apto 5D
CALLE NUM. APTO.
México 11, D.F.
ENTRE REPARTO

PUEBLO O ZONA POSTAL PROVINCIA

VALOR 5¢

40 CORREO
40 CORREO
MEXICO

Sr. Carlos Jurado Delmar
Calzada de Tacubaya 172, ap. 5D.
México 11 DF

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Remite. M.C
Cerrada Rio Janeiro 12B
Mexico 7 DF

La Habana,27 de Julio de 1967.

Estimado Carlicho:

Hoy hace más de un mes que recibí tu carta,por las conversaciones telefónicas sostenidas habrás podido comprender que la demora en contestarte se debe,no precisamente a apatía de mi parte,sino falta de canales adecuados para tal fin.

Esta te la envío por la gentileza de un compañero de trabajo cuya esposa va hacia ésa,dicho sea de paso yo no la conozco a ella,por lo tanto es realmente una casualidad que te pueda enviar noticias;pero bien no quería demorar más y he aquí estas líneas.

Creo que entiendo perfectamente tu situación,pues es necesario abrirse paso con los propios medios,demostrar con hechos;esto puede que al principio te huela a consejo,pero realmente no lo es pues precisamente la idea la he tomado de ti y ahora la adopto como posición o actitud ante los hechos.Era mi deseo poderte enviar noticias concretas y amplias esta vez,pero justamente tengo las mismas dificultades que tu enumeras,a pesar de la cercanía física.Entregué tu carta al compañero no me fue posible hablar con él sobre el particular pues el día que fuí llegaron muchas visitas,antes de que él llegara hablé algo con la señora,concretamente me dijo que habían recibido tus noticias,que también te habían contestado;que te iban a invitar los organismos correspondientes pero que ellos aún no tenían noticias concretas;despues como te dije llegaron las visitas y no pude sacar ninguna conclusión;estimo que a estas alturas ya debes tener noticias; posteriormente no he podido ocuparme de ello principalmente por líos de mi parte, fundamentalmente por cuestiones de trabajo.

Ahora bien,te prometo hacer nuevas gestiones pues en estos días tengo un respiro,aunque las gentes por aquí en estos días están bastante ocupadas con la cantidad de actividades y de acontecimientos especialmente de este mes,pero ya veremos.

Creo que no es necesario que te aclare,que en general,tendrás que acostumbrarte a estos problemas,pues las cosas a veces le parecen a uno muy fáciles y desde luego no lo son mas que en apariencia,es necesario comprender a los otros,máximo en estas cosas,un poco pensar como ellos;alguna vez en nuestras discusiones me has señalado como yo justificaba las cosas siempre con la frase"hasta cierto punto tal o tales cosas son inevitables";creo que esta no es una frase sin sentido no es una cómoda salida, es para mi una conclusión de las realidades que me han tocado vivir aquí,hoy la sigo repitiendo y aún tiene más sentido.Lo anterior,por supuesto,no significa que hay que resignarse y esperar que los acontecimientos se desarrollen normalmente,todo lo contrario,hay que provocar la ruptura,cómo?,justamente "aprendiendo a rascarse con las propias uñas", demostrando con hechos y un poco "no esperar nada de nadie".

Dirás por fin cayó en el plano del consejo,te ratifico no se trata de eso,tu mismo lo has dicho eres lo suficientemente grande para comprender las responsabilidades que adquieres,por lo tanto huelgan los consejos,sobretodo los que se dan a control remoto. simplemente trato de imbuirte de una idea que ya tienes.Me parece que hay seriedad y responsabilidad en lo que haces era de esperar de ti,me complace que midas todo lo que implica por ambas partes, es un camino sumamente peligroso,sé que lo sabes mejor que yo,pero Carlos siempre tu eres demasiado bueno y de la bondad a la ingenuidad no hay más que un pasito,esto es algo de lo cual tu no eres consciente,en estas cosas es de vital importancia comprender a profundidad esto.Nadie trabaja o lucha,buscando aquello en lo cual no exista peligro,por lo menos entre nosotros,nadie le tiene miedo a los cuatro metros de tierra,pero el aliciente o la meta no es el peligro ni la muerte,realmente con eso no se hace nada,simplemenes dejar un nombre para una Fábrica,en el mejor de los casos;se trata de algo muy distinto.Me hablas de una cosa normal y lucrativo,esto es bueno a condición de que se comprenda que eso constituye el aspecto externo de la cuestión,es decir la forma,pero lo importante es lo interno el contenido lo esencial;no se conoce la casa por la fachada,ésta la mayoría de las veces nos engaña.A qué todo esto?;bueno,en primer lugar es la opinión de un amigo que algunas cuestiones las conoce un poco mejor que tu,además conociéndote tengo necesidad de referirme a esto y en segundo lugar porque necesito de ti,de tu situación,de tu comprensión,porque también yo he agotado mi capacidad de espera y realmente en estos momentos cuento conmigo mismo y contigo,no hace falta explicarte porque pues nuestra situación es similar,por lo tanto tus apuntes y actividades me interesan sobremanera por las cuestiones apuntadas anteriormente.

Ahora tus noticias son fundamentales para mi,sobre todo dame detalles,quiero hacer las cosas sabiendo y conociendo lo que voy a hacer,tengo prisa por hacer algo pero no por los posibles 4 metros de tierra,no lo excluyo,pero tampoco los busco especialmente.Por fin he resuelto lo que me ataba a este gran país,comprende que aún puedo hacer mucho aquí,pero es infinitamente pequeño comparado con lo que tengo que hacer fuera de aquí;sabes bien que no soy capaz de emborronar tantas cuartillas simplemente por llenarlas se trata de un planteamiento serio.

Espero que la Cichay(la C cuando se traduce del inglés al chino suena como CH o al revés)ya esté bien,esas son las consecuencias de ser su propio médico(librotero),pero de todas maneras nos alegramos mucho de que haya podido salir de las garras de todos los OLCGes.Carliche necesitaría que en la próxima oportunidad me consiguieras unos encerios (Zapatos)para la Cati,si se da cuenta de esta solicitud me asesina,pero yo cargo con el pedido,son el número 6½ a 7,.-

espero tus noticias,saludos a Ciha y(Chichay-).

Perdona lo abstracto y las repeticiones Fito

esta vez tuvo que ser así, por razones obvias.
Llegó a las veinte horas
doce días después de tu llamada me llama-
ron del [illegible] para [illegible] y viaje
hoy [illegible] de [illegible] y no
Te envío abrazos. Siempre Carlos [illegible] Cruz.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WH/COG 5

S E C R E T 160722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2492

16 Aug 67 IN 33264

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2455 (IN 30815)

1. MOTHER OF MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL PHONED LIRING-4 ON 14 AUGUST AND ASKED MEET HER. AT ENSUING MEETING OROZCO'S MOTHER STATED THAT ALRA MARINA ARREOLA, HER HUSBAND AND SON WERE RECENTLY DEPORTED TO GUATEMALA BY MEXICAN POLICE WHERE EXECUTED ON ARRIVAL.

2. ~~IMU N~~ in VIEW OF MANNER IN WHICH REF INFO OBTAINED, DO NOT PLAN CHECK ABOVE WITH LITEMPOS. BUT TRYING OBTAIN DETAILS THEIR INTERROGATION OF OROZCO CONDUCTED ON BASIS STATION REQUIREMENTS AND OROZCO BACKGROUND INFO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OF 2, SECUR 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 151515Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2479

ACTION

15 AUG 67 IN 32323

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE 18 AUGUST.

2. AFTER THOROUGH REVIEW LIRING-3 OPERATION FEEL IT MOST DESIRABLE KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 (WHO LIABLE GO CUBA AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA IN NEAR FUTURE) DURING ROWTON'S ABSENCE. UNTIL SGSWIRL CAN BE GIVEN LIRING-3 BY SPANISH SPEAKING OPERATOR AS REQUESTED BY STATION, FEEL IT WISE NOT PUSH LIRING-3 TO WITTING LNHARP RECRUITMENT. THEREFORE BELIEVE LIRING-3 SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPANISH SPEAKER ABLE PASS NOTIONALLY AS EUROPEAN BUSINESS FRIEND OF ROWTON (I.E. WITHOUT GRINGO ACCENT). ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE EUROPEAN LANGUAGE NATURALLY DESIRABLE IT NOT ESSENTIAL AS PER ROWTON LIRING-3 WILL NOT QUESTION BACKGROUND HIS FRIEND OR MEET HIM IN PRESENCE OF OTHER FOREIGNER SINCE MEETINGS HELD IN SAFEHOUSE. TO AVOID SECURITY COMPLICATIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE BELIEVE LIRING-3 WOULD BEST BE HANDLED FOR THREE - FOUR WEEK PERIOD BY TDYER FROM WAVE OR HDQS WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. STATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSUME COMPLETE DIRECTION THIS OPERATION.

3. ALTERNATIVE TO HANDLING BY TDYER WOULD BE TO PLACE

maybe get L-3 go [illegible] and [illegible] -

201 LIRING-3 201-798301 201 Stewart

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2479 S E C R E T

LIRING-3 "ON ICE" FOR PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE SENDING HIM OUT OF MEXICO CITY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THUS CUTTING HIM OFF TEMPORARILY FROM FURTHER CONTACTS WITH CUBANS, GUATEMALAN REBELS AND LOCAL MEXICAN LEFTIST FRIENDS. THERE NO GUARANTEE HOWEVER LIRING-3 WOULD STAY OUT OF MEXICO AND FURTHER OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT FOR FULL PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE.

4. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY.

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PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, WH/COG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Developments of the LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

References:
A. MEXICO CITY 2322
B. MEXICO CITY 2331
C. MEXICO CITY 2358
D. MEXICO CITY 2363
E. MEXICO CITY 2396

1. Forwarded as Attachment One under separate cover are seven contact reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on recent developments of the LIRING-3 Operation dated 27 and 28 July, 1, 3 (two reports), 5 and 9 August 1967 (two reports). One of the reports dated 3 August is a monthly resume of operational activities for the month of July. It is forwarded together with the other reports rather than separately to give as complete a picture as possible of LIRING-3's dealings with Moises OROZCO Leal, the circumstances in which the two men met and the reporting of these dealings by LIRING-3 to ROWTON. Forwarded as Attachment Two, also under separate cover, are photo copies of a two page typewritten message left by OROZCO at LIRING-3's apartment on 1 August. Another copy of this message is being forwarded Guatemala City seperately.

c o n t i n u e d . . . .

Attachments:
I - Seven Reports a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER
II- Message Left by OROZCO UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/atts USC
1 - C/WH/COG w/o atts
4 - FILES

1 ATT.

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO
SD 23 AUG 67

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-32778

DATE
15 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2. There is little question that LIRING-3 seized the opportunity given him by the sudden apperition of OROZCO on the scene to cover vis a vis his wife a few days of misbehaving. Instead of proceeding to Tapachula to receive from the FAR new contract instructions in Mexico City (an awkward arrangement to say the least), LIRING-3 remained at the safe house he uses in the capital to receive the visit (as indicated by LIFEAT) of Berta WIGISSER his "regular" mistress, Silvia DURAN (of Lee Harvey OSWALD fame) and possibly a certain Yolanda (who appears for the first time in this operation and whose phone number is not in the Station reversed Mexico City telephone directory). Pinned down on the fact that he was in Mexico City during the period of 19 to 21 July, LIRING-3 admitted that he was but felt that he had to tell another lie rather than admit his misbehavior. This lie was that he did not want to appear dependant on Sergio VALDEZ in the eyes of ROWTON and so made his first meeting with OROZCO "more intriguing" by inventing the trip to Tapachula. To add credence to the Tapachula story, LIRING-3 previously asked his wife to impress ROWTON with her concern for him, telling ROWTON that he had disappeared for three days without telling her where he went. This she did very convincingly with much sobbing and crying. The LIROSIN LP which continues to experience technical difficulties now and then did not operate properly that day (it's recorder broke down) but, as luck will have it LIROSIN live monitored a conversation between LIRING-3 and his wife during which the latter reported that her tears seemed to have convinced ROWTON. Another point on which ROWTON had some pretty blunt talk with LIRING-3 concerned the mention of the alias which ROWTON uses with LIRING-3 and 4 to various persons with whom LIRING-3 is in touch. LIFEAT coverage had indicated, for example, that LIRING-3 mentioned ROWTON in alias to Sergio VALDEZ. This LIRING-3 denied. He produced on 3 August 1967 a written review of all the people of interest to ROWTON with whom he has been in contact indicating whether or not he mentioned ROWTON's alias to them. This review is attached to one of ROWTON's reports dated 9 August.

3. What happened between OROZCO, LIRING-3, Sergio VALDEZ and Raul MORENO is explained in detail in ROWTON's reports forwarded with this dispatch. A few additional points should probably be made here. First of all, part of the first meeting between LIRING-3 and OROZCO at LIRING_3's safehouse was live-monitored by LIROSIN when the latter returned home from his regular bartending job in the early hours of the morning. LIROSIN heard enough (his recorder was once more inoperative) to basically confirm LIRING-3's report of his meeting with OROZCO to ROWTON. Secondly, neither VALDEZ nor MORENO were present during the night of 31 July - 1 August when LIRING-3 told OROZCO that the latter was in fact a deserter from the FAR, refusing to indicate how he knew this (ROWTON had passed LIRING-3 information on OROZCO received by the Station from both LIREBEL-1 and 2). The two men arrived at LIRING-3's apartment in the early morning hours when OROZCO had admitted everything and thus do not know what prompted him to tell the truth. Thirdly, LIRING-3 insists that he told OROZCO nothing about his plastic flower business and it's contemplated use to cover activities in support of the Guatemalan rebels. According to him, OROZCO already knew this as well as other details of his dealings with the FAR. LIRING-3 presumes that OROZCO learned this from the higher-ups of the FAR guerrillas while in the hills. OROZCO mistakenly apparently thought that LIRING-3 was in the actual arms procurement business whereas his discussions with the FAR have been limited up to now to the eventual transportation of FAR acquired supplies from Northern Mexico to Guatemala (with the FAR assuming the responsibility of smuggling these supplies over the Guatemalan border). LIRING-3's plastic flower business designed to cover support activities on behalf of the FAR, is not, as a matter of fact operative yet. Thus OROZCO was badly informed of LIRING-3's activities. How OROZCO hoped to obtain arms from LIRING-3, had the latter been able to deliver some at the Guatemalan border area, in view of the fact (as he later admitted) that he was stone broke, is a matter of conjecture. A desperate man may do desperate things and LIRING-3 could have found himself in serious trouble. Judging from the FAR's shooting habits it is a good thing in any case that OROZCO was not armed during the argument at LIRING-3's apartment the night of 31 July to 1 August, particularly when VALDEZ started to threaten him.

4. This Station believes that the LIRING-3 Operation has reached a critical point as a result of the OROZCO affair. Both the Cubans and the FAR (via Ernesto CAPUANO Del Vecchio) have been notified by LIRING-3 of OROZCO's conduct and statements (a copy of OROZCO's message forwarded as Attachment Two was given CAPUANO). If the FAR is at all interested in LIRING-3 he will somehow hear from the Guatemalan guerrillas and negociations concerning arms and equipment will be reopened. LIRING-3 has not heard from "GARCIA" since June and does not even know if the latter is in Mexico. It is the Station's opinion that he probably will hear nothing directly from the Cubans.

5. Headquarters will note, per ROWTON's report dated 28 July, the relative ease with which LIRING-3 claims to be obtaining a false passport and other identity papers. The Cuban's passports that LIRING-3 purchased in Nuevo Laredo, mentioned in the same report, were issued in 1953 and 1959 and may be of marginal value. They will nevertheless be forwarded to Headquarters together with other documentation held by the bearers of these passports.

"Garcia" is who?

Juan CASTILLO Ralda?

David CASC[illegible]A?

Ramiro BERMUDEZ Mellol?

Mario Ina?

Valentin [illegible]? – no traces in Orozco.

Raymond A Frodyn

for Willard C. CURTIS

4/5/c

Att No. II to Hmma-32778, 15 August 1967. 201-798301

CS COPY

TALLER DE VITRALES
PLAZA MIRAVALLE 2
MEXICO, D. F.

y ni en lo pendejo [illegible] lo que mas me ha molestado [illegible] la forma en que vivía y [illegible] llaman unos [illegible] la revolución, sin tomar en cuenta los sacrificios que [illegible] han hecho y de [illegible] la revolución en provecho particular de [illegible], por me habían [illegible] encontrarme envuelto en [illegible] de la realidad, que tener que [illegible] de algunos, yo estoy dispuesto a que sea mío. los [illegible] un [illegible] de confianza, mas no el de dar un paso en [illegible] mi [illegible] ya [illegible] que no soy ni he sido [illegible] [illegible] en esta vida [illegible] esa vida lo que [illegible] en las [illegible]

[illegible] esta [illegible] sistema nervioso que [illegible] en la primera vez que [illegible] mi [illegible], ya que en el [illegible] haga [illegible] de servicio en [illegible] lo presento y que [illegible] hacer el papel [illegible] una vez en otras condiciones yo ya [illegible] mi propia letra para [illegible] la historia, cuyo solo [illegible] la historia la hacen los vencedores [illegible] surgir de los [illegible], mas no estoy todavía colgado como [illegible] de mas si [illegible] alguno de juz- de mi [illegible] de cabra mi domicilio, [illegible] y [illegible] que pasa, pero eso si [illegible] posible con [illegible] por mi propio esfuerzo mi [illegible] con [illegible] ningún vividor, [illegible] que no dan sin [illegible] nada, [illegible] lo fui y podía contarles mi historia [illegible] en lo justo para que uno les pueda criticar [illegible] juzga desde su punto de vista, [illegible] la pendejadas que se cometen a diario y no las quieren ver, no [illegible] un dedo si no cuento con el apoyo [illegible] es desde el punto [illegible] o [illegible] como [illegible], se puede juzgar, la solidaridad humana es una cosa que a todos [illegible] debe preocupar pero no desde el punto de [illegible] sino de echar, -- que

tan buena información a recabado de mi persona porque no [illegible] mas a respecto y de lo que [illegible] tener las [illegible] yo esto dispuesto par. la etapa de suicida ya la pase hace mucho tiempo, hoy soy consciente y [illegible] que toda la vida me la he [illegible] solo en [illegible] hasta haciendo locuras como dicen por hay he tenido mas suerte que muchos, he incluso [illegible] inteligencia que muchos he sido mas [illegible] que muchos y no he tenido pelos en la lengua cuando le [illegible] puntos de vista se trata he sido discreto y no hay cuidado en lo que se refiere a torturas y demas yo la vida ya la [illegible] y no es una carga pero tampoco me [illegible] vivir unos días mas o menos mas no sin que esto tenga su justificado fin, de pasarme algo lo único que me apena es mi madre por lo que la hice sufrir. los [illegible] mas de lo que se [illegible]ran a la mano le podrían echar la culpa, y luego a fin de cuentas cuantos fusilamientos románticos en la historia de las revoluciones no han habido y la revolución sigue su camino contra viento y marea a pesar de que los dogmáticos se cuidan como si ellos no salieran a flote en los triunfos populares, la revolución en medio de todo y sin [illegible] se ha dado a pesar de los [illegible], no la [illegible] a bailar a chalupa no soy [illegible] y les [illegible] todas las atenciones que han tenido con mi persona si uds. lo creen conveniente sino [illegible] que se hace, pueden [illegible] la hora que gusten para la tarea que quieran mas no [illegible], no soy un soldado [illegible] y menos [illegible] dar un paso lo [illegible] y soy de decisiones rápidas para [illegible] a nadie en una aventura en la que considere que no puedo salir adelante con el dolor de ver que alguien por mi culpa falta.

el

[illegible] no [illegible] desconfianza no me gusta [illegible] podria decir como [illegible] ya [illegible] justificarme [illegible] de [illegible] lo dicho a otros creo que a mi me [illegible], y [illegible] de otros yo podria [illegible] en contra de todos pero no [illegible], en mi [illegible] hay [illegible] que he tenido que [illegible] que [illegible] estar [illegible] de la [illegible] y darme la mano son dos cosas que [illegible] pero que [illegible], el quien escriben las [illegible], hay cosas dentro y una de ellas son los muchachos [illegible], practicos, [illegible], sin objetivos, valientes hasta la [illegible], [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible] que [illegible] todas las [illegible] que [illegible] en una esquina y que no les han [illegible] por creerse el [illegible], del que en determinada forma les ha dado todo y despues [illegible] el olvido, o cuando alguien [illegible] mas loco [illegible] ellos las realidades, entonces comienza a creer el que le [illegible] el fuego, todo porque porque para ellos [illegible], los que [illegible] romanticos en [illegible] estan mas [illegible] confundidos y de verdad es que si [illegible] me [illegible] cuenta que no necesitamos los frentes populares no existian [illegible] es mas en [illegible] momento ellos [illegible] al pueblo evitan tomar parte en este echo, [illegible] NO SON [illegible] DE LA VERDAD SON [illegible] porque no se llegan a las masas y las masas los admiran pero no los [illegible] pide accion y ellos se [illegible] de la cuenta [illegible] y que no lo es el que es revolucionario y que no [illegible] es sobre los echos ya se puede hacer historia [illegible] la que por no se han echo y cual es el futuro si no se toma en cuenta las condiciones reales de desarrollo del movimiento, se ha [illegible] por falta de objetividad, se perdio la iniciativa por [illegible] cuando se [illegible] cuenta de que las vias pacificas estaban cerradas en toda su plenitud, y que guerra es guerra pero en toda su plenitud [illegible] de [illegible] bravucones y viejos [illegible], se [illegible] con el [illegible] del muerto y ellos [illegible] a muerto donde esta el [illegible], en el que, les dice las verdades y cree en la revolucion, la violencia blanca no la han podido parar porque si esto, si aquello, si lo otro, la lista larga de los que se han [illegible] en [illegible] por falta de coordinacion, disciplina, [illegible] etc. no la quiero alargar mucho quiere decir que este cuerpo no se tendra que dejar un dia pero que no sea a lo estupido, como los [illegible], caso [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] granadia, [illegible] en fin yo no [illegible] como si ella tubiera una zona liberada, cuando apenas estoy en la primera etapa, de lo que es la revolucion porque [illegible] de ella no se [illegible] ni padrino [illegible] asesinado por eso y cuanta gente de su propia [illegible] cuidado pero yo quiero caer por algo no por pendejo y [illegible] de aprender, sin el minimo de seguridad no regreso, o sea sin [illegible] defender la vida no regreso estoy dispuesto a tomar el camino que siempre me ha pertenecido como parte del movimento, si tienen algo en lo que les pueda ser util estoy a sus ordenes previa discusion del caso, los telefonos y otras cosas las queme por seguridad, no es desconfianza sino seguridad.

USC

TALLER DE VITRALES

PLAZA MIRAVALLE 3 MEXICO, D. F.

[illegible]

A mi en lo personal lo que mas me ha molestado [illegible] la forma en que tiras y troyanos [illegible] uno [illegible] de la revolucion, sin tomar en cuenta los sacrificios que [illegible] hecho y de donde la revolucion en [illegible] particular de [illegible] o un cargo, mas me hubiera gustado encontrarme envuelto en la entre la masa inconsciente de la realidad, que tener que terminar [illegible] de ajedrez, yo estoy dispuesto a [illegible]. Los [illegible] un voto de confianza, [illegible] mi direccion y [illegible] yo no soy ni he sido [illegible] de pelicula barata, todos [illegible] en esta vida, [illegible] personas no han sido [illegible] y presiento que con todo lo que [illegible] me podrian hundir en las tinieblas de la carcel y es mas [illegible] que soy un [illegible] en el [illegible] que [illegible] sin [illegible] que la [illegible] no [illegible] para mi, [illegible] que tenga que tomar [illegible] ni [illegible] la [illegible], ya que en el trabajo [illegible] no hay hoja brillante de servicio [illegible] y que [illegible] hacer el papel [illegible] en [illegible] condiciones yo ya [illegible] la guerra [illegible] para [illegible] la [illegible] sola se nutre y cuantas nuevas surgen, la historia la hacen los vencedores [illegible] los vencidos, claramente [illegible] los hombres surgen los [illegible] surgen de los [illegible], mas no [illegible] de mi [illegible] sobre mi domicilio, [illegible], andarme [illegible] y haber que [illegible], pero eso ni los [illegible] de ser posible [illegible] por mi propio esfuerzo mi pluma con sus respectos necesarios [illegible] aunque [illegible], para que no den [illegible] nada, [illegible] lo [illegible] y [illegible] contarles mi historia mas de ellos dependen estan en lo justo para que uno los pueda criticar y en mas de mi la critica es justa desde su punto de vista, [illegible] no podria [illegible] de la [illegible] que se comentan a diario y no la quieren ver, [illegible] un [illegible] si no cuento con el apoyo suficiente cuando menos en lo moral en desde el punto [illegible] o [illegible] como dicen, [illegible] se puede [illegible], la solidaridad humana es una cosa que a todos nos debe preocupar pero no desde el punto de soy esto sino de echos, --

tan buena informacion a recabado de mi persona porque no [illegible] mas a respecto y de lo que [illegible] tener las soluciones yo esto [illegible] para la etapa de suicida ya la pase hace mucho tiempo, hoy soy consciente y mas que nada la vida me la he jugado solo en muchas ocasiones [illegible] haciendo locuras como dicen por hay he tenido mas suerte que muchos, he incluso mas inteligencia que muchos he sido mas sincero que muchos y no he tenido pelos en la lengua cuando he [illegible] puntos de vista [illegible] he sido discreto y no hay cuidado en lo que se refiere a torturas y [illegible] yo la vida ya la conoci y no es una carga pero tampoco me sobra vivir unos dias mas o menos mas no sin que esto tenga su justificado fin, de pasarme algo la unica que me apena es mi madre por lo que la hice sufrir. los pensamientos corren mas de lo que me [illegible] a la mano le podrian echar la culpa, y luego a fin de cuentas [illegible] romanticos en la historia de las revoluciones no han habido y la revolucion sigue su camino contra viento y marea a pesar de que los dogmaticos se cuidan como si ellos no [illegible] a flote en los triunfos populares, la revolucion en medio de [illegible] y sin [illegible] se ha dado a pesar de los pesares, no la paran ni [illegible] a bailar a chalma no soy deshonesto y les pagare todas las atenciones que han tenido con mi persona si uds. lo creen conveniente sino [illegible] que se hace, pueden [illegible] a la hora que quieran para la tarea que quieran mas no incondicionalmente, no soy un soldado [illegible] y menos de esa columna, [illegible] un paso lo [illegible] y soy de decisiones rapidas pero [illegible] a nadie en una aventura en la que considere que no pueda salir adelante con el dolor de ver que alguien por mi culpa falta.

el

[illegible] no [illegible] acostumbrado no me gusta yo podria decir como hombre [illegible] cumpli, justificarse eso. [illegible] han [illegible] pasado y le he dado a otros creo que si me echan [illegible] culpan, y hasta culpas de otros yo podria convertirme en contra de todos pero no seria justo, en mi pueblo hay camaradas que [illegible] tenido que aguantar [illegible] que seguir aguantando estas calumnias saber que de la cuenta y darme la razon son dos cosas que [illegible] pero que [illegible] llevaran, si quieren saber las [illegible] verdaderas, hay cosas [illegible] de ellas son los muchachos [illegible], [illegible], desorientados [illegible], sin objetivos, valientes [illegible] la [illegible], [illegible] de barrio, sino que lo sigan todos los que [illegible] dejado [illegible] en una esquina y que no les han [illegible] el [illegible], del que en determinada forma [illegible] todo y despues [illegible] el olvido, o cuando [illegible] pudiera con ellos las realidades, entonces comienza a [illegible] el que le puede quitar el hueso, todo porque para ellos [illegible] es su [illegible], los que [illegible] esten [illegible] confundidos y de verdad es que si estos y aquellos se dieran cuenta que no necesitamos los frentes populares no estarian [illegible] es mas en dado momento ellos [illegible] evitar al pueblo evitar tomar parte en este echo, [illegible] de [illegible] HUMANIDAD NO SON [illegible] DE LA VERDAD SON [illegible] porque no se ligan a las masas y las masas [illegible] porque la masa pide accion y ellos se [illegible] de la cuenta de que es marxista y que no lo es de que es revolucionario y que no lo es sobre los echos ya se puede hacer historia en la que por no no han echo y cual es el futuro si no se toma en cuenta las condiciones reales de desarrollo del movimiento, se ha [illegible] por falta de objetividad, se perdio la iniciativa por confianzas cuando se dieron cuenta de que las vias pacificas estaban cerradas en toda su plenitud, y que guerra es guerra pero en toda su plenitud no guerritas de [illegible] bravucones y viejos amargados, se [illegible] con el petate del muerto y ellos [illegible] a muerto donde esta el [illegible], en el que, les dice las verdades y cree en la revolucion, la violencia blanca no la han podido parar porque si esto, si aquello, si lo otro, la lista larga de los que se han [illegible] en martires por falta de cordinacion, disciplina, [illegible] etc. no la quiero alargar mas no quiere decir que este cuerpo no se tenga que dejar un dia pero que no sea a lo estupidos, caso los 23, caso [illegible] chinino, [illegible] granadia, rio hondo en fin yo no llevare [illegible] como si [illegible] tuviera una zona liberada, cuando apenas estoy en la primera etapa, se lo que es la revolucion porque en medio de ella me he creado mi padrino fue asesinado por eso y cuanta gente de mi propia sangre no ha quedado pero yo quiero caer por algo no por pendejo y porque me apendeja, sin el minimo de seguridad no regreso, o sea sin conque defender mi vida no regreso estoy dispuesto a tomar el camino que siempre me ha pertenecido como parte del movimiento, si tienen algo en lo que les pueda ser util estoy a sus ordenes previa discusion del caso, los telefonos y demas cosas las queme por seguridad, no es desconfiana sino seguridad.

27 July,1967

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at brief preliminary debriefing that during Rowton absence a Guatemalan (unidentified) telephoned him a safehouse and instructed him go to Tapachula on 19 July and await contact in lobby of local moviehouse. LIRING/3 stated that he took trip and was approached in lobby by same xxxxx young Guatemalan woman (with oriental features) whom he had met in Guatemala City during his last trip. This woman simply informed him that a comarade would contact him (L/3) at his home in next few days and disuuss future operations. LIRING/3 continued that he returned to Mexico 6ity next day and was contacted at his home by Guatemalan aged about 45, mustache, glasses, balding head,slightly hooked nose, wearing hat ixxxtxxxt who later stated his true name is Moises Crozco Leal and that he has been in Mexico past twenty years.

2. At meeting next day in safehouse Crozco informed L/3 that he ordered by Montes group to establish contact with L/3 in order expedite first shipment of arms and ammo which urgently needed. When L/3 mentioned possiblity airlift from San Cristóbal area through small privately chartered plane, Crozco intensely interested and acceded to L/3 request that he first meet with "responsible high-level" FAR representatives. Crozco stated that in his opinion L/3 should discuss whole operation with Montes himself and volunteered to arrange meeting in near future.

3. LIRING/3 states that he is awaiting further instructions from Crozco and is prepared for trip to Chiapas once final arrangements made.

4. Re Garcia L/3 reported that he has not reappeared and when he queried Orozco about him, Ixxx Orozco stated he personally not acquainted with him, since strict compartmentation being enforced. Also in course of conversation Orozco stated that only part of the medicines procured by L/3 had arrived at their dexxtination and it is presumed that remainder was captured by Guatemalan army. He added that FAR needed a docxtor urgently for about ten days and would appreciate L/3 a ranging this if feasible. L/3 suggested to Rowton that Raûl Moreno, who is in third year of medical studies, might qualify if Rowton could not come up with fully qualified docxtor.

5. Request traces Moises Crozco Leal.

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att No I to Hmma - 32778 of 15 august 1967





MOISES
OROZCO
LEAL

20 AÑOS EN MEXICO
36-~~38~~45 EDAD APROX.

28 July,1967

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/3.

1. On the morning of 27 July,1967, the day after his return to Mexico City, Rowton contacted LIRING/3 at his home and arranged for a meeting at the safehouse at 1130 that same morning. L/3 commented that he was greatly relieved that Rowton had returned safely since many things had happened during his absence and L/3 had felt uncertain about what he should do in the event Rowton had been delayed any longer.

2. At the 1130 meeting at the safehouse, LIRING/3 reported that he and LIRING/4 had accompanied L/3's half brother in his car to Sabinas,Coah., on the afternoon of 10 July (the day that Rowton had departed). L/3 related that immediately on arrival he had his half-brother introduce him as planned to the judge in Nueva Rosita, a small village near Sabinas. L/3 reported to Rowton that the judge is named Francisco Mario Valdez Hernández and is actually a "Juez Menor" but also a notario publico and an "agente del Ministério Público", and,as such, has authority to issue important documents. According to L/3, judge Valdez, who gave the appearance of a homosexual, spoke openly about his ability and willingness to issue false documents and arrange for a passport for L/3 in the alias Alberto Zárate. He promised to take care of the matter for the sum of 2,000 pesos, but accepted a down payment of 1,500 pesos and gave L/3 a receipt for this amount "para el arreglo de un pasaporte mexicano", addressed to Alberto Zárate Vidal. In addition LIRING/3's half-brother persuaded the judge to ixx arranng for the issuance to Alberto Zárate of an identity card showing that.Zárate was an "actuario" of the Ministry of Labor, and for a driver's license,so that Zárate would have additional documents attesting to his identity.

3. LIRING/3 commented that he was certain that he could arrange for false papers for Rowton in the event the latter felt he could use such papers. L/3 continued that he and L/4 then proceeded to Nuevo Loredo and picked up the three Cuban passports that his half-brother had purchased on his behalf for the sum of 500 pesos. L/3 explained that although the persons to whom the passports were issued were dead they might conceivably be of use to Rowton in the future.He added that the hotel clerk who sold the documents to his half-brother had originally asked 1,500 pesos but apparently was glad to get the 500 when it was offered in cash on the table.

4. LIRING/3 continued that he and L/4 returned to Mexico City on 14 July

taking the bus at ~~Torreón.~~ LIRING/3 then announced jubilantly that a few days after his return, while he was visiting the safehouse in the hope of Rowton's return or at least a telephone call, he received a telephone call from an anonymous man, obviously a Guatemalan, who asked whether he could make a trip to Tapachula in order to meet with a friend. When L/3 indicated that he could make the trip, the person instructed him to wait in the lobby of the Figueroa movie house until he was approached by the "friend". LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then proceeded by train to Tapachula (on 19 July) and waited in the lobby as instructed. To his great surprise, he was approached by the same Guatemalan young woman who had met him in GuatemalaCity in late January,1967, and told that a certain "Valentín" would contact him at his home in Mexico City in the near future and that this person was to be his new contact with FAR. LIRING/3 continued that since this appeared to be the sole purpose of the trip, he returned to Mexico City on 21 July in order to await the arrival of "Valentín". According to LIRING/3 this occurred in a rather strange way. When he returned home he found a note under the door with a brief text stating that someone had passed by to see him. The note was signed with a five-pointed star rather crudely drawn in the place of a signature. L/3 stated that he was completely puzzled at this, but on reflexion felt that the five-pointed star meant 1700 and he therefore went to the safehouse at 1700 that day to await further contact. According to L/3, a person did telephone him shortly after he arrived and identified himself as "Valentín" He asked L/3 to await another call at 1030 the following day so that a meeting could be arranged. L/3 continued that he finally succeeded in meeting with "Valentín and brought him to the safehouse on the evening of 25 July. He stated that he talked with this person until 0400 the following morning.

5. LIRING/3 reported that "Valentín", who identified himself by true name as Moisés Orozco Leal, Calle Tenis 88, Apt 5, Zona 21, Country Club, Col. Churubusco, Mexico City,D.F. Orozco stated to L/3 that he had been in Mexico some twenty years and had been engaged in propaganda work for the FAR. He added that recently he had received instructions to contact L/3 and talk with him "very frankly" concerning the procurement problem. He explained to L/3 that Far had had very disappointing experiences in the past and was in desperate need of secure and efficient channels for the procurement of arms and ammunition from the U.S. and Mexico. He stated that FAR had the cash necessary to purchase the arms and hoped that LIRING/3's commercial netweork could handle the procurement and transport. He indicated to L/3 that FAR had checked him out with favorable results both locally and with

the Cubans. In the course of conversation "Valentín" mentioned that Doctora Mercedes Pereira, whom L/3 had met in Havana, was currently in Mexico. "Valentín" stated that it was a very critical time for FAR and that everyone hoped that something would be resolved in Havana with regard to concrete aid from the Cubans. He indicated that in the past both the Cubans and the Soviets had done more talking than producing in both material and hard cash. In speaking of the most immediate needs, "Valentín" stated that FAR needed a doctor urgently to train the revolutionaries in first aid, and he asked L/3 whether he could recommend a doctor that might be willing to visit FAR headquarters for about ten days for this purpose. L/3 told Rowton that he promised to look into the matter soonest, adding that he had in mind his friend Raúl Moreno Monchee, who was a medical student and probably qualified to give first aid instruction.

LIREBEL-1 ?

5. LIRING/3 continued that he expressed his willingness to help FAR in the arms procurement effort, but would prefer to be able to talk directly with FAR leaders to get first-hand information as to their needs, and arrange secure methods of payment. When L/3 referred to the delinquent account (medicine and radio tubes) "Valentín" relpied that unfortunately only part of the medicine had arrived intact, the other part presumedly having been captured by the Guatemalan army. He promised that L/3 would be paid ~~mfx~~ for the material furnished and apologized for not having the money with him he added that he receives not financial assistence from FAR and has to live as best he can from his own resources. In reply to L/3's query, "Valentín" stated that he did not personally know "Gardia", since Far insisted on compartmentation, and there had been no need for him to meet "Garcia" in the past. He then lectured L/3 on security, stating that FAR prinicipal problem to date had been within the organization itself resulting from laxness on the part of revolutionarimis and outright betrayal by some members. He added that LIRING/3 had been assigned the battle-name "Rafael" and that henceforth he should use that name whenever dealing with FAR members.

6. LIRING/3 told Rowton that, in the course of conversation regarding possible supply channels, he mentioned the possibility of air-drops from small privately chartered planes, using ~~thx~~ Raúl Moreno as a pilot. According to L/3, "Valentín" showed immediate interest in this, commenting that he was certain FAR would be most interested. He then stated that he felt L/3 was an important enough asset to meet directly with César Montes himself and he promised to look into the possibility of arranging a personal interview. L/3 replied that he would welcome this opportunity since it would clarify

the entire picture for him and enable him to render the most efficient service to FAR. "Valentín" promised to have some specific word on this at their next meeting which he requested for Friday 28 July, promising to come to L/3's home between 1500 and 1700. "Valentín" explained that although the safehouse appeared to be an excellent meeting place, it was FAR policy not to use the same apartment or place of meeting more than once.

7. Rowton met with LIRING/3 again at 1430 on 29 July,1967, at the safehouse The second meeting had been scheduled for 1900 on 28 July, but on arrival at hte safehouse, Rowton found a note from L/3 stating that he would not be able to make the 1900 meeting but would see Rowton at 1430 the following day. The only explanation in the note for the delay was "cosas muy importantes han sucedido". When Rowton met with LIRING/3 the next day at 1430, the latter explained that "Valentín" had left a note at his home saying the meeting would be delayed, and then appeared unannounced when L/3 was not at home and talked briefly with LIRING/4. L/3 stated that he alarmed LIRING/4 by stating that he ("Valentín") had a wounded man that must be taken care of urgently and asked L/4 to pass on the message to L/3 in the hope that L/3 could look into the possbility of locating a good trusted doctor. "Valentín" promised to come back to the house as soon as he could. According to L/3, "Valentín" reappeared unannounced at about 1000 on 29 July, and showed L/3 a telegram which he had just received from Guatemala City. The telegram contained the text " If you are interested in further details concerning the business, present yourself here", and was addressed to "Valentín" in his true name and address. L/3 stated that he could not recall the sender's name or address but he assumed that it would be an alias in any case.

8. According to L/3, "Valentín" explained to him that the telegram meant that a meeting with César Montes could be arranged and that L/3 should accordingly prepare himself for the trip. In reply to L/3's query, "Valentín" stated that this took priority over the operation involving the wounded comrade, who was expected in Mexico City in about 7-8 days. "Valentín" then stated that he and L/3 would have to make a trip to Tapachula as soon as feasible in order to receive from a FAR contact a sealed envelope containing the name of the first contact in Guatemala City. He added that he himself would not know what was in the envelope and would himself proceed on into Guatemala with the FAR contact who delivered the letter. He added that L/3 would then have to return to Mexico City and fly into Guatemala City under commercial cover, since it would be too dangerous to

proceed on to Guatemala City from Tapachula by air (the airport being small and all travelers being subject to the curiosity and scrutiny of the local officials). Valtentín then stated that L/3 should be able to pass through the Bustemala City airport without difficulty provided he kept his eye out for a certain José Linares, an ex-Chief of Police who worked for the North-American Embassy and had a complete file on all suspect persons who might enter or leave the airport. "Valentín" described Linares as a man of short stature, thin, grey hair combed in a high peak in front, usually dressed in a double-breasted jacket. "Valentín" added that Linares was considered the most dangerous man at the airport, although he is not an official but simply a secret agent of the North Americans.

9. "Valentín" then, according to L/3, stated that the latter should procure the following items at once so that he could bring them to Tapachula with him:

1) Khaki shirt and trousers(pantalón y camisa de lona muy gruesos)
2) Leather combat boots (zapatos de campaña)
3) Browning or Walter 9mm automatic weapon with 3 clips and 50 rounds of ammunition.
4) Detonators with wick or electric fuse
5) Gauze for medical treatment
6) Three pills of most potent poison avialable.

007

"Valentín" explained that the Dorwning automatic was the best since it could be converted easily into a "machinegun" with its clip of 13 cartridges. The Walter was also good since it could be fitted with a silencer. "Valentín" also explained that the poison capsules were desirable to be taken in the event of capture by the army to avoid the possibility of anyone confessing under torture. He added that one was for the use of L/3 and the other two for the comrades who would be his escorts.

10. "Valentín" further explained that L/3 should open the sealed envelope he had received in Tapachula when he was aboard the plane enroute to Guatemala City, memorize the name and address and then destroy the paper. He added quickly that he realized L/3 could open the envelope any time after he received it in Tapachula, and he was free to do so, but it was hoped for security reasons that he would open it only after he had left Mexico City airport. "Valentín" added that he himself had no idea of what name would appear on the paper, but in any case he was sure that it would be the name of a person not directly involved in revolutionary activities.

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LIRING/3 was to pay a friendly visit to this person, making no reference to politics, but simply using a prearranged code word in the conversation. This recognition signal would lead to the first meeting with the comrades (probably two) who would escort LIRING/3 to César Montes.

11. LIRING/3 stated that he had another meeting with "Valentín" at 2200 that same evening (29 July) at the Café Literario where he hopes to obtain more **detail** regarding the timing of the trips. L/3 said that he preferred to make the first trip (to Tapachula) on 1 August since LIRING/4 was greatly upset over the recent developments and had to be calmed down. He added that L/4 was very pessimistic over L/3's chances of returning from such a trip alive and he would have to reassure her that he intended to take all possible precautions.

12. Inasmuch as Rowton's careful review of LIENVOY traffic for the period ~~17x~~ 14-24 July failed to reveal any telephone call from anyone asking L/3 to make the trip to Tapachula, and in fact revealed traffic indicating that LIRING/3 was in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July, when he claimed to be in Tapachula, Rowton stated that he did not believe L/3's story regarding his initial contact with "Valentín" and his trip to Tapachula. Since Rowton's telephone answering service reported repeated messages from "señor Juarez" and L/3 himself in true name, he felt he could use this rather than intimate in any way that L/3's (safehouse) phone was tapped. LIRING/3 became thoroughly upset, as he had done on the previous occasion when Rowton had impugned his veracity, and assured Rowton with tears in his eyes that he had always been "fundamentally" honest, although he might have exaggerated in the matter of details and exact dates. L/3 was so emotionally disturbed that he felt it unwise to press the matter further at that time and proposed to L/3 that he (Rowton) meet with LIRING/4 that evening at 2200, when he would be meeting with "Valentín" again. Rowton turned down L/3's invitation to be present at the Café Literario so that he could get a look at "Valentín" himself, since Rowton hoped that the meeting would be covered in any case by the Station team (which had L/3 under surveillance since the previous afternoon).

DON'T UNDERSTAND THIS. IF L-3 CALLING THE ANSWERING SERVICE, HOW CAN HE TELL ROWTON HE IN TAPACHULA AT SAME TIME? SEEMS IRRATIONALITY.

13. LIRING/4 came to the safehouse at 2200 and Rowton was able to talk privately with her for about two hours. She arrived in a highly emotional state, alleging that she was not aware of what was happening and was sure that L/3 was heading for disaster. She exclaimed that "making capital was one thing, but risking one's life was another", and that although she agreed with the principle of the revolution, she could not accept the terrible

consequences of revolutionary activities that had suddenly become a reality for her. She complained that L/3 kept her in the dark about many things and that she could not understand his willingness to risk his life and the happiness of his family "so precipitously". When Rowton questioned her discreetly as to L/3's trip to Tapachula, she stated in uncontrollable sobs (they appeared to Rowton quite genuine) that he suddenyl left the preceding week, saying he was going to Chiapas and disappeared for 3-4 days. She said she was so upset she could not remember anything but the feeling of abandonment. She then complained that although Rowton was the only person she could turn to in a crisis like the one she went through last week, she could not locate him anywhere. She called his telephone (answering service) repeatedly and then in desperation called LIRING/7 in the hope that he would know something (L/7 replied that he di not know "Which Harris" she was referring to). LIRING/4 then stated that she realized suddenyl that if L/3 were to disappear she would be subject to deportation to Cuba, a fate which she apparently genuinely dreaded. Rowton assured her that he would do everything possible to see that she was taken care of in this eventuality, but she protested that L/3 was the only person she could hope to find happiness with and Rowton could not bring him back if anything happened to him.

14. Rowton then stated that before L/3 could take such a trip with serious risks involved, he would have to study the situation thoroughly. He explained that at the moment he had serious doubts regarding the contacts that have brought L/3 to this point. L/4 replied that she herself had seen the latest contact ("Valentín") only once when he came to the house and gave her the message regarding the wounded person. When Rowton queried her again concerning the trip to Tapachula, she stated that L/3 had told her upon his return that he had asked someone else to make daily calls to Rowton's answering service, and upbraided her for calling. (This would explain what appeared to be L/3's daily calls during the period 19-21 July, but it would not explain L/3's conversations with Berta Wigisser and Sergio Valdez on 20/7/67 and his remark to Berta Wigisser on 21/7/67 that he "did not go out of town after all".)

15. Rowton felt that, although his meeting with L/4 was not particularly productive, it served its purpose in advising L/3 indirectly that he did not accept L/3's story of the trip to Tapachula and his initial contact with "Valentín".

Wallace B Rowton

1 August,1967

1. At meeting with Rowton 1700 31 July LIRING/3 reported that Moisés Crozco Leal, who claimed be L/3's new FAR liaison for procurement of arms, currently staying in his apartment on Calzada Tacubaya. L/3 explained to Rowton that at 2200 29 July meeting with Crozco, latter stated that he had ~~instructions~~ "ordenes" from FAR headquarters to escort L/3 to Tapachula for contact instructions and instructed L/3 procure immediately Browning or Walter 9mm automatic with ~~52~~ three clips and at least 50 cartridges plus detonators with normal or elctric fuse and three poison tablets of highest possible potency which ~~he~~ (L/3) would needs on trip from Guatemala City to Montes headquarters. Crozco, however, insisted that L/3 bring these items with him to Tapachula and added that he would himself see to it that they were safely delivered to Guatemala City for eventual pick-up by L/3.

2. At end of meeting Crozco asked L/3 to put him up for the night at his home "since it was very late and in any case he wanted to discuss their travel plans further". L/3 did so without the least suspicion Crozco's true motives, and appeared to Rowton to have accepted Crozco's bona fides although he admitted that he had never heard of Crozco before latter's unexpected approach to him 25 July. L/3 stressed to Rowton that Crozco revealed an astounding knowledge Guatemalan revolution, Cuba, as well as L/3's past activities and dates his trips to Guatemala.

3. Rowton stated to L/3 that his preliminary checks revealed that Crozco in all probability a deserter from FAR who actually using L/3's apartment as a hideout. Rowton confessed he could not understand why Crozco would want to return to Guatemala with~~xxx~~ or without LIRING/3, but urged L/3 to attempt to get the truth from Crozco posing as sympathetic but indicating that he was aware of Crozco's true status in the hope that Crozco could be moved to a safehouse and made available for thorough interrogation. L/3 agreed and arrangements made for Rowton/L/3 meeting at ~~xxxxxx~~ midnight 1 August.

4. When L/3 appeared at 0030 he reported enthusiastically that he had succeeded in breaking Crozco down but that he had had to call on his friends Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno "for help". Crozco stated that he had been sent to mountains to organize guerrilla bands but found everyone "stupid" and his task impossible. He added that David Casasola who was with him was undisciplined and made mistakes that led to capture of many of his men and probably to his own capture. Crozco continued insisting that he was the

only intelligent revolutionary, referring to "the FAR Party" and at one point calling Montes a "cabrón". When he asked L/3 who had given him the information that he was a deserter and L/3 refused to divulge his source, Crozco, according to L/3, exclaimed: "It was Roberto; I know." Crozco then stated that he intended to form his own revolutionary movement which he named "First of May" and had approached L/3 for xxx support since he at the moment had no financial or material means. L/3 told Rowton that it was then that he realized that Crozco intended to use the supplies listed para one above for his own use and that once he turned them over to Crozco he would never see them or Crozco again.

5. In reply to L/3's query as to how Crozco had gotten to him, Sergio Valdez (who joined L/3 at the end of the session) explained in the presence of Crozco that Alberto Domingo had referred him to him and that he knew nothing of Crozco's background. At this point Valdez threatened Crozco with physical violence xxx exclaiming to L/3 that they must dispose of him at once so that he could not reveal vital secrets of the revolution. L/3 claimed to Rowton that he managed to calm Valdez down and get him out of the apartment. L/3 stated that he left both Valdez and Moreno "on guard" outside the apartment house in the event Crozco tried to escape before he could confer with Rowton.

Sergio the KARATE type

6. In view of this highly explosive development Rowton instructed L/3 to return to the apartment and attempt to persude Crozco to accompany him to a hotel where Rowton could arrange some sort of protective surveillance until Crozco thoroughly interrogated. L/3 insisted that Crozco be kept incommunicado in view of the information he possesses about L/3, Valdez and Moreno. Rowton promised to do the best he could but insisted that Crozco be removed from ~~the~~ L/3's apartment as soon as possible, L/3 promised to make every effort and asked Rowton meet with him again at 0300 to discuss results his effort.

7. At 0400 Rowton met L/3 at the safehouse (where AIRING/4 had moved with their child) and L/3 reported that Crozco could not be persuaded to leave the apartment. Although he feigned calmness, L/3 realized that he was terrorized of what might await him the moment he stepped out of the apartment house. Crozco promised to talk to L/3 again at 1000 that same morning when he had more time to think things over. L/3 stated that he left Valdez and Moreno on guard outside the apartment house (in Moreno's car) on the possible chance that Crozco would make a run for it. L/3 stated that "under no circumstances" would Crozco be allowed to escape.

8. Rowton, not excluding the possiblity of Crozco's commiting suicide in L/3's apartment or attracting attention of the neighbors, recommended that L/3, Moreno and Valdez enter the apartment soonest and remain inside with Crozco until Rowton could work out some plan to remove him from the apartment early ~~xkexfz~~ that same morning. L/3 promised to try but was not at all sure that he could convince Crozco to open the door (which he had bolted from the inside). In any case he assured Rowton that he and his two friends would remain on guard outside so that they could surveil or seize Crozco the moment he left the premises. L/3 stated that he was quite certain that Crozco was unarmed and without funds and could easily be controlled by ~~thexthreexofx~~ Moreno and Valdez, thus permitting him (L/3) to communicate with Rowton.

9. Alternatives in this sensitive situation appear to be following:

(a) Rowton instruct L/3 deliver Crozco to specified place where he can be turned over to "pistoleros" hired by Rowton for purpose of getting Crozco off hands of L/3 and his friends and detaining him long enough for interrogation. L/3 assured Rowton that he able make delivery and agrees desirability thorough interrogation by Rowton or person designated by him. Delivery could possibly be arranged without presence Valdez and Moreno.

(b) LIRING/3 reveal entire affair to LIRING and/or ~~xx~~ FAR (probably via Ernesto Capoano de Vecchio) and let decision rest with them, interrogating Crozco as best he could in the meantime in his apartment.

(c) Let Crozco escape, after giving him enough money to make his way out of town or to another hideout.

10. Alernative (a) would/permit lengthy interrogation but would involve enventual disposal of Crozco that would be acceptable Moreno and Valdez (L/3 would accept Rowton final decision). L/3 could allege subsequently that Crozco disposed of by Rowton pistoleros and report this to LIRING and FAR. Alternative (b) would mean loss to WOFACT of valuable debriefing if this deemed desirable. Alternative (c) according to LIRING/3 probably not feasible since Valdez and Moreno fanatic enough to kill Crozco themselves rather than see him escape.

|| 11. L/3 insists that he has not revealed Rowton's coaching in this affair to either Valdez or Moreno.

Wallace B. Rowton

What about alternative D - turn. O over to LITENSOR (which was actually done).

14-00000

3 August,1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report on Developments in Moisés Orozco Case.

1. During the early morning hours of 1 August,1967, Rowton remained in constant contact with L/3, either through brief meetings with him or through LIRING/4 who acted as a cut-out at the phone of the safehouse. When Rowton telephoned L/4 at the safehouse at about 0730 on 1 August, she stated that L/3 had called a few minutes before and passed the message that "things were a ltiile better, but he needed help". Rowton knew that L/3 and Sergio Valdez together with Raúl Moreno were surveilling the Tacubaya apartment house in order to pick up Crozco if and when he tried to leave the premises. L/3 had told Rowton at an earlier meeting (0400) that morning that when Crozco refused to accompany him peacefully to a hotel, he gave Crozco two alternatives. First he stated (bluffing) that he had a direct channel to FAR and would query FAR about Crozco and bring with him a FAR representative at 1000 that morning and if Orozco had a clear conscience he would have nothing to worry about; secondly, if Crozco did not desire this he could take 3000 pesos which L/3 put in an envelope and leave the apartment for some other place of refuge. L/3 explained to Rowton that he hoped Crozco would take the second alternative so that he and Valdez and Moreno could follow him or seize him as he left the apartment. L/3 asked Rowton to assist in this operation by providing a few pistoleros. Rowton, feeling that he might be able to arrange to take Crozco off L/3's hands once he was out of the apartment (provided the Station could provide a safehouse and several unilateral agents to guard Crozco and eventually interrogate him) promised to hire several pistoleros who would be unwitting of the true situation to help L/3 and his friends. L/3 also asked for a weapon which he said might be necessary if Crozco gave him any trouble. Rowton, of course, refused to comply, saying that since Crozco was unarmed it was unnecessary at that time.

2. When Rowton talked again to L/3 on the phone (from the safehouse) the latter reported that things were still quite difficult. He explained that Crozco was still in the apartment and refused to answer the doorbell,obviously terrorized that L/3 had already notified the FAR of his whereabouts L/3 reported in addition that Raúl Moreno had taken off in his car,apparently too tired to continue the surveillance; he and Sergio Valdez were consequently left alone without a car to surveil Crozco in the event he left the apartment. L/3 again appealed to Rowton for help. Rowton stalled since

6 201-798301

he was unable to confirm whether the Station had any unilateral assets to assist or in fact was interested in taking over Crozco from L/3 until after 0900 that morning. When Rowton talked to L/3 again on the phone at about 0915, L/3 reported that Crozco had left the apartment at 0830 and proceeded directly via pesero to his mother's house (Tenis 188/5) in Colinia Country Club and that L/3 and ergio Valdez had succeeded in surveilling him there and were at that moment watching the house from nearby. About 20 minutes later L/3 reported that Crozco had left the house and was at that moment in a nearby barbershop. L/3 added that he and Valdez could not carry on the surveillance much longer since they were becoming conspicuous (as later reported, a police car (unmarked) was spotted by Valdez in the vicinity and might have approached them if the house was actually under surveillance by the Mexican police).

3. Rowton therefore reported to the Station that he had instructed L/3 to remain on surveillance for about 10 minutes more and that unless Station assets could take over the surveillance would have to be abandoned. Rowton was informed that a decision had been made to request the Mexican police to arrest Crozco at the home of his mother and that therefore L/3 could be taken off the case. Rowton met with L/3 again at the safehouse at about 1030 and the latter reported that he and Sergio Valdez had been forced to abandon the surveillance effort. Rowton alleged that in the meantime he had rounded up three "pistoleros" and sent them to the house but shortly thereafter had received from them a "danger signal", indicating that the house was being watched by the Mexican police and that they could not become involved. As a result they had left the area and could not be of any further use.(Rowton felt constrained to invent this story since he was aware that Crozco's arrest was imminent and in order to throw the blame off himself when the report reached L/3 and Valdez).

4. Rowton met with L/3 that afternoon at 1700 at a small coffeeshop on Reforma and denied to L/3 that he had any knowledge of what had happened to Crozco in the meantime. L/3 reported that he ant Valdez were attempting to make plans as to the best course of action. Rowton advised L/3 to contact Jacobo Rodriquez Padilla and through him to attempt to contact a FAR representative in Mexico City (possibly through the lawyer Ernesto Capoano). L/3 agreed that this was essential since he and Valdez had come to the conclusion that Crozco must somehow be "eliminated" before he fell into the hands of the Mexican police since he knew too much, especially about L/3's

commercial cover plans and activities and his past connections with FAR. L/3 promised to meet with Jacobo the following morning and press him for contact with the FAR. In the meantime Rowton continued to feign ignorance of the arrest of Crozco (which took place about 1000 on 1 August,1967).

5. Rowton met again with L/3 at his Tacubaya apartment at 1800 on 2 August. L/3 reported that he had talked with Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla at 1200 that xxxx day in the Café Literario but with disappointing results. Jacobo as usual appeared very fearful of involving himself in any way politically, and when L/3 informed him that he had to see someone from FAR urgently and it occurred to him that the lawyer Ernesto Capoano might be able to arrange the contact, Jacobo replied that he could not vouch for Capoano at all as far as political matters were concerned. He stated that Capoano was generally helpful for Guatemalans seeking papers and legalizing their status (for which he gave his services gratis) but he was not sure that Capoano would stick out his neck for L/3. According to L/3 he then dropped the matter, without diclosing to Jacobo that he was interested in Crozco, feeling that it would be too risky to bring Capoano into the picture (although Jacobo had offerred to arrange a meeting with him for L/3).

6. L/3 continued that he felt his only other alternative was to talk the matter over xk with Cepeda in/his LIRING office. He therefore went directly there after having talked with Jacobo, and, not finding Cepeda in, went to the office of Curbelo. He managed to see Curbelo privately and related to him the entire affair. He explained that originally he had had a very discreetx contact with FAR but that unexpectedly this contact had disappeared ("Garcia"). Recently however, equally unexpectedly, a new contact in the person of Moisés Crozco Leal had appeared claiming that he was a bona fide FAR representative and had been referred to L/3 by Alberto Domingo of Siempre. L/3 purposely stressed this, commenting that he assumed that Alberto was in touch with LIRING and therefore a person to be trusted. L/3 then informed Curbelo that he found several loop-holes in Crozco's story and decided to check on him. He contacted a friend in Guatemala and discovered to his amazement that Crozco had deserted from FAR and was actually in hiding in Mexico. L/3 revealed to Curbelo that Crozco had locked himself in L/3's apartment the preceding night after he had confessed to L/3 his true status. L/3 conluded that as far as he knew Crozco was currently in hiding at his mother's home. L/3 then stated that he needed desperately to communicate these facts to FAR so that appropriate action could be taken to eliminate Crozco before he fell into the hands of the Mexican police

and revealed very sensitive information about FAR as well as about his own(L/3's) involvement. L/3 commented to Rowton that Curbelo appeared thoroughly shaken by this and his hand trembled as he made notes. He replied to L/3 that he would communicate this development immediately to FAR Cuba inthe hope that he would receive some guidance to pass along to L/3.

7. L/3 then reported that he and Sergio Valdez (apparently both were disgusted with Raúl Moreno for having left them holding the bag and did not recontact him again) had decided that it was essential to discover whether Crozco had been arrested so that they could plan some sort of action to "eliminate" him before he could be deported to Guatemala. L/3 reported that Valdez had sent his girl-friend Alejandrina URBINA TORRES of the glass factory (Plaza Miravalle) to the home of Crozco's mother in an attempt to determine whether Crozco was still there or arrested in the meantime. L/3 later (at 2200) that evening reported that no one had answered the door at the apartment and hence the woman friend of Valdez had been unable to learn anything about the fate of Crozco. L/3 added that he and Valdez had struck upon another plan which they hoped would flush out the true facts. In the meantime he asked Rowton to attempt to determine whether Crozco had been arrested. When Rowton telephoned L/3 the following morning at 0900 as he had promised he again denied any knowledge and suggested that L/3 go ahead with the plan and report to Rowton that evening at 1800. (Rowton did not wish to have prior knowledge of the plan since he felt it better for L/3 and Valdez to proceed on their own in a spontaneous manner so that L/3 would have a well backstopped story to give Curbelo when he met with him again.)

Wallace S. Rowton

3 August,1967

Subject: Monthly Report of Developments in the LIRING/3 Operation.

1. During the month of July,1967, the most important development in the LIRING/3 operation was the approach made to LIRING/3 by Miosés Crozco Leal, who purportedly conveyed instructions to L/3 from the FAR of Guatemala for a personal meeting with César Montes in the mountains of Guatemala. This new contact was reported to Rowton by LIRING/3 at the first meeting following Rowton's return from TDY in Goergetown,Guyana (26 July,1967). When Station traces revealed that Moisés Crozco had actually deserted the FAR forces some time after May,1967, and that FAR was actively looking for him most probably to eliminate him and thus prevent his revealing sentsitive information to the Mexicans and/or Guatemalans regarding FAR plans and activities, Rowton warned LIRING/3 against taking Crozco's statements and claims seriously and suggested that he question him carefully concerning his past connections with FAR. L/3 did so at his 31 July,1967, meeting with Crozco,who was then living in L/3's apartment (on Calzada Tacubaya), and informed Rowton later that evening that he had "broken" Crozco, and that the latter had admitted that he had deserted the FAR forces and claimed to be in the process of forming his own guerrilla movement to be called "Primer del Mayo".

2. In consultation with Rowton through the early morning hours of 1 August, LIRING/3 with the help of his friends Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno, attempted to persuade Crozco to leave L/3's apartment and remain in hiding in a nearby hotel (Which Norris K. Umphlett had rented in an alias "Antonio Sanchez" at Rowton's request). Crozco, however, refused to leave L/3's apartment with them by sneaked out at 0830 when he apparently thought that L/3 was not in the vicinity. L/3 and Sergio Valdez, however, were watching the apartment house and manged to surveil Crozco to the home of his mother in Colonia Country Club. L/3, however, on Rowton's instructions, aboandoned the surveillance of the house at about 0930 that morning. L/3 subsequently reported the affair to Curbelo of the LIRING office in the hope of getting word to FAR of the whereabouts of Crozco and of the ruse he attempted to play on L/3. The latter said that he str-ssed to Curbelo that it was Alberto Domingo of Siempre who had originally sent Crozco to LIRING/3 (through Sergio Valdez).

3. LIRING/3 continued to monitor the activities of his friend Sergio Valdez who during the month set up a company (Colrluz) in the workshop of his Mexican firend, señorita Alejandra Urbina Torres, at Plaza Miravalle in Mexico

— NO RI NO MEXI DAR [illegible]

City. In view of the response of the Venezuela Station (discouraging Rowton from directing L/3 into Venezuelan guerrilla activites with Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno) Rowton instructed L/3 to refrain from involvement with them in this aspect of the operation. He agreed, however, with L/3 that the new company gave him much-needed additional financial cover, especially in the eyes of the PBRUMENS in the likely event that they would question him more closely during a future trip into their area.

NO FI NO MORE OSA -

4. During the month, on a trip to Sabinas, Coah., L/3 succeeded through his half-brother in meeting Judge Francisco Mario Valdez of Nueva Rosita who promised to arrange for the issuance to L/3 in the alias Alberto Zárate Vidal of a (false) passport. LIRING/3 feels that the possession of such a false document will enhance his potential in the eyes of the PBRUMENS as well as FAR.

5. During his trip to northern Mexico LIRING/3 also managed to "purchase" the passports of three (deceased) Cubans who had left the documents together with other papers at the hotel in Nuevo Laredo where they had stayed prior to their supposedly clandestine entry into the U.S. L/3 procured these documents with Rowton's prior approval on the asumption that they might prove useful to Rowton at some future date.

6. In connection with the Moisés Orozco affair, Rowton uncovered an important instance of deception on the part of both LIRING/3 and LIRING/4. A review of LIFEAT interecepts revealed that L/3 was in the safehouse during the period 19-21 July, when he had claimed to Rowton that he was on a trip to Tapachula to receive contact instructions for his first meeting with Orozco. LIRING/3 apparently asked L/4 to backstop his story when Rowton queried her separately, since she did so (although claiming ignorance of the purpose of the trip). L/3 subsequently admitted to Rowton that he had not made the trip to Tapachula but had actually met Orozco through Sergio Valdez (who had been referred to him by Alberto Domingo of Siempre) and that he had not wanted to reveal this to Rowton until he"could figure out how Valdez fitted into the picture". Since Rowton and the Station felt that this was another opportunity to SCHWIRL LIRING/3, a request was repeated to Headquarters for a Spanish-speaking operator. The request could not be complied with at the time and Rowton has had to continue checking LIRING/3's reports as carefully as he can without benefit of the technical interrogation.

Wallace E Rowton

Wallace E. Rowton

201-798301

5 August,1967

Subject: Analysis of LIFEAT Traffic Relating to LIRING/3 Operation.
for the Period 29 June to 1 August,1967.

1. During this period the most significant operational support provided by LIFEAT intercepts occurred during the period 17 July to I August, the period of LIRING/3's contact with Moisés Orozco Leal. On 27 July,the first meeting Rowton had with L/3 after Rowton's return from TDY to Guyana, L/3 reported that he had been contacted in a mysterious manner by a FAR representative who identified himself by true name as Orozco. He related that he had received a telephone call requesting him to travel to Tapachula, andthat he had made the trip 19-21 July, and received contact instructions to meet with a certain "Valentín" in Mexico City. LIFEAT intercepts revealed, however, that L/3 was physically in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July. SAN 33(8.2) reveals that L/3 telephoned sra. Berta Wigisser and made a date for 1930 on 21/7/67 at the safehouse apartment. He commented that he did not go out of town after all. Furthermore Rowton's telephone answering service reported to him regular calls from L/3 asking for Rowton daily during the period he was allegedly out of town. This gave Rowton sufficient evidence to challenge L/3's story at his meeting on 29 July. In order to prtect the security of LIFEAT Rowton used the evidence of his telephone asnwering service and his own intuition and logic to discount L/3's story of his original contact with Orozco. LIRING/3 finally confessed that he had made up the story because of the involvement of his friend Sergio Valdez (who it now appears met Orozco through Alberto Domingo and introduced him to L/3). LIRING/3 felt that reporting the true facts to Rowton would not have been as intriguing in Rowton's eyes and would have made him appear dependent on Valdez for this productive aspect of the operation. On the morning of 31 July, LIRING/3 justified his action by stating that he continued to feel under extreme psychological pressure to "produce" for Rowton since he felt deeply obliged to him for the confidence and financial support he had been giving him. He now states that he realizes that he can repay Rowton only by reporting accurately and fully all deveopments in his dealings with FAR and other revolutionary groups.

IS L-3 A SIMPLETON?

2. All other LIFEAT intercepts relating to the Orozco affair check out with reports given to Rowton by LIRING/3, including the latter's effort to contact Capoano through Jacoto Rodriguez Padilla (SAN-37(22). In SAN-33(10.2) it is apparent that L/3 has discussed "señor Harris" or at least some contact he has with Sergio Valdez, since he states that "he" has not yet

returned. L/3 has admitted to Rowton that he has revealed to Sergio Valdez and Enrique Morales that he has a businessman who finances him in certain commercial ventures, but swears that he has never revealed Rowton's alias to anyone (this can most effectivley by checked in an SGSWIRL examination).

3. LIFEAT intercepts confirm the reports from LIRING/4 that she has made every effort to maintain social contact with Irti Cepero and Yolanda Díaz as well as Cubrbelo in the hope of keeping the door open to future re-employment in LIRING. LIRING/4's reports to Rowton appear reliable with the exception of the one relating to the alleged trip to Tapachula, when L/4 backstopped L/3's deception (although vaguely since she insisted that she did not know where he was during the period 19-21). This, of course, indicates that L/4 is basically loyal to L/3 and cannot be trusted to provide independent information conerning his movements and activities in the future.

4. SAM-32 (3.7) xnd confirms L/3's conversation with René Ochoa, his Honduran friend inxx Havana on 17/7/67. LIRING/3 subsequently received the latter from Ochoa mentioned in the intercept and passed the original to Rowton (5/8/67). LIFEAT intercepts of conversations between L/3 and his half-brother in Sabinas also confirm L/3's reports to Rowton concerning the false passport and birth-certificate for himself in the alias Alberto Zárate.

5. Additional control information was provided in SAM-29(4.7) concerning L/3's affair (amorous) with Silvia Durán, as well as with a new woman, Yolanda, with whom he attempted to make a date (SAM-35(9). This woman, whose husband's first name is Rolando, has telephone 43-25-59, and has not previously appeared in the L/3 operation. Rowton has not confronted L/3 with any data provided by LIFEAT of this nature in the hope of using it in an eventual SGSWIRL interview.

WBRowton

Wallace B Rowton

9 August, 1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Ernesto Capoano.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at 1700 at the Tacubaya apartment and remained with him until about 1900. LIRING/3 reported that he had telephoned Ernesto Capoano at his office on 4/8/67, after having obtained the phone number from César Tejeda Fonseca, the husband of the daughter of (Pascual) Ortiz Rubio (ex-President). L/3 stated that he did not identify himself to Capoano, but stated simply that he wanted to talk with him regarding a sensitive matter. According to L/3 Capoano said quickly: "Don't mention any names, but give me some idea of what it's all about". L/3 continued that he replied simply that it concerned "the medicine". At the mention of this, Capoano requested that the caller telephone him again at 1000 on 7/8/67 for an appointment, explaining that he had to leave town over the week-end. L/3 reported Capoano's number as 18-62-09.

2. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he called again on 7/8/67 as requested, still not identifying himself, Capoano asked to meet him in front of Gobernación at 1200. Each gave a general description of the other for recognition. When, however, L/3 appeared in front of Gobernación at the time appointed, he saw no sign of anyone answering the description of Capoano (about 45 years old, wearing dark glasses, with green suit), nor was he approached by anyone. After waiting about 30 minutes in the vicinity L/3 told Rowton that he left. L/3 then stated that he planned to drop in to Capoano's home that same evening since obviously the phone call had not smoked him out. He gave the address of Capoano as Calle Bucareli 128, apt. C-7, which he stated he received from César Tejeda.

3. When Rowton met with L/3 again at 1000 on 8 August, the latter reported that finally he had managed to contact Capoano at his home (and office). He reported that at about 1930 he rang the bell and was shown into a spacious and mce elegant apartment and asked to take a seat in what served as a waiting room. After about twenty minutes Capoano appeared, introduced himself, and led L/3 into his office.

4. The following is a verbatim account of the conversation between Capoano and LIRING/3, as recalled by Rowton from L/3's report:

L/3: I have come to see you on a rather delicate matter that is of great concern to me personally. Can we talk safely here?

Cap: Yes, I think it is private enough here in my office.

(Cap. then closed blinds) We can talk in a low voice, just to be sure. What is it you wish to talk to me about?

L/3: It concerns a person with whom I have recently been in contact. I must explain that I have certain commercial affairs in Guatemala and travel there more or less regularly. I have also had contacts of a rather delicate nature with elements there and also a contact here in Mexico City until recently. This particular contact was abruptly cut off for reasons I am not aware of, and apparently take up by the person I have come to talk to you about.

Cap: Who is this person?

L/3: I shall tell you later. In any case I have come to you since this person mentioned your name and I feel that you might be in a position to give me some advice. I stress again that I feel my commercial affairs have been jeopardized by this last contact.

Cap: So you are the person who called me last Friday.

L/3: Well, I wanted to reach you in the most discreet manner.

Cap: You did very well. As I told you when you called, I avoid mentioning names on the telephone, since I am sure that my phone is tapped. I am afraid that in all probability my mail is being intercepted. For your information I was at Gobernación, just to take a look at you, but I did not approach you feeling that surely you would come to my home eventually.

L/3: Fine. Now let me give you an account of what has happened to me. As I said, this new contact met with me several times and asked for a certain kind of help, claiming to represent certain elements in Guatemala and mentioning names and facts that concerned my own previous activities there. At first I accepted him at face value, but later he made certain comments that disturbed me. He criticized the most important faction from that area and suddenly asked me to arrange for a trip to Tapachula so that he could enter without formality. He also asked me to put him up in my home and requested that I provide certain things that appeared strange.

Cap: Did he ask for a revolver?

L/3: Yes, but a special one - a Browning automatic with three clips and fifty cartridges, canvas clothes and, most surprising three poison pills. He said there items were to be for my own use once I entered the territiory of Guatemala. All this appeared strange to me in the light of my previous contacts. The other people had never asked for such things and always had a place of their own to live in while in

Mexico City. I therefore queried him carefully, and, to make a long story short, he broke down (se abrió) a told me things that convinced me that he did not represent the main faction and had in fact deserted from it some time ago. After this he insisted on remaining in my home and I was forced to give him the following alternative. I alleged that I had another contact with his people and that I planned to consult with this contact and bring him along with me the following day at 1000 so that the three of us to continue the conversation. When the person showed obvious alarm at this, I said that he could, however, if he choose, leave my home of his own free will and I gave him some money - 300 pesos - in an envelope, just in case he was without funds. I felt very concerned about my commercial affairs and wanted to seperate myself from this person as soon as possible. I had no desire to do him any harm, despite the fact that by that time I realized that he had tried to trick me and even place my life in jeopardy. In any event he left the apartment on his own the following morning, leaving my keys, the envelope with the money, and a letter for me on the table

Cap: A letter? This is very important. Can you tell me who this man is?

L/3: Yes. His name is Moisés Crozco Leal, and he has lived many years in Mexico.

Cap: Ah, yes, I know this man. He was arrested recently by the Mexican police and released Friday. I have been informed of this by his family.

L/3: Then things are worse than I imagined. Who knows what he has revealed to the Mexicans about my business connections.

Cap: Please do not be too worried. I have been given to understand that Crozco, who is a valiant person, conducted himself in a commendable manner. I doubt that he revealed anything about you. Now the important thing for me to tell you is that I have certain very indirect delicate contacts with them there ("arrita") and I am in a position to check on this person.

L/3: I am still worried since he possesses so much detailed knowledge. I was planning another trip to Guatemala City, but now I don't know what to do.

Cap: Please do not move until you have heard from me.

L/3: Fine, then here is my full name, telephone number and my references.

Cap: I really don't need referneces.

L/3: But I shall give them to you anyway, since I want to be aboveboard with you in all this. (L/3 then writes out names of César Tejeda and Jacobo Rodriquez Padilla).

Cap: So you know César Tejeda Fonseca and Jacobo. Fine. Now the important thing is the letter. Could you give me a copy as soon as possible? this is very important. You have done a very wise thing in coming to see me about all this - much wiser than you could realize.

L/3: The letter is typewritten on my typewriter and unsigned, but I'm sure anyone who knows Crozco could recognize the style.

Cap: Yes. Could you send it by hand with Jacobo? Whatever you do, please do not telephone and talk about anything sensitive, or use names.

L/3: I could send my wife tomorrow morning, or possibly even later tonight.

Cap: Alright,but send it as soon as possible.

L/3: Just one other thing. I am anxious to get in touch with an old friend of mine, Dra. Pereira. I understand that she is in town, and I might be able to contact her through you. What I suggest is this, that you give her my name and telephone number and ask her to call me at her convenience.

Cap: Fine. I'll do what I can. In any case I'll be in touch with you. Again please don't leave town until you have talked with me again onthis matter.

5. Rowton made a date with L/3 for 1030 the following day (9/8/67) to pass to L/3 a copy of the Crozco letter. It will be recalled that he gave the original of the letter to Abelaric Curbelo. Incidentally L/3 stated that no mention of the Cubans was made during his conversation with Capoano.

WBRowton
Wallace B. Rowton

201-798301

14-00000

9 August, 1967

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Knowledge of Rowton Alias.

1. On the evening of 8 August, 1967, LIRING/3 gave Rowton the attached typewritten statement of the persons who might be aware of Rowton's alias, as per Rowton request to L/3 at their previous meeting.

2. L/3 has explained that he feels safe enough from a security standpoint in his relationship with Rowton, since at present he actually does know or has known a fair number of Greeks in Mexico and Central America, including Pandelis Economou, Gazdelis, Batsakis (all of whom he has met) and Stylianos Prevolis, Angel Arvanitis, with whom he is in indirect business contact through Rowton. He feels that if Rowton's name (alias) comes up either in conversation with the Cubans or Guatemalans, he can cover it under the umbrella of his Greek commercial contacts without difficulty.

3. L/3 cannot recall either Sergio Martínez or Hugo del Pino ever bringing up Rowton name or querying him about Rowton's current activities. He recalls Martínez on one occasion many months ago simply asking him to give "señor Harris" his regards.

W B Rowton
Wallace B Rowton

6 p.

Personas que están enteradas de mis actividades en forma general:

Arnold Rodríguez NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos
Osmani Cienfuegos NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE " " " " " "
Ismael Echemendía NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE " " " " " "
Personas de Seguridad del Estado en
Cuba NO CONOCEN POR MI CONDUCTO NINGUNA DE MIS ACTIVIDADES
Zepeda NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE Le he dicho que mis informes provienen de amigos
centroamericanos.
Joaquín Hernández Armas
Embajador. En el mismo caso de Zepeda.
René Ochoa NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE, cree que mis actividades están patrocinadas
normales
por negocios particulares con Griegos.
" García" NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos.
Compañeros de Guatemala En el mismo caso de García.
Curbelo y Abreu en el mismo caso de Zepeda y el Embajador.
Sergio Valdez NO CONOCE SU NOMBRE sabe que estoy relacionado con Griegos.
Raúl Moreno en el mismo caso de Valdez.

Sergio y Hugo de comercial CONOCEN SU APELLIDO, posiblemente hablaron de usted con Echemendía, Zepeda y el Embajador. No lo aseguro.

Enrique Morales y su esposa CONOCEN SU APELLIDO pero suponen que me patrocina comprándome cuadros . Saben que estoy relacionado con Griegos para negocios normales en Guatemala. (La esposa de Morales es de orígen guatemalteco y su hermano Ricardo es Marxista.)
Jacobo Rodríguez NO SABE ABSOLUTAMENTE COMO Y PORQUE DESARROLLO MIS ACTIVIDADES.
Carlos Navarrete En el mismo caso de Jacobo.
Enrique Martínez NO SABE ABSOLUTAMENTE NADA supone que quiero instalar un negocio en San Cristóbal.
Carlos Navarrete conoce a Esperanza la esposa de Morales.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

47

1		5	
2	1	6	
3		7	
4	2	8	

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/IC 2.

S E C R E T 1502Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2476

ACTION

15 AUG 67 IN 31815

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

PBRUMEN

1. IN INITIAL TALKS WITH LIRING-3 IN LATE JULY MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL MENTIONED MERCEDES PEREIRA (WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN HAVANA 1962-64 AS SPANISH REVOLUTIONARY INVOLVED IN SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION) NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY. LIRING-3 OBTAINED HER ADDRESS FROM ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO.

2. LIRING-3 SPENT FOUR HOURS 13 AUG WITH PEREIRA AND 17 YEAR OLD ARMANDO PEREIRA WHO CLAIMED HE RECEIVED GUERRILLA TRAINING CUBA. PEREIRA STATED HER SISTER SOFIA PEREIRA CURRENTLY WORKING CZECH EMBASSY HAVANA EXPECTS TRANSFER CZECH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY IN "NEAR FUTURE". PEREIRA WHO IN PROCESS BECOMING MEXICAN CITIZEN SAID SHE STILL IN CONTACT WITH GUAT REVOLUTIONARIES AND HOPES CONTINUE SUPPORT GUAT REVOLUTION FROM MEXICO AS "MATTER OF CONSCIENCE". SHE FELT LIRING-3 SHOULD MEET GUAT FRIENDS WHOM PLANNING INTRODUCE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS AND TRACES. STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED ONLY 1962 LIFEAT INFO TO EFFECT PEREIRA (THEN LIVING MEXICO CITY) WAS IN CONTACT WITH NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST EDELBERTO (TORRES) ESPINOZA (201-252883?).

[illegible] running traces

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: WH/2/G
EXT: 6026
DATE: 15 AUGUST 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 23 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: cl/cH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR c/SB5, c/ci, c/ci/ea, c/FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

15 17 10Z

CITE DIRECTOR 28195

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2455 (IN 30815)

1. AURA MARINA (ARRIOLA) PINAGEL DE MENDEZ, 201-732208, JMTIGER, MISTRESS OF RICARDO ARNOLDO (RAMIREZ) DE LEON, 201-83287, JMTIGER, MARRIED TO HERNAN (MENDEZ) ROJO PER HMMA 18102, 1 NOVEMBER 1961. ARRIOLA REPORTED CUBA 1965 WITH RAMIREZ, PER HGG-3762, 22 APRIL 1965. CHE GUEVARA APPARENTLY GOD FATHER OF ARRIOLA-RAMIREZ SON.

2. HERNAN (MENDEZ) ROJO WENT USSR OCTOBER 1961 ON 6 YEAR SCHOLARSHIP. HERMAN (MENDEZ) ROJO REPORTED STUDENT LENINGRAD STATE UNIVERSITY MAY 1964. HERMAN (MENDEZ) ROJO'S PARENTS ARBENZ COMMUNISTS.

3. JORGE ROLANDO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR AND MARIO AUGUSTO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR ARRESTED GUATEMALA CITY JULY 1963 FOR VIOLATION LAW OF DEFENSE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (OUTLAWING COMMUNIST PARTY) PER NEWSPAPER REPORT EL IMPARCIAL 24 JULY 1963. FURTHER TRACES AS FOLLOWS:

A. MARIO PARTICIPATED ATTACK ON GUATEMALAN ARMY BUS 26 MAY 1964 PER HGG 3590, 13 OCTOBER 1964, FOR WHICH ARRESTED 4 FEBRUARY 1966

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 28145

TO

AND HELD INCOMUNICADO FOR OVER 2 MONTHS BY SALVADOR NATIONAL GUARD AT GUATE REQUEST , SALV 6203, 5 APRIL 66, AND SALV 6205, 11 APRIL 66.

B. MARIO AGAIN ARRESTED GUATE CITY MARCH, 1966, FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND REPORTED LIVING CLANDESTINELY IN MEXICO CITY PER HMM 10576, 3 AUGUST 66.

C. ROLANDO MENDEZ TRAINED IN URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, WANTED BY GUATE AUTHORITIES, FOR SECURITY REASONS, IN MEXICO CITY FOR MEDICAL OPERATION PER MEXI 6879, 13 APRIL 1966.

4. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON MENENDEZ AS WRITTEN PARA 3 REF. BELIEVE STATION MEANS MENDEZ AS WRITTEN PARAS 2 AND 4.

5. PER PARA 4 OF REF MEXICAN AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE CONCERNED WITH ACTIVITIES OF HUSBAND HERMAN MENDEZ, OR PARAMOUR RICARDO RAMIREZ WHO HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE PGT/FAR MEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Mexico City asked by Guatemala City Station for enlightenment as to Mexican authorities interest in activities of husband of Aura Arriola during Mexican interrogation of Moises OROZCO Leal.

WH/1
WH/2/HD&ES
WH/COG
SB/CI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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COPY NO.

14-00000

See MEXI 2455 IN 30815

FOLLOWING TRACES SUBJECTS PARA 3 REFERENCE:

A. AURA MARINA(ARREOLA)PINAGEL DE MENDEZ 201-732208

SECRET

FROM: (requester's name) ① J Stuart	BADGE NO. DT 629	NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST
BRANCH WH/1/mex	ROOM 3E4463	EXTENSION 9141
DATE	RID CONTROL NO.	

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		14 Aug 67 mx	
REQUESTER	FS-6			②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DH-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5		✓	

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

TELE. REQ.

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME MENDEZ AGUILAR

GIVEN NAMES Mario [illegible]

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED 5 ✓

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS C-40 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

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(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED YES ☐ NO ☐

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO REPORT RID ☐ DESK ☐

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in SR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

14-0000

SECRE

MENDEZ, Mario

65-7-4-20

Spain June 49
an alias of Mario Roatta (Gen.)

MENDEZ, Mario

200-4-173-172
(IRS-865)

probably MENDEZ Montenegro, Mario

MENDEZ, MARIO

SEX M DOB 03 JUL 20
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AZUA
CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC CHIEF MARITIME SECT.
REF SDOM-05637, 26 JUN 65.
EXCL FM LIST N
A DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
CHIEF OF MARITIME SECT, SANTO DOMINGO POST OFFICE. DOI JUN 65.

201-778550.

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE ?

OI CODE ?

339453.

6507061060

MENDES, Mario

in Brazil

16-4-26-96
TRR 3180

2

THI[illegible] [illegible]D

338073

14-00000

SECRET

MENDEZ, MARIO

022-004-134
DEF -06981
25 NOV 66
DEFENSE
P3

SEX M DOB ?

CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC ?
< DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MENDEZ, Mario

035-009-0008
(GUAT 00264
(25 Jun 57

THIS
CARD

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO

035-004-134
SALV-06203
05 APR 66

SEX M DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?

SALV NATL GUARD DETAINED SUBJ AT LA HACHADURA BORDER POINT 04 FEB AND PRESENTLY HOLDING HIM INCOMMUNICADO IN SAN SALVADOR. ARREST MADE AT REQUEST GUAT JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES WHO ADVISED SUBJ WAS INVOLVED COMMIE, SUBVERSIVE AND TERRORIST ACTS GUAT.

HGG

6605170060

MENDEZ, Mario

200-7-38-1741
(SALV 1817)
(IN 41176)
(1955)

MENDEZ, MARIO (MAJ.)

IN 29565
Salv 307

Sal - 20 Apr 49

(Commander).

SECRET

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO AUGUSTO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?

035-004-135
SALV-04205
11 APR 66
P1

BEING HELD BY SALVADORAN NATIONAL GUARD SINCE 04 FEB 66 AT REQUEST GUAT JUDICIAL POLICE. MEMBER GUAT GUERRILLAS WHO MACHINEGUNNED GUAT ARMY BUS 26 MAY.64 AND SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED.

MENDEZ AGUILAR, MARIO AUGUSTO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

037-009-008
HUG -03590
13 OCT 64
#35-9-8.3

SUBJ ASSOCIATE OF HECTOR RODOLFO SANDOVAL [illegible], PARTICIPATED IN ATTACK ON ARMY BUS ON 26 MAY 64.
RE INFORMATION ON GUERRILLAS AND COM- MUNISTS FROM POLICE INTERROGATIONS DURING JUL AND AUG.

MENDEZ, Mario

200-4-173-[illegible]
(HRS-[illegible])

MENDEZ, Mario

200-4-173-211
(HRS-903)

MENDEZ, Mario

73-6-4-5
(HUMG-72)
TS-[illegible]
(Att 5)

2

339458

TH[illegible] FILED
[illegible]
IN MAIN INDEX

SECRET

SECRET

CRET

MENDES, Mario

Rio de Janeiro-CIA-Int-1
Folder # 20-649
Sect. # 2

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
MAIN
INDEX

11 VIII-57

3

338274

MENDES, Mario

202-7051
(TBR-A-1137)

1

338272

MENDES, MARIO

151-300-002
OPL -02028
05 AUG 65
P2

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PORT GUINEA
OCC ?
Δ GUINEA, CONAKRY
SUBJ IN OFFICE OF AFRICIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY FOR GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE IN DAKAR, SENEGAL 63. SUBJ FORMERLY WORKED FROM TOSCANO AND S. DOMINGOS.•

6508250893

SECRET

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: (Requesters name) ① J. Stewart
BADGE NO. D8629
BRANCH WH/1/MEX
ROOM 5B4404
EXTENSION 904
DATE
RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		[illegible]	
REQUESTER	[illegible]			②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DH-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

TELE. REQ.

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME ARREOLA-M.ENDEZ
GIVEN NAMES Aura Marina

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED
201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES
OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS
M. Fries

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

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(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)
CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED ☐ YES ☐ NO
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS
FILE TO BE KEPT ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, CSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE
SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

SECRET

ARREOLA, M.

50-4-2-966

HMM [illegible] 631

Monterrey, Nuevo Leon,
Mexico

2

21 MAR 55

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
MAIN
INDEX

5

SECRET

DE MENDEZ, MARINA BACA MEJIA

53-6-4-196
(SANJ 2416
(1957
(ZRCL

Ministry Public Security F2

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX
17 JUN 57

339451

MENDEZ, AURA MARINA

201-732208*

SEX F DOB ?
GUATEMALA
CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
Δ ?
REF HGGA-07008, 30 AUG 63
NEE OF ARRIOLA P NAGEL DE MENDEZ, AURA MARINA
CP MBR. SCHEDULED FOR DEPORTATION TO MEXICO ON 9 AUG 63. WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

CORR CARD
#HGG

338868

1 703 166

MENDEZ, AURA MARINA

201-732208*

SEX F DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA ?
OCC ?
Δ
REF
NEE OF ARRIOLA PINAGEL, AURA MARINA

338869

557 250
1 352 250

[illegible], Mario [illegible]

Subj has been a [illegible] for over 15 yrs; [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] and lives in [illegible] is about [illegible] yrs old, [illegible], and 135 lbs.
([illegible], [illegible] Apr 62)

MENDEZ, MARIO
201-062086
UFGA-07259
23 JAN 63
PI

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
Δ USA, FLA., TAMPA, 1802 MACDILL ST.
OCCUPANT OF ACCOMODATION ADDRESS
PROVIDED BY SUBJ OF /201-62086/.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 366 271

SECRET

FROM (Requester's name) ① J. Stewart

BADGE NO. 05629

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

BRANCH WH/1/MC4

ROOM r-3U403

EXTENSION 904

DATE

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	GT-5		14 Aug 67	
REQUESTER	FS-6			
RID/FILES	GT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	GW-6			
RID/INDEX	GT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

TELE. [illegible]

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME MENDEZ-AGURAR,

GIVEN NAMES Rolando NMN-I

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

S-N

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS C. 40 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

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(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT ☐ RID ☐ GT-5

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 9-65 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(45-38)

[redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB 12
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FATHER OF ROBERTO MENDEZ.

019-005-030
324 -2061366
27 DEC 66

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB C 11

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUSPECT AGENT OF DEPT. OF STATE SECURITY.
ALLEGEDLY WORKS AS DSE TEAM WITH SON, ROBERTO.
RANCHO BOYEROS, HAVANA.

019-005-030
UFGA-27182
17 MAR 67

5

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB 12
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< CUBA, HAVANA, RANCHO BOYEROS,
CALLE 8 BETWEEN 10TH AND 11TH
S IN REPARTO RIO VERDE
A

019-005-030
324 -2061366
27 DEC 66

MENDEZ, ROLANDO

SEX M DOB C 43

CIT GUATEMALA
OCC ?
< MEXICO
TRAINED IN URBAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES.
WANTED BY GUAT AUTHORITIES AND WENT
MEXICO FOR OPERATION FOR SECURITY REASON.

035-004-135
MEXI-06879
13 APR 66

MENDEZ, R.J.
DOB ?

CIT ARGENTINA

FROM BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
NOT IDEN W/SUBJ 201-234286.

200-007-218
ONH -04906

SER 435

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 112315Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2455

12 Aug 67 IN 30815

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 2438 (29707)

ACTION

1. LIRING-3 VERY CONCERNED AFTER HEARING OF ARREST AND RELEASE MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL DECIDED REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM AS

A. HE AFRAID OROZCO MIGHT COME GUNNING FOR HIM IF CONVINCED LIRING-3 RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ARREST. LIRING-3 ANXIOUS DEMONSTRATE HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ARREST.

B. HE INTERESTED LEARN DIRECTLY FROM OROZCO IF POSSIBLE WHAT LATTER TOLD MEXICAN POLICE ABOUT HIS (LIRING-3'S) DEALINGS WITH FAR.

C. HE INTERESTED LEARN OROZCO'S CURRENT HIDING PLACE FOR POSSIBLE TURNOVER TO FAR IF SUCH TURNOVER NECESSARY IN LIRING-3'S MIND FOR HIS SECURITY.

2. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, LIRING-3 SENT LIRING-4 TO OROZCO'S MOTHER WITH NOTE FOR OROZCO TELLING HIM HE HEARD OF ARREST AND RELEASE AND HOPED EVERYTHING NOW ALL RIGHT. MOTHER TOLD LIRING-4 THAT MEXICAN POLICE HAD TWICE SEARCHED HER HOUSE SINCE HER SON'S RELEASE AND PROBABLY HAD PHONE TAPPED. SHE SAID OROZCO NOT MISTREATED BY

Traces
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

8

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2455 SECRET KAPOK

POLICE WHICH ASKED BASICALLY SAME QUESTIONS LIRING-3 HAD ASKED HIM SHORTLY BEFORE OROZCO'S ARREST. ONE OF TOPICS POLICE SEEMED MOST INTERESTED IN AND KEPT COMING BACK THROUGHOUT OROZCO'S QUESTIONING WAS ACTIVITIES OF HUSBAND OF AURA MARINA ARREOLA. MOTHER SAID THAT OROZCO DID NOT KNOW ARREOLA OR HUSBAND. OROZCO PHONED LIRING-3 ON 10 AUG TO THANK HIM FOR NOTE AND ASSURE HIM HE TOLD MEXICANS NOTHING REGARDING LIRING-3'S ACTIVITIES.

732208

HMM-4403 [illegible] PGT. HMM 3731 [illegible]

3. INFO IN STATION FILES DATED JULY 63 INDICATES AURA MARINA A ARREOLA DE MENDEZ PGT FAR CONTACT AND COURIER BETWEEN GUATEMALA AND MEXICO. SHE KNOWN BE MISTRESS OF RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON, GUAT GUERRILLA FROM WHOM HAD CHILD. HUSBAND COULD BE ~~NR dash~~ ROLANDO OR MARIO AUGUSTO MENENDEZ AGUILAR WHO GUAT BROTHERS. STATION INFO DATED APRIL 1966 INDICATES ROLANDO TRAINED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE AND WANTED BY GUAT AUTHORITIES FOR URBAN TERRORISM. MARIO AUGUSTO ONLY LISTED IN STATION FILES AS GUAT EXILE. LIREBEL-1 STATED 10 AUG THAT MENENDEZ BROTHERS NOW LIVING MEXICO CITY WITH OTHER GUAT NR dash JULIO SOSA AT ADDRESS HE GAVE STATION.

HMM-10576 30 Apr 66 PGT [illegible]

[illegible] 23 July 63 [illegible]

4. CAN GUATEMALA STATION CONFIRM ARREOLA MARRIED TO ONE OF MENDEZ BROTHERS AND THROW SOME LIGHT ON MEXICAN CONCERN ACTIVITIES ARREOLA'S HUSBAND?

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE, VR, C/CI, DDP, ADDP, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 111552Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7781

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

12 AUG 67 IN 30563

KAPOK

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 7738 (IN 24232)

1. ACCORDING TO GUAT AIR FORCE AIDE, MIN DEF COL ARRIAGA WAS TO HAVE DEPARTED EARLY IN MORNING 11 AUGUST BY FAG AIRCRAFT ON UNPUBLICIZED TRIP TO MEXICO. LNPURE HAS REPORT ARRIAGA MAY BE VACATIONING WITH WIFE IN ACAPULCO BUT AIDE INDICATED TRIP WAS RELATED TO MISSION OF SUBJECTS OF REF WHO HAVE NOT YET RETURNED FROM MEXICO.

2. REQUEST ANY INFO THAT COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION CONCERNING PURPOSE OF ARRIAGA'S VISIT. ARRIAGA DUE RETURN GUAT 14 AUGUST.

SECRET

BT

OROZCO case (insider LIRING-3)

SECRET

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 11 AUGUST 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

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INFO: FILE , VR C/OPS WH/COG 8

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 27465

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY 12 11 46Z

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2438 (IN 29707)

NO TRACES CESAR TEJEDA FONSECA. NOTE POSSIBLE IDEN OR RELATIVE: CARLOS TEJADA FONSECA, FORMER GUATEMALAN MINISTER HEALTH UNDER ARBENZ, WENT FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA 10 DECEMBER 1955; DOCTOR CARLOS TEJEDA, REPORTED BE GUATEMALAN SUBVERSIVE 19 JULY 1961; CARLOS ENRIQUE TEJEDA, GUATEMALAN PASSPORT 107383, WENT FROM MEXICO TO CUBA DECEMBER 1961; CARLOS TEJADA FONSECA WENT FROM CUBA TO MEXICO JANUARY 1962.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/GUAT S. Caldwell
WH/COG/CICS F. AMES (TELECOORD)
C/WH/2 [illegible]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, FI

10 Aug 67 IN 29685

SECRET 101930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2436

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

AQUATIC

PLEASE POUCH TWO UHER 4000L RECORDERS WITH ACCESSORIES.

CHARGE PBRUMEN.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

I am guessing - ops - TSD says these believed to be for LIRING-3. HMMA-32672 16 Aug. cost for two around 500-600 $.

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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FILE, VR, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3,

S E C R E T 102200Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2438

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

PBRUMEN KAPOK

10 Aug 67 IN 29707

REF A MEXICO CITY 2358 (IN 24956)

B MEXICO CITY 2363 (IN 25077)

C MEXICO CITY 2396 (IN 26963)

1. HAVING HEARD NOTHING FROM CUBANS RE MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL, LIRING-3 OBTAINED PHONE NUMBER ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO FROM CESAR (TEJEDA) FONSECA, HUSBAND OF DAUGHTER OF PASCUAL (ORTIZ) RUBIO, EX MEXICAN PRESIDENT. WITHOUT IDENTIFYING SELF LIRING-3 MADE APPOINTMENT TALK TO CAPUANO (THIS CONFIRMED BY LIFEAT).

2. WHEN CAPUANO DID NOT SHOW AT MEETING LIRING-3 WENT TO HIS HOUSE 7 AUG. DURING CONVERSATION CAPUANO (A) ADMITTED HE IN CONTACT (DELICATE AND INDIRECT) WITH GUAT GUERRILLAS.

B. TOLD LIRING-3 OROZCO ARRESED AND RELEASED 4 AUG BUT DOUBTED HE SAID ANYTHING REGARDING LIRING-3.

C. SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN LIRING-3 STORY RE OROZCO'S ATTEMPT USE LIRING-3 TO DOUBLE CROSS FAR AND ASKED FOR COPY OF LETTER LEFT BY OROZCO AT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT.

D. REQUESTED LIRING-3 DO NOTHING IN CONNECTION WITH GUAT

SECRET

TRACES
MEXI
RI
GUAT
CUBAN

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2438 S E C R E T KAPOK

GUERRILLAS QUOTE UNTIL YOU HEAR FROM ME UNQUOTE. WARNED HIM AGAINST CONTACTING HIM BY PHONE AS HIS NUMBER DEFINITELY TAPPED.

3. AFTER SERGIO VALDEZ DETERMINED ALBERTO DOMINGO OF MAGAZINE
ideas en Politica
"SIEMPRE" (WHO RECOMMENDED OROZCO TO VALDEZ) ABOUT TO FLY TO HAVANA LIRING-3 DECIDED USE DOMINGO TO HAND CARRY SEALED LETTER TO ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS

A. GIVING DETAILS OROZCO AFFAIR.

B. TELLING RODRIGUEZ HE CONTACTED CUBAN EMBASSY RE OROZCO,

C. POINTING OUT DOMINGO'S CARLESSNESS IN RECOMMENDING OROZCO AS GOOD FAR CONTACT PARTICULARLY SINCE DOMINGO "MUST BE TRUSTED CUBAN CONTACT."

4.? STATION FILE CHECK PRODUCED INFO FROM LIENVOY-2 DATED 31 MARCH IDENTIFYING TEJEDA AS GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA.

S E C R E T

BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2,

S E C R E T 101830Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7777 10 Aug 67 IN 25649

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 26670 (IN 24232)

1. GUAT OFFICIALS CITED GUATEMALA CITY 7738 DID TRAVEL MEXICO CITY. EXPECTED RETURN GUAT 10 AUGUST. IT POSSIBLE THEY AWARE INDISCRETIONS LOPEZ MORAGA AND HE MAY HAVE BEEN THORN IN THEIR SIDE IN OROZCO CASE. IF SO, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL REPORT SAME TO ARRIAGA.

2. HOPEFULLY WE WILL GET READING ~~REAKNG~~ ON RESULTS MISSION GUAT OFFICIALS FROM ESMICA-3 (GUATEMALA CITY 7745) (IN 25060) WHICH MIGHT SHED LIGHT ON WHETHER FURTHER ACTION DESIRABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

WH/1
LIRING-3
201-798301

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM 24/WH #9

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DDP, C/CI, C/WH/COG-2

SECRET 092230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2428 9 AUG 67 IN 28865

DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN JMROD

REF DIRECTOR 24435

1. IN REPLY TO ROWTON QUERIES, LIRING-3 SAID HE FIRST HEARD ARREST TERESA PROENZA SOMETIME IN 1964 FROM HERMES CABALLERO, CUBAN HIGH FUNCTIONARY IN MINISTRY EDUCATION DURING LATTER'S VISIT TO MEXICO. CABALLERO WARNED LIRING-3 NOT TO REVEAL HE HAD KNOWN HER OR HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH HER SINCE SHE IMPRISONED AS WOFACT AGENT AND LIRING-3 MIGHT UNWITTINGLY FALL UNDER SUSPICION IN INVESTIGATION THEN GOING ON. LIRING-3 RECALLED HE SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED PROENZA CASE IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION IN CUBA WITH ARNOL (RODRIGUEZ) CAMPS (WITH CUBAN SUGAR MINISTRY), RENE OCHOA FUNEZ (HONDURAN REVOLUTIONARY) AND MAX FIGUEROA ARAUJO (CUBAN VICE MINISTER EDUCATION) BUT COULD NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT SAID.

2. LIRING-3 COMMENTED FAMILY TERESA PROENZA MOST PROBABLY UNDER SUSPICION BUT NOTED THAT HER SISTER, CARIDAD, WIFE OF JORGE (ROJAS) MENDOZA OF CUBANA DE AVIACION, MEXICO CITY, SEEMS BE CIRCULATING FREELY. HE ADDED PROENZA WAS SECRETARY DIEGO RIVERA AND WAS INVOLVED IN MARQUITAS/ORDOQUI CASE. SECRET

LIRING-3

201-798301

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 2428 S E C R E T KAPOK

3. LIRING-3 BELIEVED TERESA PROENZA STILL IN JAIL WITH NO INDICATION WHEN WILL BE RELEASED AND OFFERED DISCREETLY CHECK ON THIS WHEN NEXT VISITS HAVANA. LIRING-3 DID NOT KNOW OF ANY RELATIONSHIP PROENZA MIGHT HAVE HAD WITH ELENA (VASQUEZ) GOMEZ OR MIRTA AGUIRRE. ALTHOUGH LAST NAME RANG BELL.

4. DOES HDQS WANT MAKE PROENZA REQUIREMENT FOR LIRING-3'S NEXT TRIP HAVANA R IN CONVEN WITH SOURCES IN MEXICO?

S E C R E T

SECRET

ET *[illegible]

OR IN CONVERSATIONS WITH SOURCES IN MEXICO ?

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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DESTROY ☒ SIG.
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, SECUR 4, C/OA, CCS 3, CSPS

SECRET 040235Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2374

ACTION

4 Aug 67 IN 25162

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: DIRECTOR 24298

AS STATION HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED NEED SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR TO PASS AS SGSWIRL EMPLOYEE OF ONE OF LOCAL BANKS (WHICH USE SGSWIRL INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES). ROWTON, WHO WILL BE VISITING HDQS WHILE ON HOME LEAVE LATE AUGUST CAN DISCUSS THIS REQUIREMENT DIRECTLY WITH SGSWIRL PERSONNEL.

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BT

SECRET

Pull OS. Bedman wire [illegible]
[illegible]

201-798331

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR CSDO, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 032343Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2370

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 251860

NIGHT ACTION

4 AUG 67 IN 25136

1. COS HAS PUT NO PRESSURE AT LITEMPO/8 OR LIRAMA LEVEL ON HIS CASE; AND SINCE OROZCO FOUND TO HAVE IMMIGRANTE STATUS WITH ALL PAPERS IN ORDER AND SINCE HE CLAIMED HE WOULD BE KILLED BY EITHER FAR OR GOVERNMENT IF SENT BACK TO GUATEMALA, NO PRESSURE OF ANY KIND HAS BEEN PUT ON LITEMPOS TO RETURN HIM.

2. WILL LET LITEMPOS AND GUATS WORK OUT CASE, AND BELIEVE LITEMPOS WILL RELEASE OROZCO BY NOON ON 4 AUGUST IF REPEAT IF GUATS HAVE NOT CONVINCED THEM RETURN HIM PRIOR THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

INDEX: ☒ YES ~~☐ NO~~

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FROM

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S E C R E T 032120Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2363 MEXI

3 Aug 67 IN 25077

MICROFILMED AUG 23 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

KAPOK PBRUMEN

~~REFS: A. DIRECTOR 24844~~

B. GUATEMALA CITY 7743 (1-24531)

C. MEXICO CITY 2358 (1-24556)

ZP

1. PROBABLY BECAUSE ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO DID NOT HELP HIM OBTAIN BADLY NEEDED DOCUMENTATION WHEN NEEDED IT AND BECAUSE RELATIVE OF MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL APPARENTLY WORKING CAPUANO'S OFFICE, JACOBO PADILLA WOULD NOT DO MORE THAN SET UP CAPUANO INTERVIEW FOR LIRING-3 AFTER WHICH LIRING-3 ON HIS OWN. IN VIEW OF THIS, LIRING-3 FELT HE BETTER NOT SEE CAPUANO ABOUT OROZCO AND PRESSED PADILLA FOR CONTACT WITH OTHER FAR REP. PADILLA WHO VERY NERVOUS ABOUT WHOLE OROZCO AFFAIR SAID HE WOULD SEE WITHOUT COMMITTING SELF.

2. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT KNOW OF OROZCO'S ARREST BY MEXICAN POLICE, LIRING-3 AND SERGIO VALDEZ IN FACT SUSPECT IT AFTER SEEING WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS POLICE CAR IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF ADDRESS WHERE OROZCO ARRESTED BY LITEMPOS. UNABLE CONTACT FAR REPS, LIRING-3 FELT OBLIGED TO PROTECT SELF TO TELL CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT OROZCO. LIRING-3 ACCORDINGLY TOLD ABELARDO (CURBELO) PADRON, WHO HAS ACTED

SECRET

B-201-742616
B-201-812145
B-201-210804

B-201-350227

201-798301
3 Aug 67

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2363 SECRET SECRET

AS CHARGE IN CUBAN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE, ABOUT OROZCO'S STATEMENTS AGAINST FAR LEADERSHIP AND HIS ATTEMPT USE LIRING-3 TO DOUBLE-CROSS FAR LEADERS. CURBELO TOOK DETAILED NOTES WHICH HE SAID WOULD CABLE IMMEDIATELY TO RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE IN CUBA AND ADVISE LIRING-3 OF THEIR RESPONSE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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4-83 JUIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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3 AUG 67 IN 24956

S E C R E T 031730Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2358

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF A GUATEMALA CITY 7738 (IN 24232)

B DIRECTOR 24844

1. STATION CONSIDERED THERE SOME RISK OROZCO MIGHT BE EXECUTED IF TURNED OVER GUAT AUTHORITIES BEFORE TAKING STEPS HAVE HIM ARRESTED BY LITEMPOS. IN VIEW NAKED FAR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN GUAT DID NOT FEEL HOWEVER SUCH POSSIBILITY SHOULD DETER US FROM AQUISITION RECENT AND MEDIUM LEVEL INFORMATION ON GUAT GUERRILLA MOVEMENT (WHICH OROZCO NO DOUBT HAS). SUBJ INFO MIGHT ENABLE GUATS TO STOP DEVELOPMENT OF NEW GUERRILLA ARE OROZCO ORIGINALLY ENTRUSTED WITH AND SAVE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE.

2. TRUST GUAT CITY CAN MAKE DEAL WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES HAVE OROZCO GIVEN TRIAL AND LENGTHY JAIL SENTENCE. SUCH SENTENCE WOULD PROBABLY IN THE END SAVE OROZCO'S LIFE AT LEAST UNTIL RELEASED AS THERE LITTLE DOUBT FAR WOULD KILL OROZCO (IT MAY EVEN KIDNAP HIM IN MEXICO) AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS WHICH STATION BELIEVES SOUND, LIRING-3 INSTRUCTED DENOUNCE OROZCO TO FAR. LIRING-3 ALREADY CONTACTED JACOBO

SECRET

SECRET

PADILLA IN THIS CONNECTION AND ASKED HIM SET UP INTERVIEW WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO KNOWN FAR REP IN MEXICO CITY TO SHOW HIM TWO PAGE VIRULENT DENUNCIATION FAR LEADERS LEFT BY OROZCO AT LIRING-37S APARTMENT. STATION CAN NOT AT THIS POINT REVERSE THIS MOVE CALCULATED TO FURTHER INGRATIATE LIRING-3 WITH FAR.

3. WOULD LIKE STRESS THAT PURE AND SIMPLE RELEASE OROZCO IN MEXICO IS NO GUARANTEE IN VIEW OF ABOVE THAT FAR OR GUAT GOVT WILL NOT ATTEMPT PUT THEIR HANDS ON EX GUERRILLA LEADER AND EXECUTE HIM AFTER DEBRIEFING. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE SUCH DEBRIEFING WILL NOT BE AS PROFESSIONAL AS WOFACT ONE CONDUCTED WITH GUATEMALA'S BLESSING AFTER OROZCO ARREST IN GUATEMALA. IN ADDITION, AND THIS SHOULD BE VIEWED AS MAJOR CONSIDERATION, RELEASE OF OROZCO IN MEXICO WOULD CONSTITUTE OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS PERSONAL THREAT TO LIRING-3 AS OROZCO MAY FEEL, AFTER WHAT HAPPENED FEW DAYS AGO IN HIS APARTMENT, THAT LIRING-3 TURNED HIM IN.

4. SO FAR AS STATION AWARE, NO GUAT REQUEST RECEIVED AS OF NOON 3 AUGUST BY MEXICANS. LITEMPOS INSIST THEY HAVE NO REASON TO HOLD, AND STATION FEELS HE WILL BE RELEASED, PROBABLY NOT LATER THAN EARLY 4 AUGUST, UNLESS GUATS CAN MAKESTRONG CASE WITH PROMISE OF TRIAL AND PRISON SENTENCE ONLY.

SECRET

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14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 11

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ORIG: CHARLES W. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7205
DATE: 13 AUGUST 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER WH # 9

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO [illegible] BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR DDP C/CI

SECRET

4 22 20 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 25548

TO MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

REF: MEXI 2224, 13 JUNE 67

1. PER ROWTON/LIRING CONTACT REPORTED 26 MAY 67 HE NOTE LIRING-3 REPORTED TERESA PROENZA CONVICTED AS WOFACT AGENT.

2. WITHIN LIMITATIONS ROWTON-LIRING/3 RELATIONSHIP PLEASE QUERY LIRING-3 ON ALL POSSIBLE ASPECTS THIS STATEMENT INCLUDING HIS SOURCES OF INFORMATION, EXACT NATURE AND APPROXIMATE DATES OF THEIR STATEMENTS, PROENZA'S CURRENT STATUS, WHETHER OTHER MEMBERS OF HER FAMILY SIMILARLY SUSPECT AND WHAT HER CONNECTIONS HAVE BEEN AND STILL ARE WITH ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, NOW SECRETARY TO LAZARO CARDENAS. ARE CUBANS PLANNING RELEASE PROENZA OR PERMIT HER TRAVEL ABROAD? WHAT ARE HER RELATIONS WITH MIRTA AGUIRRE?

END OF MESSAGE

Joe Stewart
LIRING-3
201-798301

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible] J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

FILE VR, CS/DO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FE

S E C R E T 231558Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7743

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

3 Aug 57 IN 24931

KAPOK

REF: DIRECTOR 24844

1. IN DISCUSSION THIS CASE WITH ESLYRIC-1, COS STRESSED DESIRABILITY OF ATTEMPTING DEFECT OROZCO AS WAS DONE IN CASE OF "GALLO GIRO". PUBLIC DENUNCIATIONS OF FAR LEADERS [illegible] CUBANS BY OROZCO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE GREAT IMPACT, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME WHEN INTERNAL DISSENSION RAMPANT IN GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. ESLYRIC-1 IN AGREEMENT AND STATED THAT IF OROZCO TURNED OVER TO GUATEMALA, THEN ATTEMPT TO SECURE HIS DEFECTION WILL BE PRIMARY EFFORT. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WILLINGNESS OF OROZCO TO COOPERATE, AND STATION, OF COURSE, CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE EXECUTED.

2. STATION AGREES THAT OROZCO HAS PROBABLY BEEN NUETRALIZED AS A FAR ASSET, BUT BELIEVE THAT IF HE WERE TO BE RELEASED LIKELY HE WILL TRY TO AFFILIATE WITH "RED GUARD" EXTREMISTS LED BY "GABRIEL SALAZAR", JOSE MARIA (ORTIZ) VIDES, AND RICARDO (RAMIREZ) DE LEON. AS THIS CHINESE LINE GROUP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY NEED ASSETS IN MEXICO,

SECRET

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

SECRET

OROZCO MIGHT VERY WELL BE ACCEPTED.

3. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY THAT OROZCO MIGHT BE KILLED BY GUATEMALANS, BUT DOES BELIEVE THAT ESLYRIC-1 WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE HIS DEFECTION. BELIEVE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT CONTINUATION OF EFFORTS TO HAVE MEXICANS TURN HIM OVER TO GUATEMALAN FOR DETAILED INTERROGATION AND ATTEMPTED DEFECTION.

S E C R E T

BT * Returned Sov'd. per [illegible]

SECRET

NNNNOU OFG

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE [illegible] COPIES 10

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI

2 Aug 67 IN 23437

S E C R E T 012318Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7732

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2323 (1-22588)

1. JOSE LINARES OF REF PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE BERNABE (LINAGES) SOSA (201-149973), WHO RABID ANTI-COMMUNIST. HELD HIGH POLICE POSITIONS DURING REGIMES OF UBICO, PONCE, CASTILLO ARMAS, AND YDIGORAS.

2. STATION DOES NOT KNOW PRESENT WHEREABOUTS LINARES, BUT WILL CHECK.

S E C R E T SECRET

~~CK~~

Stuart

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 24844

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

[illegible]

A. [illegible]*

B. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN 22426)**

C. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN 23361)***

1. [illegible] HQS INTERESTED IN OROZCO DEBRIEFING WOULD NOT WANT [illegible] ACTION WHICH WOULD PLACE HIS LIFE IN JEOPARDY. BELIEVE IF OROZCO RETURNED GUAT HE WOULD EITHER BE EXECUTED BY [illegible]

2. IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES RECOMMEND MEXICO CITY SUGGEST LITEMPO'S DEBRIEF AND RELEASE OROZCO. ARREST AND DETENTION HAVE ALREADY SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE OF NEUTRALIZING OROZCO'S FUTURE AS FAR ASSET.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Guatemala City to discuss extradition of Moises OROZCO Leal, Guat Communist guerrilla, with Guat Govt contacts.
**Mexico City states OROZCO can be detained by Mexican authorities until 3 [illegible].
***[illegible] arrested by Mexican authorities who have taken steps to have him returned to Guatemala.

C/WH/2 [illegible]
WH/FI

[illegible] BROE
C/WH

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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PRECEDENCE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

3

ACTION

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[illegible]	2225Z	M

INFO

FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CA, CI/OPS, CI/FI, WH7

S E C R E T 022155Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7738 02 AUG 65 24232

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 23416)

B. MEXICO CITY-2338 (IN 23436)

1. COS DISCUSSED OROZCO CASE WITH ESLYRIC-1 ON AFTERNOON 2 AUGUST. ESLYRIC-1, WHO INDICATED LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY OF GUATEMALAN AMBASSADOR TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION, SAID HE WILL PHONE GUATEMALAN MILITARY ATTACHE AT 1600 HRS 2 AUGUST AND REQUEST THAT HE INITIATE ACTION THROUGH MEXICAN MILITARY TO HAVE OROZCO HELD PENDING ARRIVAL OFFICERS DESCRIBED BELOW. (ALTHOUGH CHANNELS WHICH GUATEMALAN MILAT WILL USE NOT KNOWN, WILL PROBABLY GO THROUGH HIGH RANKING DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS WHO CLOSE CONTACTS OF ESLYRIC-1.)

2. ESLYRIC-1 SAID THAT LT. COL. JORGE MANUEL (ESTRADA) ESTEVEZ, OFFICIAL OF GUATEMALAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, AND ISRAEL (CHINCHILLA) MORALES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF GUATEMALAN REGIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNIT (SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT UNDER OFFICE OF PRESIDENT), WILL TRAVEL MEXICO CITY ON 4 AUGUST TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURN OVER OF OROZCO. CONTACTS OF THESE TWO OFFICERS WILL PROBABLY BE WITH MEXICAN DEFENSE MINISTRY, AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE MADE TO HAVE OROZCO

SECRETLY HANDED OVER TO GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES AT BORDER.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

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FROM 24

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 020055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2338

2 Aug 67 IN 23436

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

(NO NIGHT ACTION)

ACTION

KAPOK -231

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 7734 (IN 23416)

BELIEVE CAN TALK LITEMPOS INTO HOLDING OROZCO UNTIL 3 AUGUST NOON. PLEASE ENCOURAGE GUAT TAKE ACTION SOONEST AS LITEMPOS HAVE NO LEGAL GROUND AT PRESENT TO HOLD OROZCO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Stewart

14-00000

w 4/1/77

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City
Chief of Station, Managua

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Luis CASTILLO Ralda

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HGGW-4269, 17 August 1967
B. MEXICO CITY 2323, 1 August 1967

Reference B refers to a photograph of Luis CASTILLO Ralda that was provided to ROWTON during a visit to Guatemala City. It is requested that a copy of this photograph be forwarded for inclusion in CASTILLO's 201 file at Headquarters.

Kenneth F. SARFATY

Distribution:
O and 1 - Guatemala City
1 - Mexico City
1 - Managua

30 August 1967

LIRING-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HGGW-4298	7 SEP 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-820375

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PRECEDENCE

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

FROM 30

ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY ☐ ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TIME 0002 BY M

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, DDP, ADDP

23416

S E C R E T 012322Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 7734 1 aug 67 IN ~~[illegible]~~

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF: MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN-23584)

1. MOST EFFECTIVE AND SECURE CHANNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE REF IS THROUGH ESLYRIC-1 WHO WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSS MATTER PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT.

2. ESLYRIC-1 EXPECTED RETURN GUATEMALA CITY EITHER LATE 1 AUGUST OR 2 AUGUST. WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT CONTACT HIM IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL.

3. HOW LONG CAN LITEMPOS HOLD OROZCO PENDING GUAT GOVT ACTION?

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CADEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 27

PRECEDENCE

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION c/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

AT WH TIME 2/59 BY M

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, c/WH/COG 5, c/CI, c/CI/PS, c/FI, c/SOD 3, c/FI/INT 2, c/CA 2, c/CS/SSO

1 AUG 67 IN 23361

S E C R E T 012041Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2331

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

KAPOK

REF MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

1. WITH ROWTON INFO THAT MOISES OROZCO MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TELLING TRUTH ABOUT OROZCO'S ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH FAR GUERRILLAS (INFO BASED ON LIREBEL-1 AND LIREBEL-2'S STATEMENTS PER REF) LIRING-3 SUCCESSFULLY CONFRONTED AND "BROKE" OROZCO AT HIS APARTMENT NIGHT 31 JULY IN PRESENCE SERGIO VALDEZ AND RAUL MORENO. OROZCO ADMITTED HE RECENTLY SENT GUATEMALA TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA AREA BUT SAID HE UNABLE ACCOMPLISH HIS TASK DUE STUPIDITY FAR REPS. OROZCO DEMANDED TO KNOW SOURCE LIRING-3 INFORMATION. WHEN LIRING-3 REFUSED SAYING ONLY HE IN CONTACT WITH FAR, OROZCO SAID "IT MUST HAVE BEEN ROBERTO". HE WENT ON TO THROW INSULTS ON CESAR MONTES AND OTHER FAR REPS (MENTIONING WAR NAMES) SAYING THAT DAVID CASSASOLA WHO WITH HIM IN GUATEMALA WAS UNDISCIPLINED AND RESPONSIBLE FOR CAPTURE OF MANY OF THIS MEN AND PROBABLY HIS OWN. OROZCO CLAIMED HE ONLY TRUE GUAT REVOLUTIONARY AND ADMITTED HE HAD HOPED ENLIST LIRING-3'S HELP IN OBTAINING ARMS WITH WHICH HE HOPED REARM FAR FOLLOWERS LOYAL TO HIM AND FORM OWN REVOLUTIONARY GROUP. OROZCO WAS GIVEN LIRING-3'S PHONE NUMBER BY

SECRET

Stewart

VALDEZ WHEN LATTER RECOMMENDED TO OROZCO AS FAR MEMBER BY ALBERTO DOMINGO OF REVIEW POLITICA THOUGHT OROZCO WOULD BE GOOD CHANNEL TO GUAT GUERRILLAS. VALDEZ BECAME VERY ANGRY DURING ABOVE CONFRONTATION, CALLED OROZCO A TRAITOR AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM. OROZCO BEHAVIOR THROUGHOUT CLEARLY INDICATED HE VERY MUCH AFRAID FAR GUNNING FOR HIM.

2. AT 0400, VALDEZ, MORENO AND LIRING-3 DEPARTED, BUT OROZCO APPARENTLY TERRORIZED REFUSED LEAVE LIRING-3'S APARTMENT BUT PROMISSED HAVE NEW DISCUSSION AT 1000 HOURS. LIRING-3, AFRAID OROZCO MIGHT COMMIT SUICIDE HIS APARTMENT TRIED REENTER HIS PLACE A LITTLE LATER BUT FOUND OROZCO UNWILLING OPEN UP. LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ THEN SPENT REST OF NIGHT IN FRONT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT TO MAKE SURE OROZCO "WOULD NOT ESCAPE". AT ROWTON SUGGESTION, LIRING-3 HIRED TAXI WHICH WAITED NEARBY. BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 1 AUG OROZCO LEFT LIRING-3'S APARTMENT AND WENT TO HIS MOTHER'S ADDRESS FOLLOWED BY LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ IN TAXI.

3. AFTER REVIEWING ABOVE CASE STATION DECIDED CALL LITEMPO'S AND HAVE THEM PLACE OROZCO UNDER ARREST. STATION FELT LITEMPOS COULD HAVE RECOGNIZED OROZCO WHEN STAKING OUT MOTHER'S PLACE (OROZCO HAS KEPT AWAY FROM HIS MOTHER'S ADDRESS IN HIDING FOR

SEVERAL WEEKS). LIRING-3 AND VALDEZ WHO COULD NOT GET TAXI TO WAIT ANY LONGER RETURNED TO LIRING-3'S APARTMENT BEFORE ARRIVAL OF LITEMPO'S WHO TOOK OROZCO IN CUSTODY. LIRING-3 WAS THEN INSTRUCTED ATTEMPT MAKE URGENT CONTACT WITH FAR TO FINGER OROZCO VIA JACOBO PADILLA (WHO FIRST INTRODUCED LIRING-3 TO FAR). LIRING-3 NATURALLY NOT TOLD OF OROZCO'S ARREST BY LITEMPOS. STATION DOES NOT BELIEVE OROZCO'S ARREST WILL JEOPARDIZE FUTURE LIRING-3 OP.

4. ALTHOUGH LITEMPO'S FOUND OROZCO'S PAPERS IN ORDER ARTICLE 33 OF MEXICAN CONSTITUTION ALLOWS DEPORTATION OF FOREIGNERS WHOSE PRESENCE IN MEXICO IS UNDESIRABLE. THUS IF GUAT GOVT INSTRUCTED IT'S AMBASSADOR IN MEXICO CITY TO PRESS CHARGES AGAINST OROZCO AS DANGEROUS REVOLUTIONARY AND ASK FOR HIS RETURN FOR TRIAL, LITEMPOS WOULD VERY PROBABLY QUIETLY TURN OROZCO OVER TO GUATS. WOFACT WOULD THEN HOPEFULLY HAVE OPPORTUNITY INTERROGATE OROZCO AT LENGTH ON HIS RECENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN GUAT. JUDGING FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE GUATS WOULD PROBABLY QUIETLY DO AWAY WITH OROZCO AFTER INTERROGATION.

5. IN VIEW OF ABOVE RECOMMEND GUAT STATION CONTACT LIAISON IMMEDIATELY AND TAKE STEPS HAVE OROZCO TURNED OVER TO GUAT REPS AND TAKEN TO GUATEMALA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FACE REVOLUTIONARY AND OTHER CHARGES. IN VIEW RECENT ARRESTS OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS

SECRET

IN MEXICO TRYING INITIATE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND GUERRILLA WARFARE, BELIEVE LITEMPOS CAN BE EXPECTED BE MOST COOPERATIVE.

6. STATION MAKING AVAILABLE TO LITEMPOS DETAILED REPORT COVERING OROZCO'S BACKGROUND AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AND GUATEMALA.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 1 August 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 35/24 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OA, SECUR 4

(classification) 1 19 19 Z CCS3 (date and time filed) 24298 (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22504)

B. DIRECTOR 99380

C. MEXICO CITY 2105 (IN 11046)

REGRET SPANISH-SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR READIED 1 JUNE PER REFERENCE B NOW NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SEPTEMBER. CAN FURNISH ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPERATOR FROM HEADQUARTERS NOW IF ACCEPTABLE. ~~COULD ALSO HANDLE REFERENCE C CANDIDATES IF DESIRED.~~ PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. ASSUME YOU UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT HIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST ONCE SGWHIRL USED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comments: A. Requested SGSWIRL operator for LIRING-3 4 Aug. B. Spanish-speaking SGSWIRL operator available for LIRING-3 1 June. C. Station queries if can examine new Station contract employee and three field agents.

WH/COG MAHONEY (TELECOORD)
OS/JRD BEONAR (TELECOORD)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/1
W.J. Kaufman
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE f TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

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FROM 49

ACTION C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/CI

S E C R E T 312335Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2323

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

1 AUG 67 IN 22588
22588

REF: MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

1. PHOTO LUIS CASTILLO PALDA PROVIDED POWTON DURING RECENT VISIT GUATEMALA CITY SHOWN WITH DARK GLASSES AND LONGER HAIR TO LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATED PHOTO VERY PROBABLY THAT OF GARCIA OF FAR. LIRING IDENTIKIT COMPOSITE OF GARCIA PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY LIREBEL-2 AS VERY PROBABLY CASTILLO.

2. MOISES OROZCO LEAL WARNED LIRING-3 STAY AWAY FROM JOSE LINARES WHO DESCRIBED AS LNPURE AGENT AND EX CHIEF POLICE WORKING AT GUAT CITY AIRPORT. REQUEST TRACES. STATION FILES CONTAIN REFERENCES DATED 57 AND 59 TO CHIEF OF SECRET POLICE BY SAME NAME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 26 PRECEDENCE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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UNIT CSDO TIME 0320 BY M

INFO FILE, VR, C/CA, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/SOD 3, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

SECRET 312335Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2322

1 Aug 67 IN 22584

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY

KAPOK

1. LIRING-3 REPORTS HE UNEXPECTEDLY CONTACTED 23 JULY BY MOISES OROZCO LEAL (201-812145) WHO SAID HE NOW HAS FAR LIAISON. OROZCO CLAIMED NOT KNOW GARCIA WHO HE IN FACT REPLACING AND SAID HE ORDERED ACTIVATE PROCUREMENT OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES VIA LIRING-3 IN VIEW CURRENT DESPERATE FAR SITUATION IN GUATEMALA. (OROZCO EVEN ASKED LIRING-3 FOR A DOCTOR.) LIRING-3 CLAIMS THAT TO EXPEDITE MATTERS, OROZCO PROPOSED DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN LIRING-3 AND CESAR MONTES IN GUATEMALA.

2. STATION ESTABLISHED THAT HOLES EXIST IN LIRING-3 STORY AT LEAST ON DETAIL OF MANNER IN WHICH FIRST OROZCO MEETING CAME ABOUT. THERE ALSO FACT THAT ACCORDING TO LIREBEL-1 AND LIREBEL-2, TWO SEPARATE SOURCES, OROZCO WHO WAS IN GUATEMALA IN CONNECTION WITH GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, APPARENTLY GOT COLD FEET, RECENTLY RETURNED MEXICO AND IS CURRENTLY HIDING FROM FAR.

3. BEFORE GOING ANY FURTHER REQUEST HDQS PROVIDE SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR BY 4 AUGUST. AS POINTED OUT PARA 3B HMMA 32635 SENT AS ITEM 31 OF POUCH NO. 5242 DUE HDQS 31 JULY, HDQS

Stewart

SPEED LETTER SECRET	REPLY REQUESTED X YES ☐ NO	DATE 16 Oct 72 pm LETTER NO C - ~~XXXXX~~ 101663 /201- 330173
TO : WH/1/~~XXXXX~~ Mexico ATTN:	FROM: CI/OA Paul Marine, 2B11, x1886	

SUBJECT: ESPERON, Consuelo

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to WH/3/Mex.; OA dated 20 Aug. 63, under JMATE.

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

Lee E Pinckney for

~~[illegible]~~

~~ACTING~~ Chief, CI/OA SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE 19 Oct 72

TO : CI/OA

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( )

b. Inactive (✓)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

2 0454

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 1-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

C-101663.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
DISSEM BY 26 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6

S E C R E T 060230Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5139 6 APR 68 IN 86257

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 985

C-101663

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-7 LISAMPAN

1. LITAMIL-7 RETIRED BY EMBASSY EFFECTIVE 31 MARCH 1968. LIENVOY TAKE 28 MARCH REFLECTING THIS DEVELOPMENT RECEIVED STATION 29 MARCH LITAMIL-7 LAST DAY OF WORK. LITAMIL-7 DID NOT NOTIFY LITAMIL-3, C-87966 CLAIMING BE WAITING FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE TYPE AND AMOUNT SEVERANCE PAY. REFUSED BRING OUT ANYTHING FROM LIRING (ADDRESS BOOKS, KEYS, ETC) FOR FEAR MIGHT AFFECT FINAL SETTLEMENT. ASKED CHIEF LIRING IF COULD PURCHASE OLD TYPEWRITER SHE HAD BEEN USING 22 YEARS BUT WAS REFUSED.

2. LITAMIL-7 WAS PAID 60,000 PESOS 2 APRIL. WILL GET 7,000 ON 11 APRIL AND FINAL 2,500 END APRIL. ABOVE TOTALS PROPER COMPENSATION FOR 36 YEARS SERVICE, BASED MEXICAN LAW.

3. ALTHOUGH LITAMIL-7 RETIREMENT ELIMINATES ONLY STATION PHYSICAL ASSET AT LIRING, DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY ACTIVATE LISAMPAN/CHARLIE. AS ADDEES AWARE LITAMIL-7 HAD BEEN ISOLATED COMPLETELY FROM ANY BUT MOST INNOCUOUS CONVERSATIONS. HER REPLACEMENT BY WIFE LIRING STAFFER MAY PROVIDE INTERESTING INFO. STATION PLANS ACTIVATE CHARLIE WEEK 14 APRIL, AFTER WEEK OF TAKE ON TEST

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5139 S E C R E T

BASIS OF FOXTROT, REACTIVATED 5 APRIL.

4. STATION PLANS MAINTAIN OCCASIONAL CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHENEVER PERSONNEL OR OPERATIONALY REQUIREMENTS WARRANT SUCH CONTACTS. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER SHE WILL REMAIN RETICENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT PARA 2 ABOVE.

S E C R E T

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET 070104Z MAR 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 4732 7 MAR 63 65226

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE THE HAGUE

PBRUMEN MHAPRON AMCRUMB-1

1. BOTH LITAMIL-2 (C-82583) AND LITAMIL-3 (C-87966) MADE INDEPENDENT EFFORTS MAKE CONTACT WITH AMCRUMB-1 DURING LATTER VISIT TO IN LAWS IN MEXICO CITY. LITAMIL-3 PHONED TO MAKE DATE FOR SOCIAL VISIT AND LITAMIL-2 ACTUALLY CALLED AT AMCRUMB-1 CURRENT RESIDENCE. IN BOTH CASES AMCRUMB-1 WIFE STATED HER HUSBAND OUT OF TOWN (WHICH NOT TRUE).

2. LITAMIL-7 (C-101663) REPORTED 5 MARCH THAT AMCRUMB-1 HAD COMPLAINED HE BEING BOTHERED BY FORMER CUBAN FRIENDS BUT AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THEM. IN VIEW OF THIS PROSPECTS FOR AMCRUMB-1 APPEAR BLEAK.

SECRET

SECRET

11 MAR 1963

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 3, [illegible]

S E C R E T 212115Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2219 21 JUL 67 IN 16105

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PERUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 2053 (IN 95509)
B DIRECTOR 22977

1. CHECK ALL CUBANA MANIFESTS 12 JUNE TO 15 JULY SHOWED ONLY TWO CUBANS REMAINED MEXICO ANY LENGTH OF TIME DURING THIS PERIOD. ONE WAS HISTORIAN ERASMO DOMPIERRE ARENAS WHO IN MEXICO 24 JUNE TO 15 JULY FOR HISTORICAL RESEARCH (LIENVOY CONFIRMED HE CONTACTED PEOPLE IN HIS FIELD TO WORK WITH THEM). OTHER WAS JESUS CRUZ GONZALEZ WHO IN MEXICO 12 JUNE TO 15 JULY IN CONNECTION WITH PRENSA LATINA MATTERS (TOGETHER WITH ORLANDO FUNDORA LOPEZ AND TITO LUSSON BATTLE WHO SPENT SHORTER TIME MEXICO). LIENVOY SHOWED CRUZ IN WORKING CONTACT WITH LIRING-9 AND 201-775733.

NR

C-82545

2. LITAINT-2 SAW RAFAEL MIRABAL FERNANDEZ 8 JULY IN COMPANY OF CUBAN WHOM MIRABAL TREATED AS VISITING OFFICIAL WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION (MIRABAL SURPRISED LITAINT-2 BY TURNING DOWN LUNCH INVITATION TO STAY WITH CUBAN VISITOR). LITAMIL-7 STATED 18 JULY THAT THREE CUBANS UNKNOWN TO HER QUOTE HAD BEEN RUNNING AROUND EMBASSY UNQUOTE DURING PREVIOUS WEEK WITH PORTFOLIOS, FILES,

C-101663

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY [illegible]

PAPERS AND BOOKS [illegible] IN HER OFFICE OR WORK SOMEWHERE ELSE IN EMBASSY. ONE OF THESE MEN FIT DESCRIPTION OF OFFICIAL CUBAN VISITOR SEEN BY LITAINT-2.

3. LITAINT-2/LITAMIL-7 INFO SEEMS INDICATE UNUSUAL ACTIVITY IN CUBAN EMBASSY FIRST SECOND WEEK OF JULY. ONLY VISITOR WHO SPENT TIME AT EMBASSY WHO COULD HAVE ARRIVED DIRECTLY FROM CUBA WAS ORTIZ. OTHERS SEEN BY LITAMIL-7 MAY HAVE ARRIVED FROM CANADA, FAR EAST, OR ELSEWHERE. VISITORS FROM CANADA USUALLY ANNOUNCE THEIR ARRIVAL AHEAD OF TIME AND TURN UP ON LIENVOY WHICH PRODUCED NO SUCH INFO IN THIS CASE.

4. LIRING-9 MET LISASSY 13 JULY BUT [illegible] UNABLE DEBRIEF AS YET. LIRING-9 MADE ATTEMPT CONTACT LIRING-7 ON 7 OR 8 JULY AFTER RETURNING FROM CUBA 3 JULY BUT LIRING-7 NOT AT HOME. LIRING-9 GAVE NO SIGN OF LIFE UNTIL LIRING-7 PHONED HIM 14 JULY. LIRING-9 SAID WOULD VISIT LIRING-7 NEXT DAY BUT DID NOT SHOW UP. THIS SEEMS CONFIRM INFO OBTAINED BY LIRING-4 THAT LIRING-9 VERY BUSY (AS RESULT OF REPORTED INSPECTION).

304668

NR

5. IF INSPECTION TOOK PLACE AND IRREGULARITIES FOUND THIS OFFICE, LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN OBJECT UNFAVORABLE COMMENTS AS REPORTED REF A. SERIOUSLY DOUBT HOWEVER HE IN ANY DANGER BEING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 2249 S E C R E T

SENT HOME. INFORMATION OBTAINED BY LIRING / (WHO RECENTLY COMPLETED PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT FORM ON LIRING-9 WHICH STATION POUCHING), LIRING-4, LITAINT-2, LISASSY AND OTHERS DOES NOT INDICATE LIRING-9 IS SUITABLE TARGET AT THIS TIME FOR RECRUITMENT-DEFECTION ATTEMPT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN STATION NOT MAKING EFFORTS OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON HIS ACTIVITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS AS SITUATION, WITH WOFACT HELP, COULD CHANGE. ATTEMPT CURRENTLY BEING MADE FOR EXAMPLE, TO FIND SUITABLE CONTROLLABLE FEMALE ASSET TO ACT PART HIS GIRLFRIEND (LIRING-9 CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR NEW ONE) TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO HIS EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, DEEPEN HIS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND TRY ELICIT OPERATIONAL INFO FROM HIM. INITIAL APPROACH IDEN (WHO PREVIOUSLY SELECTED BY STATION FOR THIS JOB) BY RAYMOND H GERENDE UNDER COVER LOCAL DETECTIVE BUREAU OPERATOR TOOK PLACE . JULY. WILL POUCH DETAILS AFTER GERENDE'S SECOND MEETING WITH IDEN.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES IDEN. LOCAL TRACES NEGATIVE.

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14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible]

SECRET 210115Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2222

21 Jun 67 IN 16039

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF MEXICO CITY 2219 (IN 16109)

IDEN IS SILVIA TREVINO GASPARI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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INFO FILE [illegible] EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible] FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 272243Z CITE JMWAVE 8473

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, BARCELONA

27 JUL 67 IN 20506

TYPIC [illegible] QUOTA

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 8472 (IN 20509)

C-101[illegible]5

SUBJECT REFERENCE PARA 2.A. AMCUTLER/2, WIFE SUBJECT REF PARA 2.B. WHO AMCUTLER/1. A/1 WAVE ASSET 61-FEB 67 WHEN TERMINATED. A/1 RECRUITED WAVE AREA TO RETURN TO PBRUMEN WHERE HE WORKED SHORT PERIOD HELPING BROTHER (AMFAUNA/1) SUCCESSFULLY ORGANIZE PRODUCTIVE AMFAUNA NET. A/1 OBTAINED ASYLUM VENEZUELAN EMBASSY AND RETURNED WAVE AREA SEPT 61; AMCUTLER/2 BECAME PRIMARY AMFAUNA NET ASSET PBRUMEN UNTIL ARRESTED DEC 63. AMCUTLER/2 BEING HELD GUANAJAY WOMEN'S PRIOSN AS OF OCT 66. LAST STATION CONTACT WITH A/1 WAS MAY 67. A/1 AND AMFAUNA/1 ATTEMPTING OPEN AMUSEMENT PARK WAVE AREA AT THAT TIME.

C-87550

C-88260

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/CE, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 242035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9122 IN 3240 8

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: FRADYER) INFO MANAGUA

NO NIGHT ACTION

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF: DIRECTOR- 44183 (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

OVER

1. DUE PROLONG STAY [illegible] LITAMIL-17 HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT [illegible] LITAMIL-9 THROUGH [illegible] LITAMIL-3 WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM [illegible] LITAMIL-7. INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PBRUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 15 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 15 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

CRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

3. IF HQS CONCURS [illegible] S CAN BE RE[illegible]STED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION [illegible] MEXICO [illegible]. ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT LITEMP[illegible] [illegible] LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA [illegible] LITAMIL-[illegible] WOFACT. ADVISE [illegible] WOULD BE [illegible] LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENS[illegible].

4. RECEN[illegible] FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVIS[illegible] ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

S E C R E T

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 21

[redacted] [redacted]

Uhlmann
ORIG: B.CAREW:mot
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 28 SEPT 66

☐ FILE RID
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☒ NO INDEX
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SECRET

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[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

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[redacted] SECRET [redacted] [redacted]

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

29 13 12 Z

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 3651 (IN 04697)*

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)**

79 5301

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT ROWTON/LIRING-3 RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRING-3 AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE PLACE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AS MENTIONED REF B? HAS LITAMIL -7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY [redacted] EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

C-TCIGG3 LIRING/4

END OF MESSAGE

* ** REFS ATTACHED.

C/WH/C/CICS ____
C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)
WH/C/FI/TC J. Lucey (draft)
C/WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (draft)
C/WH/1 J. Fisher (draft)
WH/C/MO R. Ortman (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

28-23

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FILE VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, ODC, DDP, ADDP,

[illegible] 83830

ALL

OVER

SECRET 252130Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 5555

TYPIC MHSPAWN MHAPRON

REF DIR [illegible]*

* RE STATION REQUEST CABLE SPECIFIC LEADS IN ORDER HQS GEAR RQMS.

1. GIST OF FIRST TEN PARAS REF AND GUIDANCE OF PARA 11 PASSED LIROOK-1 WHO EXPECTED EXPLOIT IN MEXI PRESS.

2. FOLLOWING PROPOSALS REPRESENT STATION THINKING OF FUTURE EXPLOITATION OF PURGE/UNREST SITUATION AT PRESENT:

A. MAKE PITCH TO JORRIN. APPROACH TO BE MADE BY ROWTON ON STREET. ROWTON INTRODUCE SELF AS FRIEND OF "QUIQUE" (ENRIQUE VILLAVICENCIO) [redacted], ASK HOW VILLAVICENCIO IS, WHETHER IT TRUE HE IN TROUBLE, EXPLAIN HE TOLD ROWTON ALL ABOUT WHAT A GOOD FRIEND JORRIN WAS. INDICATE THAT VILLAVICENCIO AND ROWTON HAD MANY GOOD TIMES TOGETHER INCLUDING SEVERAL PARTIES WITH ACCOMODATING GIRLS. ASK JORRIN WHAT CAN BE DONE TO HELP VILLAVICENCIO, COULD JORRIN GET ANYTHING TO HIM. INDICATE HAS HEARD JORRIN DUE FOR TRANSFER BACK TO HAVA SOON. ROWTON BELIEVES COULD MAKE QUICK DETERMINATION FROM JORRIN REACTION TO APPROACH WHETHER JORRIN INTERESTED IN PLAYING CASE FOR CUBS, INTERESTED IN [illegible] VILLAVICENCIO OR MERELY WISHES BE LEFT ALONE. IF

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXI 6556 S E C R E T IN 83830 Page 2

ANY EVENT, IF HE CAN BE DRAWN INTO CONVERSATION ROWTON COULD TAILOR PITCH TO REACTION AND MAKE CLEAR TO JORRIN THAT IT TO HIS BEST INTEREST LISTEN TO AND COOPERATE WITH ROWTON

B. MAKE PITCH TO JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ. WHEN QUERIED IN NOV 65 AS TO WHO HE WOULD GO AFTER IF HAD TO CHOOSE ONE EMBASSY STAFFER, LIONION-1 2-88917 PICKED OUT LOPEZ. ASKED TO ELABORTATE ON REASONS, HE EXPLAINED LOPEZ APPEARS LIKE BETTER THINGS OF LIFE, QUICKLY PUT EMBASSY CADILLAC INTO USE AFTER HE ARRIVED IN MEXI, DRESSES WELL, GIVES IMPRESSION OF WISHING TO BE "GRAN SENOR." ON 22 MAR, IN LIGHT OF CASTRO PURITANICAL PURGE, LITAMIL-7 2-101663 WAS ASKED WHO SHE FELT WAS MOST DEVOTED TO "DOLCE VITA" AMONG EMBASSY STAFFERS. SHE PICKED JULIAN LOPEZ FOR SAME REASONS SET FORTH EARLIER AND INDEPENDENTLY BY LIONION. STATION HAS NOT YET FORMULATED PLANS FOR METHOD OF APPROACHING LOPEZ. REVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA CONTINUING. WOULD PROBABLY USE ROWTON OR ALECCIA TO MAKE CONTACT.

C. WORK ON HERNANDEZ ARMAS. BELIEVE PURGE OFFERS GOOD OPPORTUNITY PUT HIM BEHIND EIGHT BALL. PROPOSE USE

SECRET

PAGE THREE MEXI 6556 S E C R E T IN 23830 PAGE 3

LICLOD-1 (201-759176) AS VEHICLE. PROPOSE EXPANDED VERSION OF STORY OF MEXI 2989, 23 SEPT 64, WHICH CONTAINED STATEMENTS BY HERNANDEZ WIFE THAT HE VIRTUAL PRISONER, WATCHED BY SECURITY PEOPLE, ETC. EXPANDED VERSION WOULD BUILD ON ACTUAL STATEMENTS OF WIFE TO INCLUDE SIMILAR STATEMENTS SUPPOSEDLY MADE BY HERNANDEZ HIMSELF IN SECRET MEETING/S WITH LICLOD IN SEPT 64. THESE PURPORTED STATEMENTS WOULD HAVE HERNANDEZ DISILLUSIONED "OLD COMMUNIST," STILL ESSENTIALLY FAITHFUL TO MARXIST THEORY BUT DISMAYED AT CASTRO COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE. IN ADDITION TO BEING VIRTUAL PRISONER, UNDER EVER WATCHFUL EYE OF SECURITY PERSONNEL, WOULD HAVE HIM ADMIT SADLY TO LICLOD THAT HE ALSO PRISONER IN SENSE THAT ALTHOUGH HE DISILLUSIONED HE FINDS SELF LOOKED UP TO AS ONE OF FOREMOST APOSTLES OF COMMUNISM IN MEXI BY MEXI COMMUNISTS SUCH AS RECTOR UNIVERSITY MORELIA (EREMAUNTZ), OTHERS OF LIKE PROMINENCE. THESE PEOPLE APPARENTLY FOOLED BY CASTRO COMMUNIST FACADE AND HERNANDEZ UNWILLING LET THEM DOWN. HERNANDEZ ALSO AFRAID MOVE BECAUSE OF FAMILY, PARTICULARLY TWO BROTHERS WHO HOLD HIGH GOC POSITIONS. PROPOSE FOLLOWING SCENARIO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE FOUR MEXI 5556 S E C R E T IN 83830 Page 4

FOR SURFACING STORY: LICLOD, HAVING LEARNED ABOUT PURGE IN CUBA, TO GO ON AIRWAVES THROUGH APPROPRIATE CUBAN EXILE OUTLET. EXPLAIN WHO HE IS, TELL OF HIS LONG ASSOCIATION WITH HERNANDEZ FAMILY, VERY HIGH REGARD FOR HERNANDEZ AS INDIVIDUAL. EXPLAIN THAT WHILE IN MEXI IN SEPT 64 HAD CONTACTS WITH HERNANDEZ AND WIFE BUT BOTH MADE HIM SWEAR NEVER TO REVEAL WHAT THEY TOLD HIM. NOW REALIZES IS BREAKING PLEDGE TO WELL-MEANING FRIENDS BUT IN VIEW OF RECENT TURN OF EVENTS IN CUBA FEELS MUST TELL WHAT HE KNOWS. HAS CHOSEN PUBLIC FORUM AS BEST MEANS FORCE FRIEND HERNANDEZ TO OPENLY MAKE BREAK HE MADE IN HEART TWO YEARS AGO. EXPLAIN WROTE LETTERTO HERNANDEZ "TWO DAYS AGO" TELLING HERNANDEZ OF PLAN ASKING HIS FORGIVENESS FOR BREAKING CONFIDENCE BUT IMPLORING HIM TO UNDERSTAND LICLOD HIGH MOTIVES. WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE HIM MAIL SUCH A LETTER. BELIEVE LICLOD, PROPERLY REHEARSED, AND USING HIS EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF HERNANDEZ BACKGROUND (SEE MEXI 2752 1 SEPT 64) COULD GIVE STORY RING OF SINCERITY AND TRUTH. SWIFT PRESS FOLLOW-UP COULD INSURE RAPID PROPAGATION OF STORY. GOC COULD CHECK LICLOD BACKGROUND UNTIL BLUE IN

SECRET

PAGE FIVE MEXI 6556 S E C R E T

IN 83830 PAGE 5

FACE AND NOT SHAKE GOOD PART OF STORY. BELIEVE THIS MIGHT PLACE HERNANDEZ IN VIRTUALLY UNTENABLE POSITION IN MEXI AND ALSO WITH HIS GOVT. MIGHT ALSO MAKE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF MORE AMENABLE TO APPROACH OR AT LEAST SHAKE THEM UP.

3. VARIATION OF THEME 2, C, WOULD BE HAVE LICLOD COME TO MEXI TO MAKE APPROACH TO HERNANDEZ. HOWEVER NOTHING IN STA FILES INDICATES HERNANDEZ RIPE FOR RECRUITMENT. HE MIGHT BE SOFTENED UP BY PUBLICITY PER 2, C, AND A FOLLOW-UP DEFECTION ATTEMPT MIGHT THEN BE IN ORDER.

4. CAN HQS LOCATE LICLOD? AMCONCERT-4 SHOULD KNOW HIS WHEREABOUTS. [illegible] RECORDS DO NOT SHOW STATESIDE ADDRESS.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS CONCURRENCE PARA 2 PLANS. IF DECISION MADE GO AHEAD WITH LICLOD OR STATION WILL PROPOSE SEND BARKER TO REHEARSE LICLOD FOR HIS PRESENTATION.

S E C R E T

CFN 6556 II LIPOOK-1 A JORRIN PONTON QUIQUE ENRIQUE VILLAVICENCIO VILLAVICENCIO VILLAVICENCIO NAVA CUIS B JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ NOV 65 CADILLAC GRAN SENOR 22 MAR CASTRO LITAMIL-7 DOLCE VITA ALECCIA C HERNANDEZ ARMAS LICLOD-1 201-759175 MEXI 2585 23 SEPT 54 METINGS/S SEPT 54 RECTOR UNIVERSITY MORELIA ([illegible]) GOC CUBA SEPT 54 MEXI [illegible] 1 SEPT 54 GOC 2, C, 2,C, AMCONCERT-4 NOT SHOW HQS 2 BARKER LICLOD

ST

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO [illegible], [illegible], WH/C 8, CI/CA, WE 8

15 FEB 66

14 FEB 66 IN 54788

SECRET 1922Z

DIR HAGU CITE MEXI 6265

PERUMEN LITAMIL AMCRUMB

REF HAGU 9927 (54509)*

File

1. LITAMIL-7 REPORTS AMCRUMB-1 TOLD HER 7 FEB HE WOULD BE RETURNING CUBA THENCE HOLLAND SOON. A-1 WIFE TOLD L-7 SHE DISLIKES HOLLAND, NOT ANXIOUS RETURN.

2. L-7 SAYS A-1 APPEARS IN GOOD HEALTH AND SPIRITS, WIFE APPEARS TO HAVE AGED, LOOKS SICKLY.

SECRET * REF FIGHT

CFN 6265 PERUMEN LITAMIL AMCRUMB 9927 LITAMIL-7 AMCRUMB-1 7 A-1 L-7 HOLLAND NOT ANXIOUS L-7 A-1

BT

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SECRET

ROUTING
4
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: C/WH 5 (TEMPO FOR WH SLOTTED AT: [illegible], 17 JUNE 64)
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 172244Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAGU CITE MEXI 9923

PBRUMEN AMCRUM

REF MEXI 9885 (IN 07151)*

01113

17 JUN 64 IN 08807

1. LITAMIL-7 REPORTS THROUGH LITAMIL-3 THAT AMCRUMB-1 TRIP TO PBRUMEN IS TEMPORARY [illegible], THAT HE EXPECTED RETURN MEXI SOON. STATION WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PITCH HIM.

2. ACCORDING L-7 AMCRUMB WANTS TO RETURN HAGU POST OR OTHER POST ABROAD TO INSURE HE NOT ASSIGNED PCS PBRUMEN.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *RYBAT REF.

18 JUN 1964

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3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH/SA 8

INFO : DCI, WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, VR

26 MAR 1964

IN 47435

C-101663

S E C R E T 252133

DIR CITE MEXI 3393 (EASBY ACTING)

TYPIC AMROD

FOLLOWING FROM LITAMIL-7, 25 MARCH: TERESA PROENZA VISITED PERUMEN EMBASSY 24 MARCH WITH SISTER CACHITA. SAID SHE RETURNING HABANA SOON ON UNSPECIFIED DATE. HER PASSPORT MARKED "PARA REINTEGRARSE EN SU CARGO", BUT L-7 TELLS OF CABLE PRECEDING PROENZA ARRIVAL: "LLEGARA A LIQUIDAR SUS ASUNTOS. TENGANOS INFORMADOS". EMB STAFF WARNED NOT TO TELL PROENZA OF THE WORDING OF CABLE WHICH INDICATES SOMETHING DONE BEHIND HER BACK DESPITE WHAT SHE MAY HAVE BEEN TOLD. P SAID SHE NOW PREFERS WORK INSIDE PERUMEN RATHER THAN IN AN EMB SINCE SHE CAN DO MORE GOOD THERE. L-7 BELIEVES THAT EVEN HABANA NOT SURE WHAT TO DO WITH PROENZA.

(REINTER BASE)

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

C No. 101663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico Wayne Carley

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/7 ______________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 24 June 1963.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 20 August 1963 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
[illegible]

SECRET

FORM 9-59 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 20 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 101663

SET UP FOR P.C.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
✓	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Leonard W. Tate
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

-OA-

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

16 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : C-101663
#280 142

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 August 1962 requesting an appropriate investigation of Subject in connection with his use under an Operational Approval as an FI agent by IFW in Mexico City.

2. In view of the certification set forth in your request, no CIA files other than those of the Office of Security have been searched in connection with this case.

3. It is assumed that all pertinent information concerning Subject as requested in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5 has been furnished.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case.

5. The records of Government agencies were checked regarding the Subject with the following results:

ONI - NR
ACSI - NR

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

file
20 aug 63

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

16 AUG 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : C-101663
#280 142

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 15 August 1962 requesting an appropriate investigation of Subject in connection with his use under an Operational Approval as an FI agent by TFW in Mexico City.

2. In view of the certification set forth in your request, no CIA files other than those of the Office of Security have been searched in connection with this case.

3. It is assumed that all pertinent information concerning Subject as requested in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5 has been furnished.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case.

5. The records of Government agencies were checked regarding the Subject with the following results:

ONI - NR
ACSI - NR

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/M - W. Carley

NUMBER
C - 112663

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is reinstated until 25 September 1963.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	28 JUN 1963

FORM 7-58 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 28 JUN 1963	CASE NO. C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE NOTICES ✓ DATE		EXPEDITE FBI NOTICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	✓ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T W. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
✓	REINSTATE POA FOR 90 DAYS UNTIL 28 Sep 63		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (11)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 1 July 63 cjn

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT: JMaTE

SUBJECT : C c-101663-[illegible], Consuelo

NO. 280142

1. TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ PSA	☒ OA	☐ SPEC. INQ.	☐ CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT

5. USE OF SUBJECT

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM		
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES

8. DIVISION TRACES

9. FIELD TRACES

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS EFB

FORM 6-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7
C-101663
201-330173

Attached is the PRQ part II on LITAMIL-7. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

JUN 26 9 41 AM '63

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SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21526

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is *not* to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215 paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ, part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM LITAMIL - 7

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

LITAMIL-3, a former superior of LITAMIL-7 in the PBRUMEN Embassy handled her for several months before turning her over to Clyde K SHRYOCK on 7 May 1962. SHRYOCK is known to L-7 as "Roberto". Direct contact with L-7 was made in order to get better and more detailed information re the PBRUMEN Embassy personnel and activities.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer through LITAMIL-3, who continues to be her closest and most trusted friend.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Not applicable

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.

1

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(4-20)

SECRET

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is anti-Communist and pro-U.S. She wants to prove that she is anti-Communist by providing information to ODYOKE re activities inside the PBRUMEN Embassy.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico City has little control over Subject except to reveal her activities to PBRUMEN authorities.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are held at the home of LITAMIL-7 and if necessary the Case Officer could represent a visiting "friend".

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject is employed at the PBRUMEN Embassy and her information is gathered during the course of her working day.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(will work, is working)*.

Subject knows she is working for ODYOKE. She does not think in terms of intelligence agencies.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject has had no connection with any intelligence service in the past.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-3, who introduced Subject to Case Officer and frequently attends meetings with Case Officer.

LITAMIL-9 suspects that Subject is working for ODYOKE. He knows she is in contact with LITAMIL-3 and he knows L-3 is in contact with Case Officer.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no training in clandestine operations. She is becoming increasingly aware of intelligence techniques, however, and her production has improved for this reason.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject, being a Mexican, would probably collaborate with the Mexican Government if approached by high authorities.

SECRET

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

LITAMIL-3 has been in contact with Subject for many years and continued in contact with her as of this date. Subject provided information on the [illegible] Embassy through L-3.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains her information from [illegible] personnel at the Embassy and by observation and elicitation.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information which she provides goes to Washington D.C.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is presently being used to provide information re travel to [illegible] applies the issuance of "courtesy visas" which she handles and information on the personalities and activities of [illegible] personnel through "clear" cable traffic, conversations, elicitations, and observation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY: AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is collaborating with KUBARK unselfishly. On occasions the Case Officer has sent her gifts and tried to help re visa problems, scholarships (close friend).

SECRET

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is a bird fancier (canaries and parakeets).

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is from Oaxaca and typifies the native of that region, i.e. she has Indian facial characteristics. Subj is probably recognizable as a Mexican.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information on PRQ Parts I and II came from Station files, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, and LITAMIL-7, herself.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

Subject's termination will be routine.

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

The Case Officer has a phone number through which contact can be made in an emergency. Subj knows the ODACID phone number and extension. She will ask for "Roberto" and she will use the name "Paula". Contact can also be made through LITAMIL-3.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject was "pitched" by LITAMIL-3 during the period Dec. 60 and Jan. 1961. Subject was offered $10,000 U.S. to "defect" and make statements provided by [illegible], which she refused to accept after serious consideration. LITAMIL-3 was the "cut-out" for this operation which was handled by Andrew F [illegible].

DATE: 12 June 1963

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER: [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 27 May 63 dlr

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

C# 151663

The file on LITAMIL/7 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 3-62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 23 May 63	CASE NO C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE					EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR		OA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T M. CHK	USE AREA:	

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/S DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
XXXX	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST 21 TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

27 MAY 1963

dlr

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

Thomas Carroll Jr.

for EPB

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 19 March 1963 jmh
TO: WH/3/MEXICO ATTN: BLAINE CARLEY	C NO. 101663
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/7

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired 19 March 1963. Please submit PRQ II. If within 30 days no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SECRET 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 19 MAR 1963	CASE NO. C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE

SET UP FOR	☐	OA	☐	SP INQUIRY	☐	GOV'T N. CHK	USE AREA:

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: (No notice to division)	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	XXX	TICKLE 45 Days
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
XXXX	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I XXXX PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

POA expired on 10 March 63. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(21)

~~2~~ 15 March 63

[illegible]

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible] : [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

File for ~~the~~ Bowns

JAB

This illegible thermo merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/Mexico.

EPB

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TFW
Attn: H. E. Mulloy

NUMBER C-101663

SUBJECT LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 13 August 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

APPROVAL

BY: CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DATE: 10 September 1962 mm

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE	CASE NO. C-101663

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
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☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE 15 Aug 62 cjb

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101663

NO.

PROJECT JMATE

1. TYPE OF REQUEST
XX OA ☐ PA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CSC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)
28 Aug 62

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY
21 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
TFW - Mexico City

5. USE OF SUBJECT
FI agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	X	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		X
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	X	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		X

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT
None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (*Explain fully*)

7. RI TRACES
NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES
NDI

9. FIELD TRACES
NDI

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED X YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS X PRO PART 1 ☐ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P. O. A.
CI/OA Advised ____________
Date ____________

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

EB

FORM 4-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 14 AUG 1962

CASE NO.

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

✓ EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 21 Aug 62

✓ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE 28 Aug 62

SET UP FOR ☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T'N. CHK

USE:
AREA:

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Area - Mexico City

Use - FI agent

1cc PRQ I to SO

Brown
SIGNATURE

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
TFW/Cus Spt
G H 5512

NO.

DATE
13 Aug 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/OA 2 B 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 O - 476751

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 13 Aug 62

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
TFW/Ops Spt
G H 5512
7646

SUBJECT: (True name) Consuelo ESPERON

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL-7 ✓

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 330173

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (*SO field investigation*)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Will be used for reporting on Cuban Embassy activities and personnel.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

Aug 13

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127452

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explain)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: H.E. Mull
H.E.Mulloy

EXTENSION: 7646

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: William K. Harvey

FORM 8-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

RQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Sex)
[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

"Carlo"

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible], Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

Drinks socially.
Catholic - extremely religious.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)

No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION [illegible]	9g. FACE (Shape) [illegible]
9h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	9i. COLOR OF EYES Brown		9j. TEETH Some gold.		9k. BUILD Stout	9l. POSTURE Erect

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE
Neat dresser.

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(14-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible]

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different from Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
[illegible]

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION	2. TITLE	3. SALARY *(Per annum)*
[illegible]		[illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*
[illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
[illegible]	X		X		X		X	

SECRET

14-00000

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

12 Oct 19[illegible]

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

	DATES					
COUNTRY*	FROM	TO	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]				
[illegible]		[illegible]				

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 19[illegible] - Present	2. EMPLOYER Cuban Embassy	3. ADDRESS Mexico, D.F.	
1	4. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible]	6. REASON FOR LEAVING	
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	
2	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	
3	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	
4	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	
5	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECRET

GROUP 1

14-00000

SECRET

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

1. FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

1. FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECRET

SECRET

ECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

*FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Luis	[illegible]			[illegible]	Mexican
Enrique	[illegible]				
[illegible] Mariano	[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]				
Maria [illegible]		[illegible]			

SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

ECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of [illegible].

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Luis [illegible]

Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 27 July 1962

SIGNATURE:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

13 AUG 1975

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

FROM:

IP/

CLARK [illegible]
IP/[illegible]
EXT. 4[illegible]9

GT-[illegible]9
[illegible]
[illegible] GT7

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1		14 AUG 1972		
2. Davis				D
3.				
4. DDC/WH/1				
5.				
6. IP/DMS				pdg
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI				

COMMENTS

9192

Copy Detached

1-2 Pls get in touch w/ Cyzulski in BK/6 and ask him to [illegible] a memo, J.

8/15/72 - Mr. Cyzulski will prepare memo.

LITAMIL-7 file is 201-330173

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE

~~[illegible] file~~ ~~this is~~ LITAMIL-7 ~~file~~

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

~~201-~~
~~[illegible]~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 3 July 72

DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA 42186

FORM 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's Station file has just been reviewed for purging, and it was noted that his OA is still active and no final dispatch has been written closing this file, even though we are no longer in contact with Subject. Since Gerald D. FAHLANGER was the last Case Officer in contact with LITAMIL-7, it is requested that Headquarters have FAHLANGER (now assigned Headquarters) prepare a memorandum describing his last relationship with LITAMIL-7 and requesting that his OA granted on 7 February 1968 (HMMW-16118) be cancelled and file be closed. The Station plans no further contact with LITAMIL-7. Contact was dropped with LITAMIL-7 by mutual consent; he was not a paid agent and was not anxious to play an aggressive role against the PBRUMEN target. See MEXICO CITY 4955 of 26 March 1969.

Jesse R. GARDALPHE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY

[illegible] FROM GENERAL [illegible]
OF E. O. [illegible]
§ 5B(1), [illegible]
[illegible]

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-42186

DATE: 31 July 1972

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-329609~~ 201-330173

SECRET

TX-1616

22 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

1962

1. According to Gerald D. FAHLANGER, LITAMIL-7, who is a female, was a secretary in the Mexico City PBRUMAN Embassy for more than 30 years. She was originally recruited by former Station asset LITAMIL-3 in approximately 1966-67. Although Subject was never a very productive asset, she did provide information on activities of the installation and individuals working therein. In approximately 1969-70, Subject was retired by the PBRUMAN Embassy, ending her previous usefulness for the Station. In spite of her loss of access to the embassy, she did continue to maintain contact with the personnel, including the ambassador. For this reason the Station maintained contact with her through LITAMIL-3. However, this too was not very productive because she felt she had been treated fairly upon retirement, and felt a certain degree of loyalty to them. This was somewhat incongruous, since she did not feel such loyalty when she was working in the embassy.

2. Subject met FAHLANGER, as Jose (Pepe) Martin, approximately six times in her home. The last time she was told that in view of her retirement, which resulted in the loss of access to the embassy, our relations with her would be terminated. However, if she reestablished contact with the personnel, or was recalled to work part or full time, we would, of course, consider contact again. This, of course, never happened.

3. While Subject was not paid a regular salary, she did receive spot payments for the information she submitted. She also received occasional small gifts at Christmas time and on her birthday. The

AD

~~NFD~~

1 ATT

CS COPY

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: 055272

22 Aug 72

~~201-339609~~
201-330173

SECRET

termination was amicable, and Subject agreed to notify LITAMIL-3 if she had any information of value to report.

4. Attached is the Agent Termination Report on Subject.

Suzanne Lulewicz
WH/1/IA

SECRET

Attachment to ______________

15 August 1972

Agent Termination Report

1.	AGENT CRYPTONYM:	LITAMIL-7
2.	PROJECT IDENTIFICATION:	LITAMIL
3.	AGENT RECRUITED BY:	LITAMIL-3
4.	CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED:	Penetration of the FBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City
5.	RATE OF PAY:	Spot payments based on information she submitted. Average was approximately $20.00 U.S. per month.
6.	OTHER COMMITMENTS:	None
7.	AGENT DISMISSED BY:	Gerald D. FAHLANGER
8.	SECURITY RISKS:	None
9.	IS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE:	No
10.	REASON FOR AND MANNER OF DISMISSAL:	She retired from her position in the embassy. Termination by FAHLANGER was done at a meeting with her.
11.	LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED:	No. She was not witting of her role for LNBUZZ, and was not receiving a specific monthly salary.

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: 055272

h/w att #1 of TX1616.

ES COPY

201-330123
~~201-329609~~

SECRET

SPEED LETTER **SECRET**

REPLY REQUESTED		**DATE** [illegible]
✓ **YES**	**NO**	**LETTER NO.** [illegible]

TO : [illegible]
ATTN:

FROM: CI/OA
[illegible] 2B12 x1558

SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) A review of CI/OA records reflects that Subject was of interest to [illegible] dated [illegible]

(2) CI/OA requests that the responsible desk inform CI/OA by reply whether this case is still active, or whether CI/OA may cancel and retire its folder.

Joseph J. Dooley
[illegible]
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE [illegible]

TO : CI/OA
FROM : [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

(1) Case is:

a. Active ( )

b. Inactive (✓)

(2) CI/OA may/~~may not~~ cancel and retire Subject file.

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SIGNATURE

RESPONDER'S FILE

FORM 9-67 **1831** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during this period. She was, however, seen chatting with LIRING members on several occasions. She was not observed visiting LIRING.

HMMA-36185
15 JAN 69

14-00000

HMMA-35501
80-120-13
10 OCTOBER 1968

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during September.

SECRET

HMMA-35523
50-120-13
30 September 68

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station continued to maintain periodic contact with LITAMIL-7 during July and August, but she still is not prepared to return to work.

SECRET

ORIG: W. FRIETZE/act
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R 1819
DATE: 14 AUGUST 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 36

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, PILAN, DO 4, CAS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 24706

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, SAN JOSE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 6703 (IN 69063)

B. DIRECTOR 24373 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. SINCE PORTUONDO APPEARS BE ON UNESCO MISSION REGULATION MENTIONED REF B ALSO APPLICABLE HIS CASE.

2. SUGGEST LITAMIL-7 ATTEMPT DETERMINE HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS REGIME.

3. FOR SAN JOSE, SUGGEST STATION ATTEMPT FIND OUT IF PORTUONDO IN FACT ATTENDING UNESCO CONF OR HE ON SOME OTHER MISSION FOR GOC.

WH/1 file:
LITAMIL-7
201

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/COG
C/WH/2/

Calvin M. Smyth
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

HMMA-34973
50-120-13
9 July 1968

201-file

A. LITAMIL-7: LITAMIL-7 was met on 21 May. She was debriefed more on the physical layout of LIRING, and was offered a job—in general terms. (The Station is considering using her as a transcriber of LISAMPAN.) LITAMIL-7 was receptive to the idea of maintaining contact with the Station, but asked for more time to put her personal affairs in shape.

HMMA-34623
10 May 1968
19-120-13/1

E. LITAMIL-7: LITAMIL-7, the Station's only physical penetration of LIRING, was finally retired by LIRING. This had been in the wind for some time. The problem was that according to Mexican laws LIRING had to pay LITAMIL-7 one month's salary for every year worked, and she had worked for LIRING 38 years. She was notified on 28 March that on instructions from the Foreign Ministry her employment with LIRING was being terminated effective 31 March 1968. On 28 March, all her phone books, keys, et cetera were taken away, and her appearance on 29 March was a mere formality. Her termination pay ($6,000 U.S.) is being given in three installments, with the last one the end of April. LITAMIL-7 gave her Case Officer no advance notice of her release, probably for fear of compromising her retirement benefits. Station will, however, continue to maintain casual contact with her after she receives the last installment of her severance pay. She may be of help in the future in identifying LIRING visitors or newcomers. Now that LITAMIL-7 is gone, the Station plans to activate LISAMPAN/CHARLIE, which, it is hoped, will become a regular source of information on LIRING.

201-330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-7
Progress Report for the Period January through March 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-5139, 5 April 1968

Summary: During the period of this report, LITAMIL-7 was met on a weekly basis. Most of the meetings with LITAMIL-7 were conducted in the presence of LITAMIL-3, who has known her for many years and is the only person who can pressure her into reporting information on the daily LIRING activities. Unfortunately, LITAMIL-7 has reported only routine information, much of which the Station already obtained through other means. In many cases, however, her information served to support information the Station suspected or needed to confirm. The following were factors that contributed to LITAMIL-7's apathy and reluctance to collect and report information of value. First, there was the problem of her health. Although she did have high blood pressure, most of her preoccupation over this condition was psychosomatic. It appeared that it provided her with a crutch to justify her inability to service Station requirements. Second, and this was probably the most significant factor behind her reluctance to collaborate fully, she was aware of the LIRING attitude towards retention of foreign employees in that office. In January 1968, LIRING released all local employees except LITAMIL-7, and as the months went by it became increasingly evident that it was only a matter of time before she would be released also. Evidence of her

Continued.......................

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD

16 MAY 1968

RI
Litamil-7

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 34598

DATE
6 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-128/3

imminent termination was given by the fact that she was given less duties as the months passed, until at the very end she did little more than put in her time. With the spectre of unemployment looming over the horizon, LITAMIL-7 was reluctant to take any risk that might have compromised her situation at LIRING. At stake was a sizable termination payment which the PBRUMENers were obligated to pay her according to local employment regulations. Obviously, she would do nothing to jeopardize this payment, which amounted to approximately $6,000 (U.S.). A further deterrent to her collaboration with the Station, even after her release by LIRING on 31 March, was the LIRING arrangement to make the termination payment in three increments, the last to be made at the end of April 1968. In view of this latest development in this operation, the Station has terminated the weekly meetings between the Station Case Officer and LITAMIL-7.

1. Introduction: During the period covered by this report, LITAMIL-7 was met and debriefed on a weekly basis. Her information was very limited and usually dealt with internal activities of a routine nature in LIRING. As pointed out above, her supervisors isolated her from all but the most routine administrative duties. Consequently, she lost access to virtually everything that may have been of interest to the Station. The Station asked her to bring out the book of addresses and telephone numbers which she had compiled over the years, but she refused for fear that it would be missed during the afternoon when she was not on duty. The Station then asked that she begin to copy the contents of the book a few pages each day. She agreed, but before she began this process the book disappeared, and all efforts to find it failed. She then began to compile a new book of addresses and telephone numbers, which she intended to bring out, but one of the LIRING officers asked for it on the day she was fired. In the end, the sum total of LITAMIL-7 LIRING information during the first three months of 1968 was the identification of several photographs of LIRING employees, the tentative identification of offices and rooms in LIRING (tentative because she had not been in the second floor area since 1961, thus much of the identification was from memory), and finally, LITAMIL-7 confirmed telephone numbers assigned to specific LIRING personnel and furnished telephone numbers of individuals and companies servicing LIRING maintenance requirements (dry cleaners, pharmacy, typewriter repairmen, etc.). LITAMIL-7 volunteered to provide additional information on LIRING to the Station provided it was within her capability, and after she received her final severance payment from LIRING.

2. Finance: LITAMIL-7 received no salary and no termination bonus from the Station.

3. Security: Since all contact with LITAMIL-7 was maintained through LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 does not have a Station telephone number. She does not know the true names of any of the Station Case Officers who handled her. All meetings with her were held in her home, thus no safehouses were used, and she was never seen with Case Officers in public. She had no telephone, so no contacts were made with her by phone. From the security point of view, the LITAMIL-7 operation enjoyed a long life, January 1961 through March 1968. Taking into account her fear and apprehension, plus the fact that she maintained good relations with LITAMIL-3, this record is all the more remarkable. From the intelligence point of view, it is unfortunate that her production was so minimal.

4. Future of the Operation: Although for all intents and purposes the LITAMIL-7 operation has come to an end, the Station intends to maintain a casual contact with her. It is very likely that she may know new personnel assigned to LIRING and may be able to furnish information on these individuals. There may also be developments in LIRING which, on the basis of her lengthy service in LIRING, she might be able to assess and clarify. Since LITAMIL-7 was not a salaried agent for the Station, the operation cost nothing more than the investment of Case Officer time, and an occasional gift of flowers. In view of her intense pride, there is little reason to believe that she will accept money in the future. If she is able to provide information to the Station it will probably be done without any thought of compensation.

for Willard C. CURTIS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

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☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ACTION

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
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7
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9
10

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, C/OA, FI, TSD 6

S E C R E T 060030Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5139 6 APR 68 IN 86257

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 985

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-7 LISAMPAN

WH/1 file: M
LITAMIL-7 201. ck

1. LITAMIL-7 RETIRED BY EMBASSY EFFECTIVE 31 MARCH 1968. LIENVOY TAKE 28 MARCH REFLECTING THIS DEVELOPMENT RECEIVED STATION 29 MARCH, LITAMIL-7 LAST DAY OF WORK. LITAMIL-7 DID NOT NOTIFY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING BE WAITING FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO DETERMINE TYPE AND AMOUNT SEVERANCE PAY. REFUSED BRING OUT ANYTHING FROM LIRING (ADDRESS BOOKS, KEYS, ETC) FOR FEAR MIGHT AFFECT FINAL SETTLEMENT. ASKED CHIEF LIRING IF COULD PURCHASE OLD TYPEWRITER SHE HAD BEEN USING 22 YEARS BUT WAS REFUSED.

2. LITAMIL-7 WAS PAID 60,000 PESOS 2 APRIL. WILL GET 7,000 ON 11 APRIL AND FINAL 2,500 END APRIL. ABOVE TOTALS PROPER COMPENSATION FOR 38 YEARS SERVICE, BASED MEXICAN LAW.

3. ALTHOUGH LITAMIL-7 RETIREMENT ELIMINATES ONLY STATION PHYSICAL ASSET AT LIRING, DEVELOPMENT PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY ACTIVATE LISAMPAN/CHARLIE. AS ADDEES AWARE LITAMIL-7 HAD BEEN ISOLATED COMPLETELY FROM ANY BUT MOST INNOCUOUS CONVERSATIONS. HER REPLACEMENT BY WIFE LIRING STAFFER MAY PROVIDE INTERESTING INFO. STATION PLANS ACTIVATE CHARLIE WEEK 14 APRIL, AFTER WEEK OF TAKE ON TEST

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5139 SECRET

BASIS OF FOXTROT, REACTIVATED 5 APRIL.

4. STATION PLANS MAINTAIN OCCASIONAL CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHENEVER PERSONNEL OR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS WARRANT SUCH CONTACTS. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER SHE WILL REMAIN RETICENT UNTIL FINAL PAYMENT PARA 2 ABOVE.

SECRET

SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-34335
27 March 1968
50-120-13

H. LITAMIL-7: The Station was successful in obtaining limited operational support intelligence from LITAMIL-7 during February. She was again sick almost half the month and unavailable for meetings. The Station is also using LITAMIL-7 as a source of information in its physical target study of LIRING.

SECRET

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-8-128/3

6. There were no major problems involving assets under this project during this period. LITAMIL-7 continued to be in poor health from time to time, but this is not expected to change.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-8-128/3

12. LITAINT-2 and LITAMIL-7 were of extreme value in monitoring the reaction of LIRING-2 during the roll-up of AMQUACK-1 and his associates. LIRING-2 was implicated in the AMQUACK-1 support apparatus in Mexico.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HMMA-33910
24 JANUARY 1968
50-H-128/3

22. [redacted] continued to provide items of interest on the personnel of LIRING. His most valuable use is to identify photographs of the staff and visitors.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ESPERON-PEREZ, CONSUELO
201-330173
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-012
HMMA-33722A01
10 JAN 68

CIT ?
OCC ?
SEC TO 2ND SEC
CUBAN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN MEXICO

UFG

R 6801262172

LITAMIL-7

FILE IN 201-330173

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

HMMA - 33695
19 December 1967
19 - 120-13/1

[illegible] were valuable eyes into LIRING during the period immediately after the publicized death of "Che" Guevara and the roll-up of the commo system of the revolutionaries in Bolivia. They were especially useful in monitoring the reaction of LIRING-2 who was very closely tied to this commo net and against whom the Station was planning an operation.

C. Through LITAINT-2, two denigation leaflets were produced attacking the LIRING staff in Mexico. One on the LIRING representative in Veracruz produced a reaction in the form of a reward being offered for the apprehension of the perpetrators of this material.

7318

Dos. M13.- 24 abril 67.-

168.- Entrada a las 1045hs.- MF con Chelo.- PLATICA PERSONAL./ ---- MF invita a Chelo a comer con ella hoy para platicarle de Lucho.--- Chelo acepta.-- 198.

209.- Salida al 196643.- 1054hs.- Chelo con Conchis.- Asuntos personales. - Chelo le pide disculpas por haberse violentado el otro día con ella por lo de Lucho.--- Conchis se encuentra agripada.--- Chelo: que le habló María Elena y que le dice que se va a Oaxaca para el casamiento de Pila y que hoy ella va a comer con ella.-- 244.-Chelo come con María Elena.

258.- Salida al 135807.- 1104hs.- Chelo con Huelgas le hace un pedido de papel, sobres y artículos de escritorio.- 312

326.- 358. Salida al 111727.- 1118hs.- Chelo con MF le pide que ,manden a una persona para que revisen la máquina IBM que usa el embajador.- MF que van a hacer todo lo posible por pasar en la mañana.--- 405.

443. Salida al 462220.- 1130hs.- Chelo con MF que le diga a la Srita.Jasso y al Lic. Santana, haber si es posible que el Sr.Subsecretario pueda recibir hoy a Abreu porque sale mañana.-- MF que les pasará el recado.--- 466.

467.- Salida a las 1132hs.- Chelo con MF el Lic. García Camberos hablan sobre una cita solicitada por Abreu y Cicard - con el Sr.Director.- García: que va a ver si es posible que los reciba hoy, que luego le llama.--- 490.

50-6-75/4
LIENVOY
HMMA-31987 22 May 67

504.- Salida al 141326.- 1304hs.- Chelo con Guerrero hablan sobre el pago de ciento cincuenta pesos por unos boletos de la Cruz Roja.-- 533.

FILE WH-1 LITAMIL/7

542.- Salida al 109551.- 1311hs.- Chelo con MF la Srita.Luna le pide dos ejemplares del Anuario Financiero de México, cuyos ejemplares cuestan 150 pesos cada uno.- Chelo queda en mandar recogerlos.--- 589.

201-330173

590.- Salida a la embajada de Suiza.- Chelo con la embajado -- de Suiza confirma el pago de los boletos de la Cruz Roja.-

le dice que está muy sentido porque no vinieron al coctel de su despedida el jueves 20; que para el sábado próximo sale para la Habana definitivamente pero que antes pasará a despedirse de ellos.-- Abreu le pregunta por el teléfono de Juan.-- MF que es el 480207.---- Abreu le pregunta por Pepo. MF que no tienen noticias.--- Abreu queda en comunicarse con pages a la revista.--- 560.

569.- Salida al 480207.- 1320hs.- Abreu con MF Juan se saludan y se citan para el viernes a las 9.30pm en el María Isabel.-- Abreu le dice que el sábado sale para la Habana.-- 603

604.- Entrada a las 1325hs.- MF Gustavo con Chelo su hermana le dice que ha estado esperando su llamada como le dijo. Chelo: Presión muy alta.--- Visitas a familiares.--- Gustavo que su mamá está muy mala grave que tiene los intestinos pegados y que tiene infección intestinal.-- Chelo como de costumbre con sentimentalismos, que por que no le había hablado....---- Gustavo queda en llamarla el viernes por la mañana.--- 653.

654.- Entrada a las 1340hs.- MF con Chelo que el Dr.Chavarría del Grupo José Martí, quiere hablar con el embajador.- Chelo que un momento.--- Chelo que el embajador no está en su despacho.--- MF que se encuentra en la casa del maestro Ancona.- Chelo: que como ha seguido de sus males.- MF que está mejorado.- Que Ancona quiere saber si salieron los guajolititos aquellos que si se embarcaron.... Chelo: que le parece que sí, pero que en cuanto vea al embajador le dice que le llamaron.--- 710.

723.- Entrada a las 1355hs.- MF la guera con Chelo.- Asuntos personales.--. Chelo le ofrece unas prendas usadas para la confeccion de otras prendas que se utilicen.-- La guera queda en mandar a Eduardo por las prendas.--- 878.

881.- Salida al 436980.- 1400hs.- MD Arturo pregunta por Cepeda.- MF que no ha llegado.- Arturo: que cuando llegue que se comunique con el porque le tiene un recado del embajador.- ---------------------------------------895.------------. . . .

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, WH Division
PBRUMEN/LISAMPAN
Cuban Embassy Floor Plan

Action Required: Update Floor Plans, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City

Reference : MEXICO CITY 1231 (IN 54233)

1. It would be appreciated if the Station would prepare up-to-date as possible seating and office plans of all floors of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in order to assist Headquarters in following LISAMPAN and LIENVOY take. Locations ~~of the various telephones by number would also be appreciated~~ in this connection. If architect floor plans are available, these would be welcome but sketches are acceptable. Presumably LIFEUD-2, LITAINT-2 and LITAMIL-7 would contribute to this requirement.

2. What type of and how much activity is there in reference office?

3. Please indicate the probable location of the room ~~AMBEATLE-1 alleged the Cubans described as the only one not~~ bugged by WOFACT (UFGA-27310). Is a LISAMPAN unit scheduled for installation in this room?

Andrew F. MERTON

LITAMIL-7

4 MAY 1967

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-75/3

HMMW-15446

3 May 1967

50-6-145/3

SECRET

WH/1 J. Stewart pem 6954

RI
Chrono
50-6-75/3
LITAMIL-7

WH/COG/CICS

7. Physical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING.

1 Oct 66 - 31 March 67

A. LITAMIL-7. LITAMIL-7 continued to report on the activities known to her of the LIRING personnel she comes in contact with and to provide information on PBRUMEN visitors and dependents of LIRING personnel. She furnished interesting information on the goings-on at LIRING at the time of the [illegible] crash including the presence of General Lazaro CARDENAS. Later the same month, she obtained from one of the LIRING officers propaganda records produced by the Cultural Ministry which she lent us for copying. She was the first to report that a former LIRING intelligence officer had gained a high level position in the PBRUMEN Ministry of Culture.

Extract from HMMA 31777, 10 Apr 67

47[illegible]. Entrada 1249.-Milagro [illegible] de enterarse de que Chelo tiene la presión alta, queda de mandarle ahorita el papel para mimeógrafo como el que le ha mandado y Chelo acepta y aclara que el lunes arreglan cuentas.- 520.-

520. Entrada 1906.- HP de la Juventud Sindicalista pregunta dónde pueden conseguir el disco donde viene la primera declaración de La Habana y Chelo pide hable al 255679.- 521.-

521. Entrada 1910.- HP extranjero queda de pasar por Chelo a las 2 y ésta acepta. __[illegible]__: Bien.- 529.-

531. Salidas al 169596.-1917.-Abreu pregunta por Silvia y HP dice que acaba de hablar con ella y ésta le dijo que no ha terminado de sus compras pero que no se preocupe; que en caso de que no lo encuentre en la embajada, se los llevará al aeropuerto. Abreu acepta y pide que si le habla, le diga que el avión sale como a las 5. HP: Bueno.- 551.-

552. Salida al 299600.-Alberú se comunica a Relaciones, pide la ext.273 y posteriormente pregunta a Carlos Serrano si ya consultó en relación con la invitación y éste dice que sí, pero nuevamente hablará con el licenciado; que se espere. Alberú acepta. Luego Carlos pide le hable como a las 2½ porque el licenciado ahorita está en una conferencia a larga distancia. Alberú está de acuerdo.- 614.-

614. Entrada 1952.-Félix y su querida Chelo Esperón platican de sus enfermedades y de sus cosas personales.- 706.-

- -

- - (4.-LL3.- 23 Oct.66).-

some

HAVANA 385-VS (50-6-75/9)

LITAMIL-7

File

201

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief, WH; Chief, WE

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Rome

SUBJECT
Forwarding Papal Blessing

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

HMMA-28330, 17 February 1966

In accordance with request contained in Reference, attached is Papal Blessing.

Joseph M. RILANDER

Attachment:
Papal Blessing h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w
3 - C/WE w/o/att
2 - C/WH w/o/att

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OIRT-8664

DATE
6 April 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Rome

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Procurement of Certificate of Papal Blessing for LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LITAMIL-7, an aging spinster, is a penetration agent of the Mexico Station inside the PBRUMEN Embassy. She has recently been seriously ill on two occasions and has been shabbily treated by her employers while the Station has lavished attention on her. As a result of this contrast in demonstrated concern for her wellbeing, LITAMIL-7 has shown a determination to be of much more active service to the Station than in the past.

2. LITAMIL-7 is a devout and practicing Roman Catholic. It is the Station's understanding that certificates of Papal blessing can be obtained without too much difficulty in Rome. If this is the case, and the Rome Station can securely obtain such a certificate, it is believed that its presentation to her would cinch her already demonstrated determination to help the Station with its anti-AMTHUG work.

3. A blessing of LITAMIL-7's home or prayer for her continued health or any other appropriate form of certificate would be much appreciated. Please T/A any costs to the Mexico Station. LITAMIL-7's identity follows by separate cover attachment.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Identity u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS/Rome w/att u/s/c out pouch
1 - C/WHD w/o att

GROUP 1
[illegible]

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28330

DATE
17 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

X-REF TO FILE NO. ____
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ____

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/C8 CI/K2 CI/OPS CI/OA

SECRET 131716Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5887

13 JAN 65 IN 33126

PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

1. LITAMIL-7 UNDERWENT SURGERY 12 JANUARY FOR OVARIAN TUMOR. POST OPERATIVE CONDITION NOT YET DETERMINED. LITAMIL-3 KEEPING TAB ON SITUATION.

2. IN PREPARATION POSSIBLE EXTENDED DELAY LITAMIL-7 RETURN

To WORK LIRING, STATION PROPOSES ATTEMPT PLACE BROTHER-IN LAW LITAINT-2 IN LIRING ASSIST LIRING-1 AND 2.. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN TOUCHING LIGHTLY IN THIS AREA BUT PREFER NOT INVOLVE HIM IN STEADY EMPLOY INSIDE LIRING AS MAY RAISE QUESTIONS HIS OUTSIDE SOURCE INCOME IF WORKING LONG HOURS LIRING. LITAINT-2 BROTHER-IN-LAW APPROX 21 YEARS AGE AND WOULD BE ABLE WORK PART TIME LIRING WHILE CONTINUING STUDIES AT UNIVERSITY. THROUGH LITAINT-2 GRADUAL INTRODUCTION LIRING-1 AND 2, BROTHER-IN-LAW NOW ON MAILING LIST LIRING AND SOVEMB INFO BULLETIN.

3. WILL CABLE ESSENTIAL DATA FOR POA AND POUCH PRQ I WHICH BEING COMPLETED.

SECRET

CFN 5887 LITAMIL-7 12 OVARIAN TUMOR NOT YET LITAMIL-3 LITAMIL-7 LIRING LITAINT-2 NOT INVOLVE 21 LITAINT-2 POA PRQ I

BT

201

SECRET

PROJECT LITAMIL	**DATE OF INFORMATION** 31 Jan to 5 Mar 62	**FIELD NO.** **REPORT** HMM-6235
SOURCE LITAMILs-2,3,4,5,7 (B) LICASCADE-3	**DATE ACQUIRED** 31 Jan to 5 Mar 62	**CABLE**
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION	**RI NO.**
	DATE 6 Mar 62	
	GRADE B-2	**REPORTS OFFICER** ILS/kpr
SUBJECT Bloque Pro-Unidad Cubana En Exilio (Mexico), New Cuban/Mexican Anti-CASTRO Organization	**TO**	
	WASH. DISTRIBUTION	**C S** 3/504,205 — **EVAL. REQUESTED**
	DATE	
	GRADE	**AREA** Mexico/Cuba
	TO	

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT Scheduled Interview Between Mexican Foreign Minister and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION 8-11 Jan 63

DATE ACQUIRED 9 Jan 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 10 Jan 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE F-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 6923
CABLE MEXI 3052
IN 67307

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER jct

C S 3/533,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

This report was sent to the desk for processing because the source was received "LIAMIL-7". The desk that handles LITAMIL-7 said the source evaluation should be F.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 2

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE MEXI 3052

IN NO. 67307 dh

JAN 10 [illegible] 63

NOT DISSEMINATED

DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS CJZ

HMM 6923

INTEL FORMAT

NON-INTEL FORMAT

IW HAS NO SOURCE DATA CARD FOR LIAMIL 7.

RECEIVED NOT DISSEMINATED DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-60 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (13-20)

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9
LITAMIL-7 ✓

SUBJECT
Activities of Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Cuban Ambassador, in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION 10-14 January 1963

DATE ACQUIRED 12-14 January 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE [illegible]
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE MEXI-3078, 3091
IN 49031 49380
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

CS 3/534,370

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Portions of these two cables disseminated as a CS.

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-3 from LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT
New Employees of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 January 1963

DATE ACQUIRED
24 January 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 January 1963
GRADE B fm F - 2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 6965
CABLE MEXI 3205
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

No dissemination. Information of this type is reportable by ODACID.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 13 April 1963	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7188 CABLE MEXI 4214 IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 18 April 1963	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 17 April 1963 GRADE B-2 TO	RI NO. REPORTS OFFICER jct
SUBJECT Meeting Between Cuban Ambassador in Mexico and Mexican Foreign Minister	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

This report was not disseminated. Information marginal, no intel value to customers.

Hq notes that the Station has apparently raised LITAMIL-7 from F to B. We feel that a more proper evaluation for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 3

SECRET *(When Filled In)*

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD	CITE MEXI 4214	IN NO.
	APR 19 [illegible] 63	
	NOT DISSEMINATED	DISSEMINATED
COMMENTS CNS	HMM 7188	INTEL FORMAT / NON-INTEL FORMAT

---THIS LOOKS PRETTY MARGINAL TO THIS IWO. TO DESK FOR REVIEW.

nada

nada

RECEIVED	NOT DISSEMINATED	DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-60 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 26 April 63	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7225 CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 26 April 63	RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 30 April 63 GRADE B-2 TO	REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT Resignation of Quintin PINO Machado, Cuban Ambassador to Hungary	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Cuba/Hungary

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissemination. Already known.

Re Source evaluation, see Source Record Card for HMM-7188.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

2

PROJECT No Project LIFLAB	DATE OF INFORMATION 13 Apr 63	FIELD NO. REPORT T-04-7236 CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7 ✓ LIFLAB	DATE ACQUIRED ?	
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 7 May 63 GRADE F & B - 2	RI NO.
SUBJECT Travel to Cuba of Jorge Aspillaga Gonzales and Jose Cruz Zalavera	TO	REPORTS OFFICER PHS/jet
	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S [illegible] EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

[illegible] CUSTOMERS AND HQS EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT LIFIRE and No Project

SOURCE LIFIRE
LITAMIL-7 ✓

SUBJECT Travel of Latin Americans to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION 26 April 1963

DATE ACQUIRED 26 April 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE R & C-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE MEXI-4351, 4366
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER jcb
CS 3/545,898
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Mexico/Cuba/Central Am.

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

Information in the two cited cables were disseminated as a CS report.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 3 May 1963	FIELD NO. REPORT [illegible]-7238
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 3 May 1963	CABLE IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 7 May 1963 GRADE F-2 TO	RI NO. REPORTS OFFICER FLS/jct
SUBJECT Tania Zelaya Alger, New Director of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE C-2 TO	C S 3/543,928 AREA Mexico/Cuba
		EVAL REQUESTED

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES, COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 8 May 1963	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM-7251 CABLE MEXI-4516 IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 8	RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 10 May 63 GRADE B-2 TO	REPORTS OFFICER [illegible] IMOG
SUBJECT Cancellation of Cuban Embassy Festivities Planned for 20 May 1963	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE B-2 TO	CS 3/546,827 — EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS, SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES· COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

Disseminated by IMOG as received.

Lit to "C"

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

PROJECT SECRET	DATE OF INFORMATION	FIELD NO. REPORT CABLE IN
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED	RI NO.
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	CS — EVAL. REQUESTED AREA

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Re HMM 7251, Supdata.

The complete production of LITAMIL-7 has been reviewed by Headquarters. Of the 10 reports submitted from September 1962 through May 1963, of which L-7 was the source of the complete, or a specific part of the report, 5 were not disseminated. In addition to those which were disseminated, 2 dissems used info received in ops cables which came from L-7.

The info from this source is considered to be quite low-level and fragmentary, including few details.

After this careful review, we fail to find any justification for raising her to a "B".

We wish to point out that source's access to information does not affect her rating. That would be reflected in the appraisal of content.

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source by Headquarters.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

14-00000

PROJECT
LIFIRE & Ho Project

SOURCE
LIFIRE
LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT
Alba Rosa Gonzalez Quevedo, Cuban, Training in Nursing in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
6-8 May 63

DATE ACQUIRED
8 May 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 May 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 3 Jun 63
GRADE B-2
TO C

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-7261
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S
3/548,931

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

14-00000

PROJECT No Project LIENVOY, LIRACK	**DATE OF INFORMATION** [illegible]	**FIELD NO.** **REPORT** [illegible]-7353 **CABLE** MEXI-4966 **IN** [illegible]-167
SOURCE LITAMIL-7 LIENVOY LIRACK	**DATE ACQUIRED** [illegible] **FIELD DISTRIBUTION** **DATE** [illegible] 1: 31/[illegible]63 **GRADE** [illegible]-2 **TO**	**RI NO.** **REPORTS OFFICER** [illegible]ct
SUBJECT Bank Accounts and Transactions of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.	**WASH. DISTRIBUTION** **DATE** 17 June 63 **GRADE** C, 2, B - 2 **TO**	**C S** 3/550,623 **EVAL. REQUESTED** **AREA** MEXICO / CUBA

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Three items were combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT No Project	DATE OF INFORMATION 14 Aug 63	FIELD NO.
		REPORT HMM-7636
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED 14 Aug 63	CABLE MEXI-5805
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION	RI NO.
	DATE 16 Aug 63	
	GRADE B-2	REPORTS OFFICER
	TO (But in C)	
SUBJECT Aaron SILCBAS Casado	WASH. DISTRIBUTION	C S None
	DATE	EVAL. REQUESTED
	GRADE	AREA
	TO	Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

No dissem. Of no intel value to customers.

(24) 3

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD		CITE		IN NO.	
ACTION DIV.:	PRECEDENCE:	FIELD REPORT NO.	TDCS	INTEL FORMAT	NON-INTEL FORMAT
[illegible] RECEIVED		[illegible] NOT DISSEMINATED		DISSEMINATED	

COMMENTS

THE DESK SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO CUSTOMERS TO WARRANT DISSEMINATION AS A TDCS.--

RECEIVED | NOT DISSEMINATED | DISSEMINATED

FORM 3-63 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

PROJECT: No Project

SOURCE: LITAMIL-7

SUBJECT: Issuance of Visas on Separate Pieces of Paper by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION: 7 Dec 63 - 9 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED: 23 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE: 6 Feb 64

GRADE: C-2

TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE:

GRADE: ~~C-2~~

TO:

FIELD NO.

REPORT:

CABLE: HM 8403

IN:

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER: FLS/jct

C S: 3/573,314

EVAL. REQUESTED:

AREA: Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

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(24)

3

14-00000

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4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/FI/D 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FR. FILE *C/FI, DC[illegible]

24 MAY 63 IN/4046

[illegible]CRET 241825Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3532

REF DIR 12[illegible]

PBRUMEN

LITAMILS-3 AND -7 BOTH IL. STATION WILL COMPLY REF ASAP.

SECRET

CFN

LITAMIL-7

* DISSEM PER. RYBAT LAURICLE

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible] DU BOIS/[illegible]
UNIT: [illegible] Ops
EXT: 5975
DATE: 26 MAY 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO MEXICO

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: C/F/04 INFO C/FI, DC/WH/C 4, VR, FILE, C/WH.

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 12000

RYBAT LAURICLE PBRUMEN

File LITAMIL-7

REFS: A. BOCH DISPATCH 4684

B. SOWATN 14336

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMS FORWARDED MEXI BASIS SABETAY'S RECENT VISIT AND DISCUSSION HELD WITH STA PERSONNEL RE PBRUMEN TARGET.

2. INFO AVAILABLE HQS INDICATES LITAMIL/7 CURRENTLY ONLY STA ASSET WITH DIRECT BUT CURRENTLY LIMITED ACCESS WITHIN PBRUMEN INSTALLATION. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT REQUEST FOLLOWING RQMS BE LEVIED L/7:

A. COMPLETE DETAIL DEBRIEFING RE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRUCTURE TARGET.

B. UPDATED LIST RE PERSONNEL WORKING WITHIN INSTALLATION, THEIR PHYSICAL WORK LOCATION, DUTIES AND INDICATION UNUSUAL WORKING HRS.

C. SECURITY PROCEDURES ENFORCED DURING WORKING HRS, AFTER WORKING HRS, AND DURING WEEK-ENDS AND HOLIDAYS.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO

PAGE 2 INFO CITE DIR 12080

D. AREAS L/T DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS, REASONS FOR SAME AND OPINIONS RE NATURE ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE THEREIN.

E. SPECIFIC LOCATION CODE ROOM, SECURITY MEASURES PERTAINING THERETO, AND CODE CLERK DUTY HRS.

3. PRIORITY DETAIL ANSWERS TO ABOVE RQMS WILL IMMEASUREABLY ASSIST HQS IN PREPARATION TARGET STUDY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/CUBA

C/WH

C/WH/1

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C/FI/D

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

INTRATOR, MAX
201-330173
SEX M DOB ?

201-737921
EGGA-03180
09 NOV 64

CIT CUBA?
OCC ?
RE INTERCEPTED LETTER FROM HANS-WERNER
ABTMEYER TO BRAULIO LOPEZ 201-737921

R 6503092805

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

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TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, PG2, CA2, CI/OA, CA/O4

SECRET 072209Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1845

LIRANCH

REF A. HMMA-24694

B. DIR 65335 X

C. DIR 65334

IN 37862

1. FOLLOWING KEYED TO REF B:

A. PARA 2. CALVILLO CHARGED TO OOA DURING ALL FY 64. WISH HAVE HIS FY 65 OBLIGATIONS CHARGED LILISP X AS STATED IN REF A OWING PURELY KUCAGE DUTIES. SO CHARGING AT STATION. LITAINT 2 CHARGED LILISP X DURING ALL FY 64. SINCE DUTIRES NOT IN KUCAGE FIELD STATION CHARGING HIM TO OOA DURING FY 65 AND WISH HIM INCLUDED IN LIRANCH. ABOVE DO NOT REPRESENT OBLIGATIONS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE LISTED LILISP X.

B. PARA 3. LIHUFF AMOUNTS LISTED PARA II A REF A WERE CHARGED OOA UNTIL 1 MAR 64. DURING FY 65, THROUGH NOV 64, 4100 DOLLARS PAID LIHUFF FROM LILISP X FOR STUDENT ACTIFITIES. FOR OVER YEAR STATION AWAITING WORD ON PROJECT ACTION ONE WAY OR OTHER. STATUS REPORT HMMA-24682 OF 8 NOV RENEWS PLEA FOR DECISION. WOULD LIKE EITHER TERMINATE OR GET ON WITH IT.

C. PARA 7. PROJECT IN PREPARATION.

SECRET

E. PARA 8A. LIFEUDS BEING PROJECTED SEPARATELY AS SUGGESTED. ASSUMPTION RE LICAMEO CORRECT. AS NOTED MEXI-1783 (IN 32156) ON BASIS HAVE NOTIFICATION PLAN TERMINATE LICAMEO 31 DEC. DEDUCT 600 DOLLARS FROM LIRANCH TOTAL. , -2 (wi [illegible])

F. PARA 8B. PREPARING PROJECT AS REQUESTED. LISICLE SHOULD GET ONLY 500 FOR OPS EXPENSES. HIS SALARY TERMINATED 1 APRIL 64 AS UNJUSTIFIED, BUT SERVICES RETAINED AS UNPAID COLLABORATOR. LITAMIL-7 IS UNPAID AGENT, BUT WILL BE INCLUDED IN PROJECT. LITAMIL-2 OMISSION FROM REF A WAS OVERSIGHT. WILL BE INCLUDED AT TOTAL EXPENSE FOR FY 65 OF APPROXIMATELY 9,600 DOLLARS. RECENT EVENTS INDICATE LITAINT-7 MAY REMAIN MEXI AND WILL INCLUDE HIM IN PROJECT FOR 1,400 DOLLARS. CLEARANCE ACTION BEING REQUESTED. AMPANIC-6 TERMINATED 6 AUG 64, WILL NOT BE USED FURTHER.

2. REF B. BELIEVE ALL ANSWERS CONTAINED HMID-6620 (IN 32112), ALTHOUGH STATION VIEWS OOA AMOUNT AND LITAU PROJECTION AS EXCESSIVE.

3. REQUEST HQ FILE NUMBER FOR LIRANCH.

SECRET*

* PRESUMED EXPENSES LISTED AGAINST CALVILLO AND LITAINT-2 UNDER OOA WERE MADE TO RELEIVE OVEROBIGATION OF LILISP-X.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET

ORIG: C. Betos
UNIT: WH/
EXT: 450
DATE: 19 NOVEMBER 1964

☐
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: PG2, VR, File

LITAMIL-7

19 Nov 64 Z: 49 z

SIG CEN

TO MEXI   INFO.   CITE DIR

65305

LIRANCH

REF: HMMS 24694

1. UPON RECEIPT ANSWERS FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HDQS READY SUBMIT OOA PROJ WHICH BEING REDRAFTED HERE AND ASSIGNED CRYPT LIRANCH.

2. PRESUME EXPENSES LISTED AGAINST CALVILLO AND LITAINT-2 UNDER OOA WERE MADE TO RELIEVE OVEROBLIGATION OF LILISP-X AND DO NOT REPRESENT OBLIGATIONS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE LISTED LILISP-X. PLEASE CONFIRM.

3. ASSUME MONEY OBLIGATED AGAINST LIRANCH FOR LIHUFF IS RPT IS IN ADDITION THAT LISTED LILISP-X AND INCLUDES LIHUFF SALARY.

4. EVEN THOUGH PAYROLLED AT HDQS SALARIES OF STATION ASSETS MUST BE INCLUDED UNDER STATION PROJECTS. HDQS ACCORDINGLY ADDING SALARIES FOR LICOOKY 1, AS WELL AS MANY OTHERS SINCE TRANSFERRED TO FORMAL PROJECTS.

5. MONEY MUST BE INCLUDED IN LIRANCH FOR ALL OOA CHARGES PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE OF NEW PROJECTS APPROVED DURING CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. THEREFORE HAVE ADDED MONEY FOR LICOMET, LIOXIDE. ALSO INCLUDING MONEY FOR NEW SOVIET AND CUBAN ~~RRIR~~ PROJECTS FOR SIX MONTHS. THESE NEW PROJS MUST BE SUBMITTED DURING DECEMBER AND MADE EFFECTIVE

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MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

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UNIT :
EXT :
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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

page two

TO INFO. CITE DIR 65335

B

5
1 JANUARY 196/.

6. SUGGEST PROJ FOR SUPPORT ASSETS AGAINST SOVIET TARGETS XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (PARA TWO B REF) INCLUDE LICAGE SINCE HE MIGHT BE TRANSFERRED OTHER LCIMPROVE BASE. INCLUDE RENT, SALARIES AND MISC EXPENSES OF ALL BASEHOUSES AND KEEPERS.

7. RECOMMEND ALSO LILINK PREPARE NEW PROJECT COVERING LICENTO-1 AND LICOOKY -1 AS XXXXXXXX INFORMANTS CENTRAL AMERICAN EXILE ACTIVITY MEXI.

8. REGARDING NEW PBRUMEN PROJECTS:

A. SUGGEST LICAMEOS ✓✓✓ AND LIFEUDS 22 AND 23 BE INCLUDED IN SEPARATE SINGLE NEW PROJECT AS STRAIGHT SUPPORT ASSETS. XXB ASSUME ONLY ONE LICAMEO BEING PAID AT RATE ONE HUNDRED PER MONTH.

B. PREPARE SECOND PROJECT TO COVER GENERAL INFORMANTS AND SPOTTERS PBRUMEN OPS. INCLUDING:

1) AMPACA

2) ✓LISICLE-1. BELIEVE STATION FORGOT INCLUDE HIS SALARY IN REF SO HDQS ADDING THREE THOUSAND PER XXX YEAR FOR THIS.

3) LITAMILS 3, 9 LISTED REF. ACCORDING OUR RECORDS LITAMIL ✓SEVEN ALSO ACTIVE AND SHOULD BE INCLUDED. WOULD INCLUDE LITAMIL-2 ✓

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 65335

EVEN IF SLIGHT POSSIBILITY HE TO BE RETAINED.

4) LITAINT-2. SUGGEST INCLUDE LITAINT-7 IF POSSIBILITY HE BE RETAINED. NOTE HE HAS NO CLEARANCE, SEE HMMW 13128.

5) HDQS SUGGESTS AMPANIC-6 XR WHO RECEIVES $240 MONTHLY PER PRQ ALSO BE INCLUDED.

8. AGREE DEGRIP LICHAP AND LICRAFT REMAIN OOA.

9. PLEASE CABLE REPLY. SEE SEPARATE KR CABLE MRID.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DDOS/L, DDOS 4, SPOG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 061751Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8037

IN-13994
6 Feb 64

HTBASTE PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 7940 (IN [illegible])*

ACCORDING LITAMIL-7, LECHUGA TRAVEL PLANS CHANGED: HE WENT CANADA, WILL REMAIN UNTIL 18 FEB, PROCEEDING PBRUMEN.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED SUBJS TRAVEL PLANS.

R

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1325, 27 JAN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, DDDS/L, DODS 4, SPOG, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 271549Z

PRIORITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 7940

27 JAN 64 IN 06532

KUBASTE

REF: [illegible]

LITAMIL-7 OVERHEARD CONVERSATION INDICATING CARLOS LECHUGA ARRIVING MEXI 28 JAN. NO DETAILS, NO CONFIRMATIONS. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW-11739

LITAMIL-7 was granted an OA on 20 August 1963 for use as outlined in PRQ II forwarded in HMMA-21539.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO
~~CS COPY~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11882

DATE
29 AUG 1963
~~27 August 1963~~

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
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WH/3/M.	
~~[illegible]~~	

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/3 Mexico
OFFICER: C. Bustos
TYPIST: dd
EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE: 27 AUG 1963
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

C No. 101663

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico Wayne Carley

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/7 ______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated 24 June 1963.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 20 August 1963 dlr

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FORM 7-59 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (8)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO	
FROM	Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT	LITAMIL-7

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: FYI

REFS: A) HMMW-11621, 5 June 1963

B) HMMA-21539, 13 June 1963

As of 28 June 1963 the POA on LITAMIL-7 was reinstated until 28 September 1963. On 24 June the Headquarters desk requested that an OA be granted on the basis of the PRQ Part II submitted by Reference B.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11739	11 JUL 1963 5 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-330173

Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/m	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	W. Carley	db	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/M - W. Carley

NUMBER
C - 101663

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/7

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is reinstated until 28 September 1963.

field notified 5/11/63

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	28 JUN '63

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

PROJECT	DATE OF INFORMATION	FIELD NO.
		RLPC #
SOURCE LITAMIL-7	DATE ACQUIRED	CABLE
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION	RI NO.
	DATE	
	GRADE	REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT	TO	
	WASH. DISTRIBUTION	C S
		EVAL. REQUESTED
	DATE	
	GRADE	AREA
	TO	

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Re HMM 7251, Supdata.

The complete production of LITAMIL-7 has been reviewed by Headquarters. Of the 10 reports submitted from September 1962 through May 1963, of which L-7 was the source of the complete, or a specific part of the report, 5 were not disseminated. In addition to those which were disseminated, 2 dissems used info received in ops cables which was from L-7.

The info from this source is considered to be quite low-level and fragmentary, including few details.

After this careful review, we fail to find any justification for raising her to a "B".

We wish to point out that source's access to information does not affect her rating. That would be reflected in the appraisal of content.

LITAMIL-7 is considered a "C" source by Headquarters.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

Summary -

LITAMIL-7

Field has submitted a total of 11 reports, of which 9 LITAMIL-7 was given as source for all, or a specific part of the report. 1 she was subsource, and in she was one of 6 sources and her contribution not specified. Plus that, info from her taken from 2 Ops cables for use in dissem.

Of the 11, 5 were NO DISSEM. (one still on my desk, probably no dissem.)

xx The info submitted by her is all pretty low level. Matter of fact, pretty much what would be considered overt in any normal embassy or consulate. She obviously reports what happens to come to her attention, but no indication she makes any effort to GET info to fill in the fragmentary info she submits.

I just can't see WHY the field considers her a B (except that they seem to consider all their sources a B.) It will be noted that they considered her a B from the very first report they ever submitted from her. IF they have justification for raising her, why don't they spell it out.
If this low-level informant is considered a B reporting agent - maybe we better devise some super evals for the GOOD sources.

Needless to say, I think C is very generous.

I doubt whether the AC or CO in Mexi ever evaluated her stuff.

Now - what is your opinion, Wayne? If you think she xxxxx is worth a B, its certainly OK by me (it probably would be the easy way out). However, looking at the over-all, seems wrong to give her a B unless she really deserves it -

LITAMIL-7

14-00000

12 June 63

LITAMIL-7's production (All of it)

HMM-6235 Jan-Mar 62 New Cuban/Mexi anti-Castro Organ.
(LITAMIL-7 only 1 of 6 sources reporting on a meeting that all supposedly attended. Report given overall [illegible].)
CS-3/[illegible]
C

HMM-5759 Sept 62 Domestic Employees of Cuban Emb in Mexi
(Names and salaries only. No info on 'em.)
No Dissem
Received as "B". Unfortunately, the Hq didn't mention the eval in the SAC.
(Opn cover sheet said it classified NO FOREIGN DISSEM because source believes it could pinpoint her as source!!)
B - ND

HMM-6923 Jan 63 Sched Interview between Mexican Foreign Minister & Cuban Amb to Mexi
MEXI 29[illegible]
(Reported the interview sched for 11 Jan. No other info. This during short time Lechuga in Mexi before going on to Cuba - returning fm UN in NY.)
CS 3/533,927
Field evaluated "B". Cut to F" By Hq for dissem.
SAC to field call d their attention to fact she an "F".
B - F

MEXI 3078 Jan 63 Activities of Lechuga in Mexi City
MEXI 3091
(Bits from 2 cables put out as dissem. Portion fm LITAMIL-7 reported that the 11 Jan meeting did not take place, and that Lechuga and family left Mexi for Hava 1- Jan.)
This portion was given a source eval of "F".
(Never did learn whether the Amb saw the ForMin before he left)
CS-3/534,370
- F

HMM-6966 Jan 63 New Employees of CubEmb in Mexi
No Dissem - State type reporting info.
Field correctly evaluated her as "F".
(This actually recd fm IL-3 from 7.)
F

HMM-7156 Apr 63 Meeting between Cub Amb and Mexi ForMin
MEXI-4214
No Dissem - No intel value to customers.
(Merely said meeting sched for 13 Apr - at Amb's request)
(Lechuga now back fm Cuba - enroute to NY.)
SAC went into detail re her eval - this report carried her as "B".
SAC: " We feel that a more proper eval for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation."
B - C

HMM-7225 - Next Pg

HMM-7236 Apr 63 Travel to Cuba of 2 people
(Portion of report from L-7 was that visas were issued the 2, and Cub Govt paying their fares.)
No Dissem - Hq not dissemming travel info at that time.
The field gave her inf and F in this report. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Fld probably hadn't recd the SAC for 7156 yet, so went by the earlier SAC's - and gave her an F.
(But HMM-7225 was "B" !!)
F - ND

LITAMIL-7's production

MEXI-4351 May 63
MEXI-4426
→ to C

Travel of MLA.'s to Cuba
Info from these cables (4 sources) combined for a dissem.
CS-3/545,335
Portion from LITAMIL-7 was that visas for some of people were on separate papers, & that Cub Govt paid fares for all.
Sent as Ops cable, so no eval by field.
She given a "C" by Hq.

HMMA-7225 Apr 63
B - C?

Resignation of Cub Amb to Hungary
No dissem (by SAS) - adequately covered by other sources.
This report gave her a "B" - [illegible] the following report was "F".
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible] of source eval on it.)~~
(Found it - called attn to SAS for HMMA-7183 re source eval.)

X HMMA-7232 May 63
C

New Dir of the Mexi-Cuban Instit of Cultural Relations
CS-3/548,928
Field gave her a "F" in this case. Dissemd as "C".
(SAS not yet prepared)

HMMA-7261 May 63
B - C

Cuban (female) studying nursing in Mexi
Info only that she studying nursing in Mexi on Cub Govt scholarship.
(Arrival info in LITAMIL ,
CS-3/548,931
Field gave her a B on this one, cut to C for dissem

HMMA-7251 May 63
MEXI 4515
B - + [illegible] mistake

Cancellation of CubAmb Festivities Planned for 20 May
TDCS-3/546,872 - Disseminated by IWOG. Field gave it a "B" - and so did IWOG - which is wrong. Just why IWOG dissemed it, is hard to determine. I don't think they even have a source card on her - at least not one giving her a "B" - that's certain.
Perhaps the field's argument in the supdata swayed them. It said. "Source LITAMIL-7 who station definitely considers B source. Most info submitted by L-7 is obtained directly from Cuban Embassy records. In present case L-7 personally read cable recd fm Hava."

That still doesn't qualify her for a B - that would up the appraisal of content.

HMMA-7353 31 May
Dissemed - with other info

Cuban Embassy Financial Transactions
(Title misleading - lists 2 banks in Mexi where Emb has accounts - nothing more. No actn taken yet - but doubt whether it's worth dissem, unless it represents some change.)
"Source data sheet says: "Source recd info personally from Buenaventura Reyes.
" Ref made to SAS for HMMA 7156 & 7225. Hq attention called to HMMA 7251 (Mexi 4515) wherein the Sta pointed out that it definitely considers LITAMIL-7 a B source. It is requested that Hq reconsider its C eval & and raise LITAMIL-7 to B which the Sta feels to be a more proper eval."

They gave the report ~~of~~ a B

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7
C-101663
201-330173

Attached is the PRQ part II on LITAMIL-7. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

Reference: HMMW 11426
HMMW 11621

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/att
2 - Files

201-330173

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

DATE TYPED
13 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21539

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173
P - 7575

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA 21526

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL - 7

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. [illegible] AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

LITAMIL-3, a former superior of LITAMIL-7 in the PBRUMEN Embassy handled her for several months before turning her over to Clyde K SHRYOCK on 7 May 1962. SHRYOCK is known to L-7 as "Roberto". Direct contact with L-7 was made in order to get better and more detailed information re the PBRUMEN Embassy personnel and activities.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer through LITAMIL-3, who continues to be her closest and most trusted friend.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Not applicable

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-350
1 NOV 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.

1

SECRET CS COPY

(4-20)

301-330173

ENCL # 1 to HMMA-21539

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist".)*

Subject is anti-Communist and pro-U.S. She wants to prove that she is anti-Communist by providing information to ODYOKE re activities inside the PBRUMEN Embassy.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico City has little control over Subject except to reveal her activities to PBRUMEN authorities.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are held at the home of LITAMIL-7 and if necessary the Case Officer could represent a visiting "friend".

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject is employed at the PBRUMEN Embassy and her information is gathered during the course of her working day.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject knows she is working for ODYOKE. She does not think in terms of intelligence agencies.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject has had no connection with any intelligence service in the past.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-3, who introduced Subject to Case Officer and frequently attends meetings with Case Officer.

LITAMIL-9 suspects that Subject is working for ODYOKE. He knows she is in contact with LITAMIL-3 and he knows L-3 is in contact with Case Officer.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no training in clandestine operations. She is becoming increasingly aware of intelligence techniques, however, and her production has improved for this reason.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject, being a Mexican, would probably collaborate with the Mexican Government if approached by high authorities.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

LITAMIL-3 has been in contact with Subject for many years and continued in contact with her as of this date. Subject provided information on the PBRUMEN Embassy through L-3/

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains her information from PBRUMEN personnel at the Embassy and by observation and elicitation.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information which she provides goes to Washington D.C.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is presently being used to provide information on travel to [illegible], particularly as it applies to the issuance of "courtesy visas" which she handles and information on the personalities and activities of PBRUMEN personnel through "clear" cable traffic, conversations, elicitations, and observation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is collaborating with KUBARK unselfishly. On occasions the Case Officer has sent her gifts and tried to help re visa problems, scholarships (close friend).

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is a highly qualified Spanish speaking secretary with more than 30 years of government service, i.e. with the PERUMEN Embassy in Mexico. ~~Subject takes Spanish shorthand.~~

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject does not get paid any salary and has refused same when offered.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

The Case Officer introduced a friend of Subject's to Dr. Juan GOODWIN of USIS re a scholarship to PEPRIME, has requested a visa through LITEMPO for a friend of Subject and has tried to help Subject's brother re draft dodging problem, i.e. provided him with contact in INS in Mexico City.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files and intimate friends of Subject down through the years, i.e. LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, LITAMIL-2, all trusted Station assets.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED POA granted 10 Sept 62

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, religious (Catholic), provincial in outlook, unsophisticated, intelligent, sincere, "simpatica" and unselfish. She is reliable and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with the Case Officer has been clandestine and is known to only LITAMIL-3, a trusted Station agent. On occasions the naivete of Subject has allowed her to introduce several relatives to the Case Officer without mentioning any names, i.e. a friend.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject does not drink, smoke, does not participate in any other vices as far as the Case Officer is able to determine. She is very religious and lives her religion.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII — **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is a bird fancier (canaries and parakeets).

SECTION XIV — **GENERAL**

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is from Oaxaca and typifies the native of that region, i.e. she has Indian facial characteristics. Subj is probably recognizable as a Mexican.

2- INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information on PRQ Parts I and II came from Station files, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-9, and LITAMIL-7, herself.

3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

Subject's termination will be routine.

SECTION XV — **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

The Case Officer has a phone number through which contact can be made in an emergency. Subj knows the ODACID phone number and extension. She will ask for "Roberto" and she will use the name "Paula". Contact can also be made through LITAMIL-3/

SECTION XVI — **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject was "pitched" by LITAMIL-3 during the period Dec. 60 and Jan. 1961. Subject was offered $10,000 U.S. to "defect" and make statements provided by CDYOKE, which she refused to accept after serious consideration. LITAMIL-3 was the "cut-out" for this operation which was handled by Andrew F MERTON.

DATE 12 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Clyde K SHRYOCK

ENCL #12 HMMA-21539 SECRET 201-330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Req: Submit PRQ Part II

REF: HMMW-11426, 29 March 1963

1. As mentioned in the reference, the POA on LITAMIL-7 expired on 10 March 1963. As of 27 May the file on L-7 was cancelled and closed by KUDESK/OA because of the failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI 10-5 and because of the failure to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of L-7.

2. Please forward PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-7 as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11621

DATE
29 May 1963
5 JUN 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

1 - RI
~~1 - Chrono~~

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
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WH3/MEX	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST
WH/3/Mexico/W.H. Carley:jp

EXT
5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL
CWHD

DATE
29 MAY 1963

OFFICER
J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 ~~USE PREVIOUS EDITION~~ (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 27 May 63 dlr

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

C# 101663

The file on LITAMIL/7 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ Part II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 3-62 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

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DISPATCH

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X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO.
Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Stattion, WAVE; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PERUMEN

Attached, for addressees, is a copy of Subject report dated 14 May 63.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

1 att H/W

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att
2 - COS, WAVE, /w/att VEW
2 - COB, Merida, w/att HMME
~~2~~3 - C/WHD, w/att C/WH/3
3 - Files

MICROFILMED
DOC. MICRO. SER.

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Index X
201- 330173

DATE TYPED
21 May 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO
file OUT

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21402

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173
P - 7575

Memorandum for the Record SECRET 2P 14 May 1963

Subject: LITAMIL-7

On 13 May 63, I went to Subject's home with LITAMIL-3. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED. Time: 1830-1900.

LITAMIL-7 reported as follows:

1. On 8 May 63, "courtesy" visas on separate piece of paper were issued to 13 Ecuadorans. Plane tickets to Habana only were also provided. (COMMENT: This might mean that this group plans on returning via another route.)

On 10 May 63, "courtesy" visas were issued on separate paper to 2 Argentines and 2' Brazilians. The latter group was issued a visa colectiva, i.e. one visa with the names of all the group on the paper. The 2 Argentines were provided with Cubana "round trip" tickets.

On 11 May 63, no "courtesy" visas were issued.

On 13 May 63, 9 Argentines were issued "courtesy" (separate) visas. L-7 said that there were four other persons with the above 9, who had already received "courtesy" visas on separate piece of paper in Santiago, Chile. She said she believes they were Argentines but she is not sure.

On 13 May 63, "courtesy" visas outside the passport were issued to 1 German and to 1 Uruguayan.

On 12 May 63, L-7 reported that two "courtesy" visas on separate pieces XXXX of paper were issued to 2 Peruvians.

2. I-7 reported that the two Cuban courters, Agustin ~~FRf~~ [illegible] 201-345986 and Braulio ~~FR~~ RODRIGUEZ, 201-356102 were scheduled to arrive ~~Mexico City~~ on 13 May 63, according to a cable she received.

3. L-7 reported that the following Cubans are living inside the Embassy: Manuel VEGA Perez, Buenaventura REYES Acosta, Armando SARDINAS, Jose LLAGOSTERA Garcia, and probably Emigdio XXXXXXXX VEGA Calero.

4. L-7 reported that a Dr. BRITO called re Joaquin HERNANDEZ the new Amb. This conversation came up on LIENVOY.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 25 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

att #1 HMMA 21402

201-330173

5. L-7 provided the following list of telephones within the Cuban Embassy compound:

14-13-25 - Gate

14-42-37 - In the office of the Amb's private secretary, i.e. Buenaventura REYES Has extension in Amb's office.

14-92-14 - This is in the office of LITAMIL-7, but is an extension of Teresa P's phone in the Cultural office behind the Embassy bldg proper.

25-59-14 - This is a private phone in the Amb's bedroom.

****

11-28-47 - Consulate (downstairs)

25-09-14 - Commercial Section (upstairs)

****

14-13-25 - This is extension of gate phone and is located in small library at top of stairs in bldg behind the Emb. It is usually not answered.

25-07-35 - This phone is not being used. It is in empty office and was formerly used on occasions by AMSTET-1. It is this phone that SINGRAS plans to transfer to his house.

14-92-14 - This is the phone in the Cultural Office which has an extension in L-7's office.

CKS

SECRET

FILE: LITAMIL-7

201-330173

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-7 — 201 file

SUBJECT
Meeting Between Cuban Ambassador in Mexico and Mexican Foreign Minister

DATE OF INFORMATION
18 April 1963

DATE ACQUIRED
18 April 1963

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 April 1963
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-7188
CABLE MEXI 6214
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
jcf
C S
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET

This report was not disseminated. Information marginal, no intel value to customers.

Hq notes that the Station has apparently raised LITAMIL-7 from F to B. We feel that a more proper evaluation for this source (from whom little of disseminable value has been received) would be C. If in the future her reporting warrants further upgrading to B, the station should at that time make a recommendation.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief of WH Division

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACT. REQ.: Submission of PRQ Part II

1. The POA on Subject has expired as of 10 March 1963.

2. If the Station has further interest in Subject, please submit PRQ Part II.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-330173

DATE TYPED
27 Mar. 63

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11426

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - RI 1 - Chrono	f
	4
[redacted]	
[redacted]	
C/WH/3	
[redacted]	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mex/Jane Zerance ds	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	28 MAR 1963	J. C. King

FORM 9-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 19 March 1963 jmh
TO: WH/3/MEXICO ATTN: WAYNE CAELEY	C NO. 111663
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ [illegible] Carroll, Jr.	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/7

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired 10 March 1963. Please submit PRQ-II. If within 30 days no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE LITAMIL-7

SECRET

032 28 JAN 63 WH

DATE : 25 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2.

ADDED: SAS 5

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

JAN 25 0304Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 56591

TDCS

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 3205

INTEL

REF HMM-6913 SUPDATA SOURCE LITAMIL-3 FROM LITAMIL-7 FILED 251915Z REPORT CLASS SECRET HMM-6966 MEXICO CUBA SUBJECT NEW EMPLOYEES OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY DOI 24 JANUARY 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 24 JANUARY 63 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (F) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING TWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

[illegible] EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND [illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 56591

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. LUISA CALDERON, A CUBAN, HAS REPLACED ROSARIO "CHAYO" VAZQUEZ, A MEXICAN, AS SECRETARY IN THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT ACCORDING TO VAZQUEZ, THE CUBAN EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HABANA TO DISCHARGE ALL MEXICAN EMPLOYEES OF THE EMBASSY.)

2. JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA, HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY AS FIRST SECRETARY. (SOURCE COMMENT: VAZQUEZ WILL REPLACE ANA MARIA BLANCO, FORMER SECRETARY TO CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO.) (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OBI | OO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

LITAMIL-7 ad
AMLAW-1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	15 JAN 63
O :	DIRECTOR
ROM :	MEXICO CITY
CTION:	TFW 10 (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT 2200 14 JAN 63 DM)
NFO :	DDP, ADDP, DODS, DODS/M 4, CA 2, SPOG, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 15 0300Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 49880

0

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 391

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

1. ON 14 JAN 63 LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT AMB CARLOS LECHUGA, HIS WIFE AND CHILD LEFT MEXICO FOR HAVANA VIA CUBANA ON THAT DATE. WHEN QUERIED WHETHER THEY RETURNING MEXI WIFE LECHUGA TOLD L-7 "WE DO NOT KNOW" AND AMB LECHUGA TOLD HER HE RETURNING MEXI AS HE STILL CUBAN DELEGATE UNITED NATIONS. L-7 HAS FEELING LECHUGA NOT RETURNING AS AMB MEXI.

2. L-7 COMPLETELY SURPRISED AT DEPARTURE WIFE LECHUGA WHOM SHE SAW 12 JAN AND WHO MADE NO COMMENT IMPENDING DEPARTURE FOR CUBA. LECHUGA DID NOT MAKE APPOINTMENT WITH MANUEL TELLO SCHEDULED FOR 1900 ON 11 JAN AND ON 12 JAN RAMON SINOBAS ASKED L-7 CALL FOREIGN OFFICE ASCERTAIN WHETHER APPOINTMENT SCHEDULED FOR 14 JAN CONFIRMED. L-7 CALLED BUT NO ANSWER FROM FOREIGN OFFICE. L-7 BELIEVES LECHUGA TELLO MEETING HELD MORNING 14 JAN AS LECHUGA LEFT EMBASSY EARLY.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 5 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 5 0620Z 63

ROUTINE

IN45036

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2994 (OUSLER ACTING)

GYROSE LITAMIL-9

1. ON 3 JAN 63 RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, CUBAN CHARGE, TOLD L-9 THAT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, CUBAN G-2, WAS GOING HAVA 6 JAN VIA CUBANA. VEGA, ACCORDING SINOBAS, WILL REMAIN HAVA FROM 15 TO 20 DAYS. LITAMIL-7 GAVE VEGA FAREWELL LUNCHEON AFTERNOON 3 JAN 63.

2. ON 3 JAN SINOBAS TOLD L-9 AND ANDRES ARMONA RAMOS, COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR, THAT IN FUTURE PLANS CUBAN GOVT L-9 AND ARMONA WILL NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED DIPLOMATS EXCEPT WHEN ASSIGNED OVERSEAS EMBASSY POSTS. WHEN HAVA L-9 AND ARMONA WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED DIPLOMATS. L-9 ACCORDING SINOBAS WILL FALL UNDER JURISDICTION CULTURAL DEPARTMENT MINISTRY EDUCATION AND WHEN NECESSARY FOREIGN OFFICE WILL ASK MINISTRY PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENTS. SINOBAS TOLD ARMONA HIS SITUATION SIMILAR WITH MINISTRY FOREIGN COMMERCE RESPONSIBLE HIS ASSIGNMENT.

3. SINOBAS CAME AWAY FROM PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION 3 JAN HIGHLY ELATED AND SURPRISED VIEW PRES LOPEZ MATEOS' REMARK "TRANSMITA MIS SALUDOS A FIDEL CASTRO Y A PRES DORTICOS." SINOBAS TOLD L-9 AND ARMONA HE DID NOT HAVE CHANCE MAKE HIS PREPARED STATEMENT AND IT

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

APPEARED HIM LOPEZ ANXIOUS GET HIS MESSAGE ACROSS. L-9 WHO IN RECEPITION LINE NOTED LOPEZ DELAYED SINDBAS LONGER THAN MOST OTHER DIPS AT RECEPTION.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7- LITAMIL-7

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	FI	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 28 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 28 2104Z 62

ROUTINE

IN41878

DIR CITE MEXI 2940

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

REF MEXI 2904 (IN 39430)*

1. ON 21 DEC 62 CO NOT ABLE MAKE CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHO UNEXPECTEDLY VISITED BY GLADYS LECHUGA, WIFE CUBAN AMB AT SCHEDULED TIME MEETING CO AND L-7. WIFE LECHUGA WHO ACCOMPANIED BY PARENTS STAYED TWO HOURS HOME L-7.

2. ON 27 DEC 62 CO AND LITAMIL-3 WENT HOME L-7, WHERE SHE REPORTED THAT ON THAT AFTERNOON SHE AND RAMON SINOBAS CASADO MADE OUT CUBAN DIP LIST FOR 1963 WHICH FORWARDED FOREIGN OFFICE. L-7 SHOWED CO COPY LIST. CUBAN DIPS LISTED FOLLOWING PRECEDENCE: CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA (ABSENT), RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, ANDRES ARMONA RAMOS, TERESA PROENZA PROENZA, LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, PEDRO LARA MUNOZ, JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA, BENIGNO CASTELLAR RAMIREZ. L-7 QUERIED SINOBAS RE GARCIA STATUS AND SINOBAS TOLD HER PUT HIM ON LIST AS HE IS EXPECTED RETURN.

3. ALTHOUGH WIFE LECHUGA STAYED TWO HOURS HOME L-7 PER PARA 1, L-7 SAID SHE DID NOT TALK POLITICS NOR DISCUSS HUSBAND ENTIRE EVENING.

SECRET

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 41878 MEXI 2940

4. L-7 SAID SHE ISSUED 22 COURTESY VISAS ON 27 DEC TO MEXICANS ALL OF WHOM GIVEN VISAS ON PAPER APART FROM PASSPORTS. L-7 SAID THIS TRUE MOST ALL INVITEES TRAVELLING HAVA AT THIS TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNING RECALL ALL AMBS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC REPS HAVA.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 21

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10 * (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT: 1530 21 DEC/AW)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 21 1906Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OPIM DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2924 IN39430

GYROSE LITAMIL-9 LITAMIL-7

REF DIR 06618

1. IN SEPT 62, GUILLERMO LEON ANTICH, CUBAN DIP, WHILE MEXI ON ROUTE POST CHILE (?) TOLD CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI IN PRESENCE LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNED RECALL ALL AMBASSADORS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC DIPS HAVA. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, NO INFO AVAILABLE L-9 INDICATING DIPS BEING RECALLED.

2. TRANSFER CUBAN DIPS MEXI AND BELIEVED REASONS FOR SAME AS FOLLOWS: CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, LEFT MEXI 26 OCT 62 FOR HAVA TAKE POST U.N. DELEGATION NEW YORK. LECHUGA EXPECTED RETURN MEXI 22 DEC WHERE WILL AGAIN TAKE UP AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES PROBABLY AFTER GOING HAVA REPORT U.N. DEVELOPMENTS. JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA LEFT MEXI 23 NOV 62 FOR HAVA. RETURN HAVA STRAIGHTEN OUT COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS, TAKE EXAMS AND POSSIBLY REPORT IN PERSON ON CONTACT KUBARKER MEXI. RETURN UNCERTAIN. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO LEFT MEXI 22 SEPT 62 FOR HAVA. DEFECTION PEDRO ROIG ORTEGA AND POOR ADMINISTRATION COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFER. ANA MARIA BLANCO TABRAUE LEFT MEXI 12 DEC FOR OTTAWA. LECHUGA "LOVE" AFFAIR BELIEVED REASON

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible] RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ LEFT MEXI 17 DEC FOR HAVA. [illegible] YEAR MEXI AND TRANSFER NOT UNUSUAL ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE [illegible] SYSTEM INTRODUCED CUBAN EMB AND THIS UNKNOWN TO HIM. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PAEZ REPLACED BY PEDRO LARA MUNOZ WHO SPENT YEAR MOSCOW.

3. ON 19 DEC 62, LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT ONLY RAMON CUENCA AND ANA MARIA BLANCO OF ABOVE GROUP HAVE BEEN "DROPPED" OFFICIALLY FROM CUBAN DIP LIST MEXI. OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION PAEZ EXPECTED SHORTLY. GARCIA AND LECHUGA STILL ON LIST. CO HAS SCHEDULED MEETING 21 DEC WITH LITAMIL-7 AT WHICH TIME EXPECTS HAVE REPORT ON NEWLY DRAWN UP CUBAN DIP LIST FOR PASSING FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH DUE FIRST OF YEAR. L-7 OPINION THIS WILL REVEAL FUTURE STATUS DIPS IN QUESTION PARTICULARLY GARCIA LARA.

4. ON 10 DEC 62 ALBERTO MANUEL FERRER, CUBAN DIP PP 32/695 ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA. LITAMIL-9 BELIEVES HE MEXI INSPECT AMB ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATES WITH RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, MANUEL VEGA AND PEDRO LARA ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY. ON 19 DEC L-7 REPORTED SHE INTRODUCED TO RODRIGUEZ FNU A MYSTERIOUS CHARACTER WHO LIVING AT EMBASSY. STATION BELIEVES RODRIGUEZ AND FERRER IDENS. FERRER SCHEDULED RETURN HAVA ON 21 DEC VIA CUBANA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

14-00000

4/

DATE : 069
6 OCT 62

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 6 0432Z62

ROUTINE

IN 34941

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2159

GYROSE/AMLAW-1

1. OSCAR LANDERMAN OLIVA AND MERCEDES ORTIZ LA RUBIA, CUBAN PARENTS WIFE AMLAW-1 ARRIVED MEXI 4 OCT VIA CUBANA. (LIFIRE B/DOC) ON 4 OCT LITAMIL-7 REPORTED BOTH LIVING AT CU

EMBA / MERCEDES ORTIZ VERY FRIENDLY L-7. (B/2)

BAN

/1

2. ADA KOURI BARRETO, WIFE RAUL ROA ARRIVED SAME FLIGHT AND GAVE CONTACT AS CUBAN EMBASSY. (LIFIRE B/DOC)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

-4-7

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: H.Z.MULLOY/H.G.KITCY JS:em
UNIT: TFW/FI
EXT: 6172
DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1962 1534

cwt

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 SEP 62 19 54z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT79341

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38057

GYROSE LITAMIL-7

1. PLS LEVY FOLL STANDING RQMTS LITAMIL-7 AT STATION DISCRETION:

A. REPORT NAMES AND AVAILABLE BI MEXI CITIZENS WHO REGULARLY VISIT SPECIFIC CUBAN IN EMBASSY. GIVE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED REASON FOR VISITS.

B. REPORT DETAILS ANY DISAGREEMENTS, PERSONALITY CONFLICTS, FEUDS, DISLIKES, ROMANCES, MARITAL, FINANCIAL, OR OTHER PROBLEMS AMONG CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

C. REPORT DETAILED DESCRIPTION PROCEDURE FOR PROVIDING CUBAN VISA TO NON-MEXICAN TRAVELERS FROM LA COUNTRIES WHO ARRIVE IN MEXICO WITH MEXICAN VISA AND INTEND TO CONTINUE ON TO CUBA BUT DO NOT WISH EVIDENCE CUBAN VISIT RECORDED IN PASSPORT. INCLUDE HOW PROCESS WORKS ON SUCH TRAVELERS RETURN HOME VIA MEXI. PROVIDE NAMES AND BIO DATA ON ALL SUCH TRAVELERS.

2. PLS FORWARD TO HQS ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITY DATA RE CUBAN OFFICIALS OR MEXICIANS IN CONTACT WITH CUBANS WHICH ALREADY HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY LITAMIL-7.

(END OF MESSAGE)

TFW/RQMTS for
WH/3/MEXI
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

REQUIREMENTS FOR LITAMIL - 7

1. WHEN TRAVELLERS FROM LATIN AMERICA COME TO MEXI ON MEXICAN VISA WITH INTENTION CONTINUING CUBA WITHOUT EVIDENCE CUBAN VISIT APPEARING IN THEIR PASSPORT, NEED DETAILED DESCRIPTION HOW VISA HANDLED. INCLUDE HOW PROCESS WORKS ON THEIR RETURN HOME VIA MEXI.
2. GIVE NAMES AND ~~BI~~ MEXICAN CITIZENS WHO REGULARILY VISIT SPECIFIC ~~XXXXX~~ CUBAN IN EMBASSY. GIVE ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ KNOWN OR SUSPECTED REASON FOR VISITS.
3. NEED DETAILS ON ANY DISAGREEMENTS, ~~XX~~ FUEDS, AND DISLIKES AMONG CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS.
4. REQUEST ANY SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITY DATA WHICH LITAMIL-7 HAS PROVIDED BE FORWARDED HQTRS.

Rqmts received from Kitchens
21 Sept 1962

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : W. ULLERY / crk
UNIT : TFW/OPS SPT
EXT : 7646
DATE : 13 SEPT 62 1505

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
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6

5 SEP 62 01 47z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

To: FI

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 76977
OUT-76977

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 36454 36454

GYROSE

REF: HMMA 19471 *

POA GRANTED LITAMIL 7 SUBJ REF 10 SEPT 62. 201-330173.

file.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT : * Transmitted PRQ Part 1 and requested POA for Subject

TFW/FI
TFW/INTEL
WH/3/MEXI HOLMAN (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
C/TFW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-25

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)

[illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

[illegible]

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

[illegible]

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE (Shape)
9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE		

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

[illegible]

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4-20)

14-00000

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 1.*)

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 3.*)

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)

No travel

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]

2. TITLE

3. SALARY (*Per annum*) [illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)

Moderate means.

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Secondary				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) 1960 - Present
2. EMPLOYER Cuban Embassy
3. ADDRESS Mexico, D.F.
4. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ [illegible] PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)
2. EMPLOYER
3. ADDRESS
4. TYPE OF WORK
5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
6. REASON FOR LEAVING

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE:	SINGLE		MARRIED		WIDOWED		SEPARATED		DIVORCED		ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

1. FULL NAME	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

1. FULL NAME	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

GROUP 1 [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]	[illegible]				
[illegible]					
[illegible]		[illegible]			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of [illegible] Maritime.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 27 July 1962

SIGNATURE:

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

ESPERON, Consuelo

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101663.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-330173

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(IX-40)

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TFW
Attn: H. E. Mulloy

NUMBER	C-101663
SUBJECT	LITAMIL/7
REFERENCE:	Your Memorandum, Dated 13 August 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

HMMA-19471

file 201-330173

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

APP[illegible]s Carroll, Jr.

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	10 September 1962 mu

FORM 7-60 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

(Malley) 201-330173

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 127452

DATE 13 Aug 62

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Wendell Ullery
OFFICE DESIGNATION TFW/Ops Spt
ROOM, BUILDING G H 5512
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Consuelo ESPERON C-101663

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
LITAMIL-7

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
Ca. 1909, Oaxaca, Mexico

4. CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Secretary - Cuban Embassy, Mexico City

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Secretary ; Secondary

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Secretary - Cuban Embassy	Mexico, D.F.	1930-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5' 4"	150	Brown	Grey		Stout

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
FATHER: Deceased
MOTHER: Deceased
BROTHERS: Luis, Enrique, Octavio, Mariano, Rogelio and Raul
SISTERS: Maria Louisa and Esperanza

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
All pertinent info.

ASSOCIATES: Luis Alberu Souto
Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

2nd in [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 8-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: Wendell Ullery

21 Aug 62
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

Noted
emc

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 13 Aug 62

TO: XX CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Wendell Ullery
TFW/Ops Spt
G H 5512
7646

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Consuelo ESPERON

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL-7

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 330173

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Will be used for reporting on Cuban Embassy activities and personnel.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127452

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
H.E.Mulloy	7646	William K. Harvey

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS
1-62 EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

ESPERON, Consuelo



[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

JULY GYROSE PROGRESS REPORT

LITAMILS - No previous progress report other than regular operational reporting has as yet been forwarded on the LITAMIL group. Their activities have expanded considerable during July, and this report will attempt to give a birds-eye view of the overall activity as a basis for future progress reporting. In summary during July 1962 the LITAMILS recruited a new penetration of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a former employee of that Embassy, with excellent access to Cuban Embassy circles; they had one S/W channel functioning actively during the month; they located a site for their clandestine radio; they have a cover company possibility which is being seriously considered for activation; and they have approximately seven legal traveler operations under development or active. The LITAMILS now number 13, practically all of them are active in one or more of these phases. The principal men behind the entire activity are LITAMILS 1 and 2.

HMMA-19554
10 August 1962

H LITAMIL-7 is a secretary-level penetration of the Cuban Embassy whose production has been fairly limited due to her timidity. However, she became more active during July, furnishing exemplars of Cuban letterheads, envelopes etc., and acting as a "listening post." She has recently furnished a copy of the slip they use for travelers who do not wish their travel to Cuba to appear in their passports. A station case officer is in direct contact with her. [illegible] reference include MEXIS 1594, 1570 and HMMA 19471 which forwarded PRQ Part I on her.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Consuelo ESPERON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

There are attached (4) copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject.

A POA is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Field TRACES - Non-Derog.
MEXI 1594 (IN 39209) 3 Aug 62

LITAMIL-7

RI - NR
DIV - att.
GL-127452

Attachment:
PRQ, Part I

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att
2 - Files

2cc w/att WH/3

CS COPY

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

DATE TYPED
30 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19471

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-330173

Encl-1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRI NO.:

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-19471

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) ✓ (Middle) (Last) (Nee)
Consuelo ESPERON

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)
"Chelo"

5. DATE OF BIRTH
Circa 1909

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Oaxaca, Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)
Drinks socially.
Catholic - extremely religious.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)
No Record.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE (Shape)
☐ ☒	55	55	FT. 5 IN. 4	150	Dark	Round

9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE
Grey	Brown	Some gold.	Stout	Erect

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE
Neat dresser.

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

CS COPY

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

30 July 62

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 7-60 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CS/C HMMA-19471

201-350193

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Mexican	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate number, street & city or sub-division)* Calle Oriente 53 #262, Mexico, D.F.

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

No travel

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION Secretary	2. TITLE	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* Approx. $2400.US

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

Moderate means.

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Secondary				

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECRET

14-00000

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Shorthand

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
1	1930 - Present	Cuban Embassy	Mexico, D.F.	Secretarial	200.00	month	
2							
3							
4							
5							

14-00000

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PLACE OF BIRTH
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

1. FULL NAME DECEASED	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

1. FULL NAME DECEASED	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3. PLACE OF BIRTH	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII • BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Luis	X			Oaxaco, Mexico	Mexican
Enrique	X			" "	"
Octavio Mariano	X X			" " " "	" "
Rogelio Raul	X X			" " " "	" "
Maria Louisa Esperanza		X X		" " " "	" "

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Luis - Superintendent of Pemex Maritime.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Luis Alberu Souto
Ricardo Vidal Dominguez

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 27 July 1962

SIGNATURE: Clyde K. SHRYOCK

SECRET

201-330173

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 AUG 62
036

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	OPS SPT
3		6	

AUG 3 0420Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 39209

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1594

GYROSE/LITAMIL-7

REF DIR 26991 (out 61057)*

HMMA 19659

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED PRQ PART 1 INFO ON SUBJECT.

PRQ 1 POUCHED REF B 31 JULY 62. NO DEROG TRACES. CO IN DIRECT CONTACT LITAMIL-7 WHOSE ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDE REPORTING ON EMBASSY ACTIVITIES AND PERSONNEL AS WELL PROCUREMENT EXEMPLARS SEALS, ENVELOPES (UNUSED AND THOSE MAILED FROM CUBA). L-7 ONLY STATION ASSET INSIDE EMBASSY RESIDENCE, WHERE AMB. LECHUGA, ANA MARIA BLANCO, RAMON SINOBAS CASADO AND RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ ALSO WORK. L-7 NOW COOPERATING WELL BUT APPEARS HAVE LITTLE ACCESS IMPORTANT INFO. HER WORK CONSISTS MOSTLY UNCLASSIFIED PROTOCOL NOTES MEXI GOVT AND ISSUANCE COURTESY AND DIP VISAS, I.E. THOSE NOT ISSED CONSULATE. SHE ALSO PAY CLERK LOCAL EMPLOYEES. SHE THUS FAR NOT AGGRESSIVE "MATA HARI" TYPE AND PROVIDES ONLY INFO WHICH AVAILABLE HER ROUTINE WORK. AT LEAST MTG 27 JULY PROVIDED FIRST TANGIBLE ITEM WHEN SHE GAVE CO EXEMPLAR COURTESY VISA GIVEN ALL TRAVELERS HAVA WHO NOT WISH HAVE VISA PASSPORTS. L-9 EXPLAINED IN DETAIL MANNER FILLING OUT COURTESY VISA WHICH ISSUED ON SHEET CUBAN EMB PAPER. THIS MAJOR STEP L-7 DEVELOPMENT. NEXT MTG 6 AUG.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jd
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6172
DATE : 31 JULY 1962

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 1 19 02z

~~SIG CEN~~

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT61057
OUT 61057

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 26991
26991

GYROSE LITAMIL/7

REF: DIR 23257 (OUT 54577)*

PLS REPLY REF.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED PRQ, PART 1 INFO SUBJ (NOT INDICATED) RESULTS LOCAL TRACES AND CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENT.

C/TFW/FI Ey
C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

31-6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 618
1 AUG 62 DJM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DOP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	OPS SPT
2	A	5	
3		6	

AUG 1 0246Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 37787

TO DIR WAVE INFO CITE MEXI 1570

GYROSE/LITAMIL 7

RE A MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

B MEXI 1560 (IN 37258)*

PLEASE DISREGARD IDEN REF A WHO ASSIGNED CRYPT LITAMIL-7.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED POA CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT FEDORA CAPDEVILA.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jc 18
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6173
DATE : 13 JULY 1962 1641

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 54577

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 23257

GYROSE LITAMIL/7

PLS CABLE SOONEST PRQ, PART I INFO SUBJ: RESULT LOCAL TRACES, AND CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENT.

Consuelo Esperon

C/TFW/FI

C/WH/3 Shivers

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

13-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

522

DATE : ~~2 APR 62~~

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, COP, CA 2; CA/PKG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 2 2151Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12825

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 0444 MEX - 0446
IN - 12879
3 APR 62

Mexi 0511
IN 16351
[illegible] Apr 62

CYROSE

ON 29 MAR 62, LITAMIL-3 REPORTED THAT LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI WOULD NOT RETURN TO CUBA WHERE HE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS SECTION FOREIGN OFFICE. SOUTO WHO ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA 16 MAR TOLD LITAMIL-8 (IDEN) THAT CONDITIONS TERRIBLE CUBA AND WOULD REMAIN IN MEXI. SOUTO TOLD L-8 TELL L-3 HE WOULD VISIT HIM NEAR FUTURE. STATION HOPES EXPLOIT SOUTO DEFECTION THROUGH L-3.

Dir 01703
Out 68527
4 Apr 62

No!

END OF MESSAGE

MEXI 1506
IN 34586
26 July 62

Dir 11250
Out 84385
21 May 62

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY O[illegible] THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

378

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 2 APR 62 DB

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TFW 10*

INFO : DO/P, COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 3 0019Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12879

TO DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 0446

RE MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

IDEN: CONSUELO ESPERON, MEXICAN SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE 2/8/6

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM: TFW/REG GG2702

ROOM NO.

PHONE 6572

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible]

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

AFFILIATION CODE B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65		66	67	68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text) SECRETARY [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

ACTION DESK MEX

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

COMMENTS

SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201- [illegible]

831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET

E 2 MEXICO CITY 2322 S E C R E T

I ADVISED SUITABLE OPERATOR AVAILABLE BY 1 JUNE. PER DISCUSSION WITH
ZCO, LIRING-3 TO PROCEED TAPACHULA 1 AUG TO PICK UP CONTACT
TRUCTIONS FOR INITIAL CONTACT GUAT CITY, RETURN MEXICO CITY AND
EED BY AIR TO GUAT CITY AND MONTES MEETING IN MOUNTAINS
BABLY WEEK 7 AUG. STATION HOWEVER WILL INSIST LIRING-3 DELAY
G TAPACHULA UNTIL DISCREPANCIES HIS STORY CAN BE RESOLVED WITH
SESWIRL. ROWTON WILL AWAIT SGSWIRL OPERATOR BEFORE HAVING FINAL
DOWN WITH LIRING-3. IF DISCREPANCIES SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IT
BE POSSIBLE SOMEHOW TO FOLLOW LIRING-3 TO MONTES MEETING, DE-
INE LOCATION AND ATTEMPT CAPTURE IN COOPERATION WITH GUAT LIAISON.
CRET

SECRET

JP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

MICROFILMED
JAN 5 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2.

References : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8228, 27 November 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are four reports on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON and dated 5, 10, 11, and 12 December. The most important points covered in these reports are as follow:

a. LIRING-3 made contact on 5 December with one Humberto*GONZALEZ Vega (no Station traces), who has apparently been designated by the FAR as the latter's contact with LIRING-3 in Mexico City. A description and a sketch of GONZALEZ provided by LIRING-3 are contained in ROWTON's 10 December report.

Continued......................

Re: connection with 201-798301

Attachments:
1. Reports (4), h/w
2. Letter (1), u/s/c
3. Identity sheet (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each #1 and #2; 3 copies att #3)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each #1 and #2; 2 copies att #3)

s/c att: 2
h/u att: 1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 36114

DATE
27 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 36114

b. According to GONZALEZ, Identity D, who left for Guatemala with LIRING-3 and, according to the latter, was probably executed after a period of detention, may still be alive and may have made a "deal" with the Guatemalan authorities. Identity D had apparently misappropriated FAR funds before going to Guatemala. LIRING-9's remarks to LIRING-3, as mentioned in ROWTON's report of 5 December, may be connected with Identity D's misdoings.

c. LIRING-3 hinted to LIRING-9 that he may accept a teaching job at the University of Jalapa. (Such a job was indeed recently offered to him.) LIRING-9 advised LIRING-3 not to accept this as he would much rather send him on a trip to PBRUMEN.

d. From a letter received from Gustavo X *COLINDRES Barrios, LIRING-3 gathered that the *BARRIOS brothers (Miguel and Juan Leon) may soon be released and may, in fact, contact him in Mexico City. The original text of that letter and its envelope are forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2. LIRING-3 interpreted some remarks made to him by Humberto GONZALEZ as another indication of a possible contact by the BARRIOS brothers in the near future. LIRING-3 plans to write back to the address given by COLINDRES and mention that he is in contact with GONZALEZ in the hope of getting a reaction from COLINDRES.

Cit. Guatemala.
R: Guatemala

2. The Station plans to check further the identity given by GONZALEZ. Among other things, an attempt will be made via LIKAYAK-2 to check whether a file in that name exists in the archives of the Mexican Ministry of "Gobernacion." The Station may, at a later date, attempt spot surveillance of GONZALEZ. Meanwhile, any information that can be provided by the Guatemala City Station to further identify GONZALEZ would be appreciated.

XX BARRIOS, Miguel (201-216006)
X BARRIOS, JUAN Leon

for Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible] att. 3

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO
HMMA-37739
21 Aug 69

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LIRING-3

2. Project: [illegible]VINE

3. Agent Recruited By: Wallace P. BOLTON

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Access agent to Cuban Embassy; Informant on Central American revolutionary groups and activities.

5. Rate of Pay: Did not receive regular salary, but was given between 3000 and 3500 Mexican pesos per month. (Equivalent to $240 to $280).

6. Other Commitments: None

7. Agent Dismissed By: Leonard S. TORMET. Dismissal effective 1 July 1969.

8. Reason for Dismissal: Agent in effect terminated himself, since he failed to initiate contact with Station after being turned over to TORMET by BOLTON.

9. Security Risks: LIRING-3 was not made witting of [illegible] interest in this case. He knew both BOLTON and TORMET in alias. No safehouses were exposed to LIRING-3. LIRING-3 was met once in TORMET's QF vehicle.

10. ~~Security Risks:~~

11. Manner of Dismissal: As stated above, no direct dismissal was made, since LIRING-3 broke off contact with the Station.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: No

13. Cost of Termination: None

14. Station Case Officer: Leonard S. TORMET Leonard S. Tormet
(Signature in Pseudonym)

Acting
15. Chief of Station: Horace E. [illegible] Horace E [illegible]
(Signature Pseudonym)

APPROVED:
WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
Sep. 18, 1969

SECRET

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

h/w att. 1
HMMA-37739

CS COPY

201-798301

14-00000

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

5 December, 1968

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

GP

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1100, 5/12/68; Identity A
3. Next Meeting: 1700, 6/12/68; Iden A
4. Administrative: Rowton asked LIRING/3 to rent a small apartment that they could use as a safehouse, in lieu of Iden A, for the future. This was not only in the interest of economy, ~~for~~ for are obvious security reasons. Rowton gave LIRING/3 1,500 pesos as an advance for this purpose.

5. Reports/Information Passed by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had dropped into the LIRING office on 4/12/68 in the hope of running into the LIRING Chief so that he could mention to him casually the proposed trip to PBRUMEN at the end of the month. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not see the Chief inasmuch as he was intercepted by LIRING/9. The latter appeared as cordial as on the previous occasion, but this time made a brief reference to LIRING/3's report. He asked: "Are you sure you included everything?" L/3 told Rowton that he replied in a rather puzzled tone, "Of course. Everything, that is, that I could remember." To which L/9 explained: "I mean about the 'motivos' of the arrest. It seems there's more to it than you wrote. We have some interesting data on that subject. We'll discuss it with you on Friday."

LIRING/3 then reported to Rowton that when he and LIRING/4 dropped in to Identity B on 3/12/68 the secretary of the Director, Identity C, gave them a message that a person by the name of Humberto Gonzalez Vega, residing at Calle Manzanillo 42, in apartment 8, had visited Iden B several times asking for the address of LIRING/3.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he attempted to contact Humberto Gonzalez Vega at the address given on 4/12/68 but was told by a woman of about 35 years of age with a slight Guatemalan accent that he was out at the time. She took L/3's address with interest and suggested that L/3 return after 1500 the following day in the event Gonzalez did not contact him at his home. L/3 told Rowton that he guessed (and hoped that this was "Pavel".

h/w att:1
HMMA-36114

CS COPY

201-795301

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

10 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Humberto González Vega.

1. At 1000 on 9/12/68 at Identity A , LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had met with Humberto González Vega on 5 and 6 December. He related that he had gone back to the apartment on Calle Manzanillo on the afternoon of 5 December, met González and made a date to see him again on the morning of 6 December. When he returned about 1030 on that day González' wife said that he had just stepped out to telephone the embassy of Ecuador. L/3 went out and found González at a nearby telephone booth and managed to have a relatively detailed chat with him.

2. According to L/3, González sarted off by saying that he had been looking forward to meeting L/3 for some time, since he had heard a great deal about him from mutual friends. González went on to say that although he had been away from Guatemala for the past four years, he kept in touch with his friends there. He dropped the names of Sandoval Alegría, Jorge Torrón and a certain Avecillas (phon) who he assumed were known to LIRING/3. He concluded his introductory remarks with the statement that he hoped he and L/3 would become friends, since they could be of mutual help.

3. González added that he was making a living selling books and was planning to open a book store at the University. He indicated that he might be able to help L/3 financially if the latter were interested in this business venture. González then stated that he was aware of L/3's arrest and detention and alleged that he had advance information concerning L/3's trip to Guatemala in the company of Identity D . He then asked L/3 whether he knew the real purpose of Iden D trip. When L/3 replied in a non-committal way, González alleged that Iden D had been accused of misappropriation of funds and took the trip in the hope of defending himself against these charges, González then produced a typewritten letter, undated and addressed to himself and signed by "Cruz", advising him of the charges against Iden D. González told L/3 that the letter was from FAR headquarters and was received some time before Iden D and L/3 left on their trip.

4. González then went on to say that he and his friends were not at all certain that Iden D had been executed, as L/3 and many other people assumed. He stated that some months ago Iden D mother in Mexico City had received a letter from him informing her that he was then at Salamá (phon). González added that it was not to be excluded that Iden D had made some sort of deal with the authorities to save his skin in exchange for services he might perform against Far in the future.

5. González then cautioned L/3 against indiscriminate contacts with persons

representing themselves to be from legitimate "revolutionary" movements. González recounted that he himself ~~had~~ to go into hiding for the previous two months as a result of his having been exposed to a certain Nuñez who had arrived in Mexico City with a group of Guatemalan exiles. González described Nuñez as a known member of the "Mano Blanca" and a former police officer ("tercero jefe de la Judicial").

6. González then asked L/3 whether he had made any close friends while in Guatemala. This, L/3 felt, was an attempt to smoke out his relationship with the Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán León Barrios). He told Rowton that he evaded the issue by giving a vague reply, to which González replied: "Well, I hope to have a great surprise for you soon ('alegría')" González then suggested that they meet again on 12 December and promised to visit L/3 at his home in the company of his wife, "so that L/3's and his wife could keep each other company while they themselves were talking in L/3's apartment." L/3 told Rowton that he shot this idea down by explaining that although his wife was revolutionary and trustworthy, he preferred to keep any politicial discussions strictly between himself and González. The latter then suggested that he simply drop by L/3's house and that they both proceed somewhere for a coffee on a suitable pretext.

7. LIRING/3 described Humberto González Vega as a "rather tall" man (about 1.78) heavy (about 85-90 k.), apparent age 42, with light eyes ("ojos claros") and straight ("lacio") black hair. He drew Rowton the attached sketch for possible identification.

8. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that it was advisable for him to tell LIRING/9 at his next meeting of his contact with González Vega to provoke a reaction from the LIRING establishment.

Wallace B. Rowton

HUMBERTO GONZÁLEZ VEGA

40-45 años

alto ~~1.68~~ 1.78

ojos claros

85-90 K.

pelo negro lacio



H [illegible] GONZÁLEZ VEGA

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

11 December, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with LIRING/9 and LIRING/10.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1300 on 10 December, 1968, that he had finally succeeded in talking again with LIRING/9. He related that when he went/the LIRING office as requested at about 1030 on 9/12/68 he was told by the receptionist that LIRING/9 was still out. L/3 was asked to telephone later, about 1300, to check whether L/9 had returned. LIRING/3 telephoned, as requested, a little after 1300 (in Rowton's presence) but was told that LIRING/9 had not returned. L/3 left a message for L/9 that he would come to his office again the following morning.

2. LIRING/3 continued that he reappeared at the LIRING office about the same time the next day (10/12/68) and was told this time by the receptionist (the wife of LIRING/10's assistant) that LIRING/9 was in. At this moment LIRING/9 himself emerged from his office with papers in his hand, winked at LIRING/3, and returned without addressing him. A few minutes later L/3 was told by the receptionist that L/9 would see him. The following is Rowton's reconstruction of the conversation that took place between LIRING/3 and LIRING/9, based on L/3's report to Rowton:

L/9: "Come in. I'm sorry I couldn't see you Friday or yesterday. I was out of town."

L/3: "It's alright with me, except that I have a number of things pending as far as my own plans are concerned."

L/9: "Well, how are you doing?"

L/3: "Fairly well. I just received a letter from my good friend, Prof. Carlo Antonio Castro of the University of Veracruz. He has been insisting that I go down to Jalapa to see him. He wants to organize an exposition and also to offer me an interesting position at the University."

L/9: "But would that mean that you would have to stay in Jalapa?"

L/3: "Yes, of course; that is, if I accept. It's a tempting solution to my personal problems. As I told you I'm still 'up in the air'."

L/9: "But I don't think that's the solution. A trip would be much better."

L/3: "Yes, but I have to make a decision soon. Also my wife received a letter from her father inviting her to New York. Here's the letter. Do you want to read it?"

L/9: "No. What does it say?"

L/3: "Her father says that he can give her medical certificates to prove he is very sick so that she can get a visa without any difficulty."

L/9: "But as I said before, she shouldn't go to the American Embassy. Keep her away from it. That would be bad, as I explained last time."

L/3: "I'm doing my best, but it's not easy. Things are still up ~~xx~~ in the air with us."

(At about this moment in the conversation, LIRING/10 entered the office, and, after greeting LIRING/9 rather perfunctorily, carried on the following conversation with LIRING/3:)

L/10: "How have you been?"

L/3: "Rather well, thanks?"

L/10: "And your wife? Is she recovering from the strain?"

L/3: "Just about. The nightmare is finally over and she feels better now."

L/10: "WEll I hope you'll come by here often - as often as you ~~x~~like. We enjoy chatting with you."

(After this brief exchange, LIRING/10 left the office.)

L/3: "By the way, how is your Chief doing? I'd like to drop in to express my appreciation for the interest he ~~xkmmxx~~ and his wife showed in helping my wife during my absence."

L/9: "Well, he's not doing too well."

L/3: "Oh, another thing. I finally met that Guatemalan 'Pavel' I mentioned in my report."

L/9: "Yes, how did it go?"

L/3: "His name is Humberto González Vega. He's been in Mexico for some time. A former activist in the PTG. You must know him."

L/9: "Yes.

L/3: "He wants to see me again on Thursday for a more detailed talk."

L/9: "Fine. Well, I hope you keep coming around to see us whenever you can."

3. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he felt that LIRING/10's intrusion had not been coincidental, and that L/9 had advised him of L/3's arrival before he himself received L/3 into his office.

Wallace B. Rowton

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36114

12 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Receipt of Letter from Gustavo Colindres.

1. LIRING/3 reportedto Rowton at 1700 on 12/12/68 that he had received a letter from Gustavo Colindres, a Guatemalan of about 40 years of age whom he had met in the Pavón prison in Guatemala City. LIRING/3 stated that Colindres is the uncle (mother's side) of the León Barrios brothers, although he does not have the same name of sra. Barrios. L/3 explained that they were born of different fathers. L/3 added that Colindres was imprisoned some 18 months ago for responsibility in an arms cache discovered in or near his home.

2. The following is Rowton's translation of the original letter which LIRING/3 gave Rowton for copying:

"I hope that when you arrived in your Mexico, you found only peace and satisfaction in being once again in the warmth of your home. Here on the farm we have missed you and felt badly at not hearing from the artist and the professor, and now that I have succeeded in obtaining your address, I am taking the liberty of dropping your a few lines. I want you both to keep abreast of what's going on at the old farm, even though we're still struggling to turn it over to new owners, but they haven't as yet agreed to the price. I guess I'll be the last to leave the ship, since I haven't a chance to get off. The lions are the next to leave their cage.'Lorenzana' left a month ago and the Queen left on the 2nd of December. Promise me that when you take a drink you'll toast the farm and the date that is approaching.

My best to your wife, kisses to your child.and my best wishes for your welfare. May this year of strange experiences engrave in your mind the memory of a friend.

Guat. 7/12/68

/s/ G.Colindres

Please send your correspondence to me in the name of my wife,Isabel Donis de Colindres, 5 av. y 7a Calle,lote 6-Manzana 26,Colonia Santa Marta, Zona 19,Guat.Cuidad,América Central. The address on the envelope is not correct.

3. LIRING/3 told Rowton he understood the "lions are next to leave their cage" to mean that the León Barrios brothers are soon to be released and that this letter is a signal to him to be on the alert for a contact from them in the near future. L/3 told Rowton that he intended to reply to this

letter at once,and to take the occasion to mention casually that he has met a Guatemalan in Mexico City by the name of Humberto González Vega who seems to know everyone there quite well. L/3 hopes that this will provoke some sort of comment from the León Barrios brothers wither directly or indirectly.

4. LIRING/3 stated that Gustavo Colindres, who is still in the Pavón prison, obviously smuggled out this letter through his wife who visits him regularly. L/3 commented that Colindres told him that he isa faithful FAR member, but refused to belong to the PTG, or even to accept the financial aid doled out at the Pavón prison by Francisco Corado,the PTG representative there.

Wallace B. Rowton

1P

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment #3
HMMA-36114

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Suites Marne

Identity B: Salón de la Plastica Mexicana

Identity C: Sra. Lourdes GOMEZ L. de Chumacero

Identity D: Francisco FR LARA Barrios
(201-832457)

SECRET

CS COPY

sk att 3
HMMA-36114

201-798301

ATTACHMENT #2
HMMA-36114

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM



Señor
Carlos Jurado [illegible]
Edificio Bandera [illegible] [illegible]
Pt. Veracruz México [illegible]

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

7c
GUATEMALA CORREO AEREO



RTE. [illegible] Barrios [illegible] Z. 7
Ciudad Guatemala C.A.

CORREOS ADMON. 11
1968

sk att 2
HMMA-36114

CS COPY

201-798301

[illegible]:

Espero que al arribar a su México no hallan tenido otra cosa que solo tranquilidad y satisfacción de estar de nuevo en el calor familiar.

Hemos extrañado en la granja, el hermetismo del artista y el profesor, ya no supimos nada de Uds. y ya que conseguí su dirección, me tomo la libertad de dirigirle estas líneas, quiero que estén al día de las noticias de la granjita, aún seguimos luchando por dejarla a nuevos dueños pero no han llegado al precio, yo creo que seré de los últimos en abandonar la nave, no tengo posibilidad para dejarla, ~~[illegible]~~ los leones ya están próximos para dejar la jaula, Lorenzana salió hace un mes, la Reyna se fue el 2 del mes que tenemos, Pronostico que al tomar una copa brinde por la finca y la fecha que se aproxima

Me saluda a la Señora, besos a la nena y recibiendo me la más sana intención por su bienestar, que este año de experiencias extrañas esculpan en su mente el recuerdo de un amigo,

Guat 7/12/65

Por favor su correspondencia a nombre de mi Esposa [illegible] de [illegible]
5a Av. y 7a calle lote 6 Manzana 26 Colonia Santa Marta Zona 14 Guatemala [illegible]

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO: Chief, WH Division	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.: Chief of Station, Guatemala City		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT: 0 PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Report		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8228, 27 November 1968

Forwarded under separate cover are Xerox copies of the handwritten report prepared by LIRING-3 and given by him, per reference B, to LIRING-9. The report was written in two instalments, the first titled "Situacion General" and the second titled "Antecedentes" and various other notes.

Raymond A. Frankyn
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Report, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/att - 1 copy)

S/c att:1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 36115	27 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

S/C att. 1
HMMA - 36115

201-798301

Situación General :

Durante los días que permanecí en la celda 400 del 1er Cuerpo de policía Tuve oportunidad de cambiar impresiones con Rolando Ortiz "Cebollita" sobre la situación general de Guatemala especialmente de FAR. por aquel entonces César Montes no había sido destituido y se iniciaba una campaña de Terrible represión por parte del gobierno; de acuerdo con las informaciones se desprende lo siguiente : La división entre PGT y FAR provocó una situación difícil pero algunos miembros del PGT renunciaron a este y pasaron a las filas de FAR. aunque Teóricamente el PGT dice apoyar la [illegible] lucha armada e inclusive [illegible] disponer de contingentes en la montaña (Zona de Zacapa?) lo cierto es que provoca más la división y no apoya en lo más mínimo la línea de FAR esto es a grandes rasgos ya que los detalles son bien conocidos. En los últimos Tiempos el PGT [illegible] Trata de ahondar [illegible] más las divergencias. Como ejemplo doy la situación que presencié en Pavón, donde el representante del PGT Trataba de ganar adeptos entre los presos pertenecientes a FAR ofreciéndoles ayuda económica - insistiendo en que su línea (la de FAR) es equivocada en muchos aspectos.

Al ser nombrado Yon Sosa Comandante General se esperaba que el Grupo 13 de noviembre se aglutinara. En teoría esta aglutinación se llevó a cabo, pero en la práctica se ha demostrado que este Grupo sigue actuando por su cuenta anárquicamente.

Todas estas circunstancias: divisiones, falta de organización, falta de madurez ideológica etc. han traído por consecuencia un debilitamiento de la lucha armada en Guatemala. A esto contribuye el fortalecimiento cada día mayor de las fuerzas represivas obra de los norteamericanos. Un ejército equipado con las armas más modernas asesorado y entrenado por ellos, controla cada vez más la situación en la montaña. La consecuencia de todo esto ha sido la intensificación de la guerrilla urbana. Los jóvenes de FAR han tenido que bajar a la ciudad y hacen esfuerzos desesperados pero anárquicos para efectuar acciones que muchas veces, muerte del Embajador Gordon Main por ejemplo, traen consecuencias negativas, ya que las fuerzas ~~[illegible]~~ del Gobierno intensifican la represión acabando con cuadros valiosos y necesarios. En la montaña se han sufrido reveses muy grandes, la muerte de Nestor Valle, Efigenio, la de Camilo en la Ciudad etc. han debilitado aún más las acciones de FAR, pues las especiales circunstancias que hoy se viven en Guatemala impiden la rápida sustitución de estos cuadros. La falta de fondos para financiamiento es uno de los problemas más grandes, pues actualmente el dinero tiene que conseguirse a base de asaltos a empresas comerciales, dando por resultado muchas veces, que por conseguir una cantidad pequeña han muerto varios revolucionarios.

En mis charlas con los hermanos de Ron Barrios se me hizo notar el sentido negativo que algunos aspectos de la ayuda cubana representa. Se criticó duramente a los cuadros que se formaban allá, pues según dicen, en las ~~[illegible]~~ a veces largas estancias en Cuba se inadaptaban a la realidad Guatemalteca, o. [illegible] a su vuelta conflictos a veces serios. El ejemplo más concreto es el reciente caso de César Montes, destituido por no haberse incorporado a su realidad en el momento necesario.

En Guatemala existe un fuerte nacionalismo, por ésto los jóvenes de FAR rechazan cierto tipo de ayuda procedente de Cuba; se habla mucho [illegible] entre ellos de fracasos dirigidos por los cuadros formados allá y ~~[illegible]~~ de un supuesto ofrecimiento Cubano de ayudarlos incluso con hombres.

Por ahora, hablando francamente, la lucha en Guatemala se ha debilitado. Los golpes sufridos han sido muchos y fuertes y es de extrema urgencia una reorganización ~~[illegible]~~

Uno de los más aspectos más necesarios para el desarrollo de la lucha armada de Guatemala es una mayor comprensión de la situación interna de ese país, y prestar por lo consiguiente la ayuda más adecuada. Es verdad que el ~~[illegible]~~ fortalecimiento de esta lucha será a largo plazo, pero para ello es necesario que la ayuda sea más efectiva y realista; de acuerdo con las opiniones de los hermanos de Jesús Barrios, elementos jóvenes pero entusiastas y valiosos, ~~[illegible]~~ (ellos trabajan uno en servicio de inteligencia, otro abastecimientos)

Yo tengo que seguir trabajando ~~[illegible]~~ con las FAR; la especial situación de [illegible], mis experiencias personales y la confianza que ellos me depositan han hecho que mantenga mis contactos, esperando por estos días la llegada de una persona muy responsable que me buscará con el nombre de PAVEL, para seguir trabajando en un sentido positivo.

El día 13 de abril de 1968, Francisco Galleta
Sara Barrios (Guatemalteco)

Antecedentes

En México y por conducto de Carlos Perzabal Marcué, establecí contacto con F. A. S. Barrios quien según se me informó, era Guatemalteco, miembro FAR ~~de~~ encargado de la pro- ~~[illegible]~~ paganda en esta ciudad. Sara Barrios tenía necesidad de hacer un viaje a Guatemala, pero dada su situación de exilado político no podía abandonar el país en forma legal y por ese ~~[illegible]~~ motivo se me pidió ayuda, ya que ~~[illegible]~~ por tener conocimiento de la región sur del país y además un pequeño negocio establecido en San Cristóbal las Casas estaba la posibilidad de llevar a Sara Barrios hasta la Ciudad de Guatemala.

A través de varias pláticas tenidas con él, se llegó a la conclusión de que podríamos, además de realizar dicho viaje, hacer algunos movimientos que tuvieran por finalidad prestar una ayuda efectiva a las FAR.

Fue entonces que se elaboró un plan, cuya realización quedaba sujeta a la aprobación de elementos directivos en Guatemala. Inicialmente este plan consistía en el establecimiento de un negocio de impresiones en Honduras; es decir estudiar las posibilidades en ese país para montar una pequeña máquina de ofsett para editar un Teleguía que pudiera servir en otros países Centroamericanos inclusive Guatemala. Paco Barrios tenía conocimientos de este tipo de negocio, ya que según me informó, había trabajado antes en varias compañías de publicidad. El motivo principal de esto era el de colaborar para obtener, por esos medios, ayuda financiera para las FAR. Con esa intención y desde antes, yo había montado ~~en~~ en San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, un negocio ~~similar~~ de impresiones serigráficas con la razón social de "EMARDEL de San Cristóbal"

Para realizar el viaje se pensaron en varias de las posibilidades más seguras. Lo mejor, dada la seguridad que proporcionaba, era conseguir documentación mexicana para Lara ir. Para el efecto elaboré, con la mayor perfección posible una credencial de maestro de la SEP, ya que un documento de este tipo es suficiente para obtener visado en la frontera.

En los últimos días antes de realizar dicho viaje y ya teniendo todo preparado, Lara Barrios me informó que Carlos Pérzabal y su esposa, Teresa Posada querían acompañarnos pues tenían motivos [illegible] para ir. Como la situación que esto planteaba era difícil me opuse al viaje de estas personas, pero Lara Barrios argumentó que tenían necesidad de entrevistar con motivos periodísticos a algunas personalidades en Guatemala. Las discusiones al respecto se prolongaron varios días pues no era conveniente mezclar dos tipos de trabajo en un viaje que de por sí tenía sus riesgos; por entonces surgieron varios inconvenientes que se fueron retrasando dicho viaje, uno de ellos fue que Lara Barrios - [illegible] quien era el encargado de la misión - se hirió accidentalmente la mano con una pistola calibre 25 al hacer

para práctica de tiro, y otro que por esta causa
hubo necesidad de posponer la salida y buscar
un medio más adecuado, por lo que se
recurrió por mi parte a conseguir que una persona
de confianza nos llevara en automóvil ~~para~~,
dicha persona fue Raúl Moreno quien se prestó
para hacerlo. Los detalles sobre todo esto son
variados y obran en este informe, pero hay
que hacer notar que hubo muchos incidentes
y errores por parte de todos los que íbamos
a participar en esa misión.

El 10 de abril de 1968 salimos de la
Ciudad de México, Fco Adalberto Lara Barrios,
Carlos Perzabal y [illegible] un
Raúl Moreno, pues la señora Teresa Losada desis-
tió del viaje debido a que estaba embarazada
y se consideró peligroso para ella.

Durante el trayecto y a la altura
de Matías Romero Oaxaca, debido a la
alta velocidad a que conducía Moreno
el automóvil, sufrimos un aparatoso acci-
dente que dejó seriamente dañado el
automóvil. Al llegar a Tuxtla Raúl
Moreno habló por teléfono con su

familia para informar del accidente y
nos dijo que le pedían volviera pues su padre
había sufrido un infarto cardiaco. Él todos
nosotros nos llevó hasta San Cristobal, desde
donde nosotros continuaríamos el viaje.
Carlos Pezzabal llevaba consigo unas publi-
caciones de TAR impresas en la imprenta
del Dr. Manuel Marcué Pardinas, las
que había ocultado entre las páginas de unas
revistas de modas, pero de un modo tan
visible que no creímos oportuno el que
las llevara. Al llegar a las ~~[illegible]~~ oficinas de migración
Ciudad Cuauhtémoc en un Taxi de alquiler
procedimos a documentarnos para el paso a
Guatemala. La Credencial que se elaboró
para Lara Bamos funcionó perfectamente
y le fue dado un permiso para viajar en
Guatemala valido por Tres meses. En ese lugar
y dado que no habíamos Tenido dificultad
alguna y para no entorpecer nuestro movimien-
to, Tanto Lara Bamos como yo le pedimos
a Pezzabal que no llevara las revistas, a
lo que accedió depositándolas en una barraca
cerca de la frontera usada como letrina.
El paso se hizo sin dificultad apa-

siente, sólo que Sara Barrios debía obtener un permiso del Cónsul de Guatemala, Trámite usual para Todos los Turistas. El Consulado de Guatemala que debería funcionar en Comitán o Cd. Cuauhtémoc, se encuentra por extrañas razones en la Mesilla, dentro del Territorio Guatemalteco. Sara Barrios se puso muy tanto nerviosa cuando acudimos al Cónsul para el permiso, aunque éste extendió sin dificultad. No obstante pensamos que el nerviosismo de Sara Barrios le provocó alguna sospecha misma ~~que le [illegible] haber~~ ~~con el Chofer del Taxi quien pudo haberse hablado~~ que después confirmamos pues ~~el Cónsul~~ ~~[illegible]~~ las autoridades Guatemaltecas (después de haber sido detenidos) nos mostraron las revistas donde Pezzabal había escondido las publicaciones de FAR, y que sólo pudieron haber sido obtenidas por el Cónsul quizá proporcionadas por el Chofer del Taxi que nos llevó, ~~[illegible]~~ y que Tomamos en Comitán, ya que éste durante el Trayecto nos habló de su amistad con el Cónsul y seguramente se pudo dar cuenta de que "algo sospechoso" dejó Pezzabal en la banca.

En la mesilla, después de pasar la aduana donde se nos hizo una revisión superficial y donde estuvo presente el Cónsul, abordamos una camioneta de pasajeros rumbo a Huehuetenango, pero al ir en esta nos dimos cuenta que este señor nos rebasó en su automovil.

Al llegar a la garita de inspección en el Campamento militar "EL CABLE" fuimos detenidos por e. por indicaciones de dicho Cónsul quien tenía grado de quien ordenó al oficial nos incomunicara. Antes de bajar de la camioneta y al darnos cuenta de que había problema, Sara Barrios me entregó una serie de documentos que llevaba (pasaporte auténticos, cédula de vecindad etc) mismos que por fortuna pudimos desaparecer antes del registro que el oficial nos practicó después, echándolos por entre las hendiduras de la barraca prefabricada donde nos encerraron.

Por desgracia al practicarsenos el registro, a Carlos Perzabal le fueron encontradas un par de botas soviéticas, una entrevista inconclusa con nuestro Valle, un carnet de la Universidad de la Habana y otros documentos. A partir de ese momento quedamos a disposición del ejército suponiendo que seríamos asesinados.

Del Campamento el "Cable" fuimos trasladados por la policía militar Ambulante a otro Campamento en el poblado de "Buenos Aires" en el Depto. de Huehuetenango. El Transporte se hizo en un Camión de Carga que nos llevó primero a Huehuetenango donde Perzabal fue brevemente interrogado por un Coronel quien nos dijo que seríamos fusilados. En el poblado de Buenos Aires fuimos interrogados y maltratados durante toda la noche, los interrogatorios fueron hechos por separado. Al día siguiente fuimos trasladados a Guatemala en un avión de las FAG. # 540, quien fue enviado por el ministro de la Defensa, mismo que nos recibió en el aeropuerto militar la noche del día 14. Todavía dentro del avión, y ya en el Campo, subió a bordo de éste un nos encontramos con uniforme militar ~~[illegible]~~ quien me preguntó de manera violenta si yo me llamaba "Efigenio".

Del aeropuerto militar, fuimos Trasladados al 2º Cuerpo de la policía (Pezabalos yo en una Camioneta, Sara en un Jeep) donde fuimos incomunicados en las bartolinas de la celda Nº "400". Durante varias noches fuimos sometidos a ~~[illegible]~~ "interrogatorios". Quienes éramos, a quienes íbamos a ver, eran ~~[illegible]~~ la preocupación que Tenían. En la celda 400 estaban presos algunos miembros de las FAR, los hermanos de León Barrios (Juan José y Miguel, así como el conocido por "Cebollita", ~~[illegible]~~ acusado del atentado a la base militar de "los Cipresales" y miembro destacado de las FAR. A estos compañeros Sara Barrios informé con detalle de lo que nos había sucedido. El día 20 de abril pudimos ~~[illegible]~~ enviar clandestinamente a la prensa una nota escrita en una caja vacía de cigarros que publicó el diario "EL GRÁFICO" el día 21 de abril. Por este motivo fuimos visitados por el Cónsul de México al día siguiente, evitando así el primer intento de asesinato contra nosotros. Para Barrios para entonces había sido identificado ya como Guatemalteco.

Al hacerse pública nuestra detención las autoridades Guatemaltecas inventaron un delito "repartir propaganda subversiva en las calles de la Ciudad" y fuimos consignados por esto a un Juzgado para ser sujetos a "un juicio".

El 26 de abril fuimos Trasladados al "Campo de Concentración" "Granja Penal Pavón" en una Cuerda donde También iba el "Cebollita" y posiblemente para Barrios a quien dejamos de ver el día que fuimos consignados y Trasladados a la Crujía general. En el Camino "Cebollita" a a Pavón desapareció quien según el parte policiaco, "secuestraron sus compañeros" pero que fue asesinado por la policía.

A la Granja Penal Pavón llegamos en compañía de los hermanos de León Ramos quienes fueron nuestros compañeros durante los meses que allí permanecimos y donde pude conocer más a fondo la realidad de Guatemala y establecer contactos para seguir trabajando posteriormente.

Durante esos meses (casi 7) tuve una estrecha comunicación con estos dos muchachos, quienes por sus condiciones, pudieron explicarme la verdadera situación de las FAR en relación con la situación general del país.

Es necesario hacer notar que en ese tiempo estaban recluidos allí 9 miembros del PGT esperando la sentencia de los Tribunales. El representante del grupo, Fco Coradolera quien administraba los fondos que recibía para repartir entre los presos políticos, fondos de los cuales no aportó nunca nada a ningún miembro de las FAR. Cuando nosotros llegamos trató de "asimilarnos", pero cuando yo le

dije que no pertenecía a ningún partido
ni el caso de "Trotzkista" acusación que (que lo mencionó alguna vez)
motivó por parte de Perzabal (se me hiciera
una investigación en México por parte de
su señora esposa Teresa Posada.

Por su parte las FAR hicieron lo mismo
Constatando que yo no pertenecía a ningún
grupo y terminando así con una si-
tuación molesta que se había generado.

A medida que pasó el tiempo fui
haciendo amistad personal con estos
muchachos y para entonces nos habían
pedido, para enviar a la dirección de FAR,
un informe a cada uno de nosotros de los
motivos que nos llevaron a Guatemala. De
manera franca y abierta quiero decir
que Carlos Perzabal (quien en muchas
circunstancias se portó bien) en este caso
ocultó los verdaderos motivos de nues-
tra detención. Por fortuna y gracias
a los informes que dio personalmente
Sara Barrios a las FAR ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~
por conducto del "Cebollita" y los

hermanos de León, esto ya ~~[illegible]~~ se conocían.
Me veo obligado a mencionar esto, ya
que durante el tiempo que estuvimos
encarcelados, la ~~[illegible]~~ Sra. Teresa Posada
y la señora mamá de Pergajal así como
el Sr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas,
propagaron falsos informes en contra de
mi esposa, haciéndola aparecer como
"delatora" agente de la CIA, etc. etc; in-
fluidos ciegamente para ocultar respon-
sabilidades y por problemas de índole
personal que nunca debieron mezclar.
Así mismo quiero dejar bien claro que
por lo que a esto respecta ~~[illegible]~~ estoy dispuesto
a deslindar responsabilidades frente
a ellos, si es que insisten en esa posición.

---

impresiones con " CEBOLLITA "
(situación de FAR, sugestiones trabajo futuro etc)

Fraccionalismo radical entre los diversos
Grupos (PGT, 13 nov. FAR) motivo del Fraccio-
nalismo, rompimiento con el PGT, asimilación
del 13 de nov. Nombrando a Yon Sosa 1er
Comandante. Críticas buenas y malas
a Cuba, motivos de las críticas

falta de comprensión atribuida por las FAR a Cuba en los problemas internos de Guatemala; *indebido uso de los fondos proporcionados, etc. Crítica a los cuadros formados en la Habana, quienes al regresar no se integraban a la realidad de las necesidades de las FAR.

Situación actual de FAR.

anarquía, falta de organización, debilitamiento, elementos jóvenes con entusiasmo pero sin formación ideológica correcta y medios materiales. Un "profesional de FAR" percibe un promedio de Q40.00 al mes para su trabajo.

Fortalecimiento del Gobierno, expansión del Ejército con la ayuda de USA. Debilitamientos de las guerrilla de montaña que obligan el trabajo en la ciudad (guerrillas urbanas y terrorismo) que motiva a su vez una represión cada vez más fuerte y contraproducente.

Pérdida de cuadros valiosos: Néstor Valle, Efigenio, "Cebollita" "el Bareo, etc" debidas a falta de organización de medios y al fortalecimiento de las fuerzas represivas.

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* Nacionalismo Guatemalteco que rechaza una ayuda directa en el sentido de participación activa por extranjeros, ellos no entienden por ese nacionalismo, que este tipo de ayuda es necesaria a veces para el desarrollo de la Rev. latinoamericana. Situación que no se planteó en mi caso gracias a la comprensión de la mentalidad guatemalteca por razones de ser chiapaneco y tener afinidades culturales de años con ellos.

Destitución de César Montes por motivo de haber estado mucho tiempo fuera y no integrarse a la lucha en el momento necesario; impresión que se tiene en Guatemala de algunos elementos guatemaltecos que hace tiempo viven en Cuba.

Situación General:

Durante los días que permanecí en la celda 400 del 4º Cuerpo de policía tuve oportunidad de cambiar impresiones con Rolando Ortiz "Cebollita" sobre la situación general de Guatemala especialmente de FAR, por aquel entonces César Montes no había sido destituido y se iniciaba una campaña de terrible represión por parte del gobierno; de acuerdo con las informaciones se desprende lo siguiente: La división entre PGT y FAR provocó una situación difícil pero algunos miembros del PGT renunciaron a éste y pasaron a las filas de FAR, aunque teóricamente el PGT dice apoyar la ~~[illegible]~~ lucha armada e incluso ~~[illegible]~~ disponer de contingentes en la montaña (Zona de Zacapa?) lo cierto es que provoca más la división y no apoya en lo más mínimo la línea de FAR esto es a grandes rasgos ya que los detalles son bien conocidos. En los últimos tiempos el PGT ~~[illegible]~~ trata de ahondar ~~[illegible]~~ más las divergencias. Como ejemplo doy la situación que presencié en París, donde el representante del PGT trataba de ganar adeptos entre los pocos pertenecientes a FAR ofreciéndoles ayuda económica e insistiendo en que su línea (línea de FAR) era equívoca en muchos aspectos.

Al ser nombrado Yon Sosa Comandante General ~~[illegible]~~ se esperaba que el Grupo 13 de Noviembre se aglutinara. ~~[illegible]~~ En teoría esta aglutinación se llevó a cabo, pero en la práctica se ha demostrado que este Grupo sigue actuando por su cuenta anárquicamente.

Todas estas circunstancias: divisiones, falta de organización ~~[illegible]~~, falta de madurez ideológica etc. han traído por consecuencia un debilitamiento de la lucha armada en Guatemala. A esto contribuye el fortalecimiento cada día mayor de las fuerzas represivas obra de los norteamericanos. Un ejército equipado con las armas más modernas ~~[illegible]~~ asesorado y entrenado por ellos, controla cada vez más la situación en la montaña. La consecuencia de todo esto ha sido la intensificación de la Guerrilla Urbana. Los jóvenes de FAR han tenido que bajar a la Ciudad y hacen esfuerzos desesperados pero anárquicos para efectuar acciones que muchas veces, muerte del Embajador Gordon Mein por ejemplo, traen consecuencias negativas, ya que las fuerzas del gobierno ~~[illegible]~~ intensifican la represión acabando con cuadros valiosos y necesarios. En la montaña se han sufrido reveses muy grandes, la muerte de Néstor Valle, Efigenio, la de Camilo en la ciudad etc. han debilitado aún más las acciones de FAR, pues las especiales circunstancias que hoy se viven en Guatemala impiden la rápida sustitución de estos cuadros. La falta de fondos para financiamiento es uno de los problemas más grandes, pues actualmente el dinero tiene que conseguirse a base de asaltos a empresas comerciales, dando por resultado muchas veces, que por conseguir una cantidad pequeña han muerto varios revolucionarios.

En mis charlas con los hermanos de León Barrios se me hizo notar el sentido negativo que algunos aspectos de la ayuda cubana representa. Se criticó duramente a los cuadros que se formaban allá, pues según dicen, en las ~~[illegible]~~ a veces largas estancias en Cuba se inadaptaban a la realidad Guatemalteca, [illegible] a su vuelta conflictos a veces serios. El Ejemplo más concreto es el reciente caso de César Montes, destituido por no haberse incorporado a su realidad en el momento necesario.

En Guatemala existe un fuerte nacionalismo, por esto los jóvenes de FAR rechazan cierto tipo de ayuda procedente de Cuba; se habla mucho allí entre ellos de fracasos obtenidos por los cuadros formados allá y ~~[illegible]~~ de un supuesto ofrecimiento Cubano de ayudarlos incluso con hombres.

Por ahora, hablando francamente, la lucha en Guatemala se ha debilitado. Los golpes sufridos han sido muchos y fuertes y es de extrema urgencia una reorganización ~~[illegible]~~

Uno de los aspectos más necesarios para el desarrollo de la lucha armada de Guatemala, es una mayor comprensión de la situación interna de ese país, y prestar por lo consiguiente la ayuda más adecuada.

Es verdad que el [illegible] fortalecimiento de esta lucha será a largo plazo, pero para ello es necesario que la ayuda sea más efectiva y realista; de acuerdo con las opiniones de los mexicanos de León Barros, elementos jóvenes pero entusiastas y valiosos, [illegible] (ellos trabajan unos en servicio de inteligencia, otros abastecimientos.)

Yo tengo que seguir trabajando [illegible] con las FAR, la especial situación de Pacífico, mis experiencias personales y la confianza que ellos me depositan han hecho que mantenga mis contactos, esperando por estos días la llegada de una persona muy responsable que me buscará con el nombre de PAVEL, para seguir trabajando en un sentido positivo.

~~El día 13 de abril de 1968, Francisco [illegible] Lara Barrios (Guatemalteco).~~

Antecedentes

En México y por conducto de Carlos Perzabal Marcué, establecí contacto con F. A. L. Barrios Guatemalteco, quien según se me informó, era miembro de/FAR ~~de~~ ~~[illegible]~~ encargado de la propaganda en esta ciudad. Lara Barrios tenía necesidad de hacer un viaje a Guatemala, pero dada su situación de exilado político no podía abandonar el país en forma legal y por ese ~~[illegible]~~ motivo se me pidió ayuda, ya que ~~[illegible]~~ por tener conocimiento de la región sur del país y además un pequeño negocio establecido en San Cristóbal las Casas estaba la posibilidad de llevar a Lara Barrios hasta la Ciudad de Guatemala.

A través de varias pláticas tenidas con él, se llegó a la conclusión de que podríamos, además de realizar dicho viaje, hacer algunos movimientos que tuvieran por finalidad prestar una ayuda efectiva a las FAR.

Fue entonces que se elaboró un plan, cuya realización quedaba sujeta a la aprobación de elementos directivos en Guatemala. Inicialmente este plan consistía en el establecimiento de un negocio de impresiones en Honduras, es decir estudiar las posibilidades en ese país para montar una pequeña máquina de offsett para editar un Teleguía que pudiera servir en otros países Centroamericanos inclusive Guatemala. Sara Barrios tenía conocimientos de este tipo de negocio, ya que según me informó, había trabajado antes en varias compañías de publicidad. El motivo principal de esto era el de colaborar para obtener, por esos medios, ayuda financiera para las FAR. Con esa intención y desde antes, yo había montado en San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chiapas, un negocio ~~similar~~ de impresiones serigráficas con la razón social de "EMARDEL de San Cristobal"

Para realizar el viaje se pensaron en varias de las posibilidades más seguras. La mejor, dada la seguridad que proporcionaba, era conseguir

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documentación mexicana para Lara B. Para el efecto elaboré, con la mayor perfección posible una Credencial de maestro de la SEP, ya que un documento de este tipo es suficiente para obtener visado en la frontera.

En los últimos días antes de realizar dicho viaje y ya teniendo todo preparado, Lara Barrios me informó que Carlos Pérez del al y su esposa Teresa Posada querían acompañarnos pues tenían motivos ~~[illegible]~~ para ir. Como la situación que esto planteaba era difícil me opuse al viaje de estas personas, pero Lara Barrios los primeros. lo que tenían necesidad ~~[illegible]~~ de entrevistar con motivos periodísticos a algunas personalidades en Guatemala. Las discusiones al respecto se prolongaron varios días pues no era conveniente mezclar dos tipos de trabajo en un viaje que de por sí tenía sus riesgos; por entonces surgieron varios inconvenientes que fueron retrasando dicho viaje, uno de ellos fue que Lara Barrios — ~~[illegible]~~ quien era el encargado de la misión — se hirió accidentalmente la pierna con ~~#~~ una pistola calibre 25 al hacer [illegible] práctica de uso, y otro que por esta Causa hubo necesidad de posponer la salida y buscar un medio mas adecuado, ~~[illegible]~~ lo que se alcanzó por mi parte a Conseguir que una persona de Confianza nos llevara en automovil, ~~[illegible]~~ dicha persona fue Raúl Moreno quien se prestó para hacerlo. Los detalles sobre Todo esto son variados y obvian en este informe, pero hay que hacer notar que hubo muchos incidentes y errores por parte de Todos los que ibamos a participar en esa misión.

El 10 de abril de 1968 salimos de la Ciudad de México, Fco Adalberto Lara Barrios, Raúl Moreno, Carlos Perzabal y ~~[illegible]~~ su servidor, pues la señora Teresa Losada desistió del viaje debido a que estaba embarazada y se consideró peligroso para ella.

Durante el Trayecto y a la altura de Matías Romero Oaxaca, debido a la alta velocidad a que Conducía Moreno el automovil, sufrimos un aparatoso accidente que dejó seriamente dañado el automovil. Al llegar a Tuxtla Raúl Moreno habló por Telefono con su familia para informar del accidente y nos dijo que le pedían volviera pues su padre había sufrido un infarto cardiaco. De todos modos nos llevó hasta San Cristobal, desde donde nosotros continuaríamos el viaje.

Carlos Pizzabal llevaba consigo unas publicaciones de FAR impresas en la imprenta del Dr. Manuel Marcué Pardinas, las que había ocultado entre las páginas de unas revistas de modas, pero de un modo tan visible que no creímos oportuno el que las llevara. Al llegar a las ~~afueras~~ oficinas de inmigración Ciudad Cuahutémoc en un taxi de alquiler procedimos a documentarnos para el paso a Guatemala. La credencial que se elaboró para Sara Bamos funcionó perfectamente y le fué dado un permiso para viajar en Guatemala válido por tres meses. En ese lugar y dado que no habíamos tenido dificultad alguna y para no entorpecer nuestros movimientos, tanto Sara Bamos como yo le pedimos a Pizzabal que no llevara las revistas, a lo que accedió depositándolas en una barraca cerca de la frontera usada como letrina.

El paso se hizo sin dificultad apasiente, sólo que Sara Barrios debía obtener su permiso del Cónsul de Guatemala, Trámite usual para Todos los Turistas. El Consulado de Guatemala que deberá funcionar en Comitán o Cd. Cuauhtémoc, se encuentra por extrañas razones en la Mesilla, dentro del Territorio Guatemalteco. Sara Barrios se puso un tanto nerviosa cuando acudimos al Cónsul para el permiso, creemos que éste extendió sin dificultad. No obstante pensamos que le provocó el nerviosismo de Sara Barrios alguna sospecha misma ~~que le hizo hablar~~ ~~haberse hablado~~ ~~Con el Chofer del Taxi quien pudo~~ ~~el Cónsul~~ que después confirmamos pues las autoridades Guatemaltecas (después de haber sido detenidos) nos mostraron las revistas donde Pezzal había escondido las publicaciones de FAR, y que sólo pudieron haber sido obtenidas por el Cónsul quizá proporcionadas por el Chofer del Taxi que nos llevó, ~~[illegible]~~ y que Tomamos en Comitán, ya que éste durante el Trayecto nos habló de su amistad con el Cónsul y seguramente se pudo dar cuenta de que "algo" sospechoso dejó Pezzal en la barraca.

En la mañana, después de pasar la aduana donde se nos hizo una revisión superficial y donde estuvo presente el Cónsul, abordamos una camioneta de pasajeros rumbo a Huehuetenango, pero al ir en ésta nos dimos cuenta que este señor nos rebasó en su automóvil.

Al llegar a la garita de inspección en el campamento militar "EL CABLE" fuimos detenidos [illegible] por indicaciones de dicho Cónsul quien tenía grado de [illegible] quien ordenó al oficial nos incomunicara. Antes de bajarnos de la camioneta y al darnos cuenta de que había problema, Sara Barrios me entregó una serie de documentos que llevaba (pasaporte auténticos, cédula de vecindad etc) mismos que por fortuna pudimos desaparecer antes del registro que el oficial nos practicó después, echándolos por entre las hendeduras de la barraca prefabricada donde nos encerraron.

Por desgracia al practicársenos el registro, a Carlos Perzabal le fueron encontradas un par de botas soviéticas, una entrevista inconclusa con Néstor Valle, un carnet de la Universidad de la Habana y otros documentos. A partir de ese momento quedamos a disposición del ejército suponiendo que seríamos asesinados.

Del Campamento el "Cable" fuimos trasladados por la policía militar ambulante a otro Campamento en el poblado de "Buenos aires" en el Depto. de Huehuetenango. El Transporte se hizo en un Camión de Carga que nos llevó primero a Huehuetenango donde Perzabal fue brevemente interrogado por un Coronel quien nos dijo que seríamos fusilados. En el poblado de Buenos aires fuimos interrogados y maltratados durante toda la noche, los interrogatorios fueron hechos por separado. Al día siguiente fuimos trasladados a Guatemala en un avión de las FAG # 540, quien fue enviado por el ministro de la Defensa, mismo que nos recibió en el aeropuerto militar la noche del día 14. Todavía dentro del avión, ya en el Campo, subió a bordo de este un un Teniente con uniforme militar [redacted] quien me preguntó de manera violenta si yo me llamaba "Efigenio".

Del aeropuerto militar, fuimos Trasladados al 2º Cuerpo de la policía (Pezabal y yo en una Camioneta, Jara en un jeep) donde fuimos incomunicados en las bartolinas de la celda Nº "400". Durante varias noches fuimos sometidos a ~~[illegible]~~ "interrogatorios". Quiénes éramos, a qué nos íbamos a ver, eran la preocupación que tenían. En la celda 400 estaban presos algunos miembros de las FAR, los hermanos de León Barrios (Juan José y Miguel, así como el conocido por "cebollita", ~~[illegible]~~ acusado del atentado a la base militar de "los Cipresales" y miembro destacado de las FAR. A estos compañeros Jara Barrios informé con detalle de lo que nos había sucedido. El día 20 de abril pudimos ~~[illegible]~~ enviar clandestinamente a la prensa una nota escrita en una caja vacía de cigarros que publicó el diario "EL GRAFICO" el día 21 de abril. Por este motivo fuimos visitados por el Cónsul de México al día siguiente, evitando así el primer intento de asesinato contra nosotros. Para Barrios para entonces había sido identificado ya como Guatemalteco.

Al hacerse pública nuestra detención las autoridades Guatemaltecas inventaron un delito 'repartir propaganda subversiva en las calles de la Ciudad' y fuimos consignados por esto a un Juzgado para ser sujetos a "un juicio".

El 26 de abril fuimos Trasladados al Campo de Concentración "Granja Penal Pavón" en una Cuerda donde También iba el "cebollita" y posiblemente Para Barrios a quien dejamos de ver el día que fuimos consignados y Trasladados a la Crujía general. En el Camino a Pavón desapareció "cebollita" a quien según el parte policíaco, "secuestraron sus compañeros" pero que fue asesinado por la policía.

En la Granja Penal Pavón llegamos en compañía de los hermanos de León Barrios quienes fueron nuestros compañeros durante los meses que allí permanecimos y donde pude conocer más a fondo la realidad de Guatemala y establecer contactos para seguir trabajando posteriormente.

Durante esos meses (casi 7) tuve una estrecha comunicación con estos dos muchachos, quienes por sus condiciones, pudieron explicarme la verdadera situación de las FAR en relación con la situación general del país.

Es necesario hacer notar que en ese tiempo estaban recluidos allí 9 miembros del PGT esperando la sentencia de los Tribunales. El representante del grupo, Fco Corado era quien administraba los fondos que recibía para repartir entre los presos políticos, fondos de los cuales no aportó nunca nada a ningún miembro de las FAR. Cuando nosotros llegamos trató de "asimilarnos," pero cuando yo le dije que no pertenecía a ningún partido me acusó de "Trotzkista", acusación que (que es miembro del PCM) motivó por parte de Perzabal (se me hiciera una investigación en México por parte de su señora esposa Teresa Posada.

Por su parte las FAR hicieron lo mismo constatando que yo no pertenecía a ningún grupo y terminando así con una situación molesta que se había generado.

A medida que pasó el tiempo fui haciendo amistad personal con estos muchachos; para entonces ya habían pedido, para enviar a la dirección de FAR, un informe a cada uno de nosotros de los ~~[illegible]~~ motivos que nos llevaron a Guatemala. De manera franca y abierta quiero decir que Carlos Perzabal (quien en muchas circunstancias se portó bien) en este caso ocultó los verdaderos motivos de nuestra detención. Por fortuna y gracias a los informes que dio personalmente a las FAR para Bravo ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~antes~~ ~~[illegible]~~ por conducto del "Cebollito" y los hermanos de León, estos ya le conocían. Me veo obligado a mencionar esto, ya que durante el tiempo que estuvimos encarcelados, la ~~[illegible]~~ Sra. Teresa Rosada y la señora mamá de Penzabal así como el Sr. Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, propagaron falsos informes en contra de mi esposa, haciéndola aparecer como "delatora" agente de la CIA, etc. etc.; infundidos seguramente para ocultar responsabilidades y por problemas de índole personal que nunca debieron mezclar. Así mismo quiero dejar bien claro que por lo que a esto respecta estoy dispuesto a deslindar responsabilidades frente a ellos, si es que insisten en esa posición.

Impresiones con "CEBOLLITA" (situación de FAR, sugestiones trabajo futuro etc)

Fraccionalismo radical entre los diversos grupos (PGT, 13 nov. FAR) motivo del fraccionamiento, rompimiento con el PGT, asimilación del 13 de nov. Nombrando a Yon Sosa 1er Comandante. Críticas buenas y malas a Cuba, motivo de las críticas.

falta de comprensión atribuida por las FAR a Cuba en los problemas internos de Guatemala;* indebido uso de los fondos proporcionados, etc. Crítica a los cuadros formados en la Habana, quienes al regresar no se integraban a la realidad de las necesidades de las FAR.

Situación actual de FAR.

anarquía, falta de organización, debilitamiento, elementos jóvenes con entusiasmo pero sin formación ideológica correcta y medios materiales. Un "profesional de FAR" percibe un promedio de Q40.00 al mes para su trabajo.

Fortalecimiento del Gobierno, expansión del Ejército con la ayuda de USA.

Debilitamientos de las Guerrilla de montaña que obligan al Trabajo en la Ciudad (Guerrillas urbanas) y Terrorismo que motiva a su vez una represión Cada vez más fuerte y Contraproducente.

Pérdida de cuadros valiosos: el Néstor Valle, Efigenio, "Cevallito" "el Baco, etc." debidas a falta de organización de medios y al fortalecimiento de las fuerzas represivas.

* Nacionalismo Guatemalteco que rechaza una ayuda directa en el sentido de participación bélica por extranjeros, ellos no entienden por ese nacionalismo, que este tipo de ayuda es necesaria a veces para el desarrollo de la Rev. latinoamericana. Situación que no se planteó en mi caso gracias a la comprensión de la mentalidad guatemalteca por razones de ser chiapaneco y tener afinidades culturales de años con ellos.

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DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: For Mexico City, please see Paragraph 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-35905, 27 November 1968
B. HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968

1. Guatemala City has the following information on Oscar Moises ROLDAN Espinoza, who is undoubtedly identifiable with the Oscar Moises ROLDAN E. who sent one of the letters to LIRING-3 forwarded with Reference A: ROLDAN was arrested by the Guatemalan National Police on [illegible], along with one Oscar Rolando ESTRADA Aldana, after robbing a taxi driver of his car. In his interrogation by the Guatemalan authorities, ROLDAN admitted to being a member of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). He stated that the car was to have been used for a kidnapping, but he refused to name the target of the planned kidnap attempt. (Note: ROLDAN named "CAMILO" (deceased FAR leader Carlos Francisco ORDONEZ Monteagudo), "ARMANDO" (unidentified FAR Urban Resistance leader), "JAIME" (Luis Felipe CARVAJAL, FAR Urban Resistance leader) and Percy Amilcar JACOBS de Leon, among others, as FAR members with whom he was in contact. This would tend to indicate that ROLDAN was an important militant in the FAR Urban Resistance Front.) According to information available to the Station, ROLDAN was consigned to the courts. He apparently was later sent to El Pavon prison, where he met LIRING-3.

2. A check of the files of Miguel and Juan Jose de LEON Barrios shows that the home address given by them to the police was the same as the return address on the letter sent to LIRING-3 by "Marta," the mother of the de LEON brothers.

Distribution:
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~~2-C/WHD~~

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DEC 1 3 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HGGA- 9697

DATE
13 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301
[redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HCGA- 9697

3. Guatemala City notes in the letter which LIRING-3 received from the mother of the de LEON brothers reference to greetings being sent from "Miguel, Elsa, La Negra, La Chiquita, Felisa, Maria Elena, and La Gordita." It is requested that LIRING-3 be queried for any details he can provide to further identify these individuals and any information he knows as to the FAR roles of these individuals. Equally, it is requested that LIRING-3 be queried for similar information on ROLDAN, whom he apparently knew as "Espinoza." Finally, Guatemala City will be greatly interested in all of the information LIRING-3 can provide on "PAVEL," including a full physical description, if and when he is put in contact with this individual. Since "PAVEL" is supposed to be a "genuine FAR representative," he may well turn out to be "Javier Contreras," or the "MIGUEL" known to [illegible]-1.

4. Per Paragraph 3 of Reference B, Guatemala City feels that it would be best to wait until LIRING-3 received a clear idea of what, if any, role he is to be given by LIRING, before any further direct discussions are necessary between Guatemala and Mexico City. As discussed during TORMET's recent visit, Guatemala City's interests would be best served if LIRING-3 can convince his LIRING contacts that he is now ready to help in PBRUMEN's efforts to support the FAR, that because of his poor financial position he will in the future be forced to work in a controlled fashion for LIRING, and that because of the contacts which he established with FAR leaders during his Guatemalan imprisonment he is trusted by the FAR and therefore can be influential in helping achieve LIRING's ends in its dealings with the FAR. Also, once LIRING-3 has been put into direct contact with the FAR support network in Mexico City, as he has been promised, we should have a clearer idea to what extent the FAR itself plans to utilize LIRING-3.

5. Guatemala City awaits with interest the results of LIRING-3's further discussions with LIRING.

6. For Headquarters: A seperate dispatch will be forwarded containing the information available to the Station on ROLDAN.

Leonard S. TORMET

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

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SECRET 121722 DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8397

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

12 DEC 68 IN 53169

PBRUMEN

1. PER LITAINT-2 LIRING-10 LEAVING DEFINITELY FOR PBRUMEN 20 DEC. HAVING "DESPEDIDA" 12 DEC WHICH LITAINT-2 SCHEDULED ATTEND. REPLACEMENT TO BE LIRING-24. REPLACEMENT CONFIRMED BY LIRING-3 TO WHOM LIRING -10 INTRODUCED LIRING-24 AS "MY SUCCESSOR."

2. FILE 201-759016, 201-776733.

SECRET

WH/ file:
LIRING-10
LIRING-24
~~L~~LIRING-3
} 201

SECRET

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DISPATCH

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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, Finance

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of MOC for LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LIRING-3.

Raymond A. Frazier
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
MOC (1), h/w

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1 h/w Att.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35908

DATE
29 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

SECRET

Attachment
HMMA-35908

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 29 November 1968

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LIRING-3 as Independent Contractor

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 December 1968 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been terminated. Type________. Date_________196___.

320
12
640
320

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (XX) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 4,000 per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320.00 dollars. Subject ( ) will (XX) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to __________. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: None

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (x) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase of cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: operational entertainment, inducement payments, cover expenses.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

Wallace B. Rowton
SIGNED Wallace B. ROWTON
CASE OFFICER

Willard C. Curtis
APPROVED Willard C. CURTIS
Field Contracting Office (COS)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer
Jan. 7, 1969

REVIEWED:
Carl R. Wien
Special Contracting Officer

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, Finance

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of MOC for LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

CAAS

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LIRING-3.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
MOC (1), h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)
② - C/FINANCE (w/att - 1 copy)

31 DEC 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35908

DATE
29 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

SECRET

Attachment
HMMA-35908

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 29 November 1968

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LIRING-3 as Independent Contractor

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 December 1968 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been terminated. Type________. Date________196___.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (XX) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 4,000 per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320.00 dollars. Subject ( ) will (XX) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to ________. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: None

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (x) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase of cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (x) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: operational entertainment, inducement payments, cover expenses.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the subject.

SIGNED Wallace B. ROWTON
CASE OFFICER

APPROVED Willard C. CURTIS
Field Contracting Office (CCS)

REVIEWED: ________________
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
[illegible] R Wilson for
/s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Special Contracting Officer

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of ~~Station~~, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3
0 Transmittal of Cuban "Literary" Pamphlet

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action Required: FYI

1. Forwarded under separate cover is an issue of a supposedly "literary" Cuban publication containing two short essays by the Salvadorian poet and writer Roque DALTON. The first of these essays is dedicated to LIRING-3. The interesting thing is that LIRING-3 was at that time imprisoned in Guatemala. The essay may thus be viewed as a tribute to "a suffering supporter of the cause."

2. Roque DALTON (201-215097) is, according to the files of the Station, an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service engaged in clandestine activities for the Communist Party of El Salvador. DALTON spent some time in Czechoslovakia and is now living in Cuba. He is the brother of Margarita DALTON (201-751261), whom the Cuban IS recruited to work in Mexico. LIRING-3 got to know DALTON in Havana in 1962-63 and became a close friend of his (see HMMA-32283, 19 June 1967). DALTON at one point confided to LIRING-3 that he had been approached by WOFIRM while incarcerated in El Salvador.

3. The Station is hoping that DALTON's essay is an indication that LIRING-3 is going to be viewed by the Cubans in much better light after his incarceration in Guatemala. A report of LIRING-3's complete debriefing by ROWTON was forwarded with HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968.

Raymond A Fradyer
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Magazine (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
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3/c att:1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
B201-215097
B201-751261

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35915

DATE
29 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

SECRET

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

201-798301

TO : Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

Separate Cover Attachment to
HMMA-35915

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RC-10

Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez • Alberto Moravia • Jacques Charriere • Charles Bettelheim • Roque Dalton • José Lezama Lima • Cmdte. Jorge Serguera

ENTREMESES JAPONESES

Director Artístico
ROLANDO FERRER

Escenografía
RAUL OLIVA

Vestuario
MARIA ELENA MOLINET

Conjunto de Arte Teatral
LA RUEDA

SALA HUBERT DE BLANCK
Calzada entre A y B / Vedado

este número:

La Industria azucarera analizada dentro del contexto histórico de Cuba, es el tema del trabajo PROMETEO ROMPE UNA CADENA del Comandante Jorge Serguera • QUE ES LA PRAXIS? de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, capítulo de su libro **Filosofía de la Praxis**, editado en México. Sánchez Vázquez es profesor de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Autónoma de México y autor de diversos trabajos filosóficos: Marxismo y Existencialismo, Las ideas estéticas de Marx, etc., este último libro ha sido publicado en Cuba por el Instituto del Libro • BASE ECONOMICA Y SUPERESTRUCTURAS IDEOLOGICAS de los economistas franceses Charles Bettelheim y Jacques Charriere, este trabajo forma parte del libro La construcción del Socialismo en China, publicado en México por la editorial ERA • LA PALMA DE LA MANO, poema del cubano José Lezama Lima (Dador, Versos Orficos, Paradiso). Lezama Lima trabaja en el Instituto de Literatura y Lingüística de la Academia de Ciencias • LA CASA DE CARLOS y PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI, textos del poeta salvadoreño Roque Dalton (El turno del ofendido poesía) • DEBATE, entre el escritor Alberto Moravia y cinco estudiantes italianos. Este debate fue organizado por L'Espresso de Roma, y en él se ponen de manifiesto las contradicciones existentes entre la actual generación de intelectuales y la anterior, de la que forma parte el escritor Moravia.

RC
REVOLUCION Y CULTURA

REVISTA BIMENSUAL
Año 1 Número 10
Mayo 15 de 1968
"Año del Guerrillero Heroico"
Director: Lisandro Otero
Secretaria de Redacción:
Rebeca Chávez
Impresa por el Instituto del Libro,
Unidad Productora N° 11,
La Habana, Cuba
Telf : 80 3920
Territorio Libre de América
Precio por ejemplar: 20 ctvs.

Prometeo rompe una cadena

Cmdte. Jorge Serguera

Cuando aquel aparato comenzó con su ruido atronador a echar paja por detrás, caña en trozos por el costado izquierdo, humo por arriba y cortaba hojas verdes y cogollo, alante, hacia la izquierda: alguien dijo: ¡Es bárbaro! Se había realizado un sueño que tenía 100 años. Parece que le va a llegar la hora de museo al machete. Pero todavía falta; ahora hay que construir muchas y sobre todo mejorarla. Hay que patentarla para que todo el mundo pueda usarla y uno solo no se enriquezca con el trabajo de todos: la patente revolucionaria.

La esclavitud fue sustituida por el colonato. Una especie de servidumbre que se hizo tan común en nuestro país que cualquiera se hubiese asombrado de que así no fuese. Cuando el precio aumentaba en el mercado mundial la alegría del cubano hacía carnaval y se enfrentaba a una danza de millones. Cuando bajaba el precio del azúcar la tasa de crecimiento de muertes aumentaba por vía del suicidio como ocurrió en 1930 1932. Si había paz entre naciones poderosas había crisis económica en Cuba, si había guerra, prosperidad. Así fácilmente puede inferirse que la base del progreso estaba en la guerra. Teoría muy común en el pasado. Cuando el precio era bajo había la esperanza del aumento. Cuando era alto el temor de que bajara. Así la mentalidad azucarera del pueblo a causa del monocultivo, o como técnicamente dicen, economía unilineal, era inestable. Y si se tiene en cuenta además la historia de los últimos 60 años, sus convulsiones, guerras, etc., el desequilibrio económico tenía que ser factor de angustias y alegrías, esperanzas y desilusiones que gravaban hondamente el pensamiento del pueblo. Cualquier oscilación de precio se sentía desde el último bohío hasta la primera residencia. Claro está que en forma muy diferente.

No obstante saber todo el mundo o decir que el problema era el monocultivo y que había que diversificar los cultivos para liberarse de la dependencia de un producto, sobre todo después de la crisis económica de los años 30, no se hizo: porque el uso de las máquinas cortadoras, para realizar la más dura de todas las operaciones de recolección "no se permite en Cuba donde hay superexistencia de mano de obra y las leyes sociales vigentes hacen su uso extremadamente difícil" (carta de Agregado Agrícola de los Estados Unidos, La Habana, 16 de febrero de 1954). Y también porque "la mecanización en cualquier campo de actividad humana incluyendo la agricultura, no debe ser llevada demasiado lejos si ha de amargar a los hombres que aman la tierra, la libertad y la dignidad personal". Por eso en la Unión Soviética, donde la mecanización sobrepasa incluso la agroindustrialización, de la producción cubana del azúcar, se dice que los campesinos "tararean canciones de protesta aun a riesgo de ser castigados severamente" (Azúcar Amargo, Byron White, pág. 48).

Todos estos pretextos y otros, reflejos de una realidad social, de una contradicción insuperable en las condiciones en que se planteaba, caracterizó el período prerevolucionario. Era verdad que el 56% de la tierra cultivada era dedicada a caña. Que el cultivo era extensivo; pero sobre todo porque "una mecanización óptima y precipitada de los campos cañeros podría tener consecuencias caóticas, a menos de encontrar inmediatamente otros empleos para esa fuerza de trabajo". Byron White, pág. 50).

La Contradicción que sólo una Revolución podría resolver:

Cuba era un país de monocultivo. El 56% de la tierra cultivada era dedicada a caña. El producto de mayores dividendos, por vía de exportación, era el azúcar. El volumen de las importaciones estaba determinado por la cantidad de azúcar exportada. El desbalance podría ser resultado de la oscilación del precio en el mercado mundial. La específica o especial calidad del suelo cubano para el cultivo de la caña, más los bajos salarios de la mano de obra para el corte fueron determinantes en el análisis de la costeabilidad más baja de la producción azucarera cubana en comparación con Hawai y Louisiana, donde la mecanización agrícola del corte, alza y siembra pudieron haber determinado un costo más bajo en la producción, en la década del 40 al 50.

Con una población de más de 5 millones de habitantes entre los años 40 y 50, Cuba destinaba 500 000 al corte de caña o sea cerca del 10% de la población. Pero si se considera la población activa en edad de trabajo, los números varían escandalosamente.

Los propietarios necesitaban mano de obra, barata, y en cantidad para realizar la zafra. La recolección duraba cuatro meses. Los temporeros de zafra se convertían en desempleados cuando ésta terminaba. Mecanizar la industria azucarera podría significar un aumento de las utilidades por el bajo costo de producción que conllevaría; pero el desempleo aumentaría agravando una situación social cuyos resultados eran imprevisibles. Por otra parte, a nivel internacional, una disminución en costo de producción azucarera de Cuba, óptima en este caso, sería determinante del precio, por cuanto éste, lejos de venir determinado por la oferta y la demanda, es resultado de los promedios sociales de producción a nivel internacional. Esto hubiese provocado la quiebra en Hawai, Puerto Rico, Luisiana, etc. Y los norteamericanos, tutores y beneficiarios de la explotación neocolonial velaban por un cierto equilibrio en sus neocolonias. El desplazamiento de otros productores hubiese permitido una concurrencia privilegiada de Cuba en el mercado mundial. Este sueño dorado de los capitalistas cubanos fue cortado con un simple sistema de cuotas que la metrópoli norteamericana impuso, poniendo así paz entre los inquietos tutelados. Naturalmente que la medida determinó también un estancamiento económico.

Internamente, los obreros se oponían a todo lo que fuese mecanización porque esta acarrearía un desempleo en masa y no se veían, por no existir, posibilidades de opción en otros trabajos que no fuese la industria azucarera.

El sueño de industrializar y diversificar la agricultura del país no podía realizarse porque su estado de dependencia económica y neocolonial no se lo permitía. La política del comprador determinaba el producto. Para industrializar y diversificar hay que ser libres y los gobiernos cubanos eran dependientes de la metrópoli norteamericana que no había previsto en su planificación de obtención de beneficios estas aspiraciones. La importación de materias primas y la exportación de excedentes manufacturados es un privilegio de grandes y desarrollados. El chiquito que llegaba tarde a la mesa no podía sentarse a comer. Tenía que esperar a que los "grandes" terminasen; pero eran de una voracidad sin límites. Martí lo había previsto. "El pueblo que compra, manda. El pueblo que vende, sirve. Hay que equilibrar el comercio, para asegurar la libertad. El pueblo que quiere morir, vende a un solo pueblo; y el que quiere salvarse, vende a más de uno" (Obras completas, Vol. II, Tomo I, pág. 262).

La verdadera liberación se halla en esas palabras: La evolución tenía que resolver esa contradicción:

Una ley de desarrollo capitalista es que la acumulación se hace a expensas de la explotación, empobrecimiento y depauperación progresiva de los proletarios. Porque el valor de la fuerza de trabajo viene determinado por la posibilidad de reproducción de dicha fuerza. Al aplicar esta ley del desarrollo capitalista, la clase dominante obtiene beneficios a expensas de la clase obrera; pero en la interrelación de fuerzas y con el propio desarrollo del capitalismo, la dirección principal de la explotación en los países capitalistas, pasó de la clase obrera nacional a las colonias y neocolonias, sufriendo estas últimas el mayor rigor de la ley del valor y produciéndose la actual acumulación de capital de los países desarrollados a expensas de los subdesarrollados. Por eso mientras más desarrollados son unos, más atrasados son otros.

Esta contradicción: para poder desarrollarse hay que liberarse del explotador, se planteaba en Cuba de forma confusa, como un círculo vicioso. Para salir del monocultivo y dependencia económica de un producto hay que diversificar e industrializar y para lograr la industrialización y diversificación agrícola hay que liberar la fuerza de trabajo dedicada al azúcar a través de la mecanización cañera y para mecanizar hace falta la seguridad económica de que ésta rendirá utilidades.

El Círculo Vicioso:

- **a)** Los obreros se oponían a la mecanización porque no existía otra alternativa de trabajo.
- **b)** Los capitalistas no mecanizaban por la inseguridad del precio en el mercado mundial.
  La mecanización debe habérsele presentado a algunos como una inversión dudosa. Por otra parte la mano de obra era barata y en grandes cantidades. El suelo tenía tales características que casi sin atención producía en condiciones explotables.
- **c)** Hay un factor más complejo: La industria azucarera no tenía perspectivas a largo plazo; pero tampoco era desechable en lo inmediato por la rentabilidad que producía. Su futuro era incierto; pero su presente daba utilidades. Estas características, causas de inestabilidad, vacilaciones, crisis, alzas y bajas, lejos de provocar decisiones en una u otra dirección, mantuvo un estatismo en los propietarios y gobernantes. Tal parece que hubiesen esperado que un imponderable o el simple transcurso del tiempo resolviese una situación que a la par que les preocupaba, demostraban ineptitud para resolver.
- **d)** Si el azúcar era la fuente principal de ingresos y acumulación, por tanto la base financiera del desarrollo debía ser ésta.

Problemas específicos:

- **a)** 500.000 cortadores de caña. Representa el 10% del total de la población y cerca del 40% de la población en edad laboral.
- **b)** El 50% de la tierra cultivada destinada a caña.
- **c)** La concentración de la caña: la única actividad productiva que podía permitir ingresos casi seguros, se encontraba distribuida entre un número relativamente bajo.
- **d)** La repartición democrática de la fuerza de trabajo era, como las instalaciones azucareras, horizontal, es decir, a lo largo y ancho de la isla. Concentrar las instalaciones azucareras en tierras de mayor productividad y acorde con las instalaciones de mayor capacidad, suponía también la concentración de la mano de obra.

Las dos fuentes de riquezas principales de Cuba, suelo y Mano de Obra, quedaron supeditados a un monocultivo cuyo futuro era incierto.

Pudieron haber arriesgado la diversificación e industrialización del país no tanto con las probabilidades de ganancia de un producto inseguro, sino con la realidad de un suelo rico y una fuerza de trabajo apta, pero por ineptitud y conformismo unidos a las presiones y tutela de los Estados Unidos no encararon con resolución un proceso dinámico que su visión estrecha les hacía aparecer estático.

El simple transcurso del tiempo con dos consecuencias inevitables, una social y otra económica (crecimiento de la población y concentración de capital), en las condiciones de la economía cubana, conducía a una crisis del sistema imperante: la Revolución fue la respuesta. Allí donde la burguesía en su doble condición de propietaria y gobernante demostró incapacidad y vaciló, la Revolución tenía que superarla. La Revolución heredó los problemas que no habían sido encarados y las contradicciones que no habían sido resueltas.

Las soluciones que algunos escritores progresistas, estudiosos o economistas planteaban a los graves problemas de la economía nacional, no sólo resultaban con el tiempo meros paliativos que solamente lograban la dilación de la crisis e irresolución de los problemas, sino que resultaban reformas impracticables por las contradicciones que a su vez creaban. Véase a modo de ejemplo el apéndice No. 5 de José Antonio Guerra, de fecha 28 de septiembre de 1942. También algunas conclusiones de Byron White en "Azúcar Amargo", pág. 178 y siguientes.

Pero la Revolución no solamente heredó problemas y contradicciones, sino que por su sola presencia y naturaleza del proceso como otros problemas y contradicciones que se vieron agudizados tanto por la agresividad que desde el primer momento desarrollaron los imperialistas estadounidenses como por la ignorancia y falta de madurez del pueblo, quien permeado por las ideas fáciles del pasado creía que con la simple nacionalización de la industria azucarera y otros sectores podían superarse los problemas. La distribución de la riqueza, acumulada por la burguesía hasta entonces, no hubiese servido para sobrevivir más que pocos años y además de ser utópica hubiese enajenado el desarrollo industrial del país. Por otra parte, el capital acumulado no bastaba para financiar una diversificación agrícola ni instalaciones industriales. También el mercado seguro que los Estados Unidos representaba para las exportaciones azucareras y las importaciones, tanto de alimentos, artículos de lujo y piezas de repuesto, desaparecía. La seguridad que la burguesía aceptaba, a precio de angustia e incertidumbre, esta seguridad relativa, desaparecía con la Revolución.

Esta era resultado de una contradicción que en el plano de las relaciones internacionales, bilaterales y casi exclusivas entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos, los últimos llevaban la mejor parte. El desarrollo económico tenía que haberlo encarado la burguesía cubana a pesar de los Estados Unidos. Desarrollar si se quiere una concepción nacionalista, chauvinista, de independencia económica, pero su concepción de fatalismo geográfico, sus temores y balbuceos le impidieron realizar una política para la que hacía falta, además de coraje, inteligencia. De una parte la naturaleza del imperialismo se revela incapaz para conceder reformas y por otra, es una característica sui generis de las burguesías nacionales latinoamericanas, su temor a rebelarse contra los tutores de una política y economía que por su poder y rapacidad les infunde temor. En el caso de latinoamérica no es tanto que no haya cristalizado una conciencia nacional burguesa, sino que la existencia de esta clase tiene una conciencia de dependencia de Estados Unidos que la incapacita en este período histórico para ver la posibilidad de una existencia independiente.

Con el triunfo de la Revolución, los burgueses y pequeños burgueses abandonaron Cuba, no solamente por las intervenciones revolucionarias, sino también por la convicción que tenían de que no podía mantenerse un gobierno que aplicase una política no sólo a pesar de los Estados Unidos, sino contra los intereses y objetivos de los Estados Unidos. Habían sido muy dependientes y cobardes. Desarrollaron y aceptaron como incuestionables, conceptos que elevaron a categorías de axiomas políticos, sin percatarse que eran el reflejo de una ideología y creencias temerosas: "Sin azúcar no hay País". "El pueblo cubano es haragán", "Cuba está muy cerca de los Estados Unidos para hacer lo que le plazca", etcétera.

Si al gobierno de los Estados Unidos y a las burguesías latinoamericanas causó asombro y estupefacción la proclamación socialista de la Revolución cubana, en los cobardes burgueses y pequeños burgueses, así como en los cubanos en Miami, el origen del asombro no era tanto económico, sino que provenía del hecho de que se mantuviese la Revolución. La cobardía jamás concibe otras soluciones que las ya experimentadas. Para ellos las reformas eran difíciles, casi utópicas. ¡Una Revolución, imposible!

Los soviéticos y demás países socialistas ofrecieron mercado para el azúcar.

Las inversiones económicas para el desarrollo de la industria que la lógica priorizaba, se vieron obstaculizadas por el bloqueo impuesto por los norteamericanos y por la necesidad de desarrollar un aparato militar fuerte y modernísimo, capaz de enfrentar tanto las agresiones, como las amenazas constantes que los Estados Unidos y gobiernos latinoamericanos realizaban.

Hoy la situación se plantea con agudeza. Para llevar adelante la diversificación agrícola e industrialización del país, hace falta mano de obra. Los cubanos en edad laboral somos unos 2 000 000 y el 30 por ciento está dedicado a la recolección azucarera.

Liberar esta fuerza de trabajo supone la posibilidad de dirigirla a otros sectores donde su productividad y desarrollo permita la acumulación de riquezas necesarias al despegue económico. Para esto hay que mecanizar la industria azucarera. La máquina que corte y alce liberará no sólo 500 000 cubanos, formidable fuerza de trabajo, sino que terminará por primera vez con el fatigoso corte de caña, uno de los trabajos más duros y violentos que en el planeta se conoce. El machete, símbolo de libertad y esfuerzo del cubano, también signo de dependencia y angustia, se convertirá en una pieza de museo.

Todavía por algunos años habrá que depender del monocultivo cañero, y del azúcar como producto principal de exportación. Esta prioridad azucarera es una de las razones que determina la imposibilidad de contar con mano de obra suficiente para desarrollar otros cultivos de manera intensa. Es posiblemente sólo en Cuba, donde se da el fenómeno de un equilibrio entre la densidad de población y las tierras cultivables, equilibrio en nuestro caso desfavorable al desarrollo económico, y que se ve causado o agravado por el predominio cañero.

Si en vez de 7 millones fuésemos 10 millones de cubanos el problema se plantearía en otros términos. Podría tal vez encararse la mecanización azucarera como paulatina y paralela al desarrollo de otros sectores; pero en nuestras condiciones la mecanización resulta un requisito sine qua non.

Pero la mecanización no sólo produce efectos económicos, sino que el más profundo es de carácter ético. La verdadera liberación será de la fatigosa carga del corte manual.

Alguien ha dicho que el verdadero fin de la Revolución es una máquina cortadora, que cuando esto ocurra la Revolución habrá roto una de las cadenas más pesadas y difíciles.

Esto representará la liberación de una parte considerable de la población en edad laboral y romperá las barreras de una baja productividad cuyos resultados a mediano y largo plazo, son difíciles de prever. La industria azucarera sigue siendo incierta, en tanto existe la posibilidad de producir azúcar sintético; en condiciones económicas. Pero hasta tanto eso no ocurra, la industria azucarera de la caña, seguirá siendo la base de nuestro desarrollo económico, y en pocos años, descansando en las riquezas de nuestro suelo y en la fuerza de nuestro pueblo, la Revolución habrá resuelto las contradicciones y problemas que timoratos y vacilantes no supieron encarar con el valor y el coraje que le habían legado las tradiciones mambisas: el machete que sirvió para romper el nudo con España, sirve hoy también como garante exclusivo, por la mano que lo empuña, de un desarrollo económico en el que sin riesgo de ningún tipo pueden confiar todos los gobiernos y pueblos del mundo.

a) La combinada de corte y alza que vimos en la Básica del Cauto representa una ayuda inestimable al prolongado esfuerzo y sacrificio que hay que realizar en años de una acumulación de riquezas para financiar tanto la industria como la diversificación agrícola.

b) Representa un incremento de la población en edad laboral.

c) Hará desaparecer una especie de sentimiento de culpabilidad que naturalmente tenemos que sentir todos respecto al obrero agrícola cortador.

d) La máquina de corte y alza constituye el primer eslabón de la Revolución Industrial necesaria a nuestro desarrollo y nuestra total liberación.

¿Que es la Praxis?

Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez

Actividad y praxis.

Toda praxis es actividad, pero no toda actividad es praxis. Al señalar Marx que el idealismo, en contraste con el materialismo, admite el lado activo de la relación sujeto-objeto, y al subrayar, a su vez, su defecto —no ver esta actividad como práctica—,(1) nos previene contra todo intento de establecer un signo de igualdad entre actividad y praxis. De ahí que para delimitar el contenido propio de esta última y su relación con otras actividades, sea preciso distinguir la praxis, como forma de actividad específica, de otras que pueden estar incluso íntimamente vinculadas a ella.

Por actividad en general, entendemos el acto o conjunto de actos en virtud de los cuales un sujeto activo (agente) modifica una materia prima dada.(2) Esta caracterización de la actividad justamente por su generalidad no especifica el tipo de agente (físico, biológico o humano) ni la naturaleza de la materia prima sobre la que actúa (cuerpo físico, ser vivo, vivencia psíquica, grupo, relación o institución social) ni determina tampoco la especie de actos (físicos, psíquicos, sociales) que conducen a cierta transformación. El resultado de la actividad, o sea, su producto se da asimismo, en niveles diversos: puede ser una nueva partícula, un concepto, un útil, una obra artística o un nuevo sistema social.

En este amplio sentido, actividad se opone a pasividad, y su esfera es la de la efectividad, no la de lo meramente posible. Agente es lo que obra, lo que actúa y no lo que está solamente en posibilidad o disponibilidad de actuar u obrar. Su actividad no es potencial, sino actual. Se da efectivamente sin que pueda ser separada del acto o conjunto de actos que la constituyen. La actividad muestra en las relaciones entre las partes y el todo los rasgos de una totalidad concreta. Varios actos desarticulados o yuxtapuestos casualmente no permiten hablar de actividad; es preciso que los actos singulares se articulen o estructuren, como elementos de un todo, o de un proceso total, que desemboca en la modificación de una materia prima. Por ello, a los actos del agente y a la materia sobre la cual se ejerce esta actividad, hay que agregar el resultado o producto que es esa materia misma ya transformada por el agente.

Nuestro concepto de actividad es lo suficientemente amplio para que englobe, por ejemplo: a un nivel físico, las relaciones nucleares de determinadas partículas que conducen a la transformación de unos elementos químicos en su conjunto, o la actividad de un órgano en particular; a un nivel psíquico, las actividades del hombre o del animal del tipo de la sensorial, refleja instintiva, etcétera; en este plano instintivo, la actividad puede manifestarse como una serie de actos tan complejos como el de la construcción de un nido por un pájaro, sin que por ello deje de ser una actividad meramente biológica, natural. El hombre también puede ser sujeto de actividades —biológicas o instintivas— que no rebasan su nivel meramente natural y que, por tanto, no podemos considerarlas como específicamente humanas.

La actividad propiamente humana sólo se da cuando los actos dirigidos a un objeto para transformarlo se inician con un resultado ideal, o fin, y terminan con un resultado o producto efectivos, reales. En este caso, los actos no sólo se hallan determinados causalmente por un estado anterior que se ha dado efectivamente —determinación del pasado por el presente—, sino por algo que no tiene una existencia efectiva aún y que, sin embargo, determina y regula los diferentes actos antes de desembocar en un resultado real; o sea, la determinación no viene del pasado, sino del futuro.

La adecuación a fines.

Este modo de articulación y determinación de los diferentes actos del proceso activo distinguen radicalmente la actividad específicamente humana de cualquier otra que se halle a un nivel meramente natural. Dicha actividad entraña la intervención de la conciencia gracias a la cual el resultado existe dos veces —y en tiempos distintos—, como resultado ideal y como producto real. El resultado real que se quiere obtener, existe primero idealmente, como mero producto de la conciencia, y los diferentes actos del proceso se articulan o estructuran conforme al resultado que se da primero en el tiempo, es decir, el resultado ideal. Por esta anticipación del resultado que se pretende obtener, la actividad propiamente humana tiene un carácter consciente. Lo característico de ella es que por mucho que diste el resultado real del ideal se trata, en todo caso, de adecuar intencionalmente el primero al segundo. Ello no significa que el resultado obtenido haya de ser forzosamente una mera duplicación real de un modelo ideal preexistente. No; la adecuación no tiene por qué ser perfecta. Puede asemejarse poco, o incluso nada, al fin originario, ya que éste sufre cambios, a veces radicales, en el proceso de su realización. Ahora bien, para que pueda hablarse de actividad humana basta que se plantee en ella un resultado ideal o fin a cumplir, como punto de partida, y una intención de adecuación, independientemente de cómo se plasme, en definitiva, el modelo ideal originario.

Esta inadecuación entre intención y resultado se pone de manifiesto tanto en la actividad de los individuos como en la propiamente social. Aquí, mientras los hombres no son conscientes de las leyes que rigen el proceso económico-social, la persecución de diferentes fines por los miembros de la sociedad da lugar a actividades diversas de los individuos o grupos sociales en los que dichos fines se contraponen, equilibran o se subordinan entre sí produciendo resultados que no concuerdan con sus intenciones o que se dan con independencia de éstas. Las relaciones de producción, por ejemplo, son relaciones que los hombres contraen independientemente de su voluntad y de su conciencia. Es decir, son producidas por los hombres como productos suyos inintencionales.(3) El progreso histórico se caracterizará, entre otras cosas, por una superación de esta inintencionalidad. Los hombres que en el pasado produjeron inintencionadamente la esclavitud, el feudalismo y el capitalismo se proponen hoy, conscientemente, la destrucción de las relaciones capitalistas de producción y la instauración del socialismo. Pero aunque la historia humana registra resultados que nadie ha querido, esta inintencionalidad no es sino la forma que socialmente adopta el resultado de la actividad desplegada por los individuos como seres sociales que actúan conscientemente.(4) Volveremos más adelante (en el capítulo V) sobre esta cuestión.

La actividad humana es, por tanto, actividad conforme a fines, y éstos sólo existen por el hombre, como productos de su conciencia. Toda acción verdaderamente humana exige cierta conciencia de un fin, el cual se supedita al curso de la actividad misma.

El fin es, a su vez, la expresión de cierta actitud del sujeto ante la realidad. Por el hecho de trazarme un fin, adopto cierta posición ante ella. Quien se propone realizar un viaje, construir una silla, pintar un cuadro o transformar un régimen social, muestra determinada actitud ante una situación real, presente. Si el hombre viviera en plena armonía con la realidad, o en total conciliación con su presente, no sentiría la necesidad de negarlos idealmente ni de configurar en su conciencia una realidad inexistente aún. Carece de sentido, en verdad, proponerse un fin ya alcanzado, o un resultado obtenido. El fin prefigura idealmente lo que aún no se logra alcanzar. Por el hecho de trazarse fines, el hombre niega una realidad efectiva, y afirma otra que no existe todavía. Pero los fines son productos de la conciencia, y, por ello, la actividad que rigen es consciente. No se trata de la actividad de una conciencia pura, sino de la conciencia de un hombre social que no puede prescindir de la producción de fines en ninguna forma de actividad, incluyendo, por supuesto, la práctica, material.(5)

Marx hace resaltar el papel del fin en una actividad práctica como el trabajo humano: «Al final del proceso de trabajo, brota un resultado que antes de comenzar el proceso existia ya en la mente del obrero: es decir, un resultado que tenia ya existencia ideal. El obrero no se limita a hacer cambiar de forma la materia que le brinda la naturaleza, sino que, al mismo tiempo, realiza en ella su fin, fin que él sabe que rige como una ley las modalidades de su actuación, y al que tiene que supeditar su voluntad».(6)

Al subrayar aquí el papel de la producción de fines en el proceso de trabajo, Marx destaca asimismo el papel del objeto —«la materia que le brinda la naturaleza»— sobre el cual se ejerce dicha actividad. La transformación de la naturaleza material en productos mediante el trabajo no podría darse sin estas condiciones materiales, pero, a su vez, Marx subraya justamente por tratarse del trabajo como una actividad específicamente humana el papel determinante del fin, y su carácter de ley en dicho proceso de transformación material.

El fin, por tanto, prefigura aquí el resultado de una actividad real, práctica, que ya no es pura actividad de la conciencia. Gracias a ello, el hombre no se halla en una relación de exterioridad con sus diferentes actos y con su producto como sucede cuando se trata de un agente físico o animal, sino en una relación de interioridad con ellos, ya que su conciencia establece el fin como ley de sus actos, ley a la que se subordinan, y que rige, en cierto modo, el producto. Este dominio jamás puede ser absoluto, ya que se halla limitado por el objeto de la acción y los medios con que se lleva a cabo la materialización de los fines.

Así, pues, al anticipar idealmente el resultado efectivo, puede ajustar sus actos como elementos de una totalidad regida por el fin. Esta prefiguración ideal del resultado real diferencia radicalmente la actividad del hombre de cualquier otra actividad animal que, externamente, pudiera asemejarse a ella. «Una araña —dice Marx— ejecuta operaciones que semejan las manipulaciones del tejedor, y la construcción de los panales de las abejas podría avergonzar, por su perfección, a más de un maestro de obras. Pero hay algo en que el peor maestro de obras aventaja, desde luego, a la mejor abeja, y es el hecho de que, antes de ejecutar la construcción, la proyecta en su cerebro».(7)

Tomando en cuenta la semejanza externa que puede darse entre ciertos actos animales y humanos, hay que concluir que la actividad propia del hombre no puede reducirse a su mera expresión exterior y que de ella forma parte esencialmente la actividad de la conciencia. Esta actividad se despliega como producción de fines que prefiguran idealmente el resultado real que se quiere obtener, pero se manifiesta, asimismo, como producción de conocimientos, es decir, en forma de conceptos, hipótesis, teorías o leyes mediante los cuales el hombre conoce la realidad.

Entre la actividad cognoscitiva y la teleológica hay diferencias importantes, pues mientras la primera tiene que ver con una realidad presente de la cual se pretende dar razón, la segunda hace referencia a una realidad futura, y, por tanto, inexistente aún. Por otro lado, mientras la actividad cognoscitiva de por sí no entraña una exigencia de acción efectiva, la actividad teleológica lleva implícita una exigencia de realización, en virtud de la cual se tiende a hacer del fin una causa de la acción real. En efecto, en cuanto anticipación ideal de un resultado real que se quiere alcanzar, el fin es también expresión de una necesidad humana que sólo se satisface con el logro del resultado que aquel prefigura o anticipa. Por ello, no es sólo anticipación ideal de lo que está por venir, sino de algo que, además, queremos que venga. Y, en este sentido, es causa de acción y determina —como porvenir— nuestros actos presentes. Cierto es que el hombre no solo anticipa el futuro con su actividad teleológica; al dar razón de una realidad presente, y sobre la base de su conocimiento puede prever una fase de su desenvolvimiento que no se da aún. Tal es la legítima función de la previsión científica. Con ella, se anticipa idealmente lo que todavía no existe efectivamente. Pero esa anticipación ideal del futuro no entraña necesariamente que queramos su existencia real, o aspiremos a contribuir a que advenga. En este caso, el futuro no determina nuestros actos; es decir, la prefiguración ideal de una realidad inexistente no rige como una ley —a diferencia del fin— nuestra acción. En pocas palabras, la actividad cognoscitiva de por sí no nos mueve a actuar.

Pero eso no significa que una y otra actividad de la conciencia se hallen separadas por una muralla insalvable. No se conoce por conocer, sino al servicio de un fin, o serie de fines que puede tener como eslabón inicial el de la conquista de la verdad; a su vez, como antes señalamos, los fines que la conciencia produce llevan en su seno una exigencia de realización, y esta realización presupone —entre otras condiciones— una actividad cognoscitiva sin la cual dichos fines jamás podrían tocar tierra, es decir, cumplirse. Por otro lado, todo fin presupone deter-síntesis cognoscitiva de la realidad que él niega idealmente; y, en este sentido —como índice de cierto nivel cognoscitivo— no podría desvincularse tampoco del conocimiento.

Así, pues, la actividad de la conciencia, que es inseparable de toda verdadera actividad humana, se nos presenta como elaboración de fines y producción de conocimientos en íntima unidad. Si el hombre aceptara siempre el mundo como es, y si, por otra parte, se aceptara siempre a sí mismo en su estado actual, no sentiría la necesidad de transformar el mundo ni de transformarse él a su vez. Se actúa conociendo, de la misma manera que —como veremos más adelante— se conoce actuando. El conocimiento humano en su conjunto se integra en la doble e infinita tarea del hombre de transformar la naturaleza exterior, y su propia naturaleza. Pero el conocimiento no sirve directamente a esta actividad práctica, transformadora; se pone en relación con ella a través de los fines. La relación entre el pensamiento y la acción requiere la mediación de los fines no han de quedarse en meros deseos o ensoñaciones, y van acompañados de una apetencia de realización, esta realización —o cumplimiento en una materia dada para producir determinado resultado— requiere un conocimiento de su objeto, de los medios e instrumentos para transformarlo y de las condiciones que abren o cierran las posibilidades de esa realización. En consecuencia, las actividades cognoscitiva y teleológica de la conciencia se hallan en una unidad indisoluble.

La actividad de la conciencia de por sí tiene un carácter que podemos denominar teórico en cuanto que no puede conducir por sí sola, como mera actividad de la conciencia, a una transformación de la realidad, natural o social.(8) Tanto si se trata de la formulación de fines como de la producción de conocimientos, la conciencia no rebasa su propio ámbito; es decir, su actividad no se objetiva o materializa. Por esta razón, si una y otra son actividades no son, en modo alguno, actividad objetiva, real, es decir, praxis.

La actividad práctica

Como toda actividad propiamente humana, la actividad práctica que se manifiesta en el trabajo humano, en la creación artística o en la praxis revolucionaria, es una actividad adecuada a fines, cuyo cumplimiento exige —como hemos señalado— cierta actividad cognoscitiva. Pero lo distintivo de la actividad práctica radica en el carácter real, objetivo, de la materia prima sobre la cual se actúa, de los medios o instrumentos con que se ejerce la acción, y de su resultado o producto. En la actividad práctica, el sujeto actúa sobre una materia que existe independientemente de su conciencia, y de las diferentes operaciones o manipulaciones exigidas por su transformación. La transformación de esa materia —sobre todo, en el trabajo humano— exige una serie de actos físicos, corpóreos sin los cuales no podría llevarse a cabo la alteración o destrucción de ciertas propiedades que hace posible la aparición de un nuevo objeto, con nuevas propiedades. En el trabajo, dice Marx, «el hombre se enfrenta como un poder natural con la materia de la naturaleza. Pone en acción las fuerzas naturales que forman su corporeidad, los brazos y las piernas, la cabeza y la mano, para de ese modo asimilarse, bajo una forma útil para su propia vida, las materias que la naturaleza le brinda».(9) Finalmente, el producto de la actividad transformadora es un objeto material que subsiste con independencia del proceso de su gestación, y que, con una sustantividad propia, se afirma ante el sujeto, es decir, cobra vida independientemente de la actividad subjetiva que lo ha creado.

En este sentido, podemos decir que la actividad práctica es real, objetiva o material. Y, a nuestro juicio, así la caracteriza Marx en sus Tesis sobre Feuerbach(10) al emplear la expresión «actividad objetiva». Marx subraya el carácter real, objetivo, de la praxis en cuanto transforma el mundo exterior que es independiente de su conciencia y de su existencia. El objeto de la actividad práctica es la naturaleza, la sociedad o los hombres reales. El fin de esa actividad es la transformación real, objetiva, del mundo natural o social para satisfacer determinada necesidad humana. Y el resultado es una nueva realidad que subsiste independientemente del sujeto o de los sujetos concretos que la engendraron con su actividad subjetiva, pero que, en definitiva, sólo existe por el hombre y para el hombre, como ser social.

Sin esta acción real, objetiva, sobre una realidad —natural o humana— que existe independientemente del sujeto práctico, no puede hablarse propiamente de praxis como actividad material consciente y objetiva; por tanto, la simple actividad subjetiva —psíquica—, o meramente espiritual que no se objetiva materialmente no puede considerarse como praxis.

Formas de praxis

La materia prima de la actividad práctica puede cambiar dando lugar a diversas formas de praxis. El objeto sobre el cual ejerce su acción el sujeto puede ser: a) lo dado naturalmente, o entes naturales; b) productos de una praxis anterior que se convierten, a su vez, en materia de una nueva praxis, como los materiales ya preparados con que trabaja el obrero o crea el artista plástico; c) lo humano mismo, ya se trate de la sociedad como materia u objeto de la praxis política o revolucionaria, ya se trate de individuos concretos. En unos casos, como vemos, la praxis tiene por objeto al hombre y, en otros, una materia no propiamente humana: natural, en unos casos, artificial, en otros.

Entre las formas fundamentales de la praxis tenemos la actividad práctica productiva, o relación material y transformadora que el hombre establece —mediante su trabajo— con la naturaleza.(11) Gracias al trabajo, el hombre vence la resistencia de las materias y fuerzas naturales y crea un mundo de objetos útiles que satisfacen determinadas necesidades. Pero como el hombre es un ser social, este proceso solamente se realiza en determinadas condiciones sociales, es decir, en el marco de ciertas relaciones que los hombres contraen como agentes de la producción en este proceso y que Marx llama justamente relaciones de producción.(12)

En el proceso de trabajo, el hombre valiéndose de los instrumentos o medios adecuados transforma un objeto con arreglo a un fin. En cuanto materializa cierto fin o proyecto, se objetiva en cierto modo en su producto. En el trabajo —dice Marx— el hombre asimila «bajo una forma útil para su propia vida, las materias que la naturaleza le brinda»,(13) pero sólo puede asimilarlas objetivándose en ellas, es decir, imprimiendo en la materia trabajada la marca de sus fines. Marx señala esta adecuación a un fin como uno de los factores esenciales del proceso de trabajo: «Los factores simples que intervienen en el proceso de trabajo son: la actividad adecuada a un fin, o sea, el propio trabajo, su objeto y sus medios».(14)

En esta caracterización del proceso de trabajo, podemos hablar de condiciones objetivas —la actividad del hombre y las condiciones materiales del trabajo— representadas tanto por el objeto del trabajo como por los medios o instrumentos con que se lleva a cabo esa transformación. Sin embargo, esta división no puede considerarse absoluta. En primer lugar, el hombre transforma el objeto con arreglo a fines valiéndose de instrumentos que él mismo usa y fabrica, razón por la cual Marx dice que su uso y fabricación «caracterizan el proceso de trabajo específicamente humano».(15) Al reducir Marx el instrumento de trabajo —condición material y objetiva del proceso laboral— a trabajo humano, el instrumento aparece así humanizado también —tanto por su uso como por su fabricación—. Cierto es que esta humanización no puede concebirse en un sentido abstracto, antropológico, sino como expresión tanto de una determinada relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza como de las condiciones sociales en que los hombres producen (relaciones de producción). Por ello dice Marx: «Los instrumentos de trabajo no son solamente el barómetro indicador del desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo del hombre, sino también el exponente de las condiciones sociales en que se trabaja.(16) Gracias a los instrumentos, la relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza deja de ser directa e inmediata. La aparición de instrumentos más perfeccionados modifica el tipo de relación entre el hombre y la naturaleza, y, en este sentido, es un índice revelador del desarrollo de su fuerza de trabajo y de su dominio sobre la naturaleza. El poder de mediación del instrumento se ha extendido y elevado con la introducción de la máquina hasta llegar a la automatización con la que el hombre queda separado radicalmente del objeto de la producción. Pero cualesquiera que sean los instrumentos de que se valga para transformar la materia conforme a sus fines, es, en definitiva, el hombre quien los usa y fabrica, y es él, en última instancia, el que valiéndose de ellos actúa sobre las materias y las transforma conforme a sus necesidades. El papel dominante de los medios de producción, subrayado por Marx, lejos de eliminar la presencia del hombre concreto, como sujeto de la producción, lo revela inequívocamente. Pero esta presencia se pone de manifiesto abiertamente con el tercer factor del proceso de trabajo señalado por Marx: su carácter de actividad personal adecuada a un fin. No se puede desconocer el papel de este factor al analizar el proceso de trabajo aunque ello se haga para subrayar la naturaleza material de las condiciones del proceso de trabajo y el papel dominante de los medios de producción.»(17)

Se puede afirmar el carácter teleológico de la actividad práctica, material, que es el trabajo humano, sin que ello implique hacer abstracción de la materialidad misma de ese proceso, materialidad que no se reduce, por otra parte, al objeto de trabajo y a los instrumentos materiales, sino que incluye también, la propia actividad subjetiva del hombre que se enfrenta con sus instrumentos o la materia ya que en el trabajo «pone en acción las fuerzas naturales que forman su corporeldad, los brazos y las piernas, la cabeza y la mano...» (18)

La praxis productiva es así la praxis fundamental porque en ella el hombre no sólo produce un mundo humano o humanizado, en el sentido de un mundo de objetos que satisfacen necesidades humanas y que sólo pueden ser producidos en la medida en que se plasman en ellos fines o proyectos humanos, sino también, en el sentido de que en la praxis productiva el hombre se produce, forma o transforma a sí mismo. «A la par que de ese modo actúa sobre la naturaleza exterior a él y la transforma —dice Marx en El Capital—, transforma su propia naturaleza desarrollando las potencias que dormitan en él y sometiendo el juego de sus fuerzas a su propia disciplina». (19)

Otra forma de praxis es la producción o creación de obras de arte. Al igual que el trabajo humano es transformación de una materia a la que se imprime una forma dada, exigida no ya por una necesidad práctico-utilitaria, sino por una necesidad general humana de expresión y objetivación. En cuanto que la actividad del artista no se halla limitada por la utilidad material que el producto del trabajo debe satisfacer, puede llevar el proceso de humanización que —en forma limitada— se da ya en el trabajo humano hasta sus últimas consecuencias. Por ello la praxis artística permite la creación de objetos humanos o humanizados que elevan a un grado superior la capacidad de expresión y objetivación humanas, que se revela ya en los productos del trabajo. La obra artística es, ante todo, creación de una nueva realidad, y puesto que el hombre se afirma, creando o humanizando cuanto toca, la praxis artística —al ensanchar y enriquecer con sus creaciones la realidad ya humanizada— es una praxis esencial para el hombre. (20)

Como toda verdadera praxis humana, el arte se sitúa en la esfera de la acción, de la transformación de una materia que ha de ceder su forma para adoptar otra nueva: la exigida por la necesidad humana que el objeto creado o producido ha de satisfacer. El arte no es mera producción material ni pura producción espiritual. Pero justamente por su carácter práctico, realizador y transformador, está más cerca del trabajo humano —sobre todo, cuando éste no ha perdido su carácter creador—, que de una actividad meramente espiritual.

Entre las formas de actividad práctica que se ejercen sobre una materia dada hay que incluir también la actividad científica experimental que satisface, primordialmente, las necesidades de la investigación teórica, y, en particular, las de la comprobación de hipótesis. Esta forma de praxis es la que se pone de manifiesto cuando el investigador actúa sobre un objeto material modificando a voluntad las condiciones en que se opera un fenómeno. Tal es el sentido de la experimentación como praxis científica. El investigador produce fenómenos que son una reproducción de los que se dan en un medio natural, pero los produce justamente para poder estudiarlos en un medio artificial —el del laboratorio— sin las impurezas y perturbaciones con que se presentan en el medio natural y que, por esa razón, dificultan su estudio. En cuanto que se trata de producir determinados fenómenos con ayuda del instrumento físico adecuado, la actividad científica experimental es, evidentemente, una forma de praxis. Se trata de una actividad objetiva que da lugar a un producto o resultado real y objetivo.

En este tipo de praxis el fin inmediato es teórico. El experimento se lleva a cabo para probar una teoría, o determinados aspectos de ella. Se experimenta respondiendo a ciertas exigencias teóricas con el fin de facilitar el desarrollo de ella. Un determinado experimento —por ejemplo, los realizados en agronomía— puede tener consecuencias prácticas, pero no directamente, sino a través de la teoría que trata de comprobar.

Ahora bien, la experimentación no es privativa de la ciencia; cabe hablar también de una actividad experimental en otros campos: artístico, educativo, económico o social. En estos casos, a diferencia de la actividad experimental científica, el experimento no está al servicio directo e inmediato de una teoría, sino de una forma específica de praxis; el experimento artístico o educativo tiene por fin el impulso de la actividad práctica correspondiente, el arte o la educación. De este modo, vemos que mientras en la ciencia el fin de la actividad experimental es teórico —fortalecer o impulsar el desarrollo de una teoría—, y, de un modo mediato, sirve por tanto a determinada actividad práctica, en otros campos la experimentación contribuye al desenvolvimiento de la praxis correspondiente, pero de una manera directa e inmediata: en cuanto que sus resultados se aplican en la esfera práctica adecuada.

Tales son las formas fundamentales —aunque no exclusivas— de la praxis cuando la acción del hombre se ejerce más o menos inmediatamente sobre una materia natural —naturaleza inmediata, o naturaleza ya mediata, o trabajada que sirve de objeto de nueva acción—. Veamos, ahora, el tipo de praxis en que el hombre es sujeto y objeto de ella; es decir, praxis en la que actúa sobre sí mismo.

Esta actividad práctica del hombre ofrece diversas modalidades. Dentro de ella caen los diversos actos encaminados a su transformación como ser social, y, por ello, a cambiar sus relaciones económicas, políticas y sociales. En cuanto que su actividad toma por objeto no a un individuo aislado, sino a grupos o clases sociales, e incluso a la sociedad entera, puede denominarse praxis social, aunque en un sentido amplio toda práctica (incluyendo aquella que tiene por objeto directo a la naturaleza) reviste un carácter social, ya que el hombre sólo puede llevarla a cabo contrayendo determinadas relaciones sociales (relaciones de producción en la praxis productiva) y, además, porque la modificación práctica del objeto no humano se traduce, a su vez, en una transformación del hombre como ser social.

En un sentido más restringido, la praxis social es la actividad de grupos o clases sociales que conduce a transformar la organización y dirección de la sociedad, o a realizar ciertos cambios mediante la actividad del Estado. Esta forma de praxis es justamente la actividad política.

En las condiciones de la sociedad dividida en clases antagónicas, la política comprende la lucha de clases por el poder y la dirección y estructuración de la sociedad, de acuerdo con los intereses y fines correspondientes. La política es una actividad práctica en cuanto que la lucha que libran los grupos o clases sociales se halla vinculada a cierto tipo de organización real de sus miembros (instituciones y organizaciones políticas, como son, por ejemplo, los partidos) en segundo lugar, aunque la actividad política vaya acompañada de un choque y contraposición de ideas, proyectos, programas, etcétera, y esta lucha ideológica ejerza una influencia indudable en las acciones políticas reales, concretas, el carácter práctico de la actividad política exige formas, medios y métodos reales, efectivos, de lucha; así, por ejemplo, el proletariado en su lucha política se vale de huelgas, manifestaciones, mítines e incluso de métodos violentos. En tercer lugar, la actividad política gira en torno a la conquista, conservación, dirección o control de un organismo concreto como es el Estado. El poder es un instrumento de importancia vital para la transformación de la sociedad.

La praxis política presupone la participación de amplios sectores de la sociedad. Pero no se trata de una actividad espontánea, aunque se den en ella actos espontáneos de determinados individuos o grupos. Persigue determinados fines que responden a los intereses radicales de las clases sociales, y en cada situación concreta la realización de esos fines se halla condicionada por las posibilidades objetivas inscritas en la propia realidad. Una política que responda a esas posibilidades y que excluya todo aventurerismo, exige un conocimiento de esa realidad y de la correlación de clases para no proponerse acciones que desemboquen inexorablemente en un fracaso. La lucha tiene que ser, por tanto, consciente, organizada y dirigida, y la necesidad de librarla en esta forma explica la creación de los partidos políticos.

Los partidos trazan, con una mayor o menor conciencia de los objetivos, posibilidades y condiciones, la línea de acción. Los métodos para transformar lo ideal en real, es decir, para realizar prácticamente la línea política trazada por un partido constituye la estrategia y la táctica. La estrategia señala las tareas correspondientes a una etapa histórica general, y la táctica determina el modo de cumplir la línea política de un período relativamente breve. Estrategia y táctica se relacionan dentro de la línea política y de su aplicación como lo general y lo particular.

La praxis política, en cuanto actividad práctica transformadora, alcanza su forma más alta en la praxis revolucionaria como etapa superior de la transformación práctica de la sociedad. En la sociedad dividida en clases antagónicas, la actividad revolucionaria permite cambiar radicalmente las bases económicas y sociales en que se asienta el poder material y espiritual de la clase dominante, e instaurar así una nueva sociedad. El agente principal de este cambio es el proletariado a través de una lucha consciente, organizada y dirigida, lo que presupone la existencia de un partido que eleve su conciencia de clase y trace claramente los objetivos de esta lucha, su estrategia y su táctica, que organice las fuerzas y las dirija.

Si el hombre existe en cuanto tal como ser práctico, es decir, afirmándose con su actividad práctica transformadora frente a la naturaleza exterior y frente a su propia naturaleza, la praxis revolucionaria y la praxis productiva constituyen dos dimensiones esenciales de su ser práctico. Pero, a su vez, una y otra actividad, junto con las restantes formas específicas de praxis, no son sino formas concretas particulares de una praxis total humana gracias a la cual el hombre como ser social y consciente humaniza los objetos y se humaniza a sí mismo.

La actividad teórica.

La actividad teórica en su conjunto —como ideología y ciencia—, considerada también a lo largo de su desenvolvimiento histórico, sólo existe por y en relación con la práctica, ya que en ella encuentra su fundamento, sus fines y criterio de verdad, como trataremos de poner de manifiesto más adelante. Pero por estrechas que sean las relaciones entre una y otra actividad, la actividad teórica de por sí no muestra los rasgos que hemos considerado privativos de la praxis, y, por ello, no debemos ponerla en el mismo plano que las formas de actividad práctica que antes hemos examinado. A nuestro modo de ver, la actividad teórica no es de por sí una forma de praxis.

Aunque la «práctica» teórica transforme percepciones, representaciones o conceptos, y cree el tipo peculiar de productos que son las hipótesis, teorías, leyes, etcétera, en ninguno de esos casos se transforma la realidad. No se cumplen en ella las condiciones que señalábamos anteriormente con respecto a la materia prima, la actividad y el resultado en el proceso práctico. Falta aquí el lado material, objetivo, de la praxis, y por ello no consideramos que sea legítimo hablar de praxis teórica.

Lo que a nuestro juicio veda caracterizarla así es precisamente lo que hay de distintivo en la actividad teórica, entendiendo por ésta tanto la producción de fines como de conocimientos. Por su objeto, fines, medios y resultados, la actividad teórica se distingue de la práctica. Su objeto o materia prima son las sensaciones o percepciones —es decir objetos psíquicos que sólo tienen una existencia subjetiva—, o los conceptos, teorías, representaciones o hipótesis que tienen una existencia ideal. El fin inmediato de la actividad teórica es elaborar o transformar idealmente, no realmente, esa materia prima, para obtener, como productos, teorías que expliquen una realidad presente, o modelos que prefiguren idealmente una realidad futura. La actividad teórica proporciona un conocimiento indispensable para transformar la realidad, o traza fines que anticipan idealmente su transformación, pero en uno y otro caso queda intacta la realidad efectiva. Las transformaciones que lleva a cabo la actividad teórica con relación a esta —paso de una hipótesis a una teoría, y de ésta a otra teoría más fundada— son transformaciones ideales: de las ideas sobre el mundo, pero no del mundo mismo. (21) Y las operaciones que el hombre lleva a cabo para producir fines o conocimientos son operaciones mentales: abstraer, generalizar, deducir, sintetizar, prever, etc. que si bien exigen un sustrato corpóreo y el funcionamiento del sistema nervioso superior, no dejan de ser operaciones subjetivas, psíquicas, aunque puedan tener manifestaciones objetivas.

Por otra parte, pensamos que la admisión de una praxis teórica se halla en contradicción con la crítica que Marx formula en sus Tesis sobre Feuerbach. Si recordamos el contenido de la Tesis I veremos que Marx critica a Feuerbach justamente por concebir la relación sujeto-objeto (u hombre-naturaleza) como una relación meramente contemplativa, o sea teórica. En esto radica el defecto fundamental de la filosofía Feuerbachiana, así como del materialismo tradicional. En este sentido, Marx contrapone relación (contemplativa) teórica y práctica. Y en ese mismo sentido contrapone también en su Tesis XI la filosofía como interpretación, es decir, como teoría desligada de la práctica, y la filosofía vinculada conscientemente a la transformación del mundo.

Esta contraposición de contemplación (teoría) y praxis demuestra que Marx, lejos de admitir la teoría como una forma de praxis, establece por el contrario una contraposición, entre una y otra. Por otra parte al distinguir claramente en su Introducción a la crítica de la economía política, lo concreto real y lo concreto pensado, y presentar la actividad teórica cognoscitiva, es decir, la producción de conocimientos como un proceso ascensional de lo abstracto a lo concreto —proceso que se opera en el pensamiento y que consiste en la reproducción espiritual del objeto real bajo la forma de lo concreto pensado—, Marx señala claramente que se trata de una actividad o producción que no produce nada efectivamente, es decir no transforma la realidad. (22) Una actividad que se opera sólo en el pensamiento y que produce el tipo peculiar de objetos que son los productos de éste no puede, por tanto, identificarse con la actividad práctica que llamamos praxis.

Si llamamos praxis a la actividad práctica material, adecuada a fines que transforma el mundo —natural y humano—, no cabe incluir la actividad teórica entre las formas de praxis ya que falta en ellas la transformación objetiva de una materia mediante el sujeto, cuyos resultados subsisten independientemente de su actividad. (23)

Solamente subjetivizando el concepto de praxis hasta borrar toda diferencia específica con el de actividad en general, podríamos hablar de una praxis teórica. Pero, en cuanto que la actividad teórica de por sí no modifica realmente el mundo —aunque sí nuestras ideas sobre él— no nos parece legítimo hablar de praxis teórica.

La actividad filosófica transforma nuestra concepción del mundo, de la sociedad o del hombre, pero no modifica —directa e inmediatamente— nada real. Cabría preguntarse, sin embargo, si esto es válido para toda actividad filosófica, incluyendo aquella que concibe el mundo no sólo como objeto de interpretación, sino de transformación. De acuerdo con la Tesis XI de Marx sobre Feuerbach podríamos dividir las filosofías, desde un punto de vista histórico, en filosofías que se limitan a tratar de dar razón de lo existente y que desembocan, como muestra palmariamente el sistema de Hegel, en una conciliación del pensamiento con la realidad (filosofía como aceptación del mundo), y filosofías que sirven —por su vinculación consciente con una praxis revolucionaria— a la transformación del mundo (filosofía como instrumento teórico o guía de una transformación humana radical). Ahora bien, ¿no podría decirse que, en este último caso, la actividad filosófica es ya una forma de praxis, que podríamos denominar precisamente praxis teórica? Y, de no ser así ¿no se colocarían todas las filosofías en el mismo plano teórico y se borraría la diferencia cualitativa que Marx establece en la Tesis citada entre uno y otro tipo de filosofía?

Detengámonos brevemente en esta cuestión que nos parece de suma importancia para delimitar el contenido de la verdadera praxis.

Descartemos, en primer lugar, el considerar que pueda hablarse legítimamente de praxis filosófica por el simple hecho de que una filosofía tenga consecuencias prácticas. Ya decimos en nuestra introducción que todas las grandes doctrinas filosóficas las han tenido siempre, en mayor o menor grado, más o menos directamente, en cuanto que independientemente de los propósitos del filósofo, han cumplido cierta función social. Esto vale incluso para filosofías que —como el idealismo alemán— distaban mucho de pretender servir a la transformación efectiva del mundo. No se trata, pues, de eso.

Al plantearnos la cuestión de si la actividad filosófica puede ser praxis de por sí, nos referimos a la filosofía que, vinculada conscientemente a la práctica, se propone ser instrumento teórico de la transformación de la realidad. Pensamos precisamente en el propio marxismo como filosofía que —de acuerdo con la Tesis XI sobre Feuerbach— tiene presente que se trata no sólo de interpretar el mundo, sino de transformarlo. ¿Puede decirse que la actividad filosófica, en este caso, sea praxis, sin olvidar por un momento el contenido que hemos dado a este término? A nuestro juicio, la filosofía ni como interpretación del mundo ni como instrumento teórico de su transformación es de por sí, de un modo directo e inmediato, praxis. La filosofía marxista, siendo necesariamente una interpretación científica del mundo, responde a necesidades prácticas humanas; expresa, a su vez, una práctica existente y, por otro lado, aspira conscientemente a ser guía de una praxis revolucionaria. Con ello se subraya la función ideológica y social de una filosofía que sólo puede ser práctica en cuanto que excluye la utopía y trasciende sus elementos puramente ideológicos para ser científica. Lo que la diferencia de las doctrinas filosóficas a que alude Marx en la primera parte de su Tesis XI sobre Feuerbach, así como de otras doctrinas socialistas es, pues, su carácter científico, pero también —y no secundariamente— el concebirse a sí misma en función de la praxis; es decir, como filosofía al servicio de la transformación efectiva, real, del mundo, integrando así la praxis revolucionaria como fin de la teoría.

La teoría de por sí —en este caso como en cualquier otro— no transforma el mundo. Puede contribuir a su transformación, pero para ello tiene que salir de sí misma, y, en primer lugar, tiene que ser asimilada por los que han de suscitar, con sus actos reales, efectivos, dicha transformación. Entre la teoría y la actividad práctica transformadora se inserta una labor de educación de las conciencias, de organización de los medios materiales y planes concretos de acción; todo ello como paso indispensable para desarrollar acciones reales efectivas. En este sentido, una teoría es práctica en cuanto que materializa, a través de una serie de mediaciones, lo que antes sólo existía idealmente, como conocimiento de la realidad o anticipación ideal de su transformación.

Pero si la teoría de por sí no cambia al mundo solo puede contribuir a transformarlo justamente como teoría. Es decir, la condición de posibilidad —necesaria, aunque insuficiente— para transitar conscientemente de la teoría a la práctica, y, por tanto, para que la primera cumpla una función práctica, es que sea propiamente una actividad teórica —en la que los ingredientes cognoscitivos y teleológicos se hallen firmemente vinculados y mutuamente consolidados—. En este sentido, una filosofía vinculada a la práctica, que aspira conscientemente a realizarse, lejos de carecer de un contenido propiamente teórico, lo ha de poseer en toda su plenitud. El paso de la teoría socialista de la forma utópica que tiene en Saint-Simon, Fourier u Owen, o de las doctrinas comunistas utópicas como la de Moses Hess, a la forma científica que recibe en Marx y Engels entraña, pudiéramos decir, junto a una elevación de su función práctica, una elevación de su contenido teórico, con la particularidad de que ambos aspectos se hallan en una relación indisoluble.

La filosofía que se ve a sí misma como instrumento teórico de la praxis es teoría, y como tal no transforma real y efectivamente de por sí. Interpretar no es transformar. Pero de lo que se trata —como dice Marx en la Tesis XI— es de transformar; de ahí que la teoría haya de ser arrancada de su estado meramente teórico y, por las mediaciones adecuadas, tratar de realizarla. Pero este segundo aspecto que es vital cuando no se acepta el mundo como es y se trata de transformarlo, lejos de abolir el contenido teórico de la filosofía, o de reducirlo a un ingrediente meramente ideológico, presupone aquél necesariamente —al nivel de la ciencia—, como condición ineludible para guiar la acción. Así, pues, la actividad filosófica en cuanto tal no es praxis. Y no lo es tampoco la filosofía de la praxis o teoría de la actividad práctica del hombre en sus relaciones con la naturaleza y con otros hombres.

La concepción de la filosofía de la praxis como actividad práctica de por sí es, a nuestro juicio, una concepción idealista, incompatible con el verdadero concepto de la praxis que antes hemos delimitado, y entraña la vuelta a puntos de vista filosóficos —como el de los jóvenes hegelianos—, que ya fueron criticados y superados por Marx precisamente para poder elaborar una filosofía como guía o instrumento teórico de la transformación de la realidad, y hacer posible así la transformación efectiva de ésta.

La actividad filosófica —desligada de la práctica o vinculada conscientemente a ella—, como mera interpretación o como instrumento teórico de su transformación, cultivada por intelectuales de origen burgués o de origen proletario, es siempre una actividad intelectual, teórica. La diferencia cualitativa por su carácter esencial —ideológico o científico—, o por la función que una u otra filosofía puede cumplir, no basta para hablar legítimamente de una praxis teórica.

En suma, la praxis se nos presenta como una actividad material, transformadora, y adecuada a fines. Fuera de ella, queda la actividad teórica que no se materializa, en cuanto que es actividad espiritual pura. Pero por otra parte, no hay praxis como actividad puramente material, es decir, sin la producción de fines y conocimientos que caracteriza la actividad teórica. Ello quiere decir que el problema de determinar qué es la praxis requiere delimitar más a fondo las relaciones entre teoría y práctica.

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(1) C. Marx, Tesis (I) sobre Feuerbach, en C. Marx y F. Engels, La ideología alemana, trad. de W. Roces, EPU, Montevideo, 1959, página 633.

(2) Actividad es aquí sinónimo de acción entendida también como acto o conjunto de actos que modifican una materia exterior o que es inmanente al agente.

(3) Asimismo la contradicción fundamental del modo de producción capitalista es también inintencional. «Es resultado —dice Maurice Godelier— de la acción de todos los agentes del sistema y del desarrollo del sistema mismo, pero no ha sido nunca el proyecto de ninguna conciencia ni un fin querido por nadie». (M. Godelier, Rationalité et irrationalité en économie, Ed. Maspero, París, 1966, página 79).

(4) Cf. a este respecto la carta de Engels a J. Bloch, del 21-22 de septiembre de 1890, en la que el primero dice: «... La historia se hace de tal modo, que el resultado final siempre deriva de los conflictos entre muchas voluntades individuales, cada una de las cuales es, a su vez, lo que es por efecto de una multitud de condiciones especiales de vida; son, pues, innumerables fuerzas que se entrecruzan las unas con las otras, un grupo infinito de paralelogramos de fuerzas, de las que surgen un resultado —el acontecimiento histórico—, que, a su vez, puede considerarse producto de una potencia única, que, como un todo, actúa sin conciencia y sin voluntad... De este modo hasta aquí toda la historia ha discurrido a modo de un proceso natural y sometida también, sustancialmente, a las mismas leyes dinámicas. Pero del hecho de que las distintas voluntades individuales ... no alcancen lo que desean, sino que se fundan todas en una medida total, en una resultante común, no debe inferirse que estas voluntades sean igual a cero. Por el contrario, todas contribuyen a la resultante y se hallan, por tanto, incluidas en ella.» (C. Marx y F. Engels, Obras escogidas, en dos tomos, ed. esp., tomo I, Moscú 1952, páginas 459-460.)

(5) Sobre la finalidad como categoría específica de la actividad humana y sus relaciones con la causalidad, véase mi estudio «Contribución a la dialéctica de la finalidad y la causalidad», Anuario de Filosofía, UNAM, año I, México, 1961, páginas 56-61.

(6) C. Marx, El Capital. Crítica de la economía política, traducción de W. Roces, 3a. ed. especial, t. I, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México-Buenos Aires, 1964, páginas 130-131.

(7) Marx, El Capital, ed. esp. cit., t. I., p. 131.

(8) Hablamos aquí de lo teórico en un sentido amplio que abarca tanto la esfera de los fines como de los conocimientos. En este sentido lo teórico se contrapone —no de un modo absoluto, sino relativo, como veremos en el capítulo siguiente— a lo práctico. En un sentido más restringido, lo teórico —el dominio de la teoría— se aplica a un conjunto de conocimientos aglutinados en torno a un principio unificador que los articula y sistematiza constituyendo así un campo científico dado.

(9) C. Marx, El Capital, t. I, página 131.

(10) C. Marx, Tesis (I) sobre Feuerbach, ed. cit., página 633.

(11) «El trabajo es, en primer término —dice Marx—, un proceso entre la naturaleza y el hombre, proceso en que éste se realiza, regula y controla mediante su propia acción, su intercambio de materias con la naturaleza». (El Capital, I, página 130).

(12) C. Marx, Prólogo a la Contribución a la crítica de la economía política, en C. Marx y F. Engels, Obras escogidas, ed. esp. cit., t. I, páginas 332-333.

(13) C. Marx, El Capital, I, ed. cit., página 130.

(14) Ibidem, página 131.

(15) Ibidem, página 132.

(16) Ibidem.

(17) Al analizar la concepción de Marx del proceso de trabajo en El Capital, Louis Althusser subraya, interpretando el pasaje correspondiente, la naturaleza material de las condiciones del proceso de trabajo y el papel dominante de los medios de producción en dicho proceso. A juicio suyo, el proceso de trabajo se halla determinado por esas condiciones materiales («el proceso de trabajo como mecanismo material se halla dominado por las leyes físicas de la naturaleza y de la tecnología»). Al mostrarse así las «condiciones materiales irreductibles del proceso de trabajo», Marx rompe con la concepción del «trabajo como esencia del hombre» y con el «idealismo del trabajo» que esta concepción —propia de los Manuscritos de 1844— entraña (Cf. L. Althusser, «L'objet du Capital», en el t. II de Lire Le Capital, F. Maspero, París, 1965, páginas 144-149).

L. Althusser tiene razón al pronunciarse contra una «ideología antropológica del trabajo» y, por ello, procede justamente al subrayar la importancia de las condiciones materiales del trabajo, lo que le lleva a detenerse sobre todo en dos de los elementos constitutivos de dicho proceso según Marx. Pero en su análisis omite por completo el estudio del tercero de ellos: la actividad adecuada a un fin, o trabajo propiamente dicho. Es esa omisión la que le permite contraponer radicalmente en esta cuestión los Manuscritos de 1844 a El Capital al reducir la concepción de la primera obra a «idealismo del trabajo» y la de la segunda a una «concepción materialista de la producción». A nuestro juicio, la importancia de ese tercer factor del proceso de trabajo —señalado en distinta forma tanto en los Manuscritos de 1844 como en El Capital— es la que mantiene cierta continuidad entre una y otra concepción sin que por ello se borren sus diferencias esenciales.

(18) C. Marx, El Capital, I, ed. cit., página 130.

(19) C. Marx, El Capital, t. I, ed. cit., página 130.

(20) Sobre las relaciones entre el arte y el trabajo, y la concepción del trabajo artístico como creación, véase mi libro, Las ideas estéticas de Marx (Ed. Era, México, D. F., 1965), particularmente los estudios titulados «El marxismo contemporáneo y el arte» y «Las ideas de Marx sobre la fuente y naturaleza de lo estético».

(21) Ya en La Sagrada Familia decían Marx y Engels: «Las ideas no pueden conducir nunca más allá de las ideas del viejo estado universal de cosas. Las ideas no pueden nunca ejecutar nada. Para la ejecución de las ideas hacen falta los hombres que pongan en acción una fuerza práctica.» (C. Marx y F. Engels, La Sagrada Familia, ed. esp. cit., página 165).

(22) «... El método que permite elevarse de lo abstracto a lo concreto no es otra cosa que el modo como el pensamiento se apropia lo concreto bajo la forma de lo concreto pensado. Pero no es de ninguna manera lo concreto mismo.» (Contribución a la crítica de la economía política, ed. francesa, París, 1957, página 165).

(23) En ocasiones se emplea la expresión «praxis» o «práctica teórica», para designar una «práctica específica que se ejerce sobre un objeto propio y conduce a su producto propio: un conocimiento» (L. Althusser, Pour Marx, París, 1965, página 175). En este caso, se presenta como una forma específica de la práctica en general, entendida como «proceso de transformación de una materia prima dada y determinada en un producto determinado, transformación que se lleva a cabo por un trabajo humano determinado, utilizando medios (de producción) determinados». (Ibidem, página 167). La práctica teórica así entendida corresponde en gran parte —no totalmente, puesto que nosotros incluimos también en ella la producción de fines— a lo que nosotros denominados actividad teórica.

Althusser no emplea, por tanto, esta expresión en el sentido idealista, tan firmemente rechazado por Marx, de producción de ideas que transforma por sí misma la realidad. Se esfuerza asimismo por subrayar el carácter distintivo e irreemplazable de la «práctica teórica» (cf. también a este respecto su estudio Teoría, práctica teórica y formación teórica. Ideología y lucha ideológica, en la revista Casa de las Américas, número 34, La Habana, Cuba, páginas 13-17). Sin embargo, la extensión del término «práctica» a todo tipo de relación o apropiación del mundo real, incluyendo no sólo la teórica e ideológica, sino también la ética y la religiosa (cf. Lire Le Capital, I, página 85) hace que se borre el carácter esencial de la praxis que Marx justamente pretendió destacar (como transformación efectiva, real de un objeto real) frente a un «idealismo de la praxis» (reducción de ésta a la actividad teórica o moral). Creemos, por ello, que el empleo del término «práctica» allí donde no se opera esa transformación objetiva y real induce a confusión pese al empeño en diferenciar sus formas específicas.

Base económica y superestructuras ideológicas

Charles Bettelheim, Jacques Charriere

Los objetivos fundamentales perseguidos por todos los países que han iniciado la vía del socialismo, consisten en principio en esforzarse en realizar tanto transformaciones de base como transformaciones superestructurales, es decir, llegar por una reestructuración social (y no sólo económica) y por transformaciones ideológicas profundas; aunque hay distintos puntos de vista acerca de los lazos que unen a esas diversas transformaciones.

En China se subraya con frecuencia que su meta no consiste sólo en lograr ritmos de desarrollo más rápidos que los que pudo alcanzar el capitalismo sino también y sobre todo promover una nueva formación social con sus normas de comportamiento y superestructuras específicas.

Desde el punto de vista marxista la persecución de ese objetivo no se debe a una opción arbitraria sino al reconocimiento de una exigencia histórica impuesta por el nivel del desarrollo posible de las fuerzas productivas modernas. El reconocimiento de tal exigencia histórica significa la aceptación de que sin un cambio radical no sólo de las relaciones de propiedad sino también del conjunto del modo de producción y de la superestructura de la sociedad las fuerzas productivas o no pueden desarrollarse o sólo se desarrollan de manera contradictoria, es decir, engendrando fuerzas destructivas crecientes tanto en el plano material como en el de los propios hombres. Estos últimos son esclavizados cada vez más por sus propios productos, incluyendo la esfera del consumo.

Más específicamente, el análisis anterior implica que el nuevo modo de producción, el modo de producción socialista, no puede progresar y mantenerse sin la edificación de estructuras adecuadas, es decir, particularmente de relaciones sociales, actitudes, comportamientos e ideas sociales determinadas. Sin superestructuras adecuadas, la base económica sobre la que se construye el socialismo está amenazada por transformaciones regresivas, tanto al nivel de las relaciones de producción como al nivel de las propias fuerzas productivas. Estas últimas, en efecto, corren el peligro de progresar cada vez con mayor lentitud si no encarnan con rapidez las actitudes y comportamiento que exige el desarrollo de la sociedad socialista y, sobre todo, si dichas actitudes, conductas y sistemas de valores adecuados tienden no a fortificarse sino a estancarse, en favor de actitudes, conductas y sistemas de valores que caracterizan a las formas sociales anteriores y que conservan todavía una base objetiva en las condiciones materiales, mientras el nivel de las fuerzas productivas no se haya elevado suficientemente.

Por lo tanto, la cuestión que se plantea es la de las relaciones entre la base económica y las superestructuras correspondientes. Según la interpretación mecanicista de dicho problema, se puede pensar que toda forma de producción engendra en última instancia nuevas actitudes, nuevos sistemas de valores, una nueva ideología y un hombre nuevo.(1)

Por el contrario, la interpretación dialéctica del problema nos lleva a pensar que si el progreso de una forma de producción (es decir, de sus fuerzas productivas y de sus relaciones de producción) constituye la condición necesaria de la transformación de la superestructura, esta última, dentro de ciertos límites, tiene un dinamismo propio y, sobre todo, que puede ejercer una acción regresiva sobre la misma base económica. No es inútil recordar aquí algunas de las interpretaciones que se han formulado de ciertos textos de Marx y Engels.

Una interpretación estrecha de algunos párrafos del Manifiesto Comunista o del Anti-Duhring ha originado a veces una interpretación mecanicista que, sin embargo, es contraria a los análisis globales que nos han dejado Marx y Engels. En efecto, éstos insistieron siempre en el carácter global de las transformaciones sociales y, por tanto, en la interacción de los diferentes elementos cuya suma constituye la totalidad de una formación social.

Por ejemplo, Engels en su libro sobre El origen de la familia, de la propiedad privada y del Estado, ha puesto de relieve las profundas influencias que pueden tener ciertos elementos de la superestructura ideológica sobre la evolución social. Así, cuando analiza la incapacidad de la sociedad esclavista para dar lugar directamente a un nuevo método de producción favorable al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, insiste en el "desprecio hacia el trabajo productivo" heredado de la sociedad esclavista, y que representa un freno al desarrollo.

Engels escribe: "La esclavitud... al morir, dejó detrás de sí su aguijón venenoso bajo la forma de proscripción del trabajo productivo por los hombres libres. Tal es el callejón sin salida en el cual se encontraba el mundo romano: la esclavitud era económicamente imposible, y el trabajo de los hombres libres estaba moralmente proscrito. La primera no podía ya y el segundo no podía aún ser la forma básica de la producción social. La única salida posible era una revolución radical.(2)

En ese texto podemos ver claramente de qué manera una actitud ("el desprecio hacia el trabajo productivo"), se convierte en un obstáculo al desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas y cómo Engels estima que sólo una revolución completa podía transformar suficientemente el elemento de la superestructura para que fueran posibles nuevos progresos.

Ya que hemos recordado el anterior texto de Engels, que tiene su equivalente para otras épocas en multitud de análisis marxistas,(3) no es inútil recordar igualmente que Engels prolonga su análisis de la revolución que tuvo lugar entre el quinto y el noveno siglos de nuestra era, ya que se trata esencialmente de una revolución que se efectuó al nivel de las superestructuras ideológicas y que adaptó estas últimas a las exigencias de las nuevas fuerzas productivas.(4)

Engels subraya que a lo largo de los cuatro siglos durante los cuales tuvo lugar dicha revolución, no hubo prácticamente ningún progreso, ni en las fuerzas productivas, ni en las relaciones de producción. A pesar de los grandes cambios a que dio lugar la caída del Imperio Romano y las invasiones de las tribus germánicas, encontramos bajo una nueva etiqueta, las viejas formas de propiedad y las viejas relaciones de producción.

Escribe Engels: "Así, pues, parecía como si al cabo de cuatro siglos la masa de la población hubiese vuelto a su punto de partida".(5) Sin embargo, añade inmediatamente, se había avanzado, porque aun cuando las clases sociales seguían siendo casi las mismas, "los hombres que formaban estas clases habían cambiado".(6)

La referencia a estos análisis sólo en apariencia nos aleja de nuestro tema, el del lugar especialmente importante que se atribuye en China a la adhesión de las masas al sistema de valores, de actitudes y comportamiento que corresponde a las exigencias de la construcción de la sociedad socialista.

Por otra parte, los anteriores análisis nos conducen a rechazar ciertas interpretaciones mecanicistas de las relaciones entre la base económica y la superestructura. Incluso autores que, por lo demás, abordan buen número de problemas desde un punto de vista dialéctico, han sugerido interpretaciones de ese tipo.

Así, hay una cierta interpretación mecanicista en el capítulo 2 del Tomo I del Tratado de Economía Política de Oskar Lange. En ese texto, la eliminación de la no-correspondencia entre las relaciones de producción, por una parte, y el nivel de desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas y el carácter de esas fuerzas, por la otra, aparece como el resultado de la "acción de la primera ley fundamental de la sociología". Esta última, afirma Oskar Lange, "restablece la correspondencia entre las relaciones de producción y las nuevas fuerzas productivas".(7)

En la misma obra, se dice: "Es la acción de la segunda ley fundamental de la sociología (quien) restablece la correspondencia entre la superestructura y las exigencias de la nueva base económica..."(8)

Tales formulaciones sugieren la acción unilateral de las fuerzas productivas sobre las relaciones de producción, y de la base económica sobre la superestructura. El mismo esquema aparece en la página 38 de la obra mencionada; en ese esquema, las "flechas" sólo significan que hay un movimiento de "abajo hacia arriba".

Un corolario lógico de esta concepción es la idea del "carácter conservador tanto de la base económica como de la superestructura".(9) Una y otra son vistas esencialmente como obstáculos al progreso de las fuerzas productivas y como algo incapaz de adaptarse sin retraso, bajo la acción de las dos "leyes fundamentales de la sociología".

Aun cuando Oskar Lange reconoce que el cambio de una forma social a otra constituye un proceso dialéctico, porque resulta de la solución de una serie de contradicciones, la descripción que ofrece de dicho proceso es unilateral. Se limita a invertir la dialéctica hegeliana, pero deja escapar la especificidad de la dialéctica histórica. Esta última se desarrolla a través de contradicciones no sólo operadas, sino pensadas. Por otro lado, las contradicciones no se resuelven por la intervención de una "ley" abstracta, sino por la intervención de las clases o capas sociales que integran objetivamente uno de los polos de la contradicción principal de una época, y que toman conciencia de ella.

Sólo así puede nacer una ideología o una conciencia revolucionaria, es decir, los elementos de una nueva superestructura. La superestructura, lejos de tener un carácter conservador, conduce, por el contrario, a la transformación de la base económica y a un nuevo progreso de las fuerzas productivas.(10)

Cuando se analizan en términos marxistas las transformaciones de la superestructura que condicionan un nuevo progreso de las fuerzas productivas, con frecuencia se consideran esenciales en el análisis las transformaciones políticas y jurídicas, la sustitución de un tipo de Estado por otro, del dominio de una clase por otra, de relaciones de propiedad y de producción por otras. En efecto; se trata de transformaciones decisivas, ya que permiten la sustitución de una vieja superestructura que obstaculiza el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, por una nueva, mejor adaptada a ese desarrollo. Sin embargo, tales transformaciones son posibles porque las clases antes dominadas han rechazado la ideología anterior (que les había hecho aceptar el antiguo orden de cosas) y se han adherido, al menos en lo esencial, a una nueva ideología que expresa mejor las exigencias de las fuerzas productivas y de las relaciones de producción correspondientes, es decir, las exigencias de la base económica. En este caso se hace evidente que la ideología no es un factor de resistencia al cambio, sino, por el contrario, uno de sus elementos motores.

El papel de la ideología no se limita a la fase más aguda de una transformación social. De hecho, toda nueva forma social sólo puede desarrollarse si la ideología que exige su funcionamiento es cada vez más profundamente, la ideología dominante. Así, según la naturaleza y el grado de dominación y penetración en las masas de una ideología dada, ésta puede frenar el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas o, por el contrario, contribuir a su desarrollo.

Las indicaciones precedentes no sólo tienen un interés teórico. En efecto; si se subraya de una manera unilateral el papel de la base económica, existirá la tendencia a impulsar esencialmente el progreso de esta base, y en particular, el progreso de las fuerzas productivas, el surgimiento de una superestructura ideológica adecuada (en virtud de la "segunda ley fundamental de la sociología").

Por el contrario, al se reconoce que hay una acción recíproca entre la base y la superestructura, al mismo tiempo que se impulsa directamente el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas (por la política económica), se buscará también en las masas el progreso de la ideología que corresponde a la nueva base económica, en particular a través de la educación. Esta última debe procurar que desaparezcan las actitudes y comportamientos heredados del pasado y sustituirlos por actitudes, comportamientos y sistemas nuevos de valores, correspondientes a las exigencias mismas del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas.

Parece indispensable reconocer que este papel de la educación y de la ideología es tanto más necesario, cuando más avanzadas estén las relaciones de producción y propiedad, establecidas por un proceso revolucionario, sobre el nivel de desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas en un país dado.

El avance (11) del régimen político y social sobre el nivel local del desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, da lugar, en efecto, a un tipo particular de contradicción, a una contradicción que favorece el progreso rápido de las fuerzas productivas, con la condición de que esté influida correctamente y conscientemente dominada. Esta última formulación no significa que sólo a través de un desarrollo de la conciencia se encuentra asegurado el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas (12), sino más bien que, en ese caso, la conciencia de las relaciones reales de producción y de las contradicciones que pueden caracterizarlas, así como la capacidad de dominar estas contradicciones por un comportamiento adecuado, son necesarias al progreso de las fuerzas productivas.

Para ser socialmente significativas, la conciencia y la capacidad deben expresarse no sólo en términos de conceptos y conocimientos, sino también en forma de organización y actitudes que interpreten de manera apropiada los sistemas de valores y de acción. Si faltan estos últimos, las categorías conceptuales y el conocimiento o la conciencia no son más que abstracciones sin eficacia social.

Sólo después de este largo rodeo podemos volver a ciertas características específicas de la construcción del socialismo en China.

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1. En realidad, la misma interpretación mecanicista de las relaciones entre los diferentes niveles de la vida social, ha llevado a algunos marxistas a pensar que el progreso de las fuerzas productivas es suficiente para engendrar todas las condiciones de la transformación revolucionaria de un modo de producción, mientras que en realidad dicho progreso es la condición básica de esa transformación; finalmente, la transformación no se produce sino a través de las contradicciones sociales y de la acción política que engendran estas últimas, es decir, por una acción consciente de los hombres.

2. F. Engels, *El origen de la familia, la propiedad y el Estado*, Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras, 1952, Moscú, Tomo II, página 280.

3. Es conocida la célebre frase de Lenin: "las ideas se convierten en fuerzas cuando penetran en las masas". (Lenin, *Obras Completas*, Tomo XXI, Ediciones Sociales Internacionales, 1930, página 310).

4. En efecto, las ideas se convierten en fuerzas positivas cuando corresponden a las exigencias del desarrollo social, es decir, al nivel de las fuerzas productivas y de las relaciones sociales existentes o en proceso de formación.

5. F. Engels, *El origen de la familia...* op. cit., página 283.

6. (Ibid., página 281). El análisis que presenta Engels de esta "transformación de los hombres" ("amos y esclavos") es extraordinariamente interesante. Engels subraya que los hombres de la Europa occidental del siglo noveno, no se habían formado "con la decadencia de una civilización agonizante, sino entre los dolores del parto de una civilización nueva".
Esta "nueva civilización", "en plena vitalidad de desarrollo", debía sus características a las instituciones, actitudes, comportamientos e ideas específicas que introdujeron las tribus germánicas.
Hablando de esas tribus y del origen de su contribución revolucionaria, en el preciso sentido de la transformación de los hombres, Engels escribe:
"Su capacidad y su valentía personales, su espíritu de libertad y su instinto democrático... en una palabra, todas las cualidades que los romanos habían perdido... ¿qué eran sino los rasgos característicos de los bárbaros del estadio superior de la barbarie, los frutos de su constitución gentilicia?"
(Ibid., página 295), y precisa: "Sus hábitos de gentiles, las supervivencias, vivas entre ellos, de los tiempos del derecho materno" y sus "comunidades de las pequeñas ciudades".
Aquí, Engels subraya el aporte decisivo de las instituciones, de las ideas y de las cualidades morales características del "estadio superior de la barbarie" a la revolución que se desarrolló entre el quinto y el noveno siglos. En tanto que la sociedad surgida del antiguo esclavismo había perdido toda su vitalidad, "sólo bárbaros eran capaces de rejuvenecer un mundo servil que sufría una civilización moribunda". (Engels, Ibid., página 280).

7. Oskar Lange, *Economie Politique*, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1962, XVII-403, página 42.

8. Ibid., página 42.

9. Ibid., página 43; cf. también páginas 39 a 41 e, igualmente, páginas 43 a 48 de la misma obra.

10. Dicho progreso revolucionario es descrito brevemente y de manera parcial por Oskar Lange en la obra citada (páginas 47 y 48), pero sin demostrar que en esto consiste el proceso real de toda transformación social radical, ya que tal proceso implica necesariamente una acción revolucionaria que no se presenta sino cuando ciertos elementos de la superestructura, las ideas, las actitudes, etcétera, se han integrado y encarnado en la "conciencia de clase revolucionaria", y en la forma concreta de organizaciones a través de las cuales esta conciencia de clase toma cuerpo y se expresa.

11. Según la *expresión bien conocida de Lenin*, cuando habla de la Rusia Soviética como un "país políticamente avanzado y económicamente atrasado".

12. Tal interpretación parece ser la de Ernesto Che Guevara en su artículo "La planificación socialista, su significado", en "Cuba Socialista", junio de 1964, páginas 13 a 24, cf. página 17 in fine.

LA PALMA DE LA MANO

José Lezama Lima

La palma de la mano sobre el río.
La palma paso a paso, hacia mí, leyéndome.
Narciso mascado por la niebla ascendente,
vuelven los dioses descensores, Orfeo
y Stephanophorophoro.
El índice demuestra, señala la inflexible
llanura de la nieve, demuestra.
El índice demuestra la carreta sobre un hilo,
la diagonal con cuerpo de cocodrilo
y cabeza de gavilán,
el anillo de oro en el tumor de la luna.
La mano se extiende sobre la llanura
de nieve, la palma de la mano
acompasa la boga del río.
La carreta conduce un canoso
reloj de pared. Icaro con dos guadañas.
Saturno se come las alas de cera.
Se extiende, demuestra, se deja leer.
Icaro, ya caído, nadando,
habla con el Resucitado sentado en el légamo.
El vencido por el sol regresa con las estaciones
y el que triunfa de la muerte se vuelve a morir.
Es un bodegón de cebolla, manzana y amapolas.
El aire está exprimido en el puño
que se cierra, el arador por la palma de la mano
deja el reminiscente batido y batihojas,
el deseo paliducho, la serpiente, el doble
del comienzo, el truchimán vindicativo,
círculo que golpea en las narices.
La capota caída se mide por su sombra.
Icaro vencido y el Resucitado vencedor,
el Resucitado esperando la muerte
y el Icaro eterno relator.
En su sangre el laberinto y el torete
oscuro luchando con el tigre dormido.

¿Quién de bruces acompasado en la ebriedad del relojero?
Arrugado, puro detesto, cara de rompeolas.
El Príncipe de Praga, relojero sin deseos,
ahogado en el reloj de agua,
ola por ola, ola sin sucesión,
ola para ojos.
El tiempo caminando detrás de las pestañas
como elefante; casquetes, medialunas,
ensortijados moños lloricones,
verde portezuela y amarillo prestidigitador,
abrían el bostezo en la cantina escandinava,
un penique por cada bostezo
y va de contra el bigotillo
para el perrequete circulante,
pero el tiempo no es como el aguacero
que tapa las grietas
y baldea el puente parabólico de la guitarra.
Tenemos que medir el tiempo por el vaivén
de los ojos y cerrar los ojos
y el murmullo que nos va devorando
cuando nos sumergimos en la madre de carbón.
Sumergidos toda inocencia puede llegar a ser culpa,
tan pronto surge la polifemaida del otro,
los martillazos desconchados
en el cálculo de la resistencia sombreada.
Los entorchados del fusilamiento, el pez egipcio
saltando al sol, pueden hacer el pecado inocente.
El tic-tac raspado es pecador en Isis
y después es inocente en Osiris.
El jinete escita pero sin testes y la franja
celeste rompe el cántaro de las bodas.
Así seguimos colocando ladrillos en el muro
y sobre los muros cascos de botella,
así nos cosimos la oreja en el cancán.

1967

LA CASA DE CARLOS

PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI

Roque Dalton

Carlos Jurado sufrió tanto en su infancia, que en cuanto se casó escogió como hogar aquella casa de la zona 12 del DF, adornada con una cabeza de caballo en el portón. Era una casa enorme, dividida en innumerables pisitos, buhardillas y simples rincones, donde las veraneras y los jacintos parecían engordar de humedad y de sol matutino, como pupilas de matrona provinciana que llevase una alacena repleta de mermelada de grosella en vez de corazón y quien, luego de la merienda de las diez, hubiese gastado un cuarto de hora en consumir su puro de mariguana que le abriría el apetito para el almuerzo. En el laberinto de sus jardines y corredores se perdió hace años Chaflán, aquel olvidado cómico de cine mexicano, del cual tuvieron luego que decir que había muerto, ahogado o apopléjico, en el extranjero. Precisamente la mujer de Carlos, Chichai, encontraría su esqueleto bigotudo detrás de una maceta de geranios en marzo de 1965 y, a fin de rescatarlo para hacerlo clavar en la gran cruz de la biblioteca dormitorio, tuvo que disputarlo seriamente durante toda una mañana a una vasta jauría de cucarachas doradas. Carlos paradójicamente, se había enamorado a primera vista de las rejas españolas que adornaban muchos de los ventanales interiores de la casa, porque le recordaban las de San Cristóbal de Las Casas y las de su propio hogar allá, que por cierto le servían de jaula-prisión cuando lo castigaban por mojar la cama a los ocho años de edad, exponiéndolo a las miradas de los transeúntes que marchaban friolentamente a misa, con aquel cartel autocrítico colgado del pecho: "Soy meón y cagón". Carlos nunca perdonó a su familia la imputación calumniosa del segundo pecado. Aquella casa, para empezar a decir algo funcional a su respecto, era deliciosa de habitar, tal esos sueños que se nos repiten de cuando en cuando y nos van configurando poco a poco un ideal de no se qué, cuyos definitivos perfiles y texturas venimos tan sólo a comprender 23 horas antes de morir. Hablamos, desde luego, para personas que han nacido o viven en el Hemisferio Norte. Era eso sí, una casa enemiga del invierno. Cuando llegaban las lluvias, el caballo del portón se volvía rojo de ira y desde debajo de las tejas surgían miles de tentaculillos vibrátiles, rematados en diminutos paragüitas color sangre azul que formaban una especie de pleura monumental que rechazaba el agua y convertía las calles adyacentes en Niágaras de barrio. Las paredes echaban una pelusa lanosa de un centímetro de espesor, lo cual no les impedía, sin embargo, tiritar en las madrugadas, derrumbando en los interiores reproducciones de Siqueiros, depósitos de agua bendita, diplomas de Abogados y Dentistas. Desde sus patios, ventanas, claraboyas, no se podía ver nunca la luna en esa temporada, aunque esplendiese, llena, en las escampadas; para ello había que cruzar la calle. De allí que algunos opinen que, además de la pleura aquella, la casa se erigía entonces una cúpula invisible que para el ojo humano no detenía sino los rayos de la luna. Porque las estrellas se miraban lo mismo. Y los pájaros. En el invierno cambiaba en la casa el tono del eco hasta adoptar el de un viejo bajo acatarrado impostando la voz con pésimo oficio teatral para demostrar ira patética. No importaba entonces que la voz original fuera del niño de una familia de violinistas, acostumbrado a hacer sus requerimientos fundamentales a fuerza de chillidos especialmente agudos, o de una señorita asustadita, ubicable en algún Buró Político de la Orden Tercera del Santísimo Sacramento, en plena reacción oral ante los sustos curativos del hipo. No es que la casa se volviese en aquel tiempo incómoda o agresiva. Todas aquellas transformaciones poseían su propia gravedad y hermosura y más bien construían un mundo especial de seres objetos y fenómenos relacionados entre sí con una disciplinada, responsable armonía, similar a la de las pasiones shakespeareanas, que, desde luego, podríamos objetar, en uso de una moralidad aguafiestas, únicamente con el argumento de que toda ella estaba basada en el odio al invierno. Y hablar luego con toda hipocresía de las necesidades de la producción de cereales, de los pastos para el ganado de leche, de las sequías en el Brasil y sus hambrunas concomitantes. Hasta allí somos capaces de llegar, estéticamente cobardes como, de vez en cuando, somos. Oh, queridas lectoras, pero ¡qué indiscutibilidad reinaba sobre la belleza de aquella casa cuando llegaba la primavera! Ni los espíritus más audaces serían capaces de racionalizar a primera vista la absoluta integralidad de la misma y más bien comenzarían por confundirla con una simple, aunque esplendente, paz, un orden de integración a los días en que la naturaleza se despereza y se lava la cara, una —con el perdón de ustedes y en última instancia— táctica. Por el contrario, la casa en primavera era la casa como nunca, lógicamente cerrada sobre sí, poblada de innumerables datos que nos decían de su relación directa con lo Absoluto, fulgurante en medio de una sequedad de agua dura, como una esmeralda o una espada pulimentada para muestrario, soberbia en fin, como una bailarina de dieciséis años cuando se incorpora del lecho sobre la segunda hora de amor y nos deja, mientras se mete en el cuarto de baño para sentarse en el bidet, con una mano en alto, lánguida y expectante a la vez, como en el instante de iniciar el Pas de Quatre, y nos deja, decía, felices, pero con una bolita de duda entre las manos que de pronto comienza a crecer hasta tomar un tamaño tal que nos vemos abismados a iniciar con ella (o sea, la ex-bolita de duda), angustiados, un nuevo cuerpo a cuerpo con el que no contábamos, que a lo mejor no nos permitirá ese cuarto episodio, el que decimos preferir por cuanto nos permite conocer desde ahora las urgencias de los placeres de la madurez y cuya misma posibilidad se nos torna de pronto problemática porque Ella nos ha llamado con suavidad desde el baño y nos ha dicho que no encuentra la llave del agua caliente, pero a pesar de todo nos quiere mucho y además va a pedirnos que nos asomemos porque se le antoja vernos desnudos un poquitín. Como un joven jefe de Estado Mayor que dirige, antes que nadie, la batalla. Pero me parece que hablábamos de alguien, en algún lugar de México. Y como momentáneamente no sé si se trataba de alguna referencia, en algún sentido, política, permítaseme que haga un paréntesis preventivo para ubicarme en mi normal estado de responsabilidad. Alguno de ustedes podría ayudarme, digo yo.

PRIMAVERA EN JEVANI

Colores andróginos, una verdadera Patagonia de colores, acechantes, anfitriones de la duda, impermeables a la mayor voracidad, organizadamente salvajes, manducables como una neo sinfonía japonesa escuchada junto al sol que te ha despertado de la más larga noche de amor. Los pajarillos no temen de Oswaldo Barreto ni de mí, posiblemente nos confunden con dos obreros de las fábricas de embutidos de Praga. Por el contrario, silban sobre nuestras cabezas valses para Banda Municipal y nos hacen avergonzarnos (vergonzosa vergüenza) de los gritos de nuestras urracas y nuestros querques, de la chachalaquería de las bandadas de pericos, de la pescozada sonora del azacuán herido en tiempo de frío. "A las seis de la mañana no va bien la cerveza —nos dice Ingra al traer los tarros humosos. Es, pues, este, un peligroso lugar. Como para decir, a la hora del crepúsculo (aunque es aún demasiado temprano para pensar en él, estimadas todas las cautelas): "La vida, en general, ha sido bella". Precisamente ayer, después de discutir sobre la excesiva carga sexual de la literatura moderna, visitamos una granja de cerdos. Veterinarios con gabacras blancas examinaban a los gigantescos animales rosados con estetoscopios respetantes, a la vez que conmovedores, mientras demandaban de nosotros que no habláramos en voz alta. Antes de entrar, nos habían cubierto el rostro con bozales de gasa, para evitar que nuestros microbios personales se quedaran allí. Se nos dijo que el lugar estaba incluso alejado de las carreteras y las vías de ferrocarril, pues todo ruido extraño asusta infinitamente a los cerdos, los hace perder peso y los puede matar del corazón. Nunca vi cerdos con más aspecto de hijo de puta que éstos. Son jamones vivientes, con horribles venitas azules por todos lados, insolentes, idénticos a Monseñor Francisco Castro y Ramírez, un exageradamente soberbio obispo del oriente de mi país. Oswaldo Barreto, de pronto y sin advertírmelo, emitió el más agudo alarido que recuerdo haber oído en los últimos cinco años. El desconcierto cundió como diría un novelista hondureño, sobre todo porque los cerdos comenzaron a mostrar síntomas de angustia que pronto se transformaron en una especie de ataque de asma colectivo. Los veterinarios corrían espantados de aquí hacia allá y nuestro guía, absolutamente furioso y temblón, le dijo a Oswaldo: "La regla aquí es el silencio". "Yo suelo gritar —contestó éste— soy venezolano". "Al país que fueres haz lo que vieres" —citó, popular, pero no menos tensamente, el guía. "Cuando Uds. lleguen a Venezuela no los obligamos a gritar" —sentenció Oswaldo imperturbable antes de que yo lo sacara casi a empujones del lugar. Casi vomité de la risa. Como cuando vi aquel rótulo en una calle de Santiago de Chile: "Zorobabel Galeno, sastre militar". Aunque ahora no recuerdo lo que tal anuncio tenía de gracioso. Oswaldo pagó, no obstante, su delito: anoche soñó que lo habían echado para atrás en sus estudios y que se encontraba de nuevo en cuarto año de secundaria, iniciando un examen final de trigonometría sin saber ni siquiera pronunciar la palabra cateto. Despertó sudando en plena madrugada y me ha despertado también para pasear un poco y buscar cerveza. Entonces es que yo he decidido hablar sobre la primavera. Época del año en que florecen hasta los futbolistas, como todo el mundo sabe. Y que en Checoslovaquia se transforma en una orden edilicia para bañarse entre las truchas o buscar hongos y muchachas desnudas bajo el sol que los pinos del bosque dejan bajar al suelo. Mañana volveremos a Praga con la cara quemada por ese sol. Oswaldo Barreto y yo debemos salir de estos lugares lo más pronto posible, so pena de ponernos a tener hijos rubios con Zdenas y Janas y engordar a fuerza de grandes filetes, algodonosos melocotones y fresas con crema, hasta olvidar que alguien está muriendo mal en nuestra vieja casa, preguntando por nosotros con perentoriedad. Viva esta primavera, sin embargo.

DEBATE CON ALBERTO MORAVIA

"L'Espresso" de Roma organizó, recientemente, un debate entre el escritor **Alberto Moravia** y los estudiantes **Massimiliano Fuksas**, **Sergio Petruccioli** y **Duccio Staderini**, quinto año de Arquitectura; **Valerio Veltroni**, primer año de Filosofía, y **Oreste Scalzone**, tercer año de Filosofía. El tema del debate se centra en la crítica y en la oposición a esta última generación de intelectuales contra aquellos que se dicen izquierdistas y contra aquellos que dominan el mundo de la cultura oficial. Este debate polémico pone de manifiesto las contradicciones entre ideología y vida práctica de algunos intelectuales.

Moravia: Yo pertenezco a ese tipo de proletario que se llama a sí mismo artista. Los objetos que yo fabrico son novelas y dramas, o sea, que logro crear de la nada, con mis manos o mejor dicho con mi mente, algo que antes no existía, y lo vendo. Si estuviera en la China no podría colocar mis productos porque no hay demanda, en la China de hoy, para productos como los míos. En Italia esa demanda existe parcialmente; de todas formas yo vendo estos productos a quien los paga según las leyes del mercado, porque, como he dicho, vivo de mi trabajo en un país, que es Italia. No podría colaborar en diarios partidarios pues no pertenezco a partido alguno, es decir tengo mis propias ideas que, en ciertas ocasiones, pueden o no coincidir con las de algún partido. Si yo colaborara con **Unitá** (Organo del Partido Comunista), por ejemplo, no podría escribir todo lo que se me ocurriera; y por otra parte, si bien actualmente no tendría dificultad en compartir la línea de **Unitá** con respecto a Viet-Nam, durante veinte años en cargo (hasta el XX congreso) el stalinismo me habría impedido colaborar en forma absoluta. De manera que yo publico mis novelas en el Corriere della Sera. Sin embargo, ustedes no encontrarán en el Corriere della Sera una sola palabra en favor del sistema existente hoy en Italia.

Scalzone: Quisiera recordarle a Moravia que cualquier obra literaria, cualquier producto intelectual es un hecho político. Ignorar todo eso significa hacer ya una elección política, entrar en el juego de los intereses creados, en otras palabras integrarse. Publicando novelas en el Corriere della Sera, cualquiera que sea su contenido, usted, Moravia, está tomando una posición política bien definida.

Moravia: No más que cualquier proletario en un régimen capitalista. ¿Por qué entonces los pintores deberían eximirse de esa acusación? ¿Por qué los profesores? ¿Por qué los arquitectos, o los directores de cine? ¿Por qué los obreros que trabajan, supongamos, en una fábrica de armas?

Scalzone: En efecto, nosotros no proponemos como modelo la figura del obrero esclavizado, sino la del obrero que se libera de la esclavitud. El obrero puede liberarse políticamente, volviéndose revolucionario militante. El escritor, en cambio, manipula material intelectual y a menudo identifica y limita su actividad en el acto de escribir.

Petruccioli: El obrero dentro del sistema, es un esclavizado. El intelectual, en el momento en que acepta moverse dentro del aparato de la cultura dominante, acepta un papel que no es el del esclavizado: se vuelve un intermediario entre la clase que está en el poder y los consumidores. Cuando, para vender su producto, él usa como medios de comunicación justamente aquellos canales que constituyen la fuerza y la continuidad de la cultura dominante, entonces está asumiendo una posición clara, prescindiendo del contenido de sus obras.

Scalzone: En otros términos, no se trata sólo del contenido o de las ideas, sino de la función que el libro pasa a asumir en la estructura económica.

Moravia: En un sistema capitalista los editores son capitalistas y el escritor es un proletario al igual que cualquier otro que está en condiciones de ser aprovechado (y a menudo lo es), y el libro es un producto a ser consumido. Si ustedes afirman que el arte no es expresión sino producto, entonces, no pueden pretender que el escritor sea un intelectual, o sea un creador con privilegios y responsabilidades mayores que los demás. Deben en cambio admitir que es una especie de artesano, o sea un proletario. Hay contradicción entre el papel que ustedes le exigen al intelectual, y el valor de producto que le atribuyen al arte. Por otra parte, habría que ver si el producto literario está hecho para el consumo o para la representación. Hay una gran diferencia entre la industria cultural y la expresión artística. La primera produce un arte de élite, que en los países capitalistas obedece a las leyes del beneficio y en los países comunistas, a las leyes del Estado: es lo mismo, por lo menos para los fines del arte.

En Occidente existe el límite del beneficio; en Oriente el de la propaganda. Se trata siempre de un arte de élite. O sea una literatura que tiene que ser consumida, no importa dónde, en el tren o en los bancos de las escuelas. Nunca revolución alguna quiso eso. Las revoluciones quieren la libertad de la expresión artística. Es decir, considerando que para ustedes los contenidos (o sea la crítica del poder) no cuentan, quieren la libertad del lenguaje.

El escritor que no quiere ser intermediario entre las clases dominantes y el público puede encontrarse operando en tres situaciones históricas diferentes. Si la situación lo permite, o sea los tiempos son cómodos, puede hacer arte de cualquier tipo; si los tiempos apremian deberá abandonar la representación y la poesía para el ensayo, el artículo; finalmente, si los tiempos no dejan otra alternativa, dejará de ser escritor, hombre de cultura, y será el ciudadano que defiende su libertad con un fusil. Ahora yo les pregunto: ¿en cuál de estas situaciones nos encontramos hoy? En mi opinión podemos trabajar todavía con un margen bastante amplio, en Italia por lo menos, como para hacer representación artística aunque, como sabemos, es ambigua de por sí. Cuando los tiempos apremian ciertamente la poesía ya no alcanza: se necesita la publicación periodística. Cuando finalmente empiezan a entrar los nazis en la casa de uno (como me pasó a mí) entonces es necesaria la lucha armada.

Petruccioli: Me parece que la diferenciación de Moravia entre el momento del artista, del periodista y del ciudadano, vuelve a presentar el error que ha existido en la cultura izquierdista en los últimos veinte años. ¿Qué significa individualizar tres niveles de integración para un intelectual que opera en el interior de un cierto régimen? Significa procurarle una protección ideológica.

Scalzone: Significa darle la posibilidad de considerarse inocente cuando vende las novelas al **Corriere** en nombre de la búsqueda estilística y comprometido cuando firma un cartel por la paz en nombre de sus recuerdos de la Resistencia. Significa darle la posibilidad de jugar en dos mesas.

¿Dónde puedo escribir —dice Moravia—, qué canal puedo utilizar, que me deje ser plenamente libre? Si yo escribiera en **Unitá** no podría criticar por ejemplo una película soviética como **Natacha**. Por lo tanto, escribo en el **Corriere della Sera**.

Scalzone: Esa forma de razonar refleja la personalidad del intelectual de izquierda de la década del 30. Refleja la psicología de cierta generación de intelectuales de izquierda para los cuales el compromiso político ha sido exclusivamente actividad de resistencia, que es algo muy diferente de una orgánica actividad revolucionaria. ¿No le parece, Moravia, que usted se está quedando estérilmente atado a ese mundo?

Moravia: Creo que no soy extraño a lo que está pasando alrededor de mí. Antes de la guerra teníamos el fascismo. Después de la guerra, la lucha de clases. Hoy tenemos la civilización industrial o de los consumos. Hoy, a pesar de que siguen existiendo las clases y las luchas de clase, me interesan principalmente los males de la civilización industrial.

Veltroni: Yo quisiera hablar de nuestra situación de universitarios, de nuestra polémica. Nosotros nos damos cuenta de que la universidad, en la sociedad occidental, sólo sirve para proveer los técnicos que contribuyen al fortalecimiento de la estructura capitalista. No es instrumento de libertad, no sirve para sustituir la recepción policial con el libre juego intelectual. Por eso criticamos tanto a un determinado tipo de hombre de cultura. Ciertos intelectuales para nosotros son simplemente agentes. Fingen representar a la izquierda, pero en realidad no hacen otra cosa que servir al sistema.

Moravia: La relación entre arte y política no es tan simple como ustedes creen. Cuando escribía **Gli indifferenti**, por ejemplo, yo era prácticamente apolítico. Sin embargo todo el mundo vio ahí una denuncia política.

Siciliani: Mire señor Moravia, a mí no me interesa cómo usted organiza sus relaciones con la sociedad. Sólo me preocupo de que usted no trate de justificarlas que no trate de salvar su alma, como han estado haciendo los intelectuales de izquierda en los últimos veinte años. Han conciliado lo que no es conciliable. Han repetido a cada instante "Soy un comunista, soy un marxista y por lo tanto no estoy de acuerdo con esta sociedad". Pero enseguida agregaban: "Pero ésta es la sociedad en que vivo y la actividad que yo puedo desarrollar en ella es el arte". En otras palabras han reservado para sí mismos una intervención que no cambia nada. Es una manera de integrarse, aunque sea una manera un poco hipócrita.

Moravia: Yo no deseo salvar mi alma aquí en Italia, ni en Rusia, ni en Estados Unidos ni en ninguna otra parte.

Veltroni: Usted dijo que la autogestión de las fábricas por parte de los obreros y el aprovechamiento de los obreros, aun bajo un dueño iluminado son la misma cosa. Como comunista, cuando escuchamos cosas como ésa nos rebelamos: Es una posición social-demócrata.

Moravia: Ya dije solamente que el eslabón de la cadena de montaje es factor de alienación tanto en una fábrica en autogestión como en una fábrica capitalista. En otros términos, la cuestión de fondo sigue sin resolverse: el hombre integrado en una cadena de montaje, ¿cómo hará para ser hombre? ¿Cómo hará para comunicarse?

Fuksas: Este es el secreto y la finalidad de la revolución cultural: permitirle comunicarse.

Moravia: Si usted hubiera leído mi libro sobre China, habría encontrado aquí que, para mí, una de las grandes esperanzas de la revolución cultural consiste justamente, en hacer pasar al hombre desde la condición campesina a la tecnológica sin que tenga que pasar por la etapa burguesa de los consumos.

Petruccioli: El intelectual de izquierda está atado a un tipo de actividad desarrollada en el pasado, que hoy él llama revolucionaria pero que objetivamente no lo es.

Moravia: ¿Qué actividad?

Petruccioli: A la actividad desarrollada durante la Resistencia, que actualmente se usa para justificar una serie de operaciones equivocadas.

Cuando usted dice que hoy el problema ya no consiste en la lucha de clases sino en la lucha contra la civilización industrial y la ética de los consumos, asume una actitud de esclavo. Su posición es análoga a la de aquellos que creen que es suficiente el hecho de estar inscritos en alguna organización política para calificar sus productos. Ese es un razonamiento falso. En otras palabras, serían más sinceros si se limitaran a decir: "Yo necesito ganar plata. Trato de cumplir con mi trabajo libremente, pero cuando no lo consigo tengo el atenuante del estado de necesidad". Este es el discurso que hay que rebatir; vuestra mala fe es demostrada por la venta misma de vuestros productos. Presentando vuestros productos de esa forma, como fruto de la ideología de la clase obrera ustedes desacreditan a la clase obrera misma. Ustedes se presentan como inocentes de cómo andan las cosas en el mundo capitalista a pesar de compartir la responsabilidad de todas esas cosas.

Scalzone: Quisiera recordarle la frase de Carmichael, el líder del Poder Negro, "El intelectual no nos interesa por lo que hace, sino por lo que hace por nosotros". Esto es también nuestro criterio. Con él medimos la posición política del artista.

Moravia: Ustedes, en otras palabras, quisieran un arte completamente politizado. Por mi parte, yo no escribo artículos políticos en el Corriere, como no los escribía en Unita. No tengo partido, odio a los partidos. No me afiliaría a ninguno de ellos. Me transformaría en un instrumento y no podría serle útil a nadie, ni siquiera al partido al cual estuviera afiliado.

Fuksas: ¿Pero usted está seguro, en su condición actual, de no ser un instrumento?

Moravia: Permítame definir al artista. El artista es el hombre, el único hombre que tiene el deber de mantenerse parecido a un niño, o sea no reprimirse y condicionarse en favor de sociedad alguna. La función social del artista, en otras palabras, es la de ser en alguna medida un antisocial.

Veltroni: Y afirmando eso, ¿usted sigue creyéndose marxista?

Moravia: Desde luego soy marxista. Pero no existe sólo el marxismo. Creo que éste es un excelente instrumento de conocimiento, pero no el único.

Scalzone: El marxismo no es un instrumento de conocimiento, sino de transformación del mundo.

Moravia: Conocimiento, para un artista, quiere decir transformación del mundo. Yo no soy hombre de acción: si lo fuera todo sería mucho más simple, aceptaría al marxismo como instrumento de transformación, como doctrina para la acción.

Veltroni: El "Che" Guevara ha dicho: "Los intelectuales deberían suicidarse, como clase". Eso significa que el intelectual no debe usar su pluma como instrumento para hacer lo que le gusta y evitarse el enfrentamiento con la realidad. ¿Qué piensa usted de esa frase, que en parte es aceptada también por Mao?

Moravia: Digo que es la frase de un hombre de acción, revolucionario de profesión. Un hombre que coloca la acción política por encima de todo lo demás. Pienso también que la pluma es un instrumento para hacer lo que nos gusta y en consecuencia enfrentarnos a la realidad.

Veltroni: ¿Su juicio sobre las obras de Mao y Guevara?

Moravia: Opino que Mao es un excelente escritor. Permítame citar mi libro sobre China. Página 45: "Ha sido al mismo tiempo el Lenin, el Trotski y el Stalin (pero también el Maiakovski) de China". En cuanto a Guevara, lo conozco poco como escritor. Como hombre de acción su figura (lo afirmé en una entrevista a Paese Sera) es heroica.

Scalzone: Usted, Moravia, ¿cree que sus reportajes desde China o desde Corea, o sobre Podgorny, pueden contribuir a la lucha que los países socialistas o del tercer mundo están llevando en contra del imperialismo?

Moravia: Nunca escribí nada acerca de Podgorny. El artículo desde Corea (Ver ANALISIS, No. 334) era una descripción verídica de la espantosa situación de Corea del Sur. Léanlo, o vuélvanlo a leer, y verán. Junto con otros escritores europeos he firmado en una página del New York Times, un llamado contra la guerra de Vietnam. Llamé hace poco tiempo a la Academia de Artes y Letras americana, de la cual formo parte como miembro honorario, con el fin de que se decidan a tomar posición en contra de la guerra. Naturalmente firmé manifiestos contra la guerra, no se hace otra cosa desde hace veinte años. ¿Pero para qué sirve? Se debiera hacer mas. Deberíase impedirle a Estados Unidos hacer la guerra. Pero yo, como escritor, ¿qué puedo hacer?

Veltroni: Debería hacer dos cosas. Primero: en el momento en que usted escribe reportajes o artículos por ejemplo, no debería apoyar al imperialismo. Segundo: no debería preocuparse sólo de lo que escribe, sino también de donde lo escribe, y quien lo leerá.

Scalzone: Otra pregunta a Moravia. La relación entre hombre y cadena de producción es de todas formas una relación alienada. La contradicción que interesa en el plano social es la relación entre aprovechador y aprovechado. ¿Usted de qué lado está? Si está con el segundo, ¿piensa combatir el primero? ¿Con cuáles medios? ¿Piensa que pueden ser los propios de su profesión de escritor? ¿O que se pueda y deba combatir con otros medios?

Moravia: Representar, en arte, es combatir, porque la representación es acusación y juicio. Fuera de ello, queda la acción política o armada.

Fuksas: La "generación intermedia" a la cual Moravia pertenece, ha formado una especie de monopolio cultural y económico de toda la producción. Esta es la razón por la cual renegamos de los hombres de cultura de aquella generación.

Moravia: Yo no participo de ningún monopolio cultural ni mucho menos económico. He protestado siempre, en mis libros. Protesten ustedes también. Prueben a escribir una novela en contra del monopolio.

Staderini: Una última pregunta: ¿Usted dijo que firma llamados por la paz en Vietnam?

Moravia: Es cierto.

Staderini: Firma también en el **Corriero de'la Sera**, que es el órgano de la opresión imperialista en Italia. ¿No es una contradicción?

Moravia: Si es cierto que el **Corriere della Sera** es el órgano de la opresión imperialista en Italia, es una contradicción. De todas formas no escribo artículos ideológicos, y si los escribiera, no los publicaría en el **Corriere della Sera**. Finalmente, a pesar de que yo no sea stalinista, permítame citar a Stalin: "Dicen que nos contradecimos. Pues sí, nos contradecimos". Sólo los agit-prof no se contradicen.

(Tomado de la revista "Análisis", Argentina, marzo de 1968)

Jorge Lu Reyes

PROXIMAMENTE

~~TEATRO MUSICAL~~
DE LA HABANA

Los Siete Pecados Capitales

comedia musical de
Héctor Quintero



MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET

ORIG: W. J. KAUFMAN
UNIT: C/WH/2
EXT: 9354
DATE: 23 November 1968

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ES SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 8 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301; x-ref 201-340938

DISSEM: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE ____ C/FI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, CSDO, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE 23 19 [illegible]

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

RYBAT/PERUMEN

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 40[illegible]) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

JP
23 Nov 68

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND ~~[illegible]~~ REPORTED CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. BELIEVE AS STATED REF C THAT LIRING-3 SHOULD BE FACTUAL AS POSSIBLE IN PREPARING REPORT ON CONTACTS AND EXPERIENCES WHILE IMPRISONED GUATEMALA, AND IN GIVING OPINION ON HOW ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS HAVE FAILED THERE. TO MAKE HIM APPEAR TOO KNOWLEDGEABLE ON FAR/PGT COULD AROUSE SUSPICIONS LIRING-9 AND COLLEAGUES.

3. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN RELATING DIRECTLY TO ACTIVITIES OF HECTOR SANCHEZ GONZALEZ PER MEXICO CITY 7744 (IN 18686) IF LIREBEL-2 REPORT INDEED BASED ON FACT.

MICROFILMED
FEB 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED

Ring /3

201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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5		10	

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 53465

PAGE TWO

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO BREAK UP GUAT INSURGENT FORCES AND [illegible] ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *) References attached
**)
***)

Paul
WH/COG: Paul Oberst (telecon)
WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

W. J. Kaufman

Chief, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
Att 3
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References : A. HMMA-35904, 27 November 1968
B. MEXICO CITY-8159, 22 November 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are three reports on the most recent developments of the LIRING-3 operation, one dated 17 November and two dated 22 November, prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. The gist of the 22 November report relating the conversation which LIRING-3 had on that date with LIRING-9 was cabled in reference B. Some additional comments by LIRING-9 passed on orally by ROWTON and not included in his report were included in reference B.

2. Forwarded as attachment #2 are Xerox copies for both addressees of two letters received by LIRING-3 from FAR contacts in Guatemala. The third letter was prepared as an answer by LIRING-3.

Raymond A. Frady
for Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
1. Reports (3), h/w
2. Letters (3), u/s/c
3. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

S/c att. 2
h/w att. 1

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35905

DATE
27 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

14-00000

ATT 1
HMMA-35905

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

17 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 [illegible] tact with LIRING Office.

1. During the period 4-15 November,1968, Rowton met with LIRING/3 on four occasions to debrief him on his activities. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that there were several phases to his renewed operational activity that needed careful planning and co-ordination. He commented on these as follows:

(a) Maintenance of Contact with FAR: LIRING/3 sent a letter to Rafael Argueta A. giving him his current address so that "Pavel" could be informed how to contact him. In response to this letter, LIRING/3 received a note fromthe mother of the Miguel and Juán León Barrios on 14/11/68 enquiring about his health. Since the letter was addressed to LIRING/3's new address he felt it was proff that his reply to Argueta's letter had been received. He stated that he hoped "Pavel" or some one else representing FAR would soon appear.

(b) RE-establishment of Contact with LIRING AND PERUMEN: LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that his ultimate objective would be a trip to PERUMEN to act as liaison between the authorities there and FAR. Rowton stressed the need to keep the local LIRING establishment informed and in support of his activities, to avoid hurting their feelings by going over their head (as happened before the last trip). LIRING/3 commented that he would have to maneuver matters so that he was extended an invitation. He would try this through LIRING/10, but if it did not succeed he would try a discreet approach through Orlando Suarez who, he felt, could arrange a cultural invitation without difficulty.

LIRING/3 subsequently reported to Rowton that he met with LIRING/10 on the morning of 15/11/68 in the patio area of the LIRING establishment and that the latter had introduced him to his replacement, who invited LIRING/3 to meet with him any morning about 1100 except Mondays and Fridays. LIRING/9 also asked LIRING/3 to meet with him privately at his convenience so that he could debrief him on his experiences. LIRING/3 commented that LIRING/2 was very cordial but did not ask him any specific questions or show interest in debriefing him. LIRING/3 promised Rowton that he would attempt to gain access to LIRING/10's office for the debriefing.

(c) Cover Problems: LIRING/3 told Rowton that he would make every effort to obtain some kind of cover employment so that he could justify any funds given to him by Rowton. He stated that he was attempting to

h/w att: 1

HMMA-35905

CS COPY

201-778301

arrange for an exposition to display his products and at the same time persuade a leading member of his profession to permit him to work in his establishment (for a nominal salary). LIRING/3 then suggested a better possibility - an exposition in Montreal, Canada, where he had contact with a person who could arrange matters for him. LIRING/3 confessed that he favored Canada for another personal reason. He explained that LIRING/4's father was suffering from what appeared to be terminal cancer of the throat or esophagus and that L/4 was very anxious to see him before he died. L/4 had stated several times that she planned to request a visa for travel to New York since it was out of the question for her father to travel to Mexico City to visit her. LIRING/3 told Rowton that in any case he felt it unwise to permit L/4 to visit New York where she would inievitably fall in with all sorts of refugees who would report on her attitudes. He preferred to travel with her to Montreal under cover of the exposition and then ask her father to join them there - a trip within reason for a person in his condition. L/3 added that he felt he and L/4 could travel by boat at a modest fare and this would permit him to carry as many of his products as possible for the exposition.

Rowton agreed that this might be a solution, but recommended that L/3 look into the possibility of returning to Mexico via IBRUMEN (on the boat) since this would kill two birds with one stone. Rowton suggested that L/3 determine whether L/4's father was actually in a condition to travel even the relatively short distacne. If not it might be possible for L/4 to travel to New York via Montreal by train at less expense than by air.

WBRowton

Wallace B. Rowton

ATT 1
HMMA-35905
22/11/68

1. LIRING/3 received letter ~~acknowledging~~ from "Marta" postmarked 9 November, Guatemala, C.A. acknowledging receipt L/3's letter and expressing relief from anxiety. Gives greetings from "los canchitos" Miguel, Elsa, "La Negra", "La Chiquitia", Felisa, Maria Elena, "La gordita" Envelope written by other hand is addressed to L/3 at his new residence and bears return address: M.Bol., 28c "B" 8-25 Zona 8. LIRING/3 told Rowton this letter from mother Juán and Miguel ~~xxxxxx~~ León Barrios, sent apparently to test commo channel. L/3 replied to letter 22/11/68 stating he expects soon make trip "outside country" and asking ~~xxxxx~~ Marta to tell "los canchitos" (her sons Miguel and Juán) to send him the assignment ("encargo") soonest since he in position to help them in some way. L/3 enclosed clipping from "Siempre" of letter to editor describing his experiences in Guatemala.

2. L/3 also turned over ~~to Rowton~~ letter from "Espinoza" postmarked 7 November, Guatemala, C.A., sending warmest greetings, but containing phrase, "the León Barrios send you greetings", which L/3 interprets to be signal from Juán and Miguel that contact with FAR imminent. Envelope addressed to L/3 at his new address bears return address: Oscar Moises Raldán E., Granja Penal Pavón, Fraijanes, Guatemala.

3. LIRING/3 also reported ~~that~~ he had private talk with LIRING/9 on late morning 21 November in which L/9 stated he most interested in any observations L/3 might wish make concerning attitude and opinions his FAR contact with respect to PBRUMEN support. He asked L/3 to put his thoughts in writing and submit them to him at 1730 on 26 November. At L/3 request he promised invite LIRING/10 and other interested LIRING officials to this meeting. LIRING/9 expressed opinion that LIRING/3 should subsequently travel to PBRUMEN for "more detailed" discussions and offered arrange cultural cover invitation. He added that it would not be necessary for L/3 make formal application for visa.

4. LIRING/3 will submit to Rowton draft of his report on afternoon 25/11/68 so that Rowton may amplify as desired. L/3 told Rowton he plans take line that PBRUMENs do not understand local problems and that their aid in past has been dissapated in factionalism. L/3 asked Rowton for as many details as Rowton can gather to strengthen his report (such as

local FAR attidute toward César Montes and CPG leaders through whom PBRUMEN has worked in past. Also in French girl who executed recently about whom L/9 asked L/3 a number of questions, indicating PBRUMEN interest in exact role she played via-á-vis FAR.

WBRowton

Att 1
HMMA-35905

22 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with LIRING/9.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the safehouse (Identity B) at 1015 on 22 November,1968, that he had met with LIRING/9 at the latter's private office late the previous morning for a very serious discussion. L/3 explained that he had visited the LIRING offices with LIRING/4 to pass out invitations to the exposition scheduled to begin on 23/11/68, and that L/9 approached him immediately and asked him to come into his office for a chat,"if he could spare the time." Early in the conversation, Rowton's reconstruction of which follows, LIRING/3 got the impression that L/9 had been delegated by LIRING/10 to talk privately with him on the matters he broached:

9/ "I'm glad, chico, that you have a few minutes, since I wanted to talk over a few things very seriously and in private."

3/. "I'm at your disposition. What do you have in mind?"

9/."Well, what are your plans?"

3/."What plans do you mean? After all I have a lot of plans for different things,as you can imagine."

9/."I mean your plans for the immediate future."

3/."Well, I pllan giving this exposition (to which you are invited, of course) in the hope of raising enough money to take a trip to Montreal where I expect to have another exposition already being arranged by CPIC. This will enable LIRING/4 to come up there to see her father who is very ill, as you probably know. Her father will gladly help us financially to cover some of the cost of the trip."

9/."Yes, but I mean what about your plans for continued political activity?"

3/" Well, that's different. As you know I have had a long standing interest in Central America politically, and, despite the fact that it has cost me a great deal personally, I hope to continne helping my friends within my capabilities. Fortunately, there in really nothing that I know of against me here in Mexico,since I have not become involved with organizations and parties."

9/."I see. But has your experience in Guatemala affected your attitude towards us?"

3/."Frankly it has. I have a much better idea of the struggle from first-hand experience, and much more sympathy for the difficultie that the comrades there had had to undergo."

9/."But could you be more specific?"

3/."Well, it's a long story. I had hoped to discuss it in some detail with several of you together, particularly LIRING/10 and his replacement."

9/."Yes, that will be arranged. But first I would appreicate your going over everything with me."

3/."Well first of all, I would like to have present Iden A with his wife since I want once and for all to clear up any questions about the circumstances of our mutual experience there."

9/. "Don't be childish. We know all about Iden A, just exactly what kind of person he is as well as his wife. Such a confrontation is a waste of time, as far as we're concerned."

3/."But don't forget the fact that the parents of the wife of Iden are ~~x~~ very close friends of the LIRING Chief and it's quite natural that they'll present their point of view when they see him."

9/. "Don't worry about that. It's a purely social relationship,and, in any case, our Chief really hasn't got very much to do with these things,and his opinion won't matter."

3/. "I hope so. I'd feel better in any case to talk about the detail in Iden's presence, so that he will agree,as he must on his responsibility. You realize, of course, that he carried with him such compromising material that it was a miracle that we were not assassinated on the spot."

9/."Yes, but that is unimportant now. What is important isthe fact that you have learned a great deal about the mentality of our friends down there, and that this could prove very useful to us in our future dealings."

3/."Yes,for instance, they told me among other things that César Montes had spent too much time with your people, on trips to your country and to Mexico, and had completely lost touch with the revolution. That's the reason he was "destituido".

9/."So, you know that!"

3/."Yes, and many more details of wh y they are unhappy - the lack of adequate financial support, the inability of ~~xprixx~~PBRUMEN to embarrass PBPRIME In their increasing trade success."

9/." Very interesting! I have a suggestion. Suppose you prepare a written report (informe) and bring it in at 1730 sharp on 26 November. I'll have some of my colleagues present so that we can all discuss your opinions and suggestions. I suggest 1730 because it will be quieter then and we can go to a better place to talk privately."

3/."Fine, but I would like to be able to amplify my report in person inthe PBRUMEN capital. Perhaps I could stop off there on the way back from Montreal."

9/."But there are no passenger ships making that run. Only cargo ships. I have a better suggestion. We could arrange an invitation for a cultural exposition that would appear innocuous."

3/."Fine. I agree that would be best. Do I have to make any formal application?"

9/."No. It won't be necessary. I'll handle everything. But what about LIRING/4?"

3/. "That's a rather delicate matter. She has not quite gotten over my experience,and might object to my re-involvment in political matters. I therefore would request you not to mention this aspect to her. She could go off to her home town and visit her family and think that the whole trip is cultural."

9/."Yes,I agree that would be best under the circumstances."

Wallace B Rowton

Att 2
HMMA-35905

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

91



R/Cesar Moises Raidán E.
Granja Penal Pavón
Fraijanes Guatemala

DIA DEL CARTERO
12 DE NOVIEMBRE

Señor:
Carlos Jurado
Edificio Cardona A-6
Pachuca y Av. Veracruz
Mexico 11, D.F.

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

GUATEMALA 8
CORREOS DE GUATEMALA C.A.
AEREO 5



CONTROL

s/c att. 2
HMMA-35905

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7/11/68

Estimado Carlos

no sabes la alegria que recibi al tener noticias tuyas ya que me imaginaba muchas cosas a Dios gracias no fue asi, y me siento feliz de que te encuentres con los tuyos.

De este lugar pues te dire seguimos siempre con el martirio de encontrarnos privado de nuestras libertades yo pues siempre dandole a la pelota tu sabes que es la unica distracción que hay te agradezco infinitamente por las cosas que me dejaste [illegible] los Juan Barrios te envían saludos, cuentame de Lersalud yo se que no quisieran ni mandar este lugar y tienen mucha razón, ea! pero siempre me escriban ya que me siento triste mis únicos amigos pues eran Uds, y tu sabes que en este lugar hay que saber elegir sus amistades. Bueno Carlos despues te contare muchas cosas saludame a tu esposa y a Carlos, los recuerdo al ver la Champa y me da tristeza enviame una postal. tu amigo sincero

E. [illegible]

Att 2
HMMA-35905



Remite M. [illegible]
2a. C. "B" 8-35 zona 15
Guatemala, C.A.

GUATEMALA
7

Señor Carlos Jurado
Edificio Condesa A-6
Pachuca y Avenida Veracruz
México 11, D.F.

CORREO AEREO AIR MAIL PAR AVION



ADMON. No. 11
1 NOV.58-17
MEXICO 11 - D.F.

Guatemala, 8 de Noviembre
1.963.

Carlos con que gusto recibimos tu misiva pues se nos quitó la angustia que teníamos por Ustedes.
Nosotros siempre igual ~~todos~~ esperando la voluntad de Dios y del tiempo.
Los canchitos como tu les dicas están bien y te mandan muchos abrazos y muchos recuerdos a ti y a tu esposa y nenas

yo cada ves que voy allá tengo la impresión de verte pues supuesto no lo tomes a mal pues es sin duda el cariño que te profeso pero no deseo nunca nunca jamas verte esa condición.
Resibe cariños de Miguel el rigotudo. Elsa, la negra, la Chiquitia, Eliza, María Elena, la gordita de la Cari y de tu amiga que nunca te olvidara. Y dile a tu esposa que no valla i sentir celos

de esta vieja fea pero que
la estima y quiere con todo
Gorazon,

Marta

Profe perdona letra y
Ortografia pero no se es
cribir. Que me vuelva hacer la
primera y la ultima

ATT 2
HMMA-35905

"México" DF. 21 de Nov. 68

Marthita:

Te envío un recorte. Próximamente haré un viaje fuera del país. Necesito les diga a los Cuñaditos me envíen el encargo lo más pronto posible pues puedo tratar de ayudar en algo.

Espero hayan recibido mis líneas sin novedad y reciban TODOS mis saludos afectuosos.

C.

AIR MAIL ☐ AVION ☐ AIR MAIL ☐ AVION ☐

[illegible] Alberto [illegible]
[illegible] 156
México 11 DF.

Sra.
Martha Barrios
28 Calle "B" 8-25 Zona 8
Guatemala, Guatemala
C. A

PAR AVION
VIA AIR MAIL

AVION ☐ AIR MAIL ☐ AVION ☐ AIR MAIL ☐

Siempre! Nov. [illegible]-60

AVENTURA DE JURADO EN GUATEMALA

Sr. José Pagés Llergo
Director de SIEMPRE!

Hace unos días volví a la ciudad de México, después de haber permanecido encarcelado durante casi 7 meses en Guatemala, sujeto a un juicio —del cual salí absuelto— acusado por las autoridades de aquel país de "atentar contra las instituciones democráticas".

No pretendo hacer una crónica de las circunstancias de mi detención, del proceso judicial, etc., pues estos detalles en parte fueron dados a conocer en su oportunidad por SIEMPRE!; pero sí quisiera relatarle en una forma breve algunas de las cosas que observé durante esos meses en el campo de concentración de Pavón, mal llamado "Granja Penal Pavón", donde estuve confinado.

Dicha "granja" está situada a más o menos 20 Kms. de la ciudad de Guatemala en el Departamento de Fraijanes y consiste en un hoyanco artificial rodeado de cercas electrificadas y torretas de vigilancia, como eran los campos de concentración nazis. Se supone que en los países civilizados los sistemas carcelarios disponen de los medios suficientes para proporcionar a los reclusos un mínimo de comodidades o elementos que le permitan su desarrollo o rehabilitación; pero en este sitio sólo imperan el terror y el hambre, así como las condiciones más infrahumanas y espeluznantes, ya que la insalubridad y la falta de atención en todos los aspectos es lo que allí impera.

La población aproximada de "la Granja" oscila entre 1,300 y 1,500 reos, de los cuales los "presos políticos" no llegan a 20, ya que los detenidos por delitos de esta naturaleza son generalmente asesinados después de su detención y estar sujetos a torturas.

Por lo tanto, la casi totalidad de los presos son "delincuentes comunes", pero podría decirse que en un 40% son inocentes del delito de que se les acusa: pues en Guatemala, para ser encarcelado no es necesario tener pruebas en contra. Una simple acusación policíaca o de particulares basta para quedar sujeto a un proceso en el cual es común salir absuelto después de uno o dos años de encarcelamiento.

La administración interna del penal está encomendada a los reclusos, para lo cual se escoge a los delincuentes más depravados y que tienen condenas largas: asesinos, drogadictos, etc.

Para mantener la disciplina se ha formado un cuerpo de represión denominado "servicio especial" o "garroteros", como vulgarmente se les llaman. Este grupo, cuya impunidad es ilimitada, mantiene a los reclusos en terror constante, ya que basta la falta más mínima para que golpeen con saña brutal al infractor, llegándole a causar hasta la muerte.

El penal no proporciona a los reclusos ningún medio de trabajo, pero sí propicia la formación de mafias internas que explotan a quienes tienen mayores necesidades, haciéndolos trabajar en fábricas elementales de algunas artesanías: canastos, juguetes rudimentarios o pelotas de futbol; productos que envían a la calle para su venta y de los cuales esas mafias obtienen grandes ganancias que comparten con la dirección del Penal.

Uno de los negocios más productivos, y del cual participan las autoridades en combinación con los reclusos influyentes, es la venta de seconales sódicos y mariguana a los reclusos; drogas con las que una gran mayoría trata de borrar su desesperación y angustia, pero trayendo por consecuencia reyertas que degeneran muchas veces en el asesinato.

Como mencioné antes, la "Granja Penal de Pavón" consiste en un hoyanco artificial cuyo espacio habitable se reduce a un rectángulo de 170 por 70 metros, aproximadamente, el cual incluye 5 cuadras y una explanada al aire libre, irónicamente llamada "campo deportivo". Cada una de las cuadras alberga un promedio de 250 personas que viven en la más absoluta promiscuidad. Para agravar esta situación funciona diariamente —durante 12 horas— un altoparlante, audible en todos los rincones, y que se utiliza para acrecentar el amedrentamiento y el terror. Por ese altoparlante se llama a los recluidos, que son solicitados para presentarse a la autoridad del penal, pero siempre haciendo hincapié en la amenaza y en la intimidación.

Los reincidentes o reos peligrosos, están confinados en el "Triángulo", que es un espacio pequeño, protegido por alambradas, del cual no pueden salir ni siquiera a la explanada. En las cuadras, sólo una parte de los reclusos dispone de literas; la mayoría duerme en el suelo cubriéndose con trapos viejos o cartones. La alimentación que el penal proporciona consiste en dos pequeños panes y café por la mañana, seis tortillas y un poco de caldo o de frijoles al mediodía, y otro poco de frijoles por la tarde. Una parte de los reos se alimenta con los escasos medios que sus familiares les llevan los días de visita o en pequeñas fondas que algunos han instalado para obtener ingresos. Tampoco existe atención médica adecuada: sólo una barraca con algunos implementos rudimentarios [illegible], para cualquier enfermedad, se proporcionan cuando mucho dos aspirinas, o un [illegible] y gasa, si es una herida, ya sea leve o grave.

Un [illegible] que reviste gravedad extrema [illegible]

[illegible] llegar requiere de [illegible]

[illegible]

tarios o [illegible] de [illegible] que [illegible] les esas mafias obtienen grandes ganancias que comparten con la dirección del Penal.

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Un hecho que reviste gravedad extrema para los reclusos acusados de delitos políticos, es el de cómo llegar seguros de vuelta a sus hogares el día que reciben su libertad de ese infierno. En todas las "cárceles" del país el total de presos políticos no llega a 100. Una gran mayoría de ellos [illegible]

(Sigue en la página 70)

[illegible]

(Viene de la página 6) cuestrados" y desaparecidos en la carretera por cualquier grupo de los innumerables cuerpos policiacos represivos que existen en Guatemala, previo aviso, claro está de la dirección del Penal, que comunica con toda anticipación el día que un preso político obtiene su libertad.

En general, la "Granja Penal Pavón" es posiblemente una de las prisiones más terroríficas que existen en Latinoamérica y sería oportuno que la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU organizara una revista de inspección, para desenmascarar así una de las tantas formas de violencia que imperan hoy día en tan bello pero desafortunado país.

Le agradezco muy sinceramente las informaciones y defensa que la revista SIEMPRE! ha hecho de mi caso.

Atentamente,

Carlos Jurado.

SECRET

Attachment #3
HMMA-35905

1P

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Carlos PERSABAL Marcue

Identity B: Suites Marne

CIT: Mexico
Δ: Mexico

re: connection with
Subj. of 201-798301

SECRET

S/c att ~~2~~ 3 HMMA-35905

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
Att 2
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City W

SUBJECT: C PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy each for Headquarters and the Guatemala City Station of the report covering the debriefing by Wallace B. ROWTON of LIRING-3 on his imprisonment in Guatemala. Identity A of ROWTON's report is a Guatemalan rebel living in Mexico who, as addressees will remember. accidentally shot himself in the leg a few days prior to his departure for Guatemala with LIRING-3. This wound may have convinced the Guatemalans that he had recently been involved in terrorist activities and may, in fact, have cost him his life. Identity B of the same report is the nephew of Identity F, a Mexican Communist who was arrested on 19 September 1968 during a student demonstration in Mexico City; he is still in jail.

2. As this dispatch is being written, LIRING-3 has an appointment to talk at length about his experience in Guatemala with the LIRING Station Chief, LIRING-10. The general idea is for LIRING-3 to go to PBRUMEN in the hope that he can be used to penetrate PBRUMEN-sponsored subversion efforts in Latin America or become, at least for a time, a reporting source in PBRUMEN.

3. ROWTON and the undersigned are prepared to travel to Guatemala to discuss the LIRING-3 case and its Guatemalan/FAR implications whenever the Guatemala City Station, after reviewing the available information, feels ready for such discussion. Please advise.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1. Report (1), h/w
2. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

CS COPY

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

h/w att: 1
s/c att: 1

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35904	27 November 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-798301

Liring-3

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment 1
HMMA-35904

2 November,1968

9P

Subject: Report of Debriefing of LIRING/3.

1. Upon his return from TDY, Rowton made discreet efforts to re-establish contact with LIRING/4 as directly as possible. He checked on the last known residence of L/4 on the nights of 24 and 25 October but found the third floor apartment totally blacked out. He therefore assumed that LIRING/4 had abandoned the apartment either because of fear of the Gobernación agents that had attempted to exort 500 pesos from her (as indicated in LIFEAT take for 11 Sept) or as a result of her inability to pay the October rent, or both. Rowton checked his telephone answering service but found no message from LIRING/4 as he had hoped. Rowton concluded that L/4 must have assumed that Rowton had left the country on an extended trip, since prior to his departure (15 September) Rowton had left a note on the afternoon of 11 September under the door of the apartment advising L/4 that he had to leave the country and hoped to see her the following morning at 1000 at the "consultorio". LIRING/4 did not show at 1000 the following morning or the next, probably because of the visit of the police to the apartment.

2. Rowton then telephoned **Identity C** and,on the pretext of interest in the watercolors of LIRING/3, asked srta Carillo who answered for the address of LIRING/4. Srta Carillo replied that unfortunately she did not have the present address but did have the watercolors and could show them to Rowton. She added that LIRING/3 was in Guatemala and that LIRING/4 passed by **Iden C** from time to time to check on the sale of the pictures. When she offered to give L/4 any message Rowton might have, the latter asked her to tell L/4 to telephone Rowton at his telephone answering service(alias)

3. Rowton then felt his only other source of L/4's whereabouts that would not attract undue attention (particularly on the part of the LIRING office) would be a check with LIRING/3's first wife, since he recalled that she had taken care of LIRING/3 and /4's child almost every week-end,even after L/3's arrest. Rowton therefore obtained the telephone used by LIRING/3 to contact his first wife (from the Station file) and decided to call on the morning of 29 October. In the meantime, however, Rowton learned from the Station that LIRING/3 had been released and returned to Mexico City on 18 October.

4. When Rowton called the number of the frist wife (apparently a small store in the Casas Grandes development), he asked for Carlito, the eldest son of L/3,(whom Rowton had already met) rather than for the first wife of L/3 whom Rowton did not know. A young girl replied saying that her brother Carlito was not at home at the moment. Rowton then explained that he was actually

h/w att. 1 HMMA-35904.

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201-798301

trying to locate LIRING/3. The child then exclaimed that L/3, her father, was at that very moment upstairs in her home. Rowton asked her to ask her father to come to the phone as soon as possible. After a few minutes delay. L/3 came to the phone and talked directly to Rowton.

5. LIRING/3 appeared from his tone of voice to be rather depressed and showed no sign of enthusiasm in re-establishing contact with Rowton. Rowton explained that he had been out of the country and had unfortunately not been able to see I/4 before he left. Rowton added that he had returned on 19 Oct, the day after LIRING/3 himself had returned (Rowton said this for effect, since he knew it would impress L/3 to indicate that he was fully aware of the exact date of L/3's return). When he then asked to see L/3, the latter replied "of course, when?" Rowton then made a date for 1200 that same day at the Kiss restaurant on Reforma. He then telephoned **Identity D** and reserved a room for that afternoon so that he would be able to give L/3 the safehouse at their first meeting..

6. LIRING/3 appeared on time and looked reasonably well, despite his long confinement. He explained that he had been able to recuperate during the past ten days and felt much better for the normal diet he had been able to resume. The only physical effect he still felt, besides the weakness from loss of weight and dysentery, was a recurring pain in the side, which L/3 feared resulted from a fractured rib that had healed without medical treatment. He explained that he had been beaten severely on several occasions during the initial interrogation both by the military and the police and "of course" did not have the benefit of medical treatment afterwards.

7. Rowton then alleged to LIRING/3 that he had done "everything possible" to arrange his release, principally through a notional GNA colonel whose brother was a business friend of Rowton. He explained that when he had learned that L/3 had left Mexico City for the trip as planned, he telephoned the colonel and explained that a Mexican friend, LIRING/3, was planning to visit his country and might conceivably need help at some point. Rowton continued that this gesture proved to be literally a life-saver for L/3, since a few days later, the colonel called Rowton back and reported the arrest of L/3 in the company of "very dangerous persons." At the colonel's request, Rowton met with him several days later at the border and they both planned the best course of action to save L/3. Rowton alleged that the colonel on his own initiative arranged to have L/3 transferred from the frontier to Guatemala City so that he could be released from army custody to the civilian authorities. L/3 apparently accepted this story at once, remarking that it did appear strange to him that he was flown with his companions in a twin

engine plane and that the Minister of [illegible] was present at the airport when they disembarked. L/3 told Rowton that he felt certain that had he remained in the control of the army he would have been executed without trial or publicity of any kind.

8. LIRING/3 added that when he arrived he found LIRING/4 in a state of virtual exhaustion from nervous tension and worry. He stated that L/4 had become understandably bitter at the attitude of the police and felt abandoned by everyone, including Rowton, during the last weeks of L/3's imprisonment. L/3 added that, as Rowton suspected, L/4 was not anxious for him to resume any kind of political activity and would try her best to dissuade him from resuming collaboration with Rowton, if it meant reinvolvement with FAR and the LIRING office. In reply to Rowton's query, L/3 stated that L/4 had managed financially since Rowton's departure by selling a few of his paintings, one of which was purchased by a "northamerican woman" at an excellent price and then donated to Bellas Artes (after the purchaser learned of L/3's plight)

9. Rowton met with L/3 again that same evening at 2000 in the safehouse of **Identity D** and was able to debrief him at some length under more secure conditions. LIRING/3 showed no reluctance to provide Rowton with all the details of his trip to Guatemala and to answer Rowton's questions frankly. At Rowton's request L/3 gave the following chronological account of his experiences over the past six months:

"Idens A and B and myself crossed the border on Easter Saturday(April 13) without incident, Iden A using the false Mexican documents I had provided and Iden B and myself traveling with our legal passports that had been properly visaed in Mexico City before we left. I had originally planned to get Iden A across the border illegally north of Mesilla and meet him subsequently in Guatemala City, but I was dissuaded from this plan partly by Iden A's fear of traveling alone without properly visaed papers and partly by the fact that it was an important holiday and there was more than usual movement across the border.

"Incidentally Iden B joined us at the invitation of Iden A when Iden B expressed an interest in concluding an interview with Nestor Valle of FAR (the first interview had occurred some months previously during Iden B's last trip to Guatemala). Iden B did this on his own initiative to impress his uncle with his newspaper initiative and ability, and Iden A felt that bringing Iden B with him would enhance his own prestige in the eyes of the FAR headquarter officials he hoped to meet. I myself realized that Iden B's presence was not altogether unfavorable for me, since if anything happened I would not have to bear the responsibility alone but could share it with Iden B.

"In any event we passed through the Mexican immigration and customs without difficulty, although Iden A was told that he would have to stop off at the Guatemalan consul's office (strangely enough on the Guatemalan side) to get a tourist visa, which was described as a "mere formality". At this point Iden A began to show signs of nervousness and refused to enter the Consul's office alone. I therefore accompanied him to calm him down. We found that the Consul was a colonel in the GNA, and a very observant person, despite his rather polite treatment of Iden A. Iden A, incidentally had dyed his hair at my suggestion to reduce the chances of his being spotted by an acquaintance.

"But I forgot to mention that the real reason for Iden A's nervousness was an unfortunate incident at the immigration office shortly before. One of the immigration officers mistook Iden B for a person wanted for some sort of fraud and insisted on examining him closely and even checking his height with a tape measure. Fortunately Iden B proved to be several centimeters taller than the person wanted by the police and we were alowed to pass on. This delay however did attract considerable attention and produced a state of nervous tension in both Iden A and, of course, B.

"Iden A was granted the tourist visa without delay and we proceeded to the Customs, about 200 yeards up the road. Iden A, who had only a briefcase, refused to enter the Customs shed, but waited for us in a nearby cafe to keep as calm as possible. Iden B and I had to open our valises in Customs for the routine check. It was then that I myself got a nervous shock. My own bag had nothing but clothing in it, but Iden B was carrying a camera, a Czech recording machine, Soviet-made hiking boots, and, worst of all, a Mexican magazine between the pages of which he had concealed (very crudely) several FAR propaganda leaflets (which he told me later he was carrying to "impress" the FAR with the work being done on his uncle's press in Mexico City). Altho the Customs officers asked no questions and allowed Iden B to proceed I am certain that they spotted the leaflets and noted the rather unusual equipment Iden B was carrying with him.

"When we joined Iden A at the cafe, he asked anxiously, 'No hubo clavo?' and when we assured him that there hadn't been an problem ('clavo') he regained his composture. He then hailed a small, six-passenger autobus that was bound for Huehuetenango with three passengers (Guatemalans) already aboard. About 3 kilometers outside the town (Mesilla) the driver told us we were approaching the military outpost of 'El Cable' and that we would be checked again. He, to our surprise, warned us to hide any guns we might have been carrying "under the seats" since the military would search the bus. Just then we saw a car pass us a rather high speed and recognized the Consul in the driver's seat. Iden A's nervousness gained him again and he shoved into my hand his Guatemalan passport and a few other of his legal papers. I quickly put them into my pocket and hoped that I would not be searched.

"When we reached the control point, we saw the Consul, by then wearing a side-arm, leaning against his car, waiting for the arrival of the bus. As soon as we stopped, he shouted to a nearby soldier to have the Colonel Commandant come out. When the soldier refused saying that it was more proper for him, the Consul, to goto the office of the Commandant, the Consul insisted in a rather stern voice. Finally the soldier disappeared and returned in a few minutes with the commandant, a young officer of excellent bearing. After a few minutes conversation with the Consul, the Commandant ordered us (Iden A,B and myself) out of the bus. The driver then returned our fare and was allowed to proceed on to Huehuetenango, after we had removed our luggage. We then found ourselves surround by soldiers and escorted into the "El Cable' compound. There we were assigned to different prefabricated huts and questioned separately. At an opportune moment, when the soldier guarding me (through the window of the hut) went off to get me some water, I managed to squeeze the passport of Iden A and his other papers through a crack in the floor boards where I felt sure that they would not be discovered.

"The Commandant, who was fairly polite and even gave us coffee, asked me the purpose of my trip and how well I knew the other two. I replied that I was simply sightseeing and that I had known Iden B in Mexico City since he was a well-known catedrático at the University but that I had run into him at San Cristóbal. With regard to Iden A, I alleged that I did not know him and had simply run into him by chance at the Immigration Office and had joined him and Iden B on the bus to save money in traveling to Huehuetenango. The Commandant then asked me to open my valise and he proceeded to search the contents carefully. He was particularly attracted to a clay bell which Iden A or B had placed there without my knowledge. (I later found out that they had stolen three bells from the hotel at San Cristóbal in a spoof and had put one on my valise). I told the Commandant that I did not know the bell was in my valise but recognized it as one sold at the tourist stand of the Hotel in San Cristóbal. I subsequently realized that they thought that the bells were some sort of recognition signal and wanted to get to the bottom of the apparently perplexing matter.

"After about three or four hours an army truck arrived drived by sergeant who appeared to have been drinking heavily (it was Holy Saturday and a festive occasion in the village). He ordered us tied hand and foot and literally thrown into the back of the truck. He then took off at reckless speed without any thought of the pain he was causing us (our hands were tied behind our back and we were forced to remain lying on the floor of the truck). At one point he stopped and instructed the soldiers to shoot us if we made any attempt to escape. Later one of the soldiers brutally kicked Eden A in the side when he moved suddenly, apparently to ease the strain on his arms.

"We were finally taken from the truck at the village of Buenos Aires, on the outskirts of Huehuetenango, and escorted into another military establishment where we were again interrogated. I stuck steadfastly to my original simply story, and, although I am sure that they did not believe me, there was no incriminating evidence in my luggage or on my person to serve as a basis for their suspicions. After several hours, from a good vantage point just inside the main door, where I had been deposited (still tied up) by the last interrogator, I overheard an officer sending a radio message to the Ministry in Guatemala City reporting our arrest and asking for instructions. He must have been told that a helicopter would be coming to pick us up, becasue I heard him reply that a helicopter would not be adequate and that a plane should be sent, since we were "dangerous types".

"The plane, a twin engine military aircraft, finally arrived and we were hustled into it and forced again to lie on the floor even while in flight. When we landed at the Guatemala City airport we were not removed from the plane for several hours. I recall hearing someone say,'Leave then inside. The Minister hasn't arrive yet.' Shortly thereafter, a Northamerican army officer came aboard the plane and came straight toward me. He rolled me over roughly with his boot and began interrogating me. He appeared under the impression that I was a FAR leader and at first did not believe him when I gave him my true identity. I remember him very well since he spoke with a distinct northamerican accent and had a bandage around one of his legs (apparently he had been wounded in a skirmish).'

"We were finally removed from the aircraft and taken directly to the 2nd Police Corps Headquarters in Guatemala City and assigned to cell block 400, which is reserved for political prisoners (incidentally I later learned to my amazement that they are no more that 40 political prisoners in Guatemala - the others all having been executed before trial.

"In cellblock 400 of the Pavón prison, where I spent several weeks awaiting arraignment, there are six cells with thick wooden bars, three on each side, in three of which Iden A, Iden B and myself were confined. I discovered that in one of the other cells was Rolando "Cebollito", an important FAR leader, and in another cell were two young FAR members, the brothers Miguel and [illegible] Juán León Barrios, who later told me that they were members of the G-2 of FAR. In the remaining cell were three members of the 'Mano Blanca', one of whom I later learned was named Inez Nufio Padilla.

"As soon as we became acquainted, 'Cebollito' made an investigation of the circumstances surrounding our arrest, as he said, on behalf of FAR. 'Cebollito' who had already been arraigned had more freedom than the others and was able to wander in and out with relative ease (I noted that the door of his cell was often unlocked). He therefore was able to talk discreetly with each of us through the bars to 'interrogate' us to his satisfaction. After several days he reported that he found Iden A's conduct 'inexcusable' and Iden B completely stupid in his unnecessarily exposing his companions with the compromising material he was carrying. He told me that he felt I had been the victim of very unfortunate circumstances and my only mistake was to have attempted to cross the frontier with the other two. He added that he intended to sent his report to FAR via his mother, who was able to visit him more or less regularly. Several weeks later I saw 'Cebollito' being pushed into an army truck and learned from the León brothers that he was taken out and executed before his trial was completed. The last time I saw Iden A was about April 25, when he waved to me from his cell (I had already been taken out of cellblobk 400 and moved into the large compound).

"Fortunately the Mexican Consul, Serrano, recognized my family name and told me that he was a friend of my father. He did what he could to help me get messages out to my wife and to supply me with materials to write and do some painting. Also of great help and comfort to me was Mario Armando Amador, the First Secretary, whose life, I learned later, was threatened befause of the interest he took in me and Iden B. Armando confided to me on one occasion that he had to be very discreet in sending messages to Relacions Exteriores in Mexico since the "North-americans decipher and read everything we send." He therefore had to send everything concerning me by diplomatic pouch despite the delay involved.

"I managed to get a message out to the press in a very strange way. I had gotten to know one of the 'Mano Blanca' (the oldest of the trio that had been arrested for the kidnapping of the Archbishop), Inez Nufio Padilla, and felt he was sympathetic toward us. I therefore prepared a brief message on the inside of an empty package of cigarettes 'To whom it may Concern' stating that we had been arrested and were being held unjustly, and on the day that the trio were called out to appear in court, where I knew there would be newspaper reporters are present I slipped the note to Nufio with a plea that he give it to a reporter as soon as he could. I later learned that he did so and that my note appeared verbatim in the local press.

"Several weeks later the mother and wife of Iden B visited us and either because of what he told them or on their own initiative spread the nasty rumor that I had been responsible for the arrest and that I was a Trotskyite (the wife and mother of Iden B are both members of the CP Mexico). This proved very disquieting to me but I was reassured to some extent by the León brothers who told me that they would 'investigate' and clear up the matter as soon as they could. About two months later, they took me aside in the prison compound and show me a report they stated they received from "FAR sources in Mexico". In this report I was described as "an anarchist without party affiliations, of good character and conduct, trustworthy and responsible but difficult to control". Iden B, on the other hand was described as "an opportunist, without sincere ideology, in reality a bourgeois of superficial convictions."

"From that moment the León brothers took me into their confidence. They revealed that FAR had broken completely with the CP Guatemala becasue of complete dissatisfaction with the party's handling of support matters. They pointed out to me Francisco Corado in the compound as the CP representative and commented that all financial help from the outside was being channeled through him despite the fact that he distribute the aid to his friends who were not even party members and neglected everyone else. The brothers also told me that FAR had stripped César Montes of all his authority and that he was in exile in Mexico. They commented that Montes had spent almost all his time outside Guatemala and had not accomplished the missions he was sent on. They also stated that financial and material aid from Cuba had dwindled to almost nothing because of FAR refusal to accept Cuban terms. They explained that the Cubans insisted on sending their experts to direct everything and channeled all their financial aid through the CP Guatemala.

"The León brothers also suggested that if and when I returned to

Mexico, I should maintain contact with a "genuine FAR representative" and that I should do everything possible to convince the Cubans to take a more realistic position vis-a-vis their revolution. I welcomed this suggestion, assuring them that I could and would make a trip to Havana as soon as feasible. Since I was not certain of my wife's whereabouts, I asked the brothers to have their representative in Mexico, whom they described simply as 'Pavel', contact me through **Identity C** . I suggested that 'Pavel' could contact the director, **Identity E** or her secretary Srta Carillo, and introduce himself as a person representing a certain Srta Violeta who was interested in purchasing the watercolors I had already sent to my wife. 'Pavel' could then ask for my address or leave a message telling me where I could contact him. They agreed and promised to communicate with me as soon after my release as possible.

"The trial of myself and Iden B was nothing more than a formality, since the judge was well aware that the prosecution had no solid evidence (fortunately for us Iden A had already been eliminated and could not testify even under duress). Since at least three attempts had been made to execute us before the trial (on the well-known pretext of removing us from the prison and assassinating us while supposedly attempting to escape), I demand an escort after the acquittal to accompany us to the airport. We arrived in Mexico City on 18 October and I was met there by my wife."

10. After relating the above, LIRING/3 asked Rowton to keep the proposed contact with 'Pavel' in strictest confidence, particularly from his wife, since he felt she would be very upset to learn that he, L/3, was planning to resume political activity on behalf of FAR. In reply to Rowton's query, L/3 stated that as yet he had not had time to recontact anyone in the LIRING office but promised to do so as soon as the opportunity presented itself. He agreed with Rowton that LIRING/4 would be the logical person to arrange a discreet meeting with LIRING/10. L/3 told Rowton incidentally that L/4 had protested to LIRING/10 some weeks previously that Rodolfo Reyes was spreading rumors to the effect that the LIRING office did not trust LIRING/4. L/10 replied indignantly that if there was anyone they did not trust it was Rodolfo Reyes, and that L/4 could bring him in and L/10 would tell him such to his face.

Walle B. Rowton
Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET Attachment #2
HMMA-35904

1P

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Francisco *LARA (201-[illegible])

Identity B: Carlos *PERSABAL Marcue — CIT: Mexico

Identity C: Salon de la Plastica Mexicana — A: Mexico

Identity D: Suites Marne

Identity E: /Sra/ Lourdes *CHOUMACERO — Sex: F

Identity F: Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, former editor of Politica magazine

Re: connection with / Subj of 201-798301

SECRET

S/c att: 1
HMMA-35904

CS COPY

201-798301

S E C R E T X

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

1. Forwarded herewith is one copy each for Headquarters and the Guatemala City Station of the report covering the debriefing by Wallace B. ROWTON of LIRING-3 on his imprisonment in Guatemala. Identity A of ROWTON's report is a Guatemalan rebel living in Mexico who, as addressees will remember, accidentally shot himself in the leg a few days prior to his departure for Guatemala with LIRING-3. This wound may have convinced the Guatemalans that he had recently been involved in terrorist activities and may, in fact, have cost him his life. Identity B of the same report is the nephew of Identity F, a Mexican Communist who was arrested on 19 September 1968 during a student demonstration in Mexico City; he is still in jail.

2. As this dispatch is being written, LIRING-3 has an appointment to talk at length about his experience in Guatemala with the LIRING Station Chief, LIRING-10. The general idea is for LIRING-3 to go to PBRUMEN in the hope that he can be used to penetrate PBRUMEN-sponsored subversion efforts in Latin America or become, at least for a time, a reporting source in PBRUMEN.

3. ROWTON and the undersigned are prepared to travel to Guatemala to discuss the LIRING-3 case and its Guatemalan/FAR implications whenever the Guatemala City Station, after reviewing the available information, feels ready for such discussion. Please advise.

Attachments:
  1. Report (1), h/w
  2. Identity Sheet (1), u/s/c

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
  2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

HMMA - 35904 27 November 1968

S E C R E T 201-7[illegible]8301

14-00000

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C/WH6

☐ RID COPY

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SECRET 230100Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8228
MEXI

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

~~WH/COG~~ | WH/11
ASSIGNMENT | INDEX

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

MICROFILMED
DEC 19 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. LIRING-9 WAS WAITING AT LIRING GATE 1730 HOURS WHEN LIRING-3 ARRIVED WITH REPORT. MEETING HELD IN BACK ROOM CONSULATE AND LIMITED TO LIRING-3 AND LIRING-9. FOLL HIGH POINTS THIS MEETING:

A. LIRING-9 DID NOT READ REPORT BUT HAD LIRING-3 GIVE HIM MAIN POINTS ORALLY. APPEARED MOST INTERESTED IN LIRING-3 STATEMENTS ON HOW GUAT REBELS FEEL TOWARDS PBRUMEN. NODDED WHEN LIRING-3 STATED WHAT REBELS NEED IS ADEQUATRE FUNDS NOT ADDITIONAL

CS COPY

Liring/4
B. 201-818842

*NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV 68 0300Z.

B. 201-340938 Liring/9

SECRET

27 Nov 68 Liring/3
201-798301

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8228 SECRET

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

B. LIRING-3 EXPLAINED HE ANARCHIST, LEFTIST, IDELAIST AND FELT TRUE REVOLUTION GOING ON GUATEMALA. THIS WHY HE INTERESTED IN HELPING GUAT REBELS ANY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS SEEMED SATISFY LIRING-9.

C. LIRING-9 AGAIN MENTIONED TRIP TO HIS COUNTRY FOR LIRING-3 AND WIFE AND AGREED ARRANGE FOR PASSAGE LIRING-4 ON PERUMEN SHIP TO CANADA SO LIRING-4 COULD SEE FATHER WHO NEW YORK RESIDENT AND ILL. LIRING-9 ADAMANT LIRING-4 SHOULD NOT SEEK VISA TO UNITED STATES AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE HER TO "GRILLING" BY LOCAL EMBASSY.

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3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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INFO FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG5, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SOD3, C/CS/SGO

LIRING-3 201

S E C R E T 280122Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8223

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (1*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

201 WH/1 file

1. LIRING-3 WRITTEN REPORT PER LIRING-9 REQUEST WAS REVIEWED BY STATION WITH ASSISTANCE LEONARD S. TORMET. REPORT LIMITED TO ACTUAL EXPERIENCES WHILE INCARCERATED GUATEMALA CITY AND INFORMATION ACTUALLY RECEIVED FROM FAR MEMBERS IN SAME JAIL. LIRING-3 BRIEFED TO DECLARE HIMSELF READY HELP GUAT REBELS FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND AT SAME TIME IMPLY HE IN NEED MATERIAL HELP AFTER LONG IMPRISONMENT.

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*NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV68

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ACTION　　☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8228 SECRET

MEN (MEANING UDVISORS).

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3. POUCHING LIRING-3 REPORT. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. APPRECIATE TORMET VISIT AND ASSISTANCE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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C/CS/SGO

S E C R E T 281022Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8228

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMCOBRA

27 Nov 68 IN 43465

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

201 CC: LIRING-9 WH/1 file.

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*NO RECORD IN C/S 28NOV68 0300Z.

Keith

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8228 S E C R E T

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4. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

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FILE, VR. CCS2, CSPS.

#630

SECRET 262200Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8283 26 Nov 68 IN 42426

GUATEMALA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR

ADMIN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible])

1. TORMET WILL RETURN GUATEMALA PAA 501, 27 NOV.

2. APPRECIATE HIS VISIT, WHICH VERY HELPFUL.

SECRET

WH file: LIRING-3 201

201-793301

wc

SECRET

C [illegible]

DC ____ wc

~~[illegible]~~ Katie

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION

123 C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR, C/EI/CO, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

GUAT

S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

C/A

WH/3/G

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

23 Nov 68 IN 40612

B. DIRECTOR 53469

1. LEONARD S. TORMET (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMET ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Nov 68

201-798301 [illegible]-3

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CTION 421 C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/FI/SD, CS/DO, C/WH/COG 5, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 232215Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9740

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REF: GUATEMALA CITY 9739 (IN 40612)

23 Nov 68 IN 40611

IDEN: BARRY G. ROYDEN.

S E C R E T

WH/1 file: LIRING-3 201

201-798301

SECRET

C/WH/1

DC/WH/1 WN

WC

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14

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W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
9354
23 November 1963

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IMMEDIATE 23 [illegible]

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

RYBAT/PERUMEN

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9736 (IN 40291) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND ~~[illegible]~~ REPORTED CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. BELIEVE AS STATED REF C THAT LIRING-3 SHOULD BE FACTUAL AS POSSIBLE IN PREPARING REPORT ON CONTACTS AND EXPERIENCES WHILE IMPRISONED GUATEMALA, AND IN GIVING OPINION ON HOW ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS HAVE FAILED THERE. TO MAKE HIM APPEAR TOO KNOWLEDGEABLE ON FAR/PGT COULD AROUSE SUSPICIONS LIRING-9 AND COLLEAGUES.

3. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE LIRING-9 MAY HAVE BEEN RELATING DIRECTLY TO ACTIVITIES OF HECTOR SANCHEZ GONZALEZ PER MEXICO CITY 7744 (IN 18686) IF LIREBEL-2 REPORT INDEED BASED ON FACT.

CONTINUED

C/WH/1 [illegible]
DC/WH/1 [illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIRECTOR 53465

PAGE TWO

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO BREAK UP GUAT [illegible] FORCES AND NEGATE ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE ~~[illegible]~~ CUBANS TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *) References attached
**)
***)

Paul

WH/COG: Paul Coerst (telecon)

WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
9354
23 November 1968

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CSDO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CITE DIRECTOR 53469

MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY ROUTINE: JMCOBRA

RYBAT/TYBRUMEN

23 Nov. 68

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9130 (IN 40491) *

B. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN 40273) **

C. DIRECTOR 47408 *** (NOT SENT JMCOBRA)

1. AGREE POINTS REF A PARA 1 A THRU E BUT BELIEVE TIME NOW PROPITIOUS FOR DIRECT GUAT CITY STATION REP DISCUSSION WITH MEXICO CITY STATION ON GUAT INSURGENCY SITUATION AND ~~[illegible]~~ REPORTED CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, UNLESS IMPORTANT NEEDS TO CONTRARY, RECOMMEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GUAT CITY STATION CASE OFFICER PROCEED MEXICO AS REQUESTED REF B.

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MICROFILMED
DEC 20 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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Liring-3
23 Nov 68
201-798301

B. 201-340938

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CITE DIRECTOR 53465

PAGE TWO

~~MEXICO CITY~~ GUATEMALA CITY

4. OBJECTIVE, OF COURSE, IS TO BREAK UP GUAT INSURGENCY FORCES AND NEGATE ANY CUBAN EFFORT THERE. AT SAME TIME DESIRE ENTICE [illegible] CUBANS TO EXPOSE HAND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHIN FEASIBLE KNOWLEDGEABILITY LIRING-3. ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE DETAILED DISCUSSION IN MEXICO WITH GUAT STATION C/O AT THIS TIME WOULD BE PROFITABLE AND WELL WORTH VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

Hqs Comments: *) References attached
**)
***)

WH/COG: Paul Oberst (telecon)
WH/2: Jack Murray (draft)

[illegible]. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Chief, WHD

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S E C R E T 232206Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9739

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN

23 Nov 68 IN 40612

B. DIRECTOR 53469

1. LEONARD S. TORMET (IDEN) GUATEMALA CITY CASE OFFICER TO TRAVEL MEXICO CITY FOR REF DISCUSSIONS. TORMET ATTEMPTING BOOK PASSAGE PAN AM FLT 502, 24 NOV. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA BY CABLE 24 NOV. REQUEST MEET AND ACCOMODATE.

2. FILE: 201-798301

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SECRET 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22 Nov 68 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN *)

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBILY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z.

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

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SECRET 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22 Nov 68 IN 40291

REF: MEXICO CITY [illegible] *

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

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3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

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S E C R E T 230032Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WRONG~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON TO [illegible] OFFICIAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PERUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

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IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WONG~~ WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

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IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

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RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

LP

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

REF: MEXICO CITY 7980 (IN 25321)

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 26 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS ~~WRONG~~ wrong. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PBRUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

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S E C R E T 230332Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PERUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7980 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 68 IN 40273

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 S E C R E T

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL, LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO(LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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PRECEDENCE

SECRET 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 3160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 3159 [IN 40273]

1. IDEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

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PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230031Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8160

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

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2. FILE 201-798301.

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IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY ,DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

22 Nov 68 IN 40270

DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 8159 [IN 40273]

T.C.

WH

1. IDEN IS FRANCIS SHERRY, PHONE NO. 20-76-66.

2. FILE 201-798301.

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PRECEDENCE

/WH/1

S E C R E T 230301Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9736
GUAT

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ROUTINE JMCOBRA

RYBAT/PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

22 NOV 68 IN 4028

REF: MEXICO CITY 8159 (IN *)

1. BECAUSE LIRING-3 COULD NOT LOGICALLY HAVE GAINED DETAILED INSIGHT INTO INSURGENCY MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA DURING ENCARCERATION, DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR GUATEMALA CITY STATION OFFICER PROVIDE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED BRIEFING FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GENERAL GUIDELINES, SUBJECT TO HQS APPROVAL, WHICH OSTENSIBILY TO BE IMPRESSIONS OF LIRING-3 BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH FAR LEADERS WHILE IN JAIL.

A. EMPHASIZE FRAGMENTATION, DISORGANIZATION AND COMPETITION OF INSURGENT FORCES HAVE SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED INSURGENT MOVEMENT, WHICH NOW STAGNANT.

B. LEADERSHIP IS OBVIOUSLY IMMATURE AND INCAPABLE OF ORGANIZING AN EFFECTIVE MOVEMENT.

C. ACCORDING ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA" FAR FUNDS MISUSED BY LEADERS IN "NON-REVOLUTIONARY WAYS."

D. RECENT FAR TERRORISM, WHICH FOR MOST PART ILL-CONCEIVED AND NOT PART OF OVERALL STRATEGY, HAS WEAKENED MOVEMENT THROUGH

*NO RECORD IN C/S 23 NOV 68 0400Z. Liring-3

SECRET

CS COPY

22 Nov 68

201-798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9736

LOSSES FROM GOG RETALIATION. GOG ABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IMPULSIVE ACTIONS BY FAR MEMBERS WHO FAILED MAKE ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS BEFOREHAND.

E. ESSENTIAL THAT NEW LEADERSHIP CADRE BE FOUND TO REPLACE PRESENT COMMAND IF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT TO SUCCEED.

2. FYI: OBJECTIVE OF ABOVE IS TO PAINT AS DISMAL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE FOR CUBANS, AND TO SUGGEST THAT LATTER IMPOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT INSURGENT LEADERSHIP. FEEL THAT ANY ATTEMPT BY CUBANS TO REPLACE CURRENT LEADERSHIP WOULD FURTHER FRACTIONALIZE AND DEMORALIZE INSURGENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-798301.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO

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PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 230032Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 8159

IMMEDIATE GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)

22 Nov 63 IN 40273

1. DURING LONG DISCUSSION LIRING-9 HAD AT LIRING WITH LIRING-3 ON 21 NOV LIRING-9 ASKED LIRING-3 PREPARE DETAILED WRITTEN REPORT DUE 1730 HOURS 25 NOV ON HIS EXPERIENCES GUATEMALA AND HIS CONTACTS WITH FAR PERSONALITIES WHILE INCARCERATED. WHEN LIRING-3 MENTIONED LACK ADEQUATE PBRUMEN SUPPORT LIRING-9 EXCITEDLY AGREED STATING HIS CAPITAL DID NOT UNDERSTAND FAR AND HAD DONE MANY THINGS WRONG. HE ADDED LIRING-3 SHOULD POINT OUT ON PAPER HOW PERUMEN HAD FAILED IN GUATEMALA AND GIVE HIS OPINION OF WHAT NEEDED. LIRING-9 ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN WHAT LIRING-3 KNOWS OF SQUABBLE BETWEEN GUAT LEFTISTS. AMONG MANY OTHER QUESTIONS LIRING-9 WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER JEANETTE FIRK HAD FAR MISSION BEFORE HER DEATH.

2. LIRING-9 STATED CHIEF LIRING "DOES NOT HAVE VERY MUCH TO DO WITH THESE THINGS" (CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES IN GUATEMALA) AND "HIS OPINION DOES NOT MATTER." SAID WOULD ARRANGE FOR

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8159 SECRET

MEETING AT 1730 ON 25 NOV WITH "SOME MY COLLEAGUES" SO CAN DISCUSS LIRING-3 REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS AT LENGTH " IN BETTER PLACE FOR PRIVATE TALK." WHEN LIRING-3 EXPRESSED HOPE HE MIGHT AMPLIFY HIS REPORT IN PERSON IN PBRUMEN CAPITAL. LIRING-9 SUGGESTED HE MIGHT BE INVITED FOR CULTURAL EXPOSITION TO MAKE TRIP APPEAR INNOCUOUS AND OFFERED TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS.

3. REQUEST GUAT CITY STATION OFFICER FAMILIAR WITH FAR/PGT OP PROCEED MEXICO CITY MORNING 23 NOV TO DISCUSS ABOVE AND PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION LIRING-3 REPORT TO LIRING. IN ADDITION TO PERSONAL EXPERIENCE LIRING-3 COULD ATTRIBUTE INFO WHICH WOFIRM MIGHT WANT REACH PBRUMENERS TO NOW DEAD JOSE IGNACIO ROLANDO (LOPEZ) RUIZ WITH WHOM HAD CONTACT IN JAIL. PLS ADVISE ETA BY IMMEDIATE. WILL MEET AT AIRPORT BUT IF ANYTHING GOES WRONG OFFICER SHOULD PHONE IDEN.

4. FILE 201-798301.

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-7945, 4 November 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover for each addressee is a Xerox copy of the letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala mentioned in reference.

2. The Station hopes that contact between LIRING-3 and representatives of the Guatemalan rebels will be initiated in the near future. Station plans are to discreetly surveil meetings between LIRING-3 and his Guatemalan contact after the first such meeting.

for Willard C. CURTIS

MICROFILMED
NOV 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
Letter (1), u/s/c

Distribution:
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2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/att - 1 copy)

S/c att: 1

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35822

DATE
18 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

Att HMMA-35[illegible]

2P

Guatemala 22 de Octubre de 1968.

MICROFILMED
NOV 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Señor :

Carlos Jurado Del Mar

Mexico D. F.

Apresiable ya distinguido amigo Carlos cuanto gusto es para mi saludarlo deseandole dicha y felicidad.

No sabé cuato me alegro que ya hayan recobrado esa angustiada libertad espero en Dios que se restablesca pronto de esa gran angustia le causaron mi País y tambien que esto no vuelva a suseder ya que eso es muy duro de soportar .

es- Es cuanto tengo qus decirle y perdone las faltas de- Ortografia que he cometido pero todavia me encuentro un tanto nervioso saludeme a Perzabal y Usted un cariñoso saludo de su amigo que verlo desea :.

Rafael [illegible]

cit: Guatemala

mi direccion es la siguiente :
2 Av. 27-57 Zona 12
Guatemala C. A.

en el sobre le voy a poner otra si es que me contesta Agalo a esta por favor. esta que le anote aca adentro

re: contact with, 201-798 301



LA DALIA AZUL
ENRIQUE PUENTE C.
ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS
6a. AVENIDA Y 10a. CALLE
TEL. 44-72
GUATEMALA, C. A.

Señor:
Carlos Jurado del Mar
Havre.# 7
Col. Juárez Mexico D.F.

1968

CORREO AEREO

S/2 att:

HMMA-[illegible]

CS COPY

Att HMMA-35322

Remite: Rafael Argueta A.
11 Av. 25-22 Zona 12
Guatemala C. A.

S E C R E T X Att

Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Letter Received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXICO CITY-7945, 4 November 1968

1. Forwarded under separate cover for each addressee is a Xerox copy of the letter recently received by LIRING-3 from Guatemala mentioned in reference.

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for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter (1), u/s/c

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HMMA - 35822 18 November 1968

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ACTION C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/RI/SD, C/WH/CoG-5, C/CI, C/FI-2.

#105

S E C R E T 272311Z NOV 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9675

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REF A. MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)

8 Nov 68 IN 30198

B. DIRECTOR 48471

1. ESLAIR TEAM CAUTIOUS INVESTIGATION REVEALS:

A. JUAN CARRERA, WIFE DARIA GARCIA DE CARRERA, AND CHILDREN LIVE ELEVENTH AVENUE ADDRESS. HOWEVER, BROTHERS RIGOBERTO AND RAFAEL ARGUETA ARE OWNERS AND LIVED THERE PREVIOUSLY. HOUSE NOW UP FOR SALE. LUIS ARGUETA, FATHER OF BROTHERS, LIVES IN CHIQUIMULA.

B. SECOND AVENUE ADDRESS OCCUPIED BY CANDELARIO ALVARADO AND FAMILY. NO FURTHER DETAILS BUT NAME INDICATES POSSIBLE FAMILY TIE WITH ARGUETA ALVARADO BROTHERS.

C. "LA DALIA AZUL", OWNED BY ENRIQUE PUENTE C., DOES EXIST AS INDICATED REFERENCE.

2. STATION FILES SHOW:

A. NO TRACES CARRERA AND FAMILY, PUENTE, LUIS ARGUETA, OR ALVARADO.

B. PRENSA LIBRE, 28 AUGUST 1968, REPORTED THAT RAFAEL ARGUETA ALVARADO ARRESTED DURING MAY DAY PARADE 1967 AND RELEASED 27 AUGUST 1968

Traces [illegible] [illegible]

M

[illegible] Station

CWH/1, Wit

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9675 S E C R E T

DUE LACK EVIDENCE.

C. ON 15 SEPT 1967 LIAISON REPORTED IT INVESTIGATING RIGOBERTO ARGUETA ALVARADO WHOSE NAME IN DOCUMENTS CAPTURED DURING RAID ON GUERRILLA MEETING SITE IN GUATEMALA CITY. HIS RESIDENCE GIVEN AS 11 AV. 25-22, ZONE 12, WHERE HE LIVED WITH MOTHER AND TWO BROTHERS. HIS SONS WORKED IN INTERIOR. PRENSA LIBRE OF 25 MAY 1967 AND 28 AUGUST 1968 REPORTED, RESPECTIVELY, THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL DETAINED 1 MAY 1967 AND REALEASED FROM PRISON AUGUST 1968 FOR LACK EVIDENCE.

D. HGGA-5975, 28 SEP 1967, REPORTED THAT LIAISON INVESTIGATING MIGUEL FRANCISCO ARGUETA ALVARADO WHO IT WAS LEARNED "HAD CONTACTS WITH SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR SABOTAGE AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES." LIAISON MADE ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT HIM BUT "DURING INTERVIEW HE SHOWED SIGNS OF FEAR INDICATING HE BELIEVED HIMSELF TO BE ASSASSINATION TARGET."

3. FILE: 201-248917. INDEX: ALVARADO, AND RAFAEL, RIGOBERTO, MIGUEL FRANCISCO ARGUETA ALVARADO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM
FRANCIS MARY — DY-175
WH/1 — 3E05
BRAN EXT. 4168 — TUBE DU7

DATE: 8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		11/8	68	RW	
REQUESTER					②	
RID/FILES	DT 6					
REQUESTER					③	
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7					
RID/201	DU-6					
RID/INDEX	DT-5					

OVER, 2" DB NL AC

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME ✓ ALVARADO, Candelaria	GIVEN NAMES
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED	201 NO. IF KNOWN
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	COMMENTS C20 firms NL
✓	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES | NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: RID | DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

ALVARADO, C.A.
DO3 ?

CIT COLOMBIA

FORMAL MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 7TH WYF TO BE HELD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA JUL. 59.

200-004-233.2
DIR. 28561 EC.
[illegible]
P3

166903

14-00000

SECRET

FROM
FRANCIS MARV
WH/1
EXT. 4168

DY-175
3E05
TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 8 November 1968

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TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9-11-68	
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DW-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

2113BNC

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: CABRERA, Juan

GIVEN NAMES

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

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201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (*If any*)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

SECRET

CARRERA, JUAN

056-004-109
HZP -05971
29 MAY 63
P1

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PANAMA
OCC ?
TREASURER OF THE CTRP. PLANS OF CP LABOR LDRS TO USE HIM IN EFFORT TO LEARN SOURCE OF FUNDS OF CRIT-AFFILIATED CTRP. /CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE LA REPUBLICA/.

085223

1 494 004

CARRERA, Juan

63-4-7-348
(TSS-852)

Communist involved in labor matters who escaped arrest

[illegible] FILED
[illegible]OCT 52
IN MAIN INDEX

085224

CARRERAS, Juan Durall

DURALL CARRERAS, Juan — Xref

100-2-[illegible]
([illegible]-52[illegible])
(Encl. 1)

12 APR [illegible]
THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN

085225

CARRERA, Juan Jose

201-40334-1
(HGG-165)
(11 May 53)

THIS [illegible] FILED
11 [illegible]
IN MAIN INDEX

085226

SECRET

SECRET

FROM FRANCIS MARV DY-175 BRAN WH/1 3E05 EXT. 4168 TUBE DU7	**NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST**
DATE 9 November 1963	RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9/11/63		
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME AGUETA, Rigoberto	GIVEN NAMES
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED	201 NO. IF KNOWN
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.) Guatemala City resident who possibly involved in subversive activities.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)	CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED YES NO
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	FILE TO RE REPT RID ...

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

ARGUETA, FNU
DOB ?

CIT GUATEMALA
INSPECTOR FOR FENIX BUS COMPANY GUATEMALA CITY
RECEIVED SCHOLARSHIP AND PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR
MOSCOW VIA MEXICO JAN 60.

035-004-124
HGG -01551
29 DEC 59
GUAT-00510

306942

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM
FRANCIS MARY — DY-175
WH/1 — 3E05
BRAN EXT. 4168 — TUBE DU7

DATE: 8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.:

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		9-21-68		
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: GARCIA de Carrera, Maria

GIVEN NAMES:

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA. ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*: Wife of Juan CARRERA

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
F			Guat	Guatemala City, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

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(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION *(If any)*:

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES ☐ NO ☐

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS:

FILE TO RE DEPT: RID ☐ DESK ☐

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER:

SECRET

FROM:
FRANCIS MARV
WH/1
EXT. 4168

DY-175
3E05
TUBE DU7

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 8 Nov 1968

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		11/5/68	[illegible]
REQUESTER				②
RID/FILES	DT-6			
REQUESTER				③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7			
RID/201	DU-6			
RID/INDEX	DT-5			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: [illegible]

GIVEN NAMES

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M			Guat	Chiquimula, Guatemala

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: 1 [illegible] listed

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

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(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: YES / NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: RID / DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, CSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

ARGUETA, LUIS BARRIOS

35-4-134-7
HGGA-1558
ENCL. 1
PAGE 3

THIS
CARD
FILED IN
PART
[illegible]

306977

ARGUETA, FNU
DOB ?

035-004-124
HGG -01551
29 DEC 59
GUAT-00510

CIT GUATEMALA
INSPECTOR FOR FENIX BUS COMPANY GUATEMALA CITY
RECEIVED SCHOLARSHIP AND PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR
MOSCOW VIA MEXICO JAN 60.

306942

ORIG: M. Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4137/1973
DATE: 6 November 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: c/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, c/WH/COG 5, c/RI/AN 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 40471

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7945 (IN 27533)*

6 Nov 68

1. HQS TRACES NEGATIVE RE RAFAEL ARGUETA AND ENRIQUE PUENTE.

2. FILE 201-248917, 201-798301 AND 50-9-11.

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LIRING/3 received brief typewritten unsigned letter which expressed happiness his release from Guatemala jail. Envelope was from Enrique Puente Men's Store in Guatemala City and writer identified self as Rafael Argueta.

WH/COG/OPS
WH/2/G

Calvin M. [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
for

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Liring-3

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

6 Nov 68

B. 201-798301
D. 50-9-11
201-248917

3 03 EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 18 — ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

DISSEM BY 11 PER ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
#78 C/WH 6

☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/S/PQ, C/DDP, ADDP 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 052055Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 7945

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Nov 63 IN 27533

m

RYBAT [illegible] LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7933 (IN 35321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE FUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6U AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1963 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY ______ AT ______ Z

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE VR

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7945 SECRET

ADDRESS TO USE IN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH HIM.)

3. LIRING-3 COMMENTED LETTER PROBABLY SIMPLY DESIGNED CHECK NEW COMMO CHANNEL. STATED HE HAS NEVER HEARD OF NAME RAFAEL ARGUETA A AND ASSUMES IT ALIAS OR NOTIONAL LETTER DROP. PLANS REPLY IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT AND ASKING "ARGUETA" WRITE NEXT LETTER DIRECTLY TO APARTMENT LIRING-4 RENTED DURING LIRING-3 ABSENCE. LIRING-3 WILL ASK FRIENDS TO EXPEDITE CONTACT "SINCE HE PLANNING TRAVEL".

4. IS THERE SOME WAY GUATEMALA CITY STATION CAN CHECK ON PARA 1 ADDRESS WITHOUT AT LEAST FOR MOMENT MAKING ON SPOT CHECK OR USING LIAISON?

5. FILE 201-245917, 201-793321.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: Marvin Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 41 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . C/RI/SD, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 01 23 12z Nov 68 CITE DIRECTOR 47408

TO MEXICO CITY [redacted] INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)*

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

Calvin M. Smith
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS
WH/2/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. [illegible]
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 18 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR RI(A), WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS

SECRET 240232Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 (Mexi) 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 7465 (-06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 6682 (IN 16895)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET EFFORT DETERMINE WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION ROWTON (UNDER PSEUDONYM UNDERSTANDABLE TO LIRING-3) UNABLE CONTACT LIRING-3 WIFE [illegible] FOR [illegible]. LETTER WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND URGE LIRING-3 PHONE ROWTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR DIRECTOR: ROWTON WHO RELUCTANT AT THIS POINT RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH LEFTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. FILE 20[illegible]

SECRET

1P 4

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MICROFILMED
NOV 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

B201-818342

24 OCT 68
201-798301

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/LIRING/Review of LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Attached is an operational review of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. Attention is also called to PBQ Parts I and II. Part I was sent as HMMA 30540 and part II is being prepared for pouching.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIRING-3 Review HEREWITH

Distribution:
② - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/att
3 - FILES

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30585

DATE
16 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 November, 1966.

Subject: Review and Assessment of LIRING Operation.

I. Background, Character and Assessment of LIRING/3:

1. Liring/3 (Subject) is a 26-year-old Mexican artist of the Diego Rivera School and an atheistic existentialist oriented toward the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, with relatively strong leftist political convictions. He has produced a fair amount of painting and had relatively good success in murals both in Cuba and Mexico, but has not succeeded in selling many of his works despite numerous expositions, sponsored by the Mexican Government plastic arts organization (Bellas Artes). Because of his family, educational and environmental background, Subject feels that his work has not been appreciated for its intrinsic worth by the Mexican Government and tends to blame his political convictions for this lack of acceptance. Subject, however, has, as he himself asserts, no feelings of bitterness or resentment. Although he frequently experiences the "anguish, forlornness and loneliness" of the existentialist, but he has not permitted himself to degenerate into a beatnik either in his personal or artistic life. Subject has confided to Rowton that he has no real friends and that he has withdrawn from society, the dictates of which he cannot accept. He enjoys the prospect of travel, especially abroad, "to develop his art" but also as an escape from the pressures and obligations of the social life he has been forced to lead in Mexico.

2. Shortly after he met Rowton, in April, 1966, Subject confessed that he felt himself at a critical point in his personal and artistic life. He indicated that he felt the paradoxes inherent in his philosophy were overwhelming and depressing him and that he welcomed friendship with Rowton, an experienced foreigner whom he felt he could trust implicitly. At one critical point, Subject quit his rather tedious job with the Ministry of Education (teaching art in a public school) with the comment that "everyone must make personal decisions and take risks, and I have decided to throw my lot in with you (Rowton) for better or worse. and so have quit the job since it was interfering with my availability". This he did without knowing any more about Rowton than his name, which technical surveillance revealed he did not accept as a true name, and with no guarantees of future financial support from Rowton. Rowton, in his conversations with Subject, has been careful not to reveal any data concerning his personal life and background, including his permanent or local address, providing Subject only with the number of a telephone answering service, and using the safehouse rented by Subject as a principal point of contact. Subject has accepted money from Rowton, at first only for previously approved expenses, and subsequently for his personal use, but has accepted Rowton's initiative in this matter, and made no demands on Rowton for remuneration for services rendered. He has been meticulous in accounting for funds and shown no reluctance to sign receipts presented to him by Rowton (with his true-name signature). Subject has confessed (and shown) an almost complete lack of experience in business and intelligence work, but has accepted Rowton's guidance, where required, without hesitation.

att. #1 to HMMA-30585

CS COPY

201-798301

B- Development of [illegible] by Rowton:

6. Rowton met Subject in April 1966 by cold approach in the art studio where Subject at the time was presenting his latest works under sponsorship of Bellas Artes. Rowton posed as a Greek businessman interested in Subject's style and his immediate objective at the time was to ascertain the address in New York City of Subject's wife's father (a Cuban of Chinese origin who had left Cuba as a refugee). Rowton, feeling that he had to present an above-board prospect to Subject to permit future meetings, alleged that he was anxious to arrange for the painting of a mural to be installed in a New York nightclub owned by a Greek friend of his (Nina Dmitri, owner and performer at the "La Chansonette"). Rowton felt that the painting [illegible] New York nightclub" would have the double advantage of determining Subject's sentiments toward working in New York City and in a bourgeois environment.

7. Subject reacted very favorably to the [illegible] approach and accepted Rowton's invitation to dinner in the company of Subject's wife the next evening. Both Subject and his wife were cautious in revealing any specific data concerning [illegible] but neither concealed their mutual approval of Castro's regime and dislike for the corruption in Mexico. As a result of this meeting Rowton realized that any attempt at a direct approach to either Subject or his wife, who was then employed part-time at the Cuban Consulate, would be counterproductive and that a more subtle approach would have to be developed. Rowton decided that a strong personal relationship developed with Subject would be productive and could eventually lead to useful production on Subject's part.

8. When, therefore, on 2 May 1966, Subject expressed gratification at having met Rowton and indicated that he wished to continue his friendly contacts, regardless of whether Rowton purchased his painting or arranged for the mural, Rowton ~~xx~~ moved in with an offer to "hire" Subject as his business associate on an unofficial basis, so that Subject could acquire a degree of independence financially and perhaps do some traveling for Rowton. In order to develop as much clandestinity as possible in his future contacts with Subject, Rowton explained that he was simply a tourist in Mexico and as such not permitted to engage in lucrative business activities. He would therefore have to depend on Subject's discretion in any dealings he might have with him. Subject accepted this as quite normal but pointed out to Rowton his limitations ~~xas~~ far as business training and experience went. In reply to Rowton's query, he did confess, however, that he had excellent contacts in Havana that could be exploited for business dealings with Cuba. He volunteered to make an exploratory trip to Havana to renew his friendship with the persons concerned. Rowton accepted this offer, not only to test Subject's story but also to seize the occasion to be in a position to provide Subject with money to make the trip and thus compromise him somewhat at the outset.

9. Rowton's next move was to explain to Subject that he had a long-term interest in Cuba and hoped to do a great deal of business in the future but first felt it was essential that both he and Subject develop the proper contacts inside to ensure success. Subject readily agreed to this and felt relieved that Rowton did not expect him to produce concrete results overnight. When Rowton, therefore suggested that Subject find and rent a safehouse for entertainment and development of prospective contacts, Subject set to work immediately without question. (Although Rowton's suggestion was first made on 17 June, Subject did not succeed in finding a suitable place until the end of July.) This project, however, gave Subject something specific and relatively clandestine to do for Rowton without seriously compromising any of his principles. Subject, as it developed later, was interested in such a hide-away, unknown even to his wife, for his own purposes.

off [illegible] with some friends. [illegible] then [illegible] Rowton his criticism of López' [illegible] that [illegible] but [illegible] his [illegible] functions(in the [illegible] López had [illegible] off his admonitions with the comment that there were more important things to do for the revolution. [illegible] with which López as well as [illegible] other Cuban officials, had treated Subject's friendly advice in the past, obviously cut Subject to the quick and fostered in him the resentment of a peasant toward his master. Taking this into consideration and in the hope of stirring up as much trouble for López and the Embassy as possible, the Station permitted Rowton to pass to Subject the highly restricted information that López had actually been arrested by the Mexican police for complicity in the arms smuggling ring that had recently been uncovered in their operations from Mexico into Guatemala. Rowton gave Subject enough details to make the story convincing and asked Subject to attribute the information to "Central American friends" and to stress that it was already inthe hands of the press. In addition Rowton suggested that Subject pass this information [illegible] to López as a hot tip so that López could discreetly disappear before the reporters managed to question him. When Subject did as requested by Rowton, López was apparently so overwhelmed with gratitude for Subject's good intentions that he informed the Ambassador the following morning (just before his [illegible] departure for Havana). Events then moved swiftly. The Ambassador called in Subject and expressed his personal appreciation for Subject's interest and help in this delicate matter and agreed with Subject that the involvement of Embassy personnel in arms smuggling was placing Cuban-Mexican relations in jeopardy. Overnight this raised Subject's status in the eyes of the Ambassador and his closest advisors (Curbelo and Cepeda) to that of a valued confident rather than simply a friend of the revolution. This obviously pleased Subject and made him all the more anxious to conceal the role of Rowton in the affair so that all the credit would continue to fall to him.

13. As a result Subject was subsequently called in by Curbelo and Cepeda and asked to offer his services to help the Tricontinental in its work in Central America. On Rowton's advice (which Subject sollicited) the offer was accepted on condition that the work to be done would be serious (i.e. worth the personal risks Subject would have to run) and that Subject would be permitted to work without the overt involvement of the local Embassy, These conditions were promptly accepted and Subject was invited to visit Havana again so that he could be briefed on the spot by Osmani Cienfuego and his staff.

14. Subject was thus catapulted into the level of IS activites,with Rowton maneuvered into a position of éminence grise. It remains to be seen following Subject's return from Havana (estimated at 21 November,1966) whether Subject will be entrusted with secret requirements by the Tricontinental, but it appears certain at this point that Rowton will be able to provide full guidance to Subject and to steer the operations he might be engaged in toward targets of interest to ______ : WOFACT

C- Biographical Data Elicited from LIRING/3:

15. Subject was born in Mexico City in 1930 of a middle class family. Subject's grandfather was a well-known textile merchant who served some 12 years as president of the Chamber of Commerce. At least one of Subject's aunts is currently well-to-do and the owner of several apartment houses in Mexico City. Subject has at present little or no contact with his family.

16. At the age of 15 Subject left home to join the Mexican Navy. Subject has commented to Rowton that his childhood was not particularly happy and that his mother and father separated, eventually, when he was in his teens. It appears likely that Subject left home as a result of family dissension. Subject states that his desire to travel and see the world was very strong at the time he joined the navy.

17. Inasmuch as the legal age for enlistment was 18, Subject had to have his birth certificate altered to show that he had been born in 1927 rather than [illegible]. As a consequence [illegible] Subject's official documents now show his birth-date as [illegible], including his passport.

18. Subject served a three-year hitch in the Navy and visited nearly all the ports of Mexico and many of Central America. Subject's speciality appears to have been in the quarter master branch. There he learned the rudiments of navigation and ship-handling. [illegible] he left the naval service. Subject entered the University of Mexico and took courses in Archaeology and Anthropology for the next two years. Subject simultaneously developed a strong interest in painting and sculpture and over the next five or so xx years, studied under such masters as Rivera and Siqueiros.

19. Subject was married in 1950 at the age of twenty years to a young Mexican woman from Leon, GTO. and during the next ten years had at at least four children by her. He divorced his wife in about 1960, just prior to his departure for Cuba, but he had not been on good terms with her for several years prior to the divorce. From about 1954 to 1960, subject worked in the Mexican Government Social Service among the Indians in the southern states of Mexico. Subject attributes some of the tension that arose between him and his wife to this employment venture. He commented to Rowton that his first wife wanted to live a quiet normal life in Mexico City and was unwilling to share with him the hardships of social work in remote areas of tropical Mexico. During this period Subject gradually developed his own style in painting and began to establish close contacts with Mexican art circles.

20. Subject went to Cuba in about 1960 "to join the revolution", apparently as a result of his increasingly leftist political sympathies. He did a relatively large amount of painting and mural work during his four-year residence in Cuba, while at the same time working in the Ministry of Labor and Education. In about 1961 he married a Cuban woman of Chinese origin from Santiago de Cuba and the following year a (girl) child was born to them in Havana. Subject has told Rowton that he has had very little contact with his first wife since his divorce and pays no alimony. He added that his family, however, has continued to take an interest in his first wife and the children of his first marriage and has helped to support them financially. During his stay in Cuba, Subject developed close friendship with many Cuban revolutionaries, particularly Arnol Rodriguez, whose wife worked with Subject in the Ministry of Education at the time when Arnol Rodriguez was serving as Minister of Labor.

21. Subject returned to Mexico City in 1964 with his new wife and child (whom he had naturalized as a Mexican citizen). By this time Subject had become a professional artist but supplemented the rather modest income he acquired from the sale of his painting by teaching art privately and in Mexican public schools. His monthly income during [illegible] and early 1966 did not exceed 3.000 pesos.

Wallace B. Rowton

[illegible] Rowton

3 ck EDITIONS

LIRING-3 ?

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S E C R E T 052255Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7945

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Nov 68 IN 27533

m

RYBAT [illegible] LIRING-3

REF MEXICO CITY 7933 (IN 25321)

1. LIRING-3 RECEIVED BRIEF TYPEWRITTEN UNSIGNED LETTER DATED 22 OCT FROM "RAFAEL ARGUETA A." LETTER WHICH CONTAINS MANY TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS EXPRESSED HAPPINESS LIRING-3 FINALLY RELEASED AND HOPED HE WILL SOON RECOVER FROM THE "GRAN ANGUSTIA" CAUSED BY "MY COUNTRY." WRITER CONCLUDED WITH APOLOGIES FOR MISTAKES IN ORTHOGRAPHY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE SEE LIRING-3 AGAIN. ASKED LIRING-3 TO REPLY TO HIM AT FOLLOWING ADDRESS: 2 AVE 27, 57, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. RATHER THAN TO ONE APPEARING AS RETURN ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE.

2. ENVELOPE IS AIRMAIL STATIONERY "LA DALIA AZUL, ENRIQUE PUENTE C, ARTICULOS PARA CABALLEROS, 6U AVENIDA Y 10A CALLE, TEL: 44-72, GUATEMALA, C.U." WITH RETURN ADDRESS ON BACK: RAFAEL ARGUETA A., 11 AV. 25 22, ZONA 12, GUATEMALA C.A. ENVELOPE IS POSTMARKED 22 OCTOBER 1968 AND IS ADDRESSED TO LIRING-3 AT CALLE HAVRE 7, COL. JUAREZ, MEXICO, D.F. (SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICANA WHICH LIRING-3 HAD GIVEN TO JUAN AND MIGUEL LEON BARRIOS AS BEST

Chovell/1

Kerbe

SECRET

14-00000

MF

ORIG: Marvin Francis/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 1 Nov 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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01 23 12z Nov 68

CITE DIRECTOR 47408

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 7900 (IN 25321)*

INDEX

ABSTRACT

1. SUBJECT TO GUATEMALA STATION CONCURRENCE, WE BELIEVE LIRING/3 SHOULD BE CANDID WITH LIRING/10 AND TELL HIM WHAT AND AS MUCH AS HE WANTS TO KNOW. WE FEEL IF LIRING/3 ATTEMPTED WITHHOLD OR DISTORT DETAILS HIS IMPRISONMENT, IT COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OPERATION SINCE LIRING/10 PROBABLY COULD CHECK OTHER SOURCES FOR ACCURACY.

2. THERE NO URGENCY FOR LIRING/3 MAKE TRIP TO PBRUMEN. WE BELIEVE IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR HIM TO REMAIN MEXICO AND ATTEMPT BECOME INVOLVED LOCAL PBRUMEN/GUATEMALA EXILE ACTIVITIES. IF, HOWEVER, LIRING/10 SUGGESTS LIRING/3 GO PBRUMEN, HE SHOULD NOT HESITATE DO SO.

3. DEFER TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE WAR NAMES.

4. FILE 50-6-141/3, 201-798301 AND 201-776733.

MICROFILMED
DEC 12 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

END OF MESSAGE

Calvin M. Smith
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

WH/COG/OPS
WH/2/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

VB. 201-798301 Liring-3
B. 201-776733 Liring-10

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WH/1

S E C R E T 010132Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7920

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 68 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEDGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

2. LIRING-3 HAS BEGUN GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ARREST, DETENTION AND CONTACTS ESTYLISHED DURING AND AFTER RELEASE. ASKED ROWTON KEEP SENSITIVE POINTS IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, PARTICULARLY FROM LIRING-4, WHOM FEELS WOULD NOT APPROVE HIS CONTINUED POLITICAL ACTIVITY EVEN ON BEHALF ROWTON. HIGHLIGHTS DEBRIEFING FOLLOW:

A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA". FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 400 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

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1 Nov 68

201-798301

14-00000

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7930 S E C R E T

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HUGS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

B. BROTHERS JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS, WHO CLAIMED TO BE G-2 FAR, WHO ALSO SHARED CELLBLOCK AND REMAINED IN CLOSE CONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGHOUT HIS DETENTION, SHOWED LIRING-3 REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED JULY FROM "RELIABLE FAR SOURCES MEXICO" DESCRIBING LIRING-3 AS "ANARQUICO, SIN PARTIDO, CONDUCTA BUENA, CONFIABLE, RESPONSABLE PERO DIFICIL CONTROLAR." FOLLOWING THIS GENERALLY FAVORABLE REPORT JUAN AND MIGUEL (LEON) BARRIOS DISCUSSED FAR SITUATION FREELY WITH LIRING-3 AND ARRANGED FOR SECRET CONTACT WITH FAR REPRESENTATIVE MEXICO "PAVEL". ALSO TOLD LIRING-3 MONTES COMPLETELY STRIPPED OF POWER SINCE HAD IN FACT DESERTED REVOLUTION BY REMAINING OUTSIDE COUNTRY FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. MONTES CURRENTLY MEXICO WHERE EXPECTED REMAIN. FAR HAS COMPLETELY BROKEN WITH GUAT CP. THIS ACCORDING LIRING-3 REFLECTED IN COOLNESS EVIDENT BETWEEN LEON BROTHERS AND FRANCISCO CORADO, CP RESPONSIBLE IN PAVON PRISON. FAR HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVING FINANCIAL OR MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM PBRUMEN FOR PAST SIX MONTHS SINCE REFUSAL FAR ACCEPT PBRUMEN TERMS (SUPERVISION PBRUMEN EXPERTS, FAVORED POSITION

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7920 S E C R E T

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS (IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING -3 TOLD RCWION HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA"WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (DONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING -3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL LIRING 10 HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO"PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY AND IN PBRUMEN. PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7923 SECRET

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-798301.

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ACTION WH6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. C/R/SD, C/WH/COG 5, DCI, DFI 2

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S E C R E T 012132Z NOV 63 CITE MEXICO CITY 7922

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT PBRUMEN LIRING-3

1 Nov 63 IN 25321

1. ROWTON REESTABLISHED CONTACT LIRING-3 29 OCT AND BEGAN DETAILED DEBRIEFING EVENING SAME DAY. ROWTON ALLEGED HE ARRANGED RELEASE THROUGH BROTHER OF BUSINESS CONTACT WHO COLONEL GNA. LIRING-3, WHO ACCEPTED STORY WITHOUT QUESTION, STATED HE UNDERSTOOD ROWTON COULD NOT HAVE ARRANGED EARLY RELEASE FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS AND FELT ALMOST INTOLERABLE SUFFERING WORTH PAIN SINCE HAS COME OUT IN BEST POSSIBLE POSITION VISA-A-VIS FAR AS WELL AS PBRUMEN.

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A. ROLANDO "CEBOLLITA", FAR OFFICIAL, WHO SHARED CELL BLOCK 422 WITH LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT ~~OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRING-3 TOLD LATTER THAT HE HAD SENT REPORT~~ OF ARREST FAVORABLE TO LIRIN-3 AND PLACING BLAME ON FRANCISCO

file LIRING-3 201

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INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7922 S E C R E T

LARA AND CARLOS PERSABAL TO FAR HDQS THROUGH HIS MOTHER WHO ALLOWED TO VISIT HIM PRIOR TO HIS EXECUTION.

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PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 7920 SECRET

FAR MEMBERS TRAINED IN PBRUMEN) ALL FUNDS (IN PAST CHANNELED THROUGH GUAT CP ETC).

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE INSTRUCTED LEON BROTHERS HAVE "PAVEL" GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM (DETERMINE HIS ADDRESS) THROUGH SALON DE LA PLASTICA MEXICAN BY POSING AS PERSON REPRESENTING "VILETA" WHO INTERESTED IN BUYING LIRING-3 WATERCOLORS (DONE IN PRISON). LIRING-3 PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WORK IN SIQUEIROS STUDIO CUERNAVACA AND ARRANGE SOONEST BELLAS ARTES SPONSORED EXPOSTION HIS LATEST PAINTINGS.

4. WILL POUCH COMPLETE LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING AS SOON IN COMPLETED. STATION HOPES LIRING AND PARTICULARLY LIRING-10 WILL TRY ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AS HE CAN BE EXPECTED HA HAVE INFO OF VALUE TO PBRUMEN REGIME. STATION INTENDS HAVE LIRING-3 TELL LIRING-10 ENOUGH TO WET HIS APPETITE AND CONVINCE HIM LIRING-3 SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED AT SOME LENGTH. LIRING-3 WOULD TELL LIRING 10 HE WILLING OUTLINE DETAILS HIS ORDEAL INCLUDING INFO "PBRUMENS SHOULD KNOW" BUT ONLY TO HIGH PBRUMEN FUNCTIONARY AND IN PBRUMEN. PRIOR TO POSSIBLE LIRING-3 TRIP PBRUMEN, SUGGEST HQS, GUATEMALA CITY AND MEXICO CITY STATIONS DETERMINE WHAT CAN BE PASSED PBRUMENS. CONFERENCE IN GUATEMALA

[illegible]

Langley

MFR 7714 22 Oct

SECRET

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 7900 SECRET

CITY BETWEEN ROWTON, FRADYER AND GUAT CITY STATION REPS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ASSUME GUAT NAMES MENTIONED ABOVE ARE "WAR NAMES". CAN GUATEMALA CITY SHED SOME LIGHT THEIR IDENTITIES.

6. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

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INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, RI/AN, PI, CI/OPS, FI 2,

S E C R E T 241826Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9614

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

24 OCT 68 IN 20246

PBRUMEN LIRING/3

REF: MEXICO CITY 7775 (IN 19623)

1. ESMICA/13 REPORTED LIRING/3 AND COMPANION DEPARTED GUATEMALA 18 OCTOBER 1968 VIA TACA FLIGHT 210 FOR MEXICO CITY. THEY ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ESCORT DIRECTLY FROM PRISON FARM TO AIRPORT.

2. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

WH file: LIKHUME 0/S
50-6-128/3
← LIRING-4

cc's: LIRING-3

201.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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file LIRING/3 201

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 240026Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7775 24 OCT 68 IN 19623

GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

[illegible] LIRING-3

REF A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (-06501)

B. GUATEMALA CITY [illegible] (IN 16895)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE DISCREET CHECK DETERMINING WHETHER LIRING-3 FREED. IF NOT YET RELEASED WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHEN HE SCHEDULED BE AND HOW WILL RETURN MEXICO.

2. TO FACILITATE SUBSEQUENT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 AND OPEN DOOR TO POSSIBLE CLAIM HE INSTRUMENTAL IN LIRING-3 RELEASE STATION PLANNING HAVE HORTON SEND LIRING-3 LETTER UNDER DOUBLE ENVELOPE VIA MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LETTER ON MEXICAN BELLAS ARTES OR OTHER SUITABLE STATIONERY WILL MENTION HORTON [illegible] LIRING-3 UNABLE CONTACT [illegible] LETTER WILL HINT AT IMMINENT RELEASE AND [illegible] LIRING-3 [illegible] HORTON ANSWERING SERVICE AS SOON AS RETURNS MEXICO.

3. FOR [illegible] T HORTON WAS RELUCTANT AT THIS POINT RECONTACT LIRING-3 THROUGH LEFTIST FRIENDS OR CUBANS SO FAR UNABLE [illegible] CONTACT WITH HIM.

4. [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CA5, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2

19 Oct 68 IN 16895

S E C R E T 191835Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9602 GUAT

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 7486 (IN 06501)

1. 19 OCTOBER GUATEMALAN DAILY PRENSA LIBRE REPORTED COURT OF APPEALS CONFIRMED DECISION OF LOWER COURT ABSOLVING LIRING-3 AND COMPANION OF CHARGES VIOLATION LAW OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. NO MENTION MADE WHETHER THEY ACTUALLY RELEASED FROM CUSTODY.

2. WILL REPORT ANY INFO RECEIVED ON RELEASE LIRING-3

3. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

AN. JW	
AB X	
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~~PS~~	
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WH/1	

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19 OCT 68

201-798301

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ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☐ RID COPY

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INFO

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SECRET 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486

NCIS

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 OCT 68 IN 06501 JP

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35502 PARA 5

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

B.201-818842

CS COPY

SECRET

5 Oct 68

201-798301

Liring 3

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 SECRET

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PBRUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798501.

SECRET

SECRET

57

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET 23

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ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 4167:1973
DATE: 4 October 1968

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BY 46 PER #

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR DIR 38881

04 20 23z OCT 68

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO: MEXICO CITY

4 Oct 68

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02580)*

B. DIRECTOR 36584**

1. APPRECIATE REF A RESPONSE. AGREE WE DO NOT WANT SURFACE WOFIRM INTEREST LIRING-3 OR WIFE TO GUATS IF CAN BE AVOIDED.

2. REF B WAS SENT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH LIRING-3'S CASE OFFICER, ROWTON WHO STILL TDY HQS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ROWTON, HOWEVER, WE PREFER GUAT STATION TAKE NO ACTION ON REFERENCE B REQUEST UNTIL ROWTON RETURNS MEXICO. HE CAN THEN ATTEMPT OBTAIN UPDATED READING ON LIRING-3 STATUS FROM LIRING-4 OR OTHER SOURCE, AFTER WHICH ROWTON AND MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DECIDE IF ESMAJOR-20 INTERVENTION WARRANTED.

3. INDEX 201-248917, 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
OCT 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

AH
AB X
TX
PB X
DX
D/S
EX
WH/1

Liring-3
4 OCT 68
201-798301

CS COPY

B 201-248917
B201-818842

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT:
DATE:

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OCT 10 11 51 AM '60

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38881

PAGE 2

TO

WH/1 COMMENT: *Indicated liaison contact [illegible] could attempt intercede on LIRING-3's behalf to learn when his trial would take place or possibly to obtain his release. Station reluctant surface WOFIRM interest however without Mexico City Station concurrance.

**Headquarters commented on fact LIRING-4 recently took up residence in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City because lacked funds pay rent. Also asked Guatemala Station if could arrange for early release LIRING-3 and associate from jail through high level Guat official.

WH/COG/~~[illegible]~~

WH/2/G

Calvin M. Smith
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO FILE VR C/WH6, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2,

GUAT

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SECRET 301842Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9517 IN 02560

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

ABSTRACT INDEX

WH/C/ SP

1. GUATEMALA CITY STATION IS WILLING TO USE ITS LIAISON RELATIONSHIP IN ANY WAY NECESSARY TO SUPPORT UNILATERAL WOFIRM OPERATIONS. NEVERTHELESS IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT AFTER 6 MONTHS, REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST IN LIRING-3 IS SOMEWHAT AWKWARD. WHILE GUATEMALAN CITY STATION IS NOT FULLY COGNIZANT OF ALL OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS LIRING-4 OPERATION AND ITS VALUE TO WOFIRM, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BY ALLOWING MORE TIME LIRING-3 AND COMPANION WILL BE RELEASED WITHOUT NEED INDICATE WOFIRM INTEREST. THIS APPEARS MORE IN LINE WITH MEXICO CITY STATION POSITION THEY DEFINITELY NOT IN FAVOR INTERVENTION WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES WHICH WOULD FINGER LIRING-3 AS SOME TYPE WOFIRM ASSET (MEXICO CITY 5984).

2. IF MEXICO CITY HAS CHANGED ABOVE POSITION AND NOW AGREES WOFIRM INTEREST CAN BE INDICATED, SUGGEST FOLLOWING APPROACH: STATION WILL ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 THAT MEXICO CITY HAS DEVELOPED AN OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN LIRING-3'S WIFE BUT UNABLE PROCEED WITH OPERATION BECAUSE OF HER CONCERN OVER FATE OF HER HUSBAND. WE CAN THEN ASK ESMAJOR-20 ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHEN TRIAL

3

MICROFILMED
OCT 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

30 Sept 68

201-818842

SECRET

201-798301

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 9517 S E C R E T

SCHEDULED AND INDICATION WHAT SENTENCE MAY BE. BELIEVE ANY INTEREST

~~SB~~ ESMAJOR-20 MAY REVEAL TO THE COURTS WILL DEVELOP RESPONSE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO REVEALING WOFIRM INTEREST DIRECTLY IN LIRING-3, THE STATION CAN SO ADVISE ESMAJOR-20 AND REQUEST HIS HELP.

3. FILE: 201-248917.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

RID

14-00000

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: 0 PBRUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES 201-815842

MICROFILMED
OCT 1 4 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PBRUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: 12 reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

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201-815842
[redacted]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 35502

DATE: 26 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also re-enforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals. It would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON. [illegible]

[illegible]

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

David D. Falkner
for Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

17 May,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Punto Blanco Restaurant from about 1900 until 2015 on 16/5/68. LIRING/4 had telephoned Rowton's answering service and left a message that "Dr. Barragán would see him at his office"at that time and date.

2. LIRING/4 reported that she had learned that seven Guatemalans residing in Mexico City had been arrested along with Rodolfo Sandoval. She had learned this from Manuel Marcué Pardiñas but was not able to learn the identities of the other seven. She recalled that Marcué had said that Sandoval had been arrested on 5 May,1968, just after his wife had arrived from Guatemala, and that he, Marcué,was burdened with the support not only of Francisco Lara's family (wife,mother and children) but now of Sandoval's wife. LIRING/4 understood that Marcué had moved these dependents into one of his several houses in the city. LIRING/4 added that finally she decided to avoid any further contact with Marcué since he has become a complete nuisance, telephoning and droppping in unannounced at all hours of the night.

3. LIRING/4 also reported that she had obtained a job at the Secretaría de Comercio y Industria,paying 1,200 pesos permonth, through Sergio Gonzalez Marin, and had started working regular hours (1000-1400) on 13/5/68. When she,however, mentioned this to Zacosta (FNU,phon.),Director of the office of Relaciones Culturales of the Sec Relaciones Exteriores, he told her to quit the job immediately since it was not legal for her to work, particularly in a government office where official records were kept. He promised to help her find a job where she could work on the Q.T. without jeopardizing her immigration status.

4. LIRING/4 also reported that she had received three short notes from LIRING/3 mailed from the prison where he is being detained. She stated that she was reassured by these letters that L/3 is in reasonably good health, despite the fact that he and his fellow arr/estees were not given any food for nine days following their arrest on 13/4/68.

5. LIRING/4 stated that she had talked to LIRING/2 after his return from PBRUMEN and found him very suntanned and thinner. L/2 told her that he had been cutting cane and had gotten engaged to a local woman while he was "on vacation". L/2 stated that he most probably would remain in Mexico through the Olympics,although he did not state when he planned to get married. L/2 regretted that he and his office could not help L/4 financially,but he encouraged L/4 to visit the office whenever she wished.

SECRET

6. LIRING/4 also told Rowton that she had managed to find a suitable apartment in the Edificio Condesa, Letra A, #6, for 1,100 pesos per month, through her friend, Blanca Peña, who lives in apartment 2 of Letra O. She added that she had overcome the problem of the fiador by applying to a sr. Muñoz who advertised in the newspaper and provided her with a certain sra. Gloria Beltrán, Calle Tajin 24, Col. Navarte (at a fee of 330 pesos). She also stated that she has already given the administrator of the edificio Condesa at 300 peso "gratificación" to hold the apartment until she can arrange the fiador contract.

7. Rowton then suggested that LIRING/4 might consider making her trip to PBRUMEN in the near future since it appeared to him an ideal time. L/4 replied that, although she felt obliged to make the trip in view of her previous commitment to Rowton, she felt it premature. She stressed her continued anxiety over the welfare of L/3, commenting that she was the only person who could be counted on to correspond with him, and that such correspondence from PBRUMEN would be very difficult and slow. Rowton then suggested that perhaps L/4 might be able to obtain a visa to visit L/3 for a short time to discuss with him the desirability of the trip and arrange to provide him with paints and canvasses. L/4 agreed that this would ease her mind and permit her to make the trip to PBRUMEN with less concern but she wondered whether a trip to Guatemala, provided, of course, that she could get the visa, might possibly make matters worse for L/3 since L/4 would have to travel on her PBRUMEN passport. Rowton agreed with this and suggested the following: (a) L/4 write immediately to the Mexican Consul asking him his opinion and requesting him to check it out with L/3; (b) L/4 discuss the matter soonest with L/2, explaining that she has decided to make her trip to PBRUMEN during L/3's imprisonment but that she hoped to visit him before leaving Mexico. I/4 agreed and added that she would invite L/2 to dinner at the home of Blanca Peña (de Amand) where she was currently staying as a house guest.

8. Rowton stressed that he did not wish under any circumstances to "force L/4 to make the trip to PBRUMEN, but he felt the time most opportune and he was not in a position financially to assist L/4 to any significant degree if she remained in Mexico. Rowton added that he failed to see how L/4 could earn enough in any "unofficial" job she might obtain. L/4 agreed to think the matter over and give Rowton her decision at their next meeting scheduled for 1300 on 20/5/68.

Wallece B. Rowton

SECRET

20 May,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Conversation with LIRING/2.

1. At 1300 on 20 May,1968, LIRING/4 reported to Rowton at the Punto Blanco restaurant that she had seen LIRING/2 at the LIRING offices and, as instructed by Rowton, discussed with him her difficult financial situation resulting from the detention of LIRING/3. She then stated that she was seriously considering taking her long planned trip to IBRUNE, since there she would be able to resolve the problem of living expenses. LIRING/2 sympathized with her but asked her not to make any rash decision. He pointed out that although her temporary financial problem would be solved, the moral obligation she had to follow LIRING/3's case from as close to Guatemala as possible would argue in favor of her waiting a little more. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she felt that LIRING/2 was prompted to say this in light of a comment she had just made to him that a certain Lic. Castillo, a Guatemalan lawyer affiliated with the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City, had gotten in touch with her over the weekend and told her he had come to Mexico City in connection with LIRING/3's case which he was handling at the request of the Embassy. (LIRING/4 told Rowton that Castillo was staying in room 904 of the El Presidente Hotel and that she talked to him there for about 15 minutes.)

2. LIRING/2 then said that he would do everything he could to find some sort of work to help LIRING/4 financially. He commented that work in the LIRING offices proper was out of the question, since the only persons employed there now are party members sent from the IBRUNEN capital. He added, however, that he would propose to the LIRING "consejo" that LIRING/4 be given a position in the outside cultural office. He stressed that he could not promise anything, but he would do what he could to convince the powers that be.

3. LIRING/4 promised Rowton to press LIRING/2 for this job since it would indicate the extent to which the LIRING Chief trusted her and give her some official access to the establishment, limited though it might be.

W.B. Rowton

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SECRET

12 June,1968

Subject: WALLACE B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/4.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Diana Restaurant,Calle Mississippi, from 1300 until about 1410 on 11 June,1968. LIRING/4 reported that she had finally moved into the apartment in the Edificio Condesa with the few pieces of furniture of the Tacubaya apartment. She stated that she intended to remain in close touch with her friend Blanca Peña de Amand and, of course, Catalina Cepero, at whose homes she hoped to be able to take her main meals. LIRING/4 added that she was still attempting to find some sort of work to help her meet her expenses, as well as to find a person, preferably a PBRUMEN student, to rent a room in her apartment.

2. With regard to employment LIRING/4 stated that LIRING/2 had told her the previous week that his recommendation that she been employed in the (outside) LIRING cultural office had been turned down and consequently she had appealed to Mexican friends to help her find employment. She also told Rowton that she had queried LIRING/2 about PBRUMEN students who might share her apartment but was told that the only female students (two) at present in Mexico were studying in Pátzcuaro.

3. LIRING/4 continued that she had been receiving letters regularly from LIRING/3 directly from his place of confinement. She showed Rowton a portion of one of the letters in which LIRING/3 stated that there were about 2,000 prisoners in all and that he feels obliged to share whatever food he can purchase with the money sent to him by LIRING/4 with six others who are closest to him and whose relatives cannot provide even the essentials of a basic diet. According to LIRING/4, LIRING/3 has not complained about what appear to be very difficult conditions but has revealed his constant fear of physical violence, the threat of which he feels hangs over the prison. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she had finally obtained officially notarized statemants from the proper Mexican authorities testifying to LIRING/3's bona fides as an artist, as requested by the Mexican Consul. She gave Rowton a letter from the latter which requests this information(copy of which is attached).

4. LIRING/4, in reply to Rowton's queries, stated that she still hoped to be able to make the trip to PBRUMEN but could not consider leaving Mexico at this time in view of LIRING/3's situation and the fact that she was the only point of contact he had on the outside. Rowton sympathized with her but stressed that his ability to help her financially was limited by her

SEC

performance in terms of the contract between them. Rowton reminded LIRING/4 that he contract had terminated as of 15 May, 1968, and could be extended only on the condition that she would be able to make the trip. He added that he felt he could pay her for the period 15 May until 15 June, 1962, but that would have to constitute a final payment unless LIRING/4 could commit herself to future production. Rowton added that in addition he would have to deduct the 1,875 pesos he gave to her as a travel advance inasmuch as this money was not used for the purpose intended.

5. LIRING/4 replied that, much to her regret, she could not make any firm commitment regarding the trip at the moment. She stated that she was attempting to maintain friendly relations with the LIRING personnel but had to be cautious in the light of LIRING/3's admonition to her to avoid contact with the establishment ("la casa grande" as he described it. She then stated that she had attended a play on the evening of 7 June at which she met socially with LIRING personnel in the audience. She added that LIRING/10 greeted her cordially and that she spoke briefly with LIRING/9 and LIRING/13 as well as LIRING/16. LIRING/4 also stated that she had learned from LIRING/17, who had just returned from an unexpected TDY that their mutual friend "Echemendía" had been called up on the carpet for the inferior job he had done during his last commercial mission to Mexico City. LIRING/4 also reported that she had been given a very brief note from her friend Yolanda hand-carried by LIRING/17 in which Yolanda wrote that she as still hoping that LIRING/4 would be able to make the trip.

ROWTON COMMENT: Rowton feels that LIRING/4 will make the trip to PBRUMEN wit in the next two months or sooner, provided she is assured that LIRING/3 is resigned to his fate and that everything has been done to support his appeal. Rowton has told LIRING/4 that he can give her only minimum financial support in the future, and that only on behalf of LIRING/3. Rowton feels that LIRING/4 will have great difficulty supporting herself even on a subsistence level during the next month, and will probably reconsider her decision regarding the trip. Rowton feels he should not put any direct pressure on LIRING/4 in the light of her personal situation.

SECRE Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

[illegible]-INA. DEJA R[illegible] [illegible]OS C[illegible]LLOS. NO
VAYAS A LA CA[illegible] GRANDE. URGE QUE
ENVIES DIRECTAMENTE VARITA MÁGICA.
BESOS: CARLOS

GUATEMALA

VIA AIR MAIL

Srta.
BLANCA PEÑA
EDIFICIO CONDESA LETRA "C" DEPTO. 2
AV. VERACRUZ Y MATEHUALA
(ENTRADA POR MATEHUALA)
MEXICO 11. D.F.

SECRET

Ing. Octavio R. Serrano
Cónsul General de México

SECRET

Guatemala, 21 de mayo de 1968.

Sra. Miriam Chichay de Jurado.
México, D. F.

Estimada Sra:

Me refiero a su grata carta de 17 del actual para informar a Ud. que Carlos se encuentra sin novedad, su aspecto físico es inmejorable y su ánimo muy levantado, pues ha sabido asimilar esta emergencia con filosofía.

Respecto a su situación, estamos bastante optimistas pues confiamos ampliamente en la rectitud del juez. Yá se presentaron tres testigos de descargo y el el curso de la presente semana se tomará declaración a otros dos. Hemos corrido con la suerte de que para todas las diligencias los plazos se han acortado al máximo.

Ni un solo momento lo hemos dejado solo, tanto a él como a Manuel, pues constantemente se les ha estado visitando, unas veces nuestro Encargado de Negocios, otras nuestro abogado asesor y el suscrito.

Su carta anterior la recibió en propias manos y tambien le informé de la tarjeta que Ud. me puso.

Tanto la Sra. Marcué de Persabal, como la esposa de Manuel, los estuvieron visitando casi a diario durante su estancia en ésta. No les ha faltado nada pues la Sra. Marcué dejó 175 dolares para que se les estuviera proviendo de lo necesario. A Carlos se le llevó un block para dibujo que pidió y se les llevan periodicamente cigarros, etc.

El jueves iré a verlos de nuevo y yá le informaré de su carta.

No creo que sea necesario que venga Ud. pues puede tener la seguridad de que estamos haciendo todo lo que está en nuestras manos por resolverles su situación a la brevedad posible. No sería de lo malo que esté Ud. en contacto con la Sría de Relaciones para estar al tanto del caso, pues estoy informando constantemente del curso del proceso. Creo que será cuestión de más o menos tiempo pero tengo confianza en que todo se resolverá favorablemente.

Por conducto de la esposa de Manuel le envié recado que sería conveniente enviara una constancia de Bellas Artes abonando la conducta de su esposo y que este documento lo llevara a legalizar ante el Consulado de Guatemala en México (Vallarta # 1) pues ayudaría mucho para probar su solvencia moral.

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Perdóneme si con anterioridad no le había informado, pero consideré que era innecesario hacerlo mientras no se tuviera algo concreto como es la declaración de los testigos de descargo.

Tenga confianza y calma que estamos viendo éste caso con profundo interés y simpatía.

Le ruego saludar de mi parte a mi buen amigo Daniel (su suegro) de quien hace tiempo no tengo noticias y decirle que su amigo de Arriaga lo recuerda con afecto.

Procuraré tenerla informada y puede escribirme cuantas veces lo desee.

Suyo afmo. atto. y S. S.

SECRET

[illegible] mía:

[illegible] [illegible] al tope para un asunto que preocupa mucho; ¿[illegible] [illegible] la [illegible] de los niños? [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible]

Cuando la [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ya te lo pregunta... (SEA CUAL FUERE LA) mándame decir (como tú sabes) a la prisión [illegible] directamente. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] nombre. Toda la correspondencia está censurada.

Lee la carta que mandaste al Consul. NO SE TE OCURRA POR NINGUN MOTIVO SALIR DE MEXICO.

Recibe todo mi cariño

Carlos

SECRET

SEC

18 June,1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1300,18/6/68; Diana Restaurant.
3. Date and Site of Next Meeting: 1030, 20/6/68; Diana Restaurant.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent: LIRING/4 reported to Rowton that she had received two distressing letters from LIRING/3 complaining about the miserable conditions under which he is living - very meager food, unsanitary quarters,and the constant fear of physical violence. LIRING/4 showed Rowton a paragraph of one of the letters in which LIRING/3 asks her to appeal to the "socio" to influence the judge by a gratificación of 100 quetzals so that he would dismiss the case when it finally came to trial early the following month. LIRING/3 stated that the judge to be influenced was a certain Juan Sanchez, Oficial Tercero del Juzgado Cuarto de Primera Instancia. LIRING/3 added that he felt there was no other solution, since it had become evident that the Mexican Embassy could do nothing to speed up the final release and that if Rowton could not intervene, anything could happen.

   LIRING/4 also reported that she had been asked by LIRING/9 to see him the next day (19/6/68) at his office. She did not know the purpose of the invitation, but assumed LIRING/9 wanted to be briefed on the latest developments in the LIRING/3 case.
5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent: Rowton sympathized with LIRING/4 in her distress over the desperate situation being faced by LIRING/3 but stressed that intervention on his part was not as easy as LIRING/3 might think. He pointed out that since LIRING/4 to date had not been able to make the [illegible] trip he could not ask his own colleagues in Europe to intervene through their Guatemalan government contacts and that therefore anything that he could do himself would not be effective. LIRING/4 did not volunteer any indication of her intention regarding the trip, and Rowton felt he could not press her in view of her frame of mind at the time. He suggested that they meet again after LIRING/4 talked with LIRING/9 in the hope that the latter might make some important comments on the case.

SEC

W. . Rowton

SECR

9 July,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Meeting with LIRING/11.

1. After several days of attempts by Rowton to met with LIRING/11 in the vicinity of his (LIRING/11's) residence(which is about six blocks from Rowton's home) Rowton finally succeeded at about 1600 on 5 July,1968.

2. Rowton hadchecked the home address of LIRING/11 about 1550 that day and when he had found that LIRING/11's car had not beeen parked in front, hailed a cab passing in the opposite direction. As an after-thought,however, Rowton asked the cab to go around the block on the off chance that he might catch LIRING/11 approaching his home from the intersection of Gutenberg and Ejercito Nacional. Fortunately just as Rowton's cab approached LIRING/11's apartment house, he spotted LIRING/11 alighting from his car in front of the building. Rowton stopped the cab and ran over to greet LIRING/11.

3. LIRING/11 although obviously surprised at seeing Rowton in that area, responded cordially. Rowton alleged that he had been in Switzerland and Canada most of the time since he had last seen LIRING/11, and to his regret had lost contqct withtheir mutual friends?LIRING/3 and Iden A. Rowton continued that he had written LIRING/3 at least five letters from Europe but had not received any answer, and had found that he had moved from his Atoyac address as well as his Tacubaya studio. LIRING/11 did not volunteer any information concerning the whereabouts of LIRING/3 but immediately gave Rowton the news that Iden A was working at a sort of night club (giving the name and street on which it was located.)

4. Rowton then said that he had hoped to be able to invite LIRING/11 to lunch but he had to take a short trip to Nuevo Laredo to attempt to arrange for the purchase of a car. (This was thrown out as bait in view of a comment by LIRING/4 that LIRING/11 was scheduled to return PCS and would have to sell his car). LIRING/11 did not react to this, simply suggesting that Rowton get in touch with him as soon as Rowton returned.

5. Rowton then returned to the waiting cab and continued his trip, taking the opportunity to mention to the driver in the course of conversation that he was a businessman from Europe (Switzerland) who often visited Mexico.

SECRET

Wallace BRowton P.11.264

SEC

9 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of activities.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at 1900 on 8 July, 1968, at the Sears Restaurant on Insurgentes. He had not seen her for the previous ten days because of his leave (28/6/68-5/7/68).

2. LIRING/4 reported that an old friend, Iden A, had arrived the previous week from the [illegible] capital, and that she had seen him several times prior to his moving to Cuernavaca. She commented that Iden A was divorced and lived alone (his wife having been a notorious model of loose morals). She added that his apparent age is 40, and that he must have political influence since he obtained a six-month exit permit following the invitation of Siqueiros.

3. LIRING/4 then related that she received a message early in the previous week that Iden A was trying to get in touch with her and she accordingly went to the LIRING offices on 27/6/68 to find his address. When she entered the office of LIRING/9, she found it crowded and was on the point of leaving (after getting the address of Iden A) when LIRING/9 approached her and asked her to take a ride in his car so that he could "chat "with her. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she assumed that LIRING/9 was enroute to one of the Secretariats in a rush and had asked her to accompany him to that he could save time by talking to her on the way. She was therefore surprised when he drove her to the Vaca Negra en Insurgentes and later returned with her to the offic

4. According to LIRING/4, LIRING/9 asked her routine questions as to how she was making out living as she was on her own. LIRING/4 relied that she was doing the best she could to raise enough money to survive, through part-time work arranged by Sra. Chumaceira of Artes Plasticas, the sale of some of LIRING/3's paintings and financial help from her father (all of which is partly true). She then asked LIRING/9 for a "loan" to tide her over the weekend, to which he responded with a 100 peso bill. LIRING/9 commented that things were going well with his office financially as a result of the increased fees. He dropped the figure $6,000 (US) as receipts for the previous mont LIRING/4 asked Rowton for his opinion as to why LIRING/9 would take off an hour or so on such a busy day to drive her around town, commenting that she herself could not understand his motives. She did not get the impression that he was interested in her"personally" since in that case he would have invited himself to her apartment to asked her out to dinner in the evening

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5. Rowton replied that he assumed that LIRING/9 had received some sort of

official request from his superiors to determine the conditions under which LIRING/4 was living as well as her general attitude following the arrest of LIRING/3. LIRING/4 promised to continue to see LIRING/9 and her other LIRING friends as often as possible, but stressed that she could not throw herself at them without attracting undue attention.

6. LIRING/4 then continued that when she finally got in touch with Iden A he was most cordial, inviting her for a trip to Cuernavaca, and expressing concern for the welfare of LIRING/3. Iden A commented to LIRING/4 that he had arrived from the PBRUMEN capital with only twenty Mexican pesos which he had left from a previous trip and that he would have to count on the generosity of Siqueiros for his living expenses during his anticipated three-month stay in Mexico. LIRING/4 told Rowton that she felt certain that Iden A was not a CP member, although she could not as yet determine whether or not her was pro-regime. She explained that at their first meetings she felt it best to steer clear of politics and let Iden A do the talking. LIRING/4 added that she expected to see Iden A whenever he came to Mexico City and if and when she herself could take a brief trip to Cuernavaca (if Rowton felt that necessary).

7. LIRING/4 then asked whether Rowton had been able to arrange some sort of intervention with the judge who would preside over the court in LIRING/3's case. When Rowton replied that he had asked some of his friends to inform hi as to the status of the case, she commented that Iden B had offered to do what he could since he had close friends among the Guatemalans. Rowton sugge ted that LIRING/4 get in touch with Iden B again and find out as many detail as possible concerning the channels he would use both in Mexico Cit and Guat mala City. LIRING/4 explained that at that point all she knew was that Iden whom she described as an active member of the CP Mexico, had a close friend among the Guatemalan exiles and that this friend could forward bribe money to the judge through his family in Guatemala City. LIRING/4 promised Rowton that she would try to meet with this Guatemalan to get details from him.

8. LIRING/4 also reported incidentally that LIRING/16 had left PCS and that her friend, the wife of LIRING/17, was planning to go on home leave in the near future. She added that she thought that LIRING/16's replacement was a bit "tonto". LIRING/4 also mentioned that she had learned from Iden A that Iden C had been forced to take "indefinite leave" from her job ~~xxxxxx~~ whcih was tantrount to dismissal.

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Wallace B. Rowton

SEC

9 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Activities.

Iden A is Orlando Suarez, Director de Cultura.

Iden B is Arturo Serrano.

Iden C is Mercedes Morales.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECR

SEC

12 July,1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Activities.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at a saferoom of the Suites Marne for about two hours on the morning of 10 July and again on 12 July,1968. Rowton attempted to clarify his position for the future with LIRING/4, as well as LIRING/3. He stated that he was doing the best he could to determine the probable outcome of the case of LIRING/3, and stressed that any precipitous intervention, even if could be arranged, might do more harm to LIRING/3 than good at this point. LIRING/4 confessed that her only concern at the moment was somehow to get LIRING/3 out of prison and back to Mexico. She admitted that it was hard for her to be concerned about the future. particularly about either her or LIRING/3's usefulness to Rowton, in view of what had happened to him. She said that she felt he had sacrificed enough during his three month imprisonment in such a "horrible" place, and that Rowton should himself "influence" the judge to speed up the formalities and issue a verdict simply expelling LIRING/3 and his companion. She did not see any other solution in view of the inability of the Mexican Consulate to arrange the release.

2. In reply to Rowton's query, LIRING/4 stated that she had seen Arturo Serrano of the CP Mexico during lunch at his home on 10 and 11 July,1968, and that the latter had told her that he would arrange for the 100 Quetzal bribe to be transmitted to the judge concerned via the CP Mexico and the CP Guatemala. He added that, of course, the bribe would finally be offered by a person in Guatemala completely clean of any CP ties. LIRING/4 continued to Rowton that she then alleged to Serrano that she would telephone her father at once so obtain the money. Serrano suggested that a letter or telegram might be more advisable, at which LIRING/4 wrote a letter to her father in his presence and accepted an offer from him to accompany her to the post office to mail the letter at once. LIRING/4 told Rowton that in fact she does not expect any further financial help from her father (who is unwitting of LIRING/3's situation) since he is very ill with cancer of the throat and in no position to help her at this time.

3. Rowton then expressed to LIRING/4 his doubts that the bribe would work but he agreed that it might be worth trying,particularly through Serrano. Rowton added that if this did not work, there would be only one alternative. Rowton, through his contact in Europe, might be able to approach the Guatemalans on a level higher than the judge and offer to supply them with

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information on the Guatemalan rebel activities in PBRUMEN. This would of course necessitate LIRING/4's traveling to PBRUMEN and remaining there at least two months to obtain such information. Rowton felt morally certain that through this offer he could arrange for a mild sentence for LIRING/3 and (possibily 6 months, three months of which he has already served) and subsequent expulsion to Mexico.

4. LIRING/4 took this proposal very seriously, at first expressing revulsion at the thought of providing information that would most probably mean the arrest and execution of revolutionaries who might be the subject of her report. but subsequently accepting the idea, when assured by Rowton that he himself would control the dissemination of such information. Rowton stressed that he was presenting this proposal on his own so that he could get her initial reaction. Rowton added that even if this were acceptable to the Guatemalan authorities, the release of LIRING/3 could not be expected for several months this is until LIRING/4 had accomplished her mission in PBRUMEN, although his living conditions might be improved by removal to another prison (if such existed) where he could be treated more humanely.

Rowton Comment: Rowton made the above proposal to LIRING/4 to determine her true attitude toward the release of LIRING/3 and to establish stronger control over her in the event she does make the trip.
Rowton feels that it might be feasible for Guatemala liaison to arrange the eventual release of LIRING/3 or at least to speed up the formalities (in the event that it is planned to issue a stiff sentence) in exchange for the alleged recruitment of LIRING/3's wife who could be sent to PBRUMEN for the collection of information of interest not only to WOFIRM but also Guatemala. This would, of course, blow LIRING/4 to the Guatemalans, but this might be the only solution if LIRING/3 is given a long prison term.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

atta' met Ilich-in Iran

SECR-1 17 July.1968 · ILLICH 201-801833

Subject: LIRING/4 Report of Rowton Affiliation with WOFIRM.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/4 at the Duca D'Este tea shop from 1200 until about 1245 on 15/7/68. LIRING/4 stated that she had again spent the week-end in Cuernavaca with Orlando Suarez, staying at the Casino de la Selva with her daughter in a room of an artist friend of Suarez (who had gone to Mexico City for the week-end). She added that she had been to visit the CIDOC (Centro Internacional de Documentación) again with Orlando Suarez and was impressed by its extensive library as well as the loftist orientation of its staff. She recalled the name of the director as Larry Green and one other northamerican McGregor (fnu) from the University of Puebla. She said that she learned in the course of conversation that a group of the students (possibly ten in number) had been invited to PBRUMEN [illegible] [illegible] the government there (LIRING/4 said that she did not believe that the PBRUMEN consulate was as yet invloved). LIRING/4 also commented that Orlando Suarez had been invited to give a lecture on PBRUMEN culture (for a fee of 200 pesos) although as yet the date had hot been determined.

2. LIRING/4 then stated that she had again visited the home of Arturo Serrano of the Mexican CP and that on this occasion Serrano's wife had told her that he had succeeded in locating Rodolfo Reyes and had told him about the current financial plight of LIRING/4 and urged him to help her if he could. Serrano's wife continued that Reyes then remarked: "I won't help her until I find out on what side LIRING/3 is. If he's with "El Griego I won't help since the G-2 of LIRING told me that they suspect him of being with WOFIRM, although they have no proof ("datos"). They also think he's an arms smuggler." Serrano's wife added that Reyes concluded with the statement that if it turns out that LIRING/3 acted on his own, then he would personally go to the LIRING Chief and have him request the President of Mexico to intervene.

3. LIRING/4 stated that although these comments of Rodolfo Reyes were apparently not taken seriously by Serrano or his wife (Serrano at this same occasion offerred again to pass bribe money to the CP Guatemala via the CP Mexico), she herself was badly shaken and angry with Reyes whom she described as a homosexual gossip, worse than a woman. She stated that she intended to tell LIRING/9 that Rodolfo Reyes owed her money for the use of her telephone to call the PBRUMEN capital several months previously and had never paid her. Rowton agreed that this would not only serve to collect the badly need- money but also dispel any notion Reyes might have that Ro the telephone call.

W.B. ROWTON

SECRET

18 July, 1968

Subject: LIRING/4 Report on CIDOC, Cuernavaca.

1. Rowton saw LIRING/4 again briefly at 1000, 18/7/68, at the Duca d'Este tea shop, to pass her 800 pesos to forward to LIRING/3 with vitamins.

2. LIRING/4 reported that she was continuing to see Orlando Suarez and hoped to ascertain the exact date when he would be giving the lecture at CIDOC in Cuernavaca. In reply to Rowton's queries, she stated that she had first gotten in contact with CIDOC through Prof. Jerjes Aguirre, whom she and LIRING/3 had known in PBRUMEN where Aguirre had spent some six years (part of the time at the University which LIRING/4 had herself attended). LIRING/4 continued that Aguirre had recently mentioned to her at a chance meeting that he was giving a series of lectures at CIDOC and was being well paid ($25.00 US) per lecture. When LIRING/4 met Aguirre again in Cuernavaca he introduced her to the director, a certain Larry Green, and to an American Prof McGregor, who both invited her, LIRING/4. to give a lecture on PBRUMEN women.

3. LIRING/4 told Rowton that, although she was interested in the compensation she felt totally unqualified, and took the occasion of Orlando Suarez' visit to introduce him and recommend that he give a lecture. Orlando Suarez jumped at the chance to make some money to supplement the meager allowance doled out to him by Siqueiros, and is prepared to give the lecture when a definite date is set.

4. LIRING/4 continued that when she casually mentioned this developments to the wife of Arturo Serrano (Ruth), the latter exclaimed: "Oh, don't you know that CIDOC is just an instrument of WOFIRM. You might as well recommend Orlando to the PBPRIME Embassy here." LIRING/4 was shocked by this and after reflection thought is best to repeat the comment to Orlando Suarez. She did this when he visited Mexico City on 15-16 July (and stayed at her apartment). Suarez' only comment was that such people as Ruth Serrano were "sectarian" and whether CIDOC was with WOFIRM or not did not bother him.

5. LIRING/4 also commented incidentally that Ruth Serrano was escorting a group of French journalists from L'Humanité" around town and that she had complained to LIRING/4 that she had been given only 200 pesos by the CP Mexico to cover the expenses (figate!). L/4 recalled that Ruth Serrano had mentioned that these Frenchmen had been to PBRUMEN and were planning to return very shortly.

Wallace B. Rowton

SE

SE

20 July,1968

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Recontact with RODOLFO REYES.

1. Rowton met Rodolfo Reyes at about 2230 in the dining room of the Vendimia Restaurant and night club (60 calle Liverpool) by design on 15 July,1968. Rowton had previously been informed by LIRING/11 that Reyes was currently working at the Vendimia and felt that he should meet Reyes again to pass along the story that he had given to LIRING/11 that he was unable to locate LIRING/3 or LIRING/4 in the hope that Reyes would disclose LIRING/3's arrest.

2. As soon as Rowton met Reyes the latter invited him to a corner table with what appeared to be superficial cordiality. He asked Rowton how he had located him and appeared a little surprised when Rowton said that LIRING/11 had given him hthename of the night club and the address. Rowton then alleged that he had been away for the past three months in Switzerland and Canada and just the previous week in Monterrey and Nuevo Laredo trying to buy a car (Rowton had given the same story to LIRING/11). Rowton continued that when he returned he had been unable to locate LIRING/3 or his wife and that they had not replied to his letters from Europe.

3. Reyes then revealed that LIRING/3 had been arrested in Guatemala and charged with the murder of three men! Rowton feigned surprise,shock and fear at this news. He told Reyes that this might have serious consequences for his commercial contacts, whose names LIRING/3 might reveal,as well as for himself. Reyes then said he thought LIRING/3 was very stupid to get himself arrested in such a country where anything can happen inside as well as outside of jail. In reply to Rowton's query Reyes stated that LIRING/4 was probably in PBRUMEN.

4. When Rowton remarked that he could not believe that LIRING/11 had refused to tell him the news about LIRING/3, Reyes replied that it was quite possible that LIRING/11 did not know about it, especially since he, Reyes, had just leanred about it some three days previously. At this point the conversation was interrupted by the arrival at the table of a negro choreographer and his (white) Mexican wife,who appeared to be close friends of Reyes. Rowton sat with them through the floorshow and in the course of conversation Rowton discovered that the negro was a Cuban who had emigrated to Mexico some fifteen years previously. Neither he nor his wife appeared to be interested in politics. They both seemed dedicated to his career in Bellas Artes.

SECRET Wallace B. Rowt

23 August, 1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1700, 21/8/68 and 1600, 22/8/68; Suites Marne.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 28/8/68; Duca d'Este coffeeshop.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent:

LIRING/4 stated that she had been doing her best to get Mexican leftist writers and artists to show interest in LIRING/3's case by sending telegrams and letters to the Guatemalan government urging his prompt release. She showed Horton the article in Sucesos which she claimed credit for (attached herewith) but did not appear to have any knowledge of the notice in the 5 August edition of the News, commenting that it must have been picked up from articles she had planted in other Mexican papers

LIRING/4 reported that she had purposely avoided direct contact with the LIRING office, especially during the student demonstrations, since it appeared to be closely watched by the local police. She stated that she was maintaining some contact, however, through her friendship with Iden A, who called on her whenever he came to Mexico City and on occasion stayed at her apartment overnight. She added that Iden A generally stayed at the apartment of LIRING/2 when he was in town although he commented to her that he felt he was imposing on LIRING/2 and his roomates in the already crowded quarters. LIRING/4 added that Iden A informed her that LIRING/9 had returned to PBRUMEN AND was remaining there during the student unrest "in order to protect himself", implying that LIRING/9 had been in direct touch with some of the student leaders and could not afford to compromise himself and his office by his physical presence in Mexico City during the demonstrations.

In reply to Horton's query, LIRING/4 stated that although Iden A appeared to be quite liberal in his views and mixed easily with all sorts of people he ran into, he was definitely a "revolutionary" at heart and she assumed loyal to the present PBRUMEN GOVERNMENT.

LIRING/4 aslo reported that she hoped to persude and influential lawyer from Chiapas to travel to Guatemala City on her behalf to investigate LIRING/3's case and possibly influence the judge in his favor. She added that she was quite sure that the lawyer, who was a personal friend of LIRING/3, would take the case without a fee, but she felt obliged to offer to cover his expenses. Rowton suggested that she talk this over with the family of Iden 3 who would also benefit from any success the lawyer might have.

5. Administrative: LIRING/4 told Rowton that she had spent a "considerable" amount of money (some 300 pesos) on telegrams, postage stamps and vitamins for LIRING/3 since his arrest. She stated that she was able to survive and meet these expenses by supplementing the money given to her by Rowton through the sale of works produced by LIRING/3 and sent to her periodcially. Rowton asked LIRING/4 to keep account of such incidental expenses, since he felt it better to charge these items off as operational expenses rather than to continue to charge money given to her on LIRING/3's behalf simply as "servicios".

Wallace B. Rowton

SEC

23 August, 1968

Iden A: Orlando Suarez

Iden B: Carlos Perzabal

WBR
Wallace B. Rowton

SECR

SUCESOS Y SUCEDIDOS

Por AZOR



Carlos Perzabal, catedrático de la Universidad de México, y Carlos Jurado Delmar, destacado pintor mexicano, son víctimas de la cacería de brujas instaurada en Guatemala con extremos que llegan al absurdo.

Los dos mexicanos están propiamente secuestrados por las autoridades guatemaltecas desde el 15 de abril del año en curso. Se les hacen una serie de cargos dignos de la mentalidad de un mosquito. Desde luego, como es costumbre en estos casos, cuatro meses después de su ilegal aprehensión ni siquiera han sido puestos a disposición de un juez que los juzgue.

El licenciado Antonio Carrillo Flores, nuestro secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, ha venido interviniendo en defensa de estos infortunados compatriotas, pero hasta ahora sus gestiones oficiales no han sido atendidas debidamente por el gobierno de Guatemala.

Para que usted, lector, tenga idea del atropello incalificable de que son víctimas los dos mexicanos, publicamos copia de la carta que Carlos Jurado Delmar y Carlos Perzabal dirigieron recientemente a la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU:

Comisión por los Derechos Humanos.

ONU.

Por este medio nos dirigimos a ustedes, pidiéndoles su intervención en nuestro caso.

El día 13 de abril de 1968, mientras nos dirigíamos pacíficamente a la República del Salvador y Honduras, fuimos detenidos con lujo de violencia por elementos del Ejército de Guatemala, en un lugar llamado "El Cable" a cuatro kilómetros escasamente de la frontera de México con Guatemala denominada "La Mesilla".

De ahí, llevados a un lugar llamado "Buenos Aires" donde permanecimos por una noche sujetos a torturas físicas y morales. Al día siguiente fuimos conducidos en un avión (No. 540) de la FAG a la ciudad capital, donde quedamos encarcelados en el 2o. Cuerpo de la Policía Nacional, sujetos también a torturas físicas y morales que hicieron y hacen peligrar nuestra vida.

Tan obvio es el error cometido con nosotros, que a pesar de que nuestra detención se llevó a cabo desde el día 13 de abril, como puede ser probado fácilmente con testigos presenciales y desde entonces mantenidos en prisión, el gobierno guatemalteco nos acusa de haber sido detenidos el día 17 del mismo mes, en las calles de la ciudad. ¡¡Repartiendo propaganda subversiva!! Incongruencia mayor no cabe en ninguna mente que se precie de normal.

Desde el día 26 de abril de 1968 fuimos confinados al campo de concentración de Pavón, mal llamado "Granja Penal". Donde las condiciones de vida para los reclusos y la violencia al que están sometidos, son espeluznantes como puede ser fácilmente comprobado por la H. Comisión de los Derechos Humanos.

Hemos sido sujetos a un "juicio" que el gobierno guatemalteco alarga deliberadamente con el único propósito de cubrir su error y a la vez perjudicarnos; por ésto y sobre todo por considerar en grave peligro nuestra integridad física, pedimos la rápida intervención de la H. Comisión de los Derechos Humanos para que se exija nuestra inmediata libertad.

Atentamente, Cárcel de Pavón, Guatemala, Julio 68.

Carlos Jurado, Pintor Miembro del Salón de la Plástica Mexicana.

Carlos Perzabal, Catedrático de la Universidad de México.

●

El actual ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, licenciado Emilio Arenales Catalán, ha sido mencionado varias veces como candidato a presidir la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de la ONU. Ojalá no espere a obtener ese cargo para intervenir en este caso, que según parece es de su especialidad.

●



CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, secuestrado por las autoridades guatemaltecas



LIC. ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES en defensa de dos mexicanos en desgracia



CARLOS PERZABAL, secuestrado por las autorida-

29 August,1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/4
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1000, 28/8/68;Duca d'Este Tearoom.
3. Next Meeting: Same time and place, 2/9/68.
4. Information/Reports Passed by Agent:

LIRING/4 informed Rowton that she had run into LIRING/10 and his assistant, Iden A, the previous afternoon (27/8/68) at about 1345 at the office of the director of Siempre, where she had gone in connection with added publicity for LIRING/3. She stated that LIRING/10 greeted her cordially with an embrace and asked how she was doing. He seemed genuinely disturbed to hear that things were no better, and commented that he had been hearing about her from time to time from Iden B, but felt that she should make her problems known to the LIRING office herself. When LIRING/4 commented that Iden C had told her and Iden B that it might be wiser for her to avoid contact openly with the LIRING office, LIRING/10 brushed this off, remarking that he felt it would be perfectly alright for LIRING/4 to come in whenever she felt it necessary for moral and whatever material help could be offered.

LIRING/4 told Rowton that in view of this comment of LIRING/10, she visited the LIRING office early that same morning (28/8/68) and found that LIRING/2 had returned from his TDY. She said that LIRING/2 greeted her cordially as usual, but he apparently did not have time to chat with her on that occasion.

5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent:

Rowton asked LIRING/4 to follow up on her contact with LIRING/10, especially since he appeared so friendly. Rowton suggested that L/4 ask L/10 to appeal to the Director of Siempre to give L/3's case good publicity. L/4 promised to do so and commented that L/10 appeared to be quite chummy with the director and apparently had a luncheon date with him for that same day.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRE

29 August,1968

Iden's of LIRING/4 Contact Report

Iden A: Felix Luna Mederos
Iden B: Orlando Suarez
Iden C: Jesus Cruz Gonzalez

Wallace B. Rowton

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN: Activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4 May through Mid-September 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 34682, 17 May 1968

Action Required: For your information.

1. Forwarded under separate cover are twelve reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the activities of LIRING-3, LIRING-4, and contacts of the latter.

2. The main topic covered in ROWTON's reports is LIRING-4's efforts to obtain help in getting LIRING-3 out of jail in Guatemala as soon as possible. LIRING-4 is almost penniless (ROWTON has made only token payments to her after 15 June) and has been moving from one apartment to a cheaper one living on the sale of paintings left by LIRING-3 and small loans from leftist contacts. In the hope that she may be able to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has resisted all of ROWTON's efforts to get her to undertake a clandestine mission to PBRUMEN, a mission, as Headquarters knows, was planned long ago. As a foreigner, LIRING-4 cannot work in Mexico without taking the chance of being deported, if caught. Although she has not tried it, she would probably be refused a visa to go to Guatemala to visit LIRING-3. She might also face difficulties in Guatemala including possible detention and interrogation if she succeeded in obtaining an entry permit to that country.

3. By mid-September 1968 LIRING-4 had received very little help from her Mexican leftist or outright Communist friends. In spite of promises to try to bribe the Guatemalan judge scheduled to try LIRING-3 all LIRING-4's "friends" succeeded in doing was to print several articles in the local press (some of them with LIRING-3's photo) claiming that LIRING-3 was unjustly imprisoned, that he was about to be executed, etc. If anything, these

continued . . . . . .

Attachments: 12 reports u/s/c #1
4 Iden rpts u/s/c #2

Distribution:
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CS copy in 201-818342

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 35502	26 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-798301

articles did little to prejudice the Guatemalans in favor of LIRING-3. As a matter of fact, the latter who succeeded in sending LIRING-4 a few letters via the Mexican Consul in Guatemala City who comes to visit him in jail, recently claimed that he was saved from a prison "transfer" by the Guatemalan army by the arrival of the Mexican Consul. LIRING-3 viewed this "transfer" purely and simply as an execution attempt.

4. LIRING-4 received even less help from LIRING who told her that there was nothing it could do to help LIRING-3. LIRING-4, on the advice contained in one of the notes sent from prison by LIRING-3, kept away from LIRING and its employees until she met LIRING-10 by accident at the office of one of the leftist papers on 27 July. LIRING-10 convinced her to resume her visits to LIRING. That the local PBRUMENs still have doubts about LIRING-3 despite his imprisonment in Guatemala is indicated by the statements made by Rodolfo REYES (see ROWTON's 17 July report) to the effect that the latter would not be willing to help LIRING-3 until he found out on what side of "el griego" (ROWTON under false identity) he was. REYES added that LIRING suspects the "griego" of WOFIRM connections, although it has no definite proof of this.

5. Statements such as those made by REYES confirm the Station's belief that LIRING, upon orders from home, is still attempting to investigate ROWTON. Such statements also reinforce the decision of the Station not to attempt, through liaison, to obtain the release of LIRING-3. Such an attempt, if it leaked, would not only expose LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN and Guatemalan FAR reprisals. It would probably also have adverse repercussions on ROWTON's security. LIRING-11 whom ROWTON met briefly on 5 July (see ROWTON's report dated 9 July) said nothing about LIRING-3's arrest when ROWTON complained that mail which he said he sent to LIRING-3 remained unanswered. It is also to be noted that REYES, who of course knows that LIRING-4 is in Mexico, told ROWTON that she was probably in PBRUMEN. This shows clearly the distrust with which LIRING views ROWTON.

6. LIRING-4 developed close relationship with Orlando *SUAREZ of the Ministry of Culture now in Mexico at the invitation of the Mexican Communist mural painter David ALFARO Siqueiros. By mid-September, in fact, SUAREZ was staying at LIRING-4's apartment although LIRING-4 claimed to ROWTON that there was no romancing between the two and that SUAREZ used her apartment because he was too broke to get one of his own. In view of LIRING-4's assessment of SUAREZ as very leftist and pro-AMTHUG-1 no effort was made to approach him.

7. Contacts between ROWTON and LIRING-4 have taken place with decreasing frequency because the usefulness of LIRING-4 to WOFIRM has sharply decreased and because LIRING-4 is more and more convinced that ROWTON cannot or will not help her obtain the release of LIRING-3. In her frantic efforts to do something for LIRING-3, LIRING-4 has in fact not had any contact with ROWTON since early September. Unless LIRING-3 is released by the Guatemalan authorities or receives only a light sentence keeping him in jail only a short time longer, it is doubtful that LIRING-4 will be of much use to ROWTON and the Station.

for Willard C. CURTIS

ill

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DATE: 26 Sept 68

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TO MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT TYPIC LIRING

WH/1

REF: MEXICO CITY 7335 (IN 99476)*

1. ROWTON RETURN STILL UNCERTAIN PENDING RESOLUTION DEVELOPMENT ACCESS TO AMCAGE/1.

2. RE LIRING/4, ROWTON COULD SEND MONEY OSTENSIBLY FROM L/4'S FATHER IN NEW YORK TO BAIL HER OUT OF PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION, BUT THIS WOULD BE ONLY TEMPORARY SOLUTION IN ADDITION INHERENT SECURITY RISKS (FATHER IS REPORTEDLY HOSPITALIZED AND NOT IN POSITION PROVIDE FINANCIAL HELP AT THIS TIME). L/4'S REFUGE IN LIRING ESTABLISHMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WHICH ROWTON COULD NOT CONVINCE HER TO TAKE AS LONG AS HE WAS GIVING HER MONEY, WILL SERVE TO IMPROVE HER ACCESS AND MAY LEAD TO REPATRIATION. ROWTON FEELS LATTER EVENTUALITY LIKELY ONLY IN EVENT HIS CONTINUED FAILURE RECONTACT HER SINCE L/4 WOULD POSSIBLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE. IN THAT CASE, REBRIEFING AND RESUPPLY S/W PRECLUDED PRIOR DEPARTURE. ROWTON COULD DEBRIEF L/4 UPON HER RETURN MEXICO IF AND WHEN LIRING/3 RELEASED FROM PRISON AND CONTACT REESTABLISHED.

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26 Sept 68
201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 36584

TO

3. FOR GUATEMALA: WOULD APPRECIATE RECOMMENDATIONS RE POSSIBILITY EARLY RELEASE OF LIRING/3 AND ASSOCIATE FROM JAIL. AWARE WOFIRM INTEREST MUST BE SHOWN AT HIGH LEVEL BUT [illegible] GOVT OFFICIALS COULD ALLEGE MEXICAN GOVT INTEREST TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AS BASIS OF RELEASE.

4. FILE 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

* RYBAT

William V. Broe
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG
C/WH/2/~~Guatemala~~ [illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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HMMA-35523
50-120-13
30 September 68

A. LIRING-3: LIRING-3 is still in jail in Guatemala.

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GUATEMALA CITY, DIRECTOR

8 Aug 68 IN 66274

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)

B. DIRECTOR 16024

1. ROWTON SO FAR UNABLE LEARN MORE FROM LIRING-4 ABOUT HOW JUDGE SCHEDULED TRY CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR COULD BE BRIBED OTHER THAN STATEMENT BY ARTURO (SERRANO) BEREA TO EFFECT THIS TO BE ARRANGED BY GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY AT REQUEST MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. PERSON TO MAKE ACTUAL BRIBE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE KNOWN AS LEFTIST.

2. MEXICO CITY ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "THE NEWS" 5 AUG CARRIED ARTICLE TITLED "MEXICAN ARTIST TO BE EXECUTED". ARTICLE QUOTED GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS INCLUDING PAINTERS, WRITERS, POETS AND SCULPTORS TO SAY GUAT ~~75 6) ,,8,& 3~~ GVT PLANNING EX/ECUTE JURADO BECAUSE HE ENTERED GUATEMALA IN HIS CAR FOUR MONTHS AGO AND PICKED UP SOME HITCHHIKING YOUTHS WHO LATER TURNED OUT BE CONNECTED WITH GUAT COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. ARTICLE OBVIOUSLY PLANTED BY LOCAL LEFTISTS IN EFFORT SPREAD NEWS JURADO ARREST AND DETENTION TO FORCE OFFICIAL GVT INTERVENTION. ROWTON TRYING ESTABLISH FROM LIRING-4 WHO PLANTED ARTICLE.

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3
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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 6658 SECRET

3. BELIEVE NEWS ARTICLE COULD BE USED TO APPROACH LIAISON AND ASK FOR DETAILS ON JURADO CASE WITHOUT INDICATING ANY SPECIAL CONNECTION TO JURADO. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT SENTENCE CAN BE EXPECTED IN JURADO CASE AND WHEN?

4. FOR DIRECTOR: DESPITE SOMEWHAT COOLER RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AT THIS POINT BECAUSE JURADO SITUATION, LIRING-4 STILL WILLING GO PBRUMEN AS SOON AS JURADO FUTURE SETTLED, PARTICULARLY IF HE DEPORTED OR SENTENCED RELATIVELY SHORT JAIL SENTENCE.

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INFO

FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/COG 8

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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S E C R E T 081854Z AUG 63 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9326

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

8 Aug 63 IN 67011

REF A. MEXICO CITY 6658 (IN 66274)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9242 (IN 49331)

C. GUATEMALA CITY 9132 (IN 35990)

1. ST~~[illegible]~~ATION POSITION ON LIRING/3 CASE CONTINUES BE SAME AS THAT REPORTED REF B.

2. DURING LAST QUERY OF LIAISON RE STATUS OF CASE (REPORTED REF C), LIAISON OFFICER SAID SINCE CASE IN HANDS OF COURT THEY UNABLE PROBE FURTHER RE OUTCOME. BELIEVE ANY ADDITIONAL QUERY OF LIAISON WOULD BE CLEAR INDICATION OF SPECIFIC STATION INTEREST IN LIRING/3.

3. DIRECTOR 16024 (REF B OF MEXICO CITY 6658) NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

Fi: LIRING/3

SECRET

201-798301

Carlos JURADO was target of LIFEAT coverage on behalf of Cuba section. Coverage terminated 2 April 68. Name included in list attached to HMMA 35074, 19July68

[illegible]-3

SECRET

14-00000

46

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG: Marvin Francis
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MICROFILMED
JUL 25 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

SECRET 37

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 26 PER ______ #______

☒ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818842 FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/1/PS, C/1 A CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

11 22 06z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR DIR 15576 11 July 68

2P

TO HMM HGG MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

cc: Publisher. Mexico City: Mexico

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3.

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~[illegible]~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

Offered help to 201-818842 re: imprisoned 201-798301

Liring 3

ANPW	FI	
PS/EH	DEF	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X	

D.50-9-11
B 201-818842

CS COPY

11 July 68
201-798301

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 Ju[illegible]

JUL 22 3 14 PM '63

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER
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FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION
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INFO:
FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

WH/file:
LIRING-3
201

S E C R E T 250105Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5683

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

m

wk

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5590 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

14-00000

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE VR.					

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 SECRET

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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INFO: FILE. VR. WH/COG 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 /16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

SECRET

BT

WH/1 file:
LIRING-3 201
WC

201-798301

SECRET

14-00000

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S E C R E T 102305Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5540

10 MAY 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

WH/ file: LIRING-3 201

WC

1. MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

K

HMMA-34623
10 May 1968
19-120-13/1

E. LIRING-3: During this period, LIRING-3 was introduced to members of a Guatemalan exile group by the husband of the sister of his mistress. LIRING-3 agreed to help one or more representatives of this group cross the Guatemalan border. At the urging of these representatives he also agreed to meet in Guatemala with a woman in charge of logistics for the FAR movement. LIRING-3 spent the better part of the period under review manufacturing false documentation for the Guatemalan exiles. The Station used the LIEMBRACE surveillance team to cover some of the meetings between LIRING-3 and some of his nervous Guatemalan friends. Copies of photographs taken by the LIEMBRACEs of these meetings were forwarded to the Guatemala City Station and Headquarters. Due to several postponements, LIRING-3 and his Guatemalan contacts had not left for Guatemala by the end of the period under review.

201-798341

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City,

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

LIRING-3 contacts with Guatemalan Revolutionaries in Mexico

REFERENCE: HMMA-34413, 3 April 1968

LiRing/3

The Guatemala City Station has not been able to identify any of the persons whose photographs were forwarded as an attachment to Reference.

Peter [illegible]

Distribution:
1 - COS, Mexico City
3 - Chief, WHD
2 - Files

201-798304

HGGA-9386

3 May 1968

SECRET

35-9-8

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR. WH/WE 8, AI, CI/OPS, FI

E C R E T 032121Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8961

EXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR   WH/ file: 201. (?)   3 MAY 68 IN 03831

BRUMEN LIRING-3 LIRING-4   M

EF: MEXICO CITY 5423 (IN 01169)

1. ESLAIR TEAM PRETEXT INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT TO ETERMINE OCCUPANTS OF 35 AVENIDA 22-67, ZONA 5 GUATEMALA CITY ITH FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. OCCUPANTS OF HOUSE ARE TIRZO (FUENTES) SANDOVAL, ORN 19 JULY 1922 AT SAN ANTONIO VILLASECA, DEPT OF RETALHULEU, ND HIS WIFE, MARIA DEL MILAGRO (PERALTA) E. DE FUENTES. (NO TATION TRACES EITHER FUENTES OR WIFE.) BEAUTY SHIP (SALON DE ELLEZA "LILLIAN") ALSO INSTALLED IN HOUSE, BUT NOT YET ABLE ETERMINE NAMES OF EMPLOYEES.

B. ESLAIRS HAVE NOTICED 1963 MERCURY WITH GUAT LICENSE LATES P-31-341 PARKED AT HOUSE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THIS CAR EGISTERED TO FEDERICO (CALDERON) GALICIA WHO ADDRESS 21 AVENIDA 3-36, ZONA 7. (NO STATION TRACES CALDERON.)

2. ESLAIRS WILL ATTEMPT IDENTIFY ANY OTHER PERSONS -- SERVANTS EMPLOYEES -- WHO MAY BE AT ADDRESS.

E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET

A-16-88-46

ROLANDO MASFERRER, JR.

BUSINESS:

Subject is the Vice President of Sales at the following Corporation:

A168762 - Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located by: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

[illegible] would [illegible] in [illegible]

RECOMMEND:

- ______ Release in full-text
- ______ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ______ Defer decision to ____________
- ______ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

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( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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May 77

Document No. ____________
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CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn: [illegible] Branch

DATE: 22 Aug 64

FROM : Chief, Detroit Office

SUBJECT: Interview with Wilbur Coe, [illegible] Patient at USPHS Hospital, Detroit

1. Wilbur Coe, born at [illegible], N.Y., [illegible] Jul [illegible], called the Detroit Field Office on the afternoon of 19 Aug 64 and requested an interview. He said he had information he thought 'would help us'. In response to his request, a D/S called on him the same afternoon at the hospital.

2. Physically, Coe gave the appearance of having been down on his luck for [illegible]. He is married to a Venezuelan citizen, and his wife and two children live in Maracaibo. He is a [illegible] operator by profession. He suffered an injury to his foot in line of duty in Cleveland on or about 11 August, and has been at the Detroit USPHS Hospital since that date. He carries passport no. 250[illegible], re-validated at Maracaibo, Venezuela on 17 Jul 59. Coe has a sister-in-law, Ana [illegible], whom he describes as a pro-[illegible] newspaperwoman of Maracaibo, and a member of Accion Democratica. The following is the gist of what he said in the course of the two and a half hour interview.

3. Communist-backed Anti-Somoza Movement: Through his sister-in-law, Coe met in 195[illegible] a [illegible] newspaperman by the name of Pena, a reporter for the Diario [illegible] Occidente of Maracaibo. Pena introduced him to people connected with an anti-Somoza movement composed mainly of Nicaraguan exiles in Venezuela. Coe makes the [illegible] that they would have employed him, but he found out the movement was backed by the Communist Party of Venezuela, and so he dropped them.

4. Shortly after his meeting with the anti-Somocistas, Coe came in contact with a Professor [illegible], Director of the Colegio Jose Marti, and head of the 26 of July Movement in Maracaibo. [illegible] was under the impression that Coe was an airplane pilot, and expressed an interest in using him to run arms into Cuba, to supply the Castro forces. This was prior to the Batista overthrow of January 1959.

5. Coe took a job in Miami, working on contract on a dredging operation. In [illegible] in July 1960, he met a man named [illegible], who introduced him to [illegible], leader of an anti-Castro group. [illegible] took Coe into the group and told him he would like to employ him when his job on the dredging operation ended. [illegible], according to Coe, was the one who dispatched the "Invading Force" composed of [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible]. All of them were caught and [illegible] shortly after their landing in Cuba. Coe says [illegible] had intended [illegible] of three, but a [illegible] of the [illegible] Coe unavailable. [illegible] however, [illegible] Coe [illegible] would be kept in with the "[illegible]" and [illegible] arrived there, he [illegible] contact the "[illegible]". [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Gee's opinion of [illegible] Rodriguez is low. He thinks Rodriguez is an agitator, who is only interested in the anti-Castro movement for the money he can get out of it. Rodriguez told Gee he has a brother in Cuba who is a [illegible]. He also volunteered to Gee that he was a member of the group who attacked the Cuban Consul in the Consulate in Miami, [illegible] received that Marco, Fuller and Thompson were [illegible] executed. He says [illegible] is in a "[illegible]".

7. When Gee [illegible] and he was finally available to enter the Masferrer group full time, he met a fellow by the name of Harry [illegible], in the company of Rolando and [illegible] Masferrer. [illegible] is Rolando's [illegible] and walks with a much more pronounced limp than does Rolando. Harry had an office in the same building as the Cuban Consulate, and seemed to act as a [illegible] for Masferrer, as well as a procurer of weapons on a small scale. Harry apparently has serious character flaws, also, for he swindled two of the members of the Masferrer militia out of $[illegible] each on the pretext of taking their checks from home to have them cashed for them.

8. Murder of Russ Mashor: When Masferrer started actively recruiting Americans for the group, he did not make any effort to check them out. Among them were Russ Mashor, who claimed to be an airplane pilot formerly in the service of Castro. One night Gee was in a bar next to the Masferrer task force's barracks at Key [illegible] West with Mashor, Juan (also known as El Musico) and a former member of the Castro secret police, whom he could not name. There were many other Cubans and Americans as well. Juan was a Portuguese who claimed to have entered the US illegally at Key West after jumping the Havana-Key West Ferry. His nickname derived from his musical talents. He also claimed to have had no military experience, but he proved so adept at military tactics that he later became second in command of the task force. The former Castro secret policeman was in his early 20's, about six feet tall, husky build and claimed to have been a schoolteacher. In the course of the evening at the bar, one of the three - Mashor, Juan, or the ex-secret policeman - made the remark that, on the occasion of their landing in Cuba, they should break away from the Masferrer group and try to join up with some other. Gee overheard the remark and reported it to the task force leader, though he said he could not identify which of the three had made it. The ex-secret policeman was thereupon thrown out of the task force, but Mashor was also strongly suspected of being the author of the dissident remark. As a result of this suspicion, Mashor was not allowed to take any firearms with him when the group went into training on No-Name Key. Gee, however, was allowed to take a .22 pistol. Besides Gee's weapon, the only other firearms at No-Name initially were a 12-gauge shotgun and a .22 rifle. Mashor was unable to keep up with the rigorous physical training schedule of the group, and so absented himself from that part of the training. Mashor adopted the habit of rising early in the morning and going out to hunt in the woods, having managed somehow to appropriate the .22 rifle. Because of his [illegible] attitude toward the training, plus the suspicion that surrounded him as the possible author of the dissident remark in the Miami bar, an acute bitterness grew between him and the group leader at No-Name, Lago, also known as [illegible] Lago. Lago was a former Batista police sergeant who had been tried and condemned to death in absentia. Lago proposed shooting it out with Mashor, but Mashor declined the invitation. Masferrer visited No-Name once in the company of Craig ---, an ex-G.I. who had served in Korea. Masferrer brought with him a .45 service automatic and a Garand rifle. These guns were left by Masferrer, upon his departure the next day, in the custody of [illegible] Companero, who had been a [illegible] man in Batista's army and claimed to have killed [illegible]. Companero was married to an American [illegible] who lived in Miami. Mashor arose early one morning and went hunting, according to his custom. About breakfast time, the men in the camp heard shots, and then [illegible]

[illegible] in the pool [illegible] police [illegible] and no further investigation was made.

9. Bill Bishop and CIA Contacts: About two days after [illegible], [illegible] the group received word from Masferrer that they had to leave No-Name, [illegible] of the [illegible]. They went to Little Pine Key, [illegible] Bill Bishop was sent out to take charge of them there. They spent about one week at Little Pine with no supplies whatever, and then returned to Miami. Bishop impressed the group as being a psycho, and no one would take orders from him. He left the Masferrer group after the return to Miami, but shortly thereafter contacted Gee and asked him to join him in his [illegible] with [illegible] Tabernilla. Gee visited Bishop in his apartment in Miami, and described it as a rather expensive set-up. [illegible] apartment, Bishop called Charles, Tom [illegible], Miami, gave him a report, and had a discussion. At the conclusion of the call Bishop appeared upset, and explained that he had been denied an expected pay-off. He confided to Gee that all information from Tabernilla went to CIA. He said he was fed up with Cubans and felt like getting out.

10. Other members of the Masferrer group included Henry Procter, --- Rice, and a man known as "Ocho" not otherwise identified. Julio Fernandez, Administrative Assistant to Masferrer, paid these three a total of [illegible] to waylay and beat up Julio Lopez and his wife, in revenge for an article Lopez had written for a Miami newspaper which displeased Masferrer. The Lopezes were hospitalized. In the Masferrer group there was also a - - - Weary (phonetic). Blond, with a blond mustache, claimed to be a German and a Nazi sympathizer. Weary tried to organize a group that would be armed with torpedoes for the purpose of raiding Russian shipping en route to Cuba, in the vicinity of the Bahamas. Henry Procter got drunk one night, and he and several others beat up Weary, sending him to the hospital. Upon release from the hospital, Weary moved in with the Millers, the family of the [illegible] executed in Cuba along with Carta and Thompson. Procter, incidentally, claimed to have been a POW of the Communists in Korea, one of the famous 21 or so who refused repatriation in 1953.

11. Breakup of the Masferrer group occurred around early January 1961, when Masferrer was asked by the police to close up the barracks. The members of the group were told to go their several ways, but they were nearly all flat broke. Julio Fernandez took Gee to the home of Dr. Anselmo [illegible] Alliegro, ex-President of the Cuban Senate. While Gee waited outside in the car, Julio went into the house and returned shortly with a "wad" of money. He turned [illegible] to Gee [illegible] to pay each of the men [illegible], constituting final pay-off and liquidation of the employment agreement. Gee was able to find [illegible] of the men, to each of whom he gave [illegible] dollars [illegible] still has in his possession. All of the men declared their [illegible] to get to Cuba

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of some kind. Six of them had left in a group before the payoff, and stolen a [illegible] at [illegible], and set sail for Jamaica hoping to reach a "training camp" there. [illegible] navigation, apparently, they ended up instead in Havana where they were arrested and sentenced to 30 years each. Gee added [illegible] that one of the six was a [illegible]. Another small group of the ex-trainees stole a boat [illegible] with the [illegible] intention of sailing to Cuba. They were picked up by Miami Police before they got out of the harbor.

12. All Anti-Castro Terrorist Activity in the Miami area, according to Gee, is under the direction of [illegible], of the [illegible] organization, whose residence is at S.W. 1st and 15th Ave., Miami. Gee says she provides, or makes, bombs and sees to their delivery on target.

13. Jimenez-[illegible] anti-Betancourt Plot: (Gee says that he gave the following [illegible] who met him in response to his phone call sometime early this year to the [illegible] office in Miami.) Sometime early this year, Gee is vague about the time, he met a man named Edward Davis who upon hearing that Gee was interested in returning to his family in Maracaibo, introduced him to one Luis Phillip Prato of [illegible] Collins Ave., Miami. Prato arranged an interview for Gee with a Colonel Casanova, who was introduced to him as the head of the anti-Betancourt movement in Miami. Casanova asked Gee and Davis if they could - on 30 days notice - organize and arm a group of 400 ex-G.I.'s. He assured Gee and Davis that unlimited cash would be at their disposal for the task. Casanova said all kinds of arms would be needed, including artillery and flame throwers. He was most interested in whether or not Gee and Davis had any channel for procuring the arms. They assured Casanova they could raise the 400 men and obtain the desired arms and equipment. Casanova said he had already arranged transportation for the force via commercial airline, that they would be flown to a mountain site "behind" Caracas, leaving the US disguised as tourists, and they would be given 30 days rigorous training under the direction of English-speaking Venezuelan army officers. Casanova explained that the tentative plan was for an attack by the 400 on Caracas, simultaneously with an Army revolt within the city and at other unspecified points. The attempted coup in early 1961, involving an attack on [illegible], resulted in the arrest of several army officers involved in the Casanova plot, and according to Prato, necessitated an indefinite delay. Prato told Gee, however, that Perez-Jimenez was still interested in the plan, and that it would be carried out.

14. Contacts with Gun-runners: Through [illegible] Santiago, who lives with [illegible], a relative of the ex-dictator, Gee met [illegible] Rose, former owner of the hotel [illegible] in Miami. Rose told Gee that, if he were provided with one thousand dollars cash for expenses, he would go to Belgium and buy any kind of arms needed, and he could guarantee delivery to any part of the world. Another gun-runner with whom he came in contact was Charlie Adams, 1010 NW 9th Ave., Miami, telephone number [illegible]-2764. Adams told Gee that he could obtain, for $175.00 each on minimum orders of one thousand, a weapon described as Armalite (Fairchild), with NATO ammunition. A third arms dealer that Gee contacted was [illegible] Castle, [illegible] SW 21st St., Miami, telephone CA [illegible]. He provided Gee with a list of surplus US arms which he could obtain in any quantities desired.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

JAMES R. [illegible]

HH-7300

14-00000

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]
Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

______	Release in full-text
______	Release in sanitized form
✓	Deny in toto
______	Defer decision to ____________
______	Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

[illegible]

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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May 77

Document No. ____________
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FORM 3966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO CO-A(S) 3, 252,678

SUBJECT US Citizens in Circular 1, Isle of Pines Prison, as of 24 Dec 62

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO [illegible]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Isle of Pines Prison/24 Dec 62

Eduardo Suarez Rivera
4766 Alton Road,
Miami Beach, Fla.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A [illegible], age 29.

Former owner of a tourist concession at Havana Riviera Hotel for three years, source served a prison term at Isle of Pines for being anti-Castro. Released after 20 months on 24 Dec 62 with the 2506 Brigade prisoners. Source studied three years of law at Villanueva University in Havana. He speaks English fluently, appears to be very pro-US. One of a series of reports from this source.

[This report was developed by an Air Force representative assigned to the Office of Collection.]

1. The following US citizens were in Circular 1, Isle of Pines Prison, as of 24 Dec 62:

a. Robert John Gentile, age 28-30, 6'2", 150 lbs. brown eyes and hair, divorced; home address: 13517 Kelso Ave, Cleveland, Ohio. He was caught in the Copacabana Hotel, Miramar, Havana, in December 1960 for being a counterrevolutionary. He allegedly belonged to a secret anti-Castro movement. He was supposed to have helped in an uprising in the Escambray Mountains in early 1961. He is serving a 15-year prison term. He is in urgent need of medical care, has a stomach ulcer, and is losing weight daily. He has lost 70 lbs since he has been in prison. I saw him before I left. He is nothing but skin and bones.

b. Eustace Danbrunt, age 37-40, 5'10", 187 lbs, dark brown eyes and hair; married; home address: 3915 Dorfield Blvd, Baltimore, Md. He was caught on north coast of Cuba because of counterrevolutionary activities in 1961 traveling in a yacht with seven or eight other Americans. He is serving a 15 to 20-year prison term. He has lost some weight but otherwise is doing fine. I saw him and talked to him before I left.

c. Peter Lambton, age 24, 5'10", 175 lbs, dirty blond hair, brown eyes; single; home address: Nassau, Bahamas. His father is an American residing in the Bahamas; his mother is English. He was an airplane pilot and water skiing and skindiving instructor in the Bahamas. He was caught in the Pinar del Rio Mountains, in the summer of 1960 fighting with a group of anti-Castro guerrillas. He is not a very intelligent boy and keeps to himself. Walks with a limp caused by an airplane accident.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

[illegible] very [illegible].

a. [illegible], 5'[illegible]", 1[illegible] lbs, [illegible] hair, brown eyes [illegible]. His wife lives in Miami [illegible] on the verge of breaking up. They do not write to [illegible]. [illegible] operations and was caught [illegible]. He was going to be tried [illegible] escape [illegible] with another Cuban [illegible] the St. [illegible] Hotel in Havana. [illegible]. He is serving a [illegible]-year sentence. [illegible] while he was [illegible] prison. When he couldn't get up, they [illegible] his cell. He has lost a lot of weight. [illegible] the prison administration [illegible].

b. [illegible], 35-[illegible] years old, 5'[illegible]", [illegible] lbs, blond hair and blue eyes, [illegible] single. He is a civil pilot who taught in an aviation school in north Florida. Seems very well educated; speaks Spanish [illegible] well now. He was arrested in the summer of 1960 for being connected with a conspiracy with [illegible] La Cayo to overthrow [illegible] Somoza in Nicaragua. La Cayo was traveling by commercial aircraft [illegible] from the US on his way to Puerto Rico, stopped at Jose Marti International Airport, Havana, to pick up passengers, was taken out of the plane, arrested, and taken to prison. La Cayo was trying to recruit personnel in order to overthrow Somoza at the time. Bradley is serving a 15- to 20-year prison term. He was actually working for La Cayo at the time of his arrest. Bradley was caught two or three days before La Cayo, who is also in prison now. La Cayo has no love for the US although he acts as if he loves the US.

c. Rafael del Pino is a naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents), [illegible], 5'[illegible]", 1[illegible] lbs, [illegible] hair, dark brown eyes; home address: [illegible] Miami, Fla (telephone [illegible]). His wife's name is [illegible]. He landed in [illegible] in 19[illegible], in an aircraft he was flying by himself in order to pick up some Cubans to get them out of the country. One of the Cubans he was to pick up was a G-2 agent. His plane had landed, and he was waiting for the passengers when they started to shoot at him. He tried to take off, but he and the plane were badly shot up. He was nearly dead when he was taken from the burning aircraft. He was a member of the 26 July Movement and the right hand of Fidel Castro. He met Fidel in school, went with him to Bogota (Bogotazo) and [illegible], then later turned against Fidel and started to work against him. Del Pino was a Korean War veteran and was president of the Cuban Korean War Veterans Association in Havana. He is serving a 30-year prison term.

d. [illegible] Carswell, [illegible], 5'10", 180 lbs, black hair and blue eyes; home address [illegible]. He was arrested early in 1961 in a boat on the north coast of Cuba with Eustace Danbrunt mentioned above. He is serving a 10-year term for counterrevolutionary activities. He was formerly manager of a bar in the US. I did not know him too well; he was sort of quiet and kept to himself. He is in fair health.

e. [illegible], [illegible], 5'[illegible]", 175 lbs, black hair, brown eyes; [illegible]; home address: 202 Madison Ave, Dothan, Ala, telephone Sycamore 2-[illegible]. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He is serving a 10- to 30-year term for being a counterrevolutionary and was caught on the boat with Carswell and Danbrunt.

f. [illegible], 3[illegible], 6'1", 1[illegible] lbs, blond hair, blue eyes; Harvard graduate; [illegible] Boston, Mass. He lost so much weight, he is nothing but skin and bones. Always keeps to himself and [illegible] rest of the Americans. He is allegedly a CIA agent who was caught with another US citizen in the Capri or St Johns Hotel in Havana in 1961 placing a microphone and wire recorder in the wall between his apartment and that of a Chinese delegation. The engineer, I believe, was either James [illegible] or Joe Green. He is also serving a 15-year term at Isle of Pines.

j. [illegible], [illegible], 5'9", 170 lbs, brown eyes, black hair; home address: Box 16, RFD 1, Franklinville, North Carolina. He may be the engineer who was caught with [illegible] mentioned above. He also keeps to himself. His health is fair. He is also serving a 15- to 20-year term.

k. Joe Green, 30-35, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown hair and eyes; home address unknown. He is very quiet, soft-spoken, well-educated, keeps to himself. He may have been the electrical engineer who was caught with [illegible]. He is also serving a long prison term.

l. Leonardo [illegible], 21 years old, 5'8", 150 lbs, dirty blond hair, blue eyes; high school graduate; home address unknown. He is very healthy, quiet, played chess all the time, stays with the US group. He was one of the seven caught in the yacht with the US citizens on the north coast of Cuba with Dubrunt. He is serving a 15- to 20-year prison term for counterrevolutionary activities.

m. Alfred Gibson, 30-35, 5'8", 160 lbs, fair health, Southern accent, fair education. Kept with the rest of the US citizens. I believe he was also caught in the same yacht with Dubrunt. He is also serving a long prison term.

n. Richard Allen Pecoraro, 30-35, 5'8", 150 lbs, dark brown hair, blue eyes; home address unknown. He is completely crazy, of irrational behavior, tried to escape in one of the big trash cans. Has had several crazy fits. He has been in the hospital several times. Two prisoners who are psychiatrists have been trying to help him, but in vain. He urgently needs psychiatric help. He was allegedly caught in the Escambray Mountains and arrested for being a counterrevolutionary. He was caught in late 1960 or early 1961, is serving a 15-year term. Sometimes goes around all day talking to himself.

o. [illegible], 32-35, 5'9", 150 lbs, brown eyes and hair, naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents). Korean War veteran. His wife (Lucy) and two daughters are residing in Miami. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He was arrested in Havana in 1961 for being a counterrevolutionary.

p. [illegible] ([illegible]), 20-30, 5'9", 150 lbs, light-brown hair, blue eyes, Korean War veteran, a Southerner, high school education. He was also caught in the yacht with Dubrunt, who was allegedly working for Rolando Masferrer. He worked in a New York resort center before going to Cuba.

4. These are all the US citizens that I know about who are at the Isle of Pines Prison now.

-end-

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F-77-260

Document Description: [illegible] Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
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Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

______ Release in full-text
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______ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓) Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓) Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
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( ) Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( ) Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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FORM 1-77 3355

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Undesirables, Common Criminals and Suspected [illegible] Agents Among Asylees in the Ecuadorian Embassy in Havana

REPORT NO. 00-B 3,245,641

DATE DISTR. [illegible]

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES [illegible] Beltran Vargas A-12-856-761 [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. Aug 61 - Sep 62

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [illegible] Sep 62

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 856 761, who arrived in the US on 16 Sep 62 as a political refugee.

Source is a Cuban of Ecuadorian extraction and was employed as a clerk by the Ecuadorian Embassy until September 1962.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. The majority of the Cuban asylees in the Ecuadorian Embassy were bonafide victims of the Communist regime. However, during the time I served as secretary of the Embassy I observed that some men and women of unsavory reputation entered the Embassy as political refugees. The following are those whom I consider to be undesirable: Manuel [illegible], organizer of the G-2 activities in the Isle of Pines and who executed many opponents of the regime, entered the Embassy to avoid being arrested for black market activities and embezzlement of public funds. [illegible] is an accomplished bully and terrorized the rest of the asylees with his reckless display of weapons he brought into the Embassy. As far as I know he is still in the Embassy.

2. Juan Garcia [illegible], a hired killer who was one of the most notorious members of the gang known as "Los Tigres" led by former Senator Rolando Masferrer. Evaristo Garcia [illegible], a professional gambler, who organized gambling within the Embassy and his son Evaristo Garcia, Jr. Garcia and his son are in Miami. [illegible] del [illegible], a notorious prostitute who was in [illegible] and her companion [illegible]. These two females have been in Miami for [illegible].

3. Among the suspected [illegible] agents were: Vladimir Iser, an Ukrainian [illegible] of the [illegible] who resides at 770 N.W. 2nd St., Miami, Florida. [illegible] Communist Party who is presently in [illegible], Ecuador. [illegible] also in [illegible], Ecuador. [illegible] who is in a refuge in Miami, Florida. Juan [illegible] also a Communist organizer [illegible] in Miami. Captain [illegible], former Fidel Castro bodyguard who entered the Embassy because of his participation in the automobile [illegible]. Jesus [illegible], [illegible] who was involved with a ring of [illegible] counterfeiters. He is also a [illegible] pilot.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-2-

4. Arturo [illegible], a member of a wealthy family from Santiago de Cuba, served as prosecuting attorney during the early days of the Revolution and sent many Cubans to the firing squad. This man and his family are residing in Miami. [illegible] [illegible], a mentally unbalanced female who kept the G-2 informed concerning the asylees' activities.

-end-

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
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RECOMMEND:

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____ Defer decision to ____________
____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

[illegible]

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
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( ) Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
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(-) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
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FORM 3055

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

00143)3,28 [illegible]

TO : Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

DATE: 5 April 1963

MIA(S) - [illegible]

SUBJECT: Plan to Unite the Cuban Exiles

1. At their request, Luis G. Rodriguez met with Dr. Eduardo Rafael Sardiñas, secretary of the Cuban Cane Planters Association in Exile and with Juan Amador Rodriguez, former Cuban Senator and editor of the Spanish language radio newspaper "El Periodico del Aire," [illegible] advised that they have been meeting with several personalities of the exile colony in an effort to organize all the exiles into a single group which will represent all the exiles regardless of former affiliations.

2. They feel that after the sorry spectacle provided by the Cuban Revolutionary Council, they must avoid getting involved in matters which are in conflict with the policies of the US Government. Therefore, they would like to discuss this project with Mr. John Crimmins.

3. The following personalities have been approached and have indicated their desire to cooperate to the fullest extent in an effort to unite all the Cubans in exile: Antonio Manuel de Varona, Dr. Julio Sanguily, Dr. Carlos Prio, Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling, Carlos Hevia, Jose Ignacio Rivero, Jose Alvarez Diaz, Raul Menocal, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, Luis Conte Aguero, Manuel Artime, Eusebio Mujal, [illegible] Lizaris, Orlando Cuervo Calzada, Jose Ignacio Rasco, Mario [illegible], Herminio Portell Vila, Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Lomberto Diaz, Santiago Alvarez, Ruben de Leon. Also included in this roster are General Generoso Campos Marquetti, veteran of the War of Independence, and Facundo [illegible], leader of the Transportation Workers, because both are Negroes.

4. Representatives of the Medical Association, Bar Association, Teacher and Newspaper Associations and the Students Directory have also been contacted and indicated their desire to assist in this endeavor.

5. Amador and Sardiñas stated that Former President Prio indicated that former members of the Castro regime who are exiled in the US should also be invited to join because their presence in the organization will indicate to the people of Cuba that the aim of the organization is not the return to certain conditions that prevailed before 1 Jan 59. Dr. Prio maintains that with former Fidelistas joining the organization the members of the Rebel Army and the militia plus the Government bureaucracy will not fear reprisals if and when the Castro regime is ousted. Dr. Prio added that with names such as Felipe Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Raul Chibas and even controversial Manolo Ray, the chances of defection by members of the Armed Forces will increase.

CONT'D TWO.

6. The organization will also invite to join many prominent Cubans who served under the Batista Administration and who were given a clean bill of health after the Revolution. However, such notorious criminals like Colonels Esteban Ventura, Conrado Carratala, [illegible], [illegible] Irenaldo Garcia Baez and others, will not be admitted. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and his group will not be invited because they are considered to be agent provocateurs.

7. If this works out, the new organization will be ruled by a five man board selected by a general assembly of all the above mentioned personalities. The chairmanship of the board will be rotated periodically.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

LCRodriguez:cs

cc: SAS, Miami

SAS
30 April 63
[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. E77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________ [illegible]

RECOMMEND:
- ____ Release in full-text
- ____ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ____ Defer decision to ____________
- ____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓)	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(c)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Excepted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office 12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

A-168346 A-168762

Rolando Masferrer (Jr.), Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Napper/Musulin telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandoise schemes and international arms deals. He has ~~had~~ perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Roland Masferrer, Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
CSMusulin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: ER 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

2 c CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) [illegible]

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Central / Paul
CC Washington
28 Jul 72
[illegible]

16-88-46

7 July 1972.

A-168846

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

1c

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

16-72-[illegible]

Chief, Washington Field Office 16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Hasferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead A

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from WH/3/Venezuela (Jeffrey G. Peterson).

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Hasferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not ~~repeat~~ not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusulin/daa
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: EH 23880

SECRET

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.

2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.

3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.

4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.

5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist,he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

SECRET [illegible]

SECRET

solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

SECRET

SECRET

Chief, Washington Field Office   28 June 1972

B-67-52

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

#168846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Happer/Musulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked Jeffrey G. Peterson (WH/3/Venezuela) for additional [illegible] information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

1163762

2. Jeffrey Peterson is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to Peterson, based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, Peterson mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. Peterson said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. Peterson underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigers", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

7. Peterson believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GS:mcslin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HH 23880
23880

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY | FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4	B. REQ. CODE 11 12 13 14 15	C. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26
XMIM	CC400		07 10 3

REPORT NO. A B C D E F G 27 28 29 30 31 32 33: ~~A~~ 2 0 2 6 5 7 3

J U O 34 35 36

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD 37 38 39

RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44: 07 16 3

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rolando MASFERRER
6080 W. Flagler Avenue
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4	-	-	-
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
[✓ 9]	M	I	S

* 1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	9	0	V
2	I	N	T
[✓ 3]	0	5	5
4			

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues wish us to report on Yglesias and record these developments.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH 25263

WH/COG/OS 4D 46 7-040
ATTN CHRIS HOPKINS

Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masferrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to MIM F.O. He is a slick operator. Be very cautious in your dealings in the hunt.

C/FO: MacVane:paw

F.O. CHIEF: BENAIN/PARING

CASE OFFICER: J S Musulin

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 25 7-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322 20265-73

DATE

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala

NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

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1. On 26 June 1973 the Miami Field Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with Matt MacVane of the Miami Field Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Yglesias (subject of 00A(S) 322/17013-73) that would prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6080 W. Flagler Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request Matt MacVane and Luis Desa-Soto of the Miami Field Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.

2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Yglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Yglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Yglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance secret CIA operations. Yglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for secret operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian Internal Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro Vargas, who is an advisor in armaments to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Yglesias the name of Carlos Fabri, head of the Venezuela Internal Police. Yglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a secret CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Yglesias as a black operation.

3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007632
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

00— A(S)-322/20265-73

Masferrer because, according to him, any time the US Embassy people in Bogota were passed information the Colombian guerrillas were somehow informed. Vega told Masferrer that he believed a leak had developed in the US Embassy and that the "Embassy boys" could no longer be trusted.

- end -

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4): X M I M

B. REQ. CODE (11 12 13 14 15): C C 4 C C

C. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20):

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED (MO. DA. YR.) (22 23 24 25 26): 0 5 2 4 3

REPORT NO. (A B C D E F G) (27 28 29 30 31 32 33): A 1 3 8 6 4 7 3

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible False Recruitment Effort

(Cuba/Haiti)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37 38 39):

RELEASED (MO. DA. YR.) (40 41 42 43 44): 05363

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rolando Masferrer
c/o Daniel Bermudez
6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 * NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50	*	AREA 51	52	53	54
0	E	C	O	1. SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN	1	S	O	V
1	S	&	T	2. TOO GENERAL	2	I	N	T
2	-	-	-					
3	M	I	L	3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES	4			
4	-	-	-					
5	S	O	C	4. OTHER/MISC				
6	G	E	O	5. COMBINED WITH				
7	B	I	O	6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST				
8	-	-	-					
[✓ 9]	M	I	S					

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☒ OTHER (specify below) **Call-in**

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): ☐ NO ☐ TO USSR ☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	OSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			**Musulin**

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004476 WH-3?

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS HH-23880

FYI and Possible Interest

Copies to:
WH/C/FI - 3-D-38
WH/7/HT 3-B-0001
WH/C/CI 3-D-46
7-014A

Believe your caller was Rolando Masferrer Jr. who is the nephew of the infamous Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, serving in a U.S. federal prison for organizing (1967) invasion of Haiti. Young Rolando was associated w/ Mitchell L. WerBell III. Stray cousin of Rolando Sr. ([illegible]) We will send you some background.

C/S: **BEMainwaring:mbf**

F.O. CHIEF: **BEMAINWARING**

CASE OFFICER: JSGMusulin

DIVISION/STAFF DESK

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322/13864-73

DATE 26 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

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1. At 1700 hours on 14 May 1973 the Miami Field Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.

2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 261-3689. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Daniel Bermudez, 6080 W. Flagler, Apartment #17.

3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.

4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather noncommital response.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by: 007622
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

FORM 12-72 3216 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(28)

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office 12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

A-168846 A-168762

~~Rolando Masferrer~~ Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Hepper/Musulin telecons

A 127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of ~~Strategic Services (OSS) officer~~ known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandoise schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Roland Masferrer, Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
CS Musulin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HH 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
5B(1), ②, (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

2

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

________ Release in full-text
________ Release in sanitized form
________ Deny in toto
________ Defer decision to ____________
______✓ Coordination with [illegible] prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(✓)	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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May 77

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16-88-02

Chief, Washington Field Office 16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from WH/3/Venezuela (Jeffrey G. Peterson),

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not repeat not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES H. MURPHY

GSMusulin/daa
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated: [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ______

[illegible]

RECOMMEND:

- ______ Release in full-text
- ______ Release in sanitized form
- ___✓___ Deny in toto
- ______ Defer decision to ______
- ___✓___ Coordination with [illegible] prior to above denial/release.

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(✓)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
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(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
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( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Excepted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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Chief, Washington Field Office 28 June 1972

B-67-52

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

A #168846

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject
B) Van Epper/Musulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked Jeffrey C. Peterson (UG/2/Venezuela) for additional assessment information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

A 168762

2. Jeffrey Peterson is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to Peterson, based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, Peterson mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. Peterson said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. Peterson underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

7. Peterson believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

GSMusalin/lld
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILED: HN 23880
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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: Memos

Dated: 12 June 1972
7 July 1972 (2)
6 July 1972

Document Located By: DCD
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
____ Deny in toto
__✓__ Defer decision to WH Div
____ Coordination with ________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

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( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5343, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

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FORM 5-77 3966

6 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Monday, 3 July 1972, from 2100 to 2400 hours at Clyde's Bar, Washington, D.C.; and Tuesday, 4 July 1972, from 1300 to 1600 hours, poolside, 7625 Matera St., Apt. 201, Falls Church, Virginia, the undersigned talked with Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

2. I mentioned to Masferrer that my superiors (supposedly in the State Department) were interested that some responsible U.S. Government authority be informed of his story regarding U.S. citizen involvement in drug trafficking and guerrilla training in Mexico. Masferrer said that last February he told the story up to that date to Miami, F.B.I. Agent Bob Dyer, and also certain information to U.S. Customs Bureau Agent Buchanan (fnu). Masferrer said he had not informed any government entities of events subsequent to February. I mentioned that such information was not necessarily within the unique purview of the State Department, but that my superiors would probably be interested in anything further.

3. Rolando Masferrer, Jr., related to me four different occasions when an insurgent organization, "Force Seven", comprised of American adventurers in Mexico, was brought to his attention.

4. The first time the Subject heard of "Force Seven" was from Francisco BRAVO (or Brabo) [NFI], Chief of Judicial Police, State of Morelos. Subject had met Bravo "a few years ago". They met again in Atlanta, Georgia, late December 1971, when Bravo came for a weapons demonstration at the Military Armament Corp, Powder Springs, Georgia, some 20 miles outside Atlanta. Bravo told Masferrer of the insurgency problem in the Mexican states of Morelos and Guerrero. Bravo mentioned the existence of "Force Seven". Bravo indicated his police

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23880

needed weapons to fight the insurgents and subsequently invited Masferrer and Anselmo Alliegro [son of a former Cuban Senator, naturalized citizen, and Masferrer's partner in Parabellum Corporation] to come to Mexico. Bravo promised to introduce Masferrer and Alliegro to Mexican police authorities competent to purchase firearms.

5. Subject again heard the name "Force Seven" in Miami, January 1972, from Oliverio CASTANEDA Paiz, former First Vice-President of the Guatemalan Congress. [Castaneda was head of the Guatemalan civilian counter-insurgency forces in the Zacapa region during 1967-68, and, according to Masferrer, the chief of the Mano Blanco. Castaneda was killed 12 June 1972. The Guatemalan insurgent group, F.A.R., "took credit" for the killing.] Castaneda was travelling to the U.S. with Messers. Sandoval and Figaroa. [Probably Mario SANDOVAL Alarcon, President of the Guatemalan Congress and head of the M.L.N. party; and Alvaro CUEVAS Figaroa, Castaneda's predecessor as First Vice-President of Congress. Several TDCS reports during January and February 1972 indicated Cuevas Figaroa was trying to smuggle arms from the U.S. to Guatemala supposedly for a planned coup in Costa Rica] Masferrer said Castaneda was trying to arrange the release from U.S. federal prison Rolando Masferrer, Sr. Castaneda wanted Masferrer, Sr., to emigrate to Guatemala to become involved in state security matters and also to organize an anti-Communist army. Castaneda mentioned to Masferrer, Jr., the growing insurgency problems in the Peten area of Guatemala. Castaneda mentioned that U.S. insurgents operating under the name "Force Seven" entered the Peten from Mexico. The Guatemalan Army's Mariscal Zavala Brigade had been dispatched from Guatemala City to the Mexican border in Peten province to counter the infiltration, but had recently been shifted to the border adjacent British Honduras. Masferror said Castaneda believed that former U.S. "Green Berets" were involved with the insurgents. Castaneda said that a list of all U.S. Special Forces-trained Guatemalans had disappeared when the U.S. military training mission was terminated. Now the guerrillas in Guatemala are pinpointing those U.S. trained, local military personnel with uncanny accuracy. From that evidence, Castaneda believed that "Force Seven" must include some of the U.S. "Green Berets" that had originally trained the local Guatemalan military.

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6. During the first three months of 1972, Subject made two trips to Mexico. During his first trip, three weeks in late January and February, Masferrer travelled with Alliegro and Mitchell Werbell (Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, 201-259010, former OSS member in C-B-I in World War II; former President of Military Armament Corporation; and presently associated with Defense Systems Incorporated, Powder Springs, Georgia.) In Mexico City, Francisco Bravo introduced the delegation to Mexico City Police Chief Santos [Daniel GUTIERREZ Santos] and Miguel NAZAR Haro, "Chief of Political Police". [Actually Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, DFS, a political and intelligence organization working within the Secretariat of Government.] During conversations Nazar admitted Mexico's insurgency problems and specifically named "Force Seven". Masferrer mentioned that both Nazar and Gutierrez Santos were angry with President Echeverria because of the Mexican Government's policy of light criminal punishment and short prison terms for bandits and/or guerrillas painstakingly captured by the police.

7. Bravo took the three to Cuernavaca where he showed them a house on the outskirts of the city that the police used for unofficial detentions and heavy-handed interrogations. Bravo complained that the local Catholic Archbishop was implicated with the insurgents as well as certain U.S. film personalities who vacation in the American community in Cuernavaca. Bravo also implicated a professor that was kidnapped in Guerrero in late 1971. Bravo believed that the professor [Jaime CASTREJON Diez, Rector of the University of Guerrero] actually conspired with the insurgents for his own kidnapping in order to raise the ransom money for the insurgent movement. [The ransom was finally paid by President Echeverria.]

8. Subject travelled again to Mexico in March 1972 with Bernardo DE TORRES. [Mexico 2038, 4 December 1969, mentions that LITEMPO-12, WH/MIAMI, received a phone call from one Bernardo De Torres regarding a supposed Swiss contraband arms dealer in Mexico City.] Nazar had invited Masferrer to return to Mexico to go on a "hunting party", that is, to participate in an actual counter-insurgency operation. Masferrer and De Torres arrived in Acapulco and were met by Bravo. They travelled by police vehicle for about an hour east of Acapulco to an area near La Treintas (NFI).

23850

Just before they arrived they heard on the police radio that the Army had just "shot down" a twin-engine Beechcraft. When they arrived, a search of the wreckage yielded a few weapons. A short firefight (about 15 minutes) ensued with insurgents that left two soldiers dead. Masferrer said he did not know the number of insurgent casualties. One insurgent was captured along with his .45 caliber pistol.

9. The captured insurgent turned out to be a U.S. citizen, white, male, approximately 27 years old. (Masferrer claimed he forgot the prisoner's name, but that he had it in Miami.) Bravo did not trust the Acapulco or the Guerrero state police and had his men take the prisoner to the detention house outside of Cuernavaca. Masferrer said he witnessed the interrogation in which the prisoner's head was repeatedly dunked in a rain barrel to make him talk. The prisoner eventually revealed the following information about "Force Seven": participating Americans were ex-ranger, airborne, Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam combat experience. They were armed with CAR-15 (M-16) rifles and some had M-79 grenade launchers. Other Americans operated elsewhere in Latin America. "Force Seven" provided training to the insurgents and, whenever possible, supplied weapons. In return, the Americans were paid in money and drugs, mostly marijuana, but some cocaine. Masferrer said no heroin was mentioned. The prisoner said the insurgents used the money from the drug smuggling to finance operations. Bank robberies had become increasingly difficult since the Army began posting armed guards at area banks. The prisoner said he had worked under Genaro VASQUEZ [Mexico's infamous bandit-turned-guerrilla; killed in a car accident last February]. The prisoner put guerrilla strength at about 2,000 men. Masferrer, however, said Bravo felt that figure to be high. The prisoner also mentioned that some of the insurgents had previously received guerrilla training in North Korea.

10. Masferrer said that later, upon Nazar's orders, the American prisoner was shot and killed. The whole affair was never reported in the local press because, according to Masferrer, such information, if revealed, would damage the area's tourist trade.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

2388

12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.

2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.

3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.

4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.

5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

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solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

[illegible] / [illegible]
CC Washington
28 Jul 72

16-88-46

7 July 1972

A-168846

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

5-1391

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

14-00000

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Jeffrey G. Peterson's Conversation with
Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Sunday, 2 July 1972, from 1800 to 2000 hours at the [illegible] Restaurant, Arlington, Va., I met with Rolando Masferrer, Jr. (Masferrer is unwitting of my Agency employment. My cover story is that I am a Program Officer with the State Department. I supposedly work in a research capacity for the American Republics Area until the time I can be programmed to enter the next Foreign Service Institute class.)

2. Masferrer and I, old National Guard comrades, had not seen one another for 5 months. We had dinner and later went on a tour of apartment sites in the District and northern Virginia. During the course of the conversation, he related the events of his trips to Mexico and his recent trip (June 1972) to Colombia in the course of his job as Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corp.

Mexico: Subject mentioned the trouble the Mexican Government is having with leftist guerrillas, particularly in two western states. He claimed the rebels were being trained in part by U.S. adventurers who claimed to be ex-ranger, airborne Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam experience. The Americans were training the rebels in return for money and marijuana and a piece of the drug smuggling action. The Americans operated under the nom de guerre "Force Seven". This same "Force Seven" claimed to have connections and affiliations in Guatemala. Subject claimed even to have participated in a small firefight with the Mexican Army and the Judicial Police against the guerrillas in an effort to prove the worth of his particular military products.

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Colombia: Subject mentioned Colombia's increasing alarm with the problems of drug trafficking within the country. While in Colombia he claimed to have stayed in the house of his family friend MG Jaime [illegible] Porlo, Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army.

2. The entire conversation was kept on the level of buddies swapping war stories. Subject, however, swore to the veracity of his statements. I mentioned that the State Department was currently interested in the problems of drug trafficking in Latin America and maybe there would be some interest in pursuing the matter further. I also indicated I would ask my superiors at the State Department if they had ever heard anything about the existence of a "Force Seven" or anything on the curious [illegible] of U.S. adventurers, drug smuggling, and leftist guerrilla movements in Mexico.

3. On Monday, 3 July 1972, I coordinated with the following people at Headquarters:

Robert Brugger, Acting Desk Chief, Colombia
Richard Wheeler and John Murray, Branch 1, Mexico
Robert Weicha, C/WH/FI
Drake Reid, WH/NARC

Their collective suggestions and instructions were:

a. Go slow on efforts to elicit information so not to arouse suspicions of Agency involvement.

b. Find out any information regarding the Colombian Army's B-2 battalion, U.S. citizen's involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America (names, dates, and places), Cuban involvement in cocaine traffic, and any ties between leftist guerrillas and drug smuggling.

c. Write a memorandum and Subject evaluation (where he works, where he goes, who he meets, and an assessment of recruitability).

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4. I made arrangements to meet McFerrer again the evening of 3 July 1972 and the afternoon of 4 July 1972.

Jeffrey G. Peterson

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E 17-260

Document Description: [illegible]

Dated. [illegible]

Document Located By: DCD
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Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

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____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

[illegible]

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*( ) Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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May 77

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

F-16-88-46

SECRET

Chief, Miami Field Office

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF : OOA(S) 322/13864-73

ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficing and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
GSMusulin/ds
cc: Services Division (Control)
Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

[illegible]

FOIA/PA Request No. [illegible]

Document Description: [illegible]

Dates: ____

Document Located By : [illegible]
OFFICE : COMPONENT

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____

[illegible]

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
✓ Deny in toto
____ Defer decision to ____
____ Coordination with ____ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(c)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(c)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(✓)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Excepted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and EM-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

Document No. ____
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: ____

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

FORM 3966

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. FILE CODE	C. CASE NUMBER	FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.		
X M I M	10460		0 5 2 1 8	7 3	3 6 4 2 3

D. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible False Recruitment Effort

(Cuba/Haiti)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD — RELEASED MO. DA. YR.: 75313

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Rolando Masferrer
c/o Daniel Bermudez
6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER — NO. DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT — AREA

0055

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT

☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☒ OTHER (specify below) Call-in

EVALUATION — USSR ONLY EXCHANGES: NO / TO USSR / FROM USSR — RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO	ALIEN	CSS	SOV	INT	CASE OFFICER
		X			Musulin

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 004475

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH-23860

FYI and Possible Interest

Copies to:
WH/C/FI - 3 D-38
WH/7/HT 3-B-0001
WH/C/CI 3-D-46

7-014A

Believe your caller was Rolando Masferrer Jr. who is the nephew of the infamous Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, now in a US federal prison for organizing (1967) invasion of Haiti. [illegible] Rolando was associated with [illegible] Rolando [illegible] [illegible]

C/S	F.O. CHIEF	CASE OFFICER	DIVISION/STAFF/DESK
BFMainwaring:bl	BFMAINWARING		

FORM 7-69 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20-41)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

- end -

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REPORT NO. 00-A(S)-322/13364-73

DATE 25 May 1973

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. At 1750 hours on 14 May 1973 the Miami Field Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.

2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 251-3639. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to [illegible] Bermudez, 6050 N. Flagler, Apartment #17.

3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.

4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather non-committal response.

- end -

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: [illegible] Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: XIIIH

CASE NUMBER: 00400

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORWARDED MO. DA. YR.: 07 1 03

A 20263 73

D. SUBJECT AND AREA
Guillermo Yglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

(Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD

RELEASED MO. DA YR.: 07 1 63

E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Rolando MASFERRER
6030 W. Flagler Avenue
Miami, Florida

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE DOC.: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

NOT DISSEMINATED

F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
Same

G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SUBJECT

AREA: 3 055

1. SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER/MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

H. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TRIP REPORT
☐ OTHER DOCUMENT ☐ OTHER (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE): NO / TO USSR / FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: WH

DIRECTED TO: ALIEN / CSS X / SOV / INT / CASE OFFICER

FIELD COMMENTS

Our local colleagues wish us to report on Yglesias and record these developments.

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

HH 25263

WH/COG/OS - 4D-46.7-040
ATTN. Chris Hogkins

Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masferrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to MIA F.O. He is a [illegible]. Be very cautious in your dealings with him.

CASE OFFICER: FMacVane:pew

F.O. CHIEF: EDWARD [illegible]

CASE OFFICER: J. [illegible]

DIVISION/STAFF/DESK

FORM 3-59 25 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20-41)

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Yglesias /Efforts to Raise
Money Under [illegible] and Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

---

1. On 26 June 1973 the Miami Field Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with [illegible] of the Miami Field Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Iglesias [illegible] prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6030 N. [illegible] Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request [illegible] and [illegible] of the Miami Field Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.

2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Yglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Yglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Yglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance covert CIA operations. Yglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for covert operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian National Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro [illegible], who is an advisor [illegible] to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Yglesias the name of Carlos [illegible], head of the Venezuela National Police. Yglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a covert CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Yglesias as a black operation.

3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

F-16-88-41

SECRET

OSS-820-73
31 May 1973

Chief, Miami Field Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF : OOA(S) 322/13364-73 ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficing and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
GSMusulin/ds
cc: Services Division (Control)
Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET

Subject has been identified as having remained in Korea since 28 January 1960, presumably in the above position.

PERSONS WITH WHOM GEORGE PERISTEROPOULOS IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT:

1. Kenneth C. MILLER, Chase Manhattan Bank, Tokyo, Japan. Listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

2. Al (Alphonse) RIGOD (name of firm illegible but probably L. RONDON and Company, of Tokyo, Japan), listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

   The KANTO DIRECTORY for Tokyo and Yokohama, Japan for 1955 on page 325 lists L. R. and Mrs. Alphonse (Alphonse) RIGOD, with residence address of 69 [illegible]-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, with business address for Alphonse RIGOD as c/o L. RONDON and Company, Ltd. (Japan), Tokyo. Tel. 27-3521-4.

   Alphonse RIGOD was identified in 1949 as a French citizen, resident in Shanghai, China at 75 Route Frelupt, who was serving as a cut-out conveying French Intelligence Requirements to a double agent in Shanghai in 1949.

3. Gregory TOPZE, of the FONTE Company, Tokyo, Japan. Listed by Subject as a personal reference in 1957.

4. Antonios (Anthony) E. PAPPADOPOULOS, Greek Consul, Yokohama, Japan, listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

5. Valentine HAHN aka Valentin Vasiliyevich ZHAN aka Wen-Shin HAN, former Soviet Agent, who is elsewhere identified.

6. Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who in 1953 was the manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sondovick Brothers, Incorporated, by which organization Subject was then employed.

7. William Hamilton MARTIN, as reported in cover dispatch.

SECRET

[illegible] CONTROL [illegible]

8. Officials of the Claggett-Nolan Company, Incorporated, Tokyo, Japan, whose identities have not been determined on basis of reported direct contact with Subject, but who are presumed to include Richard William Nolan CHILD and Mortimer Claggett COOKE, Junior, the principal officers.

SECRET

HX-3

18 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Agency

ATTENTION: Mr. S. Wesley Reynolds

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1. Reference is made to information orally furnished by your office to representatives of this Agency to the effect that William Hamilton MARTIN at one time mentioned the fact that prior to his resignation from his civilian contract employment with the Department of the Army in Tokyo, Japan, and prior to his actual return to the United States in late August or early September 1955, he had been offered a job as a rug salesman by one George PARIS of Tokyo, Japan.

2. A check of the indices of this Agency reveals that William MARTIN's Tokyo acquaintance, who offered him a job as a "rug salesman", and whom MARTIN called "George PARIS" is undoubtedly identical with one George S. PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERISTEROPOULOU aka George S. PARIS, aka George PARIS, born 2 January 1909 at Constantinople, Turkey, but of Greek nationality since birth. According to information provided abroad to representatives of this Agency by a Japanese liaison service, George PERISTEROPOULOS in about 1946 abbreviated his name to George PARIS. The liaison service added that he operated the Pickels Rug Company in Tientsin and Shanghai, China, as his own business" between 1927 and 1941, at which time the firm was closed down because of the war. Between 1942 and 1945 he was under house arrest, or "confined to his home in Shanghai, but significantly was not interned by the Japanese. From 1946 to 1950 he operated the George PARIS COMPANY in Shanghai. He claimed to have been unemployed between 1950 and 1952, at which time he emigrated to Tokyo, Japan, from Shanghai, obtaining employment in Tokyo with the firm of SUNDOVICH

SECRET

[illegible] CONTROL

1/800

[illegible] INCORPORATED, and in 1951 he became the manager of the Tokyo branch of this firm. In 1954 he established his own firm under the name of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, which firm appears in the trade indices published for Japan, and is reflected in attachment. In 1955 George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PARIS was appointed to the position of Honorary Deputy Greek Consul in Yokohama, in which position he was the deputy to Antonios A. PAPPADOPOULOS aka Anthony A. PAPPADOPOULOS, the Honorary Greek Consul in Yokohama. PERISTEROPOULOS appears to have continued in this diplomatic post until sometime in mid 1959, when an official Royal Hellenic Diplomatic Mission to Japan was accredited to the current government of Japan, and the functions of the Yokohama Consular Office were taken over from the two honorary consuls.

3. Liaison reported that on 28 January 1960 George [illegible] departed from Japan [illegible] Seoul, Korea, and that he had not returned to Japan as of 30 August 1960. Through a sensitive source in Seoul, with whom representatives of this Agency are in operational contact, and who is believed to be reliable, it has been ascertained that George PARIS left Haneda Airport in Tokyo on 28 January 1960 aboard regular CAT scheduled flight to Seoul, Korea, where he was to assume the position of resident representative in Seoul, Korea, of the firm of CLAGGETT-NOLAN COMPANY, INCORPORATED, an export-import firm, with offices in the Hotel Bando, in Seoul. This firm is listed in the Foreign Directory for Seoul as having headquarters in the United States, located at 24 California street, San Francisco, California. PARIS replaced a British national named Adrian James PRIOR, as representative of the CLAGGETT-NOLAN Company in Korea.

4. On basis of an official inquiry by a representative of our Agency to the United States Embassy in Seoul, it was learned that the above firm of CLAGGETT-NOLAN Company enjoys a good reputation locally and deals in the sale of electrical and mechanical machinery and equipment. It was also learned that the capital stock of the firm is controlled by one Mortimer C. COOKE, Junior, and a Richard W. CHILD, both of whom are United States citizens. The indices of this Agency reveal that Mortimer C. COOKE, Junior, of the above mentioned firm is identical with Mortimer Claggett COOKE, Junior, co-owner with Richard William Nolan CHILD of the firm of BALCOM TRADING COMPANY INCORPORATED, which has offices in Tokyo, Japan, and is incorporated under the laws of Panama. Additional

information concerning the above firms and regarding Richard William Nolan CHILD and Mortimer Claggett [illegible], Jr. will be furnished separately.

5. The activities and contacts of George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS in Japan and Korea are currently being investigated by this Agency.

6. George S. PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, identified above, and known to William H. MARTIN as "George PARIS", is identical with the individual whom Valentin HAHN aka Valentin Vasiliyevich KHAN aka Won-Shin HAN, admitted former (1947) Soviet agent, identified as "George PARIS, a Greek businessman in Tokyo", and as one of HAHN's close contacts and friends in Japan. When interviewed by representatives of this Agency in 1958, Valentine HAHN advised that the above "George PARIS" was the person who introduced HAHN to a Tokyo nightclub, located off the Ginza, the name of which HAHN gave only as "The Tomorrow Is Too Late Club". HAHN claimed that this was an exact and direct translation into English of the actual Japanese name, which, however, he never mentioned during the interview. Date of HAHN's visit to this "club" in company of George PERIS aka PARIS, is estimated to have been somewhere between 1954 and 1957. HAHN stated that at the "Tomorrow Is Too Late Club" he was introduced to a Japanese hostess by the name of Noriko MATSUZAKAYA alias Noriko AWAJI, with whom HAHN subsequently enjoyed dates. It is believed that Noriko MATSUZAKAYA @ AWAJI became the mistress of Valentine HAHN for an undetermined period of time following his original introduction to her at the above "Club" while in the company of George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS aka PARIS. HAHN also advised, that following his original introduction to this establishment by PERIS, HAHN had taken a number of unnamed married American nationals, who were stationed in Tokyo, to the same club, where such persons had also been introduced to and had enjoyed dates with the hostesses. At this time, there is no information to indicate that either William Hamilton MARTIN or Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL were among the United States nationals HAHN referred to as having been taken to the aforementioned club by HAHN. Neither is there any information currently available to reflect that William Hamilton MARTIN was known to Valentine HAHN through their mutual acquaintanceship with George PERISTEROPOULOS.

7. As attachment herewith, we are forwarding a chronologically

organized biographical outline of all information on George PARISTEROPOULOS aka PARIS, developed to date. Attachment to this communication indicates that PARIS has been or may still be a contact of Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, suspect Soviet Agent, who is the Tokyo Branch Manager of the firm of SONDOVICH BROTHERS INCORPORATED, which firm has long been suspected of being a front or cover organization for Soviet intelligence operations. Attention is invited specifically to the fact that Attachment reflects that the 1954 Japan Directory of Foreign Firms lists E. OSTROVSKY as Tokyo representative of this firm, which has offices at 61 - Tamura-cho, 4-chome, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, and telephone lines: 43-1509, 43-4369, 43-4287, whereas in 1958 subject is officially listed as George PARIS, of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, located at 64-3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Telephones: 43-1509 and 43-4287, reflecting that he shared telephone numbers with SONDOVICH BROTHERS, and presumably with Emanuel A. OSTROVSKY. It is suggested that the Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may have additional information on George PARISTEROPOULOS aka PARIS and associates.

8. No additional information, to supplement that which is reported in paragraph 6 above, identifiable with Noriko MATSUZAKAYA & AWAJI, would be located in the indices of this Agency.

9. With reference to the 'Tomorrow is Too Late Club', mentioned in paragraph 5 above, to which Valentine HAHN claims to have been taken by George PARIS, an exact and direct re-translation of the club name into Japanese from the English as given by HAHN, would read "Asu de wa Ososugiru". It is noted that the Tokyo Telephone Directory for 1957 contains a listing for an establishment of this name, as follows: ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU, located at Chuo-ku, Ginza, 8-Chome, 3 Banchi, Tokyo-to, Telephone Nos.: 57-0945, 57-6363, 57-6928. A reliable source, who is familiar with the city of Tokyo, advised in October 1960, that as of 1959 this establishment was still operating at the listed location, and that it is a coffee-house rather than a nightclub in the western sense, although alcoholic beverages are available for consumption on the premises by the patrons. The same source also advised that the above coffee-house employs "Japanese hostesses", as is customary in such establishments in Japan, and that such females might be "dated" under the circumstances indicated by Valentine HAHN. However, it should be noted

that the same source also indicated that the coffee-house known as ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU to which he was referring, which is identical with the establishment of this name listed in the 1957 Tokyo Directory, is the type of place which is not frequented in general by American nationals stationed in or visiting Tokyo as tourists; rather it caters mainly to indigenous patrons and their guests, or to foreign residents of Tokyo who have been introduced to the place and the management by indigenous patrons. These foreigners then become regular patrons after becoming known to the management. Inasmuch as the above described ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU coffee-house generally fits the description of the "Tomorrow is Too Late Club" mentioned by Valentine HAHN as a "nightclub" to which he was taken by George PERIS, it is suggested that they are one and the same establishments.

10. In light of the mutual acquaintanceship of William H. MARTIN and Valentine HAHN with George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, and in turn, PERIS' role vis-a-vis HAHN's introduction to the ASU DE WA OSOSUGIRU coffee-house, it is suggested that PERIS may have played a similar role in terms of introducing William MARTIN to Japanese night-life. This may have eventually led to MARTIN's contact and involvement with Japanese individuals, who introduced him to or indulged his masochistic interests.

11. Additional information on the individuals mentioned above will be forwarded as developed. It is requested that addressees forward to this Agency any information on George PERISTEROPOULOS aka PERIS, his contacts and activities, and on the other individuals mentioned herein.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

1 Attachment:
as stated

cc: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of the Army, ACSI

DDP/FI/D/AP:mem
Orig & 2 - addressee
1 - 100-6-124/3 (ZRGRACE)
1 - 201-284530
1 - 201-282337 (MARTIN)✓
2 - OS/SRS
1 - chrono

SECRET

ATTACHMENT

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

SUBJECT: Summary of Information on
George PERISTEROPOULOS
aka George PERIS, aka George D.
PERISTEROPOULOU, aka George
PERISTALLEROPOLU, aka
George PARIS.

Born: 2 January 1909 at Constantinople, Turkey

Nationality at Birth: Greek

Present Nationality: Greek

Parents: Names not reflected in the record, both deceased. Father died Chita, Siberia, USSR, date unknown. Mother died in Shanghai, China, date unknown.

Marital Status: Widower since about 1956; marital status since that date unknown.

Name of deceased Spouse: Aurelie PERISTEROPOULOS nee CZERWINSKA, DOB unknown. Nationality: Polish. Married at Shanghai, China. Date of marriage not reflected in the record. Died in Tokyo, Japan circa 1956.

In April 1948, under maiden name, listed as registered member of the Polish Citizens' Association of New Poles in Shanghai, which organization is loyal to the Polish Government in Warsaw.

Relatives: Mother-in-law: Mrs. Bronislawa CZERWINSKA, Polish National; 1951 resident Shanghai, China; as of 1953 applicant for a United States Immigrant Visa filed in Tokyo, Japan.

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

Sister-in-law: Mrs. Irene ADAMSKY, nee CZERWINSKA; 1953 resident 1366 Massachusetts Avenue, San Bernardino, California.

Residences:	1909-1915:	Constantinople, Turkey
	1915-1917:	Illegible, but probably Odessa, Russia
	1917-1923:	Chita, Siberia, USSR
	1923-1924:	Harbin, China
	1924-1937:	Tientsin, China
	1937-1952:	Shanghai, China
	1952-1957:	Tokyo, Japan
	April 1953:	3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo, Japan
	1958:	664, 3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo. Home telephone: 72-3444
	1959:	664, 3-Chome, Denenchofu, Ota-ku, Tokyo. Telephone: 59-1606.
	1-28 January 1960:	Tokyo, Japan
	Since 28 January 1960:	Seoul, Korea
Employment Record:	1927-1935:	Operated "own business", Nichols Rug Company in Tientsin, China.
	1935-1937:	Unknown
	1937-1941:	Operated "own business", Nichols Rug Company, Shanghai, China. Closed in 1941 because of war.
	1942-1945:	Confined to own home in Shanghai, China, but not interned by Japanese occupation authorities.
	1946-1950:	Operated firm George Paris Company, Shanghai, China.

1950-1952:	Unemployed (presumably in Shanghai).
Mid-1951:	Subject and wife from Shanghai, China applied for visas to enter Japan from China. Subject claimed he held Greek Passport A 6/50-1 issued by the Greek Consulate in Shanghai on 20 September 1950 and valid until 9 September 1951. Wife held Greek Passport A 20/50-1, issued Shanghai, 15 June 1951, valid until June 14, 1952. Subject indicated he was engaged in the import and export business, dealing in raw wool.
1952:	First entered Japan at Yokohama on 2 February 1952 with status of semi-permanent resident. Stated on arrival in Yokohama to Japanese Police that he had come to Japan "to seek peace and freedom". Employed by Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers, Incorporated, through 1952. Other indices consulted reflect that Subject in 1952 operated the firm of George PERIS in Tokyo, Japan during 1952.
1953:	Subject was elevated from the position of "employee" to that of Manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers in 1953. Also, Subject was reported still operating the George PERIS Company in Tokyo in 1953.

1954: Subject reportedly terminated his employment with Sondovich Brothers sometime during 1954, exact date not known, and established his own firm under the name of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES.

The 1954 Japan Directory of Foreign Firms lists SONDOVICH BROTHERS as a United States firm, with offices at #1 - Tamura-cho, 4-chome, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Telephones: 43-1609, 43-4369, 43-4287, and lists E. OSTROVSKY as the Tokyo Representative.

E. OSTROVSKY, of course, is Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who is known to have been the Tokyo Branch Manager of the above firm, who resided in 1954 at 19 Kouncho-Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo. Home telephone: 43-6773.

1955: Subject continued in his position as President of PARIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES.

During 1955, exact date not specified, Subject was named to the position of Honorary Deputy Greek Consul in Yokohama, in which position he became the Deputy to Antonios E. PAPPADOPOULOS, the Honorary Royal Greek Consul in Yokohama.

It is presumed that the Consulate in 1955 was probably located at the same address given in the December 1957 Gaimusho "Consular List", which reports the following information:

"Royal Greek Honorary Consulate in Yokohama, Sutherland Building, No. 75, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Tel. 8-1713.

Mr. Antonios PAPPADOPOULOS, Honorary Consul

Mr. George PERISTEROPOULOS, Honorary Deputy Consul."

1956: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, Tokyo. Continued as Honorary Greek Deputy Consul, Yokohama.

1957: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, Tokyo. Continued as Honorary Greek Deputy Consul, Yokohama.

1958: Continued as President of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES; Listed in directories as George PERIS, PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, located at 64 - 3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Tel. 43-1809 and 43-4287. (1958 Japan Times Directory)

A separate listing is also carried in the name of George PERISTEROPOULOS with office telephone listed as: Yokohama 8-1713, which is the same telephone number given in the December 1957 Consular List for the Royal Greek Honorary Consulate in Yokohama, above.

1959: Subject continued as president of PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES, and is listed as George PERIS, in connection with this firm, whose offices according to the 1959 Japan Times Directory are located at 46-3 Chome, Tamura-cho, Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo. Telephone 59-1666.

It should be noted that this is the same address listed for subject and the PERIS ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES in the preceding year, but there is a change in the telephone exchange.

1960: On 28 January 1960, Subject departed by air from Haneda Airport, Tokyo, enroute to Seoul, Korea. It was learned from a source believed to be reliable that subject was going to Korea as the Seoul Resident Representative of the American-owned firm of Claggett-Nolan Company, Inc., which has its home office at 25 California Street in San Francisco, California, and maintains an office in Seoul in the Bando Hotel. Subject allegedly replaced one William James PRICE, a British National, in this post. The capital stock of Claggett-Nolan Company, Inc. is controlled by Mortimer Claggett Cooke, Junior, and Richard William Nolan CHILD, both American citizens, who are also the principal controlling stockholders and officers of the BALCOM TRADING COMPANY, which has its main offices in the Fukoku Building, 2-Uchisaiwai-cho, 3-Chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan, but also has branches in Seoul and Pusan, Korea. BALCOM TRADING COMPANY also controls another subsidiary firm known as Allied Distributors, Incorporated, with which firm Thomas Robert KIRK aka Boris YASHIN has been affiliated for a number of years.

Subject has been identified as having remained in Korea since 28 January 1960, presumably in the above position.

PERSONS WITH WHOM GEORGE PERISTEROPOULOS IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT:

1. Kenneth C. MILLER, Chase Manhattan Bank, Tokyo, Japan. Listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

2. Al (Alphonse) RIGOD (name of firm illegible but probably L. RONDON and Company, of Tokyo, Japan), listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

   The KANTO DIRECTORY for Tokyo and Yokohama, Japan for 1955 on page 325 lists Mr. and Mrs. Alphonse (Alphonse) RIGOD, with residence address of 59 Sato-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, with business address for Alphonse RIGOD as c/o L. RONDON and Company, Ltd. (Japan), Tokyo, Tel. 27-3521-4.

   Alphonse RIGOD was identified in 1949 as a French citizen, resident in Shanghai, China at 75 Route Frelupt, who was serving as a cut-out conveying French Intelligence Requirements to a double agent in Shanghai in 1949.

3. Gregory TOPER, of the BONVE Company, Tokyo, Japan. Listed by Subject as a personal reference in 1957.

4. Antonious (Anthony) E. PAPPALOPOULOS, Greek Consul, Yokohama, Japan, listed as a personal reference by Subject in 1957.

5. Valentine HAHN aka Valentin Vasilyevich ZHAN aka Yen-Shin HAN, former Soviet Agent, who is elsewhere identified.

6. Emanuel Abraham OSTROVSKY, who in 1953 was the manager of the Tokyo Branch of Sandovich Brothers, Incorporated, by which organization Subject was then employed.

7. William Hamilton MARTIN, as reported in cover dispatch.

SECRET

[illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET

9 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Division D

SUBJECT: ZRGRACE - Tokyo Aspect;
George PERIS aka George PERISTEROPOULOS aka
George PARIS, Identified Contact of Valentin HAHN
aka Valentine Vasiliyevich KHAN aka Won-shin HAN,
Self Confessed Soviet Agent

1. Following information was made available to the writer by Messrs. CARRICO and SAYLE of CS/SPS from the Security Office file on Valentin HAHN. The information herein reported was provided by oral briefing only, and the writer was not permitted to review the HAHN file itself. Following details are therefore based entirely on notes taken during the meeting which took place in CARRICO's office on 6 September.

2. Valentin HAHN, who was born as Valentine Vasiliyevich KHAN on 22 April 1908, Slavyanka, Russia, and who is a Russian of Korean origin, admitted in the course of a Polygraph examination administered on an unspecified date, that he had acted as an agent in behalf of the Soviets. HAHN has been in the employ of CIA since approximately 1952, originally in Seoul, Korea, later in Tokyo, Japan, subsequently being transferred to Okinawa. He was terminated on unspecified date as a contract agent of the SR Division, and currently is or has been resettled in Hokkaido, where he has been given a job as a translator with the FBIS listening post at Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan. During the debriefing which accompanied his Polygraph testing, HAHN advised that during his service in Tokyo, Japan, his closest associates had been the following individuals in the order listed:

a. Arseniy YANKOVSKY and wife.

03 13-3

b. [Basil EFREMOFF] - CIA Staff Employee of [Tokyo Station,] who has been terminated on unknown date. He was identified as a Japanese Intelligence agent.

c. John Mc COY and wife - Mc COY was or still is an employee of SR Division, stationed in Japan.

SECRET

2/90

d. Vadim MEDISH - CIA Contract Agent in employ of SR Division stationed in 13-3 [Tokyo.] In process of being terminated after identification as former NKVD agent, a former Abwehr agent, and subsequent agent activity in behalf of the Soviets while in DP camps.

e. Kazua KANAZAWA - Cousin of Valentin HAHN; at one time was proposed for operational use by this Agency.

f. Charlotte BERGHOLTZ - Close friend of Anastasiya SNOW nee YANKOVSKIY.

g. Golli-Grigorevna and Marguerita PODSTAVINA - PODSTAVINA is the Godmother of Arseniy YANKOVSKIY.

h. Nicholas Anatole [illegible] - CIA Staff employee of SR Division in 13-3 [Tokyo] under [Department of State] 32 cover. Former FBI employee.

i. George PARIS (Spelling as picked up originally by Office of Security in written report of Polygraph examination report, and therefore likely phonetic.) - Greek businessman in Tokyo.

3. In the course of further debriefing in connection with his Polygraph Test, HAHN claimed that George PERIS or PARIS was the individual who had introduced HAHN to a club in Tokyo located off the Ginza, the name of which club translated into English is "Tomorrow is Too Late". At this club HAHN met a Japanese hostess by the name of Noriko AWAJI, whose real name was later established to be Noriko MATSUZAKAYA, whom he subsequently dated. There is no further information currently available on this hostess. In the interim, HAHN has obtained a divorce from his wife, who had been a witting participant in his agent activities for the Soviets, and is known currently to be living in a common-law relationship with a Japanese girl who may be identical with Noriko MATSUZAKAYA. As indicated above, HAHN and his current mistress are currently in Sapporo, Hokkaido.

4. The ex-wife of Valentin HAHN, whose full name is not known to the writer, and the two HAHN sons, are currently being sponsored for resettlement by the Agency in the United States, where all three are scheduled to receive their U.S. citizenship under CIA sponsorship.

5. With reference to the "Tomorrow is Too Late" Club, HAHN stated that a number of CIA Staff Employees of the 13-3 [Tokyo Station] frequent or have frequented this establishment and have dated the Japanese hostesses employed

4/90

SECRET

there. Date of HAHN's introduction to the Club and to Noriko MATSUZAKAYA by George PARIS aka George PERIS was estimated by Mr. Sayle to have been somewhere between 1954 and 1957. With regard to Valentin HAHN's own inclinations toward sharing his knowledge of romance with others, Mr. Sayle advised that Security Office had established that while employed as a contract agent of the Tokyo Station HAHN had pimped for CIA Staff personnel in Tokyo.

13-3

6. As attachment herewith, the writer appends additional background data on the professional intelligence activities and contacts of Valentin HAHN and family as noted during the oral briefing by Sayle.

7. On basis of the above, it can be safely assumed that the George PARIS known to HAHN is identical with George PERISTEROPOULOS aka George PERIS, well-known Tokyo businessman and Honorary Deputy Consul of the Royal Greek Consulate in Yokohama, Japan, as reported in SCTOKY-63 and SCTOKY-64. It is noteworthy that PERIS' contacts throughout his career, commencing with his original reported employment in Tientsin, China, through his activities and contacts in Shanghai, China, and later in Tokyo, not excluding his marriage to Aurelia CZERWINSKA, have been exclusively with individuals of Russian or Eastern European background, many of them of Russian Jewish background, who are either highly suspect or have been identified as long-time agents of Soviet Intelligence. PERIS' reported route of arrival in Tokyo via Harbin, Tientsin and Shanghai, as well as his employment by Sondovich Brothers and contacts with individuals who tie in with the Boris SOLOMONIK complex and Borsol Fur Trading Corporation, smacks very strongly of the old Comintern Apparat of the 20's and 30's. Also it parallels the travel patterns of a number of individuals involved in the SOBLE case, principally the SOBLES themselves who were exfiltrated from the Soviet Union via Tokyo, Japan, to the U.S.A. and who, most notably of all, also were under cover of operating a Bristle Business as is Sondovich Brothers.

8. According to earlier reporting in the ZRGRACE investigation, George PERIS is alleged to have been a contact of William Hamilton MARTIN in Tokyo, and to have offered MARTIN some type of job or business partnership deal in connection with the rug business.

9. Mr. Carrico informally indicated that he personally suspects that MARTIN's introduction to the fine art of masochistic torture by an unidentified Japanese female, as reported by Mrs. Ardelle GASDA to FBI agents, may have been effected at or through his patronage of the "Tomorrow is Too Late" Club to which he may well have been taken or introduced by his friend PERIS. This possibility, however, is subject to further investigation.

22 22

10. As initial follow-up to SCTOKY-63 and SCTOKY-64, outgoing cable of 7 Sept. 60 requesting further check-out of the Club, etc. was prepared.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

3/90

SECRET

EYES ONLY

A second cable to be sent by Privacy Link to Seoul, Korea, has also been drafted, and requests check of PERIS' arrival, activities and contacts, departure from Korea subsequent to 28 January 1960. This cable has been presented separately for your approval and may likely be subject to revision, wherefore no copy is attached. It is further suggested that Office of Security be authorized to pass to NSA Security Officials working on this case the information on PERIS relayed in above SCTOKY cables, such information to be properly sterilized of course, and that NSA in turn be requested to check and obtain from U.S. Navy Personnel Records full copies in duplicate of the original reports on the specific duty stations or assignments, including dates of service at each, to which MARTIN and MITCHELL were detailed, also detailed leave records, travel records, and other pertinent background data contained in such files, to cover the entire period of their respective service with the U.S. Navy. It is also suggested that NSA officials be requested to obtain similar detailed original reports in duplicate from the Department of the Army to cover the period of MARTIN's civilian employment in Japan, with special emphasis on any reports of MARTIN's extra-curricular activities, contacts, club memberships, identified personal contacts with persons not employed in his own office, leave travel, etc., which may be reflected in official records. One copy of all such reports are requested for this Agency, to permit further checking of known or newly identified contacts he may have had in Japan.

ANITA POTOCKI

1 Attachment: as stated

FI/D/AP:mem

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - ZRGRACE File
1 - MARTIN 201 file ✓
1 - PERIS file
1 - chrono

SECRET

EYES ONLY

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME. MASFERRER y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
VOL. IX

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN 67 THRU 31 DEC. 68

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 AUG 78		PAT ORR	
15 AUG 78		Pat ORR	
7 AUG 1978		ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FBI doc
18 aug 67 (Miami)
Subject - Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~
~~X-REF TO FILE NO.~~ 201-42669
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. R. Lehman
WH/7/HT

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Distem By 24

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UNIT CS/DO TIME 0453 BY

INFO FILE, CS/DO VR, C/WH/COG-5, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-2, C/OPSER, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 042338Z CITE JMWAVE 4894

5 Jan 67 IN 71230

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

~~[illegible]~~ DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 4385 (IN 71162)

RID/Files

1. THRU SENSITIVE LOCAL CONTACT STATION ASCERTAINED THAT REF CALLES WERE MADE TO FOLLOWING:

"ALEX": J.A. MASFERRER, 3242 42ND STREET, QUEENS, NEW YORK CITY. TEL NO 565-3621.

"MONTREAL": (REV) DIEGO MADRIGAL, 230 ALEXANDER AVENUE, BRONX, NEW YORK CITY. TEL NO 545-2387.

2. NO FURTHER INFO RE POSSIBLE IDENTITY OF "LANG/LONG".

S E C R E T

BT

Rolando MASFERRER (201-042669) called [illegible] 3 Jan 67 to solicit aid in getting release from Key West jail

SECRET

[redacted]

MICROFILMED
NOV 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: Ruth Lehman
R.O. #517 - Unit WH/7/HT
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

5 Jan 67

201-42669

14-00000

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5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-300-021
DBC -39309
18 DEC 68
FBI
P28

R 6901230755

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(7-46)

18 Dec 68

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6. DATE PROCESSED

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14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-047669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
FORMER CUBAN SENATOR NEWSPAPER EDITOR
LEADER NOTORIOUS PRIVATE ARMY CUBA KNOWN
AS LOS TIGRES /THE TIGERS/

019-300-021
DBC -39554
11 DEC 68
FBI
P7

R 6901130123

FILE IN 201-042669

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FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-61)

11 Dec 68

FBI clr.
30 Sep. 68 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojás
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
14 aug 68 (Miami)
Re- Cuban Exile Involvement in
Haitian Revolutionary
Activities

14-00000

71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 33

ORIG: GEORGE KULSTAD:eb
UNIT: WE/7/HT
EXT: 5595
DATE: 23 JULY 1968

53 S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 33 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ NO COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, DDP, ADDP, C/DO, OSC 2, SOD 6, CS/SCO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T 23 17 43z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 18614

TO PRIORITY JMCOBRA, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: PORT AU PRINCE

23 Jul 68

REFS: A. JMCOBRA-0363 (IN-55140)*

B. SANTO DOMINGO-5912 (IN-55244)**

C. SANTO DOMINGO-5907 (IN-54327)***

AB	FI
ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. HQS HAS NO OBJECTION. BELIEVE LNYUMA SHOULD CONSULT WITH U.S. ATTORNEY MEADOWS FOR DETERMINATION LEGAL STATUS, SINCE LATTER BEYOND OUR PURVIEW.

2. DOES JMCOBRA FEEL THAT MASFERRER PROPOSED TRIP IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH REFS B AND C? SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS 1859 DATED 16 MARCH 1967 SAID THAT NEY TEJEDA SPECULATED THAT THERE IS LINK BETWEEN ABBES, ROLANDO MASFERRER AND WESSIN, POSSIBLY THROUGH SECEN. SECEN FORMERLY UOAM[illegible]-4.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comments: *I&NS, through JMCOBRA, requested priority advice on whether any objections exist Hqs on proposed travel Rolando from Miami to New York by automobile.

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED....

23 Jul 68

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201-042667

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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JUL 20 . 2 55 PM

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BY RID/EDI
CONF: ☐ RID COPY

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 18614

TO

**Vladimir Secen in Santo Domingo on possible arms purchasing mission.

***Vladimir Secen told EVMUSCLE-1 in Santo Domingo that latter should be ready with group for invasion of Haiti as Secen had money and backers and would be ready shortly.

[illegible]

OGC (Mr. John Greany) John K Greany

AC/WH/7

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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ACTION 758 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PRECEDENCE

INFO FILE VR. EA/AN, WH/COG 8, CS/DO

22 JUL 68 IN 55140

SECRET 222018Z JUL 68 CITE JMCOBRA 0363

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

JMUNION

STATION HAS BEEN ASKED BY LNYUMA IF WOFIRM HAD ANY OBJECTIONS TO THE TRAVEL OF ROLANDO MASFERRE BY AUTOMOBILE FROM MIAMI TO NEW YORK. UNLESS ADVISED TO THE CONTRARY JMCOBRA PLANS TO ADVISE LNYUMA THAT WE HAVE NO LEGAL GROUND OBJECT. ADVISE PRIORITY.

SECRET

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22 JUL 68

201 - 042669

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6. DATE PROCESSED

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, RCLANDO
201-042569
SEX M DOB ?

028-006-033/03
UFGA-30185
12 JUN 68

CIT ?
OCC ?
SURJ TRIED TO RECTUIT AMSLOUCH/1,
201-351947 TO WORK FOR HIM IN CUBA.

MMM

R 6806190489

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12 Jun 68

FBI doc
10 June 68 (NY)
Subject - Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas

DOD (National Agency Name Check)
3 May '68
Subject - Masferrer

FBI doc
9 May '68 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS -311/02537-68

DATE DISTR. 15 March 1968

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Haiti

DOI 9 February-4 March 1968

SUBJECT Indications by Fernando Melo, Cuban Exile in Costa Rica, that Negotiations Between Ludwig Starke, Costa Rican Right-Wing Extremist, and Rolando Masferrer, Cuban Exile Involved in Plotting Against Haitian Government, Were Not Progressing Well

ACQ Costa Rica, San Jose (4 March 1968)

FIELD NO. HRS-4108

SOURCE An official Costa Rican service.

1. (Field Comment: The following report should be read in conjunction with TDCS-314/01096-68, HRS-4065 and CS-311/02024-68, HRS-4099, which reported that Fernando Melo Fontanills, a Cuban exile in Costa Rica, was serving as an intermediary in negotiations between Ludwig Starke Jimenez, a Costa Rican right-wing extremist, and Rolando Masferrer, a Cuban exile in the United States who was involved in plotting against the government of President Francois Duvalier of Haiti. The negotiations dealt with a plan whereby Starke would provide a staging area for an invasion of Haiti by Haitian and Cuban exiles under Masferrer's leadership. In return Masferrer, if successful, would subsequently support a move by Starke against the Costa Rican Government. Melo was reported to be planning a trip to New York on 21 February 1968 to talk with Masferrer and the latter's representative in the negotiations, Father Diego Madrigal Alvarez.)

2. When Melo returned to San Jose on 2 March after visiting New York City and Miami, Florida, he was detained and searched by security officials at the airport. Among Melo's possessions the security officials found a letter, signed by Melo, addressed to Father Diego Madrigal, New York. The letter was dated 9 February 1968. It was typewritten on letterhead stationery of Rogelio E. Pinto Impresos. (Costa Rican Service Comment: Melo sells printing equipment and thus may have a business connection with the Pinto firm.)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OPE	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
FBI 2	I&NS							

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/IC	1	WH/R	1	WH/PRIN	#	HRS-4108
CI/OP/WH	1	WH/[illegible]/CA	[illegible]	WH/FACT	#	HUGLIB
		WH/SIGS	1			(HUGLIB-5)
CA/INT	1	WH/MASA	#	WH/COG/EB		CS-311/02537-68
CA/PROP	1	WH/7/HT	2	[illegible]	#	
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH/COG 1, WH 9(1), DO 1			LIAISON # 18		HK GED/P

(20)

201-42669

3. Melo's letter acknowledged receipt of a cable from Madrigal; it then went on to state that "Rogelio obtained the visa" and now "the Haitian can come when he wishes." (Field Comment: Rogelio may be Rogelio Pinto. CS-311/02024-68 quoted Melo as saying that Starke had obtained a visa for Jacques Moringlane, a Haitian who would be the first of the Masferrer group to arrive in Costa Rica.) Melo then wrote that because nothing had been heard from Madrigal since the latter's visit to Costa Rica "the friends here" had begun to believe that "everything has been a pipe dream of mine; that we neither are going to do anything nor have anything." Melo complained that Madrigal's silence appeared to have "lessened the enthusiasm of this man of action and of rapid resolutions, who does not like to be made to waste his time." Melo warned Madrigal that if the Masferrer group had not reached a decision to move ahead with the plan, it would be better for the Haitian not to come to Costa Rica. Melo also warned that if there were no Cubans participating in Masferrer's project, he, Melo, would not support it, since he was interested only in the Cubans' problems and not those of the Haitians. Melo informed Madrigal that he expected to arrive in New York on 18 February; he suggested that they discuss the subject in detail at that time.

4. On 4 March Melo again left San Jose for Miami. He told the Costa Rican security officials that he would be away from Costa Rica for a month.

5. Field Dissem: State Army CINCSO (Also sent Managua and Port-au-Prince.)

FBI doc
11 Mar '68 (Miami)
Re - alleged Plan for
Haitian Invasion from Boat
"Yipee"
Bureau # 105-14078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

✓201-821979
HPS -04108
07 MAR 68

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
INVOLVED IN PLOTTING AGAINST THE GOVT OF PRES DUVALIER IN HAITI. LTR INDICATING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SUBJ AND LUDWIG STARKE /201-767989/ HAD NOT PROGRESSED WELL

UFGHTPHNM

R 6803261289

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 7 Mar 68 (7-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. 201 FILE NO.					
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.				4. DATE	
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION		
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO 201 FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

~~MASFERRER, ROLANDO~~
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN AS THE BUTCHER OF THE ORIENTE PROV, A CLOSE ASSCC OF BATISTA, A MASS MURDERER AND SADIST, OWNER OF PRIV GANGSTER GP, THE TIGERS, USED BY CIA IN PREPARING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION AND AGAIN IN 67 CF THE UNSUCCESSFUL INVASION OF HAITI, ESCAPED TO FLORIDA.

100-300-017
DBC -12057
04 MAR 68
FBI
PA

R 6804120056

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ ✓

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

4 Mar 68

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 201-42669

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS -311/02024-68

DATE DISTR. 1 March 1968

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Haiti

DOI February 1968

SUBJECT Negotiations Between Ludwig Starke, Right-Wing Extremist in Costa Rica, and Rolando Masferrer, Cuban Exile Involved in Plotting Against Governments of Haiti and Cuba, with A View Toward Mutual Support for Projected Revolutionary Movements

ACQ Costa Rica, San Jose (15-23 February 1968)

FIELD NO. HRS-4099

SOURCE A high-level member of the National Liberation Party (PLN) who has access to and the confidence of top leaders of his party. His strong identification with the PLN and the knowledge that his reporting will reach U.S. official circles probably cause him to present his reporting to the best advantage of the PLN. He has submitted reliable information during the past year, but he has been known to withhold pertinent information. He received the information from Daniel Oduber.

1. (Field Comment: TDCS-314/01096-68 reported that Ludwig Starke Jimenez, a right-wing extremist who is the leader of the security forces of the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), anti-Communist businessmen's group, had informed Daniel Oduber Quiros, of the National Liberation Party (PLN), that he was making plans and seeking support for a possible move against the Costa Rican Government in the event that it should appear to be in danger of passing into the hands of leftists. To that end Starke was negotiating with sympathetic groups outside of Costa Rica. He was in indirect contact with Rolando Masferrer, a Cuban exile involved in plotting against the Governments of Haiti and Cuba, through Fernando Melo Fontanilla, a Cuban exile in Costa Rica who was in touch with a priest associated with Masferrer.)

2. In mid-February Oduber said that he had contacted Melo, whom he had known for some time, in an effort to learn more about the negotiations between Starke and Masferrer, in which Melo had been acting as an intermediary. Melo said that the objective of the negotiations was to work out a plan whereby Haitian and Cuban exiles, with Starke's

201-42669

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
FBI 2	I&NS							

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CA/INT	1	WH/SJOS	1	CI/IC	1		HRS-4099
CA/PROP	1	WH/MANA	#	CI/OP/WH	1		NP(HUGALLY)
		WH/PACY	#			SJOS-0018 (IN-57320)	HC: HUGLIB(HUGLI
~~WH/R~~	1	WH/PRIM	#	WH/7/HT	2		CS-311/02024-68
WH/2/CR	8			WH/R File	1		COORDINATING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 12 (1), DO 1.						LIAISON	RELEASING HK GED/pi

cooperation, would use Costa Rican soil as a staging area for an invasion of Haiti, to overthrow President Francois Duvalier. If successful, Masferrer and his Haitian cohorts would then supply funds and armament to Starke for his projected move against the Trejos government.

3. Melo later informed Oduber that he was planning to go to New York City on 21 February, ostensibly to visit members of his family. However, the true purpose of his visit is to talk with Masferrer and Father Diego Manuel Abilio Madrigal Alvarez, the priest who has represented Masferrer in the negotiations, through Melo, with Starke. Melo has been commissioned by Starke to ascertain the quantity and source of arms that the Masferrer group will make available to Starke if the group succeeds in overthrowing Duvalier. Melo also is to find out what other assistance the Masferrer group will provide to Starke, how many Haitian and Cuban exiles Masferrer will send to Costa Rica, and when they will arrive.

1 mar 68
201-42659

4. Melo said that a Costa Rican visa already has been obtained for Jacques Moringlane, a Haitian, who will be the first of the group of Haitian and Cuban exiles to come to Costa Rica to set up their staging area. Moringlane's visa was obtained by Starke through Rodrigo Arauz Bonilla, who until recently was the chief clerk (oficial mayor) of the Ministry of Public Security.

5. (Field Comment: Melo has the reputation locally of being an inveterate intriguer and a braggart. Therefore, his veracity is open to question. It is possible that the information he has given to Oduber is to some extent exaggerated or distorted. It is also possible that Starke will find Melo to be a less than trustworthy intermediary.)

6. Field Dissem: State Army CINCSO. (Also sent Managua and Port-au-Prince).

7. (Headquarters Comment: An official Costa Rican Service reported on 23 February 1968 that Fernando Melo Fontanils, left San Jose for Miami and New York on 21 February 1968 via LACSA flight 620.)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM [illegible] WH/COG/OPS
24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 2310Z

BY 7

INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, WH 8, [illegible], CA-5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW, [illegible] DDI D/OCI-3

S E C R E T 292148Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1467

DIRECTOR

23F[illegible]61102

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

1. SENTENCES PASSED 28 FEB ON MASFERRER AND CO AS FOLLOWS: ROLANDO MASFERRER, FOUR YEARS; JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES, SIXTY DAYS; RENE LEON, SIXTY DAYS; MARTIN CASEY, NINE MONTHS; ATUN CONSTANZO, SIXTY DAYS; ANTONIO LEON, SIXTY DAYS.

2. ALL OUT ON BOND PENDING APPEAL.

3. POUCHING MIAMI HERALD CLIP ON THIS STORY.

S E C R E T

AN	FI	
PO		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

SECRET

201-42669
29 Feb 1968

FBI doc
27 Feb 68 (Miami)
Re – Alcides Perez Bauza
Bureau # 105-14702

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-042669

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-767989

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

D 201-823979

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

23 FEB 68 IN 57328

S E C R E T 232230Z FEB 68 CITE SAN JOSE 8815

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MANAGUA, PORT AU PRINCE

FERNANDO MELO FONTANILS (201-823979) CUBAN EXILE RESIDING COSTA RICA, LEFT SAN JOSE FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK ON 21 FEB 68 VIA LACSA 620. ACCORDING TO HRS-4899 BEING POUCHED ALL ADDRESSEES HE COMMISSIONED BY LUDWIG STARKE JIMENEZ, COSTA RICAN ACTIVIST, TO DISCUSS WITH ROLANDO 201-042669 ~~MASFERRER~~ PLANS FOR REVOLUTIONARY MOVE AGAINST DUVALIER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX ✓

MICROFILMED
MAR 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D- 201-767989

D- 201- 823979

23 Feb 68

201-042669

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED TO / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

019-009-008
HRS -04097
23 FEB 68

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
NEGOTIATING W/LUDWIG STARKE JIMENEZ /201-767989/ RE MUTUAL SUPPORT FOR PLANNED REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. CUBAN EXILE

R 6803072384

MTPHNN

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

23 Feb 68
201-42669

FBI doc
26 Jan 68 (Miami)
Re – Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
26 Dec 67 (Miami)
Re – Alleged Plan for Haitian
Invasion from Boat "Yipee"
Bureau #105-14078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE PLAN FOR ACTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

072-039-013
WAVE-00427
30 NOV 67
UFG -09179
P4

R 6803271995

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

30 Nov 67

PRECEDENCE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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WH/C/CA

7 3257

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR DCI D/DCI DCI (GOODWIN) DDP ADDP CSCF CS/DO ~~C/OPSER C/CI C/WH 6~~ IG C/CSPS C/CA2 C/CA

S E C R E T 171887Z CITE [redacted]WAVE 8281

DIRECTOR

AS	PI	
PS	7257	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

[redacted] TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

17 Nov 67 IN 95853

1. TRIAL TURNED OUT TO BE NO PROBLEM FOR AGENCY OR STATION. DEFENSE PLAN TO TURN IT INTO ANTI-CIA CIRCUS WAS TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY JUDGE CABOT'S FIRM RULING AND BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH OF U.S. ATTORNEY MEADOWS. AMSVIRL-1 WAS NEVER CALLED AS WITNESS, NOR WERE ANY OF OTHER FORMER AGENCY ASSOCIATES OR EMPLOYEES WHOM DEFENSE HAD ASKED TO HAVE SUBPOENAED. ONE PROSECUTION WITNESS ABOUT WHOM WE HAD BEEN WORRIED, DAVID CABEZA, FORMER AGENT AND RECENTLY PERSISTENT HARASSER OF CIA AND JMWAVE, HANDLED HIMSELF EXTREMELY WELL. COURT RULINGS PREVENTED DEFENSE FROM LURING HIM INTO OPERATIONAL REVELATIONS DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION.

2. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL PRECEDENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY MANNER IN WHICH THIS TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED WHICH CAN BE HELPFUL IN FUTURE LITIGATION INVOLVING AGENCY. E.G., COURT ISSUED ORDER ON FIRST DAY OF TRIAL WHICH PRECLUDED TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN COURTROOM AND RESTRICTED PUBLICATION OF ANY TESTIMONY OR ARGUMENTS MADE OUT OF PRESENCE OF JURY.

SECRET

201-42669

Rolando Masferrer 17 Nov 67

THE LATTER WAS MOST SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTION AS IT RELATED DIRECTLY TO QUESTIONS INVOLVING CIA. U.S. ATTORNEY PUT FORTH MOTION, WHICH COURT GRANTED, WHICH REQUIRED THAT QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO MENTION OF CIA BE ASKED AFTER JURY HAD LEFT COURTROOM.

3. LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE WAS LIGHT AND FACTUAL. PRESS SHOWED NO DESIRE TO EXPAND UPON OR INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CIA CONNECTION. AS FAR AS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DETERMINE, THERE WAS NO NATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL. INTEREST IN TRIAL IN LOCAL CUBAN AND HAITIAN COMMUNITIES MINIMAL.

4. TRIAL REPRESENTS SETBACK FOR ROBERT K. BROWN. ONE OF HIS LOCAL HENCHMEN, MARTIN CASEY, WAS CONVICTED. ANOTHER OF HIS LOCAL HENCHMEN, RALPH EDENS, WAS PRESENT AS OBSERVER DURING ENTIRE TRIAL AND WAS OVERHEARD BY FERENCE MAKING ANTI-CIA REMARKS AND ALLEGATIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH DEFENDANT MARTIN CASEY AND DEFENSE COUNSEL NEGRETTI. NOTHING CAME OUT IN TRIAL THAT BROWN COULD FIND OF MUCH USE IN BOOK HE IS REPORTEDLY WRITING.

5. LIKEWISE ABSOLUTELY NOTHING DEVELOPED IN TRIAL THAT COULD PROVIDE ANY GRIST FOR JIM GARRISON'S ANTI-CIA MILL

SECRET

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 0281 SECRET

IN NEW ORLEANS.

6. CASTRO GOT NOTHING OUT OF TRIAL EITHER. ITS VERDICT UNDERMINES HIS CONTENTION THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT IS CONTINUALLY AIDING AND ABETTING EXILES IN SUBVERSIVE EFFORT AGAINST CUBA.

7. ONLY IRONY ABOUT THIS TRIAL IS FACT THAT ITS FAVORABLE OUTCOME TENDS TO UNDERMINE IN RETROSPECT ORIGINAL AGENCY ARGUMENTS AGAINST HOLDING IT IN FIRST PLACE. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PREVENTIVE EFFORTS NEVERTHELESS SERVED VERY USEFUL PURPOSE--HAD DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH POTENTIAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS CASE FOR CIA, THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE TAKEN CARE THEY DID IN PREPARING AND CONDUCTING IT. OUR OWN EXTENSIVE PREPARATION, OUR COOPERATIVE POSTURE WITH COURT AND CAREFUL BRIEFINGS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY BY FERENCE ON ALL ASPECTS CONCERNING CIA ALL CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO WHOLESOME CLIMATE IN WHICH TRIAL WAS CONDUCTED AND HELPED DEMORALIZE THE DEFENSE WHICH, IN ALL, DISPLAYED VERY LITTLE SKILL AND NOT MUCH OF THE FIENDISHNESS WE HAD EXPECTED.

8. STATION ESPECIALLY WISHES TO COMMEND EDWARD K. FERENCE[2]

SECRET

[illegible]

201-42669

17 Nov 67

SECRET

PAGE 4 JMWAVE 0281 S E C R E T

FOR HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL, COOL HEADED AND CONSCIENTIOUS MANNER IN WHICH HE CARRIED OUT HIS DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH TRIAL. INTERESTS OF STATION AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE TOTALLY PROTECTED AND OVERALL INTERESTS OF AGENCY WERE EXTREMELY WELL SERVED BY HIS PRESENCE HERE.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

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ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY: ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, DDP, ADDP, SOD6,

SECRET 171554Z CITE JMWAVE 8274 WAVE

17 Nov 67 55479

DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

AS 62	71	
~~15~~	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT	X	[illegible]

1. FOR FIRST TIME IN MORE THAN A WEEK TRIAL HAS MADE FRONT PAGE OF 17 NOV MIAMI HERALD WITH STORY HEADLINED "SIX CONVICTED OF CONSPIRACY TO INVADE HAITI". LONG STORY WITH EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND ON THE CASE CONTINUES ON PAGE-23A UNDER HEADLINE: "CIA ROLE IN PLOTTING DISCOUNTED".

2. EXCERPTS FOLLOW: "MAXIMUM SENTENCE EACH COULD RECEIVE IS A $35,000 FINE AND SEVEN YEARS IN PRISON. SENTENCING WAS DEFERRED PENDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS. FATHER GEORGES... HAD NO COMMENT. HOWEVER, MASFERRER LABELED IT A 'POLITICAL TRIAL'. HE SAID IT "REFLECTED THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S." "DOCUMENTS INTRODUCED AT THE TRIAL INDICATED THAT THE HAITIAN INVASION WOULD GET SOME MILITARY BACKING FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THROUGHOUT THE SIX-DAY TRIAL, U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM MEADOWS AND HIS ASSISTANT, LLOYD BATES, PUT ON 30 WITNESSES. THE DEFENSE RESTED WITHOUT OPENING ARGUMENTS AND WITHOUT CALLING A SINGLE WITNESS. THE ONLY DEFENSE OFFERED

201-42669
17 Nov 1967

SECRET

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 0274 S E C R E T

WAS THE THEME THAT THE HAITIAN VENTURE WAS CIA-SPONSORED. HOWEVER, JUDGE TED CABOT RULED THERE WASN'T ANY EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THAT THEORY AND THE JURY DIDN'T GET ANY DETAILED COMMENTS ON IT. GINO NEGRETTI... ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENSE, LABELED THE DEFENDANTS FREEDOM FIGHTERS...AND ATTACKED THE LAW UNDER WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED." "NEGRETTI SAID ALL THE DEFENDANTS WILL APPEAL."

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM

5/WH/C/CI

ACTION

WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8. ~~ADDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS~~ CI/IC2, CI/PS, CS/SSO, CA2, CA/PROP, [illegible] CA/PEG, CA/O4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT2, [illegible] SOD6, CA/INTERNAL USE ONLY, DDI

WAVE

SECRET 170815Z CITE JMWAVE 0272 DIR 3,

DIRECTOR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

17 Nov 67 IN 94838

AS OF 1815 HOURS 16 NOVEMBER JURY RETURNED VERDICT OF GUILTY ON BOTH COUNTS AGAINST ALL REPEAT ALL DEFENDANTS.

SECRET

AUTH	FI	
RP	DEST	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX

201-42669
17 Nov 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-42669

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM WH/C/CI

ACTION WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH8, C[illegible], /PRE, A/34, CI/RES, FI/INTZ, [illegible]

WAJE

SECRET 151647Z CITE JMWAVE 8241

DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

AN ✓	FI	
28	DEPT.	
ABSTRACT ✓	[illegible]	

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

MIAMI PRESS COVERAGE RESUMPTION OF TRIAL ON 14 NOVEMBER EXTREMELY LIGHT. "HERALD" OF 15 NOVEMBER HAS STORY ON PAGE 21-A HEADLINED "DOMINICAN GENERAL OFFERED TO HELP SEIZE HAITI, JURY TOLD" WHICH DEALS WITH DOCUMENT INTRODUCED BY PROSECUTION WHICH ALLEGEDLY SHOWS THAT GENERAL ANTONIO IMBERT BARRERAS WAS PREPARED TO HELP THE GROUP. DOCUMENT WAS SEIZED DURING 2 JANUARY 67 RAID ON HOUSE IN KEYS WHERE MASFERRER GROUP WAS GATHERED. NO MENTION OR ALLUSION TO CIA.

SECRET

SECRET

201-42669
15 Nov 1967

14 November 1967

EXCERPTS FROM: Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT : Regular Weekly Meeting with Department of State, 6 November 1967

5. Mr. Broe noted that the Rolando Masferrer trial is finally coming up in Miami. He left a document concerning the present status of the trial with Mr. Sayre for his perusal and later return to the Agency. A similar memorandum of Mr. Sherman Kent's discussions with Diaz Ordaz was also given to Mr. Sayre for reading and return at a convenient time.

14 Nov 67
201-042669

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-242669
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM: #1
ACTION: WH/COG-8

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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3		7	
4		8	

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT [illegible] TIME [illegible] BY

INFO FILE [illegible]

WAVE

9 Nov 67 50320

AN
PI
ABSTRACT

SECRET 091612Z CITE JMWAVE 0169

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMBAR

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

MIAMI PRESS COVERAGE MORNING 9 NOVEMBER VERY LIGHT. "HERALD" CARRIES STORY ON PAGE 10-C ENTITLED "TWO LIVE GRENADES HANDED HIM, EX-DEPUTY TESTIFIES" WHICH HAS NO CIA MENTION. STORY SUMMARIZES TESTIMONY OF YESTERDAY'S PROSECUTION WITNESSES, NONE OF WHOM CONNECTED WITH PRESENT OR PAST JMWAVE OPERATIONS AND ALL OF WHOM SUPPLIED CONCRETE INFORMATION ON MASFERRER GROUP'S RENTING OF PROPERTY IN KEYS AND MOVEMENT OF MEN AND ARMS.

SECRET

SECRET

201-242669
9 Nov 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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ABSTRACT X

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

MIAMI NEWS OF AFTERNOON 8 NOV 67 CARRIES STORY ON PAGE 3-A ENTITLED "MASFERRER WARNED ON CIA TALK" FROM WHICH FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS:

"LAWYERS FOR RALANDO MASFERRER AND FIVE OTHERS ON TRIAL FOR CONSPIRACY IN AN ATTEMPTED INVASION OF HAITI CANNOT INDISCRIMINATELY RAISE THE GHOST OF THE CIA IN CROSS-EXAMINATION, FEDERAL JUDGE TED CABOT HAS RULED.

"THE JUDGE'S RULING CAME YESTERDAY ON A MOTION--OUT OF THE JURY'S PRESENCE--BY U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM A. MEADOWS.

"MEADOWS ASKED THE COURT TO REQUIRE THE DEFENSE, BEFORE ASKING A WITNESS ABOUT POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA, TO SHOW OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY WHAT IT HOPES TO ELICIT FROM THE WITNESS.

"OTHERWISE, 'SAID MEADOWS, 'WE HAVE COUNSEL ASKING ABOUT CIA CONNECTIONS WHEN THERE MAY NOT BE ANY, BUT NEVERTHELESS LEAVING THE JURORS WITH THE WRONG IMPRESSION.'

"THE MOTION WAS BITTERLY ATTACKED BY GINO NEGRETTI, CARLOS

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201-042669
8 Nov 1967

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PAGE 2 JMWAVE 0156 SECRET

FERNANDEZ AND HAROLD WITTLING, THE DEFENSE COUNSEL, BUT WAS GRANTED BY THE JUDGE.

"HE RULED THAT IF THE DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO SHOW, OUT OF THE JURY'S PRESENCE, THAN AN ANSWER FAVORABLE TO ITS CASE WAS FORTHCOMING FROM A WITNESS, THE SAME QUESTION WOULD BE PERMITTED WITH THE JURY PRESENT."

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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8 Nov 67 [illegible] 278

PRIORITY DIRECTOR ~~INFO JMBAR~~

TYPIC MASFERRER TRIAL

ANALYST [illegible]

ABSTRACT X

MIAMI HERALD OF 8 NOVEMBER HAS STORY ON 7 NOVEMBER DEVELOPMENTS AT TRIAL ON PAGE 12-A ENTITLED "DEFENSE MANEUVER STYMIED IN HAITIAN 'INVASION' TRIAL". FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS MOST PERTINENT PASSAGES.

"A GOVERNMENT WITNESS IN MIAMI'S HAITIAN INVASION TRIAL WAS THE MAN WHO TIPPED THE U.S. TO THE RUSSIAN ROCKET BUILDUP IN CUBA, A DEFENSE ATTORNEY SAID TUESDAY.

"THE COMMENT BY GINO NEGRETTI WAS PART OF A DEFENSE MOVE TO TIE THE CIA INTO THE CONSPIRACY CHARGED IN AN INDICTMENT AGAINST SIX ANTI-CASTROITES IN FEDERAL COURT.

"HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION AND THE FACT THAT THE WITNESS, DAVID CABEZA COUPAU, 601 SW 11TH ST., ONCE WORKED FOR THE CIA NEVER REACHED THE JURY'S EARS.

"U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM MEADOWS HAD BEATEN DOWN THE DEFENSE MANEUVER BEFORE IT GOT OFF THE GROUND. JUDGE TED CABOT AGREED WITH MEADOWS THAT THE DEFENSE WOULD HAVE TO OFFER SUPPORTING TESTIMONY FOR ANY QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE CIA OUT OF

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201-042669
8 Nov 1967

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PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8150 S E C R E T

THE PRESENCE OF THE PANEL. AND ANYTHING THAT WOULD GO TO THE JURY WOULD HAVE TO GET THE APPROVAL OF THE BENCH.

"BUT THE FACT THAT CABEZA, WHO NOW RUNS AN AMUSEMENT PARK IN MIAMI, HAD SEVERED HIS CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA IN 1964 CAUSED CABOT TO TURN THUMBS DOWN ON FURTHER QUESTIONS.

"THE GOVERNMENT HAD ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT HE WORKED FOR THE FEDERAL AGENCY DURING THE TIME THE ALLEGED HAITI INVASION WAS BEING HATCHED IN LATE 1966.

"CABOT ALSO RULED OUT ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT CONNECTIONS WITH THE CIA OF A BROTHER OF CABEZA.

"CABEZA, ONE OF 23 WITNESSES THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTS TO CALL, TESTIFIED EARLIER THAT HE HAD A ROLE IN THE INVASION PLOT.

"HE SAID HE WAS TO ACT AS A PROPAGANDIST IN THE STATES AND TELL THE PUBLIC THE AIM OF THE INVASION: A REVAMPING OF THE DUVALIER DICTATORSHIP AND MAKING HAITI A BASE FOR A CUBAN INVASION.

"BUT THE LITTLE ARMY THAT HAD BEEN RECRUITED MET ITS DEFEAT THE DAY AFTER NEW YEAR'S 1967--AT THE HANDS OF CUSTOMS

SECRET

AGENTS IN KEY WEST.

"CABEZA TESTIFIED THAT EARLIER HE HAD DRIVEN A TRUCKLOAD OF AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES TOWARD KEY WEST BUT FELL INTO THE HANDS OF OFFICIALS WHO DIDN'T BELIEVE HIS STORY THAT HIS PANEL TRUCK CARRIED ONLY PAINT.

"THE GOVERNMENT ALSO CALLED A MIAMI MAN, JULIO NORMILLA, OF 1450 SW 17TH ST., WHO TESTIFIED HE ACTED AS A SORT OF ADVANCE MAN FOR THE LIBERATION OF HAITI."

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

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MASFERRER RUJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
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DURING THE PERIOD 59/60 HAD BECOME ACTIVELY
ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTI CASTRO ORGANIZATION
OF SUBJ FORMER CUBAN SENATOR AND
NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER

201-273015
DBB -99864
31 OCT 67
FBI
P9

WAS 100-005-014

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31 Oct 67 (7-61)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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SECRET 262244Z CITE JMWAVE 9943

26 OCT 67 IN 80657

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

RE DIRECTOR 46321

1. CABEZA IS NOT LISTED AS PROSECUTION WITNESS IN MASFERRER TRIAL. COPY OFFICIAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INDICTMENT LISTS CABEZA AS CO-CONSPIRATOR WHO COOPERATED WITH DEFENDANT MASFERRER IN ACQUIRING USE OF A HOUSE IN COCO PLUM, MARATHON, FLA. AND IN TRANSPORTING OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM NEW YORK AND ATLANTA TO MIAMI. OFFICIAL CUSTOMS REPORT FORWARDED TO U.S. ATTORNEY WILLIAM A. MEADOWS ON 6 FEBRUARY 1967 LISTS CABEZA AS A DEFENDANT. TESTIMONY BY CUSTOMS AGENTS AND THEIR INFORMANTS CITE CABEZA AS STATING HE HAD GREEN LIGHT FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ENGAGE IN HAITIAN INVASION.

2. WOFIRM WILL HAVE NO CONTROL OVER MANNER IN WHICH CABEZA CHOOSES TO TESTIFY. EXPECT MASFERRER DEFENSE WOULD HAVE NO QUALMS IN FORCING CABEZA TO TESTIFY IN MANNER AIDING GROUP'S POSITION.

3. BASED ON REVIEW AND DISCUSSIONS WITH STATION PERSONNEL FAMILIAR CABEZA ACTIVITIES, WE SHOULD PROBABLY EXPECT CABEZA TO USE WOFIRM AS WHIPPING BOY OR "EMINENCE GRISE" BEHIND

SECRET

CS copy in 100-9-16

File in [illegible] 201-42669

PAGE TWO JMWAVE 9943 S E C R E T

INVASION PLOT. IN LIGHT THIS POSSIBILITY, SUGGEST U.S. ATTORNEY BE BRIEFED BACKGROUND CABEZA'S WOFIRM EMPLOYMENT WITH GENERAL RECAP ON HIS PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDE AS IT RELATES TO CASE. ALL PERTINENT INFO AVAILABLE AT HQS.

S E C R E T

[illegible]

IMS [illegible] trace
19 Oct 67
Subject - Masferrer

FBI doc
12 Oct '67 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau# 2-156

14-00000

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OCT 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE: 24 NOV 1967

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): [illegible]

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 10 Oct 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFGA 28655

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DISPATCH

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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING 1P
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE		MICROFILM
SUBJECT TYPIC/AMOT/Operational Anti U.S. Government Bulletin - EL ECO DE HOLGUIN		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

1. Attached herewith is AMOT Report EE-7688, dated 3 October 1967 and its attachment, a bulletin entitled EL ECO DE HOLGUIN (The Voice of Holguin) dated September 1967.

F circular

2. As noted in the report, Rolando MASFERRER Rojas (201-042669) is the author of the bulletin which attacks the U. S. Government and its agencies, including the CIA.

Gary L. Flustikoff

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
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GROUP 1
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SECRET ATT. TO UFGA-28655

FROM: SE (I-2?) EE-7688

AGENT: E-2 9P 3 Oct. 1967

VIA: I-1

SUBJECT: Attacks on the U.S. Government and its departments and agencies

SOURCE: Bulletin entitled "El Feo de Holguin" of September 1967

REF: EE-7314

1. Attached herewith is a copy of the bulletin, "El Feo de Holguin," Year 1, No. 1, dated September 1967. This bulletin calls itself the "Official Organ of the Municipality of Holguin in Exile."

2. The author of this bulletin is Rolando MASFERRER Rojas, who uses in it some of the pseudonyms he formerly in his articles in the paper, El Tiempo, of New York, such as "Ignotus," "Miguel Peralta" and "Criso."

3. It is false to say that the bulletin is the official organ of the Municipality of Holguin, as MASFERRER and his group do not belong to that organization and at a meeting held on 9 July 1967, when MASFERRER and his group tried to oust the directorate of the organization, they were completely routed.

4. This bulletin follows the same line as the other bulletin put out by MASFERRER under the name Ahora, which was also called the "official organ of the Municipality of Holguin." (See EE-7314.)

5. In this bulletin MASFERRER attacks the U.S. Government and its departments and agencies. These attacks are underlined in red in the attached copy.

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OCT 18 1967
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Att. 1 UFGA-28655

10 Oct 67
201-042669

SECRET ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-28655

EL ECO DE HOLGUIN

ORGANO OFICIAL DEL MUNICIPIO DE HOLGUIN EN EL EXILIO

NUM. 1 SEPTIEMBRE DE 1967 AÑO I

EDITORIAL

Según la "hard intelligence", en los años 70, China dispondrá de los medios de acarreo (cohetes intercontinentales) que amenazarán a Estados Unidos y Rusia.

Sábese que los chinos han impreso mapas con las fronteras del imperio de Mao en los Urales.

El potencial humano y los grandes saltos en tecnología militar de China y la realidad de su gran masa cargando sobre el sureste de Asia, Japón y Filipinas son un serio desafío para el poderío norteamericano en el Pacífico. Al extremo de que tanto Norteamérica como Inglaterra, planean ya una cadena de bases en el océano Indico.

Esto explica el acuerdo defensivo ruso-americano que contempla ya, previsoramente, tan inquietante perspectiva que solo puede resolverse en una guerra de E. U. y la URSS contra China.

Y explica los motivos norteamericanos para amarrar las manos a los exiliados cubanos que quieren golpear al tirano Castro, hasta el presente bajo la protección del acuerdo Kennedy-Kruschev.

Norteamérica no puede poner en riesgo su luna de miel con la URSS y de [illegible] Sam se convierte en el más eficaz [illegible] de Castro.

Toda la charlatanería de los incapaces dirigentes anticomunistas cubanos levantando falsas esperanzas en la Organización de Estados Americanos de quienes se espera, vanamente, una actitud viril frente a las provocaciones del hediondo bandido de La Habana, revela incomprensión y cobardía de gentes oportunistas que no tienen el coraje para llamar las cosas por su nombre. La [illegible] de que los

Pase a la Pag. 2

SECRET

BOBBY FULLER

Bobby Fuller era un americano de Holguín. Hijo de otros dos holguineros nacidos en Norteamérica: Guillermo Fuller y Jenny Jewett, colonos de Lewiston, próximo a Cacocum.

Notable atleta en sus días de estudiante en Miami, Bobby fue destacado miembro del glorioso cuerpo de Infantería de Marina de Estados Unidos.

Tras haberse jugado la vida en tareas clandestinas, en los primeros tiempos de la tiranía comunista, Bobby desembarcó en la primera expedición armada llegada a la costa Norte de Oriente, en ayuda de los alzados en la región de Guantánamo-Baracoa.

Fue capturado tras penosa odisea en las montañas. Y fusilado en Santiago de Cuba, junto a otros dos valerosos norteamericanos amigos de Cuba: Tony Barba y Dale Thompson.

Los holguineros, que ven con tristeza como muchos de sus hermanos de la patria chica de Calixto García, olvidan sus deberes con los que han quedado atrás, tienen un altar en sus corazones para Bobby Fuller, como para Barba y Thompson, que un día no muy lejano, tendrán un monumento al pie de las empinadas lomas de Oriente.

Los Renegados

Por Miguel Peralta.

Estados Unidos prefería, a todas luces, una vecina Cuba democrática al régimen de opresión [illegible] de Fidel Castro.

Pero es evidente que mucho más que la situación de miseria y terror que padecen los cubanos interesa a Norteamérica la posición de enemistad internacional y de peón de los rusos y los chinos que juega la nación cubana en el tablero de la guerra fría.

El destino triste, el hambre, la enfermedad, el miedo

Pase a la Pag. 3

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EDITORIAL....Continuación.

yanquis los escojan a ellos para administrar a Cuba libre los convierte en vulgares cómplices de esta política que ha condenado a la esclavitud al pueblo cubano que se creía, en su ingenuidad, amparado en su soberanía por los papeles mojados de los acuerdos de Rio, Caracas, Bogotá y por la letra muerta de la doctrina Monroe.

La OEA, como ha dicho valientemente el dirigente venezolano Carlos Andres Pérez, hace lo que mande Washington, y éste, al presente, baila al son de la balalaika.

Se trata, pues, de convenir en que nadie nos va a sacar las castañas del fuego. Y que nosotros, debemos pelear por nuestras libertades. Como lo hemos hecho siempre: solos.

En Cuba ocurrirá una guerra únicamente cuando desde el destierro, llegue una fuerza armada de decenas de miles de hombres. Y es evidente que Estados Unidos, por estas realidades de política mundial, no permitirá jamás que aquí se organice esta fuerza.

Pero los cubanos podemos conquistar, en alianza con luchadores democráticos de otros países, un santuario donde alistar ese ejército con aviones y tanques.

Castro no tiene más poderío militar que el que mantenía España en Cuba en 1695-98. Y hoy, la emigración tiene más potencial humano y económico y las posibilidades de adquirir armamentos en Europa y América son incomparablemente mayores que a fines del siglo pasado.

Este es el único camino para cumplir con nuestro deber y salvar nuestro honor y escaparnos de los hospitales y los cementerios bajo la nieve que son hoy la única amarga alternativa del destierro.

Quien no lo comprenda es un asno. Quien no toma esta senda es un cobarde, no importa qué pretextos o argucias esgrima para ocultar su infamia y desvergüenza.

HAY MAS DE MIL MILLONES DE DOLARES DE LOS CUBANOS RICOS Y ACOMODADOS, EN LOS BANCOS DEL DESTIERRO. ALGUN DIA, LOS SABROSONES, LOS QUE TIENEN PROPIEDADES EN CUBA, TENDRAN QUE HACER, QUIERAN QUE NO, SU CONTRIBUCION AL TESORO DE LA GUERRA.

CUBANOS MALOS Y BUENOS

Algunos cubanos han sufrido el decomiso de sus armas, la prisión o la expulsión de la Florida por intentar hacer llegar armas y municiones a Cuba o por hacerle la guerra al bandido Castro en Méjico o el Canada. En cambio, otros, más afortunados, se han hecho ricos o han gozado de una vida muelle en sus trajines de luchadores contra la tiranía.

Esto ha causado la división del destierro. A la vez que la corrupción y el escepticismo.

Si alguien quiere ganarse algunos dólares, o ser incluido en la nómina de la CIA o la Aduana, no tiene más que delatar, meterse impúdicamente a chivato y soplón. Hasta se le autoriza a portar un arma. Pero si alguien quiere arriesgarse a sufrir cárcel y persecuciones, a que le chequeen el teléfono; y aun a que se le difame por la prensa y la radio, pues que se atreva a desafiar la neutralidad norteamericana y trate de hacer una incursión a la costa de Cuba o adquiera, una embarcación para llevar armas de contrabando a la isla. O se meta en trajines de sabotaje contra Castro.

Nunca con más vigencia el viejo postulado bíblico: Por sus obras los conocereis ...

Esos dirigentes de hoteles y jets, son los bien pagados.

Los que han sufrido encierros, expedientes de deportación ... esos son los de fiar.

Que obras son amores y no buenas razones.

El alto nivel de vida de Estados Unidos, que absorbe a los desterrados cubanos en el disfrute de los bienes materiales de la sociedad americana, conspira contra el patriotismo y la abnegación que deben primar en el espíritu de la emigración. Quizá si hubiésemos dado en otras playas más inhospitalarias, en el Matto Grosso, en el Peten o en la Tundra canadiense, ya habría comenzado la guerra de independencia.



Represa "Cacoyuguín", acueducto de Holguín

LOS RENEGADOS...

Viene de la Pag. 1

y la abyección de los cubanos, en ocho años que dura su martirio, no ha llevado ni a Estados Unidos ni a las naciones del hemisferio que siguen su política exterior, sin discrepar en una coma, a librarlos de su sufrimiento.

Ni siquiera en el mero cumplimiento de lo que mandan los compromisos internacionales escritos en Caracas, Bogotá y Río de Janeiro.

Estados Unidos y las mal llamadas repúblicas hermanas del Continente, no solo no mueven un dedo para ayudar, como vienen obligadas, a que el pueblo de Cuba reconquiste su soberanía y restablezca sus libertades, sino que impiden con la fuerza, todo intento de los patriotas cubanos por hacer llegar a los que desafían el paredón de las ejecuciones en la isla, su mensaje solidario en la forma de armas y municiones.

Esto, más que fariseísmo e hipocresía, es un acto canalla, que convierte en una mojiganga a la OEA y los tratados.

Si no fuese por el eficaz rol de guardaespaldas del asesino y bandido Castro a que ha sido llevada Norteamérica, quizá habría ya una guerra civil en Cuba.

Norteamérica dice que simpatiza con los cubanos libres. Pero el aparato de represión de las actividades de los patriotas en esta nación, es cien veces más amplio y costoso que el que existía cuando los comunistas en la Sierra Maestra usaban a la Florida como base de apoyo logístico para su insurrección.

Es un secreto a voces que las armas que llevaron Hubert Matos y Díaz Lanz a Cienaguilla, Oriente, desde Venezuela, que incluían cien rifles automáticos y millones de tiros, sin los cuales Castro habría sido aplastado por el general Eulogio Cantillo, fueron adquiridas por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia. Lo de la "Campaña del Bolívar" para pagar estas armas compradas en Alexandria, Va. a la "Interarmco", fue una cortina de humo.

El afán de defender la absurda ley de neutralidad no era tan vigoroso como hoy, a pesar de que Estados Unidos no tiene relaciones amistosas formales con el barbudo de La Habana.

Quien crea que Estados Unidos o la OEA van a hacer algo contra Castro es un idiota incurable o es un vendido miserable.

Quien, por mantener estos espejismos, cobra dinero, que es el caso de muchos malos cubanos, mañana tendrán que responder de su felonía.

Norteamérica y Rusia, a pesar de sus discrepancias en público, están de acuerdo en el gran plano mundial. Nada los separa. Y solo les preocupa a ambos el peligro amarillo que para los años 70 dispondrá de los cohetes intercontinentales para agredir a la URSS y a EE. UU.

Quizá Norteamérica no tenga otra alternativa en su estrategia global y en la defensa de su vida misma.

Para que se sepa que en ese idilio de Washington y Moscú, el pueblo cubano ha sido clavado en la cruz.

Y que se diga que también los malos cubanos que anteponen los intereses de Estados Unidos a los de la patria, haciéndose pagar 30 dineros por su negra traición son una piara de cerdos.

Las organizaciones que no tienen armas, ni barco ni dinero, ni sus dirigentes desafían la hipócrita ley de neutralidad, son organizaciones de mentira.

ABUSO CRIMINAL

Jesús Fanjul, responsable militar del Municipio de Holguín en el Exilio, ex-oficial del ejército de Estados Unidos, graduado en una academia militar de este país, descendiente de muy respetable familia de nuestro término, ex-preso político en Cuba y uno de los dirigentes de la abortada expedición a Haití, fue condenado a dos meses de prisión el pasado miércoles.

Un periodista provocador y un juez de esos que destilan odio discriminatorio contra los cubanos que no se venden a la CIA ni a Castro, lo mandaron por 60 días a la temible cárcel del Condado, bajo la falsa acusación de haberle pegado al periodista que lo retrataba cuando Fanjul y otros 70 cubanos anticomunistas se hallaban presos tras el fracaso del 3 de Enero en Cayo Maraton.

De nada valieron los numerosos testigos que afirmaron que Fanjul no fue quien le pegó al impertinente cínico. El juez y el reportero, que aparentemente goza de grandes influencias en la corte, donde ejerce de cronista judicial, se reían burlonamente del condenado, en un odioso abuso de poder.

En todo caso, estas riñas se penan con una pequeña multa. Quizá con cinco días de arresto.

Fanjul tiene una esposa y una pequeña hija que ahora tropiezan, amén de con la merma de sus ingresos, con la dificultad de trasladarse al trabajo y a la escuela.

Maldito juez que en su furia anticubana, recuerda los tribunales populares del castrato.

Son los mismos endiablados chupatintas que mantienen a Felipe Rivero en las propias ergástulas sin fianza ni juicio, en violación flagrante de sus derechos civiles y humanos, desde hace más de tres meses.

Loma de La Cruz

?PODEMOS GANAR SOLOS LA GUERRA?

Yo creo que sí, pero ese no es el tema del artículo. Lo que sí creo es que los cubanos no estamos haciendo todo lo necesario para ganar. En efecto, podemos formar un ejército invasor de 25,000 cubanos bien adiestrados y apertrechados, adquiriendo armas, aviones y barcos para desembarcar por distintos puntos extratégicos, al mismo tiempo que la resistencia interna inicie en toda la isla una campaña de sabotaje que propicie el triunfo.

Eso lo podemos hacer sin la ayuda de nadie, nos bastan nuestros hombres y nuestro dinero.

Si para entonces, Rusia ha retirado sus tropas de la isla, el triunfo será clamoroso y rápido, pero de lo contrario, a la América Libre y a los Estados Unidos, no le quedará otra alternativa que apoyar nuestra guerra justa y necesaria.

La iniciativa asumida por los propios cubanos, descarta la posibilidad de una guerra internacional, que es el único valladar que hasta ahora, se ha opuesto a las determinaciones de la OEA y de Washington.

Se necesita mucho sacrificio por parte de los cubanos aptos para la guerra y de los adinerados, porque ellos son los que tienen que dar vida y hacienda por la independencia de la patria y la felicidad de las generaciones futuras.

Ambos sacrificios están acreditados por nuestros antepasados: Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, Antonio Maceo, Francisco V. Aguilera, Ignacio Agramonte, y un pueblo entero, Bayamo, y otro pueblo, Guáimaro, ardieron para iluminar el camino de la libertad, a la par que infinidad de cubanos ofrendaron vidas y fortunas en aras de la independencia.

Estamos incurriendo en las mismas privaciones, en identicos sacrificios, en iguales inmolaciones y ejemplos nobles, porque estamos defendiendo la misma causa sagrada.

Hay que hacer conciencia de guerra, conciencia de sacrificio. No importa quien ha de dirigir la guerra, que a la patria se sirve desde cualquier lugar.

El triunfo no será de los jefes, sino de todos los que participemos en la lucha; todos tenemos que trabajar: la hora es de sacrificios y renunciamientos. A lo único que no podemos renunciar es a pelear por Cuba y morir por ella.

La patria es ara y no pedestal; es agonía y deber, dijo el Apóstol, y murió en Dos Ríos.

CUBA EN EL EXILIO

Por CRISO.

Hay 10 mil holguineros en Estados Unidos. La mayor parte exiliados. Aunque abundan los emigrados que no muestran interés alguno en vengar agravios ni reconquistar su perdida dignidad de hombres.

10 mil hombres y mujeres en pie, poniendo cada día su grano de arena en el edificio de la libertad, podrían hacer mucho. Pero los comecheques que hasta aquí dirigían la organización del término en el destierro, ni se reunían, ni juntaban armas ni dinero, ni hacían una publicación, ni movilizaban a nadie en actos patrióticos. Eso sí, algunos vivos recibían su cheque de la CIA por debajo de la mesa. Y a yantar. Su consigna: "tu no comedes. Yo sí comedes..."

■

En la asamblea en que obtuvieron 16 votos y fueron echados de la organización del municipio por sometidos a la política de apaciguamiento y convivencia de E. U. con Castro, los "chivos" llevaron como guapitos a algunos soplones de la CIA con sus pistolitas al cinto.

Entre ellos, un chiquito hijo de españoles de apellido Ugartemendía que hace poco andaba por los portales de Holguín vestido de miliciano metiéndole miedo a las gentes y mostrando orondo, su carnet del G-2.

¡Jesús, que miedo..!

■

Rumores circulantes al cierre de esta edición del boletín de la gente de La Chomba afirman que le "cortaron el tubo del potaje" al ínclito picúo Luis Conte Aguero, el hombre que aplaudió el asesinato de su hermano Nicolás en Santiago de Cuba a manos de la "maffia" castrista. La sabrosona "mulata de fuego" llegó a recibir la friolera de 15 mil dólares al mes de manos de la próvida CIA. Lo cual quiere decir que si no ha montado negocios privados como su parigual Manolito Artime, ahora empezará el exilio para quien dijo: "Fidel, me miro en tus ojos..."

No se deje engañar: no hay ni mil cubanos que que se reunan cada semana con su grupo, que se multen con unos pesos al mes, o que sueñen con el fusil que nos quitará de la frente la ceniza del deshonor.

CUBA POR DENTRO

Por IGNOTUS

Un ex oficial del ejército castrista recién llegado a Miami desde Cuba, dijo que los alistados de la famosa división 50 del ejército comunista con acantonamiento en Mangos de Baraguá, son todos del servicio militar obligatorio y de menos de 20 años y que no muestran entusiasmo por "la tía Tata" como llaman a Fidel Castro.

Agregó que si no hay un desembarco desde afuera, cualquier mañana las amas de casa, desesperadas por la crisis de los alimentos, salen por cientos de miles a la calle y derriban al régimen.

Finalizó diciendo que en San Luis, sólo hay 13 comunistas. Y que esto es poco más o menos la situación en Cuba entera.

●

El pseudo escritor Lee Lockwood que ha puesto en circulación un lujoso libro que se vende a 10 dólares en Estados Unidos, con decenas de fotografías de la "tía Tata" y una amplia descripción de su apetito de Fantagruel (almuerzo en Uvero: Lechón asado, arroz, frijoles, yuca y fufú de plátano, pollo frito, cerveza, vino, coñac, filete mignon y tabacos), dice que abunda un excelente pasto para el ganado llamado "marabú", al que el INRA da mucha atención.

●

Ana Laura Infante, que era quizá la señora más aristocrática y discriminatoria de Holguín, casada con un tipo parasitario, gallego, llamado Fernando Zorrilla, es de las de "patria o muerte", y en sus alardes democráticos barre las calles de la ciudad. Su hijo "Pincho" bebedor, parrandero y alborotador, que llegó a robar a sus parientes, es todo un jefe del INRA en Holguín....

Y un candidato seguro a la soga y el sebo en la guásima cuando caiga la satrapía rusa del Caribe.

●

Se ven muy pocos rusos en Holguín y en toda la provincia de Oriente. Corre el rumor de que se van los que quedan. Una muchacha cubana que trabajaba como doméstica de una rusa, dice que esta le regaló alguna ropa y le dijo que se marchaba a su país.

Armando Acosta Cordero, antiguo concejal comunista de Sancti Spiritus, que desertó de la vieja guardia, siendo premiado con el bajalato de la provincia oriental, estaba entregado a la "dolce vita", practicaba el contrabando y la bolsa negra, disponía de muchos autos, fincas y casas. Bebía como un demonio. Días pasados hizo una boda fastuosa a su hija en Santiago de Cuba. Ahora está en desgracia. Le han quitado el mando.

●

Se han destruido las vallas de gallos en las ciudades del interior. Pero se mantienen las de los pobladitos monte adentro. Se apuesta fuertemente en las lidias. Son frecuentes las "paradas" de cinco mil pesos. El dinero es producto de la enorme corrupción de las autoridades, la bolsa negra y el juego de terminales protegidos por milicianos y comités de vigilancia. Es normal que los genízaros del régimen "decomisen" pero no encausen a los infelices que matan un cerdo o venden, a hurtadillas, un racimo de plátanos o unas frutas.

Es de viejo sabido que la corrupción de la administración es siempre el preludio del derrumbe.

●

Con motivo de la conferencia de OLAS se ordenó la reparación y pintura de fachadas de los edificios de las avenidas y carreteras. Se acopió carne y cerveza en todos los pueblos y se llevó a los hoteles donde se alojaría la "maffia" comunista latinoamericana. En Cuba todo es simulación y mentira. Mucho periódico y revista mal escrito, y peor impreso en pésimo papel. Nadie cree ya en Fidel Castro. Ni lo respetan. En especial, son virulentos los comentarios de las mujeres, incluyendo miembros del partido, en los establecimientos vacíos de mercancías.



Vista aérea de la ciudad de Holguín

DEMOCRACIA Y COMUNISMO

EL ECO, se escribe con letra de pueblo, con acento de libertad y por eso emplea el mensaje directo a los obreros y campesinos, a los estudiantes, militares, profesionales, propietarios y a todas las clases que integran la sociedad democrática.

Cuba, Hungría, Rumania ..... no tienen actualmente estudiantes ni centros de cultura; en esos pueblos no pueden haber actividades docentes porque éstas exigen necesariamente un clima de libertad y derecho que es imposible en los estados comunistas.

El estudiante, el profesional y el intelectual, como el artista, el político, el atleta, el trabajador y el campesino, el militar y el industrial, necesitan de la libertad como del aire mismo. El hombre fue hecho para la libertad y sin ella prefiere la muerte.

En los pueblos esclavizados por el comunismo no pueden haber institutos militares, porque los ejércitos constitucionales son instrumentos que garantizan el imperio de las leyes y los derechos de la ciudadanía, y en los países comunistas no se respetan esos principios, sino que se violan constantemente para mantener al individuo bajo un estado de terror permanente.

Allí no pueden haber profesionales ni intelectuales, ni políticos, porquela libertad de pensamiento está restringida y solo se pueden repetir las consignas.

En esos países comunistas no hay prensa libre, todo está bajo el control del estado, lo mismo que las organizaciones obreras, cívicas, etc.

Los propietarios y los industriales han sido despojados de sus bienes y negocios, porque la propiedad privada y la iniciativa particular están terminantemente prohibidas.

El hombre no puede tener ni ideas ni bienes propios.

La madre no puede educar sus hijos, porque estos son servidores del Estado y desde pequeños el Partido Comunista los somete a adoctrinamiento.

Se suprimen y se racionan los alimentos, porque un pueblo sano y fuerte es rebelde.

Cumplimos nuestro deber de incorporarnos al movimiento general para salvar a la América; queremos coadyuvar en los esfuerzos que se realizan en ese sentido y para ello no escatimaremos ningún sacrificio.

Somos demócratas y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

Somos cristianos y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

Somos libres y, por tanto, somos esencialmente anticomunistas.

La Libertad o la prisión; la Patria o la esclavitud; Dios o el materialismo.

Junto a la Libertad, junto a la Patria y junto a Dios, está la Democracia; al lado de la opresión, el crimen, la miseria y el materialismo, está el comunismo.

O

VENEZUELA

No nos ha soprendido la actitud postrera del Gobierno de Venezuela, al retirar prácticamente, la denuncia que "valientemente" había presentado ante la OEA, contra el gobierno comunista cubano por su agresiva política de intervención y subversión.

El camarada Leoni ha venido jugando con dos barajas; tan pronto manda a prender a los comunistas como los pone en libertad; los persigue ahora y los ampara luego. Su gobierno ha sido una obra perfecta de malabarismo político.

Estamos seguros, absolutamente seguros, que si el Ejército venezolano no se hubiera mantenido firme en su disciplina militar y obediencia a la Constitución, ya los comunistas se hubieran apoderado del gobierno venezolano y la patria de Bolívar estaría viviendo el mismo calvario que sufre la patria de Martí.

No dudamos que al presidente de Caracas le retoza el experimento marxista y por eso, hemos seguido atentamente sus pasos. Cuando las fuerzas de la democracia derrocaron al Presidente Goulart del Brasil, Leoni no reconoció al nuevo gobierno, lo mismo sucedió en el caso de Santo Domingo, apelando a una precaria y absurda doctrina de su antecesor y mentor, don Rómulo Betancourt.

¿Qué quería el camarada, qué se quedaran en sus puestos Bosch y Goulart? ¿Y si los patriotas cubanos derrocan al tirano Castro y se constituye en la isla un gobierno provisional, será reconocido por Leoni?

Hay hombres por cuyas venas no corre sangre, lo que corre es petróleo . . .

¿OPTIMISMO O PESIMISMO?

En el ambiente del exilio cubano, flota la interrogante de si conviene ser optimista o si perjudica que los voceros de la opinión pública del destierro, se excedan en sus pronunciamientos, torciendo quizá la dirección de los acontecimientos, al precipitar a los patriotas en una dirección que, por su naturaleza requiere más tiempo y mayores reflexiones.

Unos estiman que es fatal para la causa cubana, que los periodistas y los líderes de la acción anticomunista se muestren demasiado optimistas porque así desorientan a los patriotas del exilio y a los de la resistencia interior, desalentándolos para proseguir la lucha al hacerles creer que no son ya necesarios sus heroicos esfuerzos, porque de todos modos, con el concurso de los norteamericanos, los acuerdos de la OEA, la colaboración de los gobiernos latinoamericanos y la concurrencia de factores imponderables, Cuba ha de ser libre en una fecha próxima.

Otros creen que lo que resulta altamente perjudicial para la causa de la independencia cubana es el pesimismo que derrochan algunos comentaristas y dirigentes, porque al formarse ese derrotismo en la masa cubana, dentro y fuera de la isla, todos nos resignaremos a continuar viviendo en el extranjero o iremos pensando en adaptarnos a las exigencias del régimen castrista.

Nosotros reconocemos que ambas tesis estén avaladas por buenas razones y por lo tanto se justifica que cada una tenga numerosos prosélitos que defienden calurosamente sus postulados.

Pero, creo que no debemos caer necesariamente en uno de los dos bandos extremos. Debemos ser optimistas sin llegar a la fantasía; un optimismo sensato que lejos de confundir a la opinión pública y desalentar a los patriotas, sea capaz de formar una opinión más firme y canalizar los esfuerzos de todos en la lucha a muerte contra el comunismo opresor.

Nuestro optimismo debe ser medido, ha de dar la sensación precisa de que sí lo podemos hacer, pero con el esfuerzo y el sacrificio de todos. Nuestro optimismo ha de ser fe en el triunfo, resolución heroica de luchar hasta vencer.

El optimismo ha de ser sincero, que muestre grandeza; debe ser valiente y generoso para que se contagie a los que aun están equivocados o indecisos.

El pesimismo debe ser suprimido de raíz; nadie debe sentirse pesimista, no podemos perder la batalla antes de que comience. Morir anticipadamente, por nuestra irresoluta voluntad, equivale al suicidio y nadie tiene derecho a desoir el llamado urgente de la Patria; nadie puede inhibirse.

El pesimismo debe ser suprimido netamente por el realismo; pesar nuestras fuerzas no es encontrarnos débiles sino ponemos más fuertes para vencer.

El pesimismo debe ceder su lugar a la estrategia guerrerista, para atacar cuando seamos suficientemente poderosos para derrotar al enemigo. No es cobarde aplazar el combate.

Tenemos que hacernos fuertes y tener un plan; debemos estar conscientes de nuestra fuerza, de nuestra moral y de nuestro valor; y estar seguros del triunfo definitivo.

Y, sobre todo, despojarnos de ambiciones personales, de vanidades y complejos. El momento es de guerra y sacrificios, para todos hay un lugar de peligro y gloria; que cada cual ocupe su puesto.

El Caballo se enfermó
y tan furioso se puso
que un veterinario ruso
vino y lo reconoció.
Tan enfermo lo encontró
que le quitó la montura
y al verle la matadura
rebosante de gusanos
dijo a todos los cubanos:
—El Penco no tiene cura ——



LOS CHOMBEROS EN EL EXODO

Llama grandemente la atención la eterna juventud del Dr. Eduardo (Guarro) Ochoa en sus 56 años que parecen 40. Atribuye el ex-alcalde este milagro a su equilibrio espiritual logrado en estudios y meditaciones en las disciplinas de la orden mística de los "Rosacruces".

Dice "Guarro": "A fines de año se cumple el ciclo espiritual del azote comunista en Cuba. Eso marca el final de Fidel Castro".

* * *

Dónde están y qué se han hecho los ex-legisladores Andrés (Pupito) Pupo y Rodrigo Suárez Bester. No han concurrido a una sola reunión dominical del Municipio. Causa extrañeza esa desición después de su airada condenación de la mediatización de la CIA en la organización.

* * *

La organización acaba de perder un valioso cuadro de trabajo en el Ingeniero Andrés Poseiro, quien se mudó para Inmokalee, donde se desempeña como profesor de Ciencias en un High School.

* * *

Honró la última reunión de los holguineros, la presencia del batallador anticomunista y patriota de pinta firme, Evelio Borrego, actualmente Capitán del Ejército de los Estados Unidos. Durante un año, Borrego combatió en Vietnam, como oficial de un batallón de la 9a. división de infantería. Viene destinado de nuevo a Fort Benning, Georgia.

Hace un tiempo le preguntó a un jefe en Washington como podría ir a pelear en Cuba si se precipitaban los acontecimientos allí. Y el general le contesto: Donde quiera que se halle, estaré a menos de 20 horas de su patria".

* * *

EL GENERAL OLIVA

Cada cierto tiempo, el señor capitán del Ejército de Estados Unidos, Erneido Oliva, se pone su traje de paisano y hace media docena de declaraciones en la primera página de la prensa anunciando que "prepara un ejército secreto para cuando llegue el momento de derrocar a Castro".

Se da unos cuantos viajes por el mundo y regresa a sus funciones militares. Estamos por tercera vez en presencia del fenómeno, después que Oliva salió de las prisiones de Castro, tras el fiasco de Bahía de Cochinos.

Al presente, quedan unos 70 oficiales cubanos en las fuerzas armadas de Norteamérica. La mayor parte de ellos combatiendo en el Sureste de Asia. Sólo Oliva se ha perdido la magnífica experiencia que enriquecería su aval de soldado profesional.

Ahora Oliva anda trajinando de la mano del travieso Enriquito Huertas, el hombre del Banco José Martí, que ya rompió los records de viajes de Manolo Artime, Juanita Castro y Luis Conte Agüero.

En su afán de ser aceptado por los influyentes izquierdistas de Washington, Oliva, ex-oficial del ejército constitucional que cuando cayó Batista cursaba en una escuela militar yanqui en Panamá, apareció en la primera plana del "Herald" de Miami como ex-ayudante de Fidel Castro en la Sierra Maestra. Y en unas declaraciones mal aconsejadas, Oliva hizo una desafortunada incursión en la política atacando a sus antiguos jefes militares en Cuba.

Todo lo cual ha ayudado poco al ex-segundo en el mando de la Brigada 2506, quien no debía gastar pólvora en salvas ni dejarse "chotear" por los vivos.

* * *



La foto muestra el bonito parque "Calixto García" de nuestro pueblo, donde se reunían alegremente los vecinos de Holguín . . .

* * *

TODOS LOS DOMINGOS, A LAS DOCE DEL MEDIODIA, SE REUNE LA ASAMBLEA DEL MUNICIPIO DE HOLGUIN EN EL DESTIERRO.

Lugar: Local del Colegio de Abogados de Cuba en el Exilio.- Avenida 17 y Calle 12 del South West.

No sea usted de los que olvidan a los que quedaron atrás.

Si no hay reuniones periódicas para trabajos prácticos, no hay organización, y sin organización, militancia y disciplina, no habrá guerra de liberación.

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15 Sep 67

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XAAZ-27947

OGC 67-1772

15 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Cini

SUBJECT: Masferrer Trial, Miami, Florida

1. I called Mr. Philip Morris, attorney in the Department of Justice responsible for the Masferrer case, and ascertained from him that the conspiracy trial is scheduled in the United States District Court in Miami, Florida, for 6 November 1967. Of the original defendants indicted, the only one dropped was Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell of Powder Springs, Georgia. A recap of the current defendants is as follows:

ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, also known as
ROLANDO MASFERRER, also known as "PANCHO"
JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES
ANTONIO LEON ROJAS
RENE JUARES LEON
JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU
MARTIN FRANCIS XAVIER CASEY

2. Mr. Morris further said that Orlando Bosch was scheduled for trial in Valdosta, Georgia, on Monday, 18 September 1967; however, he was in an automobile accident in the Miami area sometime during the week of 4 September, and therefore there would be a hearing in Valdosta, Georgia, requesting a continuance of this trial until sometime in October. Bosch is now scheduled to go on trial in Miami, Florida, on 2 January 1968.

3. It was deemed appropriate to ask the Department of Justice the status of these trials in view of Martin Casey's name appearing in cable traffic relative to "the Brown interview."

CS COPY

John K Greaney
JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

15 Sep 67
201-042669

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MASFERRER, ROLANDO
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CIT ?
OCC ?
< FLORIDA, MIAMI 6745 S. W. 26TH ST.
TELEPHONE 6619839

100-009-016
DBB -87656
25 JUL 67
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25 Jul 67
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FBI doc
28 June 67 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojás
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
30 Mai 67 (Dallas)
Re - Raimundo Braulio Pedro
Masferrer Rojós

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CIT CUBA
OCC ?
ACCORDING TO MARIANO SORE MARIN, WAS HEAD OF COMMUNIST SHOCK TROOPS IN UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA IN EARLY 1940S. HE WAS OPPOSED BY THE FED. OF UNIVERSITY OF STUDENTS OF WHICH SORI WAS THEN SECRETARY GENERAL.
FFN 19-120-30-13/4

019-006-122/03
UFGA-27175
16 MAR 67
P6

R 6703290056

FILE IN 201- 42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. →

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

16 Mar 67

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MASFERRER y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
(VOL. VII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN. 64 THRU 31 DEC. 65

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:25 4 AUG 78		PAT ORR	

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando

23. Approximately in July 1964 I-1 had a second interview with "Nordicc in the presence of "Jim" and "Enrique."

24. At the special request of the "friends," in September and October 1964 we sent forward reports on the officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in the six provinces, including any background data and information we had on them. Afterwards, the work of making Summaries of Information was intensified.

25. During August-September-October 1964 picket lines were formed in front of the airline companies that had flights to Mexico, and in front of airports, Mexican tourist agencies, and Mexican Consulates as a protest against the Mexican Government and its policy with relation to Cuba This was done in Puerto Rico, Venezuela, Miami, New York and other place in the United States. This was done daily in Miami and New York. On different occasions pickets were placed in front of theaters which were showing Mexican films. In October pickets were placed in Miami and Miam Beach and propaganda was handed out at the time of the holding of the ASTA (Thirty-fourth World Congress of Travel Agencies).

26. In November 1964 we began to pass information to the "friends" abou the training camps which were being opened in New Jersey to prepare and train people for the invasion of Haiti. We infiltrated some of our peop into this group and thus kept informed of everything that went on.

27. At the end of 1964 and up to April 1965 we continued to make studie Among them were those on the Cuban Telephone Enterprise, the Department of Port and Coastal Vigilance, censorship of correspondence, Cuban natio al budgets 1964/65, radio programs heard in Cuba.

28. At the request of the "friends" we collaborated in the reception activities for Juanita CASTRO and obtained the support of the exile organizations for rallies organized in Miami and New York.

29. In December 1964 we organized a great propaganda campaign, mobilizi all the Masonic lodges so they would back the proposal of the Masons who were supporting LOPEZ Mateos at the UN.

30. We acted as a support mechanism to the "friends" in the matter concerning Mrs. LIPPERT.

31. In the first months of 1965 an attempt was made on three different occasions to carry out Rescue Operation No. 1.

32. During the first months of 1965 we kept informed about the situatio in the Dominican Republic and the participation of the Cubans and Dominicans in the Miami area in what was going on.

33. During this whole period, in view of the division existing among the exiles and of the formation of so many new exile groups, we infiltrated our agents into all the organizations and reported on all the movements of leaders of these groups and their activities, on all their statements and action plans. Our aim and purpose was to report everything about the movements of the Cubans and the exile groups.

34. During this period we also began carding all our reports for the

COMBAT HAITI

COMBAT

(Organization)

An exile org - backed by Joseph [illegible], Daniel [illegible], and Louis [illegible] [illegible] which has had very little success in getting established. It recently [illegible] received an invitation from the [illegible] to merge - and is presently considering the [illegible] offer.

A force of 150 to 200 trained men of the Haitian exile group.
TDCSDB-315/01038, 16 Oct 64 file 201-04[illegible]

Group to support the Government in Exile of Haiti in the US. Combat will not form any govt. in Haiti, but will support the Government in Exile's candidates. Combat, according to source, Fermin Joseph of NYC, is against Communism and against any Cominco in any future government of Haiti.
UFA-43412, 18 June 63 file 36-9-6

One of 5 organizations combined as Haitian exile organization called DF[illegible]. See DF[illegible].
UFA-59773, 18 Dec 63 file 201-118281

Haitian exile organization. Leaders of this organization and Legion Liberatrice have offered to place themselves under the personal leadership of [illegible], who also has a working relationship with the leaders of Jeune Haiti. These three groups, along with the exiles in Santo Domingo & those now in Haiti will form part of the FARH, but without losing their individual group identity.
TDCS 3 4 030 1 (IN 7 17) 16 Sept 6 ENLACE/1 Pro .

"COMBAT"

"Combat" originally formed in 1963, recently re-activated. Organization has reportedly given military training to members and some have been sent to the Miami area. "Combat" reportedly plans to invade Haiti.
UFA 96183, 25 Jun 65

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

JAN 6 1966 JAN 7 1966

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER

FROM:
WH/SA/Reports

EXTENSION:

NO. XAAZ 17997

DATE ~~17 Nov 64~~ 18 Aug 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RI/AN				
2. RI/MIS			M	This was delivered to SA/RWC on 17 Nov 64
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. RI/files				
7.				
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9.				
10.				
11.				File
12.				~~201-042669~~
13.				
14.				
15.				18 AUG 64 201-042669

DECLASSIFIED
201-42669

AN QUD
~~[illegible]~~
IN X
PS
BX 2
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~PI~~
~~ADD/FPR~~

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX
XAAZ 17997
DATE 18 Aug 64

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

XAAZ 17997

TO : Mrs. Sue Panzer

DATE: 18 August 1964

FROM : Chief, DO Division CTB

SUBJECT: Meeting with Rolando Masferrer

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1972
MICROFILMED

29

1. In accordance with our conversation, I am sending you the facts as I know them regarding the 7 August meeting in New York City between Rolando Masferrer and Averell Clark.

2. Apparently Masferrer knows Stanley Ross, the Editor of El Tiempo, a Spanish-language newspaper published in New York. The office is at 78 Fifth Avenue and the telephone number is WA 4-2750. Possibly Masferrer did not previously know Ross. But at any rate, either on his own or through someone else, he got in touch with him in late July or early August and said that he wanted to be put in touch with an American with an aviation and military background. I do not know too much about Ross at the moment except that he has had considerable Latin American experience and would be a logical person for any Latino to approach. It would be very easy to obtain additional evidence on him if desired.

3. I am attaching for your information a list of the stockholders in El Tiempo, Inc. to provide some indication of who is behind Ross. In addition, we have a list of all the senior officers of El Tiempo.

4. Ross knew of Clark through the Hitchcocks listed, as you will note, as stockholders. Mrs. Margaret Hitchcock is Clark's aunt, while Thomas Hitchcock III is his first cousin as presumably, is William Hitchcock. During the war Clark was an outstanding fighter pilot, having flown with the RAF through the roughest days of the Battle of Britain, and thereafter shifted to the Americans with whom he flew many missions as a P-47 pilot. He is still in the Air Force Reserve.

5. At Ross's request Clark met Masferrer at the El Tiempo office in New York City on 7 August. Ross left the room so that the session was only between Clark and Masferrer. As a pro-Batista Cuban, Masferrer was known to us at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In fact, at one point just before the invasion, the U.S. Department of Justice arrested him and put him in jail in Florida for violation of the provisions of the Neutrality Act.

1 ATT H/W

SECRET

18 Aug 64
201-042669

6. Masferrer alleged to Clark that he was representing some twenty Cuban exile organizations, and that he was working with a Haitian, Charles Forben, head of an anti-Duvalier organization known as "Capois La Mort." Forben allegedly asked Masferrer to help his organization by leasing or buying a PBY-5 aircraft for use against Duvalier. Masferrer claimed that Forben's group was in a position to take control of the Ile de la Gonave, an island just off the west coast of Haiti in the gulf north of Port au Prince. It is conceivable that this is the wrong island since Clark did not have the name of the island in question, but based on the description of its location by Masferrer, I am assuming this to be the island involved. At any rate, in return for help from Masferrer, Forben was to be asked to let Masferrer and some of his Cuban exiles use the island in question as a base from which to harrass the eastern end of the Island of Cuba.

7. Clark told Masferrer that as a member of the Air Force Reserve, he would have to report the conversation to the USG and could not do anything without clearing with the USG. Masferrer said that he had no objection to this, particularly with regard to the activities of Forben and his group, but he asked that Clark not mention his intention to harrass Cuba, since he maintained that the USG would forbid this as being against USG policy. Clark said that Masferrer would have to leave to him what matters he chose to discuss with the USG. It was then agreed that Clark could reach Masferrer through Ross's office for about a week, and thereafter could pass a message to him through Ross.

8. Clark got in touch with me because I had known him during the war; I had known his family for many years, and one of his closest friends, James B. Watriss, is a cousin of mine and was, until about a year ago, associated with the Agency. Incidentally, I believe that Clark has had some discussions with SOD with the idea of possibly being used in connection with special operations.

18 aug 64
201-042669

14-00000

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1972
MICROFILMED

EL TIEMPO

19

Spanish Language National Newspaper

STANLEY ROSS
Editor

78 FIFTH AVENUE
New York, N. Y. 10011
WA 4-2750

#5407 A STOCKHOLDERS IN EL TIEMPO, INC.

Miguel Alemán, former President of Mexico, and President of the Mexican National Tourist Council

Nicholas Duke Biddle, investor, civic leader, Chairman of the Board of Puerto Rican Social Service, active in Latin American Affairs

Samuel Berger, executive vice-President, Kinney Service Corp.

Dr. Enrique J. Cervantes, Correspondent of EL TIEMPO, and Prominent Public figure in Spain

Mrs. Alfred L. Cornwell, wife of the former President and Chairman of the Board of F. W. Woolworth Corp.

Luis Ferre, Puerto Rican senator, industrialist, philanthropist

William Mellon Hitchcock, President of EL TIEMPO, Inc. and member of the firm of Lehman Bros.

Mrs. Thomas Hitchcock II, (Mrs. Margaret Hitchcock)

Mr. Thomas Hitchcock III, prominent philanthropist

Sheldon J. Kravitz, executive vice-President, Smith & Dorian, Inc.

Stanley Kogut, President of Mechanical Rubber Corp.

Marshall Sundheim, Associate of Hirsch & Co. in Wall Street and leading investor in Venezuela

Edward Robinson, president of Smith & Dorian, Inc.

201-644727
Stanley Ross, editor of EL TIEMPO, Inc. Suit in contact with Orlando Masferrer 201-042669 Aug 64

Lew Sarnoff, investor and executive, brother of Gen. David Sarnoff of NBC and RCA

Max Schulman, real estate and investments

Gen. Anastasio Somoza, President of American Hemisphere Marine, The Mamenic Lines, and Lanica Airlines

Samuel Weiss, President of Rayco Stores

18 Aug 64

Att #1 to XAAZ 17997

201-042669

Sent to Analysis
16 Oct: 70

[redacted]

UFG 6267 26 Nov 64 " "

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

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7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-[illegible]
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-095/04
UFGA-24005
14 DEC 65
P1

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MANUEL GARCIA [illegible] /201-353897/ AND GROUP OF PERSONS TRUSTED BY SUBJ AND SERAFIN A. PEREZ CARRIL /201-774518/ CONTRIBUTED [illegible],000 DOLLARS TO THE CUBAN EXILE NEWSPAPER MUNDO AMERICANO. CURRENTLY HAVE FINANCIAL CONTROL OF NEWSPAPER.

R 6512220077

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-00)

14 Dec 65

FBI doc
8 Oct 65 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
7 Oct 65 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ OF EL TIEMPO. STATED HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT ERNESTO RICARDO VALERO-ABREU HAD TOLD ASSOCIATES HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES UNDER PSEUDONYM FIALLO.

100-009-014
088 -16116
16 JUL 65
FBI

R 6610032370

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(9-46)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

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12-26-

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TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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RID/ An

RN

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1. WH/7/HT		[illegible] 63		
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MICROFILMED
SEP 1 [illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

H.Q.S.

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION 30

FROM
JMWAVE

CASE OFFICER
Francis D. RACHFIELD
Henry J. SLOMAN
HQ

REPORTS OFFICER
John C. Tarboll/bcp

APPROVING OFFICER
Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.
UFG-7482 ✓

DATE OF REPORT
24 August 1965

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
UOAMBER-6
AMOT-84

XX COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY

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1 - OO/C
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HTP

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Miami reps of:
State
FBI
I&NS
Customs
Border Patrol
USCG

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

Source for paras. 1 to 3: UOAMBER-6 from Antonio Rojas Masferrer, 23 August 1965. Paras. 4 and 5: AMOT-84 from Raul ARANGO de la Noval (please protect) in DD-1559, 11 August 1965.

RI: Please card the following for the field:

*LEON Fernandez, Homero, Cuban emigre. Involvement with Rolando MASFERRER in plot to invade Haiti. Leader of FACCE.

Cit Cuba. Δ USA

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

REPORTS
AUG 25 1965

CS COPY

HQS RI COPY

D 36-8-5

24 Aug 65

FORM 7-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (20)

201-042669

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY	Haiti/Cuba/Dominican Republic	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	Plans to Overthrow Government of Haiti by Leon Cantave and Rolando Masferrer Rojas	DATE OF REPORT	24 August 1965
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	August 1965		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (11 and 23 August 1965)		UFG-7482

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: See below.

Source for paras. 1 to 3: Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relationships with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past. He received the information in this report from an associate of Rolando Masferrer Rojas.

1. On 20 August 1965 an associate of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator, said that Masferrer is in touch with General Leon Cantave regarding a plot to invade Haiti from the Dominican Republic. Masferrer is trying to recruit unmarried Cubans in New York who are willing to go to the Dominican Republic and eventually to live in Haiti. He does not want Cubans who would want to return to the United States because of family or for any other reason.

2. Masferrer asked Antonio Rojas Masferrer, his cousin, to manage a farm in the Dominican Republic which will be used as a training and staging area for about 100 men which Masferrer will recruit. This group will be enlarged by men which Cantave has in the Dominican Republic.

3. Cantave is negotiating with Dominicans to determine whether the recruits from New York will travel to the Dominican Republic with visas or whether they will enter the country illegally.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Source for paras. 4 and 5: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961. This information is from another Cuban emigre who is associated with Homero Leon Fernandez.

4. On 9 August Homero Leon Fernandez[1] said that Masferrer will arrive in Miami in August to complete preparations for an invasion of Haiti. He will bring 100 men from New York. In Miami they will be joined by 100 men from Brigade 2506 and 100 men from Leon's group. The 300 men will leave for an undetermined place from where they will invade Haiti.

5. According to Leon, Masferrer plans to use four boats and five aircraft for the invasion of Haiti. The aircraft will be used to bomb Santiago de Cuba, Oriente Province, Cuba, after Francois Duvalier has been overthrown.

Field Comment. Leon, a Cuban emigre, is a leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Constitucionales de Cuba en el Exilio (FACCE, Constitutional Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile).

FBI doc
30 June 65 (Miami)
Re Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau #MM 2-156

FBI cable
1 July 65
Re Dominican Situation

FBI cable
15 June 65
Re Dominican Situation

FBI doc
6 May 65 (Miami)
Re: Jorge L. Valdes Amable
Bureau # 105-84265

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4-63

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17. RID/FI				

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CSDB-312/01143-65
10 May 65

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-42669

0-14f (Rev. 10-23-64)

MAR 10 1965

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

ATTENTION: Deputy Director, Plans

Dear Sir:

☑ For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.

☐ No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.

☐ You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

☐ Please note change in caption of this case.

☑ Status of case: ☑ Completed ☐ Incomplete

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enc.

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

2P 4 65

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

REPORT NO: UFG-7077 ✓

FROM: JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT: 27 April 1965

REPORTING OFFICER: Francis D. RACHFIELD

RD. NO.

REPORTS OFFICER: Margaret R. NANKALL/lcp

PROJ.

APPROVING OFFICER: Andrew K. REUTEMAN

S'CE CR.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

DYVOUR JMPALM

Source: UOAMBER-6 from Miguel TABERNO Blas from Rolando MASFERRER Rojas.

RID: Please index the following names.

SEX: F CIT: Cuba

Aurea Esther POGGIO Aragon - DPOB: 11 March 1935 in Cuba, Habana. Involved with Rolando MASFERRER Rojas in the storage of arms. Subj. #201-42669

Rolando MASFERRER Rojas - 201-042669.

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES: 1

SUBJECT

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REFERENCES

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FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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27 Apr 65

201-42669

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY	Cuba/Haiti/Dominican Republic	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	Alleged Transfer of Weapons to Miami by Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban Exile Leader	DATE OF REPORT	27 April 1965
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	16 April 1965		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (23 April 1965)		UFG-7077

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relationships with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past.

1. As of about 16 April 1965, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile leader, had been sending weapons to Miami, Florida, for use by Haitian exiles in an attempt to overthrow Haitian dictator Francois Duvalier. The arms were being stored in the home of Aurea Esther Poggio Aragon,[1] a Cuban woman whose last known address was 1451 E. 8th Court, Hialeah, Florida. The weapons were to be transported to an undisclosed destination outside the United States.

2. In early April 1965, Poggio went to the Dominican Republic on behalf of Masferrer regarding the Haitian exile scene. When Poggio was out of Miami, the keys to her residence were left with Antonio Rojas Masferrer.

1. Field Comment: The same source reported in CSDB-3/661,878, dated 18 June 1964, that Masferrer had met with Poggio, among others, on 29 May 1964 regarding an expected revolt in Cuba.

AMBER

F.S. 65

Letters to Defence, State & Justice

~~It has come to the attention~~
~~of this Agency that on 28 February~~

This Agency is in possession of information which was obtained from a confidential source the substance of which is as follows: On Feb 28 Mr. Rodolfo Masferrer was interviewed in Miami, Florida. He stated that he had recently received a letter from his brother Rolando Masferrer [illegible] in which he claimed that he was visited by two U.S. Government officials in New York. These two officials allegedly asked him if he was ready to participate in an armed action against Cuba. Masferrer replied that he had been preparing himself for such action since his arrival from Cuba. In this letter, Masferrer made it clear that this was the first time that he had been under consideration by the U.S. Government. He further estimated that he could round up immediately between 300 + 400 men.

This agency does not now ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~and~~ does it ~~not~~ currently have any relationship with Rolando Masferrer. It would be ~~apprec~~ appreciated if your Department would ~~check~~ investigate and let this agency know, at your earliest convenience, if any member or members of your organization has been or ~~is~~ currently in contact with the subject. ~~and if any previous inquiries were [illegible] directed to him along the lines outlined above.~~

yer

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FROM JMWAVE

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BY

S E C R E T 050059Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9086

5 MAR 65 IN 16162

[redacted] TYPIC YOBITE UOAMBER

ON 28 FEB 65 UOAMBER-4 VISITED OFFICE OF DENTIST RODOLFO MASFERRER WHO TOLD SOURCE HE HAD RECEIVED LETTER FROM HIS BROTHER, ROLANDO, IN WHICH ROLANDO CLAIMED HE WAS VISITED IN HIS NEW YORK OFFICE BY TWO ODYOKE OFFICIALS ON UNSPECIFIED DATE. THEY ALLEGEDLY ASKED HIM IF HE READY PARTICIPATE ARMED ACTION AGAINST PBRUMEN. HE REPLIED HE WAS AND HAD BEEN PREPARING HIMSELF FOR ACTION FROM FIRST DAYS HIS ARRIVAL PBPRIME. HE INDICATED IN HIS LETTER THAT FOR FIRST TIME HE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY ODYOKE? HE ESTIMATED HE COULD IMMEDIATELY ROUND UP 300 TO 400 MEN.

S E C R E T

CFN

Rolando Masferrer

~~X E 4429~~

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: destruction

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #___ - Unit WH/C/CICS

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

5 Mar 65

201-42269

FBI doc
19 Feb 65 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau# 2-1622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

6. DATE OF INFO.

7. EVALUATION

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ OPERATES EIGHTH FORCE OF ASSAULT AND COMMANDOS, A GROUP WHICH TRAINS AT CAMP MARTI IN STATE OF NEW JERSEY

019-006-095/04
WAVE-05976
11 DEC 64
UFG -06370
P3

* 6511170198

FILE IN 201-042669

16. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 | 04 | 26 | 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

11 Dec 64

[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
& USA
RE COMMENTS ABOUT PAUL TONSSAINT'S INVASION PLANS.

200-009-038
UFG -06307
08 DEC 64
WAVE-05812
P1

R 6501051027

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201 04 26 69

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 8 Dec 64 (7-60)

FBI doc
8 Dec 64 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Haitian Revolutionary activities

FBI doc
3 Dec 64 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
2 Dec 64 (Miami)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

SECRET
(When Filled In)

280

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A HAITI ?
RE SUBJ'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE ASSOCIATION WITH HAITIAN EXILES IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI.

200-120-061
UFG -06267
26 NOV 64
WAVE-05253
P1

R 6501260744

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 | 04 | 26 | 69

FORM 8-59 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

26 Nov 64 (19-40)

FBI doc
20 Nov 64 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A USA

200-009-038
UFG -06213
17 NOV 64
WAVE-04913
P1

RPTDLY WAS VERY UPSET BECAUSE HE THOUGHT HAITIAN EXILES WANTED TO EXCLUDE HIM FROM COMBINED EFFORT TO INVADE HAITI.

R 6412310521

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

2-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-[illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

27

25

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, RI/AN, VR, FILE.

AD/CI 2, AD/NE.

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

S E C R E T 122311Z NOV 13 0305Z 64 IN 22194

H2P HTP HDC

DIR INFO LANT PACY BARR PRIN SDOM CITE WAVE 4726

4P (77)

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

SUPDATA: AMCARACKLE-1 FROM ELISEO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ. RID: INDEX.

X

FILED 122311Z

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REPORT CLASS COMFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: ATTEMPT BY ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION FOR HIS MEN OUT OF THE UNITED STATES

DOI: 10 NOVEMBER 1964

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (12 NOVEMBER 1964)

UFG-6199

SOURCE: U.S. CITIZEN WHO TEACHES SPANISH AT THE UNIVERSITY LEVEL AND WHO HAS HAD LONG RESIDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS TRAINED IN THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION. SOURCE'S REPORTING THROUGH IS

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	Q
RID/MIS	BSC
RID/PS	[illegible]
RID/FI	
RID/RR	

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

☐ ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON:

201-042669
13 NOV 64

LIAISON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

(20) MFG 11-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 22194

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

CH

e.i. Cuba A Miami, USA
INFO RE ATTEMPT OF MASFERRER TO OBTAIN TRANSPORTATION FOR "INVADERS" CH

201-216018

201-042669

201-133549

1. ON 10 NOVEMBER 1964 ELADIO DEL VALLE, AKA "YITO," A REPRESENTATIVE OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, ASKED ELISEO GOMEZ FERNANDEZ, A PARTNER IN THE ANTILLEAN MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF MIAMI, IF HE COULD USE GOMEZ' BOAT TO TRANSPORT "INVADERS" OUT OF THE UNITED STATES TO AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION AT SEA.

2. ACCORDING TO GOMEZ, TEOFILO BABUN, GOMEZ' PARTNER, LEARNED FROM HIS COUSIN, RUDOLPH BABOUN, HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, THAT RUDOLPH HAD INFORMED AMERICAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE MASFERRER PEOPLE IN MIAMI WERE PREPARING AN INVASION OF HAITI. RUDOLPH ALSO SAID THAT MASFERRER WAS VERY UPSET BECAUSE HIS PLANS LEAKED OUT.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FORM 1-64 1389 [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] (15)

FORM 1-64 3003 Obsolete Previous Editions of Form 2026a

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

PLACE CONTROLS ABOVE TOP BLACK LINE AND BELOW BOTTOM BLACK LINE

IN 22194

CONFIDENTIAL

TDCS

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL, AND USCG.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

FBI doc
12 Nov 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
31 Oct 64 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
29 Oct 64 (Wash)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
A USA, FLORIDA, MIAMI
SUBJ INVOLVED IN AMASSING HAITIAN AND CUBAN
EXILES IN MIAMI FOR TRAINING.

200-007-038
UFG -06058
17 OCT 64
~~WAVE-03474~~
P1

R 6411061097

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 17044 (7-46)

~~[illegible]~~ carded

(201- [illegible]) -042669

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT 033

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ORIG.	HELEN MORGAN	ROUTING			
UNIT	WH/2/HAITI	1		4	
EXT.	6026	2		5	
DATE	16 OCTOBER 1964	3		6	

OCT 17 11 35 AM '64

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 12

TDCS DB-315/01035-64

INFORMATION COPIES

CI/IC, DI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/C 6, CA/PEG, DCDS, SOD, WH/SA 5

DATE DISTRIBUTED
16 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/2/HT	4	WE/PRIN	1			PRIN	#		
		WH/JMWAVE/JMTALM			1	LANT	#		
						PACY	#		
						BARR	#		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
IN 94154 (WAVE 3380)
UFG-6049
XP (UCAMBER/2 FROM UCAMBER/5)
LIAISON #

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/SA/R M. Corragio (Telephone)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/RO H. Benchea

COPY NO.

FORM 1E-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

16 Oct 64

201-42669

NFG 11-63

CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI/CUBA

TDCS DB-315/01038-64

DATE OF INFO. 15 OCTOBER 1964

DISTR. 16 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

PLANS TO RECRUIT CUBAN EXILES TO JOIN THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, "COMBAT"

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (15 OCTOBER 1964)

REF IN 94154

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6049

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A CUBAN EXILE WHO HAS CONTACTS IN THE EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK, FROM DAVID QUINTAS.

1. ON 15 OCTOBER 1964 DAVID QUINTAS SAID THAT OVIDO MIRO, A CUBAN, AND ROMAN (SIC) RAMIREZ, A HAITIAN, RECENTLY ARRIVED IN MIAMI FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECRUITING APPROXIMATELY 200 CUBANS TO AUGMENT A FORCE OF 150 TO 200 TRAINED MEN OF THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, "COMBAT." (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS REPORTED IN TDCSDB-315/00917-64 THAT PAUL TOUSSAINT, A HAITIAN, AND THREE CUBANS WERE IN MIAMI TO RECRUIT CUBAN EXILES, WHO WOULD BE USED TO INVADE HAITI.)

2. MIRO AND RAMIREZ ASKED DAVID QUINTAS TO LOCATE A HOUSE IN THE MIAMI AREA IN WHICH THE TRAINED MEN COULD BE QUARTERED.

3. (SOURCE COMMENT: QUINTAS DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THE "COMBAT" GROUP, BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS IS SUPPORTING

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

TREASURY CUSTOMS BORDER PATROL USCG FBI INS

THE GROUP AND THAT HE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF "THIS SORT OF THING" HIMSELF.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMSWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, USCG, BORDER PATROL, INS, FBI AND CUSTOMS (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

END OF MESSAGE

#77

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/00853-64

SUBJECT Training at a Cuban Exile Military Camp in New Jersey (primarily Masferrer's Tigers)

DATE DISTR. 16 October 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

TE

DATE OF INFO. Late September 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (30 September 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6000

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the elements of information collection. This group has provided useful reports for about three years. This information was obtained from an individual with first-hand knowledge.

1. On a week-end during the latter part of September 1964, a group of about 250 Cuban exiles were receiving military training at the "Jose Marti Encampment" which was on a farm owned by a New Jersey councilman or individual of similar political position. The farm is in a mountainous region just off Interstate Route 80 about one and a half hours by automobile out of Union City, New Jersey. The camp is directed by Martinez Morejon (fnu) and Bienvenido Cueto; it is active only on week-ends, but there is a permanent armed guard at the camp.

2. Training consists of storming and capturing hilly redoubts, and training in the use of weapons which range from semi-automatic to fully automatic rifles, submachineguns, and .30- and .50-caliber machineguns.

3. Rolando Masferrer Rojas and about 50 of his followers were among those undergoing training. Masferrer was overheard to say that the camp was being operated without any financial assistance from the United States Government. Masferrer also said that rather severe measures would be effected against any United States Government informer who might be discovered at the camp.

4. According to some of the individuals who were undertaking training, small groups of Masferrer's men were periodically being sent from the New Jersey area to Miami, and Alfaro (fnu) aka "Sacramento" was administering the transfers. After arriving in Miami they were taken to Sheriff's Key, or some small key in the vicinity of Sheriff's Key,[1] where they were being staged prior to invading Haiti, which was to be the first step in the plan for an eventual landing in Cuba.

5. There was no apparent degree of ill-feeling between many former Castro adherents and the "Masferrer's Tigers" at the Camp. Some Puerto Ricans were also in training there.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	NIC	OCI	FBI # 2
EXPCINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS #	CUSTOMS #					
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

- 2 -   CSDB-312/00853-64

6. The training was being observed by two individuals who appeared to be neither Cubans nor Americans.

1. Field Comment. This may refer to Ragged Key, which has a Sheriff's Dock. One of several small keys off Ragged Key is owned by a sheriff. [illegible]

[illegible]

FBI doc
12 Oct 64 (Miami)
Title - Jorge L. Valdes Amable
Bureau# 105-84265

FBI doc
9 Oct 64 (Miami)
Re - Attack on Spanish Vessel
"Sierra Aranzazu", 13 Sep 64
Bureau# 2-373

FBI doc
6 Oct 64 (NY)
Re - Attack on Spanish Vessel
"Sierra Aranzazu," 13 Sep 64

14-00000

FORM 1-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

201-642669
(Masferrer)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

60

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	2	5	
2		6	
3	6	7	8
4	CA-FI	8	RID

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/CPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, (RI/AN,) WH/SA 8, VR, FILE, CS/RF.

AD/CI 2, AD/NE.

S E C R E T 032212Z OCT 4 0239Z 64 IN 86643

DIR INFO SDOM PRIN LANT PACY CITE WAVE 2720

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. AMFAST-6[1] IN AMOT[2] DD-1152 OF 29 SEPT OBTAINED FROM JOSE GARCIA VALDEZ. FIELD COMMENT BASED UFG-5934.

RID: PLS INDEX. FILED 03/2212Z

REPORTS CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

CUBA HAITI DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SUBJ: TRANSPORTATION OF A MIXED CUBAN-HAITIAN GROUP TO THE HAITIAN-DOMINICAN BORDER

DOI: 28 SEPT 64

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (29 SEPT 64)

UFG-5974

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED

CS in 200-009-038

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/PS	
RID/	
DESTR	

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4 Oct 64
201-42669

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FORM 8-64 12A-3 Use Previous Editions

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

MFG. 5-64

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2 IN 86643

IN THE ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS FOR THREE YEARS.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

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201-042669 (Morgan)

TRANSMI OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

1141 **SECRET**

ORIG.	HELEN MORGAN
UNIT	WH/2/HAITI
EXT.	6026
DATE	2 OCTOBER 1964

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 2 23 40 Z

CONFIRMATION COPIES

WH 15

TDCS DB-315/00917-64

INFORMATION COPIES

CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O 6, CA/PEG, DODS, WH/SA 5.

DATE DISTRIBUTED

2 OCTOBER 1964

PRECEDENCE

☑ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	WH/SA/R	4		WH/PRIN	#	WH/PRIN	1
WH/2/CR	2				WH/SJOS	#		
WH/2/HT	4				WH/BARR	#	WH/WAVE	1
WH/6	1				WH/LANT	#		
					WH/PACY	#		

BASED ON (P.D. RPT., PROJ.)

IN 85442 (WAVE-2571)
UFG-5966
HP (HULAKE-1)
LIAISON *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE	X	ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/[illegible]	
RID/PS	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

RECOMMEND FOR EXO

BASIC DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO DCI

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

CS in 200-009-038

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Wayne D. Bray
C/WH/2/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

WH/SA (by phone)

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

Fn C/WH/R H Bencker

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CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY HAITI

TDCS DB-315/00917-64

DATE OF INFO. 20 SEPTEMBER 1964

DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1964

SUBJECT

RECRUITMENT OF CUBAN EXILES
FOR PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (22 SEPTEMBER 1964)

REF IN 85442

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-5966

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: CUBAN EXILE (C) WHO HAS CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK. APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT THESE RECRUITING OPERATIONS ARE GOING ON AND THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE AS REPORTED).

1. ON 20 SEPT 64, PAUL TOUSSAINT, ACCOMPANIED BY RICARDO ZARAGOZI, JOSE A. MARTINEZ, AND ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN, ARRIVED IN MIAMI FROM NEW YORK. MARTINEZ, ZARAGOZI, AND THE UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN CAME TO MIAMI TO CONTACT CUBAN FRIENDS OF THEIRS FOR A PROPOSED FORCE OF 100 CUBAN EXILES WHO WOULD BE USED TO INVADE HAITI "WITHIN A TEN-DAY PERIOD". ALLEGEDLY THE INVASION WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ON THE EVENING OF 20 SEPT, TOUSSAINT RETURNED TO NEW YORK BY AIR IN ANSWER TO WHAT HE SAID WAS "AN URGENT REQUEST FROM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES". TOUSSAINT HAD PLACED SEVERAL CALLS TO NEW YORK AFTER HE ARRIVED

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI I&NS

EXO

IN MIAMI.

2. WHILE IN MIAMI THE CUBANS CONTACTED FRIENDS OF THEIRS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN RECRUITS FOR THE HAITI OPERATION. AMONG THOSE WHO WERE CONTACTED WERE OTTO SIRGO PRIETO, MEMBER OF THE ANTONIO MACEO BRIGADE, FRANK DIAZ, AND EUGENIO PEREZ COWLE. SIRGO SAID THAT HE COULD PROVIDE 25 MEN FOR ANYTHING RELATING TO CUBA. DIAZ SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF. OR 15 MEN WHOM HE COULD PROBABLY RECRUIT, UNTIL HE COULD OBTAIN CLARIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE AFFAIR. PEREZ, WHO HAD RENTED THE HUMBOLDT 7 APARTMENT IN CUBA FOR YOUNG STUDENT LEADERS WHO WERE LATER KILLED BY THE BATISTA FORCES, SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN JOINING THE OPERATION, AND HE PLEDGED SIX MEN FOR THE INVASION FORCE.

3. ON 22 SEPT, TOUSSAINT INFORMED ONE OF HIS MIAMI REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WAS NO MONEY TO GIVE THE RECRUITED MEN. HOWEVER, TOUSSAINT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WANTED 200 MEN INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINALLY PLANNED FORCE OF 100 MEN AND THAT EXPENSE MONEY FOR THE TRIP FROM MIAMI TO NEW YORK COULD PROBABLY HE PROVIDED FOR THE RECRUITS, BUT NO FURTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS COULD BE ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

4. ON 24 SEPT TOUSSAINT CALLED ONE OF HIS MIAMI REPRESENTATIVES AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO GET TO NEW YORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE "TIME IS DRAWING NEAR." HE SAID THERE WAS A TRAINING BASE FOR THE HAITI INVASION FORCE AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN NEW JERSEY, WHICH WAS HEADED BY CAPTAIN MIR, FORMER OFFICER FOR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

THE GROUP HAD THREE AIRPLANES READY FOR USE IN THE INVASION, AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS, SOME OF WHICH WERE STORED IN THE OFFICE OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, IN NEW YORK CITY. ARMS WERE ALSO CACHED AT AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN MIAMI. TOUSSAINT SAID THAT CUBANS COULD USE HAITI AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA IF THE INVASION WAS VICTORIOUS AND DUVALIER WAS REMOVED.

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, I&NS, BORDER PATROL AND USCG. (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE AND SAN JOSE.)

(END OF MESSAGE)

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

036-009-006
UFGA-17300
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CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA
RE SUBJ'S INVOLVEMENT IN HAITIAN REV
ACTS AGAINST GOVT OF HAITI.

2 115 297

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

17 Aug 64

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MFR 4 63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

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JUL 28 (RID) 26 PM '64

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHE/AESC			30 July	QH
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17. RID/FI				

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CSDB-312/00236-64
30 Jul 64

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

PRIMARY

20

H 2S

REPORT COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

REPORT NO. UFG-5559

FROM: JMWAVE

DATE OF REPORT: 22 July 1964

REPORTING OFFICER: Robert S. HUNKELER

RD. NO.

REPORTS OFFICER: Margaret R. NANKALL/lcp

PROJ.

APPROVING OFFICER: Andrew K. REUTEMAN

S'CE CR.

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

TYPIC

Source: UOAMBER-3 who spoke with Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER Rojas, whom he has known for many years, during his visit to New York City between 9 and 12 July 1964.

RID: Index.

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

REPORTS
JUL 22 1964

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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4 - Hqs. 1 - 00/C 2 - BARR 2 - SANTO DOMINGO - To oot Pouch	Miami Reps: 1 - State 1 - FBI 1 - I&NS 1 - Customs

COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES

NO. PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: HQS RI COPY

REFERENCES: CS COPY

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APPR

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

DOI: 22 Jul 64

D 19-9-9
D 22-9-26

201-42669

FORM 8-60 1461 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Comments of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas Regarding his Plans and Activities in Support of Dominican and Cuban Exiles

DATE OF REPORT 22 July 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 11 July 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (17 July 1964)

UFG-5559

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former high-level Latin American Government official (C) who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. Source is a rightist, a trained reporter, and his information has been fairly reliable in the past. This information was obtained from Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas.

1. Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, prominent Cuban exile and financial backer of several Caribbean paramilitary operations directed against Fidel Castro Ruz, revealed on 11 July 1964 that he is maintaining close contact with Dominican Consul Carlos Peguero Guerrero, the brother of General Belisario Peguero Guerrero, Dominican Police Chief. Masferrer said that he is collaborating with Consul Peguero by giving his full support to the Partido Liberal Evolucionista (PLE, Liberal Evolutionist Party) and that he is ready to go to the Dominican Republic should Luis Amiama Tio, a leader of the PLE, call for him. When discussing the method by which Masferrer was participating with the PLE, Masferrer suggested that he was prepared to offer his Cuban assets to the Dominican supporters of Amiama should the latter decide to carry out action against the triumvirate government.

2. Concerning the future of Joaquin Balaguer as a Dominican presidential candidate, Masferrer said that Balaguer was "mistaken" in his belief that he would soon be able to return to the Dominican Republic. The Dominican authorities will not permit the return of Balaguer because Diego Bordas Hernandez, former leader of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD, Dominican Revolutionary Party), was successfully financing a "stop Balaguer" movement.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

[illegible]

According to Masferrer, Bordas recently paid Stanley Ross, editor of the New York publication "El Tiempo", $5,000 to assist Bordas in stopping Balaguer from obtaining favorable publicity in the Ross publications.

3. Concerning the next candidate supported by the PLE, Masferrer said that the PLE political machine had planned to promote General Antonio Imbert Barrera instead of Amiama although Amiama had previously been pushed for the presidential candidacy with the support of the PLE.

4. Concerning Cuba, Masferrer said that he has 250 highly trained men available for paramilitary action against the Castro regime. He is personally carrying out daily practice sessions in a light twin-engine aircraft in preparation for future flights to be made by Masferrer in distributing propaganda and attacking strategic points in Cuba. He has no immediate plans, however, for an invasion nor did he reveal the locations of arms and money which he claims to have at his disposal. He said, however, that he has much faith in the United States Government and its appraisal of the Cuban problem and expected a "green light" to be forthcoming from the United States Government soon.

5. Masferrer said that unfortunately several prominent politicians and government officials have been recommending that he not be permitted to return to the State of Florida in spite of an earlier petition signed by many Cuban exiles requesting an amendment to an earlier court ruling prohibiting Masferrer from returning to Florida.[1]

6. When asked about the participation of other Cuban exile leaders with Masferrer's group, Masferrer did not comment other than to say that Carlos Marquez Sterling was a "lyric poet" but that his association with Masferrer had not been productive.

[1] Field Comment: Refer to CSDB-3/661,878, dated 19 June 1964, regarding the efforts of Masferrer's brother to obtain the signatures of Cuban exile leaders, which he intended to submit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Miami with a request for Masferrer's legal return to Miami.

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MFR 4-63

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

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JUN 15 1 31 PM '64

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TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHSAESC		19 June 64		
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17. RID/FI				

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CS DB-3/661,878
19 June 64

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER

201-042669

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HGS

REPORT COVER SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM	RPT. NO. UFG-5343

FROM JMWAVE	DATE OF REPORT 9 June 1964 3f
REPORTING OFFICER Robert S. HUNKELER	RD. NO.
REPORTS OFFICER Margaret R. NANKALL/uta JCT	PROJ.
APPROVING OFFICER Andrew K. BEUTEMAN	S'CE CR.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

TYPIC

Source: Paras 1 - 3 from UOAMBER-6 who attended the meeting on 29 May 1964. Para 4 from UOAMBER-3 who met with Masferrer on 1 June and was able to confirm that Masferrer did arrive with arms and ammunition. Para 5 from AMSWIRL-1 from a reliable source who requested that his name not be revealed.

RID: Please index.

REPORTS

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

MICROFILMED
JUN 18 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES 2
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
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HQS RL COPY

FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CS COPY

9 Jun 64

201-642669

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT Return to Miami of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas With Arms and Ammunition

DATE OF REPORT 9 June 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 22 May - 4 June 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami ~~(4 June 1964)~~

UFG-5343

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: See below.

The information in Paras. 1-3 were obtained from a former Latin American military officer who at one time resided in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He still maintains fairly close friendships with officials of those countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past.

42664

no 201 1. On 29 May 1964 Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile leader, met with Miguel Taberno Blas, former member of the Cuban House of Representatives; Cecilio Ignacio Napoles Hidalgo, former army major during the administration of Fulgencio Batista; Pedro Duque, former army lieutenant under Batista; and Aurea Ester Poggio Aragon, a Cuban woman. Masferrer said that within the next 60 days there would be a revolt within the ranks of Castro's forces and that anti-Castro groups would become active both in Cuba and outside.

no 201

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2. Masferrer said that Manuel Ray Rivero, leader of the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE, Cuban Revolutionary Junta), would play an important role in the events that were to transpire in the next two months. Although he did not elaborate on just how the revolt would come about, Masferrer did say that the uprising would be possible because those persons participating in the revolt would have access to weapons and ammunition already cached in Cuba.

no 201

3. On 4 June 1964 Enrique "Kiki" Masferrer Rojas, Rolando's brother, had obtained the signatures of several Cuban exile leaders, which he intended to submit to the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Miami requesting authorization for Masferrer to return to Miami.[1] It was expected that the document would be submitted sometime in early June 1964.

The information in Para. 4 was obtained from a former high-level Latin American Government official who has travelled frequently throughout the Caribbean and Central America where he maintains close friendships with a wide range of military and political leaders. Source is a rightist, a trained reporter, and his information has been reliable in the past.

4. Masferrer arrived in Miami on 27 May with an undetermined quantity of arms and ammunition which he plans to use against Castro.

The information in Para. 5 was obtained from a local law enforcement officer who is well acquainted with maritime matters in Florida. Source has submitted a large number of reports based on the debriefing of Cuban refugees and has been a consistently reliable reporter on the plans and activities of anti-Castro groups engaging in boat operations. This information was obtained from an unidentified informant described as reliable.

5. As of 22 May, Masferrer was alleged to have equipment in Miami to arm about 200 men. The plan called for moving this equipment from the United States mainland to an unidentified key where it would be buried. When the fighting began in Cuba, about 200 men were to proceed to the key, arm themselves with the cached materiel and proceed to Cuba. In this way they could also claim to be the liberators of Cuba.

1. Field Comment: Masferrer has been prohibited from returning to the State of Florida following an order issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

FBI doc
14 May 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-1622

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

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MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

036-009-006
UFG -04662
25 FEB 64
P1

PAFR

CIT DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
OCC ?
RE SUBJ'S INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATIONS BY ROLANDO ARCADIO MASFERRER ROJAS TO SUPPORT LEON CANTAVE'S SECOND INVASION ATTEMPT OF HAITI.

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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

25 Feb 64 (11-60)

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUBJ IS POSS SOURCE OF SUPPORT FOR POSS PLANS TO INVADE HAITI.

201-727690
UFGA-14051
19 FEB 64
200-120-63
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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 04 26 69

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14 Feb 64

FBI doc
10 Feb 64 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau # 2-1622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-081/03
UFGA-13525
21 JAN 64

1846224

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA ?
RE REPORTS OF INVESTIGATION OR SURVEILLANCE
OF SUBJ.

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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 200 | 04 | 26 | 69

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

21 Jan 64

FBI doc
15 Jan 64 (Newark)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau# 2-1622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042569
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ USA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY ?
RE RPTD DISCUSSIONS W/201-118281 PERTAINING TO INVASION OF HAITI. DOI 12 DEC 63.

019-009-009
UFG -04435
15 JAN 64

1844720
PAFR

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FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 15 Jan 64

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MASFERRER Y ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-42669
(VOL. VIII)

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 JAN. 66 THRU 31 DEC. 66

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:25 4 Aug. 78		PAT ORR	

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MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando A.

201-42669

SECRET

OGC 66-2615

16 December 1966

The Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

201-42669

Dear Walt:

After you informed me on 29 November 1966 of the possible indictment by the U. S. Attorney in Florida of Rolando Masferrer and others concerned in the plan to launch an expedition from Florida against President Duvalier of Haiti, I asked for a report on our knowledge of, or involvement in, this activity.

As you know, we have installations in the Miami area which utilize a variety of sensitive covers. The Chief of Station coordinates his activities closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury and disseminates to those offices in the area pertinent intelligence information.

Our Station was well informed on the plans of Masferrer and his cohorts and disseminated this information in the normal manner. Part of this reporting included information that Masferrer and some of his associates repeatedly asserted that their plotting had been approved by the U. S. Government. On some occasions they stated this approval came from this Agency, and the other times they intimated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had approved their actions. These claims were apparently used to persuade various persons, primarily Cuban exiles, some of whom formerly had contact with the Agency, to join the plot. It appears logical to assume that Masferrer would continue to claim that he had received what he interpreted to be U. S. Government approval of the scheme to overthrow President Duvalier, and if he has

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File in 201-42669

2396

nothing more positive he can take the approach that he considered the U. S. Government tacitly approved his plot since it obviously knew about it and did not take any action against him.

For the record, it can be flatly stated that neither by statement nor by implication has the Central Intelligence Agency indicated to anyone that it approved or was supporting the plot. On the contrary, those who queried people they knew were connected with our Agency concerning possible participation in the plot were told that it had no U. S. Government backing whatsoever. Some of the plotters attempted to contact this Agency through various intermediaries, and the intermediaries were told that the Agency wished to have nothing to do with the undertaking and that any information concerning violations of U. S. laws should be passed to law-enforcement agencies, particularly the Bureau of Customs and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Technically, therefore, the Agency has stayed clear of the plotters, and we would be in a position to state that we had no connection with the plot and had given it no encouragement or backing of any sort.

As a practical matter, however, if prosecution were pursued, Masferrer, and perhaps other defendants, would probably claim that they had CIA backing and some might even believe it to be true. This might well lead one or more defendants to seek a subpoena duces tecum for an Agency witness and the Agency documentation on the subject. As noted above, the witness can testify to the fact that the Agency had in no way participated or encouraged the activity. If it proved impossible to quash the requirement for production of documents, however, we would be faced with a situation where we would almost certainly have to claim the documents were privileged on the grounds of security. Aside from the sensitivity of the reports and their possible compromise of sources, we would have the problem of identification of our personnel under cover and of protecting the sensitive cover arrangements.

The same is true to a lesser extent of action against Masferrer in connection with violations of his parole. In view of the flagrant and numerous violations which were actually known to and reported by Government agencies without any punitive action resulting, it would appear that he could make a plausible claim that the Government had at least winked at, if not condoned, his activities. It would seem preferable to have him immediately put under a more stringent parole, perhaps with an accompanying requirement of bond. In the event he violated this new status, prompt action could be taken on those circumstances alone.

Sincerely,

s/

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

cc: The Honorable David C. Acheson
Special Assistant to the Secretary
(For Enforcement)
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

ExDir-Comp
DDP
CI
Office of Security

133

201-42669

FBI doc
31 Dec 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas
Bureau # 2-156

FBI doc
16 Dec 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

FBI doc
7 Dec 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

Masferrer

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

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ROUTING

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ORIG : A. WISNIOWSKI/esr
UNIT : WH/COG/MO/FI
EXT : 3458
DATE : ~~6 Dec. 1966~~

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-42669

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 7 1415Z CITE DIRECTOR 57687

TO JMWAVE

DYBAT TYPIC

REF JMWAVE 4359 (IN 49628)

1. FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM GENERAL COUNSEL IN RESPONSE REF.

2. REF REPORT IS EXCELLENT AND VERY USEFUL IN CONNECTION OGC DISCUSSIONS WITH DEPT OF JUSTICE.

3. TECHNICALLY, ON FACTS STATED, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR BE ANY REASON WHY WOFACT SHOULD OPPOSE INDICTMENT AND TRIAL OF MASFERRER. THIS BASED ON GROUND THAT WE COULD REFUTE ANY CLAIMS MASFERRER AND HIS COHORTS MADE OF WOFACT SUPPORT. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS DOES NOT RECOGNIZE TYPE OF SITUATION WOFACT LIKELY GET INTO IF INDICTMENT IS BROUGHT. WOFACT LEARNED THROUGH EXPERIENCE THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL ONLY TOO EAGER CLAIM WOFACT PARTICIPATION AND APPROVAL AS PART OF DEFENSE, AND IT NOT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO LAY ENOUGH BASIS FOR COURT TO ISSUE A SUPOENA DUCES TECUM REQUIRING PRESENCE OF A WOFACT

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER 7-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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7 Dec 66
201-42669

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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TO PAGE TWO

WITNESS TOGETHER WITH ALL WOFACT DOCUMENTATION ON THE SUBJECT. IN THE BUFFALO B-26 CASE THIS WAS NOT TOO BAD AS ONLY DOCUMENTATION WAS FOUR REPORTS IN WHICH THE INFO WAS NOT SENSITIVE, AND JUDGE AGREED TO EXCISE SOURCE AND OTHER SENSITIVE INFO BEFORE PAPERS WERE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE.

4. IN MASFERRER CASE A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM WOULD REQUIRE PRODUCTION OF ALL DOCUMENTS WE HAVE WHICH TOUCH ON MASFERRER-HAITIAN PLAN AND ACTIVITY. OGC REASONABLY SURE WOULD NOT BE ABLE HONOR SUCH SUBPOENA, AND DEPT OF JUSTICE AGREES WITH OGC. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT PROCESS OF SUBPOENA AND PRODUCTION OF RECORDS WOULD PROBABLY COME TO ISSUE BEFORE WOFACT WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE TO REFUTE THE CLAIM OF OUR PARTICIPATION. IF WOFACT REFUSED TO HONOR SUBPOENA, THE GOVT WOULD HAVE TO DROP ITS CRIMINAL CASE SO CHANCES SUCCESS ARE MINIMAL, BUT THE PROCESS WOULD DEVELOP EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY

(CONTINUED)

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TO PAGE THREE

WHICH EXPERIENCE SHOWS WOULD BE MOSTLY UNFAVORABLE AND WHOLE PROCEEDING MIGHT WELL EXPOSE JMWAVE COVER AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

5. BASED ON OGC DISCUSSION OF ABOVE ASPECTS, DEPT OF JUSTICE FEELS INDICTMENT SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT. ONE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT CUSTOMS THINKS THEY HAVE HOT CASE AND WANT TO PURSUE IT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH AGREEMENT OF DEPT OF JUSTICE, OGC HAS TALKED TO DAVID C. ACHESON, DEPT OF TREASURY AND POINTED OUT PROBLEM. ACHESON IS LOOKING INTO IT AND OGC WILL PROBABLY CONTACT HIM IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

6. OGC STATES DOES NOT WISH HAVE JMWAVE BLAMED FOR INTERFERING WITH CUSTOMS CASE AND THAT JMWAVE CAN PUT THE FULL BURDEN ON OGC AND DEPT OF JUSTICE. OGC SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS JMWAVE IS APPROACHED BY CUSTOMS JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE UNTIL OGC GETS THINGS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AT HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

TJFlores

C/WH/COG/MO

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
for AC/WHD

OGC L. R. Houston (telecon)

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

5
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM CONFIDENTIAL NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Haiti	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/19112-66
SUBJECT	Proposed Invasion Cancelled	DATE DISTR.	30 Nov 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	This report was previously disseminated as TD-00B-321/19112-66
DATE OF INFO.	23 Nov 66 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--- 23 Nov 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the night of 22 Nov 66 a decision was reached to call off the proposed invasion of Haiti by the group sponsored by Rolando Masferrer. The invasion is off indefinitely.

2. Father Jean Baptiste Georges and Colonel Rene Leon have been arguing with Masferrer which has caused confusion and disorganization in the movement. Many Cubans scheduled to participate have pulled out and military chief Napoleon Villaboise (sic), a Cuban national and alleged military expert, has resigned because of dissension in the group.

3. It is believed that US Government agencies have infiltrated the movement and the leaders fear that all weapons and equipment would be confiscated if plans for the invasion proceeded.

- end -

CONFIDENTIAL

30 Nov 66
201-42669

14-00000

[illegible] Broe

Confidential B

Thursday - November 17, 1966

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION between

Andrew St. George -- CBS photographer.
William G. Bowdler.

SUBJECT: Invasion of Haiti

Andrew St. George called me from Miami.

He said that he and the CBS film crew, headed by a Mr. McMullin (phonetic), were back in Miami to cover the departure this weekend of the expedition which Rolando Masferrer was organizing to invade Haiti. St. George claimed that Masferrer had recruited 300 men and arranged for the use of one B-25, two C-46s and a large boat. He said that all the preparations were so much in the open that it was evident that Masferrer and his Haitian colleagues had received the "green light". Recent events in Haiti, plus Masferrer's activities, were attracting a lot of newsmen to Miami.

I told St. George that he was mistaken about the "green light". We will not tolerate violation of our neutrality laws. Our enforcement agencies, whose duty it is to enforce these laws, will not permit what he described taking place. I wanted him and those with whom he was dealing to be clear on this point. He said he would inform Mr. McMullin.

William G. Bowdler

cc: Walt Rostow
Bill Moyers
Linc Gordon/State.
Bill Broe/CIA.

[illegible]
201-042665

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM **S E C R E T** **NO DISSEM ABROAD**

COUNTRY Haiti/Dominican Republic/ Bahamas

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/17879-66

SUBJECT Planned Invasion of Haiti between 5-13 Nov 66

DATE DISTR. 7 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-OOB-321/17879-66

DATE OF INFO. 28 Oct 66

CIRL C-DC6-52851

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---1 Nov 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in the Dominican Republic.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. On 28 Oct 66 I spoke with Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile, and he told me that he has organized a military force of approximately 250 men to invade Haiti. The invasion force consists of Cuban and Haitian exiles residing in the US, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. The invasion will probably be launched from the Dominican Republic sometime between 5 and 13 November and the target is Port-au-Prince. The invasion force will strike in the early hours of the morning selected. It is well armed, and will have air cover; the presidential palace will be bombed.

2. Masferrer stated that Eugene L. Maximilien, Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida, is aware of the invasion, but he has no knowledge of the invasion date. Maximilien is presently in Haiti informing President Duvalier that the invasion can be prevented by paying off $200,000 to Masferrer. Maximilien will return to the US on 3 November and he has agreed with Masferrer that if Duvalier agrees to the pay-off, Maximilien will receive $50,000 and Masferrer $150,000.

3. Masferrer told me that the invasion will take place in any event and the $150,000, if received, would be used to further support the invasion.

4. Masferrer stated that he met within the past 10 days with several dissident Haitian army officers and he had received their support. The Haitian army officers told Masferrer that they would revolt as soon as informed that the invasion had commenced. They do not know that the target will be Port-au-Prince; they believe that it will be in the cap Haitien area.

5. Masferrer stated that he was confident that the invasion will succeed, and if successful, Father Jean Baptiste Georges would be appointed provisional president. Masferrer stated that Colonel Rene Leon, Haitian exile, will participate in the invasion.

7 Nov 66

201-42069

FBI doc
28 Oct 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Mesferrer
Rojas

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE INVOLVEMENT IN HAITIAN EXILE ACTIVITIES.

100-009-016
DBB -63505
20 OCT 66
P2

R 6701130960

FILE IN 201- 0112669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

20 Oct 66
201-42669

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. CS-311/10608-67

SUBJECT Alleged Plan by President Francois Duvalier to Have Anti-Duvalier Revolutionaries in Miami, Florida, Assassinated

DATE DISTR. 13 October 1967

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 21 September 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (26 September 1967)

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-9090

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former Latin American diplomat who maintains relations with officials of Latin American countries. Source is a trained reporter and his information has been reliable in the past. He obtained this information from Aurea Esther Poggio.

1. On 21 September 1967 in Miami, Florida, Aurea Esther Poggio, Cuban emigre who is a secretary to Rolando Masferrer Rojas, said that plans had been made to assassinate persons linked with revolutionary movements in Miami opposing President Francois Duvalier of Haiti. Poggio said that the first such attempt was against Julio Aton Constanzo Palau on 17 September 1967.[1]

2. Poggio said that Masferrer's group was investigating the matter in an effort to find out who was carrying out the assassination plans for Duvalier.[2]

[1] Field Comment: Constanzo, Cuban emigre, was among those indicted with Masferrer, former Cuban senator, and Father Jean Baptiste Georges, Haitian emigre, by a federal grand jury in Miami in February 1967 on charges of conspiring to launch an invasion of Haiti from the Florida Keys. No coverage of an attempt to kill Constanzo has been noted in the local press.

[2] Headquarters Comment: According to TDCS-314/08728-67, about mid-1967 Duvalier instructed Andre Elie, Haitian Consul in New York, to keep close surveillance on Haitian exiles and to report all plans for invasions of Haiti.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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	CINCSO				SECRET SERVICE (PID)			I&NS

(Field Distribution indicated by "#") (Also sent Port-au-Prince)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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	WH/SLOM	1	CI/R&A	1	(DOAMBER-6)
WH/8	WH/COG/ZB	3			CS-311/ 8-67
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9. EVALUATION

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11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
ACTIVITY OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS
AND FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE GEORGES IN
PREPARING FOR ACTION AGAINST HAITI

100-C09-016
UFG -08589 ✓
12 OCT 66
PI

HOCHTP

R 6610210178

FILE IN 201-42669

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FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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201-42669

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4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-002705
UFG -08588
12 OCT 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORTEDLY ANDREW ST. GEORGE, A FREE-
LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER, HAD RECEIVED
PERMISSION FROM MASFERRER TO MAKE A FILM
FOR THE COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM
CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MAS-
FERRER GROUP WITH RESPECT TO AN INVASION
OF HAITI TO BE MOUNTED FROM THE DR

R 6610190209

FILE IN 201-42669

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FORM 10-60 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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12 Oct 66

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
IN EARLY MAR 66 GONZALEZ, ELSILIA /201-787753/ ACCOMPANIED SUBJ TO NYC THINKING HE WOULD HELP LIBERATE CUBA BUT FINDING HIM FALSE, SHE LEFT MASFERRER AND MOVED ABOUT NYC LIVING WITH FRIENDS. MASFERRER STATED IN APR 66 HE DID NOT TRUST GONZALEZ AND FELT SHE WOULD RETURN TO CUBA

201-787733
DFB-62250
03 OCT 66
[illegible]

R 6610260297

FILE IN 201-042669

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3 Oct 66

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23 Sep 66 IN 02597

S E C R E T 231938Z CITE JMWAVE 3193 ([illegible] ACTING)

WAVE

DIRECTOR INFO SANTO DOMINGO, PORT AU PRINCE

TYPIC

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 3141 (IN 00617)
B. JMWAVE 3153 (IN 00931)

ABSTRACT X

1. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FUNK AND DUNKIN CITED PARAS TWO AND FIVE REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. ADDRESS FOR ROBERT FUNK IS NEW YORK OFFICE OF CBS.

B. ADDRESS GIVEN FOR JOHN T. DUNKIN IS HIS CURRENT RESIDENCE. PRIOR MARCH 65 HE LIVED AT 215 TWELFTH STREET N.E. ATLANTA GEORGIA, WORKED FOR ATLANTA NEWS AS COPY READER AND HELD THIS JOB SINCE AUGUST 64. PRIOR TO THIS DATE DUNKIN WORKED FOR PALM BEACH POST.

#/no 201

2. FYI COORDINATOR FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS MIAMI REPORTED ON 22 SEPTEMBER THAT LOCAL LNWAPA HAD LOCATED AND STAKED OUT TWO BOATS BEING LEASED BY ROLANDO MASFERRER. ALLEGEDLY THESE BOATS WILL BE USED TO TRANSPORT ARMS TO LARGER MOTHER VESSEL LOCATED OFF FLORIDA COAST. ACCORDING LNWAPA CURRENT

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 3193 S E C R E T

ARMS SHIPMENT EXPECTED TO BE AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED TONS AND WILL INCLUDE HEAVIER WEAPONS [illegible] CACHED IN MIAMI AREA.

23 Sept. 1966
201-42669

14-00000

J.E. Tomas

ORIG: J.E.TOMAS:sld
UNIT: WH/7/Haiti
EXT: 5595
DATE: 22 Sept. 1966

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23 17 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 37582

probably Mitch WERBELL

8 July 2011

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS
-PRIORITY-

REF: JMWAVE 3153 (IN 00931)

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION: ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1966, FREELANCE PHOTOGRAPHER ANDREW ST. GEORGE REPORTED FOLLOWING TO WILLIAM G. BOWDLER, LATIN AMERICAN REFERENT ON ROSTOW STAFF ~~STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE~~ AT WHITE HOUSE: ST. GEORGE IS ON A CBS CREW FILMING A STORY OF GUNRUNNING FROM THE U.S. TO THE D.R. FOR USE AGAINST HAITI. CREW HAD COMPLETED ITS FILMING IN MIAMI AND SOON WOULD TRAVEL TO SANTO DOMINGO TO FILM OPERATION AT THAT END. ROLANDO MASFERRER AND MITCHELL WARBEL (PHONETIC) HAD PERMITTED ST. GEORGE TO FILM LARGE ARSENAL IN MASFERRER'S HOUSE IN MIAMI. WARBEL DESCRIBED AS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE/ARMS MERCHANT FROM ATLANTA WHO ASSISTING MASFERRER IN ACQUIRING ARMS. WARBEL SUPPOSEDLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SEIZURE OF MANUEL RAY'S VESSEL "VENUS" WITH ARMS ABOARD IN DOM REP. PLOTTERS PLAN TO USE BEATA ISLAND AS BASE. ARRANGEMENTS IN DOM REP BEING HANDLED THROUGH SANTIAGO REY, MARTINEZ ARANA

....CONTINUED

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CITE DIRECTOR 37582

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

2

AND OTHERS. PRES BALAGUER HAS GIVEN NOD TO OPERATION.

2. BOWDLER EXPRESSED DOUBT TO ST. GEORGE CONCERNING BALAGUER'S COMPLICITY AND ASSURED ST. GEORGE THAT U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WOULD TAKE NECESSARY ACTION.

3. ON 20 SEPTEMBER, RELIABLE SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT ~~XX~~ ROLANDO MASFERRER MADE AN OFFER TO A COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM OF ADVANCE STORY OF AN INVASION WHICH HE PLANNING, ON CONDITION THAT STORY BE HELD UNTIL AFTER ACTION STARTS. IN MAKING OFFER, HE REFERRED TO HIS SALE TO CBS OF FILMS OF HAITIANS BEING TRAINED FOR INVASION.

4. HQS REALIZES THIS PROBABLY ANOTHER IN LONG LINE OF RUMORS OF INVASION OF HAITI BUT REQUESTS STATIONS WATCH THIS MATTER EVEN IF ONLY REALITY INHERENT THEREIN IS THAT MASFERRER IS ENGAGING IN SELF-PROMOTION SCHEME.

5. FOR PORT AU PRINCE: PLS INFORM AMBASSADOR OF ABOVE.

....CONTINUED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIRECTOR 37582

TO PORT AU PRINCE, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO,
SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS

3

6. FOR SANTO DOMINGO: SUGGEST COS BRIEF EMANTHEM-1 ON SUBSTANCE OF ~~[illegible]~~ ABOVE DURING NEXT MEETING. ~~[illegible]~~

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: REPORT OF MASFERRER CLAIM THAT SMALL FORCE WILL LEAVE BY BOAT FOR DOM REP TO SET UP BASE FOR SUBSEQUENT ATTACHS ON HAITI AND CUBA, AND THAT HE HAS SUPPORT OF DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

David Ronis
C/WH/7/DR
(by phone)
Ernest Chiocca
WH/C/MO/PM

Paul V. Harwood
C/WH/7

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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21 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Liaison Meeting with FBI New York Agent Frank O'Brien

1. At 1500 hours on 13 September, Ken Millian and I met with FBI Cuban specialist Frank O'Brien at a cafe/coffee shop at 72nd St. and 3rd Ave., two blocks away from the Bureau's New York headquarters. I had arranged the meeting by telephone from Washington and advised O'Brien that I wanted to review and coordinate a number of items with him. I also informed him that I would be accompanied by Millian, a colleague interested in the Cuban UN Mission.

2. The meeting opened at an easy pace with an uninhibited review of happenings of mutual interest: O'Brien noted that in his view the Cubans at the Mission had been relatively inactive and had not recently been involved in subversive activities of any magnitude. He reviewed FBI coverage of as yet not fully explained purchasing activity by Mission personnel which included procurement from various New York area military surplus outlets of ponchos, leggings, and other similar equipment. He implied that in the process of covering the activities, the Bureau had acquired a substantial amount of surplus equipment itself but he didn't provide details and we didn't pursue the matter.

Mission Staff for Che's group? etc.

3. He noted that blanket Bureau coverage of the activities of Rolando Masferrer was continuing and that he occasionally talked with Masferrer by telephone or in person. He indicated that the Bureau was intimately aware of efforts on the part of Masferrer and other Cubans both in New York and Florida to procure arms in the U.S. and position them in the Dominican Republic. He reported that an attempt to move a shipment of such arms from the Florida Keys to the D.R. currently was underway and that the U.S. Customs Service was alerted to move in at the appropriate time to confiscate the material. (Although acknowledging Masferrer's gangster background, O'Brien complemented him on his intelligence and efficiency and indicated that Masferrer was one of the ablest Cuban refugees he had met.)

4. O'Brien also surfaced his current contact with former Rebel Army Captain Raimundo F. Antonio de la Torre y

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GROUP 1
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declassification

21 Sep 66

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Ugarte, 81-11 Pettit Ave., Elmhurst, Long Island, tel. NR 2-5487. De la Torre apparently is involved with Cuban refugees in the U.S. who are attempting to re-establish the 26th of July Movement here in the United States minus the Communist implications contributed by Fidel. O'Brien apparently is impressed with De la Torre's sincerity and ability and believes that De la Torre should be of interest to us. De la Torre has until recently stayed away from exile activities and according to O'Brien is pushing the revitalized 26th of July idea by personal contact rather than make any splash. According to O'Brien De la Torre is now operating a successful painting business and at one time held a good position with Union Carbide International. In conversations with O'Brien De la Torre has been critical of CIA. When queried O'Brien indicated that De la Torre's only real gripe was the Bay of Pigs. (C/O note: We should look into De la Torre to see if he could be used in any revitalized effort abroad to establish lines of access to non-Communist 26th of Julyers still in Cuba - Carlos Franqui etc.) We indicated that we would evaluate information available to us and discuss De la Torre with him again in the future.

Franqui a
Weak
character.
Now
working
on
Fidel's
bio
GLE.

5. Note: O'Brien has been working the Cuban target in New York for over ten years and is impressively conversant with the subject. It is, therefore, sometimes difficult to stay with him when he covers various complicated subjects with abbreviated statements, e. g., during subject meeting, he alluded to one Miguel Morales, the former husband of Nellie Barletta, daughter of Batista's ambassador to Argentina Amleto Barletta. He apparently feels there may be mileage in Morales. We will, therefore, review Morales, Barletta, et al, and resurface the subject with him when time permits.

6. The two principal action items on my agenda were the coordination of my planned luncheon meeting with photojournalist Lee J. Lockwood (201-78771), and discussion of NEKNIFE, who allegedly was interviewed by the Bureau in New York several years ago. O'Brien advised me that he had reviewed their Lockwood file and talked with the Bureau agent responsible for the Lockwood "case". He stated that he had not uncovered any derogatory information on Lockwood and saw no reason to prevent my meeting with him. I told him I would advise him of my meeting arrangements with Lockwood when they were firm and that I would brief him after the meeting was over. (It is of interest to note that during my briefing of O'Brien on the morning of the 16th, the day following my luncheon with Lockwood, O'Brien noted that some of his superiors in Washington thought Lockwood was an opposition (sic) "spy". When I asked if there was anything to support this

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Said speculation [illegible] his [illegible] connection with Souza?

theory, O'Brien said absolutely not, it was pure speculation.)

7. O'Brien checked the Bureau's New York indices on NEKNIFE but without success. If he was in fact interviewed by the FBI in New York there apparently was no record of it. I told him that NEKNIFE was expected in New York City in late September to visit his daughter and son-in-law and that we probably would attempt a meeting with him at the time. He had no objection.

8. Specific items of business concluded, we moved into a general and historical discussion of the Cuban Mission to the UN, which was the main purpose of Millian's attendance at the meeting. Recent changes in Mission personnel, including the assignment of Ricardo Alarcón Quesada (201-347590) as Ambassador, were discussed and itineraries of Cubans arriving for the General Assembly were noted. Early in the conversation, O'Brien surfaced his long term contact with Cuban UN Advisor and Alternate Representative Antonio de Souza Carvajal (201-354048), a friend of Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, who has served the Cubans in New York for the past ten years or more and has been with the Cuban Foreign Service for 40 years. The Souza subject was not new to me, since O'Brien had brought it up in conversations I had with him earlier this year. I did not choose to pursue the subject with him at that time, however, without first reviewing all implications of the case with Agency officials in Washington. O'Brien indicated no interest in Miguel Juan Alfonso Martínez (201-354041), Counselor at the Mission, whom we suspected they might be in contact ~~with~~.

9. O'Brien's eagerness to discuss the Souza matter seems to imply that he is deeply interested in it and may suggest that he is not satisfied with results thus far obtained. At one point he indicated that his headquarters was not at all happy with the take from Souza. He reviewed the history of the contact with complete candor beginning with his initial contacts with Souza in the mid/late 1950's when O'Brien had open access to the Cuban Mission in New York and was a frequent visitor there. From his description, Souza would appear to be a thoroughly experienced and skilled diplomat who has survived the numerous changes in the Cuban government because of his friendship with Roa and other influential Cubans, and because of his ability to implement effectively for the Cubans the more subtle diplomatic maneuvers required by membership in the UN community. In fact, O'Brien feels that the Cubans utilize Souza exclusively on these latter duties and tend to exclude him from high level matters involving political, military, or economic policy.

This, according to O'Brien, accounts for Souza's inability to provide information of real value. O'Brien did indicate, however, that the usual P.I. requirements had no punch. He cited, for example, the requirements after Souza's return from Hawaii, which in effect amounted to: What's new?

10. Despite the long history of the Souza contact, O'Brien is not now meeting with Souza in person. Souza feels that O'Brien is too well known in the Cuban community in New York and even the most elaborate contact arrangements would not be free of danger. Souza also shys away from talking on his home phone for fear that it may be tapped. O'Brien can, however, telephone Souza and lay on alternate telephone or even meeting arrangements. We did not establish the frequency of O'Brien's current contacts with Souza nor did we establish at what point in the history of the contact the decision was made to dispense with personal meetings; the nature of our meeting with O'Brien did not permit elaborate and detailed questioning. He did recount, however, an interesting aspect of the case which followed from the fact that a State Department security officer assigned to New York, (fnu) Swazey, occupied the apartment directly above Souza during his tour in New York and became quite friendly with Souza. O'Brien apparently used Swazey as an informal go-between on the case. (Should we choose to pursue the Souza lead, an attempt perhaps should be made to locate and debrief Swazey with O'Brien's concurrence. Note: This could be Anthony Clinton Swezey, DOB 9 August 1913, who was Special Assistant to Secretary General of U.S. Mission to UN 1946 to 1947. In 1963 he was First Secretary, FSO-2, in Paris.)

11. It is difficult at this point to identify with accuracy the true nature of O'Brien's tie with Souza. Based upon O'Brien's comments, it does not appear that Souza should be classified as an "agent" of the Bureau in the classical sense, particularly at this point when there apparently are no formal arrangements for contact, no remuneration or even instructions given, and apparently no reports received from Souza. It is probable that a critical point in this operation was reached about three years ago when, according to O'Brien, Souza talked about his advancing age (now 65), his retirement equities with the Cuban government, and his financial needs in general. O'Brien thought that Souza was looking for guarantees which would provide for his future should he choose to cooperate fully and ultimately be surfaced and forced to forego his retirement and remain in the U.S. O'Brien apparently presented Souza's case to his superiors but was unable to generate any substantial enthusiasm. He stated they were not willing to give Souza a stipend. The

Bureau's position, both then and now, apparently is that Souza has little potential as an asset for internal security matters and therefore would not justify any substantial financial obligation. In very low key, it was made clear to O'Brien that the Agency was interested in Souza's Positive Intelligence potential (his access in Havana should be good, given his long friendship with Roa and his closeness to María Celia Girona Fernández (201-327421), cousin of Celia Sánchez Manduley) and well might find justification for providing modest security for Souza's old age.

12. Throughout our conversation it appeared clear that O'Brien was of the opinion that there may be a role for the Agency in the Souza operation. We asked him, therefore, whether or not he felt Souza may still be interested in feathering his nest and, if so, if it would be bureaucratically possible to get word to Souza that such a possibility existed. O'Brien felt that Souza would still be interested and he was of the opinion that he could get the point across to Souza via double talk in a telephone conversation. This approach was accepted and it was agreed that O'Brien would advise us of the results after the call was made. If prospects appeared encouraging, it was agreed that we would then get together again to discuss the next step which might entail arranging direct contact with Souza. O'Brien noted that Souza lives in Jackson Heights and usually drives to work. Possibly a contact could be arranged somewhere along the route. The foregoing generally covers the extent of our discussion regarding Souza. When I met with O'Brien again on 16 September just prior to my departure for Washington, I requested that he not take any action on the Souza case in our behalf until he heard something further from me.

13. During our meeting we reviewed other members of the Cuban Mission with particular reference to DGI types. O'Brien noted that Chafik Homero Saker Zenni (201-335014) undoubtedly is the senior member of the DGI group but even so he was not thought to be particularly active. He reported that Saker had been in contact with Lee Lockwood (see above) on several recent occasions but nothing was known of the nature of the meetings. He also noted that the Bureau was in contact with Saker's Cuban girl friend in New York City whom they had just traced without surfacing any derogatory information. She is cooperating and the Bureau is optimistic about her potential. He did not provide the girl's name but indicated that we should hear about her shortly through channels. O'Brien also acknowledged that the Bureau has a penetration of Prensa Latina in New York. He did not provide the name or any details but on the basis of his comments we pre-

? V-[illegible]

sumed it to be Francisco V. Portella (201-281963). It would be helpful if we could obtain additional details on both these latter cases.

Cobos
Ricardo [illegible] Rivero

14. Without prompting, O'Brien surfaced the AMBIG-3 double agent case. He noted that he had been involved to a degree and actually was present at the hotel bar in downtown New York when the agent made his meet with the Cuban case officer. O'Brien, accompanied by at least one other Bureau man, reported that AMBIG-3 winked at them while passing close by them at the bar on one occasion. O'Brien took this to mean that AMBIG-3 presumed that O'Brien and his friend were Bureau men assigned to surveil the meeting. O'Brien also stated that after his meeting with his Cuban DGI contact, AMBIG-3 called for an emergency meeting with the Bureau and they gave him $200.

15. It was close to 2000 hours before our meeting terminated. We parted on a cordial note with agreement reached that we would talk soon again when some of the material discussed had been further sifted.

John R. Lucey

John R. Lucey

201-42669

FBI doc
14 Sep 66. (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas

FBI doc
7 Sep '66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION September 6, 1966

SUBJECT: Andrew St. George -- free lance photographer now working with CBS

Mr. St. George came to see me at his request. I have known him from the time that he went to Cuba in the late fifties to film the Castro movement.

He said he wanted to see me as an old friend to tell me that CBS is filming a story of gun-running from the U.S. to the D.R. for use against Haiti. He is working with the CBS crew.

Mr. St. George said that the CBS team had completed its filming in Miami and in the near future would be travelling to Santo Domingo to film the operation at that end. He claimed that in Miami Rolando Masferrer and Mitchell Warbel (phonetic) had permitted him to film what he described as a large arsenal in Masferrer's house.

In response to my question about the identity of Warbel, he said that he is a soldier-of-fortune - arms merchant type from Atlanta who is working with Masferrer in the acquisition of arms. St. George claimed that Warbel had been responsible for the seizure of Manuel Ray's vessel "Venus" in the Dominican Republic and the acquisition of the arms (mostly sub-machine guns) which were on board.

St. George stated that the base in the Dominican Republic was on Beata Island. Arrangements in the DR are being handled through Santiago Rey with Martires Araña and others whom he did not name. St. George said that Balaguer had given his nod to the operation. I told him that I did not believe there was any truth to this latter point as President Balaguer has recently normalized diplomatic relations with Haiti and is not interested in foreign adventures of this type.

In closing, St. George said he had come to see me because he believed that someone in the United States Government should know about the gun-running and the CBS film. I told him that our law enforcement agencies

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6 Sep 66

201-042669

were aware of Masferrer's past activities and would take whatever action is necessary to prevent violation of our laws. On the film, I told him that I seriously doubted whether an objective treatment of the facts of Haitian and Cuban exile efforts would add up to the type of story he described. Therefore, I questioned the wisdom of making such a film. He responded that the facts were quite different from what I thought.

William G. Bowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Robert Sayre, State - ARA
Mr. Edward T. Long - State/ARA-CAR
Mr. Robert Stevenson - State/ARA-CCA
Ambassador John Crimmins - Embassy, Santo Domingo.

FBI doc
12 July '66 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Activities of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from this office, Subject: Plot to Overthrow Haitian Government, dated July 6, 1966, concerning a visit to a farm in the Atlanta, Georgia area by an informant who witnessed the loading of arms at the farm for shipment to temporary cache sites in homes in Miami and Coral Gables, Florida; the pickup of arms from these homes; their transfer to small boats already on trailers; and the offloading of latter at Miami River docking sites for shipment to Santo Domingo and ultimate sites on the Haitian Coast. While the information below may not be related to the incident reported in reference, the similarity of the two reports merits attention.

2. A friend of Rolando MASFERRER Rojas told a usually reliable source of this office that on 27 June 1966 MASFERRER went to a house in Miami where 200 firearms were stored. He was accompanied by two American newsmen, one of whom was a photographer. The arms were removed from the premises by agents of MASFERRER whose faces were covered. The American photographer took photographs during the removal of the arms.

3. The same usually reliable source of paragraph two reported in conjunction with the above that as of early July 1966, action groups such as the Second National Front of the Escambray, ALPHA-66, Comandos-L, and Los Pinos Nuevos, possessed only small quantities of arms. The only substantial amount of arms in the area was in the hands of MASFERRER.

4. This information is being disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State.

WH/C/CICS/J. Vidal:kcj

Distribution:
2 - Department of State
2 - FBI
4 - WH/C/CICS
1 - 201-42669

Based On:
AMBIDDY/1
Raw Report, Miami
28 June 1966

08 JUL 66
201-42669

FORM 1-66 3015

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE - 17 JUNE 66
IN - [illegible]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2, DDI DC, D/ONE

COUNTRY: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/HAITI/CUBA

DOI: 13-14 JUNE 1966

SUBJECT: PLANS OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, FOR ACTION AGAINST HAITI FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ACQ: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (16 JUNE 1966) UFG-8382

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RALATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. HE IS TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

1. ON 13 JUNE 1966 IN MIAMI, FORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, SAID THAT HE HAD REVISED HIS PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DEVALIER OF HAITI TO INCLUDE THE COOPERATION OF SANTIAGO REY PERNA. REY HAD SAID THAT MASFERRER WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE A VESSEL WITH SIX OR SEVEN MEN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AFTER JOAQUIN BALAGUER IS INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT

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FORM 1-66 3007

IN - [illegible]

TDCS

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls)

OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN JULY. MASFERRER, HIS COUSIN ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, AND ATON CONSTANZO PALAU WOULD BE AMONG THOSE ON THE VESSEL.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: REY, A CUBAN EMIGRE WHO WAS A CABINET MINISTER UNDER FULGENCIO BATISTA ZALDIVAR, WENT TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN APRIL TO ACT AS AN ADVISER TO BALAGUER DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. IN MIAMI IN MID-JUNE, HE REPORTEDLY PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. SEE ALSO UFG-8378, WHICH REPORTED THAT ACCORDING TO REY HE HAD BEEN OFFERED THE USE OF A FINCA IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR ANTI-CASTRO GUERRILLA TRAINING. ANOTHER SOURCE, WHO HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST, REPORTED THAT REY WAS CONFERRING WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER AND ANTONIO ROJAS ON 14 JUNE. CONSTANZO PALAU, CUBAN EMIGRE IN MIAMI, HAS BEEN REPORTED EARLIER AS INVOLVED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER IN PLANS FOR ANTI-DUVALIER ACTION.)

3. MASFERRER ASSERTED THAT IN ORDER TO MISLEAD AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG) AND THUS PREVENT INTERFERENCE, THE GROUP ON THE VESSEL WOULD

Secret

FORM 1-65 3007

IN - 40092

TDCS

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Secret
(classification) (dissem controls)

GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC OSTENSIBLY AS REVOLUTIONARIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. HE ADDED THAT AS ANOTHER PRECAUTION AGAINST D FFICULTIES WITH THE USG, THE GROUP WOULD NOT USE UNITED STATES ARMS OR ATTEMPT TO TRANSPORT ARMS FROM THE UNITED STATES. MASFERRER SAID THAT HENRI VIXAMAR HAD ARMS ELSEWHERE, AND THAT THE ATTACK AGAINST HAITI WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, MASFERRER DID NOT YET HAVE VESSEL. VIXAMAR, A HAITIAN EMIGRE WHO HAS BEEN RESIDING IN CANADA SINCE MID-APRIL, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED EARLIER AS IN CHARGE OF THE PLANS FOR ACTION AGAINST DUVALIER.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: C ECSO, CINLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBU, I&NS, CUSTOMS, USCG, BOARDER PATROL (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO, PORT AU PRINCE)

REPORT CLASSCONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

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ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 172331Z CITE [redacted]WAVE 1553

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PORT AU PRINCE, PANAMA CITY, REP/LANT, JMBAR

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM PBRUMEN 18 [illegible] 40092

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE UOAMBER-6 FROM EMILIO VERA LEYVA FROM ROLANDO MASFERRER. SOURCE MENTIONED FIRST FILED COMMENT UOAMBER-~~4~~2.

NO INDEX FILED 172331Z

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201-42669
18 June 1966

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14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO
201-042669
SEX M COB ?

100-009-014
DBB -50924
17 JUN 66
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE MASFERRER WAS EVEN REALLY SINCERE IN OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI AND ESTABLISHING A BASE ON THE CUAST OF HAITI, FROM WHICH ATTACKS WOULD BE MADE AGAINST ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA.

R 6608101426

FILE IN 201-42669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 2-64 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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17 Jun 66 (7-46)

14-00000

FBI doc
25 May 66 (NY)
Re- Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

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ABSTRACT

INDEX X

201- 42669

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Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.
UFG-8288 ✓

DATE OF REPORT
17 May 1966

PROJECT

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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR/JMPALM

SOURCE: AMOT Source Raul ARANGO de la Noval in EE 5237, 10 May 1966. ARANGO got the information in a conversation with Antonio ROJAS Masferrer at the home of Enrique MASFERRER Rojas on 6 May 1966. Please substitute the dissemination numbers where UFG-8225 and UFG 8241 are cited in Field Comment No. 1.

RID: Please index for field:

✓ NAME: *HARRIS, Bill insufficient bio
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : ~~Prob~~ USA ?
OCC : Unknown. Emissary of Rolando MASFERR[illegible] as to go to Subj's office in Miami re anti-DUVALI[illegible] anning.

✓ NAME: *JOHNSON, Vernon No 201
SEX : M
DOB : ?
POB : ?
CIT : ~~Prob~~ USA ?
OCC : Arms runner; dealer in military equipmen[illegible] In touch with emissaries of Rolando MASFERRER Roj[illegible] re anti-DUVALIER planning. Subj is Negro.

~~MAY 1966~~

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.

REPORTS MAY 17 19..

201-42669

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FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY	Haiti/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS DB-312/01605-66
SUBJECT	Further Developments in Plan for Action Against the Haitian Government	DATE OF REPORT	17 May 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	27 April - 6 May 1966		UFG-8288
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	United States, Miami (11 May 1966)		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. On 27 or 28 April 1966, in New York, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator who has been involved in plans for action against President Francois Duvalier of Haiti, received a letter from the Haitian who is heading the operation against Haiti. The Haitian instructed Masferrer to send a trusted person to the office of Bill Harris, 7150 N.W. 77th Avenue, Miami, Florida, to talk with Vernon Johnson, a Negro. The Haitian described Johnson as a trustworthy person who would be in charge of getting arms. Under no circumstances was Masferrer's ~~emisarry~~ emissary to talk with anyone else.

2. Antonio Rojas Masferrer, Rolando Masferrer's cousin in Miami, contacted [illegible] Johnson, who said that he had in the Miami area all the equipment and arms needed for the operation [illegible] ~~was only awaiting the orders to~~ release them.

3. Rojas and Enrique Masferrer Rojas, Rolando Masferrer's brother, asked a son of Cesar Camacho Coveni, who was Minister of Justice in Cuba under Fulgencio Batista [illegible] Zaldivar, to investigate Johnson. Camacho's son, who conducts private investigations, reported later that Johnson is an arms runner who also deals in military equipment.

ment. Rojas said he had also been able to learn that although Johnson dressed in a suit and necktie he lived in a small, cheap room in one of the poor, Negro sections of Miami.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-2-

[illegible]3-316/01,605-66

UFG-8288

4. After writing the letter, the Haitian visited Rolando Masferrer in New York, brought to him equipment worth $2,000, and told him to be patient, for the operation against Haiti would be accomplished.

5. On 6 May Antonio Rojas Masferrer received a long-distance telephone call from the Haitian, who was in Canada. According to Rojas, the Haitian had told him that when Duvalier goes to Argentina he will not return to Haiti.[3] Rojas added that the United States Government knows this; that some of the Ton Ton Macoutes (Duvalier's personal police) were already giving up their jobs and others had been killed in the streets. The United States Government therefore fears that the Communists may take over in Haiti.

6. Rojas said that Rolando Masferrer was worried about the lapse of time in initiating the Haitian operation and feared that the plan might never materialize. However, Rojas felt that if the Haitian plan did not work out, the arms, which would have supplied about 150 men, could be used in attacks against Cuba.
against Cuba.

Field Comments:

1. Source gave the Haitian's name as Vicemart (sic). Henri Vixamar, who has been identified earlier as the Haitian in charge of the anti-Duvalier plan, is undoubtedly the person referred to. Vixamar left Kingston for Toronto by air on 12 April. For two related reports, see ~~UFG-8275~~ and ~~UFG-8281~~.
CSDB-316/01431-66
CSDB-312/01440-66

2. The telephone directory for the Greater Miami area lists Central Truck Sales at this address.

3. Duvalier has announced that he will attend meeting of heads of State scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires in July.

STATE ✓	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	OCR	F
REPCINCLANT	CINCSO #	~~USIA ( )~~		I&NS ( )#			

WHC/FI	1	WHC/SI	1	WE/5/R	1
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	WE/MADR	1
WHC/2E	3	WHC/CA	1	[illegible] Haiti	2
WHC/CICS	1				
WHC/MO	1	WH/PACY	1	CI/OPS/WH	2

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DC/H 1, Liaison
WHC 9 (1), WE 1 (1), WH (1)

UFG-8288
RP (RPXT)

CSDB-312/01605-66

COORD. RELEASE.
FG [illegible]

14-00000

FBI doc
6 May '66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

MAY 11 1 14 PM '66

FROM: RID/AU

PROPER FILE NO.
UFG-8281

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy detached

CB

CSDB-3/01440-66

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/ES	12	May	66	
2. WH/C/RR/RE				
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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-4

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM
JMWAVE

REPORTING OFFICER
Henry J. SLOMAN

REPORTS OFFICER
Eleanor D. PIMSLER

APPROVING OFFICER
Phillip G. ELMARD
Oliver K Payne for

REPORT NO.
UFG-8241

DATE OF REPORT
4 May 1966

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
AMOT

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Port-au-Prince 2 - Ottawa 2 - Kingston	State FBI I&NS Customs Border Patrol USCG

To OUT Pouch

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

DYVOUR/JMPALM

SOURCE: AMOT Source Raul ARANGO de la Noval, in EE-5185, 27 April 1966. ARANGO got the information from Enrique MASFERRER Rojas on 26 April. Please substitute the dissemination number where UFG 8225 is cited in the field comments.

RID: No Index

Group 1: Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification

REPORTS
MAY 4 1966

FORM 9-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CS COPY

4 May 66
201-42669

(20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true 3. Possibly true 4 Doubtful. 5. Probably false 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY: Haiti/Cuba

SUBJECT: Further Activities of Rolando Masferrer Rojas

DOI : Late April 1966

PADA : United States, Miami (27 April 1966)

SOURCE : A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. According to Enrique Masferrer Rojas, his brother ~~[illegible]~~ Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban senator who has been planning action against President François Duvalier of Haiti, left Miami, Florida, for New York on 25 April 1966 to settle several matters pending there. He planned to return to Miami afterward to wait for the right time to invade Haiti.[1]

2. Enrique Masferrer stated that his brother had found somebody who had agreed to transport arms ~~xx~~ from the United States to a point where the invasion forces were to meet. ~~[illegible]~~ The acquisition of two aircraft to be used in the invasion effort is still pending. Previously, Rolando Masferrer had said that he would buy or lease them in Miami and then locate a place outside United ~~xxx~~ States territory where they could ~~[illegible]~~ land and be loaded with bombs.[2]

3. According to Enrique Masferrer, the Haitian who was in Canada arranging various aspects of the operation, had traveled to the United States in the company of two former colonels of the Haitian Army who allegedly had the support of ~~[illegible]~~ 80 to 90 Haitian émigrés.[3] The Haitian émigrés were to meet at ~~[illegible]~~ an appointed site and be picked up by [illegible] on the plane when the time to initiate the plan came about. The former Haitian ~~[illegible]~~ colonels have stated that if they succeed in establishing a beachhead in Haiti with the arms and men ~~[illegible]~~ who currently support them, Duvalier will leave the country within 24 hours.

4. Reportedly, Rolando Masferrer had asked representatives of the Institutos Armados de la República de Cuba (Armed Institutes of the Republic of Cuba) to contribute men to the operation. The representatives agreed to ~~xxxx~~ discuss the matter.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]-9791

5. Rolando Masferrer again mentioned that his ultimate objective was an attack on Cuba using Haiti as his base.

[redacted]

Field Comments

1. Rolando Masferrer has been discussing plans for an invasion of Haiti for many months. TDCSDB-315/00658-66 reported the difficulties he was encountering. See, also, ~~UFG-0326.~~ CSDB-312/01431-66.

2. Among earlier claims by Masferrer was one that he had already purchased the two aircraft. See TDCSDB-315/00289-66 and ~~UFG-0326.~~ CSDB-312/01431-66.

3. The Haitian referred to is probably Henri Vixamar, described earlier as a former Haitian and an official of the Republic of Chad. Vixamar left Kingston for Toronto on 12 April by air. There was a previous report on a telephone conversation between Rolando Masferrer, then in Miami, and "the Haitian in Canada" regarding "Operation Haiti." ~~and UFG-0775.~~
Cf. CSDB-312/01431-66.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1 Fill in Sect 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 4 07 PM '66 2 Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation	If file no and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no below and forward document to RID/AN

FROM:

RID/ AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy attached

CSDB 312/01431-66

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
WH/C/ES		10 May 66		
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17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201 - 042669

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

29 April 1966

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFG 08225

FORM 1-64 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM
JMWAVE

REPORTING OFFICER
Henry J. SLOMAN

REPORTS OFFICER
John C. TARBELL/bcp

APPROVING OFFICER
[illegible]

REPORT NO.
UFG-8225

DATE OF REPORT
29 April 1966

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
AMOT

COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY

CS DISSEMINATION

TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs. 1 - DCS 2 - Ottawa 2 - Kingston 2 - Port au Prince	Miami reps of: State FBI I&NS Customs Border Patrol USCG

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT report EE-5149, 26 April 1966. Paras. 1 to 3: Raul ARANGO de la Noval, who received the information from Enrique Masferrer. Paras. 4 and 5: AMOT-237 from Basilio Jorge PANEQUE Mulet. Field Comment 2: KNGS-2523.

RID: No Index

REPORTS
MAY X 2 1966
10

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

HQS RI COPY

FORM 2-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CS COPY

201-42664
29 Apr 66

(20)

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A. Completely reliable B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable D. Not usually reliable E. Not reliable. Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence. F. Reliability cannot be judged. Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2. Probably true 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false 6. Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

SUBJECT Activities of Rolando Masferrer Rojas 201-042667

REPORT NO

DATE OF REPORT 29 April 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO Mid-April 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ United States, Miami (26 April 1966)

UFG-8225

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A member of a group of Cuban émigrés trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. On 21 April 1966 Enrique Masferrer Rojas said that his brother, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, who was in Miami, had received a telephone call from Canada on an unspecified date from the person who was to be the President of Haiti in "Operation Haiti." The Haitian asked Rolando Masferrer to go to Canada in order to ~~to hold discussions~~ discuss details. Rolando Masferrer replied that he was in a difficult position and could not leave the United States.

The Haitian then asked that Rolando Masferrer send an emissary whom he ~~trusted~~ trusted completely and who was knowledgeable of the ~~details~~ steps necessary ~~to~~ accomplishing the mission in Haiti. An unidentified emissary left for Canada on 18 or 19 April.

the mission in Haiti. An unidentified emissary left for Canada on ~~18 or 19 April~~.

On 21 April Rolando Masferrer received a telephone call from his emissary in Canad ~~and the Haitian. Thxx His representative said~~ said that ~~thexHaitianxhaxxx~~ he had received a check from the Haitian which was sufficient for their needs.

3. Rolando Masferrer bought a boat on an unspecified date from the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE, Cuban Revolutionary Junta) for $25,000. The boat, which is in Miami, was then used as security for a loan of $5,000 which will be used to buy arms. According to Enrique Masferrer, everything that is needed has been obtained, and the operation will definitely be carried out.

4. Another Cuban émigré in Miami said that Rolando Masferrer has about 400 men and all of the equipment which is needed for a military operation.

5. According to the émigre, Rolando Masferrer said ~~that he has the right to fight for his~~ native country, ~~and~~ that he has all the equipment that is needed, including two planes and several boats, to carry out his plans. Rolando Masferrer added that he had been persecuted by authorities of the United States Government. He said that after Fidel Castro Ruz has been overthrown he, Masferrer, will leave for Cuba immediately, with or without permission from U. S. authorities. He plans to follow the example of Francisco Caamano Deno, who, with a small group, stood firm, and became a recognized power in the Dominican Republic.

Field Comments.

1. TDCSDB-315/00714-66 gives information on the Masferrer's plans to invade Haiti.

2. The Haitian may be Henri Vixamar, who has previously been reported to be involved in the plans to invade Haiti. He left Kingston, Jamaica, on 12 April for Toronto, Canada.

3. Source Comment. Masferrer's involvement in a plan to invade Haiti may be a subterfuge for obtaining a military force and equipment which will be prepared for action in the event an internal upheaval occurs in Cuba.

Field Comment. Masferrer has a tendency to exaggerate, and he is disliked and distrusted by many Cuban émigrés. TDCSDB-315/00658-66 reported on the difficulties he was encountering in trying to complete his plan for an invasion of Haiti.

FBI doc
18 April 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
29 March 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 3. DATE
	4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 5. DATE OF INFO. / 6. EVALUATION
7. ANALYST / 8. DATE PROCESSED	9. DISSEMINATED IN / 10. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

11. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	12. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

13.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF ROLANDO ARCADIO
MASFERRER ROJAS

100-009-014
DBB -42981
28 MAR 66
FBI
P4

R 6604210444

FILE IN 201-42669

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO ARCADIO
201-042669
SEX M DOB ?

201-350227
DBB -41616
10 MAR 66
FBI
P4

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
< USA

FMR CUBAN SEN WORKING CLOSELY NY W/DANIEL FIGNOLE, INTERIM PRES HAITI 57 REGARDING PLANS OVERTHROW HAITIAN PRES FRANCOIS DUVALIER. ADDITION OTHER ACT THERE WERE 80 MEN ON FARM NR MEX C OWNED BY SUBJ, FMR MBR CUBAN HOUSE REP, WAS IN MIAMI RECENTLY DISCUSSIN W/RODOLFO MASFERRER ROJAS, ROLANDO'S BROTHER, WAS TRANSFERRING THESE MEN MEX TO HAITI. DOI 28 SEP 65.

R 6604220896

FILE IN 201-042669

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (9-60)

10 Mott

FBI doc
10 Mar 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

14-00000

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-
X REF TO FILE NO
20/21

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5
2		6
3		7
4		8

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED CS/DO, TIME 2:50, BY D)

INFO: CS/DO, VR, FILE, ADOP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SOD 4, RI/AN, WH/C 8.

D/OCI 2.

SECRET 040012Z 4 MAR 66 IN 67457

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN SDOM SNDR MANA TEGU CITE WAVE 9450

HZP HTP
HDC HDS HNM/ HHT

5P

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE UOAMBER-6. SUBSOURCES PARA 1 VERA, PARAS 2 AND 4 SANCHEZ, PARA 3 CONSTANZO. SEE ALSO AMEMB PRIN 421 (252215Z) RID INDEX MASFERRER, VIXAMAR, BELT, SANCHEZ.

FILED 040012Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

UFG 7990

HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN PLANS OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

DOI: 20 FEBRUARY - 1 MARCH 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (1-2 MARCH 1966)

RW COMMENT:

MICROFILMED
MAR 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS DB-315/00714-66

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

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DATE DISTRIBUTED:

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D 200-9-38

4 Mar 66
201-42669

(REVISED 4-65)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

MFG. 1-65

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 67457 PAGE 2

UFG-7990

REF: UFG-7969

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

FW COMMENT:

TDCS

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BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 67457

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

[illegible]

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 20 FEBRUARY 1966 IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, cit Cuba & USA FORMER CUBAN SENATOR WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PLOTTING AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI STATED THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT DUVALIER WOULD GIVE BASES IN HAITI TO CUBAN EMIGRES IN ORDER TO STOP THEIR PLOTTING AGAINST HIM.

2. ON 25 FEBRUARY EUSEBIO MUJAS BARNIOL, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS EN EL EXILIO (CTCE, CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) SAID THAT AROUND 20 FEBRUARY MASFERRER HAD MET WITH EUGENE L. MAXIMILIEN, HAITIAN CONCUL GENERAL IN MIAMI. MUJAL SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD QUESTIONED MASFERRER ABOUT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

THE MEETING THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT "OTHERS" HAD MET WITH MAXIMILIEN AND THAT ALTHOUGH HE (MASFERRER) HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT HE HAD DETAILS OF THE MEETING.

3. LATE IN FEBRUARY MASFERRER TOLD ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, CUBAN EMIGRE WHO HAS BEEN REPORTED AS WORKING WITH MASFERRER IN ANTI-DUVALIER PLANNING, THAT HE (MASFERRER) ~~HAD TO RETURN TO NEW~~ YORK TO TRY TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HENRI F VIXAMAR TO GET MONEY TO CONTINUE THE OPERATION AGAINST HAITI. MASFERRER ADDED THAT VIXAMAR HAD LEFT NASSAU FOR NEW YORK. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDCSDB-315/00658-66, WHICH REPORTED MASFERRER'S STATEMENT THAT "THE HAITIAN" WHO WAS DIRECTING THE ANTI-DUVALIER ACTIVITY HAD GONE TO NASSAU. VIXAMAR HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED EARLIER AS A FORMER HAITIAN AND FUNCTIONARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD.)

MASFERRER ATTEMPT TO GET MORE

4. ON 1 MARCH GUILLERMO F BELT RAMIREZ, PROMINENT CUBAN EMIGRE IN WASHINGTON AND A FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, TELEPHONED VIRGILIO SANCHEZ OCEJO IN MIAMI AND TOLD HIM TO GET OUT OF THE PLOT AGAINST HAITI AND TO TELL ALL HIS FRIENDS TO DO THE SAME. BELT ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TELEPHONE OTHER CUBAN EMIGRES AND GIVE THEM SIMILAR ADVICE. (FIELD COMMENT: F SANCHEZ OCEJO IS PRESIDENT OF THE COMITE PRO-GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO (CPGCE, COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.) (SOURCE COMMENT: SANCHEZ OCEJO HAD ASKED BELT TO APPROACH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND INQUIRE REGARDING MASFERRER'S CLAIMS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD APPROVED HIS PLOT TO INVADE HAITI.)

VIRGILIO CALLED BY GUILLERMO BELT RAMIREZ ADVISING THAT HE GET OUT OF PLOT AGAINST HAITI.

5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, TEGUCIGALPA.)

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-42
X REF TO FILE NO 201-282032

FROM JM WAVE

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG R. W. Tucker

ROUTING
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3 7
4 8

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED TO CS/DO AT 2215 25 FEB 66 M)

INFO CS/DO, DDP 4, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, CI/PS, FI/SPG, RI/AN, WH/C 8, IW
VR, FILE, CA 2, CA PEG, CA PROP, CI/OPS, FI/INT
D/ I 2, D/CNE

SECRET 252347Z FEB 26 0349Z 66 IN 53139 6P

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN SDOM SNOR MANA TEGU CITE WAVE 9346
HTP NDC HDS HNM HHT

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM UFG-7919

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. SOURCE PARA 3 UOAMBER-6 FROM MASFERRER WHO VISITED UOAMBER-6 AT LATTER'S HOME 22 FEB. SOURCE PARAS 5 AND 6 AMOT SOURCE ESIRE-1 WHO ATTENDED MEETING. SOURCE PARAS 7-9 AMOT SOURCE RAUL ARANGO DE LA NOVAL AND ESIRE-1, BOTH OF WHOM ATTENDED. SOURCES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 UOAMBER-4, UOAMBER-6, AND AMOTS. RE PARA 5 B, SEE WAVE 8587. (IN 38361) INFORMATION FROM UOAMBER-6 AND AMOTS CONFIRMS SECEN NOT INVOLVED. RID INDEX VILABOA, VIXAMAR, ROJAS, SIERRA, HERNANDEZ, PENA, ARIAS, CONSTANZO, LEON. FILED 252347Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

MICROFILMED
MAR 1
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TDCS DB-315/00658-66

ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

RELEASING IWO:

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8 201-282032

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201-42669
26 Feb 66

14-00000

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (REVISED)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, [illegible] [illegible]

PAGE TWO IN 83139

HAITI/CUBA

SUBJ: DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, IN COMPLETING PLANS FOR PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI.

DOI: 16-23 FEBRUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MAIMI (22-23 FEBRUARY 1966)

UFG 7979

SOURCE: (SEE PARAS. 2 AND 4, BELOW)

[illegible]

IW COMMENT:

[illegible]

TDCS

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BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

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FORM 10-63 3001

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(When Filled In)

(20) MFG. 12-64

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS.

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 63139

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

1. (FIELD COMMENT: INFORMATION DATED 20-23 FEBRUARY 1966 FROM THREE SOURCES WHOSE REPORTING IN THE PAST HAS BEEN RELIABLE INDICATES THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR WHO HAS BEEN REPORTED PLANNING AN INVASION OF HAITI IN FEBRUARY USING HAITIAN AND CUBAN EMIGRES, IS HAVING DIFFICULTY RECRUITING MEN TO PARTICIPATE. ACCORDING TO EARLIER INFORMATION, MASFERRER IS DISLIKED AND DISTRUSTED BY MANY CUBAN EMIGRES IN MIAMI.)

2. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TRAINED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

14-00000

MFG 6-65 (20)

IN 63139

BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

3. ON 22 FEBRUARY IN MAIMI, FLORIDA, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS SAID THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING HAITIANS TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS PLOT TO INVADE HAITI. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY HAITIAN WORKING WITH HIM IS HENRI VIXAMAR. (FIELD COMMENT: VIXAMAR HAS BEEN DESCRIBED EARLIER AS A FORMER HAITIAN AND A FUNCTIONARY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD). MASFERRER ADDED THAT HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO FIND HAITIAN EMIGRES WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE PART.

Subject / F cit Haiti & Florida, USA

4. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 5-9, BELOW: A MEMBER OF A GROUP OF CUBAN EMIGRES TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES OF INFORMATION COLLECTION. THE GROUP HAS PROVIDED USEFUL REPORTS SINCE 1961.

5. ON 16 FEBRUARY 1966 IN MIAMI MASFERRER MET WITH THE FOLLOWING "STAFF OFFICERS" OF THE PROPOSED Haitian INVASION EFFORT:

Mis- Same in TP
ident in
¶ 3
cit Cuba?
Florida, USA

A. GENERAL STAFF: ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ, AND JUAN HERNANDEZ. HERNANDEZ, WHO RESIDES AT 569 SW TENTH STREET, APARTMENT B, MIAMI, HAS BEEN APPOINTED RECRUITMENT CHIEF.

B. CHIEF OF OPERATIONS: VLADIMIR SECEN, WHO WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE MEETING. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE REPORTED LATE THAT MASFERRER HAD APPOINTED VILABOA TO REPLACE SECEN AS CHIEF OF OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOURCE WHO REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST, SECEN HAS TOLD FRIENDS AND CONTACTS IN THE HAITIAN AND CUBAN EMIGRE COMMUNITIES IN MIAMI THAT HE IS NOT INVOLVED IN MASFERRER'S PLOTTING AND THAT HE WILL NOT SUPPORT IT IN ANY WAY.)

[illegible] operations [illegible]

F cit Cuba? & Florida USA

15.A BATTALION COMMANDER: NAPOLEON VILABOA LLERENA.

FX

D. COMPANY COMMANDERS: ODONIEL PENA ENTENZA, WHO RESIDES AT 1516 SW THIRD STREET, MIAMI; ERIC ARIAS ARIAS; AND ATON CONSTANZO PALAU.

F R

cit Cuba & Florida USA

One is a company commander in proposed Haitian Invasion Force.

6. AT THE MEETING ON 16 FEBRUARY ANTONIO ROJAS SAID THAT WEAPONS AS FOLLOWS HAD BEEN ACQUIRED FOR THE INVASION ATTEMPT AND THAT THEY WERE IN FIRST-CLASS CONDITION:

TWENTY OR MORE 30-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS

TEN 50-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS

FOUR 81-MM MORTARS

EIGHT 60-MM MORTARS

FIVE BAZOOKAS

AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF AR-15, M-1, AND M-14 RIFLES

ONE THOUSAND HAND GRANADES

HAND GUNS AND SUFFICIENT AMMUNITION

7. ON 21 FEBRUARY AT ANOTHER MEETING OF ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUP, MASFERRER TOLD THOSE PRESENT THAT HE WAS DISGUSTED SINCE HE HAD EXPECTED TO HAVE DEFINITE NEWS THAT DAY. INSTEAD, HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE HAITIAN WHO WAS DIRECTING THE AFFAIR ORDERING A CHANGE OF PLANS. MASFERRER SAID THAT THE HAITIAN (WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY) HAD (A) GONE TO NASSAU; (B) SAID THAT THE OPERATION COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH 125 MEN INSTEAD OF 300; AND (C) ORDERED ALL WEAPONS IN MIAMI AND NEW YORK TRANSFERRED TO THE BAHAMAS. (FIELD COMMENT: MASFERRER UNDOUBTEDLY WAS REFERRING TO

HENRI VIXAMAR.)

MAR 7 10 22 AM MAR 8 10 49 AM '66

8. MASFERRER SAID THAT HE HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE HAITIAN IN NASSAU CLARIFYING SOME MATTERS AND REMINDING HIM OF THEIR PREVIOUS AGREEMENT. IF BY 22 FEBRUARY MASFERRER HAD NOT RECEIVED AN ANSWER TO HIS LETTER HE WOULD SEND LUIS SIERRA LOPEZ TO NASSAU TO MEET WITH THE HAITIAN AND "LAY THE CARDS ON THE TABLE". MASFERRER ADDED THAT IN THE MEANTIME ATTEMPTS TO RECRUIT 300 TO 400 MEN MUST BE CONTINUED, AND IN CASE THE HAITIAN EFFORT FAILED THEN THESE MEN COULD BE USED "IN SOME OTHER WAY". MASFERRER SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE DEFINITE NEWS TO ANNOUNCE AT ANOTHER MEETING TO BE HELD ON THE EVENING OF 23 FEBRUARY. (FIELD COMMENT: A CHECK WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN MIAMI ON 25 FEBRUARY FAILED TO SHOW ANY RECORD OF RECENT TRAVEL TO NASSAU BY SIERRA).

ci Cuba
a Florida
USA

9. AT THE MEETING ON 21 FEBRUARY MASFERRER ASKED HOMERO LEON FERNANDEZ WHETHER THE LATTER WAS READY TO FURNISH 100 MEN FOR THE INVASION OF HAITI, AS HE HAD PROMISED EARLIER. LEON ANSWERED THAT HE WAS. (FIELD COMMENT: LEON, A CUBAN EMIGRE, IS A LEADER OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS CONSTITUCIONALES DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO (FACCE, CONSTITUTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF CUBA IN EXILE). FOR EARLIER INFORMATION ON HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH MASFERRER, SEE (CSDB-312/02276-65.)

10. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USCG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, MANAGUA, TEGUCIGALPA).

END OF MESSAGE

FBI doc
19 Feb 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
15 Feb 66 (Miami)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas
Bureau # 2-154

FBI doc
9 Feb 66 (NY)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas

FBI doc
31 Jan 66 (Wash.)
Re - Rolando Arcadio Masferrer
Rojas Bureau #LA-21622

FBI doc
31 Jan 66 (NY)
Re - Haitian Revolutionary Activities

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible] LY ☐ C[illegible]IAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revolutionary Planning of Haitian/Cuban Emigre Group

FROM: Sally Jamison WH/7/Ht 3B2630		EXTENSION	NO. CSCI-316/00172-66 ✓	
			DATE 17 January 1966	

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/FI (3B4404)		12/1		
2. C/WH/7	2 JAN 1966			
3. c/ci/wH CI/LIA (2C35)	14 JAN 1966		Full cb	
4.				
5. RID/AN			FM	
6. RID/MIS				
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9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
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14.				
15.				

17 JAN 1966

ABSTRACT	X	

201-042669

17 Jan 66

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

17 JAN 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Revolutionary Planning of Haitian/Cuban
Emigre Group

1. Reference is made to this Agency's dissemination TDCSDB-315/00071-66, dated 7 January 1966.

2. In addition to the information contained in the referenced report, we believe it will be of interest to your Bureau to note that Rolando MASFERRER Rojas said that he (Masferrer) is keeping in constant touch with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York. As you know, Masferrer, a former Cuban senator, is a leader in a Haitian/Cuban emigre group that is plotting the overthrow of Haitian President Francois Duvalier.

CSCI-316/00172-66

DDP/WH/7/Ht/SJJamison:rae (11 January 1966)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI ~~(200-9-38)~~ 201-042669
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/RCA
2 - WH/7/Ht
1 - WH/FI

BASIC: WAVE-8281 (IN 28264)

PROJECT : NP

LIAISON : *

201-042669

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[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-042669 ✓

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22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

0050

MFG 1-65

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

FROM: JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY (COPY TUBED TO CS/DO AT 1720 BY P)

INFO: CS/DO,
VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW,
SOD 4, CA/O 4, CI, RI/AN, WH/C 8.
D/OCI 2, D/ONE.

SECRET 071833Z [illegible] AND CONTROL COPIES LATCHED 7 JAN 66 2136Z IN 29176

DIR INFO PACY LANT BARR PRIN CITE WAVE 8306 (INCHURST ACTING) 48
HZP HTP

INTEL DYVOUR JMPALM

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO. NO PROJECT. UCAMBER-6 FROM ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER. LAST SENTENCE PARA ONE FROM UFG-7504, NOT DISSEMED.

INDEX ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, RODOLFO MASFERRER ROJAS. FILED 071833Z

UFG-7854

13 JAN 66		
28		
ABSTRACT X		INDEX X

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM

HAITI

SUBJ: 1. SHIPMENT FROM NEW YORK TO MIAMI OF ARMS FOR USE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

2. ATTEMPT BY HAITIAN/CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP LEADER TO HAVE THE INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTIONS OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

MICROFILMED
JAN 27 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TDCS CS-315/00104-66

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

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7 JAN 66 ✓
201-042669

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

MFG 1-63

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

FROM:

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 29175 PAGE 2

(MIRR) CARRY OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITY AGAINST HAITI

DOI: 4 JANUARY 1966

PADA: UNITED STATES, MIAMI (6 JANUARY 1966)

UFG-7854

SOURCE: FORMER LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT WHO MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. SOURCE IS A TESTED REPORTER AND HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST.

FI COMMENT.

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Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DIST.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF -- 29:76

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ACTIVITIES OF ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS, FORMER CUBAN SENATOR, AS A LEADER OF A HAITIAN/CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP PLANNING ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON EARLIER. ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER, HIS COUSIN, HAS BEEN REPORTED, BY THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION BELOW, TO BE THE COORDINATOR IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, FOR THE EMIGRE ACTION AGAINST HAITI.)

201-042669 cit Cuba a U.S.A.

cit: Cuba? a Miami, Florida, U.S.A.

2. ON 4 JANUARY 1966, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, ANTONIO ROJAS MASFERRER SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER ROJAS HAD RECENTLY SENT TO MIAMI FROM NEW YORK A NUMBER OF RIFLES, 30-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS,

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GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR CO

PLACE CONTROLS ABOVE TOP BLACK LINE AND BELOW BOTTOM BLACK LINE

AND PISTOLS BECAUSE HE WAS AFRAID THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) IN NEW YORK WOULD FIND AND CONFISCATE THEM.

3. ANTONIO ROJAS ALSO SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD ORIGINALLLY PLANNED TO HAVE HIM (ANTONIO ROJAS) RECEIVE AND TAKE CARE OF THE WEAPONS IN MIAMI, BUT THAT SINCE MASFERRER NOW BELIEVES THE FBI IS WATCHING ROJAS HE HAS PUT RODOLFO MASFERRER P

cit. Cuba? a Miami, Florida, U.S.A for the proposed Haitian invasion

ROJAS, HIS BROTHER, IN CHARGE OF THE WEAPONS. ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD CAUTIONED HIS BROTHER TO STAY AWAY FROM THE PLACES WHERE THE WEAPONS ARE HIDDEN.

4. ACCORDING TO ROJAS, ROLANDO MASFERRER IS IN TOUCH WITH THE MOVIMIENTO INSURRECCIONAL DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MIRR, INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENT FOR REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY), A CUBAN EMIGRE GROUP LED BY ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE MIRR TO CARRY OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITY AGAINST HAITI. MASFERRER HOPES THIS ACTIVITY WILL SPARK A REVOLUTION IN HAITI.

5. ANTONIO ROJAS SAID THAT ROLANDO MASFERRER HAD TOLD ALL THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE PLOT AGAINST DUVALIER TO PASS THE WORD, SO THAT IT WOULD REACH UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES, THAT NOTHING IS BEING DONE AGAINST DUVALIER AND THAT THE EXILES ARE DISCOURAGED. MASFERRER BELIEVES THIS WILL CAUSE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES TO RELAX THEIR SURVEILLANCE, PERMITTING THE EXILES TO MOVE MORE FREELY.

6. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT, COMKWESTFOR, MIAMI REPS OF STATE, FBI, CUSTOMS, BORDER PATROL, I&NS, AND USCG (ALSO SENT PORT-AU-PRINCE).

CONFIDENTIAL END OF MESSAGE

Date: 07/11/01
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	CIA
RECORD NUMBER :	104-10176-10073
RECORD SERIES :	JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.
DATE :	00/00/
PAGES :	341
SUBJECTS :	JFK DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :	
CURRENT STATUS :	POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	JFK64-12:F4A 1998.05.22.08:03:47:560082: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION [illegible] 3

DATE ACQUIRED [illegible] 3

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE [illegible]
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE [illegible]
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] by SAS

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Michel Chartrand, Canadian Communist, to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8288
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/573,305

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/ Cuba/Canada

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made and for headquarters comment added.

FORM NO. 689 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican-Cuban Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-9282
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C/S
3/572,775

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico, Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
2 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 16 Jan 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT H-M-8291

CABLE

IN

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No Dissem.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECR T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Source (Tass rep) access to info doubted.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.82 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(20)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Mexican Students to Get Cuban Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM-8334
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
HLS/jct

CS
3/572,776

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT [illegible]

SOURCE [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION [illegible]

DATE ACQUIRED

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DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT

CABLE [illegible]

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C S [illegible]

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AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] S.S.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para. 1 - LITAMIL-9
Para. 2 - LIENVOY

SUBJECT
Planned Travel to Cuba from Mexico in Connection With Activities of the Casa de las Americas in 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
14 & 16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8340
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
MLS/jct

C S
3/573,559

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See report for changes made and headquarters comments added.

FORM NO 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 51

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
XXX LI Project

DATE OF INFORMATION
18 Jan 64

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8426
CABLE
IN

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

SUBJECT
Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE Descr
TO

C S 3/575,185

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Technical Problems at the Nicaro Nickel Plant in Cuba; Decision of Cuban Government to Base Cuban Economy on Sugar

DATE OF INFORMATION
17 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8428
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
N/D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. Previously reported. Per SAS

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para 1 - LIENVOY ✓
Para 2 - LIAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Return to Cuba of
Silvanio Reyes, Cuban Medical Student

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE 2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible] 8429
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

CS N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC. [illegible]

No dissem - by SAS. Not significant.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 51-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT: NP

SOURCE: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT: Dismissal of Homosexuals from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION: Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED: 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 13 Feb 64
GRADE: 3-2
TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE:
GRADE:
TO:

FIELD NO.
REPORT: HMM 8430
CABLE:
IN:

RI NO.:

REPORTS OFFICER:

C S: ND

EVAL. REQUESTED:

AREA: Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24) 3

PROJECT: XXXXXXXX NP

SOURCE: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT:

DATE OF INFORMATION: Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED: 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 13 Feb 64
GRADE: 3-2
TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE:
GRADE:
TO:

FIELD NO.
REPORT: HMM 8430
CABLE:
IN:

RI NO.:

REPORTS OFFICER:

C S:

EVAL. REQUESTED:

AREA: Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This report, previously not disseminated, was added as a comment to the dissem of UFG 4920, CSDB 3/660,810

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24) 3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LI[illegible]-9

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuba
Mexican Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE 2-2
TO XXXXXX

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8431
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. No intel value to customers.

No identifiable traces on Tovar or Hernandez. One Jose Tovar (citizenship not stated) was ~~xxpxxx~~ included in a list of people who collaborated with the Cuban Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, in November 1960. (F-3)

Aguilar may be identical with Rafael AGUILAR Talamantes mentioned in HMM ~~1907~~ 7227, June 63, DBA 17489 and DBA 39315. Rafael AGUILAR included in list in HMM-1907. Copies of the last three documents mentioned being forwarded. Can the Station determine whether the Aguilar mentioned in HMM 8431 is in fact AGUILAR Talamantes?

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
LIFEAT / RP

SOURCE
LIFEAT
LICAKIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Cooperation Between the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and the University of Michoacan

DATE OF INFORMATION
26-27 Feb 64

DATE ACQUIRED
28 Feb - 1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 & 12 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8535 ✓
CABLE 8564
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
HLS/jct

C S
3/577,383

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
5P

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Travel to Cuba of Genia Maria Hernandez, Mexican Teacher

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]-3536
CABLE
IN
FS NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS
SD

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
New Guinean Ambassador to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 Mar 64
GRADE 3-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8537
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S
No Dissem

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba Guinea

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Invitation to Dr. Ruben Pareja, Bolivian Physician to Visit Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMMA-8541
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
ED

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba/Bolivia

COMMENTS. (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
LIENVOY/EP

SOURCE
Para 1: LIENVOY
Para 2: LITAMIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Ismael COSIO Villegas, now President of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Feb - early Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Feb - 10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Feb/19 Mar
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM-8402, 8611 ✓
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jet

C S
3/577,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2 Reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-62
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
HP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Jose Rafael Padrino Lopez, Venezuelan, to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8612
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/JCt

C S
3/577,390

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS. (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
E.P.

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Jose HERRERA Pena; Efforts to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Mar 63

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Mar 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8673
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S
M.L.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT HP	DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64	FIELD NO.
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64	REPORT HMM 8679 CABLE MEXI 8566 IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE ~~XXXX~~ Tower TO	RI NO.
SUBJECT Comments of Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, on the trial of Marcos RODRIGUEZ Alfonso	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE 2 Apr 64 GRADE SaPrUsser TO	REPORTS OFFICER CS TD 3/577,544 EVAL. REQUESTED AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by I&CG

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of the Cuban Embassy to Increase Its Knowledge on Pro-Cuban Mexican Personalities

DATE OF INFORMATION
2[illegible] Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE ~~14 Apr 64~~
GRADE ~~B-2~~
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO. 4
REPORT
CABLE ~~HMM 8704~~
IN 8704
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S
H.D.
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal interest.

ORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
UN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT: KP

SOURCE: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT: Restrictions on Cuban Government Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION: 24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED: 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 14 Apr 64
GRADE: Descr
TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 4 May 64
GRADE: Descr
TO:

FIELD NO.
REPORT: HMM 8705
CABLE:
IN:
RI NO.:
REPORTS OFFICER:
C S: 3/580,295
EVAL. REQUESTED:
AREA: Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

See comment on Source Record Card for HMM 8721 for source description for LITAMIL-9.

Cy attached

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 2

PROJECT: KP

X cy

SOURCE: ~~[illegible]-1~~

SUBJECT: Prensa Latina Offices, Habana, Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION: Late March 1964

DATE ACQUIRED: Early April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE: 16 April 1964
GRADE:
TO:

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE:
GRADE:
TO:

FIELD NO.
REPORT: HMM-8721
CABLE:
IN:
RI NO.:
REPORTS OFFICER:
C S:
EVAL. REQUESTED:
AREA: Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

While we realise that [illegible]-1 is merely an interrogator, he is, nevertheless, the direct source and should be shown as such in the source description—followed by the appropriate subsource description. The approved description for him is "A Cuban exile in Mexico who is in touch with local Cuban exiles and anti-Castro organizations."

Also, please note that when LITAMIL-9's reporting is on Cuba, his description should read "Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half." "Person(s) (B)" is not acceptable for SA reports.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.32 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 3

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans of the Algerian Government to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Latin American Countries

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late March 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8706
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba/Algeria

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Not dissem. Inaccurate. Possibly "open embassies" was meant, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have ambassadors in Algiers, and have had for some time. Algeria has announced that it planned to open embassies in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible] - Algeria [illegible]	6/5/64	KAB
2	Attn: A. [illegible]		
3	Bob		W
4			
5			
6	[illegible]		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1-6: Recommend that no dissem be made of this. Zirout probably mean that Algeri~~a~~ would soon
[illegible] the conversation.
open up embassies in these countries, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have embassadors in Algiers, and ~~have~~ had for some time. A Cairo MENA item 6 April 64 announced that Algeria planned to open embassies shortly in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina. Our Embassy in Algiers confirmed this on 21 April - [illegible] and the Brazilian Amb in Algiers said that as far as he knew no changes had been made in these plans in spite of the fall of the Goulart

[illegible] 3706

over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]nshaw x5110	6/5

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—[illegible] government.

As for Zirout's remarks about his choosing Cuba would seem the natural thing for him to say when talking to the Cubans.

SUBJECT
MP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plan of Mexican Government Not to Vote for Admission of Communist China to the United Nations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE E-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE E-2 for reportori
TO accuracy

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8709, 8711
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jcb

C S
3/581,227

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/China/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports were combined for [illegible]

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to Buy Three Ford Automobiles

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE -2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8712
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S CI
3/781,307

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Information in this report was disseminated asa CSCI to ODENVY and to a bureau of [illegible].

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE OF INFORMATION
10-13 Apr 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10-13 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 28 May 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 8912
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jct

C S
K.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: [illegible] AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem - by WH/SA. Marginal.

This report should have carried the source description for Cuban information.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Disillusionment of Mexican Leftists After A Visit to the USSR

DATE OF INFORMATION
April 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
10 April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 20 May 1964
GRADE B-3
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-3
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8925
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jet

CS 3/583,597
EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
HP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans to Invite the Cuban Aragon Orchestra to Perform in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Jun 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Jun 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 11 Jun 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8991
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
ED

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND ... SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Marginal.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
June 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
1 June 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 June 1964
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HM 0996
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
[illegible]/a
0224-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

dissemd as received

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT KP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Efforts of Cuban Cultural Attache to Implement Cuban-Mexican Cultural Exchange [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION ~~[illegible]~~ 9 & 24 June 64

DATE ACQUIRED 19 June 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 14 July 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE [illegible]

GRADE

TO escription

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM 9092

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER KPR

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-82 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Reaction of Cuban Embassy in Mexico to Freezing of Dollar Accounts of the Banco del Atlantico, S.A.

DATE OF INFORMATION
20 July 64

DATE ACQUIRED
23 July 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lexcr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 July 64
GRADE Lexcr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9121
CABLE MEXI 0357
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
Jct

C S TD 314/00964

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (ATTACH [illegible] QUERIES AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by IMOG.

Ref Source Record card for HMM 8943. Freezing of these accounts resulted from the attachment to that report which was passed to ODALGE.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
LIENVOY

SOURCE
LIENVOY
LITAMIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Views of Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico and Mexican Personalities on Mexican Support of Cuba at the Meeting of the Organization of American States, January 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION
26 July, 11 Aug 64

DATE ACQUIRED
17 Aug 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Aug 64
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9149
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR/m

CS
311/03160-64

XREF

EVAL. REQUESTED
[illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Did station in fact mean to say OAS meeting in JANUARY 1964 or does this report refer to the July 64 meeting? Have presumed to change January to July in the title and in the body of the report. If January is correct please let us known and we will issue a correction.

Source description: para one unchanged. Para 2: Pro-Cuban Mexican (S) with good access to Cuban circles in Mexico. Appraisal of Content: Para 2: 2. pls see source eval on HMM 9162 re LIENVOY sourcing.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEN

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

3

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Postponement of A Trip to Cuba by David ALFARO Siqueiros; Fear of Expulsion from Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION 30 Oct 1964
DATE ACQUIRED 5 Nov 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 7 Nov 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-9339
CABLE MEXI-1503
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
3FF/
C.S. 05971-64
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This cable was referred to the desk. It was disseminated as a CS report with minor editorial changes.

The comment was re-written to include more information from the referenced report, which will show that he probably plans to paint another mural in Cuba.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE
MEXI 1503
IN NO.
13312
NON-INTEL FORMAT
PRECEDENCE:
ACTION DIV.:
FIELD REPORT NO.
HMM 9339
TDCS

RECEIVED
NOT DISSEMINATED
DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS

OUR SOURCE CARD FOR LITAMIL-9 ENJOINS IW TO MODIFY WH/1'S APPROVED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS ONLY ON CONSULTATION WITH THE DESK. THE FIELD BYLINE IS CONSPICUOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO HQS BYLINES IN THAT THE ~~FIXE~~ FIELD OMITS MENTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY. THEREFORE (AT 2 A.M.), TO WH/1 FOR ACTION.

Besides, didn't warrant cable dissem!
R.

RECEIVED
NOT DISSEMINATED
DISSEMINATED

FORM 8-64 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(13-20)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
[illegible]

SUBJECT
[illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION
[illegible] 3

DATE ACQUIRED
[illegible] 3

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE [illegible]

GRADE [illegible]

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE [illegible]

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT [illegible]

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] by [illegible]

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Visit of Michel Chartrand, Canadian Communist, to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City

DATE OF INFORMATION Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED 27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 16 Jan 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WAS -. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE B-2

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8288

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct

C S 3/573,305

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/ Cuba/Canada

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made and for headquarters comment added.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 683 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican-Cuban Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Dec 63

DATE ACQUIRED
27 Dec 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible]
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS
3/572,775

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico, Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See CS report for changes made.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

2

PROJECT No Project

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 2 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 16 Jan 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8291

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S No Dissem.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Source (Tass Rep) access to info doubted.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24)

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Mexican Students to Get Cuban Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 23 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8334
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
HLS/jct

C S
3/572,776

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT [illegible]

SOURCE [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

DATE OF INFORMATION [illegible]

DATE ACQUIRED

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE [illegible]
IN [illegible]
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S [illegible]
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA [illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

[illegible] S.S.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para. 1 - LITAMIL-9
Para. 2 - LIENVOY

SUBJECT
Planned Travel to Cuba from Mexico in Connection With Activities of the Casa de las Americas in 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 14 & 16 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 24 Jan 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8340
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jct

C S 3/573,559

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

See report for changes made and headquarters comments added.

FORM NO 1 JUN 51 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

PROJECT
[redacted] [redacted] Project

DATE OF INFORMATION
18 Jan 64

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8426
CABLE
IN

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

SUBJECT
Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE Descr
TO

C S 3/575,185

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Technical Problems at the Nicaro Nickel Plant in Cuba; Decision of Cuban Government to Base Cuban Economy on Sugar

DATE OF INFORMATION
17 Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8428
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
N/D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. Previously reported. Per SAS

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT LIENVOY
No Project

SOURCE
Para 1 - LIENVOY ✓
Para 2 - LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Possible Return to Cuba of
Silvanio Reyes, Cuban Medical Student

DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE [illegible]2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8429
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

[illegible]

No dissem - by SAS. Not significant.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT NP	DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64	FIELD NO. REPORT HMM 8430
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64	CABLE
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 13 Feb 64 GRADE 3-2 TO	RI NO.
		REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT Dismissal of Homosexuals from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S ND
		EVAL. REQUESTED
		AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT ~~XXXXXXXX~~ NP	DATE OF INFORMATION Jan 64	FIELD NO. REPORT ~~HMM 8430~~
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 30 Jan 64	CABLE
		IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 13 Feb 64 GRADE 3-2 TO	RI NO.
		REPORTS OFFICER
SUBJECT	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	C S
		EVAL. REQUESTED
		AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This report, previously not disseminated, was added as a comment to the dissem of UFG 4920, CSDB 3/660,810

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
No Project

SOURCE
LI[redacted]D-2

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban Mexican Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
Jan 64

DATE ACQUIRED
Jan 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 13 Feb 64
GRADE B-2
TO ~~XXXXXX~~

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8431
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No Dissem. No intel value to customers.

No identifiable traces on Tovar or Hernandez. One Jose Tovar (citizenship not stated) was ~~xxpxxx~~ included in a list of people who collaborated with the Cuban Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, in November 1960. (F-3)

Aguilar may be identical with Rafael AGUILAR Talamantes mentioned in HMM ~~1907~~ 7227, June 63, DBA 17489 and DBA 39315. Rafael AGUILAR included in list in HMM-1907. Copies of the last three documents mentioned being forwarded. Can the Station determine whether the Aguilar mentioned in HMM 8431 is in fact AGUILAR Talamantes?

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
LIFEAT / RP

SOURCE
LIFEAT
[illegible]-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Cooperation Between the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and the University of Michoacan

DATE OF INFORMATION
26-27 Feb 64

DATE ACQUIRED
28 Feb - 1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 & 12 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT [illegible] 8535 ✓
CABLE 8584
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
ELS/jct

C S
3/577,383

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports combined for dissemination.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT 5P	DATE OF INFORMATION 1 Mar 64	FIELD NO.
SOURCE LITAMIL-9	DATE ACQUIRED 1 Mar 64	REPORT HMM-3536 CABLE IN
	FIELD DISTRIBUTION DATE 4 Mar 64 GRADE D-2 TO	FS NO. REPORTS OFFICER FLS/jct
SUBJECT Possible Travel to Cuba of Genia Maria Hernandez, Mexican Teacher	WASH. DISTRIBUTION DATE GRADE TO	CS ND EVA. REQUESTED AREA Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
New Guinean Ambassador to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8537
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jct

C S
No Dissem

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba Guinea

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Invitation to Dr. Ruben Pareja, Bolivian Physician to Visit Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT EW-8541
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS
RD

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba/Bolivia

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(21)

3

PROJECT
LIENVOY/KP

SOURCE
Para 1: LIENVOY
Para 2: LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Ismael COSIO Villegas, now President of the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Feb - early Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Feb - 10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Feb/13 Mar
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM-8402, 8611
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/577,327

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2 Reports complete for dissemination.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-82 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT
MP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Jose Rafael Padrino Lopez, / Venezuelan, to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10 Mar 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 19 Mar 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 8612
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/JCt

C S
3/577,390

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
N.P.

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Jose HERRERA Pena; Efforts to go to Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION
19 Mar 63

DATE ACQUIRED
20 Mar 63

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 63
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8673
CABLE
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
FLS/jet

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES, COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. No intel value.

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT
HP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Comments of Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, on the trial of Marcos RODRIGUEZ Alfonso

DATE OF INFORMATION
24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 64
GRADE ~~XXXX~~ [illegible]
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 2 Apr 64
GRADE [illegible]
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8679
CABLE MEXI 8586
IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

CS TD
3/577,544

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by I&CG

FORM NO. 688
1 JUN 55
REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(26)

2

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of the Cuban Embassy to Increase Its Knowledge on Pro-Cuban Mexican Personalities

DATE OF INFORMATION
2 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE ~~14 Apr 64~~
GRADE ~~B-2~~
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO. 4
REPORT
CABLE ~~HMM 8704~~
IN 8704
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C S
N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. by WH/SA. Marginal interest.

FORM NO. 688 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT

KP

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

Restrictions on Cuban Government Scholarships

DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE Descr
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE 4 May 64
GRADE Descr
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8705
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S 3/580,295
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

See comment on Source Record Card for HMM 8721 for source description for LITAMIL-9.

Cy attached

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT

KP

SOURCE

X cy

~~AMSWIPE-1~~

SUBJECT

Prensa Latina Offices, Habana, Cuba

DATE OF INFORMATION Late March 1964

DATE ACQUIRED Early April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 April 1964
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8721
CABLE
IN
RI NO.
REPORTS OFFICER
C S
EVAL. REQUESTED
AREA Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

While we realise that AMSWIPE-1 is merely an interrogator, he is, nevertheless, the direct source and should be shown as such in the source description—followed by the appropriate subsource description. The approved description for him is "A Cuban exile in Mexico who is in touch with local Cuban exiles and anti-Castro organizations."

Also, please note that when LITAMIL-9's reporting is on Cuba, his description should read "Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half." "Person(s) (B)" is not acceptable for SA reports.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59-32 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT NP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Plans of the Algerian Government to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Latin American Countries

DATE OF INFORMATION Late March 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 14 Apr 64

GRADE B-2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8706

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER PLS/jet

C S N.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Mexico/Cuba/Algeria

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Inaccurate. Possibly "open embassies" was meant, rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have ambassadors in Algiers, and have had for some time. Algeria has announced that it planned to open embassies in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible] - Algeria [illegible]	6/5/64	KAB
2	Attn: A. [illegible]		
3	Bob		W
4			
5			
6	[illegible]		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

1-6: Recommend that no dissem be made of this. Zirout probably mean that Algeria would soon

[illegible] conversation.

open up embassies in these countries. rather than "establish diplomatic relations". Both Spain and Brazil have embassadors in Algiers. and have had for some time. A Cairo MENA item 6 April 64 announced that Algeria planned to open embassies shortly in several countries, including Brazil and Argentina. Our Embassy in Algiers confirmed this on 21 April - [illegible] and the Brazilian Amb in Algiers said that as far as he knew no changes had been made in these plans in spite of the fall of the Goulart

[illegible]

over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]nshaw x5110	5/5

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—[illegible]

government.

As for Zirout's remarks about his choosing Cuba would seem the natural thing for him to say when talking to the Cubans.

JECT
MP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plan of Mexican Government Not to Vote for Admission of Communist China to the United Nations

DATE OF INFORMATION
Late Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 Apr 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2 for reportorial accuracy
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-8709, [illegible]11
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
3/571,227

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/China/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Two reports were combined for dissemination

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

2

PROJECT

NP

SOURCE

LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT

Plans of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to Buy Three Ford Automobiles

DATE OF INFORMATION 24 Mar 64

DATE ACQUIRED 1 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 14 Apr 64

GRADE -2

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE

GRADE

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM-8712

CABLE

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

PLS/jct

CS CI 3/791,307

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA

Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Information in this report was disseminated asa CSCI to ODENVY and to a bureau of ODYOKE.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE OF INFORMATION
10-13 Apr 64

DATE ACQUIRED
10-13 Apr 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 28 May 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 8912
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
jcb

C S
E.D.

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR ... AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem - by WH/SA. Marginal.

This report should have carried the source description for Cuban information.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 53-92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Disillusionment of Mexican Leftists After A Visit to the USSR

DATE OF INFORMATION
April 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
10 April 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 20 May 1964
GRADE B-3
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-3
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8925
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

CS 3/583,597 EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/USSR

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION: CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS: SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES: COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Disseminated.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD (24) 3

PROJECT
NP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Plans to Invite the Cuban Aragon Orchestra to Perform in Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
1 Jun 64

DATE ACQUIRED
1 Jun 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 11 Jun 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 8991
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
PLS/jct

C S
ND

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND [illegible], SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

No dissem. Marginal.

FORM NO. 1 JUN 55 688 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
NONE

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Mexican Cultural Movement, Pro-Cuban Youth Organization

DATE OF INFORMATION
June 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
1 June 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 16 June 1964
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT H[illegible] 6996
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
[illegible]/a
0224-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

dissemd as received

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

1

PROJECT
KP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Efforts of Cuban Cultural Attache to Implement Cuban-Mexican Cultural Exchange
~~[illegible]~~

DATE OF INFORMATION
~~[illegible]~~ 9 & 24 June 64

DATE ACQUIRED
19 June 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 14 July 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE [illegible]
GRADE [illegible]
TO ~~[illegible]~~scription

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM 9092
CABLE
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR

C S [illegible]

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by WH/SA.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-82
1 JUN 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

3

PROJECT KP

SOURCE LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT Reaction of Cuban Embassy in Mexico to Freezing of Dollar Accounts of the Banco del Atlantico, S.A.

DATE OF INFORMATION 20 July 64

DATE ACQUIRED 23 July 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

DATE 23 July 64

GRADE Lemcr

TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION

DATE 23 July 64

GRADE Lemcr

TO

FIELD NO.

REPORT HMM 9121

CABLE MEXI 0357

IN

RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER jct

C S TD 314/00964

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA Cuba/Mexico

COMMENTS: (REASON [illegible] CONSUMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Disseminated by IWOG.

Ref Source Record card for HMM 8943. Freezing of these accounts resulted from the attachment to that report which was passed to ODALCE.

FORM NO. 688 1 JUN 53 REPLACES FORM 59.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
LIENVOY

SOURCE
LIENVOY
LITAMIL-9 ✓

SUBJECT
Views of Yugoslav Ambassador to Mexico and Mexican Personalities on Mexican Support of Cuba at the Meeting of the Organization of American States, January 1964

DATE OF INFORMATION
26 July, 14 Aug 64

DATE ACQUIRED
17 Aug 1964

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 25 Aug 64
GRADE
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE

FIELD NO.
REPORT
CABLE HMM 9169
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER
KPR/m

C S
311/03180-64

XREF

EVAL. REQUESTED
[illegible]

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

Did station in fact mean to say OAS meeting in JANUARY 1964 or does this report refer to the July 64 meeting? Have presumed to change January to July in the title and in the body of the report. If January is correct please let us known and we will issue a correction.

Source description: para one unchanged. Para 2: Pro-Cuban Mexican (U) with good access to Cuban circles in Mexico. Appraisal of Content: Para 2: 2. pls see source eval on HMM 9161 re LIENVOY sourcing.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM NO 688 1 JUN 55 REPLACES FORM 53.92 WHICH MAY BE USED

SOURCE RECORD

(24)

PROJECT
EP

SOURCE
LITAMIL-9

SUBJECT
Postponement of A Trip to Cuba by David ALFARO Siqueiros; Fear of Expulsion from Mexico

DATE OF INFORMATION
30 Oct 1964

DATE ACQUIRED
5 Nov 64

FIELD DISTRIBUTION
DATE 7 Nov 64
GRADE B-2
TO

WASH. DISTRIBUTION
DATE
GRADE B-2
TO

FIELD NO.
REPORT HMM-9339
CABLE MEXI-1503
IN
RI NO.

REPORTS OFFICER

C.S. -3/
05971-64

EVAL. REQUESTED

AREA
Mexico/Cuba

COMMENTS: (REASON FOR REJECTION; CUSTOMERS AND DESK EVALUATIONS; SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION OR LOAN NOTES; COMMENTS TO FIELD, ETC.)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This cable was referred to the desk. It was disseminated as a CS report with minor editorial changes.

The comment was re-written to include more information from the referenced report, which will show that he probably plans to paint another mural in Cuba.

FORM NO. 688 REPLACES FORM 59-92 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 JUN 55

SOURCE RECORD

(24) 3

SECRET (When Filled In)

REPORT PROCESSING RECORD

CITE [illegible]

NON-INTEL FORMAT

PRECEDENCE: [illegible]

ACTION DIV.: [illegible]

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

IN NO. [illegible]

TDCS

[illegible] 31 64
RECEIVED

[illegible] 7 [illegible] 64
NOT DISSEMINATED

DISSEMINATED

COMMENTS

OUR SOURCE CARD FOR LITAMIL-9 ENJOINS IW TO MODIFY WH/1'S APPROVED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS ONLY ON CONSULTATION ~~X~~ WITH THE DESK. THE FIELD BYLINE IS CONSPICUOUSLY DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO HQS BYLINES IN THAT THE ~~FIXX~~ FIELD OMITS MENTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY. THEREFORE (AT 2 A.M.), TO WH/1 FOR ACTION.

Besides, didn't warrant cable dissem!
R.

RECEIVED

NOT DISSEMINATED

DISSEMINATED

FORM 1736 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
8-64

SECRET

(13-20)

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 15 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

[redacted]
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 18 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

[redacted]
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

[illegible]

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

SECRET

7 November 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9 (C-101,331)
201-329609

REFS: A. HMMW-11983, 4 October 1963
B. MEXI-6696 (In 49286)

1. At the request of the Chief, CI/OA, reference A was forwarded to Mexico City Station requesting the Station to attempt to clarify certain derogatory information which had been reported on LITAMIL-9. Reference B contains the Mexico City Station attempt to clarify this matter.

2. It is requested that the processing of an OA for the use of LITAMIL-9 be resumed.

[redacted]
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File

Not accepted by CI/OA

7 November 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9 (C-101,331)
201-329609

REFS: A. HMMW-11988, 4 October 1963
B. MEXI-6696 (In 49286)

1. At the request of the Chief, CI/OA, reference A was forwarded to Mexico City Station requesting the Station to attempt to clarify certain derogatory information which had been reported on LITAMIL-9. Reference B contains the Mexico City Station attempt to clarify this matter.

2. It is requested that the processing of an OA for the use of LITAMIL-9 be resumed.

[redacted]
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File

Not accepted by CI/OA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, SAS 8, OS 2, RF, VR

SECRET 282304Z

29OCT63 IN 49286

DIR CITE MEXI 6696

PBRUMEN

D/A

REF: HMMW 11968 [redacted]

1. SUGGEST HQS CONTACT LINOZZLE AT PENTAGON FOR ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY 1959 REPORT FROM [redacted] THAT LITAMIL-9 BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST SINCE THIS CONFLICTS WITH NUMBEROUS REPORTS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO L-9. STATION RELUCTANT CONTACT [redacted] WHO NOW [redacted] LEST THIS FLAG INTEREST IN L-9. ODIBEX OFFICERS REPORT THEY HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH [redacted] RECEIVED ALMOST NOTHING OF INTEL VALUE FROM HIM IN PAST.

2. BELIEVE ANY EFFORT LCFLUTTER L-9 THIS TIME WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF AGENT WHO, WITH IMPENDING RETIREMENT LITAMIL-7, REPRESENTS ONLY PENETRATION PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WHO SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS STRAIN OF DOUBLE EXISTENCE. STATION FULLY APPRECIATES VALUE LCFLUTTER PROCESS AND REVIEW OF RECORDS WILL SHOW HEAVY USE THIS INVESTIGATIVE MEASURE MEXI. L-9 HAS BEEN SUBJECT CLOSE AND CONTINUAL ASSESSMENT SINCE RECRUITMENT. PAST AND PRESENT CASE OFFICERS, WHO OFTEN DISAGREED, BOTH ASSESSED L-9 INDEPENDENTLY AS SINCERE PBRUMEN PATRIOT WHO GENUINELY ANTI-ANTHUG, ANTI-COMMUNIST.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

BOTH CASE OFFICERS AGREED ANY ATTEMPT PUT L-9 ON LCFLUTTER WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE HIM TO QUIT. L-9 NOT LIKELY EVER DEVELOP INTO STRONG ACTION AGENT OWING TO FEAR OF COMPROMISE BUT SERVES AS INVALUABLE EYES AND EARS INSIDE TARGET ESTABLISHMENT. HIS DATA VALUABLE BASIS FOR MOUNTING MORE PRODUCTIVE OPS INSIDE SAME TARGET. STATION HAS NEVER DETECTED ANY DECEPTION HIS PART.

3. EVEN ASSUMING L-9 HAD ONCE BEEN COMMUNIST, WHICH STATION DOES NOT ASSUME, FEEL OPERATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED PROCEED AS RUNNING IN-PLACE DEFECTOR ON SAME BASIS RUNNING HYPOTHETICAL IN-PLACE SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO KNOWN CP MEMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, SAS 8, OS 2, RF, VR

SECRET 282304Z

23 OCT 63 IN 49286

DIR CITE MEXI 6696

PBRUMEN

D/A

REF: HMMW 11983 [redacted]

1. SUGGEST HQS CONTACT LI[illegible]OZZLE AT PENTAGON FOR ASSESSMENT RELIABILITY 1959 REPORT FROM [redacted] THAT LITAMIL-9 BELIEVED TO BE COMMUNIST SINCE THIS CONFLICTS WITH NUMBEROUS REPORTS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES MORE CLOSELY RELATED TO L-9. STATION RELUCTANT CONTACT [redacted] WHO NOW COMMANDING [redacted] LEST THIS FLAG INTEREST IN L-9. ODIBEX OFFICERS REPORT THEY HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH [redacted], RECEIVED ALMOST NOTHING OF INTEL VALUE FROM HIM IN PAST.

2. BELIEVE ANY EFFORT LCFLUTTER L-9 THIS TIME WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF AGENT WHO, WITH IMPENDING RETIREMENT LITAMIL-7, REPRESENTS ONLY PENETRATION PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WHO SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS STRAIN OF DOUBLE EXISTENCE. STATION FULLY APPRECIATES VALUE LCFLUTTER PROCESS AND REVIEW OF RECORDS WILL SHOW HEAVY USE THIS INVESTIGATIVE MEASURE MEXI. L-9 HAS BEEN SUBJECT CLOSE AND CONTINUAL ASSESSMENT SINCE RECRUITMENT. PAST AND PRESENT CASE OFFICERS, WHO OFTEN DISAGREED, BOTH ASSESSED L-9 INDEPENDENTLY AS SINCERE PBRUMEN PATRIOT WHO GENUINELY ANTI-AMTHUG, ANTI-COMMUNIST.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

BOTH CASE OFFICERS AGREED ANY ATTEMPT PUT L-9 ON LCFLUTTER WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE HIM TO QUIT. L-9 NOT LIKELY EVER DEVELOP INTO STRONG ACTION AGENT OWING TO FEAR OF COMPROMISE BUT SERVES AS INVALUABLE EYES AND EARS INSIDE TARGET ESTABLISHMENT. HIS DATA VALUABLE BASIS FOR MOUNTING MORE PRODUCTIVE OPS INSIDE SAME TARGET. STATION HAS NEVER DETECTED ANY DECEPTION HIS PART.

3. EVEN ASSUMING L-9 HAD ONCE BEEN COMMUNIST, WHICH STATION DOES NOT ASSUME, FEEL OPERATION SHOULD BE ALLOWED PROCEED AS RUNNING IN-PLACE DEFECTOR ON SAME BASIS RUNNING HYPOTHETICAL IN-PLACE SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO KNOWN CP MEMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES:
A. MEXI 1506, 26 July 1962
B. DIR-18912, 19 Feb. 1963
C. MEXI 3497, Para 11, 19 Feb 1963
D. MEXI 5015, 14 June 1963

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paras 6 and 7.

1. Although PRQ, Parts I and II, for LITAMIL-9 have been submitted by the Station to Headquarters along with results of Station traces , we have not been able to obtain an OA for Subject as requested because of the derogatory information on Subject which was reported in para 2 of MEXI 1506. (Ref A).

2. In Reference B, Headquarters requested the Station to clarify the derogatory information that was reported in MEXI 1506. This clarification was requested by KUDESK prior to the granting of a POA.

3. The Station replied to this request per Ref C. KUDESK granted a POA only for training of Subject on 20 Feb 1963.

4. KUDESK, however, deferred granting of an operational approval for Subject pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information on Subject which was contained in MEXI 1506.

(Continued)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11988

DATE: 17 OCT
4 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-329609

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID///	M
1 - RI 1 Chrono	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/PI~~	
WH3/MEX	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/3/Mexico/H.E. Mulloy;dc
OFFICER: H E Mulloy
EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	9 Oct 63	Mr. Brown Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	14 OCT 1963	J. C. KING

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

KUDESK does not consider that this was accomplished by the Station's answer contained in Ref C.

5. KUDESK has informed the desk that an OA for LITAMIL-9 cannot be granted until their request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from a Mexican Army G-2 officer in MEXI 1506 has been resolved to their satisfaction.

6. It is requested, therefore, that the Station again attempt to resolve the DI on LITAMIL-9 by debriefing the Mexican G-2 officer re his info on Subject either through the ODIBEX office or directly if this is possible and if the Mexican officer is available. In a further effort to resolve the problem, it is also requested that LITAMIL-9 be LCFLUTTERED ASAP.

7. Please cable the results of your efforts re the above request so that the processing for an OA for LITAMIL-9 can proceed.

END OF DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PERUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. MEXI 1506, 26 July 1962

B. DIR-18912, 19 Feb. 1963

C. MEXI 3497, Para 11, 19 Feb 1963

D. MEXI 5015, 14 June 1963

ACTION REQUIRED: See Paras 6 and 7.

1. Although PRQ, Parts I and II, for LITAMIL-9 have been submitted by the Station to Headquarters along with results of Station traces , we have not been able to obtain an OA for Subject as requested because of the derogatory information on Subject which was reported in para 2 of MEXI 1506. (Ref A).

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3. The Station replied to this request per Ref C. KUDESK granted a POA only for training of Subject on 20 Feb 1963.

4. KUDESK, however, deferred granting of an operational approval for Subject pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information on Subject which was contained in MEXI 1506.

(Continued)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11988	17 OCT 4 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-329609

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/RI	
1 RI Chrono	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH3/MEX	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/H.E. Mulloy;dc		5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	9 Oct 63	Mr. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	14 OCT 1963	J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

KUDESK does not consider that this was accomplished by the Station's answer contained in Ref C.

5. KUDESK has informed the desk that an OA for LITAMIL-9 cannot be granted until their request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from a Mexican Army G-2 officer in MEXI 1506 has been resolved to their satisfaction.

6. It is requested, therefore, that the Station again attempt to resolve the DI on LITAMIL-9 by debriefing the Mexican G-2 officer re his info on Subject either through the ODIBEX office or directly if this is possible and if the Mexican officer is available. In a further effort to resolve the problem, it is also requested that LITAMIL-9 be LCFLUTTERED ASAP.

7. Please cable the results of your efforts re the above request so that the processing for an OA for LITAMIL-9 can proceed.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

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Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/2/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21849

DATE
31 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
X ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief, SAS; Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contact Report/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PBRUMEN LITAMIL 9

Attached herewith are contact reports of meetings with LITAMIL-9 on 17 and 29 July 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/2/att
2 - C/SAS w/2/att
2 - COS WAVE w/2/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21849

DATE
31 July 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 330173

[illegible] introduced to the [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible]).

(c) [illegible] the new [illegible], [illegible] because he has done much [illegible] Nations.

(d) [illegible] also reported that the [illegible] in [illegible] trouble obtaining newsprint.

(e) [illegible] said that when he was in [illegible] he had trouble with the climate -- [illegible] to be sent to some other European [illegible] -- [illegible] surprised at the suddenness of his transfer to [illegible].

(f) [illegible] made a [illegible] as to who should be [illegible] Embassy [illegible] about [illegible] might be acceptable but [illegible] himself [illegible] assumed I would never ask [illegible] [illegible] de [illegible] -- might be approachable there.

(g) Only the Cubans were invited to the French Ambassador's residence on Bastille Day (14 July) -- [illegible]. Each came separately but [illegible] in the Ambassador's car. The [illegible] clearly [illegible] with the French -- [illegible] is a close friend of the French Military Attache to whom he introduced [illegible] -- and the Amb kept [illegible] by his side during the reception -- [illegible] speaks good French. At this affair, [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] a superficial [illegible] of [illegible] and it became clear that the [illegible] presence of the Soviets in the city to [illegible]. [illegible] remarked that he would be leaving soon [illegible] would be replaced with "another young man, [illegible] as I am." [illegible] and the Amb agreed that current American policy for Latin [illegible] is designed to give the impression that such governments [illegible] the new one in Argentina represent a democratic advance when in fact they are fronting for the military.

(h) [illegible] youth named Ulises [illegible] was in the Embassy [illegible] -- spoke with [illegible]. He represents a group [illegible] in Ecuador [illegible] trying to go to Cuba [illegible] will probably get there. He has a mustache and beard -- brought a book as a gift for [illegible].

(i) [illegible] is busy working on the forthcoming Congress of [illegible] which is to take place in Havana. He is dealing principally with a man named [illegible] on this [illegible]. [illegible] says that the US Government has been applying lots of pressure to have the seat of the congress [illegible] to some other country -- without success. A check for [illegible] dollars, representing [illegible] subscription fee paid by Mexican delegates to the congress, has been sent to Havana.

(j) [illegible] in the Embassy seems unduly upset by the restrictions [illegible] currency transactions with Cuba.

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR [illegible]

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT : [illegible] -9, 17 July [illegible]

1. [illegible] held [illegible] July -- [illegible] University [illegible] place at 2100 [illegible] 2100 [illegible] of Gutenberg and [illegible] A-1 -- but as [illegible] said, in English, [illegible] -9 [illegible] the mystery was [illegible] about 2030 hours [illegible] probably be back [illegible] hour -- I [illegible] (from the pay [illegible] saw [illegible] around by this [illegible] the word that I [illegible] explained [illegible] (party [illegible] he was [illegible] better pick up [illegible] was made [illegible] scheduled [illegible] (with A-1). [illegible] Hotel there [illegible] vicinity of [illegible] field. L-9 was dropped off at 2325 hours.

2. I reveal [illegible] ambassador and [illegible] are [illegible] dangerous. [illegible] a complete [illegible] were explained [illegible] schedule and [illegible] turning -- and [illegible] made in [illegible] out the details.

3. I reported [illegible] to inaugurate an [illegible] of Cuban engravings [illegible] the Escuela de [illegible] event [illegible] night of 20 [illegible] leave [illegible] July -- return about 21 [illegible] Cuban Consulate [illegible] Grupo [illegible] -- two weeks. [illegible] cultural [illegible] -- and will [illegible]

4. He reported [illegible] additional developments:

(a) [illegible] of the 26th of July [illegible] will be held in [illegible] of Tarpiles. This celebration -- [illegible] -- will take place in the [illegible] (or [illegible]). The principal [illegible] at [illegible] The event will take place

L-9 [illegible] want to have a photographer there and might [illegible] to drop a stink bomb or [illegible]

(b) [illegible], who was introduced [illegible] Jacqueline KENNEDY during the President's trip to Mexico [illegible] supporter [illegible] and who apparently [illegible] interest of Mrs. Kennedy, [illegible] in the United States and is planning to go there. I have no further details.

Att #2 to HMMA 21849 CS COPY

201-329609

(c) I turned over to B (for return) a [illegible] la [illegible] de [illegible] 20 [illegible] 1963, explaining that [illegible] Fidel Castro to act as sponsor of the 1962-1963 [illegible] class. Copy attached.

(1) I turned over a pornographic cartoon (for return) [illegible] pro-Castro elements in Tampico. Copy also attached.

(m) [illegible] the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that [illegible] has a sister [illegible] in [illegible] an American of Mexican descent, [illegible] to the border to visit her sister soon — or her [illegible] may take the trip — details not clear.

5. L-9 reports that he is very well [illegible] with the new [illegible] seems to respect him [illegible] getting along very nicely with his new boss, [illegible]. He is also [illegible] gathering method is [illegible] to keep his eyes and ears open [illegible] — thus he often gets only fragments — while questions or direct [illegible] might fill in detail [illegible] lest he arouse any suspicion.

6. While he [illegible] engraving exhibit on the [illegible] in Tampico and the subsequent [illegible] the 26th in Ciudad [illegible] — he was also concerned lest any [illegible] got him in trouble [illegible] he is the principal organizer of both affairs — felt that the Mexican Government might think the disruption was engineered by the Castro Cubans, themselves, to throw suspicion on the anti-Castroites.

7. L-9 is really worried about his security and it will be up to me to take every practical precaution to protect him. He loves to talk — quite a conversationalist — [illegible] constant encouragement and cheering-up. He is [illegible] himself on the back quite often and wait for a further pat [illegible] his case officer (which B is always quick to add). This characteristic [illegible] his conversation when he stops and says, "I did very well [illegible]" or "That was a good [illegible] idea I had, wasn't it?" or "I think my ideas on handling such-and-such are pretty clever, don't you?"

3. For the [illegible] decided to keep holding meetings in B's car — always at [illegible] up point has been abandoned in favor of a mobile pick up [illegible] at the corner of Thiers and Melchor Ocampo at the prescribed [illegible] slowly up the street to Thiers and Gutenberg — then, without [illegible] work his way back down the opposite side of the street to Mel[illegible] — B will cruise by in his car and make the pick up while L is walking. Other [illegible] details will be worked out at the next meeting.

Lau[illegible] F. [illegible]

SECRET

201-329609

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. With reference to your memorandum dated 24 June 1963 attaching FRQ Part II and requesting an Operational Approval for Subject's use, your attention is directed to derogatory information forwarded by Station Mexico to the effect that an ODIBEX report dated 25 August 1959 stated that Col. Arturo [illegible], Mexican Army G-2, believed Subject to be a Communist and one of the most influential members of the Cuban Embassy staff.

2. On 18 September 1962 we requested SAS, which then had Headquarters responsibility for this case, to request Station Mexico City to determine the basis for Mexico G-2's allegation, to obtain any evidence substantiating the allegation, and to conduct such investigation as was possible to determine the truth or falseness of the allegation. It was further agreed that SAS would determine whether the Station had direct access to Subject and would recommend polygraphing him if it were feasible. We have no indication that any of this has been accomplished or attempted.

3. On 20 February 1963, because of the exigencies of the situation at that particular time, a Provisional Operational Approval was granted only for training of Subject. The Provisional Operational Approval specified that approval for operational use of the Subject was deferred pending satisfactory resolution of the derogatory information, which CI Staff did not consider to have been accomplished. The FRQ Part II on Subject clearly shows that he has been used operationally for the past year without any approval.

4. Operational Approval for Subject's use cannot be granted until there has been compliance with our previous request to resolve the derogatory information as reported by ODIBEX from Mexican G-2.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Acting Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION: Wayne Carley

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

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Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Acting Chief, CI/OA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Cuban Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico/Luis *ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

TYPIC PBRUMEN

Reference:
(A) DIR 28665
(B) MEXI 0444
(C) MEXI 0511
(D) MEXI 1467
(E) MEXI 1626
(F) MEXI 2904
(G) MEXI 2967
(H) MEXI 2998
(I) MEXI 3006
(J) MEXI 3012
(K) MEXI [illegible]
(L) MEXI 3066
(M) MEXI 3078
(N) MEXI 3178
(O) MEXI 3199
(P) MEXI 3217
(Q) MEXI [illegible]

personal details

1. FULL NAME: Luis F*ALBERU Souto 201-329609 CIT: Cuba OCC: Diplomat
DIPLOMATIC OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: Cultural Attache. PP number D/62/80
PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain
DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915
PASSPORT NUMBER: D/62/80
FAMILY MEMBERS: Mother: Josefine F*SOUTO - Self
Sisters: Xenia F*ALBERU Souto - Sis
Marilu F*ALBERU Souto
Brothers: Leonel F*ALBERU Souto
Alfredo F*ALBERU Souto

CIT: Cuba
of Luis ALBERU
SOUTO 201-329609
Cuban Cultural Attache
in Mexico City

RESIDENCE: Michelet 7 - 301
Mexico D.F. Mexico
PHOTOGRAPH: Attached
DATE OF ARRIVAL AT POST: Date of entry into Mexico unknown, prior to Dec 1949, however. Has been employed with the Cuban Government since June 1959.

2. See cited references and the LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9 Contact Reports for further information on Subject.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD w/att 1cc: WH/3
2 - COS WAVE w/o/att
3 - Files

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA 21622

DATE: 27 June 1963

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, WAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Cuban Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico/Luis *ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

TYPIC PBRUMEN

Reference: (A) DIR 28865
(B) MEXI 0444
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(F) MEXI 2904
(G) MEXI 2967
(H) MEXI 2998
(I) MEXI 3006
(J) MEXI 3012
(K) MEXI 3035
(L) MEXI 3066
(M) MEXI 3078
(N) MEXI 3178
(O) MEXI 3199
(P) MEXI 3217
[illegible]

✓1. FULL NAME: Luis F *ALBERU Souto CIT:Cuba OCC:Diplomat
DIPLOMATIC OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: Cultural Attache. PP number D/62/80
PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain
DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915
PASSPORT NUMBER: D/62/80
FAMILY MEMBERS: Mother: Josefina F *SOUTO - self
Sisters: Xenia F *ALBERU Souto - self
Mariluz F *ALBERU Souto
Brothers: Leonel F *ALBERU Souto
Alfredo F *ALBERU Souto
CIT:Cuba of Luis ALBERU Souto 201-329609 Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City
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Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD w/att 1cc to WH/3
2 - COS WAVE w/o/att
3 - Files

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21622

DATE
27 June 1963

201-329609

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

CS COPY

201-[illegible]27609

ATTACHMENT HMMA 21622

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET

photo & true name



Luis
ALBERU
Souto

SECRET

CS COPY

201-129609

ATTACHMENT HMMA 21622

TO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET



Luis ALBERU Souto

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION PUSHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WHD, w/att, 3 copies
2 - Files

201-329609

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Encl-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 17 June 1963	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA 21557	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER P - 6079	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 13b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on [illegible] by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the Subject, a PERUMEN diplomat, to debrief and use as a penetration of the PERUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Lawrence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a
1 NOV 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-20)

att to HMMA-21557

201-329609

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. FARMERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LICOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cogniscent of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with CUYCKE is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS; GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. - EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home or at the PBRUMEN Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE 17 June 1963	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Clyde K SHRYOCK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitment - LITAMIL/9

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitment on LITAMIL/9.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
~~2~~ - Finance w/att
1 - WH w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-3842

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 13 June 1963

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] OPS and is chargeable to [illegible]. The effective date of the oral contract is 15 June 1963 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA. Date Requested 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid $4,000.00 M.N. per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 320 dollars. Subject (X) will ( )will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to a months salary. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Birthdays, holidays, ~~[illegible]~~ with approval of COS.

5. TAXES: Subject ( )is (X)is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( )will ( )will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed:

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Clyde K. [illegible]
Case Officer

REVIEWED: [illegible]
Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P [illegible]79
1 Support

Joseph B. [illegible]

SECRET

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: OA on Subject

There are attached three (3) copies of PRQ Part II on Subject and operational approval is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ Part II

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WHD, w/att, 3 copies
2 - Files

201-329609

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Encl-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21557

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
P - 6079

SECRET

PRQ NO.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the Subject, a PBRUMEN diplomat, to debrief and use as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Lawrence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 NOV 56

SECRET

(4-20)

att to HMMA-21557

201-329609

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARMERS and Edward D. KNARMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

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1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

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SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LICOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

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See para 1

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Submitted 27 July 1962 EMMA 15455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

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Subject's relationship with ODYOKE is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1- INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. - EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

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3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1- GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

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Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
17 June 1963	Clyde K SHRYOCK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitment - LITAMIL/9

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitment on LITAMIL/9.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
2 - Finance w/att
1 - WH w/o att

DATE TYPED
17 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-3842

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 13 June 1963

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] OPS .and is chargeable to [illegible]. The effective date of the oral contract is 15 June 1963 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA. Date Requested 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid $4,000.00 M.N. per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PEPRIME currency is 320 dollars. Subject (X) will ( )will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to a months salary. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Birthdays, holidays, ~~[illegible]~~ with approval of COS.

5. TAXES: Subject ( )is (x)is not subject to PEPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PEPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner:

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses:

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject ( )will (X)will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( )will ( )will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed:

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation:

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

SIGNED: Clyde K. [illegible]
Case Officer

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P [illegible]79
1 Support

Joseph B. Regan

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1615 14 JUN OH)

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, S/C 2

SECRET 141903Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5715

PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

IN60150

14 JUN 1963

STATION HAS NO RECORD POA LITAMIL-9. PLEASE ADVISE. NO INDEX.

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~

field was never notified that POA for training only was granted. Derog info still not resolved to CI/OA's satisfaction.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

221

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1615 14 JUN OH)
INFO : DOP, CI/OA, SAS 8, S/C 2

SECRET 141903Z
PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5715 IN60150 14 JUN 1963
PBRUMEN LITAMIL-9

STATION HAS NO RECORD POA LITAMIL-9. PLEASE ADVISE. NO INDEX.

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~

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SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDING FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S E C R E T
Classification

JFK MICROFILM FILE SUMMARY

SUMMARY; REEL 12, FOLDER(S) 4A & 5 CREATED by Bryant Rogers

SUBJECT OF FOLDER: LITAMIL-9

201 NUMBER, IF ANY 329609

INCLUSIVE DATES OF FILE MATERIAL JULY 62 THROUGH AUGUST 72.

RELEVANCE OR NON-RELEVANCE TO OSWALD & JFK ASSASSINATION:
NONE

REASON OR ASSUMED REASON FOR INCLUSION IN THIS COLLECTION:
In the HSCA testimony of Silvia Duran she indicated that she knew him and he was the Cultural Attache at the Cuban Consulate when she was there. This info was not in the 201 file.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION WITHIN FILE:

LITAMIL-9 was recruited by the Mexico City Station in late 62 while he was assigned to the Cuban Embassy as Cultural Attache. He provided the Station intelligence while he was in this assignment. He was deactivated in March 1965 when he returned to Cuba and was seen only occasionally after that. His contract was terminated in 1970 because of his lack of access. Only one relevant document was found which indicated that Proenza, who worked at the Cuban Embassy, believed that the strong objection to the Mexican Government by the Cuban Embassy over the Duran's detention was a diplomatic error. This document was processed for release.

CIA/US. GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP:
AGENT

PAGES OF NON-JFK-RELATED MATERIAL: 491

Third agency
document on
LITAMIL-9

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

Jack Stewart.

TO: WH/1 -- W.J. Kaufman -

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

DATE: 21 December 1965 jab

C NO. C - 101331

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐ PRQ I
☐ PRQ II
☐ FIELD TRACES
☐ RI TRACES
☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐ GREEN LIST

☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
XX OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965.

This was to advise that it is not CI/OA practice to issue POAs for 6 months under these circumstances. However, this is no bar to handling the agent as we proposed in our memo of

Jack Stewart

To be handled
as basket agent
No POA

Done
201

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 (C-101331) is due to expire 8 January 1965.

2. In discussions with the field case officer for this operation, WH/1/Mexico has found that there is no way to determine when, or whether, LITAMIL-9 will again leave Cuba. For reasons of personal security, LITAMIL-9 has not been able to function as a reporting source since his return to Cuba in early March 1965. Letters to his brother, LITAMIL-17, and reports from occasional Cuban official travelers transiting Mexico indicate that LITAMIL-9 is well and is employed by the National Cultural Council.

3. LITAMIL-9 is now an inactive agent. The Station has recently proposed that his salary cease accumulating as of 30 June 1966. If and when he again manages to leave Cuba, he will be contacted and a full assessment of his future usefulness will be made. Owing to the fact that his sister-in-law is a secretary to Fidel Castro it is expected that he will be a valuable source of information, at least for an initial debriefing period.

4. It would be appreciated if the POA on LITAMIL-9 could be extended for six months. If at the end of that time he has not left Cuba, it will be proposed that the POA be allowed to expire.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - (201-329609)
1 - C-101331

WH/1/Stewart:nre 16 Dec 65

Jane

ВЪЗДУШНА ПОЩА
PAR AVION

НР БЪЛГАРИЯ

20 ст
NR BULGARIA

Куба, Habana
гр. Comp. Luis Alberú
ул. № 11, nº 25509
Rpto Parcelación Zayas
Fontanar
La Gran Habana
Cuba

ВАРНА - VARNA
Местността „Побити камъни"
Le lieu „La forêt de pierres"
Die Gegend „Versteinerter Wald"

Querido Luis ¿cómo está ud.?

Antes de salir yo le llamé para preguntar su dirección y, claro está, para decir el último adiós (¡por 3 meses!), pero Ud. no estaba. Seguramente Ud. estuvo de cara al campo después del ciclón. Si es así, le deseo que Ud. sube como durante la Guerrilla de Girón, ¡no le sienta muy bien!

Hace ya 3 días que estamos en Bulgaria: un día en Sofía y dos – en Varna, en la casa de descanso del MINREX búlgaro. El viaje pasó bien, pero muy fatigante; no podíamos dormir porque no había la noche – a las 9 se ocultó el sol y a las 12 salió de nuevo. En Praga estuvimos un día, esperando. [illegible] Vimos unas [illegible] de Luxemburgo en un hotel-bar. En Sofía todo está bien. Hace bastante calor durante el día, pero las noches son muy frías. Aquí en Varna la misma historia, pero todas las playas están llenas de turistas que se ponen calientes y se bañan en el mar frío. Nosotros no nos bañamos [illegible] [illegible] Luis, hasta luego. [illegible]

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Dear Luis, how are you? Before leaving I called you to verify your address and, of course, to say "the last goodbye" (for three months!), but you weren't there. Surely you had your mind on the countryside after the hurricane. If you did, I wish that you could climb like during the fifteen days of Girón, that would suit you very well.

We have been in Bulgaria for three days now: one day in Sofia and two in Varna in the guest house of the Bulgarian [illegible]. The trip went fine, but it was very fatiguing; we couldn't sleep because it wasn't night -- at 9 the sun set and at 12 came out again. In Prague we spent one day while waiting for the plane to Sofia. We are living like Counts of Luxembourg in a luxury hotel. In Sofia everything is fine. It is quite hot during the day, but the nights are very cold. Here in Varna it's the same story, but all the hotels are full of tourists who get brave and go swimming in the cold sea. As for us, we haven't gone swimming yet. And generally after Cuba I am indifferent to the sea. Luis, until later.

Kira KOSOVSKA

Avia RE

NR BULGARIA
TOKYO 1964
SOFIA

Куба, Хавана
Camp. Luis Alberú
Departamento de Relaciones Culturales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura (CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Relly y Tacón, La Plaza de Armas
11 'La Habana'
Cuba

СОФИЯ - SOFIA
Джамията
La mosquée
Die Moschee
Снимка: Стр. Добрев

¡Buenos días, Luis! ¿C[illegible] andan? ¡Nosotros estamos bien, recordamos frecuentemente a La Habana y a nuestros amigos (yo - a un hombre „aburrido" también). Después del Mar Negro estuvimos una semana en Sofía, y la semana siguiente descansamos en la casa turística de la Radio-Sofía (antes de salir para Cuba yo trabajaba en la Radio-Sofía), situada en la montaña Vitosha, cerca de Sofía. Los búlgaros llaman esa montaña „pulmones de la capital". Es un lugar muy bonito. Nosotros viviendo en las ciudades, olvidamos frecuentemente las alegrías simples - acostarnos en la hierba y mirar el cielo, escuchar el silencio - ¿verdad? En Vitosha recordamos todo eso. Ahora estamos en Sofía preparándonos para continuar nuestro turismo por las montañas. A mí me gusta mucho andar y ahora tengo esta posibilidad. Pensamos subir al pico más alto en Bulgaria - Mus-alá (2925 m.) No es difícil - no es tan alto. Qué buen país es Bulgaria, pero según mi opinión le faltan hombres contemplativos, - sí, verdad, - todos son demasiado prácticos. ¡Hasta luego, Luis!

ФОТОИЗДАТ АКП-2128 13 ст

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good morning, Luis! How are you? We are well. We frequently think of Havana and of our friends (I - of a "bored" man too). After the Black Sea we spent one week in Sofia, and the following week we relaxed at the Radio Sofia tourist house (before leaving for Cuba I worked for Radio Sofia), located on the Vitusha, near Sofia. The Bulgarians call this mountain "lungs of the capital". It's a very lovely place. Living in cities, we frequently forget simple pleasures -- lying down in the grass and looking at the sky, listening to the silence. Isn't that true? On Vitosha (sic) we remembered all that. We are now in Sofia, preparing to continue our tour through the mountains. I like to walk a lot, and now I have the opportunity. We plan to climb the highest peak in Bulgaria -- Mus-ala (2925 meters). It isn't difficult -- it's not very high. What a good country Bulgaria is, but in my opinion she lacks contemplative men. Yes, yes, that's true. They are all too practical. Until later, Luis!

Kira KOSOVSKA

ПО ВЪЗДУХА
PAR AVION

NR BULGARIA

ST 20

NR BULGARIA

VARNA
20.6.66-11

RE



Гр. с. Куба, Хабана

Ул. № Comp. Luis Alberú
Departamento de Relaciones
Culturales con el extranjero
Consejo Nacional de Cultura
(CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Relly y Tacón,
La Plaza de Armas
La Habana
Cuba

¡Buenas noches, Luis!

¿Cómo ha estado Ud.? Como siempre, ¿trabajando mucho? Qué hacer – de dos opiniones sobre el trabajo („y caballos mueren del trabajo" y „el trabajo creó al Hombre") es mejor seleccionar la segunda, ¿verdad?

Todavía estamos en Varna, más exacto – a unos 15 km de la ciudad de Varna, eso no importa porque todo aquí es la zona de playas, hoteles etc. El tiempo hizo bueno, y ahora nosotros nos bañamos y tomamos sol, pero lo hacemos sin afán – somos mimados para siempre por las playas Santa María y Atlántico y por el sol cubano! Al mismo tiempo es muy agradable que aquí no hay tiburones y se puede nadar dondequiera.

Durante 2 años nosotros olvidamos muchas cosas y ahora nos admiramos del clima, de la naturaleza etc. Es verdad – aquí el aire mismo es absolutamente distinto, fresco, sano, lleno de olores de la hierba y de los árboles. A unas 300-400 m de la costa comienzan las montañas, cubiertas de bosques. Lamento mucho de que Ud. Luis, no pueda ver todo eso, pero soy optimista y estoy segura que tarde o temprano Ud. visitará Bulgaria. ¿Sabe lo que cuentan acerca de la formación del país? - Cuando Dios dividía la Tierra entre los ingleses, franceses y otros, el búlgaro no pudo venir porque estaba trabajando. Entonces cuando vino, ya no había tierra. Dios le regañó, pero tuvo que hacer algo. Entonces él tomó un cuchillo y cortó para el búlgaro un pedazito del paraíso.

No exagero - en realidad la costa del Mar Negro en Bulgaria es muy bonita. Ahora aquí están de descanso cerca de 25-30 miles de extranjeros. Y lo que es muy interesante - la mayoría eran de los países capitalistas. A cada paso se oye el francés, alemán, sueco. Tenemos un conocido - director de uno de los hoteles; él, por exemplo, dice que en su hotel viven por 28 días algunas familias de Suiza y de Bélgica y que todos están muy contentos, diciendo que el descanso en Bulgaria es agradable y barato al mismo tiempo, más barato que en Nice o en Italia. Así Bulgaria desarrolla intensivamente el turismo internacional y, claro está, gana mucho.

Pero qué cosas aburridas escribo yo! Estoy segura que Ud. ya tiene sueño. De ninguna manera quiero que Ud. piense que son los ejercicios del español para no olvidarlo. Simplemente quiero contar algunas de mis impresiones y observaciones y Ud., un hombre tan bueno y fino, puede comprenderlo, ¿verdad?

Una cosa interesante más acerca del servicio turístico aquí. Están abiertos algunos restaurantes típicos nacionales donde se manifestó la fantasía búlgara. Por ejemplo, uno representa un lugar donde están ovejas (no sé como se llama en español), es un patio grande ~~[illegible]~~ dividido en patios pequeños, todo como en el pueblo; hay un foco de piedra en el suelo, donde hierva algo en un cesto grande, hay cocina de piedra también con el fuego dentro, hay algunas construcciones de campo

- todo verdadero. Para que el cuadro sea completo en uno de los patios pequeños se encuentra un burro, en otro 1 algunas ovejas y... todos respiran un olor terrible! Pero todos están contentos y sacan fotografías etc. Los camareros están vestidos en trajes nacionales y toca la orquesta nacional también. ¿Imagina Ud., Luis? Es muy simpático!

El otro restaurante, por ejemplo, representa el interior de (no sé en español, en francés - le moulin) hay la piedra para moler, hay sacos llenos donde se sienta etc., etc. La comida se sirve en platos nacionales... pero no hablemos de la comida: hay todo en abundancia. Después de las primeras admiraciones („qué sabrosas cerezas!" „qué grandes melocotones!" etc.) yo descubrí un gran peligro en todo eso para mí. Si, por ejemplo, Angel sube 2-4 libras no hacen problema, pero para mí es problema # 1!

Así termino. Para terminar le cuento un chiste (conveniente!) Una familia se acostó una noche. De pronto se oyó un ruido fuerte — el gato chocó algo en la cocina. Pero la mujer asustada gritó: „Corre, mi marido viene!" Y su esposo, asustado también, salió corriendo por la ventana en pijama.

Hasta luego, Luis. Le estrecho la mano. La carta - entre nous
cierta bien

Kazs [illegible]

Translation of a letter from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The letter was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good evening, Luis! How have you been? Working a lot, as always? Which to choose -- of two opinions on work ("horses die from working" and "work created Man") it is better to choose the second, isn't it?

We are still in Varna, more exactly some 15 kilometers from the city of Varna; this doesn't matter because everything here is the area of beaches, hotels, etc. The weather improved, and now we go swimming and sunbathing, but we do so without eagerness -- we are spoiled permanently by the Santa María and Atlantic beaches and by the Cuban sun! At the same time it is very nice that here there are no sharks and one can swim anywhere one wants.

In the course of two years we forgot many things and now we are enjoying the climate, nature, etc. It's true -- here even the air is absolutely different: fresh, healthful, full of the odors of grass and trees. Some 300 - 400 meters from the coast the mountains, covered with forests, begin. I am very sorry that you, Luis, cannot see all this, but I am an optimist and I am sure that sooner or later you will visit Bulgaria. Do you know what they say about the formation of the country? When God was dividing the Earth among the English, the French, and others, the Bulgarian could not come because he was working. Then when he came, there was no land left. God scolded him, but he had to do something. So he took a knife and cut a little piece of paradise for the Bulgarian.

I am not exaggerating -- really the coast of the Black Sea in Bulgaria is very pretty. Now there are about 25 - 30 thousand foreigners here on vacation. And what is very interesting -- the majority from the capitalistic countries. At every step one hears French, German, Swedish. We have an acquaintance -- the manager of one of the hotels; he, for example, says that some families from Switzerland and from Belgium have been living in his hotel for 28 days, and that all are very happy, saying that the vacation in Bulgaria is pleasant and inexpensive at the same time, less expensive than in Nice or Italy. Thus Bulgaria is developing international tourism intensively and, of course, is bringing in a lot of money.

But what boring things I'm writing! I'm sure that you are already sleepy. Not by any means do I want you to think that these are exercises in Spanish so as not to forget it. I simply want to relate some of my impressions and observations, and you, a man so good and fine, can understand, can't you?

One more interesting thing about the tourist service here. There are some typical national restaurants open where Bulgarian fantasy is represented. For example, one represents a place where there are sheep (I don't know what it is in Spanish). It's a large patio divided into small patios, everything like in a town. There is a stone hearth in the floor, where something boils in a big basket. There is a stone stove, also with a fire inside. There are some farm buildings, everything true to life. To make the picture complete, in one of the small patios there is a burro, in another, some sheep, and ... they all have a terrible odor! But everybody is happy and taking pictures, etc. The waiters are dressed in national costumes and the national orchestra plays too. Can you imagine it, Luis? It's very nice! The other restaurant, for example, represents the interior of (I don't know in Spanish, in French -- the mill). There is the stone for grinding, there are filled sacks where you sit, etc., etc. The food is served in national dishes ... but let's not talk about food -- there is everything in abundance. After the first admirations ("what delicious cherries!", what big peaches!", etc.), I discovered a great danger for me in all this. If, for example, Anguel gains 2 - 4 pounds, it's no problem but for me it's problem #1!

I'll close now. Before closing I'll tell you a joke (appropriate!). A family went to bed one night. Suddenly a loud noise was heard -- the cat knocked something over in the kitchen. But the frightened woman cried: "Run, my husband is coming!" and her husband, frightened also, jumped out of the window in his pajamas.

Until later, Luis. I give you my hand. The letter -- between us, is that all right?

Kira KOSOVSKA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 26552, 8 July 1965

1. LITAMIL-9 seems to be trapped inside PBRUMEN. On 18 August the Case Officer met with LITAMIL-17 (L-9's brother) to review two letters received from L-9. One of these, dated 15 July and mailed at Gander, Newfoundland (presumably by an airline crew member), used the term "de lo mas bien." This is an indicator meaning "I expect to leave within a year." In another (undated) letter L-9 reports that he has been promoted to "Secretario de Segunda."

2. L-9 asked for a large quantity of art supplies and mentioned that he is doing a lot of painting since he has not yet gone back to work. The quantity of material requested indicates that he expects to remain inside for some time.

3. The C/O asked L-17 to phone L-9, ostensibly to request further detail on how to ship the art supplies. In the course of the conversation L-17 was to ask L-9 how long he expected to remain in PBRUMEN. L-17 reported on 28 August that he had spoken with L-9. L-9 said he did not expect to leave for "a long time."

4. With the recent defections of AMWASP-1 and a PBRUMEN Ambassador in Europe it may be difficult for L-9 to obtain a foreign post. It is not likely that he could seriously be considered politically reliable by the PBRUMEN Government. With the return of his mother and sister from Spain he no longer has an excuse to request permission to visit Madrid. The only bright spot on the horizon is his sister-in-law's close relationship to AMTHUG. L-17 feels that it is to her advantage to have L-9 abroad so L-9 can send her consumer goods which are unobtainable in PBRUMEN.

5. At present the Station has no reason to believe L-9 will be able to leave PBRUMEN any time soon.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
4 - Files

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded [illegible]

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 27048	1 September 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-329609 (P-6079)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Marianao, Agosto 19 de 1965

Compañero Félix Guerrero
Director de la Orquesta
del Teatro Lírico
Teatro García Lorca, Habana.

Estimado compañero:
Por este medio le comunicamos que con motivo de la Fiesta Nacional de la R.P. de Bulgaria se ha confeccionado entre la Embajada de la R.P. de Bulgaria y este Consejo Nacional de Cultura la "Semana de la Cultura Búlgara" que se efectuará [illegible] de Septiembre próximo.

Como parte de la programación figuran un concierto por radio y televisión para el 3 de Septiembre próximo, y un concierto para el 7 de Septiembre próximo en el Palacio de Bellas Artes; tomando parte en ambos programas artistas búlgaros y cubanos;

Por lo cual le solicitamos atentamente el permiso que se acostumbra en estos casos a fin de que los compañeros artistas cuyos nombres damos a continuación, puedan cumplimentar sus actuaciones en los dos programas a que nos hemos referido.

El permiso para el prof. León Suruyón es para el día 3 de Septiembre próximo y los permisos para Alexander Neinek, León Suruyón, Nicola Borov y Nicola Danev para el día 7 también de Septiembre próximo.

Agradeciendo la valiosa colaboración que preste a este fin, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de Patria o Muerte,

Por la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Luis Alberdi.-

el 6 y el 7 no puede ser porque
estarán con Copelia en Varadero (información Agost. 24)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitments - LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are three authenticated copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LITAMIL-9.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	HMMT-5699	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to LIKAVIDE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by KUBARK upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is [illegible] dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expences for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site, Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by KUBARK. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government became aware of his activities for KUBARK, This does not imply [illegible].

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. DUTY AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project LIRAVINE and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: ________
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
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1 Support

SECRET

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Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

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SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

ENDORSED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 2 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AC REQ: See para 2

1. A Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 as a reporting source in PBRUMEN has been granted as of 8 July 1965.

2. Since the PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9 in our file dates from June 1963, and in view of his changed mission, Headquarters would appreciate the thoughtful preparation of a revised PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9. This should reach Headquarters perhaps sixty days prior to the expiration of this POA on 8 January 1966.

Anthony R. POMCHAY

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-128/3

FILE IN 201-239609

Distribution:
O & 1 -COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13795

DATE
12 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]
XXXXXXXXX SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-128/3
201-329609

ПО ВЪЗДУХА
PAR AVION

НР БЪЛГАРИЯ

5

20
NR BULGARIA



Куба, Хавана
гр. Comp. Luis Alberú
11, nº 25509
Rpto Parcelación Zayas
Fontanar
La Gran Habana
Cuba

ВАРНА · VARNA
Местността „Побити камъни"
Le lieu „La forêt de pierres"
Die Gegend „Versteinerter Wald"

Querido Luis cómo está Ud.?

Antes de salir yo le llamé para precisar su dirección y, claro está, para decir el último adiós (por 3 meses!), pero Ud. no estaba. Seguramente Ud. estuvo de cara al campo después del ciclón. Si es así, le deseo que Ud. sale como durante la Quincena de Girón, eso le sienta muy bien!

Hace ya 3 días que estamos en Bulgaria: un día en Sofía y dos - en Varna, en la casa de descanso del MINREX búlgaro. El viaje pasó bien, pero muy fatigante, no pudimos dormir porque no había la noche y a las 9 se ocultó el sol y a las 12 salió de nuevo. En Praga estuvimos un día, esperando del avión para Sofía. Vivimos como [illegible] de Luxemburgo en un hotel-bar. En Sofía todo está bien. Hace bastante calor durante el día pero las noches son muy frías. Aquí en Varna la misma historia, pero todos los hoteles están llenos de turistas que se ponen [illegible] y se bañan en el mar frío. Nosotros ni nos [illegible] [illegible] de Ud. — muy [illegible] el mar. Hasta luego. Sinceramente [illegible]

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Dear Luis, how are you? Before leaving I called you to verify your address and, of course, to say "the last goodbye" (for three months!), but you weren't there. Surely you had your mind on the countryside after the hurricane. If you did, I wish that you could climb like during the fifteen days of Girón, that would suit you very well.

We have been in Bulgaria for three days now: one day in Sofia and two in Varna in the guest house of the Bulgarian MINREX. The trip went fine, but it was very fatiguing; we couldn't sleep because it wasn't night -- at 9 the sun set and at 12 came out again. In Prague we spent one day while waiting for the plane to Sofia. We are living like Counts of Luxembourg in a luxury hotel. In Sofia everything is fine. It is quite hot during the day, but the nights are very cold. Here in Varna it's the same story, but all the hotels are full of tourists who get brave and go swimming in the cold sea. As for us, we haven't gone swimming yet. And generally after Cuba I am indifferent to the sea. Luis, until later.

Kira KOSOVSKA

Avia RE,

Куба, Хавана

Comp. Luis Alberú

Departamento de Relaciones Culturales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura (CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Reilly y Tacón, La Plaza de Armas
s/n
La Habana
Cuba

NR BULGARIA

SOFIA

СОФИЯ - SOFIA
~~Джамията~~
La mosquée
Die Moschee
Снимка: Стр. Добрев

¡Buenos días, Luis! ¿Cómo andan?

Nosotros estamos bien, recordamos frecuentemente a La Habana y a nuestros amigos (yo – a un hombre „aburrido" también). Después del Mar Negro estuvimos una semana en Sofía, y la semana siguiente descansamos en la casa turística de la Radio-Sofía (antes de salir para Cuba yo trabajaba en la Radio-Sofía), situada en la montaña Vitosha, cerca de Sofía. Los búlgaros llaman esa montaña „pulmones de la capital". Es un lugar muy bonito. Nosotros viviendo en las ciudades, olvidamos frecuentemente las alegrías simples – acostarnos en la hierba y mirar el cielo, escuchar el silencio – ¿verdad? En Vitosha recordamos todo eso. Ahora estamos en Sofía preparándonos para continuar nuestro turismo por las montañas. A mí me gusta mucho andar y ahora tengo esta posibilidad. Pensamos subir el pico más alto en Bulgaria – Mus-alá (2925 m.) No es difícil – no es tan alto. Qué buen país es Bulgaria, pero según mi opinión le faltan hábitos contemplativos, ¿verdad? – todos son demasiado prácticos. ¡Hasta luego, Luis!

ФОТОИЗДАТ Арт. 2128 10 ст

Translation of a post card from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The card was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good morning, Luis! How are you? We are well. We frequently think of Havana and of our friends (I - of a "bored" man too). After the Black Sea we spent one week in Sofia, and the following week we relaxed at the Radio Sofia tourist house (before leaving for Cuba I worked for Radio Sofia), located on the Vitusha, near Sofia. The Bulgarians call this mountain "lungs of the capital". It's a very lovely place. Living in cities, we frequently forget simple pleasures -- lying down in the grass and looking at the sky, listening to the silence. Isn't that true? On Vitosha (sic) we remembered all that. We are now in Sofia, preparing to continue our tour through the mountains. I like to walk a lot, and now I have the opportunity. We plan to climb the highest peak in Bulgaria -- Mus-ala (2925 meters). It isn't difficult -- it's not very high. What a good country Bulgaria is, but in my opinion she lacks contemplative men. Yes, yes, that's true. They are all too practical. Until later, Luis!

Kira KOSOVSKA

ПО ВЪЗДУХА
PAR AVION

N.R. BULGARIA

RE



ВАРНА 20.6.65-11

Куба, Хавана

Comp. Luis Alberú
Departamento de Relaciones
Culturales con el extranjero
Consejo Nacional de Cultura
(CNC)
Palacio del Segundo Cabo
O'Reilly y Tacón,
La Plaza de Armas
La Habana
Cuba

¡Buenas noches, Luis!
¿Cómo ha estado Ud.? Como siempre ¿trabajando mucho? Qué hacer – de dos opiniones sobre el trabajo („y caballos mueren del trabajo" y „el trabajo creó al Hombre") es mejor seleccionar la segunda, ¿verdad?

Todavía estamos en Varna, más exacto – a unos 15 km de la ciudad de Varna, eso no importa porque todo aquí es la zona de playas, hoteles etc. El tiempo hizo bueno, y ahora nosotros nos bañamos y tomamos sol, pero lo hacemos sin afán – somos mimados para siempre por las playas Santa María y Atlántico y por el sol cubano! Al mismo tiempo es muy agradable que aquí no hay tiburones y se puede nadar dondequiera.

Durante 2 años nosotros olvidamos muchas cosas y ahora nos admiramos del clima, de la naturaleza etc. Es verdad – aquí el aire mismo es absolutamente distinto: fresco, sano, lleno de olores de la hierba y de los árboles. A unas 300-400 m. de la costa comienzan las montañas, cubiertas de bosques. Lamento mucho de que Ud. Luis, no pueda ver todo eso, pero soy optimista y estoy segura que tarde o temprano Ud. visitará Bulgaria. ¿Sabe lo que cuentan acerca de la formación del pays? - Cuando Dios dividía la Tierra entre los ingleses, franceses y otros, el búlgaro no pudo venir porque estaba trabajando. Entonces cuando vino, ya no había tierra. Dios le regañó, pero tuvo que hacer algo. Entonces él tomó un cuchillo y cortó para el búlgaro un pedazito del paraíso.

No exagero - en realidad la costa del Mar Negro en Bulgaria es muy bonita. Ahora aquí están de descanso cerca de 25-30 miles de extranjeros. Y lo que es muy interesante - la mayoría eran de los países capitalistas. A cada paso se oye el francés, alemán, sueco. Tenemos un conocido - director de uno de los hoteles; él, por ejemplo, dice que en su hotel viven por 28 días algunas familias de Suiza y de Bélgica y que todos están muy contentos, diciendo que el descanso en Bulgaria es agradable y barato al mismo tiempo, más barato que en Niza o en Italia. Así Bulgaria desarrolla intensivamente el turismo internacional y, claro está, gana mucho.

¡Pero qué cosas aburridas escribo yo! Estoy segura que Ud. ya tiene sueño. De ninguna manera quiero que Ud. piense que son los ejercicios del español para no olvidarlo. Simplemente quiero contar algunas de mis impresiones y observaciones y Ud., un hombre tan bueno y fino, pueda comprenderlo, ¿verdad?

Una cosa interesante más acerca del servicio turístico aquí. Están abiertos algunos restaurantes típicos nacionales donde se manifestó la fantasía búlgara. Por ejemplo, uno representa un lugar, donde están ovejas (no sé como se llama en español), es un patio grande dividido en patios pequeños, todo como en el pueblo; hay un foco de piedra en el suelo, donde hierva algo en un cesto grande, hay cocina de piedra también con el fuego dentro, hay algunas construcciones de campo

- todo verdadero. Para que el cuadro sea completo en uno de los patios pequeños se encuentra un burro, en otro 1 algunas ovejas y... todos respiran un olor terrible! Pero todos están contentos y sacan fotografías etc. Los camareros están vestidos en trajes nacionales y toca la orquesta nacional también. ¿Lo imagina Ud., Luis? Es muy simpático!

El otro restaurante, por ejemplo, representa el interior de (no sé en español, en francés - le moulin) hay la piedra para moler, hay sacos llenos donde se sienta etc., etc. La comida se sirve en platos nacionales.. pero no hablemos de la comida - hay todo en abundancia. Después de las primeras admiraciones („qué sabrosas cerezas!", „qué grandes melocotones!" etc.) yo descubrí un gran peligro en todo eso para mí. Si, por ejemplo, Angel sube 2-4 libras no hacen problema, pero para mí es problema #1!

Así termino. Para terminar le cuento un chiste (conveniente!) Una familia se acostó una noche. De pronto se oyó un ruido fuerte — el gato chocó algo en la cocina. Pero la mujer asustada gritó: „Corre, mi marido viene!" Y su esposo, asustado también, salió corriendo por la ventana en pijama.

Hasta luego, Luis. Le estrecho la mano. La carta - entre nous,
esta bien
Kazs [illegible]

Translation of a letter from Kira KOSOVSKA to LITAMIL-9. Kira is the wife of Anguel KOSOVSKI, who was a Second Secretary in the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana as of October 1965. They are now back in Sofia, Bulgaria. The letter was mailed from Bulgaria to Cuba.

Good evening, Luis! How have you been? Working a lot, as always? Which to choose -- of two opinions on work ("horses die from working" and "work created Man") it is better to choose the second, isn't it?

We are still in Varna, more exactly some 15 kilometers from the city of Varna; this doesn't matter because everything here is the area of beaches, hotels, etc. The weather improved, and now we go swimming and sunbathing, but we do so without eagerness -- we are spoiled permanently by the Santa María and Atlantic beaches and by the Cuban sun! At the same time it is very nice that here there are no sharks and one can swim anywhere one wants.

In the course of two years we forgot many things and now we are enjoying the climate, nature, etc. It's true -- here even the air is absolutely different: fresh, healthful, full of the odors of grass and trees. Some 300 - 400 meters from the coast the mountains, covered with forests, begin. I am very sorry that you, Luis, cannot see all this, but I am an optimist and I am sure that sooner or later you will visit Bulgaria. Do you know what they say about the formation of the country? When God was dividing the Earth among the English, the French, and others, the Bulgarian could not come because he was working. Then when he came, there was no land left. God scolded him, but he had to do something. So he took a knife and cut a little piece of paradise for the Bulgarian.

I am not exaggerating -- really the coast of the Black Sea in Bulgaria is very pretty. Now there are about 25 - 30 thousand foreigners here on vacation. And what is very interesting -- the majority from the capitalistic countries. At every step one hears French, German, Swedish. We have an acquaintance -- the manager of one of the hotels; he, for example, says that some families from Switzerland and from Belgium have been living in his hotel for 25 days, and that all are very happy, saying that the vacation in Bulgaria is pleasant and inexpensive at the same time, less expensive than in Nice or Italy. Thus Bulgaria is developing international tourism intensively and, of course, is bringing in a lot of money.

But what boring things I'm writing! I'm sure that you are already sleepy. Not by any means do I want you to think that these are exercises in Spanish so as not to forget it. I simply want to relate some of my impressions and observations, and you, a man so good and fine, can understand, can't you?

One more interesting thing about the tourist service here. There are some typical national restaurants open where Bulgarian fantasy is represented. For example, one represents a place where there are sheep (I don't know what it is in Spanish). It's a large patio divided into small patios, everything like in a town. There is a stone hearth in the floor, where something boils in a big basket. There is a stone stove, also with a fire inside. There are some farm buildings, everything true to life. To make the picture complete, in one of the small patios there is a burro, in another, some sheep, and ... they all have a terrible odor! But everybody is happy and taking pictures, etc. The waiters are dressed in national costumes and the national orchestra plays too. Can you imagine it, Luis? It's very nice! The other restaurant, for example, represents the interior of (I don't know in Spanish, in French -- the mill). There is the stone for grinding, there are filled sacks where you sit, etc., etc. The food is served in national dishes ... but let's not talk about food -- there is everything in abundance. After the first admirations ("what delicious cherries!", what big peaches!", etc.), I discovered a great danger for me in all this. If, for example, Anguel gains 2 - 4 pounds, it's no problem but for me it's problem #1!

I'll close now. Before closing I'll tell you a joke (appropriate!). A family went to bed one night. Suddenly a loud noise was heard -- the cat knocked something over in the kitchen. But the frightened woman cried: "Run, my husband is coming!" and her husband, frightened also, jumped out of the window in his pajamas.

Until later, Luis. I give you my hand. The letter -- between us, is that all right?

Kira KOSOVSKA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 26552, 8 July 1965

1. LITAMIL-9 seems to be trapped inside PBRUMEN. On 18 August the Case Officer met with LITAMIL-17 (L-9's brother) to review two letters received from L-9. One of these, dated 15 July and mailed at Gander, Newfoundland (presumably by an airline crew member), used the term "de lo mas bien." This is an indicator meaning "I expect to leave within a year." In another (undated) letter L-9 reports that he has been promoted to "Secretario de Segunda."

2. L-9 asked for a large quantity of art supplies and mentioned that he is doing a lot of painting since he has not yet gone back to work. The quantity of material requested indicates that he expects to remain inside for some time.

3. The C/O asked L-17 to phone L-9, ostensibly to request further detail on how to ship the art supplies. In the course of the conversation L-17 was to ask L-9 how long he expected to remain in PBRUMEN. L-17 reported on 28 August that he had spoken with L-9. L-9 said he did not expect to leave for "a long time."

4. With the recent defections of AMWASP-1 and a PBRUMEN Ambassador in Europe it may be difficult for L-9 to obtain a foreign post. It is not likely that he could seriously be considered politically reliable by the PBRUMEN Government. With the return of his mother and sister from Spain he no longer has an excuse to request permission to visit Madrid. The only bright spot on the horizon is his sister-in-law's close relationship to AMTHUG. L-17 feels that it is to her advantage to have L-9 abroad so L-9 can send her consumer goods which are unobtainable in PBRUMEN.

5. At present the Station has no reason to believe L-9 will be able to leave PBRUMEN any time soon.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
5 - C/WHD
4 - Files

CS COPY

GROUP 1 [illegible]

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 27048

DATE
1 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609 (P-6079)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Marianao, Agosto 19 de 1965

Compañero Félix Guerrero
Director de la Orquesta
del Teatro Lírico
Teatro García Lorca, Habana.

Estimado compañero:
Por este medio le comunicamos que con motivo de la Fiesta Nacional de la R.P. de Bulgaria se ha confeccionado entre la Embajada de la R.P. de Bulgaria y este Consejo Nacional de Cultura la "Semana de la Cultura Búlgara" que se efectuará del [illegible] de Septiembre próximo.

Como parte de la programación figuran un concierto por radio y televisión para el 3 de Septiembre próximo, y un concierto para el 7 de Septiembre próximo en el Palacio de Bellas Artes; tomando parte en ambos programas artistas búlgaros y cubanos;

Por lo cual le solicitamos atentamente el permiso que se acostumbra en estos casos a fin de que los compañeros artistas cuyos nombres damos a continuación, puedan cumplimentar sus actuaciones en los dos programas a que nos hemos referido.

El permiso para el prof. León Suruyón es para el día 3 de Septiembre próximo y los permisos para Alexander Neinek, León Suruyón, Nicola Barov y Nicola Danev para el día 7 también de Septiembre próximo.

Agradeciendo la valiosa colaboración que preste a este fin, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de Patria o Muerte,

Por la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales
con el Extranjero

Luis Alberú.-

el 6 y el 7 no puede ser porque
~~[illegible]~~ con [illegible] en Varadero (información Agost. 24)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memorandum of Oral Commitments - LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are three authenticated copies of a Memorandum of Oral Commitments for LITAMIL-9.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-5699

DATE
19 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to [illegible]. The effective date of the oral contract is [illegible] subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PEPRIME currency is [illegible] dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PEPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PEPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ______.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expenses: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site, Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if [illegible] become aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not [illegible].

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN [illegible]) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ______
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

VERIFIED: ______
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

1. TYPE AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project [illegible] and is chargeable to LIRAVINE. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 March 1965 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ________.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is 400 dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ________.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site, Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for KUBARK, this does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No accomitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR [illegible]922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ________
Case Officer

APPROVED: ________
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

APPROVED: ________
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 5 March 1965

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Engagement of LITAMIL-9 as Independent Contractor.

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2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type POA in process. Date ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP: Subject (X) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The subject will be paid 5000 Pesos per month. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is [illegible] dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's pay. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc., include: Small Christmas, birthday gifts may be give. No commitment.

5. TAXES: Subject ( ) is (X) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner: ______.

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) Subject ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increase cost-of-living and quarters expences: None.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimburse: Any minor operational expense approved by the Case Officer such as transportation to meeting site. Note: Subject has never submitted a claim for any such expense to date.

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation: Subject may have to be provided safe haven if his government becomes aware of his activities for ODYOKE. This does not imply asylum in PBPRIME.

9. No acommitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

10. Comment: This MOC submitted because Subject's salary was raised from $4000 to $ 5000 a month effective 1 March 1965. Authority: DIR 89922 (IN 5455) of 5 March 1965.

SIGNED: ______
Case Officer

APPROVED: Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

VALIDATED: ______
Contract Approving Officer

DISTRIBUTION: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs.
1 File P 6079
1 Support

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations/LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AC REQ: See para 2

1. A Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 as a reporting source in PBRUMEN has been granted as of 8 July 1965.

2. Since the PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9 in our file dates from June 1963, and in view of his changed mission, Headquarters would appreciate the thoughtful preparation of a revised PRQ Part II for LITAMIL-9. This should reach Headquarters perhaps sixty days prior to the expiration of this POA on 8 January 1966.

Anthony R. PONCHAY

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-128/3

FILE IN 201-239609

Distribution:
O & 1 -COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13795

DATE
[illegible]
12 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-128/3
201-329809

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LITAMIL-9 remains in PBRUMEN. On 19 June 1965 the C/O met with L-9's brother who reported he had talked with L-9 by telephone about 1 June. At that time L-9 was in good health and spirits and key words in his conversation indicated that he had not been bothered in any way by the PBRUMEN Security Service since his return. L-9 said that he expected to take it easy for about 3 months at which time he would probably be given a new assignment. He did not reveal whether he expected this to be a foreign assignment.

2. A PRQ Part II on L-9's brother was recently submitted with a request for Operational Approval. As noted therein, it is contemplated that he will be used only as a channel for communications to/from L-9.

3. Any new developments in this operation will be reported promptly.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

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20-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 26552

DATE
8 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 329609

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/Mexico - R. E. Scutt

NUMBER: C - 101331

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 19 April 1965

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

PRQ II
2d June 65

JUL 1965

Hmmm!

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
Edward P. [illegible] CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 July 1965

FORM 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1-64

SECRET

(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
O PERUMEN/LITAMIL-9 Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: (A) MEXI 2967, 31 March 1965
(B) HMMA 25761, 1 April 1965

well. Good.

1. On 6 May 1965 the brother of LITAMIL-9 (Subject of reference B), contacted the case officer. A meeting was held in Mexico City on the night of 7 May. L-9's brother turned over a postcard dated 25 March and a letter dated 8 April, both from L-9. These had been mailed in Mexico City on 20 April, presumably by a PERUMEN Airline pilot.

2. The card and letter revealed that L-9 is still on vacation and unmolested by PERUMEN Security forces. His mother and unmarried sister returned to PERUMEN from Madrid on 22 March and will presumably remain in PERUMEN. L-9 does not know when he will be leaving PERUMEN or where he will be stationed but the tone of his letter conveys the impression that he will be posted abroad.

3. In the letter L-9 again used a code phrase indicating that the regime appears to be leaning away from the Communist bloc.

4. A PRQ, Part II, will be forwarded soon on L-9's brother.

Lawrence F. Baxter
for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

[illegible]

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26080	DATE 12 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-329609

JR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

ALBERU SOUTO, LUIS
201-329609
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-012
UFGA-21493
10 MAY 65
P19-6-95/4

CIT ?
OCC ?
CULTURAL ATTACHE.
SUBJ HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED BACK TO CUBA FROM CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

R 6505171276

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: HMMW 13,549 15 April 1965

1. The Station is puzzled by the statement of references that operational reporting on the LITAMIL-9 operation has been "consistently neglected".

2. Using 1 January 1964 as a point of departure, the files of the Station reflect the following dispatches transmitting detailed reports [illegible]

Dispatch	Covering Meetings
HMMA22768, 17 January 64	27 December 63
	6 January 64
HMMA22831, 30 January 64	16 January 64
HMMA 23018, 4 March 64	30 January 64
	5 February 64
	1 March 64
HMMA 23268, 23 April 64	11 March 64
	28 March 64
	2 April 64
	13 April 64
HMMA 23691, 16 June 64	8 May 64
	27 May 64
	8 June 64
HMMA 23786, 30 June 64	28 April 64
	19 June 64
HMMA 23878, 14 July 64	7 July 64
HMMA 24015, 30 July 64	16 July 64
	21 July 64

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification

Cs Cy files 50-6-105/3 Jt-# 66-4/10

(continued)

GE 53

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA- 25938

DATE
23 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

HMMA 24254, 3 September 64	12 August 64
	27 August 64
HMMA 25001, 19 January 65	30 November 64
	7 December 64
	20 December 64
	22 December 64
	29 December 64

Note: This dispatch explained why reports had not been forwarded since HMMA 24254, see above- in accordance with Headquarters request that contact reports not be forwarded in the futute. HMMA 25001 explained that henceforth 1 copy only of LITAMIL-9 CR's would be forwarded to WH/SA, attention Urquhart and Labanow. Both of these officers had specifically requested that LITAMIL-9 CR's be forwarded to WH/SA. In the interim, between September and January, CR's for the following meetings were placed in Station files: 10 September 64, 21 September 64, 1 October 64, 4 October 64, 23 October 64, 29 October 64, 5 November 64, and 16 November 64.

HMMA 25238, 28 January 65	7 January 65
	18 January 65
HMMA 25408, 18 February 65	26 January 65
	28 January 65
	1 February 65
	2 February 65
	9 February 65
	11 February 65
HMMA 25670, 23 March 65	12 February 65
	17 February 65
	19 February 65
	26 February 65
	2 March 65
	3 March 65
	8 March 65
	10 March 65
	Commo Plan

3. It is realized that an operational progress report and a contact report are two different items; however, in view of the detailed nature of the LITAMIL-9 CR's the Station has felt that their submission has satisfied the requirements of operational reporting. The criticism of reference is all the more puzzling since such visitors to the Station as Chester D. Dainold, Chief, WHD; Mortán A. Woolley, erstwhile Chief of Operations, WHD; and Thomas W. Lund, present Mexico Branch Chief, have all expressed their approval of the detailed operational reporting on this operation during visits they have made to the Station at which time the reports in question have been brought to their attention.

4. When LITAMIL-9 next exits PBRUMEN, the Station will begin to prepare formal operational progress reports on the operation.

5. As for the questions raised in paragraph 2 of reference regarding operational security, advance information on LITAMIL-9's recall came from LIENVOY but he was not informed of the imminence of his transfer until it was reported routinely by LITAMIL-7 and was generally known by his colleagues. As for the implication that LITAMIL-9 was informed of the Station's capability to intercept Embassy telephone conversations, a careful re-reading of the Memorandum under critique will show that no such acknowledgement was made. LITAMIL-9 was informed that "we have a good chance of being told about such a conversation by one of our friends," i.e. that word will probably get around in Embassy circles that LITAMIL-9 is about to travel to such-and- such a point.

(continued)

As for the speculation that LITAMIL-9 suspects that Embassy phones are tapped, he has indicated his belief that this is the case ever since he was taken over by the present C/O. In fact, he is prone to say " I called so -and-so on such-and-such a matter, using the phone instead of the intercom so you could hear it." In cases wherein he has spoken this way, he has been told that chances are we will never hear about the matter discussed unless he reports on it specifically in his meetings with his C/O.

Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

19 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. An Operational Approval is requested for LITAMIL-9, who has recently returned to Cuba, and has accepted an FI mission from Mexico Station. The Station has expressed its reluctance to interview a Mexican officer who alleged in 1959 that LITAMIL-9 was a Communist, since this course of action would unnecessarily draw attention of this officer to our interest in LITAMIL-9. WH/1 has concurred in this decision, and considers that this unevaluated derogatory information on LITAMIL-9 is far outweighed by his performance record.

2. Realizing the risk involved in working with any Cuban national, WH/1 feels that LITAMIL-9's excellent record of cooperation, plus his acceptance of the idea of continued cooperation in a denied area favor consideration of an Operational Approval. Additionally, we have had audio coverage through the telephone in LITAMIL-9's office for the past two years or more, and during this time the Station has used the installation for spot checking his information, and is satisfied that there are no reasons to question his veracity and security or suspect that he is under control of the Cuban service.

3. Attached for your review are several contact reports of LITAMIL-9, as requested by Mr. Lally. Their prompt return will be appreciated. This office will be pleased to cooperate in any further review of this case which will facilitate the OA.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Attachments:
Reports of LITAMIL-9

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - 201-329609
1 - C 101331

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
AR : See Paras 3 and 4

REF: HMMA-25,670 dated 23 March 1965

1. We are pleased that Barker has prevailed upon LITAMIL-9 to return to Cuba and even more important, of course, to agree to be alert to service the cause and again, still better, to agree to the use of a communications system. Considering LITAMIL-9's known reluctance for this sort of thing we understand that Barker had to be quite convincing with his arguments and also very possibly had to resort to some arm-twisting.

2. Nevertheless, lacking operational progress reports and therefore not knowing the full background of Barker's procedures, we did note that in paragraph 3.ii, page 4, of the C/R attached to reference, the Station tipped off LITAMIL-9 that he would probably be requested to return to Cuba. We assume that the tip came from the LIENVOY or LIFEAT take, and, to complete the record here, would appreciate a note as to the origin of the information that LITAMIL-9 was to be transferred. We further note from paragraph 3 of the Memorandum for the Record dated 11 March, also attached to reference, that, in essence, a further acknowledgement was made to LITAMIL-9 that the Station has the capability to intercept Cuban Embassy telephone conversations.

3. While there may be a simple explanation for this report we are constrained to make known our concern that such apparent revelations, however well-intentioned, obviously could cause unpleasant repercussions and are regarded under normal circumstances as basically unsound violations of operational compartmentation and procedure.

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

201-321609

(CONTINUED)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13,549

DATE
15 April 1965 15 APR 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-321609

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/1
OFFICER: N.J.Kaufman:mep
TYPIST
EXT: 4506

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HDCW-13,549

4. This all, of course, again raises the practical difficulties encountered in trying to provide meaningful support to the Station when proper operational reporting is consistently neglected as in the case in the LITAMIL-9 op. Consistency has virtue only when in the right direction. While we are on it, please note that Cuban op dispatches should be addressed to C/WH; the branch will see that all items reach other interested components.

Chester D. DAINOLD

CS COPY

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	2 of 2

CP

ORIG.: R. Scutt
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 4 March 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET/KAPOK

16 ROUTING

1	1	5	FI
2		6	Leg
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4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY PRIORITY

4[illegible] 65 16 z
PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, VR, FILE

TO MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 89922

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 2577 (IN 15123)

~~Zeroc~~

File 201 LITAMIL-9

1. INCREASE LITAMIL NINE SALARY AUTHORIZED. ALSO SUGGEST PAYMENT OF BONUS UP TO FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IN RECOGNITION EXCELLENT PAST WORK AND AS INCENTIVE FUTURE COOPERATION.

2. APPRECIATE LITAMIL NINE RELUCTANCE ACCEPT SW, BUT ASSUME MEXI WILL CONTINUE STRESS IMPORTANCE OF COMMO. AS MINIMUM MEXI SHOULD ESTABLISH OPEN CODE ARRANGEMENT THROUGH BROTHER, SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN MEXI 3633 (IN 78021), 2 MARCH 1963.

3. NEED CURRENT BIOG DATA AND STATION TRACES ON BROTHER LEONEL TO PROCESS OPERATIONAL APPROVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI/J. Sherwood (phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH/D

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/KAPOK

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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3 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
MAR 4 7 37 AM '65

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
c/WH 6

INFO
VR. FILE, DDP, ADDP, DC/WH/C 5, c/CI, c/FI 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 1745 DD

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SECRET 031950Z

3 MAR 65 IN 15123

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 2677

KAPOK PBRUMEN

1. LITAMIL-9 HAS BEEN RECALLED PBRUMEN ON APPARENT PCS TRANSFER. IS WILLING COMPLY AND PLANS LEAVE 8 MARCH.

2. AMBASSADOR TOLD L-9 HE SHOULD CONSIDER KEEPING MEXI APARTMENT "SINCE, WHO KNOWS, YOU MAY BE BACK HERE IN SIX MONTHS."

3. L-9 FEELS RECALL MAY HAVE BEEN ENGINEERED BY SISTER-IN-LAW IN CONNECTION WITH REFUSAL OF L-9 SISTER TO OBEY RECALL FROM PBRUMEN EMBASSY MADRID ALLEGING MEDICAL REASONS. L-9 FEELS POSSIBLE SISTER-IN-LAW MAY ARRANGE L-9 EVENTUAL TRANSFER TO MADRID WHERE SISTER AND L-9 MOTHER BOTH RESIDING. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT L-9 BEING CALLED BACK FROM HOME LEAVE FOR WHICH HE NOW ELIGIBLE ALTHOUGH AMB SAID ORDERS APPEARED PCS.

4. C/O WAS INTRODUCED TO L-9 BROTHER NIGHT 2 MAR. HE WILL BE CHANNEL OF COMMO TO/FROM L-9. AS BEFORE, L-9 REFUSES TAKE ANY S/W MATERIAL INTO PBRUMEN OR WRITE S/W ONCE THERE. BELIEVES IF HE CAUGHT HARM MIGHT COME TO HIS RELATIVES. WILL BE STAYING AT HOME OF BROTHER AND SISTER-IN-LAW. LATTER, ONCE AGAIN SECRETARY TO AMTHUG-1, WILL BE PRIME SOURCE OF INFORMATION. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY

L-9 MAY BE SUBJECT TO THOROUGH INVESTIGATION BY SECURITY SERVICES, STATION IS NOT PRESSING S/W MATTER SINCE DELAYS IN RECEIVING INFO FROM HIM WILL BE MORE THAN OVERCOME BY QUALITY OF INFO HE WILL BE IN POSITION TO OBTAIN.

5. L-9 FEELS CERTAIN HE CAN ARRANGE TRIP OUTSIDE PBRUMEN IN NEXT FEW MONTHS. MEETING PLANS FOR POSSIBLE DESTINATIONS ARE BEING SET UP.

6. L-9 BRIEFED THOROUGHLY ON POSSIBILITY DSE PROVOCATION ONCE HE INSIDE AND BEING GIVEN GUIDANCE ON HANDLING SELF IN SUCH EVENT.

7. IN VIEW L-9 CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH AMTHUG SECRETARY, REQUEST HQS CABLE PRIORITY INFORMATION COLLECTION BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS. BRIEFING WILL BE HANDLED BY C/O. L-9 REFUSES MEET ANY OTHER PERSONS IN VIEW EXTREME CONCERN FOR HIS SECURITY.

8. STATION PLEASED BY L-9 DECISION RETURN. HE DOING THIS FOR KUBARK AS WOULD PREFER QUIETLY MELD INTO MEXI SCENE. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HQS CABLED AUTHORIZATION INFORM L-9 THAT HIS SALARY BEING RAISED ADDITIONAL ONE THOUSAND PESOS MONTHLY TO NEW TOTAL FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS. BELIEVE WORK TO DATE FULLY JUSTIFIES THIS EIGHTY DOLLAR RAISE AND BOOST WILL HELP HIS MORALE AT TIME WHEN MOST NEEDED. HAS NOT HAD RAISE SINCE BEGAN COOPERATING WITH STATION. SALARY

[illegible] 22

WILL BE HELD BY STATION DURING HIS STAY IN PBRUMEN.

SECRET

CFN



From AMTREDGE/1   See SGA to UFGA 18495, 4 Nov 1964

filed in WH/SA/MOB

LEFT TO RIGHT:

1. Julio Antonio ALVAREZ, MINREX and DSE
2. Evelio PEREZ Quintero, MINREX and DSE
3. LITAMIL-9
4. Antonio NUNEZ JIMENEZ, Pres, Cuban Academy of Science

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
2
3

ACTION: WH 8

INFO :

DDP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

S E C R E T 241223Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE MADR 8430

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)

25 MAY 1963 .

IN46431

1. REGRET MADR HAS NO FACILITIES LOCATE EMPLOYMENT FOR L-9 SISTER ALONG LINES OUTLINED PARA 1 REF.

2. IF SHE IS QUALIFIED ENGLISH-SPANISH TRANSLATOR AND COULD BE CLEARED WE COULD POSSIBLY USE IN OUWER ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, SALARY NO EXCEED ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS A MONTH.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *L-9 REQUESTED CO. MAKE EVERY EFFORT FIND EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS SISTER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ORIG : WAYNE CARLEY
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 23 May 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY MADRID
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 5, WE 4, S/C

24 MAY 63 19

DEFERRED SIG CEN
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO MADR CITE DIR 42325

PERUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)*

1. IN VIEW LACK INFO HDQS ON SISTER LITAMIL-9, SUGGEST MEXI OBTAIN MORE DETAILED INFO ON SISTERS PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES, POLITICAL ORIENTATION, RECRUITABILITY, ETC, PRIOR INVOLVING MADRID STATION IN REF PROPOSAL.

2. INASMUCH AS LITAMIL-9 DOES NOT CURRENTLY RECEIVE ANY SALARY FROM KUBARK, [redacted] MEXI SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY PUTTING HIM ON SALARY IN ORDER HELP SUPPORT MOTHER AND SISTER. THIS WOULD ALSO SUPPLY CONTROL FACTOR OVER AGENT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref requested Hqs and Madrid comments on possibility of obtaining employment in Spain for the sister of LITAMIL-9 with an American firm.

SAS/EOB Bryant (by phone)
C/WE/5
WH/COO
WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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22/30 SECRET

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ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

SECRET 171750Z

MADR DIR CITE MEXI 4621

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

18 MAY 1963 IN41326

1. ON 16 MAY 63, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT HIS MOTHER WROTE BROTHER MEXI STATING (IDEN A) PLANS GET MARRIED SEPT 63 AND FUTURE HUSBAND (BELIEVED SPANISH) WHO EMPLOYED BAYER COMPANY INSISTS SHE RESIGN POST AT CONSULATE, WHICH SHE WILL DO. MOTHER DESIRES STAY SPAIN WITH OTHER DAUGHTER AND REQUESTED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM SONS MEXI. ACCORDING L-9, HIS MOTHER NOT ABLE LIVE MEXI VIEW HEART CONDITION AND HE AND BROTHER MEXI NOT ABLE FINANCIALLY SUPPORT MOTHER AND SISTER SPAIN. VIEW ABVOE PROBLEM L-9 REQUESTED CO MAKE EFFORT FIND EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS SISTER SPAIN (IDEN B) PREFERABLY WITH PBPRIME FIRM, POSSIBLY IN PUBLIC RELATIONS WORK.

2. MOTHER SAID WOULD ALSO WRITE L-9 RE PROBLEM. INFO PARA 1 FIRST IMPRESSIONS PROBLEM AS SEEN BY L-9 THROUGH LETTER SENT HIS BROTHER. LIKELY OTHER ALTERNATIVES WILL ARISE AS MORE DETAILS KNOWN. REQUEST DIR MADR COMMENTS RE POSSIBILITY ASSISTANCE OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT PER PARA 1.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

1		4	
2			
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ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WE 4, SAS 5, S/C 2

SECRET 171750Z

MADR DIR CITE MEXI 4622

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

18 MAY 1963

IN 41344

REF MEXI 4621 (IN 41326)

IDEN A - MARILUZ ALBERU SOUTO - CONSUL, VIGO

IDEN B - XENIA ALBERU SOUTO - ABOUT 38 YEARS OLD. BORN CUBA, ATTRACTIVE, WELL EDUCATED, ACCOMPLISHED VIOLINIST.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
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201-329609

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SAS 5, OP, S/C 2

RI COPY

S E C R E T 172306Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 4629

REF A. MEXI 4607 (IN 42378) 18 MAY 1963 IN41759

B. DIR 40146X

LITAMIL-9 CASE OFFICER ON LEAVE UNTIL 26 MAY. SUGGEST TDYER BEAR ABOVE IN MIND RE TRAVEL MEXI.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE RE TDY.

Litamil-9

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/[illegible]	
[illegible]	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

201-329609

SECRET

GROUP 1
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21 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2

SECRET

1		4	
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3		6	

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

SECRET 222240Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4258 IN23005 22 APR 1963

REF MEXI 3872. (IN 90763)

ON 20 APR 63, BROTHER LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT L-9 EXPECTED ARRIVE MEXI 22 OR 26 APR 63. NOT KNOWN WHETHER L-9 REASSIGNED MEXI AS LATEST INFO FROM HAVA TO MEXI FROM L-9 RELATIVES INDICATED HE BEING CONSIDERED FOR PARIS POST. ON 21 APR L-9'S BROTHER RECEIVED LETTER FROM FUTURE DAUGHTER IN LAW IN WHICH SHE STATED GAVE L-9 PACKAGE AND LETTERS TAKE MEXI.

SECRET

SECRET

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Regulations of Mexican Government on Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/540,193

DATE DISTR. 13 March 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. February 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 25 February 1963

BY CABLE

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
Para. 2: European businessmen (F).
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Since mid-February 1963 Mexican immigration authorities have placed stamps in the passports of travellers to and from Cuba which read "Arrived from Cuba" and "Left for Cuba". The stamps are placed on the page with the picture.[1]

2. All requests for Mexican tourist visas in Cuba must be approved in Mexico before they are issued in Habana.[2]

Field Comments

1. Cuban visas are often issued on a separate piece of paper and not stamped in the passport, so that the passport would not show that the bearer had travelled to Cuba.

2. This regulation was first noticed in February 1963.

Documentation for travel from Mexico to Cuba does not differ from that needed for travel to other Latin American countries. The traveller must have a passport or other travel document, with a valid visa. Mexican citizens within the specified age group must also carry a cartilla militar.

Mexican security services do not screen applications for travel to Cuba. Although the Mexican Government has taken no action to prevent travel to Cuba, it has discouraged government employees from accepting invitations to Cuban-sponsored activities. It also appears to want to avoid recognition of Cuban Government activities by not sending government-sponsored delegations. These steps, plus the bothersome baggage searches, photographs, and questioning by Mexican immigration authorities have probably curtailed travel to Cuba.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	AID	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #								TREAS	X	FBI	3	USIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/6	1	WH/MEXI	1
CA/PROP	1	WH/FI	1	WH/3/CAN	1	WH/COPS/CCO	1
SAS/R	11	WH/I	1	WH/PACY	1		
SAS/WAVE	1	WH/2	1	WH/3/CAS	1		
WH/R	1	WH/5	1	WH/3/M	2		

MEXI-3617 IN-77675,
NO PROJECT
(LITAMIL-9)
CS-3/540,193

TOTALS DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 3, CA 1,
SAS 11 (1), WH 12 (2). BY CABLE

LIAISON * (in

COORDINATING SAS/R draft)

RELEASING LNG VR/mw

FORM 3-62 1 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Mulloy

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba/Mali	REPORT NO.	CS-3/539,466
SUBJECT	Request of Cuban Government To the Republic of Mali for a Resident Ambassador	DATE DISTR.	7 March 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	18 February 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (20 February 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-7045

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1,3: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
Para. 2: A neutralist diplomat (C) in Mexico City, from Sori Coulibaly.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On 18 February 1963 Sori Coulibaly, the Ambassador of the Republic of Mali to the United Nations and to Cuba,[1] and Mamadou Traore, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Mali Mission to the United Nations, arrived in Mexico from Habana, Cuba. Coulibaly told members of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City that he had spoken with Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, who asked Coulibaly to take steps to have the Government of Mali send a resident Ambassador to Cuba.

2. Coulibaly said that the Cubans had put pressure on him to open an office in Habana and that they had in fact given him a building for this purpose. However, Coulibaly said that he did not see how Mali could afford to open an office in Habana, in view of the fact that he had hardly enough money to operate the Mali Mission to the United Nations.[2]

3. Coulibaly and Traore left Mexico City on 20 February for New York. Coulibaly carried Mali diplomatic passport No. 23; Traore carried diplomatic passport No. 42.

[1] Headquarters Comment. Coulibaly presented his credentials in Cuba on 13 February 1963.

[2] Source Comment. Coulibaly confided that he had requested 50 million Mali francs (about $203,000.00) as an annual budget for the operation of the Mali Mission to the United Nations; that he had been allotted only one-tenth of that amount for the first quarter of 1963; and that he had not received even that.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STATE #	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	3
REPCINCLANT		CINCARIB #								TREAS	X	USIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	AF/BAKO	1	WH/CA/PROP	1		
FI/SPOG	2	AF/SPS	1	WH/FI	1		CX-164 DRHARK
AF/345/R	3	SAS/R	11	WH/3/M	2		HMM-7045
AF/COP/CA	1	SAS/WAVE	1	WH/MEXI	1	NO PROJECT	(LITAMIL-9)
AF/3	1	WH/R	1	WH/PACY	1		CS-3/539,466
TOTALS	DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 5, AF 6 (1), SAS 11 (1), WH 5 (2), PRIORITY					LIAISON #	COORDINATING RELEASING AF/3/R LNG FI/SPOG VR;dc SAS/R (draft)

FORM 3-63 1 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/539,464

SUBJECT Mexicans on the Mailing List For the Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin

DATE DISTR. 7 March 1963

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. February 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (4 February 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-6991

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (B) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 2.

The following Mexicans, all described as painters, sculptors, writers, newspapermen, or intellectuals, and who belong to an independent, pro-Cuba group in Mexico City known as the Jose Marti Group, have requested copies of the Cuban Embassy Information Bulletin:

Dr. Leopoldo Ancona, 5 de Febrero No. 90, Mexico D.F., President of the Jose Marti Group;
Prof. Manuel Duarte Guille, Alondra 45, Colonia El Rosedal, Coyoacan, Mexico, D.F.;
Lic. Enrique Arceo, Sur 69-A, No. 510 Colonia Justo Sierra, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Bernardo [illegible], Apartado 2641, Mexico, D.F. 13;
Lic. Javier Lopez Olares, Juan de la Barrera No. 78, Colonia Condesa, Mexico, D.F.;
Profa. Rosa Maria Perez [illegible], Rhin 8-2, Colonia Cuauhtemoc, Mexico, D.F.;
Lic. Alfonso Rodriguez Contreras, Corona 224, Colonia Industrial, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Virgilio Camacho Paniagua, Sur 101-A, No. 430, Colonia Prado Churubusco, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Daniel Nieto Roaro, Tabasco 301, Colonia Roma, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Silvestre Salgado, 5 de Febrero No. 90, Mexico 1, D.F.;
Dra. Rebeca Diaz Canales, Ave. Dos No. 74, San Pedro de los Pinos, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Horacio Gonzalez Martinez, Holbein No. 133-32, Colonia Napoles, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Agustin Gonzalez Lopez, Ave. Independencia 18, Mexico, D.F.;
Prof. Leonardo Curzio, Vicente Suarez No. 150, Colonia Condesa, Mexico, D.F.;
Dr. Luis Ganiochiri Carabajal, Beisbol No. 205, Mexico 21, D.F.;
Prof. Mauricio Magdaleno, Cuicuilco 89, Colonia Vertiz Narvarte, Mexico, D.F.;
Ing. Rogelio Valenzuela C., Sur 69-A No. 511, Colonia Justo Sierra, Mexico, D.F.;
Sr. Antonio Perez Henriquez, Ave. Cuauhtemoc 655-5, Mexico 12, D.F.;
rof. Marco Arturo Montero, Garcia Conde 33, Tacubaya, Mexico, D.F.;
rof. Raimundo Ramos, Sur No. 51 - No. 155, Mexico 13, D.F.;
ic. Gregorio de Luna Esparza, Prolongacion Opalo No. 33, Mexico 14, D.F.;

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

STATE # X	ARMY # X	NAVY # X	AIR # X	FBI # 3	AEC		NSA	X	OCR	X	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #			TREAS	X DIA		X USIA	# X	I&NS	#X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EE		SE		CI/ICG	1 WH FI	1 WH/PACY	1	HMM-6991	LNG
FE		WE		CA/PROP	2 WH/COPS/CCO 1			NO PROJECT	VR;aw
NE		WH		WH/R	1 WH/3/M	1 SAS/R	11	(LITAMIL-9)	
AF		IO		WH/CA/P	1 WH/MEXI	1 SAS/WAVE	#1	CS-3/539,464	

TOTALS DISSEM SEC 1, IE 2, CI 3, FI 3, CA 2,
WH 5 (2), SAS 11 (1).

LIAISON: *
Co-ordinated with: SAS/R
(in draft)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 6 MAR 63 22/35

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2000, 5 MAR)EP

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SR 4, C/WH 5,
S/C 2

ROUTING
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MAR 6 0055Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 79811

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3653

RYBAT TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF A. MEXI 3633 (IN-78031) *

B. DIR 18853

IN79811

1. LITAMIL-9 LEFT MEXI ON 4 MAR 63 FOR HAVA VIA CUBANA AIRLINES. (LIFIRE/2)

2. CO HELD LAST MTG L-9 EARLY MORNING 4 MAR. L-9 REFUSED TAKE S/W EQUIPMENT ANY KIND OR PHYSICAL BONAFIDES. WILLING ACCEPT CONTACT AFTER THREE MONTHS HAVA. MTG SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT BOOK STORE CITED REF A AFTER 1600. FUMASOLI OR PERSON KNOWN TO FUMASOLI (NOT CUBAN) SHOULD APPROACH "DE PARTE DEL SR FUMASOLI". L-9 WILL ACCEPT PERSON'S BONAFIDES VIEW FACT MTG AT BOOK STORE AND USE FUMASOLI NAME. SEES NO POSSIBILITY PROVOCATION.

3. L-9 WILL SENT LTR MEXI "DROP" AFTER APPROX ONE MONTH HAVA. WILL WRITE BROTHER ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS. OPEN CODE TO BROTHER WILL PROVIDE ANSWERS GENERAL QUESTION REF A AS WELL EXISTENCE SOVIET ROCKETS, AND POLITICAL POSITION RAUL ROA. L-9 BRIEFED AGAIN RE REQUIREMENTS REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED POSSIBILITY REMAINS LITAMIL-9 WILL TAKE S/W PENCIL OR GREEN LEAD ONLY FOR EMERGENCY USE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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[illegible] DIR CITE MEXI 3653

[illegible] LITAMIL-9

REF: A. DIR 19992

B. MEXI 3559 [illegible]

1. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 OP AS FOLLOWS: L-9 READILY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY ACCEPTED FOL MEXI ACCOMODATION ADDRESS: FERNANDO JIMENEZ APARTADO [illegible], MEXICO [illegible], D.F., WHICH HE HAS MEMORIZED. POSSIBILITY REMAINS HE TAKE S/W PENCIL OR GREEN LEAD ONLY FOR EMERGENCY USE VIA ACCOMODATION ADDRESS. WILL MAIL LTR ORDER CHECK MEXI ADDRESS WITHIN TWO WEEKS. BROTHER'S LETTER FROM MEXI WILL ADVISE HIM ARRIVAL JIMENEZ LTR THROUGH OPEN CODE.

2. L-9 PLANS WRITE BROTHER ABOUT EVERY TWO WEEKS, LTRS WILL CONTAIN SOME OPEN CODE PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON CO AND L-9, I.E., "PAPA DECAIDO" MEANING CASTRO ACCEPTING COMMUNIST ADVICE AND REGIME PLANS CONTINUE ACCEPTING COMMUNIST SUPPORT. "PAPA ANIMADO" MEANING CASTRO TRYING RID COUNTRY COMMUNIST INFLUENCE ETC.

3. L-9 PREFERS NO PERSONAL CONTACT HAVA DURING FIRST THREE MONTHS, AFTER THIS TIME WILLING TALK WITH [illegible] FUMASOLI, SWISS DIPLOMAT, FORMERLY ASSIGNED SPAIN AND POSSIBLY STILL THERE. L-9 AND FUMASOLI

[illegible] FRIENDS AND NO PROBLEM "COVER" FROM HAVA. L-9 FREQUENTS BOOK [illegible] OWNED BY SR. GELAIO KITTY CORNER POLICE STATION AND BESIDE [illegible] CAFE ACROSS STREET FROM PALACIO BELLAS ARTES. CAFE AND BOOKSTORE [illegible] ARCADE. L-9 HAS BEEN GOING BOOKSTORE FOR YEARS USUALLY BETWEEN 1100-1200 DAILY. REQUEST PRESENT LOCATION FUMASOLI AND POSSIBILITY HIS USE THIS OP. L-9 WILL BE GIVEN PHYSICAL BONA FIDES VERBAL RECOGNITION SIGNALS PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR EMERGENCY USE. L-9 POSITION RE PERSONAL CONTACT HAVA SAME THAT HIS LAST MTG PAPMERS AND CO.

4. CO MET BROTHER L-9 NIGHT 1 MAR AND CONTACT PLANS ESTABLISHED. BROTHER APPEARED WILLING COOPERATE FULLY WHEN CALLED UPON. WILL POUCH PRQ-I SOONEST.

5. NIGHT 1 MAR L-9 IN GOOD SPIRITS AND CONFIDENT WILL RETURN MEXI WITHIN THREE MONTHS. ALL AVENUES WILL BE EXPLORED DURING NEXT MTG COME UP WITH MOST EFFICIENT COMMO SYSTEM WITHIN L-9 LIMITATIONS AND LEVY REQUIREMENTS FOR "OPEN CODE" ANSWERS. L-9 LEAVING FOR HAVA ABOUT 1400 ON 4 MAR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF [illegible].

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SECRET

201-329609

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS - H.E.Mulloy

NUMBER
c-101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

Approval for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff does not consider to have been accomplished.

MEXI-1506

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pro

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/CA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

The FBI report entitled Foreign Political Matters Cuba and sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961, could not be located in RID or SAS files. Three such reports dated 29 December 1961 with the same title were obtained, but the Subject was not referred to in any of the three reports.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/INTEL/OPS SPT
1 - 201-329609

SECRET

[illegible]

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, [illegible] Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about [illegible] February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with [illegible].

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on [illegible] July 1962 and the status is being checked. (C-[illegible]; DPOB: 1925, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is R. E. [illegible], extension 4172.

OSCAR D. [illegible]
Training Officer/WH

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

18 F 62
Date

CONCURRENCE:

21 Feb.

Counter Intelligence Staff ________ Date

21 Feb

DDP Training & Qualifications Review Officer ________ Date

Distribution:

[illegible]
1 - C/[illegible]/TRO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TRO

DDP/SAS/TRO/GEMcCollum:clc (18 Feb. 1963)

~~CLASSIFIED MESSAGE~~ 201-329609

SECRET

ROUTING 201-329609

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ATE : 12 JAN 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION: WH 8* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1550 12 JAN 63)

NFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, ~~CI, CI/OPS, FI,~~ FI/INT 2, TFW 5, S/C 2

RI file this copy as indicated

☐ Destroy.

☒

☐

Marked ☐

☒ None required

Signature: WHLawson

JAN 12 2040Z 63

PRIORITY

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE SAGO CITE MEXI 3078 (OUSLER ACTING)

IN49031

REF MEXI 3052 (IN 47807) *

GYROSE LITAMIL-9

1. ON 11 JAN 63, COTY SOLORZANO VDA DE RAMIREZ, SISTER IN LAW GRAL LAZARO CARDENAS, TOLD LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN EMB SHOULD HAVE CAR WITHOUT DIP PLATES ON OCCASIONS LIKE AFTERNOON 10 JAN WHEN CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA WENT VISIT GRAL LAZARO CARDENAS. COTY SOLORZANO SAID THAT CARDENAS HOUSE UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND USE CAR RAMON SINOBAS WAS NOT WISE. L-9 REPORTED THAT LECHUGA AND SINOBAS LEFT WREATH LAYING CEREMONY RE JOSE ANTONIO MELLA ABOUT 1145 ON 10 JAN IN SINOBAS' CAR. LIKELY THEY ON WAY VISIT CARDENAS AT THAT TIME.

2. COTY SOLORZANO TOLD L-9 THAT ASSIGNMENT SINOBAS AS CHIEF MISSION MEXI IN ABSENCE LECHUGA POOR JUDGMENT PART CUBAN GOVT. HE NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED DO JOB ETC. SOLORZANO GODMOTHER SINOBAS CHILD. SOLORZANO SAID THAT CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS AGREES HER THIS POINT AND HAS ASKED HER WHAT L-9 AND EUSEBIO AZCUE "DOING", IMPLYING HIS OPINION EITHER ONE OF TWO SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN POST.

3. ON MORNING 11 JAN LECHUGA TOOK L-9'S GIFT FOR HIS SISTER FROM L-9 BUT TOLD HIM HE NOT LEAVING FOR HAVA UNTIL 14 JAN. LECHUGA AND SINOBAS ARRIVED EMBASSY ABOUT 2000 ON 11 JAN PROBABLY RETURNING

201-329609

LITAMIL-9

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
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PAGE 2

IN 49031

FROM TELLO LECHUGA MEETING CITED REF.

4. ON 11 JAN 62, JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA WITHOUT MEXI VISA EN ROUTE CHILE. LOPEZ TOLD L-9 AND BENIGNO CASTELLAR WHO MET HIM AIRPORT THAT HE CARRYING 4000 DOLLARS CASH. SAID PLANNED CARRY PROPAGANDA BUT FEARFUL WOULD BE CONFISCATED MEXI. LOPEZ SCHEDULED LEAVE FOR SAGO VIA CANADIAN PACIFIC NIGHT 11 JAN 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE NOT USED.

**INTEL RPT RE SCHEDULED INTERVIEW BETWEEN MANUEL TELLO AND CARLOS LECHUGA.

RI COPY

201-329669

SECRET

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FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
GIPOSE/LITAMIL-9 CONTACT REPORTS

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO. 050 006 105 /03
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-20472 *
4. DATE 08 JAN 63
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-334249
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.

SINOBAS CASADO, RAMON (201-334249)
WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE RECEPTION GIVEN BY PRES LOPEZ MATEOS ON 3 JAN AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. SINOBAS TOLD L-9, ANDRES ARMONA AND MANUEL SANCHEZ, WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE PALACE (SANCHEZ AS CHAUFFEUR), THAT PRES. LOPEZ MATEOS DID NOT GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO SEND GREETINGS FROM THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T BUT RATHER INTERRUPTED HIM TO SAY TRASMITA MIS SALUDOS A FIDEL CASTRO AND PRES. DORTICOS. SINOBAS SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION LOPEZ HAD PREPARED THIS MESSAGE AND WAS WAITING FOR HIM. L-9 SAID THAT HE NOTICED THAT MOST OF THE DIPLOMATS WERE MERELY SHAKING HANDS AND SAYING A FEW WORDS, HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF SINOBAS HE REMAINED WITH LOPEZ LONGER THAN MOST OF THE OTHER DIPLOMATS. AT ANY RATE, SINOBAS WAS TICKLED PINK BY WHAT LOPEZ MATEOS TOLD HIM.
ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT SINOBAS WHO IS A DIPLOMATIC SNOB TOLD ARMONA AND L-9 THAT THE CHANGES TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE WOULD MEAN THAT THEY (ARMONA AND L-9) WOULD NO LONGER BE DIPLOMATS AS SUCH, I.E. WHILE IN HAVANA THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR DIPLOMATIC STATUS. HE SAID THAT L-9 WOULD FALL UNDER THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURAL SECTION AND WOULD THEREFORE BE A DIPLOMAT ONLY IN A FOREIGN POST. THE SAME WITH ARMONA, WHO FALLS UNDER THE FOREIGN COMMERCE DEPT. L-9 SAID THAT SINOBAS IS ALWAYS TRYING TO IMPRESS OTHER MBRS OF THE EMB STAFF WITH HIS RANK AND THIS WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE. L-9 CAN'T STAND SINOBAS BECAUSE OF HIS HAUGHTY EGOTISTICAL AIR, BUT IS SATISFIED WITH HIS PLIGHT BECAUSE HE FEELS THAT SINOBAS IS TAKING HIM INTO HIS CONFIDENCE MORE AND MORE AS TIME GOES ON. L-9 DESCRIBED SINOBAS' WIFE AS STRICTLY LOW CLASS WITH NOTHING TO OFFER JAN 63.

LITAMIL-9

15.
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-334249

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
(7-46)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10 * (TFW COPY SLOTTED AT: 1530 21 DEC/AM)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

DEC 21 1906Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDI

34

JN39430

OPIM DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2978

201-329609

CYROSE LITAMIL-9 LITAMIL-7 -201-330173

REF DIR 86518

1. IN SEPT 62. GUILLERMO LEON ANTICH. CUBAN DIP. WHILE MEXI ON ROUT POST CHILE (?) TOLD CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI IN PRESENC LITAMIL-9 THAT CUBAN FOREIGN OFFICE PLANNED RECALL ALL AMBASSADORS FOR CONSULTATION RE INNOVATIONS FOREIGN OFFICE BASED SUGGESTIONS BLOC DIPS HAVA. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, NO INFO AVAILABLE L-9 INDICATING DIPS BEING RECALLED.

2. TRANSFER CUBAN DIPS MEXI AND BELIEVED REASONS FOR SAME AS FOLLOW CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, LEFT MEXI 26 OCT 62 FOR HAVA TAKE POST U.N. DELEGATION NEW YORK. LECHUGA EXPECTED RETURN MEXI 22 DEC WHERE WILL AGAIN TAKE UP AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES PROBABLY AFTER GOING HAVA REPORT U.N. DEVELOPMENTS. JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA LARA LEFT MEXI 23 NOV 62 FOR HAVA. RETURN HAVA STRAIGHTEN OUT COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS, TAKE EXAM AND POSSIBLY REPORT IN PERSON ON CONTACT KUBARKER MEXI. RETURN UNCERTAIN. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO LEFT MEXI 22 SEPT 62 FOR HAVA. DEFECTION PEDRO ROIG ORTEGA AND POOR ADMINISTRATION COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROBABLY ACCOUNT FOR TRANSFER. ANA MARIA BLANCO TABRAUE LEFT MEXI 12 DEC FOR OTTAWA. LECHUGA "LOVE" AFFAIR BELIEVED REASON

B 201-330173

RECORD COPY

201-329609

21 DEC 62

TABRAUE

BLANCO ~~TABRANE~~. RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ LEFT MEXI 17 DEC FOR HAVA. PAEZ SPENT OVER YEAR MEXI AND TRANSFER NOT UNUSUAL ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY NEW MODE SYSTEM INTRODUCED CUBAN EMB AND THIS UNKNOWN TO HIM. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PAEZ REPLACED BY PEDRO LARA MUNOZ WHO SPENT YEAR MOSCOW.

3. ON 19 DEC 62, LITAMIL-7 REPORTED THAT ONLY RAMON CUENCA AND ANA MARIA BLANCO OF ABOVE GROUP HAVE BEEN "DROPPED" OFFICIALLY FROM CUBAN DIP LIST MEXI. OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION PAEZ EXPECTED SHORTLY. [illegible] AND LECHUGA STILL ON LIST. CO HAS SCHEDULED MEETING 21 DEC WITH LITAMIL-7 AT WHICH TIME EXPECTS HAVE REPORT ON NEWLY DRAWN UP CUBAN DIP LIST FOR PASSING FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH DUE FIRST OF YEAR. L-7 OPINION THIS WILL REVEAL FUTURE STATUS DIPS IN QUESTION PARTICULARLY GARCIA LARA.

4. ON 18 DEC 62 ALBERTO MANUEL FERRER, CUBAN DIP PP 62/593 ARRIVED MEXI FROM HAVA. LITAMIL-9 BELIEVES HE MEXI INSPECT AMB ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATES WITH RAMON SINOBAS CASADO, MANUEL VEGA AND PEDRO LARA ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY. ON 19 DEC L-7 REPORTED SHE INTRODUCED TO RODRIGUEZ FNU A MYSTERIOUS CHARACTER WHO LIVING AT EMBASSY. STATION BELIEVES RODRIGUEZ AND FERRER IDENS. FERRER SCHEDULED RETURN HAVA ON 2[illegible] VIA CUBANA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR GYROSE USED.

[illegible]

[illegible] Fernandez, [illegible] Castro's [illegible]retary. [illegible] was [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] was the Secretary to Eduardo Chibas, one of the most eminent political leaders of Cuba during the last 20 years. Chibas was an avowed anti-communist. [illegible] used to be a [illegible] of Chibas political party, [illegible]". When he came to power, he appointed Mrs. [illegible] as his secretary. Chibas committed suicide on [illegible].

I do not know subject personally.

11/13/62.-

Married to Luis' brother Alberto

6

1 P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-19455

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
27 July 1962

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

MICROFILMED
AUG 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att ~~[illegible]~~ 2cc w/att to WH/3
2 - Files

INDEX - H

Encl - 1

CS COPY

201 - 3291

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET

5P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRF NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-19455

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee): Luis ALBERU Souto

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT:

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.):

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use):

MICROFILMED
AUG 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

5. DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours):

No known immoderate vices.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals):

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

9a. SEX: ☒ M ☐ F
9b. AGE: 47
9c. APPARENT AGE: 47
9d. HEIGHT: FT. 6 IN. –
9e. WEIGHT: 170
9f. COMPLEXION:
9g. FACE (Shape): Round
9h. COLOR OF HAIR: Black
9i. COLOR OF EYES:
9j. TEETH:
9k. BUILD:
9l. POSTURE:

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE:

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES:

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES:

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

CS COPY

GROUP 1

FORM 7-60 1050 [illegible] HMMA 19455 SECRET

201-329609

SECTION II

CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 1.)
Spanish

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)
Michelet 7 - 301

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 3.)

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
Cuba - Dec. 1961 - Visit relatives and for business reasons.
until March 1962

SECTION III

OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION
Diplomat

2. TITLE
Cultural Attache

3. SALARY (Per annum)
About 450.00 Us per
month or $5400 US
per annum

4. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Not known

SECTION V

EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X				X		X	
French	X				X		X	

SECTION VI
SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Artist

SECTION VII
MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Not known					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) June 1 '59	2. EMPLOYER Cuban Government	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK Diplomatic	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 300 PER month (approx.)	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER	3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX

MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE:	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☒	DIVORCED	☐	ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) NEE (Middle) (Sur) (Last)
Klara Vera Kacz Stross M ALBERU SOUTO

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
8 Dec 1949

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
Mexico City, Mexico

6. DATE OF BIRTH
DOB 17 July 1926

7. PLACE OF BIRTH
POB Vienna, Austria

SEX: F CIT: ?

8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
British

9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
Not known

Wife of Sub of 201-329609
Bo data

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI

FATHER

1. FULL NAME
Maximino Alberu

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH
Cognac, France

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
French

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION
Engineer

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE
Havana, Cuba

SECTION XII

MOTHER

1. FULL NAME
Josefina Souto

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH
La Coruna

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
Spanish

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION
Housewife

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECRET

[illegible] and [illegible]

SECTION XIII

BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Leonel Alberu Souto	X				
Alfredo Alberu Souto	X				
2 Sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV

RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Alberu (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban Government.

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV

PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza Proenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI

MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE	SIGNATURE
25 July 1962	Clyde K. SHRYOCK

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 567
25 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, WH 7, S/C 2

Mulloy

ROUTING
1 FI
2
3
4 OPS SPT
5
6

JUL 26 0127Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 34586

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1536

GYROSE

REF DIR 19359 (Out, 98071)
MEXI 0946 (IN 13857)
MEXI 0444 (IN 12825)

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA KACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 60 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.03 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIKAYAK-2, LIMUD-1, LITAMIL-10 B/2).

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. ODIBEX (LINOZZLE)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR PCA PROCESSING.

LITAMIL-9

SECRET

201-329609

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis ALBERU Souto C-101331

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1915, Oviedo, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Residence - Michelst 7301, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 127398

DATE 26 JULY 1962

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME J. Houghan
OFFICE DESIGNATOR TFW/OPS SPT
ROOM, BUILDING GE 5512
EXTENSION 7646

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Klara Vera Kacz Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Div. 56

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France Mother Josefina SOUTO, BORN LA CORUNA, SPAIN

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT XXX INFORMATION

Aug 10 2 11 PM '62

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.

SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 8-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

TO: J. Moughan

10 Aug 62
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
- X CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS	

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

[illegible]

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRO I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRO II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XXX398 LIST ATTACHED, NO:	127398

6. PI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES	
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
H.E. MOLLICY	7606	WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1-62

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michalet 7301, Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kaca Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, O-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

201-329609

S-E-C-R-E-T

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
BIOGRAPHIC REGISTER

ALBERU Souto, Luís

CUBA

Cultural Attaché, Embassy at Mexico City

Cultural Attaché Luis Alberu arrived in Mexico in October 1959, the first Cuban representative since the fall of Batista. Early in 1962 he was transferred to the United Nations section of the Foreign Ministry but returned to Mexico on 16 March 1962 because "conditions were terrible in Cuba." He is reported to be mistrusted by other members of the Embassy.

In 1953 Alberu was identified as an artist residing in Mexico. He is possibly the brother of Mariluz Alberu Souto, Consular employee in Vigo, Spain.

July 1962

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ORIG : H. E. MULLOY:jd
UNIT : TFW/FI
EXT : 6172 1623
DATE : 26 JUNE 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 54z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

~~OUT 58081~~

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 19359

GYROSE LITAMIL/9

RE: MEXI 0946 (IN 43554)*

1. PLS ADVISE STATUS LITAMIL/9. ALSO CABLE RESULTS LOCAL TRACES AND PRQ, PART I INFO FOR POA PROCESSING IF STATION PLANS PROCEED THIS OP.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *LITAMIL-3 STILL IN TOUCH WITH LITAMIL-9 BUT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE ARRANGE MTG WITH CO.

C/TFW/FI

C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER
26.5

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF, TASK FORCE W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

C/TFW

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W; Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/GYROSE
Luis ALBERU Souto/Traces on Cuban Diplomat

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: See Para. 2
REFERENCE: MEXI 444, dated 2 April 1962

1. JMWAVE files contain no information on Subject not on file at Mexico Station.

2. We would appreciate being kept informed of developments in Mexico Station's proposed exploitation of Subject including receiving any target personality data on Cuban diplomats and government officials in general which may be obtained from Subject.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2-Mexico City
2-Chief, Task Force W
2-Chief, WHD

19-120-40

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
3 April 62

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 4 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-3708

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-32

[illegible], Luis (Goste)

[illegible]-2[illegible]587 [illegible] [illegible]-3/750,116	Cultural Att[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] self only with his work. Not involved in any [illegible] [illegible] serv)
[illegible]-7852 [illegible] CS-3/[illegible],577	[illegible] [illegible] permission [illegible] [illegible] de [illegible] in [illegible] had been previously held fm [illegible] to know files read B-2) [illegible] [illegible] files. ([illegible],
UFGA-3708 4 Apr 62 19-120-32	To COS, MexC JMWAVE files contain no info on [illegible] not on file Mex Station. Requests be kept informed of developments Mex's proposed exploitation of Subj. incl. receiving any target personality data on Cuban dips and govt officials in general which may be obtained fm Subj.
HMM-6396 CS-3/511, 215 25 June 62	Subj., Cultural Att of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] by other [illegible] [illegible] (AMSTONE-1, F-2)

GARCIA, Antonia (Lara) 201-328386

HMM-6501 13 July 62 CS-	Subj, Commercial Attache of Cuban Embassy in MexC, arr'd in Mexi 23 April 1962. Before coming to Mexi, Subj held important positions with Cuban Govt in Habana. Subj is member of Cuban G-2 but did not attend Cuban G-2 school. (LIRACK fm AMSTET-1) B-2) aka Nico GARCIA.

[illegible], Luis [illegible] Cuba

[illegible]

Subj entered office of A[illegible], a high-ranking official in the Mexican Ministry of Government. [illegible] source stated that A[illegible] entered immediately unannounced and [illegible] received in spite of the fact that there were some twenty persons waiting in the outer office who had arrived prior to ALMERU.

30 Dec 61. [illegible]

Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Amb., reviewed duties of subj. at staff meeting of Emb. Mexi. on 10 Apr. '61. Subj is working Cultural affairs - lectures & publications. [illegible]

LITAMIL-3 reported on 23 Mar 62 that subj, Cuban Cultural Attache Mexi, did not return Cuba where he has been assigned to United Nations section of Foreign Office. Subj, who arrived Mexi from Cuba on 14 Mar said that conditions terrible in Cuba and he will remain in Mexi. [illegible]

ALVERU Souto, Luis Cuba

Subj is Cultural Attache of the Cuban Emb in Mexico, is mistrusted by other mbrs of the Emb.
(HMM-6396, 22 May 62, Source AMSTOKE-1)

ANIVERSARIOS NACIONALES DE LOS PAISES SOCIALISTAS

4 - Abril.	Hungría, Día de la Liberación (en 1945)
9 - Mayo.	Checoeslovaquia, Fiesta Nacional.
11- Julio.	Mongolia, Victoria Nacional de un Pueblo (en 1921)
22- Julio	Polonia, Día de la Liberación Nacional (en 1944)
23- Agosto.	Rumania, Día de la Liberación Nacional (en 1944)
2 - Sept.	Vietnam, Aniversario de la Independencia.
9 - Sept.	Bulgaria, Día de la Liberación (en 1944)
9 - Sept.	Corea, Día de la Fundación de la República (en 1948)
I - Oct.	China, Aniversario de la Proclamación de la República (en 1949)
7 - Oct.	R.D.A., Fiesta Nacional.
7 - Nov.	URSS, Día de la Revolución de Octubre.
29-Nov.	Iugoeslavia, Proclamación de la República (en 1945)

Celebración de Semanas de Cultura

Checoeslovaquia, celebrada el 3-9 Mayo 1965

R.D.A.	Oct. de 1965
URSS.	Nov. de 1965
Hungría.	pendiente de fecha en 1965
Bulgaria	Septiembre de 1965
Vietnam	Diciembre, con motivo cración FIN
Corea.	pendiente de condiciones(1965 ó 66)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

Planes Culturales

PAISES SOCIALISTAS

República Popular de Albania

Proyecto de Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el MINREX pendiente de firma.

República Democrática Alemana

Plan para 1965-1966
~~Fue firmado en la RDA en Marzo de 1965~~

República Popular de Bulgaria

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Abril de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Marzo de 1965
El de 1966-67 hay q. firmarlo en Sofía este año—

República Democrática Popular de Corea

Proyecto de Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el el MINREX pendiente de firma.

República Socialista de Checoslovaquia

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Febrero de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Febrero de 1965
el de 1966-67 hay que firmarlo en Praga en octubre

República Popular China

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en La Habana en Enero de 1964
Protocolo Adicional al Plan de 1964-1965
Presentado Proyecto del CNC.
Se encuentra pendiente de aprobación por la parte China.
el de 1966-67 hay q. firmarlo en China este año

República Popular de Hungría

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Budapest en Marzo de 1964

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

República Popular de Mongolia

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Ulan Bator en Junio de 1964

República Popular de Polonia

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Varsovia en Octubre de 1964

República Popular Rumana

Plan para 1965-1966
Se encuentra en el MINREX pendiente de firma

Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas

Plan para 1965
Fue firmado en Moscú en Mayo de 1965

República Democrática de Viet-Nam

Plan para 1964-1965
Fue firmado en Hanoi en Marzo de 1965
Está ejecutándose.

República Socialista Federal de Yugoslavia

No se ha hecho Plan
Existe solamente Convenio
Se han realizado algunos intercambios de artistas y exposiciones.

Compañero:

E[illegible] con el interés del joven tunecino que Vd. nos tr[illegible], el cual desea venir a Cuba a estudiar Música, le informamos lo siguiente:

El plan de becas de la Escuela Nacional de Arte no considera hasta ahora, becados extranjeros que vengan de otros países para estudiar en ese Centro.

El MINED sí tiene, a través de Convenios, becados de países del campo socialista que vienen a estudiar según planes del referido Ministerio.

Como Vd. recordará hubo el caso de un grupo de estudiantes de Ghana que vinieron por el MINED a estudiar Idiomas y solicitaron además estudiar Música. Eso se resolvió manteniéndolos como becados de Educación (alojamiento, ropa, manutención y enseñanza del Idioma Español) y matriculándolos en uno de los Conservatorios de La Habana, donde asisten los días y horas en que tienen sus clases.

Esa sería la forma de tratar el asunto que Vd. nos plantea, asegurando ustedes en primer lugar con el MINED que ellos lo absorberán como becado; aunque en este caso no se puede resolver por Convenio ya que el interesado no procede de un país del campo socialista.

Revolucionariamente,

Dra. Carmen Pérez Poncet,
Jefe del Dpto. Nacional de
Enseñanzas Especiales.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA:

DE: 1 Dr. Corona

A:

ASUNTO

([illegible]
redacción

en mi
trabajo

Estimado compañero:

Con el fin de estimular a la "Agrupación de Intelectuales Españoles Amigos de Cuba"; sugerimos que por parte de Uds, se les envíe una comunicación, en ese sentido, a nombre del compñaero Ricardo Martínez.

Al mismo tiempo recordamos, que dicha comunicación. nos la envían a nosotros (no directamente), para hacerla llegar a su destino a través de la Embajada; así como el material que como parte del convenio se les remita, libros, discos, etc.

Fraternal y revolucionariamente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

X copias a UNEAC a Fayad Jamis.
X Casa de las Américas. — gutiérrez
X ICAIC, Tomás G. Alea,
Univesidad de la Habana Dept. de
Filosofía, Jesús Díaz.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 15 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Co. Aurelio Martínez,
Director del I.C.R.
Edificio Radio Centro.
Vedado. [illegible] 23 71:258

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de acompañar a esta comunicación, copia de una carta y un ejemplar impreso titulado "Rose d'Or de Montreux, 1966".

Dicha carta y el ejemplar de referencia, me han sido remitidos por el Embajador de Suiza con motivo del [illegible] concurso internacional (el 7mo. de la serie), que tendrá lugar en Montreux, Suiza, del 21 al 29 de Abril del próximo año, y en el que por primera vez serán presentadas en el mismo emisiones de televisión a colores.

Le ruego que cualquier decisión que tome en relación a dicho concurso, nos lo comunique.

Con gracias anticipadas, aprovecho esta oportunidad para quedar de Ud. con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

fraternamente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona
Director.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

(es copia)

La Habana, 24 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimada compañera:

Tengo el gusto de trasladar a Ud. una copia traducida, de carta dirigida a nuestro Agregado Cultural en Londres, por el Sr. Bernard G. Mullins de aquella ciudad.

En dicha carta el Sr. Mullins, que representa la firma "Hutchinsons Publishing", se interesa y pide información sobre la posibilidad de publicar obras de poesía y ficción latino-americanas, traducidas al inglés.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud.

EXO: una copia de carta del
Sr. Bernard G. Mullins,
de Londres, Inglaterra.

Fraternalmente,

Luis Alberú,
Resp. de Protocolo

La Comp. Marcia Leiseca,
Casa de las Américas.
G y Tercera, Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

INTERPRETES

ICAP 32-3521 Espinosa , quien designó a Jorge León de países
32-5588 socialistas, y este a su vez a Nelson Fleites, guía e intérprete de ruso. Hotel Habana Libre ICAP Tel 30-5011

ANA YAVTUJOVITCH, tel. vecino 80-9003

solicité su servicio a Mercy Martínez, MINREX 30-5031

El C.N.C., tiene un plan de becas en el exterior cada año.

Tel. [illegible]

El Dept. de Enseñanzas Especiales (Pérez Ponset) 2.86.67 recibe las necesidades de becas de C.N.C. las cuales se pasan al JUCEPLAN y allí se aprueban o se modifican.

C.N.C., no tiene planes para recibir becados extranjeros tiene que ser a través del Ministerio de Educación, que sí las recibe (Dr. Eduardo Lara, Relaciones ~~Exteriores~~ Externas Educación, atiende las peticiones

para las becas del Ministerio de Educación , MINREX sirve como intermediario a través de las misiones diplomáticas.

Túnez, desde el punto de vista político ~~peee~~ escasa importancia para Cuba.

[illegible] 15 días

CNC
consejo nacional de cultura

H. del Arte

2011
SOFIA SUCANIENA
HOTEL HABANA LIBRE
HAB. 2119

Waldina Restano ICTR
7-87-10 Vizcaino EXT
[illegible]

No. 1.- Organizar 3 conferencias (2 en fábricas y 1 en la Universidad). Tema de las Conferencias: Panorama Cultural Soviético.

9 No. 2.- Visita al Museo Hemingway. Fernando Campoamor

6 No. 3.- Recorrido por la Ciudad.---

1 No. 4.- Visita al Museo Napoleónico. ← 791460 791412 791347

[illegible] a Domingo
7-49-01 act. 12
7-81-23

12 No. 5.- Visita al Museo Nacional. ← 61-39-15

día 10 Camilo Cienfuegos
No. 6.- Visita a una fábrica de tabaco. Waldina Restano ICTR

9 No. 7.- Visita a una granja cerca de la Habana. CNC

No. 8.- Visita a la Unión de Periodistas. Homero [illegible]

7-51
(14) No. 9.- Visita a la UNEAC. Juan Blanco

2-17 No. 10- Visita a la Academia de Ciencias. [illegible] y a [illegible]

(16) No. 11- Visita a la Universidad de la Habana. Vizcaino [illegible]
Viernes 12

8770
(17) No. 12- Visita a [illegible]. [illegible] H. del Arte. [illegible]

795 NOTA: Le interesa el teatro y el cine. Yelín [illegible]
(18) Experiencias [illegible]
(19) [illegible] películas [illegible]

[illegible] Eduardo [illegible]

[illegible]

Compañero Dr. Corona:

En relación a los $100.00 que en fecha [illegible] de Diciembre Ud. me entregó para atenciones a los compañeros mexicanos Carlos Ancira y Sra., y Alejandro Jodorouski; tengo el gusto de adjuntarle comprobantes que justifican el empleo de dicha cantidad.

OMPAÑEROS:

Las Organizaciones de Masa del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, en saludo al VI Aniversario de la Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, presentarán a la cantante norteamericana BARBARA DANE el próximo viernes 19 a las 4:30 pm.

La Sra. Dane que se encuentra en Cuba invitada por nuestro organismo viaja acompañada del folklorista y editor ——— IRWIN SILBER. Ambos han burlado las leyes del Dpto. de Estado norteamericano que prohibe a los ciudadanos de ese país viajar a Cuba. Han llegado con la idea de conocer por ellos mismos nuestra Revolución.

Es compromisos de todos nosotros como revolucionarios recibir dignamente a estos ciudadanos norteamericanos representantes de la más valiosa clase artística de su país.

Al finalizar la presentación se ofrecerá un brindis a invitados y empleados.

ORGANIZACIONES REVOLUCIONARIAS.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Eexcelentísimo Embajador de los E.U. Mexicanos, Sres. Miembros del Cuerpo Diplomático

Sras y Sres.

Es para mi un honor quo en ocasión como esta, represente al Consejo Nacional de Cultura en que se inaugura la exposición "Caleidoscopio Fotográfico" del artista mexicano Nacho López.

Creo sinceramente, que el gran artista Nacho López, no necesita presentación, su arte en muy conocido en Cuba a través de revistas internacionales y periódicos que con frecuencia reproducen su trabajo artísitico; además no es la primera vez que tengamos el gusto de tenerlo entre nosotros así como a otors tantos mexicanos ilustres que nos ham visitado desde el triunfo de la Revolución.

Aquí en esta sala encontraremos un exponente gráfico de lo que tan acertadamente nos dice en su introspectiva el artista que nos ocupa.

"El placer en sí - más no la diversión - de producir imágenes que despierten ideas y emociones en el espectador, pretendo hacerlo conscientede que el mundo no son cuatro paredes, trabajo y familia; sino que hay otras formas bellas y horribles, otros rostros que tambien viven, respiran y mueren, en busca de las mismas necesidades eternas: trabajo, vestido, comida y dignidad.

La exposición que nos disponemos a admirar estrecha aún más los lazos que nos une con el gran país hermano México, y no quisiera dejar de destacar en esta oportunidad, la satisfacción que nos produce cooperar con la Embajada de México que ha hecho posible la exposición que se ofrece conjuntamante con la Sociedad Cubano-Mexicana de Relaciones Culturales y el Consejo Nacional de Cultura (Delegación Provincial)

Muchas gracias,

Luis Alberú,
Responsable de Protocolo.


RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
DR. CORONA
MANUEL VEGA
MANUEL E. VEGA
DR. ELPIDIO HERNANDEZ
ALBERY
JOSE LUIS POSADA
MARTA GONZALEZ
DEPARTAMENTO DE ASUNTOS JURIDICOS
WALDO AGUILES
OFICINA DE LA PRESIDENCIA
LOLITA – MARILU
PROYECTOS Y CONSTRUCCIONES
AZCUE
Miguel Alfonso
do → ROLANDO MASVIDAL
ción única
SECTORIAL DE ACTIVIDADES
NELIO CONTRERAS
Dpto. Control Plan de Actividades
ODILIO URFE
CÉSAR ~~SENTENA~~
Dirección Nacional de MUSICA
MARTA ARJONA
Dirección Nacional de ARTES PLASTICAS
JOAQUIN MIRABAL
Dirección Nacional de TEATRO Y DANZA
NILO OTERO
SECTORIAL DE SERVICIOS
Registro de la Propiedad Intelectual
M. T. FREYRE DE ANDRADE
Dirección Nacional de BIBLIOTECAS
GLORIA PERE.
Dirección Nacional de DIVULGACION Y PUBLICACIONES
ABELARDO MORENO
Dirección Nacional de ZOOLOGICOS Y ACUARIOS
DELEGACIONES PROVINCIALES
MIGUEL ANGEL BOTALIN – ORIENTE
GIORDANO RODRIGUEZ – CAMAGÜEY
EVELIO FERNANDEZ – LAS VILLAS
ANAIS CALLADO – HABANA
RAMON MARAGOTO – PINAR DEL RÍO
JOSE ALEMAN – MATANZAS
REDENTO MOREJÓN
SECTORIAL DE ECONOMIA
MANUEL TERAN
JORGE AMARO
Dirección Nacional de COORDINACION Y DESARROLLO ECONOMICO
Empresa Grabaciones y Ediciones Musicales
Dirección Nacional de SERVICIOS GENERALES
Empresa de Suministro
MARIO MARTINEZ

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

7. NAME (Last) [illegible] (First) [illegible] (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME	(Last) (First) (Middle)	VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE - P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

53 54 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION *(Clear text)*

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION *(Clear text)*

CUBAN CULT[illegible] [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

22. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE 019

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM [illegible]

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201- [illegible]

FORM 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)



1 Julio Alvarez Ojea o Carlos Perez Quintero

2 Carlos Perez Quintero - Julio Alvarez Ojea

3 Juan Alberto Soto

4 Antonio Nunez Jimenez

Fotos de la Comision Cubana en Mexico

Source? received in envelope from up for filing 8 may 75

201-0329609





SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
ALBERU SOUTO, Luis

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO.
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
4. DATE
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED 30 July 62

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101331.

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-329669

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT ALBERU Souto, Luis	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 101331

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-329609

867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/C [illegible] THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 [illegible]

ALBERU-Souto, Luis

201-529609

WH/1/R

THERE IS A RESTR[illegible] CI/[illegible] FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 [illegible]

FORM 11-56 44c OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

LITAMIL-9

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 52 96 09

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

201-328641

E. PBRUMEN Official Involved in State-Run Tourist Activities: At Headquarters' request, the Station contacted LITAMIL-9 to obtain information on Subject on a trip to Canada (see MEXICO CITY-4955). LITAMIL-9, who had previously reported that he thought Subject might be willing to cooperate with LNHARP if properly approached, refused to make any effort to contact him. The Station suggested that the cooperation of Subject's ex-wife, now residing in the JMWAVE area, be enlisted and that she visit him in Canada with their child.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 8 PER ________

ACTION
WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

SSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 1/2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO FILE NO ________

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

INFO
FILE VR, WH/COG 8, EUR 8, SB 8,
CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT

S E C R E T 261630Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4915

PRIORITY JMWAVE, OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

REFS A. DIRECTOR ~~[illegible]~~ 85742

26 MAR 68 IN 78317

B. OTTAWA 5308 (IN 76477)

1. UNABLE LOCATE MACIQUES. NPA FLIGHT REF B FULL BUT MACIQUES NOT ON PASSENGER OR STANDBY LIST. OTHER MONTREAL FLIGHT AERONAVES FLIGHT 442 MAR 26 DOES NOT SHOW MACIQUES. STATION CONTINUING ATTEMPT LOCATE MACIQUES AND WILL ADVISE. WAS NOT ON CUBANA MANIFEST 22 MARCH, OR 25 MARCH.

2. LITAMIL-9 CONTACTED LATE EVENING 25 MAR BUT COULD NOT ADD TO PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT BECAUSE HAS NOT SEEN MACIQUES. EVEN IF KNEW WHERE MACIQUES STAYING WOULD NOT GO SEE HIM BECAUSE AS REPORTED IN MEXI 2751 LITAMIL-9 DOES NOT WANT BECOME INVOLVED IN OPS.

3. OTTAWA: PLEASE ADVISE IF MACIQUES TURNS UP MONTREAL SO STATION CAN STOP LOOKING FOR HIM. ACCORDING OTTA 4831 SEP 67 MACIQUES LIVED 6630 SHERBROOKE ST WEST, APT 2801, MONTREAL.

S E C R E T

BT

With file:
LITAMIL-9
201-329609
WK

SECRET

WC

ORIG: Will, Kerbe/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 25 March 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 6, EUR 7

CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CPS 3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 35742

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY JMWAVE INFO: OTTAWA

TYPIC

REFS: A. OTTAWA-5308 (IN 76477)*

B. JMWAVE 6305 (IN 30599), 28 MARCH ~~XX~~ 67 **

C. DIRECTOR 85178. 20 MARCH 67 ***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CITY TRY DETERMINE WHERE MACIQUES STAYING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE REF A AND NOTIFY JMWAVE. ALSO PLEASE PROVIDE SUITABLE PRETEXT TO COVER EX WIFE'S CALL TO PROTECT SMABOVE SOURCE. LITAMIL-9 REPORTED IN REF C THAT MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNHARP IF APPROACHED. CAN LITAMIL-9 OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT PER MEXI 2751.

2. FOR JMWAVE: UPON RECEIPT PARA I INFO IF MACIQUES EX WIFE STILL RESIDING HIALEAH FLORIDA PER REF B SUGGEST SHE BE CONTACTED AND DETERIME IF SHE ABLE TELEPHONE MACIQUES MEXICO CITY ASKING HE MEET WITH HER THERE ON HIS RETURN FROM MONTREAL.

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY_________ PER_________ #_________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO_________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR .

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO

PAGE TWO

WH COMMENT: *Abraham MACIQUES Maciques departing Mexico City 26 March for Montreal

**Amots identified MACIQUES ex wife as Ellen Louise Macique.

***LITAMIL-9 ~~being~~ believes MACIQUES willing cooperate if contacted.

**** LITAMIL-9 willing provide assessment of MACIQUES if latter returns/Cuba.

C/WH/COG/OPS Mr. Rothwell (in draft)

C/E/BC/C Mr. Howley (by phone)

CI/OPS Mr. Tansing (by phone)

WILLIAM B. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
C OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Reference: HMMA-33865, 19 January 1968

This is to notify the Station that LITAMIL-9 was granted a full Operational Approval on 7 February 1968 for limited use as an informant in Mexico.

Laura J. UPSTINE

Distribution
2-COS/Mexico City

CS COPY

201 - 329609
FEB 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-16115

DATE
12 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1			4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

AN PO
WH/1
ABSTRACT X INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	12 Feb 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG. 1-66
(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

No.201-329009

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1

ATTN: W. Kerbe

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of LITAMIL/9 ______, for the purpose specified in your request dated 6 February 1968.

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico.

W 2/7/68

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 7 February 1968 aal

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(8)

SECRET

6 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9
201-329609

Attached are two copies of a PRQ Part I on Subject and a copy of the PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:

PRQ I - 2 cys
PRQ II- 1 cy

SECRET

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 26 January 1968 aaa

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/M

ATTENTION : Jane F. Zerance

201 329609
C

The file on LITAMIL/9 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
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(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM 1P

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
○ PBRUMEN/OA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 1.

Reference : HMMW-15933, 16 November 1967

1. Forwarded as Attachment One, herewith, is a PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. Forwarded as Attachment Two, under separate cover, is the Part I of the same PRQ. As previously reported, Station meets very infrequently with LITAMIL-9, who is very busy, spends most of his time outside Mexico City, and is largely out of touch with PBRUMEN and LIRING. He has, for example, only visited LIRING twice in the last six months. Contacts which LITAMIL-9 made during a recent trip to Europe with PBRUMEN officials stationed in that area were unproductive. Since occasional contact is still desired, however, it is requested that a new OA be processed on LITAMIL-9 to cover his use as outlined in the Part II of the PRQ.

2. Traces were rerun on Subject through LNPURE and the Station, and no derogatory information was turned up except for that mentioned in HMMW-11988, which cannot be resolved any further than the Station's comments in MEXICO CITY-3497 of 19 February 1963.

MICROFILMED
FEB 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Raymond A. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1. PRQ Part II (h/w)
2. PRQ Part I (u/s/c) ... 31 Jan 68

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 3 copies Att #1; 4 copies Att #2)

2AN

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 33865

DATE
19 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

58

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-33865

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Nee)
Luis ABREU Souto

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: NA

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): NA

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

NA

5. DATE OF BIRTH: Circa 1915

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

No known immoderate vices

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

Not known

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9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX M ☒ M ☐ F	b. AGE 53	c. APPARENT AGE 53	d. HEIGHT FT. 6 IN. --	e. WEIGHT 170	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape) Round
h. COLOR OF HAIR Black	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH		k. BUILD		l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES
Has pock marks on face

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Sfe Att #2 HMMA 33865 w [illegible]

201 - 33[illegible]

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
Spanish

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
Cuba - December 1961-March 1962 (To visit relatives and for business reasons)
Cuba - March 1965-late 1966 (To work)

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	x		x		x		x	
French	x				x		x	
English					x			

D

SECTION VI	SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Artist

SECTION VII	MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	[illegible]		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII	EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1 June 59-Mar 65	b. EMPLOYER Cuban Government		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK Diplomatic	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Returned Cuba PCS
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Mar 65-late 1966	b. EMPLOYER Cub Nat. Cultural Council		c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Cultural	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return to Mexico
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) Late 1966-	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS Mexico
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Klara (Middle) Vera (Nee) NEE X Kacz Stross (Last) ABREU Souto

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 8 Dec 1949

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Mexico City

KLARA Vera X ABREU SoTo

36. DATE OF BIRTH: DPOB 17 July 1926

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Vienna, Austria

SEX F

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: British

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS: [illegible] of 20-344607

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): Not known

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME: Maximino Alberu

42. YEAR OF BIRTH:

43. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cognac, France

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: France

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION: Engineer

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Havana, Cuba

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME: Josefina SOUTO

49. YEAR OF BIRTH:

50. PLACE OF BIRTH: La Coruna

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Spanish

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

53. OCCUPATION: Housewife

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE:

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
201-773321 Leonel ALBERU Souto	x				
201-332877 Alfredo ALBERU Souto	x				
2 sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Alberu (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban Government

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

One sister-Cuban Consul to Vigo, Spain, in 1962

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

201-339609

5P

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HMMA-33865

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK, the first Case Officer, was introduced to Subject on 18 July 1962 by LITAMIL-3.

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2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subject also speaks good French and poor English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knew Clyde K. SHRYOCK by true name. The next Case Officer, Lawrence F. BARKER, took over in June 1963. Subject was turned over to his present Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, following his return from PBRUMEN in the fall of 1968.
7

FORM 7-55 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CS COPY
SECRET

(4-20)

ATT #1 HMMA 33865

201-309609

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist and anti-AMTHUG.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control, explain.)*

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and his Case Officer meet as acquaintances.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as a former member of LIRING, still has contacts in the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

With a WOLADY intelligence service.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Leonel ALBERU
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects LITAMIL-9 is still engaged in intelligence activities.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning, intelligent, and has an aptitude for the work.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subject has been an active asset of the Mexico City Station since 1962. First he provided information on LIRING; after his return to Mexico in late 1966 as a private citizen he still provided some info on LIRING personnel and on the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From members of LIRING and the PBRUMEN community. Also from old friends and acquaintances living in Mexico or PBRUMEN.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows that his information goes to ZRMETAL.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's current use is to pass on any information which comes to his attention which he thinks may be of interest. He is occasionally debriefed for any info he can provide on PBRUMENERS or their contacts the Station thinks he may know or have known. There is no current active direction of his activities, and his usefulness is at present close to marginal.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is no longer paid any salary. He must be considered an operational contact. In addition to his three case officers, he has known Andrew S. PARMERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN under assumed names.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises have been made to Subject.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station and LMPURE files. No derogatory information.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

POA was granted .

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 May 1967

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. He is sincere, reliable, intelligent, and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE is known to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXICO CITY 3450; they are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. He is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is basically European, but because of his Cuban accent he would probably be recognized as Cuban.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts I and II was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged when Subject may be terminated.

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by phone (his number is in the Mexico City phone book) using the name of one of the WOFIRM officers he has been in contact with as bona fides.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE:

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER:

201-329609

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference: HMMW 15832

The Provisional Operational Approval for Subject expired on 8 November 1967. Please submit PRQ Parts I and II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, the POA will be automatically cancelled.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Distribution:
2 - COS/Mexico City

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
HMMW-15933	16 November 1967
CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET	201-329609

RI
CHRONO

23 16		
		C/WH
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Gloria dePerignat	jab	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	16 Nov 67	W. J. Kaufman, C/WH/1

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: [illegible] November 1967 Epk

TO: WH/1/M Jane P. Zerance

C NO.: 201- 329609

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

PCA expired on 8 November 1967. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, PCA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a

SECRET

(20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Expiration of POA for LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II

Reference : HMMW-15481, 1[illegible] May 1967

The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 will expire 8 November 1967. In order that Headquarters may request an Operational Approval, it is requested that the Station please prepare and submit PRQ Parts I and II on him.

Lauren J. UTHFINE

Distribution:
 Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

RI
Chrono

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW - 15832

DATE
19 OCT 1967
11 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
WH/1

OFFICER

TYPIST

EXT.
4267

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	[illegible]	W. J. Kaufman

PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

32/21

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, [illegible] WH/C 8, [illegible]

S E C R E T 290020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2961 LANGDON ACTING

MADRID PARIS INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

PERUMEN

29 SEP 67 IN 61985

FYI MEXICO STATION CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN) SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXICO 25 SEPT ON VACATION TRIP MADRID, BARCELONA, PARIS AND POSSIBLY THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS. LITAMIL-9 WILL DEFINITELY CALL ON CUBAN OFFICIAL REPS MADRID, BARCELONA AND PARIS. CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS IN PARIS IS ALEJO CARPENTIER BELMONT. LITAMIL-9 WILL REPORT ANY INFO ELICITED FROM OFFICIALS HE CALLS ON.

PLANS RETURN LATE OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

WH/1 File

201-329609

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 41/53

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR8, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 290020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2962 LANDDON ACTING

MADRID PARIS INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

PERUMEN

29 Sep 67 IN 61974

REF MEXICO CITY 2961 (IN61965)

IDENTITY: LUIS ALBERU SOUTO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

WH/ File
201-329609

LITAMIL-7

SECRET

28 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto
201-329609

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 15 June 196

1. Per your referenced request, the FBI documents were located and reviewed with the following results:

a. The first document dealt with a Luis SOTO who was appointed Commercial Attache of the Dominican Embassy, Madrid. This is not our Subject.

b. All documents referenced Luis ALBERU-Souto's assignment as Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City, his residences, telephone numbers, and his relationships with the Spanish Communist group in Mexico.

c. The next three items deal with a Luis SOTO, a member of the PPS of Mexico. This is not our Subject.

2. Subject was a Cuban defector in place, and his activities per paragraph 1.b are well known to this Agency. These activities were considered to be in line with his assignment and are not presently considered to offer a threat to operational security.

3. PRQ Parts I and II will be forwarded your Office upon receipt from the Station.

J. H. V. Fisher
Acting Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
① - 201-329609
LITAMIL-9

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
15 June 1967 jab

C NO.
201 - 329609

TO:
WH/1/M - Jane F. Zerance

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:
ALBERU-Souto, Luis

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐ PRQ II	☐ REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ FIELD TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ RI TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ GREEN LIST	☐ OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review the listed F BI documents. Then, please forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the Subject.

To obtain these reports, contact Miss Dolores Brown, RID/Files, Extension 4127.

Sent list 27 JUN 1967

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

G

SECRET

ALBERU (SOUTO), Luis
#279 089

5 June 1967

On 2 June 1967, the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were searched in the name of Luis (SOUTO) ALBERU, born in 1925 at Oviedo, Spain, and revealed the following information:

1 — Refer to data regarding Dominican Situation which was sent your Agency on 5-[illegible]-66, page 1. NOT MY SUBJ.

APMT W/ CUB EMB M. C. 2 Refer to data regarding Foreign Political Matters-Cuba which was sent your Agency on 12-19-61, page 4; 5-28-62, page 2; and 12-15-60, page 1.

3 Refer to data regarding Student Strike, School of Economy, University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, November 14/18, 1966, which was sent your Agency on 12-5-66, page 4. NOT MY SUBJ.

4 Refer to data regarding Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party) State of Nayarit which was sent your Agency on 11-29-65, page 2. NOT MY SUBJ

5 Refer to data regarding Instituto De Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso (Mexican-Russian Institute of Cultural Exchange), Guadalajara, Jalisco, which was sent your Agency on 6-22-66, page 32; 10-18-63, page 5; and 3-15-63, page 3. NOT MY SUBJ

JRG/akm

DBF-97388 19 Dec 61 Cub Emb
cultural att.
MC - adviser

DBA-11277, 28 May 62. Cultural
att Cuban Emb M.C. Contact
with Spanish Commie Group
in Mexico

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9 POA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Submission of PRQ Parts I and II on Subject.

LITAMIL-9 was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 8 May 1967 for contact only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information on Cuban activities or personalities. It is requested that you please prepare and submit to Headquarters copies of PRQ Parts I and II in order that we may request a full Operational Approval.

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-329609

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-15481

DATE: 18 MAY 1967
15 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS FILE NUMBER: 201-329609

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT
INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Zerancea	sas	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
RETIRED		
WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	5/15	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/M - J. F. Zerance

NUMBER
201 - 329609

SUBJECT
ALBERU-SOUTO, Luis

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
5 April 1967
18 April 1967 cy

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

As requested in paragraph # 3 of your memorandum of 5 April 1967.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward F. [illegible]

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 May 1967

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

7309

Embajada de Cuba: 112847.-
21 abril 67.-
M 18. L 11 .-
0940 - 1310.-

001. Entradas sin contestación.- 014.-

014. Entrada 0940.-MF búlgara explica a Alina que su esposo - Angel Kosovski es el Agregado Cultural de Bulgaria en La Habana, que hoy regresan a Cuba, pero como han tenido informes de que necesitan la visa de entrada, eso les parece extraño, pues existe un convenio Cuba-Bulgaria de régimen sin visa. Alina: que llame al 250795 y pregunte por Cepeda ó Miraval.-042. ---

042. Salida al 357900.-0958.-Alina pregunta por su esposo Cepero y MF informa que fué al aeropuerto a esperar el vuelo.64.

064. Entrada sin contestación.- 071.-

071. Salida al 141326.-Alina al no encontrar a Sicar, pide a-- Pedro que si lo vé, le diga que llamó. Pedro: bien.- 078. --

085. Salidas al 251899.-1037.-HD con HF para decirle que son- $ 76.25 y no $ 65.25. HF: que lo pague y luego él le dará.107.

107. Entrada 1041.-MF con Alina quien pide se espere un momentico. MF acepta y luego cuelga.- 114.-

114. Entrada 1121.-José Noria pregunta si llegó algo para él- y Alina dice que nó.- 125.-

UTAMIL-9
WH/1 FILE 201-324669

125. Entrada 1124.-HF pregunta si llegó el permiso para la -- señora María Cerafina Naranjo Méndez y Alina dice que nó.143.

7007

Embajada de Cuba: 250795.-
21 abril 67.-
M 13. L 19 .-
0945 - 1336.-

002. Entrada 0945.- La esposa de Angel Kosowski, Agregado Cultural de Bulgaria en La Habana, explica que hoy regresan a - Cuba, pero fueron informados que necesitan pasar por la embajada para recoger las visas y quisieran saber si es necesario, pues su esposo dice que entre Cuba y Bulgaria hay un régimen- sin visas. Cepeda: que pueden viajar sin visas y no es necesario que pasen a la embajada. MF: perfecto.- 015.-

015. Entrada sin contestación.- 020.-

020. Salida al 198647.-1006.-Chelo Esperón al no encontrar a-Mery y Tere, pide a Emilia les diga que no es seguro que vaya hoy porque tiene que salir con Conchita Peraza. MFacepta.048.

048. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 058.-

058. Entrada 1019.- El Lic.y Profesor Ramón Ramírez Gómez,de- la Universidad, con Chelo quien dice que el Embajador no ha - llegado, que tan pronto esté le recordará y le llamará.-064.-

File WH/1

066. Salidas al 196648 a las 1022 y 1025.-Chelo y Conchita -- platican sobre diversos temas familiares.- 098.-

201-329609

098. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación.- 127.-

LITAMIL-9

127. Salida al 198647.-Chelo pide a Emilia le diga a la señora Chelo que sí irá a comer con ellos y Emilia acepta.-133.--

Embajada de Cuba: 250795.-
19 abril 67.-
M 13. L 13 .-
0845 - 1244.-

LIENVOY
50-6-75/4
HMMA 31987
22May67

001. Salida 0845 (Volkswagen de México) Abreu al no encontrar a Fondermeden, queda de volver a llamar.- 010.-

010. Salida al 145789.-0852.-Abreu con Enrique, quien cuelga.017.

024. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación de afuera y de adentro.

062. Salida al 145789.-Abreu después de enterarse de que Enri que ya va a salir, pide a MF le diga a Escartín que tiene que llevar a los compañeros al aeropuerto y MF acepta.- 068.-

068. Entrada 0906.-Unos búlgaros que viven en La Habana preguntan por su amigo Luis Alberú y HD pide llame al 141326. MF acepta y pide salude al Embajador de parte de Vega.HD: bien.85.

LITAMIL-9

085. Salidas ocupado y aparato muerto 7.- 102.-

102. Entrada.-María Pérez explica que tiene 7 años de vivir aquí y su pasaporte ya está vencido, pero desea ir a Miami, quisiera saber qué trámites tiene que hacer porque no tiene ningún papel y HD le sugiere pase al Consulado y MF acepta.121.

121. Entrada sin contestación de afuera y salidas sin contestac

FILE WH/1 201-329609

152. Salida 1020 (Naciones Unidas) El Embajador con Moscarela para decirle que han recibido juegos para la Conferencia de Caracas y los recibió inmediatamente, pero como el organismo que está trabajando intensamente quisiera saber si podría --

Embajada de Cuba: 141326.-
19 abril 67.-
H 30. L 31 .-
0814- 1410..-

002. Salida al 145789.-0814.-Pedro pregunta a HF qué pasa con Abreu que no ha llegado y HF acepta y dice que es un descarado.

021. Salida al 422194.-0841.-Pedro pide le manden un saco de papás y HF queda de enviárselo.- 029.-

029. Salida al 670665.-0846.-Pedro hace pedido de comestibles a nombre de Elio y HF queda de enviárselos mañana.- 083.-

083. Salida al 175300.-0854.-Pedro haciéndose pasar por Jorrin pide comestibles para Elio y HF acepta.- 111.-

111. Salida al 466164.-0856.-Guillermo Salgado y Ernesto Ferrer se comunican a la Cubana de Aviación y confirman su pasaje de México a Kingston; posteriormente pide a HF lo dejo pendiente porque ellos ya lo tienen y HF acepta.- 132.-

132. Entrada 0909.-La señora de Angel Kosowski, Agregado Cultural de la Embajada de Bulgaria en La Habana, al no encontrar a su amigo Luis Alberú, del Consejo Nacional de Cultural y quien se encuentra aquí trabajando, pide a HD le diga que están alojados en el Hotel Regente, habitación 207 y que los llame al 404699. HD: que lo localizará y le dará su recado.

176. Entrada.-Dolores de la Mora solicita hablar con Cepeda, pero como tarda en contestar, cuelga.- 213.-

213. Entrada 0930.-HF de la....... pregunta la dirección de la embajada porque tienen que ir a recoger una firma.Pedro la dá

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 18 April 1967

TO:
- ☒ CI OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1/Mexico 3 B 4406
x 4167

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALEXRU-Souto

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-329609

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE
Subject would be contacted only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information--on Cuban activities or personalities.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	x	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		x

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: # 174318

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY CI/OA IS IN possession

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY CI/OA is in possession

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☒	DEROGATORY CI/OA is in possession
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Jane Zerance	4167	

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SUBJECT: Luis
[illegible] ALBERU-Souto

DPOB: 1915 in Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
Presently Cuban exile residing in Mexico City

OCCUPATION: professional artist
diplomat

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
HEIGHT: 6 feet tall
WEIGHT 170 to 175 plus
HAIR black

[illegible] [illegible]
1949 in Mexico City. They were divorced in 1956. She was born on 17 July 1926 in Vienna, Austria.

PARENTS:
FATHER: Maximo ALBERU born 1889 in Cognac, France.
Cuban citizen, engineer, residing Cuba.

MOTHER: Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain.

(Father and Mother are divorced and she is presently residing in Madrid, Spain.)

BROTHERS: Leonel born 1917 and Alfredo

SISTERS: Xenia born circa 1928 and Mariluz born circa 1929.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 171315

DATE 18 Apr 67

TO [redacted]

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Jane F. Zerance
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1/Mexico
ROOM, BUILDING 3 B 4406
EXTENSION 4167/68

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☒ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis ALBERU-Souto 201-339119 c/o[illegible]

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1915 in Oviedo, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Cuban exile in Mexico City

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
professional artist
diplomat

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Subject was previously Cultural Attache	Mexico City	
who returned to Cuba in March 1965 and worked for the Cuban National Cultural Council until his return to Mexico in October 1966 as a Cuban exile. He will assist his brother in running a plant which extracts oils from coffee beans in Mexico. He is also a stockholder in this venture.	Cuba	

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
6 feet	170-175 plus		black		

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) Married Klara Vera KACZ-Stros-de ALBERU-Souto in Dec 49 in MexCity. They were divorced in 1956. No children. She was born on 17 July 1926 in Vienna, Austria.

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF NAMED ARE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES FATHER: Maximo ALBERU born 1889 in Cognac, France. Cuban cit, engineer, residing Cuba. MOTHER: Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain. They are divorced and she is living in Madrid. BROS: Leonel, born 1917 and Alfredo. SISTERS: Xenia born circa 1928 and Mariluz born circa 1929.

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

SEE PREVIOUS GREENLIST 127398 dated 26 July 1962.

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Jane Zerance

3 May 67
DATE

FROM: FI/D [redacted]

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. XXXX FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. *EXCEPT IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

*Previous green list TFW/OpsSpt, 26 July 1962, Dossier.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

5 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lelly

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
201-329609

1. LITAMIL-9 returned to Mexico from Cuba in October 1966. On 8 November he was contacted and debriefed by Mexico City Station. Throughout the month of November he debated the question of whether or not he should return to Cuba. In the first week of December 1966, he decided to remain in Mexico.

2. Since it was believed that LITAMIL-9 would have little access to LIRING or to persons of interest in Mexico, he was terminated and the balance of his escrow account was paid to him on 9 December 1966. However, it has since become apparent that from time to time it would be valuable to WOFACT to contact LITAMIL-9 for information on PBRUMEN personalities. He is acquainted with a large number of persons who themselves are of interest to WOFACT or who could supply information on third persons on whom information is needed.

3. Therefore, provisional operational approval and subsequent operational approval for such occasional contact with LITAMIL-9 is requested. It is not planned to pay him a salary or formalize an agent relationship. LITAMIL-9 would only be contacted when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain the information.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET [illegible]

4 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS/Hughes

SUBJECT : LIRAVINE Project Renewal

1. Reference is made to your Staff Review (Form 826) of the LIRAVINE Project Renewal Request. In response to your requests, attached are one copy of the report on the 3-6 June 1966 debriefing of Morris A. UXPELET and one copy of the results of his 7 June 1966 SOSWIEL. Copies of these reports are being forwarded to CI/OA with a request for clearance for UXPELET's current use in Mexico.

2. A request for operational approval for LITAMIL-9 was submitted on 16 December 1965, but was not granted because of derogatory information which could not be resolved. However, LITAMIL-9's location and use have changed since that time and a new request for operational approval for his current use will be submitted.

3. A request for operational approval was submitted for LIRING-3 on 27 May 1966. Approval was not granted and he is being handled as a double-agent.

4. LIRING-4 is not recruited or used in any operational capacity and no operational relationship is contemplated.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/1/Chrono
① - LIRAVINE file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION: XXX
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief WH Division

INFO: Chief, WH/COG and Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9 and the Latin American Writers Congress in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

1. Forwarded attached is a memorandum covering a succession of meetings held with LITAMIL-9 in connection with the Latin American Writers Congress in Mexico and it's Cuban delegation.

201-344217

2. In addition to the meetings mentioned in the attached memorandum, the Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, also met L-9 on 28 March. He knew from LIENVOY that Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas was having a reception that night at the Cuban Embassy in honor of Alejo CARPENTIER Belmont. He also knew that CARPENTIER had agreed to meet L-9 earlier that day. FRADYER therefore assumed that L-9 had probably been invited to the Embassy affair. FRADYER had spent some time at his last meeting with L-9 briefing the latter on elicitation techniques and how he felt L-9 would safely bring up the subjects of the Vietnam war and French-Cuban relations, two topics on which CARPENTIER could provide interesting information. FRADYER was disappointed when L-9 told him that he had left his house that morning at 7A.M. and had been at his brother's plant in Toluca the entire day. L-9 added that he would have to spend the next day in Toluca and thus would be unable to talk to CARPENTIER before the latter left.

CONTINUED . . .

Attachment:
MFR HEREWITH

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD w/att
- 1 - C/WH/COG w/o att
- 1 - COS/JMWAVE w/att
- 6 - FILES

MICROFILMED
APR 10 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31703	31 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	50-300-8

GROUP 1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-31703

3. FRADYER is very much aware of Headquarters interest in L-9. Although he plans to meet L-9 regularly, he doubts (as previously mentioned to Clyde K. SHRYOCK when the latter recently visited Mexico) that L-9 will live up to Headquarters expectations. ~~As mentioned by L-9 himself~~:

A. He is acting as the general manager of the coffee grounds to edible oil plant in Toluca in which he and his brother own shares. Not only is this a new firm, but the raw material and process used to make the oil are somewhat of a novelty. The plant is deeply in the red (L-9 has yet to receive a salary and commutes to Toluca by bus) and requires close and time consuming attention. With the best of will, it is and will be difficult for L-9 to get away whenever he is needed by this Station.

B. As pointed out by L-9 himself, L-9 has now been in Mexico for some six months and has succeeded in obtaining from Gobernacion his reinstatement as a resident alien. It must be increasingly evident to the Cubans (despite L-9's request for extended leave from his job in Cuba) that the latter will probably not go back to Cuba. In other words, the Cubans probably view him more and more as an exile.

C. Because he spends most of his time away from Mexico City and because his Cuban friends are becoming more reserved with him, L-9 has less and less contacts with visiting Cubans. In fact, only one, the Subject of Mexico City 0783, has phoned him when visiting Mexico since L-9's return to this country. L-9, who senses that he is now an exile in the eyes of many of his friends in Cuba, is even reluctant to write to them. He feels, for example, that little would be accomplished by writing to Esebio *AZCUE Lopez, as the latter would probably not leave Cuba because of his young wife and child, even though he is fed-up with the Castro regime. On the contrary, L-9 feels that he might not be doing AZCUE any favor by writing to him as the latter who is not known for being an enthusiastic supporter of the regime may be under some observation from the Cuban authorities.

4. Information obtained by L-9 from CARPENTIER, Lizandro *OTERO and Nicolas *GUILLEN indicates

A. Together with information from other sources that the Cubans probably prearranged to take over the Congress of Latin American Writers with the help of the other Communists and use it for political purposes.

B. That Cintio *VITIER is obviously not trusted by the Castro regime and may be in trouble.

C. That the Cubans are making a major effort, in line with their pro-French policy to show themselves in Paris under the best light possible.

D. That CARPENTIER obviously enjoys the confidence of the regime. His trip to Hanoi had certainly nothing to do with cultural affairs. It is regretted that L-9 did not elicit further information from CARPENTIER on his visit to North Vietnam.

CONTINUED

PAGE TWO

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	HMMA-31703

5. L-9 did not come in contact with Roberto FERNANDEZ Retamar. LICRAFT-1 who knows FERNANDEZ was unfortunately on vacation at the time of the Writers Congress.

Raymond A. Frazier

for Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

28 March 1967

MICROFILMED
APR 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9P

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9 and the Latin American Writer's Congress in Mexico

1. The undersigned reviewed the list of delegates attending the Latin American Writer's Congress with L-9 on 19 March 1967. The latter indicated he knew all the members of the Cuban delegation - Alejo CARPENTIER Belmont, Roberto FERNANDEZ Retamar, Lizandro OTERO, Nicolas GUILLEN and Pablo NEREDA, a Chilean writer whom he first met some 25 years ago and saw again about 1962. L-9 stressed he did not know the Cuban delegates to the point of calling anyone of them a personal friend as his dealings with them had been confined to professional contacts when he worked for the National Cultural Council. He had never been invited to their homes or invited them to his. The delegate he felt most at ease with was Alejo CARPENTIER with whom he felt he had more in common than with the others. CARPENTIER who has a French father and white Russian mother lived many years in France and spent some time in South America. L-9 considered him to be an intellectual of definite "bourgeois" background and tastes. Not only is CARPENTIER well known

att #1 to HMMA-31703

CS COPY

201-329609

for his novels (L-9 recalled that his name had once been mentioned in connection with the Nobel Prize for literature) and his journalistic writing (L-9 still remembered some of the articles regularly written by him in Paris for the "El Mundo" daily in the pre Castro era) but he is also an established music critic and a connaisseur of modern painting, all in all a talented and most impressive man now in his sixties.

2. L-9 had on many occasions offered to help WOFACT in any way possible. The undersigned pointed out that he now had a unique opportunity to do this with the Writer's Congress. WOFACT was interested in assessing the Cuban representatives at this Congress to determine their possible vulnerability to recruitment. It was also interested in hearing from the Cuban delegates what they thought of the Congress and it's accomplishments since it was apparent that the great majority of it's members were Communist sympathizers and would probably use the Congress for political purposes. Any information on the situation in Cuba and on Cuban Government organizations, particularly on the incorporation of the National Cultural Council into the Ministry of Education would be appreciated. It would also be interesting to know why Cintio VITIER who was scheduled to come to the Congress did not show up. L-9 said he was willing to help but was extremely busy with his brother's edible oil business in Toluca. It would be

difficult for him to find time to talk with the Cuban delegates, he felt in addition, that it would be difficult for him to simply walk in on the delegates if he could not be invited, officially, to the Congress or to a social affair connected with it. Finally, L-9 pointed out that he had now been in Mexico for nearly six months, that "everyone" knew that he had no intention of returning to Cuba and that, for these reasons, the Cuban delegates to the Congress might not be anxious to talk to him. After a long "pep" talk by the undersigned and some discussion it was decided that L-9 would call the next morning on Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas who had just returned from Cuba. L-9 would pay his respects and find out if the Embassy planned some social function at which he could openly meet the Cuban delegates (he felt he might wrangle an invitation to such an affair either directly from the Ambassador or from Heberto JORRIN, the ex-Embassy portero whom he has known for years). It was further decided that L-9 would concentrate on CARPENTIER with whom he felt he had the best rapport and who was in his view the delegate with the most "bourgeois" background.

3. At a meeting held on 21 March L-9 related that he had seen Ambassador HERNANDEZ earlier that morning (the delegates to the Writer's Congress which had been held for the last few days in Guadalajara were scheduled to return the next day). He had found the Ambassador nervous and preoccupied. The latter told him almost mechanically that

everything in Cuba (political and economic situation, sugar harvest, etc) was fine. He informed L-9 that he did not have the opportunity to see L-9's sister-in-law and that he had given a letter, which L-9 had asked him to deliver to her for passage to the National Cultural Council, to Marta GONZALEZ of the International Relations Bureau of the Council. L-9, in this letter, asked that his three month leave from the Cultural Council be greatly extended. The Ambassador said he ignored what reaction the Cultural people had to his letter. He explained that the Cultural Council is now part of a Bureau headed by Lisandro OTERO (LISANDRO IS V-P OF CNC - how could he head a Bureau over the CNC?) in the Ministry of Education. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia, the previous head of the council has been reassigned to the Tri-Continental conference as a member of the Secretariat of that organization. He was replaced as the head of the council by fnu MUZIO, ex rector of the University of Oriente. The Ambassador insisted that, in spite of this, the National Cultural Council still kept some degree of autonomy. He was rather evasive when L-9 mentioned his desire to call on the Cuban delegates to the Writer's Congress. He said that he did not think that a party would be held at the Embassy for the delegates and did not offer to put L-9 in contact with the people he wanted to see. Since he did not seem to have gotten anywhere with the Ambassador, the undersigned asked L-9 to call the next morning on the Congress delegates at the Del Prado Hotel where they were staying. ~~The next morning~~ L-9 seemed reluctant at first, but finally agreed to do this if he did not have any more luck in contacting the Cuban delegates some other way. L-9 proposed to visit the Embassy the next day and talk to JORRIN about the Congress. The Latter might be able to place him in contact with the Cuban visitors.

4. The undersigned met L-9 again on 22 March. L-9 stated that he had visited the Cuban Embassy early that day but had to wait for JORRIN who was out for about 20 minutes. The latter was ~~too~~ so busy after his return that L-9 had only a few minutes of conversation with him. JORRIN confirmed that the Embassy would not have a party for the Congress delegates "because of the Semana Santa," and said he did not know exactly when the delegates would drop in the Embassy following their return from Guadalajara. Upon leaving JORRIN, L-9 went to the Del Prado where he was told that the Congress delegates would only return to Mexico late that day. A few blocks from the hotel L-9 ran into Nicolas GUILLEN who greeted him by saying "here is L-9 in his ambiente Mexicano." The two men walked together back to the Del Prado. GUILLEN turned down L-9's invitation for a cup of coffee saying he had to visit someone. He did mention that the Congress, as far as he was concerned, was "una basura" and told L-9 that he had flown from Guadalajara

to Mexico City (he did not say why) ahead of the other Cuban delegates who were returning by road later that day. GUILLEN told L-9 that he would be in the same neighborhood early next day and would be glad to have coffee with him if L-9 could meet him then. Anyway, he added, he would be staying in Mexico for another two weeks at the request of the Ambassador. They could see each other again later on before he left. As they were about to cross a busy street shortly before parting, L-9 took GUILLEN by the arm in a friendly gesture. The latter pulled away and L-9 had the feeling that GUILLEN did not want to let L-9 be friendly with him.

5. The next meeting with L-9 was held on 24 March. L-9 said that he had not been able to call on the Cubans at the Del Prado until earlier that day. He had run into Licandro OTERO while in the lobby. The latter told him he was about to leave. When L-9 said "already?" OTERO pointed out that he had been in Mexico for two weeks already. L-9 repeated the derogatory remarks made about the Congress by GUILLEN. OTERO said that, on the contrary, this had been a successful meeting. A letter of protest had been sent to President Johnson and the Congress had taken a firm position against the "Imperialists." After relating the above, L-9 recalled that a rumor circulated in Havana, shortly before his departure from Cuba, to the effect that

Marcia LEISECA, OTERO's wife (a woman of about 34 who worked at the Casa de las Americas) was about to divorce OTERO to marry Osmani CIENFUEGOS. L-9 added that Marcia had relatives in Mexico whom she visited in 1962 and 1965. After leaving OTERO, L-9 phoned CARPENTIER and was told by the latter to meet him the next day.

6. L-9 and CARPENTIER met for breakfast on 24 March. When L-9 asked him for news about the National Cultural Council, CARPENTIER said that L-9 knew certainly more about that then he did as he had been in France since last November. CARPENTIER claimed that he had been called in by DORTICOS last October and told that Baudilio CASTILLANOS, the current Cuban Ambassador in Paris, had requested his nomination to the Paris Embassy as Minister Concellor. CARPENTIER said he tried to get out of this two year assignment which he found too long, but was told by DORTICOS that there was no way out of it. The Cuban Government, said DORTICOS, was out to make it's representation in Paris "an absolutely first class Embassy". DORTICOS added that CARPENTIER would not be so busy in Paris that he would not find time to write. Whether he found time to write CARPENTIER did not say. What he did say was that the Ambassador, who was doing a very good job, did an enormous amount of work and usually worked late at night. He also mentioned that while in Paris or shortly before arriving there he had gone to Hanoi

on an official mission. CARPENTIER gave no details other than to say that that horrible war was probably going to last, and that U.S. planes had flown right over his head during his stay. L-9 did not press him for more information but gathered that CARPENTIER remained in North Vietnam two or three weeks.

7. L-9 asked why VITIER had not attended the Congress. CARPENTIER replied that VITIER was "in a special situation in Cuba" as he was not in accord with the revolution. He had been given the opportunity to go to Spain for the Cuban Government but had refused to go. VITIER undoubtedly knew, from the background of the delegates, that the Writer's Congress in Mexico would be a leftist affair. CARPENTIER guessed that he probably declined to come because of this. Talking about himself, CARPENTIER said (without further details) that he would be going to Moscow in May. He announced that a film based on his novel "Los Pasos Perdidos" would be made this year, probably half in France and half in Cuba (negotiations with the French are still going on). Finally, he mentioned that he was trying to convince the Cuban Government to create a centralized publishing department and that as Director of the Cuban National printing office, before leaving Cuba, he had succeeded in getting some 70 million books printed. He mentioned, incidentally,

that his publisher in Mexico is Arnaldo ORFILA, ex director of the Mexico City Fondo del Cultura Economica whom CARPENTIER said he was on his way to see to collect royalties. CARPENTIER said he would leave Mexico on 29 March via SABENA and agreed to get together with L-9 on 27 March.

1 Oct 66 - 31 March 67

B. LITAMIL-9. LITAMIL-9, who some years ago worked at LIRING, has now been back from PBRUMEN for about six months and has been reinstated by the Mexican authorities as a resident alien in Mexico. Although LITAMIL-9 has no intention to go back to PBRUMEN, he has done his best to keep the PBRUMEN door open. He has for example requested that his leave from his job in PBRUMEN (originally for three months) be extended to allow him to attend to private business in Mexico. The fact is that with each week that goes by LITAMIL-9 looks more and more like an exile in the eyes of the LIRING staff. Of the people who served with him at the

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-31777, 10 Apr 67

PBRUMEN Embassy the Ambassador, the ex portero and one of the employees from the Commercial Section are left. Although LITAMIL-9 can still visit the Embassy and talk with the Ambassador, it is clear that his rapport with the LIRING staff will be more and more reserved.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 25

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~~FROM~~ BY 25/[illegible]

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH 8, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 212327Z CITE JMWAVE 6198 (INGHURST ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

24 Mar 67 26902

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF: DIRECTOR 65178

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN FOLL TRACE ABRAHAM (MACIQUEZ) MACIQUEZ IN ADDITION INFO CITED REF: BORN CA 1936 MARRIED U.S. CITIZEN BUT SEPARATED (WHEREABOUTS OF WIFE UNKNOWN). RESPONSIBLE TO CASTRO FOR MANAGEMENT ALL TOURIST FACILITIES IN CIENEGA DE ZAPATA. LOYAL TO CASTRO. (REPORT DATED 1961 FROM WH/CUBA/CE CARD.)

2. SUBJ MENTIONED JULY 66 AMOT STUDY ON STRUCTURE OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT AS FOLLOWS: ITIT OFFICIAL; FROM RANKS OF 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT; FOLLOWER OF FIDEL CASTRO. AMOTS QUERIED FOR UP-TO-DATE TRACES SUBJ; WILL FORWARD ANY ADDL PERTINENT INFO.

3. STATION UNABLE IDENTIFY SUBJS EX-WIFE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

CB

C716

Embajada de Cuba: 141326.-
22 feb. 67 .-
M 30. L 31 .-
1502 - 2110.-

002. Entrada 1502.- Alború después de enterarse de que Jorrin no está, pregunta dónde podría localizar a Ismael Paz y Pedro pide lo llame al Hotel Agnes al 255290.- 015.-

018. Entrada 1553.-Bordes pregunta por Jorrin y Arturo informa que no está.- 027.-

027. Entrada 1558.-Electa pregunta por Mercedes y HD indica que no está.- 039.-

039. Salidas sin contestación y preguntando la hora.- 044.-

044. Entrada.-Marcela pregunta por Abreu. Pedro:no está.48.

048. Entrada.-Acevedo,de Prensa Latina, pregunta por Jorrin y Pedro dice que no está.- 054.-

P 1009

054. Salidas sin contestación y proguntando la hora.- 061.-

064. Salida al 348020.-1723.-HD pide la ext.48 y queda de llamar a su amor Aurea a las 6½ a su casa y ésta acepta.079.

081. Salida al 112662.-1726.-Wilfredo Vasalle pregunta por Wuenceslao Roses y su esposa,y HF informa que no están.087.-

087. Salida ocupado.- 090.-

LITAMIL-9

090. Salida al 182753.-1740.-HD pregunta por el Ing.Cuenca y HF dice que no ha llegado.- 102.-

a Harrington

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ORIG : R. HARRINGTON:aic FILE RID
UNIT : WH/COG/FI/OD ☒ INDEX
EXT : 5061 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 17 FEB 1967 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-120-50

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICAL)

SECRET 17 1908 Z CITE DIRECTOR 76150

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LITAMIL/9

1. REQUEST QUERY LITAMIL/9 RE STATUS EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ. PER LITAMIL/9 REPORT OF AUG 66 AZCUE REMOVED FROM RESPONSIBLE POSITION PBRUMEN/EXPO STAFF; CONSEQUENTLY, AZCUE BITTER AND REPORTEDLY PLANNED DEPART PBRUMEN CIRCA DEC 66 OSTENSIBLY FOR MEDICAL OPERATION MEXICO CITY.

2. HQS EXTREMELY INTERESTED PBRUMEN PARTICIPATION EXPO 67. [redacted] FEEL CERTAIN AZCUE, IF AVAILABLE, WOULD PROVE BE GOOD SOURCE FOR INFO [redacted] CONTINGENCY PLANNING. ie

END OF MESSAGE

FILE LITAMIL-9 201

Jacob D. Esterline
JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 094- file AT. 3e2 & DEC By WH/COG

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ACTION WH 6

INFO

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UNIT	TIME	BY

FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5

ACTION CHANGE

MEXICO CITY 9483 (STATION & NUMBER)

IN 52268 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : MR BELT (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : MR STEWART (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

L-9 [illegible]

LITAMIL-9
201-329609

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 22

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/04, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 072222Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9533

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LITAMIL

7 D[illegible] 54862

REF: DIRECTOR 55121 *

1. LITAMIL-9 SAW ANTONIO CARRILO ONLY ONCE AT HAVA RECEPTION. L-9'S TWO SISTERS IN SPAIN LIVED IN MADRID IN APT ABOVE CARRILLO'S SOME YEARS AGO BUT TOLD L-9 VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIM OTHER THAN HE QUOTE NICE PERSON UNQUOTE. L-9 KNEW NOTHING OF CARRILLO'S RECENT OUSTER UNTIL TOLD BY STATION.

2. L-9 FEELS SOME HIS COMMENTS ABOUT CARRILLO MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY WOFACT. DID NOT SAY CARRILLO WAS ONE OF FIDEL'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES, BUT QUOTED HIS SISTER IN LAW TO SAY THAT SINCE HE NOT A PARTY MAN CARRILLO MUST BE PERSONALLY TRUSTED BY FIDEL TO BE APPOINTED VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS IN L-9'S OPINION IS OPINION WHICH WAS SHARED BY NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN CUBA. VICE MINISTER APPT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN IN HAVA FUNCTIONARY CIRCLES SOME THREE MONTHS BEFORE BECAME OFFICIAL. IN L-9'S OPINION REAL POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY IS OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WHO IS PARTY MAN.

S E C R E T

BT * REQ INFO ON CARRILLO OUSTER.

SECRET

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM
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WH/COG 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/14, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

MEXI

SECRET 2722[illegible] CITE MEXICO CITY 9538

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE
UFG

TYPIC LITAMIL

REF: DIRECTOR 55121*

MICROFILMED
JAN 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ANX PS 5 WH/C/ES
ABSTRACT X INDEX X
54082

1. LITAMIL-9 SAW ANTONIO CARRILLO ONLY ONCE AT HAVA RECEPTION. L-9'S TWO SISTERS IN SPAIN LIVED IN MADRID IN APT ABOVE CARRILLO'S SOME YEARS AGO BUT TOLD L-9 VERY LITTLE ABOUT HIM OTHER THAN HE QUOTE NICE PERSON UNQUOTE. L-9 KNEW NOTHING OF CARRILLO'S RECENT OUSTER UNTIL TOLD BY STATION.

2. L-9 FEELS SOME HIS COMMENTS ABOUT CARRILLO MAY HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED BY OFACT. DID NOT SAY CARRILLO WAS ONE OF FIDEL'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES, BUT QUOTED HIS SISTER IN LAW TO SAY THAT SINCE HE NOT A PARTY MAN CARRILLO MUST BE PERSONALLY TRUSTED BY FIDEL TO BE APPOINTED VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THIS IN L-9'S OPINION IS OPINION WHICH WAS SHARED BY NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN CUBA. VICE MINISTER APPT WAS GENERALLY KNOWN IN HAVA FUNCTIONARY CIRCLES SOME THREE MONTHS BEFORE BECAME OFFICIAL. IN L-9'S OPINION REAL POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY IS OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WHO IS PARTY MAN.

SECRET

BT *REF INFO ON CARRILLO OUSTER.

SECRET

LITAMIL 9 201-329609
7 Dec 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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[redacted]

DISSEM BY 2

ACTION

DC/WH/COG 5

INFO

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

FILE VR, C/WH 6, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 040400Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9483

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

4 Dec 65 IN 52268

1. AFTER MUCH SOUL SEARCHING AND LENGTHY TALKS WITH HIS BROTHER AND FRIENDS. LITAMIL-9 HAS DECIDED NOT RETURN CUBA.

A. L-9 FEELS HAS VERY LITTIE TIME LEFT TO PROVIDE FOR OLD AGE. HE MOST INTERESTED IN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN GROWING EDIBLE OIL FROM COFFEE GROUNDS BUSINESS ESTABLISHED IN MEXICO BY BROTHER AND FRIENDS IN WHICH OWNS 8 PER CENT OF STOCK. HAS GOOD CHANCE BECOME MANAGER OF OIL FIRM IF REMAINS MEXICO.

B. L-9 BELIEVES HAS NO GUARANTEE HE COULD RETURN MEXICO IF WENT TO CUBA. JOB IN CUBA DOES NOT PROVIDE POSSIBILITY TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY.

C. LIFE IN CUBA AND RESULTING MENTAL STRAIN HAVE NOT ALLOWED L-9, A PROFESSIONAL ARTIST, TO DEVELOP HIS TALENT.

D. L-9 VERY MUCH AWARE HE GOING NOWHERE CAREER-WISE IN CUBAN CULTURAL MINISTRY. ALSO REALIZES HE PROVIDED WOFACT LITTLE INFO OF TYPE (MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC) IT REALLY INTERESTED IN.

SECR

2. CONSIDERABLE TIME HAS BEEN SPENT BY STATION REVIEWING WITH L-9 HIS ACCESS TO INFO AND POSSIBILITY INCREASE HIS PRODUCTIVITY TO MAKE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WORTH WHILE.

A. ALTHOUGH L-9 LIVES IN CUBA WITH BROTHER AND BROTHER'S WIFE WHO WOULD LOGICALLY SEEM HAVE ACCESS TO SOME INTERESTING INFO, BOTH ARE VERY RESERVED IN WHAT THEY TELL HIM. ALTHOUGH L-9 BELIEVES HIS BROTHER IS BASICALLY ANTI COMMUNIST, LATTER HAS NEVER MADE ANY REAL ANTI REGIME COMMENT OR DISCLOSED ANY SENSITIVE INFO TO HIM. BROTHER AND SISTER-IN-LAW SELDOM DISCUSS THEIR CONTACTS IN MINISTRIES AND GENERALLY LIMIT SELVES TO NON CONTROVERSIAL TOPICS.

B. L-9 LIVED VERY LONELY AND SHELTERED LIFE IN CUBA AND HAD NO REAL FRIENDS. FEW GOOD SOCIAL CONTACTS HE HAD IN COMMIE EMBASSIES REFRAINED FROM DISCUSSING ANYTHING SENSITIVE WITH HIM. L-9 COMMENTED THAT "ALTHOUGH I CAREFULLY NEVER SAY ANYTHING AGAINST REGIME EVERYONE KNOWS I AM A BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUAL AND NOT A SYMPATHIZER."

C. L-9 SEES NO HOPE FOR HIM TO TRANSFER TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXTERNAL TRADE OR OTHER TARGET MINISTRY. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE CUBAN GVT WOULD SEND HIM WITH EMBASSY ABROAD TO FILL POST

SECRET

SIMILAR TO THAT HE OCCUPIED IN MEXICO.

3. L-9 RECENTLY APPROACHED LOCAL CUBAN AMBASSADOR AND ASKED HIM TO CONTACT HIS SUPERIOR IN CULTURAL MINISTRY IN HAVANA TO OBTAIN ONE YEAR EXTENSION HIS LEAVE WITHOUT PAY IN ORDER ATTEND TO PERSONAL BUSINESS IN MEXICO. AMBASSADOR DID NOT SAY WHETHER WOULD COMPLY WITH REQUEST POINTING OUT THAT YEAR FROM NOW L-9 WOULD PROBABLY AGAIN FACE SAME PROBLEM. L-9 NOW INTENDS PHONE SISTER-IN-LAW AND ASK HER INTERVENE HIS FAVOR. WILL APPLY IN EARLY DEC AT GOBERNACION FOR PAPERS ALLOWING HIM REGAIN AT END SIX YEARS MEXICAN RESIDENT STATUS WHICH LOST AFTER STAY IN CUBA.

4. ALTHOUGH HE DOING UTMOST STAY IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH CUBAN GVT AND EMBASSY IN MEXICO DOUBT L-9 WILL BE OF MUCH HELP IF, AS HE INTENDS, HE REMAINS MEXICO. L-9 CURRENTLY SPENDS VERY LITTLE TIME AT EMBASSY AND IN OWN WORDS ONLY KNOWS AMBASSADOR [illegible] [redacted]. DESPITE STATION URGING, HE HAS BEEN OF LITTLE HELP PROVIDING DETAILS ON LOCATION AND DUTIES OF EMBASSY STAFFERS NEEDED BY STATION IN CONNECTION WITH LISAMPAN.

5. L-9 VERY APOLOGETIC HIS DECISION, HOPES WILL NOT BE MISINTERPRETED BY WOFACT HQS. IN VIEW PARA 2 ABOVE, HOWEVER,

SECRET

FEEL LITTLE WOULD BE GAINED BY FORCING HIM GO BACK CUBA. L-9'S INTEL POTENTIAL NOT WORTH HARDSHIPS HE WOULD HAVE TO SUFFER AND RISK HE WOULD HAVE TAKE NOT BE ABLE LEAVE CUBA AGAIN.

6. OIL EXTRACTING FIRM, L-9 AND HIS BROTHER INTERESTED IN, CURRENTLY INCREASING ITS CAPITAL. L-9 WOULD LIKE TO INVEST WHATEVER IS LEFT IN WOFACT ESCROW ACCOUNT REQUEST HQS ADVISE AMOUNT AND AUTHORIZE PAYMENT THIS AMOUNT TO HIM. PLS ADVISE

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Managua

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/LIRESORT/LITAMIL/Transmittal of Publication and Two Boxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith for Chief of Station, Managua are two boxes, one from LITAMIL-9 and the other from LIRESORT-1. Also attached is a copy of the Honduran "Diario del Norte". LITAMIL-9 felt that the article on the back page concerning a new distillery recently installed in Honduras by his brother may be of interest to Chief of Station, Managua.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Publication & 2 boxes HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 - COS/Managua w/att
1 - C/WHD w/o att
3 - FILES

LITAMIL-9
201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30753

DATE
2 December 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-322753

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 28

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 012200Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9456

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, OSLO

RYBAT TYPIC AMADAGE

1 DEC 66 50769

REFS: A DIRECTR 54631

B. JMWAVE [illegible] (IN47847)

1. WITH HIS USUAL INTUITIVENESS LITAMIL-9 CONVINCED AMADAGE-1 NOT PRO CASTRO BUT CAN ONLY PROVIDE FOLLOWING TO BACK UP HIS CONVICTION:

A. A-1 IS WELL EDUCATED INTELLECTUAL (HE ATTENDED THE SORBONNE) OF BOURGEOIS ORIGIN WHO LOST PROPERTY AFTER CASTRO TAKE OVER AND DEFINITELY NOT REVOLUTIONARY TYPE.

B. A-1 AND WIFE APPEARED VERY ANXIOUS LEAVE CUBA AND GO NORWAY.

2. L-9 STATES A-1 FAR TOO INTELLIGENT AND DISCREET TO MAKE ANTI REGIME STATEMENTS EVEN TO CLOSE FRIENDS. L-9 HEARD FROM HIS SISTER IN LAW WHO USUALLY WELL INFORMED THAT A-1 GOING BACK TO CUBA IN DEC 66 TO STAY. L-9 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER A-1 ASKED TO RETURN OR IS BEING RECALLED. HAS NO IDEA WHETHER A-1, IF RECALLED, WOULD DEFECT RATHER THAN GO BACK.

3. L-9 COULD NOT PROVIDE NAMES OF A-1 RELATIVES OR

SECRET

FRIENDS IN WEST WHO COULD BE USED FOR RECRUIMENT APPROACH.
L-9 FELT THAT IN A-1'S CASE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT USING WOFACT
STAFFER WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE BEST RESULTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

Dissem By: [illegible]

[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI, FI, FI/INT 2

SECRET 010828Z CITE OSLO 8459

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY

1 Dec [illegible] 48926

TYPIC MHAPRON AMADAGE SALUTE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 54681

B. JMWAVE 4321 ([illegible])

SALUTE 14 ADVISED MAGAVERO 30 NOV THAT AMADAGE-1 DID SUFFER SERIOUS HEART ATTACK EARLY IN OCTOBER. HE HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL, IS RECUPERATING AT HOME, IS NOT WORKING AT OFFICE, AND MAY BE SLIGHTLY PARALYZED IN ONE LEG AS IS WALKING WITH CANE.

SECRET

SECRET [illegible] of R[illegible]

BT

Jam

LITAMIL-9

201

Slw

TOTAL COPIES: 27

X: [redacted]

ORIG: . BELT:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 30 NOV 1966

☐ FYLE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-329609

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DISSEM BY / PER # :

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG-8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH/8, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 1 75 18 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 56121

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC

201

ABSTRACT

1. PLS SOLICIT OPINION LITAMIL/9 ON REASONS UNDERLYING OUSTER ANTONIO CARRILLO AS VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ON BASIS REMARKS BY MEMBERS OF CUBAN HEIRARCHY LITAMIL/9 REGARDED CARRILLO AS ONE OF FIDEL CASTRO'S MOST TRUSTED COLLEAGUES.

2. REQUEST LITAMIL/9 FOLLOW UP THIS MATTER INCLUDING REACTIONS LIRING PERSONNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

201-329609
30 Nov, 1966

C/WH/COG/FI

C/WH/COG/MO E.J. Chuska for

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1-1
08

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COPY NO.

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
O TYPIC/OPERATIONAL Receipt from LITAMIL-9

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded, under separate cover, is a receipt for 6500 pesos, which Clyde K. SHRYOCK received from LITAMIL-9 on 9 November 1966.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK

201-329609

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico

Attachment: usc

28 NOV 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15037

DATE
23 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-329609

Distribution:
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/C/FI

ORIGINATING
OFFICE WH/COG/FI Thomas Hazlett pfd EXT. 2625

COORDINATING
WH/1 25 Nov 66

ED

ABSTRACT
INDEX

RELEASING
C/WHD 25/11 William V. Broe

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-329609
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 33

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FROM
DISSEM BY 22

ACTION
WH/C 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 7, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

MEXI

SECRET 212225Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9324

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR [illegible]

21 Nov [illegible] 43826

LITAMIL-9 HAS NEVER MET RAMON CASTRO, KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBILITY HE MAY TRAVEL OUTSIDE BLOCK. L-9 HEARD RUMOR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES THAT QUOTE RAMON IS NOT WITH REVOLUTION UNQUOTE BUT COULD NOT ATTRIBUTE RUMOR TO ANYONE SPECIFIC OR ELABORATE. L-9 GUESSED THAT RAMON MAY HAVE BECOME DISSATISFIED WHEN LOST PERSONEL PROPERTY AFTER FIDEL TOOK POWER.

SECRET

BT YREQ COMMENTS RAMON CASTRO.

SECRET

201-329609
21 Nov. 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 9

ORIG : MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT : WH/COG/FI/TC
EXT : 2625
DATE : 22 NOV 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-327902

SECRET

ROUTING

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DISSEM BY 4/CS PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY C/WH, C/EUR 4, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 25 16 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 54681

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, OSLO

RYBAT TYPIC MHAPRON SAVELL SYPINGPONG

1. LITAMIL/9 IS CLOSE FRIEND OF AMADAGE/1 (IDENTITY FOR MEXICO CITY ONLY). REQUEST, THEREFORE, OBTAIN COMPLETE LITAMIL/9 ASSESSMENT OF AMADAGE/1 INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION FRIENDS OR RELATIVES IN WEST WHO COULD BE USED FOR RECRUITMENT APPROACH. FYI ONLY: SENSITIVE RELIABLE OSLO STATION SOURCE INDICATES AMADAGE/1 CONVINCED WILL BE REASSIGNED PBRUMEN LATE 66 OR EARLY 67. ALSO INDEVOUT/3 WHO HIGH LEVEL SOURCE REPORTED NOVEMBER 66 THAT AMADAGE/1 SOON TO BE RECALLED PBRUMEN. ON 15 OCT 66, SENSITIVE HAGUE STATION SOURCE INDICATED AMADAGE/1 HAD RECENTLY SUFFERED VERY BAD HEART ATTACK AND WAS HOSPITALIZED.

2. FYI: JMWAVE IN CONTACT WITH AMADAGE/1'S BROTHER LEON WHO SENT SHORT LETTER TO AMADAGE/1 ON 14 OCT 66 BUT AS YET HAS REPORTED NO RESPONSE.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER 23-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

TO S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 5468

TO PAGE TWO

C/WH/COG/FI ______
WH/COG/MO ______
WH/1 ______
EUR/IB/C ______
EUR/N ______
EUR/BNL/N ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 33

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FROM
DISSEM BY 22

ACTION
WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WAVE, CUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 212225Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9304

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 53233 ✓

21 [illegible] 40626

LITAMIL-9 HAS NEVER MET RAMON CASTRO, KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT POSSIBILITY ~~HE~~ MAY TRAVEL OUTSIDE BLOCK. L-9 HEARD RUMOR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES THAT QUOTE RAMON IS NOT WITH REVOLUTION UNQUOTE BUT COULD NOT ATTRIBUTE RUMOR TO ANYONE SPECIFIC OR ELABORATE. L-9 GUESSED THAT RAMON MAY HAVE BECOME DISSATISFIED WHEN LOST PERSONEL PROPERTY AFTER FIDEL TOOK POWER.

S E C R E T

BT [illegible] COMMENTS RAMON CASTRO.

SECRET

Jane

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

ORIG: WILLIAM MURRAY
UNIT: DC/WH/COG/FI
EXT: 2625
DATE: 16 NOV 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 8 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED) 18 18 18 Z
CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 53030

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, FRANKFURT, BONN, BERLIN, PARIS, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 52165 (RELAYED MEXI)

REQUEST MEXICO QUERY LITAMIL-9 FOR HIS COMMENTS AND ASSESSMENT RAMON CASTRO WHO PRESENTLY TRAVELLING ON COMMERCIAL MISSION.

END OF MESSAGE

Jane

C/WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/MO
E/G Dick [illegible] (by phone)
E/F Sillers (by phone)
E/IB/C Leo [illegible] (by phone)
WH/1 Flores
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Earl J. Williamson
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

Earl J. Williamson
THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

18-13

SECRET

GROUP 1
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115

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL/Transmittal of Extracts from LITAMIL-9's files

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: PASS TO SHRYOCK

Attached are forwarded to Headquarters per SHRYOCK's request.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
a/s in Subject HEREWITH

Distribution:
② - DCWH/C w/att for SHRYOCK
1 - C/WHD w/o att 1CC To WH
2 - FILES

1 ATT

CS COPY

DEFERRED

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-30589	DATE 15 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-329609

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

[illegible] MEXICO CITY TEGUCIGALPA 6166 [redacted] ACTING [redacted]

DIRECTOR INFO ARAGUA, MEXICO CITY [redacted]

PBPRIME LITAMIL

[redacted]

15 NOV [illegible] 33407

REFERENCE: [redacted] DIRECTOR 5174[illegible]

1. [illegible] 14 NOVEMBER 66 1715 HOURS TEGUCIGALPA. [illegible] 2100 HOURS SAME DAY PER REQUEST OF REF. ACCORDING [illegible] TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS PICKED UP BY STATION 14 [illegible] SEP 1966, SUBJECT OF REF PLANNED MEET BARKER SAME DAY TONCONTIN AIRPORT, TEGUCIGALPA, PER PRE-ARRANGED CONTACT PLANS.

SECRET

SECRET

LITAMIL-9

[illegible]. Salida al [illegible].-[illegible].-Alberú le [illegible] de que no le llegó el licenciado, que a MF le recuerde la cita del lunes y ésta acepta.- 11[illegible].-

[illegible]. Salida al 11227[illegible].-[illegible].- Carbó le pide a Mercy y Hugo -- vayan para la embajada porque ya va a empezar el círculo y - Mercy acepta.- 13[illegible].-

13[illegible]. Salida sin contestación.- 141.-

141. Salida al 23329[illegible].-1000.-HD se comunica al Hotel Agnes - y pregunta si se encuentra hospedada la señorita Clara Elsa-García Lima y MF dice que estuvo hace como una semana, pero-- ahora no ha llegado.- 156.-

156. Entradas sin contestación.- 17[illegible].-

17[illegible]. Salida al 111873.-1019.-Alberú pregunta por Coty y MF-- dice que fué al salón y como a las 11 irá a la gasolinera.180.

180. Entrada 1020.-Hugo pide a Echemendía cuelgue bien el -- teléfono porque están hablando de La Habana y HD acepta.-187.

187. Entrada 1023.-Una estudiante de la Universidad pregunta si le pueden dar folletos y Jorrín pide pase el lunes.-193.-

193. Entrada 1025.-El Dr.Jordán pregunta por el embajador y- Jorrín pide le hable al 144237.- 201.-

201. Salidas al 111648.-1646.-Luis Alberú recuerda al Lic. - Ignacio Acosta la cita del lunes y éste está de acuerdo que-se vean a las 1100 h. en el mismo lugar; pregunta si le cancelaron su M-2 (6 FM-2) y Alberú dice que sí.- 238.-
(2.-291.- 29 Oct.66).-

file
LITAMIL-9
201

file
Luis Alberu 201

Same LIENVOY
HMMA 30549 (50-6-75/4)
14 NOV 66

[illegible] invitados a Chapultepec, luego tiene una sesión con-[illegible] persona y por la noche tiene una mesa redonda en la Calle de San Carlos a las 7½. María le propone que después de las 5 la llame para ver si es posible que primero vayan a Filomeno Mata y luego a la Academia de San Carlos, y Orlando está de acuerdo.- 186.-

186. Entrada 1092.- Mary y Chelo Esperón platican sobre diversos temas familiares.- 216.-

216. Salida al 299000 Ext.273.-1040.-Alberú pregunta por Maximino Serrano y MP dice que llega a las once.- 230.-

230. Salida al 262165.-1055.- Orlando Suárez al no encontrar al pintor Marín [illegible], queda de volver a llamar porque le trajo una carta de Cuba y MP acepta.- 248.-

248. Salida al 465930.-1110.-Orlando Suárez pregunta a García Cantú si hay alguna noticia en relación con el libro de los murales y Cantú dice que nó porque la comisión editorial no se reunirá hasta dentro de 10 días, pero cuando tenga -- alguna decisión de la Junta, se la comunicará, pero si gusta puede hablarle el viernes de la semana entrante. Orlando acepta, aclara que se marcha el día 11 y pregunta si lo de la conferencia en la Casa del Lago es posible que no se realice y Cantú indica que le dió una lista de conferencias al coordinador y éste irá a verlo hoy ó mañana para organizarlas porque ayer se inauguró la exposición de pintura. -- Orlando está de acuerdo y comenta que la inauguración estuvo muy bien, pues fueron algunos artistas. Cantú: que como tuvieron consejo universitario, no pudieron ir, pero que lo llame el viernes. Orlando: bien.- 286.-

(2.-113.- 20 oct.66).-

3688

[illegible] Salida al 299800 ext.273.-1112.- Luis Alberú con HF --- [illegible] que le dará la 272 porque la otra no funciona. - Alberú acepta y al enterarse de que Carlos Serrano todavía no llega, queda de volver a llamar a Relaciones.- 322.-

[illegible]7 h.
322. Entrada.- El Dr. Domínguez Loyo, Subdirector General de Población, al no encontrar a Carbelo, explica que tienen detenido a René Machín Valdés, cubano, y le están avisando de la Estación Migratoria donde lo tienen detenido, que ya tiene su pasaporte. Chelo pide se espere para que hable con Abreu, quien le informa que hoy se vá....SE CORTA por una L.D. y Domínguez queda de volverlo a hablar.- 354.-

354. Entrada 1127.- HF de parte del Dr. Domínguez Loyo pregunta por Abreu y Chelo pide se espere un momentito....SE CORTO.36 HF vuelve a llamar y Chelo pregunta su teléfono porque no encuentra a Abreu y HF indica que es el 354435. Chelo toma nota y posteriormente comunica a Domínguez Loyo que efectivamente Abreu tiene el pasaporte de Machín, pero además quisiera platicar con él; que en caso de que lo localice lo comunicará. Domínguez se dá por enterado y acepta.-431.

431. Salida al 299800.-1138.-Alberú se comunica a Relaciones Exteriores y pide la ext.273. HF:está ocupada.- 445.-

446. Salidas al 135887.-1218.- Chelo pide le manden dos mil hojas papel blanco tamaño oficio para mimeógrafo y HF queda de llevárselas.- 473.-

473. Entrada 1226.- HF pregunta el nombre del embajador y -- Chelo se lo dá.- 475.-

(3.-L13.- 25 Oct.66).-

[illegible]. Salida al [illegible].-[illegible].- Olga [illegible] de [illegible] que Morey ayer hizo el arqueo, le platica que perdió cin[illegible] de los 500 para [illegible] y Morey dice que hablará con [illegible].- 1094.-

1094. Salida al 203327.-1133.-Olga pregunta por el Embajador Madero y MP pide marque el 299000 ext.142.- 1096.-

1096. Salida al 299000 ext.142.-1136.- El Embajador le platica al Embajador Madero que Luis Alberú es funcionario del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, quien viajó con pasaporte especial equivalente al oficial para ellos; que ha tenido contactos con la Opic y una serie de cosas para desolver las relaciones culturales con algunos organismos y además con algunas galerías [illegible]; que se solicitó una extensión de su visa y Guzmán opinó que fuera a Gobernación; que fué allí y le acaba de informar que el Oficial Mayor, sr. Ojeda, le dijo que eso correspondía a la Dirección del Servicio Diplomático de Relaciones Exteriores, por lo quisiera saber si Alberú pueda pasar a verlo para que le explique. Madero: que se ocupará de todo eso con mucho gusto. Armas dá las gracias.- 1135.-

- -

(6.-136.- 28 Oct.66).-

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 14 November 1966

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TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA INFO MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA

PERUMEN LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5341 (IN 32131)

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO LEONEL ALBERU, HOTEL COLOMBIA, SAN PEDRO SULA: SIENTO NO PODER VISITAR FABRICA. TODO ARREGLADO. SALUDOS. RICARDO.

2. NO NEED FORWARD AGUILAR CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA 2 REF. ABOVE TELEGRAM SHOULD CLOSE OUT REF CASE.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER J. STEWART/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER T.J. HAZLETT

J. THEN (TELECOORD)/WH/2/N

J. THEN (TELECOORD)/WH/2/HONO

TAMIL-9

Stewart

RELEASING OFFICER EARL WILLIAMSON FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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0103

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EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 25-07-95.
10 noviembre 66.- M13-L13.
10.00-13.26hs.

01-31.- Entradas sin contestación.- Salida equivocada.

31.- Salida al 275364.--- 10.00hs.- Olga con HF por el Ing. Janus.- HF que no está.- Olga: Deja invitación para la cena del sábado en la casa de Sergio Martínez, para Janus y Salus.- HF dice que en este momento está llegando Janus.-- HF que después lo confirma.--- 61.

83.- Entrada a las 1114hs._ HF de la Librería Madero con Curbelo le dice que ya están allí los dies sesani que les pidió.- Curbel que el pasa a recogerlos.--- 89.

115.- Entrada._ HF el Dr. González Rentería por Curbelo.- Chelo que en este momento está en el consulado que le llame al 112847.--- 151.

152.- Salida al 299000 Ext.273.-- 1136hs.- HD Luis Alberú con HF Hernandez Serrano le dice que lo molesta en relación a las pinturas.- Serrano que hoy las entragan.--- 175.

176.- Salida al 263381.- 1150hs.- Chelo con su ahijada y luego con HF la guera.--- Asuntos personales.- Chelo con presión alta.--- Chelo que después lo llama.--- 193.

194.- Salida al 299000.- 1153hs._ Alberú con Hdez. Serrano le dice que el embajador dice haber recibido quinientos catálogos en vez de los mil que habían anunciado; que el embajador pensaba hacer una reparatición de los catálogos a la embajadas, pero que si lo hace se queda sin nada para enviar a Cuba; que si sería posible que le mandaran mayor cantidad.--- Hdez. Serrano: que mandaron hacer mil, pero que solamente les han entregado quinientos. Que en este momento estaba tratando de comunicarse con usted para decirle que ya está la expo

LIENVOY 17 nov 66
HMMA 30614

File
Jane Z

LITAMIL-9
201-

sición lista, que si la mandan a la embajada.- Alberú: que dí que la manden a la embajada.- Serrano: que en una hora estará.--- Que en cuanto a los catálogos entregarán los otros quinientos el lunes y que de esos quinientos él se quedará con doscientos.--- 224.

237.- Salida al 357900.- 1159hs.- Cholo con García le pregunta que si hay pasajes disponibles de la orden 35465 a disposición de la embajada.-- García: que quedan siete disponibles.--- 258.

272.- Entrada.- MF del consulado del Ecuador por Curbelo.- Cholo que le llame al 112847.--- 275.

276.- Entrada a las 1216hs.- MF del consulado General de Colombia con Cholo le dice que Curbelo recogió un mimeografo el 20 de octubre para destinarlo al Cuerpo Consular, pero que en el Cuerpo Consular no existe ese aparato y que desea que Curbelo informe donde se encuentra para reintegrarlo a su destino.--- Cholo: que Curbelo no está pero que al llegar le pasará su recado para que se comunique con el.--- 298.

336. Entrada a las 1333hs.- MF el Profesor González Ramírez por el embajador.- Cholo: que no está que salió a Relaciones y que regresará como a las 2.30pm.--- Ramírez: que luego llama.--- 348.-

349.- Salida al 198647.- 1336hs.- Cholo con MF Yola.- Enfermos.-- Cholo pasará a visitar a la enferma -abuelita de Yola-.---- 377.

378-387.- Entradas sin contestación.

• • • •

Dos. M30.- 8 noviembre 66.

mírez.- Jorrín que le llame al 144237.--- 251.-- 257.

285.- Salida al 195000.- 1226hs.- MD Estola con MF Yolanda Popoca para confirmar cita a las 15 horas.-- Estola le pregunta que donde puede comunicarse con el Dr. Duyos.- Yolanda que al Hospital Infantil, que llame al 175500.--- Yolanda que pregunta que si ya mandaron de la embajada los paquetes de Rojas porque en esos paquetes están dos paquetes de Gloria.- Estola que va a preguntar.---- 332.

385.- Salida al 299000 Ext.273.- 1238hs.- MD Luis Alberú - por Fernandez Serrano.- MF que está en la dirección en estos momentos.--- Alberú: que es en relación a las pinturas de Fanny Rabel, que si le puede informar algo.- MF que lo va a poner con la secretaria.- 412.- Alberú con MF le dice que quería hablar con Fernandez Serrano.- MF que el está en la dirección, pero que con respecto al empaque de la señora -- Fanny, que se está terminando.- Alberú: que cuando mandan - lo empacado.- MF que ella cree que mañana.-- 425.

487.- Entrada a las 1323hs.- MF con Jorrín que le dijo Orlando Suárez que le podía dejar un recado: que es de parte de Alberto Híjar, que nos vemos mañana a las siete de la - noche en el Talle de Gráfica Popular.--- 500.

501.- Entrada?- MF con Jorrín le dice que le habla María, - que les diga que el barco sale el día quince.--- 507.

530.- Salida al 287113.- 1349hs.- MD con MF Medina le pregunta que si va a estar allí.- Medina que sí.- MD que pasa a verlo.--- 600.

621.- Entrada.- Mirabal por Araceli le pregunta que como le fué.- Araceli: que tuvo que firmar como cuatro o cinco pasaportes de cortesía a los turistas y que les dijo que mañana vinieran a las diez.- Mirabal: que si la llamó Roblejo.---- Araceli que por suerte no.--- 666.

712.- Salida al 05.- 1425hs.- Jorrín reporta el teléfono

LITAMIL-9

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

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NUKI

S E C R E T 102125Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9195 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR

TYPIC PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF: MEXICO CITY 9168 (IN 35292)

10 Nov 65 IN 37303

1. LITAMIL-9 DEBRIEFED FIVE HOURS 8 NOV AND SIX HOURS 9 NOV WHICH RESULTED CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT INTEL, PARTICULARLY IN FIELD CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION. RQMS CULTURAL FIELD AND OTHERS PARTIALLY FULFILLED WITH EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION IN CASE FORMER. L-9 BROUGHT WITH HIM NINE FOLDERS CONTAINING MEMORANDA AND CORRESPONDENCE DEALING WITH CNC ACTIVITIES. L-9 NOT AWARE CUIS ACTITITIES WITHIN CNC BUT ASSIGNMENT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ AS DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN CNC CERTAINLY SIGNIFICANT.

2 L-9 AGAIN FACED WITH DILEMMA RETURN CUBA OR REMAIN MEXICO TO WORK AS ADMINISTRATOR MEXICAN COMPANY WHERE BROTHER PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BEING PUT ON L-9 BY BROTHER AND WEALTHY MEXICAN BENEFACTOR WHO OWNS COMPANY. L-9 GETTING ALONG IN YEARS (52)., HEALTH BEGINNING FAIL, SUFFERING MENTAL STRAIN, NOW ANXIOUS SETTLE DOWN MEXICO AND TAKE JOB ABOVE WHICH AMOUNTS SINECURE. THIS WILL ALLOW HIM PAINT AND DO THINGS HE HAS ALWAYS WANTED TO IN TWILIGHT CAREER. L-9 PATHETIC FIGURE TORN BETWEEN

SECRET

201-329609

10 Nov 66

NOV 16 3 56 PM '66

LNFORT AND MEXICAN BENEFACTOR. NIGGARDLY EXISTENCE (250 PESOS MONTHLY) PBRUMEN, WHERE TRAINED WITH MILITIA AND CUT CANE, DECTATE AGAINST HIS RETURN PBRUMEN GO THROUGH SAME AGAIN. ALTHOUGH L-9 UNSELFISHLY STATED WOULD RETURN PBRUMEN IF LNFORT REALLY FELT HE THAT IMPORTANT IT OBVIOUS HE PUTTING HIMSELF AT MERCY LNFORT. CO PLANS MAKE FOL PROPOSAL FOR HIS CONSIDERATION NIGHT 10 NOV. RETURN PBRUMEN WHERE HE WILL HAVE THIRD COUNTRY EMBASSY CONTACT FOR COMMO CHANNEL. DEPENDENT ACCEPTANCE THIS COMMO ARRANGEMENT SALARY WILL BE 732 DOLLARS MONTHLY IN ESCROW WITH REVIEW END SIX MONTH PERIOD FOR READJUSTMENT IF NECESSARY BASIS PRODUCTION. STATION BELIEVES THAT UNLESS COMMO CHANNEL ARRANGED L-9 SHOULD NOT BE REQUESTED RETURN. CO DOUBTS L-9 WILL ACCEPT ABOVE OFFER BUT WISHES GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY MAKE FINAL DECISION. AT ANY RATE, L-9 STILL "CLEAN" WILL PROVIDE STATION WITH LIMITED ACCESS PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI.

3. DOCS AND DETAILED NOTES INTEL AND OPS DEBRIEFING BEING POUCHED HQS. PLAN INTRODUCE L-9 TO FRADYER MORNING 11 NOV.

SECRET

BT

Memorandum for the Record

9 November 1966

Subject: Meeting with LITAMIL-9

PER telecon on the morning of 8 November, the undersigned met with LITAMIL-9 at 2100 at the Gutenberg/Thiers' glorieta. L-9 was taken to the home of Gene F. BRADDOCK, where the meeting was held. The meeting lasted until 0200 on 9 Nov 66. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS NOTED.

An interesting and fantastic incident occurred on the night of 7 Nov. L-9 said he saw the undersigned walking by his apartment when for some unknown reason he got up to look out the window. The undersigned did, in fact, walk by L-9's apartment on the night of the 7th at about 2300. L-9 was, of-course, very impressed with this quirk of fate as was the undersigned. Three years in time, a city of 5 million people etc. At approximately 2245, the undersigned called L-9 and a woman answered the phone. Nothing was said by the undersigned and the phone was hung up. It is possible that this call, if the number was correct, had some influence on his appearance at the window. However, L-9 made no mention of a woman at his place but said he had been reading and got up to look out.

PERSONAL PROBLEMS:

L-9 is very concerned about having lost his Mexican residence permit. [illegible] According to L-9, the Mexican Govt took away his residence permit because he broke Mexican laws. L-9 travelled to Cuba several times without advising the proper authorities during the last several years. L-9 always travelled to Cuba as a Cuban diplomat and not as a Mexican resident therefore there was no record of his travel. This was obviously against the rules and L-9 has to pay for it. L-9 went to see Coty SOLORZANO re this problem and she told him to get in touch with Ignacio "Nacho" ACOSTA Lagunas. ACOSTA took L-9 to Gobernacion but he was unable to see the Oficial Mayor, GALVEZ, fnu. They talked with another official who gave them little hope. ACOSTA said he would go to see GALVEZ, himself, on the following Monday but again, he was unable to get to see GALVEZ. (Lic. Carlos GALVEZ Betancourt).

File - 201 - Litamil-9

cont.

L-9 went to see Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas after ACOSTA failed to help him and HERNANDEZ told him he would talk with Ing. Jorge TAMAYO, that TAMAYO was the man who would be able to help. L-9 is pretty shook up about this problem because he was told at Gobernacion that he would have to reapply again and therefore go through the same XXXXXXX red tape as before, i.e. five years, restricted travel etc. L-9, of course, has new hope with his contact with us but XXXXX XXX he was told that only as a last resort would the U.S. get involved in order to protect the operation.

L-9 again went into the business of his brother's request and that of his friend in the Lomas, who is financing the deal, for him to remain in Mexico as the company's administrator. L-9 stated as he has done in the past that he is being pulled in both directions, i.e. toward Mexico by his brother etc and XXXXX toward Cuba by the U.S. Govt. He did not make it clear which of the two pressures he expects to succumb to. The undersigned did not push the issue at this meeting hoping to get into this matter at a later meeting.

L-9, just before he got out of the car, mentioned that he was in need of money and wanted to get spare parts etc to sent back to Cuba with Orlando SUAREZ, who is scheduled to leave for Habana on Monday. The undersigned said he would get L-9 some money for the next meeting.

L-9 was in good spirits, very proud of his files and anxious to to please. HE described himself during the last year or so in Cuba as "un soldado en su puesto" ready to serve when the time came. He was pleased,of course,to have contact again with ODYOKE and indicated he was a little shook up because his brother was "all over the place" and therefore not a good contact point. He was concerned about how hewas going to make contact.

L-9's post with the Consejo is: Jefe de Protocolo and Liaison officer with the Foreign embassies in Habana.

7. Manuel VEGA Pérez - VEGA was named to his present post in the Consejo by Carlos LECHUGA. VEGA, although not a cultured man, has a "baby faced" charm about him that gets him through. I mentioned to L-9 that VEGA was formerly G-2 in Mexico and he agreed but gave little attention to this in terms of his new role.

8. Eduardo CORONA - L-9 said that the removal of CORONA from his post was looked upon very critically by members of the dip corps. CORONA, an extremely well educated and knowledgable type was replaced by Manuel VEGA Perez. CORONA, acc L-9, was removed from the post in order to give him more time to work on the new Constitution. CORONA is also a prof at the U. of Habana. L-9 changed CORONA's despedida address because, acc L-9, the way CORONA had written it, it looked a though CORONA had been fired. L-9 commented thusly to CORONA.

9. Carlos LECHUGA - L-9 said LECHUGA is very happy in his job and [illegible] his wife is a different woman. She is very much at ease, apparently the marital problems have been solved etc. She is writing articles for "El Mundo". LECHUGA, acc L-9 was appraently scheduled to go to Paris but CASTELLANOS went in his stead. LECHUGA was actually studying French for the job. LECHUGA comments often on the personnel who were in Mexico and are now in the CONSEJO. [illegible] L-9, Jose Luis POSADA, Manuel VEGA, LECHUGA etc. , among others.

10. Jose Luis POSADA - POSADA is inthe Consejo de Cultura and will fill in for L-9 while he is away.

11. Raul ROA Garcia - ROA is away down on the totem poleof power and has enemies throughout the govt. ROA was operated on by Dr. SANTAMARIA, fnu for prostate trouble.

L-9 said he "bumped into" LITAMIL-3 on the street and L-3 has been trying to talk with him. L-9 said he is somewhat embarrassed and asked about the propriety of getting in touch with him. He was told to go ahead but to merely discuss the amenities of life and not get into [illegible] discussion to which he agreed heartily.

L-9 explained how he requested "leave without pay" etc through Manuel VERA but this is spelled out in docs L-9 provided us on 8 3 November. Copies of all these docs re L-9's departure, militia etc will be copied.

12. Carlos FRANQUI - L -9 knows nothing about FRANQUI but did comment that when Wilfredo LAM, colored painter, arrived in Habana for the TRICON, FRANQUI was at the airport and in an aside told LAM that he should avoid getting [illegible] involved with Marty FRAIDE because she was [illegible] outspokenly anti-regime.

13. Marta FRAILE - FRAILE, acc L-9, is known to be anti-CASTRO and she makes no bones about it.

14. Fidel CASTRO - CASTRO, acc L-9, is in trouble but his security forces keep things under control. [illegible] CASTRO says, according CONchita FERNANDEZ that he has to depend on his young scholarship students. He can't trust anyone else. He is obviously turnigg toward sugar after having turned twoard industry etc. Graciela EISEE, demonstrated a bit of anti-CASTRO feeling when at 26 July fiesta the crowds applauded CASTRO. EISEE commented in a sarcastic tone: "Aplaudiran", aplaudiran" . L-9 recalls that CASTRO was operated on for rectum trouble but he does not recall when. He believes Dr. RORDIGUEZ Diaz was the surgeon.

PERSONALITIES

1) Teresa PROENZA - L-9 said that when PROENZA left Mexico for Habana she was very unhappy and was cursing everybody. When L-9 arrived in La Habana he was told that PROENZA had been involved in "un asunto grave" with ORDOQUI and that she was being held. He said the latest information, about 2 months ago, is that she is under house arrest at Santa Maria del Mar, a beach resort outside Habana. Little comment is made re PROENZA in Habana.

2) Joaquin ORDOQUI and his wife, Edith BUCHACA de O. - ORDOQUI is still being held but his wife is allowed to go out on the street, accompanied by someone.

3) Marcia LEISECA - According to L-9, LEISECA and Lisandro OTERO are now divorced and rumors have it that LEISECA is going to marry Osmani CIENFUEGOS. LEISECA, acc L-9, is an important personality, particularly in the cultural field, i.e at the Casa de las Americas.

4. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas - HERNANDEZ has been very friendly with L-9 since the arrival of the latter. HERNANDEZ acc L-9 is much more at ease now than when L-9 was here last. He is relaxed and sure of himself.

5. Pablo ALDAMA Acosta - ALDAMA was fired from MINREX and he was very unhappy about it. He does not have a job but is on govt payroll. ALDAMA told L-9 he was "teed off" and name Luis GOMEZ B. as the man who was getting the breaks and that GOMEZ did nothing for the revolution etc.

6. Evelio CASTRO Rodriguez - Acc L-9, CASTRO's name was brought up by Augusto AROCS, a cousin of Gustavo, when he was with Conchita FERNANDEZ XXX A. AROCS said it was known that CASTRO was going to "jump" and yet he was allowed to leave with his family for some unknown reason. A real enigma.

15. Gustavo ARCOS - Nothing except he arrested. Will query again re ARCOS.

16. Mercedes MORALES Carrillo - SecGen of the Casa Cuba/Mexico in Habana. MORALES acc L-9, cut him L-9 out of the Mexican picutre.

17. Gen. Fernando PAMANES - PAMANES is very close to Hilda de FRANCO in more ways than one. It is the talk of the town. In fact, it was rumored that PAMANES was going to marry Hilda PEREZ de F. He is with here frequently and in public.

18. Celia SANCHEZ - Acc L-9, SANCHEZ plans on inviting Coty SOLORZANO to Cuba sometime around end of year.

19. Haydee SANTAMARIA - SANTAMARIA, it is rumored, will take over Carlos LECHUGA's post at some time in the near future. At least, thatis the rumor.

20. Agustin GUERRA Piedra - GUERRA went to Spain recently with his wife, who is going blind. Acc L-9, Dr. BARRAQUE, fnu, of Barcelona told PIEDRA he couldn't do a thing for his wife, and GUERRA returned. Acc GUERRA, he wanted his daughter to accompany them to Spain but the Cuban Govt would not grant permission. GUERRA is anti-CASTRO completo, but he's going to stay through it all.

21. Mariano RODRIGUEZ - RODRIGUEZ is a painter who recently went to Rome. THE Casa de las Americans suggested he go Spain, France etc to make contact with friends of Cuba but Consejo turned the suggestion down. It was then given to the Foreing office and they approved the travel.

22. Xiomara SANCHEZ - SANCHEZ has been fired from MINREX and she is not happy about it.

L-9 has contact with the following Embassies in Habana:

Italy - Santoro and Roqui (sic) - Very good relations here.

Francia - Lecouye sic)

Beligica - FORMER Amb.

Canada - Amb/ McClean - Svododa (not fond of Svoboda)

Hungaros - Actay (sic)

Czechos -

Polish - Koboito - Second Sec/Cultural Att.

British - BELL

Rumanian -

L-9 said his relations with Italians is excellent. He has never been invited to the Sov Embassy , in fact, it's the only one.

The Casa/Cuba-Mexico

President: Juan MARINELLO V.
XXXXXXXXX Secreat Executiva - Mercedes MORALES C.

L-9 said the President of the Instituto in Merida was in Cuba, in July 66.

22 November 1966

Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT: Fidel CASTRO Ruz

On 9-10 November 1966, LITAMIL-9 reported the following re Fidel CASTRO Ruz:

a) LITAMIL-9 was not aware of any problem that CASTRO might have had during the period May-June 1966, wheh he failed to appear publicly. L-9 believes that he would have heard about any serious problem through "Conchita" FERNANDEZ had there been one. On this score, L-9 said that we should not pay much attention to reports that CASTRO is losing power or turning it over to the Party because, although he remains out of the limelight for a time, he bounces back bigger and more popular than ever. L-9 did recall that CASTRO was operated on by Dr. RODRIGUEZ Diaz, fnu , for a rectal problem but he beliefes this was in 1966.

b) CASTRO has changed his mind about voluntary labor and now feels that those assigned to the tasks given them should get the job done without voluntary assistance. L-9 believes that Celia SANCHEZ reflected this policy when she recently told "Conchita" FERNANDEZ not to volunteer her services. Le9 believes that CASTRO has recognized his folly in the case of voluntary labor and realizes now that this merely provokes his minions into creating problems in areas where they should not be, i.e. lack of personnel in times when they needed in specific job. L-9 believes Cubans are taking advantage of voluntary labor to be missing frrom own assigned tasks in a form of clandestine subtle sabotage operattion. It is this that CASTRO is also beginning to realize.

c) CASTRO termination of militia courses per memo also shows a switch in attitude of CASTRO, who may also see conterproductive results of indoctrinating Cubans across the board. This happened about two months ago.

d)

2 PD

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
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UNIT
TIME
BY

FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

WH/C

ABSTRACT X

wh/c/FI

mexi

S E C R E T 081712Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9168 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR

8 [illegible] 35292

TYPIC

SHRYOCK CONTACTED LITAMIL-9 MORNING 8 NOV. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 8 NOV.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-329609
8 Nov. 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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UNIT CS/DO TIME 0315Z BY m

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/C8, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 042035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9122 4 [illegible] 3249

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: FRADYER) INFO MANAGUA

NO NIGHT ACTION

DIVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR- 49183 [redacted] (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

1. DUE PROLONG STAY LITAMIL-17 HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM LITAMIL-7. INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PERUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 10 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 10 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

201

8

3. IF HQS CONCURS, LITEMPO-8 CAN BE REQUESTED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO. IN ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT LITEMPO-8. THIS WOULD MEAN LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA WOULD THEN BE AWARE LITAMIL-9 AFFILIATION WOFACT. ADVISE SOONEST. ACTION COULD BE COVERED BY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENSION.

4. RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVE FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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TOTAL COPIES: 72

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
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(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

15 30 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF MEXICO CITY 9122 32477

HQS PREFERS NOT USE LITEMPO-8 GET LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO, EXCEPT IN LAST RESORT. SINCE L-9 HAS ALREADY OVERSTAYED 12-DAY LIMIT BY 18 DAYS AND SINCE NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, HEADQUARTERS BELIEVES PREFERABLE ACCEPT RISK MEXICAN AUTHORITIES BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND ORDERING L-9 OUT PRECIPITATELY. IN LATTER CASE STATION CAN ATTEMPT ARRANGE L-9 EXTENSION AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF. SUGGEST HOLD FURTHER ACTION IN ABEYANCE PENDING ARRIVAL SHRYOCK NIGHT 6 NOV.

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

WH COMMENT: REF GAVE BACKGROUND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 AND SUGGESTED USE LITEMPO-8 TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION L-9 PERMIT STAY MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER T FLORES FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

ET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/CA, FI

S E C R E T 031623Z CITE MANAGUA 3841

TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

3 Nov 66 IN 32131

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (-3,467)

1. APPRECIATE PROMPT SERVICE. REF ADDRESS SENT TO LITAMIL-17.

2. PLS OPEN ANY LETTERS RECEIVED FROM HIM AND ADVISE HEADQUARTERS, ATTN LAWRENCE F. BARKER, OF CONTENTS. L-17 WILL USE ALIAS PEDRO AGUILAR FOR RETURN ADDRESS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LITAMIL-9

201-329609

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 35

ORIG: J STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-339608

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8, CCS 3, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

3 22 13 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49415

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER), MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5340 (IN 31353)

FYI HQS PLANNING WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY SEND CLYDE K. SHRYOCK MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER ASSIST STATION REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS ESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9. REQUEST BARKER TAKE NO ACTION REF CASE.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER J. STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER W. CINI WH/C
A. PORN (TELECOORD) WH/2/M
RELEASING OFFICER W. CINI FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT :
DATE: 3 NOV. 66

☐ FILE RID
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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR ~~48786~~

TO

31457R
062

S E C R E T

~~CABLE SECRETARIAT~~

PLEASE RELAY TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (IN 31457) PRIORITY TO JMWAVE FOR INFO FRADYER.

S E C R E T

WH/C/COMMENT TEGUCIGALPA FURNISHES ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 IN HONDURAS.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT (DRAFT) WH/C/FI
A WISNOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

LITAMIL-9

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
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DATE: 3 NOV 66

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c/o/r

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF A MANAGUA 5840 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31353
B TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31457

1. PER FRADYER CONVERSATIONS HQS AND WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY STATION, CLYDE K SHRYOCK (P) PLANS ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER 1966 BY EAL FLIGHT 905. NO NEED MEET BUT WOULD APPRECIATE RESERVATIONS MADE IN TRUE NAME AT GENEVE OR SIMILAR HOTEL.

2. PURPOSE TRIP REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS REESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9 WITH STATION AND FRADYER (WHO HOLDING RESERVATIONS RETURN MEXICO CITY NIGHT 4 NOVEMBER FROM MIAMI).

S E C R E T

Stewart

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

WH/COMMENTS: A. LITAMIL-17 (BROTHER LITAMIL-9) ASKED BARKER MEET HIM SAN PEDRO SULA, AND MANAGUA ASKED TEGUCIGALPA FOR ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR L-17 INHONDURAS AND ASKED MEXICO CITY FOR LATEST ON LITAMIL-9

B. TEGUCIGALPA FURNISHED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 IN HONDURAS.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER T HAZLETT (DRAFT) WH/C/FI

S WISNIOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO (DRAFT)

RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/OA,

S E C R E T 022135Z CITE TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (DEHORN ACTING)

2 NOV 65 IN 31457

MANAGUA INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

REFERENCE: MANAGUA 5840 (IN 31333) *

1. FOLLOWING ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IS PROVIDED PER REFERENCE REQUEST:

*REQUESTED ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17,

SR. RICARDO MARTINEZ MEJIA
RDO. JAIME AGUILAR BLANCO
APARTADO 528, TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS

2. SUGGEST LITAMIL-17 BE TOLD TO USE FICTIOUS RETURN ADRESS. LETTERS NOT BEARING RETURN ADRESS FREQUENTLY PICKED UP BE SWINEHERD-3, UNILATERAL STATION ASSET WHO RUNS MAIL INTERCEPT OPERATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Jane

LITAMIL-9

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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~~FROM~~ Ray 45

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE MANAGUA 5840

ACTION

2 NOV 66 IN 37353

MEXICO CITY, TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

1. LITAMIL-17 PHONED BARKER FROM SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS, 31 OCTOBER USING ALIAS AND INNOCENT BUSINESS PHRASEOLOGY. SAID WISHED HAVE BARKER VISIT HIM IN SAN PEDRO SULA BEFORE 20 NOVEMBER. FOR SECURITY REASONS DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT LITAMIL-9.

2. BARKER TENTATIVELY PLANS STOP-OVER TEGUCIGALPA EN ROUTE BACK FROM ANNUAL COS MEETINGS PROBABLY ABOUT 14 NOV. WILL ASK L-17 TO FLY THERE FOR MEET. MEXI PLS ADVISE LATEST ON L-9 AND WHAT INSTRUCTIONS IF ANY WISH BARKER TO PASS TO L-17.

3. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: L-17 IS BROTHER OF L-9 WHO AGENT RESIDING IN PBRUMEN AND EXPECTED OUT SOON. PLEASE CABLE TO MANAGUA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN TEGU TO WHICH L-17 COULD SEND LETTER CONFIRMING MEETING PLANS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

'Re chrono

Jane

LITAMIL-9

La Habana, 5 de octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Comp. Jesús Durán
VICEMINISTRO DE ADMINISTRACION
Ministerio de Comercio Exterior
Ciudad.

Compañero:

Por este medio tengo el gusto de informarle que con motivo de realizar un viaje a Méjico, en misión cultural, debidamente autorizado por el Consejo Nacional de Cultura, donde ostento el cargo de Jefe de Protocolo de la Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales; solicito de usted la debida autorización para poder llevarme algunos libros y revistas de mi propiedad, que traten sobre pintura. Estos libros los he adquirido aquí, y me son necesarios para realizar mi trabajo como pintor. Asimismo, llevaría conmigo una máquina de escribir portátil que traje cuando vine de Méjico; en cuyo país ocupaba el cargo de Agregado Cultural de nuestra Embajada.

Desearía también llevar unos tabacos, para lo cual le estoy solicitando la autorización correspondiente.

Le adjunto la relación de los libros que deseo llevarme, notificándole que saldré del país el próximo viernes, día [illegible], en el vuelo No. 464, para Méjico.

Con saludos revolucionarios,

Luis Alberú Souto

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
De DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

MEMORANDUM

FECHA: 4 de octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

DE: Luis Alberú Solá,
Jefe de Protocolo.

A: al Comp. Manuel [illegible],
Director de R. Internacionales.

ASUNTO SOLICITUD DE LICENCIA

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, al efecto de solicitar de su amable atención, se me concedan 2 meses de licencia sin sueldo a partir del día 4 de Noviembre del corriente

Dicha licencia, es para poder terminar los cuadros que tengo empezados en mi estudio de ciudad México.

Agradeciendo de antemano, la atención que pueda prestar a esta solicitud, me reitero de Ud, con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

fraternalmente,

Luis Alberú

Luis Alberú,
Jefe de Protocolo
y Relaciones Culturales con Europa
Occidental.

4-10-66
825

LITAMIL/9

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
D. DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

MEMORANDUM

FECHA: 4 de Octubre de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

DE: Al Comp. Manuel E. Vega,
Director.

A: al Comp. Héctor Quintero,
Jefe de Personal.

ASUNTO

Estimado compañero:

Debido a las necesidades de trabajo de esta Dirección, fué necesario posponer la fecha solicitada para las vacaciones del compañero Luis Alberú Souto.

Por lo cual al mismo tiempo le informamos, que dichas vacaciones pueden comenzar a surtir efecto, a partir del 5 de Octubre del corriente.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS"

fraternalmente,

Manuel E. Vega,
Director.-

4-10-66
828

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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10 SEP 65 IN 93133

S E C R E T 092319Z ~~[illegible]~~ CITE MEXICO CITY 8513

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF ~~MEXICO~~ CITY 8467 IN 90300

[illegible]	WH/C
[illegible] DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX

1. LITAMIL-9 NOT ABOARD FLIGHT 9 SEPT. NEXT SCHEDULED FLIGHT 17 SEPT. IN VIEW NO RESPONSE TO REF AND UNCERTAINTY L-9 ARRIVAL, BARKER MET WITH LITAMIL-17 AGAIN 9 SEPT TO SET UP CONTACT PLAN WHEREBY L-17 WILL MAKE FIRST CONTACT WITH L-9 ON BEHALF WOFACT. THIS PLAN WILL FREE BARKER TO PROCEED MANAGUA DEPARTING MEXI 17 SEPT.

2. L-17 WILL BE IN HONDURAS FROM 10 TO 25 SEPT. NIGHT 9 SEPT WILL LEAVE INNOCUOUS TEXT NOTE WITH LUIS EYCHENNE PIN, LONGTIME L-9 CLOSE FRIEND WHOM L-9 WILL AUTOMATICALLY CONTACT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARRIVAL. NOTE WILL TELL L-9 THAT "ROBERTO" (BARKER) WILL PROBABLY BE OUT OF TOWN UPON L-9 ARRIVAL, L-9 SHOULD AWAIT RETURN L-17 TO MEXICO AT WHICH TIME STOCKHOLDERS MEETING CAN BE SET UP. L-9 WILL THUS NOT GO TO CLANDESTINE CONTACT POINT NIGHT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RETURN AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED WITH HIM. BELIEVE BEST LET HIM SETTLE IN AT LIRING SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE CONTACT SINCE HE MIGHT BE UNDER AMSTAFF SURVEILLANCE. L-17 CAN THEN MAKE SECURE

SECRET

CONTACT WITH L-9 AND LAY ON DATE FOR L-9 PICK UP BY C/O. COMPLETE CONTACT PLAN PLACED IN L-9 FILE ENABLING C/O CONTACT L-17 AND L-9. AGAIN STRONGLY SUGGEST SHRYOCK OR BARKER MAKE INITIAL CONTACT SINCE EXPOSURE L-9 TO ANY OTHER OFFICER MIGHT PREJUDICE CHANCES TALKING IN~~H~~TO RETURN PERUMEN.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

[redacted]

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 9 September 1966

☐ FILE RID
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SECRET

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CONF: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE · DC/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 3, C/CSPS

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) SECRET [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER) (ELITE) (PICA)

10 1456Z

CITE DIRECTOR 34241

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE MANAGUA

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

REF MEXICO CITY 6407 (IN 90306)

1. SHRYOCK AVAILABLE FOR SHORT TDY ASSIST STATION INITIAL RECEPTION LITAMIL-9.

2. HQS PREFERS NOT DELAY BARKER DEPARTURE FOR MANAGUA. SHOULD LITAMIL-9 ~~ARRIVE~~ ARRIVAL BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 17 SEPTEMBER REQUEST STATION ARRANGE CONTACT PLAN SO SHRYOCK CAN MAKE CONTACT EVEN IF LITAMIL-17 OUT OF COUNTRY WHEN LITAMIL-9 EVENTUALLY ARRIVES. SHRYOCK WILL MAKE INITIAL CONTACTS AND TURN LITAMIL-9 OVER TO ANOTHER STATION CASE OFFICER.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS COMMENT: Reference reported LITAMIL-9 coming MEXICO mid-Sept for approximately three month stay to complete certain projects he involved in when MEXICO on PCS.

WH/C/FI

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/1 (Mr. Stewart by phone)
WH/C/MO (Mr. Chiocca in draft)
WH/2 (Mr. Terrell by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

13 SEP 1966

FROM

DISSEM BY 33 7

ACTION

DC/WH/C 5

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UNIT TIME BY

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FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EUR 4,

S E C R E T 061932Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8467

6 SEP 66 IN 90306

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, MADRID, MANAGUA

ANC/FZ
PG
ABSTRACT
WH/C

KAPOK TYPIC LITAMIL-9

1. LITAMIL-17 REPORTED 2 SEP THAT LITAMIL-9 WILL COME TO MEXICO MID-SEPTEMBER FOR APPROX 3 MONTH STAY TO COMPLETE CERTAIN PROJECTS HE INVOLVED IN WHEN HERE PCS. NO PRECISE DATE GIVEN. L-17 RECEIVED NEWS IN LETTERS FROM L-9 AND FROM THEIR FATHER.

2M L-17 TOLD BARKER HE HOPES BE ABLE/CONVINCE L-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO WHERE L-17 CAN SET HIM UP IN JOB. IN INTEREST HARMONY WITH L-17 C/O DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS DESIRE ALTHOUGH HOPEFULLY L-9 CAN BE INDUCED RETURN PBRUMEN TO COOPERATE IN PLANCE.

3. L-17 TRAVELING ALMOST CONSTANTLY PAST YEAR SETTING UP INDUSTRIAL PLANTS. PRESENTLY IN SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS. MAY NOT BE IN MEXICO WHEN L-9 ARRIVES. BARKER HAS CONTACT PLAN WITH L-9 AND STATION BELIEVES HE SHOULD REMAIN MEXICO UNTIL CONTACT EFFECTED ALTHOUGH HAS TENTATIVE PLANS DEPART FOR MANAGUA 17 SEP.

4. REQUEST SHRYOCK STAND BY TO TAKE OVER CASE ONCE CONTACT EFFECTED. SINCE L-9 AVERSE TO MEETING ANY NEW WOFACT PERSONNEL (COMPLAINED TO C/O THAT WAS EXPOSED TO TOO MANY PEOPLE BEFORE AND AFTER PREVIOUS PBRUMEN TRIP), BELIEVE BEST IF CONTACT CAN BE CONFINED TO **SECRI**

Same for L-9

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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S E C R E T 311237Z CITE MADRID 9016

MADR

31 Aug 66 IN 86883

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF DIRECTOR 28220

1. AMCRASH 1 MET 30 AUG. FLT DEPARTURE FROM HAVANA DELAYED TO SOLVE EXCHANGE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH INVITEES RETURNING TO THEIR COUNTRY.

2. AMCRASH 1 SAID LITAMIL 9 GOOD FRIEND BUT DOES NOT HAVE FREQUENT INTIMATE CONTACT. CONTACT IS NATURAL AND THEY HAVE VISITED EACH OTHERS HOMES ON PURELY FRIENDLY BASIS. AMCRASH 1 SAW LITAMIL 9 AT AIRPORT JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE THIS TRIP, PURELY ACCIDENTAL. CAN CONTACT LITAMIL 9 AT ANY TIME WITHOUT RAISING ANY SUSPICIONS.

3. AMCRASH 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ESTIMATED LITAMIL 9 MOTIVATION AND SUPPORT OF GOVT AS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND FOR SURVIVAL ONLY. BELIEVES LITAMIL 9 WORKING IN FOREIGN MINISTRY CONNECTED WITH CULTURAL AFFAIRS.

4. MADRID BELIEVES OPEN CODE PLUS SW WITH DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS IN BOOK AS SUGGESTED IN DIRECTOR 25242 EXPOSES BOTH AMCRASH 1 AND LITAMIL 9 TO UNNECESSARY DANGER. AS LITAMIL 9 IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY SINCE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WE WISH GIVE MAXIMUM PROTECTION TO

LITAMIL-9

201-329609
31 Aug 1966

fml-9

RECEIVED RID MIS OCT 10 10 42 AM '66

RID/MIS OCT 13 8 21 AM '66

PAGE 2 MADRID 9216 SECRET

AMCRASH 1 [illegible] RECONTACT PLAN AND OFFER F[illegible]L[illegible] SUGGESTION:

A. AMCRASH 1 KNOWS PERSON MEXICO WHO GOOD FRIEND LITAMIL 9. AMCRASH 1 DOES NOT RECOLLECT NAME BUT WILL FURNISH NAME LATER.

B. FRIEND MEXI COULD SEND UNCOMPROMISING LETTER TO LITAMIL 9 WITH AMCRASH 1 AS "UNWITTING" COURIER. COULD USE PERSON PARA 4A ABOVE OR OTHER MORE APPROPRIATE SUGGESTED BY HQS OR MEXICO.

C. IF FIRST LETTER EXCHANGE GOES SMOOTHLY THEN SECOND SEALED LETTER COULD CONTAIN RECONTACT MESSAGE FCOM HQS CASE OFFICER. AT THIS POINT AMCRASH 1 CAN STILL CLAIM DENIAL ANY KNOWLEDGE CONTENT OF MESSAGES LEAVING HIM CLEAN IN CASE THERE EXPOSURE BY LITAMIL 9 OR ANY OTHER SOURCE.

D. IF LITAMIL 9 ACCEPTS RECONTACT CAN CONTINUE TO USE AMCRASH 1 AS COURIER OR UNTIL ALTERNATE METHOD FOUND THRU USE SW, RADIO, OR OTHER.

5. AMCRASH 1 SGSWIRLED ON 30 AUG 66. NO EVIDENCE DECEPTION.

SECRET

BT

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
D. DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

MEMORANDUM.

FECHA 19 de Agosto de 1966

DE: Luis Alberú

A: al Comp. Manuel E. Vega, Director de la D. de Relaciones Internacionales.

ASUNTO SOLICITUD DE LICENCIA

Estimado compañero:

Por medio de la presente tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, al efecto de exponerle que con motivo de mis vacaciones, quisiera aprovechar esa oportunidad, para solicitarle se me conceda licencia para viajar a la ciudad de México por el término de tres meses y a partir de la primera quincena del próximo mes de Septiembre, al objeto de terminar los cuadros que se encuentran inconclusos en mi estudio de aquella ciudad, en razón de mi traslado a Cuba y de estar desempeñando funciones en el Consejo Nacional de Cultura, que con gran satisfaccion para mi modesta persona, me han sido encomendadas a los fines de mejor servir a la Revolución.

Aprovechando el tiempo que por vacaciones me pueda corresponder, le ruego atentamente, considere dar curso a esta solicitud, no sin antes según tengo entendido, si el tiempo solicitado no cubre totalmente las vacaciones que actualmente me puedan corresponder, se tenga en cuenta un anticipo, en base de las que me correspondan en el futuro próximo.

Al mismo tiempo deseo exponerle tambien, que los gastos relativos a mi estancia, no serían un obstáculo, dado que en México cuento con familiares directos y nacidos en aquel país. Quisiera que si se accede a mi solicitud, se me facilitaran o me indicaran los trámites usuales a realizar para poder pagar el pasaje de ida y vuelta en moneda nacional, así como la autorización correspodiente para poder llevar unos libros que he comprado, los cuales utilizaría para terminar los cuadros de referencia.

Con gracias anticipadas por la atención que preste a esta solicitud, me reitero de Ud, con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

fraternalmente,

Luis Alberú,
Jefe de Protocolo.-

SE ER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AN OTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Thomas Hazlett Martin Graves		
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	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

These two books have been found unsuitable for use with system #99 ink, However, the book "Maceo", which I have retained, gives excellent results. The first two pages of the book "Maceo", which are a blank page followed by a title page, would be ideal for placement of SW.

Dave Brammer
CCG/WH

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

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FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4
1 APR 55 which may be used.

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SECRET 18 12 10Z CITE DIRECTOR 28686

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE MADRID WGR

KAPOK TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL LICOBRA

REF: MEXICO CITY 8221 (IN 74964)* (NOT SENT MADRID) WGR

1. APPRECIATE CONSTRUCTIVE REF SUGGESTIONS. COMMENTS RE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, I.E., HOSTILE INTERROGATION, ETC., IN USE AMCRASH/1 MOST PERTINENT. APPEARS IT AGREED THERE ALMOST INSOLUBLE QUANDRY IN THAT LITAMIL/9 TO BE REACTIVATED AND HANDLED ONLY VIA PERSONAL CONTACT, AND L/9 LIKELY INTERPRET ANY SUCH EFFORT AS BREACH OF FAITH.

2. IN ATTEMPT DERIVE PRINCIPLES FOR BEST SOLUTION THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM OFFER FOLLOWING THOUGHTS RE REF. HQS ASSESSMENT L/9 THAT HE BASICALLY DISTRUSTS LATINS AND RESPONSE TO LICOBRA/2 NOT LIKELY BE MUCH BETTER THAN PBRUMEN NATIONAL. BELIEVE IT CRUCIAL ALLOW TARGET RECEIVE PITCH PRIVATELY WITHOUT FEELING ANYONE ELSE WITTING EVENT AND HIS SECURITY IN JEOPARDY. BOOK/LETTER PROPOSAL LEAVES L/9 FREE WITH OPINION ONLY LITAMIL/17 INVOLVED BUT PROBABLY UNAWARE DETAILS. RENEWED WOFACT INVOLVEMENT WOULD GROW SLOWLY WITH TARGET ABLE CONTROL

RELEASING OFFICER 16-10 1530

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

SPEED OF EVENTS AND PONDER EACH STEP SEPARATELY. THIS LIKELY GIVE L/9 FEELING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. WITH ~~[illegible]~~ PRESENTATION OF LETTER BY L/2 AS SUGGESTED REF, L/9 FACED WITH TOTALLY UNEXPECTED "MOMENT OF TRUTH" IN SITUATION WHERE HE MUST ASSUME L/2 KNOWS CONTENTS. BELIEVE THIS COMPOUNDS NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND PRESENTS TARGET FAIT ? ACCOMPLI "BREACH OF FAITH".

3. AS FURTHER CONSIDERATION, BELIEVE CONTEMPLATED CUTOUT/COURIER RELATIONSHIP WOULD HAVE TO REASSURE L/9 OF SECURITY AND PROFESSIONAL WOFACT SPONSORSHIP. OUTSIDE OF DIFFICULTY OF L/2 NATIONALITY, THERE POTENTIAL PERSONALITY CLASH IN MIDST THIS SENSITIVE CONTACT BETWEEN L/2, REPORTEDLY OBSESSED MILITARY MATTERS, AND CULTURALLY MINDED L/9.

4. RE PARA 4 REF, ENVISAGE TRIGGERING LETTER AS INNOCUOUS APPEARING, BUT CLEARLY WORDED, CASUAL REFERENCE TO "MUTUALLY ENJOYABLE" PASSAGE IN "EL LIBRO DE TOMAS". FURTHER COVER COULD BE PROVIDED BY EQUATING SIMILARITY OF INCIDENT DESCRIBED IN PASSAGE TO COMMON EXPERIENCE OF BROTHERS.

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28686

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE THREE

5. NOT CONFIDENT AMCRASH/1 BETTER ABLE PROVIDE REASSURING ATMOSPHERE REQUIRED PROPOSED COURIER ROLE, BUT AT LEAST THIS ALTERNATIVE HAS ADVANTAGE PIGGY-BACKING WHAT WE HOPE LONG STANDING FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP. SUGGESTION VALID ONLY IF CONTACT ROUTINE AND CLOSE ENOUGH TO COVER MEETS. BEFORE ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION USE A/1 GIVEN, MUST DETERMINE DETAILS NATURE A/1 - L/9 PAST ASSOCIATION. SEPARATE CABLE TO MADRID THIS TOPIC.

6. HQS FILES REFLECT LAST CONTACT LITAMIL/17 IN AUGUST 1965. BELIEVE CURRENT MEETING MIGHT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT PRESENT STATUS/FRAME OF MIND OF L/9 WHICH WOULD BE CRUCIAL PROPOSED OP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/COMMENT: *Mexico City Station's view after careful consideration.

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CITE DIRECTOR 28686

TO PAGE FOUR

E/IB/C

C/WH/C/FI

Flores for WH/C/MO

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON Le Maistre

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Flores
THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

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SECRET 16 20 37Z CITE DIRECTOR 28220

TO MADRID INFO: MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH 1P

REF: DIR 25242*

13 August 1966

FILE FI
MICROFILMED
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS REF PROPOSAL CONCLUDE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY DETERMINE DETAILS EXACT NATURE AMCRASH/1 - LITAMIL/9 RELATIONSHIP. LOOK FORWARD FIRST AVAILABILITY A/1 FOR FULL DEBRIEFING/ELICITATION THIS TOPIC.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/Comment: Proposal for reactivation LITAMIL/9

C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (in draft)

Mike AMCRASH/1

for WH/C/MO

B-201-772091

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON

WH/1

201-329609
16 August 1966

E/IB/S

C/EUR/LOPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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S E C R E T 122100Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8221 12 AUG 66 IN 74964

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH LICOBRA

REF DIRECTOR 25242 *

* HQS proposal of secure reactivation LITAMIL-9.

1. FOLLOWING STATION VIEWS AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION REF PROPOSAL.

2. ANY CONTACT INITIATED WITH LITAMIL-9 INSIDE PBRUMEN WILL BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS A BREACH OF FAITH. STATION AGREES SUCH ACTION JUSTIFIED, HOWEVER, IN VIEW HIS PROBABLE ACCESS AND HAS BEEN EXAMINING MEANS EFFECT CONTACT. FEEL HE SHOULD NOT BE CONTACTED THROUGH PBRUMEN NATIONAL.

3. BELIEVE L-9 SHOULD COMMUNICATE THROUGH SOMEONE NOT SUBJECT TO ARREST. IF AMCRASH-1 USED AND PICKED UP FOR ANY REPEAT ANY REASON HE COULD BE BROKEN. L-9 WOULD BE DOOMED. WORKING ALONE L-9 WILL HAVE CHANCE SURVIVAL. AS MEMBER PBRUMEN NET OR WHATEVER CHOOSE TO CALL L-9/A-1 ASSOCIATION L-9 IS ENDANGERED UNDULY. STATION STRONGLY AGAINST ANY OPERATIONAL CONTACT WITH L-9 WITH ANY OTHER PBRUMEN NATIONAL. C/O WHO HANDLED L-9 1963-1965 BELIEVES L-9 WILL FEEL SAME WAY. STATION HAS UNEASY FEELINGS ABOUT AMMOON AGENTS IN VIEW CLOSE MHGUILE ATTENTION TO THEM. DESPITE A-1 SGSWIRL BELIEVE

SECRET

Jane

TOO DANGEROUS EXPOSE L-9 TO HIM.

4. PARA 3 REF GIVES L-9 OPTION REFUSE OFFER IN COMMUNICATION BY OPEN CODE TO BROTHER (L-17). BUT NOT CLEAR FROM REF HOW L-17 CAN "SECURELY DRAW ATTENTION" TO ALTERED PASSAGE IN BOOK.

5. MOVING FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE, ONE POSSIBILITY REESTABLISH CONTACT LIES IN USE LICOBRA-2 WHO IN NO WAY SUBJECT TO ARREST. ALTHOUGH L-2 HAS NEVER BEEN ASKED DO ANYTHING OF SORT, C/O FEELS HE MIGHT BE WILLING HELP OUT. L-2 HAS OWN COURIER WHO CAN CARRY SEALED NOTES WITHOUT PUTTING THEM INSIDE DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AS DIP COURIER HE NOT SUBJECT TO SEARCH.

6. L-9 COULD ARRANGE VISIT L-2 IN EMBASSY AFTER LETTER FROM L-17 OR PERHAPS PHONE CALL FROM L-2. FACT THAT L-9 RESIDED 18 YEARS MEXICO FURNISHES AMPLE COVER FOR VISIT AS L-9 COULD BE INQUIRING ABOUT RETENTION INMIGRADO STATUS. ONCE INSIDE, L-9 COULD BE GIVEN NOTE FROM C/O. FIRST LINE OF NOTE WOULD BE WARNING NOT SAY ANYTHING COMPROMISING SINCE EMBASSY PROBABLY BUGGED BY MHGUILE. NOTE WOULD CONTAIN PITCH FOR REACTIVATION AND OUTLINE COMMO ARRANGEMENTS. L-9 COULD MAKE WRITTEN REPLY AND GIVE TO L-2 FOR TRANSMITTAL TO C/O.

7. IF L-9 WILLING COOPERATE, COULD ARRANGE BECOME ACTIVE MEMBER MEXICAN/PBRUMEN CULTURAL SOCIETY FOR WHICH HAS EXCELLENT

COVER. THIS WOULD ENABLE HIM KEEP IN TOUCH WITH L-2.

8. BELIEVE C/O COULD ARRANGE HAVE L-2 AGREE GIVE L-9 ASYLUM IN CASE L-9 SITUATION EVER PRECARIOUS. THIS PLUS REVELATION TO L-9 THAT HE HAS 4,800 DOLLARS IN ESCROW AND PROSPECTS ADDING SIGNIFICANTLY TO THIS NESTEGG MIGHT HELP TIP SCALES IN FAVOR L-9 RENEWED COOPERATION IN PLACE.

9. PROPOSE PAY OFF L-2 BY ARRANGING FOR PROMINENT WOLADY VINICULTURIST TO VISIT L-2 VINEYARDS ZACATECAS ON ALL EXPENSE PAID (BY WOFACT) TRIP TO ADVISE L-2 HOW TO INCREASE YIELD AND QUALITY HIS GRAPES. NO MONEY WOULD BE PAID TO L-2 THUS PRESERVING HIS DIGNITY.

10. ALL ABOVE PREDICATED ON (A) SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BY HQS TO VIOLATION LNGOLD RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE MEXICAN DIPLOMATS, AND (B) ESTIMATE BY STATION THAT L-2 WOULD NOT TELL MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT OPERATION. BELIEVE FLAP POTENTIAL COULD BE LESSENED BY HAVING BARKER DO PITCHING OF L-2 ON TDY TRIP AFTER LEAVING MEXICO PCS. OP WOULD THUS HAVE NON-MEXICO BASE WHICH COULD LESSEN CHANCES BLOWBACK TO STATION AND CHIEF LNPURE.

11. HQS COMMENTS WOULD BE APPRECIATED. SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

Additional Point: to alleviate L-9 initial scare receiving note from L-2, be sure cover story include innocuous & realistic sounding explanation (& mangling for hypothetical "bug" in line)

~~[illegible]~~

NNNN

~~[illegible]~~

a. I.E. L-9 so hypersensitive he will not stand thought of "insane Mexican" ~~[illegible]~~ being knowledgeable of ~~[illegible]~~ any L-9 ~~[illegible]~~ activity out of ordinary. L-2 must appear to L-9 to be "unwitting".

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TOTAL COPIES: >4

ORIG: Martin Graves/jp
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EXT: 3553
DATE: 2 August 1966

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☐ INDEX
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SECRET

3 21 32 Z CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: MADRID JMWAVE

RYBAT TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF: DIR 89222 (18 MARCH 1966)*

1. VIEW DECREASING LIKELIHOOD LITAMIL-9 TRAVEL ABROAD AND HIS CONTINUING USEFUL ACCESS INSIDE PBRUMEN, ESPECIALLY AS BROTHER-IN-LAW FORMER AMTHUG PERSONAL SECRETARY, WISH INITIATE SECURE METHOD REACTIVATION. REQUEST COMMENTS FOLLOWING PROPOSAL.

2. CLYDE K. SHRYOCK, FORMER MEXICO CO WHO RECRUITED L-9, IN POSSESSION SEVERAL BOOKS RECEIVED FROM HIM AS PERSONAL GIFTS. WOACRE HAS EVALUATED FIRST TWO BLANK PAGES OF ONE BOOK AS IDEAL S/W CARRIER. THESE TWO PAGES COULD CARRY DETAILED PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM SHRYOCK URGING L-9 RENEWED ASSISTANCE AND REASSURING HIM THAT SECURE COMMO METHOD AVAILABLE. IN VIEW WELL-KNOWN L-9 FEAR COMPROMISE AND REFUSAL EVEN DISCUSS S/W TRAINING, PITCH NEED BE CAUTIOUS AND CAREFULLY TAILORED. MESSAGE WOULD INSTRUCT

RELEASING OFFICER 3-2 0545

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO L-9 MAKE AGREEMENT RENEWED COOPERATION KNOWN THROUGH OPEN CODE MESSAGE TO LITAMIL-17, A BROTHER RESIDENT IN MEXICO.

3. ORDER AVOID NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RECEIVING OPEN TEXT DIRECTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT FROM THIRD PERSON OR THROUGH OPEN MAILS, WOACRE WOULD REMOVE PAGE FROM BOOK AND REPLACE WITH ONE IDENTICAL IN APPEARANCE BUT CONTAINING SMALL CHANGE IN TEXT. CHANGE WOULD REQUEST L-9 TREAT BLANK PAGES TO REVEAL PERSONAL MESSAGE. PROPERLY TIMED LETTER FROM L-17 WOULD SECURELY DRAW BROTHER'S ATTENTION THIS PASSAGE.

4. FOR SOLUTION PROBLEM DELIVERING TAMPERED BOOK TO L-9, RECOMMEND USE OF AMCRASH-1. POSSIBLE SEND BOOK INTERNATIONAL MAILS OR HAVE INTERNAL MAILING BY THIRD PERSON WITH MINIMUM CHANCE DISCOVERY, BUT USE OF A-1 WOULD BE FIRST STEP DEVELOPMENT COURIER SYSTEM WHICH TO BE BACKBONE L-9 COMMO. A-1 FRIEND OF TARGET AND PLAUSIBLY COULD HAND-CARRY BOOK L-9. IF A-1 RELUCTANT MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT, OR THIS APPROACH CONSIDERED AT TIME UNNECESSARY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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MESSAGE FORM
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ROUTING			
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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

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PAGE THREE

CITE DIRECTOR 25242

TO EXPOSURE A-1, HE COULD MAKE INTERNAL MAILING WITH SHORT SHRYOCK EXPLANATORY NOTE ENCLOSED. IF A-1 AGREES PERSONAL DELIVERY, STORY COULD BE THAT HE APPROACHED BY UNKNOWN WHO ASKED HE CARRY BOOK TO L-9 FROM OLD FRIEND "TOMAS" (TRUE NAME BY WHICH SHRYOCK KNOWN TO AGENT).

5. CRUCIAL FACTOR WOULD BE TESTING AND CONTROL A-1 DURING DELIVERY OF BOOK. REQUEST MEXICO AND MADRID ASSESSMENTS A-1 BONA FIDES THIS TASK. THOROUGH SGSWIRL ADVISABLE BOTH BEFORE BRIEFING AND ON NEXT TRIP OUT, PRIOR TO L-17 TRIGGERING LETTER. FIRST STEP IN WHOLE SEQUENCE WOULD BE ELICITING AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY A-1 ADMISSION FRIENDSHIP WITH L-9.

6. AT PRESENT JUNCTURE L-9 OP HOLDS LITTLE PROSPECT SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCTION. BELIEVE LITTLE COULD BE LOST IN ABOVE PROPOSAL, AND RISK TO BOTH PARTIES MINIMAL. HQS ASSESSMENT THAT BEST CHANCE ACQUIRE L-9 COOPERATION INSIDE PBRUMEN IF CONTACT PERSONAL AND NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE INVOLVED, I. E., CARBONS, PADS, ETC. IF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIRECTOR 25242

PAGE FOUR

REACTIVATION SUCCESSFUL AND CAREFULLY PLANNED COURIER SYSTEM INITIATED, THIS CONSIDERABLE STEP FORWARD PBRUMEN RESIDENT AGENT ACTIVITY.

END OF MESSAGE

*Hqs wishes reiterate need protect LITAMIL-9 until all factors AMCRASH-1 contact with L-9 weighed.

AC/WH/C/FI H. Mahoney (in draft)
WH/C/MO EJChiocca
WH/C/RR/MHAPRON J. U. Roberts
E/IB/S
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 27 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Como sabemos en su poder las bases y propósitos de la recion integrada "Agrupación de Intelectuales Españoles Amigos de Cuba" le sugerimos que, como primer paso, escriban Uds. a los mismos; estimulándolos en su labor.

Le rogamos no envíen las comunicaciones directamente sino a través de esta Dirección, e igual procediento debemos seguir para el envío de los materiales que la institución que Ud. representa envía a los mencionados intelectuales de acuerdo con el plan trazado por los mismos.

La documentación que ellos remitan vendrá a esta Dirección y la haremos llegar a Ud. de inmediato.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Al Comp. Jesús Díaz,
Dpto. de Filosofía de la Universidad de la Habana.
Habana.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

ORIG: RAY SWIDER:sck
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 17 JUNE 1966

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DISSEM BY 15 PER #

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FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

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(CLASSIFICATION)
SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED)
20 15 47Z

CITE DIRECTOR 13687
(REFERENCE NUMBER)

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC

REF. DIR 12012

SUGGEST STATION HAVE BROTHER QUERY LITAMIL-9 RE VERACITY REF REPORT. APPRECIATE SECURITY PROBLEMS BUT FEEL THAT CAREFULLY WORDED OPEN LETTERS MAY RESULT VALUABLE INFO THIS CASE AND FUTURE CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

416

WH/C/MO

C/WH/C/FI T.J.Hazlett (in draft)

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

20-2

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

IRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 7 de Junio de 1966

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de referirme a su atenta communicación No. A.S.957/65, dirigida al compañero Carlos Lechuga, Presidente del Consejo Nacional de Cultura.

En relación a dicha comunicación, la cual trata sobre Aniversarios de Personalidades Eminentes y Acontecimientos Notables que la Unesco deberá conmemorar internacionalmente en el bienio 1967 - 1968.

La Dirección Nacional de Bibliotecas, sugiere los nombres de:

Madame de Staël, escritora francesa, 1766-1817.
Tristan Bernard, 1866-1947.

Al mismo tiempo tambien le trasladamos las sugestiones de la Comición Nacional de la Academia de Ciencias, de las Direcciones, Nacional de Artes Plásticas, de Teatro y Danza, y de Música; así como la del Departamento de Literatura. (las cuales aparecen en los anexos que se adjuntan).

NEXOS: listas sobre Aniversarios de Personalidades Eminentes y acontecimientos notables para el bienio 1967-1968.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Manuel Corrales, Secretario Permanente
de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la Unesco.
Ave. Kohly No. 151, Nuevo Vedado.

para el bienio 1967-1968
se preparó otra, con la participación de todas las Direcciones incluyendo la Biblioteca. Las copias se encuentran el el archivo de esta Dirección.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

(Anexo a la Nota No.________)

ANIVERSARIOS CULTURALES
PARA CELEBRAR EN 1966

Nombres y Apellidos.	Datos Biográficos.	Fecha del Aniversario.
Miguel de Cervantes	1547-1616 escritor español	350 aniversario de su muerte.
Rubén Darío.	1867-1916, escritor y poeta nicaragüense.	cincuentenario de su muerte.
Roman Rolland.	1866-1944, escritor francés. Premio Nobel.	centenario de su nacimiento.
Erasmo de Rotterdam.	1466-1536, humanista holandés.	500 aniversario de su nacimiento.
G.W. Leibtnitz.	1646-1716, filósofo, matemático y físico alemán nacido en Leipzig.	250 aniversario de su muerte.
Sun Yat Sen.	1866-1925, hombre político, ex-Presidente de China.	centenario de su nacimiento.
Gerge Cosbuc.	gran poeta rumano. 1866-1918.	100 aniversario de su nacimiento.
Shota Reustaveli.	gran poeta georgiano, 25 de Septb. 1166.	800 aniversario de su nacimiento.
Fentcho Slevikov.	27 de Abril de 1866 22 de Mayo de 1912 gran poeta búlgaro.	centenario de su nacimiento.
John Dalton.	1766-1844 Físico-Químico y Naturalista inglés.	bicentenario de su nacimiento.
Erik Satie.	compositor francés. 1866-1925.	centenario de su nacimiento.

(estas en su mayoría, son recomendadas, por el Movimiento por la Paz)

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 13 de Abril de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de acusarle recibo de la comunicación No. R.S.294 de fecha 5 de Mayo del corriente; la que acompaña documentación del Consejo Internacional de Música, Rotterdam, Países Bajos.

En relación a dicha documentación, ésta nos ha sido remitida con fecha 5 de Mayo; resultando por lo tanto demasiado tarde para cumplimentar la invitación que se nos hace.

Para haber participado era necesario enviar primeramente con fecha de antes del 1ro. de Abril, un informe sobre actividades cubriendo los años 1965-1966.

Nos interesa poder concurrir a un evento como este, pero necesitamos ser informados con tiempo suficiente.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE","VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director,-

Comp. Manuel Corrales.
Secretario Permanente de la Comisión Nacional
Cubana de la Unesco.
Ave. Kohly 151 esq. a 32. Nuevo Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA

DE:

A:

ASUNTO

Compañero Dr. Corona:

Informa el Dr. Corrales en conversación que sostuve con él en la tarde de ayer que, se pagaron $ 800.00 (dólares) en la forma que se describe a continuación:

A.I.A.P. (Artes Plásticas)	$ 150.00	año 1964
I.T.I. (Teatro)	$ 250.00	" 62 y 63
C.I.M. (Música)	$ 400.00	" " "
Total pagodo ————	$ 800.00	

---

se deben:

A.I.A.P. ————	$ 10.00	año 1963
" ————	$ 150.00	" 1965
	$ 160.00	
hay que planificar este año—— para 66, es necesario pagar lo atrasado lo más pronto posible; al finalizar 1966 se deberán	$ 150.00	
	$ 310.00	

I.T.I. se deben ————	$ 200.00	año 1964
" ————	$ 200.00	" 1965
pendientes————	$ 200.00	para 66
Total ————	$ 600.00	

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
SEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA

DE:
A:
ASUNTO

C.I.M. se deben ——— $ 200.00 año 1964
$ 200.00 " 1965
pendiente $ 200.00 para 66
Total ——— $ 600.00

---

el PEN CLUB no ha pasado la cuenta del
año pasado la cual asciende a ——— $ 22.00
más ——— $ 22.00 para el año 66
Total ——— $ 44.00

I.C.O.M.O.S. (Monum. y
lugares Hist.) tiene una cuota
anual de $20.00., y debe 20.00 año 1965
más ——— $ 20.00 para el año 66
Total ——— $ 40.00

I.C.O.M. (Museos) tiene una cuota anual
de $36.00., y debe ——— $ 36.00 año 1963
$ 36.00 " 1964
$ 36.00 " 1965
más ——— $ 36.00 para el año 66
Total ——— $ 144.00

Alberú
Feb. 10/66.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Marianao, 8 de Diciembre de 1965
"AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA"

Comp. María T. Freyre de Andrade,
Directora de la Biblioteca Nacional
"José Martí", Plaza de la Revolución,
Habana.

Estimada compañera:

[illegible] solicitarle la colaboración de la Biblioteca "José Martí" que usted dirige, a fin de confeccionar en la parte, en la que esta Biblioteca nos pueda ayudar; una lista de ANIVERSARIOS DE PERSONALIDADES Y ACONTECIMIENTOS NOTABLES.

La lista debe contener proposiciones de conmemoraciones que estime aconsejables se celebren, incluyendo personalidades y acontecimientos de relevancia mundial, tanto nacionales como internacionales. También dichas proposiciones deberán contener breves noticias de las personalidades y los acontecimientos señalados.

Esta colaboración servirá para confeccionar el calendario bienal de celebraciones de la Unesco, que debe prepararse en 1966, por lo cual le rogamos nos remita sus proposiciones a más tardar el [illegible] de Enero de 1966.

Con gracias anticipadas por la colaboración que nos pueda brindar, quedo de usted con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS"

Fraternalmente

Dr. Eduardo Corona
Director.

Con copias a:
✓ Pérez [illegible] -
✓ Luis [illegible] -
✓ [illegible] -
✓ [illegible] -
✓ M. T. Freyre de Andrade Bibl. -

[illegible] informe aquí.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA Noviembre 24 de 1965
AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA.

DE:

A:

ASUNTO

En relación con el Proyecto ORIENTE-OCCIDENTE, de la UNESCO, la Dirección General de Música del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, aclara que esta Dirección no ha sido invitada a participar en ese proyecto. Que sepamos, la única actividad relativa a la misma fué el ciclo organizado por la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, en la Biblioteca Nacional sobre diversos aspectos de las culturas orientales, incluyendo una conferencia ilustrada sobre la música del Oriente por Edgardo Martín. Todos los datos en este respecto obran en poder de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO; Los conciertos dirigidos por el director chino Li Te-lun y otras actividades relacionadas con la cultura de países orientales, no fueron en su oportunidad anunciados como parte del Proyecto Oriente-Occidente.

intervinieron
Carlos [illegible]
Fariñas
Pérez Sentenat
Edgardo Martín
Gilberto [illegible]

preguntar si tambien debemos reflejar la divulgación de la cultura cubana en esos países de Oriente.

informa Raquel Guillén
que no se informe [illegible]
pues nos informan
ellos a nosotros.

CONFIDENCIAL

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre de 1969
"AÑO DE LA AGRICULTURA"

Compañero, Dr. Raúl Roa García
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
Vedado.

Estimado compañero:

En relación a su Nota No. 1444 del 17 de Septiembre del corriente; me place informarle que la Dirección de Relaciones Culturales con el Extranjero tiene conocimiento de que los libros están en Ciudad Méjico desde hace unos días.

Alberto Martínez, de Cubartimpex se comunicará hoy con el compañero de Cubartimpex en Méjico, para averiguar si han [illegible] el permiso. El año pasado no dieron la autorización necesaria no obstante que los libros llegaron a tiempo.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me repito de usted,

Fraternalmente

Presidente del Consejo
Nacional de Cultura.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 15 de Diciembre de 1969

Sr. [illegible], Consejero
de la Embajada de la R.P. de
[illegible]
Calle D No.252 esquina a 11,
Vedado

Estimado Consejero y amigo:

En relación a la conversación que en fecha reciente tuvo el gusto de sostener con usted; me es grato remitirle dos paquetes conteniendo libros.

Los libros de referencia tratan diferentes aspectos sobre la literatura y la historia de mi país.

Siendo los deseos de esta Dirección y el mío propio haberlo complacido, aprovechamos esta oportunidad para expresarle nuestros saludos revolucionarios.

Fraternalmente

Luis Alberú
J. Protocolo

[illegible]
NACIONAL DE CULTURA
[illegible]

La Habana, 16 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

[illegible]

[illegible] el gusto de remitir a Ud. un programa [illegible] acto celebrado en el Teatro "[illegible]" [illegible] corriente, para conmemorar el centenario [illegible] gran poeta búlgaro [illegible]; el cual [illegible] bajo los auspicios del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, [illegible] Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, [illegible] de Bulgaria.

[illegible] el acto el compañero Félix Pita Rodríguez, quien [illegible] palabras se refirió a la vida y obra del [illegible], ofreciéndose a continuación un programa artístico [illegible] de los bailarines [illegible] Kol- [illegible], Vera Kirova y Asen [illegible], y destacados músicos búlgaros que se encontraban en nuestro país. El programa contó también con la colaboración de los cantantes cubanos Armando Pico [illegible]; Loipa Araujo y Azari Plisetski del Ballet [illegible] y cuyas obras interpretadas así como la de los cantantes y la de los bailarines mencionados, aparecen en el programa que se anexa.

Entre los concurrentes que llenó el teatro totalmente [illegible] lugar el Cuerpo Diplomático, al Embajador de Bulgaria, [illegible] quien asistió con toda la misión diplomática [illegible] país en Cuba; es de destacar [illegible] a los técnicos [illegible] al Embajador de Checoslovaquia [illegible] Suiza, de [illegible] de Yugoslavia. [illegible] ral [illegible] URSS; al Director de la [illegible] Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, respectivamente.

Continúa en la hoja 2

[illegible]

el compañero [illegible] Moreno, Secretario del Movimiento por la Paz; representaciones de [illegible]; y por la D. de Relaciones Internacionales del [illegible] el compañero Alberú y el que informa, asistiendo [illegible] número de becados que con su presencia contribuyeron [illegible] plano de fraternal recordación en que se desarrolló [illegible] homenaje al gran poeta búlgaro a que nos hemos referido.

[illegible] revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", [illegible] de Ud.

O: un programa [illegible] centenario del poeta búlgaro Pentcho Slaveikov.

Fraternalmente,

es de anotarse entre los concurrentes al Consejero y al Jefe del Frente de Vietnam del Sur; así como al Embajador de México, el Embajador de Corea y el de Mongolia.

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Ernesto [illegible], Embajador de Cuba en la R.P. de Bulgaria.
Embajada de [illegible] Sofía.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
DC/WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/LITAMIL-9/Operational Progress Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-27048, ~~1~~ Sep 65

1. LITAMIL-7 reported on 6 May 1966 that Identity A told her a few days earlier that LITAMIL-9 is well, has put on some weight, and is working hard at Identity B where he works for Identity C. This information came as a result of LITAMIL-7 having asked Identity A about how LITAMIL-9 was getting along. The general tone of Identity A's remarks about LITAMIL-9 indicated that she seems to be favorably disposed toward him.

2. The Station has had no recent contact with LITAMIL-17 who is LITAMIL-9's brother. It is assumed that should he hear anything of interest concerning LITAMIL-9, he will report it promptly to the C/O.

3. It is recalled that when LITAMIL-9 left Mexico for PBRUMEN in March 1965 he told his C/O he would, by hook or by crook, find some way to get back to Mexico within 23 months lest he lose his inmigrado status in Mexico. It is assumed that he is exploring every angle to make his escape and one possibility that comes to mind is that he might try to wangle a connection with the PBRUMEN pavilion at the 1967 Canadian International Fair in an effort to break out. Owing to his well-known non-Communist beliefs, it would seem that he has almost no chance to secure a diplomatic assignment.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: (under separate cover)
Identities

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AT
Dated 8 JUN 1966

Distribution:
2 - WH
1 - DC/WH/C

1 att

CS COPY

201-329609

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28953	DATE 17 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-329609

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment
to HMMA-28953

Identities:

A - Mercedes MORALES de LE RIVERAND, Official of the Cuban National Cultural Council, in Mexico on business since April 1966.

B - The Cuban National Cultural Council.

C - Carlos LECHUGA Hevia.

Distribution:
2 - WH
1 - DC/WH/C

SECRET

S/C ATT. 1 TO HMMA 28953

CS COPY

201-329609

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

[illegible]

La Habana, 16 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

[illegible]

[illegible] gusto de remitir a Ud. un programa-invitación [illegible] al acto celebrado en el Teatro "Amadeo Roldán" [illegible] del corriente, para conmemorar el Centenario [illegible] el gran poeta búlgaro Pentcho Slaveikov; el cual [illegible] bajo los auspicios del Consejo Nacional de Cultura, [illegible] Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, la UNEAC, el Pen Club [illegible] de Bulgaria.

Abrió el acto el compañero Félix Pita Rodríguez, quien a [illegible] palabras se refirió a la vida y obra del poeta búlgaro, [illegible]dose a continuación un programa artístico con [illegible] de los bailarines [illegible] Feldusova, [illegible], Vera Kirova y Asen Gavrilov, y destacados músicos búlgaros que se encontraban en nuestro país. El programa contó [illegible] colaboración de los cantantes cubanos Armando Pico y Humberto Diaz; Loipa Arango y Azari Plisetski del Ballet Nacional de Cuba y cuyas obras interpretadas así como la de los [illegible] de los bailarines mencionados, aparecen en el programa [illegible].

[illegible] los concurrentes que llenó el teatro totalmente anotamos [illegible] lugar al Cuerpo Diplomático, al Excmo. Embajador de Bulgaria, Atanás Kalbov quien asistió con toda la Misión diplomática de ese país en Cuba;; es de anotarse tambien a los técnicos de ese país; al Embajador de Checoeslovaquia,de Suiza, de la RAU así como el de Yugoeslavia. Al Consejero Cultural de la Embajada de la URSS; al Director de la [illegible]ional y al Secretario de la Comisión Nacional Cubana de la UNESCO, respectivamente;

Continua en la hoja 2

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

[illegible] INTERNACIONALES

al compañero Martínez Moreno, Secretario del Movimiento por la Paz; representaciones de masas; y por la D. de Relaciones Internacionales del CNC el compañero Albarú y el que informa, asistiendo también [illegible] de becados que con su presencia contribuyeron al [illegible] clima de fraternal recordación en que se desarrolló el homenaje al gran poeta búlgaro a que nos hemos referido.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", [illegible] de Ud.

Un programa-invitación sobre el centenario del poeta [illegible]
Pentcho Slavejkov.

Fraternalmente,

de anotarse entre los concurrentes al Consejero y al Jefe [illegible] de la Embajada de Bulgaria; así como al Embajador de [illegible] Embajador de Grecia y el de Mongolia.

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

- Ernesto Meléndez [illegible] Embajador de Cuba en la Rep. de Bulgaria.
Embajada de Cuba [illegible] Sofía.

[illegible]

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION [illegible] CIONALES

La Habana, 30 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tenemos el gusto de informarle que con motivo del 1ro. de Julio, Fiesta Nacional del Canadá, se llevará a cabo por la Embajada de ese país, el programa que se detalla a continuación.

Junio 27, 9:p.m. - Teatro "Amadeo Roldán", interpretación por la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional de la obra "Trois Pièces", del compositor canadiense Jean Papineau Couture. (esta obra se interpretará en Cuba por primera vez).

Junio 28, 9:p.m. - Transmisión por T.V. de parte del programa del "Amadeo Roldán", que incluye "Trois Pièces".

Junio 30, 8:p.m. - Palacio de Bellas Artes, inauguración de la exposición de "Grabados Esquimales"

Junio 30, 9:p.m. - Teatro del Palacio de Bellas Artes, proyección con películas canadienses.

El programa de referencia se organizó de acuerdo con las previas conversaciones llevadas al efecto con el Sr. Embajador Leon Mayrand.

El Sr. Embajador Mayrand, quien se muestra muy complacido, nos ha expresado su deseo de asumir como contribución personal suya, los gastos que ocasionen los derechos de autor de la obra que se interpretará "Trois Pièces", mencionada en el programa.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Compo. Ricardo Alarcón [illegible],
Director de [illegible] Regional I (América)
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Vedado.

REPÚBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCIÓN DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 2 de Junio de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud. al efecto de remitirle [illegible] esta comunicación, los programas y artículos de prensa [illegible] hasta el presente con motivo de la Exposición de [illegible] Rumana Contemporánea.

Dicha exposición cumplimenta el punto 19 del Convenio Cultural, y se organizó bajo el patrocinio conjunto del Consejo Nacional de Cultura y la Embajada de la República Socialista de Rumanía; quedando inaugurada el 27 de Mayo próximo pasado.

La Embajada ofreció un cóctel, y entre los asistentes a la inauguración señalamos a los Embajadores de Rumanía, Corea y de los Países Bajos; Consejero Cultural de la Embajada de la URSS, Funcionarios de las Embajadas de Indonesia y China; el Jefe del Dpto. de Países Balcánicos del Minrex, compañero Mario Betancourt y la responsable de Rumanía del propio Minrex compañera Melba Arce; los pintores Portocarrero, Martínez Pedro, Vidal, Sandú Darié y muchas personas más.

Pronunciaron breves palabras, Vasili Avram, Jefe de Exposiciones del Comité Estatal para las Relaciones Culturales con el Extranjero de la Rep. Soc. de Rumanía y Miguel Collazo por el CNC respectivamente, estando presentes los compañeros responsables de la Dir. Nacional de Artes Plásticas así como tambien los compañeros de la Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales del CNC, Dr. Elpidio Hernández, Luis Alburá y el que informa.

NEXO: 1 tarjeta invitación, 1 catálogo de la
Exposición, 1 hoja con recortes de
periódicos y 1 artículo de prensa.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud, Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.-

Comp. Manuel E. Ye[illegible],
Embajador de Cuba en la R. S. de
Rumanía.
Embajada de Cuba en Rumanía, Bucarest.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 29 de Junio de 1966

Muy estimado compañero Embajador y amigo:

Deseo comunicarle que, en los próximos días cesaré en mis funciones como Director de Relaciones Internacionales del Consejo Nacional de Cultura. Labores [illegible] que se me han asignado en la Universidad de La Habana, de la que soy profesor de Derecho Internacional, me obligan a dejar el cargo que por dos años he tenido el alto honor de desempeñar.

Deseo expresar a Ud. y por su conducto a los compañeros [illegible] de esa Embajada vinculados con nuestro trabajo, [illegible]ción por las relaciones que hemos mantenido y las actividades que hayamos podido realizar en conjunto.

De Ud. con la mayor consideración y aprecio,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

Excmo. Sr. Bat-Och[illegible] Gotob,
Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
de la República Popular de Mongolia.
Calle 15 No. 812, esq. a 4. Vedado.

CUBA

RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 13 de Julio de 1966

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de dirigirme a Ud, para informarle de dos actividades culturales que se llevaron a cabo recientemente por este Consejo, con motivo del 1ro. de Julio, Fiesta Nacional del Canadá.

Dichas actividades culturales se realizaron conjuntamente con la Embajada de ese país, como las tarjetas-invitación que se anexan lo indican, interpretándose por la Orquesta Sinfónica Nacional y en el Teatro Amadeo Roldán, en el concierto dedicado a la festividad de referencia, la obra Trois Pièces, del compositor canadiense Jean Papineau Couture.

También y con dicho motivo, se halla actualmente y en una de las salas del Palacio Nacional de Bellas Artes, una exposición de Grabados Esquimales, la cual fué inaugurada el 1ro. de Julio por el Encargado de Negocios a.i., de la Embajada del Canadá, Mr. Alan McLaine, y quien gentilmente destacó en su alocución su contento por la realización de las dos actividades de referencia. En su intervención, el compañero Dr. [illegible] Serena, a la sazón Director de esta Dirección, expresó, [illegible] a la fecha de celebración que estas dos manifestaciones de arte y cultura, estrechan las relaciones culturales entre los dos países.

El Cuerpo Diplomático, fué especialmente invitado, y recordamos entre los que estuvieron presentes, tanto en el concierto como en el acto de inauguración, al diplomático canadiense Mr. [illegible], de quien nos hemos referido; a los Embajadores [illegible] Bajos, y de Yugoeslavia; a los Encar-

sigue en la hoja 2

1 Comp. Américo [illegible], Embajador de Cuba en el Canadá.
[illegible]

a los [illegible] del Estado de Israel, y de la [illegible] de la Santa Sede y a los Agregados Cultu[illegible] Embajadas del Canadá, Polonia, Alemania, [illegible] Checoslovaquia, los que, acompañados de [illegible] la presencia de los compañeros, [illegible], Alejo Carpentier, [illegible], Natalia Bolívar, [illegible] y Margarita [illegible], así como también el Dr. [illegible] Fernández y Luis Alberú de esta Dirección, entre otros compañeros de nuestro mundo intelectual que, representan nuestras instituciones revolucionarias y culturales.

Por Televisión y en programa dedicado al efecto, se repitió parte del programa del Amadeo Roldán y que incluyó la obra [illegible]. Para la inauguración de la exposición de los [illegible], la Embajada ofreció un cóctel, proyectándose a continuación y en el teatro que se halla en el mismo edificio, un documental a colores con temas esquimales, a la que concurrió la mayoría del público que estuvo en dicha inauguración.

La Embajada, se muestra complacida por las atenciones recibidas en ambas actividades culturales señaladas, las que seguramente serán, un incentivo, para el acrecentamiento de las relaciones culturales entre Cuba y el Canadá.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

Fraternalmente,

Manuel Vega,
Director.-

XO: 3 hojas con anuncios y artículos de prensa, así como 2 folletos o programa, que tratan de la Exposición y del Concierto, a que nos hemos referido.

Comp. Américo Cruz Fernández, Embajador de Cuba en el Canadá.
Embajada de Cuba. Ottawa, Canadá.

CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION [illegible] [illegible]ACIONALES

La Habana, 29 de Julio de 1965

Ex[illegible] Sr. Embajador:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Ud, al objeto de [illegible] [illegible]rle información, sobre el próximo programa a real[illegible] [illegible] la Exposición de Grabados Suecos.

Por tal motivo, nos place poner a su disposición, [illegible] programa o itinerario para el tercer trimestre, [illegible] que [illegible] la provincia, para que por medio de las galerías [illegible] arte allí existentes, se vaya dando una mayor difusión [illegible], de la excelente obra de los artistas grabadores suecos.

- Galería de Matanzas, 8 - 28 de Agosto.
- [illegible] de Santa Clara, 5 - 25 de Septiembre.

[illegible]l [illegible]smo tiempo, no quisiera [illegible] expresarl[illegible] [illegible], la satisfacción que nos [illegible], esta nueva [illegible] que se nos ofrece, de cooperar [illegible] la divulgaci[illegible] [illegible], de esta excelente muestra, [illegible] y [illegible]

[illegible] con la más alta consideración,

Manuel Vega,
Director.-

l Excmo. Sr. [illegible], Embajador Extraordinario y
Plenipoten[illegible] [illegible]l Reino de Suecia.
Infanta No. [illegible], [illegible]. Ciudad.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 20 de Julio de 1966

Muy estimado Sr. Embajador:

Conociendo su amabilidad, me permito solicitarle atentamente y en calidad de préstamo, por un término de [illegible] días, el documental cinematográfico "Jardines de la Infancia".

Dicho documental, es para ser utilizado por los instructores de arte, que pasan cursillo en la Escuela Nacional de Dirigentes de Pioneros.

Excusándonos de antemano por esta molestia, le agradecemos Sr. Embajador, la atención que pueda prestar a esta solicitud.

Quedo de Ud, con la más alta consideración,

Manuel Vega
Director.-

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

DIRECCION DE [illegible] INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 12 de Agosto de 1966

Muy estimado Sr. Consejero:

Tengo el honor de dirigirme a Ud, al objeto de ofrecerle la información de las actividades culturales realizadas con la exposición fotográfica "La Comedia Francesa", gentilmente proporcionada por esa Embajada.

[illegible]

Lugar: Museo de Artes Decorativas
Fecha: Abril 22 - Julio 30, 1965.
Visitantes: 4,023

PROVINCIA DE SANTA CLARA

Lugar: Casa de la Cultura de Yaguajay
Fecha: 10 de Dic. - 12 de Enero, 1966.
Visitantes: 800

Lugar: Biblioteca de Santa Clara
Fecha: 26 de Febrero - 26 de Marzo, 1965.
Visitantes: 2,577. Tambien la profesora de Artes Manuales, Aida Ida Morales, ofreció una charla a los alumnos del Círculo de Interés de la Secundaria Básica "Antonio Pino Machado".

En cuanto al material que forma la exposición, esta se encuentra al cuidado del Director del Museo de Artes Decorativas, Sr. Angel Martí, quien lo tiene a la amable disposición de Ud, en el Museo.

Al mismo tiempo le agradecemos Sr. Consejero, la cooperación que siempre nos brinda, y nos es grato de comunicarle la satisfacción de esta Dirección, al haber mostrado la exposición en referencia, que de manera gráfica, dió a conocer al público [illegible] que la visitó, la [illegible] representativa del [illegible] de Francia.

De Ud, con la más alta consideración,

Manuel [illegible]
Director

Al Sr. René [illegible] Consejero de la
Embajada de la República de Francia.
Calle [illegible], Vedado.

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 12 de Agosto de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

En relación a su atenta Nota No.310 [illegible], de Junio [illegible] de 1966.

Tenemos el gusto de informarle, que con fecha [illegible] de Julio del corriente, le remitimos a través del Minrex, [illegible] conteniendo libros de niños, editados por la Editora Juvenil.

Tambien, y con fecha de hoy, le estamos enviando [illegible] folletos (iguales) mimeografiados, que son un extracto informativo sobre dichos libros. Una vez examinados por Ud, el contenido de los folletos, si los cree útil para la Embajada, [illegible] tomar uno o dos ejemplares.

Con los ejemplares de referencia, se cumplimenta la solicitud del caricaturista Shankar Pillai, hecha por medio de la Embajada, y por la cual estamos invitados a participar en la International Childrn's Books Exhibition, que se celebrará en el mes de Noviembre de este año, New Delhi, India.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS", me reitero de Ud,

fraternalmente,

Manuel E. Vega,
Director.-

1 Comp. [illegible] Mora Martínez, Encargado de Negocios a.i.,
de la Embajada de Cuba en la India.
Embajada de Cuba. Nueva Delhi, India.

RELACION DE TELEFONOS DIRECTOS Y EXTENSIONES DE PIZARRA DEL CNC

DIRECTOS

80-8661	Presidencia
80-8649	Sectorial Ext. Cultural
80-8666	Sectorial de Actividades
80-8664	Sectorial de Economía
80-8665	Sectorial Servicios (Divulgación)
61-2405	R. Relaciones Internacionales
80-8665	Dir. Divulgación

PIZARRA

Rotativo ------------- 80-3920 al 80-3929
Rotativo ------------- 80-3940 al 80-3944

EXTENSIONES

110	Divulgación (Coordinadora
111	Pizarra
112	Personal (Responsable del Dpto.)
113	Dir. Sectorial Economía
114	Puerta Principal (Información)
115	Relaciones Internacionales
116	Dir. Sectorial Ext. Cultural
117	Dpto. Abastecimiento Nacional
118	Literatura e Investigaciones Socio Culturales
119	Teatro Infantil
120	Promoción
121	Prensa (Divulgación)
122	Medios Básicos (Divulgación)
123	Coordinación de Planificación
124	Radio y Electricidad
125	Dirección de Artes Plásticas
126	Registro de Entrada
127	Aficionados
128	Dibujantes
129	Dirección Nacional de Escuelas
130	
131	Dtor. Sectorial de Actividades
132	Promoción (invitaciones)
133	Dirección de Teatro y Danza
160	Personal Teatro y Danza
161	Presidencia

162	Finanzas (Presupuesto)
163	Finanzas (Responsable)
164	Abastecimiento Organismo Central
165	Dirección de Música
166	Música
167	Artes Plásticas
168	Dirección de Artes Plásticas
169	Dirección de Teatro y Danza
170	Extensión Cultural
171	Dirección Sectorial de Servicios
172	Dirección Relaciones Internacionales
173	Personal
174	Servicios Administrativos
175	Divulgación
176	Servicios Administrativos (Responsable)
177	Caja (Finanzas)
178	Coordinación CNC Mined
179	Organización y Comprobación
181	Archivo General

Servicios Administrativos
16-5-66

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 3 de Mayo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Comp. Rolando Masvidal
Jefe del Sectorial de Actividades
Edificio.

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de trasladar a Ud. para su conocimiento dos libros con la versión en inglés y alemán de la obra "Persecución y Asesinato de Jean Paul Marat".

Su autor el dramaturgo Peter Weiss, es posible que nos visite por lo cual es conveniente que dicha obra sea conocida por la Dirección de Teatro.

Tan pronto tengan conocimiento de dichos libros, le rogamos se devuelvan a esta Dirección.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Eduardo Corona,
Director.

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RYBAT TYPIC AMZOO

REF DIR 95175

1. FOLLOWING INITIAL ITEMS MAY BE OF INTEREST:

A. ORAMAS, CHARGE ALGIERS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR CONAKRY.

B. "CUCO" CALZADILLA, CHARGE MADRID IS SECURITY OFFICER ACCORDING AMIMP/1.

also LITAMIL/9

C. AMZOO/1 FRIENDLY WITH MARILU ALBERU WHO WORKED MADRID EMBASSY. SHE LONG TIME AWAY FROM CUBA AND NON-COMMIE. FATHER OWNED TWO DISTILLERIES WHICH TAKEN AFTER REVOLUTION. BEFORE THAT MOTHER DIVORCED AND TOOK CHILDREN MEXICO AND LATER SPAIN. CHILDREN GOT 500 DOLLARS MONTH FROM FATHER TO LIVE ON OUTSIDE CUBA. SOMEHOW ALL GOT FOREIGN MIN JOBS UNDER CASTRO. MARILU WORKED VIGO CONSULATE THEN MADRID EMBASSY. WHEN AMZOO/1 SAW HER NOV 64 SHE TALKING SERIOUSLY OF MARRYING SPANIARD AND TRYING ARRANGE FOR HER SISTER XENIA TO TAKE HER EMBASSY JOB. BROTHER LUIS ALBERU IS CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXICO. WAS PAINTER MEXICO SINCE ABOUT 53. RECENTLY IN CUBA FOR TRICONTINENT CONF. LIKE SISTERS HE NON-COMMIE, BUT HARD WORKER SO KEEPS JOB EVEN THOUGH DENOUNCED BY OTHERS.

Jane

SECRET

PAGE 2 ACCR 2228 S E C R E T

D. ENRIQUE RODRIGUES LOHECHES, AMBASSADOR RABAT SINCE ABOUT 1963, IS CONSIDERED REACTIONARY BY ALMOST EVERYONE. WAS D TORIO MEMBER IN UNIVERSITY BUT NO OTHER "APPROVED" CONNECTIONS KNOWN. WIFE HAS MANY RELATIVES LIVING IN EXILE SPAIN AND SHE HAS BIG INFLUENCE ON LOHECHES. AMZOO/1 WORKED WITH WIFE'S SISTER, NELLA LNU, IN FORN MIN 61. NELLA NOW IN USA WITH HUSBAND AND CHILD. AMZOO/1 SAYS NO ONE CAN UNDERSTAND HOW LOHECHES KEEPS HIS JOB.

2. EMBASSY HAS ONLY ABOUT 300-400 CEDIS IN ITS ACCOUNT AT GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK. COURIER WILL BRING CHECK 22 APRIL. CUBA OWES GOG MORE THAN 100,000 CEDIS. UNDER TERMS THEIR MONETARY EXCHANGE AGREEMENT CUBAN GOVT GIVES LOCAL MONEY TO GHANA EMBASSY HAVANA FOR ALL THEIR EXPENSES AND VICE VERSA. AMBASSADOR THOUGHT AGREEMENT WOULD BE NO GOOD IF GHANA CLOSED THEIR EMBASSY HANANA, THUS ASSUMED CUBA WOULD CLOSE DOWN IN GHANA RATHER THAN RUN UP EVEN BIGGER DEBT WITH GOG OR SWITCH TO FUNDING EMBASSY ACTIVITIES WITH HARD CURRENCY. HOWEVER ON 14 APRIL AMBASSADOR GOT [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] CABLE SAYING HAVANA CONSIDERED AGREEMENT EFFECTIVE EVEN IF GOG CLOSED DOWN THEIR EMBASSY UNILATERALLY. THIS CABLE CAME AS BLOW TO AMBASSADOR SINCE HE READS INTO IT IDEA THAT CUBA DOES NOT WANT CLOSE ACCR EMBASSY

3. NO ONE IN ACCR EMBASSY KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED TO CHE GUEVARA.

PAGE 3 ACCR 8228 SECRET

AMZOO/1 ASKED AMIMP/1 SPECIFICALLY AFTER AMIMP/1 RETURNED FROM TRICONTINENTAL CONF AND AMIMP/1 SAID ONLY THERE MANY RUMORS ABOUT HIM LEADING GUERILLAS IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

4. INDEX CALZADILLA, ALBERU AND LOHECHES.

SECRET

CFN 8228 95175 OROMAS, ALGIERS CONAKRY "CUCO" CALZADILLA MADRID AMIMP/1 AMZOO/1 MARILU ALBERU MADRID CUBA NON-COMMIE 500 DOLLARS CUBA MIN CASTRO MARILU VIGO MADRID AMZOO/1 NOV 64 SPANIARD XENIA LUIS ALBERU MEXICO MEXICO 53 CUBA NON-COMMIE ENRIQUE RODRIQUES LOHECHES RABAT 1960 DICTORIO NO OTHER AMZOO/1 NELLA LNU 61 NELLA USA AMZOO/1 NO ONE LOHECHES 300-400 CEDIS GHANA 22 APRIL CUBA GOG 100,000 CEDIS CUBAN GOVT GHANA HAVANA NO GOOD GHANA HAVANA CUBA GHANA GOG 14 APRIL HAVANA GOG CUBA NOT WANT ACCR NO ONE ACCR CHE GUEVARY AMZOO/1 AMIMP/1 AMIMP/1 AMIMP/1 CALZADILLA ALBERU LOHECHES

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA 24 de Marzo

DE:
ASUNTO
A:

Compañero Dr. Hernández:

A continuación traducción por Ud. solicitada de la carta escrita en inglés, y la cual tiene fecha 14 de Febrero de 1966.

Estimado Sr.

Nos tomamos la libertad de dirigirnos a usted sobre un asunto por el cual sentimos vivo interés.

Somos una Compañía, cuyo negocio conciste en comprar derechos, para producir obras, presentar actores, promover y llevar adelante Festivales en los cuales toman parte artistas extranjeros e israelíes.

Por lo cual le estaríamos muy agradecidos si nos expresa su opinión sobre que artistas cubanos podríamos invitar para que visiten Israel y actúen aquí. Nosotros podríamos encontrar la forma viable para intercambiar cantantes, músicos etc, y así ampliar las Relaciones Culturales entre Israel y Cuba, algo que mucho nos concierne.

Como para la próxima Primavera estamos planeando un Festival Internacional de Folklore, mucho lo agradeceríamos su pronta respuesta.

Su seguro servidos,

A. Timmor
Secretario General

(traducción libre de Alberd)

Lo traduje [illegible]
misma fecha [illegible]
se me [illegible]

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

MEMORANDUM

FECHA 1ro. de Julio/66

DE:

A: [illegible] se cortó para hacer la traducción.

ASUNTO (Traducción)

Québec, Canadá, 24 de Marzo de 1966

Estimado Dr. Corona:

Le ruego me excuse por mi tardanza en enviarle esta carta de agradecimiento a Ud. por el esfuerzo que realizó, e hizo posible pudiésemos tocar para su pueblo.

Aun conservamos plenamente, un vívido y feliz recuerdo del viaje. Las cajas de tabacos que Ud. nos dió en el aeropuerto, fueron sumamente apreciadas por mi maestro Efren Zimbalist, quien ha sido por años un apasionado del tabaco habana.

Para el próximo verano estamos planeando regresar al Japón, para una gira de conciertos, y la Sociedad de Amistad Japón-Cuba en Tokyo, nos ha ofrecido organizar la gira.

Me parece que si Ud, pudiese escribir una carta de recomendación o endorsement, con las impresiones de Ud. sobre nuestras actuaciones en Cuba, sería de gran valor para nosotros, para que la gira en el Japón se haga posible.

Le rogamos haga llegar a su familia, nuestros más cálidos saludos y muy especialmente para Elpidio.

Confiamos en que ya Ud. sea un orgulloso abuelo.

Estamos esperando por su carta muy pronto.

Al mismo tiempo, reciba nuestros mejores parabienes y sentimientos de aprecio.

Muy sinceramente suyo,

ZEYDA Y HIDERATO SUZUKI
2202 CHEMIN STE-FOY
QUEBEC 10, P.Q. CANADA

RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 18 de Marzo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimado compañero:

Tengo el gusto de remitirle junto con esta comunicación; una lista de publicaciones programadas por la FAO para 1966 y 1967.

La lista de referencia creemos les sea de utilidad, dado el material informativo que la misma contiene.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Elpidio Hernández,

Jefe del Departamento
de Planes y Convenios
Culturales.

Comp. Abelardo Moreno, Director Nacional
del Zoológico y del Acuarium. Nuevo Vedado.

Vince Daly

G : VINCE DALY/jack
T : WH/C/FI/TC
r : R. 1271
TE : 18 MARCH 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-

48 SECRET

☐ DESTR ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

18 MAR 66 23 13z

: MADRID INFO: MEXICO, JMWAVE

OM: DIRECTOR

F: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WE8, WH8, CI/OA, FI,

MADR INFO MEXI WAVE CITE DIR

89222

TYPIC AMMOON MHAPRON

REFS: A. MADR 7506 (IN76355)
B. MEXI 6571 (IN77325)

1. SUBJ REF HEREAFTER AMCRASH/1 (201-772091). POA IN PROCESS.

2. HQS CONCURS REF B PROPOSAL AND WISHES REITERATE NEED PROTECT LITAMIL/9 UNTIL ALL FACTORS A/1 CONTACT WITH L/9 WEIGHED. SUGGEST MADR FIRST ASK A/1 FOR NAMES ANTI-GOC OFFICIALS HE KNOWS. IF L/9 NAME NOT SURFACED SUGGEST THEN PROCEED WITH PARA 2 REF B AT NEXT MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

Dave - a copy of this should go to LITAMIL-9 201. If we don't have one will you please send to RI 201 - LITAMIL-9

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1
WE/Cuba

C/WE/x

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

18-26

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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COPY NO.

DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

La Habana, 17 de Marzo de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Estimada compañera:

Tenemos el gusto de referirnos a su atenta comunicación de fecha 17 de Noviembre/65; la cual trata sobre la solicitud de becas desde el extranjero, para realizar estudios de música en nuestro país.

La Dirección General de Música ni el Departamento Nacional de Escuelas han recibido orientación alguna al respecto; no obstante en cualquier caso que se presentare alguna solicitud , se considera que es necesario antes de conceder dichas becas, aportar para el estudio de las mismas en los Departamentos correspondientes, los siguientes datos.

1ro.- Edad.
2do.- Nivel de estudios generales.
3ro.- Conocimientos musicales, si los tiene y el nivel de los mismos.
4to.- Instrumentos u otra especialidad que desee estudiar.
5to.- Si tiene o nó y en que grado conocimientos del idioma español.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", "VENCEREMOS",

Fraternalmente,

Dr. Elpidio Hernández
Jefe del Departamento
de Planes y Convenios
Culturales.

A la Comp. Raquel Montero Alvarado, Jefe del Departamento de
Control de Becas para el Extranjero.
Ministerio de Educación. Ciudad Libertad.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 20

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH-5, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 161808Z

MADR INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6571

KAPOK PBRUMEN AMMOON AMCRASH/1

REF MADR 7506 17 [illegible] 77325

1. AFTER SUBJ HAS SETTLED INTO NEW AGENT ROLE AND HIS BONA FIDES ESTABLISHED, MEXI WOULD APPRECIATE IF HE COULD BE QUERIED ON PRESENT ACTIVITIES OF MEXI AGENT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN BY SEPARATE CABLE).

2. FYI, L-9 RETURNED PBRUMEN MARCH 1965. L-9 AND RELATIVES INSIDE HAVE USED SUBJ AS COURIER TO POST LETTERS IN MEXI. SUBJ BELIEVED TO BE GOOD FRIEND OF FAMILY. L-9 NAME SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN LIST OTHER PERSONS SO AS NOT TO PINPOINT KUBARK INTEREST. SUBJ NOT AWARE L-9 ODYOKE CONNECTION. MEXI PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ANY INDICATION L-9 MAY BE PLANNING LEAVE PBRUMEN EVEN FOR SHORT TRIP.

3. POSSIBILITY EXISTS SUBJ COULD EVENTUALLY BE USED TO SET UP OPERATIONAL CONTACT WITH L-9 BUT BELIEVE BEST NOT PURSUE THIS UNTIL SUBJ HAS PROVEN OWN WORTH AND RELIABILITY AND ALL HAZARDS OF ATTEMPTING REACTIVATE L-9 CAREFULLY ASSESSED.

S E C R E T *Requested POA And Assignment Cople*

SECRET

CFN 6571 7506 LITAMIL-9 FYI L-9 1965 L-9 L-9 NOT TO KUBARK NOT AWARE L-9 ODYOKE L-9 L-9 NOT PURSUE L-9

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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2		6	05
3	FI	7	CI
4	MO	8	CI

FROM Mexico City

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UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH-5, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI

S E C R E T 171821Z

MADR INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6572

17 [illegible] 77295

KAPOK PBRUMEN AMMOOR

REF MEXI 6571 [illegible]

IDEN: LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, FORMER CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI. NOW WORKING FOR NATIONAL CULTURAL COUNCIL, HAVA.

S E C R E T

CFN, 6572 6571 LUIS ALBERU SOUTO HAVA

SECRET

BT

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA
DIRECCION DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

ANEXO a la Nota No.____________

60, Ennismore Gardens
London, S.W. 7

Febrero 18 de 1966

Sr. Agregado Cultural
de la Embajada de Cuba.
22, Mount St.
London, W. 1

Estimado Sr.

Estoy representando la Hutchinsons Publishing, la cual está de lo más interesada en las posibilidades de publicar traducciones de obras de poesía y ficción.

Estas traducciones aparecerán regularmente bajo una denominación - posiblemente, "The Latin American Library", y con la continuación de series como la "Library" lo desea, creemos dará una coherencia a las publicaciones de Literatura Latino-Americana, de la cual carece al presente.

Por le momento estoy tratando de recppilar tanta información como séa posible. Le estaré de lo más agradecido por cualquier ayuda que me pueda dar. Preferentemente desearía los nombres de destacados autores cubanos - clásicos y contemporáneos - títulos de las obras de ficción y de poesía, y una información que indique hasta que punto pueden ser traducidas al inglés.

Doy a Ud. las gracias anticipadas por su cortesía y ayuda.

De Ud. sinceramente,

Bernard G. Mullinge

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CULTURA

COMISION CUBANA
EXPOSICION DE MONTREAL

La Habana, 29 de enero de 1966
"AÑO DE LA SOLIDARIDAD"

Co.Director de Inmigración,
Ministerio del Interior,
La Habana.

Compañeros:

Por la presente le ruego se sirva expedir un permiso de Salida del país al ciudadano canadiense Sr.Guy Parent, el cual se encuentra actualmente en nuestro país hospedado en el Hotel Habana-Riviera.

El Sr. Parent tiene un pasaporte expedido en Otâwa, Canada con número SP-21741 y deberá partir el próximo lunes 31 de enero en el vuelo de la Compañía Cubana de Aviación por el Aeropuerto Nacional "José Martí".

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE" quedo de Ud. atte.,

L.A

Luis Alberd
Jefe del Protocolo
Dir.Rel. Internacionales
Consejo Nacional de Cultura

Date: 07/11/01
Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10176-10075
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : 201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.
DATE : 00/00/
PAGES : 152
SUBJECTS : JFK DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/22/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK64-12:F5 1998.05.22.10:14:03:840082: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HRG Record Print

Printed on: 7/11/2001

ID: 1998.05.22.10:14:03:840082
File Title: JFK
Job Num: 80T01357A
Location: HRG
Box Num: JFK64-12
Vol/Folder: F5

Title: 201 FILE OF PROTECTABLE SOURCE.

Title Res: N
Date of Document: 0/0/0
Status: DIF
From:
From Res:
To:
To Res:
Pages: 152
Orig. Classification: S
Originator: CIA

Last Reviewer:
Review Date:
Exemptions: 1A 1B 1C 2 3 4 5

Medium: PAPER
Last Inputter: ramsayr
NARA Comments: RELEASE DELAYED UNTIL DEATH OF SUBJECT.

Agency Comments: PER ARRB DECISION OF 13 MAY. AGENCY REQUIRED TO DETERMINE STATUS ANNUALLY.

Release:
Release Date:
Doc Num: Res:
Keywords: 201-329-609 Res: Y
LITAMIL-9 Y

Duplicate Document Of:

Component Review Info

COMPONENT DATE TASKED DATE REVIEWED RESPONSE APPEAL DATE DECISION

Sent to NARA: Y
Agency Name: CIA
Agency Number: 104
Disk Number: 10176
Control Number 10075

SECRET

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP: 27 April 1967 jep

201 #: 329609

DATE ORIG. REQ.: 18 April 1967

TRUE NAME: ALBERU-Souto, Luis

SO#279089

☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SP. IN

VARIATIONS:

CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL-9

PSEUDONYM:

PROJECT:

DATE OF BIRTH: 1915

PLACE OF BIRTH: Oviedo, Spain

CASE OFFICER: Jane F. Zoranze

DIVISION: WH/1/M

EXTENSION: 4167

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.	✓	WH/1	8 MAY 1967	Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 27 April 1967 Results: OK Cy 1 May 67
O.A.	[illegible]	WH/1	7 FEB 1968	
Case Cancelled		WH/1/M	SEP 1971	
CASE CANCELLED	✓	WH/1/M	26 JAN 1968	
PRO I	BIO ✓		12 FEB 1968	
PRO II	✓		12 FEB 1968	
174318 GREEN LIST	~~[illegible]~~ NTIT		8 MAY 1967	
RI TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			
CPS & DIV TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			See memo of evaluation
FIELD TRACES	DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA			
S.O. INDICES	[illegible] 8 May 67 Cy 8 May 67			
XX FBI INDICES				
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	See memo of 28 Aug. 1967.			
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-63 126 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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(5.9)

Office of Security Report

& liaison material

S.O. INVESTIGATION	[illegible] 27 Dec. 1967 [illegible]			
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS NC NOTIFIED	/			

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 31 AUG 1972	CASE NO. 201 329609

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE	
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐	SPD	AREA:	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST U.S. COMINT TRACE RESULTS
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	EXTENDED POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ SECURITY REPORT
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	CNC NOTICE TO DIVISION ☐ HOSTILE ☐ NON-HOSTILE
✓	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)* 31 Aug. 1972	✓	FILE memo + A-S-R.
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST IP TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	SRD NOTICE TO DIVISION
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		
☐	POA EXPIRED ____________ PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

1 SEP 1972 BC

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SIGNATURE ☐ FYFO

FORM 9-72 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2, IMPDET

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible] (21)

SECRET

24 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-7 (201-329609)

1. During a review of Station files, it was noted that LITAMIL-7's Operational Approval, which was granted on 7 February 1968, is still active. This is to advise you that Mexico City Station terminated contact with LITAMIL-7 in 1970.

2. Attached herewith is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record regarding Subject and the Agent Termination Report.

3. Please retire Subject's CI/OA File.

[redacted]

Chief,WH/1

Attachment: herewith

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: [redacted]
WN-SISM

SECRET

SECRET

22 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-7

1. According to Gerald D. FAHLANGER, LITAMIL-7, who [redacted] LITAMIL-3 in approximately 1966-67. Although Subject was never a very productive asset, [redacted] provide information on activities of the installation and individuals working therein. In approximately 1969-70, Subject was retired by the PBRUMAN Embassy, ending her previous usefulness [redacted] In spite [redacted] loss of access to the embassy, she did continue to maintain contact with [redacted] the personnel, including the ambassador. For this reason [redacted] maintained contact with her through LITAMIL-3. However, this too was not very productive because she felt she had been treated fairly upon retirement, and felt a certain degree of loyalty to them. This was somewhat incongruous, since she did not feel such loyalty when she was working in the embassy.

2. Subject met FAHLANGER, as [redacted] approximately six times in [redacted] home. The last time she was told that in view of [redacted] retirement, which resulted in the loss of access to the embassy, our relations with [redacted] would be terminated. However, if [redacted] reestablished contact with the personnel, or was recalled to work part or full time, we would, of course, consider contact again. This, of course, never happened.

3. While Subject was not paid a regular salary, [redacted] did receive spot payments for the information [redacted] submitted. [redacted] also received occasional small gifts at Christmas time and on her birthday. The

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: [redacted]

SECRET

termination was amicable, and Subject agreed to notify LITAMIL-3 if she had any information of value to report.

4. Attached is the Agent Termination Report on Subject.

[redacted]
WH/1/IA

SECRET

Attachment to ________________

15 August 1972

Agent Termination Report

1.	AGENT CRYPTONYM:	LITAMIL-7
2.	PROJECT IDENTIFICATION:	LITAMIL
3.	AGENT RECRUITED BY:	LITAMIL-3
4.	CAPACITY IN WHICH AGENT SERVED:	Penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City
5.	RATE OF PAY:	Spot payments based on information she submitted. Average was approximately $20.00 U.S. per month.
6.	OTHER COMMITMENTS:	None
7.	AGENT DISMISSED BY:	Gerald D. FAHLANGER
8.	SECURITY RISKS:	None
9.	IS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE:	No
10.	REASON FOR AND MANNER OF DISMISSAL:	She retired from [redacted] position in the embassy. Termination by FAHLANGER was done at a meeting with her.
11.	LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED:	No. [redacted] was not witting of her role for LNBUZZ, and was not receiving a specific monthly salary.

E2, IMPDET, WN-SISM
CL BY: [redacted]

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 25 March 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 25 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CFS 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY JMWAVE INFO: [redacted] 201-329609

TYPIC

REFS: A. [redacted] (IN 76477)*

B. JMWAVE 6305 (IN 30599), 20 MARCH 67

C. DIRECTOR 85178, 20 MARCH 67 ***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CITY TRY DETERMINE WHERE MACIQUES STAYING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE REF A AND NOTIFY JMWAVE. ALSO PLEASE PROVIDE SUITABLE PRETEXT TO COVER EX WIFE'S CALL TO PROTECT SMABOVE SOURCE. C-101331 LITAMIL-9 REPORTED IN REF C THAT MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNHARP IF APPROACHED. CAN LITAMIL-9 OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT PER MEXI 2751.

2. FOR JMWAVE: UPON RECEIPT PARA I INFO IF MACIQUES EX WIFE STILL RESIDING HIALEAH FLORIDA PER REF B SUGGEST SHE BE CONTACTED AND DETERIME IF SHE ABLE TELEPHONE MACIQUES MEXICO CITY ASKING HE MEET WITH HER THERE ON HIS RETURN FROM MONTREAL.

26 MAR 1968

END OF MESSAGE

CONTINUED....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85742

TO

PAGE TWO

WH COMMENT: *Abraham MACIQUES Maciques departing Mexico City 26 March for Montreal

Tramots identified MACIQUES ex wife as Ellen Louise Maciques

***LITAMIL-9 ~~bxixg~~ bolieves MACIQUES willing cooperate if contacted.

**** LITAMIL-9 willing provide assessment of MACIQUES if latter returns Cuba.

C/WH/COG/OPS [redacted] (in draft)

C/E/BC/C [redacted] (by phone)

CI/OPS [redacted] (by phone)

[redacted]

5
4
3
2
1

WILLIAM B. BROE [redacted]
C/WHD

[redacted]
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

No. 201-[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]

ATTN: W. [illegible]

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of [illegible], for the purpose specified in your request dated 6 February 19[illegible].

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 7 February 1968 sal

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

DATE: 7 February [illegible] sal

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): 1
PRQ Part I

[redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(40)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 7 FEB 1968	CASE NO. 201- 329659	

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE		
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD	AREA:		

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☑ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	✓ FILE aH. 1
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ________________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Attn: [redacted]

Limited to use as an informant in Mexico

SIGNATURE ☐ OVER

FORM 5-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
LITAMIL-9

FROM:
WH/1/Mexico/France

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.:

DATE: 6 Feb 68

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/[redacted]	6 Feb.		llK	
2.				329609
3.				
4.			0	
5. DCWH/1				
6.				
7.				
8. CI/OA				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: [redacted]

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9
201-329609

Attached are two copies of a PRQ Part I on Subject and a copy of the PRQ Part II. An Operational Approval is requested.

[redacted]
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:

PRQ I - 2 cys
PRQ II- 1 cy

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. *Write clearly.*
2. *Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."*
3. *Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.*

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

NA

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoderate vices

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH		k. BUILD	l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Pock marks on face

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-20)

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible] for business
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

English X

SECTION VI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

[illegible] known

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER [illegible]	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]matic	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]-late [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER [illegible] Cultural	c. ADDRESS [illegible], Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Cultural	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible] to Mexico
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS [illegible]
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Nee*) (*Last*)

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE

36. DATE OF BIRTH

37. PLACE OF BIRTH

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Last residence, if deceased*)

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI FATHER

41. [redacted]

42. YEAR OF BIRTH

43. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

46. OCCUPATION [illegible]

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]

SECTION XII MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]

49. YEAR OF BIRTH

50. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

53. OCCUPATION [illegible]

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

[redacted] RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. [redacted] FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-33865

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I

CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Clyde K. SHRYOCK, the first Case Officer, was introduced to Subject on 18 July 1962 by LITAMIL-3.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subject also speaks good French and poor English.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knew Clyde K. SHRYOCK by true name. The next Case Officer, Lawrence F. BARKER, took over in June 1963. Subject was turned over to his present Case Officer, Raymond A. FRADYER, following his return from PBRUMEN in the fall of 1968.

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (*Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as 'anti-communist'.*)

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the west. He is anti-Communist and anti-AMTHUG.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (*If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.*)

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and his Case Officer meet as acquaintances.

2. [illegible] IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as a former member of LIRING, still has contacts in the [illegible] community in Mexico.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (*Will work*) (*Is working*).

With a OLADY intelligence service.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (*agents, relatives, friends*) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

LITAMIL-3 probably suspects LITAMIL-9 is still engaged in intelligence activities.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning, intelligent, and has an aptitude for the work.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI.

OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subject has been an active asset of the Mexico City Station since 1962. First he provided information on LIRING; after his return to Mexico in late 1966 as a private citizen he still provided some info on LIRING personnel and on the PBRUMEN community in Mexico.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From members of LIRING and the PBRUMEN community. Also from old friends and acquaintances living in Mexico or PBRUMEN.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows that his information goes to ZRMETAL.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's current use is to pass on any information which comes to his attention which he thinks may be of interest. He is occasionally debriefed for any info he can provide on PBRUMENERS or their contacts the Station thinks he may know or have known. There is no current active direction of his activities, and his usefulness is at present close to marginal.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII

PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII

AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is no longer paid any salary. He must be considered an operational contact. In addition to his three case officers, he has known Andrew S. PARWERS and Edward D. KNAPMAN under assumed names.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

[redacted]

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises have been made to subject.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station and LNERGO files. No derogatory information.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

POA was granted.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 May 1967

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. He is sincere, reliable, intelligent, and very security conscious.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with CUYOKA is known to [redacted] and [redacted] per MEXICO CITY 3450; they are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS: GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. He is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is [redacted] but because of his Cuban accent he would probably be recognized as Cuban.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts I and II was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged when Subject may be terminated.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by phone (his number is in the Mexico City phone book) using the name of one of the WOFIRM officers he has been in contact with as bona fides.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE ____________________

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]

ATTENTION : [illegible]

201 ____________
C ______________

The file on ____ is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

[redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 8-65 691a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(8)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE [illegible]

CASE NO. 201- 329609

☐ SET UP FOR POA
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES
DATE
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
DATE

☐ SET UP FOR OA
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ ORSD
AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*
☑ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ FILE
☐ TICKLE
☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☑ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

26 JAN 1968

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

[illegible]

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 8-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 8 [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

C NO. [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
[redacted]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on [illegible]. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE	CASE NO. 201- 329609	
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD — AREA:

USE.

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ [illegible] ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION
✓	POA EXPIRED 8 Nov. '67. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

C-101331

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH/COG 5, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 292220Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2961 LANGDON ACTING

[redacted] INFO DIRECTOR JMWAVE [redacted]

PBRUMEN

C-101331

29 SEP 67 IN 61965

FYI MEXICO STATION CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (IDEN) SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXICO 28 SEPT ON VACATION TRIP MADRID, BARCELONA, PARIS AND POSSIBLY THE HAGUE AND BRUSSELS. LITAMIL-9 WILL DEFINITELY CALL ON CUBAN OFFICIAL REPS MADRID, BARCELONA AND PARIS. CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS IN PARIS IS ALEJO CARPENTIER BELMONT. LITAMIL-9 WILL REPORT ANY INFO ELICITED FROM OFFICIALS HE CALLS ON. PLANS RETURN LATE OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

29 SEP 1967

SECRET

DATE: [illegible] August [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): [illegible]

/s/[redacted]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto

FROM: WH/1 [redacted]	EXTENSION 4167	NO.
		DATE 28 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/1		8/29		329 69
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. CI/OA [redacted]				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				2[illegible] AUG 1967
11.				
12.				
13.				Copy to OS.
14.				
15.				

AUG 29 8 58 AM '67

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

28 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Traces on Luis ALBERU-Souto
201-329609

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 15 June 1967

1. Per your referenced request, the FBI documents were located and reviewed with the following results:

a. The first document dealt with a Luis SOTO who was appointed Commercial Attache of the Dominican Embassy, Madrid. This is not our Subject.

b. All documents referenced Luis ALBERU-Souto's assignment as Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico City, his residences, telephone numbers, and his relationships with the Spanish Communist group in Mexico.

c. The next three items deal with a Luis SOTO, a member of the PPS of Mexico. This is not our Subject.

2. Subject was [redacted] and his activities per paragraph 1.b are well known to this Agency. These activities were considered to be in line with his assignment and are not presently considered to offer a threat to operational security.

3. PRQ Parts I and II will be forwarded your Office upon receipt from the Station.

[redacted]
Acting Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE [illegible]

TO: [illegible] [redacted]

C NO. [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/[redacted]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review the [illegible] [illegible]. Then, please forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the subject.

To obtain these reports, contact [redacted] RID/Files, Extension 4127.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 1[illegible]967	CASE NO. 201- 329609
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD	AREA:

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ FLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE a.l.
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 15 July.
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

Proc. U.

Pls. make copy of attached FBI document listings and send to WH/1.

To: WH/1

Pls. locate and review the listed FBI documents. Then pls. forward your findings to CI/OA relative to the operational security of using the subject.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 27 April 1967 jep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 329609 SO# 279089

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
WH/1/M Mexico

TYPE OF REQUEST
☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CRC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 2 May 1967

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) ✓

USE OF SUBJECT
FI informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA
DIVISION DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA
FIELD DEROG. INFO IN CI/OA

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ - PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 5/3/67

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☑ 1. OS Indices results: ~~No data since~~ see remarks

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☐	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☒	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached FBI

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, _______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS
noth subsequent to July 1963 except
cable dated 29 Oct 1963 in # 49 [redacted]

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY

SECRET

C-101331

ORIG: [redacted] mak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/OD
EXT: 5061
DATE: 20 MARCH 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
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4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ul PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 329609

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible]

SECRET (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 00 05 Z CITE DIRECTOR 85178

21 MAR 1967 File

OVER

TO

MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC

1. AT 15 MARCH MEETING WITH SHRYOCK AND FRAYDER, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT ABRAHAM MACIQUES, CUBAN OFFICIAL INIT AND HIS FRIEND, MADE CONTACT BY PHONE AT 2300 NIGHT BEFORE HE LEFT FOR CUBA. LITAMIL-9 SAW MACIQUES AT HOTEL AGNES NEXT DAY FOR FEW MINUTES BEFORE MACIQUES LEFT FOR AIRPORT. BELIEVE L-9 GAVE MACIQUES FEW ITEMS FOR HIM TAKE TO CONCHITA FERNANDEZ. ACCORDING L-9, MACIQUES WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH LNFORT IF APPROACHED. MACIQUES FORMERLY MARRIED TO AMERICAN WHO NOW IN U.S. WITH TWO CHILDREN. MACIQUES WHO HEBREW NOW MARRIED TO CUBAN MULATTO. HE BROTHER PEDRO MACIQUES. MACIQUES TOLD L-9 HE EXPECTED RETURN MEXI EN ROUTE EXPO 67 IN ABOUT MONTH. POSSIBILITY USE BROTHER L-9 (IDEN) AS ENTREE MACIQUES DISCUSSED WITH L-9 WHO FELT THIS BEST APPROACH VIEW BROTHER's BUSINESS BACKGROUND AND FRIENDSHIP. HOWEVER, SAID WOULD HAVE TO QUERY BROTHER RE HIS ACCEPTANCE PLAY OPS ROLE. LITAMIL-9 WAS ALSO ASKED TRY AND FIND OUT CONTINUED///

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______
CONF:
☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 85178

TO ETA MACIQUES MEXI ORDER GET LEAD TIME LAY ON OP.

2. CUBANA AIRLIST SHOWS ABRAHAM MACIQUES MACIQUES, PP D/66/392, LEFT HABANA FOR MEXI 22 AUGUST 66 EN ROUTE EXPO. CUBANA AIRLIST ALSO SHOWS MACIQUES, PP D/66/392, LEFT MEXI FOR HABANA ON 8 FEB 67. FBIS REPORT SHOWS MACIQUES IN CHARGE CUBAN FOOD AND BEVERAGE COMMITTEE AT EXPO.

3. REQUEST MEXI ASCERTAIN SOONEST AMENABILITY BROTHER PLAY ROLE OP AND TAKE STEPS GET ETA MACIQUES MEXI. FOR WAVE: REQUEST STATION AMOT TRACES MACIQUES AND EX-WIFE. ALSO ADVISE SOONEST ANY INFO RE DEPARTURE MACIQUES FOR MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted] WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

[redacted]

[redacted]
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

ORIG: [redacted]/db
UNIT: WH/COG/FI/OD
EXT: 5061
DATE: 20 MARCH 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 46 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-320609

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible], FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 00 05 Z CITE DIRECTOR 85177

TO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

PBRUMEN TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 85178

[redacted] WHO NOW CUBAN EXILE MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21 MAR 1967

[redacted] WH/1 [redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
[illegible]

NUMBER	
SUBJECT	
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated [illegible]	

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

[illegible]

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ [redacted]

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification (9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 9 67

CASE NO. C01- 329609

	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
	SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY		COVERT NAME CHECK	

DATE

ORSD | AREA:

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
✓	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION Form # 501		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)		REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION
	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

To: WH/1

As requested in para # 3 of your memo of 5 April '67.

[redacted]

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST

	POA		SA		CSC		SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS RI [illegible] DIVISION [illegible] FIELD [illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED YES NO

ATTACHMENTS PRQ - PART I PARTIAL PRQ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

DATE 5/3/67

☐ 1. OS Indices results: see remarks

MAY 8 8 22 AM '67

noth subsequent to July 1963 except
cable dated 29 Oct 1963 in # 41286
WP

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET

3

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]

TYPE OF REQUEST ☐ PSA ☐ SA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT [illegible]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI [illegible]
DIVISION [illegible]
FIELD [illegible] INFO IN CI/SI

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s [redacted] J.F.L.
CHIEF, [illegible]OA

ENDORSEMENT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 25 [illegible] 61

CASE NO. 201- C-101331

✓	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE 2 May	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
✓	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ OBSD	AREA: Mexico

USE

FI informant

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ✓ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE 201
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OBSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

V

APR 25 10 35 AM '61

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WE/1/[redacted] 3 D 4406

EXTENSION: 4167

NO. 929104

DATE 18 Apr 67.

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WE/1/[redacted]		19 Apr		
2.				
3.				
4. DCWE/1		4/19		
5.				
6.				
7. CI/OA				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 18 April 1967

TO:
☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: [redacted]
WH/1/Mexico 3 B 4406
x 4167

SUBJECT: (True name) [redacted]

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

PROJECT:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-329609

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

XX	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
XX	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Mexico City

Subject would be contacted only when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain information--on Cuban activities or personalities.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		x
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	x	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		x

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	XX	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: # 174318

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY XXXXXXCI/OA IS IN possession

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	XX	DEROGATORY XXXXXXXCI/OA is in possession

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	XXXX	DEROGATORY XXXXXX CI/OA is in possession
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE: [redacted]
EXTENSION: 4167
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH: [redacted]

FORM 8-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: [redacted]

DPOB: 1915 in Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban
Presently Cuban exile residing in Mexico City

OCCUPATION: [redacted]

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
HEIGHT: 6 feet tall
WEIGHT 170 to 175 plus
HAIR black

MARITAL STATUS: [redacted] 1949 in Mexico City. They were divorced in 1956. She was [redacted]

PARENTS: FATHER: [redacted].

MOTHER: [redacted]

(Father and Mother are divorced and she is presently residing in Madrid, Spain.)

BROTHERS: [redacted]

SISTERS: [redacted]

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

201-329609

ORIG: [redacted] pfd
UNIT: C/WH/COG/FI
EXT: R1457
DATE: 17 MARCH 1967

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 21 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR

SECRET

10 00 01Z

CITE DIRECTOR 84699

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

NO NIACT

PBRUMEN TYPIC

REFS: A MEXI 0711 (IN 23299)

B WAVE 6098 (IN 23524)

C MEXI 0718 (IN 23582)

File in 201
31 Mar 67

311329

1. HQS PREFERS TRAVEL AMSNAKE-1 BE DELAYED UNTIL UPDATED ASSESSMENT OBTAINED FROM LISAVOY-1 (PARA 1 REF A) AND POSSIBLY OTHER SOURCES MEXI (LIKRAFT, [redacted] AND POSSIBLY LITAFFY-1).

S14055
C-106595

2. "EL SOL" MEXI DAILY 16 MAR REPORTED DELEGATES CONGRESS NOT SCHEDULED RETURN MEXICO CITY UNTIL 23 MAR AFTER VISITS GUANAJUATO AND GUADALAJARA. HQS OPINION IF PITCH MADE SHOULD BE MADE MEXICO CITY WHERE BETTER POSSIBILITY EXISTS ISOLATE HIM FROM OTHER MEMBERS HIS DELEGATION. HOWEVER, UNLESS HARD INFO DEVELOPED INDICATING OTERO RECRUITABLE HQS OPINION LITTLE CHANCE SUCCESS VIEW SMOTH REPORT WHICH REVEALED HE NAMED VICE PRESIDENT OF CULTURAL COUNCIL ON 18 FEB AND LITAMIL-9 INFERENCE FROM CONVERSATION WITH FERNANDEZ PER REF A THAT OTERO STAR ON

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

CONF:

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: PAGE TWO

FILE , VR

SECRET (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

RISE. IN ADDITION, PRESTIGE FACTOR WHICH FINDS OTERO AMONG MOST ILLUSTRIOUS DELEGATION WRITERS CONGRESS, I.E. CARPENTIER, GUILLEN AND FERNANDEZ ALSO MILITATES AGAINST SUCCESSFUL RECRUITMENT.

3. REQUEST MEXICO ASCERTAIN AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE ITINERARY AND DATES TRAVEL CUBAN DELEGATION PARTICULARLY ITS RETURN MEXICO CITY AND PROBABLE LENGTH STAY.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH/D

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/[redacted] (by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]

C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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COPY NO.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: [redacted] WH/1/Mexico

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.

DATE: 5 April 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1				
2.				
3.				
4. CI/OA [redacted]				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

329609

C-10133

APR 5 10 36 AM '67

7 APR 1967 –
Discussed w/A. Lackenberg, WH/1
He will submit new PRQ, Pt. I, up-dated traces – and alert [illegible] that current [illegible]. It will be necessary prior to expiration of POA, if possible.
JK

T – 14 April

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

5 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : [redacted]

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
201-329609

1. LITAMIL-9 returned to Mexico from Cuba in October 1966. On 8 November he was contacted and debriefed by Mexico City Station. Throughout the month of November he debated the question of whether or not he should return to Cuba. In the first week of December 1966, he decided to remain in Mexico.

2. Since it was believed that LITAMIL-9 would have little access to LIRING or to persons of interest in Mexico, he was terminated and the balance of his escrow account was paid to him on 9 December 1966. However, it has since become apparent that from time to time it would be valuable to WOFACT to contact LITAMIL-9 for information on PBRUMEN personalities. He is acquainted with a large number of persons who themselves are of interest to WOFACT or who could supply information on third persons on whom information is needed.

3. Therefore, provisional operational approval and subsequent operational approval for such occasional contact with LITAMIL-9 is requested. It is not planned to pay him a salary or formalize an agent relationship. LITAMIL-9 would only be contacted when specific needs for information arise and the possibility exists that he has or could obtain the information.

[redacted]

Chief, WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Case expired 19 Jan '66.

new 772, up-date

RI
Ops + A.I. } since Aug. '62
Field traces

new Green List —

What is his status w/Cuban govt? — quit the country

Where are wife & child?

→ POA requirement.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES 24 C-101331

SECRET

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FROM 7

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI,

S E C R E T 221842Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0789

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

IN 37663

PBRUMEN

JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS RETURNED FROM CUBA 18 MARCH.

C-101331

LITAMIL-9 WHO CALLED ON HIM 21 MARCH AT STATION DIRECTIVE FOUND HIM NERVOUS AND PREOCCUPPIED. AMBASSADOR NEVERTHELESS LAUDED CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION CUBA AND SAID HAD FINE VACATION.

S E C R E T

BT

29 MAR 1957

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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TOTAL COPIES 35

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PRECEDENCE

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12

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UNIT WH/COG TIME 1947 BY J

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT

SECRET 161738Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0711 16 MAR 67 IN 23299

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC PERUMEN

REFERENCE: A. DIRECTOR 83192 *
B. MEXICO CITY 0689 (IN 22402) *

1. ACCORDING TO MEJIA SANCHEZ, LISANDRO OTERO AND ALEJO CARPENTIER ARRIVED MEXI MORNING 15 MAR. OTERO PROBABLY ARRIVED FROM EUROPE WITH CARPENTIER. CHECKING AIRLISTS.

2. DELEGATES TO CONGRESS LEFT MEXICO NIGHT 15 MAR AND MORNING 16 MAR FOR GUANAJUATO AND GUADALAJARA WHERE CONGRESS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL SUNDAY, 19 MAR, AT WHICH TIME DELEGATES WILL RETURN MEXICO CITY WHERE MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL 25 MARCH.

C-101331 - 9

3. NIGHT 15MARCH, LITAMIL-9 REPORTED THAT IN RECENT TELECON WITH CONCHA FERNANDEZ LATTER GAVE HIM UNDERSTAND THAT LISANDRO OERO REPLACED CARLOS LECHUGA AS HEAD CULTURAL COUNCIL HAVANA.

4. MORNING 16 MAR CO MET MEJIA SANCHEZ FOR FIVE MINUTE SESSION DURING WHICH TIME MEJIA TOLD GET BEST READING POSSIBLE ATTITUDE OTERO DURING CONGRESS. CO GAVE SUBJ MOST RECENT BOOK OTERO WHICH

SECRET

HE GLAD RECEIVE AS WILL USE GET DEDICATORY SIGNATURE AND GET CLOSE OTERO. CO AT MEJIA SANCHEZ HOUSE WHEN CARLOS SOLORZANO CAME BY PICK HIM UP AT 0808 EN ROUTE GUANAJUATO. MEJIA OSTENSIBLY WORRI POSSIBILITY SOLORZANO SHRYOCK CONFRONTATION. MEJIA ARRIVED HOME FROM CONGRESS AT 2300 HRS ON 15 MAR AND MTG SET UP FOR 0800 MORNING 16 MAR VIEW SCHEDULED 2900 DEPARTURE FROM HOUSE. MEJIA MENTIONED AT 0800 MTG THAT ONE OF CONGRESS SECRETARIES TOLD HIM NICARAGUAN WRITERS REFUSED ATTEND CONGRESS BECAUSE IT COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED.

5. RESULTS 4 HOUR MTG WITH MEJIA NIGHT 14 MAR FAVORABLE. WILL REPORT IN DETAIL UPON ARRIVAL HQS. MEJIA INVITED CUBA TO ATTEND RECENT "ENCUENTRO CON DARIO" AND ANXIOUS GO. WENT TO SEE FRIENDS LUIS ECHEVERRIA, MIN GOVERNACION, AND ENRIQUE GONZALEZ CASANOVA WHO WORKS AT PRESIDENCIA RE ADVISABILITY TRIP AND BOTH TOLD MEJIA NOT RISK TRAVEL CUBA VIEW HIS RESIDENT STATUS. MEJIA HAS RETAINED NICARAGUAN CITIZENSHIP AND THEREFORE VULNERABLE MEXI GOVT ACTION. PLAN LOOK INTO POSSIBILITIES GET MEXI GOVT PROTECTION TRAVEL. VIEW INABILITY GO CUBA MEJIA SENT 3 COPIES PAPER RE DARIO WITH MARCO ANTONIO MONTES DE OCA FOR JOSE ANTONIO PORTUONDO, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ RETAMAR AND CINTIO VITIER. LATTER, ACCORDING MONTES DE OCA DID NOT GET PAPER BECAUSE HE NOW IN MENTAL INSTITUTION.

SECRET

SECRET

6. MEJIA HAS ACCESS MANY STATION TARGETS, INCLUDING FEDRO GUILLEN MEXICAN WHO INTIMATE FRIEND. GUILLEN, ACCORDING LIREBEL-1, IN CHARGE MEXI OF CLANDESTINE TRAVEL CUBA FOR TRAINING. MEJIA COOPERATIVE RE REQUIREMENTS CONGRESS. HE SCHEDULED ATTEND SEMINAR AT SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIV IN CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS DURING PERIOD 19-25 APRIL. CO SCHEDULED MTG WITH MEJIA FOR THAT TIME.

SECRET

SECRET + RYBAT

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, C/OPS, C/OA

S E C R E T 241912Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2573

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LITAMIL-9

4MAR67 14181

REF: DIRECTOR 78156
C-101331

1. LITAMIL-9 HAS NOT HEARD FROM OR ABOUT EUSEBIO (AZCUE) LOPEZ SINCE L-9 LEFT CUBA.

2. ALTHOUGH AZCUE DEFINITELY ANTI CASTRO AND WOULD LOVE RETURN MEXICO WHERE PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS CONSUL, HIS PERSONAL SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY FACT HE ATTACHED TO 25 YEAR OLD SECOND WIFE, WHO IN NO HURRY LEAVE CUBA, AND THEIR SMALL CHILD.

AZCUE not L-9.

S E C R E T

ET

X REQUESTED STATUS AZCUE

SECRET

NNNN

JIT

ORIG: [redacted]ak
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 5061
DATE: 27 FEB 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

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BY 44 PER ____ # ____
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INFO: FILE , VR WH 8, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO ⌐MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE, [redacted] 27 23 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 78668

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF: JMWAVE 5743 (IN 08375) (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

28 FEB 1967

File

1. HQS PURSUING LEAD [redacted] INVOLVING POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT [redacted]

2. HQS PLANNING [redacted] FOR FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND BONA FIDES LETTER FOR USE [redacted] HAVE [redacted]

3. REQUEST C-101331 LITAMIL-9 BE CONTACTED SOONEST FOR ASSESSMENT DATA [redacted] REF PROVIDED FAVORABLE ASSESSMENT [redacted]. NOW LIVING JMWAVE AREA.

4. [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

WILLI[redacted] V. BROE
C/WHD

EUR/IB/CUBA [redacted] (in draft)

WH/1 [redacted]in draft)

[redacted]
C/WH/COG

File reviewed 7 March 67 by A. Ladenburg - WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 14 November 1963

TOTAL COPIES 21

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☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH/C8, C/CPS, C/OA, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

14 22 08Z CITE DIRECTOR 51748

TO S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY [redacted] INFO MEXICO CITY [redacted]

PERUMEN LITAMIL -9 ?

[redacted]

Hale

REF MANAGUA 5241 (IN 32131)

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO [redacted]

[redacted] SIENTO NO PODER VISITAR FABRICA. TODO ARREGLADO. SALUDOS. RICARDO.

2. NO NEED FORWARD AGUILAR CORRESPONDENCE PER PARA 2 REF. ABOVE TELEGRAM SHOULD CLOSE OUT REF CASE.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted]

[redacted] (TELECOORD)/WH/2/N

[redacted] (TELECOORD)/WH/2/HONO

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted]IAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 102105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9195 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR 14 NOV 1966

TYPIC PBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF: MEXICO CITY 9168 (C-101531) 10 Nov 66 IN 37303

1. LITAMIL-[illegible] DEBRIEFED FIVE HOURS 8 NOV AND SIX HOURS 9 NOV WHICH RESULTED CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT INTEL, PARTICULARLY IN FIELD CULTURAL ACTIVITIES, RELATIONS AND ORGANIZATION. RQMS CULTURAL FIELD AND OTHERS PARTIALLY FULFILLED WITH EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION IN CASE FORMER. L-9 BROUGHT WITH HIM NINE FOLDERS CONTAINING MEMORANDA AND CORRESPONDENCE DEALING WITH CNC ACTIVITIES. L-9 NOT AWARE CUIS ACTITITIES WITHIN CNC BUT ASSIGNMENT MANUEL VEGA PEREZ AS DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITHIN CNC CERTAINLY SIGNIFICANT.

2 L-9 AGAIN FACED WITH DILEMMA RETURN CUBA OR REMAIN MEXICO TO WORK AS ADMINISTRATOR MEXICAN COMPANY WHERE BROTHER PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BEING PUT ON L-9 BY BROTHER AND WEALTHY MEXICAN BENEFACTOR WHO OWNS COMPANY. L-9 GETTING ALONG IN YEARS (52)., HEALTH BEGINNING FAIL, SUFFERING MENTAL STRAIN, NOW ANXIOUS SETTLE DOWN MEXICO AND TAKE JOB ABOVE WHICH AMOUNTS SINECURE. THIS WILL ALLOW HIM PAINT AND DO THINGS HE HAS ALWAYS WANTED TO IN TWILIGHT CAREER. L-9 PATHETIC FIGURE TORN BETWEEN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9195 S E C R E T

LNFORT AND MEXICAN BENEFACTOR. NIGGARDLY EXISTENCE (250 PESOS MONTHLY) PBRUMEN, WHERE TRAINED WITH MILITIA AND CUT CANE, DICTATE AGAINST HIS RETURN PBRUMEN GO THROUGH SAME AGAIN. ALTHOUGH L-9 UNSELFISHLY STATED WOULD RETURN PBRUMEN IF LNFORT REALLY FELT HE THAT IMPORTANT IT OBVIOUS HE PUTTING HIMSELF AT MERCY LNFORT. CO PLANS MAKE FOL PROPOSAL FOR HIS CONSIDERATION NIGHT 10 NOV. RETURN PBRUMEN WHERE HE WILL HAVE THIRD COUNTRY EMBASSY CONTACT FOR COMMO CHANNEL. DEPENDENT ACCEPTANCE THIS COMMO ARRANGEMENT SALARY WILL BE [illegible] DOLLARS MONTHLY IN ESCROW WITH REVIEW END SIX MONTH PERIOD FOR READJUSTMENT IF NECESSARY BASIS PRODUCTION. STATION BELIEVES THAT UNLESS COMMO CHANNEL ARRANGED L-9 SHOULD NOT BE REQUESTED RETURN. CO DOUBTS L-9 WILL ACCEPT ABOVE OFFER BUT WISHES GIVE HIM OPPORTUNITY MAKE FINAL DECISION. AT ANY RATE, L-9 STILL "CLEAN" WILL PROVIDE STATION WITH LIMITED ACCESS PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI.

3. DOCS AND DETAILED NOTES INTEL AND OPS DEBRIEFING BEING POUCHED HQS. PLAN INTRODUCE L-9 TO FRADYER MORNING 11 NOV.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM

DISSEM 343

ACTION

WH/C 8

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 081712Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9158 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR

8 Nov [illegible] 35292

TYPIC

C-101331

SHRYOCK CONTACTED LITAMIL-9 MORNING 8 NOV. MEETING SCHEDULED FOR EVENING 8 NOV.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

9 NOV 196

File

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT:
DATE:

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☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
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DISSEM BY 9 PER _____ # _____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: VR , FILE • WH/C 8, FI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

15 [illegible] Z CITE DIRECTOR 40536

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF MEXICO CITY 5122

24977

C-181331

HQS PREFERS NOT USE LITEMPO-8 GET LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO, EXCEPT IN LAST RESORT. SINCE L-9 HAS ALREADY OVERSTAYED 18-DAY LIMIT BY 18 DAYS AND SINCE NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, HEADQUARTERS BELIEVES PREFERABLE ACCEPT RISK MEXICAN AUTHORITIES BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS AND ORDERING L-9 OUT PRECIPITATELY. IN LATTER CASE STATION CAN ATTEMPT ARRANGE L-9 EXTENSION AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF. SUGGEST HOLD FURTHER ACTION IN ABEYANCE PENDING ARRIVAL SHRYOCK NIGHT 6 NOV.

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 49536

TO

WH COMMENT: [illegible] GAVE BACKGROUND UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9 THROUGH LITAMIL-3 AND SUGGESTED USE LITEMPO-8 TO AUTHORIZE EXTENSION L-9 PERMIT STAY MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

ET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT CS/DO TIME 0315 BY
INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 040035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 5122 4... 3249

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (ATTN: PRADYER) INFO

[redacted]

NO NIGHT ACTION

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR-49183 (NOT SENT MANAGUA)

1. DUE PROLONG STAY LITAMIL-17 HONDURAS, STATION BEGAN ATTEMPTS CONTACT LITAMIL-9, THROUGH LITAMIL-3 WHO AWARE L-9 IN TOWN FROM LITAMIL-7. INITIAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT UNSUCCESSFUL BUT LITAMIL-7 INFORMED LITAMIL-3 ON 2 NOV THAT LITAMIL-9 WISHED SEE HIM URGENTLY. LITAMIL-3 AGAIN ATTEMPTING CONTACT LITAMIL-9.

773331

C-121331

C-37764

C-101663

OVER

2. THROUGH LITAMIL-7, STATION AWARE THAT GOBERNACION HAS NOT GRANTED PERMISSION LITAMIL-9 REMAIN IN MEXICO FOR THREE MONTH PERIOD REQUESTED. PERUMEN DIPLOMATS ONLY ALLOWED 10 DAY STAY MEXICO ON TDY WITHOUT REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR LONGER STAY FROM GOBERNACION. LITAMIL-3 CLAIMS CAN ARRANGE FOR LONGER STAY THROUGH CONTACTS IN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HAS TOLD LITAMIL-7 TO INFORM LITAMIL-9 OF SAME. LITAMIL-9 SITUATION CRITICAL FROM POINT OF OVERSTAYING 10 DAY LIMIT BUT NEGOTIATIONS STILL TAKING PLACE BETWEEN LIRING AND FOREIGN MINISTRY.

SECRET

3. IF HQS CONCURS, LITEMPO-8 CAN BE REQUESTED AUTHORIZE LITAMIL-9 EXTENSION PERMIT STAY MEXICO. IN ABSENCE CURTIS, BENADUM WOULD CONTACT [illegible] LITEMPO-8. THIS WOULD MEAN LITEMPO-8 AND PROBABLY LIRAMA WOULD THEN BE AWARE LITAMIL-9 AFFILIATION WOFACT. ADVISE SOONEST. ACTION COULD BE COVERED BY LITAMIL-3 CLAIMING HE ARRANGED EXTENSION.

4. RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVE FOR SHRYOCK.

5. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS LITAMIL-9 SITUATION.

SECRET

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

2 22 13 7 CITE DIRECTOR 49415

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MANAGUA INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER), MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRAVINE LITAMIL

REF MANAGUA 5343 (IN 31353)

FYI HQS PLANNING WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY SEND CLYDE K. SHRYOCK MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER ASSIST STATION REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS ESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9. (C-101331) REQUEST BARKER TAKE NO ACTION REF CASE.

S E C R E T

4 NOV 66

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/C

[redacted] (TELECOORD) WH/2/M

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO: VR, FILE WH 8 CCS-3 [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE (FOR FRADYER)

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF A MANAGUA 5840 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31353
B TEGUCIGALPA 6753 (BEING RELAYED) IN 31457

1. PER FRADYER CONVERSATIONS HQS AND WITH CONCURRENCE MEXICO CITY STATION, CLYDE K SHRYOCK (P) PLANS ARRIVE MEXICO CITY 6 NOVEMBER 1966 BY EAL FLIGHT 905. NO NEED MEET BUT WOULD APPRECIATE RESERVATIONS MADE IN TRUE NAME AT GENEVE OR SIMILAR HOTEL.

2. PURPOSE TRIP REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT EFFORTS REESTABLISH CONTACT LITAMIL-9 (E-101331) WITH STATION AND FRADYER (WHO HOLDING RESERVATIONS RETURN MEXICO CITY NIGHT 4 NOVEMBER FROM MIAMI).

S E C R E T

4 NOV 1966

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE ,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49183

TO

WH/COMMENTS: A. LITAMIL-17 (BROTHER LITAMIL-9) ASKED BARKER MEET [redacted]

[redacted] AND ASKED MEXICO CITY FOR LATEST ON LITAMIL-9

B. [redacted] ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS FOR LITAMIL-17 [redacted]

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER [redacted] WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER [redacted] (DRAFT) WH/C/FI

[redacted] FOR WH/C/MO (DRAFT)

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
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declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

3 NOV 1965

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE [redacted] File 2 Nov 65 IN 31353

MEXICO CITY, [redacted] INFO DIRECTOR ① wh

PERUMEN LITAMIL

774321

1. LITAMIL-17 PHONED BARKER FROM SAN PEDRO SULA, HONDURAS, 31 OCTOBER USING ALIAS AND INNOCENT BUSINESS PHRASEOLOGY. SAID WISHED HAVE BARKER VISIT HIM IN SAN PEDRO SULA BEFORE 20 NOVEMBER. FOR SECURITY REASONS DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT LITAMIL-9.

C.101331

2. BARKER TENTATIVELY PLANS STOP-OVER TEGUCIGALPA EN ROUTE BACK FROM ANNUAL COS MEETINGS PROBABLY ABOUT 14 NOV. WILL ASK L-17 TO FLY THERE FOR MEET. MEXI PLS ADVISE LATEST ON L-9 AND WHAT INSTRUCTIONS IF ANY WISH BARKER TO PASS TO L-17.

3. [redacted] L-17 IS BROTHER OF L-9 WHO AGENT RESIDING IN PERUMEN AND EXPECTED OUT SOON. PLEASE CABLE TO [redacted] TO WHICH L-17 COULD SEND LETTER CONFIRMING MEETING PLANS.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 311237Z CITE [redacted] 9016

31 Aug 66 IN 86883

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON LITAMIL AMCRASH

REF DIRECTOR [illegible]

1. AMCRASH 1 MET 30 AUG. FLT DEPARTURE FROM HAVANA DELAYED TO SOLVE EXCHANGE PROBLEMS OF FRENCH INVITEES RETURNING TO THEIR COUNTRY.

16331

2. AMCRASH 1 SAID LITAMIL 9 GOOD FRIEND BUT DOES NOT HAVE FREQUENT INTIMATE CONTACT. CONTACT IS NATURAL AND THEY HAVE VISITED EACH OTHERS HOMES ON PURELY FRIENDLY BASIS. AMCRASH 1 SAW LITAMIL 9 AT AIRPORT JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE THIS TRIP, PURELY ACCIDENTAL. CAN CONTACT LITAMIL 9 AT ANY TIME WITHOUT RAISING ANY SUSPICIONS.

3. AMCRASH 1 IN ANSWER TO QUESTION ESTIMATED LITAMIL 9 MOTIVATION AND SUPPORT OF GOVT AS UNENTHUSIASTIC AND FOR SURVIVAL ONLY. BELIEVES LITAMIL 9 WORKING IN FOREIGN MINISTRY CONNECTED WITH CULTURAL AFFAIRS.

4. MADRID BELIEVES OPEN CODE PLUS SW WITH DEVELOPMENT INSTRUCTIONS IN BOOK AS SUGGESTED IN DIRECTOR 25242 EXPOSES BOTH AMCRASH 1 AND LITAMIL 9 TO UNNECESSARY DANGER. AS LITAMIL 9 IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY SINCE HIS RETURN TO CUBA WE WISH GIVE MAXIMUM PROTECTION TO

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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EACH December 21

ACTION WH/C 8

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE in WH8 [illegible]

S E C R E T 291945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8080

29 Jul 66 IN 66598

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC 87966 jacc - fyi

1. LITAMIL-3 ARRANGED MEXICAN VISA FOR ADAMINA AMALIA (FEREIRA) MARRERO, ADDRESS ISIDORO QUINTANA 153, ALDABO, HAVANA, TO COME TO MEXICO CITY TO VISIT SICK BROTHER DOCTOR OSCAR (FEREIRA) MARRERO, OWNER OF CLINICAL LABORATORY. ADAMINA WILL BE RETURNING CUBA ABOUT 10 AUGUST. PLANS EXIT CUBA AS REFUGEE LATER.

1 AUG 1966

2. ADAMINA IS GOOD FRIEND OF CONCHITA FERNANDEZ (201-332858) OFFICE MANAGER AT INRA. BECAUSE OF THIS FRIENDSHIP SHE KNOWS LITAMIL-9. L-3 HAS BEEN COACHED TO CAREFULLY ELICIT INFORMATION FROM ADAMINA ON L-9, SHOWING NO UNDUE INTEREST. NAME WILL BE INCLUDED WITH THOSE OF OTHER MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES. HOPE FIND OUT JUST WHAT L-9 DOING, HOW HE IS, IF AND WHEN HE PLANNING COME OUT, WHAT HIS OSTENSIBLE POLITICAL LEANINGS ETC.

10/33

3. ACCORDING ADAMINA CONCHITA FERNANDEZ HAS LOST MUCH INFLUENCE IN REGIME.

4. APPRECIATE TRACES ADAMINA.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 19 JAN 1966

CASE NO. C -101331

☐ SET UP FOR POA ☐ EXPEDITE INDICES DATE ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES DATE

☐ SET UP FOR CA ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK AREA

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
✓	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED - *(No notice to Division)* Cancellation of 19 JAN 1966	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE /
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

See M/R - of 19 JAN 1966

19 [illegible]
[illegible]
COPY TO [illegible]
Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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GROUP 1
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(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
10 January 1966 jab

TO:
WH/1/Mexico - W.J. Kaufman

C NO.
C - 101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965. POA expired 3 January 1966.

19 JAN 1966 - Disc'd w/J. Stewart. their only reason for asking for extension was that they were under the impression they could not pay him without a POA. The error of this thinking was pointed out to him. He is going to let POA expire which it has already done.
JL

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 10 Jan 66

CASE NO. 201 C-101331

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD AREA:

DATE

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ ...	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓ TICKLE 26 Feb 66
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

✓ POA EXPIRED 8 Jan 66 ✱ ~~[illegible] POA WILL BE [illegible]~~

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

✱ Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 Dec 1965.

275
SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
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(33)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 21 December 1965 jab
TO: WH/1 -- W.J. Kaufman	C NO. C - 101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/CA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 December 1965.

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 21 DEC 1965

CASE NO. C-101331

	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE
	EXPEDITE INDICES — DATE		
	SET UP FOR OA		ORSD — AREA:
	SPECIAL INQUIRY		
	COVERT NAME CHECK		

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)		REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE aH.
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 21 Jan.
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION
	POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Pls. come to CI/OA to discuss your request of 16 Dec. '65

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/1

EXTENSION: 4506

NO.

DATE: 16 December 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1/Stewart	16 Dec			
2. DC/WH/1	12/16			
3. CI/OA				
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. The Provisional Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9 (C-101331) is due to expire 8 January 1965.

2. In discussions with the field case officer for this operation, WH/1/Mexico has found that there is no way to determine when, or whether, LITAMIL-9 will again leave Cuba. For reasons of personal security, LITAMIL-9 has not been able to function as a reporting source since his return to Cuba in early March 1965. Letters to his brother, LITAMIL-17, and reports from occasional Cuban official travelers transiting Mexico indicate that LITAMIL-9 is well and is employed by the National Cultural Council.

3. LITAMIL-9 is now an inactive agent. The Station has recently proposed that his salary cease accumulating as of 30 June 1966. If and when he again manages to leave Cuba, he will be contacted and a full assessment of his future usefulness will be made. Owing to the fact that his sister-in-law is a secretary to Fidel Castro it is expected that he will be a valuable source of information, at least for an initial debriefing period.

4. It would be appreciated if the POA on LITAMIL-9 could be extended for six months. If at the end of that time he has not left Cuba, it will be proposed that the POA be allowed to expire.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

DEC 17 11 09 AM 65

YES ☐ NO
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MEXICO

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UNIT [illegible] TIME [illegible]

INFO
FILE VR [illegible]

S E C R E T 21[illegible]

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 4731

PBRUMEN

21 SEP 65 IN 56450

REF: DIR 44181 (IN 05142)

1. POLICE RAID EARLY MORNING 18 SEP NETTED TWO SUB-MACHINEGUNS AND ONE AUTOMATIC PISTOL. GARCIA ARRESTED, QUESTIONED BY FISCAL POLICE, CONSIGNED TO GOBERNACION WHICH CONSIDERING DEPORTING HIM TO CUBA.

2. PENETRATION AGENT REPORTS POLICE SEARCH POORLY DONE. LARGE BOX OF "WHITE POWDER" WAS WASHED DOWN DRAIN AFTER POLICE LEFT. DOCUMENTS AND PHOTOS BURNED FOR HOURS. QUANTITY OF DYNAMITE REMOVED FROM PREMISES.

3. ON 20 SEP STATION PREPARED LIST QUESTIONS TO BE POSED TO GARCIA. EXPECT ANSWERS SOON. SUBJ APPARENTLY STILL BEING HELD INCOMMUNICADO.

4. TARGET STUDY WAS INFORMAL STATION STUDY, NOT SENT TO HQS. MEXI 4770 WAS LAST CORRESPONDENCE ON CASE. SUBJ H[illegible] ON LIENVOY AND IN REPORTS BY LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-9 SINCE THEN. AIMONET HAD LITAMIL-2 DO SPECIAL REPORT ON SUBJ SEP 64.

C-95595 [illegible] [illegible]

5. CORRECT 201 NOTED. HAD PICKED UP OTHER NUMBER FROM HMMW 11470.

SECRET

23 SEP 1965

SECRET

IN-50458-[illegible]

6. WILL KEEP HQS ADVISED DEVELOPMENTS BY CABLE. NO PUBLICITY ON CASE TO DATE.

S E C R E T

CFN 4781 44131 2514 18 SEP GARCIA GOBERNACION 20 GARCIA NOT SENT HQS 4770 LIENVOY LITAMIL-2 LITAMIL-3 LITAMIL-9 64 221 11470

,9 07736:856

25

SECRET

+ HQS requested to be kept advised latest developments of case

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/1/Mexico - E. E. Scott

NUMBER
C - 101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
19 April 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

Edward P. Brown BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	8 July 1965

FORM 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-64

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 8 JUL 1965	CASE NO. C-101331

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK		AREA	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (*No notice to Division*)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (*Reason checked below,* or see remarks*)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE att.
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

To: WH/1

For use as a reporting source from within Cuba.

John F. Lally

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(21)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/R.E.Scutt

EXTENSION: 4507

NO.:

DATE: 19 April 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1		19 APR 1965		
2.				
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4. C/CI/OA	20 APR 1965			
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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19 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/OA

SUBJECT : Operational Approval for LITAMIL-9

1. An Operational Approval is requested for LITAMIL-9, who has recently returned to Cuba, and has accepted an FI mission from Mexico Station. The Station has expressed its reluctance to interview a Mexican officer who alleged in 1959 that LITAMIL-9 was a Communist, since this course of action would unnecessarily draw attention of this officer to our interest in LITAMIL-9. WH/1 has concurred in this decision, and considers that this unevaluated derogatory information on LITAMIL-9 is far outweighed by his performance record.

2. Realizing the risk involved in working with any Cuban national, WH/1 feels that LITAMIL-9's excellent record of cooperation, plus his acceptance of the idea of continued cooperation in a denied area favor consideration of an Operational Approval. Additionally, we have had audio coverage through the telephone in LITAMIL-9's office for the past two years or more, and during this time the Station has used the installation for spot checking his information, and is satisfied that there are no reasons to question his veracity and security or suspect that he is under control of the Cuban service.

3. Attached for your review are several contact reports of LITAMIL-9, as requested by Mr. Lally. Their prompt return will be appreciated. This office will be pleased to cooperate in any further review of this case which will facilitate the OA.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Attachments:
Reports of LITAMIL-9

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

2 SECRET

☐ RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
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4		8	

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UNIT TIME BY

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

INFO

VR. FILE DDP WH/C 8 files

S E C R E T 151745Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2777

C-10133)

15 MAR 65
IN 22918

PBRUMEN

LITAMIL-9 DEPARTED MEXI FOR PBRUMEN 12 MAR.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

File

JL 18 MAR 1965

13 April '65 - R. Scott, WH/1, says subject has agreed to work for station upon his return to Cuba. Scott will supply tech. ops. info. on L-9 in hopes that we might be able to resolve Subj's bona fides. This was at my suggestion since it came to my attention by independent reading of previous cables that such an installation existed. Yet WH/1 did not (or refused to) divulge such info to [redacted] CI/OA. JL.

Subj's brother, L-17, to be used as commo channel. Being processed for POA/OA.

TOTAL COPIES 1/ RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SECRET

FROM
MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION
TSD 5

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO
VR, FILE, WH/7, TSD, WH/C 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4

S E C R E T 042353Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2407

8 FEB 19 File

AQUATIC PBRUMEN

5 FEB IN 74047

REF MEXI 2235 (IN 63840)

c-10/33

1. REF FURNITURE HAS BEEN RETURNED PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND PLACED IN MUSIC ROOM WHICH LITAMIL-9 REPORTS IS USED BY AMBASSADOR FOR CLOSED DOOR SESSIONS WITH IMPORTANT VISITORS. TRANSMITTER WORKING WELL AND RESPONDS TO ON/OFF SWITCHING FROM LIONION BASE. LIONION-1 MONITORING AND RECORDING TAKE. FIRST TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATION BY AMBASSADOR AND MONDRAGON IN WHICH THEY DISCUSS FURTHER UPHOLSTERY WORK BY MONDRAGON WHO NOW HAS SEVERAL SMALL CHAIRS IN SHOP TO BE RECOVERED. PRELIMINARY STATION DETERMINATION IS THAT THESE DO NOT WARRANT BUGGING AS WILL PROBABLY BE PUT IN SAME ROOM.

2. STATION CLOSELY MONITORING EMBASSY/MONDRAGON NEGOTIATIONS. FEEL LIKELY HE WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL BUSINESS THUS ENABLING STATION MAKE ADDITIONAL TECH PENETRATIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

9 SECRET

ORIG: H F SVENSON:vzp
UNIT: C/WH/SA/CI
EXT: 6471
DATE: 19 JUNE 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-268919

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: [illegible] BRUSSELS PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/SA 8 ~~XXX~~ [illegible]

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 6, WH 7, VR

OPERATIONAL Z

IMMEDIATE

TO OPIM OPIM BRUS PARI INFO ROUTINE MEXI CITE DIR

Copy in each file.

TYPIC LICOOZE

File

19 JUN 1964

29570

1. LICOOZE CASE REVIEWED THOROUGHLY BY SHRYOCK WHO HANDLED IN MEXI. SHRYOCK COMMENTS FOLLOW: LICOOZE WAS DIFFICULT TO HANDLE BECAUSE WHILE TRUTHFUL IN ANSWER TO ANY SPECIFIC QUESTION HE SELDOM ELABORATED, SELDOM VOLUNTEERED INFORMATION AND GENERALLY WAS RELUCTANT TO FURNISH INFO WHICH DID NOT CONCERN PEOPLE WHOM HE CONSIDERED COMMIES.

2. REVIEW ESTABLISHED THAT LICOOZE AT TIME WHEN HE SAW FERNANDO AVILA AT HABANA AIRPORT SENT MESSAGE THROUGH LITAMIL-9 TO AMBASSADOR ANTONO PORTUONDO THAT AVILA WAS AN AMERICAN AGENT. THIS INFO CAME FROM LITAMIL-9 WHO IS CONSIDERED COMPLETELY [illegible] RELIABLE. GRANTING MEMORY LAPSE ON PART OF LICOOZE AS RESULTS OF PASSAGE OF TIME AND PSYCHIATRIC DIFFICULTIES, IT STILL IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT HE DID NOT RECALL ABOVE WHEN DISCUSSING AVILA CASE. DO NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND STOCKWOOD MENTIONING ABOVE

[illegible] 2-101331

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER 19-2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG
UNIT
EXT
DATE

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO: CITE DIR 29510

BECAUSE LI-9 IS SENSITIVE CURRENT SOURCE, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE STOCKWOOD REVIEWING INFO ON AVILA AND ASKING WHETHER LIOOZE KNOWS IF CASTRO GOVT REPRESENTATIVES WERE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT AVILA AND WHETHER LIOOZE EVER HAD FURNISHED ANY INFO CONCERNING HIM.

3. REGARDLESS OF LIOOZE REPLY TO ABOVE HE SHOULD BE VALUABLE SOURCE IN EUROPE. CLOSE CONTROL PROVIDED BY RUS STATION CAPABILITIES PLUS PLANNED COVERAGE HIS APARTMENT SHOULD PERMIT VERIFICATION HIS INFO AND BONA FIDES. IN VIEW OF PARA 1 UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED WITH LIOOZE THAT KUBARK EXPECTS HIM TO DISCLOSE FULLY ALL INFO OF INTEREST TO KUBARK WITHOUT NEED OF DETAILED QUESTIONING. SUGGEST HE BE TOLD THAT KUBARK INTERESTS COINCIDE WITH BEST INTERESTS OF CUBAN PEOPLE BUT THAT KUBARK NEEDS FULLEST INFO IN ORDER TO BE HELPFUL WHETHER OR NOT INFO IN HIS OPINION IS OF LEGITIMATE INTEREST TO KUBARK. AS A LAST RESORT HIS TAPED COMMENTS COULD BE REVEALED TO HIM AS CONTROL CI MEASURE ALTHOUGH IT IS HOPED THAT CONFIDENCE IN AND RAPPORT WITH STOCKWOOD PLUS CHANGED

BRUS

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO PAGE THREE

TO INFO: CITE DIR 29510

SITUATION IN CUBA AND LICOZE'S OWN OPPOSITION TO PRESENT REGIME AS WELL AS TO COMMUNISM WILL LEAD HIM TO COOPERATE FULLY.

4. IN GENERAL HQS ~~BELIEVES~~ [illegible] THAT STOCKWOOD SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON CURRENT REQUIREMENTS RATHER THAN DELVE FURTHER INTO PAST LICOZE ACTIVITIES WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN COVERED IN SOME DETAIL AND IN WHICH LICOZE APPEARS HONESTLY TO HAVE FORGOTTEN. SHRYOCK IN REVIEWING LATEST INFO FROM LICOZE FOUND IT TO CORRESPOND WITH INFO KNOWN TO HIM DURING TIME HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH LICOZE.

5. HQS WILL PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO SUGGEST MEANS WHICH CAN BE USED TO ENHANCE LICOZE REPUTATION WITH CUBAN INTEL SERVICE SO AS TO INCREASE HIS ACCESS AND VALUE IN FUTURE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1/Mexico
WH/SA/MOB
WH/SA/EOB
WE/2
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM O'RYAN
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [redacted]

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: LIAISON & OFFICE OF SECURITY

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
11:25 4AUG78		ED LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE OF CI/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER MUST NOTIFY CI/OA(5077) IMMEDIATELY IF IT IS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER GROUP WITHIN CI/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY BE RECHARGED TO THE PROPER PERSON, AND SO THAT THE FOLDER CAN BE READILY LOCATED AT ANY TIME AS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

37 ~~SECRET~~

	ROUTING
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, C/CA, FI, SAS 8, VR

3 JAN 1964

File
JL

~~S E C R E~~ T 233282Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7613 (EASBY ACTING)

2 JAN 64 IN 91186

[redacted]

C-101331

1. [redacted] REPORTS THAT TERESA PROENZA WAS SUMMARILY FIRED FROM HER JOB AS RESULT OPEN CABLE FROM FOMIN RAUL ROA RECEIVED ABOUT TEN OR TWELVE DECEMBER. (PLS NOTE ATTACHMENT TO HMMA 22634 GIVING DATE 1 DECEMBER.)

2. [redacted] SAYS THAT FIRING EVIDENTLY RESULT OF PROENZA REMARK TO SISTER IN LAW OF ROA TO EFFECT THAT STRONG ROA NOTE TO GOM REGARDING DETENTION OF SILVIA DURAN WAS DIPLOMATIC ERROR. BACKING THIS UP IS REMARK TO [redacted] BY COTY SOLORZANO ABOUT 8 DEC TO EFFECT PROENZA SHOULD WATCH HER STEP AND BE MORE FRIENDLY WITH SISTER OF ROA'S WIFE. [redacted] WAS ALSO WITNESS TO PROENZA CRITICISM OF ROA NOTE IN CONVERSATION WITH PRO-CASTRO OFFICIAL OF FINE ARTS INSTITUTE.

3. PROENZA HARD HIT BY FIRING. [redacted] ROA PROBABLY ORDERED DISMISSAL BECAUSE SHE IS COMMUNIST AND ROA IS NOT. PROENZA VISITED GENERAL HERIBERTO JARA IN VERACRUZ TO PLEAD CASE AND REPORTED JARA FURIOUS AT INJUSTICE. ON 24 DEC PROENZA SHOWED UP AT EMBASSY DINNER, APPEARED SLIGHTLY DRUNK, SAID SHE HAD JUST COME FROM VISIT WITH GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS. SHE DID NOT STAY AT EMBASSY FOR DINNER.

4. [redacted] SAYS HER DISMISSAL KNOWN BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL BUT NOT BEING

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

TALKED ABOUT. PROENZA SHOWS UP ALMOST DAILY, REMAINS FEW MINUTES, LEAVES. RECENT [redacted] REVEALS CALLERS BEING STALLED OFF WITH REPLY PROENZA NOT IN OR PERHAPS DUE TOMORROW.

5. NO EVIDENCE THIS DISMISSAL DUE TO [redacted]

?

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

33 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, C/CA, FI, SAS 8, VR

3 JAN 1964

File

S E C R E T 030002Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7613 (EASBY ACTING)

2 Jan 64 IN 91186

PBRUMEN

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SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

TALKED ABOUT. PROENZA SHOWS UP ALMOST DAILY, REMAINS FEW MINUTES, LEAVES, RECENT LIENVOY TRAFFIC REVEALS CALLERS BEING STALLED OFF WITH REPLY PROENZA NOT IN OR PERHAPS DUE TOMORROW.

5. NO EVIDENCE THIS DISMISSAL DUE TO AMROD OP BUT CONSIDER THIS POSSIBILITY.

?

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 Dec 63	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE					EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR	☐	OA	☐	SP INQUIRY	☐	GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:	

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

[redacted]

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 11 Dec 63

CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE					EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE
SET UP FOR		OA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:	

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	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-57 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONI ENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE 27 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: B. REICHART				
2. CI/OA J. Lally				Is attached correct? No changes made as agreed c/WH/3/Mex
3.				
4. Chief, WH/3/Mexico.				
5.				2 to 4: This is for your retention.
6.				
7.				
8.				Returned to CI/OA Dec. 11, for second time, by WH/Mexico.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE 27 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/CA	EXTENSION	NO. DATE 18 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: Mike Mulloy				
2.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

18 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mike Mulloy

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

1. Pursuant to a meeting held on 14 November 1963 amongst personnel of WH/3/Mexico, B. Reichart, R. Scott, H. Mulloy, J. Manning and of CI/OA, E. P. Brown and J. Lally, it was agreed that the case of LITAMIL/9 comes under the purview of CSI-F No. 10-5, Section 18a. As such, this requires Headquarters approval, i.e. that of WH Division, for the recruitment of a government official of a denied area country.

2. As described in MEXI-6696, LITAMIL/9 "serves as invaluable eyes and ears inside target establishment" reporting on information received in his government position. It was agreed such activity does not require a Provisional or Operational Approval since LITAMIL/9 is a government official of a denied area country. Under these conditions, the processing of an Operational Approval should not and will not be effected.

3. It was also agreed that if LITAMIL/9 should be employed for operational use other than reporting information received in his government position, the usual Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval procedure will apply.

4. It was agreed that CI/OA would take no further processing action at this time based on the above information. However, as in similar cases, CI/OA will forward to the desk such information made available to it which might aid the Station in its handling of LITAMIL/9.

Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ERNAL E ONLY ☐ CON. ENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/CA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 18 November 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief, WH/3/Mexico ATTN: Mike Mulloy				
2.				
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

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C-101,331

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Edward P. Brown
EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

8 OCT 1963

Ed,

I don't consider this an accurate or inclusive dispatch as was agreed to in our mtg. with c/o.

a. No mention that they are using man without approval of any kind (the POA granted for Tony only automatically expired at the completion of Tony session.)

b. No mention that he is deep in the LAURICLE requirements of the Station.

c. Para #6 should read LCFLUTTER is a must.

Would like your comments.

HMMW-11988
4 Oct. '63

8 OCT 1963

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b. No mention that he is deep in the LAURICLE requirements of the Station.

c. Para. #6 should read LCFLUTTER is a must.

JL

Would like your comments.

HMMW-11988
4 Oct. '63

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WE/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum dated 10 July 1963. Same Subject.

1. This is the second request of CI/OA's asking for an answer to our memorandum of 10 July 1963. Because of the sensitivity of this case, it is imperative that the oft-requested reply be forwarded.

2. It is to be noted that the Subject continues to be used without an Operational Approval per PRQ Part II dated 17 June 1963. It is further noted in Section VI, 4, that "Subject is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements", a most sensitive area.

3. Again, we ask for an answer to the referenced memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/JPL:aal

SECRET

SECRET

1 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Wayne Carley

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9
C-101,331

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EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/JFL:aal

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 29 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 329609

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST FI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	✓	TICKLE 12 Sept 63
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II		OTHER

REMARKS.

WH/3

WH reply to 10 July 63 CI/OA memo.

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 29 AUG 1963	CASE NO. 329609

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	✓	TICKLE 12 Sept 63
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II		OTHER

REMARKS.

WH/3

WH reply to 10 July 63 CI/OA memo.

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 11 July 1963 jev

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/3

SUBJECT: 201 - C-101332, SO#179089 ALBERU Souto, Luis

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ PCA ☒ SA ☐ CHC ☐ SO

CS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

JUL 12 1 48 PM '63

CS TRACE RESULTS | RI | DIVISION | FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 26 AUG 1963

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: see below

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached ______

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS
data contained in OS indices were furnished CI/OA by this office (OS) ~~in~~ in memo dated 30 Aug 63.

CLOSED

23 AUG 1963

James E. Mackey Jr.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

30 August 63

FORM 8-63 693a

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 11 July 1963 jev

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT WH/3

SUBJECT: 201 -
C-101 31, SO#179089 ALBERU Souto, Luis

TYPE OF REQUEST

	PCA	X	SA		CNC		SS

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

JUL 12 1 48 PM '63

CS TRACE RESULTS | RI | DIVISION | FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 26 AUG 1963

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: see below

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

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☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

AUG 30 1963

REMARKS

Data contained in OS indices were furnished CI/OA by this office (OS) ~~in~~ in memo dated 30 Aug 63.

CLOSED

23 AUG 1963

James E. Mackey for
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 9-63 693a

SECRET

30 Aug 63

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 10 JUL 1963

CASE NO.: C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE

☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE

SET UP FOR: ☒ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

USE : AREA:

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL

☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION

☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE

☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:
[illegible]

☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)*
(See "Remarks" for reason)

☐ REQUEST RI TRACES

☐ REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES

☐ REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES

☐ REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II

☐ REQUEST "GREEN LIST"

☐ REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW

☐ REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION

☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION

☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA

☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA

☐ [illegible]

☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE

☒ FILE attached

☐ TICKLE

☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Edward L. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 1 0 JUL 1963	CASE NO. C-101331	

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	X OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE : AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: [illegible]		[illegible]
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	X	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II		OTHER

REMARKS

Edward L. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

JUN 26 9 41 AM '63

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE **PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**	PRQ NO. DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12a and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM

LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I. CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the subject, a [illegible] diplomat, to [illegible] as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Laurence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work, (Is working)*.

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CABRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LURICIE requirements

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARGES and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LIOCZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Submitted 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cognizant of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE isknown to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECTION XIII	AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV	GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV	EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home ar at the PBPRIME Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI	MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE. His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
17 June 1963	Clyde K SHRYOCK

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 17 MAY 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE			EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE		
SET UP FOR		OA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Destroy tickles

To Archives

Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF TION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CI/OA		
2	2 B 11		
3	Attn: Mr. Ed Brown		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☒	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☒	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently met him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. Mike

C-101331

File
EPB
4 Mar 63

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
E. E. Mulloy R146	28 Feb

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O-587282

24 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
C-101331
201-329609

Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.

John M. Whitten
Chief, WH/3

26 9 47 AM '63

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA 21557

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

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2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: LITAMIL-9

2. PSEUDONYM:

SECTION I. CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The CO made contact with the subject, a [illegible] diplomat, [illegible] as a penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Laurence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.

FORM NO. 1050a 1 NOV 56 REPLACES FORM 51-95A WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-20)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is highly motivated toward PBPRIME and the West. He is anti-Communist.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Station Mexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PBRUMEN government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, as an employee of the PBRUMEN Embassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work, (Is working).*

Subject know he is working for PBPRIME Intelligence.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE
Subject's brother, Leonel, resident in Mexico
Jose CARRAL Escalante
LITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has not had any formal training in clandestine operations but he is cunning and intelligent and has made great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Cuban regime if it should come to power.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1- IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

Subj provided a few intelligence items through LITAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.

2- INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from members of the PBRUMEN Embassy and friends of PBRUMEN with whom he deals.

3- INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.

4- DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of the PBRUMEN Embassy of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. Subj is also aware of the Station's LAURICLE requirements

5- DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Not applicable

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1- DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Not applicable

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

Not applicable

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1- EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 4000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARGES and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is an artist

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on KUBARK'S behalf.

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files.

Close friends of Subject such as LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-7 LIOOZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

See para 1

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Submitted 27 July 1962 HMMA 19455	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctual and highly intelligent. A cosmopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cognizant of what it takes to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

Subject's relationship with ODYOKE isknown to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENNE per MEXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHENNE are not believed to be security risks.

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.

SECRET

SECTION XIII	**AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.

SECTION XIV	**GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is a European type, but because of his Cuban accent would probably recognized as such.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 was obtained through research, files, agents, and direct questioning.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.

SECTION XV	**EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's office phone. CO can make contact with Subject at his home ar at the PBRUMEN Embassy if necessary. Subjectand CO use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.

SECTION XVI	**MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject, who is well deposed toward PBPRIME, is anxious to remain a long term agent for ODYOKE; His intelligence, coupled with his contacts in leftist and Communist circles, makes him an excellent prospect.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
17 June 1963	Clyde K SHRYOCK

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 17 MAY 1963	CASE NO. C-101331	

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	CA / SP INQUIRY / GOV'T N. CHK		USE AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM / SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		[illegible]
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE attached
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE / FIRST / SECOND / THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST / PRQ I / PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Destroy tickles

To Archives

Edward P. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	CI/OA		
2	2 B 11		
3	Attn: Mr. Ed Brown		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
		☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	☒	FILE	☐	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	☒	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently met him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. Mike

C-101331

File
EPB
4 Mar 63

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
H. E. Mulloy R146	28 Feb

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LITAMIL-9, Report of TDY, Andrew S. Parmers

1. During 21-26 February 1963, Andrew S. PARMERS travelled from Headquarters to Mexico City on TDY to train LITAMIL-9 on various clandestine, operational, techniques, including SW. Upon arrival in Mexico City PARMERS ascertained that LITAMIL-9 allegedly became of moral inhibitions, was unwilling to receive training and also unwilling to accept the SW systmes Headquarters had issued for him, and which PARMERS had carried to Mexico City. Nevertheless, PARMERS met LITAMIL-9 three times to determine the agents precise objections and to overcome them if possible. Although the agents general resistance was not overcome, PARMERS did review with LITAMIL-9 clandestine methods and techniques in a general way.

2. The first meeting was held at the Station case officers home, with the Case Officer present. LITAMIL-9 explained his reasons for refusing to be trained and for not being willing to communicate in SW with KUBARK while in Cuba. Generally LITAMIL-9 claimed that he is very nervous, and incapable of performing clandestine tasks without having a nervous breakdown and at the same time getting himself caught in the act because of his general incompetancy. Also, LITAMIL-9 was planning to stay at his brothers home in Cuba, and felt it would be unethical and immoral for him to be communicating clandestinely with KUBARK while accepting the hospitality of his brother and sister-in-law who are staunch supporters of the Castro regime. These agreements obviously had already been presented to the Case Officer who had already concluded that LITAMIL-9 could not be moved from his position. The agent furthermore, felt that there was no need for training or SW since he would be returning to Mexico after only three months in Cuba. He displayed a cable he had just received from his father answering LITAMIL-9's query as to what might be his next assignment. The cable stated that LITAMIL-9 would most likely return to his present post in Mexico. The agent therefore felt that upon his return to Mexico City, he could be debriefed by his Case Officer. LITAMIL-9 rejected all attempts to convince him of our need for current info from inside Cuba. He was adament when we pointed out that he might not return to Mexico City as hoped, but might have to remain in Cuba, having no means of contact. If this happens he plans to resign his position and return to Mexico as a private citizen, since he already is a registered "resident" of Mexico.

SECRET

3. On Friday, 24 February, PARMERS spent most of the day visiting alone with LITAMIL-9 at the latter's apartment. By the end of the day LITAMIL-9 had softened a little and had revealed some of the personality traits mentioned below. LITAMIL-9 also agreed to communicate with his Case Officer through open code in letters to his brother in Mexico City. He also was willing to meet inside KUBARK, preferably if the contact was a diplomat but not Cuban. He agreed to take a set of cuff links as bona fides. As a suggestion, he mentioned that his friend, The Swiss Ambassador, now serving in Madrid, Spain, would be an ideal contact. In revealing how such a contact could be performed and in discussing LITAMIL-9 modus vevendi in Cuba, there was considerablo discussions concerning operational Security and clandestine procedures LITAMIL-9 can apply while in Cuba.

PARMEN

4. LITAMIL-9 during this meeting also presented, in logical sequence, his reasons for believing that he will return to Mexico City. Basically, he feels that between the fact that he has many contacts in Mexico City (where he has lived and worked for many years) and the fact that his sister-in-law in Cuba has a responsible position with considerable influence in the Castro Government, he LITAMIL-9 will be re-assigned to his present post in Mexico City after three months of leave, consultations, and training in Cuba.

5. The third meeting ocurred in the evening of 25 Februar , in a car pick up situation, with the Case Officer present. This time, LITAMIL-9 was less willing to communicate with KUBARK while in Cuba than he had been during the previous meeting, but with some reluctance, agreed to the use of open code and to be contacted by some diplomat. This meeting, therefore, was a routine operational meeting, with his Case Officer in charge.

6. Based upon their three meetings, PARMERS formed the following opinions of LITAMIL-9: He is a shrewd opportunist, willing to colloborate with KUBARK against the Castro Government, but not to the point where his personal security is endangered. He dislikes the Castro Regime because it has fumbled so badly, and because the current Cuban officials are crude and incompetant. He greatly admires the American people, but definitely feels that we are merely concerned about our own national security and well-being. LITAMIL-9 owes his first loyalty to the fine arts, has little Patriotic feelings towards Cuba, since he has lived in Mexico for so many years, and has declared himself to be a resident of Mexico. He is now serving the Cuban Government simply because he had an opportunity (through his sister-in-law) to achieve official status and income and still remain in Mexico where most of his

personal friends reside.

7. Although at first appearance, and according to his own opinion statements, LITAMIL-9 appears to be extremely nervous because of his clandestine activities in behalf of KUBARK and against Cuba, after some discussion it was apparent that he actually relishes these clandestine actions that he would have engaged in them long before he did, and that he would have continued a covert relationship with KUBARK even after Castro falls, serving either in Mexico (where he has many contacts of interest to KUBARK) or in Cuba in some post in some future government. He has excellent rapport with his present KUBARK case officer. He states that as long as KUBARK remains willing to accept that he has definite personal limitations, (since he can perform only those clandestine tasks related to his cover and cannot be trained or induced to do anything else) he will gladly continue collaborating with KUBARK as long as desired.

8. Actually, PARMERS feels that LITAMIL-9 would do most anything we would desire if KUBARK would someday establish some control over him. His present remarks concerning his moral qualms are artificial. He has great appreciation for shrewdness and double play, and openly admits having engaged in it all his life. On many occasions he admits that he has accomodated himself to a situation for profit or because he knew that he could turn the tables eventually on his adversaries. When he is off-guard he admits to being a cool operater who can scheme and work behind his adversaries' backs. He shows many signs of enjoying doing what he does for and with his present KUBARK case officer.

9. In summary, although LITAMIL-9 did not accept training or SW in the standard sense, PARMERS believes that the agents reluctance was based on his desire to take few risks. The agent is competent, his moral inhibitions are probably faked. He is convinced that he will return to Mexico soon, and desires to continue serving KUBARK if no greater risk is involved. Since KUBARK at present has no clear control (monetary or ideological) over LITAMIL-9, it was difficult to impose KUBARK's will over him. But he is very willing to perform for KUBARK within the limitations he sets, and if someday we can satisfy some personal need he might have, he has the potential of becoming a good controlled agent for KUBARK. He is intelligent and by nature he seems to instinctively conduct his clandestine operations in a secure manner.

Andrew S. Parmers
OTR Training Officer

C# 101331

Close file

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Sonto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Sonto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PERUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.

FEB 25 10 AM '63

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff — Date

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer — Date

C # 101331

Please file

18 February 1963

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FEB 25 [illegible]

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

Counter Intelligence Staff ______ Date ______

DDP Training & Qualifications
Review Officer ______ Date ______

15 March 1963
SAS 63-108

MEMORANDUM TO: WE/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mr. Wayne Corley

FROM : SAS/EOB

SUBJECT : Transfer of official 201 files

Transmitted herewith for your retention, action, and disposition are the following listed official 201 files:

LITAMIL-7	201-330173
LITAMIL-9	201-327609
AMSHOW-1	201-352935
AMFRASH-1	201-352934

E. E. Mulloy
SAS/EOB

MAR 15 4 32 PM '63

Distribution:
- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - SAS/EOB
- 1 - SAS/SECRETARIAT
- 1 - OPs SUPPORT
- 1 - WH/COP/CCO
- 1 - C/WH/REGISTRY
- 1 - C/CI/OA
- 1 - RID/FILES

Files for
M Sams
GAB

This illigible ~~[illegible]~~ form merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/MEXICO.

SECRET

15 March 1963
SAS 63-108

MEMORANDUM TO: WH/3/Mexico

ATTENTION : Mr. Wayne Carley

FROM : SAS/EOB

SUBJECT : Transfer of official 201 files

Transmitted herewith for your retention, action, and disposition are the following listed official 201 files:

LITAMIL-7	201-330173
LITAMIL-9	201-327609
[illegible]-1	201-352985
AMFRASK-1	201-352984

E. E. Mulley
SAS/EOB

MAR 15 4 32 PM '63

Distribution:
- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - SAS/EOB
- 1 - SAS/SECRETARIAT
- 1 - OPs SUPPORT
- 1 - WH/COP/CCO
- 1 - C/WH/REGISTRY
- 1 - C/CI/OA
- 1 - RID/FILES

Files for
M Barnes
GAB

This illegible ~~[illegible]~~ form merely transfers responsibility for this case from SAS to WH/3/MEXICO.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J. M.
J. MOUGHAN
SAS/OPS SPT
3E 14

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 Feb 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

The FBI report entitled Foreign Political Matters Cuba and sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961, could not be located in RID or SAS files. Three such reports dated 29 December 1961 with the same title were obtained, but the Subject was not referred to in any of the three reports.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

FEB 26 3 01 PM '63

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee

File
EAB
1 MAR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J. M.
J. MOUGHAN
SAS/OPS SPT
[illegible] 14

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 25 Feb 63

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				
2.				
3.				
4.				
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12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : LITAMIL/9, C - 101331

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Desmond FitzGerald
C/SAS

FEB 26 3 01 PM '63

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee

File
EAB
1 MAR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SAS - [illegible]

NUMBER
C-101331

SUBJECT
LITAMIL/9

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

Approval for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which CI Staff does not consider to have been accomplished.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pre

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
[illegible]

NUMBER	c-101331
SUBJECT	LITAMIL/9
REFERENCE:	Your Memorandum, Dated 25 July 1962

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

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/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	20 Feb 1963 pre

FORM 7-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 20 FEB 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR: OA / SP INQUIRY / GOV'T N. CHK	USE: AREA:
ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II	OTHER

REMARKS

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

~~as granted~~ ~~The~~ Approval ~~for~~ ~~Authorization~~ for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which ~~has not yet~~ CI Staff does not ~~accomplished to the satisfaction of CI Staff~~ consider to have been accomplished.

Edward L. Brown
SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 20 FEB 1963	CASE NO. C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES:	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES:	DATE	
SET UP FOR		OA		SP INQUIRY		GOV'T N. CHK
USE : AREA:						

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED: *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

POA is granted only for training of Subject.

~~as granted~~ Approval ~~for~~ ~~No designation~~ for operational use of Subject is deferred pending satisfactory resolution of derogatory information, which ~~has not yet been~~ CI Staff does not ~~accomplished to the satisfaction of CI Staff~~ consider to have been accomplished.

Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

[illegible] 26 0272 [illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 34586

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1536

CYROSE ✓

REF ✓ DIR 19359 (Out 98071) ✓

✓ MEXI 2046 (IN 43354)

✓ [illegible] ([illegible])

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA MACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 63 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.83 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIKAYAK-2, LINUD-1, LITAMIL-10 3/2).

details about agents family history

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. ODIBEX (LINOTELE)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR POA PROCESSING.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, WH 7, S/C 2

[illegible] 26 0127Z 64
ROUTINE
IN 54586

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1536

CYROSE

REF: DIR 19359 (Out 98071)
MEXI 2346 (IN 43354)
MEXI 2444 (IN 45825)

1. LUIS ALBERU SOUTO CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE MEXI. BORN CIRCA 1915 OVIEDO SPAIN. FATHER: MAXIMINO ALBERU BORN COGNAC FRANCE. MOTHER: JOSEFINA SOUTO BORN LA CORUNA SPAIN. FATHER LIVING HAVA. NO FURTHER DATA MOTHER. IN 1949 MARRIED KLARA VERA HACZ STROSS BORN VIENNA AUSTRIA, BRITISH CITIZEN. DIVORCED 1956. NO CHILDREN. OCCUPATION: ARTIST. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE SINCE JUNE 1959. SALARY DEC 63 INCLUDING REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES: $292.83 "TAKE HOME" PAY. PRESENT ADDRESS: MICHELET 7 301, MEXICO, D.F. BROTHERS: ALBERTO MARRIED CONCEPCION "CONCHA" FERNANDEZ, CASTRO SECRETARY, LEONEL NOW LIVING MEXICO FORMERLY EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOVT. HAS TWO SISTERS NOW LIVING VIGA WHERE ONE CUBAN CONSUL THAT CITY. SPEAKS SPANISH FRENCH. (SOURCES: LIKAYAK-2, LIMUD-1, LITAMIL-10 3/2).

2. STATION TRACES REVEAL AMTORE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-7 ALL CONSIDER ALBERU ANTI-COMMUNIST. OBIDEN (LINOZZLE)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

REPORT DATED 25 AUG 59 STATES COL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY BELIEVES ALBERU COMMUNIST AND ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS CUBAN EMB STAFF. POUCHING PRQ PART I 27 JULY 62.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE STATUS ALSO TRACES FOR POA PROCESSING.

SECRET

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Sonto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Sonto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PERUVIAN cultural ~~attache in the Embassy~~ in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

________________________________ ______________
Counter Intelligence Staff Date

________________________________ ______________
DDP Training & Qualifications Date
Review Officer

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TSD/TRO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TRO

DDP/SAS/TRO/ODMcCollum:clo (18 Feb. 1963)

SECRET

18 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/Operations School
Chief, TSD Training

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Souto

1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Souto.

2. The objective of the training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.

3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques and include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.

4. Subject is a PBRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DPOB: 1915, Oviedo, Spain)

5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. R. Mulloy, extension 6172.

OSCAR D. MCCOLLUM
Training Officer/SAS

APPROVED:

Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONCURRENCES:

______________________________ ______________
Counter Intelligence Staff Date

______________________________ ______________
DDP Training & Qualifications Review Officer Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TSD/TRO
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/TRO

DDP/SAS/TRO/ODMcCollum:clo (18 Feb. 1963)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
29 August 1962 mu

TO:
TFW
Attn: H.E. Mulloy

C NO.
C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
[illegible] Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	BI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	[illegible]	☐	[illegible]
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/CA to discuss results of Field traces.

Joe

201-329604

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
29 August 1962 mm

TO:
TFW
Attn: H.E. Mulloy

C NO.
C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

[illegible] Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT:
LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	[illegible]	☐	[illegible]
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/CA to discuss results of Field traces.

Joe

201-329606

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 mu

TO: TFW
Attn: E. E. Mulloy

C NO. C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICES: [illegible]

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significence of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 September 1962 mu
TO: TFW Attn: E. E. Mulloy	C NO. C-101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICES: [illegible]

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significence of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 8-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

SECRET

Chief, CI/OA 30 AUG 1962

Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject, However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 28 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 28 December 1961, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Heintzel
for Victor R. White

SECRET

SECRET

Chief, CI/OA 30 AUG 1962

Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

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4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Hunting
/ Victor R. White

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 [illegible]

TO: TFW

Attn: E. Z. Mulloy

C NO. C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 September 1962 mu

TO: TFW

Attn: E. Z. Mulloy

C NO. C-101331

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: LITA IL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
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☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☒	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment and advise CI/CA of significence of the information.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

[illegible]

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 31 AUG 1962	CASE NO. C-10/331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR ☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK			USE : AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL FOR [illegible] *(No notice to division)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	✓	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST #1 TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment & advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

Note to Proc. Unit:

Pls. attach copy of S.O. memo.

Thomas Carroll, Jr

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 31 AUG 1962	CASE NO. C-10331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE : AREA:
	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to division)*		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	✓	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

REMARKS

Please locate FBI reports referred to in attachment & advise CI/OA of significance of the information.

Note to Proc. Unit:

Pls. attach copy of S.O. memo.

Thomas Carroll, Jr

SIGNATURE

FORM 8-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (29)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

T20 aug

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 30 AUG 1962

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

2. On 31 July 1962 your office was advised telephonically that Office of Security indices contained no record of the Subject.

3. On 17 August 1962 you were advised that the FBI has not conducted an investigation on the Subject. However, the FBI made reference to data re "Foreign Political Matters-Cuba" which was sent to this Agency on 26 December 1961. The date of said report is not given, however, it is known that the FBI has provided this Agency with numerous reports so captioned, on a continuous basis. Office of Security indices were searched for the above referenced report received on 26 December 1962, with negative results. Therefore, it is assumed it is available in RID, TFW or WH Division files.

4. No further action is contemplated in this case unless otherwise requested by your office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Heinbaugh
for Victor R. White

AUG 30 2 59 PM '62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

T20 ay

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 30 AUG 1962

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: C-101331
#279 089

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 27 July 1962 wherein Provisional Operational Approval interest, only, was indicated for possible use of Subject as an agent in Mexico by TFW under Project JMATE.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert L. Heinbaugh
f Victor R. White

AUG 30 2 59 PM '62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: TFW Attn: R.E. Mulley	DATE 29 August 1962
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	C NO. C-101331
	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of Field traces.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: TFW Attn: F.E. Mulley	DATE 29 August 1962 mr
	C NO. C-101331
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: LITAMIL/9

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of Field traces.

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 22 Aug '62

CASE NO. C - 101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

☐	EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR	☐ OA ☐ SP ENQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK		USE : AREA:
☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
	REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☑	OTHER

REMARKS

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of field traces.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 22 Aug '62

CASE NO.: C-101331

SET UP FOR P.O.A.

EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE
SET UP FOR ☐ OA ☐ SP ENQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK	USE: AREA:
☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED:	☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA *(Notice to division)* *(See "Remarks" for reason)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRO I ☐ PRO II	☑ OTHER

REMARKS

Please come to CI/OA to discuss results of field traces.

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

NO. 101331

DATE 10 August 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. TFW		17 Aug 62	J.M.
2.			
3. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 16		22 Aug '62	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the require-ments of Para. (a) 5a (2) CSI 10- dated 16 September 1958, please re the attachments or dossier o Subject in FI/D and advise CI/OA i writing as to the significance o the information [illegible] as to its effect on the use of th Subject in the operational capacit requested.

[illegible]

1-3 DOSSIER ON SUBJECT WAS REVIEWED BY THE UNDERSIGNED IN FI/D AND FOUND TO BE NON-DEROGATORY. FYI COLLATERAL REFERENCES WERE ALSO REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE NDI.

J. Moughan
17 August 1962

AUG 17 3 14 PM '62

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/OA

NO. 101331

DATE 10 August 62

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. TFW		17 Aug62	J.M.
2.			
3. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 16		23 Aug '62	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the requirements of Para. (a) 5a (2) CSI 10-7 dated 16 September 1958, please re [illegible] the attachments of dossier o [illegible] Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA i writing as to the significance of [illegible] its effect on the use of th Subject in the operational capacit requested.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1-3 DOSSIER ON SUBJECT WAS REVIEWED BY THE UNDERSIGNED IN FI/D AND FOUND TO BE NON-DEROGATORY. FYI COLLATERAL REFERENCES WERE ALSO REVIEWED AND FOUND TO BE NDI.

J. Moughan
17 August 1962

AUG 17 3 14 PM '62

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: TF4/CPS/Support
GE 5512

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/OA 2B 16				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
2.				

0 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : **Luis ALBERU Souto C-101331**

Attached herewith for your retention are two copies of PRQ Part I prepared on the above listed subject.

William K. Harvey
Chief
Task Force W

Attachments:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att

File
9 Aug 62
EBS

Aug 6 4 32 PM '62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: TSD/CPS/Support
GE 5512

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/OA 2B 16				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
2.				

0 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

6 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : **Luis ALBERU Souto C-101331**

Attached herewith for your retention are two copies of PRQ Part I prepared on the above listed subject.

William K. Harvey
Chief
Task Force W

Attachments:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att

AUG 6 4 32 PM '62

File
9 Aug 62
E

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-19455

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
27 July 1962

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

RE "201" - CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

REFERENCES
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

C-101331

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att
2 - Files

201-329609

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET **DUPLICATE**

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

RI NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.*
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Sex)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoderate vices.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
9h. COLOR OF HAIR [illegible]	9i. COLOR OF EYES		9j. TEETH		9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

FORM 7-58 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4-20)

SECRET

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)* [illegible]

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible] - Dec. [illegible] - visit relatives [illegible] business reasons.
until [illegible] 1962

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]	2. TITLE [illegible]	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* [illegible]

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

[illegible]

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Not known

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X						X	
[illegible]	X							

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Radio

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Not known					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	2- EMPLOYER [illegible]	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK [illegible]	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]
2	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1- INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2- EMPLOYER	3- ADDRESS
	4- TYPE OF WORK	5- SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	6- REASON FOR LEAVING

SECRET 3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION IX. MARITAL STATUS

1- CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2- STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3- NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)
[illegible]

4- DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	5- PLACE OF MARRIAGE [illegible], Mexico
6- DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	7- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
8- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]	9- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10- PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
[illegible]

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
None					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI FATHER

1- FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH French
5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6- OCCUPATION [illegible]	7- PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]	

SECTION XII MOTHER

1- FULL NAME [illegible]	2. YEAR OF BIRTH	3- PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]	4- NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]
5- SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6- OCCUPATION [illegible]	7- PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SE

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Leon[illegible] Alberu [illegible]					
[illegible]					
2 Sisters					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1- NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Alberu (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban

2- RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3- NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4- NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1- LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza Proenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE Clyde K. SHRYOCK

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE 27 July 62 cjb

PROJECT JMATE

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101331
ND.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST ☒ POA ☐ OA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CAT

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date)

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY 8 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT TFW - Mexico

5. USE OF SUBJECT agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	X	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		X
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	X	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		X

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA (Explain fully)

7. RI TRACES NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES NDI

9. FIELD TRACES see attached

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P. O. A.
CI/OA Advised ____________
Date ____________

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

FORM 8-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET.

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 26 July 68	CASE NO.
SET UP FOR P.O.A.		
(✓) EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 8 Aug 68	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE	
SET P	SP INQUIRY	GOV'T N. CHK	USE : AREA:

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
[illegible] (No notice to division)	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER CI/OA (Notice to division) (See "Remarks" for reason)	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	OTHER

REMARKS

Area — Mexico
Use — agent.

Please make
1 thermo

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (31)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HMMA-19455

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Luis ALBERU Souto

ACTION REQUIRED
POA on Subject

REFERENCES
GYROSE
MEXI-1506

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DATE
27 July 1962

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

C-101331

There are attached copies of a PRQ, Part I on Subject. A POA is requested.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - C/Task Force W w/2 att
2 - C/WHD w/2 att
2 - Files

201-329609

53

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET **DUPLICATE**

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

NO.

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Sex)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known immoral vices.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

Not known

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH		9k. BUILD		9l. POSTURE

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Has pock marks on face.

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

FORM 7-59 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)*

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible]

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
1. PRESENT OCCUPATION	2. TITLE	3. SALARY *(Per annum)*

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

[illegible]

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

Not known

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X							
[illegible]	X							

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic

SECRET

SECTION VI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Not known

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
[illegible]					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*) [illegible]	2. EMPLOYER [illegible]		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	6. REASON FOR LEAVING

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECTION IX.

MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK ONE: SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED ☐

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)
[illegible]

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
[illegible]

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
[illegible], Mexico

6. DATE OF BIRTH

7. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
[illegible]

9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

10. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
[illegible]

SECTION X

CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI

FATHER

1. FULL NAME
[illegible]

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
French

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION
[illegible]

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE
[illegible]

SECTION XII

MOTHER

1. FULL NAME
[illegible]

2. YEAR OF BIRTH

3. PLACE OF BIRTH
[illegible]

4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
[illegible]

5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

6. OCCUPATION
[illegible]

7. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SE

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]					
[illegible]					
? Sister					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1- NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE; INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Concepcion Fernandez de Albere (sister-in-law), employed by Cuban

2- RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Sister - Cuban Consul in Vigo, Spain.

3- NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

4- NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1- LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

Teresa Proenza Proenza - Cuban Cultural Attache

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

Carried Cuban Diplomatic Passport #D/59/543

DATE [illegible]

SIGNATURE Clyde K. SHRYOCK

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 27 July 62 cjb

TO : Deputy Director of Security

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 101331

ND.

PROJECT: JMATE

1. TYPE OF REQUEST
☒ POA ☐ OA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CRC

2. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY *(Date)*

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY
8 Aug 62

4. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
TFW - Mexico

5. USE OF SUBJECT
agent

6. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION	X	
B. C.I.A. INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION		X
C. SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM	X	
D. SUBJECT AWARE OF C.I.A. INTEREST IN HIM		X

E. LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT
None

F. SUGGESTED "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. REASON FOR NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA *(Explain fully)*

7. RI TRACES
NDI

8. DIVISION TRACES
NDI

9. FIELD TRACES
see attached

10. GREEN LIST INITIATED ☒ YES ☐ NO

11. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ PART 1 ☒ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER:

12. REMARKS

P. O. A.
CI/OA Advised ________
Date ________

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

/s/ Thomas Carroll, Jr.

INITIALS

FORM 8-61 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET.

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 26 July 62

CASE NO.

SET UP FOR P.O.A. ✓

(✓) EXPEDITE INDICES: DATE 8 Aug 62

EXPEDITE FBI INDICES: DATE

SET P

SP INQUIRY

GOV'T R. CHK

USE :
AREA:

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
[illegible] DATED (No notice to division)	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER CI/OA (Notice to division) (See "Remarks" for reason)	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FOR FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	OTHER

REMARKS

Area — Mexico
Use — Agent.

Please make
1 thermo

SIGNATURE

FORM 4-61 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (21)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J.M.
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

NO.

DATE 26 JULY 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				DEADLINE 8 AUG 62
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
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9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
- ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9 ✓

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

MEXICO

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XXX398	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127398

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

☐ LIST SOURCES CHECKED: PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES

☐ NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
H.E. MULLOY H E Mulloy	7616	WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michelet 7301. Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kacs Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: J.M.
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

NO.

DATE
26 JULY 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CHIEF, CI/OA 2B - 11				DEADLINE 8 AUG 62
2.				
3.				
4.				
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14.				
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FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

GPO 1961 0-

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 25 JULY 1962

TO:
☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
J. MOUGHAN
TFW/OPS SPT
GH 5512

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis ALBERU Souto

PROJECT: JMATE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LITAMIL/9 ✓

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒ PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS
☐ PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: MEXICO

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE:

FI ASSET MEXICO

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒ PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED
☐ PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED
☐ PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
XXX398N LIST ATTACHED, NO: 127398

6. RI TRACES

☐ NO RECORD
☐ WILL FORWARD
☒ NON-DEROGATORY
☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐ NO RECORD
☐ WILL FORWARD
☒ NON-DEROGATORY
☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFO.
☐ LIST SOURCES CHECKED
☐ NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐ WILL FORWARD
☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

PLS SEE ATTACHMENT FOR FIELD TRACES

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: H.E. MULLOY H E Mulloy

EXTENSION: 7646

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: WILLIAM K. HARVEY

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1-62

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

PRQ PART I

Name	Luis ALBERU Souto
DPOB	1915, Oviedo, Spain
Citizenship	Cuban
Residence	Michelet 7301. Mexico
Occupation	Cuban Cultural Attache in Mexico
Father	Maximino ALBERU, born Cognac, France
Mother	Josefina SOUTO, born La Coruna, Spain
Wife	Klara Vera Kacs Stross, born Vienna, Austria, British citizen. Married 1949, Divorced 1956.

SECRET

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

It is requested that a report be sent to the Mexico Desk regarding the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject. The OA was initially requested on 24 June 1963.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

MAY 4 12 [illegible] '64

File per E.P.B.
6 May 64
emc

SECRET

22 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : LITAMIL-9
(C-101331)

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John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

MAY 1 12 23 PM '64

Tele fr E.P.B.
6 May 64
emc

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

26 JULY 1962

FIELD TRACES

LUIS ALBERU SOUTO

MEXICO STATION TRACES REVEAL THAT AMSTOKE-1, LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3 AND LITAMIL-7 CONSIDER ALBERU TO BE ANTI-COMMUNIST. AN ARMY REPORT DATED 25 AUGUST 1959, STATED THAT COLONEL ARTURO CORONA, G-2 MEXICAN ARMY, BELIEVED ALBERU TO BE A COMMUNIST AND ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY STAFF. THIS WAS REPORTED IN MEXI 1506, DATED 26 JULY 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
CHIEF
TASK FORCE W

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1 ~~[illegible]~~	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1305, 4 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, CI/CA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

File

5 JUN 1964

S E C R E T 041616Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO HAGU CITE MEXI 9736

PBRUMEN

REF DIR 25583

(101331

4 Jun 64 IN 28318

1. WHEN QUERIED BY C/O LITAMIL-9 REPORTED 1 JUNE FIRM CONVICTION MARISTANY COULD BE RECRUITED, EXPRESSED GREAT SURPRISE ODYOKE HAD NOT RECRUITED HIM YEARS AGO, SUGGESTED CARLOS PRIO WOULD MAKE EXCELLENT RECRUITER. ACCORDING L-9 MARISTANY HAS NO TAINT OF COMMUNISM, IS CULTURED PERSON OF DIFFERENT BREED FROM LATTER DAY CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND PROBABLY FEELS REVULSION FOR REGIME.

2. ACCORDING LITAMIL-3, WHO HAS GOOD ACCESS, MARISTANY AND WIFE NOW VACATIONING ACAPULCO.

3. WIFE IS MEXICAN CITIZEN, COUPLE EXPECTED REMAIN IN MEXICO APPROX ONE MONTH. MEXI CAN PITCH SUBJECT THROUGH LITAMIL-3 OR CAN USE L-3 TO SET HIM UP FOR OUTSIDE RECRUITER. IN LATTER CASE SUGGEST RECRUITER TRAVEL MEXI SOONEST. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1 ~~[illegible]~~	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT:1305, 4 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, C/CA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, VR

File

5 JUN 1964

S E C R E T 041616Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 9736

PBRUMEN

REF DIR 25608

4 Jun 64 IN 98318

101331

1. WHEN QUERIED BY C/O LITAMIL-9 REPORTED 1 JUNE FIRM CONVICTION MARISTANY COULD BE RECRUITED, EXPRESSED GREAT SURPRISE ODYOKE HAD NOT RECRUITED HIM YEARS AGO, SUGGESTED CARLOS PRIO WOULD MAKE EXCELLENT RECRUITER. ACCORDING L-9 MARISTANY HAS NO TAINT OF COMMUNISM, IS CULTURED PERSON OF DIFFERENT BREED FROM LATTER DAY CUBAN DIPLOMATS AND PROBABLY FEELS REVULSION FOR REGIME.

2. ACCORDING LITAMIL-3, WHO HAS GOOD ACCESS, MARISTANY AND WIFE NOT VACATIONING ACAPULCO.

3. WIFE IS MEXICAN CITIZEN, COUPLE EXPECTED REMAIN IN MEXICO APPROX ONE MONTH. MEXI CAN PITCH SUBJECT THROUGH LITAMIL-3 OR CAN USE L-3 TO SET HIM UP FOR OUTSIDE RECRUITER. IN LATTER CASE SUGGEST RECRUITER TRAVEL MEXI SOONEST. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : [illegible]/o
C-101331

With reference to your memorandum dated 22 April 1964, requesting a report on the status of the Operational Approval action on Subject, a memorandum setting forth this information was forwarded to your office on 18 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA and was again forwarded to your office for your retention on 27 November 1963. It was returned to CI/OA a second time without comment on 11 December 1963, whereupon it was filed in Subject's folder in this office. No further approval action has been taken in this matter for the reasons explained in the memorandum.

EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/EPB:jas

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3

ATTENTION : Mr. John M. Whitten

SUBJECT : [illegible]/o
C-101331

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EDWARD P. BROWN
Chief, CI/OA

CI/OA/EPB:jes

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI, TSD 6, WE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 232232Z

6 APR 1964

IN 53965

DIR CITE MEXI 3933

File

C-101331

TYPIC

REF DIR 29271

1. (ON 9 MAR A MADAME BOYER AND UNIDEN MAN CALLED ON RAUL APARICIO, CUBAN CULTURAL COUNSELOR. BOYER TOLD APARICIO SHE RECENTLY CAME FROM CUBA, PLANNING 4 MONTH TRIP THRU ALL COUNTRIES LATIN AMERICA TO COMPILE INFO FOR BOOK SHE PLANNING PUBLISH. WANTED TO READ BOOKS ABOUT EACH COUNTRY BEFORE GOING AND ASKED APARICIO HELP OBTAINING THEM. PLANNED RETURN CUBA SOON WITH BOOKS. APARICIO NOT INFORMED THAT BOYER COMING MEXI BUT OFFERED ASSISTANCE INTRODUCED HER TO LITAMIL-9 AND AMBASSADOR'S WIFE.

2. BOYER SAID SHE BORN UNITED STATES, MARRIED FRENCHMAN, NOW DIVORCED BUT HAS FRENCH NATIONALITY. MAIDEN NAME HUNGARIAN "[illegible]SSAN" (PHONETIC). MOTHER RUSSIAN, GRANDPARENTS CAME TO U.S. BEFORE WAR (SIC). BOYER LIVED PARIS AND 7 YEARS ITALY. SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ACCENT AND SOME DIFFICULTY. (SOURCE: DELAYED MXTRAP TRANSCRIPT).

3. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS ONE BOYER KATZANDER, FRENCH TURISTA WITH SAME PASSPORT DEENA BOYER LEFT MEXI FOR HAVA 15 MAR. WILL

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

PLACE ON WATCHLIST AND QUERY LITAMIL-9. IF BOYER RETURNS MEXI, STATION CAN PROVIDE ASSET TO APPROACH. ASSUME HQS DESIRES RECRUITMENT PITCH BUT REQUEST MORE DETAILS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE STA CAN LOCATE AND IDENTIFY (DINAH BOYERE).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH/SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6, WE 4, WH 7, VR

SECRET 232238Z 6 APR 1964

IN 53965

DIR CITE MEXI 3933

File

TYPIC

REF DIR 89271

C-101331

1. ON 9 MAR A MADAME BOYER AND UNIDEN MAN CALLED ON RAUL APARICIO, CUBAN CULTURAL COUNSELOR. BOYER TOLD APARICIO SHE RECENTLY CAME FROM CUBA, PLANNING 4 MONTH TRIP THRU ALL COUNTRIES LATIN AMERICA TO COMPILE INFO FOR BOOK SHE PLANNING PUBLISH. WANTED TO READ BOOKS ABOUT EACH COUNTRY BEFORE GOING AND ASKED APARICIO HELP OBTAINING THEM. PLANNED RETURN CUBA SOON WITH BOOKS. APARICIO NOT INFORMED THAT BOYER COMING MEXI BUT OFFERED ASSISTANCE INTRODUCED HER TO LITAMIL-9 AND AMBASSADOR'S WIFE.

2. BOYER SAID SHE BORN UNITED STATES, MARRIED FRENCHMAN, NOW DIVORCED BUT HAD FRENCH NATIONALITY. MAIDEN NAME HUNGARIAN "KASSAN" (PHONETIC). MOTHER RUSSIAN, GRANDPARENTS CAME TO U.S. BEFORE WAR (SIC). BOYER LIVED PARIS AND 7 YEARS ITALY. SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ACCENT AND SOME DIFFICULTY. (SOURCE: DELAYED MXTRAP TRANSCRIPT).

3. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS ONE BOYER MATZANDER, FRENCH TURISTA WITH SAME PASSPORT DEENA BOYER LEFT MEXI FOR HAVA 15 MAR. WILL

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
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Copy No.

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SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE STA CAN LOCATE AND IDENTIFY (DINAH BOYERE).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT, WH 7, VR

5 MAR 1964

SECRET 031929Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8478 C-101331

TYPIC AMROD

1. FOLLOWING FROM LITAMIL-9 NIGHT 1-2 MARCH. IN 31542

2. RAMON SINOBAS, WIFE, TWO CHILDREN ARRIVED MEXI 1 MARCH EN ROUTE TAKE UP NEW POST EMBASSY SANTIAGO CHILE. WIFE DESCRIBED AS COMMON, "CHEAP".

3. ELENA VASQUEZ GOMEZ, "LOVER" OF TERESA PROENZA HAS RETURNED FROM CUBA, SAYS TERESA WILL PROBABLY WORK IN CUBA BUT MAY MAKE TRIP TO MEXI SOON.

4. ENRIQUE GONZALEZ CASANOVA BACK FROM CUBA, SAYS HE SAW TERESA AT PARTY ATTENDED BY RUAL ROA AND JOAQUIN ORDOQUI AMONG OTHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT, WH 7, VR

5 MAR 1964

S E C R E T 031939Z

DIR CITE MEXI 8478 C-101331

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S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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104-10176-10222

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

LIRING-3

Vol. VI

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3 VOL VI

201-0798301

INCLUSIVE DATES: 7 Jan 1969 -- 10 May 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
17 JUL 1978		Edwin J. Lopez	Edwin Juan Lopez
20 Dec.		Edwin J Lopez	Edwin J Lopez

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1 DOC ENCLOSED
201-0798361
VOL 6 TO SecState
Wash. D.C.
FROM AmEmb Mexico City
Unclassified Telegram 1631
3627 PEEL OFF LABEL AND REUSE ENVELOPE 29/3/69

Re Visa application

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

1. Forwarded herewith for Headquarters information and files is an Agent Service Record on LIRING-3.

2. As Addressees are aware, Wallace P. ROWTON recruited and formerly handled LIRING-3 for the Mexico City Station. Prior to ROWTON's PCS departure from Mexico City in July 1969, it was decided, after some discussion, to effect a turnover of LIRING-3, rather than terminate him. Although LIRING-3 apparently had been well "burned" with the Cubans, he seemed to have maintained good contacts with members of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) of Guatemala. In addition, in May and June of this year, he had begun to develop access to some Panamanian revolutionaries of interest. It was therefore decided to run LIRING-3 on a trial basis to determine whether he could be used effectively against Central American revolutionary targets, despite his problems with the Cubans.

3. ROWTON introduced Leonard S. TORMET, in alias, to LIRING-3 on 1 July 1969. Although ROWTON had represented himself to LIRING-3 as a Greek businessman, it was decided that it would be preferable to "clear the air" somewhat with LIRING-3, at least by making it

......Continued

Attachments:
1.Agent Service Record - Herewith
2.IDENTITY Sheet - Under Separate Cover

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 3 [illegible]

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD, w/att 1, 3 cys (h/w); w/att 2 (u/s/c)
1 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att 2 only (u/s/c)

2 atts:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[illegible]	HMMA-37739	21 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-795301

14-00000

clear that he was in touch with a WOLADY organization. Nonetheless, no specific explanation was given LIRING-3 of his sponsor and he requested none. LIRING-3 was told that TORMET would be seeing him for some months, since ROWTON was leaving the country for an indefinite period.

4. LIRING-3 was told that although TORMET was trusted by ROWTON and collaborated with him, he represented a different organization. LIRING-3 was also told that although he had in the past been receiving between 3,000.00 and 3,500.00 Mexican pesos per month on an informal basis, TORMET's organization felt that 1,500 Mexican pesos per month ($120.00) would be a fair salary at this stage of the operation. TORMET explained that he was aware of LIRING-3's past activities directed against the Cubans, and the resultant problems which had arisen. It was explained that TORMET's interest was in Central American revolutionary activities. In order to deal with LIRING-3's virtual "burned" status with the Cubans, he was directed to tell any Central American contacts that the Cubans no longer trusted him, and that he therefore was no longer directly involved with any revolutionary groups or activities. Nonetheless, LIRING-3 was directed to offer any assistance which he could provide to any revolutionaries, on the basis of his leftist beliefs and the friendships which he had made with FAR members while in prison in Guatemala. It would then be a matter of time before we could learn whether LIRING-3 was completely blacklisted in all revolutionary circles because of his problems with the Cubans or whether he could provide information of value.

5. LIRING-3 throughout the meeting seemed in good spirits and he seemed to accept the turnover without any qualms. Indeed, he pointed out that the Cubans had lost trust in him only after he had been given various tasks to do by ROWTON which he had known and warned in advance would cause suspicion. It was agreed that LIRING-3's troubles were not of his own making, but that at this stage all that could be done was to attempt to circumvent the existing problems.

6. LIRING-3 was given a Station non-attributable telephone number and false name to ask for (Identity) to set up meetings with TORMET. Only the meeting time was to be set by phone, and a prearranged pickup point was decided upon. It should be noted that TORMET's QP vehicle was used for this first meeting with LIRING-3, which means it was of course exposed to LIRING-3.

7. Subsequent to this meeting, LIRING-3 never initiated contact with the Station. Although he might have lost the new telephone number he was given to use with TORMET, there is no indication he ever again tried to call ROWTON, who was in Mexico for at least three weeks after the 1 July turnover to TORMET.

8. The Station assumes that for whatever reasons, LIRING-3 has in effect terminated himself. Given the nature of this case--the fact that LIRING-3 was denounced in Cuban official circles as a RVROCK agent, the fact that LIRING-3 in over two years was never very productive and now the apparent decision of LIRING-3 to break off contact--it has been decided to make no effort to reestablish contact with him.

for Horace E. PRALLETT

201-735821

SECRET

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LIRING-3

2. Project: [illegible]

3. Agent Recruited By: Wallace P. ROWTON

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Access agent to Cuban Embassy; Informant on Central American revolutionary groups and activities.
5. Rate of Pay: Did not receive regular salary, but was given between 3000 and 3500 Mexican pesos per month.(Equivalent to $240 to $280).
6. Other Commitments: None

7. Agent Dismissed By: Leonard S. TORMET. Dismissal effective 1 July 1969.

8. Reason for Dismissal: Agent in effect terminated himself, since he failed to initiate contact with Station after being turned over to TORMET by ROWTON.

9. Security Risks: LIRING-3 was not made witting of KUBARK interest in this case. He knew both ROWTON and TORMET in alias. No safehouses were exposed to LIRING-3. LIRING-3 was met once in TORMET's QF vehicle.

10. Security Risks:

11. Manner of Dismissal: As stated above, no direct dismissal was made, since LIRING-3 broke off contact with the Station.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: No

13. Cost of Termination: None

14. Station Case Officer: Leonard S. TORMET Leonard S. Tormet
(Signature in Pseudonym)
Acting
15. Chief of Station: Horace E. F[illegible]
(Signature Pseudonym)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-37739

IDENTITY:

14-54-49, "Sr. Zuniga"

CS COPY

SECRET

S/C ATT 1 TO HMMA 37739

201-798501

34

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 2 - 79[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO. 2 - 812145
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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FROM 40

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INFO FILE, VR, 5006, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

MEXI

S E C R E T 040003Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2372

4 AUG 67 IN 25197

1P

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PHOTO LEONARDO (CASTILLO) JOHNSON, CHIEF SAN MARCO GUERRILLA AREA, GUATEMALA, SHOWN LIRING-3 WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE. LIRING-3 STATED HOWEVER THAT MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL TOLD HIM 31 JULY THAT CASTILLO HAD BEEN KILLED. OROZCO ALSO IMPLIED DAVID (CASASOLA) MEJIA ALSO DEAD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AR FI
DE
ABSTRACT ✓

201- 798301

201 - 812145

REJECTED FOR MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B201-812145

201-798301

4 AUG 67

LIRING-3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

JURADO, CARLOS
201-798301
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-016
HMM -13035
10 MAY 72
P2

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO MBR OF THE COALITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS OF MEXICO. HAS INITIATED CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF THE CURRENT LEFTIST STUDENT STRUGGLE.

R 7206051060

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 798301

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INFO WHS, RI/AN

S E C R E T 271602Z SEP 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9511

GUAT

27 SEP 68 IN 01147

C

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 36584

1. MEXICO CITY 7555 NOT RECEIVED BY GUATEMALA CITY.

2. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

AN ee
AB X
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201-798301
27 Sept 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: Marvin Francis/lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 4167:1973
DATE: 4 October 1968

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CITE DIRECTOR 38881

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO: MEXICO CITY 04 20 23z OCT 68

WH/6 file:
LIRING-3
201

REFS: A. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)*

B. DIRECTOR 36584**

1. APPRECIATE REF A RESPONSE. AGREE WE DO NOT WANT SURFACE WOFIRM INTEREST LIRING-3 OR WIFE TO GUATS IF CAN BE AVOIDED.

2. REF B WAS SENT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH LIRING-3'S CASE OFFICER, ROWTON WHO STILL TDY HQS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ROWTON, HOWEVER, WE PREFER GUAT STATION TAKE NO ACTION ON REFERENCE B REQUEST UNTIL ROWTON RETURNS MEXICO. HE CAN THEN ATTEMPT OBTAIN UPDATED READING ON LIRING-3 STATUS FROM LIRING-4 OR OTHER SOURCE, AFTER WHICH ROWTON AND MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DECIDE IF ESMAJOR-20 INTERVENTION WARRANTED.

3. INDEX 201-248917, 201-798301.

END OF MESSAGE

201-798301

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 38881

TO

WH/1 COMMENT: *Indicated liaison contact [illegible] could attempt intercede on LIRING-3's behalf to learn when his trial would take place or possibly to obtain his release. Station reluctant surface WOFIRM interest however without Mexico City Station concurrance.

**Headquarters commented on fact LIRING-4 recently took up residence in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City because lacked funds pay rent. Also asked Guatemala Station if could arrange for early release LIRING-3 and associate from jail through high level Guat official.

SM

DEC 4 72

Calvin H. Smythe
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG/[redacted]
WH/2/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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24 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: WH/1 (Marvin Francis)

SUBJECT: 17 September 1968 discussion with DRISCOLL re LIRING/3 & LIRING/4.

PARTICIPANTS: DRISCOLL, KERBE, FRANCIS and Laurence PIPER (C/WH/2/G).

1. LIRING/4 is still very concerned about the imprisonment of LIRING/3. LIRING/4 will not travel to Cuba until she is assured of the safety of LIRING/3. DRISCOLL has thoroughly discussed L/3 with L/4 and has pointed out the danger of attempting to intercede on L/3's behalf through business contacts. L/4 contacted the Cubans for assistance but they stated there was nothing they could do. They have assisted L/4 with small amounts of money. L/3 has devised an open code which he uses in letters to let L/4 know how he is. The letters are grim reading because L/3 keeps stating he is unable to hold out much longer. Fellow prisoners have warned L/4 not to let the Guats transfer him to another prison as this usually ends in the prisoner being shot "while escaping." One good result from the continued imprisonment of L/3 is that both he and L/4 are furthering their bona fides with the Cubans.

2. L/4 is in telephone contact with the Third Secretary of the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. He has made inquiries about L/3 with the Guats on behalf of Foreign Minister CARRILLO Flores. A few weeks ago (prior to the assasination of the U.S. Ambassador) the Third Secretary told L/4 there were three possibilities, the first which he considered out of the question was that L/3 would be shot, the second was that L/4 would come to trial and be released within a few weeks, and the third was that he would receive a sentence of two or three years. Just prior to departing Mexico on this current trip, DRISCOLL attempted to arrange a meet with L/4 in the usual means by slipping a typed note under her apartment door. She did not make the meeting. DRISCOLL later learned through phone tap material that she called the Cuban Embassy and informed them the

201-798501

Mexican authorities had notified her she was being fined 500 pesos. The purpose of the payment was not identified. Later she made a call from the Cuban Embassy which indicated she was staying there until she could get the funds to pay the Mexicans. DRISCOLL, therefore, concluded she had not returned to her apartment and did not get the note to make their meeting. DRISCOLL said SUAREZ (the visiting Cuba Cultural type) has a key to L/3's apartment and might see the note but would be unable to identify the sender since DRISCOLL uses a meaningless sc[illegible] as a signature.

3. DRISCOLL now plans upon his return to Mexico to recontact L/4 to get the latest reading on L/3's status in Guatemala. If the Mexican Charge is unable to obtain L/3's release in behalf of the Mexicans and if it appears he will be held indefinately, DRISCOLL wants to explore the possibility of our doing something to get L/3 out so the operation can become active again.

4. In the above regard L/3 was discussed with Mr. PIPER of the Guatemala desk. Mr. PIPER believed the Station has a high enough contact with the Guats (ESMAJOR/20-Presidents brother) to arrange to get L/3 and his Mexican compatriot out of prison and back to Mexico with a minimun security risk. DRISCOLL said he would initiate the cable upon his return to Mexico after he has talked with L/4. DRISCOLL felt he should possibly travel to Guatemala and have a preliminary meet with L/3 before Guat Station makes any all out effort to officially request L/3's release. If, after seeing L/3 DRISCOLL is satisfied that L/3 is still an ally and is willing to cooperate after his release then DRISCOLL believes we should attempt to have the Station intercede with ESMAJOR/20. Hopefully, ESMAJOR/20 will arrange the release so that all involved believe it has been done at the request and urging of the Mexican Government. DRISCOLL, however, would like L/3 and L/4 to believe he (DRISCOLL) had something to do with the release in order to raise his status with both for the sake of future operational tasks he will levy on them.

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INFO FILE, VR, C/FI/D, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 042307Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7486

DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

5 Oct 68 IN 06501

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 36584

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9517 (IN 02560)

C. HMMA 35522 PARA 5

WH/6 T/b: LIRING-3 201 WC

1. STATION WISHES TO REITERATE ONCE MORE ITS RELUCTANCE TO SOMEHOW TRY TO FREE LIRING-3 FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA CITY BY GOING TO LIAISON AND EXPOSING HIS WOFIRM CONNECTION. MEXICO CITY STATION IN AGREEMENT WITH REF B STATEMENT THAT MORE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE IF LIRING-3 WILL NOT BE RELEASED IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE WITHOUT INDICATING WOFIRM INTEREST. AS STATED IN REF C SUCH INDICATION IF IT LEAKED (AND STATION ASSUMES THIS POSSIBLE IN GUATEMALA) OR IF IT ATTRACTED SUSPICION GUAT REBELS, MEXICAN LEFTISTS OR PBRUMENERS WOULD RENDER FURTHER OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4 PROBLEMATIC. IT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT GUAT REBELS TO TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4. FURTHERMORE STATION NOT AT ALL SURE THAT FREEING LIRING-3 THROUGH INTERVENTION LIAISON MIGHT NOT JEOPARDIZE ROWTON SECURITY.

2. IF LIRING-3 RELEASED AFTER NORMAL TRIAL WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF OUTSIDE INFLUENCE STATION ASSUMES BOTH HE AND LIRING-4

SECRET

201-758301

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7486 SECRET

WILL HAVE INCREASED OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL. IF LIRING-3 NOT RELEASED IN NEAR FUTURE LIRING-4 MAY FIND ONLY WAY OUT HER CURRENT PREDICAMENT IS AT LEAST TEMPORARY RETURN TO PBRUMEN. SHE MIGHT AT THAT POINT BE AMENABLE UNDERTAKE MISSION SIMILAR TO THAT SHE PREVIOUSLY AGREEABLE ATTEMPT FOR WOFIRM.

3. STATION WOULD NATURALLY BE WILLING RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION RE LIRING-3 IF GUATEMALA CITY STATION COULD DETERMINE BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPROACH OF JUDGE THROUGH LIAISON WOULD NOT LEAK. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION GIVE SUCH ASSURANCE?

4. FILE 201-798301.

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SECRET 01 18 21z OCT 68 CITE DIRECTOR 99476

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

GUATEMALA CITY

WH/COG:
LIRING-3
201

PLS RELAY MEXICO CITY-7335 (IN 99476) TO GUATEMALA CITY FOR INFO. CY CABLE ATTACHED.

END OF MESSAGE

D C/WH/COG Paul Roberts

C/WH/2/G Eustriell

Calvin H. Smyth
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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REPORTING OFFICER Leonard [illegible]. TORMET	DATE OF REPORT 22 June 1971		NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Oliver N. SINDONE	PROJECT KDLADDER	1	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Roger T. KINGMAN	SOURCE CRYPT KDLADDER-2		TDCS DISSEMINATION

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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

HF= 35-4-3
FF= 35-4-100

This report was done to follow pattern of HMM-12,183 and same source description was used. The reference to the RGG has to indicate in some way a different source, since the description used on it is different. Not passed liaison.

RI please index the following:

BALCARCEL	- 201-160430
CARDOZA	- 201-042366
ALVARADO	- 201-065125
SOLORZANO	- 201-072176
RODRIGUEZ	- 201-244191
DIAZ	- 201-787386
PEREYRA	- 201-798301
ILLESCAS	- 201-764855
GOMEZ	- 201-251494
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35-4-100

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FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS

DATE DISTR.

COUNTRY Guatemala/Mexico

DOI June 1971

SUBJECT Organization of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) in Mexico

ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (11 June 1971) FIELD NO. HMM-12,647

SOURCE A member of the PCM who has good contacts with Guatemalan Communists in Mexico. Much of the information which he has provided has proved accurate.

1. The highest-ranking body of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) organization in Mexico is the "Delegation of the Central Committee." This body consists of Huberto Alvarado Arellano, Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, and Jose Luis Balcarcel Ordonez. (Field Comment: CS-311/03978-70 (HMM-12,183), from the same source as this report, reported on the make-up of the PGT organization in Mexico as of April 1970. Cardoza and Balcarcel made up the "Delegation of the Central Committee" at that time. TDCS-314/ -71 (HGG-), from a reliable source, provided the information that Alvarado, the Third Secretary of the PGT, planned to reside in Mexico for the immediate future.)

2. Balcarcel also heads the "Directive Committee" of the PGT organization in Mexico, which is responsible for determining what activities the local PGT organization will undertake and who will carry them out. The other members of the "Directive Committee" are Alfonso Solorzano Fernandez and Julio Rodriguez Aldana. (Source Comment: There has been no change in the membership of the "Directive Committee" since April 1970. Although Rodriguez occupies this leadership position, he has been relatively inactive in PGT affairs.)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3. There are currently two active cells under the guidance of the "Directive Committee:"

a. A "Propaganda Cell" headed by Carlos Caceres Ruiz, which also includes Solorzano and Horacio Landa Castaneda; and

b. A "Finance Cell" headed by Rodriguez, which also includes Elisa de Balcarcel, Mercedes de Pereyra, and Carlos Illescas Aguirre.

4. Ernesto Capuano del Vecchio, who was formerly a member of the "Finance Cell," now works directly under the "Directive Committee" and is not formally a member of the "Propaganda Cell," submitted his resignation from the PGT in April 1971. Raul Diaz Ramirez, who was also formerly a member of the "Propaganda Cell," has been temporarily separated from active participation in the ~~[illegible]~~.

5. Field Dissem: State (Also sent Guatemala City)

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S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0125

MEXI

DIRECTOR

8 May 69 IN 53298

M

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9830 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4343, 16 FEB 68

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

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SECRET

201-798301
8 May 69

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for reprocessing of
defective apertures

Mexi City
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG-A3

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36408, 11 February 1969

1. Forwarded attached as attachment #1 are ten contact reports written by Wallace B. ROWTON dated 11, 14, 15, and 19 February, 27 March, 8, 11, 21, and 25 April, and 5 May on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation.

2. The high points of ROWTON's reports are as follow:

a. LIRING-3 is intermittently in contact with "Romulo," whom he identified from a photograph produced by the Station as Mario Augusto FR MENDEZ. (201-850751)

Continued.....................

re: connection with 201-798301

Attachments:
1. Reports (10), h/w
2. Surveillance report, h/w
3. Identity sheet, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each atts 1 and 2; 3 copies att 3)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each atts 1 and 2; 2 copies att 3)

3 atts:

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 37136

DATE
14 May 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 37136

b. "Romulo," who made at least one trip "out of town" from 17 February to 2 April 1969 (possibly to Guatemala) during the period covered by ROWTON's reports, appears to belong to a faction of the Guatemalan FAR family disillusioned with PBRUMEN.

c. The only real service asked LIRING-3 by "Romulo" during the period under review was to put up an unidentified "comrade" scheduled to come to Mexico at a date which "Romulo" said he could not determine exactly. This "comrade" was not the young Guatemalan who dropped in on LIRING-3 for a couple of days mentioned in the report dated 25 April.

d. LIRING-3 continues to collect clear evidence that LIRING has done its best to denounce him as a suspicious element definitely not to be trusted (see reports dated 15 and 19 February).

3. Several attempts to tail "Romulo" did not produce particularly significant results. A pretext investigation of apartment 102 of Calle Coahuila, where LIRING-3 met "Romulo," produced the results contained in the Spanish language report dated 26 February forwarded as attachment #2. There were no traces on the Ines X*BASTON de X*PIMENTEL family. sex:F cit:Mexico A:Mexico

4. There is little question at this point that LIRING-3 is close to persona non grata with LIRING. Hence, his further usefulness against the PBRUMEN target is very limited. ROWTON has kept away from LIRING-4 since LIRING-3's release from prison in Guatemala. Although LIRING-4, following her father's death (see MEXICO CITY-0125), may visit her mother in PBRUMEN, she has no particular love for LIRING or the PBRUMEN authorities. On the Guatemalan side of this operation, the Station is, as it has done many times in the past, waiting for LIRING-3's Guatemalan contacts to make the next move.

Raymond A. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment #1 HMMA-37136

11 February 1969

55P

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1100, 11/2/69; Camino Real
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 14/2/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Submitted by Agent:

LIRING/3 told Rowton that there had been little or no developments since he last saw Rowton (21/1/69), just before Rowton had left on his business trip to Monterrey. He commented that he had felt it wiser not to take any initiative in seeking out his FAR friends or revisiting the LIRING office until Rowton had returned. He stated that his old Guatemalan friend, Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla, had called on him once in the company of Carlos Vega, but nothing significant had emerged from the casual conversation. Vega, at several points in the conversation, had mumbled something to Rodriguez about the "crisis" but nieher gave an explanation. L/3 told Rowton that he assumed that this remark referred to the current factionalism in the Guatemalan revolutionary struggle.

LIRING/3 then identified the attached photo of Mario Augusto Mendez Aguilar immediately at the first glance as that of "Rómulo", aka "Mario Mendez" and "Pavel." LIRING/3 did not recognize the photo Rowton showed him of Mario Otoniel Mendez Molina.

5. Guidance/Information Given to Agent:

Rowton told L/3 that according to the very sketchy information he had concerning Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar it appeared that the latter belogged to a strongly anti-PBRUMEN faction and that this would perhaps explain the turn-about of the LIRINGs after he, L/3, had indicated to LIRING/9 that he was in contact with "Pavel."

Rowton urged L/3 to seek out "Rómulo" at the calle Coahuila 221 safehouse, and, failing this, to recontact Humberto González Vega at his home on calle Manzanillo, in the hope that the latter could arrange a recontact with Mendez.

Wallace B Rowton

h/w att: 1
HMMA-37136

CS COPY

201-798301

14 February,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 14/2/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1100, 15/2/69; same place.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE: LIRING/3 told Rowton that his friend, Berta Wigisser has rented a furnished apartment that can be used by him and Rowton as a safehouse as soon as it is vacated by its present occupants. L/3 explained that these occupants are relatives of sra Wigisser who are visiting from Argentina but who are expected to return to their own country within the next ten days.
5. REPORTS/INFORMATION GIVEN BY AGENT:

L/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" (whom he identified from a photo as Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar) visited him at his home unannounced at about 2000 on 11 February and stayed until almost midnight.

According to L/3 Rómulo apologized for not having seen L/3 for so long (last date reported was 3/1/69) explaining that he was very busy. He then stated that he had recently seen and talked with Rodolfo Sandoval Alegría in the(Lucumberri)prison and was pleasantly surprised to learn that Sandoval knew L/3 and spoke very highly of him. Rómulo then went on to say that he had known Sandoval many years and had actually been his deputy in Guatemala. Rómulo recalled that when he was last arrested (he explained parenthetically that he had been arrested four times in all) he was tortured in an effort to make him reveal the whereabouts of Sandoval. He claimed to L/3 that he finally,to avoid execution, gave a false address- that of one of Sandoval's relatives.

L/3 told Rowton that he then took the occasion to tell Rómulo of the harrassment he was being subjected to by various persons whom he felt were being inspired by the Chief LIRING. L/3 told Rowton that Rómulo then asked him what the false charges brought against him were. L/3 told Rómulo the truth, saying that he kept getting reports that he was regarded as a LCFIRM agent. According to L/3.Rómulo exclaimed that he should pay no attention to that sort of slander since the LIRING office was always trying to neutralize persons and groups not acting under their control. He added that the people who really count in the struggle were used to such nonsense and were aware of what the LIRINGs were up to. He added that as soon as Sandoval got out of prison he would "straighten some of those people out" since he was personally aware of L/3's motives and activities before his trip to the border. When L/3 mentioned his contacts with Carlos Vega (always at the latter's initiative), Rómulo described him as "Pastelito, a very sectarian sneaky pro-LIRING bastard". He said he would like L/3 to arrange a meeting with Vega so that he could burst in and confront him with the facts. Regarding Humberto González Vega, Rómulo said that he was a good "elemento" and had suffered a great deal for the cause, but at the moment was more or less out of the picture. He saw no need for L/3 to be in contact with him. When L/3 expressed a desire to have some way of contacting Rómulo, the latter promised to give him his home address as soon as he move to a better place. He explained that at the moment he was living in a furnished room. At the end of the talk, when Rómulo asked when they could get together again, explaining that he might have to go down to Orizaba over the week-end, L/3 told Rowton that he made a date for 1900 on 14/2/69. L/3 then suggested that they meet outside so as not to involve his wife (L/3 told Rowton that he did this so that Rowton would have a chance to observe Rómulo in some public place), and Rómulo agreed but said he had a better suggestion. He then stated that he knew a Mexican family very well and could arrange that they meet at their home and have dinner. He added that he might bring along a Brother ("hermano") and would come by L/3's home at 1900 to pick him up. L/3 agreed, saying that he had no objection to the brother coming along.

W B Rowton

15 February,1969.

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1100, 15/2/69; Camino Real restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 19/2/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that he met again with "Rómulo" but under circumstances somewhat different from that anticipated. L/3 related that when he arrived at his apartment about 1850 the previous eveningin the company of his wife (after having dropped off his daughter at the home of his ex-wife) he found a note from "Rómulo" asking him to meet him at apartment 102 of Calle Coahuila 200.
L/3 continued that since his wife was present when he read the note he felt he had to ask her to come along (and in addition she had been upset that afternoon and did not want to be left alone). They therefore both proceeded to the address given by Rómulo and found him there in the midst of a rather large number of persons, apparently of the same family residing in the apartment. After about fifteen minutes of social chatter, Rómulo suggested that they go to a nearby restaurant to talk more privately. Romulo then took L/3 and his wife to the restaurant Kuku at Calle Coahuila 223 where they had dinner. L/3 told Rowton that because of his wife's presence he was not able to discuss anything substantive with Romulo and had to leave the questions he wanted to ask him re FAR/PBRUMEN activites until a subsequent meeting. L/3 added that in the course of conversation, Romulo stated that Rodolfo Sandoval Alegría hoped to be released from prison in March,1969. Romulo also stated that he worked in a newspaper office, but L/3 felt he could not securely ask the name of the newspaper at that time.
L/3 told Rowton that Romulo agreed to another meeting on 18 February and asked L/3 to met him again at apartment 102 of Coahuila 200 shortly after 1900, inasmuch as he generally leaves his place of employment a little before that time. Romulo,L/3 and his wife then took in a movie.
L/3 then told Rowton that after he had left Rowton the previous day he had another very disturbing experience (he appeared to Rowton nervous and suffering from lack of sleep). L/3 explained that when he dropped into the Salón de la Plástica Mexicana about 1300 on 14/2/69, he ran into an old friend, Fanny Ravel, a Mexican artist with whom he had worked very closely in PBRUMEN some years ago. L/3 continued to Rowton that despite their

past friendship, Fanny Ravel treated him in an obvious cold manner. L/3, feeling that he could not this pass unnoticed, got Fanny in the corner and asked what was up. She replied that for some time she had been hearing "disturbing reports" about L/3. Under further questioning by L/3 she specified thatoriginally, some 7-8 months previously she had been told by a LIRING official that L/3 "was not to be trusted". Fanny continued that she did not pay too much attention to this, since the official was rather "low-level", but more recently she was told the same thing by an "unimpeachable source" and could not challenge it despite her high personal esteem for L/3.

L/3 commented to Rowton that the "unimpeachable source" must be the Chief LIRING, inasmuch as Fanny Ravel as always been a close personal friend of his and possibly even one of his mistresses. L/3 continued that LIRING had several times commented to him (when L/4 was working in the LIRING office) that Fanny Ravel was infrequent telephone contact with the Chief.

5. GUIDANCE Given to Agent:

Rowton told L/3 that he was more convinced than ever that the LIRING office had mounted a slander operation against him because of his contacts with the Camilo Sanchez group (León Barrios brothers and Romulo) which PBRUMEN was apparently attempting to isolate in their own interest. When L/3 appeared a little consoled at this, Rowton continued that he felt L/3 should, at the 18 Feb meeting with "Rómulo", tell the latter that he knew the game the LIRINGs were up to and ask "Rómulo" point blank whether he knew to what extent the LIRING office was trying to sabotage FAR because of its nationalistic anti-PBRUMEN position. Rowton asked L/3 to entice "Rómulo" into such a discussion in the hope that "Rómulo" would ask him, L/3, to help discover any unilateral operations PBRUMEN might be planning. Rowton continued that L/3 should tell Romulo that although he was virtually cut off from the LIRING office, he still had a great many PBRUMEN friends (e.g.   ) from whom he could possibly get useful information to help Romulo's faction. Rowton suggested that L/3 could also propose to Romulo that they both put the squeeze on Carlos VEga (apparently a LIRING provocation) to obsome preliminary information on the intentions of the LIRING operation.

W. B. Rowton

19 February,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 19/2/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: Same time,same place, 21/2/69.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that "Rómulo" appeared unannounced at his apartment on the late afternoon of 17/2/69 and consequently he did not go to meet him at apartment 102 of 200 Coahuila St. on 18/2/69 as originally planned. LIRING/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" promised to see him again about 1900 on 20/2/69, coming to pick him up at his apartment.

LIRING/3 then stated that on the morning of 17/2/69 he had run into Anna Godoy, the wife of Jorge, at Gobernación and was so disturbed at the cool reception that he looked up Jorge Godoy later that day to find out what was going on. Jorge Godoy was quite frank with him telling him that the LIRING office had advised him to keep clear of LIRING/3 because he was not to be trusted. Godoy continued that a LIRING official had told him that LIRING/3 was being used (perhaps unconsciously at first) by some counter-revolutionary organization and that the LIRING Office based it assertion on the following three points: (1) LIRING/3 had been in touch with a foreignor who pretended to be a businessman but who did not do any business with PBRUMEN, (2) LIRING/3 had access to information that could come only from a police source (3) LIRING/3 was responsible for the arrest of Identity A and had undertaken the mission to Guatemala to get information against the revolution.

According to LIRING/3, Horge Godoy told him that it was difficult to belive all this, especially in the light of L/3's relatively long imprisonment,but he had to take it seriously in view of the source of the charges. L/3 told Rowton that he went over each point in rebuttal on a matter of principle despite the fact that Godoy's mind obviously was already amde up.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that when he talked later that day with "Rómulo" he related what had happened with Godoy. "Rómulo" replied that those LIRING allegations were not to be taken seriously. He commented: "We have already looked into them and do not believe them." He explained that for one thing if L/3 had beer a spy he certainly would have continued (with the approval and connivance of the authorities) on up the the mountains where he could get useful information, instead of permitting himself to be arrested just after stepping across the border. "Rómulo" aggreed with L/3 that the LIRING office probably does not want L/3 to help his ("Rómulo's") faction and have done everything possible to isolate L/3 from his normal social contacts. Rómulo added that the only important point in the whole affair was that there were "certain elements" among the Guatemalan revolutionaries that might believe the LIRING charges and possibly do harm to L/3 and or his wife. Rómulo urged L/3 "to be careful" and for that reason di not encourage the idea of a confrontation with Carlos Vega at this time. He continued that if, however, L/3 insisted he would be glad to have it out with Carlos Vega to find out who had sent him to provoke L/3. Rowton agreed that little or nothing could be accomplished in pursuing this matter.

L/3 continued that when he told Rómulo that he felt frustrated and helpless in the face of the LIRING action, Rómulo told him that he must, as a good revolutionary, have courage and patience in confronting these problems. He continued that he himself hoped to continue to see L/3 and he was sure that things would work out. He stressed that he and his faction value the friendship and loyalty of individuals such as L/3 whereas the LIRING establishment is interested only in groups and organizations that can further their own interests.

5. GUIDANCE/INFORAMTION given to agent:

Rowton encouraged L/3 to continue his efforts to find steady employment since he was most vulnerable to both the LIRING agents as well as FAR in the matter of his financial resources. L/3 told Rowton that he had already been promised an appointment to some teaching position by Xavier Espinosa, private secretary to Yañez, the Secretary of Education. L/3 commented that Espinosa is at heart a "good progressive" and has been very sympathetic to him since his return to Mexico. L/3 also stated that he intends to look up Heracleo Zepeda in the hope that the latter can place him somewhere in CONASUPO or arrange a job with his Chiapas newspaper ("Renovación").
Rowton also urged L/3 to continue to elicit information from "Rómulo" concerning his faction of the FAR and any knowledge he might have concerning the independent operations being planned by FERUMEN in Guatemala.

Wallace B. Rowton

27 March,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 27/3/69; Camino Real Restaurant
3. Next Meeting: Same place and time, 3/4/69.
4. Information/Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that unfortunately "Romulo" (Mario Augosto MENDEZ Aguilar) had not reappeared since his last meeting with him (17/2/69) and that he felt he could do nothing but wait for him to initiate the recontact.

LIRING/3 continued that on his own initiative he had dropped by the LIRING offices on 21 March, feeling that he should not continue to remain in isolation despite the unfavorable rumors against him apparently originated by that office. He told Rowton that unfortunately he did not find anyone of importance in the offices at that time, but was told by the gatekeeper that "they wanted to see him" and that he should return early the following week.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that instead of returning to the office he decided to telephone LIRING/9 at his home. He did so on the morning of 25/3/69 but was told by a woman with a Mexican accent (obviously the maid)that neither LIRING/9 nor LIRING/2 was at home. LIRING/3 then left his name and asked the woman to inform either of them that he had called.

LIRING/3 continued that about 1200 that same day (25/3/69) his old friend **Identity B** appeared unannounced at his appartment. L/3 told Rowton that although it was obvious that **Iden B** had appeared in response to the telephone message that L/3 had left for LIRING/9, **Iden B** did not refer to it, explaining simply that he had dropped around to see how LIRING/3 and his wife were doing. He did mentioned subsequently in the conversation that he was now living with LIRING/2 and LIRING/9 and LIRING/13 in their "very ample" apartment. **Iden B** continued that he hoped to remain in Mexico until July 1969 and that he was planning to marry a Mexican divorcée with three children (boys) whom he had originally met many years ago in a visit to Mexico City.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that **Iden B** was surprisingly cordial, regretting the fact that they had not seen each other for some time and encouraging LIRING/3 to keep in touch in the future. He invited L/3 to lunch on 29/3/69 but asked him to telephone to confirm. He gave L/3 the telephone number of LIRING/9's residence, apparently forgetting that L/3 already had the number.

Iden B then told LIRING/3 not to be disturbed over the rumors circulating about him, since he himself had been subjected to much the same treatment several years previously in PBRUMEN. He then stated that in any case the PBRUMEN Chief would not be returning to Mexico, and that this should make L/3 happy. To console L/3, **Iden B** continued that the LIRING Chief was not popular with the staff, since he was considered to formal and snobbish, and somewhat petty in his vindictiveness. **Iden B** agreed with L/3 that the LIRING Chief had done much to harm LIRING/3's reputation,and probably acted from purely personal motives (under the influence of Carmen Lozada's father and husband).

Iden B did not tell L/3 who would replace the LIRING Chief. He commented that for some time back he had withdrawn from politcis and tried to mind his own business, earning his living by giving lectures on his own initiative.

On the domestic situation in PBRUMEN, **Iden B** commented that things were "very bad" both politically and economically. He explained that PBRUMEN currently found itself in a squeeze play between the big powers and was genuinely fearful of a Soviet/Nixon rapprochement, at their expense, of course. On the economic side **Iden B** commented that he was happy to be in Mexico but added weakly that there was every hope that things would get better by 1970. When L/3 countered that everyone had been singing that tune for many years, **Iden B** did not defend his position.

LIRING/3 then told Rowton that he took the occasion to mention to **Iden B** that a certain Carlos Vega (akaCarlos Enrique LOPEZ Garcia) had been pestering him in the hope of finding someone traveling to PBRUMEN who would be willing to carry some packages to some of his friends (including the son of Turcios). When L/3 asked **Iden B** whether he would be willing to meet this Carlos Vega before consenting to carry over his packages, **Iden B** replied; "Sí,como no. Con mucho gusto."

LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he brought up the name of Carlos VEGa as a sign of good faith both vis-avis the latter as well as the LIRING office since he felt it highly probable that Vega was reporting regularly to the LIRING couple either directly or indirectly and that in fact Vega had possibly been sent to check on LIRING/3 and his wife. LIRING/3 continued that he planned to recontact Jacobo Rodríguez Padilla and ask him to pass along the message to Carlos Vega that LIRING/3 was anxious to see him again since he felt that he had resolved Vega's "problem."

LIRING/3 also told Rowton that he had expressed the desire to **Iden B** to revisit PBRUMEN some time in the future. **Iden B** replied that he would do everything he could to expedite the visa, which he said he felt present no problem.

LIRING/3 also told Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a letter from her mother asking her to attempt to obtain a 30-day visitor's visa for her to come to Mexico on vacation. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he and LIRING/4 had already made formal application for the visa, although they were not optimistic that Gobernación would grant it. LIRING/3 added that he did not mention this development to Iden B , although he might possibly mention it in passing at his next chat. LIRING/3 commented to Rowton that he felt LIRING/4's mother might have some interesting gossip but could not be expected to tell him and LIRING/4 anything startling. He added that he had applied for the visa more out of courtesy that in earnest and actually hoped that the visa would not be granted, since this would give him and LIRING/4 a good pretext to make another trip to PBRUMEN for purely personal reasons.

Wallace B. Rowton

8 April, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 7/4/69; restaurant of Camino Real hotel.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 9/4/69; same place.
4. Information/Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that at long last "Rómulo"(Mario Augusto Mendez Aguilar) had reappeared at his apartment, on the afternoon of 2 April, without prior notice, as usual. LIRING/3 told Rowton that "Rómulo" apologized for not having been able to revisit LIRING/3 before that date, and explained that he had been "out of town". According to L/3 "Rómulo" did not give any explanation of his absence since mid-February and L/3 felt he could not ask for such explanation. "Rómulo" promised to keep in touch with LIRING/3 by dropping in to his apartment "whenever he could". LIRING/3 told Rowton that he made a discreet effort to get from "Rómulo" a telephone number or address through which he could be contacted.

LIRING/3 also reported that he had met with Iden B twice during Easter week, but as yet had been unable to get into his residence,as he had hoped. He stressed that his relationship with Iden B was improving steadily and he felt this a good sign, inasmuch as he felt certain that Iden B would not take the initiativeof recontacting LIRING/3 without prior consultation with LIRING/9 and LIRING/2.

LIRING/3 then told Rowton that LIRING/4 had received a very pessimistic letter from a certain Echemendía, a uncle residing in Brooklyn, New York, who stated that LIRING/4's father was dying of cancer of the throat and was unable to leave his home. LIRING/3 continued that he had just discovered that LIRING/4 on her own initiative had rushed to the U.S. Consulate and requested a visa. As she subsequently told LIRING/3, LIRING/4 was informed by a consular official that her case would have to be "investigated carefully by JOFACT" and that she was required to pay 125 pesos for a telegram to Washington,D.C. to expedite the case. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt LIRING/4's action had been precipitous and could cause him additional embarrassment with the LIRING office. He added that he did not think a visa would be granted, but asked Rowton to do whatever he could to make certain that LIRING/4's request was turned down. He continued that in view of this unexpected development, he felt it wise

to recontact LIRING/9 and tell him about LIRING/4's application for the visa. Rowton agreed that this would be the best course of action, especially since LIRING/3 had originally mentioned LIRING/4's desire to visit her sick father and the problem this represented for him, when he first talked to LIRING/9 after his return from Guatemala.
LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt this would also constitute a good pretext to sound out LIRING/9 about his personal feelings toward LIRING/3 and his own situation in the LIRING Office. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 take this occasion to mention casually that he was still in occasional contact with the Guatemalans and to give LIRING/9 the names of "Rómulo" and Carlos Vega, if L/9 asked for details.

Wallace B Rowton

11 April,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 11/4/69, Camino Real restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: Same time, place, 1000, 14/4/69.

4. Information/ Reports Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported that he received an unexpected visit on 9/4/69 from Rogelio Aguirre, bpother of Jerjes Aguirre, whom both he and LIRING/4 have known for many years (from their work together in PBRUMEN). LIRING/3 told Rowton that he was surprised at the visit since both Rogelio and Jerjes Aguirre were close friends of Teresa Lozada and her husband, Carlos Persabal. L/3 explained to Rowton that both Rogelio and Jerjes are employed in the Secretaría de Educación where Teresa Lozada worked for several years.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that Rogelio, without making any reference to the Persabal family, asked LIRING/3 to do him an important favor. He went on to state that, as LIRING/3 knew, **Identity C**, was currently living in her home town in PBRUMEN(the same area that LIRING/4 comes from) and was hoping to visit them in Mexico City in the near future. Rogelio continued that he hoped that LIRING/3 could have a check from a Canadian bank and immigration documents hand-carried to **Iden C** so that she could pay for the ticket and present the Mexican visa locally in PBRUMEN. LIRING/3 told Rowton that although he felt a bit mystified at this request, he told Rogelio Aguirre that he would do what he could to find someone who was planning a trip to PBRUMEN in the near future.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that the name of his friend **Iden B** immediately came to his mind,and he attempted to telephone him at the apartment of LIRING/9. He, however, found that the telephone was not in service,and felt that he had an excellent pretext to visit the apartment about 1500 on that same day (11/4/69) explaining to **Iden B** (and/or LIRING/2 or /9) that he had to get in touch urgently to pass on the request of Rogelio Aguirre. LIRING/3 agreed with Rowton that he could take this occasion to ask the LIRING office to attempt to obtain information on the state of health of the father of LIRING/4 through the LIRING office in New York City. LIRING/3 agreed that there was little chance of this request being honored, but it would serve to reveal his lack of any other channels to LIRING/4 's father and stress the legitimacy of LIRING/4's concern for the health of her father(an application for a visa to visit him).

LIRING/3 then stated to Rowton that he suspected the telephone of the LIRING/9 apartment was tapped. He explained that generally when he had called in the past, there was an unexplained interruption in the line before the party could reply. He stressed to Rowton that this was his own personal observation, and that Idon R , when he met with as recently as 9/4/69 did not make any comment about the telephone service in the apartment.

LIRING/3 promised Rowton that when he visited the apartment that afternnon he would take as good a note as possible of the lay-out and furnishings and ascertain the identity of the maid.

Wallace B Rowton

21 April,1969

CONTACT REPORT

A. Agent: LIRING/3
B. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 21/4/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
c. Next Meeting: Same time, place; 25/4/69
D. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 apologized for not having been able to make the last scheduled meeting with Rowton, 1000 on 18/4/69. He explained that his friend, **Iden B**, had unexpectedly dropped in to see him at that time and he felt it more important to see him again than to make the meeting with Rowton (he subsequently left a message with Rowton's answering service).

LIRING/3 continued that he explained to **Iden B** the emotional strain that LIRING/4 was undergoing as a result of the bad news concerning her father's health. He then asked **Iden B** to attempt to ascertain the true state of his health through the LIRING Office in New York and gave **Iden B** the name and telephone number of the aunt of LIRING/4 who appeared to be the best source. **Iden B**, according to LIRING/3 promised to send a message with the next pouch and hoped to have news for LIRING/3 within the next ten days.

According to LIRING/3, **Iden B** then suggested that LIRING/3 think about moving to PBRUMEN for a "lengthy stay, perhapw indefinitely." He explained that he felt he understood LIRING/3's problems, the calumnies, the subtle persecution and the resultant increasingly difficult financial situation he found himself in, and he felt there was no real solution in Mexico. In PBRUMEN, however, he could manage much more easily for his wife and child, since most of his basic financial problems would be solved. He added that he was sure that he could find LIRING/3 some sort of work in the cultural field as soon as he returned to PBRUMEN and then arrange an invitation. LIRING/3 told Rowton that although he regarded this proposition as encouraging (since he was certain that **Iden B** had prior approval from the LIRING Office), he took a natural and logical approach in replying to **Iden B** He stated that he told **Iden B** that in principle he agreedbut he had to face the realities of the situation. First he was not at all certain that he could convince his wife to make such a move, and second, he was not optimistic that **Iden B** could arrange a good position for him in PBRUMEN that would permit him to work seriously and, of course, make enough money to meet his living expenses. **Iden B** replied that he felt it quite possible to arrange something for LIRING/3 and for that reason had brought up the idea at this point.

Rowton told LIRING/3, in reply to his query, that such a trip to PBRUMEN would be interesting to him only if LIRING/3 was offered a position in the cultural field with good access to PBRUMEN intellectuals and government officials. LIRING/3 agreed, commenting that he knew **Iden D** and such young rebels well enough to develop good contact with them, provided he was given a reasonably serious job. In any case he promised to work on LIRING/4 in the hope of persuading her to go along with him, when and if **Iden B's** proposal materialized.

LIRING/3 continued that **Iden B** then offered to arrange an exposition for LIRING/3 at **Iden F** in Cuernavaca, stating that he could do so without difficulty through the director of the galleries (female) who was a close friend of his. LIRING/3 accepted this apparently genuine offer and arranged to travel to Cuernavaca on the morning of 22/4/69 to talk the matter over with the director of the art galleries.

LIRING/3 then reported to Rowton that "Rómulo" had again visited him at his apartment late on the evening of 18/4/69 (thus anticipating the meeting for 1830 in front of Woolworth's for the following day, as originally planned). According to LIRING/3, "Rómulo" (Mario Augosto Mendez Aguilar) told him that he had taken the liberty of coming that evening to LIRING/3's apartment since he wanted to talk in private of "something that LIRING/3 could do to help his friends". "Rómulo" then went on to explain that one of his comrades was expected to arrive in Mexico City "in the near future" and would need a secure place to live, at leaste until he could find a place of his own. "Rómulo" stressed that this person, whose identity he himelf did not as yet know, would be traveling "clandestinely" and could not risk renting a room on his own until he had established himself in the area. LIRING/3 replied that he, of course, would do his best, but pointed out that he himself was not in a good position to protect anyone. He finally agreed that this person might be able to use his kitchen as temporary living quarters, entering and leaving the apartment throught the back(service)entrance. LIRING/3 pointed out to "Rómulo" that the back door to the apartment house was locked at 1700 every day and that therefore it would be necessary for the person using that entrance to return to the apartment for good every night before 1700. "Rómulo" was apparently satisfied with this offer of LIRING/3 and promised to let him know when the person arrived in Mexico City.

+"Rómulo" then mentioned to LIRING/3 that **Iden E** was currently in the

PBRUMEN capital and that he himself ("Rómulo") was in more or less regular touch with the mother of "El Chino",(whom LIRING/3 understood to be Yon Sosa). "Rómulo" also mentioned in passing that he works for two or three hours a day in the accounts office of Ovaciones and also does some part time work at a golf club in Mexico City.

E. Information/Guidance Given to Agent:

Rowton asked LIRING/3 to continue to press **Iden B** for more specific information about his proposed assistance to LIRING/3 in obtaining a job in PBRUMEN, AND some indication as to the extent of the knowledge and backing of the LIRING office. Rowton did not encourage LIRING/3 to take such a proposal seriously until he could get more concrete data from **Iden B**.

With regard to "Rómulo's" ~~[illegible]~~ request for assistance, Rowton stated that he would be much more interested in this development, when and if LIRING/3 could get the identity of the comrade of "Rómulo" whom he was to provide a safehouse for. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 put this person up when he appeared for a few days, long enough to permit Rowton to get a look at him and identify him. A determination could then be made as to the best course of action for LIRING/3 with regard to this person. In reply to LIRING/3's query, Rowton thought that it would be best to reinsure with the LIRING office regarding this matter by casually mentioning to **Iden B** that he was performing this service for his FAR friends. LIRING/3 agreed, commenting that he hoped that he would not again be caught in the crossfire between the LIRING Office and the nationalist faction of the FAR.

Wallace B. Rowton

25 April, 1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 25/4/69; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 28/4/69; Robbin Restaurant.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he went to Cuernavaca early on the morning of 22/4/69 alone, since **Iden B** backed out of the trip at the last minute, saying he had to remain in Mexico City. LIRING/3, however, was able to talk to the Director of the Art Gallery of **Iden F** himself and arranged an exposition for 7 June, 1969.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he returned home late that same night he found a note from his wife informing him that she had gone out to telephone long distance and would not be back until late that night. When she returned she informed him that she had received a telegram informing her that her father had died at 2030 on the previous evening (21/4/69) and that she had been attempting to telephone her mother in PBRUMEN but had not been able to get through. LIRING/3 continued that his father-in-law was buried on 24/4/69 and that his wife was still in a state of depression and grief, especially since she had been unable to see her father before his death or attend the funeral.

LIRING/3 also reported that at about 1030 on 23/4/69 a Guatemalan, aged about 25, poorly dressed and somewhat resembling Carlos Vega, had appeared unannounced at his apartment with a small piece of paper on which were written LIRING/3's name and address. He introduced himself without name simply as a "friend of the León Barrios brothers from Guatemala City," and asked LIRING/3 to put him up for a few days. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he agreed after some reluctance, suspecting that this was the person referred to by Mario Mendez ("Rómulo"), although the young Guatemalan did not mention "Rómulo" by name. LIRING/2 told Rowton that before promising to put the Guatemalan up, he commented to him that although he had a great deal of personal respect for the León Barrios brothers he was disappointed that neither they nor their mother had written to him for the past several months, apparently because they believed the calumnies spread against him by Carlos Perzabal, . According to LIRING/3, the young Guatemalan told him that his friends back in Guatemala City continued to have confidence in LIRING/3, but "had to respect the opinions of others, and had no alternative but to discontinue correspondence with LIRING/3, at least for a respectable period." He continued that LIRING/3 should realize that their organization in Guatemala City was in no position to check out various and sundry charges made against their friends and had to let time take care of most of their problems of this nature.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he finally gave the unexpected house-guest a cot to sleep on in the room of his child, moving the latter to his studio. He then asked the guest to remain as inconspicuous as possible, informing him that he expected a number of children that afternoon for an art lesson in the apartment. The Guatemalan promised to be out of the apartment during the day and to return late at night. LIRING/3 told Rowton that in fact he did not reappear until about 2300 that night, and left before 0700 the following morning. When he returned at about 2200 on the night of 24/4/69 he informed LIRING/3 that he would be leaving the apartment the next morning early and would not have to return. He thanked LIRING/3 profusely the next morning (25/4/69) and left at about 0900 without telling LIRING/3 where he intended to go.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that at about 1930 on 23/4/69, when he returned to his apartment, he found "Rómulo" (Mario Mendez Aguilar) in his living room having coffee with his wife. LIRING/3 took the occasion to tell Rómulo about the unexpected houseguest. According to LIRING/3 "Rómulo" appeared genuinely surprised and asked for the identity and physical description of the person. When LIRING/3 told him as much as he knew, "Rómulo" stated that he could not identify the person as a friend of his. He speculted that the unannounced guest had been sent to check on LIRING/3 and advised him to be cautious and as normal as possible in his routine while the person remain in the house. He said that he did not exclude the possibility that this person had been sent by the LIRING office "to check on LIRING/3's private life". "Rómulo" then offerred LIRING/3 a revolver for his self-defense, but LIRING/3 turned it down, saying that he was not worried to that extent. According to LIRING/3, "Rómulo" stated that he himself preferred to avoid meeting the young Guatemalan since he could not identify him. He reassured LIRING/3 that his own comrade who might also be in need of a saferoom would not appear unannounced in such a manner, adding that to date he did not have any definite word on this person's ETA in Mexico City.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he expects "Rómulo" to revisit him at his home sometime during the late evening of 26/4/69. He told Rowton that it occurred to him that he might invited **Iden B** to the apartment on the same night in the hope that he could witness a face-to-face meeting with "Rómulo" and **Iden B.** He felt that this would serve to keep his hands as clean as possible in the eyes of the LIRING office, since he was certain that **Iden B** would report promptly of his meeting with "Rómulo." Rowton agreed, feeling that it was important for LIRING/3 to bring his occasional meetings with "Rómulo" fully to the attention of the LIRING office, on the off-chance that they already did not know about them, and that **Iden B** would be the best channel for this.

Wallace B Rowton

5 May,1969

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date & Site of Meeting: 1000, 5/5/69; Robin Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1000, 7/5/69; same place.
4. Reports/Information Given by Agent:

LIRING/3 announced with apparent pleasure that at long last the commo channel with the FAR had been reopened. He stated that he had just received a letter from the elder of the two León Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán) indicating that in his mind the long period of "probation" was over ~~that~~ and that closer contact could be expected in the near future. LIRING/3 then showed Rowton a letter dated 28 April,1969,in the handwriting he stated he recognized as that of Miguel León Barrios, in which the writer, who signed the letter as "Julio Antonio", informed LIRING/3 that he had just been released from prison ("sanatorio") and was planning to leave town until things cool off for him. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he understood the double-talk of the writer to mean that he needed money (Q.100) to travel to Mexico where he hoped to visit LIRING/3. Rowton's photostat and translation of the letter is attached herewith.

The envelope, postmarked Guatemala City,2/5/69, is addressed to LIRING/4 (as previously requested by LIRING/3) and bears the return address J. Antonio Medina, 24 Calle 1-65,Zona 1,Guatemala, and was sent special delivery. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he did not recognize the return address,and assumed that it,as well as the sender's name, Medina, was notional. He added that "Violeta" was the code word for operational contact with anyone arriving on behalf of the León Barrios brothers, and that Doña Luisa referred to Marta, the mother of the León Barrios brothers.

When Rowton agreed that LIRING/3 should send some money,no more that 1,000 pesos (Q 80) with a cover letter from LIRING/4 (ostensibly) but in his own handwriting, explaining in double-talk that fortunately he is doing fairly well financially and that LIRING/4 is now working in an art gallery and expects to inherit money from her father who recently passed away. LIRING/3 promised to have the cover letter and envelope ready when he met with Rowton on 7/5/69 so that he could insert the money order. L/3 told Rowton that he felt it best to send the money order in the name of Elsa, the eldest of the León Barrios sisters, rather than to the mother (Marta) as requested in the letter. He explained that the last money order (actually certified bank check) in Elsa's name, sent by LIRING/4, arrived safely and apparently was cashed without difficulty. Rowton suggested that LIRING/3 send the letter, registered with receipt requested, just to be sure that the letter arrived at its destination.

Wallace B. Rowton

14-00000

SECRET Attachment #2 HMMA-37136

México D. F. a 26 de Febrero de 1969.

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

4P

ASUNTO. COAHUILA Nº 200 altos 102

A quien corresponda.

PRESENTE:

Me permito informar el resultado de la investigación en la dirección anotada.

El día de hoy estuvímos de visita en el departamento Nº 102 de las calles de Coahuila de la colonia Roma D. F.

En ese lugar viven la Señora INES BASTON DE PIMENTEL, su MAMA, una hija como de 15 años de edad, una niña como de 8 años, un hijo como de 17 años y 3 estudiantes que tienen de huespedes.

La persona que funge como jefe de casa es un sobrino de la Sra. INES de nombre JORGE CARAM HAIRAM que trabaja como agente de ventas y por lo regular siempre anda viajando.

INES BASTON DE PIMENTEL, su familia y los huespedes que tienen son VERACRUZANOS y tienen de vivir en ese departamento 3 años, tienen el teléfono Nº 64-69-34.

La Sra. INES y su familia son muy atentos y amables, pero cuando la Sra. INES se enoja es mucho muy grosera.

Cuando estabamos platicando con Ella, se enojo con su hijo y lo puso VERDE BLACO Y COLORADO de Majaderías.

Cuando le preguntamos por su Esposo, nos contesto categoricamente, NI ME PREGUNTEN POR ESE HIJO DE SU .... MADRE , por lo que ya no quizimos ahondar las preguntas.

La Sra. INES es medio blanca con un poco de paño en la cara, ojos negros, pelo negro lacio pintado, naris recta, boca regular, mentón oval, frente regular, estatura como de 1.68 mts. y de 65 a 7o kilos de peso, viste de

H/w att: 2
HMMA-37136

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SECRET

201-798301

negro a causa de la muerte de una hermana suya que hace 3 meses murió, -- La Sra. INES tiene 50 años de edad, según su propio dicho.

La casa se compone de sala comedor, cocina, baño, 3 recámaras y cuarto de planchado que tambien lo ocupan como recámara, los muebles son muy modestos, no tienen Imágenes Catolicas y solamente en una de las paredes del comedor hay un cuadro que representa un florero con unos claveles.

ATENTAMENTE K-10 y K-23

Guatemala, 28 April,1959

Dear LIRING-4:

I am very happy to be able to write to you. Excuse me for not having been able to do so until now, but it was only last week that I was able to leave the sanatorium. My departure from such a place was quite a relief. My health was declining and I almost had a relapse. Everyone at home celebrated. My brother sends you his best.

My letter has two purposes: first to excuse myself for not being able to get to your home; it's becasue, since I am still not recovered,the doctor has told me to recuperate in the country, and, to avoid problems these days, I'm planning to go to uncle Tío's farm. In any case they'll be coming to see you on behalf of Violetta since they are still talking about the business here and are very interested. That should take place any day now.

My other purpose in writing to you is to bother you for a favor. I should tell you that I have married Liz and she is now expecting a baby. (Finally I was able to follow your advice). Now that I am leaving for the farm, she will be left alone and with some financial difficulties. Since you had invited both of us there, and this is not possible, I hope you will be able to send her something. I think she could put about Q. 100 to very good use. If you could send it to Doña Luisa - she and I would be very much obliged.

Everything else is going very well. I am

as ever your friend,

/s/ Julio Antonio

GUATEMALA 28 DE ABRIL DE 1969.-

QUERIDA LIRING-4:

ES PARA MI MUCHO EL GUSTO DE PODER ESCRIBIRTE.- PERDONA QUE LO HAGA HASTA AHORA PERO RECIÉN LA SEMANA PASADA PUDE SALIR DEL SANATORIO.- LA SALIDA DE TAL LUGAR SE ME DIFICULTÓ SOBREMANERA.- MI SALUD ANDABA MUY MAL Y ESTUVE A PUNTO DE TENER UNA RECAIDA.- TE CUENTO QUE EN LA CASA SE DIÓ DE FIESTA.- MI HERMANO TE MANDA SALUDES.- MI CARTA TIENE DOS MOTIVOS: EL PRIMERO PEDIRTE DISCULPAS PUÉS YO NO VOY A PODER LLEGAR A TU CASA.- RESULTA QUE COMO TODAVÍA ESTOY UN POCO MAL, EL DOCTOR ME RECOMENDÓ QUE ME RESTABLECIERA EN EL CAMPO.- COMO YA NO QUIERO TENER PROBLEMAS EN ESTOS DÍAS MARCHO A LA FINCA DE TIO PABLO.- DE TODAS MANERAS VAN A LLEGAR A VERTE DE PARTE DE VIOLETA, AQUÍ YA PLATIQUE DEL NEGOCIO Y ESTÁN MUY INTERESADOS. ESTO VA A SER EN ESTOS DIAS.- EL SEGUNDO MOTIVO DE MI CARTA ES PARA PEDIRTE UNA MOLESTIA.- TE CUENTO QUE ME CASÉ CON MC Y QUE ELLA ESTÁ ESPERANDO BABY.- POR FIN PUDE SEGUIR TU CONSEJO.- AHORA CON MI SALIDA PARA LA FINCA SE QUEDA SOLA Y CON ALGUNAS DIFICULTADES ECONÓMICAS.- COMO TU QUERÍAS QUE LOS DOS FUERAMOS POR ALLA Y ESTO NO ES POSIBLE TE SUPLICO LE MANDES ALGUNA AYUDA ECONOMICA.- YO PIENSO QUE UNOS Q 100 LE PUEDEN SERVIR MUCHO.- SE LOS PUEDES MANDAR A DONDE DOÑA LUISA.- ELLA Y YO, TE ESTARÍAMOS MUY AGRADECIDOS.- POR LO DEMÁS TODO ANDA MUY BIEN.- SE DESPIDE TU AMIGO DE SIEMPRE.

Julio Antonio

1P

SECRET

Attachment #3 to
HMMA-37136

MICROFILMED
JUN 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Francisco LARA

Identity B: Orlando *SUAREZ cit: Cuba?

Identity C: the wife of Jerjes *AGUIRRE

Identity D: Heberto *PADILLA cit: Cuba!

Identity E: Cesar *MONTES (201-303518)

Identity F: the Casino de la Selva

SECRET

S/c att: 3
HMMA-37136

CS COPY

201-798301

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IG: SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 08 20 06Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 001366

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB X
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FI

MICRO. SER.
JUN 30 1969
MICROFILMED

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

B-201-818842

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

201-798301
8 May 69

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

[illegible]/LIRING/Humberto GONZALEZ Vega

REFERENCE: HMMA-36603, 27 February 1969

1. Attached for Addressees is a translation of a report received from LINLUCK on 28 February 1969 on Humberto GONZALEZ Vega (201-845437), Guatemalan Communist exile in Mexico who has been in contact with LIRING-3 (201-798301). The report was submitted by LINLUCK in response to the query for additional information on GONZALEZ mentioned in paragraph [illegible] of reference.

2. It will be noted that LINLUCK's information tends to confirm earlier reporting that GONZALEZ is connected with the PGT rather than the FAR -- though he would appear to have some contacts with the latter organization. While LINLUCK's report is based in part on details dredged up from the past, it is believed that his comments may be of interest to Addressees.

3. LINLUCK has promised to provide any additional information on GONZALEZ which he may be able to develop.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1 translation of report

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS/Guatemala City w/att
2 - C/WHD w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36680	10 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER IN → 201-845437 201-798301

CS Copy

ATTACHMENT TO HMM-20680

(Translation of report from [illegible] on Humberto GONZALEZ Vega)

1. The business card used by Humberto GONZALEZ Vega is printed with the legend: "Salvat Editores Mexicana, S.A., Telephone 46-27-47, Madrid 21, Mexico 6, D.F.". GONZALEZ' name and -- "Division Medicina" have been added to the card.

2. GONZALEZ recently (date not known) obtained a Guatemalan passport at the Guatemalan Consulate in Mexico City. When applying for the passport, GONZALEZ indicated it would be used to travel to Venezuela on behalf of his company (Salvat). One may have doubts about this story of travel to Venezuela. GONZALEZ is a long-time member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT). When he joined the PGT in 1952 he was [illegible] section of the Ferrocarriles de Guatemala. In 1954 he went to Buenos Aires as an exile, and -- along with other Communists -- was imprisoned in the jail of Villa Devoto on orders of General PERON. (It is only just to add that there was no valid reason for jailing them). Years later GONZALEZ returned to Guatemala where he has a wife and several children that he claims to support. He is separated from his wife (who is still in Guatemala) and lives with another woman in Mexico.

3. In any event, GONZALEZ is still a member of the PGT, and has spent many months in jail because of his Communist activities. On one occasion he was jailed during the regime of Miguel YDIGORAS Fuentes, and again when Colonel Enrique PERALTA Azurdia was in power. GONZALEZ has lived in Mexico as a political asylee, but has returned clandestinely to Guatemala on several occasions, only to be expelled from that country again. In Mexico he has almost always been the "responsable" (one in charge) of the Guatemalan Communists living in Mexico... that is the representative of the PGT in Mexico. At least the visible representative. Even while Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin was alive, and GUTIERREZ died in 1966, GONZALEZ had a responsible position. Among his functions was keeping an eye on GUTIERREZ.

4. It is possible that GONZALEZ' perseverance in seeking a Guatemalan passport, and it took him nearly two years to get it, is because of a desire to go to Cuba or one of the Iron Curtain countries. Or again, it may be that he wants to go to Venezuela as he claims. He gives the impression that he receives a salary from the PGT, and his employment (with Salvat) -- if he is employed there -- is nothing more than a cover for his political activities.

.../

5. GONZALEZ' nickname is "El Gato" (the cat) -- a nickname applied to him because of his light colored eyes. He is about 5'7" in height, has light colored skin, strong build, and has a stoop. He has a large head and a closely trimmed moustache. His most distinctive features are his large cheeks. He is what you might call puffy-cheeked. When he walks he struts. Undoubtedly the Security service in Guatemala have numerous photographs of Gonzalez, as well as a more accurate physical description. The description I have given is largely from memory.

6. As the writer and GONZALEZ have known each other for many years (and the writer also gave him some help in getting his passport), GONZALEZ, at a recent (no date) chance meeting, invited the writer for coffee. Naturally he [illegible] much information of importance, but he did say the following:

> "Guerrilla warfare is not the revolutionary line to be followed in Guatemala. The guerrillas were knocked out, and the only result (of guerrilla warfare) was that it demoralized the masses and has set back the revolutionary movement several years. The Central Committee of the PGT committed a grave error when it allowed the "jovenes" (here refers to the young violent revolutionaries) to assume a role of importance. Many of these "jovenes" were trained in Cuba. (What happened was) that the PGT Central Committee was on the verge of being completely replaced by the youth leaders. To avoid this, the Central Committee found it necessary to include some of the youth leaders in the Central Committee. This naturally led to a change to the "guerrilla line". Most of the capable political leaders of the Party have died uselessly for this cause."

Later in the conversation GONZALEZ became quite agitated and said:

> "And to think that I just met with some guerrilla leaders and some other young men who just came to Mexico from Guatemala who want aid, money, and recruits in order to reorganize the guerrilla bands in the interior of Guatemala and continue the fight. This would serve no purpose and I refused to give them my aid. The only thing I told them was that this was the wrong approach."

Jp

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM

INFO. Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM Chief of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT PBRUMEN/LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: Please see Paragraph 3.

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-36184, 17 January 1969
B. HCGA- 9760, 28 January 1969

1. It is suggested that LIRING-3 be shown a photo of Carlos Enrique LOPEZ Garcia (201- 8408[illegible]), who may be identifiable with the Carlos LOPEZ met by LIRING-3 on 24 December 1968. The photo of LOPEZ was forwarded with HCGA- 9768, 30 January 1969.

2. Attached for Mexico City and Headquarters is a photo of Carlos Enrique LOPEZ Arevalo, which may also be shown to LIRING-3 for possible identification. Liaison reported on 13 February 1969 that LOPEZ Arevalo travelled to Havana, via Mexico, on 12 January 1962 and 12 November 1965. The following biographic data on LOPEZ Arevalo was taken from his Passport Application, dated 19 October 1965:

a.	DPOB	12 July 1943; La Gomera, Guatemala	
b.	Father	Timoteo LOPEZ	cit: Guatemala
c.	Mother	Nicolasa AREVALO	Δ: Guatemala
d.	Color of Eyes	Black	

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MAR 10 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: Herewith
Photo

Distribution:
2-Mexi w/att h/w 1 cy
2-C/WHD w/att h/w 1 cy

h/w att.

FEB 27 1969

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCGA- 9803

DATE
24 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-798301

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HLCA-9803

e.	Color of Hair	Black
f.	Color of Skin	Dark
g.	Height	1.62
h.	Marital Status	Single
i.	Occupation	Farmer
j.	Passport No.	169687

3. Photographs of Mario Augusto MENDEZ Aguilar and Mario Otoniel MENDEZ Molina were forwarded to Station Mexico City (Reference B) with the request they be shown to LIRING-3 for possible identification. It would be interesting to learn whether either of the above is the true name of the individual known to addressees as Javier CONTRERAS.

Amy J. STRUMNESS

ATT TO
HGGA - 9803

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

SECRET

W/att: 1
HGGA - 9803
Chief, WH Division

CS COPY

201-798301

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIRING/JMTEAK/Humberto GONZALEZ Vega

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

REFERENCE : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Headquarter's files contain the following information on a Humberto GONZALEZ and Humberto GONZALEZ Vega who is probably identical with the GONZALEZ described by LIRING/3 in reference.

a. In September 1954 one Humberto GONZALEZ, in company with other exiles, was deported from Guatemala to Panama. On 9 September this exile group arrived in Panama on board an Argentine military aircraft. It was further reported that on 10 September, this same group departed for Argentina via Guayaquil, Lima, and Santiago. GONZALEZ, described as a Guatemalan national, utilized safe conduct pass #1292 or #12925, which listed his occupation as being a railroad worker [illegible] was 2 October [illegible]. (Source: HZP-1100, 17 September 1954)

b. In early May 1957 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega was reported as being a member of the Alianza de la Juventud Democratica de Guatemala (AJDG), a Communist youth group. This group was active in the preparation and distribution of propaganda which was being directed against the Guatemalan Government. GONZALEZ was further identified as an individual who had previously taken asylum in the Argentine Embassy, had a known Communist background, and was presently employed as a salesman for the HICOL Company in Guatemala City. (Source: HGG-965, 24 May 1957, ESCONSON/2 from ESCONSON/10)

c. On 25 April 1959 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega attended a meeting at which plans for May Day celebrations were discussed. This same report contained the Field Comment that GONZALEZ was a member of the PGT. (Source: GUAT-259, 28 April 1959)

/Continued/

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - COS, Mexico City
2 - COS, Guatemala City

30 January 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-17056

DATE: 3 FEB 1969

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-798301

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: [illegible] OFFICER: [illegible] TYPIST: [illegible] EXT.: [illegible]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3/G	30-1-69	[illegible]
AC/WH/3		[illegible]

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/3
DATE: 3/2/69
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: [illegible] J. [illegible]

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-64 (40)

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-17056

d. In May 1959 one Humberto GONZALEZ Vega was reported as being a member of the Batallon Guatemala. This group had been recruited to join the Nicaraguan revolutionary forces in trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government of President Luis SOMOZA Debayle. This same report indicated that GONZALEZ had been involved in the Nicaraguan Revolutionary movement, was a member of the PGT, and worked as sales manager for the Amalia de NICOL Company. The address for this company was reported as 6th Avenue and 10th St. Zone 1, Guatemala City. (HGG-1331, 22 May 1959, ESGEM/1 from ESGEM/15)

e. In late July 1960 one Humberto GONZALEZ was reported as being a leftist who was financing a group which had prepared plans for a coup. (Source: HGG-1766, 2 August 1960, ESDEW/1 from ESRECESS/3)

2. Headquarters would appreciate any additional information on GONZALEZ that might be developed by addresses.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City RGG

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are eight reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation. The most important of these are reviewed below.

a. "Romulo," who later described himself as Mario X*MENDEZ, appeared on the scene as the liaison man between LIRING-3 and the Guatemalan FAR. Humberto X*GONZALEZ Vega, whom MENDEZ called "El Gato," apparently made initial contact with LIRING-3 on his own initiative. MENDEZ said that "El Gato" was a "good element" but emphasized that he (MENDEZ) would be the person LIRING-3 would deal with on FAR matters. A copy of the sketch of MENDEZ drawn by LIRING-3 was shown by the Station to LIREBEL-2. The latter, without any hesitation, identified it as Javier X*CONTRERAS, leading FAR representative

Continued.....................

re: Connection with (201-798301)

Attachments:
1. Reports (8), h/w
2. Documents (7), u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

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S/c att: 1
h/w att: 1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 36184	17 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-798301

in Mexico and a suspected PBRUMEN contact. The Station had the LIEMBRACE team cover the entrance of the building where MENDEZ and other FAR members have an apartment they use for clandestine meetings with LIRING-3. Despite the fact that the team knows LIRING-3 from previous surveillance and that a copy of LIRING-3's sketch of MENDEZ was also provided, the LIEMBRACEs spotted neither man. The Station naturally plans to cover another meeting and is also exploring the possibility of determining who rented the apartment and from whom. It is of some interest to note that MENDEZ, although he gave LIRING-3 the agreed upon recognition signal, may still not be the "Pavel" LIRING-3 was told he would meet. LIRING-3 was shown a photograph of Oscar (201-841522) Arturo PEREZ Ramirez (known to have serviced a letter drop in Mexico City used by Michelle Jeannette FIRK before her death in Guatemala). LIRING-3 thought it looked like a poor print of a photograph of "Pavel" shown to him while still incarcerated.

b. LIRING-3 is apparently still suspicious in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. He has received several letters (see paragraph 2) from members of the FAR in Guatemala warning him that adverse rumors (some of them calling him a WOFIRM agent) have been circulated in that country by Carlos PERZABAL Marcue. Knowing that PERZABAL's father-in-law is a close friend of Chief, LIRING, LIRING-3 sourced the rumors to the LIRING headman. He first took up the matter of the accusations made against him with LIRING-9. The latter said there was nothing to this, but, and there was a but, LIRING-9 reminded LIRING-3 that in the past he had been connected "with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations," a clear reference to ROWTON, LIRING-3's Greek friend. When LIRING-3 insisted he wanted to discuss the matter of the allegations made against him directly with Chief, LIRING, LIRING-9 promised to make an appointment for him. This appointment, however, never materialized. That Chief, LIRING may have spread the allegations made against LIRING-3 by PERZABAL was confirmed by Rolando SUAREZ (see ROWTON's report dated 31 December). LIRING-3 also took up the matter of the PERZABAL denunciations with MENDEZ, who told him that the FAR had paid no attention to them and even accompanied LIRING-3 to PERZABAL's house. LIRING-3, however, made the mistake of giving his name when asked who was calling. The result, as could be expected, was that PERZABAL was "not in." MENDEZ agreed to accompany LIRING-3 to LIRING to talk to its Chief, but he warned LIRING-3 not to make accusations without proof. MENDEZ, incidentally, does not appear to be pro-PBRUMEN. This is interesting in view of the fact that CONTRERAS, with whom he may be identical, is a suspected contact of the PBRUMENers.

c. So far, it does not seem that the FAR has been greatly disturbed by the accusations made against LIRING-3. In fact, MENDEZ and the two other FAR members LIRING-3 met on 1 January have urged LIRING-3 to join them in the hills of Guatemala, where guerrilla warfare, they said, will soon be

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intensified. They did not hide that their purpose was to broadcast LIRING-3's name and the fact that a Mexican had joined their fight. This was apparently to appeal to the Mexican left and gain their support. While LIRING-3 has declared himself ready to go back to Guatemala (if this was what ROWTON wanted him to do), he did not need ROWTON to decide that broadcasting his name from the jungles of Guatemala was not a thing he wanted anyone to do. At Station directive, LIRING-3 pointed out that after his recent imprisonment he had to take care of his wife before doing any more for the cause. The best way to do this was to take LIRING-4 to PERUMEN and leave her with relatives. This led LIRING-3 to ask what, if anything, he could do for the FAR in Mexico. So far, however, his FAR friends have not risen to the bait.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2 are the following documents:

a. A copy of a letter from Oscar Moises *ROLDAN Espinoza. (201-843703)

b. A translation and a copy of a letter, dated December 1968, from Marta *BARRIOS. sex:F

c. Translations and copies of letters from Marta BARRIOS to LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 dated 29 December and from "Violeta" dated 17 November.

[illegible] Alvarado

d. Copies of two letters and two postcards received by LIRING-3 from Rafael and Rigoberto *ARGUETA Alvarado dated 10 December (see ROWTON's report of 19 December).

e. A copy of the letter sent by LIRING-3 to Carlos *PERZABAL Marcue with copies for the Mexican and Spanish Communist Parties. This letter is dated 25 December.

f. A copy of an article written by LIRING-3 and published in a Mexican magazine. The date, number, and name of the magazine are marked on the copy.

10804

g. A copy of the note written by Jacobo *RODRIGUEZ Padilla (a longtime member of the Guatemalan Communist Party living in Mexico) introducing Carlos *LOPEZ (who was an important FAR leader in Guatemala until he came to Mexico in late 1968). cit: Guatemala

h. A copy of an article which appeared in a Chiapas newspaper announcing LIRING-3's release.

Raymond A. Hodge
for Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT #1
HMMA-36184
19 December, 1968

13P

1. LIRING/3 gave Rowton two letters dated 10 December, 1968, from Rafael Argueta A. and Rigoberto Argueta A. (Alvarado) in which former states he working in Chiquimula and gets home only every fifteen days. ~~Former~~ Latter states among profuse greetings and best wishes that "Juán José y Miguel ~~[illegible]~~ tienen un año para hacerle fuerte al destino" which L/3 interprets to mean that León Barrios brothers intend resume activity on behalf FAR as soon as they released.

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he hopes one or both brothers will come to Mexico after release and asked Rowton whether he could determine probable date of release so that he could be prepared receive them. LIRING/3 will reply to letters ~~[illegible]~~ hoping that "los leones" will come to visit him when they leave their cage.

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HMMA-36184

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201-798301

23 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact by "Pavel" of FAR.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 23/12/68 at the restaurant in the Camino Real Hotel that at long last the FAR contact promised by the León Barrios brothers had appeared. LIRING/3 told Rowton that at about 1900 on 19 December a Guatemalan came to his apartment and introduced himself as "a friend of Violeta." L/3 invited him in but asked him not to discuss anything sensitive in the presence of his wife. After about ten minutes of chit chat in the apartment, L/3 and the Guatemalan, who gave his name simply as "Rómulo", went to a nearby restaurant to talk privately.

2. According to LIRING/3, the Guatemalan stated that he had been ordered by FAR to maintain contact with L/3. When queried by L/3 regarding the Humberto González Vega whom he had met previously, "Rómulo" exclaimed, "Oh, you mean 'El Gato' - he's a good element, but he will not be your FAR contact. I have been entrusted with that mission." "Rómulo" also stated that he knew Francisco Lara well and had worked with him in Guatemala City some time ago until Lara was arrested. "Rómulo" added that unfortunately Lara's mother had betrayed him to the police and he barely escaped arrest at that time. "Rómulo" confirmed that Lara had been under a cloud as far as his superiors were concerned and had made the ill-fated trip in order to attempt to clear himself of charges against him.

3. When LIRING/3 told "Rómulo" that he had been in touch with the LIRING office since his return, the latter exclaimed,"But what have the LIRING people to do with us?" This gave L/3 the definite impression that "Rómulo" himself was not in touch with a PBRUMEN representative in Mexico City,and, in any case, did not like the LIRING establishment.

4. He then asked L/3 to give him a summary report of the arrest and detention. L/3 told Rowton that he balked at this at first, protesting to "Rómulo" that he had already given the details to the León Barrios brothers and"Cebollito" who he was sure had passed on the report to the FAR in Guatemala. When "Rómulo" explained that he would appreciate an oral report on the spot since he was not fully informed because of communications problems, LIRING/3 told Rowton that he went over the whole episode for "Rómulo's" benefit. "Rómulo" then asked to see LIRING/3 again at 1100 on 21 December to continue their discussion. He promised to meet L/3 on the street in front of his apartment house at the appointed time.

5. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that much to his surprise and indignation he received a letter on the following day(20/12/68) from Martha, the mother

of the León Barrios brothers, in which, among other things, she stated that "the man on the bicycle", which L/3 explained to Rowton meant Carlos Persabal had written a letter containing grave charges against LIRING/3. The letter, which L/3 read aloud to Rowton, went on to assure L/3 that these charges were not believed but constituted a source of annoyance to the writer's friends.

6. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he felt so indignant and shocked at this unpleasant development that he decided to see the Chief LIRING and have it out with him. L/3 explained that since the Chief LIRING is on very friendly terms with the father-in-law of Persabal he might be aware of the letter and even possibly encourgaged Persabal to write it. L/3 told Rowton that he then got in touch with LIRING/2 by telephone and made a date to meet him at the LIRING establishment at 0930 on 21/12/68. When he arrived at the gate at that time he was told that LIRING/2 had not yet arriveed. After a wait of some twenty minutes, LIRING/2 appeared but asked LIRING/3 to wait a little longer since he was very busy. After another annoying wait, LIRING/9 appeared instead of LIRING/2 and talked with LIRING/3 on the patio. LIRING/3 explained that he wanted urgently to talk with the Chief LIRING since something had come up with regard to Persabal. He reminded LIRING/9 that he originally had expressed a desire to have a face-to-face confrontation with Persabal in the LIRING office so that he could present his report on the arrest in his presence. LIRING/9, according to LIRING/3, brushed this off again with the comment, "But as I told you before, you're making a mountain of a molehill. You're exaggerating the whole business."

7. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then took out Martha's letter and insisted that LIRING/9 read it. The latter expressed amazement at the revelation of Persabal's action but did not agree with LIRING/3 that the Chief LIRING would be able to shed light on it. LIRING/3 then told LIRING/9 that he did not like the games that everyone seemed to be playing with him, and asked LIRING/9 point blank what it was that motivated him to ask for a written report of the arrest and, after L/3 complied with the request, to drag his feet. L/3 continued that he felt he had been frank with the LIRING office, whereas on the other hand they were not honest with him in telling him what they thought of him. L/9 then assured L/3 of his confidence inhim and added that in the past certain persons, including Hugo, the assistant to LIRING/11, had felt thatLIRING/3 had been connected with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations. L/3, understanding this to be a clear allusion to Rowton, admitted to having known this person in the past and having had

a few business transactions with him, including the sale of a number of his paintings, but insisted with some annoyance that this had not bearing on his political activity. LIRING/9 agreed and added that it was really a thing of the past that should not bother LIRING/3. He promised to make an appointment for LIRING/3 to see the Chief LIRING sometime the following week.

8. LIRInG/3 continued that when he met with "Rómulo" later that morning he also showed the letter from Martha to him. According to L/3, "Rómulo" became indignant and suggested that they talk to Persabal together to get to the bottom of the matter. L/3 and "Rómulo" then took a taxi to the residence of Persabal in the hope of finding him in at the time. When L/3, however, rang the outside bell he was told by a woman (who he suspects was either Persabal's wife or sister-in-law) that Persabal was not at home. L/3 noted the woman's astonishment in her tone of voice when he stated his name at her request. "Rómulo" who was present later commented that L/3 should hot have given his name since it was obvious that Persabal was at home but did not want to see LIRING/3.

9. According to L/3, "Rómulo" at the second meeting stated that "several" friends of his were planning to return to Guatemala to continue their work for the FAR and that he hoped that LIRING/3 might be able to help in this mission. "Rómulo" did not specify what kind of assistance he expected from LIRING/3 but promised to give him details when the time came for action in this matter. He promised to see L/3 again at 1600 on 24 December,1968.

10. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he planned to insist on seeing the Chief LIRING IN THE HOPE of determining his reaction to the charges by Persabal in view of the Chief's friendship with the in-laws of Persabal.

Wallace B Rowton

26 December, 1968

CONTACT REPORT

1. Agent: LIRING/3
2. Date and Site of Meeting: 1100, 26/12/68; Camino Real Restaurant.
3. Next Meeting: 1100, 28/12/68; " " "
4. Reports/Information Passed by Agent:

a) Contact of Carlos López: L/3 reported that about 1430 on 24 December as he and his wife arrived at their apartment, they found a "chaparito" who introduced himself as Carlos López, a Guatemalan friend of Jacobo Rodríguez(Padilla), and gave L/3 a note of introduction from that person. L/3 gave Rowton the original letter, which is attached herewith. L/3 told Rowton that López stated that he was anxious to send various items, including medicines, to PBRUMEN, and appealed to L/3 since he "understood" that L/3 and his wife had contacts through which he could send the items. López, according to L/3 appeared very interested to be reassured that L/3 really did have good contacts with the LIRING establishment. When L/3 assured him that he did see LIRING respresentatives, López went on to refeal that he was a friend of Carlos Perzabal and that he was fully informed concerning the recent "tragic situation" of both Persabal and LIRING/3. This bomb shell shock L/3 badly and he felt obliged to launch into a diatribe against Perzabal. When López commented that "naturally we have to take Perzabal's word against yours, since he know him better," L/3 told Rowton that he demanded an explanation of who the "we" were. López simply replied that it meant "important" persons in Guatemala and Mexico. He added that, "as you know", Persabal was known even to César Montes. L/3 retorted, "But Montes has been stripped of his authority, as you should know." This led L/3 to the counterclaim that he also had good friends in Guatemala and Mexico who could testify on his behalf.

LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then showed López a photostatic copy of the attached letter which he had written to Perzabal demanding an explanation of the calumnies he was known to be spreading against him, and which he (L/3) had already sent to the CP Mexico and Spain. He asked López to keep the copy and tell his good friend Perzabal where he got it and under what circumstances.

LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that he had to cut short the rather heated exchange with López since he had a date at 1600 that same day with "Rómulo" outside his apartment house.

b) Contact with "Rómulo": LIRING/3 told Rowton that he again saw Rómulo, the FAR liaison, outside his apartment house at about 1610 on 24 December, as prearranged. In view of what had transpired a ~~few~~ short time earlier that afternoon, he told Rómulo about the comments made by Carlos López. Rómulo, according to L/3, did not indicate that he knew López at all, but agreed with L/3 that the accusations of Perzabal must be met head-on. He suggested the following course of action: L/3 should wait for the reply from Marta (mother of León Barrios brothers) as to the exact charges made by Perzabal before taking up the matter with the Chief LIRING. HE tended to agree with L/3 that the LIRING establishment might have inspired Perzabal's letter, but felt it would be better if L/3 had a statement from Marta before accusing the PBRUMENers of bad faith with him. Rómulo added that in the meantime he would try to arrange a confrontation with Perzabal in the presence of three "important FAR officials in Mexico", including a certain "Julio" also known as "Buda". Rómulo felt that Buda could lure Perzabal to a private meeting sinne the latter ~~has~~ already had interviewed him some time ago and would be anxious to see him again. This would provide a good pretext for a confrontation between Perzabal and LIRING/3 to clear up the whole matter.

C) Proposed Meeting with LIRING Chief: LIRING/3 told Rowton that he felt it essential to see the LIRING Chief on the morning of 27 Dec even if he does not receive a reply from Marta by that time. He explained that he felt he could get some sort of statement from the LIRING Chief, either affirming or denying his knowledge of the Perzabal letter so that he could use this in a possible meeting with the latter in the presence of Rómulo and his colleagues. He said that he felt this important in view of a possible invitation to PBRUMEN that he might receive momentarily.

5. Information/Guidance Given to Agent: Rowton cautioned L/3 against jumping the gun in accusing the LIRINGs of inspiring the Perzabal letter, pointing out that it could just as easily and logically have come from such Guatemalan exiles as Navarette,Capuano,or even persons of the César Montes group,who are expected to be close to the LIRINGs and the CPM as well as possibly the PTG.

WB Rowton

CS COPY

30 December, 1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Identification of "Rómulo" Reported FAR Lisaison.

1. At 1100 on 28 December, 1968, LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the Camino Real restaurant that he had again met briefly with "Rómulo" in front of his (L/3's) apartment house about 1600 on 27/12/68. On this occasion "Rómulo" identified himself as Mario Mendez and promised to give LIRING/3 a telephone at which he could be contacted in the future.

2. With regard to the Perzabal accusations, "Rómulo" again cautioned LIRING/3 against jumping the gun with the Chief of LIRING (i.e. accusing him of having inspired the charges), since if the LIRING Chief called his bluff, L/3 would have no proof. "Rómulo" recommended that L/3 wait until he received a reply from Marta giving details of the accusations before proceeding further. He added that at that time he and his colleagues would gladly confront Persabal and clear up the matter.

3. LIRING/3 described "Rómulo" as a Guatemalan of about 28 years of age, 5'6", 125 lbs, sraight black thinning hair, small eyes, clipped moustache. L/3 added that "Rómulo" frequently squints his eyes, either from a nervous habit, or some physical defect. LIRING/3 drew Rowton a rough sketch of "Rómulo" as he recalled him from the three brief meetings he has had with him to date.

4. LIRING/3 also gave Rowton the original of the letter from Marta postmarked 18 December, 1968, in which mention was made of the Perzabal charges. L/3 reminded Rowton that Perzabal is referred to in the letter as "el hombre de la bicicleta", and that the León Barrios brothers (sons of Marta) as "los patojos."

5. LIRING/3 also gave Rowton the original letter of Oscar Moisés Roldán Espinoza dated 27 November, 1968, which LIRING/3 had received on 1 Decemner, 1968. The envelope bears the same return address as that of 7 November, 1968. Roldán encloses the negative of a snapshot of himself as a "recuerdo." The letter contains general greetings and a plea for whatever help L/3 can manage to give Roldán.

6. LIRING/3 asked Rowton's approval to send 500 pesos to Marta (via her sister) to encourage her to continue writing him and keeping him informed of what develops, especially if and when her sons are released. Rowton agreed but stressed that L/3 should explain that he had managed to have this extra money as a result of his recent exposition and to regret that he could not send more.

WBRowton

Wallace B Rowton

Yllano Mendez (PAVEL?)

25-30 años
1.68
56 Kilos
ojos chinos
[illegible]



vestido
Corduroy
"Pana"

14-00000

31 December,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with FAR Members in Mexico City.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at the Robin Restaurant at 1700 on 30/12/68 that when he returned to his apartment at about 1200 on 28/12/68 he found Mario Mendez (aka "Rómulo") waiting in the company of another FAR member, whom L/3 described as "very fat" aged about 28 with a dropping moustache. L/3 told Rowton that since he did not wish to involve his wife in conversation with these persons, invited them outside to a nearby restaurant.

2. According to LIRING/3 Mario Mendez and his friend told him that FAR had decided finally to withdraw all its forces from the cities and to regroup in the mountains, in view of the increasing "repression" and the virtual impossibility of effective action in the urban areas of Guatemala. They stated that they and a number of their comrades in Mexico were planning to return to Guatemala and join the FAR forces in the mountains. They then invited LIRING/3 to accompany them on their return trip, feeling that in that way he could contribute more to the struggle. In reply to L/3's queries they did not specify how L/3 was to survive another trip and in fact be of any use to them in the mountains. They simply said that they felt it would be useful to give wide publicity to L/3's presence in the mountains, once he reached that area. L/3 told Rowton that he reacted to this somewhat startling proposal in as logical a way as possible, saying that he would have it give it careful thought, inasmuch as it raised a number of very serious problems with him and his family. Mario Mendez and his friend concluded with a rousing cheer for the "real revolutionaries" who put aside all thoughts of personal safety and comfort and rush into the battle. When L/3 pointed out that they themselves after all had withdrawn from the action they replied that precisely for that reason they intended to return and do their share for the cause.

3. LIRING/3 also reported that he and his wife spent the 29th of December with Orlando Suarez in Cuernavaca and had lunch with him and Jorge Godoy. Suarez remarked privately to L/3 that he had visited the LIRING offices on 24-25 December and was "not pleased" with comments he had heard concerning LIRING/3. He recommended that L/3 see the Chief LIRING"as soon as possible" to put the record straight concerning the circumstances surrounding his arrest and especially his subsequent release. Suarez intimated that the Chief LIRING apparently favored the version given by Perzabal, with whose in-laws he was on very close personal terms. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he planned to try again to meet privately with the Chief LIRING on the morning of 31 December,1968.

4. In reply to Rowton's questions concerning the identity of the following names that appear in the letters to him from Marta Barrios de León, LIRING/3 made the following clarifications:

1) "Los cabchitos" and "Los patojos" refer to Juan and Miguel León Barrios.
2) "Elsa" is the true name of the eldest León Barrios sister (apparent age 25).
3) "La negra" is a León Barrios sister aged about 14.
4) "La chiquita" is a six-year-old sister of the León Barrios brothers.
5) "Felissa" is the novia of Juán José León Barrios.
6) "Yuri" is a child, probably of Maria Elena, who is a close friend and possibly relative of the León Barrios family.
7) "La gordita" and "Cari" whose identity L/3 never learned are both active members of FAR who frequently visited the León Barrios brothers and acted as FAR couriers.

5. LIRING/3 told Rowton that as regards the proposed revisit to Guatemala, he was prepared to discuss this with Rowton and would be willing to undertake the hazardous mission, "if there were no other alternative", but that in any case careful plans would have to be worked out especially with regard to commuuications, if Rowton hoped to profit by L/3's renewed involvement with FAR in Guatemala.

WBRowton

Wallace B Rowton

1 January,1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting at FAR Safehouse.

1. At 2100 on 1/1/69 at the Robin Restaurant LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he went, as requested by "Rómulo", to Calle Coahuila 221 (across from Woolworths near the corner of Insurgentes Sur) and found "Rómulo" in apartment 12 in the company of two other persons, previously unknown to LIRING/3. Both appeared younger than "Rómulo" and one could easily be his brother because of the physical resemblance. The other, apparent age 25, light skinned,who was introduced simply as an Ecuadorian, had a good Guatemalan accent, and revealed in his remarks an excellent knowledge of Guatemala. The Ecuadorian, who had the most pleasant personality of the three, remarked during the conversation that he had been imprisoned in the old penitentiary in Guatemala City and subsequently "thrown" over the border to Salvador.

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton that the small apartment contained nothing that he could see but a table and several chairs and was obviously a safehouse rather than a residence. "Rómulo" later confirmed this when he told L/3 that they would have to meet there in the future only by appointment since they did not live there but came only from time to time to talk. As a result, LIRING/3 made a date with them for 1600 on Friday, 3/1/69, at which time he, L/3, would come to the apartment. "Rómulo" promised to wait for him at the entrance to the apartment building so that L/3 would not have to ring the bell and wait outside the door unnecessarily.

3. During the friendly discussion that ensued in the apartment,L/3 took the line previously agreed on with Rowton with apparent success. The young Ecuadorian showed his approval by nodding his head several times, when L/3 outlines his reasons for not accepting at once the proposal to return to Guatemala. "Romulo" was less sympathetic, and when L/3 stated that he felt it necessary in any case to travel first to PBRUMEN to get his wife settled "Rómulo" shrugged his shoulders,remarking, "But can't she get by herself." L/3 then offerred to be of any service while in PBRUMEN, but did not receive any positive reaction. "Rómulo" responded simply with a "Yes, we'll see." L/3 made sure to drop the statement that he was planning as a matter of fact to see LIRING/9 the following morning to talk about the trip which L/9 himself had already volunteered to arrange.

4. When the subject of Ferzabal's calumnies against L/3 came up toward the end of the conversation, "Rómulo" told L/3:"Don't worry about that any more. A guatemalan, whom you don't know, will take care of that matter 'de una vez' L/3 told Rowton he felt this remark was too full of foreboding for him to ask for details. He agreed to come again to the apartment at 1600 on 3/1/69.

WBL//

14-00000

1 January,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Address of Mario Mendez,aka "Rómulo".

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 1000 on 1/1/69 at the Robin Restaurant that he had not succeeded in seeing the Chief LIRING as he had hoped the previous morning since the latter did not appear at his office by 1000, when LIRING/3 had to leave to make the contact with "Rómulo" at his apartment. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he arrived at his apartment about 1015 he found a note from "Rómulo" asking him to come to the following address ~~at~~ between 1130-1200 the following day (1 January,1969):

Calle Coahuila 221.

2. Rowton therefore made another date with LIRING/3 for that same evening at 2100 at the Robin Restaurant in order to get L/3's report of this meeting. Rowton showed LIRING/3 the two pictures passed to him by the Station of persons suspected of being "Rómulo" and the fat colleague. LIRING/3 told Rowton that he could see no resemblance to either person, but he felt that the photo of the stout person corresponded to the description of the "Pavel" he was supposed to meet. He recalled that at the time the León Barrios brothers told him they would arrange for "Pavel" to contact him in Mexico City upon his return, they showed him a rather poor reproduction of a picture of Pavel that had appeared in the local press following a gunfight that Pavel had had on the border while crossing into Mexico.

3. Rowton then expressed to LIRING/3 his grave reservations concerning ~~any~~ the proposed travel of L/3 to Guatemala in the company of his new FAR friends. Rowton pointed out that such a trip would be extremely risky for L/3 personally with little hope of any worthwhile production for Rowton. LIRING/3 agreed and said that he felt he would have to continue to stall, even at the risk of alienating the affections and confidence of his new contacts. Rowton suggested that L/3 tell them that before he could possibly consider such a return trip he would have to visit PBRUMEN with his wife and child to get them settled there so that they would not again be exposed to the difficulties they suffered during his last trip - financial as well as psychological. This would give L/3 at least another month before he would be faced with the trip. Rowton added that L/3 should offer to do "everything possible" in Mexico for his friends, reviewing for them his knowledge and experience of the border areas, his service in the navy as well as his reasonably good knowledge of photography.

4. Rowton then stressed that L/3 should assume that everything,at least in summary form, that he discussed with the FAR officials he was in contact with would directly or indirectly be reported to the LIRING office,and that hence he should "play it straight" with both sides.

8 January,1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Allegation of WOFIRM Affiliation.

1. At 1000 on 7 January,1969, at the restaurant of the Casino Real Hotel LIRING/3 reported to Rowton that he had just received three letters from Marta Barrios de León, the mother of the León Barrios brothers (Miguel and Juán) whom he had originally met during his confinement in Guatemala City. He gave the original letters, Rowton's translation of which is attached, to Rowton to copy and study. LIRING/3 appeared genuinely shaken at the revlation in the second paragraph of the letter,dated 29/12/68, that the "man on the bicycle" (Carlos Perzabal) had written in his letter to Marta that LIRING/3 was "working for another company (WOFIRM) and that Marta should not confide in anything LIRING/3 might write to her." LIRING/3 told Rowton that he had suspected that Perzabal had accused him of perhaps causing the arrest, but he never dreamed that Perzabal would go so far as to accuse him outright of being a WOFIRM agent.

2. LIRING/3 then speculated that Perzabal could not have done such a serious thing of his own initiative, but must necessarily have been inspired by some outside source, most probably the LIRING establishment. He continued that he therefore felt it more necessary than ever to put the LIRING Chief "up against the wall" and force him to admit his complicity. LIRING/3 added that he had seen "Rómulo" on 3 January as planned and had told him about the letter from Marta and Perzabal's treachery. According to LIRING/3 "Rómulo" became indignant and volunteered to accompany LIRING/3 to the LIRING establishment to have the whole thing out once and for all. LIRING/3 appeared so disturbed at the unexpected news that Rowton found it impossible to check with him on the exact time and place he allegedly met "Rómulo" on Friday, 3/1/69. When Rowton stated that he felt it very important to identify "Rómulo" positively (Rowton alleged that he had access to the Gobernación "mug file" of persons wanted by the Guatemalan Government and given to the Mexicans for identification), LIRING/3 volunteered to arrange to meet "Rómulo" somewhere in public as soon as possible so that Rowton could get a good look at him (as he had previously done in the case of "Garcia").

3. Rowton advised LIRING/3 not under any circumstances to attempt to lure "Rómulo" to any public place, especially since the latter had established a pattern of meeting with him in a safehouse, but simply to tell Rowton the next time he was invited to visit the safehouse and Rowton would cover the place from as convenient a spot as possible (e.g. Woolworth's across the street). Rowton also encouraged LIRING/3 to talk again with LIRING/9 rahher than the Chief LIRING IN THE hope of more production.

X

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Guatemala City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PERUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

1. Forwarded herewith as attachment #1 are eight reports prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON on the latest developments of the LIRING-3 operation. The most important of these are reviewed below.

a. "Romulo," who later described himself as Mario *MENDEZ, appeared on the scene as the liaison man between LIRING-3 and the Guatemalan FAR. Humberto *GONZALEZ Vega, whom MENDEZ called "El Gato," apparently made initial contact with LIRING-3 on his own initiative. MENDEZ said that "El Gato" was a "good element" but emphasized that he (MENDEZ) would be the person LIRING-3 would deal with on FAR matters. A copy of the sketch of MENDEZ drawn by LIRING-3 was shown by the Station to LIREBEL-2. The latter, without any hesitation, identified it as Javier *CONTRERAS, leading FAR representative

Continued.........................

Attachments:
1. Reports (8), h/w
2. Documents (7), s/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy each)

HMMA - 36184 17 January 1969

S E C R E T 201-798301

in Mexico and a suspected PBRUMEN contact. The Station had the LIEMBRACE team cover the entrance of the building where MENDEZ and other FAR members have an apartment they use for clandestine meetings with LIRING-3. Despite the fact that the team knows LIRING-3 from previous surveillance and that a copy of LIRING-3's sketch of MENDEZ was also provided, the LIEMBRACEs spotted neither man. The Station naturally plans to cover another meeting and is also exploring the possibility of determining who rented the apartment and from whom. It is of some interest to note that MENDEZ, although he gave LIRING-3 the agreed upon recognition signal, may still not be the "Pavel" LIRING-3 was told he would meet. LIRING-3 was shown a photograph of Oscar Arturo *PEREZ Ramirez (known to have serviced a letter drop in Mexico City used by Michelle Jeannette FIRK before her death in Guatemala). LIRING-3 thought it looked like a poor print of a photograph of "Pavel" shown to him while still incarcerated.

b. LIRING-3 is apparently still suspicious in the eyes of the PBRUMENers. He has received several letters (see paragraph 2) from members of the FAR in Guatemala warning him that adverse rumors (some of them calling him a KOPIRM agent) have been circulated in that country by Carlos PERZABAL Marcue. Knowing that PERZABAL's father-in-law is a close friend of Chief, LIRING, LIRING-3 sourced the rumors to the LIRING headman. He first took up the matter of the accusations made against him with LIRING-9. The latter said there was nothing to this, but, and there was a but, LIRING-9 reminded LIRING-3 that in the past he had been connected "with a person of mysterious and suspicious affiliations," a clear reference to ROWTON, LIRING-3's Greek friend. When LIRING-3 insisted he wanted to discuss the matter of the allegations made against him directly with Chief, LIRING, LIRING-9 promised to make an appointment for him. This appointment, however, never materialized. That Chief, LIRING may have spread the allegations made against LIRING-3 by PERZABAL was confirmed by Rolando *SUAREZ (see ROWTON's report dated 31 December). LIRING-3 also took up the matter of the PERZABAL denunciations with MENDEZ, who told him that the FAR had paid no attention to them and even accompanied LIRING-3 to PERZABAL's house. LIRING-3, however, made the mistake of giving his name when asked who was calling. The result, as could be expected, was that PERZABAL was "not in." MENDEZ agreed to accompany LIRING-3 to LIRING to talk to its Chief, but he warned LIRING-3 not to make accusations without proof. MENDEZ, incidentally, does not appear to be pro-PBRUMEN. This is interesting in view of the fact that CONTRERAS, with whom he may be identical, is a suspected contact of the PBRUMENers.

c. So far, it does not seem that the FAR has been greatly disturbed by the accusations made against LIRING-3. In fact, MENDEZ and the two other FAR members LIRING-3 met on 1 January have urged LIRING-3 to join them in the hills of Guatemala, where guerrilla warfare, they said, will soon be intensified. They did not hide that their purpose was to broadcast LIRING-3's name and the fact that a Mexican had joined their fight. This was apparently to appeal to the Mexican left and gain their support. While LIRING-3 has declared himself ready to go back to Guatemala (if this was what BOWTON wanted him to do), he did not need BOWTON to decide that broadcasting his name from the jungles of Guatemala was not a thing he wanted anyone to do. At Station directive, LIRING-3 pointed out that after his recent imprisonment he had to take care of his wife before doing any more for the cause. The best way to do this was to take LIRING-4 to PERUMEN and leave her with relatives. This led LIRING-3 to ask what, if anything, he could do for the FAR in Mexico. So far, however, his FAR friends have not risen to the bait.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as attachment #2 are the following documents:

a. A copy of a letter from Oscar Moises *BOLDAN Espinosa.

b. A translation and a copy of a letter, dated December 1968, from Marta *BARRIOS.

c. Translations and copies of letters from Marta BARRIOS to LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 dated 29 December and from "Violeta" dated 17 November.

d. Copies of two letters and two postcards received by LIRING-3 from Rafael and Rigoberto *ARGUETA Alvarado dated 10 December (see BOWTON's report of 19 December).

e. A copy of the letter sent by LIRING-3 to Carlos *PERZABAL Marcue with copies for the Mexican and Spanish Communist Parties. This letter is dated 25 December.

f. A copy of an article written by LIRING-3 and published in a Mexican magazine. The date, number, and name of the magazine are marked on the copy.

g. A copy of the note written by Jacobo *RODRIGUEZ Padilla (a longtime member of the Guatemalan Communist Party living in Mexico) introducing Carlos *LOPEZ (who was an important FAR leader in Guatemala until he came to Mexico in late 1968).

h. A copy of an article which appeared in a Chiapas newspaper announcing LIRING-3's release.

for Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT #2A
HMMA-36184

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM


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4c
CORREO AEREO

S/c att. 1
HMMA-36184

CS COPY

201-298301

14-00000

ATTACHMENT #2B
HMMA-36184

Envelope addressed to Señor Carlos Jurado
Edificio Condesa A.6
Pachuca y Veracruz
Mexico, DF

No return address
Sender's initials: M.B.

Postmarked 18 December, 1968, Guatemala.

Guatemala, December, 1968.

Dear Carlos:

Excuse me for not having replied to yours of 12 November until today, but the affairs of the "patojos" keep me on the go and besides I have been sick and upset and I keep forgetting everything. That's the reason I haven't put a date on this letter; you won't believe it but I write two letters that never got off, but it's true. We hope that you are as well as ever with your family.

I have to tell you that the "hombre de la bicicleta" wrote me last week and that I am a little peeved at him because he speaks ill of you. You should move cautiously, but don't think that it's a problem with us - we don't believe it. We feel that it's from fear. I lost his address and for that reason don't intend to write to him.

"El vigotudo" sends you regards; la negra a warm embrace; la chiquita a kiss; Elsa.FelisaCari,Maria Elena,Guri and the "patojos" many regards and embraces for the Chirstmas holidays. The "patojos" are still in the "pina" so they couldn't come. We'll see whether they can be with us the 24th; if not we'll have to go there to be with them. In any case I'll let you know when they come here.

So long with many best wishes and congratulations to you and your wife and children. Excuse the long and boring letter.

So long Carlos,
/s/ Marta


CORREO AEREO

14-00000

14-42-37

Attachment #2C
HMMA-36154

Gautemala, 29 December, 1968.

Carlos,

I'm writing this after returning from the farm where I had a chat with "los canches"; your three mmm letters came the same day, as well as the postcard which is very attractive. Thanks for all your trouble. In yours of the 20th you ask me to send a letter to the "E.C." but I don't understand where you mean, and to whom, since I don't recognize those initials. Please explain to me clearly what you mean so that I can comply.

As to the letter from the "man on the bicycle", I mislaid it since I didn't like what it said, but if I can locate it I'll send it to you, as the "patojos" told me to from the beginning, so that you can have an exact account of it. I, however, thought the weight they gave to it exaggerated. In any case he wrote to tell me that you were working for another company (CIA) and for that reason I shouldn't confide in anything that you might write to me. But I'm very sincere in that respect and for that reason I got very angry. Consider this, that when you both were here, the mother of that person was very nice to me, lavishing flattery and gifts on me, for which I am sincerely grateful and do not forget, but his action doesn't seem (honest) to me. We all have to be loyal and faithful to our convictions and not be shameless with respect to our comrades; we have to be responsible in all our actions.
I haven't been able to write until today since I'm running around town arranging things. All this must be boring to you. Receive greetings from Miguel, chiquita, negra, Maria, Felisa, my grandson, Elsita, Gorditaand Cari. Also my own "abrazos" and good wishes.

/s/ Marta

Carlos: Lesbia ("La Negrita") sends you fond remembrances. Excuse the red pen and the bad handwriting. Imagine! you fooled all of us since we thought you had made the Christmas card yourself -since you paint so well, but you'r not going to believe that. I'm writing you just a few lines because mamá didn't leave me much space. Greetings to your wife and children, even though I haven't had the pleasure of meeting them. So long,

/s/ Lesbia

Guatemala, 29 December, 1965

Dear Chichai,

This letter is to send you greetings in the hope that you are well together with your husband and children.
I was happy to learn that the person who wrote to me was you; it was quite a practical joke when I found out that it was really Carlos who was writing. Tell him that the letter he sent with the clippings has not yet been received.
Many "abrazos" and endearments from your friend

/s/ Marta.

Carlos: I'm writing simply to send you my best wishes for a prosperous and happy new year. /s/ Elsa.

Guatemala. 17/11/62

Carlos,

I send you my best, wishing that you and your family are well. Everything here is the same as when you were with us. We learned that your trip was good in all respects.
You can settle with the "Chino" the accounts you left here. He's going to send you two postcards that are very interesting. I trust you'll appreciate how difficult it was for us to find them among so many attractive cards we have here.
You can write to Doña Luisa. Greetings and "hasta pronto."

/s/ Violeta

The above is one of the many oversights of Doña Luisa. Excuse it.
(Handwriting of Marta)

Señor Carlos Zarate
Edificio Condesa A. 6
Pachuca y Av. Veracruz
Mexico D. F.

CORREO AEREO AIR MAIL PAR AVION

GUATEMALA 17/11/68

CARLOS:

TE ENVIO CALUROSOS SALUDOS.- DESEO QUE TE ENCUENTRES BIEN EN UNION DE TU FAMILIA.- POR AQUÍ TODO SIGUE IGUAL QUE CUANDO, ESTABAS TU.- SUPIMOS QUE TU VIAJE FUÉ DEL TODO BIEN.- LAS CUENTAS QUE AQUI DEJASTE LAS PUEDES ARREGLAR CON EL CHINO.- EL TE VA A MANDAR DOS POSTALES MUY INTERESANTES.- ESPERO SEPAS APRECIAR EL TRABAJO QUE HA COSTADO BUSCARLAS ENTRE TANTAS Y TAN LINDAS QUE AQUI TENEMOS.- PUEDES ESCRIBIR A DOÑA LUISA.- SALUDOS Y HASTA PRONTO.-

TE RECUERDA

VIOLETA

Esta fué uno de los tantos olvidados Doña Luisa [illegible]



Reinaldo I de L.
Guatemala, C.A.

SUCURSAL DE CORREOS COL
30 DIC 1963

Señor Carlos [illegible]
Edificio Lucerna A-6
[illegible] y Avenida Veracruz
México 11, D.F.

CORREO AEREO
VIA AIRMAIL

Correo Aéreo

Guatemala, 29 de Diciembre de 1968

Carlos: al escribir esta le hice al regreso de la finca despues de platicar, con los cuaches, tus cartas vinieron el mismo dia las tres y la tarjeta que esta muy linda muchas gracias por todas tus finezas. En la que viene con fecha 20 me mandas a decir que le envie una carta o la E C. pero no te entiendo a donde es o a quien, pues no conosco esas iniciales, hasme el favor de explicarme bien con eso cumplo con lo que me pides. La carta del hombre de la bicicleta creo me desagrado tanto la extravié pero si la encuentro te la mando pues los patojos me lo dijeron desde un principio para que tu te dieras cuenta exacta de ella pero yo creí muy exagerada la medida. El me mandó a decir que estabas trabajando en otra compañia (CIA) por lo tanto no me confiara en lo que tu me mandabas a contar. pero yo soy muy sincera a ese respecto y por lo mismo me enojé mucho. Toma en cuenta que cuando Ndo estuvie aquí. la mamá de él se portó muy bién con migo. pues me llenó de alagos y regalos lo cual agradezco de todo corazón y no lo olvido pero la acción de él no me parece que nosotros debemos de ser leales fieles a nuestras convicciones y no ser sinverguenzas con nuestros compañeros, para ser responsables con todos nuestros actos. Te escribo hasta hoy porque solo en la calle vivo arreglando el asunto. Está ya te ~~[illegible]~~ aburrió con seguridad, resibe recuerdos del Miguel, la chiquita, la negra, Marie, Felisa, el nieto, la Elsita la gordita de la Cari y de mi muchos abrazos y felicidades.

Marta

Lulas: Te escribe cariñosamente y recordándote siempre Lerina (la negrita). Perdona que te escriba con rojo y azul, mala letra. Fíjate que nos [illegible] a toda pensamos que la [illegible] mandado la debías hecho tú, porque como fuiste tan bien [illegible] por eso no te vayas a creer mucho. Te escribo poco porque mi mamá ya me dejó muchas [illegible]. Saludos a ti y a tu señora y no sé aunque no tengo el gusto de conocerla y a tu hija Silvia.

Correo Aéreo

Guatemala, 24 de Dic de 1963

Estimada Chichai

La presente es para saludarla deseando que se encuentre bien de en unión de su esposo e hijos. Me dio mucho gusto al saber que la que me escribía era Ud, pero me hizo bien la inocentada cuando vi que era Carlos el que me escribió, dígale que la carta que me mandó con los recortes no la recibí.

Resiba muchos abrazos y cariños de su amiga Marta

CARLOS:

TE ESCRIBO ÚNICAMENTE PARA DESEARTE A TI Y ALOS TUYOS DICHA Y PROSPERIDAD EN EL AÑO NUEVO. ELSA

ATTACHMENT # 2D
HMMA-36134



Señor:
[illegible] Gil [illegible].
Edificio Condesa A-6
México 11 Distrito Federal



Remit: [illegible]
27 calle 37-43 zona 12

Guatemala, 10 de diciembre de 1965

Señor:

Carlos Del Mar.

La presente es portadora de mis saludos deseando te encuentres gozando de buena salud al lado de tu señora y tus hijos. Carlos es para mi mucho gusto escribirte estas sinceras palabras no como amigos si no como hermanos, aunque muy poco tiempo tuvimos la oportunidad de tratarnos, pero tu sabes que entre nosotros bastó conocernos para querernos como hermanos, [illegible] la alegría que nos embargó al saber que ustedes ya se encontraban en casa y deseo de todo corazón que pases una feliz navidad y un próspero año nuevo al lado de tus seres queridos, te mando una postal de mi bello país para que te acuerdes de este tu hermano que siempre te recuerda. Qué más puedo yo decirte hermano si no que deseo buena suerte y que seas feliz en tu hogar.

Te cuento que Juan José y Miguel [illegible] su año para [illegible] el destino.

Buena manera recibe saludos de mis padres mi señora y en especial de tu hermano Rigoberto Aguilar A. Saludos a Carlos.

Guatemala 10 de diciembre de 1.961

Señor:

Carlos del Mar.

Estimado Carlos al recibir la presente deseo se encuentre gozando de buena salud al lado de su querida esposa e hijos y le deseo de todo corazón una feliz navidad y un prospero año nuevo 1.961.

Carlos perdone que la salutación le va un poco tarde pues fijese que no estoy en la capital me encuentro trabajando en Chiquimula y no me ha quedado tiempo pero llego cada quince días a mi casa, me saluda a Carlos P. y dígale que le deseo muchas felicidades en esta navidad y que que tenga un venturoso año nuevo al lado de su querida familia.

Reciba saludos de mis padres mis hermanos y no pierdo las esperanzas de conocer ese su grande y hermozo paiz que cada día se agiganta más me saluda a su esposa e hijos y Ud. reciba un apretón de manos de su amigo y hermano que siempre lo recuerda, reciba saludos de mi esposa le mando una. Bella postal de mi hermoso paiz.

Siempre lo recuerda.

Rafael Argueta A.

DHXXX

2a av. # 27-43 zona 12.

10 de diciembre de 1968
Como un recuerdo de
mi querida Guatemala
para Ud. Carlos
de su amigo y hermano
Rafael Augusto Alvarado.

No 401 Distribuidora Librería "PIXKIKI" 5a AV. No. 16-42 ZONA 1

Lago Atitlán
Lake Atitlán
GUATEMALA, C.A.

Guatemala 10 de diciembre de 1968
Como un recuerdo de mi bella
Guatemala esta humilde postal
para ti y tu sincero hermano
de tu amigo y hermano
Rafael Augusto Alvarado

ATTACHMENT #2E
HMMA-36184

México, D.F. a 25 de diciembre de 1968

Sr.
Carlos Ferrabal Marcué
Presente.

Ferrabal:

Juntos tuvimos una dura experiencia: las causas que la ocasionaron TU LAS CONOCES MEJOR QUE NADIE y sabes perfectamente que hay personas y organismos que se enteraron de todo en su oportunidad.

Ahora, por motivos de índole personal, familiar y probablemente para cubrir errores de los que NO SE TE ACUSA, estás deformando los hechos y me estás difamando.

Tu actitud no es honesta. Tengo en mi poder pruebas CONCRETAS de tus calumnias y como no soy un mártir ni un franciscano las haré públicas. Considero muy grave la situación que estás provocando. Si tú dispones de elementos concretos y definidos que confirmen lo que estás divulgando, te sugiero que también lo hagas. Así tanto tú como yo nos atendremos a las consecuencias.

Carlos Jurado
Carlos Jurado.

c.c. a organismos competentes y personas interesadas.

14-00000

SIEMPRE #810 — ATTACHMENT #2F
HMMA-36184
1 JANUARY 1969

[illegible]

Sr. director:

En el No. 805 correspondiente al 27 de noviembre del presente año, fue publicada en su estimable revista una carta mía sobre la "granja penal Pavón" en Guatemala, lugar donde estuve confinado por unos meses. En el No. 808 del 18 de diciembre, la señorita Gloria Menéndez Mina, agregada de Prensa —me imagino que de la embajada de Guatemala en México— responde a ella.

Considerando que su respuesta no se apega a la realidad, pues lógicamente un funcionario como la señorita Menéndez no puede hacer otra cosa que elogiar el régimen del cual depende, me permito hacer algunas aclaraciones que por cierto ella me pide en su carta. Por lo tanto ruego a usted de la manera más atenta se sirva dar a la publicación las siguientes líneas:

Srita. Gloria Menéndez Mina
Agregada de Prensa de Guatemala.

Evidentemente que nadie que sufra prisión saldrá de ella hablando maravillas, pero de esto a falsear la realidad hay una gran diferencia. Quiero aclararle que no fui a Guatemala en plan de reformador como usted dice. Los motivos de mi detención son ya plenamente conocidos y no voy a repetirlos ahora. Sólo debe usted saber que fui ABSUELTO de los delitos que se me imputaban. ABSUELTO quiere decir libre de cargos y dicha absolución me concedió libertad inmediata; es decir, que no se encontraron pruebas del falso delito del que la policía me acusó. Por lo tanto el adjetivo de "reformador" no me corresponde.

Sostengo que la "granja penal Pavón" es un campo de concentración y que no reúne ni una sola de las condiciones de una prisión común y corriente. Lo que escribí sobre ella es real y no exageré en nada. Usted dice que la "granja" sustituye a la antigua Penitenciaría que fue demolida. Eso es cierto, pero sí se llegó improvisadamente a su establecimiento. Probablemente los planos de sus constructores así como la opinión de los penalistas que menciona, contemplaban el establecimiento de granjas penitenciarias auténticas pero si es que tuvieron esa idea no la hicieron realidad.

En esa "granja" no existe ninguna ventaja sobre la vieja penitenciaría. Las condiciones de vida son infrahumanas y, como dije antes, sostengo lo escrito en mi anterior carta. Le propongo que el gobierno de su país permita la visita de periodistas y fotógrafos extranjeros (en ningún otro país se opondrían a que visitaran sus centros de reclusión) así como de la Cruz Roja Internacional, para que sean ellos quienes opinen y den a conocer al mundo la realidad de lo que llaman "Granja Penal".

Es una lástima que la revista SIEMPRE! no circule libremente en Guatemala. De ser así con toda seguridad que mucha gente de su país le haría sus aclaraciones sobre que esta "granja" es una prisión modelo.

Usted me pide que concrete nombres y fechas de personas secuestradas y asesinadas en la carretera de la "granja". Por ahora le daré dos: El 6 de abril de 1968 fueron secuestrados y asesinados por la policía los señores René Orellana e Ignacio Rolando Cruz. Nunca dije que en Guatemala no hay presos políticos; existen unos 100 aproximadamente en todas las prisiones del país. Son en cambio más de 4,000 los asesinados por el actual régimen. Sobre estas muertes y la violencia que priva hoy hay suficiente información y le [illegible] información a la Comisión por los Derechos Humanos de la ONU, donde existen numerosas quejas y datos muy concretos.

Sobre que "personajes como yo" son los que ponen en entredicho la buena amistad y las relaciones entre pueblos y gobiernos, yo creo que exagera. Salí absuelto y no soy "un redentor" ni un "sacrificado" como usted me nombra. El fallo de las leyes de su país confirma esto.

Atentamente:

Carlos Jurado.

ATTACHMENT #26
HMMA-36184

Estimado Carlos:

Recibí tu recado y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a Tampa

pero no tuve la suerte de hablarte.

La presente es amigo [illegible] quien es de toda confianza y tiene [illegible] para pedirte [illegible] es muy amigo de alguien a quien conoces bien y podrá explicarte de lo que digo. Te agradeceré si está en tus posibilidades le ayudaras en lo que te explicará.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para desearles a la niña Zum Zum (no se su nombre) [illegible] y tu muchas felicidades para el año que viene y [illegible] las fiestas de fin de año. Un abrazo

P.D. no lo hago personalmente porque estoy bajo 23 [illegible] [illegible] -

[illegible] en la [illegible] de Acalá. Se nos informó que dichos trabajadores —entre otros más— fueron contratados

[illegible] bajadores no fueron [illegible] de los propiedades deletéreas del in-

[illegible] barse las ropas llenas de [illegible] libros, pues sin estas últimas [illegible]

[illegible] al acercarse a sus padres.

Sin hacernos solidarios de

[illegible] a quien corresponda las responsabilidades contraídas, en protección de las familias damnificadas.

RENOVACION

AÑO I Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chis., Martes 22 de Octubre de 1968 NUMERO 13

ATTACHMENT #2H
HMMA-36167

VIET-NAM

SAIGON, 21 de octubre. —Los Estados Unidos devolvieron hoy a 14 soldados de las fuerzas de liberación. Expresaron la esperanza que la acción conduzca a poner en libertad más prisioneros. Los liberados fueron conducidos a tierra en pequeñas embarcaciones, mientras se suspendían en ambos lados las acciones militares.

PELIGRO DE GUERRA

BELGRADO, 21 de octubre.—El peligro de una nueva guerra mundial está muy cerca y no se excluye la posibilidad de que las grandes potencias empleen armas atómicas, dijo hoy el presidente Josif Tito hablando hoy en dos pueblos sudorientales servios durante una gira especial.

Carlos Jurado fué absuelto

En un cable procedente de Guatemala, la AFP informa que la Corte de Apelaciones de la República vecina, declaró absueltos por falta de pruebas a los profesores mexicanos. Carlos Jurado y Carlos Manuel Perzábal, quienes se encontraban presos en un campo de concentración guatemalteco desde el pasado 14 de abril, supuestamente acusados de actividades conectadas con el movimiento guerrillero.

La noticia alegrará sin duda los círculos intelectuales de nuestro Estado, ya que Carlos Jurado es un chiapaneco distinguido que a través de su gran calidad artística como pintor y grabador, ha hecho grandes aportaciones a la cultura nacional. Como ciudadano el pintor Carlos Jurado ha desempeñado con verdadera pasión difíciles tareas en el Instituto Nacional Indigenista, en varios de sus centros. En el de San Cristóbal fue fundador, junto con Rosario Castellanos y Marco Antonio Montero, del extraordinario teatro guiñol "PETUL", que en lengua tzeltal desarrollara una gran labor entre la población indígena de los altos de Chiapas.

La injusta encarcelación de los profesores Jurado y Perzábal (este último profesor de la Facultad de Economía de la UNAM) movilizó a amplios grupos de intelectuales [illegible] a través de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de nuestro país, exigió al Gobierno de Guatemala respeto a la vida de ambas personalidades y demandaron un juicio apegado a la Ley. Entre las numerosas peticiones en este sentido se destacó la hecha por el Colegio de Abogados de Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

Ambos detenidos estaban acusados por supuestos actos de "propaganda subversiva", realizados el día 17 de abril: es decir tres días después de haber caído presos cuando se dirigían, en un viaje turístico a la República de El Salvador.

El cable de la AFP infor forma que ambos profesores fueron trasladados desde la cárcel hacia el aeropuerto, donde abordaron un avión [illegible]

LA SITUACION EN PANAMA

PANAMA, 21 de octubre.— El llamamiento para una huelga general por 72 horas hecha por la Federación Estudiantil de Panamá, en protesta por el reciente golpe de estado militar, tuvo poco éxito hoy. Informes procedentes de la ciudad nos dicen que se verificaron aislados incidentes de violencia.

Algunos comercios permanecieron cerrados y el tránsito pareció más rápido que el usual.

Salieron de Checoslovaquia

BUDAPEST, 21 de octubre.—Las primeras unidades militares húngaras que abandonaron checoslovaquia llegaron hoy a este país, cruzando la frontera por tres puntos. Este es el primer contingente militar que parte de tierras checas, después de ser ratificado el tratado checo-soviético, respecto a la permanencia o retiro de las tropas del pacto de Varsovia.

EL APOLO VII CUMPLIO SU PROGRAMA

CABO KENNEDY, 21 de octubre.— Los astronautas del Apolo—VII hicieron hoy su última trasmisión por televisión a la tierra y mantuvieron la nave en una órbita menor, para iniciar el descenso a la tierra el día de mañana en el Atlántico Occidental.

Minutos después de la trasmisión apareció en las pantallas de los televisores el Director del vuelo, quien expresó que la misión del apolo VII había conseguido todo lo que se había propuesto, la inyección del motor principal del Apolo, situándolo en una órbita más baja, colocándolo en la posición propia para la misión cumplida

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S E C R E T 162323Z JAN 69 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9997

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

16 Jan 69 IN 73418

REF A. HMMA 36174

B. HGGA 9709

1. PER PARA 1 REF A, FAR CONTACT KNOWN TO LIRING/3 AS "ROMULO" AND "MARIO MENDEZ" MAY BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH MARIO AUGUSTO (MENDEZ) AGUILAR. STATION TRACES MENDEZ DESCRIBE HIM AS PGT ARMED ACTIVIST WHO ILLEGALLY ENTERED MEXICO JULY 1966. MENDEZ PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FITS THAT GIVEN REF A. PHOTO OF MENDEZ REQUESTED FROM LIAISON, AND WILL BE POUCHED ADDRESSEES WHEN RECEIVED, WITH FULL STATION TRACES.

2. PER HMM-10576, LIREBEL/1 IN PERSONAL CONTACT WITH MENDEZ IN JULY 1966. IF LIREBEL/1 AVAILABLE, SUGGEST SHOW HIM LIRING/3 SKETCH OF "MARIO MENDEZ" FOR POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION.

S E C R E T

With f.6

LIRING 3

201

WL

SECRET

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FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Activities Against PBRUMEN Targets in October and November 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 13.

Reference : HMMA-35591, 10 October 1968

1. Personnel: There were no changes in personnel in the PBRUMEN Section of the Station during October and November. Wallace B. ROWTON returned from his TDY on 15 October. Leslie I. HENDRIQUE was at the Station TDY 26 through 30 November in connection with the LISAGA case. Henry J. SLOMAN was at the Station TDY on 8 November to debrief AMSTRUT-16. Leonard S. TORMET visited the Station during the last week of November in connection with the LIRING-3 case.

Continued.....................

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	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-120-13

Liring/3

2. Operations in PBRUMEN and Against Visiting PBRUMEN Officials:

A. LIAGILE-1: LIAGILE-1 came to Mexico on 19 October and returned to PBRUMEN on 1 November, but he did not contact the Station. (See MEXICO CITY-7974.)

B. LICARD-1: LICARD-1 returned from his TDY to Madrid in October. His mission was unsuccessful. The Madrid Station provided detailed reports on this operation.

C. LISAGA-1: LISAGA-1 returned to Mexico on 25 November 1968. He remained in Mexico to receive special training and to undergo debriefing by a Headquarters TDYer until 9 December, when he returned to PBRUMEN.

D. Subject of MEXICO CITY-6266: LIADLIB-1 finished his debriefing of Subject during this period. (See HMMA-35618)

E. HAGLIDER-1: HAGLIDER-1 did not return to Mexico during this period.

F. YJWAIT-2: YJWAIT-2 did not return to Mexico during this period.

G. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7595: Subject defected to the Mexicans during the Olympics. The Station arranged for a press conference through LITAMIL-3. LITAMIL-3's debriefing revealed that Subject did not have any intelligence of value. (See also MEXICO CITY-7621.)

H. AMWILLOW-1: AMWILLOW-1 arrived in Mexico on 22 November and returned to PBRUMEN on 2 December. FRADYER could not meet him as he was at Headquarters on TDY. (See MEXICO CITY-8215 and -8335.)

[illegible]

3. Active Leads to Prospects in PBRUMEN:

A. Subject of MEXICO CITY-5442: LICOMET-2 received a call from Subject on 24 November asking him to take care of two friends who were visiting Mexico from PBRUMEN. During the same call, Subject indicated he would be coming to Mexico City soon on vacation and would notify LICOMET-2 of the exact date and details.

B. AMICARUS-1: After enlisting the cooperation of AMICARUS-3 in Veracruz, the Station is awaiting the arrival of AMICARUS-1, scheduled to transit Mexico City from PBRUMEN, to re-establish contact between the two and have AMICARUS-3 develop AMICARUS-1. (See MEXICO CITY-8136, et cetera.)

C. AMCAJOLE-2: Per MEXICO CITY-7451 and -7453, AMCAJOLE-1 was scheduled to visit Mexico from PBRUMEN. However, his father at the last minute reportedly "blocked" his departure. (See also MEXICO CITY-7574 and -7622.)

D. LIALMANAC-1: LIALMANAC-1 told ROWTON on 23 November that he is a close, long-time friend of the Subject of HMMA-36016. He says now he believes he can develop a close relationship with QUMOON, Mexico City.

E. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7946: The Station is cooperating with LNERGO in preparing for the arrival of Subject's son in Mexico. The Station has assisted in getting a Mexican visa for the son. The son arrived in Mexico on 2 December, but it has not yet been determined whether he is willing to be contacted and, hopefully, debriefed.

4. Legal Travelers to PBRUMEN:

A. LIRING-4: According to LIRING-3, LIRING-4 is in no condition to accept any assignment or instructions for a trip to PBRUMEN. There is, however, some possibility that LIRING-3 may go to PBRUMEN on a "cultural" mission, at which time he will report directly to PBRUMEN officials on his activities in Guatemala. LIRING-9 has reiterated that he wants both LIRING-3 and LIRING-4 to go. but has not suggested dates for this travel. (See MEXICO CITY-8159 and -8228.)

B. LIRENO-2: LIRENO-2's papers are finally in order, and she has indicated that she is still willing to travel to PBRUMEN. However, the recent death of her mother, as well as the recent incarceration of her son (in a frame-up by his employer - see MEXICO CITY-8182), has brought her to a physical and psychological low. The Station is allowing her time to recuperate before raising the question again.

C. LIANKLE-1: LIANKLE-1 has not yet settled in Mexico City. There was no contact with her during this period.

D. LIARM-1: Per MEXICO CITY-7433, LIARM-1 was met during the Olympics, but did not have access to much information of value. (See MEXICO CITY-7563 and -7741.) In spite of the fact that he was in daily contact with PBRUMEN participants, some of whom spent considerable time with him, he came up with virtually nothing. The Station, at present, has no contact with LIARM-1, who has returned to the Monterrey area.

E. Subject of MEXICO CITY-5853 (News contact of LITAMIL-3): Subject has been reapproached about making a trip to PBRUMEN now that the Olympics are over. He has indicated his willingness to make such a trip now. LITAMIL-3 is arranging a meeting between Subject and a Station Case Officer.

F. LIRENO-8: On 17 October LIRENO-8 was instructed to actively arrange for a trip to PBRUMEN, and, if he goes, to see about taking some courses in that country. (See MEXICO CITY-7738 and HMMA-35593.) In the meantime, he has become completely integrated into the PBRUMEN Consulate and cultural institute in his town. In this capacity he will be in a position to report on PBRUMEN activities in that area.

G. Subject of HMMA-35516: The Station is still planning to have ROWTON explore the feasibility of approaching Subject and using him as an eventual source in PERUMEN, where, by the nature of his function, he still maintains contacts. (See HMMA-35516.)

H. AMSTRUT-16: Subject traveled to PERUMEN on 18 October 1968 and returned on 1 November. On her return to Mexico she was debriefed by Henry J. SLOMAN, who came to Mexico on TDY for this purpose. The results of this debriefing were received in UFAA-355.

I. Subject of MEXICO CITY-8319: LITAMIL-3 was contacted by Subject, who returned from PERUMEN on 2 December. Subject was debriefed by a Station Case Officer on the current status of the relationship between his organization and the PERUMEN Government, and on other requirements given him before his departure for PERUMEN. The most promising factor in this operation is the fact that four of his subordinates will be coming out for a conference in April 1969. Subject promised to give the Station access to any or all of these individuals.

5. Technical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING and the Residences of LIRING Personnel:

A. MKTRAP in Chief, LIRING's Residence: MEXICO CITY-7982 reported on the difficulties encountered in trying to have a LIRISK unit installed in the LIHACK-4 LP. The Station made its own LIRISK installation on 23 November. (See MEXICO CITY-8182.) All attempts to activate the MKTRAP have so far been unsuccessful. (See MEXICO CITY-8303.)

B. LISAMPAN: LISAMPAN coverage of BAKER continued. EASY was lost on 9 October as a result of a routine installation in the same building by the LIRISK company. Attempts to activate EASY from LISARI were unsuccessful. (See MEXICO CITY-7598 and -8232.)

C. LIENVOY: LIENVOY coverage has remained unchanged. The LIRING Commercial line still has not been reconnected.

D. LIFEAT: LIFEAT coverage of LIRING-21 was discontinued on 15 November for security reasons. The coverage was renewed on 6 December.

E. LIONION: LIONION-1 continued to perform his photographic and audio duties. His ability now to identify people by name by monitoring DOG is particularly useful.

F. LIROSIN: LIROSIN-1 was kept on full salary during the period. In late November he was given the assignment of renting a new LP which was spotted by LITAINT-2. He successfully rented this LP on 4 December, after LIRENO-1 laid the groundwork, and will move into it on 18 December 1968. This will be the base for an audio operation against LIRING-2, LIRING-9, and LIRING-13.

G. Trash Operation: The trash operation was not reactivated during this period.

H. Audio Against the Residences of LIRING-21 and LIRING-24: Via LIREALM-1 the Station located empty apartments in the same buildings where these two LIRING officers live. Attempts to rent at least one of these for an audio operation proved difficult in view of the need for a cosigner and finding suitable people to move in. LIROSIN-1 was going to attempt to make some arrangement when the LP described in subparagraph 5F turned up. The Station decided the latter was of higher priority and discontinued its efforts to rent the apartments next to LIRING-21 and LIRING-24.

6. Physical Penetration and Coverage of LIRING:

A. PBRUMEN Deputy in Merida: This target left PCS on 15 November 1968. (See MEXICO CITY-8148.)

B. LITAMIL-7: The Station had no contact with LITAMIL-7 during this period. She was, however, seen chatting with LIRING members on several occasions. She was not observed visiting LIRING.

C. Female Access Agent (Subject of MEXICO CITY-5988): No contact was established during this period.

D. LIRING-3/LIRING-4: On 29 October ROWTON met LIRING-3 after his release from jail. The results of the initial debriefing were cabled in MEXICO CITY-7900. LIRING-3 indicated that LIRING-4 was very nervous and upset, and that he wanted all his own activity and association with ROWTON to be kept from her. LIRING-3 has been meeting fairly frequently with LIRING-9, who has been debriefing him on his encarceration in Guatemala. (See MEXICO CITY-8159 and -8228.)

E. PBRUMEN Maids: The Station decided to mount an operation against the PBRUMEN maids, and selected LIEMBRACE-3 as a suitable access agent. (See MEXICO CITY-7861.) The Station is in the process of turning LIEMBRACE-3 over to LIREALM-1, who will be the outside Case Officer on this operation. (See also MEXICO CITY-8124.)

F. Chief, LIRING: The Station has corresponded with Headquarters about a false flag cold approach against Chief, LIRING. This still is in the exploratory stages. (See MEXICO CITY-8242.)

7. Harassment of LIRING: There were no new Huarache leaflets put out during this period.

8. LICOMET Debriefing Center: MEXICO CITY-8066 reported that the charitable sponsorship covering the overt activities of the debriefing center ended on 31 October 1968 and that the extra financial cover for the office space would end 30 November. Headquarters' assistance was requested in resolving this problem. (See also MEXICO CITY-8179 and -8287.) HMMA-35887 forwarded more detailed LICOMET-2 reports on the LICOMET cover problem.

9. QUMOON: There were no operations against QUMOON during this period. QUMOON's activity in Mexico remained normal.

10. Double Agents: LISASSY-1 returned from his European trip on 17 November and was recontacted by LIRING-9, who levied requirements on him as reported in MEXICO CITY-8339. LISASSY-1 continues to have difficulty satisfying LIRING-9 requests for information on the activities of the PBRUMEN community in Mexico City and Miami. The CI aspect of the LISASSY-1 operation was virtually at a standstill for two reasons: first, at one time or another, either LIRING-9 or LISASSY-1 was out of Mexico; and second, the Station has been unable to come up with information which LISASSY-1 could pass to LIRING-9. In this last respect, LISASSY-1 continues to be an excellent channel of WOFIRM-controlled information to the PBRUMEN Government via LIRING-9.

11. Operations Against PBRUMEN Subversive Activities in Latin America:

A. LIRING-3: See MEXICO CITY-7900 for RONTON's initial debriefing of LIRING-3 on conditions in Guatemala. MEXICO CITY-7945 reported that LIRING-3 received a letter from Guatemala which he interpreted as a check on a new commo channel between the Guatemalan rebels and him. LIRING-3 reported at length to LIRING-9 on his contacts with FAR members while in jail. At LIRING-3's suggestion, LIRING-9 may send LIRING-3 to PBRUMEN to make a personal report on this. (See MEXICO CITY-8159.) More detailed reports were forwarded in HMMA-35905. HMMA-35904 forwarded a report of LIRING-3's imprisonment in Guatemala.

B. Letter Drops: The PBRUMEN letter drops being covered by the Station only produced one interesting letter during this period. (See HMMA-35873.) The Station suggested that Headquarters follow up on the lead provided.

C. LIRING-7: LIRING-7 continued to see his Mexican leftist student "friends" during this period. (See HMMA-35823.) He also escorted a high-ranking member of the Orthodox Church during a visit to Mexico. One intelligence dissemination was made on the basis of information produced by LIRING-7 during this visit.

D. LIHACK-4: When he was in jail in mid-November, LIHACK-4 was approached by some Mexicans arrested in connection with the student disturbances. He was asked to take a walkie-type radio into jail for their commo, and was asked if he would be willing to assist them with his ham radio equipment for direct commo between the revolutionaries and PBRUMEN, since going through LIRING was not satisfactory. The Station is taking a wait-and-see attitude to see how this develops. (See MEXICO CITY-8213.)

E. Subject of HMMA-35872: Via LIFEAT, LIENTRAP, and the LIEMBRACEs, the Station identified a Mexican student contact of LIRING. Background information on this person, including photos, was passed to the LITEMPOs on 21 November 1968 with a suggestion that they arrest and interrogate the person. (See HMMA-35872 for details.)

12. Miscellaneous:

A. AMBOOK-3: AMBOOK-3 is employed by a local Mexican television station and apparently does not intend to return to PBRUMEN. The Station had no ops contact with AMBOOK-3 during the period of this report. He planned to travel to the United States to cover the Apollo/8 launching at Cape Kennedy in late December 1968, but this was not definite.

B. Travel Control Information: LIFIRE, LICOMET, and LITEMPO continued to provide this type of information.

C. PBRUMEN Fishing Fleet: There was no activity against this target. Several fishing boats, however, did seek shelter at Isla Mujeres, and on each occasion several crew members sought asylum. The LICOMETs were alerted each time to try to obtain debriefings of these men. (See MEXICO CITY-8039.)

D. MHVIPER: The LICOMETs continued to provide QUMOON cargo manifests, and LIRENO-1 provided crew and ship manifests. The manifests were pouched to JMCOBRA and Headquarters for processing. (See HMMA-35912.)

E. AMDESTINE-1: AMDESTINE-1 was terminated per Headquarters direction. See MEXICO CITY-7664, DIRECTOR-42579, and MEXICO CITY-7739.

F. AMDAUB-1: On 17 October AMDAUB-1 asked for assistance from LNPURE. (See MEXICO CITY-7709.) On 25 October he left Mexico for Miami, where he was met and handled by WH/Miami. (See JMCOBRA-1427.)

G. LIAMATOL-1: LIAMATOL-1 was met on 17 October 1968 and agreed to cooperate with the Case Officer by furnishing information on the activities of the PBRUMENers in the Veracruz area. LIAMATOL-1 requested that his main line of communication with the Station be through LIRENO-1 for security reasons. (See HMMA-35913 and -35917.)

H. Subject of MEXICO CITY-7515: The Station notified Headquarters of the arrival in Mexico of a person on the list of "40." The Station was asked to contact this Subject's brother to determine the present status of Subject. This was done, and the report submitted in MEXICO CITY-7754 indicated that he was content with his life in PBRUMEN and was not interested in contacts, even with his own brother, if there was to be pressure applied for him to remain outside PBRUMEN.

I. During a baseball game between PBRUMEN and the United States during November, the PBRUMEN players attacked several spectators. Through LITAMIL-3 the Station is trying to arrange to have one of those attacked sue a LIRING employee. (See MEXICO CITY-8044, -8048, -8078, and -8285.) However, the Station-cleared lawyer ran into difficulties with the Mexican Government. Court authorities who passed the lawyer a transcript of the original charges against the LIRING employee advised the lawyer he would be wasting his time on this case because orders from an unidentified high Mexican Government official indicated that the planned charges against the employee would not be accepted for trial.

12. AMSTET-1: AMSTET-1 sent a letter to the home of AMSTRUT-8, who in turn notified the Station to come and pick it up. The contents of the letter were forwarded to Headquarters in MEXICO CITY-8130. This is a Headquarters case in which the Station participates only as a letter drop via AMSTRUT-8.

13. As can be seen, all the above has been previously reported to Headquarters. In view of this, and the fact that the PBRUMEN Section, in addition, submits regular quarterly progress reports on its projects, it is felt that reporting on the Station's activities against the PBRUMEN target is adequate. Therefore, the Station once more suggests that formal PBRUMEN Section monthly or bimonthly reports be discontinued. Please advise.

Raymond

for Willard C. CURTIS

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO of Station, Mexico City

INFO. , [illegible] Hemisphere Division

FROM of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQ.

nce: HMMA-36114, 27 December 1968

. The "Humberto GONZALEZ Vega" mentioned in reference is probably ical with Angel Humberto GONZALEZ Vega. The only Station trace on atter individual was forwarded with HGG-3098, 14 June 1963, from a of undetermined reliability. In this report GONZALEZ was listed ng active in the peace movement of the Guatemalan Communist Party . GONZALEZ's date of birth was given as 2 October 1927. Biographic and a photo of GONZALEZ have been requested from liaison and will be rded to addressees when received.

. According to Station information, Gustavo COLINDRES Barrios was ted on 3 July 196[illegible] by the Guatemalan authorities. He was described is time as a member of "the supply network of the Rebel Armed Forces ". Although no further information is available in Station files, DRES was apparently consigned and sent to El Pavon.

. In reference to the names mentioned to LIRING-3 by GONZALEZ dov[illegible] Alegria, Jorge Torron and Avecillas"), Guatemala City feels probably refer to Hector SANDOVAL Alegria, Jose Samuel TORON os, and Ricardo Israel VALLECILLOS Perez. All of these individuals reportedly arrested by the Mexican authorities in May 1968 for an [illegible]. (MEXICO CITY 5590, 17 May 1968). In addition, it is y that the "Nunez" mentioned later by GONZALEZ is identical with Roberto NUNEZ Sanchez, a Guatemalan Rightist who was also reportedly ted with SANDOVAL, TORON, and VALLECILLOS.

(continued....)

[illegible]:
- Mexico City
- Chief, WHD
- Files

JAN 15 1969

CROSS REFERENCE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HGGA - 9721

DATE 14 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER 201-[illegible]8301

INUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HGGA - 9721

. Guatemala City agrees that GONZALEZ is apparently the FAR contact
blished for LIRING-3 in Mexico. Whether or not LIRING ever seeks to
the services of LIRING-3, the maintainence of his contact with
ALEZ might lead the FAR to utilize LIRING-3 in some support capacity
exico City. Such an opportunity could provide WOFIRM with a valuable
ght in a difficult and worthwhile target.

Leonard S. TORMET

14-00000

PATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
of Station, Guatemala Ci'y

SUBJECT
LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

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(continued....)

[illegible]:
- [illegible], Mexico City
- Chief, WHD
- Files

JAN 15 1969

...UMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DATE
 | HGGA - 9721 | 14 January 1969

SECRET | CLASSIFICATION | HQS FILE NUMBER
 | SECRET | 201-[illegible]301

INUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HGGA - 9721

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Leonard S. TORMET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

FROM:

RID/

WERDEN, PHILENA
RID/AN
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GA-50
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COMMENTS

201-Copy Detached

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1		3 [illegible] 1969		
2. CC				
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4. Kravcow				K
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7.				
8. C/WH/C/I		[illegible] 1969		K
9. ENMS			7 Apr	
10. WH/1		8 Aug 8		
11. Kravcov				K
12. RID/AN		16 [illegible]		VB
13. WH/1				
14. RID/AN		17 [illegible] 1969		VB
15. RID/ED1				
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17. RID/FI				

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by RID for [illegible] reason
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orig. Indexing
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☑ Project Subject
☐ [illegible] after [illegible] with information

Route to RID/AN, 2E GA-50 for final processing.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST
☑ ABSTRACT X
INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
[redacted]

~~REFERRED~~

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
11 Feb 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 36408

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

No index

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 PBRUMEN/The LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-36184, 17 January 1969

1. Forwarded attached are the two last contact reports written by Wallace B. ROWTON on LIRING-3 before ROWTON's departure on TDY in late January 1969. These reports are dated 15 and 22 January. Also forwarded is another report by ROWTON, dated 28 November 1968, which the Station somehow failed to forward.

2. That LIRING has forwarded information to the Mexican Communist Party casting suspicion on LIRING-3's past activities did not come as a great shock. Heraclio ZEPEDA is known to the Station as a previous teacher at the University of Jalapa who said in 1960 that he would accept a teaching position in PBRUMEN, a country he has visited on several occasions at the invitation of its government. ZEPEDA also spent some time

Continued....................

Attachments:
1. Reports (3), h/w
2. Identity Sheet, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy att 1; 3 copies att 2)
2 - COS, Guatemala City (w/atts - 1 copy att 1; 2 copies att 2)

AT UIS
IS X
FI

s/c att: 1
h/w att: 1

CS COPY

~~DEFERRED~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 36408

DATE
11 February 1969

201-778301

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA - 36408

in 1965 in the U.S.S.R., where he was described as Foreign Correspondent of La Voz de Mexico, an official organ of the Mexican Communist Party (see HMMA-27727, 24 November 1965). ZEPEDA apparently also visited Communist China. He appears to be well acquainted with LIRING-9. In view of the above, the Station instructed ROWTON to ask LIRING-3 to refrain from attempting to use ZEPEDA to obtain a "bootleg" copy of the LIRING letter to the Mexican Communist Party. The Station feels a copy of this letter would add little to the known fact that LIRING-3 is a person that LIRING continues to view as "suspect." LIONHEART has been asked for up-to-date information on ZEPEDA's Party position. Any information passed by LIONHEART will be forwarded to Headquarters.

Raymond A. Frazier

for Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	2 of 2

SECRET

Attachment #1
HMMA-36408

28 November,1968

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Meeting with LIRING/9.

1. LIRING/3 reported to Rowton at 0915 on 27/11/68 that he had met with LIRING/9 at the LIRING establishment from about 1745 until 1900 on 26/11/68. He stated that he gave LIRING/9 his written report on his recent experiences in Guatemala and the conclusions he drew from talking with FAR members there. L/3 also stated that he did his best to assure L/9 that, although he sympathized with the laments of the León Barrios brothers, he was really on the PBRUMEN side and offered to do all he could to assist the LIRINGs in their attempts to assist the revolutionary forces. The following is Rowton's reconstruction of the conversation, based on LIRING/3's report:

L/3: "I'm sorry to be late, but I had to finish the report."

L/9: "Alright. I've been waiting here at the gate so there wouldn't be any further delay. Let's go to my office so we can talk privately."

Upon entering office, L/9 removes jacket and offers L/3 a seat in the office.

L/3: "Well, here's my report. I must apologize that it's in rough draft form. I had to write it rather hurriedly when my wife was not around. It's really just a series of badly organized thoughts and ideas but I'll be glad to explain. There's a great deal more, of course, that I could explain on the subject. Do you wish me to read it?"

L/9: "No, that's alright.

L/9 glances through the report and continues:

"I'll read it carefully later. I really didn't expect such a long report. I appreciate it. In the meantime, how are you doing in your personal affairs?"

L/3: "Well, as I told you last time, I'm very much up in the air at the moent. My exposition has started but is not going as well as can be expected - as well as I had hoped. You know, these things have their up's and down's. I'll sell some things, at least to cover my current expenses, but I'll really have to get better organized financially in the near future. The first problem that I'm really worried about is my wife, and I frankly feel that I must appeal to you for help.

L/9: "Of course. Well, what is the problem?"

L/3: "As you know, some time ago my wife and I had a series of unpleasant situations that almost led to a separation.."

L/9: "Is that right! Was it that serious?" "anything political?"

L/3: " No, absolutely not. It was purely a domestic misunderstanding. Now I feel that I must be very frank with you. I was probably responsible

att: 1
HMMA-36408

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Att #1 00000-36408

because of an affair I had with ~~the~~ Carmen, - you know, the daughter of the doctor we just said hello to as we came in, the one talking with LIRING/2. "

L/9: "Is that so? I had no idea!"

L/3: "Well I assumed you knew, since Carmen's father is a close friend of your Chief. In any case, it's over now, and I don't expect any trouble from that quarter. However, I feel that I should explain that I have an obligation to my wife for all that she did not me while I was in jail with no help from anyone, as you well know."

L/9: "Yes, it was difficult for her."

L/3: "You see, my wife is a sincere revolutionary, but she really doesn't want any part of the activity that a revolution demands. She's like so many others, including my former cell-mate and his famous uncle, who talk a great revolution, but fall apart when the chips are down."

L/9: "Yes, we know plenty of those types."

L/3: "Well, anyway, my wife wouldn't approve of my reinvolvement and keeps pressing me to take a "respectable" job which she knows I could obtain through my friends. What I really wnat to do is to somehow calm her down and arrange things so that she won't have any idea of my political plans. As you know her father is very ill in New York, and she is anxious to see him before he dies. I can arrange an exposition in Montreal and then ask the father to come up to see us there. That would get around the problem of a U.S. visa, which I'm sure neither of us could get."

L/9: "No. I'm sure you couldn't."

L/3: "The only problem is transportation. Air passage is too expensive and unfortunately there are no boats going from here. They all stop at New York. Don't you have regular ship traffic to Montreal, so that we could go that way?"

L/9: "Yes we do. I'm sure that could be arranged. I see no problem."

L/3: " We could then kill two birds with one stone, by stopping off at the PBRUMEN capital enroute."

L/9: " Yes, there's really no problem."

L/3: "I hope you understand my problem. I'm in a very serious way financially at the moment, and couldn't possibly solve this problem myself without your help."

L/9: "Well, how are you doing otherwide - I mean in meeting living expenmses?"

L/3: "Just getting by. You know we live on a very modest - day to day basis.

Att #1 HMMA-36408

29 November,1968

"The exposition is not going as well as I expected. But the problem I'm really concerned about is that of my wife."

L/9: "Let her go to PBRUMEN."

L/3: "what do you mean? I don't understand."

L/9: "Well, I mean with you, when you go."

L/3: "Oh, yes, I see. Of course. She can see her relatives and there won't be a problem. You know my wife was getting pretty desperate about seeing ~~X/9XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ her father and she even talked of going to the Northamerican Ambassy for a visa so that she could go to New York. Imagine that! I told it would be no use - just a waste of time since she woiulnd get the visa."

L/9: "For heaven's sake, tell her not to go! That would create no end of interrogations in the PBRUMEN capital. Calm her downaby all means.

L/3: "Getting back to my report, as I said, many points can be expanded."

L/9: "Yes. Let's meet again on,say, Monday, at a time convenient for you."

L/3: "You know I have plenty of time now. I'm up in the air, as I said, not doing much - just the exposition. On the other hand you're a busy man. You set the time."

L/9: " I think about 1000 would be good. Is that okay with you?"

L/3: " Yes. I'll be back."

L/9: "I'm gald you covered the important point as to what the FAR thinks of us. This is very important to us. Also you say that you expect a contact with one of them here?"

L/3: "Yes, with a certain 'Pavel' but I don't know when. I am in contact as you can see. They have been writing me more or less regularly since my departure." (L/3 takes two letters from pocket and shows them, but L/9 makes no move to take them or read contents.)

L/9: "Well, I'll be waiting for you at 1000 on Monday."

2. LIRING/3 told Rowton at a subsequent meeting (1100,28/11/6800 that when he returned home the previous evening, he found to his surprise a note slipped under the door from LIRING/9 asking him not to forget to come by at 1000 on Monday, 2 December,1968.

W B Rowton

SECRET ATT #1 HMMA-36408

13 January 1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Activities for the Period 7-13 January, 1969.

1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at the Camino Real Restaurant at 1000 on 10 and 13 January. He reported the following developments in connection with the accusations made against him to Marta Barrios de León by Identity A

(a) On the evening of 8 January, 1969, Identity B called on him at his home unannounced and made an effort to smooth over the hard feelings that had arisen between LIRING/3 and her husband. She denied any knowledge of charges made by her husband against L/3 and claimed that she could not believe them in any case. When L/3 stated that he had definite proof in the form of a letter Identity B insisted on seeing it. L/3 (who had given the original letter to Rowton) stalled promising to produce the letter on 10 January in the presence of her husband. L/3 told Rowton that when he attempted to contact Iden B and her husband by phone on the morning of 10 January, he found the phone constantly busy and suspects that the receiver was left purposely off the hook.

(b) On the evening of 12 January, 1969, Arturo Serrano of the CPM, visited LIRING/3 at his home and told him that the Central Committee of the CPM had discussed his feud with Identity A, in response to the letter LIRING/3 had sent to it alleging that Iden A was maligning him unjustly. Serrano continued that the CC of the CPM had found the letter too vague to make any sense, but in any case could not take Iden A seriously. Serrano told L/3 that Iden A and Identity B had been recently formally expelled from the party for ideological reasons, but still had a number of friends willing to vouch for them. On the other hand Serrano stated that the CC of the CPM had received information "some time ago" from the LIRING office alleging that LIRING/3 had been acting in a suspicious manner, especially with regard to certain information he had provided concerning Julián López that "could not have come from a source other than the police." Serrano continued that although the CPM had no love for the LIRING office it nevertheless had to take such a report into consideration and the burden of proof was really on LIRING/3.

SECRET

SECRET

ATT #1 HMMA-36405

22 January, 1969

Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Address of Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico City.

1. At 1000 on 21/1/69 LIRING/3 told Rowton that his old Guatemalan friend Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla was residing at Calle Veracruz 14, apartment, and that the Carlos Vega, whom Jacobo had sent to LIRING/3's home with a note asking L/3 to help Vega, was living in the azotea (servant's) room belonging to Jacobo's apartment.

2. L/3 also reported that Carlos Vega again called on him unannounced at his apartment on 20 January.and asked him to arrange through his PBRUMEN friends to send a package of medicine to a son of Turcios who was living in the PBRUMEN capital. Vega also asked L/3 to send two "very important" letters to PBRUMEN through friends who could bypass the usual censorship. L/3 promised to do what he could and asked Vega to deliver the letters tohim on 25 January.

3. Because of the obvious possibility of provocation in this rather unexplained behavior of Carlos Vega (he originally told L/3 that he was a close friend of Identity A), Rowton agreed with L/3 that no attempt should be made to open the letters and that they should be delivered promptly to the LIRING office for whatever disposition that establishment might wnat to make of the letters. L/3 promised to note carefully the addressees of the letters.

4. Rowton told L/3 that he would have to leave town for a visit to Monterrey and was not certain when he would be able to finish his business there. He made a date, however, for 1000, 3 February, at the Camino Real restaurant, and asked L/3 to return to the same place at 1000 on 7 February in the event that Rowton did not appear at the first time and date.

Wallace B. Rowton

SECRET

201-718301

SECRET

ATT #1 HMMA-36408

Serrano, as a friend, advised L/3 to "take the bull by the horns" and send as much data as possible to defend himself to all "important progressive" organizations. He volunteered to pass a copy of the letter from Marta Barrios to the CPM and L/3's version of the arrest and detention as soon as he had prepared it.

7A 8025

2 2. In response to Rowton's query as to any other friends L/3 might have in the CPM who might be able to obtain a copy of the original letter from the LIRING Office, LIRING/3 recalled that an old acquaintance from Chiapas, Heraclio Zepeda, had recently invited him to dinner and appeared anxious to re-establish contact with him. L/3 told Rowton that he had known Zepeda in the PBRUMEN capital some six years previously and recalled that Zepeda had traveled and studied in Communist China and the Soviet Union before returing to Mexico. Zepeda recently told L/3 that he was employed in CONASUPO and that he had written several articles favorable to L/3 in "Renovación" a daily newspaper he controlled in Tuxla-Gutierrez, Chiapas. L/3 told Rowton that he later learned thatthe newspaper was actually owned by Hank González, general director of CONASUPO, who apparently had political ambitions.

3. Rowton suggested that L/3 get in touch with Zepeda not only to determine why he had recontacted L/3 after so long a time, but to ascertain his current relationship with the CPM and the LIRING office, if any.

4. LIRING/3 stated that he had not been recontacted by "Rómulo" and promised to advise Rowton in advance of a future meeting so that Rowton could cover it in the hope of getting a good look at the FAR representative.

WRL
Wallace B Rowton

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment #2
HMMA-36408

Identity Sheet

Identity A: Carlos PERZABAL

Identity B: Teresa LOZADA de PERZABAL

SECRET

s/c att: 1
HMMA - 36408

CS COPY

201-798301
[redacted]

☐ CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: DKB PER

ACTION WH8 ☐ RID COPY

508

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 280045Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2826

MECI

28 JUN 69 IN 91228

PANAMA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 8498 IN 85341

B. MEXICO CITY 2744 IN 88360

C. PANAMA CITY 2510 IN 86266

2D

11

m

MICROFILMED

JUL 17 1969

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. LIRING-3 (IDENTITY) REPORTED 27 JUNE THAT HAD TALKED WITH LELIS AMADEO (RODRIGUEZ) ANGULO (201-306789) 25 JUNE. IN CONNECTION LIRING-3 EFFORT GET RODRIGUEZ WORK AT CIDOC, LIRING-3 ABLE QUESTION RODRIGUEZ ON PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION AND SURFACE REQUIREMENTS LEVIED REF C.

2. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 VANGUARDIA DE ACCION NACIONAL (VAN) IMPORTANT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION WITH POLITICAL LINE PARALLEL TO PANAMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. RODRIGUEZ STATED VAN ONLY PANAMANIAN PARTY "VIEWED WITH FAVOR" BY CUBANS. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 CHIEF OF VAN IS JORGE TURNER (201-48393), WHO RECENTLY ARRIVED MEXICO CITY AFTER RELEASE FROM PRISON. RODRIGUEZ STATED TURNER HERE TO CONFER WITH CUBANS IN ATTEMPT GET CUBAN ASSISTANCE FOR VAN.

15 PW

13 X

15 X

11 4

WH/1

3. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE TRYING FIND TURNER PLACE TO STAY AND ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD PUT UP TURNER FOR FEW DAYS. RODRIGUEZ TO

B201-3373

B201-48393

B201-306789

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301

28 JUN 69

14-00000

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY: JUL 10 AT 3 55 PM '65

DISSEM BY: [illegible] PER

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
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3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0826 SECRET

INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO TURNER 28 JUNE.

4. ACCORDING RODRIGUEZ, THELMA KING (201-003373) IS PANAMANIAN WITH STRONG NATIONALIST POLITICAL ORIENTATION. HE STATED KING NOT MEMBER OF COMMUNISTS PARTY BUT HAD WIDE CONTACTS AMONG VARIOUS LEFTIST GROUPS. HE ALSO STATED KING IN TOUCH WITH NORTHAMERICANS, WHO HAVE APPARENTLY HELPED IN TAKING CARE HER DAUGHTER WHO SICK WITH LEUKEMIA. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 CUBANS DO NOT TRUST KING AND HAVE ASKED PANAMANIAN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS BE CAREFUL IN DEALINGS WITH HER. HOWEVER, RODRIGUEZ STATED PANAMANIAN LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS FEEL KING USEFUL TO CERTAIN POINT, ALTHOUGH MANY MEMBERS FELL SHE "PLAYING BOTH SIDES".

5. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE NOT MEMBER ANY ORGANIZATION, ALTHOUGH HE FORMERLY IN PANAMANIAN CP. HE STATED HE AUTHORIZED BY "VARIOUS EXTREMISTS GROUPS" GO COSTA RICA AND ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH PANAMANIAN REFUGEE GROUPS THERE. RODRIGUEZ STATED "FACTION" MEXICAN POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) HAD ALREADY SET UP CONTACT FOR HIM IN COSTA RICA TO ENABLE HIM OBTAIN ARMS THERE FOR SHIPMENT PANAMA.

6. LIRING-3 INSTURCTED ALLOW TURNER STAY WITH HIM, IF TURNER AGREEABLE, AND TO USE OPPORTUNITY ATTEMPT LEARN PROGRESS TURNER'S TALKS WITH CUBANS. LIRING-3 WILL ALSO ATTEMPT LEARN WHO IN PPS IN CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ

SECRET

14-00000

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BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO

FILE VR

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0806 SECRET

7. DEFER TO ADDRESSEES ANY FORMAL DISSEM ABOVE INFORMATION. LIRING-3 CONSIDERED UNTESTED SOURCE, WHO KNOWN BE IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS LEFTIST AND REVOLUTIONARY FIGURES.

8. REQUEST ANY REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE FOR LIRING-3 USE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH TURNER.

9. NO INDEX. FILE: 50-322-1. CROSS REF TO 201'S INDICATED.

SECRET

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CAS: CA/PROP

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 280046Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2807 MEXI

PANAMA CITY, INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

28 JUN 69 IN 91233

REF MEXICO CITY 0806 IN 91228

1. IDENTITY: CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR - MEXICAN ARTIST AND POLITICAL ANARCHIST WHO IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS OFFICIALS CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY. HE ALSO IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN LEFTISTS, INCLUDING MEBERS OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) OF GUATEMALA.

2. NO INDEX. FILE 56-308-1.

S E C R E T

AB PW
AB X
PS
BX 4
D/S NFD
WH/1

MICROFILMED
JUL 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B201-3373
B201-48393
B201-306789

CS COPY

SECRET

201-798301
28 JUN 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, FI2, ADDP, DDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, SODC, CS/SGO,

ACTION NO. 563

S E C R E T 192233Z JUN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2690 (Mexi)

HZP HCG

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, GUATEMALA CITY

[redacted]

JP

REF A. MEXICO CITY 2389 (IN 67732)

B. PANAMA CITY 0258 (IN 68597)

C. HZPA 17529

19 JUN 69 IN 85321

AN	
AB	X
IH	X
PS	
BK	3
DF	
FI	
WH/1	

1. ON 16 JUNE LIRING-3 IDENTIFIED PHOTO OF LELIS AMADEO (RODRIGUEZ) ANGULO (201-306789) FORWARDED REF C AS AMADEO RODRIGUEZ KNOWN TO HIM.

2. LIRING-3 CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FOR RODRIGUEZ GET FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM CENTRO INTERCULTURAL DE DOCUMENTACION (CIDOC), HEADED BY FATHER IVAN ILLICH (201-327833) AND LOCATED CUERNAVACA, MEXICO. LIRING-3 SPOKE WITH PERSONAL FRIEND CARMEN (201-143911) MOLINA, LEFTIST WHO WORKS CIDOC, AND MOLINA PROMISED ATTEMPT HELP RODRIGUEZ. LIRING-3 FOLLOWED SUGGESTION WALLACE P. ROWTON AND TOLD RODRIGUEZ PREPARE DETAILED PAPER ON REVOLUTIONAY SITUATION PANAMA, FOR WHICH HE COULD BE PAID BY CIDOC. (RODRIGUEZ CLAIMS NEEDS MONEY TO TRAVEL COSTA RICA.) RODRIGUEZ TO DATE NOT KNOWN TO HAVE MADE ANY OTHER FRUITFUL CONTACTS AMONG LOCAL REVOLUTIONARIES.

sex: F

3. LIRING-3 PREPARED ASK RODRIGUEZ QUESTIONS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION PANAMA, BASED RODRIGUEZ' PAPER. REQUEST ANY REQUIREMENTS AND

MICROFILMED
AUG 14 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

19 June 69
201-798301

B 201-306789

JUN 25 6 37 AM '69

[illegible]

JUN 24 9 26 AM 69

RECEIVED

RID/EDI

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2690 S E C R E T

GUIDANCE PANAMA CITY MAY HAVE TO BE PASSED LIRING-3 FOR USE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH RODRIGUEZ.

3. INDEX MOLINA. FILE: 56-4-100. CROSS REF TO 201'S INDICATED.

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7F SECRET

MEXICO CITY

WH/SA 8

☐ ☐ ☐

VR. FILE, DDP, WH 7, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 032130Z

[illegible] IN 56516

DIR CITE MEXI 2126

TYPIC LICRAFT

REF DIR 75551

1. FOLLOWING FROM LICRAFT-1: JOAQUIN MIRABAL IS NOT BROTHER OF Alfredo MIRABAL DIAZ FORMER CONSUL MEXI, HAS ONLY ONE SIBLING, SISTER. OFFICIAL TITLE IS DELEGADO DEL MINISTRO DEL INTERIOR EN LA PROVINCIA DE LA HABANA. HAS AUTHORITY REPRESENT RAMIRO VALDES, ENTER ANY SECURITY OFFICE IN HABANA PROVINCE, ISSUE ORDERS UNDER VALDES AUTHORITY. WEARS ARMY CAPTAINS UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA. IN 1961 WAS SECOND IN COMMAND OF G-2 HQS AT QUINTA AVENIDA AND CALLE 14. MAN IN COMMAND THEN IS NOW POLICE CHIEF HABANA.

2. MIRABAL CLOSE FIREND VALDES SINCE LONG BEFORE CASTRO TAKEOVER. IS FROM HABANA. MOTHER REPORTED TO BE OLD TIME COMMUNIST. FAMILY HOME WAS ON CALLE GOSS, VIBORA, HABANA. IS ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD. LICRAFT FIRST MET IN 1957 AT WHICH TIME MIRABAL WAS CUSTOMS AGENT IN HABANA WORKING FOR UNCLE ALSO NAMED MIRABAL. FIRM HAD SEARS ROEBUCK ACCOUNT, MAY HAVE HAD WOOLWORTH ACCOUNT. MIRABAL ADMITTED TO LICRAFT [illegible] THE WAS MAKING LOTS OF MONEY SMUGGLING LIQUOR. PRIOR TO 57 HAD HAD A FLING AS POPULAR SINGER, HAS VERY GOOD VOICE. WAS VERY FRIENDLY WITH GUSTAVO

SECRET

14-00000

IN 56516 pg 2

GIG WHO IS NOW WELL KNOWN CUBAN CHOREOGRAPHER. MANY OF MIRABAL ASSOCIATES THIS PERIOD WERE SUSPECT HOMOSEXUALS. ONCE MIRABAL [illegible] LICRAFT TO VISIT BAR JUST ESTABLISHED BY [illegible]. LICRAFT WALKED OUT WHEN APPARENT PLACE WAS HOMOSEXUAL HANGOUT.

3. AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER MIRABAL WAS ASSIGNED AS CUSTOMS OFFICER HABANA PORT, LATER WAS ASSIGNED TO AIRPORT. WAS IN SECURITY WORK AT LEAST BY 1960, PERHAPS EARLIER. VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF LABOR MINISTER MINISTER MARTINEZ SANCHEZ. WIFE WORKED FOR MARTINEZ SANCHEZ.

4. "CHICAGO" INFORMANT OF LICRAFT IS MRS. ALBERT RECIO, [illegible] WELL STREET, GARY, INDIANA, PHONE 938-5055. SHE IS SISTER OF MIRABAL WIFE, DISLIKES MIRABAL INTENSELY BUT DOES NOT WISH ANY HARM TO COME TO HER SISTER. WOULD BE COOPERATIVE IF APPROACHED AFTER ALERTING PHONE CALL FROM LICRAFT. NEW YORK INFORMANT IS NENITA GARCIA [illegible] FRIEND OF MRS. RECIO AND OF LICRAFT, USED TO HAVE [illegible] THAT USED BY LICRAFT. LICRAFT WILL OBTAIN HER PRESENT ADDRESS.

05, 08

08

05

05

5. SUGGEST HQS ARRANGE TO INTERVIEW MRS. RECIO BUT NOT BEFORE LICRAFT PHONES HER. PLS CABLE NAME TO BE USED BY INTERVIEWING OFFICER.

05

6. LICRAFT WILL PREPARE STUDY ON MIRABAL. PLS CABLE SPECIFIC POINTS WISH COVERED.

SECRET

5/BR

14-00000
104-10177-10134
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of Army

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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15.				201 88764

[illegible] FILE [illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

FROM: AIR ATTACHE MEXICO CITY ROUTINE

TO: DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE 10 NOV 48

ACTION: DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE IN 17654

INFORMATION: ADSO (1), COPS (2), NEG (3), AEC (4)

AIR GRAM

TO: CS USAF

FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS 200 GRAMS URANIUM OWNED BY DAVID PHILLIPS OF PROVEEDORA MUNDIAL MEXICO CITY IS ON DEPOSIT IN VAULTS OF BANCO CONTINENTIAL OF MEXICO CITY. PHILLIPS REPORTEDLY CONNECTED WITH SALE OF MERCURY TO JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II AND WAS BLACKLISTED IN MEXICO. SOURCE REPORTS RUSSIAN MIL ATTACHE IN MEXICO IS NEGOTIATING FOR PURCHASE OF THIS URANIUM.

ACTION: OIN

INFO: ODC

CAF IN 9 6 7 (17 NOV 48) DTG 102355Z

TOR: 1710Z 24 NOV 48

not believed to be identical with David Atlee Phillips.

IT'S NOT! DAP 14 FEB 1975

201-88764

~~201-33432~~

SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO
Unnumbered

DATE
[illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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15.				[illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

No 202

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

TO: Chief, FDI (Russell)

Provisional Operational Clearance is hereby granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

Limitations: Fulminator Project as outlined in TSC-A-967.

This clearance is valid for only 90 days and must be reviewed before the expiration of that time.

STAFF C/

Operational Clearance Officer
for Assistant Director, Special Operations

Date MAY 2 1950

Copy 1 of 2 copies

~~201 33432~~

201-83761

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Copy of [illegible] 23, 749
Accession No.
Date Received SA [illegible] 016

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. NWC	Claypool		15 May		
2. Harwell			15 May		
3. Vandervoort			15 May	B/III	
4. Heitman			17 May		Fulminator-1
5. Morris					MAY 15 10 39 AM '50
6. RI/ED		PROCESSED THRU RI/CO 2 AUG 1957			
7.					
8.					
9.					PHILLIPS, David Atlee
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

201-56764

~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947 (1063)

FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM: SANTIAGO
ROUTINE

TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
12 MAY 50

ACTION: FDT (1-2)
IN 25749

INFORMATION: OSO (3-4), STA (5), STC (6), IID (7), S/C (8-9-10)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SAGC 016

TO: WASHF CITE: SAGOF

1. FOLLOWING IN REPLY WASH 4717 (OUT 55415):

(A) REF PARA 1: PRESENT PLANS ARE AWAIT BRITISH CONTACT, THEREAFTER FULMINATER-1 WOULD APPROACH HOLZER DIRECT. IF BRITISH FAIL CONTACT HQS BY 1 JUNE 50, THIS STATION PLANS TO PLANT FULMINATER-1 NAME ON HOLZER AS THE AMERICAN AGENT IN CHILE WITH EXPECTATION HE WILL ENDEAVOR ESTABLISH CONTACT AND PENETRATE FULMINATER-1 WHO WOULD USE NORMAL DISCRETION ALLOWING HOLZER BELIEVE HE HAD PENETRATED U.S. SERVICE BY HIS OWN EFFORTS.

(B) REF PARA 2: HOLZER NOW UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE BY FULLNESS PER TSC 1085. CONSIDER PENETRATION UNLIKELY WITHOUT IMMEDIATE DETECTION.

(C) REF PARA 3: ASIDE NORMAL PRECAUTIONS STATION HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ALERT SINCE INCEPTION THIS CASE. FULMINATER PROJECT DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION IN ADDITION TO EXPLOITATION.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL ABOVE. IF JANDA REMAINS LONG ENOUGH IN ECUADOR PERHAPS FULMINATER-1 NAME COULD BE PLANTED ON HER WHILE THERE THROUGH ECRATIC.

2121Z 12 MAY 50

TOR:

201-88764

SECRET

COPY No. 1

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~~201-33432~~

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FROM: CABLE

CONFIRMATION SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Wash - 5067

Copy of out ~~Wash~~ 55780

Accession No.

Date Received SA ~~Oct 55~~

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. NWC	Claypool			mjc	
2. Howell			18 May		
3. Vandervoort			18 May		
4.					
5.					
6. Morris					Fulminator-1
7. RI/CO		PROCESSED THRU RI/CO 2 AUG 1957		cd	
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					PHILLIPS, David Atlee

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
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201-58764

~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-18
JAN 1947

(1882)

Form No. 35-6
April 1947

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(753)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SECRET

PAGE NO.

TO: SANTIAGO ROUTINE

FROM: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 16 MAY 50

CONFIRMATION: FDT (1-2) OUT 55780

INFORMATION: ADSO (3-4), STA (5), STC (6), FDD (7), 11D (8), S/C (9-10-11)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 5067

TO: SAGOF CITE: WASHF

RE: SAGO 016 (IN 25749).

1. APPROVAL GRANTED PARAGRAPH ONE.

2. WE DO NOT AGREE WITH PLAN INVOLVING JANDA.

J. ANGLETON WKH WJS JMH W. WHEELER

RELEASING OFFICER ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0400Z 17 MAY 50

SECRET

COPY NO. 201-88764

~~201-33432~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4-00000

SECRET

DATE 31 May 1950

TO: OSO Budget Officer

THROUGH: STB

SUBJECT: Project Sub-Allotment

1. This AN ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ AMENDEND SUB-ALLOTMENT TO PROJECT FULMINATER-1 FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1 June 1950 TO 30 June 1951

FISCAL YEAR 1949-50 FISCAL YEAR 1950-51

AMOUNT $65 U.S. AMOUNT $780 U.S. TOTAL $845 U.S.

$50 per month
+ $12.50 expenses

2. EXPENDITURES FOR THIS PROJECT WILL BE CHARGED AGAINST THE BUDGET OF Santiago, Chile, AND UNDER THE FOLLOWING CRYPTONYM(S):

FULMINATER-1

3. IF THIS IS AN AMENDED SUB-ALLOTMENT, IT REPRESENTS:

☐ AN INCREASE IN AMOUNT FROM TO
☐ A DECREASE IN AMOUNT FROM TO
☐ A TERMINATION SUB-ALLOTMENT

CASE OFFICER

CHIEF, FOREIGN DIVISION T

THE ABOVE BUDGET ☐ DOES ☐ DOES NOT CONTAIN SUFFICIENT FUNDS.

OSO BUDGET OFFICER

DATE

PROJECT APPROVAL CERTIFIED

STB

DATE

201-58764

FORM NO. 51-91
FEB 1950

SECRET

201-33432

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Copy of TCSA-1064

DATE 10 Jul [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-9-8

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

AIR

TCS-A-1064

Chief, Foreign Division T and
Chief, Finance Division

10 July 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Operational Matters
Bank Accounts - United States

1. The following bank account addresses are forwarded herewith for the use of the Finance Division in making appropriate payments in the United States as previously authorized:

a) FULMAR:

Bank - National City Bank of New York
Jackson Heights Branch
Roosevelt Avenue and 81st Street, New York, N.Y.

Amount - $100.00 per month

Schedule - July to be paid 1 August 1950
August to be paid 1 September 1950
September to be paid 1 October 1950
October to be paid 1 November 1950

b) FULMINATER-1:

Bank - Fort Worth National Bank
Fort Worth, Texas

Amount - $50.00 per month

Schedule - First payment to be made 1 August 1950 and to be continued on the first of each month thereafter until further notice.

c) FULMINATER:

Bank:- Mercantile Trust Company
Redwood and Calvert Streets, Baltimore, Maryland

Amount - $50.00 per month

Schedule - First payment to be made 1 August 1950 and to be continued on the first of each month thereafter until further notice.

~~201- 33432~~
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DATE APR 12 1955
201-55 164

SECRET

d) **FULFILLER:**

Change - Due to his absence from Chile from 15 July to 15 October 1950, all payments during this period should be suspended. Payment should be made however for half of the month of July 1950, due to the overlap of 15 days in July in which he assisted FULMAR in taking over all the agents.

2. Future operational duty reports submitted on the first of each month will reflect the above changes.

Jerome C. Dunbar

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Copy of TCSA-1137

DATE
28 Aug 58

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15 8-2-17

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201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AJF TCS-A-1137

SECRET

Chief of Foreign Division T 26 August 1950

Chief, of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

Ref: TCS-A-1064

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-33432~~

ABSTRACT INDEX

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-58761

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 55

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

JF TCS-A-1137

SECRET

Chief of Foreign Division T 26 August 1950

Chief, of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

Ref: TCS-A-1064

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

FULLBACK	$100.00
FULLIAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-93432~~
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88761

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Copy of TCSA-1171

DATE 21 Sep 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-7-6-136

201-55764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1171

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

SEP 27 1950

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of September 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1, now inactive

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201 33432~~

~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~

~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

201 60764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

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FORM 610 1 DEC 55 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No. 692

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

To: Chief, FDT/NWC

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

TCS

Limitations: FULMINATOR Project as outlined in ~~TSC~~-A-967.

STAFF C/ John C. Bonnet
Operational Clearance Officer for
ADSO

Date OCT 3 1950

Copy 1 of 2 copies

Dithy

TCS-A-1171

[illegible] current [illegible] from [illegible] alternative payment in U.S. [illegible] stated Fulminator-I is inactive. Please [illegible]

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201-[illegible]761

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chief, Finance Division 23 October 1950

Chief, FDT

Restoration of Salaries for FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

It is requested that the salaries of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 be restored effective 1 October 1950. Both these individuals are to receive $50.00 per month to be deposited in their respective bank accounts (see TCS-A-1064).

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

201—33432

201-58761

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO Unnumbered

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Fulminator-1 26 October 1950

Viña del Mar, Chile

31 October 1922 - Ft. Worth, Texas

U.S.A.

U.S.A.

present wife Helen Haasch born 25 March 1919 ?, Wisconsin, divorced from Lt. Comm. John Alley USN in 1945. Subject previously married to Joan Hildebrandt, Bloomington, Illinois and divorced her in September 1943.

Child - Maria Louisa, female, born 9 August 1949 in Santiago. Dual citizenship.

Publisher and Editor of the South Pacific Mail, No salary.

Spanish, French, German

none known

b. Still in reserve for future action

c. Fulminator - business activities
Fulminator-1 - newspaper business

d. Desire to serve against the communist menace.
Need of additional sources of income.

e. None - it is anticipated he will respond fully, once approached.

f. Contact only with Fulminator - (no contact as yet)

g. Fullminator - Fullminator 2 - Fullminator 3
Fullness ?

h. none

i. -

3.

a. To provide a false operation to channelize and control Soviet efforts to penetrate U.S. Intelligence Service in Chile.

b. through deceptive leads would investigate and report on Soviet/communist activities in Chile.

4. COST OR PROFIT:

201-33432

Currently inactive / when active $50.00 U.S. per month

5.

a. no

b. Close coordination with H.Q. - Also with Station Lima on transmittal of written material.

Cannot be evaluated as yet. No action

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1214

DATE 2/14/70

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

AIR

TCS-A-1214

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

27 October 1950

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties the entire month of October 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. For authorization of reactivation of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 see WASH 17632 dated 19 October 1950.

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-173

201 - [illegible]432
ABSTRACT [illegible]
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88764

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. TCS-9-1235

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FDT NWC		NOV 29 1950		DM
2. Claypool		30 Nov	30	mjc
3. Christensen		30 Nov		JC
4. Wheeler		13 Dec '50		WW
5. Claypool			14 Dec	mjc
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COMMENTS

BY HAND

KAPOK

request in last paragraph authorized ?

OK - WW

TCS-W-1108
13/12/50

Fulminates-1

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-26

201-88764

~~201~~-33432

ABSTRACT X INDEX

DATE APR 12 1955

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

10—61155-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TCS-A-1235

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T
DATE: 17 November 1950
FROM : Chief of Station, Santiago
SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational Matters
SPECIFIC- ACQUISITION SAFE-APARTMENT: FULMINATER-1

1. Due to the exigency of providing safe quarters for the polygraphic examination of FULMINATER-2, this Station acquired a safe-apartment for FULMINATER-1 to bring FULMINATER-2 to the polygraph team. The authority for this action was believed to have been construed in WashF-19400. The following details pertain to this apartment:

Location: Calle MacIver 272, ninth floor, apartment 915.

RENTAL: Monthly rent: P/3,800. According to local custom it was necessary to pay an advance over and above the initial month's rent also paid in advance. Therefore, P/3,800 was paid for one month, 12 November - 12 December 1950, and P/2,566 was paid as the advance guarantee for twenty days.

Renter: Juan SIVORI, same as FULLNESS safe-apartment, arranged for by FULLNESS.

Negotiator: FUMARIC handled all the negotiations between SIVORI and the owner, whose name is not immediately available at this writing.

Description: The apartment is completely furnished according to Chilean customs and consists of one living/dining room combination, a bathroom and a small kitchen.

Control Status: This apartment is known as FULMINATER-1's apartment and aside from FULLNESS, FUMARIC, the polygraph team, FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA, no one else directly or indirectly connected with this Station will have knowledge of or access to this apartment.

Use: Present: The apartment has been used by the polygraph team to conduct its examination of FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA. The translater of the team, resided in the apartment during his stay in Santiago.

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

CLASSIFICATION

1·28764
~~01 33432~~

Use: continued

Future: It is desired to retain this apartment as long as required in order to provide a safe meeting place for [illegible]-1 and [illegible]-2.

2. In order to clarify this Station's authority to retain the above safe-apartment and to assume the expense of same, it is requested that Headquarters so authorize this Station accordingly as early as practicable.

Jerome C Dunbar

201 88764

~~201-33432~~

AIR

ICS-A-1235

KAPOK

Chief, Foreign Division T

17 November 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Operational Matters
ACQUISITION SAFE-APARTMENT: FULMINATER-1

1. Due to the exigency of providing safe quarters for the polygraphic examination of FULMINATER-2, this Station acquired a safe-apartment for FULMINATER-1 to bring FULMINATER-2 to the polygraph team. The authority for this action was believed to have been construed in WashF-19400. The following details pertain to this apartment:

Location: Calle MacIver 272, ninth floor, apartment 915.

RENTAL: Monthly rent: P/3,800. According to local custom it was necessary to pay an advance over and above the initial month's rent also paid in advance. Therefore, P/3,800 was paid for one month, 12 November - 12 December 1950, and P/2,533 was paid as the advance guarantee for twenty days.

Renter: Juan SIVORI, same as FULLNESS safe-apartment, arranged for by FULLNESS.

Negotiator: FUMARIC handled all the negotiations between SIVORI and the owner, whose name is not immediately available at this writing.

Description: The apartment is completely furnished according to Chilean customs and consists of one living,dining room combination, a bathroom and a small kitchen.

Control Status: This apartment is known as FULMINATER-1's apartment and aside from FULLNESS, FUMARIC, the polygraph team, FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA, no one else directly or indirectly connected with this Station will have knowledge of or access to this apartment.

Use: Present: The apartment has been used by the polygraph team to conduct its examination of FULMINATER-2 and Maria JANDA. The translater of the team, resided in the apartment during his stay in Santiago.

201 88764

~~-201—33432~~

Uses continued
Future: It is desired to retain this apartment as long as required in order to provide a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2.

2. In order to clarify this Station's authority to retain the above safe-apartment and to assume the expense of same, it is requested that Headquarters so authorize this Station accordingly as early as practicable.

Jerome C Dunbar

201-88764

~~201-33432~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1244

DATE 25 Nov. 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-6-2-189

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

AIR

TCSA-1244

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

23 November 1950

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of November 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMRATER	50.00
FULMRATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-157

~~201-33[illegible]~~

ABSTRACT INDEX ☐

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1108

DATE 13 Dec 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

ORIGINAL FILED IN: 15-6-3-200

201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Air

SECRET

TCS-W- 1108

Chief of Station, Santiago

DEC 13 1950

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational

Safe Apartment, FULMINATER-1

Ref: TCS-A-1235

You are authorised to retain the safe-apartment described in reference document as long as required for use as a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2. The expense may be charged to FULMINATER-1.

MJC/djm
4 Dec. 1950

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

By Martha Jane Claypool

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-200

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201-[illegible]~~

ABSTRACT ☐ INDEX ☐

DATE APR 12 1955

1108

201-88764

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1277

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

AIR

TCS-A-1277

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

23 December 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of December 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-204

201 [illegible]
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

R01-82764

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

WH D

NO.

Copy of TCSA-1171

DATE

27 Sep 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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DOCUMENT FILED IN 15-7-0-176

201-55764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1171

Chief, Foreign Division Y

SEP 27 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of September 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1, now inactive

Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201 33432~~

~~ABSTRACT ☑ INDEX ☐~~

~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

No. 692

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

To: Chief, FDT/NWC

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of FULMINATOR/1.

Limitations: FULMINATOR Project as outlined in TCS TSC-A-967. ✓

STAFF C/ John C. Bonnet
Operational Clearance Officer for
ADSO

Date OCT 3 1950

Copy 1 of 2 copies

Dithy TCS-A-1171.
[illegible] current [illegible] payment in U.S. [illegible]
Fulminator-1 is inactive [illegible]

SECRET

~~201 33432~~
[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 24 Jul 64

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Chief, Finance Division 23 October 1950

Chief, FDT

Restoration of Salaries for FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

It is requested that the salaries of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 be restored effective 1 October 1950. Both these individuals are to receive $50.00 per month to be deposited in their respective bank accounts (see TCS-A-1064).

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Unnumbered

DATE
[illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 3 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Fulminator-1 26 October 1950

Viña del Mar, Chile

31 October 1922 - Ft. Worth, Texas

U.S.A. U.S.A.

present wife Helen Haasch born 25 March 1919 ?, Wisconsin, divorced from Lt. Comm. John Alley USN in 1945. subject previously married to Joan Hildebrandt, Bloomington Illinois and divorced her in September 1943.

Child - Maria Louisa, female, born 9 August 1949 in Santiago. Dual citizenship.

Publisher and Editor of the South Pacific Mail. No salary.

Spanish, French, German

none known

Still in reserve for future action

Fulminator - business activities
Fulminator-1 - newspaper business

Desire to serve against the communist menace.
Need of additional sources of income.

None - it is anticipated he will respond fully, once approached.

Contact only with Fulminator - (no contact as yet)

Fullmeas ?
Fullminator - Fullminator 2 - Fullminator 3

none

To provide a false operation to channelize and control Soviet efforts to penetrate U.S. Intelligence Service in Chile.

through deceptive leads would investigate and report on Soviet/communist activities in Chile.

201—33432

currently inactive / when active $50.00 U.S. per month

no

close coordination with H.Q. -- also with station Lima on transmittal of written material.

Cannot be evaluated as yet. No action

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1214

DATE 2 DEC 59

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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15-6-2-175

201-33764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

C
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P
Y

AIR

TCS-A-1214

Chief, Foreign Division T

27 October 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties the entire month of October 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. For authorization of reactivation of FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 see WASH 17632 dated 19 October 1950.

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI Copy filed in [illegible]

201 - 33432
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1244

DATE 28 Nov 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-6-2-169

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201 [illegible]

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 55

☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1244

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

28 November 1950

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of November 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-167

~~201-33832~~

~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~ ☐

DATE APR 12 1955

201-88744

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1108

DATE 13 Dec 60

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air

SECRET

/ TCS-W- 1108

Chief of Station, Santiago

DEC. 13 1950

Chief, Foreign Division T.

Operational

Safe Apartment, FULMINATER-1

Ref: TCS-A-1235

You are authorized to retain the safe-apartment described in reference document as long as required for use as a safe meeting place for FULMINATER-1 and FULMINATER-2. The expense may be charged to FULMINATER-1.

MJC/djm
4 Dec. 1950

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

By Martha Jane Claypool

RI AP 21 [illegible] in 15-6-3-200

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

~~201-33432~~ 1
ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☐
DATE APR 12 1955

1108
201 [illegible] 764

SECRET

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1277

DATE [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR TCS-A-1277

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T 28 December 1950

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of December 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

Jerome C. Dunbar

RI copy fld in 15-6-3-204

~~201-38432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

201-58714

SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1325

DATE 31 Jn. 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-1-1-757

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201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

C
O
P
Y

AIR

TCS-A-1325

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

31 January 1951

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of January 1951, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULFILLER	125.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

RI [illegible] 15-1-757

~~201-33432~~

~~DESTROY INDEX~~

~~DATE [illegible] 1955~~

201 [illegible] 164

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1432

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN: 15-4-4-665

201-58764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TCS-A-1432

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY CHILE PERIOD COVERED JAN-MAR 1951 CRYPTONYM FULMINATOR-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Cut-out between FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2. Responsible for the direct handling of the latter as required by this Station. In addition to this function, Subject has performed services for this Station in the fulfillment of BRGHYTHM-LCACTING directives.

SALARY: $50 U.S. per month; terminated 28 February 1951. Paid $100 U.S. for special services pertaining to LCACTING project.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: A very serious, conscientious and loyal American, who has demonstrated his willingness to serve his country in the above capacity. It is believed that he will be of future value in matters pertaining to BRGHYTHM-LCACTING in Chile.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS: Security of Subject under FULMINATOR project considered satisfactory. On the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING project Subject is handled by FUMARIO under satisfactory security conditions.

COMMENTS: Subject provided a useful service to this Station under deep cover conditions in the handling of FULMINATOR-2. It is contemplated that latter agent will be deported from Chile in the immediate future and that FULMINATOR-1 will then be available for other duties related to the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING objectives in Chile.

RI copy filed in 15-4-4-665

4(a)

SECRET

~~201 33432~~

201-88764

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1432

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-11-665

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

TCS-A-1432

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY CHILE PERIOD COVERED JAN-MAR 1951 CRYPTONYM FULMINATOR-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Cut-out between FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2. Responsible for the direct handling of the latter as required by this Station. In addition to this function, Subject has performed services for this Station in the fulfillment of BRGHYTHM-LCACTING directives.

21 April fild in 15-4-4-665

SALARY: $50 U.S. per month; terminated 28 February 1951. Paid $100 U.S. for special services pertaining to LCACTING project.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: A very serious, conscientious and loyal American, who has demonstrated his willingness to serve his country in the above capacity. It is believed that he will be of future value in matters pertaining to BRGHYTHM-LCACTING in Chile.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS: Security of Subject under FULMINATOR project considered satisfactory. On the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING project Subject is handled by FIMARIC under satisfactory security conditions.

COMMENTS: Subject provided a useful service to this Station under deep cover conditions in the handling of FULMINATOR-2. It is contemplated that latter agent will be deported from Chile in the immediate future and that FULMINATOR-1 will then be available for other duties related to the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING objectives in Chile.

4(8)

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

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☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1182

DATE 28 Feb 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-63-224

RD 1 88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air Pouch

TC: [illegible]

SECRET

Chief of Station, Santiago [illegible] 1951

Chief, Foreign Division T

Administrative

Payments to Agents

Fulminator-1 C

1. Headquarters records reveal that dollar payments to allottees in the United States are being made for the following agents used by your station:

FULFILLER	$125 per month
FULLER/CZ	$100 " "
FULMINATOR	$ 50 " "
FULMINATOR-1	$ 50 " "

2. This process has become so cumbersome in view of world-wide requirements, that it has become necessary to ask field stations to make salary payments locally, either in dollars or local currency, whenever possible. Please advise by return pouch whether it will be possible to make the above-listed payments locally.

3. It is further requested that you clarify the status of FULMINATOR, FULMINATOR-1, and FULMINATOR-2. The most recent exchange of cables (S/GO-160 and WASH-79482) left headquarters with the impression that the entire FULMINATOR project was about to be discontinued, in which case, it is presumed, dollar payments for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-1 should be discontinued. Please advise by pouch.

RI Copy filed in 15-63-224

DMC/djm
19 Feb. 1951

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.
By Dale M. Christensen

Staff B

Wm. M. Wheeler, Jr.

201-[illegible]

ABSTRACT [illegible]DEX

DATE APR 1[illegible] 1955

201-85764
1152

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSW-1182

DATE 28 Feb 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FBI ✓

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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Air Pouch

TC [illegible]

SECRET

FEB 28 1951

Chief of Station, Santiago

Chief, Foreign Division T

Administrative

Payments to Agents

Fulminator-1

1. Headquarters records reveal that dollar payments to allottees in the United States are being made for the following agents used by your station:

FULFILLER	$125 per month
FULLBACK	$100 " "
FULMINATOR	$ 50 " "
FULMINATOR-1	$ 50 " "

2. This process has become so cumbersome in view of world-wide requirements, that it has become necessary to ask field stations to make salary payments locally, either in dollars or local currency, whenever possible. Please advise by return pouch whether it will be possible to make the above-listed payments locally.

3. It is further requested that you clarify the status of FULMINATOR, FULMINATOR-1, and FULMINATOR-2. The most recent exchange of cables (SACO-160 and WASH-77948) left headquarters with the impression that the entire FULMINATOR project was about to be discontinued, in which case, it is presumed, dollar payments for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-1 should be discontinued. Please advise by pouch.

1 - Copied f/d in 15-63-224

DHC/djm
19 Feb. 1951

Wm. H. Wheeler, Jr.
By Dale M. Christensen

Staff B

Wm. H. Wheeler, Jr.

201 - 33432
ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE APR 18 1955
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SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1398

DATE 17 Mar 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AIR

TCS-A-1398

Chief, Foreign Division T

19 March 1951

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Payments to agents; [illegible] Project

Reference: TCS-W-1282

1. Pending preparation of a chronological review of the recent developments of the [illegible] Project since submission of TCS-A-1257, Headquarters is advised that this Station desires the termination of payments to [illegible] and [illegible]-1 as of 28 February 1951 and that no payments be made for the month of March 1951 or henceforth until further notice.

2. Due to the anticipation of an early termination of this project and the absence of any further need for the [illegible] Safe Apartment, this Station has allowed its control on same to lapse as of 10 March 1951.

3. It is anticipated that the abovementioned review will be ready for submission to Headquarters in the next available pouch. Meanwhile for Headquarters information the control over [illegible]-2 has passed to [illegible] who will handle the former's debriefing and deportation as early as practicable.

Jerome C. Dunbar

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RI copy filed in 15-6-3-227

~~201-33432~~

~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~

~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

COPY

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO Copy of TCSA-1398

DATE 17 Mar 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

AIR

TCS-A-1398

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

19 March 1951

Administrative

Payments to agents; FULMINATER Project

Reference: TCS-W-1182

1. Pending preparation of a chronological review of the recent developments of the FULMINATER Project since submission of TCS-A-1257, Headquarters is advised that this Station desires the termination of payments to FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 as of 28 February 1951 and that no payments be made for the month of March 1951 or henceforth until further notice.

2. Due to the anticipation of an early termination of this project and the absence of any further need for the FULMINATER safe apartment, this Station has allowed its control on same to lapse as of 10 March 1951.

3. It is anticipated that the abovementioned review will be ready for submission to Headquarters in the next available pouch. Meanwhile for Headquarters information the control over FULMINATER-2 has passed to FULMENS who will handle the former's debriefing and deportation as early as practicable.

Jerome C. Dunbar

cfo

RI Copy filed in 15-6-3-227

~~33432~~
~~ABSTRACT~~ ~~INDEX~~
~~DATE APR 1 1955~~

201-88764

COPY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO Unnumbered

DATE 10 Aug 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Finance Division
ATTN : .r. George
Chief, FDT

10 April 1951

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 have been terminated as of 28 February 1951. Therefore, it is requested that no further payments be made to their respective accounts.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

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~~201-33438~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO Unnumbered

DATE 10 Apr 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
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FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

10 April 1951

Finance Division
ATTN : Mr. George
Chief, FDT

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1

FULMINATER and FULMINATER-1 have been terminated as of 28 February 1951. Therefore, it is requested that no further payments be made to their respective accounts.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

NO. Copy of TCSA-1564

DATE 17 Jul 57

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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15.				201-42764

157-3-168

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TCS-A-1564

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY CHILE PERIOD COVERED APR/JUN 1951 CRYPTONYM FULMINATOR-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Functions as cut-out for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2 discontinued with the departure from Chile of FULMINATOR-2. Performs service for this Station in the fulfillment of the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.

SALARY: None at the present time as inactive.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: No change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable

OTHER FACTORS No change

COMMENTS: None

Prepared by: Kenneth J. Tendler

RI copy filed in 15-7-3-168

SECRET

201-33432

201-22764

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1564

DATE 17 Jul 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15 7-3 168

201-66764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY CHILE PERIOD COVERED APR/JUN 1951 CRYPTONYM FULMINATOR-1

TCS-A-1564

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Functions as cut-out for FULMINATOR and FULMINATOR-2 discontinued with the departure from Chile of FULMINATOR-2. Performs service for this Station in the fulfillment of the [illegible]-LEACTIRO projects.

SALARY: None at the present time as inactive.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: No change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED: Not applicable

OTHER FACTORS No change

COMMENTS: None

Prepared by: Kenneth J. Tandler

RI copy filed in 15-7-3-168

SECRET

~~201-33433~~
201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1685

DATE 23 Dec 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-11 · 763

201 [illegible] 764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

TCS-A-1685

SECRET

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY Chile PERIOD COVERED Jun/Sept '61 CRYPTONYM FULMINATED-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: In a position to cooperate with this Station in carrying out the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.

SALARY: None at present time. Paid on a piece-work basis for work performed.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

No Change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS It is believed that FULMINATED-1's value to this Station's operations will increase in proportion to the increased ZACACTUS operations in this area.

COMMENTS:

SECRET

201 copied filed in 15-4-763

201 88761

201 33433

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSA-1685

DATE 23 Oct 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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ORIGINAL FILED IN 15-4-4-763

W

201-55764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

TCS-A-1685

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

COUNTRY Chile PERIOD COVERED Jun/Sept '51 CRYPTONYM FULMINATER-1

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: In a position to cooperate with this Station in carrying out the BRGHYTHM-LCACTING projects.

SALARY: None at present time. Paid on a piece-work basis for work performed.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

No Change

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED:

Not applicable.

OTHER FACTORS It is believed that FULMINATER-1's value to this Station's operations will increase in proportion to the increased ZACACTUS operations in this area.

COMMENTS:

201 copy filed in 15-4-4-76 M

SECRET

201-88764

~~201 33432~~

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 24 Nov 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
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15.				21 [illegible] 7-1

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLANS

26 November 1951

Acting Chief, WHD

FULMINATER-1

1. The FULMINATER Project, in which FULMINATER-1 was used on several occasions, did not develop and was not formalized. FULMINATER-1 is therefore not active currently, but is being held in reserve status for future use in other projects.

2. In the future, there will be no charges made against FULMINATER or FULMINATER-1.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

This info sent to Plans 7 Dec. 1951

SECRET

~~201 — 33433~~

201 35761

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WHD

NO. Unnumbered

DATE 26 Nov 61

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 55

☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLANS 26 November 1951

Acting Chief, WHD

FULMINATER-1

1. The FULMINATER Project, in which FULMINATER-1 was used on several occasions, did not develop and was not formalized. FULMINATER-1 is therefore not active currently, but is being held in reserve status for future use in other projects.

2. In the future, there will be no charges made against FULMINATER or FULMINATER-1.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

THis info sent to Plans 7 Dec. 1951

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

PAGE No.

FROM:	SANTIAGO	ROUTINE
TO:	OSO/OPC	10 MAR 52
ACTION:	WHD (1-2-3)	IN 26322
INFORMATION:	IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SAGO 413

TO: WASHFG CITE: SAGOFG

RE: A: WASH 29903 (OUT 60513)
B: TCS-A-1887

1. RE REFERENCE A, INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED BY F 1. HE USING RESERVATIONS STATLER HOTEL AS OF 25 MARCH 52.

2. F-1'S ITINERARY AS NOTED REF B BUT HIS ARRIVAL NEW YORK TO BE 25 MARCH NOT 26 MARCH.

1919Z 10 MAR 52

201-88764

TOR:

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE 201 33432

SECRET

30 JUL 1954

TO : PI/STC/SPB

ATTENTION:

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT : JO-8142
#40696

1. **Reference is made to your memorandum dated 23 July 1954 requesting a covert security clearance to permit Subject's use in the United States in preparing reports and furnishing contacts in the newspaper and lecture field in the United States and abroad. He will work closely with PP/CRTV Office.**

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the covert use of the Subject as described in your request set forth in paragraph 1 above.

3. The Subject is not to represent himself as, nor is he to be represented as, an employee of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-9. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

201-5764

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : PP/Admin 30 July 1954

Willis F. Hawley

FROM : FI/STC/SPB

SUBJECT: David Atlee Phillips

1. Your request for clearance to use Subject dated 23 Jul 54 was processed and transmitted to the Chief, Special Security Division, for final action.

2. The results of this action are attached.

Attachment:
Memo dtd 30 Jul 54

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 59-46
FEB 1953

(47)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

NO.
Copy of TCSA-1091

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				15-8-1-17
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14.				✓
15.				201-283764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Air TCS-A-1091

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative

Duty Status Reports

Reference: TCS-A-1062

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. Re sub-paragraph (d) of referenced message, I certify that FULFILLER having worked through the 15th of July 1950 should receive payment for half the month of July 1950.

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

~~201-33438~~

~~ABSTRACT~~

~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

SECRET

201-88764

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WHD

Copy of TCSA-1091

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				15 8-1-(7)
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15.				[illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Air TCS-A-1091

SECRET

Chief, Foreign Division T

Chief of Station, Santiago

Administrative
Duty Status Reports

Reference: TCS-A-1064

1. I hereby certify that the following named individuals have performed duties during the entire month of July 1950, and that the following dollar payments are approved and authorized to be made at Headquarters to subjects:

NAME	AMOUNT
FULLBACK	$100.00
FULMAR	100.00
FULMINATER	50.00
FULMINATER-1	50.00

2. Re sub-paragraph (d) of referenced message, I certify that FULFILLER having worked through the 15th of July 1950 should receive payment for half the month of July 1950.

/s/ Jerome C. Dunbar

SECRET

~~201-33432~~

DATE APR 12 1955

SECRET

Expired CSC

12 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

VIA : CI/OA

SUBJECT : PHILLIPS, David Atlee JG-8142 #40696

Please cancel the covert security clearance issued 30 July 1954 on subject. Mr. Phillips is now a Staff Employee.

JEANNE K. LETELLIER
Chief of Administration
Psychological and Paramilitary
Operations Staff

PP/ADMIN/DEW:dew

Distribution:
- Addressee - Orig & 1
- CI/OA - 1
- PP/Admin - 2
- FI/RI/AN - 1

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO JG 8142	SOURCE CI/OA	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
SUBJECT PHILLIPS, David Atlee born 31 Oct 1922 in Ft Worth Texas			DATE 25/7/55 mts csc

PERTINENT INFORMATION

RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON ABOVE IN RI/AR FILES

APR 17 1956
MICROFILMED

	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
CROSS-REFERENCE FORM	201 88764

FORM NO. DEC 1952 59-34

SECRET
(When filled in)

[illegible]

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

Date 25/7/55

TO : Chief , PP/OPS

ATTENTION:

FROM : [redacted] CI/OA

SUBJECT : PHILLIPS, David Atlee
JG 8142 # 40696-

1. The action checked below concerning Subject of this memorandum is hereby cancelled:

a. Operational Clearance No.

b. Provisional Operational Clearance No.

c. Covert Security Clearance dated 30/7/54

d. Covert Name Check dated

e. Other

2. This cancellation action is taken because of:

a. Memorandum dated 12/7/55

b. Termination of Project ☐

c. Removal of Subject from Project ☐

d. Other

3. Before Subject can be used operationally in the future, it will be necessary to furnish an up-to-date clearance request to [redacted] CI/OA

MTS
INITIALS

MTS

201-88764

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Signal Center Cable Archives	SOURCE: Out 54554 Wash 3995	DATE OF DOCUMENT 2 May 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
	201 22-11,4

FORM NO. 1 AUG.54 137 REPLACES FORM 59-34 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(35)

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Signal Center Cable Archives	SOURCE: Out 69926 Wash 17632	DATE OF DOCUMENT 19 Oct 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
	201	F 10	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 51-34 WHICH MAY BE USED
1 AUG 54

(35)

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. Cable Archives Signal Center	SOURCE: In 48648 Sago 122	DATE OF DOCUMENT 8 Nov 50	ANALYST
SUBJECT			DATE 24 Aug 56

PERTINENT INFORMATION

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [illegible]

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 55-21
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

(35)

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET 20 April 1956

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: RI/Files

TELEPHONE:

NO: TCS/PRQ/5 (Part II)

DATE: ~~30 AUG 1956~~

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. RI/CO	PROCESSED THRU RI/CO	DEC 5	1955	JC		Close Case See: 201-88764
2.						
3.						PHILLIPS, David Atlee
4.						
5.						
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8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						201-88764 ~~201-[illegible]~~
14.						ABSTR. ~~CIT~~ X ~~INDEX~~ DATE 30 Aug 1956
15. RI/FI	1400L					LLB

FORM NO. 610 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 APR 55

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61155-4

(40)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO. TCS/PRQ/5 (Part II)

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. Vandervoort		24 April		BMC	
2. Claypool		26 Apr			
3. Hansell			26 Apr		
4.					
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8. [illegible]					
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14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
APR 1948

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TCS /PRQ/ 5

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym FULMINATER -1

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Not contacted to date but has been a social acquaintance of Agency personnel for several years.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Probably. To whom? Any staff officer or approved cut-out.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation Desire to serve against the Communist menace and probably is in need of additional sources of income.

201-58764

201 33432

TCS /PRQ/ 5

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject? Local agency and police records.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased? None. It is anticipated that he will respond fully once approached.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information? He would be informed that he would be working with the American Government and no more.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service. None known.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received. None. Once employed he would act as cut-out only.

201-28764

~~201-33432~~

TCS /PRQ/ 5

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain. Cut-out. See TCS-A-967

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain. No. He will be oriented and trained in the duties of a cut-out once he is employed.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information? See TCS-A-967

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities. $50. USC per month salary.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain. None

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain. No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Middle class 201-88764

~~201~~ 33432

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Believed moderate in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.
Believed discreet, security conscious and dependable.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.
None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future? As a cut-out for other operations in the event proposed project does not materialize.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.
Not immediately available.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?
By the agency. Subject completed Part I upon request without asking questions nor being told what it was for except that the Agency requested it.

201 - 88764
~~201-33438~~

SECRET

___/PRQ/___

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None

Case officer
Jerome C. Dunbar

201-88764
~~201 33432~~

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

TCS /PRQ/ 5

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
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6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

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Not contacted to date but has been a social acquaintance of Agency personnel for several years.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Probably. To whom? Any staff officer or approved cut-out.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation Desire to serve against the Communist menace and probably is in need of additional sources of income.

201-28749
~~201-33432~~

SECRET

TCS/PRQ/ 5

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject? Local agency and police records.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased? None. It is anticipated that he will respond fully once approached.

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43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service. None known.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received. None. Once employed he would act as cut-out only.

201 - 88764
~~-91 - 33432-~~

TCS /PRQ/ 5

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain. Cut-out. See TCS-A-967

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See TCS-A-967

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49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

None

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Middle class

201-88764
~~201-33432~~

[illegible]/PRQ/ 5

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Believed moderate in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.
Believed discreet, security conscious and dependable.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.
None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future? As a cut-out for other operations in the event proposed project does not materialize.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.
Not immediately available.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?
By the agency. Subject completed Part 1 upon request without asking questions nor being told what it was for except that the Agency requested it.

[illegible] - 88764
01 33432

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None

Case officer
Jerome C. Dunbar

2 51-88767
~~51-33432~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Copy of TCSW-1440

DATE
[illegible] 51

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				15 6 3.2 276
2.				
3.				
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6.				
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8.				
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15.				201-88764

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Air Pouch

TCS-~~5~~ 1470
28 Nov. 1951
(D)

Chief of Station, Santiago

Acting Chief, WHD

Operational
Termination of Projects

1. In order to formalise headquarters records, the appropriate staffs have been notified of the termination of the FULMINATER Project, and have been informed that in the future no charges will be made against the FULMINATER Project, or against FUL[illegible]1. If this agent is used temporarily in the future and not in connection with an approved project, please charge any expenses incurred to Other Operational Activity.

2. Notice of the termination of FULMADO has also been furnished the headquarters Staff, and any charges for future information from him should also be charged to Other Operational Activity.

RI copy filed in 15-6-3-376

MJClaypool/mec
26 November 1951

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

By Martha Jane Claypool

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

H. J. McKellops, Jr.

SECRET

~~201-33432~~
~~ABSTRACT INDEX~~ 1470
~~DATE APR 12 1955~~

201 55764

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

RE-PUNCH

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION 25 JUL 1965

ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM

ROOM NO

TELEPHONE

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐ NONSENSITIVE ☐

201 NO 88764 (1)

SOURCE DOCUMENT ML

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): PHILLIPS, DAVID ATLEE

SEX (3): [✓ M] F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME (2) (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

PHOTO (4): [✓ YES] NO

BIRTH DATE (5): 31 10 22

COUNTRY OF BIRTH (6): USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH (7): FORT WORTH, TEX

OTHER IDENTIFICATION (8): 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION POSITION: PUBLIC REALATIONS

OCC/POS CODE (9): NEWS

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE (10): C19 CUBA

ACTION DESK (11): C15

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST (12)

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST (12a)

COMMENTS: CIT: USA

PUNCHED

MIS Processed

CS COPY

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201- 88764

PERMANENT CHARGE: YES NO

RESTRICTED FILE: YES NO

SIGNATURE: 2ac

Form No. 831 Use previous editions
1 Oct 56

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(38)

SOUTH PACIFIC

MAIL

JEANNE CRAIN

Photo by Larry Buttle

November 30th
1951

An Erskine Caldwell Story

10 PESOS
No. [illegible]

kly Report from

Peter Warwick

S. P. M. Correspondent



MILESTONE

A most important gentleman had an unusually important day this week. Charles Philip Arthur George, son of Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip, and England's future king, became three.

It was a happy day all round. For not only did Bonny Prince Charles enjoy to full measure the usual delirium of the small boy's birthday, but the King felt fit enough to attend the party and invite a Press photographer.

The King's rapid recovery to the point where he can walk unaided and move with no apparent strain has astonished and delighted the nation. The TIMES photographer - the first member of the public to see him since his operation - reported in some amazement that the King showed no sign of illness, laughed and chatted happily and seemed altogether out of character for a man so recently at grips with major surgery.

The Prince's birthday began, as every such day should, with eager opening of many parcels. He was then taken for his usual outing in St. James's Park - that delightful playground that he can never fully enjoy. For, as a royal prince he must not sail boats in public ponds or feed ducks, or ride on the swings. Still, he seems happy enough as his nanny pushes the pram between admiring strollers, followed by bulky men stamped Scotland Yard all over. He's a friendly child with a democratic tendency to talk and wave to everybody as he clutches two grubby lead soldiers. He's a firm had the spirit

On his third birthday, he shows many of the qualities of warmth, manliness and downright commonsense that he has shared so much. He spends much of his time with adults and is way past the baby-talk stage; he is bright, interested in everything and very obviously no cissy. He has had to learn to bear long absences from his parents and conduct himself with dignity in public. London, the world's most critical judge of royalty, awards him top marks all round in its third Report on Progress, and heartily wishes him very many happy returns.

—oOo—

TRAP

Londoners face a new hazard, another pit in the treacherous bog of regulations that surrounds today's law-respecting citizens.

This week, careful sidesteppers along the narrow pathways of rectitude learned that the phone may lead to a fine.

In our public telephone boxes are two buttons: after the money has clicked into the box and some sort of response been evoked the caller presses Button A so that the other end can hear him. If he gets the wrong number or none at all he presses Button B and gets his money back, usually. Sometimes, the mechanism appears to develop an unusual contrition in its behaviour and pours out a shower of coins wildly in excess of the Button B presser's due. Till now, this pleasant quirk has invested the dull business of telephoning with a certain sporting quality. No call is complete without a hopeful lunge at Button B.

The other day, it seems, a youth trying to phone his girl-friend was getting no reply, which is trouble enough, anyway. Pressing Button B, he was rewarded with eightpence, five more than he was entitled to. If there's one soul in the whole of London's ten million who wouldn't have pocketed that extra fivepence it certainly wasn't our young swain. Unfortunately, somebody spotted his transaction and the lad eventually found himself in court as wrong a number as anyone ever got.

They fined him ten shillings, saying that he should have returned the other fivepence to the box or a post-office. The authorities explain that people who forget to press Button B to regain their money claim on the Post Office and, **therefore**, anyone pocketing money thus hurled at them is robbing the Postmaster General. There may possibly be people who claim for the odd forgotten threepence, but this column has never met even a remote friend of one.

So something of the sport has gone out of life. And a lot of people are congratulating themselves on a narrow escape from disgrace. There, but for the grace of God. The lad seems to have had less than a generous deal from Fate. London hopes he at least enjoyed the consolation of a plausible explanation by his girl-friend.

—oOo—

HOPE

Among the more frightening visions floating in the mind's eye just now is one of cohorts of plump ladies standing purposefully on their heads. For somebody has discovered that this unedifying caper produces a reduction in weight.

Britain's amateur bantam-weight boxing champion had a spot of bother up at Wembley this week which necessitated his checking a overweight so he took a hot bath and jogged about a bit and had another shot. No matron ever registered more disappointment on a weighing machine - he was still overweight. A bystander, who might have been a witch-doctor but who was a more than ordinarily knowledgeable gymnast, suggested the dejected bantam-weight should stand on his head. Surprisingly, instead of giving the know-all a clip on the ear for ill-timed levity, the boxer did as he was told. They weighed him again and he had lost the surplus six ounces. The story ends happily enough, as he won his fight a few hours later.

Now, there's another fight in progress between the "experts." Some doctors refused to believe it, like the man who first saw the giraffe. Others say that standing on the head couldn't have had any effect; it was something else. From Harley Street comes the theory that being upside down disturbs a body's air content and sends some of it higher; this reresults in a temporary loss of weight. But this isn't among

Whatever the explanation, the trick has fascinated London which, in the privacy of its homes, is spending more time than usual upside down, in test runs. Whether this is the answer to the middle-aged ladies' prayer for an easy summer isn't yet clear, but it's certainly due for a thorough going into. More than ever, the Atomic Age woman needs a good head on her shoulders - preferably with a flat top.

—oOo—

TAIL END

There'll be no extra food at Christmas, says the new Food Minister. More time for devotion and somewhat less for digestion this year.

—oOo—

An enquiry reveals that electric bulb manufacturers have been running price rings to prevent competition. Could this be the light fantastic we hear about?

American Country Day School

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—oOo—

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

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FRANCE IN MOROCCO

THERE has always been discussion about the peculiar trait of human nature which finds expression in a feeling of pleasure in contemplating the misfortunes of others. The great Lucretius in his poem "De rerum natura" tells of the satisfaction enjoyed in witnessing, from the safety of the shore, the shipwrecked mariners struggling in the sea; but he does not seem to have found anything reprehen[illegible] in the sentiment. Nowadays we should, of course, indignantly deny any such baseness in ourselves, though we may not be so sure about "the other fellow" who is quite capable of putting a banana—skin on the path for our special benefit. However this may be, it cannot be ignored that the "foreign" press tends to gloat over the difficulties of Great Britain, formerly in India and Palestine, now in Iran and Egypt, conveniently forgetting the fact that no country in the world with international responsibilities can hope, in present world circumstances, to evade situations dangerous to national prestige.

Just twenty years—no more—have passed since a magnificent "Exposition Coloniale" was held in the Parisian suburb Vincennes, which attracted visitors from all parts of the world and was proudly pointed to in many countries, as being convincing evidence that the great nations of Europe, and the United States with them were in no way disposed to accept the concept of "the twilight of the West" or to renounce their "mission civilistrice".

How stands that Colonial Empire today? It has to be remembered that France, as a colonial power had a great asset shared by no other Western nation—the absence of a rigid colour bar. The extending to "native" peoples of the full rights of French citizenship went beyond legal formulae; mixed unions are not frowned on and "a touch of the tar brush"—or of yellow paint in the Far East, conveys no stigma, whatever other handicaps may have to be overcome. Moreover, colonial France has called forth the energy, and in not a few cases, the genius of great soldiers and administrators, second to none, and whatever may happen in the fu[illegible] their place in history is secure. Nevertheless, though the [illegible]coleur still flies over many lands and over millions of many races, all of them, potentially if not actually, overseas Frenchmen, the wave of nationalism rising to full tide after the disasters of the second world-war has swept away many land-marks that seemed to have their foundations firmly based in tradition. Syria and Lebanon, with their great French Crusader castles, speaking still of warriors and heroes of the past who left their giant bones from Antioch to the Gulf of Aquaba and beyond-all gone. On Indo-China and Annam, Tonquin and Madagascar, we see French dominion fighting there for very life, and fate hangs daily in the balance. Now the interest and anxiety concentrates on Morocco, a question that really concerns all French Africa, north and central.

In Morocco the position is peculiar. Less than fifty years ago, though so near Europe, Morocco was very little known and foreigners were not welcomed there. The mutual jealous[illegible] of European powers helped to perpetuate this situation un[illegible] became intolerable, and in return for the usual shady agreements not to interfere with the ambitions of others elsewere, France was given a free hand to go ahead. By 1912, it was possible to speak of "pacification," and since that date, with a shadowy native ruler in nominally supreme authority, the civilizing of Morocco had gone far enough by 1913 for that country to have its "pavilion" in the Exhibition. But under the surface nationalism fermented, raising difficulties for the Sultan as well as for French military and civil authorities. These difficulties have now become acute, and have been raised in the United Nations by the representative of Irak, [illegible] that led the French representative to leave the Mandate Commission during the hearing. It is not only Great Britain that has to struggle with problems in the Mediterranean area!

[illegible]



Dear Sir,

Last week's pin up was certainly amongst your best . but tell me who writes the captions for the photographs? I presume you import them but do you adhere to the original description. I always have an uncomfortable feeling that my leg is being pulled yet I should not be so bold as to say that you tamper with the text. However, I find it more than difficult to believe that a girl with a name like Daphne Codd should be selected by the International Pearl Divers' Association (A.F.L.) as the "GIRL WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO SHUCK OYSTERS". One other point! Is there an International Pearl Divers' Association and would they be affiliated with the American Federation of Labour.

Sincerely yours,

"Doubtful"

The captions for S. P. M. pin-ups are invariably rewritten by the staff not, however, to stretch credulence but to fill space. Miss Daphne Codd was not only selected by the International Pearl Divers' Association as the "GIRL WITH WHOM WE WOULD LIKE TO SHUCK OYSTERS" but stood as a candidate for the title "MISS BEACH-MINDED 1951, in which contest she failed to place: This fact was, therefore, omitted in order not to unnecessarily strain readers' doubts. Finally to the best of the editors' knowledge there is an International Pearl Divers' Association and Mr. Murray (president of the A. F. L.) would assuredly welcome them to the A. F. L. ED.


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NEWS OF THE WORLD
WEEKLY REVIEW

KOREAN CEASE FIRE LINE RATIFIED IN PLENARY SESSION: CESSATION OF LAND FIGHTING REPORTED

Into the chilly, rain-soaked, roadside tent at Panmunjon this week swept a gust of accord. United Nations and Communist delegates set a thirty day deadline for concluding a truce as they, at the same time, came to an agreement on the second item of the peace agenda—the location of the cease fire line.

Agreement came just five months to the day after Soviet Deputy to the United Nations, Jacob A. Malik, proposed that both sides open negotiations for a cessation of hostilities based on the thirty-eighth Parallel.

In those five, weary, bloody months proposal after ill-fated proposal flailed the negative air of Communist obduracy and U. N. insistence. Meanwhile, the fighting had gone on, savage and costly. And ridge by dreary ridge had fallen, taking their toll of thousands of lives.

And what of the final settle~~ment? It clearly defined~~ a U N territorial victory:

The present battle line—now from ten to forty miles inside North Korea—will become the permanent truce line if agreement is reached within thirty days on outstanding agenda items. If the agreement is forthcoming the armies will surrender any territory gained in the next month's fighting. If there is no accord the discussions will go on and a new line will be drawn up along the points of battle contact at the time the peace is finally signed.

Ratified by a plenary session of negotiators after lower echelon groups had debated for days the topographical details, the line that will separate the two armies extends from a point south of Kosong on the east coast to the mouth of the Imjin river on the western seaboard. Extending along the length of the twisting line is a neutral corridor two and a half miles deep, which includes Panmunjom, site of the armistice negotiations for the past month but falls by several miles to encompass Katsong, former peace city.

But three multi-pronged problems of the five-point peace agenda remained to be settled. In order of scheduled appearance these are the three questions:

(1) SUPERVISING THE ARMISTICE: Each side distrusts the other and each fears that the other might use the lull for reinforcement and re-equipment with new weapons. To obviate difficulties and to allay suspicions some sort of inspection system is called for. The United Nations Command proposed a joint policing team, free to travel anywhere in Korea. The Communist proposal calls for a joint armistice commission responsible for armistice arrangements and supervision. Never ones to tolerate unauthorized nosing in their own backyard, the Communist plan made no mention of inspection behind the lines.

(2) EXCHANGE OF WAR CAPTIVES: In United Nations prison compounds are 168,346 prisoners—148,736 North Koreans and 19,610 Chinese. Just how many U. N. prisoners the enemy is holding is not known since neither North Korea nor Communist China is a member of the Geneva convention on war prisoners, therefore does not report them. Currently missing are 10,871 U. N. troops and 88,390 South Koreans. At Tuesday's plenary session, when the cease fire line was ratified, Admiral Charles Turner Joy, chief of the United Nations delegates, suggested each side prepare statistics on prisoners to speed that issue when it comes up for debate. The senior delegate proposed that each side prepare the latest available information on names, nationalities and other identification of all war prisoners and the location of all prisoners of war camps.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED: Never a clear point, this vaguely worded item results from a U. N. refusal to put on the agenda the withdrawal of troops from Korea. The U. N. insists that troop withdrawals form part of a political aspect and have no part in armistice discussions.

At week's end came a blurred report from the battle front that all land warfare had ceased and that only the sea and air warfare was still going on. Correspondents reported large fires along the Communist front and complete tranquillity.

It was not clear from where the cease fire order had emanated but from Key West, Florida, where President Truman is taking his winter vacation, came a vigorous denial from Presidential Press Secretary Joseph Short. Said he: "There can be no cease fire in Korea untill an armistice has been signed."

EAST AND WEST CONTINUE VERBAL CLASH IN U. N.

East and West were still poles apart and no move yet made in the spacious chambers of the Palais de Chaillot, where the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly is convening, seemed capable of bridging the yawning hiatus of suspicion and tension now so much a part of East-West relationships.

Disarmament was still the number one issue on the business like agenda and the Big Two (Soviet Russia and the U. S. A.) were no closer to agreement now than they had been at the outset.

But now there was a new point of friction, which Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky raised last week. It concerns a provision in the American Mutual Security Act, which became law last October. The provision authorizes the President to spend up to $100 million out of military aid funds "for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from" Russia and the satellites "either to form such persons into elements of the military force supporting the North Atlantic Treaty organization or for other purposes.." The sponsors of the provision claim that "other purposes" provides an opening for them to aid underground forces behind the Iron Curtain

The Russians protested that the Mutual Security Act was designed to "finance subersive activities of persons and armed groups . . (to) finance traitors and war criminals who fled from their countries" They branded the $100

pledges exchanged by President Roosevelt and former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinoff in 1933 when the United States formally recognized the Soviet state.

The pledges were made at the insistence of Washington which had a wary eye on the Comintern, predecessor of the Cominform. In the exchange each side promised not to sanction efforts at "bringing about by force . . a change in the political or social order" of the other country.

Washington and the rest of the West conceded the move to Russia. It was an astute piece of diplomacy and one more step in a long-range plan—a peace propaganda battle.

At week's end the West took the initiative and simultaneous announcements from Washington, London and Paris declared that the Western Big Three were prepared to confer secretly with Russia and Luis Padilla Nervo, president of the United Nations General Assembly in an effort to reach an agreement on a common proposal for disarmament and the abolition of atomic weapons.

Taken off guard Foreign Minister Vishinsky asked for time to consider the proposal.

THE PROBLEM OF WEST GERMANY'S SOVEREIGNTY

Three facts were tangling the issues of West German sovereignty last week, all vitally interlocked and all hinged to a none-too-clear future.

How was the (West) German Ferderal Republic with its huge Ruhr industries and technical resources to be welded to the West and how was it to be fused into the Atlantic Community and its potential military manpower tapped so that it would flow into Community channels?

Last week the Western Big Three Foreign Ministers and the Bonn Government made an approach to solve these problems. U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman met with Bonn Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in Paris. They approved an agreement which moved Chancellor Adenauer to remark with rhetoric flavour: "An historical event which has brought Western Germany forever into the Western camp."

The essentials of the agreement are:

Bonn occupation will end but Allied troops will remain on West

and foreign affairs. The Allies will reserve certain rights in specific fields. The Allies will have the right to intervene and [illegible] some control of the [illegible] in any emergency [illegible] their own position is endangered, and make decisions on the [illegible] question of West [illegible] German unity.

The new Allied-Bonn arrangement would await agreement on a European army. That is a multinational army composed of units from France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg.

The uncertainties surrounding the agreement stem from three sources. First of these is the political situation in West Germany where Dr. Adenauer's stength has been weakened by losses in recent by-elections to extreme Rightist parties and especially to the powerful, well-disciplined Socialist party of Dr. Kurt Schumacher. The Socialist party leader has accused Dr. Adenauer of a "sell-out" to the Allies. He is inflexibly opposed to the European army proposal and insists that Germany rearm as a national equal with the Atlantic Pact countries or refrain from participation.

The second factor is French distrust of Germant rearmament for which reason they piloted the European army idea into prominence in an *effort to head off* any independent German rearmament plan.

The third *factor*, and perhaps the most important of all, is the dazzle of unity, long the hope of all Germans and recently brought to the fore again by an East German invitation to West Germany to participate in nation-wide elections.

However the issues were resolved even the most guileless optimist would not predict full West German membership in the N. A. T. O. before 1953.

Have yours at
THE VIOLIN GITANO
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TEA ROOM AND



[illegible] NEWS AND VIEWS

Ercilla

GUILTY CROSS

"The Colonial tower of San Francisco—the cause of humorous polemics between the Mayor of Santiago and the Prior of the Franciscan Fathers—has upset local painters. In accordance with an order from the Mayor reconstruction work has begun on the outside walls of the church and tower. Taking advantage of the ascent to the bell towers the Prior ordered that the tilted cross be straightened—the cross is 30 metres above the street and was struck by a strong bolt of lightening during a storm. Local painters have always liked to go into the green gardens of the Order, and from there paint the picturesque tower with ancient tilted cross. But now that they have seen the new position of the cross they have countered with bitter statements: "Now we must remake all our paintings because of the cross".

EL DIARIO ILUSTRADO.

"A headline in a local paper says that our transportation and traffic problems will be studied in Europe.

But along with this way of fixing things, they'd better bring along some European mentality."

LA NACION

"The world-famous cancer specialist, Dr. George Pack, who only recently [illegible] on Eva Duarte de Perón in Argentina and several years ago treated the Maharaja of Kapurtala, has arrived in Santiago. He told reporters. "Friday I shall operate in the clinic of Dr De Amesti. It will be a modest contribution to the success of this Congress (of Cancer Specialists)."

. . . . .

"Simply by answering a question concerning the yearly export of Chilean nitrate, Professor Charles K. Ranson and his wife have won a free trip throughout South America. The fortunate couple arrived yesterday in Santiago. The luck began on a radio program called "Your Tropical Trip" Professor Ranson was called before a jury and asked about the annual exportation of nitrate from Chile. He answered that it was a million tons a year (he had only ten seconds to answer). His answer was closest to the fact: the actual figure is 690,000 tons per year.

Only last year Professor won another radio prize, a trip to Honolulu, on a program called "Earn Your Vacation"

The Ransoms will stay in Santiago about ten days".

EL MERCURIO

TO THE AUTOMOBILE THIEF

who stole my automobile No. B V. 39 from my home, 751 Dr. Cadiz Street, leaving it abandoned at dawn last Sunday at Lo Encañada on the corner of Crescente Errázuriz, you are requested to come by the same spot to carry off the rest of the car that you left behind, after removing the wheels, radiator, etc., in order that I may collect my insurance since so long as there is anything left of the vehicle I can collect nothing. The automobile is still where you left it. Your cooperation will be much appreciated.

THE OWNER

. . . .

Editor's Note: At press-time the automobile mentioned above had not been re-stolen. The owner of the car has been identified by the local press as Gustavo Campaña, newspaperman and radio script writer. Señor Campaña's insurance contract carried a clause stating that if the automobile reappeared before the end of ninety days no damages could be collected.

This week's pin-up feature Miss Laurette Greutner, lovely French mannequin, currently visiting the U. S. In a few short months Miss Greutner has managed to pocket the following titles: "Queen of Rising Star, Texas", "Miss Agricultural Products of 1951" and "The Girl We'd Most Like to Change a Tire With", by the Montana Auto Association.

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PublPRESS

One of the advantages we have over most readers of the S. P. M. is that we can see what goes into print before publication and if we feel like commenting can do so at once without waiting for next week's edition. Thus we can acknowledge "Chatter Box's" comment on our column of the week before. We had asked for examples of words, which like "innings", have a singular form along with an "s" termination. Chatter Box came up with "series" and it is a good example—the dictionary states clearly that is serves both as singular and plural. Chatter Box also mentions that the headline "STIX NIX CRIX PIX" from "Variety" would produce blank despair on the face of any Englishman that came across it. It would do the same to 99 out of one hundred Americans. Probably ninety percent of those who do grasp the translation live, or have lived, within a one mile radius of Times Square. Although it will be comparable to translation from the Urdu (we used to speak it, but now have forgotten; you know how it is when you don't keep a language up) we shall attempt to clarify the meaning. First of all the strict meaning, in the terse language of Broadway: Stix means sticks, Nix is "says no to". Crix is critics and Pix is pictures. In other words the movie fans who live in the country do not swarm to the box office when a film that has been highly praised by reviewers arrives at the local flicker-house. WALL STREET LAYS AN AGG is, obviously, a reference to the crash of '29. "To lay an egg", when one is not speaking of a bird, means to drop a brick or put your foot in your mouth.

* * *

Words are fun, even the serious study of serious words. If you find yourself in the house some rainy afternoon without a game of canasta to fill your time pick up the dictionary and browse through it. The dictionary, etymologically speaking, is a fascinating tome. Take the word shibboleth,' for instance. Today it means "password, watchword; a party slogan." Its original meaning in Hebrew was "ear of corn or stream in flood". Its present usage stems from the time Jephtha used it as a battle-line password to distinguish his men from the fleeing Ephraimites —who could not pronunce it correctly. The same idea is used in today's warfare. English speaking troops often employ words that cannot be pronounced easily by the opposition. The idea even went further in an anecdote published in these pages a few weeks ago. American soldier to unknown: What are the words of "The Star Spangled Banner"? Answer: "Damned if I know them". Soldier: "Advance American soldier, and be recognized."

* * *

"Buncombe", also known as bunkum, was the name of a U. S. Congressman who made a pointless speech to impress his constituents. "Chauvinism", the practise of blind patriotism, comes from the name of Chauvin, a soldier who was continually boasting of Napoleon's glory. "Cabal", an intrigue, is a word composed of the initial letters of the names of five English gentlemen who conspired against authority. With these words we have hardly started in an investigation that can be as exciting as reading detective stories. But if the history and use of words is an interesting study, the observation of the mis-use of words is even more fun. We blush to say that we have an Aunt who "blurshes" when she is excited and often remarks on the "beautiful revenue of trees" in front of her house. Aldous Huxley once wrote a delightful story about a young man who thought the word "carminative" meant red, of or pertaining to that color. Huxley recounts how the fellow bandied the word about in an intellectual manner, and, most of the time got away with it since none of his listeners knew the difference. Actually the word describes a remedy for flatulence. And now we are going to stop before association makes someone think of descriptive words for this twittering.

D. A. P.

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A few weeks ago I commented that the performances of the Karadura Koncert Kompany, some twenty-five years ago, must have been as corny as their name. One of the organizers of that enterprise, Mr. Bert Gould, has since informed me that they were very good and that furthermore by their efforts were able to raise the sum of one thousand pounds for Earl Haig's Fund. The members of the party were all members of the British Legion and that once more demonstrates my contention that Legion Members of those days were more serious about their membership and the objects of the Legion than the new members of nowadays. To anyone who may feel offended at my comments about the name of the company, I apologise most sincerely, but nevertheless I still consider that the Name, Karadura Koncert Kompany, was a crumby one. Or should I say "krumby"?... incidentally, the suggestion put forward by "JOE" last week that the apparent lack of enthusiasm on the part of the new members may be attributed to the fact that there are now more ladies who qualify for membership, and so forth, doesn't convince me very much . . I recall a dinner at the Country Club, two or three years ago, at which the ladies sang the barrack room ballades of the 1939-1945 affray with quite as much gusty enthusiasm as the men . . And anyone who states that the ladies are not as keen on a party as the men prevaricates, and the truth is not in him . . . Mr. Bert Gould, who has always been active in Legion affairs, and for his service in the Second World War was decorated by the Chilean Government and rewarded handsomely by His Majesty's, is still around and very vital. Now that the election of officers is approaching, I emphatically suggest that the members of the Legion couldn't do better than vote for Mr. Albert C. Gould, M. M., as President . . . . This is not a paid announcement. It's just the expression of a personal opinion, to which anyone is entitled. Mr. Gould may put his medals on back to front, or the wrong way round, when he attends Church Parade, but, as he says, "What the heck! The Sergeant-Major won't be here"!

* * *

D. A. P. in his "Hell Box" the other week expressed his confusion at vagaries of the English Language as used by the reporter of a Cricket Match. He needn't feel so upset about it, because I am more than sure that there are many Englishmen who would be as equally puzzled by many of the terms . . . And I can't imagine a greater punishment for any Englishmen than to be cast on a desert island with the Sports Section of an American newspaper as a sole companion . . . I have to confess that, even after a residence of some six years in New York, and in spite of the fact that I was a staunch supporter of the Baseball Team formed by the employees of the Bank that had the doubtful honor of [illegible]ing me among them, I still am unable to explain the [illegible] points of the game . . . Once it was explained to me very carefully by a profound student of the sporting world how Baseball was evolved from cricket, but I can't even recall that interesting point . . . Maybe the fact that the ground which the team used was attached to Tromer's Brewery in Brooklyn, and the liquid refreshment was good and plentiful has something to do with the fact that I didn't pay as much attention to the game as I should have done . . As for the word "innings", which bothered D. A. P. so much, I was always under the impression that it was one of those peculiar English words with a plural form, but is really singular. Such as "series". The question is one for a philologist to explain, and if there is one in the audience, now's the time for him to step forward and do his stuff . . . Talking of the difference between English as used in England and the United States one must not overlook that famous weekly of [illegible] business Variety . . . Such [illegible] headlines as STIX [illegible] CRIX PIX and WALL STREET LAYS AN EGG are undoubtedly inspirations but I don't think they will produce anything but blank despair on the face of any Englishman who comes across them . . . Yet the fact remains that there are English people who firmly believe that they can understand fully and will be understood amply, in the United States just because they can make sense out of the stories in the Saturday Evening Post and Ladies' Home Journal. It isn't as easy as that believe me!

CHATTER BOX.

LONDON Letter

An underground gasoline tank blew up in the crowded centre of Bristol this week, killing at least seven persons and shattering store fronts in a quarter mile area. Weekend shoppers were bowled over by the blast and persons in nearby houses were trapped as ceilings and walls collapsed . . . Discovery of extensive manganese deposits in the northwestern areas of British Guiana was reported by the Barima Gold Mining Compnay (Canada) Ltd. The report said preliminary tests indicated a large tonnage of rather low grade ore.

• • •

Prime Minister Churchill and the three other ministers who are to accompany him to Washington will depart on the Queen Mary on December 29, for discussions with President Truman, expected to begin January 3rd. The other ministers are Anthony Eden, Lord Ishmay, and Lord Cherwell. On leaving, Washington Mr. Churchill will visit Canada at the invitation of the Canadian Government and spend two or three days in Ottawa. The two visits will probably take about a fortnight, after which Mr. Churchill will return home by air.

• • •

Charles Norris, a 24-year-old American in Paris was ready for bed when he saw a picture of Princess Margaret in a newspaper. He was so smitten with her beauty he decided to attempt a meeting. The newspaper reported that the Princess was attending a charity ball that night. Norris put on his tuxedo and borrowed 8,000 francs for a ticket to the ball. Making his way through a knot of admirers around Margaret, he offered his hand. He said: "Excuse me, Your Highness, I should like to present myself. I am an American and my name is Chuck Norris". "I am delighted to meet you," the Princess replied. When Norris asked for a dance, however, she told him that she sorry, but was "booked up".

• • •

Protestant and Roman Catholic churches throughout Britain will offer special prayers and thanksgiving on December 9th for the restoration to health of King George VI. The King, recovering from a lung operation, celebrates the fifteenth anniversary of his accession to the throne on December 11th . . . When American troops in Korea offered to share their Thanksgiving holiday food supplies with other United Nations troops the offer was politely declined by British units. They explained that they would rather wait for the special rations until A British-type turkey celebration was more in order at Christmas time.

• • •

A move to re-create the Home Guard, the voluntary body of part-time soldiers who stood guard over Britain while her army was fighting abroad in World War II, was approved this week by the House of Commons on its second reading. No vote was taken, although Labour party members questioned the necessity for the measure and said that it would offer amendments to it in the committee stage of consideration that will follow the second reading.

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NEW YORK Notes

BUSINESS DEPT., **Francis J. Whitehair, the Under Secretary of the Navy, conferred with President Truman who suddenly asked him: "One of your ancestors was the chief of the Osage tribe, wasn't he?" . . . "Yes, Mr. President," said Mr. Whitehair . . "And didn't he trade 5,000 acres of choice Kansas farmland for a carload of whiskey?" said the President . . . "Yes, sir," said Mr. Whitehair... The President smiled at the Under Secretary and said: "Don't you go trading any carriers without talking to me."**

SCHOOL DEPT.: On Thursday afternoon, in New Haven, there was a meeting of university presidents. One of the attendants was Dr. Franklyn Murphy, the new head of the University of Kansas, who is only 35 years old—the youngest head of a major university. The 35-year-old Murphy said to Whitney Griswold, the president of Yale: "I've become somewhat of a curiosity—being pointed out, the youngest, etc. I think I should have my hair pulled out or else dye it gray" . . . "Just wait two years," the 40-year-old Griswold replied. "Two more years at the job—and your hair will fall out."

PHOTO DEPT.: Dr. Albert Einstein continues to rank among those whose photo is published most frequently. A visitor at Princeton said to Einstein: "You are a scientist, mathematician, teacher, author—if you were asked to give your profession, what would you say?" . . . "My profession?" said Einstein, "photographer's model."

ART. DEPT.: Tom Benton, whose home is in Kansas City, decided to use his talents as a painter to help the victims of the recent flood. He therefore prepared lithographs depicting the plight of the flood-sufferers, struck off enough copies for Congress and mailed the lithographs to the Congressmen in the hope of inducing them to legislate increases in relief funds . . . Most of the Congressmen, unaware of the worth of a Benton lithograph, ignored it. Rep. Dick Bolling and his staff visited the offices of his colleagues, retrieved the Benton lithographs from their waste-baskets, took the lithographs to Kansas City and sold them at auction for the benefit of flood victims.

SCHOOL DEPT.: **Michael DiSalle, the Price Stabilizer, was invited to make the commencement address at St. Mary's, in South Bend, Ind. DiSalle's daughter, a pupil at that school, is a member of the graduating class. In his letter of acceptance, DiSalle told the head of the school: "Thanks for your invitation. I was going to be there anyway."**

Mike Todd has become the jumping jack of show business Before he came to Broadway he won and lost several fortunes, and a series of hit shows made him rich again. Then he gambled it away, made another fortune and lost that too. Now he and Lowell Thomas have been devoting their time to the production of tri-dimensional movies. Sir Alexander Korda saw a sample, spread the word that it would revolutionize movie-making and again Todd is riding high, with capital gain offers which can net him several millions. "I'll come back to Broadway only when I have enough not to worry about a review," said the producer. "I'll produce a show only when I feel that my life doesn't go with it."

The Overseas Press Club, which invited the Mayor to be guest of honor at a luncheon to discuss and be questioned about his recent trip abroad, received no reply. They withdrew the invitation . . . Sen. Bricker hears that Michael DiSalle's official announcement of his candidacy for the U. S. Senate will be made on Feb. 15 . . . The Associated American Artists, which developed a ceramics business for its 20 artists, now is venturing into another field—fabrics. They'll be featured at Macy's . . . As of last night, Dan Topping says he still hasn't heard from Joe DiMaggio about next year's plans.

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THE WINDFALL

BY

ERSKINE CALDWELL

WHEN Waldo Murdock, whose trade, when he felt like working at it, was rendering creatures, came into the unexpected inheritance, there had been no commotion in Brighton to equal it since the time when, eleven years before, one of the Perkins brothers, with no more forewarning than a clap of summer lightning, ran away in broad daylight with the resident minister's second wife.

As for the townspeople, none of them, not even Aunt Susie Shook, who told fortunes by reading tea leaves or coffee grounds if necessary, had ever had the remotest idea that anything in the nature of sudden wealth would fall into Waldo Murdock's scrawny lap, while at the same time, of course, people were quick to say that if he had not been sitting down, as usual, instead of being up and doing, there would have been no lap of his for it to fall into; and certainly Waldo himself, even though he daydreamed about almost everything else under the sun, had never entertained such a farfetched thought in his mind.

Waldo did not even know he had a brother in Australia and, even if he had known it, he would never have imagined that he would be remembered in a will. From Bangor to Burlington, all the Murdocks, especially the home-owning branch of the family, were known throughout the entire region north of Boston for their trait, which relatives-by-marriage and other outsiders called cussedness, of not acknowledging kinship with one another. And as it was, it was all Waldo could do to force himself, after having cast aside pride of long standing, publicly to admit blood relationship with another Murdock, even if he had lived in Australia, long enough to go to the bank in Waterville and cash the check the lawyer from Portland had handed him.

"Pay no mind to what the people say," he told the clerk in the bank. "There may be others in the State of Maine bearing the name of Murdock, but there's not a single drop of mingling blood that I would own to. I'd sooner claim kinship with my old black cow than I would with a so-called Murdock."

Dessie, Waldo's wife, was, at the beginning, the most levelheaded of all. She maintained her mental balance, if only at the start, much better than Waldo and some of the townspeople. Dessie, although afterward she regretted not having gone along, even remained at home and tended the house chores while Waldo was away in Waterville cashing the check. There was only one thing she did out of the ordinary that forenoon, and that was to make Justine, the hired girl, air the parlor and shake out the scatter rugs, even if it were not Saturday.

During all that time the neighbors were ringing her up on the phone and asking what she was going to do with all that money, but that, too in the beginning, failed to veer the even measure of her thoughts.

"When the check is cashed, if it's not worthless, and it'll be a wonder if it's not, there'll be ample time at hand for me to go out of my way to think about it," she told them. "Right now, and likely forever after, it's nothing but a scrawl and a promise on a slip of paper."

Dessie went back to work with her lips a little tighter each time she finished talking to one of the neighbors on the phone. She was not exactly worried, she told Justine, but she was feeling impatient. Waldo failed to come home at the noon hour for dinner, and it was not long after that before she, like everybody else in Brighton who was working himself into a frenzy over Waldo's sudden windfall, began thinking what could be done with the money.

Late that afternoon Waldo drove up to the dooryard and left the automobile standing there instead of putting it away in the shed where it belonged.

Justine came running to tell her.

[illegible] of several [illegible] when Justine, who was as excited as she, [illegible] into the room where she was.

"Mr. Murdock's back!" Justine cried, twisting her fingers.

"He'd better be!" Dessie said. "If he hadn't got home when he did, he could have just kept on traveling, for all the concern I'd ever have."

"I guess Mr. Murdock has the real money," Justine said, looking over her shoulder. "He looked like he was feeling good about it when he got out of the auto."

Dessie leaped to her feet.

"Go on about your tasks, whatever they be, Justine," she said crossly. "It's none of your money, if there is any, anyway."

Justine went to the kitchen and watched Waldo come along the path to the side door.

Waldo came in, throwing his hat on the table. He looked at Dessie for a moment, cocking his head a little to one side. His coat pocket sagged heavily.

Neither Dessie nor Waldo spoke for a while.

Presently Dessie walked up to him and held out her hand.

"Guess I'll take charge for the time being, Waldo," she said stiffly. "Hand it over."

Waldo reached into his coat pocket, drawing out a mostly empty bottle and handing it to her. She stepped back, looking at it severely. Then, without a word, she grabbed the bottle by the neck and slung it with all her might across the room. It struck the wall, shattering into dozens of pieces.

"I might have known it, and I would have, if I had only had the sense God has given most people!" she said, raising her voice. "I've got only myself to blame!"

Waldo reached for a chair.

"Now, there's no cause for a human to take on so, Dessie," he said. "Everything turned out, from here to there and back again, like it was made to order."

[illegible] pocket [illegible] of greenbacks [illegible] tightly around the [illegible] with a piece of heavy twine. Dessie forgot her anger the instant she saw the money. The scowling lines on her face disappeared completely while she watched Waldo bounce the roll up and down in his hand.

"All I've got to say," she began, "is that I never thought I'd live to breathe the air of the day when a deceasing Murdock would have the decency to do the honorable thing with his money, even if he couldn't find means of taking it along with him when he went, which would be a wonder if he didn't try to do, and he probably did, anyway."

Waldo leaned back and let her talk to her heart's content. He felt so good himself that he wanted her to have a good time, too. He let her speak what came to mind without uttering a single grumble.

"Have you any more blood relations that we've neglected to remind ourselves of, Waldo?" she asked, leaning toward him. "It seems to me that I recall your second cousin in Skowhegan saying once some years ago that a Murdock went to California at the end of the Spanish-American War and prospected for gold. It might be that he struck it rich out there, which a lot of people did, so I've read, if reading can be believed. If we'd been more particular about your blood relations in the past, we wouldn't have to sit here now and wrack our brains trying to call them to mind at a time like this."

"Guess I have no blood relations of the name of Murdock," Waldo said firmly.

Dessie drew a deep breath and looked longingly at the large roll of greenbacks bouncing up and down in her husband's hand.

Suddenly she leaned forward and grasped the roll desperately.

Waldo snatched it from her.

"This is Murdock money, woman," he said quickly. "A Murdock made it, and a Murdock shall spend it."

Dessie sat up decisively.

"Well, anyway, we'll be sensible," she said calmly. "We won't throw it away on trifles like a lot of people would who I could mention if I had a mind to."

"I've got it all settled, Dessie," Waldo told her, smiling as a kindly feeling came over him. "Guess we can afford to have a good time now at our age. Maybe we won't be lingering here much longer, which would be a shame if we hadn't taken full advantage of it by the time we went. Wouldn't be no sense in hoarding it only to have to pass it along to somebody else after we are gone."

Dessie nodded approvingly, her spirits rising again.

"I've always wanted a fur neckpiece, Waldo," she said, her face bright with hope.

Dessie did not sleep a single wink that night. For an hour after they had gone to bed, she lay silently tense, listening. Waldo did not stir. He lay on his back listening to Dessie's labored breathing.

Just before midnight Dessie got up as quietly as she possibly could and tiptoed to the foot of the bed where Waldo had laid his pants over the back of a chair. It was dark in the room with the shades drawn, and she took care in feeling her way to the chair. She was trembling nervously when she touched it, and the jerking of her breath had started a pain in her chest. Without losing any more time she slid her hand into the pants pocket.

"Get your hand out of my pants, Dessie," Waldo said, rising up in bed. "Leave that money be."

Dessie dropped the pants without having touched the money, and went back to bed without a word. Neither of them spoke as she lay down again and tried to


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[illegible] the chair.

Just as dawn was beginning to show the first signs of breaking, Dessie slid carefully from the bed and crawled on her hands and knees toward the chair. As she was rising up to reach the pants, Waldo sat up erectly.

"Don't want to have to mention it again about you putting your hand in my pants pocket," he said. "Leave that money be, Dessie."

Dessie dropped the pants and went to the window. She stood there watching a red dawn break in the east. After a while she began dressing, and as she was leaving the chamber she heard Justine starting a fire in the kitchen stove.

While she and Justine were preparing breakfast, she began to realize how uneasy she really was about the money. She had spent a sleepless night worrying over the wealth, and she was afraid she would not get a chance to spend a single penny of it herself.

"Mrs Murdock," Justine said, coming and standing beside her. "Carl and I could get mated right away if we had the money for a chamber suite."

"Let Carl Friend make his own money," Dessie said sharply, turning on the girl. "Me and my husband have worked hard all our lives for what we possess. It won't hurt Carl Friend to do the same for you, if he wants a family."

"I couldn't sleep much last night for staying awake wondering if you and Mr. Murdock wouldn't want to help me out," Justine said persistently. "Especially because I've worked here for you six years without asking favors, and I didn't think you'd miss a little of all that big inheritance from Australia."

"Mind your own affairs, Justine!" she said sharply. "Besides, Carl Friend can get the money from his own family if he wants to furnish a house for you. Those Friends have made plenty of profit in roof-tinning in the past."

"They won't help any, Mrs. Murdock," Justine said sadly. "And Carl and I don't want to have to wait and wait and wait."

"You don't have to hurry the marriage for any reason, do you?" Dessie asked suspiciously.

Justine looked at her for several moments her thoughts racing through her mind.

"Not exactly," she admitted at [illegible]

"Well, then," Dessie said, turning away, "in that case, you can afford to wait."

In turning abruptly she almost walked headlong into Waldo. He had come into the kitchen and [illegible] the [illegible] empty coffee can and left, going through the kitchen and out the door without a word being spoken. Dessie watched him leave, wondering what he was about to do. She went to the window and watched as he walked to the tool shed and came out a moment later carrying a spade. With the coffee can in one hand and the spade over his shoulder, he disappeared out of sight behind the barn.

It was not until almost ten minutes had passed that Dessie realized what Waldo was doing behind the barn.

Just as she was opening the door to run out there and observe him from the corner of the barn, Waldo walked into view. He came toward the house, carrying the spade but not the coffee can. Dessie's heart sank. He had buried the can, and the money with it, and she had failed to get out there in time to see where the wealth had been hidden. She walked back into the kitchen and placed breakfast on the table.

Waldo came in a few minutes later washed his hands at the pump, and sat down at his place. He began eating as though nothing out of the ordinary had taken place out behind the barn. Neither she nor Waldo had anything to say to each other during the whole twenty minutes they were at the table. When he finished eating, he got up and put on his hat.

"Have some affairs to attend to in the village," he said shortly. "Will be away for the forenoon, the whole of it."

Dessie nodded. She had to grip her hands tightly in order to hide her impatience. She waited until Waldo had got into the car and driven over the hill out of sight, and then she grabbed Justine by the arm and pulled her through the door. Pushing Justine ahead, Dessie ran as fast as she could to the tool shed, where she quickly snatched up two spades, and then hurried toward the back of the barn.

She set Justine to digging right away, while she looked the ground over carefully, hoping to find evidence of a freshly covered hole. She searched for nearly half an hour without finding a single trace of the hole she was positive Waldo had dug, and after that she went to work, digging methodically.

After several hours Justine slumped to the ground, completely exhausted. Dessie was tired, too, and the blisters on her hands made digging so painful that she could hardly bear to hold the [illegible] Justine [illegible] feet and tried to push the blade of the spade into the stony earth. She wanted to beg Dessie to let her rest some more, but when she glanced up and saw Dessie's closely clamped lips she knew it would be useless to ask.

Dessie stopped for a moment to ease her back. When her eyes were raised from the ground, she saw Fred Paxton leaning over the stone wall beside the road a hundred feet away.

"Going fishing, Dessie?" he called. "See you're digging fishing worms."

Dessie thrust her hand against the small of her aching back and straightened up a little more.

"Thought I might," she said slowly. "It's been a long time since I went."

"Now that you and Waldo have all that money to falute on," Fred said, "I guess you and him can afford to spend all your time doing nothing but fish, if you have a mind to."

"Maybe," she said, tightening her lips.

The mere mention of the money inflamed her thoughts until she could not see clearly. She bent over the spade, thrusting the blade into the rough, stony ground with all her might. She kept doggedly at it until she was certain Fred had walked out of sight over the hill.

Later she sent Justine to the kitchen for some bread and potatoes left over from breakfast, and when Justine returned, Dessie sat down in the shade of the barn and ate hurriedly.

"While I was in the house, Mr. Murdock phoned and said he wouldn't be back in the forenoon," Justine said. "He told me to tell you he would be away in the afternoon, too, the whole of it."

Dessie leaped to her feet.

"Why didn't you tell me right away when you came back a minute ago?" she said angrily.

Justine glanced at the stony ground.

"We're not going to dig out here the whole afternoon, too, are we, Mrs. Murdock?" she inquired pleadingly. "My hands are raw with blisters, and—"

"Never mind that," Dessie said firmly. "We are going to dig this afternoon, the whole of it!"

"But, Mrs. Murdock—"

"Shut up, Justine, and do as you are told!"

When Dessie fell on the bed at dusk that evening, she had never before in all her life felt so thoroughly miserable. Not only had she spent the entire day digging in the stony ground behind the barn, but, moreover, [illegible]

Once up in the bed, she moved her body [illegible], easing herself into a prone position. Justine had gone out earlier in the evening with Carl Friend and Waldo still had not returned. Dessie felt so tired and lonely that she wanted to cry. Just as she felt tears coming into her eyes, the phone began to ring. She lay motionless, listening to it ring for several minutes hoping all the while that it would stop so she could begin crying.

The phone did not stop, and it sounded as if it never would as long as she lived. She got to her feet, pressing her hands over her ears in order to keep out the sound, and stumbled painfully to the hall. There she sat down in the chair beside the stand and lifted the receiver.

"Hello," she said unsteadily.

"Is this Waldo Murdock's wife?" a voice boomed.

"Yes," she answered, wondering who it could be.

"Then you'd better bestir yourself and fetch Waldo home where he belongs before it's too late. This is Charles Mason. Waldo is over here at my place, in the east part of town, annoying my household, and if he was a Democrat, I'd shoot him myself, instead of turning the job over to his wife. I've never in my life seen a man behave like he's doing. I guess it's public knowledge by now, otherwise I wouldn't be repeating it that sudden wealth has gone to his head, but that's still no excuse for the way he's doing."

"What's Waldo doing?" Dessie asked, shouting impulsively into the phone.

"He's befuddling Miss Wilson, the schoolteacher who boards at my house, into going away with him. He says he's going to set sail for Australia or somewhere."

"But he can't do that!" Dessie protested.

"That's what any average, normal, level-minded human being would think, too, but I don't know what's going to stop Waldo if you don't come and get him right away, because he's already befuddled Miss Wilson into going to Boston with him tonight, and starting out again from there the first thing in the morning. He's got Miss Wilson believing everything he says, the lies along with the common truth. Looks like she would be on her guard, knowing she's associating with a newlyrich, but she's too far gone now to listen to reason. Waldo pulls out his wealth every few minutes and waves it in front of her, and the sight of that big roll of greenbacks acts on her just like chloroform [illegible]

[illegible] you [illegible] Waldo has a [illegible] roll of money?" she [illegible] "Greenbacks tied with a string around the middle?"

"He surely has, Mrs Murdock. It's the biggest roll of money I've seen on a man since the Democrats took over."

Dessie who had risen from the chair until she was almost erect, sat down, hard.

"Let him be!" she said coldly. "I don't want part or parcel of him. He had me digging in stony ground all day looking for that money in a coffee can, and it wasn't there at all. Let the schoolteacher take him. I've had my share and more of suffering, and now I'd be comforted to see somebody else have a goodly portion of it. Sudden wealth will show up a man's true nature every time, and I'm glad I found out the true size and shape of Waldo Murdock's nature before I wasted another single day of my life on him."

"You mean you're not going to try to stop Waldo from going away to the other end of the world with Miss Wilson?"

"No!" Dessie said emphatically. "Waldo Murdock has a free hand from now on!"

She hung up the receiver. A moment later she slumped brokenly in the chair. She called Justine several times before remembering that Justine had gone out with Carl Friend.

After that she hurried into her clothes and went back to the phone. She rang up Thornton Blanchard, her lawyer, and told him to come right away. He lived only a few miles distant, and he promised to be there within fifteen minutes.

While waiting for Thornton Blanchard, Dessie paced up and down the hallway, her face grim and determined. Her mind was made up, and she knew the sooner she acted the better she would feel.

After a few more minutes, he drove up to the house and stopped his car in the dooryard. Dessie went to the step, holding the door open for him. Thornton Blanchard hurried inside and went directly to the table in the center of the living room.

"Is there something wrong, Mrs. Murdock?" he asked anxiously.

"There is now, but it won't be much longer," she said, sitting down at the table, "not after I set things right I should have attended to twenty years ago."

Blanchard sat down and opened his brief case, slipping out a pad of ruled yellow writing paper and a pencil. He watched Dessie's face, waiting for her to begin.

To be continued next week

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Growing Popularity [illegible] Rugby League Football

by

Walter Pilkington

Sports Editor of the "Lancashire Evening Post" and contributor to leading sports publications in Britain

TWELVE months ago a French Rugby League team visited Britain and lost by nine points to 14 at Leeds, North of England centre of an area more attached to this offshoot of the rugby game than to Association football. Since then the French converts to the Rugby League code have become international champions. Thus the return visit to Yorkshire by France for a match at Hull against Other Nationalities (comprising ten Australians, two Scots and one New Zealander, all of them players with English Rugby League Clubs) was a recent attractive feature of a crowded programme spiced this winter by the tour of New Zealand Kiwis

These visits and the French tour of Australasia this year when they broke crowd records nearly everywhere they went have proved the ever growing popularity of the Rugby League professional game.

Enthusiasts for the code are not without hope of inspiring a liking for the game in the United States American National Football League. Sunderland's idea is to encourage the formation of a pioneering team to visit the English centres in the same way that Jean Gallia's Frenchmen first came 17 years ago, learn the game and return to encourage others to take it up. The French learned so well that an international championship which included France was formed in 1935.

AUSTRALIAN TOUR

Although travel tired after playing 22 games with only two defeats in the recent Australian tour the Frenchmen went to New Zealand and lost only one of seven matches. To show how the game is thriving in Australia the Sydney cricket ground was packed, when the third and deciding Test Match was played, by 67,000 spectators. Winning by 35 points to 14, the Frenchmen inflicted a more overwhelming defeat than any suffered by an Australian test team in the long history of Rugby League in that country. The speedy clever Frenchmen taught lessons which will be taken to heart by the selectors in choosing a young team for a return tour of England and France next year.

This girdling of the globe by a comparatively new game is amazing when one reflects that it was enduring a struggling infancy at [illegible] twenty [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] to England of the North to Rugby Union in 1895 with 22 clubs drawn exclusively [illegible] in Lancashire and West Yorkshire. Three years later unrestricted professionalism was introduced. The inevitable break away from strictly amateur rugby followed. In 1906, 13 players a side instead of 15 was tried. Other milestones were the first visit of a New Zealand team in 1907, the first England v. Australia Test match the following year, the first visit of a United Kingdom team to Australia in 1910, the changing of the title from Northern Union to Rugby Football League in 1922, and the First Cup Final in London seven years later.

The capital regarded this intrusion of the northern rugby hosts with disdain and indifference so that the modest attendance largely comprised followers of the Cup [illegible] in Lancashire and Yorkshire. But the power, stamina, speed, [illegible] and expert football of the Rugby League men eventually won the support of a more cosmopolitan public with the result that the Cup Final crowds became comparable with those seen at Wembley Stadium on great Association football occasions. Last year record receipts of £24,782 were taken at the stadium on the most eventful day in the Rugby League calendar.

HAD TO FIGHT FOR EXISTENCE

Yet it is well within the memory of many people how great clubs like Wigan, the Lancashire stronghold of the game, came into being. Wigan, since World War II, has won the League title three times in six seasons and taken the Cup twice in the last four. The club has been Lancashire champions and Cup winners every year since 1945 and 13 times altogether [illegible] 50 years ago Wigan [illegible] to fight for existence. The ch [illegible] poor and almost penniless leag [illegible] a field from the railway compan [illegible] The ground was raised and leve [illegible] led by paid and voluntary wor [illegible] ers and the first match took pla [illegible] in September 1902. The play [illegible] themselves helped in groun [illegible] improvements. At first there we [illegible] no dressing rooms. The grad [illegible] progressive changes which mac [illegible] Wigan renowned as a club hav [illegible] marked the development of t [illegible] game in other towns and countrie [illegible]

In England it is thriving [illegible] Lancashire and Yorkshire, th [illegible] counties which gave it birth, an [illegible] gaining a greater hold in sout [illegible] Wales. The time will come whe [illegible] it will spread to the north-eas [illegible] midlands and south, and th [illegible] winter's visit of the fifth team o [illegible] New Zealand Rugby League play [illegible] ers to go to England and of th [illegible] touring Frenchmen cannot fail t [illegible] stimulate wider interest.

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CALDOX
CALDOX

SOCIAL NOTES

Col. and Mrs Herbert C Chambers were hosts at a cocktail-buffet supper last Saturday night at their home The guest list included Ambassador and Mrs. Claude Bowers, Mr. and Mrs. H Gerald Smith, Col and C. W. Bennett, Mrs. T. F. Van Natta, Sr. Pedro Dela Maggiora and Sra., Col and Mrs. William Ress, Maj and Mrs. Leonard Pratt, Maj. and Mrs. Arthur Gaston, Col. and Mrs. James Wray, Col and Mrs. Horace Hatch, Capt and Mrs. Gerald Mann, Major and Mrs. Fred Nelson, Captain and Mrs. Edward Southwick, Mr. and Mrs. Armando Chellew, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Burke, Maj. and Mrs. James H. Carroll, Mr. and Mrs. W. W Bitting, Mr. and Mrs E. J. Campbell, Mr. and Mrs. John Stoddard, Mrs. J. G. Thomann, Mrs. Carlos Hall, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Glover, Miss Margaret Barnard, Miss Netta Lauder, Mr. Anthony Vaughan and Mr. Philip Davenport.

—oOo—

Mrs. Arthur Trevena Sr., of Viña del Mar, left Santiago Monday for Buenos Aires where she will stay until her boat leaves for England about December 3rd. Mrs. Trevena plans to spend a year in England, visiting her children, relatives and friends.

Mr. and Mrs. Albert Haney were guests of honor at a despedida given last Thursday night by Mr. and Mrs. David McMorris. The guests included Mr. and Mrs. John Stoddard, Maj and Mrs Arthur Gaston, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Burke, Mr. and Mrs. George Littlejohn Cook, Mr. and Mrs H. Gerald Smith, Mrs. Carlos Hall, Mr. and Mrs. Felix Caffarena, Mr. and Mrs. Jack Mac Rostie, Mrs Robert Taylor, Mr. and Mrs. F R. M. Elton, Mr. and Mrs Donall Daughters, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Davidson, Mr. and Mrs. John Trevena, Mr. & Mrs. Richard Fallon and Mr. Keith Eggers.

—oOo—

Sr. Jean Luis de Berthet and Sra. Sonia Edwards de Berthet returned to Santiago last Friday after an extensive honeymoon, in Europe.

The North American Institute celebrated Thanksgiving with a turkey dinner last Thursday night. The staff, members of the board of directors and members of the Institute attended. Impromtu entertainment was enjoyed by all.

—oOo—

Sr. Javier Valdés will return to Santiago Sunday after a business trip to New York and Rio de Janeiro.

SAINT ANDREW'S SOCIETY OF SANTIAGO

28th. Annual Dinner

to be held at the P. W. C. C.

on Saturday 1st. December at 9 p. m.

Tickets can be obtained from members of the committee and at

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[illegible] Mrs [illegible] Mrs Ma[illegible] [illegible] Bowers of U. S. [illegible] and Mrs Ed[illegible] and Southwick, Mrs E. S. Tewksbury, Mrs Octavio Mendez, Sra. Teresa Concha de Walker, Sra Josefina Val de Walker, Mrs W. J. M Paterson, Mrs Joseph Cussen, Mrs Crystal [illegible] de Atall, Mrs H. Gerald Smith, Miss Muriel Lee, Mrs. Helen [illegible], Mrs Carlos Hall, Mrs Horace Graham, Mrs Dudley Homer, Mrs C W. Bennett Mrs Robert Glover, Mrs. Arthur Gaston and Miss Patricia Bowers.

—oOo—

Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Lewis and son returned from the U. S. by way of Buenos Aires on Monday

Mrs. Geoffrey Hobsbawn and son, Donald Roy, left for their home in Chuquicamata after a month's visit with her mother-and father-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. I. Berkwood Hobsbawn, of Santiago.

—oOo—

Mrs. Felix Caffarena was hostess at a bridge-canasta tea for Mrs. Albert Haney, who, with Mr. Haney, is leaving Chile on December 12th. The guests were: Mrs. Guy Beaudry, Mrs. Kenneth Davidson, Mrs. David McMorris, Mrs. Armando Chellew, Mrs. Donall Daughters, Mrs. Jack Mac Rostie, Mrs. Jorge Howard, Mrs. Stanley Burke, Mrs. William Whotherspoon, Mrs. John Stoddard, Mrs. F. Elton, Mrs. Cedric Henderson and Mrs. Nick Liberatore.

DUNALASTAIR

The annual Prize-giving will be held on Friday 30th, November at 5.45 p. m. in the grounds of the Country Club, Tobalaba. Parents and friends of the School are cordially invited.

BIRTH

To Graciana (nee Paulsen) and Hector E. Karstegl in Hospital del Salvador, a son ERIC JUAN.

—oOo—

BIRTH

To Mr. and Mrs. Peter Turgoose. a son, Philip Norman, on November 19th.

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
HOTEL SCHUSTER
VALDIVIA

[illegible] have flown as far as the Haggis which arrived for the Santiago Society last Saturday.

By kind courtesy of Mr. Robert Taylor, Manager of British Overseas Airways, Santiago, the haggis (1) for Saturday's dinner at the Country Club was flown out from Scotland, and was ceremoniously received at Cerrillos by a group of four Kilted Scots (2) and the President of the Santiago Society, Mr. Alex Macdonald C. B. E.

On delivering his charge, the skipper of the Argonaut Speedbird was presented with a bottle of whisky, in appreciation of his services in bringing with him the first "Great Chieftain of the Pudding race" to have reached Chile by air.

(1) Usually made in the large stomach-bag of a sheep, or one of the smaller bags called the king's hood, and composed of a mixture of oatmeal, the lights, the liver and the heart.

(2) Messrs., Reid, McLean, Ruxton and Murray.

YOUNGER SET

Leslie Joan Pollock, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Alex Pollock, celebrated her second birthday on Friday with a party for friends. Among those present: Ian Bruce Irwin, Eric Dale Hobsbawn, Brian David Hobsbawn, Donald Roy Hobsbawn, Maria Louise Phillips and Linda Fay Crowder.

— :: —

Last Saturday Peter Firmin celebrated his 7th birthday with a party at the home of his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Douglas Firmin. The guests played games for prizes (and all of them won a prize!) Those present were: Patricia and Teddy Gandy, Irene and Bobby Meyeringh, Maria Cecelia Fones, Buzzy and Johnny Stevenson, Eleonor Stevenson, Rodrigo Briones, Carol Tewksbury and Bobby Glover.

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Morgan — Francisco Wedding

LEFT: THE BRIDE, MISS MARY LOU FRANCISCO, ENTERS THE CHURCH ON THE ARM OF THE U. S. AMBASSADOR TO CHILE, CLAUDE BOWERS. CENTER: THE BRIDE AND GROOM GIVE THEIR UNDIVIDED ATTENTION TO THE PRIEST DURING THE CEREMONY. RIGHT: THE HAPPY COUPLE POSE FOR A MOMENT IN THE ACT OF CUTTING THE CAKE.

Hill — Kidman Wedding

LEFT: THE BRIDE, MISS JOAN KIDMAN, AND GROOM, MR. WILLIAM HILL, PAUSE FOR A MOMENT LEAVING THE CHURCH AFTER THE CEREMONY. RIGHT: AT THE RECEPTION LATER AT THE HOTEL CRILLON THE SMILLING COUPLE CUT THE CAKE WHILE THE FAMILY OF THE BRIDE AND FRIENDS LOOK ON (PHOTOS BY "FOTO EVA")

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Don Roy

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SOCIAL NOTES

BRITISH LEGION

The Committee for the year 1st November 1951 to 31st October 1952, is as follows:

Mr. Allen Price, Hon. President.
Rev. Edgar Pearson, Hon. Chaplain.
Mr. T. A. Moodie, Chairman.
C. O. Hardy, Vice-Chairman.
D. Madden, Hon. Treasurer.
R. W. Jeffery, Hon. Secretary.
H. P. Rushforth; D. M. King; and Miss K. McLean.

—oOo—

Among those who came down from Santiago for the cricket weekend we noticed Mr. and Mrs. Ian McLean, Mr. and Mrs Dorien Cooper and Mr. Ivor Davies.

—— :: ——

Mr. and Mrs. K. T. Russell spent the weekend in Viña, returning by road on Monday.

—— :: ——

Mr. A. Forbes Robertson was a visitor to Viña del Mar and is [illegible]ning this week to Buenos Ai-

—oOo—

All members of the Women's Diocesan Union of St. Paul's Church, Cerro Concepcion wish to thank all the ladies who attended their recent Bridge-Canasta Tea; also those who contributed cakes, flowers etc., which helped to make the afternoon such a success.

—— :: ——

On Friday, December 14th, a Xmas Sale will take place at the residence of Mrs. Allen Price, wife of H. B. M. Cónsul General, Calle 6 Poniente No. 50, Viña del Mar.

There will be plum puddings, Xmas cakes, candy, cookies, Xmas gifts and two fortune tellers. From 2.30 p. m. to 7.30 p. m.

....

The American Women's group are having their monthly sale at the Instituto Chileno Norte Americano, Wednesday, December 5th from 3.30 p. m. to 7.30 p.m.

Miss Monica Whitty celebrated her 15th. birthday last Saturday with a most delightful party, which took place at her home, in Viña. Those present were:-

The Misses Jaqueline and Marija Biggs, Valerie Baiel, Mr Olivos, Ana Sanchez, Maria Olea and María Angelica Segovia, Joyce Powditch, Elena Sureda, C Silva, Alice Porter, J Avayu, Ximena Lancien, Gloria Lacquaniti, E. Calderón, Silvia Fabane, Nadine Ciffier, Noemí Ovalle, Ximena Guarda, Isabel Margarita and Laura Romani and Messrs C Cross, M. Barry, J. Gayán, A. Anker, A. Silva, R. Pollmann, A. Castilla, S. McCall, P McCall, G. Villalón, O. Garcia, H. Vicencio, J. Caviere, A. Velarde, P. Garcia, E. Purcell, J. Quintana, J Porter, D. Costa, E. Rogers, R. Perez A. Vercellino, L. Guerra, E. Fischer, R Thomas, P. Plaza, O. Soto, E. Madden, F. Aranda, D. Murdoch, P. León, R. Aranda, C. Naylor, I. Lagerborg and O. Olivos.

....

TOC H BIRTHDAY FESTIVAL—

This year Toc H Cradock Branch and Toc H (Women's Section), Valparaiso, celebrated their Birthday Festival during the week-end November 24th - 25th. The following members from Santiago attended:— Mesdames C. T. Henry, Grace Jones, Isabel Holloway and the Misses Margaret Cater, Sally Fuenzalida, Tatiana Antipaff, Otilla Bozza, Jane Plunkett and Margaret Henry.

On Saturday evening there was a short service in the Union Church at which the Rev. Murdoch MacLeod officiated and Mr. Albert Turner played the organ. The Rev. Edgar Pearson gave a most interesting and appropriate sermon, and specially mentioned the valuable help that Toc H were giving to the Seamen's Mission.

After the Service a delightful cold supper was served in the adjoining hall. The Hon. Commissioner, Mr. David Blair, then welcomed the Santiago members and friends who had come to spend the evening with Toc H.

This cricket match was [illegible] at the Prince of Wales Country Club on Saturday [illegible] of November and resulted in a win for St Peter's by 23 runs.

The Grange won the toss and as is usual in these one innings games put St Peter's in. By lunch time at 1.15 P. M. the score was 7 for 49 runs, St. Peter's having lost 3 wickets for 3 runs and 4 wickets for 11 runs. But Naylor's 20 was a very useful help to their side and the innings closed for 59. For the Grange, Vigil had 6 wickets for 21 runs and Henderson and Stringfellow each got 2 wickets. The fielding was mediocre; although 3 catches were held, several were dropped and the ground fielding needs a lot of practice and improvement.

The Grange started their innings equally badly losing 3 wickets for 9 runs and with no one except Shearman, who scored a "shaky" 10 runs, making double figures - they were all out for 36, leaving St. Peter's the winners by 23 runs.

Naylor and Wilkins bowled unchanged for St. Peter's, the former taking 3 for 18 and Wilkins 7 for 13. In fact it is fair to say that these two boys won the match for their side.

St. Peter's fielding was also only mediocre and several catches were dropped, but undoubtedly the better side won.

SEAMEN'S INSTITUTE

We are informed that Mr. Henry Boys has been appointed resident Layman of the Valparaiso Seamens' Institute as from the 1st December next.

[illegible] on November [illegible] at Wallasey, Liverpool. Mr. Hallam was sixty-seven years of age.

In Chile he worked in the Accounts Department of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company up to the year 1931 when he returned to England. In 1935 he left this country to serve in the first World War, joining the Royal Engineers, "D" Company Signalling Corps. In August of that year he was sent to France, where he was engaged in communications work. [illegible] worked for the Admiralty in Liverpool.

In Chile he will long be remembered as a keen football player, and before the first War as one of the best half-backs of the "Valparaiso" Football Club. He took part in several Intercity and International Matches.

Mr Hallam leaves a widow and one daughter now resident in Wallasey; his many friends in Chile will join us in extending to them our deep sympathy.

SUNDAY SCHOOL PICNIC

The picnic will be held in the Parque del Salitre, El Salto, on Saturday the 8th of December.

TRANSPORTATION. — There will be 4 buses (blue) starting from the following places:

From Plaza Sotomayor, Valparaiso, at 9 a. m., stopping at: Brasil corner Bellavista; Brasil corner Avda. Francia; Barón; Yolanda; Portales; Sauce; Limache in front of Valdés Vergara (Chorrillos) and thence to Parque del Salitre.

From Recreo, leaving from foot of 18 de Septiembre at 9.20, stopping at Capuchinos; Viña Station; Almacén Suizo; Railway Crossing Chorrillos, and thence direct to Parque del Salitre.

From Agua Santa, leaving corner Avda. España at 9.40, stopping at Traslaviña; Plaza Parroquia - Viña; Bolivar (La Lora); Almacén Suizo (Puente Ocoa); Railway Crossing Chorrillos; Limache in front of Valdes Vergara; El Salto station; and thence to Parque del Salitre.

From St Margaret's School at 9.20, stopping at Quillota corner 8 Norte, 8 Norte corner Libertad; Libertad corner 4 Norte; Libertad corner 1 Norte, proceeding along this Avenue to Chorrillos, stopping at corner Quillota, corner Castaños, Ocoa Bridge, Lusitania Bridge; and thence to Parque del Salitre.

MEALS.—Participants should take their own lunch but soft drinks and tea will be provided. Coca Cola and Nobis lemonades will be on sale.

RACES.—The races will commence at 15.15. Prizes will be distributed after Tea.

TICKETS. — These may be obtained at $ 10.— adults $ 5.— children, from the following: Rev. Edgar Pearson, Miss Mary Turner, Miss Inez Taylor, Mr. A. D. McKenzie, Mr. Mallandaine, Mr. Turgoose and Mr. John Sánches (West Coast Cable).

INVITATIONS.—The invitations for the young people on the Church Registers will be handed out immediately after the morning services next Sunday.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Mrs. Diamond wishes to remind her friends and acquaintances that she is receiving guests at her home in Villarrica. Her home is on the beach-front with a full view of beach and lake activities. Bathing, boating, fishing and lounging are yours.

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

The Little Man Of The Chimes

Once upon a time there was a Very Old Lady who lived by herself in a small brown house. She had a rocking chair, a thick storybook, and a clock that chimed. Every day the Very Old Lady sat in her rocking chair beside the window. Slowly she rocked back and forth and read stories from the thick book. There was a story about a white-topped mountain in Japan, one about a gray castle in Spain with a thousand rooms. And one was a story of a golden horse in Africa that could run faster than the wind.

At the end of each hour, as the Very Old Lady read from the thick story book, the clock played its chimes. They were as sweet as the song of a bird in Springtime, as sweet as a babbling brook rippling over the pebbles, as sweet as a baby cooing to its mother.

The Very Old Lady was happy, for she loved the clock and her thick storybook and her rocking chair.

But one day when the Very Old Lady sat reading, the chimes in the clock sounded tired. Every hour, as they rang out, the notes came more slowly. Finally, at six o'clock, the chimes did not ring at all. The only sound from the clock was its soft ticktock.

The Very Old Lady opened the glass door that covered the face of the clock. She took down a key and wound the spring. She tapped the clock very gently. Then she sat down in the rocking chair to wait.

The hands of the clock told the Very Old Lady that it was seven o'clock. But again no chimes sounded. Only the quiet ticktock of the clock could be heard. The Very Old Lady waited for another hour. But at eight o'clock the chimes did not play. At nine the Very Old Lady put away the thick storybook, turned out the light, and went to bed. She thought and thought about the chimes and wondered what could have happened to them. She wondered whether they would ever play again.

The Very Old Lady was almost asleep when she thought she heard a queer sound in the room. It was close to her ear. She sat up in bed and lighted the lamp. She got up and looked in all the corners of the room. There was no one there. She looked behind the door. There was no one there.

"It must have been the wind in the trees," said the Very Old Lady. And she turned out the light and went back to bed.

She closed her eyes. But just as she was drifting to sleep, she thought she heard the queer sound again.

The Very Old Lady sat up in bed and lighted her lamp. She got up and looked in all the corners of the room. There was no one there. She looked under the bed. There was no one there. She looked behind the door. There was no one there.

"It must have been a dog barking outside," said the Very Old Lady. And she turned out her light and went back to bed.

"Don't turn out the light! I can't see," commanded a tiny voice.

The Very Old Lady sat up and lighted the lamp. And there on a post of her bed stood a wee man no taller than the Very Old Lady's thumb. He was wearing a little brown hat, brown trousers, and a jacket as green as the grass in the meadow. On each of his boots glittered a golden buckle.

"My goodness!" exclaimed the Very Old Lady. "Who are you?"

"I'm Chymer," said the wee man. "I play the chimes in your clock."

"But the chimes didn't play tonight," said the Very Old Lady.

"I know!" said Chymer. "I'm tired of playing them. Every hour of every day for years and years I've played the chimes. I want a vacation. I want to travel. I want to see tall forests and gray castles and white-topped mountains and blue oceans. I'm going to go places and see all these things!"

The Very Old Lady smiled and nodded her head. "Yes," she said. "They are beautiful. But those things are all many miles away. How will you travel so far?"

"I'm going to walk," replied Chymer. He pointed to his feet. "See my shiny new boots!" he said proudly. "They have thick soles; so they won't wear out."

"But you're so tiny!" exclaimed the Very Old Lady. "You will be stepped on. Dogs will growl at you. You'll soon be hungry and cold and tired if you start out to see all those things."

Chymer's face grew sad.

"Oh, dear!" he said. "I didn't think of that! Perhaps I'd better not go after all. But I can't play the chimes for you when I'm not happy. And I'll never be happy again until I learn all about the beautiful places and things in the world."

The Very Old Lady was silent for a few moments. She was thinking of the chimes that sounded like the song of a bird in springtime and a babbling brook and a cooing baby. She was thinking about the wee man who wanted to travel to tall forests and white-topped mountains and blue oceans. At last she spoke.

"I go traveling every day," she said. "Every day I read my thick story book. It tells me about many beautiful places and things in the world. If you will stay and play the chimes in my clock, I will read to you from my book. Then, in imagination, we can travel together all over the world."

And that is just what happened. Every day after that the Very Old Lady sat in her rocking chair by the window, with Chymer perched on her shoulder. The Very Old Lady read to him from the thick storybook. She read about the whitetopped mountain in Japan, the gray castle in Spain with a thousand rooms, and the golden horse in Africa that could run faster than the wind.

After that every hour, day after day, Chymer climbed into his home in the clock and rang the chimes—chimes as sweet as the song of a bird in springtime, as sweet as a babbling brook rippling over pebbles, as sweet as a baby cooing to its mother.

A Christmas Gift For Dad

Your father would rather have a gift you made than the most expensive present you can buy. Here is something you can make that will surely please him. Ask Mother to buy you a small pocket comb. Now lay this on a piece of paper, and trace carefully around it. By drawing another line 1/2 cm outside this line, you have a pattern for a comb case, just a little larger than the comb. Using this pattern, cut two pieces of felt. (Perhaps Mother has an old felt hat she doesn't want anymore. It can be washed and pressed, if it is dirty.)

Now, stitch the two pieces together carefully around the edge, using bright yarn. (Don't forget to leave one end open, so that the comb can slide in.) Tie a small strip of felt around the last tooth of the comb, to make a little handle for pulling the comb from the case. There. It's all finished, and doesn't it look nice?

AUNT KITTY WISHES MANY HAPPY RETURNS TO FRANCIS REES, MICHAEL COLLELA, PETER FIRMIN, MARGARET CASTELAARS LESLIE POLLOCK AND DAVID VALDES

AUNT KITTY'S LETTER

Today is the very last day of November, and do you know what that means, children It means that in only 25 days, old Saint Nicholas will come creeping down the chimney with his pack full of toys. Have you made out your Christmas list, Bonnie? And you, Peter and Michael, it's time to start being very good boys so that Santa will bring you more than a bundle of sticks! And all of you had better start thinking about making presents for your friends and families, because Christmas will soon be here!

The Land Of Story-Books

by Robert Louis Stevenson.

At evening when the lamp is [illegible]
Around the fire my parents [illegible]
They sit at home and talk [illegible]
(sing.
And do not play at anything.
Now, with my little gun, I crawl
All in the dark along the wall,
And follow round the forest track
Away behind the sofa back.

— :: —

There, in the night, where none
(can spy.
All in my hunter's camp I lie,
And play at books that I have read
Till it is time to go to bed

— :: —

I see the other far away,
As if in firelit camp they lay,
And I, like to an Indian scout,
Around their party prowled about
So, when my nurse comes in for
(me.
Home I return across the sea,
And go to bed with backward
(looks
At my dear land of Story-books



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

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ANTOFAGASTA

THE retiring British Ambassador, Sir Bertrand Jerram, K. C. M. G., arrived at Antofagasta in the M. V. "Sarmiento" on November 13th en route to England. His Excellency was met by the British Consul, Mr. Thomas Bates, O. B. E. As the vessel was to load minerals at Mejillones on the following day, Sir Bertrand accepted the invitation of Mr. L. V. Duff to stay overnight at Antofagasta. This allowed him sufficient time to enjoy a motor run towards the pampa, visit the Auto Club and to call upon the Intendente of the Province

On re-visiting Antofagasta, the Ambassador took the opportunity to present the Insignia and Warrant of Appointment of membership of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire to the British Vice Consul, Mr. Stuart E. Sword. The presentation ceremony was celebrated at the English Club in the presence of the Dean of the Consular Corps, Don Max de la Fuente Locker, Consul General of Peru; the British Consul, Mr. Thomas Bates, O. B. E., don Ramón Yoma, Presidente of the Chamber of Commerce; Mr. Mansel McMahan, Vice Consul of the United States; and Mr. J. G. Macfarlane, President of the English Club. Among others who were present were the Rev. J. B. D. Cotter, and Messrs. Malcolm E. Sword, E. McLean, P. Williamson, J. R. W. Stansfield, W. R. James, W. Hughes, L. V. Duff, A. P. Sexton, T. J. K. Barber, S. Dacre, D. J. Dakin, J. L. Hill, C. F. Ferrand, C. Wood, R. Ferrand, J. W. Balshaw, W. E. Mitchell, G. W. Craig, Captain Wardale of the "Sarmiento" and Captain Rice of the "Salamanca".

— :: —

Punctually as the clock struck noon, the Ambassador was conducted into the room by the Consul and spoke as follows:— "It " is with peculiar pleasure that, " as my very last act as Ambas- " sador in Chile, I obey His Ma- " jesty's command to deliver a " decoration to so loyal and long- " standing a member of the Brit- " ish Consulate at Antofagasta " Mr. Vice-Consul Sword has been " performing valuable duties at " this Consulate, of which he has " often been in charge, for a " great many years, and is a " highly respected member of the " British community. Stuart Elliot " Sword:— I am commanded by " His Majesty the King to deliver " to you personally, not by way " of investiture, but in an official " and ceremonious manner, the " badge of a Member of the Civil " Division of the Most Excellent " Order of the British Empire " which the King was graciously " pleased to confer on the oc- " casion of His Majesty's last " Birthday in recognition of your " long and valuable services I " am commanded at the same " time to hand to you the Grant " of Dignity signed by the Queen " Mother and bearing His Ma- " jesty's sign manuel."

Following the ceremony cocktails were served and the health of Mr. Sword was drunk by the assembly.

— :: —

Sir Bertrand Jerram, accompanied by the Consul, proceeded to Mejillones by car at 10.00 a. m. on Wednesday to rejoin the "Sarmiento". His Excellency was attended by Mr. John Hopwood, M. C., and others before bidding farewell to Chilean soil.

[illegible] Rancho which had been most kindly conceded for the occasion

— :: —

In accordance with time-honoured custom, the majority of the ex-servicemen mustered at the English Club and, so far as is known, only one member failed to answer "Here!" to his name and escaped the ensuing operations. He may have deserted by air, as he was not observed either wriggling across no-man's land on his stomach, or swimming from the wreck to a Carley float.

At the bugle's call, the troops were transported in mechanised vehicles of 1914 to 1945 vintage to the Rancho, where the roll call was taken and the survivors of the initial skirmishes were found to comprise the following veterans:— R Ferrand, President, C. Wood, Vice - President, A. J. Brown, Secretary, R. L. Davies, Treasurer, D. H. Maird, J. W. Balshaw, T. J. K. Barber, J. K. Benson, M. M., D. J. Dakin, A. F. Daniell E. S. Dyer, C F. Ferrand, J. L. Hill, E. H. Holmes-Brown, J. Hopwood, M. C., I. McDowall, M. C., E McLean, W. E. Mitchell, R. Pocock, R. P. Perez, R. A. C Pritchard, H. F. Rooke, J. Slater, S E. Sword, M. B. E., E. N. Thomas, also in representation of the Chuquicamata Branch:— A. F. Swain, M. B E D S C, and E. W. Witcombe, M B E. The British Consul, Mr. T Bates, O. B E., the American Vice-Consul, Mr. M. McMahan, and Mr. A. Grondys of the Dutch Forces had been recruited as guests.

Little time was lost in sounding "Come to the cook-house door, boys", to which there was a ready response. Since the close of the campaign some of the brave lads have been heard to opine that the rations were of such quality that the reply of the senior hand of the mess to the enquiry of the officers of the day was a satiated "No complaints, Sir". However, such was the confusion created in the ranks by thrust and counter thrust that it is difficult to determine precisely of what those rations consisted. Since an important feature of the general tatical strategy had seemed to consist of their being thoroughly washed down, it is possible that is was the iron rations that had been dished out.

The serious stage of the manoeuvres included the individual firing off of toasts, executed by numbers in Bisley-like perfection by R. Ferrand who gave "The King", C. Wood who welcomed the "Visitors", S. E. Sword who recalled a host of "Absent Friends" and A. J. Brown who spoke of "Sweet-hearts and Wives"; but a Big Bertha blast was exploded by E. W Witcombe. The force of the blast apparently knocked out the Sergeant Major, for he proved incapable of reporting exactly what it was all about. A wounded straggler who limped in imagines that the rollicking Major dealt with such confused subjects as Montgomery and Mossadegh; the triangle of error and love's sweet song, pinching boots on a lengthy retreat and what Gladstone said in 1864, plus an expression of his opinion as to whether Scottish boys should wear [illegible] or [illegible] [illegible] out every now and then to say it, but were [illegible] blue-coated with rifle butts before they could say it again

A rallying call of "Up, Guards, and at 'em" saw all ranks jump to it as they did at Waterloo. "It" being the hospitable Rancho Bar, behind which were ranged the invitingly grinning sappers who had valiantly blazed a way for the advancing suppers The movement developed into a brisk general action that became further enlivened when a piano, which had been cunningly camouflaged in its dark retreat, was spotted and commandeered Relentlessly frog-marched to the canteen, it was promptly stripped of every removable piece of equipment and clothing by the M. P. It threatened to collapse with shell-shock upon being displayed in all its pristine nakedness, but made a startling recovery when copiously lubricated with whatever class of medicine, strictly of a liquid nature, that came to the hand of the Sick Berth Attendants. The timely arrival of scouts with a prisoner, Bob Condit of the American Legion, saved the critical emergency that had arisen from developing into a military disastre Bob proceeded to do his stuff, and if Santiago Branch failed to hear the responses of the rank and file gathered around the camp fire, it was not the fault of the Antofagasta troops.

So continuous became the roar of barrack-room voices [illegible] a startling feint by enemy skirmishers passed almost unobserved. They wormed their way to the rear, cleared the breach of land-mines, and ambushed comrade John Hopwood whom they carried off in triumph to their base at Mejillones, despite the stout resistence he offered, a prisoner [illegible] in dens [illegible] and the [illegible] Lamps became ever louder. Small wonder then that the troops were hazy as to the hour at which the determining phases of the action occurred, or who were the directing strategists of this historic military event. Let us imagine then that the good old hanging steel crowbar had clanged 2.00 a. m. and that unconquerable Arthur Swain and [illegible] Brown figured among the plotting General Staff. We would even amend the stricken hour to 2.30 if thereby we could escape court-martial for unseemly exaggeration. In any case, the expert scrounging of a sticky - fingered batman "won", from heaven knows where, a silver cup of fantastic proportions and unfathomable capacity The order "Fall in" was given—and the phalanx almost did fall into it, for it brimmed with an insidious brew concocted of every liquid ingredient stocked in the canteen or in any neighbouring camps. Beer was betrothed to whiskey, liqueur linked with pisco, cognac coquetted with vermouth and each with one another; the falsified frivolling with the imported. This was just a hang[illegible] conceived, get-together, one-and-all-united, one-for-the-long-long road loving-cup dram. Obedient to command and willing to serve every man did his duty and partook That probably was what finally ensured the hard-won victory, with its compensating glory for the maimed and wounded of the cheers of the welcoming homefolk when they reached their billets in time for breakfast. In short, as we stated at first, we celebrated another British Legion armistice dinner at Antofagasta

(The editors are happy to welcome a new Antofagasta correspondent, Mr. T. Gathering, well-known resident of the Port City. We feel sure that readers will join us in the wish that Mr. Gathering's reports become a weekly feature of these columns —ED.).

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

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Mrs. Ann Macleay and children [illegible] and Dinah left by air for Buenos Aires on the 15th September, from whence they left by the "[illegible] Grange" for New Zealand. They expect to be absent from Punta Arenas for about six months

— : —

We deeply regret to record the death, which took place recently in Santiago, of Mrs Kenneth Cara, an old resident of Punta Arenas, and take this opportunity of expressing our sympathy with Mr Cara in his sad loss.

— :: —

Mr. and Mrs Cecil Wells returned by air to Punta Arenas recently, after a holiday in Canada. We understand that in the autumn they will again leave Punta Arenas to take up permanent residence in Canada.

— :: —

The Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy, Rear Admiral don Carlos Torres Hevia, recently presented to the British Club a painting of the Cruiser "Chacabuco". The presentation was effected by Rear Admiral Carmona, Chief of the 3rd Naval Division, on behalf of the donor, at an informal Cocktail Party in the Club Rooms, and the President of the Club, Mr. A. D. King, made a speech in which he asked Admiral Carmona to convey the sincere thanks of the Committee and Members to Admiral Torres for his generous gesture. Among those present at the ceremony was Rear Admiral don Olegario Reyes del Rio, who served as a midshipman in the "Chacabuco" in 1901.

— :: —

On the 14th July a very enjoyable party took place at the Rio Seco Staff House, in aid of the Golf Club. The guests were requested to wear something reminiscent of the "Gay Nineties." Some of the get-ups were extremely clever, and greatly added to the hilarity of the evening. The "Tennis Girl" dancing "Boogie Woogie" with the "Churchwarden" was quite a sight to behold. On the 8th of September a similar party took place at the Staff House, the proceeds this time being divided between the Golf Club and Rio Seco Charities. The guests were asked to wear "Hidden Book Titles," and prizes were given for those who guessed the largest number of titles within a given time. These were won by Miss Leslie Stirling and Mr. L. C. Saunders respectively. Among the cleverest representations were those of Mr. Eric Davies-"The Enemy Within," Miss M. Harper-"Great Expectations," Mr. and Mrs. L. C. Saunders-"We Took to the Woods," Mr. J. Price-"Cheaper by the Dozen," Mr. S. B. Robson-"The Seats of the Mighty," and Mr. E. I. Clifford - "Britannia Mews."

— :: —

Among those who spent the Diez-y-Ocho holidays in camp were Mr. and Mrs. E Buchan, who were guests of Mr. and Mrs K O Maclean at "Rio Verde," and Mr. and Mrs. J. Price, who were the guests of Mr. E. I. Clifford at Estancia Punta Delgada

— :: —

Several Members had an "indoor picnic" at the Golf Club on Diez-y-ocho, those present being Mr. and Mrs. J. McElroy, Mr. and Mrs. A. R. King, Mr. and Mrs. A. D. King, Mr. and Mrs. G. Crew, Miss L. Stirling and Mr. F. P. Arthur.

— :: —

During the winter months fortnightly "hops" were held at the British School, in aid of the Golf Club, the total profit thereon being in excess of $ 10 000 —.

— :: —

Among those who came in from camp to attend the recent party at Rio Seco were Mr. E. I. Clifford, Mr. and Mrs. K. Maclean, Mr. and Mrs. Eric Davies and Mr. and Mrs. W. Macleay.

— :: —

Last week a "Lyonair" plane brought nine racehorses to Punta Arenas.

— :: —

Mrs. Noel Donaldson returned by air recently from a holiday in Córdoba with Mr. and Mrs. K. C Ross

[illegible] the power is repeatedly cut off during the day

— —

The sector of the town which has been without telephone service for nearly ten months-since the hurricane of November last-has now had that somewhat mixed blessing bestowed upon it once again. Mixed is the blessing indeed -on the day our 'phone was connected we were rubbing our hands in glee, and wondering to whom to give the honour of our first call, when we received our first call, which turned out to be... "wrong number." After that the blessed instrument went on strike, and for the next ten days, though it rang on an average of once every ten minutes, we could speak to nobody, not even the exchange. We understand that a representative of Erikssons is now in Punta Arenas, trying to come to an agreement with the local authorities which would enable automatic telephones to be installed, but up to the present nothing definite seems to have been arranged.

— :: —

News has just been received of the death, which took place in England, of Mr. P. A. de Bruyne, father of Mr. H. B. A. de Bruyne, of Estancia Rio Verde.

— :: —

The territory lost another of its pioneers recently when don José Menendez Behety lost his life in a motoring accident near Buenos Aires. His two sons, José and Arturo, who were with him, were injured, but we understand that both are progressing favourably.

An improvement in the weather has taken [illegible] and it continues to rain at intervals with brief periods of sunshine which is badly needed for the crops

—oOo—

Alcalde don Jerman Saelzer Balde returned from a visit to the Capital where in company with the Parliamentary representatives he visited the various Ministerial Departments with promising results.

It is announced that the construction of the new railway station in Calle Anibal Pinto has been definitely resolved, though nothing is stated about the initiation of its construction.

Promises of funds for the construction of the Intendencia Building which will house the Post and Telegraphs, the Corte de Apelaciones and the offices and private dwelling of the Intendencia, have also been made to the extent of Seven Millions which sum will be augmented when the work is advanced.

—oOo—

The 25th anniversary of the Cruz Roja de Hombres, Valdivia Branch, and of the Club Aéreo de Valdivia 13th anniversary were celebrated during the week. There was also an imposing ceremony in the Plaza on Friday last when the ladies and members of the Cruz Roja de Señoras processed through the principal streets and speeches were made from the bandstand

—oOo—

On Tuesday last Alfonso Montecinos gave a pianoforte recital in the Cervantes Theatre which was attended by a moderate audience in spite of adequate advertisement. His programme included works of Bach, Beethoven, Chopin, Liszt and the modern works of Debussy, Ravel and Allende

—oOo—

On Thursday there was a recital of dances by pupils of Herbert Belkner in the Cervantes Theatre which attracted a large audience of parents, relatives and friends of the pupils.

—oOo—

On Saturday last the engagement of Mr. George Schuler López and Srta. María Eugenia Contreras Bertoglio took place in the house of the Contreras Bertoglio family and was celebrated by a large gathering of relatives and friends of the parties concerned.

—oOo—

The first regattas of the season were held on Sunday morning with the participation of the five clubs of the Association. They were of special interest owing to the innovation of regattas Single and Double Sculls and attracted an enormous crowd of spectators to the river front. The Arturo Prat obtained first place in points followed by Centenario and Phoenix-Valdivia, the last named senior crew participating in the respective event.

—oOo—

On Sunday aftenoon the Nacional F. C. beat the Magallanes F. C. by 2-1 in a closely contested football match in the Municipal Park which was witnessed by a large crowd of spectators.

The Club is now the proud possessor of two handsome trophies, one, a Quaich, having been presented by Mr F. D. Paton, to replace the one lost in the fire, which had been presented many years ago by him and the late Mrs Paton. The second of these trophies, the Warwick Cup, has been presented by Mr. W. C. Warwick, to replace the trophy presented by him on the occasion of his visit to Punta Arenas some years ago.

On the 4th. inst, the official inauguration of the new Club House at the Golf Course took place, and the opening ceremony, was largely attended. Mr. K. C. Ross, the new President, declared the building open, and then handed to Mr. Jorge Claude a silver ashtray from the Members, as a token of their gratitude for his kindness in designing and overseeing the construction of the new building, at the same time he presented a bouquet to Mrs. Claude.



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

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CROSSWORD - - - By Eugene Sheffer



7-25

HORIZONTAL
1 silent
6. most serious
13 beyond
14 sumptuous entertainer
15 cheek bone
16 source of phosphorus compounds
17 quite
18 one who entitles
20. put on
21. purge
23 pale
24 impel
25 confine to one locality
27 cap
29 indigent
30 central part
34 at an end poetic
36 quieter
37. soft mineral
40 S. American wood sorrel
42 subsist
43 Luzon savage
44. jump
46. a beverage
47. of the people
49 adjudge
51. heighten
52. flower part
53 connected
54. white poplar

VERTICAL
1 S A. marmoset
2 sea-ear
3. compare critically
4 yellow bugle
5 sea bird
6 pasture gras
7 regret
8 culture medium
9 large vessel
10 ignore
11 counter-irritant
12 tend
19 beard of grain
22 a wine
24 trivial
26 cereal grass
28 milkfish
31 mock
32 divers
33 foot lever
35 revolve
36 balloon basket
37 small wax candle
38 corn mush (Mex.)
39 part of coat
41 felt concern
44 lath
45 bark-cloth
48 pulpy fruit
50 network

Answer to last week's puzzle.

CHAIR▨ASSORT▨
HENCE▨REAPERS
ANGEL▨IN▨ADIT
▨▨EDITS▨▨LATU
COL▨TRESS▨NEB
AKUN▨UNION▨▨▨
RESIDE▨ELATED
▨▨▨LISTS▨PERI
MAL▨STATE▨NAG
OLIO▨▨SATES▨▨
ALAS▨AT▨UNITE
TONSURE▨DOLOR
▨TEASED▨EWERS

7-25

Average time of solution 27 minutes
Distributed by King Features Syndicate

BRIDGE

NORTH
S 6 2
H 8 6 4
D K Q 10 9
C 9 7 6 3

WEST
S 8
H J 10 9 7 3
D 8 4
C A K 10 8 4

EAST
S 9 7 5 4
H Q
D J 7 6 5 3 2
C J 2

SOUTH
S A K Q J 10 3
H A K 5 2
D A
C Q 5

The bidding

South	West	North	East
2 spades	Pass	2 no trump	Pass
3 spades	Pass	3 no trump	Pass
4 spades	Pass	Pass	Pass

Opening lead: king of clubs

An attempt to deceive the opposition is untimely when the facts speak for themselves.

South reached the perfectly sound contract of four spades and saw that fulfillment would be difficult if hearts failed to break, which on percentage rated to be the case. West cashed the king and ace of clubs and shifted to the jack of hearts, drawing East's queen and South's ace. Burying his head in the sand, declarer, in ostrich like fashion, proceeded to lead all his trumps but one in the hope that someone would fall into the error of unguarding the hearts so that the king and another heart would establish the fourth card of that suit. This was the height of futility because the cards spoke for themselves and no player out of incarceration could hold onto diamonds and let go hearts.

Declarer would have been better advised to attempt to visualize the adverse holdings and he might have hit upon a scheme to win the hand without resort to chicanery. Declarer should start extracting trumps. When West shows out on the second round, he pulls one more, leaving East with the nine. Declarer cashes the ace of diamonds and then plays the king of hearts. If East ruffs he has nothing but diamonds to return, permitting declarer to dispose of his two losing hearts. If East refuses to ruff, declarer simply plays the three of trumps and forces East to win with the nine. This is a Greek gift for the forced diamond return puts an end to the contest.



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que sus cabellos
la traicionen



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PARA EL CABELLO

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BEAUTY AND YOU

DO YOU RUN LIFE.. OR DOES IT RUN YOU

By JOSEPHINE LOWMAN

Few of us run our lives. Our lives run us. If we are to lead responsible full lives this has to be so to a certain extent. However, over and over again I am impressed with the fact that few people consciously make choices. Few are firm in their determination to get from life that which has greatest meaning for them. Most persons go along in the usual groove with only a sideways glance at the things they long to accomplish; the things which have always held great interest for them.

We fail to realize that we should have an energy budget just as we have a money budget. We have only so much energy to spend without nervous exhaustion.

We should budget it in order to have time for the realization of some of those dreams and the accomplishment of some purely personal interests.

Women are supposed to run houses but most houses run women to death. In this, as in all activities, you must choose what is really important to you. Is it more important to have a perfectly kept house, or a home where everyone is comfortable and you are gay and everyone is happy? Is it important to you to entertain formally and flawlessly or to have enough energy left to enjoy your guests when they arrive?

I am not advocating a messy house. This leads to fatigue and hecticness. Charm of atmosphere and a certain amount of order are certainly essential.

Myriad small wastes in energy add up to fatigue. If your kitchen work table is not the correct height for you it will be a handicap. If you stand when you could sit that is another. If you plan your grocery lists carelessly those mad dashes to the store are tiring and hectic.

You can safely bet that those women you know who accomplish so much and still seem to have time and energy to enjoy life have learned to avoid many such small wastes in their energy budget. You can recoup your energy larder with short periodic ten minute rest periods

LONDON FASIONS

An afternoon dress with full skirt, natural shoulder line and three-quarter sleeves designed by Rembrandt.

[illegible]

The city of San Francisco, California, looms largely as the background of films we saw during the week, and very nice it looks, too, although a friend of ours who once lived there complained bitterly of the fog—and he was a Liverpudlian, at that. In THREE HUSBANDS (Tres Esposas) Emlyn Williams, for his first Hollywood picture, if we are not mistaken, abandons his predilection for playing psychopathic murderers as in Night Must Fall and phthisical coal miners as in The Citadel and breaks out as a polished Oxonian who oozes charm all over the place. What he was doing in San Francisco isn't made quite clear in the film, but he has a very modern establishment and entertains handsomely. He is very friendly with three married couples and has a cardiac condition, which is medicalese for a weak or diseased heart. As is not infrequent with such patients, he dies suddenly, but as he is a tireless prankster he leaves with his lawyer three letters, addressed to each of the husbands of the couples with whom he has been friendly, to be delivered to the addressees on the day of the funeral. In these letters he makes the simple statement that the relations between himself and the wives have been more than just simple friendship, and the film deals with the effect the news has on the husbands and we are shown in flash-backs that Mr. Williams had innumerable opportunities for developing the relations at which he hints.

It is all played with great skill, and the ladies concerned, Miss Ruth Warrick, Miss Vanessa Brown and the incomparable Miss Eve Arden, are provocatively charming. The dialogue is entertaining, adult and bright, Mr. Emlyn Williams is undoubtedly the type for whom the ladies wouldn't mind leaving home, and the picture is very neatly directed by Mr. Irving Reis, we think, though we wouldn't swear to that name on oath.

The other side of life near the Golden Gate is portrayed in SHAKEDOWN (Extorsión) where Mr. Howard Duff turns up as a taker of pictures for the newspapers. Funny the professions these Duffs get into We know of only two others and one is a Bank Manager and the other an Insurance Man. Perhaps Howard Duff is in the most respectable business. It's practically a certainty that he rakes in more shekels for his efforts.

In the course of his free-lancing, Mr. Duff gets one or two shots that are really good news-pictures, and is hired by a paper, despite the fact that the editor, Mr. Bruce Bennett doesn't care for the Duff fellow as a type. In the pursuit of his reportorial duties Mr. Duff obtains some more pictures that would definitely incriminate one or two of the local gang-leaders if they were published. These he holds on to and approaches the gangster with proposals that amount to nothing else but blackmail. One thing leads to another and he eventually finishes up pumped full of bullets by a gentleman who dislikes him considerably, but Mr. Duff has the presence of mind to press the camera bulb before he kicks the bucket and so leaves a picture of his assassin for the record, though it didn't really matter-there were scores of witnesses present.

The film is quite exciting in spots and gives a close-up of one way of earning a living, but it is, perhaps, wiser to stick to either Banking or Insurance.

—oOo—

Miss Ginger Rogers, in the course of her long career in the movies, has possibly not had a tougher job to tackle than her part in STORM WARNING task to [illegible] that she does it well, though the sisters are apt to be bothered by the memory of her dancing cheek to cheek. We recall being in the audience in the old Palace Theater of Vaudeville in New York when Phil Baker, a headline comedian with an accordion and a stooge in a box, spot-lighted Miss Rogers in the audience and described her as a Little Girl with a Great Big Future. He invited her up on the stage to sing, and she accepted. Mr. Baker was the embarrassed one: she wanted to sing "I Got Rhythm" and it taxed his ingenuity to produce a satisfactory accompaniment on his accordian. That was many years ago, and we think it may safely be said that Mr. Baker's prophecy of those day has come true.



In the film Miss Rogers is the model who accompanies a travelling dress salesman on his expeditions, and while on their way to some Southern Center in the U. S. she stops off at some small town 'Way Down South to visit her married sister. No sooner is she off the bus than she witnesses a rather brutal butchering by the Ku Klux Klan and two of the members of that inspiring organisation have been silly enough to leave off their hoods. She sees them, of course, and troubles begin when she arrives at her sister's and discovers that her brother-in-law is one of the unhooded hoodlums she has seen. What would you do? Your duty to the community at large by bearing witness against your brother-in-law and causing your sister endless distress, or keep quiet? That's the problem poor old Ginger has to face and it's made all the more difficult when she finds that Ronald Reagan is the District Attorney. It isn't very difficult for a girl to fall in love with Mr. Reagan, so there you are. After a series of unpleasantnesses, among them the whip-lashing of Miss Rogers by the Ku Klux Klan in solemn conclave, the thing is finally worked out, but it definitely leaves an unpleasant taste in one's mouth.

A foreword to this picture states that the goings-on recorded in the picture do not necessarily give an authentic picture of happenings in the United States, and we hope to goodness that is so. Nevertheless the producers must bear in mind the 99% of the people who see the picture will not take the trouble to read all the rigmarole that precedes the actual photographs and will come away from the movie with the fixed notion that these things do take place in the United States. It's regrettable, but we can't see the situation any other way.

W. G. R.

"TRY AND GET ME," NEW FILM, RELEASED IN SANTIAGO TODAY

The important paper of the motion picture industry "Showmen's Trade Review," published the following comments about the film "TRY AND GET ME" (La Justicia Injusta"), which opens to-day at the Florida Theater, of Santiago city, through United Artists release:

"This is an engrossing, realistic melodrama; a fast-moving, exciting, suspenseful story that deals with mob violence and the terrific effect of lawlessness on all people. Splendidly acted and directed, it holds its emotional grip from start to finish, and since no effort has been made to glamorize either the people or the surroundings, it is startlingly real. Frank Lovejoy, as the unemployed man caught in the web of circumstances because of his inability to get work to support his family, scores in a performance that not only rings true but wins sympathy. Lloyd Bridges, an extremely versatile actor, handles the role of the megalomaniac killer with accustomed efficient ability. Kathleen Ryan, a newcomer, is very good in a characterization that calls for true understanding to be convincing. Impressive in supporting roles are Richard Carlson, Adele Jergens and Katherine Locke. Director Cyril Endfield demonstrates his ability to ensnare the true aura of off-beat situations of the American scene with his handling of the mob scenes; and his direction throughout is practically flawless. The storming of the jail by the mob (actually filmed on location in Phoenix, Ariz. with townspeople and police participating) is one of the tensest most gripping sequences the motion picture camera has captured in a long time. The film's story premise-an appeal for judgment by reason rather than by emotion, is clearly something to provoke discussion and thus build patronage through word-of-mouth. Some people may declare that the picture is too much for them, but they'll go right on talking about it and thus excite the curiosity of others who won't be able to rest until they, too, can go see it. Robert Stillman deserves plaudits for an outstanding production."

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Cricket

INTER-CITY MATCH IN VIÑA

The Inter-City match played at Viña last week-end was interesting enough to merit a commentary from R. C R-G or E. W. Swanton. However, yours truly must suffice. The weather was fine. Lucky Chilean cricketers, as last year's Wisden pointed out to find this unexceptional.

Wonderful to relate the players were nearly all ready to start, as the secretary had ordained, at 10.30 a. m. sharp. However, nobody seemed to have faith in this coincidence and the game duly started at 11 a. m. Santiago won the toss and chose to bat. One Viña optimist was heard to remark that this was defeatism, choosing to play for a draw. But by lunch-time with Santiago 90 odd for one and Meredith seeing the ball football size there were some signs of complaisance amongst the Santiago players. Manning had by this time been exasperating the bowlers with his smothering tactics which effectively closed up one end while Meredith made hay. Even so it had not been fast moving and it looked as if the draw-prophecy was not without foundation. Jones had made a useful if lucky 26, Meredith was clear of his 50 and Manning was well, still there. Manning, incidentally, was using a substitute run getter.

From Viña's point of view, the lunch interval, always a stiff hurdle for the batsmen, worked wonders. It awoke Manning, who spluttered fitfully with a four like golden-rain fire-works and then went out played-on to Ness. It made Meredith careless and had him bowled by Freestone. Thereafter the score-sheet shows a steady fall of wickets until the end of the innings. Santiago were unlucky to lose Hobsbawn, run out on his own call, who had been shaping up well, but apart from him and Tienken there had been no other serious attempts to stop the rot. Ness had taken 6 wickets for 55 and Freestone 2 for 15 when Stuart's wicket fell caught at the wicket by Fairbrass off Maxwell at 3:30 p. m. Paine with 5 maidens out of 8 overs had been bowling with a consistency that was to be rewarded in the second innings. Apart from a few muffed catches the fielding had been keen and it was anybody's game. Although on paper it was then to be expected that Viña would be able to put on over 200 in reply and leave Santiago to make up the difference in their 2nd innings.

But the fates in cricket are no respectors of paper probabilities and Viña wickets fell with alarming rapidity. An overeager Paine played late and outside a fatally straight ball from Tienken. Sutton lost an L. B. W. suit to Meredith. Tienken teased Fairbrass into passing a fly-ball to Knowles and Freestone allowed Marshall to knock off his bails. Maxwell and Reid were in together after tea and looked as if they might pull the game out of the fire but Maxwell, the safer of the two, played a weak forward stroke to a good length ball from Meredith to be bowled. Then it was Yeomans' turn to be nibbling at Marshall and missing. And Moodie was out to the last ball of the day, being caught and bowled off a half-hearted stroke to a ball from Meredith. Reid was still there with 53 but there was Saturday night to come.

On Sunday it was not long before the Viña tail lay down and died and the scores stood at 135 to 146: still anybody's game.

In their 2nd innings Santiago were off to a bad start when Paine had Meredith caught at the wicket for O.

Then came Manning, and the bowlers heaved a sigh of resignation, but 17 was a welcome stimulus to his team's fortunes and he left with 3 boundaries to his credit when once again played on to Ness. Then Paine bowled Jones who at 39 looked dangerous and the games' complexion changed perceptively. Knowles played some pretty strokes for his 14 but never looked safe, which is a safe commentary since he confesses to never having felt safe, but Busbridge scarcely gave himself time to settle down. Paine also removed Macqueen and Marshall winkling them out as it were with the sharp pin of a consistent good length.

Once again Hobsbawn & Tienken held back the flood of Viña impatience, but once again Hobsbawn overestimated his fleetness of foot. "Getting too fat" he was heard to say in excuse although he had hurled himself headlong as bravely as any ball player making a base. His 25 runs had been well deserved and welcome to his side. The last two wickets fell to Paine bringing his bag up to 8 with an average of 5.9. Good winkling!

Set only 130 to get at a rate of about a run-a minute looked well within Viña's capabilities but again the first 3 batsmen failed to come off. This time it was Fairbrass who had to hold the side together and his canonical 66 was delightful to watch. Yeomans and Reid played 1st and 2nd end stoppers while Fairbrass-Hamlet spoke his monologue. The ghost was played by Freestone who though down as No. 7 was not allowed to bat. The cousins Hardy divided the match though which it was who made the winning hit your correspondent is unable to relate since he was then relaxing under a shower. Tienken had bowled consistently with little luck and Meredith aggressively with some. Marshall was unusually dissatisfied with himself but seemed greatly improved on last season.

There had been two full days of interest and excitement.

Viña del Mar, Nov. 24,25.

P. W. C. C. 1st. In.

S. B. E. Jones, b. Ness	26
W Manning b. Ness	9
W. N. Meredith, b. Freestone	83
J. Knowles. b. Ness	3
J. A. Busbridge, b. Ness	3
W. A. Macqueen, b. Freestone	8
D. Marshall, b. Ness	0
E. J B. Hobsbawn, run out	10
A. Tienken, b. Ness	10
R G S. Stuart, c. Fairbrass b Maxwell	0
H Unwin, not out	0
Extras	3
TOTAL	155

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Freestone	15	3	2	65
Paine	8	5	0	8
Ness	17	2	6	55
Maxwell	8 3	0	1	43

V. C. C. 1st In.

C Maxwell, b Meredith	26
M. Paine, b. Tienken	0
J. B Sutton (Capt.), l bw Meredith	3
P. C Fairbrass, c Knowles. b Tienken	3
S J Freestone, b Marshall	8
R. Reid c Busbridge b Meredith	53
D Yeomans, b Marshall	3
T Moodie, c. & b Meredith	21
H P. Hardy, c Macqueen b Marshall	4
C. O. Hardy, b. Tienken	4
A G. Ness, not out	5
Extras	11
TOTAL	146

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Tienken	19.1	3	3	45
Meredith	16	6	4	24
Marshall	18	6	3	43
Manning	5	1	0	23

P. W. C. C. 2nd In.

S. B E. Jones, b. Paine	39
W N. Meredith, c. Fairbrass, b Paine	0
W. Manning, b. Ness	17
J. Knowles, b. Paine	14
J. A. Busbridge, c. Maxwell, b. Paine	2
W. A. Macqueen, c. Ness, b. Paine	5
D Marshall, b. Paine	0
E. J B Hobsbawn, run out	25
A Tienken, b. Paine	7
R. O. S. Stuart, not out	6
H Unwin, b. Paine	1
Extras	5
TOTAL	121

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Freestone	4	2	0	11
Paine	24 2	7	8	47
Ness	15	4	1	47
Maxwell	7	2	0	11

V. C. C. 2nd In.

C Maxwell, c & b. Meredith	10
M. Paine, c. Marshall, b. Meredith	12
J B. Sutton, c Unwin, b. Meredith	6
P. C Fairbrass, c. Tienken, b. Marshall	66
D Yeomans b Meredith	9
R Reid, c. Macqueen, b. Marshall	13
T. Moodie, b. Tienken	1
H. P Hardy, not out	4
C O Hardy, not out	3
Extras	9
TOTAL for 7 w.	123

Messrs: S. J Freestone and A G. Ness did not bat

Bowling:	O.	M.	W.	R.
Tienken	17	2	[illegible]	64
Meredith	10	1	[illegible]	[illegible]
Marshall	6	0	2	25

VALPARAISO C. C. won by 3 wickets

Start your downswing in the form pictured in the next and you'll be doing all right. You can see this player is perfectly balanced on his feet and he has that straight left arm in there to guide the club-head down in a wide full circle.



And his right elbow is under the shaft so that he can pull his hands down toward his right pocket permitting the hip and shoulder pivot to supply the necessary outward swing of the club head so that clubhead meets ball from an inside-out swing and passes slightly across the direction line.

Because of that straight — but not locked — left leg — his head is going to remain in fixed position throughout the downswing so there will be mechanical precision in the swing and as a result a straight, far-flying ball.

IN the first division of the English League the first eight [illegible] maintained their positions. A start was made in the [illegible] round of the F. A. Cup. Portsmouth beat [illegible] League match by 2-0 and Arsenal were too good for Bolton Wanderers. Newcastle United, playing away, were too good for Manchester City.

RESULTS:

DIVISION 1

Arsenal	4	Bolton	2
Aston Villa	2	Middlesborough	0
Blackpool	4	Stoke	3
Chelsea	0	Preston N. E.	[illegible]
Derby	3	W. Bromwich A.	1
Burnley	3	Huddersfiel	1
Liverpool	0	Manchester Un.	0
Newcastle	3	Manchester City	2
Portsmouth	2	Tottenham	0
Sunderland	2	Fulham	0
Wolverhampton	2	Charlton	[illegible]

DIVISION 2

Blackburn	2	Leicester	1
Barnsley	0	Brentford	0
Leeds	2	Bury	1
Coventry	3	Southhampton	1
Notts For.	4	Hull	1
Luton	1	Rotherham	[illegible]
Notts County	1	Cardiff	[illegible]
Birmingham	2	Queens P. R.	0
Sheffield Un.	2	Doncaster	1
Sheffild Wed.	2	Swansea	1
West Ham	3	Everton	3

F. A. CUP FIRST ROUND

Chester	2	Accrington	1
Wat'bo	5	Aylesbury	[illegible]
Bangor	2	Southport	2
Barnstaple	2	Folkestone	2
Chesterfield	2	Barrow	0
Workington	5	Blackhall Col.	2
Blyth Spartan	2	Bishop Auck.	1
Bradford City	6	Carlisle	1
Bristol City	2	Brighton	1
Bristol Rov.	3	Kettering	0
Colchester	3	Port Vale	1
Lincoln	4	Crewe	2
Gillingham	1	Crystal Pal.	0
Grimsby	4	Darlington	0
Guildford	4	Hereford	1
Hartlepools	2	Rhyle	0
Rochdale	2	Kilkeston	1
Leyton	3	Chippenham	0
Leyton Or.	2	Gorleston	1
Leytonstone	2	Shrewsbury	0
Millwall	1	Plymount	0
Oldham	4	Nelson	0
Newport	4	Barry	0
Norwich	3	Northampton	2
Southend	3	Bournemouth	1
Stockport	2	Gateshead	2
Stockton	1	Mansfield	1
Swindon	2	Bedford	0
Tonbridge	6	Aldershot	0
Torquay	3	Bromley	[illegible]
Witton	2	Gainsborough	[illegible]
Wrexham	3	Halifax	0
York	1	Bradford	1

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LIGHTER VEIN

One of financier Bernard Baruch's friends spoke so often about his love for hunting that Baruch finally invited him to his South Carolina plantation for a turkey shoot. The friend tramped for two days shooting madly, but he failed to hit a single turkey.

Mr Baruch made no comment. The next morning however, the friend was ambling along a path near the house when he saw a fat gobbler sitting motionless in a tree. He crept up close, fired point-blank, and was overjoyed when the turkey fell at his feet. It was only when he picked it up that he noticed a card tied around its neck. The card read, "With the compliments of Bernard Baruch."

* * *

"Have you been to any other doctor before coming to me?" asked the grouchy physician.

"No, sir," replied the meek patient. "I went to the druggist."

"You went to a druggist!" exclaimed the doctor. "That shows how much sense some people have. You went to a druggist. And what idiotic advice did he give you?"

"Why, he told me to come and see you," replied the patient.

* * *

Two would-be sportsmen from the city decided to rough it for a season and rented a cabin in the North Woods. Neither had done any hunting before, but they were well-supplied with equipment and enthusiasm.

The day of their arrival, Bill, who was particularly eager to get on with the hunting, said to his companion. "You make the fire, Joe. I'll go shoot a bear for dinner."

He had walked only a few hundred feet from the cabin when he saw a large black bear. Taking careful aim, he fired. When the smoke cleared, he saw he had made a direct hit. But the bear was not dead; wounded and enraged, she was charging Bill.

Dropping his gun, the amateur hunter made for the open cabin door, the bear in hot pursuit. Just before he reached the safety of the cabin, however, the hunter tripped and fell. The wounded bear, unable to slow down, went charging right on into the cabin where the hapless Joe was struggling to get a fire started.

Bill rose and brushed himself off. Strolling over to the door, he shouted, "Okay, Joe. You skin that blighter. I'll go get another one.

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
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I FORGOT A BARRICADE WORKS BOTH WAYS
OH-H-- THE MARBLES
RING
IT'S BLONDIE'S RING--- I'LL HAVE TO OPEN THAT DOOR IF I DO IT WITH MY LAST BREATH
I FORGOT MY POCKETBOOK, DEAR
I'LL NEVER TAKE ANOTHER BATH AS LONG AS I LIVE!
3-4
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SPM SPOTLIGHT



JOHN HARDBOTTOM

(Singed in the Great San Francisco fire)

"For some time I have read and enjoyed your weekly feature which "Spotlights" various members of the English-speaking community. Interesting reports, but hardly typical. While most of the characters you have written of have lived rich, full lives and experienced everything from flood to famine, the average S. P. M. reader is not this type at all. The average S.P.M. reader is, in fact, as dull as glazed glass. May I describe him for you?

His name is John Hardbottom. He lives in a two-room apartment in Los Leones, not under a flat rock, as one would be led to believe from his appearance. He was educated in a private school and, to the infinite surprise of his parents, won his colours in ping-pong, a sport which he has since given up as too strenuous.

His first sex experience was when he stubbed his toe on a thick volume of Freud, and he has had nothing to do with the subject after this unhappy accident.

He has met his share of disasters. He was in Santiago during the great Chillan earthquake and was [illegible] nia, only seven months after the Great Fire. "Just think", Mr Hardbottom says, "if Aunt Minnie had died a few months earlier I might have been singed".

Mr Hardbottom claims to have no special eccentricities, although he does admit, with a guilty grin, to a liking for hard-boiled eggs. He decries hobbies in general as a waste of time although in his youth he had a collection of paper napkins "borrowed" from hotels. He engages in no special sports, but enjoys a brisk walk around the living room every morning before breakfast.

When asked just what he did do with time, Mr. Hardbottom replied that he is an enthusiastic linguist. "I have only been in Chile for 57 years", he says proudly, "and I am going to start using the past tense in my Spanish any day now". He also plays bridge, and often recounts the occasion when, in 1922, he bid a small slam. (Noble effort, but he went down three tricks). Mr. Hardbottom is candid in admitting that he likes to play for stakes, usually as high as one cent (avo) per hundred.

Hardbottom's cardinal virtues. He uses the same razor blade half a hundred times and hasn't changed toothbrushes in years. "I understand," he told us, "that they are making the things of nylon these days." He buys his copy of "El Mercurio" from the same boy every morning of the world and the customer-seller relationship has grown through the years. "I've literally watched that boy as he grew a beard," Hardbottom reports. Also an avid reader of the S.P.M., he never fails to read a copy at the house of Dura Hardbottom, his spinster sister.

Present plans for Hardbottom include a trip to the country, possibly as far as Melipilla. "Too much hustle and bustle for me in the city", he reports. "It's the pace of life. I' ve had my share of excitement, now I just want to relax".

That, Dear Editor, is the typical S.P.M. reader, not the glamorous creatures that have been adorning your back cover.

Sincerely,

H. V. S.

Santiago.

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

PROJECT
FURIOSO C

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. Job #61-1013/80 Box 14
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. ----

4. DATE ----

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM ----

8. DATE OF INFO. ----

9. EVALUATION ----

5. ANALYST C. McNew

6. DATE PROCESSED 28 Nov 61

10. DISSEMINATED IN ----

11. DATE ----

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

X 12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

~~Project portion has been~~ removed and sent to RI/AR. For review of file, contact RI/AR x-2471 using RI file number indicated above.

FULMINATOR-1 201-88764

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 88764

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

104-10177-10206

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MEROLA, JOSEPH R.
201-257804

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1959-1977

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LSN/ISR

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	Jan 6	Hornbeck	

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

MEROLA, Joseph R.
201-257804

201 - 257804

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOL
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL OR

FBI DOCUMENTS:

DATE: 1 OCTOBER 1959
SUBJECT: CARIBBEAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES - CUBA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: NONE GIVEN

DATE: 1 JUNE 1959
SUBJECT: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: MIAMI 97-261 BUREAU 105-75663

AGENCY DOCUMENT CONTAINING FBI INFORMATION
DATE: 16 JUNE 1959
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI REPORTS:

DATE: 11 MARCH 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-PANAMA
FBI FILE #: 109-12-223 (BUREAU)

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1958
SUBJECT: JOSEPH MEROLA; B. LEONARD BIRD;
ROBERT DILLARD: UNKNOWN PILOT
FBI FILE #: 97-230 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 1 JUNE 1959
SUBJECT: RUBEN OSCAR MIRO GUARDIA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE#: MM 97-261

DEPT OF ARMY DOCUMENT
DATE: 13 MAY 1959
SUBJECT: JOSEPH R. MEROLA (SD 7083-A) (C)
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: ACSI-CO

FBI DOCUMENTS (SOME NOT COMPLETE)

DATE: 22 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 21 APRLL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 20 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

DATE: 17 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - PANAMA
FILE: 109-12-223
CLASSIFICATION: NONE

DATE: 10 APRIL 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: 109-12-223

DATE: 2 April 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTER - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: SAC, MIAMI (109-43)

DATE: 5 MARCH 1959
SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - PANAMA
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: 109-12-223

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 77-2335
11 April 1977

David M. Curry, Esq.
First Assistant U.S. Attorney
Western District of Pennsylvania
633 U.S. Post Office and Courthouse
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Dear Mr. Curry:

Re: Joseph Raymond Merola

In response to your letter of March 10, 1977 I wish to advise you that the Central Intelligence Agency had one meeting with Joseph Raymond Merola prior to August 1961. In late 1960 Joseph Raymond Merola made several telephone calls to a CIA office offering his assistance in a general way in connection with Cuban matters, which was refused. However, on 6 February 1961 Merola claimed to have information on a Latin American senator who was a "close friend and confidant" of "Che" Guevera. Since Guevera was listed as being the subject of foreign intelligence requirements, the CIA employee agreed to meet with Mr. Merola. The meeting took place on 6 February 1961 and is the only meeting with Merola prior to his incarceration which you stated in your letter began in August 1961.

Mr. Merola was not employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. His contact with the CIA could not be described as an undercover Government informant as alleged in the Writs of Error Coram Nobis by Victor Carlucci and Daniel Hanna. This one contact on 6 February 1961 by Merola with the CIA was voluntary on his part.

Mathew McVane, an employee of the CIA, did testify in San Diego in November 1975 concerning CIA contacts with Joseph Raymond Merola. The citation we have for that case is U.S. v. Dalton C. Smith, et al. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, No. 74-2277-GT.

The testimony given in that trial is not inconsistent with the response given above. It is true that after Merola was released from prison he again volunteered information to the CIA. Merola was a voluntary source of foreign intelligence.

I hope this provides sufficient information for you to file your response. If not, please call me at (AC 703) 351-7531.

Sincerely,

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: John Martin, Esq., Dept. of Justice

OGC/JKG/[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Joseph Raymond Merola

FROM:
Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109

EXTENSION: 1542

NO.

DATE: 8 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Raymond Warren C/LA 3C2019 Hqs.	11 APR	1977		
2. DC/LA	11 APR	1977		
3. SA/LA	14			
4. File - 201				
5.				
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

FOR CIA OFFICIALS ONLY

LITIGATION

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John K. Greaney
Special Assistant to the
General Counsel

FROM : Maurice A. Sovern
O/SA/DO/O

SUBJECT : Joseph R. Merola

REFERENCE : Assistant United States Attorney, Pennsylvania Letter, 10 March 1977, Subject as Above

1. The question in reference is the nature of any involvement of Merola with CIA prior to August 1961.

2. The Directorate's first recorded contact with Joseph Raymond Merola prior to August 1961 occurred on 6 February 1961. It followed a series of telephone calls over a period of several months (late 1960 - early 1961) in which Merola had expressed interest in offering his assistance in connection with Cuban matters. Our officer had declined contact until 6 February when Merola claimed to have information on a Latin American senator who was a "close friend and confidante" of "Che" Guevera. Because Guevera was the proper subject of foreign positive intelligence collection requirement our officer agreed to a meeting.

3. The last recorded contact, except for the litigation outlined below, with Merola was a telephone contact with Merola in late July 1975 when he volunteered additional foreign positive intelligence.

4. At the end of August 1975, Merola contacted a staff officer to ask for testimony in the criminal fraud trial in San Diego, California (U.S. v. Joseph R. Merola, et al, Southern District of California, CR 74-2277-GT) which we subsequently

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012860

FOR CIA OFFICIALS ONLY

provided on 13 November 1975.

5. Subject is characterized as a voluntary occasional source of foreign positive intelligence who was in sporadic contact with us.

6. We greatly appreciate the Assistant United States Attorney's concern for the confidentiality of our information. The information above may be made available to the AUSA and the court as appropriate without further restriction.

/S/
Maurice A. Sovern

O/SA/DO/O:MASovern:kaw (1542)

Distribution
Orig & 1 - OGC
1 - C/DCD
1 - C/LA
2 - SA/DO/O

14-00000

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE [illegible]	LETTER NO.

TO: ISS/PICG
ATTN: Frederic McCann

FROM: Crocky [illegible]
SA/LA

SUBJECT: Joseph R. Merola-Litigation
REFERENCE: ISS/PICG Memo dtd 17 March 1977

A review of the files confirms that the DDO was not in any way involved operationally with Joseph R. Merola prior to 1961. However, it should be noted that subsequent to his release from prison in November 1962, Merola was in contact with members of the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, an anti- Castro organization of interest to this Agency.

SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

SIGNATURE

RESPONDER'S FILE

[illegible] 1831 [illegible]

☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Litigation: Joseph L. Merola

FROM:

Frederic McCann

ISS/PICC

EXTENSION 1520

DATE 17 March 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SA/LA/EICO IM-3			
2. [illegible]	3/21		[illegible]
3. C2G/CIES			
4.			
5. [illegible]			
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Bill: The Merola file is charged to MAS. When you're done, drop at OBS in RI (1F) and cancel my charge, please.

Maurice.

1. This is an [illegible] of Merola [illegible] FBI [illegible] early 1960s [illegible]

FORM 610 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

17 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/LA/EICO
DCD

FROM : Frederic McCann
ISS/PICG

SUBJECT : Litigation: Joseph R. Merola

1. Attached herewith is an unclassified memorandum received from OGC which requests information on the "extent and nature of any involvement of (Joseph R.) Merola with federal agencies prior to August 1961".

2. A review of 201-257804 reveals that Mr. Merola may have been in contact with WH/Miami in 1961 and was in contact with DCD prior to 1961.

3. Please review your files and provide whatever information is pertinent to paragraph 1., above. No information will be released outside of CIA without your concurrence.

4. 201-257804 is attached to the SA/LA/EICO copy of this memorandum. Please return it with your reply by 1 April 1977.

Frederic McCann

Frederic McCann

Attachments: a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

DEPT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT
SUBJECT: JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA
DATE: 10 MARCH 1977
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE: NONE

trial, "actively engaged in the service of the government."

Irving Green, attorney for Carlucci and Hanna, said the prosecutors, Hubert I. Teitelbaum and Daniel J. Snyder, knew Merola was a government agent and therefore "perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court."

Teitelbaum and Snyder are now federal judges in Pittsburgh and have not commented about the action filed by Green, which is still pending. But an official familiar with their position said the two judges will, if necessary, swear they did not know Merola was a government agent.

Cuban Connection

"The answer to this whole thing revolves around Cuba," said this official.

Green, who represents Mannarino's son-in-law, said he didn't think Merola's testimony in Chicago had been particularly "helpful" to the prosecution. A "more logical assumption" is that Merola was freed from prison because of what he could do for the government in Cuba, he said.

"This guy works anywhere he wants to," said Green. "The government has protected him in California, Chicago and everywhere else. He still has to be of value to the government."

One thing is certain: Merola is well known in the Miami Cuban community and among those who have been linked to alleged Castro assassination attempts.

"Joe was an undercover agent, he was closely associated with the government," Frank Sturgis, of Miami, told The Bulletin. "He did have an association with the CIA."

Sturgis, who gained notoriety as one of those convicted in the Watergate burglary, was a top Castro lieutenant during the revolution who served as a double agent for the CIA. He later worked against Castro in the Bay of Pigs operation and has admitted plotting to kill Castro.

"I know Joe was involved with the revolutionaries," said Sturgis. "I know he had an association with the CIA, but because of compartmentalization, you don't know what they're doing."

Tied to Burglar

A source close to the House Assassinations Committee said Merola was "a good friend" of Eugenio (Rolando) Martinez, another of those connected of the Watergate burglary. Martinez was associated with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs effort and in other anti-Castro moves.

"Joe's place in Miami Beach was on the water and it was used by anti-Castro groups to smuggle arms to Cuba," this source said. "Martinez was one of them."

"I can't recall," Martinez said, when asked by The Bulletin about using Merola's dock. "Really, I can't tell you anything about it.

"He was connected with helping people here in Miami against the dictatorship of Batista. He might have been in some other branch that I don't know about."

Alfredo Borges, a Miami business consultant and a Bay of Pigs veteran, told a Bulletin reporter inquiring about Merola to "please write me a letter."

"I don't know who you are," Borges said. "I cannot talk over the telephone."

One investigator interested in Merola said the matter is "very sensitive, records are hard to come by."

"He seems to fit everything," this investigator said. "He's a pilot, he speaks Spanish, he knows Cuba and he's connected. But nobody wants to cooperate."

A Scared Man

Records indeed are hard to come by. Official and unofficial attempts to obtain complete records of Merola's arrests proved fruitless. So did efforts to determine what encounters he might have had with officials responsible for watching the nation's borders.

But despite the belief of some that Merola enjoys the protection of the government while at the same time being welcomed by organized crime, those who know him say that is not the case.

"Joe has got a little money," said one Florida acquaintance. "I don't know where he gets it. But he's an informer and they hate informers. The man is concerned.

"He goes around Dade (County), but he is very, very careful where he goes. Joe is scared."

TO: [illegible]

SUBJECT: Court Appearance on 13 November 1975, San Diego, California

1. On 13 November 1975, Matt MacVane appeared as a witness for the defense at the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, 325 West F Street, San Diego, California. The case was the United States of America V. Dalton C. Smith, et al. MacVane was called to testify by E. Mac Amos Jr., attorney for defendant Joe Merola. In honor of the subpoena MacVane appeared at the court. On 13 November 1975 at approximately 16:30 hours San Diego time MacVane was called to the witness stand.

2. Mac Amos, attorney for defendant Joe Merola began questioning after MacVane was sworn in as a witness. Amos asked how long MacVane had been employed by the CIA? He asked if MacVane knew defendant Merola? He asked if MacVane were told by Merola about a shipment of surplus helicopter parts going to the country of El Salvador? He asked MacVane if Merola had volunteered other information to the Agency? He then asked if Merola were ever paid for such information? Amos also tried to establish the value of surplus parts in Latin America compared to the US. This was objected to by attorney Robert Thaller, prosecutor in the case. The judge sustained the objection and MacVane did not have to answer the question. Amos finished his questioning and Thaller began a short cross examination. Thaller asked if MacVane ever heard Merola mention stocks? He also asked if MacVane knew the name of the corporation that Merola represented? He then pointed out that even if some stock fraud were occurring, MacVane would not be witting because MacVane was not an investigator, but rather a collector of foreign information. The cross examination then ended. All questions were answered to the best of MacVane's ability and knowledge.

3. There appeared to be little purpose in the appearance of MacVane because it was obvious that MacVane knew nothing of any value concerning the case. MacVane's total time on the witness stand was about 10 minutes. After completion of his testimony MacVane was released.

Bruce E. Mainwaring
BRUCE E. MAINWARING

MCMacVane:ljh

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DISTRICT JUDGE

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr Barnes	6/4/71	
2			
3	Mr. Young		Y
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Any results of the meeting?

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Lee S. Morris	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED	☐ CONFIDENTIAL	☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

SECRET

6 November 1975

MEMO FOR RECORD:

RE: MEROLA, Joseph R.
201-257804
U.S. Citizen Registered to DEA/MIAMI Dec 74

FYI:
Today, Randy Daugherty, DCD case officer, asked to borrow subject 201 because he wanted to take it to Office of Genl. Counsel for Mr. John Greany.

There is to be a meeting today between Mr. Greany, Bob Starling, DCD COPS, and Matt McVane, DCD man in Miami who is visiting Hqs. McVane has an interest in MEROLA.

Told Randy that MEROLA was DEA source and that matter should be coordinated with NARCOG.

This transpired during lunch hour - Randy was in a hurry and I gave him file. He said he would tell Mr. Greany that Subj. was DEA source.

L.

SECRET

OGC 75-4073

5 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Joseph Raymond Merola

1. On 3 November I talked to Mr. Matt McVane, DCD officer stationed in Miami, and he said that he had received the subpoena from E. Mac Amos, Jr. to appear as a defense witness in the trial in San Diego on 11 November. Mr. McVane agreed to come to Headquarters on 6 November to discuss the information in the files and Mr. Robert Starling of DCD agreed to join in the meeting. Mr. McVane told me that Lt. Colonel Douglas W. Haldane, who had previously been on detail to the DCD Miami Office, had returned to the Army and was currently assigned somewhere in Europe and that his address was Headquarters, USAREUR, APO New York, New York 09403.

2. Since this Office had received a letter from Mr. Amos with a request for the current address of Colonel Haldane, I called Mr. Amos on 4 November and explained to him that Colonel Haldane was no longer with the Central Intelligence Agency and it was our understanding that Colonel Haldane was stationed in Europe. Mr. Amos did not want the current address of Colonel Haldane. He did state, however, that Mr. McVane would not be needed in San Diego until Wednesday morning, 12 November. As things stood now, Mr. Merola was the fifth defendant and it would be that length of time before Mr. McVane's testimony would be needed.

3. Mr. McVane told me that he had been called by Mr. Robert Thaler of the U.S. Attorney's Office in California. I told Mr. McVane that I would contact Mr. Thaler. I called Mr. Thaler who is a a member of the Organized Crime Strike Force, Department of Justice, Room 2307, 300 North Los Angeles Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, telephone No. (AC 213) 688-5808. Mr. Thaler was pleased to hear that Mr. McVane

was being made available to testify and explained that he thought Mr. Amos had already prepared a motion to dismiss if Mr. McVane was to be denied as a witness for the defense. I explained to Mr. Thaler that Mr. McVane was coming to Headquarters on Thursday, 6 November, and said that we would call him to discuss the role Mr. McVane played in receiving information from Mr. Merola.

4. If this case runs parallel to many criminal prosecutions, the defense may never put Mr. McVane on the stand when he actually shows up as this may prove detrimental to their defense. However, we should be prepared for his testimony if, in fact, it does take place.

John K Greaney
John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: Chief, DCD
Matt McVane

OGC/JKG/eh
Distribution:
Original - OGC SUBJ: LITIGATION CRIMINAL
1 - JKG Signer
1 - Chrono

John T. Holt
John Skyrstead Rhoades
Harrison R. Hollywood
Douglas R. Reynolds
David W. Ault
Michael L. Neil
Dan H. Deuprey
Thomas H. Ault
E. Mac Amos, Jr.
Thomas M. Dymott

HOLT, RHOADES AND HOLLYWOOD
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1010 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1712
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

Area 714
Telephone 238-1712

October 28, 1975

Office of the General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:

Our firm represents Mr. Joseph Merola who is presently on trial as a defendant in the Southern District of California in an action entitled United States of America v. Dalton C. Smith, et al. (No. 74-2277-GT). In order to properly defend Mr. Merola, we need to utilize the testimony of Mr. Matt McVane and possibly the testimony of Col. Douglas Haldane. We understand that Mr. McVane is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and works out of the Miami office. We also understand that Col. Douglas Haldane is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency but we do not have an address for service upon Col. Haldane.

Enclosed you will find copies of Subpoenas issued for Mr. McVane and Col. Haldane. These Subpoenas require the attendance of the individuals in the Southern District of California at San Diego, California on November 11, 1975 at 9:00 a.m. Enclosed you will also find a copy of the Order signed by Judge Gordon Thompson authorizing the issuance of the Subpoena for Mr. McVane. Since we do not have an address for Col. Haldane at this time, the court has not approved the issuance of a Subpoena for him in which the government would be responsible for all of the expenses and costs.

We have been informed by Mr. McVane that it is necessary for him to obtain the approval of your office before he can testify in this matter. Accordingly, we request that he be granted the necessary approval in order to allow him to testify in this matter. In addition, we request that we be provided with an address for Col. Haldane and that he also be allowed to testify in this case. We would appreciate being advised as soon as possible with respect to whether these persons will be available for testimony. If we can provide any additional information with respect to this case, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned. Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation.

Very truly yours,

HOLT, RHOADES & HOLLYWOOD

By
E. Mac Amos, Jr.

EMA/db
Enclosures

United States District Court

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DALTON C. SMITH, et al.

No. 74-2277-GT

To MATT McVANE

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California at 325 West F Street in the city of San Diego on the 11th day of November 1975 at 9:00 o'clock A. M. to testify in the above-entitled case.

This subpoena is issued on application of the¹ defendant.

~~October 23~~, ~~1975.~~

~~E. MAC AMOS, JR.~~
Attorney for defendant MEROLA
~~1810 Second Ave., Suite 1712~~
Address San Diego, CA 92101

WILLIAM W. LUDDY
Clerk.

SEAL

JOSSIE GALLAGHER
Deputy Clerk.

RETURN

Received this subpoena at on and on at I served it on the within named by delivering a copy to and tendering² to the fee for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law.

Service Fees

By

Travel $
Services
Total $

---

¹ Insert "United States," or "defendant" as the case may be.

² Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued in behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof, 28 USC 1825, or on behalf of a defendant who is financially unable to pay such costs (Rule 17 (b), Federal Rules Criminal Procedure).

United States District Court

FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DALTON C. SMITH, et al.

No. 74-2277-GT

To
COL. DOUGLAS HALDANE

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California at 325 West F Street in the city of San Diego on the 11th day of November 1975 at 9:00 o'clock A. M. to testify in the above-entitled case.

This subpoena is issued on application of the[1] defendant.

October 23, 1975

E. MAC AMOS, JR.
Attorney for defendant MEROLA
1010 Second Ave., Suite 1712
Address
San Diego, CA 92101

WILLIAM W. LUDDY
Clerk.

SEAL

TOSSIE GALLAGHER
Deputy Clerk.

RETURN

Received this subpoena at on
and on at I served it on the
within named
by delivering a copy to and tendering[2] to the fee for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law.

Service Fees

By

Travel $
Services
Total $

---

[1] Insert "United States," or "defendant" as the case may be.

[2] Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpoena issued in behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof, 28 USC 1825, or on behalf of a defendant who is financially unable to pay such costs (Rule 17 (b), Federal Rules Criminal Procedure).

E. MAC AMOS, JR.
HOLT, RHOADES & HOLLYWOOD
1010 Second Avenue, Suite 1712
San Diego, CA 92101
(714) 238-1712

Attorneys for Defendant
JOSEPH R. MEROLA

FILED

OCT 22 1975

CLERK, US DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
By DEPUTY

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1010 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 1712
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
PHONE 238-1712

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH R. MEROLA, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CR 74-2277-GT

ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS

This court having considered the application of defend Joseph Merola, and the supporting affidavit of E. Mac Amos, Jr. for issuance of subpoenas directed to Edward Stanton and Matt McVane and having found that good cause exists for the issuance of said subpoenas,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the clerk of this court issu subpoenas requiring the attendance of Matt McVane and Edward Stanton on November 11, 1975 at 9:00 a.m. in this court and, further, that all costs and fees in relation to the attendance o said witnesses shall be borne by the United States under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act.

DATED: OCT 22 1975

BY: GORDON THOMPSON, JR
GORDON THOMPSON
DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFOR

24 October 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Joseph Raymond Merola

1. On 23 October, Mr. Robert Starling of DCD called to say that Matthew McVane (phonetic), a DCD officer who is stationed in Miami, Florida, had received a telephone call from a San Diego attorney saying that he was mailing a subpoena to him. The attorney, E. Mac Amos, Jr., is a member of the law firm of Holt, Rhodes and Hollywood at 1010 Second Avenue, San Diego, California 92101, telephone No. (AC 714) 238-1712. Mr. Amos advised Mr. McVane that the subpoena was for his appearance on behalf of Mr. Merola who was on trial in San Diego.

2. Mr. Starling indicated that the charges against Merola had something to do with exporting airplane parts without a license. I called Mr. Clyde Bryant, Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, to determine if this prosecution was related to 22 U.S.C. 1934. Mr. Bryant called back and said that Merola was one of seven defendants being tried on criminal fraud charges for having engaged in a flimflam operation against the Salvadorian government. The scheme was to establish a facility in Salvador to assemble and service helicopters. The group had assembled a collection of Army surplus parts for helicopters and was in the process of shipping them without an export license and they were seized by U.S. Customs officers on 21 February 1974. Mr. Bryant indicated that the Assistant U.S. Attorney in San Diego in charge of the prosecution was a Mr. Robert Thaller, telephone No. (AC 714) 293-5668. Mr. Bryant also indicated that an individual by the name of Henry Maierhoffer was also one of the defendants and it was Mr. Bryant's recollection that Maierhoffer had some previous connection with CIA.

3. I called Mr. Starling and reported this information to him and he said that Mr. Merola was a real operator in the Miami area, always involved in some scheme to buy and sell weapons but that he had volunteered information to the DCD Office, some of which was useful. I asked Mr. Starling to have Mr. McVane call me when he got the subpoena but that he would not have to go unless they furnished the travel funds.

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

cc: Chief/DCD

Distribution - OVER

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

30 Jan 1975

201 File on U.S. Citizen

The 201 file on Merola (surname) (201 number indicated below) can be most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

___ should be closed.

___ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

___ potential witting collaborator; date opened ___________ OI Code A2.

___ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

___ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

___ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

X all others. OI Code A6. ISR

Signed ______________ C/LSN/ISR ______________
(name) (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______________ ______________ 1975
(initials) (date)

This document in a permanent part of this file.

201- 257804

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 002216

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OUTGOING MESSAGE 171

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C RE T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 091910Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 641466

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE (P/AN, LSN/MIL, OPS/INT, CI/OPS, OPS/NAR2, LSN/ID,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 32

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA. Y

MHABYSS PBRAMPART Y

REF: A. LA/MIAMI 22730 |IN 432300*| (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGBOBTA)

B. DIRECTOR 630872 |**| (NOT NEEDED CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA) Y

1. JOSEPH RAYMOND M E R O L A (201-257804) WAS REGISTERED IN ISR TO DEA/MIAMI ON 18 DEC 74 AS A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL FOR USE IN HAITI AND COLOMBIA. IT IS REQUESTED THAT LA/MIAMI ADVISE DEA/MIAMI TO CONTACT THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MEROLA. Y

2. FOR CARACAS, PORT AU PRINCE, BOGOTA: IN JUNE 74, DEA HQS INFORMED BKHERALD THAT MEROLA WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST. DEA REQUESTED TRACES AND STATED MEROLA REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR BKHERALD IN LATE 1950'S. WE REPLIED THAT MEROLA HAD NEVER WORKED FOR BKHERALD, ALTHOUGH WE WERE AWARE THAT HE HAD MADE SUCH CLAIMS ON NUMBER OF PREVIOUS INSTANCES. Y

LSN/ISR

9 JAN 75

3. FILE: 201-257804. E2, IMPDET.H

201-257804

DATE: 8 JANUARY 1975
ORIG: DARYL GEISLER:LH
UNIT: LA/CAR/CAR1
EXT: 1249

* REF A REQUESTED TRACES & REGISTRATION OF MEROLA
** REF B FORWARDED TRACES.

LA/NARC

DDO/NARCOG

LSN/ISR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

ALFONSO SPERA
C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 010116

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM:
OPS/LSN/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER BU-5

EXTENSION
1064/
5045

NO
ISRM 39170

DATE
10 DEC 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/AIS HT-3	12/11		mb	Hit!
2.				
3. IP/EIB DW-7	[illegible]	[illegible]		
4.				
5. IP/RMS DW-6				
6.				
7. IP/LDI GT-6				
8.				
9. LSN/ISR BU-5				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FILE NO. 201-0257804

DOCUMENT DATE

ABSTRACT ☒

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

NAC's Conducted
July 1972 - FBI/P
Oct 1972 - State/P
CSC - N
DCDCI - N

17 DEC [illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISR LOG

16 DEC 1974

NAT. FILE NO.		DATE [illegible]	
☐	NEW	☐	RE-REGISTRATION
☐	UTILIZATION	☐	RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCD	TO: SECURITY ✓
TO:	TO:
ISRM NO. [illegible],170	201 NO.

NAME

FORM 2-74 1797 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

11 DEC 19[illegible]

(4-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISR LOG

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to [illegible] in accordance with its [illegible] DCID 2/5 and 2/6, [illegible] NSCID 2, [illegible] this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268

13 Dec [illegible]

NAT. FILE NO.		DATE 9 Dec 7[illegible]	
X	NEW	☐	RE-REGISTRATION
☐	UTILIZATION	☐	RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCD	TO: SECURITY
TO:	TO:
ISRM NO. 39,170	201 NO.

NAME

FORM 2-74 1797 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPS [illegible] GI-703
2-[illegible] 79-5

REQUEST FOR REGISTRATION IN THE INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER

REQUESTER: Daryl ~~XXXX~~ Geisler LA/CARI

DATE SUBMITTED: 9 Dec 1974

[illegible] FILE NUMBER: DEA

201- 257804

DATE RECEIVED IN ISR: 9 Dec 74

XX NEW ☐ RE-REGISTRATION ☐ RE-CHECK

[illegible] COPY
OPERATIONS STAFF/DDO

UTILIZATION:

NAME (Last, First, Middle): MEROLA, Joseph Raymond

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS:

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH: 9 Oct 1925

PLACE OF BIRTH: NEW JERSEY

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

RESIDENCE: 135 Dupont Plaza, Miami, Fla

PRESENT EMPLOYER:

OCCUPATION: Pilot

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA (including references):

Based on LA/Miami 22730 IN 432300, 3 Dec 74 (attached)
Traces sent DIRECTOR 630872, 6 Dec 74 (attached)
Send cards to UFP 872 HVC HLB HTP

IP/AIS TRACE RESULTS:

FNU's LISTED REF merola

IP/EIB REMARKS:

NAI TO THAT KNOWN TO THE REQUESTER (OUTGOING CABLE) (630872)

16 DEC 1974

ISR REPLY TO REQUESTER:

DATE: 18 Dec 74

ISRM NUMBER: 39,170

1. Nothing in addition to that ~~xx~~ known by the requester. ~~XXXXX~~ For possible further information you are referred to the FBI and the Department of State.

2. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in ~~XXXXXX~~ Subject who is hereby registered in the ISR to DEA Miami.

EVB

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Classified by 002216
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 5B.1., (2), (3) or 4 (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

FORM 1797

SECRET

FORM 3.09
1.71 MFG. 3.74

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY gl/ PER Sep 103 TOTAL COPIES 15-1 RUN BY ZZ

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED C/LA BY A AT 1835 Z

ACTION UNIT C/LA 6

INFO: RF FILE VR DDO, C/IO/AN, C/OPS/NAR 2 C/OPS C/LSN/NIL

T 617399 EIA292 PAGE 01 IN 432300

TOR:032226Z DEC 74 LMIN 22730

Ruth

Dill

Dan (Action)

S E C R E T 032214Z DEC 74 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 22730

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FLMHABYSS PBRAMPART

REF: UFPS-1727, 25 OCT 74

1. PLEASE PROVIDE PRIORITY TRACES ON THE FOLLOWING DEA NARCOTICS SOURCE AND REGISTER IN THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER (ISR):

JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA (201-257804)

DPOB: 9 OCT 25 IN NEW JERSEY

U.S. CITIZEN

OCC: PILOT

ADD: 135 DUPONT PLAZA, MIAMI, FL.

LOCATION OF USE: COLOMBIA AND HAITI

2. PER REF, ATT. NO. 2 PLS PROVIDE PRIORITY TRACES ON DEA NARCOTICS SOURCE ORLANDO BATISTA VIERA, AND ADVISE IF REGISTERED IN ISR.

3. FILE: 200-11-11: 200-11-11/17. E2, IMPDET

IP [illegible]

Sec

[illegible] 201 — [illegible] 201

S E C R E T

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MEROLA, JOSEPH RAYMOND
201-0257804 200-011-011/19
SEX M DOB 09 OCT 25 LMIM-22730
POB USA, NJ 03 DEC 74
CIT USA
OCC PILOT

RES USA, FLA, MIAMI, 135 DUPONT PLAZA. TRACES
DEA NARCS

DATE 05 MAR 75 CORR CARD 09231716

201-0257804

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

12 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lucien E. Conein
Acting Chief, Special Operations and
Field Support Staff
Office of Intelligence
Drug Enforcement Administration

VIA: Mr. John Warner
Chief, International Intelligence Division

SUBJECT: Name Trace

REFERENCE: Memorandum, Same Subject, SEC-IGI-74-0037,
dated June 5, 1974

1. The matter of Joseph R. Merola (Reference) has been discussed between Mr. Richard Kobakoff of your office and Mr. Stanley Archenhold of this office. Mr. Merola has never worked for this Agency, although we are aware he has made such claims on a number of previous instances.

2. It is suggested that you contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation for information concerning Merola.

Seymour R. Bolten
Seymour R. Bolten
Special Assistant for
Narcotics Control Operations

DONC 74-052

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED ABROAD OR
OUTSIDE THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE RECEIVING AGENCY
WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATOR

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 5 B (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
CLASSIFIED BY 003604

201-257504

SECRET

SECRET

DONC 74-052

DDO/OPS/NARCOG:S.Archenhold:el

COORDINATION: /s/ (gee)
WH/NARC

12 [illegible]
DATE

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/NARC
1 - 201-257804
1 - DDO/NARCOG DONC File

SECRET

DEPT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT
DATE: 5 JUNE 1974
SUBJECT: NAME TRACE
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE #: NONE GIVEN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, San Salvador

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMEMB SAN SALVADOR 0048, 5 February 1974

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Headquarters requested LNERGO traces on Larry A. Carr, because of his business association with Joseph R. Merola. Trace results were negative.

MAD
Marilyn A. DAKOSKI

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 - COS, San Salvador

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 031685

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HSSW-3154	typed 1 April 1974
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	✓201-257804

1 - Chrono
1 - IP/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/2/GS	Patti Burke	mll	1454

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/2/GS		George Colman

OFFICE SYMBOL	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/2	James M. Lawler

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

F-7-2849

CSS-559-74
22 March 1974

Chief, WH/2
ATTN : David L. Smock

Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Joseph E. Merola

REF : Your Memorandum of 11 March 1974

1. For your information, subject has been a volunteer source since 1961. DCD is aware of his unsavory record, but he has from time-to-time produced information of interest.

2. DCD wishes to advise you, however, that we have broken off contact with Merola. Should he contact DCD again, we are obligated to listen politely, take down his information for transmittal to the appropriate area desk, and make absolutely no promises for future contact.

3. Please direct further inquiries to Mr. Evan B. Ames, DCD/Support Branch/Operational Support Section, Room 910, Key Building, extension 2263.

JACKSON R. HORTON

EVAN B. AMES/b
cc: Services Branch (Control)

FILE: HH-25826

SW

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 19 MARCH 1974
SUBJECT: PATTERSON CORPORATION (CENTRAL
AMERICAN AEROSCAPE)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN

[redacted]

MEROLA

SECRET

11 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Collection Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Shaun P. Ryan

SUBJECT: Joseph R. MEROLA

REFERENCE: HH 25826, 8 January 1974

1. On 10 January 1974 the WH/2/GS desk received the referenced memorandum from the Domestic Collection Division indicating the Miami field office had been in contact with one Joseph R. MEROLA. MEROLA had just returned from a business trip to El Salvador; and he reported that a friend of his had identified a Mr. Gremillion in the Political Section of the American Embassy in San Salvador as a suspect CIA representative. Headquarters traces on Joseph R. MEROLA indicated that on several occasions in the past MEROLA had claimed that he was a CIA agent. The Chief of Station, the Mr. Gremillion referred to above, was recently questioned regarding any Embassy contact with MEROLA while the latter was in San Salvador. The COS stated that both within the Embassy community and at social functions MEROLA had frequently referred to his contact with the CIA, past and present. He also volunteered this information to a former Station contact.

2. In light of the above, it would appear that MEROLA had taken advantage of his agency contacts in an inappropriate manner to the potential embarrassment of the San Salvador Station. We would, accordingly, appreciate that this be given due consideration in your assessment of the advantage of your continued contact with him.

David L. Smock
C/WH/2

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 509407

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE

TO: LWH 2 GS - Patti

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Reply from State

FROM: OPS/LSN

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED X YES ☐ NO	DATE 6 February 1974 LETTER NO.
TO: OPS/LIAISON ATTN:	FROM: WH/2/GS	

Request Dept. of State Passport Office biographic information on Larry A. CARR, U.S. citizen, currently in El Salvador negotiating on behalf of the Patterson Corp. to build a helicopter plant.

Patti Burke WH/2/GS

SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT (PASSPORT DIVISION)
DATE: 20 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: LARRY ALTON CARR
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
FILE #: NONE

STATE DEPT DOCUMENTS:

DATE: 13 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PATTERSON CORPORATION (CENTRAL AMERICAN AEROSPACE)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN (DOC #: SAN SALV. 0568)

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT (PATTERSON CORP.)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN (DOC #: SAN SAL. 0048)

DATE: 5 FEBRUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT (PATTERSON CORP.)
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
NO FILE # GIVEN
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALVADOR 0448

Patti,

We have sent a private channel letter to the COS on this matter, ~~noting at~~ asking at the end for comments as to whether MOROLA is "embarrassing" the Station or CIA generally by talking so much about his CIA connections. If his reply is in the affirmative, ~~I~~ it will probably be best for you to draft a note to ~~[illegible]~~ DCD suggesting that he somehow be silenced, perhaps by their withdrawing from contact with them since it is obviously something that he brags about and otherwise tries to take advantage of

gtc.

Matt MacVane, DCD officer in Miami, met with Joseph R. MEROLA on 15 January 1974; at which time MEROLA identified the friend in San Salvador who had identified Mr. Gremillion in the American Embassy in San Salvador as a CIA representative. [redacted] MEROLA also provided the names of two women employed in the Embassy who were ~~reported~~ involved in compromising situations with both Americans and local nationals. MEROLA identified the two women as Nancy SHALLOT and Delia OBESA. MEROLA was met again on 17 January 1974 ~~in an effort to determine any other possible~~ at which time he provided the name of a third woman in the Embassy, Gloria, who has also been involved in compromising situations. Upon ~~query~~ inquiring Headquarters personnel who had recently returned from San Salvador, the above identities were confirmed; all three are American citizens assigned to the Embassy in San Salvador.

Above is a note dated 24 January 1974 from Patti Burke, WH/2/GS/IA, based on information received orally from DCD.

SECRET

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED ☐ YES ☐ NO	DATE 23 January 1974 LETTER NO. OSS-172-74
TO : Chief, WH/2/GS (3 B 4402 Hqs.) ATTN: Patty Burke	FROM: DCD/SB/OSS SPRyan/ds	

SUBJECT: Case 61401 - Joseph Merola

On 18 January 1974, our Miami Field Office advised us of the name of a third person reportedly involved in potentially compromising situations who works at the Embassy. This person was identified as "Gloria" by our source. This information passed verbally to El Salvador Desk Officer on 18 January 1974.

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SHAUN P. RYAN Evan [illegible] for

SIGNATURE

REPLY	DATE

SECRET

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-67 1831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1974
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALV 0256

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Case 61401 - CIA Operative in El Salvador

FROM: DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268
Mr. Shaun P. Ryan SRyan

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 18 January 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/2/GS Atta. Patty Burke 3 B 4402 Hqs.				The attached is for your information and possible interest. (OSS-142-74) E 2 IMPDET CL BY 00.022
2.				
3.				
4.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/SENSITIVE

OSS-142-74
18 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Case 61401 - CIA Operativo in El Salvador

REFS : A.) MIM-006-74, 4 January 1974
B.) TWX DCD/Washington 96860, 16 January 1974
C.) Ryan/MacVane telecon 16 January 1974
D.) Ryan/MacVane telecon 17 January 1974
E.) Ryan/Mainwaring telecon 17 January 1974
F.) TWX DCD/Miami 12475, 17 January 1974
G.) TWX DCD/Miami 12476, 17 January 1974

1. One of our sources in Miami, Joseph Merola, revealed the name and position of an individual reported to be an Agency official in El Salvador to Matt MacVane during the course of an interview on 21 December 1973. This was reported in MIM-006-74 4 January 1974. This report was forwarded to the El Salvador Desk on 8 January 1974. On 16 January 1974 the Desk requested that DCD obtain the name of the individual mentioned in this memorandum who said he knew a CIA officer in the Embassy. This request was passed by telecon and TWX to MacVane by Ryan on 16 January 1974. The El Salvador Desk also questioned the reliability of our source, Joseph Merola, at this time and requested we query Miami as to his reliability.

2. On 17 January 1974 at the request of MacVane, Ryan visited the El Salvador Desk to ascertain their objections to our source, known to us as a convicted felon. Desk objections stemmed from a 1964 report which indicated that Merola had informed persons that he was a "CIA agent". Further conversation elicited the fact that Merola had again made this statement in 1973 at an Embassy function. We advised the Desk that DCD was well aware of Merola's criminal background but that he had provided DCD with reliable reports in the past unrelated to his own "pursuits".

3. The El Salvador desk confirmed the fact that the individual mentioned by Merola's informant as being a CIA officer was in fact such. Ryan advised MacVane of this per telecon on 17 January 1974. MacVane and Mainwaring told Ryan they were sending two cables relating to this case. The first would provide the name of the person who reportedly knew the CIA official. The second provided the names of two women employed in the Embassy who were reportedly involved in

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET/SENSITIVE

compromising situations with both Americans and local nationals. This latter cable was requested after the El Salvador desk officer advised that all avenues and possible leads were to be pursued to determine who leaked the information relating to the CIA official. These two names (phonetically spelled) were provided in the second cable by Miami. All of the information received in these cables was passed via secure phone to the El Salvador desk by Ryan upon receipt.

4. MacVane advised Ryan via telecon that he anticipated meeting with Joseph Merola at 1400 on 17 January to address further matters concerned with this case. MacVane advised Ryan that he would forward such information as soon as possible.

SEAN P. RYAN

cc: Miami Field Office
cc: WH/2/GS
cc: Sensitive Control Officer

JAN 17 1 51 PM '74

SECRET 171845Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12476

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (S.RYAN)

SUBJ: CASE 61401

REF : OOA(S) 322/02566-74

THE IDENTITIES OF THE TWO GIRLS WHO WERE THE SUBJECT OF OUR TELECON ARE:

NANCY SHALLOT

DELIA OBESA

BOTH SPELLINGS ARE PHONETIC, BUT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE. ONE IS SUPPOSEDLY SECRETARY TO MR. TAYLOR. E2 IMPDET CL BY 210658

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T 171845Z JAN 74 STAFF

JAN 17 1 51 PM '74

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12476

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (S.RYAN)

SUBJ: CASE 61421

REF : OUA(S) 322/02566-74

THE IDENTITIES OF THE TWO GIRLS WHO WERE THE SUBJECT OF OUR TELECON ARE:

NANCY SHALLOT

DELIA OBESA

BOTH SPELLINGS ARE PHONETIC, BUT SHOULD BE IDENTIFIABLE. ONE IS SUPPOSEDLY SECRETARY TO MR. TAYLOR. E2 IMPDET CL BY 010652

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 12-2

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 G 0 0 0 0 — PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 172306Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 502254

CONF: WHS INFO: FILE 1(1nd), DCD,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 29
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WH/2/GS

TO: PRIORITY SAN SALVADOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

REFS: A. SAN SALVADOR 20685 |IN 134584*|

B. WH/MIAMI 20664 |IN 135313**|

C. WH/MIAMI 20685 |IN 137730***|

1. FOLLOWING INFO IN ADDITION TRACES REF B: JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA (201-257804). PER DBA 62712, 13 APR 64, SUBJ CLAIMED HE CIA AGENT AND ALLEGED CIA OBTAINED PRESIDENTIAL PARDON FIVE YEAR PRISON SENTENCE FOR RUNNING GUNS CUBA. IN ADDITION CLAIMED CIA ISSUED PASSPORT IN NAME MICHAEL JOSEPH MEROLA FOR TRAVEL CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. PER HQS RECORDS, MEROLA NOT CIA AGENT, BUT HAS BEEN DCD CONTACT SINCE EARLY SIXTIES.

3. 21 DEC 73 MEROLA CONTACTED DCD MIAMI TO ADVISE HE RECENTLY SPOKE WITH FRIEND IN SAN SALVADOR WHO WORKS FOR ANSESAL. FRIEND ADVISED MEROLA NOT GO US EMBASSY SAN SALVADOR TO SEE A MAN NAMED GREMILLION BECAUSE GREMILLION, WHO US EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION OFFICER UNDER SURVEILLANCE ON SUSPICION OF BEING CIA REP SAN SALVADOR. MEROLA TOLD FRIEND HE NEITHER KNEW NOR WOULD HAVE CAUSE TO

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-257804
17 Jan 74

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 031685

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP:

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 502254

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
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SEE SUCH A MAN. FRIEND TOLD MEROLA HE ONLY TELLING HIM FOR HIS OWN GOOD BECAUSE IF MEROLA SAW GREMILLION, MEROLA WOULD BECOME A SUSPECT CIA AGENT AS WELL.

4. DCD MIAMI RECONTACTED MEROLA 15 JANUARY DETERMINE ~~ABOVE~~ IDENTITY "FRIEND" IN SAN SALVADOR. FRECDIEND IDENTIFIED AS (POSS AKA SUBJECT 201-873126) GUILLERMO R O BFE D E R, PRESIDENT INSAFI, MARRIED TO SECRETARY AT US EMBASSY IN SALVADOR CURRENTLY ON MATERNITY LEAVE.

/c

pb

5. MEROLA TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFO AT MTG WITH DCD MIAMI 17 JAN 74. WILL ADVISE.

6. FILE: 201-257804. E2 IMPDET.H

WH COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS TRACES JOSEPH MEROLA, WHO CELAIMED TO BE AERONAEUTICAL CONSULTANT WITH PATTERSON AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA

**WH/MIAMI TRACE REPLY

***NEGATIVE SLIGO BTRACES

DATE: 17 JAN 74
ORIG: PATTI BURKE pb
UNIT: WH/2/GS
EXT: 1868

DCD SHAUN RYAN (DRAFT)
WH/PERMS W. LAYBOURNE (DRAFT)
C/WH/COG O. BATHE (DRAFT)

James E. Flannery
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 031685

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ACTION UNIT WH 8	INFO	RF. FILE VR. [illegible] ops/NAR-2	1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6
ACTION #			

T 009803 PAGE 01-01 IN 137730

TOR:151451Z JAN 74 WHIM 20685

S E C R E T 142112Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20685

TO: SAN SALVADOR INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: A. SAN SALVADOR 22665 (IN 134684)

B. WH/MIAMI 20654 (IN 135313)

1. NO ADDITIONAL SLIGO TRACES ON JOSEPH MEROLA.

2. FILE: 200-11-11/3. E-2, IMPDET.

E2/29

Old ___

R ___

CL ___

II ___

M ___

CS ___

S E C R E T

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT
SUBJECT: PROPOSED HELICOPTER/AIRCRAFT PLANT
DATE: 17 JANUARY 1974
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT #: SAN SALVADOR 00193
NO FILE # GIVEN.

14-00000

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OPS/NAR 2

T 923593 PAGE 01 IN 135313

TOR:112119Z JAN 74 WMIM 20664

S E C R E T 112059Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20664

TO: SAN SALVADOR INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: SAN SALVADOR 20685 (IN 134684)

1. JOSEPH R. MEROLA, DPOB 9 OCT 1925, TURTLE CREEK, PA. STATION CARDS FROM PERIOD 1959-1963 INDICATE HE EX-CONVICT, NOTORIOUS SMUGGLER, GUNRUNNER AND GENERAL TROUBLE-MAKER. CARDS TO LNERGO REPORTS INDICATE HE WAS INVOLVED IN PANAMA INVASION PLAN IN 1959, ANDIN HAITIAN INVASION PLANS IN 1958 AND 1963. IN 1959, HE WAS UNDER INDICTMENT IN PA. FOR INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN ARMS. IN 1960, HE WAS PRINCIPAL IN PROPOSED CUBAN COUNTERFEIT PESO DEAL. LNERGO WAS CONTACTED IN 1961, AND INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD LONG RECORD, HE UNDOUBTEDLY COULD SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALSO IN 1960, HE WAS INTERESTED IN PROVIDING CONTRABAND WHISKEY TO A BRAZILIAN SENATOR, AND ATTEMPTED HAVE LIFTED A "TRAVEL RESTRICTION" WHICH PLACED ON HIM AFTER CONVICTION FOR EITHER CLADESTINELY BRINGING IN TO U.S. THE SON OF [illegible] DICTATOR

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ACTION UNIT

RF FILE VR

ACTION #

T 803593 PAGE 02-02 IN 135313

TOR:112119Z JAN 74 WHIM 20664

FULGENCIO BATISTA, OR FOR CHARGE THAT HE INVOLVED IN THEFT OF GUNS FROM NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY."

2. SUBJECT NOT LISTED 1973 MIAMI TELEPHONE BOOK. LATEST ADDRESS IN CARDS IS: 2018 NORTH BAY RD, MIAMI BEACH, FLA. HE WAS VISITED AT THIS ADDRESS IN 1961 BY MBR OF SLIGO ORGANIZATION, WHO DESCRIBED HOME AS "PALATIAL".

3. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO RECENT INFO ON SUBJECT, SUGGEST THAT HIS PLANS ESTABLISH HELICOPTER PLANT IN SAN SALVADOR MAY HAVE SHADY SIDE, POSSIBLY SMUGGLING ARMS OR LUCRATIVE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC.

4. SINCE SUBJ IS U.S. CIT, REQUEST AGOVE INFO NOT BE PASED LIAISON OR OTHER U.S. GOVT AGENCIES WITHOUT HQS APPROVAL.

5. WILL FORWARD PERTINENT SLIGO TRACES.

6. FILE: 200-11-11/3. E-2, IMPDET.

14-00000

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			3		6	

T 802260 PAGE 01-01 IN 134684

TOR:111322Z JAN 74 SALV 20685

S E C R E T 102325Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SAN SALVADOR 20685

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

201-0357804

1. REQUEST TRACES ON MR. JOSEPH R. MEROLA, AGE 48, BORN PENNSYLVANIA, RESIDENCE QS MIAMI SHORES, FLORIDA. MEROLA CLAIMS BE AERONAUTICAL CONSULTANT WITH PATTERSON AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA. HE SUPPOSEDLY TRYING NEGOTIATE DEAL TO ESTABLISH HELICOPTER PLANT EL SALVADOR. DURING TALKS AT SOCIAL PARTIES WITH EMBASSY PERSONNEL HE INDICATED PREVIOUS WORK WITH BKHERALD.

2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

K

K Svc'd

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

201-357804

11 Jan 74

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CIA Operative in El Salvador

FROM: DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch, Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2283
Mr. Shaun P. Ryan

EXTENSION:

NO. HH-25826

DATE 8 January 1974

TO. (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/2/GS Attn. Kathy Maurer 3 B 4402 Hqs.	10 JAN 1974		WH/2/B
2.			
3. DC/WH/2	11 JAN 1974		
4.			
5. C/WH/2	11 JAN 1974	11 Jan.	
6. C/WH/2/G-S			
7. WH/2/GS/Patti			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached Memorandum HHM-006-74, is for your interest and retention. Please advise us at your earliest convenience of any additional interest or requirements in this matter. Thank you.

cc: CI/OP/WH

— action —

(a) pls call DCD to find out who Merola is — job, etc.

(b) ~~send~~ ~~have~~ ask them to ask Merola who the secret service man is

(c) then send ~~memo~~ [illegible] FYI to Station.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

3:5-6 Suggest we discuss the matter.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

MIM-006-74

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division

DATE: 4 January 1974

ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (JGross)

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: CIA Operative in El Salvador

MURAWSKI??

1. Joe Merola contacted the Miami Office on 21 December 1973 to explain that he recently had spoken with a friend of his in San Salvador, El Salvador. The friend, who allegedly works for the El Salvadoran Secret Service, told Merola that when he (Merola) comes to El Salvador not to go to the US Embassy to see a man named Vermillion. The friend told Merola that Vermillion is the Commercial Attache at the embassy and is under surveillance because he is suspected of being the CIA man in San Salvador. Merola told his friend that he did not know a man named Vermillion, nor would he ever have cause to see such a man. The friend then told Merola that he was only telling him for his own good, and that if he (Merola) were to see this Vermillion that Merola would become a suspected CIA agent as well.

checked w/ DCD.
Granville
pol section

2. Merola said that he was passing this information to us in case we did indeed have a man in San Salvador by the name of Vermillion. Merola has been a contact of the Miami Field Office for some ten years, and during that period he has passed to this office some very reliable information.

Bruce E. Mainwaring
BRUCE E. MAINWARING

MM
MCMacVane:paw

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

4 February 1964

[illegible] Chief, Security Branch

FROM Greg Maruca

[illegible] 785

1. [illegible]

2. Individuals Contacted Lt. Van Buskirk, Metro Intelligence

3. Purpose of Contact To pass info and receive advice.

4. Time and Place of Contact 0930 hours, 4 Feb 64, telephonically

5. Discussion

Lt. Van Buskirk advised that Clifford V. CONNELL, who was arrested about two months ago for illegal possession of about 1½ tons of dynamite will claim as his defense that he was performing a patriotic service for his country by working with Joseph Raymond MEROLA who has on numerous occasions claimed to be working for KUBARK. The trail date has not yet been set. Others involved the same case: Remer Estuez ODOM, and Harold WIDDEN. MEROLA was born 10/9/25, Pittsburgh, Pa. and posseses FBI #4989299. Van Buskirk wanted to know if any of the above are working for KUBARK. Results of Station traces are attached.

Charlie McKay said "Joe has been of interest on intelligence level, informant type not an agent, not on payroll and not in position claim employment". McKay does not want to lose this source of info. He said one John Alie, French National, trying to overthrow Duvalier govt Haiti which might account for dynamite cache.

Advise OO. Advise Van Buskirk that the above individuals are not working for KUBARK.

OO Advised 1515 hrs 4 Feb By C.O.S. C/OO said to tell police Subject (Merola) has been of interest in past as informant - not

Greg Maruca

Greg Maruca

Metro

SECRET

Associated with KUBARK and we are not aware Subject's present activities.

VANBUSKIRK ~~[illegible]~~ advised details of above by Alhadeff 1600 hrs. 4 Feb 64
Van Buskirk said was should be prepared have somebody in court from OO office ready to deny claim of Connell as he intends use this as defense. C.O.S. was so advised.

From Mitch Lawrence
Regarding Joe Merola: Information passed on to Lt. Van Buskirk per our discussion. Van Buskirk advised that we should have somebody ready to go to court and to deny the claim of Connel that he was working on our behalf. The date for the trial is not as yet set and Van Buskirk said there is no hurry, but he would like to know whether or not we would have somebody there in as much as this person intends to base his defense on the basis of his working for us.

1645

SECRET

T [illegible] [illegible] PAGE 01 IN [illegible]

[illegible] 21 [illegible] MAY 77

S E C R E T 021322Z APR 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32956

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT [illegible] [illegible] FULL [illegible]

LAUDER FROM [illegible]

1. AS HQS AWARE, ON 9 MARCH 1977 MR. EUGENE M. P R O P P E R, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND MR. E. LAWRENCE B A R C E L L A, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DISIP AND REQUESTED WHATEVER LEADS AND INFORMATION VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES COULD PROVIDE ON ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORLANDO B O S C H AVILA AND THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR AND CABINET MINISTER ORLANDO L E T E L I E R.

2. WNSCARLET-[illegible] REPORTED ON 29 APRIL THAT [illegible] G A R C I A, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS OF DISIP, HAD HEARD THAT [illegible] HAS EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THE LACK OF ASSISTANCE [illegible] TO HIM IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE LETELIER [illegible]. DISIP OFFICIALS WERE SURPRISED AND UNHAPPY WITH [illegible] ALLEGED STATEMENT, SINCE DISIP OFFICIALS HAD EXTENDED COURTESIES, COOPERATION, TIME AND INFORMATION TO PROPPER DURING HIS VISIT IN

S E C R E T

file

TWX [illegible] FBI

Ricardo Morales /201

CARACAS. DISIP OFFICIALS HAD FACILITATED PROPPER'S INTERVIEW AND DEBRIEFING OF ORLANDO BOSCH AND THEY HAD PROVIDED PROPPER WITH ONE PEICE OF EVIDENCE WHICH PROPPER APPARENTLY WAS SEEKING EAGERLY, A MAP OF THE UNITED STATES DELINEATING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO INDICATE THAT GUILLERMO NOVO, AND IGNACIO NOVO, CUBAN EXILES, WERE TO HAVE JURISDICTION FOR CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHERE THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION OCCURRED. PROPPER WAS CONCERNED THAT A MAP INDICATING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD DISCLOSE SOMEONE ELSE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT AREA, AS THE NOVO BROTHERS WERE PROPPER'S PRIME SUSPECTS.

3. GARCIA ALSO SAID THAT RICARDO MORALES, A FORMER DISIP OFFICIAL, HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY PROPPER TO APPEAR IN COURT AS A WITNESS. MORALES WAS CONCERNED THAT ONCE WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS, HE COULD BE CHARGED WITH UNSPECIFIED VIOLATIONS; THUS, MORALES, WHO IS IN THE U.S., HAD GONE INTO HIDING.

4. WE ARE SENDING THIS INFORMATION VIA THE [illegible] CHANNEL BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE SENSITIVITY CONCERNING REFERENCE TO ALLEGED ACTIVITIES OF A U.S. OFFICIAL. IF HQS DOES NOT PERCEIVE ANY SUCH SENSITIVITY, WE OF COURSE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO REMOVAL OF THIS CABLE

STAFF

INFO

FILE VR

T 615550 EIA493 PAGE 02-03 IN [illegible]

TOR:0237222 MAY 77

FROM THE FLVKCADET CATEGORY.

5. FILE: 75-2-20/3, 200-12-208/1. E2, IMPDET.

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG 7-76

24

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T 812745 EIA826 PAGE 01 IN 266922

TOR:292234Z APR 77 CARA 32949

S E C R E T 292205Z APR 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32949

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI

RYBAT WNINTEL REAM

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 0 2 1977
MICROFILMED

2P

ABSTRACT
(2, 3) 3
(19)
CI

1. ON 28 APRIL 1977 WKDIET-5 REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (SUBJECT OF 201-0285923), AKA "EL MONO", IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED IN MIAMI A CUBAN EXILE BY THE NAME OF ROBERTO PARSONS. WKDIET-5 SAYS THAT PARSONS WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND UNDERTOOK SEVERAL CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA. HE SAID AT TIMES PARSONS HELPED GET PEOPLE OUT OF CUBA FOR A PRICE. PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976. THE EXACT REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

Kathy Skiba
Tube EU2

2. FOLLOWING ARE TRACES ON ROBERTO PARSONS: ACCORDING TO JMWAVE-1302, 16 FEBRUARY 1968, AN AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT WAS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 12 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO. PARSONS WAS A BKHERALD AGENT FROM 1965 THROUGH 1967 WHEN HE WAS TERMINATED ON 30 NOVEMBER WITHOUT PREJUDICE. HE WAS USED IN EXFILTRATION AND INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUSLY

201-779687

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

29 Apr 77

B201-779687

201-285923

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INFO

MAY 1977

T 810745 EIA888 PAGE 02-02 IN 266922

TOR:292234Z APR 77 CARA 32949

ON THE DSE AND DGI.

3. INDEX PARSONS. FILE: ~~75-120-28.~~ 201-0285923.

E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

14-00000

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 55

ESQUIRE
MARCH 1977

The Incident

by Taylor Branch and John Rothchild

How two mild-mannered reporters, on the trail of a Washington bomber, landed in Caracas and ran afoul of the Venezuelan secret service, warring Cuban terrorists, the Miami police, the State Department, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and the most dangerous man alive—all this, and their mothers didn't know a damn thing about it

Are There Pay Phones in Caracas?

They are on the Pan Am night flight to Caracas, three hours away from at least a hundred murder stories and a lot of steaming intrigue.

"What are our chances of getting through this alive?" asks Rothchild.

"Well, that all depends on who you talk to and how paranoid they are," says Branch. "Our friends in Washington used to be simple journalists and policy analysts. Now they are three-pay-phone men. That means you can't call them without using three pay phones. You call them up and all they'll say is 'phone number one.' Then they go to pay phone number one and you call them again. Then they ask you for the number of *another* pay phone near yours, and they call you on that one."

"What do you talk about?"

"Things like pay phones and letter bombs and whether the Feds can be trusted. The last time I called they told me we would be walking into four nests of known killers: the Cuban exiles in Venezuela, the Venezuelan secret police, the C.I.A. and the Chilean secret police."

"Is that true?"

"Well, it's true that all those people are down there," Branch says, "but I don't think they would be after us."

Rothchild does not look reassured. He does not like the way Branch reels off the life histories of all the C.I.A. Cubans he has known, especially since the point is always that the situation is too complicated for words. "Tell me," Rothchild says gravely, "did you tell your mother you were going to Venezuela?"

Branch squirms at the cruel question. He wants to appear as knowledgeable and confident as possible, because he has dragged Rothchild into this adventure on less than a day's notice. "No, I didn't tell her," he admits. "It's too complicated. But I think we'll only have one point of danger."

"When's the point of danger?"

"Well, we may get into the prison and get our answers," Branch replies, "or we may get them from people in the Venezuelan government. Either way, we'll know who did the murders and who paid the killers and what other murders they've done. That's what we hope, anyway. If we get that information, we'll be hot until we get rid of it. We'll have to phone it out of

continued



Orlando Bosch *Ricardo Morales*

there and then run like bandits."

Branch looks out the airplane window and pictures Orlando Letelier lying in the middle of Massachusetts Avenue, his legs blown off at the thigh, his torso pulverized, detectives all around. On the curb nearby sat his passenger Ronni Moffitt, her eyes frozen, holding her throat. The bomb in Letelier's car had blown a sliver of metal through Ronni Moffitt's carotid artery, and she was drowning in her own blood. Her husband sat nearby, suffering from shock, watching his wife die. She was twenty-five. The killers were the kind of people who would machine-gun a whole crowd of people in a public square just to hit their mark. They wouldn't care about the others. Ronni Moffitt could just as easily have been half the people Branch knew in Washington. The next day Jerry Ford rode right over the bloody spots in the road on his way to a reception for the president of Liberia; he never said a word about Washington's first gangland-style political assassination. Unwise to talk about it, especially if the force behind the murders is most likely the government of Chile. The military junta there overthrew Salvador Allende with a big boost from the C.I.A., which is still thick as thieves with the generals. Letelier was ambassador to the United States under Allende, then foreign affairs minister, interior minister and defense minister. He had been jailed and tortured by the generals after the coup, then, a year later, deported, and in September of last year he was stripped of his citizenship.

From the day of the murder, Branch had been pondering the bomb he thought was used on Letelier—C-4, a white, odorless dough resembling Silly Putty. Branch had heard many Cubans tell tales about C-4 and its predecessor, C-3. It was the C.I.A.'s favorite substance for sabotage in the war against Castro, and thousands of Cubans were trained in its use. Branch had not been surprised when evidence came out that Cuban exiles might have pulled the Letelier job, but he was surprised by tips he received that they had also killed hundreds of others on a big spree in the Caribbean. God, there is something big going on, he had thought. And all his sources and his instincts told him the answers were in Venezuela, of all places.

It was now October 21, one month to the day since the Letelier murder.

"So you decided to take a little trip to Caracas too, I guess." It is Hilda I[illegible]n, a reporter for *The Miami News*, standing in the aisle, looking down at us. She is a specialist on Latin terrorism in Miami.

"Looks like it," says Branch, shrugging. So much for the secret trip. Yet he is inclined to trust Inclán, even though he and Rothchild had met her only that day, while going through clips at the morgue of the *News*. The three work out a way to make contact in Caracas. Branch is embarrassed at being a little reserved. Inclan is candid, her face cheerful and open.

Inclán leans over and whispers, "Listen, I think you should be careful. There's something strange going on. This flight is crawling with cops and prosecutors from Miami."

Branch and Rothchild turn their heads in unison, and their necks sink down into their shoulders. There are two young Latin men in the back with neatly trimmed beards, unisex hairdos and brightly colored shirts. There are several men in the front who do not look like ordinary passengers. Rothchild decides there might not *be* any ordinary passengers.

"What are they doing here?" Branch asks bluntly.

"Who knows?" says Inclán. "I know these guys from Miami. They give me tips sometimes. But now they aren't giving me the time of day. I don't understand them, so I'm going to act just like they are. I don't think you should let them in on what you're up to, either."

"Those cops are Cubans, aren't they?" Branch asks.

Inclán nods. Branch worries. Cubans on the Miami police force are a strange lot, he has heard. The cops want to infiltrate Cuban terrorist groups and drug-running organizations, but sometimes it turns out that the terrorists and drug runners are infiltrating the cops.

Branch and Rothchild exchange signs of bewilderment as Inclán drifts back to her seat. "Jesus Christ,

Orlando Letelier's bombed car, Washington, D.C.



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

John Rothchild *Hilda Inclán* *Taylor Branch*

John," Branch mutters. "I figured we'd be in for some scrapes, but I never thought it would start before we even got there." Then he's all business. "I've got to give you a quick briefing on our main man while we have the chance. We may not have as much leisure time as we expected."

Branch pulls down their dinner trays and spreads out a pile of notes and news clippings. Then he pulls out a police mug shot. "Meet Orlando Bosch," he says.

Rothchild stares incredulously at a porcine Cuban man with a thin moustache and thick lips. "He looks like the headmaster of a military school."

"I know," Branch says, "but he's a killer. He's also a pediatrician. This whole thing's like that—yin and yang, Boston Strangler and Mad Hatter all mixed up." Branch eyes the mass of clippings and notes, wondering where to begin. "It would take all night to go through what I've heard about Bosch, so I'll get you up to Letelier as quick as I can for now. The background is simple: Bosch has been a political terrorist—what they call an action man—ever since the late Forties in Cuba. He worked for Castro, then for the C.I.A., and then he denounced the C.I.A. He has been an anti-Castro outlaw since the mid-Sixties, always telling the Miami Cubans not to trust the C.I.A. in their war against Castro. Now most of the hard-line Cubans believe him. Bosch is the patriarch of Cuban terrorism."

Branch pauses, then flips briskly through the clippings. "Bosch got arrested and indicted pretty regularly all through the Sixties. He usually got off. The witnesses against him tended to sweat a lot and forget things on the stand, if they even showed up. In general, Bosch had a threefold operation: first, political terror against Castro sympathizers; second, ordinary crimes like extortion from rich people and companies to finance the political terror; and third, all kinds of wars and feuds with his terrorist rivals. Finally, Bosch got nailed in 1968 for shelling a Polish freighter in Miami harbor. He got ten years, but he was paroled in 1972. That brings us to his international period."

Branch picks up one particular clip and holds it in readiness. "Bosch went underground two years after his parole and the pace of Miami bombings escalated. So did terrorist bombings against Castro's embassies all over the world. Then, in 1974, important Cubans started getting knocked off in gangland-style murders. A lot of groups, including Bosch's, took credit for them. The word was that C.I.A. stooges were being eliminated. Bosch became a phantom. Mysterious figures with names like Ernesto would pop up in the Miami press to speak for him. Here's a *Miami News* clip from this period. It's headlined 'Bosch Declares War on Castro.' Hilda wrote it. She's the last American reporter to interview Bosch. Shortly after it came out, Bosch slipped out of the country."

While Rothchild studies the clips, Branch continues. "He got arrested in Venezuela about two years ago. The Justice Department decided not to ask for his return to the United States despite all he's wanted for. That's weird. Then the Venezuelans turned him loose and he left with a bunch of Chilean bodyguards and a big pile of money. I heard all kinds of stories about Bosch being down in Chile with the Pinochet junta there, bargaining. Now the stories jump to February of last year, when Bosch got arrested in Costa Rica right before Kissinger visited. The rumor is that he was plotting to assassinate Kissinger. Bosch got out of Costa Rica somehow, and pretty soon there was a secret meeting in the Dominican Republic of all the major Cuban terrorist groups, which the Dominicans allowed, of course. There was a negotiated truce, and the terrorists united under Bosch in an umbrella group called CORU, supposedly with the support of several juntas in Latin America.

"Now in the last month there has been the Letelier murder," Branch continues grimly. "The terrorists showed that they were not afraid to kill in the United States, right in the capital. They have even threatened to kill one of the F.B.I. agents on the Letelier case. And his fiancée. The anonymous threats show they have collected a lot of intelligence about the agent's life. The F.B.I. is upset. Then, two weeks after Letelier was killed, terrorists blew up a Cuban plane near Barbados, killing seventy-three people. Castro blamed the C.I.A. and canceled the anti-skyjacking treaty. The terrorists loved it: Castro and the Americans getting

continued

mad at each other. Then Bosch got ar[illegible]d in Venezuela again, along with a whole bunch of Cuban exiles. Stories have been seeping out in the Venezuelan press linking Bosch with both Letelier and the Cuban plane. I picked up similar stories in Miami. My sources there tell me the Cubans in jail are almost all former C.I.A. men, F.B.I. informants and a few veterans of the Venezuelan secret police, the DISIP. Some people say DISIP has tortured the hell out of these guys, but other people say DISIP is in bed with them—holding them under protective custody till the heat blows over. It's the biggest damn mess you ever saw."

"You folks wouldn't mind telling me who you are and what you're up to, would you?"

Rothchild and Branch look up at the man standing in the aisle. He wears a leisure suit with a flashy shirt opened to his sternum, showing a lot of tan and some tufted chest hair.

"Well," says Branch, "I'm not sure. What are you doing? We're just thinking about racetracks and Cubans and stuff like that."

"Come on now. You can tell me," the man urges.

"Don't tell him anything," says Hilda Inclán from behind. She is laughing as if it were a game, but her eyes signal a warning.

Branch is way off-balance. "I'll take the fifth. Why don't we start with you?"

"Okay," says the man, smiling. "I'll play it your way, friend. My name's George Yoss. I'm an assistant state's attorney out of Miami." He flashes an ID card. Branch and Rothchild can't believe it. He seems more like a condominium salesman who wishes he could be a golf pro. "Is that right, Hilda?" Branch asks.

"Yeah, but he's being a bad boy tonight," she replies. "Tell him to mind his own business, whatever that is."

"Okay," says Yoss, "I'm going to give you one more chance. I know you're a journalist. Why don't we start with who you work for?"

Branch looks down and notices that his hands have been covering up the news clippings unconsciously. "These gave me away, eh?" he says weakly. "I'll tell you what. You've got me a little paranoid. Why don't you give me the name of your hotel and I'll call you when we get our feet on the ground? We can talk this over."

"Why don't we start with who you work for?" Yoss persists. He is still kidding, but there is an edge to it. "You may need me down here. You never know. This is a strange country and you guys could find yourselves on the next plane out. I'll give you one more chance."

"I think I'll lay low for the moment," Branch says.

Yoss makes a few more thrusts, then saunters off.

"Maybe I was too set on getting into the country on the sly," Branch says. "That sure didn't work out. This flight's like a goddamn convention! Tell me, Hilda. None of the Cuban cops is named Raúl Diaz, I hope?"

"That's Diaz right behind you," she replies.

"Oh, shit!" says Branch. He turns slowly in his seat and finds himself staring at one of the handsome Cubans.

"You must be Taylor Branch," Raúl Diaz says with a smile.

"And you're Raúl." Br[illegible] gives him a limp handshake and slumps down in his seat. Hilda Inclán shakes her head and walks off.

"Who's Raúl?" asks Rothchild.

"He's Rolando Martinez' son-in-law. One of the Watergate guys. I spent a lot of time with him in Miami."

"What's so bad about that?" asks Rothchild.

"I don't know. It's just that he probably knows who my Cuban contacts are, and I don't know what the hell he's up to. You see, some of the people who have been telling me about the terrorists are right-wingers and some of them are left-wingers. I don't care about anything except the Letelier murder, but I think it would be healthy for us if we could keep the two groups separate. The only way we can do that is to stay kind of incognito."

"You're doing great so far," Rothchild says. His mind has been wandering over the Bosch briefing. "What makes you think we can get into the prison to see Bosch and his friends?" he asks. "And why would they want to talk to us?"

"It's a long shot," Branch answers. "But Bosch is in a tough spot. The Castro government wants him, and Bosch knows that would mean curtains for him. He also knows that he could get killed any day in Venezuela by either his friends or his enemies. He may figure that his best chance to survive is to come to the United States. What we hope is that he wants to get some of his story out in the American press to force the government to turn the screws and get him back in the States. That's what I hear from some of our Venezuelan contacts. I don't know if it's true, but they are pretty high up. Now even if we can't talk to Bosch and the other prisoners directly, we might get stuff indirectly from the Venezuelans."

"What happens if all the Venezuelan contacts turn out to be flaky?"

"Then we'll just have to poke around," says Branch. "I have a lot of names. There's only one guy I know down here personally. He's a Cuban named Ricardo Morales. I interviewed him back in 1974, just before he came to Venezuela. People in Miami tell me he's way up high in the DISIP, the secret police. I don't know what he's doing now, but he might be a good fallback if nothing else works out."

Rothchild is encouraged. At least Branch knows one real person. "What's he like?"

"He's one of the most cynical people I've ever met," Branch replies, "but I liked him anyway. He doesn't have any illusions about the business he's in, and he makes fun of all the people who do. Ricardo is an old operator, even though he's only in his late thirties. He worked for Castro's secret police. Then he worked for the C.I.A. as an explosives expert. He fought for the Agency in the Congo in the mid-Sixties, and then became an F.B.I. informant. *He's* the guy who got Bosch convicted in 1968. Small world, isn't it? He surfaced in court with everything on tape. Then all hell broke loose. Morales' car was blown up. He survived but blamed Bosch for trying to kill him. Morales himself was indicted for first-degree murder, but he got off. He's a survivor if there ever was one."

"So he must hate Bosch, then," says Rothchild.

"Well, yes," says Branch.

continued

"It sounds like Bosch and Morales have tried hard enough to kill each other." Branch hesitates and then decides not to tell Rothchild that some of the old C.I.A. Cubans in Miami believe Bosch and Morales have patched things up. Branch does not believe it and it would make things too gnarled. "It's amazing that the Venezuelans would have a guy like Morales high up in their security apparatus," he says absentmindedly. "I mean he's a Cuban, and he has worked for Castro, the C.I.A., and the F.B.I., and he's a veteran of gangland-type warfare. It's like finding a West German high up in the C.I.A. and then discovering that he has also worked for the KGB and the Shah of Iran. But from what I hear, that's a pretty common background to have down here. There are Cubans all over Latin America."

Branch begins packing up the newsclips. "I'm paranoid as hell about this plane," he says. "We're supposed to get a call at the hotel around midnight. That gives us an hour to get through customs and get settled. I want to hustle away from these guys and make sure we're on time."

A Greeting from Rómulo

Rothchild and Inclán notice a huddle of shady five-footers lurking in a dark corner beside the airport entrance. They must be a Venezuelan tour group, Rothchild thinks, waiting for a bargain flight out of the country. I'm not going to get paranoid about everything I see. But the group stares at the passengers; their suits blend so well into the shadows that all you see are their mirror sunglasses. They look like a display of Foster Grants at the back of an unlighted drugstore.

They stop looking only when the Miami assistant state's attorneys and cops, the same ones who have been bugging Branch on the plane, go over and give some of the men in the shadows warm, Latin embraces. Inclán thinks it is a meeting between the Miami law-enforcement contingent and the Venezuelan secret police. She catches up in the line and says she has recognized one of the people in the police huddle as Ricardo Morales, the mysterious Cuban who is supposed to be Branch's fallback contact in Caracas. Branch is stunned. First he is reading clips about Cubans and cops, and the Cubans and cops start fingering him on the airplane. Now Morales.

"Give me your papers and follow me!" a voice booms suddenly. It belongs to a man in a turtleneck sweater and leather jacket. A flunky moves next to each reporter in the line. There is nothing to do but hand over the passports and follow.

Turtleneck and his gang herd the reporters into a special room at the back of the airport. He disappears into another office, leaving them alone with an old man seated behind a desk. There is furious typing coming from the adjacent room into which Turtleneck has disappeared. His flunkies keep running back and forth from one room to the other.

In about ten minutes, Turtleneck returns and hands each of the reporters a *citación*—in triplicate. Rothchild, translating for Branch, doesn't remember the legal definition of the word *citación*. He does, however, recognize a word farther down in the document—*cárcel*. *Cárcel* means jail. The reporters are being summoned to attend some kind of meeting in a sinister-sounding room, D-034, in a building somewhere in Caracas at nine a.m. the following day. The letterhead belongs to DISIP.

Turtleneck keeps saying it is all routine—just sign the *citación* and everybody can get a good night's sleep. While Rothchild struggles to understand the fine print, Inclán tells him she thinks it might be a mistake to acknowledge the summons. It might conceivably be construed as an admission of something, and the reporters don't know what it is for. Inclán decides to try an offensive to get information. She whips out her notebook as if to write a traffic ticket and asks Turtleneck what his name is. He doesn't answer. She repeats the question and finally he mumbles, "Inspector Rómulo."

"That's all there is to it?"

"Yeah. Just Rómulo."

"Who ordered you to do this?"

"I don't know. I can't say. It's just a procedure."

"Why is this happening to us?"

"It is so because it is so."

Inclán writes that down.

Branch, whose rudimentary knowledge of Spanish often led him to offend the Cuban community in Miami—where he would mean to say "what a grand wedding this is" and end up saying "what tremendous tits you have"—is getting a headache trying to keep up with the conversation. "Isn't there somebody who speaks English here?" he keeps asking.

"That's all right," says Rothchild. "The guy isn't saying a damn thing in Spanish, either." Inclán agrees.

The reporters get nowhere. Police keep circling, and an evasive Rómulo keeps cracking his knuckles, pacing back and forth between rooms, thrusting pens into the reporters' hands like a door-to-door salesman pushing magazine subscriptions. Inclán asks him if they will go to jail for not signing. Rómulo says, "No, you won't go to jail for that, and I don't care what you do. My orders were to hand you this *citación*, and that I have done. The rest is entirely up to you."

Inclán decides to accept the summons but not to sign it, based on Rómulo's assertion that it remains in force no matter what. Branch and Rothchild go along after a brief huddle. Rómulo is definitely peeved. He hands each of them a summons in an envelope and tells them to leave.

"I don't understand how they picked us out," says Inclán in the cab. "Especially you, John. You're not even coming as a reporter. They couldn't have gotten us off our documents." The o[illegible]ogical explanation is that someone on the plane tipped off the Venezuelans. But why?

Branch thrashes around in his spy world for answers. Nothing seems to fit. The three of them theorize all the way to the hotel, and they can only settle, like Alexander Haig, on a sinister force. Branch is still sure that the summons will be lifted as soon as he can talk to his friendly contacts in Venezuela. Rothchild keeps looking out the window for a tail.

A Visit to a Small Hotel

The taxi drops them off at the Anauco Hilton, where Inclán is staying. Branch offers to carry Inclán's bags. The lobby, amazingly, is filled with the same DISIP lurkers; they have managed to move their whole scene intact. They are leaning against walls and sitting on the couches. Branch looks toward the elevator in time to see the Miami attorneys and cops scurrying to get inside, frantically pushing buttons to get the door to close. They are as jittery about seeing the reporters as the reporters are about seeing the Venezuelan goons. And the most jittery of all, in the middle of the elevator, is Ricardo Morales himself. Morales is staring at the ceiling, trying to avoid eye contact, and Branch has the feeling that Morales is scared. It is the first time he has seen fear on the face of this hardened veteran of Congo wars and Castro plots and murders. Seeing Morales scared makes Branch scared. He warns Inclán not to go anywhere or do anything—just to call him when he arrives at his hotel, the Avila.

Back in a taxi Branch is going through another run of Cuban politics. "I don't know, John," he says. "Maybe Morales *is* behind all this, but I can't figure out why he's doing it. He sure looked as if he's in trouble. He could have been making some secret deal with those cops. Something he knows about one of those bombings in Miami. Morales might not know that we were on the flight by accident. He might think we were tailing the cops."

Rothchild is trying not to listen. The only sure contact he thought Branch had has suddenly turned into a potential enemy. Rothchild is petrified by the thought that Branch has gotten in over his head. "I think we are in more trouble," he says. "Look behind you."

This time there is a tail. The other car is right on their bumper as they wind up the back streets of Caracas. "They aren't even pretending not to be following," Rothchild says. "I don't think that's a good sign."

Branch, overwhelmed, keeps looking at the car behind them. "You know," he says with a smile, "this is the first time I've ever been tailed." Rothchild feels as if he is being cranked through the roller of Graham Greene's typewriter.

They reach the Hotel Avila, a Casablanca-type place at the top of a hill. It seems deserted until Rothchild looks down from a balcony near their room. There are people pulling into the driveway in small cars, and they have

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walkie-talkies and revolver bulges at the waists of their plain dark suits. They station themselves around the hotel entrance and even in the flower beds. They have the place surrounded.

There have been no phone calls—or at least that is the word from the desk. Branch paces nervously around the room. He thinks that something he already knows about C.I.A. Cubans and terrorism must be the key to what's happening, but he doesn't know what it is. He tells everything he knows to Rothchild, going all the way back through Prio and the pre-Castro student movement. Rothchild thinks Branch has lost his mind. It is fear, he figures. Branch realizes that Rothchild is lying down on the bed pretending not to be awake, that he has fallen into a stupor. It is fear, Branch figures.

Then a call comes through, but it is not the contact Branch awaits. It is Inclán, who has been denied a room at the Hilton (even though she had a reservation) and she can't reach anybody at the U.S. Embassy. She wonders what the hell is going on. Branch tells her the situation at the Avila, but she decides to come over; there are lots of rooms and at least the reporters can show some solidarity.

It takes a long time, too long, for Inclán to show up. Branch wanders downstairs; Rothchild waits by the phone for calls that never come. There is an uproar at the desk. The clerk is telling Inclán there are no rooms available even though the bank of keys is behind him in full view. He holds that position for about five minutes, then retreats to "there is some problem with you people. I can't give you a room." He seems scared. Everybody seems scared. Denying a woman a room at three a.m. in Venezuela is a serious violation of the chivalric code. The three reporters talk about it, but they can't sit down or move around without being followed, almost mimicked, by cops. There are now at least six of them in the lobby at all times. Inclán decides she will sleep on a couch in the lobby, and she wonders if she should put on her nightgown for the goons. She sets her bags beside one couch, and the bellhop directs her over to a better one with a gracious flourish; he could have been opening the door to the wedding suite.

After vainly scouring the lobby for pay phones, the reporters agree that they have to make a move for the room so they can talk near a phone. The three make their way up the stairs like Cary Grant tiptoeing between bedrooms. To their relief, no one stops Inclán.

Branch offers Inclán his bed, saying he will sleep on the floor. Rothchild doesn't say anything, but his paranoia tells him it is foolish to give the Venezuelans a chance to arrest them under the pretext of immoral conduct. Rothchild keeps opening the door because of his paranoia; Branch keeps closing it because of his. He doesn't want to be listened in on. Branch and Rothchild are not communicating much with each other by now. Each is worried that whatever he says the other will think it is crazy.

Inclán tries to phone her editor in Miami, but it becomes clear after about an hour of excuses that the desk clerk isn't going to put through her call. Local lines still seem to be available, but whom to call? Branch has his list of connections, but these people are in their own delicate situations and Branch doesn't want to blow their covers by calling at four a.m. on what is certainly a tapped line. Inclán can't get an answer at the U.S. Embassy. Rothchild has nobody to call, and that is one of his problems. Since he is so unconnected with the story, he is sure that the police will figure he is the heavy—a deep-cover C.I.A. man out of retirement from the Everglades.

By elimination, the reporters can think of only one person in Venezuela that they could contact. Inclán has figured out, from her visit to the Anauco Hilton, what *floor* Ricardo Morales is staying on and she thinks she knows what his room number is. Her plan is to call him directly. It is clearly a desperation move. Inclán rings up Morales at the Anauco Hilton, apologizes for the hour and begins to explain her predicament, but it is clear things are not going well. Morales apparently is denying that he is Morales. "You aren't Ricardo Morales?" Inclán asks incredulously. "You know me and I know you. I talked to your nephew in Miami yesterday. His family is fine and he sends his warmest regards."

There is a pause and Inclán begins to sound like a panelist on *What's My Line?*. "You've never heard of a Morales? Who are you then? Your voice sounds familiar. You're not a Venezuelan. You sound Cuban. Are you a Cuban?" Morales says he is tired of being interrupted in his sleep; he hangs up the phone.

An air of resignation has settled over the room. It is almost morning and the goons are still standing by the bushes. The reporters are under some kind of house arrest and they feel caged. They wonder why Morales has just denied being himself. Maybe all this is happening because they know who he is and Morales fears they will ruin his cover identity. Or maybe Morales doesn't want Branch to reveal his background to anybody in Venezuela. The reporters kick this notion around, but it doesn't fit. It seems preposterous that the Venezuelans don't know about Morales' previous lives, which are talked about all the time in the Miami rumor mill.

Branch paces around the room, trying to make his mind catch up with his fears. He even asks Inclán whether she is guarding some secret that might have caused the trouble. Inclán says no and politely doesn't return the question. The reporters already trust each other instinctively, but the spy world threatens to swallow them up, too. They decide there is nothing to do except try anything to reach the outside world in the morning before getting shuttled off to the DISIP.

Inclán goes off to the lobby for some sleep on her couch. Branch tells Rothchild the rumor about the rapprochement between Morales and Bosch, saying he'd even heard Bosch had been staying in Morales' apartment. But it doesn't make any sense. Nothing does. Branch babbles on until he finally runs out of nervous energy. "Well, John," he says, smiling thinly as he sinks onto the bed, "I was right about one thing. I told you it wouldn't be a boring weekend."



Morales Takes Over

It is five-thirty a.m. and somebody is pounding on the door. Rothchild, a light sleeper, jumps out of bed. He opens the door just a crack, and then the door is thrown back so hard it bangs against the wall like a gunshot. A man in a green suit with a long walkie-talkie hanging from his belt bursts past Rothchild, throwing on all the lights.

continued

"Pack!" he yells. In half a second he is all the way across the room. "Pack!" Branch sits up straight in bed and in the most plaintive voice Rothchild has ever heard him use, a mixture of recognition, terror, disappointment, confusion and pleading, says just one word: "Ricardo?"

It is Morales all right. Branch watches him snatch back the curtains to check the balcony, then dart around the chairs. "Pack!" There is a rhythm to his order. He is moving like a cat, frenzied but in total control. Rothchild feels the energy coming off him in waves. He slips into the bathroom to piss just to get away from Morales, but he is so scared that nothing comes.

More orders come out in staccato bursts—"Get those bags closed! Give me your passports! Give me your airline tickets!" Branch and Rothchild are convinced that he wants to destroy the documents before he kills them. Morales leaves the room within two minutes, but his performance leaves so much afterlife that Rothchild and Branch don't do anything once he has left. They don't call anybody, they don't sneak off the balcony, they don't even say a word to each other.

Both of them jump off the floor when the phone rings, then look dumbly at each other. Branch picks up the receiver, grunts, and puts it down. "All the guy said was, 'He is waiting,'" he tells Rothchild. Branch's own voice sounds far off to him.

Inclán has had rough going downstairs, maybe rougher than the other two because she is alone and also because she is not yet a U.S. citizen. Morales wakes her up with the same staccato commands. She thinks maybe he is going to take her away and have her deported back to Havana. She is so scared that she locks herself in the bathroom and doesn't come out until she hears the other two reporters stumbling downstairs with their bags.

Morales twists the knife with a little humiliation. "Pay your bill!" he yells. Branch doesn't think he should have to pay for the hospitality he has received, but he pulls out his wallet without a second's hesitation. "Pick up your bags! Let's go!" The reporters are hustled out of the lobby, past a squadron of sunglasses. Morales is already ahead of them, barking orders on his walkie-talkie. It is still dark.

The reporters are put into the back of a car. Morales and a driver are up front. Nobody is talking much. Branch is wearing his best suit, which he does not remember putting on during Morales' brutal prodding. Now he thinks maybe something deep in his unconscious had ordered him to look his best. Rothchild is terrified that they are traveling in a private car instead of an official police car. His fear of being officially detained is rapidly being replaced by a fear of being unofficially bumped off. He keeps looking back at the car full of goons that is following close behind as they careen down the mountain at one hundred twenty kilometers an hour.

The car is heading out of town now, [illegible] the populated areas and into those [illegible] where executions and accidents take place. Branch is desperately trying to make contact with Morales. He mentions some people from Miami that he and Morales had once talked to together. But every time Branch drops a name, Morales turns the volume up on the radio. He leaves it that way, blaring, until the questioner gives up and sits back in his seat. But desperation creates another question, another try, which ends in another mambo blast. Branch gives up on the name-dropping and even tries some spy-world guilt production. "Rip would not like what you are doing to us," he says. "Rip would be ashamed." Rip Robertson was Morales' gun-toting case officer in the Congo operations. Rothchild thinks Branch is foolish to bring up the Congo and remind Morales how little he cares for human life. Morales says nothing. He just gives the radio knob another twist.

Inclán is taking the personal route again, talking about this nephew she has seen, mentioning other relatives of Morales who live in Miami. Morales isn't answering her, either. He is getting tired of the radio. Now he just leans his head over against the door to get some sleep. Watching Morales nod, the fury turned off like a light, Branch's mind is filled with memories of Miami Cubans telling stories of legendary agents who would drop off to sleep just before landing in Cuba on a C.I.A. commando raid. He never quite believed the stories, but he thinks Morales' nap is very effective theater. Rothchild is also watching the nap. Every time Morales nods, Rothchild thinks he is ducking so that the bullets from the car behind won't hit him. Rothchild ducks, too.

After about twenty minutes of driving, the road flattens out and the reporters can see the airport in the distance. Morales mentioned "airport" once back in the hotel lobby, but the reporters were never sure he intended to take them there. If he were just planning to expel them, it would seem that he could afford to be more communicative, more curious about what the reporters were doing, more worried about the kind of story they might write about him. But Morales asked no questions. Rothchild knew from Branch's incessant briefings that Morales wore a lot of hats: terrorist as well as informant, mercenary as well as cop, bomber as well as representative of a government. It might be more paranoia to think he would kill them, but all last night's paranoia had come true.

The reporters know one thing: they have stumbled onto a story that is big enough and sensitive enough that top people in the Venezuelan DISIP are interrupting their sleep and risking diplomatic reprisals to scare the hell out of them. It isn't routine in Venezuela, one of the few South American countries left with any sense of freedom of the press. There is something big going on, and the reporters don't know, as they speed through Cara[illegible] whether they will ever get to find out what it is. Nobody, after all, knows where the reporters are, and the only thing on their side, besides some vestigial compassion that might reside somewhere even in goons, is the sense that world opinion would be on Morales' back if they did get tortured or killed. But that's just the point—world opinion was on the terrorists' backs about the Cuban airline crash and about Letelier and Moffitt. They killed them anyway. They didn't give a damn.

The car pulls up at the airport. It is less than eight hours since the reporters entered the country, and they have talked to nobody except Morales, the goons and each other. Their best guess is that Morales plans to keep it that way.

Breakfast at Ricardo's

Morales marches the group through part of the airport lobby and then up some back stairs, past the meteorology room and into the tower section. They arrive at a locked, knobless door with a small pass-through window, and Morales has to knock before it is opened from the inside. They have arrived at the goon control center. There is a four-drawer cabinet where the DISIP police file their guns and bullet clips like memos. There is an old couch, a few desks, and in an adjoining room some bunk beds. All the people from the night shift are still there, including Rómulo, in the same turtleneck and the same leather jacket. The most impressive new lurker is a character they call "El Largo," or "The Long One."

It is clear now that the plan is not torture, it is deportation, but the reporters sense that the plan could easily be changed. Morales is stalking between rooms, giving orders and making calls, and when he looks at the reporters he seethes with anger. Inclán and Branch are directing more questions at him from the couch. He answers only with contemptuous looks.

No one is prepared for what happens next. Morales walks out with a wide grin on his face. He clasps his hands together like a waiter and cheerfully addresses the reporters: "Is anybody hungry? Are you ready for some breakfast?"

The reporters follow Morales dumbly down the maze of corridors. They decide there is something oriental about recent developments, and they are convinced Morales could show them great courtesy one moment and yank out their toenails the next. They follow Morales down the corridors until they come to a small dining room that appears to be reserved for airport personnel. Branch gives fleeting thought to the idea of making a scene, but he decides Morales would not have brought them here unless he controlled the area. Besides, Branch realizes, he does not have the courage to make a scene in front of Morales, who still has the reporters nearly paralyzed with fright.

Morales lays his big walkie-talkie down on the table and snaps for a

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waiter. "What will you have?" he asks graciously.

The reporters had figured breakfast was probably a ruse, so they think about food for the first time. It is a struggle. Rothchild's stomach is filled with embalming fluid. He feels queasy looking at the menu. Branch asks only for coffee and an order of toast. Rothchild follows suit. Morales looks disappointed and urges them to eat more heartily. Inclán orders eggs and Morales looks pleased. He orders a sumptuous breakfast for himself. It arrives promptly.

"Well," he asks grandly, "who do you think will win your election, Carter or Ford?"

The reporters exchange the look, familiar by now, that signals their agreement that absurdity has reached new heights. They mumble offhand answers as Morales listens intently.

"You don't really have much choice, ~~do you?~~" he asks. "I mean, you have two guys who don't have any ideas and don't have any backbone, right? And neither one of them can command anything or stop anything, so it doesn't make any difference, right? At least that's what I get from *Time* magazine."

Inclán tries to change the subject. She asks Morales about his position in the DISIP and gets no response. She mentions Morales' nephew, whom she knows in Miami, and Morales parries the remark. Suddenly a cloud comes across his face.

"What's the matter with you?" he demands. "Why aren't you eating?" He points down at the dry toast, which Branch and Rothchild have been picking at like wafflers at Communion. "Aren't you hungry?"

Branch nods yes; Rothchild nods no. "You told me you hadn't gotten any breakfast, so I give you breakfast," Morales declares angrily, waving his arms. "If you are not hungry, you are liars! What's the matter with you?"

The reporters are exasperated. "We are afraid and confused," says Inclán, "because nobody will tell us why this is happening to us. I am a reporter like all the other reporters down here. I want to interview Orlando Bosch like I did once before . . ."

"Never heard of him," interrupts Morales. He gives us an exaggerated shrug and a quizzical look.

Inclán shakes her head in despair. "Oh, come on. You testified against him eight years ago in Miami and now he's the most famous prisoner in Latin America. He's in your jail."

"Did he make *Time* magazine?" asks Morales.

"Yes," says Branch.

"I guess I missed it," says Morales. He pauses, then turns to Inclán. "You should not be running around asking so many questions," he says sternly. "You are a woman. Women should be at home having babies and making their men happy. Nothing else."

Inclán is ruffled. "I can work as well as most other reporters," she says.

Morales shakes his head vigorously. "No you can't. You are a hundred miles aw from reality." He looks off and sa again.

"I don't think so," says Inclán. "I think you are."

"No," says Morales. "You are a hundred miles from reality, and I am a hundred *years* from reality. You understand the difference?"

"I don't know what I understand," says Inclán. "I know something about you. Taylor says he talked to you about your background in Miami and you talked to him like a friend. He says you were nice and now you are . . ."

"I am *not* nice," snaps Morales. "You know what I used to do in Cuba when I was a kid? I sent anonymous death wreaths to my friends. All the time. Is that nice?"

Branch does not like this subject or the faintly homicidal look he sees before him. He decides to make another stab at levity. "Look, Ricardo," he says, "I'm upset that you and your men have kept me from seeing anything about the last game of the World Series last night."

"The World Series," he says, his eyes opening wide. "Let me tell you about the World Series. It is just like the world everywhere: the Reds are winning and the Yanks are losing!" Morales breaks into laughter. Something snaps in the reporters and they laugh, too, uncontrollably. Fear floats out of their mouths and they feel better.

Branch wades in to reestablish contact. "Look, Ricardo," he says gamely, "I can't help thinking this is some kind of mistake. I want to be straight with you. All I'm interested in is the murder of Orlando Letelier. That's what I came down here for, and I want . . ."

"He's the guy who got blown up in Washington, right?" Morales breaks in. "I think I saw that in *Time*."

"That's right. He was blown up right around the corner from my apartment."

"Wel' what are you doing in Venezuela i[illegible] was killed in Washington?" Morales demands.

"Because I think the people who conspired to kill him are here. That's what my sources say, and it has even been in some of the Venezuelan newspapers."

Morales looks disgusted. "You shouldn't read the newspapers," he says tightly. "They lie. And you should investigate that murder in Washington instead of coming halfway around the world."

Branch tries another tack. "I don't understand what's behind this, Ricardo. You aren't like you were the last time I saw you, in 1974. Don't you remember? It was at night in Miami Beach, and you brought your girl friend over to the house I was staying in. And Fotingo Silva was there. And Tamayo was there. We talked almost all night about the Congo. Why have you changed? Is there something . . ." Branch stops because of what he sees on Morales' face.

"You are lying!" he explodes. "I have never heard of Ricardo Morales! This is the first time I have ever met you, and it is the first time you have met me! Understand? I have never seen you before in my life! If you say different you are lying! And bad things happen to liars!"

Inclán comes to Branch's rescue. "I have seen your picture," she says, "and I'm sure who you are. If you're not Morales, then what is your name?"

"I don't answer personal questions," Morales says, smiling, trying to look shy.

"I think maybe you figure there's a little spy conspiracy here," Branch ~~observes,~~ ~~stabbing~~ in the dark. "But there isn't. John and I are old friends, but we just met Hilda yesterday. She is interested in Bosch and his friends because of the bombings in Miami and the Cuban plane. We are interested in them because of Letelier. The three of us just happened to come down here on the same plane."

"Oh, really?" says Morales dubiously. "I guess you are good friends now."

"I guess we've gone through something together," says Rothchild.

"Now you have something in common," he nods, feigning tenderness. "Let's see, what else is there? Have you all been married?" The reporters nod. "How about divorced?" The reporters nod again. "Once?" They nod again.

Morales holds up three fingers. "I have been divorced three times," he says, "after four kids. I haven't seen them in seven years." This hangs in the air.

"Do you miss them?" asks Inclán.

"Not the children," Morales says softly. "Just the wives sometimes. I don't miss much. You know I haven't slept in two years." The reporters give each other significant looks, like shrinks attending a primal-therapy session.

"If you are going to kick us out of the country, you should at least let us call our families," Inclán says. "My editors are going to be worried. We

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have appointments and those people don't have any idea where we are. Why can't you let us make at least one phone call?"

Morales has shed his melancholy and slipped into a new persona. He is eager. "You're right," he says. "I'll call them. Anybody you want. Tell me who your appointments are with." He pulls out a pen in a flash. Branch blinks. He is startled by how fast Morales moves and how fiercely he snaps the point down.

The reporters glance knowingly at each other. They share a vision of Morales hauling their contacts down to DISIP's welcome wagon. We're not that dumb, they think.

Inclán tells Morales to call her editor at *The Miami News*, a safe, serious call. Morales spells out the name letter by letter as he writes on his napkin like a schoolboy taking down his homework. He is putting on a show. He looks at Branch.

"Tell Orlando Bosch it doesn't look as if I'll be able to make it this trip," Branch says. "He's in the DISIP prison."

The reporters giggle, but Morales deadpans. "T-e-l-l O-r-l-a-n-d-o B-o-s-h . . ."

"You've spelled Bosch wrong," says Inclán. "It's B-o-s-c-h."

"I'm sorry," says Morales.

Morales keeps writing. "You are a funny one," he says jovially. He looks up. "Anybody else?"

"Yes," says Branch. He has been trying to think of one of his contacts in Venezuela who would not be vulnerable to Morales but whose clout might impress him. Any name is a risk, but he decides to take one. "Tell the governor of Caracas that I won't be able to see him. His name is Diego Arias. Do you know him?"

Branch studies Morales for a reaction, but there is none.

After breakfast, as the procession goes by a pay phone, Inclán suddenly announces, "I'd like to make one call to the American Embassy." She breaks step and marches toward it, the first sign of overt resistance. Morales freezes Branch and Rothchild with a malicious glance and walks with her, shaking his head. Support goons appear from around corners. They seem relaxed. Morales fingers his walkie-talkie. Inclán gets to the phone and starts fumbling for Venezuelan change and her phone numbers. Morales leans up against the wall near the phone. He looks amused. His body seems to twitch a little under his suit, as if he might need some exercise.

Branch and Rothchild keep telling themselves that Inclán is making a futile gesture, but they admire her. "She's got more guts than we do," whispers Rothchild.

Branch and Rothchild watch her lift the phone from the cradle, but they don't think she has the change or the number. She is nervous. She looks Morales in the face, which is probably a mistake. He stares at her, shakes his head, and hangs up the phone gently.

An hour later, Morales suddenly mobilizes his entire office. Some of his men grab the reporters' suitcases and vanish. Others take off for unknown destinations. The rest fall in around the reporters and Morales leads them briskly out the door.

Rothchild figures they have just enough time to make the ten a.m. flight to Miami that he had seen posted on a board some time earlier. He senses an end coming and feels some relief. But when the entourage emerges on the airport's main concourse, Morales turns toward the exit into Caracas, not toward the planes.

"I thought you were putting us on the plane," says Branch. "Where are we going?"

"To the other airport," says Morales. His mind is elsewhere.

"What happens if we make a fuss when you put us on the plane?" Inclán asks. "What then?"

Morales' face is taut but breaks into a tour-guide smile. "You will either leave Venezuela nice and happy, or . . ." He pauses. "Or you will leave nice and happy." He delivers the last line with a lilt, as if making a rhyme. The reporters absorb the menacing smile and fall silent.

Several cars screech up to the curb. Once loaded, they take off at the usual torrid pace. Branch feels panic opening trapdoors under his lungs and he leans over to Rothchild. "Holy shit, John," he whispers. "I don't think there is another airport in Caracas."

After racing a quarter mile down the road, the cars turn abruptly into a parking lot. The reporters are baffled by the rush and the short trip but relieved to be staying near the airport. They figure they are headed for a plane from a different direction, but Morales leads them through another maze of corridors and into a new holding room. It has a big waiting area with two rooms partitioned off on the side. The doors are metal with no handles. They lock from both sides.

Morales vanishes, leaving Rómulo and El Largo in charge. Rómulo's fingertips do push-ups on his desk while he looks on, stone-faced. Rothchild gets the impression that Rómulo likes to stare at blank walls more than at people. El Largo, who seems to be a notch above Rómulo in the pecking order, moves into one of the partitioned offices and stays almost continuously on the phone. He reminds the reporters of his presence from time to time by loudly sucking phlegm up his long spiny nose.

After about ten minutes, Branch starts pacing away from Rómulo. "Goddamn it," Branch spurts, "I don't think we *know* enough about Morales to make him do all this. He's going to a lot of trouble to seal us off from Venezuela, but it doesn't make sense that he would do it just because we know who he is."

"Why not?" asks Inclán.

"Because," says Rothchild, "what we already know is going to come out anyway if he kicks us out of the country."

"I think maybe Morales is more worried about what we might find out if we ever get out of his clutches," says Branch. "I think maybe it's the fact that this terrorism is organized internationally. Bosch moves around on illegal passports and has fancy fund-raising dinners with supposedly respectable people in lots of countries. He's supported by at least part of a lot of governments. And this stuff looks cross-national—Cubans killing Chileans and so forth. Now look at how Venezuela fits in. It's kind of an entrepôt for everybody on all sides. The government is in a real pickle. It has to get along with the military juntas that have taken over most of Latin America, and it also has to get along with Castro. This country is filled with left-wing Chilean exiles and right-wing Cuban exiles. Letelier is buried here, which is a tilt to the left, but the people who helped conspire to kill him might well be right in the DISIP, which is full of Cubans like Morales. President Pérez [Carlos Andrés, of Venezuela] has got his own little Watergate here, because his own government is tangled up with both the terrorists and the anti-terrorists. This whole country is like a tinderbox. The government is making little gestures to both sides, trying to keep the lid on.

"Okay," Branch continues. "Let's assume that Morales is not bootlegging us out of the country on his own. That seems stupid to me. Let's assume that at least the people in the interior ministry know what's going on. And let's assume they're afraid we'll get into the country and find a story that goes something like INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERED IN VENEZUELA. OPERATIVES MOSTLY CUBAN. EXILES WITH CIA AND FBI TIES. VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLAYING BOTH SIDES. And we go on to say that Bosch has brought a lot of Latin governments around to his position, which is that it's better to trust each other than to trust the C.I.A. Now, what I'm saying is that a story like that would really screw up the Venezuelans, especially if it's fleshed out. It's the last thing the government here needs right now."

"So what side is Morales on?" asks Rothchild.

"I think he's on both sides," says Inclán.

"I think so, too," says Branch, "just like the government. Morales is in the underworld of both sides."

Inclán thinks for a moment. "There's only one big problem," she says. "If they're so afraid of a story like that, why do they let other reporters stay and just throw us out? Why do they pick on us?"

"I don't know," Branch sighs. "I don't know much about the correspondents here. They're getting some stuff out, but my impression is that they cover nine countries and just fly in for the coups and earthquakes. That still doesn't make us so special. But maybe we are to Morales. We know him. He knows Hilda knows a lot about Bosch and Miami connections. He knows that I got pretty deeply into the C.I.A. Cubans. Then he sees us with the prose-

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cutors. That may have been too much for him to take chances with us. I don't know. Maybe he thinks we're C.I.A."

Swords on the Runway

El Largo picks up the three passports off Rómulo's desk and points them toward the locked door like a baton. "Vamos," is all he says.

The metal door is unlocked by El Largo, and once again the DISIP cortege appears from nowhere. They escort the reporters down another staircase and cut toward an immigration stall in a large room that is completely isolated. It is a busy part of the day at a major airport, but the DISIP keeps finding these empty halls and empty rooms to stick the reporters in.

Something about approaching this immigration stall, which is not attended, and knowing he will pass through it and get on an airplane and not find Letelier's murderer starts to galvanize Branch. There is a tiny passage to go through and El Largo is motioning them to walk on, but Branch is having these visions of the bombed car outside his apartment and he is getting mad. The madder he gets, the slower he walks. "We can't just get on this plane," he says to Rothchild. "We have to at least do *something*." He and Rothchild, and then Inclán behind them, go into a stall—not a complete stop, but they are slowing it way down. Morales might have clamped down on this little insurrection in a second, but El Largo seems merely agitated. He is getting in front of the reporters, pleading and begging, pulling with his arms as if they are all connected by an invisible rope.

In complete exasperation, he starts sputtering threats. "If you don't move through here, I am going to use *the force!*" Two guards go running down to the end of the room, apparently to go find *the force*, which turns out to be four young soldiers in green fatigues and paratrooper boots.

With the army behind them, the reporters continue their shuffle. Two move ahead a few feet and one hangs back. Then the members of the armed forces plus the DISIP people surround the straggler, prodding him along, while one of the other two breaks away to the same spot the straggler just vacated.

Out of a picture window the reporters can see the plane being gassed up. It is VIASA, the Venezuelan airline, and not Pan Am. Inclán, finally expressing some paranoia herself, says, "Well they could blow us up on the plane, but they wouldn't sacrifice a Venezuelan plane. They don't have that many of them."

They have been dragging on this walk for almost forty minutes now, and they can see the busloads of tourists being flushed back out from their vacations. The buses are stopping at the back stairway of the plane. Then Branch gets his idea. "In here where there is nobody to see us we can't do much," he tells Rothchild. "But out there, in front of all those tourists, we can get some help. Let's go." Rothchild and Branch huddle with Inclán. They [illegible] the plan and agree. Then all three abandon their shuffle, to the surprise of the herders, who have been pushing all along. Suddenly they see their quarry running off in front of them. El Largo doesn't catch on right away, but he knows that whatever the reporters want to do, it must be the wrong thing. So he starts running after them, yelling, "Stop!" Branch and Rothchild hit the double glass door with Inclán and El Largo and the army just behind. They all pour out onto the runway to the curious looks of hundreds who are lined up to get on the plane.

For the first time since they landed in Venezuela, Inclán is visibly upset. She rushes out to the line of passengers, screaming in Spanish and English that she is a woman reporter whose dignity has been trampled on by the secret police. The police, who are massing behind her in greater numbers than ever before, don't know quite how to deal with this. The passengers don't know whether to accept her as a lunatic traveler whom they don't want with them on the plane, or to believe what she is saying, which would be unpleasant. Most of them pretend that nothing is happening and go on up the ramp.

Branch, meanwhile, has planted himself on the stairs that lead to the front cabin of the plane. He is sitting down and his hands are clenched to the rails like a Quaker chained to the White House fence. Rothchild is sitting on the steps just below Branch, and they are being surrounded by a brigade of reinforcements, the sword company. The men in brown uniforms have circled them, and they pull the swords a few inches out of their long scabbards ready to hog-stick Rothchild and Branch into the airplane. Behind them officials and police seem to be pouring out of the doors and official jeeps are screeching up and screeching off, and Rómulo has even showed up again.

The captain of the airplane, a Venezuelan, comes down the same ramp on which Branch and Rothchild have been doing their sit-in, and he has a scowl on his face. Venezuela has enough trouble developing tourism and here is his plane being held up and his passengers' last memory of Venezuela will be these goons with swords and blackjacks prodding Americans up the ramp. He steps over Branch and goes right down to the huddle of secret police, where the current brains of the operation, Rómulo and El Largo, are standing. The captain proceeds to chew them out, tell them that they are idiots to pull a show like this and that he will not take passengers on his airplane if they are loaded by force. The security risk, for one thing. If these people are that dangerous, then why should they be flying alone on his airplane?

El Largo and Rómulo don't quite know how to handle this sudden obstacle. They get a let's-talk-this-one-over-buddy look on their faces and go into a huddle with the captain. They also defer to even higher authority, a beefy cop named Camargo, who is wearing a short-sleeve shirt. Camargo arrives in the middle of the scene, looking like the frustrated director of a runaway cast. There are now dozens of DISIP men in plain clothes, a few representatives from about four different military detachments, frantic jeep drivers, airline authorities, pilots and ground-crew personnel, all crowding around to watch or take part in the action. Camargo looks skyward, thinking under pressure, and gets his idea. "Why don't you let me go with these people?" he asks the pilot. "If I take them to Miami, I guarantee there won't be any funny stuff on your plane." Rothchild thinks this is a little ironic. The reporters come down to investigate one plane bombing and return under guard so that they can't pull one off themselves.

The pilot doesn't think too much of Camargo's idea. "Do you have a U.S. visa?" he asks Camargo. "No." "Then, do you know what they will do to you when you get to Miami? Much worse than whatever you have done to them here." Camargo doesn't like the way that sounds. He scraps the plan, and the captain returns to the plane.

The reporters aren't sure of what they have just done. They have scored a theatrical victory—just look around at all these cars and soldiers and distressed officials—but they don't like the prospect of lunch with Ricardo Morales. Nobody seems to be running to call the American Embassy or any other outside help, so the plan is a qualified failure.

The three of them head back to the passenger line, where people are still loading, and start writing phone numbers on little scraps of paper—the numbers are of editors in Miami, friends, and even mothers. They try handing them out to boarding passengers. The reporters are received in this effort like Salvation Army collectors at the racetrack. Only a few of the passengers actually take the notes, but just to make sure, the DISIP people are picking them off at the higher end of the line. Some passengers even go out of their way to hand over the notes, with an air of having done their civic duty. It develops into a kind of assembly line, notes in and notes out, the DISIP goons collecting just as fast as Inclán, Branch and Rothchild can scrawl.

It is now, with the plane about to close its doors, that Branch comes up with another plan: send one, leave two. Branch still is hoping he can break the Morales logjam and get out into friendly territory, where his contacts are waiting to help him. Inclán speaks the best Spanish and seems the most adept at handling inspectors and bureaucrats. They will stay and Rothchild is chosen to leave. Branch reminds him, in front of the sword brigade, that he is an "expectant father," but Rothchild needs no encouragement. He instantly calls for the captain and explains that he wants to get on the plane. The captain hesitates, then agrees, and Rothchild runs for the stairs. As he passes Branch and Inclán, Branch sticks one page of phone numbers in his pocket and, as a diversionary tactic, clumsily sticks another note in his hand, this one in full

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view of the cops. As the sword carriers are frisking Rothchild, the second note is triumphantly confiscated. They don't know that it says "Joe Morgan" on it. The name of the great Cincinnati second baseman will go somewhere into the DISIP files.

Halfway up the ramp, Rothchild senses that the pressure has somehow been reversed, that now the DISIP wants to keep him on the ground. Several cops are following him as if they want to get ahead and stop him at the door. He scurries inside the plane and rushes back to a seat; they are still following him. He has his seat belt buckled almost before his ass hits the cushion, and the two cops reach out as if to grab him, then change their minds and abruptly leave the aircraft. But they quickly return. They tell Rothchild in a very friendly tone that his friends down on the ground want to have a word with him and that he better unbuckle and come down. Rothchild is so agitated he believes them. He gets as far as the plane entrance, the top of the stairs, when he hears Branch yelling, "Get back." He bowls over a stewardess on the way to his seat.

The cops are not through yet. They return with another ploy: Rothchild has not filled out the necessary papers and he must return to an office in the airport. "Are you sure this isn't a trick?" Rothchild asks. "No, no trick. Just a procedural matter." Rothchild tells them he isn't moving an inch until he talks to the captain.

Out his little window, Rothchild sees further agitation on the runway. They have brought up a car and they are trying to force Branch and Inclán to get into it. Camargo is flailing his arms like a giant windmill, determined to get all three reporters together—on or off the plane. The reporters are equally determined to split up. Branch and Inclán keep telling Camargo that they will not move from the runway until the plane takes off. They want to stay in plain view of all the passengers, fearing that the goons will grab Rothchild once the other two are safely out of view. Branch and Inclán keep encouraging each other and making jokes about how incredible all the commotion has become. Workmen in orange suits are crouched in the shade, smoking cigarettes, and several hundred gawkers are spread out in a semicircle like fans in the bleachers.

Camargo tries a whole string of tricks to get Branch and Inclán out of sight. Will they move into the airport, please? No. He goes off into a huddle and comes back. Will they get in the car so they can get out of the hot sun? No. Will they get in the car if he promises they can watch the plane from there? No. After one huddle, the mood changes and several goons swing little brown blackjacks. Branch and Inclán say a prayer, refuse to move and wave ostentatiously at the airplane. The goons shove and menace but then go off again. Rómulo comes back with his gun pulled, looking like a crazed assassin. Camargo soon yanks him back to the goon huddle. The plane starts taxiing on the runway and Camargo says, "You've won. Let's go." The reporters huddle and say not until it's off the ground. Camargo looks furious and barks a command to his walkie-talkie man. The plane stops immediately and sits in the middle of the airstrip. Camargo controls the tower, the reporters conclude. The game, played by inches and bluffs, goes on for nearly an hour.

Camargo Plays Hardball

Branch and Inclán are spread-eagled against the back-door openings of the goon car, facing each other, when the jet finally takes off. They have held this position for the last fifteen minutes or so of the cat-and-mouse game. The roar of the jet engines sets off tremors in Branch's gut, and he is flooded with relief. He feels tears welling up.

Rómulo is now wearing his gun tucked inside his pants at the navel. His turtleneck is soaked with sweat. He and Camargo and the head blackjack man escalate their nudging again, and extras crowd in behind them. The reporters, talking over the roof of the car, decide that the plane will not be called back. They get in the car. Rómulo sits next to Branch, and Camargo takes the front seat. They peel off down the runway with other cars following.

"How long will it take the plane to get to Miami?" Inclán asks Camargo.

"A little more than three hours," says Camargo. "It has to stop in Maracaibo."

Branch shivers and asks Inclán to translate the Spanish to make sure he heard right.

"I thought you said it was a direct flight to Miami," Inclán says in disbelief.

"It is going direct to Miami, *señora*," replies Camargo, "but it is stopping in Maracaibo."

The reporters discuss with renewed horror the fact that Maracaibo is still in Venezuela; they envision the DISIP people paying a call on Rothchild. Camargo grins at them. His lips slant in one direction, and the upper row of his front teeth slants in the other, making an X. Branch thinks Camargo must file his teeth. He inches away from Rómulo until he is almost in Inclán's lap.

Three hours later, Camargo summons the two reporters to his office after more consultation with Central Caracas. Only one thing has changed, he says graciously. Both their visas have been officially revoked; they are ordered to leave at three-thirty. The reporters ask why, and Camargo shrugs.

Without warning, the session is interrupted when one of the younger goons strolls in and hands Camargo a brand-new Jim Palmer baseball glove and a box of six baseballs. The reporters are astonished.

"Excuse me," says Camargo, who begins to pound his fist in the new glove. He is beaming. He and Branch start talking baseball, with a bewildered Inclán translating. A bond is formed. Camargo lets Branch pound his fist into the glove.

Camargo is now expansive, as if the reporters were guests in his home. He says he knows a lot about the United States and walks over to a corner where there is a stack of framed diplomas on the floor. He flips through them and hands Branch a diploma from the U.S. Army School of Special Warfare. It is signed by General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commandant. Then he hands Branch a certificate from the International Police Academy, a training school for the world's policemen. It has closed after a dose of scandal. Branch wonders if all the DISIP goons have been trained by the Agency; he would like to meet their American contacts.

Rothchild has landed in Miami. He goes straight to *The Miami News* and causes an uproar with his story. The editors there have been worried about Inclán since she missed her check-in call six hours ago. The managing edi-



"Any suggestions on who to get rid of?"

continued

tor calls the American Embassy in Caracas and lifts it off the ground with rage. The embassy promises to investigate immediately. Rothchild begins to reconsider his views on newspaper editors.

Camargo comes into the holding room wearing the look of a man who has just accomplished something.

"Your visas have been officially confiscated," he announces.

The reporters look at him blankly. "What's new about that?" asks Inclán. "You have had them all day."

"Now they are *permanently* confiscated," says Camargo. He shows them a new Venezuelan seal stamped on each one. Over the seals, someone has scrawled, "*Visa fue revocada.*"

Before the reporters have time to figure out what this signifies, Camargo gives the order to move out. He says the plane is late. The goon squads materialize.

Inclán explains to Branch that they are in big trouble. Even if Camargo lets them go, she says, they could be stopped ten feet outside the airport and asked for their papers. They could be slapped in prison for the "*revocada*" on their passports. For the first time they are not on solid legal ground. Branch shakes his head wearily and tells Inclán they have lost a round of hardball.

They follow a triumphant Camargo to the plane.

Epilogue: More Pay Phones

On October 24, two days after the reporters left Caracas, Deputy Interior Minister Marco Tulio Brunicelli talked with the press to clear up the matter. Brunicelli said Hilda Inclán had arrived carrying documents that "did not conform with national norms," and that "she was cordially asked to leave the country because it is necessary to comply with our laws." As for Branch and Rothchild, he declared that they "expressed solidarity with their colleague and decided to leave the country."

That same day, Branch was checking with Cuban sources in Miami to find out why Morales had turned on him. He received worse than a cold shoulder, and some of his best Cuban friends told him to stay out of Miami. The most loyal veterans of the C.I.A.—people who had spent years denouncing and exposing terrorists as a detriment to the anti-Castro cause—now supported the terrorists and expected nothing but opposition from the Agency. "If you don't help the good people fight Castro," said one old C.I.A. Cuban, "then we have to help the bad ones do it. There's nothing left but terrorism." Branch was stunned by how rapidly the anti-C.I.A., pro-terrorist trend had progressed in even the two years since he had left Miami. C.I.A. loyalists were now in very short supply. The last defectors were Cubans whose secret histories stretched back to the Fifties and Sixties, when their anti-Communist movement was in the American mainstream. The C.I.A. trained the Cubans to work by stealth—to lie, smuggle weapons, move illegally in and out of countries, make bombs t strike secretly against Castro targ. Some of them were "official" terrorists, who would stoically accept long jail sentences rather than reveal a C.I.A. secret. Now they were no longer official.

Rothchild was back home in the Everglades. On Monday he received the first of several phone calls from a man identifying himself as a "consultant to the government of Venezuela." He wanted to give Rothchild some money to write about Rothchild's background. Very weird, thought Rothchild. He began to worry that his trip to Caracas would follow him.

Press reports from Venezuela quoted interior ministry officials in Venezuela as saying that Ricardo Morales "did not cause the expulsion of the American journalists." In an official statement on October 26 the ministry said Morales "does not even work for the DISIP."

A few days later, Branch received a letter from someone in Venezuela who was working on the terrorist network. It came by messenger and read like Sherlock Holmes: "The key to this thing—whatever it is—is Morales, and the key to him is something you already know. It seems that something he once told you or knows you know will click with something you would be likely to hear here, or would reveal something here, that he didn't want out. Think."

Branch went to see Eugene Propper, the assistant U.S. attorney in charge of the Letelier investigation. Propper wanted to know about the Venezuela trip because he was thinking of going there himself. The leads pointed there, he said. He asked questions about the Cuban terrorists. Branch outlined what he knew. He took a reading of Propper and was satisfied that he wanted badly to solve the case. Branch only worried that they were both way over their heads. His worries skyrocketed when Propper asked to see a copy of *The Miami News*, which contained articles about Morales and the Venezuela trip.

Propper knitted his eyebrows and scrutinized the *News* as if it were a moon rock. Something gave Branch a sinking feeling. "The *News* and the *Herald* in Miami have an awful lot of stuff about terrorists," he said. "You have all that, don't you?"

"I don't think we get them," said Propper.

"You *have* to have them," Branch pleaded. Propper made a couple of unsuccessful phone calls around the Justice Department and said he would get these newspapers from the Library of Congress as soon as possible.

Branch knew what it must be like to call the police station in the middle of a robbery and find its phone disconnected. He recovered and offered to do anything he could to help, even to go back to Venezuela.

"I've only got one major reservation," he said, "and that is the informant problem. You have to rely on the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. to investigate, and the fact is that most of the suspects and likely witnesses are old C.I.A. and F.B.I. men of some sort."

Pr r said it could be handled. The F.B.I. ople on the case would arrest their own mothers if they had to. The terrorists had threatened to kill an F.B.I. agent. The Bureau had two hundred agents on the case. It was the biggest thing in the F.B.I.

"What about the Agency?" asked Branch. "Look, I don't think the C.I.A. had anything to do with these murders, but the terrorists are *using* their old C.I.A. connections in more ways than one. The Agency is in a bind. It has created a monster. The whole world of secrets in Miami has turned upside down. But I'll bet those old pros over at the Agency aren't about to sacrifice their security and secrecy to help solve a murder."

Propper said he was getting cooperation, reams of stuff in fact. Branch asked him to test it. "Ask them for their file on Luis Posada," he said. "I know they've got one on him. He came into the Agency through the M.R.P. before the Bay of Pigs. Ask the Agency what it has about Posada's involvement with a bootleg assassination attempt against Castro in 1965 involving a guy named Herminio Diaz. Diaz was caught and killed in Cuba. Now, if the Agency doesn't have *anything* on that, they're just giving you a lot of smoke." (Posada is the Cuban detective from the DISIP now held by the DISIP for the Cubana de Aviación bombing.)

Propper agreed. (On a later visit, Propper would say he was getting Agency cooperation but declined to give Branch any details.)

On November 4, the State Department responded to Branch's request for a position statement on the Venezuelan expulsion, which the U.S. Embassy in Caracas had been investigating. A State Department representative read a portion of a press briefing as follows:

Q: What did he (Branch) say and what's the State Department going to do about it?

A: He described the dealings he and two others had with the Venezuelan authorities at Maiquetía Airport when they arrived there last week. I'm not going to discuss details of what he said. That would be for him to do, if he wishes. Our Embassy has expressed our concern over this incident to the appropriate Government of Venezuela officials.

An hour later, an agitated woman from the State Department called back. "Mr. Branch," she said, "I'm afraid there's been a big mistake. That briefing that was just read to you does not constitute the department's public position. It is a guideline."

"What is a guideline?"

"It is a policy draft setting out what the people here are authorized to say in response to inquiries. What you have there is what we *would* have said had we been asked. But it is not what we have said publicly. We have no record of being asked on the record, although some reporters may have inquired privately, in which case we would have responded according to the guideline."

"So what is the State Department's position, then?"

continued

The woman went on to say, in so many words, that State was holding steady at an expression of concern.

That afternoon, Branch met with Propper and the senior F.B.I. agent on the Letelier case. The agent was convincingly determined to solve the murders. Branch sketched out what he knew again. The agent advised him strongly not to return to Venezuela, observing that the DISIP was perfectly capable of chopping off his hands and assembling a dozen Venezuelans within thirty minutes to swear it was an accident. He felt the F.B.I. had to put away the killers, who had come to Washington in order to check the terrorists' boldness. Otherwise Washington could gradually turn into Miami, and Miami could turn into Beirut.

Branch agreed and asked if the F.B.I. was planning a trip to Venezuela. The agent replied that he was not sure of the Bureau's own physical safety there, and that furthermore the F.B.I. did not have jurisdiction for such a trip. He outlined the restrictions on the F.B.I. and C.I.A. as they apply to cases that are both domestic and international, criminal and related to the national security. It added up to catch-22, but it did not destroy the agent's confidence.

Branch's confidence, however, was low. He was just offering to do what he could again when a call came through for Propper. The agent became excited and asked Branch to excuse him. On the way out the door, Branch overheard the salutation: "Is that you, Joe?" asked Propper. "Listen, are you calling from a pay phone? Okay. Give me the number of another pay phone near there and I'll call you back." #

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T 658185 EIA026 PAGE 01

TOR:072247Z MAR 77

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O 072115Z MAR 77
FM UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE HQS (ID/FIB)
TO CIA HQS OPERATIONS STAFF/LIAISON GROUP ATTN: BETTY SANDY-GA-1
INFO USSS LIAISON DIVISION
BT
UNCLAS CITE USSS 2830 07MAR77 1615EST
SUBJECT: NAME CHECKS
FILE: CO2-33115
REFERENCE IS MADE TO TELCOM THIS DATE. HEREWITH ARE NAMES FOR NAMECHECKS. RESULTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO IRS WINNER, THIS DIVIS (634-5862 OR 5310 SECURE). ALL INDIVIDUALS ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN BORN IN CUBA AND TO BE CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY HERE OR ABROAD.

Ref 8/3/77
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AGUIAR, FELIX 6-8-52
ALFONSO-RUIZ, HECTOR FRANCISCO 5-12-39 — Refer to FBI
ALVAREZ-LAZARO, JESUS ESTEBEN 12-26-49 — Refer to FBI
ARCE, SIXTO LORENZO 5-9-41 — Refer to FBI
ATIENZA, ORLANDO 7-21-38 — Refer to FBI
BLANCO, HUMBERTO 4-14-40 — NPII 8 mar 77
BOBILLO, ARMANDO 1-4-40
CABRERA-VEGA, HECTOR ALBERTO 7-30-44 — Refer to FBI
CABRERA-VEGA, RAUL ALBERTO 7-7-43 — Refer to FBI
CARBALLO, ROBERTO 12-10-38 — Refer to FBI
CALATAYUD, ANTONIO 10-3-39 — Refer to FBI
CALVINO, WILFREDO 2-14-50 — Refer to FBI
CARBONELL-ARENES, HECTOR AUGUSTO 10-1-40 — ND
CARDENAS-GARCIA, JUAN JORGE 3-29-38 — Refer to FBI
CARRILLO-CALLAS, GUIDO MAXIMILIANO 9-8-42
CARRILLO, LUIS EUGENIO 11-25-30 — NPII 9 mar 77
CASTILLO, GUSTAVO 4-28-46 — Refer to FBI
CASTILLO, PABLO GUSTAVO 4-28-46 — NPII 9 mar 77
CASTRO-PAZ, EULALIO FRANCISCO 6-4-42 — Refer to FBI
CHINEA, RAUL 1-15-42
COLMENARES, ANTONION 6-28-25 — Refer to FBI
CRESPO, LUIS ALBERTO 7-24-41 — Refer to FBI
DECASTROVERDE, WALDO IGNACIO 1-15-41 — Refer to FBI
DELACOVA GONZALEZ-ABREU, ANTONIO RAFAEL 11-27-50 — NPII 9MAR77
DELAKE, RAMIRO — Refer to FBI
DETORRES, BERNARDO 3-26-34 — Refer to DEA
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ELIAS-NAZIN.JOSE 3-19-20 ref-NPI1 DR
ENCINOSA.PEDRO 4-27-49 ref-NPI1 DR
ESPINOSA.MANUEL. REV. 37 YRS. 1940 ref-NPI1 DR
ESTRADA-ARMANDO LOPEZ 3-15-39 ref-Memo DR
GONZALEZ.FELIPE LUIS 11-10-22 ref Refer to FBI DR
GONZALEZ.AVELINO LAZARO 11-10-50 npi
GONZALEZ.VALIENTE JORGE LUCILO 10-31-41 npi
HERNANDEZ.RAUL ADOLFO 8-9-32; 8-9-41 ref ~~Refer~~
HERNANDEZ-RAMIREZ. VALENTIN 11-8-42 ref Refer to FBI DEB
IZQUIERDO-DIAZ.NESTOR 3-20-36 ref Refer to FBI DEB
JIMENEZ-ESCOBEDO.GASPAR EUGENIO 10-6-35 ref Refer to FBI DEB
JUNCOSA-PENA.RALPH 1-15-41 ref NPI1 DEB
LABRADA.RAFAEL GONZALEZ ref Refer to FBI DEB
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MANSITO.GIL S. 9-1-43 npi
MARIN-DUARTE.GUSTAVO ref Refer to FBI DEB
MARIZAL.FRANCISCO 10-4-30 ref NPI1 DEB
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MENDOZA.ORLANDO ref Refer to FBI DEB
MENENDEZ.GALIS npi
MORALES.RICARDO NAVARRETTE 6-14-39 ref Refer to FBI
MORENO.RAFAEL ref NPI1/3
~~MUNIZ.ANTONIO 3-25-48 ref Refer to FBI/3~~ 11 MAR 1977
NOVO-SAMPOL.GUILLERMO 6-6-39 ref CK Refer to the FBI
NOVO-SAMPOL.IGNACIO ROBERTO 6-7-38 ref CK "
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PARSONS.ROBERTO 10-7-30 CK ref Refer to the FBI
PATRICIO.JOSE 7-6-47 ref CK NPI1
PAZ-BELLO.EDUARDO ALEJANDRO CK 2-13-52; 10-23-51 ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ-ALAMO. DUNNE CK 11-37 ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ-FRANCO.JUAN CK ref Refer to the FBI
PEREZ.JULIO ref NPI1/3
PEREZ VALDEZ.RAFAEL 12- -49 ref NPI1/3
PINERO.RAMON 11-27-31 [illegible]
RIVERO.FELIPE ref NPI1/3
RODRIGUEZ.FRANCISCO TAMAYO 3-9-32 ref ~~[illegible]~~ Refer to FBI/3

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T 596336 EIA536 PAGE 01-01 IN 184747

TOR:111333Z FEB 77 CARA 32190

S E C R E T 111326Z FEB 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32190

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

WNINTEL KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 32143 (HVC-7589) (IN 177816)

1. FYI: AMBASSADOR WAS UNIMPRESSED WITH EITHER IMPORTANCE OF REF INFO OR URGENCY IN GETTING IT INTO VENEZUELAN GOVT HANDS. HE THINKS REPORT MAY REPRESENT MORE BRAGGADOCIO ON PART OF RICARDO MORALES THAN ACTUAL PLAN OF ACTION AND HE PRIVATELY FEELS EXCITEMENT IN DEPARTMENT OVER THIS SORT OF THING IS BIT OF TEMPEST IN A TEAPOT. NONETHELESS, TO DO OUR PART, HE ASKED STATION TO GIVE GIST OF REF TO WKSCARLET-9 AT NEXT LIAISON MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 11 OR 12 FEBRUARY.

2. FILE: 201-0285923, E2 IMPDET.

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS. Y

WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE Y

REF: CARACAS 32143 [IN 177816] (HVC-7589) Y

1. ON 9 FEB, THE ACTING DEPUTY FOR ARA IN STATE INQUIRED RE THE POSSIBILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF PASSING GIST OF REF INTEL TO APPROPRIATE REP OF VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT ON AN URGENT BASIS. Y

2. HEADQUARTERS HAS AGREED TO FORWARD REQUEST TO STATION WITH SUGGESTION THAT THE AMBASSADOR BE CONSULTED AND THAT HE MAY WISH TO HAVE THE EMBASSY PASS THE INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO AN APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL AS COMING FROM PERSONS OUTSIDE OF VENEZUELA. Y

3. PLEASE ADVISE ACTION TAKEN. Y

4. FILE: 201-0285923. E2 IMPDET.

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X ABSTRACT
INDEX

201-285923
9 Feb 77

DATE: 9 FEB 77
ORIG: T.J.DESMOND:RP
UNIT: C/LA/PNC
EXT: 1033

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C/LA/RR - L.E. BORING (DRAFT)

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T 579185 EIA789 PAGE 01 IN 177816

TOR:0420552 FEB 77 CARA 32143

S E C R E T 0420322 FEB 77 INTEL TDFIRDB-315/01346-77

CITE CARACAS 32143 HVC-7589

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WNINTEL INTEL KMSTONE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR SOURCE DESCRIPTION FOR WKDIET-2. SOURCE PARA 2 WKDIET/WKDIET-5 DIRECTLY. SOURCE PARAS 4 AND 5: WKDIET/WKDIET-2 DIRECTLY. NOT FOR LIAISON. OD OBJECTIVE: J.1. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0285923. (NOTE: SHOWN TO AMBASSADOR AND FBI AT CARACAS.) CL. BY 035133.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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DIST 4 FEBRUARY 1977

REPORT CLASS SECRET WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATORS.

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA

DOI: LATE JANUARY -3 FEBRUARY 1977

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ATTEMPT BY RICARDO MORALES TO GAIN THE RELEASE
OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH BY FORCE

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (4 FEBRUARY 1977) FIELD NO. HVC-7589

SOURCE: SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPH 2: A CUBAN EXILE WHO MAINTAINS CLOSE CONTACT WITH OTHER EXILES. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

2. IN LATE JANUARY 1977 RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, A CUBAN-EXILE WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT HE IS PLANNING TO GET CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH OUT OF JAIL BY FORCE. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, MORALES SAID, INTENDS TO TRY AND CONVICT BOSCH OF CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 6 OCTOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINER AND INTENDS TO USE BOSCH AS A SCAPEGOAT. MORALES SAID THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ENLISTING THE SUPPORT OF UN-

SPECIFIED CUBAN EXILES TO CARRY OUT HIS PLANS TO GAIN BOSCH'S RELEASE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MORALES DID NOT EXPLAIN WHAT TYPE OF FORCE WOULD BE USED TO GAIN BOSCH'S RELEASE. MORALES IS AN UNSTABLE INDIVIDUAL AND IS CAPABLE OF USING FORCE TO GAIN HIS ENDS.)

3. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5: A VENEZUELAN WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

4. ON 3 FEBRUARY 1977 MORALES SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO LEAVE VENEZUELA FOR MIAMI, FLORIDA, LATER THAT DAY. MORALES SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE REASON FOR HIS TRIP IS NOT KNOWN.)

5. MORALES CONTINUES TO RECEIVE HIS DISIP SALARY DESPITE AN EARLIER SCANDAL CONCERNING HIS DISIP STATUS. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REPORT ON MORALES SEE HVC-7548, TDFIRDB-315//11772-76, OF MID-NOVEMBER 1976, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY.) MORALES HAS RECENTLY RENTED AN EXPENSIVE APARTMENT IN A FASHIONABLE AREA OF CARACAS. THE RENT ON WHICH IS ALMOST EQUAL TO HIS DISIP SALARY.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, FBI AT CARACAS.

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FORM 9-75 3007 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 177816

TDFIR DB-315/01346-77

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT
0
Ricardo Morales Navarette (201-285923)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. The information provided below is taken from a Santo Domingo Station liaison report transmitted to Headquarters under HDCA-11074, dated 29 November 1976. The information dated 29 August 1976 was received by the liaison service from one of its agents assigned to Miami, Florida. It is being sent to you for information only. All information below was reportedly stated in testimony at the trial of the Cuban terrorist Rolando Otero in Jacksonville, Florida, and Antonio Gonzalez had obtained immunity from prosecution. The declarations he made were corroborated by Cubans Ciro Orizondo and Manuel Revuelta, former comrades of Otero in the Frente de Liberacion Nacional Cubano (FLNC).

2. According to Antonio Gonzalez, there have to be in Miami up to 500 pro-Castro agents operating; that in a supposed plot to kill Fidel Castro in Venezuela, there had been with him and Rolando Otero, a Cuban named Ricardo Morales and infiltrating into the affair, he tried to frustrate the plan. Gonzalez also said that Morales, supposedly worked for the "CIAin the Congo" and actually is an agent of the Government of Venezuela, used to investigate those Cubans who enter and exit from Venezuela. Gonzalez also said that in reality, Morales is a Castro agent.

Lemuel E. GALLAHORN

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25 JAN 1977

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DATE
24 January 1977

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HQS FILE NUMBER
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OFFICER: Robert N. Andrews
TYPIST: pm
EXT.: 1715

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C/LA/PSC	[illegible] 77	Charlotte Bustos-Videla

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

State cable dated 15 Feb 77
State cable dated 1 May 77
State cable dated 22 Nov. 77
State cable dated 22 Nov 77

FBI Report dated 26 April 77
Re: Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarrette
Registration Act

FBI Report dated 21 July 77
Re: Unknown Subjects: Explosion in
Car driven by Orlando Letelier-
Victim (Deceased), etc. 21 Sept. 76

THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES NAVARRETTE, RICARDO
201-0285923 075-008-019
SEX M CARA-33792
27 JUL 77
HVC-07716
P4

LOC VENE. FORMER OFFICIAL OF DIRECTORATE FOR SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION /DISIP/. WARNED MBRS OF COORDINATED UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION /CORU/, GUSTAVO CASTILLO AND FRANK CASTRO /201-0742365/ OF DISIP REPRESSION AGAINST CUBANS IN VENE.

DATE 09 SEP 77 09538675

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

MORALES, RICARDO NAVARRETTE
201-0285923
SEX M

200-011-009/43
DCNC-00066/77
20 SEP 77
PIL

ENTERED USA LATE 60. RECRUITED AS RADIO OPERATOR AND MBR OF PARAMILITARY INFILTRATION TEAM FOR MISSIONS INTO CUBA BUT NEVER USED.

DATE 10 FEB 78 09579154

201-285923

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

55/42/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (081) INFO: FILE, VR, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS-2, ODPD-D,
SE-8, SIA, SIA/FL, (28/W)

---

78 0207450 PAGE 001 IN 0207450
TOR: 112030Z JAN 78 CARA 35189

S E C R E T 112005Z JAN 78 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 35189

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM CKLEG WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 144358
B. CARACAS 35019 TOO OLD
C. CARACAS 33784 TOO OLD

1. STATION LIAISON OFFICER MET WITH SUBJECT OF 201-0952786 AS PART OF ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA, AND TO DETERMINE HER POTENTIAL AS POSSIBLE UNILATERAL SUPPORT ASSET AGAINST SOVIET AND BLOC TARGETS.

2. DURING DISUCSSIONS, SUBJECT MENTIONED THAT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN PAST SHE HAD NOTED ON SURVEILLANCE REPORTS OF CUBAN EMBASSY THAT A VEHICLE BEARING LICENSE PLATE REGISTERED TO MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ENTERED WITH SOME FREQUENCY. HOWVER, ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY THE PERSON TO WHOM VEHICLE ALLOCATED ALWAYS WERE RETURND TO HER WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO FORGET THE ENTRY AND TO STOP MAKING REFERENCES TO IT IN HER REPORTS. SHE FINALLY WAS ADVISED THAT THE CAR WAS USED BY (AT THAT TIME) COMISARIO RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE (201-0285923), AND THAT SHE SHOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING FURTHER INQUIRIES OR FORM INCLUDING THAT LICENSE PLATE IN HER REPORTS. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, SUBJECT WAS REMOVED FROM RESPONSIBILITY OF MONITORING AND ANALYZING CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA AND RESTRICTED TO THE SOVIETS AND SOVIET BLOC.

3. FILE: 201-0952786; 201-0285923. E2, IMPDET.

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-285923
DO NOT DESTROY

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

13-2

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP 021635Z

CITE CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 133734

CONF: C/CA 8 INFO: FILE C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/10, C/CI, C/PCS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER SCP
0 IP FILES # 132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.Y

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION Y

SECRET WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED//NO FOREIGN DISSEM Y

CIR-316/04224-77 Y

SUBJECT: RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE, FOREIGN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE - VENEZUELA Y

REF: FBI CABLE DATED 221803Z NOV 77, SAME SUBJECT Y

1. YOU ARE ADVISED, IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCED QUERY, THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ABOVE SUBJECT. ~~OUR STATION IN CARACAS NOTES THAT THE SUBJECT MIGHT FALSELY CLAIM SOME SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY IF ARRESTED, BUT IN FACT NO SUCH RELATIONSHIP EXISTS.~~ Y

2. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

CABLE SEC: PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY TO IP FOR FILING IN 201-285923 AND 19-2-18.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 285923

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CIA

133734.

CONF: INFO: FILE

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0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0

DISSEM BY:

#

ORIG: LA/CO/CI (FAUST X1325); COORD: DC/LA/CO Winters ~~([illegible])~~,

C/LA/VCE/V (AMORI), DC/LA/SR (DISTEFANO); AUTH: C/LAD (WARREN);

REF: C/PCS/LSN/ID (KUHN).

Copied

LA, E73

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: OWEN FAUST
UNIT: LA/CO/CI
EXT: 1325

DC/LA/CO
C/LA/VCE/V
DC/LA/SR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/PCS/LSN/ID
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C/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION #				

375224 E1A259 PAGE 01-01 IN 477336

TOR:281405Z NOV 77 CARA 34827

S E C R E T 251357Z NOV 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS ~~34827~~

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RNMUM

REF: DIRECTOR 130272

1. THE FBI IS FREE TO ARREST MORALES: WE HAVE NO ORS INTEREST. BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE HE MAY CLAIM RELATIONSHIP WITH RTACTION WHICH, OF COURSE, IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE.

2. FILE: 201-~~0950534~~. E2 IMPDET

90

LAPNC/V

201- 285923

28 Nov 77

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RECORD COPY

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

18-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 251731Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 130272

CONF: LA 8 INFO: FILE ~~1P/OPS~~, LSN/10, C/PCS, C14, EPS/EG2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 44
0 NO INDEX
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0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

UNINTEL RNMUM

REF: DIRECTOR |*| 130271

1. SUBJECT REF IS LIKELY TO BE ARRESTED BY THE FBI FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT. WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE PLAN TO TELL THE BUREAU THAT WE HAVE NO OPS INTEREST IN MORALES. PLS ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-0950534. E2 IMPDET.

ORIG: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI X1033); AUTH: PCS/LSN (KUHN); REL: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI).

*SIG CENTER: PLS INSERT DIR NUMBER

TRAVEL PROGRAM
LA PNC/V

201-285923
25 Nov 77

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: ALBERT/AMORI:CK
UNIT: AC/LA/VCE
EXT: 1033

AC/LA/VCE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

PCS/LSN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007667

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

10-1

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

~~STAFF~~

DATE-TIME GROUP 2517312

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 130271

CONF: C/LA 8 INFO: FILE C/LSN/10

DISSEM BY: 44

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0 IP FILES # 132

TO: CARACAS.Y

UNINTEL RNMUM Y

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FBI CABLE DATED 22 NOVEMBER 1977. THIS INFO IS FOR ADDRESSEE BACKGROUND ONLY, NOT TO BE DISCUSSED OR OTHERWISE DISCLOSED OUTSIDE RTACTION WITHOUT PRIOR HQS AUTHORIZATION:Y

|SIG CENTER: PLS TRANSMIT ATTACHED FBI CABLE - IN 473160 - BEGINNING WITH "RICARDO ANIBAL MORALES NAVARRETE; FOREIGN. . ."|

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBORIG: LA/VCE/V (MORGAN X1715); AUTH: PCS/LSN (KUHN); REL: AC/LA/VCE (AMORI).#

*COPY ATTACHED

Morales

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1977
ORIG: RUSSELL MORGAN:CK
UNIT: LA/VCE/V
EXT: 1715

AC/LA/VCE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

PCS/LSN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 247823 EIA236 PAGE 01 IN 358141

TOR:261852Z JUL 77 CARA 33796

S E C R E T 261832Z JUL 77 STAFF

WKBoxer/OPS
75-8-15
Morales Navarette
75-5-9
F-7

CITE CARACAS 33796

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT MHSPIKE WKBOXER

REFS: A. CARACAS 33793 (IN 357055)

B. CARACAS 33793 (HVC-7716) (IN 357051)

1. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS SINCE REFS:

A. WKDIET-5 REPORTS THAT ON 24 JULY WKTANGO-1 STATED THAT, WITH PRESIDENT PEREZ/ BACKING, HE IS DECLARING WAR ON CUBAN EXILES AND IF ANYTHING UNTOWARD HAPPENS, HE WILL TAKE "BLOOD BATH FROM NEW YORK TO CARACAS." HE ALSO MENTIONED AS ADDITIONAL IMPLIED THREAT THAT CUBAN SUPERTHUG, RICARDO MORALEX NAVARETTE, HAS BEEN FULLLY REINSTATED IN DISIP.

B. INFLUENTIAL LOCAL CUBAN EXILES ARE IN SOMEWHAT OF AN UPROAR OVER WHAT THEY REGARD AS POTENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF REPRESSION IN VENEZUELA AND ARE TRYING TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF BOTH COPEI OPPOSITION PARTY AND EX-PRESIDENT BETANCOURT, STAUNCH ANTI-CASTRO-COMMUNIST, TO OFFSET MOVES OF PRESIDENT PEREZ WHOM THEY CONSIDER TO BE IN BED WITH CASTRO. COPEI HAS ALLEGEDLY COME OUT FULLY IN SUPPORT OF LOCAL CUBAN

SECRET

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3		6	

T 247613 EIA236 PAGE 02 IN 356141

TOR:281852Z JUL 77 CARA 33796

EXILE COMMUNITY: BETANCOURT HHAS NOTIFIED THEM THAT HE IS STUDYING THE SITUATION BEFORE REPLYING.

C. AMBASSADOR MET PRESIDENT PEREZ FOR BREAKFAST MORNING 28 JULY. NOTHING WAS MENTIONED ABOUT CUBAN EXILE SITUATION.

2. WHAT WE COULD HAVE AS BASIS OF THIS WHOLE SITUATION IS CUBAN FORGERIES OF LETTERS FROM BOSCH TO BRING PRESSURE ON CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA WHICE REMAINS ALMOST TOTALLY ANTI-CASTRO. IT IS INTERSTING TO NOTE LETTERS PASSED BY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO PRESIDENT PEREZ WERE TYPED, NOT HANDWRITTEN, AND ONLY SIGNED BY BOSCH. IN ANY EVENT, AMBASSADOR STRONGLY DISTRUSTS WKTANGO-1 IN ANYTHING INVOLVING CUBAN EXILES AND SUSPECTS THAT RICARDO MORALES IS EMOTIONALLY, IF NOT MENTALLY, UNSTABLE AND A CUBAN AGENT(SO DO WE). COS DISCUSSED GENERAL SITUATION WITH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING. AS OF NOW, AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY INFORMMATION TO VENEZUELANS ON CUBAN EXILES EXCEPT ON ESTABLISHED TERRORISTS AND ADVANCE NOTICE OF IMPENDING TERRORIST ACTIONS, LEAST OF ALL DOES HE WANT US TO DEAL WITH WKTANGO-1 ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. SINCE THERE APPEARS TO BE SEVERAL GAMES WITHIN GAMES BEING PLAYED HERE, AND SOURCE OF REF B IS WKTANGO-1 (ONE OF THE MAJOR

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T 047813 EIA236 PAGE 03-03 IN 358141

TOR:281852Z JUL 77. CARA 33796

PARTICIPANTS.) RECOMMEND REF B NOT BE DISSEMINATED UNTIL PICTURE IS CLARIFIED.

4. FILE: 75-120-26. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

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SECRET

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INFO

RF FILE VR

T 038993 EIA651 PAGE 01 IN 354509

TOR:252324Z JUL 77 CARA 33784

SECRET 252151Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 33784

TO: DIRECTOR INFO FH/NEW YORK.

WNINTEL RYBAT REAM .

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 069199

B. CARACAS 33655 (IN 341549)

1. ANY ADDITIONAL INFO WE MAY OBTAIN ON NATURE OF MORALES CONTACT WITH SLFAT-1 WILL BE CABLED TO ADDRESSEES. AT THIS POINT ALL WE HAVE IS INFO PROVIDED IN REF B.

2. WHILE IT POSSIBLE, WE DON'T THINK THAT MORALES' CONTACT WITH SLFAT-1 IS RESULT OF A WKTANGO-1 DIRECTED RECRUITMENT OP. WE ARE MORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS IS SOME SORT OF STRANGE LIAIOSON OR DOUBLE-AGENT OPERATION, PROBABLY SUGGESTED BY MORALES HIMSELF, OSTENSIBLY TO MAKE HIMSELF USEFUL TO WKSCARLET. IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE, AND WE HAVE LONG SUSPECTED, WITHOUT ANY HARD EVIDENCE, THAT MORALES MAY BE A CASTRO CUBAN AGENT. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT HE HAS CONNED THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT, OR WKTANGO-1, INTO BELIEVING THAT HE HAS SOME SPECIAL ENTRE WITH SLFAT-1. ALL-IN-ALL, BASED ON OUR PRESENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CHARACTERS

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ACTION #			3 / 6

T 038993 EIA651 PAGE 02-02 IN 354509

TOR:252324Z JUL 77 CARA 33784

INVOLVED AND THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT, WE THINK THAT MORALES IS MORE PRONE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SLFAT-1 THAN WKTANGO-1 IS OF GIVING A SECOND TRY TO THE RECRUITMENT OF SLFAT-1.

3. FILE: 201-0067060; 201-0328945; 201-0285923.

E2, IMPDET.

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INFO RF FILE VR CI/ADMS, DDO4, 9C14,

4EESIEG2

T 810745 EIA628 PAGE 21 IN 256922

TOR:292234Z APR 77 CARA 32949

SECRET 292225Z APR 77 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 32949

TO: DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI

RYBAT WNINTEL REAM

1. ON 28 APRIL 1977 WKDIET-5 REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE (SUBJECT OF 201-2285923), AKA "EL MONO", IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED IN MIAMI A CUBAN EXILE BY THE NAME OF ROBERTO PARSONS. WKDIET-5 SAYS THAT PARSONS WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND UNDERTOOK SEVERAL CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA. HE SAID AT TIMES PARSONS HELPED GET PEOPLE OUT OF CUBA FOR A PRICE. PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976. THE EXACT REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

2. FOLLOWING ARE TRACES ON ROBERTO PARSONS: ACCORDING TO UMWAVE-1302, 16 FEBRUARY 1968, AN AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT WAS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 12 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO. PARSONS WAS A BKHERALD AGENT FROM 1965 THROUGH 1967 WHEN HE WAS TERMINATED ON 30 NOVEMBER WITHOUT PREJUDICE. HE WAS USED IN EXFILTRATION AND INFILTRATION OPERATIONS AND OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUSLY

SECRET

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INFO FILE VR

T 810745 EIA603 PAGE 02-02 IN 266922

TOR: 292034Z APR 77 CARA 32949

ON THE DSE AND DGI.

3. INDEX PARSONS. FILE: 75-120-28. 201-0285923.

E2. IMPDET.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

16:2

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 042333Z DIRECTOR 029666

CONF: LA8 INFO: FILE 1 Adms, CI4, LSN10, CIPCS,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 41
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0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS INFO LA/MIAMI.Y

UNINTEL KMSTONE Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 32949 |IN 266922|

B. CARACAS 32958 |IN 268419| Y (NOT NEEDED LA/MIAMI)Y

1. PARA 2 BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE WHICH WAS SENT TO THE FBI ON 4 MAY, BASED ON REFS. PLEASE PASS THE INFORMATION TO THE LEGATT CARACAS: Y

2. A. ACCORDING TO A VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CUBAN-BORN NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED ROBERTO PARSONS, ANOTHER CUBAN EXILE, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. SOURCE SAID THAT PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT THE REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN. Y

B. PARSONS IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 10 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO, CUBA. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY FROM JULY 1965 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1967. Y

C. A DIFFERENT SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTED ON:

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-779687

201-285423

4 May 77

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

CITE
DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

029666

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29 APRIL 1977 THAT MORALES HAS GONE INTO HIDING IN THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID A COURT APPEARANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF FORMER CHILEAN OFFICIAL ORLANDO LETELIER. Y

D. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION IS BEING MADE. Y

3. AMONG THE CLOSE ASSOCIATES PARSONS LISTED IN HIS PRQ PART I COMPLETED IN JULY 1965 IS ANTONIO BUSTILLO PEREZ (201-0756656), A MEMBER OF THE WKTANGO-1 GROUP. (WASHINGTON 026922) Y

4. FILE: 201-0285923; X REF: 201-0779687(PARSONS). E2 IMPDET.

COMMENT: REPORTED ABOVE INFORMATION AND STATION TRACES WHICH INDICATED THAT PARSONS WAS OF PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JMWAVE.

ORIG: C/LA/PNC/V(ANDREWS); COORD: [redacted]C/LA/OPS~~([illegible])~~ KINNARD, LA/COG(LATRASH), LA/CAR(AMES); AUTH: C/LA/PNC~~(DESMOND)~~ BUSTOS; REL: AC/LA (LAUDER).

DATE: 4 MAY 77
ORIG: ROBERT ANDREWS:PM
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: X1715

AC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/OPS
LA/COG
LA/CAR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Bustos
C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18-2

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP 052304Z | CITE CIA | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 030328

CONF: 4LA 8 INFO: FILE 4IP/DMS, 4LSN/ID, 4PCS, 4CI 2, 4PCS/ITC 4

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TO: FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INFO DEPT OF STATE//SY/TAG, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

CIR-316/01585-77

SUBJECT: RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE

ON 25 APRIL 1977

1. [redacted] A VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED REPORTED THAT RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE, CUBAN-BORN NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, IS RUMORED TO HAVE KILLED ROBERTO PARSONS, ANOTHER CUBAN EXILE, IN MIAMI, FLORIDA. SOURCE SAID THAT PARSONS HAS BEEN MISSING SINCE DECEMBER 1976 AND THAT THE REASON FOR HIS ALLEGED MURDER IS UNKNOWN.

2. PARSONS IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ROBERTO PARSONS RAMIREZ, BORN 10 JULY 1930 IN GUANTANAMO, CUBA. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY FROM JULY 1965 UNTIL NOVEMBER 1967.

3. A DIFFERENT VENEZUELAN SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTED ON 29

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

316/01585-77
201-285923
5 May 77

B 201-779687

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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CLASSIFICATION
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CIA

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DISSEM BY:

APRIL 1977 THAT MORALES HAS GONE INTO HIDING IN THE UNITED STATES TO AVOID A COURT APPEARANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DEATH OF FORMER CHILEAN OFFICIAL ORLANDO LETELIER. Y

4. THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN CARACAS. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION IS BEING MADE. Y

5. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. XGDS-2.H

BASED ON: PARAGRAPHS ONE AND TWO: CARACAS 32949 (IN-266922)
WKDIET (WKDIET-5)
PARAGRAPH THREE: CARACAS 32958 (IN-268419)
WKMAYOR (WKSCARLET-9)

OBJECTIVE: J-1

ORIG: LA/PNC (KENNER X9454); COORD: DC/LA/PNC BUSTOS ~~(DESMOND)~~; C/LA/COG [illegible] ~~(LATRASH)~~; C/LA/AN (BEARDSLEY); C/LA/OPS (DI STEFANO); PCS/ITC (WARNER - TELECOORD); AUTH: AC/LAD (LAUDER); REL: C/PCS/LSN (

LA/Reg
ET. 3 Regina &
ATTN: Isabelle

DC/LA/PNC Bustos
C/LA/COG
C/LA/AN
C/LA/OPS
PCS/ITC - (E. WARNER - TELECOORD)
LA/RR C. Bauer

MAY 00 77

DATE: 3 MAY 1977
ORIG: H. KENNER:LW
UNIT: LA/PNC
EXT: 9454

C/PCS/LSN
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/LAD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CHILE

Apr. 4, 1952

BRIEFS

WORKERS' HOUSING--An executive message to the Chamber of Deputies asks for the authorization of 120 million pesos for the construction of cheap housing for workers employed by the city of Santiago. The bill will be considered soon by the proper committee. (CE1180 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0030 GMT--R)

TRANSPORTATION APPROPRIATION--The Finance Ministry has dispatched the decree putting 94 million pesos at the disposal of the national transport authority for the acquisition of trolley buses and supplies to the comptroller's office. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

TEACHERS' STRIKE--At the meeting of striking teachers held Apr. 3 it was decided to adopt the following procedural points: 1--To continue the strike indefinitely; 2--to demand that salaries be fixed at a rate equal to that of the minimum paid to private employees, plus 20 percent; 3--to protest the refusal of two Deputies to give their votes to the draft of a bill to readjust the earnings of public officials, which also provides that exonerated Communist professors will be reinstated; 4--to protest an anti-strike editorial published in EL MERCURIO; 5--to meet on Apr. 4 at the University of Chile to determine the course to follow. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

COPPER SITUATION--The Minister of Labor has declared that as long as the Finance Ministry does not solve the problem of exchange, the nitrate dispute cannot be solved. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

FOREIGN MINISTRY--Juan (Marin) has been authorized to continue in his post as Chilean Charge d'Affairs in India, and Juan Guzman Cruchaga in his important Foreign Ministry assignment. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0100 GMT--R)

IMMIGRATION PLAN--The Sociedad Italiana plans to invest 100 million pesos for the purpose of cultivating and exploiting sugar beet crops in southern Chile with colonies of Italian immigrants. The society is collaborating with the Development Corporation and the Agricultural Settlement Fund and will acquire 16,000 hectares in the Province of Cautin for the purpose. (CE1174 Santiago, Apr. 4, 1952, 0300 GMT--R)

RESTRICTED

- E 3 - CHILE
Mar. 18, 1952

PRESS FREEDOM COMMITTEE--The President will form a committee for the purpose of studying laws which include repressive measures against the freedom of the press, on Mar. 18 at La Moneda. Press representatives are Emilio Pacul, Juan Honorato, and Mario Vergara. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 17, 1952, 2322 GMT--R)

COAL SITUATION--Reports from the coal region state that the situation is normal and that the workers have decided to work with provincial authorities in trying to reach an agreement after the failure of the Santiago talks. Metallurgical workers at the Lota and Coronel mines have returned to work in accordance with union directives. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 17, 1952, 2325 GMT--R)

CHAMBER PRESIDENTIAL LINE-UP--Since the Chamber of Deputies will meet Mar. 18 to open the special session which will extend to May 21, it is interesting to note the position and strength of its members in regard to the roster of Presidential aspirants: Favoring Arturo Matte Larrain are 33 Liberals, 21 Conservative-Traditionalists, 5 Agrarian Laborites, 2 Liberal-Progressives, and one Independent Democrat, or a total of 63. Favoring Pedro Enrique Alfonso are 42 Radicals, 9 Conservatives and 5 Democrats: total, 56. Carlos Ibanez del Campo: 9 Agrarian Laborites, 5 Socialists, one People's Democrat, and 2 Independent Conservatives; total, 17. Salvador Allende: 6 Socialists and one National Front; total, 7. The only unknown positions and numbers are those of the National Falangists, and the Independent Deputy, Melendez Anfruns. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 16, 1952, 2350 GMT--R)

GATH Y CHAVEZ CLOSING--Gath y Chavez has announced a closing-out of its entire stock of merchandise, thus terminating the career of one of Santiago's best-known business houses. The company closed its doors last Christmas as a result of a strike declared by its personnel. (Santiago, AFP, Mar. 15, 1952, 0000 GMT--R)

IMMIGRATION PROGRAM--The bill drafted by the Government Immigration Committee, presided over by Under Secretary of the Interior Grez, is designed to legislate all matters connected with the immigration of foreigners. The plan proposes the creation of an immigration department or office which will be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and which will be in charge of orienting all immigrants arriving in Chile. Also under consideration is the plan to exempt all immigrants from paying taxes for a period of 5 years. This would include customs duty on their property and machinery as well as income tax. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 14, 1952, 2326 GMT--R)

NAVAL APPOINTMENTS--With the retirement of Vice Admirals Carlos Torres Hevia, Immanuel Holger, and Horacio de la Fuente, the Navy will reportedly make some important promotions. Besides raising Naval Capt. Danilo Basi to the rank of Rear Admiral, and raising Enrique Lagreze and Francisco Oyarzun to naval captains, Victor Oelkers has been made rear admiral, and Alberto (Cass) Wigand, Juan Mercado Munoz, and Alfredo Lopez have been made naval captains. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2310 GMT--R)

FISHING STRIKE--Valparaiso fishermen have joined the Talcahuano fishermen who declared a strike to protest against the Purse Seine fishing enterprises. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2320 GMT--R)

U.S. PASTOR--Protestant U.S. Pastor Erickson, whose activities have been attacked in many sectors where he has held public religious meetings, will soon go to Santiago where he will hold meetings in the Caupolican Theater. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2335 GMT--R)

MINING TAX--The Government has imposed a one and one-half percent tax on sales made by "small" mining companies. All companies capitalized at less than 5 million pesos fall under this category. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 15, 1952, 2340 GMT--R)

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION--From the total of 200 million pesos allotted for public housing by the Ministry of Public Works, 20 million will go to Iquique and Santiago respectively, 25 million each to Arica and Antofagasta, 30 million to Coquimbo, 40 million to Valparaiso, and 10 million each to Concepcion, Cautin, Magallanes, and Llanquihue Provinces. (Santiago, EL TARAPACA, Mar. 13, 1952, 2334 GMT--R)

HYDROELECTRIC PLANT--Guillermo Moore, manager of the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad has announced that a new central hydroelectric plant will shortly be constructed on Rio Rapel and three more will be constructed in the southern zone. (Santiago /Official/, Diplomatic, Mar. 14, 1952, 1553 GMT--R)

CHILEAN-SWEDISH TRADE--The Minister of Foreign Affairs received the Swedish Minister who proposed negotiations for the drafting of a commercial and cultural treaty. This treaty is designed to increase the exchange of Swedish-manufactured products and machinery for Chilean Agricultural products and minerals. (Santiago /Official/, Diplomatic, Mar. 14, 1952, 1555 GMT--R)

Form No. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

FROM: FRANKFURT ROUTINE

TO: 00/OPC/OSO 27 DEC 51

ACTION: 00/CB IN 49477

INFORMATION: AD/SO (1), OPS (2), PLANS (3), STC (4), FDM (5-6), OPC (7-8-9-10), S/C (11-12-13), DDP (14)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

FRAN 3173

TO: WASHINGTON (ASHCRAFT) INFO: KARLF FRANG CITE: FRAN (CRUDEN)

PIPELINE

REUR 446 (OUT 95394)

REF PASSED MOFFETT WHO HAS BEEN EXPLORING WITH CANADIANS. THEY DON'T SEEM INTERESTED. ONLY LIKELY BUYER BELIEVED TO BE ANOTHER S.A. COUNTRY SUCH AS ARGENTINA WITH WHOM WE HAVE NO CONTACTS. WE CERTAINLY NOT ABLE DO ANYTHING HERE WHICH CAN'T BE MORE EFFECTIVELY DONE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WITHOUT EXPENSE MOVING FAMILY BACK TO GERMANY AND THEN ON OUT AGAIN.

TOR 1507Z 27 DEC 51

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Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Page No.

SECURITY INFORMATION

To: FRANKFURT   ROUTINE

From: 00/OPC/OSO   20 DEC 51

Confirmation: 00/CB   OUT 95394

Information: AD/SO (1), OPS (2), PLANS (3), STC (4), FDM (5-6), OPC (7-8-9-10), WHD (11), S/C (12-13-14), DDP (15)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60.4 AR-380-5

NR 446

TO: FRANKFURT (CRUDEN)   INFO: FRANFG   CITE: WASHINGTON (ASHCRAFT)

PIPELINE

JANNEY OF ZACABIN SAYS HE GAVE ROBINOW BACKGROUND ON AERONAUTICAL ENGINEER AMONG CHILEAN DISPOSAL GROUP AND ROBINOW PROMISED EXPLORE POSSIBILITY GETTING HIM INTO CANADA THROUGH GERMAN CONTACTS. ZACABIN ANXIOUS TO FINISH CHILEAN DISPOSAL OPERATION 15 JANUARY. THIS ONE MAN REFUSES WORK AT ANYTHING EXCEPT AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING, FOR WHICH JOB NOT AVAILABLE CHILE. ADVISE SOONEST WHAT ROBINOW HAS DONE OR WHAT HE CAN DO. ZACABIN THINKING OF MOVING DEFECTOR BACK TO GERMANY, WHERE HE MIGHT LAND IN YOUR LAP.

31-7-21

RELEASING OFFICER   ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0252Z 21 DEC 51

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Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

To:	SANTIAGO	ROUTINE
	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	30 AUG 51
From:	WHD (1-2)	~~OUT 7392~~
Confirmation:	IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), STC (8), FDS (9),	
Information:	FDM (10), S/C (11-12-13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60.4 AR 380-5

WASH 06075

TO: SAGOF CITE: WASHF

RE: SAGO 305 (IN 21737), WASH 04807 (OUT 71940)

Bernier

HEADQUARTERS WAS UNABLE TO STOP DEPARTURE OF SUBJECT, A POLE, WHO LEFT BY PLANE FOR CHILE ON 21 AUGUST, AS OUR INTERAGENCY DEFECTOR COMMITTEE WAS NOT CONSULTED. FULLNESS SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT WE NOT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. SUBJECT IS NOT A DEFECTOR WITHIN IDCOP NO. 1 REGULATIONS. THEREFORE YOU SHOULD ASSUME NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIM UNLESS HE BECOMES INVOLVED WITH OTHER DEFECTORS IN WHICH CASE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TO OUR INTEREST AND INTEREST OF PROGRAM. MA IS TO BE ADVISED BY DA THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS HIS.

V L GRESHAM	HJU	DWS	H J MCKELLOPS
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS		AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD:
2129Z 30 AUG 51

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28 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CIA Defector Committee

FROM: OSO Representative, CIA Defector Committee

SUBJECT: Army Disposal Action on Defector to Chile.

1. On 17 August 1951, CIA received a priority cable (IN 21787) from Santiago advising that the Chilean Consul in Frankfurt, Germany, had requested authority from his Foreign Office to issue an "ordinary visa" to Boguslaw Borowiez, a Russian defector (actually a Polish defector), stating that American Intelligence had requested the visa on the same basis as in the case of earlier defectors. Santiago indicated that Chilean officials did not look on this with favor.

2. On 17 August the undersigned was able to ascertain that Borowiez had defected to the 66th Detachment, CIA, in Germany in late May 1951 and since that time had been held in ECIC.

3. On 17 August CIA queried German Station (OUT 71605) as to why Borowiez had not been placed in the DRC and requested that Borowiez be sent to Chile.

4. On 17 August 1951, the undersigned telephoned Mrs. Dorothy Matlack, G-2, and requested her to have a cable sent to Germany by G-2 forbidding the disposal of Borowiez to Chile. The undersigned provided Mrs. Matlack with the serial number of the pertinent CIC memo. Mrs. Matlack stated that she would do everything possible to have this cable sent even if it required her to come in the next day, which was Saturday.

5. On 20 August CIA advised Santiago (OUT 71940) that it had no knowledge regarding this disposal action and was opposed to any more disposal actions to Chile at this time.

6. On 22 August, CIA received a reply from Germany (IN 22176) stating that this Borowiez matter was entirely within the province of CIC and under the circumstances it was impossible for CIA in Germany to have had the body sent to the DRC. It was also stated that ID EUCOM was arranging for departure on 21 August 1951. The undersigned immediately advised Mrs. Matlack of this ETD and she stated that she was doing all she could to have a priority cable sent at once.

7. On 22 August about 1600 hours, Mrs. Matlack telephoned the undersigned and stated that G-2 did not have a copy of the referenced CIC memo. She requested the undersigned to come over to the Pentagon immediately in order to exhibit the CIA copy of the CIA memorandum, as otherwise G-2 would not send out the desired cable to CIC, Germany. This the undersigned did and such a cable was eventually sent out priority by G-2 to Germany (IN W 23393).

SECRET

8. On 27 August 1951, CIA received word from Germany (IN 23698) that on 21 August Dorowics had left by plane for Chile and would apparently require no assistance there since he had his own funds.

Walter C. Janney

Janney

Form No. 35-8
April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

all WHD

SECRET

Page No.

FROM: KARLSRUHE | ROUTINE
TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS | 25 AUGUST 51
ACTION: FDM (1-2-3) | IN 23798
INFORMATION: IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11), CPP (12)
STC (13)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

KARL 3118

TO: WASHF INFO: HEIDF, MUNIF CITE: KARLF

RE: KARL 3082 (IN 22716)

1. ID EUCOM ADVISES REQUEST TO RICCIO FOR BOROWICZ DISPOSAL CHILE MADE BY ECIC.

2. BOROWICZ LEFT 21 AUGUST FOR CHILE BY PLANE. HAS OWN FUNDS APPARENTLY REQUIRING NO US HELP IN SETTLEMENT CHILE.

3. ID EUCOM RECEIVED DA WASH CABLE AMOUNTING TO REPRIMAND FOR HANDLING BOROWICZ EMIGRATION WITHOUT COORDINATION, ALSO POINTING OUT ZACABAL NOT CONSULTED.

TOR: 0751Z 25 AUG 51

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OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

To: SANTIAGO
ROUTINE

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS
23 AUG 51

Confirmation: WHD (1-2)
OUT 72590

Information: FI (3-4), AC/SO (5), PLANS (6), FDS (7), OPS (8), DDP (9), S/C (10-11-12), OPG (13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

WASH [illegible])

TO: SACOF
CITE: WASHF

RE: SACO 505 (IN 20501) PARA 2A

Borowiec

DEPORTATION OF SUBJECT NO INTEREST OR RESPONSIBILITY OF HEADQUARTERS OR YOUR STATION AND WE NOT WILLING ASSUME OBLIGATION OR EXPENSE THIS CONNECTION. SUCH DECISION STRICTLY UP TO FULLNESS.

V.L. GRESHAM
RELEASING OFFICER

HJMCK DRS
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

H.J. [illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0272 23 AUG 51

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OCT 1949

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted] SECRET

PAGE No.

	DEPARTMENT OF ARMY	PRIORITY
FROM:	HEIDELBERG	22 AUG 51
TO:	DEPARTMENT OF ARMY	IN " 23393
ACTION:	AD/SO (1), IR (2), OPS (3), STC (4), FDM (5), FDS (6),	
INFORMATION:	FID (7), RC (8), S/C (9)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as TOP SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR 380-5

NR: DA 99529

TO: CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY

FOR DI FROM G2.

SUBJECT IS BOGUSLAW BOROWIEZ. INFO HERE THAT CHILEAN CONSUL RICCIO, FRANKFORT ROSTED CHILEAN FON OFFICE ISSUE ORDINARY VISA TO SUBJECT AS OF 31 JULY, STATED AMER INTEL ROSTED VISA ON SAME BASIS AS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS. CAS ALLEGES THAT THEY NOT NOTIFIED OF BOROWIEZ DEFECTION ALTHOUGH HE IN CUSTODY 66 CIC DET SINCE 26 MAY 51. ROST INFO REF ROLE OF 66 CIC DET IN SUBJECTS DEFECTION AND FURTHER DATA AS TO WHY IDC OPN PROCEDURE NR 1 WAS NOT FOLLOWED. ROST SUBJECT BE NOT RESETTLED WITHOUT CONCURRENCE OF IDC GERMANY ALSO ROST THAT SUBJECT NOT BE RESETTLED IN CHILE IN VIEW OF DIFFICULTIES NOW HAVING WITH PREV DEFECTORS SETTLED THERE.

ORIGIN: G2

DISTR: G2(CIA)

DA 99529 (AUG 51) DTG: 221828Z

2338Z 22 AUG 51

TOR:

[redacted] SECRET

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April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Page No:

From:	KARLSRUHE	ROUTINE
To:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	21 AUGUST 51
Action:	FDM (1-2-3)	IN 22716
Information:	IR (4-5), AD/SO (6), OPS (7), PLANS (8), S/C (9-10-11), COP (12), STC (13).	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

KARL 3082

TO: WASHF CITE: KARLF

RE: WASH 04608 (OUT 71605)

1. LATE JULY CIC ADVISED THEY THROUGH WITH DEBRIEFING BOROWICZ WHO WILL BE TREATED AS DISPOSAL CASE FROM 10 AUG ON AND ASKED WHETHER WE INTERESTED IN HIM. MOB ADVISED NOT INTERESTED; BOB ADVISED INTERESTED AND ASKED MOB INTERVIEW HIM, WHICH MOB DID 9 AUG (REPORT IN MGMA 6602 EN ROUTE MUNI TO KARL AND WASH, INDICATES HE OF NO FURTHER INTEREST SINCE CIC FULLY DEBRIEFED AND ID EUCOM WAS ARRANGING HIS EMIGRATION WITH ETD 21 AUG).

2. BOB INTEREST SIMPLY DUE TO ORIGINAL CIC INDICATIONS SINCE BOB PRIMARY BASE FOR DISPATCH SINGLETONS TO POLAND WHILE MOB TRIES SPECIALIZE IN GROUP OPS.

3. PLS REALIZE WE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH B EXCEPT SINGLE INTERVIEW WHICH PRODUCED NO OPS INTEREST IN HIM. RE DRC: IN CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WAS NOT OUR CASE TO ROUTE TO DRC OR ELSEWHERE; ALSO, IT IS NOT SOP FOR PERSONS OF B'S LEVEL AND NATIONALITY TO GO DRC.

4. RE CHILEAN VISA REQUEST: WE INVESTIGATING AND WILL REPORT FACTS SOON.

TOR: 1325Z 21 AUG 51 **SECRET** Copy No.)

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Form No. 35-6

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

ROUTINE

To: SANTIAGO

From: SPECIAL OPERATIONS

23 AUG 51

OUT 71940

WHD (1-2)

Confirmation: IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), STC (8), S/C (9-10-11),

Information: FDS (12)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60.4 AR-380-5

WASH 04807

TO: SAGOF CITE: W:SHF

RE: SAGO 305 (IN 21787)

Borowiec

THIS AGENCY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF PLANS FOR ADDITIONAL DEFECTOR PRIOR RECEIPT SAGO 305. MATTER BEING CHECKED AND YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT HEADQUARTERS WILL OPPOSE SENDING MORE DISPOSAL CASES TO CHILE AT THIS TIME.

V.L. GRESHAM — RELEASING OFFICER

HJU MJC — ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

H.J. MCKELLOPS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 1738Z 23 AUG 51

SECRET

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3-5-4-38

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

To:	KARLSRUHE	ROUTINE
From:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	17 AUG 51
Confirmation:	FDM (1-2)	OUT 71605
	IR (3-4) ADSO (5) OPS (6) PLANS (7) S/C (9-10-11)	
Information:	DDP (12), STC (13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (i) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 04608

TO: KARLF CITE: WASHF

RE: KARL 2945 (IN 18811)

1. SANTIAGO ADVISES CHILEAN FONOF RECEIVED DISPATCH DATED 31 JULY FROM ITS FRAN CONSUL, RICCIO REQUESTING AUTHORITY ISSUE "ORDINARY VISA" TO SUBJECT STATED AMERICAN INTELL REQUESTED VISA ON SAME BASIS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS.

2. IN VIEW COMPLICATIONS CHILEAN DEFECTOR SITUATION NO DISPOSAL OP TO CENTRAL OR SOUTH AMERICA TO BE INITIATED WITHOUT PRIOR HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. PLS ADVISE WHO INITIATED REQUEST PARA 1 AND HOLD UP ACTION THIS CASE PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ.

3. ADVISE(A) WHY SUBJECT WAS NOT TURNED OVER TO DRC FOR DEBRIEFING PER CURRENT OPERATING PROCEDURES?

(B) SUBJECT'S PRESENT STATUS, LOCATION.

(C) CLARIFICATION BOB INTEREST SUBJECT, SUBSEQUENT MOB ACTION.

4. RE MGSA 4088. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ROTNICKI OR TEPLITZ-SEMBLITSKY. ASSUME CIC FOLLOWING UP CE ASPECTS AND ACTIVITIES WEST GERMANY.

H. CUNNINGHAM	VLH WT	W. JANEY
RELEASING OFFICER	ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS	AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 0102Z 18 AUG 51

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April 1950

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE NO.

FROM:	SANTIAGO	PRIORITY
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	15 AUG 51
ACTION:	WHD (1-2)	IN 01787
INFORMATION:	AD/SO (3), OPS (4), PLANS (5), STC (6), FDS (7) S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	23 June 51 D-270064

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SAGO 305

TO: WASHF CITE: SAGOF

army
CIC HQ 66 Det
Lt Col. David
Hunter 5-2/53

1. FULLNESS ADVISED CHILEAN FOREIGN OFFICE RECEIVED DISPATCH FROM ITS FRANKFURT CONSUL, RICCIO, DATED 31 JULY 51, REQUESTING AUTHORITY ISSUE "ORDINARY VISA" TO VAURKOY BOROWICZ entuan. BOGUSLAV, RUSSIAN DEFECTOR. STATED AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE REQUESTED VISA ON SAME BASIS AS PREVIOUS DEFECTORS.

2. FULLNESS OPINED ENOUGH DIFFICULTY EXISTED OVER PRESENT DEFECTORS WITHOUT ADDING THERETO. HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO HOLD MATTER ABEYANCE HQS COMMENTS.

3. SAGO RECOMMENDS NO NEW DEFECTORS CHILE UNTIL PRESENT PROBLEMS RESOLVED AND FULLNESS ASSURED THAT UNDESIRABLES BE RECALLED. BELIEVE DEFECTORS 47 AND 38 MOST SERIOUS ALTHOUGH INVESTIGATION UNCOMPLETED TO DATE. DEFECTORS 36 AND 42 NOT BELIEVED RECONCILABLE. RECOMMEND FRANKFURT AUTHORITIES HANDLE SUCH MATTERS THROUGH HQS AND THIS STATION.

TOR: 1519Z 15 AUG 51

SECRET

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

TCS-690 dtd 24 Aug 49

Ref: TCS-W-644

Industrial expansion of last few years in Chile reveals shortages skilled welders, automotive mechanics, farm machinery technicians and mechanics, factory mechanics, experienced lathe operaters, die and mould workers, ceramics technicians--skilled labor and technicians in almost every industry in the country.

3p79-2

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. OSC Registry 15-6-4	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT 17 Feb 1949	ANALYST Lois Smith
SUBJECT Disposal Questionnaire			DATE 29 November 1955

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Pencilled in file No. 31-7-4-1

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			
Wash	CIA	Pro	354 folder 54

FORM NO. 59-28
DEC 1952

(39)

Dept. of Army document

12 August 1955

Memo For: Dir, CIA, Fm: Collection Div, G-2

Subject: Interagency Defector Committee

Class: Secret

refer to G2-CDOA

THIRD AGENCY

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Mc LENDON, GORDON
201-299764

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 MAY 78		LESLIE WIZELMAN	Leslie Wizelman

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

6 Jan 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on McLENDON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☒ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Sam H. Girardi (name) ________ (title) IP/ANP (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed LL (initials) 6 Jan 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-79764

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET

3 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: John K. McLean

1. On 28 April the undersigned was introduced to Mr. John McLean by Mr. Wallace Lampshire, a staff officer. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Mr. McLean's connection with Mr. Gordon Barton McLendon (201-79764) and Mr. McLendon's stated desire to help his government.

2. Mr. McLean is a former staff officer (DDI/OCI) who resigned to enter the field of finance. He has been a banker, a stock broker (Sade & Co.) and currently is Vice-President and Treasurer of International Ventures, Inc., 888 17th Street N.W., Washington 20006, as well as Vice-President of Riviere & Berens Securities Corp., stockbrokers located at 1832 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

3. Mr. McLendon was born in Paris, Texas 8 June 1921 and now lives in Dallas. According to Who's Who in the South and Southwest, Mr. McLendon is the owner of a number of radio stations and is listed as the president of numerous companies in radio, TV, and motion picture theatre fields. Mr. McLendon is reputedly a multi-millionaire.

4. Mr. McLean and Mr. McLendon have maintained a friendship since their years at Yale. Mr. McLean recently visited Mr. McLendon at his ranch some thirty miles from Dallas. During this visit Mr. McLendon expressed his fears of the future of the dollar and said that he has moved millions of his dollars to Europe where the money has been put into Swiss and French francs, plus German marks. Most of the money is apparently in savings instruments of one kind or another plus a night club that Mr. McLendon has bought in Stockholm. During these conversations, Mr. McLendon wondered if these foreign operations might not be of interest to the Government (read CIA as Mr. McLendon was an ONI officer during WW II and is aware of Mr. McLean's former employment with the Agency.) Mr. McLendon mentioned his night club as a possibility, as it is frequented by persons of many countries, including the USSR.

SECRET

5. Mr. McLean has business interests in Dallas and said that he is willing to explore this possibility with Mr. McLendon if we provide guidance.

6. Mr. McLean himself perhaps offers more potential via International Ventures, Inc. Mr. McLean is seeking venture capital opportunities abroad. For example, he and a Mr. Lincoln Epworth in New York City are working with a Japanese named Ikvo Kasai who is President of Nichimen Co. of Tokyo, a firm seeking to export to the States. Mr. McLean was frank to say that International Ventures is more a dream than a reality in terms of business but the concern is making progress. Mr. McLean offered to be of any assistance.

Comment: I have sent for Mr. McLean's file and upon its receipt I will seek a PCSA.

Frederick Larkin, Jr.
CCS/CFB

FL/ekw

SECRET

FROM:

WILCOXEN ELI GL-924
BRANCH CCS/CFB 21CKEY
EXT. 3543 1U3E

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE 19 April 1972
(for Ms Larkin)

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	24 Ap	72	[illegible]
REQUESTER					
RID/FILES	DT-8	GC52			
REQUESTER					
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7	GA50			
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003			

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES

ENTER NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED ____________

Pending file

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME ✓ GIVEN NAMES

Mc LENDON, Gordon Barton

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED MAC ✓

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*) See "Who's Who in the South and Southwest", Eleventh Edition, P. 677

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	8 June 1921	Paris, Texas	U.S.A.	9300 Douglas Street, Dallas, Texas

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS night club in [illegible] Stockholm FVV'L

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX CARD REPRODUCTIONS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO RID/FILES.

TO EDIT THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS ACCORDING TO CSI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY CARDS: MARK THE CARD REPRODUCTION WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE CARD REPRODUCTIONS IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO RID/AN, VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER.

201 CONSOLIDATION (*SEE CSI 70-20*)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, RETURN ONLY THIS FORM TO RID/AN WITH REPRODUCTIONS OF INDEX CARDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN.
2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, RETURN THIS FORM TO RID/201 WITH:
   - A. A COMPLETED FORM 831:
   - B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED INDEX CARD REPRODUCTIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY RID/201.

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT CHECKED BY RID/INDEX (*SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK*).

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
CS AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
RID ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
COMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
DD BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
CS TRAVEL (*ZOMNIK-ZOD, AC*)			DOMESTIC CONTACTS SERVICE		
NAME OF BEARER FILE					
CIA APPLICANTS FILE			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
COVERT ACTION STAFF (*[illegible]*)			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
FI STAFF — RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
FI STAFF — INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG			I & NS		
CI STAFF — CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			STATE DEPARTMENT		
CI STAFF — [illegible] PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
[illegible]			SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE	

362

SECRET

MCLENDON, GORDON BARTON

201-079764*

[illegible] 4/75 [illegible]

SEX M DOB 08 JUN 21
USA, TEXAS, PARIS
CIT USA
OCC PRES
REF

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE BUSP

OI CODE ?

< USA, TEXAS, DALLAS
MCLENDON BROADCAST SYSTEM.

100000000 CORR CARD 6605250198

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BRIEF RECORD OF CASE ACTION

ITEM	DATE	REMARKS	INITIALS

MINUTE SHEET

This MUST be the TOP, unserialized document in File Number 201-

FORM NO. 78 REPLACES FORM 30-38
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(19)

14-00000

19 February 1966
Date

Memorandum For: DO/SEC (for Mr. Beers)

Reference : Request for traces and clearance

Project : [illegible]

Subject : See below

NAME: McLENDON, Gordon Barton
DPOB: 8 June 1921, Paris, Texas
CIT: USA
RES: 9300 Douglas St., Dallas, Texas
OCC: McLendon Broadcast System
ADD: 2104 Jackson St., Dallas, Texas

Trace Results:

No record in addition to 201-79764 which is attached herewith on permanent charge to DO/CO/Beers.

CI/CA file JG-9545 was reviewed and found to contain no information in addition to that contained in Subject's dossier. You will note that a request made by FE Division for a CSC on Subject was denied by the Office of Security on 29 July 1952.

Areas Checked:

RID x Area Division ___ Central Cover Staff x Office of Security ___

OCR: Biographics Register ___ Foreign Installations Branch ___ Library ___

Other ___.

Form 772 requesting PCSA/CSA was forwarded ___ to(Security) ~~(CI/OA)~~

A copy of this memorandum has been sent to RID for classification into file ___.

Bernie A. Smith
DO/CS

Attachment: 201-79764

Distribution:
Orig.- Addressee
~~xxxxx~~ DO/H - 1

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 30 December 1965

TO:	☐	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☒	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DO/OO

SUBJECT: *(True name)* McLENDON, Gordon Barton

PROJECT: WUENTREE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
US

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE
Subject will be contacted and assessed on a witting basis in support of WUENTREE. Subject is President of McLendon Corporation of Dallas, Texas and is also owner of several radio stations. He was born in Paris, Texas on 8 June 1921. He resides at 9300 Douglas Street, Dallas, Texas and has a ranch in Denton, Texas. During World War II, he served as a Japanese Language Officer in intelligence for the US Navy from 1943-45. He is the author of "The Old Scotchman's Scrapbook"

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Peter Beers	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF William A Royer

4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST / DATE PROCESSED 12 Oct [illegible]	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

[illegible]

[illegible] JK-9545

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-79714

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM (67), 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

24 May 1954

RI
ATTN: RI/CC

Chief, FE

Disposition of Files

1. Forwarded herewith for your disposition are thirty-eight (38) files, considered non-restricted by FE, for the following listed [illegible]:

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
Mc Lendon, Gordon Barton	about 1922	Atlanta / Texas / Idabelle/okla

2. Subjects are no longer in use by this office.

Originated by: Ursa T. Sharp

FOR: [illegible]
Chief, FE

Dist: Addressee - Orig & 2; Subj - 1 ea;
FE-1, CE(Rawlinson) - 1
FE-1 (chrono) - 1

SEE [illegible], Salvatore Bernard's file
Date of Birth: Sept 29, 1910; Place of Birth: N.Y.N.Y.

201-77704

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM

NO FE/1

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	REC'D	FWD'D		
1.				6 McLENDON, Gordon Barton
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13. RI/CO	PROCESSED 2[illegible]	[illegible]		
14. RI/FI				
15.				

201-77764

NOV 16 1956

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

29 JUL 1952

Chief, Staff C
Attention: Staff C/FPB
Chief, Special Security Division

SO 9525
#69488 McLendon, Gordon Barton

1. Reference is made to your request for a covert security clearance for the Subject, who is the president of a company which will provide accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization.

2. This is to advise that the covert security clearance, as requested, is hereby denied.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET
Security Information

27 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, I & S

VIA : FE/PP
STC/SFB

SUBJECT : Gordon Barton McLendon

1. It is requested that the case on Gordon Barton McLendon be closed, since this office has no further interest in Subject.

2. The request for covert security clearance on Mr. McLendon was submitted on 11 February 1953.

LLOYD GEORGE
Chief, FE

FE/III/PC/LSC:lml
Dist: Addressee - Orig. & 1
OPS - 1
FE/PP - 1
STC/SFB - 1
FE/III/PC Chrono - 1
RI - 2

-SECRET-

MEMORANDUM TO: OD/CP/Sec 11 February 1952

FROM: FE/III/PC

SUBJECT: Gordon Barton McLendon

1. Covert Clearance, for use as outlined below, it is requested for Subject, on whom available information is submitted separately.

___Op. Clearance XX Security Clearance ___Op. Support ___Sp. Inquiry

2. Use of Subject: (State in detail the scope and nature of activities to be performed, their duration, the area involved, project involved, etc.)

Subject is the president of a company which will provide accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization. It is not expected that subject will learn of the agent's connection with this organization, however, clearance is requested to so inform subject of the connection if the need may arise at a later date. Subject will know nothing of operations conducted by this agent, only that he is connected with CIA.

3. "Cover" story suggested for investigation: ___Governmental XXCommercial

Details: General Credit ___Other

4. Limits, if any, to investigation: None

5. Is Subject aware that an investigation is in process: Yes___ No X
6. Is Subject aware of CIA interest? Yes___ No X
7. Has Subject been briefed on "cover" story? Yes___ No X
8. Has Subject established "cover" for investigation with probable contacts? Yes___ No X
9. Is Prov. Operational Clearance necessary? Yes___ No X
10. Investigation to be XX Routine __ Expedite
Must be completed by: 1 June 1952
11. REMARKS:

Case Officer Lowell J. Christy

Security Officer

Branch Chief James G.L. Kellis

-SECRET-

SECRET

TO: ASST. DEPUTY (INSPECTION & SECURITY)

Date: ____________

FROM: CD/OP/OPC (Security)

J.G.: ____________

SUBJECT:

1. Necessary covert investigation is requested on Subject on whom all available background data is submitted separately. Information and/or clearance is requested for case category as follows:

   Operational Cl. XXSecurity Cl. Sp. Inquiry Operational Support

2. Name of Special Project (if applicable): XX DTMIKADO

3. Investigation to be completed as: XX Routine ____ Expedite by not later than 1 June 1952.

4. Scope and nature of use or activity:

   Subject is the president of a company which will provide ////// accreditation in Japan to a contract agent of this organization. It is not expected that subject will learn of the agent's connection with this organization, however.

5. Suggested "cover" for investigation: ____Governmental ____Commercial ____ Other
   Specific:

6. Limitations, if any, on investigation:

7. Subject HAS/HAS NOT been briefed that investigation is pending.

8. Subject HAS/HAS NOT been briefed on "cover" story to be used in investigation.

9. Subject HAS/HAS NOT indicated to probable investigative contacts investigation pending.

10. Subject HAS/HAS NOT indicated to probable investigative contacts "cover" story to be used.

11. CIA indices checks required for provisional operational clearance by ____________ (date)

12. REMARKS:

JOHN B. BREWER

FORM NO. 59-16 (TEST)
AUG. 1951

SECRET

Lou W.
Is this correct
or shld. it be Idabelle?
L.

Name- Gordon Barton McLendon
Address-9300 Douglas, Dallas Texas
Place of Birth-Atlanta Texas/Idabelle, Oklahoma--age 30
Military History-1942 Entered Navy Japanese Language School, Boulder, Colo.
1943- Graduated Navy Japanese Lang. School
1944-Commissioned US Navy Assigned as Intelligence Officer, ONI/.
Discharged as Lt(JG)
Education-Graduated Yale University
1946-Attended Harvard Law School
Wife's Name-Gay Noe(Daughter of James A. Noe former Gov. of Louisiana
Subject has four children.
Present Occupation- President of Liberty Broadcasting System.

FE

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. JG-9545	SOURCE STC/SPB	DATE OF DOCUMENT XXXX	ANALYST XXXX
SUBJECT McLENDON, Gordon Barton Born: Atlanta, Texas/Idabelle, Oklahoma, age 30 (in 1952)			DATE 26 Jan 55

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED STC/SPB FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD IN RI/AR FILE, WASH-CIA-PERS-4.

CROSS REFERENCE FORM

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 79764

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 51-36
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(39)

14-00000
104-10177-10224

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: OBYEDKOV, Ivan Dmitrievich
201-779495

INCLUSIVE DATES: Dec. 64 – March 77

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
0745 15 AUG 1978	9:08 am 15 Aug 1978	LOPES	finished reviewing 8:18 Edward Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

OBYEDKOV, Ivan Dmitriyevich

LE

201 NO. — 779495

MATERIAL FILED IN THIS FOL
IS IN CHRONOLOGICAL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

11-2

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
DATE-TIME GROUP: 1201472
CITE: UASHINGTON
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 000781

CONF: INFO: FILE

☒ 0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 # FILES #

DISSEM BY:

TO: LONDON.Y

FROM: SE/CI/X INFO SE/X/EU, E/BC Y

SUBJECT: WNINTEL ~~CKTOP~~ JAGUAR/IVAN DMITRIYEVICH OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

REF: LONDON 81224 (IN 2003461) Y

1. OBYEDKOV ACTED AS A GUARD AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARED TO BE BETTER EDUCATED THAN HIS DUTIES AS A GUARD WOULD DEMAND. AMONG HIS MAIN DUTIES, HE TENDED THE SOVIET EMBASSY TELEPHONE, STOOD GUARD DUTY AT THE GATE, TOOK MESSAGES FOR OTHER SOVIETS, NOTIFIED THEM OF MEETINGS, AND ARRANGED APPOINTMENTS. HE ALSO OCCASIONALLY DROVE ONE OF THE EMBASSY CARS ON ERRANDS. DURING HIS TEHRAN TOUR, HE WAS ALSO LISTED AS A GUARD AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY. HE WAS OBSERVED TO BE VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS. Y

2. ON BOTH PRECEDING TOURS OBYEDKOV APPEARED TO FUNCTION AS A LEGITIMATE GUARD AND WAS NEVER OBSERVED IN THE ACT OF PERFORMING ANY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. BECAUSE A SOVIET IS LISTED AS A GUARD AT A SOVIET EMBASSY, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT HE IS NECESSARILY A KGB OFFICER. SINCE WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION WE WILL NO LONGER CARRY HIM AS SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

12 Mar 77
201-779495

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:035018

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
WASHINGTON

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES

DISSEM BY:
#

000781

3. FILE: 201-779495. E2, IMPDET.

M

ORIG: SE/CI/X (JONSSON, 1911) COORD: SE/X/EU (C. MACNAMARA), E/B (S. BROWN), C/SE/CI/X (NOYES), REL: C/E/BC (A. STIMSON).

DATE: 9 MARCH 1977
ORIG: JONSSON/DTM
UNIT: SE/CI/X
EXT: 1911

C/SE/CI/X

SE/X/EU C. MacNamara

C/E/BC B. Stimson

RELEASING OFFICER

E/BG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 035018

7-71 MFG 2/78

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER Sp133 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET R

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

ACTION UNIT IPDPS ACTION #	INFO	RF. FILE. VR.

1		4	
2		5	
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T 636975 EIA248 PAGE 01-01 IN 200346

TOR:281431Z FEB 77 LOND 81224

SECRET 281359Z FEB 77 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE LONDON 81224

TO WASHINGTON.

FOR: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI

SUBJ: WNINTEL CKTOP JAGUAR

REF: DIRECTOR 719659, 17 JUL 1975

1. JAGUAR NOTES THAT IVAN OBYEDKOV (SUBJECT REF) IS NOW WORKING AS AN ELECTRICIAN AT SOVIET EMBASSY, LONDON. THEY INQUIRING REASONS WHY WE CONSIDERED HIM SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB AND ALSO ASKING, IF POSSIBLE, FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTION HE PERFORMED AS GUARD AT SOVIET EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND MEXICO CITY.

2. FILE: 201-779495. E-2 IMPDET

--

SECRET

28 FEB 1977
201-779495

OUTGOING MESSAGE

117

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ONF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2X PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 171016Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 719659

CONF: SE 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN. EUR 4 0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER SOP 0 IP FILES # 111 DISSEM BY: 38

201-0779495
TO: LONDON.

CKTOP JAGUAR TRACEY

REF: LONDON 63248 (IN 629248) (*)

FOR LIAISON LESS 201 TRACE REPLY

OBYEDKOV (201-0779495) AND WIFE HAVE SON, VLADIMIR, BORN CIRCA 53. IN 65 OBYEDKOV SPOKE POOR SPANISH. OBYEDKOV WAS A GUARD FOR THE SOV EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY FROM 28 AUG 62 TO 4 AUG 65; AND A GUARD FOR THE SOV EMBASSY IN TEHRAN FROM 15 AUG 67 TO PRIOR APR 71. DURING BOTH TOURS, OBYEDKOV'S WIFE SERVED AS PRINCIPAL OF SOV SCHOOLS. OBYEDKOV IS CONSIDERED SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY KGB, BASED ON HIS POSITION. E-2 IMPDET.

*REQUEST TRACES PCS SOV.

ND 641990

RECORD COPY

DATE: 15 JULY 1975
ORIG: CHARLIE WOODWARD/CF
UNIT: SE/BIO
EXT: 1079

17 Jul 75
201-779495

EURBC
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/CI/X
SE/X/EU
E/BC/UK
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Jackson
C/SE/BIO 15 JUL 1975
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
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SECRET

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PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

STAFF

ACTION UNIT SE 5

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IRAN EUR 4

1	4
2	5
3	6

T 149631 EIA106 PAGE 01-01 IN 629248

TOR:101040Z JUL 75 LOND 63248

SECRET 100944Z JUL 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 63248

TO: DIRECTOR,

CKTOP JAGUAR TRACE

1, JAGUAR REQUESTS TRACES ON IVAN DMITRIYEVICH OBEDKOV, BORN 28 JUL 27, RYAZANSKAYA OBLAST, WIFE: YELENA LVOVNA OBEDKOVA NEE DMITRIYEVA, BORN 04 MAR 28, MOSCOW. POSTING: TWO YEARS SOVIET EMBASSY REPLACING ANATOLIY IVANOVICH SUKHOV (201-905449). MD #221776

2, FILE DEFER, E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

SECRET

10 JUL 75
201-774495

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO

Chief, SB

INFO

Chief, NE

FROM

Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT

REDTOP AEKICK
PCS Departure - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. For your information, we no longer carry Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495), guard at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, as PCS. He was not listed on ROGWEN's April 1971 Presence List nor their December 1971 list. We assume he has departed PCS.

2. During OBYEDKOV's tour in Tehran his wife, Yelena, served as principal at the Soviet school. His son was apparently in Moscow living with Yelena's mother. On 28 October 1969, ROARC reported the grandmother calling to check with OBYEDKOV regarding a tutor for the child. They discussed the possibility of the tutor coming for three times a week, at five rubles per hour, but OBYEDKOV, after checking with his wife, decided on two times a week. OBYEDKOV seemed to be very fond of his mother-in-law. According to our AESCREEN transcriber, she was the only one that could tell OBYEDKOV what to do.

3. The following are comments made by our AESCREEN transcriber on OBYEDKOV on 8 July 1970:

> He is very security conscious, especially in dealing with "official people" or superiors. He mentions his name to his friends freely, but refuses to say his name when he knows that one of the superiors is calling, "this is the duty officer" OBYEDKOV would say several times. He often lectures people when they violate security regulations when talking on the telephone. OBYEDKOV has to be persuaded several times or even

(continued)

ATTACHMENT:

Photo, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:

~~3~~-C/SB, w/att., a/s
2-C/NE, wo/att.

CS COPY

1 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER NITA-25520	DATE 7 February 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-779495

begged if someone needs help (getting a vehicle or when asking for a favor), but when he decides to help, OBYEDKOV will stay with the problem until he gets results. Although OBYEDKOVA seems to be more cultured and better educated than her husband, it is certain that only OBYEDKOV makes the final decisions. OBYEDKOV could be very pleasant, helpful and even kind, but it usually depended on his mood.

3. The only Soviet we noted as being friendly with OBYEDKOV during his tour here was Rafik Nazhaf-Ogly ABDULLAYEV (201-808524), Third Secretary, suspect RIS, probable KGB. When speaking to one another they used the familiar "ty". We do not know the extent of their relationship.

4. Forwarded herewith is a photograph, date unknown, received from ROGWEN. We have destroyed the Station file.

Marcia A. BURGOON

201-274445

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, IVAN DMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

041-008-005
NITA-23060A01
09 DEC 68
P4

CIT ?
OCC ?
CHIEF GUARD, SUSPECT RIS. WIFE YELENA LVNOVNA
IS DIRECTOR, DEPENDENTS SCHOOL.

R 6903190152

FILE IN 201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO
Chief, NE

FROM
Chief of Station, Tehran

SUBJECT
REDTOP: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Request traces on:

Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)
born 27 August 1927, Ryazan
passport: S-105042 issued 26 May 1967
wife: Yelena born 1928, Moscow
passport: S-105043 issued 26 May 1967
occupation: guard, Soviet Embassy, Tehran
arrived: 15 August 1967.

DPOB

Photocopies of the OBYEDKOVs' passports are attached.

2. According to the 1963 and 1964 Checklists of Soviet Officials Abroad, one Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531); born 14 July 1912; wife Yelena; A number 04877, was present in Mexico City since August 1962 as an employee of the Soviet Embassy. The Checklist for 1965 lists one Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495); born 14 July 1912; wife Yelena; A number 41970, as an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City since August 1962. Apparently these two OBYEDKOVs are one in the same and although Subject's birthdate is different we believe he is identical with the OBYEDKOV who served in Mexico City. Recently a conversation was recorded on ROARC during which Subject used several Spanish words and expressions. It is possible Subject acquired a knowledge of Spanish during a previous tour in a Spanish speaking country such as Mexico. Please compare the attached photo of Subject with that of the OBYEDKOV who was assigned to Mexico City to determine if they are identical.

Veronica L. ANIELARKE

RIS INPUT NO. 14

Attachment: As stated, h/w
Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att
1 - C/NE w/o/att

CS COPY

SEP.

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1 Att h/w

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
NITA-21,826

DATE
7 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Tehran

INFO:

FROM: Chief, SB via Chief, NE

SUBJECT: REDTOP LCIMPROVE
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: NITA-21826, 7 September 1967

1. Forwarded herewith are Summary Traces in SPR format on Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495) who is suspect RIS. Paragraph 20 of the Summary is for passage to liaison.

2. Subject is not identical to Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531). When Subject first arrived in Mexico in August 1962, he was reported as Ivan Ivanovich and this error was not corrected until May 1965; therefore, two Checklists carried the wrong man PCS in Mexico. When the records were corrected, the Subject's birthdate was not, and the same date was listed for both parties. Headquarters records do not list a wife or other dependents for Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV and, as far as is known, he has not been assigned abroad PCS prior to the date of this dispatch.

R. N. T.
Rita N. TOLJANIC

ATTACHMENT:

"Soviet Personality Report" h/w

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - COS, Tehran w/att., a/s

RIS GROUP NO. 7

CS COPY

28 NOV 1967

201-779495

1 Att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HITW-11583	16 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-779495

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/O/NE	Betty Given	ii	5604

1-RID w/att.
1-SB/O/NE w/att.
1-SB/CI/K wo/att.
1-SB/CI/G wo/att.
1-NE/GTI/I wo/att.

AB	RI/	
FS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSB/O/NE	20 Nov 67	[illegible]
SB/CI/K	22 Nov	B. [illegible]
SB/CI/G	22 Nov	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/NE/GTI/I	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

PREPARED BY: Rita N. TOLJANIC
DATE: 3 October 1967
201-NUMBER: 201-779495
A NUMBER: A 41970

1. NAME: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

2. DPOB: 27 August 1927 or 19 July 1927 in Ryazan

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:

   a. USSR

   b. Service passport S009260, used while Subject was in Mexico

   c. Service passport S105042, issued 26 May 1967

6. CURRENT POSITION:

   Guard in the Soviet Embassy, Tehran

7. RELATIVES:

   c. spouse - Yelena Lvovna possibly nee DMITRIYEVA, born 1928 in Moscow. She traveled to Mexico on Service passport S009270. She served as the director of the Soviet Primary School in Mexico City and ran the summer camp in Cuernavaca.

   d. children - a son, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1953.

   e. Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA, who are probably wife's brother and sister-in-law. During Subject's stay in Mexico they occupied Subject's apartment in Moscow, given as Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apartment 69, telephone G3-72-34.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AH1 NITw 11583

201-779495

7. (cont'd)

In May 1964 Subject spoke to "Boris" in Moscow about certain purchases for the apartment, and Subject's wife also spoke to her mother, who apparently lived with Boris and his wife.

8. LANGUAGES:

Russian - native

Spanish - poor

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

Photo number S010797

[illegible] IVAN DMITRIYEVICH

DPOB: CA 30

WIFE: [illegible] E CA 30

A-41970

S010797.

201-779495

PPT

REF: [illegible]-27030 28 [illegible]



S010797



S010797

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, AND HABITS:

Although Subject acted as a guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, he appeared to be fairly well educated and was not subservient to any of the other Soviets, with the exception of Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV. (201-028975). On one occasion Subject was reported to be helping the daughter of Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO with her arithmetic homework. On another, Subject was asked about methods of producing metal wire, a subject on which Subject was well informed as a result of his having once worked for a wire factory.

Subject had a tape recorder at home which he liked to listen to. He also occasionally went fishing with other Soviets.

Subject told "Boris" in Moscow to build a large garage, because he was bringing a big car back with him. He also asked whether Boris had bought a refrigerator and TV for the apartment. On another occasion he was negotiating for a can of paint to take back to Moscow with him to repaint "the Moskvich". Subject and his wife were both buying watches just before leaving Mexico. From the above it appears that Subject was fairly well-off financially, for a guard.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Date unknown - Subject reportedly worked at the Serp i Molot (wire) factory in Leningrad.

28 August 1962 - Subject, accompanied by wife and son, arrived PCS in Mexico as an employee of the Soviet Embassy. Subject replaced Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich YEGOROV (201-273431), who is suspect GRU.

6-19 November 1962 - Subject was in the hospital in Mexico City. On the 11th of November he underwent a three hour operation of unspecified nature. The other Soviets had to guard him when he came out of the operating room.

17 August 1963 - Subject stated that he had just returned from a trip with Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN (201-261813), who is known GRU. There was no information on where or why the trip was taken.

4 August 1965 - Subject departed Mexico PCS, transiting Belgium on his return to the USSR. He was accompanied by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) who is known KGB. Subject was replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (201-782164).

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION:

Mexico City Station considers Subject suspect RIS because he appears better educated that his duties as a guard would demand, because he seems financially better off than other Soviet guards and because of his apparent association on equal footing with Soviet RIS officers. DERYABIN in 1955 advised LNERGO that the surname OBYEDKOV was familiar to him as the name of a person who was in the Guards Directorate of the MVD in 1951.

In September 1967 DERYABIN and RASTVOROV said that they neither recognized the face nor the name of the Subject. (Both Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Dmitriyevich were seen by the defectors and they did not recognize either of them.)

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

There was no intelligence activity noted on the Subject's part while he was stationed in Mexico.

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

Subject primarily handled the main Soviet telephone and took guard duty at the gate. Subject took messages for other Soviets, notified them of meetings, and contacted them for appointments with each other. He occasionally drove one of

201-779495

14. (cont'd)

the Embassy cars on errands. He kept a ledger of the telegrams sent out by the Embassy and notified other Soviets when cables came in for them.

15. CONTACTS:

a. Soviet friends and associates.

1. Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-293945), employee in the Soviet Trade Representation in Mexico from February 1961 to May 1964, suspect RIS. When the ANDRIANOVs left Mexico they were planning to get in touch with Subject's family in Moscow.

2. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from August 1962 to April 1967, known GRU. Subject appeared not to like DENISOV. It also appeared that DENISOV was responsible for reimbursing Subject for the gas Subject used in KUKHARENKO's car.

3. Aleksey Nikolayevich GANIN (201-757775), known GRU officer who visited Mexico 31 July - 14 August 1964.

Subject, along with other Soviets who were known GRU officers, met GANIN on his visit to Mexico.

4. Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831), chief of the Soviet information Bulletin in Mexico from October 1962 to August 1964, suspect KGB. Subject and KUKHARENKO were the best of friends for a time, but then KUKHARENKO began drinking too much and getting into various scrapes. Subject frequently commiserated with KUKHARENKO's wife over her husband's drinking, automobile accidents, money problems. Subject occasionally used KUKHARENKO's car.

5. Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV (201-285090), employee in the Soviet Trade Representation in Mexico from March 1961 to July 1964, known KGB. Subject gave MOSKVICHEV his home address in Moscow.

6. Vladimir Nikolavevich RADVANSKIY (201-298171), code clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from September 1964 to March 1967, known KGB. Subject is not known to have associated with RADVANSKIY; however, Subject's wife and RADVANSKAYA worked together in the school and children's camp, and

15. (cont'd)

RADVANSKAYA took over the camp after Subject's wife left Mexico. RADVANSKAYA asked Subject's wife to tell her (RADVANSKAYA's) daughter to enter the institute when she saw her in Moscow.

7. Vladimir Aleksandrovich ROMANCHENKO (201-727109), Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico from August 1963 to July 1967, no known RIS affiliation. When ROMANCHENKO was in Moscow on leave in May 1964, Subject told "Boris" (believed to be Subject's brother-in-law) to send letters to him through ROMANCHENKO when he came back to Mexico.

8. Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602), Commercial Counselor in Mexico from July 1962 to circa December 1966, suspect GRU. Subject's wife and Mrs. VISKO taught together in the school and seemed to be good friends. Subject also seemed to be friends with Mrs. VISKO, and he reportedly helped the VISKO's daughter with her arithmetic homework on at least one occasion.

20. TRACES FOR LIAISON:

Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV, born 27 August 1927, accompanied by his wife Yelena Lvovna, and son, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1953, were stationed in Mexico City from August 1962 to August 1965. Subject was a guard in the Soviet Embassy. Subject is suspect RIS.

201-774475

SECRET

I would like to have all Some of the material pertaining to Ivan Dmitriyevich Obyedkov (201-779195) removed from Ivan Ivanovich Obyedkov's file (201-121531) and reclassified into Ivan Dmitriyevich's file.

This material to be removed has Ivan Ivanovich's name on it and refers to his being PCS in Mexico, which he was not, Ivan Dmitriyevich was.

If this note is too confusing and you have further question please call Betty Given, SB/O/NE, x 1042.

06 OCT 1967

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP - Voice Samples of Soviets in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters retention are voice samples, taken from LIENVOY, of the following Soviets previously stationed in Mexico :

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-230429)
Ivan Afanasyevich BEKETOV (201-754500)
Ina Nikolayevna BOLDOVA (201-245416)
Vasiliy Karpovich BUTSEV (201-273883)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich DOMRACHEV (201-297666)
Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV (2010277418)
Vladimir Petrovich GULIN (201-734985)
Viktor Petrovich KALININ (201-735049)
Nikolay Konstantinovich KHLEBNIKOV (201-227420)
Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794)
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831)
Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870)
Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV (201-731394)
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)
Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265)
Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHCHUCHKIN (201-242728)
Vasiliy Vasilyevich SIMONOV (201-735055)
Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485)
Gennadiy Fedorovich STROGANOV (201-735036)
Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243802)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Voice samples

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

file Obyedkov
201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 31217

DATE
27 JANUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-8-10/1

OBYEDKOV & WIFE

1.
15-60-55 Dec. 18 ,64 L34-M8-T587 #451to 490
In. 1532 hrs. IRA VISKO &ANDREY SOKOLOV talk to OBYEDKOV in Russian.

2.
15-60-55 18 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T587 #943
Out. 1919 hrs. OBYEDKOV talks to New York in Spanish.

3.
15-60-55 18 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T587 #962
1939 hrs. MF talks to OBYEDKOV in Spanish.

OBYEDKOV & WIFE

4.
15-60-55 26 Dec. 64 L34-M8-T594 #328
In. OBYEDKOV talks to his wife in Russian.



OBYEDKOV
201-779495

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

SR TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

REFERENCE: HMMA-26177, 28 May 1965

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 7 July 1965 via Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and the USSR) of Subject's wife and son. According to LIENVOY, Subject will follow in September. It is not known known whether this travel is PCS or TDY.

2. Travelling on the same flight with Subject was Lyudmila Ivanovna ZHEVTUN (201-754502), who has gone on home leave to the USSR.

3. The Station would appreciate a reply to the Reference, which requested clarification of Subject's identity.

answered HMMW-13253 21 July 65

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-779495
~~201-121531~~

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 26658

DATE
22 JULY 1965

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-
FFN: P-8125

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-26824, 10 August 1965
B. MEXI-4485, 19 August 1965

1. Reference A reported the departure of Subject from Mexico on 4 August 1965. The Station now believes that Subject departed PCS, and that he has possibly been replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN, whose arrival on 14 August 1965 was reported in Reference B.

2. According to LIENVOY, KARCHIN has been answering the telephone at the Soviet Embassy, a duty for which Subject was previously responsible. According to LICALLA, KARCHIN has also been taking guard duty at the entrance gate to the Soviet Embassy, which Subject also had as one of his duties.

3. In addition, LIENVOY reported ~~that~~ on 17 August 1965 that "a new school director" had arrived at the Soviet Embassy. OBYEDKOVA had previously been the director of the Soviet school in Mexico, and the fact that she had been replaced indicates that she will not return to Mexico. The identity of the new school director has not been established, although it may be KARCHINA.

4. The attached Soviet Personality Report (SPR) on Subject represents a summary of Station information on him. It is noted that Subject is listed as suspect RIS, service unknown. his previous designation as suspect KGB was based primarily on his presumed identity with the subject of 201-121531, which has now been established as incorrect.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
SPR Photo retained in B.C

Distribution:
2 - CSR, w/att. (2 copies), H/W
1 - CWH, w/att. (1 copy), H/W

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]

CS COPY

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 27030	26 AUGUST 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495 FFN: P-8125

SECRET

CSR

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-27030

DATED 26 August 1965

SPR PREPARED BY: Jonathan L. WEENING

DATE: 26 August 1965

1. NAME: Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (4).

2. DPOB: ca. 1927-30 (3). Place unknown.

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA:
Soviet service passport no. 009260, used in 1965 (3).

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN: No information.

5. OTHER NAMES USED: No information

6. CURRENT POSITION: Unknown

7. RELATIVES:

   a. Wife: Yelena Lvovna OBYEDKOVA (1). Probably nee DMITRIYEVA (3).

      DOB: ca. 1928-31 (3).

      Soviet service passport no. 009270, used in 1965 (3).
      In Mexico 28 August 1962 - 22 July 1965 (2,5). Served as director of the Soviet primary school in Mexico City and also ran the summer camp in Cuernavaca.

   b. Son: Vladimir (1,2).

      DOB: ca. 1953-56 (3).

      In Mexico 28 August 1962 - 22 July 1965. Travelled on mother's passport, (2,5).

   c. Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA who are probably wife's brother and sister-in-law. During Subject's tour in Mexico, the DMITRIYEVs were staying in Subject's apartment in Moscow, given as Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apartment 69, telephone G3-72-34 (4). In May 1964 Subject spoke to "Boris" in Moscow about certain purchases for the apartment, and Subject's wife also apoke to her mother, who apparently lived with "Boris" and his wife (1).

8. LANGUAGES: Spanish - poor (1).

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:
Photos of Subject and his wife are attached (7).

CS COPY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

att. #1, HMMA-27030

201-779995

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS:

Although Subject acted as a guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, he appeared to be fairly well educated and was not subservient to any of the other Soviets, with the exception of Counselor Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (201-028975). On one occasion Subject was reported to be helping the daughter of Commercial Counselor Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO with her arithmetic homework. On another, Subject was asked about methods of producing metal wire, a subject on which Subject was well informed as a result of his having once worked for a wire factory (1).

Subject had a tape recorder at home which he liked to listen to. He also occasionally went fishing with other Soviets (1).

Subject told "Boris" /paragraph 7c above/ in Moscow to build a large garage, because he was bringing a big car back with him. He also asked whether "Boris" had bought a refrigerator and TV for the apartment. On another occasion he was negotiating for a can of paint to take back to Moscow with him to repaint "the Moskvich." Subject and his wife were both buying watches just before leaving Mexico. (1). /From the above it appears that Subject was fairly well-off financially, for a guard/.

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

(date unknown)	Subject reportedly had worked at the Serp i Molot wire factory in Leningrad (1).
28 August 1962	Subject, accompanied by his wife and son, arrived in Mexico as employee of the Soviet Embassy. Subject replaced Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich YEGOROV (201-273431, /suspect GRU/. (2) In Mexico City Subject and his family lived at Tacambaro 4, reportedly in Apartment 5 in January 1963 and in Apartment 4 in July 1965. (1).
9 22 July 1965	Subject's wife and son departed Mexico for the USSR (5).
4 August 1965	Subject departed Mexico for the USSR (3). Subject is believed to have been replaced by Ivan Petrovich KARCHIN (no Station traces.)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION: Suspect RIS.

The Station has no real evidence of Subject's intelligence affiliation; however, because Subject appears better educated than his duties as a guard would demand, because he seems financially better off than other Soviet guards, and because of his apparent association on an equal footing with Soviet officers, he is considered suspect RIS. It is further noted that Subject's predecessor was suspect GRU.

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: Unknown.

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY:

In Mexico City Subject primarily handled the main Soviet Embassy telephone (1) and also took guard duty at the gate (3). Subject took messages for other Soviets, notified them of meetings, and contacted them for appointments with each other. He also occasionally drove one of the Embassy cars on errands. He kept a ledger of the telegrams sent out by the Embassy and notified other Soviets when cables came in for them (1).

On 17 August 1963 Subject stated that he had just returned from a trip with Valentin Vasilyevich BAKULIN (201-261513) (1). /BAKULIN is an identified GRU officer. The Station has no further information on the nature of this trip, nor any reports of other trips taken by Subject./

From 6 to 19 November 1962 Subject was in the hospital (Sanitorio Reforma) in Mexico City. On 11 November he underwent a three-hour operation of an unspecified nature. The other Soviets had to take guard duty with him in the hospital, and it was stressed that one of the Soviet men should be with him after he came out of the operation. (1).

15. CONTACTS:

Subject is not known to have had any contact with non-Soviets during his tour in Mexico, with the exception of an occasional visit to one of the doctors regularly consulted by the Soviets. Subject's closest Soviet contacts appeared to be the following :

a. Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-293945), employee in the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico from February 1961 to May 1964, suspect RIS. When the ANDRIANOVs left Mexico they were planning to get in touch with Subject's family in Moscow (1).

b. Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV (201-726491), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since August 1962, known GRU. Subject appeared not to like DENISOV. It also appeared that DENISOV was responsible for reimbursing Subject for the gas Subject used in KUKHARENKO's (see below) car (1).

c. Aleksey Nikolayevich GANIN (201-757775), known GRU officer who visited Mexico 31 July - 14 August 1964. Subject, along with other Soviets who were known GRU officers, met GANIN on his visit to Mexico (6).

d. Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831), chief of the Soviet Information Bulletin in Mexico from October 1962 to August 1964, suspect KGB. Subject and KUKHARENKO were the best of friends for a time, but then KUKHARENKO began drinking too much and getting into various scrapes. Subject frequently commiserated with KUKHARENKO's wife over her husband's drinking, automobile accidents, money problems. Subject occasionally used KUKHARENKO's car. (1).

e. Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV (201-285090), employee in the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico from March 1961 to July 1964, known KGB. Subject gave MOSKVICHEV his home address in Moscow (1).

f. Vladimir Nikolayevich RADVANSKIY (201-298171), code clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since September 1964, known KGB. Subject is not known to have associated with RADVANSKIY; however, Subject's wife and RADVANSKAYA worked together in the school and children's camp, and RADVANSKAYA took over the camp after Subject's wife left Mexico. RADVANSKAYA asked Subject's wife to tell her (RADVANSKAYA's) daughter to enter the institute when she saw her in Moscow (1).

g. Vladimir Aleksandrovich ROMANCHENKO (201-727109), Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico since August 1963, no known RIS affiliation. When ROMANCHENKO was in Moscow on leave in May 1964, Subject told "Boris" (believed to be Subject's brother-in-law) to send letters to him through ROMANCHENKO when he came back to Mexico. Subject said that ROMANCHENKO could be reached through (fnu) MURAVYEV at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1).

h. Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602), Commercial Counselor in Mexico since July 1962, suspect GRU. Subject's wife and Mrs. VISKO taught together in the school and seemed to be good friends. Subject also seemed to be friends with Mrs. VISKO, and he reportedly helped the VISKO daughter with her arithmetic homework on at least one occasion. Mrs. VISKO was planning to send some things to Moscow with Subject when he left (1).

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:

None, with the exception of technical surveillance.

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

Not applicable

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN NEXT YEAR:

Not applicable.

KODAK ONLY

LIMITED
28 May 65

PHOTOS

SECRET

HMMA-27030

19. SOURCES:

1. LIENVOY, date as given if applicable..
2. MEXI-1850, 31 August 1962
3. HMMA-26824, 10 August 1965, LIFIRE travel report.
4. HMMA-26177, 28 May 1965, LIENVOY information on Subject.
5. HMMA-26658, 22 July 1965, LIFIRE travel report.
6. MEXI-0503, 7 August 1964, LIEMPTY report on GANIN's visit.
7. LIEMPTY photographs, taken in 1965.
8. LILYRIC surveillance reports, 1962-65.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

OBYEDKOV, IVAN DMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEFT MEXICO PCS DURING 4 AUG 1965.

050-008-010
HMMA-27102
08 SEP 65
P2

R 6509151383

FILE IN 201-779495

14. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ORYEDKOV, IVAN DMITRIYEVICH
201-779495
SEX M DOB ?

201-305052
HMMA-26853
11 AUG 65
P1

CIT ?
OCC ?
TRAVELLIN ON SAME FLIGHT WITH KOSTIKOV WAS SUBJ. SUBJ ASSIGNED AS GUARD AT THE SOV EMB IN MEXICO CITY, RETURNING TO THE USSR.

R 6508251179

FILE IN 201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CSC 1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
AUG 1 ? 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and Moscow) of Subject. (It is not known whether Subject's travel was PCS or TDY. Subject's wife and son had left Mexico on 7 July 1965).

2. LIFIRE reported that Subject was travelling on Soviet service passport no. 009260; his wife and daughter son? had travelled on no. 009270. Subject's age was given as 35, that of his wife as 34, and that of his son Vladimir as 9. (Comment: These ages may be as of 1962, when Subject originally entered Mexico.) ~~they are~~

carded D

3. <Travelling on the same flight with Subject were Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and his family. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer who was returning to the USSR PCS.>

RIS INPUT NO. 23

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

CS COPY

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26824	DATE 10 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495 FFN: P -8125

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/Operational
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 201[illegible], 28 May 1965

1. Headquarters agrees that Subject is probably not identical with Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531) as was earlier believed, and has accordingly assigned Ivan Dmitriyevich 201-779495 . A full Headquarters trace under that name turned up no information other than that originating from Mexico City Station, which has now been re-classified into the new file. We are puzzled by the fact that MEXI-1850, dated 1 September 1962, the first piece of correspondence from Mexico City Station on Subject, reported him as Ivan Ivanovich.

2. A photo comparison of the two individuals in this case is not satisfactory proof that they are in fact two people because of the difference in years and exposure in the photographs. The pre-Mexico City traces on Ivan Ivanovich reflect only a date and place of birth as identifying data. It is hoped that Mexico City Station can obtain soon identifying biographic data on Ivan Dmitriyevich in order to firmly resolve the matter.

BHG.
BRUCE H. GINTALAS

Distribution:
Orig & 2-COS, Mexico City

201-779495

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: 13843
HMMW ~~[illegible]~~ CS COPY

DATE: 29 JUL 1965
21 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-779495

1-RID
1-SR/O/WH
1-WH/3/MEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/O/PA	JOHN P. CARLSON	cmg	5523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/O/WH	23 Jul 65	
WH/3/MEX		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRTE

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief, SR Division

INFO : Chief WH, Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT : REDWOOD
Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

OCC
Δ Mexico City, Mexico

1. Douglas J. FEINCLASS has reported that the OBYEDKOV who is in Mexico City is definitely Ivan Dmitriyevich, not Ivan Ivanovich as previously recorded. (Source: LIENVOY tapes.) It is impossible to check the original flight manifest listing OBYEDKOV's arrival in 1962, since this has been destroyed.

2. OBYEDKOV also appears to be much younger than the Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV (201-121531) who was born 14 July 1912 and with whom Subject was assumed to be identical. No date of birth is available for the OBYEDKOV in Mexico City.

3. Subject's wife is Yelena Lvovna OBYEDKOVA. They have a son Vladimir, born roughly in 1953. LICALLA photographs of Subject and his wife are enclosed. According to LIENVOY, Subject's home address in Moscow is Moscow E-143, Metrogorodok, Otkrytoye Shosse 26, Building 7, Apt. 69, telephone G3-72-34. In 1964 the apartment was occupied by Boris Lvovich DMITRIYEV and Mariya Borisovna DMITRIYEVA.

4. Headquarters is requested to retrace Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV and assign a new 201 number if Headquarters agrees that he is not identical with the Subject of 201-121531.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment:
3 photos

Distribution:
2 SRD w/att
1 WHD, w/o att

201-779795

1 Attach

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA- 26177	28 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

Atta To: HMMA-26177. 28 May 1965

TO; Chief, SR Division

From: Chief of Station, Mexico City

CS COPY

Attach 1 HMMA 26177



KUBSRA ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, I. ~~X.~~ Dmitrievich	
201-1~~21531~~ 779495	050-008-010
SEX M DOB ?	HMMA-26081
	14 MAY 65
CIT ?	A01 P1

OCC ?
SUPPORT GROUP. GUARD SUSPECT KGB.
MEMBER KGB REZIDENTURA, MEXICO CITY.

R 6505262121

201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~IVANOVICH~~ Dmitriyevich
201-~~121531~~ 779495
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
EMBASSY GUARD. SUSPECT KGB OFFICER.

074-126-060/01
HMMA-25843
16 APR 65
A01 P5

R 6505032159

201-779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	6. DATE OF INFO.
	7. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
9. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DMITRIEVICH
~~IVANOVICH~~

OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~DMITRIYEVICH~~
201-~~121531~~ 779495
SEX M DOB ?

201-727109
HMMA-25188
22 JAN 65
A01 P2

CIT ?
OCC ?

IN A CONVERSATION W/WIFE, SUBJ IMPLIED VLADIMIR A. ROMANCHENKO 201-727109 WAS UNFIT FOR JOB OF NEGOTIATING FOR THE RE-ROOFING OF SOV EMB CAUSE HE WAS INDECISIVE AND VACILLATING.

R 6508121590

FILE IN 201-~~121531~~ 779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

SECRET

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: OBYEDKOV, Ivan ~~Ivanovich~~ DMITRIYEVICH - Mexico 1964

Subject's photo was shown to Soviet Defectors RASTVOROV and DERYABIN on 18 August 1964 with negative results.

SR/CI/8

201-7794-95

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DMITRIYEVICH

OBYEDKOV, IVAN ~~IVANOVICH~~
201-~~121531~~ 779495 050-008-010
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-24698A01
06 NOV 64
CIT ? P2
OCC ?
EMPL GUARD. SUSPECT KGB OFF.

R 6411241378

201- 779495

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)
8-57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

Memo for 201 file on
OBYEDKOV, Ivan ~~Ivanovich~~ [illegible]

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Geo. Finney

6. DATE PROCESSED 21 Sept 64

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Photo of OBYEDKOV was shown to AEDONOV. [illegible] He did not recognize OBYEDKOV.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 - 779495

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (TEMPO ISSUED AT 2230 6 AUG)

INFO : SR 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

SECRET 070034Z

DIR CITE MEXI 0492

7 Aug 64 IN 44977

REDCOAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: MEXI 0444 (IN 41779) *

1. ACCORDING 1 AUG LIENVOY SERGEY SEMYONOVICH KUKHARENKO ARRANGED PACKING OF CERTAIN PERSONAL EFFECTS FOR SHIPMENT USSR. (PER OTHER LIENVOY REPORTING AND INFO FROM SUBJ PARA 2 REF DEPARTURE IS FOR HOME LEAVE.) SAME DAY MRS. K TOLD SUSPECT KGB GUARD IVAN ~~IVANOVICH~~ OBYEDKOV THAT WHEN K TOOK HER HOME THAT AFTERNOON HE PULLED FAST ONE ON HER, " STEPPED ON THE GASS AND DISAPPEARED IN CLOUD OF SMOKE AND DUST. I DON'T KNOW THE PLACE WHERE HE GOES, BUT I KCOW THE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) PERFECTGY." AT [illegible] HOURS SAME EVE MRS. K AGAIN CALLZD OBYEDKOV, TOLDR HIM THAT K RETURNED COMPLETELY DRUNK AND HAD WRECKED HIS CAR. (NOTE: MRS K PLEADED WITH O ON 12 JULY TO PREVENT K FROM DRIVING CAR THAT DATE SINCE HE DRUNK AND MRS K FEARED WOULD WRECH CAR.)

2. 5 AUG LIENVOY REPORTING CONNECTED ABOVE UNCLEAR, BUT CONTENT SHORT, MRS K-O CONVERSATION INDICATES POSSIBILITY K HAD TO APPEAR AT A GOM OFFICE, AND THAT UNNAMED HIGHER LEVEL SOVIET OFFICER'S PATIENCE EXHAUSTED WITH K. WOULD ALSO APPEAR

201-779495

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

FROM 1 AND 3 AUG LIENVOY THAT INCIDENT OF DRUNKENNESS AND INCIDENT KNOWN THROUGHTOUT EMB.

3. AS HQS AWARE FROM PREVIOUS MEXI TRAFFIC, KUKHARENKO ONE OF STATION'S PRIME TARGETS FOR DEVELOPMENT DUE ERRATIC BEHAVIOR DRUNKENNESS. CONSISTENTLY UNUSUAL INDEPENDENT DEMEANOR, AND HIS EXPRESSIONS DISRESPECT COLLEAGUES AND EVEN AMB.

4. MEXI DEVELOPING ONE AGENT ACCESS AGAINST ((SEE REF) AND INTENDS INJECT LICOOKY-1 AFTER K'S RETURN.

5. GIVEN PARA 1 AND 2 INFO, APPEARS POSSIBLE THAT K MAY NOT BE PERMITTED RETURN MEXI AFTER HOME LEAVE.

6. ACCORDING 5 AUG LIENVOY, K LEAVING 16 AUG. SARBANOV FAMILY AND FEDOTOV ON SAME FLT.

7. ABOVE PRESENTED FOR HQS INFO, AND CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE APPROACH K AT THIS TIME. MEXI RECOMMENDATION IS GAMBLE THAT K RETURNS AFTER HOME LEAVE, DEVELOP MORE ASSETS AGAINST HIM, AND EVENTUALLY MAKE APPROACH IF SUFFICIENT VULNERABILITY INFO OBTAINED.

8. ADVISE.

SECRET

* C/S COMMENT- APPROVALED USE LICOOKY-1 AGAINST KUKHARENYO.

SECRET

201-7[illegible]

CS COPY

H/W Attachment
NITA-25520
To: Chief, SB
From: Chief of Station, Tehran

H/W ATT#1 to NITA-25520

SECRET



[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] ALL [illegible].

A. IVAN DMITRIYEVICH [illegible], WIFE [illegible] AND SON [illegible].

B. [illegible] TATYANA AND [illegible].

[illegible] AS REPLACEMENT FOR [illegible]

[illegible] RECENTLY [illegible].

[illegible] NO INFO YET IF DESTINED [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

201-779495

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: See instructions on reverse side of form. Type or print. Guide for use of 201 system is contained in CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.

TO: RID/201 Section

TUBE STATION: DW6

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CANCEL ☐

FROM: NAME

BRANCH

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (*Last*) (*First*) (*Middle*)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

10. NAME VARIATIONS

TYPE NAME	(*Last*)	(*First*)	(*Middle*)

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION

CODE

17. OCCUPATION (*Clear text*)

CODE

18. ACTION DESK

CODE

19. SECONDARY DESK

CODE

20. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE

21. COMMENTS

22. SIGNATURE

23. IDN-

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FORM 11-62 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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From: Bogotá Report No: TBS-1191 Local File No: 7-1

No. of Pages: Two No. of Enclosures: One (none to Lima)

Report Made By: Wallace H. Madison/mnf Approved By: Wallace H. Madison

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Source Cryptonym: Gifola References: TPL-1186, TBS-929

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

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Classification SECRET

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1948

RID COPY

SECRET

Subject: Illicit Armament Traffic

Report No: TLB-1191

Date of Information: 29 August - 6 September 1950

Place Acquired: Bogotá

Date Acquired: 12 September 1950

Evaluation: B-Doc.

Date of Report: 18 September 1950

Source: Controlled American Source

On the basis of information communicated to his Government by the Colombian Ambassador in Costa Rica, the National Chief of Detectives, Carlos RODRIGUEZ Tellez, was sent to Costa Rica to investigate reported clandestine movements of armaments in Costa Rican territory which, according to vague reports, might be shipped to Colombia. Reportedly involved in this activity was one Arturo BOTERO, of Colombian nationality, in combination with various Communist elements. A copy of this investigator's report, dated 11 September 1950, is submitted herewith. The following are excerpts of possible interest.

> The detective service in Costa Rica has knowledge of the visits to the Golfito region of the United States citizen Richard BROWN, who at present is in Puerto Limon engaged in arms traffic. We were able to confirm that this man makes frequent trips probably connected with this business. There is another American citizen named Charles LUFBOURW (LUFBORROW), who had a lumber business in this port and later engaged in fishing. He is being watched because he is also engaged in arms traffic. At present he is in Panama.
>
> In the Customs house of the port we were able to inspect the records which are kept there on the movements of foreigners but found that they are very rudimentary and we obtained no exact data of interest.
>
> The Costa Rican authorities have sent some of their best intelligence agents to Golfito to investigate the movements of Arturo BOTERO, alias "El Mocho." An agent informed me that he had been unable to discover the presence of a person by that name among the banana loading workers. This agent stated he was investigating the activities of the American Charles Marion LUFBORROW, owner of the fishing launch "Yolanda Bentin" of United States or Honduran registry, reportedly engaged in arms traffic. It was also reported that in Golfito a Colombian by the name of Carlos VALDES Gonzalez, alias Arturo GONZALEZ Molina, is working.
>
> The region between Palmar and Piedras Blancas is completely infected with Communism. It is reported that at kilometer 44 between Palmar and Golfito a deposit of armament is hidden.
>
> On some of the fincas around the estero of Sierpe it is reported that there are various deposits of armaments. In this region Communists are active.

Classification SECRET

FORM NO. 51-56
FEB 1946

Jose FIGUERES has 200 machine guns and 600,000 rounds of ammunition as well as other arms stored on his finca La Lucha.

Conclusions. In Costa Rica the existence of a permanent standing Army is prohibited. Thus the nation is a hot bed for political organizations of any kind which convert themselves into a menace to the stability of Costa Rica. Without the backing of a military organization the other institutions are extremely weak and detectivism, police, civil guard, and so forth, are unprepared to carry out the administration of the Government.

Under these conditions and with the authorization of the Colombian Ambassador in Costa Rica, Dr. Fulgencio LEQUERICA Velez, I suggest that the Colombian Government grant five scholarships to young Costa Ricans to study detective work in Colombia for the purpose of aiding Costa Rica to form a technical corps of Police and set up the basis for an organization which will benefit greatly our country since if this became effective Colombia would have in that country an organization which little by little would reflect our own interests and desires in Central America.

FIELD COMMENT: This report adds very little to our knowledge of arms traffic in Costa Rica, but it is believed to be of interest.

[illegible]-29871

Colombia/Costa Rica

23 October 1950

Colombian Police Report on Clandestine Arms Traffic in Costa Rica

2

Colombia, Bogota

1

OF
XXXXXXXX 29 August - 6 September 1950
INFO

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

*Documentary

Colombian with good contacts in the National Police.

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a report, dated 11 September 1950, which was prepared by the Colombian National Chief of Detectives following his return from a confidential mission to Costa Rica to investigate the reported clandestine movements of arms in Costa Rican territory, possibly destined for Colombia. The following are excerpts of possible interest.

2. The Colombian investigator reported that the Costa Rican detective service had knowledge of the visits to the Golfito region of the United States citizen Richard Gross, who at the time of the report was in Puerto Limon dealing in the traffic of arms. Another American citizen, Charles Marion Lufborrow, who had a lumber business in Puerto Limon and later engaged in fishing, was being watched because he also was dealing in arms. At the time of the report, Lufborrow was in Panama.

3. The Colombian investigator inspected the records kept in the Customs building at the port on the movements of foreigners, but found them to be very rudimentary and obtained no factual information of interest.

4. The Costa Rican authorities have sent some of their best intelligence agents to Golfito to investigate the movements of one Arturo Rotero, alias "El Mocho", allegedly a Colombian. A Costa Rican agent advised the Colombian investigator that he had been unable to discover the presence of anyone by that name among the banana loading workers. The agent said that he was investigating the activities of Lufborrow, owner of the fishing launch YOLANDA HENTIN of United States or Honduran registry, reportedly engaged in arms traffic. It was also reported that another Colombian by the name of Carlos Valdes Gonzalez, alias Arturo Gonzalez Molina, was working in Golfito.

5. The Colombian investigator reported that he had learned that the region between Palmar and Piedras Blancas is infested with Communism, and that various deposits of armaments were known to be hidden.

6. The investigator concluded that because a permanent standing army is prohibited in Costa Rica, the country was a hotbed for political organizations of all kinds which endanger its stability. Without the backing of a military organization,

the law-enforcement agencies are extremely weak and the detectives, police, civil guard, and so forth, are unprepared to carry out the administration of the government. With the authorization of the Colombian Ambassador to Costa Rica, Dr. Fulgencio Lequerica Velez, the investigator suggests that the Colombian government grant five scholarships to young Costa Ricans to study detective methods in Colombia. This would be for the purpose of aiding Costa Rica to form a technical corps of police and set up the basis for an organization which would benefit Colombia greatly since if it became effective, Colombia would have in Costa Rica an organization which little by little would reflect Colombian interests and desires in Central America.

7. (STATE) It is requested that the attachment be returned within one month of the above date of distribution.

Attachment: 1 copy of report prepared by Colombian National
Chief of Detectives, dated 11 September 1950.

SO DB-29871
TLB-1191

AC:MS:VL:sl
23 October 1950

Dist: STATE (Orig.)
ORE
IID (2)
ICS
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SECRET

FORM DS-10
2-10-47

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REFERENCE SLIP

DATE
10/27/50

TO: IAD [redacted]

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REMARKS:

Returned herewith is the enclosure of CIA Report No. DB-29871 Colombia/Costa Rica entitled "Colombian Police Report on Clandestine Arms Traffic in Costa Rica" dated 29 August - 6 September 1950 as requested in Paragraph 7 of subject report.

FDT

FROM
Walter G. Aalcavich
Compliance Branch
Munitions Division

SECRET

Septiembre 11 de 1.960 .

Señor
JEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL
DE INVESTIGACION CRIMINAL
E. S. D.

Ref.: Informe sobre comisión reservada a la
República de Costa Rica.

Atentamente me permito informar a esa Superioridad sobre la comisión que tube de desempeñar en la República de Costa Rica. Recibida que fué la orden verbal del Señor Coronel Samuel Agudelo, Jefe del Departamento, me dispuse a viajar el día 29 de Agosto.

ANTECEDENTES.- Por comunicación de nuestro Embajador en la República de Costa Rica, se tuvo conocimiento de algunos negocios clandestinos de armas que se efectuaban en territorio costarricense y en los cuales participaba activamente un colombiano de nombre Arturo Botero en combinación con elementos de marcada filiación comunista de ese país, cosa que constituiría un peligro para el orden público colombiano ya que dicho armamento y según vagas informaciones podría ser introducido clandestinamente a nuestro país.

DESARROLLO DE LA COMISION.- A la 12 y 30 aterriza el avión que me condujo en San José de Costa Rica. Hago mi presentación oficial al Señor Cónsul de Colombia en Costa Rica, Señor Gamaliel [illegible] quien luego de conversar conmigo promete colaborar en todas las gestiones. Hacemos la cita telefónica con el Señor Embajador Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez a las 5 de la tarde de ese mismo día para comenzar mi trabajo y la presentación oficial. Luego de conversar brevemente con el Señor Embajador me ilustra rápidamente sobre la situación y el plan de trabajo a desarrollar conjuntamente con las Autoridades Costarricenses las que me prestan su valiosa cooperación y sin reservas de ninguna naturaleza colaboran en mi trabajo. Quedé citado para el día 31 de Agosto de efectuar una entrevista con el Señor Ministro del Interior, Mayor Bentura y el Señor Mayor Pacheco, el primero Jefe del Ministerio de Seguridad Pública y el segundo Jefe de Detectivismo de Costa Rica. Hemos convenido ya el primer viaje para la investigación. Saldremos el día 1o. de Septiembre en la [illegible] en un avión de -

"Lacsa" hacia la Costa del Pacífico sitio denominado Golfito. Al efecto tomamos el avión en compañía del Mayor Pacheco quien me acompaña en mi viaje para el reconocimiento de aquellos sitios de la Costa del Pacífico y a los lugares que el Gobierno de Costa Rica considera, se guardan armas, se fomentan reuniones o depósitos clandestinos de elementos bélicos. Se tiene conocimiento en el Detectivismo de Costa Rica, que esa región de Golfito, la visita con frecuencia un ciudadano norteamericano de nombre Richard Brown y quien actualmente se encuentra en Puertolimón dedicado al tráfico de armas. Confrontamos los datos y efectivamente resulta que este señor hace frecuentes viajes probablemente dedicándolos a ese negocio. Hay además otro ciudadano norteamericano de nombre Charles Lufbourw, quien tuvo negocios de madera en este puerto después pasó a un negocio de pesquería y por medio de las Embajadas de Costa Rica en Estados Unidos y Panamá respectivamente, se ordenó su vigilancia, pues es comerciante en armas también; actualmente se encuentra en Panamá. Dicho señor es casado con una dama costarricense de no muy buena conducta y ella hace frecuentes viajes a Panamá y Centro América. En la Aduana del Puerto pudimos revisar los libros que allí se llevan sobre movimientos de extranjeros siendo una ocar muy rudimentaria y no pudiendo obtener datos exactos para nuestro interés. A las 9 de la mañana volamos sobre la Costa hacia el Norte, llegamos a un sitio denominado Parrita concesión bananera explotada por una poderosa Compañía Norteamericana donde trabajan más de quince mil obreros. La constitución de la Costa es selvática e inhabitada siendo la mayor parte costa baldía. Todo este territorio pertenece a la Provincia de Punta Arenas. A los 35 minutos de vuelo aterrizamos en el Palmar después de volar sobre grandes fincas bananeras; esta región es noventa por ciento comunista. Continuamos el vuelo de reconocimiento en la Costa. La constitución de esta zona es totalmente plana e inhabitada siendo puntos vulnerables para acciones subversivas ya que en cualquier sitio pueda aterrizar un avión enemigo del Gobierno actual de Costa Rica con armas que pudieran ser suministradas a los obreros del banano. El control comercial de esta vasta y bella región, lo tiene la United Fruit Company. En las zonas bananeras de esta parte se han presentado movimientos huelguísticos, pero sin consecuencias de gravedad, pues todo este obrerismo no es amigo del Gobierno Central de Costa Rica. A las 9 y 30 de la mañana aterrizamos en el aerodromo de Golfito. En este sitio las Autoridades Costarricenses han destacado a unos de sus mejores agentes del servicio inteligencia, para localizar los posibles movimientos del Señor Arturo Botero alis "El Mocho", colombiano, objeto de mi visita a ese sector. Dicho agente informa que entre el numeroso personal que trabaja dentro de la zona con los cargadores de banano y demás obreros, nunca ha figurado ninguna persona de tal nombre. Dicho agente ha trabajado dentro de las cuadrillas como cargador de banano ya inquirido entre ellos con mucha habilidad por Arturo Botero, sin resultados satisfactorios. Coincide la información de este agente y nos dice que está sobre la pista de un norteamericano de nombre Charles Marión Lufburow, dueño de una lancha pesquera llamada "Yolanda Bentin" de matrícula norteamericana u Hondureña, de quien se tiene noticias fidedignas que es traficante en armas y significa un peligro debido a la extensión de las Costas Costarricenses. Además se ha informado que la Policía Secreta de la República de Panamá lo está controlando en sus viajes. Sería conveniente que el Gobierno colombiano diera órdenes pertinentes al Cónsul General en Panamá para que se informen sobre sus actividades y su posible paso con su embarcación a aguas del Pacífico para llegar a Puertos colombianos. Hay además y como dato adicional que en Golfito trabaja un colombiano de nombre Carlos Valdéz González (Armando), quien se hace pasar por Arturo González Molina, tipo de pésimos antecedentes, acusado por la Policía de crímenes durante la revolución. La Bahía de Golfito tiene un muelle para carga de banano suficiente para estas labores y en tiempo de guerra internacional, los Estados Unidos han aprovechado este Golfo, para resguardar su Flota Submarina, sitio donde puede perfectamente recalar una escuadra de submarinos. El día 2 de septiembre continué mi visita y tuve oportunidad de inspeccionar los Talleres de Mecánica de la Compañía Bananera Americana, admirablemente instalados, modernos y capaces para atender las necesidades del gran movimiento de los Ferrocarriles Bananeros que llegan hasta Puerto Armuelles en territorio panameño. Desde Golfito hasta Finca Limón, (sesenta kilómetros) la vía férrea de ancho 38 pulgadas y de Finca Limón a Puerto Armuelles, (sesenta kilómetros,) hay que hacer un trasbordo, pues la línea solo tiene 36 pulgadas. Desde Golfito hacia el Noroeste hay también línea férrea de 38 pulgadas, llegando hasta Palmar Sur atravesando toda esa región Bananera. Los aeródromos de esa región son: Parrita, Palmar, Golfito, La Cuesta, Cañas Gordas "campo particular de un millonario francés de apellido Chulle en donde no pueden aterrizar sino aviones pequeños" y Armuelles en territorio panameño. A las tres de la tarde con el Mayor Pacheco y con el Licenciado Hector Guevara, Jefe del Departamento Legal de la Compañía Bananera, arreglamos el viaje hasta Palmar Sur en Motor Car "Línea Férrea" a cuatro horas por línea férrea de Golfito con el objeto de continuar nuestra visita a esa región, teniendo entendido, que de Palmar a Piedras Blancas (K.42) está completamente infectado de comunismo. Los medios de comunicación a esta región se efectuan por medio de las Agencias de Radiocomunicaciones y operan también los servicios de radio que atienden a las Compañías Aéreas. El 3 de Septiembre salimos en autocar a las 7 menos diez minutos de la mañana por la vía férrea que conduce a Palmar. Hemos atravesado toda la extensa zona bananera. El ferro que nos conduce con el Mayor Pacheco no lo ha puesto a nuestra disposición el Departamento Legal de la Zona Bananera. Las fincas de banano tienen propias construcciones para sus obreros en un trayecto de 80 kilómetros, hay varias estaciones y un servicio muy completo de trenes. En el Palmar nos recibe el Coronel Daniel Gallegos y en su Jeep nos conduce a la casa de huéspedes. Para continuar mi investigación continuamos con el Coronel Gallegos, hasta la orilla del Río Térraba, allí contratamos una canoa para pasar a Puerto Cortéz, Cantón de Osa, Costa Rica. Las peculiaridades de este pueblo son las siguientes: 6 mil habitantes en su mayoría blancos, boteros, comerciantes chinos. Es facil la entrada del Mar por las bocas del Térraba y operan tres embarcaciones de regular tamaño que hacen su servicio de Cabotaje con Punta Arenas. La idiosincrasia de estos habitantes es interesante: son jugadores, tomadores de güero bebida alcohólica violenta; se suscitan peleas y el servicio policivo, de inmigración es malo. El contrabando se hace sin mayores dificultades, y este es el sitio más peligroso y vulnerable para todo, ya que no hay autoridades de Policía suficientes para el control efectivo del movimiento de personas extrañas. Es un sitio ideal donde residen cómodamente todos los agitadores comunistas que envenenan a los obreros de la zona bananera del Palmar donde existe una fundación muy completa de la Compañía Bananera; hasta Palmar, sobre el Río Térraba hay 3 kilómetros por carretera entre bananeras de regular calidad. Se han hecho las averiguaciones sobre depósitos clandestinos de armas y las informaciones son las siguientes: Entre Palmar y Golfito sobre la línea del ferrocarril en el Kilómetro 44 se tiene noticia de la existencia de armamento escondido cuando los gobiernistas de Teodoro Picado fueron derrotados por los revolucionarios de José Figueres. Posiblemente esté enterrado en este sitio.

VISITA A SIERPE.- Con el Señor Coronel Daniel Gallegos, Jefe de la Oficina de Trabajo de toda la zona bananera y con el Mayor Jorge Pacheco, recorrimos todas las fincas de bananos de la C. B. de C. R. (38 en total). Cada finca tiene su Blub House, sus barracones donde habitan los trabajadores, y casas para empleados, distribuídas en tal forma que se asemejan a pequeños pueblitos. Llegamos hasta el estero de la Sierpe, otro brazo de mar comunicando al territorio de La Costa por un pequeño Río. Estos esteros están prácticament incontrolados, pues como caso curioso, pudimos darnos cuenta, en la conversación sostenida con un guarda de este sitio, que hace más o menos 8 meses habí llegado dos chinos, comerciantes, sin papeles ni documentos legales y vivían las bocas del estero, en cultivos de banano, maderas, [illegible], etc. Con el Coronel Gallegos nos informamos ampliamente sobre la existencia de armas y es de opinión que si las hay en algunas de esas fincas y por otra parte se confirma la idea ya antes expresada por varias personas, entre ellas, agentes del Gobierno, de que esta región es un nido de comunismo, de maleantes y de gentes peligrosas. Concluída la visita a los campamentos obreros, regresamos al alojamiento que se nos había alistado en la casa de huéspedes de "Palmar".

DIA LUNES 4 DE SEPTIEMBRE.- Faltando un cuarto de hora para las ocho de la mañana, tomamos el avión, el Mayor Jorge Pacheco y yo, con dirección a San José de Costa Rica para obtener más datos en esferas oficiales y particulares con el fín de investigar las actividades de la famosa Legión del Caribe. A raíz de todos los sucesos políticos centroamericanos la Legión Caribe tuvo una gran actualidad, pero ahora sus miembros se hallan casi todos plegados al Partido Comunista constituyendo una fuerte y peligrosa organización centroamericana de tendencias perfectamente marxistas. Los principales miembros de la Legión Caribe son los siguientes:

JUAN BOSCH, dominicano, actual Secretario General, del Presidente de Cuba; generales MIGUEL ANGEL y JUAN RODRIGUEZ, dominicanos, residentes en La Habana, Cuba.

JOSE FIGUERES, ex-presidente de la Junta Revolucionaria de Costa Rica, costarricense de origen español. Actualmente se encuentra en Israel.

En Guatemala, donde tiene su asiento la Legión Caribe y donde se encuentra la mayor parte de su armamento, residen los mayores Francisco Sánchez (El Indio Sánchez), [illegible], Mario José Navarro, Adolfo Baez Bone, López Godoy, [illegible], Teniente Coronel Jorge Ribas Montes, Doctor Emilio Gómez Revelo (médico), Mayor Francisco Morazán, de quien se dice fué el oficial encargado para asesinar al Coronel Francisco Arana, Ministro de Guerra de Guatemala y candidato a la presidencia, opositor al Coronel Arbenz, actual candidato a la presidencia de la República, quien cuenta con el apoyo oficial. Toda esta oficialidad es de nacionalidad hondureña.

En la Semana Santa última vinieron a San José, en un avión de la armada guatemalteca, Ribas Montes, Sánchez (el Indio) y José Navarro, y buscaron al coronel Edgar Cardona, ex-ministro de Seguridad Públiez de la ex-Junta revolucionaria de este país y al Mayor Max Cortés, antiguos compañeros de armas en la pasada revolución que derrocó al Gobierno del Lic. Teodoro Picado, y les expresaron que era necesario respetar y cuidar la vida del Jefe Máximo del Comunismo en Costa Rica, Lic. Manuel Mora Valverde, agregaddo que ellos habían atrasado la causa comunista. Esta conversación me la refirieron, en días pasados, Cardona y Cortés, quienes son de ideología anti-comunista. De lo anterior se deduce que estos miembros de la Legión Caribe vinieron a Costa Rica con el pretexto de pasar la Semana Santa, a una misión cerca de Figueres que aún se desconoce, pero que se cree tenga la misma relación en pro del Comunismo, pues a su regreso de México, Mora Valverde permaneció en Guatemala alrededor de dos meses, y siempre temió su regreso a Costa Rica. Figueres es de filiación izquierdista.

MANUEL MORA VALVERDE.-

Es el Gilberto Vieira de Costa Rica. Es persona de 36 años de edad, licenciado en derecho, marxista, hábil político, ex-diputado comunista y Jefe del Comunismo en Costa Rica. Estuvo exilado en México después de la caída del Gobierno de Picado y Calderón Guardia, a quienes apoyó durante sus respectivas administraciones y fué figura influyente y decisiva en dichos gobiernos. Recientemente regresó al país y procedió a reorganizar su Partido "Vanguardia Popular" que por Ley No. 1191 de 1o. de Agosto del año en curso ha quedado proscrito en Costa Rica. A pesar de lo anterior, el partido commista ha organizado, en poco tiempo, 30 sindicatos "independientes" de filiación marxista y el partido está activísimo en todos los sectores del país. Publican clandestinamente su órgano de publicidad "Trabajo" y son numerosas las reuniones que celebran privadamente en casi todas las poblaciones. En ocasiones son descubiertas son puestos en libertad en pocas horas. Actualmente existe, desde hace más de dos meses, orden de arresto contra los dirigentes comunistas Arnoldo Ferreto, Luis Moscoa, Guillermo Marquero y otros más por haberse dictado auto de detención judicial contra ellos y sin embargo dicha orden no ha sido cumplida.

JOSE FIGUERES FERRER.-

Es hijo de padre y madre catalánes; pero nacido en Costa Rica. Fué educado en el Colegio Seminario de esta capital y luego en un Colegio de los Estados Unidos de América, sin haber terminado sus estudios. En ese país casó con una dama estadinense con la que tiene dos niños. Regresó a Costa Rica, y desde entonces se consagró a la agricultura y al comercio. Logró mediante su esfuerzo personal cultivar una gran finca de café y fique, al sur de San José, que denominó "La Lucha". De 1.943 para acá figura en la política costarricense, sin haber ocupado ninguna posición oficial hasta la caída del régimen del Lic. Picado, cuando asumió el mando como Jefe de la revolución. Gobernó 18 meses sin Congreso, nacionalizó la banca y creó un impuesto al capital del 10% y lo acusan sus enemigos de haber derrochado alrededor de 350.000.000.00 de colones, de los cuales buena parte entregó a la Legión Caribe que lo ayudó a derrocar al Gobierno del Lic. Picado.

Es socialista, de temperamento autoritario, de vida austera y de trabajo. Cultivó relaciones con el Gobierno del General Franco, pero a la vez permitió que funcionara en San José una Legación del Gobierno rojo, a la cual visitaba frecuentemente. Rompió relaciones con el Perú, República Dominicana y actual Junta revolucionaria de Venezuela, relaciones que finalmente reanudó con la última.

Me refiere el Mayor Figuls, ex-Inspector General de Hacienda y que fué hombre de la absoluta confianza de Figuerres, estando hoy distanciados políticamente, que de los almacenes de su dependencia retiró Figueres 200 ametralladoras "Reising" con la dotación de 600.000 tiros y se dice que con otros armamentos retirados así mismo de los otros almacenes de guerra las llevó a su finca "La Lucha", antes de abandonar el poder, en donde las tiene ocultas.

Me refiere el Coronel Don Edgar Cardona Quirós, su ex-ministro de Seguridad, ahora distanciado del señor Figueres, que cuando se produjo la invasión del Doctor Calderón Guardia al país en diciembre de 1.948, el Presidente de Cuba, doctor Prío Socarrás, obsequió al Gobierno de Costa Rica un armamento muy valioso consistente en rifles, ametralladoras, cañones de montaña, morteros, bombas para avión, etc. etc. y la suma de cien mil dólares, lo queFigueres, según se dice, entregó íntegro a la Legión Caribe. En esa ocasión el señor Figueres se empeñó que los aviones que traían el armamento lo desembarcaran en el aeropuerto de San Isidro del General, al sur de San José y cerca de su finca y donde con anterioridad había enviado a varios miembros de la Legión Caribe para que lo recibieran. El Coronel Cardona, como Ministro de Seguridad, dió orden a los aviones que ya se encontraban volando hacía Costa Rica para que dichos armamentos fueran desembarcados en esta capital, lo que produjo en el ánimo de su Jefe, señor Figueres, seria contrariedad que fué el principio de su distanciamiento, pues el Coronel Cardona era opuesto de manera resuelta, a seguir prestando auxilios económicos y de armas, a los legionarios del Caribe.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para citar otro desagradable incidente que el Coronel Cardona me refirió. Al producirse la invasión del Dr. Calderón Guardia, que antes mencioné, llegaron a su Despacho de Ministro, el General Miguel Angel Ramírez, Jefe de los legionarios del Caribe, en compañía del Doctor Calderon Valdés, Embajador de Guatemala en Costa Rica, a ofrecerle sus servicios como veterano militar, ya que en Costa Rica no había Jefes militares de escuela. El señor Cardona le expresó las gracias, pero el general Ramírez insistió y le manifestó que él tenía 800 hombres disciplinados y listos para repeler la agresión de Calderón Guardia, a quien apoyaba indirectamente al General Somoza de Nicaragua. El Embajador de Guatemala insistió en que se aceptaran por parte de Costa Rica los servicios de Ramírez. El Coronel Cardona volvió a expresar que mucho agradecería al galante ofrecimiento de Ramírez; pero que él no podría aceptar que tropas o militares extranjeros tomaran parte en aquel conflicto nacional. Ante esta rotunda negativa, - Calderón Valdés se exaltó un tanto, al extremo de que el Coronel Cardona, según me lo manifestó, hubo de golpear su mesa y de expresar al inoportuno diplomático guatemalteco que en su despacho él era quien mandaba. La conjetura que hace Cardona es que esas tropas mercenarias, una vez repelida la agresión, se lanzarían contra Nicaragua y hubieran envuelto a Costa Rica en un grave conflicto internacional. A muy reducido número de sus amistades ha referido el señor Cardona estos graves sucesos que culminaron con su separación del Gobierno, ya que Figuerres era, y sigue siendo, resuelto partidario de una agresión contra Somoza.

OTROS EMIGRADOS POLITICOS.-

A la caída de los Gobiernos de Calderón Guardia y Picado, - tuvieron que emigrar varios costarricenses de filiación comunista y extranjeros al servicio del Gobierno depuesto, quienes en su mayoría se encuentran en Guatemala, México y Venezuela. Entre ellos figuran los siguientes:

JORGE ISAAC [illegible], alias CHACO, panameño, natural de David, Chiriquí. De vida inmoral.

JULIO LÓPEZ [illegible].- Ex-carabinero republicano español. Se dice asaltó y robó un banco en Asturias durante la dominación roja. Llegó a Costa Rica expulsado de Panamá a la caída del Gobierno del doctor Arnulfo - Arias, de quien se dice era íntimo amigo. Casó en este país civilmente con una rica heredera a quien ha despojado en México, de parte de sus haberes. Ahora - ha sido expulsado de México por actividades poco lícitas. Es hombre peligroso por sus ideas extremistas y su falta de moralidad.

JUAN JOSE TAVIO Y SILVA, de nacionalidad cubana, ex-director de policía de Batista. Atrabiliario, inmoral, pistolero. Aquí existen, en los tribunales de Justicia, numerosos procesos en algunos de los cuales se ha dictado sentencia condenatoria contra él por asesinatos, robos y estafas. Casó con una [illegible] rica a quien despojó de sus bienes. Recientemente fué expulsado de Venezuela y se ha radicado, según noticias, en la República Dominicana.

FERNANDO CHAVES MOLINA.- Licenciado en farmacia, químico peligroso agitador comunista. Reside en Venezuela. Costarricense.

JUAN CASTILLO o CASTRILLO, obrero educado en Rusia, habla correctamente el inglés, costarricense, peligroso agitador comunista. Reside en Venezuela.

JOSE MERINO Y CORONADO.- Costarricense, profesor de ciencia - físico químicas, peligroso agitador comunista.

CARLOS LUIS SAENZ, costarricense, poeta, escritor, profesor - de pedagogía Marxista, residente en la Escuela Normal de Panamá.

CORINA RODRIGUEZ.- Costarricense, profesora, agitadora comunista, residente en Guatemala.

EUNICE ODIO.- Costarricense, poetisa, agitadora, residente - en Guatemala.

ROQUE JULIO [illegible].- Este sujeto de largo historial en Perú, Venezuela, Cuba y Panamá, llegó hace alrededor de tres meses. En días pasados le mostró a varios compatriotas un cablegrama de adhesión irrestricta al Excmo. Señor Presidente de Colombia. Falta saber si en realidad dirigió al Excmo. Señor Presidente algún mensaje de adhesión.

JOSE MANUEL BENITEZ.- Natural de Girardot, se dice periodista y se propone editar un número del periódico "El Mundo", que edita a su vez en Ibagué. Es, según lo ha manifestado adverso al actual orden de cosas en - Colombia.

GOLETAS.- Me permito informar que han sido adquiridas por firmas colombianas las siguientes embarcaciones: "CONISPRAY", por la Compañía Marítima

Colombiana Ltda., de Barranquilla y "TONNY GILONI", por los señores Alfredo Rojas C. & Co. Ltda. de Cali, Colombia.

CONCLUSIONES.- La República de Costa Rica por mandato constitucional de ese país, tiene prohibido el ejército como institución permanente. De tal suerte que faltando este fuerte eslabón y pilar de una nación, es campo propicio para allí germinen todas las organizaciones políticas disciplinadas de cualquier índole, convirtiendose en verdaderas amenazas para la estabilidad y el orden jurídico de la nación costarricense. Es así, como, además y sin el respaldo de una organización militar, las demás instituciones, son extremadamente débiles, pues tiene que improvisar instituciones de la noche a la mañana, en cualquier cambio de Gobierno, como sucede actualmente, que tanto detectivismo, como policía, guardia civil etc., son impreparados para la gestión administrativa y de Gobierno; únicamente son adictos al Presidente Otilio Ulate, y tras de su nombre trabajan y se desenvuelven y transitan por los complejos e intrincados caminos de la justicia, la investigación, la defensa nacional, la administración pública etc.

En estas condiciones y con autorización del Señor Embajador de Colombia en Costa Rica, Doctor Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez, traigo la gestión de solicitar ante el Gobierno Nacional, la consecución de cinco becas para detectives, de jóvenes de Costa Rica, con el objeto de ayudar a esa Nación hermana a la formación de un cuerpo técnico de policía que vaya sentando las bases de una organización, que beneficiaría muy grandemente a nuestro país, ya que si se llega a hacer efectiva esa gestión, Colombia tendría en ese país una organización que poco a poco reflejaría nuestros propios deseos e intereses en América Central.

De esta gestión había necesidad de informar al Sr. Fulgencio Lequerica Vélez, para que él en su calidad de Embajador haga el ofrecimiento ante el Gobierno costarricense por su intermedio y abrir las vacantes correspondientes en la Escuela de Policía, General Santander.

AUTORIDADES COLOMBIANAS EN COSTA RICA.-

Nuestro país está dignamente representado en Costa Rica. El Embajador Dr. Lequerica Vélez, es un gran caballero y magnífico diplomático. Mantiene grandes relaciones con el Gobierno del país y sus conceptos va-lan y pesan en las esferas diplomáticas. Es muy estimado por el público en general. El Cónsul General Sr. Gamaliel Noriega es una personalidad, trabaja por Colombia y vive alerta para dar oportunamente cualquier información que interese al Gobierno de Colombia. Con él personalmente estuvimos obteniendo datos e informaciones y merced a su acusiosidad me suministró valiosas informaciones sobre la Legión Caribe, política costarricense etc., temas que domina y conoce a la perfección.

Dejo constancia ante el Gobierno Nacional de que estos dos funcionarios diplomáticos, representan a nuestro país, con honor, dignidad y caballerosidad.

CONTRABANDO DE DROGAS.-

Existe una poderosa cadena de contrabandistas en drogas cuya base principal es Cuba, cadena que necesariamente debe tener filiales en Colombia puesto que todo el tráfico de drogas lícitas e ilícitas para Sur América se debe efectuar por nuestro país. Tuve oportunidad de conversar brevemente con el Sr. Jorge Barseló del Departamento de Investigación de la República de Cuba, quien se encontraba en misión oficial también en algunos trabajos encomendados por su Gobierno entre otros el de localizar la red internacional de traficantes ilícitos en drogas heróicas, estupefacientes etc. Además se alcansa a reflejar muy debilmente ante esas Autoridades Centro Americanas la salida de oro, platino, esmeraldas de nuestro territorio, causando grande daño al Fisco Nacional. Sería conveniente que el Gobierno Nacional creara un cuerpo experto en estudio de estupefacientes y contrabandos, localizados para efectuar sus trabajos no en Colombia, sino en Cuba, Panamá, Costa Rica y algunos otros países Centro Americanos, para desde esos sitios tener un mejor control sobre este turbio comercio que afecta hondamente nuestra economía.

VENTA DE ARMAS.-

La venta de armas en Costa Rica es libre. En almacenes que pude observar personalmente se venden revólveres, escopetas, pistolas, fusiles calibre U. munición de 7 milímetros y clandestinamente se consiguen ametralladoras italianas marca "Breda" y "Balcing". De tal suerte que el comercio de elementos bélicos no está bajo el control del Gobierno ni las Autoridades tienen el menor interés en restringirlo ya que como dije anteriormente el precitado comercio es libre.

Dejo en esta forma rendido el informe de la comisión que me fué encomendada.

Atentamente,

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ TELLEZ
Jefe Nacional del Detectivismo.

(Continuación del Informe)

OBSERVACIONES DE CARACTER GENERAL.-

TURISMO.- El país carece de una organización técnica en el Ramo de Turismo. Hay detalles que dejan ver muy claro la falta de propaganda turística que padece Colombia en los Hoteles, Aerodromos, Casinos, Club Houses, etc. Mientras pude observar que países pequeños hacen un gran despliegue de afiches y carteles propagandísticos, Colombia no posee este servicio. En los aerodromos especialmente, hay que colocar leyendas en afiches de colores insinuando al turista que visite a Colombia, y litografiando nuestras bellezas naturales como el Salto de Tequendama, Las Salinas de Zipaquirá, Hoteles de Turismo, Laguna de Tota y mil más, que despierten en el turista el deseo de ver cosas nuevas. Se podrían organizar excursiones de turismo a esos lugares, en combinación con las empresas aéreas, para dar mayores facilidades al turista.

SERVICIO DE POLICIA EN AERODROMOS.-

Pude observar como resalta a la vista la gran diferencia, en cuanto a aseo y presentación personal de la Policía que presta servicios en el aerodromo de Medellín. Mientras en el aerodromo de Tocumen en Panamá, y la Sabana en San José, Costa Rica, tanto el personal de Aduanas como la Policía, está muy bien vestido y limpio y cortéz, en Medellín, se ven los Agentes, sucios, barbados, muy mal vestidos y en posturas nada correctas, como sentados en los descansos para los pasajeros internacionales, o con una pierna sobre las barandas que limitan el campo aéreo.

Estos detalles que al parecer son leves, sería conveniente se corrigieran para impresionar a las personas que nos visitan y que lleven por lo menos mientras esperen en los campos aéreos la salida de sus aviones, un trato agradable y cortéz y una presentación decente.

CON/JEFE CARLOS RODRIGUEZ [illegible]
Jefe Nacional del Detectivismo.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	8/16/78		

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

This
volume
is
closed.
File in Vol IV.

S E C R E T

THIS SHEET TO BE KEPT ON THE [illegible] OF AGENT FILE.
IT SHOULD ALWAYS BE [illegible].

AGENT CHECK LIST

AGENT PSEUDO OR CRYPT WKSCARLET-5

PHOTO

POA 17 January 1972
PRQ I [illegible] March 1972
PRQ II [illegible] March 1972
OA 17 July 1972
MOC 1 February 1969
(Current)

BRIEF PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AGENT:

5'11", 175 pounds, black hair, green eyes. Erect posture. has scar on palm of right hand.

ADDRESS: HOME Quinta Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas (Rent)

OFFICE WKSCARLET hqs.

TELEPHONE: HOME 38 52 37 **OFFICE**

REGULAR CONTACT PROCEDURE:

Agent contacts the C/O by phone either at the office or at the C/O's home and the meeting is set up by the hour agreed upon at the Safe House.

RE-CONTACT PLAN:

The agent will recontact the C/O through the above procedure. The C/O can call the agent between 1900 and 2000 daily by Pageboy. Tel # 62.03.41/5 No. C 657. The agent will then call the C/O at home.

EMERGENCY CONTACT PLAN: (To include meeting site, if possible a double-talk description which agent will immediately recognize. Please include all aliases used and circumstances under which each used.)

The agent will call the Embassy and request "Eduardo". the new C/O will state that he is a friend of Eduardo and that they can meet at the usual place at ______ hours. This means the SH. The agent will call in response to the [illegible] buzzer. The agent should not be contacted at home unless the C/O is fluent in Spanish. If so the story again is that the C/O is a friend of "EDuardo" and that a meeting at the usual place is requested.

S E C R E T

THIS GREEN SHEET INVALID AFTER 30 JUNE 1973
(and is to be [illegible] officer)

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
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AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT c/WH 8

ACTION # 570

INFO RF. FILE. VR. c/PLAN, c/CI, c/CCS2

DSECURY

T 213559 PAGE 01-01 IN 965335

PRECEDENCE TOR:041348Z MAY 73 CARA 21864

S E C R E T 041343Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21864

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 403768

1. STEMERMAN HAS RESERVATIONS HOTEL CONTINENTAL ALTAMIRA, LA CASTELLANA,

2. FILE: 75-2-16/3, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

Sie & Copy for me, please. Thank you,

STEMERMAN'S SECRETARY NOTIFIED ON 4 MAY 1973.

SECRET

4 May 73

201-300985

OUTGOING MESSAGE

19-2

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

SECRET

STAFF 161813Z DIRECTOR 397839

CONF: C/WH/5 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/WHRC2 DDO, ADDO.

DISSEM BY: PB/78

PER SP # 103

0 RID 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO WH/3/V

0 FILES

TO: CARACAS.

RYBAT PLUHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871*)

Feedback to [illegible] attn Frank please. Thank you Bill

1. NO HQS TRACES DOMINGO OBRERO OR "GUAJIRO" TORRES.

2. RONALD CONDON PROBABLY IDENTICAL RONALDO CONDON GIL, BROTHER FRANCISCO CONDON GIL, AKA FRANK CONDON. WAS MEMBER BRIGADE 2506. ARRIVED MIAMI WITH RANSOMED BRIGADE MEMBERS DECEMBER 1962. NO CURRENT INFO ON FILE.

3. SYLA CUERVO POSSIBLY IDENTICAL SYLA ROQUE CUERVO CASTILLO, CUBAN EXILE NOW LIVING MIAMI. SUBJECT BORN 29 OCTOBER 1920 SAN LUIS, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. ATTORNEY IN MINISTRY OF LABOR AND MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION 1945-57. WAS ANTI-BATISTA ACTIVIST, LATER JOINED VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS TO FIGHT CASTRO. CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN MEMBER BRIGADE 2506, ALTHOUGH NAME NOT ON LIST THOSE CAPTURED AT PLAYA GIRON. CUERVO WAS ACCUSED OF BEING LEADER OF GROUP MAKING "ANTI-U.S., PRO-NAZI, PRO-SOCIALIST PRO-COMMUNIST" STATEMENTS WHILE SECOND LIEUTENANT IN U.S. ARMY

CONTINUED....

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHRONO

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

18 April 73

201-300985

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

CONF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR · DATE-TIME GROUP · CITE · MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:__________

PER____#__________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO WH/3/W
0 FILES

397839

[illegible] CUBAN OFFICERS' TRAINING PROGRAM AT FORT BENNING DURING 1963-64. WAS LATER DESCRIBED AS ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT NOT PRO-U.S., AND AS "OPPORTUNIST". NO MENTION IN HIS FILE OF GAS STATION OR NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT.

4. INDEX OBRERO, TORRES, CONDON. FILE 75-2-16/3, 201-0300943, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE.

* Requested traces on subjects whom suspected narcotics trafficker WKSCARLET-3 may have contacted in Miami 9-10 March 1973.

DATE: 18 April 1973
ORIG: Robert J. Austin
UNIT: WH/3/W
EXT: 7271

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Philip
for C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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DISPATCH

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RYBAT
SECRET

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

MICRO. SER.
MAR
[illegible]ILMED

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
HPB, UFA, [illegible]
Chiefs of Station, Buenos Aires, WH/Miami, Bogota

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
PLMEASYSS/Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: CARACAS-21349, 8 March 1973

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of BNDD Report of Investigation written by Jose A. MARIN, S/A assigned to the Miami Regional Office, on 5 February 1973. The report concerns Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles, aka "Bambi:", and Humberto TRUEVA. CIT; CUBA A. USA FLORIDA, MIAMI REPORTED NARCOTICS TRAFFIC CONTACT IN USA OF SUBJECT OF 201-300985, POSADA

2. Also forwarded is a copy of BNDD Caracas telegram 1686 of 26 February 1973 concerning POSADA; BNDD Hqs telegram 1554 of 12 March 1973 concerning the implication of POSADA as a narcotics trafficker and his recent travel from Caracas; and BNDDHqs telegram 1662 of [illegible] March 1973 which summarizes the surveillance of POSADA and Camilo Vicente CUSATI Cusati while the latter two were in Miami.

Gerald R. Gizzi
Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachment:
1. BNDD Report of Investigation, hw
2. Three (3) Telegrams, hw

E 2 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

Distribution:
3 - C,WHD w atts
2 - COS, Buenos Aires, w atts
2 - COS, WH/Miami w atts
2 - COS, Bogota w atts

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 75-120-26	HVCA - 19286	15 March 1973
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ATT 1
DEA
14 MARCH 73
limited official use only
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI
BNDD 1622

ATT 2
DEA
12 MARCH 73
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LUIS POSADA AKA BAMBI ZB-73-0001
BNDD1554

ATT3
STATE
26 FEB 73
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ZB-73-0001-LUIS POSADA-CROSS FILE GFT HUMBERTO TRUEVA
CARACAS 1686

ATT #4
DEA
5 FEB 73
UNCLASSIFIED
GENERAL FILE - HUMBERTO TRUEVA- DEBRIEFING OF SG1-9-0006
NO FILE #

ATTS TO HVCA-19286

14-00000

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR6

ACTION NO. 374

INFO FILE VR DDO, ADDO, C/IPAN, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/FI, C/WH6

S E C R E T 151507Z MAR 73 STAFF

2P

CITE PARIS 37271

860426

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ROME, CARACAS INFO MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 18 1973
MICROFILMED

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF CARACAS 21422 (859671)

1. DISCUSSED REF REQUEST WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR PANELLA MORNING OF 15 MARCH. PANELLA HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MADRID AND ROME SAIC'S AND PROMISED TO KEEP US INFORMED.

2. WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI (F/No 201) LEFT MADRID ON 13 MARCH AND ARE PRESENTLY IN ROME WHERE BNDD ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THEM. BNDD LIAISON IN ROME HAS ALREADY FOUND TRACE OF THEIR ARRIVAL AT AIRPORT BUT WHEN CHECKING HOTEL THEY INDICATED THEY WOULD STAY IN POLICE LEARNED THEY DID NOT CHECK IN. AS THERE SEVERAL OTHER VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATS IN SAME HOTEL, IITALIAN POLICE AND BNDD CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL FIND THEIR TARGETS.

b

AN	
AB	✓
IN	
PS	
BK	3
DES	NFD
~~PI~~	
E/ADRC	

3. PANELLA VERY UNHAPPY WITH HIS MIAMI OFFICE WHICH, INSTEAD OF TELEPHONING REGION 17 OF WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTURE FOR MADRID, INSTEAD SENT CABLE THREE DAYS LATER, SO THAT SPANISH POLICE FOUND TRACE OF THEM ONLY AFTER THEY HAD

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985
15 MAR 73

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DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ____

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 PARIS 37271 SECRET

DEPARTED FOR ROME. REGION 17 EXTREMELY INTERESTED AND WILL FOLLOW UP CLOSELY. AT STATION SUGGESTION, PANELLA WILL QUERY FRENCH CNO TO CHECK UP IF THERE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUS TRIPS TO FRANCE BY WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI/ WILL ADVISE.

√ NO 201

4. FILE: 201-300985. CROSS INDEX CUSATI. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIO · CLASSIFIED MESSAGE · TOTAL COPIES 1

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BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 2 / 15 PER SOP .103

ACTION UNIT: C/WH6

INFO: FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IPAN, C/CI, C/NARCZ, C/FI, C/EUR6

ACTION NO. 453

S E C R E T 151706Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 18645

860594

A43KO
A3
~~IS~~
~~PS~~
~~BI~~
~~DBS~~ ~~MFD~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: A. PARIS 37222 (IN 859406)

B. CARACAS 21422 (IN 859671)

1. PLS SEE BNDD MADRID 1339* FOR DETAILS WKSCARLET/3'S MOVEMENTS MADRID. NO UNUSUAL ACTIONS NOTED.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

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ACTION UNIT [illegible]

INFO FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION

4671

S E C R E T 151935Z MAR 73 STAFF

860750

CITE CARACAS 21429

TO: PRIORITY ROME, DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKSCHRIST

REF CARACAS 21422 (IN 859671)

AN KO
BG X
FS
PI
DES NFD
PI
WH/3/V

1. BNDD APPARENTLY DROPPED THE BALL IN SURVEILLANCE OF LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES AND CAMILO VICENTE CUSATI CUSATI IN MADRID AS THEIR COVERAGE BASED ON SECOND HAND INFO AND RECORDS. FOLLOWING SUMMARY BNDD MADRID TELEGRAM 1339 OF 15 MAR 73: SUBJECTS ARRIVED MADRID 11 MAR VIA PAN AM 254. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS ON 14 MAR REVEALED THAT CUSATI REGISTERED AT HOTEL MINDANO, MADRID. POSADA NOT REGISTERED. BNDD AGENTS THEN WENT HOTEL BUT LEARNED THAT CUSATI AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MALE (PRESUMABLY POSADA) HAD JUST LEFT HOTEL. AIRPORT CHECK REVEALED THAT SUBJECTS DEPARTED 1145 HRS 14 MAR VIA TWA 900 FOR ROME. POSADA HELD TICKED NO. 164401364874 AND CUSATI TICKET NO. 164401364875.

2. SUBSEQUENT CHECKS AT HOTEL REVEALED THAT CUSATI HAD REGISTERED BY HIMSELF IN DOUBLE ROOM, WHICH OCCUPIED BY

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21429 SECRET

OTHER UNIDENTIFIED MALE (PRESUMABLY POSADA). ONE PHONE CALL OF SHORT DURATION MADE, NUMBER UNKNOWN.

3. MADRID BNDD ADVISED ROME BNDD AT 1800 HRS 14 MAR DEPARTURE SUBJECTS FROM MADRID. DELAY DUE DIFFICULTY MAKING PHONE CONNECTIONS.

4. COMMENT: BNDD SHOULD HAVE LITTLE TROUBLE SPOTTING SUBJECTS AS THEY WILL BE IN ROME EXTENDED PERIOD ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS. WOULD APPRECIATE ROME STATION KEEPING US ADVISED DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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PRECE

ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/CI, C/PLAN, D/CI, C/EI, C/NARC 2

ACTION NO. 397

S E C R E T 151515Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21427

860502

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR ROUTINE WH/MIAMI, INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 382099 (IN 839442)

B. CARACAS 21221 (ONLY SENT DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI) (IN 848386)

C. CARACAS 21298 (ONLY SENT DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI)

D. CARACAS 21408 (IN 858116)

1. IN REPLY PARA 3 REF A REQUEST, CAN ADD LITTLE THAT NOT ALREADY REPORTED. RECAPITULATE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PER PARA 4 REF B, WK~~X~~SCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY FINGERED AS NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER BY BNDD SOURCE JOSE GOMEZ.

B.~~//~~ PER PARA 3D REF B, BNDD SPECI~~/~~AL AGENT PERSONALLY SAW WKSCARLET-3 MEETING WI~~XX~~TH HUMBERTO TRUEVA AND JOSE GOMEZ ON 20 FEB 73 IN CARACAS WITH OTHER UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL. IDENTIFICATION BY BNDD SPECIAL AGENT MADE BASIS NEWSPAPER PHOTO OF WKSCARLET-3 SUPPLIED BY STATION.

C. PER PARA 1 REF C, CAR IN WHICH ~~Z/~~WKSCARLET-3 DROVE TRUEVA, GOMEZ, AND UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL IS A CAR REGISTERED TO WKSCARLET-3.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21427 SECRET

D. ACCORDING BNDD REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY SPECIAL AGENT JOSE A. MARIN, DATED 5 FEB 73, WRITTEN IN MIAMI, WKSCARLET-3 WAS LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ' PARTNER IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND FOLLOWING HERNANDEZ' INCARCERATION, WKSCARLET-3 HAD TAKEN OVER HERNANDEZ' OPERATION. (POUCHING COPY THIS ROI.)

E. REGARDING ALLEGATION THAT WKSCARLET-3 ALSO TAKING OVER EUGENIO LEAL POZO NETWORK, THIS RECEIVED ORALLY FROM S/A MARIN WHILE HE IN CARACAS ON TDY. REQUEST WH/MIAMI CHECK WITH BNDD MIAMI TO RECEIVE FURTHER DETAILS.

F. PER REF D, BNDD SURVEILLANCE IN MIAMI SAW WKSCARLET-3 IN COMPANY OF ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER, AND RONALD CONDOM, BROTHER OF FRANK CONDOM.

G. PER BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1554 OF 12 MAR 73, DEBRIEFING OF BNDD CI (IDENTITY UNKNOWN) REVEALED ONLY THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS CONNECTION IN CARACAS...

2. WILL ANSWER PARA 2 REF A QUERY RE OUR ASSESSMENT OF WKSCARLET-3'S EXPECTED REACTION TO CONFRONTATION BY SEPARATE CABLE.

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 21427 SECRET

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION NO. 325

S E C R E T 142050Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI WMIAMI 17858

859630

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21298 (IN 848386)

B. DIRECTOR 379434

C. CARACAS 21408 (IN 858116)

1. LNAGON TELEGRAM CITED REF C CONTAINS ALL MHABYSS INFO LNAGON/MIAMI HAS ON WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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14 MAR 1973

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ACTION NO: 214

S E C R E T 141950Z MAR 73 STAFF

859603

CITE CARACAS 21418

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 382423

1. WKSCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY STATED TRAVEL PLAN WOULD BE ROME VIA NEW YORK, MADRID, WITH SHORT STOP OVER LATTER CITY PRIOR HIS FINAL DESTINATION WHICH WILL BE ROME. HE MUST HAVE CHANGED ITINERARY ENROUTE ROME, WHERE HE WILL HEAD SECURITY TEAM FOR VENEZUELAN DELEGATION GULF OF MARACAIBO TALKS.

2. CAMILO CUSATI CUSATI IS WKSCARLET OFFICER WHO PART ABOVE SECURITY TEAM. WE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY HE MAY BE DRIVER OF 1966 BLUE FORD AND IS THE UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL WHO INVOLVED WITH TRUEVA AND GOMEZ DURING THEIR STAY CARACAS.

3. FRANK CONDOM PRESUMABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO MANUEL CONDOM GIL. PLS SEE DIRECTOR 303867 AND WH/MIAMI 15582 FOR DETAILS. ACCORDING MEXICO CITY 20812 (IN 687982) FRANK CONDON ("N" AS IN NOVEMBER) IN MEXICO CITY

CO

WH/3/V

201-300985

14 MAR 1973

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21418 SECRET

CIRCA AUGUST 72 TO ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY OF NARCOTICS.

THIS SUBJECT PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH FRANK CONDOM SEEN WITH WKSCARLET-3, NO STATION TRACES CONDOM'S BROTHER NOR PURRINOS.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION UNIT: C/WH 6

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ACTION NO. 172

C/NARC 2 (C/TDM)

2P

APR 13 1973

MICROFILMED

TRUE AUGRO. SER.

PROCESSED

S E C R E T 141315Z MAR 73 STAFF

872

CITE CARACAS 21408

859116

OOM VFA HAB

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES,

OFP VLB DIR

PARIS, BOGOTA, ROME.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21396 (IN 857839)

(IN 857300)

AN KO
AB X
IN Y
PS
BX 3
DES NPD
FI
WH/R/N

1. ACCORDING BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1585, OF 13 MAR 73, WHICH REPEAT OF MESSAGE ORIGINATING BNDD MIAMI, LUIS POSADA, SUBJECT REF, AND CAMILO CUSATI ARRIVED MIAMI ON 9 MAR VIA PAN AM 552. PAIR WALKED AROUND DOWNTOWN MIAMI FOR SEVERAL HOURS UNTIL THEY WERE PICKED UP BY ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED MULTI-KILO TRAFFICKER. AFTER BNDD SURVEILLANCE LOST TRIO FOR SEVERAL HOURS, POSADA AND CUSATI SEEN CHECKING OUT OF ARROWHEAD MOTEL (WHERE THEY CHECKED IN UPON ARRIVING MIAMI) AND CHECKED INTO SHERATON-FOUR AMBASSADORS ACCOMPANIED BY PURRINOS, WHO REMAINED WITH PAIR UNTIL 0230 HOURS 10 MAR. AT 1230 HOURS 10 MAR POSADA AND CUSATI WERE PICKED UP BY RONALD CONDOM, BROTHER OF FRANK CONDOM, WHO ASSOCIATED WITH NOW ARRESTED MAJOR VIOLATOR FRANK MATTHEWS.

201-300955

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21408 SECRET

CONDOM TOOK PAIR TO AIRPORT WHERE THEY BOARDED PAN AM 254 FOR MADRID.

2. COMMENT: GIVEN ABOVE CONTACTS KNOWN VIOLATORS, THERE LITTLE DOUBT NOW THAT POSADA IS TRAFFICKER. APPARENTLY CUSATI IS ALSO AN ASSOCIATE OF POSADA'S IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. BNDD CARACAS CONTINUES FEEL WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO LET POSADA RUN AND SEE WHERE HE LEADS US. BNDD CARACAS NOT AWARE OF ANY IMMEDIATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION BEING PLANNED AGAINST POSADA BUT HQS MAY WISH DOUBLECHECK THIS POINT WITH BNDD HQS.

3. INDEX CUSATI, PURRINOS, RONALD CONDOM.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ORIG ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT WH/3/V
EXT 5126; 1535
DATE 13 MARCH 1973

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CITE DIRECTOR 382423

TO PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21349 (IN 854093) *

1. PLEASE SEE BNDD MESSAGE 1585 SENT 12 MAR 73 FROM BNDD HQS WASHINGTON TO BNDD CARACAS. DID WKSCARLET-3 GIEVE STATION ANY REASON FOR CHANGING REF TRAVEL PLAN?

2. WE CHECKING NAMES GIVEN IN BNDD MESSAGE AND WILL ADVISE RESULTS. PLEASE PROVIDE STATION TRACES.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

AN KO
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BR~~
~~DSS~~ ~~NED~~
~~PI~~
WH/3/V

* Advises travel plan of WKSCARLET-3. BNDD Msg says W-3 going Madrid via Puerto Rico rather than to Rome via New York.

DC/WH/NARC Paul I Taylor
DDP/NARCOG

201-300985
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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

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RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

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ORIG: RICHARD L. CONOLLY
UNIT: 5337; 1128
EXT: WH/3
DATE: 12 MARCH 1973

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CITE DIRECTOR 362421

TO CARACAS QUITO GUAYAQUIL INFO LIMA

FJDUST SGSWIRL

REFS: A. CARACAS 21383 (IN 855917) (NOT SENT QUITO, GUAYAQUIL)

B. LIMA 24126 (IN 848857) (NOT SENT QUITO, GUAYAQUIL)

1. SUGGEST SGSWIRL OF ASSETS LISTED CARA-21383 AND REF A BE CONDUCTED AT SAME TIME AS ~~SGSWIRL~~ THAT OF WKSCARLET-3 WHICH WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN APRIL. HQS WILL SEND SGSWIRL EXAMINER TO CARACAS AT THAT TIME, IF THERE NONE ON ROAD WHO CAN BE DIVERTED.

2. QUITO, GUAYAQUIL: DUE HEAVY TDY LOAD AT HQS, REQUEST SGSWIRL EXAMINERS CURRENTLY ON TDY COMPLETE SCHEDULED ITINERARY INCLUDING RETURN MEXICO, BUT NOT BE DIRECTED TO OTHER STOPS.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

AN	XO
AB	X
IS	
FI	
PX	
DES	NFD
WH/3	✓

DC/WH/1
WH/SEC Halliwell
C/WH/FI ✓
OS/IRD H. KINNEY

201-300985

14 MAR 1973

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

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Weatherwax
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT. 1535
DATE 13 MARCH 73

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

KO
X
WH/3/V

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 373942 (NOT SENT BUENOBS AIRES, BOGOTA)*

B. CARACAS 21369 (IN 455389)**

1. AS YOU AWARE, WKSCARLET-3 REPRESENTS SERIOUS POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO BKHERALD AND WE ANXIOUS GET HIM WRUNG OUT AND, IF ALLEGATIONS PROVE TRUE, OUR ASSOCIATION WITH HIM PROMPTLY TERMINATED. WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO MOVE ALONG ORIGINAL GAME PLAN SUGGESTED IN REF A BUT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ACQUIESCE TO LNAGON REQUEST AND DELAY CONFRONTATION UNTIL WKSCARLET-3 RETURNS FROM ROME.

2. FULLY UNDERSTAND LNAGON DESIRE FOLLOW UP WKSCARLET-3 LEAD. NEVERTHELESS, POINT MUST BE MADE THAT WE HAVE SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM TOTALLY UNCONNECTED WITH PRESENT PROBLEM AND FOR OUR OWN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WE MUST RESOLVE MATTER OF HIS PARTICIPATION IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. YOU MIGHT POINT OUT TO LNAGON THAT WHILE WE CANNOT GUARANTEE ANYTHING, IT OUR ESTIMATE THAT WKSCARLET-3, BASED UPON HIS TENURE WITH US,

201-300985

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13 MAR 1973

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S E C R E T PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO ON CONFRONTATION, WILL LIKELY AGREE TO COOPERATE AND, IF THIS THE CASE, LNAGON INVESTIGATION WOULD BE ENHANCED RATHER THAN HINDERED. REQUEST your ASSESSMENT [redacted] IF (THIS) TRUE.

3. PARA 2 REF B IS FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF WKSCARLET-3 APPARENT CONNECTION WITH HERNANDEZ AND LEAL POZO. PLEASE ADVISE OF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION LNAGON MAY HAVE PASSED ON THIS SUBJECT. WOULD ALSO LIKE BRIEF REVIEW OF EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT WKSCARLET-3 HIMSELF, RATHER THAN JUST HIS CAR, SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITY.

4. TO RECAPITULATE: APPROVE YOUR AGREEMENT TO DELAY CONFRONTATION UNTIL WKSCARLET-3 RETURNS TO CARACAS AND CONCUR THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE FURTHER CONSIDERED JOINTLY WITH LNAGON BUT AS THINGS NOW STAND, PREFER TO GET THIS CASE RESOLVED AND, AS NECESSARY, BKHERALD ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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S ~~E C R E T~~ PAGE THREE CITE DIRECTOR 382099

TO

*GIVES GUIDANCE ABOUT HANDLING OF CASE OF WKSCARLET-3, UNILATERAL CARACAS STATION PENETRATION OF LIAISON WHO IS SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

**SAYS THAT LNAGON IN CARACAS HAS ASKED THE STATION TO POSTPONE ITS CONFRONTATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 BECAUSE OF CONCERN THAT EARLY CONFRONTATION MAY HINDER THE LNAGON INVESTIGGATION OF WKSCARLET-3. REQUESTS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE FROM HEADQUARTERS.

C/WH/4/AR________
C/WH/4________
DC/WH/COG________
C/WH/NARC________
DDP/NARCOG________
DDS/IOS OS________
OGC JOHN GREANEY (TELECOORD)
C/WH/FI________

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
for C/WHD

R.L. Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

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ACTION NO. 246

S E C R E T 131350Z MAR 73 STAFF 857854

CITE CARACAS 21397

TO: DIRECTOR, MADRID, ROME, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

IDEN REF: CARACAS 21396 (N857839)

IDEN WKSCARLET-3, A UNILATERAL BKHERALD AGENT WHO HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ACCORDING TO LNAGON SOURCES. E2 IMPDET.

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201-300985

13 MAR 1973

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PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chiefs of Station, WH/Miami, Buenos Aires, Bogota & Rome

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
C PLAHABYSS Luis POSADA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. CARACAS-21369 (Not sent Rome)
B. CARACAS-21349 (Not sent Bogota)

Forwarded herewith is a copy of BNDD Caracas telegram 1981, 8 March 1973, and BNDD HQS telegram 1554, 12 March 1973, both of which concern Subject of References.

Gerald R. Gizzi
Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachment:
Two (2) telegrams, hw

2 IMPDET CL BY

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ATT 1

STATE
8 MAR 73
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XRX
ZB-73-0001 LUIS POSADA CROSS FILE WITH HUMBERTO TRUEVA, GF
CARACAS 1981

ATT 2

X

DEA
12 MARCH 73
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ATTS TO HVCA-19281

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ACTION #
652

CA
CI

HVC-6597

S E C R E T 092010Z M[illegible] 5 INTEL

855811

CITE CARACAS 21374

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA, ROME.

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR HEADQUARTERS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SIMILAR TO THAT OF HVC-6539. SOURCE: WKRALLY/ WKSCARLET-3 WHO IS HEADING THE TEAM. KNOWN TO LIMITED NUMBER OF LIAISON OFFICIALS. NO INDEX. THIS REPORT NOT COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. CL BY MICHAEL C. CHOADEN.

FILED: 092010Z

IW COMMENT: WEHN DISSEMINATED ADD CA, CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, CI/IC AND SOD.

file : WKSCARLET-3

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 10 MARCH 1973
IN 855811
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
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E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/COLOMBIA

DOI EARLY MARCH 1973

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DECISION TO CONDUCT PROTECTIVE RATHER THAN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPERATIONS AT THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER TALKS BETWEEN COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELA

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS FIELD NO. HVC-6597
(9 MARCH)

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED NOT TO

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IMPLEMENT ITS PREVIOUS PLAN TO MONITOR THROUGH A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO THE BORDER NEGOTIATIONS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN ROME, ITALY, ON 19 MARCH 1973. THE VENEZUELAN 14-MAN GROUP FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), WHICH WILL ACCOMPANY THE VENEZUELAN DELEGATION TO THE TALKS, WILL LIMIT ITS ACTIVITIES TO THE PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY OF THE VENEZUELAN CONTINGENT. SHOULD THE OPPORTUNITY ARISE TO USE SECURELY A TECHNICAL OPERATION TO MONITOR THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION, ANOTHER DISIP TEAM OF FROM FOUR TO SEVEN VENEZUELANS WILL BE SENT TO HANDLE THIS. (SOURCE COMMENT: BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT A VENEZUELAN FOREIGN MINISTRY COLDE OFFICER PASSED INFORMATION TO THE COLOMBIANS BASED ON THE VENEZUELAN TECHNICAL OPERATION TARGETTED AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION AT THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS, THE VENEZUELANS FEAR THAT THE COLOMBIANS WILL BE EXPECTING A SIMILAR OPERATION AND MAY TRY TO RECIPROCATE BY MONITORING THE VENEZUELAN DELEGATION. FOR THIS REASON, THE VENEZUELANS HAVE DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT COUNTER-ESPIONAGE RATHER THAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS DURING THIS SERIES OF TALKS. ALSO,

EDITIONS

IN 855811

TDCS

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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(classification) (dissem controls)

DISIP IS NO LONGER WELL EQUIPPED TO CONDUCT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS BECAUSE THE DIRECTOR OF DISIP IN A FIT OF PIQUE RECENTLY REPLACED THE MOST QUALIFIED DISIP TECHNICIAN, THEREBY SERIOUSLY DAMAGING DISIP'S CAPABILITIES IN THIS FIELD.) (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-6508, CSCI-316/00162-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, GIVES BACKGROUND ON THE CODE OFFICER CASE. HVC-6439, CSCI-316/00333-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, REPORTS THE PREVIOUS VENEZUELAN PLAN TO MONITOR THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS. SENT TO BOGOTA, ROME.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SNESITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AQTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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INFO FILE, VR C/IP/AN C/NARC 2 C/CI C/FI DDO ADDO

ACTION NO. 615

S E C R E T 092120Z MAR 73 STAFF

855389

CITE CARACAS 21369

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALL WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 379434 KNOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA)

B. CARACAS 21349 KNOT SENT BOGOTA) (- 854093)

C. CARACAS 21298 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA) (- 848396)

1. SUBSEQUENT REF C LNAGON CARACAS REQUESTED WE POSTPONE CONFRONTATION OF WKSCARLET-3 AS LNAGON CARACAS CONCERNED POSSIBILITY THAT EXPOSURE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS NARCOTICS ASSOCIATED COULD PREJUDICE ONGOING INVESTIGATION, POSSIBLY COMPROMISE THEIR SOURCES, AND PRECLUDE FULLER DEVELOPMENT OF HWHAT COULD BE EVEN MORE REWARDING INVESTIGATION. ALL FOREGOING BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT WKSCARLET-3 COULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO CONFRONTATION, REFUSE TO COOPERATE, OR, PRETEND TO BE COOPERATIVE BUT CONTINUE HIS ILLICIT NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. SUCH FOREWARNING COULD CAUSE HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES TO GO UNDERGROUND, OR AT LEAST BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT IN THEIR ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS, THUS MAKING INVESTIGATION MORE DIFFICULT.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21369 SECRET

2. WKSCARLET-3, ACCORDING LNAGON, SLATED TAKE OVER NARCOTICS NETWORK FORMERLY HANDLED BY LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ, NOW INCARCERATED AND EUGENIO LEAL POZO, NOW IN A MIAMI JAIL. BY NOT ALERTING WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE AWARE HIS ACTIVITIES AND LETTING HIM CONTINUE HIS ACTIVITIES UNSUSPECTING WE ARE ON TO HIM, LNAGON HOPES THIS WOULD LEAD US TO EVEN BIGGER FISH, SUCH AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLY.

3. STATION WELL AWARE DANGERS TO BKHERALD IN CONTINUING RUN AGENT SUCH AS WKSCARLET-3, HOWEVER, TO FURTHER INVESTIGATION CURRENT DRUG CASE WOULD LIKE ACCOMMODATE LNAGON CARACAS AND THUS PLAN HOLD OFF CONFRONTING WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL LATTER'S RETURN FROM ROME. AT THAT TIME WILL REVIEW STATUS OF CASE WITH LNAGON CARACAS AND MAKE DETERMINATION THEN REGARDING TIMING CONFRONTATION. THIS CONNECTION REQUEST HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS AND GUIDANCE REGARDING BALANCE OF EQUITIES INVOLVED FOR LNAGON, BKHERALD, AND OVERALL ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT. STERILIZED SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE PARAGRAPHS COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH LNAGON.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION NO. 282

C/NARC 3, C/EUR 6

S E C R E T Ø821102 MAR 73 STAFF 854093

CITE CARACAS 21349

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES, ROME.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. CARACAS 21298 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, ROME) (IN 548356)

B. CARACAS 21242 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES, WH/MIAMI) (IN 540704)

1. WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTING FOR ROME 8 MARCH VIA PUERTO RICO AND MIAMI, THEN CATCHING FLIGHT FROM NEW YORK TO ROME. LNAGON HAS BEEN ADVISED OF HIS TRAVEL AND INSTITUTING SURVEILLANCE ENROUTE. LNAGON HAS NOT BEEN TOLD REASON HIS TRAVEL OTHER THAN THAT IT ON OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN GOVT BUSINESS.

2. ASSUME POSSIBILITY THAT WKSCARLET-3 MAY BE MAKING NARCOTICS CONTACTS PUERTO RICO, WHERE HE OVERNIGHTING, AND MIAMI, WHERE HE WILL SPEND AT LEAST A FEW HOURS. LNAGON NOT PLANNING ANY ENFORCEMENT ACTION AS LACK SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PLUS FACT WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELING DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT.

3. FOR ROME, BUENOS AIRES: WKSCARLET-3 IS UNILATERAL STATION PENETRATION OF LIAISON WHOM WE STRONGLY

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201-300985

08 MAR 1973

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21349 S E C R E T

SUSPECT IMPLICATED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS. IF ALLEGATIONS CORRECT, HE WILL BE TERMINATED FORTHWITH BUT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY AT SAME TO BE LNAGON AGENT. LNAGON IS INVESTIGATING ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS OF WKSCARLET-3 AND IS AWARE BKHERALD HAS "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN WKSCARLET-3.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
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DATE: 6 MARCH 73

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TO: CARACAS, WH/MIAMI

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RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY BEWKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21298 (IN 848386)*

1. CONCUR WITH PARA 4 REF REQUEST.

2. RECENT LNFALL TRAFFIC FROM BOGOTA SAYS COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS WILL RESUME IN ROME 12 MARCH 73. DOES WKSCARLET-3 STILL PLAN TO GO TO ROME? IF SO, WHAT IS TIMING HIS TRIP AND HOW DOES IT AFFECT STATION PLAN TO CONFRONT HIM?

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H

*REQUESTS AUTHORITY FROM HEADQUARTERS FOR WH/MIAMI TO TELL BNDD OF OUR INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 AND REQUEST ALL THE INFORMATION THAT BNDD HAS ON HIM. IN THE PLANNED CONFRONTATION WITH WKSCARLET-3, CARACAS STATION WOULD APPRECIATE ALL POSSIBLE AMMUNITION AVAILABLE.

C/WH/NARC EDWARD ANDERSON (TELECOORD)

DDP/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

C/WH/COG Lawrence Sternfield (Telecoord)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION NO 388

SECRET 021600Z MAR 73 STAFF

848386

CITE CARACAS 21298

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 373942

B. CARACAS 21221 (IN 839442)

1. NIGHT 28 FEBRUARY STATION VERIFIED CAR DRIVEN BY WKSCARLET-3 SAME CAR SEEN PER REF B PARA 3D.

2. PER REF A HAVE INFORMED LOCAL LNAGON CHIEF OUR OPERATIONAL INTEREST WKSCARLET-3 AND STATION PLAN CONFRONT LATTER. SHOULD WKSCARLET-3 BE UNABLE REFUTE ALLEGATIONS, WILL TRY CONVINCE HIM HIS BEST COURSE WOULD BE COOPERATE WITH LNAGON. IF HE AGREES, WILL ARRANGE INTRODUCTION CHIEF LOCAL LNAGON WHO HAS ALREADY AGREED TAKE HIM OVER.

3. TENTATIVELY PLAN CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 AFTER RECEIPT LNAGON ~~MIAM~~ MIAMI REPORT THEIR DEBRIEFING JOSE GOMEZ. UNFORTUNATELY, GOMEZ IS UNRELIABLE INFORMANT AND WILL PROBABLY WITHHOLD BITAL DETAILS, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING WKSCARLET-3. HOWEVER, REPORT WILL HELP TIE THINGS TOGETHER.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21298 SECRET

4. IN LIGHT WKSCARLET-3'S INVOLVEMENT MHABYSS SURFACED MIAMI AREA, REQUEST STATION WH/MIAMI, WITH HAS CONCURRENCE, BRING TO MIAMI LNAGON ATTENTION OUR OPERATIONAL INTEREST WKSCARLET-3 AND REQUEST ALL INFORMATION THEY HAVE ON HIM. IN CONFRONTATION, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING ALL POSSIBLE AMMUNITION AVAILABLE.

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 377441

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI 73 1 2

RYBAT PLMHABYSS UKARLLY UKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 373942*

1. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS UKSCARLET-3 CASE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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*SETS FORTH HQS' VIEWS ON HANDLING UKSCARLET-3 CASE.

C/WH/COG LAWRENCE STERNFIELD (TELECORD)
C/WH/NARC EDWARD ANDERSON (TELECOORD)
DDP/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

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THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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STATE
28 FEB 73
UNCLASSIFIED
DIFFICULTIES IN SALE OF VOTING MACHINES TO VENEZUELA
MEMO OF CONVERSATION (EMBASSY-CARACAS)

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ACTION NO. 086 — c/ca2, DDP, ADDP, cs/DO, c/ci/sa.

S E C R E T 222015Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21240 CARA

840903

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

1. WKSCARLET-3 PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON ~~17 FEBRUARY~~. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY TWO U.S. LAWYERS FROM MIAMI, SENT TO HIM BY A CUBAN FRIEND IN MIAMI, WHO REQUESTED HIS HELP AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.

2. THE LAWYERS, HEADLEY (FNU) AND SUDDUTH (FNU), WHOSE ADDRESS IS 1703 FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK BUILDING IN MIAMI, WORK FOR VARON, STAHL AND KAY, P.A., ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS, LOCATED AT 2432 HOLLYWOOD BOULEVARD, HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA. THEY ARE REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF LLOYD A. DIXON, JR., AN EMPLOYEE OF THE AVM CORPORATION OF JAMESTOWN, NEW YORK, WHICH RECENTLY GOT THE US. $20,000,000 CONTRACT FOR THE VOTING MACHINES TO BE USED IN THE DECEMBER ELECTION. DIXON IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, MIAMI DIVISION, BECAUSE OF CHARGES BY EDUARDO BLANCO URIBE AND HANS J. MAGNIN, APPARENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ELECTIONS

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21240 S E C R E T

SYSTEMS CORPORATION, A GRAND CAYMAN CORPORATION, WHO ARE ACCUSING DIXON OF FAILURE TO PAY THEM THEIR FULL COMMISSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTRACT.

3. ACCORDING TO COPIES OF THE FIRST PAGES OF SEVERAL DOCUMENTS BROUGHT BY THE LAWYERS, THE CHARGES AGAINST DIXON INCLUDE VIOLATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE LAWS AND BRIBERY OF VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS WHO ALLEGEDLY AGREED TO ACCEPT PAYMENTS FROM DIXON FOR THEIR HELP IN SECURING THE CONTRACT.

4. THE FIRST PAGE OF AN AFFADAVIT FILED BY FERNANDO ZOZAYA ITURBE, THE AVM CORPORATION LAWYER IN VENEZUELA, STATES THAT ON 4 MAY 1972, ZOZAYA WAS PRESENT WHEN DIXON TENDERED RELEASES TO BLANCO AND MAGNIN WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF FORFEITING ALL THE COMMISSIONS DUE THEM FOR THE SALE OF THE VOTING MACHINES TO VENEZUELA. BLANCO AND MAGNIN REFUSED TO SIGN THE RELEASES. DIXON TOLD THEM IT WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE AVM CORPORATION WAS UNDERGOING A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK.

5. THE PURPOSE OF LAWYERS HEADLEY AND SUDDUTH IN CONTACTING WKSCARLET-3 WAS TO OFFER HIM US$50,000 TO PRESSURE

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 21240 SECRET

VENEZUELAN LAWYER ZOZAYA INTO SIGNING A DEPOSITION STATING THAT HE NEVER HEARD DIXON OFFER THE COMMISSION TO BLANCO AND MAGNIN. WKSCARLET-3 REFUSED THE OFFER.

6. LAWYERS GAVE WKSCARLET-3 COPIES OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS WHICH HE GAVE TO WKSCARLET-1 AFTER COPYING FIRST PAGE OF EACH FOR PASSAGE TO STATION. WKSCARLET-1 NOW STUDYING DOCUMENTS WHICH WKSCARLET-3 IS SURE WILL BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT CALDERA.

7. ONE OF DOCUMENTS TURNED OVER CONTAINS DIXON'S CODE AS TO WHOM HE HAD OFFERED WHAT. WKSCARLET -3 WAS TOLD THAT MONEY HAD BEEN PAID WITH EXCEPTION OF MANGIN AND BLANCO. CODE LISTS FOLLOWING:

A. PEOPLES ELECTORAL MOVEMENT (MEP) - US$400,000

B. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN UNION (URD) - US$400,000

C. OMAR RUMBOS, URD LEADER - US$100,000

D. ANTONIO ESPINOZA PRIETO, MEP LEADER - US$100,000

E. DEMOCRATIC ACTION (AD) PARTY - US$470,000

F. MARIO LEONI (STATION UNABLE IDENTIFY BUT

SECRET

14-00000

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FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 CARACAS 21240 SECRET

POSSIBLY RELATION OF LATE RAUL LEONI OF AD) A US$40,000

G. MANGIN - US$760,000

H. BLANCO - US$760,000

8. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR APPROPRIATE DISSEM OF ABOVE. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND REQUESTS THAT INFORMATION BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF ED LITTLE IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

9. FILE: DEFER E2 IMPDET.

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S E C R E T 222025Z FEB 73 STAFF

840904

CITE CARACAS 21242

TO: ROME INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 368236

B. DIRECTOR 367030

C. CARACAS 21122 (IN 826564)

D. HVC 6540, 29 JANUARY 1973

1. DUE UNCERTAINTY NEXT ROUND GULF MARACAIBO TALKS LOCATION, WKSCARLET-3 HAS NOT YET DEPARTED CARACAS AS REPORTED REFS. WHEN CITY CHOSEN, POSSIBLY AROUND 1 MARCH, HE WILL LEAD AUDIO TEAM TO SITE. HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT CONTACT ROME STATION SHOULD THAT CITY BE PICKED.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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22 Feb 73

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FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC2

ACTION NO 809

C/EUR6

839442

S E C R E T 211615Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21221 CARA

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET-3

~~REF: DIRECTOR 372698~~

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
FS
SX
~~RID NED~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

1. WKSCARLET-3 CONTACTED STATION EVENING OF 15 FEB 73 WHICH FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT HE DID NOT DEPART FOR ROME AS SCHEDULED. AT MEETING FOLLOWING SATURDAY (WHICH CAME AFTER TWO POSTPONEMENTS) WKSCARLET-3 STATED TRIP DELAYED DUE UNCERTAINTY LOCATION OF FUTURE GULF OF MARACAIBO TALKS. TENTATIVELY WKSCARLET-3 AND AUDIO TEAM SCHEDULED DEPART 1 MARCH IF TALK CITY DESIGNATED THAT TIME. IF ROME, WKSCARLET-3 INSTRUCTED NOT MAKE CONTACT WITH ROME STATION. HE MADE NO MENTION MHABYSS MATTERS.

2. HAVE INITIATED INVESTIGATION WKSCARLET-3 AS RECOMMENDED REF. NO INFORMATION THAT HE PRESENTLY ON WKSCARLET ASSIGNMENT INVESTIGATE MHABYSS MATTERS.

3. STATUS PRESENT MHABYSS CASE IN WHICH WKSCARLET-3 ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED AS FOLLOWS

A. HUMBERTO TRUEVA AND JOSE GOMEZ

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

I KS-3 22 FEB 1973

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

ARRIVED CARACAS 1830, 14 FEB 73 AND MET AT AIRPORT BY UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL AND CARLOS CONTRERAS CASTRO. UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL DROVE TRUEVA AND GOMEZ TO CARACAS HOTEL WHERE THEY PRESENTLY UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY CITRAILS AND FIXED SURVEILLANCE BY TDY LNAGON TEAM. CAR DRIVEN BY UNKNOWN TRACED THROUGH LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTERED FEDERAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT.

B. 15 FEBRUARY SAME UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL WITH SAME CAR WENT HOTEL AND PARKED CAR ILLEGALLY. SUBSEQUENTLY TOWED AWAY. UNKNOWN AND GOMEZ RETRIEVED AUTO. UNKNOWN SHOWED IDENTIFICATION TO POLICE OFFICIAL WHO RETURNED CAR WITHOUT QUESTION. ON RETURN TO HOTEL UNKNOWN USED CAR'S SIREN TO PASS THROUGH RED LIGHTS, AND WAS STOPPED LATER BY METROPOLITAN POLICE FOR DRIVING WRONG WAY ON ONE WAY STREET. CITRAILS OBSERVED POLICE EFFUSIVELY SALUTING OUR UNKNOWN WHO THEN DROVE TO HOTEL WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. FROM THIS IT OBVIOUS OUR UNKNOWN IS HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL METROPOLITAN POLICE. SAME DAY CITRAILS PHOTOGRAPHED GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN. FROM EXCELLENT PHOTOGRAPH IT POSITIVELY DETERMINED THAT UNKNOWN NOT REPEAT NOT WKSCARLET-3. NOW

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

CHECKING THROUGH CITRAIL CONTACTS IDENTITY UNKNOWN.

C. SATURDAY THREE ABOVE MENTIONED INDIVIDUALS MET THREE OTHER UNKNOWN. FROM NEWSPAPER FOTO WKSCARLET-3 PASSED LNAGON TEAM, THEY DETERMINED THREE NEW UNKNOWNS NOT WKSCARLET-3.

D. AROUND NOON 20 FEB LNAGON POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WKSCARLET-3 FROM PRESS FOTO MEETING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICIAL. ALL FOUR MET AT HOTEL UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND DEPARTED IN WKSCARLET-3'S UNMARKED OFFICIAL CAR. LNAGON NOTED LICENSE NUMBER AND STATION VERIFYING.

E. LOCAL AND TDY LNAGON HAVE NOW CONCLUDED FIRST PART OF OPERATION,E.G., IDENTIFYING PRINCIPAL SUSPECTS AS HAVING MET CARACAS. UNABLE DETERMINE AT THIS TIME WHETHER OR NOT MHABYSS MATERIAL HAS PASSED FROM SELLER TO BUYER. HOWEVER, CURRENT TRIP TRUEVA AND GOMEZ SUPPOSEDLY FOR PURPOSE SETTING UP LARGE BUY NEXT TRIP. DURING NEXT TRIP LNAGON PROPOSES ALL OUT EFFORT IDENTIFY MHABYSS PRINCIPALS IN ACT PASSING GOODS.

4. WKSCARLET-3 ORIGINALLY IMPLICATED THIS CASE FROM INFORMATION SUPPLIED LNAGON BY INFORMANT GONE BAD,

SECRET

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PAGE 4 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

JOSE
~~[illegible]~~ GOMEZ (MENTIONED ABOVE). LNAGON WILL REQUEST BIO INFO FROM THEIR OFFICE MIAMI IN ORDER INITIATE BKHERALD TRACES THIS INDIVIDUAL. GOMEZ ALLEGEDLY WH/MIAMI ASSET DURING EARLY SIXTIES. THIS ABOUT SAME TIME WKSCARLET-3 ASSOCIATED WH/MIAMI AND IT POSSIBLE THEY BECAME ACQUAINTED FROM THAT TIME.

5. QUESTION NOW ARISES AS TO HOW SALVAGE OUR ASSET AS HE NOW DEFINITELY IMPLICATED. SHOULD TRUEVA AND GOMEZ BE ARRESTED MIAMI OR CARACAS IT ALMOST ASSURED THEY WILL IMPLICATE WKSCARLET-3. STATION THINKING IS NOW THE TIME CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 WITH EVIDENCE, POINT OUT HIS POSSIBLE LOSS CHANCE BECOME WODUAL CITIZEN, LOS OF POSITION WITHIN WKSCARLET, POSSIBLE ARREST AND LONG JAIL SENTENCE IN VENEZUELA AMONG CONVICTS HE HELPED CAPTURE AND CONVICT. THEN STRONGLY SUGGEST HE TURN INFORMANT. AT THIS TIME IT STILL POSSIBLE COVER UP HIS MHABYSS CONNECTION AS BEING A LEGITIMATE WKSCARLET CASE IN WHICH HE ACTING ON HIS OWN BECAUSE HE PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH GOMEZ AND HIS KNOWLEDGE WKSCARLET ORGANIZATION NOT INTERESTED MHABYSS MATTERS. CONFRONTATION NOW MIGHT ALSO ENLIST HIS AID ARRESTING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND UNKNOWN OTHER POLICE OFFICIAL AT TIME OF

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PAGE 5 CARACAS 21221 SECRET

BIG BUY.

6. ANOTHER COMPLICATION PRESENT. AS MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, WKSCARLET-3 ON TAP TRAVEL GULF OF MARACAIBO CONFERENCE CITY. HE WILL TRAVEL WITH VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT AND WILL PROBABLY GO THROUGH MIAMI. THIS WOULD BE EXCELLENT TIME CARRY MHABYSS MATERIAL TO TRUEVA AND GOMEZ. IF WKSCARLET-3 AGREES COOPERATE, HE COULD BE USED TO CARRY THIS MATERIAL TO MIAMI AND AT TIME OF TURNOVER TO TRUEVA AND GOMEZ, LNAGON COULD MAKE POSITIVE ARREST.

7. AS STATED, STATION FEELS, DESPITE ABOVE INFO INDICATING WKSCARLET-3 INVOLVED THIS CASE, AGENT WORTH SALVAGING AND WE SHOULD MAKE EFFORT DO SO. IF HQS AGREES REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AS TO HOW GO ABOUT THIS. STATION COULD SOUND OUT LOCAL CHIEF LNAGON AND FEEL CERTAIN HE WOULD AGREE. HOWEVER, FEEL LNAGON (BNDD) AND LNYAPA (CUSTOMS) AT HQS LEVEL WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN ON ACT. PLS ADVISE.

8. FILE 201-300-985. E2 IMPDET.

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INFO FILE VR I/PLAN SECUR 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 211435Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI KMIM 17503 (VEAUSELL ACTING) 839251

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

REF: DIRECTOR 373201

1. ACTION REQUESTED REF TAKEN WITH LNYUMA 20 FEBRUARY 1973.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

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21 Feb 73

201-300985

14-00000

ORIG: R. J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 21 FEBRUARY 1973

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BY 78/36 PER [illegible]

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CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE VR. [illegible]

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 373942

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO [illegible] 392

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

AN [illegible]
AB X
IN
IS
FX
[illegible] NMD
HI
[redacted]
WH/3/V

REF: A. CARACAS 21193 (IN 835218)*

B. CARACAS 21221 (IN 839442)**

1. WHILE SYMPATHIZING WITH STATION'S DESIRE SALVAGE WKSCARLET-3, WE CANNOT APPROVE REF B SUGGESTION FOR BAILING HIM OUT.

2. WE HAVE INFORMED LNAGON HQS THAT WE HAVE "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN WKSCARLET-3 AND THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN CARACAS WILL DISCUSS CASE WITH CHIEF LNAGON CARACAS.

3. STATION SHOULD DO FOLLOWING:

A. TELL CHIEF LNAGON CARACAS THAT STATION HAS "OPERATIONAL INTEREST" IN WKSCARLET-3, THAT YOU are ~~[illegible]~~ INVESTIGATING REF A ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM TO DETERMINE IF HE IN FACT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING OR IF THESE ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH WKSCARLET OPERATION.

B. CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 DIRECTLY WITH ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CITED REF B. DEBRIEF HIM THOROUGHLY IN ATTEMPT GET ALL THE FACTS. DEPEND-

201-0300785

22 FEB 1973

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CITE DIRECTOR 373942

TO PAGE TWO

ING ON RESULTS OF DEBRIEFING, WE WILL PROBABLY WANT TO SGSWIRL HIM IN ATTEMPT TO VERIFY (OR REFUTE) HIS STORY. WILL AWAIT WORD FROM STATION, HOWEVER, BEFORE SENDING SGSWIRL OPERATOR TO CARACAS.

C. IF IT TURNS OUT THAT UKSCARLET-3 IS INDEED INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES, STATION ~~SHOULD~~ [illegible] TERMINATE HIM [illegible] ~~IMMEDIATELY~~. IF LNAGON WANTS PICK UP UKSCARLET-3 AFTERWARDS, THIS THEY CAN DO ON OWN INITIATIVE.

4. PLEASE KEEP US FULLY (AND PROMPTLY) ADVISED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS THIS SENSITIVE CASE.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H

* SAYS UKSCARLET-3 MAY BE INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFIC OF COCAINE, SALE OF STOLEN AND SMUGGLED WRISTWATCHES AND DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS. INFO BASED ON LNAGON REPORT TO STATION.

**GIVES RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION INDICATING THAT UKSCARLET-3 IS INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

C/WH/COG ✓ C/WH/FI

C/WH/NARC

DDP/NARCOG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/8
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG: PHILIP F. SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5126: 1535
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1973

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C. LWHG FILE, VR. ODP, ADDP, C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/FI, C/LA/CE2

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 372698

17 FEB 73 00 35z

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21193 (IN 835218) *

1. WE INTEND WORK ON BASIC PREMISE THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. WE MUST THEREFORE, WITHOUT REVEALING THIS INFO TO WKSCARLET-3, IMMEDIATELY CONDUCT OUR OWN INVESTIGATION USING ALL INVESTIGATIVE MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL. RECOMMEND THAT E TELTAP, SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER INFO-GATHERING OPS BE INITIATED JUST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. REALIZE THAT WKSCARLET-3 NOW IN ITALY BUT PERHAPS CERTAIN ASPECTS THIS INVESTIGATION COULD BE MOUNTED PRIOR TO HIS RETURN.

2. ULTIMATELY WE WILL WANT SGSWIRL WKSCARLET-3 AGAIN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ALLEGED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTION COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS REPORTED REF.

3. WISH EMPHASIZE NEED ACT QUICKLY IN THIS CASE AND GET ALL THE ANSWERS BEFORE SOMEONE ELSE PRESENTS THEM TO US. PLEASE REPORT ALL INFO AS IT DEVELOPS.

AN/WH
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WH/3/V

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201-0300985

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S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 372698

TO PAGE TWO

4. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY WKSCARLET-3 COULD BE INVOLVED THESE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH WKSCARLET OPERATIONS?

5. FOR WH/MIAMI: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FEASIBLE UNILATERAL INVESTIGATIVE HELP YOU COULD GIVE.

6. FILE 201-300935. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

* Reported that BNDD has information to the effect that WKSCARLET-3 is involved in smuggling, drug-running and counterfeit operations involving Venezuela and the U. S.

WH/NARC
DDP/NARCOG
CI/LSN
C/WH/COG

Herbert W. Natzke
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

for Philip F. Snare
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

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S E C R E T 20 FEB 73 22 31z CITE DIRECTOR 373201

TO WH/MIAMI INFO CARACAS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 368616 *

B. CARACAS 21169 (IN 831931) **

C. WH/MIAMI 17390 (IN 833052) ***

1. ON 15 FEB 73 ~~[illegible]~~ (SKULL SECURITY) OFFICER TELEPHONED WH/MIAMI SECURITY OFFICER TO REQUEST HIM TO ASK MIAMI LNYUMA TO INFORM LNAGON MIAMI THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS OF INTEREST TO "ANOTHER AGENCY" AND THAT LNAGON OFFICE MIAMI SHOULD THEREFORE CONDUCT ALL-AGENCY TRACES. WH/MIAMI SHOULD TAKE NO OTHER ACTION AT THIS TIME.

2. FOR CARACAS: WISH AGAIN CAUTION THAT YOU DO NOT RPT NOT INDICATE ANY LNAGON INTEREST TO WKSCARLET-3.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

re

AN
AS
IN
FS
FK
RFD
FI

* Informed Miami and Caracas of LNAGON inquiry to LNYUMA/Miami re WKSCARLET-3. Asked Caracas not to convey info re inquiry to WKSCARLET-3.

CONTINUED. . . .

WKS -3
20 Feb 73
201-300985

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S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 373201

TO PAGE TWO OF TWO

** Said that Caracas has no idea as to why LNAGON is interested in WKSCARLET-3. Added that they unable query WKSCARLET-3 who presently in Italy.

*** Reported that WH/MIAMI had heard nothing about LNAGON's interest in WKSCARLET-3. Offered to initiate LNAGON traces if Headquarters so desires.

C/WH/3
C/WH/SEC
C/OS/AAS LOU WIENCKOWSKI (TELECOORD)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

SM

MAR 9 73

C/WH/COG

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APR 1 U 1973

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INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC-2

ACTION NO. 124

872

2P

835218

U

S E C R E T 151705Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21193 CARA

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI. VFA

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: WH/MIAMI 17390 (IN 573352)

AN	KO
AB	X
LN	X
BX	2
DESTROY	
FI	
IJH/3/V	

1. ON 14 FEBRUARY LOCAL CHIEF LNAGON INFORMED STATION HIS OFFICE HAS INFORMATION THAT LUIS CLEMETE POSADA CARRILES, AKA "BAMBY" (201-300985), MAY BE INVOLVED SMUGGLING COCAINE FROM COLOMBIA THROUGH VENEZUELA TO MIAMI. THIS INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH LNAGON TELTAPS AND INFORMERS LOCATED MIAMI. ALLEGEDLY POSADA ALSO INVOLVED IN LOCAL SALE STOLEN WRISTWATCHES SMUGGLED INTO VENEZUELA FROM MIAMI AND POSADA ALLEGEDLY MAY BECOME VENEZUELAN DISTRIBUTOR ONE MILLION COUNTERFEIT U.S. DOLLARS.

2K 201-300985

2. ABOVE ALLEGATIONS PASSED VERBALLY TO LOCAL LNAGON CHIEF BY MIAMI LNAGON TDYER. LATTER'S WRITTEN REPORT SHOULD ARRIVE CARACAS BY POUCH NEXT FEW DAYS. STATION WILL CABLE FULL DETAILS ALLEGATIONS WHEN PASSED WRITTEN REPORT.

3. AFTER RECEIPT COPY LNAGON REPORT STATION WILL ALSO CABLE ITS COMMENTS. TENTATIVELY, STATION FEELS STRONG EFFORT

CS COPY

201-300985

~~16~~ 15 FEB 1973

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 21193 SECRET

SHOULD BE MADE SALVAGE POSADA IF ABOVE INFO CORRECT AND IN FACT HE HAS NOT ALREADY GONE TOO FAR TO MAKE SALVAGE POSSIBLE. ~~S~~LNAGON NOT AWARE POSADA'S CURRENT CONNECTION WITH STATION.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

IP/EDI
FORWARDED
APR 10 8 36 AM '73

IP/EDI
RECEIVED
APR 9 6 25 PM '7

SECRET

14-00000

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ACTION NO. 831

S E C R E T 1319412 FEB 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17390 WMIM

833052

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616

1. STATION HAS RECEIVED NO INFO FROM LNAGON RE INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3. ALTHOUGH SUBJECT NOT A MBR OF UNION INSURRECCIONAL REVOLUCIONARIA (UIR) GROUP, HIS NAME WAS RECENTLY MENTIONED IN UNSPECIFIED CONNECTION WITH SEVERAL OF THEM, ALL OF WHOM INVOLVED NARCOTICS.

2. PLS ADVISE IF HQS WISHES STATION TO INITIATE LNAGON TRACES ON SUBJECT TO DETERMINE REASON FOR CURRENT INTEREST.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

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13 Feb 73
201-300985

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ACTION NO 619

S E C R E T 122035Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21169 CAR

83 1931

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616

1. STATION HAS NO IDEA LNAGON INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3. UNABLE QUERY WKSCARLET-3 AS HE IS IN ITALY FOR FOUR WEEKS. DO NOT BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE QUESTION LOCAL LNAGON.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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12 Feb 73
201-300985

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Robert J. Weatherwax
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 FEB 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 38 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF. WH8 INFO FILE, VR. [illegible], 01, c/cas, El, secur4, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

~~SECRET~~

CITE DIRECTOR 368616

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

0 WKRALLY WKSCARLET

1. ON 6 FEB 73 LNYUMA ~~KCS~~ ADVISED THAT LNAGON IN MIAMI ATTEMPTED TO REVIEW WKSCARLET-3 (IDEN FOR MIAMI) OFFICIAL LNYUMA FILE BUT WAS TOLD THAT FILE ~~AT~~ [illegible] LOCATED IN LNYUMA HQS OFFICE. LNYUMA HQS HAS ADVISED ITS MIAMI OFFICE THAT LNAGON CAN REVIEW FILE IN WASHINGTON.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW WHY LNAGON WANTS TO REVIEW FILE NOR ARE WE OBJECTING, SINCE WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT ANY MATERIAL CONNECTING BKHERALD WITH WKSCARLET-3 WOULD BE REMOVED AND LNAGON WOULD SEE ONLY NORMAL LNYUMA FILE. LNYUMA STATED LNAGON WOULD NOT BE SUSPICIOUS BECAUSE WKSCARLET-3 LNYUMA FILE HELD WASHINGTON AND NOT MIAMI, SINCE LNYUMA MAINTAINS MANY FILES IN RESTRICTED STATUS WASHINGTON.

3. WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION CARACAS AND WH/MIAMI MAY RECEIVE WHICH WOULD THROW LIGHT ON LAUREVEL LNAGON INTERESTED IN WKSCARLET-3.

4. CARACAS: PLS DO NOT CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO WKSCARLET-3.

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

201-0300985

AN	fem
WH/3/V	

Shackley
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG
C/OS/AAS LOU WISNCKOWSKI (TELEDOORD)
WH/[illegible] DRAFT

CS COPY

RLConolly 6 FEB 73
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CLASSIFIED BY: 057515
A*DIR WH - SISM

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 FEB 73

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3B PER ______ # ______

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CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, IP/AN, CI, CI/OPS, EI, SECUR 4, NARC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 368615

TO WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 368616

DIR 368616.

1. IDEN/IS CIFENCE-4.

2. FILE 201-300985 E2 IMPDET.

C/WH/3 RJ Conolly

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wh/3/V

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

LAURENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

201-0300985
08 FEB 73

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

E2-2 CLASSIFIED BY: ______
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: PHILIP SNARE
UNIT: UH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 7 FEB 73

SECRET

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BY 25 PER ____ #

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(classification) (date and time filed) 7 2 73 1:42 (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

TO: PRIORITY ROME INFO CARACAS.

368236

UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 367030*

B. CARACAS 21122 (IN 826564)*

1. ~~[illegible]~~ PREFER THAT CONTACT WITH UKSCARLET-3 ~~[illegible]~~ BE KEPT TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM FOR REASONS GIVEN REF A.

2. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-106/3. E2 IMPDET.

*REQUESTED THAT THERE BE NO CONTACT BETWEEN UKSCARLET-3 AND ROME STATION IN VIEW OF FLAP POTENTIAL.

**REPORTED THAT UKSCARLET-3 HAD ALREADY DEPARTED CARACAS AND STATION UNABLE TO GIVE HIM THE INSTRUCTIONS.

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WH/3/V

C/WH/3 R L Connolly

E/I

D 75-2-16/3

C/EUR

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

7 Feb 73
201-300985

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA 19246	6 Feb 73	13	2	16	1

DOC. SUBJECT: Weekly Progress Rept 1 Oct - 31 Jan 73

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

18. **WKSCARLET-3:**

During this reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced eleven disseminations and contributed to four others. As a chief of one of the operations sections of his service, it appeared that he would continue to have excellent access. However, in December WKSCARLET-1 reorganized his service and ostensibly reduced our agent's area of responsibility and access. WKSCARLET-3 was slightly depressed at this occurrence as he believed, and rightly so, that he had not merited this reduction. After the holidays, however, it became apparent that WKSCARLET-1 would continue to use WKSCARLET-3 in special operations and that the reduction in responsibility was solely to take WKSCARLET-3 out of the limelight. Thus, our agent is still able to report on the sensitive operations of his service. As a result of this and his past performance, WKSCARLET-3 was given a salary increase beginning January 1973.

HVCA 19306 Apr 73 Weekly Progress Rept 1 Feb - 3 March

7. WKSCARLET-3

Although WKSCARLET-3 continued his fine production during this time period, it was WHABYSS activity which produced the real interest. Through other cables and dispatches we have reported his involvement in this irregular activity, which if proved true will end in his termination as a BKHERALD asset. At the present time WKSCARLET-3 is the security team leader for the Venezuelan delegation to the Gulf of Maracaibo talks presently being held in Rome. It is planned that soon after he returns, and if we have sufficient hard facts, we will confront our agent in an attempt to clarify his WHABYSS connection.

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last...)

201-

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

Doi: 6 FEB 1973

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA 19346					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

18. WKSCARLET-3: During this reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced eleven disseminations and contributed to four others. As a chief of one of the operations sections of his service, it appeared that he would continue to have excellent access. However, in December WKSCARLET-1 reorganized his service and ostensibly reduced our agent's area of responsibility and access. WKSCARLET-3 was slightly depressed at this occurrence as he believed, and rightly so, that he had not merited this reduction. After the holidays, however, it became apparent that WKSCARLET-1 would continue to use WKSCARLET-3 in special operations and that the reduction in responsibility was solely to take WKSCARLET-3 out of the limelight. Thus, our agent is still able to report on the sensitive operations of his service. As a result of this and his past performance, WKSCARLET-3 was given a salary increase beginning January 1973.

NOTE INFO RE
SAME, PARA 18 SEE
EXTRACT FORM re
HVCA-19246, 6 FEB 73
on para 18 - SAME TEXT

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

WKSCARLET-3

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

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FILE, VR, IP/AN, EUR6, FI, CI/OPS, CSDO,

ACTION NO. 658

S E C R E T 061925Z FEB 73 STAFF

826504

CITE CARACAS 21122

CARA

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 367030

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 13 1973
MICROFILMED

1. WKSCARLET-3 DEPARTED VENEZUELA MONDAY 5 FEB; STATION RECEIVED REF TOO LATE FOR CONTACT. BELIEVE IN INITIAL CONTACT WKSCARLET-3 AND ROME OFFICER, LATTER STILL MIGHT GRACEFULLY BOW OUT. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES HE MEETS CARACAS CO AT SOME RISK TO HIMSELF AND CITING RISK FACTOR IN NOT MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM ROME WOULD BE SEVERAL POINTS LOST FOR OUR SIDE. SUGGEST, INSTEAD, THAT CONTACT BE KEPT AT ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND ONLY WHEN WKSCARLET-3 HAS WRITTEN INFORMATION OF VALUE TO "BRUSH" PASS. CONCEIVABLE THIS WOULD ONLY OCCUR ABOUT TWO TIMES AFTER INITIAL MEETING.

2. FILE: 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET.

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201-300985
6 Feb 73

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ORIG: PHILIP SNARE
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 5 FEB 73

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FEB 16 1973
MICROFILMED

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: SE

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SECRET

73 21 [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 867030

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21092 (IN 823647)*

1. AFTER CAREFUL RECONSIDERATION, BELIEVE IN VIEW CONSIDERABLE FLAP POTENTIAL THAT WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD NOT BE MET IN ROME. REALIZE THAT HE COULD PRODUCE SOME INTERESTING INTEL FROM THIS OP BUT DO NOT FEEL IN THIS INSTANCE THAT TIMELINESS OF REPORTING WORTH RISK INVOLVED.

2. SUGGEST YOU TELL WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT CANCELLED BECAUSE ROME CASE OFFICER [redacted] WHO WOULD HAVE MET HIM EXPECTS BE OUT OF TOWN AT TIME OF WKSCARLET-3'S VISIT AND NO OTHER APPROPRIATE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

3. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET

*REPORTED ON WKSCARLET-3 TRIP TO ROME TO BUG COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS.

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WH/3/V	

E/I MR. PEAKE (TELECOORD)
C/WH/FI [illegible]

5 Feb 73
201-300985

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

75-2-16/3

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

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DOC. MICRO. SER
FEB 13 1973
MICROFILMED

IN 823647
C

S E C R E T 021610Z FEB 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21092

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME.

2P

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 365470

B. ROME 27869 (IN 820226)

1. EVENING 1 FEBRUARY WKSCARLET-3 REPORTED HE AND KEY AUDIO TECHNICIANS TRAVELLING ROME IN TRUE NAME USING VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS. SITUATION WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT HE ACTUALLY INVOLVED INSTALLING AUDIO AND TELTAPS. WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELLING AS VENEZUELAN DIPLOMAT AND IF FLAP OCCURS FULLY EXPECTS USE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND BE PNG'ED. WAS TOLD THAT "OUR" PEOPLE WOULD STATE IN CASE OF FLAP THAT WE NEVER HEAD OF HIM. HE ACCEPTED OUR POSITION.

2. DURING SAME MEETING PASSED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS PER REF B. WKSCARLET-3 WILL USE NAME "EDUARDO" WHEN CONTACTING ROME STATION. HE ENGLISH VERY GOOD. CONTACT REQUESTED ENABLE WKSCARLET-3 PASS INFO TO CARACAS ON PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF VENEZUELAN SENSITIVE OPERATION AGAINST COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO ROME TALKS. AGENT TENTATIVELY PLANS ARRIVE ROME O/A 8 FEBRUARY.

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201-300985
2 Feb 73

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21092 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET

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ORIG: PHILIP F. SNARE
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 7271/1535
DATE: 31 JANUARY 1973

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 13 PER ____ # ____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

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FEB 13 1973
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CITE DIRECTOR

1F3373 15 11 Z 365470

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO PRIORITY ROME.

UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: ROME 27869 (IN 820226)*

1. RE UKSCARLET-3 TRIP ROME, PLS ADVISE:

A. WHAT SORT DOCUMENTATION HE WILL USE.

B. WILL HE BE PART OF ACTION TEAM; WILL HE BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN BUGGING?

C. ANY OTHER ASPECTS HIS INVOLVEMENT THIS EFFORT WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT USG INTERESTS IF OP WERE TO FLAP.

ANSWERS TO FOREGOING WILL BE USEFUL IN ASSESSING RISKS INVOLVED, EVEN THOUGH WE REALIZE THERE LITTLE YOU CAN DO TO PREVENT U-3'S PARTICIPATION.

2. ASSUME CARACAS WILL ANSWER REF QUESTIONS RE U-3.

3. FILE 201-0300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET.

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*SET UP CONTACT PLAN FOR UKSCARLET-3 IN ROME. ASKED IF HE U.S. CITIZEN AND WHETHER HE SPEAKS ENGLISH. (NOTE: HE IS CUBAN-BORN AND HAS VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AS WELL AS U.S. RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH.)

D 75-2-16/3

201-300985

CS COPY

C/E/I W. William Sinclair, (telecoord)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E2 - 2 CLASSIFIED BY 057519
AFDIR WN - SISM

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00339-73

DATE DISTR. 31 January 1973

COUNTRY Venezuela

DOI 8 December 1972

SUBJECT Reorganization of the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention

ACQ Venezuela, Caracas (15 December 1972)

FIELD NO. HVC-6525

SOURCE An experienced police investigator whose position gives him access to information on matters affecting the internal security of Venezuela. He reports without the knowledge of his superiors. His information has been frequently confirmed by independent sources. He provided a copy of the reorganization document.

1. On 8 December 1972 the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) was reorganized by its Director, Dr. Remberto Uzcategui Bruzual. (Source Comment: Uzcategui believes DISIP will be in line for criticism during the election year of 1973 and he wants to remove from positions of responsibility any of his controversial section heads.) The gist of the document issued by Uzcategui reorganizing DISIP follows.

2. The Director of DISIP sets the general policy based on instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and has ultimate control of the Services. The Deputy Director assists him in carrying out these responsibilities and substitutes for the Director during his absence. As its supervisory and fiscal units, DISIP has an Inspector General of Services who has the responsibility of disciplining personnel and investigating employees, and an internal comptroller who verifies the administration of the Services.

3. The following are the DISIP executive positions:

a. Secretary General of Services, which has been assigned to Dr. Oswaldo Dominguez.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	XXX	XXX	XX	NSA	XX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
	FBI							

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CI/OP/WH	1	WH/3/R	1			WKRALLY
CI/LS	2	WH/3/V	7			(WKSCARLET-3)
CA/PROP	1	WH/CARA	2			CSCI-316/00339-7
CA/INT	1	CI/PG	1	CI/R&A	1	
Totals						
IE 2, CI 8, FI 3, CA 2, WH 9(2), FR 1						WH/AC/

(10)

b. Chief of the General Information Division, which has been assigned to Lic. Joaquin Chaffardet.

c. Chief of the General Operations Division, which has been assigned to Commissioner Rodrigo Nieves Zarco.

4. The Chiefs of the Zones and other branches in the interior are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General of Services. They will handle administrative matters, intelligence and operations directly with the corresponding Divisions and will receive from them the general requirements to be fulfilled.

5. The General Operations Division has nationwide responsibility for all police and operational matters. It will be formed by as many operating divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. The current operating divisions are:

a. First Division (Prevention), headed by Commissioner Adolfo Romero Gomez.

b. Second Division (Agent Control), headed by sub-commissioner Arpad Bango.

c. Third Division (Patrol), headed by Sub-Commissioner Julio Cesar Lanza.

d. Fourth Division (Explosives and Armaments), headed by Commissioner Luis Posada.

e. Fifth Division (Protection), headed by Commissioner Luis Martinez Cuerra.

6. The General Information Division has nationwide responsibility for all intelligence and counter-intelligence matters, with the exception of subversion which is wholly the responsibility of the General Operations Division. The General Information Division will be formed by as many divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. Currently these are:

a. Eleventh Division, headed by Commissioner Jose Vasquez Blanco.

b. Twelfth Division (Archives and Analysis), headed by Dr. Rafael Rivas Vasquez.

c. Thirteenth Division (USSR and Bloc Embassies), headed by sub-commissioner Alejandro Nystor.

7. The Secretary General of Services has responsibility for all administrative matters, including personnel and requests for services, equipment and finances. He also has responsibility for all matters not falling under the jurisdiction of the two general divisions, and in particular for those related to the Divisions of Personnel and Administration.

8. Field Dissem: Embassy at Caracas.

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ACTION NO 712

S E C R E T 301730Z JAN 73 STAFF

820226

CITE ROME 27859

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF. CARACAS 21049 (818917)

1. WKSCARLET/3 SHOULD TELEPHONE IDEN. MEETING SITE WILL BE BAR OF HOTEL PACIFIC, 51 VIALE MEDAGLIE D'ORO. MEETING TIME WILL BE ONE HOUR LATER THAN TIME AGREED TO ON PHONE. CASE OFFICER WILL BE READING NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE. WKSCARLET/3 SHOULD ASK IDEN "WHAT BUS WILL TAKE ME TO ST PETERS". CASE OFFICER WILL REPLY, "NUMBER 47 IS BEST BET."

2. DCOS, RUTHERFORD J. LYNER, SEEMS TO REMEMBER WKSCARLET/3 AS WODUAL CITIZEN, SO ASSUME HE SPEAKS ENGLISH. PLEASE CONFIRM. DOES STATION ENVISION THAT WKSCARLET/3 WILL BE PASSING INFO FOR FORWARDING TO CARACAS STATION OR IS PURPOSE CONTACT SO STATION WILL BE ABLE CONTACT HIM IF NECESSARY?

3. FILE: 75-2-16/3, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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FILE, VR IP/AN, EUR6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 711

S E C R E T 301730Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE ROME 27870

820221
C

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF ROME 27869 820226

IDEN: ROBERT RUTH

TELEPHONE: OFFICE - 4674 EXT 456

HOME - 345-2656.

S E C R E T

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		DOP, EUR 5.	2	5
ACTION # 522			3	6

HVC-6539 8

S E C R E T 291600Z JAN 73 INTEL

CITE CARACAS 21048 816958

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA, ROME. Y

INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR POSSIBLE HEADQUARTERS LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SIMILAR TO THAT OF HVC-6508. SOURCE WKRALLY/ WKSCARLET-3 WHO WILL HEAD THE TEAM. KNOWN TO LIMITED NUMBER OF LIAISON OFFICIALS. NO INDEX. PLEASE ADVISE LOCAL DISTRIBUTION TO BE GIVEN HVC-6508 WHICH FORWARDED IN MEMO FORM VIA DIRECTOR 363601. THIS REPORT NOT COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY. CL BY MICHAEL C. CHOADEN.

FILED: 29/1600Z

RELAYED TO DIRTECH PER DIR 363812

IW COMMENT: WHEN DISSEMINATED ADD CA, CI, CI/OPS, CI/TC.

File: WKSCARLET-3

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 29 JANUARY 1973
IN 818958
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Service before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
DISTRIBUTION TO: SDO

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA / COLOMBIA

DOI: LATE JANUARY 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN CELEGATION TO THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER NEGOTIATIONS

ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS VIELD NO. HVC-6539
(26 JANUARY 1973)

SOURCE: AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WHITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. IN EARLY FEBRUARY 1973 THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT PLANS TO SEND TO ROME, ITALY, A TEAM OF 16 OFFICIALS OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) TO MOUNT A SENSITIVE TECHNICAL OPERATION AGAINST THE COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO THE NEXT ROUND OF BORDER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN

VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA. THE TEAM WILL CONSIST OF COMMUNICATIONS, AUDIO TECHNICIANS, SECURITY, AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO WILL REMAIN IN ROME FOR AN ESTIMATED SIX WEEKS TO TWO MONTHS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEXT SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN ROME SOME TIME AFTER THE EARLY FEBRUARY VISIT OF VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT RAFAEL CALDERA TO COLOMBIA, ACCORDING TO A PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT BY FOREIGN MINISTER ARISTIDES CALVANI ON 15 JANUARY. HVC-6508, CSCI-316/00162-73, FROM THIS SOURCE, AND HVC-6523, CSCI-316/ -73, FROM A DIFFERENT USUALLY RELIABLE SECURITY SERVICE SOURCE, ARE REPORTS MENTIONING THE SAME TYPE OF OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT DURING THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ROME WHICH ENDED IN LATE 1972.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS. SENT TO BOGOTA, ROME.

REPORT CLASS SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

14-00000

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (*Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable*)

POSADA, LUIS
201-300985
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
HEAD D. OF 4TH DIVISION /EXPLOSIVES AND ARMAMENTS/ OF DISIP

075-005-000
HVC -06525
16 JAN 73

K 7302050477

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (*Last, First, Middle*)	201- [illegible] 300985			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(7-46)

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DATE	10 JAN 1973					

CONF: WH-19

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TDCS DB-315/00238-73

DATE DISTRIBUTED 10 JANUARY 1973

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WH/RR	1	WH/BOGO	#		
WH/3/R	1	WH/SAGO	#		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-6514 CARACAS 20937
(IN-803024)
WKRALLY (WKSCARLET-3)

LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ AIR ☐

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11 Jn 73 03 21z

CLASSIFIED BY: MICHAEL C. CHOADEN

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to: WKSCARLET-3 (13-20-44-47)

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

EXO, DDI

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

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Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2) Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDCSDB-315/00238-73

DIST 10 JANUARY 1973

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CHILE

DOI EARLY JANUARY 1973

SUBJECT SCHEDULED ARRIVAL IN VENEZUELA OF THREE MEMBERS OF THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY FOR CLANDESTINE EXPLOSIVES AND COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING BY THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (27 DECEMBER 1972- 8 JANUARY 1973)

FIELD NO. HVC-6514

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY CONFIRMED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES.

1. THREE MEMBERS OF THE CHILEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA ON 9 JANUARY 1973 FOR SECRET TRAINING BY THE VENEZUELAN DIRECTORATE OF THE SERVICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP) OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE CHILEANS ARE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTION IN CLANDESTINE EXPLOSIVES AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES. DISIP

PLANS FOR THE CHILEANS TO ENTER VENEZUELA SECRETLY AT CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, AFTER FLYING TO BOGOTA AND TRAVELLING OVERLAND TO THE VENEZUELAN BORDER. THEY WILL THEN BE TAKEN TO A DISIP FARM IN APURE STATE TO RECEIVE THEIR TRAINING.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-6485, TDCSDB-315/10481-72, FROM ANOTHER SECURITY SERVICE SOURCE WHO IS USUALLY RELIABLE, REPORTED THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO A CHILEAN PDC REQUEST FOR THE SECRET TRAINING OF SELECTED PDC MEMBERS TO PREPARE A SPECIAL CADRE OF ACTIVISTS WHO WOULD PROTECT PDC MEMBERS IN THE EVENT OF A LEFTIST COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE PRIOR TO THE MARCH 1973 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. AT THAT TIME FIVE TRAINEES HAD BEEN SELECTED. THE NAMES OF THE THREE CHILEANS MENTIONED ABOVE ARE UNAVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT CARACAS: SENT TO SANTIAGO, BOGOTA.

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP ADS 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

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8. WH/B&F		24 Jan 73		
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10. OP/CPD	5E69		24/1/73	
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CIFENCE-4

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TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 5 Jan 73

DOCUMENT NUMBER: HVCA 19182

SECRET

FORM 610a

46f/

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT O WKSCARLET-3: New Memorandum of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of the new MOC for WKSCARLET-3, effective 1 January 1973.

Nora W. Cobeaga
Nora W. COBEAGA

Attachment:
MOC, 3 copies

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/ att. h/w

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-19182

DATE
3 January 1973

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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

SECRET

AMENDMENT OR TERMINATION

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 3 January 1973

TO : Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Contract Approving Officer

FROM : Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Oral Commitments: WKSCARLET-3 (Agent)
201-300985

Subject Memorandum, dated 20 August 1968 , has been amended or terminated as indicated below:

1. Compensation. Effective 1 January 1973 , Subject will be paid Bs 2000.00 per month (equivalent to $ 456.62 at exchange rate Bs 4.38/$1.00). No other changes with respect to compensation or other emoluments or benefits as detailed in the original Memorandum have been made.

2. Termination. Subject contract was terminated effective . Appropriate secrecy agreements and acknowledgement that no further claims against contracting entity are outstanding have been obtained insofar as operationally possible and feasible.

3. Other Changes.

SIGNED: Michael C. CHOADEN
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

CS COPY

s/w ATT to HVCA 19182

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201-300485

ORIG: LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 7451 R. 1948
DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1972

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TO WH/MIAMI MANAGUA

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1. REQUEST INFORMATION REGARDING COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MANUEL ARTIME FOR PAST FEW YEARS.

2. DO NOT MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT BUT ONLY PROVIDE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THIS TIME.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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Signed:
R.O. #[illegible] - Unit WH/C

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AN
AB
IN
FI

201-300985

20 NOV 1972

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/2

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ORIG: GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
UNIT: C/WH/3
EXT: 5337/1128
DATE: 16 OCT 1972

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S E C R E T 16OCT72 21 13z CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY CARACAS

REDTOP

REF: CARACAS 20277 (IN 733406) 325322

1. PLS KEEP US UP TO DATE ON THIS CASE. FYI ONLY, APPARENT SIMILAR CASE IN ANOTHER AREA OCCURRED LAST WEEK.

2. REALIZE THIS WKSCARLET CASE AND STATION NOT CALLING SHOTS; HOWEVER, IF STATION CAN FIGURE WAY DISCUSS CASE (WITHOUT BLOWING WKSCARLET-3), SUGGEST YOU DO SO BEFORE WKSCARLET DECIDES ARREST AND EXPEL 201-0731434. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD PREFER HAVE WKSCARLET COOPTEE ACCEPT RECRUITMENT (AT LEAST INITIALLY) WHILE WE TAKE HARD LOOK AT 201-0731434 AS AEKICK CASE OFFICER AND AT SAME TIME, EXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT APPROACH OPERATION.

3. FILE 201-0731434, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET. d

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SB/X/WH H Smith

for THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19067	13 October 1972	75	2	16	3

DOC. SUBJECT

WKRALLY Project: Progress report for 1 July - 30 Sept 1972

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

STATUS OF PROJECT AGENTS:

13. This period showed that while WKSCARLET-3 does have a highly responsible position within his organization, he still is being ordered to do special assignments by the chief of the service. These assignments usually involve out-of-town travel and/or long and unusual working hours. This precludes regular scheduled meetings; however, the agent is contacted on the average of once a week. WKSCARLET-3, along with his normal routine duties, was involved in a number of varied activities during the reporting period which he duly reported to the Station. He continues to investigate all possible leads in the kidnapping case of Carlos Domingues. In August he led a small team to Cucuta, Colombia where they uncovered and destroyed a small printing shop which was engaged in the fabrication of false Venezuelan identity cards. He continues the investigation of the activities of Sergio Pineda Ruiz, the Prensa Latina chief in Caracas. The problem of agent/case officer communications has been somewhat alleviated. The agent now contacts the case officer at the latter's home during the evening hours. This doesn't obviate the need for an RS-708 system, but until the details for a concealment device that will be appropriate for WKSCARLET-3's rather spartan office are worked out, phone contact is necessary. During the reporting period WKSCARLET-3 produced three disseminations and contributed to one other.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) WKSCARLET-3	201-			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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S E C R E T 131945Z OCT 72 STAFF

733406

CITE CARACAS 20277

DIRECTOR.

REDTOP

1. WKSCARLET-3 (UNILATERAL) REPORTED 13 OCTOBER SUBJECT OF 201~~[illegible]~~ -0731434 HAS ARRANGED MEETING 0900 14 OCTOBER WITH WKSCARLET COOPTEE EMPLOYED MAIQUETIA AIRPORT. COOPTEE REPORTED ARRANGEMENTS WKSCARLET AND LATTER WILL ATTEMPT PHOTOGRAPH MEETING. REASON MEETING UNKNOWN, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET THINKS MAY BE RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT. IF IN FACT IT IS, PHOTOGRAPHY WILL SUPPORT EVIDENCE OF ATTEMPTED RECRUITMENT AND RESULTANT ARREST SUBJECT 201-0732434. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3 ARREST PROBABLY WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 14 OCTOBER.

2. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-0731434, 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
CIFENCE-4 - Operational Approval

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HVCA-18757, dated 31 March 1972

CIFENCE-4 has been granted full Operational Approval, effective 17 July 1972, for use as a unilateral penetration of CIRASH.

Karen T. GEHRKE

AUG 11 3 03 PM '72

RECEIVED

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	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

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ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/V	Nancy Davis	ss (27 July 72)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	27 July	Philip F. Snare

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3	27 JUL 1974	Gardner R. Hathaway

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

27 JUL 1972

DISPATCH

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No. 201-300985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/V - Nancy L. Davis

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of CIFENCE/4 ________________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

Unilateral penetration of CIRASH.

field notified
27 Jul 72

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Lee E. P

Acting C[illegible]
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 17 July 1972 lg

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

FORM 1-67 124 [illegible] (9)

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-18940	14 July 1972	75	2	16	3

DOC. SUBJECT
CIFLUTE Project - Progress Report for the Period
1 April - 30 June 1972

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

Distribution: 3-WHD

11. In mid-April CIFENCE-4 was placed in charge of yet another of the CIRASH divisions, with added responsibility and importance. This change has allowed him more time in Caracas, and reflects a continually improving position vis-a-vis CIFENCE-1, the CIRASH Director. This coupled with what now appears the likelihood that CIFENCE-1 will retain this present position until the government changes in early 1974, makes the longevity of CIFENCE-4 with CIRASH somewhat more certain. As part of his new responsibilities, CIFENCE-4 has initiated an extensive investigation of Prensa Latina and its Caracas Director, Sergio Pineda Ruiz. This operation was interrupted in early June by the kidnapping of Venezuelan industrialist Carlos Dominguez, with CIFENCE-4 being placed in charge of the CIRASH investigation of the as yet unresolved case. As of this writing, CIFENCE-4 has been devoting all of his time to this kidnapping case, to the detriment of other operations. Because of the unpredictable work schedule of CIFENCE-4 and the security precautions observed by the Station in contacting him, operational communication has been less efficient than desirable during the reporting period, while security has been maintained. The arrangements have been reviewed and improved, but the Station is looking for a more satisfactory system. The Station tentatively plans to request an RS-708 system for this agent in the near future. CIFENCE-4 contributed to two reports during the April through June quarter.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	
CIFENCE-4	201-

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(7-46)

14-00000

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ACTION C/WH6 | FILE VR　WH? ADDP CI/IAN C/CI 2 C/FI

679 | C/CI/SO

S E C R E T 111437Z JUL 72 STAFF WH 3V　656946

CITE WH/MIAMI 15163

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. CARACAS 19663 (IN 655195)

B. HVCA-18872

1. SUBJECT REFS, ACCORDING LNERGO/MIAMI, WORKS FOR GRAMCO, AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CO., AND WAS SENT BY GRAMCO TO CARACAS. LNERGO DOES NOT RPT KNOT PURPOSE TRIP. FYI ONLY: SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO LNERGO/MIAMI AND PAID BY LNERGO; HE IS NOT TARGETTED AGAINST TARGETS OUTSIDE OF U.S. AND NOT SENT CARACAS BY LNERGO. CONSIDERED BY LNERGO AS SPECIAL CATEGORY DUE FACT WAS LNERGO'S BEST WITNESS IN ORLANDO BOSCH TRIAL. LNERGO REP SAID SUBJECT RETURNED MIAMI 10 JULY. LNERGO MIAMI AWARE SUBJECT ALSO USED BY LNAGON/MIAMI.

2. LNAGON/MIAMI USES SUBJECT AS CASUAL INFORMANT BUT DOES NOT PAY HIM OR GIVE HIM SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS AS SUCH. LNAGON COMMENTS CAUTIONS: ADMITTED ACCEPT INFO AND TELL HIM REPORT ANYTHING ELSE HEARS ON SUBJECT DRUGS BUT INSISTS HE NOT PAID BY LNAGON AND NOT CONSIDERED CONTROLLED ASSET. FYI: LNAGON/MIAMI AWARE SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO LNERGO.

3. BOTH LNERGO AND LNAGON INFORMED BY STATION THAT SUBJECT TALKING

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FOR CROSS FILING IN
201-300985

SECRET

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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ACTION UNIT

FILE. VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 15163 SECRET

TOO FREELY IN CARACAS ABOUT HIS IMPORTANCE IN DRUG OPS. WHILE LNERGO ADMITTED SUBJECT PAID BY THAT OFFICE, DENIED KNOWLEDGE SALARY DOUBLED BUT DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY GRAMCO MAY HAVE RAISED PAY.

4. NEITHER CIFENCE/4 NOR CIGOAL/5 MENTIONED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ABOVE OFFICES; REFERRED ONLY TO BKTRUST SOURCES CARACAS REPORTING SUBJECT TALKING AND BOASTING TOO MUCH FOR GOOD SECURITY.

5. FILE: 201-284816; 201-300985. EX-2 APDIR, WN-SISM.

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SECRET

201-300985.

RETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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4		8	

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BY ______ AT ______

DISSEM BY 31/ PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RF/CN, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO.

655195

4

S E C R E T 081610Z JUL 72 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 19663

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR.

REF: CARACAS 19581 (IN642128)

1. REQUEST REPLY TO REF. EMBASSY LNAGON REP HAS NOW ASKED STATION IF SUBJECT REF BKTRUST CONNECTED DUE HIS RECENT BOASTING OF OPS. LNAGON REP AT SAME TIME SAID SUBJECT REF IS INFORMANT OF LNAGON/MIAMI.

2. FILE: 201-284816; 201-300985. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

S E C R E T

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300985
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AB

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[redacted]

SECRET

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 20 June 1972 lc
TO: C/WH/3/V - N. Davis	201 NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	☒	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA; DODCI & DFI
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please review the FBI, DODCI and DFI reports contained in Subject's CI/OA file. Also comment on their significance.

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Ricardo MORALES Navarrete

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On approximately 5 March 1972, a Station asset, CIFENCE-4, while acting in his cover capacity had occasion to detain and question one Ricardo MORALES Navarrete, a Cuban resident of Miami.

2. Morales N. told CIFENCE-4 that he, Morales, is employed by LNERGO from whom he receives a salary of US$700 per month. Morales said that he was en route to Colombia on a drug case at the time. During the conversation Morales admitted to CIFENCE-4 having been responsible for a killing in Florida.

3. CIFENCE-4 reported to the Station the above, as well as stating that Morales has an extremely poor reputation in the Cuban community, where he is prone to tell nearly anyone willing to listen of his affiliation with LNERGO, with the implication that his employer sanctions his activities.

4. Morales also told CIFENCE-4 that a Cuban (true name of CIGOAL-5) who works with SIFA in Caracas is an agent of BKTRUST.

5. Attached is a copy of the reentry permit of Morales, as well as a clipping from the Miami press relating to the killing which Morales allegedly confessed to having committed.

6. The above is for the information of Station WH/Miami and further action as deemed appropriate. No coordination with LNERGO in Caracas has been effected due to security considerations involving CIFENCE-4.

EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

Attachments: h/w
1. Newspaper clipping
2. Morales reentry permit (copy)

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/ att. - [illegible]
③ - C/WHD w/ att.

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
~~201-284816~~ 201-300985	HVCA- 18872	9 June 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~DEFER~~ 201-285923

file CIFENCE-4

14-00000

Cuarto 1309, Hospital Jackson Memorial, 7:10 P.M. Miércoles Diciembre 4 de 1968.

"Yo, JULIO ATON CONSTANZO PALAU, del 752 S.W. Cuarta calle, Miami, Florida, casado con María Constanzo, la cual está aquí presente, declaro lo siguiente: Nací en Palma Soriano, Oriente, en Cuba, el 22 de Mayo de 1936. Yo tengo 32 años de edad. Me casé el 10 de Marzo de 1963 en Miami, Florida.

Yo no soy un ciudadano de Estados Unidos. Yo soy un residente, y tengo una hija, Elizabeth, la cual cumplirá cinco años de edad el 24 de diciembre, la cual nació aquí, en este Hospital, Jackson Memorial.

Mi propósito de hacer estas declaraciones se debe al hecho que la policía ha permitido que pasen varios días, y la gente que intentó quitarme la vida está afuera en la calle, libres.

El 22 de noviembre, alrededor de las 8.30 de la noche, a unas tres cuadras de mi casa, yo estaba caminando y me bajé de la acera en la 7 avenida y la Segunda calle, en la sección del S.W., cuando oí a alguien llamarme "Atón", y miré para ver quien era, y entonces yo sentí que ellos me disparaban, y yo vi las armas con silenciadores.

Yo vi a Ricardo Morales Navarrete, y él estaba en un Chevrolet Impala 1965, de dos puertas, amarillo con dos luces de cola. Estaba situado en el medio de la calle.

Este hombre, Ricardo Morales Navarrete estaba en el asiento de atrás, en la lado izquierdo. El tenía un fusil M-3, con un silenciador, el cual dispara balas calibre 45.

Otro hombre estaba manejando, y yo lo conozco de vista, pero no sé su nombre verdadero. Lo llaman con el apodo de "El Gallego". Este hombre, El Gallego, tenía una pistola que parecía una Beretta, con un silenciador adaptado.

Ambos me dispararon. Yo recibí 15 heridas de bala y 21 perforaciones.

Un tercer hombre estaba en el carro, llamado Francisco Rodríguez al que apodan "El Mejicano", el cual no disparó.

Yo identifico a Ricardo Morales Navarrete como al mismo hombre que testificó para el Gobierno en el juicio de Orlando Bosch.

Dos días antes yo lo vi a él con esta otra persona, El Gallego, observándome en frente de mi casa. Ellos estaban en otro carro, un Polara.

Yo conozco a este Morales Navarrete de La Habana, él era Jefe Asistente de la Sección del G-2 en el Aeropuerto de Rancho Boyeros, Habana, Cuba.

Yo no he hablado con él, pero otro hombre, Eddy Fernández Pla, hace casi dos meses, vino a mi casa a eso de la una de la madrugada para darme un mensaje de Ricardo Morales Navarrete y del Mejicano Francisco Rodríguez Tamayo los cuales no querían ser mis enemigos, que el enemigo era Batista, y que debíamos ser amigos porque las cosas iban a cambiar.

Yo le dije que no quería tener ninguna amistad con gente que trabajaba para Fidel Castro.

La noche que Eddy Fernández Pla vino a mi casa, él estaba con otro hombre, Rogelio Fernández, el cual es un vendedor de la Firestone.

Yo tengo una bala alojada cerca de mi corazón y tiene que ser extraída con un aparato especial, según me dijo el médico.

En estos tres últimos días no me he sentido bien y como tengo todos estos tiros en mi cuerpo sé que estoy en una mala condición y me siento como que voy a morir, y si muero, no quiero morir sin que este gran país castigue a estos asesinos, los cuales son nefastos para toda la sociedad.

Hago estas declaraciones completamente consciente de sus contenidos, sin coacción y de mi propia y libre voluntad.

He tenido atención médica para aliviar el dolor, y no me siento bajo la influencia de ninguna droga, pero me siento muy normal y hago estas declaraciones por las razones antes expuestas".

(firmado) Julio Atón Constanzo Palau

Testigos: César Camacho, Felipe Rivero.

Estado de la Florida
Condado de Dade
Jurado y suscrito ante mí este día 5 de diciembre de 1968 a las 7.30 P.M.
Gino Negretti, Notario Público.

K/watt 1 to HKMA 13812

CS COPY

201-285923

14-00000

0371516

163 S. W. 80th Avenue Miami, Florida 331[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH: June 14, 1939
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
COUNTRY OF NATIONALITY: Cuba
EYES: Black
HAIR: Black
HEIGHT: 5 FEET 9 INCHES
VISIBLE SCARS AND MARKS: NONE

VALIDITY OF PERMIT

PERMIT EXPIRES January 25, 1973	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO	VALIDITY EXTENDED TO
DATE AND LOCATION OF ISSUING OFFICE January 25, 1972 Mia	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE	DATE AND LOCATION OF OFFICE
SIGNATURE ISSUING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER	SIGNATURE REVALIDATING OFFICER

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

RESTRICTIONS

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This document is not valid for return to the United States after a temporary absence which involves travel to, in or through any of the following countries unless this restriction is specifically waived with regard to any such country or countries by indorsement hereon.

Communist portions of:

Albania	China
Cuba	Korea
Outer Mongolia	Viet-Nam

The above restriction is waived as to the following.
NONE

[illegible]	Segundo Apellido	No. de expedición Nº 05208
[illegible]	Segundo nombre	No. de Cedula
Nombre Ricardo		
Sexo [illegible] 32	Profesión Vendedor	Nacionalidad Cubana	No. de Pasaporte [illegible]
Tipo de Visa Turista	Duración 30	Autorización M.R.I. [illegible]-5	Lugar de expedición Miami, Florida U.S.A.
Firma del expedidor	Dirección en Venezuela Hotel Tamanaco, Caracas.-	
Nombre del expedidor	Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre ☐	Aéreo ☐ Marítimo ☐ Terrestre ☐
	Transportista	Destino	Transportista	Procede
Sello del expedidor REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA	Salida	DIEX [illegible] 72 Entrad.

Hw atchd to HVCA 18872

201-285923

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]RNAL ONLY ☐ CONF[illegible]TIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: IP/DPI GB-12	EXTENSION x7737	NO. HVCT-OSGOO ATTN/N DATE 5 MAY 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	8 MAY 1972	8 MAY 1972	wa	
2. WH/3	8 May			Copy detached and logged
3. VB		11 May 72		
4.				
5.				
6. WH/7/Guyana			W	
7. WH/3/V				
8.				Pls rtn to V— desk for file.
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Security Service Study on the Diamond Fields in the Venezuelan Guyana Territory

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

Attached is a study in Spanish language prepared by the Venezuelan Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) in the Ministry of Interior on a diamond field in the Venezuelan Guyana region which may be of interest to the Venezuelan and Guyana Desks. It was provided by CIFENCE-4, a unilateral security source, on 26 April 1972. According to CIFENCE-4, President Rafael Caldera was very interested in the study and excerpted large portions verbatim for one of his weekly press conferences.

Frances M. Barghahn
Frances M. BARGHAHN

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCT-05600	DATE 2 May 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 15-9-8 ~~No File~~

REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES INTERIORES
DIRECCION DE LOS SERVICIOS DE INTELIGENCIA Y PREVENCION

Caracas, 27 de MARZO de 1972.-

Informe que presentan los funcionarios LUIS POSADA CARRILES, JULIO CESAR LANZA CARVAJAL y EFREN CASTILLO, en relación a las averiguaciones practicadas en el Campo Diamantifero "La Salvación", situado en el suroeste de la Guayana Venezolana.

INFORME:

1. Ubicación y descripción geográfica de la región. Su acceso.-
2. Condiciones de vida y de trabajo de la población minera.-
3. Actuación de las autoridades.-

1. Ubicación y descripción geográfica de la región. Su acceso:

1. 1. El lugar donde se encuentra establecido el Campo minero "La Salvación" está ubicado al Sur-Oeste del Estado Bolivar, en pleno corazón de la selva, cercano a las riveras del Río Guaniamo, unas dos horas aproximadamente por vía aérea desde Ciudad Bolivar. El mencionado poblado esta enclavado en una superficie plana cuyos contornos estan sembrados de innumerables elevaciones de tierras que forman parte del macizo Guayanés.

1. 2. La única vía de acceso es aérea, ya que por la naturaleza de la región y su gran distancia de los centros poblados, es prácticamente imposible que se haga por otros medios. A tal fin se

CIFENCE-4

han construido pequeños e improvisados aeropuertos en las cercanías de la región del Guaniamo y mas pequeños aún en cada una de las minas que van apareciendo y dodde se agrupan temporalmente gran número de personas.-

Puntualizando lo antes dicho existe un aeropuerto que sirve como Base de Operaciones en la región, identificado como Aeropuerto de "La Contella", con una longitud de ochocientos (800) metros de pista de tierra, siendo este el de mayor tamaño y desde donde se hacen los trasbordos en avionetas mas pequeñas que salen a los propios campos mineros, situados en un área no mayor de quince (15) minutos ~~de vuelo~~.

En el caso de "La Salvación", este campamento minero se encuentra exactamente a unos siete minutos de vuelo saliendo del Aeropuerto "La Contella". La pista de aterrizaje es igualmente de tierra con apenas trescientos ochenta (380) metros de longitud, lo que hace sumamente peligroso su utilización, mas aún cuando observamos que se encuentra rodeada de árboles gigantescos que alcanzan 40 y 50 metros de altura. Por las características descritas, en esta pista han ocurrido varios accidentes aéreos causando muertos, heridos y varios aparatos destruidos de los cuales actualmente se pueden apreciar en el sitio cinco totalmente inservibles; igualmente no se utilizan los equipos de radio entre las avionetas y los aeropuertos, existiendo el peligro latente de un accidente por el choque de aparatos tanto en el aire como en la propia pista, ya que generalmente existen nubes muy bajas que apenas permiten ver la pista como un pequeño claro en medio de la selva; esta situación empeora aún mas por la irresponsabilidad de las líneas aéreas y los propios pilotos, quienes buscando mayor beneficio sobrecargan los aviones a veces hasta con el doble del peso permitido, sin que exista ningún control de Comunicaciones para regular tal anormalidad. Un ejemplo claro lo constituye la Línea "ASERCA", que en un año registró trece accidentes en la región.-

2. Condiciones de vida y de trabajo de la población minera:

2. 1. Las condiciones de vida de la población que alcanza aproximadamente a unas 6.000 personas (pero que llegó a tener el año pasado unas 15.000), dejan mucho que desear en el aspecto sanitario, habitacional y moral. Las aguas que corren por el lugar están contaminadas por el esparcimiento indiscriminado de excrementos en las márgenes de las quebradas y pequeños ríos, así como en el interior del propio poblado. Las enfermedades, como el paludismo y amibiasis, se observan con bastante frecuencia por falta de asistencia y control sanitario; las enfermedades venéreas abundan por no existir un riguroso control sobre el gran número de prostitutas que existen en la población. La totalidad de las viviendas estan construidas con cartones, tablas y láminas de zinc, que escasamente protegen a sus moradores de las inclemencias del tiempo, siendo mas grave la situación por la gran cantidad de niños que son llevados por sus padres al lugar, por demás peligroso e inapropiado para ellos, sin que tampoco exista ninguna regulación o control al respecto.-

La prostitución cobra marcado incremento en estas zonas, atrayendo mujeres desde diferentes lugares de la República y de países vecinos como Colombia y Brasil, que se agrupan en improvisados bares situados dentro de la población, provocando hechos reñidos con la moral que se llevan a cabo en presencia de niños y de honestas familias de mineros.-

Prolifera en sus diferentes manifestaciones el juego, siendo los mas comunes la baraja y los dados, bingos, etc., estos últimos son transmitidos por altavoces dandole un aspecto de feria nocturna al poblado.-

2. 2. Generalmente los mineros forman grupos de trabajo constituyendo pequeñas sociedades entre las que se repartirá la ganancia que logren obtener, pero como carecen de recursos indispensables se ven obligados a incluir como socios a personas que les prestan los implementos de trabajo o que financian su alimentación, constituyendo esta forma una especie de explotación si se toma en cuenta que generalmente exageran las cantidades consumidas por los mineros. Los compradores de diamantes aprovechan la necesidad de vender los diamantes encontrados por los mineros, para pagarlos a precios muy por debajo de su valor real y los especuladores aprovechan para elevar los precios de los alimentos, medicinas, etc., llegando en oportunidades de escaséz a vender hasta en Bs 40 un kilogramo de arroz. Actualmente dada la competencia y los constantes viajes que efectuan al lugar las diferentes líneas aéreas, entre ellas: "ASERCA", "AEROVEN", "GATIZSA", "LATINCARGA", "AEROTECNICA" y "COMERAVIA", los precios han dejado de ser tan exagerados.-

3. Actuación de las autoridades:

3. 1. Lakprimera autoridad civil del lugar está representada por un Comisario General de nombre JOSE TOMAS GAONA ESPINOZA, pero el verdadero control sobre la población es ejercido por la Guardia Nacional y para el momento de la presente averiguación estaba constituida por un grupo de cuatro Guardias, comandados por un Cabo de apellido CARPIO; este grupo es completamente nuevo en el lugar, a raíz de la salida del Teniente LUIS PRIN y de su segundo, un Cabo de apellido PINATE, quienes fueron sometidos a investigación por su propio Comando a causa de frecuentes denuncias de presuntas irregularidades cometidas en ejercicio de sus -

funcionaba. Entrevistados algunos comerciantes y mineros del lugar, pudimos obtener información coincidente entre los mismos informantes de las actividades desagradables para ellos desarrolladas por los efectivos de la Guardia Nacional, citando atropellos cometidos por el Teniente LUIS PRIN y el Cabo PIÑATE, destacando entre ellos los siguientes:

Que cuando el Teniente LUIS PRIN VILLEGAS era el Jefe de la Guardia Nacional en "La Salvación", existía el Bar "Bejuquero", cuya dueña aparentemente era la ciudadana PETRA GUAPE, quien era públicamente amante del Teniente PRIN, ya que eran vistos caminar tomados de la mano por el pueblo y el Tte. dormía junto con ella en el local del mismo Bar, lo grave de los hechos, según revelan los informantes, estaba en que a las nueve de la noche el Teniente ordenaba el cierre de todos los demás bares notificandole a los mineros por intermedio de los propios Guardias que si querían seguir tomando podían continuar en el Bar "Bejuquero", donde en varias oportunidades se vió a los Guardias uniformados despachando cervezas a los clientes en el interior de ese Bar, por lo que se generalizó entre los pobladores la idea de que el Tte. PRIN tenía parte en el negocio. Igualmente informan los entrevistados que los Guardias Nacionales que comandaba el Tte. PRIN VILLEGAS, especialmente el Cabo PIÑATE, se daban a la tarea de pedir a los mineros parte de la tierra que sacaban y donde podría haber o nó diamantes; igualmente cobraban una especie de impuesto a las personas que administraban las casas de juegos. Narran las personas entrevistadas que en una oportunidad los mineros, uno de ellos menor de edad, se jugaban de manos en el pueblo, resultando golpeado el menor y que su amigo, quien lo golpeó, sin mala intención, no opuso ninguna resistencia y voluntariamente manifestó a la Guardia Nacional que estaba dispuesto a enviar al médico por su cuenta a su amigo y a pagar un arresto si era necesario, cosa esta que no sucedió pues el Teniente ordenó esposarlo y propinarle cinco planazos en presencia del pueblo para así sentar un precedente de respeto, según expresó.-

Se pudo conocer que el año pasado, por el mes de Noviembre, por orden de la Guardia Nacional se llevó a cabo una reunión en el Bar del Señor ZABALA, y donde asistieron además el Coronel VALDERRAMA y el Tte. Cnel BECERRA, procedentes del Destacamento acantonado en San Fernando de Apure. En esta reunión se planteó la necesidad de que colaboraran los comerciantes de la localidad para la construcción del Comando de la Guardia Nacional en esa mina; los comerciantes aceptaron hacerlo y negocio a negocio fueron visitados dando un 100 y 200 bolívares cada uno; esta colaboración no fué del agrado de los comerciantes, pero por temor a represalias prefirieron colaborar no pudiendo determinar la cantidad recogida, pero se estiman varios miles de bolívares; con la suma de dinero donada se construyó un galpón de zinc, cercado con alambres de púas que en la actualidad hace las veces de Comando de la Guardia Nacional en "La Salvación".-

Un Mayor de las Fuerzas Aéreas Venezolanas de apellido SEGUIA, se ha hecho en las minas hombre importante en su condición de comerciante. Adquirió junto con otros socios la Línea aérea "ASERCA", piloteando personalmente uno de sus aviones, especificamente el identificado con las siglas: YV-C-ASI-, donde transporta personas y carga, especialmente cerveza traida desde Valencia y Maracay, constituyendose así en el mayor distribuidor de cerveza en la mina; además poséa la única fábrica de hielo que existe en el lugar y una planta para tratamiento del agua, la que igualmente vende en la mina.- Estos negocios estan administrados por un hermano suyo, y que las maquinarias de la compañía que fabrica hielo y potabiliza el agua, distinguida con el nombre de SAFER, fueron trasladadas a la mina en un avión de carga de las Fuerzas Aéreas.-

Esta comisión pudo ver personalmente al Mayor SEGUIA en su función de piloto comercial cobrando a los mineros que transportaba; igualmente la comisión le observó en traje civil, pero según informaron las personas interrogadas, este militar frecuentemente ha sido visto con su uniforme de las Fuerzas Aéreas, por lo que se puede deducír de que actualmente se encuentra activo en nuestras Fuerzas Aéreas.-

De la actuación de los Guardias Nacionales que actualmente se encuentran en "La Salvación" al mando del Cabo CARPIO, no hay acusaciones por atropellos, solamente y eso se pudo notar, toleran el juego y protegen algunos bares que permanecen abiertos hasta pasada dla hora normal. Entse estos bares figura uno donde se practica la prostitución y cuya dueña, de nombre ROSA, se jacta públicamente de ser "la primera dama de La Salvación" por el hecho de ser la amante del Cabo CARPIO.-

En conversación sostenida en un plano amistoso con el Cabo CARPIO, éste manifestó a la comisión que ellos aceptaban regalos en dinero de parte de los mineros por el poco sueldo que devengaban en un lugar como ese donde el costo de la vida es tan elevado.

Esta comisión, luego de hablar con las perso--

que han suministrado algunas de estas informaciones, puedo adelantar que los mismos estarán en condiciones de rendir declaraciones escritas si se les exige, pero hicieron la recomendación de que en ese caso había que hacerlo con suma discreción por temor a futuras represalias.-

Es todo cuanto tenemos que informar al respecto.-

LUIS POSADA CARRILES.
Comisario

JULIO CESAR LANZA C.
Sub - Comisario

EFREN CASTILLO.
-Sub-Inspector

/ jrgz.-

A.- DIAMANTES.- Primera Parte

1 SITUACION EXISTENTE EN VENEZUELA

11 Generalidades

En 1970 la producción diamantífera Venezolana alcanzó 508.661 quilates, siendo esta producción la más alta en la historia de esta actividad en el país. Con relación a 1969 la producción ha triplicado según se desprende de los cuadros anexos de producción.

Esta producción ha sido lograda en su casi totalidad bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento, sinónimo de sub-desarrollo en los aspectos técnico, social y económico. En el aspecto técnico el sub-desarrollo se manifiesta en los sistemas rudimentarios de explotación que no permiten el cabal aprovechamiento del yacimiento.

En el aspecto social son de todos conocidas las condiciones infrahumanas en que se desenvuelve la vida del minero, con la falta de servicios elementales, vías de comunicación, falta de seguridad personal imposibilidad de lograr una superación personal a través de una comunidad y familia estables.

En el aspecto económico los circuitos de mercadeo existentes hacen que el minero se encuentre a merced de los compradores organizados a quienes venden su producción en las condiciones que le son fijadas.

Por otra parte hay que señalar que el libre aprovechamiento solo puede ser utilizado donde concurren ciertas condiciones físicas como alta concentración del diamante y agua suficiente para las técnicas primitivas de lavado.

CIFENCE- 4

Con el nivel de producción actual y la riqueza potencial existente se hace necesario efectuar modificaciones en la forma de aprovechamiento, introduciendo técnicas industriales de trabajo.

Igualmente es de señalar que la ley y reglamento actuales de Minas datan del año 1944, cuando la producción diamantífera no alcanzaba ni siquiera el 10% de los niveles actuales. Su modificación es imperativa a efectos de introducir nuevas regulaciones cónsonas con las técnicas existentes inclusive en países menos desarrollados que Venezuela.

No se pretende recomendar la eliminación de la explotación del diamante bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento por las implicaciones socio-políticas que esta medida tendría, pero sí complementarla con la utilización de métodos industriales de aprovechamiento enmarcada dentro de una legislación actualizada.

El Ministerio de Minas conoce los pormenores de la explotación bajo el libre aprovechamiento desde hace tiempo, recalcada por los Ings. Francisco Izquierdo y Oleg Andreiev, expertos del MMH, en varias oportunidades.

La actividad diamantífera en Venezuela reviste enorme importancia según puede apreciarse en las cifras siguientes, (sobre datos de 1970):

- Representa el 1,5% de la producción mundial, estimada oficialmente en 46 millones de quilates.

- Utiliza una fuerza de trabajo entre 10.000 y 15.000 mineros. De la cifra anterior es difícil determinar el porcentaje de venezolanos y de Extranjeros indocumentados que trabajan en esta actividad.

- * Aporta a la Nación ingresos fiscalizados de 30.millones de bolivares de los cuales el Gobierno percibe en calidad de impuesto de explotación un 3%.

* El informe [illegible]-Fairbain estima un valor [illegible] para la producción en [illegible] 20.000.000 y un total de 600.000 [illegible] para 197[illegible]

Por información bancaria obtenida extraoficialmente, hemos podido saber que procedentes del exterior fué girado a Ciudad Bolivar una suma cercana a los 70 millones de bolivares destinada a compra de diamantes durante 1970.

- Adoptando una cifra conservadora de 50 millones de bolivares como valor de la producción de diamantes, esto representaría un 10% del aporte que hace el Producto Territorial Bruto el Sector Minero.

- La explotación del diamante determina una serie de inversiones en actividades conexas, altamente remuneradoras por lo general, como por ejemplo las líneas de aviación locales para transporte de mineros como Aerotécnica, Comeravia, Gatic C.A., Tanca, etc.

- Fuente de ingresos para las Municipalidades. El Comercio en el Guaniamo cancela Bs. 15.000 mensuales a la Municipalidad del Distrito Cedeño del Estado Bolivar (sin prestación de servicio alguno hasta la fecha.).

12.- Especificaciones del Diamante venezolano

- Origen

El diamante venezolano proviene de Guayana (Provincia de Roraima y Cuchivero).

Es un diamante de aluvión ó sea que se encuentra en el cauce de los ríos, ó forma en terrazas aluvionales depósitos ubicados a poca profundidad: 3 a 15 metros de acuerdo a la topografía.

En algunas regiones del mundo, los diamantes se encuentran en "chimeneas" ó "pipes"; únicas fuentes primarias de diamantes conocidas- ejemplo: Kimberley (Africa del Sur) - en otras en depósitos aluvionales como en Venezuela ó en las playas del Sur Oeste de Africa; ó en una combinación de ambos - ejemplo : Yakutia, Rusia.

No todas las "chimineas" son productivas y 75% de la producción mundial proviene de aluvión.

La riqueza de los depósitos depende:

- del tenor en diamantes del material extraido
- de la proporción entre los tipos, talla-industrial-bort
- de las características de las piedras (morfológicas y de color)

- Tenor

En Venezuela la cantidad de quilates por tonelada métrica es satisfactoria; para el Guaniamo se puede evaluar en 0,4 - 0,5 quilates por tonelada métrica - cantidad que justifica la permanencia en el sitio del Minero de Libre Aprovechamiento. (1 quilate= 0,2 gramos)

Los valores promedios de los tenores de los yacimientos del grupo De Beers en Africa del Sur son de 0,2 a 0,3 - según se desprende del Informe Anual 1969 de De Beers Consolidated Mines LTD.

COMPARACION ENTRE VENEZUELA Y EL GRUPO DE BEERS EN RELACION CON LA PRESENCIA DE DIAMANTE ENCONTRADO

ACTIVIDAD DIAMANTIFERA DEL GRUPO DE BEERS EN 1.969

Toneladas de material diamantífero extraídas y tratadas = 39 millones

Quilates obtenidos = 9 millones

Costo global = 232 millones de Bs.

Costo por quilate = 26. Bolivares

Tenor del material = 0,23 Qt./Ton.

(Fuente: Informe Anual 1969. DE BEERS CONSOLODATED MINES LTD.)

ACTIVIDAD DIAMANTIFERA DE VENEZUELA EN 1970

(Libre Aprovechamiento)

Toneladas extraídas

$$5.000 \text{ mineros} \times \frac{2 \text{ Ton.} \times 300 \text{ días}}{\text{minero-día}} = 2 \text{ a } 3 \text{ millones ton. (max)}$$

Quilates obtenidos = 500.000

Costo global = Indeterminado

Costo por quilate = Indeterminado

Tenor del material = 0,4 - 0,5 Quilates/Ton. (maX)

• Proporción Talla - Industrial - Bort

La linea divisoria entre talla e industrial es a veces arbitraria y no absoluta. Generalmente el diamante propio para la talla se caracteriza así:

- está bien conformado
- es blanco o ligeramente coloreado
- pesa más de 1/20 quilates (10 mg.)

Son comunes en nuestros yacimientos unos diamantes triangulares (equilaterales de 2 a 3 mm de lado?) llamados "panelas" clasificados como industriales pero que pueden aprovecharse para talla.

El bort, oscuro, sirve para hacer polvo de diamante.

De acuerdo a las estadísticas suministradas por el Ministerio; de Minas e Hidrocarburos tenemos que la producción venezolana se distribuye en:

	1969	1970	(Guaniamo)
Talla	61%	25%	
Industrial	30%	35%	
Bort	9%	40%	

Comparado con resultados estadísticos - muy escasos por cierto de otras partes tenemos la siguiente comparación porcentual del diamante de Talla con respecto a la producción total

	Proporción del tipo Talla
Venezuela	25% (aluvión)
Sierra Leone	60% (aluvión)
Wersselton-Kimberley	30% (pipe)
Mir-Rusia	21% (pipe)
Udachnaya-Rusia	12% (pipe)

(Cifras de MMH; Cotty y Wilks, Ingleses; Gnevushev, Bartoshinsky, Zinkov y Sobolev, Rusos).

- Forma

Característica morfológica que define al diamante de talla como un:

- octaedro
- rombo dodecaedro
- cubo
- formas intermedias entre las 3 anteriores

La forma cúbica es la más rara; generalmente en Venezuela hallamos octaedros; muy semejantes a los de Sierra Leone y que aparecen en la hoja - DIAMANTE DE TALLA - DIFERENCIAS MORFOLOGICAS -

Siendo de origen aluvionario se puede apreciar que presentan aristas redondeadas y no nítidas, significativo de un posible arrastre hasta su lugar de extracción.

Los octaedros de "chimeneas" tienen aristas nítidas y perfectas (foto). En la operación de talla, el octaedro es el mas apropiado para la talla americana ó full cut ó corte clásico del brillante.

- Estructura

Característica morfológica que corresponde al modo de cristalización de la piedra, observandose una de las dos particularidades siguientes:

- estrías en las facetas ó
- estratos en el cuerpo de la piedra

Generalmente nuestras pideras presentan estas capas ó estratos, perfectamente observables al microscopio binocular, lo cual puede merecer un cuidado especial en la operación talla.

. Tamaño

Hasta donde sabemos, los diamantes de Venezuela son mayormente pequeños. Examinando un lote al azar en operación de fiscalización Guía No. 00112, observamos la distribución siguiente:

mas de un quilate	24	piedras
menos de un quilate	1951	"
Total	1975	piedras

Las piedras grandes son raras - En 1970 fué descubierta en el Guaniamo una piedra de 57,85 quilates, (adquirida en el sitio por Bs. 65.000 avaluada en 104.000 Bs. por el M.M.H. a los efectos del Impuesto de explotación.)

En esta aspecto el comercio ilícito hace errática toda investigación y solo se dispone tanto en Venezuela como en gran parte de las áreas de producción de datos indicativos relativos al tamaño : por ejemplo en Ghana es frecuente la piedra de más de 2 quilates; en Dutoitspan - Sur Africa, el ritmo de aparición de piedras de 50 a 200 quilates es más frecuente que en cualquier otro sitio (minas controladas por De Beers).

En los placeres aluvionales de playas del sur oeste africano las piedras grandes se encuentran en la desembocadura del río Orange, disminuyendo el tamaño a medida que se aleja uno de la desembocadura (20 piedras/quilate a 200 millas de la desembocadura;explotación en el mar)

. Color

El color es otra característica que se toma en cuenta en la evaluación de la piedra bruta. En la piedra tallada su importancia es menor ya que el valor lo determinan en orden : las proporciones de las facetas, inclusiones, color y peso.

La mayoría de los diamantes son coloreados

Venezuela	Blanco amarillento
Ghana	marrón verdoso muy atractivo
Sur Africa	generalmente verdoso
Premier Mine	marrón ligeramente aceitoso
Mir-Rusia	Blanco
Sierra Leone	blanco verdoso

Conclusión.-

El diamante de talla venezolano en términos generales, es un diamante de aluvión de buen tenor; octaedro bien conformado con estratos; pequeño; blanco amarillento.

¿Como se sitúa nuestro diamante con relación a los demás? (pregunta formulada a negociantes y talladores de New York, Londres, Amberes e Israel)

La respuesta ha sido que no compiten con : Rusia, Africa del Sur Sierra Leone, Africa Central.

Compiten con : Brasil, Guayana, Costa de Marfil y otros.

13.- Comercio del diamante en Venezuela

131.- Legislación:

De acuerdo al artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Ley de Minas, el comercio de oro, diamantes y otras piedras preciosas está permitido solamente a aquellas personas debidamente inscritas en el Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos.

Los comerciantes que tienen formalizada su inscripción ante el Ministerio están en la obligación de suministrar el informe mensual de sus actividades, según lo pautado en el mencionado artículo 137, ordinales 5, 6 y 7.

Al presentar este aspecto legal del comercio estamos repitiendo las frases consagradas que se utilizan para recordar que en Venezuela muchos son los que no cumplen con la Ley.

En el caso del diamante están registrados en el MMH 433 compradores con licencias y como se verá mas adelante las 2/3 partes no cumplen con lo pautado por la Ley.

132.- Circuitos Naciones y nexos con el Exterior

Compradores .-

En base a un fichero de compradores preparado a los efectos de este Estudio se desprende que:

De los 430 compradores con licencia, registrados en el Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos:

* 104 cumplen con la Ley de los cuales :
  41 tienen una actividad permanente en el negocio, dentro del del pais y
  63 tienen una actividad esporádica
* 326 no cumplen con las disposiciones legales vigentes(Artículo 137 del Reglamento de la Ley de Minas)

Grupos.-

La población activa (104) de compradores está distribuída en 4 grupos.

Grupo I	TIMOTEO OCHOA
Grupo II	ROTH & EDER-MARIANO ALVAREZ
Grupo III	BARRADAS - DA SILVA - RODRIGUEZ
Grupo IV	INDPENDIENTES (Gutwein, Onn, Gyula etc.)

Circuitos dentro de los grupos.-

GRUPO I

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo ⇨ Mayorista Ciudad Bolivar (Ochoa) ⇨ Diamond Distributors, New York

GRUPO II

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo ⇨ Mayorista Ciudad Bolivar (Alvarez) ⇨ Exportador Caracas (Roth & Eder) ⇨ Exterior

. Superior Diamand Cutter
42 West 48 Street - NY 10107

Los manifiestos de Exportación Expedidos por la Administración de Aduanas en Maiquetía, Ciudad Bolívar y Santa Elena de Guairén señalen los destinatarios siguientes:

Destinatario	Expedidor	Licencia
NEW YORK		
• Diamond Distribuitors INC. 539 Fifth Av. N.Y. 10017	T.Ochoa	54-M
• Halpering Shiping Co. INC. 1 Maiden Lane N.Y.	Ludovico Lante	
• Superior Diamond Cutter 48 West 48 Street N.Y.	Elias Roth	122-M
• Leon Tempelsman & Son 529 Fifth Av. N.Y.	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
• Henry Hudson Hotel 58 Street West c/o Gyula David	Gyula David	318-M
• Hotel Pierre 5th. Avenue c/o. José Orlando Luxoro	José Orlando Luxoro	
• Hendersen 745 Athol Estado Nevada	Erwin A. Gombo S.	13-M
CANADA		
• Antonio Rossi Yudson Street102 Toronto 18	Antonio Rossi	185-M
BELGICA		
• C H. Brachfeld & Sons 62 Pelicanstraat Amberes	Sicha Onn Gilbert Devos en representación de Gyula David	2-M 318-M
• Theo Bloom 70 Pelicanstraat Amberes	Elias Roth	122-M

	Expedidor	Licencia
HOLANDA		
- Jacques Schlezinger Amsterdam/Shobank Sarphatistraat Amsterdam	Rubén Da Silva Danilo Rodriguez Arturo Barradas	68-M 67-M 258-M
- Theo Bloom Algemene Bank N.V Breda	Elias Roth	122-M
- Isaac Gutwein Algemene Bank Sepuistraat 128/150 Amsterdam	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
- J. Bellamy Devos Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank Saphartistraat 47-53	Hugo Di Benedetto	166-M
ISRAEL		
- PITUACH SIAMOND COMP. 3 Jabotinsky Road Ramat Gan	Elias Roth	122-M
- Ramat Gan Diamond LTD Diamond Exchange Building Ramat Gan	Isaac Gutwein	78-M
BRASIL		
- Sin especificar	A. Barradas	258-M
ARGENTINA		
- Guthaman & Klein Banco Rio de La Plata Bartolomé Mitre 841 Buenos Aires	Elias Roth	122-M

Distribucción del mercado

Los circuitos señalados han sido establecidos a partir del fichero de compradores preparado en la encuesta de PLANESA, el cual nos ha servido para conocer - dentro de lo posible- com[illegible] distribuyen el mercado los distintos grupos

VENEZUELA

CUADRO DE EXPORTACION DE DIAMANTES POR GRUPOS

Cifras en Bolívares

GRUPOS	Principales	1970 (parciales)	1969	1968	% Promedio del mercado	Destino
I	TIMOTEO OCHOA	7.206.120,oo (hasta Julio)	5.697.118,oo	3.689.690,oo	35-40	Diamond Distributors INC 539 Fifth Av. NY 10017
II	ROTH & EDER MARIANO ALVAREZ	4.469.980,oo (hasta Sept.)	3.362.095,oo	1.117.186,45	25	Superior Diomond Cutter 42 Wew 48 Sr. NY 10017 Theo Bloom-70 Pelikanstr Amberes Pituach - Romat-Gan - Diamond Exch. Bldg. Isra
III	ARTURO BARRADAS RUBEN DA SILVA DANILO RODRIGUEZ	2.439.400,oo	3.284.086,oo	1.279.[illegible],15	20-25	Jacques SCHLEZINGER Amsterdam Shebank Saphartistraat - Holanda Brasil (s.e.)
IV	INDEPENDIENTES					
	. GYULA DAVID	282.610,oo	-	-		USA
	. SINCHA ONN	508.999,50	-	-	20	Bélgica
	. ISAAC GUTWEIN	646.444,55	2.192.727,oo	1.463.293,oo		Israel
	Total	15.553.554,05	14.536.026,oo	7.550.143,60		

(Fuente : Manifiestos de exportación - Ministerio de Hacienda)

133.- Precios

1331.- Precio del diamante en la mina

Durante nuestra visita a las minas del Guaniamo en Octubre de 1970 hemos presenciando numerosas transacciones comerciales entre mineros y compradores instalados éstos en el caserio El Candado, lugar surgido en medio de la selva a 200 kilómetros al sur-oeste de Ciudad Bolivar con motivo de la "bulla" del Guaniamo.

Los precios practicados por los compradores, que por regla general actuan por cuenta de terceros, son variables y dependen de los factores siguientes:

- Del tipo de diamante

Generalmente se distinguen las categorias siguientes:

. Talla de primera	Bs. 300/qt	hasta 1 qt
. Media talla	Bs. 180 - 200/qt	
. Industrial	Bs. 80 - 100/qt	
. "reyers" reject	Bs. 50/qt	
. Bort	Bs. 10/qt	

El numero de clasificaciones puede alcanzar 8 y se observa que la finalidad que se persigue el comprador es de devaluar el lote, mientras que a nivel de fiscalización por el M.M.H. en Ciudad Bolivar el aumento del número de clasificaciones - 11 (once)-tiene por objeto valorizar el lote. No existen pués criterios unificados y sería muy difícil adoptar la misma clasificación ya que al Ministerio llegan lotes reclasificados.

- De las condiciones del mercado

Bajo este concepto podemos enumerar la afluencia de piedras, la experiencia del minero, las instrucciones impartidas desde Ciudad Bolivar, Caracas o el exterior a los compradores.

De las Condiciones de vida del minero

El Minero organizedo en grupo de trabajo, tiene ingresos provenientes de:

- una actividad diaria que rinde Bs 100 a Bs 500 semanales por persona.
- una actividad de envergadura consistente en una explotación a mayor escala donde interviene la remoción de "grunas" o bloques de varias toneladas en una quebrada; la apertura de un "telin" o canal de desvío o corte de meandro; actividad que ocupa generalmente a cuatro o cinco mineros y que rinde por ejemplo Bs 20.000,00 en un mes al grupo de trabajo.

Los gastos de existencia del minero son por otro lado muy elevados debidos a las condiciones mismas del sistema de Libre Aprovechamiento o sea aislamiento, hostilidad del medio, etc.

Podemos ilustrar lo costoso de la vida con los precios siguientes:

- un almuerzo (presa de pollo +arepa)	Bs 10,00
- un fresco	Bs 3,00
- una cerveza	Bs 5,00
- un kilo de cambures	Bs 6,00
- periódico	Bs 2,00
- pasaje en helicóptero para un vuelo de 5 minutos aproximadamente (equivalentes a trayecto caminado en 6 horas)	Bs 100,00

Por lo expuesto podemos ver que el minero necesita un nivel aceptable de ingresos para hacer frente al alto costo de la vida que impone el medio, viéndose obligado en esas condiciones a aceptar los precios que se ofrecen por la producción encontrada.

En conclusión la explotación bajo el sistema de libre aprovechamiento hace difícil la determinación de los costos unitarios de producción, los márgenes de utilidad entre intermediarios y en general toda evaluación racional de tipo económico, incluyendo la producción misma.

1332.- Precios a los efectos de liquidación del Impuesto de Explotación.

La Ley de Minas admite que el impuesto de explotación de 3% en el caso del libre aprovechamiento, sea cancelado por el comprador en caso de que el minero no pudiera hacerlo. La liquidación de esa impuesto tiene lugar en Ciudad Bolívar y es generalmente un mayorista que centraliza los diamantes provenientes de varios compradores el que presenta una solicitud de liquidación según el modelo anexo.

Es de hacer notar que el mayorista selecciona las piedras en base a una clasificación impuesta por la fiscalía y que en ninguna manera corresponde a la clasificación adoptada en el momento de la compra en el sitio de explotación.

En base a la solicitud de liquidación el M.M.H. comprueba el valor declarado y generalmente aumenta dicho valor en un porcentaje muy razonable sobre el lote total: 2 a 5% según su composición - La planilla de liquidación es la que sirve a los efectos de la cancelación en las oficinas del Banco de Venezuela que actúa como receptor de fondos nacionales.

En base a las planillas señaladas apuntamos los precios siguientes en bolívares:

Clasificación MMH	Tipo de diamante	Bolivares		
		A	S	C
1.	Talla 1 más de 1 quilate	(300)	320	20
2	menos 1 quilate	(180)	190	10
3	Talla 2 más de 1 quilate	(220)	245	25
4	menos 1 quilate	(110)	115	5
5	Talla 3 más de 1 quilate	(140)	140	0
6	menos 1 quilate	(90)	100	10
7	Talla 4 más de 1 quilate	(100)	100	0
8	Menos 1 quilate	(75)	75	
9	Industrial 1	(50)	50	0
10	Industrial 2	(30)	30	0
11	Bort	(10)	10	0

A) Valores a los cuales el comprador dice haber adquirido las piedras de los mineros.

B) Valor fiscalizado.

C) Diferencia imponible a los efectos del Impuesto Sobre La Renta (Utilidad teórica)

1333.-Progresión del nivel de precios.-

Es difícil establecer la ganancia de los intermediarios.

Se puede aceptar una utilidad de 5% por participante - es decir - que desde el minero hasta el mayorista exportador (dos o tres intermediarios) el precio de una piedra aumentaría en un 10 ó 15%, lo que no parece excesivo.

Son excepcionales las variaciones mayores: del estudio del registro de ventas de los compradores que tienen actualizada su situación en la fiscalía del Ministerio de Minas en Ciudad Bolívar, se pudo ver por ejemplo que en Mayo de 1970 el Sr. Ramón Peña vendió al Sr. Visnel Alvarez en Bs. 9.000,oo un lote adquirido en Bs. - 6.800,oo ó sea realizando una ganancia de 30%. Normalmente este margen oscila entre 4 y 7%.

En verdad, a través del circuito se opera una selección de las piedras que trae como consecuencia un aumento en el valor de los lotes.

Esto lo apreciamos en el ejemplo del IVIC - Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas - el cual adquiere diamante industrial destinado a la fabricación de las cuchillas de diamante, siendo piedras escogidas.

De cualquier manera, puede apreciarse que los exportadores de diamantes aún haciendo una ligera utilidad de 5% en cada operación, dado que ésta se repite muchas veces a lo largo del año, hacen un alto beneficio, proporcional a la rotación de su capital durante el - período.

14.- Aprovechamiento del Diamante en Venezuela.-

Del total de diamantes producido en Venezuela (en 1970 508.000,oo quilates) es ínfima la parte aprovechada en el País.

En lo que se refiere al diamante de talla existen unos pocos talleres que en pequeña escala trabajan la talla del diamante. Tenemos el ejemplo en Ciudad Bolívar del Taller Caroní, con 5 personas donde se talla aproximadamente 400 quilates por año, según información recabada en el Taller mismo. Existen otros talleres en Puerto Ordaz, Caracas y la Colonia Tovar.

Se ha estimado que actualmente no excede de 2.000,oo quilates por año la talla del diamante en Venezuela.

El Gobierno Regional en el Estado Bolívar está impulsando el establecimiento de una escuela de talla en Ciudad Bolívar, habiendo ordenado ya los equipos necesarios. Esta actividad merece todo el apoyo gubernamental con miras a desarrollar en Venezuela los equipos humanos para que estos puedan competir en el Mercado Internacional al cabo de unos años, una vez adquirida la experiencia necesaria, lograda en otros paises en varias generaciones.

Hay que estar conscientes que la talla del diamante es una actividad altamente especializada y competida en Estados Unidos, Europa e Israel. Por ejemplo en este último país existen 12.000 talladoras que devengan en promedio sueldos mensuales de 900,oo Bs., determinando esto un costo reducido de talla.

En Israel tuvimos la oportunidad de visitar los Talleres Barik que producen mensualmente 5.000 quilates tallados, variando los costos de la talla entre 15,50 $ y 27,60 $ por quilate.

Con respecto al diamante industrial, con excepción del Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas, practicamente no existe el aprovechamiento de este tipo de diamante. El IVIC aprovecha aproximadamente 200 quilates al año, como se detalla en ficha anexa.

Ejemplo.- Aprovechamiento del Diamante Industrial.-
Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificos.-

El IVIC utiliza el diamante industrial nacional para la fabricación de la cuchillas de diamantes, para cortes ultrafinos, según técnica desarrollada por el Cientifico Venezolano Dr. Humberto Fernández M.

Precio de compra del diamante y circuito del mismo.-

El IVIC aprovecha anualmente 200 quilates de diamantes reseleccionados de tipo industrial, por el cual paga a razón de 80,oo Bs/ quilate.

El circuito de adquisición de estos diamantes es:

Minero ⇨ Comprador de Campo (empleado del mayorista)
⇨ Mayorista de Ciudad Bolívar ⇨ Mayorista Exportador
de Caracas ⇨ IVIC

Mercado Externo.-

Con diamantes de buenas dimensiones y peso inferior a 1 quilate el IVIC fabrica las cuchillas para microtomo de primera calidad las cuales factura así:

. Cuchilla de 2 mm. de ancho, más soporte	120,oo dólares
. Cada 0,1 mm. adicionales	20,oo dólares

El quilate de diamante de este tipo ha sido pagado al minero a razón de 50,oo Bs/quilate. (diamante de primera, panelas), según se desprende de las planillas de declaración del mayorista de Ciudad Bolívar, - valor aceptado por el Ministerio de Minas.

Adquiriendo el diamante a 80,oo Bs/Qt. observamos que hay una diferencia de 30,oo B/Qt. que viene siendo la utilidad de los intermediarios esta ganancia no puede considerarse excesiva, máxime tomando en cuenta la selección de la piedra, pero al cabo de un año de negocio de esta naturaleza el intermediario puede llegar a un rendimiento de 200 % sobre su capital dependiendo de la frecuencia con la cual su capital sea rotado.

Ejemplo.- Valorización de la piedra al tallarla.-

Durante el transcurso del estudio se pudieron observar varias operaciones de avalúo efectuadas en el laboratorio de gemología del MMH - Ciudad Bolívar, a petición de compradores interesados en conocer el valor de una sortija personal.

El 15/10/70 se efectuó la experticia de una piedra presentada por el Sr. Splendiani de color amarillento, con un peso de 6,27 quilates (peso estimado con tabla "Weight Calculator" ya que la piedra estaba montada en sortija).

En la operación de avalúo se toman en cuenta por orden de importancia:

1.- Las proporciones de la piedra tallada (lupa y microscopio)

2.- La existencia de inclusiones, carbones y accidentes dentro de la piedra (microscopio)

3.- El color

4.- El peso

La piedra en cuestión fué evaluada en 24.000,oo Bs. (de haber tenido mejor color hubiera podido alcanzar Bs. 120.000,oo)

En la operación de talla el rendimiento es de 50% aproximadamente, o sea que la piedra bruta debió pesar 13 quilates aproximadamente.

El costo de la talla es Bs. 100,oo el quilate o sea que en este caso costó Bs. 1.300,oo

Tomando en cuenta el tamaño y calidad de esta piedra, el valor en el sitio de explotación es de Bs. 10000,oo, como máximo, haciendo notar que según la especificación del MMH en la fiscalización habría sido evaluada en un mínimo de Bs. 4.140,oo.

Puede apreciarse en consecuencia la valorización habida por la piedra en el proceso de talla pasando desde aproximadamente Bs. 12.000,oo - revendida por los intermediarios hasta Bs. 24.000,oo evaluación del gemólogo.

OTRAS RECOMENDACIONES

Las recomendaciones que a continuación hacemos guardan relación directa, aunque no aparente, con el objeto mismo de nuestro estudio y estan destinadas a corregir, completar o reconsiderar algunos aspectos de la actividad diamantífera en Venezuela.

Algunas de las recomendaciones no conciernen directamente al Ministerio de Minas e Hidrocarburos.

Liquidación Impuesto Explotación

Sería recomendable estudiar fórmulas que permitan agilizar los trámites y la propia operación de fiscalización sin restarle su debida importancia.

Se ha pensado que se podría contemplar a partir de un estudio estadístico amplio una liquidación en base al peso de los lotes o sea bolívares por quilate sin entrar a considerar calidades.

En efecto si existen 2.500 calidades de piedras, ¿porque entrar a considerar 8 clasificaciones dentro del diamante de talla?, ademas no es raro que la talla malogre la piedra por cambio de color, rotura etc. quedando el concepto de calidad sin fundamento.

El estudio estadístico sobre un gran número de lotes con distinción de Talla - Industrial-Sort, permitiría establecer 3 valores que equivaldrían al actual 3% percibido sobre el valor del lote ó posiblemente superior al 3%.

Concretamente, suponiendo que el cuadro de producción para el año -- 1970 sea un cuadro standard, observamos lo siguiente (Libre Aprovechamiento).

Talla	131.106,42	qts
Industrial	172.650,77	qts
Sort	204.903,85	qts
Total	508.661,04	qts
Valor para el impuesto	26.217.073,60	Bs.
Impuesto pagado	800.597,42	Bs.

Si se adoptan valores de referencia tales que permitan gravar el producto en la forma siguiente

Talla	5	Bs/qt.
Industrial	1	Bs/qt.
Bort	0,25	Bs/qt.

Obtenemos el cuadro de liquidación siguiente :

Talla	131.106,42	x	5	=	Bs. 655.532,10
Industrial	172.650,77	x	1	=	Bs. 172.650,77
Bort	204.983,80	x	0,25	=	Bs. 51.246,oo
Total Impuesto liquidado					Bs. 879.428,87

Licencias de Compradores

En vista de que las 2/3 partes de los compradores con licencia no cumplen con la Ley, sería conveniente reconsiderar el modo de otorgamiento de dichas licencias.

Ministerio de Hacienda

De acuerdo a la Ley, Artículo 144, las Administraciones de Aduana deben enviar copia de los Manifiestos de Exportación de Diamantes al MMH. Esto no se cumple. El 5 de Junio de 1954 mediante oficio No. 5903 MMH - pidió al Ministerio de Hacienda el cumplimiento de dicho artículo. Sería conveniente reiterar la solicitud.

Control de Lotes de Diamantes en las Aduanas

Parece irrisorio que en las Aduanas de la República no se controle el contenido de las cajitas con diamantes en bruto que se exporten, y - cuando se hace como es el caso en Ciudad Bolívar, se coloque el paquete que puede pesar bruto 100 gramos o menos sobre una balanza TOLEDO, que sirve para pesar bultos de hasta 250 Kilos.

Se recomienda utilizar una balanza adecuada, y lacrar los paquetes para evitar el cambio de su composición.

Disposiciones Arancelarias

Las cifras de importación relativas a piedras preciosas o semi preciosas, recopiladas por la Dirección General de Estadísticas del Ministerio de Fomento son prácticamente inutilizables.

Se debería precisar en el Arancel de Aduanas las preciosas y las semi preciosas; y dentro de las primeras si se trata de brillantes, esmeraldas, rubis, zafiros u otros. El actual Arancel mezcla los varios conceptos.

Recomendaciones de interés industrial

A.- Se recomienda evaluar la riqueza de los materiales ya explotados en los placeres de San Salvador de Paúl, con miras al aprovechamiento industrial del diamante-eventualmente mediante licitación pública-ya que ensayos privados han demostrado la posibilidad de recuperar aproximadamente cien dólares en diamantes por metro cúbico. ?

B.- Se recomienda considerar la posibilidad de aprovechar a mayor escala, la experiencia del IVIC en materia de fabricación de cuchillas de diamante para microtomo; experiencia que a través de doce años le ha válido al IVIC en el exterior un gran prestigio.

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 25 April 1972
ATTENTION : Chris Frederick/ WH/3
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated ________ 19____.

Reentry Permits ~~is~~ were issued for subjects on 21 April 1972, and ~~is~~ are valid to 20 April 1973. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U.S. Consuls and U.S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permits #0375384 and 0375385:

________ Signature   25 April 72. Date

File
CIFENCE/4
201

OS/AAS/EStark 25 April 1972

(GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.)

SECRET

15. CIFENCE-4 is currently assigned to the section of CIRASH with basic responsibility for guerrilla activity. As a result he is required to spend between 50 and 75 percent of his time outside of Caracas. While this has made him somewhat less accessible to the Station, he is well placed to obtain advance information with regard to possible plans for urban violence or kidnappings, high on the list of Station priorities. He has contributed to two reports during the period. A change in the Minister of Interior has recently been announced, which could result in changes down to the level of CIFENCE-4, especially should CIFENCE-1 leave his position. In the meantime, CIFENCE-4 continues as a valuable Station penetration of CIRASH.

14 April 72

[illegible]

SECRET

13 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : CIFENCE-4 (201-300985)

Please process Subject for Operational Approval for his use as a penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela (DISIP). Attached herewith are updated PRQ Parts I and II.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As stated above.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Memo Chrono
① - 201-300985

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16 ROUTING AND-OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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DISSEM BY: 35 PER #

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR, P/AN, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 381

S E C R E T 051750Z APR 72 CITE CARACAS 19040 (MYLECHRAINE ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE

5 APR 72 IN 578235

REF: DIRECTOR 248804

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SENT HQS PER REF REQUEST VIA TM NO. 256903 ON 5 APRIL.

2. CIFENCE-4 RETURNED FROM 1 DEC 71 TRIP MIAMI ON VIASA 741 MIAMI TO CARACAS ON 9 DEC 71.

3. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN

AB

WH/S/V

CS COPY

SECRET

5 APR 72

201-300985

C.F. FREDERICK
WH/3/V
9494
28 MARCH 1972

SECRET

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SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 41 PER ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

WH8 FILE VR, [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 29 MAR 72 01 22z CITE DIRECTOR 248804

CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)*

1. PLEASE SEND RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE PLUS TWO CURRENT PHOTOS OF EACH TO ARRIVE HQS BY 10 APRIL 72 SO THAT NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. WE ASSUME CIFENCE-4 HAS RETURNED TO CARACAS AFTER REF TRIP, HOWEVER PLEASE CABLE FOLLOWING INFO FOR PASSAGE TO LNYUMA: NAME OF CARRIER USED ON DEPARTURE, FLIGHT NUMBER, APPROXIMATE TIME OF DEPARTURE, PORT OF DEPARTURE AND DATE OF ARRIVAL AT DESTINATION, WHICH PRESUMABLY CARACAS.

3. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
IN
FS
BK
DSS MFL
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

*Provided specifics of CIFENCE-4 departure for Miami 1 Dec 71 on CIRASH business. Because of the urgency and the nature of his travel to the U.S., CIFENCE-4 had to travel on a Venezuelan passport. Caracas Station was anxious that INS in Miami not learn of CIFENCE-4's US resident alien status and requested WH/Miami monitor his arrival--which accomplished without incident.

CS COPY (CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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29MAR72
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300985
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C.F. FREDERICK
WH/3/V

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

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PER ☐ FILE IN RECEIVED CP/EDI

INFO FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 248804

PAGE 2

AAS/OS John Rooney (telecoord)

C/WH/COG

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
CIFENCE-4: Request for Operational Approval (OA)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HVCN-9636, 24 January 1972

1P

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover are PRQ Parts I and II for CIFENCE-4 as requested in reference. Please process for full operational approval.

Elgar B. Martegani
EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

Attachments:
1. PRQ I, 3 copies, u/s/c
2. PRQ II, 3 copies, H/W

S/C [illegible]/AB
Date 7 APR 1972

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD w/ att. 2 h/w, and att. 1 u/s/c

2 all S

CS COPY

MAR 31 1972

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA- 18757	DATE 25 March 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

14-00000

52

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.
HVCA-18757

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM
CIFENCE-4 (AMCLEVE-15)

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

See previous PRQ Part II, UFGA-23189, dated 20 September 1965

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 11 1972
MICROFILMED

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Austin G. DETLOFF - Station copy of previous report not legible

Grover T. LYTHCOTT - Walt Abeln operational alias used by Grover T. Lythcott -

Oscar C. KALBING - true name

Gordon K. RIJOCK - true name

Edgar B. MARTEGANI - true name

FORM 11-60 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-20)

Att 2 Hw to HVCA-18757 CS COPY

31 Mar 72
201-300955

SECRET

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist")*

See previous PRQ-II. While not now targeted directly against Cuban affairs, Subject undoubtedly continues in the intelligence field as a result of his former experience and the continued communist/totalitarian domination of Cuba. His opposition to such regimes and individuals associated makes for identity of interest and goals with BKTRUST.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Subject's present position and physical presence in Venezuela would be untenable if his cooperation with BKTRUST became known to the Venezuelan government.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are clandestine. Plausible denial is based on contact with CO in his official cover capacity.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject accomplishes this in the course of his actual employment.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (XXXXXXXX *(Is working)*.

BKTRUST

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Same as in previous PRQ-II. In addition, Subject has been employed in Venezuelan DIGEPOL, and CIRASH.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Wife of CIFENCE-4; AMOTEX-54 (former AMIFF-1)

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no formal training since being in Venezuela (1967). Records not available here for period when Subject worked for Station WH/MIAMI.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would not likely collaborate with any foreign power without permission from LNHARP.

SECRET

SECTION VI — **OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

See previous PRQ II for prior use by BKTRUST in Miami. Subject is known to and cooperated with LNERGO at BKTRUST direction while in the Miami area. Subject has also had contact with LNERGO Venezuela in the course of his official duties as a member of CIRASH.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from CIRASH and its files and informants in the course of his normal work as an official of CIRASH.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject knows from experience that information is disseminated throughout LNHARP

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is a unilateral penetration (FI) of CIRASH.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

None

SECTION VII — **PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

Subject is an official of CIRASH. He is not repeat not involved in liaison with BKTRUST.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

N/A

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is a paid agent. Se page 1 for Agency personnel known to Subject.

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is well trained in PM activities including maritime. He is an expert in weapons, and knows demolitions. He is skilled in police and intelligence ops.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is paid a regular monthly salary of approximately US$ 335.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None; Subject has been assisted in retaining his permanent resident status.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files. Derogatory info resolved.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

SGSWIRL 3 November 1971. See IRD No. 72501 dated 29 November 1971.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

OA 18 October 1965

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA 17 January 1972

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

See previous PRQ-II. Subject continues to demonstrate reliability and use of good security precautions. He appears to be of excellent character.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

All known cases have been previously resolved.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject moderate in use of liquor; others not known.

SECRET

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Hunting, fishing

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is increasingly able to disguise his FSRUMEN accent and pass as a Venezuelan. Among other latins, the accent would be detected in prolonged contact.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ-I obtained from Subject. PRQ-II from files and personal observation.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

N/A

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by any of former case officers, or in name used by former CO's.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

See previous PRQ-II.

DATE: 28 March 1972

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER: Edgar B Martegani
EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

SECRET

201-300985

64

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO. HVCA-18757

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Luis	Clemente	POSADA	Carriles

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.):

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

(a) Bamby (nickname), Basilio

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Las Villas, CUBA

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No court record

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 11 1972
MICROFILMED

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT ft.	in.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
X M ☐ F	44	40	5	11	175	strong	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
black	green			erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

scar, palm of right hand



n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

neat

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 8-61 1050 [illegible] -18757 CS COPY 201-300985 (4-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Venezuelan

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*: Cuban

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

Venezuela: Qta. Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas (rent)

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

Miami, U.S.A.

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

See attached list.

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION: Venezuelan Police (MRI)

17. TITLE: Comisario

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*: $1,135/month

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

$4,000

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

None (See previous PRQ I)

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
Monserrate; Cuba	Elementary	1936	1942	yes
Instituto; Cuba	High School	1942	1947	yes
Padres Dominicos	Chemistry	1947	1950	yes
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	---

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)*	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish (native)	X		X		X		X	
English	X				X		X	

ATTACHMENT PRQ PART I HVCA-18757

DATE	PLACE	PURPOSE
1956	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1961	Mexico	Political exile
Feb 1961	Miami, Florida	Political exile
April 1961	Guatemala	Invasion (Cuba)
May 1961	Miami, Florida	Invasion (Cuba)
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Puerto Rico	Cuban Affairs
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
Oct 1967	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
1968	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1969	Miami, Florida	Tourist
Mar 1970	Miami, Florida	Reentry Permit
1970	Trinidad, Tobago	Revolution--business
Jun 1970	Bogota	Business
1970	Bogota	Business
May 1971	Aruba	Business
April 1971	Lima, Peru	Business
April 1971	Argentina	Business
April 1971	Brazil	Business
Oct 1971	Portugal	Business
Oct 1971	Rome	Business
Nov 1971	Vienna	Business
Nov 1971	Rome	Business
Dec 1971	Miami, Florida	Business
Dec 1971	Puerto Rico	Tourist

14-00000

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

good marksman with small arms

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
USA	March 1963	March 1964	197 Brgd. 1st Bn.	2nd Lt.	Ft. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

USA

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1944-1946	b. EMPLOYER Pastora Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS San José de las Lajas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Sugar chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 210 PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING transfer
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1946-1954	b. EMPLOYER San Agustin Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS Cruces, Las Villas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Sugar chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 310 PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1958-1960	b. EMPLOYER Firestone (Cuba)	c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Compounds Sec.	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 325 PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Political exile
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1961-1963	b. EMPLOYER Firestone	c. ADDRESS Akron, Ohio USA
	d. TYPE OF WORK Training program	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 500 PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING enlisted in army
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1964-1965	b. EMPLOYER USA Army	c. ADDRESS Ft. Benning, Ga.
	d. TYPE OF WORK 2nd Lt.	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 330 PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Cuban affairs

1967-present Venezuelan Govt.

SECTION IX **MARITAL STATUS**

31. CHECK ONE ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS.

Divorced from first wife (Maria Concepción Castañeda) 26 June 1963 in Chicago, Illinois SUBJECT IS DIVORCED FIRST WIFE OF LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)
Reason was mutual agreement for divorce (See previous PRQ I's)

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) Nieves (Middle) Elina Rcodid (Nee) Gonzalez Leyva de (Last) POSADA

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE 13 Aug 1963	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Columbus, Ga.
36. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Dec 1935	37. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Las Villas, CUBA
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)
Venezuela: Qta. Janet, Ave. Los Caribes, El Llanito, Caracas

SECTION X **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis POSADA	X		1965	Miami, Florida	USA
Janet POSADA		X	1970	Caracas, Venezuela	Venezuelan

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

Same

SECTION XI **FATHER**

41. FULL NAME Luis Posada	42. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	43. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Cuba	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION Bookstore operator	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE Cienfuegos, Cuba	

SECTION XII **MOTHER**

48. FULL NAME Dolores Carriles	49. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	50. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION Housewife	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE Cienfuegos, Las Villas, Cuba	

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Roberto Posada	X		1931	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Raul Posada	X		1934	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Concepción Posada		X	1939	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Unknown (See previous PRQ I)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

Concha Marina Posada (aunt)
Margot Carriles (aunt) address unknown

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE 27 March 1972	SIGNATURE Edgar B Martegani EDGAR B. MARTEGANI

201-300755

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
○ CIFENCE-4 (201-300985)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 2 below.

1. CIFENCE-4 has been granted a POA effective 17 January 1972 for use as a penetration of CIRASH.

2. Please submit updated PRQ Parts I and II in order for Headquarters to process OA.

Karen T. GEHRKE

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW-9636	DATE 26 JAN 1972 typed 24 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Venezuela	Nancy Davis	kmg	1535

1 - IP
- Chrono
- CI/OA

AN nt
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~FX~~
~~DES~~ ~~SPD~~
~~FI~~
WH/3V

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	24 Jan	P. F. [illegible]
CI/OA		Norman K. Ott, Jr. (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	25 JAN 1972	Gardner R. Hathaway / L. Costello for

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

1972

SECRET

HVCA-18640, 19 January 1972

CIFLUTE
July
Operational Report for Period ~~XXXXXXX~~through December 1971

5. CIFENCE-4 has been handled since August 1971 by Edgar B. MARTEGANI. It was decided for security reasons to take this agent out of the group of agents handled by the Station Officer conducting liaison, and CIFENCE-4 is thus handled as a truly unilateral penetration of CIRASH. During the reporting period allegations arose as to affiliation of CIFENCE-4 with JKLANCE. (See WH/Miami 12203 and Caracas 17730). The Station is aware of this situation and the agent is handled accordingly. CIFENCE-4 successfully passed his ump-teenth SGSWIRL examination on 3 October 1971 and the Station's opinion of this individual continues to be favorable. (See HVCW-9612 for SGSWIRL results). As an indication of the continuing high esteem enjoyed by CIFENCE-4 within the GOV, he was chosen by CIFENCE-1 to accompany the present Venezuelan Minister of the Interior on a month long European vacation in September 1971. It is widely acknowledged that the Minister of the Interior is the leading candidate for the COPEI presidential nomination; should this occur and he be elected the next president of Venezuela, CIFENCE-4 should have a valuable friend. In summation, the Station continues to regard CIFENCE-4 as a valuable Station asset who has an excellent reputation within CIRASH and the GOV. He contributed to two intelligence reports during the reporting period, but his value to the Station lies primarily in operational reporting and his status as a unilateral penetration not known to be in contact with JKLANCE in any way.

CIFENCE-4

SECRET

SECRET

ND [illegible]

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/3/V - N. Davis

NUMBER
201-300985

SUBJECT
CIFENCE/4

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

lc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela.

PART I & II

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

[illegible], JR.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	17 January 1972

FORM 1-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535
[illegible]

FILE NO. (If any)	
DATE	12-7-71
PREPARED BY (person, office)	Terry-Airport

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) POSADA	First Name Luis	Middle Initial b C
COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP Venezuela b [illegible] 12-20-71		
UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code) Hotel Savoy		
AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL VIASA 746		
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE Ave 56 #137 Caracas, Venezuela		
BIRTH DATE Feb 15, 1928	BIRTH PLACE Caracas	

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION Miami 1201-71
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION A-2 D/S
DESTINATION Same As Above

NAI- 5 JAN 72-RED

Other agencies are requested to furnish any deregatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: CIA

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

FORM I-37
(REV. 8-1-71) Y

201- 300985

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente		**201-300985**

WH/3/V ✓

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP

(18)

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.			
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-300985		

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

1971

SECRET

28 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4 (201-300985)

1. It is requested that a POA be granted for Subject's use as a penetration of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP), a Venezuelan Security Service. Since Subject holds a key position in this organization, he will be able to monitor its intelligence operations as well as Venezuelan political matters.

2. All current traces on Subject are non-derogatory. (See attachment to Form 772 for additional information).

3. Request for Approval, COMINT Name Check and PRQ Part I (dated 28 May 68) are attached. Updated PRQ Part I and Part II will be requested from Station.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As Stated Above

WH/3/V:Nancy L. Davis:jev (28 December 1971

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI/OA w/atts.
(1 - 201-300985) CIFENCE-4
1 - WH/3/V Memo Chrono
w/o atts.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

COMMENTS RE DEROGATORY TRACES
ATTACHMENT TO FORM 772

1. A POA was requested on Subject in January 1968 for his use as a penetration of Venezuelan General Directorate of Police. Cancellation was requested in February 1968 because of indications that Subject was involved in "clandestine sabotage activity and suspicions that Subject failed to report his activities to CIA. Thereafter, Subject was treated as a "hostile". In the ensuing months Subject was described as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of his important and accurate intelligence information and operational reports. Subject was given a polygraph examination to clear up questions about possible affiliation with Cuban intelligence, unreported association with gangster elements, etc. His responses showed no information which would prevent CIA using him for ops purposes. Request for POA was again requested on 7 September 1968. This POA request was turned down on 15 October due to Subject being an "agent of a foreign power."

2. Since that time Subject has continued to provide verbal and written information reports concerning Communist and subversive elements, guerrilla activities, Soviet activities, sabotage, etc. Subject continues to report accurately and often and has a very pro-U.S. attitude. Subject was again polygraphed on 29 November 1971 (a copy of which is contained in Subject's CI/OA folder). His responses indicated no deception concerning truthfulness of reporting to CIA, no compromise of his U.S. Government connections, non-involvement in illegal arms dealings, etc.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM W

TO: Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: SGSWIRL Reports on CIFENCE-4 and CIURBAN-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Attached, for your information, are the SGSWIRL reports on CIFENCE-4 and CIURBAN-1. The Identity sheets to these reports are being sent under separate cover.

J.T.B.

John T. BACHHUBER

Attachments:
As Stated Above h/w
Identity Sheets u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO: B-201-771746

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCW-9612

DATE: 8 DEC 1971
typed 2 December 1971

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:
✓201-300985
~~201-771746~~

2 - IP
1 - Chrono

AN
AD
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PS
SX
DESENSITIZED
FI
WH/3/V

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: WH/3/Venezuela:Eric Isenstead:kmg

EXT.: 1535

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	2 Dec	Philip F. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WH/3

DATE: 2 DEC 1971

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: R L Conolly
Richard L. Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

1		5	
		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 33 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

FILE, VR YPIAN/cloes aloa ⑥

ACTION NO. 630

S E C R E T 011946Z DEC 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 1325

IN 482038

NMIM

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)

1. CIFENCE-4'S ARRIVAL MIAMI MONITORED AS REQUESTED IN REF. NO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN	
AS	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~RX~~	
~~DES~~	NFD
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WH/N	

CS COPY

SECRET

1 DEC 71

201-300985

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 18-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ERIC ISENSTEAD
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ___ PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE VR, IP/AN, SECUR 4, CS/DO, CI/OPS also ⑦

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2DEC71 23 40z CITE DIRECTOR 207472

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)*

1. RE TRAVEL CIFENCE-4 TO MIAMI: CAN YOU PROVIDE DATE HE EXPECTS RETURN CARACAS AS WELL AS AIRLINE AND FLT NUMBER? THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE USEFUL IN PICKING UP HIS IMMIGRATION FORM WHEN HE LEAVES MIAMI.

2. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

*Informed us that CIFENCE-4 traveled to Miami on 1 December using Official Venezuelan passport. Since he is a registered resident alien of the U.S., we must arrange to have his entrance and exit documents retrived from Immigration and Naturalization Service.

AN
AR X
WH/3/V

AAS/OS Mr. Wienckowski (telecord)
C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R ICHARD L. CONOLLY
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2 Dec 71
201-300985

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ACTION UNIT: WH8 INFO FILE, VR IP/AN CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 88 5

S E C R E T 032320Z DEC 71 CITE CARACAS 18403

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 3Dec IN484396

REF: DIRECTOR 207472

1. CIFENCE-4 ANTICIPATED ONLY TWO OR THREE DAYS MIAMI; MAY THEREFORE RETURN 3 OR 4 DECEMBER. WHILE NOT CERTAIN HE LIKELY WILL USE VIASA FLT DEPARTING MIAMI DAILY AT 1430 HRS. SUGGEST CHECK VIASA RESERVATIONS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~DX~~
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ACTION UNIT WHB

FILE, VR ve/ov, ci/ops, ci, fi, ci/oa,

ACTION NO. 495

8

S E C R E T 302120Z NOV 71 CITE CARACAS 18369

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

30 Nov IN 481013

1. CIFENCE-4 WILL TRAVEL MIAMI 1 DEC VIA VIASA FLT 740 ARRIVING 1200 LOCAL. TRAVELING IN TRUE NAME WITH VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL PASSPORT WHICH SHOWS HIS DPOB AS CARACAS 17 FEB 1928. CIFENCE-4 SENT BY HIS EMPLOYER TO PURCHASE TWENTY-FIVE NINE MILIMETER PISTOLS FOR USE OF GOV. HE WAS UNABLE TO REFUSE OR EVADE THE ASSIGNMENT.

2. CIFENCE-4 IS A REGISTERED RESIDENT ALIEN OF WOCORK. STATION DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DIFFICULTY EXCEPT IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY IMMIGRATION LEARNS OF HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY STATION TO SAY NOTHING OF THIS AND STICK TO STORY THAT HE GOV OFFICIAL AS INDICATED IN PASSPORT.

3. IF MIAMI HAS LIAISON CAPABILITY WOULD APPRECIATE MONITOR OF ARRIVAL CIFENCE-4 WITH CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE IF NECESSARY. SENDING IDENTITY CABLE TO MIAMI.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN

FI

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30 NOV 71
201-300985

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INFO FILE, VR ID/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI,

ACTION NO 496

(8)

S E C R E T 302130Z NOV 71 CITE CARACAS 18370

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 18369 (IN 481013)

30 Nov IN 481018

1. IDENTITY: LUIS POSADA CARRILES

DPOB: 15 FEB 28, CIENFUEGOS, CUBA

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

30 NOV 71
201-300985

14-00000

SEC. CL. S
ORIGIN OS/IRD
CONTROL NO. IRDW 72501
DATE OF DOC
DATE REC'D
DATE OUT
SUSPENSE DATE
CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILING

TO WH/3 3 B 2627
FROM OS/IRD 1 F 16
SUBJ. CIFENCE/4

Rec'd by Samuel R. [illegible]

Date 1 Dec 1971

PLEASE RETURN THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT TO 08/IRD 1 F 16.

ROUTING	DATE SENT
WH/3	11/30/71

COURIER NO.
ANSWERED
NO REPLY

2

TO : WH/3 29 November 1971

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4 IRD# 72501

BACKGROUND:

Subject, CIFENCE/4, is a 49-year-old, male, citizen of IDEN A who has been of continuing interest to JKLANCE since initial contact. He has permanent resident alien status in WOCORK as does his wife. He was last SGSWIRLed on 23 May 1968 with favorable results. Subject claimed that during service with IDEN E and previous service with JKLANCE, he had been SGSWIRLed and estimated the total number of SGSWIRLs he has had at twelve to fifteen.

PROCEDURE:

On 3 November 1971, CIFENCE/4 was given a SGSWIRL at a covert site in IDEN C. Both the English and Spanish languages were utilized in discussing the SGSWIRL and the Case Officer, Edgar B. MARTEGANI, served as interpreter. During the SGSWIRL, the English language was used. The undersigned was introduced as Mr. Bob MOUNT from WOCORK.

PURPOSE:

The SGSWIRL was requested by Edgar B. MARTEGANI to determine whether Subject knows if any member of IDEN D and specifically if IDEN E is aware or suspects his current JKLANCE connections; if he has been requested to work against LNLUTE; if since May 1968 he has been in contact with or heard about IDEN F or IDEN G; if since May 1968 Subject has been involved in illegal arms smuggling. Specific questions utilized during the SGSWIRL are given later in this report.

CONCLUSION:

There were no unresolved reactions indicative of deception. It is the opinion of the undersigned that Subject answered all questions truth-

[illegible]

IRD# 72501
Page 2
29 November 1971

fully. Apparently Subject is unaware of any compromise of his LNLUTF connections; has been truthful in his reports to JKLANCE; has not been involved in any illegal arms dealings other than smuggling weapons into IDEN A for his personal use and the personal use of other members of IDEN D and related organizations; has not been asked to work against LNLUTF and has received no information from or about IDEN F or IDEN G.

DETAILS:

Subject was co-operative throughout the SGSWIRL and did not hesitate to assist in rephrasing questions and explaining his responses. He seemed open and frank in response to all queries. Subject exhibited a response to the question concerning IDEN F and IDEN G. Discussion of the issue elicited the information that Subject had received some information concerning a son of one of these individuals. He also mentioned that on a trip to IDEN H a few years ago he had spoken by telephone to IDEN I but no mention had been made of IDEN F or IDEN G. Subject also showed a response to the question concerning illegal arms dealing. He explained that when he travelled outside of the country he brought back pistols, rifles, and on one occasion a shotgun. These weapons were for his personal use or were purchased for friends such as IDEN E or members of IDEN D. He stated that the weapons were brought in illegally and that even possession of the rifles (which were for his own use) was illegal. Specific questions concerning these arms dealings were asked. Based on the sessions results, it appears that while Subject has smuggled arms into IDEN A and possesses illegal arms, he has not been involved in smuggling large amounts of arms for personal profit or engaged since May 1968 in smuggling weapons of war into IDEN A.

Specific questions utilized during the SGSWIRL were as follows:

Were you born in IDEN J? Yes

Did you reside in WOCORK? Yes.

Are you concealing the identity of anyone who knows you work for JKLANCE? No

IRD# 72501
Page 3
29 November 1971

Does IDEN E know or suspect your present relationship with JKLANCE in IDEN A? No

Does your wife know you work for JKLANCE? Yes

Have you told IDEN K that you worked for JKLANCE? No

Have you ever been to IDEN L? Yes

Do you suspect that the IDEN M is deliberately giving you information to give to JKLANCE? No

Do you live in IDEN C? Yes

Are you employed by the IDEN M? Yes

Since May 1968, have you been involved in illegal arms smuggling? No

Since May 1968, have you had any information about or contact with IDEN F or IDEN G that you are concealing from us? No

Do you have permanent resident alien status in WOCORK? Yes

Has anyone asked you to work against LNLUTE? No

Would you like to go back to IDEN J to live? No

H. Maxwell Padon II

Distribution:
Orig. - True, Lawrence, Gaynor
1 - Lawrence
1 - CI/OA
1 - WH/3
1 - Field
1 - File

OS/IRD/HMP:lhs

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IDENTITY SHEET

IRD# 72501

29 November 1971

IDEN A	Venezuela
IDEN B	U.S. Army
IDEN C	Caracas, Venezuela
IDEN D	DISIP, a Venezuelan security service
IDEN E	Dr. UZCATEGUI, CIFENCE/1
IDEN F	Subject's brother, Raul
IDEN G	Subject's brother, Roberto
IDEN H	Columbia
IDEN I	Subject's mother
IDEN J	Cuba
IDEN K	Orlano GARCIA
IDEN L	Miami, Florida
IDEN M	Venezuelan government
IDEN N	police

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: C/WH/3/V -	DATE 7 December 1971 lc
	201 NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA NO[illegible] K. O[illegible], JR. Approval Officer x-1886 or x-9352	SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES (Incl. COMINT)	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: XXX FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Is Subject currently being used as an operational asset? If so, it is without a proper covert approval. Please advise agent status.

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ACTION NO. 367

(5)

SECRET 131335Z OCT 71 CITE CARACAS 18079

13 OCT IN 445046

DIRECTOR

SGSWIRL

REF BOOK DISPATCH 8084, 1 OCTOBER 1971

1. STATION PROPOSES SGSWIRL CIFENCE-4 AND CIURBAN-1.

2. FILE: 201-300985, 201-771746 GP-1

SECRET

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 06 1972
MICROFILMED

AN
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RS HR
DX 4
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JJH/3/✓

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13 OCT 71
201-300985

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ACTION NO. 496 CA 5 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI-3, INT, RI/AN, EUR-6, COPS, CI

S E C R E T 022200Z SEP 71 CITE CARACAS 17845

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 169864

2 SEP IN 415600

1. MINISTER OF INTERIOR LORENZO FERNANDEZ DEPARTED VENEZUELA EVENING 1 SEPTEMBER FOR EUROPEAN VACATION. REPORTED "EL UNIVERSAL" 27 AUGUST.

2. CIFENCE-4 NOTIFIED 30 AUGUST HE TO ACCOMPANY INTERIOR MINISTER. TRIP ESTIMATED ONE MONTH TO SIX WEEKS, AND CIFENCE-4 MENTIONED SWEDEN, ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND ITALY AS ON ITINERARY. WHILE TRIP OSTENSIBLY VACATION, IT WIDELY SPECULATED THAT FERNANDEZ TOUCHING BASE FOR POLITICAL REASONS PRIOR TO ANNOUNCING HIS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY UPON RETURN. HE KNOWN TO BE FAVORED CANDIDATE OF PRESIDENT CALDERA.

3. CIFENCE-4 INSTRUCTED TO REPORT ITINERARY, PERSONS CONTACTED, AND TO EXTENT POSSIBLE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

4. RE REF, THIS ANOTHER STRONG INDICATION CIFENCE-4 NOT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED BY GOV OF JKLANCE AFFILIATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

AN SW
AD ~~X~~
~~IN~~
~~PG~~
~~BX~~
~~DB3~~ ~~PFD~~
FI

30 DEC 1971

[redacted]

CIFENCE-4
201-300985
02 Sep 71

CS COPY

SECRET

4. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 continued to be a reliable, steady Station asset who continues to be one of CIFENCE-1's closest and most trusted associates. CIFENCE-1 has a great deal of confidence in CIFENCE-4 and always assigns him the most difficult jobs which he feels none of his other employees can handle. During a great deal of this reporting period, CIFENCE-4 was out of Venezuela on special missions for CIFENCE-1. He travelled to Lima, Peru to send a bomb which would not explode to the home of Perez Jimenez, went to Curacao to conduct a special investigation and spent considerable time on the Colombian border. He contributed to two disseminated intelligence reports dealing with military intelligence about Colombian activities collected by a Venezuelan security service and the reported presence of eleven Venezuelan fishing boats and one warship in Colombian territorial waters. CIFENCE-1 has appointed CIFENCE-4 chief of the division of CIRASH

continued....

201

which is responsible for coordinating all of the activities of the CIRASH offices located outside Caracas. Such a position should offer CIFENCE-4 access tovarious types of information and targets of interest to JKLANCE. As was said in the last CIFLUTE operational report, the Station continues tothink very highly of CIFENCE-4 and looks forward to a continuing productive relationship with him.

30 July 1971

HVCA-18379

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 17-1

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ORIG: W.H. WALKER:jcv
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535 RED
DATE: 12 AUGUST 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 35 PER

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XX FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985 & 201-067860.

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, FI, CI/OPS

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 12AUG71 22 35z

(elite) (pica) (reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 169864

CARACAS

REF WH/MIAMI-12203 (IN-395041)*

1. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS ON PARA 1 B REF.

2. FILE 201-300985 AND 201-067860.

END OF MESSAGE

IP

*Paragraph 1 B of reference indicated that official Venezuelan services know that Station agent CIFENCE-4 works for JKLANCE and are feeding him false information.

WH/FI ✓

~~CI/~~________

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
PS 4K
BX 4
~~DES~~ NPD
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

B201-067860

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R.L. Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

12 AUG 71
201-300985

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION NO: 589

S E C R E T 052052Z AUG 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12203 (SHOQUIST ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

5 Aug IN 355041 88

1. LOCAL LNERGO PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM A RELIABLE LNERGO SOURCE (WHICH THEY REQUEST THAT WE PROTECT):

A. ORLANDO GARCIA IS PRESENTLY IN MIAMI AND PLANS TO RETURN TO VENEZUELA VERY SOON, POSSIBLY ON 4 AUGUST. GARCIA WAS DESCRIBED BY SOURCE AS BEING A CUBAN IN THE EMPLOY OF THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AND WHO IS FRIENDLY WITH SEVERAL PROMINENT LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS.

NP

[illegible] 201s are included.

B. GARCIA SAID THAT LUIS POSADA, A CUBAN WHO HEADS A VENEZUELAN INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY, WORKS FOR JKLANCE. GARCIA SAID THAT OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICES (UNIDENTIFIED) KNOW THAT POSADA WORKS FOR JKLANCE AND THAT, KNOWING THIS, ARE FEEDING HIM FALSE INFORMATION.

2. WE PRESUME THAT GARCIA AND POSADA ARE RESPECTIVELY IDENTICAL TO ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ (201-067860) AND LUIS POSADA CARRILES (201-300985).

3. FILE: 201-067860 AND 201-300985. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Caracas XX

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Transmittal of CIFENCE-4 U.S. Reentry Permits

REFERENCE: HVCT-5177, 27 March 1971

Transmitted by separate cover attachment are revalidated U.S. Reentry Permits for CIFENCE-4 and his wife.

Clement P. DOZOIS

Attachment: U/S/C
Two Reentry Permits

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, Caracas, w/att.

28 APR 1971

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HVCS-3466

SECRET 201-300985

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1 - 201-300985
w/o att.
1 - WH/Registry
w/o att.

WH/3/V:William H. Walker:jev (23 April 71) 1535

C/WH/3/V A. D. Wedemeyer

AC/WH/3 Richard Conolly

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 16 April 1971
ATTENTION : Chief, WH/3/V - Henry Applebaum
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECTS : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated 6 April 1971.

THIS [illegible] EXTENDED

Reentry Permits ~~was~~ were issued for subjects on 16 April 1970, and ~~is~~ have been extended valid to 15 April 1972. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. ~~Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U.S. Consuls and U.S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.~~

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permit #0235566 (POSADA) and 0235567: (NIEVES)

Signature 22 April 71
Date

OS/AAS/EStark 16 April 1971

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15/3 SEP. 118(EO)

APR 14 12 40 Z PRECEDENCE

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C/WH 2 FILE, VR SDP, ADDP

6-23

"EYES ONLY"

SECRET 141546Z APR 71 CITE CARACAS 16913

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LIMA

RYBAT

IN 311053

1. ON 13 APRIL 1971, UNILATERAL AGENT CIFENCE-4 (IDENTITY FOR LIMA) SAID HE AND ANOTHER OFFICIAL OF SERVICIOS ESPECIALES (SE), INTELLIGENCE SECURITY AGENCY OF THE VENEZUELAN MILISTRY OF INTERIOR, WOULD LEAVE CARACAS MORNING 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. THEIR MISSION TO OBTAIN THE HOME ADDRESSES OF MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ AND PEDRO ESTRADA. AFTER OBTAINING THE ADDRESS OF PEREZ HIMENEZ, CIFENCE-4 IS TO SEND A LETTER TO HIM POINTING OUT IN GENERAL TERMS POSSIBLE DANGERS IF HE RETURNS TO VENEZUELA.

2. LETTER SIGNED WITH NAME CARLOS FOSSI A, WHO DESCRIBES SELF AS LOW LEVEL PEREZ JIMENEZ FOLLOWER WHOSE NAME JIMENEZ PROBABLY WILL NOT RECOGNIZE. NO STATION TRACES FOSSI, AND BELIEVE HE PROBABLY FICTITIOUS CHARACTER. LETTER ACCUSES POLITICIANS WHO URGING PEREZ JIMENEZ RETURN OF THINKING ONLY OF PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT AND IGNORING HAZARDS INVOLVED. IT ACCUSES LT. HUGO EARILLAS OF BEING GOV PENETRATION OF CRUZADA CIVICA

FYI

Answered

File CIFENCE-4 201

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

NACIONALISTA. STATION FILES SHOW RETIRED LT HUGO BARILLAS HERRERA, AKA JORGE HUGO BARRILLAS HERRERA, DOB: 1 APRIL 1936, HAD LONG RECORD OF CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES AGAINST AD GOVERNMENTS. HE WAS HIRED 1959 BY GOV ORGANIZATION COSERI OPERATED BY MINIT UNDER COMMERCIAL COVER TO CONDUCT INTEL AND RELATED ACTIVITIES. PRESUMABLY BARILLAS NOW OUT OF FAVOR WITH INTERIOR MINISTRY AND BEING FINGERED TO PEREZ JIMENEZ. LETTER SAYS IT TO BE DELIVERED BY MUTUAL FRIEND "DR. RAMITO SANDOVAL." NO TRACES ON SANDOVAL.

3. AFTER SENDING THE LETTER CIFENCE-4 IS TO SEND A PACKAGE CONTAINING AN AUTHENIC BOMB THAT IS TO BE ADJUSTED SO AS NOT TO EXPLODE. CIFENCE-4 SAID THE ORDER FOR THIS MISSION WAS GIVEN BY DR. REMBERTO UZCATEGUI, THE DIRECTOR OF SE AND FEELS THE OPERATION IS DESIGNED TO FRIGHTEN PEREZ JIMENEZ. CIFENCE-4 WILL CARRY ALL THE MATERIAL NECESSARY TO ASSEMBLE BOMB IN LIMA. UPON COMPLETION OF MISSION IN LIMA, CIFENCE-4 AND COMPANION TO TRAVEL TO BUENOS AIRES FOR ONE OR TWO DAYS AND THEN TO BRAZIL FOR ANOTHER

SECRET

14-00000

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

ONE OR TWO DAYS AND THEN RETURN TO CARACAS. CIFENCE-4 SAID ESTRADA ADDRESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONAL USE AGAINST HIM.

4. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WILL BE TRAVELLING AS GILBERTO OTERO VILORIA AND WILL USE A REGULAR VENEZUELAN PASPORT. THE TRUE NAME OF THE MAN TRAVELLING WITH HIM IS RAFAEL GUZMAN. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WISHES TO PERFORM HIS MISSION IN LIMA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND FOR THIS REASON ASKS OF JKLANCE IN LIMA COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE HIM THE ADDRESSES OF BOTH PEREZ JIMENEZ AND ESTRADA. HE SAID UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN LIMA ON 14 APRIL, HE WILL IMMEDIATELY SEEK OUT CONTACTS WHO POSSIBLY CAN PROVIDE HIM WITH THE ADDRESSES HE WISHES. IF JKLANCE IN LIMA CAN PROVIDE THE ADDRESSES HE SAID HE COULD TELL HIS ASSOCIATE THAT THE ADDRESSES WERE PROVIDED BY ONE OF THE CONTACTS HE MADE ON 14 APRIL. IF JKLANCE CAN PROVIDE THIS ASSISTANCE, CONTACT WITH CIFENCE-4 SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE 9 A.M. ON 15 APRIL. THE PERSON MAKING THE CONTACT SHOULD TELEPHONE THE HOTEL CARRILLON ASK FOR GILBERTO OTERO VILORIO, AND SAY THIS IS NUMBER EIGHT

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3753 SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY

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PAGE 4 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

(8) CALLING. CIFENCE-4 WILL REPLY THAT HE IS NUMBER NINE (9). THESE TWO NUMBERS TOTALLING 17 (SEVENTEEN) WILL INDICATE TO THE CALLER THAT HE ACTUALLY IS TALKING TO CIFENCE-4. CONTACT WITH CIFENCE-4 SHOULD BE MADE FROM A PUBLIC TELEPHONE BOOTH. THE ADDRESSES CAN BE GIVEN TO CIFENCE-4 OVER THE TELEPHONE. IN CASE, HOWEVER, PERSONAL CONTACT IS DESIRED WITH CIFENCE-4, ARRANGEMENT FOR A MEETING CAN BE MADE BY TELEPHONE.

5. THE MATERIALS CIFENCE-4 WILL CARRY TO ASSEMBLE BOMB ARE: ABOUT ONE QUARTER POUND OF PENTOLITE EXPLOSIVE, TWO DETONATORS AND M-1 DELAYING DEVICE. CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WILL PERFORM THIS OPERATION IN LIMA WITH OR WITHOUT THE HELP OF JKLANCE. IF JKLANCE CAN HELP HIM, HE FEELS THIS WILL LESSEN HIS CHANCES OF POSSIBLY BEING ARRESTED IN LIMA FOR SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES.

6. CARACAS STATION RECOMMENDS THAT ADDRESSES NOT BE PROVIDED TO CIFENCE-4 AND CONTACT NOT BE MADE, BUT DEFERS TO HEADQUARTERS IF IT SEES SOME OVERRIDING REASON FOR DOING SO.

SECRET

3750

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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BY ____ AT ____ Z

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 5 CARACAS 16913 SECRET

7. STATION DISSEMINATING GIST OF ABOVE TO AMBASSADOR ONLY. DISSEM WILL NOT INDICATE ONE OF OUR AGENTS INVOLVED, NOT THAT WE HAVE BEEN ASKED ASSIST. RECOMMEND HEADQUARTERS DISSEM, IF ANY, BE RESTRICTED AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE.

8. FILE: DEFER. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

JEW

A.D. WEDEMEYER:jcv
C/WH/3/V
1535 RED
14 APRIL 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2-1

S E C R E T

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ___ PER ___

☐ INDEX XX NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH XX FILE RID

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-003243

FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP 14 20 Z APR 71 "EYES ONLY"

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 130374

IMMEDIATE CARACAS PRIORITY LIMA

RYBAT

REF CARACAS-16913 (IN-311053)*

1. FULLY CONCUR IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION PARA 6 REF. WE SHOULD NOT ASSIST OR BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THIS SCHEME.

2. FILE 201-003243.

END OF MESSAGE

*Station liaison penetration CIFENCE-4 being sent by CIFENCE service to Lima to assemble bomb to be sent to former Venezuelan dictator Perez Jimenez. Bomb will be authentic but designed not to explode. CIFENCE-4 has requested that Lima Station help him in his mission but Caracas Station recommends no help be given.

File CIFENCE-4 201

James E. Flannery for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RhConolly
RICHARD CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

6 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: A1S/OS

ATTENTION : Mr. John Rooney

SUBJECT : Revalidation of U.S. Reentry Permits of CIFENCE-4 and Wife

REFERENCE : DIRECTOR-120632

1. Attached herewith are Form I-143's and reentry permits for CIFENCE-4 and his wife. CIFENCE-4 is presently employed as an asset of Caracas Station.

2. We would appreciate your having the reentry permits revalidated. A U.S. Postal Money Order for $20 is attached herewith to cover payment of the necessary fees.

3. Please return the revalidated permits to us for forwarding to Caracas Station.

Henry Appelbaum
WH/3/V

Attachments: H/W
1. Form I-143's (2 sets)
2. Reentry Permits (2)
3. Money Order (1)

WH/3/V:Henry Appelbaum:jev (6 April 1971)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/atts.
1 - 201-300985 (CIFENCE-4) w/o atts.
1 - WH/Registry w/o atts.
1 - WH/3/V Memo Chrono w/o atts.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
CIFLUTE/CIFENCE - Transmittal of Permits to Re-enter the United States & Applications for Extension of Permits for CIFENCE-4 & wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Extension of Permits

DIRECTOR 120632

Per reference, transmitted under separate cover are the Permits to Re-enter the United States for CIFENCE-4 and his wife and completed and signed applications for extension of these permits. It will be appreciated if Headquarters can complete item 7 on both of these applications. It also will be appreciated if Headquarters can pay the fees which must accompany these applications and TA the cost to the Caracas Station.

Gordon K. Rijock
Gordon K. RIJOCK

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover
Reentry Permits

DISTRIBUTION:
3-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

MAR 2[illegible] 1971

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCT - 5177

DATE
25 March 1971

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

c. CIFENCE-4 The same method for emergency recontact as described for CIHURON-1, but with entirely different locations, will be used for emergency recontact with CIFENCE-4. If all personal contact between CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK is deemed unwise, another Case Officer or an outside agent handler with proper bona fides and recognition signals will be used to contact CIFENCE-4.

HVCA-18146
19 Mar 71

c. CIFENCE-4   CIFENCE-4 is met clandestinely in a Safehouse or the automobile of either CIFENCE-4 or RIJOCK. Meetings are scheduled at previous meetings or by use of the system described in Attachment 2 of HVCA-17565, dated 21 April 1970. The only change in the system described in Attachment 2 of HVCA-17565 is that the word "peluqueria" has been substituted for "the usual place" (which means the Safehouse) and "costurera" has been substituted for "the location near my home".

HVCA-18[illegible]
19 Mar [illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

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H. Applebaum:pd
WH/3/V
1535
1535

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

3Y PER ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

FILE, VR. copy secret

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 16 23

CITE DIRECTOR 120632

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

1. (C) U.S. REENTRY PERMITS OF CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE MUST BE REVALIDATED PRIOR TO 15 APRIL EXPIRATION DATE. IF U.S. CONSUL IN CARACAS CANNOT REVALIDATE, BOTH PERMITS SHOULD BE FORWARDED SOONEST TO HQS. EACH PERMIT SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY COMPLETED AND SIGNED FORM I-143. POUCHING ADDITIONAL FORM I-143'S 19 MARCH.

2. FILE 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB
WH/3/V

201-300985

Alien Affairs Staff Mr. L. Wienckowski (Telecoord)

16 Mar 71

R. Conolly

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

RICHARD CONOLLY
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	S E C R E T
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, Caracas
SUBJECT	Forwarding of Photograph of Subject of 201-300985
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES	

Reference: HVCS-3405, 27 January 1971

In compliance with reference request, attached is the photograph of Subject of 201-300985.

Teresa G. FRIGONA

Attachment:
Photograph, ~~h/w~~ c/s/c

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, ~~h/w~~ c/s/c

3/c att att'd RID/AN
18 Mar 71

1 Att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-18115	DATE MAR 12 1971
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300995

SECRET

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: HVCA-18115

TO: CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, CARACAS

SECRET

CS COPY

201-300985

S/C att 1
to HVCA 18115



Photographs of C/4 and wife
Taken in 1970





1970

SUBJ: CIFLUTE Operational Report for Period November thru December 1970

HVCA-18070, 20 February 1971, FILED: 75-2-16/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 18070

3. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 continued to be a reliable, steady Station asset who enjoys the confidence of and has a very close working relationship with CIFENCE-1. During most of the reporting period, he was in charge of the surveillance of the newly arrived Soviet diplomats and was quick to pass to the Station any information coming into his possession which he felt would be of value to JKLANCE. Because most of his time was devoted to coverage of the Soviets, he was unable to give the Station the large variety and number of reports which in the past has been his custom. The Station continues to think very highly of CIFENCE-4 and looks forward to a continuing productive relationship with him.

1970

4. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 continues to be a reliable and steady Station asset who enjoys the confidence of and has a very close working relationship with CIFENCE-1. His recent acquisition of Venezuelan citizenship has increased his stature with CIFENCE-1 and among the Venezuelans with whom he works. He continues on his own to provide information coming into his possession which he feels will be of interest to JKLANCE and also continues to pass to the Station numerous reports from CIFENCE and other security-intelligence agencies. His most valuable contribution during this reporting period was the information indicating that a CIFENCE officer had information which could have led to the discovery by CIFENCE of the Station's CIGRAPE operation. CIFENCE-4 was able to convince this officer in a very discreet, innocuous manner that the information was of no value and should not be brought to the attention of CIFENCE-1. The officer was convinced, and no investigation was conducted. In the meantime, the Station completely disbanded the CIGRAPE operation. At each meeting with his Case Officer, CIFENCE-4 is asked if there is anything new in regard to this case and he has replied there are no new developments and feels the issue is a dead one. The Station feels the original information from CIFENCE-4 is the type that really proves the value of a good asset. Interesting documents provided by CIFENCE-4 during this reporting period include a list of all personnel working in Venezuelan diplomatic missions abroad, a CIFENCE report about the investigation of the purchase of arms in Miami by unknown elements in the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense, a package containing several documents from CIFENCE and other sources about Communist activities in Venezuela, a report dealing with possible conspiring against the GOV by Venezuelan military officers, a list of various subversive organizations located in several different countries, a report about the possible presence in Venezuela of Colonel Caamano Deno,

201 - CIFENCE-4

a report about the reorganization of CIFENCE, a list identifying automobile license plates used by foreign diplomats in Venezuela, a list of personnel employed by CIRASH, a key to the communications code used by CIRASH, the CIFENCE report about the surveillance of YEBALM during his most recent trip to Caracas and copies of CIFENCE reports about the surveillance of the first two Soviet diplomats now in Caracas. In addition, CIFENCE-4 has conducted name traces and identified automobile license plates for the Station and soon will provide unidentifiable license plates for use by the Station on vehicles rented for surveillance and other operational needs.

CIFENCE-4 is chief of the operations section of CIFENCE and, as such, has responsibility for surveillance of Soviet and Bloc personnel in Venezuela. Through him, the Station has the means of monitoring quite closely the movements and activities of these persons. Also, we are able to direct CIFENCE-4 to conduct special surveillances of Soviet and Bloc person who may not be under surveillance by CIFENCE as a routine procedure. The current position of CIFENCE-4 within CIFENCE is very good and should remain so as long as CIFENCE-1 remains as head of CIFENCE. CIFENCE-4 feels there is a good possiblity that if CIFENCE-1 leaves his present position he (CIFENCE-4) will be removed from CIFENCE. Should this happen, the Station will lose access to an important position within CIFENCE and CIFENCE-4 will lose his principal source of income. CIFENCE-4 has said several times he would like to have a career with JKLANCE and would be willing to work in any country of the world for us. If CIFENCE-4 eventually loses his position within CIFENCE and is unable to obtain another position in Venezuela that would provide access of interest to JKLANCE, Headquarters may wish to consider using him in some other country.

1970

See HVCA 17828, 26 October 70, re CIFENCE belief that CIGRAPE/2 is working for CIA. CIFENCE/4 advised the station of this, and ~~will~~ was told to do what he can to initiate a full-scale CIFENCE investigation of CIGRAPE/2, under his own direction, in order to remove the suspicions. He said it would be hard to do this without attracting undue interest, but he will remain alert to the problem and try to take charge of any investigation that may get under way.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Port of Spain

SUBJECT
CIFLUTE/CIFENCE
Possible Future Contact with CIFENCE-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HVCA-17611, 14 May 1970

A.R.: Paragraphs 2 and 3 below

1. I appreciate Caracas' offer for possible future contact with CIFENCE-4 in the event of another emergency situation in Trinidad, a possibility which should not be totally ruled out. I was aware that four or five Venezuelan officials had arrived in Port of Spain shortly after the declaration of a state of emergency, but I had no contact with any of these individuals during their stay here.

2. I agree with CIFENCE-4 that it would have been to the station's advantage to have had contact with him during the period of the Regiment mutiny. To this end, I propose the following contact arrangements. When CIFENCE-4 has arrived in Port of Spain and has gotten himself set up, he should call Identity A on Identity B during normal office hours (0800-1700). One hour after telephonic contact has been made with Identity A, CIFENCE-4 will be picked up in Identity C at Identity D. In order to establish bona fides, the case officer will ask of CIFENCE-4 "Are you a friend of Pedro's?". CIFENCE-4 should respond "Yes, and of Tomas also.". Recognition signals having been exchanged and authenticated, I would feel free to ask CIFENCE-4 to keep me informed of developments from his side as they occurred.

3. Please provide a physical description of CIFENCE-4.

PHILIP K. ARNAYER

attd by RIDAN
23 Jun 70

Attchment: u/s/c
Identities A,B,C,D

CS COPY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att u/s/c
1 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1a File

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HWSA-1473

DATE
JUN 12 1970
Typed: 10 June 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-300985

SECRET

S/C Attachment to HWSA-1473

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Port of Spain

IDENTITY A: Mr. Steve Allen

IDENTITY B: 62-25832

IDENTITY C: White Valiant sedan, License #PL 7602

IDENTITY D: N.W. corner of Tragarete Road and French Street in western Port of Spain

SECRET

CS COPY

S/C ATT. 1 TO HWSA-01473

201-300955

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Port of Spain

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: CIFLUTE/CIFENCE - Recent Trip to Trinidad of CIFENCE-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As Stated Herein

1. CIFENCE-4 (IDENTITY under separate cover for Port of Spain), an agent of the Caracas Station, was in Port of Spain during the periods 21 - 22 April 1970 and 24 April - 3 May 1970. CIFENCE-4 said the purpose of his trip was to protect Venezuelans in Trinidad and to collect information about the situation in Trinidad for the Government of Venezuela. He gave the Caracas Station a copy of the report he prepared for the Venezuelan Government about his activities in Trinidad. A copy of this report is being sent under separate cover to Port of Spain for the information of the Station only.

2. CIFENCE-4 said it was too bad he had no contact with JKIANCE while in Trinidad, as he feels he could have provided timely on-the-spot information. If a situation in Trinidad similar to the previous one again arises, CIFENCE-4 feels he may have to return to Trinidad. If this happens, he is willing to have contact with JKIANCE if so desired. The Port of Spain Station is requested to advise the Caracas Station if this contact would be desired and, if so, to send Caracas a contact plan. Upon receipt of this plan, Caracas will advise the name and recognition signal CIFENCE-4 will use. CIFENCE-4 speaks fairly good English, so there should be no language barrier in communicating with him.

GORDON K. RIJOCK

ATTACHMENTS: Under Separate Cover
1. IDENTITY
2. CIFENCE-4 Report

DISTRIBUTION:
2-COS, Port of Spain, w/atts 1 & 2 u/s/c
2-C/WHD w/o atts

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCA 17611

DATE: MAY 19 1970

14 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓ 201-300985

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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☐ MICROFILM

TO
COS, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Re-Entry Permits

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR-028144

Transmitted under separate cover are new Re-Entry Permits for CIFENCE/4 and his wife.

Oliver H. LAFKO

Attachment: as stated above

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas, w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCW-9067	DATE 28 APR 1970 Typed: 28 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/V	M. Berger	rr	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	28 Ap, 70	A. D. Wedemeyer

Distribution:
1 - Chrono
1 - RID

AH
AB X
DX
DES RFD
FI
C/WH/3/V

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	28 Ap. 70	Alfonso Spera for

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

P

MICROFILMED
MAY 4 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. D. J. Brennan

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : O James Melville HART
Orlando GARCIA
Luis POSADA

1. Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum of 13 March 1970 entitled JAMES MELVILLE HART - REGISTRATION ACT - VENEZUELA.

2. Neither James Melville HART nor Orlando GARCIA has any operational relationship with this Agency, although their activities are of interest to us. We are not aware of any contact between them and Luis POSADA, and our Caracas station will attempt, through discreet soundings, to ascertain whether such contact did or does exist.

3. This Agency would appreciate receiving any information which the Bureau may develop concerning HART and GARCIA and the arms traffic in which they are reported to be involved.

IN
~~AB~~
~~TI~~
PS
DX 4
~~EFC~~
~~FI~~
WH/3/V

CSCI-316/01029-70

DDP/WH/3/V/N.Perkins:ljo (8 April 1970)

Based on: CARACAS 4838, 6 April 1970

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LIAISON
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/FI
1 - WH/3/V
1 - Chrono
3 - RID/AN
(1 - CIFENCE-4, 201-300985)
(1 - James Melville HART, 201-327674)
(1 - Orlando GARCIA, 201-067860)

CS COPY

201 - 300985
22 APR 70

B 201-327674
B 201-067860

GROUP 1
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SECRET

ORIG: M. BERGER:ljo
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1335
DATE: 22 APRIL 1970

SECRET

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BY 21 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 4 INFO FILE, VR. MEHN, Secur-4, CI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 24 0 13 2 Apr 70 CITE DIRECTOR 028147

TO CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 018266*

1. PLS ADVISE CIFENCE-4 HIS APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE APPROVED 16 APRIL 1970.

2. POUCHING NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE.

3. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested CIFENCE-4 and wife complete application forms for new U.S. Re-Entry Permits and Preservation of Residence (CIFENCE-4 only).

AN
AB ✓
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~RI~~
~~DYS/NFD~~
~~FI~~

C/OS/AAS L. Winkowski (telecord)

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO A. SPERA
C/WH/3

CS COPY

201-300985
24 Apr 70

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

24 April 70

operations smoother. Unfortunately, CIHURON-1's men are already planning a rearguard action to make CIFENCE-3's job as difficult as possible. The net result of this switch, however, has been to somewhat increase efficiency of the two services and to materially increase JKLANCE unilateral access to each. For awhile, this reorganization will be beneficial, but—because of the personalities of CIHASH-17 and CIFENCE-1—we do not expect either CIHURON-1 or CIFENCE-3 to indefinitely have smooth sailing.

2. CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4 provided verbal and written information reports about various subjects of interest such as activities of Communist and other subversive elements, guerrilla activities, counterfeiting of money and documents, sabotage, information about and activities of Soviets visiting Venezuela, kidnappings of well-known persons in Venezuela, CIFENCE operations and internal problems of CIFENCE. His position in CIFENCE as Chief of Operations provides him access to practically all written reports and documents prepared and received by CIFENCE. His daring as a dedicated agent for JKLANCE has enabled him to provide the Station with copies of several of these reports and documents. During this reporting period he has provided 119 copies of such reports and documents

Some of the more significant requests levied on CIFENCE-4 during this reporting period include the following: 1) assessment for the Station's SB Section of an employee of the Venezuelan Government's Oficina Central de Informaciones (OCI), 2) for the SB and CP Sections of the Station, collection of information about and assessment of a former employee of the local TASS office in Caracas, 3) provision for the SB Section of a list of the names and license plate numbers of the users of all diplomatic automobile license plates in Venezuela, 4) investigation for the Station's CP Section of the robbery of a large sum of money reportedly destined for financing the clandestine manufacture of arms, and 5) for the Station's Case Officer in charge of student operations, collection of information about and assessment of a former Station asset in whom there is a renewed operational interest.

CIFENCE-4

CIFENCE-4's current Case Officer is Gordon K. RIJOCK who meets with CIFENCE-4 in safehouse number 45 which was obtained during this reporting period. When RIJOCK wants to schedule a meeting with CIFENCE-4, RIJOCK's wife who speaks native Spanish with no American accent, telephones CIFENCE-4's home, identifies herself as "Maria" and asks to speak with the true first name of CIFENCE-4. If CIFENCE-4 is at home, RIJOCK's wife tells him she wants to meet with him at a certain time on a certain date at "the usual place" (which means the safehouse) and asks if the time and date are acceptable to him. If CIFENCE-4 says yes, RIJOCK meets with him at the safehouse. If he says no, RIJOCK's wife asks him to set a time and date. If these are acceptable to RIJOCK, the meeting is thereby scheduled and held. If RIJOCK wants CIFENCE-4 to pick him up in his automobile, "Maria" says she wants to meet him at a certain time on a certain date "at the location near my home". If the time and date are acceptable to CIFENCE-4, RIJOCK then walks to a site a few blocks from his home where CIFENCE-4 picks him up in his private automobile. If the time and date are not acceptable to CIFENCE-4, then "Maria" asks CIFENCE-4 to set a new time and date which, if acceptable to RIJOCK, serve as the schedule for the car pickup meeting. If CIFENCE-4 is not home, "Maria" requests that CIFENCE-4 telephone "Maria" as soon as possible. Upon returning to his home and receiving the message, CIFENCE-4 telephones RIJOCK's home from a public telephone, identifies himself as "Raul" and asks to speak to "Roberto". If RIJOCK is home, he and CIFENCE-4 talk directly and arrange a meeting. If RIJOCK is not home, CIFENCE-4 says "Raul" is calling and either he wants "Roberto" to contact him or he will call "Roberto" later. If the message is for "Roberto" to call him, then "Maria" telephones CIFENCE-4's home and follows the procedure described above. (NOTE: RIJOCK's wife makes all telephonic contact with CIFENCE-4's home, to give the impression to anyone monitoring CIFENCE-4's telephone that a native Spanish speaking "girlfriend" of CIFENCE-4 wants to talk with him.

In the event RIJOCK wishes to contact CIFENCE-4 while he is in his office, "Maria" telephones CIFENCE-4's wife, identifies herself as "Maria", says she wishes to speak with the true name of CIFENCE-4 and asks his wife to tell him to call her at a certain time. CIFENCE-4's wife then telephones him in his office and gives him the message from "Maria". If the time is acceptable to CIFENCE-4, he telephones RIJOCK's home from a public telephone and either arranges a meeting schedule with "Maria" (per prior instructions from RIJOCK) or speaks directly with RIJOCK to

HVCA-17565, 24 April 70

arrange a meeting. If the time is not acceptable to CIFENCE-4, he gives a new time to his wife who immediately thereafter conveys the new time via telephone to "Maria" who in turn conveys it to RIJOCK. If CIFENCE-4 is not in his office, his wife leaves a message for him to call her as soon as possible. In such a case, his wife advises "Maria" that he is not in his office but when he calls her, she will tell him to call "Maria" as soon as possible. A meeting is scheduled when CIFENCE-4 calls and talks to either "Maria" or RIJOCK. If it is urgent for RIJOCK to talk to CIFENCE-4 as soon as possible, CIFENCE-4's wife tells CIFENCE-4 that "Maria" wants to speak to him as soon as possible. If an emergency situation necessitated immediate contact with CIFENCE-4 in his office and his wife was not available to telephone him, "Maria" would telephone him in his office.

In the event RIJOCK and/or CIFENCE-4 do not want to meet in the safehouse and do not want a car pickup at the site agreed upon, a new site is agreed upon during the course of the telephonic contacts described above. For future use, CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK will make a list of primary and alternate meeting sites and assign numbers to each site selected. During telephonic contacts to establish meetings, only numbers will be used to designate the location of the meetings.

CIFENCE-4 and RIJOCK will discuss and prepare plans for contact under emergency/contingency conditions and for emergency re-contact. These plans will be forwarded to Headquarters as soon as they have been prepared.

SRAC is not used or contemplated for contacts with CIFENCE-4.

13

75-2-16/3

File: CIFENCE/4

201

DATE: 24 April 1970

ATTN : ~~Chief, WH/5 - Mike Burgoe~~

FROM : Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence concerning this case.

2. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, by letter dated 16 April 1970, has granted the benefits of Section 316(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to cover the subject's absence from the United States from 20 March 1970, to an indefinite period, thereafter, and so long as he remains absent on behalf of the United States Government, with the understanding that he will prove to the satisfaction of the Naturalization Court when he files a Petition for United States Citizenship, five years after entry for permanent residence, that he has been absent during this period for that purpose. The benefits of this Section of the Act also permit subject to count the period of his absence toward both the residence and physical presence requirements for naturalization, provided that, since becoming a permanent resident of the United States and before applying for naturalization, he has completed an uninterrupted period of one year of physical presence in the United States.

3. The letter is being retained in the files of this Office and it is requested you so advise Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles.

Louis Wienckowski
Louis Wienckowski
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

TO: Chief, WH/3 21 April 1970
ATTN: Mike Burger
FROM: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708) and Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated 6 April 19 70.

Reentry Permit ~~was~~ were issued for subjects on 16 April 1970 and/~~is~~ are valid to 15 April 1971. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of Validity of Permit must be made on the attached "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States" (I&NS Form I-143). In certain foreign areas U. S. Consuls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity dat ever, where security or cover considerations warrent, the Permit and Appli should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date e through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

$30.00
DOLLARS CENTS
5,693,081,404
PURCHASER'S RECEIPT
U.S. Postal Money Order
DETACH AND HOLD
FILL IN OTHER SIDE
ISSUING OFFICE STAMP
MIAMI, FL.
MAR 10 1970
PURCHASER ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR FILLING IN HIS NAME AND ADDRESS AND NAME OF PAYEE IN SPACES PROVIDED ON THIS ORDER

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis Wienckowski
Louis Wienckowski
Acting Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Receipt for above Permit acknowledged:
#0235566 and 0235567

Signature Date

OS/AAS/EStark 21 April 1970

SECRET (GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading & declassification)

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO, FI 2

ACTION NO. 635

S E C R E T 082215Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4858 (CAKA)

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

8 APR 70 IN 058848

REFS A. CARACAS 4838 (IN 057022)

B. DIRECTOR 022665

1. CIFENCE-4 DENIES ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH HART AND GARCIA IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA. SAYS HE HAS NEVER MET HART. DURING OCT 69 HE WENT TO MIAMI AT REQUEST OF CIFENCE-1 TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT HART TRAVELLING TO MIAMI TO PURCHASE *3000,000 DOLLARS WORTH OF WEAPONS. PRIOR TO TRIP HE TOLD CC HIS SEVERAL CONTACTS AMONG CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI WOULD FACILITATE INVESTIGATION. RE GARCIA, CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WAS INTRODUCED TO GARCIA CIRCA MAY 69 AND LAST TALKED TO HIM IN JUNE 69.

2. PERHAPS FBI MIAMI SOURCE IS ONE OF ARMS DEALERS CIVENCE-4 KNOWS AND TALKED TO DURING OCT INVESTIGATION OF HART. IF THIS TRUE, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SOURCE CONNECTED CIFENCE-4 WITH HART. GARCIA 201 FILE SHOWS HE DEALT WITH MIAMI ARMS DEALER IN OCT 63 ON BEHALF OF GOV. CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT GARCIA HAS HAD SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS.

3. FILE 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

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WH/3/V	

*WILL SVC UPON REQUEST.

CS COPY

Cifence-4

201-300985

08 Apr 70

SECRET

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☐ FILE RQ. ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY 39/76 PER

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI 2, CI/SO

ACTION NO 443

S E C R E T 061954Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4838 06APR70 IN 057022

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

File 201

~~MB~~

NP

pls consider FBI

REF DIRECTOR 022665

1. TELL LNERGO WE INTERESTED IN HART AND [redacted] ACTIVITIES. HOPE LNERGO WILL DO ALL POSSIBLE MONITOR THEM. THEY IN NO WAY WORK FOR US.

2. CARACAS CHECKING FOR ANY POSSIBLE CIFENCE-4 CONNECTION WITH HART AND GARCIA. WILL ADVISE. GP-1.

S E C R E T

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4

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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ORIG: Nancy Perkins
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 7271/1535
DATE: 3 April 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2, WP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 03 23 50Z APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 022665

TO CARACAS INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI

REF: CARACAS 3891, 28 OCTOBER 69*(IN 74856)

1. FBI INVESTIGATING JAMES HART AND HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IN 1969, HART, ORLANDO GARCIA AND CIFENCE/4 WERE INVOLVED IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA FOR GUYANESE INSURGENTS. FBI MIAMI SOURCE ALLEGED THAT JKLANCE WAS AWARE OF FACTS, THAT CIFENCE/4 WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JKLANCE, AND THAT THE WEAPONS ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING. FBI DISCUSSED FOREGOING WITH WH/MIAMI REPRESENTATIVE WHO CONFIRMED THAT CIFENCE/4 OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST TO JKLANCE.

2. FBI ASKS IF WE HAVE OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HART OR GARCIA. RE HART, HOW SHALL WE ANSWER?

3. FILE: 201-327674.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH comment: While Station sees no immediate objections to LNERGO interviewing HART if he enters U.S. further developments might make us change our position. Recruitment might be feasible.

WH/COG

C/WH/7

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Request for Double Re-Entry Permits for Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles and Wife and Preservation of Residence for POSADA

1. It is requested that the double Re-Entry Permit arrangement be obtained for Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (hereafter referred to as the Principal Subject) and his wife, Nieves Elina GONZALEZ de POSADA, and that Preservation of Residence also be obtained for the Principal Subject.

2. The Principal Subject was born on 15 February 1928 in Cuba. His spouse was born on 12 December 1935 in Cuba.

3. The Principal Subject was initially employed by this Agency in 1961 and is still employed by the Agency as of the present time. In addition to the salary he receives from his organization, the Venezuelan Ministry of the Interior, he also is paid by this Agency.

4. The Principal Subject will be regularly stationed abroad engaged in activities in furtherance of the national intelligence effort. He will be accompanied by his wife and his son, the latter being a U.S. citizen who travels on a U.S. passport.

5. Attached are the following documents:

   a. Two original I-131 forms completed by the Principal Subject.

   b. Two original I-131 forms completed by the Principal Subject's spouse

   c. One N-470 form completed by the Principal Subject.

SECRET

d. Two signed photos each of the Principal Subject and his spouse.

e. U.S. Postal Money Order for $30 made out to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Alfonso A. Spera
C/WH/3

14-00000

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II

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO

ACTION NO: 0031

S E C R E T 201726Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6887 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMIO7

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

20 MAR IN 047033

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

C

REF: DIRECTOR 018266

1. CIFENCE-4 AND DEPENDENTS DEPART MIAMI FOR CARACAS 20 MARCH ETA 2200 HRS FLT 741 VIASA. INS FORMS COMPLETED AS PER REF AND SENT AIR MAIL REGISTERED TO DIRECTOR 010144 ADDRESS MORNING 20 MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

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Fence-4

201-300985

20 Mar 70

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 18

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M. Berger
ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 18 MARCH 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI, CI/SO, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 00 49Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018266

TO WH/MIAMI INFO CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6754 (IN 040853)*

B. DIRECTOR 010144**

C. DIRECTOR 009340***

AN
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BY~~
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~

1. REF A ENVELOPE RECEIVED 17 MARCH. REF C REQUESTED [illegible] COUPLE EACH FILL OUT TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FORMS AND EACH PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN. ENVELOPE CONTAINED ONLY ONE ORIGINAL I-131 FORM FOR EACH PERSON AND PHOTOGRAPHS WERE UNSIGNED.

2. PLS ASK CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE TO EACH COMPLETE TWO MORE ORIGINAL I-131 FORMS. WIFE'S I-131 FORM CORRECTLY FILLED OUT. CIFENCE/4 SHOULD INCLUDE HIS MATRONYM ON NEW FORMS AND SPELL OUT MIDDLE NAME. ALSO REQUEST CIFENCE/4 FILL OUT ANOTHER N-470 FORM CONTAINING SAME INFO AS N-470 FORWARDED IN REF A ENVELOPE EXCEPT FOR QUESTION FOUR WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ANSWERED. ALSO FORWARD TWO SIGNED PHOTOS FOR EACH.

3. AFTER CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE COMPLETE ACTION REQUESTED PARA TWO, THEY MAY RETURN TO CARACAS. ENVELOPE CONTAINING

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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19 Mar 70
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BY ______ PER ______ # ______

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR, RID: [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 018266

TO PAGE TWO

COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE SENT TO REF B ADDRESS.

4. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)
C/WH/COG/3 Spera

*Reported that INS forms completed by CIFENCE/4 and wife sent by registered air mail 11 March to Ref B address.
**Provided accommodation address in Headquarters area where completed INS forms should be sent.
***Requested WH/Miami meet with CIFENCE/4 and wife, provided INS forms and gave instructions on how the forms were to be completed.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

James E. Flannery
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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FBI
13 MARCH 70
SECRET
JAMES MELVILLE HART - REGISTRATION ACT-VENEZUELA
(NI) 105-193849 (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

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I

ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS

ACTION NO.: 152

S E C R E T 111655Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6754 WHIM

11 Mar IN 040853

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4665 (W039385)

1. CIFENCE-4 MET 10 MARCH. INS FORMS COMPLETED AND SENT AIR MAIL REGISTERED TO DIRECTOR 010144 ADDRESS MORNING OF 11 MARCH. AWAITING CABLE NOTIFICATION THAT FORMS IN ORDER SO THAT CIFENCE-4 CAN RETURN CARACAS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN

WH/3/V

26550

26551

SECRET

Cifence-4
201-300985
11 Mar 70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2,

ACTION NO. 007

S E C R E T 092255Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4665 CARA

PRIORITY HW/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

IN 039385

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4652 (IN 038622)

1. CIFENCE-4, WIFE, SON DEPARTING CARACAS 0900 HOURS 10 MARCH 70 VIA VIASA FLIGHT 740 WHICH SCHEDULED ARRIVE MIAMI 1100 HOURS, 10 MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

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201-300985
09 Mar 70

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR CI/OA,

ACTION NO. 918

SECRET 081445Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4632 CARA

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

8 MAR IN 038628

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

1. CIFENCE-4 DEPARTURE DELAYED UNTIL 10 MAR 70. WILL ADVISE TRAVEL ITINERARY.

2. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

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201-300985

08 MAR 70

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: MSerger:ecw
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R1535
DATE: 6 March 1970

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BY: 30 PER

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CONF: WH 8 FILE VR: Alien Security CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 06 23 18z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 015164

TO IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6708 (IN 038146)*

B. DIRECTOR 015088**

1. INS CENTRAL OFFICE ASKED INS/MIAMI (MR. TILLMAN) 6 MARCH TO SMOOTH ENTRY CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY INTO U.S.

2. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SHOULD ENTER U.S. USING ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (FORM 151) AND NOT "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS." IF ASKED BY INS ABOUT LATTER, COUPLE SHOULD REPLY THEY HAVE NEVER USED THESE PASSPORTS TO ENTER U.S. NOR HAVE THEY EVER OBTAINED U.S. VISAS IN THESE PASSPORTS. THIS REPLY IMPORTANT IN ORDER THAT PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

3. FYI: LAST TIME CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE WERE IN U.S. WAS IN OCT 1969.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

AT
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WH/3/V

201-300985

END OF MESSAGE CS Curl

06 Mar 70

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECOORD)

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Spera
ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CONF: INFO: FILE, VR. RID/EDI .

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S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 015164

TO PAGE TWO

* Advised INS/Miami not familiar with "Emergency Venezuelan Passport" and would not consider it acceptable in any event without U.S. visa. Mentioned that it presumed that CIFENCE-4 and family have been out of U.S. longer than one year and therefore will be probably questioned by INS/Miami. WH/Miami has contacted INS Inspector in Miami who will handle case discreetly if complications arise after couple enters U.S.

**Reported no problems foreseen when CIFENCE-4 and family enter U.S. and replied to questions from WH/Miami on how couple is to fill out their requests for U.S. reentry permits and CIFENCE-4's request for Preservation of Resident Alien Status.

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ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 6 MARCH 1970

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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CONF: WHB | INFO | FILE, VR. R/AN, SECUR 4, C/OPS,

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 06 22 03Z MAR 70
(elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 015088

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

INFO: PRIORITY CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-6698 (IN 037842)*

B. CARACAS-4636 (IN 037359)**

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1. HQS DOES NOT FORESEE ANY DIFFICULTY RE ENTRY CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY INTO U.S.

2. FOLLOWING REPLIES KEYED TO QUESTIONS REF A PARA TWO:

A. CIFENCE-4 SHOULD LIST CIFENCE AS HIS CURRENT EMPLOYER. RVROCK SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED.

B. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE SHOULD SIGN THEIR I-131 FORMS BUT NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO SWEAR FORM BEFORE ANYONE. THIS WILL BE HANDLED BY HQS.

C. CIFENCE-4 SHOULD SIGN HIS N-470 FORM.

D. DO NOT FORWARD I-151 FORMS (WHICH ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS) TO HQS. WE WILL HANDLE THIS REQUIREMENT HERE.

CONTINUED . . . .

201-300985
06 Mar 70

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CITE DIRECTOR 015088

TO PAGE 2

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

*Reported WH/Miami checking with local INS re re-entry of CIFENCE-4 and family. Also requested priority reply re how CIFENCE-4 should answer certain questions on applications for re-entry permits and form for preservation of residence.

**Advised that CIFENCE-4, wife, and son will arrive Miami 8 March to begin processing for re-entry permits and preservation of residence (CIFENCE-4 only) and that CIFENCE-4 will contact WH/Miami per previous instructions 9 March. Mentioned CIFENCE-4 slightly concerned about possible problem with INS due to family's long absence from U.S.

OS/AAS - L. Winkowski (Telecord)

C/WH/COG

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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PRECEDENCE I

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR BILAN SECUR4 C/OPS

ACTION NO. 811

S E C R E T 062016Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6708 (WMIM)

IMMEDIATE CARACAS INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

TYPIC CIFLUTE CIFENCE

6 Mar IN 036146

REFS: A. CARACAS 4636 (IN 037359)

B. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN 024557)

C. WH/MIAMI 6698 (IN 037842)

1. INS/MIAMI NOT FAMILIAR WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" AND WOULD NOT CONSIDER IT ACCEPTABLE IN ANY EVENT WITHOUT U.S. VISA. ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (FORM I-151) NORMALLY WOULD BE ONLY DOCUMENT REQUIRED BY INS IF HOLDERS HAD BEEN BACK TO STATES WITHIN PAST YEAR. SINCE CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY HAVE BEEN OUT LONGER THAN ONE YEAR (WE PRESUME) WITHOUT RETURN TO STATES, PROBABLY WILL BE QUESTIONED BY INS ON ARRIVAL MIAMI AND, SINCE PAPERS NOT CONSIDERED IN ORDER, CASE WILL BE DEFERRED AND CIFENCE-4 GROUP ALLOWED TO LEAVE AIRPORT WITH INSTRUCTIONS REPORT INS HQS MIAMI 9 MARCH TO CLEAR UP PROBLEM. POSSIBLE THAT INS INSPECTOR AT AIRPORT MIGHT NEGLECT TO ASK WHEN LAST IN STATES AND GROUP WILL BE ADMITTED WITH NO DEFERRAL.

8

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Cifence-4

W 4/3 ✓ 06 Mar 70

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6708 SECRET

2. IF CASE DEFERRED AT AIRPORT, STATION HAS ARRANGED FOR DEFERRAL TO BE HANDLED BY MR. JAMES TILLMAN, SUPERVISORY IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR FOR TRAVEL CONTROL, AT INS/MIAMI HQS OFFICE. TILLMAN WILL HANDLE PROMPTLY AND DISCREETLY. NO STATION OFFICER WILL BE AT AIRPORT SINCE TILLMAN PREFERS NOT TO ALERT INS INSPECTORS AT AIRPORT IN ADVANCE AND HAS ASSURED STATION LIAISON THAT DEFERRAL IS THE WORST THAT WILL HAPPEN IN THIS CASE.

3. WILL EXPECT CIFENCE-4 CONTACT 9 MARCH PER REF B.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 758

S E C R E T 061415Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6698 WINIM

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS

TYPIC CIFLUTE CIFENCE

6 Mar IN 037842

REF: CARACAS 4636 (IN 037379)

1. CARACAS: CHECKING WITH LOCAL INS ON REENTRY OF CIFENCE-4 AND FAMILY PER REF. WILL ADVISE SHORTLY.

2. DIRECTOR: PLS PROVIDE PRIORITY ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING:

A. ON INS FORMS N-470 AND I-131 CIFENCE-4 MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS AS TO EMPLOYMENT OVERSEAS. SINCE HE OSTENSIBLY WORKS FOR CIFENCE, BUT ACTUALLY WORKS FOR RVROCK, HOW SHOULD HE ANSWER, IF AT ALL?

B. FORM I-131 SHOULD BE (1) SWORN BEFORE INS OFFICER (2) SWORN BEFORE NOTARY, OR (3) SIGNED BY PERSON OTHER THAN APPLICANT. HOW DO WE HANDLE?

C. FORM N-470 CAN BE SIGNED BY APPLICANT OR OTHER PERSON ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT. WHO SIGNS, CIFENCE-4 OR HQS?

D. WHEN SUBMITTING FORM I-131, APPLICANT MUST

WH/C/OP

Cifence-4

W+13 ✓

6 Mar 70

201-300985

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6698 SECRET

SUBMIT FORM I-151. SHOULD FORMS I-151 BE FORWARDED TO HQS WITH I-131 APPLICAWTIONS?

3. WH/MIAMI WILL COLLECT COMPLETED FORMS N-470 AND I-131 AND FORWARD WITH CHECK FOR $30 AND PHOTOS TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS OF DIRECTOR 010144 BY REGISTERED LETTER. WILL ADVISE WHEN MAILED.

4. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT
WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SECUR 4 CI/OPS

ACTION NO.
773

5 MAR IN 037359

S E C R E T 051925Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4636 (CARD)

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 010472
B. WH/MIAMI 6533 (IN 35205)
C. CARACAS 4472 (IN 025595)
D. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN 34557)

1. CIFENCE-4, WIFE AND SON HAVE RESERVATIONS VIASA FLIGHT 744 LEAVING CARACAS 0900 HOURS AND ARRIVING MIAMI 1305 HOURS 8 MARCH 70. CIFENCE-4 WILL CONTACT WH/MIAMI MORNING 9 MARCH AS INSTRUCTED IN REFERENCE D.

2. CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE WILL ENTER U.S. (MIAMI) USING "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" AND ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS (I-151). PASSPORTS WILL HAVE NO RPT NO U.S. VISAS. SON IS U.S. CITIZEN AND WILL ENTER WITH U.S. PASSPORT.

3. ALTHOUGH CIFENCE-4 FEELS HE AND WIFE SHOULD NOT ENCOUNTER PROBLEM ENTERING U.S. WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" AND ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS,

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4636 SECRET

HE LITTLE BIT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE PROBLEM WITH U.S. IMMIGRATION DUE THEIR LONG ABSENCES FROM US. REQUEST WH/MIAMI VIEWS RE SUCH A PROBLEM OCCURRING. IF WH/MIAMI FEELS POSSIBLE PROBLEM MAY ARISE, REQUEST SOMEONE BE AT MIAMI AIRPORT TO ASSIST CIFENCE-4 IF NEED ARISES. IN THIS EVENT, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTACT AT AIRPORT. PLEASE REPLY BY COB 6 MARCH.

4. AFTER ARRANGING IN MIAMI TO PRESERVE HIS RIGHT TO EVENTUALLY BECOME U.S. CITIZEN, CIFENCE-4 WILL RETURN TO CARACAS WHERE HE WILL APPLY FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP. CARACAS EMPHASIZES IT VITALLY IMPORTANT THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA NOT BECOME AWARE OF TRUE REASON FOR PRESENCE IN MIAMI OF CIFENCE-4 AND WIFE.

5. CARACAS STATION PAYING FOR ROUND TRIP TICKETS ~~ZZ~~ FOR CIFENCE-4, WIFE AND SON AND PROVIDING THEM TOTAL PER DIEM ~~GM~~ OF FIFTY DOLLARS PER DAY TO COVER THEIR LIVING EXPENSIS IN MIAMI.

6. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

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ORIG: M. BURGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 16 FEBRUARY 1970

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CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, SECURY

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S E C R E T 16 23 10 z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE 010472

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI (IN 025705)*
B. CARACAS 4472 (IN 025395)**
C. DIRECTOR 010144***

1. CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE PRESENCE IN U.S. ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS. ALTHOUGH SEE NO OBJECTION COUPLE USING "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" FOR TRAVEL TO MIAMI AND RETURN CARACAS, THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT OBTAIN U.S. VISAS IN THESE PASSPORTS AND SHOULD USE ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS (I-151) TO ENTER U.S.

2. APPRECIATE WH/MIAMI OFFER MENTIONED REF A; HOWEVER COMPLETED APPLICATIONS MUST BE SENT HQS FOR PROCESSING.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

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END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)

DC/WH/COG W. L

CONT'D

Cifence-4
201-300985

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TO PAGE TWO

010472

*Advised WH/Miami can meet with CIFENCE/4 week of 8 March and offered to handle papers thru INS in Miami.

**Requested reply if CIFENCE/4 and wife presence in U.S. absolutely necessary. If affirmative, couple can travel to Miami 8 March 1970 if it convenient for WH/Miami.

***Forwarded P.O. Box in Hqs area where couples' completed applications for re-entry permits can be sent.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 903

S E C R E T 141529Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6533 WAIM (NEBECKER ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: CARACAS 4472 (IN025395)

1. NO PROBLEM IN MEETING CIFENCE/4 WEEK OF 14 Feb IN025705 8 MARCH. IF PAPERS CAN BE HANDLED IN MIAMI, NOTE THAT WH/MIAMI HAS GOOD LIAISON WITH LOCAL INS.

2. FILE: 201-300985.

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14 Feb 70

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WH/3/V
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13 FEBRUARY 1970

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WH8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS

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S E C R E T 13 23 32z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 010144

WH/MIAMI

INFO: CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI-6507 (IN 024557)*

B. DIRECTOR-9340**

1. MAIL COMPLETED FORMS AND CHECK TO:

STANLEY V. ESSMEIR
P. O. BOX 11
SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22150

2. FILE: 201 300985.

END OF MESSAGE

*Advised WH/Miami officer available to meet with CIFENCE/4, forwarded contact plan, and requested address where CIFENCE/4's complete immigration forms and check can be sent.
**Requested WH/Miami officer meet with CIFENCE/4, provide him with immigration forms, and forward completed forms and check to Hqs.

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C/WHD
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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR-4, CI/OPS,

ACTION NO. 264

S E C R E T 132132Z FEB 70 CITE CARACAS 4472 CARO

13 FEB IN 025395

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN 024657)

B. DIRECTOR 009340

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS, CARACAS STATION WOULD PREFER THAT CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE BE ALLOWED TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND CIFENCE/4 BE ALLOWED TO FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE IN CARACAS. IF THEIR PRESENCE IN U.S. ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY REPEAT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, HOWEVER, THEY CAN TRAVEL TO MIAMI AFTER 4 MAR 70. AFTER THIS DATE, CIFENCE/4 WILL BE ON LEAVE FROM CIFENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS. HE SAID HE CAN TELL CIFENCE/1 PURPOSE OF TRIP TO MIAMI TO ALLOW WIFE SEE HER BROTHER WHO RECENTLY CAME OUT OF CUBA. HE FEELS THE MAXIMUM PERIOD HE CAN REMAIN IN MIAMI IS ONE WEEK. AT PRESENT TIME, STATION FEELS CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE COULD TRAVEL TO MIAMI 8 MAR 70 WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM ENTIRE FOLLOWING WEEK FOR NECESSARY PAPER WORK. IF THIS WEEK ACCEPTABLE TO WH/MIAMI, FIRM TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE

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201-300985
13 Feb 70

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4472 S E C R E T

FORWARDED. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ADVISE.

2. RE PARA 2 REF B, CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE WILL HAVE TO USE "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS" FOR THEIR TRAVEL TO MIAMI AND RETURN TO CARACAS. WE WOULD NOT WANT THEM TO USE NEWLY ISSUED "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" IN ENTERING VENEZUELA WHEN IT IS THE INTENT OF CIFENCE/4 TO APPLY FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER HIS RETURN TO CARACAS.

3. RE PARA 3 REF B, FOR SECURITY WE AGREE IT BEST CIFENCE/4 AND HIS WIFE REMAIN IN MIAMI DURING THEIR STAY IN U.S. SINCE CIFENCE/4 HAS MANY FRIENDS IN MIAMI AREA, WE TRUST WH/MIAMI WILL TAKE MAXIMUM PRECAUTIONS TO ASSURE THAT TRUE REASON FOR PRESENCE IN MIAMI OF CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE IS KNOWN ONLY BY THOSE PERSONS WITH ABSOLUTE NEED TO KNOW. WE WISH TO PREVENT WORD GETTING BACK TO VENEZUELA THAT CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVENTUAL U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS SECUR4

ACTION NO. 156

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6507 (JMZIP)

12 FEB IN 024557

M

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

1. KERSCHEN AVAILABLE TO MEET CIFENCE/4. HAVE HIM CALL AMANSWER (IDEN A) AND IDENTIFY HIMSELF AS IDEN B. HE SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C AND LEAVE TELEPHONE NUMBER WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED. KERSCHEN WILL RETURN CALL AND ARRANGE MEETING.

2. DIRECTOR: TO AVOID POUCH TIME LAG, PLS FORWARD ADDRESS WHERE WE CAN MAIL REGISTERED LETTER CONTAINING CIFENCE/R'S FORMS AND CHECK.

3. FILE: 201-300935.

S E C R E T

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201-300985

12 Feb 70

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ACTION UNIT: WH8   INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN C/OPS SEC/R4

ACTION NO. 155

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 6508 (WMIA)   12FEB IN024558

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN-024557)

1. IDEN A: ANSWERING SERVICE AVAILABLE 0900 THRU 1600 HOURS MONDAY THRU FRIDAY. NUMBER 379-9624 REPEAT 379-9624.

IDEN B: MR. CUIS CLEMENTE

IDEN C: MR. GRADY

2. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

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201-300985

12 Feb 72

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ORIG: N. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. CI/OPS, CI/OA, C/OPS, SECURITY

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SECRET 11 23 24Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 069340

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 3365 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)*

(FORMERLY AMCLEVE/15) SP

1. HQS HAS LEARNED CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE PRESERVED THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS.

2. IT NOW NECESSARY AS MENTIONED REF FOR COUPLE COME TO U.S. TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. HQS MUST REVIEW COMPLETED APPLICATIONS BEFORE SUBMITTING THEM TO INS. AFTER APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY HQS, COUPLE MAY RETURN CARACAS IF THEY HAVE SOME DOCUMENT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM ENTER VENEZUELA. IF NOT, THEY MUST REMAIN IN U.S. THE TWO OR THREE WEEKS IT WILL TAKE HQS TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

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WH/3/✓

3. ALTHOUGH THIS CASE MIGHT BE HANDLED MORE RAPIDLY IF COUPLE CAME TO HQS AREA FOR PROCESSING, TRIP TO HQS AREA COULD POSE SECURITY HAZARD FOR CIFENCE/4 AS COUPLE WOULD NORMALLY TRAVEL TO MIAMI FOR THIS PROCESSING. ANY INDICATION COUPLE TRAVELLED

Cifence-4 201-300985

11 Feb 70

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CITE DIRECTOR 009340

TO PAGE TWO

TO HQS AREA MIGHT CAUSE CIFENCE/4'S SUPERIORS IN CIFENCE TO SUSPECT HE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH RVROCK; THEREFORE REQUEST WH/MIAMI MEET WITH CIFENCE/4 AND PROVIDE INS FORMS N-470 (CIFENCE/4 ONLY) AND TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FOR EACH TO FILL OUT. COUPLE MUST PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS EACH SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN AND ONE CHECK TO INS FOR THIRTY DOLLARS. WHEN FORMS COMPLETED THEY SHOULD BE POUCHED TO HQS. AFTER REVIEW HERE, HQS WILL CABLE WH/MIAMI AND THEN COUPLE CAN EITHER RETURN CARACAS OR WAIT MIAMI FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

4. FOR WH/MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF YOU HAVE CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE NEAR FUTURE WHO COULD MEET WITH CIFENCE/4. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS FORWARD CONTACT PLAN TO CARACAS. FYI. CIFENCE/4 (IDEN A) WAS WH/MIAMI ASSET FROM LATE MARCH 1965 to SEPT 1967 WHEN HE MOVED TO CARACAS WHERE HE HAS BEEN SERVING STATION AS PENETRATION OF CIFENCE (IDEN B).

CONT'D

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CITE DIRECTOR 009340

PAGE THREE

5. FOR CARACAS. IF WH/MIAMI ABLE HANDLE CIFENCE/4, PLS FORWARD COUPLES' ETA.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)
C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

*Advised steps necessary to preserve permanent alien resident status of CIFENCE/4 and wife and obtain new re-entry permits for them.

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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201-300985

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M. BERGER
WH/3/V
1535
TE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

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S E C R E T

11 23 24 z FEB 70

CITE DIRECTOR 009341

CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

IDEN A - LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)

IDEN B - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD), A NEWLY ESTABLISHED VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICE

SP

END OF MESSAGE

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WH3/V

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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201-300985
11 Feb 70

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN C/OPS SECUR4

ACTION NO. 156

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6507

12 FEB IN 024557

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

(VICKERS)

1. KERSCHEN AVAILABLE TO MEET CIFENCE/4. HAVE HIM CALL AMANSWER (IDEN A) AND IDENTIFY HEMSELF AS IDEN B. HE SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C AND LEAVE TELEPHONE NUMBER WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED. KERSCHEN WILL RETURN CALL AND ARRANGE MEETING.

2. DIRECTOR: TO AVOID POUCH TIME LAG, PLS FORWARD ADDRESS WHERE WE CAN MAIL REGISTERED LETTER CONTAINING CIFENCE/~~X~~4'S FORMS AND CHECK.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

cifence-4

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI/OPS SEC/R4

ACTION NO. 155

S E C R E T 122029Z FEB 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6508 12FEB IN024558

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: WH/MIAMI 6507 (IN-024557)

1. IDEN A: ANSWERING SERVICE AVAILABLE 0900 THRU 1600 HOURS MONDAY THRU FRIDAY. NUMBER 379-9624 REPEAT 379-9624.

IDEN B: MR. ~~C~~LUIS CLEMENTE

IDEN C: MR. GRADY (Nichols)

2. FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 727

S E C R E T 231325Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4332 CARA 23 JAN IN 012086

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 003365

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS REQUESTED PARA TWO REF FORWARDED HEADQUARTERS 23 JANUARY VIA TM 658733 IN POUCH NUMBER 3407.

2. FILE: 201-300985

S E C R E T

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MICROFILMED
FEB 13 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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201-300985
23 JAN 70

MEMORANDUM R THE RECORD

FROM: M. Berger, WH/3/V

SUBJECT: Naturalisation of CIFENCE/4's Wife

1. John Rooney of OS/AAS informed the Desk on 19 January 1960 that he had been mistaken when he said that CIFENCE/4's wife could be naturalised two years after C/4 receives his naturalisation. C/4's wife will have to wait three years. It is planned to inform C/4 of this change xxx(and the Station) when C/4 comes to the U.S. to process his application.

M. Berger

RO: M. BERGER
NIT: WH/3/V
T: 1535
ATE: 15 JANUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
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NFO: WH 8 FILE, VR. R/AN CI/OA SECUR 4

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SECRET 17 00 01 z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 003365

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4248 (IN 003688)*

B. DIRECTOR 62906**

1. FOLLOWING STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS OF CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR THEM:

A. HQS WILL VERIFY THAT REF A PARA TWO INFO IS IN SUBJECTS' IMMIGRATION FILES. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE MONTH.

B. AFTER ABOVE ACTION COMPLETED, SUBJECTS MUST COME TO HQS OR MIAMI FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK WHERE THEY WILL FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. PROCESSING PROCEDURE NECESSITATES SUBJECTS' PRESENCE IN U.S. AT THAT TIME. FYI. IN WIFE'S CASE ONLY,

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14 JAN 70

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE TWO

IN ORDER FOR PERIOD SPENT OUTSIDE U.S. TO COUNT TOWARD THE STATUARY PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. WHICH SHE MUST ACCRUE PRIOR TO PETITIONING FOR NATURALIZATION, WIFE WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED BY OR UNDER CONTRACT WITH RVROCK. IF THIS CLAIM CANNOT BE LEGITIMATELY MADE, WIFE WILL HAVE TO WAIT TWO YEARS AND ONE DAY AFTER HUSBAND RECEIVES HIS NATURALIZATION BEFORE SHE CAN RECEIVE HERS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WAITING PERIOD WOULD BE IF HUSBAND RECEIVED CITIZENSHIP, CONTINUED TO BE EMPLOYED BY RVROCK, AND RECEIVED ASSIGNMENT ABROAD TO WHICH WIFE WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM.

C. HQS WILL THEN PROCESS APPLICATIONS THRU INS AND RE-ENTRY PERMITS WILL BE FORWARDED TO SUBJECTS IN CARACAS. THESE PERMITS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND RENEWABLE FOR ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR. PRIOR TO END OF THIS TWO-YEAR PERIOD, HQS CAN OBTAIN NEW ONE-YEAR RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHICH ALSO

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE THREE

RENEWABLE FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR. AS THIS ACTION NECESSITATES SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM INS, SUBJECTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS DETAILS WITH ANYONE.

2. WILL ADVISE WHEN PARA ONE (A) ACTION COMPLETED AND WHETHER SUBJECTS SHOULD COME TO HQS OR MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF EXPIRED RE-ENTRY PERMITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SURRENDERED BY SUBJECTS AND IF SO, WHEN AND TO WHOM. IF NOT, PLS FORWARD THEM TO HQS.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS: JOHN ROONEY (telecord)
C/WH/COG

WH Comments *Provided data previously requested concerning names of carriers and flight numbers used by CIFENCE/4 and wife for their travels to and from the U.S. **Requested travel and passport information pertaining to CIFENCE/4 and wife in connection with preserving their U.S. resident alien status and obtaining new re-entry permits.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

201-300985

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INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN. CI. CI/OPS. E2

ACTION NO. 680

S E C R E T 082235Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4248 CARA

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

8 JAN IN 003688

REF: DIRECTOR 62906

1. RE QUESTION PARA 1A REF, CIFENCE-4 DID NOT OBTAIN U.S. VISA FROM CONSULATE CARACAS FOR USE WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" BUT ENTERED U.S. IN OCT 69 USING HIS I-151.

2. RE PARA 1B REF, FOLLOWING ARE NAMES OF CARRIERS AND FLT NUMBERS FOR DEPARTURES FROM AND RETURNS TO MIAMI OF CIFENCE-4:

	DEPART FROM MIAMI	RETURN TO MIAMI
A.	14 AUG 67 - PAA 440	27 AUG 67 - PAA 441
B.	23 OCT 67 - VARIG 801	24 NOV 67 - PAA 441
C.	5 DEC 67 - PAA 441	23 JAN 68 - PAA 440
D.	30 JAN 68 - PAA 441	6 JUL 68 - VIASA 740
E.	9 JUL 68 - VIASA 741	9 JAN 69 - VIASA 740
F.	15 JAN 69 - VIASA 741	19 OCT 69 - VIASA 740
G.	24 OCT 69 - VIASA 741	

3. ALSO RE PARA 1B REF, WIFE CIFENCE-4

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 4248 SECRET

DEPARTED MIAMI 26 DEC 67 ON VIASA 740,

RETURNED TO MIAMI 19 OCT 69 ON VIASA 740 AND

DEPARTED FROM MIAMI 24 OCT 69 ON VIASA 741.

4. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

SECRET

1969

ORIG: M. Berger
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 23 December 1969

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24 18 09Z DEC 69

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4167 (IN 01987)*
B. DIRECTOR 58935**
C. CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)***

1. APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENT STATES IT POSSIBLE FOR CIFENCE/4 TO BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND STILL RETAIN STATUS AS U.S. PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. IN ORDER ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, HQS MUST FIRST DETERMINE WHETHER CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE LOST THEIR STATUS AS PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS IN VIEW OF CIFENCE/4'S USE OF "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" CITED REF A PARA ONE AND WIFE'S FAILURE TO RENEW STATUS AS MENTIONED REF A PARA FOUR. PLS REPLY TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WHICH WILL HELP DETERMINE COUPLE'S STATUS:

A. DID CIFENCE/4 OBTAIN U.S. VISA FROM CONSULATE CARACAS FOR USE WITH "EMERGENCY VENEZUELAN PASSPORT"? IF SO, WHAT TYPE RECEIVED? FYI. IF CIFENCE/4 DID RECEIVE VISA, HE MUST HAVE FILLED OUT FORM I-94 (ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD) UPON ARRIVAL

CONTINUED.....

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 2

MIAMI AND INS WOULD HAVE INTERPETED THIS ACT AS POSSIBLE RENUNCIATION OF PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS. IN ORDER NEGATE THIS INTERPETATION, HQS MAY HAVE TO ASK INS TO AMEND RECORD OF ENTRY. HQS BELIEVES CIFENCE/4 SHOULD HAVE ENTERED U.S. IN OCT 1969 USING HIS I-151 (ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARD).

B. WHAT WAS NAME OF CARRIER AND FLT NUMBER FOR EACH DEPARTURE AND RETURN MIAMI FOR CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE WHICH CITED REF A PARAS ONE AND TWO? ✓

2. IN ORDER FOR COUPLE TO PRESERVE PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS, OBTAIN DOUBLE RE-ENTRY PERMITS, AND PRESERVE CIFENCE/4 RESIDENCE, COUPLE PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO COME TO U.S. FOR ABOUT ONE WEEK.

3. CIFENCE/4 SHOULD BE AWARE THAT UNDER SECTION 329 OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT HE CAN PETITION FOR IMMEDIATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ON BASIS OF HONORABLE SERVICE AND DISCHARGE FROM U.S. ARMED FORCES IF HE JOINED ARMED FORCES WHILE IN U.S. TERRITORY

CONTINUED.....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CONF:
INFO: FILE, VR.

SECRET (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 3

AND IF HE CURRENTLY PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN. WIFE COULD OBTAIN U.S. CITIZENSHIP AFTERWARDS ON BASIS CIFENCE/4 STATIONED REGULARLY ABROAD IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. NATIONAL INTEL EFFORT AND IT DESIRED THAT SHE ACCOMPANY AS U.S. CITIZEN. WIFE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN AT TIME OF APPLICATION. WISH TO POINT OUT THAT IF STATION AND CIFENCE/4 ELECT THIS COURSE, HQS ESTIMATES IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT AND LENGTHY PROCESS TO OBTAIN NECESSARY SPECIAL PERMISSION WHICH WOULD PERMIT CIFENCE/4 TO HOLD OSTENSIBLE VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP FOR DURATION PRESENT ASSIGNMENT. THEREFORE RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION DESCRIBED PARA ONE. WHEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RECEIVED, HQS WILL FORWARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR COUPLE.

4. FILE: 201-300985

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Requested Hqs determine status of alien residency of CIFENCE/4 and wife and make arrangements whereby they can become citizens of Venezuela and by so doing not annul their U.S. alien residency status and/or wreck their chances of becoming U.S. citizens.

Continued....

201-300985

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 62906

TO PAGE 4

**Requested information concerning travel to and from U.S. of CIFENCE/4 and wife.
***CIFENCE/4 may have to accept Venezuelan citizenship for ops reasons and is concerned over how this might jeopardize his future application for U.S. citizenship.

OS/AAS: John Rooney (telecord).

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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ACTION UNIT
WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, SEC/R 4

ACTION NO.
240

S E C R E T 121810Z DEC 69 CITE CARACAS 4167 CARA

12 Dec 69 IN 01987

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 58935

B. CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)

1. IN ANSWER TO PARA ONE REF A, AMCLEVE-15 USED "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" NUMBER 0123265, ISSUED 25 JULY 67 BY INS MIAMI AND WHICH EXPIRED 25 JULY 69, FOR FOLLOWING DEPARTURES FROM AND RETURN TO MIAMI, FLORIDA IN TRAVELLING TO AND FROM VENEZUELA:

	DEPART FROM MIAMI	RETURN TO MIAMI
A.	14 AUG 67	27 AUG 67
B.	23 OCT 67	24 NOV 67
C.	5 DEC 67	23 JAN 68
D.	30 JAN 68	6 JULY 68
E.	9 JULY 68	9 JAN 69
F.	15 JAN 69	

AN ///
~~AD~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BK~~
~~DEF~~ NFD
~~VI~~

AFTER DEPARTING FROM MIAMI 15 JAN 69, A-15 DID NOT RETURN MIAMI UNTIL 19 OCT 69 WHICH WAS AFTER DATE EXPIRATION HIS "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES". FOR RETURN MIAMI 19 OCT 69, A-15 USED "EMERGENCY

Luis Clemente Posada Carriles

201-300985
12 Dec. 69

E.-14

CS COPY
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ACTION UNIT | INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4167 SECRET

VENEZUELAN PASSPORT" WHICH TYPE PASSPORT ISSUED TO CUBANS AND OTHERS IN VENEZUELA WHO NOT CITIZENS VENEZUELA AND WHOSE COUNTRIES HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS IN VENEZUELA. A-15 USED SAME PASSPORT FOR DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI AND RETURN TO VENEZUELA ON 24 OCT 69.

2. ALSO IN ANSWER TO PARA ONE REF A, WIFE OF A-15 USED "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" NUMBER 0125892, ISSUED 13 NOV BY INS MIAMI AND WHICH EXPIRED 13 NOV 69, IN DEPARTING FROM MIAMI FOR VENEZUELA 26 DEC 67, IN RETURNING TO MIAMI 19 OCT 69 AND AGAIN IN DEPARTING FROM MIAMI FOR VENEZUELA 24 OCT 69.

3. BELIEVE QUESTION IN PARA TWO REF A ABOUT NEED FOR A-15 HAVING VALID REENTRY PERMIT ALREADY ANSWERED IN PARA ONE OF THIS CABLE.

4. A-15 MAINTAINS BOTH HE AND HIS WIFE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR FIVE YEARS REQUIREMENT FOR NATURALIZATION AS CITIZENS OF UNITED STATES. ALSO SAYS HE RETURNED TO STATES ONCE A YEAR TO REGISTER WHICH HE SAYS NECESSARY MAINTAIN NATURALIZATION RESIDENCE. HIS TRAVEL RECORD SHOWS THIS TO BE TRUE BUT THAT OF HIS WIFE SHOWS SHE DID NOT RETURN TO STATES BEFORE END OF FIRST YEAR HERE. IF NATURALIZATION RESIDENT STATUS OF A-15 AND WIFE LAPSED, AS HQS INDICATES, REQUEST ACTION BE TAKEN TO REINSTATE STATUS. ALSO

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 4167 SECRET

REQUEST EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BE DONE TO FULFILL PARA THREE REF B REQUEST, THAT IS, MAKE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES NATURALIZATION RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES THEIR BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS.

5. A-15 STARTED WORKING FOR US ON 22 JAN 68 WHICH WAS LONG BEFORE HIS "PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" EXPIRED. IF NOT ALREADY DONE, HQS MAY WISH POINT THIS OUT TO INS AS EVIDENCE HE HAS BEEN WORKING FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD BE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DETERMINING CURRENT STATUS HIS AND HIS WIFE'S NATURALIZATION RESIDENCE. ALSO HQS MAY WISH ADVISE INS OF HIGHLY IMPORTANT ROLE HE WILL PLAY IN RVROCK OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN VENEZUELA. IN SUMMARY, WHAT WE WOULD LIKE HQS TO DO IS RESOLVE SITUATION OF A-15 AND HIS WIFE IN WAY THAT WILL BE FAVORABLE FOR BOTH HIM AND THE CARACAS STATION.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

201-300985

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CONF: WE INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible] [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 15 10 02 Dec 69 CITE DIRECTOR 58935

TO CARACAS

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REF: A) CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)*

B) DIRECTOR 55078**

1. INS FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 AND WIFE INCOMPLETE AND THERE NO INDICATION EITHER HAVE PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. IT POSSIBLE BOTH MAY HAVE TO RETURN TO U.S. FOR PURPOSE OF FILING PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. BEFORE INS WILL MAKE DETERMINATION WE NEED TO KNOW DATES HE AND WIFE HAVE DEPARTED AND RETURNED TO U.S. FROM 1967 TO PRESENT, PORTS OF EXIT AND ENTRY AND DOCUMENT USED IN EACH CASE.

2. PLS TRY CLARIFY PARA 3 REF A WITH MORE DETAILS SINCE INS STATES VALID REENTRY PERMIT IS REQUIRED ON BASIS INFO WE HAVE.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

CONT.

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR 58735

TO PAGE 2

WH Comment: AMCLEVE-15 may have to accept Venezuelan citizenship for ops reasons and is concerned over how this might jeopardize his future application for U.S. citizenship. INS Miami refused to renew his reentry permit stating he did not need same.
**Cleared INS official was not available until week of 24 November.

OS/AAS John Rooney (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T

COS, Caracas

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

CIFLUTE

FYI

1. CIVISTA-5's organization (IDENTITY) has been encrypted CIFENCE, and cryptonyms of the following personnel have been changed to reflect their membership in the CIFENCE organization.

2. 201-740849 (formerly CIVISTA-5) - CIFENCE-1
201-857163 (formerly CIVISTA-9) - CIFENCE-2
201-773827 (formerly CIVISTA-7) - CIFENCE-3
201-300985 (formerly AMCLEVE-15)- CIFENCE-4
201-287019 (formerly CIVISTA-8) - CIFENCE-5
201-801643 (formerly CIVISTA-10)- CIFENCE-6

Hilton A. CACCAM

Attachment:
Identity Sheet U&C

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

201-740849 ✓300988
-857163 -287019
-773827 -801643

HVCW-8886

Typed: 26 November 1969

S E C R E T

75-2-16/3

WH/3/V R. Gullo rr 7371

Distribution:
1 - Chrono
1 - RID

C/WH/3/V A. D. Wedemeyer

C/WH/3 Alfonso Spera

Attachment to HVCW-8866

IDENTITY - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD)

21 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Staff, Office of Security

ATTENTION : Mr. John Rooney

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REFERENCE : Caracas 4018 (IN 87480) copy attached

1. Caracas Station has requested Headquarters assistance in resolving as quickly as possible a citizenship question concerning Subject. In view of Subject's operational importance to the Station we would appreciate any effort your office could make to obtain a favorable decision in this matter.

2. Subject is an employee of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) which is the successor organization to the Directorate General of Police (DIGEPOLO. As the Station Caracas penetration of this organization, Subject holds a key position and is able to monitor intelligence operations conducted by DISIP as well as internal Venezuelan political matters. In this position, Subject is a highly valued asset of the Station. For this reason, the Station desires that his operational position be protected and, at the same time, his future as a U.S. Citizen not be jeopardized.

3. Since Subject actually obtained his own job through a friend in DISIP and made his own travel arrangements, the file does not reflect what type of documentation he has other that an expired reentry permit mentioned in the reference. A biographic data sheet is attached which gives the main points in Subject's background including his U.S. military service.

4. The primary concern at this point is whether accepting Venezuelan citizenship for operational reasons will destroy or jeopardize in any way, Subject's plans to become a U.S.

citizen? It will be appreciated if your office could make a determination on this question as soon as possible, emphasizing to the appropriate authorities our concern for Subject and his operational importance to the U.S. intelligence effort.

Harry J. Archer
WH/3/V

Attachment: H/W as stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - 201-300985

ORIG: H. ARCHER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 18 NOVEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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CONF: WH8 INFO: RYAN FZ CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 18 22 20Z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 55078

CARACAS

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

REF: CARACAS 4018 (IN 87480)

1. CLEARED INS OFFICIALS QUALIFIED TO GIVE READING ON AMCLEVE-15 SITUATION NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL WEEK OF 24 NOV. WILL ATTEMPT TO GET DEFINITIVE ANSWER AT THAT TIME.

2. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Queried whether taking Venezuelan citizenship would destroy chances for AMCLEVE-15 and wife to become U.S. citizens? Note: Senior I&NS officer in liaison with AAS unexpectedly retired and his deputy is on a hunting trip in a remote area and cannot be reached for comment.

mu
AN
AB
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AN/3/V

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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amcleve-15
201-300985
18 Nov 69

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BY: M AT: 2230 Z

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8 C/OPS C/OA FI2

ACTION NO. 415

S E C R E T 172125Z NOV 69 CITE CARACAS 4018 CARA

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

17 Nov 69 IN 87480

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

M

1. AMCLEVE-15 CURRENT IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE POSITION IN GOV OF GREAT OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE VALUE TO CARACAS STATION. ANTICIPATE VALUE A-15 WILL INCREASE WITH ARRIVAL OF SOVIETS, AS HE IN CHARGE OPERATIONS AGAINST BLOC COUNTRIED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. BOTH A-15 AND STATION CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH FACT HE NOT VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND POSSIBILITY SOMEBODY IN GOV WILL ASK WHY FOREIGNER (CUBAN) IN SUCH HIGH AND SENSITIVE POSITION WITHIN GOV. IF THIS HAPPENS, THERE GOOD CHANCE A-15 WOULD BE REMOVED FROM PRESENT JOB. A-15 SAYS CIVISTA-5 PERIODICALLY ASKS IN JOKING MANNER WHEN HE GOING TO BECOME CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 REPLIES HE HAS READY ALL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR APPLYING FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND WILL BECOME CITIZEN IN DUE TIME. STATION FEELS PERHAPS GOOD JOB A-15 DOING FOR C-5 REASON C-5 DOES NOT PRESSURE A-15 INTO BECOMING CITIZEN.

MB

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~~[illegible]~~	
EX	
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041?1V	

2. BOTH STATION AND A-15 FEEL HIS POSITION WILL BE

201-300985
17 Nov 69

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

STRENGTHENED CONSIDERABLY IF HE BECOMES CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 PERFECTLY WILLING BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN IF RECEIVES ASSURANCE DOING SO WILL NOT ANNUL HIS AND WIFE'S STATUS AS RESIDENTS UNITED STATES (BOTH HE AND WIFE HAVE FULFILLED REQUIREMENT OF FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE IN UNITED STATES) AND DESTROY THEIR CHANCES BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS. HE SAYS FIRST LOVE CUBA AND SECOND LOVE UNITED STATES. SINCE HE CANNOT RETURN CUBA, PREFERS BECOME CITIZEN UNITED STATES. WIFE FEELS SAME WAY.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE PRIORITY IF ARRANGEMENT CAN BE MADE WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES BECOMING CITIZENS. DURING RECENT TRIP MIAMI THEY APPLIED FOR BUT WERE REFUSED NEW PERMITS TO REENTER UNITED STATES BECAUSE (ACCORDING TO A-15) A-15 IS RESIDING AND WORKING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES AND HAS NO NEED FOR SUCH PERMIT. PERMIT A-15 EXPIRED 25 JULY 1969 AND PERMIT WIFE EXPIRED 13 NOV 1969.

4. STATION STRONGLY URGES HQS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SOONEST IN FAVOR OF BOTH A-15 AND STATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

201-300985

DISPATCH

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, WH/Miami; Chief of Station, Georgetown

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Forwarding of AMCLEVE-15 Trip Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None. FYI.

REFERENCE : CARACAS 3954

Forwarded herewith are copies (one for each addressee) of AMCLEVE-15's report on his trip to Miami to check on the Hart arms purchase.

Lapalus
Richard H. LAPALUS

ATTACHMENT:
Report, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
~~2~~ - CH/WHD (w/att, h/w)
2 - CH/WH/Miami (w/att, h/w)
2 - COS/Georgetown (w/att, h/w)

CS COPY

NOV 7 1969

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-17126	DATE 6 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-17126

TO : CH/WHD

FROM: COS/Caracas

NOV 7 19

27 10 69

SCD.- C04

James S. Hart

Investigaciones realizadas.

A

En entrevistas realizadas con el Sr. CONSUL DE VENEZUELA EN MIAMI, Sr. ALBERTO PEREZ PERAZO, me dió a conocer, lo siguiente:

a- Que habia recibido una comunicación por escrito del Sr. CARLOS CRUZ MEJIAS, Encargado de la Dirección Especial de Guayana del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, con fecha 15 de Octubre del corriente, donde le comunicaba que el próximo día 20 viajaria a MIAMI el Sr. JAMES S. HART, con el objeto de buscar su licencia de pilóto comercial que se le habia extraviado.
   Adjunto copia de la carta.

b- Que segun noticias recibidas del antiguo CONSUL, un americano llamado HENRY [illegible], le habia informado que JAMES S. HART vendria próximamente a MIAMI con el objetivo de comprar armas a los traficantes clandestinos.

Ese mismo día 20 de Octubre, solicité la cooperación de las Autoridades Federales de la Aduana de MIAMI para que se chequearan los aeropuertos, esperando la llegada de HART.

La solicitud se la hice al Sr. [illegible] S. [illegible], Agente Especial y Encargado de la Oficina de la Aduana en MIAMI, el cual me presto su cooperación, poniendo agentes a vigilar los vuelos de Lineas Aereas que venian de VENEZUELA. Asi mismo sus agentes chequearon los vuelos de aviones privados y los vuelos de aviones de carga. El chequeo permanece activo en los momentos de redactar este informe.

Fué chequeada la FAA (Federal Aviation Agency), Lu-

CS COPY

N/W att 1 2 HVCA 17126

201-300985

gar donde HART tendría que renovar su licencia de piloto.
Posteriormente me entrevisté con el Sr. [illegible] DE WITT
cuya dirección es 7211 S. Dixie Hy., West Palm Beach, Fla.,
su teléfono es el 5821595. La entrevista se realizó en el
Hotel Columbus en Miami el 21-10-69 a las [illegible].
El Sr. DE WITT me manifestó que él era amigo de un tal HA-
RRIS STANLEY que vive en JACKSONVILLE, Fla., el cual había
tenido una conversación con HART y había quedado en proyecto
la compra de un número indeterminado de armas de guerra.
Segun DE WITT, la compra de dichas armas la realizaría HART
alrededor de la segunda quincena de Octubre, por lo cual ellos
(STANLEY y DE WITT) lo estaban esperando.
El Sr. DE WITT manifestó que HART, compraría armas y equipos
de guerra por una suma superior a $ 1000000 (un millón de
dollares) y que él en representación de HARRIS STANLEY estaba dispuesto a vender la información de toda la transacción en
un millón de dollares. La información segun DE WITT, consiste
en dar los nombres de las personas involucradas en la transacción (algunas viviendo en Miami) y entregar toda la información
concerniente a la compra y traslado de las armas.
Como me pareció absurda la solicitud de un millón de dollares
por una información le hice observar a DE WITT, primero que
no había ningun traficante clandestino de armas capaz de suministrar esa cantidad y segundo que al Gobierno de VENEZUELA,
no le interesaba pagar una cantidad semejante por esa información. Quedamos en que en caso que HART volviera por MIAMI
o hiciera contactos con él, el me avisaría, llamando al Consul de VENEZUELA en MIAMI y trataríamos de nuevo sobre este
asunto.

OBSERVACION

OO---- Es indiscutible que HART haya entrado en comunicación con HART y STANLEY para la compra de armas.

------ Para la compra de cantidades de armas en el mercado clandestino es necesario ver a varios traficantes.

------ Los grandes traficantes de armas en los Estados Unidos se encuentran en New Jersey, N.Y.

201-300985

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN. CA 2 CA/PEG, CI/OA. CI/IC 2. FI 2

ACTION NO. 709

S E C R E T 221420Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3859 CACA

AMCLEVE-15

201

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, ROUTINE GEORGETOWN, DIRECTOR

REFS: A. CARACAS 3784 (IN 64664)

B. CARACAS 3815 (IN 67036)

22 Oct 69 IN 70765

1. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT CARACAS FOR MIAMI 19 OCTOBER TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT RICHARD HART, BROTHER OF JAMES, TRAVELLING MIAMI TO PURCHASE $300,000 WORTH OF WEAPONS. AMCLEVE-15 HAD NO OTHER DETAILS, STORY CAME FROM MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

2. AMCLEVE-15 PLANNED CONTACT CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI AND SEE HIS FRIEND ALAN YARBROUGH, U.S. CUSTOMS AGENT FOR ASSISTANCE. HE HAD NO INFO RE WHEN HART TO BE IN MIAMI.

3. USDAO CABLE * 0653 OF 22 OCT QUOTES ARMA SOURCE AS SAYING JAMES HART LEFT CARACAS FOR MIAMI 20 OCT WITH $300,000 TO PURCHASE ARMS FROM AMERICAN RIGHTISTS. SOURCE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HART HAS ALREADY BROUGHT IN ARMS FOR RUPUNUNI REFUGEES.

4. FOR GEORGETOWN: ARMA SOURCE OF PARA 3 ABOVE ALSO CLAIMED VEN MILITARY RECEIVED RUMOR THAT GUYANA TO SEND TWO SMALL AIRCRAFT WITH ONE PLATOON GDF TO TAKE ANACOCO

CS C

* Not Received c/s
As of 1445 22Oct69.

22Oct69

SECRET

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT   INFO   FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 3859 SECRET

ISLAND AIRSTRIP, TIMING UNKNOWN. REF B INFO MAY BE RELATED.

5. DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHETHER ABOVE STORIES BASED ON FACT AND HARTS HAVE FUNDS FOR ARMS PURCHAS OR IF THEY FLASE AND BASED ON GOV INFORMATION RE HOLNESS AND STANLEY HARRIS CLAIMS. STATION INCLINED TOWARD LATTER. WE ATTEMPTING MONITOR ANY HART TRAVEL TO U.S. BUT THEY USUALLY FLY IN PRIVATE PLANES WHICH DIFFICULT TRACE. WOULD APPRECIATE ALL POSSIBLE MIAMI EFFORTS TO MONITOR ANY ATTEMPTS TO PURCHASE ARMS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO HOLNESS AND COMPANY.

6. FILE: DEFER.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PCSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-300985
SEX M DOB ?

075-005-000
HVCA-16903
05 SEP 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
HEAD OF OPERATIONS DIV OF /SCD/ VENEZUELAN
SERVICO CENTRAL DE DOCUMENTACION. ATT NO 1
PAGE 2 PARA 5

R 6910090804

FILE IN 201-300255

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

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4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

ACTION NO. 365

S E C R E T 021330Z SEP 69 CITE GEORGETOWN 6560 GCRG

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

2 SEP 69 IN 35035

REF CARACAS 3448 (IN 33958)

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARDED NOTATION (SMOTH FROM SLO, TRINIDAD, 31 OCTOBER 1967) THAT MEGAN BETANCOURT (SIC), DOB 1939, CHINESE PASSPORT 26672 ARRIVED TRINIDAD SAME FLIGHT PPP LEADER CHEDDI JAGAN 17 OCTOBER 1967. ACCORDING SPECIAL BRANCH THEY SEEN TOGETHER. SHE ALSO SEEN CONVERSING WITH RONALD HOOLASIE AND BELIEVED BE GIRLFRIEND TAYLHARDAT. LEFT THAT EVENING FOR CARACAS.

2. HOOLASIE TRINIDAD LEFTIST WHO SOLICITED FUNDS IN TRINIDAD FROM EAST INDIAN COMMUNITY TO ASSIST JAGAN IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

3. FILES ALSO CONTAIN TWO CARDS ON BETTENCOURT (FNU) WHO ELECTED COMMITTEE MEMBER WOMEN'S PROGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, WOMEN'S ARM OF PPP.

4. BELIEVE NAME PARA 2 REF SHOULD BE RAMLOGAN, NOT RANLOGAM.

5. FILE 201-300985.

S E QUR E T

AN	8B
AB	X
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~~BX~~	
~~DES~~	~~NPD~~
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WH	7/64

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

02 Sep 69

23

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, CI, CI/ops, FI

ACTION NO. 254

29 AUG 69 IN 33737

S E C R E T 291930Z AUG 69 CITE CARACAS 3447 (CARA

GEORGETOWN INFO DIRECTOR

33737

AMCLEVE

1. AMCLEVE-15, UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIVISTA, A GOV SECURITY SERVICE, HAS REPORTED THAT HE AND THREE OTHER CIVISTA AGENTS HAVE BEEN ORDERED BY CIVISTA TO MAKE SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY OF GUYANA EMBASSY IN CARACAS SOMETIME WITHIN WEEK FOLLOWING 27 AUGUST. PURPOSE OF ENTRY IS QUOTE "ANY INFORMATION OF INTEREST."

2. RESULTS OF CIVISTA SEARCH WILL BE CABLED SOONEST.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

SECRET

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AB	X
~~IN~~	
PS	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	

MICROFILMED
SEP 18 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D 105-9-8

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985
29 AUG. 69

CIGUSTY of Rpts for June 1969

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

Subject provided information on the following subjects: (a) the GOV "pacification program" and the MIR's reactions to same, (b) the investigative activities and the inner workings of the CIVISTA group, (c) the GOV security plans for the Rockefeller visit and the GOV reasons for cancelling the visit, (d) GOV military coup plans, (e) student riots in Merida and the GOV activities to counter same. All of this information became part of Station intelligence disseminations.

HVCA-16773 115 18 July 1969 - FILED 25-6-43/5

File: AMCLEVE-15 201

14-00000

CIGUSTY of Rpts for May 1967

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

Subject provided detailed information on the GOV guerrilla "pacification" program which became the basis of an intelligence dissemination on the subject. He continues to keep the Station abreast of all CIVISTA activities together with CIVISTA-5's personal feelings regarding his liaison with the Station. AMCLEVE-15 is now chief of CIVISTA's investigative group; as such, it is expected that he will provide an excellent source of information on coup planning within the military.

HVCA-16703 dated 26 June 1967. Filed: 75-6-43/3

File. AMCLEVE-15 201

14-00000

Digest of Rpts for April 1969

AMCLEVE-15 $335.00

During the month AMCLEVE-15 reported on the visit of MIR leader Carlos Betancourt to the office of CIVISTA-5; the recent RECE-sponsored infiltration of Cuba; internal activities of the CIVISTA group; and numerous other matters of interest to the Station. He continues to be an extremely valuable Station asset.

HVCA-16690 dtd 11 June 1969 - Filed: 75-6-43/3

File: AMCLEVE-15 201

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

POSADA CARRILES, LUIS
201-300985
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ OF 201-320217 HAS A PHOTOSTATIC COPY
OF A LTR SENT FROM VENEZUELA BY SUBJ
TO THE RECF LDR, AUGUSTO VALDES MIRANDA
AKA POLO MIRANDA

201-261211
UFAA-00885A02
22 MAY 69
P4

R 6906040399

FILE IN 201-300985

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted] SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Top Secret UMBRA Captured Document in Code

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HVCA 15939

1. After a number of false starts, the attachment to reference was determined to be in code rather than Turkish language as suspected. Returned for your information is the original attachment and the resulting document after the code had been broken. We are advised that this is a fairly unsophisticated system.

Victor I. Crapulli
Victor I. CRAPULLI

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above

DISTRIBUTION:
3 COS Caracas

Reclassify SECRET
when separated from top
secret enclosure.

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCW 8466

DATE: 13 FEB 1969
12 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION: Rid/TSCO [illegible] [redacted] SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-300985

AN MFJ
AB X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Vene:	H. Archer	bab 12 Feb 69	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/V		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	12 Feb 69	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

HVCA-16281

13 February 1969

CIGUSTY JANUARY PROGRESS REPORT

AGENT	EXPENDITURE
AMCLEVE-15	$335.00

AMCLEVE-15 continues to provide information generally leading to intelligence disseminations of the following subject and/or areas: CIVISTA-5 and his organization; Erasto Fernandez and the DIGEPOL; Venezuelan guerrilla activities; Haitian exile movements in Venezuela; and miscellaneous GOV political matters.

14-00000

SECRET

File
[illegible] - 15

RECORD NO.

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201-300985	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME POSADA Carriles	1ST NAME (PERSONALIA) Luis	OTHER GIVEN NAME (TELECODE) Clemente	[illegible] NAME
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH CUBA	DATE OF BIRTH 15 Feb 1928	CITIZENSHIP CUBAN	NATURALIZED (DATE OR PENDING)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES Venezuela	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR CARACAS	MARITAL STATUS (MOST RECENT) MARRIED	SEX (M or F) M
E	OVERT OCCUPATION ADVISOR TO Venezuela Govt	LANGUAGE Spanish	LANGUAGE English	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY U.S.	BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY	INCLUSIVE DATES MARCH 63 - MARCH 64	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE CUBA	COUNTRY Venezuela	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) PENETRATION AGENT INTO DIGEPOL			CODE
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces)			CODE
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT	HQS. FF OR USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	NOC NCA
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL N/A Subj employed by Gov	POA (STATUS)	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH/3/V	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE CARACAS	PROJECT CIGUSTY	COVER VA
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 1961	YEARLY SALARY 3946	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE Jan 1969	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces) N/A			
Q	DATE TERMINATED	REEMPLOYABLE	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces) Copy Sent			ATTITUDE

FORM 4-65 2457

SECRET

GROUP 1

(9-31)

HVCA 16243

7 February 1969

CIGUSTY DECEMBER PROGRESS REPORT

Agent	Expenditure
AMCLEVE-15 Subject furnished valuable information leading to disseminations and operational cables on the murder of Sosa Borregales and the subsequent arrest of numerous Bravo guerrillas; the implication of Orlando GARCIA Vasquez, a Venezuelan Government official, in the support of the Guyana rebels; the movements of Haitian exiles in Venezuela, and the interrogation of the two Cuban defectors from the Cuban trawler "Alecrin."	$450.00

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

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INFO FILE VR, C/FI/SP, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

#437

CAKE

S E C R E T 171925Z JAN 69 CITE CARACAS 1618

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI
UFA

17 Jan 69 IN 74220

WH/3 ↓ 18

RYBAT

REF: CARACAS 1552 (IN 67446)

1. AMCLEVE-15 RETURNED CARACAS 15 JAN. HE REPORTED THAT IN MIAMI TELEPHONE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EDGAR BUTTARI REPOZO, A RICH CUBAN WHO FORMERLY MINISTER WITH PRIO SOCARRAS GOVT. BUTTARI TOLD HIM THAT HE BUTTARI IS CLOSE FRIEND GPVALIANT AND THAT GPVALIANT TOLD HIM THAT ALTHOUGH HE COULDN'T SAY HOW OR WHEN HE WAS GOING TO FIND A WAY TO GET RID OF CASTRO. BUTTARI REPOZO ESTIMATED THAT WITHIN EIGHT MONTHS AFTER GPVALIANT TAKES OFFICE THERE WOULD BE ACTION AGAINST CASTRO.

Cit Cuba
PA U.S.A. Florida, Miami

2. AMCLEVE-15 ALSO REPORTED THAT THERE ARE NOW THREE ANTI-CASTRO GROUPS IN MIAMI SEEKING US ASSISTANCE: THE NUNEZ PORTOUNDO GROUP, THE PENABAZ GROUP AND THE BUTTARI GROUP. AMCLEVE-15 ADDED THAT MANUEL ARTIME WAS ASSOCIATED WITH BUTTARI IN HIS anti-Castro MOVEMENT AND THAT THIS GROUP HAS THE INSIDE TRACK DUE TO BUTTARI'S CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GPVALIANT.

Socio Kelly

3. INDEX BUTTARI, NUNEZ, PENABAZ AND ARTIME.

FILE: 201-300985.

S E C R E T

SECRET

17 JAN 69
201-300985

MICROFILMED
MAR 4 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

V L

PROPER FILE NO.
AN

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID/AN

JONES, MARSHA   DY-612
RID/AN   CA-50
EXT. 4239   TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3				
2. NP			16 JAN 1969	NP
3.				
4. WH/Contract	3D5324	17 JAN 1969	Feb 11	
5. ~~[illegible]~~				
6. WH/B+F		12 [illegible] HARRIET	2/12	B [illegible]
7. WH/HEADSET		14 FEB 1969		
8.				
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10. CPD	5E 69		11/2/69	
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. WH/3/V	3B 2627		Feb	
17. RI/FI				

COMMENTS

PLS SEND 1 CC TO CONTRACTS BRANCH

[illegible] sent 13 Jan 69

copy data [illegible]

P.T.

Pls complete Form 2457 for CSPS, GS-10.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST   ABSTRACT   INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
3 JAN 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HVCA 16130

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

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	MARKED FOR INDEXING
x	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO. Chief, Contracts Branch
Chief, WH/WSHEADSET

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached are four copies of an amendment to Subject's MOC reflecting a raise in salary from Bs. 1,000 to Bs. 1,500 per month. Station feels that AMCLEVE-15's operational activities and intelligence disseminations over the past six months more than justify this modest raise in salary.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT:
MOC, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
② - C/WHD, w/att (1 cy), h/w
1 - C/Contracts Br., w/att (2 cys), h/w
1 - C/WH/WSHEADSET, w/att (1 cy), h/w

(ATT

CS COPY

JAN 3 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 16130	2 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

AMENDMENT OR TERMINATION

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

DATE: 2 January 1969

TO : Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Contract Approving Officer

FROM : Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Oral Commitments: AMCLEVE-15 (Agent)
201 - 300985

Subject Memorandum, dated 20 August 1968 , has been amended or terminated as indicated below:

1. Compensation. Effective 1 February 1969 Subject will be paid Bs1,500 per month (equivalent to $ 335.00 at exchange rate Bs4.47/$1.00). No other changes with respect to compensation or other emoluments or benefits as detailed in the original Memorandum have been made.

2. Termination. Subject contract was terminated effective . Appropriate secrecy agreements and acknowledgement that no further claims against contracting entity are outstanding have been obtained insofar as operationally possible and feasible.

3. Other Changes.

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

SIGNED:
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

REVIEWED:
Contract Approving Officer
Feb 11, 1969

mac

SECRET

w/att to HVCA-16130 CS COPY 201-300985

14-00000

1968

HVCA 16123
31 Dec 68
CIGUSTY NOV PROGRESS REPORT

The following is a summary of developmental activities and estimated expenditures for Project CITGUSTY during November 1968.

AGENT	**EXPENDITURE**
AMCLEVE-15 Provided information on Erasto Fernandez, Chief of DIGEPOL; DIGEPOL; Chief of CIVISTA-5 and general info on the internal security situation which led to numerous disseminations.	$ 450.00

From: HVCA 15954, 25 October 1968 File: 75-6-41/3

Subject: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for September 1968

AMCLEVE-15	450.00

Subject attended the International Students Meeting at Merida and provided information which resulted in a dissemination. He continues to provide information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5's group. Emphasis during September was placed on information relative to the arrest and interrogation of top-level MIR leaders.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		x NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Caracas		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
AMCLEVE-15/Foreign Language Outline

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The attached outline was taken from a confessed guerrilla, recently arrested by CIRASH in the city of Barquisimeto, Venezuela. When interrogated by AMCLEVE-15 and others, the arrestee said he did not know where the outline came from; what language it was in; and, in fact, said it did not belong to him.

2. Various Station officers and assets have studied the outline, and the consensus of opinion is that it is probably Turkish or a middle-eastern language.

3. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate offices in an attempt to ascertain what language the outline is written in, together with a translation of its contents. Although Station personnel contacted felt it unlikely, the possibility exists that the outline is in code.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT:
Copy Outline, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w

CS COPY

OCT 23 1968
201-300955

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 15939	21 October 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

I) [illegible]
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II) [illegible]
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III) [illegible]
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IV) [illegible]
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V) [illegible]
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3. [illegible]

VI) [illegible]
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VII) [illegible]
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3. [illegible]
4. [illegible] ([illegible])

VIII) [illegible]
1. [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible]

11w ATT. TO HVCA-15939

CS COPY

201-300755

[illegible].-
1. [illegible] 60 - 6
2. [illegible],
3. [illegible]

[illegible].-
1. [illegible] ([illegible]
2. [illegible] ([illegible])

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 15 October 1968 dt
TO: WH/3/V - J. Gover	C NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Per our conversation, please refer to CSI-F-10-5, Section #19 relative to the meaninglessness of the issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval on the agent of a foreign power. We shall, therefore, be unable to process your POA request.

However, we should be glad to conduct a Covert Name Check since it is assumed that the authorization in DIR 71540 still obtains.

1 Apr 65
Oct 65 OA

11 Jul 67 terminated

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Luis POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

The attached report is forwarded for your information. It would be interesting to learn the identities of Subject's contacts in Miami.

Hume W. TROXELL

Attachment:
DODIIR # 2 753 0028 68, 2 Aug 68

Distribution:
3 - Caracas

AMCLEVE-15

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HVCW-8233	19 SEP 1968 16 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

AH MES
AB X 1 - RI
IN 1 - Chrono
DS
DK
DE
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ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/V/C.W.Cox:chd	4521

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/V	16/4/68	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	16 Sep	Spara

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

From : HVCA-15811, 18 Sept 68 75-6-41/3

Subject: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for Aug 68

AMCLEVE-15 $490.00

Subject continues to provide information of value on the CIRASH-4 and CIVISTA-5 organizations.

13 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1968, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile." The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

2. The Station acknowledged their instructions but demurred on Headquarters' interpretation of AMCLEVE-15's activities. The Station stated, in effect, that assets are often unsavory individuals, who are never under complete control and who seldom disclose the complete range of their activities to their supervisors. The Station added that they were interested in Subject because of his position as a "trusted confidant" of certain highly placed Venezuelan security officials.

3. In the ensuing months the Station came to describe Subject as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of the intelligence information and operational reports he furnished. For example, he reported on the involvement of the Venezuelan military in a Cuban exile plan to attack Cuba. And, he also reported on a plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela

301

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles." To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform, or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject.

5. Subject was given a polygraph examination to resolve specifically his bona fides, possible affiliation with Cuban Intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from CIA and other questions involving possible derogatory information on Subject. Subject's responses, described as substantially truthful by the examiners, appear to contain no information which would prevent CIA's operational use of Subject. On only one question, that involving Subject's association with an alleged racketeer, Lefty Rosenthal, did sensitivity persist. The examiner commented, "...In fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainty over the amount of Para military items which he had been instrumental in getting for Rosenthal from Cuban exile arms supplies."

6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that the restrictions cited in Paragraph one, above, be lifted to permit more effective utilization of this well-placed penetration agent. WH Division concurs in this request. CI/OPS concurrence is requested in authorizing full operational use of AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of Remberto UZCATEGUI's Special Group within DIGEPOL.

Jack Gower
WH/3/V

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)* *PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK*	DATE 7 September 1968
TO: ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY	FROM: JP Oewer WH/3/Venezuela 3 E 2631; 4521b/9494r
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles	PROJECT
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES AMCLEVE-15	CI/OA FILE NO. RI 201 FILE NO. 300985 SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Caracas, Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of the Remberto UZCATEGUI Brusal special group.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO. JMWAVE	☒	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED [illegible] Caracas	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

5 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1967, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile". The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

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SECRET

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles". To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform, or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject.

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6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that he be processed for POA/OA to permit more effective utilization of this well placed penetration agent.

John P. Gower
WH/3/V

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT D AMCLEVE-15
MOC and Security Clearance

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are four copies of Subject's MOC.

2. As the Desk is aware, the last word from Headquarters was that AMCLEVE-15 was to be treated as a "hostile" and that full clearance was being withheld pending his SGSWIRL. He has now been SGSWIRLed, and to the Station's knowledge, the test was favorable although an official Headquarters report has not been received. A PRQ Part I was submitted on Subject on 29 May 1968. Therefore, it would be appreciated if the Desk would contact the appropriate Headquarters officials and advise the Station of AMCLEVE-15's official status. We assume that he will be fully cleared and that a POA will be issued followed by an OA after the Station submits PRQ Part II.

3. Headquarters recently inquired as to Station thoughts on including AMCLEVE-15 in the CIFLUTE Project rather than making AMCLEVE a separate project. The Station is completely in accord with this idea although it will probably necessitate funds being shifted from CIGUSTY to CIFLUTE. However, a separate dispatch will be prepared on this subject.

4. The Station realizes that AMCLEVE-15's clearance has been a thorny problem to the Desk and hopes that we can now clear it up once and for all.

Perry G. Drapkin
Perry G. DRAPKIN

ATTACHMENT
MOC, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w

AUG 21 1968

CS COPY

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA - 15734	20 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 300985

ATTACHMENT TO: HVCA - 15734

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas

Date: 20 August 1968

SUBJECT: Engagement of **AMCLEVE-15** as Independent Contractor (201- 300985)

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under **CIGUSTY** . The effective date of the oral contract is 2 **February** 1968 , and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for subject's use ~~xxxx xxxx~~ **is pending** . Type , dated , No. .

3. Citizenship. Subject is / ~~xxxxx~~ a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will / ~~xxxxxxx~~ be paid a salary of Bs 1,000 per month (equivalent to approximately $ 250.00 at exchange rate Bs 4.47/$1.00). No raise in this salary is contemplated at this time, nor has any been promised. In accordance with local custom, subject may be given a bonus payment or gift (not to exceed one month's salary) at Christmastime, although no specific commitment has been made to this effect. No other bonuses have been promised, although such a payment may be made at some time during the effective period of this oral contract in recognition of a specific task performed or as an inducement payment. Subject may occasionally be given a gift (whiskey, cigarettes or other similar item) for operational purposes.

5. Taxes. Not applicable.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence. Not applicable.

7. Operational Expenses. When incurred upon direction and approval of Station,

   (a) Subject may be reimbursed for operational travel either on an actual cost basis, or by appropriate per diem payments;

   (b) Subject may be reimbursed for operational expenses, which will include any approved expenses subject incurs while acting on assignment by the Station, such as costs of entertainment, transportation to and from meetings or places of assignments, purchase of special supplies, etc.

8. Other Commitments. None

9. Contingent Obligations. Although no other obligations have been incurred with subject, nor implied or promised, it is possible that a bonus may be granted him upon termination of satisfactory service, which payment would be in accordance with local custom.

No commitments other than those expressly stated herein or in attached annexes have been made or implied to subject.

SIGNED: ______________________
Field Contracting Officer
(Chief of Station)

REVIEWED: ______________________
Contract Approving Officer

CS COPY

201-300985

H/w att to HVCA-15734

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ 2

DISSEM BY 3 PER ______

ACTION

WH8 ☐ RID COPY

...FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO

FILE VR R/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

...ND AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 192140Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0384

DIRECTOR

19 AUG 68 IN 73418

REF DIRECTOR 25496

CIRASH

FERNANDEZ TOLD AMCLEVE-15 HIS TRIP TO NEW YORK AND MIAMI WAS FOR PURPOSE SEEING GIRLFRIEND. FERNANDEZ DID NOT MENTION TRAVELLING TO PUERTO RICO. ANY FURTHER INFO OBTAINED THRU LIAISON OR AMCELVE-15 WILL BE FORWARDED SOONEST.

S E C R E T

BT

CC

Action 15201

SECRET

HVCA 15706
14 AUG 65

AMCLEVE-15 220.00

Subject continues to provide valuable information on the CIRASH and CIVISTA-5 organizations.

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CA-5, CA/Reg, CA/Prop, FI-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI,
#549 RI/AN

S E C R E T 122113Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0324 12 Aug 68 IN 69007

DIRECTOR

AMCLEVE-15
201

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 22253

B. CARACAS 0286 (IN 65406)

1. AT STATION DIRECTION CIHITCH-1, AMCLEVE-15 AND THREE MEMBERS CIVISTA-5 GROUP ATTENDED LATIN AMERICAN STUDENT CONFERENCE SCHEDULED 7 THRU 12 AUG AT MERIDA.
FACT THAT CONFERENCE WAS POSTPONED AND RESCHEDULED FOR LATER DATE TOGETHER WITH OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION BEING DISSEMED IN SEPARATE CABLE.

2. IN MERIDA CIHITCH-1 POSED AS JOURNALIST USING NUMEROUS LEGITIMATE CARDS HE HAS COLLECTED OVER YEARS.
AMCLEVE-15 AND CIVISTA GROUP DEVELOPED ON-THE-SPOT COVER AS REPORTERS FOR IDEN A AND WERE SUCCESSFUL IN INTERVIEWING AND PHOTOGRAPHING TWO MIR DIRECTORS. AMCLEVE-15 EXPECTS IDEN B TO PUBLISH SOME OF THEIR INTERVIEWS AND PICTURES AND TO FURNISH THEM IDENTIFICATION CARDS AS IDEN A REPORTERS FOR THE SEPT ? LASC MEETING. IF AMCLEVE-15 SUCCESSFUL, STATION WILL DUPLICATE CARD FOR FUTURE INTERNAL AND THIRD COUNTRY USE.

SECRET

Latin American Student Conference

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 0324 S E C R E T

3. IN ANY CASE CIHITCH-1 AND AMCLEVE-15 WILL COVER LASC SEPT MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

K SECRET (When Filled In)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
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5		10	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 186 WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 071943Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0292

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

7 Aug 68 IN 66189

REF JMCOBRA 0497 (IN 64601)

STATION HAS HAD COVERAGE FROM AMCLEVE-15 OF HELP GIVEN CUBAN EXILES BY VEN MILITARY. AMPAK-2 UNDOUBTEDLY IN TOUCH WITH SAME GROUP. HE MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE BETTER INFO, HOWEVER, AND STATION PLANS CONTACT HIM. REQUEST ALL PERTINENT PARTS HIS 201 BE FORWARDED CARACAS.

S E C R E T

BT

Aclever-15
201

SECRET

HVCA 15652
31 JUL 68

AMCLEVE-15 230.00

Subject continues to be a productive source of information on CIRASH and CIVISTA-5 activities. As soon as the results of his successful SGSWIRL are processed and he is removed from the hostile list, a project will be written.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

8 July 68

[illegible]

POSADA Carilles, Luis Clemente 201-300985

WH/3/V

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

Amcleve-15

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

201	30	09	85

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

WXSCARLET-3

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	8/16/78		

Luis Clemente POSADA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

When W[illegible] T-3 terminated, inform Fred Bucci and check with him on having W-3's file at 14NS * taken out of current restricted status. Memo to Bucci may be needed on this.

Done A

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

6-3.

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

	ABS	COI	ACP	TOO	TPS	GRO	DCI		PAGE OF PAGES
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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
DATE TIME GROUP: 290015Z
CITE: WASHINGTON
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 920330

CONF: LA/DP 5   INFO: FILE

0 INDEX   DISSEM BY: 27
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

90

PIB ☒ ABSTRACT
INDEX
IP CRV: PREPARE FOR FILMING
FILE NO (2...)
CABLE GEN (II)
IP CW: FOR FILING
LA/NC/V

TO: CARACAS. Y

FROM: LAPNC/V Y

UNINTEL Y

1. FOLLOWING IS DCD/MIAMI REPORT 00A {S} 322-26419-76 ON

OTP MEETING BETWEEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ AND LUIS POSADA CARRILES. Y

A. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, U.S. CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENEZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS {POSADA} CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE BCONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIBALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION. Y

B. DIEGUEZ SHOWED US A COPY OF A LENGTHY DOCUMENT GIVEN TO HIM BY POSADA SPECIFICALLY FOR OUR PERUSAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE TYPE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-300985
29 Sep 76

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION   REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE 2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

920330

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

OF INFORMATION TO WHICH HE HAS ACCESS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTED OF A LIST OF CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CARACAS, BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND ADDRESSES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND VARIOUS SUNDRY INFORMATION ON JAMAICA, GUYANA, PANAMA, AND ANGOLA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE IN OUR JUDGEMENT, TO HAVE DONE SO MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED AN AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. BY

C. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL {CALDERA}, POSADA WAS A FAIRLY HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION {DISIP}. HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POSITION WHEN CARLOS ANDRES {PEREZ} BECAME PRESIDENT. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT AS A DISIP OFFICIAL POSADA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE ELIMINATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND STRONGHOLDS. AT THAT TIME, POSADA WAS KNOWN AS "COMISARIO BASILIO".

D. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA, CURRENTLY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR IN VENEZUELA, LIVES AT CALLE VALENCIA, QUINTA MARIANINA, LAS PALMAS, CARACAS. HIS OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 743232 AND 742057. DIEGUEZ

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE.

920330

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

ALSO SAID THAT IF BKHERALD IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING POSADA'S SERVICES, CONTACT SHOULD BE INITIATED THROUGH HIM (DIEGUEZ) AND NOT DIRECTLY TO POSADA FOR "SECURITY REASONS". HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY POSADA CAN TRAVEL TO THE U.S. Y

E. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. Y

2. DIEGUEZ WAS BORN 23 OCTOBER 1937, HOLGUIN, ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA. NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN (INS NO. 7832636) ON 24 JUNE 1959 IN BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI. DIEGUEZ CURRENTLY RESIDES IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA WORKING AS A CONTRACTOR IN EXPORTING U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS. HE SERVED IN THE AIR FORCE 6 YEARS, 1956-62. HE ARRIVED IN THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER 1955 TO JOIN ERNESTO DIEGUEZ, RELATIONSHIP UNKNOWN. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE. Y

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. Y

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H

DATE: 28 SEPTEMBER 1976
ORIG: CATHY LEE WARD
UNIT: LAPNC/V
EXT: 1715

201-300985

Matthews
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Beardsley
AC/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

esc [illegible] Usted lleva casi todas las de perder, pero no se amilane. Recuerde que un ejecutivo importante debe tener siempre la respuesta exacta para cualquier situacion. Y nosotros estamos aqui para [illegible] centro del secuestro y eso le otorga inmediatamente ciertos privilegios. Póngase los lentes y lea bien para recordar mejor

—**¡No discuta!** No va a convencer a nadie de que usted no vale la pena de un se[illegible] escapar! Lo mas probable es que le vaya peor que antes. No provoque a los secuestradores pues es un riesgo innecesario que se corre con personas desconocidas. ¡Y no los subestime! Recuerde que pueden ser tan inteligentes [illegible] podemos garantizar nada.

No tome a broma lo que aqui acabamos de decirle. Un secuestro esta a la vuelta de la esquina en cualquier pais y en cualquier momento. Si no lo cree revise las páginas de su diario. ¡Y buena suerte!

POR EL INDUSTRIAL Carlos Dominguez se pagó el rescate mas caro hasta el momento en nuestro país: 5 millones de bolivares.

3

SE ACABO LA VIDA PRIVADA

Por: **ROMULO RODRIGUEZ**
Fotos **ANGEL QUINTERO**

Momento 13-19 Sept

EL SEÑOR POSADA, director de una compañia de investigaciones, muestra a MOMENTO los pequeños micrófonos utilizados para espionaje y contraespionaje.

Otra de las facetas de la investigación y seguridad, es el espionaje y contraespionaje de empresas y compañías, o bien para instalar sistemas internos o para llevarle los secretos a la competencia.

NO es nada nuevo hoy en dia que una compañia pueda estar vigilada totalmente. Desde el control de sus hilos telefonicos, hasta microfonos escondidos en las salas de conferencias, o en las oficinas de sus principales ejecutivos: tampoco es raro que un señor tome fotos allí mismo con una camara escondida en un maletin, o que a esa empresa le graben conversaciones desde una distancia de 25 metros. Tal es el caso del espionaje industrial o contraespionaje industrial. Investigadores privados intervienen, infiltran gente dentro de una compañia, con el fin de obtener datos secretos y llevarselos a la competencia. O puede ser tambien que los investigadores penetren a la propia compañia para impedir que salgan datos se instala entonces un sistema de seguridad interno.

Y cuando nos referimos a estos hechos no estamos hablando de paises capitalistas foraneos de gran desarrollo industrial, sino a esta tierra tropical y subdesarrollada. En Venezuela muchisimas compañias prestan estos servicios. Una de ellas es la que dirige el señor Luis Posada en una empresa que funciona desde el año 74 "Investigaciones Comerciales e Industriales" (ICI), se basa en la experiencia de su Director Gerente, el señor Posada, quien cuenta con 16 años dedicados a estas actividades de investigacion, repartidos en la policia de Norteamerica, en la DISIP y ahora en funciones privadas.

Conservando el acento de su tierra de origen, Cuba, Posada converso con MOMENTO.

—Nosotros no tratamos investigaciones de adulterio, ni cosas por el estilo. Nuestra funcion no es para los abogados, que son los que se enriquecen con ello. La compañia se dedica a las empresas de seguros, comercios e industrias. El 90% se enfila a robos cometidos en las industrias, cuya culpabilidad se da casi siempre en los propios empleados de estas empresas. También se investigan homicidios e incendios.

—**¿Y qué hacen para casos de espionaje industrial?**

—Tenemos dos tipos de operaciones: Ofensiva y defensiva. En las primeras se hace espionaje, y en la otra contrariamente es para defenderse de ello. Un sospechoso deshonesto puede ser fotografiado cuando hace una entrevista con alguien de la competencia. Puede ser precisado y neutralizado un directivo que se fue de la empresa y se está llevando al personal. Podemos tambien hacer vigilancia a los ejecutivos: desde las personas con quienes almuerza hasta que hace por la noche.

Refiere que uno de los más modernos equipos que tienen es un detector de mentiras, a base de un test, que permite con una cinta grabada de la voz, determinar si el examinado miente o no.

—**¿Ha dado resultado este detector?**

—Con el aparato descubrimos un desfalco de 200 mil bolivares habido en una empresa, donde grabamos a mas de 50 empleados.

Nos muestra unos grabadores minimos, casi invisibles, que funcionan con baterias que duran ocho dias, o utilizables tambien con corriente directa. Un pequeño equipo de telefonia, intercepta telefonos a sólo tres cuadras de la casa vigilada, sin intervención de la DISIP ni otros cuerpos policiales.

—Tambien hacemos "barridas", esto significa que nosotros localizamos y neutralizamos microfonos que se hayan instalado previamente, cuando en un sitio va a haber una reunión importante y secreta. Es un caso de contraespionaje. Grabamos conversaciones desde una distancia de 35 metros. Desde un maletin podemos hacer fotografias a personas o edificaciones: tambien desde una cartera de mujer.

Expresa que en las oficinas que tienen en Caracas y Valencia cuentan con un personal femenino de siete mujeres. Tambien poseen un archivo, donde fichan los casos que han investigado y otros datos. Afirma Posada que no realizan investigaciones politicas.

Tal como se ve la vida privada, dejo de serlo.



ESTE MODERNO detector de mentiras, permite saber a traves de una grabacion, si el examinado dice la verdad o no.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Operational Lead - Luis Posada Carriles

FROM:
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
Operations Services Group/OSG
910 Key Bldg. x-2268

EXTENSION:

NO. HH-28363

DATE 15 September 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. LA/NW/V 3B4406	17 SEP 1976		G	
2. LA/C/LA 3D5325			✓	MIM-OO-A(S)-322/26419-76
3. File: WKSCARLET-3/201				
4.				Attached for your information.
5.				20 Sept. asked [illegible] for more info on [illegible]. He will ask Miami. We then have to tell [illegible] how to handle.
6.				
7.				
8.				E-2 IMPDET CL BY)06875
9.				TP Sent 1 Oct 76
10.				
11.				
12.	SECRET			
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

5

REPORT CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/WNINTEL/CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
REPORT NUMBER: 00-A(S) 322/26419-76
TWX NO.: DCD/MIAMI 13513
COUNTRY: VENEZUELA
SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL LEAD - LUIS POSADA CARRILES

(THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO CONTAIN INFORMATION OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND MAY NOT BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONNEL OUTSIDE THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS WITHOUT THE PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION.)

1. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, US CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENENZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS (POSADA) CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION.

2. DIEGUEZ SHOWED US A COPY OF A LENGTHY DOCUMENT GIVEN TO HIM BY POSADA SPECIFICALLY FOR OUR PERUSAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO WHICH HE HAS ACCESS. THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTED OF A LIST OF CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN CARACAS, BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND ADDRESSES FOR THESE INDIVIDUALS, AND VARIOUS SUNDRY INFORMATION ON JAMAICA, GUYANA, PANAMA, AND ANGOLA. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE DOCUMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HEADQUARTERS BECAUSE IN OUR JUDGEMENT, TO HAVE DONE SO MIGHT HAVE IMPLIED AN AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL REMUNERATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

3. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF FORMER PRESIDENT RAFAEL (CALDERA), POSADA WAS A FAIRLY HIGH RANKING OFFICER IN THE DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP). HE WAS DISMISSED FROM THIS POSITION WHEN CARLOS ANDRES (PEREZ) BECAME PRESIDENT. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT AS A DISIP OFFICIAL POSADA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE ELIMINATION OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AND STRONGHOLDS. AT THAT TIME, POSADA WAS KNOWN AS ''COMISARIO BASILIO''.

4. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA, CURRENTLY A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR, IN VENEZUELA, LIVES AT CALLE VALENCIA, QUINTA MARIANINA, LAS PALMAS-CARACAS. HIS OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE 743232 AND 742057. DIEGUEZ ALSO SAID THAT IF BKHERALD IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING POSADA'S SERVICES CONTACT SHOULD BE INITIATED THROUGH HIM (DIEGUEZ) AND NOT DIRECTLY TO POSADA FOR ''SECURITY REASONS''. HOWEVER, IF NECESSARY POSADA CAN TRAVEL TO THE US.

5. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. - END -
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
CONFIDENTIAL/WNINTEL/CIA INERNAL USE ONLY

1. TRACES DIEGUE?

2 ANY INDICATION HE MEMBER OF WKTANGO-1 GROUP?

3. POSADA NEEDS NO ASSISTANCE; HE IS AMICABLY TERMINATED ASSET WHO KNOWS SEVERAL MEANS OF CONTACTING GRAUSPIES DIRECTLY WITH PRACTICALLY NO EFFORT.

4. POSADA DOES NOT NEED MONEY - HE MAKING MINT OUT OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS BUSINESS.

5. "HIGH RANKING" GOV OFFICIALS NOT ACCURATE - HE IS COPEYANO WHO NOT ON GOOD TERMS WITH ADECOS EXCEPT FOR WKTANGO-1. WE KNOW WKNORTH HAS POSADA ON WKBLEAK.

6. POSADA WAS MEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL OF DISIP.

7. PARA 4 BUSINESS OF NO DIRECT CONTACT IS FISHY. THIS COULD BE GOV OP TO DISCREDIT POSADA AND THROW HIM OUT OF COUNTRY.

SUNDAY	1000-	Beacon (tracking device) demonstration by Mr. Don Boottle of commercial Co.
MONDAY	0900-	FBI; 9th & Penn; ask for Mr. Robert Birmingham; full day, which should include visit to Quantico.
TUESDAY	0900-1130	US Secret Service: 1800 "G" St., 9th floor; ask for Mr. Lou McClan. Be on time, as there is meeting with Chief at 1000 hrs. Beltsville range included.
WEDNESDAY	0900-1130	Dulles (FAA); ask for Security Officer.
	1330-	Chalk Point (PEPCo.) for tour of nuclear site.
THURSDAY	0900-0930	HQS Bldg; enter thru tunnel & park.
	0930-1200	Computer briefing, 1D 41-05.
	1200-1400	Lunch, Evans Farm Inn.
	1400-1430	Return to HQS, thru tunnel & park.
	1430-1445	Meet DDCI in his office.
	1500-1630	Tech briefing, 2D 03.
FRIDAY	0800-1100	Briefings at Motel on PRC, Sovs & Cubans.
	1200-1245	Travel to Pentagon & park.
	1245-1300	Meet Chief, DIA.
	1300-1530	Carribean briefing; tour NMIC.
SATURDAY		Shopping.
SUNDAY		Return to Caracas.

PY [illegible]

SHOTGUN/RIFLE CONTACTS?

1. ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1976, US CITIZEN SERGIO DIEGUEZ CALLED THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND REQUESTED TO MEET WITH A SPANISH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATIVE. WE MET WITH DIEGUEZ ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1976. HE TOLD US THAT RECENTLY, WHILE IN VENENZUELA, HE MET WITH LUIS (POSADA) CARRILES, A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN ORIGIN. HE TOLD US THAT POSADA, ALLEGEDLY A FORMER AGENCY ASSET, HAD REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN OFFERING FOR A PRICE POSADA'S SERVICES TO BKHERALD. DIEGUEZ SAID THAT POSADA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH HIGH RANKING VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND COULD PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH VALUABLE INFORMATION.

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5. DIEGUEZ WAS TOLD THAT HIS REQUEST IN BEHALF OF POSADA WOULD BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE COULD NOT PROMISE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. - END -

3116 x6
7124

DPOB: 23 Oct 32
Holguin, Oriente Prov, Cuba

US Cit 1955 (Nat) 7832636, Riley, Kans.
24 June 59

Educ. Coral Gables

Occ. Businessman - Contractor
American Int'l Consultants (Co)

SD: U.S. Export - Pharmaceuticals
C.R.; Von (OE-324/23116-76)

OS # 679245

FBI - NR
OSI - 6 yrs 56-62 in USAF

Came Sept 55 to join
Ernesto Dieguez

1958
Jaime Rivero, NYC
Lydia Santiago, NYC
Gilberto Conde NYC
Joaquin Bode NYC
Avelino Martinez NYC
Marino Argote NYC

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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13-2

PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 242324Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 875121

CONF. LA6 INFO: FILE SECUR 3, c/ops, DCI/AA

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 49

0 NO INDEX

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0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS. Y

ADMIN SECUR Y

REF: CARACAS 30169 |IN 959929| Y

1. SUGGEST YOU COUNSEL WKSCARLET-3 THAT IF NEITHER HE NOR HIS WIFE HAVE ENTERED THE U.S. WITHIN THE PERIOD WHEN THEIR ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMITS WERE VALID, AND IF THEY DESIRE TO RETAIN THEIR STATUS AS PERMANENT-RESIDENT ALIENS (PRA), THEY MUST MAKE APPLICATIONS FOR RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS WITH THE CARACAS CONSULATE. THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE VISAS WILL BE ISSUED, SINCE ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO QUOTA NUMBER INVOLVED, THE PROCESSING IS THE SAME AS ANY OTHER IMMIGRANT VISA, WITH THE CONSULAR OFFICER HAVING THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE DETERMINATION AS TO ELIGIBILITY. IF THEY APPLY SOLELY FOR A TOURIST VISA IN THEIR VENEZUELAN PASSPORT, THEY COULD LOSE THEIR PRA STATUS, SINCE APPLYING FOR A TOURIST VISA IS PRIMA FACIA EVIDENCE OF [redacted] ABANDONMENT OF PRA STATUS. IF THEY OBTAIN RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS, THEY SHOULD BE ADVISED TO OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHILE IN U.S. Y

2. NO HQS OBJECTION TO ASSIST WKSCARLET-3 OBTAIN VISAS LOCALLY,

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

WKSCARLET-3.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE 875121

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BIF YOU FORESEE NO SECURITY PROBLEMS. WKSCARLET-3 IS NOT WATCH-LISTED BY INS. Y

3. FILE: 8201-300985. E2 IMPD ET.A

COMMENT: WKSCARLET-3 DESIRES VISIT US FOR BBVACATION. ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMIT HAS EXPIRED, BUT HE HAS VALID VENEZUELAN PASSPORT. STATION ASKED IF COULD ASSIST LOCALLY IN OBTAINING VISA. WHEN RECRUITED AGENT, HQS WOULD HANDLE HIS RE-ENTRY PERMITS, BUT AFTER TERMINATION IT WAS SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF WKSCARLET-3

COORD:

DEF/AA - FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

LA/SS/SEC ✓

DATE: 24 JUNE 76
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: C/LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT LA6

ACTION #

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T 022071 EIA332 PAGE 01 IN 959929

TOR:232055Z JUN 76 CARA 30169

S E C R E T 232041Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 30169

TO: DIRECTOR.

ADMIN SECUR

WKSCARLET-3/201

REF: DIRECTOR 538768

1. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS FAMILY VACATION TRAVEL TO CONUS DURING JULY 1976 AND HAS REQUESTED STATION ASSISTANCE OBTAINING VISAS FOR SELF AND FAMILY MEMBERS.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAS SURRENDERED FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS TO STATION:

A. HIS OWN ALIEN RE-ENTRY PERMIT A12 419 708 WHICH EXPIRED 30 MAY 1975.

B. HIS AND HIS WIFE'S (A12 443 942) ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS FORM 1-151.

C. VENEZUELAN PASSPORT V5304069 WHICH INCORRECTLY RELFECTS POB AS CARACAS AND CONTAINS U.S. B-2 NIV VISA.

3. WKSCARLET-3 HAS PRESENTED VALID VENEZUELAN PASSPORTS REFLECTING CORRECT DPOB FOR SELF, WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ASCERTAIN W-3 NOT WATCHLISTED BY INS, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE TO LOCALLY ASSIST SUBJECT

S E C R E T

9-71 MPG 2/70

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

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ACTION #		

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3		6	

T 022071 EIA332 PAGE 02-02 IN 959929

TOR:2320552 JUN 76 CARA 30169

OBTAIN VISAS.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2. IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 082231Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 866185

CONF LA 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN,

0 INDEX
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0 IP FILES # 111

DISSEM BY: 22

TO: CARACAS. Y

KMSTONE TRACE Y

REF: CARACAS 29953 [IN 939164] Y

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ON SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ MENTIONED REF. REVIEW OF THE ZZ TRAVEL LISTINGS BSHOW SEVERAL PERSONS WITH SAME NAME, OR SLIGHT VARIATIONS, AS TRAVELLING ON OFFICIAL PASSPORTS. NO INFORMATION OTHER THAN TRAVEL IS AVAILABLE. Y

2. THE OFFICIAL 201 ON SANTIAGO DIAZ PAZ (201-0801134) DOES NOT SHOW SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ AS AN ALIAS USED BY HIM. Y

3. FILE: 201-0801134; 201-0832894S; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: STATION REQUESTED TRACES ON SUBJECT WHO CAME TO CARACAS TO INVESTIGATE DISCLOSURES OF CUBANS IN LOCAL CARACAS PRESS.

COORD:

LA/COG

DATE: 8 JUNE 76
ORIG: CATHY LEE WARD clw
UNIT: LA/PNC/V
EXT: 1715

CROSS FILE COPY FOR 300985
DO NOT DESTROY

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 007255

SECRET

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

S E C R E T

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T 968054 EIA727 PAGE 01 IN 939164

TOR:031144Z JUN 76 CARA 29953

SECRET 022051Z JUN 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29953

TO: DIRECTOR,

REAM TRACE

REF HVCA 20587, 27 MAY 1976

1. DAO COLONEL ROACH TOLD COS ON 1 JUNE THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED DAO CONTACT CLAIMS TO HAVE BUG(NOW INACTIVE DUE BATTERY FAILURE) IN APARTMENT OF SLFAT-1. ROACH TOLD THAT, BEFORE FAILING, BUG REVEALED THAT ONE SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ HAD COME TO CARACAS TO INVESTIGATE DISCLOSURES OF CUBANS IN LOCAL CARACAS PRSS.

2. CARACAS HAS NO SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ LISTED IN CUBAN MACHINE RUNS BUT REF, PARA 2A NOTES ONE SANTIAGO DIAZ ARRIVED CARACAS 13 MAY 1976 FROM MEXICO TO SEE CUBAN AMBASSADOR HERNANDEZ. CUBAN MACHINE RUNS ON A SANTIAGO DIAZ PAZ (201-0801134) LIST HIM AS DGI OFFICER WHO HAS SERVED IN LONDON, LIMA AND GENEVA. REQUEST HQS TRACES SANTIAGO RODRIGUEZ.

3. STATION SUSPECTS ROACH'S SOURCE IS WKSCARLET-3 WHO HAS LATELY BEEN ACTIVE IN A PRIVATE INVESTIGATIONS

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201-
DO NOT DESTROY

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INFO RF FILE VR

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T 968054 EIA727 PAGE 02-02 IN 939164

TOR:031144Z JUN 76 CARA 29953

COMPANY WITH SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY BACKING. STATION PLANS REACTIVATE CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3, WHICH PREVIOUSLY DROPPED DUE SECURITY REASONS, AND INVESTIGATE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF ANTI-CUBAN OPERATIONS IN VENEZUELA.

4. FILE: 201-0801134; 201-0328945; 201-0300985.

E 2, IMPDET.

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INFO RF FILE VR LA7, SSY, A/AN, C/4 OSG/IC, C/OB, R/EGN

T 934.'55 EIA556 PAGE 01 IN 926731

TOR:221357Z MAY 76 CARA 29853

S E C R E T 221336Z MAY 76 STAFF

TOO MANY ACTION INDICATORS
SEE HHB 90-1 A DOI 10-10

CITE CARACAS 29853

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKSCARLET-3(001)

REAM CKTOP SGCHART

REF: CARACAS 29794 (IN 916831)

1. 19 MAY "EL UNIVERSAL" ARTICLE WITH "NUEVA PRENSA LATINOAMERICANA" AND FELIX MARTINEZ SUAREZ BYLINE "KGB Y DGI OPERAN EN UN EDIFICIO CERCAN A LA EMBAJADA CASTRISTA" LISTS SLFAT-1 AS THE DGI HEAD IN CUBAN EMBASSY IN CARACAS. ARTICLE CLAIMS SAME UNIDENTIFIED SOURCE AS REF ARTICLE AND SAYS SLFAT-1 IS INTERNATIONAL "KEY MAN". ARTICLE CONTAINS PASSPORT PICTURE OF SLFAT-1 AND PURPORTED CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPH OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR KASIMIROV, CUBAN AMBASSADOR HERNANDEZ, CUBAN PRESS ATTACHE GOMEZ, FORMER SOVIET MINISTER COUNSELOR KAZANTSEV, SLTAUNT1 AND LUIS LAZO OF "PRENSA LATINA" MEETING IN SLFAT-1'S APARTMENT NEAR THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

2. PHOTOGRAPH NOTED ABOVE IS COPY OF PHOTO THAT DAO COLONEL ROACH OBTAINED LAST WEEK FROM UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER OF WKSCARLET-3'S INVESTIGATIONS GROUP. APPARENTLY WKSCARLET-3, OR, MORE LIKELY, ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES, IS MARTINEZ'S SOURCE

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T 934055 EIA556 PAGE 02-02 IN 926731

TOR:2013572 MAY 76 CARA 29853

FOR CUBAN INFORMATION.

3. ARTICLE GOES ON TO CALL THE LETTER BOMBS THAT THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND "EROTUR" RECEIVED RECENTLY AS A DISINFORMATION PLOY BY CUBANS. ALSO LISTS AN "OPERATION CANAL" (PANAMA) AS A PLAN TO MOVE VENEZUELA AWAY FROM THE US IN WHICH SOVIET UNION IS ALSO INVOLVED. ARTICLE SAYS THAT CUBANS ARE MOBILIZING "PRENSA LATINA" NOW TO INFLUENCE VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS ON 1978 AND AGAIN NAMES SOVIET AMBASSADOR AS KGB HEAD IN VENEZUELA.

4. STATION POUCHING COPY OF ARTICLE TO HQS.

5. FILE: 75-120-28; 201-0294757, E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 15 PER LA#6 TOTAL COPIES 97-2 RUN BY

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INFO FILE VR C/CS/INT, D/SECUR3, C/CS/IO, C/OPS/ECG4, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/IO, C/DIV D2, C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/OSG/IC, C/SS3

T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 01 IN 841160

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 19265

S E C R E T 280020Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19265

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: DIRECTOR 814328

1. FOLLOWING ARE PERTINENT QUOTES FROM EXCELSIOR ARTICLE RE PASCAL:

SIXTH PARAGRAPH: "BOSCH, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES ARRIVED HERE WITH A PASSPORT, PRESUMED TO BE CHILEAN; TO PREPARE A PLOT AGAINST THE LEADER OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), PASCAL ALLENDE".

ELEVENTH (AND FINAL) PARAGRAPH: "THE REVELATION THAT BOSCH HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY WITH A CHILEAN PASSPORT, APPARENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE RESPONSE OF THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY TO THE SUPREME COURT, WOULD CONFIRM THE THESIS THAT HE CAME HERE WITH INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A PLOT AGAINST PASCAL ALLENDE, POLITICAL SOURCES SAID YESTERDAY".

2. STATION UNWARE ORIGIN EXCELSIOR CONNECTION OF BOSCH WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL. SPECULATE THAT SOURCE WAS PROABLY SOMEONE IN LOCAL SECURITY STRUCTURE. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF THIS

S E C R E T

C/LA/NW — Talked with DC/CAM today and agreed that para 2 could be answered on Monday, with a let's not. Bill

C/LA/NW/V — Bob [illegible] Galloway [illegible]. Suggest this [illegible] traffic be reclassified [illegible] 2011

Copy of [illegible] post [illegible] put in SCAMLET-3/201

Let's not

W/C SCAMLET-3/201

7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 719245 EIA237 PAGE 02-02 IN 841160

TOR:280042Z FEB 76 SJOS 1V265

DESIRED.

3. BASED STATION KNOWLEDGE THAT HUFABRIC AWARE BOSCH BACKGROUND OF BOMBINGS AND POSSIBLE THREAT TO SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING VISIT, PLUS HUFABRIC KNOWLEDGE THAT PASCAL LIFE MIGHT BE THREATENED, HUFABRIC OR OTHERS COULD HAVE PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER. HUFABRIC CONCERNED FROM ARRIVAL PASCAL HERE ON 2 FEBRUARY THAT SOMEONE MIGHT WISH TO ELIMINATE HIM. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

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T 882457 EIA204 PAGE 01 IN 906597

TOR:302255Z APR 76 SJOS 19491

S E C R E T 302237Z APR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19491

TO: SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 17347 (906509)

1. ON 28 APRIL HUGALLY-1 INFORMED COS THAT COSTA RICAN AMBASSADOR IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (CALLEJAS WHO HUGALLY-1 LABELED AS FIGUERES MAN) ARRANGED FOR ENTRY OF DR. ORLANDO BOSCH INTO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. NO DATES MENTIONED AND NO OTHER DETAILS.

2. FYI WE KNOW FROM LOCAL HUFABRIC LIAISON THAT BOSCH WAS ESCORTED/DEPORTED TO NICARAGUA BY OVERLAND ROUTE ON 26 MARCH 1976. LOCAL PRESS 27 MARCH SPECULATED THAT BOSCH DEPORTED TO OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

LA/FNC/V

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

30 Apr 76

201-300985

D 201-299292

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-1

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STAFF 302054Z DIRECTOR 830740

CONF: LA 5 INFO: FILE IP/AN

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RCB

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO BOGOTA, ~~INFO~~ CARACAS.

MHABYSS TRACE

REF: LA/MIAMI 24521 (IN 869006*) (NOT NEEDED CARACAS)

1. DEA/MIAMI MAY BE INFORMED THAT OUR RECORDS SHOW NIEVES ELINA GONZALEZ DE POSADA TO BE THE WIFE OF LUIS POSADA CARRILES (IDEN), SUBJECT OF 201-0300985, WHO IS KNOWN TO DEA/MIAMI. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON GONZALEZ.

2. NO HQS TRACES GABRIEL CORREA ECHAVARRIA.

3. FOR CARACAS: DEA REQUESTED TRACES ON GONZALEZ AND CORREA WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA.

4. FILE: 201-0300985; 200-11-11/14. E2 IMPDET.

*DEA/MIAMI REQUESTED TRACES ON GONZALEZ AND CORREA, WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA.

pdg

C/LA/NW

DDO/NARCOG L.H. PIPER (TELECOORD)

30 Mar 76

201-300985

DATE: 29 MAR 76
ORIG: P. BELLAMY
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1956

C/LA/
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/CAR
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 012913

D 200-11-11/14

OUTGOING MESSAGE

7-1

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PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
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DATE TIME GROUP
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CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
830741

CONF: LA 5 INFO: FILE 1PAN

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DISSEM BY: J
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111 . RCS

TO: LA/MIAMI INFO BOGOTA, ~~INFO~~ CARACAS.

MHABYSS TRACE

REF: DIRECTOR 830740

1. IDENTITY IS WKSCARLET-3, FORMER CARACAS STATION AGENT WITH WHOM STATION STILL MAINTAINS OCCASIONAL CONTACT. PER WH/MIAMI 20657, 10 JANUARY 74, AND EARLIER TRAFFIC, DEA/MIAMI IS AWARE OF AGENCY ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE: 201-0300985; 200-11-11/00014. E2 IMPDET.

adg

ABSTRACT ☒
INDEX
FOR FILING

C/LA/NW

DDO/NARCOG L.H. PIPER (TELECOORD)

DATE: 29 MAR 76
ORIG: PAT BELLAMY
UNIT: LA/CAR/CARI
EXT: 1956

30 Mar 76

201-300985

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

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CL BY: 012913

7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 787270 EIA573 PAGE 01-01 IN 869086

TOR:251536Z MAR 76 LMIN 24521

S E C R E T 251530Z MAR 76 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 24521

TO: DIRECTOR, BOGOTA.

MHABYSS TRACE

1. DEA/MIAMI REQUESTS TRACES ON FOLLOWING TWO PERSONS, INCLUDING ANY PAST BKHERALD AFFILIATION. BOTH ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING INVOLVED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA. NO STATION TRACES.

A. GABRIEL CORREA ECHAVARRIA, BORN 20 OCTOBER 1943, PROBABLY IN COLOMBIA.

B. and NIEVES ELINA GONZALEZ DE POSADA, BORN 12 DECEMBER 1935 IN CUBA.

2. FILE: 200-11-11/14. E2, IMPDET.

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		[illegible] (1)	
		[illegible] (9)	
[illegible]		[illegible]	

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NO TRACES PER BOGO-27937 25 Mar 76

RECORD COPY

25 Mar 76

201-300985

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D 200-11-11/14

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	012138Z	DIRECTOR	815256

CONF: C/LA-4 INFO: FILE

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0 IP FILES #

TO: SAN JOSE INFO CARACAS.Y

RYBATY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 814328

B. SAN JOSE 19265 |IN 841160|Y

1. PREFER THAT STATION NOT REPEAT NOT EXPLORE REF MATTER WITH HUFABRIC. HEADQUARTERS AND CARACAS REMAIN INTERESTED, HOWEVER, IN ANY INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER WHICH OTHERWISE COMES TO YOUR ATTENTION.Y

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.H

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
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IP/PRU		FILMING

LA/NW/4

LA/COMMENT: REF A. IS STATION AWARE ORIGIN GOCR/"EXCELSIOR" KNOWLEDGE OR PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES P A S C H A L ALLENDE?

REF B. UNAWARE ORIGIN. SPECULATE SOURCE PROBABLY A COSTA RICAN SECURITY OFFICIAL. CAN EXPLORE WITH HUFABRIC IF DESIRED.

DATE: 1 MARCH 1976
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:PDL
UNIT: LA/CAM/CRH
EXT: 1946

RECORD COPY

1 Mar 76
201-300985

DC/LA/NW W. DEVINE |TELECOORD|

C/LAD
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

FORM 3020b
7-73 MFG. 10/75

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INFO: RF FILE VR C/OPS/INT D/SECUR 3 C/CSN/ID, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DIV D2 C/CI4, C/PS/EG2, C/PS/ITG2, C/PLAN

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T 723980 EIA633 PAGE 01 IN 842949

TOR:2122217Z MAR 76 SJOS 19272

S E C R E T 0121582 MAR 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19272

TO: DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19265 (IN 841160)

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DIRECTOR 810829 STATION CONTACTED HUFABRIC (HUGLIB-8) TO ADVISE OF A POSSIBLE THREAT AGAINST THE LIFE OF PASCAL ALLENDE, AS INSTRUCTED BY HEADQUARTERS. HUGLIB-8 SAID THE SAME INFORMATION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GONZALO FACIO FROM THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT; FACIO HAD ALREADY PASSED THE INFORMATION TO THE HUFABRICS. PRIOR TO HUGLIB-8'S RECEIPT OF THE INFORMATION FROM THE STATION HE HAD ALREADY PERSONALLY VISITED ALLENDE TO WARN HIM OF THE THREAT.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

WK SCARCCF 3/201

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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STAFF 272142Z DIRECTOR 814328

CONF: C/LA15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 3, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 4, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DWD 3, C/CI 4, C/PS/EG 2

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6

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE CARACAS.Y

RYBAT VULOFTY Y

WKSCARLET-3
201

REF: SAN JOSE 19260 |IN 839451| (RELAYED TO CARACAS)Y

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER REF "EXCELSIOR" ARTICLE CONTAINS ATTRIBUTION FOR ALLEGATION THAT BOSCH INVOLVED IN PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. IS STATION AWARE OF ORIGIN OF "EXCELSIOR" OR GOCR KNOWLEDGE/PRESUMPTION THAT BOSCH PRESENCE IN COSTA RICA POSSIBLY CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST PASCAL? Y

2. HQS HAS ADVISED SAIC MASTROVITO OF SUBSTANCE REF. MASTROVITO REPORTS THAT SUBJECT OF PASCAL NEVER BROUGHT UP EITHER BY HIM, BY BOSCH OR BY HUFABRICS.Y

3. PLEASE KEEP CARACAS ADVISED OF ALL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: SAN JOSE DAILY "EXCELSIOR" CARRIES 26 FEB ARTICLE THAT ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, IN JAIL IN COSTA RICA, WAS INTERROGATED BY NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT. ARTICLE ALSO REPORTS ALLEGATION BOSCH CONNECTED WITH PLOT AGAINST CHILEAN ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, CURRENTLY IN COSTA RICA.

NOTE: U.S. OFFICIAL WHO INTERVIEWED BOSCH WAS SECRET SERVICE OFFICIAL.

DC/LA/NW - WILLIAM DEVINE (DRAFT)
(FOR) C/TFK - LEHMAN SMITH (TELECOORD)
OPS/LSN/ID - CURTIS GLENN (TELECOORD)

DATE: 27 FEB 76
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:ME
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1966

R.L. Connolly
for C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/BCAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054524

S E C R E T

2-71 WHG. 10/76

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T 715098 EIA158 PAGE 01 IN 839451

TOR:261806Z FEB 76 SJOS 19260

S E C R E T 261724Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19260

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: SAN JOSE 19240 (8 31824)

1. Relay to Caracas. Priority

2. Question for SS [illegible]

3. Potential flap - picked up in US press.

[illegible] Caracas

1. POLICE AND JUDICIAL PAGE OF LOCAL DAILY "EXCELSIOR" ON 26 FEBRUARY 1976 CARRIED ARTICLE ENTITLED "BOSCH WAS INTERROGATED BY A U.S. AGENT: WHO ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY WITH KISSINGER." ARTICLE STATES THAT BOSCH WAS VERY DISPLEASED THAT A NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AGENT WHO ARRIVED WITH A DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED KISSINGER HAD INTERROGATED HIM IN A COSTA RICAN JAIL. ARTICLE FURTHER STATES THAT BOSCH SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT ANY COSTA RICAN POLICE OR SECURITY AGENT WOULD INTERVIEW HIM BUT COULD NOT ~~ACEPT~~ ACCEPT THE FACT THAT AN AMERICAN AGENT WOULD INTRODUCE HIMSELF INTO THE COSTA RICAN POLICE SYSTEM TO INTERROGATE HIM. ARTICLE FURTHER MENTIONS THAT BOSCH ENTERED WITH ILLEGAL CHILEAN PASSPORT AND ALLEGEDLY CAME HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A PLOT AGAINST ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. POUCHING ARTICLE.

Copy [illegible]

SS [illegible]

2. PLEASE PASS ABOVE TO SAIC MASTROVITO OF THE

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T 715098 EIA158 PAGE 02-02 IN 839451

TOR:261806Z FEB 76 SJOS 19260

SECRET SERVICE.

3. ACCORDING TO HUFABRIC-14 ON 26 FEBRUARY, NO DECISION YET BEEN MADE CONCERNING BOSCH. ON POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED AND REMAIN IN COSTA RICA AND THE OTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE WILL BE DEPORTED.

4. FILE: 201 BOSCH. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 33-2 RUN BY 2

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ODO/OO, C/OIVO 2

T 707900 EIA128 PAGE 01 IN 836288

TOR:241308Z FEB 76 BUEN 35669

S E C R E T 241300Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 35669

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

R Y B A T VWLOFTY

6

WKSCARLET-3
201

REFS: A. CARACAS 29162 (IN 834939)

B. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

C. BUENOS AIRES 35629 (IN 831978)

1. ON 23 FEBRUARY WE ADVISED WKSCARLET-3 OF CIRCUMSTANCES BOSCH'S ARREST PER REF B. WKSCARLET-3 SOMEWHAT RELIEVED BUT CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL FOR HIS PERSONAL SECURITY TO CONTINUE VISIT SAN JOSE AND ATTEMPT CONTACT BOSCH AT JARDINES DE CASCATAL AS IF HE UNAWARE BOSCH ARREST. ALSO FOR COVER PURPOSES, BEFORE LEAVING BUENOS AIRES, WKSCARLET-3 WILL ATTEMPT ADVISE BOSCH OF HIS (WKSCARLET-3'S) ARRIVAL IN SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL AND WILL FOLLOW UP WITH TELEGRAM. WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDERS POTENTIAL RISK TO HIM FROM CUBAN EXILES SUFFICIENTLY HIGH THAT HE MUST VISIT BOSCH IN JAIL, IF LATTER HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED WHEN WKSCARLET-3 ARRIVES SAN JOSE ON 27 FEBRUARY.

2. WKSCARLET-3 REPORTED HE WAS CALLED FROM MANAGUA EARLY MORNING 23 FEBRUARY BUT WAS NOT AT HOTEL TO RECEIVE CALL WHICH HE

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7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 707900 EIA128 PAGE 02-02 IN 836288

TOR:241308Z FEB 76 BUEN 35669

BELIEVES COULD ONLY HAVE COME FROM FRANK CASTRO. IF SAN JOSE WANTS CONTACT WITH WKSCARLET-3, PLS PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE 26 FEBRUARY. WKSCARLET-3 WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY WKSCARLET-1 AND WILL STAY AT WHATEVER IS "BEST" HOTEL IN SAN JOSE.

3. FILE: 201-0931810, E2 IMPDET.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

371

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 2318-JZ
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 811488

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECURY, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITG 5, C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/DI/JD2, C/CI4, C/OSO
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DISSEM BY: 45

IP,I,# 6x TRAVEL PROGRAM
IP,CRY
IP,MB
IP,C[illegible]
LA/NH/V

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. BUENOS AIRES 35654 (IN 834057)

1. WKSCARLET-1 AND WKSCARLET-3 ARE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS WORKING FOR PROMINENT VENEZUELAN WHOSE NAME WAS USED IN RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER BOMB SENT TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN VENEZUELA IN LATE 1975. W-1 AND W-3 HAVE BEEN COMMISSIONED TO DETERMINE AUTHORSHIP OF LETTER BOMB, AND WHETHER IT WAS CUBAN EXILE EFFORT. W-1 AND W-3 TRAVELS ARE RELATED TO INVESTIGATION. INCLUSION OF SAN JOSE ON ITINERARY DUE TO PRESENCE THERE OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA, WHOM THEY PLAN "INTERVIEW" IN CONNECTION WITH LETTER BOMB.

2. IN ORDER TO APPEAR UNWITTING OF BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA, PER REF B W-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY.

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: A. ASKS PURPOSE OF W-3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA
B. W-3 ADVISED OF BOSCH ARREST; STILL PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO COSTA RICA

B-201-[illegible]549
B-201-2[illegible]92

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 19876
ORIG: ROBERT GULLO:SA
UNIT: C/LA/CAM/CNH
EXT: 1946

C/LA/CAM
C/LA/NW
AC/LA/SB W.W. Cantrell
COORDINATING OFFICERS

23 Feb 76
201-300985

Robert Griff
C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/TFK
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ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR

T 704858 EIA150 PAGE 01-01 IN 834939

TOR:231420Z FEB 76 CARA 29162

S E C R E T 231408Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29162

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT

REFS: A. SAN JOSE 19250 (IN 834109)

B. CARACAS 29063 (BEING RETRANSMITTED SAN JOSE) (IN 824723)

1. PURPOSE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL SAN JOSE REPORTED REF B: WKSCARLET-3 THOUGHT BOSCH WAS IN SANTIAGO BUT LATER DETERMINED HE WAS IN SAN JOSE. SINCE BOSCH NOW UNDER ARREST, WKSCARLET-3 MOST LIKELY CONTINUING TRAVEL PLANS FOR COVER PURPOSES WITH WKSCARLET-1 AND TO TRY DETERMINE WHETHER HE HAS NOW BECOME TARGET OF CUBAN EXILE EXTREMISTS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

CR

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	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
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		RYBAT REST. CODE	
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201-300985

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7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 01 IN 834109

TOR:212214Z FEB 76 SJOS 19250

SECRET 212123Z FEB 76 STAFF

Let's leave it up to WKSCARLET 3

CITE SAN JOSE 19250

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, ~~CARACAS~~.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: BUENOS AIRES 35654 (C 834057)

1. TELL WKSCARLET-3 THAT, BASED ON INFO PASSED TO LIAISON BY FBI, BOSCH HAS BEEN TARGET OF INTEREST TO LOCAL LIAISON FOR ABOUT ONE YEAR. LIAISON AWARE OF BOSCH BOMBING BACKGROUND AND THEIR INTEREST IN HIM INCREASED AS RESULT SERIES LOCAL BOMBINGS AND IMMINENT VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. THROUGH THEIR INFORMANTS THEY LEARNED THAT BOSCH GETTING SUPPORT LOCALLY (HOUSING, ETC); THAT HE USING NAME CONRADO CORTEZ OR CORTES,HRND, IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THAT HE KNOWN TO BE USING A CHILEAN PASSPORT IN ANOTHER NAME. IN LATE JANUARY THEY PINPOINTED NEIGHBORHOOD IN WHICH HE WAS LIVING AND BEGAN INTENSIVE SEARCH (THEY ALSO HAD REPORTS OF HIS PRESENCE IN DOWNTOWN AREA). THROUGH POSTAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER LOCAL SOURCES THEY PINPOINTED THE EXACT LOCATION OF HIS HOUSE IN JARDINES DE CASCAJAL AND ARRESTED HIM (THIS DONE BEFORE SAN JOSE STATION WAS ADVISED BY W-3 VIA BUENOS AIRES AS TO HIS EXACT LOCATION). ALL ABOVE CAN BE PASSED TO W-3 AND HE SHOULD

SECRET

WKSCARLET-3
201

FORM 3020S
7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 702789 EIA118 PAGE 02-02 IN 034109

TOR:212214Z FEB 76 SJOS 19250

ALSO BE CLEARLY TOLD HIS INFO DID NOT RESULT IN BOSCH ARREST.

2. RE CONTACT WITH CASTRO IN SAN JOSE, WE CAN ONLY SAY THE FOLLOWING:

A. WE HAVE NEVER DISCUSSED OR MENTIONED CASTRO WITH LIAISON, SO WE DO NOT KNOW IF THEY EVEN AWARE HIS EXISTANCE, HIS BACKGROUND, HIS INTENTIONS, OR THAT HE IN COSTA RICA.

B. IF THEY ARE AWARE OF CASTRO'S PRESENCE HERE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT THEY MIGHT PICK HIM UP TOO. THAT BEING CASE, W-3 COULD ALSO BE PICKED UP (WHICH AGAIN RAISES QUESTION OF PURPOSE WKSCARLET-1 AND 3 VISIT TO COSTA RICA).

3. FILE: 201- BOSCH AVILA, ORLANDO. E2 IMPDET.

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1-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 702450 EIA792 PAGE 01 IN 834057

TOR:211635Z FEB 76 BUEN 35654

S E C R E T 211615Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE BUENOS AIRES 35654

TO: IMMEDIATE SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

Q B

Com: WKSCARLET-3/w

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 810006

B. SAN JOSE 19243 (IN 832155)

C. SAN JOSE 19241 (IN 831949)

1. ON 20 FEBRUARY WE INFORMED WKSCARLET-3 OF BOSCH'S ARREST EMPHASIZING THAT ARREST NOT BASED ANY INFO FROM WKSCARLET-3. REGARDLESS, LATTER WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT BOSCH MOST LIKELY CONSIDERS HE HAS BEEN BETRAYED BY WKSCARLET-3 (NOTE PER PARA 1.C OF REF C, BOSCH WAS APPREHENDED AT SAME ADDRESS HE HAD GIVEN TO WKSCARLET-3 FOR CONTACT IN SAN JOSE). TO BETTER ASSESS EXTENT HIS RISK AND PLAN HIS FUTURE MOVES WITH BOSCH, WKSCARLET-3 HAS REQUESTED WE EXPLAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENT SURROUNDING BOSCH'S ARREST. BELIEVE ESSENCE OF REF C WOULD SUFFICE AND ALSO HELP CONVINCE WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE DID NOT PASS HIS INFO TO LIAISON FOR BOSCH ARREST. REQUEST SAN JOSE GUIDELINES ON PORTIONS REF C WE CAN PASS WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALSO ASKED FOR OUR ASSESSMENT OF RISK

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T 722452 EIA792 PAGE 02-02 IN 834057

TOR:2116352 FEB 76 BUEN 35654

TO HIM IN CONTACT WITH FRANK CASTRO IN SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 FEARS CASTRO MAY BE UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY AUTHORITIES IN WHICH CASE WKSCARLET-3 WILL ATTEMPT AVOID CONTACT WITH HIM IN SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 STILL PLANNING DEPART BUENOS AIRES FOR SAN JOSE ON/ABOUT 26 FEBRUARY.

3. FILE: 201-0931810. E2 IMPDET.

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FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 10/78

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T 697540 EIA005 PAGE 01 IN 832155

TOR:2001202 FEB 76 SJOS 19243

S E C R E T 200009Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19243

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, DIRECTOR, CARACAS.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 35629 *

1. WE O BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH DETENTION SOONEST. W-3 SHOULD ALSO BE ADVIS~~AD~~ED THAT HOUSE WHERE BOSCH ARRESTED HERE IS SAME ADDRESS AS THAT PROVIDED BY W-3 PER REF PARA ONE.

2. PLS ADVISE IF W-3 STILL INTENDS COME SAN JOSE DESPITE ARREST OF BOSCH. BOSCH MAY ALSO BE EXPELLED FROM COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL W-3 ON 26 FEBRUARY. IF YES, REASON FOR VISIT WILL ENABLE SAN JOSE DECIDE IF CONTACT WITH W-3 HERE DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

* PORTION SVC'D

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20 Feb 76
201-300985

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STAFF 2000032 DIRECTOR 810006

CONF: C/LA 15 INFO: FILE C/OPS/INT, D/SECUR 4, C/LSN/ID, C/OPS/ITGS, C/IP/AN, DDO, C/IS/CG2, DDO/DD, C/DIV D2, C/CI4, C/OSG 0 0 0 E 0 DISSEM BY: 45 PER LA #6

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, ROUTINE SANTIAGO.

RYBAT VULOFTY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29129 |IN 830506|

C. SAN JOSE 19235 |IN 830494|

D. CARACAS 29135 |IN 830540|

E. SAN JOSE 19237 |IN 830647|

Copy: UKSCARLET-3/201

1. SHARE CARACAS CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF UKSCARLET-3 IF INFO HE RECEIVED FROM CUBAN EXILE SOURCES AND SUBSEQUENTLY PASSED TO BKHERALD IS REVEALED TO LIAISON SERVICES IN CARACAS AND SAN JOSE, AND THEY TAKE ACTION TO FRUSTRATE PLANNED ASSASSINATION. CUBAN EXILES INVOLVED IN REPORTED ATTEMPT WILL NOT ASK WHERE SERVICES OBTAINED THEIR INFORMATION, BUT LOOK FOR LEAKS IN THEIR MIDST. HOWEVER, BELIEVE DANGER OF COMPROMISE TO UKSCARLET-3 LESSENS WITH PASSAGE OF TIME BECAUSE OF PROBABLE REVELATION OF PLANS TO ADDITIONAL PERSONS. THEREFORE, SUBJECT CARACAS CONCURRENCE SUGGEST THAT SAN JOSE ADVISE HUFABRIC THAT STATION HAS RECEIVED TIP THAT THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE. PLACE OF ACQUISITION SHOULD

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810006

NOT BE REVEALED.Y

2. ALTHOUGH ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA NOT RESULT OF WKSCARLET-3 INFORMATION, WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD BE INFORMED OF BOSCH ARREST IN SAN JOSE. WE DEFER TO CARACAS, HOWEVER, TO ADVISE BEST COURSE. IF AFFIRMATIVE REQUEST BUENOS AIRES ATTEMPT CONTACT WKSCARLET-B3 AND ADVISE HIM BOSCH ARRESTED, BUT THAT ARREST WAS NOT BASED ON ANY INFORMATION OR ACTION ON OUR PART. HE SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TRIP TO SAN JOSE AS THOUGH HE HAD NO FOREKNOWLEDGE OF ARREST.Y

3. FILE: 201-0931810; 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET.H

LA COMMENT: REF A - ADVISES AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE POSSIBILITY USE AGENCY INFO TO PREVENT HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS.

REF B - ALLENDE WIDOW IN CARACAS. BELIEVE BEST WE COULD DO AND STILL PROTECH WKSCARLET-3 IS ADVISE THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY IN CARACAS.

REF C - PASCAL STILL IN SAN JOSE. REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE HUFABRIC OF MURDER THREAT.

REF D - PLEASE ADVISE IF ORLANDO BOSCH ARREST IN COSTA RICA DUE TO PASSAGE OF W-3 INFO. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF W-3 INFO OUTSIDE LNBUZZ SINCE RISK OF

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COMPROMISE TO V-3 RUNNING TOO HIGH.

REF E HUFABRIC HAD ALREADY WATCHED FOR AND LOCATED BOSCH DUE PREVIOUS TIPS (UNRELATED PASCAL) FROM DEA AND FBI. PASSED ONLY INFO THAT BOSCH HAD BEEN SEEN IN CARACAS 7 FEB AND MIGHT TRAVEL COSTA RICA USING DOCS IN NAME "COCTEZ".
R

COORD:
C/LA/CAM
A C/LA/SB
C/LA/TFK

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: ROBERT W. ANDREWS
UNIT: LA/NW/V
EXT: 1535

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T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 01 IN 830647

TOR:1901552 FEB 76 SJOS 19237

S E C R E T 182342Z FEB 76 STAFF

9 OH

CITE SAN JOSE 19237

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES. Copy: WKSCARLET-3/201

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REF: CARACAS 29135 (IN 830540)

1. ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA WAS SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO FBI IN EARLY 1975. ITINERANT FBI REP FROM MEXICO CITY (CAMAROTA) MENTIONED NAME TO STATION AND IT IS BELIEVED HE DID SAME TO LOCAL SERVICE (HUFABRIC), AND MAY HAVE LEFT SOMETHING IN WRITING WITH THEM. BOSCH NAME ALSO MENTIONED TO STATION BY LOCAL DEA REP BUT IT NOW DETERMINED THIS WAS BASICALLY ON FBI BEHALF.

2. ON OCCASION OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ODUBER'S MEETING AT HIS RANCH WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ON 10 JULY 1975, ITINERANT FBI REP MEXICO CITY CALLED STATION TO WARN COSTA RICANS OF AN UNLEGED CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF BOSCH ON PACIFIC COAST TO DISRUPT THAT MEETING. HUGLIB-3, WHO HAD SECURITY FOR THAT MEETING, CHECKED OUT INFO TO NO AVAIL. THIS INFO WAS SUBSECUENTLY PASSED TO STATION BY HOS AND EMBASSY (WHICH RECEIVED IT VIA COSTA RICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON).

3. AT MEETING WITH CHIEF, HUFABRIC-14 ON 12 FEBRUARY HE

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T 694049 EIA619 PAGE 02 IN 830647

TOR:1901552 FEB 76 SJOS 19237

REPORTED THAT HIS SERVICE HAD DEFINITELY SPOTTED BOSCH ON TWO OCCASIONS ON OR ABOUT 10 FEBRUARY, HAD LOCATED THE AREA WHERE HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED AND HOPED TO GRAB HIM SOON.

4. ON 17 FEBRUARY STATION INFORMED HUFABRIC-14 OF THE FOLLOWING INFO FROM PARA 3 OF CARACAS 29109:

A. BOSCH WAS KNOWN TO BE IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY.

B. BOSCH MIGHT HAVE LEFT CARACAS SOME TIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA.

C. BOSCH MIGHT BE USING CHILEAN PASSPORT (WHICH THEY ALREADY KNEW) AND MIGHT BE TRAVELLING UNDER NAME CORTEZ. HUFABRIC-14 HOWEVER STATED THAT BOSCH TRAVELLING UNDER NAME HECTOR E. D'AVANZO CINTOLESI, USING CHILEAN PASSPORT NUMBER 26583.

NO OTHER PORTIONS OF CARACAS 29109 OR ANY OF PART OF CARACAS 29110 PASSED TO ANYONE.

5. WE CHECKING WITH HUFABRIC-14 ON DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING TO ARREST AND WILL ADVISE SOONEST.

6. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

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7-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 693558 EIA150 PAGE 01 IN 832548

TOR:1821432 FEB 76 CARA 29135

S E C R E T 182135Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29135

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES,

NIACT DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

REFS: A: SAN JOSE 19236 (IN 830508)

B: CARACAS 29110 (IN 828721)

C. CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704)

D. CARACAS 29129 (IN 830506)

E. SAN JOSE 19235 830494

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF REF A ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA RESULTED FROM REFS B AND C INFORMATION. IF SO, SUGGEST NO FURTHER DISSEM OF PARA TWO REF C PLOT INFORMATION OUTSIDE LNBUZZ CHANNELS AS RISK COMPROMISE WKSCARLET-3 TO EXILE EXTREMISTS RUNNING TO HIGH.

2. FILE: 200-6-495. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3/[illegible]

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T 693460 EIA055 PAGE 01 IN 830506

TOR:182041Z FEB 76 CARA 29129

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29129

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. CARACAS 29094 (IN 827361)

1. IN CONTEXT OF ARRIVAL CARACAS HORTENSIA BUSSI DE ALLENDE PER REF B, STATION BELIEVES WE COULD ADVISE LOCAL LIAISON UNILATERALLY THAT WE HAVE TIP THERE MAY BE ATTEMPT ON LIFE OF MEMBER ALLENDE FAMILY HERE IN CARACAS. FEEL THIS AS SPECIFIC AS WE COULD GET AND STILL REASONABLY PROTECT SOURCE. EVEN THEN THERE IS RISK TO WKSCARLET-3 WHO OBTAINED INFO DIRECTLY FROM SELF-DECLARED PRINCIPAL IN PLOT; WKSCARLET-3 IS ONLY PERSON WE SURE FRANK CASTRO HAS TOLD. POSSIBLY ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ IS NOT YET AWARE VICTIM IDENTITY. IF WKSCARLET-3 COMPROMISED TO EXILE EXTREMISTS, STATION FEELS HIS LIFE WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY.

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2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2, IMPDET.

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ACTION UNIT C/LA15

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T 693462 EIA057 PAGE 01 IN 830508

TOR:182043Z FEB 76 SJOS 19236

S E C R E T 182030Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19236

G

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CARAS, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT VWLOFTY

1. HUFABRIC INFORMED STATION OF ARREST OF ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE MIDDAY 18 FEBRUARY 1976. CHARGED WITH ENTERING COSTA RICA WITH ILLEGAL DOCUMENTS AND CAN HOLD FOR MINUMUM TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. STATION ENCOURAGING HUFABRIC THAT HE BE HELD UNTIL AFTER SECRETARY KISSINGER DEPARTS.

2. BECAUSE OF SECRET SERVICE, DEA, AND FBI INTEREST IN BOSCH, WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED OR ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE. WE UNDERSTAND BOSCH MAY BE INDICTED FUGITIVE FROM U.S. JUSTICE.

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 45 PER LA # 6 TOTAL COPIES 39-2 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT LA15

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INFO FILE VR OPS/INT, SECURY, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG 5, IP/AN, CI4, PS/EG 2, DDO, DDO/DO, DIUD 2

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T 693416 EIA220 PAGE 01 IN 830494

TOR:1820252 FEB 76 SJOS 19235

S E C R E T 1822002 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19235

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO CARACAS, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

Copy: WKSCARLET-3/1xn

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 808822

B. SAN JOSE 19195 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 812972

C. SAN JOSE 19215 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 818963)

D. SAN JOSE 19227 PARA 2 (NOT NEEDED CARACAS OR BUENOS AIRES) (IN 82680

E. DIRECTOR 808856

1. RE PARA 3 REF A AND REF E: REFS B,C, AND D REPORTED ARRIVAL ON 2 FEBRUARY AND PRESENCE OF ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE REPEAT ANDRES PASCAL ALENDE, NEPHEW OF SALVADOR ALLENDE, IN COSTA RICA. AFTER SPENDING DAY IN LOCAL HOTEL HE MOVED TO HOME OF MARXIST DANIEL CAMACHO MONGE, POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA. CAMACHO HOME LOCATED IN SUBURBAN TOWN OF CURRIDABAT 25 METERS NORTH OF HOME OF FORMER PRESIDENT PEPE FIGUERES. PASCAL KNOWN TO BE AT ABOVE LOCATION AS OF 18 FEBRUARY.

2. PASCAL AND GIRLFRIEND MUST REMAIN COSTA RICA FOR SIXTY DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL TO GIVE COSTA RICAN COURTS OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST TO EXTRADITE THEM.

SECRET

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7-71 [illegible]

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T 693416 EIA020 PAGE 02-02 IN 830494

TOR:182025Z FEB 76 SJOS 19235

(IN 516963)

3. SOURCE SAN JOSE 19215 WAS HUCOD-1.

4. IN VIEW KISSINGER VISIT. ADVISE IMMEDIATE PERMISSION DISCUSS MURDER THREAT WITH LOCAL LIAISON (HUFABRIC).

5. FILE: 201-931810. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 11-2

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SECRET

STAFF 181423Z DIRECTOR 808822

CONF: LA 7 INFO: FILE, 1/LA, 056, C/OPS 0 DISSEM BY: 27

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0 IP FILES

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS, INFO SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES.

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704).

1. IN ORDER AVOID CRITICISM OR ALLEGATIONS THAT AGENCY FAILED IN SOME RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING HIGHLY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS PLANNED ASSASSINATIONS, THE AGENCY MUST EXAMINE SUCH ACTIVITIES TO DETERMINE IF IT IS POSSIBLE OR PROPER TO USE AGENCY INFORMATION TO DIVERT OR ARREST THE ACTIVITY. IN SOME SITUATIONS NOTHING CAN BE DONE EITHER BECAUSE NO CHANNEL EXISTS TO AFFECT THE SITUATION OR THE SOURCE CANNOT BE PROTECTED.

2. REF PARA TWO REPORT FROM WKSCARLET-3 ON ALLEGED ~~[illegible]~~, PLOT ~~[illegible] CITIZEN [illegible]~~ TO KILL ALLENDE'S NEPHEW IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP FROM CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, IS THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY WHICH MUST BE EXAMINED PER ABOVE TO SEE IF THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF USING WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT TO MITIGATE THE PLANNED ACTIVITY. THEREFORE, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU BELIEVE WKSCARLET-3'S REPORT CAN BE PASSED TO APPROPRIATE VENEZUELAN LIAISON, OR OTHER FOREIGN LIAISON SERVICES, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING WKSCARLET-3'S IDENTITY AND SAFETY.

3. SAN JOSE: LATEST HQS INFO IS THAT LUIS ALLENDE RESIDES IN

IP,	☒	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
IP, CR Y		PREPARE FOR FILMING
IP, MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)
		RYBAT REST. CODE
		CABLE IDEN (11)
		NFO (8)
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LA/NW	✓	

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RECORD COPY

18 Feb 76

201-300985

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 019453

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE OF PAGES
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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0 IP FILES #

808822

SAN JOSE. PLEASE CONFIRM.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: WILLIAM J. DEVINE
UNIT: LA/NW
EXT: 1128

C/LAD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/NW
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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CL BY: 019453

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17 FEB 75

ACTION CC DIVD 2,

T 089349 EIA032 PAGE 01 IN 828704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

S E C R E T 171722Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29109

9

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, SAN JOSE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR; SANTIAGO. BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29029 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES) 818997

B. CARACAS 29076 (BEING RELAYED ALL ADDRESSEES LESS SAN JOSE) 826512

C. CARACAS 29110 (HVC-7327)

1. WKSCARLET-3 LOCATED ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA IN SAN JOSE 16 FEBRUARY AND SPOKE BRIEFLY BY TELEPHONE WITH HIM TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW IN SAN JOSE FOUR OR FIVE DAYS HENCE. WKSCARLET-3 LEAVING CARACAS WITH WKSCARLET-1 FOR BUENOS AIRES AFTERNNON 17 FEB AND ANTICIPATES STAYING BUENOS AIRES FOR ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE GOING SAN JOSE. WKSCARLET-3 CAN BE CONTACTED IN EITHER BUENOS AIRES OR SAN JOSE BY TELEPHONE CALL FROM NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS "RAMIREZ." HE WILL BE STAYING SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES BUT DOES NOT YET KNOW NAME OF HOTEL IN SAN JOSE. AT BOTH LOCATIONS HE WILL BE ALERT FOR CALL

SECRET

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T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 02 IN 828704

TOR:1717572 FEB 76 CARA 29109

FROM "RAMIREZ" BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 DAILY. CAUTION NATIVE SPANISH SPEAKER MUST MAKE CALL IN ORDER AVOID AROUSING EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS NATURE WKSCARLET-1 WHO MAY ANSWER TELEPHONE AND IS UNWITTING WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT WITH BKHERALD. IN ORDER VERIFY BOSCH EXACT MOVEMENTS DURING VWLOFTY, SUGGEST SAN JOSE MAY WISH FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS TO BUENOS AIRES FOR PASSING TO WKSCARLET-3.

2. WKSCARLET-3 HAD NO INFORMATION TO SUBSTANTIATE REPORT OF BOSCHS INTENTIONS ON LIFE OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR OR SECRETARY KISSINGER IN CARACAS. WKSCARLET-3 DID SEE FRANK CASTRO AT VENEZUEL'S MAIQUETIA AIRPORT ON 16 FEB. CASTRO TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE WAS HERE TO KILL LUIS ANDRES PASCAL ALLENDE, A RELATIVE OF FORMER PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE, AND THAT HIS SPONSOR WAS THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. CASTRO SAID ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ WOULD BE HELPING HIM AND INDICATED HE EXPECTED OTERO TO ARRIVE IN VENEZUELA WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. WKSCARLET-3 INTERPRETS CASTRO'S CLAIM OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP TO MEAN QUASI-GOC SPONSORSHIP: POSSIBLY MILITARY. CASTRO SAID THIS ACTION WAS BEING PERFORMED IN EXCHANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED HELP THAT BOSCH, CASTOR OR CALATAYUD (FNU), ANOTHER ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO CUBAN, HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THE GOC.

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T 689349 EIA032 PAGE 03-03 IN 020704

TOR:171757Z FEB 76 CARA 29109

3. USSS SECRET SERVICE REP CARACAS ADVISES THAT CARACAS LEGATT HAS INFORMATION FROM RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETTE (ALLEGEDLY FROM TELTAP) THAT BOSCH WAS IN CARACAS ON 7 FEBRUARY 1976 AND LEFT FOR CENTRAL AMERICA USING CHILEAN PASSPORT. SINCE WKSCARLET-3 HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK FOR "CORTEZ" WHEN HE TELEPHONED BOSCH IN SAN JOSE ON 16 FEB. SUGGEST BOSCH MAY HAVE ENTERED COSTA RICA SOMETIME AFTER 6 FEBRUARY USING CHILEAN PASSPORT IN NAME OF CORTEZ.

4. ABOVE INFOR ON WHEREABOUTS BOSCH, OTERO AND CASTRO PASSED SECRET SERVICE AND LEGATT AT CARACAS.

5. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-20/4. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 43 PER LA/6 TOTAL COPIES 40-1 BY 4

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

T 692289 EIA954 PAGE 01-21 IN 829113

TOR:1602052 FEB 76 SJCS 19233

S E C R E T 172348Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE SAN JOSE 19233

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO CARACAS, DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

VLDOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: CARACAS 29109 (IN 828704).

1. PER PARA ONE OF REF, REQUEST STATION QUESTION WKSCARLET-3 FOR TELEPHONE NUMBER SAN JOSE OR OTHER DETAILS HIS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH BOSCH ON 16 FEBRUARY.

2. PLS ADVISE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL PLANS TO SAN JOSE AND HOTEL IF KNOWN, WILL FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS UPON RECEIPT.

3. FILE: 202-6-495; 75-2-22/4. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 28 PER LA 6 TOTAL COPIES 70-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET

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STAFF PRECEDENCE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY D AT 2230 Z

ACTION UNIT LA 15

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR OPS/INT, SECOR 4, LSN/ID, OPS/ITG5, IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, DIUD2, CI 4, OSG, PS/EG2

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T 690103 EIA771 PAGE 01-01 IN 829064

TOR:172222Z FEB 76 CARA 29120

S E C R E T 172210Z FEB 76 STAFF

29109

CITE CARACAS 29120

TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LIMA, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY.

NIACT BUENOS AIRES

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 35610 (IN 828981)

1. IDENTITY OF REF REFQUEST IS: LUIS CLEMENTE P O S A D A.

2. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-22/4. E2 IMPDET

[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	X	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
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SECRET

17 Feb 76

201-300985

OUTGOING MESSAGE

9-1

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 192034Z
SITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 809591

CONF: CCS 2 INFO: FILE LA 6

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0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

JBCENT

REF: CARACAS 29065 (IN 824942) Y

WKSCARLET/3 CHECKS TOTALING $743.00 RECEIVED AT HQS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS. TAX MATTERS ARE FINALIZED AND STATION CAN CONCLUDE TERMINATION. E2 IMPDET.

WKSCARLET-3 201

LA/NW/B
LA/BF

CTC 2956T
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1976
ORIG: S. E. GROFT:LCP
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 9059R/3140X6G

C/LA/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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CL BY: 063851

FORM 2020
1-71 MFG. 10/71

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STAFF PRECEDENCE

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ACTION UNIT LA15

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T 683022 EIA987 PAGE 01 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

S E C R E T 131618Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29076

TO: IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO, MANAGUA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, LA/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

VWLOFTY MHSPIKE

REFS: A. CARACAS 29063 (IN 824723)

B. SANTIAGO 33711 (IN 825993)

1. USSS HEADQUARTERS HAS FORWARDED TO CARACAS ADVANCE TEAM NOTICE THAT USSS MIAMI REP RECEIVED REPORT ON 12 FEB 76 FROM "EXTREMELY RELIABLE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT" THAT ATTEMPT TO BE MADE ON DR. KISSINGER'S LIFE WHILE HE IN VENEZUELA. INFORMANT DESCRIBED AS "VERY CLOSE" TO ORLANDO BOSCH AVILA (USSS LATER IDENTIFIED SOURCE AS RICARDO MORALES NAVARRETE). BOSCH ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED CARACAS FROM MANAGUA TWO DAYS AGO.

2. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSEES CHECK OF TRAVEL CONTROL FOR POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION BOSCH TRAVEL. CONSIDER MORE LIKELY BOSCH WOULD BE TRAVELING WITH DOMINICAN PASSPORT 086768 IN NAME PEDRO ANTONIO PENA.

3. FYI: WKSCARLET-3, WHO PLANNED CONTACT BOSCH IN SANTIAGO NEXT WEEK, SAID HE SENT TELEGRAM TO SANTIAGO ACCOMMODATION

S E C R E T

FORM 3120S
7-71 MFG. 10/75

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN ___

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INFO RF FILE VR

T 683222 EIA987 PAGE 02-02 IN 826512

TOR:131848Z FEB 76 CARA 29076

ADDRESS LAST WEEK ASKING CONFIRMATION BOSCH WOULD BE AVILABLE. NO REPLY YET RECEIVED. ADDRESS TO WHICH TELEGRAM SENT IS:

SRTA. ADRIANA DELGADO
CASILLA 477 CORREO CENTRAL
SANTIAGO DE CHILE

4. FILE: 200-6-495; 75-2-26/4. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER

TOTAL COPIES 25-1

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CA7

T 679376 EIA363 PAGE 01-01 IN 824942

TOR:121808Z FEB 76 CARA 29065

S E C R E T 121759Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29865

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT WKBOXER

REF: CARACAS 28295 (N709274)

1. WKSCARLET-3 HAS PROVIDED STATION WITH COPIES OF HAND WRITTEN NOTES DATED 20 OCTOBER 1975 AND 12 NOVEMBER 1975 SENT TO ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS ALONG WITH COPIES OF DOLLAR CHECKS TOTALLING 743 DOLLARS. HE CLAIMS HAVE RECEIVED LETTER OF RELEASE FROM IRS. PLEASE CONFIRM SATISFACTION TAX LIABILITY SO STATION CAN CONCLUDE TERMINATION OF AGENT PROCEDURES.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2. IMPDET.

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 1L PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 22-3 RUN BY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED ______

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED LA BY C AT 1630 Z

ACTION UNIT LA 7

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR WAN OPS/ITG 4 C/OPS CI 4 OSG PS/EG 2

STAFF

T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 01 IN 624723

TOR:1216252 FEB 76 CARA 29063

SECRET 1216052 FEB 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 29063

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

answer required

CS 13/2/76

WKBOXER SECURE MHSPIKE

REF: HVC-7280, 4 DEC 75

1. WKSCARLET-3 (FORMER UNILATERAL ASSET) CONTACTED STATION 11 FEB 76 TO ADVISE HE AND WSKCARLET-1 PLAN TRAVEL SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI DURING WEEK 15 FEB. PURPOSE IS INVESTIGATION OF ATTEMPTED LETTER BOMBING CUBAN AMBASSADOR CARACAS.

2. BOMBING INCIDENT SURFACED WHEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR NORBERTO HERNANDEZ CURBELO REPORTED TO WKSCARLET ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO ALLEGED RECEIPT OF BOMB. WKSCARLET-10 DEACTIVATED DEVICE WHICH CONTAINED IN LARGE MANILA ENVELOPE BEARING RETURN ADDRESS DR. GUSTAVO A. VOLLMER. WKSCARLET-1, FORMER WKSCARLET CHIEF IS SECURITY CONSULTANT TO VOLLMER AND HE HAS RETAINED WKSCARLET-3, A FORMER WKSCARLET OFFICER NOW OPERATING COMMERCIAL INVESTIGATIONS SERVICE, TO DETERMINE WHO USED VOLLMER'S NAME. WKSCARLET-3, CUBAN EXILE, RETAINS SIGNIFCANT CONTACTS WITH EXTREMIST EXILES AND HAS REGULAR CORRESPONDENCE WITH ORLANDO

SECRET

WKSCARLET-3/201

BOSCH AVILA IN SANTIAGO.

3. IN A LETTER APPROXIMTELY THREE MONTHS AGO BOSCH TOLD WKSCARLET-3 HE HAS MADE AGREEMENT WITH EXTREMIST GROUP IN ARGENTINA (WKSCARLET-3 THINKS GROUP CONNECTED WITH OR IS ERP) FOR MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE ACTION; I.E. (ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3) IF BOSCH GROUPS WANTS SOMEONE KILLED WHERE IT DOES NOT HAVE ASSETS, THE ARGENTINE GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION IF IT HAS THE ASSETS, AND IF THE ARGENTINE GROUP WANTS THE SAME THING ANY WHERE ELSE INCLUDING PUERTO RICO, HIS GROUP WILL TAKE ACTION. WKSCARLET-3 SAID TI WAS ON BASIS THIS AGREEMENT A PAST ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ASSASSINATE CUBAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES.

4. WKSCARLET-3 PLANS INTERVIEW BOSCH AND OTHERS IN SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES AND POSSIBLY MIAMI IN ATTEMPT LEARN WHETHER CARACAS LETTER BOMB WAS EXILE EFFORT OR POSSIBLY DGI COVERT ACTION OPERATION.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ANY ADDRESSEE STATIONS INTEREST CONTACT WITH WKSCARLEY-3.

6. FOR DIRECTOR: STATION HAS OBTAINED LETTER BOMB VIA WKSCARLET LIAISON. EXPLOSIVE CONSISTS OF COILED PRIMA CORD. DETONATOR HAS BEEN REMOVED AND OBTAINED SEPARATELY. WOULD LIKE

14-00000

1-71 MFG. 10/75

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T 679200 EIA993 PAGE 03-03 IN 824723

TOR:121625Z FEB 76 CARA 29063

EXPERT OPINION RE ORIGIN OF MATERIALS USED: PLEASE ADVISE SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS.

7. FILE: 75-2-20/3. E2. IMPDET.

[illegible] SECUR D/cms
IF DESIRED SEND FORM 1604 TO CABLE SEC.

RELAYED TO DIRECTOR PER DIR 806385

S E C R E T

14-00000

DISPATCH SECRET

TO
Chief, WOGAME

INFO.
Chief, Latin America Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
JRCENT -- WKSCARLET-3 Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

File. WKSCARLET-3 201-

REFERENCE: CARACAS 28295

At the meeting cited in Reference, WKSCARLET-3 turned in a copy of correspondence he has received from IRS, which is being forwarded under separate cover.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
  2 - C/WOGAME W/ATT U/S/C T/N
  1 - C/LAD W/O ATT

Attachment:
  Correspondence, as described herein, U/S/C T/N

E2 IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCT 6766

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
9 October 1975

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 46 PER

TOTAL COPIES 23-1 RUN BY 8

SECRET

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T 370615 EIA044 PAGE 01-01 IN 709274

TOR:082122Z OCT 75 CARA 28295

S E C R E T 082113Z OCT 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 28295

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REFS: A. CARACAS 28188 (IN 695713)

B. DIRECTOR 583069

1. 0 WKSCARLET-3 CONTACTED 8 OCTOBER AND ASKED INTENTIONS RE PAYMENT TAX OUTSTANDING $743.78. WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE INTENDS PAY BUT WILL HAVE TO DO SO IN TWO INSTALLMENTS-- ONE HALF AT END OCTOBER, OTHER AT END OF NOVEMBER. SAID WOULD MAIL CHECKS TO REF B ADDRESS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

IP, IDX ☒

IP, MB

LA/NWIV

AC

201-300985
08 oct 75

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ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, LA7, CM9/NOC 3

STAFF	
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3	6

T 333753 EIA198 PAGE 01-01 IN 695713

TOR:242132Z SEP 75 CARA 28188

S E C R E T 242120Z SEP 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 28188

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REF: DIRECTOR 746473

1. STATION ADVISED WKSCARLET-3 PER HVCS-4308 OF HIS OUTSTANDING TAX PAYMENT $743.78. SUBJECT WAS SHAKEN AS HE HAD ANTICIPATED RESOLUTION OF TAX SITUATION WITH SOME BALANCE OF UNPAID COMPENSATION IN HIS FAVOR OR AT VERY LEAST TO BREAK EVEN. HE ASKED FOR TIME TO GIVE MATTER CONSIDERATION. HE IS PRESENTLY AWAY FROM CARACAS AND HAD PLANNED TO RECONTACT STATION 29 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWING HIS RETURN. WILL ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

IP,IDX ☒ TRAVEL PROGRAM rc
RESTRICT
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IP,MB
~~[illegible]~~ FOR FILING
LA/NW/U

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S E C R E T

201-300985
24 sep 75

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Caracas

Chief, WOGAME

JBCENT - WKSCARLET/3 - Tax Administration

WKSCARLET-3 ✓
201
make copy
for Chrono
JJW

REFERENCES: A. HVCS-4263 dated 1 April 1975
B. HVCT-6682 dated 17 June 1975
C. CARACAS 25040
D. DIRECTOR 583069

1. Based on a reconciliation of WKSCARLET/3's 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 Federal income tax returns, it has been determined that he has an excessive tolerance (underpayment of tax) in the amount of $512.00 for 1971, $549.00 for 1972, $769.00 for 1973 and $425.00 for 1974. Attached, under separate cover, is a sealed envelope containing copies of each reconciliation which have not been classified so that they may be handcarried to him for review. If security permits, this envelope should be opened only by WKSCARLET/3. The Station is requested to treat these documents as classified and they should be destroyed or retained in a sealed envelope by the Station.

2. The $1,860.47 due WKSCARLET/3 per Paragraph 2 of Reference C should have been reduced by $349.25 (per Paragraph 1 of Reference A) representing underpayment of 1969 and 1970 taxes. Attached is Headquarters T/A # CC-0140 in the amount of $1,511.22, representing the 1971 tax due of $512.00, 1972 tax due of $549.00 and a portion of the 1973 tax due of $450.22. The collection of these taxes will liquidate the final payment due WKSCARLET/3. The balance of tax due must be paid by WKSCARLET/3.

3. Please advise WKSCARLET/3 to mail his personal check in the amount of $743.78 to the accommodation address forwarded by Reference D. This amount represents the remaining portion of the 1973 taxes due of $318.78 that were not liquidated by his final payment and the 1974 taxes due of $425.00. The check should be made payable to himself without endorsement on the reverse. Also, please advise WKSCARLET/3 that the cashier's check for $147.00 and his original 1971 through 1974 tax returns were mailed to the IRS Philadelphia Office on 30 June 1975.

Attachments:
1. Reconciliations (4), u/s/c
2. T/A # CC-0140, h/w

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, Caracas w/atts

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

E2 IMPDET

HVCS-4303

9 July 1975

S E C R E T

~~1~~ - LA/NW/V (wo/atts)
1 - CTC 2956T

CCS/CSB

CJAustin:lcp

9059

LA/NW/V

LA/BF

BY 063051

C/LA/SS

14-00000

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MARKING REQUIRED
NO INDEXING
ABSTRACT CARD REQUIRED

TO Chief, WOGAME
INFO Chief, Latin America Division

FROM Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT JBCENT -- WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HVCW 10351, 1 May 1975
B. HVCS 4263, 1 April 1975
C. HVCW 10293, 31 January 1975

1. Forwarded under separate cover are 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974 Federal Tax Returns prepared by WKSCARLET-3. Subject avers that he prepared these to the best of his ability and recollection with few, if any, retained records to work from.

2. Also forwarded under separate cover is a cashiers check in the amount of $147.00 toward payment of balance of taxes due.

3. Termination documents for WKSCARLET-3 will be forwarded as soon as the matter of his tax liabilities has been settled.

Frederick C. GRADSPIES

Distribution:
2 - C/WOGAME W/ATTS U/S/C T/N
① - C/LAD W/O ATTS

Attachments:
Federal Tax Returns, U/S/C T/N
Cashiers Check, U/S/C T/N

E2IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCT 6682	17 June 1975
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

13 May 76

SUBJECT: R[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/Status of Station Liaison Relationships

REF : CARACAS 20841 dated 18 May 76

The following information on WKSCARLET-3 was contained in the above referenced telepouch:

CONFRONTED WITH EVIDENCE THAT LNFALL PERSONNEL WERE IN FACT BEING FOLLOWED, WKTANGO-1 SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD BE CONDUCTING THE SURVEILLANCE BUT SUSPECTED IT MIGHT BE THE PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE BEING OPERATED BY WKSCARLET-3. HE COULD OFFER NO MOTIVE BUT ALLEGED THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS RECEIVING HUGE SUMS OF MONEY FROM AN UNKNOWN SOURCE TO FINANCE AN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATION ON THE BULGARIAN EMBASSY, SURVEIL CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS ALSO ACQUIRING DATA ON INDIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL. (IN FEBRUARY 1976 STATION ASKED WKSCARLET-3 FOR ALL WKSCARLET MATERIAL ON INDIAN EMBASSY. RESULTING "STUDY" PREPARED BY WKSCARLET WAS PASSED UNILATERALLY TO STATION AND OFFICIALLY TO WKNORTH. WE SUSPECT THAT EXTENT WKSCARLET-3 ACQUISITION OF DATA ON INDIANS LIMITED TO HIS POSSESSION OF THIS STUDY.) WKTANGO-1 WAS UNABLE TO OFFER ANY LOGICAL EXPLANATION FOR SUCH A WIDE RANGE OF INTERESTS ON THE PART OF WKSCARLET-3 SPONSOR. HE DID SEEM SINCERE IN HIS DENIAL THAT WKNOBLE-24 WAS RUNNING ANY SURVEILLANCE ON LNFALL PERSONNEL, AND ON 12 MAY CONTACTED THE STATION TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE SURVEILLANCE TO THE PRESIDENT WHO HAD ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION. PROOF OF GOV INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 ACTIVITIES WAS OBTAINED BY THE STATION CO-INCIDENTALLY WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS; AMONG THE WKBLEAK TAPES OBTAINED FROM WKNORTH DURING THE LAST WEEK OF APRIL WAS ONE MISLABLED TAPE WHICH THE STATION WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY AS THE PRODUCT OF A TAP ON WKSCARLET-3's INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

18 May 76
201-0300935

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C/LA10
ACTION #

INFO: RF. FILE VR. [illegible]

T 036376 EIA137 PAGE 01 IN 576351

TOR:092252Z MAY 75 RECORDS COPY PACY 32430

The following action is authorized: Desensitize

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. # ______ Unit LA/COG/4

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate

S E C R E T 092209Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 32430

TO: DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE INFO CARACAS.

[illegible] KMSTONE HYEPOCH (IN 561989)

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 32235 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED SAN JOSE AND CARACAS)

B. DIRECTOR 689085 (NOT SENT OR NEEDED SAN JOSE AND CARACAS)

1. FYI FOR SAN JOSE/CARACAS: CASE INVOLVES ARREST IN PANAMA BY GN/G-2 OF JORGE ROBRENO MARIEGES, CUBAN EXILE, PROBABLY AT INSTIGATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY PANAMA. REFS CITED ABOVE CONCERN REPORT FROM DAVID PERE, PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR IN SAN JOSE, TO HYGRUFF-1 REPORTING ON ROBRENO. INFO IN PERE'S REPORT SOURCED TO MIGUEL MERINO MARQUEZ WHO WALKED INTO PANAMANIAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE RECENTLY. STATION OFFICER MET HYGRUFF-1 ON 6 MAY 75 AND USING INFO REF B, BURNED MERINO AS INTELLIGENCE PEDDLER POSSIBLY OPERATING UNDER CUBAN DGI CONTROL.

2. ON 8 MAY 75, HYGRUFF-1 PASSED TO STATION COPY OF ANOTHER REPORT, SAME SUBJECT, ALSO RECEIVED FROM COSTA RICA. THIS REPORT DATED 5 MAY 75 WAS PREPARED BY ONE LUIS SIMON FOR LUIS BURSTIN. HYGRUFF-1 REFUSED TO DIVULGE HOW HE

0 201-300071
0 201-300137
0 201-0289418
0 201-0774575
0 201-0273779

RECORD COPY

9 May 75
201-751639

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T 026376 EIA137 PAGE 02 IN 576351

TOR:0922522 MAY 75 PACY 32430

ACQUIRED COPY SIMON REPORT BUT IT LIKELY IT ALSO FORWARDED BY PERE FROM COSTA RICA. SIMON POSSIBLY IDENTIFIEABLY WITH LUIS ANGEL ANTONIO SIMON GARCIA GOWP3APEPOOEULM PER STATION RECORDS SIMON'S STATION 201 WAS FORWARDED TO HQS 13 DECEMBER 1966.

3. SIMON REPORT, PREPARED ON "EXCELSIOR DE COSTA RICA" LETTERHEAD PAPER, STATES THAT MERINO AND FERNANDO MELO ARE CUBAN EXILES AND CIA AGENTS. SIMON ALLEGES THAT MERINO IS ROBRENO'S FRIEND AND THE LATTER UNDER DETENTION IN PANAMA CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY AGAINST LIFE OF TORRIJOS. PER SIMON, ROBRENO'S MOTHER IS NOW IN SAN JOSE ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT JOSE FIGUERES AND PRESIDENT ODUBER. SHE INTENDS REQUEST THEIR INTERCESSION WITH TORRIJOS TO SECURE ROBRENO'S RELEASE. MRS. ROBRENO THREATENS TO CREATE PUBLIC SCANDAL FOR TORRIJOS IF FIGUERES AND ODUBER REFUSE TO HELP HER. SHE THREATENS PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ROBRENO BY PANAMANIANS AT INSTIGATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY IN PANAMA. SHE CONFIDENT "LA NACION" AND OTHER COSTA RICAN NEWSPAPERS WILL ASSIST AS WELL AS URBINA PINTO (SIC) OF MOVIMIENTO COSTA RICA LIBRE. NO STATION TRACES MELO OR

SECRET

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INFO RF FILE . VR .

T 006076 EIA137 PAGE 03 IN 576351

TOR1092252Z MAY 75 PACY 32430

URBINA PINTO.

4. IT STATION OPINION POSSIBILITY EXISTS SIMON REPORT COULD BE CUBAN PLANT BECAUSE ITS CONCLUSIONS COINCIDE WITH CUBAN THEREMS USED ON HYGRUFF-1 TO INDUCE HIM TO MOVE AGAINST ROBRENO. SIMON'S CONVLUSIONS ARE:

A. CIA WILL INCREASE USE OF CUBAN EXILES AS KEY FACTOR TO PERPETUATE STATUS OF CANAL ZONE AND ZONITES BY RESORTING TO TERRORISM (AGAINST PANAMANIANS);

B. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO "CEDE" JURISDICATION OVER CANAL ZONAK/AFTER THEIR DEFEAT IN VIETNAM;

C. AN ATTEMPT AGAINST TORRIJOS' LIFE WOULD CHANGE ENTIRE PIORAMA;

D. ATTEMPT ON TORRIJOS LIFE COULD BE MADE BY CUBAN EXILES BECAUSE MANY ARE AVAILABLE, WILLING AND ABLE TO TRY IT. REPORT MENTIONS BY NAME MERINO, MELO, ROBRENO, LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA, RICARDO PEDRAZA AND FNU MERUELOS AS LIKELY CANDIDATES. RPORT IDENTIFIES POSADA AS CIA AGENT IN VENEZUELA AND PEDRAZA IN HONDURAS. FYI, NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES POSADA, PEDRAZA, MERUELOS.

5. HANWRITTEN ADDENDUM TO REPORT STATES SIMON IDENTIFIED

S E C R E T

201- [illegible]

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ACTION #			3 / 6

T 036076 EIA137 PAGE 04 IN 575351

TOR:092252Z MAY 75 PACY 32430

GUSTAVO L O R A, OWNER OF CONANSA (COMPANIA DE CONCRETO ASFALTICO) ON CALLE BLANCO (SAN JOSE?) AS CIA AGENT. MELO FURTHER DESCRIBED AS CUBAN EXILE AND CLOSE FRIEND OF "DANIEL" ~~[illegible]~~ VERY DANGEROUS ~~[illegible]~~, TALENTED AND WELL FINANCED" (SIC). ADDENDUM ALLEGES CONTACTS EXIST BETWEEN CUBAN EXILES AND "ZONITES" TO CREATE PROBLEMS IN PANAMA AND THAT ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO FORCE FIGUERES AND ODUBER TO INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF ROBRENO'S RELEASE. FYI, LORA MENTIONED ABOVE POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE, PER STATION FILES, WITH GUSTAVO SATURNINO L O R A HERNANDEZ, CUBAN CITIZEN BORN 1925 RESIDING IN SAN JOSE WHERE HE OPERATES BROUCA RESTAURANT. DEA INFO INDICATES HE SUSPECTED OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

6. REQUEST ADDRESSEE TRACES ON INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED ABOVE EXCEPT MERINO AND ROBRENO WHO WELL KNOWN TO STATION. IN REPLIES PLEASE INDICATE PORTIONS RELEASABLE TO HYGRUFF-1 (LIAISON) SHOULD STATION OPT TO REFUTE SUBSTANCE REPORT DESCRIBED ABOVE.

7. FILE: 201-0751639. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

14-00000

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT 9LA10

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR 9IPAN 9DS 9CI/03

T 019937 EIA614 PAGE 01 IN 581898

TOR:1521552 MAY 75 CARA 27286

S E C R E T 1521232 MAY 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 27286

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO SAN JOSE, DIRECTOR.

RYBAT KMSTONE HYEPOCH

REF: PANAMA CITY 32430 (576351)

1, SUBJECT PARA 4D REF IDENTIFIED AS BKHERALD AGENT IN VENEZUELA IS, IN FACT, WKSCARLET-3, WHO IN CONTACT CARACAS STATION SINCE FEBRUARY 1968, HE WAS OF INTEREST TO STATION AS PENETRATION LOCAL SECURITY SERVICES AND HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH JMWAVE FROM MID-60'S OPS INTEREST IN WKSCARLET-3 WANED WHEN HE LOST ACCESS LAST YEAR AND STATION ONLY MAINTAINING INFREQUENT CONTACT WITH HIM FOR PURPOSE RESOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE TAX PROBLEMS, FINAL TERMINATION SESSION ESPECTED OCCURE NEXT 60 TO 90 DAYS.

2, YOU CAN TELL HYGRUFF-1, IF YOU OPT DO SO, THAT SUBJECT IS CUBAN EXILE FORMERLY ACTIVE IN MIAMI AREA WHO WORKED WITH VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND IN 1974 FOUNDED PRIVATE SECRUITY AGENCY IN CARACAS WHICH SERVES COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL CLIENTS. NOT KNOWN BE CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN EXILE ACTIVITIES.

3, FILE: 201-300985, 201-0751639. E2 IMPDET

B 201-751639

RECORD COPY

LA/AN/V BS-4
15 May 75
201-300985

SECRET

Chief of Station, Caracas

Chief, WOGAME
JLCLEAT
WKSCARLET/3 - Tax Administration

REFERENCES: A. HVCT-6601 dated 3 March 1975
B. Caracas 25040 (17 July 1974)

1. Based on a reconciliation of WKSCARLET/3's 1969 and 1970 Federal income tax returns, it has been determined that he has an excessive tolerance (underpayment of tax) in the amount of $151.25 for 1969 and $198.00 for 1970. Attached is Headquarters T/A #CC-0057 for the total amount of $349.25 that should be collected from the final payment due WKSCARLET/3 per Paragraph 3 of Reference B. Attached in a sealed envelope are copies of each reconciliation which have not been classified so that they may be handcarried to him for review. If security permits, this envelope should be opened only by WKSCARLET/3. The Station is requested to treat these documents as classified and they should be destroyed or retained in a sealed envelope by the Station.

2. Please advise Headquarters when we may expect to receive copies of WKSCARLET/3's Federal tax returns for tax years 1971 through 1974. (A copy of his 19[illegible] tax return is not required, since his [illegible] income for tax year was under $3,600, which qualifies him to be administered under the provisions of HR 20-100). To ensure confidential and timely handling of an individual's tax returns and related correspondence, an Administrative (T) dispatch should be directed to Chief, WOGAME, for all JLCLEAT tax material. Please see Book Dispatch 9711 dated 5 October 1974 for detailed instructions.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Attachments - h/w
1. Reconciliations (2)
2. T/A #CC-0057

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - COS, Caracas

E2 IMPDET

HVCS-4263 1 April 1975

SECRET

✓1 - LA/SW/V CCS/CSB CJAustin:lss 9059
1 - CCS/CSB #2956 T

WKSCARLET-3

LA/SW/V

LA/BP

DISPATCH

SECRET

INDEXING REQUESTED

NO INDEXING

APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT
WKSCARLET-3

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Our records show that WKSCARLET-3 was terminated 30 June 1974. We realize that at this time there is a pending tax problem with WKSCARLET-3 but would appreciate at your earliest convenience a termination record i.e., ASR, Secrecy Agreement.

Norris Z. GERVENOT

Distribution:
  3 - COS, Caracas

RECORD COPY

WKSCARLET-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCW 10293

DATE
31 January 1975

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

Distribution:
  1 - Chrono
  1 - IP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
LA/NW/Venezuela:	Ramon E. Gonzalez:	klt	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/LA/NW/V		Laura Cooley Laura Cooley

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/LA/NW	31 Jan 75	Richard Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Alien Affairs Officer,
OPS/LSN

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

1. On 30 June 1974 Luis Clemente POSADA's employment with the Agency was terminated by mutual consent. At that time he was establishing a private investigative agency from which he expected to earn his livelihood. The Immigration and Naturalization Service file on POSADA, therefore, may now be decontrolled. As of 27 January 1975, POSADA is still located in Caracas, Venezuela.

2. On 12 June 1974 Caracas Station advised that POSADA had been informed of and fully understands the effect that termination of his Agency employment will have upon his resident alien status and eligibility for U.S. citizenship. We have not yet received termination records on POSADA, probably because the Station is still meeting with him regarding settlement of his outstanding U.S. tax liabilities.

Ramon E. Gonzalez
LA/NW/V

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 013978

RM 3330
[illegible] 3/76

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T 739679 EIA498 PAGE 01-01 IN 477045

TOR:272149Z JAN 75 CARA 26471

S E C R E T 272111Z JAN 75 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 26471

TO: DIRECTOR.

JBCENT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 621463

B. HVCT 6555, 7 JAN 75

O

1. WKSCARLET-3 HAS RECEIVED FORM 10-601 FROM IRS ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF REF B CORRESPONDENCE DATED 16 DECEMBER 1974.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

B

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-0300985
27 Jan 75

14-00000

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	INDEXING REQUESTED
TO: Chief, Office of Finance		NO INDEXING
INFO.: Chief, Latin America Division		APERTURE CARD REQUESTED
FROM: Chief of Station, Caracas		
SUBJECT: ADMIN/JBCENT -- Correspondence of WKSCARLET-3 to the IRS		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Key. Copy for WKSCARLET-3 201 [illegible]

6

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 621463

Forwarded under separate cover true name is a copy of a letter dated 16 December 1974 from WKSCARLET-3 which was sent via registered mail to the Internal Revenue Service. WKSCARLET-3 has received no response from the IRS.

Frederick C. BRADSPIES

Distribution:
2 - C/OF W/ATT U/S/C T/N
2 - C/LAD W/ATT U/S/C T/N

Attachment:
One letter, as described herein, U/S/C T/N

E2IMPDET

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCT 6555	DATE 7 January 1975
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-300985

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T 545640 EIA580 PAGE 01-01 IN 406078

TOR:051755Z NOV 74 CARA 25907

S E C R E T 051748Z NOV 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25907

TO: DIRECTOR,

JBCENT WKRALLY

REFS: A, DIRECTOR 604241

B, DIRECTOR 583868

1, WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE WROTE IN AUGUST, PER REF B, TO THE DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS OF IRS REQUESTING COPIES OF HIS FEDERAL TAX RETURNS. AS YET, HE HAS HAD NO RESPONSE FROM IRS. HE IS ANXIOUS GET MATTER SETTLED, AS HE HAS URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR ANY MONIES DUE HIM. STATION WOULD ALSO LIKE TO CONCLUDE THIS MATTER FOR SECURITY REASONS. CAN HEADQUARTERS TAKE ANY ACTION TO HAVE IRS EXPEDITE REPLY TO WKSCARLET-3 REQUEST FOR COPIES?

2, FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
5 Nov 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE 19-1 62

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 302332Z DIRECTOR 604241

CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE IP/AN WH8 CMG/NOCY OGC2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 47
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: CARACAS.Y

O JBCENTY

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 565631 IP

B. DIRECTOR 583068

1. PLS FURNISH HQS A COPY OF WKSCARLET-9's [redacted] 1973 FEDERAL TAX RETURN AND INFORMATION OUTLINED FR 20-18 ATTACHMENT 2. Y [redacted]

Re

2. REF B ADVISED [redacted]WKSCARLET/3 CORRESPOND IRS AND OBTAIN COPIES U.S. TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1968 THROUGH 1973. HAS HE COMPLIED? IS STATION MAINTAINING CONTACT UNTIL TAX MATTERS FINALIZED? PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 2 2 1974
MICROFILMED

B 201-0278759

CTC 1297 & 2956

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1974
ORIG: CCS/CSB
UNIT: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG
EXT: 9059GN3140X6

RECORD COPY

201-0300985
30 Sep 74

R.J. Conolly
WH/3/V

WH/BF

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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CL BY: 063851

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

18

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SECRET

STAFF 052139Z DIRECTOR 583068

CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE WH8, CMG/NOC4, OGC2 0 DISSEM BY: 50

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TO: CARACAS.

ADMIN JBCENTY

REFERENCE: CARACAS 25040 (IN 309514)

1. IF WKSCARLET/3 (W/3) CANNOT LOCATE COPIES HIS FEDERAL TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1968 THROUGH 1973, REQUEST HE CORRESPOND WITH INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CENTER WHERE HE FILED ORIGINAL TAX RETURNS AND OBTAIN NECESSARY COPIES. WITHOUT THESE TAX RETURNS HEADQUARTERS CANNOT ACCURATELY COMPUTE W/3'S TRUE TAX LIABILITY FOR THOSE YEARS.

2. HEADQUARTERS WOULD APPRECIATE STATION MAINTAINING CONTACT W/3 UNTIL TAX MATTERS FINALIZED. DIRECT CORRESPONDENCE W/3 REGARDING THIS MATTER WOULD BE CUMBERSOME, SINCE HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE SKHERALD COVERT TAX PROCEDURE. SHOULD STATION HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TERMINATE CONTACT, IDENTITY ADDRESS IS PROVIDED FOR HIS USE CORRESPONDING WITH HEADQUARTERS.

3. COPIES VENEZUELAN TAX FORMS ARE NOT REQUIRED. E2IMPDET.

file WKSCARLET-3

201-

CTC 2956 T

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1974

ORIG: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG

UNIT: CCS/CSB

EXT: 6697R9059

WH/3

C/WH/SS

WH/BF

C/CCS/CSB

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CL BY: 053851

14-00000

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	052139Z	DIRECTOR	583069

CONF: CCS 2 INFO: FILE WH8, CI6woc4, OGC 2

0 INDEX
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0 IP FILES #

DISSEN BY: 80

TO: CARACAS.

ADMIN JBCENTY

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 583068

IDENTITY ADDRESS: SAMUEL G. PETERSON

P.O. BOX 61

FALLS CHURCH, VA. 22046

E2 IMPDET.

CTC 2956 T

DATE: 1 AUGUST 1974
ORIG: CHARLES E. BRISKEY/EG
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697R9059

file WKSCARLET-3 201

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3

WH/BF
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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CL BY: 063551

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ACTION UNIT WH8

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INFO FILE VR SECURY

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T 267762 EIA620 PAGE 01-01 IN 308518

TOR:162148Z JUL 74 CARA 25033

S E C R E T 162113Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 25033

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 574544

1. WKSCARLET-3'S REENTRY PERMITS WILL BE POUCHED 17 JULY AS SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-19935 WHICH POUCHED 12 JULY.

2. FILE 201-2300985, E2 IMPDET

302

X

WH/3 ✓

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-300985
16 July 74

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no below and forward document to IP/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Delivered to OS/AAS 22 July 74.

FROM:

RITCHIE ROHE
IP/AN
EXT. 1933

HC-247
GA-50
TUBE GT7

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 006087

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3	19 JUL 1974			
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. WH/3/V	22	July	74	RCB
7. Laura				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
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15.				
16.				
17. IP/FI			M	

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	☒
		INDEX	

FILE TITLE: Scarlet-3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-300955

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 11 July 74

DOCUMENT NUMBER: HVCA 19935

SECRET

FORM 6-71 610a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (40)

CAUTION - THIS FORM REQUIRES SECURE STORAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST FOR HQS PROCESSING
INDEXING REQUESTED
NO INDEXING
APERTURE CARD REQUESTED

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO:

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Caracas D

SUBJECT: O WKSCARLET-3 Reentry Permits

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HVCW-10177

Forwarded under separate cover via true name pouch are WKSCARLET-3's old reentry permits, which were received from him in exchange for his new ones.

J. T. Bachhuber
John T. BACHHUBER

Attachment:
Reentry permits u/s/c via T/N pouch

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c via T/N pouch

RECORD COPY

E2 IMPDET

/ Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HVCA-19935

DATE: 11 July 1974

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓ 201-300985

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ACTION #

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T 185196 EIA327 PAGE 01 IN 279251

TOR:122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

S E C R E T 122158Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24700

TO: DIRECTOR,

WKRALLY WKSCARLET JBCENT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 553713

B. DIRECTOR 556718

1. O IN LIGHT REF A THAT REENTRY PERMIT WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED UNTIL SOMTIME JUNE, STATION DECIDED NOT TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL 30 JUNE. STATION SEES NO PARTICULAR SECURITY PROBLEM IN THIS SINCE WKSCARLET-3 "CASE" HAS NOT COME UP SINCE LAST "ELITE" ARTICLE WHICH PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. STATION TAKING NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES IN SEEING HIM ONCE EVERY TWO TO THREE WEEKS.

2. REENTRY PERMIT AND NATURALIZATION PER REF B HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO WKSCARLET-3 AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AGAIN AT NEXT MEETING, WHEN WE HOPE TO BE IN POSITION TO GIVE HIM NEW REENTRY PERMITS, AND AT TERMINATION MEETING.

3. IN DISCUSSING HIS TERMINATION, WKSCARLET-3 SAID THAT HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE TERMINATED DUE TO HIS LACK OF ACCESS. HE ASKED IF HE WOULD BE CALLED UPON ON PART-TIME

~~S E C R E T~~

RECORD COPY

201-300985

12 Jun 74

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T 185196 EIA327 PAGE 02 IN 279251

TOR:122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

BASIS TO DO INVESTIGATIONS THROUGH HIS PRIVATE INVESTIGATION COMPANY. HE WAS TOLD THAT NO SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD OR COULD BE MADE. HE ASKED IF HE WOULD BE GIVEN A RECONTACT PLAN IN THE EVENT HE OBTAINED JOB IN NEW NATIONAL POLICE, WHICH YET TO BE ESTABLISHED, AND WAS TOLD THAT IF HE WERE TO GET JOB IN DRUG SQUAD, WE WOULD CONSIDER REESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIP. (BOTH STATION AND WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE OFFERED JOB ONCE NATIONAL POLICE ESTABLISHED.)

4. ON THE WHOLE, WKSCARLET-3 TOOK NEWS OF TERMINATION WELL. STATED THAT HIS COMPANY NOW HAS ENOUGH CONTRACTS TO PAY FOR OVERHEAD AND THAT ANY FURTHER CONTRACTS WOULD BE "GRAVY."

5. WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BEEN PAYING U.S. TAXES ON HIS WKSCARLET SALARY BUT HAS NOT DONE SO FOR 1972 AND 1973. HE HAS NEVER PAID U.S. TAXES ON HIS BKHERALD SALARY, AND NOT FILED FORM 10-40 IN PAST TWO YEARS. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE READING ON WKSCARLET-3'S TAX SITUATION. ASSUME HE MUST FILE BACK TAXES ON BKHERALD SALARY IN ORDER ADHERE TAX LAW. GIVEN PLANNED 30 JUNE TERMINATION PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

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T 185196 E1A327 PAGE 03-03 IN 279251

TOR:1122325Z JUN 74 CARA 24700

6. FILE 221-0322985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HKCA 19915	June 74				

DOC. SUBJECT
Semi Annual Operations Report

SOURCE INFORMATION

EVALUATION

(4) WKSCARLET-3. WKSCARLET-3 was granted a POA effective 17 January 1972 and an OA effective 17 July 1972. He was first brought to the attention of the Station by WH/Miami. It is difficult to tell from our files exactly when contact was initiated, but as early as 1965, Subject was being used by BKHERALD. WKSCARLET-3 is currently in the process of establishing a private investigative company in Caracas. From January through March 1974, when the new government took over and WKSCARLET-3 was asked to leave his job, he was the Chief of Gov Div of Security of WKSCARLET, and reported on all aspects, operations, etc. of that unit. He is now in the process of being terminated, effective 30 June 1974, by his case officer, BACHHUBER, due to his lack of access and high profile. WKSCARLET-3 currently receives compensation in the amount of Bs2,000 per month. Subject was last successfully given an SGSWIRL on 8 May 1973. Since March 1974, his profile has been relatively high. There have been two articles in the local press naming him as a BKHERALD agent. Since those two articles, none have appeared; however, he has several high powered personal enemies in the current government and could come under political attack at any time. The Station does not feel that WKSCARLET-3 presents or will present a security threat. He has been well treated during his long relationship with BKHERALD which he realizes and is thankful for. Meetings to carry out the termination are being conducted with strict regard for security. A safehouse used for part of the period (S/H 45) and costing about $950, was terminated in March 1974. The only special commitment with WKSCARLET-3 is a termination payment of Bs6,000.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) WKSCARLET-3	201-

FORM 867 SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (7-60)

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
202055Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
555632

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CONF: CCS2 INFO: FILE CMS/NOC4, WH8,

TO: CARACAS.Y

ADMIN JODENTY

REF: CARACAS 24700 |IN 279251|Y

1. REF STATES UKSCARLET/3 (U/3) NEVER PAID U.S. TAXES ON BKHERALD COMPENSATION. AS A RESIDENT ALIEN, U/3'S ENTIRE BKHERALD COMPENSATION IS SUBJECT U.S. TAX RETROACTIVE INITIAL NOC EFFECTIVE 2 FEBRUARY 1968.Y

2. U/3 SHOULD CONTINUE FILING TAX RETURN DIRECTLY I.R.S. REPORTING HIS UKSCARLET SALARY. HE IS NOT TO REPORT ANY BKHERALD COMPENSATION BON HIS OVERT TAX RETURN. ANY TAXES OWED ON BKHERALD COMPENSATION WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH BKHERALD TAX SYSTEM. U/3 MUST PROVIDE HQSB COPY TAX RETURNS FOR TAX YEARS 1969 THROUGH 1973 AND TAX YEAR 1974 WHEN DUE AND FILED SO THAT WE CAN ESTABLISH AMOUNT BACK TAXES DUE THOSE YEARS. HQS MUST BALSO BE PROVIDED BREAKDOWN GROSS TAXABLE COMPENSATION, BY MONTH AND IN U.S. DOLLARS, PAID U/3 WHILE UNDER NOC AT YOUR STATION.Y

3. SINCE U/3 1974 OVERT TAX RETURN NOT DUE UNTIL NEXT YEAR, REQUEST HE FURNISH 1974 ESTIMATE NON-BKHERALD TAXABLE EARNINGS

DATE: 18 JUNE 1974
ORIG: C.E.BRISKEY:LSS
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697/9059

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DATE TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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(WKSCARLET EARNINGS, INTEREST, DIVIDENDS, RENTAL, ETC.), FILING STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS, SO HQS CAN ESTABLISH COVERT TAX LIABILITY THROUGH DATE TERMINATION. ONCE HE PROVIDE HQS COPY 1974 TAX RETURN, WE WILL RECONCILE TRUE TAX POSITION AND DETERMINE WHETHER SUFFICIENT TAX WITHHELD OR WHETHER HE DUE REFUND PORTION TAX COLLECTED BASED ON ESTIMATE.Y

4. IF STATION PLANS DISCONTINUE CONTACT WITH OO W/3 AFTER TERMINATION, HQS CAN PROVIDE ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS WHERE HE CAN CORRESPOND WITH HQS TO RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING TAX MATTERS.

E2 IMPDET.H

WH/3/D

WH/BF

DATE: 18 JUNE 1974
ORIG: C.E.BRISKEY:LSS
UNIT: CCS/CSB
EXT: 6697/9059

C/WH/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Stanley E. Goff
C/CCS/CSB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
C WKRALLY WKSCARLET
Transmittal of Reentry Permits for WKSCARLET-3 and his Wife

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. DIRECTOR 556718
B. DIRECTOR 553713

1. Transmitted under separate cover are the new reentry permits for WKSCARLET-3 and his wife, both valid to 30 May 1975.

2. Please inform WKSCARLET-3 that he must surrender his and his wife's expired reentry permits, which must be pouched to Headquarters for delivery to Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Ronald L. JUNGQUIST

Attachments:
2 Reentry permits u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas w/atts

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCH-10177

DATE
11 June 1974

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/3/Venezuela
OFFICER: Felipe Acevedo
TYPIST: lm
EXT: 7271

1 - IP
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	11 June 74	Lloyd C. Burnett

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3	11/6/74	Richard L. Conolly

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

TO : WH/3/Venezuela
ATTENTION: Laura Cooley
FROM : Alien Affairs Office, OS

4 June 1974

SUBJECT: Luis POSADA-Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina GONZALEZ De POSADA (A 12 443 942)

REFERENCE: Your memorandum of request dated 17 May 1974.

Reentry Permit(s) issued for subject(s) on 31 May 1974, valid to 30 May 1975, may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. In certain foreign areas U. S. Consuls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. However, where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit and Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States, Form I-131, should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Officer in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Frederick F. Bucci

Frederick F. Bucci
Alien Affairs Officer

Receipt acknowledged for Permit(s)#0459040 and 0459041 :

Signature

Date

As subject scheduled for termination 3 June 74, Agency will not be involved renewal.

2 [illegible] 060904

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TO: CARACAS.Y

WKRALLY WKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468 (IN 2558106)

B. DIRECTOR 552723

C. CARACAS 24203 (IN 225142)

D. DIRECTOR 538768 Y

1. IN CONNECTION PROPOSED TERMINATION WKSCARLET-3 BY 31 MAY 74 (REFS A AND B), WISH ADVISE STATION THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT RECEIVE NEW REENTRY PERMITS FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BEFORE 30 MAY AT EARLIEST, SO STATION SHOULD PLAN TO MEET WKSCARLET-3 AT LEAST ONCE DURING JUNE TO DELIVER NEW PERMITS. IF VENEZUELAN RESIDENCE VISAS OF WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE ARE STAMPED IN EXPIRED REENTRY PERMITS (WHICH WE ASSUME WAS REASON FOR REF C REQUEST THAT THEY BE ALLOWED RETAIN EXPIRING PERMITS AT TIME OF APRIL VISIT MIAMI), WKSCARLET-3 WILL NEED TO HAVE VISAS TRANSFERRED TO NEW PERMITS AND THEN MEET STATION C/O AGAIN TO SURRENDER EXPIRED PERMITS, WHICH MUST BE POUCHED HQS FOR DELIVERY TO I&NS. Y

2. WITH REGARD TO POSSIBILITY OF WKSCARLET-3 NEED TO LEAVE

DATE:
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201-300985
22 May 74

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553713

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VENEZUELA HASTILY FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD, PLEASE NOTE THAT HE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT OF NEW REENTRY PERMITS. AS INDICATED REF D, IT WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE FOR HIM TO ENTER U.S. ON HIS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WITH U.S. TOURIST VISA. THEREFORE, IF HE MUST LEAVE VENEZUELA DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS, RECOMMEND HE GO TO OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO DELIVER NEW PERMITS TO HIM.Y

3. FURTHER COMMENTS FOLLOW RE WKSCARLET-3'S U.S. RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY AS RELATED TO HIS PENDING TERMINATION AND FUTURE PLANS.Y

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.H

REF A - EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS IN CASE OF WKSCARLET-3. STATION CONSIDERING TERMINATION 31 MAY INSTEAD OF 30 JUNE. LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR POSSIBLE HASTY DEPARTURE FROM VENEZUELA FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD.

REF B - CONCURRED IN STATION CONSIDERATION OF EARLY TERMINATION.

REF C - RE VISIT MIAMI TO APPLY FOR NEW REENTRY PERMITS. ASKED THEY BE ALLOWED RETAIN OLD PERMITS. MENTIONED POSSESSION VENEZUELAN PPT WITH VALID U.S. TOURIST VISA.

REF D - RECOMMENDED WKSCARLET-3 NOT USE VENEZUELAN PPT ON ENTRY MIAMI.

DATE: 22 MAY 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

OS/AAS ERVAN E. KUHNKE (IN DRAFT)

AR

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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STAFF 301944Z DIRECTOR 556718

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TO: UPRIORITY CARACAS.Y

UKKALLY UKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 553713

B. CARACAS 24489 (IN 258600)Y

1. IN COURSE OF TERMINATING UKSCARLET-3, STATION SHOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT HE UNDERSTANDS EFFECT TERMINATION MAY HAVE ON HIS RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR NATURALIZATION AS U.S. CITIZEN. PLS ADVISE UKSCARLET-3 THAT UPON TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BY AGENCY, HIS PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE WHILE ABROAD IS SIMULTANEOUSLY TERMINATED. IN ORDER TO RETAIN HIS CURRENT ELIGIBILITY FOR NATURALIZATION, HE MUST RETURN TO U.S. BEFORE ELAPSE OF ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION TO AVOID A BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF HIS RESIDENCEU REQUIREMENT. SHOULD BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF RESIDENCE OCCUR, SUBJECT WILL START A NEW PERIOD WITH 364 DAYS, AND HE WOULD THEN BE ELIGIBILE FOR NATURALIZATION FOUR YEARS AND ONE DAY FROM DATE OF RETURN TO U.S., PROVIDED ALL OTHER BASIC REQUIREMENTS ARE MET. HE SHOULD CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT REENTRY PERMIT DOES NOT [illegible] PROTECT CONTINUITY OF HIS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

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201-300985
30 MAY 71

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY: 013978

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356718

2. WITH RESPECT TO UKSCARLET-3'S WIFE, IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO GIVE A FIRM POSITION AS TO WHEN SHE WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION. SHE DID NOT HAVE A PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE WHILE ABROAD, SINCE SHE WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THIS BENEFIT, AND OUR FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY VISITS TO U.S. BETWEEN MAY 70 AND APRIL 74. COUNTING FROM HER LAST VISIT TO U.S. IN APRIL 74, SHE SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION IN APRIL 78 IF SHE RETURNS TO U.S. BEFORE ONE YEAR HAS ELAPSED. THIS COULD BE SOONER IF HER HUSBAND WERE TO BE NATURALIZED IMMEDIATELY UPON THEIR RETURN, AS SHE WOULD ONLY HAVE TO WAIT THREE YEARS INSTEDAD OF FOUR.

3. SUBJECTS SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED THAT THEY NOW HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THEIR REENTRY PERMITS CURRENT. IMPRESS UPON THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT TO MENTION TO ANYONE FACT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO GET REENTRY PERMITS IN 72 WITHOUT RETURNING TO THE U.S. IN THAT INSTANCE THEY WERE BENEFICIARIES OF [illegible] "DOUBLE DEAL" ARRANGEMENT [illegible] WHICH HQS HAS WORKED OUT WITH I&NS HEADQUARTERS.

4. NEW REENTRY PERMITS OF UKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SHOULD BE READY WITHIN FEW DAYS. CONTRARY TO STATEMENT PARA 2 REF A, IF SUBJECTS

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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0 IP FILES #

556718

SHOULD HAVE REASON VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT NEW PERMITS, THEY CAN ENTER ON ALIEN REGISTRATION RECEIPT CARDS (FORM I-151).Y

05. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.N

REF A - NEW REENTRY PERMITS CANNOT BE OBTAINED BEFORE PROPOSED DATE WKSCARLET-3 TERMINATION. W-3 SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT VISIT U.S. BEFORE RECEIPT NEW PERMITS. COMMENTS TO FOLLOW RE EFFECT TERMINATION ON CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY AND FUTURE PLANS.

REF B - RE PROPOSED TERMINATION OF WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS TENTATIVE FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE RETURN TO U.S.

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

DATE: 30 MAY 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY ac
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 013978

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ACTION #			3		6	

T 126605 EIA301 PAGE 01 IN 258600

TOR:2119232 MAY 74 CARA 24489

S E C R E T 2119072 MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24489

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468(IN 255816)

B. DIRECTOR 552369

C. DIRECTOR 552723

D. CARACAS 24481(IN 257573)

1. WKSCARLET-3 DOES NOT INTEND LOOK FOR NEW JOB. HE IS ESTABLISHING PRIVATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY FROM WHICH HE EXPECTS EARN LIVELIHOOD. HE HAS RECEIVED A FEW SMALL CONTRACTS AND THINKS THAT HE CAN DO WELL IN THAT FIELD, IF ERASTO FERNANDEZ WILL LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE. SHOULD ERASTO CONTINUE CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS, WKSCARLET-3 WILL TAKE ACTION AS INDICATED REF A. WKSCARLET-3 HAS COPIES OF RECEIPTS WHICH ERASTO SIGNED DURING FIVE YEAR COPEI GOVERNMENT PROVING THAT ERASTO WAS PAID BS. 10,000 MONTHLY FROM WKSCARLET'S SECRET BUDGET (HE OBTAINED THE RECEIPTS FROM WKSCARLET-1 WHO PAID ERASTO.) HE INTENDS TO WARN ERASTO FIRST IN ATTEMPT REACH SOME AGREEMENT WITH HIM. IF HE UNSUCCESSFUL, HE WILL HAVE THE STORY AND RECEIPTS PUBLISHED IN ONE OF THE MAJOR DAILY NEWSPAPERS.

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2. AS REPORTED REF D, 24 MAY EDITION OF "ELITE" WHICH HIT STREETS 20 MAY, CARRIED TWO PAGE STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLLO" STATING THAT ERASO FERNANDEZ IS IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATION BEING CARRIED OUT TO DETERMINE LEVEL OF POLITICAL ESPIONAGE CARRIED OUT DURING CAMPAIGN AGAINST WKNOBLE-11. WKSCARLET-3 WAS NOT MENTIONED IN STORY.

3. MORNING OF 21 MAY, WKNOBLE-8 TOLD COS THAT ERASTO IS OUT TO GET WKSCARLET-3 AND WKTANGO-1 FOR REASONS STATED REF A.

4. WKSCARLET-3 HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR TERMINATION SINCE ELECTION WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT HE WOULD LOSE JOB IN WKSCARLET AND MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO GET JOB IN AREA WHERE STATION HAD INTEREST. STATION HAS KEPT RELATIONSHIP GOING IN ORDER GIVE HIM CHANCE TO GET JOB AND IT BEGAN TO APPEAR, AFTER HIS TRIP TO MIAMI, THAT HE MIGHT GET JOB WITH WKNOBLE-8, OR NATIONAL POLICE WHEN IT FORMED. STATION THINKS IT UNLIKELY THAT WKSCARLET-3 WOULD TURN OUT TO BE SECURITY PROBLEM. OTHER THAN GETTING PRIVATE INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OFF THE GROUND, HE CLAIMS TO HAVE OTHER IRONS IN THE FIRE; RETURNING TO MIAMI WHERE HE HAS FRIENDS (NOT DRUG RELATED) AND A JOB OFFER IN SPAIN. THIS WILL NOT BE WKSCARLET-3'S FIRST TERMINATION AND HE IS FIRST TO RECOGNIZE THAT HE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO CONTINUE

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T 126505 EIA301 PAGE 03-03 IN 258600

TOR:211923Z MAY 74 CARA 24489

WITH BKHERALD.

5. STATION'S PLANS WERE TO GIVE WKSCARLET-3 UNTIL 30 JUNE TO GET JOB WITH WKNOBLE-6 OR IN OTHER AREA OF INTEREST. FAILING THAT, TERMINATE HIM, GIVING HIM BS. 6,000 (THREE MONTHS SALARY) AS TERMINATION PAYMENT. COMMENT REGARDING EXTRA MONTHS PAY IN REF A MADE SINCE HE WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN PAID JUNE SALARY. SINCE HE WILL PROBABLY BE TERMINATED 31 MAY, WOULD ADD JUNE SALARY TO BS. 6,000 THUS BRING TOTAL TERMINATION PAYMENT UP TO BS. 8,000. WKSCARLET-3 NOT PROMISED ANY TERMINATION PAYMENT, NOR HAS HE RAISED SUBJECT. STATION FULLY EXPECTS TERMINATION TO BE AMICABLE AND DOESN'T ANTICIPATE ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS.

6. FILE: 75-2-16/3; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

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STAFF

~~T 126170 EIA075 PAGE 01 IN 258432~~

TOR:211729Z MAY 74 CARA 24483

SECRET 211618Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24483

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKNUGGET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 552855

B. CARACAS 24453 (IN 254992)

{bottom SAFE}

WKSCARLET-3
WKTANGO-1
FERNANDEZ 201-324359

1. AS OF THIS TIME STATION HAS MADE NO MENTION OF SUBJECT REFERENCES TO AMBASSADOR AND UNLESS THERE CHANGE IN SITUATION AND ACTUAL COMPROMISE TAKES PLACE OR IS SERIOUSLY THREATENED, WOULD MUCH PREFER NOT TO DO SO. HOWEVER, SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY STATION WILL LEVEL WITH HIM, TELLING HIM ALL FACTS HE NEEDS TO KNOW AS WELL AS COVER STORY STATION USES OR PLANS USE WITH LIAISON. AS OF THIS TIME THERE NO FURTHER INDICATION GOV PURSUING INVESTIGATION.

2. COS HAD MEETING WITH WKNOBLE-8 MORNING 21 MAY. LATTER, WHO NOW CLAIMS HE HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR TELTAP OP BUT ADMITS THAT GOV (UNDER RESPONSIBILITY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR) NOW TAPPING ABOUT 30 TELEPHONES (WKSCARLET-9 SAYS 38 LINES). WKNOBLE-8 SAYS THAT RECENT PRESS CHARGES ON WIRETAPPING WHICH REPORTED OUR RECENT CABLES ON SUBJECT OF WKNUGGET OP WERE INSTIGATED BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND THAT THERE CURRENTLY BATTLE OF SORTS GOING ON BETWEEN FERNANDEZ

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T 126178 EIA875 PAGE 02 IN 258432

TOR:211729Z MAY 74 CARA 24483

AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR WHO FEELS FERNANDEZ IRRESPONSIBLE AND SIMPLY TRYING GET BACK AT HIS COPEI AND OTHER ENEMIES. ACCORDING WKNOBLE-8, FERNANDEZ BROUGHT WKSCARLET-3 AND WKTANGO-1 TO VENEZUELA FROM EXILE AND GAVE BOTH EMPLOYMENT, HOWEVER, BOTH STAYED WITH COPEI AFTER 1968 ELECTION AND FERNANDEZ HAS NEVER FORGIVEN THEM. HE SAYS FERNANDEZ' REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO KICK BOTH OUT OF VENEZUELA AND HE FEARS FERNANDEZ MAY SUCCEED.]

3. WKNOBLE-8 MADE NO MENTION OF MINISTRY DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP BUT DID SAY THAT THEY HAD UNCOVERED ONE BELONGING TO WKSCARLET-2, WHICH HE ALLOWED WKSCARLET-2 MAY HAVE BEEN RUNNING FOR COPEI BUT HE, PERSONALLY, THINKS WKSCARLET-2 JUST TRYING MAKE SOME MONEY IN PRIVATE BUSINESS OF HIS OWN. WKNOBLE-8 DID NOT LET ON EVEN THAT THEY HAVE DISCOVERED TAPS WHICH MAY BELONG TO STATION BUT DID SAY THAT BY CAREFUL CHECK OF FRAMES IN CENTRALS IT NOT DIFFICULT DISCOVER TELTAPS.

4. STATION AGAIN URGED HIM DISCUSS NEED FOR EARLY RESUMPTION TAPS ON SOVIETS WITH MINISTER AND HE AGAIN PROMISED HE WOULD DO SO. STATION SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF RUNNING JOINT TELTAP OP AGAINST SOVIETS, LIBYIANS AND OTHER TARGETS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND BLE-8 APPEARED GENIUNELY INTERESTED. SAID HE THOUGHT SUCH A

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T 126178 EIA875 PAGE 03-03 IN 258432

TOR:211729Z MAY 74 CARA 24483

PROPOSITION WOULD BE APPROVED IMMEDIATELY BY THE MINISTER. COS COMMENTED THAT IF IDEA APPEALS TO THEM THEN WE WOULD EXPLORE FURTHER AT A LATER DATE.

5. FILE: 75-6-55/3. E2 IMPDET

* C/S SUGGESTS ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO D/SECUR

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.Y

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 24468 (IN 255816)

B. DIRECTOR 552369 Y

1. APPRECIATE REF A EVALUATION WKSCARLET-3'S SITUATION. CONCUR STATION CONSIDERATION OF EARLY TERMINATION. ASSUME COMMENT PARA 4 REF A RE POSSIBLY PAYING FOR EXTRA MONTH, IF NECESSARY, REFERS TO EXTRA PAY IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER TERMINATION BENEFITS DUE WKSCARLET-3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS RE STATION PLANS FOR HIS TERMINATION AND BENEFITS CONTEMPLATED.Y

2. WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY LOCATING NEW JOB AND COULD FIND HIMSELF ~~[illegible]~~ WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES OVER FAIR PERIOD OF TIME. THIS BEING CASE, HE COULD WELL TURN OUT TO BE SECURITY PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY IF HE REMAINS IN VENEZUELA. THUS, BELIEVE IT BEHOOVES US TO ENSURE THAT TERMINATION AMICABLE EVEN IF THIS NECESSITATES TERMINATION BENEFITS BEYOND THOSE ACTUALLY PROMISED OR DESERVED. YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.Y

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3. FILE 75-2-16/3; 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.#

DATE: 20 MAY 74
ORIG: L.C. BURNETT
UNIT: WH/7/V
EXT: 1535

REF A - EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS IN CASE OF WKSCARLET-3. CONSIDERING TERMINATING 31 MAY INSTEAD OF 30 JUNE.
REF B - "WATERGATE CRIOLLO" STORY IS OMINOUS. ASKED IF STATION COULD ARRANGE FOR HIS QUICK DEPARTURE FROM VENEZUELA FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD.

C/WH/3

C/WH/3

SECRET

17 May 1974

201

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Request for New Reentry Permits for Luis C. Posada Carriles and Nieves Elina Gonzalez de Posada

1. It is requested that new reentry permits be obtained for Luis C. Posada Carriles and his wife, Nieves Elina de Posada, whose previous reentry permits expired on 20 April 1974. Attached are completed Forms I-131, "Application for Issuance or Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," for Mr. Posada and his wife, together with two photographs of each and a check for $20.00 payable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

2. As you know, when Mr. and Mrs. Posada visited Miami in April 1974, just prior to the expiration date of their old permits, they were permitted to retain the expiring permits for use in reentering Venezuela. It is understood that the expired permits are to be pouched to Headquarters for delivery to I&NS as soon as the new permits have been delivered to Mr. and Mrs. Posada.

Laura Cooley
WH/3/Venezuela

Attachments:
See above

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C/OPS, PS/EG4, SSS

T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 01 IN 255816

TOR:182243Z MAY 74 CARA 24468

S E C R E T 182212Z MAY 74 STAFF

PRECEDENCE

CITE CARACAS 24468

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 552369

1. STATION CAREFULLY CONSIDERED RISK IN MEETING WKSCARLET/3 TODAY BUT IN VIEW OF GOV DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP OF FELT IF NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN (AND THEY WERE) IN ARRANGING MEETING, WKSCARLET-3 MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ABLE SHED SOME LIGHT ON WHETHER OR NOT STORY ON HIM RELATED IN ANYWAY TO GOV "SPY SEARCH EFFORT". WKSCARLET-3 NOT CONCERNED ABOUT STORY AND ON 16 MAY DISCUSSED IT WITH FRIENDS IN WKSCARLET-3. ACCORDING TO WKSCARLET-3, WKSCARLET NOT CONCERNED AND HE NOTES NO SURVEILLANCE AND NO APPARENT INTEREST IN HIS ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS. HE CLAIMS THAT STORY WAS PLANTED BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ. FERNANDEZ 20 ORIGINALLY HIRED HIM BUT SINCE 1969 HAS BEEN UNFRIENDLY TOWARD WKSCARLET-3. THIS UNFRIENDLINESS APPARENTLY CAUSED BY WKSCARLET-3'S DEFECTION TO COPEYANOS (WORKING FOR WKSCARLET FOR PAST FIVE YEARS) AND IN 1973 FAILED LEAVE COPEYANOS AND WORK FOR ADECO VICTORY. WKSCARLET-2 SAID NIGHT 16 MAY HE FELT CERTAIN STORY IS PURE PRESS SENSATIONALISM, AND WKSCARLET-3 SAYS THAT IF [illegible] FURTHER

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T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 02 IN 255816

TOR:1802432 MAY 74 CARA 24468

APPEARS OF A SIMILAR NATURE HE PLANS GO DIRECTLY TO FERNANDEZ, ACCUSE HIM AND DEMAND PERSECUTION BE STOPPED. HE SAYS NAME "COMISARIO BASILIO" USED BY WRITER (FERNANDEZ) FOR FERNANDEZ LACKS PROOF OF HIS CHARGES AND IF HE HAD USED TRUE NAME OR PICTURE OF WKSCARLET-3, FERNANDEZ WOULD BE OPEN FOR LIBEL. WKSCARLET-3 CLAIMED THAT A FRIEND AND REPORTER ON STAFF OF "EL MUNDO" WAS INVITED TO MIRAFLORES PLACE (13 MAY) ALONG WITH REPORTERS FROM OTHER NEWS PAPERS TO "BE GIVEN THE STORY". "ULTIMAS NOTICIAS" WAS ONLY NEWSPAPER WHICH CARRIED STORY.

2. BRADSPIES HAD REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETING AT NOON TODAY WITH DEPUTY CHIEF WKSCARLET AND SUBJECT OF "BASILIO" ARTICLE CAME UP. DEPUTY SAID WKSCARLET ATTACHES NO IMPORTANCE TO ARTICLE, CONSIDERS IT PERSONAL ATTACK ON WKSCARLET/3 OR JUST PRESS SENSATIONALISM, AND THAT HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT WKSCARLET/3 WORKING FOR EITHER EKHERALD OR LNERGO. DEPUTY SAID HE BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT GOV WILL PURSUE "BASILIO" CASE FOR GOV INTENDS USE TELTAPS EXTENSIVELY AND WISHES AVOID ANY PUBLICITY WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN EMBARASSMENT TO IT.

3. APART FROM ABOVE, WKSCARLET/3 HAS REPORTED SEVERAL RECENT MEETINGS WITH WKNOBLE-6 IN EFFORT ARRANGE JOB ON ONE OR MORE PROJECTS WKNOBLE/6 TRYING GET UNDERWAY. WHILE WKNOBLE/6, WHO

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T 118245 EIA182 PAGE 03-03 IN 255816

TOR:182243Z MAY 74 CARA 24468

MENTIONED WKSCARLET/3 TO COS ONE ONE RECENT OCCASSION (ASKING WHAT STATION'S OPINION OF WKSCARLET/3 WAS), COMMITTED HIMSELF TO JOB FOR WKSCARLET/3. THE LATTER BELIEVES THAT SINCE PUBLICATION OF ARTICLE IT MOST UNLIKELY WKNOBLE/8 WILL HIRE HIM.

4. RELIZE THAT ALL THE FACTS NOT YET IN BUT ON BALANCE WE BELIEVE "BASILIO" ARTICLE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE AND POSSIBLY NOT RELATED TO GOV DISCOVERY OF WKNUGGET TELTAP OP NOR OF DISCOVERY OF WKSCARLET/2'S TAP. HOWEVER, WE WILL LAY GROUNDWORK SO THAT WKSCARLET/3 CAN MAKE HASTY DEPARTURE FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD SHOULD THAT BECOME NECESSARY. AT SAME TIME WE WISH AVOID CONTACT WITH HIM AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FOR DEVIOUS REASONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN FACT, STATION HAD PLANNED TERMINATE HIM EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE AS THUS FAR HE HAS BEEN UNABLE LAND JOB WITH ACCESS OF INTEREST. IN VIEW OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE WILL CONSIDER POSSIBLE TERMINATION AS OF 31 MAY 74 AND PAY FOR EXTRA MONTH IN VIEW OF SHORT NOTICE IF NECESSARY.

5. FILE: 75-2-16/3 AND 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 14-1

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SECRET

STAFF 172329Z DIRECTOR 552569

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, C/OPS, OSG/OC, C/OPS, SSS

DISSEM BY: 6

PER #

TO: IMMEDIATE NIACT CARACAS.Y

WKRALLY WKSCARLET Y

REF: CARACAS 24453 (IN 255137)Y

1. REF STORY RE BKHERALD AND LNERGO IS [illegible] OMINOUS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW RECENT WKNUGGET DEVELOPMENT.Y

2. WE CONCERNED THAT IF ARRESTED WKSCARLET-3 LIKELY TO REVEAL DETAILS OF RECENT BKHERALD RELATIONSHIP AND EVEN EMBELLISH HIS ACTIVITIES IN OUR BEHALF. WE BELIEVE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSSIBILITY OF HEADING OFF HIS BEING PICKED UP BY GOV AUTHORITIES OR EXPOSURE TO PRESS. TO THIS END, COULD STATION ARRANGE FOR QUICK DEPARTURE FROM COUNTRY FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD? [illegible] YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED.Y

3. WE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT STATION MEETING WITH WKSCARLET-3 DURING CURRENT SITUATION. PLEASE CONTINUE USE EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FILE 75-2-16/3 AND [illegible] 201-300785. E2 IMPDET.R

REF - ULTIMAS NOTICIAS PUBLISHED STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLLO" ON 14 MAY. BOTH IN HEADLINE AND IN STORY WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED USING ONLY HIS WKSCARLET ALIAS.

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DATE: 17 MAY 74
ORIG: L.C. BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WH/CA

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T 042692 EIA735 PAGE 01 IN 227671

TOR:1823512 APR 74 CARA 24235

SECRET 182222Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24235

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: A. DIRECTOR 500819

B. CARACAS 24106 (IN 208147)

1. STATION INTENDS TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 EFFECTIVE 1 MAY IF HE HAS NO JOB IN WKSCARLET, PTJ NARC SQUAD, OR WITH WKNOBLE-8 IN TELTAP OP BY THAT DATE. STATION EXPECTS NO PROBLEMS WITH TERMINATION AS WKSCARLET-3 AWARE THAT WITHOUT ONE OF ABOVE JOBS HE OF LITTLE USE TO US.

2. AFTER 1 MAY TERMINATION, STATION WILL OFFER PUT WKSCARLET-3 IN CONTACT WITH DEA PER REF A.

3. WKSCARLET-3 TERMINATION PAYMENT WILL BE THREE MONTHS SALARY, BY6,000 (US$1,402). FUNDS FOR TERMINATION INCLUDED IN REF.

4. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

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201-300585
18 Apr 74

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T 116477 EIA467 PAGE 01 IN 255137

TOR:171540Z MAY 74 CARA 24453

S E C R E T 171343Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24453

TO: DIRECTOR

WKRALLY/WKSCARLET

1. ULTIMAS NOTICIAS PUBLISHED STORY REGARDING "WATERGATE CRIOLLO." (PAGE 44) ON 14 MAY. BOTH IN HEADLINE AND IN STORY WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED USING ONLY HIS WKSCARLET ALIAS.

2. ACCORDING TO STORY, WKSCARLET-3, A CUBAN WHO WORKED FOR BKHERALD AND LNARGO IN PAST AND HAS VAST INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUND, BROUGHT VARIOUS SPYING DEVICES INTO VENEZUELA: BINOCULARS WITH WHICH ONE CAN READ LICENSE PLATES AT 1000 METERS, A MECHANISM TO LOCATE ROUTES OF CARS, AND OTHER OBJECTS TO TAP TELEPHONES.

3. SUPPOSED PURPOSE OF EQUIPMENT WAS TO OBTAIN PRE-ELECTION INFORMATION FROM TORRE DE LAS DELICIAS WHERE OFFICES OF CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WERE LOCATED WHILE HE CAMPAIGNING FOR PRESIDENT.

4. STORY ATTRIBUTED TO "A SOURCE" AND ACCORDING TO "THE AUTHORITIES" THE CASE WOULD BE TAKEN TO COURT WITH

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201-300985
17 may 74

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T 116477 EIA467 PAGE 02-02 IN 255137

TOR:171540Z MAY 74 CARA 24453

PROOF WHICH WILL CONFIRM ACTS OF POLITICAL ESPIONAGE.

5. STATION HAS NO FURTHER DETAILS. CASE OFFICER HAS MEETING SCHEDULED WITH WKSCARLET-3 TODAY AND WILL TAKE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS PRIOR TO AND DURING MEETING TO DETECT SURVEILLANCE. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-9 ON 16 MAY, WKSCARLETS KNOW NOTHING OF THIS BUT HE WILL CHECK AND ADVISE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP STORIES TO THIS DATE. WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

6. FILE: 221-0300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief WH 17 April 1974

ATTENTION : Edward A. Cahill

SUBJECT : LETTER ADDRESS ACTIONS
590 966

1. With reference to your verbal request of 15 Apr 74 the following action was taken concerning facility

P.O. Box 4540
Brookland Station
Washington, D.C. 20017

"This is a Catch-all box used by several components of this Agency"

______ Cancelled

__XX__ Added as co-addressee

Reinaldo J. FIALLO

__XX__ Deleted as co-addressee

Edmond A. SAKIN

2. Any inquiries concerning the above action should be directed to the Office of Security, Special Facilities Desk.

Given to WKSCARLET-3
for use in sending in
& applications for New
U.S. Reentry Permits.
Supposed to be one-time
use only

for Robert W. Gambino
Deputy Director of Security
Personnel Security & Investigations

FORM 10-73 3236a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (5-25)

WKSCARLET-3 201

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF	162117Z	DIRECTOR	538768

CONF: WH 8   INFO: FILE P/AN, SEC/RY 4

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TO: IMMEDIATE NIACT CARACAS INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 24203 IN

1. RE PARA 2 REF. STRONGLY RECOMMEND WKSCARLET-3 NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO OR SHOW HIS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT TO U.S. IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES. SHOULD EXHIBIT ONLY U.S. REENTRY PERMIT.

2. FYI: IMMIGRATION SERVICE WILL BE ALERTED.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF - REQUESTS HQS HAVE I&NS ALLOW WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE RETAIN EXPIRING REENTRY PERMITS. POSSIBLE PROBLEM IF I&NS ASKS TO SEE SUBJECTS VENEZUELAN PASSPORT, WHICH CONTAINS U.S TOURIST VISA.

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)
ADC/WH/COG

201-300985
16 Apr 74

DATE: 16 APRIL 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

RECORD COPY

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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C/WH/3
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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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T 235810 PAGE 01-01 IN 225142

TOR:161929Z APR 74 CARA 24203

S E C R E T 161910Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24203

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 530655 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

B. DIRECTOR 538452

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL TRAVEL VIASA FLT 750 ON 17 APRIL DEPARTING CARACAS 0930 AND ARRIVING MIAMI 1300. PLS HAVE I&NS MIAMI ALLOW THEM RETAIN THEIR REENTRY PERMITS.

2. ONLY PROBLEM WHICH STATION CAN SEE MIGHT ARISE IS IF I&NS REQUESTS TO SEE WKSCARLET-3'S PASSPORT AND REENTRY PERMIT. WKSCARLET-3 TRAVELS ON VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WHICH STATES HE BORN IN VENEZUELA RATHER THAN CUBA AND PASSPORT CONTAINS VALID U.S. TOURIST VISA.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

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201-300985
16 Apr 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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STAFF 152226Z DIRECTOR 538452

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE IP/AN LSN/ID CI/OPS SE/W24 CCS2

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0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 24186 (IN 222753)

B. WH/MIAMI 21528 (IN 222896)

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL NOT BE ABLE OBTAIN NEW REENTRY PERMITS IN MIAMI AS THEIR FILE HELD IN WASHINGTON. I&NS MIAMI NOT AWARE SUBJECT AND WIFE SPECIAL CASES. NECESSITY FOR VISIT MIAMI IS THAT OLD PERMITS MUST SHOW SUBJECTS REENTERED U.S. BEFORE PERMITS EXPIRED AND ALSO THAT APPLICATION FOR NEW PERMITS MUST BE INITIATED IN PERSON IN U.S. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SHOULD OBTAIN AND FILL OUT FORMS I-131 AND MAIL THESE FROM MIAMI, TOGETHER WITH TWO PHOTOS OF EACH AND DOLLAR CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FOR TOTAL OF $20, TO FOLLOWING (ACCOMMODATION) ADDRESS:

REINALDO J. FIALLO
POST OFFICE BOX 4540 (FOUR FIVE FOUR ZERO)
BROOKLYN STATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20017

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

201-300985
15 Apr 74

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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538452

WE WILL FILE APPLICATIONS WITH I&NS HERE AS SOON AS RECEIVED. REF B NAME AND PHONE NUMBER SHOULD BE GIVEN WKSCARLET-3 FOR USE ONLY IF SOME PROBLEM ARISES.Y

2. AS OLD REENTRY PERMITS ARE SO CLOSE TO EXPIRATION, IT NORMAL FOR I&NS TO PICK THEM UP WHEN WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE ENTER U.S. ARE VENEZUELAN VISAS IMPRINTED IN REENTRY PERMITS, AND IF SO WILL SUBJECTS HAVE ANY PROBLEM REENTERING VENEZUELA WITHOUT THEM? IF PROBLEM EXISTS, WE CAN HAVE I&NS MIAMI ALERTED IN ADVANCE OF SUBJECTS' ARRIVAL AND REQUEST I&NS ALLOW THEM RETAIN PERMITS. IF THIS NECESSARY, PLS ADVISE SOONEST AND PROVIDE SUBJECTS' FLIGHT NUMBER AND TIME OF ARRIVAL MIAMI. Y

3. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.Y

REF A - WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE TRAVELLING MIAMI 17 APRIL TO RENEW
REENTRY PERMITS. STATION ASSUMES I&NS AWARE THEY SPECIAL
CASES SO WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE WITH RENEWALS, BUT REQUESTS
MIAMI STATION PROVIDE EMERGENCY PHONE CONTACT.
REF B - NAME AND PHONE NUMBER PROVIDED [redacted]BY WH/MIAMI.

[redacted]

C/WH/COG

C/WH/SEC E. CAHILL (DRAFT)

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (DRAFT)

DATE: 15 APRIL 74
ORIG: L. COOLEY
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 0139[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

15 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: OS/Special Facilities

SUBJECT: Request of P.O. Box

1. This will confirm telephonic request to your office on 15 April 1974 for a Washington, D.C. P.O. Box to receive one letter from Luis Clemente Carriles Posada. The box should be serviced daily commencing 23 April 1974 until that one letter is received.

2. This will also confirm you provided the following for the request contained in paragraph one:

Reinaldo J. Fallo
P.O. Box 4540
Brooklyn Station
Washington, D.C. 20017

3. The letter should be sent to WH/Registry for Laura Cooley, WH/3/V, 3 B 2627 on extension R1535. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Edward A. Cahill
C/WH/SECURITY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/3/V/L. Cooley
1 - WH/Chrono
1 - WH/File

DDO/WH/SEC/EACahill:rv (15 Apr 74)

CONFIDENTIAL

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INFO RF FILE VR 10/AN, 17/AN, OSG/OC

C/OPS

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T 028991 PAGE 01-01 IN 222753

TOR:121559Z APR 74 CARA 24186

S E C R E T 121600Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 24186

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 530655 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

1. WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE PLAN TRAVEL MIAMI AT OWN EXPENSE TO RENEW UNITED STATES REENTRY PERMITS ON 17 APRIL.

2. STATION ASSUMES THAT INS AWARE THAT WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE SPECIAL CASES AND THEREFORE THEY WILL HAVE NO TROUBLE RENEWING REENTRY PERMITS. HOWEVER, IN EVENT THERE SHOULD BE SOME PROBLEM, REQUEST WH/MIAMI PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME OF CASE OFFICER FOR WKSCARLET-3 TO CONTACT.

3. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

WKSCARLET-3

201-300985

12 Apr 74

SECRET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 2720252 DIRECTOR 530655

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE 11/WH, SECUR 4, OPS/NARC 2, C/OPS

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TO: CARACAS. Y

UKRALLY UKSCARLET Y

REFS: A. CARACAS 23508 (IN 136741)

B. DIRECTOR 393224 Y

1. WISH TO ADVISE STATION THAT UNITED STATES REENTRY PERMITS FOR UKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE WILL EXPIRE 20 APRIL 74. SINCE THIS REPRESENTS END OF SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH I&NS ON THIS CASE (TOTAL OF 4 YEARS), NEXT APPLICATION MUST BE MADE IN PERSON IN U.S. WHILE APPLICANTS NEED NOT WAIT IN U.S. FOR APPLICATIONS TO BE PROCESSED, THERE NO WAY AVOID MINIMUM ONE DAY TRIP TO U.S. (CAN BE DONE IN MIAMI) IF NEW REENTRY PERMITS TO BE OBTAINED. Y

2. WE REALIZE UKSCARLET-3'S FUTURE UNCERTAIN FOR REASONS EXPLAINED REF A AND THAT EXPIRATION REENTRY PERMITS IN APRIL MIGHT FURTHER COMPLICATE MATTER. WISH POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IF PERMITS EXPIRE, SUBJECTS WILL HAVE TO MAKE APPLICATIONS FOR RETURNING RESIDENT VISAS WITH NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT VISAS WILL BE ISSUED BY CONSULAR OFFICER. ALTHOUGH NO QUOTA NUMBER INVOLVED, PROCESSING IS SAME AS ANY OTHER IMMIGRANT VISA WITH CONSULAR OFFICER HAVING THE SOLE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

UKSCARLET-3
201-300985

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27 MAR 74

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CL BY: 013978

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

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530655

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AUTHORITY TO MAKE DETERMINATION AS TO ELIGIBILITY.Y

3. EOCOSTATION MAY ALREADY HAVE THIS TIME FACTOR IN MIND IN CONSIDERING ITS FUOOTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH WKSCARLET-3. IF, HOWEVER, DECISION CONCERNING HIS DISPOSITION NOT REACHED BY MID-APRIL, WOULD SUGGEST WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BE PERMITTED TRAVEL MIAMI TO APPLY FOR NEW REENTRY PERMITS IN ORDER AVOID PROBLEMS OUTLINED PARA TWO ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.Y

4. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.H

REF A - STATION PLANNING TO OFFER WKSCARLET-3 TO DEA AS SOURCE ON NARCOTICS IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN JOB IN NEW NARCOTICS OFFICE BEING ESTABLISHED BY GOV. IF DEA NOT INTERESTED, STATION WOULD TERMINATE W-3.

REF B - NOTIFICATION OF EXPIRATION OF REENTRY PERMITS IN APRIL 1973.

OFFICE OF ALIEN AFFAIRS F. BUCCI (DRAFT)

PS
APR 11 74

DATE: 27 MARCH 74
ORIG: L.C.BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

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PAGE 01 IN 162867

TOR:091404Z FEB 74 CARA 23718

SECRET 091353Z FEB 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23718

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY SCARLET REDLEG AELEO

1. 30 JANUARY AT MEETING BETWEEN CORRO AND AELEO, CORRO PROVIDED AELEO WITH DOCUMENT CONCERNING WKSCARLET-3'S BACKGROUND (PASSED WITH WKSCARLET ACQUIESENCE). AELEO HAD ASKED CORRO TO DETERMINE WHO "BASILIO" IS AND PROVIDE SOME BACKGROUND ON HIM. "BASILIO" IS WKSCARLET-3'S WKSCARLET ALIAS. AELEO ALSO ASKED IF WKSCARLET-3 HAS ANY BROTHERS. CORRO ANSWERED "NO". WKSCARLET-3 DOES HAVE BROTHER IN CUBA AND ONE IN WEST GERMANY.

2. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3 (ON 7 FEB), THE DOCUMENT PROVIDED TO AELEO INCLUDED HIS DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CURRENT FUNCTION IN WKSCARLET, FACT THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN BAY OF PIGS OPERATION AND USUAL SCHOOLING INFORMATION.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT WHAT EXACTLY AELEO AFTER. HOWEVER, POSSIBILITY THAT HE CONSIDERING WKSCARLET-3 AS RECRUITMENT TARGET NOT OUTSIDE REALM OF POSSIBILITY.

4. STATION WILL MONITOR THIS CASE AND KEEP YOU ADVISED

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T 67195 PAGE 02-02 IN 162867

TOR:091404Z FEB 74 CARA 23718

OF ANY [illegible]THER DEVELOPMENTS.

5. [illegible]: 201-881289, 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 152028Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 500819

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TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23508 (IN 136741)

1. CONCUR STATION PLANS PARA 3 REF CONCERNING FUTURE USE WKSCARLET-3.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. /

REF - ACCORDING TO WKNOBLE-8, NEW VENEZUELAN GOVT INTENDS SET UP NATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE NARCOTICS SECTION WITH NATIONWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES. STATION BELIEVES WKSCARLET-3 HAS CHANCE OBTAINING JOB IN THIS SECTION. HOWEVER, IF HE DOES NOT GET JOB BY 31 MARCH 74, STATION PLANS OFFER W-3 TO DEA.

WH/NARC HOWARD ORR (DRAFT)

C/WH/COG J. SKURA (TELECOORD)

DDO/NARCOG STAN ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

B

DATE: 15 JAN 74
ORIG: L.C. BURNETT
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

201-300985
15 Jan 74

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PRECEDENCE

T 807440 PAGE 01 IN 136741

TOR:141648Z JAN 74 CARA 23508

WH/3/V BS-4

S E C R E T 141640Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23508

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: DIRECTOR 499853

1. WKSCARLET-3 WILL NOT MAKE TRIP TO MIAMI AT THIS TIME. HE WILL TRAVEL PUERTO RICO ON PERSONAL BUSINESS ON 14 JANUARY ON VIASA FLT 792 DEPARTING CARACAS AT 1715.

2. RE PARA 2 REF. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALMOST NO CHANCE OF REMAING IN WKSCARLET. WHILE STATION HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO WHO WILL REPLACE WKSCARLET-1, RUMORS HAVE IT THAT ERASTO FERNANDEZ MAY GET JOB FOR FIRST THREE MONTHS OF NEW ADMINISTRATION IN ORDER "CLEAN" OUT WKSCARLET. WKSCARLET-3 AND FERNANDEZ ARE, TO SAY LEAST, NOT BEST OF FRIENDS AND FERNANDEZ HAS TOLD WKSCARLET-9 THAT WKSCARLET-3 MUST LEAVE WKSCARLET. WKSCARLET-3 HAS ALSO TOLD STATION THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HE CAN STAY IN WKSCARLET.

3. ACCORDING TO WKNOBLE-8, NEW GOVERNMENT INTENDS SET UP NATIONAL POLICE FORCE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE A NARCOTICS SECTION WITH NATIONWIDE RESPONSIBILITIES. STATION

SECRET

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201-300985
(14) Jan 74

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TOR:141648Z JAN 74 CARA 23508

HAS URGED AMSCARLET-3 TO TALK TO HIS FRIENDS AND CONTACTS IN ORDER OBTAIN MEDIUM OR HIGH LEVEL JOB IN THAT SECTION AND HE HAS AGREED. STATION FEELS HE HAS AT LEAST EVEN CHANCE OF OBTAINING SUCH A JOB. IF HE DOES NOT GET JOB BY ABOUT 31 MARCH 74, STATION PLANS OFFER HIM TO DEA AS SOURCE OR TERMINATE HIM IF THEY HAVE NO USE FOR HIM.

4. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS, IF ANY.

5. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

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PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP: 112329Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 499053

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TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS {NIACT} INFO: IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 499379

B. CARACAS 23476 [IN 133902]

WH/B/U B-4

1. MUST ADVISE THAT UNDER PRESENT GROUND RULES WE SIMPLY CANNOT PERMIT OUR CONTROLLED AGENTS TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ILLICIT NARCOTIC ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WHICH COULD RESULT IN DOMESTIC LEGAL ACTION. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, SHOULD UKSCARLET-3 PROVIDE FALSE PASSPORT FOR ABREU OR CONTACT WH/MIAMI STATION FOR PURPOSE OUTLINED REF B WHILE HE UNDER BKHERALD DIRECTION.

2. IN VIEW OF SERIOUS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENT INHERENT IN USE PROPOSED REF B, WE PREFER THAT UW-3 WITHDRAW FROM CASE COMPLETELY. THIS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT U-3 CONTINUES AS VALUABLE, LONG RANGE ASSET TO STATION, IF, HOWEVER, STATION OF OPINION THAT U-3 DOES NOT HAVE MUCH FUTURE WITH UKSCARLET AND THAT HIS USEFULNESS TO STATION IS LIMITED, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO OFFER TO

{CONT'D}

DATE:
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201-300985
11 Jan 74

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

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TURN HIM OVER TO DEA TO WORK FULL TIME ON NARCOTIC MATTERS. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT ONCE TURNOVER MADE, IT WOULD BE PERMANENT AND THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OKHERALD ASSOCIATION.

3. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR DECISION IN THIS MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

REFS: A. SITUATION PRESENTS KNOTTY PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE LEGAL INVOLVEMENT. HOPE TO HAVE DEFINITE ANSWER LATER TODAY.

B. REPORTED THAT WKSCARLET-3 (UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF DISIP) RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM DOMINGO ABREU (WELL DOCUMENTED CUBAN VIOLATOR IN MIAMI AREA) ASKING IF W-3 COULD PROVIDE HIM [illegible] WITH VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

OCG MR. GREANEY (TELECOORD)

DDO/NARCOG S. ARCHENHOLD (TELECOORD)

DC/WH/NARC H. ORR (DRAFT)

C/WH/COG J. Skupa (telecoord)

C/WH/4 K. Scofield (Draft)

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1974

ORIG: L. BURNETT

UNIT: WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

R L Conolly

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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CL BY:

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OUTGOING MESSAGE 16-1

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STAFF 111803Z DIRECTOR 499379

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE C/IP/AN, DDO, DDO/DO, C/CPS/WR2, C/CPS

DISSEN BY: 32 / 5

PER 800

# 103

TO: IMMEDIATE CARACAS INFO IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO BDOROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23476 (IN 133902) (BEING RELAYED BUENOS AIRES)

1. REF SITUATION PRESENTS KNOTTY PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE LEGAL INVOLVEMENT WKSCARLET-3 IN NARCOTICS CASE, IMPLICATIONS OF WHICH WE STILL TRYING TO CLARIFY. HOPE TO HAVE DEFINITE ANSWER FOR YOU LATER TODAY. IF TIME RUNS OUT ON US, YOU SHOULD ADVISE WKSCARLET-3 NOT TO PROVIDE BLANK VENEZUELAN PASSPORT AND NOT TO ~~CONTACT [illegible]~~ GO TO MIAMI AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.

22 JAN

C/WH/3/V B54

WH/NARC - HOWARD ORR (IN DRAFT)

DDO/NARCOG - ARCHENHOLD (TELECORD)

DATE: 11 JAN 74
ORIG: R.L. CONOLLY
UNIT: C/WH/3
EXT: 1128

201-300985

11-Jan-74

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T 800692 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01 IN 134114

TOR:1021242 JAN 74 WHIM 20657

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WH/3/M	BS-4		

S E C R E T 1021112 JAN 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 20657

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, CARACAS, FR/NEW YORK.

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 23476 (IN 133902)

1. DEA/MIAMI ADVISES:

N°30' AND ANDRES MARIANO PURRINO

A. DOMINGO ABREU/ IS UNDER CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BY DEA. WARRANT FOR HIS ARREST WAS ISSUED LATE 1972. EFFORTS LOCATE AND ARREST HIM AT THAT TIME PROVED FUTILE. ON 29 MARCH 1973 PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN BNDD AND U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN MIAMI, ARREST WARRANT CANCELLED. REASON NOT INDICATED IN DEA FILE.

N°30'

B. ✓ANDRES MARIANO PURRINO IS ALSO UNDER CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BY DEA. HIS ADDRESS IS 401 N.W. 49TH AVENUE, MIAMI. STATION RECORDS SHOW REF TELEPHONE NUMBER IS REGISTERED TO A-1 AUTOMOTIVE PARTS, 6625 W. FLAGLER ST., MIAMI.

2. AS ALTERNATIVE TO REF CONTACT PLAN, STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CUTTING IN DEA/MIAMI ON REF OP SINCE DEA IS AWARE OF BKHERALD ASSOCIATION WITH WKSCARLET-3 AND STATION WH/MIAMI DOES NOT HAVE SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY

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201-300985
10 JAN 74

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T 800692 PAGE 02-02 IN 134114

TOR:102124Z JAN 74 WNIN 22657

NOR CHARTER TO CONDUCT LOCAL NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. WKSCARLET-3 COULD THEREFORE BE PLACED IN CONTACT WITH DEA/MIAMI IF AND WHEN HE ARRIVES HERE. STATION OFFICER WOULD CASE OFFICER OP. IF HQS AND STATION CARACAS CONCUR, STATION COULD BRIEF DEA/MIAMI HIGHLIGHTS OF REF AND WORK OUT CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS LOCALLY WITH THEM. ALSO REMIND ADDRESSEES THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS WELL-KNOWN TO DEA/MIAMI AND UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD COME UNDER IMMEDIATE SURVEILLANCE BY THEM SHOULD HE ENTER AREA. WKSCARLET-3 HAS BEEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING PREVIOUS TRIP MIAMI AREA.

3. FILE: 201-300985, E-2, IMPDET.

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T 888822

PRECEDENCE

PAGE 01-01

IN 134173

TOR: 102246Z JAN 74

CARA 23488

SECRET 102232Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23488

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI INFO FR/NEW YORK.

NIACT WH/MIAMI

RYBAT MHABYSS

REF: WH/MIAMI 20657 (IN 134114)

1. CONCUR REF PARA 2 PLAN.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

WH13/V 35-4

201-300985

10 Jan 74

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INFO FILE VR DDO, C/IP/AN, C/OPS/NAR2, C/OPS

STAFF			
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T 800180 PAGE 01 IN 133902

TOR:101740Z JAN 74 CARA 23476

S E C R E T 101726Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 23476 PRECEDENCE

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI, FR NEW YORK.

RYBAT MHABYSS

1. DURING MEETING LATE 9 JANUARY, WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE RECEIVED LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALL FROM NEW YORK FROM DOMINGO ABREU. ABREU ASKED IF WKSCARLET-3 COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH VENEZUELAN PASSPORT. WKSCARLET-3 TOLD ABREU THAT HE COULD PROBABLY DO SO. ABREU TOLD WKSCARLET-3 THAT HE COULD NOT BE REACHED IN NEW YORK BUT PROVIDED WKSCARLET-3 WITH NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN MIAMI THROUGH WHICH HE COULD BE CONTACTED: ANDRES PURRINO, TEL: 261-4581.

2. FOLLOWING ARE STATION TRACES ON ABREU AND PURRINO:

A. ABREU, DOMINGO: AKA CHINO: WELL DOCUMENTED CUBAN VIOLATOR IN MIAMI AREA. (HVCA-18943A0").

B. PSMRINO,HYNDRES: DOCUMENTED MULTI-KILO TRAFFICKER (CARACAS 21408,* 14 MARCH 74).

WH/3/V BS-4

3. NO ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE FOR TRANSFER OF PASSPORT, HOWEVER, WKSCARLET-3 WILLING TRAVEL MIAMI WITH BLANK, VALID PASSPORT, CALL PURRINO, AND DELIVER IT. WKSCARLET-3 SAID HE

S E C R E T

201-300985

10 Jan 74

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T 800180 PAGE 02 IN 133902

TOR:1017402 JAN 74 CARA 23476

IS GOING TO MAKE TRIP TO PUERTO RICO 12 JANUARY BUT COULD POSTPONE TRIP UNTIL 14 OR 15 JANUARY. STATION WILL PHOTOGRAPH PASSPORT AND FORWARD COPIES TO ADDRESSEES.

4. UPON ARRIVAL MIAMI, WKSCARLET-3 WOULD CONTACT STATION AND HOPEFULLY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE NAME TO BE USED IN PASSPORT. HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ILLICITE ANY INFO REGARDING PURRINO/ABREU DEALINGS.

5. PITFALLS IN ABOVE PLAN ARE MANY, PARTICULARLY IF PURRINO AND/OR ABREU DEA SOURCES, OR UNDER INVESTIGATION, OR UNDER INDICTMENT, AND PASSPORT AT ANY TIME USED AS EVIDENCE, SINCE ABREU AND PURRINO COULD TIE WKSCARLET-3 TO VENEZUELAN PASSPORT.

6. ALTERNATIVE (WHICH STATION DOES NOT RECOMMEND) WOULD BE TO HAVE WKSCARLET-3 CALL PURRINO FROM PUERTO RICO OR MIAMI AND TELL HIM THAT HE COULD NOT OBTAIN PASSPORT BUT OFFER TO BRIEF PURRINO ON CURRENT SITUATION IN VENEZUELA. WKSCARLET-3 WOULD ATTEMPT THROUGH TALKS WITH PURRINO TO FIND OUT WHAT PURRINO AND ABREU UP TO.

7. FOR WH/MIAMI: PLEASE CHECK WITH DEA TO DETERMINE STATUS PER PARA 5 OF PURRINO AND ABREU. DEA CARACAS AWARE ABOVE AND

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INFO RF FILE VR

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T 820180 PAGE 03-03 IN 133902

TOR:101740Z JAN 74 CARA 23476

THAT WH/MIAMI WILL CONTACT DEA MIAMI BUT DOES NOT PLAN TO INITIATE ANY CORRESPONDENCE RE WKSCARLET-3 TRAVEL.

8. IN ANY EVENT, WKSCARLET-3 PLANS TRAVEL PUERTO RICO AND IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE WILL HAVE TO BE ADVISED SINCE HE TRAVELING ON OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN PASSPORT WITH U.S. VISA AND HE IS U.S. RESIDENT.

9. STATION WILL PROVIDE FLT NUMBER, DATE OF TRAVEL, ETC., AS SOON AS KNOWN. WKSCARLET-3 ALWAYS TRAVELS VIASA WHICH FLIES CARACAS, PUERTO RICO, MIAMI.

10. SUBJECT DIRECTOR CONCURRENCE, WOULD WH/MIAMI PROVIDE CONTACT PLAN FOR WKSCARLET-3, AND ARRANGE SURVEILLANCE TO FOLLOW UP ANY LEADS OBTAINED BY HIM.

11. PLEASE ADVISE BY NOON 11 JAN.

12. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

* APPARENTLY MARCH 73. IN NO. WILL
BE FURNISHED ON REQUEST.

SECRET

201-300895

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(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19626	2 Nov 73				

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WKSCARLET-3		

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

7. WKSCARLET-3 -- WKSCARLET-3 is being met on a weekly basis in a safehouse. While his access remains unchanged, his reporting has dropped off during this reporting period due mostly to the fact that his energies are being directed against guerrillas and since the capture of Gabriel Puertas and Carlos Betancourt, the WKSCARLETs have had little success in this field. WKSCARLET-3's division is currently working against Gordo Mansania, Solo Suarez, Tito Herrera, and Elias Eljury. During the period he produced no disseminations, however, information reported by him was used for one field comment.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(7-46)

DISPATCH

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
WKSCARLET-3 SGSWIRL Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the report on the SGSWIRL examination given WKSCARLET-3 on 8 May 1973.

CTR

Christine T. RATHWICK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Caracas

Attachments:
a. SGSWIRL Report h/w
b. Idens for Att. a. u/s/c

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 058903

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
TRAVEL PROGRAM
~~ABSTRACT~~
INDEX
IP/FIS
IP/RI
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REQ TO:
~~IP/FILES~~ ~~FOR FILES~~
WH/3 ✓

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCW-10041

DATE
1 AUG 1973

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-300985

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/V	Laura Cooley	bw (30 July 1973)	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/3/V		Thomas Doolittle

Distribution:
1 - IP
1 - Chrono

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	31 JUL 1973	for Philip [illegible] Richard L. Conolly

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19475	17 July 73				

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WKScarlet-3		

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

3. From a negative point of view, WKNUGGET coverage of the home phone of WKSCARLET-3 was useful in that it did not reveal any indications that he was involved in narcotics trafficking. Since he also successfully passed his SGSWIRL, and satisfied the Station in a debriefing that he was not trafficking in narcotics, the WKNUGGET coverage of WKSCARLET-3 was discontinued.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201-

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
8-66

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-48)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA - 19452					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION		
SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
wk scarlet - 3	3/7/73	

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

7. WKSCARLET-3

WKSCARLET-3 continued his normal rate of production during this period. The questions regarding his "irregular [illegible] activities and contacts" were resolved through confrontation and a successful SGSWIRL.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201-			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

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(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HVCA-19470					

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WKScarlet-3	3/7/73	

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

14. As Headquarters is already aware, WKSCARLET-3 passed his SGSWIRL with flying colors on 8 May. Based on the SGSWIRL and his earlier debriefing concerning his alleged involvement in narcotics, it seems that WKSCARLET-3 was only guilty of having the wrong kind of friends. LNAGON Caracas was advised on 15 May regarding our conclusions based upon the debriefing and SGSWIRL of WKSCARLET-3. LNAGON Caracas agreed with our conclusions and now regards the case as being closed. WKSCARLET-3 agreed, and we so advised LNAGON, that WKSCARLET-3 would help out with narcotics leads he might come across. We told LNAGON that such assistance would only be on an ad hoc basis subject to our other priorities as well as WKSCARLET-3's security.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201-			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

SECRET

TO : WH/3/V

29 June 1973

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: WKSCARLET/3 - IDENTITY A
201-300985

IRD# 72501

BACKGROUND:

Subject of this report is a KMSTONE born citizen of IDEN B who has permanent resident alien status in WODUAL. Subject was granted a renewed OA on 17 July 1972 and he was last SGSWIRLed on 3 November 1971 with favorable results. Subject estimated that he has been SGSWIRLed approximately ten times by BKHERALD and two or three additional times by the WODUAL Army.

PURPOSE AND PROCEDURE:

On 8 May 1973, in IDEN C, Subject was again SGSWIRLed at the request of his Case Officer, Gabriel J. LABRENZ. The session was conducted in order to determine if Subject has ever been involved in the illegal drug traffic as alleged by a LNAGON source and also whether Subject knows anyone involved in the illegal drug business. Subject has a good command of the English language and the entire session was conducted in English. All of the test questions were coordinated with LABRENZ in advance and he remained in an adjoining room within hearing range. This examiner was introduced to Subject as Bill JOHNSON from WODUAL.

RESULTS:

No indications of deception.

SGSWIRL results supported Subject in his contentions as follows:

1. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has not used drugs for non-medicinal reasons.
2. that, excluding IDEN D, he is not acquainted with anyone who he knows is involved in the illegal drug traffic. (See DETAILS for those he "suspects.")

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3. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has never received money or been involved in the sale, purchase, or smuggling of drugs.

4. that, excluding what he told us (See DETAILS), he has never been asked to participate in the illegal drug traffic.

DETAILS:

During the pre-test discussion, Subject stated that he personally has smoked marijuana on three or four occasions and he has sniffed cocaine on approximately five occasions in the past ten years. Subject asserted that on each occasion, he was attending social gatherings with KMSTONE friends and he felt socially compelled to indulge in order to please the other participants. He estimated that he knows approximately thirty-five people who use cocaine or marijuana. Subject asserted that his last use of cocaine was last month when he visited WODUAL. SGSWIRL supported Subject's claim that his personal use of drugs has not been more extensive.

During the pre-test discussion, Subject asserted that he was not acquainted with anyone who he knew for certain was involved in drug trafficking. Subject did list the following IDENS when asked if he knew anyone who he "suspected" was involved in trafficking drugs: IDENS D, E, F, G, H and I. Subject asserted that his suspicions were based on rumor and these people have never talked to him about illegal drugs. After recording reactions to the test question, "Are you concealing the identity of anyone who you know is involved in the sale or smuggling of drugs?" (Ans. No), Subject acknowledged that his concern for the question was due to the fact that he more than merely "suspected" IDEN D was involved and he was "90% certain."

During the pre-test discussion, Subject stated that in 1954 or 1955, while in KMSTONE, he and a friend sold a non-dangerous drug to a buyer who believed it to be cocaine. Subject asserted that he made $25.00 from this transaction. Also, while in KMSTONE at the same time, Subject stated that a friend, IDEN J, asked him if he wished to participate in the smuggling of cocaine out of Peru. Subject advised that he declined the offer. As previously noted, SGSWIRL results supported Subject's contentions that his involvement with dangerous drugs has not been more extensive.

John M. Sandels

Distribution:
Orig. - Jones, Dempsey, Gaynor
1 - Dempsey
1 - CI/OA
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AGENCY MESSAGE

T 266131 PAGE 01-01 IN 928984

TOR:242208Z MAY 73 CARA 22054

S E C R E T 242145Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 22054

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, OTTAWA INFO WH/MIAMI.

REAM SLALARM WKSCARLET WKRALLY

REFS: A. OCOA-17700

B. CARACAS 21985 (IN 920774)

C. DIRECTOR 413095

1. REGRET WKSCARLET-9 TRIP TRECA SEMINAR CANCELED BY WKSCARLET-1 DUE LACK WKSCARLET INTEREST.

2. IDEA FOR TRIP GENERATED BY IDEN REF B WHO, ACCORDING WKSCARLET-9, EITHER WANTED FREE TRIP NORTH OR WAS REQUESTED BY GOVERNMENT PARTY, COPEI, TO ATTEND. IF LATTER THE CASE, WKSCARLET-9 SPECULATES THAT COPEI WANTED REPRESENTATIVE AT SEMINAR BUT DID NOT WANT EXPEND PARTY FUNDS FOR TRIP.

3. FILE 201-901757 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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T 250757 PAGE 01-01 IN 926079

TOR:2217202 MAY 73 CARA 22021

S E C R E T 221510Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 22021

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WHMIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 410692

1. LNAGON CARACAS ACCEPTED RESULTS OUR DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL. LNAGON SAIC STATED WOULD CABLE HIS HQS AND MIAMI OFFICE THAT AS FAR AS CARACAS CONCERNED CASE AGAINST WKSCARLET-3 NOW CLOSED.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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WH 3

201-0300985

22 MAY 73

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE TIME GROUP: 181922Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 410692

CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/NARC 2, C/FI,
DISSEM BY: 38
PER: SCP# 103

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0 RETURN TO WH/3/V
0 IP FILES

TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT 0 MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 21885 (IN 909807)

B. CARACAS 21919 (IN 913409)

C. DIRECTOR 407370

1. IN 17 MAY MEETING WE GAVE LNAGON HQS OFFICERS GIST REFS A AND B. THEY APPEARED ON SURFACE ACCEPT OUR REASONING FOR BELIEVING WKSCARLET-3 NOT INVOLVED NARCOTICS ACTBIVITBY AND REQUESTED WE SEND GIST REFS A AND B TO THEM OFFICIALLY, WHICH WE DOING.

2. PLEASE ADVISE REACTION OF LNAGON CARACAS TO RESULTS OF WKSCARLET-3 DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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WH/3/V

REFA- RESULTS OF DEBRIEFING OF WKSCARLET-3 ABOUT HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.
REF B- WKSCARLET-3 UNDERWBENT SGSWIRL 8 MAY 73 WITH NO INDICATIONS OF DECEPTION.
REF C- AGREEMENT OF HDQS FOR CONTINUED USE OF WKSCARLET-3 AS A UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF WKSCARLET. LNAGON SHOULD BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS OF HIS DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL AND BE CONVINCED OF HIS NON-INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

RECORD COPY

DATE: 18 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535/5126

AC/WH/NARC
DDO/NARCOG S. Caldwell
C/WH/COG
C/WH/FI ✓
COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-0300985
18 MAY 73

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION # 627

INFO RF. FILE. VR. IP/AN, FI, CI/OPS

T 250239 PAGE 01-01 IN 923076

~~TOR:1820422 MAY 73~~ ~~WMIM 18537~~

S E C R E T 181717Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 18537

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

KMSTONE

REF: CARACAS 21985 (IN 920774) NR

1. NEITHER STATION NOR SLIGOS HAVE ANY INFO ON INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS CUBANS. DEFER TO HQS FOR ANY RQMS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

AN
AB

RECORD COPY

18 May 73

201-300985

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE 14-1

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
162231Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
409708

CONF. WH 8 INFO: FILE RIAN c/so CCS2

DISSEM BY: 33

PER ____ #________

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ________
0 IP FILES

TO: CARACAS

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21938 (IN 916111)

1. REVALIDATED PERMITS FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE BEING POUCHED 18 MAY 73.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. #

REF - ASKS FOR STATUS REEEPORT ON REVALIDATION OF "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS WIFE.

AN
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W-H/3/V

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201-0300985
16 MAY 73

DATE: 16 MAY 73
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Philip Freeman
for C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

4-00000

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division 11 May 1973
ATTEN : Bob Weatherwax, WH/3/V
FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (A 12 419 708)
Nieves Elina Gonzalez de POSADA (A 12 443 942)
REFERENCE: Your request for Reentry Permit dated ________ 19__.

Reentry Permits ~~was~~ were issued for subjects ~~on~~ 21 April 1972, and ~~is~~ have been extended /valid to 20 April 1974. The Permit may be used for unlimited entries into the United States during validity. ~~Validity of Permit may be extended for a maximum period of twelve (12) months only. Extension of validity of Permit must be made on the attached, "Application for Extension of Permit to Reenter the United States," (I&NS Form I-145). In certain foreign areas U. S. Consuls and U. S. Immigration Officers are authorized to extend the validity date. [illegible] where security or cover considerations warrant, the Permit [illegible] tion should be forwarded to Alien Affairs Staff in order to have the validity date extended through cleared liaison with Immigration and Naturalization Service.~~

THIS [illegible]

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

Louis Wiencke
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

Attachment.

Receipt acknowledged for Permits #0375384 and 0375385 :

____
Signature Date

OS/AAS/EStark 11 May 1973

File 201-300985
([illegible])

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
1023482

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
407370

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, C/IPAN, C/CI, C/NARC2 C/FI

DISSEM BY: 27/28

PER # 163

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO. WH/3/V

0 IP FILED

TO: CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. CARACAS 21885 (IN 909807)

B. CARACAS 21919 (IN 913409)

1. AGREE THAT STATION SHOULD CONTINUE USE WKSCARLET-3 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF WKSCARLET ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, IT IMPERATIVE TO PROTECTION BKHERALD POSITION IN THIS MATTER THAT LNAGON BE ADVISED OF RESULTS DEBRIEFING AND SGSWIRL AND BE CONVINCED OF ~~[illegible]~~ W-3'S PERSONAL NON-INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. ADDITIONALLY, ~~[illegible]~~ URGE THAT STATION ~~[illegible]~~ REMAIN ALERT TO ANY FUTURE INDICATIONS THAT WKSCARLET-3 IS IN ANY WAY PARTICIPATING IN THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY.

RECORD COPY

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2. FILE 2001-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF A REPORTS THE RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING OF WKSCARLET-3 ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTICS.

REF B SAYS THAT WKSCARLET-3 UNDERWENT AN SGSWIRL ON 8 MAY 1973 WITH NO INDICATIONS OF DECEPTION. HE WAS EXAMINED IN REGARD TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS, HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NARCOTICS TRADE AND HIS ASSOCIATION WITH NARCOTICS PERSONALITIES MENTIONED IN BKHERALD AND LNAGON INVESTIGATIONS OF HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES.

201-0300985
10 MAY 1973

DATE: 10 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535/5126

C/WH/FI
AC/WH/NARC
C/WH/COG
DDO/NARCOG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

H.J.W. Natzke
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 225643 PAGE 01 IN 913409

TOR:091606Z MAY 73 CARA 21919

S E C R E T 091525Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21919

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. CARACAS 21885 (IN 909807)

B. DIRECTOR 399617

C. CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

1. WKSCARLET-3 UNDERWENT SGSWIRL 8 MAY 73 WITH NO INDICATIONS DECEPTION. EXAMINED HIS KNOWLEDGE OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS, POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT NARCOTICS TRADE AND ASSOCIATION NARCOTICS PERSONALITIES MENTIONED OUR AND LNAGON INVESTIGATION HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES. EXAMINATION FACILITATED THROUGH WKSCARLET-3'S OWN WRITTEN REPORTS ON NARCOTICS-LINKED PERSONALITIES AND HIS OBVIOUS EFFORT BE FRANK AND FORTHCOMING ON ALL SUBJECTS RAISED.

2. GIVEN RESULTS SGSWIRL AND DEBRIEFINGS, STATION REASONABLY CONVINCED WKSCARLET-3 INNOCENT NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT. BELIEVE ALSO CAN CONVINCE LNAGON HIS INNOCENCE. PENDING ANY NEW EVIDENCE HE IS IN FACT INVOLVED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, DESIRE CONTINUE WKSCARLET-3 AS UNILATERAL PENE-

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201-0300985
09 MAY 73

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T 225643 PAGE 02-02 IN 913409

TOR:091696Z MAY 73 CARA 21919

TRATION WKSCARLET ORGANIZATION.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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T 216872 PAGE 01 IN 909807

TOR:051426Z MAY 73 CARA 21885 C

S E C R E T 051330Z MAY 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21885

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT MHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET REFS A. DIRECTOR 399617

B. CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

1. AS SUGGESTED REFERENCE A, GABRIEL J. LABRENZ AND WILFRED O. CLOWER MET WKSCARLET-3 NIGHT OF 2 MAY IN TWO HOUR CONFRONTATION WHICH IN REALITY WAS DEBRIEFING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH ALLEGED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. DURING MEETING WKSCARLET-3 VERY FORTHCOMING, FRANK AND CONVINCING IN HIS DENIAL OF BEING INVOLVED NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. AT END DEBRIEFING AGREED TO BE SOSWIRLED DURING WEEK BEGINNING 6 MAY.

2. BEGIN DEBRIEFING HIS ASSOCIATION WITH HEMBERTO TRUEVA, WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE INTRODUCED TRUEVA THROUGH HIS CASUAL ASSOCIATION WITH JOSE GOMEZ. (GOMEZ IS LNAGON MIAMI SOURCE WHO CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE LESS THAN RELIABLE). GOMEZ ORIGINALLY MET WKSCARLET-3 THROUGH THEIR MUTUAL FRIEND RAMON ESCARDA RUBIO AKA MONGO. (ESCARDA IS PETTY

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201-0300985
05 MAY 73

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T 216872 PAGE 02 IN 989887

TOR:051426Z MAY 73 CARA 21885

CROOK WHO ALWAYS TRYING MAKE A "DEAL" WHICH USUALLY TURNS OUT TO BE SHADY). WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE MET TRUEVA ONE TIME AT HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA AND HAS NOT SEEN OR HEARD FROM HIM SINCE. NO BUSINESS OF ANY KIND DISCUSSED. THEY SIMPLY HAD A FEW DRINKS AND SPOKE OF MUTUAL CUBAN FRIENDS. (IT AT CLUB AMERICANA WHERE LNAGON SURVEILLANCE TEAM SPOTTED WKSCARLET-3 MEETING TRUEVA, GOMEZ AND FREDDI MANUAL BALBOA SOLIDES.)

4. BALBOA WAS UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL, WHO LATER IDENTIFIED BY WKSCARLET-2 FROM PHOTOGRAPH. BALBOA WORKS AS CHIEF, RETEN DE LA VEGA PRISON. DURING 2 MAY MEETING WKSCARLET-3 ADMITTED MEETING BALBOA, BUT COULDN'T REMEMBER NAME ONLY THAT HE WORKED FOR DR. LUGO LUGO, WHIEF OF THE PREFECTURA, WHOSE COMMAND INCLUDES THE RETEN DE LA VEGA PRISON.

5. WKSCARLET-3 WAS THEN ASKED RETELL HIS TRIP TO MIAMI VIA PUERTO RICO. THIS HE DID AND WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS MIRRORED THE TWO LNAGON SURVEILLANCE REPORTS IN STATION HANDS. EXCEPTIONS WERE THE MEETING OF ANDRES PURRINOS IN MIAMI AND JOAQUIN CASONA IN

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PUERTO RICO. WKSCARLET-3 KNOWS PURRINOS BY THE NAME OF DOMINGO ABREU, WHO HE MET IN VENEZUELA ONE YEAR AGO AND WHO IS CASUAL FRIEND SHARING MUTUAL INTEREST IN HUNTING AND FISHING. CASONA HE MET AS "EL GALLO", ON ONE BRIEF OCCASION. (STATION COMMENT: WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES IT WAS EL GALLO WHO ALERTED MIAMI AS TO ARRIVAL DATE AND TIME OF OUR AGENT.) WKSCARLET-3 CONSIDERS EL GALLO AS PETTY CROOK WHO WOULD SELL OWN MOTHER IF PRICE RIGHT.

6. IN MIAMI WKSCARLET-3 MET DOMINGO ABREU, RONALD CONDOM-GIL, SILA CUERVO AND RAIMONDO TORRES. HE CATEGORICALLY DENIES SUBJECT OF NARCOTICS EVER DISCUSSED WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS. DID HOWEVER, DISCUSS WITH ABREU AND CONDOM-GIL FACT HE BEING SURVEILLED. BOTH EXPRESSED LITTLE CONCERN ABOUT THIS SUBJECT.

7. STATION NOW LEANING TOWARD BELIEF WKSCARLET-3 VICTIM OF HAVING WRONG KIND OF FRIENDS. IF SGSWIRL SUPPORTS HIS DENIALS, STATION TENTATIVELY BELIEVES EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE CONTINUE HIS USE AS BKHERALD ASSET UNTIL AND UNLESS THERE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE HE INVOLVED IN DRUGS. IF

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T 216872 PAGE 04-04 IN 989887

TOR:0514262 MAY 73 CARA 21885

SGSWIRL NEGATIVE AND HEADQUARTERS AGREES BELIEVE WE COULD SATISFY LNAGON WITH THIS RATIONALE.

8. FILE: 201-380985 E2 IMPDET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 022337Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 403768

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/KPIM, C/CI, D/SCOUR 4, C/CCS 2,

DISSEM BY: 38

PER #

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TO: CARACAS.

RYBAT D UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 401972 (*)

1. SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 AT 2005 HOURS ON PAA 217. NO NEED ~~TO~~ MEET. PLEASE ARRANGE ~~MAKE~~ MODERATE ACCOMMODATIONS AT HOTEL NEAR LNFALL AND ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

LN RJ
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* SAYS SGSWIRL EXAMINER PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 FOR PERIOD OF TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. ALSO SAYS HEADQUARTERS WILL ADVISE TRAVEL DATA IN SEPARATE CABLE.

6

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 5126; 1535

WH/Sec [illegible] 2 MAY 73 201-0300985

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

Philip F. [illegible]
for RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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ACTION # 771

T 198010 PAGE 01-01 IN 902476

PRECEDENCE TOR:2715402 APR 73 CARA 21810

S E C R E T 2715402 APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21810

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS A. DIRECTOR 400956

B. CARACAS 21803 (IN 901669)

1. WKSCARLET-3 CONFRONTATION SCHEDULED FOR WEEK BEGINNING 29 APRIL. DEPENDING ON OUTCOME, SGSWIRL EXAMINER MAY OR MAY NOT BE NEEDED. IN ADDITION, MEETING WITH WKSCALE-3 PROBABLY DELAYED UNTIL AFTER 7 MAY AND SGSWIRL NOT NEEDED FOR HIM UNTIL AFTER THAT DATE. IF EXAMINER SCHEDULE PERMITS, REQUEST DELAY HIS ARRIVAL CARACAS UNTIL 7 MAY.

2. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

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27 APR 1973

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 272334Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 401972

CONF: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE C/WH/AN. C/CI. D/SECURITY DDO/DO.

DISSEM BY: 78

PER ___ # ___

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT O UKRALLY UKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21810 |IN 902476|

1. SGSWIRL EXAMINER PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 7 MAY 73 FOR PERIOD TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS. WILL ADVISE TRAVEL ~~ITINERARY~~ DATA IN SEPARATE CABLE.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. H.

REF - REQUESTS SGSWIRL EXAMINER WHO WILL HANDLE UKSCARLET-3 AND UKSCALE-3 CASES TO DELAY HIS ARRIVAL IN CARACAS UNTIL 7 MAY 73.

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

AN CJ	
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WH/3/V	

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DATE: 27 APRIL 73

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX

UNIT: WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

201-0300985

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

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DATE-TIME GROUP: 252357Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 400956

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE E/IPLAN C/CI D/SECUR 4 C/CCS 2

DISSEM BY: 43

PER ___ # ______

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS

RYBAT D UKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 397601

B. DIRECTOR 399617

1. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY, SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN PLANS ARRIVE CARACAS 30 APRIL 73 AT ~~000~~ 2005 HOURS ON PAA 217. PLEASE ARRANGE MODERATE ACCOMMODATIONS AT HOTEL NEAR LNFALL AND ADVISE PRIOR COB 27 APRIL.

2. FILE ~~0~~62201-0300985. E2 IMPDET. d.

REF A - ASKS WHEN A SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE IN CARACAS TO HANDLE THE EXAMINATION OF WKSCARLET-3 AND ANY OTHER STATION SGSWIRL REQUIREMENTS THAT TIME WILL PERMIT.

REF B - ASKS AGAIN WHEN THE SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE IN CARACAS.

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

WH/Sec Mr. Sullivan telecoord

AN LJ
AB X
IN
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DES NFD
SI
WH/3/V

DATE: 25 APR 73
ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: ~~0000~~ 1535

25 APR 1973

201-0300985

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EXT.	7271/1535
DATE	20 APRIL 1973

ROUTING

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CONF: WH-14

INFO: SA 3, SA/PEG, SA/PROP, DDO/DO, FI 5, IW, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, SOD, FR 4.

TDFIR-314/03534-73

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 20 APRIL 1973

PRECEDENCE: ☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
HVC-6680 CARACAS 21745
(IN 893854)
WKOMEGA (WKOMEGA-7)
(F.C. PARA 1 WKNOBLE/
LIAISON: * WKNOBLE8-12

DISSEMINATION

WH/REG	1	WH/3/V	7
WH/CA	1	WH/CARA	2
WH/FI	1		
WH/RR	1		
WH/3/R	1		

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21 APR 73 03 482

CORRECTION TAPE USED ON FORM 1K-2

CL BY: MICHAEL C. CHOADEN

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: Alton Blutight
C/WH/3/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S):

RELEASING OFFICER: Robert H
C/WH/RR

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File: WKSCARLET-3

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Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 893854

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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SECRET

CITE TDFIR-314/03534-73

DIST 20 APRIL 1973

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

DOI MID-APRIL 1973

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN MILITARY REACTION TO THE VOTING MACHINE SCANDAL

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (16 APRIL 1973) FIELD NO. HVC-6680

SOURCE

A SENIOR VENEZUELAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS A LEADING ARMY COMMANDING OFFICER. HE IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE. THE FOLLOWING IS HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT.

1. ALTHOUGH THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CURRENT WIDELY PUBLICIZED SCANDAL OVER ALLEGED BRIBING OF VENEZUELAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY LEADERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONTRACT FOR VOTING MACHINES FOR THE DECEMBER 1973 ELECTION, NO ACTION OF ANY KIND IS CONTEMPLATED IN THIS CONNECTION. THE EXPOSE IS LOOKED UPON BY THE MILITARY AS JUST ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF HOW THE POLITICIANS HAVE FAILED THE PEOPLE. WHILE

2
1

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

MOST MILITARY OFFICERS DO NOT DOUBT THAT BRIBES WERE INVOLVED, AND POSSIBLY TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN AS YET ANNOUNCED. FEW THINK THAT THE GOVERNING SOCIAL CHRISTIAN (COPEI) PARTY IS IMPLICATED BECAUSE IT OPPOSED THE PURCHASE OF THE MACHINES. THERE IS EXTENSIVE MILITARY COMPLAINING ABOUT AND DISCUSSION OF THE SCANDAL BUT THIS IS CONFINED TO CONVERSATIONS WITH FELLOW OFFICERS, FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES. IN GENERAL, THE MILITARY BELIEVES THE VOTING MACHINE CONTROVERSY IS OUTSIDE ITS PROVINCE AND CONCERN, AND THERE IS NO INCLINATION TOWARD MILITARY INTERFERENCE. (FIELD COMMENT: CARACAS EMBASSY TELEGRAM 3155 OF 12 APRIL GIVES FULL BACKGROUND ON THE VOTING MACHINE CONTROVERSY. INDEPENDENT SOURCES OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY HAVE REPORTED THAT BOTH COPEI AND THE MAJOR OPPOSITION DEMOCRATIC ACTION (AD) PARTY ARE WORRIED ABOUT MILITARY REACTION TO THE SCANDAL.)

2. (FIELD COMMENT: THE EMBASSY COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS: FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER MARTIN GARCIA VILLASMIL AND SOME NON-AD/COPEI POLITICIANS HAVE CLAIMED THERE IS SERIOUS PREOCCUPATION AMONG THE MILITARY OVER THE VOTING MACHINE SCANDAL, BUT INFORMATION FROM MILITARY SOURCES LEADS

IN 893854

TDFIR-314/03534-73

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE EMBASSY TO AGREE WITH THIS REPORT THAT THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT PARTICULARLY UPSET BY THE MATTER.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT AT CARACAS.

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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DATE TIME GROUP: 211836Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 399612

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE DDC, ADDO, D/IP/AN, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/FI.

DISSEM BY: 13

PER: 103

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS UKRALLY UKSCARLET REPLY TO

REF: CARACAS 21753 (IN 895109)

AN K.O
AB X
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FI
UN/3N

1. CONCUR WITH REF PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION OF UKSCARLET-3 WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. RE PARA 2C, FEEL ONE OF OUR STRONGEST CARDS IN SECURING UKSCARLET-3'S COOPERATION ON THIS MATTER IS IMPLIED THREAT OF OUR REPORTING HIS NARCOTICS INVOLVEMENT TO GOV AND POSSIBLE RESULTANT LOSS HIS UKSCARLET JOB. RECOGNIZE PROBLEM OF PERHAPS PROVOKING VIOLENT REACTION BY APPLYING TOO MUCH PRESSURE BUT IF WE DON'T USE THIS THREAT, BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE WEAK HAND INDEED. ALSO, SUGGEST THAT U-3'S CASE OFFICER BE ACCOMPANIED TO MEETING BY SECOND OFFICER. FEEL THAT PRESENCE OF SECOND OFFICER AS WITNESS WILL INDICATE TO UKSCARLET-3 SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM AND ALSO WILL SERVE AS INHIBITION, SHOULD HE BE TEMPTED RESORT TO PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. GOOD CANDIDATE FOR THIS ROLE WOULD BE YOUR FORTHCOMING VISITOR, ROBERT F. STONTWIST. IF FOR SOME REASON STATION PREFERS NOT USE STONTWIST, SUGGEST WILFRED O. CLOWER, WHO DUE TO LEAVE CARACAS PCS THIS SUMMER.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-300985

21 APR 1973

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 064566

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE TIME GROUP May 10 4 44 PM '73

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

39447

DISSEM BY:
PER #

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PLEASE ADVISE WHAT YOU PLAN TO DO.

2. ADDITIONALLY, IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, ~~URGE~~ STATION SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF UKSCARLET-3, AS NATURALIZED VENEZUELAN CITIZEN, GOING TO UKSCARLET-1, OR OTHER INFLUENTIAL GOV OFFICIAL AFTER CONFRONTATION, SAYING BKHERALD "BELIEVES" HE HAS BEEN WORKING AS PENETRATION OF UKSCARLET BUT HE REALLY HAS NOT (OR SOME VARIATION THIS THEME); AND TELLING UKSCARLET-1 THAT NOW BKHERALD ACCUSING HIM OF BEING INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES TO COERCE HIM INTO GREATER COLLABORATION. ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THIS MAY BE REMOTE POSSIBILITY, URGE ~~XX~~ STATION TO ~~THINK ABOUT IT AND~~ MAKE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR POSSIBLE BLOWBACK OF THIS TYPE. ~~WE KNOW THAT UKSCARLET-1 HOLDS UKSCARLET-3 IN HIGH REGARD BUT AT THIS POINT CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON HIS REACTION TO SUCH A STORY BY UKSCARLET-3.~~

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN SGSWIRL EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE CARACAS.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

REF - OUTLINES THE CARACAS STATION'S PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION WITH UKSCARLET-3.

DATE: 20 APR 73
ORIG: R.J.WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 16535

C/WH/NARC
C/WH/4
C/WH/COG
DDO/NARCOG
C/WH/FI

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION #: 029

INFO: RF. FILE. VR. DDC, DDO, cl/ops, cl/cl, cl/ops/c2, cl/FI.

T 183902 PAGE 01 IN 896501

TOR:202343Z APR 73 WNIN 18287

AN INDEX / AB / IN / FI / BY / DES UFD / FI / WH/3/V

3P

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 21 1973
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 202047Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 18287

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES.

HVC HAD

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871)

1. FOLLOWING ARE STATION AND SLIGO TRACES SUBJECTS REF:

1. A DOMINGO OBRERO: NO STATION TRACES.

PROBABLY IDEN WITH SUBJECT OF 201-300943

B. SYLA CUERVO: PROBABLY IDEN WITH SYLA ROGUE CUERVO CASTILLO, DPOB 29 OCT 1920, SAN LUIS, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. HE IS LAWYER AND WORKED FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF LABOR 1945-57: AT NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPS 1959-60. HE WAS MEMBER OF 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN CUBA AND IN NOV 59 WAS DESCRIBED BY CUBAN PRESS AS INTERVENTOR OF HAVANA METROPOLITAN BUSES. SUBJ ARRIVED IN U.S. APRIL 61. IN MIAMI HE BECAME MEMBER OF BAY OF PIGS FORCE, AND HAS BELONGED TO OTHER ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, LNERGO REPORTED IN OCT 64 THAT HE POSSIBLY A LEADER OF GROUP ACCUSED OF ANTI-U.S., PRO-NAZI, PRO-SOCIALIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST STATEMENTS.

201-300943 <TRACE REPLY: POSSIBLY LEADER OF ANTI-U.S. GROUP>

FR

AN / AB / UFD / WH/3/V

C. "GUAJIRO" TORRES: PROBABLY IDEN WITH RAIMUNDO BRUNO TORRES REYMON, DPOB 6 OCT 21, CANAJUANI, LAS →

PROB IDEN WITH

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RECORD COPY

21 Apr 73
201-300985
~~201-300943~~
300935

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VILLAS PROVINCE, CUBA. HE WAS SELF-EMPLOYED AUTOMOBILE SALESMAN IN HAVANA UNTIL AUGUST 64. ARRIVED U.S. NOV. 64, AND WAS DEBRIEFED BY STATION AT THREE MEETINGS FOR INFO ON PERSONALITIES OF INTEREST. HE WAS ACTIVE IN ANTI-CASTRO EXILE ORGANIZATION, MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECUPERATION (MRR), HEADED BY MANUEL ARTIME. PER REFUGEE SOURCE, TORRES WAS LIVING IN MIAMI 1965, BUT RESIDED CARACAS MAY 70. AS OF MAY 72, HE WORKED IN MASSAGE ROOM OF FOUR AMBASSADORS HOTEL. INFO FROM 1969 INDICATED HE KNOWN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER. HE WAS ON IRS LIST FROM MID-72 OF PERSONS TO BE INDICTED FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

CIT CUBA

N0531 DPOB 3 APR 40, CUBA, HAVANA

(201-290322)

D. RONALD CONDON-GIL, WITH HIS BROTHER FRANCISCO, CONDON-GIL WAS ARRESTED EARLY MARCH 73 FRO COCAINE TRAFFICKING. THEY RECEIVED COCAINE FROM PERUVIAN CONTACT, HILDA L A N D E O, WHO SERVING 10 YEAR SENTENCE ON SAME CHARGE. RONALD WAS BORN 3 APRIL 40, HAVANA. IN 1960, HE BELONGED TO RESCATE, ANTI-CASTRO GROUP OPERATING WITHIN CUBA. HE WAS ARRESTED 1961 AND SENTENCED TO SIX YEARS BY CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL, CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE AND POSSESSION EXPLOSIVES. ENTERED U.S. AT MIAMI ON 24 DEC 62 (ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCE, HE WAS RELEASED ALONG WITH ITS MEMBERS). FRANCISCO WAS TAKEN PRISONER

N0531

OF RONALD AND FRANCISCO CONDON GIL

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INFO: RF. FILE. VR.

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T 183922 PAGE 03-03 IN 896501

TOR:222343Z APR 73 WNIN 18267

DURING BAY OF PIGS, LATER RELEASED.

2. FILE: 201-2320985, E-2, IMPDET.

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	X	INDEX	
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S E C R E T

201-300943

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ACTION # 357

INFO: RF, FILE, VR DDO. ADDO. c/PAN c/Cl. c/h. c/NARC2.

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T 180174 PAGE 01 IN 895109

TOR:191628Z APR 73 CARA 21753

S E C R E T 191445Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21753

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 397601

1. HAVE CONSULTED WITH SAIC HERRING AND HE CONCURS CONFRONTATION.

2. STATION NOW PLANNING MEET WITH WKSCARLET-3 AFTER EASTER, AS HE SPENDING SEMANA SANTA AT THE BEACH WITH FAMILY. SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSION AS FOLLOWS:

A. WILL STATE HAVE RECEIVED SOME VERY DAMAGING ALLEGATIONS FROM LNAGON IN MIAMI. ALLEGATIONS CONCRN HIS CONTACTS WITH KNOWN DRUG TRAFFICKERS BOTH MIAMI AND CARACAS. NAMES OF TRAFFICKERS WILL BE GIVEN WKSCARLET-3. STATION OFFICER WILL THEN STATE THAT IF WKSCARLET-3 WILLING DISCUSS FULLY HIS ACQUAINTANCE THESE INDIVIDUALS, WE READY TO LISTEN. IF HE UNWILLING, HE WILL BE TOLD THAT BKWERALD CANNOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUSPECTED DRUG TRAFFICKER AND THAT THIS NOW

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201-300985

19 APR 1973

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T 100174 PAGE 02 IN 895109

TOR:191628Z APR 73 CARA 21753

HAS BECOME TERNINATION MEETING.

B. STATION WILL ONLY REVEAL NAMES HIS DRUG CONTACTS IN ORDER NOT INFORM WKSCARLET-3 EXTENT OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS ACTIVITIES. THIS WILL PRECLUDE HIS PUMPING STATION OFFICER OUR KNOWLEDGE OF HIM AND HIS CONTACTS. THUS, WKSCARLET-3 MUST TELL US WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW, AND PERHAPS, SOMETHING OF WHICH WE DO NOT KNOW.

C. IN ADDITION, STATION OFFICER WILL PREFACE DISCUSSION WITH OUTLINE STATION POSITION CONCERNING WKSCARLET-3'S ALLEGED ACTIVITIES. BRIEFLY, THIS WILL BE A STATEMENT THAT BKHERALD NOT IN ENFORCEMENT BUSINESS AND THAT WE IN NO POSITION INFORM WKSCARLET-1 THAT HIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN BKHERALD AGENT. THUS, IF WKSCARLET-3 UNWILLING TO TALK, HE CAN WALK OUT OF SAFE HOUSE A RELATIVELY FREE MAN. HE MUST, OF COURSE, REALIZE THAT THIS POSITION DOESN'T PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER POLICE SERVICE MAY HAVE SUFFICIENT INFO TO ARREST HIM. THIS STATEMENT AND THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS EVOLVED BETWEEN THE

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T 180174 PAGE 03-03 IN 895109

TOR:191628Z APR 73 CARA 21753

CASE OFFICER AND WKSCARLET-3, SHOULD KEEP THE LATTER FROM USING HIS ALWAYS PRESENT .45 ON THE FORMER.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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T 174449 PAGE 01-01 IN 892900

TOR:171909Z APR 73 CARA 21730

S E C R E T 171655Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21730

TO: DIRECTOR.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 393224

1. POUCHING 18 APRIL BY TM 275565 FORMS FILLED OUT BY WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE, ALSO MONEY PAY REVALIDATION FEE. AS AGENT DID NOT RETURN CARACAS UNTIL 14 APRIL, WE UNABLE POUCH COMPLETED FORMS EARLIER.

2. ALTHOUGH STATION ASSISTING RENEWAL, WE PLAN RETAIN REVALIDATED PERMITS PENDING OUTCOME INVESTIGATION INTO AGENT'S ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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201-0300985

17 APR 73

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 172337Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 397601

CONF: c/wH6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, c/plan, c/cl, c/NARC 2, c/FI,

DISSEM BY: 36/21
PER SCP# 103

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT 0 PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: A. CARACAS 21703 (IN 890115*)

B. CARACAS 21722 (IN 891871**)

1. B CONCUR WITH REF B PLAN FOR CONFRONTATION OF WKSCARLET-3. HOWEVER, AFTER CONSULTING WITH SAIC HERRING AND PRIOR TO CONFRONTATION, PLEASE CABLE OUTLINE OF INFORMATION THAT WILL BE USED IN CONFRONTATION. WE WILL REVIEW AND FORWARD ANY COMMENTS WE FEEL WILL ASSIST THE STATION IN THIS DELICATE OPERATION.

2. SGSWIRL EXAMINER MARK D. STEMERMAN (IDEN FOR CARACAS) WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 30 APRIL - 13 MAY 73 TO HANDLE WKSCARLET-3 AND ANY OTHER STATION SGSWIRL REQUIREMENTS THAT TIME WILL PERMIT. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST DATE EXAMINER SHOULD ARRIVE. B

3. FILE 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET.H

*PROPOSES CARACAS STATION TERMINATE WKSCARLET-3 WITHOUT CONFRONTATION OVER HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.

(CONTINUED)

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201-0300985
17 APR 73

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397601

**SAYS UKSCARLET-3 RETURNED TO CARACAS ON 13 APRIL 73 AND TOLD HIS CASE OFFICER ON 14 APRIL 73 THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER SURVEILLANCE IN MIAMI. ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THIS "INVESTIGATION" (SURVEILLANCE) OF UKSCARLET-3 CAN BE USED AS A PEG TO CONFRONT HIM WITH THE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE IS INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS.

C/WH/NARC E. ANDERSON (IN DRAFT)

C/WH/4

C/WH/COG

DDO/NARCOG

OS/IRD HARRY A. KINNEY (TELECOORD)

DATE: 17 APR 73

ORIG: R. WEATHERWAX

UNIT: AC/WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
RELEASING OFFICER C/WHD

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER C/WH/3

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 172337Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 397602

CONF: c/wh6 INFO: FILE DDO, ADDO, c/ciops, c/ci, c/narc 2, c/fi,

DISSEM BY: 56/721
PER: SOP# 103

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: DIRECTOR 397601

TO DIR 397601
IDEN: JOHN M. SANDELS. E2 IMPDET.H

B

C/WH/NARC E. ANDERSON (IN DRAFT)
C/WH/4
C/WH/COG
DDO/NARCOG ✓

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WH/3/V

DATE: 27 APR 73
ORIG: R. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: AC/WH/3/V
EXT: 1535

201-0300985
17 APR 73

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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T 172827 PAGE 01 IN 891871

TOR:1622542 APR 73 CARA 21722 K

S E C R E T 162235Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21722

TO: DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMAHBYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET-3 SURVEILLED

REF: CARACAS 21703 (IN 890115)

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1. WKSCRALET-3 RETURNED CARACAS FRIDAY 13 APRIL AND CONTACTED CASE OFFICER SAME DAY. SAFEHOUSE MEETING ARRANGED FOR FOLLOWING DAY. DURING MEETING WKSCARLET-3 MOST ANXIOUS DESCRIBE HIS LAYOVER MIAMI (9 TO 10 MARCH) DURING WHICH HE WAS TAILED FROM AIRPORT CUSTOM'S BAGGAGE INSPECTION TO HIS DEPARTURE TWENTY HOURS LATER. ACCORDING WKSCARLET-3, SURVEILLANCE DONE BY ONE PERSON WHO VERY OBVIOUS, SO MUCH SO THAT WKSCARLET-3 BELIEVES IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROVOCATION.

2. WKSCARLET-3 DISCUSSED HIS SURVEILLANCE WITH RONALD CONDON, MIAMI BAIL BONDSMAN AND BROTHER OF FRANK CONDON WHO CONNECTED WITH FRANK MATHEWS (SEE CARACAS 21428). IT ALSO POSSIBLE HE DISCUSSED "TAIL" WITH DOMINGO OBRERO (RUNS A NUMBERS BANK), SYLA CUERVO (GAS STATION OWNER), AND "GUAJIRO" TORRES (RUNS GYM AT FOUR AMBASSADORS HOTEL). WKSCARLET-3 MENTIONED NO OTHER

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T 172027 PAGE 02 IN 891871

TOR:162254Z APR 73 CARA 21722

NAMES (ACCORDING LNAGON REPORT OUTLINED CARACAS 21408 WKSCARLET-3 MET ANDRES PURRINOS, DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER).

3. WKSCARLET-3 STATED HE STILL AT LOSS EXPLAIN WHY HE TAILED IN MIAMI. FOR A TIME THOUGHT IT WAS C.I.A. SURVEILLANCE, BUT NOW BELIEVES THAT IT TOO UNPROFESSIONAL FOR THEIR WORK. HE SPECULATED DURING MEETING THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN WORK OF A MIAMI DETECTIVE AGENCY, BUT FOR WHAT PURPOSE HE DOES NOT KNOW. HE ONLY KNOWS THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE KNEW HE ARRIVING MIAMI 9 MARCH, AND HE HAD TO CALL MIAMI FRIENDS TO LET THEM KNOW HE IN TOWN.

4. CASE OFFICER FEIGNED SURPRISE DURING RECOUNTING OF EVENTS THEN STATED HE WOULD CABLE MIAMI AND REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE IN DISCOVERING WHY WKSCARLET-3 SURVEILLED. BELIEVE WE CAN USE THIS "INVESTIGATION" AS PEG TO CONFRONT WKSCARLET-3 WITH ALLEGATIONS HE INVOLVED NARCOTICS. CONFRONTATION COULD TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS WEEK 22 APRIL.

5. REF THINKING WAS STATION DID NOT WISH PREJUDICE LNAGON INVESTIGATION BY CONFRONTING WKSCARLET-3 PREMATURELY AND THEREFORE WE RECOMMENDED AN "AMICABLE" TERMINATION HOWEVER, FAULTY SURVEILLANCE MAY HAVE BLOWN WKSCARLET-3'S

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T 172027 PAGE 03-03 IN 091871

TOR:162254Z APR 73 CARA 21722

USEFULNESS TO HEMBERTO TRUEVA, ET AL, AND MAY HAVE PREJUDICED ENTIRE LNAGON CASE. THEREFORE, NOW BELIEVE HAVE NOTHING TO LOOSE BY CONFRONTING WKSCARLET AND CLEARING AIR OVER ALLEGATIONS. DEPENDING WKSCARLET-3 REACTION DURING CONFRONTATION: WOULD APPRECIATE SGSWIRL TDYER STANDING BY WEEK BEGINNING 29 APRIL.

6. HQS COMMENTS REQUESTED.

7. FOR WH/MIAMI: HAVE ONLY INFORMED LOCAL LNAGON WKSCARLET-3'S RETURN CARACAS: NOTHING PASSED CONCERNING MIAMI EVENTS. HOWEVER, PLAN CONSULT WITH SAIC HERRING PRIOR CONFRONTATION. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION AND SLIGO TRACES, OBRERO, CUERVO, TORRES AND CONDON.

8. FILE: 201-0300985. E2 IMPDET

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T 167268 PAGE 01 IN 890115

TOR:132218Z APR 73 CARA 21703

S E C R E T 132010Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21703

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF DIRECTOR 380299

1. TO RESOLVE WKSCARLET-3 SITUATION QUICKLY AND WITH LEAST RISK PREJUDICE LNAGON INVESTIGATION, STATION PROPOSES WE TERMINATE HIM WITHOUT CONFRONTATION OVER HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. SUGGEST WE TERMINATE HIM ON SOME PRETEXT WHICH WE WOULD TELL HIM WAS MATTER OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DOES NOT REFLECT ADVERSELY ON HIM, E.G. BKHERALD BUDGETARY/MANPOWER CUTS? IN THIS TERMINATION SCENARIO, WE WOULD MAKE TERMINATION AMIABLE, SAYING IT REGRETTABLE BUT UNAVOIDABLE, AND THEN TRY STEER CONVERSATION TOWARDS INDUCING HIM TO QUERY US AS TO POSSIBILITY HE WORKING FOR ANOTHER LNBUZZ AGENCY. WE WOULD BE RESPONSIVE SUCH A QUERY; AND SUGGEST FACT SINCE HE CUBAN, HE MIGHT BE ABLE DEVELOP INFO ON CUBANS WHO WELL KNOWN BE INVOLVED TRAFFICKING. IF HE BITES, WE

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SECRET

201-0300985
13 APR 73

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INFO RF. FILE. VR.

ACTION #

T 167268 PAGE 02 IN 898115

TOR:132218Z APR 73 CARA 21703

COULD SUGGEST REFEREING HIM TO LNAGON. IF HE DOESN'T BITE, NOTHING HAS BEEN LOST, AS WE WOULD NOT HAVE REVEALED OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES. THIS HAS ADVANTAGE OF SECERING OUR POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS RELATIONSHIP, NOT PREJUDICING LNAGON INVESTIGATION, AND GIVING HIM OPPORTUNITY VOLUTNEER BECOME LANGON SOURCE.

2. IN MEANTIME, WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE OUR INVESTIGATION HIS ACTIVITIES. ABSENCE WKSCARLET-3 FROM CARACAS HAS TEMPORARILY DRIED UP POTENTIAL LEADS BUT EXPECT THAT UPON HIS RETURN AND PRESUMED RESUMPTION NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES THAT MORE LEADS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE.

3. ASSUMING HQS AGREEABLE ABOVE, QUESTION CONFRONTATION BECOMES ACADEMIC. WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE NOT TO CONVINCE WKSCARLET-3 THAT WE REALLY HAVE GOODS ON HIM. NOR DOES LNAGON HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR INDICTMENT. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HIS TENURE WITH US WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE

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T 167268 PAGE 03 - 03 IN 898115

TOR:1322182 APR 73 CASA 21783

AS TO HIS COOPERATION IN ANY CONFRONTATION, HIS REACTION WOULD BE ONE IN TERMS SELF-INTEREST AND WHAT WOULD BE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HIM: CONTINUED BKHERALD SALARY OR MORE LUCRATIVE EARNINGS FROM NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. WHAT WOULD PROVIDE REASONABLE ASSURANCE HIS COOPERATION IS PROBABILITY ARREST AND LOSS WKSCARLET JOB. WITHOUT MORE SPECIFICS THAN WE HAVE NOW, WKSCARLET-3 WOULD NOT NECESSARILY FEEL TRHEATENED IN CONFRONTATION, KNOWING WKSCARLET-3, ONLY IF HE FELT HE WERE BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE WOULD HE AGREE COOPERATE.

4. THEREFORE, SINCE OUR INTERESTS LIE IN TERMINATING HIM AND NOT NECESSARILY IN CONFRONTING HIM, REQUEST HQS VIEWS TERMINATING WKSCARLET-3 ON CONTRIVED PRETEXT AND WITHOUT CONFRONTATION. PLAN TO DO SO SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN, AS HIS PRESENT CASE OFFICER DEPARTING END MAY AND WE DO NOT DESIRE INTRODUCE NEW CASE OFFICER TO HIM

5. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

201-0300985

HISTORY OF VOTING MACHINE ISSUE RECOUNTED

Caracas Radio Continente Network in Spanish 0300 GMT 11 Apr 73 P

[Text] The president of the Supreme Electoral Council, Luis A. Pietri, has denied the charges made regarding the collection of commissions on the sale of voting machines. Just as this station has reported, Pietri has ordered a thorough investigation in order to establish responsibilities. The announcement was made by Pietri during a press conference held tonight at the headquarters of the Supreme Council. Speaking for himself, Pietri said that he would have filed suit against those implicated in the commissions deal. He said that he would have started the suit if he had known which persons were involved in the affair.

The statement made by Antonio Espinoza Prieto regarding a supposed reduction in the contract for the purchase of the voting machines is completely false, said the comptroller general, Manuel Vicente Ledesma. The report was published in local newspapers. According to the papers Antonio Espinoza Prieto said that Mr Dixon, former president of the Automatic Voting Machines [AVM] Company, had come to Venezuela to negotiate a reduction in the price of the contract. [Words indistinct] Prieto said that the reduction was in the nature of $3,050,000, but the comptroller general of the republic denied the information because his office never had any knowledge of Prieto's assertion.

The affairs of the collection of commissions on the purchase of voting machines has turned into a real scandal. It will be recalled that the proposal to purchase the voting machines in the first place was a sensation. On that occasion the representatives of the various parties represented in the Supreme Electoral Council were divided. The opposition insisted that machines had to be used in the next elections because the laws specified this. The Social Christian Party [COPEI], the Democratic National Front [FND] and an independent party were opposed to the purchase because it meant a disbursement of millions of bolivares. Subsequently the matter was submitted to a vote and the opposition parties won.

Contacts were begun with the machine supplier and more disagreements arose. The opposition wanted to purchase the machines from AVM, while COPEI and FND wanted to purchase them from another company. The opposition won again because it was in the majority and it was decided that AVM would supply the machines. The U.S. representatives arrived: the owners, the salesmen, and the commission agents of the company. The contract was drafted and it specified that Venezuela could not pay more than 1 percent of the total transaction in commissions. The transaction was for 180 million bolivares.

At this stage a ghost appeared to pursue the AVM in the United States in the form of the Election Systems Company, which sued the AVM, alleging that the AVM negotiated directly in Venezuela without going through the Elections Systems Company. The latter demanded its commission and last week won the suit. This is how the scandal broke: The AVM said that it could not pay commissions to the Election Systems Company because these commissions had been paid directly to Venezuelan politicians. The AVM defended itself and its representatives said at the trial what they had to say, which is precisely what Pedro Segnini La Cruz told the papers today. The People's Electoral Movement [MPE] was accused of having received $40 per machine which, multiplied by 10,000, amounts to $400,000, or 1.8 million bolivares.

File: WKSCARLET-3

MILITARY COURT QUESTIONS BLANCO PARTY LEADER

Paris AFP in Spanish 1453 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Excerpts] Montevideo, 11 Apr--Reliable sources today reported that the military court has asked Blanco Party national leader Omar Murdoch for information about a declaration issued 2 weeks ago in which the Blanco Party strongly criticized President Bordaberry and the military authorities.

The military court is trying to establish whether the Blanco Party leader committee a violation of military regulations. It also asked Murdoch whether he concurred with the terms of the Blanco Party declaration.

It was reported that the alleged violation concerned the military regulation which prevents retired officers from participating in or formulating political declarations during the 4 years following their retirement.

According to reliable sources, Murdoch--a retired navy captain--will be brought before the military tribunal if the violation is confirmed.

The military court's action agitated the political atmosphere and the Blanco Party leaders will meet this evening to discuss the situation. A Blanco Party member expressed the opinion that instead of looking into the political attitudes of retired officers, the military court should try those military men on active duty who have in effect formed a political party.

It was revealed in parliamentary circles that opposition legislators will demand in parliament that the defense minister explain the true motives which led to the proceedings initiated by the military court.

ARGENTINE AUTHOR RELEASED FROM URUGUAYAN PRISON

Paris AFP in Spanish 1445 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Montevideo, 11 Apr--Argentine writer and journalist Eduardo Galeano was released yesterday by a military court after a 1-week detention. Galeano himself confirmed his release today and said that he was in perfect health and that he had been well-treated during his detention.

He was arrested at Carrasco Airport on his return from a visit to several Latin American countries. Galeano, who has been living in Uruguay for a long time, is a journalist of the leftist weekly MARCHA and was recently appointed director of the Argentine review CRISIS.

The reason for his arrest is unknown. Several circles not only in Uruguay and Argentina but also in several Latin American countries protested the arrest of the author of the book "The Opened Veins of Latin America."

In addition, the representative of the MSP, Antonio Espinoza Prieto, received 450,000 bolivares. The same arrangement was made for the Democratic Republican Union [URD] and Omar Rumbos, another one of the representatives of the opposition on the Supreme Electoral Council. Rumbos and his party received similar amounts to those received by the MPS and Espinoza Prieto. Democratic Action [AD], which was also accused, was supposed to receive more than the others, that is, 2,115,000 bolivares. The distribution also included several lawyers, one Mr (Hans), and others named Eduardo Blanco and Leoni.

According to the same document released by Segnini La Cruz today, the AVM representative said that he unknowingly signed a commission invoice for $305 per machine. This means there is a $2 commission per machine, the recipient of which the AVM representative said he did not know. As spokesmen for public opinion, we are obliged to inform the Venezuelan people about the content of Segnini La Cruz' document. In the meantime, it is up to those involved to explain the scandal of the collection of commissions for the purchase of the voting machines.

The comptroller's office has never had any information to the effect that the former president of the AVM came to Venezuela to negotiate a reduction in price. Manuel Vicente Ledesma made the explanation in connection with a report published in the local newspapers and attributed to Antonio Espinoza Prieto. Prieto said that Mr Dixon had come to Venezuela to reduce the selling price of the voting machines by $3,050,000. From another quarter, Ledesma said that the tools and supplies which will be used to manufacture the machines will remain in Venezuela. In addition, the country will take possession of the voting machines in a domestic port and not abroad.

BRIEFS

FNTA POSTS--The Social Christian Party has obtained seven posts and the Democratic Action Party has won two on the executive board of the National Federation of Agricultural and Livestock Workers [FNTA]. FNTA held its convention in Barquisimeto with the participation of 135 delegates from approximately 19 labor unions. [Caracas EL NACIONAL in Spanish 5 Apr 73 p C-14 P]

GUERRILLA LEADER CABANAS CLAIMS KIDNAPING ROLE

Paris AFP in Spanish 0443 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Acapulco, 10 Apr--Lucio Cabanas, top guerrilla leader of the country, appears as signatory of a press communique in which he claims responsibility for kidnaping a rich cattle breeder, Franciso Sanchez Lopez, on 7 March in Texpan, Guerrero State.

The document was published today, Tuesday, by the newspapers LA VERDAD and EL GRAFICO issued in Acapulco with a picture of five masked men in uniforms and with Mexican Army guns surrounding someone who seems to be Sanchez Lopez.

Lucio Cabanas added to his alleged signature the title of head of the executing peasant brigade of the Poor People's Party, in the name of which he accused Mexican society of being capitalist and of exploiting the people and said, that for this reason, this society must be eliminated.

He added that the kidnaped cattle breeder, of whom nobody has heard since his disappearance, is a bourgois who exploits the people whose land he has seized by means of usury and unlawful maneuvers.

He called the government a bloody murderer of peasants and stated that, for this reason, the executing brigade applies the law of retaliation in kind and justly retaliates by means of executions and kidnapings as well as bank and company holdups. After urging peasants and students to join the movement, Lucio Cabanas said, in conclusion: Our basic method is that of arms.

OPPOSITION PARTY LEADER CHARGES POLICE PERSECUTION

Paris AFP in Spanish 1055 GMT 11 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Mexico City, 11 Apr--Jose de Jesus Martinez Gil, head of the local branch of the National Action Party (PAN--rightist opposition party), said Tuesday that PAN propaganda distributors are being persecuted by the police. According to Martinez Gil, the police in one electoral district removed and destroyed the propaganda printed by the opposition party and threatened to arrest those who were distributing the propaganda.

Martinez Gil added that in other areas of the city the police arrested several PAN militants when they--using loudspeakers--were asking the people to vote for the PAN. Elections will be held in the country in July to choose all members of the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress.

BRIEFS

NEW NAVAL COMMANDER--Mexico City, 5 Apr--The Navy Department's recently promulgated organic law has designated Cmdr Enrique Baltanas Hope chief of the four naval zones on the Pacific Coast. The new official will be in charge of the Guaymas, Mazatlan, Salina Cruz and Acapulco naval commands with headquarters in the port of Acapulco. A similar command has been established for the Gulf of Mexico with headquarters in the port of Veracruz but its commander has not been named. Baltanas, who was commander of the Tampico naval zone on the Atlantic Coast, has stated that with the establishment of the new post it will be possible for the first time to provide real protection for the country's maritime resources. [Havana PRELA in Spanish 1351 GMT 5 Apr 73 C--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY]

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T 158419 PAGE 01 IN 886605

TOR:102116Z APR 73 CARA 21667

872

S E C R E T 102045Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21667

TO: DIRECTOR, BOGOTA, WH/MAIMI INFO BUENOS AIRES.
HQ UFA HAB

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS A. CARACAS 21427 (IN 860502)

B. BOGOTA 21841 (IN 876212)

C. BOGOTA 21863 (IN 882076)

D. BNDD HQS 2310, 10 APR 73 NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.

E. CARACAS 21462, HVC 6613 (IN 865032)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY REF D:

A. MARIA CHRISTINA F LEAL, WIFE EUGENIO LEAL POZO, ADVISED S/A SHORT THAT SERRANO WAS AT BARRANQUILLA PHONE NUMBER 44-910

RALPH F SERRANO WAS AT BARRANQUILLA PHONE NUMBER 44-910 FEB 73. PER MARIA CHRISTINA LEAL

B. FROM ABOVE NUMBER SERRANO CALLED MIAMI NUMBER 634-9532. THIS LISTED TO TONI J. F JEWETT IN 3055 NW 13TH ST. IN MIAMI CALLED BY SERRANO SHE WIFE OF HUMBERTO F TRUEVA, WHOSE HIS 1971 OLDSMOBILE, LICENSE 1WW-40758, SEEN AT THIS ADDRESS. 3055 NW 13TH ST., MIAMI

2. STATION COMMENTS:

DOC. MICRO. SER.
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T 158419 PAGE 02-02 IN 886685

TOR:102116Z APR 73 CARA 21667

A. ABOVE FURTHER REENFORCES SUSPICIONS LINKS BETWEEN TRUEVA AND SERRANO. BY EXTENSION, THIS MIGHT ALSO LINK WKSCARLET-3 TO SERRANO.

B. WE SPECULATE ABOUT POSSIBLE LINK OF LUIS ENRIQUE JARAMILLO, SUBJECT REF E. TO SERRANO AND WKSCARLET-3. THIS BASED FACT JARAMILLO RESIDENT IN BARRANQUILLA, WHERE SERRANO WAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY LOCATED, AND JARAMILLO'S SUSPICIOUS CONTACT WITH UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL IN CARACAS. HYPOTHESIZE THAT UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH UNIDENTIFIED POLICE OFFICIAL WHO MET WITH TRUEVA, HOSE GOMEZ, AND WKSCARLET-3. JARAMILLO MET WITH POLICE OFFICIAL LATE FEBRUARY, WHICH ABOUT TIME GOVEZ AND TRUEVA LEFT CARACAS.

POSSIBLE LINK TO SERRANO

C. ALL ABOVE DISCUSSED WITH BNDD, WHO CONCURS.

3. FOR BOGOTA: MAY WE PASS REF C TO BNDD?

4. INDEX LEAL, SERRANO, JEWETT, TRUEVA, JARAMILLO. FILE 201-300985, 75-102-26. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

15-1

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PAGE 1

S E C R E T

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 062202Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 393224

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE (HAN) SECUR 4

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TO: CARACAS.

0 WKRALLY WKSCARLET

1. WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT "PERMITS TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES" FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE EXPIRE 20 APRIL 73. IF WKSCARLET-3 CLEARED OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM, FOLLOWING WOULD HAVE TO BE POUCHED TO HQS TO EXTEND PERMITS FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR:

A. PERMITS WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE CURRENTLY ~~HAVE~~ HOLD.

B. "APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF PERMIT TO REENTER THE UNITED STATES"

(I&NS FORM I-143) - WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE HAVE TO COMPLETE SEPARATE APPLICATIONS WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED FROM U.S. CONSULATE IN CARACAS.

B

C. CHECK FOR 20 DOLLARS (10 DOLLARS EACH FOR WKSCARLET-3 AND WIFE.)

2. SUGGEST RENEWAL OF ABOVE PERMITS COULD BE USED AS ONE MEANS OF ~~COERCING~~ CONVINCING WKSCARLET-3 TO COOPERATE IN FORTHCOMING CONFRONTATION, IN EVENT HE B~~U~~ALKS AND REQUIRES PROMEPTING.

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3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET. //

201-0300985

06 APR 73

DATE: 6 APRIL 703

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX

UNIT: WH/3/V

EXT: 1535

OS/AAS FRED BUCCI (TELECOORD)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RL Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION #
892

INFO: FILE VR DDO, ADDC, C/HAN, 4CL, 4/NARC2, C/FI, 4/EUR6

T 146272 PAGE 01-01 IN 001527

TOR:051558Z APR 73 CARA 21619

S E C R E T 051345Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21619

TO: ROME, MADRID, DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, BUENOS AIRES, WH/MIAMI.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21460 (in 865173)

1. ACCORDING UNILATERAL WKNUGGET TAP HOME PHONE LUIS POSADA, MRS POSADA PHONED HER HUSBAND AT HOTEL CLUB, ROME, PHONE NUMBERS 460878 OR 479292 CIRCA 28 MAR, POSADA TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELING TO MADRID AFTER LEAVING ROME, POSADA ALSO SAID HE WOULD BE ARRRIVING VENEZUELA EARLY APRIL. (COMMENT: POSADA LAST KNOWN TO REGISTERED HOTEL KING, ROME.) IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION, MRS. POSADA TOLD ANOTHER PERSON THAT POSADA WOULD BE TRAVELING TO MADRID WITH ANOTHER PERSON, NAME UNKNOWN.

2. ABOVE PASSED TO BNDD CARACAS. ADDEES MAY DO LIKEWISE.

3. ANY NEWS ROME RE POSADA?

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION # 603

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T 147367 PAGE 01-01 IN 882076

TOR:052231Z APR 73 BOGO 21883

SECRET 052140Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 21883

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLNHABYSS

REF: BOGOTA 21841 (876212).

1. BOGOTA PHONE NO 358-461, CITED PARA 2 REF, INSTALLED IN APT 902, CALLE 64, NO 7-18, IN NAME OF ISMAEL ACEVEDO CERON, OWNER OF APT BUILDING. PRETEXT CALL REVEALED THAT FAMILY SURNAMED LEAL ACTUALLY RESIDES IN APT 902. IT UNKNOWN WHETHER LEAL FAMILY RELATED TO EUGENIO ANTONIO LEAL POZO (201-890270). NO STATION TRACES ACEVEDO.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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05 APR 1973

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
O PLMHABYSS/Forwarding of BNDD Documents Regarding Luis POSADA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: CARACAS-21539

1. Forwarded herewith are two BNDD ROIs and one telegram regarding Luis POSADA. The first ROI prepared by S/A Jose Marin and dated 6 February 1973 is based on a debriefing of a BNDD source who identifies POSADA aka "Bambi" as being a source of supply for narcotics in Venezuela. The CI also claims that POSADA, along with Jose Gomez and Humberto TRUEVA, have been involved in other illegal activity such as dealing in stolen merchandise, counterfeit money, and contraband.

2. The other ROI, prepared by S/A Charles R. Schaming and dated 13 March 1973, concerns a debriefing of a source who does not believe that POSADA is involved in narcotics.

3. The third document is BNDD Headquarters telegram 1846 of 23 March 1973 (repeated from Miami BNDD) concerning the debriefing of Jose GOMEZ, the BNDD CI who went sour. GOMEZ' debriefing adds little and in the opinion of the Station and BNDD Caracas, GOMEZ is either lying and/or not telling the whole truth. GOMEZ lists a number of names of persons he claims to have met while in Caracas which we do not consider worth a follow up except that of Colonel Freddie BALBOA. BALBOA may possibly be the unidentified police/security official so frequently seen with GOMEZ et al.

Gerald R. Gizzi
Gerald R. GIZZI

Attachments:
1. Two (2) ROIs, hw
2. One (1) Telegram, hw

Distribution: E2IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
3 - C,WHD w atts
2 - COS, WH/Miami watts
2 - COS, Buenos Aires, wo atts

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA - 19310

DATE
5 April 1973

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-300985

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT

STATE CABLE FROM AMEMBASSY CARACAS (CARACAS 2866)

DATE: 4 APRIL 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LETTERS ROGATORY IN CASE OF ELECTIONS SYSTEMS CORP. VS. AVM CORP.

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INFO

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PAGE 01-01

IN 877680

TOR:021549Z APR 73

CARA 21584

S E C R E T 021530Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21584

TO: BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: BOGOTA 21841 (IN 874212)

1. IF BNDD BOGOTA TRAFFIC SENT BNDD CARACAS, WE CAN OBTAIN SAME LOCALLY. HOWEVER, PLS RELAY ANY BNDD BOGOTA INFO THAT IS NOT SENT TO BNDD CARACAS.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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DOC. MICRO. SER.

MICROFILMED

T 133753 PAGE 01 IN 876212

TOR:3022332 MAR 73 BOGO 21841

872 F

S E C R E T 302207Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 21841

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR. HVC

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET ATTEMPT TO LOCATE

REFS: A. CARACAS 21534 (872287)

B. BOGOTA BNDD 2397/26 MAR 73

C. BOGOTA BNDD 2479, 28 MAR 73 (NOT SENT CARACAS)

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EX 3
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WH

1. ON 12 MAR 73, BOGOTA BNDD REP SENT INVESTIGATOR TO BARRANQUILLA, COLOMBIA, TO LOCATE RALPH SERRANO. AS STATED IN REF B, INVESTIGATOR TOLD BOGOTA BNDD REP THAT SERRANO HAD RESIDED IN APARTOTEL ESLAIT FURNISHED APARTMENTS, CARRERA 53, NO. 72-27, FROM APPROX 15-27 FEB 73. TELEPHONE 44910 IS SWITCHBOARD NUMBER OF ESLAIT BUILDING.

2. FYI ONLY, NOT FOR CARACAS BNDD: INVESTIGATOR, AN OFFICIAL OF COLOMBIAN ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS), IS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BOGOTA STATION. HE GAVE STATION OFFICER FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFO: SERRANO HAD BEEN RESIDING IN APARTMENT NO 3-C, APARTOTEL ESLAIT, UNDER NAME "LAURO SERRANO". HE HAD DOMINICAN PPT NO. 200640 AND CALIMED BE DOMINICAN CITIZEN RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CARACAS. SERRANO'S ALLEGED WIFE, LOURDES SERRANO,

CS COPY

S E C R E T

201-300985

30 MAR 1973

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________

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AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

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T 133753 PAGE 02 IN 876212

TOR:302233Z MAR 73 BOGO 21841

DPB: APPROX 1950, HAD DOMINCAN PPT 230441 AND WAS STAYING IN ROOM 27, DEL PRADO HOTEL, BARRANQUILLA. IT UNCLEAR WHETHER SERRANOS MOVED TO DEL PRADO AFTER LEAVING ESLAIT OR WHETHER THEY NOT LIVING TOGETHER. IN ANY AEVENT, RALPH SERRANO'S CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. IN ADDITION PHONE NOS CITED REF A. SERRANO ALSO CALLED BOGOTA 358-461. STATION ATTEMTPING DETERMINE SUBSCRIBER AND LOCATION. INVESTIGATOR ALSO DETERMINED THAT SERRANO'S LAWYER IN COLOMBIA IS AKA "GUILLERMO F LANK". STATION BELIEVES THIS LAWYER IDENTIFIABLE WITH MIGUEL GUILLERMO F LAMK VALENCIA RPT LAMK VALENCIA, LAWYER OF ARABIC ORIGIN WITH OFFICE AT CALLE 9, NO 4-25, CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, PHONE 7948 RPT 7948. ACCORDING STATION ASSET GIDARK-1, F LAMK USES GUILLERMO AS FIRST NAME AND IS LAWYER F[illegible] OF FERNAND BERTAGNINI, SUSPECTED COCAINE TRAFFICKER.

3. REF C STATED THAT MEDELLIN PHONE NO 774-872 (CITED REF A) REGISTERED TO GUSTAVO GIL SALGADO, CARRERA 50-1 NO. 33-61, ITAGUI, ANTIOGUIA, DEPT., COLOMBIA. REF C FURTHER ADVISED UNAVAILABILITY OF INFO ON SUBSCRIBER OF MEDELLIN PHONE NO 422-022. FYI: NO STATION TRACES GIL. ITAGUI IS SMALL TOWN NEAR MEDELLIN.

4. BNDD IS RUNNING SERRANO CASE FROM BOGOTA END. IF CARACAS

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AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT

INFO RF. FILE VR.

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T 133753 PAGE 03-03 IN 876212

TOR:3022332 MAR 73 BOGO 21841

DEEMS IT NECESSARY, STATION BOGOTA CAN RELAY BNDD INFO DEVELOPED THIS CASE. ADVISE.

5. INDEX SERRANO AND LAMK. FILE:201-300985. E2, IMPDET

SECRET

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY [illegible] PER [illegible] TOTAL COPIES [illegible] RUN BY 4

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AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 8

ACTION # 718

INFO RF. FILE VR [illegible] C/CI C/FI C/WH/COG
DDO H/DDO C/WH6

T 129082 PAGE 01-01 IN 874153

TOR:2911352 MAR 73 PARI 37717

T

S E C R E T 2910192 MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37717

TO: ROME INFO CARACAS, DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLWHABYSS

REF CARACAS 21536 (IN 872333)

1. FROM DISCUSSION WITH REGION 17 DEPUTY DIRECTOR PANELLA STATION LEARNED THAT SOME DAYS AGO ITALIAN SURVEILLANCE TEAM REPORTED THAT LUIS POSADA HAD TAKEN COUNTER SURVEILLANCE PRECAUTIONS AND HAD BECOME AWARE OF HIS ITALIAN POLICE SURVEILLANTS. ITALIANS APPARENTLY PUT NEW TEAM ON HIM.

2. ROME: WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF STATION COULD ARRANGE GET ORAL RUN DOWN APPROX ONCE A WEEK FROM SAIC IN ROME ON THIS INVESTIGATION BECAUSE BNDD CABLES AND ROI'S OFTEN FAIL TO REPORT DETAILS OF INTEREST.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

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201-300985
29 MAR 73

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AGENCY MESSAGE

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

ACTION # 558

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE. VR. ADDO, DDO, [illegible], C/CI C/FI, C/NARC 2, C/EUR 6,

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T 124748 PAGE 01 IN 872323

TOR:272142Z MAR 73 CARA 21536

S E C R E T 272040Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21536

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET CUSATI ~~[illegible]~~ PHONE CALLS IN ITALY

REF CARACAS 21468 (865173)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY BNDD ROME TELEGRAM 2364 OF 27 MAR 73:

A. SLAERNO NUMBER CALLED BY CUSATI LISTED TO ALFONSO GREICO, BORN SALERNO 23 OCT 32, RESIDING VIA LUNGOMARE COLOMBO 39, SALERNO. INP REPORTS GREICO COFFEE IMPORTER WITH NO CRIMINAL RECORD. NO TRACES ROME BNDD.

B. ON 26 MAR 73 CUSATI CALLED CARACAS NUMBER 45-24-70. ON 27 MAR HE DEPARTED ROME FOR NAPLES WITH PROPOSED STAY OF THREE DAYS.

2. CARACAS NUMBER LISTED TO GENARO CATALDO SATURNO, PUENTO HIERRO, AVDA. 3, LAS FLORES. CHECKING DETERMINE PRESENT USER THIS NUMBER AND WILL ADVISE. NO

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201-300985

27 MAR 1973

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AGENCY MESSAGE

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INFO RF. FILE . VR .

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T 124748 PAGE 02-02 IN 872323

TOR:272142Z MAR 73 CARA 21536

PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES CATALDO NOR GREICO.

3. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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LE SEC DISSEM BY 71/80 PER Dcr-02 TOTAL COPIES 16-1

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AGENCY MESSAGE

ACTION UNIT WH6

ACTION # 576

INFO ~~RF~~ FILE , VR , [illegible] CI/OPS [illegible]

DDO ADDO

T 124786 PAGE 01-01 IN 872348

TOR:272154Z MAR 73 CARA 21539

S E C R E T 272040Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21539

TO: DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF CARACAS 21298 (NOT SENT BUENOS AIRES) (C 848386)

1. STATION HAS COPY BNDD MIAMI DEBRIEFING OF JOSE GOMEZ (# NO RECORD IN C/S) AS SUMMARIZED IN BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1846 OF 23 MAR 73. GOMEZ ADMITTED MEETING LUIS POSADA IN CARACAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BUT DENIES DISCUSSING NARCOTICS WITH POSADA OR ANYONE ELSE. SAID POSADA DISCUSSED IMPORTING RAWHIDE SKING TO US FOR LEATOER PRODUCTS. BOTH STATION AND BNDD CARACAS OF OPINION THAT GOMEZ NOT TELLING TRUTH. THEREFORE GOMEZ DEBRIEFING ADDS LITTLE FOR OUR PLANNED CONFRONTATION. POUCHING TELEGRAM.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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201-300985

27 MAR 1973

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MAY 7 1973
MICROFILMED

T 124685 PAGE 01 IN 872287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 3P CARA 21534
872

S E C R E T 272042Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21534

TO: BOGOTA, DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, OTTAWA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF CARACAS 21369 (NOT SENT OTTAWA) (855389)

1. LEAD FROM BOGOTA BNDD SUGGESTS POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION ANOTHER MEMBER HUMBERTO TRUEVA, JOSE GOMEZ, LUIS POSADA GROUP. ACCORDING BNDD BOGOTA TELEGRAM 2397 OF 26 MARCH, US FUGITIVE RALPH SERRANO TELEPHONED HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA (71-44-11) IN CARACAS FROM BARRANQUILLA, COLOMBIA, DURING APPROXIMATE PERIOD 15FEB-27 FEB 73. SERRANO WAS IN BARRANQUILLA DURING AFOREMENTIONED PERIOD AT RESIDENCE WHOSE PHONE NUMBER IS 44910. SERRANO ALSO CALLED 32-24-50 IN CARACAS; 634-9532 IN MIAMI, AND 42-20-22 AND 77-48-72 IN MEDELLIN.

2. COMMENT: INTERESTING ASPECT HOTEL CLUB AMERICANA CALL IS THAT TRUEVA AND GOMEZ WERE STAYING AT HOTEL AT TIME CALL MADE. CAN

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201-300985

27 MAR 1973

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T 124685 PAGE 02 IN 872287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 CARA 21534

THEREFORE SPECULATE SERRANO WAS CALLING TRUEVA/GOMEZ. SERRANO IS DOCUMENTED TRAFFICKER WHO WAS LAST KNOWN BY STATION TO BE DEALING FROM MONTREAL. SERRANO KNOWN TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ROLANDO LUCAS GONZALEZ NUNEZ AND EUGENIO LEAL POZO. ALTHOUGH LATTER TWO DISLIKE SERRANO. IN MAY 72 BNDD SPECULATED THAT PHONE CALLS BY SERRANO FROM MONTREAL TO CARACAS INDICATED NARCOTICS DEAL WITH GONZALEZ. WE ALSO AWARE TRUEVA TRAVELED TO COLOMBIA AFTER DEPARTING CARACAS. WHICH LENDS FURTHER WEIGHT HYPOTHESIS OF LINK TO SERRANO.

ZR 201-0981133

R201-0542070

3. 32-24-50 LISTED TO JUAN VICENTE HERNANDEZ, AVENIDA 4 BETWEEN 6TH AND 7TH TRANSVERSALS, ALTAMIRA, QUINTE HERLAND, CARACAS. NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES. ATTEMPTING DETERMINE ACTUAL RESIDENT THIS ADDRESS. ALSO ATTEMPTING DETERMINE PHONE CALLS MADE BY TRUEVA/GOMEZ FROM HOTEL. WOULD APPRECIATA ANYTHING BOGOTA STATION MIGHT ADD RE SERRANO, SUCH AS CONFIRMATION

numerous [illegible]

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INFO RF. FILE. VR.

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T 124685 PAGE 03-03 IN 072287

TOR:272122Z MAR 73 CARA 21534

HIS PRESENCE COLOMBIA, DATES ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE, ITINERARY, ETC.

4. ALL ABOVE MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH BNDD.

5. INDEX SERRANO. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION UNIT C/WH6

FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IDEX, C/CI, C/FI, C/NARC2

ACTION NO. 958

S E C R E T 231856Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17977 WMIMI

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21427 (IN 860502)

868761
M

1. BNDD/MIAMI STATES INFO RE ALLEGATION THAT WKSCARLET-3 TAKING OVER EUGENIO LEAL POZO'S NETWORK RECENTLY SENT BNDD/CARACAS. IN ORDER AVOID DUPLICATION, THEY REQUEST STATION CARACAS CONSULT BNDD REP TO OBTAIN DETAILS.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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201-300985

23 MAR 1973

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BNDD DOCUMENT

BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1846
DATE: 23 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: LUIS POSADA ZB-73-0001
BNDD FILE NO: NONE GIVEN

BNDD DOCUMENT

BNDD CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1847)

DATE: 23 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LUIS POSADA ZB-73-0001

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
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ACTION UNIT C/WH6
INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/CI, C/EI, C/WARC2
ACTION NO 555 C/EUR6

866411

S E C R E T 212050Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 17954 (WMIM)

TO: CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, PARIS, ROME, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

B. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

1. STATION HAS CONTINUING INTEREST REF INVESTIGATION HOWEVER NO NEED SUMMARIZE BNDD TRAFFIC AS THEIR REPORTS AVAILABLE LOCALLY.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E-2 IMPDET

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21 MAR 1973

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ACTION UNIT c/WH

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, c/IPlAN, c/a, c/h, c/NARC 2, c/OPRC

ACTION NO 426

S E C R E T 211544Z MAR 73 STAFF

866087

CITE ROME 28631

TO: CARCAS, DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, WH/MIAMI, MADRID,
BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21468 (865173)

CARA-21468

1. ROME STATION HAS CONTINUING INTEREST REF TRAFFIC.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

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201-300985
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FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/NARC2, C/WH6

ACTION NO 943

S E C R E T 211610Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MADRID 18687

866153

TO: PARIS, CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: A. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

B. CARACAS 21468 (IN 865173)

1. LOCAL BNDD AWARE POSSIBILITY SUBJECTS REFS MAY RETURN CARACAS VIA MADRID.

2. STATION RECEIVING ALL BNDD TRAFFIC. NO NEED CONTINUE RECEIVING SUMMARIES.

3. FILE: 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

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ACTION NO. 306

S E C R E T 201925Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21468 CARA

865173

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME, PARIS INFO WH/MIAMI, MADRID, BUENOS AIRES.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REFS: A. CARACAS 21429 (IN 860750)

B. DIRECTOR 383866

C. ROME 28609 (IN 863762)

D. PARIS 37356 (IN 863806)

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1. ASSUME ALL ADDEES (EXCEPT WH/MIAMI) HAVE SEEN BNDD ROME 2088 OF 16 MAR 73 WHICH REPORTS ARRIVAL LUIS POSADA AND CAMILO CUSATI ROME ON 14 MAR. FOLLOWING SUMMARY THIS TELEGRAM: PAIR STATED THEY WOULD BE STAYING CLARIDGE HOTEL, VIA LIEGI 62, ROME, BUT DID NOT DO SO. PAIR RESIDING HOTEL KING, VIA SISTINA, ROME, IN COMPANY VEN DIPLOMAT ADOLFO EMILIO REYES-MEJIAS, DPOB 6 OCT 43 CARACAS. PAIR HAVE STAYED KING HOTEL PREVIOUS OCCASION. CUSATI MADE PHONE CALL TO 53-52-20 LISTED TO MONSIGNORE CAMILO FORTE,

201-300985

E2 IMPDET

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20 MAR 1973

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 21468 SECRET

VIA FALCONIERE 82, ROME, SINCE CHECKING IN HOTEL.

2. ACCORDING BNDD ROME TELEGRAM 2141, [illegible] MAR 73, REYES CALLED CARACAS PHONE NUMBER 69-21-41. OUR RECORDS REVEAL THIS LISTED TO DR [illegible] PEREZ PEROZO, SAN ANTONIO, LOS ALTOS, LOS CASTORES, AVDA FRATERNIDAD, QUINTA RIBEA. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES PEREZ. FOREGOING SUBSCRIBER INFO PASSED TO BNDD CARACAS, WHICH WILL REPORT SAME INFO THROUGH ITS CHANNELS. CUSATI ALSO CALLED SALERNO, ITALY NUMBER 089-354359 WHICH BEING CHECKED OUT BY BNDD ROME.

3. COMMENT: REYES IS SUBJECT OF 201-835921. NO INDICATION SO FAR THAT HE INVOLVED IN ANY ILLICIT ACTIVITIES AND PRESUME UNTIL EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY THAT REYES CONNECTION WITH POSADA:CUSATI HAS NO NARCOTICS SIGNIFICANCE.

4. PER REF D QUERIES, STATION PUT BOGOTA ON DISTRIBUTION BECAUSE POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH NETWORKS ONCE HANDLED BY EUGENIO LEAL POZO AND LUIS PORFIRIO HERNANDEZ. BELIEVE ALL

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INFO FILE, VR

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 21468 SECRET

ADDEES SHOULD CONTINUE HAVE INTEREST THIS CASE AS SUBJECTS MAY RETURN CARACAS BY SAME ROUTE: I.E. MADRID, MIAMI, SAN JUAN. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDEES COMMENTS HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY WISH CONTINUING RECEIVE SUMMARIES BNDD TRAFFIC OR WHETHER ADDEES ARE ASSURED BNDD WILL PASS TRAFFIC THIS CASE TO ADDEES.

5. FILE 201-330985. E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION UNIT C/WH6

INFO FILE, VR [illegible] c/CI c/FI c/WHECR DDO ADDO

ACTION NO. 026

S E C R E T 191730Z MAR 73 STAFF

863762

CITE ROME 28609

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI, MADRID, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21429 (IN 860750)

1. LOCAL BNDD HAVE ARRANGED FOR THEIR LOCAL LIAISON (GUARDIA DI FINANZA) COVER POSADA AND CUSATI WHO ARE LIVING AT HOTEL KING, VIA SISTINA. OHTER FIVE VENEZUELANS (ANDRES PEREZ; JOSE RODRIGUEZ; HECTOR GONZALEZ; VICTOR BIANCO VASANEL AND BIANCO ARPAD) ALL LIVING AT HOTEL CLARIDGE.

2. LOCAL BNDD WILL KEEP PARIS RDO AND BNDD CARACAS INFORMED.

3. FILE: 201-300985, E2 IMPDET.

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ACTION NO. 044

S E C R E T 191640Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37356 (PARI)

TO: CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO ROME, MADRID, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

863806

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21329 (IW 850513)

1. ROME EMBTEL 2088* DATED 16 MARCH IS FIRST BNDD REPORT FROM ROME ON POSADA MOVEMENTS, AND SHOWS THEY ON TOP OF SITUATION. BNDD FOUL UP RE MADRID COVERAGE EXPLAINED IN PARIS 37271. NOTE THAT BNDD NOT PUTTING BOGOTA ON DISTRIBUTION. PLS ADVISE IF HQ WISHES US SUMMARIZE BNDD ROME CABLES OR IF WE CAN MERELY CONTINUE TO FLAG BNDD TRAFFIC ON THIS CASE OR IF HQ CAN ARRANGE TO RECEIVE TRAFFIC ON THIS CASE AUTOMATICALLY THRU BNDD HQ. ALSO PLS ADVISE IF ALL ADDEES CONTINUE TO HAVE INTEREST THIS INVESTIGATION.

2. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

AN KO
AB X
~~IB~~
~~PS~~
~~BI~~
~~D~~
~~F~~
WH/3/V

B

*NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT

201-300985

19 MAR 1973

SECRET

BNDD DOCUMENT

CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1688)

DATE: 16 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN (RE INFORMATION ON POSADA AND TRUEVO)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: ROBERT J. WEATHERWAX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 15 MARCH 73

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21/3C PER SOP #103

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO, ADDO, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/NARCZ, C/FI, C/EUR6

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

303005

SECRET 1[illegible] 73 21 12z CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY PARIS, MADRID, CARACAS INFO ROUTINE, ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

KO
ABX

RYBAT PLMHABYSS EWKRALLY WKSCARLET

REFS: A. PARIS 37222 (IN 0859406)*

B. CARACAS 21422 (IN 859676)**

1. CONCUR WITH REF B THAT YOU SHOULD TRY OBTAIN FULL REPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND NOT RPT NOT QUERY WKTALENT-1 ON THIS SUBJECT. ALSO INTERESTED ANY INFO ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS IN ROME.

WH/3/V

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

*ASKS IF HQS WANTS THE STATIONS IN MADRID OR PARIS TO ASSURE THAT A FULL REPORT IS OBTAINED FROM BNDD ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND ASKS IF WKTALENT-1 SHOULD BE QUERIED ABOUT THIS CASE.

**SAYS THE CARACAS STATION WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER PARIS AND/OR MADRID COULD EDO TO ENSURE THAT WE OBTAIN A FULL EEEREPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN AND PREFERS THAT WKTALENT-1 NOT BE QUERIED ABOUT THIS CASE.

201-300985

16 MAR 1973

C/EUR

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

C/WH/NARC
E/EUR/NARC
C/WH/4
C/WH/COG
C/E/F
C/E/IB
DDP/NARCOG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

EX - 2 CLASSIFIED BY: ________
APDIR WN - SISM

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

BNDD DOCUMENT

CABLE FROM BNDD HQS WASHDC (BNDD 1657)

DATE: 15 MARCH 1973

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: LUIS FOSADA AKA BAMBI - ZB-73-0001

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to IP/ADB
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to IP/AN.

PROPER FILE NO

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

IP/
CHAMBERS LOIS
IP/AN
EXT. 7715

GC-598
GA30
TUBE CT"

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. WH/3/V		[illegible] 1973	28 MAR 1973	
2.				
3. BV				BV
4. ND				nd
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7.				
8.				
9. IP/AN		6 APR 1973		Xue
10.				
11.				
12. WH/3/V	3B-2627			nd
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17 IP/FI				

File WKSCARLET-3
201 FILE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAR 27 1973
MICROFILMED

201-300985

~~75-120-26~~

~~9) plz classify to 75-120-26 in addition to the 201 file. WH/3/V~~

plz file WKSCARET-3 201.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE: WKSCARLET-3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-300985

DATE MICROFILMED:

DOCUMENT DATE: 15 March 73

DOCUMENT NUMBER: 0ND 00683 BNDD

FORM 610n OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 27/Ll PER SCP .103

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 6

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/PLAN, C/CI, C/NARC 2, C/FI, C/EUR 6

ACTION NO 318

S E C R E T 141517Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE PARIS 37222

859406

TO: CARACAS, DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, ROME, WH MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF: CARACAS 21396 (IN 857839)

1. NOTE BNDD HQ CABLE 1622 DATED 13 MARCH WHICH PROVIDES DETAILS ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN MIAMI AND WHICH ADVISES REGION 17 THAT HE DEPARTED FOR MADRID ON 10 MARCH. WITH CARMILO VINCENT CUSATI VEN DIP PP-686.

2. ASSUME MADRID REGIONAL OFFICE WILL GET SPANISH POLICE TO PUT WKSCARLET-3 UNDER SURVEILLANCE. PLS ADVISE IF WISH STATION MADRID OR PARIS TO ASSURE THAT FULL REPORT IS OBTAINED FROM BNDD ON WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN.

3. UNLESS THERE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WKSCARLET-3 AND CUSATI PLAN CONTINUE TO ROME SUGGEST FUTURE TRAFFIC NOT BE SENT TO ROME AS NOTE THAT BNDD MESSAGE DID NOT GO TO ROME EITHER.

AN
AR
IN
FS
SX
~~DES~~ NFD
FI
E/NARC

4. HQ AND CARACS: PLS ADVISE IF WISH STATION TO

CS COPY

201-300985

SECRET

14 MAR 73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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BY: AT: MAR 16 11 03 AM '73

DISSEM BY: PER RECEIVED IP/EDI

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 PARIS 37222 SECRET

QUERY CITIZEN I RE HIS EVENTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF WKSCARLET-3 AND HIS TRAVEL COMPANION.

5. FILE: 201-300985. E2, IMPDET.

SECRET

FORWARDED
IP/EDI

MAR 21 1 23 PM '73

SECRET

CABLE SECRET DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16-1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

SECRET (When Filled In)

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BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 35/30 PER SOR.103

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 6

INFO FILE, VR DDO, ADDO, C/IP/AN, C/FI, C/CI, C/WARC 2

ACTION NO. 324

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

SECRET 142135Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 21422

TO: PARIS, DIRECTOR, MADRID INFO ROME, WH/MIAMI, BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS

REF PARIS 37222 (IN 859406)

859671

1. WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER STATIONS PARIS AND/OR MADRID COULD DO TO ENSURE WE OBTAIN FULL REPORT REGARDING WKSCARLET-3'S CONTACTS IN SPAIN.

2. BELIEVE FURTHER TRAFFIC THIS CASE SHOULD BE SENT ROME AS ROME ULTIMATE DESTINATION AND PURPOSE HIS TRAVEL.

3. RE PARA 4 REF REQUEST, PREFER WKTALENT-1 NOT BE QUERIED RE THIS CASE.

4. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

AN
AS
IN
FS
RK
DES; NPD
PI
E/NARC

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

14 MAR73

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

4 SECRET (When Filled In)

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 105 PER Sy 103

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ACTION UNIT c/WHG

FILE, VR DDO. ADDO. c/EURG c/WH/c/a.c/6 c/NARC2

ACTION NO. 945

SECRET 131350Z MAR 73 STAFF 857839

CITE CARACAS 21396

TO: DIRECTOR, MARDRID, ROME, WH/MIAMI INFO BUENOS AIRES, BOGOTA, PARIS.

RYBAT PLMHABYSS POSADA TRAVEL PLANS

REFS A. CARACAS 21349 (NOT SENT BOGOTA, MADRID, PARIS) (N 854093)

B. CARACAS 21369 (NOT SENT ROME, PARIS, MADRID) (N 855389)

1. ACCORDING BNDD HQS TELEGRAM 1554, WHICH ORIGINATED MIAMI BNDD, LUIS POSADA (IDENT), SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MIAMI 9 MAR VIA PAN AM 552 FROM SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. FROM MIAMI HE TICKETED TO NEW YORK THEN MADRID. (NO MENTION MADE ROME.) POSADA CARRYING VENEZUELAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO. 65 AND TRAVELING WITH CAMILO POLALI OR PUSALI. BNDD MIAMI PLANNING SURVEILL POSADA WHILE IN MIAMI.

2. FILE 201-300985. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

ko

~~WH/NARC~~

ww13lr

Scarlet 3

201-300985

13 MAR 1973

CS COPY

SECRET

BNDD DOCUMENTS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA
DATE: 13 MARCH 1973
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RE POSADA
BNDD FILE NO: XB-73-0001

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FROM MIAMI, FLORIDA
DATE: 6 FEBRUARY 1973
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF SGI-9-0006
BNDD FILE NO: GENERAL FILE - TRUEVA, HUMBERTO

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
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MEMORANDUM

7 September 1966

WCI- 1492

TO : C/Cover

THRU : C/CI

FROM : CI/PLUSTIKOFF

SUBJECT: Cover Status of Luis POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REF : WCV-1056, 25 October 1965

Distribution

1- Cov
1- CI
1- 201-300985
1- Reg

On 1 August 1966 Luis POSADA began employment with RECE, a Cuban exile organization located in Miami. He is a salaried employee of RECE (and is also being paid by 24 WOFACT to report on the activities of RECE.) For security reasons, POSADA can no longer claim (Tri-State Engineering 24 Service) as his place of employment. Therefore, it is requested that his resignation from (Tri-State Engineering 24 Service) be recorded and made effective 31 July 1966.

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

3/PJ

I made an application for buy a house at 6?46 S.W and 29 St. I made my application thorugh Roso Realty that is located at 6345 Coral Wy. I have to pay $ 100 down by the VA plan or $ 300 down by FHA plan and a monthly payment of $ 75.00 . I have to use my cover 29 of (Tri State) for my credit references. I fill my aplication and put in there that I was working for this Company for two years, that my salary was $ 120 a week, and that my position in this Company is like an electronic technician. Would you please advise them of all this matter in order that when they will receibe the papers from VA or FHA fill them the right way ?

I can not use RECE for the application of this credit because an exile group corporation is no good for this kind of credit references. As I told you I am not going to use (Tri State) 29 any more but it is an exeption.

COVER notified, they will handle. EI 20 September 1966

[illegible]

([illegible] SINCE [illegible] FL[illegible])

29

4. (Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc.) is located at 06 (800 First National Bank Bldg., Miami 32, Fla.) The local mailing address is (P.O. Box 3737, Miami 1, Fla) 06 The telephone number is 06 (377-0003 (cover phone located in Cover Branch.)) (Mr. Peter T. Fay) 06 is President of the firm. The firm is engaged in the general practice of engineering in all its branches with particular emphasis in the fields of Marine engineering, including marine salvage, underwater research, underwater communications, underwater demolition, and off-shore petroleum and mineral exploration and development.

[illegible]

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

7/PV

25 October 1965

MEMORANDUM

WCV-1066

TO : Chief, Training Br

FROM : Chief, Cover Br

SUBJECT : Cover for Luis POSADA Carriles and Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - TR
1 - REG
1 - 201-262136
1 - 201-300985
2 - Cov

REFERENCE : Memo from C/Tr to C/Cov dtd 17 Sept 1965, Subj: Action & Status Cover for Subjects

1. In accordance with the request contained in Reference, action and status cover with Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc. has been arranged for Subjects.

2. Luis POSADA will be acknowledged as a Technical Supervisor at a salary of $400 per month. This employment will be acknowledged as of 1 September 1965.

3. Alberto ALBERTY will be acknowledged as a Technician/Instructor at a salary of $425 per month. This employment will be effective 13 September 1965. Mr. Alberty's previous employment with Radio & Electronics Equipment Company is terminated as of 10 September 1965.

4. Tri-State Engineering Service, Inc. is located at 800 First National Bank Bldg., Miami 32, Fla. The local mailing address is P.O. Box 3737, Miami 1, Fla. The telephone number is 377-0083 (cover phone located in Cover Branch.) Mr. Peter T. Fay is President of the firm. The firm is engaged in the general practice of engineering in all its branches with particular emphasis in the fields of Marine engineering, including marine salvage, underwater research, underwater communications, underwater demolition, and off-shore petroleum and mineral exploration and development.

5. It is requested that the Case Officer brief Messrs. Alberty and Posado on the cover story as outlined in paragraph 4 above. A copy of this memorandum is attached for inclusion in the individual's 201 files.

RETURN TO CIA
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[illegible]

TO : Chief, Cover Branch

THRU : Chief, Maritime Training Section
Chief, Training Branch

FROM : TRG/TREADESS

SUBJECT: Action and Status Cover for
Luis POSADA Carriles and
Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia

17 Sept 1965

MTB-1083

Distribution
2 - C/CCS w/att.
2 - TRG (SOI's) w/att.
1 - TRG Chrono w/o att.
1 - FEG Chrono w/o att.

ACTION REQUIRED: Provide cover

29

1. Request that action and status cover of (Tri-State Engineering) be given to Luis POSADA Carriles and Alberto de Jesus ALBERTY Garcia. Both Subjects have recently been assigned to the Maritime Training Base. POSADA is presently under no cover arrangement. ALBERTY was given cover of (Radio & Electronics Equipment Company, Inc.) as of 14 June 1965. 29

2. Biographic data on each Subject is attached. Please advise effective date of cover.

2|PJ

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME	Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles
DOB	15 February 1928 - Cuba
EMPLOYER	(Tri-State Engineering) 29
DATE EMPLOYED	1 September 1965
POSITION	Technical Supervisor
SALARY	$300.00 net per month ACTUAL $400.00 net per month COVER
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT	Jewlry Salesman
ADDRESS	750 N. W. 15th Street; Miami, Fla.
TELEPHONE	337-0971
MARITAL STATUS	Married

VPV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

208/OJ/OT

DATE : 4 MAY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [LUXEMBOURG] 15-A

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

MAY 5 17 03:59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 12839

TO DIR INFO CITE [LUXE] 0097 20-19

REF: [LUXE] 0094 (IN 10377); DIR 24181 (OUT 98923) 20-19 01

1. HAD ALREADY ASKED [QJBANNER 1] GET DESCRIPTION, DETAILS, ETC BUT SINCE HE UNABLE DO WITH CLARITY RABNEY UNDER [HBFINCH COVER] 24 QUESTIONED SUBJ 4 MAY. SUBJ STATES FOLLOWING IS ALL HE KNOWS BUT CONSIDER PROBABLE HE KNOWS MORE THAN TELLING OR INVOLVED SOME DEAL FOR WHICH HOPES PROTECT SELF AGAINST LEGAL ACTION BY STATING WORKING FOR AMERICANS.

2. ARMAND DELACOUR, RESIDENT 28 RUE ERARD (ALSO RCVD EMARD), PARIS AND THREE TIME CONVICT, APPROACHED SUBJ MID-APRIL WITH OFFER FIRST REF. STATED TWO SICILIANS LIVING PARIS ALREADY SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGED THIS TRAFFIC, ONE OF WHOM RECEIVED 50 KILOS OPIUM HONG KONG AND DELIVERED PERSONALLY IN STATES, ENTERING VIA CANADA. DELACOUR GAVE NO DETAILS OTHER THAN THAT CHICOMS PROVIDE OPIUM GRATIS ON CONDITION DELIVERY STATES. WHEN SUBJ ASKED RE ENTRY STATES DELACOUR REPLIED CAN FOR U.S.$200 GET FULL FRENCH DOCUMENTATION NEEDED FOR AMERICAN VISA.

3. DELACOUR ALSO USES NAME DELAMARE, AGE 47, HEIGHT 175CMS, WEIGHT 70 TO 72 KILOS, BROWN HAIR BALDING, OVAL FACE, BROWN EYES, CROOKED NOSE, THICK LIPS, HEAVY CIGARETTE SMOKER. BORN BASQUE

SECRET

5 MAY 1959

5/pd

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 MAY 1959

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE -2-

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

15-19 IN 12839

LUXE 0097

TO INFO CITE

COUNTRY. SMUGGLED NARCOTICS BEFORE AND AFTER WAR FROM NORTH AFRICA. LAST RELEASED FROM JAIL DEC 58, THEFT CHARGES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJECT SAID INVITED BY DELACOURT TO JOIN RING WHICH RECEIVING "GRATIS" FROM CHICOMS LARGE AMOUNTS OPIUM TO BE SMUGGLED TO U.S.

SECRET

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Copy No.

104-10178-10078

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

8615

PICO Ramon, Rainaldo [illegible] Cuba

PICO, RAMON, [illegible]

PRQ I	bio				[illegible]		
PRQ II				P.O.A			
104566 GREEN LIST	NR	[illegible]	29 Sept 60				
RI TRACES	ndi			O.A.			
OPS & DIV. TRACES	~~ndi~~			P.C.S.A.			
FIELD TRACES	~~ni of v~~			C.S.A.			
S.O. INDICES	NR	[illegible]	28 Sept 60	P.P.A. PROP. APP.			
FBI INDICES	II	[illegible]	10 Oct 60	C.N.C.			
ORAL NOTICE S.O. INVESTIGATION				CCD/NC NOTIFIED COORD COMPLETED			
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION				TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT			

CASE OFFICER Joseph Piccolo

DIVISION wh/4/c

EXTENSION 8565

COMMENTS

COMMENTS

No add'l data subsequent to that previously sent.

No FBI refs came up in RI check per Al [illegible] [illegible]

(Name probably never indexed [illegible].)

X [illegible], Elvis [illegible]; SANCHEZ, Jose [illegible]

[illegible]

JMCE

DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] July 1932

PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible], Havana, Cuba

CASE OFFICER: [redacted]

DIVISION: [illegible] C/CA/PA

EXTENSION: 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
		wh/SA	15 JUN 1964	
P.O.A.	[illegible] Ext	wh/[illegible] wh/[illegible]	[illegible] Jan 65 3[illegible] Jun 65	Records on LIS Agents Checked in CI/SIA, date: [illegible] 1965 Results: NR 6 July 65 [illegible]
O.A.		wh/[illegible]	4 Feb 66	
CSC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	wh/[illegible]	15 Jan 65	
PRQ I	bio. 16 Feb 65	cic		
PRQ II	16 Feb 65	[illegible]		
152512 GREEN LIST	NFR	alm	11 June 64	
RI TRACES	NDI			
OPS & DIV TRACES	NDI			
FIELD TRACES	NDI: JMWAVE			
S.O. INDICES	No pertinent data	[illegible] alm	12/10/60 11 Jul 64	
Miami FBI INDICES	NDI	jev	2 June 1964	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	7 Aug 65	[illegible]		
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT	✓	[illegible]	16 Dec 64	
[illegible]				
[illegible] COMPLETED				

SECRET

14-00000

224658

PICO Ramos, Reinaldo

Male 224428

☐ ☐ CAC ☐ ☐ ☐

PRESLEY, Elvis (operational); GARCIA, Luis (operational)

CRYPTONYM
AMICE/31

DATE OF BIRTH
21 July 1933

PLACE OF BIRTH
Regla, Havana, Cuba

CASE OFFICER
Henry A. Ozga

C/CA/B4

EXTENSION
6774

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.				RECORDS ON RIS AGENTS CHECKED RESULTS: NR 3 Oct 69 [illegible]
O.A.	XX	WH/C/RR/OA	4 Feb 1966	
ORSO				
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	CA/B4	11 DEC 1969	
PRO I	16 Feb 1965			
PRO II	16 Feb 1965			
GREEN LIST	FORWARDED BY DIVISION			ASKED B. BOWER OF DESK REVIEW DOSSIER 14/10/69 ALSO REMINDED DESK FT'S OUTSTANDING.
RI TRACES	ND			
CPS & DIV TRACES	ND			
FIELD TRACES	WILL BE FORWARDED			
S.O. INDICES	No additional data since 23 Jul 65		13 Oct 69	
FBI INDICES XX	See 693	MSS	12 Dec 69	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	NR [illegible] 2 Dec 69	[illegible]	20 Dec 69	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
[illegible] NOTIFIED				
[illegible]				

FORM 126

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/SA/IOS - W. ULLERY

NUMBER
201-284658

SUBJECT
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
2 June 1964

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when the investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by that [illegible] division ceases.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and
[illegible]

SIGNATURE
/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

DATE
15 JUNE 1964

FORM 12[illegible]

SECRET

Office of Security Polygraph

2 Office of Security Investigations

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

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10 SECRET

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BY D AT 0025 Z

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

28/6 55

71-27C/3

RECORD

ACTION
CHS
412

☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE VR RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIDORIC JMDEVIL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; (IN 05005) OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 (128 46 58) CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15 (130 09 85), BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 2 Oct 1969 sav

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: CA/B4 Venezuela/Ecuador

SUBJECT: 201 - 284658 SO - 224428

TYPE OF REQUEST: UPDATE UPDATE ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date): 8 October 1969

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date):

USE OF SUBJECT

FI Reporting Source

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	ND	ND	WILL FORWARD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: XX YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Please bring Subject's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are N.D. and current Field traces will be forwarded. Subject is reported as currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subject carries S.O.# 224428 and was first processed for POA in 1960.

/S/ John E. Howard R.R

CHIEF, CI/OA

T/N: PICO Ramos, Reinaldo

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA DATE 8 Oct 69

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: NC ADD. DATA SINCE 23 Sept 65

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OGI	I & N		
☒	☒	ACSI 5/15/?	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐		☐

DEC 8 11 AM '69

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached I&N

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

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CSDO

BY D AT 0025 Z

DISSEM BY 30 PER

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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2	28	7	46 58
3		8	
4		9	
5	71-276/3		

ACTION CAS ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

412

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DIDORIC JMDEVIL

16Oct69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; (IN 05005) OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 (128 46 58) CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, (130 09 85) BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 2 Oct 1969 sav

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
CA/B4 Venezuela/Ecuador

SUBJECT: 201 - 284658 SO - 224428

TYPE OF REQUEST: UPDATE | UPDATE | | CNC | | ST

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 8 October 1969

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

FI Reporting Source

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	ND	ND	WILL FORWARD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

Please bring Subject's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are N.D. and current Field traces will be forwarded. Subject is reported as currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subject carries S.O.# 224428 and was first processed for POA in 1960.

/S/ John E. Howard P.R
CHIEF CI/OA

T/N: PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE 8 Oct 69

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: NO ADD. DATA SINCE 23 Sept 65

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OGT	I & N		
☒	☒	ACM 5432 1962	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐

DEC 8 11 58 AM '69

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached I & N

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

RV

FORM 9-67 693 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 8 December 1969

CASE NO.: 284658

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ TYPED BY INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR CSA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD	AFLA

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FIELD DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FILED COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
✓ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED 5 December 1969 *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ______. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ * FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

11 DEC 1969

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

SECRET

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) 25 46 58

FROM:
CA/B4/Support
H.Stilson
3 D 0119

EXTENSION: 4383

NO:

DATE: 5 December 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CA/B4 H.Stilson			KHS	releasing
2.				
3. CI/OA Attn: Mr. Ruffner 2 B 11 QT-5				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				J.U. ✓
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	C NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

CARACAS.

the

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 17 November 1969

CASE NO.: 284658

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ CRSD	AREA:

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI'D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (*No notice to Division*)	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (*Reason checked below,* or see remarks*)	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST FI TRACES	☐ FILE
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ CRSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

CA/R 4 · HELEN STILSON

Station traces, Caracas, have not been received as yet by CI/OA nor the answer as to whether Subj's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

If we are to have ~~[illegible]~~ undertaken this clearance action and if you no longer have an operational interest in subject, please request cancellation.

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible] CI/OA

SECRET

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·My cut 28 46 58

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2 6
3 7
4 8

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6952
DATE: 15 October 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CA5 FILE, VR. RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 46526

TO PRIORITY CARACAS 15 20 02z OCT 69

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF A: HVCW-8792

REF B: DIR-42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 (PER PARA 3 REF A) REQUEST PRIORITY FIELD TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

28 46 58

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4
WH/3/V
WH/CA

5
4
3
2
1

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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C/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

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-7/31/

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)
201-204658 28 4658

FROM
CI/OA

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE
14 OCT 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CA/B-4			13 Oct 69
2. ATTN- BARBARA BOWEN			BB
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7 CI/OA 2-B-11			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To 1:

In accordance with the requirements of CSI No. 10-7, Para. 4 C, dated 23 June 1961, please review the ~~attachments or~~ dossier on Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA in writing as to the significance of the information and your opinion as to its effect on the use of Subject in the operational capacity requested.

(ANOTHER SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FIELD TRACES NOT RECEIVED IN CI/OA AS YET.)

2-7. FID file contained information concerning Subject's requests for visas to travel to Latin America at various times since 1964. All visas were granted. Travel was in connection with Subject's trade union work. Information is not derogatory and will not effect the use of Subject in operational capacity requested.

Helen Stilson
CA/B4

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - SO -

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ PDA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS | RI | DIVISION | FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

: Deputy Director Security, IOS
ROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 - SO -

TYPE OF REQUEST								OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
☐	POA	☐	OA	☐	CSC	☐	SI	(Date)	(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED				ATTACHMENTS					
☐	YES	☐	NO	☐	PHQ - PART I	☐	PARTIAL BIO	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

[illegible]

/S/ Jonn E. Howard R.R.
CHIEF, CI/OA

T/N. PICO RAMON, Reinaldo

ENDORSEMENT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

2 October 1969	CASE NO. 28 4658		
SET UP FOR POA	✓ EXPEDITE INDICES	8 Oct 1969	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES / DATE
SET UP FOR CA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	NAME CHECK	ORSD / AREA: Venezuela/Ecuador

USE: FI Reporting Source

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / LCFLUTTER REPORT
CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see reverse)*	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FIELD TRACES	NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / FINAL
REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

EXPEDITE

POA EXPIRED ______ . PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT

REMARKS

SSO. – Pls bring Subj's POA/OA investigation up to date based on the 1965 ~~on~~ bio data already in your file. RI and Div traces are OK. Any current field traces will be forwarded. Subj is reported as ~~to~~ currently employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. Subj same as # 224420 and was first processed for POA in 1946.

(Note for File - Called Barbara [illegible] this date to ask whether [illegible] current [illegible] check being run. She called back & says [illegible] her office had sent request to [illegible] of Sept 69.)

FORM 707

SECRET

28 46 58

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6723
DATE: 30 September 1969

SECRET

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 2 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CA 5 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, CA/PEG, DO 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 427602

TO CARACAS 01 15 49 Z OCT 69

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: HVCW-8792 (19 SEPTEMBER 1969)

28 46 58

1. AMICE/31 OA NOW FOUR YEARS OLD. APPRECIATE ~~RUROCK~~ STATION TRACES SOONEST FOR UPDATING.

2. AMICE/31 ALLEGEDLY NOW EMPLOYED "OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS" IN CARACAS. IF TRUE, IS THIS A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BODY OR PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

3. FILE: 200-124-192/3 AND 201-284658.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B4

WH/3/8

WH/CA ✓

C/WH

C/CA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

28 44 58

FROM:
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 6774

NO.

DATE: 30 September 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/3/V BS-4 ATT: Mr. R. Allenbach	1 Oct 69			
2.				
3. WH/COG DU-3 ATT: Mr. J. Sears		[illegible]		
4.				
5. CI/CA CT-5 ATT: Mr. Ruffner				
6.				
7.				
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15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

30 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

VIA: WH/COG

WH/3/V

SUBJECT: AMICE/31 (201-284658)

1. It is requested that responsibility for AMICE/31 be transferred from WH/COG to CA/B4, and that his OA be amended for a one-time reporting mission on the 20 - 24 October 1969 Quito meeting of the Council of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

2. Caracas is being asked for unilateral traces and for determination as to whether AMICE/31's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs in Caracas, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

HENRY A. OZGA
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

CA - 69 - 933

SECRET 24 Sept 1969

Memo for the Record

Talked to Tom Dollar (x1498), CA/4, and John Sears (x1255), WH/COG, re this case 25 & 24 Sept 1969. CA/4 had prepared dispatch to Caracas which opened by stating OA valid for travel and op use planned. (This op use detailed in the 15 Sept '69 dispatch to Caracas in file.)

~~It Ais~~ The CI/OA file on Subj showed, however, that WH/COG had OA for use in labor activities in Miami. Per the telephone call to John Sears (above ~~[illegible]~~), it developed that WH/COG no longer had any op interest in Subj. ~~Per~~ In the telephone conversation with Tom Dollar, he had talked with me earlier re Subj and had asked ~~if~~ the equivalent of whether or not CA/B4 could ride piggyback on WH/COG's clearance and levy requirements through WH/COG. My answer had been yes, if WH/COG agreed. This was the basis for the statement in the ~~dis~~ proposed dispatch to Caracas that Subj's OA was valid.

Per a telephone call with Barbara Bowen (x1254) of CA/B4 this date, I asked her to prepare a memo ~~request~~ to CI/OA requesting that responsibility for the case be transferred to CA/B4 and that it be amended to authorize the operational use desired. She agreed to do this, routing the memo through WH/COG. 2.

also asked him to request Caracas traces, run a new 6 ~~Ex~~ Check and to determine if Subj's present employer, The Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs, is U.N connected. ~~I pla~~

I plan to amend the OA for this one-shot use once the necessary checks have been run - assuming no derog info is developed.

21/9/64

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Caracas
[illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible], London for LCPIPIT; COS, London

Chief, [illegible]

DTDORIC [illegible]

ACTION: See Paragraph 3

1. Headquarters is anxious to have coverage of the Eleventh Council meeting of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CLASC), scheduled for Quito, [illegible] October 1969. We are particularly interested in what transpires in the following areas:

a. CLASC plan for cooperation and "unity of action" with the Permanent Congress for Latin American Trade Union Unity (CPUSTAL), with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), [illegible] Trade Union Internationals, and the Cuban Central Union of Revolutionary Workers (CTC-R)--in connection with CTC-R, Headquarters is in the process of disseminating a recent report on Maspero's proposal to send a mission to Cuba;

b. CLASC [illegible]-delegation attending part or all of the [illegible] Congress in [illegible] [illegible] October 1969 (CLASC's [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] to send a delegation [illegible] from [illegible] parent organization, the World Confederation of Labor (WCL) in Brussels);

c. Financing of [illegible] from other than European Christian [illegible];

d. A proposed [illegible] CLASC campaign for the "defense of trade union rights."

2. Caracas and Miami will recall that AMICE-31 covered the CLASC Council meeting in Dominican Republic, May 1968, and produced some useful and disseminable intelligence. According to a recent [illegible] report from Miami, AMICE-31 is now employed in Caracas at the Office of the Coordinator of Economic Affairs. We are checking into the status of his OA.

3. Meanwhile, perhaps Caracas Station would be considering the feasibility of contacting AMICE-31 to find out if he plans to attend the Quito conference and whether or not the Station could handle such a one-shot reporting assignment for AMICE-31, assuming his OA can be up-dated. We will cable his OA status as soon as possible.

Peter A. [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS, [illegible]
1 - COS, [illegible]
1 - COS, [illegible]
1 - COS, London for [illegible]
1 - COS, London

[illegible] - 6792 | 13 September 1969

S E C R E T | 200-124-193/3

DDP/CA/4: E. [illegible] | 6723

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INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

070

S E C R E T 241605Z JAN 69 CITE CARACAS 1674

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR 24 JAN 69 IN 78844

JMDEVIL

REFS A. DIRECTOR 68107

B. WH/MIAMI 2455 (IN 76310)

27 JAN 1969

File

1. BASED COMMENT IN REFS, JUDGE FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRESENT OPTIONS:

176813

A. SHELVE (EDUARDO) GARCIA MOURE.

284658

B. HOLD FURTHER ACTION ON AMICE-31 IN W36-,CE AS APPEARS WHILE COULD BE USEFUL ALSO COULD BE HANDLING PROBLEM.

C. BEGIN SPADEWORK HERE FOR LOCAL APPROACH TO JOSE DE JESUS PLANA. C-2868

D. SIMULTANEOUSLY, ACCEPT REF B OFFER RECONTACT FJBABE-1, TO DETERMINE HIS CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH CLASC AND EMILIO MASPERO AND BASED ON WH/MIAMI FINDINGS. EVALUATE POTENTIAL FOR HIM TO REJOIN MASPERO/CLASC HERE. NOTE WE NOT PREPARED COMMIT OURSELVES ON CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BUT WISH MERELY DETERMINE WHETHER FJBABE-1 COULD REATTAIN POSITION

278135

S-E-C-R-E-T

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INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 1674 SECRET.

CLOSE TO CLASC HEARTBEAT SUCH AS HAD IN CHILE. RECOMMEND GEORGE J. COPSIDAS MAKE RECONTACT SINCE HE HAS ADVANTAGES OF EXPERIENCE IN BOTH SANTIAGO AND CARACAS. COPSIDAS SHOULD USE QUESTIONS GIVEN IN CARACAS-1594. HQS NOTE WE APPRECIATE OFFER, BUT NO ACTION BY RUBASH REQUIRED SINCE DOPSIDAS CAN MAKE MOVES TO RELOCATE FUBABE-1 STARTING NOW.

2. ANY OTHER LEADS INTO CLASC TARGET ADDEES DREDGE UP WILL BE APPRECIATED. SUGGEST HQS RELAY HVC-5090 TO WH/MIAMI.

3. FILE: 36-4-17, 201-766313, 201-275947, -1-279135.

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SERVICE

CARACAS 1674 — STA & NR

24 JAN 69 — DATE

78844-A — IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PARA 1 B READS

"ACTION ON AMICE-31 IN ABEYANCE AS APPEARS WHILE"

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI 2

630

S E C R E T 211936Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2455

22 JAN 1969

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

21 JAN 69 IN 76310

JMDEVIL EVMULE

REF CARACAS 1594 (IN 71598)

1. CONCUR YOUR ASSESSMENT RE LIKELIHOOD JMDEVIL WILL TAKE ON RENEWED IMPORTANCE IN VIEW COPEI ELECTION VICTORY AND MAY BECOME PROBLEM TARGET FOR WOFIRM. BELIEVE BOTH AMICE-31 (284658) AND FUBABE-1 (278135) WORTH CONSIDERATION AS JMDEVIL PENETRATIONS.

2. PER PARA 2 REF, WE RECALL THAT STAFFER LOUIS J. SOCKWELL, FORMER CARACAS C/O WHO NOW SANTIAGO, CONTACTED EITHER GARCIA OR PLANAS OR BOTH IN 1965 BUT THAT RELATIONSHIP DID NOT PROSPER. THERE WAS ANOTHER ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO CONTACT PLANAS THROUGH JACOB L. VAVRICK IN EITHER LATE 67 OR EARLY 68.

3. SUGGEST FOLLOWING POINTS IN WOFIRM'S OPS RELATIONSHIP WITH AMICE-31 WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE AS BONA FIDES:

A. PERSON MAKING CONTACT COULD USE NAME "MR JOHNS" WHICH WAS ALIAS USED BY FORMER JMWAVE C.O.

B. SINCE AMICE-31 WITTING, COULD USE "REPRESENTATIVE OF ORGANIZATION WHICH PAID HIM $300 MONTHLY SALARY."

4. DEFER TO HQS FOR LATEST INFO ON FUBABE-1 AND HIS

SECRET

14-00000

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 2455 SECRET

PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH JMDEVIL. MOST RECENT INFO IN STATION 201 IS ALMOST TWO YEARS OLD. SUGGEST HQS RELAY DIRECTOR CABLES 82534 AND 75995 (11 MARCH AND 17 FEB 67 RESPECTIVELY) TO CARACAS FOR GOOD BACKGROUND AND ASSESSMENT FUBABE-1. WH/MIAMI COULD PROBABLY FIND OUT CURRENT STATUS AND ADDRESS FUBABE-1 THROUGH AMICE-34, ONLY LABOR/CD TYPE WITH WHOM WE STILL IN TOUCH, BUT WE RELUCTANT INDICATE RENEWED INTEREST IF HQS ALREADY HAS THIS INFO ON FILE. STATION WILL HAPPILY TRY RE-CONTACT FUBABE-1 IF CARACAS AND HQS SO DESIRE.

5. FILE: 201-278135 AND 200-124-52.

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28 4658

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201: CI/OA, FI2

SECRET 091445Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2294

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR SANTO DOMINGO PORT AU PRINCE PARIS KINGSTON

EVMULB AMCLEVE [illegible]

9 JAN 69 IN 68106

REF: CARACAS 1545 (IN 66735)

284658

1. PARA 3 REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT. SUBJECT IS AMICE-31.

2. STATION POUCHING PERTINENT DOCS FROM HIS 201. AMICE-31 HAS OA AND RECEIVED $300 MONTHLY SALARY VIA AMICE PAYROLL UNTIL PROJECT TERMINATED IN 1967.

3. NO ONE PRESENTLY AT WH/MIAMI KNOWS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, HENRY RUBASH, LAST JMWAVE AMICE CASE OFFICER, WHO NOW HQS ON CONSULTATIONS, MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT AMICE-31 FOR CARACAS.

4. FILE: 201-284658.

SECRET

JACK LALLY FYI

13 [illegible] 1969

SECRET

14-00000

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ORIG: R. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 22 23 35 Jan 69 CITE DIRECTOR 68107

TO CARACAS, WH/MIAMI

DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

For use in Miami Area

23 JAN 1969

REF: CARACAS 1594 (IN 71598)*

284658

1. RUBASH DESCRIBED AMICE-31 AS VIRILE AND VAIN; WIFE LEFT A-31 AND HE LITERALLY KIDNAPPED HIS OWN SON TO CARACAS IN MAY-JUNE 1968 BECAUSE DIDN't WANT WIFE TO HAVE BOY. POSSIBILITY THERE ARE KIDNAP CHARGES AGAINST HIM. MILITANT ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS HARBOR SOME ILL WILL TOWARD A-31 SINCE HE WENT BACK ON WORD TO RETURN CUBA AS MEMBER PRISONERS-EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

2. A-31 [redacted] WAS ONE OF TWO LEADERS OF CUBAN DELEGATION TO CLASC CONGRESS IN DOM REP IN MID-1968. RE BONA FIDES, RUBASH USED NAME OF DOUGLAS POMROY WITH A-31, RUBASH [redacted] WAS AMERICAN WHO SENT A-31 [redacted] TO SANTO DOMINGO FROM MIAMI IN 1968. A-31 [redacted] KNEW PREVIOUS CONTACT AS PABLO.

CONTINUED . . . .

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ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 22 JANUARY 1969

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BY ________ PER ________ # ______

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CITE DIRECTOR 68107

TO

PAGE TWO

3. RUBASH ALSO COMMENTED ON FUBABE-1 (201-278135), EDUARDO GARCIA MOURE (201-766813), AND JOSE DE JESUS PLANA (201-275947). ~~SAID FUBABE WAS PART OF AMICE~~ COMPLEX WHO MORE CAPABLE THAN A-31. FUBABE WAS SECRETARY TO MASPERO IN CHILE AND CONSIDERED QUITE-FAVORED DISCIPLE OF MASPERO.

4. RUBASH DISPARAGING REMARKS AGAINST GARCIA MOURE INCLUDED HE VERY ANTI-AMERICAN WHO HAS THREATENED SOME WOFIRM PERSONNEL WITH EXPOSURE. DESCRIBED AS A MASPERO LIEUTENANT WHO CAME TO MIAMI TO DO MASPERO BIDDING.

5. PLANA IS DEVOTED TO SOCIAL CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT WHO CONCERNED WITH WORKERS EDUCATION. DESCRIBED AS QUIET, STUDIOUS; GOES TO NEW YORK OCCASIONALLY.

6. 201'S REVIEWED AND SHOWED GARCIA MOURE GRANTED POA 26 APRIL 1965 TO BE USED AS POLITICAL ACTION AGENT IN CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. HE RELEASED STATEMENT 1965 EXTREMELY CRITICAL U.S. UNILATERAL INTERVENTION IN DOM REP. AT FIRST MEETING 4 MAY 65 WITH SOCKWELL, HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HE NOT ANTI-U.S. BUT

CONTINUED . . . .

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ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
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CITE DIRECTOR 68107

PAGE THREE

TO

SIMPLY AGAINST CERTAIN ASPECTS U.S. POLICY. CARACAS ASSESSMENT OF MOURE INDICATED (HVCA-12814) THAT OPERATIONAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MOURE NOT FEASIBLE. HEADQUARTERS COUNTERED (HVCW-6736) WITH SUGGESTION STATION CONTINUE CONTACT AS HE WAS INSIGHT INTO MASPERO LINE OF CLASC. NO OA EVER OBTAINED. INDICATION THERE WAS INS DEPORTATION CASE AGAINST MOURE IN NOV 1967. CASE NOT RESOLVED PER FILE.

7. JOSE DE JESUS PLANA GRANTED POA 10 MAY 1960 FOR USE AS PROPAGANDA PREPARATION AND TEACHER OF POTENTIAL LABOR LEADERS. OA OBTAINED 27 JUNE 1960, AMENDED 13 APRIL 1965 FOR USE AS POLITICAL ACTION AGENT AND SOURCE INFO ON CLASC. ACCORDING HVCW-7089, AMENDED OA STILL VALID.

8. FUBABE-1 GRANTED POA 25 AUG 64 TO WORK WITH CHILEAN BRANCH OF DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL IN ITS ANTI-CASTRO CA ACTIVITIES. OA GRANTED 2 NOV 64 FOR CONSIDERATION TO USE SUBJECT AS FUNDING CHANNEL TO CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS FOR

CONTINUED . . . .

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ORIG: R. ALLENBACH
UNIT: WH/3/V
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CITE DIRECTOR 68107

PAGE FOUR

TO

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, AND FOR PROP PURPOSES. WE TERMINATED FUBABE AMICABLY LATE 1966 DUE OUR DOUBT THAT HIS CLASC EMPLOYMENT WOULD PROVE PERMANENT IN MIAMI. HE PUT IN TOUCH WH/MIAMI. NO INDICATION OA TERMINATED. FUBABE DISAPPOINTED THAT WOFIRM DOUBTED HIS ABILITY TO CARVE FUTURE IN CLASC FROM MIAMI.

9. RUBASH GOING MIAMI FIRST PART FEBRUARY. EXPRESSED HIS AVAILABILITY TO CONTACT FUBABE, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, ON ONE SHOT BASIS IF NEED ARISES.

10. FILE: 36-4-17
201-766813
201-275947
201-278135

END OF MESSAGE

*Comment: Station plans fresh approach to CLASC and Haitian exile activities in Venezuela. Asked for overall assessment.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH/D

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

C/WH/COG

CA/B1 Barbara Bowen (In Draft)

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S E C R E T 051543Z JUNE 68 CITE CARACAS 9800

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

5 JUN 68 IN 25149

JMDEVIL AMICE

REF JMWAVE 2626 (IN 24511)

284658

JACK LALLY FYI

STATION CARACAS ESTIMATES AMICE-31 WOULD REQUIRE $500 PER MONTH PLUS HOUSING AND EDUCATION ALLOWANCES OVER AND ABOVE JMDEVIL OFFER IN ORDER ENABLE HIM LIVE EVEN MODESTLY HERE. ATTEMPTING COVER MONETARY SUPPLEMENT THIS MAGNITUDE COULD BE DIFFICULT. WHILE WE DO HAVE INTEREST IN MONITORING JMDEVIL, IT IS RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY IN TERMS LOCAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATION WILL TAKE IT ON ONLY IF HQS BELIEVES IT CONSTITUTES OVER-RIDING NATIONAL PRIORITY. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN COSTS AND COVER CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, IS BALPA.

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[illegible] [illegible] FE, [illegible], [illegible]

S E C R E T 241524Z MAY 63 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5684

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE, BUENOS AIRES INFO MONTEVIDEO, LA PAZ

DTDORIC JMDEVIL 24 MAY [illegible] 17902

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0663 (N 15743) 284658

27 MAY [illegible]

1. STATION INITIATED CONTACT WITH AMICE-31 ON 24 MAY FOR SHORT DEBRIEFING. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NO ADDITIONAL CONTACT TO BE MADE. AMICE-31 TO PROVIDE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION FROM CLASC EVENTS ON ARRIVAL JMWAVE 27 MAY.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT MEETINGS ACCORDING AMICE-31 COORDINATED EFFORT COMMENCING JUNE, WHICH FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO[illegible]), TO DEMAND RELEASE ALL LABOR AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA. CLASC ALREADY SENT CABLE TO BARRIENTOS IN BOLIVIA DECRYING HIS TREATMENT ORGANIZED LABOR. THESE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE DURING ENTIRE ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF ILO AND PER AMICE-31 COULD WELL BE SOURCE OF DISCOMFORT TO MAJORITY LATIN GOVERNMENTS.

3. SINGLE CENTRAL OF LABOR DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS BUT NOT YET FIRMED UP. PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL TO BE ESTABLISHED, PROBABLY IN CARACAS WITH PRATAS OF URUGUAY AS

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PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5604 SECRET

HEAD. MASPERO LIKELY TO BE NAMED AS SECRETARY GENERAL FOR COMMITTEE. AMICE-31 SAID THAT INCLUSION COMMUNISTS IN CENTRAL NOT BROACHED AND HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT LIKELY IN LIGHT STRONG ATTACK MADE BY MASPERO AGAINST COMMUNISTS DURING SESSIONS. AT ANY RATE, EMPLEMENTATION THIS CONCEPT DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

4. AMICE-31 COMMENTED THAT MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS OF U.S. DURING GATHERINGS HAVE BEEN RAIMUNDO ONGARO OF ARGENTINA AND GALLO OF URUGUAY; HOWEVER, BASIC TENOR ENTIRE GROUP STRONGLY ANTI-US.

5. FOR BUENOS AIRES: POUCHING TAPE 19 MAY TV SHOW IN WHICH ONGARO VIOLENTLY ATTACKED U.S. WHILE PRAISING CUBA.

SECRET

BT

*Being Svcd

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SERVICE

SANTO DOMINGO 5624 PARA 1	24 MAY 65	17932
STA & NR	**DATE**	**IN NR**

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"LABOR ORGANIZATION ([illegible]), TO DEMAND RELEASE"

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284658

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FILE. VR. WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 042028Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2626

4 JUN 68 IN 24511

CARACAS DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

JMDEVIL AMICE

1. DURING NINTH CONGRESS IN SANTO DOMINGO EMILIO MASPERO RENEWED AN OFFER TO AMICE-31 OF A POSITION IN THE CLASC OFFICES IN CARACAS AT A SALARY OF $400 PER MONTH AND ONE WAY AIR FARE. AMICE-31 TOLD MASPERO THAT SALARY WAS NOT ENOUGH IN VIEW HIGH COST OF LIVING IN CARACAS BUT THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER AND GIVE ANSWER BY EARLY JUNE.

284658

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT AMICE-31 FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE BUT THIS SEEMS TO PRESENT WOFIRM AND OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR CLOSELY CLASC PLANNING AND DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENT ON OPERATIONAL NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF STATION CARACAS OFFERING AMCIE-31 SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MOVING FAMILY TO CARACAS AND SOME REGULAR SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME IF AND WHEN HE IN PLACE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

384658

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TOTAL COPIES: 32

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ORIG: Porter J. Goss jam
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6728
DATE: 10 May 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: nf PER ____ #

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CA/PROP, C/OA C-I/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET MAY 10 19 00 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 98637

TO SANTO DOMINGO INFO: JMWAVE

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 5472 (IN 05023)

B. JMWAVE 2310 (IN 05038)

384658

1. HQS ENDORSES AMICE-31 TRAVEL AND SANTO DOMINGO STATION EFFORTS NOTED REF A TO COVER CLASC MEETINGS.

2. REQUEST CABLED REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT HIGHLIGHTS PARTICULARLY ANY EVIDENCE OF MEANINGFUL CLASC PLANS TO PROMOTE JOINT ACTION WITH COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICAN LABOR CIRCLES.

END OF MESSAGE

13 MAY 1968

WH/COG Telecoord (Mr. Wniers)
C/WH/7
WH/CA ✓
AC/CA/B4

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T 262117Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2310

7 MAY 1968

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

7 May 68 IN 05038

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 2309 (IN 05035)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 59355)

284658

1. AMICE-31 WILL ATTEND CLASC CONSEJO BEGINNING 13 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. WILL FORWARD ETA WHEN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FIRM.

2. IT IS AMICE-31 UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL DELEGATES TO BE HOUSED TOGETHER IN INFA. IF SO, THIS FACT, COUPLED WITH PROBABILITY THAT SEVERAL PBRUMEN EXILES WILL TRAVEL AND STICK TOGETHER (SEE REFERENCE A), MAKES IT DIFFICULT LAY ON CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FROM THIS END. REQUEST THAT SANTO DOMINGO STATION PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME BY MEANS WHICH AMICE-31 CAN INITIATE CONTACT. AMICE-31 WILL GIVE HIS NAME SAYING HIS "AMIGO DE MAIRO EN MIAMI". FYI AMICE 31 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH.

3. AMICE 31 BELIEVES THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN EXPLAINING SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL. EACH CLASC AFFILIATE RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING DELEGATE TRAVEL AND IN PRACTICE THIS

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PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2310 SECRET

MEANS THAT HERE EACH DELEGATE IS MAKING HIS OWN PRIVATE COLLECTION AMONG FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES, AND CONCERNED PBRUMEN EXILES. JMWAVE PLANS TO PROVIDE AMICE-31 WITH $250 TO INCLUDE ROUND TRIP TRAVEL AND ALL EXPENSES.

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BT

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S E C R E T 062243Z MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5472

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

6 MAY 68 IN 05023

MHSPAWN ~~DTDORIC~~ PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFS: DIRECTOR 77850

SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 99355)

7 MAY 1968

284658

1. PLEASE ADVISE STATUS AMICE/31 ATTENDANCE CLASC COUNCIL MEETING SET FOR 13 TO 17 MAY AND FIRST "SINDICAL" CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA FROM 20 TO 24 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. STATION IN FAVOR HIS ATTENDANCE DUE TO RELATIONSHIP WITH MASPERO AND FACT THAT NO STATION CONTROLLED ASSETS TO ATTEND MEETINGS.

2. SANTO DOMINGO MOST WILLING HANDLE AMICE/31 WHILE HERE AND WILL FORWARD CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IF DECISION MADE TO SEND HIM.

777370 793238

3. EMDAM/3 AND EMFIST/1 COVERING MEETINGS IN COVER CAPACITIES BUT THEIR ACCESS LIMITED TO FINAL RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT BENEFIT KNOWLEDGE IN-FIGHTING AND NECESSARY COMPROMISES MADE BY DELEGATIONS. STATION ENDEAVORING SECURE INDIRECT COVERAGE THRU EMHELIX/1 AND EMHABIT/5.

275190 748610

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34

SECRET

RIG: Lee G. Mestres:pah
NIT: AC/WH/7/DR
XT: 4537
ATE: 26 February 1968

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET FEB 26 23 17 Z CITE DIRECTOR 77850

27 FEB 1968

PRIORITY
TO JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: CARACAS

201-284658

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 1346 (IN 55924)*
B. CARACAS 8993 (IN 54407)**
C. SANTO DOMINGO 5082 (IN 56151) (NOT SENT JMWAVE OR CARACAS)

1. HQS HAS ACTIVE INTEREST CLASC MEETINGS AND BELIEVES IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE HAVE AMICE-31 ATTEND CLASC COUNCIL MEETING OF REFS. (SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS RE MEETING AND BACKGROUND IN COMPLIANCE REF C.) AS OF TWO YEARS AGO AMICE-31 QUITE CLOSE TO MASPERO AND MAY BE ABLE GIVE US GOOD ACCESS TO INNER MASPERO CLIQUE FOR INTEL PURPOSES. NATURALLY WE WOULD ~~WANT~~ NOT WANT HIM TAKE ACTIVE PART IN SUPPORT OF MASPERO'S POSITION AT CONGRESS. JBDELAPSE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR AMICE-31's EXPENSES UP TO 500 DOLLARS.

2. FOR JMWAVE: COULD AMICE-31 PLAUSIBLY EXPLAIN SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR HIS TRAVEL?

3. FOR SANTO DOMINGO: ALTHOUGH WE IN FAVOR AMICE-31's ATTENDANCE, LEAVE FINAL DECISION TO YOU. HIS HANDLING IN SANTO DOMINGO WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CLOSE; HIS BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING IN JMWAVE AREA BEFORE AND AFTER CONGRESS WOULD BE OF GREATER IMPORTANCE.

4. FYI ALL ADDRESSEES: AMICE-31 WAS ONE OF TWO WOFIRM REPORTING SOURCES ATTENDING FIFTH CLASC CONGRESS HELD PANAMA OCT 66. STATION PANAMA CITY THEN FOUND AGENT COOPERATIVE AND GOOD REPORTER.

END OF MESSAGE (CONTINUED)

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CITE DIRECTOR 77858

TO

PAGE TWO

*AMICE-31 invited to be delegate at ninth CLASC Consejo planned for May 13-17 in Santo Domingo. A-31 could be useful as reporter and/or action agent since he is opposed to CLASC alliance with Marxist groups and in opposition to Emilio Maspero.

**Based on recollection of A-31's previous performance at Bogota CLASC meeting, in which AMICE-31 seemed inclined to Maspero, Caracas sees little point in WOFIRM subsidizing A-31's trip this time, but defers action to Hqs and Santo Domingo.

C/CA BH Tovar

CA/BF Healy

WH/CA

CA/B/4 P. Goss (Telecoord)

WH/COG F. Ames (Telecoord)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

PAUL V. HARWOOD
C/WH/7

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27 FEB 68 IN 53355

S E C R E T 271755Z FEB 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5099

DIRECTOR INFO SAIGON, JMWAVE, ~~LCPIPIT,~~ LONDON, CARACAS

MHSPAWN DTDORIC TUMIX PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 77850

B. DIRECTOR 77134

C. SAIGON 8927 (IN 55474)

D. SANTO DOMINGO 5081 (IN 56156)

28 FEB 1968

NC 284658

1. WELCOME ATTENDANCE AMICE/31 PER REF A. JMWAVE PLSE CABLE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS PLUS SUMMARY BRIEFING GIVEN PRIOR DEPARTURE JMWAVE AREA.

2. RE REFS B AND C; WE HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS REGARDING PROPOSED ATTENDANCE AS OBSERVER OF TUMIX/5. C-31926 AT BEST HE WOULD BE EXTRA-CONTINENTAL FACTOR WITHOUT VOTE AND LITTLE VOICE ON CENTRAL ISSUE OF MASPERO LINE. LATTER ADVOCATES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY EXPLOIT TUMIX/5'S PRESENCE TO INJECT INTO DISCUSSIONS U.S. POSITION VIET NAM, WHICH NOT GERMAIN TO CLASC PROBLEMS AND NOT AN ISSUE IN CONTEXT DOMINICAN POLITICS, DESPITE EFFORTS BY DOMINICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES THROUGH PROP EVENTS LIKE "VIET NAM WEEK" AT UNIVERSITY ABOUT YEAR AGO (WHICH BACKFIRED BECAUSE COMMIES RAISED COMMUNIST FLAG HIGHER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5099 SECRET
THAN DOMINICAN FLAG ON TOP UNIVERSITY BUILDING). THEREFORE WE REQUEST TUMIX/5 TURN DOWN INVITATION, USING REF B SUGGESTION THAT NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS PREVENT HIS ATTENDANCE CLASC MEETING. IN A NUTSHELL, COMMIES HAVE TRIED TO INTERJECT VIET NAM INTO THIS SITUATION WITHOUT SUCCESS, BUT DC NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME TO GIVE THEM FREE RIDE ON MERRY-GO-ROUND IF WE CAN HELP IT.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 072006Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1171 10 OCT 1966

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: PANAMA CITY ~~1119~~ (IN 07778) 984658

7 Oct 66 12485

1. AMICE-31 ETA COSTA RICA 9 OCT. HAD NO TROUBLE AT CLASC CONGRESS PARTICULARLY SINCE GUTIERREZ DOES NOT ENJOY MASPERO FAVOR.

2. A-31 COOPERATIVE, HELPFUL AGENT. ONLY PROBLEM WAS HIS DIFFICULTY IN LEAVING CONGRESS SITE ALONE WHICH PREVENTED FREQUENT CONTACT. THIS NO FAULT OF HIS. LAST CONTACT SCHEDULED 8 OCT. APPRECIATE JMWAVE ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T *Amice-31 Alerted 30 Sept re Possible Attack.

BT

NNNN

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 011745Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1119

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 201-284658

JMDEVIL

1 OCT 63 IN 07778

REF: A. PANAMA CITY 1105 (IN 07300)

B. DIRECTOR 59752 7.6

C. JMWAVE 3341 (IN 07380)

1. AMICE-31 ALERTED 30 SEPTEMBER RE POSSIBLE ATTACK. HE CONFIDENT GUTIERREZ COULD ONLY MAKE OBVITUS CHARGES MENTIONED REF C. BELIEVES REAL SOURCE OF PROBLEM IS PERSONAL. A-31 DISLIKES GUTIERREZ WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS TOO SOFT ON COMMUNISTS. APPARENTLY THIS DISLIKE IS MUTUAL.

2. A-31 CONFIDENT HE WILL HAVE SUPPORT OF OTHER CUBAN DELEGATES AND MASPERO WHO HE CONSIDERS A PERSONAL FRIEND. ALSO FEELS IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OTHER CONGRESS DELEGATES, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE PROBLEM WILL BE SERIOUS. SAYS HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

SECRET

3. NEXT CONTACT WITH A-31 EXPECTED 3 OR 4 OCTOBER DEPENDENT HIS JUDGEMENT OF SITUATION.

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 302313Z CITE JMWAVE 3341

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

30 Sep 63 IN 07380

TYPIC JMDEVIL

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)*

AGREE PACY STATION PLAN TO ALERT AMICE-31 SOONEST OF PARA 1 REF REPORT IN ORDER ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE AND OBTAIN POSSIBLE SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. AMICE-31 AND HIS ORGANIZATION OFFICIALLY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL, AND WITH HIS RECEIVING LEITIMATE INVITATION TO ATTEND CONGRESS BELIEVE HE IN POSITION REBUT POSSIBLE CHARGES. SPECIFIC EXPOSE INFORMATION POSSIBLY POSSESSED BY GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN AT JMWAVE. OBVIOUS CHARGES WOULD PROBABLY EXPOSE AMICE-31 AS FORMER EXILE LABOR LEADER, OLD AMICE COLLABORATOR AND WHOSE ORGANIZATION IS MEMBER OF AMICE, WHICH GENERALLY VIEWED AS WOLADY-SUPPORTED ORGANIZATION.

S E C R E T

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*REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN KNEW JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY U.S.

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S E C R E T 302044Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1109

30 SEP 66 IN 07300

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: JMWAVE 3273 (IN [illegible])

1. STATION SOURCE REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN, DIOGENES GUTIERREZ, STATED JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY US. SPECIFICALLY NAMED AMICE-31 SAYING A-31 WILL BE UNMASKED FROM CONGRESS PODIUM (ASSUMEDLY AT CONGRESS INAUGURATION 2 OCTOBER).

2. STATION HAS NO INDICATION WHAT EVIDENCE GUTIERREZ MIGHT POSSESS. A-31 CONTACTED STATION OFFICER BY PHONE EVENING 29 SEPTEMBER SAYING ONLY THAT HE WITH FRIENDS AND WOULD HAVE TO CALL AGAIN 0600 FOLLOWING MORN. DID NOT CALL FOLLOWING MORN (POSSIBLY DUE TO INOPPORTUNE SITUATION OF DELEGATE LODGING). NO MEETING WITH STATION YET EFFECTED.

3. EXPECT A-31 CALL AGAIN EVENING 30 SEPT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD WARN A-31 OF GUTIERREZ PLAN AND ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE WITH SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. HOWEVER WILL AWAIT JMWAVE CONCURRENCE BEFORE TAKING THIS COURSE. ALTERNATIVE IS TO HAVE A-31 WITHDRAWN FROM CONGRESS POSSIBLY SUFFERING

SECRET

ATTACK IN ABSENCIA. PLEASE ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE.

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ORIG : MR THOMAS J. FLORES
UNIT : C/WH/C
EXT :
DATE : 30 SEPT 1966

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CITE DIRECTOR 39752

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)

SUGGEST AMICE-31 BE WARNED OF PLAN ATTACK HIM AND THAT HE PREPARE DEFENSE AS SUGGESTED REF. HOWEVER DEFER TO WAVE IF OTHER ALTERNATIVE APPEARS PREFERABLE.

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER MR THOMAS J. FLORES C/WH/C

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

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S E C R E T 281547Z CITE JMWAVE 3272

PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: PANAMA ~~CITY~~ 1070 [illegible]

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29 SEP 1968

1. AMICE/31 WILL MAKE CONTACT PER INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA ONE REF.

20 SEP [illegible] 65435

2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AMICE/31 AS FOLLOWS: AGE 33 YEARS, BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, HEIGHT 5' 7", WEIGHT 155 POUNDS, SOLID BUILD, LIGHT SALLOW COMPLEXION, EVEN FEATURES. AMICE/31 FORMED JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA, AND SERVED AS OFFICER IN NATIONAL TRANSPORT FEDERATION. WAS MEMBER 26 JULY MOVEMENT UNTIL 1960 WHEN JOINED ANTI-CASTRO UNDERGROUND AND CAME INTO EXILE. AMICE/31 IS ADHERENT OF CLASC POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND IS CONSIDERED BE PRO-MASPERO, WHOM HE VIEWS AS STRONG, EFFECTIVE LEADER.

AGE 33

S E C R E T

BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 271449Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1070

27 SEP 66 IN 04387

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 37751

B. JMWAVE 3243

1. PREFER NOT TO CONTACT AMICE-31 AT REF IDEN B ADRESS DUE POSSIBLE SECURITY RISKS. REQUEST JMWAVE DIRECT AMICE-31 PHONE (PANAMA) 35551, IDENTIFY SELF AS "RAMON" AND ASK FOR "LUCHO". LUCHO WILL TELL RAMON THAT HE (LUCHO) IS A FRIEND OF PABLO AND ARRANGE MEETING. SUGGEST AMICE-31 CALL LATE EVENING OR EARLY MORNING HOURS.

2. ALSO REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE AMICE-31 DESCRIPTION AND PERTINENT DATA.

SECRET

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3243 27 SEP [illegible]5

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 37751 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)
B. DIRECTOR 37762 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. AMICE/31 (IDENTITY A) ARRIVING PANAMA CITY 29 SEPTEMBER AT 1230 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 511. A/31 ALERTED TO TELEPHONE CALL AT IDENTITY B ADDRESS FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF PABLO". IF STATION WISHES MAKE OTHER CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS, PLS CABLE INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. A/31 BRIEFED PER REFERENCE B GUIDELINES AND WILL SUBMIT REPORT UPON RETURN TO JMWAVE 20 OCTOBER. AMICE/31 PLANS SPEND 12-22 OCTOBER IN SAN JOSE TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH COSTA RICAN TRANSPORT WORKERS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4, WH/CB

SECRET 262322Z CITE JMWAVE 3244

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

27 Sep 68 63094

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3243 ([illegible])

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES CRISTIANOS
AVENIDA 7, CENTRAL 2420
EDIFICIO PREMIER, FIRST FLOOR.

SECRET
BT

SECRET

284658-

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG: NM PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 18 AUG 1967

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
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4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 3 PER #

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 29138

18 22 12Z

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS-7605 (IN 34009)* 284658

1. NO HQS TRACES ON JOSE LUIS ARAGON GARCIA.

2. FOR JMWAVE: REQUEST STATION AND AMOT TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Requested POA for ARAGON TO DIRECT Barquisimeto net.

COORD: WH/COG

for JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

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ORIG : PHYLLIS EDWARDS
UNIT : C/WH/2/CR & N
EXT : 4438
DATE : 14 MARCH 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3 SECRET

TO : MANAGUA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, DDP, DC/WH 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA

TO MANA INFO CITE DIR 87733

REFS: A. MANA-5622 (IN73409)
B. MANA-5623 (IN73411)

OVER

1. VISUALIZE VALUE OF IDEN OF REFS AS POSSIBLE STATION PENETRATION AGENT ONLY IN EVENT HE REMAINS IN NICARAGUA. SINCE VISA REFUSED AL ON BASIS INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES AND LOSS OF SCHOLARSHIP LOGICALLY EXPECTED TO RESULT IN STRONG RESENTMENT AGAINST ODYOKE. ADVISE EXTREME CAUTION IN CONTACT AND APPROACH.

2. ALTHOUGH HQRS NOT SANGUINE FOR ABOVE REASON, NO OBJECTION STATION CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT FOR EVENTUAL ~~XXXX~~ RECRUITMENT AS HOSTILE BODY WITH ALL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES LAID ON FOR PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PBSWING INVOLVEMENT. POA NOT REQUIRED PER CSI-F PARA 18. CNC INITIATED. NO HQS TRACES.

3. RECOMMEND AN INITIAL MEETING UNDER PRETEXT INTERVIEW

(CONTINUED)

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EXT :
DATE :

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

5 March 66

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO MANA INFO CITE DIR 87763

BE USED TO ASSESS SUBJECT, ELICIT BIODATA, DRAW OUT RE FUTURE PLANS AND REASONS FOR DESIRE STATESIDE STUDY, ETC., WITHOUT INDICATING VISA MAY BE REFUSED.

END OF MESSAGE

16 [illegible]

File

201-284654

WH COMMENT: *Luis Hueto Garcia, who Communist youth at Univ School of Engineering applying for US scholarship grant. Station requests POA and proposes recruitment attempt.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Edwin Terrell
EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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No.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________________

______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated ______________________________.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: ______________________________

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

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FORM 6-63 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

4 - FEB 1955

237653

SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	[illegible]	[illegible] INDICES
SET UP FOR OA	SPECIAL INDICES	TRUE NAME CHECK	CRSO	AREA

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQ FOR GREEN LIST
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
✓ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ [illegible] REPORT
CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCES. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		CRSO NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II, ETC. WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT

REMARKS

707

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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BOGOTA

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI

12 JAN 1966

S E C R E T 112101Z

12 Jan 66 IN 31540

WAVE CARA INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6736

AMICE

REF BOGO 6775*

1. FOR WAVE: AMICE/31 WROTE THREE CABLES TO LETTER DROP PROVIDED BY WAVE AND FIRST TWO WERE RETURNED WITH NOTICE THAT NO ONE LIVING AT GIVEN ADDRESS. THIS IS TO ALERT STATION IN CASE ADDITIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE EXPECTED AT THAT DROP.

2. FOR CARA: AMICE/31 PLANS DEPART MEDELLIN 15 JAN AND EXPECTS ARRIVE CARA APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS LATER THAN ANTICIPATED BECAUSE PLANS TRAVEL WITH VENEZUELAN DELEGATION IN CUCUTA, COLOMBIA, PRIOR TO GOING TO CARA. AS STATED REF, AMICE/31 APPEARS BE STRONG PARTISAN FOR JMDEVIL/1. AMICE/31 CLAIMS HE INSTRUMENTAL IN GETTING CLASC COUNCIL TO DENOUNCE TRI CONTINENTAL CONF IN HAVANA (SEE BOGO 6717, SENT DIR ONLY).

SECRET

NO RECORD CABLE SEC AT 7030

CFN 6736 REF 6775 AMICE/31 NO ONE /31 15 JAN 24 HOURS CUCUTA COLOMBIA /31 JMDEVIL/1 /31 CLASC HAVANA 6717

BT

*NLY

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 55

24 SECRET

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FROM BOGOTA

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UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, WE-8, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4, EE-6, WH/C-8, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA/PEG, CI/OA, AF-7

S E C R E T 131820Z

DIR INFO PALP BONN CMNY ROME SAGO LIMA CARA WAVE CITE BOGO 6725

11 JAN 1966

10 JAN 66 IN 30551

DYVOUR JMDEVEL

REFS A. DIR 59025

B. BD 5275

211284

All marked out

1. ON 7 AND 8 JAN DUBOLD/1 WAS MET IN MEDELLIN FOR APPROX ONE HOUR EACH TIME AND REPORTED INFO SET FORTH BELOW, EXCEPT IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE IT IS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT AMICE/31 IS SOURCE. LATTER WAS CONTACTED ON 8 JAN FOR ONE HOUR DEBRIEFING. KRUSKALL RETURNING TO MEDELLIN ON 12 JAN FOR FURTHER DEBRIEFINGS. ADDEES PLS NOTE THAT DUBOLD/1 APPEARS BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO JMDEVIL/1 WHILE AMICE/31 APPEARS BE STRONG PARTISAN OF JMDEVEL/1.

2. INFO ON CONFERENCE:

A. CONFERENCE STARTED ONE DAY LATE DUE TO DELAYED ARRIVAL OF MANY DELEGATES. AS OF 8 JAN THERE WERE 52 DELEGATES, 38 OF WHOM HAVE VOTES. BRITISH HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA DID NOT SEND DELE-

SECRET

SECRET IN 30531 P2

NICS. CISC, MISEREOR AND INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ARE REPRESENTED BY HELMUT PALLA WHO IS THERE AS OBSERVER AND APPARENTLY IS NOT MIXING IN.

B. CONFERENCE HAS BROKEN UP INTO FOUR COMMISSIONS WHICH ARE DRAFTING OR DISCUSSING VARIOUS PROGRAMS TO BE SUBMITTED TO FORTHCOMING CONGRESS: POLITICAL COMMISSION IS HEADED BY EMILO MASPERO; COMMISSION ON DOCTRINE BY JOSE GOLDSACK; COMMISSION ON STATUTES BY EDUARDO GARCIA; AND DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY FULGENCIO BARREIRO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR ATLANTIC STATES.

3. POST CONFERENCE PLANS:

A. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, CISC HAS SENT SEVEN TICKETS WITH NAMES LEFT OPEN FOR COUNCIL DELEGATES TO GO TO BRUSSELS TO DISCUSS MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT DELEGATES NOT PRE~~SENTLY ON~~ EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL BE INCLUDED ON TRIP TO BRUSSELS. AMICE/31 STATED THAT ENTIRE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL GO TO BRUSSELS.

38 4655

B. AFTER DELEGATES RETURN FROM BRUSSELS, A CONFERENCE OF CARIBBEAN AFFLILIATES IS SLATED TO TAKE PLACE IN GUATEMALA UNDER DIRECTION OF AUGUSTO BONILLA.

C. QUESTION OF WHERE CONGRESS WILL TAKE PLACE NOT YET RESOLVED. BOTH AGENTS HAD HEARD THAT SANTO DOMINGO HAD BEEN PICKED AS SITE

SECRET

IN 30551 Pg 3

B FORTHCOMING CONGRESS AND BOTH AGREED TO WORK BEHIND SCENES TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. AMICE/31 CITED PANAMA, CARACAS OR SANTIAGO AS SITES WHERE CONGRESS WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE. BOTH AGREED THAT IT IS SCHEDULED FOR MAY 66. HONOR OF BEING HOST TO CONGRESS IS MITIGATED BY FACT THAT HOST AFFILIATE MUST PAY AT LEAST 30 ? PER CENT OF CONFERENCE COST.

4. SIGNS OF DISSENSION IN CLASC: DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT JMDEVIL/1 AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ARE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE AT COUNCIL MEETING.

A. JMDEVIL/1 HAS APPARENTLY ALIENATED LEADERS OF A NUMBER OF AFFILIATES. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, CHILEAN REPS HAVE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT JMDEVIL/1 ~~WAS~~ LIVING BEYOND HIS SALARY AND THEY ARE THINKING OF ACCUSING HIM OF HIGH LIVING AT EXPENSE OF FUNDS PROVIDED TO CLASC BY CISC. HE APPARENTLY HAS BOUGHT A HOUSE AND OWNS A CAR, AND THIS IS RESENTED.

B. ACCORDING TO DUBOLD/1, HELIO APONTE WHO REPRESENTS CUSIC, OPENLY ACCUSED MASPERO OF TURNING AGAINST HIS OLD FRIENDS IN CLASC SUCH AS GOLDSACK.

C. PRO MASPERO ARE: MEXICAN AND ALL CARIBBEAN AFFILIATES FOR TOTAL OF 14 VOTES. REP OF VENEZUELAN COMITE UNITARIO DE

SECRET

IN 30551-I24

SINDICALISTAS APPARENTLY ALSO PRO MASPERO, AS IS COLOMBIAN DELEGATE HELIODORO AGUEDELO.

D. ANTI MASPERO FORCES ARE: SOLID BLOC OF NINE CAMPESINO VOTES, MOST OF DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AMERICAN AFFILIATES AND ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN HELPING DUBOLD/1 ARE LUIS QUIROGQ AND JUAN ARCO FROM CHILE, ANTONIO CARDOZ FROM URUGUARY AND JOSE LARA SALCEDO FROM BOLIVIA. ALSO ANTI MASPERO IS HELIO APONT OF VENEZUELA.

5 4. PROPOSED MOVE OF SECRETARIAT: JMDEVIL/1'S DESIRE TO MOVE SECRETARIAT FROM SAGO TO CARA APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRE RID HIMSELF OF PRESENT SECRETARIAT MEMBERS AND STRENGTHEN HIS HAND. SUCH A MOVE WOULD ENABLE HIM GET RID OF JOSE GOLDSACK WHO, DUE TO EXPENSE INVOLVED IN MOVING LARGE FAMILY, WOULD BE UNABLE MAKE MOVE TO CARA. JMDEVEL/1 WOULD LIKE REPLACE HIM AND OTHER MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WITH EDUARDO GARCIA, JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS, HENRI MOLINA FROM SDCM AND AMICE/31. (COMMENT: THIS PROBABLY EXPLAINS AMICE/31 PARTISANSHIP FOR JMDEVIL/1.) OTHER JMDEVIL/1 REASON FOR SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE TO BE PHYSICALLY NEAPER TO AFFILIATES WHO ARE GIVING HIM SULL SUPPORT; I.E., CARIBBEAN AFFILIATES. DUBOLD/1 STATES THAT THIS PROPOSED MOVE WILL BE OPPOSED BY SOLID BLOC OF CAMPESINOS AND MOST DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AMERICAN AFFILIATES

SECRET

SECRET IN 36051 P.5

AD HENCE WILL PROBABLY BE DEFEATED. DUBCLO/1 BELIEVES SEAT OF SECRETARIAT WILL REMAIN IN SAGO, AND IF NOT THERE, HE WILL PROPOSE IT MOVE TO LIMA,

5. FUTURE FINANCING OF AFFILIATES:

A. MATTER OF HOW FUNDS FROM CISC, MISEREOR AND IIS WILL BE HANDLED HAD NOT BEEN TABLED BY 8 JAN, BUT AMICE/31 STATED THAT SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE OVER THREE YEAR PERIOD FOR EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES BY THE THREE FUNDS. METHODS AND MEANS OF FUNDING ADDITIONAL ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS TO CLASC AFFILIATES FOR OVERHEAD APPARENTLY WILL BE DISCUSSED IN BRUSSELS MEETING.

B. DUBCLO/1 LEARNED FROM ANDRES MERCAU THAT JMDEVIL/1 IS TRYING OBTAIN FUNDS FROM LIBIO LABO, PRESIDENT OF ACLI. MERCAU ALLEGED THAT ACLI LEADERS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH AFRICANS (AND SPECIFICALLY CONGOLESE GROUP) AND WERE PUTTING OUT FEELERS TO ASIAN LABOR GROUPS, AND THAT JMDEVIL/1 PUSHING THIS AS HOPES TO OBTAIN [illegible] FINANCIAL HELP FROM ACLI.. (COMMENT: CIFW 24793 IS OF SPECIAL INTEREST AS REGARDS CLASC ATTEMPTS SEEK FINANCIAL HELP FROM ACLI.)

SECRET

SECRET

IN 35557

7. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL INFO: DUBOLD/1 IS ATTEMPTING ASCERTAIN WHICH DELEGATES RECEIVED THEIR TICKETS TO MEDELLIN MEETING FROM CLASC SECRETARIAT AND WHICH RECEIVED THEIRS FROM CISC OR OTHER SOURCES. THIS INFO WOULD BE INDICATIVE OF WHICH DELEGATES ARE PRO MASPERO. FOR EXAMPLE, AUGUSTO CIPRIANI FROM PERU RECEIVED HIS TICKETS DIRECTLY FROM CISC. DUBOLD/1 CLAIMS THAT HIS DELEGATION RECEIVED FORMAL INVITATION TO ATTEND THE COUNCIL MEETING ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE IT OPENED.

8. FOR DIR PALP: IF WORD COULD REACH DUBOLD/1 AND HIS COHORTS THAT CISC AND GPASHEN NOT BACKING DOWN ON FUNDING ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED IN 19 NOV LETTER, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND IN OPEN OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL.

9. FOR SAGO: ~~IS DI~~ IF DIC CONCURS AND SAGO ABLE TO PLACE ARTICLE INSINUATING THAT JMDEVIL/1 LIVING ABOVE HIS INCOME, BELIEVE IT WOULD PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE FLAMES BEING SPREAD BY DUBOLD/1 AND GROUP OPPOSED TO JMDEVIL/1.

10. FOR LIMA, WAVE, CAPA: OPS CABLES FOLLOW.

11. LIST OF DELEGATES WILL BE MAILED TO ALL ADDEES.

SECRET

SECRET SECRET IN 30551 7/4/7

[illegible] 6129 A 69905 P ID 5275 7 9 DUSOLT/1 [illegible] ANTICO/31

KUSKALL 12 PLS /1 JIDYVIL/1 /31 /1 ? 52 03 INITIAL HONDURAS
NICARAGUA NOT SENT CISC MISREP NELMUS PALLA NOT [illegible] EMILIO

MASPERO JOSE GOLDSACK EDUARDO GARCIA FULGENCIO PAREIRO /1 [illegible]

/1 NOT PRESENTLY /31 A GUATEMALA AUGUSTO BONILLA NOT YET SANTO

DOMINGO /31 PANAMA CARACAS SANTIAGO 55 37 PERCENT CLASC /1 /1

/1 A /1 CHILEAN /1 CLASC CISC A A /1 HELIO [illegible] [illegible]

PRO MASPERO 14 COMITE UNITARIO DE SINDICALISTAS [illegible]

AGUDELO ANTI SOUTH AMERICAN /1 LUIS QUIROGA JUAN ARCO ANTONIO

CARDOZO URUGUARY JOSE LARA SALCEDO BOLIVIA TIME A JOSE GOLDSACK

/1 EDUARDO GARCIA JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS HENRI MOLINA /31 /31

/1 /1 A I E /1 CAMPESINOS STUIH AMERICAN /1 NOT THERE LIMA

CISC MISREOP NOT BEEN 8 /31 CLASC /1 ANDRES MERCAU /1

[illegible] LABOR ACLI ACLI /1 ACLI CIPW 24773 CLASC ACLI /1 CLASC

[illegible] AUGUSTO CIPRIANI PERU CISC /1 A /1 CISC NOT [illegible]
[illegible] /1 /1 /1 /1 OPS

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FROM Jmwave

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SE C R E T 042124Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 8213 (INGHURST ACTING)

DYVOUR JMDEVIL PBRUMEN

4 JAN 65 IN 26417

REF A. BOGO 6698 (IN 26107)

B. WAVE 7069 (IN 88240)

C. DIR 69005

D. WAVE 8379 (BEING RELAYED BOGO CARA) (IN 21016)

E. WAVE 8132 (IN 23524)

1. RE REF A, AMICE/31 IS IDEN A OF REF B. ALTHO HIS GROUP IS JMDEVIL AFFILIATE, AMICE/31 HAS NO OFFICIAL JMDEVIL POSITION. PER REF E, AMICE/31 INSTRUCTED CABLE MEDELLIN ADDRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WAVE WILL ADVISE BOGO PRIORITY WHEN INFO RECEIVED. IN INTERIM BOGO MAY WISH ATTEMPT CONTACT CARE OF IDEN.

2. AMICE/31 WAS BRIEFED ON BASIS REF C PRIOR HIS 2 JANUARY BOGO DEPARTURE.

3. REF D, WHICH CONTAINS WAVE ASSESSMENT OF AMICE/31, BEING RELAYED FOR INFORMATION BOGO AND CARA.

211284

SECRET

CFN: 8213 INGHURST ACTING 6698 7069 69005 8379 8132 RE A AMICE/31 A B AMICE/31 NO OFFICIAL E /31 MEDELLIN /31 C 2 D /31

201-

SECRET

5 JAN 65

[illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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7, SECRET

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S E C R E T 042124Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CARA CITE WAVE 8214 (INGHURST ACTING)

DYVOUR JMDEVIL PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 8213 (IN 26417)

IDEN: HELIODORO AGUEDELO
CALLE 70 A, NO. 51-73
MEDELLIN

4 JAN 66 IN 26411

S E C R E T

CFN: 8214 INGHURST ACTING 8213 HELIODORO AGUDELO CALLE 70 A NO. 51-72 MEDELLIN.

BT

SECRET

NNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OA

SECRET 041444Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6698

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL

PLS REPLY BOGO 6685.(IN 24114)*

SECRET

4 J[illegible] 26107

26107

* REQUESTED TRUE NAME & POSITION OF AMICE/31 201-284658

CFN

: 6698 PLS REPLY BOGO 6685.

BT

SECRET

4 JAN 1966

R. POLLARD
ORIG : J. DISTEFANO:bv
UNIT : WH/CA-CA/4
EXT : 5006
DATE : 30 DEC 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES: 37

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TO : JMWAVE, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, BOGOTA, SANTIAGO, CARACAS, LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, WH/C8, WE8, CA2, CA/O4, CA/PROP, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

TO WAVE LIMA (PRIORITY) INFO MEXI BOGO SAGO CARA PALP (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 69005

JMDEVIL/LIRAZZ

REF: A. PALP 4997 (IN 94537) (NOT SENT WAVE)

B. HMMA-27843 (NOT SENT WAVE)

C. WAVE 8136 (IN 23509) (NOT SENT OTHER ADDES)

D. LIMA 8202 (IN 23469) (SENT BOGO, SAGO ONLY)

[illegible]

1. FOLLOWING INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR WAVE AND LIMA BRIEFINGS/ REQUIREMENTS OF ~~DUBOLD-1~~ AND AMICE-31, BUT WILL ALSO SERVE OTHER ADDEES AS INTEL REPORTING GUIDELINE FOR JMDEVIL MEDELLIN MTG.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN JMDEVIL FIELD IS DECISION BY ZRGAMIN TO FUND JMDEVIL AFFILIATES DIRECTLY, THUS DEPRIVING JMDEVIL-1 OF HIS MOST WEIGHTY CLUB FOR KEEPING AFFILIATES IN LINE AND STIFLING ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1 AND HIS POLICIES.

Do we have anything?

3. CURRENT INDICATION IS THAT ZRGAMIN STILL HOLDING TO REF A POSITION, THOUGH ~~JMDEVIL-1~~ XEXX CONTINUES ACT LIKE HE HAS FINAL SAY IN ALLOCATION OF ZRGAMIN FUNDS TO AFFILIATES. IN ABSENCE ANY HARD INTEL THAT ZRGAMIN HAS CHANGED ITS STANCE, WE CONCLUDE JMDEVIL-1 IS BLUFFING, BIDING TIME, XXXXXX MANEUVERING TO CREATE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE NO
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ROUTING

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UNIT :
EXT :
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☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 65005

PAGE TWO

SITUATION AT MEDELLIN MTG WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY FORCE ZRGAMIN TO RETURN TO OLD PRACTICE OF FUNDING JMDEVIL AFFILIATES VIA JMDEVIL HQS.

4. NEW PROPOSED STATUTES THAT JMDEVIL WILL SUBMIT AT MEDELLIN (ATT TO REF B) CONTAIN SEVERAL TWISTS THAT APPEAR AIMED AT LIMITING AFFILIATE AUTHORITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION, PRESSURING ZRGAMIN TO REVERSE ITS REF A STAND, AND STRENGTHENING JMDEVIL-1 EXECUTIVE CONTROL. WE VIEW FOLLOWING AS MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES THAT ASSETS SHOULD OPPOSE:

A. ARTICLE EIGHT G STIPULATES THAT ONLY ~~[illegible]~~ JMDEVIL CAN REPRESENT AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS IN RELATIONS WITH HEMISPHERIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENTITITES. STRICTLY INTERPRETED, THIS ARTICLE BLOCKS DIRECT AFFILIATE RELATIONS WITH ZRGAMIN, THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (THRU THE INSTITUTE FOR INT. SOLIDARITY) AND THE GERMAN BISHOPS (THRU THE MISEREOR FUND). IF THIS ARTICLE APPROVED JMDEVIL-1 WOULD HAVE BASIS [illegible] ARGUING THAT ZRGAMIN RESCIND ITS DECISION TO FUND [illegible] AFFILIATES DIRECTLY, FOR SUCH ACTION [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE THREE

B. ART 15 CALLS FOR ALL AFFILIATES TO ACT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF JMDEVIL AS WELL AS THE DECISIONS OF THE CONGRESS, COUNCIL AND EXEC COMMITTEE. FAILURE TO COMPLY CAN RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF AFFILIATE BY ACTION OF EXEC COMMITTEE PENDING FINAL DECISION OF NEXT COUNCIL OR CONGRESS. EXEC COMMITTEE COULD PRESUMABLY SUSPEND AFFILIATE FOR DEALING WITH OR ACCEPTING SUBSIDY FROM INT ORGANIZATIONS IF ARTICLE EIGHT C APPROVED.

C. ARTICLE NINE A IMPLIES THAT CAMPESINO ORGANIZATIONS CANNOT EXIST AS ORGANICALLY SEPARATE ENTITIES. ARTICLE 12 APPEARS PERMIT THE EXISTENCE OF LIRAZZ WITHOUT NAMING IT, BUT ONLY IF ITS AFFILIATES ARE PART OF NATIONAL [illegible] AND THUS ALREADY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL. IN [illegible] THE [illegible] PROVISIONS APPEAR BE TO LIMIT LIRAZZ [illegible] WHICH VERY SORE POINT WITH JMD[illegible]

D. ARTICLE 44 PROVIDES THAT [illegible] (WHICH INCLUDES LIRAZZ SEC GEN AND ASST SEC GEN) [illegible] RESIDE IN CITY WHERE JMDEVIL SECRETARIAT [illegible] LOCATED. [illegible] AIM

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4 8

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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PAGE FOUR

THIS AIM IS TO CLOSE DOWN LIRAZZ OFFICES IN MEXICO CITY, BRING ITS OPERATIONS AND LEADERSHIP UNDER REPRESSIVE WING OF SECRETARIAT. JMDEVIL-1 TRIED THIS ONCE BEFORE AND FAILED. REAL BATTLE EXPECTED DEVELOP ON THIS ISSUE.

E. ARTS ONE AND TWO PROPOSE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN STATUTES. NO MENTION IS MADE OF CHRISTIAN NATURE OR INSPIRATION OF AFFILIATES. IT WOULD NOW SUFFICE TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLES, PROGRAMS, AND STATUTES OF JMDEVIL TO GAIN AFFILIATION. IF APPROVED DOOR MIGHT BE OPENED TO X ASSORTED LEFT-LEANING GRPS WITHOUT CHRISTIAN LABEL.

5. FOLLOWING REPORTING OF PRIORITY INTEREST:

A. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT JMDEVIL-1 PLANNING OUST JMDEVIL PRESIDENT AND TREASURER. JMDEVIL-1 CHOICE AS NEW PRESIDENT WAS IDEN A BUT OPPOSITION TOO GREAT AND IDEN B (WHO REPORTEDLY GOOD MAN) NOW APPEARS [illegible] THAN [illegible]. IF IDEN B BECOMES PRESIDENT HE EXPECTED ASSIST LRS [illegible] CARA. HQS BELIEVES CHANGE WILL MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE [illegible] POSTURE AS LONG AS JMDEVIL-1 [illegible]

SECRET

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CITE DIR 69005

PAGE FIVE

B. LISTING OF AFFILIATE LEADERS PRO AND CONTRA JMDEVIL-1. IF ZRGAMIN SUBSIDIZES INDIVIDUAL AFFILIATES BETWEEN NOW AND HOLDING OF CONGRESS (TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR MAY) CAN WE EXPECT NATIONAL LEADERS TO ORGANIZE FULL BLOWN CAMPAIGN TO DEPOSE JMDEVIL-1? IS THERE ~~XXXXXX~~ ANY ONE LEADER RECOGNIZED AS HEADING OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1?

C. ARE LIRAZZ LEADERS GENERALLY MORE MILITANT IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO JMDEVIL-1 AND HIS POLICIES THAN OTHER AFFILIATE LEADERS? HOW STRONG IS CAMPESINO LEADERS' BELIEF THAT SPECIAL RURAL LABOR PROBLEMS DEMAND HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY WITHIN JMDEVIL?

D. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL PROBABLY CONFER WITH ZRGAMIN LEADERS IN EUROPE FOLLOWING MEDELLIN MTG. DETAILS OF AGENDA, JMDEVIL-1 PLANNED TACTICS IN LIGHT OUTCOME MEDELLIN MTG REQUESTED.

E. JMDEVIL-1 ATTEMPTING REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON ZRGAMIN AND GERMANS. IS HE ATTEMPTING DEVELOP FRENCH, ITALIAN, OTHER SOURCES?

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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PAGE SIX.

F. WHAT IS CONSENSUS OF AFFILIATE LEADERS RE DETERMINATION ZRGAMIN FUND AFFILIATES DIRECTLY? IF ZRGAMIN BACKS DOWN AND REVERTS TO OLD SYSTEM OF FUNDING THRU JMDEVIL HQS, WILL SOME AFFILIATES BE LIKELY DISAFFILIATE? WHICH ONES?

G. DID JMDEVIL PAY FOR TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATIONS OF ALL DELEGATES TO MEDELLIN? IF SO WHAT IS SOURCE OF MONEY IN VIEW REPORTS JMDEVIL SUFFERING SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND ZRGAMIN OPPOSED TO HOLDING MEDELLIN MTG?

H. DATE AND PLACE OF JMDEVIL CONGRESS?

6. WAVE: LYNER REGRETS UNABLE TRAVEL WAVE FOR BRIEFING AMICE-31.

7. BOGO OR CARA: WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OBTAIN DEBRIEFING AMICE-31 SOON AFTER TERMINATION MEDELLIN MTG, SINCE HE WILL BE ATTENDING MTGS IN CARA AFTER MEDELLIN AND WILL NOT RETURN WAVE UNTIL END JAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/4 [illegible]
WH/1
WH/3

JACOB D. ESTERLINE, C/WH [illegible] G. [illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8 CI/OA FI FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 301719Z

WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO 6685 201-284658 wh/1

30 DEC 65 IN 24114

PBRUMEN/JMDEVEL

REF: WAVE 8132 (23534)

1. REQUEST TRUE NAME AND POSITION IN CLASS OF AMICE/31.

2. STATION WILL CONTACT AMIC[illegible] 27 IN MEDELLIN AS PER PARA 2 OF REF.

S E C R E T

CFN 6685 REF 8132 CLASS AMICE/31 [illegible] MEDELLIN 2

BT

3 JAN 1966

File

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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BOGOTA

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UNIT	TIME	BY

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S E C R E T [illegible]

WAVE INFO DIR CITE BOGO [illegible]

30 DEC 65 IN 23957

201-284658

JMDEVIL LIRAZZ

REF DIR 67459 *

~~PLS~~ ADVISE.

S E C R E T CFN

* ~~Re~~ AMICE-31 PARTICIPATION CLASC MEETING, HQS HAS NO OBJECTION BOGO CONTACT AMICE-31. DEFERRED TO WAVE FOR CONCURRENCE.

[illegible] 6688 REF DIR 67459 PLS [illegible]

BT

SECRET

3 JAN 1966

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - SC#291427

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown RFR
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/C/RR/OA - W. Ullery

NUMBER
201- 284658

SUBJECT
AMICE/31

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
CI/OA

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an ~~individual~~ as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Subject's POA is herewith extended until 30 September 1965 to allow additional time for the completion of the OA investigation.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	29 June 1965

SECRET

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 29 JUN 1965

CASE NO.: 254658

	SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FOR INDICE	DATE
✓	SET UP FOR OA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
✓	EXTEND POA ~~[illegible]~~ UNTIL 30 SEPT 65		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
✓	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ☐ ATTACHMENT ☑ PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA: ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LOFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE PRQ I & II
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
	REQUEST: ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II		OTHER

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

WH/C/RE/OA - W ULLERY

SUBJECT'S POA IS HEREWITH EXTENDED UNTIL 30 SEPT 1965 TO ALLOW ADDITIONAL TIME FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE OA INVESTIGATION.

SIGNATURE

☐ [illegible]

FORM 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMICE/31
201-284658

Attached herewith are two copies of Subject's PRQ Part I and one copy of a PRQ Part II. An OA is requested.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FEB 17 5 AM '65

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA".
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Rec)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

[illegible]

5. DATE OF BIRTH

[illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH

[illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

[illegible]

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

[illegible]

FEB 17 11 53 AM '65

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT IN	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE		

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

[illegible]

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING, ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPHS AND FINGERPRINTS IF AVAILABLE

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

[illegible]

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]	[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]			

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK*	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

[illegible]

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

[illegible]

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

[illegible]

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

[illegible]

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

14-00000

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PRQ NO.

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 5a, 9, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Contacted by Keith C. Rongiero in May 1964 when Subject was debriefed after his trip to Venezuela for May 1st celebration and [illegible] Congress.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject can be turned over to any Spanish speaking case officer

FEB 17 11 [illegible] '65

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

Subject knows Rongiero as Mr. [illegible], and [illegible] in true name.

FORM 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1

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(4-20)

SECRET

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (*Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use such a comment such as "anti-communist".*)

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (*If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.*)

[illegible]

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

[illegible] house.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

[illegible] member of [illegible] since 1947 and always [illegible]

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (*Will work*) (*Is working*) [illegible]

[illegible] for.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (*Agents, relatives, friends*) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

[illegible]

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

[illegible]

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

If employed [illegible] international labor organization or [illegible] of [illegible], subject can supply information regarding the organization, personalities, inter-relationships, etc. [illegible] capacity in liberated [illegible].

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

[illegible] in the labor field. [illegible]

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE.

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY.

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY. AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

[illegible]

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

[illegible]

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED
[illegible]	[illegible]

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible]

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

[illegible]

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

[illegible]

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para 43b, supra)*

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, [illegible] WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE. WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
WH/SA/IOS - W. Ullery

NUMBER
201 - 284658

SUBJECT
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
22 January 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA reinstated until 26 April 1965 to allow for submission of PRQ Part I and PRQ Part II on Subject per WH/SA/IOS request of 22 January 1965.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 January 1965

FORM 125

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 26 JAN 1965	CASE NO. 201- 284658

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐	EXPEDITE FOR INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR CA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK		AREA	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
✓	REINSTATE POA FOR 90 DAYS UNTIL 26 APR 1965	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FOI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	FICHLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

WH/SA/105-

POA REINSTATED UNTIL 26 APRIL 1965 TO ALLOW FOR SUBMISSION OF PRQ PARTS I + II ON SUBJ PER WH/SA REQUEST OF 22 JAN 1965.

2/22

SIGNATURE ☐

707

SECRET

SECRET

22 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Reinaldo PICO Ramon
201-284658
C-85445

Please reinstate Subject's POA for 60 days. A PRQ Part I and II was requested from the Field on 22 January 1965 via cable.

for John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH(SA)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

JAN 22 [illegible] '65

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SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 January 1965 Jb

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/SA/IOS

ATTENTION: Wendell Ullery

C# 201 - 284658

The file on PICO Ramon, Reinaldo is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE: 17 DEC 64	NO.: 284658
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES — DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA
USE			

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ COLLATERAL REPORT
✓	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
✓	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT		

REMARKS

15 JAN 1965

CANCELLED
[illegible] SECURITY

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SIGNATURE ☐

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 15 JUN 1964

CASE NO.: 284658

☐	SET UP FOR POA	☐	EXPEDITE INDICES
DATE		☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
DATE			
☐	SET UP IN CA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐	COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☒	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LIFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SO #224428

Leonard W. Tate

SIGNATURE

FORM 707

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE 10 JUN 1964
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI

CS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

d

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	4 JUN 1964	CASE NO. C-55445

☒	SET UP FOR POA	☒	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE 11 June 64	☐	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐	SET UP FOR OA	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐	AGENT NAME CHECK	AREA Miami Area	

CSI

PA/Prop asset

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

OS - Miami FBI no derogatory info
(Subject had POA previously)

Leonard W. Tate

FORM 707

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always hand carry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 2 June 1964

TO:
- XX / OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Wendell Ullery
WH/SA/IO
G G 14

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Reinaldo PICO Ramon

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI OA FILE NO. C-85445

RI 201 FILE NO. 284658

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL (RENEWAL)		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

JMWAVE area

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

PA/PROP asset - for use in Covert Action ops.

(DEADLINE - 11 June 64)

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?	X	
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? X YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO. 152512

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. JMWAVE & MIAMI FBI		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Jerry Ott	7646	Bruce B. Cheever

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PRQ PART I

NAME : Reinaldo PICO Ramon

DPOB : 21 July 1933, Regla, Havana, Cuba

OCCUPATION : Businessman

RESIDENCE : Miami, Fla.

SPOUSE : Carmen Marcela Pino

FATHER : Regino PICO

MOTHER : Maria de la Paz Ramon

PAST ACTIVITIES : Member of Brigade 2506; Member of the Prisoners Exchange Commission. Subject refused to return to Cuba after the negotiations failed.

SECRET

SECRET

1 May 1961

Due to the cessation of JMATE activity CI/OA is suspending all processing of these cases until new interest is apparent.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/C

Attn: Joseph Piccolo

NUMBER C-85445

SUBJECT Reinaldo PICO Ramon

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA originally granted on 14 Oct 1960 is hereby extended for a period of 180 days until 14 Oct 1961.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	18 April 1961 jfd

FORM 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE: 17 Apr 61	CASE NO. 25945

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
X	EXTEND POA FOR 180 DAYS UNTIL 14 Oct 61		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
	FILE		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:		OTHER

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Cuba
Attn: Joseph Piccolo

NUMBER
C-85445

SUBJECT
Reinaldo PICO Ramon

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
21 September 1960

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Thomas Carroll Jr

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	14 October 1960 ada

FORM 2-59 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 14/4/60

CASE NO. C-85445

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR: ☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
✓	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE ---- COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
	FILE		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:	✓	OTHER

REMARKS:

(POA- granted)

SIGNATURE

SECRET

DATE: 28 September 1960 ada

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C 85445
OA: 224428

Thomas Carroll Jr

THOMAS CARROLL, JR
Chief, CI/OA

ATTACHMENTS. (if any) copy WH/4 memo dtd 26 Sept 60

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 28 Sept 60	CASE NO. C-35445

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitation or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. LNK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓ FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ copy WH/4 memo TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE WH/4 memo dtd 26 Sept 60	NOTICE ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

T - 5 Oct 60

SIGNATURE

SECRET

26 September 1956

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Drew Kohler

FROM : WH/4/Ops Support

SUBJECT : Reinaldo PICO y Ramon
C-85445

1. The following is the birth date of Subject received in correspondence subsequent to the original request for clearance that was forwarded to your office. It is requested that this information be included in your files.

(a) Date of birth: 21 July 1933

(b) Place of birth: Regla, Cuba

SEP 26 4 33 PM 56

Jacob D. Esterline
C/WH/4

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

J. Piccolo/ds

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 21 Sept 60 per

PROJECT:

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATTEN: Mr. Ralph Tobiassen 2605 rja
FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT : C 85445
NO.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: only ☒ POA ☐ OA ☐ SPEC. INQ. ☐ CRC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: ☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY: 22 Sept 60

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED BY (Date): 27 Sept 60

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT: WH/4/Cuba

6. USE OF SUBJECT: PM Agent

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF: ☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☒ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES: ni of v

RI TRACES: ndi

DIVISION TRACES: ndi

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ-PART 1 ☒ OTHER: bio

12. REMARKS

JMARC

P.O.A.
EXPEDITE
CI/OA Advis
Date

INITIALS

FORM 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 21 Sept 60	CASE NO

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

✓ SET UP FOR POA only ☑ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES 22 Sept ☑ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES 27 Sept 60

SET UP FOR.
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE — COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
FILE	NOTICE ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

Use: PM Agent

PRIORITY

2605 - I (Tibur...)

H/C

JMARC

SIGNATURE

707

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)*	DATE [illegible]
TO: X CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: [illegible] C. [illegible], Jr. [illegible] 2115 Barton Hall [illegible]
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Reinaldo RICO Ramon	PROJECT JMARC
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO.
	SO FILE NO.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE

For use in JMARC PM Activities program.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X YES		NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		YES	X NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 104536

FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED WITH EVALUATION		NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

	NO RECORD	X	RECORD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

	NO RECORD	X	RECORD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER [illegible] Jr.	EXTENSION [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 772 [illegible]

SECRET

Reinaldo PICO Ramon

1934

Cuba

Cuban

Formerly held high office in Bus Worker's Union.
To be used in JMARC PM activities program.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 18

ORIG: Robert Bladergroen:new
UNIT: CSC
EXT: 7331
DATE: 30 June 1967 R-1835

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

RS SEC

CONF: OGC 2 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . c/WH/COG 5. c/WH 6

c/ci, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

30 15 49Z

CITE DIRECTOR 15915

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC

AMCLEVE-15

REF DIRECTOR 15805

1. REQUEST STATION TRACES ALBERT LARRAIN MAESTRE.

2. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADVISES HE A FUGITIVE UNDER NARCOTICS INDICTMENT AND ALLEGEDLY ADMITTED TO AMCLEVE-15 HIS INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBINGS WITH ROSENTHAL. REQUEST STATION COMMENT AMCLEVE-15 EVER RECEIVE SUCH ADMISSION FROM LARRAIN MAESTRE.

3. NO HQS TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED LCH CS

FROM 30

ACTION C/WH/COG5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐

ACTION

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, C/WH6, C/CI, CC 2, ADDP,

30 Jun 67 M 02 20

02284

S E C R E T 302022Z CITE JMWAVE 7953

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REFERENCE: A. DIRECTOR 15805

B. DIRECTOR 15915

1. ANSWERS KEYED TO QUESTIONS IN REF A AS FOLLOWS:

A. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT VOLUNTEER SELF TO LOCAL FBI. HE DID REPORT TO JMWAVE, WHICH IN TURN INFORMED FBI. FBI THEN APPROACHED AMCLEVE/15 ON THEIR OWN DURING LATE JULY 65 AND QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT JULY 65 DEAL.

B&C. JMWAVE INFORMED FBI ON 24 JULY 65 (SEE A ABOVE)

D. SINCE AMCLEVE/15 FAILED TO REPORT OCT 66 TRANSACTION TO JMWAVE UNTIL 9 JUNE 67, FBI NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL 15 JUNE 67. (AMCLEVE/15'S EXPLANATION FOR NOT REPORTING OCT 66 TRANSACTION WAS THAT HE "JUST FORGOT")

E. SEE PARA 2 BELOW.

F. SOURCES WERE LOCATED IN THE MIAMI AREA ONLY.

G. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE DID NOT RECEIVE ANY MONEY FOR OCT 66 TRANSACTION; ONLY MONEY AMCLEVE/15 EVER REPORTED

SECRET

RECEIVING WAS $500 FROM ROSENTHAL DURING JULY 65. ROSENTHAL HAD INSISTED AMCLEVE/15 TAKE $500; TO AVOID ANY ROSENTHAL SUSPICION OF AMCLEVE/15, LATTER WAS INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO TAKE THE MONEY. AMCLEVE/15 WAS ALLOWED BY STATION TO KEEP THE $500.

2. AMCLEVE/15 UNABLE TO RECALL ALL DETAILS OF JULY 65 DEAL. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE ONLY PASSED TO DIEGO (BORGES) TORRES (201-284161) 6 GRENADES WHICH AMCLEVE/15 OBTAINED FROM HERMINIO (DIAZ) SANDALIO (201-203040). BORGES IN TURN PASSED THEM TO ROSENTHAL. (BORGES AND NORMAN ROTHMAN WERE ACTING AS AGENTS FOR ROSENTHAL). FRANCISCO (RODRIGUEZ) TAMAYO (201-293114) MADE SILENCERS. RODRIGUEZ AND AMCLEVE/15 JOINTLY DELIVERED THEM TO BORGES. JMWAVE RECORDS DO NOT SHOW WHERE DIAZ OBTAINED THE GRENADES.

3. AS REPORTED IN REF AMCLEVE/15 IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE FBI AND FOLLOWING THEIR INSTRUCTIONS RE ROSENTHAL.

4. ~~RE REF B. NO JMWAVE TRACES LARRAIN. AMCLEVE/15~~
REPORTED
~~LARRAIN INFO TO FBI 2W TO JMWAVE ON 27~~ JUNE 67 ~~7,3 67OL~~ STATING ~~HOWEVER THAT~~
IT WAS ONE DOMINGO (ECHEMENDIA)
~~ESCALANTE (201-2979405~~ WHO ~~HAD SAID THAT~~ LARRAIN WAS IN CHARGE ~~)-44-8, 2- 8, : -4&3~~

PARA 4

"AMCLEVE/15 REPORTED LARRAIN INFO TO FBI AND TO JMWAVE ON 27 JUNE 67 STATING, HOWEVER THAT IT WAS ONE DOMINGO (ECHEMENDIA) ESCALANTE (201-297940) WHO HAD SAID THAT"

SECRET

PAGE.
0-83 3 JMWAVE 7953 S E C R E T

OF BOMBINGS AND ROTHMAN WAS THE BOSS.

5. WOULD APPEAR HQS JUSTICE QUERIES BASED ON FBI REPORTING FROM MIAMI. WOULD IT BE OF ANY HELP IF WE GOT TOGETHER WITH BUREAU HERE TO RESOLVE IN LOCO (INFO HQS) ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

S E C R E T

BT

* PORTION GARBLED BEING SVC'D

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH

KAPOK DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC
AMCLEVE/15 Contact with Frank "Lefty" ROSENTHAL

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-7900, 27 June 1967.

Transmitted under separate cover per reference are copies of three JMWAVE memoranda to the FBI dated 24 July and 11 August 1965, and 15 June 1967. Subject: Procurement of Arms and Munitions by American Group.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments - USC
Memos (3)

Distribution:
3/- WH/COG

CS COPY FILED IN 14-2-4

File in
201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GROUP 1 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27903

DATE
JUN 30 1967
29 June 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T KAPOK DESENSITIZED

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 8

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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: R.A. Ortman:jeb
UNIT: WH/COG/MO
EXT: 7451
DATE: 29 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ____ # ____

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INFO: FILE , VR C/CI, OGC 2, C/WH6

ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

29 23 07 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 15805

TO JMWAVE

PRIORITY KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF: JMWAVE 7900 (IN 00397)

1. FOLLOWING QUERIES FROM JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAVE EMERGED FROM MEETINGS WITH OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL. REQUEST REPLIES SOONEST.

A. DID AMCLEVE/15 VOLUNTEER HIMSELF TO LNERGO OR DID THEY APPROACH HIM INITIALLY. DATE FIRST AMCLEVE/15 CONTACT LNERGO.

B. WHO INFORMED LNERGO OF JULY 1965 DEAL. AMCLEVE/15 OR JMWAVE.

C. ON WHAT DATE WAS LNERGO INFORMED.

D. SAME INFO B AND C ABOVE FOR OCTOBER 1966 TRANSACTION.

E. WHAT WERE AMCLEVE/15'S SOURCES FOR ITEMS OR COMPONENTS.

F. WERE THOSE SOURCES WITHIN OR WITHOUT STATE OF FLORIDA.

G. JUSTICE HAS INFO TO EFFECT THAT AMCLEVE/15 MADE PROFIT ON OCTOBER 1966 TRANSACTION WHICH HE ATTEMPTED TURN IN

-CONTINUED-

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO:
FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 15805

TO "THE COMPANY" WITHOUT SUCCESS. PLEASE COMMENT.

2. ALSO PLEASE ELABORATE ON STATEMENT PARA 2 REF THAT "PER JMWAVE INSTRUCTIONS AMCLEVE/15 COOPERATED WITH BORGES AND ROSENTHAL BY ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY IN PASSING SILENCERS AND GERNADES."

3. JUSTICE HAS SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY USE AMCLEVE/15 TO ASSIST ROSENTHAL OBTAIN ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AS BASIS FOR ARREST OF ROSENTHAL FOR HAVING POSSESSION OF SUCH MATERIALS. APPRECIATE JMWAVE COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

OGC Mr. Bladergroen (draft)
C/WH/COG/CICS Mr. Mahoney (draft)

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
C/WHD

Earl J. Williamson
AC/WH/COG

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 3

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UNIT [illegible] TIME 1845

INFO
FILE [illegible]

AN [illegible] | WH/COG
ABSTRACT X | INDEX

28 Jun 67 IN 00397

S E C R E T 272015Z CITE JMWAVE 7980
WAVE

PRIORITY DIRECTOR
DESENSITIZED

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEAVE/15

REF DIRECTOR 14671

1. AMCLEVE/15 CURRENTLY COOPERATING WITH LOCAL FBI IN INVESTIGATION OF FRANK "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL.

2. AMCLEVE/15 INITIALLY BECAME INVOLVED WITH ROSENTHAL IN JULY 65 WHEN DIEGO EMILIANO (BORGES) TORRES (201-284161) INTRODUCED HIM TO ROSENTHAL AND NORMAN ROTHMAN. (BORGES WAS AGENT FOR ROSENTHAL IN PURCHASE OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES). PER JMWAVE INSTRUCTIONS AMCLEVE/15 COOPERATED WITH BORGES AND ROSENTHAL BY ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY IN PASSING SILENCERS AND GRANADES FROM HERMINIO (DIAZ) SANDALIO (201-203040) AND FRANCISCO (RODRIGUEZ) TAMAYO (201-293114) TO BORGES WHO IN TURN PASSED THE MATERIAL TO ROSENTHAL.

3. LOCAL FBI WAS NOTIFIED AT THE TIME BUT AFTER ABOUT ONE WEEK JMWAVE INSTRUCTED AMCLEVE/15 TO WITHDRAW HAVING DISCOVERED THAT GROUP WITH WHICH

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Desensitize
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. # WH/COG/L
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

AN | WH/FIOC
ABSTRACT X | INDEX

201-284161
28 June 67

HE WAS IN CONTACT WAS COMPOSED OF GANGSTER ELEMENTS.

4. FROM JULY 65 TO CIRCA OCT 66 AMCLEVE/15 NOT INVOLVED WITH ROSENTHAL ALTHOUGH AT VARIOUS TIMES ROSENTHAL CALLED AMCLEVE/15 AND ASKED HIS HELP OBTAIN WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES WHICH AMCLEVE/15 REFUSED. AROUND OCT 66 ROSENTHAL CONTACTED AMCLEVE/15 AT LATTERS RESIDENCE AND THREATENED HIM BECAUSE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY BORGES TO ROSENTHAL WAS FAULTY. AMCLEVE/15 THEN MADE AND GAVE ROSENTHAL 120 PENCILS AND 50 FUSE DEVICES WHICH SEEMED TO SATISFY ROSENTHAL.

5. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT REPORT PARA FOUR ABOVE TO JMWAVE UNTIL 9 JUNE 67 AFTER ROSENTHAL HAD AGAIN CONTACTED HIM ON 6 JUNE 67, THREATENED HIM AND ASKED HIM FOR MORE EQUIPMENT. LOCAL FBI WAS ADVISED BY JMWAVE ON 15 JUNE 67 OF AMCLEVE/15 ROSENTHAL CONTACTS OF OCT 66 AND 6 JUNE 67.

6. AS REPORTED IN PARA 3 OF REF AMCLEVE/15 CURRENTLY TRYING TO SUPPLY ROSENTHAL UNDER INSTRUCTIONS LOCAL FBI. FBI HAS PROMISED MAXIMUM SECURITY AND

PROTECTION FOR AMCLEVE/15. FBI HAS NOT NOTIFIED LOCAL POLICE DUE POSSIBILITY POLICE PENETRATED BY GANGSTER ELEMENT.

7. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS NONE OF MATERIAL PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED ROSENTHAL WAS OF WOFACT ORIGIN; HE ALSO CLAIMS HE NEVER SUPPLIED ROSENTHAL WITH C-4 EXPLOSIVES.

8. NO ADDITIONAL JMWAVE INFO ROSENTHAL AND ROTHMAN. NO OPS INTEREST BORGES RODRIGUEZ. DIAZ DECEASED.

9. POUCHING HQS COPIES OF JMWAVE MEMOS TO FBI UFGA-27888.

SECRET

BT

201-254161
2 June 67

SECRET

28 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Clements POSADA-Carriles

REFERENCES: a. Memo for Record, 26 June 1967, by LRH, same subject
b. Williamson/Henze Telephone Conversation, 28 June 1967

1. In my meeting with the Department of Justice today, I confirmed that POSADA-Carriles was our man. I outlined the preliminary information we had developed on the transactions between him and one Lefty Rosenthal.

2. Justice was advised that our information disclosed that POSADA-Carriles had passed silencers and grenades to Rosenthal during July 1965, and that in October 1966 he had furnished pencils and fuses. I also stated that it was our understanding that POSADA-Carriles was in contact with FBI/Miami and that it had been advised of these dealings. Justice was told that the items involved were not of Agency origin. It was emphasized, however, that this was our preliminary conclusion and that we would undertake to verify it.

3. Justice acknowledged that FBI reporting disclosed POSADA-Carriles as its contact but apparently the details are somewhat vague. To make a federal case against Rosenthal because of his suspected involvement in the bombings, it will be necessary to show that the items used were obtained through interstate commerce. A preliminary reading suggests prosecution under Title 18 Section 837. Out of concern for the allegation of entrapment, Justice asked that

but it after
not the [illegible]
[illegible]

we supply answers to the following: (a) did POSADA-Carriles volunteer himself to the FBI or did it approach him initially; (b) who informed the FBI of the July 1965 deal - the Agency or POSADA-Carriles; (c) on what date was this information given; (d) similarly as regards the October 1966 transaction, the date the information furnished and by whom; (e) what were POSADA-Carriles sources for the items or their components; (f) were these sources within or without the State of Florida? And incidentally were we aware that supposedly POSADA-Carriles realized a "profit" for furnishing the October 1966 items and that he tried without success to turn it into the "company"? While I agreed to undertake to obtain the information requested, I suggested that much of it might be readily available from the FBI. Justice conceded this and intends to have further discussions with it.

4. During the course of the meeting the interesting hypothesis was suggested to the effect that POSADA-Carriles might have been "moonlighting" for Rosenthal, and only when he began to feel the pressure did he start reporting to the Agency and the FBI.

5. Under strictly controlled conditions with POSADA-Carriles acting as a conduit, Justice is considering the possibility of assisting Rosenthal to obtain his needed items, whereupon he will be arrested immediately for possession. I told them while we might be willing to have POSADA-Carriles so used we were understandably concerned over the adverse comment that our employee's involvement could generate.

6. On a matter that may be related: one Albert LARRAIN Maestre is alleged to have admitted to POSADA-Carriles that he has been involved in the bombings with Rosenthal and to have said more explosives were needed. LARRAIN Maestre is a fugitive under a narcotics endictment having formerly resided at 153 East 57th Street, New York, New York. Do we have any information on this person?

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

OGC:RJB:mej
Distribution:
Original - Subject
1 - Signer
1 - Chrono

14-00000

WILLIAMSON NOTES ON
28 JUNE TELECON W. HENZE

AMCLEVE/15 currently ccoperaing FBI

Became involed R July 65

On station instructions cooperated as intermediary in passing stuff--
silencers and grenades--at that FBI informed

Instructed to withdraw

Until Oct 66 -- was threatened -- asked to make or obtain

At this point he made certain things 150 pencils. Did not tell
station until fairly recently

Then put in touch with LNERGO 6 June told 9 June told FBI 15 June
$350.00

FBI man called up north

15 wants their assistance "to disappear"

Probably not losing a great deal

RE DRAFT

28 June 1967

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation - Williamson/Hense, 1015 hours, 28 June 1967

Note
28 Ju

1. Station reply sent 1640 hours 27 June (JMWAVE 7900).

2. AMCLEVE/15 currently on Station roles at $350 per month. He has been cooperating with FBI.

3. During July 1965, 15 introduced to Rosenthal by third party. On Station instructions he cooperated with Rosenthal acting as intermediary in passing to him silencers and grenades. FBI informed.

4. In accordance with Station instructions, 15 broke off contact with Rosenthal.

5. On October 1966, 15 recontacted by Rosenthal. Rosenthal demanded he make or obtain additional items threatening him with bodily harm and also complaining previous items faulty. Whereupon 15 furnished Rosenthal 150 pencils and some fuses. Station only recently advised of this transaction and 15 put in contact with FBI.

6. Items furnished July 1965 and October 1966 transactions not Agency origin.

7. On 6 June, 15 again contacted by Rosenthal.

8. On 9 June, 15 reported Rosenthal contact to Station.

9. On 15 June, Station advised FBI.

RE DRAFT

10. 15 wants Station assistance in doing a disappearing act.

11. 15's FBI contact now in Washington for discussions re this case.

12. Re proposal para 3 DIR 14671, Hense's immediate reaction this probably OK and we not using much but would want to check it further.

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ORIG: Robert Ortman:now
UNIT: WH/COG/PO
EXT: 7451/1948
DATE: 26 June 1967

CA | CI/CS
MO | CI/OS
RR | CI/PI
FI | SS
RS | CSEC

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3C PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CA, C/FI2, C/FI/INT, DDP, ADDP, OGC2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 00 00Z CITE DIRECTOR 14671

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

RYBAT AMCLEVE-15

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

1. DEPARTMENT JUSTICE INVESTIGATING ONE LEFTY ROSENTHAL BELIEVED TIED IN WITH MIAMI CRIME FIGURES AND INVOLVED IN SEVEN RECENT BOMBINGS MIAMI AREA.

2. ROSENTHAL ALLEGEDLY APPROACHED U.S. CITIZEN NORMAN ROTHMAN IN DOMREP WHO PUT HIM IN TOUCH AMCLEVE-15 WHOM ROSENTHAL KNOWS TO BE AFFILIATED WOFACT. ROSENTHAL CLAIMS AMCLEVE-15 SUPPLIED HIM WITH CAPS PRIMERS AND C-4 EXPLOSIVES ALSO CLAIMS OFFERED TO DISCUSS BACKGROUND BOMBINGS, WHO INVOLVED, AND WHY, WITH AMCLEVE-15 BUT LATTER INDICATED NO INTEREST.

3. ROSENTHAL REPORTEDLY ASKING AMCLEVE-15 TO SUPPLY 240 POUNDS C-4 WITH CAPS AND PRIMERS BY 1 JULY 67.

4. LOCAL POLICE INVESTIGATING SEVEN BOMBINGS BUT NOT AWARE FOREGOING DETAILS RELATIVE AMCLEVE-15.

5. APPRECIATE PRIORITY COMMENTS INCLUDING XXXXXX ANY POSSIBILITY MATERIAL GIVEN ROSENTHAL COULD BE WOFACT ORIGIN.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 14671

TO 6. PREFER NO DISCUSSION WITH LOCAL LNERGO AT THIS TIME.

7. NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ROSENTHAL. NUMEROUS LNERGO REPORTS CITE ROTHMAN FOR GAMBLING, GUN RUNNING AND OTHER SHADY ACTIVITIES IN U.S., CUBA AND MEXICO INCLUDING EFFORTS ESTABLISH ANTI-CASTRO BASE IN YUCATAN.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/COG/MO

OGC (Mr. Bladergroon in draft)

Earl J. Williamson
EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

26 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA-Carriles

1. The Department of Justice has been investigating one Lefty Rosenthal whom they believe to be tied in with key members of organized crime in the Miami area and who also they believe has been involved in seven recent bombings in the Miami area. According to the information the Department has gotten so far, Rosenthal went to a United States citizen named Norman Rothman in the Dominican Republic and through him directly or indirectly through a person known as Diego, Rosenthal was put in touch with Luis Clemente Posada-Carriles, Alien Registration Number A-12419708, 263 S.W. 26th Street, Miami. Rosenthal understands that Posada-Carriles is attached to CIA and claims that Posada-Carriles supplied him with caps, primers and C-4 explosives. Rosenthal is reported to have offered to talk to Posada-Carriles about the background of the bombings and who was involved and why, but Posada-Carriles said he had no interest in the background.

2. Rosenthal is reported to be asking Posada-Carriles to supply 240 pounds of C-4 explosives with caps and primers by Saturday and has told Posada-Carriles that twenty more bombings are scheduled. The local police are investigaging the seven bombings which have taken place and do not know this other background material.

3. Justice would very much like to have Rosenthal prosecuted and accordingly would like to have the explosives delivered to Rosenthal but to have 99% of it faulty and have the state prosecute him on the possession of the 1% of valid explosives. The Justice Department has a report from the

Bureau's Security Squad reporting to the Bureau's Organized Crime Division which states that Posada-Carriles is a CIA Agent in a GS status.

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

Luis Posada Carriles
2 Feb 61 to Mexico, entered US 28 Feb 61 as
exile from Argentine embassy
18 april 61 to Guat for 2506 training
27 april 61 ret to US via Guantanamo

Dec 64 gunner on m/V Venus based Puerto Rico
target was raid on Oriente

1964-65 Santo Domingo
Mar 63 - Mar 64 Fort Benning, Ga - 2nd Lt
May 64 in Polk City Fla as instructor at Juno Tazo

April 65 employed by JMWAVE instructor in
Maritime training, informant Alejos - Guat

14-00000

SECRET

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: Chief of Station, London
: Chief, European Division

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC [illegible] AMRIVER [illegible]
Declining Importance of MINCEX In Cuban Government

4 P

During JMWAVE debriefing on 11 April 1967, AMRIVER-1 provided the following information on the above subject:

1. As of March 1967, the role of MINCEX in the Cuban Government, including the Commercial Office in London, was less important than it had been two years earlier. During those two years, MINCEX lost a substantial portion of its functions and operating elements. Beginning early in 1966, Cubana de Aviacion made its own purchases abroad without the assistance of the MINCEX Commercial Offices. CUBATABACO, formerly an operating element of MINCEX, was abolished late in 1966 and its functions were taken over by an independent enterprise called Empresa Cubana del Tabaco with headquarters in Havana. In April 1967, [illegible], an operating element of MINCEX, was scheduled to be abolished and replaced by Instituto del Libro with headquarters in Havana. In January and February 1967, the CCC was studying the feasibility of transferring CUBAZUCAR, an operating element of MINCEX, to the Sugar Ministry.

SOURCE COMMENT: This trend of events appears to indicate that in the future MINCEX functions will be further reduced and possibly even eliminated completely.

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - WH/COG
2 - Chief, EUR Division
2 - COS, London

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DATE TYPED 26 Apr 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 3 1967
CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-747424	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27448
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 10 - 120 - 31

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

2. During 1966 and early 1967 various GCC enterprises sent their own purchasing missions to London thereby eliminating the need for the Commercial Office to make purchases for them. For example, the Basic Chemistry Mission headed by Francisco CORRAL Pico and Rafael CASTILLO (LNU) arrived in London late in 1965 to make chemical purchases. Late in 1966, the Cuban Telephone Company sent Roberto POSADA Carrilos to shop in London for telephone equipment and supplies. In February 1967, a mission from the Ministry of Construction arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment. This mission was headed by Fernando POMARES Hernandez.

3. The chain of events which heralded the reduction in importance of the Commercial Office in London began with the assignment of persons of a much lower level of competence than those who preceded them. Examples of persons recently assigned to the Commercial Office in London who had only six or seven years of schooling and little or no experience in foreign trade or business are Marcos PEREZ Puig, representative of CUBAZUCAR; Orlando ROMERO Crespo, representative of MEDICUBA, CUIMPORT and acting representative of CUBATEX and CONSUMIMPORT; and Ruben GUAL Yero, representative of MAQUIMPORT and FERRIMPORT. The qualification of PEREZ apparently was that he was a member of the Communist Youth organization, and the qualifications of ROMERO and GUAL apparently were that they were Communist Party members.

4. Significant JMWAVE Traces:

Marcos PEREZ Puig: AMOT report //AA-4487 67: In October 1966, Subject was a Regional Director of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources.

Orlando ROMERO Crespo: Traces provide no additional significant information.

Ruben GUAL Yero: AMOT report EE-6285 17 January 1967; according to the official Gazette Subject was assigned to the following positions: Manager Hoffman Machine Company 20 November 1961 to 21 March 1962; Manager Hardware Unit H-24 March 1962 to August 1962.

Francisco CORRAL Pico: AMOT reports AA-4237, 14 October 1966: Subject was Supply Chief of the Consolidated Basic Chemical Enterprise. He went to England and France in November 1965 as a member of a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Industry to buy raw materials. PCC member. Fanatic supporter of the regime.

Roberto POSADA Carrilos: AMFAST-13 debriefing report of 20 April 1967- In March 1967 Subject was Chief of the Special Area of the Cuban Telephone Company in charge of classified and sensitive telephones.

Fernando POMARES Hernandez: No identifiable traces.

Rafael CASTILLO: OSMA-16398, 13 Dec 1963: Regime supporter employed at the Havana telephone plant.

John B. [illegible]
for
Mark F. EFFIELD

[illegible] SECRET [illegible]

[illegible]

GIVEN NAME: Marcos
201- 909702

OCCUPATION: [illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: In October 1966 Subject was a Regional Director of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources.

Member of Communist Youth organization is Subjects only apparent qualification for this job. [illegible]

[illegible]RO - [illegible], Orlando [illegible]
201- [illegible]

COUNTRY OF BIRTH: [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP: [illegible]

OCCUPATION: [illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible]

Appears to be qualified ~~for this position~~ because he is a Communist Party Member. This is only apparent qualification.

[illegible] Ruben [illegible]
201- 315 [illegible]

OCCUPATION: [illegible] and [illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible]

Member of Communist Party seems to be only qualification for job.

~~According to the official Gazette Subject has held following positions: [illegible] Company, 20 Nov 61 - 21 [illegible] 62, Manager [illegible] 62.~~

[illegible] Francisco [illegible]
201- [illegible]

OCCUPATION: Supply Chief of [illegible]

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): [illegible]

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Subject went to England and France in November 1965 as a member of a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Industry to buy raw materials. PCC member. Fanatic supporter of the regime.

[illegible] Roberto [illegible]
201- [illegible]

OCCUPATION:

[illegible] Construction which [illegible] to purchase [illegible] construction equipment [illegible]

SECRET [illegible] 3 of 4

SECRET

[illegible]

SURNAME [illegible] GIVEN NAME Fernando MIDDLE NAME [illegible] 201-[illegible]

SEX M DATE OF BIRTH COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In February 1967, a mission from the Ministry of Construction arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment. This mission was headed by Subject.

SURNAME CASTILLO GIVEN NAME Rafael MIDDLE NAME 201-[illegible]

SEX M DATE OF BIRTH COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION [illegible] RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible]

Arrived in London late in 1966 to make chemical purchases.

or

Regime supporter employed at the Havana telephone plant.

SURNAME GIVEN NAME MIDDLE NAME 201-

SEX DATE OF BIRTH COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SURNAME GIVEN NAME MIDDLE NAME 201-

SEX DATE OF BIRTH COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SURNAME GIVEN NAME MIDDLE NAME 201-

SEX DATE OF BIRTH COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES • STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING
ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSERVE/YOCARD/Operational
Debriefing of Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: YOCARD Input

1. Attached herewith is a debriefing report received from AMFAST/13 on 20 April 1967 containing information on the following:

a. Roberto *POSADA Carrilles: a DSE agent and Cuban Telephone Company employee; supervisor for "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City and employed at "Area Especial".

b. Pedro *DIEU: a DSE agent and Cuban Telephone Company employee; chief of installations and maintenance of "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City.

c. Jesus *BELTRAN: a DSE and PCC member, employed as an installer and repairman at "Area Especial" of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

d. Information on "Area Especial" department of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

2. The source of the report, Lazaro Armando *HERNANDEZ Perez, A 17 405 510, arrived in the United States from Cuba via the airlift on 14 April 1967. Source was employed as an installer and repairman of telephone equipment for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana City from January 1959 to 6 February 1967.

3. JMWAVE trace results are as follows:

a. Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez: no traces

b. Roberto POSADA Carrilles: Cuban Telephone Company employee since 1952. He is the brother of AMCLEVE/15 and the Subject of a JMWAVE PERS file.

CS COPY

Attachments - herewith
1. Debriefing Report
2. Input Forms

Distribution
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO
19-5-30

DATE TYPED
25 Apr 67

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 27 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27444

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-30-71/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

c. Pedro DIBU: no traces.

d. Jesus BELTRAN: no traces.

4. The information concerning the "Area Especial" department of the Cuban Telephone Company was passed to the Reports Branch of JMWAVE for possible dissemination.

5. Eight machine input forms are attached herewith.

for Harry F. EFFIELD

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27444

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME HERNANDEZ Perez	GIVEN NAME Lazaro	MIDDLE NAME Armando	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 17 December 1937	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Artemisa
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Refugee		RESIDENCE Elizabeth, NJ
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Arrived US from Cuba via the airlift on 14 April 1967; ~~[illegible]~~

SURNAME POSADA Carriles	GIVEN NAME Roberto	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Las Villas Prov.
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel. Co. official		RESIDENCE Marianao, Havana
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
DSS [redacted], supervisor for "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City and is employed at "Area Especial" located at 19th St. corner of B St., Vedado, Havana.

3

SURNAME DIEG	GIVEN NAME Pedro	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1917	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel Co. employee		RESIDENCE Havana
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
DSS agent, chief of installations and maintenance of "Area Norte" which is responsible for Havana City. PCC member.

SURNAME BELTRAN	GIVEN NAME [illegible]	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH ca 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Cuban Tel Co. employee		RESIDENCE Marianao, Havana
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[illegible] and PCC member; emplyed as an installer and repairman at "Area Especial" of the Cuban Telephone Company in Vedado, Havana.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-27444

Debrief = 17 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
page 1
(7)

SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ [illegible]
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Province
Alien Registration #A17-485-510

1.- Debriefer contacted HERNANDEZ, instructed by C/O, to find out if HERNANDEZ could provide information on one Roberto POSADA Carriles.

2.- HERNANDEZ arrived in Miami, on 14 April 1967, via US sponsored airlift.

3.- HERNANDEZ was claimed by his wife's aunt, Amparo MARTINEZ Cevla, who arrived in the US in circa 1961 and resides at 1659-West, 3rd. Avenue, Hialeah, Fla.

4.- HERNANDEZ is married to Esther Consuelo MIGUEL Martinez (DPOB: 14 September 1939, Havana, Havana Province). They are temporarily residing at 1659-West,3rd. Avenue, Hialeah, phone number 885-2327. HERNANDEZ will depart (date not set yet) for: c/o (sister) Elvira HERNANDEZ Perez, 364-Williamson street, Elizabeth, New Jersey.

5.- Since 1958 up to April 1967, HERNANDEZ resided at Santa Irene #26, Santos Suarez, Havana.

6.- On 22 October 1957, HERNANDEZ started to work for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana employed as laborer. During August 1958, after undergoing a training sponsored by the enterprise, HERNANDEZ was promoted as assistant-installer-repairman of telephone equipment within the telephone company. In early 1959, he was promoted as "operador" (installer and repairman of telephone equipment) position which he held up to 6 February 1967. HERNANDEZ claims that even though he had presented his application to leave the country since 18 May 1966, he did not inform the telephone company of his plans to leave until 4 February 1967. On 6 February 1967, HERNANDEZ resigned from the telephone company.

7.- As a telephone company worker, HERNANDEZ operated from "area norte" (north area-which includes all Havana city) with offices at 19th street corner of B street, Vedado. HERNANDEZ claims that as installer and repair-man he never was involved in "bugging" or installment of any kind of special equipment, because this task was assigned to another group that operates from "area especial" (special area) which is located at 19th street corner of C street, Vedado. Since 1963 up to 1965, HERNANDEZ was assigned to work at Plaza Civica (now Plaza de la Revolucion) where he repaired and installed telephones for: MININD, INRA, Ministry of Communication, Ministry of Transportation, MINCONS and for the Public Library. In early 1966, before the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the MININT, were moved to the Plaza Civica, HERNANDEZ was told that if he wanted to keep his job, at Plaza Civica, he had to become fully integrated with the G-2, when HERNANDEZ refused he was transferred and assigned to service private residences.

8.- Since 1956 up to January 1959, HERNANDEZ was a 26th of July member, in the propaganda section, selling bonus and delivering propaganda.

(over to 2)

(Continued)
SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

9.- HERNANDEZ claims that he never belonged to any GOC organization.

10.- In April 1961, during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, HERNANDEZ was detained for 11 days at Principe prison in Havana, for not been pro-GOC. On 18 September 1962, HERNANDEZ and seven others were caught when they stole an INIT boat and attempted to escape from Cuba by Guanabo beach, Guanabacoa, Havana. This time, HERNANDEZ was detained (together with his companions) for a month and a half at DSE offices, Quinta corner of Catorce street, Miramar, and then they were released after they were given a lecture that the Revolution was sending them free because it was a generous revolution. (Debriefer's note: By that time the GOC was not sentencing to prison terms persons who were caught escaping). During 1964 HERNANDEZ was detained for four days when he had a fist fight with a CDR member in his neighborhood, this time HERNANDEZ was aided in getting out of jail by his sister, Andrea HERNANDEZ Perez, who is pro-GOC. In early 1966, HERNANDEZ was detained for two days accused of playing domino (betting).

11.- HERNANDEZ' sister: Andrea HERNANDEZ Perez (DPOB: circa 1935, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Province). CDR-member and GOC sympathizer. Works at "Salud Publica" with offices at 17 street (unnumbered) between 2 and 4 streets, Vedado, employed as office clerk. During March 1967 was punished to work for "Flota Pesquera" at Havana docks, packing fish, when she refused to do voluntary work. During 1965 she was married to (fnu) CANCIO (mat unk.) (DPOB: circa 1927, Havana, Havana Province who is employed as Director Physical Fitness at Havana University, and who is a staunch GOC supporter and a militiaman. Andrea and his husband reside at Calle San Miguel (# unr.) corner of Marques Gonzalez, Havana city.

12.- HERNANDEZ provided the following info of CI interest:

a) Roberto POSADA Carriles; DSE-agent, Supervisor for "Area Norte" (which includes all Havana city) of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" (Special Area) of the Telephone Company. Attachment #1

b) Pedro [illegible] (mat unk.); DSE-agent, Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. CP member. Attachment #2

c) Jose (pat - - mat unk.) Aka: "Pepe"; DSE and CP member and installer and repairman for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. Attachment #3

d) [illegible] BELTRAN (mat unk.); DSE and CP member and installer and repairman for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company. Attachment #4

e) General Information of CI interest. Attachment #5

(over to 3)

Debrief - 19 April 67
Report - 20 April 67
Page 3

(Continued)
SUBJECT: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration A17-405-510

COMMENT: HERNANDEZ talked freely and was very cooperative. He appears to Debriefer as being clear regarding CI interest and also a reliable source of information.

(over to 4)

ATTACHMENT #1

SUBJECT: Roberto POSADA Carriles.
DSE agent, Supervisor for "Area Norte" (which includes all Havana City) of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" (Special Area) of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez.
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-435-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met POSADA in early 1966 when POSADA was appointed as Supervisor for "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of D Street, Vedado, Havana. POSADA had been transferred from "Area Oeste" to this job at "Area Norte" position which he is still holding.

2.- Also upon his arrival, POSADA was assigned to work at "Special Area" of the Telephone Company which is located at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado. HERNANDEZ claims that since that time it was known that POSADA was a DSE agent, as it was known that all the personnel working for "Area Especial" were DSE agents (they use to brag about it) since their job is to install and repair telephone equipments for DSE, Military and all GOC big shots. HERNANDEZ claims that he does not know what position POSADA holds within "Area Especial", since only "Area Especial" personnel is allowed to enter the premises.

3.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that since circa 1942, POSADA was a Cuban Telephone Company employee.

4.- HERNANDEZ claims that even though POSADA'S position at "Area Norte" is that of Supervisor he never works as such, and only works as Telephone Technician (work unk.) when he is needed at "Area Especial". HERNANDEZ claims that POSADA'S real work at "Area Norte" is to check all the employees, mainly those who are not pro-GOC, so they work hard and to avoid sabotage.

5.- HERNANDEZ claims that POSADA wears military uniform most of the time and carries side arm even when wearing civilian clothes. HERNANDEZ also claims that he had heard POSADA when talking with other "Special Area" personnel, and that they brag a lot about being DSE agents. They also talk about when they are assigned to install any kind of telephone equipments for a GOC personality (ex: CASTRO, Celia SANCHEZ etc.).

6.- During mid 1966, POSADA traveled for some six months to East Germany, and it was said that he had gone to buy new equipment for the Telephone Company. But HERNANDEZ claims that time went by after POSADA'S return to Cuba, and nobody saw nor heard about any new equipment for the Telephone Company.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw POSADA for the last time at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company, on 6 February 1967.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: In circa 1930, unk., Las Villas Province; caucasian (fair skin); straight black hair (crew-cut); dark eyes (wears sunglasses); long face; good teeth; 6'1" height and 175# slender build. Married (names unk.) Resides at (address unk.) Marianao, Havana. DSE agent, Supervisor of "Area Norte" and member (position unk.) of "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

(over to 2)

Debriefed = 19 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
Vs page 5
(7)

ATTACHMENT #2

SUBJECT: Pedro DIBU (mat.unk.)
DSE agent, Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and employed at "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company; CP member.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration A17-835-510

1.- HERNANDEZ saw DIBU for the first time during 1950, but never met him until circa 1954 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

2.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that DIBU was a Cuban Telephone Company employee since circa 1937.

3.- DIBU is the Chief of Installations and Maintenance of "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company and also works (position unk.) for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, so it was known that DIBU was a DSE agent since he was an employee of "Area Especial".

4.- HERNANDEZ claims that DIBU besides bragging about being a DSE agent with other "Special Area" employees, tells everybody that he is very proud of being a CP member.

5.- HERNANDEZ claims that DIBU together with Roberto POSADA Carriles is always checking on the "Area Norte" employees in the task of avoiding sabotages.

6.- HERNANDEZ also claims that DIBU only works as a Telephone Technician (work unk.) when he is needed at "Area Especial" or when there is a "estado de alarma" (national alert set by CASTRO) that DIBU has a "Special Area" member is assigned to install telephone lines for Army-Trenches along the Island or wherever needed.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw DIBU for the last time during early 1967, at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1917, unk.; light mulatto; straight black grayish hair; crew cut; hazel eyes (wears corrective lenses); round face; good teeth; 5'8" in height and 180# heavy build. Married (name unk.). Resides at (address unk.) Havana. DSE agent; CP member, Chief of Installation and Maintenance of "Area Norte" [illegible] "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

(over to 6)

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Report = 20 April 67
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(T)

ATTACHMENT #3

SUBJECT: Jose (pat and mat unk.) Aka: "Pepe"
DSE and CP member and Installer and repairman
for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met Jose during 1957 when they both started to work for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana.

2.- Up to circa 1962, Jose was employed as installer-repairman for "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of B Street, Vedado, Havana.

3.- In circa 1962 Jose was assigned to work as repairman and installer of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, and since then it was known that Jose was a DSE agent, as every other "Area Especial" employee.

4.- Jose as all other "Area Especial" personnel brags a lot about being a DSE agent. He wears military uniform always, showing no rank and is always side armed.

5.- In early 1966, Jose was elected to become member of the Cuban Communist Party in an assembly to elect new CP members at his place of employment.

6.- In the performance of his job, Jose installs and repairs telephone equipments at: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Military Headquarters, GOC personalities' offices and homes, etc.

7.- HERNANDEZ saw Jose for the last time in early 1967 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

8.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1937, unk.; caucasian (brunette); wavy black hair; dark eyes (wears sunglasses); round face; good teeth; 5'9" in height and 160# strong build. Married (names unk.). Resides at (address unk.) Havana. DSE and CP member, installer-repairman of Telephone equipments for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana.

(over to 7).

Debrief = 19 April 67
Report = 20 April 67
V-   page 7
(T)

ATTACHMENT #4

SUBJECT: Jesus BELTRAN (mat unk.)
DSE and CP member, installer-repairman for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company.

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

1.- HERNANDEZ met BELTRAN during 1956, when they were both Cuban Telephone Company employees in Havana.

2.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that prior to 1959, BELTRAN was an active 26th of July Movement member in Havana.

3.- HERNANDEZ claims knowledge that prior to his (HERNANDEZ') arrival to the Cuban Telephone Company, BELTRAN (date unk.) was a Cuban Telephone Company employee.

4.- Up to circa 1962, BELTRAN was an installer-repairman of telephone equipments at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of B Street, Vedado, Havana.

5.- In circa 1962, BELTRAN was assigned to work as repairman and installer of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, and since then, it was known that BELTRAN was a DSE agent as every other "Area Especial" employee.

6.- BELTRAN wears military uniform, showing no rank, most of the time and is always side armed, even when wearing civilian clothes. He also brags a lot about being a DSE agent.

7.- In early 1965 BELTRAN was elected to become member of the Cuban Communist Party in an Assembly to elect new CP members at his place of employment.

8.- In the performance of his job, BELTRAN installs and repairs telephone equipments at: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Military Headquarters, GOC personalities' offices and homes, army trenches (when needed), etc.

9.- HERNANDEZ saw BELTRAN for the last time during February 1967 at "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company.

10.- PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: DPOB: Circa 1931, Havana, Havana Prov. Caucasian (brunette); straight grayish black hair; green eyes; (mustache); round face; good teeth; 5'9" in height and 150, slender build. Married (names unk.). Resides at (address unk.), Marianao, Havana. DSE and CP member, installer-repairman of telephone equipments for "Area Especial" of the Telephone Company at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana.

(over to 8)

ATTACHMENT #5

SUBJECT: General Information of CI interest:

SOURCE: Lazaro Armando HERNANDEZ Perez
DPOB: 17 December 1937, Artemisa, Pinar del Rio Prov.
Alien Registration #A17-405-510

A) AREA ESPECIAL (SPECIAL AREA) OF THE TELEPHONE COMPANY

HERNANDEZ claims that in early 1960, the GOC stablished a new department within the Cuban Telephone Company, this department was called "Area Especial".

As sito for "Area Especial" was chosen a building located at 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado, Havana, that is in the opposite corner of the same block that "Area Norte" of the Telephone Company is located (19 Street corner of B Street). Prior to being taken by the GOC, the building was the local of "Colegió Sepulveda" (Sepulveda private school).

HERNANDEZ claims that since "Area Especial" was organized, all of its members that had to deal with installations or repairments of telephone equipments had to be DSE agents (by that time DIER, later on G-2).

Even though only the acredited members of "Area Especial" can enter the premises, HERNANDEZ claims that it is common knowledge among telephone employees that the functions of the members of "Area Especial" is to install, service and maintain telephone equipments for: Offices of Ministers, DSE offices, Ministry of the Armed Forces, MININT, GOC personalities' homes and offices (including CASTRO'S), DGTI and any other GOC entity requiring security measures. It is also a main function of "Area Especial" personnel to establish telephone equipments and lines among trenches of the Cuban Army whenever needed (ex: October crisis of 1962).

Note: Debriefer had been previously informed by Eusebio Pio RIVERO Valdes-Castro, on debriefing carried out at Freedom House on 7 April 1967, that a telephone cable had been installed (underground) from 2 Street corner of 13 Street, Vedado, (place which RIVERO referred to as "Unidad Militar-Military Unit") up to 19 Street corner of C Street, Vedado (place which RIVERO referred to as: Telephone Company sub-plant of Vedado area). RIVERO at that opportunity told Debriefer that this operation was done in late 1962 after the October crisis, and that he thought that this was some kind of "bugging operation". Asked by Debriefer, HERNANDEZ stated that during late 1962 after the October crisis, a telephone cable (underground) was installed at "Area Especial" and that it was said that the DSE was installing a "new" switchboard at "Area Especial". (No further info).

B) Asked by Debriefer HERNANDEZ stated that he had no knowledge of anybody by the name of Alfonso REY Alvarez within the Telephone Company.

ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CI/OP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 22 April 1968

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SECRET 22 23 47 Z CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO BOOK CABLE

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99

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIRECTOR 93162 *

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CITE DIRECTOR 93538

TO

1. LNERGO FINGERPRINT FORMULA FOR JAMES EARL RAY: 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12 RPT 16, M OVER M, 9 OVER 4, U OVER W, O OVER I, O OVER O, O OVER I, 12.

2. PLEASE PASS TO LIAISON.

*LNERGO (1) has positively identified accused assassin as James Earl Ray.

DC/CI

C/WH Thomas Polgar

C/EUR

C/FE 03

DDP for C/NE

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

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CITE DIRECTOR 93260

PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, THE HAGUE, HONG KONG, LA PAZ, LONDON, MADRID, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, MANILA, MUNICH, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SANTO DOMINGO, SANTIAGO, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH 29

RYBAT WOMUSE

REF: DIR 93162

1. REQUEST ADDRESSES CONSTRUCT IDENTIKIT COMPOSITE OF JAMES EARL RAY FOR USE PRIOR RECEIPT PHOTOS NOW EN ROUTE.

2. CODE: H 50 C 32 X 2 B 31 D 82 N 35 X 2 L 28 X 2.

3. NOTE: SCAR ON FOREHEAD MENTIONED REF OMITTED FROM COMPOSITE AS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN. LEFT EAR PROTRUDES MORE THAN RIGHT.

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 70-17

END OF MESSAGE

20 Apr 68
201-0832732

INITIAL PROGRAM
RESTRICT ☒
INDEX
PREPARE FOR FILING

DDP Richard Ober
by direction.

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

RECORD COPY

Ray
cc Assassin

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ORIG: Richard Obar
UNIT: CIOP/DO ✓
EXT: 6537
DATE: 19 April 1968

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KYBAT WOMUSE

DESENSITIZED per DOI 70-17

REF: DIR 92664

1. LNERGO HAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED ASSASSIN AS JAMES EARL RAY, BORN 10 MARCH 1928 IN ILLINOIS; HEIGHT XXXXXX FIVE FEET TEN INCHES; WEIGHT 163-174 POUNDS; BLUE EYES;

RECORD COPY

19 Apr 68
201-0832732

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File. AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Ray
Richardy
→ Assassin

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CITE DIRECTOR 93162

TO

BROWN HAIR. SMALL SCAR ON CENTER OF FOREHEAD AND SCAR ON PALM OF RIGHT HAND. IN ADDITION TO ALIASES CITED REF HAS ALSO USED NAMES JAMES McBRIDE, JAMES WALTON, W.C. HERRON, AND JAMES O'CONNOR. SERVED IN U.S. ARMY FROM FEBRUARY 1946 TO DECEMBER 1948; DISCHARGED AS INEPT AND UNABLE TO ADJUST. ONCE CONFINED TO MENTAL HOSPITAL. HAS BEEN EMPLOYED AS BAKER, LABORER, AND "COLOR MATCHER". A DRIFTER WITH LONG CRIMINAL RECORD FOR BURGLARY, ARMED ROBBERY, AND FORGERY. HAS BEEN MISSING FROM MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY SINCE 23 APRIL 1967. CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. PHOTOS OF RAY (LABELED GALT PRIOR TO IDENTIFICATION) BEING POUCHED FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP Richard Ober by direction

CI/OP/DO Richard Ober

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ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
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99

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RECORD COPY

15 Apr 68
RAY
201-0532932 .. Assassin
.. CS90

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TO

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED XXX COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. XXXXX INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~MS~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS
WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

201-0 532732

DDP Richard Ober by direction/SH.
for C/NE Ober
ECI/OP/DO R. Ober

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
201-300985
VOL. II

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

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ESCARLET - 3
Formerly CIFENCB-4)

Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

201-300985

DISPATCH

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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Raul and Roberto POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

No201 No201

1. AMCLEVE-15 recently received a letter from his mother in Cuba, in which she gave him news of Raul and Roberto POSADA Carriles. Posada Carriles

2. Raul spends most of his time in Cienfuegos because he is directing the installation of a thermoelectric plant in the area. A snapshot of Raul was enclosed, and we are enclosing a blow-up of Raul for your information.

3. Roberto is apparently in Havana (at least not in Cienfuegos), and the only comment about him was that he is suffering from back trouble.

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENT:
As stated para 2 (2 copies)

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AMCLEVE-15

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JUN 28 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-15572

DATE
28 June 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

Snapshots of
Raul POSADA Carriles sent
by mother from Cuba to
Luis POSADA Carriles.
201 - 300985
Att to HVCA - 15772,
21 June 68

Raul POSADA Carriles
bro. of AMCLEVE-15.

June 21, 1968

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE HFG

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMCLEVE-15 - Report from Cuban Exile

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below.

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is a report furnished by AMCLEVE-15 on 26 June 1968. AMCLEVE-15 received the information from Jorge MAS Canosa, who got it from Johnny Alvart, who recently arrived in Miami from Cuba. NO 201

NO X [illegible]

2. The report names Jorge Norate as a Cuban lieutenant who studied rocketry in the USSR for three years. It states that Norate is disaffected with the Castro regime and sells things on the black market that the Russians bring into Cuba. The report also mentions that "El Gallego" Fernandez, chief of a squadron of MIG's at the Olguin Air Base, is also disaffected with the Castro government and used to give Alvart information about the base. Fernandez told him that in April 1968 there were severe fuel restrictions on the air base which limited the MIG flights.

3. JMWAVE may wish to contact Alvart if it has not already done so.

Oscar C. KALBING

MICROFILMED
JUL 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ATTACHMENT:
As stated para 1

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JUN 28 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-15571

DATE
28 June 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

AMCRUX-[illegible]
26 Jan 68

[illegible]

ST-67-[illegible]

25[illegible]

[illegible] Información sobre Oficiales del Gobierno de Cuba.

[illegible] Jhonny Alvart.

[illegible]: C

El cubano JHONNY ALVART, recientemente llegado de Cuba a MIAMI por los Vuelos de la Libertad, le confió a JORGE MAS CA[illegible]A la siguiente información:
El cubano JORGE NORATE, que tenía los grados de Teniente en el Ejercito Rebelde, fué a la Union Sovietica ha recibir cursos sobre cohetería, allí pasó tres años en esos cursos, hasu llegada a Cuba y ya experto en estos asuntos dicho sujeto fué nombrado en una alta posición, que es algo com Encargado de la Costa Sur de Oriente, es el cubano con mas alta jerarquía. Este elemento sostenía mucha amistad con JHONNY ALVART y se dedicaba entre otras cosas a la bolsa negra en Cuba, comerciando con artículos, que traian los rusos de la Union Sovietica. Tambien informa ALVART que NORATE era desafecto a el Gobierno y que se podía hablar de cualquier cosa con él.
También era amigo de ALVART un individuo llamado EL GALLEGO FERNANDEZ que es Jefe de Escuadrila de los aviones MIG de la Base aerea de Olguin. Dicho individuo también según ALVART era desafecto a el gobierno, y le daba informaciones de la Base de Olguin; una de esas informaciones es que en el mes de Abril habia una gran restricción de combustible q limitaban los vuelos de los MIG.

MICROFILMED
JUL 11 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

JUN 28 1968

CS COPY

Att 1 UFGA-15571

[illegible]

FROM: HVCA-13519, 7 June 1968 75-6-43/3

SUBJECT: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for May 1968

AMCLEVE-15 440.00

Subject continues to provide valuable information on CIRASH and CIVISTA-5. He took an SGSWIRL examination which successfully cleared up some points that had been of concern to Headquarters.

SECRET

LX-3321

TO : WH/COG

7 June 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE/15 -- IDEN A
201-300985

IRD #72501

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 40-year-old PBRUMEN male who has been of continuing WOFIRM interest since initial contact with JMWAVE and more recently with the Caracas Station as a penetration of the IDEN B organization.

PURPOSE/PROCEDURE:

Subject was SGSWIRLed at the request of the Caracas Station because of several issues which tended to question Subject's bona fides, possible affiliation with PBRUMEN intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from WOFIRM, plus other items specified in questions listed below. The interview was conducted in the home of Oscar C. KALBING in both English and Spanish. (Subject's English is quite good, however, during actual testing Spanish was used to avoid ambiguity or misunderstanding of the question content.) KALBING did the translating.

RESULTS:

Subject remains sensitive to one question which is related to his past dealings with IDEN C but in fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainity over the amount of items which he had been instrumental in getting for IDEN C. Sensitivity initially recorded in other areas was resolved through post-test discussion and responses to all other questions are regarded as substantially truthful. Subject was most cooperative and candid throughout the entire interview.

DETAILS:

Because of the numerous issues which were believed in need of clarification, a three phase test was structured prior to the interview and rehearsed with Subject completely before any testing took place. Discussions, as noted, were in both English and Spanish. Specific questions asked of Subject and answers given by him are as follows:

SECRET

CS COPY

201 - 300985

Have you used any name besides IDEN A? Answer: No, except for nicknames and aliases used with WOFIRM.

Have you ever travelled to Washington, D. C.? Answer: Yes. Once several years ago.

Have you ever been to the Soviet Union? Answer: No.

Are any of your relatives members of the Communist Party? After some discussion Subject felt it probable that they were. Those specifically mentioned were his two brothers IDEN D and IDEN E and also possibly a sister named IDEN F who is also in PBRUMEN and married to a Captain in the Militia. When the question was prefaced with the words: "Is it your belief that any of your relatives are members," Subject's answer was always yes. He based this belief on the fact that both brothers hold highly responsible positions in key industries in PBRUMEN and hence must be members. He also noted that prior to his leaving PBRUMEN, he (Subject) and his two brothers had many discussions about politics and their views differed from Subject's. As for his brother IDEN E, Subject regarded him as the "brain" in the family and originally a very religious person who attended Catholic services daily. He later evinced distrust for the clergy in PBRUMEN and blamed them for the downfall of the church. When Castro made his move, IDEN E was in complete sympathy with him and remained with him despite his apparent conversion to Communism, although IDEN E never acknowledged that he had been a Communist and would usually retort with a comment that he (IDEN E) was a "humanist."

Are any of your relatives working for PBRUMEN Intelligence? His answer was that he felt that at least one of them was according to what KALBING inferred during his discussion with Subject the day before the SCSWIRL test. This was his brother IDEN D, but he also wondered about his brother IDEN E who might also be with PBRUMEN intelligence because according to what his mother mentioned in a letter some time ago, IDEN E had been in the USSR receiving training of some sort. This training lasted for a full year and occurred in 1962 to the best of Subject's memory. Subject was reasonably sure of this date because of the "Missile crisis" and President Kennedy's death which occurred later.

After this discussion the question read: "Is it probable that your relatives (brothers) are working for PBRUMEN intelligence? Answer: Yes."

Did you know your brother (IDEN D) was working with IDEN G before we told you? Answer: No. But again had some suspicions.

Besides the letters we asked you to send to your brothers have you communicated with anyone in PBRUMEN? Answer: Yes. His mother about two or three times a year and with an aunt named IDEN H which was the person to whom he actually addressed the letter to his brother which WOFIRM asked him to write. This letter incidentally was posted in 1967 (a few months before coming to Caracas) and not 1966 as noted in Station files. Since arrival in Caracas, Subject has written his mother only once and had the letter posted from Miami to prevent anyone knowing his exact whereabouts. (In addition to these contacts, Subject has sent one telegram to his mother soon after the IDEN I just to let her know he was alright.) It was about this time that IDEN E wrote to him and criticized his participation in IDEN I.

Have you seen either of your brothers since 1961? Subject answered no. Last saw IDEN E at the airport in the distance but there were employees from IDEN E's place of employment present and IDEN E was apparently reluctant to go near the plane. Since 1961 Subject has not seen any member of his family and as time goes on does not miss them as much. The persons he claims to have been closest to were his aunt and grandmother and addresses comments to them personally when he does write to his mother. When further discussing his brothers on this question, Subject was somewhat complimentary despite their differing political views and generally considered them as hard-working energetic types with good school records.

Do you have a secret means of contacting anyone in PBRUMEN? Claims he knows of friends who have used telegrams to transmit coded messages but he has never engaged in such activity. These messages were directed against the PBRUMEN.

Have you ever been in Communist China? Answer: No.

Have you ever worked for the intelligence service of any country besides IDEN J and LNHARP? Answer: No.

Have you ever received intelligence training in PBRUMEN? Answer: No.

Have you ever been a member of any Communist guerrilla group? Answer: No. Later explained sensitivity to the question as emanating from current work with two former Communist guerrillas named IDEN K and IDEN L both of whom are now with IDEN B.

Have you told anyone in PBRUMEN that you are working with WOFIRM? Answer: No. This question led to a discussion of broadcasts from PBRUMEN which identified Subject as a member of WOFIRM. These broadcasts occurred in October 1967 according to Subject and the man fingering him was IDEN M. The latter was not officially in Subject's WOFIRM group before his capture in PBRUMEN hence Subject does not know why it was that he was specifically named. When it was later suggested that this announcement would probably have some effect on his family, Subject said he just didn't know what effect it would have and has heard of none. He agreed that it was quite ironic that one side of the family was working with an intelligence service which was diametrically opposed to the side to which another member of the same family was affiliated and in fact because of his present IDEN B employment he was actually in the business of hunting them down. Subject agreed that it was indeed ironic but felt his convictions differed from his brothers' and that was that.

Have you told anyone in IDEN N that you are working for WOFIRM? Noted that some knew of his past affiliation hence the question was qualified to mean his present affiliation. Later after reactions were recorded, Subject noted that his wife is fully witting of his WOFIRM employment as is IDEN O. He also mentioned that a PBRUMEN type, IDEN P, whom he knows from childhood has been kidding him constantly in Caracas that he is still with WOFIRM until Subject finally told him in an offhand way, "Sure I'm with WOFIRM," but he does not know what effect this had on IDEN P or whether he has told anyone of his suspicions of Subject's WOFIRM involvement. He specifically denied that anyone other than these three persons were knowledgeable.

Does anyone in IDEN B know you have this meeting with us today? Answer: No.

Have you ever been asked to perform any task or mission against the LNHARP? Answer: No.

Have you ever performed any task or mission on behalf of IDEN G? Answer: No.

Has anyone told or instructed you on what to report to us? Answer: No.

Have you had contact with IDEN C since 1967? Answer: No. Continued reactions to this question which necessitated a breakdown test to isolate the reason for his sensitivity to the topic. He repeatedly denied that he had had any contact with IDEN C since the IDEN Q told him not to but acknowledged a physical revulsion to the mention of the man's name, and a long discussion ensued regarding the extent of Subject's involvement with the man. Subject contended that the contact began quite innocently in 1965 and was what Subject initially thought was a deliberate provocation to see what Subject's reaction would be. Subject immediately reported the contact to JMWAVE handlers who guided him through continued contacts and instructions from IDEN Q. Subject was instructed to sell IDEN C "silencers" (guns with silencers attached--about six or seven to the best of his recollection) in order to find out his true identity. Subject furnished physical descriptions and license numbers to JMWAVE and continued to report on contact with IDEN C. He offered Subject $500 US which JMWAVE told Subject to keep since it was merely a bonus given him for his work as an intermediary. IDEN C continued to force contact with Subject and once came to his home in shorts and made veiled threats which were answered with counter threats of violence from Subject, and an outright threat that Subject would kill IDEN C if he threatened him again. In 1967 while with the IDEN R, Subject gave IDEN C some "pencils" to keep him away which Subject did not then report to WOFIRM but later did. He gave him about 120 altogether. Subject had promised IDEN C some 500 pounds of C/4 explosives, M-2's, sub-machine guns, etc. but all was intended to bait IDEN C for arrest and none was ever supplied to him. Later Subject noted after reacting to a break-down question that he had supplied him with pencils, silencers, and also some grenades and pentolite. But these he claims should be a matter of record with JMWAVE. The grenades were typical military type and numbered about 24 to 48 altogether. Again, however, Subject noted that he acted only as intermediary between IDEN C and another individual who is now deceased in PBRUMEN and did not physically handle any munitions shipments. As noted above, continued sensitivity to the question of the amounts or types of equipment furnished IDEN C is believed attributable to uncertainty of Subject's part as to exactly what he did arrange for shipment to IDEN C. As to the basic question about contact with him since 1967 (or when he was told by IDEN Q to no longer have contact with IDEN C), Subject insisted that he never re-established contact of any kind but always checks at IDEN S to determine if IDEN C is around.

Do you now have in your possession any arms, munitions or articles of demolition which was once the property of the LNHARP? Only those items which were discussed during a pre-test debriefing, viz., items brought to Caracas by him in a suitcase and consisting of the following: 3 or 4 smoke grenades; 6 or 7 booby traps (army type); 1 piece of delay fuse about 100 feet long; one primer cord about 100 feet; 2 or 3 MK2 grenades; about 10 pencils (some regular open market supply items and some of the "company" variety); demolition pliers; knife; compass; metascope (infra-viewer worth about $50 used). These items he said were taken while with the IDEN R and with the knowledge of IDEN T although IDEN T did not know exactly what he had taken. Subject was using these items frequently in training courses and they were not to the best of Subject's knowledge the property of LNHARP at that time although it is possible that some of these items were at one time LNHARP and possibly WOFIRM items. But he explained further that these items are plentiful in the Miami area and can easily be obtained through gun dealers. During a later conversation Subject noted that he has heard of many places where munitions could be obtained very easily especially in New Jersey, in California and in Miami, but he denied being personally involved in any such dealings.

Have you ever stolen equipment of any type from WOFIRM? Answer: Yes. About 5 gallons of gas once from a launch boat. Other than this, nothing.

Do you know the identities of persons who stole arms and equipment from LNHARP? Answer: No.

Break-down questions dealing with IDEN C:

Did you have contact with IDEN C from 1965 through 1967? Answer: Yes.

During this time did he give you $500 for equipment which he wanted? Answer: Yes.

Did you receive more than $500 from him? Answer: No.

Is it correct that you received threats from him? Answer: Yes.

Besides the pencils, silencers, grenades and pentolite did you give him any other items? Answer: No. (as noted continued sensitivity which is unexplained except in the examiner's conclusion)

Did IDEN Q tell you to stop contacting him in October or November 1967? Answer: Yes.

Did you contact IDEN C after November 1967? Answer: No. (Slight sensitivity but explained as relating to constant checking on his whereabouts to avoid contact.)

Has your employer contacted him since November 1967? Answer: No, not to his knowledge. On this question Subject noted that his employer can easily obtain guns and supplies from European

SECRET

sources cheaper than LNHARP. Also Subject noted that the few guns (small calibre snub nose weapons) which he has brought to Caracas with him from Miami are merely for the personal use of some of his fellow employees in IDEN B, and he breaks no laws in bringing them with him on the few trips he has made between 1967 and the present. He feels he has perhaps brought a total of 6 such small sidearms to Caracas and also one sport rifle (AR-15) which he was asked to bring back by IDEN U. The rifle was a gift to IDEN U. The weapon was not automatic per Subject.

The only other items which Subject could think of which could link WOFIRM with his organization are the silencers which he reported on in Miami some months back which his organization took from captured guerrillas and which were probably issued to a group which went to PBRUMEN and were lost. Subject is positive they were WOFIRM issue but purportedly the serial numbers which he submitted could not be checked.

One additional item which was cleared up dealt with the pentolite which had been reported seen in Caracas. Subject voluntarily mentioned that he had seen such a supply under the bed of a friend. The supply was attached to magnets which were to be used to attach the charge to the underside of a ship in Caribbean waters of IDEN V or IDEN W nationality. The charge was to discourage further shipments between these latter IDENs and PBRUMEN. Subject said he detached the magnets from the pentolite and intended using it in training classes for students with his present employer. The person who brought it to Caracas was IDEN X. Subject does not know how he got it here, but knows that his employer could facilitate such deliveries.

Raymond J. Rygiel

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1 - Field
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OS/IRD/RJR:hjd

SECRET

IRD #72401

IDENTITY LIST

IDEN A	Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles
IDEN B	DIGEPOL
IDEN C	Lefty ROSENTHAL
IDEN D	Roberto
IDEN E	Raul
IDEN F	Maria
IDEN G	Castro's Intelligence service
IDEN H	Angelia POSADA
IDEN I	Bay of Pigs invasion
IDEN J	Venezuela Government
IDEN K	Hugo Alencar Tovar (aka: David)
IDEN L	Coco ELIAS
IDEN M	LAUSERICA "El Poeta"
IDEN N	Venezuela
IDEN O	Antonio COMELLAS
IDEN P	Aldo HERNANDEZ
IDEN Q	FBI
IDEN R	RECE Organization
IDEN S	Customs in United States (Miami office Mr. Allen Jarbough)

SECRET

IRD #72501

IDENTITY LIST -- Continued

IDEN T	**Jorge MAS (A leader in RECE Organization)**
IDEN U	**Orasto FERNANDEZ**
IDEN V	**English**
IDEN W	**Japanese**
IDEN X	**Rafael TREMOL**

SECRET

201 – 300985

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INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

SECRET 052207Z JUN 68 CITE CARACAS 9808

Amcleve 15 201

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

6 JUN 68 IN 25390

M

REFS A. CARACAS 9758 (IN 21250)

B. JMWAVE 2600 (IN 23543)

1. AMCLEVE-15 MET WITH LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ AT CIRASH-4'S DIRECTION AND HIS REPORTS LED TO THEIR ARREST. UNFORTUNATELY CIRASH-4 DID NOT COVER AMCLEVE-15 AND RODRIGUEZ IS CONVINCED HE FINGERED THEM AND HAS SWORN KILL AMCLEVE-15 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. WHILE CARACAS UNDERSTANDS LNERGO WOULD NOT HAVE GREAT INTEREST THIS CASE, IS IT EQUALLY TRUE THAT NEITHER LNERGO NOR LNYUMA COULD ARREST RODRIGUEZ FOR LEAVING COUNTRY ILLEGALLY AND TRAVELLING ON FALSE DOCUMENTS? WE ANXIOUS PROTECT AMCLEVE-15 AND WONDER IF JMWAVE CAN PREVAIL ON LNERGO OR LNYUMA TO ACCEPT RETURN OF LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INTERROGATION.

3. CIRASH-4 PLANS DEPORT THEM TO MIAMI ON 8 JUNE ON VIASA. WILL ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN FLIGHT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

6 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

Forwarded herewith are two copies of a current PRQ I on Subject.

John P. Gower
WH/3/Venezuela

14-00000

c/WHD 11

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TO
Chief of Station, CARACAS

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT D
AKULE PBRUMEN AMOT Operational
Letter Sent to RECE from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JUN 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: UFGA-30112, 23 May 1968

1. Attached hereto is AMOT Report DD-2279, dated 22 May 1968, and its' attachment, which is a copy of a letter sent to a Miami based Cuban exile organization, Cuban Representation in Exilo (RECE), by Luis POSADA Carriles.

2. FYI: Luis POSADA Carriles was associated with RECE in Miami from July 1966 to June 1967.

Gary L. PLUSTIKOFF

Attachment: H/W
AMOT Rpt. DD-2279 w/att.

Distribution:
3 - COS/CARACAS w/att. - autpek
(2) - C/WHD w/att.
2 - WH/COG w/att.

AMCLEVE-15

JUN 3 1968

CS COPY

1 Att.

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 19-300-18

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30142

DATE
29 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

H/W Att. to UFGA-30142

57

S E C

FROM: SE (I-27)
AGENT: I-111
VIA: I-1

DD-2279
22 May 68

SUBJECT: Letter sent to RECE from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles.
SOURCE: Augusto PINEDA (mat. unk.).
SUB-SOURCE: Aguedo LUGO (mat. unk.).

1. On 22 May 1968 I-111 obtained the following information from Augusto PINEDA (mat. unk.).

2. On 19 May 1968 PINEDA was visited at home by Aguedo LUGO (mat. unk.) who had returned from a trip to Venezuela.

3. During their conversation, LUGO showed to PINEDA a photostatic copy of a letter which had been sent from Venezuela by Luis POSADA Carriles to Augusto VALDES Miranda, aka "Polo MIRANDA," a RECE leader. LUGO had delivered this letter to VALDES Miranda by hand.

4. At a moment when LUGO was not looking, PINEDA took the photostatic copy of this letter, which is attached to this report. In this letter POSADA mentioned the following matters:

a. The aid which had been given to the Association of Bay of Pigs Veterans (Brigade 2506) by the Venezuelan Army and the reasons why this aid was stopped.

b. Possibility of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior of becoming involved in a plan to help Cuban exiles fight against the Castro regime.

c. RECE should do everything possible so that RECE will be the Cuban exile organization to receive this aid (see preceding paragraph 4.b.), with POSADA offering to help RECE in this respect.

MICROFILMED
JUN 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

H/W Att 1 to UFGA-30142

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201-300985

REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES INTERIORES
DIRECCION GENERAL DE POLICIA

DIRECCION

No.________

Dr Polo Miranda
FR1-1722
oficinas del Rece –
1784 W. Flagler.

Dear friend Palo,

This is the third letter that I am sending you. Since I am sending this letter by messenger, I can explain more.

The Government here assisted a group of Cubans called the Brigade. The Department of Defense (Army) provided this assistance without consulting the Ministry of the Interior. When the Minister of the Interior found out, he demanded an explanation from the military men and they stopped the assistance.

There are strong possibilities that a plan will be developed for Cuba, which will involve the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior and which will be assigned to a group of serious persons. I believe it is highly important that I go to Miami urgently or that some of you come here. This is urgent.

If you want me to go, send my fare to this address:

San Juan Bosco Avenue
Mayflower Bldg. Apt 24
Altamira, Caracas Venezuela

On the other hand, ERASTO FERNANDEZ is being summoned by Congress. He is accused of being too severe with the Communists. Send a telegram as soon as possible, expressing solidarity with his attitude, in the name of the Cubans in EECE. If possible, mention me in the telegram.

The address is: Police Headquarters
Las Colinas Av, Las Bribas Bldg
Los Chaquaramos, Caracas, Venezuela

[illegible]

Some organization (I do not know the name) has already sent telegrams. ERASTO can be of great assistance to us.

When you send the telegram, do not mention me by name. Word it something like this " Greetings from our fellow countryman, who is fighting beside us" or words to that effect.

My telephone is 321506

Regards to all your friends.

Juan Pasid

1-5-60

Estimado amigo Pelo:

Es la tercera carta que te llega, en esta como que te la mando con un propio te puedo explicar mas.

El gobierno de aquí le dió ayuda a un grupo de cubanos con el nombre de la Brigada, esto lo hizo el Departamento de Defensa (Ejercito) sin contar con el ~~Dep~~ Ministerio del Interior, por esta causa el Ministro del Interior se enteró y llamó a los militares a contar y ~~debido~~ la ayuda cesó para ellos.

Existen grandes posibilidades de que se haga un plan para Cuba en que intervengan el Ministerio de Defensa y el Ministerio del Interior y que se lo den a un grupo de personas serias, yo creo que es de suma importancia que yo vaya a Miami urgentemente o que alguno de Uds. se traslade aquí. Esto es urgente.

Si quieren que yo vaya me mandan el pasaje a la dirección esta.

Avenida San Juan Bosco -
Edificio MAYFLOWER APT. 24
ALTAMIRA, CARACAS VENEZUELA.

Por otro lado, ERASTO FERNÁNDEZ está siendo interpelado por el Congreso, acusado de mano dura en contra de los comunistas, hay que a la mayor brevedad posible, le envíen un telegrama, diciendo que se solidarizan con su actitud, en nombre de los Cubanos del Rece, si es posible me nombran a mí en el telegrama - La dirección es.

Dirección General de Policía -
Avenida Las Colinas, Edificio Las Brisas,
Los Chaguaramos. Caracas, Venezuela.

Alguna organización (no sé el nombre).

le mandarás ya telegramas. Esto nos puede ser de mucha ayuda.

Cuando envien el telegrama, no pongan mi nombre al mencionarme, sino algo por este estilo "saludos a nuestro compatriota que lucha a su lado" o algo así.

Mi teléfono es 321506

Un abrazo a todos tu amigo

Juan Pablo

110

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
0 PRQ Part I on Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
See below.

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Forwarded herewith is an up-to-date PRQ Part I which was filled in by Subject on 23 May 1968.

HVCA 14975
6 Dec 67

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENTS:
~~B~~ As stated (4 copies)

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MAY 29 1968

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201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-15488	28 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

5P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Luis 201-300985	Clemente	Posada Carriles	

CYN

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT	3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)
Same	Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

Bambi (nickname)

5. DATE OF BIRTH	6. PLACE OF BIRTH
15 February 1928	Cienfuegos, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No record

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurement, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
☒ M ☐ F	40	37	FT. 5 IN. 10	180	Normal	

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
Black	Green	All	Strong	Normal

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar, right-hand palm

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

Normal

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

None

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

H/ FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ATT 4 to HVCA-15458 CS COPY (4-20)

14-00000

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Cuban	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.)

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)
Rent - Edif Mayflower, Apt 24, Ave. San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
Miami, Florida

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)
1964 - Dominican Republic - working for J.U.R.E organization (exiles affairs)

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Ministry of Internal Relations	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum) Bs 1800 mo.

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
None

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Political - Frente Revolucionario Jose A. Echevarria - 1960 in Cuba
Political - J.U.R.E. - 1963-1964
Political - Rece - 1967

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Monserrate Cienfuegos, Cuba	Elementary	1963	1942	Yes
Instituto Cienfuegos, Cuba	S. High School Bachelor	1942	1947	Yes
Padres Dominicos Cienfuegos, Cuba	Sugar Chemist	1947	1950	No
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	No

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Hunting (good shot)

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
USA	1963	1964	197 Brgd 1st Batallion	2nd Lt.	F. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

None

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1944-1945	b. EMPLOYER Pastora Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS San Jose de Las Lajas Las Villas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 210 **month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Transfer
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1946-1954	b. EMPLOYER San Agustin Sugar Mill	c. ADDRESS Cruces, Las Villas Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 310 **month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Studying
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1956-1958	b. EMPLOYER Self -(Fumigadora)	c. ADDRESS Cienfuegos Las Villas, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK Fumigation	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 250 **month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1960-1963	b. EMPLOYER Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.	c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba, and Akron, Ohio
	d. TYPE OF WORK Supervisor	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 500 **month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Army
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1963-1964	b. EMPLOYER U.S. Army	c. ADDRESS Fort Benning, Ga.
	d. TYPE OF WORK 2nd Lt.	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 380 **month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Cuban affairs

SECTION IX		MARITAL STATUS				
31. CHECK ONE	☐ SINGLE	☒ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ SEPARATED	☐ DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Married December 1956: Divorced 26 June 1963 from
Maria Concepcion Castaneda: Reason - [redacted] incompatibility.

10 201

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last) nee

Nieves Elina ~~XXXXXX~~ Gonzalez y [illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE 13 Aug 1963	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Colombus, Ga. - Muscogee County
36. DATE OF BIRTH DPOB 13 Dec 1935	37. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Cuba [illegible] WIFE of SUBJECT 201-300985
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)

Edf. Mayflower, Apt 24, Avenida San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis Posada	X		1966	Miami, Florida	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME Luis Posada	42. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	43. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Cuba	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION Book Store	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE 4110 Ave. 56, Cienfuegos, Cuba	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME Dolores Carriles	49. YEAR OF BIRTH Unknown	50. PLACE OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, Cuba	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION Housekeeper	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE Same as for father	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Roberto Posada	X		1931	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Raul Posada	X		1934	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Conchita Posada		X	1939	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

None

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Roberto Posada - Telephone co. - Cuba
Raul Posada - Electric & Power Co. - Cuba

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

Augusto Val Des Miranda (friend)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

I have aunts (2) and cousins (2) who are American citizens.
I do not know anything of certificates.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE 23 MAY 68

SIGNATURE Luis Posada

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SECUR 4

S E C R E T 271613Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9725 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

19272

REF: JMWAVE-2475 (IN 15683)

27 MAY 68 IN 19272

1. AMCLEVE-15 PASSED SGSWIRL EXAM 23 MAY WITH SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATION ALL POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS. POUCH FOLLOWS.

2. WISH THANK JMWAVE FOR REF WHICH MOST USEFUL IN PRE-TEST DISCUSSIONS WITH SGSWIRL OPERATOR.

S E C R E T

BT

amcleve-15
201 file

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C/WHD

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PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, CARACAS

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE PERUMEN Operational
Forwarding of AMCLEVE/15 201 File

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : None, FYI

REF: JMWAVE 2475, 21 May 1968

1. Attached hereto, as Attachment 1, is a copy of the cryptonym portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

2. Forwarded under separate cover, as Attachment 2, is a copy of the true name portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

3. Also included in the attachments are pertinent AMCLEVE/15 contact reports and a JMWAVE Personality file pertaining to his brother, Roberto.

Gary L. Flustikoff
Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments

1. Cryptonym portion of file
2. True name portion of 201 file

Distribution:

3 - COS/CARACAS w/att. #1 h/w & #2 usc to [illegible] pouch
② - C/WHD w/o atts. 2cc fwd w/1 / 1 w/o att
2 - WH/COG w/o atts.

CS COPY

MAY 20 1968

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30136

DATE
24 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

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SECRET 222222Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9686(LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

22 May 68 IN 16569

PBRUMEN

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS FOLLOWING CUBAN SUSPECTED BY CIVISTA-5 TO HAVE ENTERED VENEZUELA RECENTLY AS CUBAN AGENT;

ALBERTO ANTONIO (ORIZONDO) E IGUZQUIZA
DPOB 13 JUNE 1925, HAVANA
PASSPORT 43570 , CEDULA 793295

2. NO STATION TRACES. REQUEST HQS, JMWAVE AND AMOT TRACES.

SECRET

BT

CL

retain or destroy

SECRET

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S E C R E T 212253Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2475

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE ~~PB~~ UMEN

~~MEN~~ AMCLEVE

ACTION

22 May 68 IN 15683

WH/C
CC -
File - AMCLEVE-15
201

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 01313

B. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15:

A. AMCLEVE-15 INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE WITH BROTHERS RAUL AND ROBERTO. THIS DONE LATE 1966 AFTER IT LEARNED ROBERTO HAD TRAVELLED ENGLAND ON GOC PURCHASING MISSION (JMWAVE 3182, SEPT 66). IN APRIL 1967, STATION ADVISED AMCLEVE-15 THAT ROBERTO WAS SUPERVISOR TELEPHONE COMPANY WHICH INFO OBTAINED FROM RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEE (UFGA-27444, APRIL 67.) AMCLEVE-15 TOLD FORMER CO HE LAST SAW BROTHER (ONE OR OTHER) AT HABANA AIRPORT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO FEB 61.

B. AMCLEVE/15 WAS PRIMARILY USED BY STATION TO REPORT ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA. HAD CONTACTS WITH MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING EX STATION ASSETS, SELF STYLED EXILE LEADERS AND GANGSTERS. DURING ROSENTHAL

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INFO.

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2475 SECRET

CASE MID-1967, AMCLEVE-15 FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS OF LNERGO AND STATION AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK AND INCONVENIENCE TO SELF AND FAMILY.

2. STATION WILL FORWARD COMPLETE FILES ON AMCLEVE-15 TO CARACAS.

SECRET

BT

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

SECRET

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 20 MAY 68

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SECRET My 20 19 23 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01312

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REFS: A. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)* (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

B. DIRECTOR 99409** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

C. CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)*** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

File AMCLEVE

1. WISH ASSURE STATION THAT HQS DOES NOT HAVE DEROGATORY INFO ON AMCLEVE-15 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO STATION. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR STATION OBTAIN PERMISSION LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON AMCLEVE-15 OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RE SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN REF A:

A. IN PRQ'S I DATED 1961, 1965 AND 1966 AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED BOTH BROTHERS IN "BROTHERS AND SISTERS" SECTION BUT ONLY LISTED RAUL AS EMPLOYED BY GOC. RAUL WAS DESCRIBED AS "ADMINISTRATOR FOR AN ELECTRICAL COMPANY" OR "ELECTRICAL ENGINEER BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYED BY GOC." FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ON BROTHER ROBERTO SEE ATTACHMENT TO HVCW-7776, 4 DECEMBER 1967. HQS HAS NO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE TWO

DETAILS ON JMWAVE REQUEST THAT AMCLEVE-15 INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO. IN ANY CASE BELIEVE POINT OF SGSWIRL IS TO RESOLVE ANY DOUBT THAT CONFUSION OVER BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ANY MORE THAN NORMAL OVERSIGHT AND THAT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH BROTHERS (OTHER THAN 1966 EPISODE) SINCE DEPARTURE FROM CUBA. 13

B. HQS CONCERN THAT AMCLEVE-15 MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THEFT OR DISPOSAL OF WOFIRM DEMOLITION OR SABOTAGE GEAR WAS CAUSED BY ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-14975, 5 DECEMBER 1967, WHICH STATED AMCLEVE-15 SHOWED CIRASH-15 SOME STUFF HE HAD TAKEN FROM MIAMI INCLUDING FUSES, BOOBY-TRAP SWITCHES, DETONATING CORD, INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES AND TIME PENCILS. HQS HAS NO PROOF THIS GEAR STOLEN FROM WOFIRM BUT BELIEVE NATURE OF EQUIPMENT (PARTICULARLY INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES) IS SUCH THAT AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD AT LEAST BE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HE HAS EVER STOLEN OR

RELEASING OFFICER

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S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 91313

TO

PAGE THREE

KNOWINGLY RECEIVED EQUIPMENT STOLEN FROM WOFIRM.

C. HQS HAS NO DETAILS ON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OF AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO STATION AND JMWAVE. PURPOSE OF SGSWIRL QUESTION WOULD BE DETERMINE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE HAS BROKEN OFF COMPLETELY WITH LEFTY ROSENTHAL GROUP AND THAT HE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ GROUP WHICH COULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO U.S. GOVT, SUCH AS SMUGGLING BETWEEN MIAMI AND CARACAS.

3. REQUEST JMWAVE ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WHICH COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO AMCLEVE-15 SGSWIRL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/ Paul E Oberst

WH Comment: *Asked for further details on topics on which Hqs ~~deemed~~ desired AMCLEVE-15 be tested.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE FOUR

WH Comment: **Agreed SGSWIRL for AMCLEVE-15, suggesting he be tested on possible involvement in theft or receipt of stolen WOFIRM equipment and whether past involvement in illegal activities make him vulnerable to blackmail.

***Asked permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. Stated testing would be restricted to whether he had in past or was currently involved in activity hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECUR 6

S E C R E T 172050Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 5646 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

17 May 68 IN 13549

REF: DIRECTOR-99409

1. ALLEGATIONS AND SUSPICIONS AGAINST AMCLEVE-15 DISCUSSED WITH HIM BY CASE OFFICER AND HE DENIES THEM ALL AND IS COMPLETELY WILLING, EVEN EAGER, TO TAKE SGSWIRL IN ORDER CLEAR HIS RECORD.

2. THE 201 FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 FORWARDED BY JMWAVE IN SEPT 1967 WAS APPARENTLY STRIPPED DOWN VERSION AND NO PART I PRQ'S EVER RECEIVED; THEREFORE, WE DO NOT HAVE THE FACTS ON HIS FAILURE LIST BROTHER ROBERTO AS GOC EMPLOYEE. THIS POINT DISCUSSED WITH HIM, HOWEVER, AND HE STATES THAT HE DID NOT TRY CONCEAL HIS BROTHER'S STATUS BUT MERELY THOUGHT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS LOW-LEVEL AND NON-GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ARE TECHNICALLY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. IN ANY CASE, HIS ONLY COMMUNICATION WITH ROBERTO SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM CUBA IN FEB 1961 WERE TWO LETTERS SENT IN 1966, AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST, WHICH WERE NEVER ANSWERED. REFERENCE TO SEEING BROTHER IN APRIL 1961 WAS OBVIOUSLY CONFUSION OF EXACT DATES AFTER FIVE AND HALF YEARS. AMCLEVE-15

SECRET

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WAS IN GUATEMALA TRAINING CAMP PREPARING FOR BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

3. WE WERE NOT AWARE THAT AMCLEVE-15 WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN WOFIRM DEMOLITION AND SABOTAGE ITEMS. WE DID NOT ASSUME FROM HVCA-14975, ON ALLEGED POSSESSION OF SOME SUCH ITEMS BY AMCLEVE-15, THAT HE HAD STOLEN THEM FROM WOFIRM. DID HQS SO ASSUME, OR IS THERE OTHER INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH CARACAS HAS NOT RECEIVED? WHAT WAS DATE OF ALLEGED THEFT? SUBSEQUENT TO LAST SGSWIRL IN APRIL 1966? AMCLEVE-15 TOLD CASE OFFICER THAT HE BROUGHT TO CARACAS SMALL SUITCASE OF SUCH ITEMS WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY RECE ORGANIZATION AND WHICH TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WERE COMMERCIAL ITEMS, NOT WOFIRM.

4. AMCLEVE-15 STATES HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ONLY ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS WERE AT SPECIFIC REQUEST JMWAVE (AS CONFIRMED BY JMWAVE-8866) AND WERE ALL FULLY REPORTED TO JMWAVE. AGAIN WE ASK, DOES HQS HAVE SOME INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH WE DO NOT?

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FILE VR

PAGE 3 CARACAS 9646 SECRET

5. IT APPEARS FROM REF AND REVIEW OF TRAFFIC SINCE START OF CONSIDERATION OF USE AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS THAT HQS IN POSSESSION DEROGATORY INFO NOT KNOWN TO CARACAS. WE SUGGESTED THIS IN HVCA-14978 AND REQUESTED THAT WE BE PROVIDED WITH ANY SUCH INFO. DIRECTOR-56598 OF 2 DEC 1967 HINTED AT SUCH INFO HELD BY HQS AND PROMISED DISPATCH "WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE," BUT DISPATCH NEVER RECEIVED. SGSWIRL OPERATOR STATES IT DIFFICULT TO RUN MEANINGFUL EXAM ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS WITHOUT ALL FACTS. THEREFORE, REQUEST:

A. DETAILS OF WHAT AMCLEVE-15 DID LIST RE HIS BROTHERS ONPRQ, AND REQUEST BY JMWAVE TO INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO AND RESULTS.

B. DATE AND DETAILS OF THEFT ON WOFIRM ITEMS.

C. DETAILS OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE UNDERTAKEN AT SPECIFIC WOFIRM REQUEST

D. ANY OTHER DEROGATORY INFO OR ALLEGATIONS KNOWN TO HQS OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPRISED.

6. PLEASE REPLY IN TIME FOR SGSWIRL, SCHEDULED FOR 22 MAY.

SECRET

BT

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

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ORIG: [redacted] L. A. Ge[illegible]
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

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INFO: 14 F3 31-2 . WH/COG 8, CI/OA,

(date and time filed)

(elite) 99409 (pica)
(reference number)

~~PRIORITY~~ IMMEDIATE

TO CARACAS

CITE DIRECTOR

copy to [illegible] 201 -

REF: CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)

1. CONCUR SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. IN ADDITION AREAS OUTLINED REF BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD BE TESTED ON FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. STATUS OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS BROTHERS, IDEN A AND IDEN B. IDEN B IS BELIEVED TO BE A DSE AGENT AND IS TRUSTED BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD. NOTE AMCLEVE-15 CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO LIST IDEN B AS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOV IN PRQ'S FILLED OUT IN 1961, 1965, AND 1966 ALTHOUGH IDEN B WAS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN TELEPHONE COMPANY DURING THIS PERIOD. AFTER PHONE CALL FROM FAMILY IN HAVANA IN SEPTEMBER 1966, AMCLEVE-15 TOLD STATION JMWAVE OF IDEN B AND SAID HE HAD LAST SEEN HIM IN APRIL 1961. THIS AT VARIANCE WITH 1961 PRQ I WHICH SAYS AMCLEVE-15 ARRIVED IN U.S. IN FEBRUARY 1961.

B. REALIZE STATION WISHES AVOID QUESTIONS CONCERNING AMCLEVE-15'S EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH DO NOT DIRECTLY RELATE TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST WOFIRM. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL~~LY~~ TO CLARIFY DEGREE TO WHICH AMCLEVE-15 INVOLVED IN

CONT...

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE 2

99409

THEFT AND DISPOSAL OF DEMOLITION AND OTHER SABOTAGE DEVICES UNIQUE TO WOFIRM BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL HARM OF THESE ACTIVITIES TO WOFIRM. ALSO BELIEVE STATION SHOULD ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE FEELS PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OR ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS MAKE HIM VULNERABLE TO BLACKMAIL.

2. HQS PREPARED CONSIDER LESS RESTRICTED USE OF AMCLEVE-15 IF SGSWIRL REVEALS NO DECEPTION.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: CI/OPS/Mr. Hughes F. W. Hughes

OS/IRD/Mr. Bednar J. B. Bednar

WH Comment: Requests permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, restricting test to points designed determine that he has not, is not, and does not plan engage in activities hostile to WOFIRM.

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

L. Sternfield
LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) 99410

CITE DIRECTOR

TO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

REF: DIRECTOR 99409

IDEN A: RAUL POSADA CARRILLES

IDEN B: ROBERTO POSADA CARRILLES

END OF MESSAGE

File - ARCHIVE - 15
201

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L Sternfield
LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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AMCLEVE-15 220.00

Subject continues to provide excellent information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5.

FROM: HVCA-15438, 13 May 1968

SUBJECT: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for April 1968

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SECRET 102037Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9588

10 MAY 68 IN 08516

DIRECTOR

FILE AMCLEVE-15 201

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 71540

B. HVCA-15159

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS PROVED EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE AND VERY VALUABLE SOURCE SINCE PICKED UP BY CARACAS STATION FEBRUARY 1965. WE BELIEVE HE COLLABORATING FULLY WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD NOT EXPOSE, INFORM ON OR WORK AGAINST WOFIRM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE MIGHT NOT ENGAGE IN SIDE ACTIVITIES OF HIS OWN UNRELATED TO WOFIRM ACTIVITIES WITHOUT INFORMING WOFIRM.

2. BELIEVE GOOD TRADECRAFT REQUIRES HE UNDERGO SGSWIRL AT THIS TIME. ALSO WE WOULD LIKE REGULARIZE HIS STATUS, REINSTATE HIS CLEARANCE AND REMOVE HIM FROM "HOSTILE" LIST SO WE CAN WORK WITH HIM MORE CLOSELY, LEVY REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREBY REAP FULL BENEFIT HIS POTENTIAL.

3. WE WOULD PROPOSE LIMIT EXAMINATION TO POINTS DESIGNED DETERMINE THAT HE HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PLAN ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO WOFIRM. OUR ONLY REAL CONCERN IS TO BE ASSURED HE NOT WORKING AGAINST US. SINI CE MUCH OF HIS VALUE TO CIRASH-4 IS BASED ON HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES AND HIS CONTACTS

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FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9588 SECRET

IN MIAMI, AS POINTED OUT REF B, AND SINCE WE ARE OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH CIRASH-4, WE WOULD PROPOSE NOT CONDUCT DIRECT QUESTIONING ON THIS ASPECT HIS ACTIVITIES.

4. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, BUT WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT PROPOSE USE EXAMINATION TO PROBE POINTS RAISED REF A; RATHER ONLY TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WORKING FOR AND NOT AGAINST US.

SECRET

BT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT
DATE: 8 MAY 1968
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT AID TO CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO EXILES
REPORT #: 2 753 0015 68

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 302055Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9497

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

U4 Fil. AMCLEVE-15 201 6

KAPOK TYPIC

1 May 68 01396
m

REF CARACAS 9387 (IN 92196)

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS AGEDO LUGO IN CARACAS, APPARENTLY ON GANGSTER MISSION FOR CHUCHU FERNANDEZ, VENEZUELAN MILLIONAIRE IN MIAMI. LUGO TOLD AMCLEVE-15 THAT LNERGO INSTRUCTED HIM BE ON LOOKOUT FOR PRESENCE IN CARACAS OF FOLLOWING CUBANS SENT FROM CUBA TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT RAUL LEONI:

A. FRANCISCO LINARES, ALIAS PANCHO. NO STATION TRACES.

B. COMANDANTE WILLIAM GALVES. NO STATION TRACES. MAY REFER TO CUBAN COMANDANTE WILLIAM REPORTEDLY KILLED WITH DOUGLAS BRAVO GUERRILLAS.

C. ABELARDO COLOME, ALIAS FURRY. THIS IS ABELARDO COLOME IBARRA, ALIAS CAPTAIN FURRY (201-297702) WHO REPORTEDLY IN VENEZUELA FOR TWO YEARS TRAINING GUERRILLAS AND WHO RETURNED CUBA MARCH 1965 AFTER BEING WOUNDED.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 9497 SECRET

D. ORESTES GUERRA. PROBABLY ORESTES GUERRA GONZALEZ, CUBAN REPORTED WITH BRAVO GUERRILLAS IN SEPTEMBER 1967.

2. NOT DISSEMING DUE UNRESOLVED STATUS AMCLEVE-15 SOURCE WHO CLAIMS BE LNERGO INFORMANT. INFO RE RECENT ARRIVAL FROM CUBA OF ORESTES GUERRA AND COMANDANTE WILLIAM UNCONFIRMED BUT BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS, JMWAVE, AND AMOT TRACES ON LUGO AND CONFIRMATION FROM LNERGO IF HE THEIR AGENT. ALSO, TRACES ON LINARES AND GALVES AND ANY INDICATION TRAVEL OF ANY ABOVE FOUR MEN. PRESUME IF LNERGO HAD INFO RE ASSASSINATION PLOT AGAINST LEONI SUCH INFO WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE WOFIRM.

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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UNIT WH/3/V
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BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
CARACAS 9453 (IN 97611)
HVC-4762
N. P. (AMCLEVE-15)
FC, Para 1 (AMIFF-1)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

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CITE TDCS DB-315/01471-68

DIST 25 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI 29 FEBRUARY - 23 APRIL 1968 25 23 12Z

SUBJECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY IN A CUBAN EXILE PLAN TO ATTACK CUBA

ACQ VENEZUELA, CARACAS (24 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO. HVC-4762

SOURCE AN EXPERIENCED POLICE INVESTIGATOR WHOSE POSITION GIVES HIM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF VENEZUELA. HE REPORTS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SUPERIORS. ALTHOUGH HE IS A NEW SOURCE, HIS INFORMATION TO DATE HAS BEEN FOUND FREQUENTLY TO CONFIRM INDEPENDENTLY REPORTED INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. SOURCE HAD ACCESS TO DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION.

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SUMMARY: AN INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION BY THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) ON CUBAN EXILE PLANS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON CUBA HAS REVEALED THAT MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED. THE VENEZUELANS HAVE PROCURED ARMS FOR THE PLOTTERS AND HAVE HELPED THEM BRING IN ARMS BY BOAT. THE PLANNED ATTACK HAS BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE DIGEPOL'S INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED DETAILS OF THE OPERATION. HOWEVER, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO INTEREST ITSELF IN AIDING CUBAN EXILE PLANS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN FEBRUARY 1968, THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF POLICE (DIGEPOL) BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION OF REPORTS THAT VENEZUELANS WERE PROCURING ARMS FOR A CUBAN EXILE GROUP IN VENEZUELA WHICH PLANNED TO ATTACK CUBA. INITIAL REPORTS IDENTIFIED TWO CUBANS INVOLVED IN THE CASE: SALVADOR ROMANI-ORUE-GARCIA, WHO ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA AS AN EXILE FROM CUBA IN 1959, AND REINALDO BONIFACIO GONZALEZ-LEON GARCIA, WHO IS A CLOSE FRIEND OF ROLANDO MASFERRER AND WHO TOOK PART IN THE BAY

OF PIGS INVASION ATTEMPT. (FIELD COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT AND UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN NOVEMBER 1967 THAT GONZALEZ-LEON WAS THEN APPROACHING THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY WITH REQUESTS FOR ARMS AND BOATS TO BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT AGAINST CUBA.)

2. BY APRIL 1968 DIGEPOL'S INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION HAD IDENTIFIED NINE MORE CUBAN PARTICIPANTS AND HAD REVEALED THAT TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY, AN ARMY COLONEL AND A MAJOR, WERE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN. THE TWO VENEZUELANS HAD PROCURED ARMS FOR THE GROUP AND HAD ALSO HELPED TO ARRANGE THE ARRIVAL IN VENEZUELA IN EARLY 1968 OF TWO BOATS CARRYING ARMS. THE BOATS WERE DOCKED AT CLUB PUERTO AZUL AND AT PUERTO CABELLO.

3. UPON LEARNING THAT THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PLAN AND THAT THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAMON FLORENCIO GOMEZ KNEW THAT VENEZUELAN MILITARY AID WAS BEING GIVEN TO THE CUBAN PLOTTERS, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONFRONTED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ON 23 APRIL WITH THE ACCUMULATED EVIDENCE COLLECTED ON THE CASE. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADMITTED ITS INVOLVEMENT.

(SOURCE COMMENT: NO HOSTILITY TOWARD, OR CRITICISM OF, THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WAS SHOWN DURING THE CONFRONTATION BECAUSE INTERIOR IS AFRAID OF DEFENSE. INTERIOR MERELY REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED.)

4. WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WAS FULLY INFORMED ON THE DETAILS OF THE CUBAN PLAN, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CANCEL THE OPERATION. THE CUBANS WERE TO BE INFORMED OF THE CANCELLATION ON 24 APRIL. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO STUDY THE "GENERAL CONCEPT OF AID TO A CUBAN EXILE ATTACK ON CUBA FOR THE FUTURE."

5. THE FOLLOWING CUBAN PARTICIPANTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY DIGEPOL: LEONEL GOMEZ; MELITON (LNU); ANIBAL JUSTO POZO; CESAR LA MADRID; ELADIO ROMAN BAS TORRIENTE; ANTONIO FERNANDO MALLO LOPEZ; JUAN ALBERTO MORA CHAVEZ; SALVADOR MADRUGA; AND CAROL (FNU).

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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IN 97611

TDCSDB-315/01471-68

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MILGROUP CINCSO CINCLANT.

7. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN JUNE 1967, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS, INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FAVORED FORCEFUL ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THIS ACTION WOULD INVOLVE COMMANDO RAIDS AND AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS. SEE TDCSDB-315/02094-67.)

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DATE: 25 APRIL 1968

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25 23 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 94578

TO CARACAS, REP/LANT, PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 9453 (IN 97611) HVC-4762 (ZRWAHOO)

REFERENCE DISSEMINATED TDCSDB-315/01471-68 WITH ADDITION OF PARAGRAPH 7 AS FOLLOWS: "(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN JUNE 1967, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS, INCLUDING THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FAVORED FORCEFUL ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THIS ACTION WOULD INVOLVE COMMANDO RAIDS AND AERIAL BOMBARDMENTS. SEE TDCSDB-315/02094-67.)"

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/R

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

REPORT NO. CS-311/03646-68

DATE DISTR. 18 April 1968

COUNTRY Cuba

DOI 17 February 1968 and December 1967

SUBJECT Identification and Location of Political Prisoners

ACQ. Spain, Madrid (11 March 1968) FIELD NO. OSM-8876

SOURCE A member of a group of Cuban emigres who have been trained in the techniques of information collection and who have provided useful reports since early 1962. The information was obtained from the Cuban emigres identified below.

Subsource of paragraphs 1, 2, and 3: CC-3572, Bernabe Eugenio Yanez Pelletier, a Cuban refugee and former resident of Havana City who left Cuba on 19 February 1968. Yanez was imprisoned for six years and eight months and was released from La Cabana on 8 January 1967. His brother, Jesus Yanez, former aide to Fidel Castro, is serving 15 years at La Cabana; subsource last visited his brother on 17 February 1968, on which date he was held in galera 34.

1. As of 17 February 1968, the following were among the prisoners held in galera 34 of La Cabana prison:

Jose Luis Gallareta
Fernando Sanchez Amaya
Rafael del Pino Siero
Enrique Arrate
Ernesto de la Fe
Sosa Chabau (fnu)
Juan Valdes Morejon
Gonzalo Miranda Garcia
Santiago Verdeja

Alberto Blanco
Orlando Castro
Alberto Cruz
David Salvador
Rafael Menendez Aponte
Luis de Posada
Mario Salavarria
Kirvy Long (U.S. citizen, serving 30 years)

2. Except for Mario Salavarria, who has a nearly useless leg, all of the above were in good health. The prisoners in

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for March 1968

HVCA - 15368, 17 April 1968 75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15 220.00

Subject has proven to be an extremely valuable penetration of CIRASH, passing to the Station all the documents which he can, and providing timely information on the activities of CIRASH and CIVISTA-5.

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SECRET 162056Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9387

16 APR 68 IN 92196

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. AMCLEVE-15 WORKING ON CIRASH CASE INVOLVING POSSIBLE SMUGGLING FROM MIAMI TO VENEZUELA. ONE OF THOSE INVOLVED IN MIAMI IS AGEDO LUGO, ALIAS EL NEGRO LUGO. IN MEMO TO CHIEF CIRASH TO GIVE HIS BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE OF PEOPLE INVOLVED, AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED LUGO AS NEGRO WHO INFILTRATED BY LNERGO INTO BLACK POWER GROUPS IN MIAMI.

2. HQS MAY WISH BRING TO ATTENTION LNERGO THAT POSSIBLY ONE OF THEIR AGENTS KNOWN TO AMCLEVE-15 AND THEREBY PROBABLY OTHER CUBANS IN MIAMI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED CSDO
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED
BY D AT 2300 Z
DISSEM BY 58 PER
ACTION C/WH6 ☒ RID COPY

C[illegible] MESSAGE H TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.
INFO.
FILE. VR. CS/DO, C/WH/COG5, C/CI C/FI2

[illegible]ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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PRECEDENCE

SECRET 152209Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9376 (LYNER ACTING)

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

RYBAT

15 APR 68 IN 91426

201

AMCLEVE-15

REFS A. CARACAS 9356 (IN 88953)
B. CARACAS 9364 (IN 89759)
C. SCGUATEMALA CITY 521

IN VIEW REF C WE ANXIOUS PIN DOWN WHETHER ILLICH CARACAS. BELIEVE POSSIBLE GO TO CIVISTA-5 WITHOUT BLOWING AMCLEVE-15 INFO REF B. CAN WE GO TO CIVISTA-5 WITH STORY THAT MEXICO CITY STATION HAS ADVISED THAT ILLICH MAY BE TRAVELLING LATIN AMERICA AND THEY BELIEVE HE PLANS STOP VENEZUELA IN ADDITION OTHER COUNTRIES? WE WOULD TELL CIVISTA THAT WOFIRM INTERESTED BEING ADVISED SHOULD ILLICH APPEAR ON SCENE. WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL GIVE CIVISTA-5 SOME BACKGROUND ON ILLICH. IF AGREEABLE, WOULD APPRECIATE ILLICH BACKGROUND FROM MEXICO CITY BY 1500 HOURS LOCALTIME 16 APRIL TO PERMIT ROGOVER RAISE AT SCHEDULED MEETING WITH CIVISTA-5.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

ORIG: J. GOWER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 12 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 11

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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BY 15 PER
CONF: WH 8
☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

13 16 09 Z CITE DIRECTOR 91348

TO CARACAS INFO: GUATEMALA CITY, MEXICO CITY AMCLEVE -

REF: CARACAS 9364 (IN 89759)*

HQS HAS NO RECORD OF ANY TRAVEL BY ILLICH TO GUATEMALA. NAMES OF THOSE TRAVELLING TO BLOC FROM SEPTEMBER 1967 TO FEBRUARY 1968 AND NAMES OF THOSE TRAVELLING TO CUBA SINCE 1962 ALSO CHECKED. RESULTS NEGATIVE IN BOTH CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Reported arrival of Illich in Venezuela; requested information whether Illich was in Guatemala in recent months.

COORD: C/WH/1 W. J. Kaufman
D C/WH/2/ L. H. Piper

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Guerrilla Course in Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. OSMA-23303, 7 December 1967
B. UFGA-29461, 8 February 1968

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of seven folders which comprise the notes taken by Mario Cannella at a guerrilla course he attended in Cuba from December 1966 through October 1967. Copies of these notes were received from unilateral penetration agent of CIRASH, AMCLEVE-15.

2. The course was particularly heavy on explosives, with the first three volumes being devoted to it exclusively. Volumes 4 and 6 are also mostly on explosives, with the first part of each being on photography and Marxism, respectively. Volumes 5 and 7 deal with such subjects as tradecraft, infiltration-exfiltration operations, security, safehouses, recruitments, sabotage operations, etc.

3. No copies of the attachments are being sent to JMWAVE; we defer to Headquarters as to whether it would be worthwhile to reprint some of the courses for distribution to JMWAVE or others.

Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENTS:
One copy each of seven folders described in paragraph one

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/att, h/w)
1 - COS, JMWAVE (w/o att)

75-4-124

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-15345

DATE
10 Apr 68
9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

From: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for February 1968

HVCA-15894, 22 March 1968 75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15 224.00

He is the Station's new penetration of CIRASH and has provided excellent information on the activities of CIRASH, CIRASH-4 and CIVISTA-5. He has been put on a salary of Bs 1,000 per month, to start.

From: CIGUSTY Operational Reporting for January 1968
HVCA-15293, 22 March 1968 75 - 6 - 43/3

AMCLEVE-15 None

He was picked up as a penetration of CIRASH at the end of January and will be put on a salary beginning 1 February 1968.

1013 Mrs. Stanfield
ROOM NO. | BUILDING
W #K6

REMARKS
cc 16 F

Mr. Gremillion
saw the
original

FROM:
ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 30-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

SECRET TELEPOUCH

TLP NO- UFGW-6380

FILE NO- 75-120-22

DATE - 1 MARCH 1968

INDEX - NO

FILE - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - GUSTAVO ERNESTO ORTIZ FAEZ

ACTION - SEE PARA 1.

REFS - HVCA 15195 /POUCHED/ T.M. NO. 208722

1. REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE ANY AVAILABLE INFO CONCERNING ACTIVITIES GUSTAVO ERNESTO /ORTIZ/ FAEZ WHILE VISITING MIAMI AREA LATE JANUARY EARLY FEB 1968 HQS DULY CONCERNED OVER APPARENT INVOLVEMENT AMCLEVE-15 IN ORTIZ PLANS TO OBTAIN QUOTE "CURARE POISON FOR USE IN HYPODERMIC NEEDLES" UNQUOTE. IN VIEW SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NEEDED PROTECT UNILATERAL STATUS CIRASH-15, STATION CARACAS NOT IN POSITION QUERY AMCLEVE-15 DIRECTLY. HQS HOPEFUL STATION JMWAVE MAY BE IN POSITION OBTAIN SUFFICIENT LEAD INFORMATION WHICH MAY MAKE DIRECT APPROACH AMCLEVE-15 POSSIBLE.

2. JMWAVE REQUESTED QUERY LNERGO FOR INFO ON ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS ORTIZ WHILE VISITING MIAMI. STATION SHOULD PASS WRITTEN MEMO TO LNERGO ADVISING THAT QUOTE "UNIDENTIFIED CUBAN EXILE" UNQUOTE REPORTED THAT ORTIZ ATTEMPTED OBTAIN QUOTE "LETHAL POISONS" UNQUOTE WHILE IN MIAMI AT END OF JANUARY. STATION REQUESTED PROVIDE HQS WITH COPY OF MEMO PASSED TO LNERGO SO THAT APPROPRIATE NOTICE MAY BE PROVIDED.

LNERGO AT HQS LEVEL.

3. AS STATION AWARE, THIS SITUATION DEEPLY COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT AMCLEVE-15 CLOSE INTIMATE FRIEND OF CIRASH-4 AND CIRASH-6, THE LATTER A FORMER CUBAN EXILE, FORMER U.S. CITIZEN AND NOW VENEZUELA CITIZEN. STATION FILES SHOULD HAVE DETAILED INFO ON BACKGROUND ORTIZ WHO ALSO SUBJ OF SEVERAL LNERGO REPORTS.

XG GERALD L. GARDYNE

DISTRIBUTION
3: TAPE 3-COS,JMWAVE

ORIGINATOR:

AC/WH/COG/OPS William Murray

COORDINATION:

WH/3/ Mr. Sternfield

RELEASING:

C/WH/COG David A. Phillips

DISTRIBUTION:
1-RID
1-WH/REG/C
1-WH/3
1-WH/COG/OPS
1-Originator

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

C[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

GROUP 3X

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, C/CI'S, C/ICG, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 282015Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 9019

28 FEB 68 IN 60225

ROME INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE

1. LIAISON PENETRATION AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS VENEZUELAN CONSULATE ROME GRANTED TOURIST CARD 99977 ON 14 FEB 1968 TO ITALIAN COMMUNIST MARIO PITRUCCI, DIRECTOR OF TRAVEL AGENCY ITALNORD.

2. REQUEST STATON TRACES PETRUCCI. NO LIAISON.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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FROM 3

...SSIFIED MESSAGE f TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

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ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 0225

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CF, CS/DC, DDP/SSU, C/CA, C/CA/E, C/62, C/FI/D4, D/SECUR 4, C/TSD 3, C/WH/COG 5.

SECRET 282317Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 9025

DIRECTOR

RID KG

cc

RYBAT

ACTION

REF CARACAS 2922 (IN 50020) * on list of phone taps.

* Embassy is number one target

1. LATEST INFO FROM AMCLEVE-15[1] ON LNPURE[2] PHONE TAP WHICH HE FOLLOWING UP:

A. ALTHOUGH LNPURE[2] AT TOP OF TARGET LIST HE SAW IT AMCLEVE-15'S[1] IMPRESSION THAT COVERAGE IS SPOTTY AND LNPURE[2] MAY NOT AT THIS MOMENT BE COVERED.

B. CIRASH[3] HAS 36 LINES COVERED. MAN IN CHARGE OF TAPS TOLD AMCLEVE-15[1] THAT WHEN ALL LINES NOT BEING USED ON SPECIFIC TARGETS, "AS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1967," ANY EXTRA LINES PUT ON LNPURE[2].

C. CIRASH[3] HAS ONLY THREE RECORDERS FOR THESE 36 LINES, EACH RECORDER COVERING 12 LINES EVEN THOUGH MORE THAN ONE CONVERSATION MAY THEREFORE BE FEEDING INTO IT AT GIVEN MOMENT.

SECRET

Baloney – any organization using only 3 recorders + no line is not using dial recorders

L.

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9025 S E C R E T

D. THREE SHIFTS COVER LINES 24 Hours ~~HOAMS~~ A DAY. ALL COVERAGE TAKEN BY RECORDERS; NO LIVE LISTENING.

E. CIVISTA-5[4] TOLD AMCLEVE-15[1] THAT CIRASH[3] PLANS BE ABLE COVER 100 LINES AND HAS ALREADY REQUESTED 100 RECORDERS TO HANDLE EACH LINE SEPARATELY.

F. DIAL RECORDERS BEING USED (QUANTITY UNKNOWN).

2. ABOVE INDICATES PRESENT LNPURE[2] COVERAGE PROBABLY POOR AND CONFUSING. WHILE THIS MEANS DANGER LESS THAN WE SUPPOSED, WE STILL TAKING PRECAUTIONARY STEPS OUTLINED IN REF.

S E C R E T

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

TO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Venezuelan Security Services Technical Capabilities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AMCLEVE-15

REFERENCE: HVCS-2610

1. Headquarters' request to review the contents of the attachment to Reference was received at a time when the Station was unable to produce current data to make a meaningful contribution to updating subject matter. Since receipt of Reference, the Station has unilaterally recruited a telephone technician who is knowledgeable of SIFA telephone taps. This Subject has not been used as yet, nor has he received his first months salary and RYKOVER is not yet prepared to probe Subject on SIFA taps. With regard to DIGEPOL technical operations, the Station has only recently been able to obtain unilateral type information through AMCLEVE-15 who is only now getting to know the man in charge of the DIGEPOL telephone operation.

2. Within the next two months the Station should be in a position to provide a more detailed and specific report on GOV technical operations.

3. The following is all the information currently available to the Station on SIFA/DIGEPOL technical operations.

a. SIFA telephone taps are monitored in the building housing the Ministry of Communications, which is located alongside SIFA headquarters. According to the telephone technician, they have a capability to intercept 50 lines, but only a dozen are in operation at any given time. The monitoring section consists of 2-3 persons. Because of this personnel shortage many tapes are not replayed and even less are transcribed. SIFA offices in the interior have been reduced and it is doubtful that a telephone program is in operation.

b. The DIGEPOL telephone intercepts are now directly under command of the Minister of Interior and all intercept requests must have his approval. According to CIGIRO-1 in conversations with the COS, the former claims a telephone capability of 50 lines, not including 3-4 lines he has running directly into his office. (Plans call for completion of an additional 100 lines by the end of February 1968.) These are monitored in the building of Ministry of Interior. The staffing pattern, production and utilization of the take is unknown to the Station. Since a capability of this extent involves running a cable to the monitoring post, it is most probable that the actual taps are on the frame at the main telephone exchange in Caracas.

(USE CONTINUATION) Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HVCA-15208

DATE
23 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
75-2-13/3
75-2-14/3

c. The Station is unaware of any capability of the GOV may have to place transmitters in telephones and it is doubtful that they have considered this type of operation during the past year.

d. A recent development, too early for the Station to report on as yet, is the formation of a Special Group under CIVISTA-5. It is known that CIVISTA-5 has been in the throes of developing a clandestine unit to run true intelligence type operations. In keeping with his plans he ordered a large amount of technical equipment from Germany. This equipment arrived on 14 February with one of his agents who had been receiving intelligence training in Germany. As yet the equipment has not been unpacked, but it is believed to contain material more of a photographic nature rather than audio type material. It is believed that CIVISTA-5 has also placed an order for audio equipment with a firm in the United States.

4. As can be seen from the above, the best GOV capability is to be found in the telephone intercept program, and as has been indicated, the Station will have much better information on this and other technical operations within the next few months.

Matthew R. HOOVER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HVCA-14975
B. HVCA-15159

1. CIRASH-15 reported that AMCLEVE-15, shortly after the latter's return from Miami on 30 January 1968, asked CIRASH-15 if he could obtain curare poison for "approximately forty hypodermic needles." AMCLEVE-15 said that the request had been made by Gustavo ORTIZ Faes, who was still in Miami at that time. ORTIZ returned to Caracas during the second week of February, and on 15 February he personally contacted CIRASH-15 and reiterated the request. CIRASH-15 has so far been unable to determine for what purpose ORTIZ wants the curare.

2. We have not heard anything about this from AMCLEVE-15 and will not ask him in order not to expose CIRASH-15. This is possibly another one of the goon squad activities tentatively planned for Caracas mentioned in Reference A, but more likely it has to do with some wild Cuban exile scheme in Miami, since AMCLEVE-15 told CIRASH-15 when ORTIZ was still in Miami that ORTIZ wanted the curare shipped to him there via a Viasa pilot.

3. As was stated in Reference B, we do not approve of these activities and would like to discuss them with AMCLEVE-15, pointing out that they could jeopardize his employment here with CIRASH-4; but our present relationship with AMCLEVE-15 precludes such discussions. Meanwhile, the case officer will wear his special armored shirt to all meetings with AMCLEVE-15.

Oscar C. KALBING

amcleve-15
201 file

DISTRIBUTION
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCA-15198	19 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: COX CHARLES
WH/1/V
EXT. 4521

UW-628
382631
TUBE BS-4

DATE: 13 Feb 68

RID CONTROL NO.: 122 FEB 21 68

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-6				
REQUESTER			20 Feb	65	①
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	GG-5				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

RECEIVED RID/IN
FEB 19 1 03 PM '68

VERIFIED

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: PARSONS - Ramirez

GIVEN NAMES: Roberto

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED: ZN | SN

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 779687

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	10 July 36	Guantanamo, Oriente, Cuba	Cuba	Miami, Florida

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

		COMMENTS
☐	NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	
☑	CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	19 FEB 68

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED
☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

[illegible]
☐ RID ☐ FILE

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/AFD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7777.

NOTE

SIGNATURE OF RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

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ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, C/OPS, C/CI2,

S E C R E T 162331Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1362 KC/CC — AW

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR 16 FEB 68 IN 53017

AKULE PBRUMEN AMCLEVE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 4769 (IN ?)

1. NO STATION TRACES ROBERTO PARDON.

2. REF AMCLEVE-15 MIAMI CONTACT IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH ROBERTO (PARSONS) RAMIREZ, DPOB 10 JULY 1930, GUANTANAMO, ORIENTE, CUBA. CITIZEN OF CUBA CURRENTLY RESIDING MIAMI AS PAROLEE. WAS WOFIRM AGENT FROM 1965 THRU 1967. TERMINATED 30 NOVEMBER 1967 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. PARSONS USED IN EXFIL-INFIL OPS AS REPORTED BY AMCLEVE-15 BUT HE ALSO OCCASIONALLY REPORTED GRATUITOUS AND MOSTLY UNSUBSTANTIATED INFO ON DSE AND DGI.

S E C R E T

SECRET

× MORE THAN YEAR OLD

No WH/3/V traces.
RI + COG requested.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

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ACTION A WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/COG 8, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 150950Z FEB 68 CITE THE HAGUE 3810

ACTION

15 FEB 68 IN 51467

A

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

CIWRIT

REF CARACAS 8893 (IN 49506)

TCC 188 FROM HANK. DODGE NOT KNOWN HERE AS OWNER TAXI LINE OR OTHERWISE. INTRIGUED BY STORY, ESPECIALLY LINK SABA. APPRECIATE LEARNING FURTHER DETAILS.

us
J6
AMCLEVE-15
info.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Secret

ORIG: C. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/1/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ___ #___
CONF. [illegible] 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET FEB 15 1826 Z CITE DIRECTOR 75107

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8895 (IN 49509)*

RE PARA 1 A REF: NO HQ TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested HQ traces on Giuseppe MATTESSICH Marcuzzi suspect CUIS contact in Caracas who carries Italian passport, and on his wife Maria Luisa PEREZ Hernandez de Mattessich who has Cuban passport.

COORD: WH/COG Earl Williamson

Tom Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

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DISSEM BY: 25 PER

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-V

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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SECRET 142247Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1269

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

15 FEB 68 IN 51208

PBRUMEN AMCLEVE

REF CARACAS 8895 (IN 49509)

1. NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES GIUSEPPE (MATTESSICH) MARCUZZI.

2. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES MARIA LUISA (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ DE MATTESSICH. ACCORDING CUBAN PRESS, 18 NOV 1960, GOC FINANCE MINISTRY AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE OF MARIA L. (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ FROM CUBA. SHE BENEFICIARY UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY AND RETIRED UNDER SCHOLASTIC PROGRAM (AMOTS).

SECRET

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Feb 14, 1968



POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente Faustino 201- 300985

WH/3/V

THERE IS A RESTRICTI ER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A RESTR OLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201 30 09 85

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/CAG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI/D 4, FI/INT 2, IW, EUR 8

S E C R E T ~~[illegible]~~ 122236Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8895

Cut
RG ✓
cc — Traces pls.

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

13 FEB [illegible]

REF: CARACAS-8894 (IN 49508)

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF 9 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH AMCLEVE ~~[illegible]~~ THAT NOT INCLUDED REF:

A. DIGEPOL SUSPECTS CUBAN G-2 OPERATING OFFICE UNDER COVER BOOK STORE IN CARACAS. ALLEGED CONTACT WITH CUBANS FOR THIS OP IS GIUSEPPE (MATTESSICH) ~~10-4-7-8~~ MARCUZZI, DPOB 9 OCTOBER 1892, BORGO ERIZZO, ITALY. VEN FOREIGNERS CEDULA E-752002, ITALIAN PASSPORT 2067532 ISSUED BY ITALIAN CONSULATE HAVANA 14 APRIL 1956. HIS WIFE IS MARIA LUISA (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ DE MATTESSICH, DPOB 13 MAY 1902, PINAR DEL RIO, CUBA. VEN FOREIGNERS CEDULA E-798883, CUBAN PASSPORT 30088 ISSUED ~~SEHANA~~ HAVANA 5 JULY 1956. NO STATION TRACES. REQUEST JMWAVE, HQS, AND AMOT TRACES.

B. CUBANS RUN INFILTRATION OP THROUGH CURACAO TO BRING CUBANS AND VENEZUELANS INTO VENEZUELA IN PUERTO CABELLO AREA. MAN IN CHARGE IN CURACAO IS ONE FNU DODGE WHO OWNS TAXI LINE. (WILL CHECK WITH CIWRITS.)

C. DIGEPOL JUST OBTAINED COMPLETE URBAN

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 3395 S E C R E T

TERRORIST PLANS OF FALN FOR MARCH AND APRIL. AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT GET FULL COPY FOR STATION; ONLY DETAIL KNOWN TO HIM NOW IS THAT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WAS ON ASSASSINATION LIST.

D. AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED AGAIN, AS HE HAS AT PREVIOUS TWO MEETINGS, THAT DIGEPOL IS UNBELIEVABLY DISORGANIZED. HE HAS FREE HAND TO DO WHATEVER HE LIKES BECAUSE HE AT LEAST WORKS AND HAS INITIATIVE. HE HAS BEEN COMPILING DOSSIERS ON LEADING SUBVERSIVES, A THING WHICH DIGEPOL INCREDIBLY DOES NOT HAVE.

2. ABOVE INFO OF INTEL VALUE BEING DISSEMINATED.

S E C R E T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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ZC

ACTION
WH 8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/RA, SOD 6, CI/PS
CA 5, CA/PEG, CS/SGO

EW
KG
JG
CC
charly note last para

S E C R E T 122233Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8894

13FEB68 IN 48500

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN AMSHADY AMCLEVE

REF: JMWAVE-1213 (IN 48140)

1. ORIGINAL SOURCE FOR DIGEPOL ON REF INFO RE CUBANS COMING VENEZUELA MAY HAVE BEEN AMCLEVE-15. ON 9 FEBRUARY AMCLEVE-15 INFORMED STATION THAT UNKNOWN NUMBER CUBANS MAY SOON BE INFILTRATED VENEZUELA, AMONG THEM TONY CASTELLS AND FNU CLADERIN. AMCLEVE-15 HAD RECEIVED THIS INFO FROM ROBERTO PARDON DURING AMCLEVE-15'S VISIT MIAMI LAST WEEK ~~KNUSEY~~ JANUARY. AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED PARDON AS EX-WOFIRM AGENT WHO USED EXFILTRATE PEOPLE FROM CUBA AND STILL ENGAGED THIS ACTIVITY ON OWN. (REQUEST JMWAVE TRACES.) AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT MENTION SUSANA, BUT STATION FILES SUGGEST SHE MAY BE GUIOMAR (YEPEZ) PATINO, BRAVO FALN SUPPORT AGENT AND member MEVAER YEPEZ PATINO FAMILY ALMOST ALL OF WHOM ACTIVE SUBVERSIVES.

2. AMCLEVE-15 HAS REPORTED TO STATION ON BUILD UP OF URBAN TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCREASED USE OF UCV CAMPUS AS HIDE OUT. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT ON 7 FEBRUARY DIGEPOL AGENTS CRUISING UCV CAMPUS WERE FIRED ON BY TERRORISTS WHO

SECRET

~~AM~~

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8894 SECRET

RECOGNIZED EX-TERRORIST IN CAR WHO NOW INFORMING TO DIGEPOL. CARACAS STATION FEELS THAT IT WOULD DEFINITELY BE ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE AMSHADY-1 ACCEPT DIGEPOL ASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF WOFIRM HAS NO DIRECT ACCESS TO HER. IF WE DO, THAT WOULD BE A BONUS. (WE TRUST THAT HER BEING HIRED BY SHADY CHARACTER SUCH AS GUSTAVO ORTIZ WILL NOT CAUSE CONCERN SIMILAR AMCLEVE-15 CASE.)

SECRET

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM 26

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 5, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA, SOD 6, CS/SG 6, CI/PS

S E C R E T 092316Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1213 10 FEB 68 IN 48140

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMSHADY

1. ON 5 FEBRUARY 1968 GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1 IN MIAMI. ORTIZ INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS EMPLOYED BY DIGEPOL. HE TOLD AMSHADY-1 THAT INSURGENCY IS NOW BUILDING UP IN URBAN AREAS AND WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES IN VENEZUELA AND THAT CUBANS ARE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT DIGEPOL HAS INFORMATION THAT CAPTAIN LESTER RODRIGUEZ AND COMANDANTE TONY CASTELLS, BOTH OF THE CUBAN REBEL ARMY, ARE IN VENEZUELA OR EN ROUTE THERE FROM CUBA. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBABLE COORDINATOR OF THE URBAN TERRORISM IS A VENEZUELAN WOMAN WHO IS USING THE WAR NAME SUSANA BUT THAT DIGEPOL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HER FURTHER.

2. ORTIZ SAID THAT HE WAS TO BE IN MIAMI ONLY A SHORT WHILE AND HE WANTED FROM AMSHADY-1 WHATEVER INFO SHE HAD OR COULD GET ON CURRENT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA. HE ALSO SAID THAT DIGEPOL WAS PLANNING TO TRAIN SELECTED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, INCLUDING FEMALES, AS PENETRATION AGENTS AND HE ASKED AMSHADY-1 IF SHE WOULD BE

SECRET

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 1213 S E C R E T

INTERESTED IN GOING TO VENEZUELA, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, AS A TRAINER.

3. AMSHADY-1 MADE IT CLEAR TO THE JMWAVE CASE OFFICER THAT SHE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WITH LEGITIMATE EFFORTS TO THWART CUBAN SPONSORED INSURGENCY INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIPS TO VENEZUELA AND ELSEWHERE ON TRAINING MISSIONS. SHE REPORTED THAT SHE TOLD ORTIZ THAT SHE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING CUBANS IN VENEZUELA AND SAID SHE HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE TRAINING OFFER, WHICH SHE FELT TO BE MERELY TENTATIVE. SHE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ORTIZ FOR WHICH PURPOSE HE GAVE AMSHADY-1 A POST OFFICE BOX NUMBER, HIS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN CARACAS.

4. JMWAVE REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ANY INDICATION OF OPS INTEREST IN AMSHADY-1 COLLABORATION WITH DIGEPOL ALONG THESE LINES.

S E C R E T

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 9 February 1968 aaa
TO: Chief, WH/3/V E. Tsikerdanos C. Cox	C NO. 201-300985
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Receipt is acknowledged of your request for cancellation. Please refer to the requirements of CSI F 50-17 (9). It would seem most pertinent in this case.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

(20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT
Operational/AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR-71540
B. CARACAS-8748
C. HVCA-14975

1. AMCLEVE-15 was contacted by Oscar C. KALBING again on 2 February 1968. AMCLEVE-15 is willing to provide the Station with any information that comes his way in CIRASH, and the Station has agreed to pay him Bs 1000 per month for such information.

2. We will, of course, handle AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile", as requested in Reference A, although we do not share Headquarters' alarm concerning AMCLEVE-15's possible engagement in harassment of communists. This is not the type of activity that we would choose for AMCLEVE-15, of course; and, as stated in Reference C, we had intended to advise him to stay clear of it in order not to jeopardize his position with CIRASH-4. We will not discuss this with him now, however, and risk exposing the source, CIRASH-15, to a "hostile". While we would hope, if we did talk to AMCLEVE-15 about these activities and asked him to desist, that he would comply, we would not be overly surprised if he did not. We are only fooling ourselves if we think that agents, whom we like to consider we "control", are telling us everything they do.

3. At the risk of belaboring the point, it is precisely because he is the kind of person that he is that AMCLEVE-15 is able to become the trusted confidant of people like CIRASH-4, CIRASH-6, Remberto UZCATEGUI and Gustavo ORTIZ, all of whom may be considered somewhat unsavory characters but who, whether or not we like it, run an important part of the security system in Venezuela. And it is precisely because of AMCLEVE-15's position as such a trusted confidant that we are interested in him.

4. We will attempt to ascertain AMCLEVE-15's motives, as requested in Reference A, but this task will be considerably hampered by our need to handle him as a "hostile", which will preclude the use of some of the basic tools of investigation, such as the SGSWIRL and the levying of requirements.

ATTACHMENTS:
As stated in para. 5 (11 pages)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH-WHD (w/atts, h/w)

FEB 7 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA-15159	DATE 7 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 75-2-13/3

5. We are attaching copies of some of the reports that AMCLEVE-15 passed at his first meeting with a Station case officer on 22 January 1968. At the second meeting he said he would try to obtain for us copies of the interrogation of Antonio ROMERO Celis, of CICLOSE fame, and the report from the CIVISTA agent who recently returned from Cuba (see MADRID-3121 and CARACAS-8318). AMCLEVE-15 is only now really getting deeply into his work with CIRASH, having just settled his family into an apartment on 1 February 1968, and he expects to be able to furnish a great deal more in the near future. In spite of the problems inherent in some of AMCLEVE-15's friendships and peripheral activities, we are hopeful that this is going to be a productive and valuable operation for the Caracas Station.

Oscar C. Kalbing
Oscar C. KALBING

[illegible]

ORIG: C.W. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R-9494
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WHP ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CS/DO, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71540

TO CARACAS FEB 2 03 03Z

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

S E C R E T

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______PER______#______

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 71548

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.

**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.

***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

WH/FI

by Jacob W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

UPDATED BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles
(201-300985)

DPOB : 15 February 1928 Cienfuegos, Cuba

MOC : Effective 26 March 1965 as Training Branch Instructor, JMWAVE

TERMINATION : Effective 11 July 1967 as CI informant, JMWAVE

CURRENT OCCUPATION : DIGEPOL employee, Ministry of Interior, Caracas, Venezuela

PRESENT ADDRESS: Caracas, Venezuela

SECRET

Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles   Army Serial No. O 2 312 445

DOB: 15 Feb 1928   Third Army Control Symbol: AB 517726.

Entered USArmy March 1963.

Released from Active Duty 6 Mar 64.

Served Ft. Benning, Ga as 2nd Lt, Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon, Co B, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. Also as Platoon Leader, Weapons Platoon, same Company.

Information desired:

1. Confirmation above information.
2. Dates and status when entering Army, dates entering and graduating Army schools, troop duty assignment changes, promotions, status when leaving Army service, reserve assignments.
3. Current reserve status and extent obligation.
4. Comments on efficiency reports.
5. Anything unusual in file.

[illegible] 9474

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4. Comments on efficiency reports.
5. Anything unusual in file.

CIA

From: Jim Ludlum CI/LI [illegible]
Luis Posada 3 - Jan 68

No Unlabeled file
ASN ok Birth ok.

Applied for appt as USAR officer 14 Mar 63. On 21 Mar 63 3rd Army Hq ordered him to active duty for ~~[illegible]~~ 6 mos + commissioned him 2nd Lt. Reported 23 March 63 to Infantry.

AGO 21 Mar 63, appt him 2nd Lt USAR.

Schools

(1) Went to Infantry School, at Fort Benning 23 Mar 63 - Student Brigade.

(1a) As of 23 Mar mail address was Detach 21 2nd Student Battalion TSB.

(2) 19 June 63 he requested ~~[illegible]~~ an Intel Staff Officer Course. He was then a member of Special Officer Training Program [illegible] Cam. [illegible], 2506th Cuban Brigade

[Background NAC invest completed 14 Jun 62.]

Limited Access Clearance

21 Nov 63 he was given LAC to Classified Defense info up to + incl "Secret".

Polygraphed 19 Aug 63 - in connection investigation for attendance at [illegible] Staff Off course. Passed.

27 Feb 64 he tendered his resignation to be effective 27 Feb 64 "No plans in US Army to liberate Cuba" His Option he asked be appointed to Stand by reserve

28 Feb 64 he transferred from active duty to standby reserve (US Army Active Reserve) + assigned 5 USA REC
Main Station 4100 Aurora St
Coral Gables, Fla

11 March 64 assigned to that unit

~~Honorable discharge~~

On [illegible] of issue
only course shown is
US Army Infantry School April 63 –
August 63. — Apparently did
not attend Intell officers course
~~[illegible]~~

~~30 Oct 64.~~
17 Feb 66 he was honorably separated
from Army. He tried to get
commission back but Army
advised him that he did not
meet age requirement which would
not be waived.

SECRET

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201-300985

1. It is requested that a Provisional Operation Approval be granted for the use of subject as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization. The Caracas Station has requested that processing be expedited.

2. The Caracas Station has reviewed Subject's file and the documents sent by Headquarters and sees nothing that would preclude the use of Subject as a penetration of DIGEPOL. (copy attached)

3. Significant information in Subject's file concerns his two brothers who are currently in Cuba and his relations with a well known Miami gangster. One brother, Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect DSE official, is the Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte, including Havana City. Subject has not seen either brother since he left Cuba in 1961. Subject has also been in contact with a well known gangster."Lefty" Rosenthal in the Miami area. Both JMWAVE and the FBI were aware of this contact which was maintained at the latter's request.

E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)* *PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK*	DATE 25 January 1968
TO: ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY	FROM: E. Tsikerdanos C/WH/3/V 3B2631
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles	PROJECT
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES AMCLEVE-15	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO. 300985 / SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 181884

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☒	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☒	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER C. Cox	EXTENSION R-9494	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

25 Jan 68

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

Subject : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201 - 300985

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Ernie
C/WH/3/V

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978

B. HVCW-7776

C. DIRECTOR-56538

24 Jan 68 38499

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI, PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

2. IT EVIDENT HE COMPLETELY WILLING WORK WITH STATION AS PENETRATION CIRASH. AT MEETING AMCLEVE-15 TURNED OVER FOR STATION COPYING SEVERAL VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FROM CIRASH PROVIDING OPS LEADS ON KEY TERRORISTS.

3. SALARY NOT DISCUSSED, BUT STATION WOULD PLAN PAY AMCLEVE-15 FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 BS. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT FOR MIAMI MORNING 23 JANUARY. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

SECRET *Section Sixth

SECRET

as a source of information on subversive personalities made available to him thru the course of his official duties in DIGEPOL.

as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual intelligence organization.

NOTES

1. In a Spanish questionnaire of Personal Information made out in 1961, Subject listed his brother Raul POSADA-Carriles as an administrator of the Marianao Electric Company as a relative in some government service. He did not list his brother Roberto in this section, although he did list Roberto in Para 16, Subject: Brothers and Sisters.

2. In another signed but undated Spanish Personnel Information form of apparently 1965, he again listed both his brothers in Section M, Subject: Brothers and Sisters, and in Section N he again listed his brother Raul, who he stated he believed to be working for the Cuban government as an engineer. He again failed to list his brother Roberto.

3. Concerning his PRQ Part I filled out in March 1965, again no mention of his brother Roberto appears in Section XIV, Subject: Relatives, Acquaintances and Contacts in any Government Service.

4. According to POSADA's own admission in an LC Flutter of 14 April 1965, he had been involved in planning for a Guatemalan coup headed by Roberto ALEJOS-Arzu. This matter later came to the attention of the FBI. There is an FBI report dated 17 May 1965 in the 201. AMCLEVE-15 also furnished information on this Guatemalan coup for JMWAVE, who disseminated this information in July 1965.

5. AMCLEVE-15 informed JMWAVE concerning other independent exile operations into Cuba in July of 1965.

6. His PRQ Part II, Section XI, dated September 1965, says that "Subject is of good character, very reliable and security

conscious. Subject demonstrated good security techniques while reporting on the activities" of Roberto ALEJOS concerning the attempted coup against Guatemala.

7. An FBI report of 30 September 1965 outlines the contacts that had been made by some Americans seeking to purchase pistols, blasting caps, hand gernades and silencers. This is the first indication in the 201 that Subject was involved with Frank Lang "Lefty" Rosenthal, Miami, who had the reputation of gambler and hoodlum associated with other hoodlums and jewel thieves in the Miami area.

8. In a report filled out by Subject on 21 April 1966 to update his employee file, Subject again reported his brother Raul POSADA in government service but failed again to report brother Roberto POSADA.

9. A JMWAVE memo WTR-1299, 21 July 1966, explains a request from AMCLEVE-15 to resign from his job as an instructor in the maritime training section to accept a job on the Junta being set up at that time to govern the activities of RECE, COMMANDOS L, 30 NOVEMBER MOVEMENT and the 2506 BRIGADE. An FBI report of 29 July 1966 and another for 1 August 1966 both commented that Subject had been approved by the exile groups to accept the position of military leader of the newly formed alliance.

10. On 1 August 1966 AMCLEVE-15 was transferred from the Training branch to the CI branch of JMWAVE. He ~~will~~ was to be used to report on the activities of the central Junta.

11. The first mention of Subject's brother Roberto in the 201 is JMWAVE internal memo WCI-1501, dated 21 September 1966. In this memo Subject described his telephone call from his family in Cuba. Subject stated that his mother told him that his brother Roberto was in England on a purchasing mission for the GOC and that some time soon his brother Roberto would travel to Spain. Subject's mother expected Roberto to be out of Cuba for two months. He stated that he last knew his brother to be employed for the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana and in Cienfuegos, Las Villas Province. He said that he last saw his brother Roberto in April 1961. This is at variance with info in the 1961 Questionnaire which stated he came to the U.S. as a political exile 28 February 1961.

12. A. JMWAVE 3182 (IN 01749), 23 September 1966, stated that Madrid-8990 (IN 85265) reported that Roberto arrived in Madrid from Havana 26 August 1966.

B. Only other station traces on Roberto ~~is~~ are in UFGA-20828 (transmittal of Luis POSADA PRQ Part 1) which passed information provided by Subject.

C. AMOT files show Roberto in charge of telephone center at Buenavista, Marianao, according to a telephone company bulletin of June 1964.

D. AMOT-214 in October 1964 reported Roberto had been an employee for the Telephone Company.

13. London 6140 (IN 16675) 13 October 1966, stated Roberto arrived from Madrid 27 August 1966. Landing card indicated Roberto born 12 April 1931, Lasvillas, Cuba. Carries passport EF/66/2258, issued 23 August 1966. Roberto said would stay in UK for one or two months doing business with commercial mission.

14. A Memorandum for the Record, 26 June 1967, by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, Subject: Luis Clemente POSADA-Carriles, reported FBI information concerning one "Lefty" Rosenthal and concerning U.S. citizen Norman Rothman. Through Rothman, Rosenthal was put in touch with Subject. Rosenthal understood that Subject was attached with CIA and claimed that Subject supplied him with caps, primers, and ~~c~~C-4 explosives. Rosenthal was reported to have asked Subject to supply more explosives and associated materials. The Justice Department sent to the Agency a report from the security section of the FBI which stated that POSADA was a CIA agent.

15. According to index cards, Norman Rothman has a long history of gambling, illegal arms dealing and other shady dealing in the U.S., Cuba, and Mexico. Card dated July 1961.

16. Note for the Record: Subject: Telephone Conversation - Williamson/Henze, 1015 hours, 28 June 1967. This records information about Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise a matter of record in the 201.

17. Memorandum for the Record, 28 June 1967, by Robert J. Bladergroen, Assistant General Counsel, also covers information on Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise mentioned in 201

18. Cable DIRECTOR-15805, 29 June 1967, requested replies to series of questions concerning AMCLEVE-15's activity with ROSENTHAL and FBI. JMWAVE replied in JMWAVE-7953 (IN 02284), 30 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15 had failed to report the October 1966 transactions with Rosenthal until 9 June 1967, and therefore the Miami FBI was not notified until 15 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15's explanation for not reporting the October 1966 transaction was that he "just forgot."

18 ~~19~~. Cable DIR [illegible]805, 29 June 1967, requested replies to series of questions concerning AMCLEVE-15's activity with ROSENTHAL and FBI. JMWAVe replied in JMWAVE-7953 IN 02284, 30 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15 had failed to report the October 1966 transaction with Rosenthal until 9 June 1967, and therefore the Miami FBI was not notified until 15 June 1967. JMWAVE stated that AMCLEVE-15's explanation for not reporting the October 1966 transaction was that he "just forgot."

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19. In UFGA-28079, dated 31 July 1967, it stated that AMCLEVE-15 planned to seek employment in Caracas, Venezuela, through an old friend who resides there. This information may have been given to JMWAVE in either an 11 July 1967~~m~~ meeting or ~~on~~ during a 21 July ~~June~~/1967 meeting. DIR-24039 states that KI~~K~~COBALT-1 reported that he met Luis POSADA in Miami the week before. POSADA had informed KI~~K~~COBALT-1 that POSADA had ~~approved/ZN// been~~ approached ~~by~~ the Bolivian consul in Miami offering POSADA's services as interpret~~o~~er/ guerrilla fighter in Bolivia. POSADA said that a reply had come back from KICHEER-1 saying KICHEER-1 approved the salary of $800 per month and that the MIAmi Bolivian Consul was authorized a $500 advance to PO~~A~~SADA. POSADA left the impression with KICOBALT-1 that POSADA departing for La Paz soon. Cable stated: "~~A~~POSADA is unsavory character who is messed up in shady deals in Miami." KICOBALT-1 and KICOLBALT-2 were depressed at the thought of POSADA being in Bolivia. DIRECTOR-24439, 1 ~~2~~ August 1967, requested cable content of memorandum KICOBALT submitted to JMWAVE and all other material related to POSADA's Bolivian job.

Check p.5 (21) ~~20~~. JMWAVE-8577 IN 24285, 2 August 1967 stated that while AMCLEVE-15 is not a paragon of virtue, he cannot be classified as an unsavory character. His involvement in shady deals ~~d~~ in the past 2 years resulted "almost entirely from Stations (and (BJ) eventually) encouragement. He followed directions and reported fairly well."

2C ~~21~~. JMWAVE-8569 IN 24289~~01~~, 2 August 1967, summarized KICOBALT-1's report. KICOBALT-1 met AMCLEVE-15 on 28 July. AMCLEVE-15 said he was going to Bolivia to help train a special unit in guerrilla warfare. KICOLBAT01 confirmed that AMCLEVE-15 was in touch with the Bolivian consul in Miami and the Bolivian military attache to whom AMCLEVE-15 had made the offer to organize the group of Cuban guerrilla training officers. JMWAVE felt that either AMCLEVE-15/~~gave/up~~/ somehow came up with the idea on his own or some leak occured during initial contacts on this program. ac. Since this was in conflict with statement AMCLEVE-15 made to JMWAVE that AMCLEVE-15 was seeking employment in Caracas.

22. JMWAVE-8748 IN 29699, October 1967, sent to Caracas, info director, gave Caracas first information concerning Subject's plans to travel to Caracas on 21 August 1967. ~~EA~~ AMCLEVE-15 stated he hoped to find employment through his friend Ricardo AKA Jose, who is connected to the TV industry in Caracas.

23. Headquarters in DIRECTOR 428911, 18 August 1967, reported no ~~anew~~ headquarters traced identifiable with Venturini.

23. JMWAVE Internal Memorandum-1592, 10 August 1967, stated AMCLEVE-15's plans to go to Caracas.

24. CARACAS-7589 IN 32469, 15 August 1967 identified Ricardo Venturini as mentioned in liaison report of January 1967 as a member of the Cuban DSE.

25. JMWAVE-8866 In 34036, 17 August 1967, advised no contact be made by AMCLEVE-15 for two reasons:

1. His name was mentioned as a CIA agent on

GOC radio and TV during Laso conference.

2. He has also been involved in shady deals ~~AAIAXI/~~ in Miami, although undertaken at JMWAVE behest might prejudice his effective use.

26. JMWAVE-8997 IN 40592, 28 August 1967: AMCLEVE-15 had just returned to MIami to obtain visa to enable him to work in Venezuela. Reports he obtained job at DIGEPOL through Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda and Gustava ORTIZ Faez.

27. JMWAVE-9080 In 44174, 1 September 1967 states that AMCLEVE-15 now uncertain about returning to Caracas. Says DIGEPOL job would pay only about $250 per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. AMCLEVE-15 actively seeking job Miami (Case Officer Comment: This seems direct turn-about from Para 2 JMWAVE 8997 sent 3 days before) AMCLEVE-15 now states he would be willing to go back to DIGEPOL or other job in Caracas to work for CIA, but he requires total income approximately $600 per month to cover cost of living. JMWAVE stated that agrees that while working for DIGEPOL AMCLEVE-15 would be a good asset for Caracas station.

28. JMWAVE-9138 In 46714 £ September 1967, AMCLEVE-15 had previously worked under CIRASH-4. AMCLEVE-15 claims he has job of working for CIRASH-4 on ~~Jamor~~ Major Mienes CROES of Army Intelligence (G-2.) Digepol job would be investigative.~~M~~ AMCLEVE-15 received letter ~~XX~~ 5 September 1967 from friend Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda, DIGEPOL employee, in which TREMOLS told AMCLEVE-15 that AMCLEVE-15's contract to work in Venezuela had been approved by the Department of Works and AMCLEVE-15 should apply to the Miami Venezula consulate for visas.

29. DIRECTOR-34096, 8 September 1967, quoted AMCLEVE"S brother Roberto considered trustworthy by Cuban government to travel overseas

[illegible]

on GOC mission last 1966, and that AMCLEVE-15's Caracas contact Gustavo Ernesto ORITZ-Faez unsavory character who involved in political murder of anti-Communist professor at Havana University.

30. RI traces were run 30 August. No derogatory information was surfaced in the RI traces. Concerning AMCLEVE"S-15 brother, Raul, RI traces came up with nothing. Traces on brother Roberto, however, did ~~not~~ surface derogatory information.

1. DSE agent for area Norte, which is responsible for Havana City ~~and~~ and Cienfuegos.
2. Subject headed ~~had~~ mission from Ministry of Construction which arrived in London to purchase heavy construction equipment in September 1967.

RI check ~~traces~~ of Gustavo Ernesto ORTIZ-Faez surfaced derogatory information.

Should it read "no derogatory information"?

31. DIRECTOR-35982, 15 September 1967 discouraged any further JMWAVE encouragement for AMCLEVE-15 to seek a DIGEPOL job.

32. RI traces on Rafael TREMOLS Fresneda, 1 Dec 1967, show previously employed by JMWAVE-AMSPELL organization first as AMBARB-41 and later as CITUTOR-1. This student organization (DRE) was run by WAVE but administered by Caracas. Caracas had attempted to obtain CI information thru ~~how~~ CITUTOR organization. L. C. ~~Flet~~ Flutter revealed CITUTOR-1 to be a loose talker who had revealed his agency affiliation to a number of persons in Caracas.

33. JMWAVE-9802 IN 74926, 18 Oct 67 gave a report on telephone call from Gustavo ORITZ on 18 October 1967. ORITZ informed AMCLEVE-15 that CIRASH-4 would be new director of DIGEPOL late October 1967. ORITZ on behalf of Fernandez assured AMCLEVE-15

a

DIGEPOL employment at proper liveable salary and ~~that~~ stay at home of ORTIZ.

Insert A.

London 6170 (IN 16675) 13 Oct 66 stated Roberto arrived from Madrid 27 Aug 1966. Landing card indicated Roberto born 12 April 1931, Las Villas, Cuba. Carries passport EF/66/2258 issued 23 Aug 66. Roberto said would stay in UK for 1 or 2 months doing business with commercial mission.

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/IIA

4 Dec 67

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA - Carriles

[redacted] It is requested that the military 201 file of subject be borrowed from the Department of Army for our review. From records available to us we believe he entered the United States Army in March 1963.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/V

NOTES

1. In a Spanish questionnaire of Personal Information, made out in 1961, Subject listed his brother Raul POSADA-Carriles as an administrator of the Marianao Electric Company as a relative in some government service. He did not list his brother Roberto in this section, although he did list Roberto in Para 16, subject: ~~of~~ Brothers and Sisters.

2. In another signed but undated Spanish Personnel Information form of apparently 1965, he again listed both his brothers in Section M, subject: Brothers and Sisters, and in Section N, he again listed his brother Raul, who he stated he believed to be working for the Cuban government as an engineer. He again failed to list his brother Roberto.

3. Concerning his PRQ Part I filled out in March 1965, again no mention ~~was made of his b~~ of his brother Roberto appears in ~~this~~ section XIV, subject: Relatives, Acquaintances and Contacts in any government service.

4. According to POSADA's own admission in an LC flutter ~~report~~ of 14 April 1965, he had been involved in planning for a ~~Guadamaulan~~ Guatemalan coup headed by Roberto Alejos-ARZU. ALEJOS-Arzu. This matter later came to the attention of the FBI. There is an FBI ~~out~~ report dated 17 May 1965 in the 201. AMCLEVE-15 also furnished information on this ~~Guadamaulan~~ Guatemalan coup for JMWAVE, who disseminated this information in July 1965.

5. AMCLEVE-15 informed JMWAVE concerning other independent exile operations into Cuba in July of 1965.

6. His PRQ Part II, Section XI, dated September 1965, says that "Subject is of good character, very reliable and security conscious. Subject demonstrated good security techniques while reporting on the activities" of Roberto ALEJOS concerning the attempted coup against ~~Guadamaula~~ Guatemala. (7) An FBI report of 30 September 1965 outlines the contacts

that had been made by some Americans seeking to purchase pistols, blasting caps, hand gernades and silencers. This is the first indication in the 201 that Subject was involved with Frank ~~"Long~~ LANG "LEFTY" ~~LIPe"~~ Rosen~~tahl~~thal, Miami, who had the reputation of gambler and hoodlum associated with other hoodlums and jewel thieves in the Miami area.

8. In a report ~~sent~~ filled out by Subject on 21 April 1966 to update his employee file, Subject again reported his brother Raul POSADA in government service but failed again to report brother Roberto POSADA.

9. A JM~~QACW~~WAVE memo WTR-1299, 21 July 1966 explain~~s~~ a request from AMCLEVE-15 to resign from his job as an instructor in the ~~military~~ Maritime training section to accept a job on the Junta being set up ~~in~~ at that time to govern the activities of ~~Reco Commandos L,~~ RECE, COMMANDOS L, 30 November ~~Government~~ MOVEMENT and the 2506 Brigade. An FBI report of 29 July 1966 and another for 1 August 1966 both commented that Subject had been approved by the exiles groups to accept the position of military leader of the newly formed alliance.

10. On 1 August 1966 AMCLEVE-15 was transferred from the ~~[illegible]~~ training branch to the CI branch of JM~~[illegible]~~WAVE. He will be used to report on the activities of the central Junta.

11. The first mention of Subject's brother Roberto in the 201 is JMWAVE internal memo WCI-1501, dated 21 September 1966. In this memo Subject described his telephone call from his family in Cuba. Subject stated that his mother told him that his brother Roberto was in England on a purchasing mission for the GOC and that some time soon his brother Roberto would travel to Spain. Subject's mother expected Roberto to be out of Cuba for two months. He stated that he last knew his brother to be employed for the Cuban telephone Company in Havana and in Cienfuegos, Las Villas Province. He said that he last saw his brother Roberto in April 1961. This is at variance with ~~[illegible]~~ info [illegible]-1961 Questionnaire which states he ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] the US as a political exile 28 Feb 1961.

9

12. A. JMWAVE 318 (IN 1749), 23 September 1966 stated that Madrid-8990 (IN 85265) reported that Roberto arrived in Madrid from Havana 26 August 1966. B. Only other station traces on Roberto is UFGA-20828, (Transmittal of Luis POSADA PRQ Part I) which passed information provided by Subject.

~~13.~~ C. [illegible] AMOT files show Roberto in charge of telepone Center at Buena Vista, Marianao according to a telephone company bulletin of June 1964. D. AMOT-214 in Oct 64 reported Roberto had been an employee of the Telephone Company of Cuba since 1952.

Insert A. 13.

~~14.~~ 15. A memorandum for the record, 26 June 67 by Lawrence R. Houston, General ~~Consul~~ Counsel, Subject Luis Clementi POSADA-Carriles, reported FBI information concerning one "Sefty" Rosenthal and concerning U.S. citizen Norman Rothman. Through Rothman, Rosenthal was put in touch with Subject. Rosenthal understood that Subject was attached with CIA and claimed that Subject supplied him with caps, primers, and C-4 explosives. Rosenthal was reported to have asked Subject to supply more explosives and associated materials. The Justice Department sent to the AGency a report from the security section of the FBI which stated that POSADA was a CIA agent. 15 According to index cards, Norman Rothman has a long history of gambling, illegal arms dealing and other shady dealing in the U.S., ~~CANADA~~/Cuba and Mexico. Card dated July 1961.

16 ~~16.~~ Note for the Record: ~~No further record~~ Subject's Telephone Conversation — Williamson/Hinze 1015 hours, ~~Wilson/Mae Hensey 10-15~~ - 28 June 1967. This records information about Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise a matter of record in the 201.

(17) ~~16.~~ Memorandum For the Record, 28 June 1967, by Robert J. Bladergroen, Assistant General ~~Consul~~ Counsel, also covers information on Subject and Rosenthal not otherwise mentioned in 201.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	S E C R E T
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING ZP MICROFILM
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, Caracas
SUBJECT	Operational/AMCLEVE-15

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFS A. DIRECTOR 56598
B. CARACAS 8417
C. CARACAS 8557

MICROFILMED
DEC 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The Station desires to explain its viewpoint on AMCLEVE-15 clearly because of what could conceivably be construed to be a tone of impatience in the first line of Reference A. First of all, why do we want to hire AMCLEVE-15? Our objective is to use him as a unilateral penetration of CIRASH and CIVISTA, which controls that organization. Specifically, we would like to penetrate the inner circle surrounding IDENTITY and CIRASH-4. The recent provocation (reported in reference C) which we believe was run by IDENTITY is a clear indication of the need for this type of penetration over and above the normal need for penetration of security services.

2. What we are not trying to do is to make a CIGOAL-1 or AMOT-260 out of AMCLEVE-15: that is, put him on the payroll as an advisor to CIRASH-4. We want to be very clear on this point, since this may be the cause of Headquarters' concern. His role will not be advisory. AMCLEVE-15 is to be used to obtain counterintelligence information to protect the Station and its operations and to get for us that portion of the intelligence available in CIRASH which is not made available to the Station via the liaison channel.

3. From the information available to us, AMCLEVE-15 seems to present an almost golden opportunity to Caracas Station: i.e., a cleared WOFIRM agent (who although terminated still reports to WOFIRM when in the JMWAVE area), who is a well-placed "hombre de confianza" of the chief of CIRASH and the chief of the special investigative unit within CIVISTA which may have monitoring of WOFIRM activities as one of its objectives. We say "seems to present" because, although we have confirmation from CIRASH-15 that AMCLEVE-15 does in fact hold the position described above, we are of an open mind regarding the practicability of his use and we are completely willing to accept any information that would militate against his secure and fruitful employment.

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover
1. Identity

[illegible] 13 DEC 67

CONTINUED

201-300985

DISTRIBUTION:
3-C/WHD w/att u/s/c

CS COPY

DEC 6 1967

~~75-2-13/3~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO D-75-2-15	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 14978	DATE 6 December 1967
6- 201-740849	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HVCA - 14978

4. We have chosen to send this communication by dispatch, rather than by cable along with reference B, because we do not want to give wide dissemination to what might be interpreted as a difference of opinion between the Station and its Headquarters Desk. We do feel, however, Headquarters opposition to the use of AMCLEVE-15 has been consistant since his case was first brought to our attention. We assume that Headquarters and JMWAVE have some data concerning AMCLEVE-15 which we have not yet received and which results in Headquarters' view of his use. If this is the case, we hope that it will be forwarded soon so that we can drop the matter. If on the other hand, Headquarters objects to the concept of the operation, we would like to develop a cordial exchange of views to see if these divergent views can be reconciled.

Stefan R. Labanow

STEFAN R. LABANOW

201-300955

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

1P

MICROFILMED
FEB 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT to
HVCA -14978

IDENTITY - Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual

SECRET

MICROFILMED
DEC 14 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

S/C ATT. 1 TO HVCA-14978

CS COPY

201-300985

amcleve-15

DISPATCH

TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
FROM	Chief of Station, Caracas
SUBJECT	TYPIC CIRASH/CIVISTA/AMCLEVE-15 Activities of Identity of Reference A and Plans to form an Anti-Communist Goon Squad.

REFERENCES: A. HVCA - 14978, dated 5 December 1967

B. HVCA - 14796, dated 26 September 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a report submitted by CIRASH-15 concerning the organisation of Identity of Reference A's office. On 23 November 1967 a meeting was held in Identity of Reference A's office with members of the PTJ who were to work for Identity of Reference A in the special investigative unit he is establishing. Identity of Reference A announced that the director of the PTJ had refused to let his men work in Identity of Reference A's organisation, although the request for their services had come from CIGIBO-1. The men were given until the end of November to decide whether or not they would quit the PTJ to begin work for Identity of Reference A. (We have not yet heard of their decisions).

2. A new member of Identity of Reference A's office who was present at the meeting was AMCLEVE-15. It was CIRASH-15's opinion that AMCLEVE-15 had been brought to Venezuela with the help of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez, an old friend of CIRASH-4. After the meeting CIRASH-15, AMCLEVE-15 and Identity of Reference A went to ORTIZ's house where ORTIZ showed them some explosives which were to have been used in blowing up an unidentified ship. (The explosives were not used as the operation was cancelled). AMCLEVE-15 showed the group some explosive devises which he had smuggled in from Miami. AMCLEVE-15 said that he was able to smuggle anything into the country because CIRASH-4 would send a CIRASH official car to pick him up at customs.

Attachment:
As Indicated, u/s/c

Distribution:
3, Chief, WHD, w/att, u/s/c
1, COS, JMWAVE

	HVCA - 14975	5 December 1967
	SECRET	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	HVCA - 14975

3. AMCLEVE-15 and ORTIZ asked CIRASH-15 to join them in an anti-Communist group which would harass Communists without the knowledge of CIRASH-4. On another visit to ORTIZ's house, CIRASH-15 met two Cubans who had been imprisoned in La Cabaña prison in Cuba and who had apparently been helped out of Cuba by ORTIZ and will work with him in the anti-Communist goon squad. CIRASH-15 also met another Cuban exile in the group whose alias is "Fósforo". CIRASH-15 expects to be able to identify these Cubans in the near future.

4. This type of goon-squad activity is not what we would like AMCLEVE-15 to be mixed up in, and if and when we get in touch with him we will request that he stay away from such activities so as not to antagonise CIRASH-4 or Identity of Reference A.

5. Please assign Identity of HVCA-14978, dated 5 December 1967 a cryptonym in the CIVISTA series.

Oscar C. KALBING

14-00000

Caracas.November 27th.,[illegible]

This morning,Dr.Uzcátegui phoned up my house and asked me to be in - his office at the Ministry of Interior about 11 am. Once I was there, the other people from P.T.J.(mentioned in previous report),and who - were supposed to form Uzcátegui's new group of investigation,joined me, and Dr.Uzcátegui talked to them like this:

"....Gentlemen,this is to report you that Dr.OLIVARES BOSQUE (P.T.J. Director), has refused the Ministry of Interior,Dr.LEANDRO MORA,the permission of having you here to work with me.Unless you decide to - quit your job in P.T.J. and then join my office,I am afraid it will be impossible for us to work together, at least openly.....I think that Dr.OLIVARES's great fault of cooperation with us,is increasing Dr.LEANDRO MORA's feeling of unfriendliness towards him and myself as well. So,each one of you,shall have time until the 30 of this month to give me an answer as to about the decision to renounce P.T.J. or not;definitely,due to actual conditions,it is not possible to "borrow you" from P.T.J...."

After everybody left,I stood a little more with Dr,Uzcátegui, and he introduced me to a new member of the office: Tomás Carriles,Luis Clemente,(a) "Eduardo",whose cédula number (found out later) is E-97[illegible]. This guy is Cuban,and has just come-in from Miami-Florida.As far as I could find out later on,the man who helped him into Venezuela is Dr. [illegible] Gustavo (please remember old report about him),a Cuban veterinarian, and an old friend of [illegible],now DIGEPOL Director. The newcomer to Dr.Uzcátegui's group,has [illegible] a Cuban refugee in Miami, since the invasion of Bay of Pigs [illegible] few years ago.The already mentioned "Eduardo",has got into [illegible] friendship with me,and has been very impressed by my silencers ([illegible]), which I have just given to Dr.Uzcátegui.He said that,while in the [illegible],he used to work on silencers and other technical stuff [illegible] called groups [illegible] live there and also in conjunction with [illegible] to the [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] asked Dr. [illegible] to try [illegible] and I [illegible] over to [illegible]. Both of them were very [illegible] of my results, and we started talking a lot about technical material. "Eduardo" showed me some stuff he has taken with him from Miami (fuses, booby-trap switches, detonating cord, infrared [illegible] devices, time-pencils for demo.charges and incendiary devices). It was then when Dr.Gustavo C[illegible] pulled out from underneath the bed a big heavy package and said it was a demo.charge of pentolite,--fixed with magnets, which was to be used in wrecking a ship. He did not specify what ship it was, how he got the bomb, but he said that he had to cancel the "operation". Of course, I did follow with interest what they talked about, so, in the general talk, Eduardo said that he could pass all that stuff through the Customs, because a prowl-car from DIGEPOL (ordered by Erasto Fernandez) was awaiting for him inside the airport in Maiquetia, that he had his family in Miami,-and, as soon as he could find an apartment, he would go back to Miami, pick up his family and a lot more of "stuff" he has left there, and bring all of it to Venezuela, the same way he did it the first time. On the other hand, Dr.Gustavo C[illegible], whom I know since a long time, helped by his friendship with Erasto Fernandez (who, reports directly to Dr, Leandro Mora), has asked me (Eduardo did as well) if I wanted to help them off to "disturb" [illegible] here in Venezuela. But they do not want [illegible] to know about it, because that could - cause problems to Erasto's activities. In other words, they need my technical advise for future operations against communist leaders, properties, meetings, etc; it's got to be something like a cell, a group formed only, or mostly, by highly trusted and long known anti-communist people. In few words, this is what, up to now, I have been proposed. I have been able to find out that Dr.Gustavo C[illegible], gets, somehow, letters from Cuba; mostly from old friends who want to get a possibility to reach Venezuela. Visiting Dr.Gustavo C[illegible]'s house last week, I met - there a couple of other Cubans who spent a long time in a Cuban prison called "La Cabana" (after the Bay of Pigs Invasion). I do not know their names so far, but it will not be long before I do. The general topic when I go over there, is that of organizing and creating a group that may cause as much trouble to the [illegible] as possible.

[illegible] things incendiaries mixture, etc. etc. Last week, Dr. Gustavo ORTIZ, Eduardo and another Cuban called "Fósforo", prepared to sabotage a Communist meeting with a " CS gas-bomb "(please see paper clip attached). Action did not take place because meeting place was too vigilated by communists, and there was no chance for Eduardo to place the 20 minutes delay CS gas-bomb inside the auditorium, while Dr. Gustavo ORTIZ and "Fósforo" played a protection role for Eduardo with automatic pistols ready in their trouser belts. Eduardo is now in Miami, and will be back at the end of this week with his family. In a very confidential way, he's been asked to bring back bullets cal. .32 (Dr. Uzcátegui gave him $100.00 for a silencer cal. 32). He will also take back all the war material he has left in Miami. He will also try to get in touch with links (Cuban and C.I.A.) to get as much stuff as possible, to be used probably here. Dr. Uzcátegui, beside asking Eduardo to buy bullets and a silencer cal. 22 for himself, also asked Eduardo, on his way back to Caracas, to stop in Puerto Rico a couple of days for something he had to do there. Dr. Uzcátegui has asked me what I think about Eduardo's capabilities as a member of the office, in the field of sabotage, etc., explosives, etc. I told Dr. Uzcátegui it was good to have people with some background in the mentioned field. On the other hand, Eduardo and Dr. ORTIZ want me to help them with instruccion on the same technical field, but do not want either Dr. Uzcátegui or Erasto Fernandez to know about it. Dr. Uzcátegui has asked me to find people for the office. He needs, for the moment being, some 6 guys, as P.T.J. has refused their own..... Everything is normal for the moment. This is all I have to report.

The Inspector

3 NOV 1967

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

32

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 24

SECRET

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ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

5Dec67 IN 06564

SECRET 052352Z CITE JMWAVE 0497

DIRECTOR CARACAS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. CARACAS 8417 (IN 05744)

1. ALL PERTINENT INFO RE AMCLEVE/15 CONTACTS AVAILABLE IN HIS 201 FILE WHICH FORWARDED TO HQS WXST OCTOBER SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS REPORTED BY CABLE.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT GIVE ANY OTHER MEANS FOR CONTACT OTHER THAN ADDRESS IN JMWAVE 9996 (IN 82922) WHICH, ACCORDING TO AMCLEVE/15 IS RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS (VETERINARIAN CLINIC) OF GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ.

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Luis Clemente POSADA Carrilos

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: CARACAS 8398

Action Required: FYI

Per reference the attached documents provide information on the brother of subject and two other cronies of CIRASH-4.

Hume W. TROXELL

Attachment: herewith & Identities u/s/c

Distribution:
  3 - Caracas

201-300985

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HVCW-7776	4 DEC 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-300985

Distribution:
  1 - RI
  1 - Chrono

AB	FI	
~~RS~~	~~DEPT~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/V	C. Cox	cs	4521

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/V	4 Dec.	E. Tsikerdanos

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	4 Dec.	Lawrence N. Sternfield

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

4 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/LIA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA - Carriles

It is requested that the military 201 file of subject be borrowed from the Department of Army for our review. From records available to us we believe he entered the United States Army in March 1963.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

6-65 JWIV

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES (27)

SECRET

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3

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO. FILE VR, WH/COG8, CA, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 042220Z CITE CARACAS 8417 4DEC 67 IN 05744

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. JMWAVE 0422(IN 02678)

1. FOR REASONS OF COMPARTMENTATION CIGOAL-1 HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTLY QUERIED, BUT HE HAS NEVER MENTIONED AMCLEVE-15 AND STATION BELIEVES THEY DO NOT KNOW EACH OTHER.

2. CARACAS STATION CAN ADD NO BIO DATA ON AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS. STATION RECEIVED REPORT FROM CIRASH-15, HOWEVER, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT AMCLEVE-15 IS WORKING FOR CIRASH-4 AND UZCATEGUI AS STATED IN REF B.

3. FOR JMWAVE: DID AMCLEVE-15 EVER GIVE WAY TO CONTACT HIM IN CARACAS, OTHER THAN ADDRESS PROVIDED JMWAVE 9996? WOULD PREFER TELEPHONE HIM IF POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FIRST MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: C. W. COX Secretary
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 38 PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 56593

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE 2 20 21 5Z

REF: CARACAS 8398 (IN 03338)*

1. ~~UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES~~ IF YOU REALLY FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY APPROVE STATION CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR OUR EDIFICATION DOES AMOT-6 KNOW AMCLEVE-15 AND VICE VERSA? FOR ELICITATION INFO ONLY. PLS FORWARD PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS. PROCESSING POA. ADDRESSEES PLS FORWARD UP TO DATE TRACES AND BIO DATA. FOR JMWAVE: FORWARD CONTACT REPORTS SINCE TERMINATION AMCLEVE-15.

2. DOCUMENTS ARE BEING FORWARDED 4 DEC PRIMARILY TO ILLUSTRATE CAUTION TO USE IN DEALING WITH HIM. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE. END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Station reiterates desire have AMCLEVE-15 as agent. Station believes need pay only supplement to DIGEPOL salary. Requested expedite documents and POA.

COORD: C/WH/COG

by Jack W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Maurice J. Gremillion
MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

GROUP 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 7 TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/CA, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 301738Z CITE CARACAS 8398 (LYNER ACTING) 30 Nov 67 IN 03338

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. JMWAVE 0422 (IN 02672)

B. DIRECTOR 47965

1. REF A REINFORCES STATION OPINION AMCLEVE-15 WOULD PROVE VALUABLE AGENT. HIS SALARY OF 700 DOLLARS FROM CIRASH SUGGESTS STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY AMOUNT.

2. HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DOCUMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED REF B. PLEASE EXPEDITE THESE DOCUMENTS AND POA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~FROM~~ 2/

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/PS, SOD-6, CI/IC-2, FI/SPG

S E C R E T 262222Z CITE JMWAVE 0422 29 Nov 67 IN 02672

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

1. AMCLEVE/15 TEMPORARILY IN MIAMI ON PERSONAL BUSINESS.

2. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS HE WORKING DIRECTLY UNDER CISAHW-4 ~~CIASHW-4~~ AND ALSO REMBERTO UZCATEGUI IN MININT AT $700 PER MONTH SALARY WITH PROMISE OF RAISE JAN 68.

3. DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE/15 HAS BEEN INVOLVED FOLL TASKS:

A. RE-INTERROGATION OF MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ, CAPTURED CUBAN GUERRILLA. ‖ ?

B. INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OF ANOTHER CAPTURED CUBAN, SANTIAGO (ASPURU) SAUNDERS AKA GILBERTO MARTINEZ.

C. INVESTIGATION OF HONDURAN CONSUL RAFAEL (GARCIA) NAVARRO, (201-302235).

D. INVESTIGATION OF FIDIAS MARCANO, VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST, WHO, ACCORDING TO DIGEPOL, WILL SOON TRAVEL TO SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO AND RECEIVE CHECK FROM CUBAN

What of Amcleve-15 + Quat-6 wire assn.?

SECRET

IS AGENT. CHECK, IN NAME ARMANDO CAMPOS, WILL BE CASHED IN NATIONAL CITY BANK BY MARCANO AND MONEY USED FOR FUNDING VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS TRAVEL SAN JUAN 1 DEC AND CONTACT A BANK EMPLOYEE FRIEND. THROUGH FRIEND, AMCLEVE/15 ~~[illegible]~~/15 WILL TRY MEET PROPER PERSON EMPLOYED AT NATIONAL CITY BANK WHO COULD ALERT AMCLEVE/15 WHEN TRANSECTION OCCURS THUS MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR DIGEPOL TO INTERCEPT MARCANO WITH MONEY WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS.

4. AMCLEVE/15 WILL RETURN TO CARACAS DIRECTLY FROM SAN JUAN.

5. DEFER TO HQS FOR PASSAGE OF INFO PARA 3-D TO FCI- NO1.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM 4

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR DDP, ADDP, CA2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 021356Z CITE CARACAS 8227 2 Nov 67 IN 85222

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 48508 *

1. APPRECIATE PROMPT HQS ACTION.

2. RUMOR THAT LEANDRO MORA TO SHIFT FROM MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TO BE REPLACED BY MANUEL MANTILLA IS ABOUT A MONTH OLD. WHILE NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BELIEVE SUCH A CHANGE PROBABLY NOT IN WIND.

3. ORLANDO GARCIA MENTIONED PARA 3 REF IS ORLANDO GARCIA VASQUEZ (201-67860) WHO FORMERLY WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ IN DIGEPOL. SINCE ERASTO IS REPORTEDLY CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ' CREATURE, GARCIA VASQUEZ COULD HAVE BEEN SENT FOR BY EITHER PEREZ OR FERNANDEZ. MOST PROBABLE THAT GARCIA VASQUEZ IS BEING RECALLED TO FORM PART OF FERNANDEZ' TEAM AS HAS AMCLEVE 15. IT IS NOT BEYOND REALM OF POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, THAT CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ MAY HAVE RECALLED HIM TO HANDLE POLITICALLY ORIENTED WORK REQUIRING GARCIZ VASQUEZ' PARTICULAR TALENTS.

AMCLEVE 15

SECRET

* APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

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UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
FILE VR WH/COG 8 CT/OA

SECRET 311525Z CITE CARACAS 8213 31 Oct 67 IN 83556

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 47965

1. WILL NOT CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 UNTIL HAVE HAD CHANCE REVIEW DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED.

2. IMPOSSIBLE KNOW WHAT AMCLEVE-15 SALARY WILL BE, IF ANY, BEFORE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. PREVIOUS HQS RESERVATIONS THIS CASE WERE BUDGETARY, BUT WE ASSUMED BASIC PROBLEM WAS SOLVED WHEN JMWAVE ADVISED THAT AMCLEVE-15 WOULD BE PAID BY CIRASH THE SALARY HE FELT HE HAD TO HAVE. IT MAY BE THAT STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY TOKEN AMOUNT, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN FROM CIRASH BUDGET, BUT ONLY DIRECT TALKS WITH AMCLEVE-15 WILL GIVE US THE ANSWERS.

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES (24)

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 16098, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

30 OCT 67 IN 82922

SECRET 302301Z CITE JMWAVE 9996

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

1. JMWAVE RECD LETTER FROM AMCLEVE/15 ON 30 OCT 67. AMCLEVE SAYS HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON 1 NOV. ADDRESS IS AVENIDA JOSE FELIX RIVAS, QUINTA CLARITA, CARACAS.

2. ACCORDING AMCLEVE/15 NOMINATION OF CIRASH/4 AS DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL DELAYED BECAUSE CIRASH/4'S POLITICAL PARTY, ADECO, IS IN TROUBLE.

3. LAWRENCE R. DEROME IS ALIAS OF AMCLEVE/15'S JMWAVE CO.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 7 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 22 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH 4 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR [illegible]

FI (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

C/A

SEP 8 20 41 Z Keith CITE DIRECTOR 34096
Charlie

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF A. JMWAVE 9138 (IN 46714)*

B. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)** C. CARACAS 7756 (IN 47458)

1. HQS BELIEVES THAT, IN VIEW UNSETTLED DIGEPOL SITUATION AND VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED NATURE AMCLEVE-15 JOB POSSIBILITIES, NOT ADVISABLE MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO A-15 TO ENABLE HIM RETURN VENEZUELA. SHOULD A-15 RETURN ON HIS OWN AND CARACAS DETERMINES HE HAS OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL, POSSIBILITY OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT CAN BE RECONSIDERED.

2. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO PROBABLY NOT AVAILABLE JMWAVE OR CARACAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A-15 BROTHER ROBERTO CONSIDERED TRUSTWORTHY ENOUGH BY CUBAN GOVT TO TRAVEL OVERSEAS ON GOC MISSION LATE 1966.

B. A-15 CARACAS CONTACT GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO WAS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MURDER OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY.

3. WILL POUCH DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
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5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ___ PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 34696

TO

WH COMMENT: *REF gave AMCLEVE-15 PRQ data. Stated JMWAVE had no further info indicating possible security problems other than Havana broadcast during recent LASO conference naming A-15 as CIA agent which WAVE claims has no bearing on ops use as DIGEPOL penetration.

**A-15 stated DIGEPOL job paid about 250 dollars per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. Would be willing work for DIGEPOL or Station in Caracas if had total income approx 600 dollars per month.

COORD: WH/COG/MO ✓ (in draft)

WH/3/V Uc

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM 12

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

ACTION

11 SEP 67 IN 49565

Charlie

S E C R E T 111655Z CITE CARACAS 7775

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9177 (IN 47495)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. IN VIEW REF B, STATION WILL HOLD CONTRACT OFFER IN ABEYANCE UNTIL HE IN PLACE.

2. SUGGEST AMCLEVE-15 PHONE OR CABLE ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND OBTAIN DEFINITE COMMITTMENT WHERE HE TO WORK AND EOD.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM 25/21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CCS 3

S E C R E T 082146Z CITE JMWAVE 9177

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING @ JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, WH
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational
Forwarding of AMCLEVE/15's 201 File

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE 9138, 6 Sept 1967

1. Attached herewith as Attachment 1 is AMCLEVE/15's field 201 file.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment 2 is the true name portion of AMCLEVE/15's 201 file.

Gary L. Flustikoff
Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachments -
1. As Stated (H/W)
2. As Stated (U/S/C)

Distribution
3 - C/WH/COG w/atts #1 hw, #2 u/s/c
2 - COS, Caracas w/atts #1 hw, #2 u/s/c

WH/3/V ext

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

DATE TYPED
7 Sept 67

DATE DISPATCHED
SEP - 8 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28432

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET 071919Z CITE CARACAS 7756 7 SEP 67 IN 47458

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: JMWAVE 9138 (IN46714)

1. STATION WILLING ACCEPT AMCLEVA-15 FOR ONA-QAAR CONTRACT AT SALARY $350 PER MONTH PLUS CARACAS AND RETURN AIR FARE FOR ONE. CONTRACT REVIEWABLE AT ANY TIME. ALSO 30-DAY TERMINATION CLAUSE AT STATION OPTION.

2. WOULD HOPE THAT AMCLEVE-15 CAN REESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP WITH ERAETO FERNANDEZ, AS LATTER MAY SOON BE NAMED NEW DIRECTOR DIGEPOL AND IF NOT, HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN MININT INVESTIGATIVE APPARATUS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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FILE, VR, WH/COG 8

ACTION CHANGE

JMWAVE 9138
(STATION & NUMBER)

IN 46814-A
(IN NUMBER)

ACTION

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/COG Kurt
(DIVISION)

TO : WH
(DIVISION)

BY : A Gonzalez 7657
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : K. Gardner 4521
(NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

Charlie —

SECRET

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FROM K/3

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI, C/IPS

ACTION

S E C R E T 051500Z CITE CARACAS 7725 5 SEP 67 IN 45532

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

1. STATION CARACAS INTERESTED PROPOSITION CONTAINED REF A.

2. REQUEST JMWAVE FORWARD SOONEST PRQ DATA; EXACT DIVISION IN DIGEPOL FOR WHICH HE WORKING; NAME OF CHIEF AND NATURE OF JOB.

3. STATION OFFICER PLANNING BE IN MIAMI MID MONTH AND WILL INTERVIEW AMCLEVE-15.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

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FILE, VR, WH 8, C/CA, C/OPS, FI

6 Sep 67 IN 46714

SECRET 062218Z CITE JMWAVE 9138

CARACAS, DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 32719

B CARACAS 7725 (IN45532)

1. FOLL IS AMCLEVE/15 PRQ DATA:

A. BORN 18 FEB 1925, CIENFUEGOS. EDUCATED CIENFUEGOS RECEIVED DEGREE SUGAR CHEMISTRY 1950. EMPL AS CHEMICAL ANALYST, EXTERMINATOR CIENFUEGOS 1946 TO 1958. DEPT MANAGER FIRESTONE TIRE CO. HAVANA MAR 1958 TO MAR 1959. THEN UNEMPLOYED AND BECAME POLITICAL ASYLEE ARGENTINE EMB. ARRIVED US VIA MEXICO 28 FEB 1961. REMAINDER OF FAMILY (FATHER, MOTHER, BROTHERS, SISER) STILL IN CUBA. TRAINEE FOR BRIGADE 2506 BUT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN INVASION. EMPL FIRESTONE TIRE CO. AKRON OCT 1961 TO MAR 1963. MEMBER US ARMY MAR 1963 TO MAR 1964, DISCHARGED AS 2ND LT. EMPL AS EXTERMINATOR MIAMI SEPT 1964 TO MAR 1965.

B. RECRUITED BY JMWAVE MAR 1965 AND USED AS TRAINING INSTRUCTOR AND SUBSEQUENTLY AS REPORTER ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA UNTIL TERMINATION JULY 1967.

C. HAS PM/MARITIME EXPERIENCE AND IS EXPERT IN WEAPONS

SECRET

AND DEMOLITIONS.

D. MARRIED. ONE SON. HAS NATIVE SPANISH AND FLUENT ENGLISH.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DOES NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIVISION OF DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE EMPLOYED, ONLY THAT HE PREVIOUSLY WORKED DIRECTLY UNDER ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) WHO WORKS WITH OR UNDER THE DEFENSE MINISTER. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE HAS CHOICE OF WORKING FOR FERNANDEZ OR MAJOR NIEVES *(CROES) OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (G-2). NATURE OF DIGEPOL JOB AS DESCRIBED BY AMCLEVE/15 WOULD BE INVESTIGATIVE.

3. AMCLEVE/15 RECEIVED LETTER 5 SEPT 1967 FROM FRIEND RAFAEL TREMOL, DIGEPOL EMPLOYEE, IN WHICH TREMOL TOLD HIM HIS CONTRACT TO WORK IN VENEZUELA HAD BEEN APPROVED BY DEPT OF WORKS AND HE COULD NOW APPLY MIAMI VENEZUELA CONSULATE FOR VISA.

4. JMWAVE'S RESERVATIONS MENTIONED REF A, INCLUDING FACT AMCLEVE/15 WAS NAMED AS WOFACT AGENT ON HAVANA TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE, HAVE NO BEARING ON OPS USE AS DIGEPOL PENETRATION. STATION HAS NO FURTHER INFO INDICATING POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

5. POUCHING 201 FILE.

S E C R E T

BT

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INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH/COG 8, CI

C/ SEPT 6

Pete
Keith see
clearly
para 4

SECRET 012138Z CITE JMWAVE 9080

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7694 (IN41504)

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT DEFINITELY MADE UP MIND TO RETURN TO CARACAS. HIS JOB WITH DIGEPOL (WHICH HE SAYS STILL AVAILABLE TO HIM) PAID ONLY ABOUT 250 DOLLARS PER MONTH WHICH HE CLAIMS TOO LITTLE TO LIVE IN CARACAS. WHILE JOSE VENTURIN MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE JOB LATER, HAS NOTHING NOW. THUS AMCLEVE-15 ACTIVELY SEEKING JOB MIAMI.

I am definitely opposed to us picking up another Cuban at this point. K.

2. AMCLEVE-15 STATES WOULD BE WILLING GO BACK TO DIGEPOL OR OTHER JOB IN CARACAS TO WORK FOR WOFACT, BUT WOULD REQUIRE TOTAL INCOME APPROX 600 DOLLARS PER MONTH DUE CARACAS COST OF LIVING.

3. WHILE AWARE EXTRA WOFACT INCOME COULD CREATE COVER PROBLEM, PERTINENT TO POINT OUT THAT IN YEARS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT BEEN UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT MONEY PER SE; THUS DO NOT BELIEVE HE PLAYING HARD TO GET. FURTHER, JMWAVE AGREES THAT WHILE WORKING FOR DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE A GOOD ASSET FOR WOFACT.

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER CARACAS WISHES PICK UP AMCLEVE-15

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SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 9080 SECRET

ABOVE BASIS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS

ACTION

S E C R E T 082146Z CITE JMWA[illegible]917

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING @ JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 31 AUG 1967

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SEP 1 22 20Z

CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

JTJF

REF: A. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)*
B. CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)**

1. BASED ON INFO CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HQ NO OBJECTION TO STATION CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 PENDING CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION SOURCES HE ACTUALLY WORKING FOR DIGEPOL AND IN WHAT CAPACITY. IF CONTACT DESIRED AMCLEVE-15 STANDARD CLEARANCE PROCEDURES MUST BE INITIATED. ?

2. CAN CARACAS DISCREETLY CONFIRM DIGEPOL JOB?

3. REQUEST WAVE DUPLICATE FIELD 201 SOONEST AND SEND TO CARACAS AND HQ FOR REVIEW. RE REF. B. DOES WAVE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO FOR CARACAS SUGGESTING CAUTION IN CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE 15?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *AMCLEVE-15 reported to Wave he obtained job with Digepol in Caracas and was involved in Digepol operation culminating in capture Espinoza, a Cuban guerrilla, who landed Falcon province July 66 with Luben Petkoff. A-15 stated to Wave he talked with Espinoza day following capture.

Betty - file A-15

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CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO

**Caracas believes to station advantage to have contact with A-15. Rejects Wave objections based on Cuban broadcasts. Requested WAVE tell A-15 Caracas wants contact him. Requested info re return A-15 to Caracas and info for contact.

COORD: C/WH/3/V E. Tekender
C/WH/COG Carl J. Williamson

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 111851Z CITE JMWAVE 9205

11 SEP 67 IN 49694

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

REF A JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)

B DIRECTOR 34096

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT RETURN CARACAS FOR DIGEPOL JOB WITHOUT ASSURANCE SIMULTANEOUS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT DUE LOW SALARY MENTIONED REF A.

2. WE READ REF B AS INSTRUCTION TO JMWAVE TO TELL AMCLEVE-15 THIS ASSURANCE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT HE CAN INTENSIFY SEARCH FOR MIANI EMPLOYMENT. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

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Keith, file

charlie - Victory

Amen!

charlie - COG got action but we had better originate reply. K.

4-65 JVIU

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FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 132203Z CITE CARACAS 7805

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 Sep 67 IN 51849

REFS. A. JMEAVE 9205 (IN 49694)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. CIGIRO 1 REPORTED EVENING 12 SEPT THAT HE HAD NOMINATED ERASTO FERNANDEZ BETANCOURT TO BE DIRECTOR DIGEPOL. CIGIRO 1 SAID PRESIDENT RELUCTANT APPROVE APPOINTMENT DUE FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION. CIGIRO 1 CONTINUING PRESS FOR APPROVAL APPOINTMENT ON BASIS HE WILL WATCH FERNANDEZ.

2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION FEELS AMCLEVE 15 SHOULD PHONE FERNANDEZ TO TRY FIRM UP DIGEPOL JOB; BUT DELAY ACTUAL DEPARTURE TILL HIS POSITION CLARIFIED. THIS BEING SUGGESTED ON ASSUMPTION AMCLEVE 15 MAY NOT IMMEDIATELY LOCATE JOB IN U.S. AND WOULD BE WILLING CONTINUE TRY KEEP VENEZUELAN OPTION OPEN ON CHANCE IT MIGHT WORK OUT.

3. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE.

S E C R E T

BT

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ORIG: K. GARDINER *LCC*
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 SEPT 1967

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SEP 15 20 12Z

CITE DIRECTOR 35982

TO

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF A: CARACAS 7805 (IN 51649)*

B: DIRECTOR 34096**

1. BELIEVE ANY FURTHER JMWAVE ENCOURAGEMENT AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB MAY BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS IMPLICIT COMMITMENT OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT ONCE HE REACHES VENEZUELA. WISH AVOID ANY SUCH MISUNDERSTANDING WITH AMCLEVE-15 SINCE NO ASSURANCE HE WILL BE OF SUFFICIENT OPS POTENTIAL TO MERIT EXPENDITURE STATION TIME AND MONEY. POINTS TO CONSIDER ARE:

A. ACCORDING TO CIRASH-12 DIGEPOL HAS NEITHER PERSONNEL, BUDGET NOR HIGH LEVEL POLICY DIRECTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION AS EFFECTIVE ANTI-SUBVERSION ORGANIZATION REGARDLESS WHO IS DIRECTOR.

B. APPARENT THAT DIGEPOL (AND, IN VIEW FORMATION OF NEW INTEL ORGANIZATION BY UZCATEGUI, ENTIRE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) UNDERGOING SHAKEUP. DIFFICULT MEASURE AMCLEVE-15 POTENTIAL AS LOW TO MEDIUM LEVEL PENETRATION DIGEPOL AGAINST POSSIBILITY OBTAINING LOCAL PENETRATION AGENTS UNTIL DUST OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CITE DIRECTOR 35782

RECRIMINATION ~~[illegible]~~ SETTLES.

C. HQS STILL BOTHERED BY INHERENT SECURITY PROBLEMS ~~ASPECTS~~ AMCLEVE-15 CASE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ~~CONCERNING~~ HIS BROTHER WHO IS ALLEGED TO BE A ~~OSE~~ DSE AGENT. BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 AS CUBAN IN EMPLOY OF DIGEPOL MIGHT EASILY COME TO ATTENTION OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE.

2. UNLESS WE HAVE MISSED SOME POINT WHICH MAKES AMCLEVE-15 VITAL TO CARACAS OPS PROGRAM PREFER JMWAVE NOT ENCOURAGE AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB. HOWEVER WE DO NOT OBJECT TO TELEPHONE CALL PER REF A.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Suggests JMWAVE have AMCLEVE-15 telephone Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, who has been nominated as new head of DIGEPOL, to attempt to firm up previous job offer by Fernandez. AMCLEVE-15 should delay actual departure for Caracas until his position is clarified. Requests Hqs concurrence.
**Hqs believes that, in view unsettled DIGEPOL situation and vague and unsubstantiated nature AMCLEVE-15 job possibilities, not advisable make financial commitment to him to enable him to return to Venezuela. If he returns on his own and Caracas determines he has operational potential, possibility of WOFACT employment can be reconsidered.

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OA, CI/PS

S E C R E T 181600Z CITE CARACAS 7841

18 SEP 67 IN 54359

ACTION

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 35982

IN VIEW HEADQUARTERS STRONG RESERVATIONS HIRING AMCLEVE-15, STATION DEFERS TO HQS VIEWS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MS

Charlie

Keith

file 201

INS. YES ☐ NO
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ACTION CHANGE

JMWAVE 9448 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 59289-A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

Charlie

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : Fisher Ames 5106 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : E. Tsikerdanos 4521 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

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INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, SOD6, FI

S E C R E T 252203Z CITE JMWAVE 9448

al
Charlie 25 SEP 67 IN 59289

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

FYI: AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GUSTAVO ORTIZ INFORMING HIM THAT ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETANCOURT WILL ARRIVE MIAMI ON TDY 27 SEPT 67. ORTIZ STATED FERNANDEZ WILL SEEK INFO FROM CUBAN EXILES MIAMI WHO MAY KNOW OR HAVE INFO ON CUBAN GUERRILLAS VENEZUELA. ORTIZ ASKED AMCLEVE/15 WORK WITH FERNANDEZ DRUING HIS TDY MIAMI; AMCLEVE/15 AGREED.

A bad penny turns up.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

G. Tsikerdanos
ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 27 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
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INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI.

FI/INT 2, CI, SEP 27 19 30 Z
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38879

TO

PRIORITY

CARACAS JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 7291 (IN 59861)*

1. IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JMWAVE CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 PER PARA 4 REF AS THERE SUFFICIENT INFO OUR FILES TO APTLY ILLUSTRATE TYPE INDIVIDUAL FERNANDEZ IS AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS WOFACT. STILL WISH AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART TERMINATED AMCLEVE-15 THAT WOFACT WOULD SUBSIDIZE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH DIGEPOL.

2. FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. ACCORDING CIRASH-12 HE TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE AS VEN CONSUL MIAMI, WHERE HE DRUNK MOST OF THE TIME, WILL ACQUIRE FURTHER DETAILS FROM CIRASH-12.

B. CIRASH-7 REPORTED 2 DEC 65 (CARACAS 3159) THAT FERNANDEZ IN TROUBLE WITH GOV BECAUSE OF CONDUCT MIAMI AREA AND THAT HE SIX MONTHS IN ARREARS ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING.

C. ON 7 OCT 65 CIARK-1 ASKED BY CIRATAL-1 TO LOOK INTO ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI: THAT HE NEGLECTING HIS JOB AND DEVOTING HIMSELF TO LIFE OF PLEASURE (HVCA-12834, 15 OCT 65).

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

D. CIRASH-9 REPORTED THAT FERNANDEZ AS DEPUTY CHIEF, DIGEPOL WAS EXPENDING $550 TO $670 FOR A NIGHTS ENTERTAINMENT. EXTRA SOURCE OF INCOME WAS APPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF COMMUNISTS, RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOR A PRICE ETC. (HVCA-11693, Sept 64).

E. STATION REPORTED IN HVCA-13182, 25 FEB 66 THAT FERNANDEZ SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH THE GOV. WHILE STATION NOT ANXIOUS PROVOKE QUARREL WITH HIM, HIS RETURN TO ANY POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VEN WOULD MILITATE AGAINST WOFACT INTERESTS.

F. IN UFGA-24884, 5 APRIL 66 AMHARSH-1 REPORTED ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI AREA AND THE SHIPPING OF WEAPONS TO VEN.

G. WE CAN ALSO CITE HIS POOR HANDLING OF CIURBAN-2 CASE IN WHICH AGENT WAS BLOWN TO MIR WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF TAKEOVER.

H. MONROE B. DIFFENDAL (P) WHO CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY ON TDY TRIP HANDLED FERNANDEZ WHILE LATTER DEP CHIEF DIGEPOL. WHEN HE RETURNS WILL QUERY HIM ON FERNANDEZ. HQS RECOLLECTS ONE PET GRIPES CASE OFFICER WAS THAT FERNANDEZ PASSED STATION INFO TO CIVISTA STATING IT CAME FROM HIS OWN (NON-EXISTENT) AGENT NETS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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INFO: FILE , VR

PAGE 3
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

3. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR STATION TO WORK WITH FERNANDEZ IF HE APPOINTED CHIEF, DIGEPOL BUT FEEL THAT SENSITIVE OPS SHOULD CONTINUE BE HANDLED WITH CIWOODS OR UNILATERALLY. IT IS TRUE THAT FERNANDEZ COOPERATED WITH STATION DURING HIS PREVIOUS TOUR AND APPEARED NOT BE ANTI-WOFACT BUT HIS GENERAL GREEDINESS AND LACK OF SCRUPLES MAKE HIM AN UNSAVORY PARTNER TO DEAL WITH AT THAT LEVEL.

4. IF STATION DOES NOT HAVE ABOVE DOCUMENTATION HQS WILL FORWARD. WILL DISCUSS FERNANDEZ WITH COS ON HIS ARRIVAL HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *COS, Minit and Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, for DC/Digepol met to discuss colaboration between Station and Digepol. Not clear if Fernandez to be new Chief. While F has bad rep not clear why. Fernandez was cooperative with Station previous time no clear indications he enriched himself by accepting bribes from left. Station would work slowly until full assessment acquired. Asked WAVE to work closely with AMCLEVE-15 during Fernendez stay in Miami to collect info on latter.

COORD: C/WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman (by phone)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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S E C R E T

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1		6	
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3		8	
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5		10	

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 30 OCTOBER 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: [illegible] PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 47965

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

1. HQ INITIATING PROCESSING OF POA FOR ASSESSMENT ONLY.

2. WE RECOGNIZE YOUR INTEREST IN AMCLEVE-15, BUT SUGGEST YOU REVIEW CAREFULLY DOCUMENTS WHICH WE ARE FORWARDING BY POUCH.

3. PLEASE FORWARD SALARY INFO. HOW MUCH DOES STATION PROPOSE TO PAY HIM AND WHERE IN OPS BUDGET WILL IT COME FROM?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Station interested possibility pick up Luis POSADA Carriles as unilateral penetration of DIGEPOL if Erasto Fernandez Betancourt named Director. Requested authorization to contact POSADA for assessment as soon as JMWAVE advises permanent address Caracas.

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ACTION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: 74

ACTION: WH-8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/CoG-5, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

SW

SECRET 281910Z CITE CARACAS 8190

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9802 (IN 74936)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

28 Oct 67 IN 81968

O.K. lets dream again

not out for POA. 4

1. STATION DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY PICKING UP AMCLEVE-15 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIRASH IF AND WHEN CIRASH-4 IS NAMED DIRECTOR. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF HE WOULD BE AS CLOSE AS PAST TRAFFIC SUGGESTS TO CIRASH-4, WHOM NEEDLESS TO SAY WE DO NOT COMPLETELY TRUST.

2. REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR ASSESSMENT AS SOON AS JMWAVE ADVISES OF MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS CARACAS. PER PARA ONE REF B, IF AMCLEVE-15'S OA CANCELLED, PLEASE REINSTATE IT BASED ON INFO IN HQS FILES TO WHICH DISPATCH ADD ~~11 ,35 9, 8,19 8, 1 18)3 59 2 81 23 :-,,95~~ -$D- AT PRESENT. *

3. FOR JMWAVE: WILL APPRECIATE CABLE AS SOON AS AMCLEVE-15 ADVISES PLACE CONTACT CAN BE MADE. IS LAWRENCE R. DEROME TRUE NAME OR PSEUDO?

SECRET

SECRET

* SVCD FOR CONFIRMATION

25

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 28 PER #

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ACTION WH 8

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR. WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

SERVICE

ACTION

CARACAS 8190 — STA & NR

29 OCT 64 — DATE

81988 -0 — IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PLEASE REINSTATE IT BASED ON INFO IN HQS"

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM 24

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

18 OCT 67 74936

ACTION

S E C R E T 182122Z CITE JMWAVE 9802

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF CARACAS 7805 (1-51649)

1. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GISTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ ON 18 OCT 67. ORTIZ INFORMED AMCLEVE/15 THE ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETABCOURT WILL BE NAMED DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL LATE OCT 67. ORTIZ ON BEHALF OF FERNANDEZ ASSURED AMCLEVE/15 DIGEPOL EMPLOYMENT AT PROPER LIVABLE SALARY.

2. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS FLY CARACAS 23 OCT 67. WILL STAY TEMPORARILY AT HOME OF ORTIZ. STATION HAS ASKED AMCLEVE/15 TO NOTIFY JMWAVE WHEN HE HAS MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS AND WE WILL ADVISE CARACAS. IF STATION DESIRES CONTACT, PERSON SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF TO AMCLEVE/15 AS FRIEND OF LAWRENCE R. DEROME.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM 32/21

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2,

S E C R E T 271923Z CITE CARACAS 7937 27 SEP 67 IN 50958

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

1. REQUEST HQS, JMWAVE AND AMOT TRACES ON GUSTAVO ERNESTO (ORTIZ) FAEZ, BORN HABANA, 20 APRIL 1928. VETERINARIAN BY PROFESSION AND NOW RESIDING LA CASTELLANA AREA OF CARACAS.

2. SUBJECT IS CLOSE FRIEND OF ERASTO FERNANDEZ, POSSIBLE NEW CHIEF OF DIGEPOL. STATION FILES CONTAIN BRIEF NOTE ALLEGING SUBJECT "SUSPECTED MEMBER CUBAN G-2."

SECRET

BT

SECRET

AMCLEVE-15 friend

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational
AMCLEVE/15 Report on Arrest of Manuel ESPINOSA Diaz and Two Communist Guerrillas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-8997, 28 Aug 67

2 P

1. Attached herewith is AMCLEVE/15's report concerning the arrest of Manuel *ESPINOSA Diaz and two Communist guerrillas by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967, the slaying of two Communists by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 and AMCLEVE/15's interview with ESPINOSA.

2. JMWAVE checked the serial numbers of the weapons as provided by AMCLEVE/15 in an attempt to determine if they are of WOFACT/JMWAVE origin with negative results.

GARY L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment - h/w
As stated

Distribution
3 - COS, Caracas w/att
2 - C/WH w/o att acc to WH/3/V
2 - WH/COG w/att

MICROFILMED
SEP 13 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 ATT

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201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 Aug 67	[illegible] 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28382

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 28382

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: ✓ [illegible]IAS — GIVEN NAME: Felix — MIDDLE NAME: — 201-
SEX: M — DATE OF BIRTH: — COUNTRY OF BIRTH: — CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Venezuela — OCCUPATION: ~~[illegible] guerrilla~~ [illegible] ~~deceased~~ — RESIDENCE: Venezuela Urdaneta St., Caracas
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): aka "Comandante Claudio"
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

2
SURNAME: ESPINOSA-Diaz — GIVEN NAME: Manuel — MIDDLE NAME: ~~[illegible]~~ — 201-
SEX: M — DATE OF BIRTH: ca 1934 — COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba — CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Palma Soriano
CITIZENSHIP: Cuba — OCCUPATION: [redacted] — RESIDENCE: Caracas Venezuela
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

3
SURNAME: FABRICIO-[illegible] — GIVEN NAME: Eliazar — MIDDLE NAME: ~~[illegible]~~ — 201-
SEX: M — DATE OF BIRTH: — COUNTRY OF BIRTH: — CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Venezuela — OCCUPATION: ~~deceased Communist~~ — RESIDENCE: Venezuela Caracas
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): aka "El Loco"
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

4
SURNAME: FERNANDEZ-Vera — GIVEN NAME: Luis — MIDDLE NAME: ~~None~~ — 201-
SEX: M — DATE OF BIRTH: — COUNTRY OF BIRTH: — CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: Venezuela — OCCUPATION: ~~[illegible] Communist~~ — RESIDENCE: Venezuela Caracas
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
[redacted]

5
SURNAME: — GIVEN NAME: — MIDDLE NAME: — 201-
SEX: — DATE OF BIRTH: — COUNTRY OF BIRTH: — CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: — OCCUPATION: — RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-60 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

14-00000

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMCLEVE/Operational
AMCLEVE/15 Report on Arrest of Manuel ESPINOSA Diaz and Two Communist Guerrillas

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: JMWAVE-8997, 28 Aug 67

1. Attached herewith is AMCLEVE/15's report concerning the arrest of Manuel *ESPINOSA Diaz and two Communist guerrillas by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967, the slaying of two Communists by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 and AMCLEVE/15's interview with ESPINOSA.

2. JMWAVE checked the serial numbers of the weapons as provided by AMCLEVE/15 in an attempt to determine if they are of WOFACT/JMWAVE origin with negative results.

GARY L. FLUSTIKOFF

Attachment - h/w
As stated

Distribution
3 - COS, Caracas w/att
2 - C/WH w/o att
2 - WH/COG w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE TYPED
30 Aug 67

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28382

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-192/4

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA- 28382

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
FARIAS	Felix		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Vene	Communist guerrilla XXXX - deceased	Urdaneta St., Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

aka "Commandante Claudio"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Subject was killed by DIGEPOL agents near his residence in Caracas on 25 Aug 1967. Subject wanted by the police since 1965.

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
~~XXX~~ ESPINOSA	Manuel	Diaz	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	ca 1934	Cuba	Palma Soriano

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Cuba	guerrilla-captured	Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Subject attended guerrilla course in Cuba, infiltrated ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Venezuela ca. July 1966 with 13 other Cubans. Subject's commander was Luben PETKOFF. On 25 Aug 1967 Subject participated in a bank holdup in Caracas and was ~~XXXX~~ captured by the police.

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
FABRICIO	Eliazar	Aristiguieta	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Vene	deceased Communist	Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

aka "El Loco"

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Killed by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 in Caracas. Subject was Wanted by the police in connection with the killing of Julio IRIBARREN Borges, former director of the Social Securitie, and for the death of a DIGEPOL agent.

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
FERNANDEZ	Luis	Vera	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
Vene	deceased Communist	Caracas

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Killed by DIGEPOL agents on 25 August 1967 in Caracas. Subject was wanted by the police for being involved in an assassination plot against army officers and for subversive activities.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

FORM 10-65 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	

SECRET ATTACHMENT TO UFGA-28382

CARACAS - 15 AGOST - 1967 -.

I MET MR. ERASTO FERNANDEZ TROUGH. MR RAFAEL TREMOL AND DR. GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ BOTH CUBAN WORKING FOR THE DIGEPOL ERASTO FERNANDEZ WORK WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND WITH THE DIGEPOL, HE WAS FORMER VENEZUELA CONSUL IN MIAMI (1965)

I ASKED HIM (E.F.) FOR A JOB. HE ASKED ME FOR MY NAME FOR INVESTIGATION - THE INVESTIGATION ABOUT ME LAST ABOUT FIVE DAYS. HE TOLD ME THAT I CAN START WORKING WITH THE DIGEPOL - HE DID NOT TELL ME ABOUT MY SALARY, BUT I FOUND OUT THAT WILL BE VERY

ATT 1 to UFGA 28382

CS COPY

SECRET

201-300985

SECRET

LOW ($250). I SHOULD GO OUT OF VENEZUELA AND APPLY FOR A "TRANSEUNTE VISA" BECAUSE WITH A TOURIST VISA I CAN NOT WORK. THEY WILL HELP ME WITH THE GOVERMENT OF VENEZUELA FOR GET THIS VISA.

I STARTED WORKING WITH R. TREMOL AND WITH DR ORTIZ FOR A FEW DAYS 20 AUG 1967 AT THE MAIQUETIA AIRPORT. THE WORK WAS CHECKING ON THE WIFE OF DUGLAS BRAVO AND SOME OTHER COMUNIST FROM CUBA THEY PROBABLY WILL COME TO VENEZUELA TROUGH MEXICO, SPAIN

SECRET

OR SOME OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY – WE DID NOT ANY POSSITIVE IDENTIFICATION –

CARACAS 24 THURSDAY AGOST

7 GUNMEN DID A HOLD UP AT MIRANDA BANK "SUCURSAL" ~~AT~~ OF THE INDUSTRIAL ZONE IN CARACAS, ANTIMANO HA WAY – THEY HIT THE MAIN BOX – THEY ABDUCTED THE MANAGER AND ONE OF THE TELLER IN THEIR HOUSES FOR TWELVE HOURS THEY GOT FIRST THE TELLER FRANCISCO GOMEZ MANSO AND THEN THE MANAGER

SECRET

4 EDGAR PIÑERO BOTH WERE ABDUCTED WITH THEIR FAMILYS.

ABOUT 0700 O'CLOCK 4 GUNMEN WENT WITH THE TWO MEN TO THE BANK - MEANTIME THE OTHERS THREE WERE IN THE HOUSES WITH THE FAMILY OF THE TWO MEN.

THE FOUR GUNMEN GOT IN THE BANK WITH THE EMPLOYEES: AND FORCED THEM TO OPEN THE MAIN BOX - THEY TOCK 390,000, BOLIVARS FROM THE BOX. THEN ONE OF THE GUNMEN CALLED THE OTHERS

SECRET

5 WHO WERE IN THE HOUSES AND TOLD THEM EVERYTHING WAS AllRIGHT AND THEY All LEFT. THE POEOPLE FROM THE BANK LEFT IN A BLACK 1961 CHEVY THIS OPERATION WAS SIMILAR TO THE VENEZUELA BANK SUCURSAL OF OCUMARE DEL TUY.

CARACAS 25 FRIDAY AGOST

ABOUT 0700 PEOPLE FROM THE DIGEPOL WENT TO THE STREET URDANETA OF CHACAO FOR SEARCHING THE

7

WHEN THEY SAW
COMING FELIX FARIAS
A WANTED MAN.
FELIX FARIAS ALIAS
COMANDANTE CLAUDIO'
THE POLICE WAS
LOOKING FOR HIM FROM
1965 - THE GUERRILLERO
CARLOS NAVARRO INFANTE
ACCUSED HIM TO KILL
IN THE FIRING SQUAD
IN THE MOONTEN OF
FALCON STATE THE
FOLLOWING PEOPLE:
CONCHITA JIMENEZ 19 YEARS old
HER BROTHER
CRISTOBAL CAMPERO
RAMON JIMENEZ

6

SECRET

APARTMENT 27 OF
THE PERITE BUILDING
ON ACCOUNT OF ~~A~~
A TELEPHONE CALL
THAT THEY GOT ABOUT
0600 O'CLOCK. THE
INFORMER TOLD THEM
THAT THE CHEVY WHO
TOOK PART IN THE
BANK HOLD UP WAS
THERE. THEY CHECK
THE PLACE FOR ABOUT
A HALF HOUR. (I HEARD
ABOUT THAT IN THE
DIGEPOL)
THEY WERE FOR
ABOUT FIVE MINUTE
OUTSIDE THE BUILDING

SECRET

AND HIS OWN BROTHER JUAN FRANCISCO FARIAS THE DIGEPOL DID RECCONOISE HIM AND STOPED HIM - THE PEOPLE FROM THE APARTMENT 27 SAW THAT AND STARTED FIRING TO THE DIGEPOL AGENTS, FARIS DRAW A 38 SPECIAL REVOLVER BUT THE DIGEPOL SHOT HIM DOWN HE GET 6 SHOTS - THEY TOOK HIM TO THE PEREZ DE LEON HOSPITAL IN PETARE BUT HE WAS

9 DEAD ON ARRIVAL.

IN THE APARTMENT 27 THE DIGEPOL ARRESTED THREE PEOPLE ONE OF THEM A WOMAN, THE OTHER WAS THE CUBAN MILITIAN MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ; I HAD THE OPORTUNITE OF MADE AN INTERROGATION ON HIM THE NEXT DAY AND I GOT VERY GOOD INFORMATION FROM HIM - IN THE SEARCH OF THE APARTMENT AN ARSENAL WAS FOUND I DID INSPECT ALL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

SECRET

10

THE WEAPONS WERE AS FOLLOW -

A FAL CAL 7.62 # 2932 CONVERT —

4 SUBMACH. MADSEN

1 M3A1 WITH SILENCER # 737598

1 M3A1 WITH SILENCER # 732039

IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW. THAT THOSE M3 ARE COMPANY WEAPONS BECAUSE I INSPECTED THEM, AND I AM PRETTY SURE ARE THE TYPE THAT THE COMPANY HAS - WITH THE SERIAL NUMBER, I THINK, IS NO PROBLEM TO KNOW

SECRET

SECRET

"IF THERE ARE WEAPONS CAPTURED BY CASTRO IN CUBA OR IF THEY ARE WEAPONS THAT CUBANS WHO WERE WORKING FOR THE COMPANY SOLD THEM IN MIAMI –

1 30 CAL CARBINE ENFORCE TYPE M-1 #28662

1 SUB MACH. THOMPSON COMERCIAL TYPE # 528766

1 SUB MACH. THOMPSON MOD- 1928 # 817321

1 SUB MACH. HOTCHIS

1 REVOLVER 38 POLICE SPECIAL # 1192

1 SUB MACH ZK # 00044

1 RIFLE GRENADE

SECRET

12

SECRET

9 HAND GRENADES
GT 9 TYPE.

100 FEET DELAY FUSE

200 FEET PRIMA CORD
WHITE

2 ANTI RIOT GRENADES
ONE TEARGAS AND
THE OTHER OFFENSIVE

2 SOAP BOX GELATINE
INCENDIARIES WITH
TWO PENCILS EACH
ONE 4 1/2 HOURS AND
THE OTHER 6 3/4 HOURS
IS VERY IMPORTANT
TO KNOW ABOUT THE
INCENDIARY SOAP BOXES
BECAUSE ARE SIMILAR
TO THE COMPANY
SOAP BOX BUT ARE

SECRET

SECRET

13 DIFERENT. THE PENCILS ARE QUITE DIFERENT. I INSPECTED THEM VERY CAREFUL

- ALSO I FOUND SEVERAL NOTES COPY BOOK, ABOUT DEMOLITIONS AND SABOTAGES AND ALL OF THEM ARE BETTER IN SOME ASPECTS TO THE DEMOLITION COURSES THAT WE GOT.
- SOME ARMY UNIFORMS
- BOOTS AND MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT.
- SEVERAL TAGS LICENSES -

IN A DRAWER THEY

SECRET

SECRET

N

FOUND SOME 240,000 BOLIVARES, THIS MONEY BELONGE TO THE HOLD UP OF THE MIRANDA'S BANK. LATTER THE BANK MANAGER AND THE TELLER DID RECONOISSE THE CORP OF FELIX FARIAS AS ONE OF THE GUNMEN IN THE HOLD UP - WHEN I DID INTERROGATE THE CUBAN MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ HE TOLD ME, THAT HE DID PARTICIPATE IN THE HOLD UP, HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS THE DRIVER

SECRET

THEY ALSO FOUND IN FELIX FARIA'S BODY TWO FALSE I.D. CARDS ONE WITH THE NUMBER # 3094628 UNDER THE NAME OF GABRIEL ELIAS KAMEL ELJURI WITH FARIA'S FHOTO IN IT THE OTHER I.D. CARD IS FROM THE POLITICAL PARTY "ACCION DEMOCRATICA" WITH THE NAME ALSO OF GABRIEL ELIAS KAMEL "ELJURI"

AT PETARE HOSPITAL THE DIGEPOL TOOK

SECRET

12

THE FINGER PRINTS
TO STABLISH THE
IDENTITY OF FELIX
FARIAS.

6 SHOTS WERE FOUND
IN FARIA'S BODY - TWO
IN THE HEAD - TWO IN
THE CHEST - ONE IN THE
RIGHT TIGHT ONE THE
OTHER IN THE BELLY

THE APARTMENT
27 WAS RENTED BY
FARIAS THE 25 OF
JANUARY 1967 IN
A REALTOR GIVEN,
THE NAME OF GABRIEL
ELIAS KAMEL ELJURI

SECRET

SECRET

17 HE PUT LIKE REFERENCES WHEN HE RENTED THE APARTMENT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

RAFAEL SUAREZ WHO WAS SALESMAN IN THE CORPORATION "PINTURAS BRISTOL.

RAFAEL ZAMORA
EDDY FERMIN VAZQUEZ
RAMON BORGES
DR HUGO TIRADO.

LIKE NEAREST KIN
ANA RAMIREZ DE ARIAS
FROM CALLE REAL LA PLANICIE #21

BEFORE LIVING IN THE APARTMENT 27

SECRET

18 FARIAS WAS LIVING AT BUILDING 1 APT 15 IN LA CAPILLA AVE.

- THE CUBAN WAS TAKEN TO THE DIGEPOL OFFICES FOR INTERROGATION BY ERASTO FERNANDEZ WHO CHECK WITH US SEVERAL TIME DURING THE INTERROGATION -

I DID INTERROGATE THE CUBAN NEXT MORNING 26 SATURDAY

25 FRIDAY AUGUST

10 DIGEPOL AGENT WENT TO BOLIVAR STREET ON NAZARENO AREA

SECRET

19 EST PART OF PETARE. ONE OF THEM CARLOS JOSÉ GONZALEZ NOCK ON THE DOOR ON A CORNER HOUSE CLOSE TO THE NAZARENO CHURCH.

NOBODY ANSWERED, SO HE WENT FOR THE BACK OF THE HOUSE BUT THE COMMUNIST SHOT HIM DOWN. THE OTHER AGENTS SURRENDER THE HOUSE WITH SUBMACHINGUN AND A SHOTING START FABRICIO (EL LOCO) WAS IN THE HOUSE HE WAS FIRING WITH 7.65 PISTOL

SECRET

20
HE HAD SOME HANDGRENADE TOO. IN THE HOUSE TOO WAS LUIS FERNANDEZ VERA BETANCOURT WHO WAS FIRING WITH A 9MM ~~SUB~~ MADSEN SUBMACHINGUN LOCO FABRICIO WHOSE NAME WAS ELIAZAR FABRICIO ARISTIGUIETA WAS ONE OF THE KILLER OF JULIO IRIBARREN BORGES DIRECTOR OF THE SOCIAL SECURITIE HE WAS CHARGED TOO WITH THE DEATH OF SOME DIGEPOL AGENT

SECRET

21

I WAS ABLE TO KNOW IN THE DIGEPOL OFFICE THA THEY HAVE SOME EMPTY SHELLS WITH THE FABRICIO'S FINGER PRINTS IN THE CASE OF THE MURDER OF IRIBARREN. BORGES -

LUIS FERNÁNDEZ VERA BETANCOURT. WHO WAS ALSO KILLED WAS ECONOMIC STUDENT AT VENEZUELA UNIVERSITY HE WAS WANTED FOR SUVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND FOR AN ASSANATION COMPLOT AGAINST SOME ARMY OFFICERS

SECRET

22

BEFORE THAT L. F. B.
USING WOMAN DRESS
ESCAPE FROM THE
DIGEPOL OFFICE.

15 MINUTES AFTER THE
FIRE START ONE OF
THE MEN INSIDE THE
HOUSE TROW AN MK2
HAND GRENADE.

L.V.B. FELL DEAD
WITH SEVERAL BULLETS
IN HIS BODY HE WAS
USING GREY PANTS
AND MAROON SHIRT.
HIS BODY HAD 12
BULLET WOUND - HE
STILL HAD IN HIS HANDS
THE MADSEN SUBMACH.
HE WAS USING HIS

23 HAIR TINTED BLONDE

LOCO BABRICIO WAS KILLED FOR TEN BULLETS - HE WAS IN THE ROOF OF ONE OF THE NEIBORHOOD HOUSE WHEN WAS KILLED - HE HAD THE 7.65 PISTOL WITH GOLDEN GRIPS CLOSE TO HIS RIGHT HAND. HE WAS USING GREY PANTS, WHITE SHIRT AND NO SHOES

THE HOUSE WERE THEY WERE HIDEN HAS MORE THAN A THOUSAND HITS. IN THE HOUSE WAS ALSO A 7 YEARS OLD

24 GIRL, WHO WAS ABDUCTED BY THEM. THE NEIGHBOORS SAID THAT THEY SAW TWO WOMEN USING NURSES CLOTHS VISITING THE HOUSE.

---

26 SATURDAY AGOST.

I HAD THE OPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW THE CUBAN MANUEL ESPINOSA DIAZ.

HE IS ABOUT 5'7" 150 POUNDS - HE SAID HE WAS 33 YEARS OLD AND WAS BORN

25 IN PALMA SORIANO ORIENTE, CUBA - HE HAD A WOUND NO TO SERIUS IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD PROBABLY ~~BEC~~ ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION HE WAS VERY COOPERATIVE HE LOOKED VERY HUMBLE HE SAID HE ASKED THE COMMUNIST THAT HE WANTS TO GO BACK TO CUBA - BUT THEY DID NOT LET HIM GO - HE SAID THAT HE CAME FROM CUBA 13 MONTHS AGO, WITH

26

SOME OTHERS 13 CUBAN. HE SAID THEY DID NOT TEll HIM WHERE HE GO UNTIll HE WAS IN THE HIGH SEAS. His COMANDER IN THIS TRIP WAS LUBEN PETKOFF - THEY LANDED IN A BEACH NAMED CHICHIRIVICHE IN FALCON STATE. THEY All WERE TRAINED IN CUBA ~~FOR~~ IN GUERIllA WARFARE. I HAD THE OPORTUNITY TO

SECRET

77 SEE ONE OF HIS COPY BOOK, AND THE TRAINING LOOKS TO ME VERY GOOD —

HE SAID THAT HE TOOK PART IN THE MIRANDA BANK HOLD UP. HE SAID HE WAS THE DRIVER THERE.

HE SAID THAT HE WAS IN CARACAS ~~FOR~~ TWO MONTH AGO, HE SAID HE CAME DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAIN BECAUSE HE HAD SOME KIDNEY SICKNESS.

HE SAID HE WAS SARGENT THIRD CLASS

SECRET

SECRET

28 WITH THE MILITIA -
HE SAID HE WORKED
WITH THE "BATALLONES
DE TRABAJO" IN PINE
ISLAND. HE SAID THAT
IN 1963-1964 HE WAS
IN CHRGE OF THE
17-70 BATALLION AT
CAMAGUEY PROVINCE
THE GUERILLA COURSE
IN CUBA WAS APROX
TWO MONTHS.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM

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ACTION WH 8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, [illegible]

ACTION

S E C R E T 292210Z CITE CARACAS 7694

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 8866 (IN 34036)

B. CARACAS 7589 (IN 32469)

C. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)

29 Aug 67 IN 41504

1. IT CLEAR FROM REF C THAT IT TO STATION'S ADVANTAGE HAVE CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS AS HE COULD HAVE INFORMED US OF CAPTURE OF CUBAN CONSIDERABLY BEFORE WE HEARD OF IT FROM GOV.

2. STATION DOES NOT FEEL REF A OBJECTIONS TO CONTACT ARE VALID, ESPECIALLY WITH AMCLEVE-15 WORKING FOR DIGEPOL. UNLESS JMWAVE HAS FURTHER OBJECTION NOT PRESENTED REF A, REQUEST AMCLEVE-15 BE TOLD STATION CARACAS DESIRES CONTACT HIM. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN AMCLEVE-15 WILL RETURN CARACAS AND HOW HE CAN BE CONTACTED.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

Gus - [illegible] Charlie

I would like discuss this ad nauseum personal [illegible] & lets talk.

have done so.

3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

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[redacted] 28

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

CI

S E C R E T 282207Z CITE JMWAVE 8997 (STEADMAN ACTING)

PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ~~DIRECTOR~~

NO NIACT

ACTION

REF CARACAS 7668 (IN 39826)

28 AUG 67 IN 40592

inv. Keith Pete Bill Charlie ? Ambrose ?

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES EPINOZA. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

2. AMCLEVE-15, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO MAIMI TO OBTAIN PROPER VISA TO ENABLE HIM WORK IN VENEZUELA, REPORTS HE OBTAINED JOB WITH DIGEPOL THRU RAFAEL TREMOL AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ AND WAS INVOLVED IN ESPINOZA CAPTURE.

3. ACCORDING AMCLEVE -15, DIGEPOL RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT 0600 HOURS 25 AUGUST FROM INFORMANT WHO REPORTED BLACK CHEVROLET SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH 24 AUGUST BANK ROBBERY HAD BEEN SEEN IN URDANETA STREET NEAR PERITE BUILDING, ON ARRIVAL POLICE SAW FELIZ FARIAS, ALIA "COMMANDANTE CLAUDIO", WHO WANTED FOR 1965 FIRING SQUAD MURDER OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. FARIAS DREW REVOLVER AND WAS SHOT DOWN, PEOPLE IN APARTMENT 27 OF PERITE BUILDING BEGAN FIRING ON POLICE. POLICE ENTERED APARTMENT AND ARRESTED ESPINOZA AND TWO OTHERS, FOUND 240,000 BOLIVARES FROM BANK ROBBERY, ARMS, AMMUNITION, GRENADES AND

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8997 S E C R E T

OTHER ITEMS. (AMCLEVE-15 PROVIDED LIST AND PICTURE).

4. AMCLEVE-15 TALKED WITH ESPINOZA 26 AUGUST. ESPINOZA STATED HE 33 YEARS OLD, BORN PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE. CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM CUBA JULY 1966 WITH 13 OTHER CUBANS UNDER COMMAND LUBEN PETKOFF AND LANDED AT CHICHIRIVICHE BEACH IN FALCON PROVINCE. HAD APPROX TWO MONTHS TRAINING GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CUBA. AMCLEVE-15 SAID ESPINOZA VERY COOPERATIVE. HAD A NOT TOO SERIOUS WOUND IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD "PROBABLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION".

5. AMCLEVE-15 SAID SOME OF ARMS LOOKED LIKE THOSE ISSUED BY WOFACT. WILL POUCH FURTHER DETAILS, INCLUDING ARMS WITH SEVERAL NUMBERS.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION 10 117 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

FILE [illegible]

SECRET 271760Z CITE CARACAS 7668

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

27 Aug 67 IN 30828

(NO NIGHT ACTION)

1. TIMING OF MININT PRESS CONFERENCE 26 AUGUST COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER. TWO DIGEPOL RAIDS OF PREVIOUS DAY GAVE PRESS CONFERENCE ADDED SPICE, BUT PRESENTATION AT PRESS CONFERENCE OF CUBAN GUERRILLA CAPTURED IN RAID 25 AUGUST WAS PARTICULARLY DRAMATIC, GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO VENEZUELAN CASE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION BEFORE OAS.

2. CUBAN IDENTIFIED AS MANUEL ESPINOZA DIAZ, AGE 33, OF PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE PROVINCE, CUBA, WHO SAID HE WAS SERGEANT IN CUBAN MILITIA BATTALION AND CAME TO VENEZUELA TO TEACH GUERRILLA TACTICS. ESPINOZA SAID HE ENTERED VENEZUELA JULY 66 WITH LUBEN PETKOFF GROUP AT CHICHIRIVICHE AND THAT LANDING PARTY INCLUDED 13 CUBANS. THIS SUBSTANTIATES CIURBAN-2 STATEMENT THAT FOTOS WHICH APPEARED IN SUCESCOS ARTICLES ON PETKOFF GROUP INCLUDED NUMEROUS CUBANS. COS WHO SAW TV PRESENTATION FOUND ESPINOZA APPEAR BE LOW LEVEL AND NOT WELL INFORMED, ALTHOUGH SHOCK AND FATIGUE COULD HAVE CAUSED HIM TO APPEAR MORE STUPID THAN HE IS.

3. REQUEST HQS AND JMWAVE (TO INCLUDE AMOT) TRACES. WILL POUCH FOTOS ESPINOZA TO JMWAVE FOR POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BY AMUG-1 AND CIURBAN-2.

PAGE TWO CARACAS 7658 SECRET

4. WILL TRY GET TV FILM OF PRESS CONFERENCE.

5. STATION PREPARING DEBRIEFING REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS AND JMWAVE.

6. AS INTERESTING SIDELIGHT, STATION RECEIVED NO ADVANCE NOTICE OF ESPINOZA CAPTURE FROM MININT PRIOR PRESS CONFERENCE DESPITE ASSISTANCE RENDERED TO FOLLOW THIS SERIES OF LEADS.

SECRET

BT

ATTACHMENT 1. to UFGA-28432

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Acting Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Operational/PBRUMEN
Interrogation of "CIA Agents" at LASO Conference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

file

1. The attached is an excerpt from the FBIS Daily Report dated 10 August 1967 (FB 155/67) concerning the interrogation of "CIA Agents" at a special session of the LASO Conference.

2. Your attention is drawn to the indicated paragraph concerning Luis POSADA and the Cuban Exile Organization Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile-RECE), POSADA appears identifiable with the Subject of 201-300985.

LEONA R. VESTUTO

AUG 23 1967

✓ w/atts

Attachment: h/w
1-Excerpt from FBIS Daily
Report, 10 August 1967

Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6657

DATE
[illegible] AUG 19[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

[illegible]

[illegible]

Question: What kind of [illegible] for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Laucerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Laucerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were these bullets prepared for?

Laucerica: These bullets were prepared over there in [illegible]. (Polo--phonetic) Huerta, member of an organization called (?[illegible]) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whose lives attempts were to be made. But they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Laucerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Laucerica. Yes, sir.

Question: These counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miami, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

Laucerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence. But there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of (?[illegible]) which--through [illegible], who is known by all as a CIA agent--that is all the activities of [illegible] on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were these attempts to be made with that type of weapon?

Laucerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the [illegible] were to take part in Havana, well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 212103Z CITE JMWAVE 8896 21 Aug 67 IN 36006

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF JMWAVE 8866 (1-34036)

AMOT TRACES NEGATIVE VENTURINI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

4-63 JUIW

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM 22

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR WH/COG 8 CA 2 CA/PROP CA/4 CI/OPS CI/IC 2

w/ Pete

S E C R E T 172217Z CITE JMWAVE 8866 17 AUG 67 IN 34036

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: CARACAS 7589 (IN 32469)

G

1. JMWAVE ADVISES NO CONTACT BE MADE WITH AMCLEVE/15. HIS NAME MENTIONED AS WOFACT AGENT ON GOC RADIO AND TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE. HE HAS ALSO BEEN INVOLVED SEVERAL SHADY DEALS MIAMI WHICH, ALTHOUGH UNDERTAKEN AT JMWAVE/FBI REQUEST, MIGHT PREJUDICE HIS EFFECTIVE USE.

2. STATION TRACES NEGATIVE VENTURINI. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM 3

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible] CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 152132Z CITE CARACAS 7559 (LYNER ACTING) 15 AUG 67 IN 32469

a/Pete — Have Fisher do these traces pls. G

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. UFGA-28079

B. JMWAVE-8758 (IN 29699)

1. FROM REF A. INFO AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT APPEAR OF INTEREST IN HIMSELF TO CARACAS STATION. HOWEVER, CHECK OF HIS FRIEND REVEALED FOLLOWING: AMOT-6 REPORTED THAT RICARDO VENTURINI, CUBAN, EMPLOYEE OF RADIO CARACAS TELEVISION WAS IDENTIFIED IN AL LIAISON REPORT OF JANUARY 1967 AS A MEMBER OF CUBAN DSE.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE INFO AMCLEVE-15 MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE INFO ON A DSE OPERATIVE IN CARACAS. REQUEST JMWAVE, AMOT AND HQS TRACES VENTURINI. ALSO, IF JMWAVE CAN PROVIDE, WOULD APPRECIATE ADDRESS WHERE AMCLEVE-15 CAN BE CONTACTED SHOULD CARACAS DEVELOP ACTIVE INTEREST.

SECRET

BT

answered

WH/COG/CI Olivia Williams — COG has nothing
WH/4 has nothing
RI has "

ATTACHMENT #1 to UFGA-28032

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MEMORANDUM FOR AMCLEVE/15's File 14 August 1967

SUBJECT: Salary Misunderstanding

ORIGINATOR: Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

1. AMCLEVE/15 submitted the attached note, written by him, to the writer. In the note AMCLEVE/15 says "he is not asking for anything but wants the records checked regarding his past salary of $325.00 per month." AMCLEVE/15 claimed "Chip" (Grover T. LYTHCOTT, his former CO) told him that effective October 1966 he would be paid $100.00 per month by WOFACT, while the balance would be placed in a bank for him.

2. For the record AMCLEVE/15 was told by the writer and not Chip that effective August 1966 (not October) he would be cut back in his salary to approximately $100.00 per month. He was cut back from $350.00, not $325.00, for reasons of economy and cover and he was agreeable to the cutback. The writer did not tell him that the balance of approximately $212.00 was being saved for him; only that his gross salary would be raised to $350.00 in the event RECE ever stopped paying him his salary. (It was assumed that his RECE employment might be short-lived). For administrative reasons the salary cutback was not effective until September 1966 and from latter date until December 1966 he was paid $111.13. From January 1967 until June 1967 he was paid $110.90 due to a FICA change. During the entire period, September 1966 to June 1967, AMCLEVE/15 was budgeted by JMWAVE in the amount of $350.00 gross with the notation of his voucher of "possibility of paying balance later". Then in June 1967 AMCLEVE/15's salary was increased to $350.00 gross, as so promised, because he was unemployed during most of June.

3. The writer explained the above to AMCLEVE/15 and he seemed satisfied. He told the writer that he had to borrow some money to cover expenses in connection with his trip to Venezuela.

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

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ORIG: MM PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 17 AUG 1967

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/FI 2, FI/INT 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 28911

10 10 00Z

TO CARACAS

REF: CARACAS-7589 (IN 32469)*

NO HQS TRACES IDENTIFIABLE WITH RICARDO OR JOSE VENTURINI.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Venturini is AMCLEVE-15's point of contact in Venezuela. Caracas reported that liaison have Venturini listed as a member of Cuban DSE. Requested Hqs, JMWAVE and AMOT traces.

COORD: WH/COG/CICS/OS Olivia Williams (telecoord)
WH/COG ____

for JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

POSADA, LUIS

INTERROGATION OF CIA AGENTS' AT LASO SESSION

CUBA

10 August 1967 aaaa 27 LASO CONFERENCE

Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 0107 GMT 7 Aug 67 Official Use Only

Question: What kind of weapons did you bring for assassinations?

Laucerica: We brought two Beretta pistols with silencers, a .22-cal. pistol with a silencer, and an M-3 with a silencer.

Question: What kind of ammunition did you bring for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Laucerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Laucerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were those bullets prepared for?

Laucerica: Those bullets were prepared over there in Miami. (Polo--phonetic) Miranda, member of an organization called (?El Reco) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whose lives attempts were to be made, but they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Laucerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: Those counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miama, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

Laucerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence, but there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of (?El Reco) which--through Luis Posada, who is known by all as a CIA agent--belongs, that is all its activities of landing on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were those attempts to be made with that type of weapon?

Laucerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the idea of counterrevolution were to take root in Havana, well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

SO: F315 DR# 155, 10 AUG 67 QAO

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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ACTION

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

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5		10	

S E C R E T 102265Z CITE JMWAVE 8758

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR wl 10 AUG 67 IN 29698

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: UFGA-28979 6

FYI: SUBJ PARA 3 REF LUIS CLEMENTE (POSADA) CARRILES (201-303985) PLANS TRAVEL TO CARACAS 12 AUG 67. HOPES FIND EMPLOYMENT THROUGH FRIEND RICARDO (AKA JOSE) VENTURINE WHO CONNECTED TV INDUSTRY CARACAS.

S E C R E T

BT

ms

Sue: Please stain 201 for me. Thanks. P

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Acting Chief, WHD

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Operational/FBRUMEN
Interrogation of "CIA Agents" at LASO Conference

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

1. The attached is an excerpt from the FBIS Daily Report dated 10 August 1967 (FB 155/67) concerning the interrogation of "CIA Agents" at a special session of the LASO Conference.

2. Your attention is drawn to the indicated paragraph concerning Luis POSADA and the Cuban Exile Organization Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (Cuban Representation in Exile-RECE). POSADA appears identifiable with the Subject of 201-300985.

LEONA R. VESTUTO

Attachment: h/w
1-Excerpt from FBIS Daily
Report, 10 August 1967

Distribution:
3-COS, JMWAVE w/att h/w

2 4 AUG 1967

1 ATT

CS COPY

CS COPY

201-300985

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6657

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE
10 Aug 67

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

AN	FI	
	DEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

Distribution:
1-WH/COG/CICS
1-WH/Reg/O
1-Originator

AN	FI	
BS		
ABSTRACT X		

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	Laura Carberry	bar 16 Aug	5106

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/CICS	17 Aug	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	17/8	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

Question: What kind of weapons did you bring for assassinations?

Laucerica: We brought two Beretta pistols with silencers, a .22-cal. pistol with a silencer, and an M-3 with a silencer.

Question: What kind of ammunition did you bring for the .22-cal. pistol with silencer?

Laucerica: Part of the ammunition was conventional bullets and part of it was cyanide-tipped bullets.

Question: Who prepared the bullets with cyanide?

Laucerica: I prepared them.

Question: What were these bullets prepared for?

Laucerica: These bullets were prepared over there in Miami. (Polo--phonetic) Miranda, member of an organization called (?El Reco) asked me to prepare them, in spite of the fact that I know nothing about chemistry, for attempts on lives, to make sure of the death of the individuals against whose lives attempts were to be made, but they were for specific attempts.

Question: What plans were made in the United States or among the counterrevolutionary circles, what is the main objective sought?

Laucerica: Well, the physical elimination of the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.

Question: The physical elimination of Maj. Fidel Castro?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: Those counterrevolutionary groups which operate from Florida, from Miami, do they have the approval of the North American Government for their actions?

RECF

Laucerica: Almost entirely. For example the most opportunist elements over there create small groups to obtain dollars from the US Government for their subsistence, but there are close links among all the organizations in exile with the Central Intelligence Agency. We have, for example, the case of (?El Reco) which--through Luis Posada, who is known by all as a CIA agent--belongs, that is all its activities of landing on Cuban coasts, actions against merchant ships and so forth, are linked to the CIA.

Question: You say that you had a .22-cal. pistol with poisoned bullets for specific attempts on lives?

Laucerica: Yes, sir.

Question: I would like you to clarify something more. What specific attacks, against which figures, were those attempts to be made with that type of weapon?

Laucerica: Well, against the most prominent figures of the revolution according to existing circumstances and according to the individuals who were going to execute them. Specifically, it is to be supposed that if the idea of counterrevolution were to take root in Havana, well then the effort to kill the leader of the revolution would be intensified.

201-300985
FB 155/67
10 AUG 67

CS COPY

ATT 1 to UFGW 6657

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

10 August 1967

WIO-1592

TO : Chief, IO

THRU : Chief, IO/3

FROM : IO/3/FLUSTIKOFF

SUBJECT: AMCLEVE/15's Plans for Employment - Bona Fides Given for Possible WOFACT Contact in the Future

Distribution
1 - C/IO
1 - 201-300985
1 - IO/3 Chrono
1 - Registry

1. AMCLEVE/15 informed the writer on 9 August 1967 that he plans to fly to Caracas, Venezuela from Miami on 12 August 1967 accompanied by Aldo HERNANDEZ, a friend who is employed as a salesman in Caracas. In Caracas AMCLEVE/15 will seek employment through or with an old friend, Ricardo VENTURINE aka Jose VENTURINE, connected in some way with the TV industry in Caracas. HERNANDEZ is also a friend of VENTURINE.

2. If AMCLEVE/15 finds employment in Caracas, he does not intend to return to Miami and his wife and son will then join him in Caracas.

3. If AMCLEVE/15 does not find employment in Caracas, he intends to go to Puerto Rico from Caracas to look for employment through some of his friends living in Puerto Rico.

4. AMCLEVE/15 was given a recognition signal for establishing bona fides in the event that WOFACT should want to contact him in Caracas or elsewhere. AMCLEVE/15 was instructed that the person would establish bona fides by saying, "I'm a friend of Lawrence". He was also given JMWAVE address Mr. Lawrence R. DEROME, PO Box 390, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida.

5. JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on VENTURINE and HERNANDEZ.

6. AMCLEVE/15 reported that his name was mentioned on the GOC radio on 6 August 1967 in connection with the alleged captured WOFACT agents. He was described by Alberto LAUCIRICA Diaz as the liaison between WOFACT and RECE.

SECRET

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension) WH/COG/CICS/OS O. Williams - 5136

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.:

201 NO.: 201-300985

PROJECT:

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject is no longer of Operational interest to the Station.

REF: UFGA 28079, 31 July 1967

201-300985

DATE: 8 August 1967

SIGNATURE:

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 8-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET

Carl: 5 August 1967

Please brief me on the final result of the AMCLEVE/ 15 case ?? Was Sam eventually satisfied and is all now calm ??

Thank you,

hm

Harry -

There was no problem with Sam on this case. At Hqs instructions JMWAVE terminated AMCLEVE-15 and the FBI ~~[illegible]~~ (or rather the Justice Dept.) planned to use A-15 to collect evidence against a Miami gambler. However the Dept. of Justice cancelled this plan [illegible] [illegible] leaving A-15 a free body.

Since then A-15 became involved with KICKSALT-1&2, which has caused a minor stir. I am holding the file until all the dust settles.

Carl

7 AUG 1967

Carl

Thanks - Please retain for the file.

Thank you

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

GA
MO
RS
UNIT

ACTION
C/WH/

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CA, C/FI 2, C/SOD 3

S E C R E T 022306Z CITE JMWAVE 8577 2 AUG 67 IN 24285

DIRECTOR INFO LA PAZ

KAPOK

REF: DIRECTOR 24039

STATION WISHES TO CORRECT THE RECORD AS FAR AS LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH ONE OF REF IS CONCERNED. WHILE AMCLEVE/15 IS NOT A PARAGON OF VIRTUE HE CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS UNSAVORY CHARACTER. HIS INVOLVEMENT IN SHADY DEALS IN THE PAST TWO YEARS RESULTED ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM STATION'S (AND EVENTUALLY FBI) ENCOURAGEMENT. HE FOLLOWED DIRECTIONS AND REPORTED FAIRLY WELL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 3

ACTION c/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

FI RS

UNIT ESEC TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, c/ci/cops, c/ci, c/ci/ps, c/ci/sgo, c/ca2, c/fi2, c/fi/int2

S E C R E T 022200Z CITE JMWAVE 8569

2 Aug 67 IN 24289

DIRECTOR INFO LA PAZ

KAPOK DYVOUR

REFS: DIRECTOR 24039

DIRECTOR 24439

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF KICOBALT 1 REPORT RECEIVED 28 JULY BY JMWAVE CONTACT:

A. 28 JULY KICOBALT 1 MET AMCLEVE 15 (ERRONEOUSLY REPORTED AMCHEER 15 PER DIRECTOR 24040) WHO SAID HE WAS GOING TO BOLIVIA TO HELP TRAIN A SPECIAL UNIT IN GUERRILLA WARFARE. AMCLEVE 15 CLAIMED TO BE OFFERED EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH AND TO BE LEAVING FIRST WEEK IN AUG AND TO HAVE RECEIVED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLAR ADVANCE.

B. KICOBALT 1 CONFIRMED ABOVE WITH AMDESK 1 WHO IS A FRIEND OF AMCLEVE 15 AND WHO ADDED THAT AMCLEVE 15 WAS IN TOUCH WITH BOLIVIAN CONSULATE IN MIAMI AND A BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE TO WHOM AMCLEVE 15 HAD MADE THE OFFER TO ORGANIZE A GROUP OF CUBAN GUERRILLA TRAINING OFFICERS. AMCLEVE 15 HAD OFFERED TO TAKE ON AMDESK 1 SHOULD KICHEER 1 APPROVE THE WHOLE PLAN. AMCLEVE 15 CLAIMED CONCEPT OF PLAN AND HIRING

SECRET

OF AMCLEVE 15 HAD BEEN APPROVED BY KICHEER 1 THRU ATTACHE.

2. KICOBALT 1 COMMENTED TO CO THAT SUCH A UNILATERAL GROUP UNCONTROLLED BY WOFACT WOULD DO MORE DAMAGE THAN GOOD; THAT KICOBALT SPONSOR AND COVER WOULD BE BLOWN IF IN FACT OTHER MIAMI CUBANS IN BOLIVIA ON SAME MISSION.

3. RE PARA 4 DIRECTOR 24039 JMWAVE FEELS THAT EITHER AMCLEVE 15 SOMEHOW CAME UP WITH IDEA ON HIS OWN OR SOME LEAK OCCURRED DURING INITIAL CONTACTS ON THIS PROGRAM AND HE NOW FISHING FOR INFO AND HANDLE TO CLIMB ON THE BAND WAGON. STATION HAS BEEN ADVISED BY AMCLEVE 15 THAT HE SEEKING EMPLOYMENT IN CARACAS. HE LEGAL U.S. RESIDENT AND IS IN POSSESSION OF MULTIPLE EXIT AND REENTRY PERMIT VALID ONE YEAR. AMOT 11 DOES NOT KNOW AMCLEVE 15 NOR IS HE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF KICOBALT OPERATION. AMFAST 6 (ANOTHER MEMBER AMOT GROUP WHO KNOWS AMCLEVE 15) REPORTED AMCLEVE 15 HAD TOLD HIM THAT AMCLEVE 15 AND WIFE HAD BEEN ENTERTAINED BY U.S. OFFICIAL (HINTED WOFACT) AND HAD DISCUSSED POSITION IN BOLIVIA.

4. INCIDENT OF COURSE REQUIRES INVESTIGATION AND IS BEING PURSUED. WILL ADVISE ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

EXT: 5269

DATE: 1 August 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: X0 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO WH/4 BRANCH

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF.: WH 1 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE VR

1 22 25 Z

(date and time filed)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 2443

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO: LA PAZ

REF: DIRECTOR 24039

A. REQUEST PRIORITY ~~POSADA~~ CABLE CONTENT OF MEMO KICOBALT-1 (AMPOLISH-1) SUBMITTED TO JMWAVE CASE OFFICER AND ALL OTHER MATERIAL RELATED TO REF SUBJECT.

B. UNDERSTAND THAT MEMO IN POSSESSION STATION SINCE 20 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: KICOBALT-1 reported that he met Luis Clements Posada Carriles who informed him he had approached Bolivian Consul in Miami offering his services as Interrogator/Guerrilla fighter in Bolivia.

C/WH/3 L. M. Sternfield

by [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EARL WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: 5337
DATE: 31 JULY 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
ZJ

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: C/WH-6 ☐ RID COPY INFO: C/WH/C6 5 C/CI, C/FI 2

2/5023
31 Jul

(classification) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 24039

PRIORITY LA PAZ INFO: PRIORITY JMWAVE

RYBAT

1. KICOBALT-1 REPORTS HE MET LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (JEN) CUBAN EXILE IN MIAMI LAST WEEK. POSADA INFORMED HIM HE HAD APPROACHED BOLIVIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI OFFERING HIS SERVICES AS INTERROGATOR/GUERRILLA FIGHTER IN BOLIVIA. POSADA SAID THAT REPLY HAD COME BACK FROM KICHEER-1 SAYING HE APPROVED SALARY OF $800 PER MONTH AND CONSUL AUTHORIZED PROVIDE $500 ADVANCE TO POSADA. POSADA LEFT IMPRESSION HE DEPARTING FOR LA PAZ SOON. POSADA IS UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO MIXED UP IN SHADY DEALS MIAMI AREA.

2. AS CAN BE EXPECTED KICOBALT-1 AND KICOBALT-2 DEPRESSED AT THOUGHT OF POSADA BEING IN BOLIVIA AND UNDOUBTEDLY SUSPECT WOFACT INVOLVEMENT.

3. WOFACT HAS NO INVOLVEMENT THIS MATTER. REQUEST IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH KICHEER-1 TO DETERMINE VERACITY OF POSADA'S STORY. IF TRUE MAKE IT CLEAR TO KICHEER-1 THAT WE IN NO WAY ARE INVOLVED IN THIS AND IN VIEW POSADA'S BACKGROUND WE WISH HIM TO CANCEL CONTRACTING POSADA POINTING OUT IT WILL JEOPARDIZE OUR AND HIS OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLAS.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO __________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY __________ PER __________ # __________ ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE , VR ,

PAGE TWO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 24039

4. FOR JMWAVE: IF POSADA'S STORY NOT TRUE STRONGLY SUSPECT LEAK IN EXILE COMMUNITY RE WOFACT INVOLVEMENT IN SENDING CUBANS TO BOLIVIA. COULD AMOT-11 OR OTHERS HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT ASSIGNMENTS. PLS PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

by AC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

RECEIVED
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/AN

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]/EEGC		7 - AUG 1967		
2.				
3. WH/C/CIOS		7 AUG 1967	8 Aug 67	RD
4.				
5. WH/C/MO		8 AUG 1967		
6.				
7. WH/C/CICS		10 AUG 1967	10 AUG 1967	
8.				
9. WH/CONTRACTS		11 AUG 1967	22 AUG 1967	JW
10. WH/B&F			8/22	
11. C/WH/SS		22 Aug 67		
12. CPD	5E-69			
13. WH/COG/MO	3038	[illegible]0 AU[illegible]		
14. WH/C/CICS/[illegible]		31/9		
15. WH/3/V				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

copy detached

for signature

file 201

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE TITLE
	INDEX		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201 - 300985

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 31 July 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFGA 28079

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
COS, Caracas

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Termination of AMCLEVE/15

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See para 7

Reference: JMWAVE-8156, 11 July 1967

1. As reported in reference, AMCLEVE/15 was terminated effective 11 July 1967. AMCLEVE/15 was terminated because he resigned from his position as a military coordinator/member of RECE (Cuban Representation in Exile), a Miami based Cuban exile organization, in early June 1967 and he thus lost access to his target, as AMCLEVE/15 had been reporting on the activities of RECE since 1 August 1966. In addition, JMWAVE does not have a current need or any operational interest in RECE, and the AMOT organization has the capability to penetrate and report on RECE if and when the need should arise. After AMCLEVE/15 resigned from RECE, he was a candidate for employment in the AMOT organization; however, because of his involvement with Frank "Lefty" ROSENTHAL and for other security reasons it was decided that the AMOT organization should not hire him.

2. AMCLEVE/15 began his employment with WOFACT in April 1965 and initially served as an instructor in the Maritime Training Branch of JMWAVE. He was also active in reporting on exile activities. On 1 August 1966, AMCLEVE/15 was transferred to the CI Branch where he was used to report on the activities of RECE until his resignation in early June 1967.

3. Since AMCLEVE/15 was amicably terminated, JMWAVE does not envision any problems at this time. AMCLEVE/15 plans to seek employment in Caracas, Venezuela, through an old friend who resides there.

4. On 21 July 1967 AMCLEVE/15 was given a termination bonus of $650.00, which is equivalent to two months salary, minus FICA and federal income tax. He was paid $549.60 net.

Dait

Continued

Attachments - herewith
1. Agent Service Record
2. Form 2457

Distribution
3 - WH/COG w/atts
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - C/WH w/o atts
Att: Joel N. NEBECKER

[illegible]

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-300-18
201-300985

DATE TYPED
25 July 1967

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28079

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-300985

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ATTACHMENT A2 TO UFGA-28079

RECORD NO.

INVENTORY - NON STAFF PERSONNEL

	1	2	3	4
A	ARBITRARY NO.	SUBJECT'S 201 201- 300985	OTHER FILE NO.	
B	SURNAME AMCLEVE/15	1ST NAME / PERSONALIA	OTHER GIVEN NAME/TELECODE	TYPE OF NAME C
C	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	DATE OF BIRTH 15 Feb. 1928	CITIZENSHIP Cuba	NATURALIZED-US (yes or pending)
D	COUNTRY CURRENTLY RESIDES USA	CITY CURRENTLY RESIDES-YEAR Miami	MARITAL STATUS (most recent) Married	SEX (M or F) M
E	OVERT OCCUPATION Unemployed	LANGUAGE Spanish, R,W,S	LANGUAGE English, R,W,S	LANGUAGE
F	MILITARY SERVICE-COUNTRY USA	BRANCH OF SERVICE Army	INCLUSIVE DATES 63-64	
G	COUNTRY AREA KNOWLEDGE Cuba	COUNTRY	COUNTRY	
H	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) Maritime Instructor ~~XXXXXXXX~~ July 65-Aug 66			CODE SO~~XX~~
I	FUNCTION(S) PERFORMED FOR AGENCY (limit to 62 spaces) CI Agent Aug 66-11 ~~XXXX~~ July 67			CODE CI
J	CONTRACT EMPLOYEE	TYPE EMPLOYEE TYPE A OR B	EMPLOYEE WIFE	FULL, PART TIME OR WAE
K	MAINTENANCE/SERVICE	CONSULTANT	PROPRIETARY OR SUBSIDY	CAREER AGENT
L	FIELD AGENT Yes	HQS. PF OR USF ~~XXXXXXXX~~USF	INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR	NOC/NOA NOC
M	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Yes	POA / STATUS	STAFF CLEARANCE	CSA/PCSA
N	HQS COMPONENT RESPONSIBLE WH	FIELD STATION RESPONSIBLE JMWAVE	PROJECT	COVER NONOFF
O	ENTRY ON DUTY DATE 7 Apr 65	YEARLY SALARY $4200	DATE LAST PAY CHANGE August 1966	
P	PART OF A RETIREMENT PLAN - SPECIFY (limit to 62 spaces)			
Q	DATE TERMINATED 11 July 1967	REEMPLOYABLE Yes	STAFF CEILING SPACE	
R	REMARKS (re: termination, etc.) (limit to 62 spaces) A/15 terminated because he for ~~CXXX~~ lost access to target and/security reasons.			ATTITUDE good

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FORM 4-65 2457 SECRET GROUP 1 (9-51)

CS COPY

UFGA-28079

201-300985

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28079

5. AMCLEVE/15 signed a termination agreement/quit claim form and a final secrecy agreement and are being retained by JMWAVE.

6. Attached herewith are copies of AMCLEVE/15's "Agent Service Record" (Form 2457) and the Inventory-Non Staff Personnel Form.

7. Please cancel AMCLEVE/15's OA and MOC.

Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF

APPROVED:

WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

FORM 5-60 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

MICROFILMED
AUG 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET ATTACHMENT #1 to UFGA-28079

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1P

1. Agent's Cryptonym or Pseudonym: AMCLEVE/15
2. Project Identification:
3. Agent Recruited by: Grover T. LYTHCOTT
4. Capacity in which Agent Served: Maritime instructor and CI agent, reported on Cuban exile activities in Miami.
5. Rate of Pay: $350.00 per month
6. Other Commitments: none
7. Agent Dismissed by: Gary L. FLUSTIKOFF
8. Reason for Dismissal: Subject lost access to the target and for security reasons.
9. Security Risks: None, at time of termination.
10. Is the Agent Recommended for Re-Use: Not recommended for re-use in the Miami area.
11. Manner of Dismissal: Amicably-informed in person by CO.
12. Letter of Termination Signed: yes

SECRET

CS COPY

[illegible] 1 UFGA-28079

201-300485

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

ACTION

FROM

22

ACTION

C/WH/COG 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

CA
MO
RR
FI
RS
CICS
CIOS
CIPT
SS
ESEC

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 191832Z CITE JMWAVE 8307 19 JUL 67 IN 15102

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF: JMWAVE 8039 (IN 06002)

ON 19 JULY LOCAL FBI INFORMED JMWAVE THAT THEIR HQS HAD CANCELLED ALL PLANS FOR AMCLEVE-15 PARTICIPATION REF OPERATION. SAID OPERATION NOT BEING PURSUED DUE LEGAL PROBLEMS WHICH THEY ENVISIONED MAY ~~A~~RISE.

S E C R E T

BT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 11 JULY 67

FILE CLASS:

OUT: [illegible]

TO | INFO | CITE

SECRET

CITE JMWAVE 8158

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF: DIRECTOR 1[illegible]

1. AMCLEVE/15 AMICABLY TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 11 JULY 1967. WILL BE PAID BONUS EQUIVALENT TWO MONTHS SALARY.

2. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

Request JMWAVE terminate AMCLEVE/15 as Hqs desires to disassociate from AMCLEVE/15 and have LN[illegible]/Justice assume direction.

5
4
3
2
1

[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]

DIR 15805 (para 3)
Justice Department has suggested possibility use AMCLEV/15 to assist Rosenthal obtain additional material as basis for arrest of Rosenthal for having possession of such materials.

JMWAVE 7953 (para 3)
AMCLEVE/15 is currently working with the FBI and following their instructions re Rosenthal (30 June 1967)

DIR 16167
Headquarters will propose to Justice Department that any further questions arising locally be discussed directly between FBI and Station Rep. (1 July 1967)

JMWAVE 8039
At their request JMWAVE met with local FBI and Justice Dept. attorney on 6 July to discuss future action AMCLEVE/15 case. JMWAVE position was to agree have AMCLEVE/15 aid in case as much as possible without exposing AMCLEVE/15 or his WOFACT employment.

The following proposal:
Justice Dept. attorney requested AMCLEVE/15 recontact Rosenthal and the meet would be covered by FBI. AMCLEVE/15 would ask Rosenthal for money for down payment on material (c-4 explosives) but nothing would nothing would be furnished at that time. Later AMCLEVE/15 would furnish Rosenthal sufficient amount of explosives to constitute violation. When AMCLEVE/15 and Rosenthal separated , Rosenthal would be arrested.

AMCLEVE/15 was to contact Alberto Larrain-Maestre and exhibit requested silencer which would not be furnished. This contact would also be covered by FBI, but action wuld be taken by local authorities to avoid possible disclosure as to involvement of AMCLEVE/15 in the matter.

JMWAVE was in process of terminating AMCLEVE/15, but in view of FBI need, he would be retained on payroll until 30 Sept.

DIR 13094 (dated 7 July 67)

Headquarters opposed toa any use being made of AMCLEVE/15 that would involve his appearance as a witness for prosecution.

Headquarters requested JMWAVE terminate AMCLEVE/15 before permit ting his use for prosecution. Ex It was Headquarters desire to disassociate from AMCLEVE/15 and have FBI/Justice Dept. assume direction and responsibility for this criminal case.

JMWAVE 8156 (dated 11 July 67)
Station terminated AMCLEVE/15 effective 11 Jul167.

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-310985

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

28/RYAN

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6 C/MPS/BG, C/CI

WAVE

SECRET 112207Z CITE JMWAVE 8156

11 Jul 67 IN 08470

AN ✓	FI
~~DO~~	~~DISP~~
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCLEVE/15

REF DIRECTOR 18094

1. AMCLEVE/15 AMICABLY TERMINATED EFFECTIVE 11 JULY 1967. WILL BE PAID BONUS EQUIVALENT TWO MONTHS SALARY.

2. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-300985
July 1967

TERMINATION AGREEMENT AND QUIT-CLAIM

I, THE UNDERSIGNED Luis Posada, HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE
(print your name)

THAT I HAVE BEEN RENDERING SERVICES TO AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE GOVERNMENT. I ACKNOWLEDGE FURTHER THAT MY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS TERMINATED AS OF THE DATE SET FORTH BELOW. I ACKNOWLEDGE FINALLY THAT I HAVE NO CLAIMS OF ANY KIND AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND DO NOT INTEND TO TENDER ANY CLAIMS NOW AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ARISING OUT OF MY PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES.

DATE 11 July-1967 Luis Posada
(write name longhand)

PLACE Miami-Fla-

WITNESSED Henry L. Pleetikoff

SECRETO

CONVENIO DE SECRETOS

1. YO, Luis Posada - HE RECIBIDO informaciones confidenciales y secretas sobre asuntos relacionados con mis labores en conexion con mi trabajo para el senor [illegible].

2. Juro ante Dios que nunca divulgare a nadie informacion que me ha confiado el senor [illegible], o cualquier persona colaborando o trabajando con el senor [illegible] o informacion de que me entere.

3. Tomo esta obligacion libremente sin reservacion mental ninguna.

Luis Posada
FIRMA

11 July-1967
FECHA Y CIUDAD

[illegible]
TESTIGO

SECRETO

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

11 July 1967

WIO-1502

TO : Chief of Station

THRU : DCOS/E
AC/IO

INFO : Chief, Finance
Chief, Cover
Chief, Security

FROM : IO/3/FLUSTIKOFF

SUBJECT: Proposed Termination Bonus for AMCLEVE/15

Distribution
1 - 201-300985
1 - C/FIN
1 - C/COV
1 - C/SEC
1 - IO/3 Chrono
1 - Registry

1. Pursuant to discussion with DCOS/E and the writer, JMWAVE plans to terminate AMCLEVE/15 effective 11 July 1967.

2. AMCLEVE/15 began employment with WOFACT during April 1965 and served as an instructor in the Maritime Training Section from July 1965 to 1 August 1966 when he was transferred to the CI Branch. AMCLEVE/15 was used by the CI Branch to report on the activities of RECE, a Miami based Cuban exile group, from 1 August 1966 until above termination date.

3. Approval is requested for a total of $650.00; minus FICA and federal income tax. AMCLEVE/15 will be paid $549.60 net.

APPROVED:
Mark F. EFFIELD

[illegible]

SECRET

ORIG: Robert Bladergroen:now
UNIT: OGC
EXT: 7531
DATE: 6 July 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 20

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: OGC 2 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 6 17 57Z CITE DIRECTOR 17267

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF A. JMWAVE 7953 (IN 02284)

B. DIRECTOR 16467

1. HQS AND JUSTICE CONCUR SUGGESTION REF A, PARA 5. MEETING WITH LOCAL LNERGO MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL ITS INVESTIGATION ROSENTHAL. JUSTICE HAS FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT STATION MIGHT WISH CONTACT MR. WALLACE JOHNSON, LOCAL REP, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION. BELIEVE THIS COULD BE HELPFUL TO DETERMINE NATURE AND EXTENT POSSIBLE WOFACT INVOLVEMENT IF AMCLEVE-15 USED AS WITNESS FOR PROSECUTION HOWEVER LEAVE DECISION RE THIS CONTACT TO STATION. JOHNSON'S OFFICES LOCATED FEDERAL COURT HOUSE.

2. NO OBJECTION IF INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTIVE ASPECTS ROSENTHAL MATTER DISCUSSED AT TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH LOCAL LNERGO AND JUSTICE REPS.

3. PLEASE KEEP HQS ADVISED DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM 3

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, OGC2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 062321Z CITE JMWAVE 8039

6 JUL 67 IN 06052

Action CT

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

RE DIRECTOR 16467

1. AT THEIR REQUEST JMWAVE MET WITH LOCAL FBI AND JUSTICE DEPT ATTORNEY ON 6 JULY TO DISCUSS FUTURE ACTION AMCLEVE-15 CASE. JMWAVE POSITION WAS TO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND AGREED UPON, SUBJECT TO OUR RESPECTIVE HQS CONCURRENCE.

A. JUSTICE ATTORNEY REQUESTED HAVE AMCLEVE-15 RECONTACT ROSENTHAL FOR MEET. MEET TO BE COVERED BY FBI AND POSSIBLY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. AMCLEVE-15 WILL ASK ROSENTHAL FOR MONEY FOR DOWN PAYMENT ON MATERIAL (C-4 EXPLOSIVES) TO BE FURNISHED, HOWEVER, NOTHING WILL BE FURNISHED AT THIS TIME. SUBSEQUENTLY ROSENTHAL WILL MEET WITH AMCLEVE-15, AT WHICH TIME ONLY SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES WILL BE FURNISHED TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATION, AFTER WHICH ROSENTHAL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15, WILL BE ARRESTED.

B. WITH REFERENCE TO ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE, NARCOTICS

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8039 S E C R E T SECRET

FUGITIVE, AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM TO EXHIBIT REQUESTED SILENCER, WHICH WILL NOT BE FURNISHED; THIS MEETING WILL BE COVERED BY BUREAU AGENTS AND FUGITIVE SURVEILLED TO DETERMINE RESIDENCE AND/OR ARREST, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15.

C. JUSTICE ATTORNEY CONDITIONS THE ACTION BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON THE BASIS THAT PROSECUTION WILL BE DISMISSED RATHER THAN RISK ANY POSSIBLE DISCLOSURE AS TO INVOLVMENT OF AMCLEVE-15 IN THIS MATTER.

D. FBI ALERTING AMCLEVE-15 TO MAKE ABOVE CONTACTS FOR FIRST PART OF NEXT WEEK.

2. JMWAVE WAS IN PROCESS OF TERMINATING AMCLEVE-15, BUT IN VIEW FBI NEED IN ABOVE OPERATION HE WILL BE RETAINED ON PAYROLL UNTIL 30 SEPTEMBER.

3. DIRECTOR 17267 JUST RECEIVED. GLAD TO SEE THAT WE ALREADY WERE ON HQS WAVE LENGTH.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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ACTION C/WH/COG 5

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR. C/WH 6 C/CI C/FI-2 OCC-2 DDP ADDP

SERVICE

JMWAVE 8039 PARA 1 — STA & NR

7 JULY 67 — DATE

06052 — IN NR

ACTION

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PORTION OMMITTED

"AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING AMCLEVE-15 OR HIS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND"

SECRET

14-00000

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RS ESC

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S E C R E T 062321Z CITE JMWAVE 8039

ACTION

6 JUL IN 6052

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

RE DIRECTOR 16467

Cable No 5838

Cable sec 9296 1833 Sig Center

CT

1. AT THEIR REQUEST JMWAVE MET WITH LOCAL FBI AND JUSTICE DEPT ATTORNEY ON 6 JULY TO DISCUSS FUTURE ACTION AMCLEVE-15 CASE. JMWAVE POSITION WAS TO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING ** PROPOSAL WAS REACHED AND AGREED UPON, SUBJECT TO OUR RESPECTIVE HQS CONCURRENCE.

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Source?

B. WITH REFERENCE TO ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE, NARCOTICS

SECRET

** PORTION OMITTED. Sentence should read: JMWAVE POSITION WASTO AGREE HAVE AMCLEVE-15 AID IN CASE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXPOSING AMCLEVE-15 OR HIS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT. THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL ....

FUGITIVE, AMCLEVE-15 WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM TO EXHIBIT REQUESTED SILENCER, WHICH WILL NOT BE FURNISHED; THIS MEETING WILL BE COVERED BY BUREAU AGENTS AND FUGITIVE SURVEILLED TO DETERMINE RESIDENCE AND/OR ARREST, WHEN SEPARATED FROM AMCLEVE-15.

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Harry — why not on FBI payroll? T

3. DIRECTOR 17267 JUST RECEIVED. GLAD TO SEE THAT WE ALREADY WERE ON HQS WAVE LENGTH.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

CBJ

ORIG: C. TRETTIN:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 5106
DATE: 1 JULY 67

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(classification)

1 16 50Z
(date and time filed)

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 16467

TO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLEVE-15

REF: JMWAVE 7953 (IN 02254)

APPRECIATE REF PROMPT RESPONSE. HQS WILL PROPOSE TO JUSTICE DEPT THAT ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ARISING LOCALLY BE DISCUSSED DIRECTLY BETWEEN FBI AND STATION REP. WILL ADVISE JMWAVE OF JUSTICE RESPONSE.

END OF MESSAGE

DC/WH/COG/CICS

OGC(R. BLADERGROEN IN DRAFT)

by

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Earl J. Williamson

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FID FILES REVIEWED 15 October 1969. Contained following info:

PICO Ramon, Reinaldo name contained in list of cubans traveling to Latin America in document dated 12 Sept. 1967. PICO had requested visa to travel to Honduras.from Guatemala. 15 day Honduran business visa authorized 30 August 1967.

OTHER TRAVEL NOTED IN FILE:

Travel FR/To	Message sent FR/to	Message Date
U.S./Brazil	Miami/Rio	14 August 1965
REMARKS: Visa REquested		
Chile/Venesuela	Caracas/San Juan	9 February 1965
REMARKS: 15 day tourist visa authorized provided he has reentry visa or visa to continue to another country.		
Vene.Chile	Santiago/Caracas	21 Jan. 1965
REMARKS: 15 day temporary resident visa authorized. He is a delegate to Executive Council of Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions to be held in Santiago first two weeks in February.		
U.S./Venezuela	~~Miami~~ Caracas/ Miami	14 Oct. 1964
REMARKS: 10 day tourist visa authorized at request ofXXXXXXXXXXXXX Confederaction Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Christianas provided bhey have re-entry or continuation visas.		
U.S./Dom. Rep.	Santo Dom/Miami	1 Aug 1964
Dominican Visa Authorized.		
U.S./Venezuela	Miami/Caracas	14 Jul 1964
REMARKS: 15 Day tourist visa authorized provided he has re-entry in into U.S. at request of Latin American Christian Trade Union Confederate.		

Travel Fr. To.	Message Sent FR/To	Message Date:
U.S./Venezuela	Caracas/Miami	10 March 1964
REMARKS: 1 Week tourist visa provided he has reentry to U.S.		
U.S./Venexuela	Caracas/Miami	2 March 1967
REMARKS 30 day tourist visa is authroized at the request of La Confederacion de Trabajodores de Venezuela.		

Helen H. Stilson
15 Oct. 1969

14-00000

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FILE VR RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DTDORIC JMDEVEL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; (IN 05005) OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6952
DATE: 15 October 1969

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INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, CI/CA

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CITE DIRECTOR 46526

TO PRIORITY [illegible] CARACAS 15 20 02Z OCT 69

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF A: HVCW-8792

REF B: DIR-42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 (PER PARA 3 [illegible] REF A) REQUEST PRIORITY FIELD TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4

WH/3/V

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C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CA/B4
H. Stilson 3 D 0119

EXTENSION: 1254

NO.:

DATE: 30 September 1969

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FI/D 7 B 44 Tube ES-1		7 OCT 1969	all
2. CI/OA	15 -	16 OCT 69	
3. CA/B4 3 D 0119 Tube EW-4 ~~H. Stilson~~			
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12.			
13.			
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15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

- Prev. green list was "operational." —

2-3: to attention in your fu.

nbs file

Rlo's 201

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

US/Venezuela   Caracas   2 Mar 67
Miami

30 day permit Visa in [illegible] at the request of La Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela

Form from/to   message from/to   msg date

Remarks

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN, SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
PICO Ramon, Reinaldo 201-[illegible]

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
/

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
21 July 1933, Regla, Havana

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Correspondent - Carcas
Daily "EXCELSIOR"

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Journalist

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK

DATE 30 Sep. 1969

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Helen H. Stilson
OFFICE DESIGNATOR CA/B4
ROOM, BUILDING 3 D 0119
EXTENSION R1254

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Former Chief CTC Youth Bureau Officer in National Transport Federation	Cuba	

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Member 26 July Movement later fought clandestinely against Castro in Cuba.

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'7"	155	Brown	Black	Latin	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Carmen

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Regino PICO; Mother: Maria de la Poz PICO

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
Please check for all available information.

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

7 OCT 1969
DATE

TO: H Stilson

FROM: FI/D

Results noted, 10 Oct 69
in CI/CA

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6952
DATE: 15 October 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

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BY 33 PER #

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: CAS
FILE, VR. RI/AN, CA/PEG, WH 8, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

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TO PRIORITY CARACAS 15 20 02 Z OCT 69 CITE DIRECTOR 46526

DTDORIC ~~JMDEVIL~~

REF A: HVCW-8792

REF B: DIR 42602

1. IN VIEW IMMINENCE QUITO MEETING CITED REF A, AND PROVIDED CARACAS DECISION IS AFFIRMATIVE ON FEASIBILITY OF HANDLING AMICE-31 (PER PARA 3 [illegible] REF A) REQUEST PRIORITY ~~FIELD~~ TRACES TO UPDATE A-31'S OA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 200-124-192/3.

C/CA/B4
WH/3/V
WH/CA

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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C/ AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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[illegible]

5831

AMICE-31

PICO Ramon, Reinaldo 201-284658 C-85445

WU

DPOB: 21 July 33, Regla, Havana

POA req 3 Jun 64 - WAVE 7146 - CA ops.

WH/SA/EOB/PA-PROP (Ott) DL-11 June 64

FLUTTERED ON [illegible]

[illegible]

PRQ Part I PRQ Part II

UFGA-19701 UFGA-19701

3 Feb. 65 3 Feb. 65

P. O. A. granted

POA ISSUED UNTIL 26 April 1965 Date 15 June '64

POA CANCELLED 60 day [illegible] [illegible] Field Advised

15 Jan 65

/31/CA

TO : [illegible] DATE. 17 Sept 65

FROM : [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible] -31 CA

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION CA/04

INFO

SECRET

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VR. FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, WE 6, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, FI

R I COPY

S E C R E T 252120Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 7479

25 [illegible] 66739

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF DIR 79563

AN		FS	
		FI	DESTROY
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX	

1. DETAILS AMICE-31 RECRUITMENT AND PRQ DATA BEING FORWARDED UFGA 19590. ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE AND SUBJ RESPONSIVE REF OP.

2. PLAN HANNDLE A-31 INITIAL PERIOD PRIMARILY THROUGH AMICE-3 AND AMOT-20, AMICE OFFICIALS. IF A-31 GETS ONE OF REF TARGET POSITIONS, PROPOSE UNILATERAL HANDLING BY KUBARKER AND GRADUAL SEPARATION FROM AMICE EXCEPT NOMINAL COVER TIES.

3. A-31 LEFT 22 JAN PRIOR RECEIPT REF. DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET GUIDANCE (ESPECIALLY SINCE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT JOB ONE HE MOST LIKELY BE OFFERED AND ACCEPT DUE PAST AMICE/CLASC DEALINGS), BONGIRNO WILL CONTACT A-31 CARA WHERE LATTER STOPPING EN ROUTE SAGO DISCUSS CIV SHIPPING BOYCOTT. BONGIRNO WILL PASS REF INSTRUCTIONS ON PRETEXT PROP JOB NOT PRODUCTIVE OR INFLUENTIAL.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 35

SECRET

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/B4
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

ROUTING

1		5	
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4		8	

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4 INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO SAGO PALP CITE DIR 79561

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

AN		RS	
		FI	~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT		INDEX	

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

END OF MESSAGE

WE/PO/D

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA

C/CA

RELEASING OFFICER [redacted] RI COPY COORDINATING OFFICERS [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER [redacted]

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MESSAGE FORM 34

46 SECRET

ORIG: William Brown/scr
UNIT: CA/B4
EXT: 6761
DATE: 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

R1 ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
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22 JAN 65 ... 33z

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO: SAGO PALP CITE DIR 69560

QRSNIPS PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 7250 (IN 62274) NOT SENT PALP

1. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE OPS USE AMICE-31 PER REF. REQUEST ASSESSMENT A-31, METHOD OF HANDLING, AND DEGREE HE RESPONSIVE. POA NOW BEING REINSTATED AND REQUEST STA FORWARD PRQ 1 AND 11 SOONEST.

2. IN VIEW NATURE CLASC EXEC MTG DO NOT EXPECT A-31 TO BE IN POSITION INFLUENCE THIS EVENT. FUTURE VALUE WILL DEPEND ON CLASC POSITION OBTAINED. SUGGEST FOLLOWING CLASC TARGETS AS KEY SECTORS FOR PENETRATION: TREASURY DEPARTMENT HEADED BY DI PACCE; OFFICE OF SEC GEN MASPERO; OFFICE OF PRES GOLDSACK. FYI SAGO NOW HAS PENETRATION IN CLASC HQS PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT THROUGH FUBIAS-7 (IDEN) AND DO NOT WISH DUPLICATE THIS CHANNEL. DEFER TO SAGO FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS A-31 USE.

3. IN A-31 BRIEFINGS DO NOT INDICATE SCOPE KUBARK INTEREST AND PROGRAMS RE CLASC.

4. REQUEST A-31 DEBRIEFING SAGO MTG. BE FORWARDED WHEN OBTAINED.

ROB	~~INT~~	SS	SB
	~~JOS~~	PERS	AR
~~WS~~	RPTM	LOU	CA
~~CI~~	SL	EP	EH
		SEC	BS

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PO/B ________

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA ________
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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE FORM 34

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/B4
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO 201-284658

4 SECRET

R ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO: SAGO PALP CITE DIR 79561

QRSHIPS PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

END OF MESSAGE

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
EOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SL	[illegible]	[illegible]
☐		[illegible]	[illegible]

WH/FO/B ______________

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

DC/WH/SA ______________
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/IOS - W. Ullery	NUMBER 201 - 284658
	SUBJECT PICO Ramon, Reinaldo
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 22 January 1965 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

POA reinstated until 26 April 1965 to allow for submission of PRQ Part I and PRQ Part II on Subject per WH/SA/IOS request of 22 January 1965.

201-284658

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 January 1965

SECRET

22 January 1965

~~MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,~~ [redacted]

SUBJECT: Reinaldo PICO Ramon
201-284658
C-85445

Please reinstate Subject's POA for 60 days. A PRQ Part I and II was requested from the Field on 22 January 1965 via cable.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH(SA)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/SA/IOS
~~1~~ - 201-284658

201-284658

14-00000

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FROM
JMWAVE

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CA/04

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S E C R E T 182223Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7251

19 JAN 65 IN 62266

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7250 (IN 62274)

IDEN: REINALDO (PICO) RAMON.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-284(
X-REF TO FILE NO. 200-124-5-17/49
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. William

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES ~~30~~

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FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
C/A/O 4

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UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO
VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, ZI/AN, CI/IC 2

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1P

SECRET 182223Z

19 JAN 65 IN 62274

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7250

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN ~~PBRUMEN~~

REF DIR 76863 *

AN	2	PS		
		23	FI	~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT		X	INDEX	

MICROFILMED
FEB 11 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLASC PROMISING HIRE AMICERS AFTER SOLUTION BUDGETARY PROBLEMS PRESUMALBY AT NEXT EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING. CLASC ALSO INDICATED CERTAIN AMICERS INCLUDING IDEN (ASSIGNED AMICE-31) WELCOME ABOARD NOW IN ANTICIPATION SALARY FUNDS WITHIN FEW MONTHS.

2. PLAN HAVE A-31 ACCEPT OFFER AND ALSO PERSONAL INVITATION ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING SAGO. A-~~13~~ 31 WILL BE INSTRUCTED PENETRATE CLASC FOR JOINT AMICE/KUBARK PURPOSES:

A. REPORT DETAILS CLASC STRUCTURE, BIODATA AND INTER-RELATIONSHIPS KEY PERSONNEL.

B. ASSESS EXTENT SUCCESS COMMUNIST FAR LEFTIST ATTEMPTS ~~TRUN~~ TURN CLASC AGAINST U.S. THEREBY UNDERMINING HEMISPHERIC ANTI-CASTRO SOLIDARITY.

C. MANEUVER INTO POSITION SPOT AND EXPOSE OR NEGATE ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND BRING CLASC MORE IN LINE MUTUAL GOALS.

3. A-31 ETD 21 JAN. INDEX.

* RE OP TO UNDERMINE MASPERO STATURE IN CLASC, AND THUS SET STAGE FOR HIS REPLACEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

201-284(
19 Jan 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 January 1965 jb

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH/SA/IOS

ATTENTION: Wendell Ullery

C# 201 - 284658

The file on PICO Ramon, Reinaldo is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

WAVE 7146

60 day reinstatement requested on 22 Jan 65

201-284658

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 12-63 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

[illegible]

(9)

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief, WH

X

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

TYPIC/AMSAFE
Request for HQ Intercession to Facilitate Entry of Identity A

AR: See Paragraph below

1. Identity A, who is the mother of AMICE/31, a Station asset, has been twice denied permission to enter the United States as a refugee from Cuba. The local ODURGE office has stated that Identity A has been placed on a denied admissions list because of information supplied by ODACID.

2. According to AMICE/31, Identity A applied for admission to the United States with her daughters, Identities B and C. Identities B and C received the necessary authorization on 24 February 1966 from the Swiss Embassy and arrived in the United States by air on 28 February.

3. Identity A was the wife of Identity D, a member of the Cuban Communist Party for some twenty years, at the time of her first application to leave Cuba. Identity D died in October of 1965 and according to AMICE/31 lost his Communist Party membership card about a year prior to his death. According to AMICE/31, Identity A has never joined or been a member of the Communist Party although there is a possibility that her husband may have placed her name on the membership lists. AMICE/31 also stated that she has long been a practicing Catholic and that she is very anti-Communist. Sent as separate cover attachments are two statements from the Bishop of Cienfuegos and the Assistant Bishop of Havana testifying to her good character and to her standing as a practicing Catholic.

- Continued -

Attachments:
1. Identities, USC
2. Letters, USC

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts USC

4. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate ODACID and ODURGE officials for the purpose of removing Identity A's name from the denied admissions list since her close connection with a member of the Cuban Communist Party, which presumably was the basis of the derogatory information, is no longer a fact.

Philip G. ELMARD

A. Maria de la Paz RAMON Rodriguez de PICO
Calle Fomento No. 506 Rpto Palatino, Cerro
Havana, Cuba
DOB: 14 Nov. 1912
POB Lima, Peru
Peruvian citizen

B. Regino Pico Valiente
C. Sonia Pico Ramon
D Milagros Pico Ramon

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
C AMICE/31

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA-19701

Subject was granted an OA on 4 February 1966.

HOWARD R. COLLEARY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-5818 HS COPY

DATE: [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-284658

1 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - 201-284658

RL

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/C/RR/OS	W. J. Ellery	jln	9 Feb. 66	7646

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/C/RR/OS	9 Feb 66	J. Houghtan
WH/C/CA/PP		S. Chaconas
WH/C/MO		R. Ortman (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/C/WHD	[illegible]	John [illegible]

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, WH/SA

FROM
COS, Brussels

SUBJECT
Cuban Travel

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: OBBT-2238, 4 August 1965

Attached is Cuban travel information received from NIGALE during August.

Diena G. WIGZELL

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE (w/att)
1 - Chief, WH/SA (w/o att)
2 - Brussels (w/o att)

PROCESSED
[illegible]

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OBBT-2275	3 September 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	CONFIDENTIAL	FF-5231



AMBASSADE DE BELGIQUE A SANTIAGO DU CHILI
VAN BELGIE TE
de Bélgica a

Modelo 1B

N°

BULLETIN DE RENSEIGNEMENTS
POUR L'OBTENTION D'UN VISA DE PASSEPORT

STAAT VAN INLICHTINGEN
TOT HET BEKOMEN VAN EEN PASPOORTVISUM

FORMULARIO DE INFORMES
PARA OBTENER LA VISACION DE UN PASAPORTE

Annexes
Bijlagen
Anejos

Identite de la personne qui sollicite le visa : (Grands Caractères)

Identiteit van de persoon die het visum aanvraagt : (Blokletters)

Identidad del (de la) solicitante (letra de imprenta)

BELF Z 412

RE

Nature et durée du visa / **Aard en duur van het visum** / Naturaleza y duración de la visación:

Nom (1) / **Naam** / Apellido: PICO RAMON

Prenoms / **Voornamen** / Nombres: Reinaldo

Lieu et date de naissance / **Plaats en datum van geboorte** / Lugar y fecha de nacimiento: La Havane, Cuba, 21-7-1933

Nationalité d'origine / **Oorspronkelijke nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad de origen: cubaine

Nationalité actuelle / **Huidige nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad actual: cubaine

Etat civil (célibataire, marié, veuf, divorcé) / **Burgerlijke staat (ongehuwd, gehuwd, weduwnaar, weduwe, gescheiden)** / Estado civil (soltero, casado, viudo, divorciado): célibataire

Nom du pere / **Naam van de vader** / Nombre del padre: Regino PICO

né à / **geboren te** / nacido en: La Havane, *le* / **de** / el: 17-7-1909

Nom de la mère / **Naam van de moeder** / Nombre y apellido de la madre: Maria de la Paz RAMON

née à / **geboren te** / nacido en: Lima, Pérou, *le* / **de** / el: 14-11-1912

Voyage-t-il (elle) seul(e)? / **Reist hij (zij) alleen?** / Viaja solo(a)?: oui

Identité du conjoint : (Grands Caractères)

Identiteit van de echtgenoot of echtgenote : (Blokletters)

Identidad del conyuge (letra de imprenta)

Nom (1) / **Naam** / Apellido:

Prenoms / **Voornamen** / Nombres:

Lieu et date de naissance / **Plaats en datum van geboorte** / Lugar y fecha de nacimiento:

Nationalité d'origine / **Oorspronkelijke nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad de origen:

Nationalité actuelle / **Huidige nationaliteit** / Nacionalidad actual:

Epoux ou épouse, veuf ou veuve, divorcé ou divorcée de

Echtgenoot of echtgenote of weduwe weduwnaar gescheiden van

Casado o casada con, viudo o viuda, divorciado o divorciada de

Date de mariage / **Datum van het huwelijk** / Fecha en que contrajo matrimonio:

Nom du pere / **Naam van de vader** / Nombre del padre:

né à / **geboren te** / nacido en: *le* / **de** / el:

Nom de la mère / **Naam van de moeder** / Nombre y apellido de la madre:

née à / **geboren te** / nacido en: *le* / **de** / el:

Photographie du conjoint s'il accompagne (A attacher)

Foto van de echtgenoot (de echtgenote) indien hij (zij) medereist (vasthechten)

Reservado para la fotografia del conyuge si lo acompaña

---

(1) *A inscrire en caractères romains. S'il s'agit d'une épouse ou d'une veuve ou d'une divorcée indiquer également le nom de jeune fille*

(Extract)

[illegible] 201 -
[illegible]

Verblijfplaats 1545 S.W. 125t MIAMI, Florida, E.U.

Profession habituelle
Gewoon beroep commerçant
Profesion habitual

Durée du séjour en Belgique
Duur van het verblijf in België 10 jours
Tiempo de permanencia en Belgica

Motif exact du voyage
Juiste reden van de reis assister au Conseil M... C.I.S.C.
Finalidad exacta del viaje

Le départ est-il déterminé par une cause politique, raciale ou idéologique?
Vindt het vertrek plaats om politieke, rassenpolitieke of ideologische redenen? non
Es la salida originada por un motivo politico, ideologico o racial?

Séjournerez-vous en Belgique comme réfugié politique? Motifs?
Zult U in België verblijven als politiek vluchteling? Redenen? non
Permanecera en Belgica en calidad de refugiado politico? Indicar los motivos

Mode de transport utilisé
Gebruikt vervoermiddel avion
Modo de transporte que se usa

Date d'entrée en Belgique et adresse complète pendant la durée du séjour
Datum van aankomst in België en volledig adres tijdens het verblijf 12 octobre 1965
Fecha de entrada en Belgica y direccion completa en el tiempo de permanencia en Belgica
78, Boulevard Poincaré, Bruxelles

Nom, prénoms, adresses complètes des personnes à visiter
Naam, voornamen, volledig adres der te bezoeken personen
Apellido, nombres y direccion completa de las personas que se visitarán
Auguste VANISTENDAEL, 78, Boulevard Poincaré, Bruxelles
Monseigneur J. CARDYN ... i..

Indication de l'autorité qui a délivré le passeport, date, numéro et durée et validité
Aanduiding der overheid die het paspoort heeft afgeleverd, datum, nummer en geldigheidsduur
Indicar la repartición que ha extendido el pasaporte, fecha, numero y termino de validez
La Havane, Cuba, 18-10-1963.- N° 267730

Prénoms et âge des enfants qui accompagnent
Voornamen en leeftijd der kinderen die medereizen
Nombres y edad de los hijos que lo acompañan

Références (nom et adresse des personnes citées)
Referenties (naam en adres der vermelde personen)
Referencias (nombre y direccion de las personas que cito)
Auguste VANISTENDAEL, Sec. Général de C.I.S.C.
Monseigneur Joseph CARDYN, Assesseur de la J.O.C.

Fait à / **Gedaan te** / Extendido en Santiago-du-Chili *le* / **de** / el 11 août 1965.

(Signature du requérant)
(Handtekening van de aanvrager),
(Firma del solicitante)

Reinaldo Pico

Avez-vous déjà résidé en Belgique? Quand?
Hebt U reeds in België verbleven? Wanneer?
Ha residido ya Ud en Belgica? Cuando?

CONSIDÉRATIONS ET AVIS DE L'AGENT DIPLOMATIQUE ET CONSULAIRE
BESCHOUWINGEN EN ADVIES VAN DE DIPLOMATIEKE OF CONSULAIRE AMBTENAAR

A ... *le* ...
Te ... **de** ...

MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE
Ministerie van Justitie

3° Direction Générale
3° Algemene Directie

Administration de la Police des Étrangers
Bestuur der Vreemdelingenpolitie

N°
N°

Renvoyé à ...
Teruggezonden naar

Décision
Beslissing

Bruxelles, le ... 19 .
Brussel, de

Au nom du Ministre,
Namens de Minister,
Pour l'Administration de la Police des Étrangers
Voor het Bestuur der Vreemdelingenpolitie.

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
~~WH/C/RR/OA - W. Ullery~~
WH/C/CA/PP

NUMBER 201- 284658

SUBJECT AMICE/31

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
CIA

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Subject's POA is herewith extended until 30 September 1965 to allow additional time for the completion of the OA investigation.

File

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Edward P. Brown

201-284658

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	29 June 1965

SECRET

FORM 1-64 125

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 091736Z
SAGO INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0537
TYPIC MHVIPER
REF SAGO 9006 (IN 30977)

ABSTRACT

58

Pico-Ramos

9 APR 65 IN 42032

PREPARATORY SAGO TRIP AMICE-31 CABLED WENCESLAO MORENO AMICE COLLECTING FUNDS AMONG CUBAN EXILES FRO CHILEAN EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS AS DONATION PROPER AUTHORITIES THROUGH HIS FEDERATION. MORENO REPLIED WITH GRATITUDE. FUND APPEAL WILL NOTE 24-HOUR WORK STOPPAGE BY CHILEAN PORT WORKERS 24 FEB IN CONNECTION BOYCOTT MOVEMENT. HOPEFULLY AMICE WILL COLLECT SEVERAL HUNDRED DOLLARS WHICH WAVE MAY SUPPLEMENT TO ASSURE GOOD PUBLICITY ON A-31 ARRIVAL SAGO. WILL ADVISE ETA WHEN FIRM.

S E C R E T

CFN

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201-284658
9 April 1965

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~Chief, CI/OA~~

SUBJECT : AMICE/31
201-284658

Attached herewith are two copies of Subject's PRQ Part I and one copy of a PRQ Part II. An OA is requested.

John L. Hart
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

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201-284658

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201 No. 234658

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~WH/C/RR/CA - Wendell Ullery~~
WH/C/CA/PP

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ________

AMICE/31, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 16 February 1965.

F4F + file

Ref: UFGA-19701

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 4 February 1966 jab

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INFO

FILE VR

SECRET 051543Z JUNE 68 CITE CARACAS 9800

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

5 JUN 68 IN 25149

JMDEVIL AMICE

REF JMWAVE 2626 (IN 24511)

STATION CARACAS ESTIMATES AMICE-31 WOULD REQUIRE $500 PER MONTH PLUS HOUSING AND EDUCATION ALLOWANCES OVER AND ABOVE JMDEVIL OFFER IN ORDER ENABLE HIM LIVE EVEN MODESTLY HERE. ATTEMPTING COVER MONETARY SUPPLEMENT THIS MAGNITUDE COULD BE DIFFICULT. WHILE WE DO HAVE INTEREST IN MONITORING JMDEVIL, IT IS RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY IN TERMS LOCAL REQUIREMENTS AND STATION WILL TAKE IT ON ONLY IF HQS BELIEVES IT CONSTITUTES OVER-RIDING NATIONAL PRIORITY. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN COSTS AND COVER CONSIDERATIONS, HOWEVER, IS BALPA.

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S E C R E T 042025Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2626 4 JUN 68 IN 24511

CARACAS DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

JMDEVIL AMICE

FIA

1. DURING NINTH CONGRESS IN SANTO DOMINGO EMILIO MASPERO RENEWED AN OFFER TO AMICE-31 OF A POSITION IN THE CLASC OFFICES IN CARACAS AT A SALARY OF $400 PER MONTH AND ONE WAY AIR FARE. AMICE-31 TOLD MASPERO THAT SALARY WAS NOT ENOUGH IN VIEW HIGH COST OF LIVING IN CARACAS BUT THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER AND GIVE ANSWER BY EARLY JUNE.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT AMICE-31 FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE BUT THIS SEEMS TO PRESENT WOFIRM AND OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR CLOSELY CLASC PLANNING AND DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENT ON OPERATIONAL NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF STATION CARACAS OFFERING AMCIE-31 SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MOVING FAMILY TO CARACAS AND SOME REGULAR SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME IF AND WHEN HE IN PLACE.

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Amice-31

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S E C R E T 241534Z MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5604

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE, BUENOS AIRES INFO MONTEVIDEO, LA PAZ

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

24 MAY 68 IN 17032

REF: BUENOS AIRES 0663 (IN 15743)

1. STATION INITIATED CONTACT WITH AMICE-31 ON 24 MAY FOR SHORT DEBRIEFING. DUE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NO ADDITIONAL CONTACT TO BE MADE. AMICE-31 TO PROVIDE COMPLETE DOCUMENTATION FROM CLASC EVENTS ON ARRIVAL JMWAVE 27 MAY.

2. MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT MEETINGS ACCORDING AMICE-31 COORDINATED EFFORT COMMENCING JUNE, WHICH FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO9II$.070), TO DEMAND RELEASE ALL LABOR AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN LATIN AMERICA. CLASC ALREADY SENT CABLE TO BARRIENTOS IN BOLIVIA DECRYING HIS TREATMENT ORGANIZED LABOR. THESE EFFORTS TO CONTINUE DURING ENTIRE ANNIVERSARY YEAR OF ILO AND PER AMICE-31 COULD WELL BE SOURCE OF DISCOMFORT TO MAJORITY LATIN GOVERNMENTS.

3. SINGLE CENTRAL OF LABOR DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS BUT NOT YET FIRMED UP. PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL TO BE ESTABLISHED, PROBABLY IN CARACAS WITH PRATAS OF URUGUAY AS

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FILE, VR

PAGE 2 SANTO DOMINGO 5604 SECRET

HEAD. MASPERO LIKELY TO BE NAMED AS SECRETARY GENERAL FOR COMMITTEE. AMICE-31 SAID THAT INCLUSION COMMUNISTS IN CENTRAL NOT BROACHED AND HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IT LIKELY IN LIGHT STRONG ATTACK MADE BY MASPERO AGAINST COMMUNISTS DURING SESSIONS. AT ANY RATE, EMPLEMENTATION THIS CONCEPT DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

4. AMICE-31 COMMENTED THAT MOST OUTSPOKEN OPPONENTS OF U.S. DURING GATHERINGS HAVE BEEN RAIMUNDO ONGARO OF ARGENTINA AND GALLO OF URUGUAY; HOWEVER, BASIC TENOR ENTIRE GROUP STRONGLY ANTI-US.

5. FOR BUENOS AIRES: POUCHING TAPE 19 MAY TV SHOW IN WHICH ONGARO VIOLENTLY ATTACKED U.S. WHILE PRAISING CUBA.

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

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5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

PICO RAMON, REINALDO	200-124-052
201-284658	HDCA-07090
SEX M DOB ?	15 MAY 68
	P10

CIT ?
OCC ?
DELEGATE TO IX CLASC COUNCIL CELEBRATED IN
SANTO DOMINGO FROM 13-17 MAY 1968

R 6806030162

FILE IN 201-284658

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [illegible]

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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17-46?

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SECRET 101604Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2352

10 MAY 68 IN 08270

PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: SANTO DOMINGO 5478 (IN05810)

AMICE-31 (IDEN) ETA SANTO DOMINGO 1715 HOURS (LOCAL) DOMINICANA FLIGHT NO. 301 ON 11 MAY.

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 101605Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2353

PRIORITY SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 2352 (IN 08270)

IDEN: REINALDO PICO.

S E C R E T

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10 MAY 68 IN 08272

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S E C R E T 072104Z MAY 68 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 5478

7 MAY 68 IN 05810

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

PERUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REF: A. SANTO DOMINGO 5469 (IN 59355)

B. JMWAVE 2310 (IN 50038)

1. INSTRUCT AMICE/31 CALL 94141 EXTENTION 332 AND ASK FOR JOSE. MEETING TO TAKE PLACE ONE HOUR BEFORE TIME MENTIONED ON TELEPHONE AT INTERSECTION GEORGE WASHINGTON AVENUE, WHICH PARALLELS SEA, AND PALO HINCADO. LARGE OBELISK IN MIDDLE GEORGE WASHINGTON AT THIS INTERSECTION. CASE OFFICER TO PICK UP AMICE/31 IN FADED MAROON AMERICAN RAMBLER WITH PRIVATE PLATES. HAVE AMICE/31 CARRY COPY "EL CARIBE", LOCAL MORNING DAILY, IN LEFT HAND.

2. PLS PROVIDE IDENTITY AMICE/31.

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INFO: FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, CA 2, CA/PROP.

S E C R E T 062217Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2309

IN-05035

7 MAY 68

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1346 (IN 55924)

1. AMICE-31 REPORTS THAT FOLLOWING CUBAN EXILES INVITED ATTEND NINTH CLASC CONSEJO IN SANTO DOMINGO:

REINALDO PICO-SECRETARY GENERAL OF CLASC AFFILIATE ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA DE TRANSPORTE (ORT) AND ALSO REPRESENTING MIAMI-BASED SOLIDARIDAD DE TRABAJADORES CUBANOS (STS). OFFICIAL DELEGATE WITH RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

NELSON (DIAZ) FERNANDEZ-SECRETARY GENERAL OF STC. OFFICIAL DELEGATE WITH RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

JUAN A. WOODS-FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA (JOC) NOW RESIDING NEW YORK. FULL PARTICIPATION AND VOTE.

ALBERTO CAO-FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING SANTO DOMINGO. TO ATTEND AS FRATERNAL DELEGATE ONLY. NO VOTE.

RAMON (GARCIA) TOME--FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING PUERTO RICO. NO VOTE.

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PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2309 SECRET

LAZARO MIRANDA-FORMER JOC MEMBER NOW RESIDING NEW YORK. NO VOTE.

EDUARDO (GARCIA) MAURE-ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF CLASC. RIGHT HAND MAN OF EMILIO MASPERO.

CARLOS MORIS-MEMBER OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS-MEMBER OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. CLASC DIRECTOR OF WORKER EDUCATION.

2. THE THREE MEMBERS OF CLASC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL HAVE RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION BUT NO VOTE. AMICE-31 SAYS THAT GARCIA AND MORIS ARE UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORTERS OF EMILIO MASPERO BUT THAT PLANAS WILL LIKELY REMAIN AL~~U~~OOF FROM DEBATE. AMICE-31 REPORTS THAT OTHER CUBANS AMONG DELEGATES TEND TO BE ANTI-MASPERO AND THAT THEIR BASIC ORIENTATION IS ANTI-CASTRO AND ANTI-COMMUNIST. THEIR MAIN CONCERN WILL BE THAT CUBAN EXILES ARE NOT UNDERCUT BY ANY CLASC DEAL WITH LA COMMUNIST UNIONS.

3. AMICE-31 FURTHER REPORTS THAT ALL OF THE ABOVE NAMED CUBANS WILL CAUCUS IN SANTO DOMINGO IN EFFORT FIND COMMON BASIS FOR PRESENTING PROGRAM TO CLASC ON BEHALF ALL

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PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2329 S E C R E T

CUBAN EXILES. THIS TO INCLUDE OPPOSITION TO IDEA OF FRENTE SINDICAL LATIONO AMERICANO. CHAIRMAN OF THE CAUCUS WILL PROBABLY BE PLANAS WHO HIGHLY REGARDED AND RESPECTED BY GARCIA MAURE AND MORIS. AMICE-31 DOUBTS POSSIBILITY OF UNANIMITY BUT THINKS THAT ANTI-MASPERO CUBAN CONTINGENT CAN CARRY THE DAY IN THE CAUCUS. AMICE-31 BELIEVES THAT PICO WILL CONTROL VOTES OF DIAZ AND WOODS AND THAT CAO, GARCIA TOME AND MIRANDA WILL PROBALY GO ALONG WITH THEM. THEY ALSO COUNT ON AT LEAST TACIT SUPPORT FROM PLANAS WHO VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST.

4. JMWAVE STATION TRACES AS FOLLOWS:

ALBERTO CAO-PROBALY IDENTICAL WITH ALBERTO (CAO) HERRERA, CUBAN NEGRO WHO ACCORDING AMBLESS-1 DEBRIEFING REPORT WAS LAST PRESIDENT OF JOC IN CUBA. MEMBER OF CATHOLIC LEFT WHO SELECTED TO GO TO ICFTU CONFERENCE IN VIENNA, JULY 1963. CALLED EXPERT IN YOUTH PROBLEMS AND "NICE PERSON WITH PRINCIPLES AND GOOD FAITH".

NELSON (DIAZ) FERNANDEZ-AMOT REPORT OF JULY 1961 LISTS SUBJECT AS INFORMER AND VOLUNTARY COLLABORATOR WITH CASTRO REGIME. AMRAZZ-1 REPORTS OF JULY 1966 LIST SUBJECT

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PAGE-4 JMWAVE 2309 SECRET

AS MEMBER OF LEFTIST CUBAN EXILE GROUP CALLED "NUEVA GENERACION". SOME AMONG GROUP ARE ANTI-U.S., ACCORDING TO AMICE-31.

LAZARO MIRANDA-WORKED WITH MANUEL ARTIME IN SIERRA MAESTRA ACCORDING TO REPORT DATED MAY 1960. WELL THOUGHT OF BY ARTIME. NO TRACES ON JUAN A. WOODS OR RAMON (GARCIA) TOME.

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S E C R E T 062117Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2310

SANTO DOMINGO INFO DIRECTOR, CARACAS

7 May 68 IN 05038

PBRUMEN JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. JMWAVE 2309 (IN 05035)

B. SANTO DOMINGO 5099 (IN 59355)

1. AMICE-31 WILL ATTEND CLASC CONSEJO BEGINNING 13 MAY IN SANTO DOMINGO. WILL FORWARD ETA WHEN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FIRM.

2. IT IS AMICE-31 UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL DELEGATES TO BE HOUSED TOGETHER IN INFA. IF SO, THIS FACT, COUPLED WITH PROBABILITY THAT SEVERAL PBRUMEN EXILES WILL TRAVEL AND STICK TOGETHER (SEE REFERENCE A), MAKES IT DIFFICULT LAY ON CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FROM THIS END. REQUEST THAT SANTO DOMINGO STATION PROVIDE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAME BY MEANS WHICH AMICE-31 CAN INITIATE CONTACT. AMICE-31 WILL GIVE HIS NAME SAYING HIS "AMIGO DE MAIRO EN MIAMI". FYI AMICE 31 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH.

3. AMICE 31 BELIEVES THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN EXPLAINING SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL. EACH CLASC AFFILIATE RESPONSIBLE FOR FINANCING DELEGATE TRAVEL AND IN PRACTICE THIS

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PAGE-2 JMWAVE 2310 S E C R E T

MEANS THAT HERE EACH DELEGATE IS MAKING HIS OWN PRIVATE COLLECTION AMONG FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES, AND CONCERNED PBRUMEN EXILES. JMWAVE PLANS TO PROVIDE AMICE-31 WITH $250 TO INCLUDE ROUND TRIP TRAVEL AND ALL EXPENSES.

S E C R E T

BT

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

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INFO
VR. FILE, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, WE6, WH/SA8, DDP, WH7, FI

Bill Brown.

S E C R E T 252120Z

25 Jan 65 IN 66739

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 7479

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

REF DIR 79560

201-311333 Orestes Ruiz Rios

201-288243 Mario Fontela

1. DETAILS AMICE-31 RECRUITMENT AND PRQ DATA BEING FORWARDED UFGA 19590. ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE AND SUBJ RESPONSIVE REF OP.

2. PLAN HANNDLE A-31 INITIAL PERIOD PRIMARILY THROUGH AMICE-3 AND AMOT-20, AMICE OFFICIALS. IF A-31 GETS ONE OF REF TARGET POSITIONS, PROPOSE UNILATERAL HANDLING BY KUBARKER AND GRADUAL SEPARATION FROM AMICE EXCEPT NOMINAL COVER TIES.

3. A-31 LEFT 22 JAN PRIOR RECEIPT REF. DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET GUIDANCE (ESPECIALLY SINCE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT JOB ONE HE MOST LIKELY BE OFFERED AND ACCEPT DUE PAST AMICE/CLASC DEALINGS); BONGIRNO WILL CONTACT A-31 CARA WHERE LATTER STOPPING EN ROUTE SAGO DISCUSS CTV SHIPPING BOYCOTT. BONGIRNO WILL PASS REF INSTRUCTIONS ON PRETEXT PROP JOB NOT PRODUCTIVE OR INFLUENTIAL.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

Pico
201-251658

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Santiago

ACTION WH-8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA-8, CA-2, CA/O-2, WE-4, CI, CI/OPS, FI

25 Jan 65 IN 66678

S E C R E T 252222Z

WAVE INFO PALP DIR CITE SAGO 8628

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

CLASC OFFICES GOLDSACK MASPERO AND DI PACCE ARE SMALL ONE-TWO MAN UNITS USUALLY INCLUDING OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FEMALE SECRETARY. UNLESS AMICE-31 HAS ACCESS TOP LEVEL CLASC OFFICIALS AND STRONG CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BACKGROUND SAGO DOUBTS IF HE CAN OBTAIN HIGH LEVEL JOB OR INFLUENCE CLASC EXEC MTG. BELIEVE BEST WAIT UNTIL DEBRIEFING AND SEE WHAT TYPE JOB CLASC OFFERS. SAGO CAN MONITOR A-31 ACTIVITIES SAGO THRU FUBIAS-7. IMPORTANT TO NOTE MASPERO VERY SUSPICIOUS ANY PBRUMEN EXILE CONTACT PAST OR PRESENT WITH ODYOKE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 34

ORIG William Brown/scr
UNIT CA/34
EXT 6761
DATE 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

46 SECRET

RJ ROUTING

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TO JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM DIRECTOR

25 JAN 1965

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, C/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

TO WAVE INFO: SAGO PALP CITE DIR 79561

QRSHIPB PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 79560

IDEN: ENRIQUE VILLARREA (CUBAN)

END OF MESSAGE

WE/PO/B ______________

WHSA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

201-284658

DC/WH/SA ______________
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA ______________
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM 34

46 SECRET

ORIG : William Brown/scr
UNIT : CA/B4
EXT : 6761
DATE : 22 January 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-284658

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☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

2 JAN 65 23 33 z

TO : JMWAVE SANTIAGO PARIS/LCPIPIT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CA/O 4

INFO : VR, FILE, CA 2, WH 7, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 6, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

RI COPY

TO WAVE INFO SAGO PALP CITE DIR

QRSNIPE PBRUMEN

AN	E	PS		64154
PALP		ED		DESTROY.
ABSTRACT		X	INDEX	

79560

22 January 1965

REF: WAVE 7250 (IN 62274) NOT SENT PALP

1. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE OPS USE AMICE-31 PER REF. REQUEST ASSESSMENT A-31, METHOD OF HANDLING, AND DEGREE HE RESPONSIVE. POA NOW BEING REINSTATED AND REQUEST STA FORWARD PRQ 1 AND 11 SOONEST.

2. IN VIEW NATURE CLASC EXEC MTG DO NOT EXPECT A-31 TO BE IN POSITION INFLUENCE THIS EVENT. FUTURE VALUE WILL DEPEND ON CLASC POSITION OBTAINED. SUGGEST FOLLOWING CLASC TARGETS AS KEY SECTORS FOR PENETRATION: TREASURY DEPARTMENT HEADED BY DI PACCE; OFFICE OF SEC GEN MASPERO; OFFICE OF PRES GOLDSACK. FYI SAGO NOW HAS PENETRATION IN CLASC HQS PRESS AND PROPAGANDA DEPT THROUGH FUBIAS-7 (IDEN) AND DO NOT WISH DUPLICATE THIS CHANNEL. DEFER TO SAGO FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS A-31 USE.

3. IN A-31 BRIEFINGS DO NOT INDICATE SCOPE KUBARK INTEREST AND PROGRAMS RE CLASC.

4. REQUEST A-31 DEBRIEFING SAGO MTG. BE FORWARDED WHEN OBTAINED.

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PO/B [redacted]

WESA/MB J Ott coordinated in draft

201-284658
22 Jan. 65

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DC/WH/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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FROM JMWAVE

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TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, Z/AN, CI/IC 2

Bill Burch

Art F.

S E C R E T 182223Z

19 Jan 65 IN 62274

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7250

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF DIR 76863 *

1. PAST SEVERAL MONTHS CLASC PROMISING HIRE AMICERS AFTER SOLUTION BUDGETARY PROBLEMS PRESUMABLY AT NEXT EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING. CLASC ALSO INDICATED CERTAIN AMICERS INCLUDING IDEN (ASSIGNED AMICE-31) WELCOME ABOARD NOW IN ANTICIPATION SALARY FUNDS WITHIN FEW MONTHS.

Bill; Per our discussion, be sure you are convinced this guy is right for job & completely trustworthy. [illegible]

Bill

2. PLAN HAVE A-31 ACCEPT OFFER AND ALSO PERSONAL INVITATION ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMMITTEE MEETING SAGO. A-13 WILL BE INSTRUCTED PENETRATE CLASC FOR JOINT AMICE/KUBARK PURPOSES:

A. REPORT DETAILS CLASC STRUCTURE, BIODATA AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS KEY PERSONNEL.

3. ASSESS EXTENT SUCCESS COMMUNIST FAR LEFTIST ATTEMPTS TURN CLASC AGAINST U.S. THEREBY UNDERMINING HEMISPHERIC ANTI-CASTRO SOLIDARITY.

C. MANEUVER INTO POSITION SPOT AND EXPOSE OR NEGATE ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND BRING CLASC MORE IN LINE MUTUAL GOALS.

3. A-31 ETD 21 JAN. INDEX.

* RE OP TO UNDERMINE MASFERRER STATURE IN CLASC, AND THUS SET STAGE FOR HIS REPLACEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

201-284658

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INFO VR. FILE, WH/SA 8, DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 182223Z

DIR INFO SAGO CITE WAVE 7251

19 JAN 65 IN 62266

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 7250 (IN 62274)

IDEN: REINALDO (PICO) RAMON.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

According to Official File Subject was Electrical Union leader in Cuba when Castro took over - Successfully fought Communist in his Union - Eventually left Cuba - became member of CUBAN forces and was captured during Bay of Pigs - One of Prisoners sent to negotiate for tractor deal in exchange for prisoners - Defected during negotiation trip - Used by WAVE in PW - member of FaRDC - POA expired 15 Jan because of failure to submit PRQ Part II - Jerry ott having POA Reinstated.

CB

21 Jan 65

Case Cancelled 15 Jan 65
WH/SA/IOS

Failure to submit Part II

WH/C

GG-1903

1154

201-001650

14-00000

SECRET

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WH 8

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IA, CI/IC 2, WE 6, DO 4, IO/WH 3

☐ ☐ ☐

S E C R E T 162204Z

IN 82295

DIR INFO WAVE CARA CITE SAGO 8749

REF: DIR 84546

DYVOUR PBRUMEN MHVIPER PSYCH

1. FUBIAS-7 AND AMICE/31 MADE TRIP TO VALPARAISO 13 FEB TOGETHER WITH GUILLERMO MARTINEZ OF CLASC. THEY ARRANGED WITH WENCELAO MORENO AVILA, VICE PRES ORIT AND SEC GEN CONFEDERACION MARITIMA DE CHILE (COMACH) TO HOLD BOYCOTT AGAINST ENGLISH, FRENCH AND SPANISH SHIPPING ON 24 FEB FOR 24 HR PERIOD IN SOLIDARITY WITH CTV. F-7 AND A-31 ARRANGED WITH EMILIO MASFERO, SEC GEN CLASC, TO APPROVE CLASC RESOLUTION JOINING COMACH IN BOYCOTT AND IN SUPPORT CTV.

2. STATION HAS COPY LETTER FROM MORENO TO CTV, OBTAINED THRU [illegible] OFFERING SUPPORT AND GIVING INFO ON BOYCOTT. SAGO PLANS USE LETTER AS PART MEDIA PROP BEGINNING 21 FEB. F-7 CLAIMS MORENO [illegible] BOYCOTT IN ALL CHILEAN PORTS. COMACH CONTROLS APPROX NINETY PER CENT OF MARITIME WORKERS OF CHILE.

3. STATION PROP ASSETS WILL GIVE MAX COVERAGE ORIT CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS PER PARA 2 REF.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

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TO: SANTIAGO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: CA/04

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TIME

BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA8, WH 7, CI/IC 2, CA 2, WEG

S E C R E T 122225Z

DIR INFO PALP WAVE BUEN CARA RIOD MEXI LIMA CITE SAGO 8737

DTDORIC ZRGAMIN

REF: SAGO 8707 (IN 77121)

12 FEB 65 IN 79831

1. FUBIAS-7 REPORTS AS OF 11 FEB MASPERO AND ALL EXEC SECS PRESENTED THEIR SPEECHES AND THAT DISCUSSIONS PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS NOW BEGUN ONE BY ONE. NO DISSENSION YET APPARENT AND ACCORDING EDUARDO GARCIA, APPEARS MASPERO TRYING TO APPEASE EVERYONE AND WILLING ACCEPT ALL RECOMMENDATIONS. DUE TO SLOW START MTG WILL EXTEND THRU 17 FEB. APPEARS GENERAL ATMOSPHERE CLOSED BUT MOST PROPOSALS ARE OPEN AND YET TO BE DISCUSSED.

2. F-7 SAID VANISTENDAEL CONVERSATIONS WITH MASPERO HAVE HELPED. VAN TOLD M ALL HIS BAD POINTS AND SAID CORRECT THEM OR AID WOULD CEASE. M ACCEPTED CRITICISM AND PROMISED REFORM.

3. FOR WAVE: AMICE-31 NOT SITTING IN ON CLOSED EXEC COMM MTG, ONLY ALLOWED SPEAK TO EXEC COMM ON RESOLUTION ESTABLISH FRATERNAL RELATIONS A-31 UNION AND CLASC. F-7 SAID MASPERO HAS GIVEN CONSENT TO RESOLUTION AND THINKS HIGHLY A-31. A-31 AND F-7 TRAVELING VALPARAISO WITH CLASC LDRS TO ORGANIZE MARITIME BOYCOTT, APPEARS CLASC WILLING HELP. A-31 ETD NOW 18 FEB.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Ackerman

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FROM [illegible]

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ACTION [illegible]

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INFO VR, FILE, [illegible] CA/O, CI/OA, [illegible] WH 7, SAS 6, C/IC 2,

[illegible] CI/OA

SECRET 110153Z

11 FEB 65 IN 78079

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE WAVE 8143

TYPIC QRSHIPE

REF SAGO 8703 (IN 77077)

1. WILL DEBRIEF AMICE-31 ON EXEC COMMITTEE MTG WHEN RETURNS WAVE.

2. A-31 SECGEN IDEN GROUP AND HIS REMARKS RE AFFILIATION REFER TO IDEN NOT AMICE.

SECRET

* AMICE-31 ASKED FUBIAS-7 FOR CONTACTS IN VALPO TO START STRIKE IN FAVOR PBRUMEN EXILES AND BAN PBRUMEN SHIPPING. SAID HE PLANS STRIKE WORK THRU ORIT.

[illegible]

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CA 2, CI/OA 4, WE 6, WH 7, SOD 6, CI/IC 2,

[illegible]

11 FEB 65 IN 78081

S E C R E T 112153Z

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE WAVE 8141

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF WAVE 8140 (IN 78079)

IDEN: ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA DE TRANSPORTE (ORT).

S E C R E T

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES 7 ☑ COPY ☐

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FROM: Santiago

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: WH/SA-5

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TIME | BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, CA-2, CA/O-4, WE-6, WH-7, SOD 6, C/CI 2, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI/OA

S E C R E T 092216Z

9 FEB 63 IN 77077

WAVE INFO DIR PALP CITE SAGO 8783

REF: WAVE 8029 (IN 53655) *

TYPIC QRSNIPE

ACCORDING FUBIAS-7, AMICE-31 ARVD SAGO 7 FEB AND STAYING HOTEL RITZ, F-7 SAID MASPERO APPARENTLY SENT CABLE AND INVITED A-31 TO ATTEND CLASC EXEC COMM MTG. A-31 TOLD F-7 HE ASKING FOR FRATERNAL AFFILIATION WITH CLASC AND PLANS TRAVEL LA VISITING VARIOUS MARITIME UNIONS AND TRY ENGAGE THEM WITH CLASC. A-31 ASKED F-7 FOR CONTACTS IN VALPO TO START STRIKE IN FAVOR PBRUMEN EXILES AND BAN PBRUMEN SHIPPING, SAID HE PLANS STRIKE WORK THRU ORIT. A-31 LEAVING SAGO 16-17 FEB FOR ANTOFAGASTA, LIMA AND BOGOTA.

S E C R E T

*Re KUBARK relationship with AMICE members

SECRET

201-281658

4/25 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM SANTIAGO

ACTION WH 8

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AT | TIME | BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, DO 4, CI/IC 3,

SECRET 022017Z

WAVE DIR INFO PALP LIMA [illegible] SGTO

REFS: A. SGTO 0621 (IN 66678)

B. WAVE 7253 (IN 62274)

2 FEB 65 IN 72335

[illegible] PBRUMEN

FUBIAS-7 [illegible] STATION 2 FEB THAT EMILIO MASFERRO, SECRETARY CLASC, TOLD HIM HE [illegible] FROM FORDC TO WORK IN CENTRAL AMERICA USING LABOR [illegible] UNDER [illegible] ALSO EXILE [illegible] CARIBBEAN AREA. [illegible] SAID HE AWARE [illegible] FOUR WITH KUBARK, BUT [illegible] FACT THEY WILL WORK FOR CLASC AND [illegible] SALARY PAID BY SOMEONE ELSE, H WILL ACCEPT THEM. H MENTIONED [illegible] FRANCISCO TORRES AND REINALDO [illegible] AMONG THOSE HE PLANS HIRE.

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: [illegible]

ACTION: [illegible]

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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TIME | BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH-7, CA-2, CA/[illegible], WE-6, CI/OA, CI/OPS, [illegible]

DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 070045Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 8329

7 FEB 65 IN 75365

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF A. SAGO 8679 (IN 72335)

B. SAGO 8628 (IN 66678)

1. MASPERO REF A STATEMENT RE KUBARK RELATIONSHIP FOUR AMICE MEMBERS PROBABLY REFERS IDEN A THROUGH D ON WHOM AMICE AND CLASC IN CORRESPONDENCE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. OF THESE ONLY IDEN A (AMICE-31) HAS DIRECT KUBARK RELATIONSHIP FOR FORMALIZED RECENTLY FOR QRSNIPE. IDEN B ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR RECRUITMENT, BUT NEVER CONTACTED. IDEN C NOT CONSIDERED AGENT CANDIDATE. HIS MAIN IMPORTANCE AS MULATTO SHOWN LATIN AMERICAN WORKERS CASTRO-COMMUNISM NOT HOPE OF COLORED PEOPLES. IDEN D OPERATIONALLY PREEMPTED BY OTHER ODYOKE AGENCY.

2. AMICE WAS MEMBER AMBUD WHICH HIGHLY PUBLICIZED AS ODYOKE SUBSIDY AT TIME ITS STORMY DEMISE, AND ONE OF FEW MEMBER ORGS STILL ACTIVE. ON THIS BASIS MASPERO PROBABLY CONCLUDES AMICE FUNDS FROM KUBARK. HOWEVER A-31 BRIEFED TO SAY AMICE OPERATING COSTS AND SALARIES COVERED BY DUES SEVERAL THOUSAND MEMBERS WHO ALSO OCCASIONALLY DONATE DAY'S PAY FOR SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND

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TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP WH-7 CA-2 CA/O-4 WE-6 CI/OA CI/OPS CI/IC-2, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 070345Z

DIR INFO SAGO PALP CITE WAVE 8030 7 FEB 65 IN 75364

TYPIC QRSNIPE

REF: WAVE 8029 (IN 75365)

IDENS: A. REINALDO PICO

B. FRANCISCO DE LA TORRE

C. LUIS MORENO

D. CONRADO RODRIGUEZ

S E C R E T

SECRET

[redacted]

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING		
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XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT DYVOUR/JMDEVIL/Operational
Transmittal of letter from Juan Carlos LOUREIRO to AMICE-31

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: None

Forwarded under separate cover for addressees' possible interest is a copy of a letter from Juan Carlos LOUREIRO, secretary-general of the Acción Sindical Argentina (ASA), to AMICE-31, regarding Argentine labor developments in the transport sector.

Philip G. ELMARD

MICROFILMED
JAN 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
copy of letter, USC

Distribution
3 - COS, Buenos Aires, w/att., USC
② - C/WH, w/att., USC
2 - WH/C, w/att., USC [illegible]

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
11 Jan 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 12 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26741

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-284658

CLASSIFICATION
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SEP. COV. ATT:
UFGA-26741

Buenos Aires, 10 de Diciembre de 1966

11 Jan 67

Companero
Reinaldo Pico Ramon
P.O.Box#3373
Miami 33101,Fla.

Querido Amigo:

Paso a contestar tu atenta nota de fecha 2 del actual.- Rapidamente, trataré de darte un panorama de lo que ocurre aquí y de algunas ideas para la FLAT.- Para mejor información tuya, te acompaño además un informe sobre la situación interna de la CGT Argentina y algunos problemas que nos afectan muy agudamente a los trabajadores de esta parte de Latinoamerica.-

1.- La huelga general de los obreros del puerto lleva ya al día de la fecha - 53 días de duración.- A pesar de la solidaridad que han recibido de muchos gremios y de todas las fuerzas populares, la situación de estos compañeros es muy dura.- Los motivos de la huelga los encontrarás en el informe adjunto.-

La ITF ha "recomendado" el boycott internacional en apoyo de los portuarios argentinos.- La medida es justa, pero ha resultado bastante limitada ya que no todos los sindicatos adheridos a la ITF lo han puesto en práctica, además en algunos lugares se aplicó mal, pues se boycoteaba a los barcos argentinos, pero no a los de otros banderas que venían con mercaderías de Argentina; esto no es eficaz y se presta a maniobras turbias.- YO ESCRIBI A LA CLASC y a la CISC pidiendo un apoyo decidido a los portuarios argentinos, pero aun no hemos recibido aquí la documentación sobre las medidas que hayan adoptada nuestras centrales internacionales.-

2.- Otro conflicto sumamente grave, es el que enfrentamos en este momento los ferroviarios.- El gobierno ha sancionado por ley un nuevo reglamento de trabajo que nos retrotrae a 50 años atrás en muchos aspectos; además el plan oficial prevé la reducción de los 25 talleras con 51 líneas de producción que existen, a solamente 19 talleros con 31 líneas de producción. Esto significa DESOCUPACION y además, perjudica al sistema ferroviario y al país.-

Es necesario presionar a la Federación Internacional de Sindicatos Cristianos del Transporte de la CISC, y a las organizaciones de base de la FLAT, para que se pronuncien tambien en este grave conflicto, crucial para el movimiento obrero argentino, YA QUE LA UNION FERROVIARIA ES EL SINDICATO MAS PODEROSO DE LA ARGENTINA.-

3.- La CCT Argentina se ha lanzado ya a un enfrentamiento abierto contra el gobierno militar de Onganía. El proximo miercoles 14 habra un paro general de 24 horas, como protesta contra el escandaloso aumento del costo de vida, contra el "arbitraje obligatorio" y en apoyo de los gremios en conflicto.-

MICROFILMED
JAN 18 1967
DOC MICRO SER

CS COPY

4.- En el aspecto interno de la FLAT, te diré que como secretario general, me he visto totalmente frenado por la falta de recursos, ya que ni para imprimir papel membretado tengo dinero.-

A pesar de esta dificultad, he tratado de hacer algunas tareas mínimas: enviar información a la CLASC y a la CISC sobre los problemas del transporte que existen en Argentina, y mantener un mínimo de cohesión y de organización del grupo de sindicalistas cristianos del transporte que actúan en mi pais.-

Lo que estoy necesitando, son las direcciones de las organizaciones afiliadas a la FLAT. En Panama no las tomé, porque se nos había prometido una lista completa de nombres y direcciones de todos los participantes del Congreso de CLASC; pero esto nunca llego.

5.- Estoy completamente de acuerdo contigo, en la necesidad de presionar al Buró y al Comité Ejecutivo de CLASC, para que pongan en marcha las FEDERACIONES PROFESIONALES.- Tambien deberán solucionar tu situación (es necesario que vengas a Latinoamerica), proveer de algunos recursos mínimos a la FLAT, y CONCRETAR DEFINITIVAMENTE EL CURSO-CONGRESO DEL TRANSPORTE.-

Siempre a tus órdenes, te saluda fraternalmente,

Juan Carlos Loureiro

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

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ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

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INFO FILE, RI, WH/C 8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT

PACY

S E C R E T 072230Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1175

RIO DE JANEIRO INFO DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY, SANTIAGO, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 2153 (IN 07329)*

8 OCT 66 12580

1. AMICE-31 REPORTED CLASC CONGRESS VOTED 6 OCTOBER TO AFFILIATE CSB. AT SAME TIME VOTED DECIDEDLY TO DISAFFILIATE "CIRCULO OBRERO" (A-31 COULD NOT IDENTIFY THIS ORGANIZATION AS CBTC BUT DESCRIBED IT AS "ORGANIZATION WHICH SUPPORTED MILITARY COUP OF CASTELO BRANCO IN BRAZIL"). SAID THEY WERE DISAFFILIATED FOR TAKING THIS POSITION. CIRCULO OBRERO REP ONLY HAD OPPORTUNITY TO PROPOSE CREATION OF A NEW ORGANIZATION WHICH CLASC COULD SUPPORT. WHEN ASKED WHETHER FIGHT ENDUED ON THIS ISSUE A-31 SAID NO. CONGRESS WAS IN AGREEMENT.

2. NO FURTHER DETAILS AT PRESENT. WILL ADVISE WHEN MORE INFO AVAILABLE.

*Not CBTC delegates to CLASC congress.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN	RI	11/7
ABSTRACT ✗	INDEX	

[illegible] RI [illegible]
8 Oct 66
201-284658

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ACTION WH 8

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UNIT

TIME 2115Z

BY D

INFO FILE VR CS/DO WH/C8 CA2 CA/PEG CA/PROP CA/O4 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 FI FI/SPG FI/INT CA/OA

S E C R E T 302044Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1109

30 SEP 66 IN 07300

IMMEDIATE JMWAVE INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: JMWAVE 3273 (IN 05352)

1. STATION SOURCE REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN, DIOGENES GUTIERREZ, STATED JMDEVIL CONGRESS PENETRATED BY US. SPECIFICALLY NAMED AMICE-31 SAYING A-31 WILL BE UNMASKED FROM CONGRESS PODIUM (ASSUMEDLY AT CONGRESS INAUGURATION 2 OCTOBER).

2. STATION HAS NO INDICATION WHAT EVIDENCE GUTIERREZ MIGHT POSSESS. A-31 CONTACTED STATION OFFICER BY PHONE EVENING 29 SEPTEMBER SAYING ONLY THAT HE WITH FRIENDS AND WOULD HAVE TO CALL AGAIN 0800 FOLLOWING MORN. DID NOT CALL FOLLOWING MORN (POSSIBLY DUE TO INOPPORTUNE SITUATION OF DELEGATE LODGING). NO MEETING WITH STATION YET EFFECTED.

3. EXPECT A-31 CALL AGAIN EVENING 30 SEPT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD WARN A-31 OF GUTIERREZ PLAN AND ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE WITH SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. HOWEVER WILL AWAIT JMWAVE CONCURRENCE BEFORE TAKING THIS COURSE. ALTERNATIVE IS TO HAVE A-31 WITHDRAWN FROM CONGRESS POSSIBLY SUFFERING

[illegible]

SECRET

30 Sep 66

PAGE 2 PANAMA CITY 1129 S E C R E T

ATTACK IN ABSENCIA. PLEASE ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE CABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

OCT 17 1 37 PM '66

RID/MI

OCT 19 5 45 PM '66

SECRET

XREF RYBAT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, C/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI/SPG

S E C R E T 302313Z CITE JMWAVE 3341

30 SEP 65 IN 07380

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC JMDEVIL

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1129 (IN 07300)*

AGREE PACY STATION PLAN TO ALERT AMICE-31 SOONEST OF PARA 1 REF REPORT IN ORDER ADVISE HIM PREPARE DEFENSE AND OBTAIN POSSIBLE SUPPORT OTHER DELEGATES. AMICE-31 AND HIS ORGANIZATION OFFICIALLY AFFILIATED TO JMDEVIL, AND WITH HIS RECEIVING LEITIMATE INVITATION TO ATTEND CONGRESS BELIEVE HE IN POSITION REBUT POSSIBLE CHARGES. SPECIFIC EXPOSE INFORMATION POSSIBLY POSSESSED BY GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN AT JMWAVE. OBVIOUS CHARGES WOULD PROBABLY EXPOSE AMICE-31 AS FORMER EXILE LABOR LEADER, WHO AMITE COLLABORATOR AND WHOSE ORGANIZATION IS MEMBER OF AMITE, WHICH GENERALLY VIEWED AS WOLADY-SUPPORTED ORGANIZATION.

S E C R E T

* REPORTED FITC SEC/GEN KNEW JMDEVIL CONGRESS FINANCED BY U.S.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

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INFO FILE VR WH/SA CI/OPS CI/OA

RAW

S E C R E T 281547Z CITE JMWAVE 3272

PRIORITY PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: PANAMA CITY 1070 [illegible] 87

1. AMICE/31 WILL MAKE CONTACT PER INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA ONE REF.

28 SEP 66 IN 05435

2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION OF AMICE/31 AS FOLLOWS: AGE 33 YEARS, BROWN EYES, BLACK HAIR, HEIGHT 5' 7", WEIGHT 155 POUNDS, SOLID BUILD, LIGHT SALLOW COMPLEXION, EVEN FEATURES. AMICE/31 FORMED JUVENTUD OBRERA CATOLICA, AND SERVED AS OFFICER IN NATIONAL TRANSPORT FEDERATION. WAS MEMBER 26 JULY MOVEMENT UNTIL 1960 WHEN JOINED ANTI-CASTRO UNDERGROUND AND CAME INTO EXILE. AMICE/31 IS ADHERENT OF CLASC POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND IS CONSIDERED BE PRO-MASPERO, WHOM HE VIEWS AS STRONG, EFFECTIVE LEADER.

AGE 33

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG : MR THOMAS J. FLORES
UNIT : C/WH/C
EXT :
DATE : 30 SEPT 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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1	C/WH/C	5	MO
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4	FI-TC	8	

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DISSEM BY 25 PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WH8, CI/OA, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 39752

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY, JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

REF PANAMA CITY 1109 (IN 07300)

SUGGEST AMICE-31 BE WARNED OF PLAN ATTACK HIM AND THAT HE PREPARE DEFENSE AS SUGGESTED REF. HOWEVER DEFER TO WAVE IF OTHER ALTERNATIVE APPEARS PREFERABLE.

SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER MR THOMAS J. FLORES C/WH/C

BT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-29[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 28

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FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, C/CA, FI, FI/INT, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4

PACY

S E C R E T 011742 CITE PANAMA CITY 1119

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

JMDEVIL

1 OCT 63 IN 07778

REF: A. PANAMA CITY 1103 (IN 07300)

B. DIRECTOR 39752

C. JMWAVE 3341 (IN 07380)

1. AMICE-31 ALERTED 30 SEPTEMBER RE POSSIBLE ATTACK. HE CONFIDENT GUTIERREZ COULD ONLY MAKE OBVITUS CHARGES MENTIONED REF C. BELIEVES REAL SOURCE OF PROBLEM IS PERSONAL. A-31 DISLIKES GUTIERREZ WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS TOO SOFT ON COMMUNISTS. APPARENTLY THIS DISLIKE IS MUTUAL.

2. A-31 CONFIDENT HE WILL HAVE SUPPORT OF OTHER CUBAN DELEGATES AND MASPERO WHO HE CONSIDERS A PERSONAL FRIEND. ALSO FEELS IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OTHER CONGRESS DELEGATES, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE PROBLEM WILL BE SERIOUS. SAYS HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

3. NEXT CONTACT WITH A-31 EXPECTED 3 OR 4 OCTOBER DEPENDENT HIS JUDGEMENT OF SITUATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: A.B. Outright
UNIT: WH/2/P
EXT: 5421
DATE: 11 October 1966

☐ FILE
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

11 22 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 42449

TO PANAMA CITY INFO: REP/LANT, CARACAS, SANTIAGO, JMWAVE, SANTO DOMINGO,
LIMA, MEXICO CITY, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO, LCPIPIT

REF: PANAMA CITY ~~1050~~ 1190 (IN-13995)

REF ZRWAHOO DISSEMED AS TDCS-314/12911-66 WITH ADDED CONTROL NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

SOURCE DESCRIPTION CHANGED TO READ: "AN ATTENDEE AT THE CONGRESS DESCRIBED BELOW WHO IS A SUPPORTER OF EMILIO MASFERO. HE HAS NOT PROVIDED [illegible] SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO WARRANT A JUDGMENT AS TO HIS RELIABILITY." K.

END OF MESSAGE

WP

A

File: [illegible] 31

WH/F1 BFuller

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/R

EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
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COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-2[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C-8 CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/O-4

AN	~~PI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX.	

PACY

S E C R E T 072006Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1171

7 Oct 66 12485

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: PANAMA CITY 1119 (IN 07778) ✓

1. AMICE-31 ETA COSTA RICA 9 OCT. HAD NO TROUBLE AT CLASC CONGRESS PARTICULARLY SINCE GUTIERREZ DOES NOT ENJOY MASPERO FAVOR.

2. A-31 COOPERATIVE, HELPFUL AGENT. ONLY PROBLEM WAS HIS DIFFICULTY IN LEAVING CONGRESS SITE ALONE WHICH PREVENTED FREQUENT CONTACT. THIS NO FAULT OF HIS. LAST CONTACT SCHEDULED 8 OCT. APPRECIATE JMWAVE ASSISTANCE.

S E C R E T *Amice-31 Alerted 30 Sept re Possible Attack.

BT

Send to WH/CUBA for RI

NNNN

201-2[illegible]
[illegible] 1966

XI ☐ YES ☒ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

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FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CA 2, CI/[illegible], CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 271449Z CITE PANAMA CITY 1070

PACY

27 SEP 66 IN 04387

RL FI

PRIORITY JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

JMDEVIL

REF: A. DIRECTOR 37751

B. JMWAVE 3243

1. PREFER NOT TO CONTACT AMICE-31 AT REF IDEN B ADRESS DUE POSSIBLE SECURITY RISKS. REQUEST JMWAVE DIRECT AMICE-31 PHONE (PANAMA) 35551, IDENTIFY SELF AS "RAMON" AND ASK FOR "LUCHO". LUCHO WILL TELL RAMON THAT HE (LUCHO) IS A FRIEND OF PABLO AND ARRANGE MEETING. SUGGEST AMICE-31 CALL LATE EVENING OR EARLY MORNING HOURS.

2. ALSO REQUEST JMWAVE PROVIDE AMICE-31 DESCRIPTION AND PERTINENT DATA.

S E C R E T

BT.

SECRET

Send to WH/Cuba for RI Handling

B

201-284658

27 Sept 66

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 30/M

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 3

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1	PP —	5	HQ
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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4, WH/C8.

Swider A.
Cohen
Forsythe
Alvarez

27 SEP [illegible] 5

S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3243

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 37751 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)
B. DIRECTOR 37762 (NOT SENT SAN JOSE)

1. AMICE/31 (IDENTITY A) ARRIVING PANAMA CITY 29 SEPTEMBER AT 1230 HOURS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 511. A/31 ALERTED TO TELEPHONE CALL AT IDENTITY B ADDRESS FROM PERSON IDENTIFYING SELF AS "FRIEND OF PABLO". IF STATION WISHES MAKE OTHER CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS, PLS CABLE INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO 29 SEPTEMBER.

2. A/31 BRIEFED PER REFERENCE B GUIDELINES AND WILL SUBMIT REPORT UPON RETURN TO JMWAVE 20 OCTOBER. AMICE/31 PLANS SPEND 12-20 OCTOBER IN SAN JOSE TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH COSTA RICAN TRANSPORT WORKERS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/O4, WH/CB

S E C R E T 262302Z CITE JMWAVE 3244

PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, SAN JOSE

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3243 (IN [illegible])

Swider
Cohen
Forsythe LW
Gonzales

27 SEP 6[illegible] [illegible]3894

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. FEDERACION INTERAMERICANA DE TRABAJADORES CRISTIANOS
AVENIDA 7, CENTRAL 2420
EDIFICIO PREMIER, FIRST FLOOR.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 38

SECRET

Phil Holt
ORIG: Phil Holts:res
UNIT: WH/2/Panama
EXT: 5421
DATE: 23 September 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/C 8, CI/OA, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT

SECRET (CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) 23 22 32Z (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 37751

TO PANAMA CITY ~~XXXXX~~ JMWAVE INFO: LIMA

REFS: A. JMWAVE 3126 (IN-99957)*

B. PANAMA CITY 1039 (IN-01669)**

IN ADDITION EMFEVER-1, SUGGEST PANAMA CITY ALSO CONTACT JMWAVE ASSET AMICE-31 FOR COVERAGE JMDEVIL CONGRESS. FOR PANAMA CITY: PLEASE ARRANGE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AMICE-31 WITH JMWAVE. FOR LIMA: WILL DUBOLD-1 ATTEND CONGRESS? IF SO, BELIEVE STATION CONTACT WOULD BE USEFUL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comments: *JMWAVE asset AMICE-31 invited to CLASC congress Pacy. JMWAVE plans pay his travel to Pacy and instruct to report congress developments, especially CLASC proposal to create Miami based organization of Cuban workers.

**Contact instructions for EMFEVER-1 in Panama City when he arrives for CLASC congress.

WH/C/MO Magaret Forsythe (by phone)

WH/3/Peru E. Laffin (in draft)

WH/7/DR A. Kida (in draft)

WH/CA De Gottfield

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Ewterrell
EDWIN M. TERRELL
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI

S E C R E T 202144Z CITE JMWAVE 3126 INGHURST ACTING

20 SEP 65 IN 99957

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

TYPIC

JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3025 (IN 99954)

1. AMICE-31, (IDENTITY A), HAS BEEN INVITED ATTEND REF CONGRESS. UNLESS HEADQUARTERS ADVISES TO CONTRARY, JMWAVE PLANS PAY COST OF AMICE-31 AIR TRAVEL AND WILL INSTRUCT HIM MONITOR AND REPORT ON CONGRESS DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY JMDEVIL PROPOSAL TO CREATE MIAMI-BASED ORGANIZATION OF CUBAN WORKERS.

2. AMICE-31 JMDEVIL CONTACTS INCLUDE CIHAZEL-1 AND CIHUMP-1 (IDENTITY B), BOTH OF WHOM RECENTLY TRANSITED JMWAVE.

S E C R E T

ST

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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3	RID	7	D
4	FI-T	8	X

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, DDP/OA, DDP/OPS, DDP/CA 2, CA 2, CA/O4, CA/PROP, FI

S E C R E T 282145Z CITE JMWAVE 3127 INGHURST ACTING 20 SEP 65 IN 99959

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY

TYPIC JMDEVIL AMICE

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 3126 (IN 99957)

IDENTITY A. REINALDO (PICO) RAMON, PRESIDENT OF ORGANIZACION REGIONAL DE TRANSPORTE (ORT - CLASC AFFILIATE) AND MEMBER FORDC.

IDENTITY B. JOSE DE JESUS PLANAS

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

RID/AN

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

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S E C R E T

UFGA 24522/05

UFGA-24522/05

C-300

ARCHIVED

PICO Reinaldo

201-284658

PICO Ramon, Reinaldo
Parents: Rufino and Maria de la Paz. DPOB: 27 July 33, Regla, Havana. Married to Carmen PICO Herrera. Brothers: Hector, Sonia and Milagros. Address: 2267 SW 16th St. Miami. Address in Cuba: Fomento 516, Apt. 2, Reparto Palatino, Cerro. Arrived at the US on 29 Dec. 60 from Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Passport 35973.
Source: Personal data recruitment form, 17 Jan 61.

26 years old. Married. Cuban. High School Education. Tourist. Secretary of the AOMRR.
Source: MRR registration form.

Says he will not return with the rest of the Giron prisoners that came in a Commission to try to obtain an exchange of prisoners.
Source: Memo C-300 (from Newspaper "El Popular", 29 July 61).

DPOB: 21 July 33, Regla, Havana. Current address: 1067 SW 8th St. Miami. Joined the military commission on 1st Sept. 61 (Transportation organization) Metropolitan Buses. Does not receive pay. Unemployed.
Source: Form as member of the Revolutionary Organization, Military Commission, 16 March 62.

Born in Regla, Havana on 21 July 33. Address: 1067 SW 8th St. Miami. Worked for Metropolitan Buses.
Source: Revolutionary Transportation Organization. Military Commission, April 62.

DD-231. Meeting between Manuel RAY Rivero and several persons in Miami, 29 June 63.

201-284658

UFGA 24522/05

PICO Roman, Reinaldo (cont.)
DPOB: 21 July 33, [illegible], Havana, Cuba. Parents: Pedro PICO Valiente and Maria de la Paz Roman Rodriguez. Married to Alicia Lugo Gonzalez. Sons: Reinaldo Mario and Maria del Carmen PICO Pino (first marriage) and Alex PICO Lugo (second marriage). Bus driver. Address: 1645 SW 12 St. Miami. Passport No. 187738 (expires on 18 Oct. 68) Resident No. A12 445 812. Preparatory course. Took courses with the Catholic Working Youth. Was a delegate to the X Anniversary Congress of the J.O.C. Costa Rica and gave several conferences. Started an underground cell of the 26 of July Movement as Chief of Action and Sabotage in the Havana area. On 3 May 59 was appointed delegate before the official and employers organizations representing the Metropolitan Busses Union. At the First Congress of Transportation Workers was appointed President of Comments Commission and later Secretary of Foreign Relations of the National Transportation Federation. Because of the X CTC-R Congress held on Nov. 59 resigned to both posts. When he arrived at Miami joined the FORDC, but left it from April 61 to March 64, when he again joined the FORDC. While he was away from the FORDC he organized the "Organizacion Revolucionaria del Transporte" (ORT) now with the FORDC and also the "Alianza de Trabajadores Cubanos" now also with the FORDC. During 1958 was an activist for the M-26-7, the only organization to which he belonged apart from the JOC. Late 1959 joined the MRR and was National Coordinator until December 1960 when he became an asylee. Currently is only a member of the FORDC. Was a member of Brigade 2506 and was a prisoner at Giron. Was in the Rebel Army at the victory of the Revolution.
Source: P-8, 1[illegible] April 64.

From the Transportation Revolutionary Organizations. Member of the anti-Castro groups called "Los Juramentados" who want to start the Cuban war of liberation and are collecting money for arms and ammunitions. This group is made up by representatives of several organizations.
Source: Archivos, Inside Info. 19 May 64.

Secretary-general of the Revolutionary Transportation Confederation. Was invited to Venezuela by the Latin American Confederation of Christian Union (CLASC) representing the "Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democratico Cubano (FORDC) to the festivities of the 1st of May.
Source: Newspaper "Miami Herald", 22 May 64.

Appeared in the program "Entrevista Estelar de Prensa" over radio station WFAB, Miami, on 20 June 65.

PICO Roman, Reinaldo
Announced the beginning of the recruitment of a Transportation Battalion.
Source: "Radio [illegible]", Miami, Broadcast, 9 April 62.

PICO [illegible], [illegible]
Secretary-general [illegible] the Christian Union Movement. [illegible] a statement [illegible] "Diario de las Americas" [illegible].
Source: "Diario de las Americas", 8/10/61

PICO, Reinaldo (cont)

Member of the MRDC. Lives at 2267 NW 1[illegible]th street, Miami.
Source: List of MRDC members, 14 March 61.

Took part in the debates at the MRDC Session, according to the column "Noticias al Oido".
Source: "Diario de las Americas", 14 Feb. 61.

Has taken shelter together with Milton Collazo at the house located at 1930 NW 29th St. because he fears an attack.
Source: C-42, 29 July 61.

While at the offices of the Committee for the Liberation of the Prisoners at Giron said: Fidel told the Commission that came to Miami for the exchange of prisoners that if they did not show up with 6 or 8 millions, there would be no exchange.
Source: C-84, 28 July 61.

Revolutionary person who worked in action and sabotage in the M-26-7 together with Angel Maria Hernandez Avila.
Source: Angel Maria Hernandez Avila, 17 Jan 61.

Alberto Mellado says that Reinaldo Pico told him he would leave for Cuba to take explosives; that he worked for the CIA and was paid $300.00 monthly.
Source: C-5, 12 Dec. 61.

Remained in Miami when he came with other prisoners of Playa Giron to try to obtain his freedom and that of his companions.
Source: C-90, 12 May 62.

DD-505. Function in honor of Jose Ignacio RIVERO Hernandez, in Miami, on 17 Nov. 63.

President of the Revolutionary Transportation Organization. One of the four organizations sponsoring the Workers Training Course.
Source: Newspaper "Miami Herald", 21 Feb. 6[illegible].

14-00000

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH8 ☐ RID COPY RI/AN, WH/COG8, EUR6, CI/OPS

201 CI/OA, FI2

S E C R E T 091445Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2294

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR SANTO DOMINGO PORT AU PRINCE PARIS KINGSTON

EVMULE AMCLEVE 9 JAN 69 IN 68106

REF: CARACAS 1545 (IN 66735)

1. PARA 3 REF ASSUMPTION CORRECT. SUBJECT IS AMICE-31.

2. STATION POUCHING PERTINENT DOCS FROM HIS 201. AMICE-31 HAS OA AND RECEIVED $300 MONTHLY SALARY VIA AMICE PAYROLL UNTIL PROJECT TERMINATED IN 1967.

3. NO ONE PRESENTLY AT WH/MIAMI KNOWS SUBJECT. HOWEVER, HENRY RUBASH, LAST JMWAVE AMICE CASE OFFICER, WHO NOW HQS ON CONSULTATIONS, MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE PERSONAL ASSESSMENT AMICE-34 FOR CARACAS.

4. FILE: 201-284503.

S E C R E T

Pico

SECRET

UFGA 30258
10/7/68

SECRET

8 July 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

VIA: Chief, CA

FROM: CA/Henry J. RUBASH HJR

SUBJECT: AMICE Progress Report
1 April - 30 June 1968

A. OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

1. AMICE-31 was a delegate to the Ninth CLASC Consejo which was held in Santo Domingo from 17-24 May 1968 and he also attended the First Latin American Labor Conference on Development and Integration which took place following the Ninth Consejo. A documented report on these meetings was submitted under UFGA-30216.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE

2. During the fourth quarter of FY 68 a total of approximately $6,787 was spent on the AMICE activity. This amount includes termination payments made to AMICE-3 and AMOTEX-66. The cumulative total of AMICE expenditures for FY 68 is $71,628.

3. AMICE-3 and AMOTEX-66 were terminated amicably as of 30 June 1968. The only remaining active AMICE agent is AMICE-34 who will be retained by JMCOBRA as the labor reporter for the AMHIM Bulletin.

AMICE

C. PROBLEMS

4. There are no problems of an operational nature.

D. PLANS FOR NEXT QUARTER

5. Not applicable.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 31

ORIG: JEAN BELL
UNIT: CA/INT
EXT: 4383
DATE: 19 JUNE 1968

S-E-C-R-E-T

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 09760

TO JMWAVE INFO SANTO DOMINGO

20 19 25 z JUN 68

DTDORIC INTEL JMDEVIL

REF: SANTO DOMINGO 5604 (IN 17932)

PLS ADVISE IF STATION HAS YET DEBRIEFED AMICE-31 RE CLASC CONFERENCES HELD IN SANTO DOMINGO DURING MAY AND, IF SO, WHEN REPORTS CAN BE EXPECTED HEADQUARTERS. LNGOLD AND LNWIRE HAVE REQUESTED ALL INFO AVAILABLE WHICH NOT REPORTED IN PRESS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA -
DC/WH/7/[redacted]
CA/B4 - TONY HOLLAND (IN DRAFT)

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/CA/INT
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

7100-201

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo: Chief of Station, JMCOBRA; Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE/AMICE
Comments of AMICE-31 on Raimundo ONGARO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: None; FYI

REF: HDCA-7116, 31 May 1968

see B.A. 0663 + S.D. 5604
also 201
NO

1. AMICE-31 had only the following to add concerning Raimundo ONGARO and his activities: After ONGARO had made his violent speech on television in Santo Domingo he was cornered by the Cuban (exile) delegation the members of which were incensed by his allegations concerning Cuban exiles and his misinformation about the Castro regime. According to AMICE-31 their arguments prevailed and ONGARO in the end was quite apologetic and admitted to them (AMICE-31 thought sincerely) that he had been in error. As proof of the sincerity of ONGARO's change of mind on the Cuban question AMICE-31 pointed to the fact that, on behalf of the Cuban delegation, ONGARO approached Juan Luis GALLO Estevez, the intransigent Uruguayan whose negative vote (the only one) doomed the Cuban-sponsored resolution on political prisoners to defeat, and tried to get him to go along with the majority.

2. AMICE-31 called ONGARO basically "un buen muchacho" and non-Communist. He reported that ONGARO was a strong peronista and a "good, practicing Catholic". He added this latter description with some wonderment because he had always placed "good, practicing Catholics" automatically in the pro-U.S., anti-Castro camp.

Henry J. RUBASH

Distribution:
2 - COS Buenos Aires next pouch
2 - COS Santo Domingo next pouch
2 - COS JMCOBRA
2 - C/WH [illegible]
2 - WH/COG

201-274658

~~DEFERRED~~

SECRET [illegible]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-30217	JUN 21 1968 19 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-52

14-00000

FORM G-325 A REV. 4-1-67

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 43-R436

BIOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(FAMILY NAME) LUGO	(FIRST NAME) ALICIA	(MIDDLE NAME) None	☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE	BIRTHDATE (MO-DAY-YR) 12-16-37	NATIONALITY CUBAN	ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (IF ANY) [illegible]
ALL OTHER NAMES USED None			CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH Habana Cuba			SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (IF ANY) [illegible]

	FAMILY NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE, CITY AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH (IF KNOWN)	CITY AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
FATHER	LUGO	JOSE	(DECEASED)	
MOTHER (MAIDEN NAME)	[illegible]	Faustina	Habana Cuba	Miami Fla.

SPOUSE (IF NONE, SO STATE) FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	CITY & COUNTRY OF BIRTH	DATE OF MARRIAGE	PLACE OF MARRIAGE
None					

FORMER SPOUSES (IF NONE, SO STATE)

FAMILY NAME (FOR WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)	FIRST NAME	BIRTHDATE	DATE & PLACE OF MARRIAGE	DATE AND PLACE OF TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE

APPLICANT'S RESIDENCE LAST FIVE YEARS. LIST PRESENT ADDRESS FIRST

STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	PROVINCE OR STATE	COUNTRY	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
1173 NW 29 St	Mia	Fla	USA	April	'65	PRESENT TIME	
530 SW 10 St	Mia	Fla	USA	"	65	April	65
1001 SW 4 Ave	Mia	Fla	USA		62	"	65
LAST FOREIGN RESIDENCE OF MORE THAN ONE YEAR IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)							
[illegible]	Hab	Cuba			1922	May	1961

APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT LAST FIVE YEARS (IF NONE, SO STATE) LIST PRESENT EMPLOYMENT FIRST

FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	OCCUPATION	FROM MONTH	FROM YEAR	TO MONTH	TO YEAR
[illegible] 1500 SW 8 Ave	Front End		1965	PRESENT TIME	
File [illegible] 201-287655					
LAST OCCUPATION ABROAD IF NOT SHOWN ABOVE (INCLUDE ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE)					

THIS FORM IS SUBMITTED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATION FOR
☐ NATURALIZATION ☐ ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
☐ OTHER (SPECIFY) Permanent Resident

PENALTIES: SEVERE PENALTIES ARE PROVIDED BY LAW FOR KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY FALSIFYING OR CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT.

IF YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IS IN OTHER THAN ROMAN LETTERS, WRITE YOUR NAME IN YOUR NATIVE ALPHABET IN THIS SPACE.

DATE

Alicia Lugo
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR PETITIONER)

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

XX

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/JMDEVIL/AMICE
Proposed Travel of AMICE-31

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: FYI

REF: UFGA-25587 dated 25 July 1966

Headquarters has considered the invitations received by AMICE-31 and has reached the following conclusions on his proposed travel:

A. There seems no useful purpose to be served by covering AMICE-31's personal expenses for the trip described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the referenced dispatch as WOFACT has good coverage from other sources.

B. Headquarters has no interest in AMICE-31's attendance at the meeting described in paragraph 3 but also no objections to his accepting the invitation if Station JMWAVE deems it advisable or considers this will be of value in any of the Station's own operations.

JANE D. ASTRAHAN

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

201-284658

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 19-126-35/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-6158

DATE: 22 AUG 1966

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-284658

TYPED:
16 August 1966

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ORIGINATING
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COORDINATING
AC/WH/C/CA [illegible]
WH/C [illegible]
WH/CA [illegible] Castellano (Telecon)

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO [illegible]

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INFO FILE, VR, SECUR 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

AN FI

ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 080213Z CITE JMWAVE 1348

8 JUN 66 IN 32850

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 09454 *

*HQS STATUS BURDEN OF ACTION RE REF CASE NOW LIES WITH AMICE 31 AND KIN.

1. WAVE OFFICER MET WITH COORDINATOR CUBAN AFFAIRS MIAMI AND DEPUTY CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICE 7 JUNE FOR DISCUSSIONS ON REF CASE. BOTH OFFICERS AGREED TO ARRANGE ENTRY OF MOTHER AMICE 31 BASED ON OUR INTEREST THIS CASE.

2. CHIEF CCA/M PREPARING LETTER FOR SWISS AMBASSADOR IN CUBA STATING THAT MOTHER'S CASE REVIEWED AND PERMISSION HAS BEEN GRANTED FOR HER ENTRY TO U.S. LETTER WILL INCLUDE REQUEST FOR PRIORITY ACTION BASED ON POOR STATE MOTHER'S HEALTH.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-274658
8 June 1966

Margaret Forsythe:new
WH/C/CA/PP
2981
2 June 1966

SECRET

DIR 09454

SECRET

JMWAVE

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

REFS A. UFGA 24861

B. JMWAVE 1135 (IN 25370)

1. REF B ENTRY REFUSAL FOR MOTHER AMICE-31 PER SECTION 212-A INDICATED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP. REF A PARA 3 STATES POSSIBILITY DECEASED HUSBAND PLACED NAME ON PARTY ROLES. THERE NO EVIDENCE IN FILES TO CONFIRM OR DENY AND HQS HAS NO BASIS FOR REQUESTING RE-OPENING OF CASE.

2. KUSODA SUGGESTS IT BEST FOR AMICE-31 AND OTHER RELATIVES OR KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS CONTACT LOCAL ODURGE OFFICE TAKING AFFIDAVITS FROM PERSONS NOT IN WAVE AREA, LETTERS FROM BISHOPS MENTIONED REF A OR ANY OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS, EXPLAINING BACKGROUND AND ASCERTAINING WHAT FURTHER EVIDENCE MAY BE NECESSARY TO SECURE REVERSAL PRESENT DECISION.

3. WAVE MAY BE ABLE ARRANGE FAVORABLE RECEPTION AMICE PRESENTATION THROUGH ODURGE CONTACT OR AT LEAST STEER AMICE-31 TO SYMPATHETIC

SECRET

PAGE TWO

OFFICIAL. HQS WILL FOLLOW UP WITH ODURGE AND ODACID HQS WHEN THERE ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT RE-OPENING DISCUSSION AT THIS LEVEL BUT BURDEN OF ACTION NOW LIES WITH AMICE-31 AND KIN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Requests assistance in arranging entry of AMICE-31's mother barred under Section 212A of Immigration Law

C/WH/C/CA_______________

OS/AAS (Mr. Knott by phone)

WH/C/MO (Mr. Chiocca in draft)

WH/C/CA/PP (Mr. Chaconas in draft)

WH/C/CI (Mr. Cutoro in draft)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

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FROM Dissem BY 24

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 262100Z CITE JMWAVE 1135 INGHURST ACTING

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMSAFE AMICE

26 May 66 IN 25370

REFERENCE: UFGA 24861

1. AMICE-31'S MOTHER (IDENTITY A OF REFERENCE), TELEPHONED HIM ON 13 MAY, READING LETTER FROM SWISS EMBASSY WHICH STATED THAT U.S. AUTHORITIES HAD DECIDED THAT SHE WAS INELIGIBLE FOR ENTRY INTO U.S. FURTHER CHECK WITH LOCAL ODACID OFFICE HERE REVEALED AGENT'S MOTHER REFUSED ENTRY ON BASIS OF SECTION 212 A OF IMMIGRATION LAW.

2. PER PARA 4 OF REFERENCE, STATION WOULD APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION OF CASE WITH ODACID AND ODURGE.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO ACTION BRANCH
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RL

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
WH/C/ES		6 April 66		jd
2 WH/C/CA/PP				
3 WH/CA/ [illegible] 3-B-4466				jd
4. WH/C/AN/RE				
5.				
6. WH/C/MO	13 APR 1966		15 APR 1966	
7.				
8 WH/3 Colombia			18/4	CH
9.				
10 WH/C/CA/PP				
11 Bongiorno				
12.				
13.				
14				
15				
16				
17 RID FI				

COMMENTS

Copy detached

Note Bongiorno report, for our conversation w/Forsythe

3-10 — We have pulled one copy of dispatch and attachments for study. jd

U/S/calle
6 apr 66

Copy for chrono

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-284656

DOCUMENT DATE

31 Mar 66

DOCUMENT NUMBER

UFGA 24874

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACC.
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH

INFO: WH/C

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: DYVOUR/JMDEVIL/ AMICE-31 Production

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached is AMICE-31's report on the meeting of the Eighth Continental Council of the Confederacion Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Cristianos (CLASC, Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions), held in Medellin, Colombia, from 5 to 14 January 1966.

2. Since the Station has not received copies of any disseminations that may have been made from information cabled during the meeting at Medellin, no attempt has been made to prepare portions of AMICE-31's report for dissemination. If any of the report is disseminated at Headquarters, the Station would appreciate receiving copies, along with copies of any reports that may already have been disseminated on the meeting at Medellin, and any future disseminations on the CLASC.

3. Also attached, under separate cover, is a copy of a report by Keith G. BONGIRNO which includes a list of AMICE-31's achievements at the meeting and his impressions of and attitudes toward certain delegates and issues.

Eleanor D. Pinsler
for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
③ - WH w/atts h/w, and u/s/c - Att'd RID/AN
2 - WH/C w/atts h/w, and u/s/c

201-284658

2 Atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 29 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-24874

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-284658

SCA

February 7,1966

PICO'S TRIP TO MEDELLIN

After reading Pico's report and talking to him twice I reached following conclusions :

I ACHIEVEMENTS of Pico

1. Achieved with the cooperation of Edgar Maduro to soften the anti-US line in the Declaration of Principles and elimination of US name which was ~~xx~~ replaced by "imperialisms".

2. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Together with the Venezuelan delegates drafted the motion condemning the Tricontinental Conference. and participated actively in drumming up the support for this motion.

3. Pushed thru the motion condemning Castro's regime.

4. Excercised a strong anti-communist and anti-Castro influence among the delegates.

II PICO'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEDELLIN MEETING

1. Pico came back favorably impressed by strongly anti-communist stand of the delegates. He says that even if Maspero would try to cooperate with the commies the rank and file will not let him to do so.

2. Pico noted only three rabid anti-US delegates : Miguel Cardoso(Accion Sindical Uruguaya), Diogenes Gutierrez(Federacion Istmeña de Trabajadores Cristianos -Panama) and Heliodoro Agudelo Rivera(Accion Sindical Antioqueña) .

3. Pico informs that Henry Molina(Sec.Gen.of Confederacion Autonoma de Sindicatos Cristianos CASC-D.R.) even if highly critical of US intervention in D.R. is an outspoken communist and he recommends him as a material for recruitment.

4. Molina spoke very favorably of Conrado Rodriguez who during his stay in D.R. as FORDC delegate made an excellent impression and became good friend of CASC .

5. It is evident from the briefing instructions received from HQ and cables received from "our man in Medellin" that a strong opposition to CLASC HQ stand (or Maspero's) to the new funding proposal by CISC and ISI was expected. Pico says that he could not discover such opposition and that three national unions which already applied for direct funding according to the instructions received from CISC quickly withrew their application. Pico also did not note any "betrayal" on the part of Federacion Campesina.

Thus I see two possibilities : a) the opposition to CLASC HQ stand that all funding should go thru HQ was exaggerated b) Pico is considered as close friend to Maspero and was not trusted by the opposition.

According to Pico the feeling was quite unanimous the the funding should go thru CLASC HQ and the CISC attempt of direct funding was resented as an effort to undermine CLASC Executive Committee.

ATT 1 TO UFGA 24874 31 MAR 201-[illegible]

6. It looks that our friend who talked to Pico in Medellin and Bogota was disgusted because Pico was satisfied with the results of the meeting. Pico's satisfaction stemmed from the strong anti-Castro stand the Council adopted and it is obvious that the fuming problem so important to us could not ~~x~~ upset him.

7. Pico reports that there is a good chance that Dagoberto Gonzalez(Sec.Gen.of Trabajadores Copeyanos) will be elected as CLASC president at the next CLASC Congress. According to him Jose Goldsack will become Treasurer and present treasurer Alfredo di Pacce will head a new CLASC office dedicated to raise funds from the LA affiliates.
Pico cousiders Gonzalez as a staunch anti-communist and better disposed toward I than Maspero. He thinks that flanked by Gonzalez and Gold sack, Maspero will not have so much to say and his power will be limited. Gonzalez is apparently a much more forceful personality than Goldsack, who doesn't have enough guts to oppose Maspero.

8. Pico believes that Maspero is less aggressive and anti-US as he used to be. He thinks that the pressure from CISC and ISI plus a strong anti-communist posture pf the affiliates accounts for this.

In the cables received from our Colombia office there is a strong criticism of Pico as a sort of Maspero's stooge. After discussiong this topic several times with Pico I think that his opinion of Maspero ~~XXXXXX~~ is :

Maspero is a forceful, dynamic and well ~~prepared~~ educated leader. As an Argentine and ex-peronista he has more drive and is a better organizer than the others in CLASC. Besides he offers CLASC a promise of bringing CTG into an alliance with them, a feat which only he can accomplish. For Pico's taste Maspero is too demagogic and he doesn't like his anti-US and soft of commies attitude, however, Pico claims that Maspero lately is much more aware of commie danger. As Maspero is without doubt the most powerful single individual in CLASC and as Pico positi is weak(his Federation is not created yet and he has to be confirmed as Secretar General) he sees no use of bucking Maspere especially as no organized and strong opposition exists. Pico,however, would see with sympathy Maspero power restricte or it will not bother him al all to see Maspero removed completely. But as long as he exists Pico believes that for his personal good and in order to be able to push strong anti-Castro stand(in which he is mainly interested) he has to work and live with Maspero.

This position impresses me as a sensible one.

III MISC. REMARKS

1. There is some inconsistence in the cables we received. In one of them Romano Tschumi, CLASC Executive Secretary for the Dutch Antilles and President of CEDEU is described as " widely considered insignificant and unipresive element". In another cable this same Tschumie is quoted as a source (direct source not via Pico as Pico said that he didn't know about campesinos sold out) and as a new CLASC Asst Secretary General(Pico also claims that he doesn't know about it even if he was criticised for before ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ getting his info from such a lousy source as Tschumie).

[illegible] Jan.1964.

2. Pico reports that in Caracas he met Carl Norden from ISI Bonn office in CLASC office. Carlos Moris(vice-director of Instituto de Estudios Sociales d Caribe), Mariano Benitez(Centro Documentacion -Caracas) Santiago Tortosa(Sec Gen of CODESA), Ezequiel Borges(CIS) were also present. Norden reported that the

US Embassy in Bonn informed them on Sunday Jan.16th in the morning about all important toxpics discussed, resolutions etc adopted in Medellin. While impressed by the fast work and correct reporting ~~mx~~ Norden expressed his curiosity as to how it was possible that the embassy in Bonn was so fast informed (NOTE : I am surprised even more that a blubber-mouth like Norden was informed about such report!). The general consensus of the present was that CIA must have few men infiltrated among the delegates.....

3. According to the new by-laws Pico's Transport Federation(in formation) will hav 3 votes during the next Congress, equal to other L.A. Federations and national delegations. Threfore it is important for us that we continue to work with Pico,

4. Pico should also go to the CLASC meeting in Guatemala in March when the Central American Confederation will be created. CLASC also wants to create Central American Transport Federation and there where Pico's presence is requested.

5. I asked Pico if his CLASC friends don't resent the fact that he works for FORDC. He said that this problem was solved once for ever. CLASC executives know that only two principal currents exists among the Cuban exiled labor : the batistian and the revolutionaries. The Batistianos are the Mujalistas of CTC aided by ORIT and CLASC is against the Mujalistas. They are in favor of the revolutionaries an they are in FORDC, which is the only really active exile labor organizations. CLASC leaders know that FORDC is being supported by the US government , but they accept it as a necessity and understand that it is inevitable as neither the batistianos or the communists will support it and CLASC has no funds to do so.

SUMMING UP

By no means I consider that Pico is an ideal agent. He ~~might~~ may be influenced or awed by Maspero. He also is sometimes impulsive and puts his foot in the mouth. On the other hand he is : young, agressive, better educated than average Cuban labor leade: He is accepted in CLASC, his organization ORT is a ~~fxxx~~ member and he will be the head of the Latin American Transport Federation which will give him following advantages : a) voice and 3 votes at CLASC meetings b) can influence CLASC decision: c) will bring strong anti-Castro and anti-communist influence d) will soften up anti-US outbursts e) will report to us, even if we have to take his reliability wit a grain of salt.

NOTE : I forget to call your attention to the curious little item in Pico's repo:

He advises that the Copeyanos gained the control of the Sindicato Portuario in Puerto Cabello wrestling it away from Correa after it was found that 200,000 bolivares were missing from the treasury. Pico also reports that there are widespread rumors that Correa is living it up at the expense of the boycott and that he is blackmailing Spanish, Japanese and British embassies getting hard cash for not boycotting the ships......

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO. Att. # 2 to UFGA-24574

DATE 31 Mar 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

201-284658

SUBJECT: PICO-Ramon, Reinaldo

REPORT (in Spanish) ON MEETING
OF LATIN AMERICAN CONFEDERATION
OF CHRISITAN TRADE UNION

BULKY

CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6859
FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS
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PROPER FILE NO

FROM:

RID/[illegible]

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICERS INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1 [illegible]/EE	13	apr	66	
2. SWH/C/MO		14 APR 1966	[illegible]	
3				
4.				
5. WH/Security		4/18/66		
6. WH/C/[illegible]				
7 OS/AAS		19 MAY 1966		
8 ~~[illegible]~~				
9.				
10				
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15				
16				

COMMENTS

copy attached

2 to 5 Can you handle this?

OS/catt
13apr66

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 copy retained by OS/AAS
5-4
19 MAY 1966

[illegible] in info that one Manuel de la Paz Ramirez Rodriguez, (without the "de Paz") not otherwise identified and not necessarily identified with our Ramirez, who was CP member in 1951.

[illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
APR 1
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMSAFE
Request for HQ Intercession to Facilitate Entry of Identity A

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: See Paragraph 4 below

1. Identity A, who is the mother of AMICE/31, a Station asset, has been twice denied permission to enter the United States as a refugee from Cuba. The local ODURGE office has stated that Identity A has been placed on a denied admissions list because of information supplied by ODACID.

2. According to AMICE/31, Identity A applied for admission to the United States with her daughters, Identities B and C. Identities B and C received the necessary authorization on 24 February 1966 from the Swiss Embassy and arrived in the United States by air on 28 February.

3. Identity A was the wife of Identity D, a member of the Cuban Communist Party for some twenty years, at the time of her first application to leave Cuba. Identity D died in October of 1965 and according to AMICE/31 lost his Communist Party membership card about a year prior to his death. According to AMICE/31, Identity A has never joined or been a member of the Communist Party although there is a possibility that her husband may have placed her name on the membership lists. AMICE/31 also stated that she has long been a practicing Catholic and that she is very anti-Communist. Sent as separate cover attachments are two statements from the Bishop of Cienfuegos and the Assistant Bishop of Havana testifying to her good character and to her standing as a practicing Catholic.

- Continued -

Attachments:
1. Identities, USC [illegible]
2. Letters, USC [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 24861

DATE
29 March 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-284655

4. It is requested that Headquarters contact the appropriate ODACID and ODURGE officials for the purpose of removing Identity A's name from the denied admissions list since her close connection with a member of the Cuban Communist Party, which presumably was the basis of the derogatory information, is no longer a fact.

Sylvia B.
Philip G. ELMARD

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 1 2 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

18

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
NO. 1 TO UFGA 24861

Identity A. Maria de la Paz *RAMON Rodriguez de *PICO
Calle Fomento No 506 Rpto Palatino, Cerro
Havana, Cuba
DOB: 14 November 1912 POB: Lima, Peru
Peruvian Citizen
Request for Hq intervention to facilitate entry to U.S.

Identity B. Regino Pico Valiente

Identity C. Sonia Pico Ramon

Identity D. Milagros Pico Ramon

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TRANSLATION

ASSOCIATION OF
CUBANS IN EXILE
"Sevillana" Manor,
Los Almendros Avenue,
San Rafael de la Florida,
Caracas, Venezuela.(Phone:71.33.32

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

38

Caracas, March 11, 1966.

Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen:

By this means I am pleased to state that I know Mrs. María de la Paz Ramón personally, whose son Reinaldo Pico Ramón worked actively for Catholic Labor Youth in Havana, Cuba. I can assure you that Mrs. Ramón Rodríguez was never a Communist and that due to her opposition to the regime she wishes to leave Cuban territory. She has always had democratic ideals.

Hoping that this information may be of use to you, I remain,

Very truly yours,

(signed) Eduardo Boza Masvidal
Asst.Bishop of Havana, Cuba.

(There is a seal of the
Mission of Our Lady of Charity,
Caracas, Venezuela)

(This is a translation of the attached letter)

14-00000

UNION
DE CUBANOS EN EL EXILIO
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
CARACAS VENEZUELA

Caracas, Mayo [illegible]

Departamento de Estado
Washington

Señores:

Confidencialmente me es grato manifestarles que conozco personalmente a la Sra. María de la Paz Ramón Rodríguez, cuyo hijo Reinaldo [illegible] Ramón trabajó activamente en la Juventud Obrera Católica en La Habana. Puedo asegurar que la señora Ramón Rodríguez nunca fué comunista y que es por oposición al régimen que desea salir de Cuba, habiendo sido ella siempre persona de ideas democráticas.

Esperando les sea útil esta información queda de Uds. muy atentamente

Eduardo Boza Masvidal
Obispo Auxiliar de La Habana

La Habana, 23 de Febrero de 1966

A quien pueda interesar

Yo Monseñor Alfredo Muller Obispo de Cienfuegos por la presente HAGO CONSTAR BAJO JURAMENTO que la señora Maria de la Luz Menon Rodriguez a la cual conozco desde hace años asi como a sus hijos son de procedencia Catolica y con los cuales hube de tener tratos y conocimientos ya que pertenecian a los Grupos de Accion Catolica de mi Parroquia en el Cerro " El Salvador del Mundo "

Atentamente.

Obispo de Cienfuegos

3

MD **SECRET**

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ACTION CAS ☐ HID COPY

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN CSDO CA/PEG WH8 CI/OA

412

S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820 CARA

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

DTDORIC JMDEVEL

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639; (IN 05005) OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
NOV 3 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

D-200-124-192/3

16 Oct 69

201-284658

SECRET

30 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

VIA: WH/COG

WH/3/V

SUBJECT: AMICE/31 (201-284658)

1. It is requested that responsibility for AMICE/31 be transferred from WH/COG to CA/B4, and that his OA be amended for a one-time reporting mission on the 20 - 24 October 1969 Quito meeting of the Council of the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

Clays

2. Caracas is being asked for un~~ilateral~~ Liaison traces and for determination as to whether AMICE/31's present employer, the Office of the Coordinator for Economic Affairs in Caracas, is an organ of the Venezuelan government or of the United Nations.

HENRY A. OZGA
Chief, Branch 4
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B4:B.Bowen:bln (30 September 1969)

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG
1 - WH/3/V
1 - 201-284658
1 - CA/CRU
2 - CA/B4

CA - 69 - 933

ORIG: Barbara Bowen
UNIT: CA/34
EXT: 6728
DATE: 30 September 1969

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: CA 5 FILE, VR, CI/OA, WH 8, CA/PEG, DO 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 42602

TO CARACAS 01 15 49 Z OCT 69

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: HVCW-8792 (19 SEPTEMBER 1969)

1. AMICE/31 OA NOW FOUR YEARS OLD. APPREICATE STATION ~~RYBOCK~~ W TRACES SOONEST FOR UPDATING.

2. AMICE/31 ALLEGEDLY NOW EMPLOYED "OFFICE OF COORDINATOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS" IN CARACAS. IF TRUE, IS THIS A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT BODY OR PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

3. FILE: 200-124-192/3 AND 201-284658.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B4 + ____
WH/3/ ____
WH/CA ✓

C/WH ____ C/CA ____

CS COPY FILED IN - 200-124-192/3

PICO.

FILE IN 201-284658

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Ray [illegible]

DATE : 17 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : C/WH 9

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

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NOV 18 0208Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 44227

PRITY DIR INFO WASH CITE HAVA 6939

NO NIACT

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

REF HAVA 6115 (IN 11660)

1. NICOLAS *MENDOZA TOLD HAVA STA 17 NOV THAT HIS BROTHER
Ray Contact with the Hava Station
IGNACIO HAD NOT LEFT HAVA AS PLANNED. IGNACIO NOW PLANS REMAIN HAVA FEW MORE DAYS IN HOPE HE MAY OBTAIN PERMISSION CUBAN GOVT TO LEAVE LEGALLY.

2. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

FILED 172133Z

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED MENDOZA COMING MIAMI 12 SEPT.

~~SECRET~~

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2/BR

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File copy
AMRung-1

SECRET

Ray

8 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUNG-1 201-280613

1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMRUNG-1 and WINDECKER were met at the Washington Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by taxi to the Mayflower Hotel, where a room had been reserved ... for their use. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to the room, where AMRUNG-1 was given a short briefing on Francisco Castell, the W/T operator who was scheduled to meet AMRUNG-1 at 1400 hours. 03

2. At 1400 hours, the undersigned went to the lobby of the hotel where Francisco was waiting with Ray Garcia, his escort officer. Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco up to the room. It was agreed in advance of this that all principals would with draw from the room to give AMRUNG-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone. However, it was suggested that Garcia return a half hour before the interview was terminated to clear up any points as to the nature of Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMRUNG-1 might wish to clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated about 1510 hours, as AMRUNG-1 stated he would be pleased to have Francisco assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was established between the principals and a complete understanding was reached as to the future role of Francisco as the W/T operator for the AMYUM group in Cuba.

3. At approximately 1535 hours, Andy Rogers put in his appearance at the room and was introduced to AMRUNG-1 as Mr. Rodrick. Prior to this meeting, AMRUNG-1 was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific aspects with him, prior to his return to Cuba. Cecil Cartwright, who had escorted AMRUNG-1 to Washington, asked to sit in on this meeting along with Peters and Rogers, as he felt that WASH should be fully informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMRUNG-1 for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and WASH. Rogers indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have him sit in at this meeting.

4. In substance, Rogers covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attempts to supply the AMYUM group with arms and ammo, and air-maritime operations currently being planned. In this connection, AMRUNG-1 was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound

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shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and again urged that more such shipments should be stepped up in the future. 03 Rogers then briefly discussed the SINNFA operation and asked AMRUNG-1 if he didn't think this area for the DZ was already "blown" due to the number of people who already knew of this operation. (This includes 5 other people besides AMYUM-1 and AMRUNG-1.) AMRUNG-1 stated he was not sure, but would investigate this upon his return. However, he felt that this was an excellent DZ site and should be utilized for any subsequent airdrop scheduled in the Pinar del Rio province. 03 Rogers informed AMRUNG-1 that his overlays on various LZ's and DZ's had been received and were being reviewed by the operations people. He complimented AMRUNG-1 on the excellent work of his cartographer and expressed the view that these DZ areas would be put to good use. Finally, he assured AMRUNG-1 that no stone is being left unturned to provide his group with the necessary materiel support which is critically needed and that this support will be stepped up as our infiltration capabilities are increased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned AMRUNG-1 not to take any unnecessary chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since his leadership in the AMYUM group was vital to our overall interests. The meeting was terminated about 1720 hours as Rogers and Peters took their departure. 03

5. Some of the more significant highlights of the conversations which took place between AMRUNG-1 and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the W/T operator (Francisco) and Rogers are noted herewith: 03

a. Security: Castro has taken stringent action in tightening up his internal security against counter-revolutionary forces inside Cuba. The militia are being used to search houses for concealed weapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce proper identification is removed for questioning by the DIER. Hence, AMRUNG-1 and his organization are largely confining their activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. He considers night operations - particularly on the streets of Havana - as highly dangerous inasmuch as the DIER (security organs) are constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check their identification documents.

b. Documentation of Agents in Cuba: AMRUNG-1 suggested using an identification card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he claims was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valid. Similarly, a driver's license properly authenicated along with a health certificate were considered to be good "cover" documents for agents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identification cards will be turned over to the Station by AMRUNG-1 for transmittal to headquarters for any subsequent documentation of

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418

agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University. (He suggested preparing one for his W/T operator (Francisco).

c. Operational Expenditures: Queried on this aspect, AMRUNG-1 stated his organization would need a minimum of 50 to 60,000 pesos a month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of vehicles and gasoline, allocation of funds to various subdivisions of the AMYUM organization located in various provinces of Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various agents whose families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.

d. W/T operators: To date, both AMPANIC-14 and AMGLEN-1 have not met the requirements for effective communication with us on AMYUM operations. However, AMRUNG-1 feels that AMPANIC-14 has not been compromised or turned by the DIER and once he gets over his nervous state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although AMGLEN-1 is considered to be a good W/T operator, AMRUNG-1 feels his usefulness to him has been considerably negated by the nature of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions to this base by orders of the Castro regime. In short, AMRUNG-1 feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations and that direct communications with the Embassy is growing increasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are under close surveillance by the Castro security forces. For this reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious void in this respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMYUM organization in Cuba.

e. Support for other anti-Castro groups in Cuba: AMRUNG-1 stated that all materiel support should be funneled directly to his organization for distribution to other anti-Castro groups in Cuba. In his view this would serve as a control factor in unifying the overall effort of the various splinter groups seeking such support in Cuba and would also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spearhead for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis. (i.e., he sited Nino Diaz in Oriente). AMRUNG-1 felt this was a serious mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and direction now being provided by the MRR throughout Cuba. The undersigned told AMRUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of a coordinated effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rallying center. However, the question of support being directed through one channel namely: his organization in Cuba, was neither feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, would make it difficult or impossible for the AMYUM group to ship arms and other equipment from Havana to the eastern most provinces (i.e., Las

Villas, Camaguay or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shipments and personnel. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our part to supply those fighting groups in these provinces. This explanation appeared to satisfy AMRUNG-1, however he still insisted that his organization should at least be appraised of any materiel support provided other groups in Cuba. He was assured that we would take his request under consideration.

f. AMBIDDY-1: AMRUNG-1 feels that no useful purpose would be served in sending his associate to join forces with him in Havana. He feels that AMBIDDY-1 should continue to represent the AMYUM faction in the FRD and when the counter-revolutionary forces are fully prepared to overthrow the Castro regime, AMBIDDY-1 will be brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the AMYUM forces in this province.

g. Manolo Ray: AMRUNG-1 considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro regime. In his opinion, RAY poses a serious threat to VARONA's leadership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support from the middle class represented by business interests, politicians, and the professional class. Should RAY be persuaded to join forces with the FRD, AMRUNG-1 thinks he will continue to operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with his own organization in Cuba.

h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although AMRUNG-1 recognizes the need to support the FRD as a political front for rallying counter-revolutionary groups against the Castro regime, he nonetheless feels that the FRENTE and Tony VARONA have lost considerable face in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into the FRENTE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of any of this money to support their efforts to overthrow Castro. Hence, confidence in the FRD is at a relatively low ebb among the people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel and financial support is needed to restore this confidence. According to AMRUNG-1 this support must be forthcoming soon because such people as Manolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.

John D. Peters

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03

ORIG : GRACE ROBERTS:dla
UNIT : WH/4/PA
EXT : 8715
DATE : 28 OCT 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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687

ROUTING			
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TO : JMASH HAVANA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 9

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

6. R

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED OCT 31 21 49Z 60
X ROUTINE U CABLE SECT
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 87264
OUT87264

TO MASH INFO HAVA CITE DIR 09095

JMWEST 09095

05,05,05,05

1. POA GRANTED AMBARG, UTRERA VALDES, MORFFI MACHADO, ROIG PEREZ, AND HERNANDEZ BETANCOURT.

05 (here)

2. FOR MASH: REQUEST BIOG DATA FOR POA ON JUAN ESTEVEZ RAMIROS. HQS DATA INSUFFICIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

03

R. D. Gahagan for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. D. ESTERLINE, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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049 JN/JG/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

FILE NO 19-5-3

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/PRD, PP/PYD 2, PP/PMD, IOD 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

DEC 17 07 44:53
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38553

TO DIR INFO SACU CITE HAVA 0693

INTEL

DA 16 DEC

APPR: PARAS 1,4 (2) PARAS 2,3 (3) PARAS 5-6

OS

SOURCE: PARA 1 [GEORGE K HARPER,] LAS VILLAS PLANTATION OWNER (F) PARAS 2,3 AMARIA (B) PARA 4 AMBARK-1 (C) PARA 5 6 [HARRY GRAHAM] (F) FROM DR MEMBER (F)

1. ERNESTO GUEVARA HAS MOVED WESTWARD. HIS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN BUT 165 MEN THOUGHT TO BE UNDER HIS COMMAND ARE CAMPED NEAR MANACAS IN WEST LAS VILLAS. GUEVARA IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE BELIEVED TO BE TO CUT OFF CENTRAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC WEST OF SANTA CLARA. FC: AMBARK-2 CONFIRMS THIS REBEL STRATEGY, SAYS MAY BE PLANNING TRY CUT HIGHWAY AT SANTO DOMINGO. SC: HEAVY TRUCKS CANNOT TRAVEL EAST OF SANTA CLARA. BACKROADS CAN BE USED BY AUTOS AND LIGHT TRUCKS.

2. 26TH OF JULY REPLACING CTC LABOR OFFICIALS WITH OWN PEOPLE ON SUGAR CENTRALES WHICH IT CAPTURES. CONRAD BEQUER DIAZ, WITH HQS IN SIERRA MAESTRA, IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM.

239-271

FORM 1389

SECRET

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2/60

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

[illegible]

PAGE 2

ROUTINE

IN 38553
HAVA 0693

TO INFO CITE

3. MANUEL RAY, MRC CHIEF, IS VISITING SIERRA MAESTRA FOR CONFERENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO DISCUSS CASTRO DESIRE DISSOLVE MRC AND INCORPORATE IT INTO 26TH JULY.

4. SMALL FEU FORCE ACTIVE NEAR COLISEO IN MATANZAS. ARMS SHIPMENT SEIZED IN CAYO HUESO, FLA WEEK 7 DEC WAS PURCHASED BY FEU FOR USE IN HAVA.

5. BATISTA HAS CONTRACTED FOR SERVICES 2 FRENCH ARMY OFFICERS EXPERIENCED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TO ADVISE CUBAN ARMY.

20-3

SUPDATA: HQS MAY WISH QUERY [PARI] ON PARA 5.
DISSEN EMB DEF ORALLY.
RELEASED 161830Z

END OF MESSAGE

239698

SECRET

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1/90

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief, JMWAVE

SUBJECT GYROSE/AMCONCERT-1
Report on Cira MARTINEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

RETURN TO CIA
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Attached herewith is an AMCONCERT-1 report on Cira *MARTINEZ, a confidante of Manuel RAY.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: h/w
Copies of report (2)

Distribution:
2-Headquarters w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
2 Nov 62

DATE DISPATCHED
NOV 6 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 6460

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33

CLASSIFICATION
SECR

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Hw ace to UFGA-6468

Miami, 8 Oct 62

REPORTING AGENT: AMCONCERT-1

SUBJECT: Cira MARTINEZ, aka: "Cirita", very closely connected to Manuel RAY.

SOURCE: Marta DIEZ Rivas. Married to Dr. Ricardo MACHIN. Was connect in Havana with various anti-Communist organizations.

On a visit I made to source, she told me that she had met Mrs. Cira MARTINEZ in Havana. That Mrs. MARTINEZ used the clandestine pseudonym "Josefina" and was married to architect Frank MARTINEZ. That both subject and her husband were persons in the absolute confidence of engineer Manuel RAY, and "Josefina" had been RAY's secretary for a long time.

Source claims to have learned from "Josefina" that she was dissatisfied with RAY's political actions, to the extent that RAY wanted her to join the executive of the organization J.U.R.E. but she had refused because she did not agree with the/policies of this organization. That "Josefina" had described this organization as a political movement the same as Castroism, only changing the name of the leader. That she knows the plan of this organization is to organize all anti-BATISTA and anti-CASTRO organizations, under the direction of the J.U.R.E., and develop a nationalistic and especially an anti-American policy in order to be able to group all the elements existing in Cuba that have not figured prominently in the CASTRO regime. After the fall of the CASTRO regime they plan to form a strong political party in Cuba and capitalize on the mistakes committed by the provisional Government. With this objective in mind, they will stay separated from the C.R.C. and from all relations with the U.S. Government in order to be able to carry out their plan freely.

Mrs. Cira MARTINEZ lives with her husband at 1004 NE 17th St., Miami, phone number PL-8-0483 on which they talk to many persons related with RAY's plan.

NOTE: One of RAY's most trusted leaders in Miami is still Osorio DAVILA, former treasurer of the 26th of July Movement and man in the absolute confidence of Haydee SANTAMARIA. For a long time DAVILA was the Chief of the Havana Immigration Department, until he came to the U.S. by boat from the coast of Matanzas. Some days ago I submitted a detailed report on Osorio DAVILA, and also on CISNEROS and many other

8 Oct 62, subj: Cira MARTINEZ (cont.)

known leaders of J.U.R.E., because there is another group of individuals whose names are not advertised but who have command powers in the J.U.R.E. One of these men is Ignacio LEDON, former leader of the 26th of July Movement, private secretary of the Commissioner of Havana Jose LLANUSA, and G-2 delegate in Havana City Hall. LEDON persecuted many persons in the City Hall because he was the one who made the lists of persons who should be watched, to the G-2. He also had close connections with the Minister of the Interior, Jose A. NARANJO, whom he kept informed about the persons under suspicion who worked in the Ministry of the Interior. One time LEDON visited NARANJO and informed him, in the presence of NARANJO's secretary, Lucy ECHEVERRIA, that he should keep Captain Ramon PADILLA, at that time Chief of the Isle of Pines prison, under surveillance. In 1960 PADILLA was preparing the escape of Captain Jorge SOTUS, and thanks to Lucy's warning PADILLA took precautions and the plan could be carried out. Ignacio LEDON lives in Miami but I don't know his home address. Although he later declared himself an anti-Communist, and I think he sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy, I have no trust in him at all.

[redacted] SECRET

30 Oct 62

On Sunday, October 28, I met twice with Manolo RAY of the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) at the San Juan Intercontinental Hotel, in San Juan, Puerto Rico. My main objectives were: (1) to elicit from him a list of Cubans, presently associated with the Castro regime, who are critical of Castro and might be considered potential defectors; (2) to obtain a list of Cubans, either inside or outside the island, who could be available, in case of an emergency, to help in setting up some kind of provisional government; and (3) to have his general views on the possibility of an insurrectionary movement.

Since I had arranged to return to Washington on the same day, I did not give Ray much time to do a thorough job. However, he was able to furnish me with a list of names, covering points (1) and (2). He promised to provide me with additional information after checking with some of his associates in New York and Miami. His thoughts on the possibility of an insurrectionary movement will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

LIST I

The persons herein indicated are either in Cuba or are working for the Cuban Government. I add my own comments in parenthesis, based on my conversations with Ray.

A - GENERAL

06 [Regino BOTI] - [Minister of Economy] 08
(Ray feels he is disgusted with the Castro regime. Instructions have gone out to sound him out. No reply as yet.)

06 [Commander Efigenio ALMEJEIRAS]
(Said to hold a key command position in Central Cuba and to be thoroughly disgusted. Could be a key man in a top level revolt.)

06 [Commander Lester RODRIGUEZ]
(Has helped the MRP. His allegiance to Castro has considerably weakened)

06 [Commander Pedro MIRET]
(Very close to Rodriguez. Will most probably follow him.)

Commander Rolando CUBELAS
(Is anxious to leave Cuba)

06 [Rafael BETANCOURT]
(Commands an artillery post. His brother [name unfurnished] is actively against the regime.)

[redacted] SECRET

6/920

← To protect identity of Luis Pinedo – suggest we redact "Policia Judicial"

06 [Captain Luis PINEDO Pérez (Terry)]
(Chief of the "Poli
talked against Cast

06 [Commander Faustino PEREZ]
(Former Minister. I
views. Probably und
in Ray's opinion.)

06 [Commander Antonio E. LUZON]
(Favorable to the MR

06 [Commander Bernabe ORDAZ] 08
(In charge of [Mazorra

06 [José NARANJO]
(Held key position in Havana province. Reported to have expressed strong views against Castro.)

06 [José ASSEF]
(Formerly connected with "Gobernación". Also in opposition to Castro).

06 [Sebastián ARCOS]
(Formerly connected with the Finance Ministry. Known to be critical of regime.)

06 [Enrique IBARRA] 08
(Under-Secretary [of Public Works.] Favorably inclined to the MRP)

06 [Armando FRANCO]
(Present post unknown. Reported to be against Castro.)

06 [Alfredo YABUR] 08
([Minister of Justice.] Conflicting reports as to his Allegiance to Castro.)

06 [Carlos LECHUGA] 11
(Ambassador to [Mexico.] Has recently written to an MRP Friend. Weak willed, might be anxious to defect.)

06 [Enrique RODRIGUEZ Loeche] 11
(Cuban Ambassador to [Morocco.] Presumed to be anti-Castro.)

06 [José PELLON]
(One of the executive members of the "Confederación de Trabajadores Cubanos" - Cuban Workers' Union. Has been in contact with the MRP.)

18/90

06 José DIAZ (Another labor leader, known to be anti-Castro.)

06 Captain Manuel CARBONEL (Assistant to 06 ALMEJEIRAS. In opposition to regime.)

06 Commander Guillermo GARCIA (Active in the western provinces. The MRP is checking on a report regarding his disaffection.)

06 Antonio ESCOCERA (Was in command until recently of a naval post in BARACOA. Definitely anti-Castro).

10

06 José OGLE Colón (Also from Baracoa. In charge of one of the militia regiments.)

06 Manuel PEREZ 08,10 (Municipal Treasurer, Baracoa. Decidedly anti-Castro.)

06 Taras DOMITRO (Held government position in Oriente. Known to be Anti-Castro.)

06 Captain Duque ESTRADA (Has helped the MRP)

The "Alcaldes" (Mayors) of 10 Guanajuay and 10 San Cristobal are believed to be against the regime.

06 José Angel ROMERO (A former businessman from Baracoa.)

06 Juan GUILLARON (Also from Baracoa. A public accountant.)

06 Elio HARDO (Former mayor of 10 Artemisa)

06
Heriberto DEL PORTO
Erasmo GOMEZ
José SANCHEZ
José MUZA
Danilo MESA
Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt
Manuel DORTA Duque
(Could be helpful in Havana Province.)

18/20

08

06 Agustín TORR
(From Camaguey. Former governor in 1959-60. Trusted by the original revolution.)

06 Osorio DAVILA
(Very respected in Matanzas. Also linked with the original revolution.)

06 Argelio MARTINEZ
10
(Former commissioner in Matanzas.)

06 José DEL RIO Lago
10
(A respected land surveyor in Pinar del Río. Former Commander of the July 26 Movement.)
08

The main center of conspiracy within the government against Castro, according to Ray, is the Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación.)

B - TRAINED PERSONNEL

1. The following list includes technicians working for the government under contract or as public officials. Those marked with an asterisk (*) are highly trusted by Ray.

08.
06 Arq. Joaquín SEBARES
Public Works, Oriente Province (Aguilera 558, Guantánamo)

06 * Arqu Carlos MARURI (Maruri, Jr.)
Municipality of Havana

08
06 * Arqu. Armando PUENTES
Public Works, Havana (Ave. 26 Between 29 & 27 Vedado))

06 * Arq. Marianao DOU Riera
Municipality of Havana
08 Sta. Catalina 360, Víbora, Havana

06 * Arq. Rodolfo SANCHEZ García
Public Works, Havana
25 - #5609, Marianao 08

06 * Arq. Fernando NUÑEZ de Villavicencia
Public Works, Oriente
Ave. 9-A #15007, Rpto. Cinódromo, Marianao, 08

06 * Arq. Gerardo OOKLEY Van Der Gutch (Public Works, Habana)
N #408 Between 27 & Jovellar, Havana
08

21/80

06 Arq. Julio ALDECOCEA 08
(Las Villas) Edfi. Retiro Odontológico 1302, Vedado.

06 ** Arq. José MARZOL Valenzuela
Professor at University of Havana
Soto #50 Corner 1st, Arroyo Narando 08

06 Arq. Antonia SUAREZ
Public Works, Havana
Ave. 11 #4813, Marianao 08

06 ** Arq. Joaquín PELAEZ Canellada,
INRA, Havana
Infanta No. 24 - Apt. 601, Havana 08

06 * Francisco LARA,
88 A - #5307, Marianao 08
Truck business

06 Messrs. Manuel and Mario LOPEZ
194 #6510 - Between 65 y 73 Marianao 08
Foremen in Public Works, Las Villas

06 * Arq. José CANAVES Ugalde 08
Ave. 26 & Zoológico, Havana

2. Other trained personnel, not connected with the government:

06 Arq. Pedro GUKSH (?),
Was in Public Works, Havana

06 * Arq. Felipe GOMEZ Albarrán (
Ex-professor University of Havana and Vilanova

06 * Arq. Carlos MOURIN
Was in Public Works, Havana
Ave. Zoológico 202, Vedado 08

06 Arq. Ricardo COROMINAS Gusport 08
28 No. 270 Bet. 21 and 23 Vedado

06 Arq. Alberto COURIEL 08
Calzada No. 1059 Corn of 14, Vedado

06 Arq. Rodolfo SOCARRAS Sanchez 08
Extension of Maceo, El Llano, [illegible]

06 Arq. Miguel ALCOLADO de la Torre 08
Máximo Gómez No. 3, Guantánamo

06 Arq. Rodulfo IBARRA Perez
President, National College of Architects, 08
15 No. 259, Vista Alegre, Santiago de Cuba.

06 * Arq. Sebastian J. RAVELO, 08
Terraza No. 155, Santiago de Cuba

06 Arq. Emilio CARBO, 08 No. 8610 Between 86 and 88, Miramar, Havana

06 Arq. Everardo GARCIA Fernández, 5a Ave., 6602 08
Marianao

06 * Mr. Anastasio ROSEMOND, Contractor 08
180 No. 4107 - Bet. 41 and 43, Marianao

06 Mr. Manolo RODRIGUEZ, Garage,
26 No. 502, Vedado 08

06 * Mr. Humberto RODRIGUEZ, 08
Plumber 60-A, 2114, Marianao

06 * Mr. Manuel LOBELLA,
Electrician - Marianao.

06 ** Arq. Antonio VIEGO,
Altahabana (Municipality of Marianao) 08

06 * Arq. José Roberto CEOMAT, Ex-Dean University, School of Architecture
3rd Ave. #130 - Bet. 12 & 14, Marianao

October 30, 1962

18/920

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DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief, Task Force W

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYROSE/AUBESK
Debriefing of Miguel Angel ORELLANA Rodriguez [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

1. Subject was removed from CAC on 3 [illegible] and taken to a safe site where he was debriefed for [illegible]. The [illegible] of the debriefing was to ascertain the Subject's [illegible] Cuba and determining if he had any relationship with the G-2 or any other Security organization.

2. During the course of the debriefing the Subject appeared to be willing to cooperate and there were no indications [illegible] attempt of deception. However, it is believed that the Subject is a sharp operator, an opportunist and an individual who lives by his wits. He is very verbose, loud and attempts to hold the floor at all times.

3. ORELLANA claims that he had no relationship with the Cuban G-2, that he knew Ramiro VALDES, Chief of the G-2, [illegible] Manuel PINEIRO, Deputy Chief of the G-2, but that he never conducted any business with them. He stated that he knew [illegible] by sight but never knew their names. He is of the opinion that all members of the G-2 are Communists and individuals of very low caliber.

4. Subject was granted asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy on 06, 08 [illegible] April 1962, which was obtained through the [illegible] of [Fernando RODRIGUEZ, leader of the Chauffeurs Union,] who knew the Uruguayan Ambassador. According to Subject he had to seek asylum in the Uruguayan Embassy because he was in danger of being picked up by the Cuban Security Services. He claims that in [illegible] 1961 he was engaged in the transportation of material and personnel from Habana to the "Segundo Frente" in the Escambray Mountains, in the Province of Santa Clara. At that time he was cooperating with 06 06 [Captain (fnu) SALAS, Elio BALMASEDA,] "Benito," "[illegible]," [illegible] GUTIERREZ Menoyo, [Kiko [illegible],] 06 [Captain Ramiro [illegible]] and [Bernardo PARALTA.] 06 According to Subject, an individual named "[illegible]" was arrested in March 1962 and during the course of his interrogation

(continued)

Attachment: herewith
History

Distribution:
3 - C/TFW w/att

18 Sept 62

UFGA-5775

201-[illegible]

SECRET

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CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

S E C R E T

by the Security Service, "[illegible]" [illegible] including the Subject. In view of [illegible] had [illegible]

5. [illegible] admitted that during the [illegible] engaged in negotiations for the purchase of [illegible] Batista. That during the month of September [illegible] he was in Los Angeles, California where he travelled [illegible] of purchasing arms from a John [illegible] of Los Angeles. He said that he did not purchase the arms from [illegible] but that he did make arrangements for the [illegible] elements to obtain these arms from [illegible]. It is believed that the Subject may have engaged in other [illegible] which he did not mention. This deduction is based on the information he provided in the attached Personal History Statement regarding his travel and the short term jobs he held in the past.

6. Subject also admitted that he was arrested on 26 April 1961 by the DTI because of his connection with a group engaged in the purchase and sale of U.S. currency in the black market. According to Subject he was a friend [illegible] of [illegible] who was engaged in the purchase of U.S. currency which he endeavored to take out of the country. Two of [illegible] associates, Vicente Benito [illegible] Hernandez and Juan [illegible], were arrested by the Security Services. Allegedly [illegible] and RODRIGUEZ informed the Security Services that the Subject knew the whereabouts of RAMOS. Subject was arrested and asked to provide the address of RAMOS. Subject denied that he knew RAMOS and after being held for four days he was bailed out by [illegible] and RODRIGUEZ, who were released a few days before the release of Subject.

7. Subject denies any association with the Communist Party, G-2 or any other Security Service. He claims that he hates Communism and is willing to do anything in his power to combat Communism and liberate Cuba. Subject [illegible] of [illegible] interest and was returned to [illegible] for [illegible]. [illegible] does not contemplate any future contact with [illegible]

8. JMWAVE traces reflect the following information on some of the individuals mentioned in this dispatch:

a. Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo - Probably identical with Subject of 201-283349; [redacted] [illegible] July [illegible] August 1961, [redacted] 1 September 1961; and [illegible], [illegible] 1961.

b. Aurelio SILVA - Probably identical with Aurelio SILVA, former member of Cuban National Police. See [illegible], 19 June 1961.

c. Domingo MENDEZ - Probably identical with [illegible] MENDEZ mentioned in HKH-03284, 28 September [illegible].

d. General Genovevo PEREZ Davera - Believed to be identical with Genovevo PEREZ Damera, one-time [illegible] of the Cuban Army. See HKHA-5580, 22 October 1955.

There are no identifiable traces on all other individuals mentioned in this dispatch.

END OF DISPATCH

ARMS
[illegible]

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

RB Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐ Signature:

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978.

SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. OCTOBER 1961

REFERENCES IN 11257

15-1

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)

23

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-30,995

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO. HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (43)

3/920

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536 PA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-239298 Pay
REF 19-11c-22

DATE : 24 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [LONDON] 15-1

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/DRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT ~~6, FI/D, BELL 5,~~ WH 16, WE 7, DD/I(A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, OS 2 S/C 2.

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
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Signature:

ROUTING	
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OCT 24 2131Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 11257

TDCS -3/490,978

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2
SUPDATA SOURCE [SMOTH]

TIME FILED 1310Z 23

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL [OEL]-30,995 CUBA

SUBJ STATEMENTS OF MANOLO RAY

DOI OCTOBER 1961
15-1
PADA [ENGLAND LONDON] 24 OCTOBER 1961
24
SOURCE [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

RI COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

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WH/PW	1	OS/SSD	1			XX	ROUTINE
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8/80

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

201-239218 30 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1735 19 JUN DD)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2 WHITE AND GREEN COPIES MATCHED

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IN63271

SECRET 1
7727Z

KPRITY DIR INFO PRITY MADR SJAN WAVE ROUTINE BRUS CITE PARI 9068

TYPIC

REF A PARI 9008 (IN 61964)* 19 JUN 1963

B PARI 9049 (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS) (IN 63094)

1. RAY CONTACTED BY JERVAY (UNDER IDEN A ALIAS) 17 AND 18 JUNE. IN ADDITION CONTACTS REPORTED PARA ONE PARI 8824 (IN 56769) RAY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT UNRUMBLE 6, UNPAPIST, AND AT LEAST ONE CONTACT WITH AMSPORT 1. RAY DESIGNATED UNRUMBLE 6 AS HIS CONTACT MAN PARI. JERVAY NOT INTRODUCED BUT WILL CONTACT SHORTLY. STA FEELS THIS IS GOOD MOVE SINCE UNRUMBLE 6 APPEARS BE GOOD MAN AND HAS APPROACHED EMB IN PAST SEPARATELY FROM UNRUMBLE 2 WITH SOME INTERESTING PLANS. STA DID NOT APPROACH HIM DIRECTLY IN PAST BECAUSE DID NOT WANT TO DISTURB RELATIONSHIP WITH UNRUMBLE 2. UNRUMBLE 2 WILL NEVERTHELESS BE WRITING UNRUMBLE 6 CURRENT RELATIONSHIP. RAY WAS DRIVEN AIRPORT BY ALBERTO BAEZ WITH WHOM RAY SPENT MUCH TIME AND WHO SEEMS BE CLOSEST TO RAY AMONG HIS CONTACTS PARIS.

2. CABRERA DID NOT PHONE OR COME PARIS OVER WEEKEND. WILL CONTINUE MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH UNRUMBLE 6.

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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3. RAY BELIEVES CABRERA WILL WORK ON ARCOS BUT SAYS MAN WHO COULD REALLY DO THE JOB IS ARCOS UNCLE WHO IN PUERTO RICO AND KNOWN TO RAY. HE COULD NOT REMEMBER NAME OR EXACT RELATIONSHIP BUT PLANS CONTACT HIM ON RETURN AND GROOM HIM FOR TASK. RAY ASKED BE INFORMED WHEN ARCOS RETURNS BRUS.

4. 24 KUBARK STAFFER (IDEN B) OF CONGRESS OF CULTURAL FREEDOM MET RAY AT LEAST TWICE. EXCELLENT RAPPORT. HE ARRANGED RAY'S PRESS INTERVIEW WITH GUILLON DE MOULINS (INCORRECTLY REPORTED IN PARA FIVE PARI 8947) (IN 60159) OF LE MONDE. ALSO ARRANGED DINNER 03 JUNE. WAS NONCOMMITAL BUT ENCOURAGING ABOUT JOB POSSIBILITY FOR FRANQUI SHOULD HE DEFECT.

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6/PN

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10. INDEX.

C/S COMMENT: *RAY DEPARTING PARI AF 015 ARRIVING NY 1300 HOURS 18 JU

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2/17V

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1735 19 JUN DO)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WE 4, WH 7, S/C 2

CT
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SAVAR
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IN63271

KPRITY DIR INFO PRITY MADR SJAN WAVE ROUTINE BRUS CITE PARI 9068

TYPIC

REF A PARI 9008 (IN 61964)

19 JUN 1963

B PARI 9049 (NOT SENT SJAN BRUS) (IN 63094)

1. RAY CONTACTED BY JERVAY (UNDER IDEN A ALIAS) 17 AND 18 JUNE. IN ADDITION CONTACTS REPORTED PARA ONE PARI 8824 (IN 56769) RAY HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT UNRUMBLE 6, UNPAPIST, AND AT LEAST ONE CONTACT WITH AMSPORT 1. RAY DESIGNATED UNRUMBLE 6 AS HIS CONTACT MAN PARI. JERVAY NOT INTRODUCED BUT WILL CONTACT SHORTLY. STA FEELS THIS IS GOOD MOVE SINCE UNRUMBLE 6 APPEARS BE GOOD MAN AND HAS APPROACHED EMB IN PAST SEPARATELY FROM UNRUMBLE 2 WITH SOME INTERESTING PLANS. STA DID NOT APPROACH HIM DIRECTLY IN PAST BECAUSE DID NOT WANT TO DISTURB RELATIONSHIP WITH UNRUMBLE 2. UNRUMBLE 2 WILL NEVERTHELESS BE WITTING UNRUMBLE 6 CURRENT RELATIONSHIP. RAY WAS DRIVEN AIRPORT BY ALBERTO BAEZ WITH WHOM RAY SPENT MUCH TIME AND WHO SEEMS BE CLOSEST TO RAY AMONG HIS CONTACTS PARIS.

2. CABRERA DID NOT PHONE OR COME PARIS OVER WEEKEND. WILL CONTINUE MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH UNRUMBLE 6.

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10. INDEX.

C/S COMMENT: *RAY DEPARTING PARI AF 015 ARRIVING NY 1300 HOURS 18 JUNE

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ATE : 19 AUG 62

O : DIRECTOR
ROM : MEXICO CITY
CTION: TFW 10
IFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 TFW/SA 4 PA/PROP
2 5
3 6

AUG 19 0125Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 47827

DIR INFO SJAN WAVE CITE MEXI 1743

GYROSE

REF DIR 30436 (OUT 66673)*

01, 24

1. JEREMY K BENADUM, WHO HANDLES [LITEMPO VISA] CHANNEL, BELIEVES PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE GET MEXICAN VISA BY APPROACHING MEXICAN CONSUL MIAMI OR SJAN. PROBLEM IS GETTING GOBERNACION VISA PERMIT. GOBERNACION HAS LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF APPLICATIONS STACKED UP ON WHICH ACTION NORMALLY BUROCRATICALLY SLOW ANYWAY AND ON WHICH GOBERNACION DOES NOT REALLY DESIRE TAKE ACTION, BECAUSE OF DANGER CUBANS WILL BECOME PUBLIC CHARGES. BEST CHANCE IS FOR ANY HIGH LEVEL MEXICAN OFFICIAL IN MEXICO CITY FRONT FOR AMBANG-1 AND FOLLOW UP CASE CLOSELY THROUGH GOBERNACION. NEXT BEST CHANCE IF A-1 HAS NO SUCH HIGH LEVEL CONTACT IS TO USE ANY CUBAN FRIEND OF HIS MEXI WHO HAS SUCH HIGH LEVEL MEXICAN CONTACT. THIS IS USUAL METHOD. USE OF 24, 01 [STATION LITEMPO] CHANNEL WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BURN ODYOKE INTEREST IN A-1 BECAUSE 24 [HIGH LEVEL GOBERNACION OFFICIALS] SOMETIMES KNOWINGLY USE 01 24 [LITEMPO VISA] CHANNEL THEMSELVES FOR "PERSONAL INTEREST" CASES AND MIGHT VERY WELL BE USING 24 [THE CHANNEL] THEMSELVES 08 [IN A-1'S CASE.] IF BY COINCIDENCE 08 [A-1'S CUBAN FRIEND] MEXI HAPPENED TO APPROACH THEM. STATION HAS NOT DISCOURAGED SUCH USE

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DATE :		ROUTING	
TO :		1	4
FROM :		2	5
ACTION:		3	6
INFO :			

PAGE 2 IN 47827 MEXI 1743

OF THE [CHANNEL] 24 BECAUSE IT TENDS TO HELP EVERYONE WHO "IN ACT" TO KEEP MOUTHS SHUT AND TO KEEP [CHANNEL] 24 FROM BEING BRANDED AS EXCLUSIVELY [ODYOKE.] 01

2. WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR A-1 TO ~~Z~~TRY ON HIS OWN AS INDICATED BUT [MEXI] 24 CAN AND WILL ON REQUEST INITIATE AND FOLLOW THROUGH ON ACTION. IMPORTANT THING IS THAT ACTION NOT BE CARRIED ON BY A-1 AND [STATION] 24 SIMULTANEOUSLY. THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR [STATION] 24 TO INTERVENE WITH MEXI CONSUL MIAMI ONCE VISA PERMIT ISSUED IF NO QUESTION A-1 CAN PROVE HIS ABILITY REENTER PBPRIME WITH SOME DOCUMENT. IF SUCH QUESTION ARISES, MEXI CONSUL WILL PROBABLY CONTACT [STATION CASE OFFICER] 24 (IN ODACID [COVER ROLE) 32] ON OWN. IF NOT A-1 CAN SUGGEST CALLING THEIR USUAL ODACID CONTACT MEXI.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE OBTAINING VISA FOR AMBANG/1.

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3 Jan. 64

TSD/CAP MEMO #646
3 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Special Affairs Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. A. Rodriquez

SUBJECT : Radio Switch Equipment for Demolition Firing Purposes

03 1. After our conversation on 03 this subject on 30 December, the question was discussed with Mr. Jay Alpern, TSD/AOB, and Mr. Lee Poole, TSD/QRF. The following information is forwarded for your consideration as a result of our discussions.

2. Mr. 03 Alpern, Audio Operations Branch, recommends two companies as sources of equipment of this nature. These companies have experience, under classified contracts with TSD, in producing reliable equipment for special purposes of this sort. They also, of course turn out commercial equipment of good quality for normal communications needs. These companies are:

29,08

a. Motorola, Chicago, Illinois
b. Kell, Cambridge, Massachusetts 29,08

29,29

The TSD VHF radio switch equipment for demolition needs was developed for us by Motorola. 'Kell-Com' transistorized sets have been produced to meet the special needs (not for demolition purposes) of other SAS projects.

3. In the opinion of both persons consulted, the expenses noted in our first discussion should have produced a reasonable amount of workable equipment if the source was both capable and reliable. TSD recommends the use of frequencies in the VHF/UHF spectrum for equipment of this sort and crystal tuning control for reasons of reliability, selectivity and rejection of spurious signals.

4. Inexpensive equipment of Japanese or American manufacture in the citizen's band frequency ranges for toys, radio control devices,

6/pj

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short range communications, etc., is available from many manufacturers. Our Quick Reaction Facility can produce a small number of radio switches based on these devices with a considerably lesser degree of security from false signal triggering with a lead time of 6 to 8 weeks. Simple mechanical protection against accidental triggering can be gained by inclusion of counting switches, for example, which require a preset number of firing impulses intentionally transmitted to produce the final closure of a relay and firing of a charge.

5. Reliability of operation in terms of response to a transmitted signal of a given power is quite difficult to predict when conditions of antenna length, orientation and exposure cannot be foreseen. Location of the receiver in a target building will also have a strong bearing on 'range' from the transmitter. Building construction, intervening obstacles and interference from other nearby radio frequency sources will affect performance of the set.

6. If you wish to discuss the problems in greater depth, we recommend a conference with audio technicians or engineers. It may serve to clarify the appropriate characteristics which special or m modified commercial equipment should possess to meet the needs of your operation. Problems of camouflaging the explosive or incendiary material to serve operational requirements would be minor compared to the necessary consideration of effects on the receiver switch concealed within which could have important effects on performance.

AUSTIN M. JONES
C/TSD/CAB/SD

03

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2-C/SAS

'/P

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2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG-1

1. I met with AMBANG-1 on 27 July 1963 in Miami. The following is a resume of the business transacted at that meeting.

a. Request for High Explosives

AMBANG-1 stated that in view of my outline of strategic targets inside Cuba during our last meeting which took place in Washington on 21 June 1963, he had decided to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant. He informed me that he has a man employed in the power plant in Havana who is capable of launching this operation. In this connection AMBANG-1 asked if we could make available twenty pounds of high explosives as well as six to eight thermite grenades. AMBANG-1 asked if it were possible to have the twenty pounds broken into smaller lots. In our further discussion of this subject, it became apparent that A-1 would be willing to receive the materiel either in San Juan or inside Cuba, but that he definitely preferred the latter if this were possible. Like in most other instances during our conversation, I advised AMBANG-1 that I would need to discuss this matter with my superiors but that I could tentatively assure him of our ability and willingness to furnish the high explosives in San Juan and possibly inside Cuba. At this point I asked AMBANG-1 if he could foresee the need for materiel of this type inside Cuba. I told him that I asked this question because if his group were prepared now or in the near future for meaningful sabotage action inside Cuba it was conceivable that we could begin the caching of needed materiel inside Cuba. AMBANG-1 assured me that they were in a position to sabotage the electrical plant in Havana. (I did not ask, neither did he specify which plant.) He did not promise immediate action, adding that he wanted to assure himself of the details of the planned operation and the safety-odds of the man involved. A-1 then indicated that he would certainly be in a position to accomplish this mission and others in the future and would be most grateful for any materiel we could put in place. I left the matter with him with the understanding that if it were possible we would proceed with caching the high explosives in the general area of Havana. He assured me of their capability to service and retrieve the cache.

b. Request for Contact in Guantanamo

AMBANG-1 asked me if it would be possible for us to arrange some means for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo and talk to his brother who is an employee of the Naval Base and another agent of theirs likewise employed there. The reason A-1 gave for the request was that they wished to inform Ramon Cisneros Diaz of the JURE plans to begin the implementation of their plan of resistance and overthrow of the Castro Regime. I advised A-1 that whereas I would look into this matter as I could tentatively tell him that the chances of accomplishing this were remote.

c. AMBANG-1 Political Plans

AMBANG-1 informed me that he was planning at this time to be in New York on or about 10 August and that following this trip he intended to go to Santo Domingo and Caracas. In Santo Domingo he hoped to set up a small base for operations such as a small house on a farm near the shore which could be used for boat travel to Cuba. Once he had made such arrangements he intended to talk to President Juan Bosch telling him of the plan and asking his acquiescence if not support. AMBANG-1 intends to tell Bosch that he will not embarrass him and will go about his business in a secure and professional manner adding that if he should embarrass Bosch, the latter could disclaim him and A-1 would desist from any further activity there.

So far as AMBANG-1's trip to Caracas is concerned, that will be principally devoted to orienting the JURE representation in that city. In addition, AMBANG-1 will attempt to see and talk to Venezuelan Government officials including President Betancourt.

Some time after this trip AMBANG-1 intends to visit Central America principally Costa Rica and if he can procure a visa, Mexico. The purpose of all his travel is the raising of funds, the general tightening of his organization and discussions necessary to coordinate their efforts.

d. Isolation of Cuba.

AMBANG-1 made it exceedingly clear that the lifeline to his assets inside Cuba had been severely restricted when PAA flights were suspended. Nothing could suit AMBANG-1 more than to have these flights resumed. AMBANG-1's obviously great interest in the resumption of these flights was the most eloquent statement yet of his belief that he has a network, or that he can revive a network within Cuba. At least at this stage of JURE operations, AMBANG-1 does not appear to consider the infiltration of manpower as necessary.

AMBANG-1 stated that the use of flights from Spain and Mexico to Cuba was difficult and costly whereas the Miami-Havana run had been most useful in maintaining contact within Cuba. It was AMBANG-1's opinion that the resumption of PAA flights would be an operational boom to JURE and that whereas he could see Castro making some political capital out of the flights, he believed that some appropriate statement such as "there is no political significance but only a humanitarian and compassionate reason for the reestablishment of this link," would be sufficient to negate any political advantage by Castro.

e. AMBANG-1 Phasing Out of his Employment

AMBANG-1 gave me to believe that he is closing shop and giving up his position with the Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Viviendas where he is employed as an engineer in charge of building pre-cast concrete houses. AMBANG-1 stated that during the past week Governor Munoz Marin gave final authority for the erection of a plant to produce these houses in Puerto Rica. AMBANG-1 is torn with the thought of leaving this project which he believes will be most successful, and which would assure his livelihood, but he knows that he must devote himself to the fight against Castro. It is obvious to me that AMBANG-1 will within the next two months phase out of this employment to devote full time to the liberation of Cuba.

f. A JURE Radio Link

AMBANG-1 asked me if I would be able to assist him in the establishment of a San Juan-Caracas-Miami radio link. He explained that the JURE has spent a great deal of money on telephonic communications between these points and were most anxious to set up a means of radio communication in order to economize. I guess that AMBANG-1 could tell from my reaction that I was not too sympathetic to his request for he withdrew it almost as soon as he had made it. He went on to say that this was a problem which they could overcome and I presume that he will seek to establish such radio communications without our assistance.

g. Aerial Maps of Cuba

AMBANG-1 informed me that the JURE membership had brought out of Cuba an entire series of maps showing key roads, bridges, industrial plants, et al, which they had copied by the Aero Service Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. AMBANG-1 stated that they had received most of these photos from the Aero Service Corporation but that the 101 were still missing. He gave me the numbers of those missing and asked if we could procure them. I have since informed AMBANG-1 that it would perhaps be best it he could, or his organization, do this instead but that we would pay the travel of one of his men, should this prove necessary. Attached, hereto, is a copy of the missing photos in question.

h. JURE Organization and Strength

AMBANG-1 informed me that the membership of the JURE in San Juan was now at about 500 members and that each of these individuals makes a weekly contributionto the organization.

In addition there are large JURE organizations in Caracas, Venezuela and Dallas, Texas. There are according to AMBANG-1 a total of thirty delegations in Latin America, the U. S. A. and Europe. He cited as an example the delegation in San Francisco which had recently purchased a typewriter through the collection of green stamps. He added that Rogelio Cisneros had travelled to San Francisco some time ago to communicate with that group and to tighten its organizational activities.

i. AMBANG-1 Asks About ARTIME and the Activities in Central America

AMBANG-1 raised the question of Manuel ARTIME's activities in Central America and particularly in Nicaragua. He stated that any association with Somoza would not help in creating the mistique and political coloration necessary to inspire revolution and resistance from the non-Communists elements in Cuba. Whereas, I had expected AMBANG-1 to go into a long harangue as to the positive damage that ARTIME's actions with Somoza could cause, he left the matter at about this point. I agreed that the Somozas did not have a liberal political reputation throughout Latin America, but added that whatever Cubans could do from that or any vantage point against Communism in Cuba would in my estimation be helpful, -- while I am sure AMBANG-1 did not agree with me, he did not say so. In respect to ARTIME and Miro Cardona, whose name entered into the conversation later, AMBANG-1 took a fairly objective view. He stated that Miro had arrived in San Juan and that he wished him the best as he figured he had suffered enough. Insofar as ARTIME was concerned I gathered that AMBANG-1 might feel that the association with Somoza would not do ARTIME any good in a post-Castro Cuba. As AMBANG-1 is convinced that a government after Castro must be of a progressive liberal stripe, ARTIME was not doing himself any good by identifying himself with the Somozas.

j. A List of Cuban Diplomats

As AMBANG-1 had asked for a list of Cuban Diplomats abroad while we were in Paris, I advised him that such a list had been prepared and we would make it available to him. In this connection he asked if we could include the addresses of each of the Cuban installations. Speaking of diplomats, AMBANG-1 wanted to know if Ambassador Gustavo Arcos had returned from Prague. I informed him that I did not know. AMBANG-1 was most interested to learn that Franqui's wife and children had actually come out of Cuba, and indicated that he would intensify his efforts to maintain contact with Cuban Diplomat Cabrera Infante in Brussels as a means toward the eventual recruitment of Franqui.

k. AMBANG-1 Relation with Jorge Volsky

In conjunction with questions regarding propaganda sent to Cuba, and the JURE's general plans in this field, I asked A-1 about his relation with Jorge Volsky. A-1 stated that he considered Volsky to be an extremely able, serious newspaperman. He added that whereas he saw Volsky frequently on his trips to Miami, the latter did not work for him. A-1 stated that Volsky's work was a full-time job which left him little time to do anything else.

A-1 stated that JURE propaganda was produced by a twelve - man board.

A-1 added that the JURE expected to shortly introduce a statement on its position into Cuba.

l. AMBANG-1 Asks about Two Man Underwater Craft

A-1 asked if I knew anything about a two man type craft which travels through the water. I presume A-1 was talking about the "sea-sled." I advised him that I know little about this type craft, but in my opinion its usefulness for the type activity he had in mind was limited. AMBANG-1 would use this craft for the final phase of an infiltration effort. A-1 stated that this craft was being used at the hotel beaches in San Juan as a type of sporting activity. I will advise him that he could pursue this matter himself as all knowledge on this subject is publicly available.

24

m. AMBANG-1 Trained in [Simple Scorch System]

03

A WAVE technician, [Culver Ladd,] under the name of Mr. Lane trained A-1 to use a [simple scorch system] of S/W. A-1

24

3/PN

was given some eighty pills with which he will be able to make the "ink" used in this system of S/W. A-1 was pleased with the system, especially its simplicity. He will use the system to communicate with his chief delegate in Paris and undoubtedly other persons in Cuba as well as in the other JURE delegations.

n. AMBANG-1 is Writing an Article for Cuadernos

At the request of German Arcienegas, the famed Colombian intellectual, A-1 is preparing an article which is to be published in Cuadernos. The article will deal with the problems facing Latin America and how they can be resolved. A-1 will be in select company as Arcienegas has asked a number of prominent Latin American intellectuals for their views.

o. Communication Between AMBANG-1 and Case Officer

AMBANG-1 gave me the following addresses at which he can be reached:

Corporacion de Renovacion
Urbana y Viviendas
PARADA 31
Ponce de Leon,
Hato Rey
Puerto Rico Telephone No. 723-1671

(NOTE: This is not AMBANG's office or home, but that of a friend who is always able to reach A-1.)

Also:

Mr. Jaime Mitrani
1260 W. 61 Place
Hialeah, Florida

AMBANG-1 was given the following means of contacting me:

Mr. Alfred Fernandez
P.O. Box 1104, Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. Telephone No. 737-8294

AMBANG-1 will use the name "Tony" as a signature in mail to me.

2. General Observations

I beleive AMBANG-1 is planning to return to Cuba. He indicated that he would give the matter serious thought to even go in, disguised, as a legal traveller if that road were generally open, i. e., if rather large numbers of travellers were going in via PAA flights. This line seemed a bit out of character for A-1, for it seems unrealistic and somewhat remindful of Macaulay's references to the state of mind that exiles develop. I also detected what we consider to be a somewhat unrealistic appraisal of the Cuban situation in A-1's estimate that Castro has considerably less than 40% of the Cuban people with him. A-1 may be losing more than a little touch with Cuban reality.

A-1 remains convinced that he is on the right track in working for the eventual overthrow of Castro. He is convinced, however, that two to three years is all the time left for actually destroying the Castro regime, believing that there will be a favorable turn in the Cuban economic situation by late 1965. A-1 is likewise convinced that Castro cannot add to the improvement of Cuba, to the contrary that so long as the principal decisions are made by Castro, the general trend will be confusion arising from a failure to concentrate on specific problems until they are corrected.

AMBANG-1 is likewise convinced that the JURE is building a political group and general outlook which will have an impact on Cuba for many years to come. He is especially concerned with the need to carefully consider each position of his group in order to create the lasting impression that JURE knows where it is going and that its leadership is composed of men who know how to "run" a country without the false starts, confusion and chaos identified with the Castro regime.

AMBANG-1 is likewise greatly concerned with the necessity of not creating an impression inside Cuba that the JURE will return to mete out "justice." It is essential, A-1 states, to convince the general populace that the overthrow of Castro will not result in a bloodbath, rather that the sole aim is to save the revolution that has been betrayed. He is anxious that the people inside Cuba see the JURE as a responsible, intelligent and dispassionate group which is capable of bringing to Cuba all that the revolution promised.

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

Distribution:
1 - C/SAS
03
1 - SAS/Bolten; Hecksher; [Amori]
1 - Chrono
1 - RAY File

1/pV

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : SAN JOSE
ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 0323112 IN 54031

DIR INFO WAVE MANA CITE SJOS 6699 C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD CABLES.

REF: SJOS 5700 (IN 50434)

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD 52

1. UNDER COVER OF [ODACID POLIT OFFICER] MICHAEL H. MARTUFFI MET IDEN, VISITING "ENGINEERING CONSULTANT", AT HOME PAO ON 2 APRIL. IDEN REQUESTED PRIVATE TALK IN WHICH HE QUICKLY PUT FORTH THE REQUEST THAT MARTUFFI TELL HIM WHAT WAS KNOWN LOCALLY OF MANOLO RAY'S TRAINING EFFORT IN COSTA RICA. HE SAID "OUR GOVERNMENT ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT JURE GROUP DOING HERE" AS IF HE ODYOKE EMPLOYEE. MARTUFFI SAID PBSWING HAS HEARD RUMORS CUBAN ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PER RECENT SPEECH MANUEL MORA BUT NOTHING DEFINITE. IDEN SAID HE FRIEND MANOLO RAY AND "WE KNOW HE HAS BOUGHT 133 FOOT BOAT WHICH NOW IN PUERTO RICO" BUT DON'T KNOW WHO BACKS RAY FINANCIALLY.

2. IDEN VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND FULL-FLEDGED NAME DROPPER. HIS COMPANY RECENTLY SECURED CONTRACT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

80

ENTERED HAVA AIRPORT [illegible]. SAID HAD [illegible] EUROPE IN NEW YORK. VIEW HIS BACKGROUND AND ACTI[illegible] STATI[illegible] WONDERS IF HE KUBARKER AND IF NOT FOR WHOM DOES HE WORK. APPRECIATE INFO HIS STATUS IF ANY.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 030315Z IN 54034

DIR INFO WAVE MANA CITE SJOS 6703

DESENSITIZED REF SJOS 6693 (IN 54031)

RYBAT TYPIC AMWORLD

IDEN- ZACHARY DE CASTER OF SMITH AND GILLESPIE ENGINEERS, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD CABLES.

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

ROUTING

1	~~KOB~~	~~[illegible]~~	4	
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	EOB	~~[illegible]~~	LOG	CA
	~~CI~~	SI	BF	[illegible]
	☐		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : JMWAVE
ACTION : DC/WH/SA 3
INFO : DDP, VR

S E C R E T 270132Z

DIR INFO SJAN CITE WAVE 8556

27 J[illegible] IN 15975

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMBANG

1. ACCORDING AMFAST-6 REPORT 25 JUNE, AMBANG-1 INFORMED PEPE GATILLO (JOSE GARCIA VALDEZ) THEIR DEPARTURE DATE FOR PBRUMEN WOULD BE 1 JULY. BOAT TO BE USED IS UNNAMED RYBOVITCH RENTED IN FORT LAUDERDALE AND SUPPOSED BE AT INTERNATIONAL MARINE DOCK 26 JUNE. BELIEVED BE 31-FOOTER WITH TWO CHRYSLER ENGINES EACH 280 HORSE POWER AND SPEED 35 KNOTS. AMBANG-1, GATILLO AND MECHANIC TO USE RYBOVITCH WHILE 1950 GREEN CHRIS CRAFT, OWNED BY ARMANDO ACOSTA AND NOW AT ANACAPRI PIER, 1884 NW NORTH RIVER DRIVE, MIAMI TO SERVE AS MOTHER SHIP AND BE OCCUPIED BY ARMANDO ACOSTA, ORLANDO "BEBO" ACOSTA SUAREZ (201-297784), AND BILL CHUS (SCHUSS? 201-281273), AMBANG INTEL CHIEF, CHUS TO SERVE AS MECHANIC AND GO ASHORE WITH AMBANG-1.

2. GATILLO TOLD AMFAST-6 THAT HE AND AMBANG-1 TO LEAVE AT 0500 ON 1 JULY AND TO MEET OTHER BOAT AT 0900 SAME MORNING OFF

SECRET

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Copy No.

Ambang 1

PBPRIME COAST WHERE CHRIS CRAFT TO SUPPLY RYBOVITCH WITH 200 GALLONS GASOLINE. THEY EXPECT ARRIVE COJIMAR ABOUT 20 HOURS AFTER DEPARTURE. ON THEIR ARRIVAL THEY TO BE MET BY [RAUL PEREZ, AKA "MIRRINGA," CALLE REAL 138, COJIMAR,] WHO TO TAKE THEM HABANA. [PEREZ'] WIFE'S NAME [ROSA.] 06

06, 08

06

3. GATILLO BELIEVES AMBANG-1 ACTUALLY PLANS LEAVE BEFORE 1 JULY BUT HE DOES NOT WANT ANYONE KNOW EXACT DATE. HE HAS TOLD ALL THOSE GOING WITH HIM BE READY BEFORE 1 JULY.

4. ON 24 JUNE GATILLO TOLD AMFAST-6 THAT AMBANG-1 WOULD REMAIN PBRUMEN ABOUT 15 DAYS IN ORDER COORDINATE PLAN OF ACTION WITH PEOPLE THERE AND IN ORDER TO SEE CERTAIN PEOPLE CLOSE AMTHUG-1 WHO PLOTTING WITH AMBANG-1. DATE TO RETURN TO PBRUMEN AND PICK UP AMBANG-1 TO BE SET AT TIME AMBANG-1 LANDS PBRUMEN. AMBANG-1 PLANS CALL ALL ORGANIZATION MEMBERS FOR VERY IMPORTANT MEETING AT WHICH TIME HE TO DEPART FOR PBRUMEN INSTEAD. THIS TO BE 27 OR 28 JUNE.

José? 311334

5. GATILLO ALSO TOLD AMFAST-6 ON 24 JUNE THAT NICOLAS SALADO MATA LEFT 23 JUNE FOR WEST PALM BEACH BY TRUCK WITH TRAILERED BOAT WHICH BELONGS AMBANG ORGANIZATION. MOTOR OF BOAT TO BE REPAIRED IN WEST PALM BEACH AND THEN BOAT TO BE SHIPPED PUERTO RICO ABOARD FERRY. GATILLO SAID TWO MEN CLAIMING BE ODENVY AGENTS WENT TO PIER LOOKING FOR SALADO AND BOAT. THEY ANGRY TO FIND BOTH GONE. GATILLO COMMENTED THEY DID NOT LOOK LIKE ODENVY AGENTS AND HE DOUBTS THEY

3/PV

WERE. AMOT TRACES REVEAL JOSE NICOLAS SALADO MATA BORN 15 MAY 25 IN ISABELA DE SAGUA, LAS VILLAS, LEFT PBRUMEN 25 SEPT 61 AND ARRIVED WAVE AREA ON OLGA ON 27 SEPT. ASSIGNED NUMBER A 12 490 730. WAS FISHERMAN AND KNOWS NORTH COAST VARADERO VERY WELL. (SEE (W/13/63) WAVE 8375, NOT SENT SJAN, FOR ALLEGED REPORT SALADO TOOK ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO PBRUMEN.)

6. ACCORDING AMRAZZ-1 REPORT 24 JUNE, MAX LESNICK SAID ON 23 JUNE THAT AMBANG-1 INVITED NEW YORK BY CHIEF LATIN AMERICAN SECTION TIME MAGAZINE AND THAT HE LEAVING FOR NEW YORK MORNING 24 JUNE. LESNICK SAID AMBANG-1 TOLD HIM HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK CONCERNED PUBLICITY WHICH APPEARED TIME ABOUT HIS ARREST AND TELEGRAM OF PROTEST WHICH HE HAD SENT TO TIME ABOUT FALSENESS PUBLICITY. LESNICK TOLD AMRAZZ-1 HE VERY CONFIDENT AMBANG-1 WOULD LEAVE FOR PBRUMEN WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

7. ON 25 JUNE AMRAZZ-1 SAID ED REINGOLD OF TIME TOLD HIM ON 24 JUNE THAT AMBANG-1 HAD GONE NEW YORK THAT DAY TO MEET WITH HIS BOSS GEORGE DANIELS AND THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE BACK WAVE AREA 25 JUNE. REINGOLD DISCLAIMED INTENTION MAKING FUN AMBANG-1 IN HIS ARTICLE. HE SAID HE HAD NOT MENTIONED ANYTHING TO EFFECT THAT AMTHUG-1 MUST BE LAUGHING AT HIM AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN PUT IN BY NEW YORK RE-WRITE MAN WHO DOES NOT LIKE AMBANG-1.

8. ACCORDING AMTAUP-2, IN DD-980 OF 24 JUNE, WHO TALKED WITH AMBANG-1 ON 23 JUNE, AMBANG-1 SAID HE GOING ZRMETAL 24 JUNE. AMOT

14-00000

AGENT ACCIDENTALLY OBSERVED AMBANG-1 LEAVE HOUSE AT NW 38TH ST AND 19TH AVE AT 9:45 24 JUNE AND PROCEED TO JACKSON BYRONS WHERE HE WAS MORNING 24 JUNE. (WAVE COMMENT: AMBANG-1 MAY HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING LEAK MISLEADING INFO TO PRECLUDE DISCOVERY HIS ACTUAL WHEREABOUTS.)

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Base, Munich   Xx

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, EE
PERUMEN
[Liaison LfV] - PERUMEN Group in Bavaria
24

REFERENCE: EGMT 8907, 13 August 1963

The information requested in Reference is being sent to you under separate cover. This report, is the latest information 24 available on Subject Resistance Group and may be passed to the [LfV.]

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PRESTON C. HUVKEN

Attachment: UNDER SEPARATE COVER
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - MOB W/Att USC
2 - COS W/O Att

Group 1
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Downgrading and
Declassification.

EGMW 12948   17 October 1963

23
[BSW-]120-28

03

HQS Distribution:
1 - EE/C/ID
1 - RI
~~1~~ - EE/G/W
1 - EE/G/CE
1 - SAS/EOB

EE/G/W [Ernest A. Lewis] jay 4282

C/EE/G/CE   E. Wagner (Coord in draft)

SAS/EOB

17 NOV. 63

03
C/EE/G/W [WESTON C. PARKER]

5/pf

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID
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PROPER FILE NO.

FROM

RID

RID/AN
EXT. 4239

CA 50
TUBE GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/E		23 APR 1970		S
2. Burke				g
3. Vasquez				Bv
4. Ennis				E
5.				
6. Meier		8 May		Km
7. Burke				g
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. Mary Paul				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Per your request

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Per request. See attached sheets.

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1970
DOC. MICRO SER.

08465

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT ✓	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 19-5-42
	INDEX ✗	

DATE MICROFILMED

3

DOCUMENT DATE 14 Apr 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04862 ✓

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH/COG

INFO: Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI; Chief, Domestic Operations

FROM: Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMROSE/DOMOPS
Current Analysis of Cuban UN Mission and DGI Center in New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Transmitted herewith are one copy each for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI of the April 1970 Cuban Official Presence Listing as prepared by the local LNERGO Cuban Squad. The under-signed has added on the 201 numbers, indicated CUIS affiliation, added two names and deleted one. The departure dates for several CMUN personnel also are noted. The listing, thus, is valid as of 10 April.

2. According to LNERGO, only two CMUN working wives are officially carried on LNERGO records. Maria BERMUDEZ Garcia, wife of Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), and Consuelo HORTA Larrinaga, wife of Pablo DRAKE Capiro (201-815821). BERMUDEZ, because of the impending departure of the VIERAs on 14 April, can be deleted from the listing. Additionally, other CMUN wives work or have worked in the past on a sporadic basis (such as Teresita FERNANDEZ Aranga, wife of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-330002). However, only BERMUDEZ and HORTA of late have been regular local employees.

3. Addressees will note the preponderance of DGI personnel on the CMUN roster. Of the 18 (excluding Rolando PEREZ Alfonso) personnel on board as of 10 April, 12 are DGI. Interestingly enough, 6 non-DGI personnel is a higher number than has been the rule over the past several years; at one point there were only 3 non-DGI personnel, including the Ambassador/Permanent Representative. Of these,12, two (DRAKE and CADALSO) are code clerks detailed to the DGI Center from the DSE. Two others (REYES Goicochea and SANTIAGO) are the "architect"

Attachment:
As stated - Para 1 - h/w.

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/att. h/w. ✓
2 - Chief of Station, MIAMI, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, DO, w/o att.

1 Att

no copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
11200-9-52	UNDA-4862	13 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-500 19-5-42

and the mason assigned here temporarily to work on the CMUN secure rooms and security systems (see previous reporting for details). Thus, 8 personnel are left for espionage operating purposes. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665) probably serves now as the Deputy to Center Chief PRENDES. Allowing for the impending departures of Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Jose Raul VIERA Linares, and Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, the DGI Center will now consist of:

✓Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez

✓Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

✓Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez

✓Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz — 951 ✓

✓Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez

Ruben Rafael FRANCO Gonzalez ✓

✓Raul REYES Goicochea

✓Roberto SANTIAGO Humet

✓Pablo DRAKE Capiro

Rafael CADALSO Bandomo

LA [illegible] PROCESSED

4. As will be noted, the departure of Jorge REYES Vega (in March) and the impending departures of VIERA and PINERO will change the complexion of the DGI Center considerably. If they are not replaced for one reason or another (per other reporting), the DGI Center will have but four experienced and competent Case Officers at its disposal. Of these, PRENDES spends by far the bulk of his time inside the office pursuing his role of supervisor/manager. RODRIGUEZ is a handler. GELABERT and SANTANA are mainly concerned with operational support tasks -- GELABERT is the Center's best counter-surveillant, and SANTANA is the technical "expert" of the Center. PEREIRA is a handler, but his abilities are rather limited in this regard, per Base and LNERGO information and observations. Should the departees not be replaced, the Center may be forced de facto into a cutback of operational activity.

5. We shall watch with interest the behavior patterns of the DGI Center in the near future, in light of the above and in light of other recent reporting re the status of the DGI abroad.

Howard G. FIGALAN

19-6 42

SECRET

4P

Cuban Mission to the United Nations
6 East 67th Street
New York, New York
April 6, 1970

[illegible] members of Cuban UN mission as of 10 Apr 1970

		Pct.
FR ✓ ALARCON QUESADA, RICARDO		19
Position	(201-347590)	Ambassador
Residence		1175 York Ave., Apt. 6D, NYC
Phone		PL 2-0123
Dependents		MARGARITA PEREZ, wife; (R coded) MARGARITA ALARCON, daughter; BLANCA MAZA PEREZ, mother-in-law
FR ✓ ALOM GIL, JULIO		17
Position	(201-851731)	First Secretary
Residence		Cuban Mission to the UN 251 E. 51st St., Apt. 10L
Phone		593-0480
Dependents		MARITELA LARRAMENDI RODES, wife, born 4/10/36; LENA ROSA ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 11/22/64; LAURA ESTHER ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 5/11/67 (R coded)
FR ✓ DE SOUZA, ANTONIO	~~(20-354048)~~ 201-UNK	110
Position		Adviser
Residence		83-10 35th Ave., Apt. 6U, Jackson Heights, NY
Phone		TW 9-9282
Dependents		ALICIA MATEOS DE SOUZA, wife; (R coded) ANA MARIA, daughter, born 2/7/54; ALICIA ANTONIA, daughter, born 6/23/51
FR ✓ DRAKE CAPIRO, PABLO	(201-815821)	19
Position		Attache
Residence		Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone		UN 1-5250 (R coded)
Dependents		CONSUELO HORTA LARRINAGA, wife

Detailed DGI - code clerk
arrived October '69

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APR 23 1970
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H/w att/to [illegible]

19-5-42

SECRET

	Pct.
FR ✓ FRANCO GONZALEZ, RUBEN RAFAEL	19
Position	Attache
DGI Residence (201-857465)	370 E. 69 St., Apt. 5K
Phone	---
FR ✓ GELABERT MARTINEZ, JUSTO CESAR	17
DGI Position	Attache
Residence (201-839221)	61-15 97th St. Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M
Phone	699-5526
FR ✓ JIMENEZ PADRON, FLORENTINO	10
Position	Attache (chauffeur)
Residence (201-850953)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependents	AGUEDA MARTINEZ GARCIA, wife, born 4/15/37 (R coded)
FR ✓ MORALES CARBALLO, PEDRO A.	17
Position	Counsellor, CMUN
Residence (201-850951)	400 E. 55th St., Apt. 16
Phone	593-2431
Dependents	MARIA ANGELINA DE LOS REYES, wife, born 2/2/41; MARIANELA MORALES DE LOS REYES, daughter, born 11/10/64; PEDRO CESAR MORALES DE LOS REYES, son, born 7/31/69; ISABEL BERMUDEZ DIEZ, born 4/18/07 (R coded)
FR ✓ PEREIRA GONZALEZ, ORLANDO F.	19
Position	First Secretary
DGI Residence (201-848605)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependent	MARIA DE LOS ANGELES LOPEZ CANAS, wife, 3/1/47 (R coded)
FR ✓ PEREZ ALFONSO, ROLANDO	19
Position	Attache
Detailed DGI - Residence (201-836757)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
Codeclerk Phone	UN 1-5250
Dependent	MARIA DE LAS MARTINEZ LARA, wife (R coded)

Leaving c/A 11 April 1970 PCS. — [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

			Pct.
FR	PINERO ETRIN, PEDRO LUIS		19
DGI	Position	(201-824376)	Third Secretary
	Residence		401 E. 74th St., Apt. 5K, NYC
Leaving soon	Phone		861-2468 (K coded)
	Dependent		JUANA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, wife
FR	PREDES GUTIERREZ, ORLANDO		19
DGI - Center Chief	Position	(201-330002)	First Secretary
	Residence		201 E. 66th St., Apt. 7H, NYC
	Phone		249-0324 (K coded)
	Dependent		TERESITA FERNANDEZ ARANGO DE PREDES, wife
FR	REYES GOICOCHEA, RAUL		19
DGI	Position	(201-859874)	Attache
	Residence		Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67th St., NYC
	Phone		UN 1-5250
FR	REYES VEGA, JORGE E.		20
DELETE: DGI	Position	(201-816437)	Second Secretary
departed PCS on	Residence		15 W. 72nd St., Apt. 17H, NYC
7 March 1970	Phone		787-0544
	~~Dependent~~ [illegible]		MARIELA REYES, daughter
FR	RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO		110
DGI	Position	(201-332665)	First Secretary
	Residence		Park Plaza Apartments 61-15 97th St., Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M
	Phone		699-5526
FR	SANTANA FRAIZ, MIGUEL M.		19
DGI	Position	(201-816439)	Attache
	Residence		345 E. 81st St., NYC, Apt. 5J
	Phone		UN 1-5862
FR	SANTIAGO HUMET, ROBERTO		19
DGI	Position	(201-859875)	Attache
	Residence		Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC
	Phone		UN 1-5250

		Pct.
FF VIERA LINARES, JOSE		10
DGI	Position (201-328953)	Counselor
	Residence	305 E. 72nd St., Apt. 2E, NYC
Leaving PCS	Phone	AG 9-2877
14 April 1970	Dependents	MARIA BERMUDEZ GARCIA, wife; (Recalled) JULIO ANTONIO VIERA y BERMUDEZ, son; ISABEL BEATRIZ VIERA y BERMUDEZ, daughter.

ADD ON:

FR FERNANDEZ Padilla, Victoria		17
	POSITION (201-340661)	ATTACHE
	RESIDENCE	220 E. 63rd St., Apt. 5 M, NYC
	PHONE	------
	DEPENDENTS	None
FR CADALSO Bandomo (n), Rafael		
Detailed DGI -	POSITION (201-866098)	Attache
Code clerk	RESIDENCE	CMUN, 6 E. 67th St., NYC
Arrived early	PHONE	UN 1-5250
April 1970	DEPENDENTS	NANCY GUIROLA MAZAURRIETA, wife; (Recalled) RAFAEL CADALSO GUIROLA, son; MARLEN CADALSO GUIROLA, daughter

10-5-47

5-9-3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 081
29 MAR 62 JO

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : DDP, COP, CA 2, ~~CA/PMG, CA/PAG,~~ CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 6, FI/D, ~~TFW 5, TOD 4, WH 8, PO/T~~ AD/CI 2, S/C 2

3P

ROUTING
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MAR 29 0507Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 10495

TDCS-3/506,346

DIR GUAT INFO PACY LANT CITE MEXI 0408

INTEL

SUPDATA LINLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. RE PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LINLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY. FILED 290005Z REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL HMM 6283 GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 62 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 62 APR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

INDEX

MAY 1 1962

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SECRET

35-9-9

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO

SUBJECT PGT VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/506,346

DATE DISTR. 29 MARCH 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 10495

DATE OF INFO. 24 MARCH 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (24 MARCH 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 6283

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO.

H

1. VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, HEAD OF THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT-GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY) IN MEXICO, SAID ON 24 MARCH 62 THAT THE PGT IN GUATEMALA REGRETS THE WAY IN WHICH THE GUERRILLA FIGHT HAS DEVELOPED THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PGT, THE RESULTS OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP (MEMBER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER 1960 ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT) HEADED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE PGT ALSO REGRETS THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO (PUR-EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY) HEADED BY CARLOS PAZ TEJADA WERE INTERCEPTED AND

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	FBI

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN CONDITIONS WERE NOT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM. ACCORDING TO THE PGT THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS, WITH THE LOSS OF "MIDDLE RANK COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND NATIONAL LEADERS." THE PGT CONSIDERS IT A "MIRACLE" THAT PAZ TEJADA WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, THE PGT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, WILL SOON FALL.

2. THE MAIN HOPE OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME. H

69. 6 1 NOC

3. GUTIERREZ SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ as LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT "THE PERSON FROM CUBA WHO IS GOING TO TAKE OVER RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HERE IN MEXICO, STILL HAD NOT ARRIVED." RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE MAJOR ALFONSO PRERA, A LEADER OF THE NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO, ON 24 MARCH.

subject, Mar 62

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, RID [illegible]

S E C R E T 232339Z

[illegible] DIR CITE WAVE 5149

~~DESENT~~ DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PERUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

24 NOV 64 IN 28944

INDEXED AND CONTROL [illegible]
MATCHED

ROUTING	INITIAL
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
CWHSA	CK

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The [illegible]
auth[illegible] de-sensitize

Signed: Nancy E. Strickland

R.O. # [illegible] 11/1/06

Note: [illegible]

AMKNOB Sol

CS COPY

201-332665

23 NOV 64

~~201-330759~~

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CI/OH/3

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, [illegible]

SECRET 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

IN 26844

TYPIC DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

REF MEXI 1660 (IN 26958) *

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: desensitize

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #179 - Unit 10N/cex

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

SECRET

201-332665

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
EDSEL USUALLY DRIVEN BY SUBJ, CUBAN DIP AND SUSPECTED G-2 AGENT. MAR 62.

201-067886
MEXI-02883
19 DEC 62
P1

PCZR
1222779

1 222 779

P-7365

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
SECRET
(7-60)

7 Sept 1962

18:07 [illegible] ... responde que no.

22 Sept 1962

(3365)

13:25 FAVIO RUIZ, de la Universidad Latinoamericana de La Habana, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ por el compañero VIDOPIA. ROGELIO informó que hoy salió para Cuba en el vuelo regular de Cubana.

(2812)

VIDORIA?

27 Sept 1962

(0432)

17:10 JERRIN, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, reservó pasaje para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ en el vuelo de mañana en Cubana de Aviación.

17:34 DOLORES DE LA SERRA pidió a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ le traiga a su regreso de Cuba las "medidas de los zapatos de quien tú ya sabes, porque como le gustan mucho las botas de por acá, yo quisiera regalarle unas". ROGELIO cumplirá el encargo.

EMBAJADA DE CUBA.-
L 30. X 30. Tel. 14-13-26.-
10 septiembre 62.-

2

files

#6

1134. Entrada 1535.- HF pregunta por VEGA y HD informa que-- no está; pregunta si quiere darle algún recado y HF dice que sí, que le diga que le habló ALVAREZ (VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ); que el asunto que le encargó el sábado, ya está resuelto, que por favor le avise a Dn. ROGELIO, que éste no tenga pena, porque su asunto ya está arreglado. HD: muy bien.- 1153. -

- -

7365

X RODRIGUEZ Lopez

1-7365

M.-

50-9-3-3

A
~~Win~~
~~Warren~~
~~Jack~~
Reports

7 Sept 62

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On 6 Sept 62, LITAMIL-7 told LITAMIL-3 that Subject has arrived in Mexico. She added that she was told not to put Subject on the Diplomatic List, orders from Cuba.

Subj arrived inMexico on 3 Sept 62 via Cubana Airlines - (LIFIRE B/2)

CKS

Cary J, EIP III

P

FILE: XXX Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
LOPEZ

P-7365

SECRET

6 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR :

FROM :

SUBJECT : Jose Miguel [illegible] LASURTO

REFERENCE : Legal Attache Memorandum dated 6 July 1962, Same Subject

1. Our Mexico City files contain no identifiable reference to subject.

7365

2. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, contacted one Gabino FERNANDEZ on 26 September 1961 and arranged to meet with him. On [illegible] February 1962 Gabino FERNANDEZ received an invitation from the Cuban Embassy to attend a film showing at the Cuban Cultural Office, Tokio 63. This information is from a sensitive reliable source and should not be disseminated outside your organization.

#5248

P-7365

Orig - Addressee
cc - Liaison with LA
R cc - 50-9-3-3 (Index names)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: July 2, 1962

To:

From:

Subject: JOSE MIGUEL ABREU BASURTO

Dean
Stewart

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

A source has advised that captioned individual, described as a Cuban national, is reportedly a resident of the state of Nevada. He allegedly makes frequent trips to Mexico from Nevada, and on occasions has traveled from Mexico City to Cuba, returning to the United States via Mexico.

While in Mexico City, captioned individual reportedly resides with Lic. GABINO FERNANDEZ, Secretaria de la Presidencia, Berlin, Colonia Juarez, Mexico, DF. The source advised that GABINO FERNANDEZ frequently visits Havana, having made as many as eight to ten trips monthly.

This office would be most appreciative of any information you may be able to furnish concerning the activities of ABREU BASURTO and GABINO FERNANDEZ.

50-9-3-3
Feb 62

105-3013

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez 3rd Sec. Cuban Embassy contacted Gabino Fernandez on 26 Sep 61 and arranged to meet with him.

File 26 Sep 61

(Jose Miguel ABREU Basurto

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT

DBA-11277

28 May 1962

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

I. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY

.....

EXCELSIOR [Mexico City daily newspaper], May 6, 1962, page 7D, contained a brief article entitled, "Airport," which stated in part that ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, returned to Havana, Cuba ..... on May 5, 1962. ..... RODRIGUEZ said that he will remain in his country for a year and will serve the socialist government of Prime Minister FIDEL CASTRO.

.....

SECRET [illegible] [illegible] MESSAGE [illegible]

DATE :

TO :

CITE :

14 May 62

1. [illegible]

C. [illegible] SEND [illegible]

[illegible] RELATIONS [illegible] NAVAL ATTACHE [illegible]

[illegible] PREVIOUS [illegible] BEGAN [illegible]

[illegible] DECLINE [illegible]

B. MEMB [illegible] ED [illegible]

[illegible] VEGA [illegible]

[illegible] REPORT [illegible]

[illegible] ACTIVE CZ [illegible]

[illegible] OF GOOD [illegible]

[illegible] MANY [illegible]

E. [illegible] OF [illegible] AND [illegible]

[illegible] FRIGHTEN [illegible] ALITY [illegible]

D. [illegible] COMM [illegible] GATES [illegible]

F. DOES NOT [illegible]

[illegible] TRAVEL TO [illegible]

ORIG OFF: ________ COORD ________ RELEASING OFF: ____

DIST: [illegible]

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

14-00000



LIFIRE | 20 MAY '61

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

20 MAY 61

P. 1365

"P" Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

14-00000

Al C. General de Brigada, José Gómez Huerta,
Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial,
Los Pinos.

Informe No. 001699

DE: C-4.

TEMA: SALIDA DE UN CUBANO.

FECHA: Mayo 7, 62.

HECHOS:

1.- En el Vuelo # 465 de la Cía. Cubana de Aviación, que salió con destino a la Habana, Cuba el día 4 del actual a las 15.00 horas, salió :

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, con Pasaporte AD/61/164, de 19 años, soltero, cubano, con Visa Diplomática # 334 del 10/5/62 expedida en la Habana, Cuba.

DATOS OPERATIVOS.

Vigilancia Aereopuerto.

Respetuosamente.

Jefe del Grupo
L. Silveti.

new
P-7365

SECRET

[illegible]

11 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

1. On 11 May 1962 BENADUM (P) reported that LITEMPO/1 had said that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ left Mexico (PCS) on 4 May 1962.

2. Manuel E. VEGA Perez replaced Rogelio RODRIGUEZ in the Cuban Embassy, according to LITEMPO/1.

Distribution:
Orig - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ P-
1 - Manuel E. VEGA Perez P-
1 - LITEMPO/Prod.

SECRET

P-7365

7 May 62

17:27 JUANITO [illegible] pregunta por [illegible]. [illegible] hoy salió [illegible] mucho [illegible], pues [illegible] "me dejó [illegible]" [illegible] ya platicará a [illegible] de qué se trata [illegible], puede venir mañana a la Embajada a pasar de [illegible] confianza nacional, pero estará solamente un momento, pues "queremos guardar con el mayor respeto posible toda fiesta nacional". JUANITO vendrá a las 10:00 hs.

7 May 62

14:58 Un individuo que se obstina en no dar su nombre, pide comunicarse con [illegible] MARTINEZ o con MARCOS su sucesor. SINORAS manifiesta [illegible] Secretario de la Embajada Cubana y le pide que se identifique y que si quiere hablar con él o pasar [illegible] por la Embajada. El individuo dice que se llama [illegible] y que no puede pasar "sólo necesito decirle que tengo un [illegible] a la otra persona, pues RUFINO ya no había [illegible] que iba a hacer el viaje; entonces con la otra persona, pero debe ser antes de las cuatro; él ya sabe a dónde llamar; dígale que donde hacen los aparatos". SINORAS pasará el recado.

EXCERPT

REPORT NO. HMM-6343

1 May 1962

CUBAN ASSISTANCE AND INTERVENTION IN THE
GUATEMALAN POLITICAL SITUATION

Appraisal of Content: 2

•••••

2. ..... Fernandez [Csmin FERNANDEZ Concepcion, Cuban Communist] said that he first met with Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, and with other trusted members of the Cuban Embassy abd explained the determination of the 13 November group in Mexico to aid the Guatemalan revolution. According to Fernandez, Habana was consulted and Castro gave instructions that assistance be given immediately to the 13 November group and that encouragement should be given to the guerrilla fighters.

•••••

27 April 62

16:28 ENRIQUE ESTEVES, con acento sudamericano, desea ponerse en contacto con el mismo ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, para le haga saber si ya tiene la autorización de visa para viajar a La Habana. El Portero de la Embajada manifestó que ROGELIO se encuentra en el Aeropuerto, pero que no se va hoy a Cuba sino hasta el próximo viernes.

Report

28 April 62

14:27 JUAN REJANO, con acento gachupín, indicó a MAIZ "PACHO", portero de la Embajada Cubana, que necesita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ urgentísimamente; que si le puede mandar recado. MAIZ dice que ROGELIO ha salido y no sabe a qué hora volverá, pero en cuanto regrese le dirá que vaya a verlo. REJANO le pide que procure mandarle recado a algún sitio, porque es una cosa muy urgente. MAIZ está seguro que ROGELIO no está en su casa porque su mujer se fué ayer a Cuba y él habrá ido a comer a algún lado, pero cree que vuelve por la tarde. REJANO pide le diga en cuanto llegue que se comunique con él, ya sabe a dónde, que tiene urgentísimamente que hablar con él, "pues este hombre parece que se ha olvidado de que teníamos que habernos visto ayer, y de una porción de cosas, y estoy verdaderamente apurado". MAIZ en tono acusativo comenta que "aquí se olvidan muchas veces", pero que en cuanto vea a ROGELIO le dirá que REJANO lo está buscando con verdadera urgencia. (MAIZ siempre contesta en forma ruda a todo mundo e inclusive al mismo personal de la Embajada, pero en este caso se dirige a REJANO llamándolo JUANITO y le habla con mucho comedimiento).

2 May 62

11:02 Un individuo del Boletín Diplomático y Consular [illegible] a TERESA PROENZA, de la Embajada Cubana, que se habían solicitado suscripciones para los señores (A[illegible]) y ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. TERESA informa que los mencionados ya no se encuentran aquí, pero que ahora que ella hable con el Embajador LECHUGA le planteará ese asunto. El individuo pregunta qué tal es el Embajador. TERESA dice que muy bien, muy entusiasmado y "con grandes planes generales", y ahora sólo están esperando la presentación de credenciales y todo eso.

Copy to B-file

290.- Entrada a las 1154hs.- HF Rogelio/ Rodríguez -de la Embajada de Cuba- por Alexandrov.- 357.- HD que Alexandrov está muy ocupado, que él la llamará mas tarde.- Rogelio: que es que el agregado comercial quería tener una cita con Alexandrov y que por eso le llamaba.- HD: enterado.---- 370.-

LIENVOY
25Apr62

P-7365

①

~~P-6~~

17 Apr 62

14:36 Desde Cuba, el nuevo Embajador LECHUGA manifestó a su esposa GLADIS, quien junto con la hija de ambos ya se encuentra en México, que para el día 30 estará aquí. GLADIS a su vez le indica que ayer se recibieron las órdenes de traslado de ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y de XIOMARA SANCHEZ, y que ésta última quiere saber a dónde la trasladan, para llevar ropa adecuada; quiere saber si la van a mandar a Rusia. LECHUGA le recomienda decirle que eso no se sabe todavía.

(7365) (7086)

23 Apr 62

(7365)

[illegible]
Lunes [illegible] 1962.

07:55 El Embajador [illegible] se comunicó [illegible] con el Dr. RAUL ROA. Este le indicó que existen unas medicinas, unos libros, que ahora que [illegible] se van a se los lleve; añadió que por lo que respecta a [illegible] a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ solo puede decirle que se deben concentrar a La Habana. A continuación ROA pone a LECHUGA en comunicación con [illegible], quien manifiesta que sale a Cuba el día 27. Por su parte LECHUGA dice que él saldrá rumbo a México el día 30.

10:55 De parte de ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ dijeron al Sr. STREMATS de la Imprenta [illegible] que necesita verlo. STREMATS indica que irá por allá como a las 12:30 hs. La mujer dice que a esa hora llega el vuelo de Cubana. STREMATS dice que en ese caso irá en media hora.

25 Apr 62

(6474)

20:20 Un mesero del restaurante Ciro's se quejó con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, en el sentido de que en la mañana les arrojaron unas bombas pestilentes y por la tarde han seguido haciendo lo mismo y arrojando a la vez unas fotografías del Embajador PORTUONDO algo indecentes, por lo que de seguir así las cosas, han acordado no exponer al restaurante a mayores daños. ROGELIO manifestó que ya están acostumbrados a esas pendejadas.

20:24 El Ing. MANUEL MARCUE preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si la reunión tendrá lugar en el Ciro's. ROGELIO indicó que en virtud de haber algunas dificultades, se acordó efectuarla en la Embajada Cubana. MARCUE allí estará.

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-92-14.
17-abril-62.
M13-L13.-

P-7365

93.- Entrada a las 1024hs.- Rojas con Xiomara le dice que tiene boletos para ella su hija y Rogelio Rodriguez para la Habana.- Rojas le pregunta que si la trasladan.- Xiomara: que sí Rojas: que a donde.- Xiom: que no sabe, que ni el embajador lo sabe; que ella necesita saber porque tiene que llevar bota de miliciana, que no hay, ni pistola.- Rojas: que a poco va de miliciana.- Xiomara: que sí, que a ella le duele muchísimo el traslado porque ella adora aquí porque tiene muchos amigos.- Rojas: que si no se podría arreglar eso y que a quien van a mandar en su lugar.- Xiomara: que no sabe.---- Xiomara: hace la aclaración que Rogelio tiene señora y que está aquí.- Rojas: que no mandan boleto para la señora y que Rogelio necesita que lo arreglé luego. Que si a Rogelio también lo trasladan.- Xiomara: que sí.- Rojas: que si tampoco sabe a donde. Xiomara: que tampoco sabe, que a lo mejor es a Cuba. Que ella tendrá que irse con los embajadores.- Rojas: que entonces le diga a Rogelio que arregle lo del boleto de su señora.-------- Rojas: que también tienen orden de pasaje para Ester Gavilán Rosales, para que le avisen.- Xiomara: que Ester Gavilán es la mujer de Rogelio -que dice Berta-.- Rojas: que entonces queda solucionado el problema.----- Rojas pregunta que si está Carrillo porque tiene que hablar con el con urgencia o con alguno de la comisión.----151.- HD Quintana con Rojas le dice que ya sabe que están con el problema del equipaje de ellos que a Cuba no se puede mandar nada por cobrar y que hay que pagar el exceso; que le dijo Carrillo que iba a hablar con alguien en la Habana para ver como solucionaban eso; que hoy recibió un radio y que tiene que contestarlo urgente: que la única manera que tiene que hacer es visarles la cantidad de equipaje que tienen y que con una orden de MINREX puede docum montarse el equipaje pero que para eso necesita saber cuanto equipaje llevan.- Quintana: que la va a decir la cantidad que se pagó por exceso en Peruana que es lo único que le puede decir....que fueron 487 dólares pero que lo dejaron en 365 dólares; que el recibo lo tiene Carrillo; que ese pago se hizo de Guayaquil a México.- Rojas: que cuantas personas eran.- Quintana: que doce.- Rojas: y que si esas doce personas van a viajar juntas ala Habana._ Quintana: que sí.- Rojas: que con esa información va a hacer un cálculo de cuantos kilos son para mandar un radio a la Habana porque hay que mandar una orden de Canje a Minrex para que se pueda usar.- Quintana: que al doctor Carrillo se le puede llamar al teléfono - 14008.- Rojas: que no pueda ser porque deben de ser seis cifras.- Quintana: que es 140008.---- 222.-

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....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
Operational/LINLUCK's relationship with Cuban [illegible] Concepcion, aka "Oswaldo", concerning Guatemalan guerrilla activities.		RI FILE NO.	50	6	50/3
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-18861(HY[illegible]-1542)		DATE 17 Apr. 62	
		SOURCE CRYPTONYM LINLUCK	DATE OF INFO. 13 Apr. 62	EVALUATION [illegible]	
ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN		DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

XX	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ;

(Mentioned page 6, 1st. paragraph)
(Reported to be trusted by Cuban Emb., Mex. City)

P-7365

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. P-7365

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867.-1 AUG 54
1 MAY 58 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

11 April 62

13:05 Un individuo que dijo ser de la FUR, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si ya puede pasar por las películas a la Embajada de Cuba, pues la función es para mañana en la tarde y ya se anunció e inclusive se repartieron invitaciones a los Sindicatos. ROGELIO indica que tiene una y le pide que en cuanto la desocupen se la traiga luego porque tiene que ser pasada el viernes en otro lado. El individuo pregunta que si puede recoger las dos películas que habían quedado, o sea El Ejército Rebelde y Muerte al Invasor. ROGELIO indica que tiene Muerte al Invasor y va a tratar de conseguir El Ejército Rebelde. El individuo dice que habían anunciado las dos, pero que la que importa es fundamentalmente Muerte al Invasor y que entonces a las 17:00 hs. pasará por la Embajada.

12 april 62

(1099) (2365)

10:22 ESPEJEL preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ por la película. Este dijo que tendrá que esperar hasta mañana, pues la tuvo que prestar, pero está nueva, no tiene ningún defecto. ESPEJEL pide a ROGELIO la lista de racionamientos. Es mejor se dirija a TERESA PROENZA. (265)

(375)

10:40 MARTA TAMAYO en nombre del Grupo de Mujeres invita a ROSA CASTRO entre otras personas, a una despedida que ofrecen a MARTA DE FORTUONDO el martes 17 a las 19:00 hs. en la casa de TAMAYO.

(5986) (6396)

10:58 Del Ceremonial de Relaciones avisaron que el Lic. MARISCAL recibe al Embajador HOKES a las 12:30 hs.

11:07 VERGARA preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ "nuestro amigo podrá llamarme por teléfono?" ROGELIO cree que sí, además él le avisará. VERGARA quiere informarle sobre un asunto.

11:23 RABADAN del periódico "Verdades" preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ cómo le pareció la publicación y que opina de lo de KENNEDY. ROGELI[illegible] que está bien. RABADAN agrega que desea pasar a ver [illegible] ADO. ROGELIO lo cita para el lunes próximo.

Indica PORTU[illegible]

17 Apr 62

(6157)

10:29 JORGE [illegible], de la Cubana de Aviación, manifiesta a XIOMARA SANCHEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, que ya llegaron las órdenes de pasaje para élla y su hija, así como para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ y señora. Asimismo pregunta extrañado que si a ROGELIO también lo trasladan. XIOMARA asiente, agregando que parece que a todos van a cambiar.

INDEX
6

Judith Ferreto [illegible] 2 Apr 62

9:56 JUDITH, con acento cubano, preguntó a la cubana TERESA PROENZA qué hay. TERESA responde que hay cantidad de cosas, pero en general todo bien. JUDITH dice que "tenemos que hablar mucho". TERESA espera que sea hoy. JUDITH pregunta cómo está ELENITA y que si recibió su carta. TERESA se la entregó personalmente. Asimismo le pregunta cómo dejó a la familia alla y cómo está el Movimiento. JUDITH responde que toda la familia bien y el Movimiento está magnífico. TERESA le pregunta que cuándo llegó. JUDITH llegó el sábado en la tarde y estuvo tratando de localizarla. TERESA se pasó todo el día en Puebla. Asimismo le pregunta que si conoce a una joven MARTA, costarricense, de Prensa Latina y que está casada con el Primer Secretario "de aquí". JUDITH no la recuerda. TERESA indica que MARTA va a venir pronto, pues ahora está en La Habana esperando un bebé y cuando venga se la presentará. JUDITH pregunta por ROJO. TERESA contesta que a ROGELIO no lo ha visto hoy. A JUDITH le urge mucho hablar con él y le pide a TERESA se lo diga así tan pronto como lo vea. TERESA indica que inmediatamente que venga ROGELIO lo comunicará con JUDITH.

5 april 62

10:30 El Ing. TEODORO ALTAMIRANO pidió a nombre de la Asociación Nueva Generación del Istmo le manden a Chalco núm. 96-17, México, D.F., las publicaciones y revistas que envían de La Habana. ROGELIO tomó nota.

12:27 MAIZ, desde la portería, manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que lo busca MAURICIO AREGOLLIE. ROGELIO ordena que lo pasen.

12:50 ALBERTO LUMBRERAS pregunta a JORGE L. TAMAYO qué sabe acerca del empleo ese en la Cuenca del Balsas. TAMAYO responde que no ha visto a CUAUHTEMOC, pero seguramente lo verá en estos días. ALBERTO le suplica no deje de tratar el asunto.

12:59 LUIS MACIAS espera a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ en la portería de la Embajada. ROGELIO bajará a verlo.

7 Apr 62

13:10 HUMBERTO H. TREJO OVIEDO reclamó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana que lo tiene muy olvidado, que está carente de material y que además tiene un asunto muy importante que tratarle. ROGELIO pasará a ver a TREJO a su oficina.

14-00000

SECRET

DATE: 01 APR 62
CITE: PACY 7711
TO : DIR

PRECEDENCE: RUTINE
IN NUMBER: 7656
INFO: MEXI CARA GUAT

Cy to his 201 file

Armando 1020

RYBAT HYAB

REF: A. PACY 7640 (NOT SENT CARA GUAT) ((8IN 7490))
B. PACY 7421 (NOT SENT CARA GUAT) ((IN 6992))

1. HYAB RETURNED PACY FROM MEXI REF TRIP 29 MARCH VIA GUEST FLT 270. CARRIED $5,000 RECEIVED FROM SOVIET EMBASSY MEXI THROUGH MARTINEZ VERDUGO. THESE FUNDS TO BE USED BY PDP FOR TRIPS TO VARIOUS CONGRESS INCLUDING FORTHCOMING KOMSOMOL CONGRESS, WHICH HYAB BELIEVES WILL BE HELD IN MOSCOW. PDP WILL SEND ONE DELEGATE.

2. ON RETURN FLIGHT HYAB HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY EDUARDO MACHADO, LEADING CARA CP LEADER. MACHADO STATED TOP CARA CP REQUIREMENT IS OBTAIN ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON U.S. TRAINING BASES IN CANAL ZONE, PARTICULARLY ANY TRAINING LATIN AMERICANS IN ANTI-GUERRILLA WARFARE WHICH IN PART TO BE UTILIZED AS INSTRUCTIONS VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS AS WELL AS TO UTILIZE INFO TO COUNTER ANTI COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. 7365

163

[illegible] "El Rubio" Sept 69 [illegible]

3. HYAB FURTHER IDENTIFIED QUOTE EL ROJO UNQUOTE (REPORTED REF B) AS ROGELIO LNU, CUBAN EMBASSY FUNCTIONARS IN MEXI AND WAS SHOWN CP QUOTE SAFEHOUSE UNQUOTE AT 175 CALLE MONTES DE OCA, APT. 1.

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

4. HYAB ALSO RECEIVED GENERAL BRIEFING ON GUAT CP STRATEGY AND POLICY LINE FROM MARTINEZ VERDUGO, WHO FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY. INTEL CABLE TO FOLLOW. POUCHING DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] to his 201 file

NOT CLEAR DID ROGELIO SHOW HIM THE SAFE HOUSE?

EOM: 01/2045Z
DIST: SUBJECT FILE
COMMO
CHRONO

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

200-4-5/5

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 081
29 MAR 62 JO

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : IW 2

INFO : DDP, COP, CA 2, CA/PMO, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 6, FI/D, ~~TFW 3~~, ~~TSD~~, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

MAR 29 05072 62

ROUTINE

IN 10495

TDCS-3/506,346

DIR GUAT INFO PACY LANT CITE MEXI 0408

INTEL

SUPDATA LINLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. RE PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LINLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY. FILED 290005Z REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL (HMM 6283) GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 62 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 62 APR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

Rodriguez
Lopez

INDEX

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/IHG
WH/3/G

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: John [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED: MAR 29 1503Z 62

BASED ON: HMM 6283 LINLUCK

LIAISON

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

29 March 6

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO

SUBJECT PGT VIEWS ON THE ~~POLITICAL SITUATION IN~~ GUATEMALA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/500,346.

DATE DISTR. 29 MARCH 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 MARCH 1962

REFERENCES IN 10495

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (24 MARCH 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS AMONG GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO.

1. VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, HEAD OF THE PARTIDO GUATEMALTECO DEL TRABAJO (PGT-GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY) IN MEXICO, SAID ON 24 MARCH THAT THE PGT IN GUATEMALA REGRETS THE WAY IN WHICH THE GUERRILLA FIGHT HAS DEVELOPED THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PGT, THE RESULTS OF THE GUERRILLA FIGHTING HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP (MEMBER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER 1960 ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT) HEADED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE PGT ALSO REGRETS THAT THE COMMUNISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO DE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIO (PUR-EXTREME LEFTIST PARTY) HEADED BY CARLOS PAZ TEJADA WERE INTERCEPTED AND

Rodriguez Lopez

SECRET CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OO | DIA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

29 Mar 62

35-9-8

27 Mar 62

FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN CONDITIONS WERE NOT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THEM. ACCORDING TO THE PGT THE RESULTS WERE DISASTROUS, WITH THE LOSS OF "MIDDLE RANK COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND NATIONAL LEADERS." THE PGT CONSIDERS IT A "MIRACLE" THAT PAZ TEJADA WAS ABLE TO ESCAPE. HOWEVER, THE PGT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF MIGUEL YDIGORAS FUENTES, PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA, WILL SOON FALL.

2. THE MAIN HOPE OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME.

3. GUTIERREZ SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT "THE PERSON FROM CUBA WHO IS GOING TO TAKE OVER RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA HERE IN MEXICO, STILL HAD NOT ARRIVED." RODRIGUEZ TOLD GUTIERREZ THAT HE PLANNED TO SEE MAJOR ALFONSO PRERA, A LEADER OF THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO, ON 24 MARCH.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

P. 2.

EMBAJADA DE CUBA.-
M 11. L 11. Tel. 14-42-37.-
29 marzo 62 .-

841. Entrada 1232.- MARTEL con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar en el número 871) para recordarle que antes de ayer habló con él y le pidió que le llevara una cosa, pero no ha podido pasar porque no tiene tiempo, pero "ellos" quedaron de llamarle ésta mañana a su casa y no le llamaron y el otro asunto está por llegar y quedó pendiente hasta el jueves; que es fundamental que le llamen para arreglar eso. ROGELIO pregunta si no puede pasar por la Embajada y MARTEL indica que nó, que no tiene nada de tiempo; que les diga que le hablen a su casa hoy a las 16.00 h. porque ella sale mañana y no le da tiempo para nada; que lo que ROGELIO le pidió, se lo entregue a la persona que le tiene que llevar la otra cosa. ROGELIO acepta.- 899.-

899. Entrada 1239.- El Sr. VERGARA con ROGELIO para platicarle que ha tenido malas noticias de su familia; pregunta que hay del boletin y ROGELIO indica que todavía no sale, que si gusta le puede llevar algunos números atrazados que él tiene. VERGARA: que sí, porque le urgen, que aunque sea el anterior. ROGELIO acepta y dice que se los llevaría el sábado. VERGARA: que a él le gustaría que fuera hoy mismo. ROGELIO: que tiene muchos compromisos y no puede salir y no se los podría llevar personalmente. VERGARA pregunta si ya sabe lo que le sucedió a su hermano. ROGELIO dice que sí, pero que le gustaría que le contara qué fué lo que le sucedió. VERGARA: que sí, que por eso quería contarle lo que le pasó, por su esposa y todo, además todos los niños cayeron en cama y él creé que no tienen salvación y la cosa es grave; pide vaya a su casa hoy mismo. ROGELIO: que irá como a las 17.00 h. VERGARA está de acuerdo, agregando que así hablará con su hermano y le recomiende "al médico, aquel que me dijo". ROGELIO acepta.- 939.-

P- V 3 65

939. Entrada.- HF con ROGELIO para recordarle que habló con él hace como dos meses pidiéndole unos ejemplares de la Obra

Rogelio Rodriguez L.

Revolucionaria, el número 26, del discurso de FIDEL CASTRO; que ya los recibió y le envió acuse de recibo por correo;-- pregunta si La Obra Revolucionaria ya editó la segunda declaración de La Habana. ROGELIO: que nó, que ellos tienen el boletín de información de la Embajada, en donde está impresa la segunda declaración de La Habana. HF pide - le facilite un número igual de ejemplares, es decir 25. - ROGELIO acepta y pide su nombre y dirección. HF: JORGE - BASURTO, Avenida UNO número 76, Manzana 6, Colonia Educación, México 21. ROGELIO toma nota. BASURTO: que a él- le interesaría visitar Cuba, pero no sabe si haya manera de ir a los festejos del 26 de Julio, ya que en ocasiones anteriores se han hecho invitaciones a estudiantes de la Universidad y él quisiera saber si hoy habrá oportunidad de ir. - ROGELIO: que él creé que se seguirá el mismo sistema de invitaciones, pues éstas vienen de Cuba y ellos unicamente - trasladan al Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos, - las peticiones de los que desean ir a Cuba. BASURTO -- pregunta cuál es el conducto para hacer la solicitud y ROGELIO le sugiere mande una carta a la Embajada dirigida al -- Embajador. BASURTO agradece la información, agregando- que en cuanto le lleguen las revistas, le avisará. ROGELIO acepta.- 984.-

1054. Entrada 1420.- VARGAS solicita hablar con ROGELIO y -- MD indica que fué a buscarlo a la portería, pero le informaron que ya salió para su casa; que si gusta puede dejarle - el recado y VARGAS llame como a las 16.30 h. VARGAS: que le diga que le ha llamado a partir de las 11.00 h. como le- indicó, tres veces, que es para el asunto de las revistas,- que ROGELIO ya sabe, pero quisiera hablar con él ahora mismo. MD toma nota del recado y pide que hable a las - 16.30 h. VARGAS acepta.- 1083.-

- -

M.-

SECRET

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY: HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE: 28 MARCH 1962 PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

TO : DIR GUAT INFO: PACY LANT

CITE: MEXI 0408

TDCS 3/506,346

INTEL

SUPDATA LIHLUCK FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ. HE PARA TWO PGT SENT CONGRATULATIONS TO LIHLUCK FOR HIS WORK AND OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED FACT HE SHOULD CONTINUE HANDLE EXCLUSIVELY PURCHASE WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT BUT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT HIS PERSONAL SECURITY.

FILED 290005Z

2-1110

REPORT CLASS SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL HMM-6[illegible]03 GUATEMALA/MEXICO SUBJECT VIEWS OF THE PGT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GUATEMALA DOI 24 MARCH 1962 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 24 MARCH 1962 APPR 2 PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN GUATEMALAN EXILE CIRCLES IN MEXICO.

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ORIG OFF: ________ COORD OFF: ________ RELEASING OFF: ________

DIST: SUBJ FILE:
COMMO
CHRONO

P-7365

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SECRET

SECRET

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE: PRECEDENCE:

TO : INFO:

0408

CITE: PAGE TWO

2. THE MAIN HOPE OF THE PGT NOW HINGES ON THE ACTIONS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP ORGANIZED AND ARMED IN MEXICO. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO HAD CROSSED THE MEXICAN/GUATEMALAN BORDER SUCCESSFULLY AND HAD ESTABLISHED A SECOND GUERRILLA FRONT.) THE PGT BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GROUP "EVEN IF THE POLITICAL CRISIS SHOULD ELIMINATE YDIGORAS". IT BELIEVES THAT THIS GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE MOUNTAINS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH AND STABILIZE ANY DEMOCRATIC REGIME.

7365

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4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

EXTRACT to 4p4

ORIG OFF: FLS COORD OFF: LJB RELEASING OFF: WCC

DIST: SUBJ FILE: 1 - chrono
1 - 200-7-38-1
COMMO
CHRONO

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SECRET

24 mar 62

10:45 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí está una persona que quiere verle. ROGELIO pregunta que qien es. MAIZ dice que no le conoce, pero que PAEZ dejó dicho que ROGELIO lo atienda. Así se hará.

10:57 (1410) Un individuo con acento sudamericano, tal vez guatemalteco, de nombre HILARIO, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que tiene una cosa urgente que darle. Al tratar de convenir un lugar para verse, HILARIO pregunta ROGELIO que "si recuerda el Jardín ó en la Luna". ROGELIO irá hoy a las 20:00 hs. a buscarle. Al despedirse HILARIO insiste en que es urgente. (151)

26 mar 62

12 [illegible] de la Embajada de [illegible] salió [illegible] con los paquetes [illegible] el [illegible] se enteró.

27 mar 62

12:20 VERGARA, con acento sudamericano, pidió al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ le lleve el boletín. ROGELIO manifiesta que no ha llegado, pero que le enviará los materiales "ésos que a usted tanto le interesan".

12:49 RICARDO, con acento cubano, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ayer lo estuvo esperando. ROGELIO no pudo ir, pero el jueves pasará a verlo.

28 mar 62

13:27 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada de Cuba, anunció a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí lo están esperando ROBERTO GAYADA y el señor GARNICA. ROGELIO irá a la portería a recibirlos.

29 mar 62

13:20 La señora MARTEL, con acento argentino, indicó al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que sale mañana y que por favor le manda "con esa persona las cosas que le falten". [redacted] lo hará.

15 March 1962

13 19 [illegible] GONZALEZ ORTEGA manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que le habla para comunicarle que no ha podido ir porque anden allí, "[illegible] piedra" [illegible] dijeron a ROGELIO, con LEON y que hoy en la noche hablarán con este último para ver si mañana pueden pasar a la Embajada, y pregunta a ROGELIO que como y qué horas lo pueden encontrar. ROGELIO indica que a las 10 está en su oficina. 15 Mar '62

16 March 1962

17:35 De parte de EDMUNDO JARDOS, piden a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, los sobres para Prensa Latina que hoy trajo de Cuba un Agregado Cultural. ROGELIO dice que el Agregado está charlando con el Embajador, y que posteriormente llevará esos sobres a Prensa Latina

19 Mar '6

16:36 VERGARA dejó recado para ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana en el sentido de que es urgente que se comunique con él. TERESA pasará el recado.

RESUMEN
jueves 22 marzo 1962. 1

10:04 MAIZ dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí en la portería está el señor ISSEZ y desea verlo. ROGELIO dice que lo pasen.

11 20 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí está el venezolano [illegible] y quiere pasar. ROGELIO ordena que lo haga.

23 Mar 62

16:45 Desde la portería MAIZ indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, ambos de la Embajada Cubana, que ahí están ARTURO y LUZ SERRANO. Que pasen.

1

LIENVOY- 13 MAR 62

10:17 ALFREDO, mozo de la Embajada Cubana, desde las oficinas de Prensa Latina dice a TERESA PROENZA que no ha podido recoger el bulto porque la persona que lo tiene no ha llegado. TERESA le ordena que lo espere, y que le diga a JARDON que ROGELIO tiene el material para Panorama Económico y que mande a una persona.

12:22 MAIZ comunica a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que LUCIO HERRERA está en la portería. ROGELIO irá a verlo.

13:16 MAIZ comunica a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que ahí está un muchacho que dice que viene de la Prepa 7 y desea hablar con él. ROGELIO ordena que lo pasen.

P-7365

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On XXX 13 March, LITAINT-2 reported that Subject is living at Tacubaya # 74, Apartment# 503. Tel: 25-08-45. Subj is using an Edsel with placas D-314. On occasions Subj leaves his car in driveway and walks to Embassy or takes a cab.

CKS

FILE: Rogelio RODRIGUZ L.

SECRET

CRYPTO SECURITY DOES NOT APPLY. HANDLE AS SECRET CORRES.

DATE:

PRECEDENCE:

TO :

INFO:

CITE: MEXI 0293
12 Mar '62

TO GUATEMALA. (FIELD COMMENT: IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT MEMBERS OF THE PGT IN MEXICO WERE UPSET BECAUSE THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT CONTACTED THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO INSTEAD OF THE PGT.)

PERERA?

4. ACCORDING TO PERERA, CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT MESSENGER WAS MADE THROUGH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, THIRD SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. RODRIGUEZ WENT TO PERERA'S HOME AND SHOWED HIM A SMALL PIECE OF PAPER SIGNED "IBARRA". PERERA SAID THAT IBARRA (FNU), WHO IS MARRIED TO HIS NIECE, RECENTLY WENT TO CUBA TO STUDY. WHEN CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE CUBAN MESSENGER, PERERA SAID THAT THE MESSENGER GAVE HIM THE MONEY AND TOLD HIM CASTRO WAS DELIGHTED TO LEARN THAT THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP IN MEXICO WOULD RETURN TO GUATEMALA TO HELP FIGHT. THE MESSENGER TOLD PERERA THAT THE GROUP DID NOT HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MONEY, BUT COULD MAKE USE OF IT FOR PATRIOTIC MILITARY PURPOSES, AND THAT CASTRO HOPED THE GROUP WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL SO THAT HE COULD SEND IT GREATER ASSISTANCE.

PERERA?

NIECE

5. MORENO, WHO HAS BEEN CHOSEN TO HEAD THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP WHICH WILL GO TO GUATEMALA, HAS DECIDED TO SEND HIS FAMILY TO FRANCE AND WAS GIVEN ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS OF THE CUBAN MONEY TO FINANCE THE TRIP. THE GROUP ALSO PLANS TO GIVE SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS TO [illegible] PINEDA ALDANA, GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST LIVING IN MEXICO, TO HELP COVER HIS

ORIG OFF: ________ COORD OFF: ________ RELEASING OFF: ________

DIST: SUBJ FILE:
COMMO
CHRONO

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

P-7365

12 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

RECTIFICACION DIRECCION SR. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: La dirección del señor Rogelio Rodriguez López es Calzada de Tacubaya # 74 Dto. 503, con teléfono 25-08-45.

En el interfón que corresponde a su departamento está el nombre de Diego Giolio.

COMENTARIO: El señor Rogelio Rodriguez López traé el a-utomovil Essel, placa D-314, pero por lo regular va a la Embajada caminando ya que le queda a cuatro cuadras de su domicilio.

Source: LITAMIL-2

P-7365

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

12 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

VECINOS DEL SENOR ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: Los nombres que aparecen en el interfón del edificio marcado con el número 74 de la calzada de Tacubaya son los siguientes;

101	GESSELA	102	SRA. SPINDOLA
103	ARTURO LECARO B.	203	BARRAGAN
204	JOSE ARANDA	302	LEON RIVAS Jr.
304	JUAN HERNANDEZ	401	JUAN SAYAS
403	GUILLERMO MARTINEZ	404	JOSE GIOCOMAN
503	DIEGO GIOLIO	504	TORREZ

Hay muchos departamentos que no tienen nombre están ocupados pero no aparecen los nombres de las personas.

9 de Marzo de 1962
INFORME #

LOCALIZACION DOMICILIO SR.ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

INFORME: El señor Rogelio Rodriguez López vive en el departamento que ocupaba el señor Hector Pascual Gallo, Tacubaya #74 Dto. [illegible] 502 con el - teléfono 25-45-08.

COMENTARIO: Junto al departamento ocupado por el señor Rogelio Rodriguez López rentan un departamento, informan sobre él, 10-98-52 señor Joaquín.

7 March 1962

09:56 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ suplica a YURI ALEXANDROV lo disculpe por no poder asistir a la cita que tenían hoy. YURI estará de todos modos todo el día en la Embajada Soviética. ROGELIO, aunque sea tarde, puede pasar a verlo.

20:12 GALINDO OCHOA manifestó a ROGELIO que acaba de leer su crónica "y qué chinga les arrimaste; tú tan decente que eres: chingaste a FIDEL, chingaste a RAUL, chingaste a ALFONSO; no dejaste títere con cabeza". ROGELIO arguye que dejó a los dos buenos nada más. GALINDO dice "no la jodas; tú eres el decente; qué me espera con los demás!". ROGELIO pregunta qué dijeron. GALINDO dice que no dijeron nada, pero no hay que pasar estas cosas por alto "y además son mis cuates". ROGELIO cambia el giro e indica que el General no fué a la clausura. GALINDO dice que no, que la clausuró el señor FERNANDEZ ALBARRAN JUAN. ROGELIO pregunta que si entonces se sujeta a los datos que ya tenía. GALINDO responde que sí, que sólo agregue que fué clausurada a las 20:00 hs. por el Secretario General en representación del Presidente.

8 Mar 62

11:51 ESPEJEL preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, si puede pasar hoy a la Embajada a platicar con él, pues tiene algunas cosas interesantes que informarle. ROGELIO lo espera en el curso del día.

12:52 El portero MAIZ indicó que allí está un señor PIERRE buscando a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. Este indica que lo dejen pasar.

13:55 El portero MAIZ indicó que están unos señores de la Revista "Expresión" de Sinaloa que quieren ver a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. Este indicó que no los puede recibir hoy, que vuelvan otro día.

10 march 1962

11:52 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ comunicó a RAMIRO, a la Embajada Cubana en Brasil, que el domingo a las 3:00 hs. por Aerovías VARIG en vuelo 811 salen ENIO BENITEZ y GAUDENCIO IMPERIAL, para que los vayan a esperar. RAMIRO queda enterado.

RESUMEN
martes 6 marzo 1962

preguntó si ya recibió los boletines. RICARDO dice que no y que desea pasar a la Embajada. ROGELIO, después de meditar, manifiesta que mejor lo ve en el lugar de siempre a la misma hora. RICARDO le esperará.

10:34 RICARDO, con acento centroamericano, se comunicó con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba. Este inmediatamente le

10:49 MAIZ, desde la portería de la Embajada Cubana, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí están unos señores que vienen de La Normal y lo quieren ver porque traen un recado de ROQUE MENDOZA. ROGELIO indicó que los pase inmediatamente.

11:50 MAIZ, portero de la Embajada Cubana, indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí están unas personas que vienen a buscar una película para la Federación Obrera Revolucionaria. ROGELIO le indica que los deje pasar.

P-7365
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ

12:17 MAIZ comunicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que allí está el señor SILVA que quiere hablar con él. ROGELIO indica que lo pase.

13:30 JULIO CARMONA manifestó al Embajador PORTUONDO que mañana sale para Centroamérica, Honduras, Nicaragua y Guatemala, y desea saber si a PORTUONDO se le ofrece algo. PORTUONDO indica que por el momento no, pero que llame a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para ver si tiene algo.

14:56 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ indicó a PAEZ que por la tarde como a las 16:30 irán a buscarlo unas personas, "tú ya sabes", y que no va a estar porque tiene que ir al hotel a recoger a la señora de LECHUGA. PAEZ queda enterado.

....

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-42-37.
5-Marzo-62.
M11-L11.-

Possibly ? Rafael aka X SOLIS Barrio Done

751.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- HF HILARIO con MD Ana Luisa le preguntta por Rogelio.- Ana: que salió para el aeropuerto, que si gusta dejar recado que ella selo pasará.- Hilario: que le diga que desd en la mañana lo está buscando Hilario y que es una cosa urgente para hoy y que si quisiera hablarle por última vez a donde él ya sabe, que porque es una cuestión que no pueden dejar para otro día.--- 775.-

824.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- HF Hilario con Rogelio le dice que tuvo que hacer uso de esta cosa por una urgencia; que el enfermo que vieron anoche que luego vió el al doctor y que le dijo que como la cosa es urgente y que no va a poder estar después que si era posible que hoy mismo a las ocho de la noche.- Rogelio: que va a ser imprescindible que sea una hora después a las nueve porque el enfermo se agravó hoy por la tarde.- Hilario: que si vió un recado que dejó.- Rogelio: quesí.- Hilario: que si ya sabe -- donde.- Rogelio: que sí, que va a ser una hora después.- Hilario: que entonces va a buscar al amigo, que porque creyeron que era mejor la cosa de cerca y no de lejos.- Rogelio: correcto.- Hilari que solucionan una serie de cosas que ellos tienen pendientes.--- Rogelio: de acuerdo.---- 847.-

---

....

P 7365
Rogelio, Rodriguez

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] Márquez [illegible]

3/x/62

P-7369

20

NEGATIVES

"P" – Rogelio Rodríguez

EN [illegible] ahora yo estoy [illegible]
en la casa de mi amigo [illegible]
que [illegible] todo [illegible]

Dile a [illegible] que [illegible]
[illegible] de [illegible] que [illegible] en la Embajada de
[illegible].

[illegible]

Saludo

Socialismo Base de la paz Mundial

Patria o Muerte

Venceremos.

CoN CERA C SINCERA

VENCEREMOS.

Socialismo Base de la Paz Mundial

2b

16 Feb 62

436. Entrada 1127 HF del Banco Nacional de México con SIOMARA para avisarle que llegaron las siguientes órdenes de pago y pueden pasar a cobrarlas; Para el Embajador 635; Sr. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ 350.80; Sr. LUIS GOMEZ 300.60; SIOMARA 300.60; Sr. CUENCA 408.75; Sr. PEDRO L.ROY ORTEGA 352.99; Embajada 50; Sr. EUSEBIO AZCUE 224.63; Sr. HECTOR GALLO 569.55 y Sr. RADULFO PAEZ PEREZ 300.80 dólares. SIOMARA toma nota y dá las gracias. 459.-

27 Feb 62

10:00 ESPEJEL del Sindicato de Electricistas, preguntó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que si MAIS, el portero, le había entregado lo que le dejó. ROGELIO asintió y a su vez preguntó a ESPEJEL que si ya había hablado con el compañero PAEZ. ESPEJEL dijo que nó, que no lo había visto.

(1379) (224)

RESUMEN
miércoles 28 febrero 1962

(E) 1

8:35 AJA, desde el Hotel Agnes, pidió a MAIZ, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, que diga a RADULFO PAEZ que los dos asuntos que tiene se los lleve ya al Hotel. Asimismo que diga a ROGELIO que se comunique con él desde luego. MAIZ pasará los recados. Rodriguez (1365)

off

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO	OO-K-3,210,416
SUBJECT	Travelers Using Cuban Diplomatic Passports	DATE DISTR	23 Feb 62
		NO PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO	Feb 1962 & earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ	[illegible] Feb 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national exiled in the US.

Source travels frequently to Central and Latin American countries.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation]

I received a letter from one of my contacts in Mexico City advising of the arrival of travelers from Cuba in Dec 1961 and Jan 1962 bearing Cuban diplomatic passports. My contact has also indicated the names and dates of arrival of the aforementioned travelers as follows:

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ernesto [illegible]	[illegible]	1 [illegible]
Fernando [illegible] Castillo	Cubano	4 Dic.
Konstantin [illegible]	Ruso	8 Dic.
[illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Josef [illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Humberto [illegible] Gutierrez	Cubano	11 Dic.
[illegible] Carrillo	Cubano	11 Dic.
Jose [illegible]	Cubano	11 Dic.
Jorge [illegible] Vigoa	Cubano	11 Dic.
[illegible]	Polaco	11 Dic.
Antonio [illegible] Pena	Mexicana	14 Dic.
[illegible]	Ruso	14 Dic.
Jose [illegible]	Cubano	15 Dic.
[illegible]	Cubano	15 Dic.
[illegible]	Cubano	15 Dic.
Baly [illegible]	Chino	15 Dic.
[illegible] C. [illegible] Montoto	Cubano	18 Dic.
Zygmunt [illegible]	Polaco	18 Dic.
[illegible]	Japones	18 Dic.
Gloria [illegible]	Cubana	18 Dic.
Gustavo [illegible] Salazar	Boliviano	18 Dic.
Leopoldo [illegible] Bernal	Cubano	18 Dic.
Alejandro [illegible]	Ruso	21 Dic.
Nicolai [illegible]	Ruso	21 Dic.
[illegible]	Yugoslavo	21 Dic.
Jesus Alonso Garcia	Cubano	21 Dic.
Jesus [illegible] Alum	Cubano	21 Dic.

ZAVILAM. father

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC



Habana 18 de Febrero 1962
"Año de la Planificación"

Sr Rogelio Rodríguez.

Mi querido ahijado, me alegraré que cuando ésta llegue a tus manos estén bien en unión de Ester, nosotros bien.

Rogelio mucha alegría me dio que me mandaras el retrato, yo creía que con tanto amor te habías olvidado de mí, pero veo que no es así, lo único que con tu nuevo trabajo no te alcanza el tiempo para escribir, ni a Ester tampoco, te voy a explicar lo del nuevo trabajo, como tu estas recién casado tienes un nuevo trabajo, que se llama amor.

Rogelio le dices a Ester que lo que nosotros hablamos de los aretes el día que reciban una carta por algun compañero luego que vaya para esa, te lo voy a mandar, para que me lo compren así que tengan cuidado al abrir las cartas, sin mas besos de tu abuela que esta loca por verte pues casi hace un año que no te ve. querido, podía escribirte muchas cosas como la segunda declaración de la Habana, y lo enfrascado que esta el pueblo en la segunda zafra del pueblo, con decir que de la Habana a salido para Camaguey un batallón de 7.000 obreros, para el corte de caña esos obreros abandonaron su trabajo para ir a cortar caña como voluntarios, de los campesinos le diré que

P. 7365

ha sido la mas grande que ha habido en Cuba
porque ahora las carrozas no son comerciales
sino la integran los 25 sindicatos de Cuba.
antes de pasar la carroza para la comparsa
que la integran los obreros a la cual pertenece
la carroza, quisiera que pudieras ver a esos
obreros bailando al compás de sus orquestas y
conjuntos, ya se acabo aquellas comparsas, de
negros solos, que bailaba con la botella de aguar-
diente en la mano y se acababa a puñaladas
no te canso mas pues te estes muy ocupado, sin
mas recibe el cariño de tu tia que te quiere como a
un hijo

Fina

Rogelio dice tu padrino que lo unico que
quiere, es, que le mandes un retrato tuyo que
se vea bien la cara.

saluda a Ester de mi parte no le debia mandar
mi saludos tan siquiera en dos meses no he
tenido ni dos letras para mi, saludos de Alberto
y de Carlito

Francisco Marquez 160 26/2/62

NEGATIVES

24

Angeles Rodriguez Lopez


Rogelio Rodriguez
VIA AEREA

Año de la Planificación

Habana 12 de Febrero 1962

Sr/
Rogelio Rodriguez
Mis Queridos hijos
Deseamos que al recibir
estas líneas se encuentren bien
de salud
nosotros bien
Rogelio recibí tu retrato estás
de lo más bien
un poco más delgado pero se
te ve bien
María me trajo el retrato de
Celia y está de lo más [illegible]
y de lo más satisfecha
dile que se acuerde de escribirme
que si Dios quiere nos vemos
en las [illegible]
y que se prepare la clave de
forma que la haya dicho
mándalame a decir si por
fin Celia está enterada

23

P-7365


Habana
Guanabacoa

le as cosa de el [illegible]
no sabes la alegria que
me da el saber que vas
a ser padre
para que tu esposa como
se quieren los hijos
dime como se encuentra
Esther de salud
no te vayas a decir nada
en las cartas a mi de
lo que te paso a Esther
para que no se asuste
sabras que tu hermana
esta de lo mas formal
y estudiosa
seguimos [illegible]
[illegible] mas [illegible]
[illegible] se despide [illegible]
su Madre que no se
olvida ni un solo momento
con un abrazo [illegible] fuerte
[illegible]

Patria o Muerte

Venceremos

En la de nuestra Revolucion
Socialista

23

Francisco Marquez 160

26/2/62 [redacted]

23

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodríguez López

2 February 1962

(1 7365)

10:50 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, informó a HECTOR ANAYA de Prensa Latina, sobre la llegada del Diputado brasileño JULIAO, quien va de paso para La Habana.

Francisco da Paula

(7365)

RESUMEN
domingo 11 febrero 1962 ④ 1

18:15 LEONCIO CABAÑAS MATUS, jalapeño y que dijo ser muy amigo del cubano MANUEL GUILLOT [illegible], supo que éste había llegado hoy a la ciudad de México en el vuelo de Canadian Pacific. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana manifestó que él no sabía que GUILLOT tuviera amigos mexicanos, pero informó que efectivamente GUILLOT se encuentra en México, solo que nó en esos momentos allí en la Embajada. CABAÑAS dejó su domicilio, sito en Lorenzo Boturini # 111 Bajos, casi esquina con I. la Católica, aunque indicó que posteriormente volverá a llamar para ponerse en contacto con GUILLOT. (Este tal vez sea miembro de la Embajada de Cuba qué se encontraba en Argentina).

Phillips
Pepita

6 February 1962

10:44 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba manifestó al Sr. ESTREZATE de la Imprenta Maloro, que es urgente que hoy por la mañana pase a la Embajada, pues tiene material que entregarle. ESTREZATE estará a las 12:00 hs.

(6474)

17 Feb 62

10:32 **RAUL NESTOR FUENTES pidió comunicarse con el cubano ROGELIO. ROGELIO de momento no sabe quién es. NESTOR le indica que él debe tener por allí una tarjeta. ROGELIO le pregunta que si es el asunto de los muchachos. NESTOR dice que sí, que él es el encargado de ése. ROGELIO le indica que entonces está todo arreglado. NESTOR pregunta que si llegaron éllos hoy allí, "pues yo llegué a las nueve de la mañana; es que me dieron una misión, un encargo de recoger una documentación". ROGELIO dice "ya fueron a buscarte allá, fué uno de los muchachos". NESTOR contesta "entonces no me muevo yo de la casa porque ése estoy esperando precisamente".**

17 Feb 62

16:30 MIGUEL, del Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, manifestó a [illegible], de la Embajada de Cuba, que le tiene una [illegible] que de allí le mandó MARIANO. (50-11-3-3)

(7365)



ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ P.
Agregado de Prensa EMBAJADA DE CUBA
MEXICO D.F.

Casilla [illegible]
La Paz Bolivia

JUNTA DE [illegible]
[illegible]
LA PAZ - BOLIVIA

La Paz, Bolivia 12 de Febrero 19[illegible]

Señor
Rogelio Rodriguez Pereira
Mexico D.F.

Recordado Rogelito, Por pura casualidad supe donde te encontrabas, una notici. de prensa y me dije le escribo y ahí van mis letras portadoras de inolvidable afecto al hermano [illegible] que tuve en Camiri y donde el destino nos reunió.

[illegible] te encuentras, tu esposa [illegible] hijos, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que estes en situación buena, y siempre superando, ahora tienes que pensar en los hijos.

Y te acuerdas de esta tierra, que tan [illegible] fue tuya en nuestros buenos y malos, te diré que nada cambió, la misma constante, las mismas dificultades que tú la dejaste, la [illegible] siempre [illegible] y [illegible].

Yo sigo igual, trabajo en una revista como Sub-Directora, pero ésta sale cada dos meses, estoy preparando un nuevo libro, pero no de versos, te lo haré llegar, ahora que sé tu destino.

Con la duda si estas letras llegaron a su destino y si te me recordarás, [illegible] [illegible] que me escribas y me digas si puedo serte útil ahora que estas en lucha fuerte y decisiva, siempre tu hermana de corazón

22.

P 7365

Francisco Marquez 166 19/2/62

NEGATIVES

22 "P" Eligio Rodríguez López

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-18537

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-300-3

TO
Chief of Base, Monterrey

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
2 February 1962

SUBJECT
•Jose Arturo DE LA PENA

RE "CHECK ONE"
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

1. LIENVOY (B) reported that Jose Arturo DE LA PENA had been trying to reach Rogelio •RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Cuban Third Secretary, on 20 January. Since he was unable to reach RODRIGUEZ, he left a message to the effect that he was leaving Mexico City and on his return he would give the address to which they should send the Information Bulletin of the Cuban Embassy. He said the pressure is a "little strong here, since yesterday (19 January) they were picking up all that left the embassy - newspapers and all that" and for that reason he did not go in. He said that he was taking several copies of No. 4 of the Information Bulletin to Coahuila, but that he also wanted No. 5 which contained information about scholarships.

2. Station would appreciate any information Monterrey may have on DE LA PENA.

Willard C. CURTIS

1 February 1962

Distribution:
- 2 - Monterrey
- 2 - WHD
- 2 - Files
  - 1 - Chrono
  - 1 - 50-9-3-3

DRCassavetis/cme

P-7365

SECRET

11 January 1962

11:40 [illegible] FUENTES de Prensa Latina, manifestó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, que hoy por la tarde irá a la Embajada para charlar con él.

17 Jan. 1962.

16:30 7365 ESPEJEL, del Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, manifestó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, que tiene una carta que le envió [illegible] de allá, y que dentro de la carta, viene otra dirigida a ROGELIO. Este le pide que se la pase a dejar a la portería.

7786

20 Jan. 1962

16:56 JOSE ARTURO DE LA PEÑA ha estado tratando con insistencia en ponerse en contacto con el cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, y al no encontrarlo le deja recado en el sentido de que le va a escribir para que le manden el boletín de información de Cuba, pues él va a salir fuera de la ciudad, pero cuando regrese le dará la dirección para que se lo manden, porque está la presión un poco fuerte aquí, pues ayer estaban recogiendo todo lo que salía de la Embajada, periódicos y todo éso, y por éso él no entró. Agrega que lleva a Coahuila varios boletines del número 4 de información sobre Cuba, pero que también quiere el número 5 donde viene información sobre las becas. OLGA toma el recado y se lo pasará a ROGELIO.

20 Jan 1962

10:04 7365 HECTOR GALLO pidió a GLORIA que a como dé lugar despierte a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, pues el Embajador PORTUONDO ordenó que "todos estemos aquí y falta ROGELIO". GLORIA cumplirá con el encargo.

26 Jan 1962

11:55 PUENTE, quien ayer llegó de Tamaulipas, Tampico, y que así se lo hizo saber al Lic. LOMBARDO diciendo que ya traía el dinero para comprarle los dos pasajes de ida y vuelta, sábado y domingo próximos respectivamente, informó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que tienen organizada allá una exposición fotográfica con las fotos aquellas que le regalaron en el Palacio Presidencial de La Habana y desea que ROGELIO le proporcione boletines "y otras cosas" para repartirlas allá (Tampico). ROGELIO le indica su conformidad y le pide pase a la Embajada a recogerlas.

SECRET

22 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

FROM: LDPuckett

SUBJ: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (P-7365)

1. Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance on 20, 21, and 23 October 1961 (see surveillance reports in P-7365 which should have been routed to COS by Hazlett) with no conclusive results re student contacts.

2. The surveillance was cancelled (see reports) because of the continued presence of Mexican Secret Service agents and vehicles in the area of the Cuban Embassy - a problem which has plagued our surveillance attempts for months. Consequently, the team has not been able to mount a prolonged surveillance at the Cuban Embassy.

3. After 1 Juanuary 1962 the team can make another attempt on subject if so desired by the Chief of Station.

Thanks

Distribution:
  Orig - P-7365
  1 cc - LITENSOR P-
  1 cc - Cuban Embassy Activities
  1 cc - UNAM
  1 cc - Humberto ROMERO P-

SECRET

P-7365

SECRET

LW

22 December 1961

① Tex Any reports (See Tom's notes) of

② Scro

See attached memo LW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez P-

1. On 2 October 1961 Lic. Humberto ROMERO, private Secretary to President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos told me that the President was very concerned about a Cuban "from the Cuban Embassy" who spends considerable time at the U.N.A.M. working amongst students there. ROMERO did not name.

2. I asked SHYROCK who said this was probably Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. The attached concerns ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

3. SHYROCK told me that as of 16 October 1961 Tex would put Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez under surveillance; but, as of 22 December 1961, I have received nothing.

Distribution:
Orig w/att - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez P-
1 - LITENSOR P-
1 - Cuban Embassy Activities
1 - U.N.A.M.
1 - Humberto ROMERO P-

SECRET

Ann – This is the character [illegible] is looking for, I believe. Lex hesitates and will put him under surveillance on 16 Oct 61

13:15 Un individuo que dijo ser el Secretario General del Grupo JOSE MARTI, pidió películas, propaganda y boletines para repartir entre los alumnos de la Preparatoria. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, indicó que para hablar de eso es preferible que se llegue a las oficinas de la Embajada. Así lo hará. ✓

11 OCT 61

LIENVOY

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

FBI doc.
19 Dec 61 (Wash)
Re: Foreign Political Matters
No Bufile given

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Classification
UNCLASSIFIED

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COUNTRY MEXICO

[illegible] NO. ID

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat (?) Disarmed

DATE OF REPORT 17 December 1961

NO. OF PAGES One

DATE OF INFO 8 December 1961

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico City, 9 Dec 61

EVALUATION B-2

SOURCE Local Press (Excelsior)

FROM USARMA MEXICO

PREPARED BY LtCol A.W. Gunn, GS

R-SERIES NO. R-308-61

① Stewart

② Dee

③ files

P-

SUMMARY:

A young third secretary of the Cuban Embassy was disarmed by an assortment of Mexican law-enforcement personnel. The fracas occurred 8 December 1961 at the International Airport.

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: AirA/NA, PolR/Emb, FOL, USARCARIB, 4th Army

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, a third secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, was disarmed at Mexico's International Airport on 8 Dec 1961.

2. The fracas apparently started over the documentation of a diplomatic courier, one Fernando [illegible] Castillo, by the emigration agent who was processing Cubana de Aviación's flight 465, outbound for Havana. RODRIGUEZ rushed to "defend" the courier and harsh words ensued. Before it was all over officials of Emigration, special agents of Interior, and the Federal Judicial Police took part. In the melee it was discovered that both Cubans were carrying concealed pistols. The Judicial Police confiscated the weapons. The affair ended with RODRIGUEZ threatening to return armed the following Tuesday and declaring, "We'll see if you take my pistol then."

COMMENT: 1 The following Tuesday (12 Dec) has come and gone with no similar incident reported.

2. The rank and file Mexican is no longer enchanted with his Cuban brother. CASTRO's defiant pronouncement of his true color stripped away the last vestige of respectability his government may have had in the eyes of Mexico's literates. (i.e. politically speaking)

3. The police probably enjoyed the encounter.

APPROVED:

Chester L. Johnson
CHESTER L. JOHNSON
Brigadier General, GS
Army Attaché

[illegible]

UNCLASSIFIED

P-7365

17:37 [illegible] de la Torre à Lima dijo a [illegible] que en la [illegible] que allí está el compañero [illegible] ([illegible], guatemalteco) y lo está esperando. [illegible] por el momento no puede ir, sería más tarde. JARDON le pregunta que si quiere que se encamine para allá ahora, porque trae el tiempo muy limitado y tiene algunas otras cosas que tratar "además de lo de allí de ustedes", a ver si es posible que se vaya mañana. [illegible] lo espera.

18:03 [illegible] FUENTES manifestó a JARDON que acaba de llegarle el rumor de que el General fué baleado, aunque él espera fervientemente que no se confirme dicho rumor. JARDON pregunta que cuál General. FUENTES responde que cuál General ha de ser, CARDENAS, y le pide que verifique la noticia él que tiene más contacto con esas gentes. Posteriormente JARDON preguntó a [illegible] RIVERA si era cierto que el General había sido objeto de un atentado. RIVERA dijo que era falso, pero al preguntar JARDON que si así podía informarlo a los compañeros de la prensa, RIVERA respondió que mejor lo consultará con el General y posteriormente llamará a JARDON.

P-7493

18:17 El Gral. CARDENAS preguntó a [illegible] JARDON qué hay de la noticia que le dieron. JARDON indica que le hablaron los compañeros del diario La Prensa, preguntándole qué había de un supuesto atentado que CARDENAS sufrió, en el cual había muerto uno de sus ayudantes. CARDENAS dice que inventos de éstos hay todos los días, pues "estamos vivitos y coleando absolutamente y saliendo para todas partes sin que nadie nos moleste". JARDON manifiesta haberle dicho a FUENTES, a quien encargaron que indagara ese asunto, que le parecía absurdo, pero de todas maneras pidió a RIVERA que consultara ésto con el General, para que cuando lo vuelvan a llamar, decirles que es completamente falso. CARDENAS le indica "cuando lo vuelvan a llamar, hay que decirles a éllós que ya habló conmigo y que es conveniente que se los diga a los que están inventando ésto que dónde consideran éllos que yo en lo personal pueda tener algún peligro para ir sin acompañamiento ninguno a esa área; pues si el pueblo quiere éso ni hay ninguna desconfianza de uno para que vayan a creer que se cuida uno de algo; hay que decirles ésto a los llamados compañeros de la prensa, porque son [illegible] pero no compañeros". Ambos se ríen. JARDON cambia de tema e indica al General que tiene unos documentos que le interesa conocerlos; que si se los manda o puede venir alguno de sus ayudantes. CARDENAS indicará a [illegible] que vaya ahora a Prensa Latina.

20:15 De Nueva York preguntan a [illegible] JARDON los siguientes mensajes [illegible], procedentes de Cuba: "[illegible] preguntas 212-9 si llegó [illegible]-42 de [illegible] 327-11. Ojalá nos lleguen todas estas cosas que esperamos como agua de mayo. Sa-

P-7365

P

13 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM : .

SUBJECT: Probable Transfer of Ramiro del Rio Perez

1. On 12 December 1961, LITAMIL-2 told me that Chelo Esperon, Cuban Embassy secretary, had been told by Jose Antonio Portuondo, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, that he had succeeded in getting Subject out of the Cuban Embassy. LITAMIL-2 also reported information from Esperon that Portuondo was arranging a secret meeting with Ricardo Vidal, former Cuban Embassy Counselor, prior to his Mexican defection.

Rogelio

2. Source comment: With the removal of Subject and the possible removal of third secretary, Rodrigues, who was recently involved in a pistol-toting incident at the airport, Portuondo may feel the necessity of discussing the current Cuban Embassy personnel situation with Vidal, who is a veteran Cuban diplomat.

3. Station comment: There is also the possibility that Portuondo may wish to try to use Vidal to obtain oil for Cuba. Portuondo has recently been exhausting all sources in an effort to obtain oil.

Rogelio

Distribution:
1 - P-Ramiro del Rio Perez
1 - P-Jose Antonio Portuondo
1 - P-~~Roberto~~ Rodrigues
1 - P-Ricardo Vidal
1 - JMZIP/III
1 - Cuban Embassy Activities

P-7365

[illegible]

Mexico City News
9 Dec 61

CUBA

Two Interior Department agents yesterday had to

CONTINUED ON PAGE 9A

MEXICAN BRIEFS...

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2A

beat two Cuban diplomats into submission during a violent scuffle at the airport when the latter refused to give up their guns.

Claiming diplomatic immunity courier Fernando Alonso and Cuban embassy Third Secretary [illegible] Rodriguez vociferously turned down a request from the Mexican agents to turn in the guns they were brandishing publicly obligating these to use force.

The shouting and scuffling created a near panic among the Havana-bound passengers on Cubana's flight.

The gun-toting Castreñes said all diplomats in Cuba not only are allowed to carry guns but that the Cuban government itself provides them.

A nice, rosy little society.

P-7365

50-9-12

cuando acepten algunas sugerencias y reformas substanciales que es necesario introducir. AGUILAR está de acuerdo en éllo y se comunicará la semana entrante con CASTILLO para hacer de su conocimiento lo que resolvió el Comité Nacional.

15:10 El Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA informó al Lic. DIAZ ORDAZ que hoy desde la diez horas hubo un paro de los maestros de la Sección 35, en Saltillo, por falta de pago de sueldos. Que dicho paro continuará indefinidamente. Además un incidente que se registró en el Aeropuerto en el que tomaron parte ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba y el Correo Diplomático FERNANDO ALONSO quiénes pretendieron entrar armados. Los agentes de Migración al notar esto, los desarmaron no sin antes tener un forcejeo con éllos. 8 Dec 61

17365

17:20 El Ing. JORGE L. TAMAYO preguntó a su cuñada GELA qué le pareció a su cónyuge JOSE ALBERTO el nombramiento del General CARDENAS, ya que no lo quiere nada ni es santo de su devoción. GELA responde que ya no trata esas cosas con JOSE ALBERTO porque siempre están en desacuerdo. TAMAYO ve este asunto desde muchos ángulos de vista y cree que tiene mucha importancia desde el ángulo de la mala jugada que le hicieron al Gobierno Brasil, Ecuador, Uruguay y Argentina de rajarse a la hora de la votación en la OEA. Entonces el Gobierno necesitaba apoyo y TAMAYO cree que ésa fué la intención del General CARDENAS al aceptar el cargo del Gobierno, porque éso se lo habían ofrecido hace 3 años. GELA dice que sí, y que no se le habían dado. TAMAYO rectifica en el sentido de que CARDENAS no lo había aceptado, y de la noche a la mañana lo aceptó y entonces a TAMAYO le parece que fué en función de la situación internacional. A GELA le dió mucho gusto, pues le parece que es una de las cosas que necesitaba el Gobierno, un puntalito, porque con el General no se juega. Asimismo le parece que los demás ni fu ni fa. TAMAYO a ese respecto comenta que fué requisito que pidió el General, que llamaran a todos. Claro que a los otros les dieron cosas simbólicas y en realidad el que fué a una posición de importancia fué el General CARDENAS.

7365

17:43 ELENA VILIE secretaria del Lic. AGUILAR dejó recado para la Sra. CLEMENTINA BASSOLS, en el sentido de que hoy a las 20:00 hs en el despacho del Ing. CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS será la reunión del Comité Nacional.

18:25 FEDERICO BARRERA FUENTES comentó con FRANCISCO GALINDO OCHOA que éste ahora sí tiene mucho material, preguntándole a la vez qué opinión tiene de los nombramientos. GALINDO responde que buena. FEDERICO dice que no hay más que un error de ubicación en el asunto de la pesca, pues éso le quita valor a los 20,000. HECTOR contesta que 9,000, pero que tuvieron que recortar lo de quién invitaba. RENATO pregunta que si así les van a servir. HECTOR dice que sí y que se repartieron, pero supone que todavía habrá en Salvador. De todos modos hay que ver éso, porque parece que no se llevaron todo lo que habían hablado. RENATO tiene todavía, y sólo quería informarle qué lugar y qué fecha. El sábado se ven allá.

(39) (3696)

14:22 ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ preguntó a MAIZ, el portero de la Embajada Cubana, que si no ha regresado TERESA PROENZA todavía, porque aquí la están esperando en Fundición, 8, y la señora dice que TERESA iba a ir primero a la Embajada Norteamericana. Que por favor en cuanto llegue, le diga que la están esperando en esa dirección. MAIZ comenta que si TERESA fué a la Embajada Norteamericana, a lo mejor allí ya la degollaron. ELENA se ríe de la ocurrencia.

(265)

14:57 El Ing. JORGE L. TAMAYO recomendó a su hijo el Lic. JORGE que ahora que vaya a la casa lo espere, porque quiere hablar con él, pero que procure que la cosa no sea muy ostentosa, pues no quiere que de ésto se dé cuenta su esposa MARTA. Que el Ingeniero irá disimuladamente a su recámara y luego suba JORGITO en la misma forma, pues le urge hablarle.

14:59 El Embajador PORTUONDO puso el siguiente cable a GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, Embajador de Cuba ante la ONU en Nueva York: "Favor SOUSA espere compañeros TALAVERA y RODAS, Delegados CIES llegarán vuelo 400 Aeronaves México seis horas mañana sábado".

16:11 POSADA, Consul de Cuba en Veracruz, desde el Puerto Aereo dijo a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada Cubana, que dentro de un rato sale a Tampico, a las 18:00 hs., y pregunta que si allí en la Embajada tienen alguna información que llevar para allá manden a alguien con ella y él se encargará de hacerla llegar a aquella gente o que si quieren decirle algo vaya alguno al Aeropuerto a verlo. ROGELIO manifiesta que tratará de ir con otro compañero de allí de la Embajada.

18:00 De parte de [illegible] preguntaron por el Lic. AGUILAR, manifestando que es urgente. En el despacho de AGUILAR se informó que se encontraba en las oficinas de Salvador [illegible] y se les proporcionó el número de teléfono.

18:52 Un individuo no identificado preguntó a la oficina comercial de la Embajada Cubana, por [illegible], quien vino de Culiacán para arreglar un asunto allí en la Embajada, según expresó el individuo. Una vez en comunicación, éste reclamó a JOAQUIN que no hubiera ido ni a la Unión, ni al Parti-

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT **Norman LAINFIESTA**	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO. P-7216
	DIS~~PATCH OR~~ SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. memo from W.M. Scott
	DATE 29 Nov 61
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	DATE OF INFO.
	EVALUATION
ANALYST	DISSEMINATED IN
DATE PROCESSED	DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

Contact of Subject, while he, subject was in Mexico.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ P-7365

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

7365

11:55 FUENTE preguntó al cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que si ha habido algo, pues a él lo fueron a buscar de parte de un señor RODOLFO ROMERO de La Habana y FUENTE no sabe si es cierto o le quieren tender una trampa, porque parece que ya le andan pisando los talones, por lo del Movimiento de Liberación, y entonces quiere saber si allí en la Embajada tienen información sobre las personas que llegan, a ver si este señor RODOLFO ROMERO está aquí o vino antier. ROGELIO le sugiere que mejor llame al Consulado de Cuba, aunque desde luego "no sabemos quién sea ese señor". FUENTE mejor va a hablar con el señor de la Cubana de Aviación, además de que va a ponerse más abusado.

4p4

12:20 El Lic. AGUILAR manifestó al Ing. HEBERTO CASTILLO que lo ha estado llamando en virtud de que recibió un telegrama de los compañeros de Poza Rica, quienes tienen interés en saber en definitiva quienes van y cuando estarán allá, además de que en el telegrama indican con quien ponerse en contacto allá. AGUILAR agrega que precisamente está aquí ahora NACHO ACOSTA y con él va a precisar los nombres para así telegrafiarles a aquellas gentes, pues parece que son los mismos cinco elementos inicialmente propuestos. HEBERTO dice que parece que se incorpora también NACHO AGUIRRE. AGUILAR a su vez manifiesta que ACOSTA indica la posibilidad de que también vayan dos o tres petroleros de la Secc. 35, y eso sería muy útil. HEBERTO no puede precisar quienes son, no obstante que el sábado estuvieron tratando ese asunto con los petroleros. AGUILAR dice queel acto será el sábado a las 20:00 hs. HEBERTO le recalca que la comisión estará integrada por el Lic. CALDERON, el Lic. CASTILLEJOS Ing. SANTOS BARONA, NACHO AGUIRRE, Sra. CASTILLEJOS, el propio HEBERTO y los dos o tres petroleros.

365 Copy to 4p4 Jesus 395

12:45 El Ing. TAMAYO con una risa servil, dijo al Lic. SILVA HERZOG que vé con agrado que lo aceptaron como colaborador de la revista Política. SILVA asiente agregando que fueron muy gentiles. Cambiando de tema TAMAYO indica que le mandará un ejemplar de la revista Hoy en la que le hicieron una entrevista para contestar a [illegible].

13:04 ANTONIO GARCIA [illegible], de la CTAL, envió el siguiente telegrama a CRISTINO SANTOS a Xicoténcatl, 111-A en Saltillo Coahuila: "Estamos organizando salida Delegación día 29 por Sabena. Urgenos conocer nombres y número delegados para reservación viaje. Usted y otros delegados deben estar aquí más tardar próximo lunes 27. Saludos".

13:24 [illegible], de la CTAL, envió el siguiente cable a [illegible], Secretario de la CTC de La Habana, Cuba: "[illegible] informarnos fecha salida avión especial agradeciéndo-

P 7365

que lo ha obligado a aumentar el tiraje. Efectivamente AGUILAR se había extrañado de ver el nombre de BRAMONTE en una revista de estas gentes que siempre se han distinguido por sus ataques y su hostilidad, pero no obstante eso acepta escribir el artículo que BRAMONTE le pide, a petición de JULIO SCHERER GARCIA.

11:23 Un individuo desconocido pidió a la revista Política que mande un fotógrafo y un reportero a la calle de Norte 46 A, cerca de La Villa de Guadalupe, donde están siendo golpeados unos ferrocarrileros, por granaderos, que trataron de apoderarse de unos furgones para vivir. JOSE LUIS MARQUEZ tomó nota y verá que puede hacer.

(4915) copy to P-1493

11:35 JACINTO LOPEZ, tal como se lo había indicado el Gral. CARDENAS, se reportó con éste para informarle que está ahí con él, una comisión de campesinos que quieren que los reciba. CARDENAS indica que lo hará la semana entrante y lamenta no poder saludar más ampliamente a JACINTO.

11:45 ARROYO CH. citó urgentemente al Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA, en su oficina.

(2367) copy to P-

11:46 ROGELIO CASTILLO, contacto de JULIO COUTTOLENC con el Sr. P. GONZALEZ Corporation de Los Angeles California, en el asunto de cierta cantidad de arroz que va a comprarse para la Embajada de Cuba, preguntó a URBIETA qué han resuelto sobre el particular. URBIETA indicó que CUENCA necesita tener la muestra.

(7086)

12:15 MIJAILOV de la Embajada Rusa, de acuerdo con la invitación que le hizo XICHLRA SANCHEZ para pasar este fin de semana en la casa de COTY, en Cuernavaca, quedó de pasar por élla el próximo domingo a las 09:00 hs.

12:40 De parte del Corl. RANGEL ESCAMILLA transfirieron una comida para el miércoles próximo, entre aquél y el Sr. GABRIEL ALARCON.

(7365)

12:40 El Cubano ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ comunicó que en la Valija diplomática de hoy, ya se fue "eso", que son seis bultos, y va consignado al Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, y los recibirá en el Aeropuerto el Sr. [illegible], Dier. JARDON a su vez informa que " ya tenemos la entrevista", está picosa . (seguramente se trata de una entrevista con [illegible] SOCARRAS).

(5400) 1671

12:54 [illegible], argentino contacto del Lic. [illegible] TOLEDANO [illegible] de Cuba, informó a MIJAILOV de la Embaja[illegible] [illegible] lo pueden llamar y es el [illegible]-55. MIJAILOV tomó nota.

SOURCE : [illegible] (P-2)

DATE: Monday, 23 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio [illegible] Lopez

✓ 0900- On duty at subject's home.

✓ 1027- He came out of home and walked to Cuban embassy, going in through consulate door on Marquez and Zamora.

✓ 1252- Car 446 came out of embassy; SUBJECT and three men in it.

✓ 1256- They arrived at Hotel Agnes on Saltillo street and one of the men went inside.

✓ 1302- Trunk of car was seen to be open...

✓ 1309- Man came out of hotel and they drove off.

✓ 1326- They arrived at International section of airport and took out several bags from trunk of car; they then went into Mexicana de Aviacion ticket counter.

✓ 1405- SUBJECT said hello to red faced man who used to live at hotel on Azueta street; he helped put this man's bags in car 446; man apparently had just arrived...

✓ 1409- SUBJECT and other Cubans went into restaurant; they also had taken bags to car...

✓ 1417- They came out of restaurant and SUBJECT said hello to two Russians who had arrived at airport in car no. 86.

✓ 1419- SUBJECT said hello to three students... They were apparently Cubans also.

✓ 1420- SUBJECT said goodbye, then went into waiting room no. 4.

✓ 1515- SUBJECT came out of waiting room accompanied by one of the Russians; this man was seen at airport with other men and woman, apparently all Russians.

✓ 1517- SUBJECT and Russian drove off in car 86; two men and a woman who had been seen with Russian also left in 1961 Ford, plates 141.

✓ 1539- SUBJECT and Russian arrived at subject's home; SUBJECT got off car and went into home, but came out immediately and walked off. Car 86 drove off... (Russian in it has been seen often in this car- long, blond hair; long nose; horn-rimmed glasses).

✓ 1542- SUBJECT went into small store, "La Jalisiense", Marquez and Zamora. P-7365

✓ 1545- He came out of store, and went into Cuban embassy through main gate; it was noticed at this time that there were two patrol cars in front of embassy, and two other cops on foot in armea... One patrol car left soon after this, and the two cops were also relieved by three new ones...

1615- Off duty; police car was again parked at corner of Marquez and Tacubaya, making dispatching difficult, while three cops on foot roamed area around Marquez street; a dark blue 1955 Dodge, (secret service), plates no. 10-75 was seen cruising by, once on Zamora and the other time on Tacubaya; both times going by Cuban embassy; five men in it, very much the "agente" type...

(No police car was seen at Russian embassy today).

SOURCE: [illegible] (___)

DATE: Saturday, 21 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

0900- On duty at subject's home, Pachuca 153.

1028- SUBJECT came out of home and bought newspaper at corner of Pachuca and Marquez.

1033- He went into Cuban embassy.

1045- SUBJECT came out of embassy accompanied by a young man with very clean-cut features.

1049- They took cab at Marquez and Tacubaya.

1057- They got off at corner of Reforma and D. Guerra.

1058- They went into offices of Cubana de Aviacion. Reforma 56.

1103- They came out.

1110- They took "peso" cab going down town at corner of Morelos and Reforma and were lost when team cars were not in position to follow...

Checked all known addresses with negative results.

1215- On duty at Cuban embassy and at subject's home.

1445- Off duty; SUBJECT was not seen again and now there were two police cars in front of Cuban embassy, making dispatching there extremely difficult.

NOTE: Team leader has noticed police cars on duty at all times at the Cuban, Russian, Check and Dominican Republic embassies... This has been going on for a couple of weeks.

P-7365

SOURCE: [illegible]

DATE: Friday, 20 October, 1961

FILE:

SUBJECT: Surveillance of Rogelio [illegible] Lopez

0900- On duty at Pachuca 153 and at Cuban embassy.

0958- SUBJECT came out of no. 153.

1000- He went into store, "La Jalicience", Zamora and Marquez...

1004- He came out with another man.

1005- Other man opened door to consulate office and they both went inside.

1033- SUBJECT and man who lives at Tacubaya 74 came out of embassy.

1035- They took cab at Marquez and Tacubaya and picked up another man at doorway to embassy.

1357- They arrived at international section of airport and went inside, but were lost...

1503- SUBJECT came out of airport with two men plus another who apparently arrived in a flight... These three drove off in a cab and SUBJECT went back inside.

1505- He met man from no. 74 and another and they all went into restaurant.

1528- They came out and went to American Airlines counter, then walked off.

1618- After just walking around, SUBJECT and othet two came out and drove off in car 385 that was waiting outside.

1640- They arrived at Cuban embassy and went inside.

1749- SUBJECT came out driving car 446 with another man in front seat.

1750- They arrived at gas station, Marquez and Mazatlan.

1754- They drove off.

1817- They arrived at international section of airport again and went inside.

1819- They went into restaurant.

1842- They came out.

1843- They spoke to employee at Real Aerovias Brazil counter.

1844- They went into international platform no. 2.

1850- They came out accompanied by a man and woman; they went to Aerovias Brazil counter again, then walked out.

1855- SUBJECT and other man drove off in car 446; couple drove off in a green Volkswagen with plates no. 10-13-58.

1928- SUBJECT and other man arrived at Cuban embassy and drove inside.

2050- SUBJECT came out of embassy with man from Tacubaya 74; they immediately took cab in front of embassy and were lost.....Team members dispatching did not advise in time.

2100- Off duty. Checked known gun shop with negative results...

NOTE: SUBJECT was lost at 2050 hrs. due to bad dispatching conditions around Cuban embassy; teamhas been forced to dispatch on foot away from cars. Car are left out of sight of embassy, as there is usually at least one police car at corner of Marquez and Tacubaya; there was one at this time... Also, there is usually a cop on foot roaming around area of Marquez corner with Zamora...

7 Oct 61

101. ✓ Entrada.- HF pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. SIOMARA: que hable el lunes.- 104.-

171. ✓ Entrada.- HF de parte de unos compañeros ferrocarrileros, pregunta por ROGELIO. SIOMARA: que habla el lunes. 174.-

11 Oct 61

13:15 Un individuo que dijo ser el Secretario General del Grupo JOSE MARTI, pidió películas, propaganda y boletines para repartir entre los alumnos de la Preparatoria. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, indicó que para hablar de eso es preferible que se llegue a las oficinas de la Embajada. Así lo hará.

17 Oct 61

X Rogelio Rodriguez 7365

11.- Entrada a las 0958hs.- HD Villamar pregunta por Roberto Frías. Teresa: que quien es Roberto Frías.- Villa: que así le dijo Rogelio que llamara.- Que si no está del Río.- Teresa: que no sabe.- Villa: que mas tarde llama.--- 63.-

20 Oct 61

010. Salida.- ROGELIO avisa a ELEAZER MORALES de Prensa Latina, que hoy llega la gente a las 6 de la tarde; que los compañeros del Congreso de Arquitectura tuvieron dificultades en La Habana con respecto a la visa y hoy llegaron los arquitectos, los profesores que van al otro Congreso. MORALES pregunta el teléfono de la Real Aerovías Brasil y ROGELIO dice que es el 35-81-60.- 035.-

035. Salida al 35-81-60.- ROGELIO pregunta a que horas llega el vuelo procedente de Brasil. HF: 18.30 h.- 043.-

11 October 1961

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Pro-Cuban Ceremony at Escuela "Republica de Cuba" - [illegible] #258
Mexico, D.F.

On 11 Oct 61, LITALUS-1 reported that the ceremony planned at the Escuela "Republica de Cuba" in memory of the "Grito de Yara" was held on this date at 1120. The following people of note were present:

Directora - Elvira ROCHA - Member of the MRM. "Rojilla"

Manuel S. HIDALGO - Rep from the ~~XXP~~ SEP.

Teresa PROENZA - Press Attache Cuban Embassy and Cultural

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez - Asst. Press/Attache Cuban Embassy.

7365

X-1-(6?) 3696

Nothing of a political nature was discussed during the ceremony. After the ceremony PROENZA and RODRIGUEZ met with officials at the school and talked for some time. It is not known what was discussed.

LITEM[illegible]-1 reported that DFS Hqs assigned him to find out the whereabouts of Angel FERNANDEZ Casas, "un barbudo" cubano who arrived in Mexico from Havana on 6 Oct 61. The purpose of the DFS request is not known.

I gave L-1 above assignment on the night of 10 Oct 61.

FILE: Cuban Embassy

50-1-3-3

P-7365

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

On 11 Oct 61, I gave Tex Puckett data re Subject for surveillance op to be mounted on 16 Oct 61. LITENSOR interested Cuban dip who in contact Mexican students. I believe XXXXXXX Subject may be man LITENSOR interested in.

CKS

FILE: "P" FILE SUBJECT

22 Sept 61

18:12 [illegible] de la [illegible] Libre, preguntó a la [illegible] Cubana por ROGELIO [illegible], y al no encontrarse éste dejó el [illegible] urgente que se comunique conmigo". [illegible] el regreso. Posteriormente ésta dijo a [illegible] de la Embajada que en cuanto llegue ROGELIO le diga que vaya allí a la oficina por que lo tiene [illegible] muy urgente.

29 Sept 61

087. Salida 10,00 h.- ALBERU con la señorita COLAR. Esta se encuentra muy apenada con él, antier lo estuvo esperando, - ayer pensaba llamarle, pero estuvo muy ocupada porque tenía que atender a unas chicas de la Universidad Iberoamericana- y se le fué el tiempo en su laboratorio porque tenían que - hacer una serie de preparaciones y cosas. A ALBERU asíle pasó antier; pregunta si la puede ver. COLAR indica que sí, pero ahorita va a salir para el museo. ALBERU - queda de irla a ver allá entre doce y una. COLAR lo espera.- 106.-

LIENVOY

8 Oct 61

292. Salida 15.49 h. al 10-21-71.- ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ pide a SOUSA que de ser posible le mande el traje negro. SOUSA indica que todavía no está.- 315.-

362. Salida 16.46 h. al 46-60-15.- ROGELIO pregunta por - ELIEZER MORALES. BORDES informa que no está. ROGELIO indica que aquí está el Presidente de la FEU y querían- ver si ELIEZER los podía llevar a la Universidad para que- la vieran. BORDES: que se fué con EDUARDO PASCUAL y - OSCARES, que en caso de que lleguen les dirá se comuniquen- con ROGELIO.- Este acepta, agregando que el lunes lo irá a ver. BORDES está de acuerdo.- 389.-

P-7365

50-9-3-3



2

9

hablar hoy [illegible] Elena. [illegible] dice que [illegible] por sus [illegible] salen de [illegible] [illegible] mientras [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] condiciones [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] frente de la casa [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] dice [illegible] 5 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 21 de septiembre [illegible] el 20 de Octubre. La [illegible] de [illegible] de defunción [illegible] [illegible] como [illegible] [illegible] nuestra [illegible].

Recibe un beso de tu [illegible] que te quiere y no te olvida nunca. [illegible]

La dirección de Roberto [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

21

Francisco Marquez 160 10/11/61.

P-7365

2

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



AEREA

Año de la Educación

Habana 1 de Octubre 19[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

Mi querido hijo Dios quiera
que al recibir estas letras te
encuentres bien de salud
Rogelio recibí tu carta de
fecha 15 de Septiembre donde
me dices que tienes que esperar
permiso para venir a la
Habana lo que quiero es que
me mandes a decir 8 días
antes cuando vengas para pedir
permiso acuérdate de traerme
la cadena que no se te
olvide sabes que quiero la
cadena con un Crusifijo
mira haber si me puedes mandar
un Complet de Jorge Negrete
de canciones bonitas mexicanas
estamos en Pinar del Rio
los Brigadistas como la madre

2 0

14-00000

es donde quiere que uno termina
solo un [illegible] [illegible] un
Cuenta lo que tenemos en Cuba
cuando escriba el sobre de las
cartas no pongas falta de ortografía
aunque no se si lo escribiste tu
se despide de ti tu Madre que
no se olvida de ti un solo
momento un beso y abrazo bien
fuerte tu hermano Jorge te
manda igual

Lina

Patria o Muerte

Venceremos

Viva nuestra Revolución

Socialista única en las
Américas

20

Francisco Marquez 160 10/11/61

NEGATIVES

P-7365

20

P

File - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



Sr Rogelio Rodriguez Lo[illegible]
Francisco Marquez [illegible] 102
con Calzada de Tacubaya.
Colonia Condesa Mexico, D.F.

VIA AEREA

COMPRE AZUCAR

R. [illegible] Lopez Lopez
[illegible] Cuba

Año de la Educacion
Habana 22 de Septiembre 1961
Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez
Mi querido hijo deseo que
al recibir estas letras te encuentres
bien de salud nosotros bien
mi hijo hace 3 semanas que no
recibo carta de ti recibi noticias
tuyas por tu madrina donde me
dice que vendrias en el mes de
Octubre no sabes la alegria que
me dio al recibir esa noticia
me dice que tienes a [illegible]
de unos [illegible] que primero que me
mande a decir 3 dias antes
cuando tienes para pedir permiso
y tener tiempo para mandarme
hacer un vestido para la boda
de ustedes para pedir 2 dias
de permiso en el trabajo te
mando esta foto mia para que
veas a tu madre vestida de

19


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible] escribeme aqui
acuerdate de la cadena
me la compras con un crucifijo
me la traes cuando vengas
no se te olvide tengo muchas
ganas de verte porque tiene muchas
ganas de verte y yo tambien
se despide de ti tu madre que
no te olvida ni un solo momento
con besos y [illegible] un abrazo bien
fuerte

Patria O Muerte

Venceremos

Viva nuestra Revolucion
Socialista

19

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

14

14-00000

Francisco Marquez 160

10/2/61

NEGATIVES

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19

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

La Habana Sept 18 1961
"Año de la Educación"

Sr.
Rogelio Rodriguez

Cuñado:

La presente es para decirte sobre los trámites que se están corriendo aquí para la Boda de Doles, como Doles es menor de edad y papá está muerto hay que sacar una certificación de defunción para presentarlo en los papeles del matrimonio hoy se fue a pedir ese papel y no sale hasta el 4 de Dic, pero eso no tiene mayor importancia en caso de no conseguirse pues se hace una declaración jurada ante un notario y cuando ese papel esté se adjunta a los ya archivados en la notaría, la certificación de nacimiento de Esther y la fe de soltera estarán para el 2 de Oct, mañana a las 10 a ir a Inmigración a solicitar la tarjeta pues eso tiene un trámite de 15 días

14

Mañana va Tana a ver a la Sra que le
arregle la pensión a la madre de Gilberto
y tratar de ir a [illegible] para ver
si ellos pueden sacar el certificado de
defunción; me alegro mucho la mejo-
ría de la próxima toda de ellos y
por suerte ya habían pedido el extendido
para poderse quedar aquí con quien
Bueno ojalá que pronto estén aquí
aunque no tengas de [illegible] pero todo
tiene su tiempo y lo pasado estará
hecho.

Te quiere la cuñada
Nena

Patria o Muerte
Venceremos

18



VIA AEREA

VIA AIR MAIL

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez
Francisco [illegible] #160
e/ [illegible]
[illegible]

La Habana   18 de Septiembre 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez López

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien. Mi vida recibí tu carta con fecha del día 9 me alegro mucho al saber que era culpa del correo y no tuya, pues ya hacía cerca de un mes que no tenía noticias. Luego el otro día supe de ti por tu mamá que me escribió y me decía que tú le habías escrito que pensabas venir dentro de dos meses y ahora me dices que tú no piensas estar aquí para el cumpleaños de Jorge, y me dices que tengas los papeles arreglados que si dejan [illegible] vienes en [illegible] y te casas y nos vamos. El lunes ya estoy solicitando los papeles de [illegible] la solicitud me la dan el 2 de Octubre y también el papel de soltería que demora 20 días [illegible] y lleva un trámite de unos 15 días o menos. Así que ya solicité el [illegible] también se [illegible] [illegible] otra cosa que no hay problema pues el problema aquella es la [illegible] de [illegible] que [illegible] me la dan el [illegible] de diciembre ya [illegible] te explicaré mejor en una carta del problema que hay de todas formas si no te casas por ahora, bueno ya estarán arreglados los papeles.

18

P-7365

Si tan como te dejan [illegible] y vienes a casarte ahora hasta en [illegible] los días. Le [illegible] tu mamá para la boda, y [illegible] tan [illegible] luna de miel con a mayor ~~[illegible]~~ casamos el domingo y nos vamos el lunes eso está a tu disposición como tu quieras.

Recibe un beso de tu novia que te quiere y no te olvida nunca Estela

4

14-00000

Damiana Marquez #160 9/25/61

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



VIA · AEREA

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez
[illegible]
Francisco Marquez 100
[illegible] Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia [illegible]
Mexico D.F.

Remite Alejandrina López López
Finca La Campana
[illegible] Pinar del Río
Pancho Torres

Año de la Educación
Habana 19 de Septiembre de 1961
Sr. [illegible] Rodriguez
Mi querido hijo: espero que
al recibir estas letras te encuentres
bien de salud mi hijo Dios quiera
que tengas [illegible] tiempo
Deseos de verte me dice [illegible]
que esta en un circulo de
Capacitación Revolucionaria
no te puedes imaginar la alegria
que me da saber que todos en
la casa estan cooperando con
la Revolucion porque esta
de lo mas grande y formal
tu Padre está con nosotros
pasandose unos dias aqui
te mando la dirección de
Deuvre para que le escribas
[illegible] a tu [illegible] que
siempre me dice que tu no le
escribes te mando la dirección
de el

se despide de ti tu madre
con besos y un fuerte abrazo
con toda el alma y corazon
Lina

te mandare el retrato que
me pediste de Brigadista en
la proxima carta por que es
que los negros no se encuentran
recuerdale de comprarme la
cadena con el crucifijo tu sabes
que [illegible] muchos dicen de Lima
una Cadena esta es la direccion
de Palmira
San Francisco #356
San Juan Puerto Rico

y esta es la direccion de tu Padrino

San Rafael 874
Apartamento 501
Habana

17

9/26/61.

Francisco Marquez 166

NEGATIVES

P-7365

f - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]

[illegible] Rosales
[illegible]
[illegible] del Patrón
La Habana, Cuba

P-7365

[illegible]

[illegible]

Recibí [illegible]

[illegible] ella) [illegible]

[illegible] Gaceta [illegible]

[illegible] también ella.

[illegible]

[illegible] ahora [illegible] libros [illegible]

[illegible] como [illegible] ella

[illegible]

[illegible] la cantidad de [illegible] para que [illegible] tengo que [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] para [illegible]

Francisco Marquez 7/160 9/22/61

NEGATIVES

"P" Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
Lopez

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible]

35c

50 CTS
CORREO
AEREO

MEXICO

Sra. Alejandrina [illegible] López (Irigo[illegible]
Pinar [illegible]
Cuba, Pinar del Río
Cuba.

P-7365

Sta Alejandrina [illegible]

Mi Alma: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ella que [illegible]

[illegible]

tengo [illegible] porque [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Sobre la [illegible]

[illegible] aproximadamente [illegible]

[illegible] allá

Te [illegible]

[illegible] formal [illegible]

[illegible] todo un hombre [illegible]

[illegible]?

[illegible] por el [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

¡Patria o Muerte

Venceremos

[illegible]!

Francisco Marquez #166 9/22/61

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodz-Lopez

11 de Sept. de 1961
INFORME #48

PINTURA ROJA EN MAZATLAN #126

ANTECEDENTES: En las calles de Mazatlan #126 es el domicilio del Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López, que se encuentra en lugar de Rodriguez Cué. G-2.

INFORME: A la una de la mañana del dia 11 de Sept. se pinto el escudo Ruso en la casa #126 de las calles de Mazatlan y se tiro pintura en la puerta de la mismo.

125(?)

P-7365

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

18 Aug 61

[illegible] En una llamada de larga distancia [illegible] a Veracruz [illegible] SOLE CRUZ manifestó a POSADA, Cónsul Cubano en [illegible] que aquí en la Embajada están unos agentes [illegible]

D 7365

ción Federal de Seguridad y preguntan por JOSE AGUSTIN RAMIREZ GOMEZ, de 16 años, hijo de uno de los ayudantes del Presidente de la República, de quien se sabe que se casó con una salvadoreña de nombre MARGARITA DALTON, y los dos se fueron para Cuba; que los agentes dicen que el Presidente quiere saber cómo está el asunto. POSADA informa que efectivamente, JOSE RAMIREZ GOMEZ y su esposa MARGARITA se fueron para Cuba en el barco Bahía de Siaguanea y trajeron a Veracruz una recomendación del Embajador PORTUONDO quien debe saber todo. POSADA agregó que el ICAP tiene que saber el domicilio en Cuba.

(265)

5 Sept 61

[illegible] de la Embajada Cubana, [illegible] [illegible] en la [illegible]

11:00 En voz muy baja, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana dijo a CALLO : TELLEZ habló con ALFREDO SILVA FLORES y le dijo que él era del servicio secreto ~~de esta Embajada~~; además le preguntó que qué venían a hacer ellos a la Embajada, que si venían a buscar ayuda. CALLO comentó : bueno, pues.., nos vemos compañero.

Tom

11 Sept

14 Sep 61

19:30 [illegible] de la Embajada Cubana, usando el nombre de [illegible] [illegible] entra hoy [illegible] porque [illegible] pero insiste en su solicitud y pide a [illegible] que lo [illegible] en su casa, sobre las 10:00 hs." [illegible] asistirá a la cita.





Año de la Educacion

Habana 10 de Septiembre 1961
Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez .
Mi querido sobrino espero que
al recibo de esta carta te encuentres
bien en compañia de tus
[illegible] Rogelio [illegible]
como un mes que no recibo
carta tuya, y me estaba como
esta de desesperada porque no
tengo noticias tuyas. ahora
que tengo mucho deseo de verte
y de abrazarte parece como
si yo [illegible]
[illegible] cerca esta ultima [illegible]
[illegible] que en la casa de nosotros
todo a cambiado [illegible]
una cosa [illegible]
[illegible] todos
[illegible] un dia [illegible]
para todo nosotros [illegible]
que [illegible] de la casa [illegible] .

P-7365

se despide de ti tu madre
que no te olvida ni un solo
momento con un abrazo bien
fuerte y muchos besos
de Jorge tambien y tu [illegible] Padre

Firma

Patria C. Puente

Encierros

10

Francisca Marquez #160 9/19/61

NEGATIVES

Rodriguez
P - Rogilez Lopez



P7365 13



[illegible]

13

Francisco Marquez #166

9/12/61

NEGATIVES

-5-

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq.a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa,
MEXICO D.F.

14

Francisco Marquez 160

NEGATIVES

P-7365 II

P - Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ López

18 Aug 61

Carlos ARIEL and Julieta were there talking about Human Rights Congress at the Del Prado.

GALLO told Subj they were interested in closer relation with Belice, i.e. mutual collaboration. He talked quite some time on the Cuban Revolution and what is was doing. He told Subj that he was veryinterested in his union and that it affiliate itself as soon as possible with the ~~XXXXXXX~~ Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC), in fact, he asked him to write out (dictate) a letter to Rozalio RODRIGUEZ Lopez re affiliation with CTC. Subj told GALLO that he would discuss this with Edmundo JARDON and that the two of them wo ld come ~~up with~~ something re the CTC. GALLO told Subj that they would like the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) to be th lick between the PGT in Guatemala and the CTC in Cuba. GALLO also asked Subj if he knew anything about a military buildup in Puerto BARRIOS. Subj believes that GALLO thinks that there has been a mil itary buildup there. Subj told him he knew nothing about this whi which is the truth. GALLO also asked about relations between B. H. and British Guiana.

Subj reported that Guillermo TREJO ~~of Te~~ [illegible] Prensa Libre went to Toluca on urgent mission on 17 Aug. 61.

Subj said that GALLO, RODRIGUEZ and BORDES tal ked at some length in Spanish in his presence but he was not able t to understand what they were talking about. He cited the followin items: something will happen in Mexico whichiwill bring about an- other situation similar to Guantanamo. CARDENAS mentioned, and name HERNANDEZ of FERNANDEZ on several occasions. Also Oaxaca and Chilpan- cingo.

P-7365

FILE: Norman LARRIESTA


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11
12

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López
Francisco Marquez #1/0
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya.
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO-D.F.

[illegible] 20 de Agosto 1961
Escuela de Educación

Rogelio Rodríguez López

[illegible] recibido esta carta [illegible]

[illegible] hace aproximadamente una semana [illegible] carta [illegible] recibido [illegible] cartas [illegible]

[illegible] muy grave [illegible] en una casa [illegible]

[illegible]

13

[illegible] el [illegible] solamente [illegible] cuando [illegible] sabe todos los días yo [illegible] tiempo, [illegible] cuan- [illegible] un [illegible] que estos [illegible] cualquier cosa y [illegible] cuando la [illegible] queridos [illegible] amor [illegible] mayor [illegible] llevar [illegible] aquí esta [illegible] de los [illegible] alumbra la vida, [illegible] vamos [illegible] el [illegible] nada [illegible]

[illegible] a [illegible] molestar [illegible] no [illegible] cuando uno se encuentra un poco triste [illegible] ya es [illegible]

[illegible] en todos [illegible] y [illegible] a ver [illegible] y [illegible] y [illegible]

14-00000

Francisco Marquez 160 8/28/61.

NEGATIVES

P-7365 13

"P" - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMA-17365

TO
Chief of Station, Caracas

INFO
Chief, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Gustavo R. *MENDOZA

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCES

50-9-12

11 August 1961

X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. LIENVOY (3) reported that on 9 August 1961 Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero, Honduran Communist who lives in Mexico, told Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Cuban Embassy employee, that he wanted to discuss with him the matter of Gustavo R. MENDOZA, a Venezuelan who is an instructor in the use of farm machinery. He said that MENDOZA, member of the revolutionary group in Venezuela, can no longer return to his country and has been practically dismissed from his teaching job at Chapingo because of his ideology. ZELAYA said that he would send MENDOZA, who has had much experience, to see RODRIGUEZ.

2. Station has no traces on Gustavo R. MENDOZA.

Willard C. CURTIS

11 August 1961

DISTRIBUTION:
3-Caracas
2-WHD
2-Files

1- chrono
1- 50-9-12

DRCASSAVETIS:gss

P-7365



[illegible] 11 [illegible]
[illegible] de la Educación

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

[illegible] esta carta [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] hoy casi todos los días [illegible]

[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
Esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

12

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] momento [illegible] de así [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que el accidente era de desagrado y [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible] las cosas de la [illegible].

[illegible] esta [illegible] de nuevo [illegible] en un [illegible] que [illegible] [illegible] de la mar [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que la medicina que me [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] separe [illegible] de nuevo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] te [illegible] he mariado [illegible] que [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] tiempo me canse de [illegible]. y [illegible] también por mucho tiempo [illegible] [illegible] de cual forma, y [illegible] que te [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] la mente mis [illegible] [illegible] esta separación y cual es tu [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible] se [illegible] no se cansa de esperar [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] un [illegible] [illegible] tu novia que te [illegible] y no te olvida nunca. ni se cansa tampoco de [illegible] Ester.

P.D. Por favor no le pases nunca a los cartos [illegible] [illegible] que no se [illegible]. [illegible]

12

Embajada Cuba

6/18/61

NEGATIVES

P7365-2

"P" - Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MEXICO D F

Sr. Jesús A. Zen[illegible]

EMBAJADA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MEXICO D F

No. 941

28 de julio de 1961
"AÑO DE LA EDUCACION"

Card

Sr. Jesús A. Zentella C.,
República de El Salvador # 7 Dep 4,
México 1, D.F.

Distinguido amigo:

Por encargo del señor Embajador, tengo el gusto de acusar recibo de su atenta carta de fecha 12 del presente.

Agradecemos y estimamos su interés por el proceso revolucionario cubano. El Departamento de Prensa e Información de esta Embajada de acuerdo con su solicitud, le suministrará los materiales de información a medida que se reciban.

De usted con la mayor consideración,

Rogelio R.

Rogelio Rodríguez López
Tercer Secretario

Embajada de Cuba

8/2/64

P-7365

NEGATIVES

"P" Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubayo.
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

La Habana 27 de Julio 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr.
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien.

Cuanto hace una semana que no recibo carta [illegible] hoy tenia esperanza de recibir carta [illegible] importa porque yo se que no te ~~[illegible]~~ queda tiempo para escribir por tus negocios siguiendo y así al.

Pero el motivo de escribirte hoy no es para decirte que no recibo carta tuya que aún te escribí y te decía que me voy a meter a miliciana pero se me olvidó mandarte a decir que estuve mirando el [illegible] y que [illegible] que me [illegible] por no hacerlo en la carta anterior a esta.

Olga se mudó hoy la llamé por teléfono para ver cuando se iba y me dijo que se había mudado yo quiera que tu me mandes [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] con la [illegible]

Me [illegible] con la gente de aquí la [illegible]

[illegible] de la Federacion me ello para hacer mi pase a nacional yo creo que demos pase para meterme en el otro asunto despues que pase para la nacional que tu crees de eso.

Hoy supiera de tu mama esta con Jorge en una [illegible].

Recibe un beso de tu nena que te quiere y no te olvida. Gata

PATRIA O MURTE

VENCEREMOS

VIVA NUSTRA

REVOLUCION

Socialista

11

Embajada de Cuba

8/2/61.

P-7365

Joan

NEGATIVES

"P"

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya,
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

10

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

7/21/64

NEGATIVES

P-7365

"P"

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

La Habana 6 de julio 1961
Año de la Educación

Sr:
Rogelio Rodríguez López

Deseo que cuando reciba esta carta te encuentres bien.

Mi vida es la segunda carta que te [illegible] [illegible] hoy domingo y [illegible]. [illegible] nuestros días [illegible] que pasamos juntos. Todo el día algunas veces [illegible] no [illegible] el [illegible] que [illegible] juntos. Hoy [illegible] a mi lado [illegible] [illegible] a mi lado y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] que era mejor [illegible].

[illegible] que hoy ya [illegible] antes de ir [illegible] en tu casa y [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] ya era muy tarde y [illegible].

[illegible] el [illegible] está en [illegible] en la [illegible] y [illegible] [illegible] el 26 de [illegible]. [illegible] una [illegible] que está con [illegible]

Aquí está un trío de música el domingo llega a [illegible] a las 5 de la tarde y [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] no me [illegible] [illegible] de las calles.

Yo hoy [illegible] en la cuadra esta en la casa de Adela te acuerdas cuando [illegible] en la [illegible] Celia y mamá en la Teresa [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] para hacer el [illegible] de la [illegible] y se [illegible] [illegible] con unas [illegible] de [illegible] en el [illegible].

Recibe un beso de tu [illegible] que te quiere y [illegible] te olvida Tata

PATRIA O MUERTE
VENCEREMOS

9



12 de Julio de 1961
Año de la Educación
Cuba territorio libre de América

Dr. Rogelio Rodríguez

Querido:

Son mis mejores deseos que al recibo de esta te encuentres bien, yo estoy enfermo de un oído, y ahora que no me duele te estoy haciendo unas cuantas letras, para que te recuerde que [illegible] estoy vivo, porque hace tiempo que no me [illegible] [illegible]

Creo que ya por la prensa de [illegible] te habrás enterado de todos los festejos que se están preparando de [illegible] del 26 de Julio. [illegible] la Habana con desfile el día 24 de [illegible] [illegible] Villas, [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible] Oriente [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] con [illegible] con con- [illegible], de [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] blanco, con [illegible] de [illegible] flores [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] y [illegible].

9

14-00000

En la entrada del capitolio van
a poner el retrato de Fidel y Camilo
y el 26 entra con la [illegible]
[illegible] Asamblea del pueblo mayor a
la de la Declaración de La Habana
[illegible] no me [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] la [illegible] de los [illegible]
Sin más por el momento se despide
tu [illegible]
Eduardo

Patria o Muerte
Venceremos

9

Embajada de Cuba

7/22/61

"P" — Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Joan ~~Photo and page~~

Jack — Jr

P-73165

NEGATIVES

9

3 July 61

1[illegible]:[illegible]7 De la Embajada De Cuba han estado insistiendo al 24-94-56 que pertenece a Librería Madero, sita en A. Ortega # 1355, que si ya están listas las pruebas de los boletines. Posteriormente un individuo que dijo ser de la Imprenta Madero indicó a TERESA PROENZA que ya estaban listas las pruebas, pero esta dijo que mañana pasarían a revisarlas. Más tarde ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana indicó que enseguida iba a revisar esas pruebas de los boletines.

3666, 4

pg 61

7365

5574

4 July 61

13:39 ESPEJEL indicó a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana que

"ya le tiene todo eso que ROGELIO quería". Posteriormente ROGELIO indicó a MAIS, portero de la Embajada que a la hora que llegue ESPEJEL le franquee la entrada.

7365

6471

13:40 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana insistentemente ha estado tratando de comunicarse con el Ing. LORENZO CELAYA sin conseguirlo.



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López
Francisco Márquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya.
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D. F.

8

P-7365



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Embajada Cubana

6/19/64

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez



Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez López
Francisco Marquez #160
esq. a Calzada de Tacubayo,
Colonia Condesa.
MEXICO D.F.

7


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
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

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba 6/14/61

NEGATIVES

File —

"P" File = Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ

Lopez



La Habana junio 5 de 1961

Año de la Educación

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López

Deseo que cuando recibas esta carta te encuentres bien

En estos momentos que te escribo [illegible] que tu abuelo estuvo en [illegible] ayer se [illegible] hora ya esta mejor.
[illegible] que te entrase ayer [illegible] que no [illegible] junio [illegible]
Semana escribo estas cosas [illegible] cuando [illegible] a escribir estas cosas [illegible]
siempre los Domingos me [illegible] escribirte fijate el Domingo pasado te envie [illegible] cartas encima de las cartas [illegible] este Domingo [illegible], por eso [illegible] una carta el Sabado y el Domingo [illegible] carta te parecera [illegible] mejor [illegible]
Hoy [illegible] que recibi tu carta [illegible] fecha 27 de mayo [illegible] en esa carta me decias que [illegible] dos cartas al correo [illegible] llegado las carta [illegible].
[illegible] semana volvi a [illegible]
[illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López
Francisco Márquez # 166
esq. a Calzada de Tacubaya
Colonia Condesa
México D.F.

6

[illegible] un beso de tu nena que te
extraña mucho y no te olvida
[illegible]

[illegible] escribo mas esta [illegible]
cita [illegible] luego, porque tu no te
puedes [illegible] recibes carta todos
los dias porque yo escribo todos
los dias.
[illegible] cuando menos, pienso
meterme en la escuela de [illegible]
[illegible] tu medeyos, yo creo que me
[illegible] médica. Termine el
[illegible] ahora [illegible] tu [illegible]
yo tengo el color es rojo es lo
que me veo [illegible].

6

Embajada de Cuba

8/10/61

"P"

Rogelio RODRÍGUEZ López

NEGATIVES



Patria O muerte ~~[illegible]~~

Viva nuestra Revolución Socialista

Habana 21 de Abril 1961 año de la Educación

Sr. [illegible]

mi querido hijo con mucho gusto al recibir esta letra te encuentres bien de salud nosotros bien mi hijo recibimos tu carta [illegible] un mes [illegible] que tienes [illegible] para tu madre [illegible] tu carta [illegible] que [illegible] nosotros [illegible] escribiendo y estamos esperando a tu Padre [illegible] a [illegible] nosotros tenemos muchos deseos de verte [illegible] que hace [illegible] que no te veo aquí en Cuba todo está mejor que nunca las [illegible] de la Alfabetización ya suma 100,000.00 [illegible] y todavía faltan [illegible] mas [illegible] alfabetizada de los [illegible] Gobierno [illegible] localizando a [illegible] por la [illegible] para [illegible] cuando [illegible] estar en la Habana para cuando te casas. [illegible] mucho tanto [illegible] ya está muy [illegible] y se despide de ti tu madre que no te olvida ni un solo momento con muchos besos y un abrazo [illegible] fuerte

5

14-00000

Dinamarca Marquez #166 9/6/61.

P-7365

NEGATIVES

"P" Rogelio Rodríguez Lopez

14-00000

Rodriguez

Francisco
MAIZ
Alberti

Source - LIFIRE..

May '61

"R"

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

"AÑO DE LA EDUCACION"

CORREO AEREO

[illegible] Pasaje [illegible] entre [illegible] San Juan de los Pinos [illegible] San Miguel del Padrón. Cuba. Habana.

[illegible] 100. [illegible]

CORREO AEREO

Habana [illegible] de Mayo 19[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Dios quiera
que al recibo de esta carta te encuentres
bien de salud [illegible]
la [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] sabes la alegría que me
causó. mi [illegible] carta que
te estoy escribiendo [illegible] después
que recibí una tarjeta del día
1[illegible] y la carta del día 13 que
[illegible] [illegible]
con la dirección que me dio
Esther me alegró mucho que estés
bien y que estés contento tú no
sabes los deseos que yo tenía de
que me escribieras tu [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] para [illegible]
[illegible] que saber que ya llegamos
[illegible] [illegible] que [illegible]
que [illegible] [illegible]
aquí todos estamos trabajando

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

[illegible] lo que tu sabes ya
Tu tía te manda mucho recuerdo
y se puso muy contenta cuando
supo que tu te [illegible] todo y sirve
para [illegible] de la
todos sus familiares te mandan
mucho recuerdo mi hijo acuerdate
de comprarme la cadena.
con una crucifijo y de traerle algo
a tu hermanita que dice que
te extraña mucho los la mañana
igual que yo cuidate mucho
y pidele al santisimo que
te [illegible] todos los dia lo
llevo tu madura como [illegible]
[illegible] y luchando mucho.
cuando vuelvas vas a tener alegria
de muchas cosas que estan pasando.
Bueno mi hijito se despide de te
tu madre que no deja de pensar en
ti ni un momento con un abrazo
muy fuerte y mucho besos

4

Embajada de Cuba 5/29/61

I

"P" —

NEGATIVES

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

(mother's name:

Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez



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[illegible]
[illegible]
Colonia Condesa
México D.F.

[illegible]

3

14-00000

[illegible] Abrazo [illegible] y
[illegible] con
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] tu [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] llamo [illegible]
[illegible] contigo [illegible]
[illegible] contesta [illegible] para [illegible]
Claro sabes que me contesté las cartas. [illegible]
[illegible] mucho [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] un abrazo de tu [illegible]
[illegible] cuando [illegible] ahora cuando estas lejos [illegible]
[illegible] pensamiento [illegible] pendiente con [illegible]
[illegible] un beso de tu novia Estel

Recuerdos te manda [illegible] y Carmita, Luis

3

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba 5/29/61

"P"

3 Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

NEGATIVES

Habana, Cuba, 23 May. 1961
Año de la Educación
Territorio Libre de América.

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez
Cuñado

Son mis mejores deseos que al recibo de esta te encuentres bien, nosotros bien.

Ayer cuando llegué a la casa me alegró mucho tu carta.

Pero ya vine de Escambray, [illegible] una oposición [illegible] el Instituto Tecnológico [illegible] del Escambray, la [illegible] y ya estamos dando clases en la escuela de [illegible].

En tu carta me decías que te [illegible]

Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez [illegible]
[illegible] # 166
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] E.U.

revolución Socialista [illegible] acon-
tecimiento. Fue [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] del [illegible] que la
[illegible] dos [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] al pueblo, el otro
acontecimiento fue ya te dije la
[illegible] del cambio de Mer-
cenarios por tractores y como
[illegible] sabes la consolidación
de la Revolución que toda
es una parte.

Tú sabes que el vier-
nes pasado llamé a Laura
por teléfono y me invitó a
una fiesta que había en
su casa, y me dijo que
la fuera a visitar a su
casa mientras no se
vaya a Alfabetizar.

Se despide de ti tu
[illegible]
Eduardo.

Embajada de Cuba

5/27/61

NEGATIVES

2

"P" file - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ
López



[illegible] # 160

[illegible] Yucatan

[illegible]

[illegible] Rogelio [illegible] Rogelio [illegible]

e rajado = He Rajado

TULA = TUIA

beco = beca

ella



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[illegible] con [illegible]
[illegible] mas debajo [illegible] los [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] junto [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] muchos besos y cariños. Betty
[illegible]
[illegible]
Betty

14-00000

Embajada de Cuba

5/27/61

Open new - Cuban Dip.

"P" - Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

NEGATIVES

Memorandum for the Record 31 May 61

Subject: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

In letter dated 23 May 61 from girlfriend following noted for XXX S [illegible]'s file:

Sweetheart's name is Ester, she uneducated , misspellings are many: veca (beca) evajado (he bajado) tulla (Tuya) etc.

Subj has mother in Cuba.

Girlfriend in Habana.

JKS

FILE: P" FIL SUBJECT

P-7365

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE. Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM: [illegible]

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT

10 TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65		66	67	68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

Third Secretary, Cuban [illegible], Mexico City, Mexico, [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

22. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-

FORM 7-61 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/AMMUG/Operational; Shipment of explosives to Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: FYI

Following is a translation of a report submitted by AMMUG-1 concerning a shipment of explosives to Mexico:

"The Communist Party of El Salvador had asked me to send them twenty-five one-quarter pound packages of gelatin explosives. They requested that the explosives be sent to Mexico where they would receive them and take them to El Salvador.

'In view of the request, I spoke with Manuel PINEIRO regarding the shipment itself, as well as the amount. PINEIRO answered by telling me to do so.

'During my trip to Mexico (March 1964) I spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez regarding this shipment and he ~~told me that there was no~~ need of my sending the explosives to Mexico as this type of explosive was available in the Embassy. I then told RODRIGUEZ that I would answer the request from El Salvador.

'Upon returning to Cuba I spoke with PINEIRO, who told me not to send the explosives as the orders now were to send nothing but money due to the recent exposure of the arms shipment to Venezuela."

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

P7365

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12916	21 SEP [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	~~SECRET~~	201-749651

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS CI-316/00714-64
SUBJECT	Esther GAVILAN Rosales	DATE DISTR.	8 September 1964
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	CSCI-3/782,061 29 June 1964
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. September 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April ~~1964~~.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Esther GAVILAN Rosales is the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, the Subject of the above referenced report.[1]

[1] Headquarters Comment

1. Official travel manifests reveal that Esther GAVILAN Rosales arrived in Mexico City from Cuba on 15 December 1961 and carried a diplomatic passport; departed Mexico City for Cuba on 27 April 1962, carrying Cuban diplomatic passport number D/61-538; and arrived in Mexico from Habana on 8 July 1963, carrying Cuban diplomatic passport number D/63/455.

CS COPY

SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[illegible]	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT			CINCSO #		I&NS			
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH SA EOB 1	WE 5 R1	CI LIA 1	IE CANADA 1	~~LX-1601~~ - 1 2 2
WH SA MOB 1	WE MADR 1	CI R&A 3	IE BRITISH 1	No Project (AMMUG-1)
WH SA R 1			L WASH BR 1	CSCI-316/00714-64
WH SA CI 4				
WH WAVE 1		RID AN 1		
TOTALS WH SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1			LIAISON	COORDINATING CI/SI/D. ema CI/R&A

FORM NO 6-63 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-332665

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS CI-316/00696-64

SUBJECT Shipment of Explosives to Mexico

DATE DISTR. 25 August 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Following is a translation of a report which source wrote concerning a shipment of explosives to Mexico:

"The Communist Party of El Salvador had asked me to send them twenty-five, one quarter pound packages of gelatin explosives. They requested that the explosives be sent to Mexico where they would recover them and take them to El Salvador.

"In view of the request, I spoke with Manuel PINEIRO regarding the shipment itself, as well as the amount. PINEIRO answered by telling me to do so.

"During my trip to Mexico (March 1964) I spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez regarding this shipment and he told me that there was no need of my sending the explosives to Mexico as this type of explosive was available in the Embassy. I then told RODRIGUEZ that I would answer the request from El Salvador.

"Upon returning to Cuba I spoke with PINEIRO, who told me not to send the explosives as the orders now were to send nothing but money due to the recent exposure of the arms shipment to Venezuela."

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA		OCR	FBI 2
	REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS		XXX		

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA		LIE/CANADA	1		LX-1642
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A		3IE/BRITISH	1		NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
WH/SA/R	1					L7/WASH/DR	1		CSCI-316/00696-64
WH/SA/CI	4			RID/AN		1			
WH/WAVE	1								COORDINATING

TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1

LIAISON

WMK:LD:swk
CI/R&A

FORM NO. 4-63 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: August 20, 1964

To: Mr. Winston M. Scott

From: Clark D. Anderson
Legal Attache

Re: ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your communication of May 26, 1964, that the subject and his chauffeur planned to travel to Nuevo Laredo to pick up a new automobile.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information on July 24, 1964:

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, of 160 Uturgas Street, Mexico City, was in Nuevo Laredo on May 27, 1964, to obtain an automobile for the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. A 1964 black Ford Galaxie 500, Serial Number 4B62X150451, was delivered to RODRIGUEZ on May 27, 1964.

RODRIGUEZ appeared to be about 23 years of age, and it is known that he was buying cigarettes and radios during his stay in Nuevo Laredo.

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

The Mexican diplomatic license plates #333 were placed on the above mentioned vehicle.

Now has D- 36

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?
CUBA ?
CIT CUBA ?
OCC IS AGENT
Δ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY
DGI OFFICIAL AND COMPLEMENT OF MANUEL VEGA PEREZ /201-334253/.

201-334253
HMMA-24080 E01
11 AUG 64
P12

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15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

HMMA-24080 EC1 11 Aug '64

EXCERPT

24 July 1964

(info of May 1964)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General : Debriefing Report #126 of AMMUG/1
Specific: Identification of Cuban Passports and Other Photographs

Source identified the photographs of subjects and gave the following comments:

•••••

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther	AMMUG identified subject as the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ [Lopez], a DGI officer stationed in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

•••••

Daniel Flores
WH/SA/CI

EXCERPTS

24 July 1964



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte [illegible]

[illegible]



El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Sra. Esther Gavilán Rosales

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Esposa del Sr. Rogelio Rodríguez López Tercer Srio. adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba en México

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurará la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1965

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores



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PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

ESTE PASAPORTE TIENE QUE SER ENTREGADO AL [illegible] DE INMIGRACION A SU REGRESO A CUBA.



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 648

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA, 4 JUL 1963

Po. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Inzunza

PEDRO INZUNZA
CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ★ INMIGRACION-CUBA ★

SALIDA

8 JUL 1963



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

0/68/-54

201-332665

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,

concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Sr Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

donde ejercerá las funciones de Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurará la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1963

Pelegrín Torras

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
[illegible] Luz
[illegible]
[illegible] Exteriores



PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

[illegible]



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 647

Válida para [illegible] a México

LA HABANA, CUBA 24 JUL 1963

P.O. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Azunza

PEDRO AZUNZA
CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR * INMIGRACION · CUBA *
SALIDA
JUL 8 1963
RANCHO BOYEROS

EXCERPT

24 July 1964

(info of May 1964)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General : Debriefing Report #126 of AMMUG/1
Specific: Identification of Cuban Passports
and Other Photographs

Source identified the photographs of subjects and gave the following comments:

.....

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther	AMMUG identified subject as the wife of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ [Lopez], a DGI officer stationed in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

.....

Daniel Flores
WH/SA/CI

EXCERPTS

24 July 1964

14-00000



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

[illegible]



El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,

concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Dra. Esther Gavilán Rosales

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

Esposa del Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba, en Mexico

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurará la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 3 de julio de 1963

Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores



PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

FIRMA DEL PORTADOR

ESTE PASAPORTE TIENE QUE SER ENTREGADO AL FUNCIONARIO DE INMIGRACION A LA LLEGADA A CUBA.



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 648

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA, 4 JUL 1963

Po. DEL EMBAJADOR

P. Inzunza

Pedro Inzun
Consejero

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ★ INMIGRACION · CUBA ★
SALIDA
JUL 8 1963



República de Cuba

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

Pasaporte Diplomático

0/63/-454

201-352665

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
concede **Pasaporte Diplomático** a favor de

Sr. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

para que por la vía que más le convenga se dirija a

Estados Unidos Mexicanos

donde ejercerá las funciones de Secretario adscripto a la Embajada de Cuba

Por tanto: en nombre del Sr. Presidente de la República, ordena a las Autoridades de la Nación le faciliten su embarco y le guarden las consideraciones debidas a su rango. **Y ruega y requiere** a las de los países extranjeros por donde transitare, que le presten todo el favor y ayuda que necesite y le reconozcan las inmunidades y prerrogativas que conforme al Derecho de gentes corresponden a los de su clase; haciéndolo así asegurarán la reciprocidad en Cuba en casos análogos.

Habana, a 5 de julio de 1965

Pelegrín Torras
Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
[illegible] de la Luz
[illegible]
Relaciones Exteriores



PERSONAS QUE LE ACOMPAÑAN:

14-00000



EMBAJADA DE MEXICO

VISA: DIPLOMATICA

NUMERO: 647

Válida para dirigirse a México

LA HABANA, CUBA 24 JUL 1963

P.O. DEL EMBAJADOR

PEDRO ARZUNZA
CONSEJERO

MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR ★ INMIGRACION · CUBA
SALIDA
JUL 8 1963
RANCHO BOYEROS

DJTR C

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: 132 SECRET

JUL 23 21 19 64

ORIG.	B. Brown, [illegible]
UNIT	WH/SA/Intel Reports
EXT.	[illegible]547
DATE	23 July 1964

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TDCS-[illegible]

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/SA [illegible]

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, [illegible], CA 2, CA/PEG, DDP, [illegible]

DATE DISTRIBUTED
23 July 1964

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
[illegible]-0316 [illegible]-55[illegible]
[illegible]-9[illegible]S
[illegible]
[illegible]

DISSEMINATION

SA/R	3	SA/31		WH/PA[illegible]	[illegible]	WH/1		[illegible]	#
SA/I[illegible]		SA/WA[illegible]	1	WH/P	1	W[illegible]		[illegible]	#
SA/TC[illegible]	2	SA/SC[illegible]	1	WH/1/P	2			[illegible]	#
SA/CI				WH/2/P	1	W[illegible]/5		[illegible]	#
SA/MOB	1			WH/3/P	1	W[illegible]			

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/[illegible]/R V. Renshaw ([illegible])

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
GROUP 1 [illegible]
(WHEN FILLED IN)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/SA/Intel

COPY NO.

FORM 12-62 1E-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(15-20-44-4)

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA, MEXICO/LATIN AMERICA

TDCS-314/[illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 16-21 JULY 1964

DISTR. 23 JULY 1964

SUBJECT

TRAVEL PLANS OF DELEGATES TO THE 26 OF JULY CELEBRATIONS IN CUBA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (17-22 JULY 1964)

REF IN 33902

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: RESIDENT OF MEXICO WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS. SOURCE HAS GOOD CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND CUBANA AIRLINES IN MEXICO CITY.

1. ON 16 JULY 1964 ANTONIO HADIK, SELF-IDENTIFIED AS A REPORTER FOR PANORAMA, ARGENTINE MAGAZINE, MADE AN APPOINTMENT AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO HABANA.

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SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [illegible] OCI ONE OCR ORR OO FBI INS

4. ALSO, THAT DAY, [illegible], PRO-COMMUNIST RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHOACAN, WAS PLANNING, ALONG WITH ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED PROFESSOR, TO LEAVE FOR HABANA ON 22 JULY TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS.

5. ON 20 JULY THE CUBAN CONSULATE RESERVED PASSAGES FOR TEN COSTA RICANS ON CUBANA'S FLIGHT OF [illegible] JULY. JUAN DUCH COLLELL, WRITER AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA MEXICANO (PCM - MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY), TOLD ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, WHOM HE WAS TO SEE ON 23 JULY, THAT HE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE WAITING LIST FOR 24 JULY, BUT IT WAS CERTAIN THAT HE COULD LEAVE ON 25 JULY. DANIEL MOLINA, OF POLITICA, MEXICAN MARXIST SEMI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE, ALSO HAD TICKETS TO LEAVE ON 25 JULY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT MOLINA WAS TO ATTEND THE CELEBRATIONS EITHER FOR POLITICA OR AS A DELEGATE OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN - NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT), PRO-CUBA, ANTI-UNITED STATES COMMUNIST FRONT.)

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8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

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505. Entrada 1226.- Novicky, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia al no encontrar a Rogelio Rodríguez, pide a Berta le diga que no se le olvide la cena que tiene hoy con él a las 20.00 h. en su casa. Berta:que está bien.- 536.-

P. 1365.
X

536. Entrada.- HF solicita hablar con Roa y Berta pide llame al 141326.- 550.-

566. Salidas ocupado y equivocado.- 591.-

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621. Entradas sin contestación.- 633.-

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(6.-L36.-17 Julio 64).-

P. 1365

DUPE

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: 132 SECRET

JUL 23 21 [illegible] 54

ORIG. B. Brown[illegible]

UNIT WH/SA/Intel/Reports

EXT. [illegible]547

DATE 2[illegible] July 1964

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DATE DISTRIBUTED

23 July 1964

PRECEDENCE

[illegible] ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

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SA/I[illegible]		SA/WA[illegible]	3	WH/R		W[illegible]		[illegible]	#
SA/[illegible]	2	SA/SC[illegible]	3	WH/1/R	2			[illegible]	#
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 33962

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p. 7365.
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621. Entradas sin contestación.- 633.-

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- - (6.-L36.-17 Julio 64).-

P. 7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 15 JUL 64

SECRET

	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	MESSAGE NUMBER
RRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PWO	1422052V	1153

TO PRIORITY LIMA INFO MEXI

CITE DIR ~~[illegible]~~ 35306

RYBAT DYVOUR
REFS A LIMA 5566 (NOT SENT MEXI)
B. LIMA 5663 (NOT SENT MEXI)
C DIR 34453 (NOT SENT MEXI)
D. ZURC 0227(IN 1033)

1. POA GRANTED ~~[illegible]~~ DUIRON-I (D-1) 14 JULY FOR PURPOSES CONTACT, ASSESSMENT AND LCFLUTTER ONLY.

2. FOLL IS FOR POSSIBLE STATION BACKGROUND USE RE D-I BONA FIDES:

A. JACINTO RENTERIA MACHUCA LISTED DUEBON "NOTA DE INFORMACION" NO 000330 AS FIR ACTIVIST IN JAUJA, LED 29 MAY 62 ATTACK THERE. DOB C. 1937 IN PIURA, WORKS "FERTISA" (NOV. 9163), LIVES AVDA BUENOS AIRES 308, CALLAO, MILITARY CARD A2-54-00863, VOTER CARD 1452140.

B. JUAN LOPEZ LIZANA SEGUNDO, PERU PP 06617, TRAVELED 5 APRIL MEXI-HAVANA WITH D-I AND RENTERIA.

C. "ROGELIO" ALMOST CERTAINLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 2ND SECRETARY PBRUMEN EMB MEXI AND IDENTIFIED DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA (DGI) OFFICER FOR MEXI.

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F. NO HQS TRACES ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, BUT IN DECEMBER 1962 JUAN AYZA DEL RIESCO (PERU PP 01799) AND JUAN AYZA MERINO (PERU PP 057775) TRAVELED MEXI-HAVANA TOGETHER.

3. D-I RECRUITMENT, TRAVEL AND TRAINING CHECK IN MOST SPECIFICS. FOLL STILL QUESTIONABLE

A. NO FALSE PBRUMEN PASSPORT CARRIED BETWEEN HAVANA AND PRAGUE. THESE NORMALLY ISSUED, COLLECTED PRAGUE, TRAINEES CONTINUE ON SAME OR ANOTHER FALSE NAME ON ANY LA PASSPORT.

B. VIEW D-I HAZY MOTIVE GO PBRUMEN, WHY HE WILLING, ABLE PAY OWN FARE HOME CITY-MEXI? (THIS NORMAL PRACTIVE FOR MOST L. A. TRAINEES.) WHICH AIRLINE USED?

C. TRAINING SESSIONS PBRUMEN NORMALLY THREE TO SIX MONTHS, BUT EXACT CIRCUMSTANCES TERMINATION D-I TRAINING STILL UNCLEAR. REQUEST COMPLETE DETAILS.

D. EXACTLY WHAT DOES RETERIA KNOW OF D-I'S BACKGROUND? PBRUMEN

(CON'T ON PAGE TWO)

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE:

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DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS		INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

NUMBER

PAGE TWO OF DIR 35306(IN 1153)

OFFICIALS? DO THEY QUESTION HIM RE HIS BACKGOUND? THEY WISH USE HIM IN OTHER THAN GUERRILLAOPS? WHAT IS CURRENT SECURITY STATUS D-I'S KUBARK CONTACTS?

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B. FURNISH LIST OF MALE RELATIVES DUIRON-I WITH PATRONYM VELARDE, INCLUDING KNOWN WHEREABOUTS.

C. CABLE COMPLETE INFO D-I PAST AND CURRENT STATUS ODIBEX LIMA.

CHRONO DUMY

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 15 JUL 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE RRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS PWO	142205ZV	1153

TO PRIORITY LIMA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 35306

RYBAT DYVOUR

REFS A LIMA 5666 (NOT SENT MEXI)

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PAGE TWO OF DIR 35306(IN 1153)

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DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE: 08 JULY 64

INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

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ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS JPC	0814552	1033

TO

CITE

LIMA DIR BERN PARI MEXI ZURC 0227
NUMBER

TYPIC DYVOUR INK

REF PARI 5091 (NOT TO MEXI) ALEJANDRO AUGUSTO * THALIGRI-ARC

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBJECT REF STORY ON ACTIVITIES SINCE WENT AWOL FROM FORT ORDM

A. UPON HEARING THAT UNCLE AND AUNT SERIOUSLY ILL, SUBJ LEFT BY PLANE VIA MEXICO CITY TO LIMA, ARRIVING 6 SEPT 63. UNCLE ERNESTO VELARDE DIED OCTOBER 63, AUNT ELENA ARENAS DE VELARDE DIED 3 DEC 63. ON HIS PARENTS URGING, SUBJ WROTE PRES KENNEDY IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL LIMA. NOV 63 RECEIVED REPLY VIA COL BENSON, MILATT AT LIMA. HOWEVER DID NOT SEE COL BENSON UNTIL FEBRUARY OR MARCH 64.

B. JANUARY 64 SUBJ ACCIDENTALLY MET LONGTIME FRIEND, ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, DOB CA 38, SPANISH CIT. SUBJ FIRST DISCOVERED THAT AYZA INVOLVED WITH COMMUNISTS IN MARCH 63 WHILE SUBJ WAS VISITING PERU. AT THAT TIME A LIMA POLICEMAN WAS RUN OVER AND KILLED BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF PERUVIAN YOUNG COMMUNIST GROUP WHO WAS DRIVING CAR OWNED BY AYZA. AYZA SUGGESTED SUBJ NOT RETURN U.S. BUT GO CUBA INSTEAD AND INTRODUCED SUBJ TO RENTERIA WHO "WOULD ARRANGE EVERYTHING."

C. BETWEEN JANUARY AND MARCH, SUBJ SAW RENTERIA APPROXIMATELY EVERY TWO WEEKS. AT EACH MEETING RENTERIA CLAIMED PLANS TO GO TO CUBA WERE PROGRESSING. DURING THIS PERIOD SUBJ THOUGHT RENTERIA "JUST MAKING TALK". HOWEVER IN MARCH RENTERIA ANNOUNCED PLANS COMPLETED, AND THEY READY TO GO. THEN INTRODUCED SUBJECT TO CASTRO LAVARELLO, SALOMON BOLO HIDALGO AND GENERAL PANDO.

D. SUBJ AND RENTERIA TRAVELLED TOGETHER TO MEXICO CITY ARRIVING 1 APRIL. RENTERIA CARRIED SEALED LETTER FROM LAVARELLO TO "SENOR JORDAN" WHICH RENTERIA WAS TO DELIVER AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. AT THIS POINT IN INTERVIEW, SUBJECT VOLUNTEERED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON JORDAN: JORDAN IS G-2 OFFICER. SUBJ BELIEVES THAT JORDAN IS MAN IN CHARGE OF CUBAN PROGRAM TO TRAIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONALS IN SUBVERSION AND GUERILLA WARFARE. SINCE SUBJ AT NO TIME IN CUBA WAS IN COMPANY OF OTHER THAN PERUVIANS, THIS IS LOGICAL MISUNDERSTANDING. SUBJ MET JORDAN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. HOWEVER JORDAN HELD SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ONLY WITH RENTERIA WHO, DURING ENTIRE TIME AND ON ALL MATTERS, WAS CONSIDERED SUBJ SUPERVISOR AND HANDLER. SUBJ PAID OWN FARE FROM LIMA TO MEXICO. GEN PANDO, THROUGH LAVARELLO, GAVE RENTERIA AND SUBJ EACH 2000 SOLES POCKET

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XXRX ZURC 0227 PAGE TWO
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THAT LAVARELLO RECEIVES ONE THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS FOR EACH
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PER INSTRUCTIONS, RENTERIA AND SUBJ MADE CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY
P.3146 WITH CARLOS ACEVEDO, DOB CA 1926, MEXICO CITIZEN, EMPLOYEE OF PRESNA
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AT ACEVEDO APARTMENT, THEY MET ANOTHER PERUVIAN, TRUE NAME
JUAN LOPEZ DOB CA 1933 WHO WENT WITH THEM TO CUBA. IN CUBA
LOPEZ ADOPTED ALIAS CARLO SUAREZ. RENTERIA AND SUBJ, ACCOMPANIED BY
ACEVEDO, WHO HANDLED ALL MATTERS WHILE THEY IN MEXICO, WENT TO
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E. 5 APRIL SUBJ RENTERIA AND LOPEZ FLEW TO HAVANA, STAYED
RIVEIERA HOTEL UNTIL 8 OR 9 APRIL. THEN UNTIL 13 MAY STAYED
AT LARGE VILLA ON SEVENTH AVENUE IN MARIANAO NEAR GOLF COURSE ON
WHICH ARMY UNIT WAS BIVOUACKED. THERE THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY
JOINED BY FOURTH PERUVIAN, ALIAS IVAN MENENDEZ, DOB CA 33, ETHNIC
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WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN FIGHTING ANTI-CASTRO GUERILLAS. GROUP WAS
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THAT THEY PARAGUAYAN STUDENTS AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY. CUBAN INSTRUCTOR
WHO ACCOMPANIED GROUP ALIAS BERNABE DOB CA 42. BATTALION COMMANDER
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PAGE THREE ZURC0227 (1033)
GUN. INSTRUCTOR ALIAS JOSE DOB CA 42.

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PAGE FOUR ZURC 0227 (1033)
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4. NOT ABLE JUDGE INTEL VALUE ABOVE INFO. DEFER HQS RE DISSEM ANY PART OF ABOVE.

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REF PARI 5091 (NOT TO MEXI) ALEJANDRO AUGUSTO * TALIGRI-AREN

1. FOLLOWING IS SUBJECT REF STORY ON ACTIVITIES SINCE WENT AWOL FROM FORT ORDM

A. UPON HEARING THAT UNCLE AND AUNT SERIOUSLY ILL, SUBJ LEFT BY PLANE VIA MEXICO CITY TO LIMA, ARRIVING 6 SEPT 63. UNCLE ERNESTO VELARDE DIED OCTOBER 63, AUNT ELENA ARENAS DE VELARDE DIED 3 DEC 63. ON HIS PARENTS URGING, SUBJ WROTE PRES KENNEDY IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL LIMA. NOV 63 RECEIVED REPLY VIA COL BENSON, MILATT AT LIMA. HOWEVER DID NOT SEE COL BENSON UNTIL FEBRUARY OR MARCH 64.

B. JANUARY 64 SUBJ ACCIDENTALLY MET LONGTIME FRIEND, ERNESTO AYZA DEL RISCO, DOB CA 38, SPANISH CIT. SUBJ FIRST DISCOVERED THAT AYZA INVOLVED WITH COMMUNISTS IN MARCH 63 WHILE SUBJ WAS VISITING PERU. AT THAT TIME A LIMA POLICEMAN WAS RUN OVER AND KILLED BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF PERUVIAN YOUNG COMMUNIST GROUP WHO WAS DRIVING CAR OWNED BY AYZA. AYZA SUGGESTED SUBJ NOT RETURN U.S. BUT GO CUBA INSTEAD AND INTRODUCED SUBJ TO RENTERIA WHO "WOULD ARRANGE EVERYTHING."

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EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-13-26.-
6 julio 64.-
M30-L31.
1540-2108hs.-

13.- Entrada alas 1556hs.- HF Pichardo de la Casa Lechuga por Vega.- Que se le diga a Vega que ya tiene sus piezas y que si ya le hace su nota.- Jorrín: que cuando llegue le dice.- 21.

22.- Entrada a las 1608hs.- MF con Jorrín.- Jorrín que no ha llegado nada; que el recibió carta de su mamá y que todos está bien. Que le llame mañana a las once.--- 33.-

39.- Salida a las 1620hs.- Jorrín con HF le pregunta que si habla al restaurante que está en Niño Perdido y que si tiene reservados.- HF que sí.- Jorrín que si es el restaurante que est junto a la terminal de omnibus.- HF que no, que está en frente. ---- 46.-

61.- Salida al 459764.- 1628hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez habla a la embajada de Indonesia y pregunta por Suprato.- HF que no está Rogelio: que es para la cena de esta noche, que invite al Sr. Soeparti.-- HF de acuerdo.--- 72.-

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73.- Entrada a las 1648hs.- MF Laura por Wilfredo.- Wilfredo - que ahora mismo va con ella.--- 94.-

142.- Salida al 259100.- 1658hs.- Peregrina por la Srita.Trujil le dice que es sobre la visa.... MF Trujillo que manden por el ----Reforma 305.----Embajada de los Estados Unidos.-- 153.-

154.- Entrada a las 1719hs.- MF de la embajada de Indonesia con Rogelio Rodríguez López le dice que lo molesta de parte de Suprato que dice que el no está seguro donde va a ser la cena qu si en la residencia o en la casa de usted.- Rogelio: que en su casa Baja California 178-3, que es de 8 a 8.30pm.--- 166.-

Pasa a la hoja dos....

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSCI-3/782,061
SUBJECT	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	DATE DISTR.	29 June 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D.C. May 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, who uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo," "Casimiro," and "Jose Antonio," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence) stationed in Mexico City, Mexico.

2. RODRIGUEZ, who was born in approximately 1940, is five feet eight inches tall, has a husky build, a reddish complexion and blond hair.[1,2,3,4,5,6,7]

Headquarters Comments.

1. A usually reliable source in a report dated 29 March 1962 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez is the third secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Source also said that RODRIGUEZ had plans to see Major Alfonso PRERA, leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico on 24 March 1962.

2. In a report dated 14 February 1964 Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez was reported to be the second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

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CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXXX	OCR	FBI 2
	REP CINCLANT		CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1			LX - 1526
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1			NO PROJECT
WH/SA/R	1	WH/1/Mexi	1							(AMMUG-1)
WH/SA/CI	4	WH/MEXI	1	RID/AN	1					CSCI-3/782,061
WH/WAVE	1									

TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), WH 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1	LIAISON *	COORDINATING	RELEASING WMK:LD:db CI/R&A

FORM NO. 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-332665

MAR 13 12 47 PM '65

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
MAR 22 3 55 PM '65

3. A fairly reliable source in a document dated 4 March 1964 said that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, at the 18 January 1964 Cuban Embassy staff meeting, was given the assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

4. In a report dated 26 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses the pseudonyms "Chele" and "Gorrin" with his contacts in Mexico.

5. On 28 April 1964 it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, a known Cuban intelligence service officer, left Mexico for Cuba on 25 April 1964 for a permanent change of station.

6. In the 17 May 1964 issue of Hoy it was reported that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, left Cuba on 16 May 1964 to return to duty in Mexico.

7. A fairly reliable source in a report dated 5 June 1964 stated that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, second secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, is the son of a Communist Party member and that he (RODRIGUEZ) previously worked in the Foreign Office on Mexican matters in the Latin American Political Department. Source also said that he thought RODRIGUEZ probably worked for Manuel PINEIRO.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSCI-3/782,061
SUBJECT	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	DATE DISTR.	29 June 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D.C. May 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, who uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo," "Casimiro," and "Jose Antonio," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI - General Directorate of Intelligence) stationed in Mexico City, Mexico.

2. RODRIGUEZ, who was born in approximately 1940, is five feet eight inches tall, has a husky build, a reddish complexion and blond hair.1,2,3,4,5,6,7

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CS COPY

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM 201-332665

GROUP 1
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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXXX	OCR	FBI 2
	REP CINCLANT		CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1			LX - 1526 NO PROJECT (AMMUG-1) CSCI-3/782,061
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1			
WH/SA/R	1	WH/1/Mexi	1							
WH/SA/CI	4	WH/MEXI	1	RID/AN	1					
WH/WAVE	1									

TOTALS	LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), WH 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1	*		WMK:LD:db CI/R&A

FORM NO. 1
4-63

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

201-332665

MAR 19 12 47 PM '65

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
MAR 22 3 55 PM '65

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EXCERPT

DST-11954

27 June 1964

FROM : Amembassy MEXICO

SUBJECT: Changes in Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel in Mexico

The Mexico City daily Excelsior reported on June 17 that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, was given a farewell party by his friends. Rodriguez recently made a trip to Cuba and, at that time, it was rumored that he would be transferred. Instead, he returned to Mexico. The Embassy possesses no other information regarding Rodriguez' possible re-assignment.

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For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Wallace W. Stuart
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

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EXCERPT DST-11954

27 June 1964

DESTROY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH SA 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 6, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 1630Z1Z

16 Jun 64 IN 07119

DIR INFO BRUS WAVE CITE MEXI 9836

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

C/S COMMENT: *REF IS RYBAT.

REF BRUS 9953 (IN 99439) 5 June '64

1. FYI: ROMERO PARA 3 REF IS FERNANDO ROMERO HERNANDEZ (201-225175) LISTED 1963 FEDERAL DIRECTORY AS CHIEF MEXI JUDICIAL POLICE. STATION HAS BEEN AWARE HIS CUBAN AND COMMIE CONNECTIONS, HOPES DEPOSE HIM AFTER INAUGURATION LITEMPO-2. VARELA, PARA 4 POSSIBLY IDEN/ JAIME VARELA CANOSO (201-267743) CUBAN NAVAL ATTACHE MEXI EARLY 60. MARTIN REYES PARA 9 PROBABLY IDEN MARTIN REYES VAYSSADE, FORMER UNAM LAW STUDENT REPORTED FEB 63 BE MEMBER DISSIDENT FACTION PCM. CANNOT IDENTIFY FNU LNU AGENT PARA 5.

2. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ IS SECOND, NOT FIRST SECY.

3. ZOILO MONDEJAR PRESENTLY MEXI. WAS REFUSED PBPRIME VISA. HAS BEEN GIVEN TOKEN DEBRIEFING BY AMSAIL-1 UNIT BUT WITHHELD PERTINENT INFORMATION. THREATENS ENTER PBPRIME ILLEGALLY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

FORM 1389

~~RI COPY~~ RI COPY

16 June 64

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
~~CLASSIFY TO FILE NO~~
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

43 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH SA 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 6, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 1630317 15 JUN 64 IN 07119

DIR INFO BRUS WAVE CITE MEXI 9856

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP C/S COMMENT: *REF IS RYBAT.

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S E C R E T

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GROUP 1
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Copy No.

FORM 8-63 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ~~RI COPY~~ RI COPY

16 June '64

14-00000

SECRET

feel that FLORES Sanchez was deliberately creating difficulties and putting up roadblocks in connection with Cuban plans to put on an art exhibit in Mexico City. (Perhaps this falling out may be exploitable in the current campaign to discredit APARICIO)

g. On 5 June Hermes CABALLERO and Angel GONZALEZ Drets arrived from Cuba to attend some sort of UNESCO meeting. Staying at the Hotel Montejo. CABALLERO knows Dra. MACHADO of the Embassy. L-9 heard that both of these men have Spanish wives. They are scheduled to return to Cuba about 5 July. GONZALEZ Drets' trip was paid for by UNESCO, not so with CABALLERO. CABALLERO remarked that in Cuba recently one of the visiting Mexican chess players chided him by asking why two militiamen guarded all the busses in town.

h. Coty SOLORZANO arrived back on 5 June from Cuba. She brought best regards for L-9 from his sister-in-law and said the s-i-l needs some medicines. This was the first time Coty had met L-9's brother and s-i-l, was very impressed by both -- this reflects favorably on L-9. On 6 June Dra. MACHADO told L-9 that Coty had said lots of nice things about L-9's relatives in Cuba. (This is interesting since MACHADO rarely says anything nice to anyone). P-8360

i. A staff meeting was held on Saturday 6 June. The Ambassador said that he had been invited by President LOPEZ Mateos to attend the inauguration of a new hospital; remarked that this had happened a few times before but that he had noted that he is invariably the only ambassador in attendance -- apparently LOPEZ Mateos keeps him isolated. P-8736

j. INTERIAN did not attend the staff meeting but VEGA and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ were there.

k. The preoccupation with hidden microphones was again evident at this staff meeting -- staff members were warned once again to be careful what they say since the enemy is probably listening.

l. It was announced that APARICIO had been the target of unfounded accusations (in connection with the Berta ORTEGA de ARROYO case) but that everyone should know that he had acted in good faith in his dealings with this ballerina. The Ambassador then rapped APARICIO's knuckles by saying that from this time on he should keep strictly to cultural matters, that "the next time something like this happens it will be more serious than a ballerina," and that matters pertaining to the chancery should be referred to Dra. MACHADO. Although MIRABAL was not present, the Amb said that the same warning applies to the Consulate -- it should not get involved in things which properly belong to the chancery. P-8729 P-8590

m. APARICIO reported that a planned AMCOSAC social affair (perhaps a dance) would not take place because the organization had run out of money.

n. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ was especially friendly to L-9 at this staff meeting, gave him a pack of Cuban cigarettes, chatted amiably, etc. P-736

o. On 8 June a Canadian citizen was visiting APARICIO.

-2-

SECRET

Source [Litamil-9]
11 January 1964
P 7365

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P-8424

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11 June 1964

P 7365

24 May 1964

237. Salidas al 181260.-1253.- Sin contestación. Luego-VEGA separa espacios para el vuelo cel próximo día 26 a Nuevo Laredo a favor de ROGELIO y ALEJANDRO RODRIGUEZ. MF toma nota y pide que pasen el lunes por sus boletds antes de las 1400 h.- 262.- —Going to pick up new Ford at border.

5577
~~4924~~
,7365

26 May 1964

249. Entrada L.D. de Nuevo Laredo a las 2000.- ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ con el embajador para decirle que no pudieron resolver hoy nada del coche porque cerraron las oficinas a las 1400 h. y a esa hora ellos llegaron allí, por lo que esperan mañana resolver todo el asunto. ARMAS: quo antes de regresar lo llamon para saber a que horas salen. ROGELIO acepta.- 262.-

365

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365

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING		
		ACTION	ACTION PUSHED
		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
		ABSTRACT	
		MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM
Chief of Station, Panama

SUBJECT LYAB/Operations
Contacts in Mexico with Soviets and Cubans

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The Panama Station has completed the preparation of Field Information Reports based on information provided by LYAB from his contacts in Mexico with IDENTITY 1 and IDENTITY 2. Such reports did not, however, include operational details of such contacts, summary of which follows:

— what month?

1. LYAB checked into his hotel in Mexico City on a Friday morning and immediately telephoned IDENTITY 3.making an ostensibly innocuous inquiry using specific terminology in line with procedures arranged by IDENTITY 1 during previous meetings with LYAB in Mexico City. Although this inquiry was intended to alert LYAB's contact for a meeting the following day (alternate meeting twenty-four hours later), the system failed or IDENTITY 1 did not follow through for unknown reasons. Five days later (Tuesday), LYAB requested the assistance of IDENTITY 4 in contacting IDENTITY 1. IDENTITY 4 instructed LYAB to meet him the following night (Wednesday) at 7 p.m. on the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc Avenue. Alternate meeting was fixed for twenty-four hours later.

2. IDENTITY 4 did not appear for the first meeting, but did appear for the alternate meeting on Thursday. He and LYAB entered a taxi, and drove to the corner of Nola Boulevard and Bolivar Street in the Colonia Alamos, where LYAB walked one block while IDENTITY 4 went to determine

Distribution:
2-WHD w/att USC
1-MEXI w/att USC
2-Files

Attachment: Identities, Under Separate Cover

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
2 June 1964	10 JUN 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
HPPA-14415	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
50-6-14/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPO

P-9365

whether IDENTITY-1 had arrived for the meeting. He returned to LYAB about twenty minutes later and said that the meeting had been postponed until the following day (Friday). IDENTITY-1 did not show for the Friday meeting, and LYAB and IDENTITY-4 agreed that no further effort should be made until Monday. IDENTITY-1 did not appear for the Monday meeting, but on Tuesday IDENTITY-4 instructed LYAB to go to the corner of Toledo and Andalucia in the Colonia Alamos at 8 p.m., to enter a small store there, and drink a soda. IDENTITY-1 whom LYAB would recognize, would pass the store during that interval. This contact plan was carried out as scheduled, with LYAB finally meeting IDENTITY-1 approximately one block from the store in question. The next meeting was fixed for the following day (Wednesday) at 8 p.m. in front of the Mexican Power and Light Building for the purpose of delivering $20,000 to LYAB and for passing of reports from the Party in Panama.

3. The Wednesday meeting took place as scheduled. LYAB and IDENTITY-1 went to a restaurant, where IDENTITY-1 reviewed the reports provided by LYAB and discussed Party matters in accordance with the briefing given LYAB by Party leaders prior to his departure from Panama. At the end of their discussion, IDENTITY-1 told LYAB to go to a nearby corner and wait there for him, that he would return in a few minutes with the funds. LYAB did as he was told. IDENTITY-1 returned to the corner within a few minutes, continued walking a short distance, and turned into a small lane. LYAB followed, and also entered the lane; however, he noted that he was being followed by a car driven by a man of Slavic appearance who stopped his car at the entrance to the lane and dimmed the lights: LYAB feels that this was a surveillance of the meeting by IDENTITY-1's associates, however, there were no further unusual incidents and the funds were passed as planned.

4. LYAB had arranged to meet IDENTITY-4 at 1 p.m. on Thursday at the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc for a meeting with IDENTITY-2; however, IDENTITY-5 substituted for IDENTITY-4 with the explanation that IDENTITY-4 was busy. IDENTITY-5 said that he would wait with LYAB to introduce him to a Party member (a woman) who would take him to the meeting with IDENTITY-2. IDENTITY-5 said that the meeting would be held at a restaurant in Coyocan, because this would be more comfortable for all concerned. A short time later, the woman appeared driving a car which LYAB entered after being introduced by IDENTITY-5. During the drive, the woman told LYAB that her name is IDENTITY-6. She said that she is a medical doctor who studied in Europe. In France she met some youths who interested her in attending a World Youth Festival. On her return to Mexico, she joined the Mexican Communist Party. She said that she had worked in Cuba and had taken a political training course there. She now works as a political educator for the Party in Mexico. She has a sister, IDENTITY-7 who works in the women's movement of the Party.

5. IDENTITY-6 said that she had planned to return to Mexico from Cuba on the day that President John Kennedy was assassinated, but because of the assassination her return was delayed. She said that there is much sectarianism and many supporters of a Chinese hard-line position in Cuba; however, the people involved are the least qualified of the Cubans, politically speaking. She said that these people

adore Fidel Castro, and act on the basis of what Castro says, not on the basis of whether or not Castro is right. The old members of the Partido Socialista Popular are in a very difficult position, and are generally disliked.

6. Because of the location of the restaurant in the center of a block in Coyocan, LIYAB was unable to provide the name of the street on which it is located. He said that it is a typical Mexican restaurant in a colonial building, and that the employees wear native dress. IDENTITY-2 arrived somewhat late at the restaurant, explaining that they lost their way because they did not know Coyocan. LIYAB identified them as IDENTITY-8 and a large heavy-set man whose name LIYAB does not know. Following the luncheon, LIYAB was driven to the home of a personal friend by IDENTITY-6. The following day (Friday), he returned to Panama.

KAPOK

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HZPA-14415

2 June 1964

IDENTITY-1 - A Soviet Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-2 - Cuban Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-3 - Consular Section of Soviet Embassy

IDENTITY-4 - Tzintzun Carranza

IDENTITY-5 - Manuel Terrazas Guerrero

IDENTITY-6 - Rufina ~~Torres~~ or Portes (Phonetic) Rodriguez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-7 - Marta (Lnu) Rodriguez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-8 - Rogelio (lnu)

Rodriguez of Cuban Embassy

Distribution:
2-WHD
1-[illegible]I
2-Files

[illegible] — [illegible]

Ext MS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
INFO POSTED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM
Chief of Station, Panama

SUBJECT
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Attachment: Identities, Under Separate Cover

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
~~2 June 1964~~

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CLASSIFICATION
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HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
36-6-14/3

P. 7365

whether IDENTITY-1 had arrived for the meeting. He returned to LYAB about twenty minutes later and said that the meeting had been postponed until the following day (Friday). IDENTITY-1 did not show for the Friday meeting, and LYAB and IDENTITY-4 agreed that no further effort should be made until Monday. IDENTITY-1 did not appear for the Monday meeting, but on Tuesday IDENTITY-4 instructed LYAB to go to the corner of Toledo and Andalucia in the Colonia Alamos at 8 p.m., to enter a small store there, and drink a soda. IDENTITY-1 whom LYAB would recognize, would pass the store during that interval. This contact plan was carried out as scheduled, with LYAB finally meeting IDENTITY-1 approximately one block from the store in question. The next meeting was fixed for the following day (Wednesday) at 8 p.m. in front of the Mexican Power and Light Building for the purpose of delivering $20,000 to LYAB and for passing of reports from the Party in Panama.

3. The Wednesday meeting took place as scheduled. LYAB and IDENTITY-1 went to a restaurant, where IDENTITY-1 reviewed the reports provided by LYAB and discussed Party matters in accordance with the briefing given LYAB by Party leaders prior to his departure from Panama. At the end of their discussion, IDENTITY-1 told LYAB to go to a nearby corner and wait there for him, that he would return in a few minutes with the funds. LYAB did as he was told. IDENTITY-1 returned to the corner within a few minutes, continued walking a short distance, and turned into a small lane. LYAB followed, and also entered the lane; however, he noted that he was being followed by a car driven by a man of Slavic appearance who stopped his car at the entrance to the lane and dimmed the lights: LYAB feels that this was a surveillance of the meeting by IDENTITY-1's associates, however, there were no further unusual incidents and the funds were passed as planned.

4. LYAB had arranged to meet IDENTITY-4 at 1 p.m. on Thursday at the corner of San Luis and Cuatemoc for a meeting with IDENTITY-2; however, IDENTITY-5 substituted for IDENTITY-4 with the explanation that IDENTITY-4 was busy. IDENTITY-5 said that he would wait with LYAB to introduce him to a Party member (a woman) who would take him to the meeting with IDENTITY-2. IDENTITY-5 said that the meeting would be held at a restaurant in Coyocan, because this would be more comfortable for all concerned. A short time later, the woman appeared driving a car which LYAB entered after being introduced by IDENTITY-5. During the drive, the woman told LYAB that her name is IDENTITY-6. She said that she is a medical doctor who studied in Europe. In France she met some youths who interested her in attending a World Youth Festival. On her return to Mexico, she joined the Mexican Communist Party. She said that she had worked in Cuba and had taken a political training course there. She now works as a political educator for the Party in Mexico. She has a sister, IDENTITY-7 who works in the women's movement of the Party.

5. IDENTITY-6 said that she had planned to return to Mexico from Cuba on the day that President John Kennedy was assassinated, but because of the assassination her return was delayed. She said that there is much sectarianism and many supporters of a Chinese hard-line position in Cuba; however, the people involved are the least qualified of the Cubans, politically speaking. She said that these people

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HZPA-14415

adore Fidel Castro, and act on the basis of what Castro says, not on the basis of whether or not Castro is right. The old members of the Partido Socialista Popular are in a very difficult position, and are generally disliked.

6. Because of the location of the restaurant in the center of a block in Coyocan, HYAB was unable to provide the name of the street on which it is located. He said that it is a typical Mexican restaurant in a colonial building, and that the employees wear native dress. IDENTITY-2 arrived somewhat late at the restaurant, explaining that they lost their way because they did not know Coyocan. HYAB identified them as IDENTITY-8 and a large heavy-set man whose name HYAB does not know. Following the luncheon, HYAB was driven to the home of a personal friend by IDENTITY-6. The following day (Friday), he returned to Panama.

KAPOK

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HZPA-14415

2 June 1964

IDENTITY-1 - A Soviet Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-2 - Cuban Embassy representative.

IDENTITY-3 - Consular Section of Soviet Embassy

IDENTITY-4 - Tzintzun Carranza

IDENTITY-5 - Manuel Terrazas Guerrero

IDENTITY-6 - Rufina Tormes or Portes (Phonetic) Borquez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-7 - Marta (lnu) Borquez de la Fuente

IDENTITY-8 - Rogelio (lnu) Rodriguez of Cuban Embassy

Distribution:
2-WHD
1-MEXI
2-Files

EXCERPT

HZPW-5835

10 June 1964

TO: Chief of Station, Panama City

FM: Chief, WH/Division

SUBJ: AMMUG-1 Interrogation Results

1. AMMUG-1 has provided the following additional information concerning your area. His information is sketchy because he was not specifically concerned with this area:

.....

c. The following are Cuban Intelligence officers stationed in Mexico:

1) Alfredo Mirabal Diaz (pseudo "Federico") is the Chief CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City as of January 1964.

2) Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, CIS officer, Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, uses psuedos "Eduardo", "Casimiro" and "Jose Antonio". He is about 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky, blond hair and reddish complexion. He is Thelma King's contact.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4 SS SB
2 5 PERS AR
3 6 LOG CA
CI SI BF HH
SEC NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRUSSELS

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT:1335, 5 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR

S E C R E T 0515452 5 June 64

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO PARI WAVE CITE BRUS 9963 IN- 99439

SECTION ONE OF TWO both sections here.

[TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP]

EXCERPT

REF A DIR 25283 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

B DIR 24961 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE) IN 93730 ~~[illegible]~~

C MEXI 9634 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE) IN 96496

D MEXI 9695 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE

8. LIOOZE/1 SEEMS TO HAVE HAD HONEST DIFFICULTY RECALLING DETAILS PAST INTEL ACTIVITIES BUT HAS RESPONDED TO PATIENT QUESTIONING PROVIDING MORE DATA EVERY MEETING. AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY HE TOLD OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION ON DEPARTURE CUBA. NOW HAS EXPLAINED HE WAS UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT AND AS SECURITY MEASURE HAD TRIED FORGET INTEL MATTER AND ASSOCIATIONS. HAS GIVEN FOLL INFO OF PRIORITY INTEREST:

.....

12. LIOOZE GOT EUSEBIO AZCUE JOB IN MINISTRY FOREIGN RELATIONS. ARCHITECT WHO FOUGHT IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR. DRINKER AND TALKER. NOT SUITABLE FOR OR CONNECTED WITH INTEL. AFTER SERVING AS CONSUL IN MEXI LEFT FORNOF AND NOW EMPLOYED JUNTA CENTRAL DE PLANIFICACIONES (JUCEPLAN)

13. ROBERTO ROMERO ADAMS HALF BLIND MUSICIAN ACTED AS OOZE INFORMANT ON ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES.

14. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ AKA EL ROJO, SON OF CP MEMBER, PREVIOUSLY WORKED IN FORNOF EXCLUSIVELY ON MEXI MATTERS IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEPT. PROBABLY WORKING FOR PINIERO. NOW MEXI AS FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMB.

15. ELPIDIO INTERIAN IS CP MEMBER PROBABLY WORKING FOR CUBAN INTEL. HIS BROTHER IS DIP COURIER.

.....

EXCERPT

5 June 64

4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

		ROUTING			
1	~~NOS~~		4	SS	~~SB~~
2		ICS	5	PERS	AR
3	~~IOS~~	RPTS	6	LOG	CA
	CI	SI		BF	HH
				SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRUSSELS

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT:1335, 5 JUN 64 LMG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR

SECRET 031545Z

5 June 64

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO PARI WAVE CITE BRUS 9963

IN- 99439

SECTION ONE OF TWO

both sections here.

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

EXCERPT

REF A DIR 25283 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

B DIR 24961 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

in 93730-4%

C MEXI 9654 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE)

in 96496

D MEXI 9695 (NOT SENT PARI WAVE

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EXCERPT

5 June 64

MEETING with LIT

1. Attached is

interest is his

2. Next meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

SRI TRAVEL

(39)

REPORT NO. CS-3/542,077

DATE DISTR. 2 June 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES D-ACQ-02349

DATE OF INFO. 16 May 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 18 May 1964

BY CABLE

SOURCE Persons (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

Travel data show that the following arrived in Mexico City from Habana by air on 16 May 1964: Cubans: Zaila Diaz Carmona, PP 14931; Octavio Campos Marquez, PP 19017; [illegible] Abreu Trujillo, PP 01841; [illegible] Marquez Ramirez, PP 65337; Maria Fernandez Castellanos, PP 16[illegible]; [illegible] Martinez Armenteros, PP 44853; Otero Fernandez Blanco, PP 14145; Catalina [illegible] Culell, PP 25[illegible]; [illegible] Quezada, PP 00319; Rosa [illegible] Romero, PP 00[illegible]; [illegible] (sic.), PP 72[illegible]; Maria Salgado Benito, PP [illegible]; [illegible] Delgado Alfonso, PP 28[illegible]; Ricardo Alarcon Rodriguez, PP 21[illegible]; Gloria Soto Goveantes, PP 10278; Ricardo Alarcon Soto, child, PP [illegible]; Carlos Alarcon Soto, PP 2231[illegible]; Hortensia Costa Quintana, PP 26146; Angel [illegible] Marti, PP 26[illegible]; Hector [illegible] Rallo (sic.), PP [illegible]; Victor de [illegible] Ybarra, PP [illegible]; Dario A. Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP [illegible]; Patricia Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP 09966; Vitali Fidel Ojalvo Devesa, child, PP 39993; Delkys [illegible] Rodriguez, PP [illegible]; Maria J. [illegible] Rodriguez, PP 524[illegible]; Jacobo Ojalvo Arneo, PP 32117; Maria Arias Llorens, PP 25847; Maria [illegible] Llorens, PP 120189; Antonio Criado Varona, PP 67976; Isabel Abreu Rodriguez, PP 60397; [illegible] Lopez, Dip PP D/64/[illegible]; Elena del Pino Valle, Dip PP D/6[illegible]; Yamil [illegible], Dip PP D/63/4[illegible]; Juan Guido Licea, Dip PP D/64/250; [illegible] Rodriguez Lopez, Dip PP D/63/454; Esther Gutierrez Rosales, Dip PP D/63/455. Mexicans: Crescenciano [illegible], PP 15672; and Santiago Gutierrez, PP 19/63.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPCINCLANT	CINCSO		JANS

Gutierrez (Rosales) Esther

14-00000

Bob

Lorna

Trudi

M E M O R A N D U M

file: P-6605

file: P-7575

3 June 64

MEETING with LITAMIL-3 to debrief on his meeting 2 June with L-7.

1. Attached is a self-explanatory report from L-3. Of special interest is his access to Carlos Maristany, of current ops interest.

2. Next meeting set for 9 June.

F.N.Aimonet

7365

ve por su negocio.

10.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Secretario de Tercera y Alejandro Rodríguez, Chofer de la Embajada, fueron hasta Laredo Tamaulipas, a recoger un automóvil procedente de los Estados Unidos para el uso del Embajador. La Casa vendedora "La Ford Motor". Entró con franquicia. 1365 8579

11.- Max Rojas, Secretario del Instituto de Relaciones Culturales José Martí, tiene asignado quinientos pesos mexicanos de sueldo.

p-8436 p-8591 11.- Existe una situación bastante difícil entre el Embajador y la Dra. Margot Machado; parece ella solicitará su traslado.

L-3 22.- Carlos Maritany. Embajador de Cuba en Holanda, se encuentra en Acapulco en compañía de su señora que es mexicana.

33.- Ana Luisa Salinas, que trabajaba en el Consulado de Cuba en México, en calidad de secretaria, ha sido declarada cesante y al mismo tiempo vejada e insultada por la Dra. Margot Machado. La Salinas amenazó con dar un escándalo en la prensa y por temor la pagaron tres meses de sueldos. p-8786

44.- Un hombre de la raza negra y de apellido Calambú, con categoría de Auxiliar de Cuarta Clase, con sueldo de cuatrocientos dólares, desempeña el cargo de cocinero de la Emabajada. P-

55.- El Consúl en Veracruz, Ovidio Samá, se encuentra en México y hace alarde de no haber sido molestado por la autoridades cuando el atentado. p-8649

66.- Están preparando una gran recepción para el 26 de julio.

77.- El gobierno mexicano negó la franquicia de 16 cajas que llegó por barco xxxxx contenido libros para propaganda.

18.- Permitieron la entrada en el territorio de un número de bultos conteniendo propaganda y no se solicitó franquicia.

19.- Interián llamó y sostuvo una larga conversación con Jeronimo Rodríguez, que es el encargado de servir las comidas en las recepciones de la Embajada. Jeronimo, no simpatiza con ellos. Le sir-

3214

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3214

EXCERPTS

29 MAY 64

PRIORITY BRUS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 9654 IN 93730

TYPIC LIOOZE AMNIP

REF BRUS 9914 (IN 93451)

1. VOLUMINOUS LIOOZE-1 FILE AT STATION SHOWS MYRIAD CONTACTS IN PERIOD 1959-60. FOLLOWING POINTS PICKED AT RANDOM TO ENABLE DEBRIEFERS GET READING ON WHETHER L-1 ON LEVEL. SUGGEST BE QUERRIED FOR ALL INFO ON:

.....

E. RAMON CUENCA MONTOTO, FORMER CUBAN IS OFFICER MEXI.

.....

.....

3. SUGGEST THOROUGH DEBRIEFING ON CUBAN IS SET-UP MEXI, ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN IS PERSONNEL OUTSIDE EMBASSY. IN EMBASSY INTERESTED IN ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, OSCAR CONCEPCION, ELPIDIO INTERIAN, ALFREDO MIRABAL, LUIS ALBERU, ANTONIO GARCIA LARA, MARGOT MACHADO, PEREGRINA ALONSO.

SECRET

EXCERPTS

MEXI 9654
IN 93730
29 MAY 64

EXCERPTS

29 MAY 64

PRIORITY BRUS INFO DIR CITE MEXI 9654 IN 93730

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SECRET

EXCERPTS

MEXI 9654
IN 93730
29 MAY 64

14-00000

UFGA-16346/1

SECRET

Report # CC-658, [redacted], 28 May 64 (cont.)

201-332665

4 RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: (DIP PP-D-63/454)

RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: Left Mexico on 15 May 61, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

Left Mexico on 7 May 62, diplomatic visa. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

In Dec 62 he appears as Third Secretary in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Promoted to Second Secretary and stayed in the Embassy in Mexico City. Was accredited to Mexico as Third Secretary. Was called to Havana and on 5 Jul 63 he returned to Mexico as Second Secretary. Dangerous. Reserved and competent young man. Works with interest. Hard core Communist. (Source: [illegible]-152 [redacted] 30 Jul 63.)

CS COPY

Attach to UFGA-16346

SECRET

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 50-6-122

28 May 64

201-332665

UFGA 16346/1

SECRET

Report # CC-658, [redacted], 28 May 64 (cont.)

201-332665

40 RODRIGUEZ López, Rogelio: (DIP PP-D-63/434)

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unit-152

CS COPY

Attach to UFGA-16346

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 50-6-12

SECRET

29 May 64

201-332665

CLASSI[illegible]D MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

☐ COPY ☐ REPLY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

46

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
C/WH 5

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO
VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, RI/AN, Dummy
[illegible] 4 [illegible] VR

S E C R E T 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

24 Nov 64 IN 28944

DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PERUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK

INDEXED AND [illegible]

NOT MATCHED

REF MEXI 1669 (IN 26958) *

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

Iden with subject of Mexi 166[illegible]

2. INDEX.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JAN 8 1965
DOC. MICRO SER.

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

ROUTING	
RID/AN	
RID/[illegible]TS	BSC
RID/PS	
RID/[illegible]	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

201-332665

ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒
DATE 24 Nov 64	

24 Nov 64

201-[illegible]

CIA [illegible]-11/[illegible]/64

CLASSI[illegible]D MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

☒ COPY ☒ DITTO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5/ 46/46 SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH/5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, R/AN Dummy

[illegible] VR

S E C R E T 232339Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5149

HMM

24 Nov 64 IN 28944

DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMXNOB ZRKNICK

INDEXED AND [illegible]

NOT MATCHED

REF MEXI 1665 (IN 26958)*

18 (64)

1. WAVE TRACES REFLECT SUBJ REF IDENTICAL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, 201-332665. NO WAVE TRACES CHAIN NUSIN.

Iden with subject of Mexi 1665

2. INDEX.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JAN 8 1965
DOC. MICRO SER.

* Stated that IDEN was unquestionably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

ROUTING	
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	BSC
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

201-332665

ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒
DATE 24 Nov 64	

24 Nov '64

[illegible] MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY			INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	C 20177	5521

TO | INFO | CITE WAVE 5105

NUMBER

[illegible]

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN [illegible]

REF WAVE [illegible] (IN 53535)

1. WAVE RCV OF MESSAGE FROM [illegible]/1 DTD 17 NOV WHICH STATED FOLL:

A. 15 NOV [illegible] A/1 CONTACTED PBRUMEN EMBASSY. TALKED WITH JORDAN AND WAS INSTRUCTED CALL EMBASSY 1100 HRS 17 NOV.

B. A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND HAD CONTACT WITH CIS OFFICER CITED PARA 3 REF.

C. CIS OFFICER TOLD A/1 HE STILL WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM [illegible] RE A/1'S TRIP SOON.

D. A/1 INSTRUCTED BY CIS OFFICER RETURN EMBASSY 1500 HRS 19 NOV PURPOSE CHECK IF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RCVD FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1.

2. A/1 MENTIONED FOLL CHANGES PBRUMEN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

A. ELIMINATE IDEN A AND CONTINUE USE IDEN B.

B. IDEN C SUBSTITUTED FOR IDEN A.

3. 15 NOV A/1 SAID [illegible] STUDENTS WHILE PBRUMEN EMBASSY WHO HAD APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW WITH [illegible] (PHONETIC). ONE STUDENT NEGRO, ONE MULATTO AND OTHER TWO WHITE.

4. A/1 SAID CONTINUES PUSH [illegible] FUNDS IN ORDER MAKE TRIP. HOWEVER HAS RCVD ONLY SYMPATHY THUS FAR.

5. NO WAVE TRACES IDEN C OR [illegible]. HOWEVER LATTER MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH IDEN D.

6. INDEX.

END OF MESSAGE

CHRONO [illegible]

21/2353Z

P-6079

P-7365

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED | PRIORITY | INITIALS | DTG | INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE | INITIALS | 2120177 | 3524

TO
INFO
CITE WAVE 5105
NUMBER

MEXI DIR
RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB ZRKNICK
REF. WAVE 4050(IN 35351)

1. WAVE RCV SW MESSAGE FROM AMKNOB/1 DTD 17 NOV WHICH STATED FOLL:

A. 15 NOV 64 A/1 CONTACTED PBRUMEN EMBASSY. TALKED WITH JORRIN AND WAS INSTRUCTED COME EMBASSY 1100 HRS 17 NOV.

B. A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND HAD CONTACT WITH CIS OFFICER CITED PARA 3 REF.

C. CIS OFFICER TOLD A/1 HE STILL WAITING FOR ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1'S TRIP SOON.

D. A/1 INSTRUCTED BY CIS OFFICER RETURN EMBASSY 1500 HRS 19 NOV PURPOSE CHECK IF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RCVD FROM PBRUMEN RE A/1.

2. A/1 MENTIONED FOLL CHANGES PBRUMEN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

A. ELIMINATE IDEN A AND CONTINUE USE IDEN B.

B. IDEN C SUBSTITUTED FOR IDEN A.

3. 15 NOV A/1 SAID OBSERVED FOUR STUDENTS WHILE PBRUMEN EMBASSY WHO HAD APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW WITH FNU PERUF (PHONETIC). ONE STUDENT NEGRO, ONE MULATTO AND OTHER TWO WHITE.

4. A/1 SAID CONTINUED PUSH FOR CIS FUNDS IN ORDER MAKE TRIP. HOWEVER HAS RCVD ONLY SYMPATHY THUS FAR.

5. NO WAVE TRACES IDEN C OR PERUF. HOWEVER LATTER MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH IDEN D.

6. INDEX.

END OF MESSAGE

CHRONO FDUMMY

21/2353Z

PHILLIPS

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO P-6079
P-7365

FILE No

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS [illegible]	212177	3023

TO MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 5197 NUMBER

REF WAVE 5193(IN 3024)

IDEN A: MARTA ALVAREZ CASTILLO

IDEN B: CARIDAD DE LA [illegible]

IDEN C: JUANA ACOSTA DIAZ, CALLE PRIMERA, NO. 9, ENTRA AYNTAMIENTO Y AYESTARAN, HAVA.

IDEN D: LUIS ALBERU SAUTO, CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21/2350Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

~~P-[illegible]~~

P-7365

14-00000

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

ACTION COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 64

FILE:

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	PYD	212177Z	3623

TO: MEXI

INFO: DIR

CITE: WAVE 5107
NUMBER

REF WAVE 5106(IN 3624)

IDEN A: MARTA ALVAREZ CASTANO

IDEN B: CARIDAD DE LA VEGA

IDEN C: JUANA ACOSTA DIAZ, CALLE PRIMERA, NO. 9, ENTRA
AYNTAMIENTO Y AYESTARAN, HAVA.

IDEN D: LUIS ALBERU SAUTO, CULTURAL ATTACHE, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

21/2350Z

S0022

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO

P-7365

FILE No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 21 NOV 1964
FILE:

ROUTING	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS [illegible]	202117

INCOMING NUMBER 3606

TO [illegible] INFO DIR CITE [illegible] 5078
NUMBER

[illegible] (3535)

[illegible] ON MESSAGE FROM [illegible] DTD 11 NOV 64 WHICH

[illegible] HRS 7 NOV 64 A/1 HAD APPOINTMENT WITH CIS OFFICER [illegible] 3 [illegible] A AT [illegible]) WITH IDEN A. A/1 OBSERVED HIS CIS OFFICER APPROACHING CONTACT SITE BUT FOR UNKNOWN REASON HE DID NOT MEET IDEN A OR MAKE CONTACT WITH A/1.

[illegible] ABOVE CONTACT NOT MADE 7 NOV 64, A/1 PLACED TELCON [illegible] EMBASSY, TALKED WITH [illegible] AND WAS INSTRUCTED COME [illegible] 1700 HRS 9 NOV 64.

[illegible] A/1 WENT EMBASSY AND LEARNED REASON CIS REP DID NOT MEET A/1 [illegible] PARA ONE A ABOVE DUE FACT CIS REP [illegible] FEELING HE OR A/1 BEING FOLLOWED. A/1 TOLD CIS REP BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE NOT BEING FOLLOWED.

[illegible] A/1 PASSED CIS REP WRITTEN REPORTS RE [illegible]/2 AND A/1'S ITINERARY FOR COMING MONTHS, E.G., WAVE, SJOS, SDOM, AND MADR. CIS REP ACCEPTED REPORTS WITH COMMENTS A/1 SHOULD NOT BECOME OVERLY FRIENDLY WITH [illegible]/2. CIS REP ALSO STATED DESIRED BRIEF A/1 PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR WAVE AREA WEEK 15 NOV 64.

[illegible] RE FOUR MICRO NEGATIVES, A/1 SAID NEGATIVES CONTAINED INSTRUCTIONS ON REPORT WRITING, USE [illegible] CARBON SHEETS, AND NEW [illegible] ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS (UNSPECIFIED BY A/1).

7. CIS REP WAITING INSTRUCTIONS FROM PBRUMEN FOR A/1 AND REQUESTED A/1 CALL EMBASSY 1700 HRS 12 NOV 64.

8. A/1 RAISED QUESTION WITH CIS REP RE FUTURE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AND TOLD CONTINUE USE NAME IDEN B WITH IDEN C WHEN ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH EMBASSY.

[illegible] F: WAVE CO PLANS ARRIVE MEXI 23 NOV 64 PROVIDING A/1 HAS NOT ARRIVED WAVE AREA PRIOR THIS DATE OR WORD RCVD WAVE INDICATES A/1 TRAVEL IMMINENT.

[illegible]

CHRONO DUMMY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 20 [illegible] 1964

FILE:

ROUTING	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
[illegible]	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	[illegible]	202230Z	3604

TO [illegible]

INFO DIR

CITE WAVE 5073
NUMBER

[illegible]

REF [illegible] 5072 [illegible])

[illegible] EL [illegible]

[illegible] SUAREZ

[illegible] (P-8368)

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

P 7345

P-8368

P 8368

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM:
ACTION:
INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 20 NOV 1964
FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	202230Z	3604

TO [illegible]
INFO DIR
CITE WAVE 5973
NUMBER

TYPIC [illegible] PBRUMEN AMMUG

REF WAVE 5972 ([illegible])

ITEM A CINE LAS AMERICAS
ITEM B NORBERTO SUAREZ
ITEM C JORRIN (P-8308)

END OF MESSAGE

FILED [illegible]
21/[illegible]

SCC [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

CYS. TO P 7316
P. AMMUG-[illegible]
P-8308

P. 6661

1869

el teléfono es 352110, que si gusta puede pedirlas a nombre de Silvia. Raúl toma nota y acepta.- 213.-

228. Salida al 352110.- Raúl después de enterarse del precio de las latas con galletas y de que están en José María Iglesias 51, indica que a MF que pasará el lunes.- 241.-

241. Entrada 1757.- Coty después de enterarse de que Juanito no le ha hablado a Raúl y de que el embajador está durmiendo, pregunta a Raúl si ya se fué el otro embajador y si es simpático para saber si lo podían invitar para ir mañana. Raúl: que sí, pero es más joven que Hernández Armas, sin embargo creé que npuedan ir mañana, pues van a almorzar a la casa de Sol en compañía de Bola de Nieve, Bertica y Rogelio; que precisamente acaba de tener un disgusto tremendo con Bertica, pues ésta le pidió cuenta del coche del Consulado y como Wilfredo llevó a Roa a la tienda para ir de compras, no le pareció y él le paró el alto, que parece que en vez de parirla la madre, la cagó, pues es una cosa de madre y con ella se acabó el mundo, pero como Rogelio y Bertica son uña y carne, la llevó. Coty: que Rogelio y "ella viven juntos, a falta de.....". Raúl: que sí, que eso ya lo han comentado. Coty: que Margot le dijo que Rogelio se divorciaba llegando allá, porque no la quería y era una mierda. Raúl: que eso es mentira y una porquería, pues hablan hasta de la madre que la hizo. Coty le dá la razón y agrega que si el señor pregunta por ella, le diga que pasó, pero que él le dijo que estaba ocupado y que..... Raúl: que eso no importa. Coty: que está bueno.- 291.

P-7365
P-8604

291. Salida preguntando la hora.- 295.-

296. Salida al 237995.-1830.- Raúl con MF. Esta le platica

(3.-L31.-21 nov.64).-

P-7365

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P-7365
P-8604

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(3.-L31.-21 nov.64).-

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

DISSEMINATION PROHIBITED		
ICS	ISS	AR
~~NPTS~~	LCS	CA
SI	SS	HH
TIME	SEC	BY HS

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO VR. FILE DDP, DC/WHISA 5, ADDP, CI/CI, C/FI.

[redacted]

S E C R E T 220003Z

20 Nov 64 IN 26958

Miller

WAVE INFO DIR CITE MEXI 1669 EASBY ACTING

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]AT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) * 19 Nov 64

IDEN E REF UNQUESTIONABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY KNOWN IS. TEL NUMBER LISTED 1964 AS ACADEMIA DE ACCORDEON EIZENSTAT CVIKEL, CHAIM NUSIN PROFESSOR, ATLEXCO 132-5.

NO STATION TRACES. INDEX NUSIN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

* RE. S.W. MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB-1

20 Nov 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ICS	FE	AR
RPTS	LOG	CA
SI	BB	HH
TIME	SEC	BY NS

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO

VR. FILE DDP, DC/WHISA 5, ADDP, CICI, C/FI.

[illegible]

Miller

S E C R E T 200003Z

20 Nov 64 IN 26958

WAVE DESENSITIZED DIR CITE MEXI 1669 EASBY ACTING

[illegible]AT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) * 19 Nov 64

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NO STATION TRACES. INDEX NUSIN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CFN

* RE. S.W. MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB-1

20 Nov 64

1551

107- Entrada.- sin contestacion fuera.- 111-

111- Entrada.- 17[illegible] hrs.- DOLORES DE LA MORA saluda a ROGELIO y pregunta por FERNANDEZ ROA o por VEGA. ROGELIO que hoy se fue VEGA y pregunta que es de su vida. DOLORES dice que ella está en el exilio y que estuvo en Jalisco tres meses y acaba de regresar, pues allá en Guadalajara está ayudando en la Campaña del Gobernador. ROGELIO que llame a FERNANDEZ ROA mas tarde como a las seis. DOLORES que esta bien y pregunta que sabe de LUIS. ROGELIO que hace tiempo que no sabe de el nada. DOLORES porque eso ya amerita un rompimiento de relaciones diplomaticas.- risas. ROGELIO la invita a tomar un café. DOLORES lo llamara el domingo para ponerse de acuerdo o sea que a las doce le llama y ver si salen juntos. ROGELIO que esta bien porque el esta de soltero. DOLORES podria invitarlo hoy pero tiene que ir al periodico El Dia a pedir una disculpa porque hace mucho que no escribe para ese diario. ROGELIO que esta bien.- 131-

P.8128
P 7365

132- Entrada.-1753 hrs.- NORBERTO saluda a JORRIN y pregunta si le llegó algo. Este dice que no que esta pendiente lo de la visa pero que llame mas tarde como a las ocho. NORBERTO que esta bien porque el de todos modos se va el domingo y quiere pasar a la Embajada para ver lo de las dos revistas que se quiere llevar. JORRIN que esta bien.- 140-

P.8061

141- Entrada.- MF por DOMENECH. JORRIN dice que ya salio hace rato.- 142-

ARE EITHER OF THESE HOME PHONES?

143- Entrada.- MF doctora SANCHEZ MORA por el numero del telefono de [illegible] SINOBAS porque es quien esta curando a su hijo. BERTA dice que es el 11-21-79.-151- (..3.-L31- 19 nov.64)
o el 14-57-89 ----

P-7365

1551

107- Entrada.- sin contestacion fuera.- 111-

111- Entrada.- 1716 hrs.- DOLORES DE LA MORA saluda a ROGELIO y pregunta por FERNANDEZ ROA o por VEGA. ROGELIO que hoy se fue VEGA y pregunta que es de su vida. DOLORES dice que ella está en el exilio y que estuvo en Jalisco tres meses y acaba de - regresar, pues allá en Guadalajara está ayudando en la Campaña del Gobernador. ROGELIO que llame a FERNANDEZ ROA mas tarde como a las seis. DOLORES que esta bien y pregunta que sabe de LUIS. ROGELIO que hace tiempo que no sabe de el nada. DOLORES porque eso ya amerita un rompimiento de relaciones diplomaticas.- risas. ROGELIO la invita a tomar un café. DOLORES le llamara el domingo para ponerse de acuerdo o sea que a las doce le llama y ver si salen juntos. ROGELIO que esta bien porque el esta de soltero. DOLORES podria invitarlo hoy pero tiene que ir al periodico El Dia a pedir una dispulpa porque hace mucho que no escribe para ese diario. ROGELIO que esta bien.- 131-

P. 8128

P. 7365

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P. 8061

141- Entrada.- MF por DOMENECH. JORRIN dice que ya salio hace rato.- 142-

ARE EITHER OF THESE HOME PHONES?

143- Entrada.- MF doctora SANCHEZ MORA por el numero del telefono de RAMON SINOBAS porque es quien esta curando a su hijo. BERTA dice que es el 11-21-79.-151- (..3.-L31- 19 nov.64)
o el 14-57-39 ----

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

RUN BY ☐ COPY ☐ SLOTTED

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, C/CI, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4986

19 Nov 64 IN 26141

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF MEXI 1542 (IN 21080) *

1. WAVE RECEIVED TWO SW MESSAGES FROM AMKNOB/1 DATED 4 AND 5 NOV 64.

2. FIRST MESSAGE STATED 3 NOV 64 A/1 FINALLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH CIS MEXI VIA TELCON TO PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND WAS INSTRUCTED REPORT EMBASSY 1000 HRS 4 NOV 64. A/1 REPORTED AS DIRECTED AND WAITED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE UNTIL SUMMONED. A/1 OBSERVED MEXICAN WOMAN'S ARRIVAL AND OVERHEARD HER STATE SHE THERE IN BEHALF Sr. RANGEL IDEN A. WOMAN IMMEDIATELY ADMITTED INTO OFFICE. A/1 OBSERVED MALE MEXICAN WHO IDENTIFED SELF Fernando OROZCO IDEN B REQUESTING MEETING WITH Mr DOMENECH IDEN C. A/1 ALSO OBSERVED SEATED EMBASSY RECEPTION OFFICE MULATTO WITH SPECTACLES WHOSE ACTIONS INDICATED SUBJ PERFORMS SECURITY TASKS E.G., OBSERVING VISITORS.

3. A/1 SUMMONED TO INNTER PATIO BY JERRIN IDEN D AND APPROACHED BY IDEN E WHO DID NOT IDENTIFY SELF BY NAME AND AFTER EXCHANGE PLEASANTRIES STARTED DEBRIEF A/1. IDEN E APPEARED FRIENDLY AND GREETED A/1 AS THOUGH OLD FRIENDS. IDEN E BEGAN DEBRIEF A/1 RE

SECRET

19 Nov 65

RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN, MADR BUT INTERRUPTED SAME BY PASSING A/1 TYPEWRITTEN NOTE INSTRUCTING A/1 PROCEED IDEN F. IDEN E TOLD A/1 HAD RECEIVED CORRESPONDENCE FROM CIS PBRUMEN WHICH COVERS VARIOUS TOPICS WHICH IDEN E WOULD DISCUSS WITH A/1 NEXT MEETING.

4. 5 NOV 64 A/1 PROCEEDED IDEN F CONTACT SITE WHERE IDEN E WAS WAITING. IDEN E DISCUSSED A/1'S RECENT TRIP WAVE, SJAN AND MADR. IDEN E ALSO INTERESTED RE A/1'S KNOWLEDGE ANTI PBRUMEN ACTIVITIES MEXI. A/1 STATED HE HAD NO FIRM KNOWLEDGE THEREOF. IDEN E INSTRUCTED A/1 PRIOR DEPARTING BE SURE TAKE ENVELOPE UNDER IDEN E'S OVERCOAT ON CHAIR. IDEN E TOLD A/1 CONTENTS ENVELOPE WERE CARBON PAPER AND KEYRING HOLDER WHICH CONTAINED NEGATIVES A/1 COULD READ WITH MAGNIFYING GLASS. IDEN E PREARRANGED ANOTHER CONTACT LOCATION IDEN G. A/1 BRIEFED IDEN E RE AMBARB/2 AND WAS INSTRRUCTED PREPARE WRITTEN REPORT RE A/2.

5. A/1 STATED ENVELOPE CONTAINED FIVE SHEETS WHITE CARBON AND KEY HOLDER WITH FOUR 16 MM MICRO FILM NEGATIVES. EACH NEGATIVE REPRESENTED LETTER PAGE.

6. FORTHCOMING SW MESSAGE WILL REFLECT CONTENTS MICRO FILMS.

7. CAN MEXI IDENTIFY IDEN E AND DETERMINE LOCATION/OWNER TELE NUMBER CITED PARA ONE REF. AMMUG-1 BEING ASKED IF CAN IDENTIFY IDEN E THRU DESCRIPTION RENDERED BY AMKNOB-1.

SECRET

Norberto left tel no. for Raul Pereyra call him.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 17

☐ COPY ☐ [illegible]

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YE/12 SECRET

FROM	JMWAVE
ACTION	C/WH 5
INFO	VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME BY

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4986

19 Nov 64 IN 26141

RYBAT DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

REF MEXI 1542 (IN 21080) *

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SECRET

* Norberto left tel no. for Raul Pereyra Call him.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

RI ☐ COPY ☒ DUMMY

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION C/WH 5

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI, [illegible]

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4987

DESENSITIZED DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMKNOB

18Nov64 IN 26059

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) 19 Nov 64

1. IDEN A: SR RANGEL
2. IDEN B: FERNANDO OROZCO
3. IDEN C: MR DOMENECH
4. IDEN D: JORRIN
5. IDEN E: CUBAN MALE, APPROX 27-29 YRS OLD, 5'7", WEIGHT 170 LBS, HAIR: LIGHT CHESTNUT TENDING TOWARD BLOND, COMBED BACK WITH LOCK FALLING LEFT SIDE; SKIN COLORED PINK/WHITE, SMALL MOUTH, RED LIPS, MEDIUM BROWN EYES, WEARS THICK CLEAR GREEN GLASSES WITH DARK BONE FRAME, DARK BROWN EYEBROWS WHICH MEET OVER NOSE BRIDGE; HAS CHUBBY ROSY CHEEKS AND APPEARS WELL-FED; SMALL HANDS, WEARS GOLD COLORED WRISTWATCH WITH LEATHER BAND LEFT WRIST; SMOKES EL PRADO CIGARETTES. APPEARS ALERT, INTELLIGENT AND WELL EDUCATED.
6. IDEN F: 1415 HRS 5 NOV 64 VIENNA RESTAURANT 450 INSURRGENTES AVE FRONT CINEMA LAS AMERICAS.
7. IDEN G: 1415 HRS 7 NOV 64 FRONT LAS AMERICAS CAFE.
8. INDEX.

SECRET

(WILL TRY QUERY CUBAN IS MACHINE FILE LIST GICS)

NOT DONE SEE MEXI-[illegible]

[illegible] for [illegible] Lucio [illegible]

SECRET

IDENS

18Nov64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18 RI ☐ COPY ☒ DUMMY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI, 2/ Killed Dummy

S E C R E T 182138Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4987

18 Nov 64 IN 26059

DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PBRUMEN ANKNOB

REF WAVE 4986 (IN 26141) 19 Nov 64

1. IDEN A: SR RANGEL

2. IDEN B: FERNANDO OROZCO

3. IDEN C: MR DOMENECH

4. IDEN D: JORRIN

5. IDEN E: CUBAN MALE, APPROX 27-29 YRS OLD, 5'7", WEIGHT 170 LBS, HAIR: LIGHT CHESTNUT TENDING TOWARD BLOND, COMBED BACK WITH LOCK FALLING LEFT SIDE; SKIN COLORED PINK/WHITE, SMALL MOUTH, RED LIPS, MEDIUM BROWN EYES, WEARS THICK CLEAR GREEN GLASSES WITH DARK BONE FRAME, DARK BROWN EYEBROWS WHICH MEET OVER NOSE BRIDGE; HAS CHUBBY ROSY CHEEKS AND APPEARS WELL-FED; SMALL HANDS, WEARS GOLD COLORED WRISTWATCH WITH LEATHER BAND LEFT WRIST; SMOKES EL PRADO CIGARETTES. APPEARS ALERT, INTELLIGENT AND WELL EDUCATED.

6. IDEN F: 1415 HRS 5 NOV 64 VIENNA RESTAURANT 458 INSURRGENTES AVE FRONT CINEMA LAS AMERICAS.

7. IDEN G: 1415 HRS 7 NOV 64 FRONT LAS AMERICAS CAFE.

8. INDEX.

SECRET

(WILL TRY QUERY CUBAN IS MACHINE FILE LIST GICS

NOT DONE SEE MEXI-[illegible]

Too long for [illegible] Lucio [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] ago

SECRET

IDENS 18 Nov 64

TO	[illegible], Managua
INFO.	Chief, [illegible] Division [illegible]
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	[illegible] Transmittal of Photos

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

Reference: DIR 80782

1. Transmitted herewith are photographs of Elicio *GONZALEZ Moreno at the Mexico City airport in the company of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and Manuel VEGA Perez of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. RODRIGUEZ is Second Secretary and VEGA is Third Secretary, and both are identified Cuban intelligence officers.

2. The photographs were obtained by the LIEMBRACE team with a concealed camera on 28 October 1964 and may be shown to Liaison. It is hoped that they will be of assistance to the Managua Station.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Photos - herewith

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att (2 sets)
2 - COS Managua (3 sets)
1 - COS WAVE (1 set)
4 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA [illegible]	3 November 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201 - [illegible]

ORIGINATING
OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: [illegible] H. PRIEST [illegible]
EXT.

chrono
P-8849 w/att
P-7921 w/att
P-7365 w/att

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Michael C. CHOADEN

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH



XICA

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Eliecer Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

Manuel Vega Perez

Eliecer GONZALEZ
Moreno

Eliecer GONZALEZ
Moreno

1. Eliecer Gonzalez
2. Rogelio Rodriguez

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Eliecer Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Managua

INFO.
Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
[illegible] Transmittal of Photos

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

Reference: DIR 80382

1. Transmitted herewith are photographs of Elicio *GONZALEZ Moreno at the Mexico City airport in the company of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and Manuel VEGA Perez of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. RODRIGUEZ is Second Secretary and VEGA is Third Secretary, and both are identified Cuban intelligence officers.

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Willard C. CURTIS

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1 - COS JMWAVE (1 set)
4 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA [illegible]	DATE 3 November 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - [illegible]

ORIGINATING
OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST: Glenna H. PELLEN gem
EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		Michael C. CHOADEN

chrono
P-8849 w/att
P-7921 w/att
P-7365 w/att

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000



1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2 Elicio Gonzalez
3 Manuel Vega

Manuel Vega Perez

Elicio GONZALEZ
Moreno

Elicio GONZALEZ
Moreno

---

1. Elicio Gonzalez
2 Rogelio Rodriguez

---

1. Rogelio Rodriguez
2. Elicio Gonzalez
3. Manuel Vega

ASSIFI: SECRET TOTAL COPIES 24 RI ☐ COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 7

☐ ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

SECRET 292345Z

TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 1416 30 Oct 64 IN 13317

PERUMEN

FYI PER LIENVOY HONDURAN NAMED RAUL BRAUN CALLED CUBAN EMB 22 OCT WANTED TO SEE ABOUT GOING TO CUBA, WAS REFERRED TO CONSUL. ON 25, 26, 27 OCT ASKED FOR ROGELIO (ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SECOND SECY KNOWN IS). WAS TOLD KEEP CALLING SINCE NOTHING HAD ARRIVED.

SECRET

SECRET

30 Oct '64

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24 RI COPY ☐ DISM

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM: MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION: WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT TIME BY

INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA T, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 292345Z

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S E C R E T

SECRET

30 Oct '64

MCC

COMMO
CHRONO

SECRET

28 OCT 64

P-8849
P-7921
P-7365
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXX

DIR MANA WAVE MEXI XXXV 1487

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: MEXI [illegible] 1342

1. ON MORNING 26 OCT, WHEN BECAME APPARENT LITEMPOS UNABLE PERSUADE GOBERNACION SWITCH PAPERS OF GONZALEZ FOR LATER ARREST, STATION PLACED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE ON GONZALEZ AT HOTEL ASTORIA. (LIEMBRACE COVERAGE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN WHEN LITEMPOS FOUND GONZALEZ, AS STATION DID NOT WANT LITEMPOS AND LIEMBRACES TRIPPING OVER EACH OTHER AT ASTORIA). LIEMBRACES DID NOT PICK UP GONZALEZ UNTIL MORNING 28 OCT WHEN HE DEPARTED FOR AIRPORT AND FLEW TO CUBA.

2. CLANDESTINE PHOTOS TAKEN OF GONZALEZ AT AIRPORT BY LIEMBRACES CLEARLY SHOW HIM IN COMPANY OF MANUEL VEGA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, KNOWN DGI OFFICERS. POUCHING COPIES.

3. INDEX ELICIO DARINTO GONZALEZ MORENO/

END OF MESSAGE

H C CHOADEN SECRET W C CURTIS

MCC

COMMO
CHRONO

28 OCT 64

S E C R E T

P-8849
P-7921
P-7365
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXX

DIR

WAVE

MEXI
XXXV 1407

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: MEXI [illegible] 1342

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3. INDEX ELICIO DARINTO GONZALEZ MORENO/

END OF MESSAGE

W C CHOADEN

S E C R E T

W C CURTIS

GHP

COMMO
CHRONO

26 OCT 64
P-8436
~~P-5644~~ 8544
~~P-7365~~
P-8769
Cuban Chrono

S E C R E T

XXXXXXX

DIR WAVE MEXI [illegible]

TYPIC JMGIN LIFIRE

MARCELINO MINSAL LEFT FOR HAVA 22 OCT. OSCAR CONCEPCION AND ESTHER GAVILAN WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LEFT FOR HAVA 24 OCT. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AND FAMILY LEFT FOR HAVA 25 OCT. PER LIENVOY 25 OCT, ARMAS SAID HE WOULD BE GONE ONLY A WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

P-7365

W C CHOADEN

G H FELLEN S E C R E T W C CURTIS

GHP

COMMO
CHRONO

S E C R E T

26 OCT 64
P-8436
P-~~5544~~ 8544
P-7365
P-8789
Cuban Chrono

XXXXXXXX

DIR WAVE MEXI [illegible]

TYPIC JMGIN LIFIRE

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END OF MESSAGE

P- 7365

M C CHOADEN

G H FELLEN

S E C R E T

W C CURTIS

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	21 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP # D/63/455
CONCEPCION MENDOZA OSCAR.	28 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP.# D/63/403

Llegada	Aerolinea
24	

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
24 DE OCTUBRE DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO# 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 348 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

CONCEPCION MENDOZA OSCAR. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 514 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 8 DE JULIO DE 1964

P-8544

P-7365

EXCERPT

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, WH/SA

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJ: PBRUMEN/Operational - Initiation of Contact with AMSESS-1

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

[Meetings: 24 September 1964, AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1; and 25 September 1964, Lawrence F. BARKER (C/O), AMNIP-1 and AMSESS-1. AMSESS-1 returned to Cuba and did not make subsequent meetings with KUBARK.]

.....

14. On the subject of "M" (Direccion General de Inteligencia), the following exchange took place:

C/O: Who is the "M" chief in the Embassy [in Mexico] ?
A-1: Vega. (Manuel VEGA Perez)

.....

C/O: Who else is with "M"?
A-1: Rogelio (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez). But he is just a second rater.

.....

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

EXCERPTS

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

EXCERPT

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, WH/SA

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJ: FBRUMEN/Operational - Initiation of Contact with AMSESS-1

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

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.....

RODRIGUEZ Lopez

EXCERPTS

HMMA-24419

30 September 1964

MAY 64

TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM

(Note: [illegible] where space does not suffice)

Source and Comment

A. BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 201-332665
(P-7365)

1. Full name. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

2. Name at birth.

3. Aliases, legal changes.
*Uses pseudos Eduardo, Jose Antonio, and Casimiro (AMMUG-1 25 April 1964)

4. Date and place of birth.

5. Citizenship. Cuban

6. Previous nationality, racial or ethnic background
White

7. Official identity or travel papers.
Diplomatic Passport D/63/454 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
Previous Dip Passport D/61/~~161~~ 164 (LIFIRE 15 May 61)

8. Father. BI data (open new TPD Form if needed)
Living in Cuba. Appears to spend time away from family but visits them occasionally. (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)

9. Mother: same as 8.
Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez
(see attachment item 9)

10. Spouse: same as 8.
Esther GAVILAN Rosales PP D/63/455 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
a) born c. March 1943 (LIENVOY 13 Mar 1964)
b) married Subject after his tour in Mexico began, was a minor at the time. (LIMUD 1961)
Apparently married summer 1962 (LIFIRE Sept 1962)
c) home address in Cuba:
Pepe San Martin #11639
Alturas de San Miguel del Padron, Habana (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
d) father is dead (LIMUD 18 Sept 61)
e) Esther is not well educated — uses misspelled words; planned to become a miliciana (LIMUD 1961)

*Used name ROBERTO when talking to Guillermo TREJO. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 1961)

Told one VILLALAR to call him and ask for Roberto SALAS. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 1961)

Uses pseudos CHELO ~~[illegible]~~ with intel contacts. (WAVE 5002 IN 9696 27 Apr 64)

FILE P-7365 (MAY 64)

and Comment

11. Children: same as 8.
NONE — or two

12. Siblings: same as 8.
Has little brother named Jorge (LIAUD 24 May 1961)

13. Other relatives by blood or marriage: same as 8.
(see attachment item 13)

14. Religion.

15. Education.

16. Languages.
Spanish

[illegible] and Comment

17. Military service.

18. History of Employment.

a) Subject arrived in Mexico City 10 May 1961 along with 8 other young diplomats between 19 and 25, accompanied by member of Cuban Foreign Office. Purpose was to make known Castro Revolution in Mexico, Chile, Colombia Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil. Subject was Third Secretary. (LIFIRE 15 May 61) (Excelsior 13 May 61)

b) Assistant Press and Cultural Attache Cuban Embassy, Mexico (LITALUS 11 Oct 61)

c) Returned to Cuba 4 May 1962. Replaced by Manuel VEGA Perez (LITEMPO-1 4 May 62)

d) Arrived Mexico 3 September 1962. (LIFIRE 4 Sept 62)
Orders from Cuba that he not be placed on Diplomatic List. (LITAMIL-7 7 Sept 62)
Leaving for Cuba 28 Sept 1962. (LIENVOY 27 Sept 62)

e) Reportedly received a scholarship - not known what kind or where. (HMMA-21403 21 May 63) (LITAMIL-9)

f) Arrived Mexico 6 July 1963 as Second Secretary (LIFIRE 9 July 63)

Sources and Comment

19. Record of arrests

Disarmed by Mexican Judicial Police when became involved with emigration agent over documentation of Fernando ALONSO, a diplomatic courier. Was carrying concealed pistol.**

LITEMPO-
LIENVOY 8 Dec 61
USARMA Report
17 Dec 61

20. Physical description

Apparent age

Height

Weight

Build

Face shape

Eyes

Hair

Complexion

Teeth

Scars

Habits of dress

General appearance

Mannerisms

Prominent features

Other identifying features

Portrait Parle interleafed? ....

21. Photographs interleafed? ....

Fingerprints interleafed? ....

**His pistol was confiscated, but he threatened to return armed again, declaring "We will see if you take my pistol then." Affair noted in press.

Source and Comment

B. CURRICULUM VITAE (Chronologically by year from birth to present)

22. Year	Location	Position	Activity

SECRET

Source and Comment

C. PERSONAL AND PRIVATE DATA

23. Address & telephone of present residence.
Baja California 178 Apt 3
no telephone

LITAMIL-7 and LIENVOY

24. Nature & description of lodging & surroundings.

25. Floor plans interleaved? ....
Photographs interleaved? ....

26. Owner and/or lessor: BI data.

27. Other residents: BI data.

28. Servants: BI data.

29. Meals: where, when, with whom?

30. Barber: BI data.

31. Tailor: BI data

32. Dentist: physician: BI data.
Dra. fnu GOMEZ Sanchez (Ester's doctor) (LIENVOY 31 Mar 64)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Comment

33. Shops.

34. Church.

35. Sports, participant: times participating.

36. Sports, spectator: times attending.

37. Time at residence.

38. Theater, cinema; ticket agencies.

39. Night clubs, cafes, pubs.

40. Vacations: how & where spent; mode of travel.

41. Hobbies.

SECRET

Source and Comment

42. Mistresses or lovers: times of meeting; BI data.

43. Personal friends: times of meeting; BI data.

44. Persons who visit residence: same as 43.

Unknown man and Raul Pereyra will meet at Rogelio's house next Saturday — LIENVOY 17 Feb 64

45. Persons visited: same as 43.

Subject and wife went to Nico GARCIA's home for New Year's (LITAMIL-9 7 Jan 64)

Subject and wife invited to lunch at MIRABAL's home (LIENVOY 17 May 64)

46. Mail deliveries: details.

A branch post office (not specified) notified embassy it had parcel and magazine for Subject (LIENVOY 12 June 1961)

47. Dispatch of mail: details

48. Correspondents: details including frequency.

49. Telephone: details of calls.

SECRET

Source and Comment

50. Tobacco: details.

51. Alcohol: details.

52. Casual sex: details.

53. Other habits.

54. Mode of transportation on different occasions.

Using Edsel D-314 - leaves car in drive-way of residence and walks to Embassy or takes cab (LITAINT-2 13 Mar 62)

55. Private automobile: details of make, license, etc.

56. Garage & service stations.

57. Real estate owned: location, description, value.

58. Chattel property: location, description, value.

59. Personal bank accounts: location, amounts.

Banco Nacional de Mexico - order arrived for subject to pick up (LIENVOY 16 Feb 1962)

60. Other property: description, value.

61. Other relevant personal information.

One Sra. DECIS's who was subject's landlord at Mazatlan 152 A told Hector GALLO that subject went out one night, left the door open, and she saw single women in his room. Subject also had not notified her he was planning to move. (LIENVOY 6 Sept 61)

Source and Comment

D. POLITICAL DATA

62. Party membership.

63. Party functions.

64. Societies.

65. Labor unions.

66. Lodges & fraternities.

67. Orders, Masonic & other.

68. Degree of political conviction and indoctrination cite evidence.

Subject is 100% pro-regime and dangerous.	(LITAMIL-7, 16 July 63)

69. Other political data.

E. JOB DATA

Source and Comment

70. Job title. Second Secretary — Diario Oficial

71. Official documents & credentials carried.

72. Rank & salary.

73. Allowances.

74. Other income.

75. Where employed. TID form filed?

76. Basic duties: description.
see attachment

77. Basic duties: by whom assigned? Bi data.
Takes orders from Counselor
Hector Gallo I. — (LITALUS-3 1 Aug 61)

78. Basic duties: by whom directly supervised? Bi data.

79. Special duties: description. Cuban Intel Staffer — (AMMUG-1 24 April 1964)
Given special assignment as Political
reporting officer — (LITAMIL-9 Feb 1964)

80. Special duties: by whom assigned? Bi data.

81. Special duties: by whom directly supervised? Bi data.

SECRET

Source and Comment

82. Superiors: degree of intimacy.

83. Subordinates: basic duties; BI data.

84. Subordinates: special duties; BI data.

85. Subordinates: degree of intimacy.

86. Colleagues: functions; BI data.

87. Liaison contacts: functions; BI data.

88. Servants & menials: functions; BI data.

89. T/O interleafed? ....

Flow chart interleafed? ....

90. Telephone contacts: details of calls.

(See attachment item 90.)

SECRET

Source and Comment

91. Correspondents: details of correspondence.

92. Work schedule: days of week, hours, location.

93. Work schedule: lunch & rest periods, where & with whom?

94. Work schedule: times, routes, vehicles, companions from lodgings to work.

95. Work schedule: times, routes, vehicles, companions from work to lodgings.

96. Work schedule: regular conferences, times & places.

97. Work schedule: night & holiday work, times & places.

98. Professional travel: details.

(see attached)

99. Telephone number, how used? Uses phone numbers
14-42-37 (Ambassador's office)
14-13-26 (Porteria)

[LIENVOY)]

SECRET

Sources and Comments

100. Receipt of mail: where, when, how?

101. Dispatch of mail: where, when, how?

102. Intra-office communication: details.

103. Access to safes: location, description.

104. Access to safes: where are keys and combinations kept?

105. Passes carried.

106. Keys carried.

107. Professional reputation.

10[illegible]. Dispatch of mail where, [illegible]

[illegible] communica[illegible]

103. Other relevant job data.

[illegible]

14-00000

Source and Comment

(LIENVOY 11 Feb 1964)

F. CONTROL DATA

109. Family difficulties.

Ester asked subject why he didn't sleep at home last night. He replied that he is coming for lunch. She said there wouldn't be any lunch.

110. Difficulties in office.

111. Difficulties with friends.

112. Difficulties with mistresses or lovers.

113. Political difficulties.

114. Black market activity.

109 Family difficulties

115. Smuggling activity.

110 Difficulties in office

116. Acceptance of bribes.

111 Difficulties with friends

SECRET

Source and Comments

117. Persons to whom most attached

118. Property to which most attached

119. Information which could be used to blackmail

120. Information which could be used to check [illegible]

121. Access to target information

122. Access to target personalities

123. Other relevant control data

Subject is from old commie family in Cuba but is not commie himself. Could be persuaded to work in Mexico for democratic Cuba

(LESNICK from Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo MRID 0436 11 Ap 64)

This info later retracted.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM
ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

9. Mother

a) Address: Pasaje Jose 10410 entre 3a y Final 1,
San Juan de los Pinos, Calzada de San Miguel
del Padron, Habana (LIMOUD 24 May 1961)

b) Mother became a Brigadista. New address Finca de Campana
Coas, Pinar del Rio (LIMOUD 5 Sept 61)

c) Mother asked subject to send her a crucifix. (LIMOUD 24 May 61 & 18 Sept 61)
Also requested 24 Sept and 8 Oct 61

d) Mother uses many misspelled words, signs letters PATRIA O MUERTE. (LIMOUD)

13. Other Relatives

a) Godmother - Josefina LOPEZ y Lopez at address 9a above (LIMOUD 18 Feb 62)

b) Godfather - name unknown - address: San Rafael 874
Habana Apt 501 (LIMOUD 18 Sept 61)

c) Sister-in-law - Niña - lives in Habana (LIMOUD 18 Sept 61)

d) Brother-in-law - Eduardo aka R. GAVILAN
Address: S. Camaricca
Mtzas, Cuba
PATRIA O MUERTE, VENCEREMOS type
Asked for repair parts for 1957 Buick
23 May 61
(LIMOUD 28 Feb 62)
(LIMOUD 14 Aug 63)

e) Bienve LNU
Address: San Francisco 356
San Juan, P.R.

(Don't know if he is a relative, but his address was sent to Rogelio by latter's mother) (LIMOUD 18 May 61)

f) Iluminada Rosales
Calle 60 #1704
Marianao, Habana (Ester's sister?) (LIMOUD 20 Aug 63)

g) has relative in PBPRIME (LESNICK from Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo MRID 0436 11 Apr 64)

redacted later

23) Addresses (previous)

a) Living at Mazatlan 152 A Tel 250928 (LIENVOY 5 July 61)

b) Lived at Mazatlan 126 - in Rodriguez Cue's
place who G-2 (no source)

c) Living at Pachuca 153 (LIEMBRACE 21 Oct 61)

d) Lives at Tacubaya 74 #502 (LITAMIL-2 13 Mar 62)

78) Basic Duties

a) On first tour was in touch with Imprenta Madero re publications, was also involved with films, propaganda and bulletins.
(LIENVOY)

79) Special Duties

a) Probably identical with member of Cuban Embassy who spent considerable time among the students at UNAM.
(CURTIS Memo 22 Dec 1961)

b) Present at meeting in Cuban Embassy attended by one Alfonso PRERA, at which matter of giving aid to 13 November exiles in Mexico was discussed, in order that they could return to Guatemala to assist the anti- Ydigoras group. (HMMA-18801 17 April 62 RYBAT LINLUCK)

98) Professional Travel (see also under Job History)

a) Went to Veracruz and Merida (LIENVOY 9 July 1961)

b) Traveled to the interior. Guillermo TREJO told subject he knew where Subj had been and said it was urgent they get together. (LIENVOY 30 Nov 1961)

c) Subject went to Veracruz mid April 1964 apparently in connection with shooting incident involving Cuban Consul there. (LIENVOY 16 April 1964)

d) Subject left for Cuba 25 April and returned to Mexico 16 May 1964. Wife preceeded him and returned on same date. (LIFIRE and LIENVOY)

90. Telephone Contacts

a) Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero - Honduran commie in Mexico - sent Gustavo A. [illegible], to see Subject. [illegible] was Venezuelan instructor in use of farm machinery and member of revolutionary group in Venezuela who could not return to his country and who was practically discharged from his teaching job at Chapingo because of his ideology. (LIENVOY 9 Aug 61)

b) Guillermo TREJO Oviedo of Prensa Latina. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 61)

c) Humberto H. TREJO Oviedo of Prensa Latina. (LIENVOY 22 Sept 61)

d) Lupe LNU - subject arranged to meet her at her home. (LIENVOY 29 Sep 61)

e) Roberto LNU - Esther (subject's girlfriend, later wife) informed subject she didn't know Roberto's address. (LIMOUD 2 Oct 61)

f) Some "compañeros ferrocarrileros" ask for subject. Not in. (LIENVOY 7 Oct 61)

g) Seen with Ramiro DEL RIO Perez coming out of Cuban Embassy. (LIEMBRACE 19 Oct 61)

h) One VILLAMAR, lnu, called the Cuban Embassy for Roberto FRIAS who unknown to Teresa PROENZA who answered the phone. VILLAMAR said Subject told him to call. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 61)

i) Subject was driven home from unspecified function in car with license 86. (In 1960-61, license D-86 was registered to Vladimir S. [illegible], a Soviet military attache.)

j) Subject told SAMOKHINE (Vladilen) of the Soviet Embassy that he had good news for him and wanted to come over to tell him. SAMOKHINE preferred to go to see subject and said he would come in a half hour. (LIENVOY 9 Nov 61)

k) Subject is a contact of Norman LAMFESTA. (W.C.CURTIS memo 29 Nov 61)

l) Edmundo JARDON of Prensa Latina told Subject that a Guatemalan named PARRILLA was waiting for him. (LIENVOY 14 Dec 1961)

m) Enrique BORGES of Prensa Latina coming to see Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 11 Jan 1962)

n) EZEQUIEL, fnu - of the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas, told Subject he had a letter from Mariano LNU and inside the letter was one for Subject. (FREQUENT CONTACT) (LIENVOY 17 Jan 62)

o) One Jose Arturo de la PENA insists on getting in touch with Subject about the information bulletin. (LIENVOY 20 Jan 62)

p) One FUENTES arrived from Tamaulipas and Tampico and told Subject he had told LOMBARDO he would bring money for two round trip passages. He also wanted photos and bulletins and other things for Tampico. Subject told him to call at the Embassy to pick them up. (LIENVOY 20Jan 62)

q) Teodoro ALTAMIRANO Robles, president of the new generation of ISTMO who are loyal to the Cuban Revolution, wanted materials from the Embassy. Subject asked for his address. (LIENVOY 29 Jan 62)

Costa Rica #57 Miraflores, La Paz, Bolivia. Letter addressed to Rogelio RODRIGUEZ F. (LIMUD 12 Feb 62)

(LIENVOY 28 Feb 1962)

u) Hilario LNU looking for Subject urgently. Leaves message about a "sick" person. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 62)

v) One Mr. SILVA wants to speak to Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

w) Julio CARMONA tells the Cuban Ambassador he is leaving for Central America and offers his services. The Ambassador hasn't any need, but says to ask Rogelio. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

x) Ricardo LNU wants to come by the Embassy for bulletins. Subject tells him better to meet at the same place and time. Ricardo has Central American accent. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

y) Some gentlemen from La Normal are bringing a message from Roque MENDOZA and want to see Subject. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

z) Subject tells Yuri ALEXANDROV of Soviet Embassy that he couldn't get to the meeting but will come to see him later. (LIENVOY 7 Mar 62)

aa) Somebody named Pierre LNU is coming to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

bb) Some people from "Expresion" from Sinoloa came to the Embassy to see subject but he not in. (LIENVOY 8 Mar 62)

cc) One Lucio HERRERA came to the Embassy to see Subject and was told to come in. (LIENVOY 13 Mar 62)

dd) Pedro GONZALEZ Ortega coming to Embassy to see Subject. (Person of this name was PP Secretary General in Nayarit and leader of small farmers and workers in coastal area.) (LIENVOY 15 Mar 62)

ee) One VERGARA, fnu left a message for subject that it urgent he communicate with him. (Later contacts - discussed the bulletins and family problems.) (LIENVOY 19 Mar 62)

ff) One ISSUZ, fnu, came to Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

gg) A Venezuelan named MENDOZA, fnu came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 22 Mar 62)

hh) Arturo and Luz SERRANO came to the Embassy to see Subject. (LIENVOY 23 Mar 62)

ii) One Hilario, a Guatemalan, urgently wants to see Subject. Hilario asks Subject "que el recuerda el Jardin o en la Luna". Subject will look for him at 8:00 P/M. (Note in file that Hilario may be identical with Rafael SOLIS Barrios, member of PGT).

jj) Ricardo - with Cuban accent - tells Subject he waited for him yesterday. (SEVERAL LATER CONTACTS WITH ONE RICARDO) (LIENVOY 27 Mar 62)

kk) Roberto GAYADA and Mr. GARRICA waiting for Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 28 Mar 62

ll) Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, head of PGT in Mexico, met with Subject who told GUTIERREZ that the person who is going to take over relations with Guatemala in Mexico still had not arrived. Subject planned to see Alfonso PERA a leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico. (L[illegible] 28 Mar 62)

mm) One MARTEL, fnu visited Subject at the Embassy to deliver something. Later, a Senora MARTEL, Argentinian told subject she leaving and please send things she lacked. (LIENVOY 29 Mar 62)

nn) One VARGAS, fnu, called Subject. (LIENVOY 29 Mar 62)

u) Hilario LNU looking for Subject urgently. Leaves message about a "sick" person. (LIENVOY [illegible] Feb 1962)

v) One Mr. SILVA wants to speak to Subject. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 62)

w) Julio C[illegible]A tells the Cuban Ambassador he is leaving for Central America and offers his services. The Ambassador hasn't any need, but says to ask Rogelio. (LIENVOY 6 Mar 62)

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z) Subject tells Yuri ALEKSANDROV of Soviet Embassy that he couldn't get to the meeting but will come to see him later. (LIENVOY 7 Mar 62)

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jj) Ricardo - with Cuban accent - tells Subject he waited for him yesterday. (SEVERAL LATER CONTACTS WITH ONE RICARDO) (LIENVOY 27 Mar 62)

kk) Roberto GAYADA and Mr. GARNICA waiting for Subject at the Embassy. (LIENVOY 28 Mar 62

ll) Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, head of PGT in Mexico, met with Subject who told GUTIERREZ that the person who is going to take over relations with Guatemala in Mexico still had not arrived. Subject planned to see Alfonso PERERA a leader of the 13 November Group in Mexico. (LIENVOCK 28 Mar 62)

oo) [illegible] identified Subject as [illegible] Subject at the Embassy to deliver something. ~~[illegible] mentioned in [illegible] 29 Mar 62)~~ d[illegible]ted 1962 and not available). (MEXI 7711 IN 7050 1 Apr 62)

pp) One caller with a [illegible] accent, asks for [illegible]. Teresa PROENZA says she hasn't seen Angelio today. Judith wants to communicate with him, urgently.
(LIENVOY 2 April 62)

qq) One Mauricio [illegible] came to Embassy to see Subject and was told to come in.
(LIENVOY 5 April 62)

rr) Subject will come down to see Luis [illegible] who is waiting for him downstairs.
(LIENVOY 5 Apr 62)

ss) An individual from the PCM asks Subject if he can come by the Embassy for some films.
(LIENVOY 12 Apr 62)

tt) One [illegible] from the newspaper _Verdades_ wants to see Subject.
(LIENVOY 12 Apr 62)

uu) Enrique ESTEVES, with South American accent (sic) wants to contact Subject re a visa.
(LIENVOY 27 Apr 62)

vv) Juan REJANO wanted urgently to speak with Subject. (LIENVOY 28 Apr 62)

ww) A person who refused to give his name asked for Subject or Marcos, his successor. [illegible] asked person to identify himself and latter said he is SOLIS. He can't come but has a request to make to the other person. Subject didn't tell SOLIS he was going away. He will meet with the other person who knows where to come. [illegible] should tell him "que donde hacen los aparatos". [illegible] will pass the message.
(LIENVOY 7 May 62)

xx) One Alvarez (transcriber says is voice of Guatemalan, Victor Maneul GUTIERREZ) leaves message for Subject not to worry because the matter is arranged.
(LIENVOY 10 Sep 62)

yy) Dolores de la Mora asks Subject to bring back from Cuba the shoe sizes of "you know who" because she wants to send gifts.
(LIENVOY 27 Sep 62)

zz) Subject tells SVETSKA of the Czech Embassy that he is again in Mexico. SVETSKA is leaving in 15 days but will introduce Subject to his replacement.
(LIENVOY 12 July 63)

aaa) A student from Preparatoria #6 asks for Subject and wants information bulletins.
(LIENVOY 17 Jul 63)

bbb) Alvarez (voice of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ) left message for Subject that he waited last night at the same place. Subject's message arrived late and he cannot see Subject but will await him next Saturday.
(LIENVOY 18 Aug 63)

ccc) Czech Press attache, Oldrich NOVICKY, tells Subject that regarding the matter about which Subject asked him, he hasn't yet found the comrade' but is keeping the matter in mind. (Later contacts) (LIENVOY 27 Aug 63)

ddd) Subject tells a Spaniard, Col. Manuel SOUZA that the latter has abandoned him. SOUZA says no, the "pieza" is arranged.
(LIENVOY 31 Aug 63)

eee) Dr. ALVAREZ asks Subject if he has anything. No. Tomorrow is the day of the meeting and Subject will pass by ALVAREZ's office.
(Later contact re lab exams sic)
(LIENVOY 3 Sep 63)

fff) Guillermo, from Colombia asks for Subject who not in. Tells VEGA the merchandise leaves tomorrow and now he knows what to do.
(LIENVOY 27 Sep 63)

ggg) TOVAR, fnu and Subject arrange to have lunch. Double-talk re meeting place.
(LATER CONTACTS)
(LIENVOY 26 Oct 63)

hhh) One Oscar [illegible] who has come from Los Angeles asks for Subject and asks him in English if he belongs to the Partido Socialista. Subject cannot understand English and insists [illegible] come to the Embassy. Someone else gets on the phone and says Oscar has an address which is Manuel [illegible], Parque Mariscal Sucre 92, Mexico City. Is told to come to the Embassy.
(LIENVOY 7 Nov 63)

[illegible] Dominican exiles want to speak personally with Subject and are told to come in. (LIENVOY 17 Nov 63)

kkk) A Chilean, Manuel Antonio [illegible], informs Subject that he has arranged [illegible] and ready to go. (LIENVOY 21 Nov 63)

lll) Subject tells Miguel Angel [illegible] of [illegible] in Habana, that [illegible] is going as a delegate to the Seminario Latinoamericano de Estudiantes. (LIENVOY 21 Nov 63)

mmm) Jaime (probably de LEON) from Panama asked for Subject who said nothing had arrived yet. (LATER CONTACTS) (LIENVOY 26 Nov 63)

nnn) One Fabio wanted to contact Subject who not in. Told to come back. (LIENVOY 6 Dec 63)

ooo) One Juan RAMIREZ arranges to meet Subject. (LIENVOY 19 Dec 63)

ppp) Subject received gifts from someone in the Czech Embassy at Christmas. (LITAMIL-9, 27 Dec 63)

qqq) KUZNETSOV of Soviet Embassy called for Subject who not in. (Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, known KGB) (LIENVOY 20 Jan 64)

rrr) Unknown woman tells Subject re "quotations". Subject will pass by the building to pick them up. (AMROD?) (LIENVOY 20 Jan 64)

sss) Ricardo LEON asks for Subject. Has something urgent for him. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 21 Jan 64)

ttt) Subject arranges to see [illegible] (Adolf, suspected IS) regarding a problem. (LIENVOY 22 Jan 64)

uuu) Subject told KIBOCK-1 he might hve trouble getting Mexican visa to reenter and might have to return to LaPaz via Prague. ([illegible]-7888, 22 Jan 64)

vvv) Subject tells one MORALES, fnu that there is nothing for him and to call in the afternoon. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 24 Jan 64)

www) MIJARES from Emigracion calls Subject about some cigars he offered him. (LIENVOY 24 Jan 64)

xxx) FUENTE[illegible] from Tampico has a message for Subject from Jose Luis. Told to come by the Embassy. (LIENVOY 29 Jan 64)

yyy) ACEVEDO of Prensa Latina tells [illegible] of Cuban Embassy that the girl who is there now will discuss something which SUBJECT knows about. (LIENVOY 31 Jan 64)

zzz) Call from "El Profesor" to Subject about unspecified matter. (LIENVOY 1 Feb 64)

LNU

aaaa) Maruja/tells JORRIN she has an urgent message for Subject and he should wait for her to come after two. (LIENVOY 4 Feb 64)

bbbb) Roberto, LNU asks for Subject who not in. Will call later. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 4 Feb 64)

cccc) Lic. DIAZ Galvez asks to speak to Subject who not in, and leaves message to call him at his office. (LIENVOY 6 Feb 64)

dddd) "El Professor" on behalf of the doctor asks Subject if the medicines have been received. More talk about medicine - possibly code. Subject asks "how is our friend El Chino". (LIENVOY 10 Feb 64)

eeee) Thelma King asks for Subject and told to call later. (LIENVOY 11 Feb 64)

ffff) Crescencio LNU asks for Subject and is told to come to Embassy (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 11 Feb 64) gggg) [illegible] and Subject discuss their friend [illegible]. ([illegible] 12 Feb 64)

hhhh) Subject's name given to Nicaraguan DA for contact at Cuban Embassy. (14 Feb 64) (MAMA-4716 in 8441)

iiii) Unknown person living at Articulo 123, num 49 has an appointment with Subject. (LIENVOY 20 Feb 64)

jjjj) ([illegible]) HARRY (contact of Jaime de Leon) asks Subject if anything has arrived for him. Also previously asked Subject if HARRY had been to see him. (LIENVOY 29 Feb 64)

kkkk) Juanito wants to see Subject. Latter says he saw him yesterday and to tell him the matter is resolved. (LIENVOY 5 Mar 64)

llll) A Senorita MARTINEZ leaves message for Subject to call her. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 19 Mar 64)

mmmm) Subject and SANCHEZ, fnu, arrange to meet for lunch later in week. (later contact) (LIENVOY 23 Mar 64)

nnnn) Melva GARCIA leaves message for Subject that she is leaving tomorrow. (Thelma King's contact) (LIENVOY 25 Mar 64)

oooo) One ALLIER recommends Carlos G. BASURTO of Diario de Mexico to Subject. (LIENVOY 3 April 64)

pppp) One Senorita DOMINGUEZ wishes to see Subject at the same place. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 3 Apr 64)

qqqq) Maria Elena GAYTAN, possibly a student, arranges to meet subject. (LATER CONTACT) (LIENVOY 6 April 64)

rrrr) One ESCOBAR called for subject but latter out of town (in Veracruz) (LIENVOY 17 April 64)

ssss) The "brother of Jacinto" asked subject to take some things with him to Cuba. (LIENVOY 23 April 64)

tttt) Ing. GONZALEZ asks for new appointment with subject since he waited for him and he didn't arrive. (LIENVOY 23 April 64)

uuuu) ROBERTO leaves message for Subject that "the senor is impatient. (LIENVOY 23 April 64)

vvvv) Mauricio de la SELVA reports to Subject in Mexico. (AMMUG-1 27 April 64)

wwww) Xiomara SANCHEZ asks if Subject has returned from Cuba and gets his home address. (LIENVOY 17 May 1964)

14-00000

MAY 64

TARGET PERSONALITY DATA FORM

(Note: Interleaf where space does not suffice)

Source and Comment

A. BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA 201-332665 (P-7365)

1. Full name. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
2. Name at birth.
3. Aliases, legal changes.
   *Uses pseudos Eduardo, Jose Antonio, and Casimiro (AMMUG-1 25 April 1964)
4. Date and place of birth.
5. Citizenship. Cuban
6. Previous nationality; racial or ethnic background
   White
7. Official identity or travel papers.
   Diplomatic Passport D/63/454 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
   Previous Dip Passport D/61/~~161~~ → 164 (LIFIRE 15 May 61)
8. Father: BI data (open new TPD Form if feasible)
   Living in Cuba. Appears to spend time away from family but visits them occasionally. (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
9. Mother: same as 8.
   Alejandrina LOPEZ Lopez
   (see attachment item 9)
10. Spouse: same as 8.
    Esther CAVILAN Rosales PP D/63/455 (LIFIRE 8 July 1963)
    a) born c. March 1943 (LIENVOY 13 Mar 1964)
    b) married Subject after his tour in Mexico began, was a minor at the time. (LIMUD 1961)
       Apparently married summer 1962 (LIFIRE Sept 1962)
    c) home address in Cuba:
       Pepe San Martin #11639
       Alturas de San Miguel del Padron, Habana (LIMUD 15 Sept 61)
    d) father is dead (LIMUD 18 Sept 61)
    e) Esther is not well educated - uses misspelled words; planned to become a miliciana (LIMUD 1961)

*Used name ROBERTO when talking to Guillermo TREJO. (LIENVOY 14 Sept 1961)

Told one VILLAMAR to call him and ask for Roberto FRIAS. (LIENVOY 17 Oct 1961)

Uses pseudos CHELE ~~[illegible]~~ with intel contacts. (WAVE 5062 IN 9696 27 Apr 64)

FILE P-7365 (MAY 64)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
ty Chief, WH/SA
f, WHD

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/DYVOUR/YBRUMEN/JMGIN/AMOT
Cubans Travelling Between Havana and Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Attached herewith are copies of AMOT Reports CC-626, C 29 and CC-630 containing traces on Cubans travelling between Havana and Mexico City on 20, 24, 25 and 28 April 1964.

2. RID: No indexing required for JMWAVE since attachments have already been indexed for Station files.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
AMOT Reports CC-626, CC-628, CC-629, CC-630, h/w

Distribution:
COS, Mexico City, w/atts.
- DC/WH/SA, w/atts.
- C/WHD, w/o atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED
13 May 64

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 18 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15066

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-5-3/4
19-6-95/4

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

SECRET

Report # CC-623. 30 Apr 64

MEMO FROM [redacted] annex 2

SUBJECT: File Traces on Cubans traveling from Mexico City to Havana via air on 20 Apr 64.

AMEZCUA, [illegible]: (Special PP-E-64/82)

[illegible] Rodríguez, Jorge M.: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 5 Apr 64, Cuban Special PP-64/82. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

CALVO y Rodríguez, Manuel: (PP-2/1001)

CALVO Rodríguez, Manuel: Information reported on this individ- on 1 Apr 64, CC-595, travel file traces.

[illegible]:

Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 23 Mar 64, Cuban PP-27001. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

CARDENAS, Miguel Angel de: (PP-26946)

CARDENAS Porcades, Miguel de: Traveled from Havana to Mexico 20 Feb 64, Cuban PP-26946. (Source: passenger list from "friends.")

FLORES, Osvaldo: (PP-03107)

FLORES Rodríguez, Osvaldo: Camaguey Province Delegate of the Director, Fabric Warehouses and Similar Consolidated Enterprise /Empresa Consolidada de Almacenes de Tejidos y Conexos/. Replaced Héctor VALLADARES Lima in this position per Resolution #4586, 18 Oct 62, Ministry of Internal Commerce. (Source: Official Gazette #4, 8 Jan 63, page 146.)

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther: (DIP PP-D-63/445)

P-7365

GAVILAN Rosales, Esther: Cuban diplomatic PP-63/455. Traveled from Havana to Mexico City via Cubana Airlines on 24 Oct 63. (Source: passenger list.)

GONZALEZ, Josefina: (DIP PP-D-64/141)

GONZALEZ [illegible], Josefina: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on 27 Mar 64 diplomatic PP-D-64/141. (Source: passenger list from "friends

GONZALEZ, Mario: (Special PP-E-63/856)

GONZALEZ Baroja, Mario J.: Traveled from Havana to Mexico on [illegible]pr 64, Cuban Special PP-E-63/856. (Source: passenger list from "frien

SECRET

1.

D

7365

from HOY

17 May 1964

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, 2nd Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, leaves Cuba 16 May 1964 to return to duty in Mexico.

[illegible] from HOY, 17 May 1964

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ ROGELIO.	22 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP.# D/63/454
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	21 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP.# D/63/455

Llegada	Aerolinea
16 DE MAYO DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO #464

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
		MEXICO D.F.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ ROGELIO. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 347 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 348 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 12 DE MAYO DE 1964.

P-7365

13 Feb 64

20:40 El jefe de la Delegación de Estudiantes Chilenos se comunica
con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba. Este manifiest
que el Embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS le pidió que hablara con ell
para ver que posibilidades había de que dos de sus compañeros
chilenos se quedarán aquí en México hasta el vuelo del sábado,
" porque hay el problema de dos compañeros Diplomáticos que ll
garon de Chile y tienen urgencia de viajar mañana a la Habana'
El jefe de la Delegación de Estudiantes Chilenos indica que p
ticara con sus compañeros y posteriormente le informará el resultado.

11 Feb 64

69.- Salida al 140263.- 1103hs.- Rogelio con Esther que le dé el número de la última visa que tiene.- Esther que es la 1015 de fecha 18 de octubre de 64.- Rogelio que de 63.- Esther que no que 64.---Esther le reclama porque no fué a dormir anoche a la casa.- Rogelio que pasa a almorzar.- Esther que no porque no hay almuorzo, que se divierta.- Cuelga.--- 94.-

365

361-394.- Entrada.- Thelma King con Rogelio Rodríguez le pregunta que si leyó la prensa ayer.- Rogelio: que por arriba nada mas. Thelma: que si se fué todo ayer.- Rogelio: que sí.- Thelma: que ella se quería ir el sábado.- Rogelio: que el próximo vuelo es el jueves.- Thelma: que entonces el jueves por la mañana le lleva el paquete que hay que llevar.- Rogelio: que si es posible que mejor traiga el paquete mañana por si hay algun cambio en el vuelo.- Thelma que entre diez y once de mañana lo lleva.--407.

7763
7365

195.- Entrada a las 1132hs.- Mr Thelma King por Rogelio.- Jorrin que no está.- Mr que llama mas tarde.-- 203.-

7365
7763

208.- Entrada.- Crescencio por Rogelio.- Jorrín que un momento.- Jorín que pase por la embajada que quiere verlo.- Cres.de acuerdo.--- 232.-

12 Feb 64

356. Entrada 1117.- TOVAR pregunta a ROGELIO cuándo van a cenar y ROGELIO sugiere que sea hoy. TOVAR pregunta si pueden adelantar la hora, unas siete horas de la fijada y ROGELIO dice que pensaba adelantarla una hora. TOVAR:que sería muy conveniente que adelantaran unas siete. ROGELIO después de pensarlo, indica que tenía pensado ir a comer a la casa de "nuestro amigo CARLOS, pero....". TOVAR pregunta si a cenar y ROGELIO dice que sí; pregunta qué le parece y TOVAR comenta que muy bien, pero entonces quedaría mejor a las nueve. ROGELIO acepta y pregunta si el número de la casa es 180 y TOVAR dice que ya se olvidó, porque como la conoce...., pero mejor sería a la misma hora que habían quedado la vez pasada y TOVAR lo esperaría afuera. ROGELIO está de acuerdo.- 383.-

7365

10 Jul 64

951. Entrada.- El profesor de parte del doctor pregunta a - ROGELIO si ya recibió esas medicinas y ésto dice que todavía no ha llegado nada, pero le hace falta que el doctor mañana lo pudiera enviar si tiene algo para ROGELIO. HF acepta. ROGELIO pregunta cómo está "nuestro amigo el chino" y HF -- dice que está buscando que lo inviten a comer, porque éste solo vino a arreglar un negocio de unos casimires que tiene, ya que viene acá para surtirse, pero le dijo a HF que se -- va pasado mañana ó un día más; que HF llamó a ROGELIO el -- sábado y el viernes, poro se aburrió de estarlo llamando, - que sobre todo lo hizo por las medicinas esas del doctor, - ya que eso es un tedio para HF. ROGELIO pregunta si - sería buen día el miércoles. HF "de todas mandras, usted dice que tiene que entregarle a él un muestrario médico a - éste hombre, no ?." ROGELIO: "ajá, entonces me lo manda mañana por aqui". HF: "entonces yo le voy a decir a -- éste hombre a ver qué, verdad ?". ROGELIO: sí, "entonces yo lo espero mañana por acá". HF pregunta a qué horas -- estará y ROGELIO dice que toda la mañana. HF:que entonces"él" llegará pasadas las 10.30 h. ROGELIO:correcto.-1027.

1365

095. Entrada.- ESPEJEL pregunta por ROGELIO y JORRIN dice-- que no ha llegado. ESPEJEL:que entonces irá para la -- embajada porque quedó de estar con él a las 10.30 h. J. que esta bien.- 100.-

1365

1000 h.

100. Entrada.- HF pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no ha llegado y es posible que no v[illegible] porque hoy llega -- avión. HF pregunta por el Embajador y J. informa que- no está.- 107.-

6 Feb 64

Entrada 2039.- HF amigo de RICARDO LEON pregunta por-- RODRIGUEZ y HD dice que salió a comer hace un ratito. -- HF pregunta sino le dieron su recado de en la tarde y HD -- indica que JORRIN debió habérselo dado con seguridad. - HF:que entonces volverá a llamar mañana. HD:que está -- bien.- 1213.-

1213. Entrada 2046.- HF solicita hablar con RODRIGUEZ y -

D-7365

(11.-L31.-6 feb.64).-

JORRIN indica que RODRIGUEZ le dijo que si HF tenía algo,-- que se lo llevara. HF:que quisiera hablar con RODRIGUEZ mañana en la mañana por teléfono "porque él precisamente -- tenía que contestarme...." JORRIN:que sí, pero le dijo que no tenía nada;que si HF tenía "la receta, se la trajera". HF: "bueno, porque cuando él tenga, vamos a hablar, dígale". JORRIN:que está bien.- 1244.-

865. Entrada 1700.- El Lic. DIAZ GALVEZ solicita hablar con-ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no está. DIAZ:que-cuando llegue le diga se comunique con él a su oficina. -J.que está bien.- 884.-

7365

7 Feb 64

363.- Entrada a las 1115hs._ HF Morales por Rodríguez.- Jorrín que dice Rogelio que no tiene nada para el.- 374.-

D-7365

10 Feb 64

18:58 El amigo de RICARDO LEON, dice a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ que " me acaba de llegar otra cotización". ROGELIO le recomienda que se la deje con JORRIN. El amigo, indica que está bien, que se la dejará en un sobre cerrado.

4 Feb 64

[illegible] Entrada [illegible].- [illegible] pregunta si ya llegó ROGELIO y JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un momento, dice que pase a la [illegible]. [illegible]: que era para darle un recado urgente [illegible] hasta qué horas estará en la embajada [illegible] indica que como hasta las 2 y pico. [illegible]: que ella más tarde [illegible] le diga que la espera. JORRIN: que está bien.- 321.-

365

(3.- L31.-4 feb.64).-

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130. Entrada 1012.- ROBERTO pregunta por ROGELIO y JORRIN-- informa que no ha llegado todavía; que llame dentro de media hora. ROBERTO acepta.- 134.-

365

134. Entrada.- [illegible] pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN dice que no ha llegado. [illegible]: que le diga que llamó como le dijo, pero que le llamará mañana ó pasado ya que no lo pudo encontrar. JORRIN: que está bien.- 151.-

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174. Entrada.- El Lic.DIAZ GALVEZ solicita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un momento, indica que ROGELIO lo llamará por la tarde.

365

(2.-L31.-6 feb.64).-

6 Feb 64

1108. Entrada 1932.- BUENAVENTURA comunica a ROGELIO que no está ni el Sr.VELA ni el otro señor y ninguna de las señoritas sabe sobre el particular, por lo que dejó el recado para que se lo dieran a "61" mañana por la mañana y la cosa será hasta mañana. ROGELIO: que está bien.- 1131.-

1 Feb 64

622.- Entrada a las 1324hs._ HF "El Profesor" con Rogelio Rodriguez le dice que esa cuestión así como se la propuso, que es bastante difícil, porque ya había estado todo concertado en la otra manera.- Rogelio: que como lo dice que.... HF que que para hacerlo mas para allá y no más para acá que es a lo que se refería; que por otra parte tiene algo que le acaba de regalar uno de los cuatos tuyos.- Quedan para las seis.-- 642.

P. 7365

120. Entrada 1956.- **ROGELIO** pregunta sino lo han llamado y- JORRIN dice que nó. ROGELIO:que si llama ALVAREZ le diga que mañana lo llamo sobre las once,porque quiere hablar con él. JORRIN:que está bien.- 129.-

7365

47.- Salida al 237995.- 1703hs.- Pereyra con Aralia le pregunta lo que hace.-- Que Peregrina se fué a los toros con unas personas del Comercio Exterior, que el no pudo ir porque están preparando un almuerzo para mañana en la embajada.- HF con Pereyra se saludan y Pereyra le dice que para el proximo sabado se van a reunir en la casa de Rogelio.-- 64.-

8535
7365

.... Pasa a la hoja 2.

3 Feb 64

15:43 TEJO OVIEDO pide a JORRIN, portero de la Embajada Cubana, que diga al Embajador o a FERNANDEZ ROA que están esperando a que lleguen para empezar el acto. JORRIN indica que el Embajador tuvo que salir urgentemente a una diligencia, y FERNANDEZ ROA fué a esperar a su señora que llegaba hoy. TEJO dice que si entonces no va a venir nadie; que si el Embajador tenía que salir debió haber nombrado un representante; que ésto es una falta total de atención y que le diga al Embajador que está bastante molesto, pues ya no puede esperar porque tiene allí a todos los invitados y es una cosa bastante penosa que les hagan esa falta de atención.
Acto seguido JORRIN se pone en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y le hace saber que habló ahora TEJO OVIEDO diciendo que "están esperando a la gente de aca" para empezar el acto, y parece que está disgustado porque no ha llegado nadie; por lo que sería conveniente que ROGELIO se arrancara para allá. ROGELIO acepta la sugerencia y a su vez le pide que diga a la Doctora MACHADO que uti~~lizó~~ ice el carro para ir "allá".

7365

29 Jan 64

776. Entrada 1350.- PUENTE, de Tampico de La Martí, solicita hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para darle un recado de JOSE LUIS. JORRIN después de pedirle que se espere un momentito, pide que pase mañana a las diez y PUENTE acepta. - 816.-

365

30 Jan 64

441.- Entrada a las 1619hs,- HF Espejol por Rogelio.- Jorrin que no ha llegado.- Espejol que le urge verlo, que llama dentro de media hora.- 475.-

P-1365

707.- Entrada a las 1959hs.- HF El Profesor con Rogelio le pregunta que hay de nuevo.- Rogelio: que mucho. Que si tiene noticia para el.- HF que si, pero que pensaba verlo mañana. Que quiere que coman con un poeta que es muy importante.- Rogelio

3.-L31.- 30 enero 64.-

244. Salida al 46-60-16.-1216.- JORRIN avisa a CARLOS ACEVEDO de Prensa Latina que ya está ROGELIO y el muchacho está en el Consulado. ACEVEDO: que el muchacho es quien tiene que hablar con ROGELIO, sobre todo con el Cónsul, pues se trata de un asunto que ROGELIO sabe. JORRIN: que está bien.- 256.-

1365

261. Entrada 1227.- OSWALDO pregunta a RAUL qué hay sobre lo de mañana en la embajada y RAUL después de preguntarle a ROGELIO, indica que mañana como a las 4 van a trabajar en -

(3.-L31.-31 enero 64).-

24 Jan 64

231.- Entrada a las 1132hs.- HF Morales con Rogelio Rodríguez. Rogelio le dice que no ha llegado nada todavía, que lo llame mañana a la una de la tarde.-- 258.-

P. 7365

162.- Entrada a las 1740hs.- HF Mijares -de Emigración- por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está.- Mijares: que se trata sobre unos puros que le ofreció.- Que está por la noche en el aeropuerto en el 22-34-14.--- 192.-

7365
8308

25 Jan 64

1141. Entrada.- TOVAR pregunta a ROGELIO qué día se pueden-- ir a tomar una copa y ROGELIO dice que el lunes porque ha - habido muchas dificultades. TOVAR: que está bien.- 1155.

7365

28 Jan 64

(7365)

12:24 El compañero [illegible] JAIME DE LEON quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ para saber si hay alguna respuesta de los estudiantes universitarios de Cuba. [illegible] indica que ROGELIO no está, pero no hay la tal respuesta, y si hay avión, seguramente la habrá.

29 Jan 64

(7365)

11:06 ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, pregunta a SVORIE, agregado comercial de la Embajada Checa, que "cómo está el asunto aquél del que hablamos". SVORIE manifiesta que es una cosa regular y no hay ningún problema traspasar todo eso..."pero sería bueno que tu embajador hablara con el mío". ROGELIO se lo comunicará al embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS.

038. Salida al 45-27-13.-1106.- RODRIGUEZ pregunta a SVORIE cómo está el asunto aquel de que hablaron y HF dice que es- una cosa regular, que no hay ningún problema al traspasar - todo eso, pero de todos modos sería una cosa buena hacer el

7365

encargo a "nuestros superiores, van a hablar eso asunto". - RODRIGUEZ pregunta si tiene que hablar el Embajador HERNANDEZ ARMAS con el de él y HF dice que sí, porque el de HF lo sabe y lo único que falta es que "ellos" hablen y traten eso para ver si están de acuerdo ó buscarán algunas posibilidades y no habrá ningún problema. RODRIGUEZ: que entonces se lo dirá al Embajador. HF acepta y agrega que ayer habló "con nuestro Cónsul" cuando visitaron el Instituto y dijo que nohabría ningún problema y que se podría arreglar normalmente, ya que "regularmente se puede traspasar todo dentro a las personas que están aqui como nosotros, para explorar la venta libre entonces es necesario esperar esos tres años". RODRIGUEZ repite que se lo transmitirá al Embajador para que éste llame al de HF y se pongan de acuerdo. HF está de acuerdo y ROGELIO dá las gracias por todo.- 066.-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 221832Z

LAPA INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7333

22 Jan 64 IN 03646

REF LAPA 5261*

1. KIBOCK-1 ARRIVED MEXI 19 JAN AND CONTACTED STA 21 JAN. EXPECTS LEAVE MEXI FOR CUBA 22 OR 23 JAN.

2. K-1 REQUESTED 20 DOLLARS PAY EXTRA BILLS DUE DELAY MEXI. ALSO, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL, TOLD K-1 MAY NOT BE ABLE GET MEXI RE-ENTRY VISA FOR RETURN TRIP THUS MAY HAVE RETURN LAPA VIA PRAGUE. K-1 NOW HAS 120 DOLLARS BUT MOST PAY MEXI HOTEL AND OTHER EXPENSES.

3. INTEL REPORT FOLLOWS.

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1440 22 JAN 64.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

22 Jan 64

Copy No.

[illegible] Jan 64

373. Salida al 45-61-80.-1100.- RODRIGUEZ pregunta a OLDRICH ...... de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia, si puede irlo a -- ver de parte del Embajador para un problema que tienen y -- OLDRICH dice que sí, que lo espera dentro de 10 minutos. - RODRIGUEZ acepta.- 387.-

7365

20 Jan 64

149.- Entrada a las 1351hs.- HF Kuznetsov por Rogelio Rodríguez.- --- Peregrina que Rogelio no está que le va adar el telefono - del consjero ~~cultural~~ que también pertenece a la AMCOSAD.- --- 149214.--- 169.-

7365

186.- Entrada a las 1812hs.- MF por Rogelio le dice que tiene e encargo del Ingeniero de entregarle las cotizaciones, que como le hace para verse.- Rogelio que el pasa a recojerlas al edificio a las 8pm.- MF que lo espera.-- 206.-

21 Jan 64

10:44 El amigo de RICARDO LEON quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana. JORRIN pide que le deje recado. El individuo indica que "tengo algo para el". JORRIN, después de consultar, dice que lo llame a las 4 de la tarde. El individuo pide decirle a ROGELIO "que me urge hablar con él.....que si no está, que me deje algún recado". JORRIN toma nota.

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(56)

22 Jan 64

327.- Salida al 452713 (Embajada Checa) 1146hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez por Zboril le dice que tiene un problema y que quiere que lo reciba.- Zboril que sí, que si urge mucho.- Rodríguez: que con relación al asunto que le trató el otro día.- Zboril: que lo espera mañana a las nueve.- 357.-

7365



4

10 de Enero /63
"Año de la [illegible]"

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez
Mi querido hijo
Con [illegible] deseos que al recibir
estas letras te encuentres bien en compa-
ñía de [illegible]
Nosotros bien
Rogelio [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] hasta la tu
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] mal
Rogelio te escribí una carta [illegible]
[illegible] la dirección
no [illegible]
esta [illegible] de tu
padre y de Jorge

R. Alejandrina López
Reparto San José H. # 11
[illegible] San Juan de los [illegible]
S.M.P. Habana

Sr.
Rogelio Rodríguez
Francisco Márquez # [illegible]
Calzada de Tacubaya
México D.F. # 11

VIA AEREA

P- 1365.

La de Jorge es 34 y la de tu
padre 42 de la Cacuna te
dice que tiene que ir al medico
dan luego mandarte la formula
de tu hijo te dire que esta de
lo mas lindo y todo
cuando llega aqui hay que
dejar todo y atenderlo
en cuanto llega al pasaje
empieza a llamarme Aguela
y la tia
En los Reyes le compramos
muchas cosas y lo que mas le
gusto fue lo que le compro Jorge
un perro de cuerda que brinca
sabes que Jorge le estamos haciendo
los tramites para meterlo en
la Escuela de Oficiales para
hacerle tecnico
tu padre hoy se encuentra un poco
enfermo de su presion
Tu Abuela esta desde mas bien
Avisale a Estela que
no se olvide de la faja
y dile haber si puede conseguirme
pomo de crema de almendra y
un [illegible] de [illegible]
[illegible] con tu hijo dale un fuerte
abrazo a Estela y tu recibe
de tu madre y tu Padre que
no se olvidan de ustedes ni un
solo momento
Recuerdo de todos
Jorge Alberto firma Aguela
te manda un abrazo y besos

Lina

Carula guardala en alto

Francisca Marquez 160 30/1/64

NEGATIVES

SECRET

/ January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Lawrence F. Barker

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 6 January 1964

1. A meeting was held with L-9 from 2000 hours until 2320 hours 6 Jan -- pick-up and drop-off were made by car, the meeting took place at B's home with B's wife working the gate.

2. L-9 was unusually depressed -- had just received a letter from Spain indicating that his sister had been forced to leave her work as a result of excessive fatigue and the "never ending round of discussions and study circles" etc. She had not received much sympathy from the Cuban FOMIN and her request for 2 months leave in Spain was denied pending further study. L-9, who is quite fond of his sisters, took this news to heart and it ate away at him and compounded his usual miserable feeling. The first part of the meeting was taken up in a C/O delivered pep talk.

3. L-9 had the following to report:

a. At the evening reception of 2 Jan at the Embassy, the TASS representative remarked that he believed KHRUSHCHEV did not travel to Cuba to attend the anniversary celebrations because of the revelation of an exile plot to bomb Havana -- revelations which came about as the result of the arrest by the US Coast Guard of some war-like Cubans with bombs in their possession. The TASS man said that he believed that KHRUSHCHEV would show up someday in Havana quite unannounced as did CASTRO in the USSR.

To P 3697

b. Teresa PROENZA may be hired back by the Embassy -- APARICIO recently remarked to L-9, "Surely they will re-hire her." It is quite clear that APARICIO doesn't want her in his office again and he expressed the wish that if she were to be rehired she would work in the main embassy building.

c. In regard to the PROENZA firing, ROJAS of Cubana de Aviacion, who is married to Teresa's sister, said that he had written to FOMIN Raul ROA in her behalf but had received no reply.

d. Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas sent a Christmas present to GOROSTIZA of the Mexican Foreign Office this year -- it was really a New Year's present, sent 31 Dec. L-9 does not know what it was.

18691

4. L-9 was asked what all the ruckus was at the airport on 5 Jan. This drew a blank. B then said he had heard that a phalanx of Embassy officers was out there apparently guarding someone who was on his way to Cuba. L-9 didn't know anything about it. B remarked that two Cuban officials were supposedly on the flight to Havana -- one from the Embassy in Montevideo. At this point, L-9 slapped his forehead and said, "My God, PEREZ! I forgot about him." He then related the details of a conversation he had had with Earle PEREZ Friman at the Embassy on 2 Jan -- details sent to HQS separately by cable. (See MEXI 7659). L-9 was not aware that PEREZ had been on the 5 Jan flight -- he described him perfectly. He was not made aware of KUBARK involvement in the alleged "assault" nor was he told anything about PEREZ' appearance at TPELIDE.

5. L-9 identified a number of persons appearing in the photos taken at the diplomatic reception held at the Embassy 2 Jan. Identifications were noted

SECRET 7365 ~~P-6079~~

on the photos.

6. L-9 revealed that he had welcomed in the New Year at Nico GARCIA's home -- at Nico's invitation. When Nico picked him up at the Embassy they made a swing by a house at 131 Alejandro Dumas, Polanco, where Nico wanted to drop a couple of bottles off with a friend named Mary, a Cuban. L-9 tried to remain in the car -- was not dressed for calling -- but Nico insisted that he come in. Mary was not there but her sister was -- she had just recently arrived from Cuba. Another Cuban man and woman were there -- anti-Castro types who were very sad at being away from their homeland -- the man was softly crying -- probably a bit liquored up. Nico fit right in -- L-9 says that he is a master at getting along with people, even those on the other side of the political fence. (This tallies with info on file). The Mexican landlady -- an old crone -- tried to put the make on L-9, really flipped for him, and wanted him to stay but he and Nico finally drove off. L-9 does not know who these people are (to be checked out). They then went over to Nico's place where L-9 joined the family for a Cuban dinner. Nico's mother-in-law was there -- she recently came out of Cuba to be with her daughter (Nico's wife) while she has a baby -- due soon. Jorrin appeared soon thereafter and joined in the meal. Nico put on some popular and light classical records, working his way from dance music to Tchaikovsky. When a carload of Embassy people -- Rogelio RODRIGUEZ and wife, Dra. MACHADO, Berta MACHADO, and Buenaventura REYES appeared in front Nico quickly took off the music and put on a record of Fidel CASTRO intoning his Second Declaration of Havana -- the new arrivals were greeted with this as they came in the door. L-9 says that Nico is a superb actor and knew just what to do when the Patria o Muerte types showed up.

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[illegible]
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7. In response to questioning L-9 revealed that Nico looks upon him as a Fidelista but definitely not a Communist. He says that Nico is very self assured, a calm man who cannot be ruffled. He appears to have no complexes about being a Negro. Asked whether he felt there might be any chance that Nico would cooperate against CASTRO, L-9 said, "Let us face the fact that many people are becoming more and more convinced that the revolution is here to stay. This man GARCIA is one of them. On the other hand, if he could be "got to" he would be invaluable. He would be a great loss to the Embassy. I would say that the chances are slim but it would probably be worth the effort to try to win him over. He has many friends from all walks of life, many of them among the anti-Castro elements."

8. L-9 showed B some documents regarding Cultural plans of the Embassy which did not seem to merit reporting. He turned over two long lists of persons invited to the 2 Jan receptions.

9. L-9 reported that Mr. Dudley THOMPSON, an opposition senator from Jamaica had been in town and he identified THOMPSON from among those photographed at the Diplomatic Reception of 2 Jan. T was in Nairobi, Kenya, two weeks ago and arrived in Mexico from Miami on 1 Jan. He hoped to continue on to Cuba right away but was unable to make the trip since he could not be assured of getting there and back to Jamaica by 6 Jan -- he had to be in Jamaica on the 6th to attend a meeting of those opposing the BUSTAMANTE regime and had to attend another meeting on 10 Jan which was to be attended by Cheddi JAGAN of British Guiana and leaders from Barbados. He hoped to be able to go to Cuba to see Jesus CANIZARES of the INRA in order to brief C about land reform measures in Kenya. He told L-9 that he would probably be back in Mexico in February 1964 to arrange to go to Cuba. L-9 says that T appears to be a very well educated, bright person.

14-00000

DIRECTOR

ROM : [illegible]

CTION : WH 8

NFO : [illegible]

S E C R E T 141945Z

IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MANA 4716 14 FEB 64 IN 19935

PBRUMEN

v 7994
2 Feb 64

1. FOLLOWING REPORTED BY ERYTHROID/1 ON 13 AND 14 FEB:

IN LATE JAN NIC SECURITY SENT TWO AGENTS, TO COSTA RICA TO PENETRATE GROUP LED BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ WHICH PLOTTING TO KILL GEN. ANASTASIO SOMOZA. TWO AGENTS ARE IDEN A AND IDEN B. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL AND IDEN A REPORTED ON 11 FEB THAT AGUILUZ HAD INSTRUCTED IDEN B GO TO CUBA FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. IDEN B TO GO MEXICO CITY ON 12 FEB, TO REGISTER AT HOTEL CONGRESO, CALLE ALLENDE, AND -- ON FOLLOWING DAY HE TO GO CALLE FRANCISCO MARQUEZ NUMBER 160 (POR TACUBA) WHERE HE TO ASK FOR SEÑOR VEGA OR SEÑOR ROGELIO. WHEN ASKED BY VEGA OR ROGELIO "DE PARTE DE QUIEN", HE TO ANSWER "DE PARTE DE SENOR CANEIRAS" WHO HAD SENT HIM TO ARRANGE HIS PAPERS. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B, THAT IF HE UNABLE LOCATE EITHER VEGA OR ROGELIO, HE TO CALL TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26 REPEAT 14-13-26. IDEN B ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE NEEDED SOMETHING (PRESUMABLY WHILE IN (CUBA) HE TO WRITE TO APARTADO 110, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, TO WRITE NOTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B HE WOULD BE GIVEN A COMMO SYSTEM IN MEXICO AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SO HE COULD LET IDEN A KNOW WHEN HE PLANNING TO RETURN. AGULUZ EXPLAINED THAT IDEN B WOULD RETURN FROM CUBA CLANDESTINELY BY SUBMARINE.

ALSO RCVD 1110

v 19598
Feb 64

Mex. 822
14 Feb 64

v 19988
14 Feb 64

2. THIS OPERATION BEING RUN BY ERYTHROID/1 WHO NOT REPEAT NOT AWARE STATION BEING INFORMED BY ERYTHROID/3. STATION OBTAINING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. FOR MEXI: E/3 REQUEST URGENT IDENTIFICATION REGISTRY OF MEXICO CITY TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26. MUST HAVE REPLY BY MORNING 15 FEB IF E/3 TO BE ABLE ADVISE HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICO CITY. IDEN B TO MAKE CONTACT VEGA OR ROGELIO -- OR BY PHONE, BY 17 FEB AT LATEST.

SECRET

14 Feb 1964

14-00000

DIRECTOR

OM : MANAGUA

CTION : W. 8

NFO : [illegible]

SECRET 141925Z

IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MANA 4716

14 FEB 64 IN 19935

PBRUMEN

v 9994

2e64

1. FOLLOWING REPORTED BY ERYTHROID/1 ON 13 AND 14 FEB:

IN LATE JAN NIC SECURITY SENT TWO AGENTS, TO COSTA RICA TO PENETRATE GROUP LED BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ WHICH PLOTTING TO KILL GEN. ANASTASIO SOMOZA. TWO AGENTS ARE IDEN A AND IDEN B. THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL AND IDEN A REPORTED ON 11 FEB THAT AGUILUZ HAD INSTRUCTED IDEN B GO TO CUBA FOR SPECIAL TRAINING. IDEN B TO GO MEXICO CITY ON 12 FEB, TO REGISTER AT HOTEL CONGRESO, CALLE ALLENDE, AND -- ON FOLLOWING DAY HE TO GO CALLE FRANCISCO MARQUEZ NUMBER 160 (POR TACUBA) WHERE HE TO ASK FOR SEÑOR VEGA OR SEÑOR ROGELIO. WHEN ASKED BY VEGA OR ROGELIO "DE PARTE DE QUIEN", HE TO ANSWER "DE PARTE DE SENOR CANCIRAS" WHO HAD SENT HIM TO ARRANGE HIS PAPERS. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B, THAT IF HE UNABLE LOCATE EITHER VEGA OR ROGELIO, HE TO CALL TELEPHONE NUMBER 14-13-26 REPEAT 14-13-26. IDEN B ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE NEEDED SOMETHING (PRESUMABLY WHILE IN (CUBA) HE TO WRITE TO APARTADO 110, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA. HE WARNED, HOWEVER, TO WRITE NOTHING OF SIGNIFICANCE. AGUILUZ TOLD IDEN B HE WOULD BE GIVEN A COMMO SYSTEM IN MEXICO AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SO HE COULD LET IDEN A KNOW WHEN HE PLANNING TO RETURN. AGULUZ EXPLAINED THAT IDEN B WOULD RETURN FROM CUBA CLANDESTINELY BY SUBMARINE.

ALSO RCVD 1110

v 19598

Feb 64

MEXI 822

14 Feb 64

19958

14 Feb 64

2. THIS OPERATION BEING RUN BY ERYTHROID/1 WHO NOT REPEAT NOT AWARE STATION BEING INFORMED BY ERYTHROID/3. STATION OBTAINING ADDITIONAL DETAILS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

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SECRET

14 Feb 1964

14-00000

Vi

[redacted]

WH/SA 64-364
6 May 1964

LX-1576

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3 Mexico

VIA: Chief, WH/PO/A (Mr. Horton)

SUBJECT: General: Debriefing Report # 59 of AMMUG-1
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)

REFERENCE: OTTA 1611 dated 28 April 1964

1. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez is the Cuban Intelligence Officer (DGI) stationed in Mexico City. He uses the pseudonyms "Eduardo", "Casimiro", and "Jose Antonio".

2. RODRIGUEZ has the following physical description: age approximately 24 years old, 5'8" tall, husky build, blond hair and a reddish complexion.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/PO/A (Mr. Horton)
2 - WH/SA/CI (chrono)
1 - WH/SA/Esec

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

201-332665

CS COPY

201-332665

EXCERPTS

2 MAY 64

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3363 IN 74652

DYVOUR AMMUG

REF: A. DIR 18730

B. CTTA 1609 (IN 69508)

1. TRACES REF B ..... INCLUDE FOLL ONLY:

A. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. FORWARDED IN PACY 3312. (IN 71483)

.....

D. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO. HHT-827, 31 JULY 62, REPORTS ONE ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS A CITIZEN OF HONDURAS INVOLVED IN COMMIE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES TEGU. HZPA-11329, 9 JUNE 61 REPORTS ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS NAME ON LIST CARRIED BY IUS DELEGATE.

E. RICARDO MARTINEZ. HZPA-13234, 9 MAY 63, REPORTED RICARDO AUGUSTO MARTINEZ AS SALVADORAN, PDOB SANTA ANA, SALV, 23 JUNE 36, OCCUPATION: BRICK MASON, RESIDENCE INDEPENDENCIA NO. 76, SANTA ANA, AS POSSIBLE TRAVELLER TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRY MARCH 63.

.....

EXCERPTS

PACY 3363
IN 74652
2 MAY 64

P-7575
P-6605

[illegible] 64

[illegible] brief him on his meeting [illegible] 7

Text: [illegible]

1. Attached [illegible] self-explanatory list of comments b[illegible] primarily of an operational nature. [illegible] cable Hqs see if they can identify [illegible]CIO.

we ask for a more complete name

1.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Tercer Secretario, salió el viernes 24 de abril para Cuba. Se cree no regresará por el momento.
P-7365

2.- Ovidio Saná, Cónsul [illegible], desapareció de la Embajada. [illegible] salió hacia Cuba o Veracruz. Se [illegible] precauciones alrededor de su persona. Temen lo ataquen
P-1649

3.- Se ha participado a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México, el nombramiento de un tal Villavicencio. Intervinieron en la redacción de la comunicación [illegible] Hectora Machado y Peregrina Alonso. El mencionado Villavicencio, vendrá a sustituir un funcionario (En el próximo informe se dará su nombre completo y el de la persona que reemplazará.)

4.- Ana Luisa Salinas, Auxiliar del Consulado en México, solicitó un aumento de sus haberes y se le negó. Comentaron que la tenían por pena en el cargo que desempeña.

5.- Se recibió un cable del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba [illegible] de sus párrafos decía "Es mejor morir [illegible]ando, que ganar la paz sin honor"
sin!

6.- [illegible]mente se entablan grandes discusiones entre varios miembros del personal de la Embajada, por los vuelos de reconocimiento de los aviones americanos sobre Cuba. Tienen la certeza que Fidel actuará cuando sea necesario.

7.- Se está tratando de averiguar con mas claridad que [illegible] Ovidio Interián.

8.- [illegible] Berta [illegible] vida.

9.- Comentarán más [illegible] Cultural en México, [illegible] Ortilla.

7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

WH	INT	SS	SM
	IOS	FEDS	
[illegible]	RPTS	LOG	CA
C	SI	BP	SH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDA

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 292000Z

MEXI INFO DIR WAVE CITE MRID 0457

DESENSITIZED

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

30 APR 64 IN 72650

REF MRID 0436 (IN [illegible])*

1. ON 24 APRIL 64 LESNICK SAID:

A. REFERRED PARA 1 B AND GUTIERREZ COMMENT PARA 2 REF.

B. THIS INFO REFERRED TO ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, MEMBER CUBEMB MEXI.

C. RUIZ COUSIN CIRA ANTONIA MUINO RODRIGUEZ, WIFE ANTONIO CARLOS VECIANA BLANCH, FUND RAISER FOR GUTIERREZ.

D. VECIANA WOULD APPROACH RUIZ MEXI ON REQUEST. NEEDS MEXI ENTRY VISA, US EXIT AND REENTRY PERMIT AND EXPENSES.

E. VECIANA SAID RUIZ WOULD PROBABLY NOT REPORT APPROACH TO CUBEMB MEXI.

F. NO FURTHER INFO ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. 201-332665

G. WOULD ADVISE ANY G-2 TARGETS GUTIERREZ MAY BE ABLE SUGGEST (PER WAVE SUGGESTION).

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

2. WAVE HAS INDEPENDENT CHANNEL TO VECIANA. TO AVOID FURTHER CONTACT WITH LESNICK AND GUTIVERREZ, MERTON ARRANGED HAVE LESNICK ADVISE VECIANA THAT SOMEONE MAY CONTACT HIM THIS MATTER "DE PARTE DE CARLITOS."*

3. QUICK CHECK WAVE FILES INDICATED:

A. ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ COMMERCIAL COUNCELOR CUBEMB MEXI (AUG 63). GUILLERMO RUIZ, MILITIA MAN, MILITANT RED, CHIEF DEPT CONSTRUCTION EXPENSES STUDIES HACIENDA (UFG 1539, 8 SEP 62); G-2 PENETRATION OA/WORKED HACIENDA/FATHERCOMMIE AND CHIEF BARBERS UNION (HKHW-3506, 17 JUNE 60).

B. VECIANA HAD POA 29 JAN 62; BORN 18 OCT 28; PROFESSION ACCOUNTANT; VARIOUS CONNECTIONS WITH FNE, ALPHA 66, MRP AMBANG-1.

C. MUINO BORN 4 OCT 35 HAVA.

4. DEFER ANY FURTHER ACTION MEXI. COMMENT: SINCE MUINO IS RELATIVE INVOLVED, MIGHT BE DESIRABLE SHE AND HUSBAND MAKE ANY PITCH TOGETHER,

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *PROVIDED INFO DATED 5 APR 64 RE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, G-2 REP CUBEMB MEXI.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 150557

DATE 29 April 64

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Vivian A. Petrowski

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/SA/CI

ROOM, BUILDING GH 43

EXTENSION 6471

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, 201 NUMBERS, ETC.

pseudo "Chele" - "Guero"

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

unknown

4. CITIZENSHIP

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

2nd Secretary, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Political Reporting Officer, Cuban Embassy Mexico

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☒ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 1-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

Reply Over: ______
dated: 18 May 64

SECRET

TO: Vivien Petrowski

9 May 1964
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. XXXXX SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

EXCERPT

28 APRIL 64

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE MEXI 9201

IN 71640

INTEL URGEN LIFIRE

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFIRE AIRLISTS. .....

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING WENT TO HAVANA FROM MEXICO CITY BY AIR ON 25 APRIL 1964: ..... CUBANS: ROGELIO LOPEZ RODRIGUEZ [sic], DIP PP-D/63/454; .....

EXCERPT

MEXI 9201
IN 71640
28 APRIL 64

E X C E R P T

28 APRIL 64

PRIORITY OTTA DIR CITE MEXI 9137

IN 71516

DESENSITIZED KAPOK DYVOUR ZRKNICK

REF A. OTTA 1609 (IN 69508)

B. OTTA 1611 (IN 69843)

C. DIR 17103

1. RE REF B: ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ AGE 40 CUBAN CONSUL ARRIVED MEXI 2 SEPT 63. REPORTEDLY D~~OES NOT KNOW~~ HIS JOB AS CONSUL AND HELD IN CONTEMPT BY HIS STAFF FOR INCOMPETENCE. KNOWS JUAN REJANO AND HAD ONE KNOWN SOCIAL CONTACT OCT 63 WITH PAVEL YATSKOV SOVIET CONSUL MEXI.

2. MANUEL VEGA PEREZ THIRD SECY KNOWN CUBAN IS RETURNED TO MEXI 16 APRIL 64 TO REPLACE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ FOR UNSPECIFIED TIME.

3. NO TRACES NOEL GUERRERO SINCE NOV 62 WHEN HE REPORTEDLY IN CUBA.

4. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ KNOWN CUBAN IS LEFT FOR CUBA 25 APRIL APPARENTLY PCS. HAD NUMEROUS CONTACTS MEXI WHICH REFLECTED IN TARGET STUDY NOW IN PROCESS. WILL FORWARD.

5. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA CONTACT OF LICOOKY-1 AUG 62, WENT TO CUBA FOR 26 JULY CELEBRATION 62. JAN 64 ENTERED MEXI ILLEGALLY FROM GUAT WITH NO DOCUMENTATION.

6. NO INFO VICTOR OR LAURA. ALL SIGNIFICANT INFO THELMA KING, JORGE TURNER MORALES AND BROTHER DAVID TURNER MORALES PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED HQS.

7. NO TRACES SUBJ REF A.

8. FYI: CHECK FLIGHTLISTS 24 AND 25 APRIL FAIL SHOW CUBA TRAVEL ANY SUBJECTS REFS.

.....

E X C E R P T

MEXI 9137
IN 71516
28 ~~APRIL~~ 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 28APR64

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	LFK	272350Z	9620

DIR OTTA INFO WAVE MEXI SJOS PACY CITE MANA 4847

KAPOK DYVOUR ZRKNICK
REF A DIR 17103 (IN 9616)
B OTTA 1611 (IN 9609)
C OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)

1. STATION FILES CONTAIN REFERENCES TO FOLLOWING PERSONS REFS B AND C:

A. 'ROGELIO' (REF C PARA 1-3): PROBABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SEC CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. IDEN B OF MANA 4717, AGENT OF NIC SERVICE WHO SENT CUBA VIA MEXI, WAS INSTRUCTED CONTACT ROGELIO BY MARCIAL AGUILUZ (SEE MANA 4716). IDEN B IN CONTACT WITH RODRIGUEZ, WHO USED ALLIAS JCHELE' WITH IDEN B, FROM 14 FEB 64 TO 10 MARCH WHEN IDEN B LEFT FOR CUBA. FROM OTHER TRAFFIC RE THIS CASE, INCLUDING HMMA-3083, HMMA-3022, AND MEXI 8228, APPEARS OBVIOUS INVOLVED INTEL ACTIVITIES MEXI.

B. MANUEL VEGA (REF C PARA 1-E): IDEN B, ABOVE, ALSO GIVEN NAME 'VEGA' AS CONTACT AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI (MANA 4716). IDEN B UNABLE CONTACT 'VEGA' AND MEXI 8228 REPORTED HE PROBABLY MANUEL VEGA PEREZ WHO NO LONGER MEXI.

C. NOEL GUERRERO (REF B PARA 6-D): UNDOUBTEDLY NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO (201-061519), BORN 12 APRIL 1914 AT LEON, NICARAGUA. GUERRERO LONG-TIME NIC COMMUNIST WHO HAS ALSO BEEN MEMBER MEXICAN COMMIE PARTY AND HAS BEEN INVOLVED COMMIE ACTIVITIES SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WAS ACTIVE IN FOUNDING CASTRO/COMMIE NIC EXILE ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA. IN LATE 62 AND EARLY 63 HE LEADER OF FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FLN - COMMIE-DOMINATED AND CUBAN-DIRECTED NIC GROUP) WHICH IN TRAINING IN HONDURAS, AND IN LATE JULY 63 LED GROUP FROM HONDURAS INTO NICARAGUA. HMM-867, WHICH REPORTED ACTIVITIES THIS GROUP IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA, REPORTED THAT GUERRERO AND FOUR OTHER MEMBERS FLN LEFT NICARAGUA (LEAVING MAIN GROUP BEHIND) IN EARLY AUGUST AND RETURNED TO HONDURAS, REACHING TEGUCIGALPA SOMETIME IN LATE AUGUST. IN FLN, GUERRERO USED PSEUDONYM -- 'EL PATRIARCA'. MOST RECENT INFO AVAILABLE STATION WAS SJOS 6390, 18 NOV 63, WHICH REPORTED HE IN CUBA.

2. STATION HAS NO INFO THELMA KING OR RAMIRO VALDEZ WHICH NOT AVAILABLE HQS AND OTHER STATIONS.

END...

280240Z

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

P-7365

SECRET

28 April 1964

P

Memo to the files

Cuban Lienvoy—Voice identifications

1. P-579 Bulky contains a reel section from M-11 L-36, 9 April 1964, containing conversation at RT 34, between Ricardo (lnu) and Rogelio Rodrigues. It was thought Ricardo mai be the post-box serviceman used by the opposition in the Amrod op.

This speaker seems to be a Mexican

TGURquhart

7365

14-00000

~~Dave~~
~~Dot~~
~~Lorna~~ Lm
Trudi

P-7575
P-6605

to other P files

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

27 April 1964

Meeting with LITAMIL-3 to Debrief his meeting with L-7

Next Meeting: 30 April

1. Attached is self-explanatory report from LITAMIL-7. Full of little goodies, all of operational nature.

Floyd N. AIMONET

P-7921

1.- Manuel Vega será acreditado como Tercer Secretario y viene a sustituir temporalmente al Tercer Secretario Rogelio Rodríguez. Sus funciones en la Embajada: Preparar valijas, Recibir autoridades y personajes cubanos. No se sabe que tiempo durará sus funciones en México.

✓ P-7365

2.- Rogelio Rodríguez, Tercer Secretario, saldrá para La Habana y según dice permanecerá en dicho lugar más o menos unas cuatro semanas.

3.- El correo Almara, que regresó del Canadá, dice que el Embajador Américo Cruz, se encuentra en Cuba.

P-8649

4.- Ovidio Samá, Cónsul en Veracuz, se encuentra aquí en México. No le da importancia al suceso de Veracuz. Está muy seguro que nada le sucederá. Se cree que mañana jueves regresará a Veracruz.

5.- El nombramiento de Gorotiaza, causó muy buena impresión en la Embajada.

P-3696

6.- Teresa Proenza, tiene ordenes de visitar lo menos que pueda a la Embajada. No se sabe cuando saldrá hacia Cuba.

7.- Berta Pino, tiene a su cuidado el Registro de las Visas.

8.- En el Hall de la Embajada, casi diariamente se reune todo el personal de la Embajada para discutir el asunto del Brasil y lo de la Base de Guantanamo.

9.- El mesero Pereira, insiste en hablar con el amigo.

10.- Han enviado a las Embajadas amigas y no amigas copias de "Mimiografos" de las declaraciones de Fidel sobre el problema del Brasil.

P-7365

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

DATE: 27APR64

INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FILE:

DEFERRED / PRIORITY / INITIALS / DTG / INCOMING NUMBER

RRRRRRRRRRRR / OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE / INITIALS LFK / 261755Z / 9606

TO PRIORITY OTTA INFO DIR MEXI SALV TEGU T SJOS GUATWAVE 5662
NUMBER

TYPIC
REF OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)
WAVE TRACES SUBJS REF FOLL:

1. IBRAHIM (VILA) ABREU: GENERAL MANAGER PRAGUE OFFICE CUBANA AIRLINES (DBA-4761, 19 JUL 63).

2. JULIO (DAMASO) VASQUEZ:

A. LISTED AS MBR CUBAN INVASION FORCE WHICH LANDED PANAMA 25 APR 59: AGE 23; FORMER MEDICAL STADENT AND VETERAN SIERRA MORENO FIGHTING CUBA. (HZP-3054 1 JUNE 59).

B. CIRCA 62 RPTD AS LT IN DSE SECURITY DETAIL MINAS DE MOA, BARACOA, ORIENTE PROV. CLOSE FRIEND RAMON (VAZQUEZ) MONTENEGRO KNOWN CIS OFFICER (AMKARN/1 22 DEC 62).

C. NO TRACE "SERGIO".

3. "CHAIN": PROBABLY IDENT CARLOS SIXTO (CHAIN) SOLER 201-349576, 1ST SEC CUBAN DELEGATION TO OAS WASH DC NOV 61 TO FEB 62. REPORTED MBR MINISTRY INTERIOR WITH RANK CAPTAIN LATE 62 (UFGA 7246 23 JAN 63). WAS NATL COORDINATOR 26 JULY MOV ORIENTE PROVINCE CIRCA 58 AND USED PSEUDO GUSTAVO (TDCS 3/370,313 15 SEP 58).

4. ROGELIO LNU: POSSIBLY IDENT WITH ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ 201-332665 2ND SEC CUBAN EMB MEXI SINCE MID 63. AND IDENTIFIED AS INTEL OFFICER BY AGENTS NICARAGUAN SERVICE. USES PSEUDOS CHELE AND GORRIN WITH INTEL CONTACTS MEXI (HMMA 3033 10 MAR 64).

5. FNU SOSA: POSS IDEN WITH PABLO ARMANDO (SOSA) RAMIREZ DPOB 3 AUG 34. HONDURAN WHO TRAVELED CUBA TO CSR MAY 63 PP 23485 (DST 10599).

6. ROQUE (DALTON) GARCIA: SUBJ 201-215097 DPOB 14 MAY 35
SAN SALVADOR. HEAD OF SALV DELEGATION TO CSR MAR 61. (HSS-1071
9 JAN 61). LATER WORKED AS WRITER IN LA SECTION RADIO HAVA (DBA
11609 14 JUNE 62). UNDER PSEUDO JUAN MONTENEGRO POSS IDENT WITH
JUAN (MONTENEGRO) GUASPO CUBAN PP 453 TRAVELLED CUBA TO CSR JAN 63
(OCOA 6422).

7. ALEJANDRO (GOMEZ) MONTANO: HIS PSEUDO RAMON (SEONE) SOLIS LISTED AS CUBAN WHO TRAVELLED CUBA TO CSR SEP 63 PP 14269 (OCOA 7001).

8. NO WAVE TRACES OTHERS.

END...

270019Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

P. 7365

EXCERPT

IN 71483

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3312

[illegible] DYVOUR ZRMTICK

DESENSITIZED

REF: DIR 17103

.....

6. ROGELIO NO DOUBT IS ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PER PARA 1, MANA 4847. HYSAGE-1 CONTACTED ROGELIO BY PHONE AT CUBAN EMB ON 8 FEB 64 DURING HER VISIT MEXI, MAY HAVE SEEN HIM DURING CALL AT EMB ON 16 FEB 64 (MEXI 8171).

.....

EXCERPT

PACY 3312
IN 71483
28 APRIL 64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TRAVEL

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

SUBJECT Travel Between Mexico and Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/579,744

DATE DISTR. 28 April 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES D-ACQ-02389

DATE OF INFO. 20 April 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City 21 April 1964

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8892

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good access to travel information. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Travel data show that the following went to Habana from Mexico City by air on 20 April 1964: Cubans: Miguel Angel de Cardenas, PP 26946; Mireya Vilaseca, Dip PP D/64/142; Josefina Gonzalez, Dip PP D/64/141; Jorge Amezqueta, PP E/64/82; Mario Gonzalez, PP E/63/856; Osvaldo Flores, PP 03107; Fabio Ruiz, PP 03104; Esther Gavilan Rosales, Dip PP D/63/445; Manuel Calvo Rodriguez, PP 2/1001; Mexican: Luisa Rodriguez Urbina, PP 729.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY #	AIR #	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI # 3
REPCINCLANT		CINCSO #						I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

[illegible]

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 14-13-26.-
27 abril 64.-
N30-L31.-
1726-2118hs.-

01-25.- Salidas solicitando taxi.-

25.- Salida al 464324.- 1731hs.- Jorrín con MF pregunta por el precio de suscripción a la revista Siempre por un año y por seis meses.- MF que 144 y 72 pesos respectivamente.- 30.

32.- En rada a las 1750hs.- Dolores de la Mora por Fernández Roa le dice que acaba de llegar.- Enfermedad del niño de Roa.- Roa: que cuando vuelve.- Lola que para el viernes.- Roa que ahora sí se ven.- Lola: que el diez de mayo se va con su mamá a Puerto Vallarta para pasarlo allá con la familia.- Quedan de llamarse mañana para ponerse de acuerdo cuando se ven.- 79.-

P. 8128

82.- Entrada a las 1834hs.- Tovar por Rogelio.- Jorrín que Rogelio no regresa hasta dentro de quince días.--- 86.-

P. 7365

97.- Salida al 230792.- 1840hs.- Roa con Victor Rico Galán le dice que lo espera que va a pasar con el.- Victor de acuerdo.--- 105.-

P. 9554

106.- Entrada a las 1852hs.- Enrique Luengo por García Lara.- Jorrín que no está.- Luengo que repite la llamada.--- 114.

P 7554

115.- Entrada a las 1846hs.- MF por Minsal.- Jorrín que no está.- MF que llame a Rogelio Castillo.--- 120.-

121.- Salida al 216822.- 1859hs.- Minsal con Castillo.- Castillo que que ha habido de nuevo.- Minsal que nada nuevo que solo la conversación y que ahora un cable que tiene sobre la mesa contestándole la conversación que dice que sobre el cable que el vapor cargará [illegible] Coatzacoalcos los fertilizantes y el ajo y que [illegible] hasta completar su cúbico, que han calcula[illegible]

[illegible]

P-7365

EXCERPT

26 APRIL 64

DIR GUAT MEXI WAVE SALV TEGU   CITE OTTA 1612   IN 69876

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] TYPIC KUDESK JMGIN

AMMUG-1

1. RODRIGUEZ GAVE FOLLOWING INFO ON PERSONS TRAINED IN CUBA USUALLY FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND IN SOME CASES FOR WORK AS CUBAN INTEL AGENTS ABROAD. .....

.....

3. SALVADORANS:

.....

G. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA, BORN CIRCA 36 IN EL SALVADOR, ... FILE AND SOURCE EXPLANATION MAKE IT APPEAR DALTON IS NOW ASSIGNED PCS MEXI WHERE HE IS IN CONTACT WITH MAURICIO DE LA SELVA. MAURICIO REPORTS TO CUBAN INTEL OFFICER ROGELIO LNU IN MEXI. .....

.....

EXCERPT

OTTA 1612
IN 69876

26 APRIL 64

EXCERPT

26 APRIL 64

DIR INFO WAVE FACY MEXI MANA CITE OTTA 1611 IN 69843

DESENSITIZED TYPIC KUDESK HYSAGE ZRKNICK

REF: DIR 17031 (NOT SENT MANA FACY)

.....

AMMUG-1

6. INFO FROM RODRIGUEZ RE CUBAN INTEL OPS MEXI:

.....

E. ROGELIO WHO IS CUBAN INTEL OFFICER MEXI HAS THREE PSEUDOS EDUARDO, CASIMIRO AND JOSE ANTONIO. What about "Chele" + [illegible] → ?

[illegible]

.....

G. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA, SALVADORAN WHOSE CUBAN INTEL PSEUDO IS JUAN MONTENEGRO IS IN MEXI NOW. SEE PARA 3 G OF REF A FOR DETAILS.

.....

EXCERPT

OTTA 1611
IN 69843
26 APRIL 64

14-00000

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 25APR64

SECRET

DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
RRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	LYK	252249Z	9605

TO IMMEDIATE OTTA

INFO WAVE MEXI SALV GUAT TEGU SJOS

CITE DIR 17021

ATTN: LANGOSCH
RYBAT TYPIC ZRKNICK
REF A OTTA 1602 (IN 9562)
B OTTA 1609 (IN 9590)
FOLLOWING ARE PRELIM TRACE RESULTS FROM ZRKNICK INDICES:
1. SAUL GONZALEZ (REF A, PARA 1, A) SUGGEST POSSIBLY IDEN
JORGE PUENTE BLANCO ALIAS RAUL GONZALEZ AKA "RAULIN", PANAMANIAN
SERVING CUBAN MINREX, WHO ALSO CONTACT HYSAGE-1. PUENTE IN HAVA
MAR 64, WAS ADDRESSEE COURIERED LETTER SENT BY HYSAGE-1 FOR DELIVERY
MANUEL PINEIRO LOSADA IN REPLY INSTRUCTIONS ENTER PANAMANIAN
SOCIALIST PARTY. (PACY-2952, 1 APR 64) PUENTE ALLEGEDLY ALSO INVOLVED
SUBERSION EFFORT LATIN AMERICA AND SCHEDULED BE SENT VENEZUELA
END 63, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY REFER HIS BROTHER JOSE MARIA (PUENTE)
BLANCO, WHO NOW CARA.
2. ROGELIO (LNU) CUBAN IS OFFICER MEXI, (REF A, PARA 1, E
AND REF B, PARA 1, C) UNDOUBTEDLY IDENTICAL ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ)
LOPEZ, SECOND SECY CUBAN EMB MEXI, IDENTIFIED CUBAN INTEL OFFICER,
WHO CONTACTED BY MELVA (GARCIA) ARIAS, HYSAGE-1'S FRIEND AND
COMMUNICATOR ON 14 MAR 64. (MEXI-3709,). ALSO CONTACTED BY
HYSAGE-1 DIRECTLY ON FEB 64 TRIP MEXI. (MEXI-8357, HMMA-22957,
24 FEB 64; MEXI-8171, 11 FEB 64; MEXI-8226, MEXI-8228, 14 FEB 64).
3. JUAN (LNU), SOVIET INTEL ADVISER IN DCI, (REF A, PARA 1,
H AND REF B, PARA 1, A) APPARENTLY IDENTICAL WITH JUAN (LNU)
SOVIET INTEL OFFICER WHO TRAINED HYSAGE-1 IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AND
S/W. WEIGHT AND HEIGHT GENERALLY FIT.
4. NO TRACES IBRAHIM VIALLA, JULIO (DAMASO) VASQUEZ ALIAS
SERGIO, MENTIONED REF B, PARA 1. C.
5. (FNU) SOSA OF REF B, PARA 1, D, POSSIBLY REFERS MARCO
ANTONIO (YON) SOSA AKA "EL CHINO" ALIAS "MAX", GUATEMALAN, LEADER
13 NOV 60 REVOLT, DIRECTOR GUAT GUERRILLAS, AND IDENTIFIED IN
ZRKNICK. (CSDB-3/655,554, 18 JULY 63; HMMW-12110, 15 NOV 63;
GUAT-3537, 18 NOV 63; HGGA-7035, 13SEPT 63; DIRAYWRETN 20 AUG 63.)
6. (FNU) CHAIN ALIAS AGUSTO (OR AGUSTO), OFFICIAL MINREX,
OF REF B, PARA 1, C, PROBABLY IDENTICAL CARLOS (CHAIN) SOLER, WHO
WAS CUBAN INTEL OFFICER IN CUBAN DELEGATION TO OAS, WASH., D.C. 1961-
1962. DOB CA 1933, DESCRIBED: HT 65 INCHES; WT CA 130 LBS; SLIM
BUILD; BLACK HAIR. (UFGA-7246, 18 JAN 63.) POSSIBLY IMPLICATED
BOLIVIAN ASPECTS ZRKNICK.
CONT::::::

P-7365

1303
11-57

DISTR:

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ACTION:

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DATE:

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DEFERRED	PRIORITY		INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		

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PAGE TWO DIR 17081 (IN 9605)

7. ROQUE (DALTON) GARCIA ALIAS JUAN MONTENEGRO, ARMANDO
CABRERA, ETC. OF REF B, PARA 1, D, NO ZRKNICK TRACES. HOWEVER
HE REPORTED OCOA-5475, 23 AUG 62 AS MEMBER SALVADORAN CP, EMPLOYEE
RADIO HAVA, WRITER LATIN AMERICAN SECTION. ALSO REPORTED
REVOLUCION REPEAT REVOLUCION, 19 MAR 63, AS PARTICIPANT LECTURE
SERIES AT CASA DE LAS AMERICAS ON L.A. MYTHOLOGY.

8. OTHERS MENTIONED REF B, PARA 1, D: NO TRACES ON RAFAEL
(ACEVEDO) BLANCO, JOSE LEMBERTO (CARRILLO) CALDERON ALIAS MARCOS A.
(VARGAS) SALGUERO, ETC, ALEJANDRO (GOMEZ) MONTANO ALIAS JOSE
RAFAEL (SARADIA) ALIAS RAMON (SEONE) SOLIS, ALIAS RICARDO MARTINEZ.

9. NO TRACES PEDRO (LNU) OF REF B, PARA 1, E.

10. RE MANUEL ANTONIO (CALERO), SALVADORAN OF REF B, PARA 1, F,
NO ZRANICK TRACES UNDER TRUE NAME. ONE (FNU) AYALLA AND ONE
(FNU) RAMIREZ PER CARDED INFO IMPLICATED JUDITH FERRETO ACTIVITES
MEXI. UNKNOWN IF THIS REFERS CALERO UNDER ALIAS.
L
XEND...

2614252

S E C R E T

(44)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 25 APR 64

FILE:

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED	PRIORITY PPPPPPPPP	INITIALS PWO	DTG 251410Z	INCOMING NUMBER 9590
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO | INFO | CITE OTTA 1509

PRIORITY DIR WAVE MEXI SALV
TEGU SJOS GUAT
TYPIC KUDESK
REF OTTA 1508(NOT SENT TEGU SJOS)(IN 9563)

1. FOLLOWING INFO IS FROM REF RODRIGUEZ, DEFECTED CUBAN IS STAFFER
NOW BEING DEBRIEFED OTTA.
[illegible]. INTEL ADVISERS WITHIN DCI ARE SOVS AND NOT FROM SATELLITES.
[illegible]. PEOPOSE FROM WH AREA WHO GO CUBA FOR TRAINING, INCLUDING
GUERRILLA TYPE, RETURN THEIR COUNTRIES VIA PRAGUE AND ON DEPARTING
CUBA CARRY TWO PASSPORTS. ONE WHICH IS CUBAN UNDER FALSE NAME IS
SURRENDERED TO CZR SECURITY SERVICE PRAGUE WHICH DOES NOT RETURN TO
CU[illegible]. (COMMENT: AND POSSIBLY RETAINS FOR OWN USE) OTHER FROM ANY
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY UNDER SAME OR ANOTHER FALSE NAME IS USED FOR
ONWARD TRAVEL. CONTACT PLAN IS ARRANGED WITH CZR SECURITY FOR CUBAN
PASSPORT PICK UP BUT CZR SECURITY SERVICE HAS NO ROLE TO LEVY
REQUIREMENTS OR DO ANYTHING ELSE THEN TO RETRIEVE CUBAN PPT.
C. CUBAN INTEL STAFFERS INCLUDE IBRAHIM VIALLA IN PRAGUE;
MAN WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT KNOWN USING JULIO DAMASO VASQUEZ WHOSE
INTERNAL DCI PSEUDO IS SERGIO AND WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED FOR ASSIGNMENT
TO CENTRAL AMERICA IN PARACHUTING, SW CODES AND CIPHERS AND RADIO
BUT WHO UNTIL VERY RECENTLY STILL IN CUBA; MAN, WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT
KNOWN BUT WHO IS DEPUTY TO MANUEL PINIERO IN DCI AND WHO IS CALLED
CHAIN IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WHO IS KNOWN UNDER PSEUDO
OF AGUSTO IN DCI; AND ROGELIO LNU WHOSE DCI PSEUDOS ARE EDUARDO, JOSE
ANTONIO AND CASIMIRO AND WHO IS ASSIGNED TO MEXI. P. 7365
D. CUBAN INTEL AGENTS WHILE WORKING OUTSIDE CUBA INCLUDE: FNU
SOSA WHO IS HONDURAN CITIZEN TRAINED BY CUBAN DCI IN RADIO, CODES AND
CIPHERS AND SW AND WHO PROBABLY IN COSTA RICA NOW; ROQUE DALTON GARCIA
WITH SAME DCI TRAINING AS ABOVE WHO IS SALVADORAN NOW IS SALVADOR WHO
HAS USED PSEUDOS JUAN MONTENEGRO, ARMANDO CABRERA AND JOSE OLIMPIO
[illegible] AND WHOSE ACCOMODATION ADDRESS FOR SW IS RAFAEL [illegible]
[illegible] CALLE DELGADILLO 22, COLONIA SANTO TOMAS, ZONA 17, MEXICO
D.F.; JOSE REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON, SALVADORAN, WHO USES PSEUDO
[illegible] A. VARGAS SALGUERO, ~~REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON, SALVADORAN~~ WHO
[illegible] PSEUDOS ~~MARCOS A. VARGAS SALGUERO~~, JUAN CONTRERAS AND ANDRES
[illegible] VELASQUEZ (WHICH IS TRUE NAME OF SALVADORAN TRAINED IN CUBA
GUERRILLA WARFARE); ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO, SALVADORAN, NOW IN
[illegible] WHO USES PSEUDOS JOSE RAFAEL SARAVIA, RAMON SEONE SOLIS
[illegible] RICARDO MARTINEZ (LAST TRUE NAME SALVADORAN TRAINED IN CUBA IN
GUERRILLA WARFARE).
(CON'T ON PAGE TWOL)

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P. 7365

(44)

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DATE:

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE TWO OF OTTA 1609(IN 9590)

E. OTHER CASE OF SPECIAL INTEREST IS MALE MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE GUAT CP WHOSE TRUE NAME NOT KNOWN BUT WHO USES PSEUDO OF PEDRO AND WHO HAD GUERRILLA TRAINING IN CUBA ABOUT SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 63.

F. ANOTHER CASE OF SPECIAL INTEREST IS MANUEL ANTONIO CALERO, SALVADORAN, NOW IN SALVADOR, WHO USES PSEUDOS MARIANO AYALA PENA, ARMANDO RAMIREZ, AND ALFONSO RAMIREZ CUETO WHO HAD REGULAR GUERRILLA TRAINING PLUS SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN GUN RUNNING AND EXFILTRATION, WHO WORKS PRINCIPALLY IN SALVADOR BUT ALSO IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO.

2. RODRIGUEZ PRODUCES VARIOUS DOCS TO SUBSTANTIATE PARA ONE INFO AND ALSO ON OTHER PERSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN CUBA IN GUERRILLA WARFARE BUT WHO ARE NOT CONSIDERED AGENTS BECAUSE THEY HAVE NEITHER COMMO SYSTEM NOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. REQUEST ALL ADDRESSEES CABLE TRACES ON ABOVE TO HQS AND OTTA, TOGETHER WITH ESTIMATE OF ABILITY TO CONTROL MOVEMENTS AND COMMO AND ACCOMODATION ADDRESSES BOTH UNILATERALLY AND THROUGH LIAISON. REQUEST HQS CHECK ZRKNICK INDICES AND CABLE ANY THING PERTINENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

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FORM 1303
11-57

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 24 APRIL 64

FILE:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	1 241510Z	9563

TO PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE MEXI SALV GUAT PACY MANA SNTO PRIN CITE OTTA [illegible] NUMBER
ROME

REF OTTA 1595 (NOT SENT INFO ADDRESSEES) 2

1. DEFECTED CUBAN INTEL OFFICER VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERE GIVEN PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING BY LANGOSCH NIGHT 23 APRIL. FOLLOWING FROM RODRIGUEZ INDICATES SCOPE HIS KNOWLEDGE:

A. BACKGROUND: 11 YEARS FORMAL SCHOOLING. IN 1957 ENGAGED IN SAB AND PROP ACTIVITIES AGAINST BATISTA ON BEHALF 26 JULY MOVEMENT. [illegible] JULY 57. PRISONER UNTIL FEB 58. ON RELEASE JOINED COLUMN 9 [illegible] HUBER MATOS IN SIERRA MAESTRA. FOUGHT AS PRIVATE UNDER CAPTAIN [illegible] UNTIL BATISTA FELL. THEN MADE LIEUTENANT AND ASSIGNED TO [illegible] SQUAD IN HABANA INVESTIGATION DEPT TO CONTROL GAMBLING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE CABARETS. NO 59 BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF POLICE PRECINCT 10. JAN 61 WAS ASSIGNED NATIONAL POLICE HQS ON STAND-BY [illegible]. COLLECTED PAY BUT HAD NO ASSIGNED DUTIES UNTIL TRANSFER TO [illegible] BATTALION. SEPT 61 SENT TO STUDY AT CASTILLO DEL MORO. [illegible] STUDENT UNTIL DECEMBER 61 WHEN GIVEN HOLIDAY LEAVE. HE [illegible] SUBMITTED RESIGNATION FROM ARMY IN WHICH HELD RANK FIRST LIEUTENANT [illegible] HOLDING ABOVE JOBS. HE DID NOT REPORT BACK TO DUTY AND WAS [illegible] CRITICIZED AS DESERTER. THIS MADE REEMPLOYMENT DIFFICULT [illegible] GOT JOB [illegible] MINISTRY OF EXTERIOR COMMERCE 3 APRIL 62 WORKING IN PLANNING AND [illegible] STATISTICAL SECTION OF DEPARTMENT CONCERNED WITH AUTOMOBILE IMPORTS. [illegible] AUGUST 63 GOT JOB IN INTEL THROUGH FRIENDSHIP WITH SAUL GONZALES, CHIEF OR DEPUTY CHIEF OF ILLEGAL SECTION B OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE. THIS SECTION TRAINS AGENTS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

B. INTEL ASSOCIATION: RODRIGUEZ FROM AUGUST 63 UNTIL DEFECTION [illegible] IN SECTION M OF DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELIGENCIA WHERE [illegible] DESK OFFICER FOR SALVADORAN OPS. HE SUPERVISED ARRANGEMENTS [illegible] SALVADORANS PICKED BY CP SALV TO CUBA FOR GUERRILLA [illegible] THEN SELECTING THOSE WITH APTITUTE AS AGENTS WHO WOULD [illegible] AND RETURNED TO WORK WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF CP. INCIDENTALLY [illegible] BECAME FAMILIAR WITH AGENTS PICKED FOR OPS IN OTHER [illegible]S. TO [illegible] OPS.

C. DIRECCION GENERAL DE INTELLIGENCIA (DGI) IS HEADED BY [illegible] PINEIRO AND COLLECTS INTEL ABROAD. COMPLETELY SEPARATE FROM [illegible] DE SEGURIDAD DEL ESTADO (DSE) WHICH HEADED BY ABRA[illegible] AND CONDUCTS COUNTERINTEL OPS. BOTH REPORT TO RAMIRO VALDES WHO IS MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND SUPREME CHIEF OF INTEL AND SECURITY. DGI HQS [illegible] WHERE THEY OCCUPY FULL BLOCK SURROUNDED BY 49, 51, 7 [illegible] STREETS. DSE HQS ARE IN OLD VILLA BATISTA ON CALLE SAN MIGUEL.

CLASSIFICATION

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P-7365

FORM 1303
11-57

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE NUMBER

PAGE TWO OTTA 6102

D. RODRIGUEZ KNOWS AGENTS ASSIGNED AS FOLLOWS: 2 IN GUAT,
HOND, 2 PACY, 3 SALV, 3 MEXI, 1 NICARAGUA (NOW IN CUBA), 2 SANTO
DOMINGO, 1 HAITI (NOW IN CUBA).

E. CUBAN INTEL STAFFERS INCLUDE: ALFREDO MIRABAL WHO CHIEF
IN MEXI UNTIL 15 APRIL 64 WHEN WAS TO BE REPLACED BY MANUEL VEGA;
TWO OTHERS THERE ARE ROGELIO AND COMMERCIAL ATTACHE; ROBERTO MORO IN
ROME WHERE COVER IS FIRST SECRETARY EMB.

F. COMMO BETWEEN DCI AND AGENTS ABROAD: ACCOMODATION ADDRESSES
AND SW ARE USED NORMALLY. SW HAS CAUSED PROBLEMS BECAUSE DEVELOPERS
DO NOT WORK AT TIME. TWO WAY RADIO ALSO USED BUT OFTEN IS FOR
EMERGENCY TRAFFIC.

G. RODRIGUEZ BROUGHT OUT DOCS WHICH HE HOARDED OVER PERIOD TIME
TO PROVE HE TELLING TRUTH. THESE ARE NOT FOR DELIVERY TO AGENTS.
THEY INCLUDE LEGITIMATE PASSPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
OBTAINED FOR USE IN CUBAN INTEL OPS, CUBAN PASSPORTS ISSUED IN FALSE
NAMES, LEGITIMATE IDENTITY DOCS AND PHOTOS OF SALVADORANS WHO TRAINED
IN CUBA, DCI OPS FILES, FINANCIAL REPORT ON FRENTE DE LIBERACION
NACIONAL IN NICARAGUA, AND PHOTO COPIES OF DOCS RELATED TO INTEL OPS
AND INTERCALATIONS USED IN ENCIPHERING.

H. THERE ARE FIVE SOV BLOC INTEL ADVISERS IN DCI ONE CALLED
JUAN IS SIX FEET TALL, 200 POUNDS WITH GRAY HAIR AND GRAY MUSTACHE.

4. VIEW ABOVE, ALICE N. HADFELLI NOT NEEDED AND WILL RETURN
[illegible]ST. LANGOSCH WILL CONTINUE DEBRIEFING. STATION WILL TRY
[illegible]GE FOR RODRIGUEZ PROCEED TO U.S. AND BELIEVES LOCAL AUTHORITIES
[illegible]ING PERMIT HIM DO SO. RODRIGUEZ EAGER GO U.S. AND COOPERATE.

5. RECOMMEND HQS ARRANGE ENTRACE UNDER SPECIAL PROCEDURE AS
[illegible] VALUE CAN BE OBTAINED IF RODRIGUEZ DEBRIEFED SOONEST WHERE
[illegible] REFERENCE CAN BE MADE TO FILES. IF THIS CAN BE DONE IN MATTER
[illegible]AYS, LCFLUTTER CAN BE GIVEN IN HQS AREA. ADVISE SOONEST
[illegible]NGEMENTS WITH INS. MEANWHILE WILL HAVE RODRIGUEZ APPLY FOR
IMMIGRANT VISA AS ALTERNATIVE IF HQS CAN EXPEDITE APPROVAL.

6. WILL CABLE SIGNIFICANT INFO AS DEVELOPS.

[illegible]2340Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 — 4
2 — 5
3 — 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDA

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

23 [illegible] 38182

SECRET 231715Z

MEXI INFO WAVE DIR CITE MRID [illegible]654

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A. MEXI [illegible] (IN 63189)

B. DIR 05150.*

MERTON ETA MIAMI 24[illegible]Z FROM MRID BY PAA 5[illegible]. NO NEED MEET.

RETURN MRID ETA 27[illegible]15Z BY PAA 452.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *AUTHORIZED MERTON'S TRAVEL JMWAVE.

SECRET

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SECRET
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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 231611Z

23 APR 64 IN 67848

PRIORITY MRID INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 9125

PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 8992 (IN 59445)*.

SUBJECT OF REF LEAVING MEXI FOR HABANA 24 APRIL APPARENTLY PCS HENCE MERTON MIAMI TRIP NOT REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * SUBJECT IS TOR PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK).

201-332665

SECRET

GROUP 1

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Copy No.

21 April 1964

895.- Entrada a las 1723hs.- Larga Distancia de Canada.- HF Márquez con Raul Pereyra le dice que SALGADO llega esta noche en vuelo de Canadian Pacific [illegible], que es el vuelo de sale de Toronto a las 8.05 de la noche.---- Raul le dice a HF Acosta que Rogelio se va definitivamente para la Habana el siete.--- Raul - Acosta manda saludos para todos los de la embajada.--- Raul que Manolo el guajiro que pasó para Chile con Sinobas y Armando López.---- Raul que le escribe en esta semana.--- Raul: que el chino Curvelo pasó para Bolivia.---- 980.-

7365
86 31

23 April 64

25.- Entrada a las 1135hs.- HF por Rogelio Rodríguez López.- Peregrina que un momento.--- HF que habla el hermano de Jacinto que si por fin se va mañana.- Rogelio que no que sale el lunes, pero que de todas maneras que si tiene la cuestión pues.. HF que le gustaría mandarle algunas cositas pero que pocas para que no cargue mucho y una carta.- Rogelio de acuerdo, que puede pasar a dejarselas hoy o mañana por la mañana.- HF de acuerdo.--- 38.-

7365

18:27. ~~ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ~~ manifiesta a JORGE ROJAS de la Cubana de Aviacion que no se va mañana a la Habana, sino hasta el lunes. (ROJAS toma nota).

6243

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
VILASECA GONZALEZ MIREYA.	28 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/64/142
GONZALEZ GRANDE JOSEFINA.	51 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/64/141
AMEZQUETA RODRIGUEZ JORGE.	24 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. #E/64/82
GONZALEZ GARCIA MARCO JOAQUIN.	44 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. #E/64/85
GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER.	27 AÑOS.	CUBANA.	DIP. #D/63/455

Llegada	Aerolinea

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de desembarque
20 DE ABRIL DE 1964	CUBANA. VUELO # 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana expedida en:

VILASECA GONZALEZ MIREYA. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 225 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 23 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GONZALEZ GRANDE JOSEFINA. VISA DIPLOMATICA / 224 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LAHABANA CUBA EL 23 DE MARZO DE 1964.

AMEZQUETA RODRIGUEZ JORGE. VISA OFICIAL # 236 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 25 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GONZALEZ GARCIA MARCO. VISAOFICIAL # 235 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 25 DE MARZO DE 1964.

GAVILAN ROSALES ESTHER. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 1015 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 18 DE OCTUBRE DE 1963.

P-7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

18 [illegible] 64200

S E C R E T 172253Z

MEXI INFO DIR MRID CITE WAVE 5263

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF MEXI 9044 (IN 63189) *

CONCUR MERTON TRAVEL WAVE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *STATED MEXI AGREES MERTON TRIP TO MIAMI TO CONFER WITH LESNICK AND GUTEIRREZ, DEFER FOR APPROVAL TO WAVE.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
[illegible]

Copy No.

ORIG: R. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/[illegible]
EXT: 5940
DATE: 17 Apr 1 64

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY INFO MERIDA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-8

INFO: DDP, WH/SA-8, CI/OA, CCS-3

17 APR 64 20 53z

SIG CEN

R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO MRID CITE DIR 15160

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 9044 (IN 63189)*

AUTHORIZE MERTON TRAVEL JMWAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: COB Merida wishes travel JMWAVE to confer with Lesnick re RODRIGUEZ, G-2 officer, high priority recruitment lead Mexi.

WH/SA/MOB S. Darling (phone)

WH/SA/CI N. Prew (phone)

R.W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 170018Z

WAVE DIR INFO MRID CITE MEXI 9344(EASBY ACTING)

[illegible] IN 63189

PBRUMEN

REF MRID 0441 (IN 62830)*

MEXI AGREES MERTON QUICK TRIP MIAMI TO CONFER WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ. DEFER TO WAVE FOR APPROVAL IDEA AND DIR FOR AUTHORIZATION TRAVEL.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ, BASE BELIEVES ADVISABLE MERTON MAKE WEEK-END TRIP MIAMI DEAL WITH THEM PERSONALLY.

W 5263
18 Apr 64

[illegible] 15760
17 April 64

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MERIDAN

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH/SA 8, VR

S E C R E T 152155Z

16 Apr 64 IN 62330

MEXI INFO DIR WAVE CITE MRID 0441

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A MERTON-CHOADEN TELCON 15 APRIL

B. MEXI 8982 (IN 59445)

C. WAVE 5073 (IN 61087)

MEXI 9044
16 April 64

1. CONFIRMING TELCON REF A, LESNICK SAID ON 13 APRIL WOULD TRY SOONEST FURNISH MERTON INFO REQUESTED REF B.

2. REF C, VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE WITH LESNICK AND GUTIERREZ, BASE BELIEVES ADVISABLE MERTON MAKE WEEKEND TRIP MIAMI DEAL WITH THEM PERSONALLY; COULD LEAVE APPROPRIATE WAVE OFFICER IN CONTACT. COULD ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE TRIP TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE UNTAPPED ASSETS PBRUMEN WITH LITAMIL-6 AND GET QUICK REFRESHER WAVE OPS FROM BASE POINT OF VIEW. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

(1-DD)

SECRET

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14-00000

del embajador y tendrá el gusto de asistir.- 116.-

118. Entrada 1057.- MF de la Oficina Sanitaria pregunta por el Dr.NIKITA MUKUCHEV y MIRAVAL indica que no ha llegado. - MF:que en caso de que llegue se comunique a la Oficina Sanitaria al 254880. MIRAVAL toma nota y acepta.- 130. -

130. Entrada 1116.- La señora UGALDE pregunta a MIRAVAL si su hermana que desea ir a pasear a Cuba debe pedir allá la visa ó no es necesario. MIRAVAL:que aqui tiene que -- hacer la solicitud a fin de mandarla allá; pregunta si MF - tiene familiares allá y UGALDE dice que sí, su cuñada la -- señora JUANA UGALDE DE NOYOLA, la viuda de NOYOLA, quien -- hace poco vino y la invitó para pasar sus vacaciones en La Habana. MIRAVAL le sugiere que hable con el embajador, pues quizá por una atención a la familia NOYOLA le conceda la visa, que llame al 144237. UGALDE toma nota y acepta.- 150.-

150. Entrada L.D. de Mérida a las 1124.- GARCIA comunica a MIRAVAL que la embarcación EL JOVEN ANTONIO llegó a Isla - Mujeres, que como él le puso un telegrama para que la reclamara, a ver si puede salir lo antes posible tan pronto llegue el otro barco, el barco a recoger el CARLOS CUARTO y ver si se lo pueden llevar. MIRAVAL pregunta cuándo llegó esa embarcación y GARCIA dice que ayer al mediodía, la matrícula es Batabanó, tonelaje 6.02 bruta y neta, propiedad - Gobierno Cubano, robada en Cuba por 5 sustractores; que hay que rechamarla, que se la entreguen para mandarla conjunta-- mente con el otro barco. MIRAVAL toma nota. GARCIA pregunta si sobre el asunto de Veracruz hay algo y MIRAVAL dice que algunos periódicos han reflejado bien toda la cosa, pero otros nó, pues han dicho que fué un cubano gusano,pero

P. 7365
1

P. 8088

(2.-L11.-16 abril 64).-

P- 7365

no fué así, ya que SAMA disparó en defensa, que hasta ahora no hay problema ninguno y ya salió para allá ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y BUENAVENTURA. MARIANO GARCIA: que está bien. --- MIRAVAL pide que mejor no venga el sábado, pues estará el - domingo ocupado, que mejor salga el otro viernes en la noche para que esté aquí sábado y domingo. GARCIA acepta. MIRAVAL pregunta si no ha habido ninguna dificultad aparte de lo que le cuenta en la carta y GARCIA dice que nó; pregunta cómo llegaron los compañeros y MIRAVAL comenta que -- bien, que ya están tramitando la cosa pero no se podrán ir hoy, sin embargo los acompañará a Gobernación para hacer -- todo lo posible y se puedan ir. GARCIA esta de acuerdo y pregunta si mañana se dará siempre el acto en el Instituto y MIRAVAL indica que sí, pero hay que tener cuidado para no abusar y sobre todo avisárselo a las autoridades mexicanas y si pueden poner alguna vigilancia sería mucho mejor. GARCIA: que está bien. MIRAVAL: que le diga - a LAIN haga un informe sobre ese asunto y cuando vengan el sábado lo traigan y lo dirija a quien GARCIA sabe. - GARCIA: que está bueno.- 196.-

196. Entrada L.D. de Guadalajara a las 1154.- HF con MIRAVAL para decirle que es mexicano y su esposa cubana, que hace-- como un año estando en Veracruz hicieron la solicitud para ir a Cuba, pero hasta la fecha no les han contestado, no -- obstante que allá ya checaron su nuevo domicilio; que allá tienen familia y dos niños. HD: que él vaya a Relaciones Exteriores y su esposa a Imigración. HF: que está bueno. 227.

227. Entrada 1202.- SABARIEGO con MIRAVAL. Este dice que encontró el acta de nacimiento, hizo la nota y hoy saldrá en el avión. SABARIEGO: que está bien.- 236.-

(3.-L11.-16 abril 64).-

16 April 1964

308. .365 Entrada 1236.- ROBERTO pregunta por ROGELIO y J.dice - que está fueras de México, que llame mañana a la misma hora. R. acepta.- 314.-

26.- 65 3649 1088 Entrada a las 1730hs.- Larga Distancia de Veracruz.- HF Rogelio con el embajador Hernández Armas le dice que ya salioó Zamá con fianza de cinco mil pesos que ya se pagó; que mañana tiene que volver de nuevo para prestar declaración. Que el -- Rogelio- sale para acá a las cuatro de la mañana.- Armas: -- que si el pueda salir para acá.- Rogelio: que no, que debe de estar 72 horas en Veracruz por si lo llaman o lo citan, pero que si usted desea que el puede ir mañana allá que hará un - viaje rapido.- Armas: que el debe de venir acá pero que no le gustaría que se quedara el consulado solo.- Rogelio: que no que se queda Manolo y Ventura.- Armas: que se apuren a arreglar las cosas y que se vengan mañana, que se acuerde que mañana hay una recepción.- Rogelio de acuerdo.--- 44.-

207. 165 8591 Entrada L.D. a las 1238.- ROGELIO pregunta por el embajador y PEREG.dice que no está. ROGELIO: que estuvieron - conversando con un abogado quien les dijo sin estar muy seguro, que en la Conferencia de Cancilleres efectuada en La Habana en 1928 se firmó un acuerdo en el que se dice que -- los Cónsules tienen inmunidad total en materia criminal e inmunidad parcial en materia civil, que hacía falta confirmar eso "porque si eso es así, pues sale inmediatamente", que - esa conferencia fué firmada por México. PEREG.toma nota y pregunta como está "él" y ROGELIO dice que se imagine. PEREG.pregunta cuándo ROGELIO regresa y éste indica que hoy como a las 2000h. PEREG.que hoy hay avión, por lo que están preparando todo. Luego ROGELIO con la Dra.MACHAD para decirle "la situación está bien por aqui, estamos -- tratando de ver si hoy antes de las 2 lo podemos sacar bajo fianza". MARGOT se alegra y pregunta si lo van a traer para México y ROGELIO indica que sí, que él saldrá como a - las 8 y llegará en la madrugada, pues tiene que llevar el - carro al taller. MARGOT: que está bien. ROGELIO - repite lo que le dijo a PEREGRINA respecto a la Conferencia, agregando que como ese es un asunto de tipo criminal, de -- ser así inmediatamente.... pues ya exonerado de toda cosa,- además también está exonerado por la cuestión de que fué... una agresión según la ley mexicana, por lo que creé que no- haya mayor problema. MARGOT está de acuerdo.- 251. -

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-33~~65
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WE 4, WH/SA 8, VR

RI COPY

S E C R E T 141704Z

14 Apr 64 IN 61087

MEXI INFO DIR MRID CITE WAVE 5075

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF A MRID 0436 (IN 59141) 11 April '64

B MEXI 8982 (IN 59445) * 11 April '64

1. IF CONSONANT WITH MEXI PLANS WAVE CAN CONTACT MAX LESNICK MIAMI FOR FURTHER INFO REF A LEAD. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ HOWEVER WOULD NEED SOME PRETEXT IN KEEPING WITH MERTON/LESNICK RELATIONSHIP. PLS ADVISE.

2. FYI LESNICK LIVES APT 3 1236 SW 36 AVE MIAMI, TEL: HI 3-0886.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJECT IS ONE OF TWO TOP PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK)

SECRET

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FORM 3-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY Rodriguez Lopez RI COPY 14 April 64

13 April 1964

762.- Salida al 460856.- 1222hs._ Rogelio Rodríguez con HF Inzunza le dice que le estaba hablando a Serrano por necesitan dos mesas para escribir a máquina y que le dijeron que estaba en Puebla, que a qué otra persona se puede dirigir para las mesas.- Inzunza: que al Sr.Arazil.------ Inzunza: que ya se cambiaron que ya no están en Reforma, que están en Avenida -- Juárez número 157, esquina frente Monumento Revolución.--796.-

1365

757.- Salida al 222401.- 1616hs.- Rogelio Rodríguez con García Romero le pregunta que a que horas se va el avión.- Romero: - que mas o menos como a las cinco.- Rogelio: que hace falta mandar una cosa urgente para la Habana hoy.- Romero: que cuanto se van a tardar porque el avión casi ya está listo, que hay muy poco pasaje.- Rogelio: que llamó a Cubana y que le dijeron que el avión había salido a las cuatro; que si cree que le dará tiempo.- Romero: que si llegan antes de las cinco que el cree que sí porque ya está casi para salir.---- 789.-

1365

1096.p Entrada a las 1607.-hs.- HF Jorge Rojas con Rogelio le pregunta que auien la llama de la embajada._ Rogelio que eran ellos que el problema que hay que es que hay que mandar para la Habana

1365

una cosa urgente y que como el vuelo no llegue posiblemente hasta el domingo, que eso tiene que estar en la Habana antes del viernes.- Rojas: que el avión en este momento ya esta subiendo a bordo el pasaja ya.- Rogelio: que es una cosa super urgente y que si las cosas no están en cinco minutos.- Rogelio: que en cinco minutos no pueden estar.- Rojas: que entonces se quedaron, que lo siente en el alma pero que ya está todo mindo a bordo.- Rogelio: que correcto.- Rojas: que para el viernes hay vuelo.- Rogelio: que si no se puede tratar de ..... Rojas: que no que allí está la autoridad que está furiosa porque los tripulantes han demorado que deben de haber salido hace 45 minutos y que tiene la Comandancia encima.- Que - mande las cosas pero sin asegurarle que lo van a esperar.-- - ---- 1129.-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
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2		5	
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RPTS LOG CA
SI EF FH
SEG NS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MERIDA
ACTION: C/WH 5
INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

S E C R E T 1?2122Z

11 Apr 64 IN 59141

MEXI INFO WAVE DIR CITE MRID 9436

WAA 5073
4/15/64

MEXI 8982
11 April 64

KAPOK REBRUMEN

MRID 0067
30 APR 64

DESENSITIZED

1. FOLL INFO DATED 5 APRIL 64 RE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, G-2 REP CUBEMB MEXI:

A. SUBJ NOT IDEN ROGER RODRIGUEZ, FORMER MEMBER SEGUNDO FRENTE DEL ESCAMBRAY, WHO REPORTED WORKING HOSPITAL CUBA AS DOCTOR, COMPLETELY ACCORD CASTRO COMMUNISM.

B. SUBJ FROM OLD COMMIE FAMILY IN CUBA BUT HE HIMSELF IS NOT COMMIE, IS AGAINST CASTRO COMMUNISM AND COULD BE PERSUADED WORK IN MEXI FOR CAUSE OF DEMOCRATIC CUBA.

2. SOURCE ABOVE INFO MAX LESNICK MENENDEZ FROM ELOY GUTIERREZ

3

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

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MENOYO. BASE HAD INQUIRED OF LESNICK, LONG TIME HERTON CONTACT HAVA, IF ROGELIO POSSIBLY IDEN WITH ROGER. GUTIERREZ COMMENTED SUBJ HAS RELATIVE PBPRIME AND ODYOKE APPARRENTLY ALREADY CONSIDERING APPROACH SUBJ.

S E C R E T

CLA[illegible]FIED MESSAGE

9 SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/D 4, WH/SA 8, VR

~~NCB~~ INT SS SB
IOS PERS ~~AR~~
EOB RPTS LOG CA
~~Other~~ SI RF HH
SEC NS

S E C R E T 111728Z

11 A[illegible] IN 59445

MRID INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8932

PBRUMEN

REF MRID 8436 (IN [illegible]) 11 April '64

1. SUBJ REF (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez) IS ONE OF TWO TOP PRIORITY MEXI TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT (OTHER IS CODE CLERK). STATION PLANNING PITCH SOON.

2. PLS ASCERTAIN ASAP IDENTITY RELATIVE IN PBPRIME AS MEXI PRESENTLY SEARCHING FOR MEANS ACCESS TO SUBJ.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE ELABORATION STATEMENT SUBJ "COULD BE PERSUADED." ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN REF SOURCE VIEWS ON BEST METHOD APPROACH.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REFERENCE RYBAT.

SECRET

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Copy No.

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

11 April '64

6 April 1964

348. Entrada 1242.- MARIA ELENA GAYTAN con ROGELIO.Este pregunta cuándo va por la embajada y MARIA dice que tiene unas cosas, pero hay el problema de que tiene que entrar a la escuela y no..... ROGELIO la interrumpe y pregunta si -- mañana podría ser y MARIA dice que parece que es urgente;-- pregunta si la puede esperar porque sale a las 3 de trabajar y ROGELIO pregunta si no puede ir a las 1600 h. y MARIA indica que sí. ROGELIO:que entonces la espera a esa hora. MARIA:que perfecto, que allá se ven.- 359.-

,7365

705. Entrada 1120.- ESPEJEL avisa a ROGELIO que va para -- allá, que no tarda ni 20 minutos. ROGELIO:que está bien. 721.-

7365

502. Entrada 1050.- SANCHEZ con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar- en el núm.570) para preguntarle si puede ir hoy y ROGELIO - dice que sí, que irá sobre las 5. S.que está bien.-576.-

,5

7 apr 64

03.- Entrada a las 1339hs.- HF Crescencio por Rogelio Rodríguez.- Crescencio:.... que no sale y que encantado de escucharle.------ 13.-

P. 7365

8 Apr 64

240. Entrada.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ con ROGELIO (empiezan- a hablar en el núm.307) para pregunta si se pueden ver y - ROGELIO dice que sobre las 7½. DOMINGUEZ acepta.- 311.-

,7365

3 / Mar 64

1104. Entrada 1331.- ROBERTO solicita hablar con ROGELIO y - RAUL indica que no está. ROBERTO pregunta sino le dejó ningún recado y RAUL dice que nó, pero que si gusta puede llamarlo más tarde al 144237. ROBERTO toma nota y - acepta.- 1130.-

1365

3 Apr 64

14:26 ALLIER pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. No está. ALLIER suplica a JORRIN que cuando llegue le diga que se comunique con CARLOS G. BASURTO al Diario de México, encargado de los asuntos internacionales, pues éste tiene algo importante que decirle " en relación con los últimos acontecimientos".

(8127)

1127.- Entrada a las 1426hs.- HF por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está.- HF que quería recomendarle el caso de un amigo suyo que es periodista del Diario de México; que a las cinco dela tarde el copañero ese va a estar en la redacción del Diario de México en el 181834, que es Carlos G.Basurto que es el encargado de la Sección Internacional; que se le diga a Rogelio que le habló -- Allier, que si quiere comunicarse con Carlos, que hay una cosa importante relacionado con los últimos acontecimientos.- 1169.

1365

---

4 April 64

446.- Entrada a las 1328hs.- MF la Srita.Domingues con Rogelio le dice que quiere verlo.- Rogelio que si le parece a las --- seis.- MF que bien.- Rogelio que en el mismo lugar.--- 474.-

1365

13:28 La señorita DOMINGUEZ manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada de Cuba, que necesita verlo hoy. ROGELIO dice que si le parece bien a las 18:00 hs. en el mismo lugar que ya conoce. La DOMINGUEZ está de acuerdo.

6 April 64

163. Entrada 0929.- La señorita MARTINEZ pide a J.le diga - a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ se comunique con ella. J.que está - bien.- 167.-

1365

25 mar 64

520. Entrada 1301.- MF pregunta por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y J.- indica que no está. MF: que le diga que habló MELBA - GARCIA, que adelantaron el viaje y se irán mañana, que la - llame al Hotel Ambassadeur. J. que está bien.- 533.

23 mar 64

360. Entrada 1136.- SANCHEZ pregunta a ROGELIO qué hay de-- nuevo y éste dice que hasta ahora nada; pregunta si hoy pue de ir a la comida esa y ROGELIO indica que no será posible- por lo menos hasta fines de semana ya que está muy ocupado; pregunta si el compañero llegó bien y SANCHEZ dice que sí.- ROGELIO: que lo llame por el viernes y SANCHEZ acepta.-381.-

1365

25 mar 64

13:01 MELBA GARCIA deja recado a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba, en el sentido de que "adelantaron el viaje y salimos mañana; que por favor me llame al Hotel Ambassador hoy mismo".

31 mar 64

194. Entrada.- MF de parte de la Dra. GOMEZ SANCHEZ pide a - RAUL le diga a ROGELIO que recuerde que tiene que llevar a- su esposa a la clínica para que le hagan los análisis. - RAUL: que está bien.- 199.-

P-1365

199. Entrada 1559.- ESTHER la esposa de ROGELIO pregunta a NELA si ya le dijeron lo de ésta noche y ésta dice que sí.- Quedan de verse a las 9 en la embajada. Luego RAUL in- dica que acaba de hablar la doctora del laboratorio pidién- dole le recordara a ROGELIO que la tiene que llevar para -- los análisis. ESTHER se dá por enterado y pregunta si- encargó los refrescos y RAUL indica que eso está resuelto.- ESTHER pregunta el teléfono de la casa de APARICIO y RAUL - dice que es el 141299.- 225.-

17 March 19~~70~~ 64

203. Entrada 1155.- HF pregunta por ROGELIO y J.informa --- que no está. HF:que volverá a llamar dentro de 30 minutos para ver si ya llegó y caerle. J.que está bueno.-211.-
7365

211. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 217.-

223. Entrada 1226.- HF con ROGELIO ? (empiezan a hablar en el núm.259). HD pregunta cómo está eso y si sigue el -- problema. HF:que sí, pero creé que para mañana ya esté bien; que necesita mandarle un presupuesto urgentísimo para que se lo apruebe, que se trata del presupuesto de que habían hablado; que quisiera mandarle una persona pero desea saber a qué horas para que lo encuentre con seguridad y lo espere. HD:que lo mande a las 5½;pregunta si lo podría ver mañana a las 1330 h. y HF dice que sí. HD pregunta si "mi amigo ya se fué ó todavía no" y HF dice que se va -- mañana posiblemente. HD:que está bien; que de todas maneras esperará a esa persona ahora, pero quiere ver a HF -- mañana a la una. HF acepta.- 268.-

321. Entrada 1258.- ESPEJEL pregunta si ROGELIO ya está y - J.dice que sí, que lo está esperando.- ESPEJEL:que va para allá ahora mismo.- 325.-
7365

19 Mar 64

157. Entrada.- La señorita MARTINEZ pregunta por ROGELIO -- RODRIGUEZ y BUENAV.informa que no está. MF:que cuando llegue se comunique con ella.- 163.-
365

19 Mar 64

678. Entrada 1407.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ pregunta por -- ROGELIO y J.después de pedirle que se espere un momentito,- dice que por favor mañana le tenga listos los libros, porque ROGELIO irá a recogerlos a la misma hora. DOMINGUEZ:gracias.- 712.-

13 mar 64

301.- Salida al 140263.-1336.- BUENAVENTURA felicita a ESTHER por haber cumplido 21 años y pregunta si siempre van hacerla comida mañana y ESTHER después de darle las gracias, dice que lo sabrá hasta que llegue ROGELIO y después lo llamará. BUENAV. acepta.- 361.-

1365

585. Salida al 237325.-1635.- J. de parte de ROGELIO pide a MP mande hoy un arreglo floral a la Sra. ESTHER DE RODRIGUEZ a Baja California 178-3. MP toma nota y acepta.- 648.-

328. Entrada.- RICARDO de la Martí de Madero pide a JORRIN- le pregunte a ROGELIO a qué horas lo puede recibir porque hoy tiene que salir para allá y J. después de pedirle que se espere, dice que pase a las 1630h. RICARDO acepta. - 358.-

14 mar 64

500. Entrada 1124.- TOVAR y ROGELIO. Quedan de verse el lunes para ir a cenar.- 529.-

1365

16:19 MALBA GARCIA que dice ser la joven de Panamá, quiere ponerse en contacto con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ a la Embajada Cubana. PEREGRINA dice que no se ~~encuentra ahora~~. MALBA pide la dirección para ir ahora a la Embajada. PEREGRINA arguye que primero tendría que avisárselo a RODRIGUEZ. MALBA argumenta que "él sabe que yo estoy aquí, pero no nos pusimos de acuerdo cuándo iba a llegar yo, porque estaba por el interior". PEREGRINA le pregunta

3

12 Mar 64

Entrada a las 1125Hs.- HF Luis Suárez con Roa.- Le dice que se murió la mujer de Juan, que el ha estado toda la noche en la Delegación hasta que pudieron sacar el cuerpo de allí y que todavía no ha ido a su casa y que ahorita está en la Procuraduría donde ya han obtenido las dispensas y una serie de molestias, pero que no saben si el entierro será hoy o mañana; que si es hoy, le muestre lo hacemos mañana de todos modos y que si es para mañana, que en todo caso se retrasarán dos o tres horas.- Roa: que el no sabía nada del accidente.- Luis: que fué el domingo y que fueron dos días de Cruz Roja; que le diga al embajador que era amigo de Juan y que el avisará cuando es el entierro; que el cuerpo está en la Agencia Gayosso.- Roa que le diga a Juan que cualquier cosa que necesite que sin pena se la plantee.- Luis: que no necesita nada. Que le avise al embajador, a Aparicio y a Rogelio que son amigos de Juan, que el cuerpo está en la capilla 31.---- 487.-

.4

27

1365

12:54 La señorita DOMINGUEZ manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba que "quería avisarle que ya le tengo los libros que me pidió; donde lo puedo ver y cuando?". ROGELIO acepta y propone que sea hoy a las 15:00 hs. La DOMINGUEZ está de acuerdo y pregunta que si en el lugar de la otra vez. ROGELIO asiente.

60KY

(1350)

13 Mar 64

148. Entrada 1211.- RICARDO pregunta por ROGELIO y J. informa que no está.- 153.-

191. Entrada 1302.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ solicita hablar con ROGELIO y J. pide que se espere un momentito. SE CORTO. 260.

260. Entrada 1312.- La señorita DOMINGUEZ con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar en el núm. 306). Quedan de verse hoy a la misma hora.- 313.-

(J.-131.-13 marzo 64).-

P-1365

D. TIS

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Mexico

REPORT NO. CS -3/575,185

SUBJECT Additional Assignments for Members of the Cuban Embassy Staff in Mexico City

DATE DISTR. 10 March 1964

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 January 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (30 January 1964)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8426

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Latin American official in Mexico City who has regular contact with Cuban Embassy personnel; he has been a reliable reporter for about a year and a half. [LITAMIL-9]

On 18 January 1964 the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City announced a three-month plan, according to which certain staff members will prepare special reports, in addition to their usual duties. Raul Aparicio Nogales, Consul for Cultural Affairs, will prepare a report on the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM - National Autonomous University of Mexico), which will include the physical layout, activities of the student body, and ways in which the Cuban Government can exert influence there. Luis Albery Souto, Cultural Attaché, was instructed to prepare a similar report on the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes (INBA - National Institute of Fine Arts). Margot Machado Padron, Consul, will prepare a report on countries which have diplomatic relations with Cuba, emphasizing how contact with their representatives in Mexico will aid the Castro Government. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary, was given an assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

Based on attach to
HMMA-23018
4 Mar 64

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

10 March 64

5 Mar 64

541. Salida al 140263.-1400.- J. avisa a ROGELIO que ahí está JULITO. ROGELIO que ya lo vió ayer; que le diga que el asunto ya se resolvió. J. que está bien.- 542.-

365

276. Entrada.- MORALES pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y J. dice que no hay nada, que llame por la tarde. M. acepta.- 284.-

P. 1365

7 Mar 64

627.- Entrada a las 1622hs.- HF Harris por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no ha llegado.- Que le llame mañana por la mañana.--- 640.-

1365

8 Mar 64

11:10 El panameño X HARRIS pregunta a ROGELIO R [illegible] si ya recibió contestación de su asunto. ROGELIO informa que sí, [illegible] dole que venga a la Embajada de Cuba para ver si se puede ir [illegible] a la Habana o si no mañana que hay otro vuelo..."porque no te va a dar tiempo". HARRIS manifiesta que prefiere que sea [illegible]..." pues lo más pronto mejor, tú sabes ROGELIO".

10 Mar 64

169.- Entrada a las 1725hs.- HF por Rogelio.- Jorrín que no está que si quiere dejar recado.- HF que le diga que lo llamó Crescencio que si va a estar por la tarde que quiere pasar a verlo.- Jorrín: que llame maña a las diez.-- 194.-

P. 1365

11 Mar 64

048. Entrada 1012.- RICARDO pregunta si está ROGELIO para irlo a ver y HD informa que todavía no llega.- 052.-

1365

14-00000

29 Feb 64

399. Entrada.- JAIME DE LEON (el compañero de Panamá) pregunta a ROGELIO si no ha ido HARRIS y ROGELIO dice que nó ni sabe dónde esté alojado. JAIME: que lo anda buscando para arreglar una cuestión y no le ha sido posible preguntar si no ha habido nada y ROGELIO dice que nó, pero espera que mañana llegue algo; que lo llame el lunes antes de ir. JAIME acepta.- 418.-

1365

026. [illegible] 1933.- HARRIS de Panamá solicita hablar con -- ROGELIO y J. [illegible] que no está. HARRIS pregunta si no llegó nada [illegible] y J. dice que nó y ROGELIO no le dejó -- ningún [illegible]. HARRIS: que por su cuenta se dirigió a -- Cuba, [illegible] le llamará el martes para ver si ya le llegó algo. [illegible] que mejor llame mañana como a las 9 porque llegará [illegible]. HARRIS acepta.- 034.- (EL NOMBRE CORRECTO ES HARDY).-

65

3 Mar 64

312. Ent[illegible] [illegible] pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y J. [illegible] que no le [illegible] y no ha regresado [illegible] sa de [illegible] hasta el jueves, pues ahora llamó a la comp[illegible] [illegible] en cuanto [illegible] guntará s[illegible] hable mañana como a las once [illegible] que RODRI[illegible] lo tendrá informado. [illegible] acepta.- [illegible]

365

5 Mar 64

654. Entrada, 1617.- JAIME DE LEON de Panamá pregunta por - ROGELIO y ROJAS dice que todavía no llega.- JAIME: que - tratará de acercarse un poco a la embajada por si acaso llega, pues quiere hablar personalmente con él. ROJAS: que - está bien.- 684.-

EXCERPTS

from Attachment to HMMA-23018

4 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : Lawrence F. Barker

SUBJECT : Meeting with LITAMIL-9, 30 Jan 1964

.....

2. L-9 reported on the following:

a. On Saturday 18 Jan at the usual Embassy staff meeting, several new assignments were passed out. ..... Rogelio RODRIGUEZ was given an assignment as Political Reporting Officer.

.....

1. ..... Danilo PEREZ ~~Rogelio~~ Regalado, a Honduran, visited Cultural Department. ..... Later on he spoke with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ and told L-9 afterwards, "Rogelio doesn't seem to trust me."

.....

14-00000

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 341914Z

4 MAR 64 IN 32439

PACY INFO DIR CITE MEXI 8494

1. ON 2 MAR PANAMANIAN JAIME DE LEON LEFT MESSAGE AT CUBAN EMB FOR HUMBERTO HARRY OF PANAMA TO CALL LEON AT LATTER'S HOTEL UNPON ARRIVING MEXI. 29 FEB AND 1 MAR, ONE HARRY HAD CALLED CUBAN EMB, ASKED IF ANY MESSAGE. TOLD TO CALL BACK LATER SINCE "HE" HAD NOT ARRIVED. ALSO 1/ MAR HERBERTO JORRIN OF CUBAN EMB CALLED UNIDENTIFIED MAN, ASKED IF ANY MESSAGE FOR HARRY OR MORALES. ANSWER NO.

2. BOTH LEON AND HARRY ASKED FOR ROGELIO, (ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECY) BUT HE NOT IN. (SOURCE LIENVOY) INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

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GROUP 1
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Copy No.

4 March '64

14-00000

EMBAJADA DE CUBA
México, D.F.
No. 138

México, D. F., marzo 4 de 1964.
"AÑO DE LA ECONOMIA EN CUBA"

Sr. Jorge L. Rojas
Gerente de la Empresa
Consolidada Cubana de Aviación
Reforma No. 56,
Ciudad.-

Estimado compañero:

Atentamente solicito de usted se sirva expedir pasaje de ida solamente ~~a~~ de los que esta Embajada tiene a su disposición en esa Empresa, al Sr. Enrique Gonzalez Bogen.

________________, quien (es) deberá (n) permanecer en Cuba por un período indefinido.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me reitero de Usted,

Fraternalmente,

Rogelio Rodríguez López.
SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

FORM 1303
11-57

DIS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ACTION:

INFO:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 28 FEB 1964

FILE:

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
XXXX		ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS MNS	290020Z	8531

TO DIR MEXI WAVE

INFO SJOS

CITE MANA 4739
NUMBER

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS: A. DIR 04121 (IN 8501)
B. MANA 4730 (IN 8427)

1. IDEN A RETURNED MANAGUA FROM MEXICO CITY 27 FEB AND REPORTED IDEN B STILL MEXICO CITY. IDEN B IN DAILY CONTACT WITH CUBAN EMBASSY, BUT HAS NOT BEEN TOLD WHEN HE WILL LEAVE. "CHELE" NOW SAYS POSSIBLE IDEN B WILL GO DIRECTLY CUBA INSTEAD OF MAKING TRIP MIAMI FIRST (THOUGH THIS STILL A POSSIBILITY). "CHELE" TOLD IDEN B NOT WORRY ABOUT COMMO PLAN (REPORTED MANA 4715 -- COMMO [redacted] SYSTEM BETWEEN IDENS A AND B); THAT HE ("CHELE") WOULD SEND INFO RE COMMO SYSTEM TO AGUILUZ.

2. IDEN B SAID HE ACCIDENTLY LEARNED (WHEN HE OVERHEARD PHONE CONVERSATION) THAT "CHELE" IS ROGELIO. (PROBABLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ MENTIONED MEXI 8228).

3. IDEN B NOW CALLS EMBASSY EACH DAY, USUALLY AT 1300 HRS, AND ASKS FOR "GORRIN", ANOTHER NAME USED BY "CHELE".

4. IDEN A PLANS RETURN MEXICO CITY 3 MARCH AND HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY ERYTHROID/3 TO REMAIN THERE UNTIL IDEN B LEAVES.

END OF MESSAGE

29/0223Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

14-00000

P-7365

EMBAJADA DE CUBA

México, D.F.

No. 117

México, D. F., febrero 24 de 1964.
"AÑO DE LA ECONOMIA EN CUBA"

Sr. Jorge L. Rojas
Gerente de la Empresa
Consolidada Cubana de Aviación
Reforma No. 56,
Ciudad.-

Estimado compañero:

Atentamente solicito de usted se sirva expedir pasaje de ida solamente a de los que esta Embajada tiene a su disposición en esa Empresa, a los señores? ERASMO FRANCISCO PEÑA; ANDRES MEDARDO BOLIVAR y ATILIO JOSE BARRETO MILIANI.
________________, quien (es) deberá (n) permanecer en Cuba por un período indefinido.

Con saludos revolucionarios de "PATRIA O MUERTE", me reitero de Usted,

Fraternalmente,

Rogelio Rodríguez López.

SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

4-00000

24 Jul 63

071. Entrada 1742.- JUAN con ROGELIO (empiezan a hablar en el núm.114) para preguntarle si el viernes recibió algo para él y ROGELIO dice que nó. JUAN:que si algún recado.- ROGELIO:que ninguno. JUAN: porque el amigo que se fué,- quedó de que el viernes le mandaría un recado después de - haber hablado con un amigo allá.... ROGELIO lo interrumpe y agrega que espera que llegue éste viernes que viene. - JUAN pregunta si "él" y ROGELIO dice que nó, que el recado. JUAN: que era un poco urgente, que era para un caso relacionado aquí con Prensa Latina y "él" quedó én hacerle la cosa al día siguiente de su llegada y calculaba que el viernes ó el lunes.... pregunta si hoy no vino avión y ROGELIO dice - que nó, que hasta el miércoles ó viernes. JUAN:que entonces se comunicará con ROGELIO el miércoles ó irá a verlo. ROGELIO acepta y agrega que verá si mañana pasará por su - casa para tomar un café, a las 5. JUAN:que mañana nó, - porque desde en la mañana estará todo el día fuera;pregunta si es muy muy urgente y ROGELIO comenta que regular. - JUAN pregunta si lo pueden dejar para pasado, el miércoles- como a las 5 y ROGELIO está de acuerdo.- 127.-

-7365

17:42 JUAN, de acento español, pregunta a ROGELIO/RODRIGUEZ de la Embajada Cubana, que si ha recibido al~~go de la Habana par~~. él. ROGELIO informa que nada. JUAN indica que " el amigo que se fué quedó de que le mandaría un recado después de haber hablado con un amigo allá". ROGELIO dice que tal vez lo haga el miércoles o el viernes que hay vuelo de la Habana. JUAN manifiesta que es un poco urgente, porque es una cosa relacionada con Prensa Latina. ROGELIO dice que mañana irá a su casa a tomar café. JUAN dice que mejor el miércoles, porque mañana va a estar muy ocupado toda la mañana. ROGELIO está de acuerdo.

18 Feb 64

20:47 ANTONIO GARCIA (NICO), de la Embajada de Cuba, se comunica con TELMA KING y le pregunta qué se le ofrece. TELMA responde que le urge mucho hablar con ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ o con RAMON CESAR CUENCA hoy mismo en la noche y a la hora que sea, pues debe hacerlo antes de salir de México mañana, ya que a las 08:00 hs. tiene que estar en el Aeropuerto. NICO manifiesta que ha estado tratando de comunicarse con ROGELIO y con CUENCA inútilmente, prometiendo que en cuanto localice a alguno de los dos le pasará el recado. copy [illegible]

18 Feb 64

924. Entrada [illegible].- MORALES pregunta por RODRIGUEZ y [illegible]ORRIN dice que [illegible] preguntó a [illegible] y éste le dijo que todavía no t[illegible] para él; pregunta si está [illegible] una respuesta [illegible] dice que sí. [illegible] que no hay nada que mañana llame como a las 11.30 h. MORALES acepta.- 941.-

365

20 Feb 64

154. Entrada 1145.- HF (acento extranjero) solicita hablar con RODRIGUEZ con quien tenía una cita. JO[illegible] después de pedirle que se espere un momentito informa que [illegible] está; pregunta si él está en algún hotel y HF dice que no, [illegible] vive en un departamento de Artículo 123 núm. [illegible] que vuelva a llamar. HF acepta.- 190.-

365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

~~MOB~~ ~~[illegible]~~ SS SB
IOS PERS AR
[✓ ROB] ~~RPTS~~ LOG CA
[illegible] SI BF HR
SEC NB

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DOP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 142046Z

IMMEDIATE MANA INFO DIR SJOS WAVE CITE MEXI 8228

PBRUMEN

14 Feb 64 IN 19988

REF MANA 4716 (IN 19935) 14 Feb 64

1. VEGA OF REF PROBABLY MANUEL VEGA PEREZ, KNOWN IS, NO LONGER MEXI. ROGELIO IS UNDOUBTEDLY ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, SECOND SECRETARY OF EMBASSY. 14-13-26 IS EMBASSY TELEPHONE FOR RODRIGUEZ, DOORMAN AND OTHERS. ADDRESS IS THAT OF EMBASSY.

2. FYI: PARA ONE NUMBER COVERED BY STATION. WILL ADVISE ANY PERTINENT INFO, INCLUDING DEPARTURE DATES.

SECRET

SECRET

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

Copy No.

14 Feb 1964

14-00000

FORM 11-57 1304

(44)

ORIG.:
EXT.:
DISTR.:

CHP
COMPO
CHFO NO - dummy

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 FEB 64

FILE:
P-7763
P-7365
P-8?80
NUMBER

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
XXX OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS
INITIALS
CTG.

TO
INFO.
CITE MEXI 8226
NUMBER

PRITY PACY DIR

RYBAT ZRKNICK HYSAGE-1

REF: MEXI 8199

1. PER LIEMBRACES 13 FEB HYSAGE-1 MADE RESERVATION PAA FOR PACY LEAVING MEXI 0930 SUNDAY 16 FEB.

2. PER LIENVOY 11 FEB, HYSAGE-1 CALLED ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ SECOND SECY CUBAN EMB, ASKED IF EVERYTHING LEFT YESTERDAY. RODRIGUEZ SAID YES. HYSAGE-1 SAID SHE WOULD LIKE TO GO SATURDAY (SIC). ALSO SHE BRINGING PACKAGE TO EMB 12 FEB FOR NEXT CUBANA FLT. (FYI, CUBANA HAD FLT 10 FEB, ANOTHER COMING 14 FEB).

3. NIGHT 12 FEB LIEMBRACES AGAIN SURVEILLED BERNAL AND "DAVID". THEY DROVE TO VICINITY PLAZA MIRAVALLE. BERNAL LEFT CAR WALKED TO PLAZA, TOOK SEAT THEN WALKED TO STREET CORNER WHERE APPROACHED BY UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THEY BOTH LIT CIGARETTES, THEN MAN FOLLOWED BERNAL TO CAR, NOT SPEAKING UNTIL THEY ENTERED CAR AND DROVE OFF. SUBJECTS CHECKING SO CLOSELY FOR SURVEILLANCE, TEAM HAD TO DROP OFF. FOUND THEM AGAIN IN RESTAURANT ON AVENIDA INSURGENTES SUR BUT SUBJECTS CHECKING ALL CARS DRIVING PAST, SO TEAM DROPPED SURVEILLANCE. UNIDENTIFIED MAN DESCRIBED AS "FOREIGN LOOKING, ABOUT 33 YRS, 5'6", 160 LBS, SHORT REDDISH STRAIGHT HAIR, ROUND FACE WITH PROTRUDING CHEEKS, SLIT EYES REDDISH COMPLEXION. LIEMBRACE 13 FEB SAW THIS MAN ENTERING CUBAN EMB. STATION TRYING IDENTIFY AND WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JLN (IIN DRAFT)
M C CHOADEN

G H PERMAN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

W C CURTIS
RELEASING OFFICER

21 May 1964

16:25 (2761) RICARDO manifiesta a ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ, de la Embajada de Cuba que " te queremos ver, ~~como a que horas te~~ sales de la Embajada". ROGELIO indica que hoy no será posible que lo vean. RICARDO insiste diciéndo que tiene que ser hoy " porque aquí está mi amigo y te queríamos enseñar algo que acaba de llegar de allá". ROGELIO acepta manifestando que los espera ahora mismo en la Embajada. (36)

22 May 1964

062. Entrada.- COUTTOLENC avisa a MINSAL que ya tiene el -- saco de la muestra conteniendo las patatas. Minsal pregunta si le dieron confirmación a Rogelio sobre lo que hablaron del embarque ésta mañana y COUTT.dice que sí, pero-- acaba de llamarlo y no está. Minsal:que se informe de eso y mañana le diga,porque sobre eso ya le están preguntando de allá, por lo que ya se puede confirmar y se puede -- firmar el contraro y mandar las modificaciones que hay que hacer. COUT. acepta y pregunta si no llegó nada para -- ellos y Minsal indica que no sabe si haya habido correspondencia, pues la gente hace poco que llegó;que preguntará -- y mañana lo llamará para que le lleve la muestra y la cotización. COUT. está de acuerdo y agrega que en caso -- de que sepa algo, lo volverá a llamar. M.que está bien. 078.-

1-7365

23 May 64

344. Entrada.- La señorita Vargas solicita hablar con Rogelio y J.dice que ya se marchó, que le habla mañana entre - 10½ y 11. Vargas acepta.- 369.-

365

EXCERPT

20 MAY 64

DIR INFO PACY WAVE CITE MEXI 9530 IN 86572

INTEL JMGIN LIFIRE

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFIRE AIRLISTS. .....

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY FROM HABANA BY AIR ON 16 MAY 64: CUBANS: ..... ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, DIP PP D/63/454; .....

EXCERPT

MEXI 9530
IN 86572
20 MAY 64

~~Log It~~
Dias —
Bol —
Lona —
Trade —

MEMORANDUM

20 May 1964

P-6605
P-7575 xtra copy pls.

TO The Files
FROM Floyd M. AIMONET
SUBJECT Debriefing of LITAMIL-3 on his meeting with LITAMIL-7
NEXT SCHEDULED MTG.: 27 May, Car pickup on Lerma, Guadalquivir, 0930

1. Once again, our bid to establish a small monthly deposit in the bank for LITAMIL-7 has failed. L-7 appreciates the thoughtfulness but won't accept a cent. No hard feelings and L-7 will continue to help in any way possible. Aimonet has decided against seeing L-7 personally because of the fact that a PBPRIMER's presence in the home of L-7 represents a disturbing factor and we do not want to rattle L-7 now that L-7 is calmed down and producing.

2. Following tidbits from this week's meeting:
   a) A long locked-door session between Lechuga and H. Armas on 18 May
   P-8412 B) Roa officially placed in charge all statements released to Mexican press.
   P- c) The full name of the new diplomat coming is Enrique Villavicensio Argudin. (will send cable requesting traces)
   d) José LAIN, consul Merida, PCS to Habana
   P-7365 e) Rogelio Rodgríguez returned with wife but left child behind Cuba.
   P-7921 f) Vega Perez placed in charge all fares and flights for those invited to Cuba from or through Mexico.
   P-8515 P-8591 g) Mirabal and Dra. Machado have had long daily sessions (meetings, that is.)
   P-7887 h) Ruiz and Garcia Lara have had long closed door sessions recently with Hernandez Armas.
   i) The Cuban FornMinistry cabled all personnel abroad to be "on alert view current rumblings"*(w.t.m.)
   j) On 16 May 16 Mexican chess players left for Cuba, guests of IDER
   k) On 16 and 18 May, total of 13 Colombians left for Cuba with fares paid and separate pieces of paper visas.
   l) Dr. Arturo Barber Orozco (suplente for Lechuga) arrived with Lech

3. LITAMIL-7 finally told off Pereira. He stopped bothering L-7

4. Instructed LITAMIL-3 to tell Mendejar to visit AMSAIL-1 as initial step in showing good faith and establishing bona fides.

*w.t.m. equals whatever that means.

7365

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

~~MOB~~	~~INT~~	4 ~~ES~~	~~SB~~
		5	
	~~ICS~~	6 ~~FPS~~	~~AR~~
~~EOB~~	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH 5, VR

Prew

WC

S E C R E T 191445Z

19 MAY 64 IN 86080

DIR CITE SDOM 3822

KAP[illegible] TYPIC AMMUG

DESENSITIZED

[illegible]: DIR 21432

STATION HAS NO INFO THIS TIME RE BROKEN LEG RODRIGUEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

GROUP 1
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declassification

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Copy No.

19 May 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 SECRET

ROUTING
1 ~~WH~~ INT 4 SS SB
2 IOS 5 ~~PERS~~ ~~AR~~
3 6
DOB FI/TS LCC CA
CI SI BF HH
SEC HS

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY
ACTION : C/WH 5
INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, DC/WH/SA, VR

WC

S E C R E T 182130Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE PACY 3564

19 May 64 IN 85528

DESENSITIZED SAGE ZRNICK

C/S COMMENT: *RE HYSAGE/1 MEETING WITH PONCHAY.

REF: PACY 3458 (in 84816) > not in this File.

1. MEETING HYSAGE-1 15 MAY HYSAGE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH APPEARS BE TOTAL HER KNOWLEDGE ALLEGED "ISLA DE MUJERES" MEETING SPOT:

A. DEPARTURE TIME AND TRAVEL TIME ESSENTIALLY AS ORIGINALLY REPORTED. PASSED THROUGH SMALL CITY, HOWEVER, TO ARRIVE AT EMBARCADERO. A LONG SHED-LIKE TIENDA WAS AT THE WATER EDGE. HYSAGE-1 NOTICED THIS BECAUSE IT WAS OPEN THOUGH HOUR WAS LATE.

B. WHEN ARRIVED AT ISLAND WHICH HAD NORMAL FOLIAGE AND VEGETATION, LANDED AT LITTLE VILLAGE WHERE MOST OF HOUSES WERE ADOBE CONSTRUCTION (LOW CLASS HOUSING). HOTEL WAS TWO STORY STRUCTURE WITH VERANDA. WAS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE VILLAGE ALONG BEACH AND ONLY BUILDING THAT TYPE SEEN IN AREA. (COMMENT: APPEARED TO BE LARGE GUEST HOUSE WITH EATING FACILITIES.)

X 4

C. PARTY DEPARTED ISLAND ABOUT DARK. ON LEAVING ISLAND HYSAGE-1 SAID SHE COULD SEE LIGHTS SHORE LINE IN FAR DISTANCE.

D. MAKEUP PARTY TRAVELING BY CAR AS FOLLOWS: MEXICAN OF SPANISH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Mention of "Rogelio" → over

GROUP 1

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Copy No.

19 May 64

ANCESTRY WAS (FNU) MOYA, A MEXICAN JOURNALIST OR NEWSMAN. HE OCCASIONALLY REFERRED TO OWNER OF HOTEL AS "TIO". SECOND MEMBER OF PARTY WAS ROGELIO, AN OFFICIAL OF CUBAN EMBASSY. THIRD MEMBER WAS CLOSE FRIEND BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, WHOM SHE MET WITH BRANKO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. NAMES NOT USED AND HYSAGE-1 NOT SURE WHETHER HE CZECH OR RUSSIAN BUT DESCRIBED HIM AS THE PERSON BRANKO ALWAYS DEFERS TO. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: APPROXIMATELY 5'11" TO 6', ANDRZEJ STOCKY STRONG BUILD, ~~LIGHT~~ BROWN HAIR, FAIR COMPLEXION, NOTICEABLY LIGHT GRAY EYES, AND EXTREMELY HANDSOME FROM WOMEN'S POINT OF VIEW. FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKER. WIFE, WHOM HYSAGE-1 MET AT COCKTAIL PARTY BRANKO HOME, DESCRIBED AS SHORTER THAN HUSBAND [illegible] AND EXTREMELY UNATTRACTIVE.

D. MEMBERS OF GROUP HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN ISLAND BEFORE JUDGING BY CONVERSATION "TIO" AND FAMILIARITY WITH PLACE.

E. YACHT REPORTEDLY HAD SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS MAX EIGHT PERSONS.

2. FOR HQS:

OF INTEREST IS HYSAGE-1 STATEMENT THAT THE EUROPEAN DESCRIBED ABOVE CHAIRED THE MEETING ~~WITH~~ which TOOK PLACE ON ISLAND. THE CUBANS, INCLUDING CONCHITO FERNANDEZ, DEFERRED TO HIM. PRESENT WITH CONCHITO WAS ANOTHER CUBAN REFERRED TO AS "DOCTOR". DISCUSSION WHICH LASTED ALL DAY CONCERNED PLANNING FOR PANAMANIAN ELECTIONS WHICH PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON, AND DISCUSSION POSSIBILITY FURTHERING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT PANAMA IN LIGHT EXISTING SITUATION. (COMMENT: OTHER THAN ELECTION PLANNING WHICH INVOLVED ECHEVERS, ZUNIGA, AND VICTOR AVILA, IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FUTURE, WITH LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE.)

SECRET

FORM DS-933
12-1-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY

REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: CIA

FROM: VO - Duncan 4/23/68

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

I NAME (If married woman, include maiden name): Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
SN

DATE OF BIRTH: May 3, 1942

PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana

ALIASES AND NICKNAMES: previous check 9/15/67

SEX: m

MARITAL STATUS: uk

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

ADDRESS:

OCCUPATION AND NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Designated First Secretary of the Cuban Permanent Mission to the UN

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA:

#701

CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE OFFICE OF SECURITY BY:

DIVISION OR AGENCY: Visa Office

DATE:

NAME OR REQUESTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:R.Duncan

REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM: F 31 - 7 Cuba

II. RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION AT
☐ OTHER (Use reverse side for

SPECIAL

Ret 4/24/68

CHECKED BY:

DATE:

III FOR USE OF OFFICE OF SECURITY:

For information concerning Subject you are referred to CSCI-3/782,081 dated 29 June 1964, subject as above, and CSCI-316/00696-64 dated 25 August 1964, subject: Shipment of Explosives to Mexico, and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

KTJ
26 April 1968

FILE IN 201-338665 *

24 APR 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATI CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COP 27 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR C/CA DO4 C/CI/PS C/ICG FI2

ACTION NO. 345 CAG C/FI/INT DDP ADDP

S E C R E T 251614Z AUG 70 CITE DO BASE WASHINGTON 2790 19698

DO BASE, NEW YORK INFO: DIRECTOR (DOSB 2790) dr

AKULE/DOMOPS/AMROSE/WUSLAB 149698

REF: DO BASE WASHINGTON 2781 (IN 146109)

1. WUSLAB LUNCHED WITH ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665) AT BEAUX ARTS HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY, 21 AUGUST 1970.

2. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE INTERESTED OPINIONS NOT DOCUMENTS AND SUGGESTED WUSLAB/1 TALK TO PROMINENT US AND LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND FOUNDATIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS IN THE WIND RE US POLICY TOWARD CUBA. RODRIGUEZ CONTENDED THAT THERE ARE MANY FACTORS INDICATING INCREASED U.S. PRESSURE ON CUBA. THIS SITUATION FORCES CUBA TO ~~XXXX~~ ACCOMODATE OWN REVOLUTION WITHIN RIGID SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND AWAY INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLES OF 26 JULY MOVEMENT. THUS CUBAN SOCIETY IS NOT THE JOYFUL ONE FIDEL PROMISED.

AN	
AB	
~~IN~~	
FROM	
~~BX~~	
DES	NFD
FI	

3. RODRIGUEZ GAVE WUSLAB/1 LARGE HTBASTE INTER OFFICE ENVELOPE CONTAINING BOOK BY RAUL ROA, BROADSIDE BY VICTOR VACCARO, AND COPIES OF GRAMMA AND VERDE OLIVO.

4. RODRIGUEZ EXERTED NO PRESSURE ON WUSLAB/1 AND SEEMED SATISFIED WHEN WUSLAB/1 REMARKED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY NOT GO NYC AGAIN FOR SOME

D 200-6-337/3

CS COPY

201-332665

SECRET

PAGE TWO DO BASE WASHINGTON 2790 SECRET

TIME. POUCHING DETAILS THIS MEETING.

5. FILE: 200-6-337/3 AND 201-332665. GP-1.

SECRET

SEP 2 70

35

ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE:GHD
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: ~~WH-COG-OPS~~
DATE: 4164/1325 25 November 1970
~~416~~

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 Nov 70 20 16z CITE DIRECTOR 080058

TO DO BASE WASHINGTON INFO DO BASE NEW YORK WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE WUSLAB

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF WUSLAB-1'S AMSTAFF CASE OFFICER ARRANGED TO TURN WUSLAB-1 OVER TO OTHER AMSTAFFER. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE LATEST INFO ON WUSLAB-1'S NEXT ASSIGNMENT WITH HTBASTE.

2. FILE: 201-332665 AND 200-6-337/3.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

DDS
X
4

WH/COG/OPS

AC/WH/COG

JOHN F. MARKHAM
C/DOI/2
D200-6-337/3
RELEASING OFFICER

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
27 NOV 1970
201-332665
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

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C/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, DO Division

FROM: Chief of Base, Washington

SUBJECT: AKULE TYPIC AMORSE WUSLAB WUSHARP DOMOPS
WUSHARP request for assistance

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : DO BASE WASHINGTON 2989

1. On 14 December 1970, the undersigned visited WUSHARP at the latter's request and had the following discussion. WUSHARP asked whether we could use WUSLAB/1 as a means of contacting Cuban officials for the purpose of establishing lines which could later be exploited by WUSHARP assets. I explained to WUSHARP that WUSLAB/1 had been instructed to adopt a passive role in relationship to his Cuban contacts, and to respond only to contact initiated by the Cubans. WUSHARP stated that they understand our point of view thoroughly.

2. At this meeting I briefed WUSHARP on the telephone call from a DGI representative cited in reference. I told WUSHARP that I would give them a memorandum on this as well as a copy of the PCQ on Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (201-332665) in which they expressed definite interest.

J. G. Benson
Joseph G. BENSON

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - C/WH
2 - C/DO

200-6-337/3

201-332665

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UWCA - 6085

DATE: 16 DEC 1970
15 December 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-6-337/3

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: JOHN M. BURKE:mli
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7141/1819
DATE: 27 MAY 1970

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BY DP PER

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CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, C/CI/SP, C/DO 4, DDP, ADDP, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI 2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 20 18 51Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO DO BASE NEW YORK WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

ABSTRACT INDEX

038015

REFS: A. DO BASE NEW YORK-7800 (IN-090897)

B. UNDW-3230, 15 MAY 70

1. WITH ONE EXCEPTION ALL PERTINENT AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ AVAILABLE AT HQS WAS FORWARDED TO ADDRESSEES WITH REF B. EXCEPTION CONCERNS TOP SECRET REPORTS FROM LNERGO ON RODRIGUEZ OPS INVOLVING EMPLOYEE OF SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY IN WASH D.C. AND POSSIBLE OP AGAINST STATE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THIS SOURCE OF HIS. BELIEVE CURRENT LNERGO HQS INTEREST IN RODRIGUEZ IS POSSIBLY DUE TO OUR RECENT PRODDING THEM FOR ANY INFO THEY MAY HAVE DEVELOPED ON HIM THROUGH THEIR INVESTIGATION THIS SOURCE. FYI: HQS IS ALSO CURRENTLY LOOKING AT RODRIGUEZ AS PRIORITY TARGET BECAUSE OF LARGE NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER JKLANCE ASSETS WHO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH HIM (SEE REF B).

2. CONCUR THAT SUBJECT BE MADE PRIORITY CASE FOR AMOTS.

/CONTINUED/

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
[illegible]

CS COPY

25 May 70
201-332665

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 038015

TO

PAGE 2

HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT BASE MAY WISH TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE COORDINATED FOUR-PRONGED APPROACH TO RODRIGUEZ AS A TARGET. FIRST IS AMOT APPROACH. SECOND, JKLANCE DEFECTORS AND AGENTS WHO KNOW SUBJECT. THIRD, LNERGO ASSETS. FOURTH, LNERGO'S ABILITY TO ENTRAP SUBJECT AND HIS CURRENT ASSETS IN LEGALLY ACTIONABLE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND APPLY CARROT OR STICK ULTIMATUM. CAN BASE ASCERTAIN WHAT, IF ANY, ACCESS AGENTS LNERGO NOW HAS NEXT TO RODRIGUEZ? EXTENT OF LOCAL LNERGO KNOWLEDGE OF RODRIGUEZ OPS IN WASH, D.C.? ALSO, CAN BASE ASCERTAIN IF LNERGO "TARGET STUDY" IS FOR PURPOSE OF DEFECTION, RECRUITMENT IN PLACE, OR DOUBLE AGENT OP?

3. FOR MIAMI: PLEASE PROCESS AMOT STUDY SOONEST, ADVISE WHICH OF JKLANCE ASSETS MENTIONED REF B STUDY ON RODRIGUEZ CAN BE UTILIZED THIS CASE FOR ASSESSMENT OR APPROACH, AND MAKE SUBJECT AND HIS FAMILY PRIORITY REQUIREMENT FOR NEXT AMANVIL DEBRIEFING.

/CONTINUED/

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TO PAGE 3

4. FILE: 201-332665.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/Comment: *Reference, attached, concerns FBI request for AMOT support in preparing target study, and probably a defection attempt, against a DGI officer stationed at the CMUN.

DO/I/B2 R.J. Baker

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/DO 4 DDP ADDP CS/DO C/CI C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 245

AN 2	~~PI~~	14 H/C/OP
~~ES~~	~~SECT~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

NYDO

S E C R E T 262038Z MAY 70 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7800

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

26 MAY 70 IN 090897

4

RYBAT TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

1. FOLL FOR WOMACE INFO ONLY.

2. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT JKLANCE PROGRAM TO UNCOVER RELATIVES AND FRIENDS OF DGI OFFICIALS ASSIGNED ABROAD HAS NOT AS YET PROGRESSED TO EXAMINATION OF DGI OFFICIALS IN NEW YORK, LOCAL LNERGO INFORMALLY HAS ASKED IF SURVEY COULD BE MADE ASAP OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), CMUN FIRST SECRETARY AND DGI OFFICER. LOCAL LNERGO HAS RECEIVED DIRECTIVE FROM ITS HDQS TO COMPILE DETAILED REPORT ON RODRIGUEZ AND HIS ACTIVITIES AND FORWARD "TARGET STUDY" TO LNERGO HDQS. BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS AMANVIL/1 AND OTHER REPORTING ON RODRIGUEZ, AND BECAUSE HE NOT NOW MARRIED, LNERGO HDQS APPARENTLY FEELS HE SHOULD BE PRIME TARGET FOR APPROACH. LOCAL LNERGO QUITE WILLING INFORMALLY COORDINATE ACTIVITY WITH BASE. THUS, WOULD APPRECIATE WHATEVER INFO ADDEES CAN PROVIDE AS TO ANY LEADS TO RODRIGUEZ VIA RELATIVES OR FRIENDS WHO MAY BE IN U.S. AT PRESENT.

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
[illegible] - May [illegible]

3. RODRIGUEZ BORN 3 MAY 42 HAVANA. FORMERLY MARRIED TO

201-332665

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE 2 DO BASE NEW YORK 7800 SECRET

ESTHER GAVILAN NOGALES, DPOB NOT KNOWN. SON EDUARDO ABOUT SIX YEARS OLD, RESIDES CUBA CITY NOT KNOWN. PARENTS NAMES NOT KNOWN, BUT FATHER REPORTEDLY LONG TIME MEMBER PSP. RODRIGUEZ PERMANENT CUBAN ADDRESS LISTED SEPTEMBER 67 AS CALLE 30, VEDADO, HAVANA.

4. BASE JUDGES THAT PROMPT PROVISION OF SURVEY DATA INFORMALLY TO LOCAL LNERGO WOULD BOTH ENCOURAGE ACTION AGAINST RODRIGUEZ AND PERSUADE LOCAL LNERGO TO DEEPEN COOPERATION CONCERNING THIS AND OTHER OPS AGAINST LOCAL CUBAN TARGET. THUS REQUEST SOONEST ACTION BY HQS.

5. FILE 201-332665. NO INDEX. GP-1.

SECRET

NID

FBI doc.
21 May 70 (NY)
Re. Cuban Mission to the United Nations
no Bufile given

FBI doc
11 May 70 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
7 May 70 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
4 May 70 (Wash)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Bufile: (NI) 105-130905

SEC

27 APR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT : Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Cuban Intelligence Officer

1. Reference is made to your previous correspondence concerning Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) and an officer of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). Rodriguez is the CUIS Case Officer for Jennifer Enid Miles, a South African national, now under investigation by the Bureau. Your most recent memorandum on Rodriguez and Miles was dated 26 January 1970.

2. On 30 January 1970, there was a liaison discussion about Miles and Rodriguez at which time your representatives advised that your Bureau planned to interview Miles, on an appropriate pretext, and that there were signs that she might be susceptible to "doubling". We recognize that the Miles Rodriguez case is an internal security responsibility of the Bureau but, to assist us in our efforts to assess Rodriguez as a DGI officer, it would be appreciated if you would provide us with the results of your interview with Miles as well as personality information about him that she may acquire in the future.

3. We would also like to have your comments about considering Rodriguez as a potential penetration of the DGI in Cuba. There is the possibility that Miles might be used to assist in approaching Rodriguez if, for example, she has refused to cooperate as a double agent or later if internal security considerations warrant an approach to Rodriguez.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

Signed: Raymond G. Rocca
James ANGLETON

CIOL-00061-70

SECRET

[illegible]
DECLASSIFIED [illegible]

DDP/WH/COG/OPS/JBurke:jaf

21 April 1970

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Addressee
  1 - C/CI
  1 - WH/COG/OPS

FILE: 201-860915

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY		
UFGA-5697	29 Apr 70, Att. 5	201-[illegible]-237/3		

DOC. SUBJECT

Transmittal of WUSLAB Contact Reports, February-April 1970

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
WUSLAB/1	Meeting on 10 Apr 70; report dated 13 Apr.	

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

2. Production: WUSLAB/1 said that Jose Raul Viera Linares had phoned him at his home at about 1100 on 8 April. Viera said that a friend had described to him an acquaintance who had had an eye problem similar to WUSLAB/1 (or words to that effect), and that Viera now realized the seriousness of the case and that WUSLAB/1 would not be able to travel. Viera said that the chances were now remote that he would be returning to New York. A friend of his named "Rogelio" would contact WUSLAB/1. He did not say when or where, but it would be when circumstances permit. WUSLAB/1 asked if Viera might be assigned to another foreign country. Viera did not deign to answer this question.

3. I asked WUSLAB/1 what he considered the possibilities of recruiting Viera were. He thought an important factor would be Viera's liking of comfort and security. He would not be motivated by money, but he did like good living. He also probably did not like living in Havana, and would not like to stay there for a very long period. W/1 thought that if Viera came out to a country such as Spain that contact with him could easily be developed. In the United States Viera was on his guard. Also in the United States Viera did not have high level contacts with the local government, whereas in other countries he would be expected to have such contacts. Some of those contacts might then be also in contact with U.S. officials and you could get a cross-check on Viera. I told WUSLAB/1 that we would finish the PCQ form on Viera the next time we get together.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201-			

FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (7-46)

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665 019-005-042
SEX M COB ? UNDA-04862A01
14 APR 70
CIT ? +19-500
OCC ? P3
MBR OF CUBAN UN MISSION AS OF 10 APR 70

UFA R 7004230770

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

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ACTION UNIT DO 4

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH 7, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 625

S E C R E T 102113Z APRIL 73 CITE DO BASE WASHINGTON 2574

DO BASE/NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

ISOLOG PERUMEN WUSLAB

REF: DO ~~BASE/NEW~~ YORK 7515 (IN052816)

10 APR [illegible] 060598

1. JOSE PAUL VIERA LINARES PHONED WUSLAB/1 MORNING 6 APRIL. SAID MOST LIKELY WOULD NOT BE RETURNING TO NEW YORK. UNDERSTOOD NATURE WUSLAB/1'S HEALTH WOULD PREVENT HIS TRAVELLING. HIS FRIEND "ROGELIO" WOULD CONTACT WUSLAB/1. GAVE NO DETAILS FUTURE CONTACT.

2. VIERA DID NOT ANSWER WUSLAB/1'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD BE ASSIGNED ANOTHER POST OUTSIDE CUBA.

3. LOCAL LNERGO BELIEVES "ROGELIO" MAY BE ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN PERMANENT MISSION.

4. FILE: ~~#~~ 201-328953 AND 200-6-337/3. GP-1.

S E C R E T

cc to 201-332665

SECRET

FBI doc.
30 Mar. '70 (NY)
Re: Joanna Faith Haas
no Bufile given

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO
Chief, WH/[illegible]

INFO. Chief of Station, WH/[illegible];
Chief, DO Division

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT [illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible] -- Information from [illegible]/1 on Cuban UN Mission Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI, extract to appropriate 201 files, and per paragraph 7

REFERENCES : A. DIRECTOR 0[illegible]
B. DO [illegible]/NEW YORK 7570
C. DO [illegible]/NEW YORK 7575

1. Transmitted herewith as an attachment to this dispatch are one copy each for WH/COG and WH/[illegible] of the [illegible]/1 debriefing results on CUUN and DGI Center personnel and activities in New York. The information was obtained by [illegible] during a short meeting 22 March 1970 (the information on Teofilo ACOSTA and "[illegible]" was obtained jointly by [illegible] and [illegible]). Other information was forwarded via Reference B. Information on Pedro Luis PINEIRO [illegible] ([illegible]), CUUN Third Secretary and DGI officer, also was cabled separately via Reference C.

2. Copies of the attached have been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO office. "[illegible]" is the local code name used between the Base and LNERGO to designate [illegible]/1. As addressees will note, the attached sheet on PINEIRO makes no mention of the LNERGO [illegible] made to and reported by him; rather than make such information a matter of record within LNERGO FIGALAN merely passed that information to LNERGO orally 23 March.

/continued

Attachments:
As Stated, H/W

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH/COG, w/2 cc of attachments, H/W
2 - COS, WH/[illegible], w/2 cc of attachments, H/W
2 - Chief, DO Division, w/o attachments

CROSS REFERENCE TO GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM [illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UN[illegible]-4041	DATE 26 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-[illegible]/3

3. [illegible] we had but limited time with [illegible]/1 on this trip, the attached information is necessarily slim. Items of particular interest concern PINEIRO and the forthcoming cutback in [illegible] activity, not only here but elsewhere.

4. Re the attached information on Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-[illegible]), CMUN Counsellor and DGI officer, [illegible] told the writer that VIERA's contact within Random House (publishing firm) is one

Jason EPSTEIN (no further bio data available).

5. Re the attached information on [illegible] (201-[illegible]), First Secretary and DGI officer, and his "female friends", [illegible] told the writer that one known romantic involvement is one

(Miss) Joanna Faith [illegible]
DOB: 1947
POB: Believed U.S.A.
CIT: U.S.
OCC: [illegible] (or intern), General [illegible], Beth Israel Hospital, New York City.

This young lady, who is part or all Jewish, is the daughter of a New York taxi driver. She visited Cuba in 1969. From technical coverage of the CMUN [illegible] is aware that DGI Center Chief Orlando [illegible] Gutierrez (201-[illegible]), First Secretary, knows of [illegible]' involvement with Miss [illegible] (one morning [illegible] phoned the young lady's apartment at 0815 hours to ask if [illegible] were there). [illegible] believes that [illegible]' interest in [illegible] is romantic only; as opposed to PINEIRO's interest in Mildred MARQUEZ Ortiz, per the attached sheet.

6. Re war-name "[illegible]" per the attached sheet, [illegible] believes that [illegible]/1 may be mistaken in the year "[illegible]" was here as part of the Cuban Delegation to the UN General Assembly; as related below, there are possibilities for "[illegible]" in both 1967 and 1968. In 1967 there are the following personalities who could be identical with "[illegible]":

A. Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso, born 26 August 1937 in Havana;

B. Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz, born 25 November 1945 in Pinar del Rio;

C. Pedro Juan [illegible] Veloso, born 8 March 1938 in Las Villas;

D. Carlos E. ANTELO Perez, born 15 January 1943 in Pinar del Rio;

E. Gonzalo [illegible] Solo (201-728312), born 10 January 1930 in Havana.

In 1968 there are the following personalities who could be identical with "[illegible]":

F. Eduardo [illegible] Agero (201-840186), born 21 March 1930 in Las Villas;

G. Gonzalo GONZALEZ Cueto, born 15 November 1942 in Havana;

H. Crescencio E. [illegible] Paez, born 14 September 1941 in Havana;

I. Alvaro P. [illegible] Fonseca, born 6 December 1943 in Oriente;

J. Reno VALENZUELA Acebal, born 26 July 1938 in Havana;

K. Julian TORRES Rizo, born 1 September 1944 in Havana.

Other members of the UNGA Delegations for 1967 and 1968 we have been able to eliminate because they are either not DGI personnel and/or AMMUG/1 knows them sufficiently to rule out the possibility that they are identical with "AGLO". If the cut-name corresponds to the true name at all, then it would appear that the two most likely candidates for "AGLO" are Eduardo ARIOZ Agero (201-840126) and Carlos [illegible] Perez. The latter was here in 1967; ARIOZ here in 1968. We lean toward ARIOZ.

7. Should addressees be able to shed any light on the true identity of "AGLO" we would be most interested. Even if this is not possible, presumably we will know eventually who he is should his assignment here materialize.

8. The attached sheets should be extracted to the appropriate 201 files. To facilitate this the 201 numbers are listed below:

Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-[illegible]48505)
Pedro Luis PINERO Marin (201-[illegible]4876)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-[illegible])
Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-[illegible]302)
Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (201-[illegible]7536)

Howard G. FIGMAN

UN DA - 4841
26 March '70

7. Recruitment Targets. Subjectively, Source considers that the most vulnerable of the CMUN personnel are Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Ambassador ALARCON, and Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo. RODRIGUEZ because he likes the ladies and the material things in life; ALARCON because of his strained relationship with PRENDES; and MORALES because he is basically a good sort and a realistic person. As stated, this is subjective reasoning on Source's part.

Teofilo ACOSTA Rodriguez
201-755744

8. Replacement Personnel. With VIERA and PINERO leaving soon, there is talk in Havana about assigning one Teofilo ACOSTA here as a replacement for one or the other. ACOSTA is a negro in his early 30s and has served in several African posts for the DGI (including Tanzania and Mozambique). ACOSTA has been protected by Manuel PINEIRO Losada, former DGI chief, but is disliked by most MINREX types who know him. Source described ACOSTA as a sly and suspicious person who would not hesitate to report on anyone, including his friends and neighbors. ACOSTA is believed to have been deeply involved in various "wars of liberation" in Africa. ACOSTA was originally under consideration as a replacement for Francisco V. PORTELA, the Prensa Latina chief in New York, but it was finally decided to leave PORTELA here as there were advantages to his being a U.S. citizen.

Source also mentioned that one "AGEO" (a war name; real name not known to Source) was under consideration for assignment here. Source said that "AGEO" was a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 22nd UN General Assembly in 1967 (date possibly not correct). This "AGEO" was in charge of the purge within MINREX in 1967 which resulted in the ouster of some 300 persons regarded as homosexuals, counter-revolutionaries, or incompetents.

UNDA - 4841
26 Mar 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-052
UNDA-04834A01
24 MAR 70
P2

CIT ?
OCC ?
CURRENTLY IN NEW YORK AS OF MAR 70 AS MBR OF CMUN

UFA

R 7004022074

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

RODRIGUEZ

PRIOR TO FILING	TO. ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
CA [illegible]
[illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	5 [illegible]			
2.				
3.				
4.		13 Apr		
5.				
6.		13 Apr		
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9. DO/KT		21 Apr 70		
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15.				
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17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

3

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
200-9-52

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
24 Mar 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UNDA 04834

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

08437

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH/COG		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, WH/MIAMI, Chief, Domestic Operations Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Base, New York			MICROFILM

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMKOSE/DONOPS
Transmittal of Cuban Official Presence Listing for New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

UFA

Action Required: FYI

REF: DIRECTOR 018607

1. During a visit to the Base on 20 March 1970 the Headquarters officer mentioned in paragraph 3 of the reference requested that the Base pouch to Headquarters a listing of all currently-assigned personnel of the Cuban UN Mission. Attached herewith for WH/COG and WH/MIAMI are one copy each of the monthly listing prepared by the local LNERGO Cuban Squad showing each CMUN official and his dependents (the latter may be here or back in Cuba; changes are not recorded in this category).

2. This listing is as of 3 March 1970; it remains valid with the exception of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary and DGI officer, who departed PCS on 7 March.

3. NOTE: The "Pct." number indicates in which police precinct each CMUN official resides.

Howard G. FIGALAN

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment:
As stated - Para 1 - h/w.

Distribution:

2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, WH/MIAMI, w/att. h/w.
2 - Chief, DO, w/o att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1 Att

200 to DC/CI

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4834	23 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~19-500~~ 200-4-52

Cuban Mission to the United Nations
6 East 67th Street
New York, New York
March 3, 1970

Currently in New York as of May 1970 as member of CMUN

		Pct.
ALARCON QUESADA, RICARDO (201-347590)		19
	Position	Ambassador
	Residence	1175 York Ave., Apt. 6D, NYC
	Phone	PL 2-0123
	Dependents	MARGARITA PEREZ, wife; MARGARITA ALARCON, daughter; BLANCA MAZA PEREZ, mother-in-law
		(R coded)
ALOM GIL, JULIO (201-851731)		17
	Position	First Secretary Cuban Mission to the UN
	Residence	251 E. 51st St., Apt. 10L
	Phone	593-0480
	Dependents	MARINELA LARRAMENDI RODES, wife, born 4/10/36; LENA ROSA ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 11/22/64; LAURA ESTHER ALOM LARRAMENDI, daughter, born 5/11/67
		(R coded)
DE SOUZA, ANTONIO (201-354048)		110
	Position	Adviser
	Residence	83-10 35th Ave., Apt. 6U, Jackson Heights, NY
	Phone	TW 9-9282
	Dependents	ALICIA MATEOS DE SOUZA, wife; ANA MARIA, daughter, born 2/7/54; ALICIA ANTONIA, daughter, born 6/23/51
		(R coded)
DRAKE CAPIRO, PABLO (201-815821)		19
	Position	Attache Cuban Mission to the UN
	Residence	6 E. 67 St., NYC
	Phone	UN 1-5250
	Dependents	CONSUELO HORTA LARRINAGA, wife
		(R coded)
FRANCO GONZALEZ, RUBEN RAFAEL (201-857465)		19
	Position	Attache
	Residence	370 E. 69 St., Apt. 5K
	Phone	----

MICROFILMED
APR 2 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

CS COPY

N/w #1 to UNDA-4834

200-9-52

NY 105-31084

	Pct.	
✓ FR GELABERT MARTINEZ, JUSTO CESAR	17	
Position (201-839221)	Attache	
Residence	61-15 97th St. Elmhurst, NY, Apt. 15M	Solsiguez apt.
Phone	699-5526	
✓ FR JIMENEZ PADRON, FLORENTINO	19	
Position	Attache	
Residence (201-850953)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC	(Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250	
Dependents	AGUEDA MARTINEZ GARCIA, wife, born 4/15/37	
✓ FR MORALES CARBALLO, PEDRO A.	17	
Position	Counsellor, CMUN	
Residence (201-850951)	400 E. 55th St., Apt. 16	(Recoded)
Phone	593-2431	
Dependents	MARIA ANGELINA DE LOS REYES, wife, born 2/2/41; MARIANELA MORALES DE LOS REYES, daughter, born 11/10/64; PEDRO CESAR MORALES DE LOS REYES, son, born 7/31/69; ISABEL BERMUDEZ DIEZ, born 4/18/07	
✓ FR PEREIRA GONZALEZ, ORLANDO F.	19	
Position	First Secretary	
Residence (201-848605)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC	(Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250	
Dependent	MARIA DE LOS ANGELES LOPEZ CANAS, wife, 3/1/47	
✓ FR PEREZ ALFONSO, ROLANDO	19	
Position	Attache	
Residence (201-836757)	Cuban Mission to the UN 6 E. 67 St., NYC	(Recoded)
Phone	UN 1-5250	
Dependent	MARIA DE LAS MARTINEZ LARA, wife	

to be replaced
by Rafael CADALSO
Bombino - 201-850416
16 March

SECRET

SECRET

NY 105-31084

Pct.

FR
PINERO AIRIN, PEDRO LUIS — 19
Position — Third Secretary
Residence — 401 E. 74th St., Apt. 5K, NYC
Phone — 861-2468
Dependent — JUANA CRUZ FERNANDEZ, wife
(201-824376)
(R coded)

PRENDES GUTIERREZ, ORLANDO — 19
Position — First Secretary
Residence — 201 E. 66th St., Apt. 7H, NYC
Phone — 249-0824
Dependent — TERESITA FERNANDEZ ARANGO DE PRENDES, wife
(201-330002)
(R coded)

REYES GOICOCHEA, RAUL — 19
Position — Attache
Residence — Cuban Mission to the UN
6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone — UN 1-5250
(201-859874)

FR
~~REYES VEGA, JORGE E.~~ — ~~20~~
Position — ~~Second Secretary~~
Residence — ~~15 W. 72nd St., Apt. I7H, NYC~~
Phone — ~~787-0544~~
Dependent — ~~MARIELA REYES~~, daughter
(201-816437)
unique [illegible]
(departed US PCS on 7 Mar 70)

FR
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO — 110
Position — First Secretary
Residence — Park Plaza Apartments
61-15 97th St., Elmhurst, NY,
Apt. 15M
Phone — 699-5526
(201-332665)

FR
SANTANA FRAIZ, MIGUEL M. — 19
Position — Attache
Residence — 345 E. 81st St., NYC, Apt. 5J
Phone — UN 1-5862
(201-816439)

FR
SANTIAGO HUMET, ROBERTO — 19
Position — Attache
Residence — Cuban Mission to the UN
6 E. 67 St., NYC
Phone — UN 1-5250
(201-859875)

SECRET

104-10180-10050

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

C19-006-133/03
UNDA-04764
12 FEB 70

CIT CUBA
OCC 1ST SECY
< USA, NY, NY
SERVES AS THE OFFICIAL CMUN/DGI CONTACT W/ JOSE MARIA QUIMPER, A LEFTIST PERU NATL EMPL IN THE DEPT OF POLI AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS UN SECRETARIAT. APPEARS HANDLE MUCH OF CMUN BUSINESS W/LOCAL PRENSA LATINA OFFICE

R 7002190005

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INSTRUCTIONS

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TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/SD

Kathy

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/C/fg		12 FEB 1970	12 FEB 1970	
2. WH/C/op				
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4. ENNIS			File CS	
5. BURKE			B	
6. Kathy				
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17. RID/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

copy to Pisano File

RYBAT

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
19-6-133/3

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
12 FEB '70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA 04704

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET/RYBAT

TO
Chief, WH/COG
XX

INFO.
COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM
Acting Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/ZAPOSR/POLOPS/AMANVIL
Information Provided by AMANVIL/1 on Cuban UN Mission Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Extract to appropriate 201 files
REFERENCE: URDA-4763, 10 February 1970

1. Transmitted herewith as an attachment to this dispatch are one copy each for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI of the AMANVIL/1 debriefing results on CMUN and DGI Center personnel in New York. The information on Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, DGI Center Chief, and Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez was obtained by BETHOURN during meetings 26 January 1970 and 31 January respectively (some of the information on PRENDES was forwarded via DO BASE/NEW YORK 7403). The remainder of the information was obtained by FIGALAN during a meeting 1 February. Other information obtained by BETHOURN and FIGALAN from AMANVIL/1 on local subjects was forwarded by the referenced dispatch.

2. Copies of the attached have been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO office. "ELGIN" is the local code name used between this Base and LNERGO to designate AMANVIL/1.

3. The attached should be extracted to the appropriate 201 files. To facilitate this the 201 numbers are listed below:

Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201-330002)
Pedro Luis PINERO Kirin (201-824376)
Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)
Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-848505)
Victoria FERNANDEZ Padilla (201-340661)
Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez (201-812436)

All but FERNANDEZ and BALLESTER are DGI personnel.

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: H/W
Debriefing Results (5)

Howard G. FIGALAN

CS COPY

Distribution:
1ATT (2-WH/COG w/att   2-WH/MIAMI w/att   2-DO w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER URDA-4764	DATE FEB 12 1970 11 February 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-133/3

51

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 31 JANUARY AND 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary and DGI Center Chief. PRENDES is a highly intelligent and capable DGI officer who has some nine years experience in his trade. He is well-liked and respected by Manuel PINEIRO Losada ("Barba Roja"), former Chief of the DGI, and Ramon OROZA Naveran ("Demetrio"), currently Chief of U.S. operations in DGI Headquarters, particularly by the latter. PRENDES appears to be a fanatical revolutionary. He also is well-liked and respected by the staff of the DGI Center here, and he in turn is quick to single out each for praise--with the notable exception of Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, DGI officer and First Secretary. PRENDES seldom mentions PEREIRA, and Source concludes that he does not like or have much use for PEREIRA.

2. PRENDES' dislike for both Permanent Representative Ricardo ALARCON Quesada and Mrs. ALARCON is growing daily, and ALARCON's recall has become a fixation with PRENDES. While PRENDES is basically modest, his vanity emerges when discussing his own professional ability and accomplishments. Outwardly, he is anti-American, referring to Americans frequently as "nuestros enemigos". However, he is enjoying his tour in New York and obviously admires certain aspects of U.S. life. He has a large collection of American records, likes American clothes, etc.

3. PRENDES' wife, Teresita FERNANDEZ Arango, is scheduled to return home to Cuba permanently in June 1970. PRENDES plans to do the same in December 1970, after the next UN General Assembly ends. His two year tour will be up in September 1970. Teresita FERNANDEZ is popular with the CMUN personnel.

4. Source stated that PRENDES' father was uneducated (believed to be a fisherman), and his mother is a directress of a school in Matanzas. Source considers PRENDES a much more likeable type than the average Cuban intelligence officer. PRENDES is interested in the CMUN and its job as a whole, unlike his predecessor as Chief of the DGI Center, Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni ("an animal", according to Source).

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

1W ATT 1 to UNDA-4764

19-6-133/3

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Pedro Luis PINERO Kirin, Third Secretary. PINERO is the favorite of DGI Center Chief Orlando MENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary, because PINERO is hard-working and "audacious". Source believes that PINERO is the DGI Center officer specializing in the handling of Cuban exile agent operations; PINERO "disappears" from the CMUN for 2 to 3 days at a time, and Source speculated that PINERO might be traveling to Miami to contact DGI agents. PINERO also continues to be active at night in lower Manhattan, and Source thought that he might be either making new contacts amongst youth/student circles in Greenwich and East Villages, or seeing existing contacts in those locations; this, of course, is only speculation on Source's part.

2. PINERO is currently in a state of mental depression. Not only has he been working too hard, he also received a "Dear John" letter from Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, who had been a member of the Cuban UNGA Delegation in Fall 1969. This letter was hand-carried from Cuba to New York City in January 1970 by Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, a Cuban delegate to the Ninth Governing Council Session of the UN Development Programme. (PINERO is divorced from his wife in Cuba, and has two children by her; he and ARUCA had been planning marriage). Source thought that PINERO might return to Cuba soon for these reasons, as he has been here already for a little over two years.

3. According to comments made by Ramon OROZA Naveran, Chief of U.S. operations, DGI Headquarters, PINERO and Jose Raul VIERA Linares are considered by OROZA to be the two DGI officers here in the most danger of being declared persona non grata by the U. S. Government.

SOURCE [illegible]

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "[illegible]" ON 3 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Miguel Manuel SANTANA Frais, Attache. SANTANA's chief DGI duty is the purchase of electric and electronic instruments and components, mainly for shipment back to Cuba. SANTANA is an accomplished electrician and technician and is particularly knowledgeable re technical television matters. After Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, Third Secretary and DGI officer, SANTANA is the favorite of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez. SANTANA has done the electrical and technical work on the CMUN closed circuit television and alarm systems, and PRENDES has praised his work highly in this regard. Source thinks that some other Cuban Embassies abroad may install similar systems, and opined that the materials for same would be procured here by the CMUN and pouched either directly to the particular Embassy or via Havana. SANTANA would handle such procurement.

2. Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor. Source could offer little new information on VIERA and his intelligence activities. VIERA, not overly intelligent, has intellectual pretensions and likes to give people the impression that he is cultured and very well-read. VIERA has the responsibility within the CMUN (and the DGI Center) for handling U.S. citizens who wish to travel to Cuba; he handled the volunteers of the Venceremos Brigada who went to Cuba to assist in the sugar cane harvest. According to comments made by Ramon OROZA Naveran, Chief of U.S. operations, DGI Headquarters, VIERA and Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin are considered by OROZA to be the two DGI officers here in the most danger of being declared persona non grata by the U.S. Government; VIERA would be expelled mainly because of his involvement with U.S. citizens as indicated above.

3. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary. Source could offer little new information on RODRIGUEZ; the latter has always been very reserved with Source and seldom talks with him. Source is aware that RODRIGUEZ serves as the "official" CMUN/DGI contact with Jose Maria QUIMPER, a leftist Peruvian national employed in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, UN Secretariat. RODRIGUEZ also appears to handle much of the CMUN business with the local Prensa Latina office. As far as contacts go, RODRIGUEZ concentrates--at the UN at least--on Latin Americans.

Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, First Secretary. PEREIRA is not overly liked within the CMUN. He is servile to and afraid of DGI Center Chief Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez. Whereas PRENDES has remarked to Source in favorable terms about all his other Center staff personnel, PRENDES has seldom mentioned PEREIRA at all. Source concludes that PRENDES does not like or have much use for PEREIRA.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 1 FEBRUARY 1970

1. Mrs. Victoria FERNANDEZ Padilla, newly arrived Attache at the CMUN, was the subject of a squib passed to your office 23 January 1970. Source "ELGIN" provided the following information on FERNANDEZ on 1 February 1970.

2. FERNANDEZ will stay in New York City for probably about a three month period; while here she will be working on documents and files at the CMUN. In Havana, she is employed in the documents section of the International Organizations Directorate of MINREX. She had been scheduled to come here for three months for the same purpose in Fall 1969 during the XXIV UN General Assembly, but Cuban Permanent Representative ALARCON had objected so her travel was postponed. FERNANDEZ is billeted in the apartment (5 M, 220 East 63rd Street) previously occupied by Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache; GELABERT is staying temporarily with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary, in his apartment in Queens, 15 M, 61-15 97th Street, Elmhurst. Neither GELABERT nor RODRIGUEZ is happy over this turn of events. FERNANDEZ is married, but Source does not know anything about her husband.

3. FERNANDEZ is fat and ugly; she does not dress well. She is a mulatto. She is not known for her intelligence quotient. She has a somewhat rigid personality and does not get along well with people, male or female. She is convinced that she is discriminated against because she is part negro. FERNANDEZ considers herself as a revolutionary but does not seem to understand politics and ideologies. She takes herself extremely seriously. Within MINREX she is a "loner"; older than most of her female professional associates, she has nothing in common with them and her overbearing attitude is offensive to them. Source believes that it is almost a foregone conclusion that FERNANDEZ and Permanent Representative ALARCON will have a run-in, based on their respective personalities.

4. FERNANDEZ' brother, Oscar FERNANDEZ Padilla, is Vice-Minister for Labor Justice, Ministry of Labor. He is an "old guard" Communist, and Victoria FERNANDEZ is thus linked in some minds to the out-of-favor old guard herself.

5. In previous years Victoria FERNANDEZ has served as an instructress in the civil defense program. She has enjoyed being in a position of authority over those normally, outside the training program, her superiors in position and ability.

6. She has no known intelligence/security affiliations, but Source believes that she would be happy to collaborate with the DGI or DSE if so requested.

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 26 JANUARY 1970

Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, Cuban Government Official

1. Esperanza BALLESTER Fernandez, born 12 March 1927 in Havana, attended the Ninth Session of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Governing Council in New York City 19-27 January 1970.

2. At the present time BALLESTER is Chief, Technical Assistance Section, Directorate of International Organizations, Cuban Foreign Ministry. In January 1967 BALLESTER, as an Observer, attended the Third Session of the UNDP Governing Council in New York City; in January 1969 she attended the Seventh Session. She is not known to have any intelligence/security affiliation.

3. On 26 January 1970 Source "ELGIN" commented on BALLESTER as follows.

> While ostensibly an ardent revolutionary, BALLESTER does not really understand revolution and appears to be confused. Among other things, she is disturbed by the fact that her mother and brother left Cuba. The former is in Miami, but BALLESTER is reluctant to have any contact with her at this time because she fears the Cuban Government would misunderstand. Instead, BALLESTER is considering making a request for official Cuban Government authorization to meet her mother outside the U.S. at a later date.
>
> BALLESTER is a hard-working "bureaucrat" who attacks her work conscientiously. Her husband, Rafael MARTEL, is a well-known Cuban radiologist who currently is serving an 18 month tour in North Vietnam with a Cuban technical aid group. BALLESTER and MARTEL are quite wealthy, by Cuban standards, and both are undertaking their current jobs out of loyalty to Fidel.

19-6-133/3

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ACTION UNIT c/WH8

FILE, VR c/WSD c/DO4 c/FI2 c/CI c/EURS c/RF5

ACTION NO. 173

SECRET 202226Z JAN 72 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 7392

(MILESWORTH ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE DOMOPS

REF DIRECTOR -602301

23 JAN 72 IN 015755

1. CASE OFFICER FIGALAN HAS DISCUSSED JENNIFER ENID MILES, SUBJ REF, AND HER DGI ROLE WITH LOCAL LNERGO OFFICE. NOTE LNERGO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE HANDLING CASE. LOCAL LNERGO ONLY ON PERIPHERY, ALTHOUGH OP INVOLVES CUBAN OFFICER ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ. MILES BACK IN WASHINGTON AS OF MID JANUARY 72.

2. BASE WILL CONTINUE MONITOR MILES CASE THROUGH LOCAL LNERGO, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE HQS CONTINUING FORWARD TO US ALL LNERGO HQS DISSEMS THIS MATTER.

3. FILE 201-358915 (MILES), 201-332655 (RODRIGUEZ).

SECRET

SECRET

FBI doc. (X-ref.)
26 Jan. 70
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
12 Dec. 69 (Wash.)
Re: Jennifer Enid Miles
Bufile: (LA)-65-73121

FBI doc (X-ref)
9 Dec. 69
Re: Rodriguez-Lopez, Rogelio

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible]:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 13 JAN 70

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

13 23 32Z JAN 70

CITE DIRECTOR 002301

OTTAWA MADRID PARIS LONDON MEXICO CITY

INFO WH/MIAMI DO BASE NEW YORK PRETORIA

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE

Irish File
→ Vasques FYI

1. LNERCO HAS REQUESTED ANY INFO THAT COMES TO RVROCK'S ATTENTION RE TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES OF IDENTITY, KNOWN DGI AGENT. REPORTEDLY PLANNED FOLLOWING TRIP TO EUROPE: 24 DEC 69 WASHINGTON, D.C. TO CANADA. 27 DEC 69 CANADA TO MADRID WHERE SHE HAD EIGHT DAY RESERVATION AT UNNAMED HOTEL. THEN PLANNED FOUR DAYS IN PARIS AND FOUR DAYS IN LONDON PRIOR TO RETURNING TO WASHINGTON.

2. SUBJ TRAVELED TO CUBA FROM MEXICO CITY 22 DEC 67, RETURNING 25 MAR 68. IS PRESENTLY IN CONTACT WITH KNOWN DGI OFFICER STATIONED AT CUBAN UN MISSION, NYC (COPY OF 201 BEING POUCHED NEW YORK, TM #S074683).

3. SAME INFO AND REQUEST GIVEN TO LNERCO REPS AT ACTION ADDRESSEES BY THEIR HQS. PLS DO NOT QUERY LOCAL LIAISON.

4. FILE 201-860915.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Jennifer MILES

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR 002301

PAGE 2

C/WH/COG ________

C/EUR/BC ________

E/F Mr. Silsby (draft)

E/IB/S Mr. Sorrels (draft)

C/AF/COPS/CI Mr. Bergin (draft)

C/AF/2/SA Mr. Fuller (draft)

DC/WH/1 Mr. Tsikerdanos (draft)

C/CI/OPS/AF Mr. Caveadine (draft)

C/CI/OPS/WH Mr. Hughes (draft)

DO/I/B2 Mr. Markham (draft)

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

5
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COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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ORIG: J. MERTZ:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 13 JAN 70

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13 23 32 z JAN 70

CITE DIRECTOR 002302

TO OTTAWA MADRID PARIS LONDON MEXICO CITY

INFO WH/MIAMI DO BASE NEW YORK PRETORIA

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE

REF: DIRECTOR 002301

IDEN: JENNIFER ENID MILES.

DGI ALIAS: MARY; CIT: SOUTH AFRICA; DPOB: 6 MAY 44, KIMBERLY, SA.; HT: 5FT 9IN; WT: 130-135 LBS; HAIR: BLOND; EYES: BLUE; PP: "O" 20107 ISSUED 26 JUN 68, OTTAWA; OCC: SECRETARY AT SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, SINCE APR 69. PREVIOUSLY WORKED TORONTO AND LONDON BUT NOT AS EMPLOYEE OF SOUTH AFRICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG
C/EUR/BC
E/F Mr. Silsby (draft)
E/IB/S Mr. Sorrels (draft)
C/AF/COPS/CI Mr. Bergin (draft)
C/AF/2/SA Mr. Fuller (draft)
DC/WH/1 Mr. Tsikerdanos (draft)
C/CI/OPS/AF Mr. Caveadine (draft)
C/CI/OPS/WH Mr. Hughes (draft)
DO/I/B2 Mr. Markham (draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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1. [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible]
2. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If [illegible] insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN [illegible]

FROM:

[illegible]

Bettie

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION [illegible] ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. wt/Reg		31 OCT 1969	31/10	LLL
2. Wie/lips		Dale		
3. Brown				
4. ~~Cr[illegible]~~				P
5. Ennis			3/20	S
6. Harrister				
7. Piccolo				P
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MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RYBAT

File

FILE TITLE

TRAC REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 19-6-133/4
	INDEX	X	
DATE MICROFILMED			DOCUMENT DATE 23 Oct 69
			DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04684

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO
Chief, WH COG

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.
COS, WH MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM
Acting COB, New York UCOB

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE - Debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 on Cuban UN Mission and Delegation Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Extract for appropriate 201 files

Refs: a. UNDA-4675, 14 October 1969
b. UNDA-4676, 14 October 1969

1. Attached herewith for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI are two copies each of three memoranda concerning results of an 11 October 1969 debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 by Howard G. FIGALAN on CMUN and Delegation personalities. The meeting with AMCLOCK/1 was necessarily brief, and thus the results are not as extensive as those forwarded by the two referenced dispatches (from a 6 October meeting with AMCLOCK/1).

2. A copy of each of the memoranda has been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO Cuban Squad, per our existing informal arrangement. "ELGIN" is the code name for AMCLOCK/1 as used between the Base and LNERGO here.

3. Items should be extracted for the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Attachments:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH/COG, w/atts.
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI, w/atts.
2 - Chief, DO, wo/atts.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1 ATT

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4684	23 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-133/4

31

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 11 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN-UN MISSION PERSONALITIES

2R 201-834376

1. Pedro Luis PINERO Ervin, Third Secretary. ELGIN stated that PINERO continues to spend much of his time with Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso of the Cuban UNGA Delegation. ELGIN said that PINERO seems to have the approval of the DGI Center here for his modish dress and his excursions to Greenwich Village, et al. ELGIN assumed that PINERO is being used by the DGI Center to roam around town at night meeting new people in the hopes of developing U.S. contacts. Apparently PINERO's garb at times approaches that of a hippie. ✓

2C 201-815881

2. Pablo DRAKE Capiro, Attache-designate. DRAKE is scheduled to arrive here in late October to replace Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache and DSE code clerk. ELGIN did not recognize DRAKE's name and could furnish no information concerning him. 2C 201-351449 ✓

2C 201-853407

3. Jose Osvaldo GARCIA Calvo, Attache-designate. GARCIA had been scheduled to come here in July 1969 as an aide to Antonio DE SOUZA, CMUN Advisor. His wife, Nydya Irene ARROYO Martinez, was to have been a secretary to Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. ELGIN said that GARCIA and ARROYO will not be coming to New York; their assignment has been cancelled. ARROYO currently is working in the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX), but GARCIA has been sacked from MINREX and is now somewhere in the interior of Cuba. GARCIA fell into official disfavor because a girl friend of his denounced him to the DSE, either because GARCIA would not divorce his wife and marry her, or because she just became disenchanted with him for some reason. Moreover, GARCIA in his MINREX capacity had accompanied the British Ambassador in Cuba on a provincial tour several months ago. During the tour, the Ambassador, apparently favorably impressed by GARCIA, invited him to visit the United Kingdom. GARCIA neglected to report this invitation to the proper Cuban authorities, and when the fact of the invitation leaked out, GARCIA was suspended from MINREX.

4. MISCELLANEOUS. Although he naturally would not be aware of the specifics, ELGIN commented that it appears to him that the DGI Center here is extremely active operationally and seems to have more than enough funds at its disposal to pursue such activities.

MICROFILMED
OCT 31 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

16 ATT. 1 to UNDA-4684 CS COPY 19-6-133/4

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON [illegible] OCTOBER 1969

[illegible] RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, CMUN FIRST SECRETARY AND DGI OFFICER

1. ELGIN was shown the two photographs (as furnished by your office) of the individual believed to be Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, CMUN First Secretary and DGI officer, who was engaged in an intelligence activity in Queens on Saturday night, 4 October 1969. ELGIN identified the better of the two photographs as RODRIGUEZ; his identification was unhesitating. In questioning ELGIN further to be sure that he was positively convinced that the individual in question was RODRIGUEZ, ELGIN stated that RODRIGUEZ had recently had his hair cut and that it was now lying flatter on his head and that he was keeping it "slicked down" with water or oil. There was no doubt at all in ELGIN's mind that the individual was RODRIGUEZ. ELGIN has known RODRIGUEZ for several years and has seen him here this past month fairly frequently.

2. ELGIN could not furnish any information as to where RODRIGUEZ might have been over the week-end of 4/5 October. He did not see him on either of those two days.

3. ELGIN commented that RODRIGUEZ has been spending quite a bit of time lately with Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, an Alternate Representative of the Cuban UNGA Delegation. Their companionship is assumed by ELGIN to be more in the social line than in the professional line. RODRIGUEZ is a bachelor; FLORES is a divorcee.

SECRET

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[illegible] OCTOBER 1962

CUBAN UNGA DELEGATION PERSONALITIES

ZR 201-71533

1. [illegible] FERNANDEZ Vasquez, Advisor. ELGIN stated that he had seen very little of FERNANDEZ in the previous week, and could offer no new information on him or on his activities. FERNANDEZ seems to shun most of the Delegation and Mission personnel apart from his fellow DGI people.

ZR 201-333693

2. Augusto C. VEGA Hernandez, Advisor-designate. Although VEGA has been carried on the provisional Cuban Delegation listing, he has yet to appear here. ELGIN was not familiar with VEGA's name, but he commented that he had heard talk of another Advisor coming here in October; ELGIN thought that possibly this could be VEGA.

3. Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, Alternate Representative. FLORES has been spending quite a bit of time with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, CMUN First Secretary and DGI officer. RODRIGUEZ is also an Alternate Representative of the Delegation. Their companionship is assumed by ELGIN to be more in the social line than in the professional line.

SECRET

19-6-133/4

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665 019-500
SEX M DOB ? UNDA-04682
21 OCT 69
CIT ?
OCC ?
CMUN FIRST SECY AND DGI OFFICER,
ARRIVED JUN 69

R 6910300759

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

14-00000

[illegible] 18

DISPATCH

SECRET

X

TO: Chief, WH/COG

INFO: COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM: COB, New York

SUBJECT: TYPIC/[illegible]
Cuban Activity Reports, 1 July - 30 September 1969

Action Required: FYI, and abstracting to appropriate 201 files

Reference: UNDA-4583, 10 July 1969

1. Transmitted herewith for Chief, WH/COG, and COS, WH/MIAMI, are one copy each of the monthly Cuban activity reports prepared by the undersigned concerning operational activity against the official Cuban target in New York for the months of July, August, and September 1969.

2. It is suggested that abstracts be placed in the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Attachment:
Reports, as stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WH/COG, w/atts
2 - Chief, DO, w/o/atts.
2 - COS, WH/MIAMI, w/atts.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

CS COPY

OCT 2 [illegible]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4682	21 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-500

14-00000

SECRET

NYM-6825 2P

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM

Distribution:
1 - Unit A (DUMMY)
1 - Unit B (DUMMY)
1 - COB/MAR
③ - MGF

TO : Chief of Base

FROM : Howard G. FIGALAN

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/Operations
Western Hemisphere Targets, Group II: Cuba
Monthly Activities Report, July 1969

1. During July 1969 the writer continued in contact with AMBEDEW/3. No Intelligence Information Report disseminations sourced to AMBEDEW/1 were received from Headquarters during July, nor were any operational information squibs received. Results of the photos sent for identification by AMBEDEW/1 via UNDA-4574, 26 June, were not received by the end of July. Although AMBEDEW/1 was "surfaced" on 16 July, the Base was not advised of the vehicle by Headquarters until 23 July, after the Base had queried via DO BASE NEW YORK 6572. Fortunately, AMBEDEW/3 advised the Base of the media of surfacing prior to 23 July. The surfacing had minimal impact locally, as the vehicle chosen for the surfacing does not reach the local observer as would the New York Times, the New York Daily News, or the New York Post. With the turnover of AMBEDEW/1 to WODISH for resettlement, the case, for informational purposes, is closed.

2. 2P DO BASE NEW YORK 6607 concerned the effort to expel Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331833), CUMUN First Secretary and Deputy Chief of the DGI Center; and Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816433), Third Secretary and DGI officer; and the intent to deny a reentry visa to Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary and DGI officer, who is currently in Cuba on leave. Subsequently, BOZA left for Cuba on leave on 27 July; his wife already had returned to Cuba in June. Additionally, the following CUMUNers will be placed on "warning" status and liable to expulsion if any further illicit activities occur: Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376), Third Secretary and DGI officer; Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439), Attache and DGI officer; and Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), Counsellor and DGI officer.

3. Shortly before his departure on leave, Jorge REYES Vega introduced on 9 June Base asset WUHABIT/1 to REYES' "replacement" for the leave period. This turned out to be Orlando E. PEREIRA Gonzalez (201-848505), newly arrived First Secretary. The threesome lunched, and REYES did most of the talking, concentrating on the Cuban election to the Governing Council of the UN Development Programme. WUHABIT/1 did ascertain that PEREIRA spoke fair English and good Russian, and PEREIRA volunteered that he had spent two years in the Soviet Union (he was a First Secretary in

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SECRET

H/W ATT. 1 to UNDA-4682 19-500

the Cuban Embassy in Moscow 1967/1969. In introducing PEREIRA, REYES stressed that WUHABIT/1 should feel free to discuss any subject with him, and in turn told PEREIRA that he should call upon WUHABIT/1 whenever PEREIRA needed advice or help. While RYBCCK traces did not reveal any intelligence affiliation for PEREIRA, the Base and local LNERGO strongly suspect that PEREIRA is a DGI officer. His behavior in the future months will undoubtedly confirm or deny this.

4. The most noteworthy new arrival, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665), First Secretary and DGI officer, has been lying dormant since his arrival in early June. He is living, presumably temporarily, in the CMUN. Julio [illegible] GIL (201-851731), another new First Secretary, also has been quiet since his June arrival.

ZR

5. UNDA-4578, 3 July, transmitted a current listing of CMUN personnel to WH/Miami for use in debriefing AMCARD/1 as to any knowledge or acquaintanceship with any of them. The writer and EXTHOURN of WH/Miami discussed in New York on 1 July the possible move of AMCARD/1 to the New York area.

6. The month of July appeared to be a quiet one for both the legitimate CMUN personnel and the DGI Center.

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RYBAT

19-500

SECRET
RYBAT

[illegible]-6707

3 September 1969

MEMORANDUM

Distribution:
1 - Unit A (DUMMY)
1 - Unit B (DUMMY)
1 - COD/MAR
3 - HGF

TO : Chief of Base

FROM : Howard G. FIGALAN

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/Operational
Western Hemisphere Targets, Group II: Cuba
Monthly Activities Report, August 1969

1. AMBEDEW/1 arrived in the area for resettlement on 1 August 1969. Although WODISH is handling the administrative aspects of the resettlement, the writer is staying in periodic contact with AMBEDEW/1 and AMBEDEW/3 for future operational purposes (e.g., debriefing AMBEDEW/1 on new CMUN arrivals, etc.). Results of the last batch of photographs forwarded by UNDA-4574, 26 June, were received via DIRECTOR 25971 in early August.

2. On 20 August the UN Secretary General was briefed by the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN on the illicit activities of Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816438), CMUN Third Secretary and DGI officer, and Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331032), First Secretary and Deputy Chief of the DGI Center. The following morning, 21 August, the CMUN was advised by diplomatic note that ESPINOSA should expeditiously depart the U.S. and that BOZA (then in Cuba on leave) would not be allowed a reentry visa. Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary and DGI officer, also was requested to confine his activities to those related directly to his status as an officer of a mission to the UN. (See DO BASE NEW YORK 6763 for background.) The story surfaced in the press the following day, 22 August.

3. In mid-August LNERGO advised the writer that AMCLOCK/1 would be visiting the U.S. This was the first indication to RYROCK of his possible travel here this year.

4. On 30 August AMOELAY/1 arrived in the area for resettlement.

5. In late August the Base with local LNERGO monitored, for WH/MIAMI, the AMGAIT/1 matter involving Pedro Luis PINERO Kirin (201-824376), CMUN Third Secretary and DGI officer. We were all in agreed opinion that PINERO would not show up for the 28 August meeting as it had been laid on prior to the events cited in paragraph 2 above; we were correct as PINERO did not appear. See DO BASE NEW YORK 6792 for background. It is likely that the local DGI Center will remain more operationally quiet for a time because of the knocks taken by the DGI lately: the expulsion of Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, the defection of AMBEDEW/1, the expulsion of

SECRET
RYBAT

H/W ATT 2 to UNDA-4682

19-500

DOZA and ESPINOSA, and the defection of AMDELAY/1 all coming within the past six months.

6. In mid-September the Cuban Delegation to the 24th UN General Assembly will start arriving in sections. The first arrives on 11 September, the second 15 September, and the last on the 18th. Not surprisingly, the name of AMCURVE/1 (201-333971) is not among those coming. We doubt that he will be out for quite some time, if ever. The bulk of the Representatives, Alternate Representatives, and Advisors of the Delegation have been here before for General Assemblies. The distaff side will be well represented by Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, and Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida; the first two are well known to us from previous General Assemblies. Ramon OROZA Naveran, an Advisor of the Delegation, is well-known to us as a leading official of DGI Headquarters.

19-500

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665 201-858915
SEX M DOB ? UNDA-04679
21 OCT 69
CIT ?
OCC ?
TRANSMITTAL OF PHOTOS

UFA R 6910311045

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/~~AN~~ SD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
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COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/SD

Bettie

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]		29 OCT 1969	[illegible]	WA
2. [illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]
3. Brown				[illegible]
4. Pinda				P
5. Ernie				E
6. Mertz				[illegible]
7. Darryl Lucky				[illegible]
8. Piccolo				P
9. [illegible]			[illegible] 1969	RM
10.				
11. Piccolo				[illegible]
12. Mary				Mc
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OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RYBAT

Pike

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX X

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
19-6-133/4

DOCUMENT DATE
14 Oct 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UHDA 04675

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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TO
Chief, WH/COG

INFO.
COS, WH/MIAMI; Chief, DO

FROM
COB, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMLOSE
Debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 on Cuban UN Mission and Delegation Personalities

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Extract for appropriate 201 files

1. Attached herewith for C/WH/COG and COS/WH/MIAMI are two copies each of two memoranda concerning results of a 6 October 1969 debriefing of AMCLOCK/1 by Howard G. FIGALAN on Cuban UN Mission and UNGA Delegation personalities.

2. A copy of each of the two memoranda has been passed by FIGALAN to the local LNERGO Cuban Squad, per our existing informal agreement. "ELGIN" is the code name for AMCLOCK/1 as used between the Base and LNERGO here.

3. Results of the 6 October meeting concerning Marta JIMENEZ Martinez (201-784065) of the Cuban Delegation have been forwarded to above addressees by separate dispatch.

4. The writer anticipates that further and more detailed debriefing information on personalities of local interest to this Base and LNERGO will be forthcoming in future sessions with AMCLOCK/1.

5. Items should be extracted for the appropriate 201 files.

Howard G. FIGALAN

Distribution:
2-WH/COG, w/both atts.
2-WH/Miami, w/both atts
2-DO, w/o atts.

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OCT 28 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments:
As stated above

OCT 14 1969

COPY

2 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-4675	13 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 19-6-133/4

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INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 6 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN UN MISSION PERSONALITIES

All in USA as of 6 Oct 1969

ZR -- 201-850951

1. Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo, Counsellor. Source stated that MORALES has no intelligence/security affiliation. He is close to Fidel CASTRO Ruz. He is "very frivolous", not a serious type of person. Although MORALES is an Alternate Representative on the II Committee of the UNGA, he knows little about the issues or the work of the Committee. He has intellectual pretenses, but in actuality is of somewhat limited intellectual capacity. Does not take his work seriously. Source termed him a "tonto". Source is not aware whether MORALES has had any contacts with Cyrus EATON since MORALES' arrival here.

ZR 201-851731

2. Julio ALOM Gil, First Secretary. Source stated that ALOM has no intelligence/security affiliation. ALOM is very close to Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. ✓

ZR -- 201-843605

3. Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez, First Secretary. Source stated that PEREIRA is a DGI officer. He speaks a "little" Russian learned when he was assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Moscow. PEREIRA is a close associate of Manuel PINEIRO Losada, Chief of the DGI. PEREIRA is the DGI replacement for Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, former CMUN Counsellor; however, JIMENEZ' diplomatic replacement is Pedro Amado MORALES Carballo. Source does not personally like PEREIRA. Just before PEREIRA was assigned to New York he married Maria de los Angeles LOPEZ Canas. ✓ Until her marriage, LOPEZ served as secretary to the Chief of the Cuban Communist Youth Organization. She now works part-time in the CMUN as a teletype operator.

ZR -- 201-332665

4. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary. RODRIGUEZ is a bachelor, which Source stated is rare among DGI personnel assigned abroad. Source stated that RODRIGUEZ has a frank ✓ and open manner, also rare among DGI personnel.

ZR -- 201-850953

5. Florentino JIMENEZ Padron, Attache. Source stated that JIMENEZ has no intelligence/security affiliation. He is the CMUN chauffeur. Member of the Cuban Communist Party. A "campesino" type. Came to the Foreign Ministry as a chauffeur from the Cuban Armed Forces. JIMENEZ enjoys good personal relations with Foreign Minister Raul ROA, and is under ROA's "protection". ✓ During his assignment at the Cuban Embassy in Prague, JIMENEZ initiated a one-time sexual liaison with a local woman with

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H/W ATT 1 to UNDA-4675

19-6-133/4

the approval of the DGI Center. He continued the liaison, however, and the DGI Center complained to the Foreign Ministry; ROA bailed JIMENEZ out.

ZR 201-846371

6. Serafin GARCIA Rodriguez, Attache. GARCIA (who had arrived here in February 1969) has departed permanently from New York for Cuba.

ZR 201-824376

7. Pedro Luis PINERO Zirin, Third Secretary. Source stated that PINERO and Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, member of the Cuban UNGA Delegation, of late are always together, day and night. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez commented that one time Lohania did not return to her room until 0400 hours in the morning after having been with PINERO. Source assumes that PINERO and ARUCA are having an affair. (In 1967, during the UNGA, ARUCA and Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazarain, then CMUN Counsellor, were romantically involved; ARUCA expected RODRIGUEZ to divorce his wife and marry her -- he didn't).

ZR 201-839221

8. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache. Source was told by Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary, that GELABERT and his wife, Noida BLANDY Reyes, returned to Cuba at the direction of the CMUN because BLANDY was behaving promiscuously ("como una prostituta"). They plan to divorce. Source doubts that GELABERT will return to New York. Source did not know the person or persons with whom Noida BLANDY was sexually misbehaving. Source said that REYES commented to him that GELABERT appeared to be afraid of BLANDY.

9. MISCELLANEOUS

ZR 201-330002

(A) Source continues to regard Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary and Chief of the local DGI Center, as a very "simpatico" person. He also thinks well of Teresita FERNANDEZ Arango, PRENDES' wife, as a person. PRENDES spends little time outside of the CMUN. As Chief of the DGI Center he concerns himself principally with administration of the Center's personnel and operational activities, leaving conduct of actual operations to his subordinates.

ZR 201-328953

(B) Source thinks that Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor, may be acting as the deputy to PRENDES. At any rate, after PRENDES, the three ranking DGI personnel are VIERA, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, and Orlando PEREIRA Gonzalez (not necessarily in that order).

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201-836757

(C) Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Attache, and Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache, continue as the two code clerks.

201-351449

201-816439

(D) Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz, Attache, is very interested in radios. SANTANA is a "disagreeable person", and rarely speaks. Source is not sure whether SANTANA is with the DGI or the DSE.

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19-6-133/4

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 6 OCTOBER 1969

CUBAN UNGA DELEGATION PERSONALITIES

201-357128

1. HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio, Ambassador, and Enrique CAMEJO Argudin, Ambassador, are rooming together in the Peter Cooper Hotel. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Minister, Maria de los Angeles FLORES Prida, First Secretary, and Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, First Secretary, are rooming together at the Peter Cooper Hotel. Roberto Miguel FERNANDEZ Vasquez, Antonio Bruno FERNANDEZ Pajon, and Victor Manuel GONZALEZ Valdez, all Advisors, have moved from the Peter Cooper and are now staying in the apartment of Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, #5 M, 220 East 63rd Street. (It is possible that one of the Cuban diplomatic couriers is also staying in the GELABERT apartment as well). 201-79133

2. DELEGATION ADVISORS. All of the "Advisors" on the Delegation are with the DGI. Ramon OROZA Naveran, Manuel MARTINEZ Galan, and Raul Ceferino ZAYAS Linares have gone to Canada to "inspect" the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa; from there they will return to Cuba via Mexico. They do not plan to return to New York enroute home. Source thinks that the other three Advisors -- FERNANDEZ, FERNANDEZ, and GONZALEZ -- will remain in New York until the end of the UNGA. They are currently taking English lessons for several hours most mornings (place not known to Source). Source considers that these three are all "disagreeable" people -- very reserved and not at all friendly. Source considers Roberto FERNANDEZ Vasquez to be a "sinverguenza". 201-335771 201-33[illegible]

201-276104

3. MISCELLANEOUS. Carlos OLIVARES Sanchez, formerly Cuban Ambassador to the Soviet Union and formerly a high ranking official of the Foreign Ministry, may attend a later portion of the UNGA. OLIVARES is in Boston to have an eye operation at Massachusetts General Hospital. He may stop off in New York enroute back to Cuba. OLIVARES' influence in Cuba has been waning ever since Fidel CASTRO began replacing the "Old Guard Communists" with "Fidelistas".

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OCT 28 1969
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H/W ATT. 2 to UNDA-4675

19-6-133/4

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
AKA ROGELIO
INFO AS REPORTED IN DEBRIEFING OF SUBJ OF
201-815358

019-005-034
316 -0312069
02 SEP 69
P41

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FILE IN 201-332665

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

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RODRIGUEZ / LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB C 35

CIT ?
OCC ?
ADDITIONAL INFO AND TRACES

201-334253
UFAA-01145A01
31 JUL 69
P2

R 6908060705

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc,
30 July '69 (Wash.)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
no Bufile given

23 JUN 1969

ASSIGNED AGENT: C. JOHNSON 6/19/69
AX File #: 105-RC

NAME: LOPEZ, ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ
AKA's

DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: 5/3/42, Havana, Cuba.
SEX:

CITIZENSHIP:

FOREIGN TRAVEL & DATES:

Ref Jak

6-24-69

IDENTIFICATION #'s

NAI to, CSCI-316/00696-64 dated 25 August 1964, subject: shipment of Explosives to Mexico and CSCI-3/782,061 dated 29 June 1964, subject ~~[illegible]~~ as above.

ADDRESSES:

OCCUPATION & EMPLOYMENT & DATES

9-10/67, Technical Aide of the Cuban Government at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly of the UN.

RELATIVES:

24 JUN 1969

104-10180-10050

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, USC Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY MEXICO CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/552,869

SUBJECT NAMES AND PASSPORT NUMBERS OF CUBANS FLYING FROM HABANA TO MEXICO CITY

DATE DISTR. 10 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

TRAVEL

REFERENCES IN 76244

DATE OF INFO. 6 & 8 JULY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (9 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7504

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PERSONS (B) WITH GOOD ACCESS TO TRAVEL INFORMATION.

1. TRAVEL DATA SHOWS THE FOLLOWING CUBANS ARRIVED IN MEXICO CITY FROM HABANA VIA AIR ON THE DATES INDICATED: 6 JULY 1963: ALICIA FERNANDEZ ESTEVES, PP NO 23747; MARTA MARTINEZ GARCIA, PP NO E/63/389; RAFAELA CHACON MARDI, PP NO E/63/388; AGUSTIN YASELLS GONZALEZ, PP NO DIPLOMATIC D/61/509; MARIO OIZ FOLGUEIRA, PP NO DIPLOMATIC D/63/447; IRMA MILAN OLIVERA, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/433; FIDEL ARMONA Mila MILAN, INFANT, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/433; SILVIA B. REYNES MONTES DE OCA, PP NO 32489; MARTHA CABALLER DARDER, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/432; ~~MARTHA CONCEPCION, INFANT,~~ DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/432; RAUL A. MACUER Parra PARRA, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/451; RAUL PEREIRA VAZQUEZ, PP NO E/ RODRIGUEZ, INFANT, PP NO 63/456; ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/454 AND ESTER GAVILAN ROGALES, DIPLOMATIC PP NO D/63/455.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCSO CINCLANT.

His wife

14-00000

RODRIGUEZ (Lopez) Rogelio

CUBA

The September 2nd issue of the Diario Oficial of the Government of Mexico reveals several changes in the personnel of the Cuban Embassy during the month of August. New arrivals were Raul APARICIO Nogales, Counselor for Cultural Affairs, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary, and Elpidio [illegible] Conesaños, Attaché. The single departure during the month was Armando SARDIÑAS Garcia, Attaché.

13 Sept 1963
Mexico A-336

UNCLASSIFIED

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RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Rogelio

DELEGATE TO MEXICAN NATIONAL ACADEMY OF MEDICINE INTERVIEWED -- Havana, Hoy, 15 May 64

Pedro Baeza, Cuban delegate to the Centenary celebration of the National Academy of Mexico, was interviewed upon his return to Havana. The most important event at the celebration, he told reporters, was his meeting with US scientist Linus Pauling who wishes to visit Cuba.

BOLIVIAN DELEGATE TO LABOR DAY CELEBRATION LAUDS REVOLUTION -- Havana, Hoy, 20 May 64

Paulino Tito Calle, secretary for foreign affairs of the Agrarian Workers Union of Canton Coyana, Aroma Province of La Paz Department, Bolivia, praised the Cuban Revolution and branded as false the propaganda against it. He is a member of the Bolivian delegation to the Cuban celebration of Labor Day which included Alejandro Silva and Mario Cortes.

SECOND SECRETARY RETURNS TO MEXICO CITY POST -- Havana, Hoy, 17 May 64

13F

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, second secretary in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, left Havana by plane for Mexico City to resume his post.

AMBASSADOR TO UN DEPARTS FOR NEW YORK -- Havana, Revolucion, 19 May 64

Ambassador to the UN Carlos M. Lechuga, accompanied by his wife Gladys Lauderman and daughter Miriam, left Havana for New York City to resume his post on 18 May.

SINGER TOURS COMMUNIST CHINA CITIES -- Havana, Revolucion, 19 May 64

Cuban singer Miriam Acevedo, who sang in various cities in the Soviet Union, is currently appearing in various cities in Communist China such as Peiping, Nanking, and Shanghai. While in the latter city, she was visited by Cuban students.

FDD Sum No 5706 ; Date 10 Jun 64
Press Info on Cuba No 151 ; OOO

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED

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MICROFILM

TO Chief of ~~
INFO Chief of Station, WH/Miami
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMBEDEW Rogelio RODRIQUEZ Lopez
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Reference your telephone request of 24 June 1969 requesting a photograph of Eugelio RODRIGUEZ which is better than the one appearing in the Cuban Mugbook, it is believed that Subject of your request is Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, whose photograph is included in the Mugbook. There is no photograph of Eugelio RODRIGUEZ.

2. Forwarded herewith for your retention is a photograph of Rogelio *RODRIQUEZ Lopez, recently designated First Secretary, CMUN, who was scheduled to travel to New York via Mexico in early June 1969. Unfortunately, this photograph is little, if any, better than the one in the Cuban Mugbook. It is the only other photograph available at Headquarters.

3. AMBEDEW-1 has been shown and has positively identified the attached photo as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, a DGI officer in Section III who was known to AMBEDEW-1 as "Rogelio." A-1 last saw Rogelio in Paris on 21 November 1968, at which time Rogelio was enroute to Conakry on what A-1 thought to be an important mission. It appeared that someone in Conakry could not leave until Rogelio arrived. A-1 understood that Rogelio had been in the UN Mission in New York, or in Canada, in 1964-65.

4. The above information may be passed to LNERGO.

Olive S. ECKHOLM

Distribution:
2 - COB, New York, att. h/w
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DATE 3 JUL 1969
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HQS FILE NUMBER 201-332665 ✓

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COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips
DO/I/B2		

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL C/DO DATE OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Gordon Jorgensen

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION MFG. 11-65 (40)

DISPATCH

Dept. of State
27 June 64
A-1517
Re: Changes in Soviet Bloc Diplomatic
Personnel in Mexico

FBI doc. (X-ref)
4 Jun 69
Re: Rodriguez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
27 May 69 (Wash)
Re: Cuban Mission to the U.N.

WK

ORIG: DARYL GEISLER:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 5061 R. 1457
DATE: 24 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. R.IAN DO 4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 25 14 57Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 96045

TO DO BASE NEW YORK INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 6232 (IN 37470)

1. FOLLOWING TRACES ON ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SUBSEQUENT SEPT 67:

A. LNREAD ([redacted]) DOCUMENT REPORTED HE SON OF LONG TIME MEMBER OF PARTIDO SOCIALISTA POPULAR. MARRIED TO ESTER GAVILAN NOGALES (DBC 2003, 30 NOVEMBER 67).

B. QUTIMID 15 SEPTEMBER 68 SAID RODRIGUEZ ARRIVING MADRID FOLLOWING DAY IN TRANSIT TO GUINEA ~~(POSSIBLY SPANISH GUINEA)~~ AND THAT HE TRAVELING WITHOUT VISA BECAUSE HAD TO LEAVE HAVANA IN HURRY.

C. AMBEDEW/1 REPORTED THAT RODRIGUEZ WAS DGI OFFICER IN SECTION III (NORTH AMERICA AND SOVIET BLOC). SAW HIM ON 21 NOVEMBER 68. WAS GOING TO CONAKRY ON IMPORTANT MISSION. APPEARED THAT SOMEONE COULD NOT LEAVE CONAKRY UNTIL HE ARRIVED.

D. FOLLOWING TRAVEL AVAILABLE RODRIGUEZ FROM 67 TO PRESENT: 12 JUNE 67 CUBA-MEXICO; MEXICO - CUBA 19 JUNE 67; CUBA- MEXICO 19 SEPT 67 (I); MEXICO - UNNY 18 SEPTEMBER 67 (I); CUBA - BWIN 18 SEPTEMBER

201-332665
25 April 69

Index X

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DATE: APR 29 12 46 PM '69

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE TWO

1967; BWIN - UNNY APRIL 68 (I); CUBA - SPAIN 19 SEPTEMBER 68; FRANCE - CSR 4 OCTOBER 68.

END OF MESSAGE

MAY 19 69
JAR

T W L O'Brien
GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG
DO/I/B2 ✓
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET 221551Z APR 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 3630 WMIM 22 APR 69 IN 41615 C

DO BASE NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF: DO BASE NEW YORK 6232 (IN 37470)

1. NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES ROGILIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 1967.

2. FILE 201-332665.

SECRET

AN FE

AB X

[illegible]

FI

WH/COP

CS COPY

201-332665
22 april 69

SECRET

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16 Apr 69 IN 37470

S E C R E T 162059Z APR 69 CITE DO BASE NEW YORK 6232

NYDO

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC DOMOPS AMROSE

REF DO BASE NEW YORK 4322

1. CUBAN UN MISSION HAS REQUESTED VISA BE AUTHORIZED MEXICO CITY FOR ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), DESIGNATED FIRST SECRETARY NEW YORK. RODRIGUEZ IS WELL KNOWN DGI OFFICER. AS ADDEES WILL RECALL FROM REF, RODRIGUEZ WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR ASSIGNMENT HERE APRIL 68 BUT NEVER CAME.

2. REQUEST ADDEES UPDATED TRACES (INCLUDING AMOT) SUBSEQUENT JMWAVE 9521 AND UNDW 1832, BOTH DATED SEPTEMBER 67.

3. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

AN
AD X
WH/C/OP

CS COPY

201-332665
16 April 1969

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: CIA

FROM:

DATE

FULL NAME (Married women include maiden name)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

ALIASES, NICKNAMES

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
May 3, 1942
Havana

HOME ADDRESS
previous check 4/23/63

SEX
m

CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

MARITAL STATUS

SPOUSE'S NAME

OCCUPATION

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

Will apply Amembassy Mexico for visa as First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the UN

201

Vol
4/17/69

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE
Visa Office

DATE
4/16/69

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER
SCA:VO:BKDuncan

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM

RODRIGUEZ, Rogelio (Lopez)

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NAI
TO CSCI-3/782,061
dtd 29 Jun 64. subj.
as above.

WH/C/OP

24 Apr 69

201-332665

17 APR 1969

FORM 9-65 DS-939

FBI doc.
28 Oct. 68 (NY).
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez
Bufile: 105-130905
NY - 105-91642

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [illegible]CECC				Wa
2. [illegible]		1 NOV 1968		
3. [illegible]		4 NOV 1968		
4. SelC		[illegible]	5 Nov	
5. ERRIS		6 NOV 1968		
6. MeT		14 NOV 1968		
7. Daryl				
8. Nancy		14 NOV 1968		
9. [illegible]				
10. W. King		14 NOV 1968		K
11.				
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17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX X

DATE MICROFILMED

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 200-9-52

DOCUMENT DATE 25 Oct 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04161

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH/Cuba

INFO.
Chief, DO

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
TYPIC/DOMOPS/AMCLOCK
C Transmittal of Information on Official Cuban Community in New York

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Index, if necessary; extract information to appropriate 201 files

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 5174

1. As indicated in the reference, the undersigned met with Subject on 19 October 1968 for the purpose of debriefing him on items of local interest to the Base and LNERGO.

2. Attached herewith is the information obtained at that meeting, broken down on separate sheets by major topics:

A) Cuban UN Mission (CMUN) personnel;

B) Cuban personalities of local interest (but who are not now in New York);

C) Physical lay-out of the CMUN;

D) Miscellaneous information on the official Cuban community;

E) Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UNGA.

MICROFILMED
NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

3. Perhaps the most interesting items are the following:

A) Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- 330032 ?) appears to be the new chief of the DGI contingent within the CMUN, with Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832) probably serving as the deputy; Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953) and Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244) follow as the third and fourth ranking DGI officers;

1 att

ATTACHMENT:
1-3 copies per para 2 above, att. h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
2-C/DO, w/o att
3-C/WH/C, w/ 3 cc of att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-19-5-42

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-4161

DATE
22 October 1968
OCT 25 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-9-52
19-500

B) There are apparently now two code clerks in the CMUN;

C) The physical lay-out of the CMUN;

D) The proportion of intelligence/security personnel within the CMUN (this information updates that given in UNDA-4116, 23 September 1968).

4. It is suggested that Headquarters extract appropriate items for the respective 201 files, particularly the intelligence/security personnel. To facilitate this process, the following individuals are mentioned in the attachments (201 numbers shown where known):

Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244)
Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953)
Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (201-787157)
Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832)
Carlos MORALES Quevedo (201-777568)
Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- ?) 201-310002
Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376)
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)
Cecilia ANDRE Sardain (201 - ?) 201-8[illegible]
Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz (201-816439)
Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez (201- ?) 201-839021
Rafael AGUILERA Batista (201-351449)
Rolando PEREZ Alfonso (201- ?) 201-836757
Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437)
Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazarain (201-804011)
Marta JIMENEZ Martinez (201-784065)
Alfonso VILLACORTA (201- ?) 201-773477
Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez (201-766981)
Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio (201-357128)
Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez (201-333971)

5. Copies of the attachment were passed to the local LNERGO office by the undersigned. ELGIN is the code name for Source in dealings with local LNERGO.

Howard G. FIGALAN

14-00000

7P

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN UNITED NATIONS MISSION (CMUN) PERSONNEL

201-749244

1. Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar, Counsellor. JIMENEZ was promoted to Counsellor in July 1968 because, according to Source's opinion, this rank would give him more status in his overt responsibility for economic and UN Development Programme matters. Source believes that JIMENEZ is now the fourth ranking DGI officer in the CMUN behind PRENDES, BOZA, and VIERA. Source considers JIMENEZ to be the most sophisticated officer in the CMUN.

201-328153

2. Jose Raul VIERA Linares, Counsellor. Source believes that VIERA is now the third ranking DGI officer in the CMUN behind PRENDES and BOZA. Source thinks that VIERA will be transferred back to Cuba soon, probably in December 1968.

NOV 1 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-757157

3. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez, Counsellor-designate. Source stated that the Foreign Ministry has cancelled the assignment of BOLANOS. He definitely will not be coming to New York.

201-331832

4. Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary. Source believes (but does not have positive proof) that BOZA is now the Deputy Chief of the DGI contingent in the CMUN, behind PRENDES. BOZA specializes in "Black Power" matters. Source said that BOZA is now occupying the apartment formerly lived in by Carlos MORALES Quevedo, First Secretary, and his family. The wife of BOZA, Adamina VASQUEZ Caparo, currently is working in the CMUN as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON. Source believes that the assignment here of BOZA means greater emphasis is to be placed on "Black Power" matters.

201-777565

5. Carlos MORALES Quevedo, First Secretary. Source stated that MORALES has reservations to leave New York enroute to Cuba 18 December 1968. Since the departure in early October of his family, MORALES has been living in the CMUN.

201-336002

6. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez, First Secretary. Source is positive that PRENDES is now the Chief of the DGI contingent within the CMUN. Source also stated that in such capacity, PRENDES also would be responsible for DGI activities in Canada.

201-824376

7. Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, Third Secretary. Source believes, based on stories that he had heard in Cuba, that PINERO is a DGI officer.

CS COPY

201-833265

8. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, First Secretary-designate. Source does not know RODRIGUEZ or anything about him. RODRIGUEZ was scheduled to come to New York some months ago; it would seem that he is not coming at this point. RODRIGUEZ amply has been documented as a DGI officer through other sources.

201-873421

9. Cecilia ANDRE Sandain, Second Secretary-designate. Source does not know ANDRE, who was scheduled to come at the same time as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. Source thought ANDRE might be the wife of Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (paragraph 3 above), as he thought BOLANOS' wife was named Cecilia, whom Source knew to be employed as a staff officer in the Cuban Embassy in London during BOLANOS' assignment there.

201-816439

10. Miguel Manuel SANTANA Fraiz, Attache. Source, who had identified SANTANA as a DGI officer in November 1967, now states that he is not sure whether he is with the DGI or with the DSE. Source thinks that he is probably with the DGI. Source said that the wife of SANTANA will return here late October.

201-839221

11. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez, Attache. Source stated that GELABERT is with the DSE. He replaced Ramon MARTINEZ Suarez as the "Portero" of the CMUN.

201-351449

12. Rafael AGUILERA Batista, Attache. Source confirmed that AGUILERA replaced Roberto GUERRA Gonzalez as a code clerk.

201-836757

13. Rolando PEREZ Alfonso, Attache. Source stated that there are now two code clerks in the CMUN; by process of elimination, it would appear that PEREZ might well be the second one (Source did not know the name of the other code clerk).

14. CLERICAL EMPLOYEES. In addition to Adamina VASQUEZ Caparo (wife of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Cato, First Secretary) who works as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON, and Mercedes SALGADO Hernandez (wife of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary) who is the Telex operator, Source believes that two other wives of CMUN officers also work part-time in the CMUN. One of these females is pregnant, and may be married to one of the code clerks. Source thinks that the other might be the wife of Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin, Third Secretary (her name is Juana CRUZ Fernandez), but was not at all sure of this identification.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN PERSONALITIES OF LOCAL INTEREST, BUT NOT NOW IN NEW YORK

201-869011

1. Nicolas RODRIGUEZ Astiazaraín, Former CMUN Counsellor. Source stated that RODRIGUEZ is now the head of the Czech (and possibly the Hungarian) Desk, Directorate of "Socialist Countries", Foreign Ministry. He is now divorced from his wife, Magaly MESTRE Pintado, and reportedly will marry Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso, who was a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 22nd UN General Assembly in the Fall of 1967. RODRIGUEZ was not in any known difficulties or trouble when he returned to Cuba in early March 1968; he did do a short stint of "voluntary" cane-cutting after his return, but this is particularly required of members of the Cuban CP (of which he has been a member for some 4 years).

201-784665

2. Marta JIMENEZ Martínez, Member of Cuban 22nd UNGA Delegation. Source does not believe that JIMENEZ will attend any portion of the 23rd UNGA this year. She is the Deputy Chief of the Directorate of International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry; since the Chief of that Directorate is in New York for the 23rd UNGA, Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez, Source believes that JIMENEZ could not be absent from Cuba at the same time. Source stated that JIMENEZ is very close to Fidel CASTRO, and at times has by-passed Foreign Minister Raul ROA to go directly to Fidel on certain questions.

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

PHYSICAL LAY-OUT OF THE CUBAN UN MISSION (CMUN)

1. BASEMENT -- contains a kitchen and storage rooms.

2. GROUND FLOOR -- reception area; archives of unclassified UN (mostly) documents and papers; telex machine room; offices of Justo César GELABERT Martinez, Attache, and Mercedes SALGADO Hernandez (wife of Jorge REYES Vega, Second Secretary). GELABERT, a member of DSE, replaced Ramon MARTINEZ Suarez as "Portero" of the CMUN. SALGADO (reported last year by the same Source as a member of the DSE) is the Telex operator.

3. SECOND FLOOR -- office of Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (runs along the front side of the CMUN on East 67th Street); reception salon for visitors; large office occupied by Antonio DE SOUZA Carvajal, Advisor; smaller office occupied by Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen, Attache, and Adamina VASQÚEZ Caparo (wife of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary). VASQUEZ is acting as secretary to Ambassador ALARCON.

4. THIRD FLOOR -- mostly living quarters; large common room; library; Rolando CONDE Figueredo, Attache (who is the chauffeur), lives on this floor; there are also several offices, occupants unknown.

5. FOURTH FLOOR -- entire floor is occupied by DGI personnel. (Last year, the Source reported that the DGI occupied the third floor; what Source actually meant was that the DGI had the third floor per European style of reference, which is the American fourth floor).

6. FIFTH FLOOR -- more living quarters (presumably the residential occupants of the CMUN, other than CONDE, live on this floor).

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION ON OFFICIAL CUBAN COMMUNITY

201-773477

1. Alfonso VILLACORTA, Prensa Latina. Source stated that VILLACORTA is disgusted with the Cuban regime, but has stayed on with Prensa Latina here because his brother is in prison in Cuba. Source believes that VILLACORTA would defect were his brother ever able to get out of Cuba. VILLACORTA cordially dislikes the CMUN and its personnel. VILLACORTA, who has been reportedly pro-Chinese in the past, has no deep political convictions, according to Source. Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez, a member of the Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UN General Assembly this year, has spent quite a bit of time with VILLACORTA in the past month. Source thinks that VILLACORTA may be homosexual.

2. Relations between the CMUN and the local Prensa Latina Office. Source said that relations between the two offices continue to be marked with ill-feeling on both sides. The CMUN personnel look down on the two Prensa Latina employees, and the latter are well aware of this condescending attitude.

3. CMUN Morale. Source claimed that morale is high within the CMUN regarding Cuba's current status in the world. In response to a question as to whether VIERA and JIMENEZ resented the arrival of PRENDES and BOZA, and the consequent "demotion" of the first two within the DGI hierarchy here, Source indicated that he had seen no manifestations of resentment on the part of either VIERA or JIMENEZ. Source believed that this was mainly because both PRENDES and BOZA have long been senior to VIERA and JIMENEZ.

4. Proportion of Intel/Security Personnel within the CMUN. Of the 16 officers of the CMUN, 12 are believed to be affiliated with either the DGI, DSE, or DIER (the affiliation now thought for the code clerks). PRENDES, BOZA, VIERA, JIMENEZ, MORALES, and REYES are known to be DGI officers. PINERO is a presumed DGI officer. SANTANA is either DGI or DSE. ESPINOSA and GELABERT are known DSE. AGUILERA is known to be either DSE or DIER (Investigations Department of the Rebel Army). PEREZ is suspect DSE or DIER. Only four CMUN personnel are without any intelligence or security affiliation: Ambassador ALARCON, DE SOUZA, PLAZA, and CONDE.

SECRET

INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM SOURCE "ELGIN" ON 19 OCTOBER 68

CUBAN PERSONALITIES, 23rd UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DELEGATION

201-766981

1. Jose FERNANDEZ COSSIO Rodriguez. Director of International Organizations, Cuban Foreign Ministry. Now gets along well with Foreign Minister Raul ROA, but at one time he led the "anti-ROA Mafia" within the Ministry. Major ambition at this time is to become an Ambassador in one of the more prestigious posts abroad. Interestingly, he is a distant relative of Raul ROA. Has been a member of the Cuban CP for 4/5 years. Source said that FERNANDEZ COSSIO is "making a career of Communism", meaning that he makes the system work for him but is not ideologically oriented. He is a "loner", and his only real friend is the head of Directorate of Socialist Countries of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, who once saved the life of FERNANDEZ COSSIO during BATISTA days. Source terms FERNANDEZ COSSIO a superficial person, not an intellectual type, and interested in living comfortably and having money to spend.

201-357138

2. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio. Not pro-Communist and not really pro-CASTRO. A political rationalizer who is happy with the regime that allows him to lead his own life. Would not consider defection unless the regime changed its attitude toward him, which is not likely, according to Source.

201-333971

3. Jose Antonio RABAZA Vasquez. RABAZA is, in Source's belief, a homosexual (consistent with other reporting on RABAZA). He works in International Organizations of the Foreign Ministry under Marta JIMENEZ Martinez, Deputy Chief. While in New York, RABAZA has been very friendly with Alfonso VILLACORTA of the local Prensa Latina office. Source believes that VILLACORTA at least has tendencies toward homosexuality himself. RABAZA is very close to Osmani CIENFUEGOS in Cuba, and the latter has protected him in the Foreign Ministry (other reporting has indicated that RABAZA found himself in difficulties with the regime after an assignment in Rome; he spent close to a year in prison). According to Source, CIENFUEGOS spoke up for RABAZA and this is why he still is in the Foreign Ministry. RABAZA does not associate with others in the Delegation or in the CMUN; he spends little time in the UN Delegates Lounge, contrary to others in the Delegation. Source characterized his behavior as "mysterious", and suspects that RABAZA may be practicing his sexual proclivities here. He is well-educated and speaks several languages. He considers himself to be a good poet.

S E C R E T

4. Technical Assistants of the Delegation. Source stated that all of the Technical Assistants of the Delegation are members of the DGI, the external intelligence service. All have now departed New York. During their stay, Source observed that all spent their time with DGI officers assigned to the CMUN. The only Technical Assistants personally known by Source are Ramon SANCHEZ-PARODI Montoto, Alvaro TAMAYO Fonseca, Rene VALENZUELA Acebal, and Eduardo ARAOZ Agero. Source did not know of any specific duties or missions of any of the Technical Assistants. He commented that TAMAYO was a close friend of Alberto BOZA Hidalgo-Gato, First Secretary of the CMUN, who specializes in "Black Power" matters in New York. Source does not know if any more Technical Assistants will come to New York during the 23rd UNGA.

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18 OCT 68 IN 16325

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11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

201-009239
UNDA-03263A02
16 OCT 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE TRIP TO NEW YORK AS CITED BY SUBJ
OF 201-009397

WAS RYBAT

R 6903032527

FILE IN 201-332665

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FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

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UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 16 OCTOBER 1968

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CITE DIRECTOR 42495

TO MADRID INFO: LONDON 17 17 27Z OCT 68

TYPIC

BT.

REF: LONDON 7682 (BEING RELAYED MADRID)* (IN 13417)

1. REQUEST MADRID CABLE NAMES AND TRAVEL DATA ALL CUBAN COURIERS OR EMBASSY INSPECTORS WHO HAVE ARRIVED OR DEPARTED MADRID SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER 68. AUDIO TECHNICIANS KNOWN USE THIS COVER WHEN TRAVELLING ABROAD ON SWEEPING MISSIONS.

2. NOTE THAT ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ ARRIVED MADRID 19 SEPT 68 PER MADRID-6153. RODRIGUEZ IDENTIFIED BY AMCLOCK/1 OCT 67 AS CUBAN EMBASSY INSPECTOR. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY DETAILS AVAILABLE ONWARD TRAVEL BY RODRIGUEZ AFTER ARRIVAL SPAIN. MADRID-6211 INDICATED HE PLANNED ARRIVE MADRID 16 SEPTEMBER IN TRANSIT GUINEA. CAN THIS BE CONFIRMED?

3. LONDON: TO ASSIST IN EFFORT IDENTIFY PERSONS WHO CONDUCTED SWEEP, SUGGEST SMOTH BE QUERIED FOR NAMES ALL CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE ARRIVED UK SINCE MID-SEPTEMBER 68.

4. FILE 201-332665.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

201-332665
17 Oct 1968

AN CC
AB X
IN
TS
PI

WH/COG/COMMENT: *Reported unknown persons conducted sweep of new Cuban Embassy building London during period 3-9 Oct 68;

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DATE:

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FILE , VR

PAGE TWO
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 42445

TO

SMOTH requested info re possible identities of persons who conducted sweep.

C/WH/COG
EUR/CUBA
EUR/BC/UK Ed Wilt (phone)

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO
FILE. VR. c/[illegible], c/wh6, c/fi/ey, c/ci, c/fi 2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
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S E C R E T 101134Z OCT 68 CITE MADRID 6310 MADR

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY 10OCT68 IN 39311

~~NYBAT~~ TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 1158 (IN 04422)

1. QUAXE-1 REPORTED DEPARTURE THELMA ESTHER (KING) HARRISON FOR CUBA ON IBERIA FLIGHT 941, 9 OCTOBER. KING NEITHER MET NOR ACCOMPANIED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS. QUAXE-1 SAID THAT KING NOT IN TRANSIT WHEN BOARDED AIRCRAFT THUS PROBABLY ARRIVED MADRID 7 OR 8 OCTOBER. WE WILL CHECK QUTIMID AND QUDOZE FOR ANY ACTIVITY.

2. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

B 7

EXD	SI	WH/C66
FB	~~DUST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Destroy

Signed:

R.O. #463 - Unit WH/2/Panama

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate

CS COPY

10 Oct 68
201-332665

SECRET

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INFO
FILE, VR. C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2, DDP, ADDP, C/OBR

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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S E C R E T 022115Z OCT 68 CITE JMCOBRA 1158

PANAMA CITY, MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

2 OCT 68 IN 04422

MADRID

~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC

(IN 04307)

REF: MADRID 6211 (NOT SENT PANAMA CITY)

1. LNERGO ADVISED STATION 2 OCTOBER THELMA KING TRANSITED MIAMI 29 SEPTEMBER TO CATCH PANAM FLIGHT 114 FROM NEW YORK TO PARIS. HER TRAVEL INTERESTING IN LIGHT TRAVEL ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PER REF, AND STATION WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO FROM MADRID.

2. FOR PANAMA: STATION FILES REFLECT ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ A DGI CASE OFFICER, WHO HAS HAD CONTACT WITH LATIN AMERICANS IN THE PAST, AMONG THEM THELMA KING.

3. FILE 201-332665.

S E C R E T

WE
WH/C/DP

B-7

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized:
Desensitize

Signed:

R.O. #463 - Unit WH/2/Panama

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

SECRET

2 Oct 68
201-332665

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY zd PER

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☐ RID COPY

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR. WH-8, EUR-6, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

RC	G AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
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SECRET 021701Z OCT 68 CITE MADRID 0211

mace

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

2OCT68 IN 04307

TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 1122 (IN 02373)

1. QUTIMID 15 SEPTEMBER SAID THAT RODRIGUEZ ARRIVING MADRID FOLLOWING DAY IN TRANSIT TO GUINEA (POSS SPANISH GUINE

. REPORT ALSO SAYS THAT RODRIGUEZ TRAVELLING WITHOUT VISA BECAUSE HAD TO LEAVE HAVANA IN HURRY. NAME DOES NOT SHOW ON QUOTA TRAVEL LISTS.

3.7.

2. FILE 201-332665.

SECRET

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201-332665
2 Oct 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION

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GROUP 1

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 301530Z SEP 68 CITE JMCOBRA 1122

30 SEP 68 IN 02373

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 6153 (IN 00361)

1. ADVISE ANY INFO ACTIVITIES REF SUBJ AND ONWARD TRAVEL.

2. FILE 201-332665

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B J.

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FI
CUN/CI/OP

COPY

SECRET

201-332665
30 Sept 1968

SECRET

TC

242

WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

WH-8, EUR-6, RF/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI-2

SECRET 261741Z SEP 68 CITE MADRID 6153

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC WATCHLIST

26 SEP 68 IN 00361

1. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP D-68-320 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HABANA ON IBERIAN FLT. 942 SEPT 19.

2. FILE: 05-120-20.

SECRET

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM: pk

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/REG.		25 SEP		pk
2. WH/Mexico		26 SEP 1963		
3. [illegible]	[illegible]			
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17. RID/FI				

MICROFILMED
SEP 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

pls detach cc/s,
my file

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT X	X
		INDEX	X

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 200-9-52

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 23 Sept 1963

DOCUMENT NUMBER UNDA 04116

FORM 1-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Cuba
INFO.
Chief, DO Division, Chief of Station, JMCOBRA
FROM
Chief of Base, New York
SUBJECT
TYPIC/DOMOPS -- Current Roster of Cuban UN Mission
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

MICROFILMED
SEP 26 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The following is a current listing (as of 13 September 1968) of the officers assigned PCS to the Cuban Permanent Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in New York City. Intelligence or security affiliation is also shown where applicable. The listing is in the probable order of real (as opposed to UN listing) precedence. As can be seen, the CMUN continues to upgrade both legitimate diplomatic personnel and intelligence/security personnel both in terms of quantity as well as quality.

A. Ricardo ALARCON Quesada (201-347590), Ambassador and Permanent Representative;

B. Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953), Counsellor, DGI officer;

C. Jesus JIMENEZ Escobar (201-749244), Counsellor, DGI officer;

D. Antonio DE SOUZA Carvajal (201-354048), Advisor (essentially a figure-head without substantive responsibilities or power);

E. Alberto LOZA Hidalgo-Gato (201-331832), First Secretary, DGI officer;

F. Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez (201- ?), 201-320002 First Secretary, DGI officer (presence not confirmed as of 13 September, but was scheduled to arrive 18 September);

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Chief, WH Cuba
2 - Chief, DO Division 2cc [illegible]
2 - Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

200-9-52

CS COPY

(CONTINUED)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-19-5-42 D-100-5-14 GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	UNDA-4116	SEP 23 1968 20 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-500

G. Carlos MORALES Quevedo (201-777568), First Secretary, DGI officer;

H. Jorge REYES Vega (201-816437), Second Secretary, DGI officer;

I. Lazaro ESPINOSA Bonet (201-816438), Third Secretary, DSE officer;

J. Pedro Luis PINERO Eirin (201-824376), Third Secretary, presumed DGI officer;

K. Miguel ~~Manuel~~ SANTANA Fraiz (201- ?), Attache, presumed DGI officer; 201-816439

L. Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen (201-805658), Attache;

M. Justo Cesar GELABERT Martinez (201- ?), Attache, reportedly was with DIER in 1961, no further information available; 201-839221

N. ~~Rafael~~ AGUILERA Batista (201-351449), Attache, code clerk, either DIER or DSE employee;

O. Rolando CONDE Figueredo (201-354057), Attache;

P. Rolando PEREZ Alfonso (201- ?), Attache, (here according to UN records but not confirmed by LNERGO as of 4 September). 201-836157

2. In recent months visas have been requested for the following officers, but they have not arrived as yet, and presumably some of them may not now be coming for one reason or another.

A. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (201-787157), Counsellor-designate, was due to arrive in late August but presence has not been confirmed;

B. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665), First Secretary-designate, DGI officer, visa requested in April 1968 with no further information available as to whether he will come (presumably he will not);

10820

C. ✓ Cecilia ANDRE Sardain (201- ?), Second Secretary-designate, same ETA status as Rogelio RODRIGUEZ above.

3. VIERA Linares serves as Charge d'Affaires in the absence of Ambassador ALARCON Quesada. Up to this point, neither the Base nor LNERGO have been able to state evidentially as to whether VIERA or JIMENEZ Escobar is the sucessor to Chafik Homero SAKER Zenni (left PCS October 1967) as the DGI Station Chief. We both, however, tend to regard JIMENEZ as carrying the most weight in terms of operational activity and in terms of effectiveness. Now, with the arrival of BOZA Hidalgo-Gato (who reportedly has been the deputy to Ramon OROZA Naveran, head of U.S. operations for the DGI, per our last information), it remains to be seen if BOZA figures higher in the local hierarchy than VIERA or JIMENEZ. With JIMENEZ, VIERA, BOZA, and PRENDES Gutierrez, the local DGI station has more ranking talent than has been the norm. The Cubans do not necessarily slot their intelligence officers in Mission titles equivalent to their true ranks and responsibilities.

4. In terms of vulnerability from the LNHARP standpoint, the intelligence/security personnel at this point appear to offer little in the way of approach potential. Jorge BOLANOS Suarez (if he comes) and Gustavo Adolfo PLAZA Peterssen, on the basis of known information, seem the likeliest targets for us as of now. Both the Base and LNERGO, however, continue to look at all of them in this regard.

5. It will be noted from the above that of the 16 CMUN personnel now here, 8 are identified DGI/DSE, 2 are presumed DGI, and 1 (GELABERT) may be DSE or DIER. The percentage of personnel involved with intelligence/security thus ranges from a minimum of 50% up to 69% of the total CMUN personnel strength.

6. The number of official Cubans in New York will, of course, be swelled by the arrival of the Cuban Delegation to the 23rd UN General Assembly this month. We have requested, via DO BASE/NEW YORK 4844, traces on the 8 of the 12 man delegation on whom we hold no information.

Howard G. FIGALAN

FBI doc. (X-ref)
24 Apr. 68
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 67 (NY)
Re: Rogelio Rodriguez
no Bufile given

FBI doc.
6 Oct. 67 (NY)
Re: Cuban Mission to the United Nations
no Bufile given

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-00239
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. WH/C/FI J. McTighe Rm 3D54
FROM 32 21 WH/COG #3
ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY
INFO FILE, VR, DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH, C/DO 2, C/EUR 4, C/SB 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 24

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UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 292115Z CITE JMWAVE 9521 (STEADMAN ACTING)

29 SEP 67 IN 62756

DO BASE/NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMCLOCK

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3359 (IN 61764)

WH/C/I
ABSTRACT
WH/C/FI
INDEX

1. FOLL ARE STATION TRACES JESUS (JIMENEZ) ESCOBAR (201-749244): NAVY CAPTAIN OF "SIERRA MAESTRA"; STUDIED AT MARITIME SCHOOL NEAR HAVANA; FROM COMMIE FAMILY (REVOLUCION NEWSPAPER, 4 JAN 62). GRADUATED MARIEL NAVAL ACADEMY AS NAVIGATOR FOR CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE; CA 1960 DECK OFFICER FOR MAMBISAS; 1961 SENT SOV BLOC TO ASSUME CAPTAINCY OF SHIP "SIERRA MAESTRA"; INCOMPETENT AND THUS UNDER ORDERS OF GERMAN OFFICERS ON FIRST TRIPS "SIERRA MAESTRA"; MARRIED GERMAN GIRL, MONIKA, DURING TRIP TO GERMANY; MID-62 HAD ACCIDENT WITH SHIP AND LOST JOB OF CAPTAIN; COMPLETELY INTEGRATED WITH REGIME (AMOT-54, 13 OCT 63). TRAVELLED MEXICO-HAVANA 12 JULY 65 (CUBANA AIRLINES MANIFEST). COMMERCIAL POLICY SPECIALIST, MINCEX, DELEGATE GATT MEETING URUGUAY JAN 67 (SENSITIVE REPORT, JAN 67 AND MONTEVIDEO-2775, 16 JAN 67). BORN 16 SEPT [illegible]; MAMBISAS REP STATIONED HAVANA AS OF EARLY 67; FORMERLY MAMBISAS REP ROTTERDAM; KNOWN AROUND SHIPPING LINES AS COMMIE

SECRET

201-009339

(DIR-67550, 18 JAN 67).

2. ONLY STATION TRACE JORGE E. (REYES) VEGA (201-816437) IS ASSIGNMENT UN MISSION NEW YORK 15 APR 67 (SENSITIVE REPORT DATED MAY 67).

3. FOLLOWING FYI ARE SUMMARY STATION TRACES SUBJS PARA 2 REF:

A. ALBERTO MANUEL (BOZA) HIDALGO-GATO (201-331632); EMPLOYEE CUBAN CONSULATE WHEN IT LOCATED SAVANNAH, GEORGIA; FORMER CUBAN CONSUL TORONTO, CANADA, DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA CANADA NOV 62 FOR CARRYING UNREGISTERED FIREARMS; SUSPECT CUIS OFFICER.

B. JOAQUIN CAMILO (GARCIA) ALONSO: BORN 16 AUG 37, HAVANA, PSP MEMBER SINCE 1957; BEGAN WORKING FOR G-2 IN MID-59; LATE 59 COMMISSIONED AS AIDE AND SECOND CHIEF OF G-2 ISLE OF PINES; 1960 DESCRIBED AS SECOND LIEUTENANT G-2; LATE 60 OR EARLY 61 WORKED IN DEPT OF REGIONAL POLITICS, MINREX; EARLY 61 REPORTED AS G-2 OFFICER IN HAVANA; CIRCA 62 REPORTED WORKING AS G-2 AGENT IN "DIRECCION DE POLITICA COMERCIAL CON LA AMERICA LATINA" IN MINISTRY INTERNAL COMMERCE, AND IN THIS POSITION IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH MANUEL PINEIRO.

SECRET

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 5521

C. ROGF

8.

C. ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332655): BORN 3 MAY 42, HAVANA; IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG/1, AMSEES/1, AMSKIFF/5, AND AMKNOB/1; STATIONED CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO 1962 APR 65, DURING WHICH TIME HE BELIEVED HAVE ACTED AS DEPUTY CHIEF DGI MEXICO; ASSIGNED DGI HQS SINCE APR 65; HAS SERVED AS CASE OFFICER FOR NUMBEROUS CLANDESTINE CUIS OPS IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA; APPEARS TO BE EXTREMELY COMPETENT, WELL TRAINED AND DEDICATED DGI OFFICER.

4. NO IDENT STATION TRACES GONZALO (DIAZ) DIAZ EXCEPT FACT HE ATTENDING PRESENT SESSION UNGA.

5. RE PARA 3 REF, ONLY PARODI STATION FILES WHO CONNECTED WITH CUIS IS RAMON (SANCHEZ-PARODI) MONTOIO (201-777320), ON WHOM THERE FOLL POSSIBLE TRACES: G-2 AGENT WHO TRAVELLED U.S. AND MEXICO ON GOC MISSIONS (DBA43319, 31 DEC 62); SELF-ADMITTED G-2 AGENT HAVANA (OOA-3,218,566, 6 SEPT 62); G-2 AGENT WHO ARRIVED U.S. 30 OCT 60 (WH/COG/CE CARD); MEMBER G-2 SECTION, MINREX, WORKING IN DEPT KNOWN AS "DIVISION DE ASUNTOS LATIONO AMERICANOS" (DBF-82092, 5 JULY 51); G-2 AGENT SIERRA MORENA, LAS VILLAS (UFK-138, 21 SEPT 62); DSE OFFICER HAVANA (SUBJS FATHER, MAY 65). SPOCHING PHOTO OF 201-777320

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

[illegible]
Chief of [illegible]
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Requirements for Handling of [illegible] by [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated below

REFERENCES: None

1. Attached please find pertinent Headquarters traces on the following members of the Cuban delegation to the United Nations XXII General Assembly:

a. Fernando ALVAREZ Tabio

b. Marta JIMENEZ Martinez

c. Lohania Josefina ARUCA Alonso

d. Joaquin Camilo GARCIA Alonso

e. Alberto Manuel BOZA Hidalgo-Gato

f. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

There are no Headquarters traces on Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz, another member of the Cuban delegation. Traces on other members of the delegation were forwarded earlier.

CONTINUED

Attachments:
Hqs. traces (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - C/DOB, New York (w/att h/w)
2 - COS, JMWAVE (w/att h/w)

1 Att.

201-009239

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	UFGW-1832	26 SEP 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	201-009239

Typed: 21 Sept. 67

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/FI
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - DO/I/WH
1 - WH/REG

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/FI	[illegible].J. Weatherwax:flg	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/C/FI	9/22	William Murray
C/WH/C/CICS		Harry T. Mahoney
WH/COG/MO C/WH/COG		Robert Ostman David A. Phillips
DO/I/WH		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DD	26 [illegible]	

2. [illegible] [illegible] help [illegible] possible suspects for recruitment or doubling. Of particular interest is any information indicating they are working for Cuban intelligence and/or security services.

[illegible]

SECRET

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez ([illegible])

Rodriguez was stationed in Mexico City as a Third Secretary from 1961 to April 1965. He has been identified by a number of reliable sources as a DGI official, including [illegible] who stated Rodriguez used following [illegible]: Eduardo, Casimiro, Jose Antonio. He was the case officer for [illegible] using the Raul for quite some time prior to his return to Cuba from Mexico. He was one of two Cuban diplomats who were disarmed at the airport in Mexico City by Mexican officials in December 1961.

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20535

FILE NO. (If any)

DATE
Sept. 20, 1967

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 101 (a) 15 (A) or Section 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

FAMILY NAME (Capital Letters) First Name Middle Initial
RODRIGUES- Lopez, ~~[illegible]~~ Rogelio

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP
Cuba

UNITED STATES ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)
6 East 67th St. New York, N.Y.

AIRLINE AND FLIGHT NO. OR VESSEL OF ARRIVAL
PAA 206

Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Calle 30 #307, Babana, Cuba

BIRTH DATE
5-3-42

BIRTH PLACE
Habana Cuba

NAI
11 Oct 67
KTJ

FILE IN 201-332665 *

DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION
9-19-67 Preinspection at Nassau for NYC arrival.

4/16/67

PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF ADMISSION
To Attend UN Session for duration of session.

DESTINATION
Cuban Mission to UN NY.C.

201 300505

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F. B. I.

cc: C.I.A.
G-2
O.S.I.
State Dept.
O.N.I.

Deputy Associate Commissioner
Travel Control

M 1-57
6-1-961

FORM DS-939
2-1-51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY
REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION

TO: CH	FROM: MBSaladino	DATE: 9/15/67

I NAME (If married woman include maiden name) Rogelio RODRIQUEZ Lopez	DATE OF BIRTH 5/3/1942	PLACE OF BIRTH Havana

ALIASES AND NICKNAMES	SEX m	MARITAL STATUS uk	CITIZENSHIP Cuban

ADDRESS	OCCUPATION AND NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER Technical Assistant

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA

Member, Cuban Delegation to 22nd Session UNGA.

CONTROL: THIS REQUEST PLACED WITH THE OFFICE OF SECURITY BY:

DIVISION OR AGENCY Visa Office	REASON FOR REQUEST, OR TYPE OF PROGRAM V 31 7 CUBA (TWENTY SECOND DELEGATION UNGA)
DATE 9/15/67	
NAME OR REQUESTING OFFICER SCA:VO:MBSaladino:ms	

19 Sept 67

II RESULTS OF THIS REQUEST FOR SECURITY INFORMATION:

☐ NO RECORD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION
☐ SECURITY INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ OTHER *(Use reverse side for reporting)*

CHECKED BY	DATE

III FOR USE OF OFFICE OF SECURITY:

Refer to CSCI 3/782,061 dtd 29 June 67
CSCI 316/00696-64 dtd 25 Aug 64
and to the FBI

18/9/67

(Date)
18 SEP 1967

Dept. of State
272 (mexico)
13 Sep. 67

CR

ORIG: CLIFTON ROBERSON:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 7447/9008
DATE: 15 JUNE 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-332665

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE 16 23 46 Z CITE DIRECTOR 11931

TYPIC/WATCHLIST

REF: MEXICO CITY 1764 (IN 88532)

AN FI
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

SENSITIVE SOURCE INFO INDICATES ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ, DGI OFFICER WHO ARRIVED MEXI 12 JUNE 67, IS DELEGATE CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF UNESCO MEETING MEXICO. REQUEST STATION REVIEW SC WASH 65760 RE SUBJECT ACTIVITIES AND/OR POSSIBLE TRAVEL PLANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: SUBJ ARRIVED MEXICO 12 JUNE 67

C/WH/COG/CICS H. T. MAHONEY (DRAFT)
WH/1/MEXICO

201-332665
16 June 1967

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

S E C R E T [illegible]

Chen ~~Kay L. M.~~

Dick H.

MEXICAN VISA REQUESTED FOR CUBAN [illegible] DELEGATE

FM HAVANA: HABANEX [illegible]

TO MEXICO CITY: FOREIGN MINISTRY -- 324

THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTRY REQUESTS A VISA ON THE DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT OF [illegible], A DELEGATE TO THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL CONDITIONS OF [illegible], WHICH WILL BE HELD IN MEXICO. PLEASE SEND INSTRUCTIONS BY CABLE.

[illegible] S T U A R T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, ROGELIO
201-332665
SEX M DOB ?

201-257691
HMMA-31788
11 APR 67
P11

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
ALL THROUGH FILE, PER LIENVOY REPORTS, EVI-
DENCE OF REG/FREQUENT CONTACT BETWEEN NOVICKY
AND IATSKV OF SOV. EMB, AS WELL AS WITH
SUBJ OF CUBAN EMBASSY.
POSSIBLE INTEL CONTACT OF CSR 2ND SECY OLDRICH
NOVICKY /201-257691/.

R 6704190723

FILE IN 201-332665

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-40)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

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FROM 8

ACTION WH/COG 8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 130029Z CITE MEXICO CITY (MEXI 1746)

13 Jun 67 IN 88532

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332665), CUBAN DIP PPT D 66 627 ARRIVED MEXICO FROM HAVANA 12 JUNE ACCORDING TO LIFIRES. NO INFO AVAILABLE ON REASON FOR TRIP OR POSSIBLE TRAVEL FROM MEXICO.

ZZ

S E C R E T

BT

AN (9) FI
~~JS~~ ~~RESP~~
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

~~ZZ~~ PROCESSED
20/6/67 HC

201-332665
13 June 67

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☐ ☐

INFO

FILE

S E C R E T 251115Z CITE MADRID 9817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

25N [illegible] 46050

KEYWAY PBRUMEN XHARRON

IBERIA FLT 542 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 NOV W/137 PAX.

CUBAN OFFICIALS WERE: OCTAVIO COTON BUSTAMANTE PP-EF-65-725; EYUIS 737- 54737 EF-65-3402; ABDO SOTO PRIETO PP-D-64-181; JOSE GONZALEZ SJOSTROM PP-E-65-1358; GUIDO SANCHEZ ROBERT PP-D-65-[illegible]; MERCEDES LLANES GARCIA PP-[illegible]-65-599; RAMON RAMIREZ SOTO PP-D-65-52[illegible]; NESTOR ALVAREZ SALERO PP-E-65-1353; JORG FCADIZ CABRERA PP-E-65-[illegible]; ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP-D-65-637.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-332665

14-00000

201-352665

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: E. SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 25 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	CA-PA
2		6	RO
3	FI-IC	7	PI
4	IMO	8	p

DISSEM BY 24 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH-8, EUR-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

28 19 42 Z CITE DIRECTOR 55146

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

ES

BT

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF: MADRID 9813 (IN 45905)

1. ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG/1, AMSESS/1, AMSKIFF/5 AND AMKNOB/1. HAS USED ~~[illegible]~~ PSEUDOS EDUARDO, CASIMIRO, JOSE ANTONIO AND RAUL.

2. STATIONED CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY 1962 THROUGH APRIL 1965. BEGAN ASSIGNMENT AS THIRD SECRETARY AND PROMOTED TO SECOND SECRETARY 63. NOVEMBER 64 IDEN, AGENT PENETRATION OF THE YOUNG COMMUNISTS OF HONDURAS (JCH), A REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, SENT MEXICO BY JCH WITH PACKAGE TO TURN OVER TO CUBAN WHO WOULD CONTACT HIM. IDEN CONTACTED BY RODRIGUEZ TO WHOM GAVE PACKAGE. RODRIGUEZ SAID ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR IDEN GO CUBA SAME DAY. SEVERAL HOURS LATER RODRIGUEZ AGAIN ARRIVED IDEN HOTEL, TOLD HIM NOT NECESSARY GO CUBA, GAVE HIM PACKAGE AND FIFTY DOLLARS, INSTRUCTED HIM RETURN HONDURAS OVERLAND. PACKAGES TOO WELL WRAPPED FOR IDEN TO IDENTIFY CONTENTS. RODRIGUEZ ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT SEVERAL HONDURANS WHO ORGANIZING GUERRILLA MOVEMENT FOR JCH.

cont/

RELEASING OFFICER 26-1 COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

08-3

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER) (ELITE) (PICA)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 55746

TO PAGE TWO

3. AMKNOB/1 IDENTIFIED RODRIGUEZ FROM PHOTO AS CURRENT CUIS CASE OFFICER MEXICO EARLY 65. STATED KNEW RODRIGUEZ AS RAUL.

4. REQUEST ANY INFO ONWARD TRAVEL, DESTINATION, AND ACTIVITIES RODRIGUEZ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS ______
WH/COG/FI ______
for WH/COG/MO ______
WH/1/Mexico ______
E/IB/S ______

2

5
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1

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 50

ORIG: E. SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 25 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	CA-PA
2		6	[illegible]
3	EI-IC	7	[illegible]
4	MO	8	[illegible]

DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ # ____
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE · WH-8, EUR-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

[redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) 23 19 42 Z CITE DIRECTOR

[redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER) 55147

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC WATCHLIST 1813

REFS: A. MADRID (IN 45905)

B. DIRECTOR 55146

IDEN: BAYARDO (PAGOADA) FIGUEROA.

ES

BT

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS

WH/COG/FI

for WH/COG/MO

WH/1/Mexico

E/IB/S

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

26-2

0830

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 153

ACTION
WH/COG 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI

SAP FI

~~ABSTRACT~~ ~~INDEX~~

S E C R E T 250951Z CITE MADRID 9813

MADR

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

25 Nov 66 IN 45905

TYPIC WATCHLIST

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ PP-D-66-637 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 21 NOV IBERIA FLT 942.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-332665
25 Nov, 1966

FBI doc. (X-ref)
20 May '66
Re: Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET/KAPOK
TO	Chief of Station, Kingston
INFO	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	TYPIC/KAPOK Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665)

DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

REFERENCE : DIR 98504

It is requested that the attached photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665) be shown to RUABBE and RUADLIB/1 for possible identification in connection with CUIS activities. There is no information at Headquarters which indicates that Subject has been in Jamaica.

Constance M. QUILHOT

Attachment: H/W
Photo

Distribution:
3 - COS/Kingston w/att

Jamaica

CS COPY

GROUP 1

201-332665

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HJKW-353	DATE 9 MAY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-332665

DESENSITIZED

2 May 66
Distribution:
1 - WH/C/CICS
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - WH/7
1 - RID

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/C/CICS	Ida Galliher	mak	3411

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/C/CICS		Joseph Vidal
WH/7	5 MAY 1966	
FI/D/CSB	6 May	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DCWHD/C	5	John T. Flynn

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 3, C/CI, C/FI/D 4

DISSEM PER DJO-8

18 Apr 66 IN 99148

S E C R E T 152249Z

KNGS INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0246

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF KNGS 2531 (IN 97625)

AN		WH/C/ES
~~IS~~	~~DIST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

1. NOTE "CELI" POSSIBLY PHONETIC FOR "CHELE" AKA OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665), DGI OFFICER MEXI UNTIL 1965, WITH INTEL INTEREST AND CONTACTS CENTRAL AMERICA.

2. ALL WAVE INFO ON RODRIGUEZ AVAILABLE HQS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0246 2531 "CELI" "CHELE" AKA ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ (201-332665) DGI 1965 CENTRAL AMERICA HQS

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Action I.G.

201-332665

18 April 66

CARDE

(5)

Nombre (s)	Edad	Nacionalidad	Pasaporte
[illegible] .P10843	[illegible] AÑOS.	[illegible]	DIP. [illegible]/67/343
[illegible] X [illegible] .-P-7365	[illegible]	CUBANO.	[illegible]/67/077
[illegible] .P8303	[illegible] AÑOS.	[illegible]	[illegible]/67/317
[illegible] X [illegible] CASO.. ✓	48 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. D/67/[illegible]
Jose X [illegible]. ✓	59 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. D/67/330
Jose [illegible]. P9046	73 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. [illegible]/66/131
[illegible] X [illegible]. ✓	40 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. [illegible]/67/312
Alejandro [illegible]. ✓		CUBANO	DIP. D/67/312
[illegible] [illegible]GO. ✓	34 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. D/67/[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]. P1852	38 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	DIP. D/67/1466
Luis X [illegible]. ✓	42 AÑOS.	CUBANO.	ESP. D/67/664

Llegada **Aerolinea**

Salida	Aerolinea	Punto de Desembarque
19 DE JUNIO DE 1967	CUBANA. VUELO 465	LA HABANA CUBA.

Visa Mexicana Expedida en:

~~[illegible]~~ Emio [illegible]. VISA [illegible] 327 [illegible] POR LA [illegible] EL 16 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

[illegible]. VISA [illegible] 497 [illegible] POR LA [illegible] 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. [illegible] 464 DEL DIA 12 DE JUNIO.

Fernando [illegible]. VISA [illegible] 394 [illegible] POR LA [illegible] 24 DE MAYO DE 1967.

[illegible] CASO. VISA [illegible] 2109 [illegible] POR EL [illegible] 14 DE JUNIO DE 1967. [illegible] 15 DE JUNIO DE 1967. [illegible].

Jose [illegible]. VISA [illegible] 496 [illegible] 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. [illegible] 12 VUELO 464 [illegible].

200-9-4/2

P-7365

Jose [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 478 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 7 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE JUNIO DE 1967 VUELO [illegible].

Orlando [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 462 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 5 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE JUNIO VUELO [illegible].

Alejandro [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 325 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN [illegible] EL 14 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

Max [illegible]. VISA DIPLOMATICA # 495 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 9 DE JUNIO DE 1967. LLEGO EL 12 DE 1967 VUELO # 464.

Romulo PEREZ ROJAS. VISA OFICIAL # 977 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 27 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1967.

Luis [illegible]. VISA OFICIAL # 150 EXPEDIDA POR LA EMBAJADA DE MEXICO EN LA HABANA CUBA EL 16 DE JUNIO DE 1967.

FROM 201 ON

Valentin Vasilyevich DAKULIN

201-251813

SENT WITH HMMA - 31320

13 FEBRUARY 1967

b. Non-Soviet Contacts :

45). Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (P-7365, 201-332665), Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and identified intelligence officer.

On 25 August 1961 RODRIGUEZ wanted to borrow a film from Subject (3).

P-7365

FBI doc. (X-ref)
26 Dec. 66
Re: Rodriguez, Rogelio

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. E. Scoggin

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 25

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI,

AN	
PS	DEST
ABSTRACT	~~INDEX~~

S E C R E T 151800Z CITE MADRID 0036
MADR

15 Dec 66 IN 60399

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 55146

B. MADRID 9813 (IN 45905) *

CHECK OF QUOTA RECORDS INDICATE ROGELIO * RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ LEFT MADRID FOR GENEVA 22 NOV.

* LOPEZ ARRIVED MADRID

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

201-332665
15 Dec. 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 22

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 051413Z CITE BERN 8768

5 Dec 65 IN 52856

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, JMWAVE, GENEVA

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF DIRECTOR 56955*

AN 2	FI	
~~28~~	DEST	
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

NO BERN INFO ON RODRIGUEZ. PLS ADVISE WHETHER LIAISON MAY BE QUERIED.

S

S E C R E T

SECRE

BT

*ROGELIO LOPEZ.

201-332665

5 Dec, 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-3322

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2-1

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

IN [illegible]	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX

S E C R E T 021503Z CITE GENEVA 3457

GNVA

BERN INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REF MADRID 9882

2 DEC [illegible] 51389

NO INFO AVAILABLE RE RODRIGUEZ ACTIVITIES GENEVA. DEFER TO BERN RE POSSIBLE LIAISON CHECK FOR PARA TWO REF TRAVEL INFO.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ

201-332665
2 Dec. 1966

14-00000

~~File in 301~~
67

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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4		8	

FROM
DISSEM BY 24

ACTION
WH/COG-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, EUR 1, WH-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, RI/AN, FI

S E C R E T 011311Z CITE MADRID 9882

MADR

INDEXED AND FILED COPIES
MATCHED

1P

ESG UFG HMM ESB
DIRECTOR, GENEVA INFO JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY, BERN

IN 50682

TYPIC WATCHLIST

at. C.be.

AN	LHC/ES
PS	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

ZZ

REF: DIRECTOR 55146 (NOT SENT GENEVA, BERN) 3

1. LATIN AMERICAN TRAVEL RECORDS SHOW ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ (201-332665) DEPARTED MADRID FOR GENEVA ON 22 NOV 66.

2. FOR GENEVA: RODRIGUEZ ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVANA 21 NOV. REF REPORTED RODRIGUEZ IDENTIFIED AS DGI OFFICER BY AMMUG-1, AMSESS-1, AMSKIFF-5 AND AMKNOB-1. HAS USED PSEUDOS EDUARDO, CASIMIRO, JOSE ANTONIO AND RAUL. REF REQUESTED ANY INFO ONWARD TRAVEL, DESTINATION, AND ACTIVITIES RODRIGUEZ.

3. INDEX RODRIGUEZ.

S E C R E T

BT

Rodriguez - Lopez

SECRET

MICROFILMED
JAN 26 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-332665
1 Dec. 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7 ✓

ORIG: E.SCOGGIN:mot
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 30 November 1966

☐ FILE RI
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	el	5	RN
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3	FI-TC	7	
4	MO	8	

DISSEM BY 1 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE EUR 8 CI CI/OPS FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET
(DATE AND TIME FILED) 3 1557 Z
(REFERENCE NUMBER) 56955
CITE DIRECTOR

TO GENEVA INFO: MADRID JMWAVE BERN

BT
S

TYPIC WATCHLIST

REFS: A) MADRID 9813 (IN 45905) (NOT SENT GENEVA)
B) DIR 55146 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA)
C) DIR 55147 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA)

1. REF A STATED ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ, PP D-66-637, ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVANA 21 NOV. REF B GIVES BIO DATA ON RODRIGUEZ AND REQUESTS INFO ON ONWARD TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES. SENSITIVE INFO INDICATES RODRIGUEZ GOING GENEVA FROM MADRID.

2. REQUEST STATION PROVIDE ANY INFO POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO
E/AS/A
E/~~IBES~~ CUBA
C/WH/COG/FI

AC/EUR/AS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1-7

16

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

FBI doc. (X-ref.)
30 Mar '66
Re: Rodriguez-Lopez, Rogelio

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-332665
X-REF TO FILE NO. [illegible]
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

71 SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY
INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS.

S E C R E T 062350Z

7 DEC 65 IN 08987

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 7727

TYPIC AMMUG

REFS: A. DIR 61329

B. MEXI 5410 (IN 01718)

1. ON 3 DEC 65 AMMUG/1 REPORTED LUCIO AND RODRIGUEZ NOT IDENTICAL.

2. RE PARA 3 REF B: A/1 HAS NEVER KNOWN RODRIGUEZ TO USE PSEUDO LUCIO.

S E C R E T

QUERIED IF RODRIGUEZ AND LUCIO ARE IDENTICAL

CFN: 7727 61329 5410 3 DEC 65 AMMUG/1 LUCIO RODRIGUEZ NOT IDENTICAL 3 B A/1 PSEUDO

BT

SECRET

Copy

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201-332665

14-00000

[illegible] ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM
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ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
[illegible]108		8	

ORIG : E. SCOCCIA:sr
UNIT : WH/C/CICS
EXT : 9465
DATE : 27 NOVEMBER 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-332665 ✓

84 SECRET

B 201-769095

TO : JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

9 Nov 65 20 48

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY RI/AN, WH8, CI/OPS

SIG CEN

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 61329

29 Nov 65

REF: MEXI 5410* (01718)

ORDER CINCH IDENTIFICATION OF LUCIO, REQUEST WAVE ASK AMSPICE/1, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ AS DGI OFFICER, IF RODRIGUEZ AND LUCIO ARE IDENTICAL.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 7 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*AMSPICE/1 has identified RODRIGUEZ as her CUIS CO "Lucio."

B 201-769095

9 Nov 65
201-332665

C/WH/C/CICS
WH/C/MO
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

for
JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

29-8

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

3 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Owner of Auto Bearing California License HEW 810
(Now Mexican Diplomatic Plates D-136)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 July 1965 on the above subject. This office has no objection to your including information contained in our memorandum of 6 April 1965 in a report to the Bureau of International Commerce, The Bureau of Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

2. It is noted that according to a usually reliable source, this automobile is currently registered to Camilo Domenech Gadea, who was Commercial Counselor of the Cuban Embassy until he left for Cuba on 10 February 1965. As of the present date, the automobile is still being used by the Cuban Embassy.

Distribution: Legal Attache

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

FILES: 50-2-4-A
P-7365
P-8955

SECRET

Date: July 26, 1965

To:

From:

Subject: OWNER OF AUTO BEARING CALIFORNIA
LICENSE HEW 810
105-4380

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be further distributed without appropriate authorization.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 6, 1965, captioned as above.

It is noted the automobile referred to in your memorandum is now in possession of an employee of the Cuban Embassy, which could be a violation of export laws regarding Cuba. Your approval is therefore requested to include the information in your memorandum in a report to the Bureau of International Commerce, The Bureau of Customs, and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

P-7365

*NAME: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez

[illegible]:

*RESIDENCE ADDRESS:

TEL #

*OFFICIAL TITLE:

SALARY:

DUTIES: finance officer, pays the employees
Suspected G-2

POLITICAL POSITION:

CONTACTS:

*PLACE OF BIRTH:

*DATE OF BIRTH:

CIVIL STATUS: Married

*FAMILY MEMBERS - PP # Wife: Ester GAVILAN Rogales PP D/63/455
Children : Dolores RODRIGUEZ Baes PP D/63/456
Miguel Gustavo Fernandez RODRIGUEZ PP D/63/456

AUTOMOBILE:

HABITS - HOBBIES:

SIGNATURE - HANDWRITING:

*ARRIVAL IN MEXICO - PP # D/63/454, Arrived with wife and 2 children 8 July 1963

SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL: Was previously assigned to Mexico, left late Sept 1962

*PHOTOG



FILM 2
PHOTO 14
5 AUG 1963



FILM 194
PHOTO 2
12 JULY 1963

P - 7365
Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez
201--332665

14-00000

Mexico

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, San Jose

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico

FROM: Chief, WH/Division

SUBJECT: Jorge VEGA Rodriguez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-25993, 29 April 1965

Action : See Para 3.

1. It was reported in Reference that a man identifying himself as "Roberto" from Costa Rica phoned the Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, on 23 April 1965, in an attempt to get in touch with the successor of Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Cuban intelligence officer. The man further stated that he was the doctor friend of Manuel, presumably Manuel Mora, head of the Costa Rican Communist Party.

2. An intercepted letter, dated 2 May 1965, to Judith Ferreto from Dr. Jorge Vega Rodriguez, Apartado 1212, San Jose, refers to his recent quick trip to Mexico. Vega wrote to Judith using her Party pseudo of Juanita Saenz, and at the end of the typewritten letter he wrote by hand "Greetings to Cafula and Engle (?)". Cafula is one of the pseudos used by Costa Rican Communist leader Carlos Fallas Sibaja. Headquarters has been interested in Vega's frequent trips to Mexico and his intimate friendship with Judith, as revealed by their telephone conversations, but no derogatory information on Vega has been developed. However, the fact that he is familiar with the Party pseudos of Judith and Fallas suggests that he may be more involved than he appears to be.

879

3. It is requested that Station San Jose determine if Dr. Vega was in Mexico on 23 April 1965, the date of the call to the Cuban Embassy. The Station is again asked to try to uncover any indication of subversive activity on the part of Vega. Is he friendly with the Mora brothers?

CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2-San Jose
1-Mexico

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HRSW-2700

DATE
10 JUN 1965
7 June 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-42557

SECRET

Chief of Station, San Jose XXX

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

PBRUMEN/Unknown Costa Rican in Contact with Cuban Embassy

Action Required: For information, and see paragraph two.

1. According to LIENVOY, on 23 April 1965, an unidentified man called the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to speak to the Ambassador, who was not in. The man refused to give his name but said he was the person who used to be seen with "the young blond man" from the Embassy. Subject asked the Embassy secretary to tell the Ambassador that he had received a cable from the Embassy asking him to come to Mexico from Costa Rica and that now he was here, but could not stay long. Subject also said that he had seen the Ambassador frequently but had been told not to use names on the telephone; that he had received the cable at the beginning of Holy Week but could not get a plane reservation then; that they had known him in the Embassy by the name of "Roberto"; that since the young blond man had now gone to Cuba, Subject was supposed to make the acquaintance of the person who had taken the young's place; and that the cable had alluded to some business they were going to take care of. Finally, Subject said to tell the Ambassador that he was the doctor friend of Manuel.

2. The Station is unable to identify Subject. However, the blond man is probably Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary and identified Cuban intelligence officer, who left PCS for Cuba on 5 March 1965. The Station would be interested to know the identity of Subject if it can be determined by the San Jose Station.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, San Jose
- 1 - C/WHD
- 3 - Files

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declassification

HMMA 25998 29 April 1965

SECRET 50-6-75/4

Glenna H. PELLEN egm

chrono
50-6-75/4
P-7365

Lawrence P. BARKER

SECRET

6 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Owner of Auto Bearing California License HEW 810

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 26 March 1965 on the above subject. According to a usually reliable source, the automobile which previously bore California License HEW 810, now has Mexican diplomatic plates D-136 and is owned by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The date on which the license plates were changed is not known.

2. The description of Rogelio Rodriguez, who purchased the automobile in California, does not fit the descriptionof Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, who was a member of the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at the time of the purchase; and the identity of the purchaser is unknown.

Distribution: Legal Attache

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Distribution:
50-2-4/A
P-7365
P-8955

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

9053

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

ACTION COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRRE T

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 1, '55

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RRRRRRRRRRRR	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS LFK		6161

TO DIR - INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 0590

NUMBER

KAPOK TYPIC AMKNOB
REF WAVE 9937 (IN 5865)

1. DEBRIEFING AND FLUTTER AMKNOB-1 CONDUCTED DURING PERIOD 23 MAR - 7 APR 65 ESTABLISHED AND REAFFIRMED HIS CURRENT AND PAST BONA FIDES. A-1 FLUTTER CONDUCTED 2 APR INDICATED NO DECEPTION FOLL POINTS:

A. A-1'S CURRENT CIS CONTACTS AND HISTORY HIS PAST RELATIONS THEREWITH.

B. HIS STATEMENT HE NOT INVOLVED WITH OTHER INTEL SERVICES.

C. HIS CLAIM HAS NOT INFORMED CIS RE KUBARK CONTACT.

D. A-1'S ASSERTION HAS TOLD COMPLETE TRUTH TO KUBARK RE HIS CIS RELATIONSHIP.

E. A-1 CLAIM HAS NOT FABRICATED REPORTS TO KUBARK.

2. A-1 ADMITTED UNDER FLUTTER HAVING ENGAGED IN SOME EXAGGERATION IN HIS REPORTING TO WAVE. PROBING THIS TOPIC WAVE ESTABLISHED A-1 HAD SPECULATED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE RAUL HIS CIS CO MEXI WHOM HE REPORTED TO WAVE AS CHIEF CIS OFFICER MEXI. A-1 EXPLAINS IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO HIS CIS CO BASED ON FACT LATTER TREATED RESPECTFULLY BY FELLOW EMPLOYEES. SIMILAR INSTANCE FUZZY REPORTING RESULTED IN A-1 REPORT TO WAVE THAT HE WAS DIRECTED TRAVEL SPAIN BY CIS. IN FACT A-1 WANTED VISIT SPAIN ORDER SPEND CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS WITH FAMILY, SO HE SURFACED POSSIBILITY HIS TRAVEL TO SPAIN TO RAUL. RAUL RESPONDED WOULD LIKE VISIT SPAIN AND MIGHT CONTACT A-1 THERE. DANGERS SUCH INACCURATE REPORTING IMPRESSED UPON A-1 WHO CLAIMS WILL STICK STRAIGHT FACTS IN FUTURE.

3. A-1'S PAST CURRENT VALUE TO CIS CLEARLY NOMINAL VIEW HIS VAGUE REPORTING TO DATE. WAVE PLANS PROMOTE HIS STATUS WITH CIS PRIMARILY BY PROMPTING HIM IN REPORTING TO CIS INFO HE ACQUIRES ON OWN FROM CUBAN EXILES AND FEEDING HIM ITEMS SELECTED BY WAVE FOR PASSING CIS.

4. REVIEW HIS CONTACTS INDICATES A-1 HAS ACCESS MRR, SECOND FRONT, MOST OTHER ANTI-GOC INDIVIDUALS WAVE AND MEXI AREAS. FOR EXAMPLE A-1 LEARNED FROM MANUEL (ARQUES) DIAZ (201-273016) THAT HE

'''ECONT''''

12 APR

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

CYS. TO P-7365

FILE No. P-8061

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

INFO.

CLASSIFICATION

DATE:

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO INFO CITE

PAGE TWO XXX WAVE 0590 (IN 6161) NUMBER

INVOLVED UNIDENTIFIED GROUP PLOTTING ASSASSINATE AMTHUG-1. WAVE IN PROCESS CHECKING THIS INFO AND IF APPROPRIATE PLAN FEED IT CIS VIA A-1. THIS MOVE CERTAIN INCREASE CIS INTEREST IN HIM.

5. A-1'S PAST VALUE KUBARK ALSO REDUCED DUE PREIMARILY A-1'S INACCESSIBILITY PRECLUDING CLOSE OPS GUIDANCE WHICH HE REQUIRES MORE THAN AVERAGE AGENT. HE WILLING SPEND 6 MONTHS TRAIL PERIOD MEXI IN EFFORT INCREASE CIS INTEREST EVALUATION OF HIM AT SAME TIME AVAILABLE FOR CLOSER KUBARK DIRECTION EXPLOITATION. IF GRANTED A-1 WILLING HAVE FAMILY JOIN HIM MEXI FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE MEXI. NO MOVE THIS DIRECTION WILL BE MADE UNTIL WAVE ABLE ASSESS ITS PRACTICALITY.

6. WAVE PREPARING A-1 FOR DISPATCH MEXI NEAR FUTURE TO CONTACT CIS. WILL ADVISE ETD.

7. IN CONTINUED ATTEMPTS IDENTIFY A-1'S CIS CO MEXI, WAVE SHOWED A-1 WAVE'S MUG BOOK AND A-1 SUCCEEDED IDENTIFYING PAUL, HIS CURRENT CIS CO MEXI, AS IDENT TO ROGELIO (RODRIGUEZ) LOPEZ (201-332565). MUG BOOK ALSO SHOWN AMMUG-1 WHO ALSO IDENTIFIED SAME PHOTO AS THAT OF RODRIGUEZ.

8. INDEX RODRIGUEZ.

'''END'''

CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

①

Date : March 26, 1965

To :

From :

Subject: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Owner of Auto
Bearing California License HEW 810

This document is for the use of your agency only and neither it nor its contents should be [illegible] without appropriate authorization.

It has been reliably reported to this office that captioned vehicle, not otherwise described, was observed on the grounds of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City at 11:30 A.M. on October 29, 1964.

Investigation to date to identify the owner has developed that captioned vehicle is a 1961 Ford Falcon two-door with Vehicle Identification Number 1R11S123981. Investigation in California has disclosed that the captioned vehicle was last sold to one ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ who gave a false address in the Los Angeles area to the seller of the vehicle. At the time of the sale, RODRIGUEZ indicated that he was buying the automobile for someone else in Mexico, and would allegedly go to Mexico in the automobile.

RODRIGUEZ was described at the time of the purchase of the vehicle as a man between 35 and 40 years of age, apparently a Mexican (judging from his Spanish, dress, etc.) and was allegedly staying with relatives in Los Angeles, California.

CONFIDENTIAL

Group I
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Downgrading and Declassification

copies to
P-8955
P-7365

P-7365

①

It is possible that captioned automobile was purchased for a Cuban diplomatic establishment. Any information you may have which would assist in identifying the owner of this automobile would be greatly appreciated.

14-00000

[illegible] 1304

ORIG.: FLB

EXT.: COMMO
CHRON

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 22 MARCH 65

FILE: P-2768
Cuban chrno

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.		NUMBER
XXXXXXROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS			

TO WAVE INFO. DIR CITE MEXI
NUMBER

TYPIC

REF: WAVE 9539 (IN 5639)

POUCHING UNDER TM 723649 PHOTOS OF CUENCA, RODRIGUEZ, AND VEGA.

END OF MESSAGE

Copies to "P" files

CUENCA (P-
RODRIGUEZ (P-
and Manuel VEGA (P-
Thanks
S

[illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

L F BARKER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING

W C CURTIS
RELEASING OFFICER

P-7365

14-00000

DISTR:

ACTION: ACTION COPY

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 15 MAR 1965

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
XXXXX ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS MHS	15[illegible]Z	5639

TO DIR

INFO MEXI

CITE WAVE 9539
NUMBER

TYPIC

REF A WAVE 9233 (5502)
B DIR 91534 (NOT RCVD)
C MEXI 2752

1. AMCOG-1 WHO ACCOMPANIED PRIO TO MEXI REPORTED FOLL INFO POSSIBLY RELATED REFS. IN HOTEL ROOM ON 11 FEB, PRIO TOLD A-1 THAT ON PREVIOUS AFTERNOON WHILE WALKING DOWN MEXICO CITY STREET, UNIDENTIFIED MAN (PRIO GAVE NO DESCRIPTION) APPROACHED HIM, SHOOK HANDS AND IDENTIFIED SELF AS G-2 OFFICIAL. PRIO SAID THHEY THEN HELD SHORT TALK ON "GENERAL TOPICS".

2. AMCOG-1 UNABLE AMPLIFY STORY. ACCORDING A-1, PRIO DID TAKE NUMBER WALKS WHILE MEXI CITY, BUT USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY GROUP CUBAN EXILES SO A-1 VIEW WOULD BE UNUSUAL FOR MEMBERS EMBASSY APPROACH PRIO IN STREET.

3. ATTEMPTING ELICIT FURTHER DETALS FROM PRIO THROUGH AMPALM-4.

4. MEXI: PLEASE FORWARD PHOTOS MENTIONED REF C. WILL ATTEMPT HAVE PRIO REVIEW THEM FOR POSS IDENTIFICATION.

END OF MESSAGE

16/0137Z

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

AMCOG-1

CYS. TO

FILE

P- Carlos Prio Socarrás

14-00000

D

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

2

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIRAVINE/Operations
AMMUG-1 Review of LITAINT-2 Material

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-25052, 23 December 1964

1. AMMUG-1 was shown copies of several documents obtained by LITAINT-2, and attached to reference for Headquarters comments. Of those shown to AMMUG-1 on 2 February 1965, only those translated in paragraph 3 were identified by him as pertaining to DGI.

2. AMMUG-1 pointed out the following items of significance in reference to the attached correspondence:

a. The name "ALBERTO" written in pen in the upper right hand corner probably refers to the "ALBERTO" of the LN Section of the DGI.

b. The name in the upper right hand corner indicates the person to whom the reply should be directed.

c. The name "FERRO" written in the upper right hand corner refers to Jose Miguel ROA Fernandez, who was assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

d. The signature "PABLO" indicates it is correspondence from Cuba to Mexico.

3. The documents referred to above have been translated for the record as follows:

"30/ICI: R[illegible] Eulogio:

In the month of January ________ I am forwarding a cable from M-One requesting films of that country and other Central American countries.

CONTINUED . . .

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-13443	10 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-128/3

15 MAR 1965

P-7365

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EMMW-13443

"We suggest you take care of this matter as soon as possible and to report the possibilities of obtaining these films or of sending some person for the purpose of realizing this work, including the cost of the operation.

Revolutionary,

Pablo"

⑳

"S/N ICL

Comrade Ferro__

Several days ago we received a request from comrade Eulogio with reference to your need of a loan to pay some debts, which resulted from recent purchases made by you.

We are aware that your work requires certain commodities, such as a presentable house, capable of making persons, who you receive, feel comfortable in the atmosphere they are in.

Now, you should have analyzed your economic possibilities before incurring those debts. If you had done so you would have realized that these were not within your reach (budget), for which reason you would have turned to us, with the purpose of finding a solution to that problem.

We are instructing comrade Eulogio to make you a reasonable loan with which you can get out of your present debts.

In the future you should consult us and in particular present a plan to comrade Eulogio, on any problem of that nature, with the confidence that it will be solved.

You should make us a report justifying the loan that you will get to pay the debts you have."

John N. CORNISH

3.-131.- 8 marzo 63.

761.- Salida al 154198.- 1250hs._ Jorrín con la esposa del Sr. Herrera Franyuti le dice que el embajador que está enfermo quiere que el Sr. pase a verlo.- HF que en seguida que llegue le avisa.- ---804.-

883.- Entrada a las 1311hs.- HF Ramón Rubidal por Cepeda._ Jorrín que anda por el aeropuerto.--- 889.

890.- Entrada a las 1325hs.- Morales por Rogelio.- Jorrín que Rogelio salió a Cuba.--- 903.-

p.1365

95.- Salida al 260225.- 1436hs._ HD Avilio por Efraín.- HF que acaba de salir.--- 914.-

----

....

P- 1365

14-00000

SECRET

2 March 1965
LX-2460

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: General: AMMUG/1 Debriefing Report #271
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez/Photographic Surveillance of Cuban Consulate, Mexico City.

1. On 9 February 1965, AMMUG/1 identified a photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a member of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia). He also identified a photograph of RODRIGUEZ' wife whose name he could not recall.

2. These photographs are part of the surveillance on the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and were taken from the following:

Film No.	Photo	Date
373	10	22 February 1964 (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ)
279	15	26 November 1963 (RODRIGUEZ' wife)

3. Additional information on RODRIGUEZ is contained in the following AMMUG/1 Debriefing Reports:

#153 dated 24 August 1964
#181 " 9 September 1964
#217 " 2 March 1965.

Ret'd to Havana 5 Mar 1965

J. Piccolo
WII/C/RR/OS

ABSTRACT
~~INDEX~~

Ben Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

SECRET

201-332665
201-332665

2 March 1965
LX-2460

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: General: AMMUG/1 Debriefing Report #271
Specific: Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez/Photographic Surveillance of Cuban Consulate, Mexico City.

1. On 9 February 1965, AMMUG/1 identified a photograph of Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a member of the DGI (Directorio General de Inteligencia). He also identified a photograph of RODRIGUEZ' wife whose name he could not recall. Wife is Esther Gavilán Rosales de Rodrigez.

2. These photographs are part of the surveillance on the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and were taken from the following:

Film No.	Photo	Date
373	10	22 February 1964 (Rogelio RODRIGUEZ)
279	15	26 November 1963 (RODRIGUEZ' wife)

3. Additional information on RODRIGUEZ is contained in the following AMMUG/1 Debriefing Reports:

#153	dated	24 August 1964
#181	"	9 September 1964
#217	"	2 March 1965.

J. Piccolo
WH/C/RR/OS

Ben Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

Distribution:
2-RI (201-332665) 2-AMMUG/Pro, Mary, Bernice, Lois, Chrono

201-332665

CUBA 1964
RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ROGELIO. DIPLOMAT.
SECRET CIA-P-202222

CUBA 1963
GAVILAN ROSALES DE RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ,
ESTHER. (WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ
LOPEZ).
SECRET CIA-P-202221

Film 373 Photo 10

22

Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez

DPOB:

[illegible] Cuba

Second Secy, Mexico City Cuban Embassy.

and DGI member.

(Direccion General de Inteligencia)



CUBA
GAVILAN ROSALES DE RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, ESTHER. (WIFE OF ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ).
1963
SECRET
CIA-P-202221

1 March 1965
WH/C #65-48
LX-1836

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/D Staff

SUBJECT : General: AMMUG/1 Debriefing Report #217
Subject: S/W Communications

In s/w communications, the agent is given a name, separate from his own pseudonym, as an indicator. In the Romeo Operation the use of the name "JULIO" meant that the letter was for "EDUARDO" that is Rogelio RODRIGUEZ, who had that as one of his pseudonyms and used it in August 1962 when he was in the MA Section at DGI (Cuban Intelligence service) Headquarters. The Valladares Operation similarly used "GENARO" to indicate that the letter was for "TEODORO," identity unknown, but a case officer in MA Section in August 1962.

Mary Hutchison
WH/C/RR/OS

Benjamin Stotts
C/WH/C/RR/OS

Distribution:
2-FID
2-AMMUG/1 Production
1-WH/C/ESEC
2-RI (19-5-1 and 201-332665)
1-Lois
1-Mary/Bernice
1-Chrono

CS cy filed 19-5-39

Copy 201-332665

(6)

8369

RESUMEN

miércoles 10 febrero 1965

2152

09:07 SOL ARGUEDAS se reporta a casa del Lic. ALONSO AGUILAR y éste le pregunta cómo le fué en su viaje por Cuba. SOL responde que estupendamente. AGUILAR se alegra y comenta que sería muy bueno charlar ampliamente pues "a nosotros nos interesan mucho tus comentarios" de todo lo que seguramente ha podido seguir mas de cerca. SOL agrega que este ha sido el viaje mas inteligente que ha hecho, inteligente en el sentido de la comprensión, una cosa menos emotiva. AGUILAR así lo cree y manifiesta que ahora ya tiene una base que deberá servirle para la reapreciación de muchas cosas. SOL dice que además tiene pensado regresar muy pronto, y por tal motivo quisiera que AGUILAR y señora fueran el sábado a cenar a su casa. AGUILAR agradece la invitación pero no puede aceptar en vista de que precisamente ese día deberá estar en Ciudad Obregón, pues tiene el compromiso de hacer un recorrido rápido por el Estado de Sonora, pero promete que a su regreso se pondrán de acuerdo y se reunirán.

7365 146

09:24 El Dr. ALVAREZ (la voz del guatemalteco VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ) pregunta a la Embajada de Cuba por ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ y al ser informado por JORRIN que no se encuentra deja el recado siguiente: que lo esperaron ayer los esposos que lo habían invitado y que como no pudo ir lo esperan el sábado para merendar, porque ellos van a estar fuera. JORRIN toma nota y pasará el recado.

8955 1825

09:37 JESUS GIL después de ofrecer a la venta cierta cantidad de frijol azufrado a CAMILO DOMENECH de la oficina comercial de la Embajada Cubana, dice que mañana almorzará con TOÑO ROCHA pues es muy amigo de él y que es el Procurador de la República y que va a aclarar esas cosas que han publicado en contra de mismo CAMILO los diarios capitalinos. Este dice que lo tien sin cuidado, pues es la misma prensa que siempre ha criticado a los grandes hombres y verdaderos próceres, con mas razón van a criticar a un pobre hombre como lo es él. JESUS dice que de todas maneras " son unos mierdas, y bien mierdas", pero que los verdaderos amigos están con CAMILO que lo quieren de verdad. CAMILO lo sabe y se lo agradece.

10:15 Una empleada del Lic. FERNANDO FIGUEROA TARANGO Secretario del Presidente de la Gran Comisión del Senado, manifiesta que aquel desea ir a Cuba con su familia en viaje de placer. El Vice-Consul ABREU dice que lo puede hacer. La empleada entonces solicita "un salvo-conducto para FIGUEROA". ABREU indica que no es necesario pues eso solo es cuando hay estado de guerra, pero que si tiene pasaporte oficial puede otorgársele la visa.

6

P-7365

200. Salidas al 09.-1410.- Sin contestación. Luego Rogelio Rodríguez pide una conferencia al 33565 de La Habana y posteriormente pregunta a Bertha Pino (empiezan a hablar en el número 309) si ha recibido todas sus cartas y Bertha dice que sí. Rogelio pregunta por qué no le ha contestado y Bertha no responde y pregunta por el ...... y Rogelio indica que lo mandó con Mario hace dos semanas, lo mismo que los zapatos. Bertha se dá por enterada. -- Después la Dra.Margot Machado con Rogelio para comunicarle que ya está bien. Rogelio se alegra y pregunta cómo Verenita y Margot comenta que bien y engordando. Nuevamente habla Bertha y pregunta a Rogelio si está haciendo mucho frío y éste dice que nó, que ya levantó. Bertha pregunta cómo están en la embajada y Rogelio comenta que todo mundo bien. Bertha pregunta cuándo regresan a Cuba Vega y él y Rogelio creé que hasta marzo, a principios; pregunta si va a contestar sus cartas y Batha aclara que el viernes le contestaron y le mandaron un sobre amarillo con La señora de Sama. Rogelio:que ya lo recibió; pregunta si ya empezó a trabajar y Bertha dice que nó, que hasta el 23 de febrero y el martes irá a Santa Clara. Rogelio:que ayer con Bola de Nieve e Iván, le mandó una carta; pregunta si está de acuerdo con las cartas y Bertha indica que sí; que le dé recuerdos a todos los compañeros. Rogelio: que está bien.- 360.-

P-1365
P-8591
P-1921
P-8604

362. Entrada equivocada.- 366.-

367. Salidas al 09.-1425.-Sin contestación. Luego Rogelio pregunta el importe de la llamada que hizo a Cuba y MF pide que dentro de 20 minutos llame al 188440.- 380.- Posteriormente MF le dá tiempo y precio de la llamada a Cuba.-383.-

383. Salida al 141861.-1906.-J.se comunica a la farmacia y pide medicamentos a nombre de Cepeda.- 396.-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3.-L31.- 7 feb.65) - - -

P 1365

Embajada de Cuba: 144237.-
2 feb. 65 .-
M 11. L 36.-
0950 - 1407.

105. Entrada 0950.- HF pregunto si ya llegaron las becas -- para los estudiantes y MD pide llame al 141326 para que lo informen.- 123.-

123. Entrado 1122.- Novicky de la Embajada de Checoslovaquia con Rogelio para decirle que le urge hablar con él; pregunta si es posible y éste dice que sí y quedan de verse a las 12 en el lugarsito aquel.- 143.-

P. 7365
X

143. Entrado 1205.- El Lecado Cuauhtémoc Pardo al no encontrar a Sinobas, queda de volver a llamar.- 154.-

X

155. Entrada 1212.- Urdanivia pregunta al embajador qué se - lo ofrece y éste dice que necesitaba lo comunicara con el-- Ing.Carlo Durant porque hablaron de verse para hablar algo- de materia azucarera, ya que parece que hay una bibliografía que Durant estima que es muy moderna y le gustarí preguntarle ciertas cosas. Urdanivia: que Durant es un hombre de mucha confianza y muy competente. Armas está de - acuerdo y agrega que Durant, le estuvo hablando de unas publicaciones sobre determinadas técnicas azucareras que se-- han ido incorporando en algunos países a la industria. - Urdanivia: que Durant tiene simpatía por la revolución de -- Cuba y todo, que es un hombre en quien puede confiar y por- lo tanto mañana le dará sus teléfono. Armas acepta. -- Urdanivia pregunta qué noticias de Nuñez tiene y Armas indica que en éstos no ha sabido nada, sin embargo está esperando carta porque él le escribió mandándole unos libros que - le pidió; que en caso de que sepa algo, lo llamará. -

To Report
P-8726

P- 7365

CUBA

CUBA
Cancillería y residencia: Francisco Márquez 160
(Colonia Condesa)

Excmo. Sr. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas,
Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario
Señora Clara CARBONELL de Hernandez
Presentación de credenciales: 3 de Julio de 1963

Señor Ramon SINOBAS Casado. Consejero
Señora Marta SOLIS de Sinobas
Residencia: Alvaro Obregón 123, Depto. 605,
3er. Piso (Col. Roma) Teléfono: 11-21-79

Señor Raúl APARICIO Nogales, Consejero Cultural,
Señora Raquel ABREU de Aparicio
Residencia: Zamora 199-A (Condesa). Teléfono: 14-57-89

Señor Camilo DOMENECH Gadea, Consejero Comercial
Señora Esther Natalia JIMENEZ Navarro de Domenech
Residencia: Cuernavaca 35-7 (Condesa). Teléfono:

Señor Rogelio RODRIGUEZ López, Segundo Secretario.
Señora Esther GAVILAN de Rodriguez Lopez
Residencia: Baja California 175-3. Teléfono: 14-02-63

Señor José Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa, Tercer Secretario.
Señora Lolita RODRIGUEZ de Fernandez Roa.
Residencia: Juanacatlan 23-401 (Condesa). Teléfono:

Señor Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez, Tercer Secretario
Residencia: Francisco Márquez 160 (Condesa). Teléfono: 14-13-26

Señor Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez, Tercer Secretario.
Residencia: Telefono:

Señor Luis ALBERU Souto, Agregado Cultural
Residencia: Michelet 7, Depto. 301 (Anzurez).

Señor Enrique VILLAVICENCIO Argudin, Agregado Diplomático.
Señora Xenia MENENDEZ de Villavicencio.
Residencia: Francisco Márquez 160 (Col. Condesa). Teléfono: 14-13-26

SO: DIARIO OFICIAL, Organo del Gobierno Constitucional de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2 de Enero de 1965

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049 JG/JG/) PART

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

SECRET

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, PP 2, PP/PRO, PP/PYD 2, PP/PMD, 100 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE
MICROFILMED: FEB 10 1960

ROUTING

1		4	
2	✓	5	
3		6	

DEC 17 07 44:53
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 38553

10

TO DIR INFO [SACU] CITE HAVA 0693 ✓

INTEL

DA 16 DEC

APPR: PARAS 1,4 (2) PARAS 2,3 (3) PARAS 5-6
06, 08

SOURCE: PARA 1 [GEORGE K HARPER, LAS VILLAS PLANTATION] OWNER (F) PARAS 2,3 AMARIA (B) PARA 4 AMBARK-1 (C) PARA 5 06 [HARRY GRAHAM] (F) FROM DR MEMBER (F)

1. ERNESTO GUEVARA HAS MOVED WESTWARD. HIS EXACT LOCATION NOT KNOWN BUT 165 MEN THOUGHT TO BE UNDER HIS COMMAND ARE CAMPED NEAR MANACAS IN WEST LAS VILLAS. GUEVARA IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE BELIEVED TO BE TO CUT OFF CENTRAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC WEST OF SANTA CLARA. FC: AMBARK-2 CONFIRMS THIS REBEL STRATEGY, SAYS MAY BE PLANNING TRY CUT HIGHWAY AT SANTO DOMINGO. SC: HEAVY TRUCKS CANNOT TRAVEL EAST OF SANTA CLARA. BACKROADS CAN BE USED BY AUTOS AND LIGHT TRUCKS.

2. 26TH OF JULY REPLACING CTC LABOR OFFICIALS WITH OWN PEOPLE ON SUGAR CENTRALES WHICH IT CAPTURES. CONRAD BEQUER DIAZ, WITH HQS IN SIERRA MAESTRA, IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM.

SECRET

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3/80

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6

S E C R E T

DATE : 16 DECEMBER 1958

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]
[illegible] ☐
[illegible] ☐
[illegible] ☐
[illegible]
[illegible] ☐

PAGE 2

ROUTINE

IN 38553
HAVA 0693

TO INFO CITE

3. MANUEL RAY, MRC CHIEF, IS VISITING SIERRA MAESTRA FOR CONFERENCE WITH FIDEL CASTRO DISCUSS CASTRO DESIRE DISSOLVE MRC AND INCORPORATE IT INTO 26TH JULY.

4. SMALL FEU FORCE ACTIVE NEAR COLISEO IN MATANZAS. ARMS SHIPMENT SEIZED IN CAYO HUESO, FLA WEEK 7 DEC WAS PURCHASED BY FEU FOR USE IN HAVA.

5. BATISTA HAS CONTRACTED FOR SERVICES 2 FRENCH ARMY OFFICERS EXPERIENCED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TO ADVISE CUBAN ARMY.

20-4

SUPDATA: HQS MAY WISH QUERY [PARI] ON PARA 5.

DISSEM EMB DEF ORALLY.

RELEASED 161830Z

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

FORM 1389 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1/20

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
TSD/SAB
4200 Admin. Bldg.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/TSD/TA		23 June		
2.				
3. TSD/SRS		23 JUN 1960		
4.				
5. WH/4/FI		Coordinated by phone		
6.				
7. RI/DP	1308 L	23 JUN 1960		
8.				
9. TSD/SRS				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				

COMMENTS

PRIORITY

RECORD COPY

PRIORITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NAME BY PHONE	OFFICE
Ralph Seehafer	WH/4/FI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
COLIN C. REID 03	C/TSD/SAB

RELEASING OFFICER

NAME	TITLE
03 ROBERT K. CRAVEN	AC/TSD/TA

ENCLOSURE

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER 08
201-274049

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMW-3523

FORM

SECRET

[illegible] PRIORITY [illegible]

TO : Chief of Station, Havana
INFO

201-(274049) 08

FROM : Chief, KURIOT

DATE 23 JUN 1960

SUBJECT : AQUATIC/Operational 01
SW Supplies for AMIRE-1

RE: "[illegible]" – CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES
: HAVA - 4989, 17 June 1960

1. The SW supplies and instructions needed to establish two-way SW correspondence with AMIRE-1 are transmitted herewith. We realize that some of the instruction forms and supplies which are being transmitted are duplicates of those sent to the Station in support of other operations. However, in order to facilitate the handling of each operation, the supplies for each are furnished as a complete unit. This will preclude the need for borrowing from one agent's supplies to outfit another.

2. AMIRE will write to the Case Officer, using carbon system #39337. 99 Two unused sheets of carbon #39337 should be issued to the agent for this purpose. He should be told to store them separately to avoid accidental loss of his writing system. His carbon system is developed by means of tablet #30607. A supply of the developer material, in quantities sufficient for training purposes, accompanies this dispatch.

3. According to the WH operational plan, SW messages written by AMIRE-1 01 will be mailed to accommodation addresses in various Latin American countries. In accordance with that, KURIOT will provide the appropriate WH Field Stations 28 with the materials necessary for developing the operational messages.

4. AMIRE-1 01 will develop 99 the SW messages he receives by means of pill #58838. 99 He should be issued twenty pills #58838 for that purpose. It is recommended that the agent be told to hide his developer materials in a safe place. This should not present much of a problem because the pills are so small. 99 We do not generally recommend that pills be camouflaged as medicines. 99 Even in cases where the SW ingredient does have a bona fide medicinal usage, the concentration represented by the SW pill would usually be in excess of the 99 normal dosage, and thus there would be a danger of having an unwitting person use them by accident. 99 If the Case Officer feels that for operational reasons it is desirable to camouflage them as medicines they should only be kept in a bottle which is clearly marked FOR EXTERNAL USE ONLY. 99

5. According to the operational plan, the Case to agent SW messages will be prepared for the Area Division by KURIOT at Headquarters. The Area Division will pouch the SW messages (as "blank" sheets of stationery) 99 to the appropriate Field Station for application of the cover text and mailing.

6. The AMIRE-1 01 99 Case Officer should familiarize himself with the accompanying supplies and instructions before any attempt is made to train and issue supplies to the agent. Experience has shown that it is advisable to plan for two or three short (2 hour) agent training sessions scheduled over a period of days, rather than to attempt to cram the training into one long session.

7. Special attention should be given to planning the 24 cover correspondence. It is usually recommended that the agent use false name and return address on his SW messages to the Station, thereby dis-associating himself completely from his SW reports once they are in the mail channel. 24 This requires that the correspondence be fictional, and entails a certain amount of skill on the part of AMIRE-1 in fabricating apparently innocent correspondence. 24 We have found that the use of a 24 false postal identity frequently provides the agent with considerable psychological reassurance during the course of the operation.

8. The cover/

24/pv

HMMW - 3823

FORM 10-57 53b (43) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PRIORITY

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1 of 3

08
([illegible])

8. The cover correspondence must in no way appear to be different from the bulk of mail ordinarily found in the channel being used. It should contain no information which could be viewed as suspicious in any way. The external aspects of the correspondence must be innocent in all aspects if the SW is to be expected to provide any level of security.

9. We have found that the reliability of any SW system depends nearly entirely on the care with which it is used. Please stress the need for careful writing techniques in your agent training sessions.

10. The following supplies and instructions are transmitted in support of the AMIRE 01 operation:

a. Standard Form 99 #1059-CWT which describes in detail how to write with a carbon 99 sheet.

b. One carbon 99 sheet #2010, labeled 99 DEMONSTRATION CARBON is to be used to demonstrate the principles of 99 carbon writing. The development process for this system can be carried out in the agent's presence.

c. One bottle (100 ml.) 99 of developer #20609 which will develop the demonstration 99 carbon writing.

99 d. Instruction 99 Form/H-16029 describing the development of the DEMONSTRATION CARBON.

e. Three carbon sheets 99 #39337. The one labeled 99 PRACTICE CARBON is to be used in training and is to be retained by the Station. Two 99 are to be issued to the agent. The agent should not be allowed to witness the development of this system, nor should he be shown the message after development. 99

f. Instruction 99 Form H-36037 specific instructions for the development of carbon system #39337 99

g. 99 Twenty pills #30607, to be used to develop practice and real messages written with carbon #39337 99

h. Two practice messages written with AMIRE 01's ingoing SW system which he should use to practice his development technique.

i. Twenty-five pills 99 #58838 which AMIRE 01 will use 99 to develop the SW messages he receives. Two or three of these pills should be used in training. 99 Twenty of the remaining pills should be issued to the agent.

99 j. Instruction 99 Form #H-26058, instructions for the use of developer #56838.

k. One copy of the "Station Maintenance of SW Supplies form.

l. Miscellaneous items such as 99 cotton, swab sticks, and blotters; items generally useful for SW processing.

11. You will note that two different kinds of 99 carbon sheets have been submitted with the supplies. One is labeled DEMONSTRATION CARBON 99 This should be used in the practice session only. It should be used to demonstrate carbon 99 writing techniques 99 to the agent. This system can be developed in the agent's presence. The other carbons submitted (#39337) 99 constitute the agent's operational sending system. 99 One sheet of carbon #39337 has been labeled PRACTICE CARBON. 99 After the agent has mastered the use of the DEMONSTRATION CARBON 99 he should be given an opportunity to write with the PRACTICE CARBON 99 It is very important that the Case Officer have the chance to critique the agent's SW writing technique with the actual system which the agent will use. However, the agent

should not/

34/PN

99

should not be allowed to witness the development of his operatio[illegible] [illegible]on system nor be shown the message after development. The develop[illegible] [illegible] carbon 99 / 39337 should be carried out at the Station. 99 If the Case Officer [illegible] that the training messages written with the operational PRACTICE CARBON 99 [illegible] that the agent's technique is poor, he should use photographs of the [illegible] [illegible]ped messages to point out to the agent those areas where improvement [illegible] [illegible]ded, or he should just discuss it verbally.

12. The Station should retain the DEMONSTRATION 99 CARBON, the [illegible]TICE 99 CARBON, and the rest of the supplies. Please bear in mind that [illegible] [illegible]veloped messages and working materials should be treated as classified.

13. Please do not hesitate to request additional help from [illegible] as needed.

for Sherman M. Pravisto
JOANNA H. MANESTR[illegible]

Enclosures: (1 Box & 1 Env)
1. Supplies & Instructions
2. Supplies

22 June 1960

Distribution:
3 - COS, Havana, w/encls a/s

~~1~~ - RI, w/o encls
1 - TSD/SRS, w/o encls
2 - WH/4/FI, w/o encls
1 - TSD/SAB, w/o encls

TSD/SAB(JHManestrick)(2922):gke

03

CS COPY
23 Jun 60

EF[illegible] - 3523

9/12J

([illegible])08

08
201-(274649)

12 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

ATTENTION: C/C & TAB

SUBJECT: (Emilio Americo RODRIGUEZ) 04

1. Subject has been recruited by the Habana Station at the rate of $300.00 per month effective 1 June 1960.

2. It is requested that Finance Division deposit the monthly salary of Subject to (Account No. 44-335-104, Whitney 04 National Bank of New Orlenas, P.O. Box 1260, New Orleans 10, Louisiana.) This account is under the name of (Emilio Rodrigues.) 04

3. The first deposit should be made on 30 June 1960 for the month of June and monthly thereafter until further notified.

4. No taxes are to be withheld from Subject's salary.

J. D. Esterline
C/WH/4

WH/4/FI/RSeehafer/dc

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/Finance
1 - WH/4/Chrono
→ 1 - WH/4/Subject

12 Jul 60
201(274649)
08

5|PN

01
AM(IRE)-1 08
201 — (274049)

1752

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

18-13

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG : RALPH SEEHAFER
UNIT : WH/4/FI
EXT : 2065
DATE : 18 MAY 1961

TO : CARACAS

FROM: ~~[illegible]~~BELL

CONF: BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

MAY 18 2048Z 61

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 9323
9323

TO PRITY CARA INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 0628
0628

JMZIP

PLS PUT FOLLOWING INTO SW WRITE COVER LETTER AND MAIL TO AM(IRE)-1: 01

"MSG NUMBER FIVE. (HENRY). 06 RECEIVED YOUR SW MSGS THRU FOURTEEN. BE VERY CAREFUL OF (ELVIRA JOVANE DE SAYAS) 06 WE HAVE REPORT SHE VERY PRO-CASTRO. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU ALSO BEING SENT BY RADIO. HENRY, CLINTON, HAPPY AND EUGENIO SHOULD LEAVE CUBA AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. USE EVERY MEANS AVAILABLE INCLUDING COMPANY FUNDS FOR LEGAL OR ILLEGAL TRAVEL. MEANTIME DIVORCE YOURSELF FROM OPERATIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND CONCENTRATE ON YOUR EXFILTRATION. ADVISE IF OUR HELP NEEDED. IF ROBERTO WILLING BE ALTERNATE WT CHANNEL FOR PETE AND NET PROVIDE HIM WITH RADIO. HE ONLY TO BE USED IN EMERGENCY. USE INK AS PRIMARY CHANNEL. INSTRUCT FELIPE USE SW AND COURIERS FOR NORMAL COMMO AND WT ONLY FOR VERY URGENT MATTERS. WE SENDING POUCH VIA TIGERS WIFE. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE REMOVED ENVELOPE THREE CONTAINING PERSONAL LETTERS AND REPLACED WITH ENVELOPE CONTAINING PESOS FOR FELIPE MANAGE OPERATIONS. TELL FELIPES WIFE SEND FULL DETAILS BANK ACCT TO HENRYS PO BOX MIAMI. WE WILL

99

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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6/pJ

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 9323 BELL 0628

TO INFO CITE DIR

- 2 -

99 06

INTERCEPT AND BEGIN MONTHLY DEPOSITS. TELL PETE BE CAREFUL OF COUNSELLOR YUGOSLAV EMB WHO INTELLIGENCE AGENT. DIMPLE BRIEFED CONTENTS THIS MSG FOR ORAL RELAY TO YOU."

06

END OF MESSAGE

R. W. Herbert
02
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

03
Terrell
AC/WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Reichhardt
C. A. STANULIS
AC/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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4/PV

AM(IRE)-1
01

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 054 9MAY61
TO : BELL
FROM : CARACUS
ACTION : BELL 15
INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
2	FI	5	
3		6	

08
9MAY61 0326Z
201 — (274049)

PRIORITY

IN 1615

PRITY BELL WAVE CITE CARA 5885

JMZIP

01

1. FOLLOWING FROM AM(IRE) COVER LETTER DATED 29 APRIL: MSG 9 STOP UR W/T 17 APR JUST RCVD STOP (CLINTON, WIFE AND EUGENIO) RELEASED STOP REGISTERING (SWISS) END STOP STAND BY POSSIBLY CLINTON TRANSMITTING STOP COMPLETELY ORGANIZING OPERATIONS AROUND PETE AND PACO STOP PETE WILL HAVE CONTACTS WITH TIGER, PANAMA AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORES WHO VERY ACTIVE COUNTER-REV STOP FURNISH ADDRESS FOR DELIVERIES STOP ALL REPEAT ALL SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE USED STOP BELIEVE IMPOSSIBLE ANY AMERICAN OPERATION STOP PRELIMINARIES ALL DEPARTING UNDERWAY STOP SUGGEST OBTAIN MORE POST OFFICE BOXES STOP HAVE NO NEWS BINIARIS WHOM PLAN SEEK FUNDS STOP SIGNED (HENRY) 06

06.06.06

99

2. ENVELOPE POSSIBLY OPENED AND RESEALED. NO EVIDENCE OTHER EXAMINATION. COVER LETTER APPARENTLY WRITTEN BY WOMAN.

01

3. FROM RE-EXAMINATION MSG 7 FROM AM(IRE) WOULD APPEAR THAT LAST PART LAST SENTENCE ENDS WITH ("HAPPY AND SELF"). THE NAME (HAPPY) IS PROCEEDED WITH WORD ENDING IN E.

24

06

END OF MESSAGE

9 May 61
201-(274049)
08

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

"/r/

SEENAFER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

536

DATE : 9 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : DOP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

AMFIRE-1

01

201 —

MAR 9 1929Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2743

PRITY MEXI INFO BELL CITE WAVE 4342

JMZIP

REF MEXI 7544 (IN 2645)

06

1. STATEMENTS MADE BY (LUIS ALBERTO DE JESUS CONDON CAJIGAL) TO MEXI ACCURATE. OLIEN HANDLED (BOBBY MADURO) AND (JUAN MENDEZ) WHO IDEN A. (RIVERO) MENTIONED POSS IDEN B; PSUEDO (EMILIO FERNANDEZ) AKA (EUGENIO) IDEN C; (PLINIO PRIETO) IDEN D. ALL KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER.

06 06 06 06 08 07

2. WAVE HAS NO INTEREST SUBJ. HOWEVER, WAVE SUGGESTS IF SUBJ DESIRES TRAVEL WAVE AREA JOIN AMIRON MIL TNG PROGRAM WILL HAVE AMOTS ASSIST HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

9 May '61

08

201-(274049)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

OSS
DATE : 9 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

MAR 9 0445Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2645

PRITY BELL INFO PRITY WAVE CITE MEXI 7544

JMZIP SECUR

REF: BELL 1750 (001-4614)+

FOLL STATEMENT FROM LUIS ALBERTO DE JESUS CONDOM CAJIGAL: 06

REJOINED ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND ABOUT MAY60. OFFICES WERE AT EDIFICIO FOCSA APTO 214 06 SECOND FLOOR WHERE LOCATED CIA (CUBANA DE FIANZA) 24 06 PRESIDENT BOBY MADURO 06 IN CHARGE OF JUAN MENDEZ 06 (NOW IN UNDERGROUND HAVA). THERE ASKED JOIN FRD BY SENORES RIVERO 06 AND EL RUBIO 06 WHO CARRIED FRD CREDENTIALS. MAR 06 ACCEPTED AND SENT PLANILLAS OIAMI OF JUAN MENDEZ 06 WAR NAME JORGE PILOTO 08 AND OF SELF, WAR NAME JORGE PINO. 08 GROUP HAD CONTACT WITH AMCITIZEN AMEMBASSY HAVA NAMED EMILIO FERNANDEZ 06 WAR NAME EUGENIO. 08 GROUP ASKED CHECK RECEPTION RADIO SWAN IN PROVINCES PINAR DEL RIO HAVANA AND MATANZAS. GROUL VISITED BY PINIO PRIETO 06 (LATER EXECUTED 12 OCTOBER 60) AND DELEGATE FABIO 06 FROM MIAMI RE ORGANIZATION FIFTH COLUMN UTILIZING PLASTIC EXPLOSIVE SELECTING HOUSES HAVANA FOR ARMS CACHES AND DROP ZONES. SUBJ TOOK ASYLUM 2 JANUARY 61 MEXI EMBASSY HAVA. 06

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * NO TRACES ALIAS JORGE PINO. 08

SECRET

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08

201-(274049)

(Rodriguez, Emilio) 04

01

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. J. MULLANE 65
UNIT: WH/4/SECURITY
EXT: 6785
DATE: 9 MARCH 1961

TO: JMMOVE

FROM: ~~DIRECTOR~~ JMBELL

CONF: BELL 15

INFO: COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

ROUTING 09-18

1
2
3
4
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6

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INITIALS

WH/4/Security

9 MAR 61 2050Z

OUT 6435

OUT 6435

TO FRITY MOVE

INFO

CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 2491

2491

JMZIP SECUR

REF RDN: 3161 (IN 2661) (NOT SENT MOVE)

06, 08

1. REQUEST KUSODA REP ASAP CONTACT MR. (ERN[illegible] TO RODRIGUE. GONZALES, INSTRUCTOR, BERLITZ SCHOOL, 1209 ST. CHARLES AVE.) AND RELAY MESSAGE FROM SON (EMILIO) "DO NOT RETURN CUBA. EXPLANATION WILL FOLLOW IN LETTER." TELEPHONIC CONTACT SUFFICIENT.

06

2. FYI SON RECENTLY ARRESTED AND RELEASED. AUTHORITIES SEEKING FATHER.

END OF MESSAGE

This is probably — the (Emilio Rodriguez) 04

201-(274049)

08

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
CHIEF, WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/4/FI R. Seehafer in draft
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOSEPH F. LANGAN
CHIEF, WH/4/SECURITY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

7/pJ

SECRET

6 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: AMIRE-1 Arrest on 3 March 1961 08 01

REFERENCES: (A) RIPM 3046 (IN 2218)

(B) BELL 2340 (OUT 6009)

1. Reference A does not give sufficient detail to make a very realistic appraisal at this time of the damage to our operations from the arrest of AMIRE-1. 24

2. According to AMRYE-1, the head principal agent of our stay-behind nets in Cuba, AMIRE-1 01 was kept fully informed of everything concerning operations and reporting. He also knew of the AMPARCH-1 agent net and how contact can be made with the agents. He was kept fully cognizant of all incoming and outgoing radio messages and reports.

3. Following is a list of the agents known or probably known to AMIRE-1: 01

AMRYE-1
AMPARCH-1
AM[illegible]TON-1
AM[illegible]-1
AMDIVY-1
AMMICLITE
AMMICLITE-2
AMBOUT-1
AMPALMA-1
AMALBA-1
AMBLAB-1
AM[illegible]ED-1
AMPARLOR-2
AMDCIT-1
AMCONCERT-1
AMTIS-1
AMPEDARCH-11
AMG[illegible]-9
AMPALM-4

4. AMIRE-1 01 was also in contact with counter-revolutionaries such as the following which could have been the cause of his arrest:

Francisco SANTIAGO 06
06 Pepo SOLIS
06 SANTANA (fnu), FN radio operator 06
06 Humberto SORI Marin

SECRET

IPV

SECRET

5. AMIAS-1 was also made aware of the persons and places where the staybehind funds are cached or stashed. He was to have provided 01,24 AMOT-34 with a radio set on 4 March 1961. He was also one of the staybehind agents who was originally introduced to the British. 24

03
Robert E. Whedbee
C/WH/4/FI

WH/4/FI/RGSeehafer:mkt

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/4/CI
1 - C/WH/4/FI/D/CU
1 - WH/4/F&P (File British Liaison) 24
1 - WH/4/Chrono
2 - WH/4/FI

SECRET

5/PV

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO [illegible]A-6710, 24 August 1960

06

(Juan M. Cassanova Rodriguez)
(Apartado 6290) 08
Habana, Cuba

[illegible]ET

CS COPY

2/rw

F-1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

ADVANCE COPY

SUBJECT: Operational/CYPOSE/AMIRE/AMGLEN/AMFOX
WT Operator Candidate Inside Target Area.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Request for Headquarters Review of Files - Para 5.

1. In the fall of 1960 AMIRE-1 (Peter J. DI CERVENO) recruited in Havana a WT operator candidate, whose name he cannot recall at this time. This candidate was spotted and first contacted by AMPANIC-1, who passed the lead over to AMIRE-1. AMPANIC-1 first contacted the candidate on the porch of the old Mercedes Benz Agency at Malecon and Principe Streets, and AMIRE-1 then contacted subject in the latter's apartment in the fourth floor of a building located in the middle of the block on the East side of Menocal Avenue (Infanta) between Valle and San Jose Streets. This building had a store in the first floor, was painted a pinkish beige, and the apartments were very small (one bedroom and bath, living-dining room combination and a small kitchen). Subject was at the time working in a hardware store and living with his wife and a small child. Subject was about 33 years old, 6'6" tall, 120 lbs., wore thick glasses, light complexion, light hair, protruding facial features.

2. Subject had experience as a professional WT operator and worked a clandestine WT set for the Organizacion Autentica (OA) against the Batista regime. AMPANIC-1 was a member of the OA and spotted subject through a leader of the OA for whom Subject worked in the underground.

3. Subject was trained for a week or so by AMGLEN-1 in a safehouse located at 39 San Rafael Street which had been obtained for that purpose by AMFOX-1. AMFOX-1 attended the training sessions as a look-out, but neither AMFOX-1 nor AMGLEN-1 knew the identity and address of the trainee. Training included the clandestine operation of a RS-1, the use of signal plans, the use of pads in coding and decoding, and personal security. Training was conducted in the fall of 1960 after recruitment of Subject and with the approval of CO George D. SCOPGORY, who was AMIRE-1's CO at the time and to whom full reports were turned in on the

(Continued)

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 Jan. 63	1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-7439

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33-54/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

A/N

training and the identity of the candidate. Subject was never activated and was kept on stand-by for possible use at a later date. For that purpose bona fides were established by AMIRE-1 and reported to his CO. Subject was not supplied with a WT set and no signal plans nor pads were issued to him.

4. AMIRE-1 recalls Subject was very secure in his clandestine contacts and operations. Despite established bona fides, AMIRE-1 had considerable trouble in gaining Subject's confidence and three preliminary contacts were necessary before getting down to business. Subject was last contacted by AMIRE-1 at Subject's apartment described above, in January or February 1961. At this time Subject was still willing and ready to work.

5. It is assumed that Headquarters files on the activities of AMIRE-1, AMCLEN-1 or AMFOX-1 will contain copies of the training reports and information reported by AMIRE-1. We would appreciate Headquarters assistance in ascertaining Subject's identity and present whereabouts in order to determine if he could still be used operationally inside target area. AMPANIC-1 has been terminated by JMWAVE PW Branch because of weakness in his personal security, and it is believed best not to contact him on this matter if possible.

END OF DISPATCH

30 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4
03
ATTENTION : George Hleovas
SUBJECT : Cover for AMIRE/1
01

1. Pursuant to your requirement for status cover 01 for AMIRE/1, 01 the following devised cover has been developed. AMIRE/1 will be employed as of 1 November 1961, by Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service, ≥4 a devised cover firm engaged in providing consulting services in the field of electronics and electrical instruments. His immediate position will be that of consultant assigned to the Southeastern part of the United States. This cover was selected in view of AMIRE/1's past employment where he represented various electrical suppliers. 01

2. Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service ≥4 is located at 08 4010 Glengyle Avenue, Baltimore 15, Maryland, 08 telephone ROgers 4-6770. This is a fully backstopped cover device which will list AMIRE/1 as one of its employees thereby furnishing a credit and employment 01 reference for him. His payments will be made to him by bank transfer as in the past.

3. It should be pointed out to AMIRE/1 01 that he will receive ≥4 a U. S. Treasury form 1099 at the end of each taxable year, showing Roberts as his source of income. Therefore, it is incumbent on AMIRE/1 to 01 file an overt tax return listing himself as an independent contractor with Roberts, thereby explaining why taxes were not withheld. ≥4

4. You are requested to advise CCG when this cover arrangement is no longer needed, so that proper backstopping can be effected.

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
C/CCG/NC

30 Oct 61

SECRET

201-274049
08

5|DJ

03

ORIG : ([illegible])
UNIT : [illegible]/4/[illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 2 NOVEMBER 1961

1579

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

03

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT64[illegible]

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 21802

JMZIP

REF: WAVE 7378 (IN 18[illegible])*

1. [illegible] BACKSTOPPED BY ([illegible] ELECTRONIC AND ENGINEERING SERVICE) ([illegible] AVE BALT 15 MD) TEL ([illegible] [illegible]-377[illegible]). EMPLOYED 1 NOV 61 AS CONSULTANT ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTS FOR [illegible] AT [illegible] DOLLARS YEAR.

01 24 06 06

2. TAX INFO TO FOLLOW BY [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested priority cover status for subject

03

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

[illegible] (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

G. J. [illegible]
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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7IPJ

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: UFG-W-642 dated 17 [illegible]

SUBJECT: Cover for Subject

1. Pursuant to your requirement for status cover for Subject, the following devised cover has been developed. Subject will be employed as of 1 November 1961, by (Roberts Electronic 24 and Engineering Service) a devised cover firm engaged in providing consulting services in the field of electronics and electrical instruments. His immediate position will be that of consultant assigned to the Southeastern part of the United States. This cover was selected in view of Subject's past employment where he represented various electrical suppliers.

08 2. (Roberts Electronic and Engineering Service 24) is located at (4010 Glengyle Avenue, Baltimore 15, Maryland) telephone 08 (ROgers 4-6770.) This is a fully backstopped cover device which will list Subject as one of its employees thereby furnishing a credit and employment reference for him. His payments will be made to him by bank transfer as in the past.

3. It should be pointed out to Subject that he will receive a U.S. Treasury form 1099 at the end of each taxable year, showing 24 (Roberts) as his source of income. Therefore, it is incumbent on Subject to file an overt tax return listing himself as an independent contractor with (Roberts 24), thereby explaining why taxes were not withheld.

4. You are requested to advise Headquarters when this cover arrangement is no longer needed, so that proper backstopping can be effected.

6/pJ

SECRET

(RUIZ Perez, Carlos (Guillermo))

[illegible]

RUIZ, Guillermo

Latest information (7 July 1971) indicates he is with the MINREX office of Scientific-Technologic Affairs in Havana.

(UNEDIT from SECRET)

201-735296

SECRET 201-735296

CLOSED

File in next

volume.

14-00000

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Report

Olejarz
~~[illegible]~~
Lunsford

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. CS DB-312/02338-69

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

DATE DISTR. 8 October 1969

DOI 19 September 1969

SUBJECT Rejection of Air Spain Offer to Sell Three Britannia Aircraft to Cuba

ACQ Spain, Madrid (19 September 1969)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE Member of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid who is a reliable reporter and is known to have access to this type of information.

201-735296

1. On 19 September 1969, Guillermo Ruiz Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, sent a letter to Air Spain officially rejecting their offer to sell three Britannia aircraft to Cubana Airlines. (Headquarters Comment: In CS-311/07888-69, dated 8 September 1969, an Iberian Airlines employee whose reporting is usually accurate reported that Air Spain had offered, on 1 August 1969, to sell Cubana Airlines three Britannias for US $2,643,000.)

201 file

2. Field Dissem: None.

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

File: Amparo

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	BIC	TREASURY					

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3
WHC/OPS	2			E/MADR	1
WHC/EW	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	E/R	1
WHC/PP	1				
WHC/MIAMI	1				

MADRID 9618
(IN 49866)
QUOTA/QUDOZE
CSDB-312/02338-69

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1

LIAISON	COORDINATING	RELEASING
Joint/65	E/IB/R P.R.	RH JM cb

[illegible] C R E T

[illegible] Division

[illegible] Cuban Personnel in Madrid

1. [illegible] has provided the following [illegible] on Cuban [illegible] personnel assigned to Spain, [illegible] Pere[illegible] (201-321007); Ricardo *[illegible] (201-[illegible]) and [illegible] Guillermo *RUIZ Perez (201-[illegible]):

[illegible] Mercedes)

[illegible] was [illegible] to the post of [illegible] to take charge of the Cuban [illegible] 1967; this [illegible] left Cuba, although he [illegible] Foreign Affairs (M[illegible]) [illegible] Chargé d'Affaires at the Cuban [illegible] Cruz arrived in [illegible] Embassy in [illegible] late 1965. Although [illegible] of his post [illegible] has been [illegible]. It was commented that [illegible], and a very good opinion [illegible], he cooperated with the [illegible]

[illegible] abroad to [illegible], who is about [illegible] years old, [illegible] presumably left in [illegible] to continue at his post. [illegible] the impression [illegible]

[illegible]

S E C R E T

[illegible] (approximately [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] on past two occasions [illegible] Switzerland, and [illegible] City on [illegible]. [illegible] bus driver [illegible] much power, [illegible] Ministry of [illegible] and attitudes [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] visiting [illegible] with a person [illegible] but sincere, and [illegible] advised to [illegible] to conclude [illegible] memorandum [illegible] the joint [illegible] functions of [illegible] to the [illegible]

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/QUDOZE/Unidentified Cuban in Zaragoza

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Osvaldo GARCIA who arrived in Spain nearly two months ago to supervise the production of two-burner stoves being manufactured by the Spanish firm Talleres Cataluna, S. A. (TACA) (TACA is also manufacturing the 10,000 cane wagons for the Cubans), passed through Madrid on 23 September and told AMAUTO-1 that there was an unidentified Cuban in Zaragoza who is preparing a study on Spanish firms trading with Cuba. AMAUTO-1 immediately suspected that this Cuban was an agent of RVROCK and suggested that GARCIA get to know this person and try to elicit biographic information as well as attempt to get a photograph of him for possible identification.

2. Station has no idea who this Cuban might be.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR [illegible]
2 - COS/WH,Miami

CS COPY

FILE AMAUTO-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-25535	2 October 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 25

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 7 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8 — INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 782 CI/OA FI 2

26 SEP 69 IN 53062

SECRET 261334Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9655 (MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 40647

1. AMAUTO-1 RETURNED TO MADRID FROM HOME LEAVE ON 18 SEPTEMBER. WIFE AND FAMILY ARRIVED MADRID 17 SEPTEMBER. QUTIMID REPORTED AMAUTOS PLAN REMAIN MADRID FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR AND POSSIBLY TWO. WIFE PREGNANT WITH SIXTH CHILD.

2. STATION WILL SUBMIT OUR VIEWS ON AMAUTO-1 AFTER REVIEW YOUR DISPATCH.

3. FILE 201-735296.

SECRET

mw

JB

C/WH/

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

26 Sep 69

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1969
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
FILE NUMBER: TELEGRAM # 67091

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:cs
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1819
DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE: VR. RI/AN EUR6 DDP ADDP CSDO F2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 24 19 05 Z SEP 69

CITE DIRECTOR (reference number) 40647

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. OSMA-24926

B. MADRID 9234 (IN 19794)

C. MADRID 9263 (IN 22677)

1. HQS STILL INTERESTED AMAUTO-1 AS POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGET. INTERESTED PARTICULARLY HIS PRESENT STATUS. ACCORDING QUTIMID REPORT MARCH 69 (REF A) SUBJECT INTENDED DEPART MADRID PCS AUG 69. REF B REPORTED SUBJECT HAD DEPARTED FOR HAVANA 4 AUG BUT NO HQS INFO HIS DEPARTURE PCS. LATEST INFO (REF C) REPORTED SUBJECT [illegible] ON HOME LEAVE, THEREFORE ASSUME HE WILL RETURN MADRID SOON.

2. ~~PRESENTLY IN PROCESS~~ PREPARING DISPATCH CONCERNING OUR RENEWED INTEREST AMAUTO-1, ASSUMING HE INTENDS RETURN MADRID TO CONTINUE ASSIGMENT. ~~WILL FORWARD BY SEPARATE POUCH.~~ MEANWHILE, WOULD APPRECIATE STATION VIEWS (BY POUCH) ON [illegible] NEW APPROACH TO SUBJECT; ALSO

AN JB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~FB~~
~~BX~~
DESTROYED
~~RI~~
c/ci/ic

(CONTINUED)

201-735296
24 Sep 69

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
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3	09	7	
4		8	

RIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE: OCT 1 3 17 PM '69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION RE[illegible]ED
RID/EDI

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 40617

PAGE TWO

POTENTIAL STATION ASSETS WHICH WE COULD USE AS AVENUE FOR APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

3. WISH TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO STATION AND QUSEQUINS FOR PAST INITIATIVE AND GOOD REPORTING RE AMAUTO CASE.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

E/IB F. A. Allner

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

NEED TO DO A DISPATCH TO [illegible] DETAILING OUR VERY RENEWED INTEREST IN AMMUG-1 AS A POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGET.

3 ITEMS OF INTEREST - VULNERABILITIES.

1. HIS DESIRE FOR EXPENSIVE ITEMS AND GOOD LIVING (MONEY)
2. MEDICAL PROBLEM - POSSIBLE EITHER PERMANENT INJURY THAT COULD CAUSE HIM TO LIMP.
3. HIS DESIRE TO WORK IN INDUSTRY -

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RF/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CI/OA FI 2

ACTION NO. 787

26 SEP 69 IN 53062

S E C R E T 261334Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9655

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 40647

1. AMAUTO-1 RETURNED TO MADRID FROM HOME LEAVE ON 18 SEPTEMBER. WIFE AND FAMILY ARRIVED MADRID 17 SEPTEMBER. QUTIMID REPORTED AMAUTOS PLAN REMAIN MADRID FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER YEAR AND POSSIBLY TWO. WIFE PREGNANT WITH SIXTH CHILD.

2. STATION WILL SUBMIT OUR VIEWS ON AMAUTO-1 AFTER REVIEW YOUR DISPATCH.

3. FILE 201-735296.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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FILE, VR, [illegible] EUR 6, FI 2, IW,

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5		10	

Wheeler

S E C R E T 221635Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9618

DIRECTOR

49866

23 Sep 69 IN 49866

TYPIC INTEL QUDOZE

REF: OSM 9665

1. ON 19 SEPTEMBER AMAUTO-1 DICTATED LETTER TO AIR SPAIN INTERVENTORS OFFICIALLY REJECTING AIR SPAIN OFFER TO SELL THREE BRITANNIA AIRCRAFT TO CUBANA.

2. DEFER FILE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR 6 CI CI/OPS FI 2

ACTION NO. 372

SECRET 231446Z SEP 69 CITE MADRID 9624

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

23 SEP 69 IN 50289

TYPIC WATCHLIST

1. LUIS O. RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ PP-D-62-56 AND GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ PP-D-67-S90 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HABANA 18 SEPT ON CUBANA FLT 470.

2. FILE: 65-120-20

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

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11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MINCEX VICE MINISTER UNTIL LATE 67. CUBAN EMB IN MADRID CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. REFUSED TO ACCEPT DSE DOMINANCE OF CUBAN EMB IN MADRID.

201-808896
OSMA-25453
15 SEP 69
P2

R 6909181350

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

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WH 8		FILE, VR RI/AN EUR 6 FI 2 CI/OPS
ACTION NO. 664		

S E C R E T 131239Z AUG 69 CITE MADRID 9263 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

22677

13 Aug 69 IN 22677

d/

1. REQUEST TRACES INCLUDING AMOT ON JUAN ANTONIO (CURBELO) LEMUS BORN VULTUS, CUBA 8 MAR 30. SUBJ CURRENTLY ACTING CHARGE CUBAN EMBASSY WHILE GUILLERMO RUIZ ON HOME LEAVE.

2. FILE 201-733544.

S E C R E T

[illegible] 28 [illegible] 69 Emmy —

CURBELO (201-733544) FORMER 2ND SECRETARY SANTIAGO, CHILE, [illegible].

Answered K2

MADRID [illegible] (IN 19794) 8 MAR 69 [illegible] [illegible] MADRID [illegible] [illegible] ON 4 MAR 69.

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR EUR 6, RI/AN, FI 2, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 103

S E C R E T 182055Z AUG 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 4945 18 Aug 69 IN 25849

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC

E mmy

REF: MADRID 9263 (IN 22677)

1. JUAN ANTONIO CURBELO LEMUS (201-733544) ARRIVED SANTIAGO, CHILE, AS SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY IN AUGUST 63 (HCSA-10169, 20 AUGUST 63, AND SAGO 5834, 24 AUGUST 63). RETURNED TO CUBA FROM CHILE IN AUGUST 64 (MACHINE TRAVEL LISTING). ATTENDED WORLD CONFERENCE ON AGRARIAN REFORM HELD IN ROME IN JUNE/JULY 66; DESCRIBED AS OFFICIAL OF CUBAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (OIRA-45082, 23 JUNE 66; ROME 0386, 8 JULY 66, AND OIRA-45261, 27 JULY 66). SEE MACHINE TRAVEL LISTING FOR ADDITIONAL TRAVEL.

2. NO ADDITIONAL AMOT TRACES. DIRECTOR: ABOVE DOCUMENTS WHICH NOT AVAILABLE STATION FILES MAY CONTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON SUBJECT.

3. FILE: 201-733544.

SECRET

SECRET

Spain

DISPATCH

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Europe Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
KIAMBROSIA Transmittal of Photographs of Cuban Officials in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MADRID 9147

1. As explained in Reference we are forwarding several photographs of Cuban officials currently assigned to Madrid. We would appreciate KIAMBROSIA-3 reviewing the photographs to possibly identify the official who met in Madrid.

Photograph #1 - Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Cuban Minister

Photograph #2 - Aristides DIAZ Ruviroes, First Secretary and current Intelligence officer.

Photograph #3 - Orestes BARRETA Perez, First Secretary

✓ Photograph #4 - Jose DIAZ Puga, Attache and suspected intelligence officer. Iden OGI ... [illegible]

2. Photograph number 5 is that of Hector GALLO Portiles, former Cuban intelligence officer in Madrid. Although a long shot we wonder if this GALLO is the same person who met the agent in Havana. (2[illegible] Jul 69)

Howard R. ZACODES

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA-25360

DATE
4 August 1969

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805

INFO. FILE, VR. RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 101630Z JUL 69 CITE MADRID 8970 (ROPARD ACTING)

10 JUL 69 IN 01275

4

DIRECTOR INFO ROME

TYPIC AMBGEWN AMCAGE-1 TAOIMID

1. AMCAGE-1 ADVISED AMOUTO-1 6 JULY HE PLANNED GO HAVANA VIA MADRID 7 JULY. DURING BRIEF STOPOVER AT MADRID AIRPORT INTENDED TO MEET PRESIDENT OF ALFA ROMSO COMPANY WHOM WILL ACCOMPANY TO HAVANA. WISHED TO INTRODUCE AMAUTO-1 TO THIS MAN.

2. FILE 201-759701.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File: AMAUTO-1

SPAIN

ORIG: EMMY PRYOR:nk EP
UNIT: WH/COG OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 10 JULY 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH 8
INFO FILE: VR. DDP, ADDP, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

Ennis
Pryor

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 15 [illegible] JUL 69 CITE DIRECTOR 19791

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW

REFS: A. OSMA 25059, 21 APRIL 1969
B. DIRECTOR 16159
C. MADRID 8882 (IN 92987)

1. PHOTOS FORWARDED WITH REF A SHOWN TO AMBEDEW-1 WHO IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING, NUMBERED PER REF: NO. 1, RECOGNIZED AS "GALLO," (HECTOR GALLO) FORMER CHIEF OF CENTER, SPAIN. NO. 4. IDENTIFIED AS "ENCARGADO DE NEGOCIOS" IN SPAIN, GUILLERMO (RUIZ). A-1 ADDED THAT RUIZ WAS VERY "DICTATORIAL" IN HIS DEALINGS WITH DGI OFFICERS, AND THAT HE HAD SERIOUS PERSONALITY CONFLICT WITH GALLO. NO. 6, RECOGNIZED AS THE MAN A-1 THINKS REPLACED GALLO AS COC IN SPAIN, WHOSE PSEUDO IS "DOMINGO."

2. ALTHOUGH A-1 THOUGHT PHOTO NO. 2 LOOKED VERY FAMILIAR, HE UNABLE IDENTIFY. DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY OF REMAINDER PHOTOS.

3. BASED ON FACT PHOTOS SUBMITTED WITH REF A REPRESENT SMALL PERCENTAGE NUMBER CUBAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED SPAIN, PLUS FACT DGI KNOWN TO UTILIZE COMMERCIAL OFFICE PERSONNEL, BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE REQUEST FROM LIAISON PHOTOS OF ALL CUBAN DIPLOMATS ASSIGNED SPAIN FOR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR 79794

TO PAGE TWO

POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATIONS BY A-1, AS REQUESTED REF B.

4. NO INDEX. FILE 19-6-139/4.

END OF MESSAGE

5
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3
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1

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

for C/WH/COG

E/IB

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMAUTO /1/
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-08368
10 MAY 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ HAS STARTED AFFAIR W/AMAGONIZE/1 /201-298225/ LAST TWO NIGHT. NIGHT 8TH SUPPOSEDLY WORKING LATE BUT TOGETHER

WAS 201-353964

R 6908180632

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

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FILE, VR, DR/SD, CI/OPS, DCI, CI/F2

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PRECEDENCE

SECRET 101203Z MAY 69 CITE MADRID 8368 10 MAY 69 IN 55419

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMEDIA QUTIMID AMAGONIZE

REF: DIRECTOR 00167

1. ALL QUTIMID INFO CHECKED THRU EARLY MORNING HOURS 19 MAY. LATE EVE CALL TO HOTEL BY AMAGONIZE-1 REPORTED AMMEDIA-1 NOT YET ARRIVED MADRID. AMAGONIZE-1 INDICATED IN CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 WIFE THAT HAD CALLED AMMEDIA-1 EMB EITHER 6TH OR 7TH AND THEY REPORTED HE HAD LEFT FOR MADRID. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AMAGONIZE-1 AND AMAUTO-1 WIFE SHOW BEWILDERMENT AND CONCERN NON ARRIVAL AMMEDIA-1. CONVERSATION LATE EVE 8 MAY AMAUTO-1 WIFE ASKED "JOKINGLY" IF HE MIGHT NOT HAVE DEFECTED.

2. AMAUTO-1 HAS STARTED AFFAIR WITH AMAGONIZE-1 LAST TWO NIGHTS. NIGHT 8TH SUPPOSEDLY WORKING LATE BUT TOGETHER. AT 0100 HRS 10TH AMAUTO-1 WENT TO APT AMAGONIZE-1 AFTER OFFICIAL FUNTION. BEING UNUSUALLY NICE TO EACH OTHER ON PHONE LAST COUPLE DAYS.

3. AMAGONIZE-1 NOW WORRIED AMMEDIA-1 MIGHT BE SECRETLY MADRID WATCHING HER MOVEMENTS. CLAIMS ON PREVIOUS OCCASION IN MADRID OBSERVED HER MOVEMENTS FOR FOUR DAYS BEFORE CONTACTING HER.

4. UNABLE MAKE OTHER CONFIRMATION ARRIVAL AMMEDIA-1

SECRET

File:
AMAUTO-1

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES | ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 8368 SECRET

WITHOUT DIRECT QUESTION TO QUSEQUINS WHICH BELIEVE NOT ADVISEABLE. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

5. FILE: 201-353964

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 00167

PRIORITY MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMBROWN AMMEDIA

REF: MADRID 8337 (IN 53617)

1. WILL SEND AMBEATNIK/1 (IDEN) ON FIRST AVAILABLE FLIGHT UPON CONFIRMATION AMMEDIA/1 [illegible] VISIT MADRID.

2. FILE 201-353964.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

E/IB Mr. Sorrels

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 0016[illegible]

PRIORITY MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMBROWN AMMUDIA

REF: DIRECTOR 00167

1. IDEN IS DR. IGNACIO FITERRE RIVERA, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO THE HAGUE 1959-61; PROFESSOR MATHEMATICS SMALL COLLEGE JACKSONVILLE, FLA. 1961-PRESENT; FRIEND AND BENEFACTOR CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA AND BERTHA FERNANDEZ SINCE MID-FORTIES WHEN BOTH WORKED FOR HIM IN MINISTER EDUCATION OF GRAU SAN MARTIN REGIME; ALFARAS RECENTLY ASSURED FITERRE THAT THEIR FRIENDSHIP REMAINS AS WARM AS EVER. DESCRIPTION: APPARENT AGE 55; FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, 200 LBS; GREY HAIR, STRAIGHT, FULL; BROWN EYES; NATURALIZED US CITIZEN. WAS ACTIVE IN TRIPLE A, JAILED AND EXILED UNDER BATISTA.

2. 201-353964.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Pls ref attached cable.

[illegible]

C/WH/COG

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

E/IB Mr. Sorrels
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
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S-E-C-R-E-T

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559 C/FI 2

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INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR 5, C/SB 5, C/RI/SD, ADDP, DDP, C/CI

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S E C R E T 301835Z APR 69 CITE MADRID 9275 (BOPARD ACTING)

30 APR 69 IN 48023

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC REDCOAT AMAGONIZE

1. SINCE 24 APRIL QUTIMID HAS REPORTED MORE THAN SEVEN HOURS OF REVEALING CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN AMAGONIZE-1 AND WIFE AMAUTO-1 ON SUDDEN RECALL OF FORMER. CONVERSATIONS TOTALLY INDISCREET AND EXPOSE EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT INFO ON SUPPOSED REASONS FOR RECALL AND ITS APPARENT CONNECTION WITH AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR. CANNOT EMPHASIZE ENOUGH THE BITTERNESS VOICED BY AMAGONIZE-1 OVER URGENT RECALL. FONOFF INSISTED SHE TAKE FIRST FLIGHT PBRUMEN WHICH SCHEDULED 5 MAY, ALTHOUGH AMAUTO-1 HAD CABLED FONOFF FOR EXTENSION DEPARTURE DATE TO 13 MAY.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THEIR SUPPOSITIONS REVEALED BY QUTIMID FOR SUDDEN RECALL:

A. AS FREQUENTLY REPORTED AMAGONIZE-1 HAS VOICED DISPLEASURE WITH WORKING CONDITIONS MADRID, AND FONOFF, ACCORDING QUTIMID IS AWARE FRICTION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND AMAGONIZE-1. (AS NOTED BEFORE MOST COMPLAINTS VOICED TO WIFE AMAUTO WHO CERTAINLY KEEPING HER HUSBAND INFORMED.)

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PAGE 2 MADRID 8275 S E C R E T

IN ADDITION, AMAGONIZE-1 NEVER HAD GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH AMADRIFT-1, WHO NOW IN PBRUMEN, AND HE PROBABLY HAS TOLD AMSTAFF AND FONOFF ABOUT AMAGONIZE-1 BEHAVIOR.

B. WIFE AMAUTO-1 SUGGESTED THAT RECALL PROBABLY STEMS FROM GENERAL PRECAUTION TO PREVENT FUTURE AMBEDEW-1 TYPE DEFECTIONS. THESE CONVERSATIONS LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR HAS CAUSED WIDESPREAD AND DEEP CONCERN IN FONOFF. AMAGONIZE-1 COMMENTED SHE SURE FONOFF THINKS THAT VULNERABILITIES WHICH CAUSED AMBEDEW-1 DEFECTION ARE ALSO PRESENT IN HER CASE. NOTE NO MENTION NAME AMBEDEW-1 BUT MANY REFS TO DEFECTION, "SERIOUS HAPPENING PARIS", DESERTION, ETC.

C. AMAGONIZE-1 SUSPECTS FONOFF ALSO CONSIDERS ~~HIM~~ HER A RECRUITMENT TARGET BECAUSE OF UNEXPECTED INVITATIONS BY AMAGONIZE-2 AND QUAXE-1 (AND POSSIBLY CONTACT WITH QUCHESS-1). SHE INFORMED AMADISU-1 OF THESE CONTACTS BECAUSE IT WAS HIS BUSINESS TO KNOW. (DURING A BUSINESS CALL TO PBRUMEN EMB RECENTLY QUAXE-1 INVITED AMAGONIZE-1 TO A DRINK SOME DAY. AMAGONIZE-1 OBVIOUSLY BECAME

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MADRID 8275 SECRET

SUSPICIOUS. QUAXE-1 MADE INVITATION ON OWN INITIATIVE BUT LATER TOLD CASE OFFICER.)

3. AMAUTO-1 AFRAID AMAGONIZE-1 MIGHT DEFECT AND MADE HER SWEAR SHE WOULD NOT. (AMAUTO-1 PROBABLY ALSO EXPRESSING FEARS OF FONOFF.) AMAGONIZE-1 CONSIDERED THIS PREPOSTEROUS BECAUSE OF HER COMPLETE LOYALTY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND FACT SHE INCAPABLE ABANDONING HER DAUGHTERS. (WE SUSPECT FONOFF NOW QUESTIONING OR RE-THINKING BASIS HER LOYALTY AND THEIR TRUST IN HER. AMAGONIZE-1 HAS SAID THAT CHILDREN WOULD PROBABLY BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT HER THUS CONTRADICTING STATEMENT ABOVE.)

4. IN VIEW SERIOUS SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE, OBVIOUSLY PRECIPITATED BY AMBEDEW-1 AFFAIR, REQUEST HQS CONSIDER APPROACH TO AMAGONIZE-1 UNDER FJSTEAL FLAG BEFORE HER DEPARTURE 5 MAY. PITCH COULD ACCOMPLISH FOLLOWING:

A. SHE COULD ACCEPT PITCH AND WORK AGAINST PBRUMEN TARGETS. (THIS CONTRARY TO APPROACH AGREED UPON BY STATION AND HQS, BUT AMAGONIZE-1 FREQUENTLY STATED SHE ALONE AND HAS NO FRIENDS. HER BITTERNESS WITH PBRUMEN TACTICS RE HER RECALL MIGHT BE IMPETUS ENOUGH TO QUICKLY

SECRET

[illegible] NOTIFIED

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INFO.

FILE, VR.

PAGE 4 MADRID 8275 SECRET

ACCEPT FRIENDLY OFFER FROM FJSTEAL NATIONAL SINCE SHE WOULD IDENTIFY WITH HIM HER OWN NATIONAL ORIGINS.

B. IF SHE REFUSES PITCH AND RUNS TO SUPERIORS HERE THIS COULD CONFIRM TO FONOFF HER VULNERABILITIES TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD PROBABLY RAISE MORE SERIOUS QUESTION OF HOW LONG SHE WAS IN CONTACT WITH FJSTEALER. SHE MAY NOT REVEAL PITCH BECAUSE BY SO DOING SHE WOULD BE CUTTING OWN THROAT AND THIS WOULD MAKE HER SUBJECT TO SEVERE SCRUTINY AND INTERROGATION. ON OTHER HAND IF SHE REVEALS PITCH THIS MIGHT SERVE AMPURPLE OBJECTIVE AND MIGHT ALSO RAISE QUESTION IN PBRUMEN MINDS ON WHETHER AMEEDEW-1 RECRUITED BY FJSTEAL OR BY WOLADY. (NO EVIDENCE PBRUMENS MADRID AWARE WOLADY INVOLVEMENT.)

5. FILE: 201-288225.

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INFO: FILE VR. C/R/SD, C/EUR 5, C/FI 2, C/CI

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SECRET 301251Z APR 69 CITE MADRID 8256

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 APR 69 IN 47801

RYBAT TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 8156 (IN 42197)

1. AMAUTO-2 REPORTED 29 APR THAT COULD NOT RETAIN JOB WITH AMAUTO-1 HOUSEHOLD AND SHE TERMINATING EMPLOYMENT 4 MAY AFTER RETURN AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE FROM BARCELONA. CLAIMS SHE SPOKE WITH WIFE AMAUTO-1 NIGHT 29 APR ABOUT KEEPING JOB BUT WIFE ALREADY DECIDED THAT WANTED YOUNGER PERSON AND HAD ALREADY PLACED ADVERTISEMENT IN LOCAL PAPER. AMAUTO-2 NOW WORKING WITH NEW EMPLOYEE WHOSE LAST NAME NOT YET KNOWN, BUT A-2 WILL TRY OBTAIN. A-2 HAS PROVIDED LAYOUT AMAUTO-1'S OFFICE AT HOME AND DINING AREA.

2. A-2 TOO NERVOUS AND TIMID TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS AND NO AMOUNT REASSURANCE COULD MITIGATE FEARS.

3. A-2 WILL BE AVAILABLE TO WIFE AMAUTO-1 FOR PART TIME WORK THUS PREFER POAS NOT BE CANCELLED.

4. FILE: 201-848515.

SECRET

SECRET

AMAUTO-1

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: LAWRENCE SULC:ch
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 23 April 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY ____ PER ____ # ____ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 95667

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI 24 18 14Z APR 69

RYBAT TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 8156 (IN 42197)

1. POA REQUESTED FOR AMAUTO-5 (201-848517), A-3's HUSBAND. WILL ADVISE.

2. REQUEST AMPLIFICATION PARA 7 REF. RECRUITMENT OF AMAUTO-2 ACCOMPLISHED BY STATION UNILATERALLY, WHICH WE BELIEVE WAS DESIRABLE MEANS. UNLESS OVERRIDING LOCAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SURFACING PLANS TO QUSEQUIN-37, WOULD ~~PREFER~~ SUGGEST CONTINUED UNILATERAL OPERATION.

3. FILE: 201-848517, 201-848515.

END OF MESSAGE

1) C/WH/COG Paul E. Probst

E/IB
MR. SORRELS

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

Paul E. Probst
for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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[illegible]

DISPATCH

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RYBAT

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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC AMROSE AMBEDEW
Transmittal of Photographs for AMBEDEW-1 Recognition

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 93245

1. Attached are 15 photographs of personalities both Cuban and non-Cuban who reside in the Madrid area. The majority are Cuban officials. We have added appropriate comments alongside the name of those individuals in whom we suspect are Cuban intelligence agents or collaborators. Another list will be forwarded as soon as photographs can be obtained.

Photo #1	Hector GALLO Portieles (known DGI) Name mentioned by AMBEDEW-1
Photo #2	Ricardo DIEZ Gallart - commonly called Gallart Code Clerk Madrid
Photo #3	Orestes BARREDA Perez, First Secretary formerly in Switzerland, Mercedes ARIAS, wife
Photo #4	(right to left) Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Encargado de Negocios; Nilde VECIANA de RUIZ, wife of Encargado; Ricardo ESPINO Martinez, Commercial Counselor
Photo #5	Ricardo ESPINO Martinez, Commercial Counselor
Photo #6	(arrows only) Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa, First Secretary and suspected DGI

(continued)

Attachment: H/W
Photographs

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
2 - C/EUR wo/att
2 - COS/WH/Miami wo/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-35059	DATE 21 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-120-20

Photo #7	Guillermo RUIZ Perez Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa and wife
Photo #8	Jose Andres MARTINEZ Sanchez aka Sorel (nom de plume) suspected collaborator who may be closely integrated into leftist movement in Spain.
Photo #9	(left to right) Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa Unidentified Cuban - we suspect that he is a courier. Unidentified A Cuban entertainer - name unknown
Photo #10	Unidentified Cuban - possibly a courier
Photo #11	Another photo of Jose Andres MARTINEZ Sanchez (in middle) see Photo #8.
Photo #12	Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Encargado de Negocios Alfredo HIDALGO, Dominican national who was studying law in Madrid very close to Hector GALLO and Aristides DIAZ, both DGI
Photo #13	Julio CASTELLO Dumas, Cuban journalist now in Madrid.
Photo #14	Vera BORODOWSKY Jackievich, (in center) Secretary to RUIZ
Photo #15	Nilda VECIANA de RUIZ Vera BORODOWSKY Jackievich Guillermo RUIZ Perez

2. It is suggested that Headquarters show AMBEDEW-1 a number of photographs of QUMOON crewmen preferrably photos of crewmen on the international circuit including those of QUTRUNK-19, QUCRASH-1 and QUZONE-1. We would suggest against showing only those of our assets if photos of other crewmen are not available.

Howard R. SACODER





















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

RUIZ estrecha la mano a un dominicano llamado HIDALGO.-

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INFO FILE C/E/SD, C/TSD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EUR 5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

S E C R E T 281739Z MAR 69 CITE MADRID 7944 28 Mar 69 IN 24937

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, FRANKFURT

RYBAT TYPIC TECHS

REF: A. OSMA-24746

B. MADRID 7945 (IN 24849)

1. REQUEST TRACES MARIA JESUSA (MARTIN) VILLAR AND JOSE ANTONIO (FERNANDEZ) CREGO, BOTH SPANISH CITIZENS WHO APPLYING FOR IMMIGRANT VISA FOR UNITED STATES. MARTIN CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS DOMESTIC IN HOME AMAUTO-1. REGRET HAVE NO FURTHER BIO DATA ON COUPLE BUT BOTH OF ADVANCED AGE. SHOULD HAVE SOME BIO ON 31 MAR. INFO BELOW GLEANED FROM QUTIMID.

2. FERNANDEZ RETURNED GALICIA BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY FIND EMPLOYMENT MADRID. MARTIN ANXIOUS JOIN HIM SOONEST, BUT TRYING SAVE MONEY FOR TRAVEL. QUTIMID 20 MAR REVEALED THAT MARTIN PROCESSING FOR VISA TO STATES BUT IS KEEPING THIS NEWS FROM AMAUTOS. SHE RECEIVES MAIL FROM STATES AT HOME FEMALE FRIEND AND HER PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH FRIENDS RE LETTERS ARE HUSH HUSH. SHE APPEARS PURPOSELY TRYING WITHHOLD INFO FROM AMAUTOS.

3. QUTIMID REPORTS THAT MARTIN WILL BE LEAVING

File: AMAUTO-1 201

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE W MADRID 7944 SECRET

AMAUTO HOUSEHOLD IN JUNE ALTHOUGH AMAUTOS UNHAPPY BECAUSE MARTIN APPARENTLY TRUSTED IN SENSE THAT AMAUTOS CONFIDENT CHILDREN IN GOOD HANDS WHEN THEY LEAVE TOWN OR ARE ENTERTAINING OUT. AMAUTOS WANT HER REMAIN WITH THEM UNTIL AFTER THEIR HOME LEAVE JULY-AUGUST, BUT MARTIN WANTS LEAVE BEFORE. (HOME LEAVE PLANS NEW TO STATION. WE REPORTED EARLIER THAT AMAUTO-1 DID NOT WANT RETURN SPAIN.)

4. OPERATIONAL BREAK OCCURRED MORNING 28 MAR WHEN NAME OF FEMALE FRIEND UNCOVERED. REQUEST TRACES AND PRIORITY CLEARANCE ON TOMAS (HIDALGO) GATO (COMMONLY USE GATO AS LAST NAME), BORN HAVANA, 22 AUG 1911 AND ON WIFE, ALINA (FREYRE) BORN HAVANA 6 SEPT 1915. BOTH U.S. CITIZENS. FATHER OF TOMAS IS TOMAS GATO BORN KEY WEST, FLORIDA 26 DEC 1885. MOTHER CELIA GOMAS BORN KEY WEST 1893. ALINA NATURALIZED 12 JUNE 1968. HIDALGO IS MANAGER WOOLWORTHS MADRID AND GOOD FRIEND AMERICAN CONSUL. IT WAS FROM CONSUL THAT WE OBTAINED INFO ON MARTIN AND HUSBAND. ALINA CAME TO EMBASSY 24 MAR TO INQUIRE INTO PROCEDURE OBTAINING VISA FOR MARTIN AND HUSBAND. QUTIMID LED US TO CONSUL.

RID/ in traces.

RID [illegible] /

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ACTION

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INFO

FILE

PAGE 3 MADRID 7944 SECRET

5. WITH APPROVAL AND FAVORABLE TRACES INTEND CONTACT HIDALGO AND WIFE FOR POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION MARTIN FOR USE EXPLAINED IN REF B. HIDALGOS LEAVING MADRID 2 APR FOR APPROX TEN DAY VISIT TO STATES. HIDALGOS VERY GOOD FRIENDS OF FORMER AMERICAN CONSUL MARGARET HUSSMAN WHO NOW IN WASHINGTON. HQS MAY WANT CONTACT HUSSMAN FOR ASSESSMENT. NO STATION TRACES ON ALL ABOVE. PLS INDEX.

6. FRANKFURT: FYI ONLY.

7. FILE DEFER 201.

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ORIG: LARRY SULC/act
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R 1819
DATE: 11 APRIL 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 4 PER ____ # ____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/SO CI/OPS, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 19 03Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 92231

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: MADRID 7966 (IN 26836)

1. POA GRANTED 11 APRIL AMAUTO-2 PROVIDE INFO ON AMAUTO-1. WILL ADVISE RE POAS AMAUTO-3 AND -4.

2. FILE: 201-848515.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG
EUR/C Wm A K Jones

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ACTION c/WH5

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INFO FILE c/FI/SD, c/TSD3, c/CI, c/FI2, c/EUR5, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

044

S E C R E T 281742Z MAR 69 CITE MADRID 7945 28 MAR 69 IN 24849

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, FRANKFURT

RYBAT TYPIC TECHS

MADRID 7944 (W 24937)

1. AS REPORTED EARLIER TRAFFIC AMAUTO-1 HAS PRIVATE OFFICE IN HOME WHICH HE FREQUENTLY USES ACCORDING QUTIMID/QUDOZE. HAS HAD NUMBER OF MEETINGS WITH RUMANIAN REP. Maria Teresa MARTIN OFFERS EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR COLLECTION INTEL ON AMAUTO-1 GUESTS AND HABITS, BUT MORE IMPORTANT HER ACCESS TO HOUSE MAKES IT POSSIBLE INTRODUCE SUITABLE AUDIO DEVICE IN AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE OFFICE AS WELL AS DINING ROOM SINCE AMAUTO-1 FREQUENTLY ENTERTAINS HIGH LEVEL PBRUMEN VISITORS, OFFICIALS AND SPANISH BUSINESSMEN.

201-848575

2. FILE DEFER 201.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Div., COS, WH/MIAMI

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

QUTIMID 21 February 1969 reported that AMAUTO-1 will be leaving Spain PCS in August 1969. He revealed this information to AMPOSSUM-1.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - C/WH
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2 - COS, WH/MIAMI [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-24926	11 March 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-735296

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

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8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

065-008-007
OSMA-24877
28 FEB 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER IN MADRID

UFA

R 6903120462

FILE IN 201- 735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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ACTION C/WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/TSD 3, C/FI 2, C/CI, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS

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S E C R E T 031515Z FEB 69 CITE FRANKFURT 1565 3FEB69 IN 85183

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

[redacted] TYPIC AMAUTO TECHS

REF: OSMA-24746

1. PER REF, DURING NEXT TECH VISIT TO MADRID KUHARICH WILL DISCUSS PROPOSED REQUIREMENT.

2. KUHARICH WILL TDY MADRID UPON CHOLOMETES RETURN.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

S E C R E T

Ruiz-Perez

L.C.

wH/COG

Desensitized

Alva E. King

WH/COG

3 Feb 69

201-735296

Files

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: R Y B A T/S E C R E T

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: C/EUR Div., C/WOACRE; COB/Frankfurt MKNOVA

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/TECHS/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 16 January 1969 QUTIMID reported a discussion between Subject and the Chief of the Rumanian Trade delegation in Spain, during which the Rumanian asked when they could meet. Subject invited the Rumanian to his home where, he said, he has set up a small office and was beginning to work more at home than in the office, because of the added comfort. (We wouldn't be surprised if this was suggested by his wife, who is very jealous of her husband.) The meeting was arranged for 1130 hours on 17 January. AMAUTO-1 commented that he is up quite early in the morning, presumably to begin work in his office.

2. The above report is the first we have received on Subject's use of his home as an office. The invitation to the Rumanian, of course, casts suspicion on the nature of the conversation.

3. Since his move to new quarters, AMAUTO-1's home is about 50 yards from two WOFIRM staffers - Martin B. CRYMM and Conrad B. FALAGIARO. (See attached sketch). Edwin B. RATTEREE lives approximately 200 yards from the AMAUTO home. This proximity to AMAUTO-1's home by three staffers brings up the question of the use of an RF device to monitor conversations in AMAUTO's office at home, assuming at this time, that he has a phone in the office, most likely an extension of the home phone. For planning purposes, we would appreciate from MKNOVA a list of requirements for a target study in the use of an RF device. If other means are available for external penetration of his home we would welcome your suggestions and comments. Please advise us also if the RF device is still a controlled item, which cannot be discussed with or released to liaison. Your earliest reply would be appreciated.

4 [illegible] 69

CS COPY

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

Att: Sketch of Area-AMAUTO-1's home: Iden sheet usc
Distribution: 2-C/WH w/att; 2-C/EUR w/o att; C/WOACRE w/att; 2-COB/Frankfurt/MKNOVA w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA-24746

DATE: 24 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION: R Y B A T/S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296


IDEN D
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att #1 to HMMA 24746

201-135296

R Y B A T/S E C R E T

SEPARATE COVER ATT.
OSMA-24746

IDEN A	CALLE JEREZ
IDEN B	CALLE TRIANA
IDEN C	CALLE PIO XII
IDEN D	Ralph Seehafer
IDEN E	Howard Ellis
IDEN F	C.H. Duffin
IDEN G	Guillermo RUIZ Perez

R Y B A T/S E C R E T

S/C att #2 to OSMA 24746 201-[illegible]

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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION

RYBAT

DISPATCH NUMBER CSMA-24746	DATE 24 Jan 69	
ENCLOSURE NUMBER	PAGE NUMBER	PARAGRAPH NUMBER

SECURITY REGULATION(S) VIOLATED: CSI-F 110-2 para 4 d and a

SUBSTANCE OF VIOLATION:

Agent (target) compromised by position of contact, date & time of visit.

RID. ANALYST

FORM 6-64 2244 SECRET (36-43)

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INFO.

FILE, VR, [illegible]

SECRET 031152Z JUL 68 CITE MADRID 5594

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

3 JUL 68 IN 43255

TYPIC

ON EVENING OF 15 JUNE 68 WIFE OF AMAUTO-1 SAID AMAUTO-1 HAS MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FOR [illegible] ON 6 AUGUST TO GO ON VACATION. SHE COMMENTED THAT POSSIBLY AMAUTO-1 MIGHT NOT WANT TO RETURN TO MADRID.

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SECRET

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DISPATCH

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S E C R E T

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MICROFILM

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

Chief, EUR Div., Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM

Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT

Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE/MHGUILE Indications of Clandestine Activity planned by PBRUMEN Embassy in Madrid.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: A. MADRID 4776
B. OSMA-23406, 12 Jan 68

1. In the four month period since the forwarding of ref B, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID Operations have continued to provide insights into the program of the PBRUMEN official establishment in Spain, the requirements laid on it and the evolution in the thinking of AMAUTO-1 and his staff as they work toward expanding their contacts and influence in the political, economic and cultural-propaganda fields. These developments will provide the subject matter for subsequent dispatches. However, in addition to such conventional "public relations", the QUDOZE Reports have recently carried evidence of MHGUILE activity. Because such activity automatically means PBHUMEN involvement in Spain's internal affairs, QUOTA has taken an even greater than usual interest in these developments. Translations of the transcripts detailing this information are given below.

2. The earliest and certainly the most striking MHGUILE information was forwarded under ref A describing AMAUTO-1's advice to AMADIEU-1 on the techniques of living a clandestine life, on the use of disguise and on the necessity for good organization for "with bad organization we are lost". Then, a QUDOZE Report of 30 April 68 summarized a discussion on the lack of personnel in the Embassy to make scientific and technical contacts, at which time AMAUTO-1 digressed into describing the cover for a new member of the staff whom he apparently expected to arrive in the near future. ".....what is lacking is a comrade who could take care of the cultural and apparently the technical aspect also. Who could also ascertain who are the Americans, their addresses, in what streets are located their...." He adds that this comrade will have to move about, to make contacts, to be up on everything, and if time remains to do other things. He added that he remembers the President (of PBRUMEN) gave much importance to this as a matter of honor for all the missions abroad. He repeated that the technical aspect (i.e.collecting technical information) required a comrade, a

Distribution:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-23370	28 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-6-44/3

comrade who learns the details of foreign commerce in order to be able to converse well with people. Apparently this would be a type of overt specialty that they would give to the comrade who in order to hide the true purpose of his mission which would be to collect information for them as AMAUTO-1 is heard to comment that they have to "invent" the work of this comrade in order that he might have a definite specialty. AMAUTO-1 seems to be thinking of a specific person because he comments that he speaks two languages, that he likes economics, and adds that at the end of two months he would be ready.

3. Following the return of AMADRIFT-1 on the 7th of March 68, via PBRUMEN national flight, after home leave in PBRUMEN, the QUDOZE material reported extensive conversations between AMADRIFT-1 and AMAUTO-1 on future plans. Two were of MHGUILE interest:

A. QUDOZE Rport of 13 March 68. AMAUTO-1 says, "this is... with the American movement in Spain and with the monopoly that they have here". He says, "In my judgement our fundamental problem in Spain from the political point of view is to ascertain what there is behind all this, what is there here, we must get ourselves in motion". "That is a very important point for us, to ascertain what are their names, who are those who are here, how they (the Americans) are moving". He adds that, "If we are able to find out, we will be able to stop them completely."

B. QUDOZE Report of 14 Mar 68. AMAUTO-1 says that they have to find out "what are the forces in Spain, with the possibility of our having access (to them)". He comments that Spain, is at a crossroads internally and externally. He says they have to find out what is happening in Spain, whether they give the workers liberty to strike, etc. He again repeats all they have to find out, mentions finding out "who are the monarchists, what forces they represent, to what forces are they united, who are the elements that are being financed by the CIA and by the American Embassy". "Which are those scattered elements that the newspaper of the Movement has accused of being backed by the American Embassy, what financial power do they have?"

4. AMAUTO-1 had apparently set great hope on the 1 May 68 anti-government demonstration by workers and students which, as Headquarters is aware, the police effectively handled. In a 2 May QUDOZE Report, AMAUTO-1 repeatedly commented on what a tremendous failure the demonstration had been; he kept asking AMADRIFT-1 what had happened, why the Spanish people had not responded, why the workers had not, and finally said "The next demonstration we are going to name here a member of the Embassy".

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

SPAN-[illegible]

SECRET

Chief, European Division X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, Madrid

QUDOZE

1. The following conversation came from Subject source:

(At a meeting with Hector GALLO and Aristides DIAZ, the following statement was made by Guillermo RUIZ, Cuban Charge d'affaires:

"You know why I'm saying this....because the CIA is directly intervening in the internal affairs of the country, ARAGON can say it, the DGS Director can say it, as well as our dear friend Don Camilo PONSEVEDRA (phon.), and here they don't permit this or anything because they know very well that......here the Soviet KGB as well as the American CIA can't.....because the Spaniards.....hate it so much. The Americans are trying to asphyxiate this government, first because while FRANCO is in power there is always the great danger of a revolt here. The Americans want to have a government in Spain of the type Italy, France and West Germany have, a stable government, that has a high middle class, and where there is a high standard of living, because when you have the difference between the individual who is eating.....and the individual who is eating a chicken, then you have a dangerous problem, because in Latin America we have.....but here in Europe it's different, that is why I'm telling you this.....they can be intervening in the government.....that is why we must try to find out."

2. Following is the identity of the personnel involved -

a. Hector GALLO Protieles, First Secretary of Cuban Embassy, also believed to be Chief, DSE officer stationed at the Embassy.

b. Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa, Second Secretary/Press Attache, also possibly involved in intel matters.

c. Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez, Charge d'Affaires.

Distribution:
2 - C/EUR; 2 - C/WH

OSMA-23813 7 May 1968

SECRET 65-6-44/4

The exact identities of ARAGON and RONSEVEDRA are not known. The DGS refers to Direccion General de Seguridad which is the Spanish Internal Security Service.

Edwin W. RATTEREE

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INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD

S E C R E T 241716Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4776

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

24 APR 68 IN 57392

1. FOLLOWING AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST IS TRANSLATION OF PORTION OF QUDOZE TAKE OF 4 APRIL 68:

Ruiz — Aristides Diaz

IDEN A HOLDS A CONVERSATION WITH IDEN B. IDEN A GIVES HIM ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS RELATED TO THE FACT THAT IN THE FUTURE HE WANTS IDEN B TO BE DISGUISED WHEN HE MEETS PEOPLE. (IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY IF IDEN A ALSO REFERS TO OTHER PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY AS WELL). ONLY PHRASES CAN BE DISTINCTLY UNDERSTOOD: IDEN A: YOU ARE ALREADY CLANDESTINE, YOU KNOW THAT NOT EVERYTHING IS BAD NEWS. ORGANIZATION AND NO CONTACTS, AN ORGANIZATION IN CHARGE OF LOOKING FOR HOUSES, MEANS ..... THAT IS TO SAY, TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE YOUR FACE QUICKLY. USE ELEVATED SHOES TO APPEAR TALLER, YOU HAVE TO CHANGE EVERYTHING, WHEN YOU START LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY, THEN NOT ONLY MUST YOU LIVE SECRETLY BUT YOU MUST ALSO CHANGE YOUR

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PAGE 2 MADRID 4776 SECRET

APARTMENT. WHEN YOU MEET WITH PEOPLE FOR EXAMPLE, YOU PUT ON THE ....AND THEN WHEN THE MEETING IS OVER, YOU CHANGE YOUR APPEARANCE AND GO OUT TO THE STREET. IDEN B: .....THEY WERE ABLE TO GET TRUCKS, MACHINERY, ARMS, PACKAGES OF .... BUT IT SEEMS THAT THE POLICE DETAINED THEM. IDEN A: WITH BAD ORGANIZATION WE ARE LOST. IDEN A LATER COMMENTS THAT HE WAS ONLY ARRESTED ONCE, BUT IT WAS ONLY A JOKE, BUT ASIDE FROM THAT HE SAYS THEY NEVER CAUGHT HIM.

2. IT NOTED THAT QUOTAS VERY EXCITED OVER THIS PORTION OF THE QUDOZE TAPE.

3. PLS INDEX IDEN B.

SECRET

BT

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INFO: FILE, VR, EUR 5, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6

S E C R E T 241716Z APR 68 CITE MADRID 4777

24 APR 68 IN 97376

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF: MADRID 4776 (IN 97353)

IDEN A: GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ

IDEN B: ARISTIDES DIAZ ROVIROSA.

Kerby action

S E C R E T

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CA CI/CS
AC CI/OS
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/P CHRS, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, TSD, [illegible]

FI/INT

S E C R E T 131150Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4154 13Feb63IN49920

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT

TYPIC MHAPRON TECHS

1. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE IN RESTAURANT WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS IDENTIFIED ON CUDOZE AS HIS FAVORITE RESTAURANT IN MADRID. IDEN RESTAURANT PARTIALLY OWNED BY QUSEELY-1 WHO CASE OFFICER CONVINCED WILL DO ANYTHING ASSIST IN OPERATION. HAVE NOT YET APPROACHED HIM THIS BASIS.

2. STATION INFORMAL CASING RESTAURANT ON 12 FEB FINDS NO VASES OR MOVABLE OBJECTS ON TABLES SUITABLE FOR CONTAINING MICROPHONES. UNDERTABLE INSTALLATION VERY LIKELY UNSUITABLE IN VIEW DIRECTIONAL NOISES FROM OTHER TABLES.

3. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY PURCHASE SMALL SLENDER VASES TO CONTAIN ARRANGEMENT TWO OR THREE FLOWERS FOR EACH TABLE AND WOULD REQUEST SUITABLE INSTALLATION BY MKTOPAZ IN AT LEAST TWO VASES OF SMALL MIKE/TRANSMITTER, TYPE TO BE DECIDED AFTER DETERMINATION EXACT SIZE VASES.

4. THIS CABLE ONLY FOR PURPOSE ADVISING ADDRESSEE STATIONS FACTS THIS OPERATION WHICH CONSIDERED OF VALUE IN VIEW

~~Rothwell~~
file
AMAUTO
E Scapp

PAGE 2 MADRID 4154 S E C R E T

GIDGZE HAS DISCLOSED OCCASIONS IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS CALLED SPANISH CONTACTS TO MEET THEM AT IDEN RESTAURANT FOR BUSINESS CONVERSATIONS.

SECRET

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D14YD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO: Chief, European Division

INFO: Chief, WH Div., COS, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: KAPOK/QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1 Discussion of Missiles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

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1. On 10 January 1968, AMAUTO-1, in one of his many daily discussions with his subordinates, reflected on the international position of his country, and among the things he said, we quote the following which may be of possible interest to addressees. Although part of the discussion was not heard because of the emotional inflection of the speaker, we feel that the jist of the discussion is clear and understandable.

> "We are demonstrating to the world that Cuba...is favorably disposed to do whatever...(AMAUTO-1 begins to talk against the United States) that when the Americans have to raise the white flag...because the first plane that appears on radar...(AMAUTO-1 is speaking excitedly and it is very difficult to understand each word but it appears that he is talking about the positions of missiles in Cuba), Havana, Las Villas and Camaguey and that with these missiles, we can cover Miami, New York, and all their bases and all of their "mierda". . .if the Americans say they are going to ~~sud them~~ (missiles? planes?), we will send them; if they (Americans) say they are going to invade us, the first plane that comes to invade...(AMAUTO-1's subordinate remarked that 15 October 62 marked a point in international politics, when the Yankees ordered the Soviets to withdraw their missiles). . .(AMAUTO-1 injected) "they (the Soviets) presented them (the Cubans) with ten bombs".

2. Our reason for reporting this fragmentary information is that AMAUTO-1 might be confirming the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba.

Howard R. SACODER

201-735246

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON/QUTIMID/QUDOZE
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The new Cuban Ambassador to Spain, Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez arrived in Madrid on the Iberia flight of 3 December 1967 accompanied by his wife, Nilda, and three sons. CALZADILLA, RUIZ's predecessor had not been a strong administrator and had let the various components of the Cuban official establishment in Spain run their own affairs. This fact plus the inevitable tendency of a new chief to be a "new broom" and rearrange things according to his own lights, led Station Madrid to expect some changes particularly within the Embassy. However, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations have shown RUIZ at least initially to be an aggressive and well organized individual with ideas of his own that clearly reflect his background in commercial affairs and prepared to make changes that promise to go beyond the superficial sweeping of a new broom. Underlying RUIZ's actions and proposals is the clear implication that he came to Madrid with the specific task of upgrading the Cuban mission in Spain both in terms of prestige and effectiveness. Station Madrid will transmit to the addressees the relevant information on this program as it becomes available from the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations along with information on the official Cuban personalities administering the program.

2. A striking difference between RUIZ and his predecessor was noted in the QUDOZE and QUTIMID reports of that first week. RUIZ has no inhibitions over spending money. One of the Embassy cars, a Peugeot was replaced with a new model and there was discussion of replacing the other two Peugeots with new ones. Nilda, RUIZ's wife, was picked up by the wife of GOVIN who turned $200 over to her to go shopping at the Corte Inglesa, one of Madrid's two best

Continued .....

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	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-120-61

known department stores. RUIZ checked with GALLO, his deputy, on the proper clothes for diplomatic functions in Madrid and an appointment was to be made with a tailor. Nilda declared that the apartment where CALZADILLA and his family had lived economically was inadequate and they decided to look for a chalet, something very spacious and well-priced. They subsequently seriously considered one known to rent for 30,000 pesetas ($500) per month and then turned it down, apparently for reasons other than price. A new telex machine was ordered for the Embassy. The technician stated they could install a teletype that could only receive, not send, messages but this seemed acceptable.

3. On Monday, 4 December 1967, the day after his arrival, RUIZ ordered the Cuban consuls in Barcelona, Sevilla and Vigo to Madrid for a meeting. The order was couched in terms of "wanting to meet" them, but after their arrival on Wednesday, 6 December, all parties settled down to a detailed meeting in which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The latter two subjects will be dealt with in separate dispatches. On the administrative side, RUIZ listened sympathetically to complaints about low salaries, old buildings and inadequate operating budgets and concluded by asking for a monthly report on receipts and expenses and a report on the consuls' current needs, their monthly balances and their administrative activities. The printing and telephone bills were the two items of expense that kept recurring throughout the discussions.

4. By the end of the week, RUIZ had prepared a report on the situation he found in the Chancerry and the mission in general for forwarding to Havana and which he first discussed with his subordinates. He started by assuring them that he had "found great co-operation among all the comrades in this mission" and declared that the staff was complete. Apparently, RUIZ intends to make no personnel changes and Hector GALLO Portieles, who had previously been most eager to return PCS to Havana, now has gone to Havana on vacation. He left Madrid on the 20 December 1967 Iberia flight.

5. The Cuban mission has certain financial problems since the present budget dates from previous years and does not cover current expenses. However, the "new economic activities of the consulate" are expected to assist with the problem. Here RUIZ is presumably referring to the pressure brought to bear in November 1967 by Cuban sympathizers in the Spanish Foreign Office working through the Customs and the Immigration Office to force Cuban exiles to register with the Cuban consulate and pay the $22.50 fee for a valid passport. Enough exiles have responded to this pressure to relieve some of the financial problems of the Cuban mission. This source of income will last as long as the Cubans' friends in the Foreign Ministry are able to assist them.

6. The reception of Cuban official travelers at the airport and the handling of Embassy pouches poses a continuing administrative problem for the Embassy. Jose DIAZ Puga, who is in charge of this airport work has to devote himself exclusively to taking care of the couriers and their pouches when any come in, leaving visitors to fend for themselves. This situation has been alleviated by other Embassy staff members jaunting out to the airport at will to meet the incoming planes. Now, RUIZ has declared that the rest of the staff must stay in the Embassy because they have a work plan to fulfill. Thus, he has left himself with an unresolved problem he must face in the very near future.

7. The new Ambassador concluded his report with three recommendations:

a. Rent another building where the Chancillary, the Commercial Office, the Consulate and the Cubana Offices can all be housed instead of being dispersed in separate buildings as they are now;

b. Rent or preferably buy a residence for the Chief of Mission. The one they now have is not adequate;

c. Send another person from Cuba who has the background to take care of scientific work plus continuing the contacts the Mission will have already made. In view of RUIZ's previous statement on the completeness of the staff, such a person would likely be a "non-official" representative of one of Cuba's cultural fronts such as the Casa de las Americas.

8. RUIZ concluded his remarks by saying that in Spain there is a tremendous field for the Cubans, they have no language problem and they can do a great work. Such is the goal RUIZ has proclaimed and that Station Madrid believes he was sent to attain.

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

Informe Nº 729

221-81-87

Página -1
D
4 de septiembre 1968

1. VERA LLAMA A LA CASA MERCEDES.- Para decir que están interesados en comprar un automóvil y pide les visite un vendedor con los modelos. Quedan en pasar mañana por la mañana.

2. LA SRA. DALIA RAMOS (Cubana) LLAMA A RUIZ.- Esta señora conoce a RUIZ porque estuvieron juntos en la escuela, en Cuba cuando GUILLERMO tenía 12 o 13 años. Hace 20 años que no se ven y RUIZ le comenta que cuando lo vea no va a conocerlo porque ha cambiado mucho. DALIA (Lilia) le comenta que ella no cree que haya cambiado mucho porque él (RUIZ) es rubio de ojos verdes y que en cambio ella (DALIA) se tiñe el pelo. DALIA está casada con el hermano de MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, MANOLITO. Está en la playa de Gandía, Valencia pasando una temporada y cuando regrese a Madrid visitará a RUIZ, en la oficina. RUIZ le dice que la invitará entonces a comer juntos. El objeto de la llamada de DALIA es presentarle a HERMINIO PORTELL VILA, puertorriqueño-español, que quiere hacer contacto con Cuba para exportar ajos. HERMINIO PORTELL VILA es primo de MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI. GUILLERMO lo invita a pasar por la oficina el lunes por la mañana.

3. VERA LLAMA A UN AMIGO DE FLIA que parece cubano.- Le pregunta si tiene visita ahora y él le contesta que acaba de ver a ARISTIDES. VERA le comenta que tiene una cosa que decirle y éste le dice que lo invita a a comer a su casa (de VERA). Ella le dice que lo invita si ~~mismo~~ él (el amigo) cocina.

4. PERSONA QUE NO SE IDENTIFICA LLAMA A ANDRES MARTINEZ.- Para cobrarle una cuenta. ARISTIDES le dice que ya no trabaja con ellos y le da la dirección donde vive. Virgen del Coro 12 o 14.

FIN.

Copy of att to OSMA-24210, 10 Sept '68

201-735296

14-00000

[illegible]

26 septiembre 1962
1[illegible]

Conversación entre Gallo y Ruiz relacionada con las [illegible] del ejemplo [illegible] núcleo del Partido. Gallo alega que es una obli[illegible] moral (asistir?) ya [illegible] de no discutir asuntos internos del Partido. Parece ser que ésto se menciona porque Ruiz no ha asistido a alguna/s reuniones. Ruiz comenta que él tiene otros asuntos importantes además de eso, y más adelante relacionado con el [illegible] cuando le dice a Gallo, "...disculparme, porque tú estás en permanente [illegible]." Gallo sigue insistiendo sobre la obligación moral que tienen con el Partido. Ruiz ya un poco [illegible] le dice que él (Ruiz) es miembro del Partido [illegible] a las reuniones del núcleo en el [illegible] como se desarrollaba, pero que no había participación activa. También [illegible] de una persona [illegible] que no ha [illegible] suficientes [illegible] (confianza?).

Ruiz pide a V.A. que le consiga el nombre completo del doctor [illegible] lo llama por teléfono a [illegible]. —— Habla con [illegible], le pregunta si [illegible] lo que le envió el [illegible] (no puede [illegible] su instru[illegible]) [illegible] en que se verán durante el día

V.A. avisa a Ruiz que el nombre del doctor es J[illegible]

cy. of att. to OSMA-24303
15 Oct 1968

201-735291

[illegible] Nº 72[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 2 de [illegible] 1968

1. [illegible] - Para [illegible] a la revista [illegible]. Le dicen que se dirija al Instituto de [illegible] en Fuencarral 45.

2. [illegible] - Para decirle que en el vuelo de las [illegible] de hoy, salió de París un paquete "que ya tu te imaginas para quien es" y va como carga acompañada por él [illegible]. Añade que él [illegible] a Madrid a las [illegible] de [illegible], [illegible] de esa gente y de aquí sale tránsito para La Habana. [illegible] que tiene que estar en el [illegible]. Parece que es [illegible] que viaja con [illegible] a [illegible]. (Véase Inf. 822 par. 3).

3. [illegible] - Para decirle que [illegible] gente viniendo de París esta tarde en el vuelo de Iberia 161.

4. [illegible] - Para solicitar una entrevista con el agregado cultural de la Embajada.

5. YEPA LLAMA A ELIDA.- Para que diga a GUILLERMO que ella está dejando sobre el escritorio de él un confidencial que manda [illegible] el de Portugal para La Habana.

6. [illegible] Y MARIA [illegible].- Parece que ambas están disgustadas [illegible] que no les [illegible] los [illegible] de vacaciones a que tenían derecho aunque parece les han subido el salario en unas 400 pesetas más. [illegible] le dice "son unos hijos de..." refiriéndose a [illegible] y ELIDA. MARIA la manda a callar, etc. [illegible] dice "estoy negra y lo que hay es una cochinería." Comenta que "el que ha movido esto es el marido de la otra (parece que refiriéndose a GALLO). Les he dejado de decir cosas terribles." MARIA pregunta a [illegible] que [illegible] dónde han ido (RUIZ y ELIDA) y ésta le dice que deben haber ido a ver un piso por allí. Comenta que "están locos, se [illegible] van a [illegible]." [illegible] al pagar [illegible] mil pesetas de [illegible]. de [illegible] y [illegible] ha sido el [illegible]. [illegible] todo lo monstruo que era él, estos son 40 veces más monstruos. [illegible] contaba [illegible] no las iba a creer." MARIA le dice "bueno ya hablaremos." MARIA le dice que RUIZ y ELIDA le preguntaron si ella (MARIA) sabía de alguien para sustituir a [illegible] y [illegible] le dice que ELIDA ha comentado que ella no quiere recomendación de nadie, ni de [illegible] y que va a poner un anuncio en el periódico. (Nota: [illegible] de RUIZ, pañuelos y corbatas). Parece que [illegible] lleva 20 años trabajando con el personal cubano y MARIA 10 años.

7. UNA [illegible] - Para decir que ella es prima hermana de [illegible] y [illegible] noticias de [illegible] a España. [illegible] le dice [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

201-735291

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, European Division Chief of Station, JMCOBRA			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Madrid			MICROFILM
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE/QUTIMID/MHAPRON Guillermo RUIZ Perez			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			

Action Required: FYI

1. Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, has occupied that post for nearly a year. During that time, the QUDOZE/QUTIMID material has revealed various facets of his personality, showing him to be a man of volatile temper, an incessant talker and with more breadth of experience and outlook than the other members of the local Cuban mission.

2. In his public relations RUIZ seems to do well. Here in Spain he has been interested in meeting as many people as possible and in widening his circle of acquaintances. No matter what their political views may be, he feels it is worth establishing some kind of relationship with them and will listen attentatively to persons with a good reputation in the intellectual world. He has laid great emphasis on cultural matters in outlining his plans for the Embassy's activities. He has shown a certain intellectual restlessness, a desire to keep abreast of events in the world outside of Cuba and a willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from that exterior world. Thus, during his early conversations with his staff soon after his arrival, he extolled the virtues of the Yankee system of "briefing" and the fact that executives have privacy for thinking without being bothered by the routine details of the office. RUIZ has been concerned over having Cuba and the Cubans well thought of in Spain. He early said he was pre-occupied by the interpretation he would be able to give to Cuba here, that cultural relations were

continued ....

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR [illegible]
- 2 - COS, JMCOBRA

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
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201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-24,212	13 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-6-44/3 65-2-10/9

reduced to a very narrow circle and since Cuba was "in" economically it was now necessary to give attention to the political and cultural fields. He later commented on the fact that Cuba is practically unknown in Spain, that Cuban products are never seen in the local stores and that the view of Cuba of the average Spaniard has come from the exiles. He has continued to discuss the need for advertising Cuban products and considered decorating his office and his home with Cuban items and furniture so he could show a little bit of Cuba to his Spanish and foreign contacts. Another consequence of this desire to put Cuba's best foot forward is a certain harshness in dealing with the shortcomings of his colleagues and fellow Cubans outside the mission, calling attention to any deficiencies in their conduct and ways of dealing with the persons they meet. As recently as in a QUDOZE report of 13 July he was complaining that the Cubans seem to have lost the elegant touch in their public functions.

3. RUIZ's attitude toward money follows logically from his desire that Cuba's prestige increase and he is quite willing to spend money where it will show. The Embassy's 6 January reception was an expensive affair, the Embassy and Commercial officers take their Spanish contacts to the best restaurants, he and his wife pay 30,000 pesetas (approximately $ 430.00) rent per month for a house deemed suitable to his position and buy new clothes without hesitation for the various diplomatic functions. Before he went on home leave on 6 August 1968, he was encouraging his staff to rent better apartments that would more nearly match their status as diplomats and his wife was looking for a different house for them, one with fewer maintenance headaches and with rooms large enough for small receptions of as many as 40 people. All of this is quite in accord with RUIZ's own bourgoise tastes, reflected more than any thing else in his great interest in clothes and in being well dressed. Yet the Cuban mission operates on a slim budget and the salaries are not high. Station Madrid has no information on whether Cuban mission personnel receive a housing allowance but assumes they must as otherwise RUIZ, at least, could never make ends meet. RUIZ earns a gross salary of $681.50 per month and all his living expenses including clothes, food, medical expenses, education for the couple's 5 children and perhaps utilities must come from this sum. RUIZ also expects to be able to invite Cuban officials transiting Madrid and his Spanish and foreign contacts home for lunch or dinner at any time. There is no indication that he receives a representation allowance yet he will allow his wife to charge nothing except the salaries of two maids to the Embassy and she can't economize on food when they are alone because he will go out to a restaurant rather than eat rice and beans. RUIZ is plainly cautious in his dealings with Havana over money, even while wanting to live as well as possible in Madrid. The difference in the couple's manner of living between Havana and Madrid must be striking since RUIZ had a good position in the Ministry of Foreign Commerce prior to becoming Charge d'Affaires and yet his wife told Vera, the Embassy secretary and her closest friend, that she did not have a refrigerator in Cuba and would like to take one back with her if they did not return to Madrid after home leave!

4. As an individual, RUIZ has appeared in QUDOZE/QUTIMID as nervous, capricious, quick tempered. In contrast to his pleasant public appearance and his usually acceptable telephone language, his private conversation is vulgar, low and full of ugly words. He swears continually and flies off into rages. He is a compulsive talker and apparently uses his long conversations and his consultations over some course of action as a means of psychological reinforcement. He has given the impression of being insecure in his position and when faced with an accumulation of problems in the office prior to home leave, was talking of resigning and returning to Cuba. This insecurity may account for his touchiness over the way he is treated by the Spaniards, especially those in government positions. He has been noted describing several of his interviews with Spanish Ministers or people holding important government positions at great length, going into much detail on the length of the meeting, if they shook hands, if the person smiled, if he had anything nice to say about Cuba or the Cubans, etc. As the addressees know, RUIZ came to his post as a transfer from the Ministry of Foreign Commerce. On numerous occasions he has said that his life interest is in commerce and industry and prior to his vacation in Cuba, he was increasingly depressed over his present position and his ability to fill it, which may account for some of this sense of personal uncertainty. He has seemed a hard worker and a man with good ideas on the work of the Embassy and how it should be organized, ideas which he has repeated endlessly, but he has been unable to inspire in his subordinates. In his disputes with GALLO in June he complained about the lack of team spirit in the office.

5. RUIZ's political ideas are centered in the Cuban revolution and the Station considers him as an unquestioned regime supporter. However, his approach is different from that of the younger, less intelligent men who have known nothing else. RUIZ has had a sufficient breadth of education and experience to make a choice, to have reached his own decision that the Castro regime is good for Cuba and that Marxism as interpreted by the Cubans is an adequate intellectual foundation for life. A QUDOZE Report of 13 December 1967 included a discussion with a Spanish employee of the Embassy during which RUIZ explained that the Cuban revolution is different from any other revolution there has ever been in the world, that it has different characteristics and trajectories, that in spite of having a mark of Marxist principles it has many variations which make it different. These variations are unknown even to some of the comrades themselves. In a QUDOZE Report of 23 June, he commented on certain features of the Cuban system as "very difficult to understand unless one is of the left". The QUDOZE Report of 4 July quoted extensively in OSMA-24,112 of 9 August 1968 showed most clearly RUIZ's view of Cuba and the revolution as one entity and to see himself within that structure, a part of it and serving it. Beyond that, his mind runs in business and public relations rather than political channels and he has shown less interest in the policies than in the power relationships of the men within the hierarchy who administer the policies. He has been able to avoid sounding doctrinaire in his discussions and has been able to deal satisfactorily with the wide variety

of people he likes to meet. This last winter the couple was able to find a secular school for their children where they would not be taught religion. Along with the rest of his staff RUIZ has exaggerated ideas about the size and aggressive intentions of the WOFIRM organization in Spain and is always on the lookout for a "provocation" even to the extent of refusing to receive an unknown newspaper man who called for an interview.

6. RUIZ seems to have little time for his wife, Nilda, and their children and, at least in public, his attitude toward his wife has been quite curt. He has mentioned on at least two occasions having "his problems at home" and that all married couples have problems they alone can solve, but he has never discussed them. Nilda, for her part, in her long conversations with Vera has made no comments that would indicate any special problems. She had always worked prior to coming to Spain and at first was quite discontented with a life of idleness, but adjusted herself to her new situation. She appears intelligent, competent, a good mother and probably a good business woman. She is outspoken but also solicitous and affectionate with her husband, always interested in his work and encouraging him in what he does. RUIZ, like most of the members of his staff, has health problems. He has had trouble with his back since 1955 and here in Spain has had colds and an intensification of the pain in his back.

7. Despite health problems, office problems and whatever feelings of inadequacy he may have had, home leave must have done RUIZ good for he returned to Madrid on 30 September 1968 for another year and his wife and children are expected to follow shortly.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
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JAN 16 3 59 PM '68
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22 JAN 1968

— make sure that these are where we can get to them —

Check my B..

RUIZ - Photo #55 Vol. II

BOHDOWSKY - Photo #57 Vol II

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST		ABSTRACT	X
		INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
12 Jan 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 23400

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief of Station, JMWAVE	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, European Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Madrid		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON Biographic Data and Photos of RUIZ and BORODOWSKY		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Forwarded herewith for the information of the addressees is the biographic data and photos on the new Cuban Ambassador to Spain Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) and his wife and on RUIZ's secretary Vera BORODOWSKY Jackiewich (201-298225). The material was secured through liaison.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

1CC WITH ATT MADE INTO OSMA 23400 - CLASSIFIED (201-298225)

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WH Division, w/att H/W
- 2 - COS, JMWAVE, w/att H/W
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[200-6-118/5 - w/ATT]

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1 ATT

CS COPY

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA-23,400	12 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-120-61

14-00000

NEGATIVES

Ministerio de la Gobernación

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL
DE SEGURIDAD

COMISARIA GENERAL
DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL

Madrid, 22 de diciembre de 1967

Asunto: ORESTES-GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, ENCARGADO DE NEGOCIOS DE CUBA EN MADRID.-

N/ Ref.ª:

S/ Ref.ª:

DIRECCION GENERAL DE SEGURIDAD
COMISARIA GENERAL DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL
SECRETARIA TECNICA
22 DIC.1967
REGISTRO DE SALIDA
Núm. 162[illegible]

Ampliando nota núm. 15890 del dia 13 del corriente, sobre la llegada a Madrid del Encragado de Negocios de Cuba en España Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, en sustitución de Francisco CALZADILLA NUÑEZ, a continuación se incluyen datos referentes a dicho individuo y su señora:

La Sra. RUIZ PEREZ, nació en La Habana el dia 26 de diciembre de 1934, y como ya consta, se llama Nilda VECIANA LOPEZ.

En cuanto al Encargado de Negocios, Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, nació también en La Habana el dia 10 de febrero de 1930.

Se sabe que estan efectuando gestiones para encontrar vivienda más adecuada a sus necesidades que la que ahora ocupan que, es la que tuvo siempre en nuestra capital el anterior Encargado Cubano.

Se acompañan fotografias del Representante Diplomatico Aludido y su esposa.

- - - - - -

M. G. 15. Mod. 3 —UNE A 4

ATT 6 CSMM 22400 CS COPY 201-235296

Ministerio de la Gobernación

DIRECCION GENERAL
DE SEGURIDAD

COMISARIA GENERAL
DE INVESTIGACION SOCIAL

Madrid, 22 de diciembre de 1967

Asunto: ORESTES-GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, ENCARGADO DE NEGOCIOS DE CUBA EN MADRID.-

N. Ref.ª:

S. Ref.ª:

DIRECCION GENERAL DE SEGURIDAD
SECRETARIA TECNICA
22 DIC. 1967
REGISTRO DE SALIDA
Núm. [illegible]

Ampliando nota núm. 15890 del dia 13 del corriente, sobre la llegada a Madrid del Encargado de Negocios de Cuba en España Orestes-Guillermo RUIZ PEREZ, en sustitución de Francisco CALZADILLA NUÑEZ, a continuación se incluyen datos referentes a dicho individuo y su señora:

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Se acompañan fotografias del Representante Diplomatico Aludido y su esposa.

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMCOBRA

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/QUDOZE
Conflict Between Guillermo RUIZ Perez and Hector GALLO Portieles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
AUG 1? 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: OSMA-24,050 dated 12 July 1968

Action Required: FYI

1. At the time the referenced dispatch was prepared, the QUDOZE Reports were showing the beginning of a full fledged fight between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and his first Secretary, Hector GALLO Portieles. As so often happens in human relations, less important issues proved the vehicle for expressing deeper conflicts and problems. In this case, the primary problem can be simply summarized. The members of RUIZ's staff operate independently of their chief and he feels he is neither consulted nor informed by his subordinates on their activities. This is particularly true in relation to GALLO. The specific issues which sparked their quarrels were RUIZ's dispute with Emilio ROMERO, editor of the newspaper Pueblo, and the distribution of Che GUEVARA's Diary.

2. A QUDOZE Report of 2 July 1968 outlined a hot discussion that ensued when RUIZ went into a rage over a phone call GALLO had received from Emilio ROMERO. RUIZ and ROMERO are not on speaking terms whereas GALLO and ROMERO get along well. GALLO said he feared enmity with ROMERO would bring about the publication of articles unfavorable to Cuba whereas RUIZ replied that when the first unfavorable article comes out, he will take it to the Foreign Minister and settle the matter on that level. He believes that he represents Cuba in Spain and that his

continued ....

Distribution:
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2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, JMCOBRA

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201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO B 201-306051	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA-24,112	DATE 9 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-6-44/3

subordinates should back him by taking the same positions in public that he takes, a not unreasonable demand on the part of a Chief of Mission. RUIZ bluntly told GALLO that he, GALLO, had committed an error and GALLO just as bluntly disagreed. GALLO's view was that RUIZ had come in in a bad humor and nothing pleased him whereas RUIZ felt GALLO should try putting himself in RUIZ's place, something he claims GALLO is incapable of doing. Finally, this particular argument ended in a form of compromise with GALLO agreeing to call ROMERO the following day and remind him that he "should call the Minister".

3. On 4 July the battle was renewed over the distribution of Che's Diary. At that time the Embassy only had 6 or 7 copies which were being loaned out on an overnight basis. RUIZ said he wanted to send the Diary "to a mountain of people" while GALLO was also offering it freely and without consulting RUIZ about the action or his list of recipients. RUIZ scolded him roundly for this and, ignoring GALLO's attempts at self-justification, told him he had to respect the instructions he received. At one point in his tirade, RUIZ even went so far as to suggest it would be better for one of them to leave and go to work in another country, for example Rumania. Several interesting items emerged from this long quarrel:

A. GALLO has some undefined problem which Station Madrid assumes is related to his personality and his approach to his fellow workers. Ruiz said, "Look, GALLO, here everyone knows the problem you have. It is necessary to be hard, because unfortunately all the comrades that have come here through many years know of the problem..." Ruiz then insisted on the importance of discussing problems among the comrades and said "for example in your case, you have been foolish in not outlining the problem. I was waiting and ESPINO was waiting and PILOTO".

B. RUIZ commented that now he can understand the attitude of CALZADILLA. Before, he had thought CALZADILLA was in error but now he feels the same way. He mentions "an ambivalence" and says he will not react the same way, "that CALZADILLA was wrong in limiting himself to a reduced group of persons whereas I will continue to go forward but with everyone, not just a few."

C. RUIZ takes a broader view of Party membership than his contemporaries. In commenting on the weekly study circle for members of the Party, he set forth his opinion that all the comrades of the local Cuban Mission should participate even though they may not be members because in his eyes it is as if they all really were members.

D. RUIZ repeated a statement he has made on previous occasions - the great interest of his life is foreign commerce. However, in this 4 July QUDOZE Report, he added the interesting detail that he had not wanted to come to Madrid as Charge and, in affect, had been persuaded to come against his will. He believes he is best able to serve in the control of industry and that is where he could perform a tremendous work for his country as every revolutionary ought to be in the place of work where he is able to do the most. "Until now, I have always done and have always gone where the revolution sent me... with my present limitation of criteria, I should not be here". He repeated his conviction that he is wasting his talents and doing nothing for Cuba in the position of Charge in comparison with what he could do elsewhere. "I believe that with which I am best able to serve my country is in the control of industry...I put myself in an industry and I see if things are being done well or if they are being done badly because I have knowledge and because I arrive at my conclusions through the accounting...look, here I am wasting my presence and my resources when I am able to be useful to production in another position."

By the end of this 4 July report, RUIZ had exhausted all his combativeness and appeared very depressed.

4. RUIZ is due for home leave in Havana the first part of August. There have been indications scattered throughout the QUDOZE and QUTIMID Reports of the last month or two that he might not return. The information given in Paragraph 3-D above seems to make this possibility even more likely and is a developement that Station Madrid will watch closely.

5. The arguments ended inconclusively. Neither man could afford to carry the battle to the ultimate conclusion of an open break. GALLO has tried to make some pro-forma gestures acknowledging RUIZ as head of the Mission and RUIZ will soon be going on home leave. However, the former close association noted upon RUIZ's arrival is gone and they are more distant and cool. GALLO at one point in this same 4 July QUDOZE Report mentioned how he had looked forward to working with RUIZ and QUDOZE had shown an initially close working relationship between them with daily discussions of the problems of the Mission and the events of the day. Now, their relationship is cool, correct and business-like. The personalities of the two men have also come into sharper relief. RUIZ with his quick temper, shouted and used harsh, course language and in the end got nowhere; GALLO did not raise his voice, although his language was no improvement over that of his boss, and tried to sound reasonable but never gave in an inch on any of the points over which they quarreled. In the end nothing was resolved except possibly to clear the air of some of the tension between the two men for in a 10 July QUDOZE Report, RUIZ was still complaining about GALLO's friendship with Emilio ROMERO and saying that GALLO only wanted to be out meeting people and not preparing written memos on his work!

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN



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INFO. FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH 8, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CAS, ADDP

S E C R E T 090852Z AUG 68 CITE MADRID 5702

9 Aug 68 IN 67286

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR, LA PAZ

TYPIC

REF: JMCOBRA 0490 (IN 63507)

1. STATION HAS MONITORED ACTIVITIES ORESTES GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ AND HIS WIFE CLOSELY THROUGH QUDOZE/QUTIMID SINCE COUPLES ARRIVAL MADRID LAST DEC AND CONVINCED REF REPORT BY VECIANA ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. RUIZ, FAR FROM BEING DISSATISFIED WITH REGIME IS CONVINCED SUPPORTER WHO BELIEVES THAT IN SERVING CUBAN REVOLUTION HE IS SERVING BEST INTERESTS OF CUBA. RUIZ INTERESTED IN OUTSIDE WORLD AND IN MAINTAINING DIALOGUE WITH VARYING TYPES OF PEOPLE BUT DOES THIS FROM INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION WHICH HAS ACCEPTED CASTRO'S INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNISM AS APPLIED TO CUBA. ONLY ELEMENT OF DISSATISFACTION NOTED IS RUIZ FEELING HE IS NOT IN POSITION WHERE CAN BE MOST USEFUL. HE BELIEVES HE IS WASTING HIS TALENTS IN DIPLOMATIC POST AND WOULD LIKE POSITION MORE SUITED TO HIS INTERESTS IN EITHER COMMERCE OR INDUSTRY WHERE CAN

AN
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201-735246
9 Aug. 1968

SECRET

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PAGE 2 MADRID 5702 SECRET

SERVE REVOLUTION BETTER. WIFE APPEARS AS NON-FANATIC BUT ALSO REGIME SUPPORTER AND AS A WOMAN WHO WILL BE RULED BY HUSBAND IN SUCH MATTERS.

2. DETAILED DISPATCH BASED ON MATERIAL ACCUMULATED DURING PAST EIGHT MONTHS FOLLOWS SHORTLY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

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S E C R E T 031132Z JUL 68 CITE MADRID 5394

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

3 JUL 68 IN 43255

TYPIC

ON QUTIMID OF 15 JUNE 68 WIFE OF AMAUTO-1 SAID AMAUTO-1 HAD MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THEIR DEPARTURE FOR PBRUMEN ON 6 AUGUST TO GO ON VACATION. SHE COMMENTED THAT POSSIBLY AMAUTO-1 MIGHT NOT WANT TO RETURN TO MADRID.

S E C R E T

AN | PL
PS | DEST | wh/cops
ABSTRACT X | INDEX

CS COPY

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201-735296
3 July 1968

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO B 201-249867
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296
X-REF TO FILE NO. B 201-818437
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 30

68

SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, EUR8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

201-249867
201-818437
201-735286

MADRID

S E C R E T 061054Z CITE MADRID 3302

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 DEC 67 IN 05127

TYPIC WATCHLIST

CIT: CUBA 201-735296

ISIDORE MALMIERCA PEOLI PP D-67-921; GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ PP D-67-890; RICARDO ESPINO MARTINEZ PP D-67-627 ARRIVED MADRID FROM HAVA 3 DEC IBERIA FLT 942.

11P

S E C R E T

ANAL FI

AN KB
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PG~~
~~RY~~
~~DES~~ ~~MPD~~
FI

MICROFILMED
DEC 29 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

B. 201-249867
B. 201-818437

201-735296
~~201-735269~~
6 Dec 1967

22 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez (201-735296)
Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid

According to QUDOZE/QUTIMID, Subject is suffering from a spinal ailment resulting from a fall he had about 12 years ago. Since then he has had chronic backaches which were particularly severe during the time that he was in the U.S., Haiti, and Santo Domingo. His pains have recurred since he arrived in Spain about six months ago. On 3 June he had another severe attack and was treated by the Embassy's Spanish doctor VILLALANDA who prescribed Cortisone. His condition was diagnosed as incurable since it was doubted that the injury to his spine could be corrected by an operation. Subject was further told by his doctor that the condition would worsen to the point where within six to 10 years he would have a defective walk. Subject planned to send the diagnosis and x-rays to ROA in Havana who would pass them to the Cuban specialist MARTINEZ-PAZ for reviewing.

Gloria de Perignat
WH/COG/OPS

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14-00000

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ACTION EUR 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WHCOG 8, CI, CI/OPS, MADP, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 181533Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4454 18 [illegible] 72639

5 1P

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

KEYWAY PBRUMEN QUTIMID

AN	FI	
RG	~~DESP~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX ✓	

1. ON 12 MAR 68 AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS DAVID JACOBUS WENT TO THE PBRUMEN EMBASSY AND REQUESTED SEE AMAUTO-1 (IDEN). AMAUTO-1 REFUSED SEE HIM UNTIL HE HAD IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AND STATED PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT IN WRITING. [illegible] 201-735246 [illegible]

2. JACOBUS SAID HE STAYING AT HOTEL CAPITOL, CALLE JOSE ANTONIO 41. ADDED HE HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH U.S. GOVT AND BEING PRESSURED FINANCIALLY TO RETURN TO U.S. WHERE HE WOULD BE ARRESTED. REQUESTED AMAUTO-1 SUGGESTIONS FOR RECEIVING AID.

3. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH OTHER MEMBERS EMB STAFF AMAUTO-1 SAID THERE AN AMERICAN WHO WANTS GO PBRUMEN SAID IF HE WANTS TO GO WHY DOESN'T HE STEAL AIRPLANE OR BOAT.

4. NO OBJECTION PASSING TO LNERGO. PLS PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCE.

S E C R E T

BT

MICROFILMED
MAY 7 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

201-735246
18 March 1968

14-00000

2234P

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TSD6 FI DDP ADDP

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S E C R E T 061204Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4359

6 MAR 68 IN 64742

DIRECTOR, FRANKFURT INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAFRON QUCAB TECHS

REF: MADRID 4358 (IN 64743)

AN	PI	
PS	DEST	CI/OPS
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

IDEN - MAGIN (FERRER) TRAVE, DIRECTOR OF SERVICIO TECNICO COMERCIAL DE CONSTRUCCIONES NAVALES ESPANOLAS. THIS ORG IS SEMI OFFICIAL ASSOCIATION OF 37 SHIP BUILDING FIRMS AND HELPS ARRANGE AND/OR COORDINATE MANY OF CONTRACTS FOR SHIPBUILDING FOR OTHER COUNTRIES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-735296
6 March 1968

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TSD, FI, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 061204Z MAR 68 CITE MADRID 4358

DIRECTOR, FRANKFURT INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC MHAPRON QUCAB TECHS

REFS: A. MADRID 4154 (IN 49596)

B. MADRID 4322 (IN 61628)

AMA- Y	FI	
~~TO~~	DDP	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. INVESTIGATION BY QUSEELY-1 SHOWS AMA TO-1 DOES FREQUENT REF A IDEN RESTAURANT. MOST MEETINGS RECENTLY HAVE BEEN WITH ID0A AND UNDOUBTEDLY CONCERN NEGOTIATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION TWO SHRIMP BOATS. THIS SUBJECT OF SPECIAL INTEREST BOTH FROM THE MHVIPER POINT OF VIEW AND ALSO FOR POSSIBILITQY THAT THESE BOATS MIGHT BE CONSTRUCTED FOR USE BY PBRUMEN FOR EXPORT OF THE REVOLUTION.

2. REQUEST FRANKFURT EARLY VISIT FOR FREQUENCY SWEEP AND PREPARATION OF PEPPER MILLS REQUIRED FOR INSTALLATION AS DISCUSSED PER MADRID 4322 (IN 61628).

3. QUSEELY-1 PREPARED PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE INSIDE RESTAURANT TO PLACE ARTICLE ON TABLE AT APPROPRIATE TIME. BELIEVES PEPPER MILL IS APPROPRIATE ARTICLE TO USE.

4. FOR ADDL BACKGROUND OF SHIPBUILDING NEGOTIATIONS HQS MAY WISH REVIEW MADRID EMBASSY TELEGRAMS 2633, 16 FEB 68; 2230, 17 JAN 68. NATURALLY OUR INTEREST EXTENDS

SECRET

201-735296
6 March 1968

14852

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MADRID 4358 SECRET

BEYOND THIS SUBJECT AS WE HOPE TO COVER MANY CONTACTS OF AMAUTO-1 AT THIS RESTAURANT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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- X MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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TO: Chief, FE Division

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, European Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: Operational/BGBERET/QUDOZE/PBRUMEN
C Comments of Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid on Vietnam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

A: SPAIN, MADRID CIT CUBA

1. According to a QUDOZE Report of 17 February, the 201-735296 Cuban Charge d'Affaires in Madrid, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, was discussing the war in Vietnam with one of his subordinates and commented that a Chinese general is driving the North American command mad. He added that this Chinese says that they failed the first time and can fail the second time but that in the end the victory will be theirs. He also added that Vietnam had been at war with the Chinese for thousands of years, that the Chinese have a demonic power that is their people.

2. The nature of the QUDOZE Report does not permit further amplification of the above information which, even though fragmentary and obscure, is being forwarded for whatever use Headquarters may wish to make of it. Should any clarifying information appear in future QUDOZE reports, it will be forwarded. It is interesting to note that, although Station traces do not show the information, a previous QUDOZE Report quoted RUIZ as saying he had once been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

MICROFILMED
MAR 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-777193
OSMA-23549
23 FEB 68

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
VICE MINISTER OF ECONOMY WAS DIMISSED
RE DEBRIEFING REPORT OF ARIEL PICOT DIAZ
201-777193

UFG

R 6803210106

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

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5. WH/COG/RR			23 Feb	
6. WH/COG/ops				
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17. WH/C/OPS ~~RID/FI~~				

Should we ask for the original tape on this for more clarification
Yes

Has been done

27 FEB 1968

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Signed: S. Vitie

R.O. WH/COG

Date

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

9 Feb. 68

DOCUMENT NUMBER

OSMA 23513

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Div., COS, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
~~KAPOK~~/QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1 Discussion of Missiles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 10 January 1968, AMAUTO-1, in one of his many daily discussions with his subordinates, reflected on the international position of his country, and among the things he said, we quote the following which may be of possible interest to addressees. Although part of the discussion was not heard because of the emotional inflection of the speaker, we feel that the jist of the discussion is clear and understandable.

> "We are demonstrating to the world that Cuba...is favorably disposed to do whatever...(AMAUTO-1 begins to talk against the United States) that when the Americans have to raise the white flag...because the first plane that appears on radar...(AMAUTO-1 is speaking excitedly and it is very difficult to understand each word but it appears that he is talking about the positions of missiles in Cuba), Havana, Las Villas and Camaguey and that with these missiles, we can cover Miami, New York, and all their bases and all of their "mierda". . .if the Americans say they are going to send them (missiles? planes?), we will send them; if they (Americans) say they are going to invade us, the first plane that comes to invade...(AMAUTO-1's subordinate remarked that 15 October 62 marked a point in international politics, when the Yankees ordered the Soviets to withdraw their missiles). . .(AMAUTO-1 injected) "they (the Soviets) presented them (the Cubans) with ten bombs".

2. Our reason for reporting this fragmentary information is that AMAUTO-1 might be confirming the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba.

Howard R. SACODER
Howard R. SACODER
201-735296

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9 February 1968

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FILE [illegible]

SECRET 131132Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4154

13 FEB 63 IN 48920

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, FRANKFURT

TYPIC MHAPRON TECHS

1. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE IN RESTAURANT WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS IDENTIFIED ON QUDOCE AS HIS FAVORITE RESTAURANT IN MADRID. IDEN RESTAURANT PARTIALLY OWNED BY QUSEELY-1 WHO CASE OFFICER CONVINCED WILL DO ANYTHING ASSIST IN OPERATION. HAVE NOT YET APPROACHED HIM THIS BASIS.

2. STATION INFORMAL CASING RESTAURANT ON 12 FEB FINDS NO VASES OR MOVABLE OBJECTS ON TABLES SUITABLE FOR CONTAINING MICROPHONES. UNDERTABLE INSTALLATION VERY LIKELY UNSUITABLE IN VIEW DIRECTIONAL NOISES FROM OTHER TABLES.

3. STATION INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY PURCHASE SMALL SLENDER VASES TO CONTAIN ARRANGEMENT TWO OR THREE FLOWERS FOR EACH TABLE AND WOULD REQUEST SUITABLE INSTALLATION BY ARTOPAZ IN AT LEAST TWO VASES OF SMALL MIKE/TRANSMITTER, TYPE TO BE DECIDED AFTER DETERMINATION EXACT SIZE VASES.

4. THIS CABLE ONLY FOR PURPOSE ADVISING ADDRESSEE STATIONS FACTS THIS OPERATION WHICH CONSIDERED OF VALUE IN VIEW

[illegible] 72524 6
13 FEB 1963

[illegible]
RID/MIS

FEB 23 9 29 AM '68

PAGE 2 MADRID 4154 S E C R E T

QUDOZE HAS DISCLOSED OCCASIONS IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 HAS CALLED SPANISH CONTACTS TO MEET THEM AT IDEN RESTAURANT FOR BUSINESS CONVERSATIONS.

S E C R E T

FORWARDED
RID/MIS
FEB 23 2 12 PM '68

MAR 8 68

14-0000

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9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

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10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO ORESTES
201-735296 065-009-007
SEX M DOB ? OSMA-23493A01
02 FEB 68
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
ASSIGNED SPAIN PCS. CUBAN OFFICIAL
REP CHARGE D AFFAIRES. DATE OF ARR
IN SPAIN 03 DEC 67

UFGHMMHFGOSB R 6802160509

FILE IN 201-735296

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(7-46)

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INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
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INFO
FILE VR, WH7, [illegible], CI, CI/OPS

ANAL
PS
ABSTRACT

1P

SECRET 251759Z JAN 68 CITE MADRID 3978

~~DIRECTOR INFO~~ JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

REF: MADRID 3859 (IN 31987)

ONLY CUBAN MALE WHO TRAVELED US (NEW YORK) 6 JAN WAS ROBERTO CRUZ SEGUNDO. OBTAINED IMMIGRANT VISA 27 DEC 67. NO STATION TRACES.

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 14 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

201-735296
26 Jan 1968

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5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-133/03
UNDA-03310
30 OCT 67
P5

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
VICE MINISTER FOREIGN COMMERCE. RUIZ WILL BE GOING TO SPAIN AS CHARGE D AFFAIRES

UFG

R 6802161385

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

R~~5~~/DM

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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FROM

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UNIT WH/COG TIME BY 6

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, WH 8, EUR 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 171220Z JAN 68 CITE MADRID 3859

17 JAN 68 IN 31987

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

TYPIC MHGUILE

1. IN QUDOZE REPORT OF 5 JAN 68 AMAUTO-1 REQUESTED THAT A CABLE BE SENT SAYING THAT THE FOLLOWING DAY A COMPANERO (UNIDENTIFIED) CARRYING AN ENVELOPE WAS LEAVING FOR MIAMI. PREVIOUSLY IN THE CONVERSATION AMAUTO-1 ASKED THE PERSON IF HIS PASSPORT WAS READY. HE REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED ENTRANCE AND EXIT PERMIT, AND RETURN VISA. COMMENTS WERE MADE RE PRICE ROUND TRIP TO MIAMI BEING 600 DOLLARS SO ASSUME THE PERSON RETURNING TO MADRID.

NIC	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~

2. MADRID WILL CHECK QUOTA TRAVEL REPORTS THAT DATE AND WITH CONSULATE IN EFFORT IDENTIFY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-735296
17 Jan 1968

RI/ND

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS

WAVE

S E C R E T 302252Z JAN 68 CITE JMWAVE 1081

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC MHGUILE

REFEREENCES MADRID 3859 (IN 31999)

MADRID 3978 (IN 37739)

AN ✓	FI	
~~PC~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

30 JAN 68 IN 40434

NO STATION OR AMOT TRACES ROBERTO CRUZ SEGUNDO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-735296
30 Jan 1968

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

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50 FEB '68

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

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TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

IN VIEW OF [illegible]
CUBAN [illegible] AND
[illegible] ACTIVITIES
IN SANTO DOMINGO, [illegible]
NEW FILE CLASSIFICATION
MIGHT BE WARRANTED.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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MICROFILMED
JAN 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST — ABSTRACT ☒ — INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 19 JAN 1968

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 23415

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

21

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/MHSPAWN/QUDOZE/QUTIMID
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid on Propaganda Matters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMA-23,413 of 19 January 1968
B. OSMA-23,406 of 12 January 1968 200-235-296

MICROFILMED
JAN 30 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. When Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the new Cuban Charge met with the Cuban consuls following his arrival in Spain, the result was a long meeting at which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The subject of propaganda will be dealt with in this dispatch.

2. The Castro regime has always attached great importance to propaganda activities of all kinds and when the new Cuban Charge d'Affaires began to re-organize the work of his subordinates, propaganda matters were not overlooked. According to the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations, the provincial consulates have been receiving four types of propaganda for distribution, two of which were identified. One was the propaganda put out by the organizations created by the Castro regime, for example "The Voice of Vietnam". The other is newspapers. PACHECO, Consul in Sevilla, mentioned Granma, which he claimed many people read, and added that lately he had been receiving Juventude Rebelde.

3. RUIZ's ideas apparently go beyond hand-shaking and the distribution of propaganda. He asked the consuls to make a list of all the institutes and all the scientific centers in their territories including the special positions of these centers and any other relevant information. They are to use these lists to develop a systematic work plan of visiting each one, making friends, trying to obtain scholarships for Cuba, trying to obtain publications and propaganda of every type, free if possible or by subscription

Continued ......

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division
2 - C/EUR Division
2 - COS, JMWAVE
[2 cc E/10/S]

GROUP I
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CROSS REFERENCE TO: D65-8-7

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMA-23,415

DATE: 19 January 1968
200-235-296

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 200-120-58

if necessary. The consuls were told to go with the attitude of "looting".

4. Even while he was laying these responsibilities on his consuls, RUIZ was busy within the Embassy. In discussions with Andres MARTINEZ, a Spanish employee who works on cultural matters and is responsible for publication of the Embassy bulletin, RUIZ mentioned that he is interested in offering Cuban documentaries to Spanish Cine (Movie) Clubs as they now have a large number, "an infinity", of documentaries showing both Cuban technical application and how the people live. RUIZ also asked to see copies of the Embassy bulletin and in the meantime suggested MARTINEZ do a bulletin drawing a parallel between Gibralter and Guantanamo. Finally, according to a QUDOZE report of 11 December 1967, Hector GALLO Portieles had been ordered to prepare a work plan for cultural activity. In this context cultural activity is not limited to art, music and literature but also includes public information media. The Cuban Embassy has already built up a series of press contacts over the past years and the Cuban Revolution seems to draw a ready response in Spanish intellectual circles as evidenced by the Spanish delegates attending the Cultural Congress held in Havana from 4-11 January 1968. An expense-paid trip is always attractive to be sure but the delegates, many of whom were not communists, were also sympathetic to the host. Accordingly, within the limits imposed by the Spanish government, Station Madrid expects an increase in the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban official establishment.

Jane D. Astrahan

Jane D. ASTRAHAN

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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JAN 17 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

22 JAN 1968

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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296
	INDEX	

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
CL [illegible]	12 Jan 68	USMA 23406

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM 3P

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/MHAPRON/QUTIMID/QUDOZE
Plans of New Cuban Ambassador in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
JAN 17 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. The new Cuban Ambassador to Spain, Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez arrived in Madrid on the Iberia flight of 3 December 1967 accompanied by his wife, Nilda, and three sons. CALZADILLA, RUIZ's predecessor had not been a strong administrator and had let the various components of the Cuban official establishment in Spain run their own affairs. This fact plus the inevitable tendency of a new chief to be a "new broom" and rearrange things according to his own lights, led Station Madrid to expect some changes particularly within the Embassy. However, the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations have shown RUIZ at least initially to be an aggressive and well organized individual with ideas of his own that clearly reflect his background in commercial affairs and prepared to make changes that promise to go beyond the superficial sweeping of a new broom. Underlying RUIZ's actions and proposals is the clear implication that he came to Madrid with the specific task of upgrading the Cuban mission in Spain both in terms of prestige and effectiveness. Station Madrid will transmit to the addressees the relevant information on this program as it becomes available from the QUDOZE and QUTIMID operations along with information on the official Cuban personalities administering the program.

2. A striking difference between RUIZ and his predecessor was noted in the QUDOZE and QUTIMID reports of that first week. RUIZ has no inhibitions over spending money. One of the Embassy cars, a Peugeot was replaced with a new model and there was discussion of replacing the other two Peugeots with new ones. Nilda, RUIZ's wife, was picked up by the wife of GOVIN who turned $200 over to her to go shopping at the Corte Inglesa, one of Madrid's two best

Continued .....

Distribution:
2 - C/WH Division
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2 - COS, JMWAVE

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201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D. 200-9-44	OSMA-23,406	12 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-120-61

known department stores. RUIZ checked with GALLO, his deputy, on the proper clothes for diplomatic functions in Madrid and an appointment was to be made with a tailor. Nilda declared that the apartment where CALZADILLA and his family had lived economically was inadequate and they decided to look for a chalet, something very spacious and well-priced. They subsequently seriously considered one known to rent for 30,000 pesetas ($500) per month and then turned it down, apparently for reasons other than price. A new telex machine was ordered for the Embassy. The technician stated they could install a teletype that could only receive, not send, messages but this seemed acceptable.

3. On Monday, 4 December 1967, the day after his arrival, RUIZ ordered the Cuban consuls in Barcelona, Sevilla and Vigo to Madrid for a meeting. The order was couched in terms of "wanting to meet" them, but after their arrival on Wednesday, 6 December, all parties settled down to a detailed meeting in which primary attention was given to administrative matters, trade and propaganda. The latter two subjects will be dealt with in separate dispatches. On the administrative side, RUIZ listened sympathetically to complaints about low salaries, old buildings and inadequate operating budgets and concluded by asking for a monthly report on receipts and expenses and a report on the consuls' current needs, their monthly balances and their administrative activities. The printing and telephone bills were the two items of expense that kept recurring throughout the discussions.

4. By the end of the week, RUIZ had prepared a report on the situation he found in the Chancerry and the mission in general for forwarding to Havana and which he first discussed with his subordinates. He started by assuring them that he had "found great co-operation among all the comrades in this mission" and declared that the staff was complete. Apparently, RUIZ intends to make no personnel changes and Hector GALLO Portieles, who had previously been most eager to return PCS to Havana, now has gone to Havana on vacation. He left Madrid on the 20 December 1967 Iberia flight.

5. The Cuban mission has certain financial problems since the present budget dates from previous years and does not cover current expenses. However, the "new economic activities of the consulate" are expected to assist with the problem. Here RUIZ is presumably referring to the pressure brought to bear in November 1967 by Cuban sympathizers in the Spanish Foreign Office working through the Customs and the Immigration Office to force Cuban exiles to register with the Cuban consulate and pay the $22.50 fee for a valid passport. Enough exiles have responded to this pressure to relieve some of the financial problems of the Cuban mission. This source of income will last as long as the Cubans' friends in the Foreign Ministry are able to assist them.

6. The reception of Cuban official travelers at the airport and the handling of Embassy pouches poses a continuing administrative problem for the Embassy. Jose DIAZ Puga, who is in charge of this airport work has to devote himself exclusively to taking care of the couriers and their pouches when any come in, leaving visitors to fend for themselves. This situation has been alleviated by other Embassy staff members jaunting out to the airport at will to meet the incoming planes. Now, RUIZ has declared that the rest of the staff must stay in the Embassy because they have a work plan to fulfill. Thus, he has left himself with an unresolved problem he must face in the very near future.

7. The new Ambassador concluded his report with three recommendations:

a. Rent another building where the Chancillary, the Commercial Office, the Consulate and the Cubana Offices can all be housed instead of being dispersed in separate buildings as they are now;

b. Rent or preferably buy a residence for the Chief of Mission. The one they now have is not adequate;

c. Send another person from Cuba who has the background to take care of scientific work plus continuing the contacts the Mission will have already made. In view of RUIZ's previous statement on the completeness of the staff, such a person would likely be a "non-official" representative of one of Cuba's cultural fronts such as the Casa de las Americas.

8. RUIZ concluded his remarks by saying that in Spain there is a tremendous field for the Cubans, they have no language problem and they can do a great work. Such is the goal RUIZ has proclaimed and that Station Madrid believes he was sent to attain.

Jane D. Astrahan
Jane D. ASTRAHAN

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
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21 DEC 1967

MICROFILMED
DEC 18 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

27 FEB 1968

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 14 Jan 1967

DOCUMENT NUMBER: UFGA 29123

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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4-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, MADRID

INFO: Chief, EUR Division; Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC AMOT/Operational
Cuban Embassy Official (fnu) RUIZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. Madrid 3135
B. Madrid 3204

1. JMWAVE traces reveal that (fnu) RUIZ, successor to Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez, 201-315988, may be identical with Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, 201-735296. Information pertaining to RUIZ Perez is as follows:

a. In August 1963, RUIZ was appointed Cuban Commercial Counsellor at Mexico City, and was believed to be a G-2 official attempting to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups based in Mexico. (UFGA-11065, dated 16 September 1963, and UFGA-11445, dated 23 September 1963.)

b. In 1964 an attempt was made to establish communications with RUIZ through Antonio VECIANA, an uncle of RUIZ' wife. VECIANA stated that neither he nor members of his family were in correspondence with RUIZ, and that he was unwilling to act as a "go-between." (UFGA-19006, dated 21 December 1964.)

c. A Headquarters' "WATCHLIST" card, dated 1 June 1965, indicates that RUIZ was believed to be assigned to the General Directorate of Intelligence, Ministry of Interior, in Havana.

2. AMOT traces pertaining to Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, and an evaluation of his new assignment are attached.

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 5 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Julian T. PROCARIO

Attachment: H/W
AMOT Report EE-8119

Distribution:
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3 - WH/COG w/att.
3 cc [illegible] w/att

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201-735296

DEC 1 4 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-29123

DATE: 12 December 1967

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-315983
201-735296

14-00000

ATTACHMENT to UFGA-29123

SECRET

FROM: SE/REA

AGENT: I-46

VIA: I-1

FE-8119

5 Dec. 1967

FP 201-315185

SUBJECT: Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez <replaced by Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez as Charge d'Affaires of Cuba in Spain>
(201-735196)

REF: AR-2294, 30 Nov. 1967

1. Francisco CALZADILLA Nunez has not been an attache at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid but rather the head of the Embassy as with his rank of Minister Plenipotenciary he has always acted ad Charge d' Affaires Ad Int. in Spain.

2. Since the end of 1959, after the incident which took place in the CMQ TV station in Havana between Fidel CASTRO and the then Ambassador of Spain to Cuba, Juan Pablo de LOJENDIO, and the subsequent recall of Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona who, at that time, was Cuban Ambassador to Spain, both countries have kept persons with a rank of less than ambassador as the heads of their respective embassies.

3. If Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez is replacing CALZADILLA Nunez, he will do so as Charge d'Affaires a.i. If we take into consideration the fact that RUIZ Perez, since August 1963, has been holding positions of confidence in the Cuban Government in the fields of economics and commerce, such as Commercial Counselor in Mexico and Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, first in administration and afterwards in economy, it can be presumed that he has complete knowledge of the commercial policies of the Cuban Government.

4. From the above, it is believed that the designation of RUIZ Perez to be in charge of the Cuban Embassy in Spain means that the Cuban Government is anxious to intensify even more its commercial exchange with Spain and for this reason is sending as its top re-

MICROFILMED
DEC 16 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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Att. 1 UFGA 29123

201-735196

SUBJECT: Francisco CALZADILLA's replacement in Spain (cont.)

presentative in Spain a specialist in international commerce. As such, he can not only fertilize the ground for the above purpose but also take a principal part in the conversations which at this time are always held by commercial delegations of both countries, with a view to commercial trade between the two countries.

5. Following are the file traces we have on RUIZ Perez:

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez: EE-2131, Information about him, I-21, 30 Oct. 1964.

EE-2251, Information about him and file traces, I-31, 17 Nov. 1964.

Commercial Counselor at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico in Nov. 1963. Address: Francisco Marquez No. 160 (Colonia Condesa), Mexico, D.F. (Source: Cuban Diplomatic and Consular Missions Abroad, 25 Feb. 65.

EE-4342, List of Ministers and Vice-Ministers of the Cuban Govt., 26 Oct. 1965, page 1.

Vice-Minister of the MINCEX. One of the head persons present at a meeting held by the workers of the MINCEX on 8 Feb. 1966 to express their solidarity with the statements made by the Prime Minister in reply to the Red Chinese Government. (Source: El Mundo and Granma, 9 Feb. 1966.)

Member of the Cuban Delegation at the second session of the Bulgarian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, held on 17 Feb. 1966 in Havana. (Source: El Mundo, 18 Feb. 1966.)

EE-5349, Study on the structure of the Cuban Govt., I-31, 13 June 1966.

Vice-Minister of Political Economy of the MINCEX. Supporter of the regime. Born in 1928 approx. White. About 5'5" tall, weighing about 130 pounds. Blond hair and blue eyes. Married. Lived in Havana Mun. Dist. and Province. (Source: Debriefing of Danilo PIEDRA Humpierre, I-42, 27 Dec. 1966.)

Orestes RUIZ Perez: CC-666, Travel Havana-Mexico.

Travelled Havana-Mexico on 21 May 1964. PP. 63487. (Source: CCA passenger manifest.)

Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez: Cuban, 42 years of age. Came to take the place of Enrique VEGA Perez, former attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. PP-D-63/487 diplomatic. Arrived in Mexico on 29 Nov. 1963. (Source: Passenger manifests.)

IE-8119, 5 Dec. 67

SUBJECT: CALZADILLA's replacement (cont.)

Guillermo RUIZ Perez: Financial Director of Economy of the Ministry of Finance. (Source: Hoy, 12 Dec. 1962.)

Vice-Minister of MINCEX. One of the leading persons present at an event to give prizes to 154 cane cutters of the different enterprises of MINCEX who worked during the Fifth People's Harvest. (Source: Hoy, 1 Aug. 1965.)

ES-4471, Information about Ramon DOMESTEVEZ Dominguez, E-15, 17 Nov. 65.

One of the leading persons who took part in an event held at the National Association of Lawyers of Havana on 23 March 1966. (Source: Granma, and El Mundo, 24 March 1966.)

Guillermo RUIZ: Head of the office of the economic group of Finance Ministry. Communist. C-2. (Source: Jose PAZ Novas, 17 Jan. 1961.)

Militiaman. Active Communist. Head of the Department of Study and Expenses of the Constitution of the Finance Ministry. (Source: AA-365, 10 Aug. 1962.)

Vice-Ministry of MINCEX. Attended the signing of a commercial treaty between Cuba and Bulgaria for the period 1965-1970. (Source: Bohemia, 4 Sept. 1964.)

Attended a dinner given by the MINCEX in honor of its vanguard workers in the city of Havana. (Source: Revolucion, 13 Mar. 1965.)

Vice-Minister in charge of administration of the MINCEX. Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth World Festival. (Source: Radio Progreso, 15 Mar. 1965.)

Attended the graduation exercises of a school of the MINCEX. (Source: Revolucion, 21 Sept. 1965.)

Vice-Ministry of Economy of the MINCEX. Attended a meeting of workers of the ministry. (Source: Granma, 9 Feb. 1966.)

Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. Received officials from Bulgaria when they arrived in Havana by plane. (Source: Granma, 11 Feb. 1966)

Member of the Cuban delegation which took part in the second session of the Bulgarian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration held in Havana. (Source: Granma, 18 Feb. 1966.)

Member of the Cuban delegation that began conversations today with the Bulgarian Minister in Havana, with a view to the signing of the Protocol of Collaboration between the two countries. (Source: Radio Progreso, 18 Feb. 1966.)

Was present when Lachezar AVRAMOV, minister and member of the secretariat of the CC of the PC of Bulgaria, visited President DORTICOS. (Source: Granma, 20 Feb. 1966.

EE-8119, 5 Dec. 67

SUBJECT: CALZADILLA's replacement (cont.)

Arrived today in Santiago de Cuba with the group which included the Minister and Secretary of the CC of the PC of Bulgaria. (Source: Granma, 20 Feb. 1965.)

Present at the affair held at the MINCEX on 27 May 1966 to began a course on combative preparation. (Source: El Mundo, 28 May 1966.)

Presided over the general assembly of the workers of the MINCEX held yesterday afternoon. (Source: Granma, 12 July 1965.)

Received the Minister of MINCEX, Dr. Marcelo FERNANDEZ Font, when the latter returned from the USSR, where he was a member of the Cuban delegation to the celebration of the 49th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. (Source: El Mundo, 18 Nov. 1966.)

Went to the Jose Marti Airport to receive the Bulgarian Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade. (Source: El Mundo, 7 Dec. 1966.)

Vice-Minister of Economy of the MINCEX and president of the Cuban delegation which took part in the signing of the commercial protocol for 1967 between Cuba and Poland. Went to the airport to receive Marian DMOCHOWSKI, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade of Poland. (Source: Granma, 8 Jan 1967.)

He signed the commercial treaty between Cuba and Poland for the Cuban Government. (Source: Radio Progreso, 14 Jan. 1967)

Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade. Signed a commercial treaty for 1967 between Cuba and Poland. (Source: Granma, 14 Jan. 1967.)

At the airport to receive the Cuban delegation headed by Marcelo FERNANDEZ which was returning from Moscow. (Source: Granma, 3 Feb. 67.)

Member of the G-2. Works at the MINCEX. (Source: I-91, 24 Apr. 1967.)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
DISPATCH

FROM: WH/COG/CICS/E.Scoggin ECS

EXTENSION: R-9008

NO. OSMW - 10827

DATE: 12 December 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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4.			
5. C/WHD	14 Dec 67		E
6.			
7. EUR/CUBA	15	Dec	S
8.			
9. C/E/IB			✓
10.			
11. RID/D&P			gl
12. RID/AN			MAS
13. [illegible]			[illegible]
14. WH/~~Reg~~ C/CICS			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

~~[illegible] 1 line~~

15

file 201-735296

NO

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief of Station, Madrid	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division VIA:C/EUR		MICROFILM

MARKED FOR INDEXING

SUBJECT: TYPIC MHGUILE/Operational
Ambassador Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For Your Information

1. The earliest information in the file of Guillermo RUIZ Perez, born 1931, is that he was in exile in Mexico during the BATISTA regime. In April 1962, he was described by a refugee who was a former co-worker as a militiaman and a militant communist who was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics, Ministry of Treasury. RUIZ arrived in Mexico City in August 1963 as Commercial Counsellor. Shortly thereafter, AMTIKI/1, a reliable JMWAVE asset, stated he had received a letter from a friend inCuba who stated that RUIZ was a "G-2" member sent to Mexico to infiltrate counter-revolutionary groups. In January 1964, LITAMIL/9, a reliable Mexico Station asset, reported that RUIZ of the commercial office was emerging as a fanatical Fidelista.

2. In April 1964, the AMOTS contacted several members of the VECIANA family (relatives of Nilda VECIANA Lopez, wife of Guillermo RUIZ) who live in Miami to see if any one of them would be willing to contact RUIZ for purposes of recruitment.

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Madrid
1 - COS, JMWAVE

201-735296

C-O-N-T-I-N-U-E-D

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMW - 10827	DATE 19 DEC 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

12 December 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - C/WH/COG
1 - E/IB/S

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	E.Scoggin	mot	R-9008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	
AC/WH/COG/CICS		Gordon Rothwell
WH/COG/MO	13/12/67	
C/WH/COG	13 Dec 67	David A. Phillips
C/WHD		William V. Broe
EUR/CUBA		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/E/IB	12/15/67	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMW - 10827

The VECIANA family members stated they do not correspond with Nilda, were not willing to contact RUIZ, and did not believe he would cooperate. They stated that RUIZ's father was an old guard communist and his brother (first name not given) was a member of the Department of State Security (DSE, the Cuban internal intelligence agency) in Havana. In May 1964, AMMUG/1 stated that Guillermo RUIZ was one of the DGI officials stationed in Mexico and that he was "case officer for intelligence operations targetted against some nearby area."

3. RUIZ was appointed Vice Minister for Economics of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in August 1964, and it is assumed he held that position until appointed Cuban Ambassador to Spain.

NORREN D. METTENET

HOWARD G. DOBBS

201-735246

14-00000

RID/AN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-735296

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FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE [illegible] FI

SECRET [illegible] MADRID [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

AN ☐ PI
PS DEST
ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

2 Dec 67 IN 04829

REF A MADRID 3256 (IN 04620)

B MADRID 3204 ([illegible])

SUBJECT REF A IS COUSIN OF CUBAN CHARGE-DESIGNATE GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ WHO EXPECTED ARRIVE MADRID WEEKEND 2-3 DECEMBER. STATION ANXIOUS MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SUBJECT REF TO TAKE ADVANTAGE POTENTIAL ACCESS TO NEW CHARGE.

SECRET.

SECRET

201-735296
2 Dec 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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4		8	

ACTION [illegible] ☑ RID COPY

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 210925Z CITE MADRID 3135 [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2945 (IN 83682)

1. FRANCISCO CALZADILLA AND FAMILY LEFT SPAIN FOR HABANA IBERIA 941 ON 18 NOV. SOTO ON SAME FLIGHT.

2. QUAXE-1 REPORTS CALZADILLA TO BE REPLACED BY RUIZ (FNU), FORMER VICE MINISTER FOREIGN COMMERCE. POSSIBLY IDEN ORESTES GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, VICE MINISTER OF ADMIN OF MINISTRY FOREIGN COMMERCE.

SECRET SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DISSEM BY 26/21 PER

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#132

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

FILE, VR. C/FI/D4, C/RI/SD

ACTION CHANGE

MADRID 3303 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 06970 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : F/D (DIVISION)

TO : WH/COG (DIVISION)

BY : T. ROBERTSON/F/D/X-6974 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : B. MURRY/WH/COG/X-5061 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

For Chris H.

Ref. cable attached. pls. Transfer to CICS

SECRET

Chrono

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
15/FILD

ACTION
C/WH/[illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, C/FI, C/EUR 2, ~~C/[illegible]~~ 5, C/WH 2, C/CI/SD
C/FI/[illegible]

6 Dec [illegible] IN 06978

S E C R E T 061054Z CITE MADRID 3303

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, JMWAVE, MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYLOTE PBRUMEN WATCHLIST

1. IN 4 DECEMBER TELEX GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ (WATCHLIST 552) ASKED EMBACUBA PARIS TO INFORM JOSE ANTONIO (GARCIA) LARA (WATCHLIST 227) IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) THAT RUIZ IN SPAIN AS CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. √/

D 65

2. INDEX RUIZ AND GARCIA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ NO
CL 0 FILE NO. 201-[illegible]
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM 47

ACTION WH/SOG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C, EUR8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 050821Z CITE MADRID 3287

5 DEC 67 IN 05962
05962

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 3204 (IN 01996)

1. GUILLERMO (RUIZ) PEREZ, PP D-67-890, NEW CUBAN CHARGE, ARRIVED MADRID 3 DECEMBER WITH WIFE, NILDA (VECIANA) LOPEZ, PP-D-891, AND THREE SONS, GUILLERMO, ALEJANDRO AND JULIO.

2. REQUEST 201 NUMBER AND CRYPT FOR RUIZ.

S E C R E T

3287

E.C.PAYNE:mot
WH/COG/CICS
R-9008
6 DEC 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 3

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-735296

6 PER
WH/COG 8 ☒ S/R COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH 7, EUR 7, C/A/PS
C/WH 2 FI-Z 2

S E C R E T

7 13 42 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 57644

MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC

REFS: A. MADRID 3204 (IN 01996)*
B. MADRID 3287 (IN 05962)**
C. MADRID 3257 (IN 04629)***

SUBJ REFS A AND B IS AMAUTO/1 (201-735296). TRACES FOLLOW BY DISPATCH. IF STATION AND QUWEB ASSESSMENT CARDOSO FAVORABLE, CONCUR PLAN MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIM FOR POTENTIAL ACCESS AMAUTO/1.

END OF MESSAGE

ANL... ABSTRACT X INDEX

WH/COG/Comment: *Ref A requested traces on Subj refs A and B.
**Ref B requested 201 number and crypt for Subj refs A and B.
***Ref C stated station considering contact CARDOSO, a recent Cuban refugee Madrid and cousin of AMAUTO/1, for future access to AMAUTO/1.

AC/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO
C/WH/COG
EUR/CUBA

C/EUR/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

201-735296
6 Dec 1967

```
                                                  S-E-C-R-E-T

0009 RUIZ, GUILLERMO                                                     019-005-030
     SEX M                                                               DBC-06992
     CIT CUBA                                                            26JAN68
     PRESENTLY VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN COMMERCE RE                      FBI
     ACTIVITIES FOR CUBAN AUTHORITIES                                    P6
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DBC-06992                                      26 FEB 68  03628863


0010 RUIZ, GUILLERMO                                                     201-0729530
     SEX M                                                               OSMA-30162A01
     CIT CUBA                                                            04JUN76
     VICE MINISTER FOR LIGHT INDUSTRY IN MINCEX. RES
     CUBA. INFO FROM DEBRIEFING NOTES OF SLCAPRICE/1.
     ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO LA/C/OP, 305317 , 9229, 28/04/75
     OSMA-30162                                     27 SEP 76  09438195


0011 PEREZ RIOS, ORESTES                                                 201-0311333*
     SEX M DOB 19JUL16              POB CUBA, LAS VILLAS                 TYPE NAME T
     CIT CUBA                                                            RCD DATE 61
     REF WAVE-00373, 02 JAN 62
     RES ? CORR.CARD WAS RIOS, ORESTES
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                    31 DEC 65  00678215
```

```
                                        S-E-C-R-E-T

0012 PEREZ, GUILLERMO /CPT/                                                019-005-030
     SEX M DOB C35                        POB CUBA, ORIENTE, HOLGUIN      DBD-06485
     CIT CUBA                             OCC GOVT EMPL                   12FEB71
     < CUBA, ORIENTE, YATERA DSE CHIEF YATERA MOUNTAIN                    FBI
     ZONE                                                                 P5
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     DBD-06485                                   11 MAR 71  03608966

0013 PEREZ, GUILLERMO                                                     200-007-292
     SEX M                                                                HCS-02017
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HCS-02017                                   18 NOV 72  02787539

0014 PEREZ, GUILLERMO                                                     018-004-109
     SEX M                                POB NICA                        HRS-04536
     CIT NICA                             OCC LABOR                       16APR70
     < NICARAGUA ATTENDED SECOND MEETING OF THE CUSCA IN                  P2
     COSTA RICA, SAN JOSE FORM 19-21 MAR 70, REPRESENTED
     CGT-I AT CONFERENCE
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HRS-04536                                   30 APR 70  02698572
```

```
0021 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     PANAMA JULY 48                                                    056-004-001
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52                        SER-44
     056-004-001-44
                                             01 JAN 58  07199467

0022 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M                                                             053-004-102
                                        OCC SHOEMAKER                  HNMA-04672A01
     < USSR ENROLLED AT CADRE SCHOOL IN USSR                           08JUN71
                                                                       P2
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     HNMA-04672
                                             24 FEB 72  02717361

0023 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M                                                             019-006-095/04
     CIT CUBA                                                          UFAA-01222A01
     < CUBA ARMY CAPT ASSIGNED TO DSE IN GUANTANAMO,                   21AUG69
     ORIENTE                                                           P187
     FORMERLY: SER >19-5-3/4,
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
     UFAA-01222
                                             27 MAR 70  02154970
```

```
0024 PEREZ, GUILLERMO
     SEX M
                                                          009-004-134
                                                          HOP-00530A01
                                                          08AUG55
     FORMERLY: OD NO DATE, SER NO FSN,                    SER-8
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52           SER 8
     HOP-00530
                                       13 JUL 60  05901917

0025 PEREZ, ORESTES
     TREASURER OF THE CUBAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF JUL    100-009-012
     26, CHICAGO, ILL.                                    OFB-04590
                                                          09JUN58
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52           P 5
     OFB-04590
                                       19 AUG 58  06152269

0026 PEREZ, ORESTES
     TREASURER OF THE CUBAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF JULY   100-009-012
     26, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.                               OBF-04590
                                                          09JUN58
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52           P 5
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
     OBF-04590
                                       31 DEC 58  06174810
```

---CONTINUED---   XB809

```
0032 RUIZ                                                        201-0145265*
     SEX M DOB C17                    POB HOND                   TYPE NAME A
     CIT HOND                         OCC TAILOR                 RCD DATE 57
     REF HHT -02131, 19 MAY 69        OCC CODE CRAF
     RES HONDURAS @ OF AGUILERA, SAMUEL MBR COMMUNIST
     PARTY TRAVELLED TO USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                           12 JUN 69  00210957


0033 RUIZ                                                        201-0746401*
     SEX M                                                       TYPE NAME A
     REF MANA-04717, 14 FEB 64                                   RCD DATE 64
     RES NICARAGUA @ OF RUIZ SILVA, JOSE CIT NICARAGUA.
     OCC NICARAGUAN SECURITY AGENT. IN CONTACT W/OFFICE OF
     FRANKLIN A. WHEELOCK GARCIA /201-240990/ DOI FEB 64
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                           31 DEC 65  00210949


0034 RUIZ                                                        201-0064528*
     SEX M DOB 09OCT20                POB HOND                   TYPE NAME A
     CIT HOND                                                    RCD DATE 54
     REF HHT -02114, 30 APR 69
     RES HONDURAS @ OF DIONISIO, RAMOS-BEJARANO
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                           17 MAY 69  00210893

                      END OF REPLY - 0034 RECORDS LISTED
```

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

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OSMA-30148	28 May 1976	201-0729530		

DOC. SUBJECT
SLCAPRICE/1 Debriefing Notes

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
SLCAPRICE/1	24 May 1976	

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ, Orestes Guillermo Perez

As of 1969 was a DGI officer. Code name is "Adam." Seems to be anti-Soviet and not terribly communistic. Hates PSP. A capable intelligence officer, who is quiet about his ideological differences.

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
RUIZ, Orestes Guillermo Perez

201- 735296

FORM 11-73 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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E-2, IMPDET CL. BY [illegible]

(7-46)

Gester
① Guillermo RUIZ Perez

② wife: Nilda VECIANA Lopez



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TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-056
OSMA-28783A01
09 AUG 73
P24

CIT ?
OCC ?
DGI.
NAME APPEARED ON CUBAN WATCHLIST INCORPORATING INTEL AND AUDIO TECHS.

UFA

R 7309140244

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201- 735296

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

100-002-082
316 -0159172
09 JUN 72

CIT CUBA
OCC CHARGE D' AFFAIRES
RES SPAIN, MADR. TRACE REPLY

R 7206161151

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 735296			

FORM 8-62 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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[illegible]

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DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF SECOND COPY			
SX-20079	1 Nov 72	74	6	755/5	

DOC. SUBJECT

AERANK PERSONALITIES

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

SOURCE: AERANK, GRU SIGINT OFFICER

PHOTO/NAME IDENTIFICATIONS

NAME: SHENANAYEV, Albert Mikhaylovich (201-739593)

PHOTO NUMBER: SD24266

DATE SHOWN: 27 Oct 71

REMARKS: Photo/name not familiar

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SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)*	201- 739593			

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DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

VUCINIC, GAVRILO
201-735655
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MIN COUNSELOR YUGO EMB ROME.

201-346816
OIRA-55434A01
30 MAY 72

R 7206090699

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201- 735655

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[illegible]

(7-46)

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DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT *(Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)*

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296 065-008-007
SEX M DOB ? DEF -20075
16 JUN 71
CIT ? DEFENSE
OCC ? P2
DEPARTED SPAIN ON 16 SEPT 70

R 7108040954

[illegible]

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FORM 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (7-68)

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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED BY SUBJECT OF 201-749651

201-749651
UFAA-02925A01
19 APR 71
P3

R 7105030375

amauto/1

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
A DGI OFFICER

201-276761
UFAA-02626A01
14 JAN 71

OSM

R 7101260931

File — AMPITO/1

FILE IN 201-735296

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

065-008-007
OSMA-26609
22 OCT 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
FRIEND OF LUIS HERMOSILLA
< SPAIN

AmaUT

UFA

R 7011090365

FILE IN 201-

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨ 201-735296

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

TO ~~Chief of Station WH/Miami~~
Chief of Station, Madrid

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MARKED FOR INDEXING
MICROFILM

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
AMAUTO/Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAA-2231

Headquarters agrees that the primary objective of contact with AMAUTO-1 by a controlled person for assessment purposes, was well met. We wish to add, moreover, our appreciation for a smooth job with what could have been a difficult "controlled" asset.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

MICROFILMED
AUG 24 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami
3 - COS, Madrid

CROSS REFERENCE TO 8-201-866054	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAW-912	DATE 19 AUG 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296 ~~x-ref 201-866054~~

(14 Aug 1970)

Distribution:
1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - RID
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Richard Wheeler	pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG	1 [illegible]	Wesley L. Laybourne

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD AC/EUR/IB	7 Aug 70	William V. Broe Louis F. Rosso

PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front-cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

RID

WEAVER [illegible] [illegible]
RID/AN [illegible]
EXT. [illegible] [illegible]

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.	13 AUG 1970			
C/WH/C - Brown				
2.				
3. Wheeler				dr
4. Brown				
5. Lunsford				CL
6. Paulette				
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17. RID FI				

COMMENTS

MICROFILMED
[illegible] AUG 13 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

You butcher life!

Fyi

3-6: I believe we hold both 201's. If so, pls file & send sales tickets back to RI.

111519

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
10 Aug 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 02231

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
~~Chief of Station, Madrid; Chief, EUR~~

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
AMAUTO/Follow-up Interview with Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. MADRID 1287, 8 June 1970
B. WH/MIAMI 7776, 4 June 1970

Action: FYI

1. Forwarded herewith is a contact report from PACHANKIS on his follow-up interview of Alexander SAMKO (201-866054), which concerns SAMKO's contact with AMAUTO/1 (201-735296) in Madrid. As can be seen from the report, Madrid Station's defensive briefing of SAMKO apparently took effect and he has been cautious in avoiding the many suspicious characters that have appeared since his trip to Madrid.

2. The question of his writing to AMAUTO/1 was mentioned by SAMKO. He was told that AMAUTO/1 was back in Cuba and we did not know when he would return to Madrid, if ever. WH/Miami believes we should wait until AMAUTO/1 returns to Madrid, or some other post in the Free World, and then have SAMKO write to him.

3. Despite SAMKO's newly self-discovered James Bond talents PACHANKIS enjoyed handling him. It also appears that our primary objective, contact with AMAUTO/1 for a face to face assessment, has been met.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachment:
Contact Report (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att (in dupl.) h/w 2 cc sent C/IG/S, w/att
2 - Chief, EUR, w/att (one copy) h/w
2 - COS, Madrid, w/att (one copy) h/w

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
B-201-866054

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-2231

DATE
AUG 10 1970
5 August 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

SECRET

2P

29 July 1970

AUG 13 1970

Contact Report on Alexander SAMKO, on 28 July 1970.

1. On the morning of 28 July, I called Sam to check in with him after being away on TDY for almost 6 weeks. He sounded a bit upset at not being contacted during this period, so I dashed out to his Hollywood home to explain what had happened and set him at ease.

2. It was plain to see that the trip had changed him. He is now a bit presumptuous, cocky, and know it all James Bond. He told me all sorts of wild stories about being tailed in Madrid "by 7 or 8 'Chivatos' (Castro agents," and leading them on long "8 or 9 mile hikes through Madrid." Castro agents were also "watching" him on the day he was in Barcelona and on the short layover his Pan Am plane had in Lisbon on his way home. At no time, however, was he molested by these "agents."

3. The Castro surveillance continued -so Sam says- in Hollywood. "About the second night after I got home," c. 14-15 June, a car parked across the street and a little to the rear of his house "after it got dark." When Sam got into his car and went to the gas station, the car -described as looking like a white Volkswagen, without headlights on- followed Sam's car on his short trip in the neighborhood and back to his home. He could not make out the physical description of the driver of the VW. He has never seen this car again.

4. The only other suspicious individual near his home, was "a tall, thin man," (described as about 5-11 to 6 ft and 170 lbs; black hair; no distinguishing features visible; once wearing slacks and white shirt, another time wearing a suit). This individual showed up across the street from his home "just as the sun had gone down, several evenings during the first week that I got home." (c. 14-18 June) The man just walked past the front back and forth a few times and appeared to have his car around the corner of Sam's house. He could not identify the car or anything else about the man.

5. Again, during the first week after his return Sam received several telephone calls where no one would answer when the phone was picked up, or the person calling would say, "sorry, wrong number." Sam has not experienced any other suspicious incidents after the first week home from Spain. I should note that Sam does not talk of these incidents with fear, but ratherin the vein of a paperback detective story.

6. Sam would not admit that he enjoyed himself somewhat in Madrid as a tourist, although he did not deny that he stayed in a luxury hotel, ate as well as drank well, saw the sites and even went to a night club, all on the house. He went so far as to say that if he had "known it was going to be like this, I never would have gone." Yet, in the same breath, he told "William" that he would be back in Spain in September. Of course, Sam would go again if we asked him,

H/Watt to UFHA-2231 SECRET CS COPY 201-735296 "but, only to help my country." (With "Patriots" like Sam, how can we lose.)

7. Sam is most anxious to start some correspondence to "William." He says "William" asked him to send him some photos of Cape Kennedy and some smoked shrimp. Sam wants to know if we want to supply him with photos of the Cape that he can send. Sam states he will write anything we wish. I promised to check out the status of the case with my office and Madrid to see what course of action they deem should be initiated.

8. Modesty not being one of his greatest virtues Sam rambled and rambled about the "secrets" he got out of "William" and passed on to the Madrid c/o. I went along with him and complimented him on a job well done; which is true. But, he was not satisfied with my plaudits, he wanted to know "What Washington said?" To which I said, "everyone, Washington, Madrid and Miami thought you did an excellent job and we are most grateful for your cooperation." He liked that very much; you could see it in the smile on his face. He tries to make it sound like it was a great ordeal and sacrifice on his part to go to Spain to see "William," but he cannot hide his anxiety to get on the next plane to Madrid, and the good life there.

9. I pointed out that "William" is now back in Cuba and there is no indication of when he will return. Nevertheless, Sam feels he should write him "because the letter will be sent to Cuba to him." I assured him that I would get a reading on this matter and have an answer for him sometime next week. At that time, I promised to take him and his close friend Masip to lunch. Sam gave me an extensive and expensive expense account of his trip. I will attempt to decipher it at the close of this report.

10. We ended the meeting on very cordial terms. He was not so mad at not being contacted so much as he is dying to get back on the gravy train, and so much time has passed by without word to or from "William." Sam asked for some way in which he can contact us "right away" if "William" notifies him "that he's ready to jump. You know when he jumps he won't have much time." I pointed out that at present "William" is in Cuba and the prospects of him defecting from Cuba right now are very slim indeed. We would, however, take this into consideration after "William" returns to Spain or another foreign post. We will be seeing each other next week to clear up the accounting (we owe him money, he says) and have lunch.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

201-735296

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

CARL LUNSFORD/cb
WH/COG/OPS
7144, 1819
8 AUGUST 1970

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
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FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

C/WHE | INFO | FILE, VR. C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SDC, DDP, ADDP, C/EURS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 10 20 10 Z AUG 70 CITE DIRECTOR 058060

MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI

REF: DIRECTOR 051625

1. HAS MADRID LEARNED ANYTHING FROM QUTIMID/QUDOZE RE REF (MONEY) CHECK WHICH PERTAINS TO AMMARTINI-1 CASE?

2. HQS CHECKED WITH WOBONE NEW YORK AND WERE ADVISED CHECK REGISTERED TO AMAUTO-1 WITH NO DIFFICULTIES AND POSTED 17 JULY 70. APPEARS STRANGE NOTHING HAS SURFACED CONSIDERING TIME LAPSE UNLESS AMAUTO-1'S MAIL BEING FORWARDED TO HAVANA.

3. FILE: 201-870553 AND 201-788424.

END OF MESSAGE

(WH/COG COMMENT: Informed Madrid that the check for Danilo MENDEZ in the amount of $171.00 was being sent to AMAUTO-1 via New York. Check was balance of $1521.00 which AMMARTINI-1 brought out when he defected.)

AC/WH/COG W. Lunsford

AC/E/IB/S

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

AMAUTO-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL [illegible]-129
RID/AN CA 50
EXT. [illegible] [illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

COPY DETACHED file

I'm not sure #15 was a good idea, though the P.S. cancels it anyway. For the rest, a very good job!

The seed is planted. Will it flower?

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

File.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/IOH/C		5 AUG 1970		
2. Wheeler		6 Aug		
3. Lunsford				CL
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17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST ABSTRACT X INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 21 Jul 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 26417

55024

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCH

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC AMAUTO~~
Details of Meetings between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

<Details of meeting with Subject of 201-735296 in Madrid on 27-7-70>

References: A. MADRID 1261

B. MADRID 1287

(201-866054)

1. Alexander SAMKO arrived in Madrid on 30 May and was met by the undersigned at 1700 hours in his hotel room. SAMKO does not know the true name of the undersigned. He quickly complained of his flight and said never before has he flown on a "cattle plane" and avowed never again to fly Aeronaves de Mexico. PACHANKIS correctly assessed him as a querulous person. The undersigned was mentally prepared for his comments regarding the flight, the bad food served on the plane, and, much later in the week, the hotel room, Madrid in general and, because of the language barrier, his one-plate diet of steak and potatoes. He said his return trip would be through London where he expected to fly the Boeing 747 to New York. SACODER interrupted him and said that we had other plans for him and his only reply was "oh!". Beneath his rough exterior and use of the vernacular, which is indeed spicy, SAMKO is a loveable person who has an infinite number of anecdotes. Although he had no children, he gives the impression of being a good, grandfatherly type who could easily put anyone in a nostalgic mood. After leaving the room we continued the conversation in the hotel bar. SACODER reviewed the cover stories and went through a series of do's and don'ts; i.e., do try to establish a channel between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1; don't hesitate to accept an invitation to visit AMAUTO-1's office, failing all other means to meet with him; do try to invite him out alone to a restaurant for dinner or to a bar for a drink; do accept an invitation to have dinner at his home; don't hint to your sponsorship for this trip. He had no objections to the cover stories, but embellished them to his liking with

MICROFILMED
AUG 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/att, USC, 2 cc [illegible] w/att
2 - C/EUR, wo/att
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, USC

...continued

1 Att

Attachment: Photographs, USC

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26417

DATE
21 July 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

appropriate references to his deceased spouse, the fact that "Julio" was always jealous of AMAUTO-1 and his doctor's orders to take a vacation to relieve his mind of the recent death of his wife. After several rehearsals SAMKO would have convinced anyone of the purpose of his visit to Europe. He did an outstanding job throughout the operation.

2. On the evening of 30 May SAMKO and SACODER dined at an out-door restaurant. We spent another three hours rehearsing his cover story, reviewing the objectives and trying to anticipate questions AMAUTO-1 might ask during their meeting together. SAMKO was given the following objectives:

a. The foremost objective was for SAMKO to renew and improve upon his relationship with AMAUTO-1, to the extent that they would be able to reminisce, over a prolonged period, about the relationship that existed before AMAUTO-1's departure from the United States.

b. To exchange addresses and telephone numbers for the purpose of sending occasional greetings to one another.

c. To invite AMAUTO-1 (and his wife, if necessary) to dinner, at his expense.

d. To ascertain AMAUTO-1's future plans.

e. To assess AMAUTO-1's feelings toward the United States and toward his own government.

f. For SAMKO to talk favorably about the United States using himself as an example,(the son of immigrant parents who made good in business); to emphasize the opportunities available to anyone with imagination, ambition and aggressiveness.

g. If the opportunity presented itself, to show sympathy for the apparent failure of the Cuban Government to reach the 10 million ton sugar goal and to ask whether the non-fulfillment of this goal would adversely affect the economic development of Cuba. It was our hope that sometime during the conversation AMAUTO-1 would volunteer to discuss his country's economic situation which might have opened the conversation to further exploitation by SAMKO.

h. Parallel with objective e. above, SAMKO was instructed to ask (provided an appropriate opening appeared in the conversation) AMAUTO-1 for his personal comments on the Vietnam issue and anti-war demonstrations in the United States and abroad. We were trying to draw out AMAUTO-1's personal analysis of the U.S. position vis-a-vis the war in Vietnam and to compare his statements with the Cuban Government position .

3. Although SAMKO was determined to see AMAUTO-1 even if he had to camp outside AMAUTO-1's home, we reminded him that because of AMAUTO-1's position, he might refuse to see SAMKO in his home, but that SAMKO should not hesitate to

accept any reasonable invitation to be with AMAUTO-1. When SAMKO approached AMAUTO-1's home we had a stroke of luck. First, one of AMAUTO-1's children was in the front yard playing, and two, the door to the driveway was open, thus SAMKO was able to enter the front yard. Under separate cover for C/WHD and COS, Miami we are forwarding photographs taken during the initial meeting between SAMKO and AMAUTO-1. The pictures were taken from the home of one of our staffers. We believe they highlight the events leading to the reunion of these two old friends. The following is a description of each photo:

PHOTO A: SAMKO arrives at AMAUTO-1's home at 1150 hours, 31 May 1970. (Although not shown, KENTLAND and SACODER were monitoring AMAUTO-1's home from 0900 hours on 31 May so that, in the event AMAUTO-1 decided to leave before SAMKO's arrival, we could instruct SAMKO by phone to delay his departure.)

B: After trying to enter via the front gate, SAMKO called to one of the children who was playing in the front yard. The child told him to go to the garage entrance. SAMKO walks toward that entrance.

C: The boy apparently called for someone in the house. A maid, not shown in this photo, but who can be seen in photo L, came out and approached SAMKO. In his halting Spanish, SAMKO said he wanted to see "el Senor". The maid said he wasn't in. He explained to the maid that it was "very importante" to see the Senor. By this time another maid appeared, shown in this photo, and she gets into the act. She repeats that el Senor is not in. SAMKO, sensing he wasn't getting anywhere, changed his tactics and asked to see "la senora". The maids went into individual monologues, but SAMKO could not understand what they were saying. Finally, SAMKO produced a note, which he was asked to prepare, and handed it to the maid in this photo. SAMKO repeated that it was "very importante to see el Senor."

D: The maid accepts the note and returns to the house. Three of AMAUTO-1's children observe the activities from the front entrance.

E: AMAUTO-1 exits, with note in hand and looks toward the driveway. SAMKO spots him and calls out, "Bill, don't you remember me, it's SAMKO." Bill replies, "SAMKO, muy bien, come here, come here." Actually, AMAUTO-1 goes toward SAMKO and they embrace. (The driveway slants toward the house and from our observation post we could not see the embrace.)

F: AMAUTO-1 accompanies SAMKO into the house, arm in arm. As they go SAMKO tells AMAUTO-1 that he put on weight and asked where his boy was. AMAUTO-1 replies that he's rich because all these kids are his (pointing to the three boys).

G: Same as F, above.

H: After a brief talk in the house, the AMAUTOs and SAMKO return to the driveway where they snapped some pictures. AMAUTO-1 is impressed with SAMKO's Polaroid and they exchange comments on their cameras.

I: AMAUTO-1 helps move the baby carriage through the gates. This is his newest and sixth child.

J: Same as I, above.

K: Maid takes baby out for a stroll. This is a new maid.

L: A picture of the new maid. (Might prove helpful for future identification in the event we resume our operation against AMAUTO-1's residence.)

M: AMAUTO-1 prepares to open both gates to remove his new Alfa-Romeo.

N: Same. Notice AMAUTO-1's high forehead. He has lost a considerable amount of hair since his arrival in December 1967.

O: AMAUTO-1's wife enters the picture; also, another one of his sons.

P: SAMKO's still taking pictures. He gave the pictures to AMAUTO-1 to avoid casting any suspicions. (SACODER ran out of film here, but AMAUTO-1 removes his Alfa from the garage. The car still carries Italian license plates. The AMAUTOs, SAMKO and the kids get in the car and leave for the amusement park located at the Casa del Campo.)

4. During the conversation in AMAUTO-1's home, SAMKO began his deliberate softening of AMAUTO-1 with such comments as "you know Bill, Julio was jealous of you because I treated you like a brother. I didn't want you to return to Cuba, but I couldn't stop you. We were all in favor of Castro." Bill admitted here that SAMKO was a good friend and enjoyed his job and the pay was good, but added that "I had to go. I was in the States illegally." SAMKO added "you know, Bill, I never was blessed with any children; you were like a son to me, but when I heard you died in the mountains in Cuba, I blamed myself for letting you go." Bill replied that he was wounded on his left side. SAMKO explained that if AMAUTO-1 was in the States illegally, SAMKO could have arranged for him to remain in the States by getting assistance from some police and detective friends in Florida. SAMKO repeated his delight to again see AMAUTO-1 and how happy he was to know he is alive.

5. Moments after entering the house, AMAUTO-1 invited him to have breakfast. SAMKO refused, but settled for a beer. AMAUTO-1 excused himself, went to the phone and called an unidentified party. SAMKO could not understand the conversation, but SAMKO and Station officers suspect that he called his embassy or one of his colleagues, possibly advising him of SAMKO's presence. (It is also possible that AMAUTO-1

called the embassy to advise the duty officer that he (AMAUTO-1) would be leaving for the Amusement Park. There were no QUTIMID reports supporting this theory.) The fact that the telephone call was made soon after SAMKO's arrival leads us to suspect that the call was made to establish a surveillance of SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 at the park. As noted in references SAMKO was specifically briefed on this possibility and was alerted to report any absence of AMAUTO-1 from the room.

6. We were confident that AMAUTO-1 would be the first to ask the cover questions, but instead his wife asked both questions: What are you doing here? and How did you get our address? SAMKO repeated the cover story and at the end of the second - how did you get our address - AMAUTO-1 said that it was quite possible. (AMAUTO-1's wife remained cool and suspicious throughout the initial confrontation, but later reacted warmly toward SAMKO.) As we noted above, SAMKO embellished the story to his satisfaction. He also shed a few tears when he repeated the story of his wife's death and the doctor's recommendation that he take a vacation. He continued his softening approach of AMAUTO-1 by adding: "Bill, when my wife took ill some years ago, she asked me to divest myself of all business interests, but if you were there with me, Bill, you could have handled my affairs and you might have been a millionaire today." SAMKO sensed that AMAUTO-1 and his wife were moved by this comment and were literally drooling with the thought of being millionaires. The wife asked a number of questions regarding SAMKO's wealth, his real estate activity, collection of silver and his success in general. The wife was astounded with the simple explanation of how SAMKO went about building and financing apartment houses. SAMKO made a suggestion that AMAUTO-1 invest in silver because the scarcity of this metal would eventually raise the market value. He explained to AMAUTO-1 that he was collecting all silver coins stamped prior to 1965. The next couple of hours were spent at the amusement park where, on arrival, AMAUTO-1 steered SAMKO to a cafeteria near the main entrance. In short order two men arrived on the scene, friends of AMAUTO-1. They were introduced to SAMKO, but SAMKO could not remember the names. After a few moments a couple arrived and they, too, were introduced to SAMKO. (SAMKO could not identify the persons he met from the photographs in our mug book.) AMAUTO-1's friends took a number of photographs of SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 and after a short while together, they left. The conversation at the park was aimless. They discussed the kids and SAMKO repeated how delighted and proud he was to know that one of AMAUTO-1's children was named Alexander - his namesake. AMAUTO-1 had a wide grin while SAMKO was talking about Alexander. He asked AMAUTO-1 about the oldest boy. AMAUTO-1 replied that the oldest was in Havana studying civil engineering. SAMKO suggested to AMAUTO-1 that he should give his children the best education and have them stay away from politics and political courses but concentrate on the professional fields, engineering, law, medicine, etc. AMAUTO-1 admitted that his intention was to keep his children away from a political career. SAMKO said he would send Alexander some commercial slides of Cape Kennedy and other points of interest in Florida.

7. While still at the park SAMKO said he hoped AMAUTO-1 would get an assignment to the United Nations so that AMAUTO-1 would have an opportunity to visit SAMKO in Florida. AMAUTO-1 was thrilled with this idea and SAMKO's offer. SAMKO said his eyes glowed while AMAUTO-1 pondered this possibility. SAMKO talked about his home and the beach nearby, the climate, his new car, etc. SAMKO's comment on AMAUTO-1's reaction was interesting. He said that beneath AMAUTO-1's communist exterior lies the capitalist. Before leaving the park (AMAUTO-1 had to leave for the airport where he had an appointment to see AMECRU-1), SAMKO said, "Bill, if you ever need me, I'll never let you down. You have a good friend who loves you a lot." SAMKO said he noted some emotional change on Bill's face after this comment.

8. SAMKO was met 48 hours after the contact with AMAUTO-1 in the event AMAUTO-1 decided to put a surveillance on SAMKO. No surveillance was noted when SAMKO was picked up, but on entering the car SAMKO suggested that SACODER keep an eye out for a tail. We drove around town for fifteen minutes. Certain that no one was tailing us, we drove to a Station safehouse which has an underground garage. SAMKO was visibly excited and was enjoying the "cloak and dagger" role, but he was nervous. He was highly impressed with the garage entrance to the safehouse and commended us for being so shrewd and security conscious. He wanted to know whose apartment it was and SACODER said that it was his private "pad". His comment was:"you sure live it up well." As PACHANKIS aptly explained in one of his reports, SAMKO's temper does rise. He was highly excited during the meeting because he was asked to leave the hotel room. Since the reservation was made for four days, he was asked to leave. He pleaded with SACODER to do something to keep him in the hotel room or risk losing the opportunity to lunch with AMAUTO-1 because AMAUTO-1 was to call him at the hotel on Saturday, 6 June. SACODER admitted the error but added that there was a simple solution if he could not convince the hotel management to allow him to stay a few more days. SACODER suggested that he should explain to the manager that 1) his laundry had not yet returned and 2) he was expecting an important phone call on Saturday and that there was no way of getting in touch with the caller. Failing this, SACODER offered another simple solution. Since SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 had not yet exchanged addresses, SAMKO could return to the AMAUTO-1 home and give the maid a note advising AMAUTO-1 that he had to change hotels. (SAMKO admitted that he told AMAUTO-1 about the possibility of having to leave the hotel because his reservation ended soon.) SAMKO did not at first accept this logic, but SACODER explained that he (SACODER) could not plead with the hotel management on SAMKO's behalf. This was poor security. SAMKO accepted this and after a glass of scotch and water admitted that the solution was indeed simple, but he was terribly excited at first.

9. Throughout the debriefing SAMKO revealed the following: He was born in Perth Amboy, New Jersey on 2 November 1907 to Polish parents. At the age of 14-15 he worked as a construction hand on a bridge being built in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania. Later, he worked on the construction of the Anhauser Yeast Factory in Oldbridge, New Jersey. He married in 1930. During the hard years, his wife worked in a factory while he roamed the streets looking for employment. In the early 40's he worked for Dupont reportedly on the atomic bomb project, but specifically with U-235. After the war he applied for work with NBC which he thought would be the National Broadcasting Company, but after he filled out his application and was accepted

for employment, he learned that it was the National Buscuit Company. He was a master mechanic. He's an ingenious person and has invented several items on which he has patents. Although the years before, during and after the war were difficult, he had the foresight to put his meager savings in real estate. He moved to Florida in the early 50's, reportedly purchased two apartment buildings, but sold them after a year for a $15,000 loss and made some investments in land near the Cape Kennedy area. He was about to begin a multi-million dollar building project on the land, but the NASA complex was moved to Houston and he therefore cancelled his plans and sold the property. While he is not considered wealthy SAMKO lives quite comfortably in retirement. He has a Lincoln continental in the garage and a home valued at about $50,000. Another of his complaints was the way we controlled his purse strings while in Madrid. We put him in a hotel used by many travel agencies which SACODER thought was comfortable, but SAMKO would have preferred the Hilton. He complained of the fact that he was dipping into his own money and was not happy with the idea of keeping receipts (aside from the hotel bills and the airline ticket, SAMKO probably did not keep any receipts). He was advanced $280 in Madrid which will be T/A'd to Miami. Miami should pick up his full tab and might consider buying him a case of scotch as a token of our appreciation for his accomplishments on the assignment, but PACHANKIS probably has learned that a couple of pats on SAMKO's back is sufficient to reward him.

10. Contact was again made with SAMKO on the eve of his possible luncheon engagement with AMAUTO-1. We again reviewed the objectives and he was given a defensive briefing as suggested by WH/Miami. He was told that PACHANKIS probably would not visit with him for about two weeks after his return and that he should not attempt to get in touch with PACHANKIS. He understood why this was necessary and agreed with the briefing. If a luncheon could be arranged, SAMKO was asked to concentrate on the following: (in addition to the requirements he was given before his first meet with AMAUTO-1)

A. Try to ascertain AMAUTO-1's future, his ambitions, his next possible assignment.

B. If possible engage him in a conversation regarding the United States to get his reaction toward our problems.

C. Build up your successes and reflect on how AMAUTO-1 might have achieved similar goals had he remained in the United States.

D. Be alert for any opening to inject questions relating to the Cuban economy vis-a-vis the failure of the "ten million", but to avoid criticism for this failure, and show sympathy.

11. SAMKO had no difficulty convincing the hotel management that he had to remain in the hotel until Saturday, 6 June. He spoke directly with the manager and told the manager that he was planning to leave on 7 June for Barcelona and would stay at a sister hotel and asked the manager to make reservations for him. The crisis had passed.

12. On the morning of 6 June AMAUTO-1's wife called SAMKO and, in English, said that her husband would pick him up at 1400 hours in front of the hotel. At the appointed hour, AMAUTO-1's official vehicle pulled up in front of the hotel driven by a chauffeur. AMAUTO-1 greeted SAMKO in front of the hotel and after exchanging a few words, they departed for a nearby restaurant. (SAMKO was too preoccupied to make note of the name of the restaurant. We decided against any surveillance during the AMAUTO-1/SAMKO meeting to avoid alerting AMAUTO-1 and/or his staff that the SAMKO visit to Madrid was pre-planned.)

13. At lunch SAMKO and AMAUTO-1 again reminisced. They discussed the following:

A. In one of his references, AMAUTO-1 said that men like him are needed in Cuba and noted that he would probably die fighting for Cuba which is young and aggressive, but that some day it will be a great country; that he has been fighting all his life to relieve the oppressed and repeated that he will die fighting. (It is interesting to note SAMKO's reaction here to AMAUTO-1's statement. When SAMKO first visited AMAUTO-1 on 31 May, he was certain that under the facade of being a devoted revolutionary AMAUTO-1 was indeed a capitalist at heart, but at this meeting SAMKO modified his comment by adding that it appears AMAUTO-1 is truly a communist, who maintains strong convictions of the righteousness of the revolution. The above comments by AMAUTO-1 produced the peg on which SAMKO could have questioned the veracity of AMAUTO-1's statement on freeing the oppressed, but he was not specifically instructed to maintain a polemic argument on the rights and wrongs of the revolution because we felt this objective was secondary to the re-establishment of a relationship between these two old friends. A future meeting might include the exchange of an objective appraisal of the revolution as seen by SAMKO.)

B. AMAUTO-1 proposed that SAMKO act as an intermediary for the sale of Cuban sea food in the United States. He explained that the Cubans have a large fishing fleet in the Canary Islands. The fish caught is processed in the Canary Islands and can be shipped to the United States as a product of Spain, not of Cuba. AMAUTO-1 added, "SAMKO, you're like a father to me, please think about it (the agency)? AMAUTO-1 explained that SAMKO could earn about $200,000 a year in commission based on sales of $2,000,000. SAMKO said he would think about it, but privately to SACODER he said that he had no intention to disturb his retirement with a fishy business.

C. SAMKO gave AMAUTO-1 a new Kennedy half-dollar which delighted AMAUTO-1.

D. SAMKO told AMAUTO-1 that he expected AMAUTO-1 to be bigger than just an ambassador to Spain. He said, "I want you to get to the United Nations." SAMKO repeated his desire to show AMAUTO-1 his Florida home and spend a few days at the beach with him. AMAUTO-1 again was visibly moved with this idea.

E. SAMKO restated that "Bill, you have a good friend, don't forget it. You are like a son."

F. They exchanged addresses. SAMKO had printed his address, but AMAUTO-1 asked him to write it on another piece of paper. AMAUTO-1 reasoned that he wanted it written to understand it better, but we believe he will use the sample to compare it with letters SAMKO might send in the future. They promised to write to each other. SAMKO was given AMAUTO-1's private address, not that of the embassy.

G. AMAUTO-1 regretted that SAMKO had to leave so soon because he would have enjoyed showing SAMKO the Spanish interior. SAMKO said he might consider returning near the end of 1970, but AMAUTO-1 did not say whether he would be in Spain in late 1970.

H. AMAUTO-1 said he was suspicious when he first saw SAMKO noting that the nature and importance of his position make him act suspicious, but the suspicion soon dissipated - so he said.

14. On saying their last goodbyes at the hotel, both men embraced and again promised to keep in touch through correspondence. At this point the operation was over. SAMKO was met late that evening. He was taken to a new safehouse.

15. Accomplishments: We feel the objectives programmed and rehearsed were successfully fulfilled, perhaps far greater than our own expectations. Unless we are misjudging the shrewdness of AMAUTO-1 through our own naivete, we believe the relationship was sincerely re-established and a channel opened for future use by AMAUTO-1 should he desire to use this channel other than to maintain a friendly correspondence. It was unfortunate that his Barcelona trip interfered possibly to the point of SAMKO having one or two additional meetings with AMAUTO-1 nonetheless, in the six plus hours together, SAMKO admirably fulfilled our requirements and courageously maintained the fiction of his visit to Spain. We believe too, that although AMAUTO-1 appears to be solidly in favor of the Cuban regime, he did not criticize the United States which we feel he might have done had he suspected that SAMKO's visit to Madrid was sponsored by the U.S. Government. AMAUTO-1 has come a long way since his internship as a butcher in the United States and

probably realizes that while he retains a prodigious role in the Cuban Government, he will continue to give his loyalty and devotion to the regime. At the same time, we feel, AMAUTO-1 is an opportunist and might take advantage of the SAMKO channel should the current regime come to an end or his own position jeopardized by the vengeful attitude of his colleagues.

15. We would appreciate PACHANKIS doing the following:

A. Purchase a dozen or so slides of Cape Kennedy and rocket launchings which will be sent to AMAUTO-1's son, Alexander. SAMKO should prepare a letter to AMAUTO-1 as soon as the purchase is made extending his appreciation to AMAUTO-1 for spending his valuable time with SAMKO and repeating his desire to help in any way possible and not to hesitate doing so.

16. We again would like to extend to SAMKO our appreciation for his support and full cooperation. Also, our thanks to Miami and PACHANKIS for their fine support.

Howard R. SACODER

P.S. AMAUTO-1 was recalled on 30 June 1970 and his future is uncertain at this time; therefore, we suggest that SAMKO not mail any letters or send any slides to AMAUTO-1 in Madrid.

201-735296

29

201-7552

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OSMA - 26417, 21 JULY 1970

TO: CHIEF, WHD

FROM: COS, MADRID

CS COPY

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Came in Cuba separately

S/c att to OSMA-26417

SECRET

4



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
RECALLED TO HAVANA ON 30 JUNE

201-821698
MADR-01639
16 JUL 70
OSM -10090

UFA

R 7007311560

FILE IN 201-235296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

R1519/7114
15 JULY 1970

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
28 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

c/WH3 FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

16 21 04Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051625

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI

REF: MADRID 1509 (IN 114492)

1. ACCORDING OUR CALCULATION, TOTAL VALUE OF THREE CURRENCIES REPORTED MADRID 1529 (IN 101645) IS $1521. CHECK SENT FROM COLOGNE ($1350) LEAVES BALANCE OF $171.

2. CHECK IN AMOUNT $171 DRAWN ON MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, NEW YORK, MADE PAYABLE TO DANILO MENDEZ FERNANDEZ, BEING SENT FROM NEW YORK ON 16TH. LETTER IS REGISTERED TO GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, CUBAN EMBASSY, MADRID. DE LA NUEZ AT HOTEL BILTMORE NEW YORK NAMED ON ENVELOPE AS SENDER. SINCE RUIZ NOT IN MADRID ASSUME SOMEONE ELSE AUTHORIZED ACCEPT CERTIFIED LETTER.

3. PLS ADVISE IF YOU LEARN LETTER RECEIVED.

4. FILE: 201-870553.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: To enforce story that DE LA NUEZ out of Spain Station suggested remaining sum of $175.00 be sent to MENDEZ Fernandez from New York.

AC/WH/COG

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

E/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FILE: AMMARTINI

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

35

WH 8 RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

576

S E C R E T 161551Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID (MADR 1645) 16 JUL 70 124103

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 1639 (IN 124057)

1. REFERENCE REPORTED ARRIVAL 15 JULY NARCISO MARTIN MORA DIAZ (210-301123), REPLACING GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296), AND ROBERTO MULET DEL VALLE (201-821693), POSSIBLY REPLACING ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821007).

2. IN VIEW CLOSE ASSOCIATION BARREDA WITH RUIZ, MUST CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THAT HE WAS DGI STATION CHIEF MADRID INSTEAD OF ARISTIDES DIAZ ROVIROSA (201-791154). MULET ASSIGNMENT, THEREFORE, MERITS PARTICULAR STUDY AS POSSIBLE NEW DGI CHIEF.

3. REQUEST FULL TRACES MORA AND MULET, INCLUDING AMOT.

4. FILE 201-301123, 201-821693. CP-1

SECRET

201-301123

File: 201-735296
16 Jul 70

FORM [illegible] USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

10 SECRET (When Filled In)

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

DISSEM BY DDP PER

ACTION C/WH 8 FILE, VR C/RI/SD C/EUR5 C/CI C/EI2 C/SB5 DDP ADDP

713

S E C R E T 241212Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1440

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI MADR 24 JUN 70 IN 110110

1P

RYBAT TYPIC GUDOZE

1. GUDOZE REPORTS 18 JUNE FOLLOWING CUBAN AMBASSADORIAL ITEMS:

AF Bn

PS

WH/COP

A. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735295) AND WIFE GOING HAVANA 20 OR 21 JULY FOR GENERAL MINREX MEETING CHIEFS OF MISSION LATTER HALF JULY.

B. PERSON CURRENTLY CHIEF OF SECRETARIAT FOR CARLOS CHAIN SOLER GOING TO WARSAW AS AMBASSADOR.

C. OTHER AMBASSADORS IN MADRID THAT DATE AWAITING 23 JUNE FLIGHT TO HAVANA INCLUDED RAUL VALDES VIVO (201-?) ALIPIO ZORRILLA MAZORRA (201-812116), AND CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA (201-814891).

MICROFILMED
AUG 10 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

D. SOME DISCUSSION HELD BETWEEN RUIZ, WIFE AND ABOVE VISITORS CONCERNING WHO WILL BE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO. IN DOUBT WHETHER WILL BE CHAIN SOLDIER SON-IN-LAW OR POSSIBLY SON-IN-LAW AMMARTINI-1 (201-870443). (CANNOT CLARIFY SINCE PARTICIPANTS EQUALLY VAGUE.)

2. FILE 201S AS NOTED. GP-1

24 June 70

SECRET

B-201-812116
B-201-814891
B-201-870443

CS COPY

201-735296

SECRET

OSMA - 26416, 16 July 70
QUPOD 36
Report No. 344 17 June 1970

Ruiz dictates to Nilda: "The Cuban Embassy greets the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has the pleasure to request the corresponding permission to carry a pistol, "Star" 9 m.m. short, No. 50.234, which at the present time is being held in the offices of the "Star" factory, in the Plaza de España, for ________________ ______________, whose photograph is attached."

File: AMMUG-1 201

Ruiz is talking with a Cuban who is in Madrid on a scholarship.

They are talking of bringing a teacher from Cuba and Ruiz says that this would be very difficult. He says that instruction is given by professors, but education is given by the parents, and what the children will be depends on this education. Ruiz says that his father made him a communist. Of all the children, he was the only one that studied, but it was his father that formed them all. From the time he was a small child his father gave him books of Lenin to read. These books arrived clandestinely to Cuba. He remarks about problems his own children have given him. He refers to an incident where one of the children was invited to a First Communion, and speaks of the freedom he gave the child to make his First Communion also, if he wanted to.

Then Ruiz says that his other son "ALEJANDRO, is inclined to remain in Spain, and he is willing to let him if this is what the boy wants. He says that these things have to come from one's own self, and if they are opposed in these actions it can leave marks on them for the rest of their lives. Ruiz says he gives them the liberty to choose.

Ruiz tells this student with whom he is conversing that Alejandro DE LA NUEZ has gone to the United States, and adds that De La Nuez' wife never came to meetings or reunions that were held at the embassy. She always gave as an excuse that her nerves were bad. Ruiz says that De La Nuez took the money with him.

This comrade(F) left at 12:15. He said goodbye to her very cordially. Apparently around the 29th of the month she is going to Paris.

Later Ruiz entered the office again and put the radio on very loud. He didn't leave the office all morning, but the radio continued to play very loud; so much so that you can hardly tell when anyone goes in or out of the office.

Report 345 18 June 1970

Apparently they have received a document in which all the Chiefs of Mission have been called to Cuba for the third week of July, as some of them can make it coincide with their leave. He tells Curbelo that he intends to send Nilda either before or after he leaves.

File:
AMMUG-1
201

SECRET

Report 351(continued)
royalties from the song throughout the world, which have been calculated at between $750,000 and $1,000,000, and although this amount will have to be divided among many things, something would fall to them.

Ruiz says to work abroad they have to or should send people of the greatest trust, otherwise it is better that they remain in Cuba. If there isn't complete confidence it is a constant struggle with the capitalistic life, money, the stores, the easy life. They mention De la Nuoz, and Ruiz says if he's gone he's gone, but the interesting thing would be to know what motivated him; his wife, his son, or money. He says that it has caused a great impression here, and that no one even imagined such a thing. Only two days before he had been in the study circle with all of them.

A girl that is in this meeting with Ruiz says that De la Nuez' daughter is married to Juan Antonio GARCIA, who is Head of Government..., that he has been proposed for ambassador(Ruiz says that they will now have to reconsider this), and what they all three agree on is that De la Nuoz was not to blame,

Ruiz mentions the letter from De la Nuoz' son in which he says that his father has betrayed them. They also mention an ambassador who has left(for Cuba-?) and took watches as gifts to everyone in the Ministry. Ruiz thinks that some of them will remain here in Spain as they have a great deal going for them there.

Report No.352 26 June 1970

Ruiz' is very displeased. He speaks to Horacio about how badly some of the comrades speak of him when they return to Havana. He asks him if he remembers the name of one of these comrades that spoke badly of him last summer when he was there on vacation. It was someone named COLON and another one that soon left. After what COLON said they wrote him a letter calling his attention to the criticism. Ruiz is very worried about his re-call to Havana. He tells Horacio that he doesn't think it is about his work, and Horacio says they are doing things there th at are super-human, that without the necessary means at hand they are resolving difficult problem of various kinds. Ruiz mentions contacts that he has had in Spain with different people, and he never has committed an error, and has always handled everything with great tact and in favor of his government, even when he has had to deal with Falangists.

Ruiz says that he is very sensitive and that things have got to the point that he can't just let them go by, things they are accusing him of in Havana. But, there is no one that has the courage to tell him directly to his face so that he could justify himself, and if they are things that he cannot handle then for them to call him back, and relieve him of the post because "Comandante Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them, but the thing is

Report No.352(continued)
that the Minister doesn't want to receive him or listen to him when he goes there. Horacio says that the worst of it is that here in Spain there is always some personality from there that they have to entertain, someone important, and that the attention they need is continual, and sometimes it is necessary to attend to the people here in Spain, which prevents them from attending those who arrive from there, but they don't understand this.

He continues to talk with Horacio and he is indignant. Ruiz says that he has been in the Revolution since he was twenty years old, when he began to think for himself. He says that he belongs to no party, none other, that is, but the Cuban communist party. He says that the situation is becoming so uncomfortable regarding him, and he doesn't like it at all. He says he puts everything he has an all the care possible into doing his job.

Ruiz says that one never knows about these things in Havana, and that it is possible that he won't be returning. In the event that this should happen, he is going to leave Horacio officially in charge, so that he will represent him during his abscence.as Charge'de Affairs, and if he returns he will notify the Spanish government officially. He wants samples or models of the passports to take with him, and then he tells Horacio that if he has not returned by the 18th of July, that he should represent him at the official reception. He gives Horacio instructions as to what to wear, what the official ceremonies are and just what they consist of.

Report No.354 30 June 1970
Ruiz speaks to someone that calls and gives him a message which annoys Ruiz. Someone has called the Provincial Department of Public Health of Santander saying that they (the Cubans) use "boric acid" in the stoves(?) which they export. They give him this message in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba, they have a Latin-American accent, and say that they would take adequate measures so that no stove would be shipped.

Ruiz says to Horacio that he doesn't have time to take care of this matter, and for him to accompany Franco and go to the General Department of Security and make charges about the telephone call which is interfering with the trade between Cuba and Spain. He says to go right up as far as the General Director if necessary, not explaining the "boric acid" one way or another, but simply as to the malicious call which was made in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba. This can cause a delay of six or eight days in the departure of a ship while this call is being explained in Public Health.

4-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID
[illegible] FI-109
RID/[illegible] [illegible] 50
[illegible] [illegible] GT-7

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	Sule	1970		5
2. Lunsford				CL
3.				
4. Manor		27 July		
5.				
6. Wheeler		18 Aug.		
7. Brown				
8.				
9. RID/AN/CARC		19 AUG 1970		CW
10.				
11. RID/EDI				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

6-7: This is now quite academic, but with the approach by SAUKO under his belt, & this bolt from Havana in his face, we may yet see some action from this broken love affair. Less than this has driven men into us. He surely needs an approach by a staffer.

MICROFILMED
AUG 31 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

PLS X-REF [redacted] TO 201-016156
AND 201-821007

CW

3

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735376

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
15 Jul 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 26409

FORM 7-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

55016

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami
Chief, Europe Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: TYPIC/QUDOZE
Guillermo RUIZ Perez' Recall to Havana

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AUG 31 1970

References: A. MADRID 1466
B. MADRID 1457

(201-821089)

1. Relative to Subject's recall to Havana, which came via a telephone call on 24 June (probably from MINREX) bidding him and Orestes BARREDA Perez to return, QUDOZE has recorded Subject's reaction to the unexplained call as follows:

recalled to Havana

(201-016136)

A. on 26 June Subject ~~talked at length with~~ Horacio FUENTES Martinez speculating on Havana's possible motives for requesting his return at this time, when in a matter of a few weeks he was scheduled to travel to Cuba for the 26 of July celebrations which he expected to combine with his vacation leave. He was extremely upset and complained bitterly about companeros who have tried to discredit him in Havana. He wondered if Havana was going to put him on the carpet for charges brought against him by these companeros. He recalled one COLON (he was not sure of the name) who last summer made false accusations against him, for which he received a letter of reprimand from Havana.

Subject 201-735296 re calling recall to Havana

B. Subject also wondered if Havana could have any complaints about his work. He had always maintained good relations with the Spaniards and despite their contrary political idiology, he was careful not to ruffle their feathers while upholding his government's position at all times. He could not

(continued)

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
65-6-44/3	OSMA 26409	15 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

imagine that Havana would question him on that score. However, if there were problems that Havana felt he lacked the ability to resolve, he should simply be removed "because Comandanto Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them." Subject said he had been a revolutionary since the ago of 20 when he began to think for himself. He had never bolonged to any political party other than the Cuban Communist. The current state of affairs, however, was becoming too disturbing and distasteful to him because conscientiously he knew that he was putting forth his full mental and physical capacity toward the fulfillment of his function.

C. Subject told Fuentes that since he didn't know what was brewing in Havana it was possible that he might not return to Madrid. In any event he would designate Fuentes to substitute for him as charge d'affaires. During the entire conversation no mention was made of Orestes BARREDA Perez and why he was asked to return with RUIZ. The latter seemed to be thoroughly absorbed in his own concern over whatever fate lay in store for him on his return to Cuba.

for Philip C. Kenhurst
Helen B. NOTHDURFT

201-735-246

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6 CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 321

S E C R E T 141535Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID MADR 1621

14 JUL 70 122500

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. QUSECRET-1 (QUDOZE MONITOR) REPORTS 14 JULY THAT COMPLETE CLEANING UNDERWAY IN CUBAN EMBASSY, ALL STAFF PATICIPATING, IN PREPARATION FOR ARRIVAL 15 JULY OF VIP FROM HAVANA. FURTHERMORE, THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS BELONGING TO FAMILY GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) WERE PACKED, INCLUDING ALL OF RUIZ'S PERSONAL BOOKS FROM OFFICE. DEFINITE IMPRESSION IS THAT RUIZ WILL NOT RETURN.

2. STATION MONITORING QUDOZE/QUTIMID AND AIRPORT TO DETERMINE FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING NEW ARRIVAL AND OTHER CHANGES.

3. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN
~~AB~~
LH
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WH/C/RR

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14 Jul 70
201-735296

SECRET
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-339505
MADR-01604
13 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
GOING HAVANA FROM MADRID 14 JULY

R 7008030136

UFA

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

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ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION NO. 2/6

FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, FI 2

Mcloz

S E C R E T 131619Z JUL 70 CITE MADRID 1604

DIRECTOR INFO WH/IAMI

TYPIC QUTIMID

13 JUL IN 121769

01

1. ALBA GRINAN NUNEZ (201-339505), CUBAN AMBASSADOR LONDON, GOING HAVANA FROM MADRID 14 JULY.

2. ALSO ON SAME FLIGHT WIVES AND CHILDREN GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821007).

3. FILE 201'S MARKED. GP-1

S E C R E T

pmou 70-1

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SECRET
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DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA

C19-009-001
WMIM-08160
07 JUL 70
UFA -00562
P2

OSMOFPOIROELHMM

R 7106070271

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RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA

019-009-001
WMIM-08160
07 JUL 70
UFA -00562
P2

R 7106091029

OSMOFPOIROELHMM

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8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, GUILLERMO	C19-009-001
201-735296	WHIM-08160
SEX M DOB ?	07 JUL 70
	UFA -00562
CIT CUBA	P2
OCC ?	
SLATED TO BE RECALLED TO CUBA	
	R 7007300682
OSMGFPOIRCELHMM	

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6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

DIAZ VIGO, ALBERTO
201-792504
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-815359
PARI-09562
02 JUL 70

R 7007160602

FILE IN 201-792504

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 14 WH/MIAMI 8126 S E C R E T IN 115903, 2 JULY 70

SEARCH - AMANVIL

MINISTRY. HE WAS LATER NAMED FIRST SECRETARY IN NORTH KOREA AFTER BASILIO RODRIGUEZ, FORMER LABOR MINISTER, WAS SENT THERE AS AMBASSADOR. RUMOR IN MINREX IS THAT MULET WAS RECRUITED BY DGI IN NORTH KOREA. ON HIS RETURN, HE DISAPPEARED, FAILING TO COME TO WORK FOR EITHER THE LABOR MINISTRY OR MINREX. HE SUDDENLY REAPPEARED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO TO STUDY JAPANESE IN PREPARATION HIS CURRENT ASSIGNMENT. RUMOR IN MINREX CIRCLES IS THAT HE RECEIVED DGI TRAINING DURING PERIOD HE OUT OF CIRCULATION.

L. EXPANSION OF INFLUENCE IN IBERIAN PENINSULA. SUBJ SAID HE KNEW OF NO DGI PLANS IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID THAT HE KNOWS GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ WELL AND CONSIDERS HIM DGI. (WILL DEBRIEF SUBJ ON RUIZ IN NEW YORK.) SUBJ DOES NOT KNOW RAFAEL FERNANDEZ SARDINAS. SUBJ EXPECTS CUBAN RELATIONS WITH SPAIN TO DETERIORATE BECAUSE CUBA VOTED AGAINST IMPORTANT SPANISH RESOLUTION AT RECENT ILO CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. (BETHOURN UNFORTUNATELY DID NOT GET DETAILS RESOLUTION.) CUBAN DELEGATION HAD GOTTEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM RISQUET

// Extract for AMAUTO-1 201

SECRET

FILE: AMAUTO-1

14-00000

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ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: 7141 R. 1819
DATE: 30 JUNE 1970

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BY 2L PER ____

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CONF: C/WH-8 INFO FILE, VR, C/EUR-5, C/KE/SD, C/CI, C/FI-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 01 22 30z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 047881

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI PARIS

RYBAT TYPIC QUDOZE

REF: OSMA-26240 (NOT SENT PARIS)

WH/C/RR

1. IN REF QUDOZE REPORT NO 314 OF 5 MAY AMAUTO-1 HAS VERY INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO APPARENTLY JUST ARRIVED MADRID FROM CUBA AND PLANNING STUDY IN ALCALA, UNIVERSITY OF SANTANDER, AND LATER IN PARIS.

2. ACCORDING CONVERSATION BETWEEN SUBJECTS, UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN IS PCC MEMBER, PLANS MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID AND WILL POSSIBLY SERVE AS INFORMER/SPOTTER AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. AMAUTO-1 ASKED SUBJECT LEAVE MAILING ADDRESS AND PROMISED FUTURE CONTACT BY "PARTY WOMEN'S FEDERATION." UNFORTUNATELY SUBJECT'S ADDRESS NOT MENTIONED. ADDITIONAL CHECK OF HQS QUDOZE/QUTIMID INFO FAILED MENTION ANY SUBJECT POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH THIS WOMAN.

3. VIEW POSSIBILITY DGI PLANNING USE SUBJECT AS COLLABORATOR WHILE SHE IS ABROAD, HQS WOULD APPRECIATE MADRID ASSISTANCE IN ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HER IDENTITY, RESIDENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND ANY ADDITIONAL INFO FOR ASSESSMENT AS POSSIBLE IN-PLACE RECRUITMENT

CS COPY

1 July 70

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RELEASING OFFICER

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201-735296

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 047881

TO PAGE TWO

TARGET. NO OBJECTION STATION QUERYING LIAISON.

4. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: QUDOZE info on conversation between AMAUTO-1 and unidentified woman who appears fully integrated with Cuban regime and offers collaborate with DGI while studying abroad.

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

for AC/WH/COG
EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 919

S E C R E T 261620Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1478 (MADR)

26 Jun 111882

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE

cit Cuba

1. IVAN R U I Z VECIANA, SON OF GUILLERMO R U I Z PEREZ (201-735296), LEFT FOR HAVANA 24 JUNE WHERE WILL ATTEND SCHOOL.

2. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

COPY

201-735296

26 Jun 70

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

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WH 8 FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

586

25 JUN 70 IN 111523

SECRET 261023Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1466 (MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI UFA

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE travel

REF: MADRID 1457 (IN 110636)

1. ON 25 JUNE CONFIRMED THAT GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ AND ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (TRAVELING HAVANA 30 JUNE) FR-(201-821007)

2. RUIZ STILL IN DOUBT AS TO PURPOSE OF CONSULTATION BUT EXPRESSED WORRIES TO WIFE THAT SOMEONE IN HAVANA MAY BE UNDERCUTTING HIM.

3. CARLOS A. NEIRA GARCIA WHO ARRIVED Madrid 24 JUNE APPARENTLY WAS UNABLE CLARIFY. FR-(201-811811)

4. FILE 201-735296 GP-1

SECRET

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7 JUL 1970

MICROFILMED
JUL 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-735296
26 Jun 70

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 768

S E C R E T 250923Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1457 MADR

25 JUN 70 110636

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO QUDOZE

1. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND ORESTES BARREDA PEREZ (201-821007) GOING TO HAVANA SOON IN RESPONSE TO 24JUNE PHONE CALL FROM MINREX. RUIZ IN DOUBT WHETHER PURPOSE RELATED TO ADVANCED DATE OF JULY CHIEF OF MISSION MEETING OR SPANISH-CUBAN RELATIONS. SPECULATION MADE THAT IT COULD RELATE TO RECENT REQUEST FOR AMBASSADOR TO FINLAND TO TRAVEL HAVANA. RUIZ PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH CARLOS NEIRA GARCIA (201-811811) UPON ARRIVAL MADRID EN ROUTE PARIS ON 24 JUNE.

2. FILE 201 AS INDICATED. GP-1

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JUL 7 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

B201-821007
B201-811811

SECRET

25 Jun 70
201-735296

FORM 1020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 10 SECRET

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8

ACTION NO. 713

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OPS, CA, CA/PEG, CI/ICG, AMAUTO-1 ~~DDP~~ ODP

~~CC AMMARTINI~~

S E C R E T 241212Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1440

24 JUN 70 IN 110110

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC GUDOZE

1. GUDOZE REPORTS 18 JUNE FOLLOWING CUBAN AMBASSADORIAL ITEMS:

A. GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ (201-735296) AND WIFE GOING HAVANA 20 OR 21 JULY FOR GENERAL MINREX MEETING CHIEFS OF MISSION LATTER HALF JULY.

B. PERSON CURRENTLY CHIEF OF SECRETARIAT FOR CARLOS CHAIN SOLER GOING TO WARSAW AS AMBASSADOR.

C. OTHER AMBASSADORS IN MADRID THAT DATE AWAITING 23 JUNE FLIGHT TO HAVANA INCLUDED RAUL VALDES VIVO (201-?) ALIPIO ZORRILLA MAZORRA (201-812116), AND CARLOS ALFARAS VARELA (201-814891).

D. SOME DISCUSSION HELD BETWEEN RUIZ, WIFE AND ABOVE VISITORS CONCERNING WHO WILL BE NEXT AMBASSADOR TO MOROCCO. IN DOUBT WHETHER WILL BE CHAIN SOLDIER SON-IN-LAW OR POSSIBLY SON-IN-LAW AMMARTINI-1 (201-270443). (CANNOT CLARIFY SINCE PARTICIPANTS EQUALLY VAGUE.)

2. FILE 201S AS NOTED. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

M-6803
22 June 1970

SUBJECT: Jules Chopin

At 2200 hrs on the evening of Saturday, 20 June, Jules Chopin entered the Embassy offices as instructed. His face showed the strain of the situation, yet he managed to force a grin. He was taken to a convenient office and for the next 3½ hours was debriefed. While sipping Scotch throughout the evening he managed to control some of his natural fears of the present and future.

In all fairness, he must be commended for answering our questions in a straightforward, sincere manner. While not every question--from the various interested parties--was put to him, the majority were. In some cases, he was given requirements for the next meeting, and in addition, he offered several worthwhile reports.

Apart from the business aspects of the meeting, there were two dominating themes running throughout: His passionate pleas for the personal safety of his family in the US and my stand that after his conduct on 12-13 February 1970, he had to prove his worth and good faith; not to me, but to the powers that be, who were highly distrustful of his intentions.

Specifically, the following matters were discussed:

1. Asked if he knew what the DGI was, Chopin was confused, but understood when I said "DSE" or "G-2". In his circle, the intel people are known as "Seguridad del Estado" or "G-2". He denies that he has ever worked for them wittingly. He doubts that he has ever worked for them unwittingly, because he has never had more than a passing working relation with them. Chopin states that he has never known officially who the intel personnel are, "but after awhile, you can hear and see things that leave no doubt." Asked to identify those persons who he feels are intel and their hierarchy, Chopin stated:

A. In early 1969, Armando LOPEZ, appeared to be Chief of Intel and DIAZ Vigo, the number two man.

B. When Orlando CASTRO defected in c. March 1969, LOPEZ was immediately recalled to Havana and has not been heard from since. DIAZ Vigo assumed head of intel, and Havana sent Emidio VALDES Martinez as a replacement. With VALDES, came his wife Magda (Magdalena ESPINOSA Vivar) who went to work as DIAZ Vigo's secretary. Chopin considers her to be an intel agent as well.

C. In c. late February or early March 1970, Diaz Vigo was recalled to Havana. He has not been heard from again and there is

DIAZ

W/W Cctl #1 To CFPA 92830 SECRET 201-815359 talk that he will not return.

D. Magir has taken over the control of the Consular Section and appears to be directing the functions that DIAZ Vigo had. No one has been appointed to take DIAZ Vigo's post.

E. The only other prominent suspect of being a full fledged intel type is Hildo ALVAREZ Valdes, who came to Paris about 2 years ago with the cover position of chauffeur. ALVAREZ' true role was made evident shortly after he arrived in Paris when an unwitting functionary of the Cuban Embassy gave ALVAREZ a routine chauffeur's assignment. Whereupon ALVAREZ turned to the individual and said, "I didn't come here to be a chauffeur." ALVAREZ has never functioned prominently as a chauffeur, "and they had to change his status after a while, because he couldn't fool anyone in that role."

F. Chopin denies that he knows anything of their manner of operations; who their contacts or agents are; and, in a word, the inner workings of the intel apparatus.

G. Chopin acknowledges that many Latin Americans visit the Embassy, "but they go upstairs to the Consulate," and he does not know their identities, nor the exact purpose of their visits. His lone contact with Latin American types are when they enter his section asking for propaganda material. In those cases, Chopin directs them to help themselves from the racks of Cuban publications available.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, European Division Chief of Station, WH/Miami		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Madrid PCL		MICROFILM

SUBJECT RYBAT TYPIC
Guillermo RUIZ Perez(201-735296) and Danilo MENDEZ Fernandez (201-788424)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At Christmas 1969, after turning down other invitations, AMMARTINI-1 and his wife accepted an invitation to dinner at the home of Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) and his wife Nilda. Another couple was present, Danilo MENDEZ Fernandez (201-788424) and his wife Lydia. Ruiz impressed the AMMARTINI couple as intelligent and muy fino. He talked very favorably of the U.S., especially New York City for which he had great admiration. "Americans are very bad", he said, "but they have very good things." "Jose, let's go to New York", he said at one point, causing MENDEZ, a good revolutionary, some discomfort. He never had trouble in the five years he spent in the States, Ruiz said at another point in the conversation.

2. Mendez is a "great apple polisher", according to the AMMARTINI couple, and he was hard put to know what to say when the "Ambassador", his boss (indirectly) spoke so favorably of the U.S. AMMARTINI-1's wife, on the other hand, said that Lydia Mendez was having a somewhat similar problem with Nilda Ruiz. The latter was expecting again at the time and after five boys, Lydia suggested that she (Nilda) probably wished for a girl. "Not at all", said Nilda. "I don't want a daughter of mine to go into agricultural work at fourteen years of age", she exclaimed setting Lydia back. AMMARTINI-1 pointed out that the Ruiz couple has a 14 year-old son in Cuba -- a "hostage" while they are abroad. They might be willing to defect, according to AMMARTINI-1, if it weren't for leaving the boy in Cuba.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

CS Copy filed in 201-870553

File in 201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA - 26343	19 June 1970
201-788424	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-870443 201-735296

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	RYBAT/SECRET SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA - 26343

3. Incidentally, AMMARTINI-1 said that he was surprised to learn that Ruiz had been Vico-minister of Foreign Trade before coming to Spain. Ruiz himself mentioned it casually one day.

Reginald N. FLOREGA

RYBAT/SECRET

201-735296

14-00000

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

Action changed
to Nicaraguan
Desk per Ennis

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RF/AN CI/OPS, CI, FI2

ACTION NO. 134

S E C R E T 181136Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1389

HNM HRS UFH MADR HM 18 Jun 70 IN 106027

DIRECTOR INFO MANAGUA, SAN JOSE, WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC QUT/MID

1. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ MAIRENA, NICARAGUAN, CALLED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 25 OR 26 APRIL REQUESTING PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH AMAUTO-1 FOR WHOM HE BROUGHT TWO LETTERS. SAID HAD BEEN DEPORTED FROM COSTA RICA WHERE JAILED FOR "POLITICAL REASONS". WAS REFUSED ASYLUM BY MEXICO AND LEFT SAN JOSE FOR MADRID ON 24 OR 25 APRIL. IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER OF "FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL SANDINISTA" WHO SPENT 14 MONTHS IN CUBA, DEPARTING CUBA ON 9 JANUARY 1969. ATTACHE (AND DGI OFFICER) JOSE DIAZ PUGA WHO ANSWERED PHONE TOLD RODRIGUEZ TO CALL EMBASSY FOLLOWING MORNING FOR INTERVIEW WITH AMAUTO-1.

201

cit Nica

request interview with subject
of 201-735296
trace request

2. NO STATION TRACES. LIAISON BEING QUERIED. PLEASE SEND TRACES.

3. FILE DEFER. GP-1

S E C R E T

WH
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WH/C/PP

MICROFILMED
JUL 6 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-735296
[illegible]
18 Jun 70

CS COPY

SECRET

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	WH/C/OPS/WARREN	2 Aug	
2	BROWN (p.16)	"	
3	WH/C/RR		
4	WH/C/PP		
5	WH/C/SW		
6	FOLEY, p.48		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

1. COPIES MADE FOR AMMAULO-1 AND AMMARTINI-1 FILE.

2. WE DIDN'T KNOW AMMAULO-1 WAS WORRIED ABOUT HIS RECALL. HE APPEARED QUITE UPSET, ~~THIS~~ COULD HAVE BEEN [illegible] THE RIGHT TIME FOR A DIRECT RECRUITMENT PITCH.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/C/OPS/ LUNSFORD	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

2554.

Report No. 344 — 17 June 1970

Ruiz dictates to Nilda: "The Cuban Embassy greets the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has the pleasure to request the corresponding permission to carry a pistol, "Star" 9 m.m. short, No. 50. 234, which at the present time is being held in the offices of the "Star" factory, in the Plaza de España, for ____________, whose photograph is attached." ____________

Ruiz is talking with a Cuban who is in Madrid on a scholarship.

Tch
Annou 10
201

They are talking of bringing a teacher from Cuba and Ruiz says that this would be very difficult. He says that instruction is given by professors, but education is given by the parents, and what the children will be depends on this education. Ruiz says that his father made him a communist. Of all the children, he was the only one that studied, but it was his father that formed them all. From the time he was a small child his father gave him books of Lenin to read. These books arrived clandestinely to Cuba. He remarks about problems his own children have given him. He refers to an incident where one of the children was invited to a First Communion, and speaks of the freedom he gave the child to make his First Communion also, if he wanted to.

Then Ruiz says that his other son "ALEJANDRO, is inclined to remain in Spain, and he is willing to let him if this is what the boy wants. He says that these things have to come from one's own self, and if they are opposed in these actions it can leave marks on them for the rest of their lives. Ruiz says he gives them the liberty to choose.

Ruiz told this student with whom he is conversing that Alejandro DE LA NUEZ has gone to the United States, and adds that De La Nuez' wife never came to meetings or reunions that were held at the embassy. She always gave as an excuse that her nerves were bad. Ruiz says that De La Nuez took the money with him.

This comrade (F) left at 12:15. He said goodbye to her very cordially. Apparently around the 29th of the month she is going to Paris.

Later Ruiz entered the office again and put the radio on very loud. He didn't leave the office all morning, but the radio continued to play very loud; so much so that you can hardly tell when anyone goes in or out of the office.

Report 345 — 18 June 1970

Apparently they have received a document in which all the Chiefs of Mission have been called to Cuba for the third week of July, as some of them can make it coincide with their leave. He tells Curbelo that he intends to send Nilda either before or after he leaves.

Report No.345(continued) 18 June 1970

Ruiz and Nilda are alone and are talking about when they can leave Spain. Ruiz wants here to go on Iberia, but Nilda says she doesn't want to go separately. If he goes on Cubana she will go with him. Nilda speaks of the 18th of July fiesta, and says that the Minister has been so nice to him that he shouldn't miss this Spanish holiday. They then discuss leaving for Havana on the 20th or 21st of July.

We had better follow this one closely, because it should by [illegible]-1's son-in law

Report No. 345

18 June 1970

Nilda speaks to Ruiz about someone that spoke to her, that wants to stay in Madrid for a few days, but they don't have any money, (Possibly it is ALFARA) and they have asked her if they can stay at her house. It seems that the people she is talking about are on their way to Cuba, and they say, if they don't have the money to stay in Madrid, then let them go directly to Cuba. Nilda says that CHAIN's son-in-law is going to Morocco as Cuban ambassador. The one that he had as his secretary. When Alfara was in Madrid he said that the son-in-law had neither the personality nor the qualifications for the position. Ruiz says that if they are referring to the head of Chain's office, that he is going to Poland as ambassador, but Nilda insists that it is the husband of Chain's daughter.

Two comrades arrive, a man and a woman. They are going to Holland, where they will spend a week, and they want a visa. They will go to other European countries also, and will be a month and a half altogether. (It seems that it is only the woman that is going to Holland and the other countries). Ruiz asks her if it is her first trip to Europe. She says it is her first trip to Western Europe, but that she has already been in the socialist countries of Europe. Ruiz asks them what Havana thought about De la Nuez. Ruiz says it isn't worth having an argument or quarrel with the "gallego" because of De la Nuez. Ruiz believes that the whole affair was handled by the C.I.A.

Ruiz asks them who has been named ambassador to Morocco, and they confirm the fact that the husband of his daughter (CHAIN-?) has been appointed.

They return to the topic of De la Nuez. Ruiz says the only thing they know is that he has gone, but they don't know where. In any case, most likely they had family or friends among the refugees in Miami.

Ruiz asks the girl if there are new people in the Ministry there (Havana-?), if new ones are coming in. She says that her enterprise has 71 employees, and that 55 of them are outside of the enterprise, that the personnel situation is very bad. Two days ago they started giving language classes in French and German, and they talked with RAUL and he believes it is very necessary, because it is very difficult to find people. In addition to their being of trust, what is difficult is their lack of culture.

I should think this could make good CA press play

Again they discuss De la Nuez' case and his wife. They tell Ruiz not to be too discouraged because it is the first time that anything like this happened to him here. Ruiz tells them about the illness of the woman, and that she never wanted to come to the meetings, but on the other hand went to meetings and gatherings of commercial people and others. He was never suspicious of him. Two days before he had been in the study Center with all of them. Ruiz says that it had been six months since they

Report No.345(continued)
proposed getting a substitute for De La Nuez, but only because of his administrative inefficiency, and for no other reason. If Ruiz had suspected anything he would have put him on a plane and sent him back there.

A person from the Feria in Barcelona comes into the office. He has some business to do with Horacio here in Madrid. They hope that Raul LEON will arrive on Thursday, as they have many things to work out together regarding the Chamber of Commerce in Madrid. He speaks about "Cubaexport" and a problem that they have with the brand name. He says it would be better to postpone the process and continue exporting meanwhile to the Canary Islands, until it is all settled. He has visited the Chamber of Commerce in Barcelona. He has eaten and had supper with some of the people from there. He mentions GUERRERO y Garabon, to whom he and ROVIRA have given an explanation: First, the problem that exists with the Cuban Chamber of Commerce can be resolved by a simple diplomatic gesture, Second, the individual that has an interest in it, it is up to him Third, the problem can be solved by establishing another Chamber of Commerce in Madrid. This however, would involve spending and would not be worth it to them economically.

FOLEY

ROVIRA told him that he wanted to go to California. He wants to be close to Cuba and learn the future development of the Cuban production.

Nilda says that they have received a call from Paris telling them that VALDES VIVO left there and will arrive in Madrid at 2:45 PM. Ruiz asks if they sent the cable to Moscow. Nilda says that they have, but that no one answered the cable. They have received only one cable from Moscow saying that he was coming. Then they sent another cable back asking on what Flight, and on what day, but they have had no answer.

Report No.346
Two people enter Ruiz' office. One of them is called "ZORRILLA"(ph). They are discussing De La Nuez. Zorrilla says he has been very hurt by it all, not only politically, but personally also. He says that he always felt that De La Nuez was a person one could trust, and that he has failed them. Ruiz says that here everyone trusted him.

Report No.346(continued)
They continue to talk about De La Nuez, particularly the visitors. Ruiz says that after this they are going to have to strengthen the cadres, that it is important for everyone. He says he has spoken to [illegible]. MANUEL CASTRESANA (phon), and they have agreed to form new very strict cadres.

The visitors leave and on saying goodbye Ruiz says not to discuss the De La Nuez affair too much so that it won't spread any further. Besides, they are all very impressed by it.

VALDES VIVO CALLS RUIZ on the telephone. Ruiz asks him if he has arrived at the hotel and if he has seen MARISI (phon). (MARISI is staying at the same hotel as Valdes). Ruiz says that Zorrilla has just been there, and he has given him the telephone number of the hotel for him to call. He says they have had no word on the Cubana flight, only that it is to arrive today and will leave tonight. But, Ruiz says if it arrives at 3 o'clock that this will not give them time to inspect it and all to leave, even though they will do it all at night. Both Valdes and Marisi are leaving this evening on Cubana.

Ruiz then speaks with Marisi, and says that he had heard of his appointment as ambassador. Apparently this is the one that is to be in Morocco. They say that this ambassador, in all the capitals that he is going to, is visited by the best doctors. Ruiz tells them that he has a luncheon engagement but that he will keep in touch regarding the flight.

Report No.348
The ambassador that has just arrived from Beirut enter the office. He was at the movies last night and they comment on it. Then two other persons come in, one of them is Zorrilla. They speak of various things; that by diplomatic mail they should only send things of a confidential nature, everything else should go by diplomatic pouch.

MERCEDES enters and says that Comrade Armando VELAZQUEZ, whom Ruiz does not know, is here. He is the father of the Cuban consul in Jamaica. He says he has been here 15 days waiting for something to be resolved. He adds that a Rosa Maria of the Ministry was supposed to resolve this problem, but she hasn't done so. He doesn't want to borrow money here, and BARREDA has already given him 1000 pesetas. He wants them to send a cable to Havana to resolve his situation. Mercedes says that this consul studied in the University with Barreda and that he is a very fine person.

Report No.348 (continued)

They tell Ruiz that the person that is here is ALARCON; he hasn't seen him, nor has he received any cable about his arrival.

Then the ambassador asks Ruiz if they carry pistols here. Ruiz shows him one with five chambers, with which he can shoot without taking it out of his pocket. He says they won't kidnap him, and that one has to be prepared for there are 10,000 gusanos here.

Ruiz tells the ambassador to consult with ROA and tell him that he has received a cable telling him to be in Havana the second week of July, but that the National Day in Spain is on the 18th. He says that he doesn't want to miss this celebration, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to their fiesta, and he would have to explain about the reunion in Havana and all that, and they could think something else. So that he is thinking of staying even if he has to leave the very next day on the 19th.

Report No.349

Some comrades arrive. It appears to be the Alfaras. Mercedes calls Iberia and confirms reservations for the afternoon flight to Havana, #941, in the names of Carlos Alfara and Berta Fernandez. She asks what time they should be in the airport in order to leave on the six o'clock flight. They tell her they should be there an hour before flight time.

Ruiz begins to dictate the following to Nilda, in a very low voice: "To enlarge further on the report dated 7 of the current month regarding my meeting with the Minister of Labor, Sr.LICINIO DE LA FUENTE, in relation to the request of theNational Institute of Fishing and the Ministry of Basic Industries for contracting Spanish technicians, we wish to inform you that today we received a telephone call from the Executive Officer to the Ministry of Labor. He informed us that our request for Spanish technicians is still being considered, but that the Minister of Labor and the Spanish government wishes to communicate officially to my Government, their official displeasure with the position adopted by the Cuban representation in the last meeting of the O.I.T.(I.L.O) regarding a proposition that interferes in the internal affairs of Spain. Unfortunately the Minister of Labor had confirmed that the request of our representative in Geneva contradicted the efforts that were being made at high levels of our countries for the betterment of our relations, and the cooperation, and for the brotherhood that should exist between two peoples of the same blood.

My total lack of knowledge of what took place in the I.L.O. with regard to Spain, and the position taken by our delegation, precludes me from answering with accuracy, limiting myself only to saying that I would pass on the words of the Minister and that an explanation of the problem would be given.

Report No.349(continued)
On the other hand, on this same date I received word from our Consul in Barcelona advising that he has observed a minimum of interest in the industrial circles with which we trade. This would make it appear that a problem exists at a high level between the Government of Cuba and the Government of Spain, which is holding back trade with our country. Specifically, some industrialists have advised our representative that the Ministry of Commerce has spread the word that until certain talks are held between the two governments authorization of permission of import with destination Cuba have been suspended.

We are attempting to confirm this today and learn if there exists some relation with what we have been advised by the Ministry of Labor.

We would appreciate it greatly if you would, as soon as possible, inform us what the position of our Government was in the meeting of the I.L.O. in Geneva. — [illegible] please!

Dear ROA: I beg you to see that this confidential [note] gets to our President, to the Minister of Basic Industries and to the President of the Fishing Institute.

Ruiz tells Horacio that he should tell MARIÑAS that "we are willing to change our passports, and to give us blank models of both the diplomatic and regular passports in order to study them and compare them with those used by other countries.

Report No. 350 — 24 June 1970

Ruiz asks PACHECO if they have reserved tickets for him and BARREDA, who have been called from Havana by telephone. The tickets are to be reserved for the two of them only, not for the wives, neither Mercedes nor Nilda.

Ruiz says that NEIRA is to arrive today on his way to Paris, and they will see what he has to say about this (the call from Havana) They don't know if the call from Havana is for the ambassadors meeting which will be held now, or only for the two of them to discuss something related to Spain. Pacheco says that that is maybe why the ambassador of Helsinki asked for reservations yesterday.

JM

FOLEY
Suspicious Cubana crews!

Ruiz continues to talk with the new person that has arrived. He says that he has had to go to the Hotel Conde Duque to visit the crew of Cubana, who have never once come to the embassy, although sometimes some of them are here for a week; they don't attend the study circles, the meetings, nor anything. They havee complained about Ruiz because sometimes they have learned of receptions that have taken place and they haven't been invited. Ruiz says that if at these receptions they invited industrial and commercial people, or even cultural people, they would get nothing done here. When they give a reception it is because of work, to maintain contacts, find things out, and not for any other purpose. They have nothing to do there, and he is not going to invite them to just come and eat and drink When they have to spend some pesetas they do it, but for questions of work. Nevertheless they have the obligation to maintain contacts. Ruiz has sometimes met these people on the street, especially the air-stewardesses, with some "pick-up", and although all the people they are friendly with are very nice people, they should know who these people are.

Ruiz then explains to this new comrade the problem of the location of the embassy. He tells him that they are building a new embassy and all the services will be together. There will also be some community rooms, such as a library, a recreation room, a dining room with a bar, that they will all have a chance to see, but this is going to take probably a year. It will be on Avenida de la Havana. Meanwhile they are putting up with this place because they only pay $50.00 for it, and Havana finds its a gift. If they were paying $500, by now they wouldn't be here; they would have found some other place. They have the place rented since 1936, and even though they have spent more than a thousand (or one hundred thousand) in fixing it, it is still an old house.

With this new arrival he talks about the children, and the problems they have with the schools. They have to find schools where they don't teach religion nor politics.

Report No.350 (continued)   24 June 1970

It seems that they would like to bring a professor from Havana, so that the children could study the same revolutionary methods as there, but Ruiz sees this as a very difficult thing to do. Because, one would not solve the situation of the different grades and ages, and they are not going to send four or five because they are needed there. He sees it as a better possibility to hire Spanish professors among the young capable people, with revolutionary leanings and who are simpathetic toward Cubans, and have them teach the methods, and from books that are brought from there. In this way they could have many professors or teachers for the various ages, and they could rent and furnish an apartment for this purpose.

Apparently Ruiz has no problems with the school his children attend. The Director of the school is a friend of theirs and visits the embassy. Her husband is a communist. The children that attend the school have the same political leanings as their parents. Neither religion nor politics are taught. Ruiz says that the two older ones eat at the school, but the little ones don't as they need help. Ruiz pays over $100 for 4. The person who is with him has two children and pays $100 for the two.

The children of this new comrade that is talking to Ruiz arrive day after tomorrow. He has a little girl 11 years old and the other one is nine. Ruiz is advising the comrade to send his children to the same school where his children go. The name of the school is "ESPINO" or "EL PINO", in the Calle Serrano. He says he will be glad to speak to the Director. They have sports, and music, and the children can have lunch at the school.

Report No.351   25 June 1970

He is talking with Mercedes, and they enter the office and continue the conversation. They are speaking in confidential voices, because Mercedes normally talks very loud, they are now talking in very low voices. Mercedes is trying to console him, saying that his work is very difficult and little understood. Ruiz says that they are"throwing him the bait." He is very depressed.

Tomorrow he has an appointment with Quiroga publishing company, who have had a meeting with DAVID PAX(phon) about the rights of the song "Guantanamera.", which was acknowledged in London by an American firm, and it's author as being the Cuban Jose FERNANDEZ Diaz, at a reunion that was held there. In the United States alone there are rights (or royalties) of over $50,000. They are trying to establish definite authorship for this Cuban, so that he will be able to collect some of the

Report 351(continued)
royalties from the song throughout the world, which have been calculated at between $750,000 and $1,000,000, and although this amount will have to be divided among many things, something would fall to them.

Ruiz says to work abroad they have to or should send people of the greatest trust, otherwise it is better that they remain in Cuba. If there isn't complete confidence it is a constant struggle with the capitalistic life, money, the stores, the easy life. They mention De la Nuez, and Ruiz says if he's gone he's gone, but the interesting thing would be to know what motivated him; his wife, his son, or money. He says that it has caused a great impression here, and that no one even imagined such a thing. Only two days before he had been in the study circle with all of them.

A girl that is in this meeting with Ruiz says that De la Nuez' daughter is married to Juan Antonio GARCIA, who is Head of Government..., that he has been proposed for ambassador(Ruiz says that they will now have to reconsider this), and what they all three agree on is that De la Nuez was not to blame,

Ruiz mentions the letter from De la Nuez' son in which he says that his father has betrayed them. They also mention an ambassador who has left(for Cuba-?) and took watches as gifts to everyone in the Ministry. Ruiz thinks that some of them will remain here in Spain as they have a great deal going for them there.

Report No.352 26 June 1970

Ruiz' is very displeased. He speaks to Horacio about how badly some of the comrades speak of him when they return to Havana. He asks him if he remembers the name of one of these comrades that spoke badly of him last summer when he was there on vacation. It was someone named COLON and another one that soon left. After what COLON said they wrote him a letter calling his attention to the criticism. Ruiz is very worried about his re-call to Havana. He tells Horacio that he doesn't think it is about his work, and Horacio says they are doing things there that are super-human, that without the necessary means at hand they are resolving difficult problem of various kinds. Ruiz mentions contacts that he has had in Spain with different people, and he never has committed an error, and has always handled everything with great tact and in favor of his government, even when he has had to deal with Falangists.

Ruiz says that he is very sensitive and that things have got to the point that he can't just let them go by, things they are accusing him of in Havana. But, there is no one that has the courage to tell him directly to his face so that he could justify himself, and if they are things that he cannot handle then for them to call him back, and relieve him of the post because "Comandante Guillermo Ruiz cannot resolve them, but the thing is

Report No.352(continued)
that the Minister doesn't want to receive him or listen to him when he goes there. Horacio says that the worst of it is that here in Spain there is always some personality from there that they have to entertain, someone important, and that the attention they need is continual, and sometimes it is necessary to attend to the people here in Spain, which prevents them from attending those who arrive from there, but they don't understand this.

He continues to talk with Horacio and he is indignant. Ruiz says that he has been in the Revolution since he was twenty years old, when he began to think for himself. He says that he belongs to no party, none other, that is, but the Cuban communist party. He says that the situation is becoming so uncomfortable regarding him, and he doesn't like it at all. He says he puts everything he has and all the care possible into doing his job.

Ruiz says that one never knows about these things in Havana, and that it is possible that he won't be returning. In the event that this should happen, he is going to leave Horacio officially in charge, so that he will represent him during his abscence.as Charge'de Affairs, and if he returns he will notify the Spanish government officially. He wants samples or models of the passports to take with him, and then he tells Horacio that if he has not returned by the 18th of July, that he should represent him at the official reception. He gives Horacio instructions as to what to wear, what the official ceremonies are and just what they consist of.

Report No.354 30 June 1970
Ruiz speaks to someone that calls and gives him a message which annoys Ruiz. Someone has called the Provincial Department of Public Health of Santander saying that they (the Cubans) use "boric acid" in the stoves(?) which they export. They give him this message in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba, they have a Latin-American accent, and say that they would take adequate measures so that no stove would be shipped.

Ruiz says to Horacio that he doesn't have time to take care of this matter, and for him to accompany Franco and go to the General Department of Security and make charges about the telephone call which is interfering with the trade between Cuba and Spain. He says to go right up as far as the General Director if necessary, not explaining the "boric acid" one way or another, but simply as to the malicious call which was made in the name of the Commercial Office of Cuba. This can cause a delay of six or eight days in the departure of a ship while this call is being explained in Public Health.

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S E C R E T 151731Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1364

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMECRU AMSOUR

15 J[illegible] 103797
dl

REF: MADRID 1237 (IN 94220)

1. NAMES AMECRU-1 AND WIFE LISTED ON MANIFEST IBERIA FLIGHT 10 JUNE BUT MARKED "NOT ABOARD". NEXT FLIGHT 17 JUNE.

2. INCIDENTALLY, CUDOZE REPORTED 13 JUNE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND MANUEL FALCON FROM UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH MINISTRY (PRESUMABLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS) IN WHICH AMAUTO-1 SAID WHEN HE SAW AMECRU-1 IN BARCELONA LATTER HAD MENTIONED HIGH ESTEEM FALCON HOLDS FOR AMAUTO-1. BOTH AGREED TO INVITE AMECRU-1 TO LUNCH MADRID UPON HIS RETURN. NO TRACES FALCON.

3. FILE 201-261863; X-REF 201-325364. GP-1

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ACTION NO. 758

SECRET 130955Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1350

13 JUN IN 102856

T

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT TYPIC AMMARTINI QUDOZE

REF: MADRID 1312 (IN 100475)

1. ON 12 JUNE GILLERMO RUIZ DICTATED REPORT FO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF AMMARTINI-1. AMONG OTHER THINGS, REPORT SAID FOLLOWING: SUBJ DEMONSTRATED HE INCAPABLE HANDLING JOB; HAD NO KNOWLEDGE FOREIGN TRADE. CESETA OFFICIALS SO INFORMED AND ORESTES RUIZ OF CESETA HAD ADMITTED THESE FACTS. FRANCISCO LEON HAD BEEN CHOSEN REPLACE SUBJ. NO EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL DEVIATION, HOWEVER, EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION HAD SPENT TOO MUCH ON CLOTHES FOR CELEBRATION OF FIESTA NACIONAL. HIS WIFE DID NOT ATTEND WOMENS FEDERATION MEETINGS AND WAS NOT NORMAL. SUBJ WAS SUPERFICIAL WITH HIS SUPPLIERS. WHAT IS MORE, HE DRANK IN EXCESS. AFTER LEARNING SUBJ'S "TRAICION" ANALYSIS SHOWED HE HAD PLANNED THE ACT IN ADVACE: ITEMS WERE THAT ONE OF HIS CHILDREN LEFT COUNTRY; HIS WIFE HAD REMARKED THAT SHE HAD DONE MUCH FOR REVOLUTION, NOW REVOLUTION OWED HER SOMETHING; AND SUBJ'S DISTANCE (OR STRANGENESS) WITH RESPECT TO HIS NEPHEW, ORLANDO DE LA NUEZ. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF

FILE: Ampalo-1

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1350 SECRET

HIS DISAPPEARANCE WAS 9 JUNE. HAD BEEN CALLS TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE THAT SUBJ WAS VISITING OTHER CITIES ON BUSINESS. SUBJ DID NOT APPEAR AT WORK 8 JUNE. RICARDO ESPINO TALKED TO "PORTERO" AT SUBJ'S HOME BUT LATTER HAD NOT SEEN HIM LEAVE. WHEN FUNCTIONARIES OF COMMERCIAL MISSION AND EMBASSY ENTERED HOUSE, NOTHING THERE. ALSO CESETA MONEY BOX, CONTENTS UNKNOWN, MISSING. HAVE BEGUN PROCESS TO NOTIFY SPANISH AUTHORITIES OF DISAPPEARANCE. RUIZ' WIFE SAID THAT SUBJ'S DAUGHTER ALSO OUTSIDE CUBA REPRESENTING SOMETHING. RUIZ LATER TOLD HORACIO FUENTES THAT SUBJ HAD TAKEN OFFICE FUNDS AND WAS PROBABLY IN MIAMI OR NEW YORK. HE BLAMED SUBJ'S WIFE. (SOURCE: QUDOZE).

2. A-1 AND WIFE NOT AWARE DAUGHTER OUT OF CUBA. CUBAN OFFICIALS PROBABLY MISTAKEN ON THIS ITEM.

3. FILE 201-870443. GP-1

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ACTION NO. 164

SECRET 081452Z JUN 70 CITE MADRID 1287 MADR 8 Jun [illegible]335

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1261 (IN 096017)

3P

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR MEETING BETWEEN SAMKO/AMAUTO-1.

A. SAMKO PICKED UP BY AMAUTO-1 IN CHAUFFEUR DRIVEN EMBASSY MERCEDES.

B. WHEN DISCUSSING FUTURE PLANS, AMAUTO-1 SAID WILL RETURN CUBA TO FIGHT FOR JUST CAUSE. THAT HE WILL PROBABLY DIE FIGHTING FOR CUBA WHICH IS YOUNG AGGRESSIVE COUNTRY, BUT NOT PRESS THIS THEME NOR SPEAK ADVERSELY OF UNITED STATES. SAMKO DID NOT CHALLENGE STATEMENT, BUT ADDED THAT HOPES SOMEDAY AMAUTO-1 ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS THUS WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY VISIT SAMKO IN FLORIDA. AMAUTO-1 VISIBLY DELIGHTED WITH POSSIBILITY.

C. THEY EXCHANGED ADDRESSES AND AMAUTO-1 URGED SAMKO WRITE. SAMKO HAD PRINTED OUT HIS NAME, ADDRESS

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PAGE 2 MADRID 1287 SECRET

AND PHONE NUMBER, BUT AMAUTO-1 ASKED HIM TO WRITE IT OUT "UNDERSTAND IT BETTER" BUT SAMKO AND STATION BELIEVE AMAUTO-1 WILL USE SAMPLE TO COMPARE WITH LETTERS SAMKO MIGHT SEND IN FUTURE.

D. AMAUTO-1 REGRETTED THAT SAMKO HAD TO LEAVE SO SOON BECAUSE WOULD HAVE ENJOYED SHOWING SAMKO SPANISH INTERIOR. SAMKO SAID HE MIGHT CONSIDER RETURNING NEAR END OF YEAR, BUT AMAUTO-1 DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE WOULD B

E IN SPAIN AT THAT TIME.

E. AMAUTO-1ADMITTED THAT HE WAS SUSPICIOUS ON SEEING SAMKO FOR FIRST TIME ON 31 MAY BUT CONCERN SOON DISSIPATED. SAID NATURE AND IMPORTANCE HIS POSITION MAKES HIM SUSPICIOUS.

F. REQUESTED SAMKO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY IN U.S. FOR SALE CUBAN FISH PRODUCTS TRANSPORTED FROM CANARY ISLANDS AND MARKED "PRODUCT OF SPAIN". SAID SAMKO STANDS TO EARN $100,000 YEARLY. SAMKO SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER OFFER.

2. SAMKO DEPARTED MADRID 7 JUNE [illegible] BARCELONA WHERE HE WILL GET DIRECT FLIGHT TO NEW YORK. EXPECTS [illegible]URN

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PAGE 3 MADRID 1287 S E C R E T

MIAMI 10JUNE. SAMKO GIVEN DEFENSIVE BRIEFING. WILL EXPECT NO PERSONAL CONTACT FOR AT LEAST ONE WEEK AFTER RETURN.

3. STATION BELIEVES SAMKO CARRIED OUT MISSION IN EXCELLENT MANNER AND FEEL THAT BASIC OBJECTIVES SUCCESSFULLY FULFILLED.

4. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

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WH 8 FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

885

S E C R E T 041354Z JUN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7776 WMIM

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

4 JUN 096798

01

REFS: A. MADRID 1261 (4096017)

B. DIRECTOR 039497

1. ONLY CONCERN WE HAVE IS SECURITY OF SAMKO DURING TRIP BACK TO MIAMI. WOULD APPRECIATE DEFENSIVE BRIEFING BY MADRID OF SAMKO. IT MAY BE THAT HE APPEARS VERY INTERESTING TO CUBANS AS AGENT POTENTIAL IN STATES. OUR COMPLIMENTS ALSO TO SAMKO AND STATION.

2. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

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201-735296

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863

SECRET 041228Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID 1267 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 039497

4 JUN 70 IN 096572

1. SACODER PHOTOGRAPHED SAMKO'S ARRIVAL AT AMAUTO-1 HOME AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN FRONT YARD. PHOTOS HIGHLIGHT ACTIVITIES LEADING TO SAMKO'S ENTRY INTO HOUSE.

2. INTEND SHOW MUG BOOK TO SAMKO AT NEXT MEETING. OPINION HERE IS THAT AMAUTO-1 PROBABLY WANTED COVER HIMSELF WITH OWN STAFF AND POSSIBLY TO LAY ON SURVEILLANCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SAMKO WAS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST HIM.

3. AMAUTO-1 DEPARTURE PLANS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO PERMIT HIM TRAVEL TO BARCELONA FOR OPENING TRADE FAIR 3 JUNE AND ALSO TO BE PRESENT AT FAIR FOR "CUBA DAY" SCHEDULED FOR 10 JUNE. AMAUTO-1 REPORTEDLY TO RETURN MADRID FROM BARCELONA ON EVENING 5 JUNE.

4. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

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201-735296

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RIG: CARL LUNSFORD/cb
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SECRET 03 22 36 z JUN 70 CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MADRID INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI 039497

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1261 (IN 096017)

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JUN 23 1970
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1. REF CABLE MOST INTERESTING. OUR COMPLIMENTS TO SAMKO AND STATION FOR JOB WELL DONE.

2. AGREE EVENTS MENTIONED PARA 1 F PUZZLING AND HQS WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FOLLOW-UP STATION CAN OBTAIN THROUGH QUTIMID/QUDOZE. SINCE SAMKO WAS INTRODUCED TO OTHER COMRADES BY AMAUTO-1, LATTER PROBABLY PREPARED CONTACT REPORT. POSSIBLY QUTIMID/QUDOZE MAY INDICATE HIS TRUE FEELINGS TOWARD SAMKO OR REVEAL ANY SUSPICIONS OF SAMKO VISIT.

3. HQS ALSO INTERESTED CLARIFICATION OF PHOTOS WHICH STATION POUCHING. DID SAMKO IDENTIFY SUBJECTS FROM STATION MUGBOOK, OBTAIN NAMES, ETC., OR WAS HE PROVIDED COPIES OF PHOTOS WHICH TAKEN AT CAFETERIA? JUDGING FROM REF, AMAUTOS' HAVE CHANGED ORIGINAL DEPARTURE PLANS WHICH ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 31 MAY. ADVISE.

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(CONTINUED...)

3 Jun 70
201-735296

B-201-866054

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CITE DIRECTOR 039497

TO

4. FILE: 201-735296 and 201-866054.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: Reported highlights of Alexander SAMKO operational contact with AMAUTO-1 on 31 May. SAMKO warmly received by AMAUTO but latter's wife appeared suspicious. Later meeting scheduled for 6 June.

R/E/IB/S Louis Rosso

C/WH/COG W.

C/WH/FI

JOHN L. HART
C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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INFO FILE, VR, EUAN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 772

SECRET 031645Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID 1261 (GOPARD ACTING)

MADR

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

3 Jun 70 IN 096017

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: WH/MIAMI 7703 (IN 091445)

3P

1. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS SAMKO/MAUTO-1 FOUR-HOUR MEETING 31 MAY.

A. WIFE AMAUTO-1 WAS FIRST TO RAISE COVER QUESTIONS BUT SAMKO DID SUPERB JOB WITH ANSWERS. WIFE WAS COLD AND SUSPICIOUS THROUGHOUT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS, BUT LATER WARMED UP TO POINT EXCHANGING ABRAZOS ON DEPARTURE.

B. SAMKO BELIEVES RELATIONSHIP FIRMLY RE-ESTABLISHED AND AMAUTO-1 DESIRES EXCHANGE OF ADDRESSES FOR PURPOSE MAINTAIN CONTACT.

C. AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE ACCEPTED DINNER FOR SATURDAY, 6 JUNE.

D. AMAUTO-1 AND WIFE VISIBLY MOVED WHEN SAMKO ASKED DISCUSS HIS BUSINESS SUCCESSES AND THEY ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF HIS BUSINESS.

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PAGE 2 MADRID 1261 SECRET

D. POLITICS AVOIDED PER OUR INSTRUCTIONS.

E. SAMKO TURNED ON CHARM DURING CONVERSATIONS AND FED AMAUTO-1'S EGO WITH COMMENTS ON HOW HE WISHED AMAUTO-1 REMAINED IN MIAMI TO HANDLE HIS AFFAIRS. THAT HE COULD HAVE BEEN MILLIONAIRE TODAY; EXPLAINED THAT WAS NEVER BLESSED WITH CHILDREN BUT AMAUTO-1 WAS LIKE SON. HAD BLAMED HIMSELF FOR ALLOWING AMAUTO-1 RETURN TO CUBA TO GET KILLED BUT WAS PLEASED WHEN HEARD HE WAS WELL. PARTING COMMENT BY SAMKO WAS "IF YOU EVER NEED ME BILL, I'LL NEVER LET YOU DOWN. YOU HAVE A GOOD FRIEND WHO LOVES YOU A LOT."

F. SAMKO AND STATION DISTURBED BY POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE. MOMENTS AFTER ENTERING AMAUTO-1'S HOUSE AMAUTO-1 MADE PHONE CALL. SAMKO WAS BRIEFED THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. ONE HOUR LATER AT AMUSEMENT PARK AMAUTO-1 STEERED SAMKO TO CAFETERIA WHERE MOMENTS LATER FOUR CUBANS, PRESUMABLY FRINEDS OF AMAUTO-1, WERE INTRODUCED TO SAMKO. CUBANS TOOK NUMBER OF PICTURES. SEEMS INCONSISTENT WITH GOOD SECURITY PRACTICE, BUT EVENT OF SOME CONCERN TO STATION. FORTUNATELY, NO CONTACT WAS

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PLANNED WITH SAMKO FOR 48 HOURS AFTER HIS MEET WITH AMAUTO-1. NO SURVEILLANCE NOTED WHEN SAMKO CONTACTED BY STATION, EVENING 2 JUNE. SAMKO IN HIGH SPIRITS AND ENJOYS ROLE. RAPPORT GOOD. WILL POUCH PHOTOS AND DETAILS.

2. STATION PLANS BRIEF CONTACT WITH SAMKO BEFORE HIS NEXT MEET WITH AMAUTO-1. HE WILL ATTEMPT DRAW OUT AMAUTO-1'S FUTURE PLANS. IF ADDEES HAVE COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS PLS FORWARD ASAP.

3. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-366054. GP-1

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2-3: There is backtraffic on her. She is of poss ops interest to Madrid. Better put her in a shadow.

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JUN 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C	Brown	15 JUN 1970		
2. Wheeler				DW
3. Lunsford				cL
4.				
5.				
6.				
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9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
03 Jun 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 26265

54872

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami: COS, Lisbon

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC QUTIMID
Aida Rosa CORREA Felipe de ECHEVARRIA

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MADRID 1230

re contact with subject & 201-235296

1. QUTIMID periodically has reported contact between Subject and Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister in Madrid, mostly over the telephone but also indicating that he has seen her personally. It would appear that he has taken unusually strong interest in her, considering the number of other more demanding tasks he claims to have. Until now, we have not been able to identify either Subject or her relationship with RUIZ.

2. On 28 May QUDOZE (a sensitive joint audio penetration with liaison) reported the following memorandum (presumably to Havana) on Subject as dictated by RUIZ:

> "Sr. RUIZ Ojeda. Some months ago we received a ciphered cable dealing with Aida Rosa CORREA Felipe asking that we contact her to determine her situation. At that time we informed you that said Aida Rosa CORREA, married to Pedro ECHEVARRIA, Portuguese citizen who was in Cuba during 1959-1968, intended to return to our country, abandoning her husband because of his alcoholism.
>
> "Approximately one week ago the brother of Aida Rosa CORREA - Luis CORREA Felipe - passed through Madrid en route to France on a special mission. He spoke with her at the Airport about definitely returning in order to see that her 12-year-old son might be educated in Cuba.,

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS, WH/Miami
- 2 - COS, Lisbon

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-65-2-10/9

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26265

DATE
3 June 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-235296
Ø65-6-44/3

Today we interviewed Aida Rosa CORREA and her son, who at all times has maintained a positive attitude toward this Embassy concerning her return. We have let her know that given the circumstances of her presence in Spain - not as a 'gusano' but as the wife of a foreign doctor who has worked in our country - we saw no difficulty to prevent her from returning, especially taking into account the fact that she expressed herself as a revolutionary, but that first we had to receive official permission.

"In our opinion, because the situation in which she finds herself in Spain because of marriage to a foreigner, her return can be authorized, based on what has expired."

Philip C. KENTLAND

201-735296

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL EX-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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2.				
3. Purke		11		JB
4. Ennis		11 June		
5. Wheeler				✓
6. ~~Ray Frazier~~ Irish		~~30 June~~	28 OCT 1970	
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15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

AMOT Study on SPAIN
- good results

~~we'll need photos for these~~
- please send photos to AMOTS

MICROFILMED
JUN 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Input - see me if you have any problems

P.S. MADE CARDS ALL THOSE AND [illegible] IN THE DGI [illegible] NETWORK IN SPAIN.

IA COMPUTER PROCESSED

43280

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 01 Jun 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 02047/01

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

UFAA-26477/01

OTA 9228

~~MAY 19 1970~~

1 Jun 70

SECRET

Name: Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

DPOB: 10 February 1930, Havana Municipal District, Havana Province

Occupation: Minister, Cuban Charge d' affaires in Spain. From August 1964 until late 1967, he was Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MINCEX). From 1 August 1963 until mid-1964, he was Cuban Commercial Counsellor in Mexico. From 1959 until 1962, he was an official of the Ministry of Treasury, having appeared in 1961 and 1962 as Director of Economy Financing of the Ministry of Treasury. It has also been reported that he was a G-2 member (member of the Department of State Security (DSE)) in 1961 and 1962. It has been reported that he had been working at the Ministry of Treasury since prior to 1959, that is, under the Batista regime. So far, we have not been able to confirm this information.

Date of arrival at post: Exact date unknown. We believe that he has been holding his present position since at least 18 November 1967.

Physical description: White, approximately 5'7" tall, about 180 pounds of weight (it has been reported that he has a stout build), light-colored eyes (blue or green), blond hair (somewhat wavy and combed back), round face. Has no visible identification marks.

Parents:
- a. Jose Antonio RUIZ (the matronymic is probably Armas)
- b. Nieves PEREZ Entrialgo.

Spouse: Nilda VECIANA Lopez, (R [illegible]) born between 1934 and 1942, place of birth unknown. White, approximately 5'5" tall, 135 pounds of weight, blond or light brown hair, green eyes. She is a schoolteacher. PCC, FMC and CDR member.

Children:
- a. Guillermo RUIZ Veciana
- b. Ivan RUIZ Veciana
- c. Julio G. RUIZ Veciana
- d. Alejandro RUIZ Veciana
- e. Juan C. RUIZ Veciana

Already in [illegible]

Siblings:
- a. Jose Antonio RUIZ Perez
- b. Osvaldo RUIZ Perez

SECRET

201-735296

0TA2223

Political affiliations and attitude: It has been reported that Subject is a member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) and a staunch sympathizer of the Cuban regime. There is information to the effect that in 1958, Subject was in exile in Mexico and was a member of the Triple A Organization led by Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. It has also been reported that during the struggle against BATISTA (1957-1958), Subject belonged to action and sabotage groups in Havana and was charged with placing bombs and other devices. Source does not know exactly what activities Subject carried out as a member of action and sabotage groups, but believes that he had to leave for Mexico in 1958 on account of his activities.

Intelligence connections: RUIZ has been reported as a member of the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI). It has been reported that in 1961 and 1962 he was a G-2 (DSE) member at the Ministry of Treasury, where he worked.

Travels: He traveled to Mexico (from mid-1963 until mid-1964, he was Cuban Commercial Counsellor in Mexico). Spain, where he has been since late 1967 as Cuban Charge d' affaires. (It was reported that on 27 July 1968, he arrived in Paris, from Madrid. We do not know the reasons for that trip).

Access: a. Rolando CARDOSO Perez (A18 239 674). Arrived in the U.S. on 10 October 1968 from Madrid, Spain. He knows Subject because he and Subject are cousins (Subject's mother and Rolando's mother are sisters). When Rolando arrived in the U.S., he said he was going to reside at 940 SW 11th Avenue, Miami, Florida, telephone number 377-3877. We have not been able to locate him because we were told at this address that Rolando had left for another state and that his present address was unknown to them). Rolando saw Subject for the last time at the Barajas Airport, Madrid, Spain, on 10 October 1968, when Rolando was going to take the plane which brought him to the U.S. According to Rolando, they greeted each other on that occasion. Rolando said he had seen Subject at this same airport in early or mid-1968 and that they had talked for approximately five minutes. On this opportunity, Subject was at the airport waiting for the arrival of a group of Cuban diplomats.

b. Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez (A18 780 716). Arrived in the U.S. on 20 February 1970 by way of the Refugee Airlift. He knows Subject because he and Subject are cousins (Subject's mother and Manuel's mother are sisters). Manuel saw Subject for the last time in 1963, at the home of Subject's mother, where they happened to meet. According to Manuel, he and Subject only said hello to each other. When Manuel arrived

OTA-[illegible]

[illegible] 19 1970

in the U.S., he reported his address as 4000 NW Fourth Street, Miami, Florida, telephone number 445-7193, home of a lady named Mercedes BORGES Dobarros. Manuel also stated that he would later leave for 433 West 49th Street, New York, N.Y., home of Antonio GOMEZ Lemus. Manuel told I-122 that he and his friend, Jorge BORGES Dobarros, were homosexuals and had been living together since approximately 1963. (Jorge BORGES Dobarros arrived in Miami aboard the same Refugee Airlift flight as Manuel. He is a brother of Mercedes BORGES Dobarros, and he and Manuel went to live in Mercedes' house when they arrived in Miami).

We believe that Manuel cannot be used in an approach to Subject because they have not maintained relations for a long period of years. In addition, Subject might know Manuel' weakness (homosexualism) and might take advantage of this knowledge to blackmail Manuel. Manuel also told I-122 that he had received psychiatric treatment in Havana.

Assessment: Subject's present position; the positions, all of them important, which he has held before; and the fact that he has been reported as a DGI officer, lead us to believe that we do not have many possibilities of success in an attempt to recruit or defect Subject. The fact that Subject's father has been a militant Communist since prior to 1959 and that Subject's wife has been reported as a supporter of the regime should not be forgotten.

Subject's revolutionary background during the struggle against BATISTA seems to indicate that he is in favor of acts of terrorism. This gave him knowledge and experience in matters related to subversive activities and/or intelligence activities which he could use later.

Therefore, we believe that Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez must be a very useful person for the Cuban regime, in Spain. He has experience in negotiating trade agreements and in handling administrative affairs (he has been working in this field for more than ten years). All this knowledge and experience added to his knowledge and experience in subversive and intelligence affairs make him a man who is not often found in the Castro regime.

1. OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, contains information and/or file traces on Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, his wife, and other members of his family. OTA-1858 also contains or lists all other references or reports in which Subject has been mentioned.

2. We have the following new traces on Subject and his wife:

OTA2228
MAY 19 1970

a. RUIZ Perez, Orestes Guillermo:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 20 February 1970; Cuban passport PP-D/67/890. Seat No. 24. Source: CCA passenger list.

b. VECIANA Lopez, Nilda:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 30 January 1970; Cuban passport PP-D/67/891. Seat No. 25. Source: IBERIA passenger list.

4

MAY 19 1970

SECRET

3. We have the following file traces on persons mentioned in this report:

A. RUIZ? Jose Antonio: Father

OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information and file traces on Jose Antonio RUIZ.

B. PEREZ Entrialgo, Nieves: Mother

OTA-1858, 16 January 1970, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Nieves PEREZ Entrialgo is mentioned in this report (no traces).

C. RUIZ Veciana, Guillermo:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Guillermo RUIZ Veciana.

D. RUIZ Veciana, Ivan:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Ivan RUIZ Veciana.

E. RUIZ Veciana, Julio G.:

RUIZ Veciana, Julio:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. File traces on Julio RUIZ Veciana.

F. RUIZ Veciana, Alejandro:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on Alejandro RUIZ Veciana.

G. RUIZ Veciana, Juan C.:

RUIZ Veciana, Juan:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on Juan RUIZ Veciana.

H. RUIZ Perez, Jose Antonio:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information and traces on Jose Antonio RUIZ Perez.

I. RUIZ Perez, Osvaldo:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Information on Osvaldo RUIZ Perez.

Brother of Guillermo RUIZ Perez. White, born approximately in 1930. He is working as a farm laborer, waiting for his turn to depart Cuba by way of Spain. Married, opposed to the regime. Resides in the City of Havana. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

J. CARDOSO Perez, Rolando:

OTA-1858, 16 Jan 70, I-33. Debriefing of Rolando CARDOSO Perez. Traces on this person.

K. VIGOS Perez, Manuel Domingo German:

VIGOS Perez, Manuel Domingo:

A18 780 716. DPOB: 5/12/41, Havana, Cuba. U.S. address: 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 353 Santos Suarez St., Santos Suarez, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 2/20/70 (RD-1065). No occupation in Cuba. Single. Source: Immigration card.

VIGOS Perez, Manuel D.:

Trip Varadero-Miami, 20 Feb 70. He is 28 years old. Has no passport. Bricklayer. Source: AIRLIFT passenger list.

L. BORGES Dobarros, Mercedes:

Resides in Miami, Fla. Sister of Jorge BORGES Dobarros (homosexual). (BORGES is a close friend of Source). Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

GARCIA Dobarros, Mercedes:

Resides at 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla., where Source, who is a friend of hers, is residing. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122.

M. GOMEZ Lemus, Antonio:

Head of the Department of Associations of the Havana Provisional Revolutionary Government. Interventor of the Havana Association of Veterans. Handed it over to Liberation Army Lt. Antonio PANUNCIA Garcia. Source: Press, 10/15/60.

Attended the "Condecoration of Drivers" which was held in the Declaration of Havana Hall of the Provisional Government. Source: Press, 11/18/60.

Has a college degree. Greeted the "Cobre Agrarian Star" and her companions when they visited Havana. Source: Press, 1/7/61.

Official of the Havana Provisional Government. Communist

OT 122[illegible]

MAY 19 1970

and informer. Source: Jose PAZ Novas, 17 Jan 61.

Head of the Department of Associations of the Havana Provisional Revolutionary Government. Met with the President and Secretary of the Union of Revolutionary Civic Associations. Source: "Revolucion" newspaper, 1 Jun 61.

N. BORGES Dobarros, Jorge:

Homosexual and close friend of source. The latter resided in his house when he arrived in the U.S. Born approximately in 1923. Prior to 1963, he worked with Muebleria Salas Furniture Store as an interior decorator and also as a salesman. Worked with the MICONS (Ministry of Construction), in Havana, as a watchman at construction work sites. Source: Debriefing of Manuel Domingo German VIGOS Perez, 24 Feb 70, I-122;

BORGES Dobarros, Jorge B.:

Trip Varadero-Miami, 20 Feb 70. 46 years old. Cuban passport PP-026677. Employee. Source: AIRLIFT passenger list.

BORGES Dobarros, Jorge Benito:

A18 781 146. DPOB: 4/19/23, Havana, Cuba. U.S. address: 4000 NW Fourth St., Miami, Fla. Address in Cuba: 353 Santos Suarez St., Santos Suarez, Havana. Entered the U.S. at Miami on 2/20/70 (RD-1065). Passport PP-026677, issued on 4/9/69. Single. Source: Immigration card.

201-735296

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ACTION UNIT c/WH8 INFO FILE, VR c/RI/SD, c/EUR5, c/CI, c/FI2, D/COMM D4

ACTION NO. 590 DDP, ADDP, CS/DO

SECRET 011735Z JUNE 70 CITE MADRID 1237 (ROPARD ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

1 JUN [illegible] 094220

RYBAT TYPIC AMSOUR AMECRU

REF: A. MADRID 1161 (IN 089967)

B. DIRECTOR 037031

1. RESULTS AMECRU-1 MEETING 29 MAY WITH QUPILL-1 AND KENTLAND AS FOLLOWS:

A. EXPENSES. A-1 EXPLAINED THAT FOR HIS TRAVELS, PHONE CALLS AND RESIDENCE BILLS PARIS (FOR CONVENIENT ACCESS TO AMKNAR-1) HAS RECEIVED $2500 FROM ONE FAMILY (AMCALL-1), $1000 FROM ANOTHER (AMPANIC-7) AND $3000 FROM AMSOUR-1 SISTER. NOT PRESSING FOR MORE UNTIL SEES RESULTS CURRENT TRIP, BUT COMMENTED THAT MUCH AS SYMPATHIZES WITH AMSOUR-1 SISTER DIFFICULTIES WITH STOCK MARKET, SUCH DETAILS MINOR COMPARED TO LIFE OF HER BROTHER.

B. CASES TO DISCUSS HAVANA. WILL GIVE PRIORITY TO AMPANIC-7 (201-276080), (HAS LETTER FROM AMPANIC-7 MOTHER TO CELIA SANCHEZ), AMCALL-1 (201-275949) (HAS LETTERS TO FIDEL CASTRO FROM BELGIAN MINISTER RAYMOND

AMAUTO-1

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1237 SECRET

SCHEYVEN , VATICAN SECSTATE AND VANISTENDAEL), AMSOUR-1, AMHINT-3 (201-287682) AND SUBJECT 201-859862. WILL FIRST CONTACT CELIA SANCHEZ AND THEN WORK WITH MININT OFFICIALS DESIGNATED BY HER OF FIDEL CASTRO (SHOULD HE GET TO SEE HIM). FOR TIME BEING WILL NOT RAISE CASE OF PERSON APPEARING IDEN WITH AMOBESE (201-334245) FOR WHOM COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET REACHED REQUIRED $30,000. HAS NOT RECLAIMED AMPANIC-7 RANSOM FROM PARIS EMBASSY IN ORDER KEEP CASE NEGOTIABLE. UPON SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION THESE CASES WILL DISCUSS WITH APPROPRIATE PERSONS POSSIBILITIES FOR PACKAGE EXCHANGE FOR WHICH, HE REALIZES, CANNOT EXPECT ANY PRIOR LNHARP COMMITMENT.

C. HOPES TO VISIT U.S. THIS SUMMER OR FALL AND SEE OLIVER G. GALBOND.

D. AMAUTO-1 (201-735296): LUNCHEON APPOINTMENT SET FOR 30 MAY. INTERESTING TO NOTE HIS CAPSULE ASSESSMENT AMAUTO-1 AS "INTELLIGENT, WELL-ORGANIZED MAN WHO HAS ATTAINED POSITION UNUSUALLY HIGH FOR HIS

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3	7
4	8

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1237 S E C R E T

LIMITED BACKGROUND AND WHO PROBABLY WILL REMAIN WITH REGIME BECAUSE OF MANAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED AND PATRIOTIC MOTIVATION TO IMPROVE COUNTRY THROUGH REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE".

2. C/O ASKED IF PROPER MOMENT PRESENTED DURING AMAUTO-1 LUNCH THAT A-1 ATTEMPT TO ELICIT WHETHER AMAUTO-1 WOULD BE IN TOWN 31 MAY. A-1 WOULD USE LOGICAL PRETEXT OF NEED TO KNOW IF AMAUTO-1 AVAILABLE FOR LAST-MINUTE CONSULTATION BEFORE HE BOARDS 31 MAY FLIGHT TO HAVANA. (A-1 PHONED C/O NIGHT 30 MAY TO ADVISE THAT AMAUTO-1 WOULD BE IN MADRID ALL DAY 31 MAY.)

3. WILL PREPARE FOR JKLANCE DETAILED REPORT ON EVENTS AND OBSERVATONS HIS TRIP WHICH WILL GIVE TO C/O AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY AFTER RETURN ON (HE HOPES) 10 JUNE. (ALSO WILL ~~LOAN~~ LEND HIS DOMINICAN PASSPORT FOR STATION TO COPY VARIOUS OFFICIAL CACHETS.)

4. AMECRU-1 APPEARED ELATED OVER PROSPECT OF TRIP AND RELATIONS WITH BOTH QUPILL-1 AND KENTLAND WERE QUITE CORDIAL.

5. QUPILL-1 LATER TOLD C/O THAT AMSOUR-1 SISTER

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PAGE 4 MADRID 1237 SECRET

PHONED NIGHT 28 MAY QUITE UPSET OVER FAILURE TO HEAR FROM HIM. HAD CONSULTED WITH "FRIENDS" WHO SUGGESTED SHE TRAVEL TO SPAIN FOR PERSONAL MEETING WITH QUPILL-1, FOR WHICH ALREADY HAD RESERVATIONS ON FLIGHT 29 MAY. WHEN Q-1 ADVISED HER THAT NO FURTHER NEWS EXPECTED UNTIL AFTER AMECRU-1 RETURN, SHE AGREED TO CANCEL TRAVEL PLANS.

6. QUTIMID CONFIRMS AMECRU-1 LUNCH DATE WITH AMAUTO-1 AND AIRLISTS SHOW HIM AND WIFE ON 31 MAY MANIFESTS.

7. FILE 201061063, 201-325064. XREF 201-276080, 201-275949, 201-287682, 201-859862, 201-735296, 201-334245, 201-836293. GP-1

SECRET

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: RUIZ-Perez, Orestes Guillermo
[201-0735296]
Volume 2

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: PCS/LOC

ROOM: 2 D 11

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency documents

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RUIZ Perez, Orestes Guillermo

AMAUTO-1

VOL II

201-73529

14-00000

END OF VOL II - 31 May 1970

4-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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WH8 FILE, VR C/AN ENCL6 FI2 C/CAS C/FIO

ACTION NO. 109

S E C R E T 271427Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7703 WMIM

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

27 M[illegible] 091445

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7651 (IN 083062)

B. DIRECTOR 036576

C. MADRID 1177 (IN 089749)

1P

1. SAMKO HAS CONFIRMED FLIGHT RESERVATIONS FOR MADRID ON 29 MAY. HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND UNDERSTANDS CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

(11)

X

4

WH/C/8

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JUN 1 0 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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IB-201-866054

201-735296

28 May 70

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/ICA, FI2

ACTION NO. 055

S E C R E T 251224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1177 (MADR)

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

1P

TYPIC AMAUTO

IN 089749

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7651 (IN 088062)

B. DIRECTOR 036576

1. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN SANKO 29 MAY TRAVEL CONFIRMED. ON ARRIVAL MADRID WILL BE CONTACTED BY SACODER PER MADRID 1166. RESERVATION AT HOTEL FENIX CONFIRMED BUT WONDER IF HE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY WITH FLIGHT RESERVATIONS IN VIEW RATHER HEAVY PRE-SEASON TOURIST TRAFFIC THIS YEAR.

2. FLOREGA PRESENCE MADRID FOR SANKO APPROACH COULD BE HELPFUL BUT NOT DEEMED ESSENTIAL. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD IT APPEAR DESIRABLE TO EXTEND CURRENT DEBRIEFING BEYOND 29 MAY, SUGGEST HE BE ALLOWED REMAIN TO WRAP UP CASE.

3. FILE 201-735296, 201-866054. GP-1

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B-201-866054

201-735296

CS COPY
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25 May 70

File:

Quero 26
Report No. 314

5 May 1970

FRANCO enters the office. They mention the incident that happened last night at Barajas airport when the plane arrived from Havana. A woman(Spanish) raised her umbrella and threatened HORACIO, while a gusano kept hitting him. FRANCO says that he hit five or six of the attackers real hard, and that he thinks he really hurt one of them quite badly around the face and head. Everyone was covered with blood.

A woman and a man come into the office and talk about the incident(above) also. Then the girl says that she has come to Spain to take a course in Alcala. It seems that the course is connected with UNESCO. She will later go to the University of Santander and on to Paris to take a course there. She says she is a member of the Party, and wants to know how she is going to maintain he[illegible]ontact here in Spain. RUIZ says that they too are members, but that due to the difficulty of public relations that it is a month and a half since they have had a group meeting. He says that the work that they are doing makes it difficult to carry on the Party life, but that nevertheless it is necessary to have group meetings to discuss the members. She says that she would like to live in Madrid, in a student residence, and commute to Alcala by car, or bus every day. Ruiz says that in this way it would be more economical for her and she would have more contact with the other students. She says that she would like to be in some Spanish-American college to get acquainted with the students there. RUIZ says she could be very useful to them with her student connections, and that without interfering with her studies she can also be helping Cuba. He highly recommends that she get every thing she can, culturally during her stay in Spain. He says that for very much she has read about museums and historical and artistic places it is quite differnnt seeing them.

Ruiz asks her to leave her address at the embassy so that the President of the Women's Federation of the Party can take advantage of her being of use to them in one way or another. Ruiz tells her that anything that might happen to her to come to the embassy and let them know about it. He says there is the danger that they will spy on her or follow her and that there is the possibility of enemies getting close to her. He says that everyone makes mistakes and that if she does to let them know at once so that they can prevent the consequence, and give her good advice.

He has been out of the office for a long time. At about 2:30 pm he comes in with BARREDA and another person. Ruiz says that he has to write to the Deputy Secretary(of Foreign Relations-?) about the incident at Barajas airport. He is going to point out the permissiveness of the police. He is going to point out that the officials of the embassy were provoked by the others

EMMA-26245

22 May 1970

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR R/AN. EUR6. CI/OPS. FI2.

ACTION NO. 896

SECRET 221222Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1166 MADR

22 MAY 70 IN 088519

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: WH/MAAIMI 7651 (IN 088062)

1P

1. SAMKO HAS RESERVATION AT HOTEL FENIX RPT FENIX PASEO DE LA CASTELLANA 2, BEGINNING 30 MAY. ON ARRIVAL SAMKO SHOULD TAKE TAXI DIRECTLY TO HOTEL WHERE SACODER USING ALIAS JOHN ALCINO WILL CONTACT AT 1700 HOURS, 30 MAY. IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY SAMKO SHOULD CALL ALCINO ON 276-6990. WHILE WAITING FOR SACODER'S VISIT SAMKO SHOULD ARRANGE FOR SEPARATE TOURS OF MADRID, TOLEDO AND EL ESCORIAL/VALLEY OF FALLEN FOR 1, 2 AND 3 JUNE. THIS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT STORY AS WELL AS FOR SAMKO TO HAVE LITERATURE ON HIS PERSON WHEN MAKES CONTACT WITH AMAUTO-1.

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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WH/COP	

2. THANKS FOR FINE SUPPORT.

3. FILE 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

SECRET

P 201-866054

201-735296

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22 May 70

ORIG: G[illegible]ill
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EXT: [illegible]
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CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DO-4, RE/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ 25 10 23Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 030857

TO DO BASE LOS ANGELES

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DO BASE LOS ANGELES 2098 (IN 037976)

1. THANK YOU. MOST USEFUL.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG

DO/I/B1 J.C. [illegible]

T. J. O'Brien
C/DOI

William V. Broe
C/WHD

FILE:
AMAUTO-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR KI/AN, EUR-6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI-2

ACTION NO. 870

S E C R E T 212102Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7651 (NEBECKER ACTING) WMIA

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087021)

B. WH/MIAMI 7633 (IN 087093)

C. MADRID 1151 (IN 087675)

21 May 70 088062

MICROFILMED
JUN 12 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. SAMKO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE RESERVATIONS ON AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT TO MADRID ON 29 MAY.

2. SAMKO THOUROUGHLY UNDERSTANDS FOLLOWING COVER FOR TRIP:

A. WHEN WIFE PASSED AWAY, WAS BROKEN UP AND STILL NOT COMPLETELY RECOVERED. DECIDED TRIP TO EUROPE WOULD HELP FORGET.

B. SAW "JULIUS" LAST YEAR AT SAMKO'S HOLLYWOOD DELICATESSEN. SAMKO, WHO HEARD AMAUTO-1 HAD BEEN KILLED, WAS TOLD BY "JULIUS" OF AMAUTO-1'S CURRENT POSITION IN MADRID. SAMKO, THEREFORE, LOOKING UP AMAUTO-1 FOR OLD TIMES SAKE.

3. IF CONTACT ESTABLISHED, SAMKO INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW THESE LINES WITH AMAUTO-1:

WH/C/OP

B-201-866054

CS COPY
SECRET

21 May 70

201-735296

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7651 S E C R E T

A. RELIVE OLD DAYS AND TRY TO REKINDLE OLD SPARK. MENTION HOW GOOD THINGS ARE IN STATES AND OPPORTUNITIES EXISTING.

B. IN LOW KEY, SOUND HIM OUT ON FEELINGS TOWARDS STATES, ANTHUG, REGIME, FUTURE, AND FAMILY.

C. SET UP CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FUTURE, USING SAMKO'S HOME ADDRESS. AT SAME TIME, ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ADDRESS TO WHICH HE COULD WRITE AMAUTO-1.

4. SAMKO UNDERSTANDS THESE BASIC INSTRUCTIONS AND CONCURS IN THEIR LOGIC. HE STATED WILLINGNESS TO APPLY THEM IN EVENTUAL MEETING WITH AMAUTO-1. ANY MORE COMPLICATED INSTRUCTIONS WOULD TEND TO CONFUSE AND POSSIBLY ALIENATE SAMKO AT THIS TIME. THIS ALSO

ALLOWS MADRID ANY OPTIONS IT MAY WANT TO USE WITHOUT CONFUSING SAMKO.

5. SAMKO INDICATED "JULIUS" WAS JULIO DIAZ, BORN CIRCA 1930 IN CUBA. DURING 1950'S WHEN AMAUTO-1 WORKED FOR SAMKO, "JULIUS" ALSO WORKED AND WAS FRIEND OF AMAUTO-1. "JULIUS" RESIDES SOMEWHERE IN WEST PALM BEACH OR FORT LAUDERDALE, IS MARRIED, AND HAS CHILDREN. SAMKO HAS

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INFO. FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 7651 S E C R E T

NOT SEEN SINCE CHANCE ENCOUNTER ABOUT YEAR AGO.

6. PLS PROVIDE HOTEL AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. SAMKO WILL ACCEPT ANYONE WHO MENTIONS MR. JOSEPH NORRIS.

7. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 FILE, VR RI/AN, D04, EUR6, FI2, CI/OPS

3201

S E C R E T 211605Z MAY 70 CITE DC BASE LOS ANGELES 2298 LACD

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

21 [illegible] 08797 3 wh/c/cA

REF: DIRECTOR 035471

1. ROFFINOLI CONTACTED SUBJ REF (SUBJ) [illegible] UNDER SUITABLE PRETEXT EVENING 20 MAY. SUBJ LIVING AT REF ADDRESS WITH ONE JORGE BORGES, A CUBAN REFUGEE.

2. NEITHER SUBJ NOR BORGES UNDERSTAND ENGLISH, SPEAK ONLY FEW ENGLISH PHRASES. SUBJ SOLVED LANGUAGE BARRIER BY ASKING SPANISH-ENGLISH SPEAKING NEIGHBOR TO INTERPRET. WHILE SUBJ CALLING NEIGHBOR, ROOMMATE BORGES MANAGED TELL ROFFINOLI SUBJ SUFFERING FROM SEVERE NERVOUS CONDITION, HAD UNDERGONE ELECTRO SHOCK TREATMENT APPROX YEAR AGO. ROFFINOLI NOTICED SOME NERVOUSNESS ON PART OF SUBJ, BUT THOUGHT PROBABLY DUE INITIAL UNCERTAINTY WHY ROFFINOLI CONTACTING HIM.

3. SUBJ IS WHITE CUBAN APPROX 5'6" TALL, WEIGHS 130-135 LBS. HAS SLENDER BUILD ALTHO SMALL PAUNCH. FACE OVAL SHAPED, COMPLEXION SLIGHTLY BLEMISHED. AQUILINE NOSE. HAS BLACK HAIR, CUT AT AVERAGE LENGTH. (NO SIDEBURNS, ETC.) SUBJ HAS VERY BOYISH APPEARANCE, COULD EASILY PASS AS PERSON 21-22 YEARS OLD ALTHO HE CLAIMS TO BE 29. NO OVERT HOMOSEXUAL TENDENCIES NOTED.

201-235296

CS COPY

21 May 70

SECRET

PAGE 2 DO BASE LOS ANGELES 2098 S E C R E T

4. SUBJ NEVER EMPLOYED SINCE ARRIVING LOS ANGELES ALTHO HAS APPLIED FOR SEVERAL JOBS. ACCORDING TO BORGES, SUBJ DENIED WORK DUE TO HIS NERVOUS CONDITION.

5. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

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FILE, VR Eur6, R/AN, F2.

ACTION NO. 785

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PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 211235Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1151 MADR

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR

21 May 70 IN 087675

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: A. DIRECTOR 035742

B. WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087021)

1. PLEASED WITH APPEARANCE OF "JULIAS" INTO OPS PICTURE. WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 USING SAMKO; HOWEVER REF B HIGHLIGHTS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF SAMKO'S CHARACTER WHICH COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION. BEFORE PROVIDING CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS NEED CLEAR INDICATION THAT SAMKO, ALTHOUGH DOING FAVOR FOR HIS GOVT, WILLING AND ABLE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. HE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HIS MISSION TO MADRID IS TO OBTAIN ASSESSMENT OF AMAUTO-1 AND THROUGH RENEWAL OF OLD FRIENDSHIP TO OPEN CHANNEL TO AMAUTO-1 SHOULD THE LATTER EVER NEED A FRIEND IN THE U.S. ALSO THAT HE CANNOT RPT CANNOT EXPRESS OR IMPLY TO AMAUTO-1 THAT VISIT TO MADRID WAS AT THE BEHEST OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR JKLANCE. WITH THIS ASSURANCE SEE NO REASON NOT TO PROCEED WITH OP. ON OTHER HAND

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201-735296

21 May 70

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1151 SECRET

IF HE NOT WILLING OR ABLE COMPLY WITH THESE GUIDELINES, THEN OPERATION NOT LIKELY ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES AND MIGHT CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO ALL CONCERNED.

2. WELCOME ANY WH/MIAMI CHANGES IN SCENARIO; OTHERWISE STATION WILL PROCEED AS PREVIOUSLY NOTED.

3. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN EUR6 CI CI/OPS CI/OA

ACTION NO. 695 FI 2

20 MAY 70 IN 087093

S E C R E T 201545Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7633 (WMIN) (NEBECKER ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF WH/MIAMI 7628 (IN 087021)

1 P

1. SAMKO CONTACTED MID-DAY 20 MAY. HE HAS SHOTS, NEW PASSPORT, AND READY TO TRAVEL. PACHANKIS MENTIONED TENTATIVE DATE OF 29 MAY VIA IBERIA.

2. WHEN QUESTIONED ON MUTUAL FRIEND WHO COULD HAVE TOLD HIM OF AMAUTO-1 POSITION IN SPAIN, SAMKO SAID HE TALKED TO "JULIAS" FROM OLD DAYS ABOUT ONE YEAR AGO. "JULIAS" WORKED IN GROCERY STORE WITH AMAUTO-1 AND CURRENTLY RESIDES IN MIAMI/HOLLYWOOD AREA. SAMKO CANNOT FURTHER IDENTIFY. APPEARS WE CAN INVOKE "JULIAS" AS COVER STORY FOR CONTACT, RATHER THAN PURSUE MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ LEAD.

3. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

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WH/C/OP

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

b-201-866054

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201-735296

20 May 70

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ACTION NO. 690

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S E C R E T 201805Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7628 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMIM

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MADRID

20 MAY 70 IN 087021

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 1131 (IN 085999)

B. DIRECTOR 035471

C. DIRECTOR 035482

D. DIRECTOR 035499

MICROFILMED
JUN 9 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2P

1. REFS B THRU D APPEAR TO BE CONTRADICTORY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. IN ANY EVENT, SAMKO HAS ALREADY BEEN BRIEFED ALONG LINES OF DIRECTOR 033355. DO NOT BELIEVE BRIEFING ON COMPLICATED SENARIO WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE, AS SAMKO IS SIMPLE MAN, HAS SOMEWHAT VOLATILE PERSONALITY, AND NOT TRAINED INTEL OPERATIVE. HE IS IN EFFECT DOING FAVOR FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT A RECRUITED ASSET WHO HAS BEEN TRAINED TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS. IN ADDITION, HE APPEARS TO BE RATHER NAIVE AS FAR AS INTEL OPS ARE CONCERNED. (AS EXAMPLE, WHEN SAMKO APPLIED FOR PASSPORT, EXPECTED RED CARPET TREATMENT. DESCRIBED PASSPORT OFFICIAL AS "MISERABLE SOB" WHO GAVE EVERYONE HARD TIME.

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B-201-866054

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20 May 70

201-235296

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PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 7628 SECRET

PACHANKIS TOLD HIM FOR SECURIY REASONS PASSPORT PEOPLE NOT ADVISED SAMKO ROLE IN AMAUTO CASE.) ALSO, BELIEVE ANY PREARRANGED PLAN COULD MOST EASILY GO AWRY GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES OF AMAUTO CASE.

3. SUGGEST MIMAI BRIEFING OF SAMKO REMAIN SIMPLE AND UNCOMPLICATED. THIS WILL ALLOW MADRID CASE OFFICER TO PERSONALLY ASSESS SAMKO ANT TAILOR OPERATIONAL DIRECTION TO SAMKO AND OPERATIONAL CLIMATE IN MADRID. IN SUMMARY, GIVEN TIME ELEMENT AND OUR ASSESSMENT SAMKO, WE FEEL CONTACT BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1 AT THIS STAGE SHOULD BE AIMED AT UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT OF LATTER AND POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT COMMO CHANNEL TO FREE WORLD.

4. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054. GP-1

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EXT: R-1325
DATE: 20 May 1970

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INFO FILE, VR. EUR 6, WH/4, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T 20 21Z 20 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035742

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 1131 (IN 035999)
B. DIRECTOR 035471
C. DIRECTOR 035482
D. DIRECTOR 035499
E. WH/MIAMI (IN 037021)

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. BELIEVE CONTRADICTION CITED REF E IS ONLY APPARENT. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER (NOT NUMERICAL ORDER) OF OTHER REFS WAS D, A, B, AND C. THAT IS, REF D, WRITTEN FIRST, TOOK BASIC POSITION THAT VIGO NOT TO BE CONSIDERED FOR APPROACH WHEN WE HAD SANKO FOR THAT PURPOSE. THIS POSITION OBTAINS. REFS B AND C WERE ONLY IN RESPONSE TO REF A SUGGESTION THAT KNOWLEDGE OF VIGO ON SANKO'S PART WOULD BUILD UP CREDIBLE SANKO STORY TO AMAUTO-1. THIS DOES NOT MEAN ANY USE OF VIGO. REFS B AND C WERE SENT PRIORITY AND THUS GOT LOWER NUMBERS THAN REF D.

2. DEFER TO ADDEES ON SCENARIO.

CONTINUED

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201-735216

B201-866054

20 May 70

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR 035742

S E C R E T PAGE TWO

3. FILE: 201-735296 AND 201-866054.

END OF MESSAGE

19 JUN 1970

A C/E/IB Louis Rosso

W. Langham
James E. Flannery
C/WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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RG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
IT: WH COG/OPS
T: R1819
TE: 19 MAY 1970

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S E C R E T 1923 19 Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035499

WH/MIAMI, MADRID

TYPIC-AMAUTO

REFS: A. WH/MIAMI 7595 (IN 085478)

B. DIRECTOR 033355

1. DUE LACK OF INFO MENTIONED REF A, PLUS SHORT TIME AMAUTO-1 SCHEDULED REMAIN MADRID, DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE VIGO LEAD WORTH PURSUIT. APPRECIATE WORK DONE ANYHOW.

2. HQS BELIEVES SAMKO APPROACH MENTIONED REF B OUR ONLY GOOD POSSIBILITY VIEW TIME LIMITATIONS. WHEN MADRID VIEWS ON SCENARIO RECEIVED, SAMKO AND PACHANKIS CAN ARRANGE TRAVEL.

3. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A mentioned location of distant cousin of AMAUTO-1, current recruitment target. Ref B urged field to consider sending former employer of AMAUTO-1 to Madrid for "chance confrontation,"

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

EUR/IB Louis Rosso

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/ ... RELEASING OFFICER
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UNIT: C/WH/CCG/OPS
EXT: 1325
DATE: 19 MAY 70

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SECRET 19 22 05Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR 035482

TO PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 1131 (IN 035999)

1. ASKING LOS ANGELES FOR REF INFO SEPARATELY, EXCEPT BELIEVE NOT ADVISABLE ASK AMAUTO-1 COUSIN ABOUT AMAUTO-1 LOCATION SINCE COUSIN HAS NOT SEEN HIM FOR SEVEN YEARS AND HAS BEEN UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT.

2. COMPLETELY CONCUR REST OF REF.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AS X
RID
RI

C/WHD

AC/EUR/IB/S Louis Rosso

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG
201-735296

~~JOHN SHERWOOD~~ Caswell
C/EUR/FI/CI
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CONF: WH 5 | FILE, VR, RI/AN, DCI, EUR, FI, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 19 22 23 Z MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY DO BASE LOS ANGELES INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI MADRID 035471

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. PLS DETERMINE ASAP PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND OCCUPATION OF MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, 935 BEACON AVENUE, APARTMENT 10, LOS ANGELES, APPARENTLY NO TELEPHONE. VIGOS WENT LOS ANGELES FROM MIAMI IN EARLY MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

AT
AR
IB
RF
BX
RID/FD
FI

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Based on Madrid 1131 (IN 035999) request that access agent of WH/Miami be given much information about Subject as possible for sake of approach to Cuban target in Madrid.

C/WH/F

AC/EUR/IB/S

C/WHD

JOSEPH BULIK
C/DO/I/B1

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

201-735296
19 May 70

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

ACTION NO. 542

S E C R E T 191224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1131 MADR

19 MAY IN 085999 ~~[illegible]~~

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 033355

1. WE BELIEVE THAT CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH AMAUTO-1 ALONE TOO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE SINCE AMAUTO-1 IS FREQUENTLY IN COMPANY SOMEONE FROM HIS STAFF OR HAVING LUNCH WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS OR BUSINESSMEN. MOREOVER, ENCOUNTER UNDER THIS SITUATION, WE FEEL, WOULD NOT PERMIT RELAXED EXCHANGE BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1. WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:

A. ON ARRIVAL SPAIN VIA AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT 450 LEAVING MIAMI FRIDAY SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO HOTEL OF STATION SELECTION. STATION OFFICER WILL ALSO OCCUPY HOTEL IN ALIAS AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH SAMKO WILL BE MADE IN HOTEL. (INCIDENTALLY, BELIEVE NO NEED PACHANKIS ACCOMPANY SAMKO TO MADRID.)

B. EARLY SUNDAY AFTERNOON SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE. HIS EXCUSE WILL BE THAT HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO EMBASSY BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 1131 SECRET

EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSED. IN ADDITION, SINCE SAMKO SCHEDULED TOUR OF MADRID AND SUBURBS LEAVING EARLY MONDAY MORNING DECIDED MAKE EFFORT CONTACT AMAUTO-1 AT HOME RATHER THAN POSSIBLY MISS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HIM. (SAMKO WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO SIGN UP FOR TOUR OF CITY TO LEND AUTHENTICITY TO STORY.) SAMKO WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED REPLY TO INEVITABLE QUESTION FROM AMAUTO-1: HOW DID YOU FIND MY ADDRESS? SAMKO'S REPLY WOULD BE THAT HE OBTAINED ADDRESS FROM IBERIA EMPLOYEE AT AIRPORT WHO SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME TRYING TO LOCATE AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE. (ADDRESS APPEARS IN DIP LIST AVAILABLE OVERTLY.) SAMKO WOULD FURTHER EXPLAIN, IF NECESSARY, THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW EMPLOYEE GOT ADDRESS, BUT KNOWS SHE MADE NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS. WE CANNOT PREDICT AMAUTO-1'S REACTION TO THIS DIRECT APPROACH. HE MIGHT CLAIM PRESS OF BUSINESS OR OTHER COMMITMENTS THEREBY REFUSING SEE SAMKO IN HOME BUT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT SAMKO VISIT EMBASSY MONDAY MORNING. SAMKO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT IF THIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS AMAUTO-1 HE WOULD GLADLY CANCEL TOUR AND GO. TO USE STANDARD LINE

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MADRID 1131 SECRET

THAT BECAUSE HE IS AMERICAN HE SHOULD NOT VISIT PBRUMEN EMBASSY, WOULD, WE FEEL, QUICKLY AROUSE AMAUTO-1'S SUSPICION. SAMKO'S APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE CAN BE MONITORED FROM HOMES OF TWO STAFFERS WHO LIVE WITHIN EYSHOT OF AMAUTO-1'S RESIDENCE.

C. AMAUTO-1'S PROBABLE SECOND QUESTION: HOW DID SAMKO KNOW HE WAS IN MADRID? REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT AND HELP FROM MIAMI. IDEALLY, SAMKO SHOULD BE ABLE SAY THAT A MUTUAL FRIEND OF BOTH AMAUTO-1 AND SAMKO WERE TOGETHER RECENTLY IN MIAMI AND AMAUTO-1'S NAME MENTIONED. SAMKO ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO AMAUTO-1 AND FRIEND DISCLOSED THAT AMAUTO-1 NOW "AMBASSADOR" TO SPAIN. (SUBJECT WH/MIAMI 7595 (IN 085476) MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE "FRIEND" WHOSE NAME SAMKO MIGHT USE. STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONTACT BE MADE WITH SUBJECT IN LOS ANGELES TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE KNOWS WHERE AMAUTO-1 IS. ALSO OBTAIN PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, OCCUPATION IN LA AND PRIOR JOB IN MIAMI PLUS OTHER NOTABLE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COULD BE USED AS FILLER BY SAMKO TO SHOW THAT POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN AMAUTO-1'S COUSIN AND SAMKO.) IN ADDITON, SUGGEST

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PAGE 4 MADRID 1131 SECRET

PACHANKIS RE-CONTACT SAMKO TO ASCERTAIN NAMES OF PERSONS IN UNITED STATES WHO KNEW AMAUTO-1 AND FROM WHOM SAMKO OSTENSIBLY MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION OF AMAUTO-1'S MADRID ASSIGNMENT. WELCOME OTHER SUGGESTIONS AS REPLY TO ABOVE QUESTION.

2. LINE SAMKO WOULD TAKE AFTER FOOT IN DOOR SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY REHEARSED IN MIAMI BEFORE ARRIVAL MADRID BECAUSE OF OI- ELEMENTS MIAMI SHOULD + CABLE WHAT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO SAMKO SO THAT STATION OFFICER COMPLETELY AWARE OF HOW SAMKO IS TO CONDUCT HIMSELF.

3. IN VIEW DESIRE TO INITIATE CONTACT BEFORE AMAUTO-1'S JUNE DEPARTURE SUGGEST CONTACT ABOVE PERSONS ASAP.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

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101800Z MAY 70

CITE TDCS DB-315/02487-70

DIST 18 MAY 1970

COUNTRY CUBA/SPAIN

DOI 4-6 MAY 1970

SUBJECT PROTESTS BY CUBAN EMBASSY IN SPAIN OVER ALLEGED ATTACKS ON CUBAN OFFICIALS

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (EARLY MAY 1970)

FIELD NO. OSM 10026

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE; FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. IN EARLY MAY 1970, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MADRID PREPARED A PROTEST NOTE TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER AN INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE BARAJAS AIRPORT IN MADRID BETWEEN CUBAN REFUGEES AND CUBAN OFFICIALS, IN WHICH BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. ACCORDING TO MINISTER GUILLERMO RUIZ, CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, THE EMBASSY WILL CHARGE THAT SIX FUNCTIONARIES AND FOUR DIPLOMATIC COURIERS FROM HAVANA WERE PHYSICALLY ATTACKED ON 4 MAY AT THE AIRPORT BY DISAFFECTED CUBANS, ALL RESIDENTS OF SPAIN. THE NOTE STATED THAT "THIS COWARDLY AND UNJUSTIFIABLE AGGRESSION" ENDANGERED DIPLOMATIC

DOCUMENTS AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED ACT BUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AT BARAJAS. SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE ASKED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THESE INCIDENTS.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ANOTHER UNTESTED SOURCE WHO WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO THE 4 MAY INCIDENT, THE CROWD INCLUDED 23 MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND A NUMBER OF CUBAN EXPATRIATES MEETING AN IBERIA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA WHICH WAS CARRYING 75 CUBAN OFFICIALS AND 30 CUBAN REFUGEES. MAXIMO TORRES, FORMER MAYOR OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND A MAN OF OVER 60 YEARS OF AGE, ADDRESSED ONE OF THE ARRIVING CUBAN OFFICIALS, MISTAKING HIM FOR A REFUGEE. THE OFFICIAL REBUFFED HIM RUDELY AND A GENERAL ARGUMENT ENSUED AND BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. HORACIO FUENTES MARTINEZ, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, JUMPED FROM A NEARBY CAR AND PISTOL-WHIPPED ONE OF THE REFUGEES. AFTER THE POLICE ARRIVED, TORRES AND HIS WIFE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION.)

3. ON 6 MAY, ROBERTO FRANCO OLIVA, CUBAN CONSUL IN MADRID, COMPLAINED TO A SPANISH POLICE INSPECTOR CONCERNING THE INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES." THE INSPECTOR REPLIED TO THIS THAT SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE

INVESTIGATING AND WOULD GIVE CUBAN OFFICIALS THE PROTECTION IN SPAIN WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE. HE SAID THAT THREE CUBAN REFUGEES HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WOULD BE DEPORTED TO FRANCE. FOR THEIR PART, THE REFUGEES HAD SAID THAT HORACIO FUENTES HAD PULLED OUT A GUN DURING THE FIGHT, A CHARGE WHICH FRANCO DENIED AT LENGTH.

B. MANY OTHER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS AT THE AIRPORT AND DAMAGE DONE TO THEIR PARKED CARS.

C. WHEN CUBAN SEAMEN ARE ARRESTED BY THE SPANISH POLICE IN THE CANARY ISLANDS THEY ARE INTERROGATED SEPARATELY IN THE POLICE STATION BY AN AGENT OF THE CIA WHO IS A CUBAN "GUSANO" (TURNCOAT).

D. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SPANISH REPUBLICANS AND SPANISH COMMUNISTS IN CUBA, THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA IS NEVER MOLESTED.

E. FRANCO IS PREPARED TO ADVISE CUBAN PASSENGERS COMING TO SPAIN TO CARRY RAZORS FOR SELF DEFENSE. CUBAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO GO TO THE AIRPORT, SHOULD APPLY FOR LICENSES TO CARRY PISTOLS.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE, CUBAN DIPLOMATS MAY APPLY FOR GUN PERMITS TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE PERMISSION. NON-DIPLOMATIC CUBANS MUST APPLY TO THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF

INTERNAL SECURITY (DGS) BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION. TDCSDB-315/01741-70 REPORTED THAT AS OF 8 APRIL ALL CUBAN COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WERE CARRYING PISTOLS, AND THAT SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT CUBAN DIPLOMATS ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE.

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(21)

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LS

WH8 FILE, RI Full Rilm. a. clops Fz

439

S E C R E T 151826Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7555 (WMIN) (REDECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

IN 085470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR 036893 (4081546)

B WH/MIAMI 7519

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 935 BEACON AVE., APT 16, LOS ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

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INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI/OPS CI CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 298

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 151724Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7570 (NEBECKER ACTING)

IN MIAMI

15 MAY 70 084149

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 033355

B. UFAA-1978

1. IN MEETING WITH SAMKO ON 14 MAY, PACHANKIS MENTIONED POSSIBLE TRIP TO MADRID AS TOURIST TO HOLD "CHANCE MEETING WITH AMAUTO/1. SMAKO VERY ENTHUSED, FLATTERED HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED HIM, AND IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND FOR OPERATION. NO FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS MADE (EXPECT WE WOULD PAY EXPENSES ON TRIP) AND HE APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED TO HELP COUNTRY AND OLD FRIEND. AT OUR REQUEST, SAMKO HAS APPLIED FOR NEW PASSPORT. INCIDENTALLY, HIS WIFE PASSED AWAY ON 6 NOVEMBER 1969.

2. WE ARE NOW IN POSITION TO DISPATCH SAMKO. PLS ADVISE WHEN HE IS NEEDED ON AMAUTO/1 APPROACH.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

OK, let's go. Do you think enough caution, "chance," and "non-political" etc. have already been written into this op?

NOT yet.

[illegible] 10-1

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ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR R/AN, C/OA, FI 2, EUR 6

ACTION NO. 927

S E C R E T 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12[illegible] 01548

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

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CONF: WH/8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6, DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 21 06 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 033355

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 030893 B. UFAA-1978

1. VIEW REF B, HQS SANGUINE ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF "CHANCE" APPROACH BY SAMKO TO AMAUTO-1. AS REASONABLY WELL OFF RETIRED PERSON, SAMKO COULD NATURALLY GO TO MADRID AS TOURIST. HQS WONDERS WHETHER THIS WOULD HOLD WATER UNLESS WIFE ACCOMPANIED HIM. REQUEST MIAMI INVESTIGATE THIS POINT.

2. APPROACH BY SAMKO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAD TO RECRUITMENT, BUT WOULD OFFER PERSONAL READING OF AMAUTO-1 BASED ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE WARM ENTREE PROVIDED BY FONDLY-REMEMBERED PAST ASSOCIATION. IF APPROPRIATE, SAMKO COULD PROVIDE LINK TO "OTHER WORLD" IN CASE AMAUTO-1 EVER NEEDED HELP. LATTER SCHEDULED TRAVEL HAVANA IN JUNE 70 AND RETURN MADRID PRIOR POSTING CUBA. JUDGING FROM AMBEDEW-1 AND AMDELAY-1 CASES, BRIEF RETURN TO CUBA MIGHT PROVE TURNING POINT IN ANY DECISION TO DEFECT. THEREFORE, ANY MEETING WITH SAMKO SHOULD BE PRIOR JUNE DEPARTURE.

AE UU
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DESTROYED~~
[✓ FI]

3. IN EVENT POSSIBLE SAMKO TRAVEL TO MADRID, WE WOULD NEED

201-735296

CONTINUED...

CS COPY

12 May 70

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________ PER________

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO

703335

PAGE TWO

LIST OF PLACES FREQUENTED BY AMAUTO-1 WHERE SAMKO WOULD HAVE CHANCE "BUMP INTO" HIM. IF MADRID HAS OTHER IDEAS, WELCOME ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Ref A said Hqs willing consider use of SAMKO to approach AMAUTO-1. Ref B gave results of Miami's contacts with SAMKO.

WE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/IB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James E. Flannery
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR, R/AN, C/OA, FI2, EUR6

ACTION NO. 927

S E C R E T 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

12 May 70 IN 001540

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

FILE: AMAUTO-1

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES (21)

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WH8 FILE, VR ELL. RI/AN. CI. CI/OPS FI2.

439

S E C R E T 181826Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7595 (REDECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

IN 005470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR 030893

B WH/MIAMI 7515 (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 935 BEACON AVE., APT 10, LOST ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

View lack info, suggest only hold in record. What you think?

Answ. no interest.

AMAUTO-1

SECRET

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4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-01054
08 MAY 70

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING
OF AMBASSADORS

UFAOIR

R 7005190007

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

TO Chief of Station, Madrid	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief of Station, WH/Miami	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT Study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMW-11726

Forwarded herewith is a completed version by AMEDIT-2 of the study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

KENNETH B. TICINETO

Attachment: h/w

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMW-11829	DATE 8 MAY 1970
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(5 May 1970)

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FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS Richard Wheeler	pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	5 May 70	James E. Flannery for

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/EUR/IB		Louis Rosso Glenn A. Rounsevell

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES, GUILLERMO
201-735256
SEX M COB ?

201-866054
UFAA-01978
04 MAY 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO AS REPORTED BY SUBJECT OF 201-866054

R 7005110495

OSM

FILE IN 201-735296

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 587

SECRET 081046Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1054

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

TYPIC AMMEDIA QUDOZE

8 MAY IN 073059

1. FROM QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE 6 MAY:

A. CARLOS ALFARAS, CUBAN AMBASSADOR LEBANON AND SYRIA, TOLD ANTOLIN (PROBABLY ANTOLIN ALFONSO CASTENEDA), CUBAN EMBASSY ROME THAT HE (ALFARAS) AND WIFE SCHEDULED FLY MADRID/ROME 9 MAY IBERIA FLIGHT 358. ANTOLIN SAID THAT SALVADOR VILASECA, AMBASSADOR ITALY, IN CUBA FOR WEEK'S VACATION; EXPECTED RETURN ROME 6 MAY ALITALIA 366.

B. GUILLERMO RUIZ, CHARGE IN MADRID, SAID HE TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS.

2. FILE 201-814891, 201-7352996, 201-759701. GP-1

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Extract for 201's

FILE:
[illegible]

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 1 MAY 1970

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CONF: WHE INFO FILE, VR. [illegible], [illegible], C/OPS, [illegible], C1, C/IC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

17 [illegible] 70

TO MADRID ~~[illegible]~~ WH/MIAMI CITE DIRECTOR 030393

VU XR DES NFD FI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 7346 (IN 072939)

B. DIRECTOR 021639

1. REF A REPRESENTS LEAD TO AMAUTO-1 WHICH HQS WILLING PURSUE IF MADRID THINKS WORTH WHILE. ALTHOUGH SAMKO DID NOT INDICATE RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY DEEP, QUTIMID/QUDOZE TRAFFIC SEEMS TO INDICATE AMAUTO-1 LOOKED ON SAMKO WITH GREAT DEAL NOSTALGIA. MUCH DEPENDS ON MADRID'S OTHER PLANS THROUGH SUBJECT REF B (201-866047). REQUEST STATUS YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM AND PLANS.

2. RECENT REVIEW OF AMAUTO-1 TAPES BY AMEDIT-2 SHOW THAT AMAUTO-1 MAINTAINS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH QUSEQUIN-82. AMEDIT-2 COMMENTS THAT QUSEQUIN-82 KNOWS AMAUTO-1 PERSONALLY AND SEES HIM RATHER OFTEN BUT PRESUMABLY IN LINE OF DUTY. HQS INTERESTED IN NATURE AND EXTENT THIS RELATIONSHIP. VIEW QUSEQUIN-82 COMMENTS REPORTED IN OSMA-23624, ATTACHMENT 1, STATION MIGHT USE THIS RELATIONSHIP TO APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

201-235246

3. ~~[illegible]~~ WODISH REPORT DATED 27 MAR 70 WAS DEBRIEFING OF MANUEL

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DATE: MAY 7 10 23 AM '70

MAY 11 4 26 PM '70

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BY: RID/EDI
CONF:
INFO FILE, VR.

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

(classification)
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(elite) (pica)
(reference number)

TO

CITE DIRECTOR 630193

(VIGOS) PEREZ, 30-YEAR OLD CUBAN WHO ARRIVED MIAMI BY AIR ON 20 FEB 70. VIGOS CLAIMS TO BE UNIDENTIFIED CLOSE RELATIVE OF AMAUTO-1 BUT HAS AMAUTO-1'S HISTORY SOMEWHAT GARBLED. VIGOS ALSO SAYS THAT ONE OSVALDO RUIZ PEREZ, DESCRIBED AS BROTHER OF AMAUTO-1, HAS ASKED TO LEAVE CUBA AND IS NOW IN CANE FIELDS. WH/MIAMI REQUESTED TO CHECK THESE LEADS.

4. FILE 201-735296. END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A said that SAMKO, Miami butcher who old acquaintance of AMAUTO-1. has been located and willing travel to Madrid if necessary. Ref B is POA grant for one Carlos CARRASCO, whom Madrid plans to use somehow to get to AMAUTO-1.

MAY 18 70

NS

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

C/WH/COG

ac/EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
CUTIMID QUDOZE
Sonia GOMEZ Aragon, Cuban MINREX Official

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: None, FYI. Please assign 201 number

References:
A. MADRID 0473
B. WH/MIAMI 6576
C. DIRECTOR 011307

1. The following information about Subject's trip to Spain and her activities while here was obtained from QUTIMID and QUDOZE.

2. Subject arrived in Madrid on 10 February 1970. She traveled to Barcelona during the week of 23 February and returned to Madrid 6 March whereupon she then left for Portugal. She returned to Madrid on 17 March and waited for Guillermo RUIZ Perez' return from the Spanish/Cuban Commercial negotiations in Cuba. Sonia departed Madrid for Cuba on 27 March 1970. It appears that she intended to travel to Vienna, Austria next, since several cables were sent to Vienna from Madrid advising Sonia's travel status. During her stay in Spain, Sonia was in frequent contact with one Jose Agustin GOYTISOLO, Spanish writer in Barcelona, telephone 228-4063 (Station traces are OSBA 02385, 17 February 1965; OSBA 02718, 11 August 1967; and OSBA 02795, 1 March 1968). She was not known to have been in contact with any other locals and what little time she had for diversion she spent with the mission officers and their wives.

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2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

201-869482

CROSS REFERENCE TO
~~65-2-1079~~
~~65-6-44/4~~
~~201-735296~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 26218

DATE
13 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-~~
201-735296

3. The purpose of Sonia's trip to Madrid was to discuss the 1970 work plan for the Embassy with the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez. She also talked with the various Embassy officials, most probably to familiarize herself with their duties and to see if they had any problems. She pitched in and helped with the backlogged work of Orestes BARREDA and Horacio FUENTES and also helped with the cultural activities. For instance, she sent two cables to MINREX - one regarding the forwarding of movie posters for a March exhibit and another regarding the forwarding of a Cuban stamp exhibition by end March.

4. In their discussion of the 1970 work plan Sonia told RUIZ that they were going to plan the February, March, and April quarter. She showed him "an agenda for the control of planned and unplanned activities" and the general directives of the plan which included scientific information and political information, with specific directives (requirements) for Spain. RUIZ has to prepare for Havana a monthly report, then a quarterly summary, of the activities accomplished. Based on these reports the activities of the following quarter will be planned.

a. In line with the plan of scientific information, Sonia and RUIZ discussed the pros and cons of a Comite Cientifico-Tecnico which is to be set up in Madrid. RUIZ was of the opinion that the local (Spanish) Communist Party would try to infiltrate it and this would bring problems to the Embassy. Sonia pointed out the successes encountered in Switzerland and Sweden with such a committee even though at first there were problems which were later overcome.

b. Sonia showed RUIZ a commercial project which she planned to take to Portugal and asked him to read it because it was also of interest to the Cuban mission in Spain.

c. Sonia mentioned that the Plan of Information was still to be completed especially in the priority categories of livestock and economy.

d. They turned next to the topic of the budget. Sonia said that the budget for each mission had to be submitted before the end of April (every year) and no additional expenditures could be submitted for approval during the course of the year. Spain, Canada, and France, however, would be treated individually. Their special needs, such as acquisition of more office space, raises in cost of living allowances, etc., would be taken into consideration at any time.

5. During their various discussions RUIZ aired his complaint about the Visa Department in Havana saying that the department was practically worthless and that last year 76 cables regarding visas remained unanswered. Sonia defended the Ministry saying that it had a lot of work to do, but RUIZ replied that they wanted to work only 8 hours a day. They also discussed the scholarship situation. It seems that during an interview between PRIETO (Probably Jose PRIETO Benitez, Director of Foreign Relations of the DAP) and the Minister of Public Works, PRIETO was asked to provide a list of scholarship candidates to be considered and he had none. Sonia mentioned that in Belgium they also lost four scholarships because of this same reason.

6. According to QUTIMID Sonia GOMEZ Aragon is married to one Miguel (LNU) and has a daughter named Iliana. Sonia's mother is still living although appeared to be very ill at the time Sonia left for her trip to Madrid because Sonia cabled at least twice to Havana inquiring about the status of her mother's health. (TYLOTE reported that Sonia's home phone number in Havana is 7-4263.) Perhaps Headquarters can determine the full name of her husband by checking the reverse telephone listings. Sonia is attractive, intelligent, sertious-minded and reserved. The last time she visited Spain she stayed with Vera BORODOWSKI and was on the same type of mission as the present one - to discuss the Madrid Embassy's work plan. She also visited the Barcelona Consulate and the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) file

Since Headquarters has recently prepared an extensive analysis on RUIS for the information of addressees, an additional review has been omitted. However, the attached biographic study should be useful.

30 April 1970

NAME:	Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) (NOTE: A comprehensive study/analysis on RUIZ was prepared in February 1970, see OSMW-11726.)
ALIAS:	Also uses Guillermo RUIZ Perez
DPOB:	10 February 1930, Havana
PRESENT POSITION:	Minister, Charge d'Affaires, Cuban Embassy, Madrid, since December 1967.
WIFE:	Nilda VECIANA Lopez (DPOB: 26 December 1934, Havana)
CHILDREN:	Five sons, and a sixth child due to be born April/May 1970, Guillermo, the oldest, in school in Cuba. Alejandro, Julio, Juan Carlos and Ivan with their parents in Madrid.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:	White, variously described as 5'5" - 5'7" tall, and 170-190 pounds, stout build; round face, fair complexion, blond slightly wavy hair, light-colored eyes (also reported as blue and green), wears glasses. No visible identifying marks. Well dressed.
PERSONALITY:	Perhaps a relative's description of RUIZ sums up his personality - "a man of many moods." He has variously been described as intelligent, mentally alert, competent, hardworking, and respected by his subordinates. Pleasant, easy going, nervous, quick-tempered, brusque but sincere, opinionated, strong-minded idealistic, self-confident. Has basic emotional instability, gives impression of being insecure in his position. At times sarcastic, indifferent, egotistical, cynical, serious, ungrateful and cold, who, paradoxically, appears friendly to some people. Outspoken, compulsive talker, articulate, limited vocabulary, swears a good deal.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

He can turn on considerable charm, where motivated. In contrast to his pleasant public image and acceptable language, private conversation is vulgar, swears continually and flies into rages.

Likes good living and spends money where it shows. Avid reader, keeps abreast of world events, shows willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from the outside world. Concerned with the image and prestige of Cuba in Spain. Emotionally committed to an ideal. An AMEDIT study summed RUIZ up as a realist. He speaks English and French. His wife, a teacher, always worked before going to Spain, and there works as a secretary and bookkeeper at the Embassy on an informal basis. Appears intelligent, competent, outspoken but solicitious and affectionate with her husband; interested in, and encourages him in his work. Appears to support the regime, but not a fanatic. RUIZ is the dominant personality of the two.

EDUCATION:

One reference states that he went to work at age 14, which suggests lack of formal education.
In 1960 as an employee of the Ministry of the Treasury, selected to attend a statistics course offered by CEPAL, which lasted two years.

One relative reported he completed elementary education at "Hermanos Maristas" school in Havana; did not know whether he attended high school, but said in early days of the Castro regime attended the University of

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

Havana.

Another relative said his primary and secondary education was received in private institutions, and that he has a degree in "political economics" from the University of Havana.

He is well versed in world affairs and has an understanding of international trade.

PREVIOUS POSITIONS: Vice Minister, MINCEX, 1964-1967.

Commercial Counselor, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Although he was accredited to that position in December 1963, travel indicates he was in Mexico from August 1963 to May 1964. Other references indicate he was in that position in September 1963.

Ministry of the Treasury. In April 1962 he was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics of that ministry. He was with the ministry as early as 1960, when he was selected to attend the statistics course.

During the Batista regime he was in exile. Came to the U.S. sometime in the 1950's and apparently remained for some time before he left in February 1957, when, according to some reports, he entered Cuba clandestinely. Also reported to have been in exile in Mexico.

LNYUMA records show he came to U.S. on 8 November 1956 to see his brother, left 17 November for the Dominican Republic where he received five months military training. Returned to the

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

U.S. 5 April 1957, overstayed his time, and on 11 February 1958 was ordered deported; claimed he would be killed if he returned to Cuba and did not show for deportation. Subsequent investigation showed he was in Cuba as of 2 March.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE:

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Davalos, Secretary of Organization. Although he has been described as a militant Communist, a convinced supporter of the Castro regime and a fanatic Fidelista, there is evidence to dispute this image. An analysis of available information indicates that he is not a convinced Marxist, he cannot accept Party discipline, and that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves.

His father is reported to be an old-guard Communist and a leader of the barber's union. A brother reported to be a member of DSE in 1946.

He expressed dissatisfaction with his position as a diplomat, feels his talents are wasted and would like a position in commerce or industry, where he considers he could better serve the revolution. Has criticized the bureaucracy and inefficiency in the government in Havana.

He has said that many Cuban diplomats want to stay out of Cuba, but it seemed to him that the Cuban government wanted to keep him (RUIZ) out of the way (i.e., outside Cuba). That LEON had appointed him, supported him, and they are good friends, but that he (RUIZ) does not like to work with a man who one does not get to know, nor to know what he is thinking. He said he felt as if he were in Miami.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS:

In May 1964 AMMUG-1 reported RUIZ was a DGI case officer in Mexico for operations targetted against "some nearby area," and later identified his photograph as DGI member in Mexico.

In 1961 an emigre said RUIZ, with the Finance Ministry, was a Communist and G-2.

AMTIKI-1 said a letter from a friend in Cuba stated that RUIZ, then in Mexico, was a member of G-2, sent to try to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups (1963).

In April 1968, RUIZ advised Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa on the use of disguises, the need to "live secretly" and commented on DIAZ' being "already clandestine."

The Cuban Ambassador to Geneva, in 1968, commented on RUIZ' refusal to accept DGI dominance of the Cuban Embassy, Madrid. (AMDELAY-1). In July 1969, AMBEDEW-1 said RUIZ was very dictatorial in his dealings with DGI officers.

CONTACTS:

Not much is known of his contacts in Madrid, other than official. Is in touch with Ahmed LAIDI, Algerian Ambassador; Manuel TELLO Troncoso, Counselor of Chilean Embassy, Madrid; Alexandru PETRESCU, Romanian Minister to Spain and Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera, a lawyer and personal friend.

TRAVELS:

1963:	Aug.	To Mexico
	22 Nov.	Mexico-Cuba
	29 Nov.	Cuba-Mexico
	8 Dec.	Cuba-Mexico
1964:	21 May.	Mexico-Cuba
1967:	13 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1968:	15 Jan.	Spain-Netherlands

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

	16 Jan.	Netherlands-Spain
	27 July	Spain-France
	31 July	France-Spain
	6 Aug.	Spain-Cuba (via Ireland, Canada)
	29 Aug.	Cuba-Spain
	21 Nov.	Spain-Cuba
	10 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1969:	27 Feb.	France-Spain
	27 Feb.	Spain-Dominican Republic
	11 Mar.	Spain-Switzerland
	4 Aug.	Spain-Cuba
	17 Sept.	Cuba-Spain (via French West Indies, Azores)
	10 Oct.	Spain-Cuba
	29 Oct.	Cuba-Spain
	14 Nov.	Spain-UK
	16 Nov.	UK-Spain
	28-30 Nov.	Two-day trip by auto to San Sebastian and Burgos

6 Jan 70. To Italy, returning by auto.

Also claims to have been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission (QUDOZE).

ASSESSMENT: It appears that RUIZ might well be responsive to an approach, with consideration given to the manner in which it is undertaken, the timing and the person involved.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

ACCESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:

Although RUIZ' health has been described as generally good, he suffers from a back ailment which resulted from a fall in 1955 and which has been diagnosed as incurable. Also he suffers from a liver ailment for which he takes medicine.

RUIZ is scheduled to return to Cuba in mid-1970, where he expects to be with MININT, rather than MINREX or MINCEX.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE • TOTAL COPIES 7

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 798

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7346 (WMIM) 29 APR IN 072939

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A WH/MIAMI 7304 (IN 070131)

B UFAA-1978

1. SAMKO SHOWN PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 AND REMARKED, "WHY, THIS IS WILLIAM." REMEMBERED AMAUTO-1 AS NICE CLEAN-CUT BOY WITH HIGH IDEALS. WHILE THERE WAS PROBABLY FATHER-SON RELATIONSHIP, SAMKO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH.

2. SAMKO IS WILLING TO TRAVEL TO MADRID TO TALK WITH AMAUTO-1. HE HAS AN EXPIRED PASSPORT. WAS TOLD INTERVIEW WAS EXPLORATORY AND PACHANKIS WOULD RECONTACT IF SAMKO SERVICES WERE NEEDED.

3. POUCHING ABOVE CONTACT REPORT, ALONG WITH REF A CONTACT REPORT, VIA REF B.

4. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

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CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296
29 Apr 70

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

Chief of Station, Madrid;
Chief, European Division

FROM

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT

TYPIC AMAUTO
Interview of Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2 below

References:
A. DIRECTOR 026320,
B. WH/MIAMI 7304
C. WH/MIAMI 7346

1. Forwarded herewith are two contact reports submitted by Henry S. PACHANKIS on his interviews with Alexander SAMKO (201-866054) concerning Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296). Both contact reports are self-explanatory and were summarized in References B and C.

2. Please advise if WH/Miami should pursue the matter of contact between SAMKO and RUIZ in Madrid. If so, the Station suggests that PACHANKIS accompany SAMKO to Madrid as his handler.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachments:
A. Contact Report, 21 April 1970
B. Contact Report, 28 April 1970

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - COS, Madrid w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - Chief, EUR w/atts h/w (one copy)

MAY 4 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO

201-735296

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFAA-1978

DATE

29 April 1970

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

201-866054

C/FI/
DC/FI
Kerschey

21 April 1970

SUBJECT: Interview with Alexander SAMKO.

1. SAMKO was contacted by phone (927-6721) on the morning of 21 April, and he agreed to meet with "Joseph MORRIS, an official of the US government," later the same morning at his home: 1647 Rodman Street, Hollywood, Florida.

2. SAMKO accepted my credentials without any reservations. He is a Caucasian male in his 60s. He is of strong build; "white" gray hair; small clear eyes which require thick glasses to read. His most distinguishing feature is a large tatoo on his right forearm. He has a loud booming voice, with a NY accent and although he does not appear to have much of a formal education, he is articulate and sociable. He appears to be retired now and spends his days playing chess with a business associate. He lives in a clean middle class neighborhood and has a Lincoln Continental (about 3 or 4 years old) in the garage.

3. After speaking with him for over half an hour, SAMKO does not appear to know Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez. SAMKO answered my questions in a straightforward manner and I have no reason to doubt his testimony. Specifically, these are the facts as SAMKO related them:

A. The name Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (it was typewritten on a 3 x 5 card) means nothing to him. His business associate -who has worked with him for many years and especially during the 1950s- does not recall the name.

B. SAMKO acknowledges that from c. mid 1958 till c. the end of 1959, he owned the "Fruit Center" -a grocery, meat market, and fruit store- on 100 SW 17th Avenue, Miami (one block from Flagler Street). He does not recall that anyone in his employ answered to the name of Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez, or any combination of these names. He never had anything but an impersonal employer/employee relationship with his personnel.

C. The last time he had been to Cuba was in c. 1948, "when I went down from New York." He denied several times that he had been to Cuba after Castro took power in 1959.

D. SAMKO had bought the "Fruit Center" from a Mr. FNU WOODS, who also owned the property in the vicinity of 100 SW 17th Avenue. SAMKO dismissed the personnel WOODS had in the store when he bought. He does not know the whereabouts of WOODS at this time, but presumes he still owns the property.

4. Naturally, SAMKO was curious to know why we were after RUIZ. To satisfy his curiosity and perhaps elicit some admission, in the event he was playing games with me, I disclosed these bits of information:

H/W [illegible]

[illegible] 1-054

A. RUIZ had been exiled in the US -from Cuba- in the 1950s. (He was in his mid 20s at the time).

B. We had information that RUIZ had worked for SAMKO in his store as a butcher in the 1950s and that they had established a close personal friendship apart from the normal business relationship.

C. When Castro took power in Cuba (c. 1959), RUIZ had returned to Cuba and there are reports that SAMKO had visited RUIZ in Cuba in 1959. And, further, that SAMKO had offered RUIZ a partnership in his store if RUIZ returned to the US.

D. RUIZ was now the Cuban Minister to Spain and the GOUS was interested in talking to his old friends to see what kind of a person RUIZ was. We had reason to believe that SAMKO was an old friend of RUIZ'.

5. SAMKO listened intently. He seemed confused by all these reports. He denied the allegations firmly, but without betraying any sign of nervousness or doubletalk (as when one is telling less than the truth.)

6. SAMKO asked if we had a photo of RUIZ. He said he knew of no other SAMKO in the Miami area, such as a brother, uncle, etc. He did not appear to be bothered or inconvenienced by the allegations, so if he was not telling the truth, he did a wonderful job of it. The only thing he could suggest was to locate Mr WOODS -the owner before him of the "Fruit Center"- to see if he had RUIZ as an employee.

7. In view of SAMKO's statements of denial, there was nothing more to do than to thank him for his cooperation and say good morning.

Henry. S. PACHANKIS.

[illegible] 1975

SUBJECT: Interview with Alex [illegible] SANKO, on the identity of
[illegible] Guillermo RUIZ Perez, DGI Minister to Spain.

1. On the evening of 27 April, SANKO was contacted by phone at his Hollywood home ([illegible]). He was cordial and agreed to receive us on the morning of 28 April. He said he looked forward to seeing the photos of RUIZ: "Maybe we can get to the bottom of things if I see his picture."

2. Before showing him the pictures on 28 April, I gave him a short preamble on the background of the case. I said that we were perplexed that he did not recognize RUIZ' name since we had it on good authority that RUIZ still reminisced about his days in SANKO's employment and remembered him with fondness. I added that our purpose was to have someone in whom RUIZ had complete confidence talk to him and find out how he feels about his political fate. There was no violence or hanky panky involved; only a straight man to man exchange. (It was my hunch that perhaps SANKO feared we were trying to tie him into something illegal or related with RUIZ' Revolutionary activities while he was in the US and SANKO was playing it cool. This was a possibility since it was strange SANKO did not recognize RUIZ, while everything pointed that there had been a relationship.)

3. My fears were dispelled when SANKO had an opportunity to study the photos carefully: "Why, this is William. He has aged, but I would know him anywhere." There was a friendly, happy smile on his face as he reached back into his memory:

"When I bought the store, he was already working for the previous owner, [illegible]. He worked for me about 7 or 8 months and then he left for Cuba, to fight Batista. There was a tear in his eyes when he said goodbye. I understood that he had been killed. I never heard from him again. You say he is a big shot with Castro. I'm surprised at the turn, since he was such a freedom lover. He had high ideals. In my opinion, he was pro American, although he seemed more pro Cuban. He loved his country and wanted to liberate it and rid it of tyranny. He used to show me the atrocities that Batista committed when they were published in "Bohemia" and it made his blood boil. And, it made my blood boil too. He used to talk to me about taking part in the Revolution and I used to try to talk him out of it. He was happy after he talked it over with me. He would consult his problems with me and after the talk he would say, 'Sanko, I'm glad I talked to you.' I used to [illegible] him off, set him straight and help out in every way I could. I used to contribute food from the store. William would have it picked up. He said it was for the families of those men who were jailed in the US for running guns to Cuba. Although he was just a grocery clerk -he was the [illegible] of the grocery department and I kept him in the meat department when the butcher took a day off- he was a very clean cut fellow. He had a good appearance and was an all round nice kid. He was a quiet boy, a loner. I never socialized with him enough to know of his family. I don't remember that he had any relatives or friends that I knew. [illegible] back. Remember its been 19 years, a long time and I haven't thought about him in all this time. I [illegible] a long time ago and I haven't run into these people again. He was an enthusiastic Castro follower then, but I can't understand how he has turned so far left. I didn't realize he still remembers me, and you say he talks of me fondly (his face lit up with pride). He was a good boy, young, in his 20s. All of my employees had respect for me. I backed them up in everyway I could and William did everything I asked of him. No, I can't remember his last name. I only recall 'William.' Will I write to him? I won't write, because he won't answer it. You have to confront him. Sure he will talk to me. We have alot to talk over. He will pay attention to me. You say you want me to go to Spain to see him? At my expense? Oh, well, at your expense. Well, if it is for my country, I would be glad to help out."

4. I pointed out on more than one occasion that this was not a commitment, but an exploratory interview. We were grateful for his cooperation and would certainly consider him in the event my superiors opted to contact RUIZ. SAUKO was born in New Jersey and has a birth certificate. He has an expired passport from his days as a merchant seaman. In the event he is requested to go to Spain to pitch RUIZ, SAUKO understands that he will be paid only for his personal expenses.

5. To sum up, SAUKO has finally disclosed his relationship with RUIZ, but only after viewing RUIZ's photos. He knew RUIZ only as "William." Although from what SAUKO said of their relationship there was a definite father-son alliance, SAUKO never thought of it as such. Evidently the younger man was more impressed with his mentor, than the mentor with his pupil. SAUKO is available to travel to Spain to meet with RUIZ, "and try to steer him back to the high ideals he had in 1959."

6. Before parting, I thanked SAUKO once again for his cooperation and promised to keep in touch with him in the event his services were required. He too was gracious and said we could call on him anytime we need him. He repeated his refrain: "If its for my country, I'll cooperate."

Henry S. [illegible]

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 396

SECRET 242136Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7304 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

24 Apr 70 IN 070131

REF: DIRECTOR 026320

1. ALEXANDER SAMKO INTERVIEWED AND CLAIMED HE NEVER HEARD OF OR KNEW AMAUTO-1. LAST TIME HE WAS IN CUBA WAS 1948 AND DENIED HE EVER TRAVELED TO CUBA AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER IN 1959. EXPERIENCED CAREER AGENT PACKANKIS INTERVIEWED AND HAS NO REASON TO DOUBT SAMKO ANSWERS. AS FOLLOW-UP, PACHANKIS WILL SHOW TWO DIFFERENT PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 TO SAMKO FOR IDENTIFICATION. WILL ADVISE. POUCHING SAMKO INTERVIEW.

2. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

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File in:

201-735296

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, EUR; Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUDOZE/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In a conversation held in his office on 3 December 1969 AMAUTO-1 said that in 1957 he worked in the United States as a butcher for one Alexander SAMKO, a Polish-Italian. He said that SAMKO visited PBRUMEN after 1 January 1959 and invited AMAUTO-1 to return to the States to continue his job as a butcher. SAMKO is not further identified in the report.

2. If SAMKO could be located it might be interesting to obtain his assessment of AMAUTO-1.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

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2 - C/EUR
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

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OSMA-25745

DATE
5 December 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO.	Chief, European Division Chief of Station, WH/Miami
FROM	Chief of Station, Madrid
SUBJECT	RYBAT/TYPIC/AMAUTO Meeting with 201-866047 ([illegible])
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

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1. On 16 April 1970 Stacy R. HARRIOTT had lunch with Subject and Agustin GERVAS who are partners in Taller, S.A. The following is HARRIOTT's report of that meeting:

A. "Subject, and GERVAS have joined with another lawyer, fnu ITURRIAGA, to explore joint venture possibilities in Spain. Subject and Iturriaga are law partners with offices in Madrid. An assessment of Subject based on such a short conversation would not normally be of much assistance but since Subject opened up on his thoughts about Cuba, a general recommendation can be reached.

B. "During the lunch I was able to work the conversation around to the business potential for Spanish and U.S. companies in Latin America. Eventually, we touched on Cuba, and Gervas said that Subject considers himself to be an expert in this area as he visited Cuba last year and had a private three-hour interview with Fidel Castro. Gervas said that Subject received a "snow job" from the "jefe", and this about sets the tone for his feelings for the present Cuban regime. It was not clear how Subject received an invitation to Cuba, but he said that he assisted in obtaining a contract from Cuba for the Pegaso truck company - whether as a representative of this company or in a free-lance capacity

/continued/

CS copy filed in 201-866047.

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2 - WH/Miami

File in 201-735296

FILE: AMAUTO-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA 26195	DATE 29 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-866047 ~~201-735296~~

was not brought out. It seemed to me that Subject is riding an emotional high for Cuba and Castro. His face lit up and he became relatively excited when telling us how Castro mixes and talks with the "common people," and is from Spanish parents, and has done so much for the country. I asked him what his general impression was of life there and he replied "phenomenal," and I believe he meant it.

C. "Some comments that Subject made would appear to be inspired by Cuban propaganda or a briefing. He said that JKLANCE is in control of U.S. internal security and is forcing a rightest swing in its internal politics. Also, all people going to Cuba from Mexico are photographed by JKLANCE people, while if you go from Spain you don't rum this risk.

D. "I asked him if there was good potential for Spanish companies doing business with Cuba. He replied that Cuba is a bridge to Latin America. This seemed a strange answer, and I pointed out that you didn't have to go to Cuba to get to Latin America. He said, "that's true, but other countries will change to the Cuban system and will need technicians to assist them. Then we (Iguess he meant Spanish business men doing business with Cuba) will have excellent possibilities.

E. "Subject said that he knew the Cuban Ambassador to Spain and in fact visited him this morning and received a large box of Havana cigars from him.

F. "Subject is about 30 years old, good looking and makes an excellent first impression. He appears to have a good business background in addition to being a trained lawyer. He seems aggressive, determined and has a good imagination for business ventures.

G. "It would be premature to say that Subject leans toward Communism or has been had by the Cuban I.S. I doubt that he would have talked so freely about his admiration for Cuba if he is working covertly for them. It is quite certain that he is being used by the Cuban Embassy for commercial purposes, and I would estimate that he would make an excellent "front man" for Cuban business ventures.

H. "I would recommend against trying to recruit Subject as a means of getting to the Cuban Ambassador. He would probably turn down the pitch and inform the Cuban Embassy."

2. The above report is an excellent beginning in our assessment of Subject and HARRIOTT must be commended for his adeptness at steering the conversation toward the relevant areas of interest. We think the report stands alone and requires little commentary by the Station; however, we might add here that there is a strong probability that Subject was indeed snowed under by the impact of his alleged three-hour talk with Castro. Given Castro's charisma and persuasive qualities it would not be difficult to "convince" a young lawyer, alien to the Cuban environment, of the progress in Cuba. Not withstanding HARRIOTT's fine report we feel that Subject is still wallowing in the ebullience of this confrontation with Fidel Castro. His short relationship with the Cuban Embassy and one visit to Cuba would hardly make him an authority on Cuba.

3. If you agree we would like to try another attempt to get an assessment of Subject. For days we have been trying to devise a cover story for a Station officer to use in an approach to Subject. We have one and would like your comments, suggestions and ideas. A Station officer, preferably in disguise and using an alias, would approach Subject as a free lance writer for "World News" (a suggestion made by UCAMERA-1 because there are so many stringers for "World News" that it would be virtually impossible to confirm) with the intention that he is writing an article on Spanish lawyers in business with the theme that a degree in law offers greater opportunities for advancement in business and government. (The theme actually is taken from an article in Fortune or Business Week magazine read by the undersigned some years ago). The theme was tested on CUCAMERA-1 and he agrees that it is a good one and would work because of the general nature of Spanish businessmen to like to talk about themselves. What is involved however, is a considerable amount of homework, particularly in the collection of names of lawyers in business who have been successful. CUCAMERA-1 is preparing a list of such people and we will review them together. The undersigned subsequently will ask for Dun and Bradstreet reports on the firms these lawyers represent as well as review the firms' financial history in our reference aids located in the Embassy's commercial library.

4. The theme opens the door to a number of provoking questions, but it particularly offers a good opportunity to assess the personality of the target. Perhaps the opportunity will again come when Subject discusses his relationship and knowledge of Cuba at which time an interesting exchange might ensue possibly provoking Subject to reveal his true relationship with the Cubans and/or his affection for the Cuban system. No pitch would be made and, if after this assessment, the officer arrives at HARRIOTT's conclusion, the Station would recommend against using Subject as an intermediary to AMAUTO-1.

Advise.

Howard R. SACODER

RYBAT

201-735296

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ACTION NO. 396

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INFO FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

S E C R E T 242136Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7304 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

REF: DIRECTOR 026320

24 Apr '70 IN 070131

1. ALEXANDER SAMKO INTERVIEWED AND CLAIMED HE NEVER HEARD OF OR KNEW AMAUTO-1. LAST TIME HE WAS IN CUBA WAS 1948 AND DENIED HE EVER TRAVELED TO CUBA AFTER CASTRO TAKEOVER IN 1959. EXPERIENCED CAREER AGENT PACKANKIS INTERVIEWED AND HAS NO REASON TO DOUBT SAMKO ANSWERS. AS FOLLOW-UP, PACHANKIS WILL SHOW TWO DIFFERENT PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 TO SAMKO FOR IDENTIFICATION. WILL ADVISE. POUCHING SAMKO INTERVIEW.

2. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

File: Amauto-1

ORIG: RICHARD ENNIS;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1255
DATE: 22 APRIL 1970

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23 00 01z APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 027720

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: OTTAWA

TYPIC AMROSE AMDOCILE

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 020399

1. LNERGO DOCUMENT ON GINES GORRIZ CASTROMAN DATED 1961 AND MISFILED JUST RETRIEVED BY HQS. DOCUMENT CONCERNS GORRIZ'S MILITARY SERVICE RECORD WHICH WE STILL TRYING OBTAIN.

2. LNERGO DOCUMENT LISTS GORRIZ'S NEXT-OF-KIN WHILE IN SERVICE AS HUMBERTO MARRERO, 617 152 STREET, NEW YORK. GORRIZ BROTHER LISTED AS SUMBERTON (SIC) CASTROMAN, SAME ADDRESS. GORRIZ HOME ADDRESS SAME PLUS "CARE OF PEREZ".

3. COULD THE HUBERTO (SIC) LISTED AS GORRIZ'S BROTHER IN WH/MIAMI 6934 (IN 049917) BE HUMBERTO MARRERO? ONE NOT IDENTIFIABLE, NON-DEROGATORY TRACE ~~[illegible]~~ CU MARRERO FROM LNERGO IN 1952.

4. NO HQS TRACES SUMBERTON CASTROMAN. NO CASTROMANS IN NEW YORK TELEPHONE DIRECTORY. NO PEREZ AT ABOVE ADDRESS IN REVERSE DIRECTORY. NO HUMBERTO MARRERO IN DIRECTORY.

5. CAN YOU PIN DOWN MARRERO'S ADDRESS SO WE CAN TRY LOCATE?

AN	ULC
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DES	RFD
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201-735216

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6. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

APR 2 9 '70

LR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/BC/C L Leas
E/BC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

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Qu T, mic
Report No. 2533.

14 April 1970.

Mr. JAVIER, from the Casa Conde of Vigo, calls HORACIO to say that they have had in Vigo for two months the ship VIA JAIBA (ph) for repairs and the captain has decided that it is best if the crew takes its month of vacation now and return later to the ship in Vigo. J adds the captain has to return to Cuba on Friday by CUBANA, but he has no visa and authorization must be requested from the General Department of Security. HORACIO takes down the captain's name: Eugenio LEOPOLDO PORTAL y PEÑA, Passport No. 038-534, issued 12 September 1969, Havana.

Nilda RUIZ calls Alicia FRANCO to instruct her that should someone go by claiming to be a relative of hers to say she has no cousins or relatives of any sort. AF tells her that person went by the Consulate the day before claiming to be her cousin and saying he was a Spaniard. NR contends she cannot imagine where he got that notion because she has no cousins, adding that her cousins are Catalonians and not from Gijón. AF says the man who came to the Consulate saying to be her cousin resembles NR, and describes him as having blue eyes, sort of blond, and tall. She then says it is an older married couple. According to NR, all her family comes from Catalonia. AF repeats this is an older married couple and their problems cannot be solved by the Consulate, rather they must be resolved there (in Cuba?),

OSMA-26224

15 May 1970

for as she says, "It is a boy who also claims to be a relative of yours and wants to come here, but that he has a brother in New York." NILDA says, "That is a bunch of lies..." N wants A to take down the name of that person if he should come back to the Consulate, so that she may find out who they are.

FRANCO talks with ALICIA and says that the case of the gusano who killed this wife is being handled by HORACIO.

Report No. 2536. 14 April 1970.

Raul GONZALEZ Romero calls ALDO (ph) to ask if VILLA ROYA is there, for he wants to talk with him. He is. ALDO ask the architect comrade how are things going regarding the lots. GR says everything they have seen has been interesting and it is good experience for they can compare and select. He adds that so far the lot on Paseo de la Habana is the best and this is precisely what he wants to tell José Miguel VILLA ROYA.

GONZALEZ ROMERO (to VILLA ROYA): After having seen what we have seen until now and after having checked everything yesterday afternoon--with this man next door--the possibility of resolving at this time the question of the frontón /pediment/, we think that the best lot we have seen, and the truth is that we should not let any more time go by because we might lose it, is the one one Paseo de la Habana. That is, the first one

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BY: AT: Z

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. TDCSDB 315/01741-7

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. OSM 9970

DISSEM BY IW PER GIS

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI O, FI/D, IW, BI/AN.

ACTION NO. 839

CI, SOD 3, WH/COG 4, WH/COG/R 4, EUR 9, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, CS/RF

SECRET 121553Z APR 72 CITE MADRID 0861

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

10A 060346

INTEL TYPIC ZRWAHOO TIMID

SUPDATA SOURCE: PARAGRAPH TWO FROM

1 2
QUAXE-1 AND FROM QUFLUTE-1. NO INDEX.

FILED: 121553Z

(IW COMMENT: OPS DATA (TRUE NAME) DELETED FROM SUPDATA PER CSHB-F-51-1, CHAPTER IV, PARA 29. COPY OF ORIGINAL SUPDATA GIVEN TO WH/COG, EUR/IB, VR, FILE, ADDP, C/FI.)

FILE:
pmm 70-1

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

IN 060346

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

EXO DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CONFIDENTIAL 101918Z CITE TDCS DB 315/01741-70

DIST 10 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY: CUBA

DOI: 3 APRIL 1970

SUBJECT: CUBAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON KIDNAPPING OF CUBAN DIPLOMATS

ACQ: SPAIN, MADRID (6 APRIL 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 9970

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. ON 3 APRIL 1970 GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ, CUBAN MINISTER TO SPAIN, ADVISED HIS SUBORDINATES OF THE OFFICIAL CUBAN POSITION ON KIDNAPPING. HE SAID THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL CUBA EXCHANGE ANY POLITICAL PRISONER FOR A CUBAN OFFICIAL - THAT "HE WHO KIDNAPS ONE OF US WILL HAVE TO KILL US."

2. (FIELD COMMENT: REPORTS FROM OTHER SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT ALL CUBAN DIPLOMATS TRAVELING OR STATIONED ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON. AS OF 8 APRIL 1970 ALL CUBAN

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

S [illegible] 1970

7. The Station has now focused on a possible intermediary to an eventual approach to [illegible]. Of all the operations currently active or planned, we believe this operation will be the most demanding on the Station. (See OSMA [illegible], 18 March 1970.)

8. We have now pinpointed the home address of the mistress of Subject of 201-[illegible] and it is now a question of watching her movements. A lack of surveillance capability has placed a burden on Station personnel, but it is expected that a pitch will be made before the end of April, preferably by Perry D. WACHAL prior to his departure.

9. A dispatch was prepared and forwarded asking for Headquarters permission to use [illegible]-1 to make a recruitment pitch to Subject of 201-[illegible]. [illegible]-1 and Subject are former classmates and based on his assessment there might be a good chance to gain Subject's cooperation. (See OSMA 20085, 1 April 1970.)

10. Headquarters approval was received to mount operation AMCACTUS. [illegible]-37 will arrange all the details with AMCACTUS-1 and AMCACTUS-2. In an effort to make operation AMCACTUS as broad and flexible as operationally possible, the Station has commented on the use of the AMCACTUS devices in parallel operations. (See OSMA 20105, 8 April 1970.)

11. The PBRUMEN Government has approved the construction of a new official installation in Madrid which is expected to be completed within one year. The Station is actively pursuing this matter with the intention to install various audio devices in the new building. There will be a number of barriers to overcome since the PBRUMENs appear to want the building constructed by their own team of workers. The Station expects to work closely with [illegible] in this operation. (See OSMA 20040, 18 March 1970 and DIRECTOR 621511, 1 April 1970.)

Perry D. WACHAL

[illegible] 1
201-

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

[illegible]

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat in Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez

REPORT NO. 00-[illegible]

DATE DISTR. 27 MAR 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES [illegible]. I-A, I-B

DATE OF INFO. Feb 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Havana/Feb 70 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 13 780 716, age 30, who arrived in the US by air on 20 Feb 70. Source was a resident of Havana. He completed 15 years of schooling.

[This report was developed by a Naval representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

1. Guillermo Ruiz Perez, a close relative, is the "Cuban Ambassador to Spain [collateral information dated 19 Jan 65 indicated that a Guillermo Ruiz Perez was the Acting Charge d' Affaires in Spain]. Ruiz has been a Communist since before the days of Castro's regime. I think that he was a member of the old PSP. Just prior to 1959 Ruiz was operating clandestinely in the Dominican Republic trying to create an overthrow of Trujillo's regime. For this Trujillo reportedly wanted him dead, but Ruiz escaped and returned to Cuba. Castro appointed Ruiz Minister of Foreign Relations sometime during 1959. Ruiz filled this post until 1963 or 1964 at which time he was appointed Ambassador to Spain, a post that he still holds.

2. Ruiz is a well-educated individual with a degree in political economics from the University of Havana. All his prior secondary, and primary education was conducted in private institutions. Ruiz is a man of many moods. At times he is, sarcastic, indifferent, hypocritical, cynical, serious, ungrateful, and cold. Paradoxically, he appears friendly to some people. Regardless, he is a very intelligent and outspoken person.

3. At present he is living at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Spain, with his wife and four children. I do not think that he has returned to Cuba since his last trip here in early 1969. He has a brother, Osvaldo Ruiz Perez, who has asked to leave Cuba via Spain and is presently working in the cane fields.

4. Physical description of Guillermo Ruiz: Caucasian, age 40, 5'6", 175 lbs, green eyes, thin blond hair, wears glasses, and is always impeccabl[illegible]

-end-

Personalities

U Y[illegible]

S Y[illegible]

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NO DISSEM ABROAD

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201

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba, Spain

SUBJECT Cuban Diplomat in Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez

REPORT NO. 00-[illegible]/07039-70
CAC

DATE DISTR. 27 MAR 1970

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES (53[illegible]) C-C[illegible]-69003, I-A, I-B

DATE OF INFO. Feb 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Havana Feb 70 and earlier

1P

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Cuban national, A 18 780 716, age 30, who arrived in the US by air on 20 Feb 70. Source was a resident of Havana. He completed 15 years of schooling.

DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

[This report was developed by a Naval representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

201- 735296

1. Guillermo Ruiz Perez, a close relative, is the Cuban Ambassador to Spain [collateral information dated 12 Jun 68 indicates that a Guillermo Ruiz Perez was the Acting Chargé d'Affaires in Spain]. Ruiz has been a Communist since before the days of Castro's regime. I think that he was a member of the old PSP. Just prior to 1959 Ruiz was operating clandestinely in the Dominican Republic trying to create an overthrow of Trujillo's regime. For this Trujillo reportedly wanted him dead, but Ruiz escaped and returned to Cuba. Castro appointed Ruiz Minister of Foreign Relations sometime during 1959. Ruiz filled this post until 1963 or 1964 at which time he was appointed Ambassador to Spain, a post that he still holds.

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brother of subject 201-735296

4. Physical description of Guillermo Ruiz: Caucasian, age 40, 5'6", 175 lbs, green eyes, thin blond hair, wears glasses, and is always impeccably dressed.

-end-

CS C[illegible]

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1970
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U	YES

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NO DISSEM ABROAD

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II

ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR C/EUR 5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI 2,

ACTION NO. 462

SD

WH/C/SOP

S E C R E T 252057Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6934
WMIM

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC SMABOVE

25 MAR IN 049917

R

1. PER AGREEMENT DURING SMABOVE VISIT MIAMI, WE HAVE LOCATED SEVERAL RELATIVES OF GINES SILVIO GORRIZ CASTROMAN. IN CONTACTING FRANCISCO GORRIZ CARBALLO ONE OF THE AMOTS RECEIVED A RATHER UNFRIENDLY RECEPTION. WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF SMABOVES COULD DETERMINE WHETHER GINES HAS HAD ANY CONTACT WITH FRANCISCO.

2. ACCORDING TO THE AMOT REPORT GINES HAS A BROTHER IDENTIFIED AS HUBERTO GORRIZ CASTROMAN RESIDING NEW YORK CITY ON OR NEAR 162TH STREET, EXACT ADDRESS UNKNOWM.

3. POUCHING COMPLETE AMOT REPORT FOR OTTAWA AND DIRECTOR.

4. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

25 Mar 70

SECRET

201-735296

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATI[illegible] TOP AND BOTTOM

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr White		
2	DU-3		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

This sort of pitty-patty Belles-Lettres exchange will get no one anywhere. No one is serious about amount of he is learning, and - so - it's futile. Dismal performance.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CI/F1	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

TO JOHN SHERWOOD

FROM WHEELER

Would appreciate your comments in turn. Pls return for an on going

Notes

1. Now that AMAUTO-1 is scheduled to go back to Cuba in mid-year, it is a bit late to begin the recruitment of an intermediary. We have information that he intends to go back to MININT rather than MINREX or even MINCEX, which makes the likelihood of his coming out again somewhat slimmer to say the least. I'm afraid that, although we have time only for a reasoned quick approach, this type of approach might lose him to us for good.

2. This causing him to become suspicious is not quite what we had in mind when we wrote ref B. We made, I think, a rather strong case for laying cards on the table with AMAUTO-1, and a slow development by a senior staff officer seemed to emerge from the possibilities. We even suggested how it might be done (through the gymnasium). That might be impossible, but the validity of the approach should deserve a comment.

3. An intermediary would be an access agent, so certainly he should be responsive. I can't consider this point to have any additional bearing on the matter. Of course it will be difficult, and I'm glad they're prepared to work on it.

4. I'd like to have had a chance to review the Dun & Bradstreet file on Carlitos, even tho the PCA has gone forward. CORRECTION: we have it.

5. A joint operation (in some ways) is the easy way out. We simply did not get started in time.

6. I disagree, because the question of commitments is somewhat premature, but I'd be willing to push for 750-1,000 a month while working in place, with a bonus when he does come out. For defection outright, which is a poor second, he might even be worth work to resettle him here. UBGA 19006 reported a 1964 attempt to get at Mrs. AMAUTO-1's relatives in Miami, and they might still be there. PerO haps they would sponsor. Everything, but everything depends on initial approaches and debriefings.

7. There are a lot of unanswered questions, posed in the outgoing, and I'd have appreciated a word about them: we have answered this one, we are working in tal manner on that one, etc.

a. The construction work on the new Embassy. There is a separate dispatch on this so all is on wheels.

b. The lonely automobile trips deserves looking into. No comment in the incoming.

etc.

In any case, they're on it, so I want to encourage as much as possible.

Pls tube back (DV-3) when you've had a chance to comment

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

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TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT: RYBAT TYPIC
AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMW 11585

B. OSMW 11726

1. There is little we can contribute to the exceptionally fine reports submitted by Headquarters on AMAUTO-1. His character, personality, physical and mental capabilities, and to some extent even his vulnerabilities, are succinctly outlined in your reports. In addition, you have appropriately recognized the Hurculean task we have, to overcome his strong-mindedness and idealistic character.

2. After a series of discussions among the officers involved with PBRUMEN operations at the Station, we have concluded that to execute a logically developed "traditional" recruitment, we are faced with the challenge to recruit a person, an intermediary, in whom AMAUTO-1 has confidence and respect; an individual who is able to plausibly carry on a polemic argument with AMAUTO-1 without either antagonizing him or causing him to become suspicious of the intermediary's true role. Moreover, the intermediary must be intelligent to be able to respond in an appropriate way to our instructions, as well as show a genuine willingness to cooperate. Frankly, we have no such person currently on our list of assets and to find someone with the attributes set forth in Reference A, will be difficult to say the least, but we are prepared to work diligently on this problem.

[illegible]
Date 25 MAR 70

Attachments:
A. PRQ Part I, USC
B. Identities, USC

ATT. # 1 SLASHED into OSMA-26061/01; FILED INTO 201-866047.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/atts A&B, USC
2 - C/EUR, w/att B, USC
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att B, USC

....continued

1 ATT

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA - 26061	18 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T/R Y B A T	201-735296

3. AMAUTO-1 confides in few people. From our reading of QUTIMID and QUDOZE, there are at least three persons who could logically and effectively fill the role as an intermediary. They are Identities A, B, and C. We can categorically eliminate Identity A for obvious reasons, i.e., lack of direct access to him. Because of his relationship to Identity D, we can also tentatively eliminate Identity B. He presents a risk which we are not certain should be taken; however, we would like to add a comment on him in a later paragraph. Identity C would seem to be the most logical choice. He is intelligent, a professional man, well-to-do, young and one with whom AMAUTO-1 frequently talks and whom he often sees. We know little about his political proclivities although he gives the impression of being a moderate analyst of world events and doesn't seem to have a strong affection or aversion for the PBRUMEN Government. We have a good background on him prepared for us by Dun and Bradstreet; however, as you can well imagine, the report concentrates on the economic side of the individual. We have made a number of attempts here in the Embassy to determine whether he has any American contacts, but with negative results. His visa file does not show where he visited in the United States or the purpose, except that it was a business trip. He has an indefinite visa and we are fairly certain that, if necessary, we could use the question of his visa as an entree to him. We are currently reviewing with all Station assets their knowledge of Identity C. In addition, we are also considering assets such as QUCASH-1 and QUSPOT-1, who could, under some legitimate business pretext, contact Identity C. Our objective is to develop a warm entree to Identity C without compromising any of our agents, but we are in need of an assessment of Identity C by either a Station Officer or an asset working under an officer's instructions. We will keep you advised of our progress. We are forwarding PRQ Part I under separate cover. A POA on Identity C was requested separately. There are no derogatory Station traces.

4. Identity B would be an excellent choice if not for his relationship with Identity D. This avenue might be explored with QUSEQUIN-48 if Headquarters is agreeable to a joint operation. QUSEQUIN-48 could probably get the necessary clearances from Identity D directly, or from one of Identity D's aides, to contact Identity B. We will not pursue this until we receive your comments.

5. It is not too early to consider the emoluments we might want to offer to AMAUTO-1 at the time a pitch is made. As always they should be divided into two areas - for defection and for recruitment and work in place.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

201-735296

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A. TO: OSMA - 26061, 18 March 1970

IDENTITIES

Identity A: Romanian Minister to Spain

Identity B: Nicholas FRANCO

Identity C: Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera

Identity D: Generalisimo Francisco FRANCO, Chief of State

CS COPY

S/C ATT. 1 to OSMA-26061

201-735296

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division;
COS, WH/Miami; COB, FRANTECH

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
RYBAT TYPIC TECHS/Construction of New PBRUMEN Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA 24774

1. The PBRUMEN government has approved the construction in Madrid of a new office building to be used as an Embassy, Commercial office and residence for the PBRUMEN Minister. The site has been identified and work is expected to begin soon, probably after the return of AMAUTO-1 from PBRUMEN, sometime within the next two weeks. The builders expect to complete the building within eight months.

2. QUSEQUIN-37 is far more confident than we are, about the possibility of getting access to the building during the construction phase to possibly install various audio devices. We believe this operation to be a formidable one and we might be challenged by the presence in Madrid of PBRUMEN security forces overseeing the construction, the presence of PBRUMEN electricians and other professions, complicating the access to the building. We believe AMAUTO-1 has the Romanian experience well in mind and most likely will do everything within his power to overcome the possibility of an audio penetration of his building.

3. We would be grateful for any information addressees might have on the general modus operandi of PBRUMEN security forces in areas where PBRUMEN official installations have been constructed. Have they used PBRUMEN technicians, electricians, construction engineers, etc? Also we would like to know whether the PBRUMENS have installed their own telephone system or have they generally relied on the system of the host country. We would appreciate too, any comments Headquarters or other addressees would like to make on the best course of action for the Station to consider. QUSEQUIN-37 believes he can get a copy of the blueprints after the plan

(continued)

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2 - COB,FRANTECH

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 26040	18 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER Advise File

is submitted for approval to the Spanish Government. He feels confident that he can probably get the Spanish telephone company to cooperate and possibly some of the sub-contractors, if there are any.

4. We have made the assumption above that Headquarters desires the Station to pursue this matter,; if not please advise.

Howard R. SACODER

C. L.

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:mdu
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819/7144
DATE: 20 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR. CI/AN, EUR-6, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 23 29 Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 018916

TYPIC ANAUTO

REF: WH/MIAMI 6841 (IN 044777)

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON ALEXANDER SAMKO.

2. SAMKO ASSIGNED 201-866054. HIS POA IS BEING PROCESSED, WILL ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-866054, X-REF 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref provided bio data and requested POA for debriefing on Alexander SAMKO, businessman in Miami, Florida. AMAUTO-1, recruitment target in Madrid, Spain, worked for one Alexander SAMKO as an apprentice butcher in 1957.

E/IB/S ______

File:
Amauto-1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ARL LUNSFORD:mdu
WH/COG/OPS
R1819/7144
17 MARCH 1970

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CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, EUR6, CI/OA, FI/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 19 19 15Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 018318

TO MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

1. ONLY HQS TRACE ON CARLOS CARRASCO MUNOZ DE VERA OTHER THAN INFO CONTAINED OSM-9487, MAR 1969, IS TRAVEL FROM SPAIN-CUBA 10 MARCH 69; CUBA-SPAIN 14 MARCH 69.

2. CARRASCO ASSIGNED 201-866047. POA BEING PROCESSED, WILL ADVISE. IF ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE, WILL ASSIGN CRYPTONYM.

3. FILE: 201-866047, X-REF 201-736296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Reference requested traces and priority POA on Carlos CARRASCO Munoz De Vera, businessman and lawyer in Madrid, Spain, and a personal friend of AMAUTO-1.

C/WH/COG

AC/E/IB/S Luis Porro

FILE!
AMAUTO-1

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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I

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 CI/OA

ACTION NO.
708

S E C R E T 172034Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6841 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMTM

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

17 Mar IN 044777

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

1. THROUGH LOCAL WOBONE OFFICE STATION HAS LOCATED AN ALEXANDER SAMKO WHO LIVES IN HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA. ACCORDING TO LOCAL RECORDS HE WAS BORN 2 NOVEMBER 1907 IN PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY. WIFE'S NAME IS SELMA SAMKO. HE IS CURRENTLY LISTED AS THE OWNER OF THE BEACH DELICATESSEN AND GROCERY LOCATED AT 302 JOHNSON STREET, HOLLYWOOD.

201-366654

2. THE 1957 MIAMI CITY DIRECTORY LISTED SUBJECT AS MANAGER OF A FIRM KNOWN AS MIR-A-KIL PRODUCTS. 1958-59 DIRECTORY LISTED HIM AS OWNER OF THE FRUIT CENTER AT 100 SW 17TH AVENUE.

3. LOCAL FILES STATED THAT ON 12 MAY 1960 SAMKO MADE AN APPLICATION FOR A LIQUOR LICENSE. HE WAS FINGERPRINTED AND HIS FINGERPRINTS WERE FORWARDED TO LNERGO. LATTER REPORTED NO CRIMINAL RECORD.

4. STATION WILL CONTACT AND DEBRIEF ON RECEIPT OF POA.

5. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN 1/70
~~AR~~
~~IN~~
~~PG~~
~~EX~~
~~DEC NPD~~
~~FI~~
L.H/C/HP

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201-735296
17 Mar 70

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14

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR ~~RID~~, EUR6

ACTION NO. 659

S E C R E T 171406Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6832 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

17 [illegible] 044405

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

B. MADRID 0690 (IN 043656)

1. NO STATION TRACES CARLOS CARRASCO MUNOZ DE VERA.

2. FILE CARRASCO 201. X-REF 201-736296. GP-1

S E C R E T

FILE: AMAUTO-1

SECRET

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II

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI 2

ACTION NO. 560

S E C R E T 161518Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0690 16 MAR 70 043656

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: MADRID 0689 (IN 043650)

1. IDENTITY: CARLOS (CARRASCO) MUNOZ DE VERA

DPOB: SPAIN, 6 MARCH 1939

2. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS CI/OA FI 2

ACTION NO. 561

S E C R E T 161517Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0639

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

16 Mar IN 043650

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 015890

1. STATION COMMENTS ON RECRUITMENT AMAUTO-1 TO BE POUCHED 18 MARCH.

2. REQUEST TRACES AND PRIORITY POA ON IDEN WHO IS LAWYER, AND PERSONAL FRIEND AMAUTO-1. PRQ PART I WILL BE ATTACHED TO ABOVE DISPATCH. POA FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT AND IF FAVORABLE, RECRUITMENT AS INTERMEDIARY FOR OP AGAINST AMAUTO-1.

3. FILE 201-73$\overset{5}{6}$296. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID/[illegible] 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

[illegible] VAL [illegible]-129
[illegible] CA [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] CT-7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		19 MAR 1970		5
2. Wheeler		23 Mar.		dw
3. Lunsford				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID. FI				

COMMENTS

[illegible] Thli

2-3: This is probably Lourdes Suárez de Cepeda, ¿no? Doesn't look like any action required.

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

61547

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT ✓	X
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
13 Mar 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
OSMA 26025

FORM 1-61 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1401

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division;
COS, WH/Miami, COB/DO, New York

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUTIMID/U.S. Company in Touch with Cuban Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OSMA 25995
B. DIRECTOR 014234
C. MADRID 0620

1. According to QUTIMID on 26 February, Miss SUAREZ de Cepeda of the Grolier Company called AMAUTO-1 and spoke with his secretary to explain that her company is giving their book to a number of persons in order to obtain their opinions about the product and AMAUTO-1 was one of the persons on Grolier's list. AMAUTO-1's secretary said that he would call when he returned. Later, Miss SUAREZ was told that an appointment was made for 10 March.

2. This would appear to be a routine item which probably would not merit further investigation, unless we can discover someone of higher caliber in the Grolier Company who could approach AMAUTO-1 as a means of cultivating a meaningful friendship with AMAUTO-1.

Philip C. KENTLAND

2cc to E/IB/5

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami
2 - COB/DO, New York

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 26025	13 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~05-120-80~~ 201-135296

WH/C/OP

RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
WH/COG/OPS
R1819
DATE: 13 MARCH 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 10

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ #

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, ARC 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 14 16 20Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 017236

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

REF: WH/MIAMI 6753 (IN 040850)

1. FOR STATION'S INFORMATION IN REF INVESTIGATION, LNYUMA FILE ON AMAUTO-1 SHOWS HE USED FOLLOWING ADDRESSES DURING HIS STAY THERE:

A. C/O OSVALDO RUIZ (BROTHER)
826 N E SECOND AVENUE

B. 121 N E FIFTH STREET, APT 19

C. 1440 N W TWENTY FIRST TERRACE

D. 1749-½ N W TWENTY FIRST STREET

2. FOR HIS LNYUMA INVESTIGATION HE RETAINED LAW FIRM OF WALTERS, MOORE, AND COSTANZO, 1008 AINSLEY BUILDING.

3. FILE SHOWS HE FIRST LEFT CUBA 8 NOV 56, WENT TO KEY WEST TO SEE BROTHER, LEFT MIAMI AIRPORT 17 NOV 56 AS TOURIST TO DOM REP WHERE HE RECEIVED FIVE MONTHS MILITARY TRAINING. DECIDED TO LEAVE BECAUSE HE FOUND HE WAS IN WITH GROUP OF CUBAN "GANGSTERS" AND WAS IMPRISONED THERE FOR FIFTEEN DAYS FOR TRYING TO ESCAPE. POLICARPIO

AN
RID

CS COPY

12 Mar 70

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201-735296

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MAR 19 11 02 AM '70

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 017236

TO

SOLER (AKA JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ) WAS IN CHARGE OF CUBAN EXILES TRAINING THERE.

4. HE REENTERED U.S. 5 APRIL 57, OVERSTAYED HIS TIME, AND ON 11 FEB 58 WAS ORDERED DEPORTED TO CUBA. HE CLAIMED HE WOULD BE KILLED IF HE RETURNED, THAT U.S. WAS ONLY PLACE WHERE HE FELT FREE, SO HE NEVER SHOWED FOR DEPORTATION. LATER LNYUMA INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT AS OF 2 MAR 58 HE WAS LIVING AT CALLE 86 NUMBER 705, APT 1, MIRAMAR, HAVANA, HAVING LEFT ON "EXPEDITION PLANE" FROM MIAMI.

5. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENTS: Ref reports WH/Miami reviewing leads in Miami area pertaining to targetting of AMAUTO-1.

MAR 19 3 59 PM '70
FORWARDED
RID/ED

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

EUR/IB

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DO4, EUR6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 483

S E C R E T 132110Z MAR 70 CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 7526 NYDO

LATER INFO REVEALED SHE WAS STAYING IN MADRID. CABLE FROM MADRID NO. [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC DOMOPS QUTIMID AMAUTO

13 MAR IN 042774

4

REF DIRECTOR 014234

1. NO BASE OR LOCAL LNERGO TRACES MISS (FNU)LOURDES SUBJ REF. PRETEXT PHONE CALL BY BASE OFFICER TO GROLIER INC. PUBLISHER (ONLY LOCAL FIRM CORRESPONDING TO GROLIER CITED REF) ESTABLISHED THAT NO PERSON THAT NAME EMPLOYED THERE.

2. NOTE THAT PHONE NUMBER MENTIONED REF IS MADRID NUMBER, NOT NEW YORK.

3. UNLESS FURTHER IDENTIFYING INFO FORTHCOMING ON LOURDES BASE PLANS NO ADDITIONAL ACTION THIS MATTER.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1.

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

201-735296

13 Mar 70.

15 November 1976

SUBJECT: Typed Notes from Review of I&NS File of
Orestes Guillmero RUIZ Perez

Subject's file was presumably reviewed in the spring of 1970 at the I&NS office at 119 D St., N.E., Room 547

/Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez7 made application at Miami on 2 April 1957 c/o Osvaldo RUIZ
826 N.E., 2nd Avenue
Miami, Fla.

Was admitted 5 April 1957 (from 3 Apr primary inspection)

Alias in school: Willie
Address : Quinte 5, #714, Havana
DPOB : Havana, 10 Feb. 1930
Remarks : Cannot go back to Cuba.
Havana U. student. If he returns would be killed by Batista Govt.

Left Cuba 8 November 1956, went to Key West to see his brother, above address.

Left from Miami approx. 17 Nov 56 as tourist to Dom. Rep. by CDA airline on tourist card. Stayed with Mrs. Rosa HERNANDEZ, Calle Morffa # 17, C.T. Family friends of 1 yr. from Havana. Stayed two weeks. Went to Feria de la Pax as interpreter and guide, hired by HERNANDEZ family. Worked for tips. Lived at boardinghouse at Calle Barahouce # 115 for 4 months.

Wanted to immigrate because it was only place where he felt free.

Came to U.S. on CDA #400 on 2 Apr 57. Had previously applied in 1947 for study in States from Havana but didn't come. Was married at that time.

Had written letters to newspapers in Havana against Batista Govt.

Full set of finger prints available.
Applied to extend time of temporary stay. Statement dated 10 May 57 (with interpreter)

Address given: 121 N.E. 5th St., Apt 19
Miami
Passport : 49248, Cuban

continued

Was a prisoner in Dom Rep, not in a prison, but in a concentration camp with 11 others for 15 days because he tried to escape, because he was taking military training. Had been asked there by one Jose Antonio ECHEVERRIA who was killed in Cuba in attack on Pres. Palace on 13 57. ECHEVERRIA approached RUIZ at Havana U. When he went to Dom Rep, found a bunch of Cuban gangsters instead of decent people. POLICARPO Soler aka Joaquin RODRIGUEZ, was in charge of group, who was one who arrested him. Had actually 5 months military training Nov 56 to Apr 57.

Was in student demonstrations and passed propaganda vs. Batista regime.

One Dr. VENAGE, Cuban, gave RUIZ a ticket to return to the U.S. from Dom Rep.

N.B. He is opposed to Communist philosophy. His group, the university students, had a fight with Communists. not true admitted leftism comments

On or about 12 July 57 RUIZ wanted to obtain permanent residence visa in U.S.

5 Nov 57 notified he had to leave by 4 Dec 57.

25 Sept 57, living with wife and child at 1440 N.W. 21st Terrace. /Miami/

In Nov 57, at 1749½ N.W. 21st St., Miami and ____________ had joined there.

Overstayed his time. 11 Feb 58 ordered deported to Cuba. Represented on or about 14 Feb 58 by the firm Walters, Moore, and Costanzo (1008 Ainsley Bldg.)

Notified 4 times of interrogation but had moved addr. week a/o 25 Jul 58.

Order for detention issued 21 Aug 58.

Order for deportation issued 19 Mar 59.

Investigation showed he returned to Havana to Calle 5#714 on 2 Mar 58 on an "expedition by plane." A/o 6 Apr 59 living at Calle 86 #705, Apt 1, Miramar

Chris Hopkins
Task Force "K"

TAL SLIP | DATE [illegible]

ROOM NO. | BUILDING

REMARKS:

119 D St NE
Rm 547
Ask for Edith
Byard

FROM:

ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
☆ GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

①

Made appl at Miami on ~~[illegible]~~ 2 Apr 57
c/o Osvaldo Ruiz
826 NE 2nd Ave
Miami, Fla.

Admitted 5 Apr 57 (from 3 Apr primary inspection)

Alias in school : Willie
Address : Quinta 5, #714, Havana
DPOB : Havana, 10 Feb. 1930
Remarks : Cannot go back to Cuba. Havana U. student. If he returned would be killed by Batista govt.

Left Cuba 8 NOV 56, went to Key West to see his brother, above address.

Left from Miami a/p 17 NOV 56 as tourist to Dom Rep. by CDA airline on Tourist Card. Stayed w/Mrs. ROSA HERNANDEZ, Calle Martha # 17, C.T. Family friends of 1 yr. from Havana. Stayed 2 wks. Went to Feria de la Paz as interpreter & guide, hired by HERNANDEZ family. Worked for tips. Lived at boarding house at Calle Barahona #115 for 4 months.

Wanted to immigrate because it was only place where he felt free

②

Came to US on CDA #400 on 2 APR 57
Had previously applied in 1947 for study in States from Havana but didn't come. was married at that time
Had written letters to newspapers in Havana against Batista govt.

Full set of fingerprints available
Appl to extend time of temporary stay
Statement dated 10 May 57: (w/interpreter)

Addr given: 121 N E 5th St, Apt 19
Miami
Passport: 49248, Cuban.

Was a prisoner in Dom Rep, not in a prison, but in a concentration camp w/11 others for 15 days because he tried to escape, because he was taking military traing. Had been advised there by one José Antonio Echeverria who was killed in Cuba in attack on Pres Palace on 13 Mar 57. Echeverria approached Ⓡ at Havana U. when he went to DR found a bunch of Cuban gangsters instead of decent people. POLICARPIO SOLER aka JOAQUIN RODRIGUEZ was in charge of group, who was one who arrested him. Had actually 5 mos. military traing Nov 56 - Apr 57.

Was in student demonstrations & passed propaganda vs. Batista regime.

③

Chi Dr. Venage, Cuban, gave Ⓡ ticket to return to US from DR.

He is opposed to Communist philosophy. His group, the University students, had a fight w/Communists.

a/o 12 July 57 wanted to obtain permanent residence visa in U.S.

5 Nov 57 notified he had to leave by 4 DEC 57.

25 Sep 57, living w/wife & child at 1440 NW 21st Terrace

In Nov 57, at 1749½ NW 21st St, Miami & M-in-L had joined them

Overstayed his time

11 Feb. 58, ordered deported to Cuba.

Represented a/o 14 Feb 58 by firm Walters, Moore, & Costanzo (1008 AINSLEY BLDG

Notified 4 times of interrogative but had moved addr. unk a/o 25 JUL 58.

Order for detention issued 21 Aug 58

Order for deportation issued 19 MAR 59.

Investigation showed he returned to Havana to Calle 5 # 714 on 2 MAR 58 on an "expedition by plane."

A/o 6 Apr 59 living at Calle 86 # 705, apt 1, Miramar

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I

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, FI 2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 160

S E C R E T 111655Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6753 4 m!m 11 MAR IN 040850

01

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO -1

REF: DIRECTOR 015890

Whelan

1. WH/MIAMI ATTEMPTING TO CHECK OUT REF INFO ON AMAUTO-1 THROUGH SEVERAL ASSETS AND LOCAL WOBONE. WILL ADVISE IF ANYTHING DEVELOPED.

2. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN CW
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201-735296
11 Mar 70

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 10 MARCH 1970

S/E C R E T

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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CONF: WH/8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN EUR6 E2 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 10 23 16z Mar 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY MADRID, WH/MIAMI 075890

TYPIC AMAUTO-1

REFS: A. OSMW-25989 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)

B. OSMW 11726

1. ITEM 12 DATED 28 JAN 70 REPORTED REF A QUOTES AMAUTO-1 AS SAYING THAT HE WILL NOT BE IN MADRID FOR INAUGURATION NEW BUILDING SINCE HIS TOUR IN SPAIN ENDING. ITEM 15 DATED 6 FEB REPORTED REF A, QUOTES AMAUTO-1 AS SAYING HE INTENDS TO LEAVE FOR HAVANA AFTER 18 JULY.

2. VIEW ABOVE, REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON REF B ASAP.

3. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: Ref A is normal dispatch take from QUTIMID/QUDOZE audio operation run against AMAUTO-1 in Spain. These items were not signalled by cable.
Ref B is lengthy dispatch from Hqs pointing out vulnerabilities of AMAUTO-1, means of targetting him, and request for comments by WH/MIAMI and Madrid.

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

CS COPY

C/WH/CCG

EUR/IB W. Sorrels

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

201-735296

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

10 Mar 70

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

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King

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/00665-70

DATE DISTR. 6 March 1970

COUNTRY Cuba/Spain

DOI December 1969-30 January 1970

SUBJECT Problems of Cuban Mission in Madrid with Lack of Response from Havana

ACQ Spain, Madrid (2 February 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 9937

SOURCE An official Spanish service from a usually reliable source who was able to read the memorandum reported below.

1. In a memorandum dated 30 January 1970 to Carlos A. Neira Garcia, official of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cuban charge d'affaires in Madrid Guillermo Ruiz Perez outlined the salient current problems of most concern to his mission:

a. Building construction. Ruiz submitted a proposal to Havana in December 1969 for the construction of a building to house all the mission offices including the embassy, the consulate, the commercial office, the Cubana Airlines office, and possibly the minister's residence. Ruiz had not received a concrete reply to the proposal and he urged Neira to take it up again with the ministry.

b. Radio facility. Responding to a request from the Director of the Cuban National Fishing Institute, Emilio Aragones Navarro, in December 1969, Ruiz applied to the Spanish authorities for permission to install a radio facility in the Canary Islands for communicating with Cuban ships. The permission had been granted by late December yet Havana had failed to follow up the project with plans and instructions.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	BIC	TREASURY	FBI 4					

FILE: [illegible]

WHC/PR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3		OSM-9937
WHC/OPS	2			E/MADR	1		QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE
WHC/EW	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	E/R	1		(ZRSAUCE)
WHC/PP	1						CSDB-312/00665-70
WHC/MIAMI	1						COORDINATING
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 2, WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1						LIAISON	RH SR CO

c. Visa delays. Havana is consistently late in processing visa requests for foreigners traveling to Cuba. Ruiz attributed the delays to the red tape which involves processing the requests through two ministries; The Visa Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Directorate of Immigration in the Ministry of Interior. Ruiz requested authorization for the consulate to send its visa requests directly to the Directorate of Immigration since this is the section that ultimately determines whether a foreigner may or may not enter Cuba.

2. Field Dissem: None.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 4 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, DO4, EVR6, FI2, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 709

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

SECRET
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. MAR 5 3 [illegible] 70

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. [illegible]

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

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II

S E C R E T 051515Z MAR 70 CITE MADRID 0620

DIRECTOR INFO DO BASE NEW YORK

TYPIC QUTIMID AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 014234

1. LOCAL TRACES MISS LOURDES FORWARDED OSMA-25995, POUCHED 4 MARCH 70.

2. FILE: 65-2-10/9. GP-1

S E C R E T

5 MAR IN 037245

dl

10

Is this any [illegible] Burke [illegible]

NO

THIS PERTAINS TO THE GAL THAT INTERVIEWED [illegible] FOR SOME TYPE [illegible]

SECRET

FILE, [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division;
COS, WH/Miami; COB, DO New York

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUTIMID/U.S. Company in Touch with Cuban Embassy, Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QUTIMID reported a 21 January 1970 conversation held between the wife of the Cuban Charge in Madrid and a Miss "Lourdes" speaking for the Grolier Company in New York. Miss Lourdes said that her company was undertaking some type of publicity and wished to interview the Charge in this regard. When questioned about what kind of work the company does, Miss Lourdes replied that Grolier is an investigation (studies) and consultant firm with central office located in New York City. Lourdes gave her local number as 233-7448. She was advised that the matter would be brought up to the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ, and she would be informed of the results later.

2. Later that day Aristides DIAZ Ruvirosa, the Embassy's press officer and a member of the DGI, called back to say that he would see her the next day in his office at 10:30.

3. According to QUSEQUIN, telephone 233-7448 is registered in the name of Isaac BENDAHAN Sananes at Calle General Moscardo 6, 6th floor, Apt. C, Madrid. There are no Station or liaison traces on BENDAHAN.

4. DO Base New York may be able to identify the Grolier Company in New York and the reason for which their representative was in touch with the Cuban Embassy.

5. Whatever follow-up action is conducted, the sensitivity of the QUTIMID operation should be kept firmly in mind so that our interest does not appear to stem from a technical monitoring of the Cuban installation.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami
2 - COS, DO/NY

Philip C Kentland
Philip C. KENTLAND

COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA 25995	DATE 4 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 65-2-10/4 ~~65-120-20~~

CSMR-25570
15 FEB 197

Source
Report No. 259 (Cont'd). 27 JAN 1970

I told her that I personally regretted it, as an individual and as Cuban, but that as a diplomat I could not do her any favor because she had left Cuba voluntarily, in flight, and that I could not render any assistance to her and least of all protect her. If I had then been able to take pictures, I could have sent them to Havana for them to see (This happened when RUIZ had first arrived here.)

RUIZ goes on to say that many people are misled when they arrive in Madrid from Cuba, or have been misled by their relatives. Parents bring their children--RUIZ says there are over 400 Cuban children in one school. One of them left /school/ once and passage had to be provided for him at the airport in CUBANA and allowed him to leave because they did not want to be mixed up in that affair. The child was 14 years old and did not want to stay in Madrid in the parrochial school with the monks. R says that should anything happen to him and his wife wants to stay in Madrid, he wants his children to return to Cuba and remain there until they become of age and make their own choice, but that to take children out of Cuba is a mistake.

FYI
[illegible]
[illegible]

FILE: [illegible]

Report No. 261.   29 Jan 1970

NILDA is typing while RUIZ is out of the office. CURBELO comes in and she tells him a cable arrived granting her permission to travel to Havana, but that she will not be going because RUIZ became annoyed. She adds that RUIZ is very selfish.

NILDA and RUIZ discuss her trip. R asks her if she is going; she says 'no' because he does not want her to go. Apparently he tells her to go home that instant and get ready, after she tells him that she has no time to take out her summer clothes, etc. She declines by saying that he has already ruined everything. She goes on to say that she had not asked MELVA or anyone else for her passage, but had written to RUZ (ph) saying that she was very depressed and that she missed her son very much, and they had arranged for her passage. NILDA adds that she is not going on a pleasure trip, but to see her son and see how he is doing, which she finds only natural. She would have stayed with him for two whole days and would have talked to the School Director and found out how the child was doing. She calls R selfish and says if the trip had been for him she would not have doubted it. She wants to know why RUIZ places objections to her trip to Havana. He wants the two of them to go together, and for her to wait until their vacation, not at this time. She

Report No. 251 (Cont'd)

contends it is because he does not want to stay by himself, as she knows him well after 16 years of living together.

NILDA says she will have to write to NEIRA regarding her passage and to thank him.

Report No. 262 (Cont'd).

other such things. This amount could be reduced if we bring our Cuban architects, who were here two years ago, and knowledgeable of their mission could discuss with the land owner and the construction firm those things they feel could be omitted and the price could be brought down considerably. We do not need a luxury building, but one that is attractive, simple and functional. Term payments could also be extended. I want to impress upon you that when we entered into negotiations we had a binding agreement.

"The lot is on Avenida La Habana. Fermín GUTIERREZ looked well into this matter. He asked me to send him the project and that he would look at it. The system of payments in Spain allows us to pay $100,000 or $150,000 annually which will not be difficult for us.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to CHAIN, not bearing pressure on him, but to make him understand that what I want is to leave my successor established, for any construction , lasting over nine months I certainly will not be able to enjoy.

[illegible]

"Another thing I want to bring to your attention is in regard to our Consulate, its activities and relations with the Visa Section. A letter has come from VERA addressed to FRANCO pointing to FRANCO's incorrect wording of a cable to that Section. I agree that it was incorrect, but I

Report No. 263.

31 Jan. 1970

There is another unidentified Cuban in the office. When RUIZ is left alone with her, he says that he feels like an exile, that he has been out for two years and is tired. There are many who want to be out of Cuba, he continues, but it seems to him they want to keep him out of the way. He goes on to say that LEON had appointed him, and supported him, but although they are good friends, he does not like to work with a man whom one never knows what he is thinking, and one never gets to know. R mentions a cable he had sent and says it could have cost his assassination,and that he had purposely done so to see if he were summoned to discuss the matter in Cuba. He would have liked to discuss it there, but they have apparently remained silent. R laments he feels as if he were in Miami.

Report 2314

4 February 1970

MERCEDES READS RUIZ THE FOLLOWING TELEX :

" WE FEEL NILDA SHOULD TRAVEL ON IBERIA NEXT MONDAY BECAUSE THE TRIP IS SHORTER AND SHE HAS THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED. MINREX." Ruiz is at home and remarks he is going out to dinner tonight.

/See Report 262, 30 Jan 70, for memo that Ruiz sent NEIRA at MINREX with Nilda./

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 25

44

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 18
DATE: 2 MARCH 197

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, DO 4, EUR 6, FI 2, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

UND

04 17 59Z MAR 70

CSM

CITE DIRECTOR 014234

DO BASE NEW YORK, INFO: MADRID

TYPIC QUTIMID AMAUTO

REF: OSMA-25969 (NOT SENT DO BASE NEW YORK)*

IP

cit US Sex F

1. ACCORDING SENSITIVE SOURCE ONE MISS LOURDES, OF GROLIER COMPANY OF STUDY AND RESEARCH, MAIN OFFICE NEW YORK, CALLED CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID ON 21 JAN REQUESTING AN INTERVIEW WITH CHARGE, GUILLERMO RUIZ. INTERVIEW FOR SOME TYPE PUBLICITY AND GRANTED FOR FOLLOWING DAY.

trace copy

2. RUIZ IS PRIME HQS RECRUITMENT TARGET AND WE THEREFORE INTERESTED ANY OUTSIDE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT THAT OFFERS ASSESSMENT DATA. APPRECIATE ANY INFO DO BASE NEW YORK CAN PROVIDE RE FULL IDENTITY AND BIO ON MISS LOURDES, TEL: 233-74-48. NO OBJECTION BASE QUERYING LOCAL LNERGO, PROTECTING SOURCE OF INFO.

3. INDEX LOURDES. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
MAR 23 1970
DOC. MICRO SER.

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WH/COG/COMMENT: *Reference was intercepted telephone call from Miss LOURDES, employee of Grolier Co. in New York to Cuban Embassy, Madrid, requesting an interview with the Charge d'Affairs.

FI

201-735296

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

4 Mar 70

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INF: INFO FILE, VR.

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PAGE TWO 04 17 59z MAR 70 70142347

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C/WH/COG

EUR/IB

DO/I/B2 RJ Baker

GORDON JORGENSEN
C/DO

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTIO[illegible] OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS P[illegible]IBITED.

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

RECEPCION POR EL XIV ANIVERSARIO DEL EJERCITO POPULAR NACIONAL DE LA R.D.A.

● El agregado militar, naval y aéreo de la Embajada de la República Democrática Alemana, capitán de fragata Emil Fehlauer, ofreció anoche una recepción con motivo del 14 aniversario del Ejército Popular Nacional de la RDA, fundado el primero de marzo de 1956.

A la recepción, celebrada en la sede diplomática alemana, asistieron los miembros del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, comandantes Manuel Piñeiro Loseda, viceministro primero del Ministerio del Interior; Manuel Díaz González, jefe de la sección de Relaciones Exteriores del MINFAR; Roberto T. Viera Estrada; y Orlando Rodríguez Puerta.

Igualmente se encontraban presentes los comandantes Julio Casas, viceministro para los Servicios del MINFAR; Samuel González Rodiles; José Quevedo Pérez; y Emigdio Báez Vivo, de la Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria; así como el primer capitán Harry Villegas Tamayo y otros oficiales de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias.

De la celebración del aniversario del Ejército Popular Nacional también participaron los integrantes de la delegación del Ministerio del Interior de la RDA que se encuentra en Cuba encabezada por el viceministro primero, teniente general Herbert Günstein; agregados militares de las embajadas acreditadas en nuestro país; representantes del cuerpo diplomático extranjero y funcionarios del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba.

FILE: [illegible] TC-1

Report No. 2234 (Cont'd)

to see about a package that Melba had lost traveling from Cuba the week before and could not locate because she had lost the ticket.

One Miss LOURDES calls on behalf of the Grolier Company from New York and tells NILDA they are conducting some type of publicity and would like to arrange an interview with Guillermo RUIZ. NILDA asks what type of company it is. She is told it combines study and research. N notes down the following information for RUIZ to call when he gets in: Grolier Company of Study and Research, main office in New York, Miss LOURDES, tel.: 233-74-48. [illegible] from the [illegible] to grant the interview she [illegible] for 10:30 the next morning.

Checking with fos.

SANTAMARIA, from the Ministry of Commerce, calls in answer to R's call and to apologize for not having been able to attend the reception. R begins by saying that when Raúl LEON had left for Cuba he had sent a letter of thanks to the Minister (of Commerce) for his kind considerations and at the same time had mentioned that "before your /pl._7 trip it would be most beneficial and advisable for both parties if you /pl._7 could advance us a list of subjects you are interested in discussing in Havana, for it would at least give us a little time to prepare ourselves." SANTAMARIA says, "Precisely, on Friday at 10:30 I am having a

[illegible]

[illegible] Mrs. Concepción CAMACHO de MATOS calls RUIZ. NILDA asks if she is the same person who called the other day and said she was the widow of... (MATOS). The woman says 'yes' and NILDA tells her: "Look Miss, you're playing a very dangerous game."

MATOS: I don't know what you mean, miss.

NILDA: Well, because none of the comrades here is going to allow himself to be provoked. So, please do not keep on."

MATOS: Well, I don't know what you are referring to, miss, I am completely astonished.'

NILDA: Well look, don't be astonished, you might end up some other way.

MATOS: I don't know what you are talking about.

NILDA: Well, we do.

NILDA hangs up.

Mrs. MATOS calls the Ambassador's secretary again; it seems there has been a misunderstanding.

NILDA: Look miss, we do not wish to talk to you anymore. We are telling you in a nice way. Please do not call anymore.

MATOS: I am not going to call again... I only want to say I had nothing to do.,. I know nothing at all.

[illegible]

... Only that I have received a message. I received a telephone call... I have just arrived in Madrid, I am not familiar with Madrid, or know anyone.

NILDA: Aren't you the one who called the other day? You made a date.

MATOS: What kind of a date?

NILDA: Didn't you make a date with the Charge d'Affaires?

MATOS: No, no,no. One moment, miss. I received a telephone call and was told to call this gentleman, the Cuban Ambassador. I could also tell you about another ambassador, but that they were trying to get in touch with me.

NILDA: Who are'they'? To whom do you refer when you say that 'they' called you?

MATOS: I was called on behalf of the Ambassador of Chile and the Ambassador of Cuba. I thought it was extremely unusual, miss, because I don't know anyone here.

NILDA: Didn't you call here a few days ago?

MATOS: I called when I was advised to do so.

NILDA: And you made a date with the Ambassador.

MAŒOS: I don't know now what exactly did happen. I was asked to talk with him and to get in touch with him, miss.

NILDA: But, who called you, miss?

MATOS: Whoever it was said "I am the Cuban Ambassador," so then it all seems to have been a plot, or something of the sort.

NILDA: Look, if it is a plot I suggest you do not get involved because where we are concerned it is somewhat dangerous.

MATOS: No miss, I am very proper and a serious person.

NILDA: Since you are so serious and proper don't ever let anything happen to you.

MATOS: I live with a daughter and you must realize that I live only for her.

NILDA: Well, look, if you live for her, don't get mixed up in these things for they may cost you dearly.

MATOS: Very well, miss. I am deeply grateful to have been enlightened by you. I can see already that it is simply a plot or an implication by someone.

NILDA: It is a plot and we know it. And we know who is behind it.

MATOS: Yes, miss, I would also like to know, I assure you.

NILDA: Well look, stay away from this mess or you'll pay dearly... good-bye.

MATOS: Fine, miss. I am also very grateful that you have told me. My apologies, huh?

EXTRACT FROM
CSMA 35989
20 FEB 70

CONTINUED

Item 12-continued.

with the Minister who told him that next week they would discuss the matter of costs and that the Minister was in favor of Ruiz' idea. Ruiz asks Villaroya to wait a few days more and in the event that they receive bad news they will have a few drinks together at the Castellano to forget their sorrow. Ruiz says he is very anxious to move out of the place he is in, and aks how long it will take to construct bhe building. Villaroya tells him about 9 or 10 months. Ruiz says that most likely he won't be there to inaugurate the building because his tour is ending in Spain, but that he will come from wherever he is for the inauguration.

28 January 1970

Item.1.- PILOTO CALLS YOLANDA. He asks for the address of the school. She says it is Cuadalquivir 16.

Item 3.- AN UNIDENTIFIED COMRADE CALLS THE HOSTAL GENEVA. A Cuban answers. The Comrade asks to speak to Antonio CASADO. The Cuban(F) says he is not there that he is on a trip to New York. The comrade leaves no message.

Item 4.- ARISTIDES RUIZ CALLS UNESCO IN PARIS, tel. 56-65-757. (The connection is poor) Ruiz greets MARTINEZ MOREL(phon-he seems to be Cuban) and tells him that he (Aristides) arrived Saturday and that he is leaving on Sunday (1 February) for Cuba. He asks for MILT(phon) and Martinez says that up to Monday he hadn't arrived.

Aristides asks to speak with extension 4111. They don't answer. He then asks for 4110 and an American, whose name seems to be Frank, answers. They speak lengthily in English about the installation of television in two Cuban schools. They also speak about films and the financing of the projects, mentioning the Swedes and the people of UNICEF.

Item 23.- PILOTO CALLS CUCA (It is 10:30 PM). They speak for a long time although Piloto is a little worried and nervous. He says "--the one on guard today is one of the bad ones and besides this, he is with his wife". He tells Cuca that as the offices are carpeted you can't hear anyone's footsteps--and he is afraid they will hear him. He remarks, "The people here have got me very nervous".

3 February 1970

Item 11.- DR. MACORRA CALLS HORACIO. This doctor has just had an operation and now that he is well again he wants to renew his connections(with Horacio) because he has to go to Cuba to give a course in the Cuban Society for Oncologicos(phon) Studies. Mercedes asks for his full name, which is LUIS DE LA MACORRA, tel. 261-12-83, home telephone 200-93-52.

Later, referring to the same subject Pepe says "the last new people (that have arrived?) are alcoholics ? ? but if you only know, things are better at least with regard to us, peace and charity".

10 February 1970

Item 18.- The second tape begins with part of a conversation between Piloto and Cuca around dinner time. Cuca says that her mother is 55 years old and her father is 57. Her mother she says has had six children. Piloto mentions the difference in age between him and Cuca; he says 12 years is a lot. Piloto says he continues to lose weight.

11 February 1970

Item 3.- CONCHITA CALLS NILDA.- She says that the place where she bought the radio is called BARROSO and it is at Lavapies 45. Nilda talks to Alicia. She says that she had a very nice time (in Havana), but that the weather was very bad; it rained a lot and it was cold. Nilda was with (in Havana) Alicia's children. She says that they got very good marks in their studies and the little one can read and they are very happy. Nilda also spoke with Alicia's mother-in-law. She is suffering from la pres ion (high or low blood pressure) and she has not been able to get the necessary medicine. Then Nilda speaks of her own son. She says he is very tall and thin and that he is working in tobacco. She says he is in Guane (phon), and as she couldn't make the trip as it was two and a half hours long, they sent the boy to her house and she was with him for a few days. She says the boy is very happy, he is a serious type and causes no problems. Apparently Nilda's mother is ill, according to her remarks. Alicia says it is better that Nilda's boy is in Cuba, because there he will become a man and solve his own problems.

[illegible]

Item 8.- VILLAMOYA, OF CONSTRUCCIONES AZAGRA CALLS RUIZ. He asks Ruiz about the project. Ruiz says that the news is good in the sense that it has been accepted in principle, and he believes everything is going along fine. But, they will have to wait. Ruiz thinks they will have a definite answer in about two weeks. He adds that they have great interest in this matter and also he would like to know definitely.

Item 20.- Someone REMARKS that Piloto "is seldom (in the embassy) in the afternoons".

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD;
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 13 FEB 1970 WH/C/OP

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BY ________ PER ________

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH8
INFO FILE, VR. EUR6, FI/D, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI 10 21 03 Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUDOZE

011307

REF: MADRID 0473 (IN 026722)

1. IN NOV 1967 ONE SONIA GOMEZ (NAT UNK) LISTED AS EMPLOYEE IN ECONOMIC OFFICE OF NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (CNIC) LOCATED IN HAVANA CITY.

2. TRAVEL TRACES SHOW SONIA GOMEZ ARAGO (SIC), CUBAN CIT, TRAVELLED CUBA-SPIAN 26 NOV 68. LEFT SPAIN FOR CUBA 21 JAN 69, DIP PP 68/676.

66
8
RID
FI

3. IF "SONIA" STILL IN MADRID APPRECIATE STATION OBTAIN ADDITIONAL BIO, DETAILS HER ACTIVITIES, CONTACTS, INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY, ANY ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS, ETC.. (NOTE PARA TWO, "SONIA" APPARENTLY STAYED MADRID ABOUT TWO MONTHS ON LAST VISIT).

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE:

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref reported suspicious activities and requested traces on recent arrival Spain from Havana of unk Subject identified only as "Sonia". Sonia possibly iden with Sonia GOMEZ Aragon (or Arago).

C/WH/COG
EUR/IB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI
RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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19 Feb 70
201-735296

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

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III

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR6,

ACTION NO. 421

S E C R E T 170833Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0473 MADR

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

17 FEB IN 026722

TYPIC QUDOZE

1. QUDOZE 11 FEBRUARY REPORT COVERS LENGTHY CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMAUTO-1 AND RECENT ARRIVAL FROM HAVANA IDENTIFIED ONLY AS "SONIA" CONCERNING CONFIDENTIAL DETAILS HIS MISSION ACTIVITIES. AIRLIST SHOW SONIA GOMEZ ARAGON ARRIVING 10 FEBRUARY, CARRYING DIP PASSPORT.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES.

3. FILE 65-6-44/3. GP-1

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR EUR6, RI/AN,

ACTION NO. 480

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LISB

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

17 FEB IN 027047

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. NO KNOWLEDGE DR. CAMACHO AT UNIVERSITY COIMBRA HOSPITAL. ALSO NO COIMBRA HOSPITAL IN LISBON. NO LISTING CAMACHO AT ALL IN COIMBRA PHONE DIRECTORY. NO STATION TRACES ON CONCHA OR CONCEPCION CAMACHO.

2. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1.

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ACTION UNIT [illegible] | INFO | FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 341

S E C R E T 161426Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0464 15 FEB 70 020187

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO/QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. SEE ALSO TWO CONVERSATIONS IN QUTIMID REPORT 2288, POUCHED 11 FEBRUARY. WOMAN IDENTIFIES SELF AS CONCEPCION CAMACHO VIUDA DE MATOS. QUSEQUIN IDENTIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER AS BELONGING TO CONCEPCION CAMACHO DE CASAR, PLAZA CARBALLO 8, TOWER 7. NOT IN TELEPHONE BOOK OF NOVEMBER 1969. NO TRACES STATION FILES UNDER ANY VARIATIONS NAMES. NO PLAZA CARBALLO ON CITY MAP BUT PROBABLY IN NEW SECTION CITY.

2. BECAUSE OF CONFUSION AND CONTRADICTIONS IN CONVER-SATIONS REPORTED IN 2288 APPEARS POSSIBLE WOMAN MAY HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMOROUS ADVENTURE WHICH MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN BASED ON CHANCE SOCIAL ENCOUNTER OR ON REPUTATION AMAUTO-1 AS "DON JUAN". PROBLEM NATURALLY COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT WHEN SHE TALKING TO AMAUTO-1 SECRETARY SHE WAS IN FACT TALKING TO HIS WIFE. AT NO TIME IN THE CONVERSATIONS IN QUESTION DID SHE BECOME AWARE THIS FACT.

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PAGE 2 MADRID 2464 SECRET

3. NOTE ALSO THAT IN QUTIMID 2247 SHE FIRST IDENTIFIED SELF AS WIFE DIRECTOR COIMBRA HOSPITAL BUT IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 SAID HER HUSBAND WAS PILOT.

4. WILL ADVISE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON IDENTITY OF WOMAN RECEIVED FROM QUSEQUINS BUT BELIEVE UNLIKELY ANYTHING HERE WHICH CAN BE EXPLOITED.

5. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

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INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 341

S E C R E T 161426Z FEB 70 CITE MADRID 0464 MADR

16FEB 70 IN 026187

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: DIRECTOR 009871

1. SEE ALSO TWO CONVERSATIONS IN QUTIMID REPORT 2288, POUCHED 11 FEBRUARY. WOMAN IDENTIFIES SELF AS CONCEPCION CAMACHO VIUDA DE MATOS. GUSEQUIN IDENTIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER AS BELONGING TO CONCEPCION CAMACHO DE CASAR, PLAZA CARBALLO 8, TOWER 7. NOT IN TELEPHONE BOOK OF NOVEMBER 1969. NO TRACES STATION FILES UNDER ANY VARIATIONS NAMES. NO PLAZA CARBALLO ON CITY MAP BUT PROBABLY IN NEW SECTION CITY.

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PAGE 2 MADRID 0464 SECRET

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5. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

Guillermo RUIZ Pérez

DOB : Late January or early February 1930.
POST: Minister Plenipotentiary, accredited
since 12 December 1967.
ADDRESS: Juan de Mena #8, Madrid.
TELEPHONES: 259-5956 (home), 221-7028 (office).

DOI : March 1970.

WIFE: Nilda VECIANA. Probably in her early thirties, she is pregnant and was due to have her sixth child in May 1970. However, her physician recommended forced labor (reasons unknown), which was scheduled for 17 April 1970. She has had difficulties with her pregnancy because of recurring fainting spells and overweight, which are being treated by Dr. HERNANDEZ and Dr. MATA (the latter ordered lab tests for Diabetes, the results of which are unknown).

Married for 16 years to Guillermo, Nilda is a pleasant woman who has not been known to quarrel openly with her husband or express political or religious opinions, although in this last respect she has recited the Lord's Prayer in front of Embassy personnel, which suggests that she may have been or is a practicing Catholic.

Mrs. Ruiz is a language teacher by profession (speaks English fluently), and is active in the Embassy as secretary to her husband and bookkeeper, but only on an informal basis.

Of rather weak personality /_Exception, see Attachment II; she was upset at the time_7, which is reflected in the way that she handles her five boys--"little beasts," according to Severina ORTIZ, the maid--, Mrs. Ruiz does not permit them to be punished severely and is always complaining that she does not spend sufficient time with them.

She is known to have lived in New York for five years in the fifties (on 48th St., three blocks from Times Square), a city that she likes very much. She goes shopping alone, and once even to the airport in a taxi (Juan Antonio CURBELO, the embassy security officer, did not like the idea) to wait for her husband's arrival from one of his trips. She seems to get along well with the wives of other Cubans in the staff.

Nilda travelled to Havana on 30 January 1970 to see her son Guillermito, and returned to Madrid on 11 February. Although RUIZ used her to send a lengthy memo to Carlos NEIRA, his superior at MINREX [for text see Attachment III], he was not very happy with her trip— an attitude that Nilda resented very much ("You are very selfish") until her husband changed his mind.

Her parents live in Havana (local telephone, 2-8130). [Cuban Telephone Directory lists that telephone number under Y. LAM, Calle 21 #3421, Marianao.]

CHILDREN :

1.- Guillermito ("Guille"). At 14 he is the oldest and is currently studying in Havana. He is very tall and thin. There were reports that he was unhappy in Cuba, and his father went to Havana on 16 October 1969 to solve a "personal problem" with Guillermito. If true, Guille no longer feels that way because on 26 December he was quoted to be very happy in his new school.

Guille was scheduled to cut cane after 10 January 1970, but was actually assigned to a tobacco farm in Guane early this year.

2.- Alejandro, who is nine years old (DOB: 15 Feb). According to those who know him he is a real "devil" and a good swimmer. He is taking guitar lessons, and goes to Colegio

Estilo and Gimnasio Mascardó, Pilar de Zaragoza #99, Madrid.

3.- Ivan, who is about eight years old.

4.- Juan Carlos.

5.- Juliote.

All five are very spoiled and have caused several maids to leave their jobs. Severina ORTIZ bitterly complains that they show no respect for their parents. This is why she "hates" Mrs. Ruiz. There was another maid, Ana María, who was replaced because she did not look after the children. [Ana María is currently employed by the wife of Arístides DIAZ, who is leaving Spain definitively in August 1970.]

BACKGROUND : Guillermo RUIZ, familiarly known as El Guajiro, probably comes from a humble family in Cuba, as he lived in a solar [in Cuba, a slum dwelling] in Marianao and began to work when he was only 14 years old.

accpt says he has a degree from U. of Havana?

In the fifties he emigrated to the United States, travelling throughout the East Coast and holding minor jobs. In 1957 he began to work as an apprentice butcher for a Polish-American named Alexander SAMKO, who had a grocery store on Flagler St. in Miami. He did so well in attracting Latin-American customers to the store that he soon began to distribute meat in the area for SAMKO.

He has said that when he left Miami in 1958 he turned over to his brother a house in North Miami, a brand new car, and over a thousand dollars in the bank.

But his "success" could be traced, perhaps, to another acquaintance that he is known to have had.

At the time RUIZ and Major José María MOLEON Carreras, then another Cuban exile, were in contact with an American of Cuban descent known as Joe LOUIS or LUIS, an underworld figure who was competing with the Italians in the bolita racket in Tampa. RUIZ himself has told close associates that LUIS or LOUIS offered them $800 a month, plus car and expenses, to supervise "collections" in Miami.

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Furthermore, LOUIS or LUIS even asked them to kill a man named FERNANDEZ, who was involved in the numbers game in Miami, for $5000 each.

In February 1958 RUIZ left Miami with Harry VILLEGAS Tamayo [a Captain in the Cuban Army, he has been seen at parties in foreign embassies in Havana with Major Manuel PIÑEIRO Losada, DGI chief] and three other members of the 26th of July Movement and entered Cuba clandestinely.

At the triumph of the Revolution Alexander SAMKO went to Havana, where he stayed for a week at RUIZ's home, and offered him a partnership in the business, which RUIZ rejected.

In 1960 he was one of 18 out of 5000 who were selected by the Ministry of the Treasury, where he was working, to take the full statistics course outlined by ECLA. The course, which lasted two years, included such subjects as mathematics, finances, democracy...and Marxism-Leninism.

One of his schoolmates at the time was Marta ARCOL, now director of the Art Museum of Havana.

In 1963 he was sent to Mexico, and after returning to Havana was appointed Chief of the Trade School at MINCEX, post that he held for two years.

In 1967 he was sent to Spain to replace Ramón CALZADILLA as charge d'affaires.

EDUCATION : Aside from the statistics course taken in 1960, RUIZ seems to lack, in the eyes of some observers, a solid, formal education. But he makes up for it by being an avid reader (five newspapers a day, plus books). This impression, however, may be wrong, for there are indications that he either studied or wanted to be a CPA.

He understands and speaks English and French (fluency unknown), and has undertaken to teach grammar to the embassy staff.

Sensitive to art, or so he says, he frequently complains of the general lack of culture in Cuba. His vocabulary level is rather low, cussing quite often in the presence of others.

RUIZ is well-versed in world affairs, and does have an understanding of international trade.

He has read some of the works of José Martí, whom he likes to quote. But there is another book that he also refers to repeatedly, Kim PHILBY's, the KGB spy who penetrated MI-6.

He is up-to-date on current intelligence publications.

HEALTH : Blond, baby-faced, and blue-eyed ("Very handsome," according to Anita, the young maid), RUIZ is known to be suffering from an undisclosed liver illness for which he takes a medicine called bilidis. Late in 1969 he was planning to go to Portugal on vacation following the advice of his physician, Dr. Pedro CABAS (telephones, 276-7746, 256-2294), but he did not make the trip. He coughs frequently, is used to cold weather, and was thinking of going to the same gymnasium as his son Alejandro.

He wears eyeglasses to correct astigmatism, and is known to like skin-diving, a sport that he practiced in Cuba.

In general terms, however, he enjoys good health.

EMPLOYMENT : There is no doubt that Guillermo RUIZ exercises the full authority that presumably he should have as Minister Plenipotentiary (relations between Cuba and Spain remain at this level because of Spain's refusal to appoint a full Ambassador after LOJENDIO was expelled from the Island by Fidel CASTRO).

He is involved in and kept informed of all matters that have to do with Cuban-Spanish relations, including trade. He does not permit commercial attachés to bypass him when they submit reports to their respective enterprises in Havana.

In addition, he supervises Cubana Air Lines operations, and no one may travel on Iberia to Havana without his permission (this applies only to Cubans, for tickets must be paid in foreign currency). Evidently he controls the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon, and Rafael FERNANDEZ Sardiñas, the chargé there, travels frequently to Madrid for consultations with RUIZ (" Our relations with Portugal are not very good now").

Cuban officials arriving in Madrid must consult with him before arranging visits to Spanish officials or factories, and only he, Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemes, Arístides DIAZ Rovirosa, and Roberto FRANCO Oliva, are authorized to issue visas for people travelling to Cuba.

He seems to have good working relations with Spanish Government officials because he is always careful to place all the "cards" on the table in his meetings with them.

Nothing is known about unofficial contacts with other diplomats in Madrid except that he is close to and exchanges information with the Algerian Ambassador.

At times he tries to give the impression, and this might be true, that he enjoys the full personal confidence of Osvaldo DORTICOS and Raúl ROA.

He frequently tells other Cuban diplomats stopping in Madrid that he makes 90% of the decisions without consulting Havana because that is "why I am here for."

Above all, he directs constant and bitter criticism against the bureaucracy in Havana because of its incompetence, which, in his opinion, will cause Fidel CASTRO to carry out a major purge after the 1970 sugar harvest comes to an end ("No one in Havana wants or cares to make a decision").

The Peter Principle /" In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence" 7, which he has read and is going to send to Fidel CASTRO for reading on the advice of Melba HERNANDEZ, should be taken as an example of what is happening in Cuba. Furthermore, in his view Havana is always trying to interfere with the Embassy in Madrid, resulting in lack of co-ordination and even co-operation. (To Horacio FUENTES Martínez: " More than lack of organization there is chaos in Cuba today.")

He directs almost the same criticism against his staff in Madrid because they lack qualifications for the posts that they hold. " They think that I am a fool," he once told an associate, "but I don't miss anything that they do."

In turn, he has also been the target of criticism from Havana, first from Sonia GOMEZ, who made a critical evaluation of the Embassy, which he decided not to answer ("I took a librium, smoked a cigar, and forgot all about it").

[Sonia GOMEZ, a MINREX inspector close to Vice-Minister Carlos CHAIN, was in Madrid in mid-February 1970 for another review of embassy accomplishments. But this time she seemed friendly with Guillermo RUIZ.]

On another occasion he complained to Arístides DIAZ that he had received one more critical report from Havana because the Embassy "had not achieved much," although they had done things that were not included in the yearly plan.

But perhaps the most serious censure of his activities came in by telex (" Why worry? The Americans and the Spaniards intercept all messages anyway") early in October 1969. Havana questioned the way RUIZ was handling trade negotiations with the Spanish Government. [The trade agreement was extended by mutual consent to 31 December 1972.]

In his reply addressed to Raúl LEON Torrás, first vice-minister of MINCEX and senior Cuban official directly responsible for the talks, Guillermo RUIZ defended his right to be "informed" and "consulted" in rather strong language. Therefore, he rejected that his cable number 521 was offensive to Joaquin ALVAREZ, a Cuban trade official who had been the source of the complaint.

In the last paragraph he told Raúl LEON that the indemnification question (payment to Spanish citizens who owned property in Cuba) depended on his reply to Don Pedro SALVADOR, a Spanish Foreign Office official, and not on "bribery" conjectures.

Evidently this last cable upset him so much that he was nervous and particularly security-conscious. Less than a week later, he called Raúl LEON Torras and requested permission to go to Cuba, ostensively to settle a "personal problem with my son."

When he returned to Madrid on 29 October he was a changed man, again fully confident of himself. Nevertheless, he has told close friends that he feels very lonely in Spain and has had the desire to simply board a plane and return to Cuba abandoning the Embassy.

Late in January 1970 he was again depressed, for he felt like an "exile" in Spain after two years of service (" Even though LEON played a part in my appointment I cannot work for a man that I do not understand. Maybe he sent me abroad to get me out of the way. I feel as if I were in Miami.")

He thinks he is "burned" in Spain, and when he returns to the Island he will definitely not go back to MINREX, but to MININT. He has told close friends his term in Spain is up and he will be returning to Cuba probably in the summer. In any event, he does not plan to be in Spain more than nine months. Nilda, his wife, has stressed that they are leaving Madrid permanently in July 1970.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS: Although outwardly a "revolutionary", Guillermo RUIZ is a man of moderate political views struggling to justify the actions of his government in face of the political and economic realities of Castro's Cuba.

In this sense his inner feelings perhaps lie closer to the theory of the betrayed revolution, but not for ideological reasons: the incompetence of the Cuban Government has in fact sabotaged the goals of the Revolution. ✓

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, to which he was admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Dávalos, secretary of Organization, he is definitely not a convinced Marxist, and consequently cannot accept the role of "robot" required by Party discipline and vertical structure (" Revolutionaries should not be coerced by political control forms," he wrote Telesforo DIAZ Portillo, a MINREX official, on 26 December 1969. " Communists are quite meddlesome," he told another colleague soon after, although in this instance he may have been referring to the Spanish CP).

But the most important revelation of his views came to light on 11 December 1969, when he was quoted as telling a visiting DAP official from Havana: " If I disagree with orders, I question them because I am not a robot nor do I have the mentality of one. As a human being I express opinions no matter the risk that I may personally have to take."

Obviously, a man who thinks in this way cannot be a Marxist.

Aside from the constant criticism of Havana because of incompetence, lack of vision, and the unreal world they live in, he is quick to point out other deficiencies in life there, as reflected in his directive to the embassy staff not to celebrate Christmas together because there are "hungry people" in Cuba. But he did invite some of his associates for dinner on Christmas eve, the classical Spanish Nochebuena. He has also said that medicine in general is quite backwards in Cuba.

Probably an atheist, he is known to believe that "religion should not be considered a handicap for people trying to return to Cuba."

On the other hand, he refers to Latin-American diplomats as "bootlickers" because they use the English language in parties, and has remarked that "capitalism is no good".

RUIZ seems to have certain admiration for Francisco FRANCO, who, in his view, is the only reason why Spain has not turned communist. Of course, it is doubtful that he really believes this.

He does not hide his favorable opinions of the American people, who are "frank" and "simple". " They treated me very well," he told Raúl LEON Torras in December 1969.

On international matters he is up-to-date and well-informed. Following are some of his views, which are contradictory at times:

" Cuba is a political power, not a military or economic power.

" The USSR has neutralized U.S. sea power in the Mediterranean.

" Cuba can destroy Guantanamo whenever it chooses to do so, although the base has lost its strategic value to the United States.

" US-China rapproachment should be feared, but also a Japan-China alliance.

" U.S. power is beginning to crumble, but the Soviets are revisionists.

" The Egyptians harm us when they buy sugar from Cuba and then resell it to other countries.

"We have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view; secondly, because whether right or wrong they are on the same side fighting those who are on the other side.

" Cuba has had and has major discrepancies with the USSR, China, and the U.S., but we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism.

" Israel and Cuba have the same motivations. That is why they are so successful against the Arabs. They have no choice.

" The Egyptians and the Syrians are not brave. The Israelites, like the Cubans, are brave enough to face the enemy."

PERSONALITY : Guillermo RUIZ is an easy-going rather simple man who no doubt enjoys the prestige and success that he has had in Spain.

He has a strong personality, undoubtedly the predominant pole in his marriage. He seems to get along well with his wife. (" If anything should happen to me and my wife wants to remain in Spain, I want my children to go back to Cuba to study. Then they can decide for themselves what they want to do.")

Certain degree of racism can be detected in his speech, for he always refers to Negroes as niches, a contemptuous Cuban expression.

He almost never discusses women with colleagues, nor is he known to be involved in any extramarital affair.

[Possible exceptions: Vera VORODOWSKI, his secretary now in Cuba. There were rumors that RUIZ was the beneficiary of Vera's affection. There is also a young Spanish girl named JIMENA (lnu), who addresses RUIZ in the familiar tu. She lives in the house of Carmen LABRA or LABRADA.]

He likes to go to the movies (saw Topaz; no comments), and receive people at his home for cocktails.

SECURITY : It is normal for any member of the Cuban Foreign Service to exercise certain discretion in the area of security, but Guillermo RUIZ is particularly sensitive in this respect, which perhaps could be traced to his probable involvement with the DGI in one way or another.

He is quick to warn visiting Cubans of the CIA's efforts (" La Compañía Sociedad Anónima") to compromise them, even before leaving Havana. "Our Embassy," he says, "is the primary target for U.S. operations in Spain."

He keeps control of mail going to and coming from Havana in the diplomatic pouch, and states repeatedly that his office is bugged and telephone tapped (" There are microphones here the size of olives"). In addition, he thinks he is followed openly by Seguridad.

For all these reasons he has asked Havana for funds to build a new embassy, where he plans to have a shielded room free from microphones. (The building, which will cost approximately $600.000, was approved by Havana and a Cuban architect travelled to Madrid in late March 1970 to discuss the project with Sr. VILLARROYA, from Construcciones Azagra, who is handling the real-estate operation. Villarroya's telephone number is 254 4238.)

He is particularly aware of what he calls "traps", and in this sense recalls that once he was asked to dinner by the wife of a VIP, and after accepting the invitation he was told that someone else and a priest would attend too. Even though the lady in question was very upset, he did not go because one of those present could have been a "seditionist" ready to be "arrested" by the police. An inevitable scandal would have followed. He adds that he receives visits in the Embassy because there he admits only those that he wants to see.

An interesting item is the case of Conchita CAMACHO (telephone 201 4989), who called RUIZ at the Embassy claiming to have met him at a party and wanting to see him, alone, at the Hilton for a "chat". /See Attachments I and II./

Perfectly aware of the implications and seemingly in violation of his own rules, he did go to the hotel after ordering Horacio FUENTES to check the telephone number (" The CIA has a new agent"), in spite of the fact that Raúl LEON Torras was arriving in Madrid on that night.

He and Fernando, his driver, waited outside until the woman left the hotel with some men. RUIZ wanted only, so he says, to warn her not to get involved in matters between Cubans because she could "lose her life".

Regarding communications, Guillermo RUIZ has even suggested installing a radio transmitter and speaking in code with Havana. / The Cubans are in fact installing a radio transmitter on Islas Canarias to communicate with their fishing fleet. But RUIZ, in this particular case, has stressed to the Spanish Government that Cuba is willing to permit Spanish citizens to operate the station, thereby avoiding any suspicion that the transmitter will be used for other purposes._7

In spite of his security-consciousness, he himself is the target of certain control by Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemus, the "cultural" first secretary who in reality is the security man at the Embassy (RUIZ has complained that he needs a "real" one in Madrid: " Sergio /_DEL VALLE, minister of the Interior_7 told me they were getting someone ready to send as cultural attaché"), for CURBELO instructed the front-desk girl to pass on to him a summary of who sees who and for what, including RUIZ's visitors.

RUIZ likes to recall the time when a Cuban in his staff (name unknown, but presumably he is back in Cuba) spread the rumor that RUIZ and Nilda were not well-liked in Havana, perhaps to undermine his authority. CURBELO reprimanded the man by stressing that "when Havana is doubtful of anybody here in Madrid it uses official channels to let us know."

Nevertheless, he does make mistakes, as evidenced by discussing in his office, with members of his staff, the possibility of advising Havana that a Spanish foreign service officer scheduled for duty there might be open for recruitment. Recalling his constant warnings that his office is bugged by Seguridad, such discussion clearly exposes him to expulsion from Spain.

By the same token, he likes to travel by car to the interior of the country alone (he must have powerful reasons to do so, for he is risking attack by Cuban exiles, a possibility that he surely must not discard given the reception that they gave Armando HART Dávalos, Carlos CHAIN, and Carlos ALFARAS at Barajas Airport on 30 June 1968). Neither his wife nor CURBELO approve of this.

At times he is known to write on paper key phrases or names when discussing confidential matters in his office, or to speak very low. Furthermore, he says he goes to Parque del Retiro when he wants to discuss sensitive matters with anybody.

In short, he is security-conscious, very shrewd, and suspicious of anybody that comes near him.

TRAVEL : Following are the trips that Guillermo RUIZ made from October 1969 to February 1970:

To Havana to settle a "personal problem" on 20 October 1969 by Iberia (first class), returning to Madrid on 29 October.

To London on 14 November 1969 for consultations with Raúl LEON Torras, returning two days later by air (also first class).

To Bilbao, San Sebastian, and Burgos, by car, on 28 November 1969, returning two days later.

To Italy from Barcelona with his wife and two children on 29 December 1969. He went to pick up an Alfa Romeo, which he paid out of his own funds. They returned through Florence, Genoa, San Remo, and Barcelona, arriving in Madrid on 6 January 1970.

To Burgos by car with REGALADO (fnu) and URQUIZA (fnu) on 24 January 1970.

To Havana on 20 February 1970. He was scheduled to participate in trade negotiations with the Spanish delegation that left Madrid on 22 February 1970. RUIZ returned to Madrid on 24 March 1970.

FRIENDS : Not much is known about Guillermo RUIZ's personal acquaintances, except for the following:

Pedro RUIZ.- A good friend who goes to his home rather frequently, Pedro is quite influential according to Guillermo. He is also a friend of MASSO (fnu).

Carlos or Enrique CARRASCO.- He is a partner of Carrasco, Muñoz e Iturriaga, with offices at Avenida Generalísimo #28, 10th floor. RUIZ meets with him often, either for lunch or at his home. They seem to be good personal friends. CARRASCO may have to do with arrangements for the sale of Cuban frozen seafood. Travelled to New York late in October or early November 1969. RUIZ is known to have visited CARRASCO's office.

Rosendo CANTO.- Lives at Goya #54, Madrid. His friendship with RUIZ may be interesting if he is the same Rosendo Canto who was a well-known batistiano (probably his father). If this is the case contacts with RUIZ are politically dangerous for the latter, unless he is using CANTO with the approval of Havana. According to Roberto FRANCO Oliva, the consul, CANTO wanted to go to Cuba, live there for a year, and then join the Cuban Foreign Service ("He is a fool," RUIZ). CANTO's father is ill in Cuba and sends him mail through the Cuban diplomatic pouch. CANTO is involved with the diplomatic representation of Equatorial Guinea.

Armando FERNANDEZ.- "A good friend," says RUIZ. But he has doubts about FERNANDEZ's source of income ("Maybe he gets money directly from Havana without my knowledge"). FERNANDEZ sends a "lot of things" to Cuba. He is an artist, and lives at Bondad #1 (telephone, 255-3281). Armando claims to know Fidel CASTRO and Celia SANCHEZ personally. It may be true, for he received a package at the embassy from the latter in March 1970. However, he asked the Cuban staff to send it to him because he "did not want to be seen taking something out of the embassy." FERNANDEZ's father has cancer.

201-226172
not worth
following up.

JIMENEZ Asenjo, deputy director of the Spanish Dirección General de Seguridad. Knows RUIZ personally, and is in contact with him rather often, but presumably in the line of duty.

SUMMARY : Guillermo RUIZ is a very shrewd, articulate individual who has reached heights that in all probability would have been beyond his capability in normal circumstances.

Nevertheless, from what can be seen his work in Spain has been effective, and he keeps a tight control over his staff. He is a man confident of himself and of the backing [Armando HART Dávalos ?] that he surely must have in order to remain in this sensitive post of the Cuban foreign service.

Precisely because of his privileged status RUIZ is very careful in whatever he does, avoiding mistakes that would endanger his position.

Therefore, he will probably resist any indirect approach, which he will recognize in time to brush it off.

But this does not mean that he is unapproachable, for he is not. There is no question that his personality is incompatible with the system that he serves, although with profound misgivings as to its efficiency. It is then a question of how and when.

The very fact that he has made open remarks suggesting his unhappiness with Havana and his non-Marxist leanings in an office "bugged by the other side," as he points out, could be interpreted as a signal on his part indicating that he is ready to listen.

But he will be suspicious of an indirect or subtle approach, which, in his view, could be a trap to compromise him, including a loyalty test by the DGI.

Consequently, a direct approach has much better chance of success. It would be proof for him that he is walking on firm ground by dealing directly with Americans. Which leads to the question of when . There are two key factors to consider :

a) His recall to Cuba.

b) The 10-million ton sugar harvest, which is scheduled to end on 15 July 1970.

RUIZ has indicated that he is unhappy in his post--perhaps not really meaning what he says--, which he has occupied for over two years.

As he has said that Fidel CASTRO plans a major purge after the 1970 sugar harvest, he himself may be one of the targets. Assuming that his ideological inconsistencies have been noticed, the DGI, in the absence of proof regarding his loyalty and considering whatever support he has in Havana, may request his recall at an appropriate opportunity: during a major reorganization of the Cuban Government.

In any event, RUIZ does not expect to remain in Madrid much longer, and is planning to be back in Havana by the 18th of July.

If Cuba is successful in harvesting 10 million tons of sugar, and they have already reached six, the "victory" that Cuban propagandists will herald from July on may have a psychological impact on RUIZ's thought. He will be less inclined to defect, in place or otherwise, at such time.

SECRET

Finally, if RUIZ's personality were to be summarized in one word, that word would be realist with a logical mind. Above all, this is what RUIZ is.

SECRET

Attachment #I.

Report No. 2274.

9 January 1970.

One 'Miss' CONCHITA calls asking for RUIZ. NILDA says she is his secretary and CONCHITA may leave the message with her. C would like to surprise him. NILDA asks for her last name; C does not give it to her because it would then fail to be a surprise, but leaves her telephone number (201-49-69) for R to call her after 8, for she works until that time. On NILDA's insistence C gives her last name as CAMACHO, adding she is the widow of the doctor who was director of the Coimbra Hospital.

RUIZ calls Mrs. CAMACHO at 201-49-69. She begins the conversation by saying they had met at a party which she had attended with her husband at the Dominican Embassy in Madrid. She reminds him that they had talked with the Paraguayan Ambassador and former Dominican Ambassador Rafael COMPRES, and that the party had taken place two years ago. Despite all the details RUIZ insists he does not remember her and asks how he can be of service to her. She tells him "I have just arrived and find myself somewhat isolated, disoriented, and I must find work. I recall you telling me on that ocassion 'If you should ever have any problem and you come to Madrid, look me up.' One other ambassador also offered me his assistance and I have tried to locate both of you." Mrs. C mentions having a daughter, that her husband was a pilot and that she is a Spaniard, adding she is not too old. R replies that in all honesty he does not remember her. She insists on seeing him to have a chat, and R suggests she come to his office at her convenience. She prefers talking with him alone, without his secretary or anyone else present, and suggests a bar at some hotel like the Palace, Ritz or Hilton. He is agreeable to any place she may desire; they agree to meet that night at 9:30 in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel. She will be dressed all in black.

RUIZ calls FERNANDO F is to meet R outside the latter's home about 9 o'clock dressed in coat and tie.

SECRET

Report No. 2248.

HORACIO calls the telephone company requesting the address for telephone number 201-49-89. The information is denied.

RUIZ calls PILOTO to have him meet RAUL LEON in Barajas that night. RUIZ is unable to do so because of a previous engagement.

FERNANDO calls CURBELO to ask for PUGA's phone number. F wants to tell P he cannot meet the professor at P's house that night because he (F) has to take RUIZ somewhere.

SECRET

Attachment #II

Report 2288. 22 January 1970

Mrs. Concepción CAMACHO de MATOS calls RUIZ. NILDA asks if she is the same person who called the other day and said she was the widow of... (MATOS). The woman says 'yes' and NILDA tells her: "Look Miss, you're playing a very dangerous game."

MATOS: I don't know what you mean, miss.
NILDA: Well, because none of the comrades here is going to allow himself to be provoked. So, please do not keep on.
MATOS: Well, I don't know what you are referring to, miss, I am completely astonished.
NILDA: Well look, don't be astonished, you might end up some other way.
MATOS: I don't know what you are talking about.
NILDA: Well, we do.
NILDA hangs up.

Mrs. MATOS calls the Ambassador's secretary again; it seems there has been a misunderstanding.

NILDA: Look miss, we do not wish to talk to you anymore. We are telling you in a nice way. Please do not call anymore.
MATOS: I am not going to call again... I only want to say I had nothing to do... I know nothing at all. ... Only that I have received a message. I received a telephone call... I have just arrived in Madrid, I am not familiar with Madrid, or know anyone.
NILDA: Aren't you the one who called the other day? You made a date.
MATOS: What kind of a date?
NILDA: Didn't you make a date with the Charge d'Affaires?
MATOS: No, no. no. One moment, miss. I received a telephone call and was told to call this gentleman, the Cuban Ambassador. I could also tell you about another ambassador, but that they were trying to get in touch with me.
NILDA: Who are 'they'? To whom do you refer when you say that 'they' called you?
MATOS: I was called on behalf of the Ambassador of Chile and the Ambassador of Cuba. I thought it was extremely unusual, miss, because I don't know anyone here.

NILDA: Didn't you call here a few days ago?
MATOS: I called when I was advised to do so.
NILDA: And you made a date with the Ambassador.
MATOS: I don't know what exactly did happen. I was asked to talk with him and to get in touch with him, miss.
NILDA: But, who called you, miss?
MATOS: Whoever it was said, "I am the Cuban Ambassador," so then it all seems to have been a plot, or something of the sort.
NILDA: Look, if it is a plot I suggest you do not get involved because where we are concerned it is somewhat dangerous.
MATOS: No miss, I am very proper and a serious person.
NILDA: Since you are so serious and proper don't ever let anything happen to you.
MATOS: I live with a daughter and you must realize that I live only for her.
NILDA: Well, look, if you live for her, don't get mixed up in these things for they may cost you dearly.
MATOS: Very well, miss. I am deeply grateful to have been enlightened by you. I can see already that it is simply a plot or an implication by someone.
NILDA: It is a plot and we know it. And we know who is behind it.
MATOS: Yes, miss. I would also like to know, I assure you.
NILDA: Well look, stay away from this mess or you'll pay dearly... good-bye.
MATOS: Fine, miss. I am also very grateful that you have told me. My apologies, huh?

/NILDA was very upset after this call./

SECRET

Attachment III

Report No. 262. 30 January 1970.

RUIZ records following memorandum on tape:

"Comrade NEIRA.- I take this opportunity that NILDA is going to Havana to bring to your attention some of our problems here in Spain.

"The first pertains to the construction project for a building which I sent to CHAIN with the President of the National Bank when he passed through here in December, and to this day, after five weeks, I have not received an adequate answer. You know that when preliminary negotiations are initiated one enters into certain obligations with the land owners as well as with the construction firm, to whom we must give an answer.

"On my insistence, Comrade ROA gave me... sent a cable informing me that as yet the budget had not been approved and he could not give me the results.

"Present locales do not meet the Spanish minimum requirements for working space. CURBELO brought from Havana proposals for the leasing of a locale for the Commercial Office with a rental fee of $2,000 a month. We discussed this proposal at a meeting of comrades here and it was rejected in the belief that it was more advantageous for us to buy. We also discussed this with Fermín GUTIERREZ, who visited the Commercial Office and to whom we pointed out that in view of the system of payment here in Spain it was better to purchase a building, since this transaction at no time would affect our system in our trade policy with Spain.

"To the point of being persistent we should like to request a building for all services: the Cuban Office, the Commercial Office, the Consulate-Embassy Office, plus living quarters on the top floor for the diplomatic Representative, something with which I am not in complete accord. In summary, a building which would offer maximum security and freedom of movement. The Commercial Office would occupy the first floor, the Embassy, the second floor, and the third floor the living quarters for the Chief of the Mission. This would resolve all our local problems and our representation in Spain.

SECRET

"This construction firm built for the Rumanian representation in Spain and is now building for the Polish and others. We have been quoted a fixed price of $600,000 which includes a luxury building, with glass windows, air-conditioned, and other luxuries. This amount could be reduced if we bring our Cuban architects, who were here two years ago, and knowledgeable of their mission could discuss with the land owners and the construction firm those things they feel could be omitted and the price could be brought down considerably. We do not need a luxury building, but one that is attractive, simple and functional. Term payments could also be extended. I want to impress upon you that when we entered into negotiations we had a binding agreement.

"The lot is on Avenida La Habana. Fermín GUTIERREZ looked well into this matter. He asked me to send him the project and that he would look at it. The system of payments in Spain allows us to pay $100,000 or $150,000 annually which will not be difficult for us.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to CHAIN, not bearing pressure on him, but to make him understand that what I want is to leave my successor established, for any construction not lasting over nine months I certainly will not be able to enjoy.

"Another thing I want to bring to your attention is in regard to our Consulate, its activities and relations with the Visa Section. A letter has come from VERA addressed to FRANCO pointing to FRANCO's incorrect wording of a cable to that Section. I agree that it was incorrect, but I find it strange that that Section should pay so much attention to correct forms and analyze the contents so little. The contents of things are not being studied, and it is essential that deep thought be given to the work that is being done. When someone comes to the Consulate with an authorization to travel to Cuba, it is usually three or four days prior to flight departure. Since the Visa Section must defer to the Department of Emigration for its authorization, inasmuch as the latter determines whether or not a foreigner can go into Cuba, the process is not carried out with the urgency that it requires, consequently, there is delay. This creates much inconvenience for us, and even personal problems, for we must consider that often people arrive with the exact amount of money and a week's delay could hurt them so that at times they don't even have enough money for lodging or food.

"At present we have the case of a member of the Chilean Communist Party and OSPAAAL whose passage has been set aside by these organizations to travel from Madrid to Cuba. Four days ago FRANCO sent a cable and still there is no answer. We made the decision to grant this person a visa because the plane leaves tonight, otherwise he will have to delay the trip one more week. If the tickets were reserved for him here there is no doubt he has been given authorization.

"NEIRA, I want you to talk to OJEDA and request that our Consulate be able to contact the Emigration Department directly. FRANCO has been on the job for approximately one year and has never given reason for complaints, but if he has now made a mistake in the editing of a cable it could have been that in the face of mounting problems he is presented with daily he might have exploded.

"Another thing I want to tell you is that last night we had as guests in our home the Chilean Director Hugo BENAVENTE and his wife, the leading lady in his Peruvian company which has brought to the stage "Luz de Europa". If they are not communists in the sense of the word, like the rest of the company, they do sympathize with us. They invited PINEDA to attend the premiere, and he answered with a cable which was shameful to see and read. The wording of that cable gives the impression that PINEDA is being held captive and asks them to please come to his help and send for him. He makes us look ridiculous. Just think that cable has been read by others before they showed it to me. The political position of PINEDA and other Cuban writers should be investigated, as now they are putting up on stage "La Noche de los Asesinos" and they also want another Cuban writer to come. I should like to get your advice in this area as I am totally ignorant of matters related to culture, for we have no cultural attaché here.

"There is also the following problem: The comrades in the fishing /department/, specifically Comrade ARAGONES, are interested in having a radio communications station to contact ships on the high seas. In this regard I spoke to Mr.ASENJO in the Security Department who said there was no inconvenience on his part if they requested it and took the necessary steps. You know Mr. ASENJO. I saw him a month ago and he had asked me if we had decided not to go ahead with it, as there had not been an answer in that regard after having obtained authorization from the General Administration of Security which was the most difficult step.

"Comrade Joaquín ALVAREZ reports that in reference to the letters left here by LEON for the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Commerce here in Spain, the former is taking an offensive position in foreign relations as you can see, and the Minister of Commerce has been quite busy, for the entry of Spain in the Common Market is almost a fact and conversations are in progress. This is why they have assigned to Mr. SANTAMARIA, General Director of Commercial Policy, the study of subjects which the Spanish side plans to take up in Havana during the negotiations in February. I am in touch with this man and in fact had to call him up today, for he had said that before giving me the agenda of subjects to be discussed there was to be a meeting of Ministries to include Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Information and Tourism, plus others, to determine what was to be discussed in Cuba and decide on other matters.

"Because Mr. SANTAMARIA was not in this morning, he has promised to call me at 6:30 this afternoon, but he will not find me here because I'll be taking NILDA to the airport.

"Tell Joaquín ALVAREZ that regarding the 50-million credit request from Cuba to Spain for 1970, there has been no confirmation inasmuch as we have been unable to talk with the present Secretary of Commerce. We find the figure somewhat high but have no basis for judgment to focus on any area.

"You must have heard already about the success of our reception. Not only because of the number, which was quite high, but because of the quality of the attendants. We had to use two rooms. We had prepared only one but when the Minister arrived it became necessary to open another room. There was representation from the ultra-right to the ultra-left. This has been a great triumph for us considering that in these countries the quality of people attending these events is taken well into account.

"Comrade NEIRA, an embrace for you and for those working with you. I hope when SONIA comes over she brings a project for 1970 that can be fully undertaken by us. We are very bad at making projects. This past year we did many things that had not been planned, while others that were planned remained undone, but with last year's experience we shall strive to plan better.

"Take charge of my wife's return. I have given her permission for one week and no more, for I do not like to act as babysitter--they are four children and although they are my own I do not care for it. Greetings to all my comrades and you do the cutting of the cane for I have been unable to cut. A hug."

DISPATCH | SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Madrid; COS, WH/Miami
INFO
ATTN: ROGER S. KIRKMAN

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC Continued Operational Interest in AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 5, below.

References : A. OSMW-11585
B. MADRID 9655

1. Headquarters has just completed, with the able help of AMEDIT-2, a thorough review of QUDOZE tapes for the last quarter of 1969. We have added pertinent file material where necessary in order to round out the picture, but the review emerges primarily as an assessment of AMAUTO-1 as a personality and as a recruitment target. We forward this study as an attachment hereto, under separate cover, for your consideration.

2. Headquarters has not lost its keen interest in AMAUTO-1 as a long-range recruitment target, foreseeing the possibility of defecting him in place (at least for the remainder of his posting to Madrid), or defecting him outright (which would admittedly be less desirable). In line with these purposes, we offer the following readings, which may or may not be entirely applicable to AMAUTO-1:

a. AMAUTO-1 is a shrewd, articulate person who has reached heights that probably he might not have reached under normal circumstances. His work in Spain has been effective in general, and he seems to be very confident of himself and of the backing which he thinks he has from PBRUMEN.

/continued/

Attachment:
As Described Para. 1 above (USC)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Madrid W/Att. USC
1 - COS, WH/Miami W/Att. USC

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMW-11726	DATE 12 FEB 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

Distribution:

1 - EUR/IB
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OPS

FEB 15 8 31 AM '70

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Richard Wheeler:ak 2/4/70	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG	[illegible] FEB 1970	Wesley L. Laybourne
FEB 16	8 32 AM '70	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/EUR		John L. HART

FORM 1-61 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

b. Nevertheless, he has received some rather telling criticism of a professional nature, even though it is unknown whether this criticism also touches on his personal life. Perhaps because of this, AMAUTO-1 seems to be very careful in whatever he does, avoiding mistakes that would endanger his position, and avoiding any real or fancied provocation.

c. There seems to be little question that AMAUTO-1 is approachable, although he would probably resist any indirect approach in which "cards are not laid on the table." It appears very likely that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves (with profound misgivings as to its efficiency).

d. The very fact that he has made open remarks suggesting his unhappiness with PBRUMEN and his non-Marxist leanings in an office he himself points out is "bugged by the other side" could be interpreted as a signal from him, indicating that he is ready to listen. His remarks on the subject might be those of a man who believes he can "jump off" at any time, if necessary. Note that he tends to live with criticism from his home office rather than try to get out from under --- perhaps meaning that he would not accept a PCS assignment home. (The attachment hereto shows him describing a compatriot who wishes to return home as "a fool.") He has said himself that he believes AMTHUG-1 plans a major purge for mid-1970, and he might consider himself as a victim of that purge.

e. A fact which might affect timing is the arrival of a child in May. If he were to persuade his wife (and his government) to have the child in Spain, rather than return home for it, he would have a good excuse for requesting the presence of his oldest child (the only one who is now at home). If his wife returns home for delivery, he would (for a time at least) have three hostages in PBRUMEN instead of one.

f. UFGA-19006 reported a 1964 attempt to get at AMAUTO-1 through his wife's relatives. The consensus at the time was that AMAUTO-1 is probably immune to this type of approach. Headquarters, therefore, still opts for a logically developed, "traditional" recruitment build-up.

3. In line with the above, Headquarters suggests to Madrid certain lines of action which might be followed in an attempt to know more about AMAUTO-1. These actions might seem somewhat easier from our perspective than they actually are in the field, but we propose them for your consideration.

a. The man handling the new construction work (paragraph 16 of the attachment) should be checked out.

b. The established pattern of lonely automobile trips outside the capital (see paragraph 22 of the attachment) might be instructive to follow down. At least, the situation might offer a chance for approach or for subsequent handling.

c. AMAUTO-1's desire to see more people at home, and the indication that he discusses important matters at home becomes doubly interesting with the possibility of a vacant house next door (see paragraph 18 of the attachment). The person who owns the apartment building might offer a fruitful lead.

d. The apparent hostility of the current maid (see paragraph 24 and 27 of the attachment) might offer further exploitation.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMW-11726

e. AMAUTO/1's desire to affiliate himself with an exercise group (see paragraph 26b of the attachment) might offer a possibility to put an access agent next to him. The circumstance would be relatively normal, not calculated to arouse his suspicions. The use of someone of WOLADY nationality might, in fact, help to allay what is evidently a tendency AMAUTO/1 has of suspecting provocation.

f. Headquarters would greatly appreciate the opportunity of examining AMAUTO/1's X-rays. In this connection, we would like to see an investigation of the physician used on this matter (see paragraphs 31 and 32 of the attachment).

g. We would like to have Madrid's assessment of the diplomat mentioned in paragraph 8 of the attachment.

4. At the same time, we would appreciate it if Miami could follow down any of the leads stemming from AMAUTO/1's time in WOLADY. We are trying to trace his entrance back in the 1950's and as much of his time here as possible, and perhaps Miami Station can develop leads on the persons mentioned in paragraph 24 of the attachment hereto, especially in reference to the brother left with the house. (Note Below.)

Michael V. SLATINSKI

I would appreciate your giving personal attention to this matter, because it is rare that we have such a detailed assessment as we have in this case.

Edward D. SABETAY

201-735296

FORM 8-64 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3.

SECRET

Under Separate Cover Attachment to: OSMW-11726

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Pérez

DOB: c. 1931

Cuban Minister Plenipotentiary to Spain,
accredited 12 December 1967.

CHRONOLOGY

1. RUIZ probably comes from a humble family in Cuba, because he lived in a solar (semi-slum area) and began to work when he was only fourteen years old. This circumstance suggests that he lacks a formal education. He appears to come from a "revolutionary" family (his father was identified as a Communist and a leader of the barbers' union in UFGA-13595, and a brother was identified as a member of the DSE as of 1964 in UFGA-19006), [illegible] (201-735296)

2. In the fifties RUIZ emigrated to the United States, traveling throughout the east coast and holding minor jobs. In 1957 he began to work as an apprentice butcher for a Polish-American named Alexander SAMKO, who had a grocery store on Flagler Street in Miami. He evidently did so well in attracting Latin American customers that he soon began to distribute meat in the area, working for SAMKO (RUIZ seems to be somewhat proud of this success). He also appears proud of the fact that when he left Miami in February 1958, he left his brother (same brother?) a house in North Miami, a brand new car, and over $1,000 in the bank.

3. Although he did well in the meat business, he traces a large part of his success to another acquaintance in Miami: an American of Cuban descent known as Joe LOUIS (or LUIS). Joe LUIS was an underworld figure who was at that time competing with the Italians in the bolita (numbers) racket in Tampa. RUIZ and MOLEON (fnu), another Cuban exile, were each offered $800 a month by LUIS to supervise bolita collections in Miami. (There is no specific indication that RUIZ took his bolita friend up on this offer). Furthermore, LUIS went so far as to offer RUIZ and MOLEON $5,000 apiece to kill a man named FERNANDEZ (fnu), who was also involved in the bolita racket in Miami.

4. In February 1957 (note the 1958 date, above; perhaps an error on RUIZ' part) RUIZ left Miami along with a man named VILLEGAS (whose first name might be Harry) and three other members of the 26th of July Movement. They entered Cuba clandestinely. When the revolution triumphed in Cuba, Alexander SAMKO went to Havana, where he stayed for a week as RUIZ' house guest. SAMKO offered RUIZ a partnership in the meat business in Miami if he would return. RUIZ rejected the offer, saying that the Revolution needed him.

CS COPY

SECRET

S/C att to OSMW-11726

201-735296

5. RUIZ brags that in 1960 he was one of 18 persons out of 5,000 who were selected by the Ministry of the Treasury, where he was working at the time, to take a statistics course offered by CEPAL. The course, which lasted two years, included such subjects as mathematics, finance, democracy (?), and Marxism-Leninism. One of his schoolmates at the time was Marta ARCOL, now the director of the Museo de Arte in Havana. (It is interesting to note that in UFGA-13595 RUIZ was described as an anti-Communist as of 1960 by a Cuban refugee.

6. UFG-1539 reported RUIZ as Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies of the Ministry of the Treasury in 1962, and he was described as a militant Communist. In 1963 he was in Mexico, and UFGA-11065 mentioned him as G-2, living at Calle Cuenavaca 35, apartment 7. A report from LITAMIL-9 in 1964 characterized RUIZ as a violent CASTRO partisan, and AMMUG-1 in 1964 described RUIZ as a CUIS officer. Presidential Decree 3440 of 4 August 1964 (UFGA-19006) reported RUIZ as being appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Commerce, and QUDOZE has him appointed about that time as chief of the trade school at MINCEX, a post he held for two years. In 1967 he was appointed charge d'affaires in Madrid vice Francisco Ramon CALZADILLA.

ON THE JOB

7. There seems little doubt that RUIZ exercise the full authority that presumably he should have as Minister Plenipotentiary. The relations between Cuba and Spain appear to remain static because of Spain's refusal to appoint a full Ambassador to Cuba after LOJENDIO was expelled from the island by CASTRO in 1959. RUIZ is involved in and is kept informed on all matters related to Cuban-Spanish relations, including trade. He does not seem to permit commercial attaches to bypass him when they submit reports to their respective home offices in Havana. In addition, RUIZ takes a keen and active interest in Cubana operations, and he has said that no one may travel to Havana on Iberia without his permission. He insists that Cuban officials arriving in Madrid consult with him before arranging visits to Spanish officials or factories. He seems to have good working relations with Spanish government officials, because he is always careful to "put all his cards on the table" in meetings with them. (The tenor of his conversation seems to emphasize that he likes things this way in all his relations, personal as well as professional).

8. Little appears concerning RUIZ' unofficial contacts with other diplomats in Madrid, except that he is close to and exchanges information with the Algerian Ambassador. (According to current records, this is Ahmed LAIDI, posted to Madrid on 15 December 1966, living at Calle Tiemblo 3, Ciudad Puerto de Fierro. Latest desk traces show this person as born 20 April 1934 in Oudja, Morocco, and as of 25 October 1966 to have been the Director General of the Foreign Ministry in charge of political, economic, and cultural affairs. He is described as

reserved, intelligent, and probably something of an operator. He was Ben Bella's chief of cabinet before joining the Foreign Office in 1964, and he functions more on special assignment than as part of the chain of command. He was a member of the Algerian UN delegation as of 28 September 1965.)

9. RUIZ tries to give the impression that he enjoys the full confidence of Osvaldo DORTICOS and Raul ROA, thereby being able to exercise the full authority of his position. He frequently tells other Cuban diplomats stopping in Madrid that he makes 90% of the decisions without consulting with Havana, explaining that "this is the reason I am here."

10. Above all, RUIZ directs constant and bitter criticism against Havana, because of what he terms the incompetence there. In his opinion, this generalized incompetence will cause CASTRO to carry out a major purge after the 1970 harvest is in. (He specifically repeats that "no one in Havana wants to make any sort of decision"). One of his favorite books is The Peter Principle, to which he refers constantly, and he uses this book to describe what is going on in Havana. In RUIZ' view, Havana is always trying to interfere with the Embassy in Madrid, a situation which results in a lack of coordination and cooperation. RUIZ directs the same criticism against his staff in Madrid, because his personnel lack qualifications for the jobs they hold. He once told an associate: "They think that I'm a fool, but I don't miss anything they do."

11. In turn, he has also been the target of criticism from Havana, first from Zoila GOMEZ (?), who made a critical evaluation of the Embass. RUIZ' reaction is instructive: "I decided not to answer it. I took a librium, smoked a cigar, and forgot all about it." On another occasion he complained to Aristides DIAZ that he had received another critical report from Havana regarding his program for the Embassy. Havana was complaining that not much had been achieved. RUIZ noted that the Embassy had accomplished much that was not in the plan, and he intended to answer that particular criticism in detail.

12. Perhaps the most serious criticism of his activities came in a coded cable received by the Embassy early in October 1969. Havana questioned the way that RUIZ was handling the commercial treaty negotiations with Spanish authorities. In a communication directed to Raul LEON Torres (201-725624) (Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Commerce) and in rather strong language, RUIZ defended his right to be informed and consulted on the matter, denying that his cable number 521 was offensive to Joaquin ALVAREZ (Director of Trade with Western Europe and North America), who was evidently the source of criticism against RUIZ.

13. Evidently, this last piece of criticism upset RUIZ so much that he was nervous and particularly security-conscious. Less than a week later he called LEON in Havana and requested permission to go to Cuba, ostensibly to settle a personal problem with his son. However, his wife explained to another person in the Embassy that RUIZ' trip was due to his sick mother. His trip was probably due to the exceptionally sharp criticism and RUIZ' desire to clear it up personally.

14. When RUIZ returned to Madrid on 29 October 1969, he was a changed man, again relaxed and fully confident of himself. Nevertheless, he has told close friends that he feels very lonely in Spain and at times has had the desire simply to board a plane away from Spain and abandon the Embassy. He is always careful to say he desires to return to Havana, but he leaves room for the inference that he would rather go somewhere else. He believes that he is "burned" in Spain. He has said that when he returns to the island, he will definitely not return to his Ministry.

SECURITY AND SECURITY-CONSCIOUSNESS

15. RUIZ seems to be particularly sensitive in the area of security-consciousness. This attitude can possibly be traces to an involvement with the DGI in one way or another, but his background and especially his political views (see below) would appear to argue against his affiliation. RUIZ is quick to warn visiting Cubans against the efforts of what he terms "la compania, sociedad anonima" to compromise them, even before they leave Havana, indicating RUIZ' possible belief in the omnipresence and power of the sociedad anonima. He censors mail going to and coming from Havana, and he repeatedly states that his office is bugged, his telephone is tapped, and that he is followed quite openly wherever he goes. He attibutes this surveillance to the Seguridad, and he probably ascribes it to the Spanish. (Note that, despite his "knowledge" that his words go to hostile surveillance, he still dares to express critical opinions openly).

16. This security-consciousness is apparently the big reason he has asked Havana for funds for a new Embassy building, where he plans to have a shielded room free from bugs. He intends to have Havana send electricians for the job and Cuban personnel to act as doormen, etc., with the wives of the latter to be his char force. He seems fanatic on the subject of not having any Spanish personnel in the building. (Note that one Sr. VILLARROYA, of Constructiones Aznar in Madrid, is handling the real estate operation.)

17. RUIZ is particularly aware of what he calls "traps." He once recalled that he had been asked to dinner by the wife of a VIP and, after accepting the invitation, was told that a priest would also attend. He did not attend the dinner, although it considerably upset his hostess, because he was afraid of a scandal arranged by the police. He said that he receives only in the Embassy, because through that door can enter only those whom he wants to see.

18. Nevertheless, RUIZ has several times mentioned that he holds his really important conversations at home, and that he would rather see more people at his home instead of at his office. (In this connection, it is noted that the house next door to his --- Calle Triana 44 --- which used to be a home for the aged) is now empty. The owner of the apartment building where he lives is Ignacio ARTERO, a Spaniard.

19. RUIZ has even suggested installing a radio transmitter and speaking in code with Havana. The Cubans are in fact installing a transmitter on the Canary Islands, but RUIZ, characteristically keeping his actions correct, has stressed to the Spanish that Cuba will not use the transmitter for other than legitimate commercial purposes. RUIZ even offered to allow Spanish citizens to operate the station in order to emphasize his point.

20. Correct as he generally is in his professional behavior, RUIZ made what appears to be a mistake in discussing with members of his staff the possibility of telling Havana that a Spanish foreign service officer scheduled for duty there (Juan TORROBA Gomez, cf. OSMA-25692) might be open for recruitment. If one recalls RUIZ' constant warnings that his office is bugged by Seguridad, the discussion about TORROBA clearly exposes him to action by the Spanish authorities.

21. RUIZ himself is the target of what appears to be control by Juan Antonio CURBELO Lemus (201-733544) who is allegedly the First Secretary in charge of cultural affairs but who seems to be the "security man" in the Embassy. (We note that CURBELO's photograph was shown to AMBEDEW-1, who did not recognize the likeness). RUIZ has complained at least once that he needs a "real" cultural attache. CURBELO has instructed the front-desk girl to pass on to him a summary of who sees whom at the Embassy and for what purpose, including RUIZ' visitors. (Given RUIZ' near-mania for running his own shop, CURBELO must indeed exert an acknowledged security control).

22. Despite security considerations, however, RUIZ appears addicted to taking automobile jaunts by himself to the interior of the country. He must have very powerful reasons to do so, for he is probably exposing himself to attack by Cuban exiles. Given the reception accorded to Carlos ALFARAS, Armando HART, and Carlos CHAIN at the Barajas airport in June 1968, RUIZ might be unnecessarily exposing himself. He has not told anyone of where he goes or what he does, and both his wife and CURBELO strongly disapprove of his custom.

FAMILY

23. RUIZ' wife is Nilda VECIANA, who was reported on in UFGA-19006. She is probably in her early thirties. She is pregnant and due to have her fifth (?) child early in May 1970. She has had difficulties with her pregnancy because of recurring

fainting spells and overweight. These conditions are being treated by Dr. HERNANDEZ (fnu) and Dr. MATA (fnu).

24. Nilda is a pleasant woman who has not been known to quarrel with her husband or express political or religious opinions, although once she recited the Lord's Prayer by heart in front of others. A teacher by profession, she handles the bookkeeping at the Embassy on an informal basis. She appears to have a rather weak character, judging from the way she handles her boys. According to Severina ORTIZ Gomez, the maid, these are little beasts who treat the servants badly, even reviling them with obscenities, while referring to their mother as "la chula." Nilda does not permit the boys to be punished.

25. Nilda goes shopping by herself, and once she even took a taxi by herself to the airport to meet her husband, even though CURBELO did not like the idea at all. She seems to get along well with the wives of other Cubans on the staff.

26. RUIZ' children are:

a. Guillermito. He is the oldest and is now studying in Havana. There were reports that he was unhappy there, and RUIZ asked on 16 October 1969 to go to Havana to settle a personal problem with Guillermito. If there were a problem, it seems to have been solved, because RUIZ on his return quoted Guillermito as being very happy in his new school. (Some time ago, Mrs. Hector GALLO Portieles was constantly needling the other women about not being "revolutionary" enough and took Nilda RUIZ to task for having her children with her instead of at school in Cuba. The RUIZ family had brought four of their children with them, and later the other(s) came to join them, before the older one returned to school. RUIZ once told a visitor that Guillermito had been left with his grandparents during their exile in Miami and had been very resentful of it, so they had been very careful ever since not to repeat that mistake).

b. Alejandro. He is about six years old. According to those who know him, he is the real devil of the lot as well as a good swimmer. He is taking guitar lessons, goes to Colegio Estilo, and swims at Gimnasio Mascardo, Pilar de Zaragoza 99. (Nilda has talked to the Gimnasio people about RUIZ' going there also for swimming or exercise).

c. Ivan.

d. Juan Carlos.

e. One other (?)

27. All four children are very spoiled and have caused several maids to leave their jobs. Severina bitterly complains that the children show no respect for their parents, and that is the reason Severina gives for her hate for Nilda.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

28. Aside from the two-year statistics course taken in 1960, RUIZ appears to lack a solid, formal education, although he makes up for it by being an avid reader (five newspapers a day plus books). He understands and speaks English and French (fluency unknown) and has undertaken to teach grammar (presumably Spanish) to the Embassy staff.

29. RUIZ appears to be sensitive to art, and he frequently complains about the general lack of culture in Cuba. (This might indicate thatRUIZ considers himself "above" the Revolution). He shows some of the general inconsistencies of the self-educated. For example, his vocabulary level is rather low, and he curses frequently when talking to other male members of the staff. On the other hand, he seems rather well versed in international affairs and has a good understanding of international trade. It is probable that he has read some of the works of José Marti and, although he dictates letters to his secretary, he types some of his own reports to Havana.

HEALTH PROBLEMS

30. RUIZ suffers from what his wife has described as a liver illness (not further specified) for which he takes a medicine called bilidis. (This may refer simply to the medical words for "liver disease". Competent experts here guess that the medicine is used for anything from chronic constipation to gassiness and constant eructation because of inadequate digestion of fatty foods. It is possible that RUIZ suffers from the hard-to-pin-down mal de foie, which can be found in a high-strung, hard-driving person. RUIZ' evident use of librium (see above) might also suggest this condition).

31. Late in 1969 RUIZ was planning to go to Portugal to rest, following the recommendation of his physician Dr. CAVAS (also received as CABAS and CALDAS), and whose telephone number appears to be 276-77-46. There is also a mention of a Dr. PERIU, but his relationship is indistinct. RUIZ coughs frequently, is used to cold weather, and was planning to go for his health to the same Gimnasio as his son, Alejandro.

32. A July 1968 memorandum for the record stated that RUIZ suffers from a spinal ailment resulting from a fall he had about 12 years ago. Since then he has had chronic backaches which were particularly severe during the time that he was in the U.S., Haiti, and Santo Domingo. His pains have recurred since he arrived in Spain. On 3 June 1968 he had a severe attack and was

treated by the Embassy's Spanish doctor VILLALANDA (fnu), who prescribed cortisone. His condition was diagnosed as incurable, since it was doubted that the injury to his spine could be corrected by an operation. RUIZ was further told that the condition would continue to grow worse, and that within six to ten years he would have a defective walk. RUIZ planned to send the diagnosis and X-rays to ROA in Havana, who would pass them to the Cuban specialist MARTINEZ-PAZ for review.

TRAVELS

33. Following are the trips RUIZ is known to have made during the last quarter of 1969:

a. To Bilboa, San Sebastian, and Burgos by car, on 28 November 1969, returning two days later.

b. To Havana, to settle "a personal problem," on 20 October 1969 via Iberia (first class), returning to Madrid on 29 October.

c. To London on 14 November for consultations with Raul LEON Torres, returning two days later by air.

d. To Italy with his family on vacation on 28 December to pick up an Alfa Romero that he bought for the Embassy, returning by car and arriving in Madrid on 6 January 1970.

CONTACTS IN MADRID

34. Little is known about RUIZ' contacts in Madrid. Aside from the Algerian Ambassador (see above), we know about:

a. Pedro RUIZ. A good friend who goes to RUIZ' home frequently. According to RUIZ, Pedro is quite influential and is a friend of MASSO(?).

b. Carlos CARRASCO. Another person who calls RUIZ frequently. In late October or early November 1969 CARRASCO went to New York.

c. Rosendo CANTO (201-749310). CANTO lives at Goya 54, Madrid. His friendship with RUIZ is interesting, given CANTO's background, because their being together could be very dangerous for RUIZ unless he were using CANTO for some reason with the approval of Havana. CANTO wants to go to Havana for a year, live there for a year, and then join the Cuban Foreign Service. Referring to CANTO's desire, RUIZ said on 8 January 1970: "He is a fool."

CHARACTER

35. Superficially, RUIZ seems to be an easy-going and rather simple man who no doubt enjoys the prestige and position he has and the successes he has had professionally in Spain. He appears to have a strong character and probably plays the predominant role in his marriage. He and his wife seem to get along very well

together, and they are not heard to argue. On the other hand, there appear to be very deep inconsistencies in his public and private behavior. Sometimes he speaks like a man at war with himself.

36. A certain degree of racism can be detected in his constant reference to blacks as "niches," a disrespectful Cuban colloquialism roughly comparable with the pejorative word, "nigger."

37. RUIZ almost never discusses women with his colleagues, except for one off moment when he mentioned a girl he knew in the United States before the Revolution. Perhaps RUIZ wisely remembers that Nilda also works at the Embassy and refrains from mentioning women on her account. In any case, he is not known to be involved in any extramarital affair. (Still, one wonders about the custom of absenting himself by automobile into the interior of Spain).

38. His habits seem to be simple: he likes movies; he has read Topaz (but made no comment thereon); and he receives people at his home for cocktails.

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS

39. Although outwardly a "Revolutionary," RUIZ gives much more the appearance of a man with moderate political views struggling to justify to himself the actions of his government, especially in view of the political and economic realities of his country. It is possible that his feelings might lie closer to the theory of the "betrayed revolution" ---but not for strictly ideological reasons. The incompetence of the Cuban governmental bureaucracy, for example, has sabotaged the revolution.

40. In the first place, RUIZ definitely does not seem to be a Marxist and consequently he cannot accept the role of "robot" (his term) required by Party discipline and vertical structure.

a. On 29 December 1969 he wrote to Telesforo DIAZ Portillo, a MINREX official: "Revolutionaries should not be coerced by forms of political control."

b. On 11 December 1969 he told a visiting Agropecuario official from Havana that: " ... if I disagree with orders, I question them because I am not a robot nor do I have the mentality of one. As a human being I express opinions no matter what the risk that I may have to accept personally."

c. RUIZ seems to have little compunction in talking to what he thinks of as old acquaintances, even though they may be on the opposite side of the political fence from him. He once mentioned how he went out of his way to greet a "gusano" on the street because they had been friends in Havana. The Cuban exile evidently turned away from him, but RUIZ defended his own action in initiating the greeting.

41. Aside from the constant criticism of Havana's incompetence, lack of vision, and lack of realism, he is quick to point out the deficiencies of life in Cuba as reflected in his directive to his Embassy staff not to celebrate Christmas together, because there are hungry people at home. RUIZ has also said that medicine in general is quite backward in Cuba.

42. Although he is probably an atheist (or likes to think of himself as one), he is known to believe that "religion should not be considered a handicap for persons trying to return to Cuba." He does not hide his views of the American people, either, for he describes Americans as "frank" and "simple". "They treated me very well," he told Raul LEON Torres in December 1969. On the other hand, he refers to Latin American diplomats as bootlickers because they use the English language at parties, and he has remarked that "capitalism is no good."

43. He seems to have a certain admiration for General Francisco FRANCO, of whom RUIZ has said: "FRANCO is the only reason that Spain is not Communist." RUIZ also called FRANCO "one of the few most brilliant politicians of all time." These seem like strange words for a man as security-conscious as he.

44. He appears to be well-informed on international matters. Some of his views are contradictory at times, but they characterize him as what might be called an undecided realist:

a. "Cuba is a political power, not a military or economic power."

b. "The USSR has neutralized US sea power in the Mediterranean."

c. "Cuba can destroy Guantanamo whenever it chooses to do so, although the base has lost its strategic value to the United States."

d. "US-China rapproachment should be feared, but also a Japan-China alliance."

e. "US power is beginning to crumble, but the Soviets are revisionists."

f. "The Egyptians harm us when they buy sugar from Cuba and then resell to other countries."

g. "We have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view; secondly, because, whether right or wrong, they are on the same side fighting those who are on the other side."

h. "Cuba has had and now has major discrepancies with the USSR, China, and the US, but we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism."

201-735296

14-00000

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:c.
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7344/1549
DATE: 10 February 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

S E C R E T

15

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 15 PER #

CONF: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

(classification)
S E C R E T

(date and time filed)
13 19 09 Z FEB 70

(elite) (reference number)
CITE DIRECTOR 009071

TO MADRID LISBON

TYPIC AMAUTO QUTIMID

REF: OSMA-25870 (NOT SENT LISBON)

1. REF CONTAINS QUTIMID REPORT NUMBER 2274 DATED 9 JAN 70 CONCERNING CALL BY ONE CONCHA CAMACHO TO AMAUTO-1, UNDER SOMEWHAT PROVOCATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. CONCHITA DESCRIBES SELF AS WIDOW OF THE DOCTOR WHO WAS DIRECTOR OF COIMBRA HOSPITAL (PLACE UNKNOWN). SHE LEAVES PHONE NUMBER 201-49-89, WHICH CURBELO TRIES VAINLY TO TRACE THROUGH PHONE COMPANY.

2. REQUEST MADRID TRACE PHONE NUMBER, CONCHITA CAMACHO, AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT, SINCE AMAUTO-1 AGREED MEET HER. REQUEST LISBON CHECK COIMBRA HOSPITAL IN ATTEMPT IDENTIFY DR. CAMACHO (PORTUGAL?). THERE WERE NO IDENTIFIABLE HQS TRACES ON CONCHA OR CONCEPCION CAMACHO.

3. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: Ref contained phone tap information as above, plus other details hinting at some sort of provocation of AMAUTO-1. Field had not alerted us to this possible operational lead.

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

C/WH/COG
E/IB/S
E/IB/P

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

13 Feb 70

RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-735296

14-00000

ORIG: RICHARD [illegible]
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R/ 1819
DATE: 9 FEBRUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 ~~[illegible]~~ 5 [illegible]
2 ~~[illegible]~~ 6 [illegible]
3 ~~[illegible]~~ 7
4 [illegible] 8 [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30/13 PER 10/1 .22

☒ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/WH6
INFO: FILE, VR. DDP C/FI C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 10 21 04Z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC LISAGA 003947

REF: MADRID 0420 (IN 020665)

1. REQUEST STATION TRY GET AN ORIGINAL COPY FOR RETENTION. FAILING THIS, REQUEST PHOTOCOPY. HQS MOST INTERESTED KNOWING WHETHER AMAUTO-1'S ORDER RE BOOK DISTRIBUTION IS HIS OWN IDEA OR STEMS FROM HIS HQS, IF YOU HAVE ANY WAY TO FIND OUT.

2. FILE 201-735296, 201-805447, 50-6-149/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref reported that AMAUTO-1, Cuban Chargé Madrid, has received from Habana 30 copies of book concerning LISAGA-1 case. QUFLUTE-1 may have possibility of obtaining copy for us. AMAUTO-1 reportedly has ordered no distribution of book outside official Cuban Community.

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

JOHN SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

EUR/IB

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division;
~~Chief of Station, Madrid~~

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC QUDOZE
AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References:
A. OSMA-25745, 5 December 1969
B. DIRECTOR 004676, 23 January 1970
C. WH/MIAMI 6341, 26 January 1970

WH/Miami has been unable to develop any leads or traces to Alexander SAMKO, the individual for whom AMAUTO-1 worked in the States. Local LNERGO was also queried with negative results.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

[illegible] E\IB|S

Distribution:
(3) - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, EUR
2 - COS, Madrid - out pouch

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-1770

DATE
FEB 6 1970
4 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

SECRET

Extract from [illegible] Report No. [illegible]80, Item 7, [illegible] February 1970
[illegible], 20 April 1970

Lilia Ruiz [illegible] Lilia Diaz (Aristides' wife). She asks her how the [illegible], that was [illegible] with the Ruiz, is getting along. Lilia Diaz says that the questions that [illegible] spoke to her about are [illegible] for her, because she thinks that she and Aristides will [illegible] definitely come back to [illegible].

(THINK WHAT WAS MEANT WAS THAT RUIZ (AMMUTO-1) AND [illegible] BY AUGUST)

SECRET

FILE:
AMMUTO-1

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 2 Feb 70

TO: Mr Wheeler

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

D U-3

file in

AMAUTO-1

201.

FROM: AF/1/A

ROOM NO. 6C39

BUILDING

EXTENSION 7361

FORM NO. 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (C)

LAIDI, Ahmed

Algeria

DOB: Oudja, Morocco dob: 20 April 1934

Named August 1963 advisor on African Affairs in presidency and now is listed as Ben Bella's chief of Cabinet. While he is a relative newcomer to scene here and not known personally to the Embassy, it appears likely that he is close to Ben Bella and therefor a useful contact.

Deptel #658
4/10/63

In accordance with a decree published on 12 November 1963, Ahmed Laidi has been appointed chef du cabinet of Presedent Ben Bella.

Journal Offic
15 Nov 1963
Algiers

Subj is new Director General of Political Affairs, MFA. (Algiers EMBTEL 964, 21 Oct 64
filed:Alg/Cuba

Laidi, (Director General, Foreign Ministry in charge of Political, Economic and Cultural
Affairs), member of Sept 65 delegation to UN General Assembly. Described as reserved, in-
igent, and probably something of an operator; he was Ben Bella's chief of cabinet before
ing foreign office in 1964 and although technically still number three man in fonoff, has
ed to function more on special assignment basis than as part of chain of command. His mo
recent [illegible] project has been B ndung 2. Algiers Embtel 660, 28 Sept 65, Alg/UN

Appointed Algerian Ambassador to Spain, October, 1966

A-168, 25 Oct 66
Filed Algeria/Spain

WH/COG 70-38

26 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SB/C

ATTENTION : Connie Terry

SUBJECT : Cuban Charge d'Affairs Comments on Czechoslovakian Situation

REFERENCE : OSMA-25789, dated 7 January 1970

1. The following comments of the Cuban Minister to Spain, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, reflect Cuban thoughts on the Czechoslovakian situation:

> The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has been a disaster; however, criticizing the Soviet action would mean taking sides with the Americans. A friend may be criticized in private but publicly he should be defended. (QUDOZE, 19 November.) The Cubans have to side with the Soviets for military and economic reasons and because, whether right or wrong, they belong to the same ideological group. Cuba had and still has enormous discrepancies with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States but weighing the differences Cuba is with Communism and opposed to Capitalism. (QUDOZE, 3 November.)

2. The above information was obtained from a Sensitive Source and should be protected as such.

Glenn O. Brown
C/WH/COG/OPS

Distribution:
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I

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 852

S E C R E T 261525Z JAN 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6341 WMIM

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

26 JAN IN 0 13247

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 004676

1. UNABLE TO DEVELOP LEADS TO AMAUTO/1'S FRIEND ALEXANDER SAMKO. HAVE REQUESTED CHECK FROM LOCAL LNERGO AND WILL ADVISE.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

S E C R E T

AB
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
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201-735296
26 JAN 70

14-00000

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144 R. 1819
DATE: 21 JANUARY 1970

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 23 00 44z Jan 70 CITE DIRECTOR 004676

TO WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. THROUGH QUDOZE AMAUTO-1 HAS AT LEAST TWICE TALKED ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES IN MIAMI AREA IN 1957 WORKING IN MEAT BUSINESS WITH ONE ALEXANDER SAMKO (OR SAMKOV). HQS TRACES CANNOT IDENTIFY THIS PERSON. REQUEST MIAMI TRY.

2. FILE 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

AN V
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~DS~~
FI

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WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

E/IB M. Sorrels

J. Brown for
JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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23 Jan 70
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-735296

2/WH

1P

SECRET

Chief of Station, Madrid CSM
Chief, European Division
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami
OPERATIONAL/AMOT
Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735290)

Reference: DIRECTOR 62752

Forwarded herewith is AMOT report, OTA-1858, containing biodata and comments on Subject, from IDENTITY, who is Subject of 201-826285 and of reference.

Rolando Cardoso Perez, cousin

Albert N. DANZIGER

Attachment:
1. OTA-1858 h/w
2. Identity u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c
2 - C/EUR w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c
~~3~~ - C/WH w/att 1 h/w, 2 u/s/c

MICROFILMED
FEB 09 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Date 4 Feb 72

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2 att

UFAA-1690

20 January 1970

201-735290
~~201-826285~~

SECRET

CS COPY

[illegible]

S E C R E T

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Date: 11 [illegible] 1969

8P

201-735276

I. [illegible]

1. Name: Guillermo RUIZ [illegible]

2. DPOB: Born about 193[illegible], [illegible] in Havana, Cuba.

3. Address:

a. Present: Madrid, Spain (exact address unknown)

b. Permanent: Marianao, City of Havana (exact address unknown)

4. Other names used: None

5. Present Position: As of 10 October 1969 when Source [illegible] him for the last time, he was holding the position of Commercial Attaché of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Spain (Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Spain). Source does not know since what date Subject has been holding this position.

(W coded)

6. Marital Status: Subject is married but Source does not know the name of Subject's wife (Hilda V[illegible] López). She is white, was born about 1934, and is slender and blonde. She is a schoolteacher and resides with Subject in Spain. Her political ideology is not known to Source, but Source believes that she follows Subject's ideology. (Subject's wife, Hilda V[illegible] López, is the daughter of Juan or Celestino V[illegible] [illegible] (?) and Palma LOPEZ Méndez or Menéndez (?).)

7. Relatives:

a. Parents: José Antonio RUIZ (mat. unk.) (?), white, born about 1910. He is a barber and owns a barber shop located on Cuba St., City of Havana. He is a former member of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and is now a member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). He is also the head of a sectional office of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) in Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, City of Havana.

[illegible] RUIZ [illegible] (??). She was born about 1914 in Havana and is white. She is a housewife. She is adapted to the present Cuban regime on account of her husband's and son's political ideology. Resides with her husband in Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, City of Havana.

b. Brothers and Sisters:

(1) José Antonio RUIZ [illegible] (?). He was born in Havana about 1935 and is white. He is known to have worked as a truck driver and, during the present Cuban regime, he worked as a Havana-Víbora Route 37 bus driver in Havana. He is a supporter of the regime. Member of the National Revolutionary Militia (MNR) and wears the militia uniform. He is said to be a gunner. Resides in Reparto Monterrey, Jacomino section, Havana, next to his parents' home.

Born c 1935 Cuba
Havana

traces

S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
FEB 09 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

[illegible] / LFHA 01690

201-735276

14-00000

[illegible]
[illegible], Ha[illegible]
Birth of Subject
201-735296

[illegible] type of [illegible] time in [illegible] work [illegible] Havana [illegible] [illegible] not know [illegible]

c. Children: Source [illegible] children, but does not know if the children are [illegible] Subject or not. (Subject has [illegible] children: Guillermo RUIZ Veciana (M), [illegible] RUIZ Veciana [illegible]), Julio RUIZ Veciana (M), Juan RUIZ Veciana (M) and Ivan RUIZ Veciana (M).)

8. Languages:

a. Native language: Spanish

b. Foreign languages: Source believes Subject knows some English because Subject has resided in the U.S.

9. Physical Description:

a. Race: white

b. Apparent age: about 50

c. Height: about 5'7"

d. Weight: about 190 lbs.

e. Build: stout

f. Hair: blond, slightly wavy, combed back

g. Eyes: light-colored (Source does not remember exact color)

h. Complexion: fair

i. Shape of face: round

j. Clothing: Usually wears coat and tie, by virtue of his position in Spain.

k. General appearance: average

l. Identification marks: none visible

m. Characteristics: no distinguishing characteristics

10. Personality, Character, Habits and Personal Weaknesses:

a. Personality: Intelligent, normal.

b. Character: Pleasant, normal.

c. Habits: Smokes cigarettes.

d. Personal Weaknesses: Has a weakness for women, especially Asiatic women or women of [illegible] type. Likes to dance and drink with some moderation.

S E C R E T

11. Financial situation:

a. Before 1959: [illegible] did not have Subject to hold any job [illegible] supported by his family. [illegible], Subject had all his needs.

b. After 1959: [illegible] with regard to power and [illegible].

12. Curriculum Vitae [illegible]

a. Education: Subject attended the primary [illegible] at the "Hermanos Maristas" School in Vibora, City of Havana. Source does not know if he studied high school. In the early days of the present Cuban regime, Subject was attending Havana University but Source does not know what he was studying.

b. Employment Record: Prior to 1959, Subject was not known to have held any job in Cuba. In 1958, he was in exile in the U.S. but Source does not know if he worked in the U.S. or not. During the present Cuban regime, Subject has made a few trips to Latin America and Europe on CSC missions. (In 1958, while Subject was in exile in the U.S., he returned to Cuba clandestinely as a stowaway.)

13. Travel outside Cuba: In 1958, Subject was in exile in the U.S. (no further details known to Source). During the present Cuban regime, Subject has traveled to Latin America and Europe on CSC missions. As of 20 October 1960, he was in Spain (Source does not know when Subject arrived in Spain).

14. Contacts and Friends:

a. Relatives and friends in the government: According to Source, the members of Subject's family on his father's side are Communists. Some of them were members of the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). Source obtained this information from comments which he has heard among relatives. He does not know or remember the names and positions of these members of the family of Subject's father.

b. Friends in Cuba who do not hold positions in the government: Unknown.

c. Relatives and friends outside Cuba: Source (Subject's cousin).

II. [illegible]

A. Political [illegible]:

1. Prior to 1959, Subject was not a member or collaborator of the Communist Party of Cuba. He was known to be connected with the Youth Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Authentic).

SECRET

2. Subject was anti-Batista prior to [illegible].

3. Subject helped in the struggle [illegible] the Batista regime in what was known [illegible] He is said to have [illegible] the Batista regime. He [illegible]

4. Subject was in [illegible] after it was [illegible] Castro was in [illegible]

5. Source does not know exactly whether Subject has accepted and cast himself with the Cuban regime, but believes that Subject has accepted it totally and completely.

6. Source does not know if Subject is capable of extensive personal sacrifice for a "cause."

7. Subject has benefited from the present regime. He presently holds a position which he probably would not hold had there been no revolution.

8. Source does not know if Subject is the sort of person who would be capable of doing something against the present Cuban regime if he were opposed to it, although, according to Subject's background and activities during the Batista regime, he is the sort of man who fights.

9. Subject has never been anti-Communist. Subject's father is an old-guard Communist.

10. Source has never heard Subject express any opinion on the United States, but believes that Subject follows the policy of the Cuban regime in this regard, as he is a supporter of the regime.

11. Source has no indication or evidence that Subject could be recruited or defected. However, Source says that any attempt to recruit or defect Subject could be based on his position or benefits for his wife and children. Source says that it should also be considered that Subject has a weakness for women, especially Asiatic women or women of Asiatic type.

12. Subject is outside Cuba but Source does not know if his wife and children are with him and if he would be in a position to defect if he wished to do so.

[illegible]

A. [illegible]

[illegible], 31 July 19[illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] Pérez, Guillermo:

Trip Madrid-Havana, [illegible] passport [illegible]. Source: [illegible]

Trip Madrid-Havana, [illegible]; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/[illegible]. Source: [illegible] passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, [illegible] November 19[illegible]; Cuban diplomatic passport [illegible]-D/67/[illegible]. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 August 19[illegible]; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/[illegible]. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Born on 10 February 1930, Havana. Arrived in [illegible] from Madrid on 27 July 1968. Source: List of Cubans Traveling, 31 August 1968.

B. VICENTE López, Hilda:

PD-8134, 7 December 1967, [illegible]-103.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 August 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/891. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1966; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/635. Source: [illegible] passenger list.

VICENTE López, Hilda:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1968; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/67/891. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Member of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Daughter of Juan VICENTE and Palma LOPEZ. Married to Guillermo [illegible]. Is in Spain with her husband and her parents. White, born about 1942, about 5'5" tall, 135 lbs., blond hair, light green eyes. Teacher. Member of the Federation of Cuban Women and Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Source: Orlando [illegible], 14 April 1969, [illegible]-10.

C. VICENTE, Juan:

White, born in 1907, 5'8" tall, about 200 lbs., graying black hair, gray eyes. Married to Palma LOPEZ. Has a daughter named Hilda VICENTE López, born about 1942. He was born in Cataluña, Spain, and is a naturalized Cuban citizen. He resided on 70th Ave. at the corner of 5th Ave., [illegible], Marianao, Havana, in a house that was given to him by the present Cuban regime. Visited the U.S. prior to 1959. He is a high official of the Ministry of Construction. PCC member. Unconditional supporter of the regime.

V[illegible], Juan ([illegible]):

He is an uncle by marriage of [illegible]. [illegible] in Spain since March 1959 with [illegible]. Source: Orlando CASTRO Cardoso, 24 April 19[illegible], I-11.

V[illegible] Palma, Cele[illegible]:

Trip Havana-Madrid, [illegible] January 1960; Cuban passport [illegible]/60. Source: CCA passenger list.

Note: According to information in our possession we believe that Juan VIGNIER is identical with Celestino VIGNIER Palma.

D. [illegible]:

Married to Juan VIGNIER (md. unk.). She was born about 1911 and is white, weighs about 115 lbs. and has graying hair and light-colored eyes. She has a daughter named Hilda VIGNIER López, born about 1942. Resides on 70th Ave. at the corner of 5th Ave., Miramar, Marianao, Havana. Has been in Spain with her husband since March 1959. Member of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC). Aunt of Source's wife. Source: Orlando CASTRO Cardoso, 24 April 1959, I-10.

LOPEZ Menéndez, Palma:

Trip Havana-Mexico, 9 December 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 10 June 1959; Cuban passport PP-E/59/472. Source: CCA passenger list.

LOPEZ Méndez, Palma:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 20 December 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. [illegible]. Source: CCA passenger list.

E. RUIZ, José Antonio:

RUIZ Ramos, José:

Manager of the Wall Street Barber Shop, located at 360 Aguiar St., Havana. Appointed to this position by Resolution #3586, 17 April 1963, of the Ministry of Domestic Trade (MINCIN). Source: Official Gazette #116, 26 June 1963, page 6864.

F. [illegible]:

On [illegible] July 19[illegible], [illegible] on a list of Cuban students [illegible] Technological [illegible]. Source: [illegible], 9 [illegible].

G. [illegible]:

Trip [illegible], [illegible] passport PP-D/[illegible]. Half fare. [illegible]

Trip Mexico-Havana, 29 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. [illegible]. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic [illegible] PP-D/57/392. Source: Iberia passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 29 June 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/57/392. Source: CCA passenger list.

H. RUIZ Vesiana, [illegible]:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/57/391. Source: Iberia passenger list.

RUIZ Vesiana, Alejandro:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/335. Half fare. Source: CCA passenger list.

I. RUIZ Vesiana, Julio:

Trip Havana-Mexico, 29 November 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/407. Infant. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/62/335. Half fare. Source: CCA passenger list.

RUIZ Vesiana, Julio C.:

Trip Madrid-Havana, 29 June 1960; Cuban passport PP-D/59/472. Child. Source: CCA passenger list.

J. RUIZ Vesiana, [illegible]:

Trip Havana-Madrid, 12 February 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/58/50. Source: CCA passenger list.

Trip Madrid-Havana, 4 August 1960; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/58/50. Child. Source: Iberia passenger list.

7

[illegible]

Trip [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/20. Source: [illegible] list.

[illegible]

Trip [illegible]
PP-D/63/20. [illegible]

K. [illegible]

Trip [illegible]-Mexico, 8 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Infant. Source: Cubana passenger list.

Trip Havana-Mexico, 22 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Child. Source: passenger list (does not say what [illegible]).

Trip Madrid-Havana, 6 [illegible] 1963; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/20. Child. Source: Iberia passenger list.

RUIZ, Evin:

Trip Mexico-Havana, 9 May 1964; Cuban diplomatic passport PP-D/63/744. Child. Source: passenger list.

Y

201-735296

SEPARATE
TO: UFAA-1690

SCA TO:
UFAA-1690

[illegible]

2P

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO UFAA-1690

FR

Cousin of Subject
of 201-735296

1. IDENTITY IS: Rolando CARDOSO Perez (201-822965), cousin of Subject of UFAA-1690. CARDOSO last saw Subject at the Barajas Airport in Madrid when CARDOSO was departing for the U.S. in October 1968. They exchanged greetings only at that time, however, they had previously seen each other at Barajas Airport in mid-1968 when they talked for about five minutes about trivialities. Subject was at the airport to meet arriving Cuban diplomats. CARDOSO is willing to write to Subject and to assist in an approach should it be desired, however, he does not believe that Subject is recruitable. They have a family relationship but are not close because of political differences, however, it would not be unusual for them to exchange greetings. (DIRECTOR 62752 points out CARDOSO's faults).

2. The following is biodata on Rolando CARDOSO Perez:

   a. Parolee No.: A18 239 674

   b. DPOB: 23 May 1936, Havana, Cuba

   c. Address in Cuba: 419 Libertad St. between Juan Delgado and D'Strampes Sts., Santos Suarez, Havana

   d. Employment in Cuba: From approximately 1952 until 1958, he worked in his father's bicycle repair shop on Soledad St. between Pocitos and Carlos Tercero Sts., Havana. From the end of 1958 until 1963, he worked in a coffee shop located next to his father's bicycle repair shop in Havana. From 1963 until 1965 he was unemployed, studying English and business administration. From the end of 1965 until the end of 1966, he worked in the Construction Department of the Antonio Guiteras National Electric Enterprise in Havana, earning a salary of $80.00 pesos a month as a common laborer. From the end of 1966 until approximately March 1967, he worked as a farm laborer as a member of the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP) in Florida, Camaguey Province. From March 1967 until he left Cuba in November 1967, he was unemployed, engaging in making and selling hair nets and other similar items. From November 1967 until 10 October 1968, he was in Spain and did not have any employment during this period.

   e. Date of arrival in the U.S.: He arrived in the U.S. on 10 October 1968. He had departed Cuba on 26 November 1967 on a Checa Airlines plane, going to Paris, France, and then taking another plane to Spain the following day.

   f. Address in U.S.: 540 SW 11th Avenue, Miami, Fla., phone 377-3877

   g. Employment in U.S.: From mid-October 1968 until December 1968, he worked at the Delicias fruit preserves

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FEB 09 1970
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/Continued/

S/C att. to UFAA-01690

201-735296

plant on W. 28th St., Hialeah, Fla. In December 1968, he underwent a hernia operation. In January 1969, he worked three days in the Los Pinos Nuevos Bakery in Miami. Then he was unemployed for two months, recovering from the hernia operation. Since approximately March 1969, he has been working at the Marti Theater on SW 8th Ave. between 4th and 5th Sts., Miami, under the orders of the manager, Manuel ALVAREZ.

h. Spouse: Alina ALVARADO Torres (NT). They have been married since 23 December 1966. She is white and was born on 21 October 1937 in Havana, Cuba. She is an English, French and painting teacher, and also a stenographer. Resides with Source. They have no children.

i. Children: none

j. Parents: Bernardo CARDOSO Rodriguez (NT). White, born about 1902 in La Esperanza, Las Villas Province. Resides at 689 Soledad St., Havana. Retired National Police corporal. Opposed to the present Cuban regime.

Francisca PEREZ Entrialgo (NT). White, born about 1911 in Havana. Housewife. Resides with her husband. Opposed to the regime.

k. Brothers and Sisters:

(1) Rina PEREZ Perez (NT). Arrived in the U.S. in approximately 1961. Claimed Source from the U.S. Resides at 2755 SW 24th Terr., Miami, Fla., phone 446-4555.

(2) Bernardo CARDOSO Rodriguez (NT). Born about 1929 in Havana or in La Esperanza, Las Villas Province. White. Resides in New Jersey.

(3) Jorge CARDOSO Perez (NT). White, born about 1942 in Havana. Lives with his parents. Opposed to the regime. Now unemployed. Formerly worked in a laboratory in Havana. Opposed to the regime.

(4) Pastora CARDOSO Perez (NT). White, born about 1951 in Havana. Lives with her parents.

l. Physical description: White, appears to be about 34 years of age, about 5'8" tall, 140 lbs., average build, fair complexion, light brown hair, brown eyes, ovoid shaped face, no identification marks.

m. Other names used: none

n. Education: He completed two years of business school and took a course in business administration. Knows some English (fair).

CSMA-25832, 14 Jan 1970
QUXO26

[illegible] (   )

He thinks, now that he knows the past history of the case, that your friend had been used as a tool for "others(people's) interests".

Report No. 241 2 December 1969

Ruiz is talking with Curbelo and Franco about the new building. Apparently they are waiting for an O.K. from Havana. Ruiz seems concerned about the maintenance of the building, as it has six floors and a basement. Havana will have to send an electrician, who is also a plumber, and that understands something of carpentry. They will need three or four other men to act as doormen, watchmen, etc. The wives of these men will be the charwomen of the building. Curbelo says once that Havana approves the building they will have to sit down and talk over what difficulties hiring Spanish personnel might present. Ruiz doesn't want Spanish personnel under any circumstances. He speaks of having two dining rooms, one for the Commercial Office and the other for the Embassy; here meals prepared outside will be served. The dining room will be completely isolated so that no visitor or invited guest will be able to place anything in the ceiling nor in the walls without being seen. They are going to install a closed circuit television so that all entries and exits will be controlled. Ruiz says that a Japanese type television of the kind they are discussing only costs something over $500, and he adds that most likely there is one in the American embassy.

Report No. 242 January 1970

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
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SMITH, LESLIE
RID/AS
EXT. 7670

EP-499
GASO
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TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

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COMMENTS

N.G.

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7. SR				
8.				
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12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

ENOUGH WITH GUA/CO AND CRATZ, NO PARTICULAR INTEREST.

3. TO 4.
NANCY DO YOU HAVE AN INTEREST IN THESE INDIVIDUALS
4 - 3 TO.

3. TO 6.
MAY BE OF SOME INTEREST IN REGARDS TO SPANISH-CUBA RELATIONS

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT ✓

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
9 Jan 70

DOCUMENT NUMBER
DSMA 25306

60050

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
QUDOZE
Joaquin AUVI Casals, Lazaro GARRIDO Sanchez & Antonio MARQUEZ Pedraza

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-735296

1. Of possible interest to addressees is a translation of the following letter dictated by Guillermo RUIZ Perez to his secretary on 26 December 1969. The letter was addressed to a comrade "OCUZA or LANUZA (fon)" in Havana in response to a confidential note received by RUIZ from Havana.

> "In relation to your confidential note number 7240 about the Spanish prisoners, Joaquin AUVI Casals, Lazaro GARRIDO Sanchez and Antonio MARQUEZ Pedraza, whose release was requested in a note from the Spanish Embassy in Havana, I would like to tell you the following: Firstly, Senor Joaquin AUVI Casals was of interest to D. Pedro SALVADOR de Vicente; but because of the bad record and activities of this man, it was understood that his departure would be denied. I talked to Pedro SALVADOR about this matter and upon mentioning this man's background he told me that his interest was due to a phone call he had received from a friend of his in Miami. He considers that, given the background in this case, his friend was supposedly an instrument of "other interests". Secondly, regarding the other Spaniards, we have no objection whatsoever to their departing the country. Without anything of further consequence,....."

2. Station files contain no traces on AUVI, GARRIDO or MARQUEZ.

Perry D. Wachal
Perry D. WACHAL

Pedro SALVADOR de VICENTE, the
[illegible] DELEGATE for LATIN AMERICAN
AFFAIRS of THE SPANISH MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR RE L/IB/S
2 - COS, WH/Miami

[illegible]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA - 25806	9 January 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

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SECRET

REPORT NO. CSDB-312/03010-69

DATE DISTR. 17 December 1969

COUNTRY Cuba, Spain

DOI Late September 1969

SUBJECT Cuban-Spanish Commercial Relations

ACQ Spain, Madrid (Early October 1969) FIELD NO. OSM 9815

SOURCE An official Spanish service from a source described as sensitive and usually reliable.

1. On 23 September 1969 the Cuban Minister to Spain, Guillermo Ruiz Perez, called on Pedro Salvador de Vicente, the Special Delegate for Latin American Affairs in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss the forthcoming trade negotiations in Cuba. During the discussion Salvador told Ruiz that the one and only question which concerns the Spanish Government is that of Cuban indemnifications and pensions for Spanish employees, and he asked Ruiz what the latter could say regarding this problem. (Field Comment: The indemnifications refer to property owned by Spanish nationals which was confiscated by the Cuban Government.) Ruiz claimed that he had no instructions on what he could say, adding that the claims were numerous and that the paperwork involved was difficult and required a great deal of time.

2. Salvador told Ruiz that the subject of indemnifications and pensions must be discussed during the forthcoming negotiations, and that the Cuban Government must provide at least an approximate figure of what it is going to pay. He said that the indemnification figure must be based on the value of the expropriated properties, less the amount of any taxes levied on the properties. (Source Comment: Salvador did not say what would happen if the Cuban Government failed to reach some agreement on the question but he implied that negotiations would be delayed until the Spanish Foreign Ministry received the Cuban Government's reply to this question.) (Field Comment: Since the conversation between Salvador and Ruiz was held before the recent change of the Spanish Cabinet and other Government positions, there is no

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(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
DCS	BIC	TREASURY		FBI 4				

WHC/RR	3	WH/SAO	1	E/IB/R	3			OSM-9817 QUSEQUIN (OUDOZE) CSDB-312/03010-69
WH/OPS	2			E/MADR	1			
WHC/EW	1			E/R	1			
WHC/PP	1	CI/OPS/WH	2					COORDINATING
WHC/MIAMI	1							RELEASING RH SR

TOT IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO 1.
WH/C 7 (1), EUR 4 (1), WH 1

LIAISON

information on how these changes would affect the question raised by Salvador or the signing of a new trade agreement with Cuba. As of 17 November 1969, Salvador was still Special Delegate for Latin American Affairs.)

3. (Field Comment: Until recently, the indemnifications and pensions problem had not emerged as a serious factor in the negotiations for a new trade agreement. There has been a gradual deterioration of Spanish-Cuban commercial relations since the conclusion in May of preparatory negotiations for a new agreement, but this deterioration ostensibly was the result of a Spanish Government decision to reduce Cuban sugar imports over the next three years. The Cuban Government apparently had not considered such decision in its analysis of Cuban-Spanish commercial relations, and it was quite upset when the decision was revealed during the preparatory negotiations. Some of the problems causing the strain in Spanish-Cuban relations were previously reported in TDCSDB-315/2470-69, TDCSDB-315/02182-69, TDCSDB-315/03509-69, CS-311/08659-69 and CSDB-312/02600-69.)

4. **Field Dissem: State.**

14-00000

[illegible]
[illegible] 25570

9 January 1970

Report No. 2274

N.T.

One 'Miss' CONCHITA calls asking for RUIZ. NILDA says she is his secretary and CONCHITA may leave the message with her. C and R have not seen each other for two years and C would like to surprise him. NILDA asks for her last name; C does not give it to her because it would then fail to be a surprise, but leaves her telephone number (201-49-89) for R to call her after 8, for she works until that time. On NILDA's insistence C gives her last name as CAMACHO, adding she is the widow of the doctor who was director of the Coimbra Hospital.

RUIZ calls Mrs. CAMACHO at 201-49 89. She begins the conversation by saying they had met at a party which she had attended with her husband at the Dominican Embassy in Madrid. She reminds him that they had talked with the Paraguayan Ambassador and former Dominican Ambassador Rafael COMPRES, and that the party had taken place two years ago. Despite all the details RUIZ insists he does not remember her and asks how he can be of service to her. She tells him "I have just arrived and find myself somewhat isolated, disoriented, and I must find work. I recall you telling me on that ocassion 'If you should ever have any problem and you come to Madrid, look me up.' One other ambassador also offered me his assistance and I have tried to locate both of you." Mrs. C mentions having a daughter, that her husband was a pilot and that she is a Spaniard, adding she is not too old. R replies that in all honesty he does not remember her. She insists on seeing him to have a chat, and R suggests she come to his office at her convenience. She prefers talking with him alone, without his secretary or anyone else present, and suggests a bar at some hotel like the Palace, Ritz or Hilton. He is agreeable to any place she may desire; they agree to meet that night at 9:30 in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel. She will be dressed all in black.

RUIZ calls FERNANDO. F is to meet R outside the latter's home about 9 o'clock dressed in coat and tie.

Report No. 2248.

[illegible]

HORACIO calls the telephone company requesting the address for telephone number 201-49-89. The information is denied.

HUMBERTO PILOTO FUENTES in the commercial office

RUIZ calls PILOTO to have him meet RAUL LEON in Barajas that night. RUIZ is unable to do so because of a previous engagement.

[illegible]

FERNANDO calls CURBELO to ask for PUGA's phone number. F wants to tell P he cannot meet the professor at P's house that night because he (F) has to take RUIZ somewhere.

JUAN ANTONIO CURBELO LEMUS

[illegible] Serviços, [illegible]

[illegible] companhia rural — Viseu

[illegible] Fontes [illegible] cap.
[illegible] Gomes Vaz de [illegible]
[illegible] Saul Henrique [illegible]
[illegible] João Eduardo Cruz.
[illegible] Augusto Aguiar, ten.

[illegible] companhia rural — Aveiro

[illegible] Luís Correia, cap.
[illegible] Alves Caetano, ten.
[illegible] Fernando Manuel [illegible] Valério da Silva.
[illegible] Telmo da Graça [illegible] Pereira de Vasconcelos, ten.

[illegible] companhia rural — Coimbra

[illegible] José Alfredo de Sousa Fa[illegible] cap.
[illegible] de secção:
[illegible] Serafim de Oliveira Brito.
[illegible] de Magalhães, ten.
[illegible] Manuel de Sousa Almeida.

[illegible] companhia rural — Guarda

[illegible] António Pinto [illegible]
[illegible] de secção:
[illegible] dos Santos Antunes.
[illegible] José de Melo Bravo [illegible] ten.
[illegible] do Nascimento, ten.

[illegible] rural — Castelo Branco

[illegible] José Marques da Sil[illegible]
[illegible] de secção:
[illegible] Jorge Vasco de Olivei[illegible] ten.
[illegible] Borges Alexandre [illegible]
[illegible] Correia da Costa [illegible]
[illegible] Jaime Geraldes dos [illegible]
[illegible] António Resende Sove[illegible]

Guarnição militar

[illegible] de Serviço de Saúde

[illegible] Bairro de Santana
Telefs. [illegible] e 25010

[illegible] de Mobilização do Regi[illegible] de Serviço de Saúde

[illegible] de Artilharia Ligeira, n.º 2

(Santa Clara)
Telef. 22077

Centro de Mobilização de Artilharia 2

Largo de Santa Isabel

[illegible] Grupo de Companhias de Saúde

Rua da Sofia
Telef. 22453

[illegible] de mobilização do serviço de saúde n.º 2

Carreira de tiro

Hospitais Civis

Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra

Telefs. [illegible]
Administração: 25066
P. P. C. A. ([illegible] linhas) 22133

Administração

Provedor: Dr. Mário Manuel Gândara Nolasco.
Provedor adjunto: Dr. Joaquim Pedroso de Lima.
Direcção técnica:
Director dos serviços clínicos: Prof. Dr. Joaquim Antunes de Azevedo.
Director dos serviços clínicos, adjunto: Dr. José Lopes Cavalheiro.
Director dos serviços de urgência: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.
Chefe do internato médico: Vago.
Serviços administrativos e gerais:
Chefe da secretaria: Dr. Jorge Manuel de Matos e Silva Fernandes.
Chefe da contabilidade: Dr. Roque Pinto Ferrão.
Chefe dos serviços de manutenção do património: Vago.
Chefe dos serviços economicos: Vago.
Tesoureiro: José Rosa Madeira de Carvalho.
Abastecimento e armazéns: Dr. Cândido Pacheco de Araújo.
1.os oficiais:
Aníbal Duarte Apóstolo.
Aníbal Francisco Simões Martinho.
António Simões dos Santos Ferrão.

Directores dos serviços de medicina

1.ª Medicina

(Propedêutica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Manuel Joaquim Bruno da Costa.

2.ª Medicina

(Terapêutica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Joaquim Antunes de Azevedo.

3.ª Medicina

(Patologia médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Mário Simões Trincão.

4.ª Medicina

(Clínica médica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Augusto Pais da Silva Vaz Serra.

1.ª Cirurgia

(Propedêutica cirurgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.

2.ª Cirurgia

(Medicina operatória)

Director: Prof. Dr. Luís José Martins Raposo.

3.ª Cirurgia

(Patologia cirúrgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Fernando Alberto Serra de Oliveira.

4.ª Cirurgia

(Clínica cirúrgica)

Director: Prof. Dr. Bártolo do Vale Pereira.

Serviços de especialidades

Urologia

Director: Dr. Alexandre José Linhares Furtado.

Otorrinolaringologia

Director: Dr. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Miguéis.

Clínica Obstétrica (Clínica do Dr. Daniel de Matos)

Telef. 22051

Director: Prof. Dr. Albertino da Costa Barros.

Oftalmologia

Director: Dr. Leovegildo de Albuquerque

Dermatologia

Director: Dr. António Vasco Beltrão Polares Baptista.

Ortopedia

Director: Prof. Dr. Fernando Alberto Serra de Oliveira.

Pediatria

Director: Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.

Psiquiatria (Manicómio Sena)

Telef. 22093

Director: Dr. António Henriques de Elias Nunes Vicente.

Neurologia

Telef. 22093

Director: Dr. António Henriques de Elias Nunes Vicente.

Ginecologia

Director: Prof. Dr. Francisco Manuel Santos Ibérico Nogueira.

Pneumotisiologia

Director: Prof. Dr. José de Gouveia Monteiro.

Clínica de doenças infecciosas

Telef. 22093

Director: Vago.

Quartos particulares

Q 1 e Q 2 — Medicina e cirurgia
Q C O — Obstetrícia
Q P — Psiquiatria

A direcção clínica dos quartos particulares é exercida pelos professores das diversas clínicas hospitalares e chefes de serviço.

Serviços complementares de diagnóstico e terapêutica

Chefes de serviços:
Radiologia: Dr. Álvaro da Costa Martins.
Sangue: Dr. Teodoro Fernandes Mendes.
Electrocardiografia: Dr. António José Chorão de Aguiar.
Análises clínicas: Vago.

Serviços farmacêuticos

Director dos serviços farmacêuticos: Vago.
Chefe dos serviços farmacêuticos: Dr.ª Alda Lopes Ramos.
1.os químicos farmacêuticos:
Maria Elisa Lopes Serra.
Maria Luísa Aires da Veiga Azevedo.

Sr.: Anuário Comercial de [illegible], Vol. [illegible]

Enfermagem

Enfermeiros-gerais:
Alberto da Silva Mourão.
Deolinda dos Anjos Moreira.
Enfermeiros-chefes:
[illegible] Ventura Cardoso,
Adelino Costa,
Celeste Paiva,
Domingos Carvalho,
Eugénia da Conceição Paiva.
Francisco Cândido da Silva.
Francisco [illegible] Velho.
José Augusto Guimarães dos Reis.
João Maria Pereira dos Santos.
Josefina Ferreira dos Santos.
Manuel Ferraz de Carvalho.
Maria da Conceição Marques dos Santos.
Maria da Conceição da Silva Mourão.
Maria da Luz
Maria da Piedade Madeira da Fonseca.
Maria Pureza Simões Serra.
Maria Vieira Falcão.
Rosinda Nunes Baptista.
Silvério Carvalho.

Escola de Enfermagem do Dr. Ângelo da Fonseca

(Edifício dos Hospitais da Universidade)

Telef. 22133

Administrador: Dr. Mário Miguel Gandara Norton.
Monitor-chefe: Dulce Augusta Magalhães Pinto.
Chefe da secretaria: Naldi Maria Clara Castelo Branco.

Militar

Hospital regional n.º 2

Avenida Jardim Botânico

Telef. 25491

Inspecção-Geral das Actividades Económicas

(Zona de Fiscalização n.º 6)

Avenida Sá da Bandeira, 91

Telefs. 23147 e 24709

Inspector: Armando Lourenço Coelho dos Santos, cap.
Técnico de 3.ª classe: João Rui Pestana Mendes de Almeida.
Adjunto de zona: João Coutinho Vilar.

Inspecção-Geral dos Produtos Agrícolas e Industriais

3.ª Delegação

Rua Augusta, 31

Telef. 22078

Chefe da delegação: Vago.
Regente agrícola de 1.ª classe: Albano Duarte Silva.
Agente técnico de engenharia de 2.ª classe: Manuel da Costa Valente.
Regentes agrícolas de 3.ª classe:
Félix Dias Ramalho.
Serafim Pina de Almeida.
Chefe fiscal: Carlos Sabino de Carvalho.
Agente fiscal de 1.ª classe: Aníbal Pereira Viegas.

Instituto de Assistência à Família

(Delegação)

Rua Dr. Santos Rocha, 42, telef. 24062

Delegada: Alzira Luísa de Praga Costa.

Instituto de Assistência Nacional aos Tuberculosos

(Delegação da Zona Centro)

Avenida Bissaia Barreto

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Delegado: Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.

Centro de Diagnóstico e Profilaxia da Zona Centro (S. C. G.)

Avenida Bissaia Barreto

Telefs. 28163 e 28164

Director: Dr. José dos Santos Bessa.
1.º assistente: Dr. João Carlos de Moura Marques.
Serviços clínicos:
Radiologista: Dr. Paulo de Albuquerque e Melo de Moura Relvas.
Dr. Manuel Folhadela C. Oliveira.
Dr. Rogério Tavares Pinto.
Assistente vacinador: Dr.ª Maria de Lurdes Madureira.
Serviços técnicos e auxiliares:
2.º ajudante técnico radiologista: Maria Cândida Laranjeiro A. Lopes.
Encarregada de câmara escura de 2.ª classe: Dulce Irene de O. Leite.
Serviços de enfermagem:
Enfermeira-chefe: Maria Jorge de Lucena S. de Carvalho.
Brigadas móveis:
Médicos:
1.º assistente: Dr. Abílio de Almeida Henriques.
Dr. Elísio Gomes de Matos.
Dr. José Pedro dos Santos.
Dr. Júlio Cardoso.
Dr.ª Maria Célia Judice Serra Cunha.
Dr.ª Maria de Lurdes Flaiho dos Santos Gomes.

Instituto de Assistência Psiquiátrica

Delegação da Zona Centro

Dispensário de Higiene e Profilaxia Mentais

Av. Sá da Bandeira, 85, telef. 23903

Delegado: Dr. Domingos Vaz Pais.
Chefe da secretaria: Dr. Alberto Luís Gomes.

Instituto de Coimbra

Rua da Ilha, 1, telef. 24633

Presidente: Doutor Diogo Pacheco de Amorim.
Vice-presidente: Doutor Guilherme Braga da Cruz.
Secretários:
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Dr. Francisco Teixeira de Queirós, *Ponte de Lima.*
Dr. João Manuel Bairrão Oleiro.
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Tesoureiro: Dr. João José Lobato Guimarães.

Instituto de Criminologia

Bairro de Santana, telef. 22614

(Funciona no edifício da cadeia penitenciária)

Director: Prof. Dr. Eduardo Henriques da Silva Correia.
Chefe da 1.ª secção: Dr. Mário Artur da Silva Maldonado.
Adjunta: Dr.ª Maria Rosa Graça de Lemos Crucho de Almeida.
Chefe da 2.ª secção: Dr. António Herculano Gomes de Matos Beja.
Adjunto: Dr. Fernando Andrade Cordeiro de Figueiredo
Secretário: Alfredo Henriques Anjão.

Instituto Industrial

Rua [illegible]

Telef. [illegible]

Director: Artur [illegible], eng.
Professores ordinários:
Joaquim Vieira da Fonseca, eng.
Dr. José Carlos Teixeira [illegible]
Octávio António Vieira [illegible] Prontes, eng.
Director do laboratório de química: [illegible] Vieira de Abreu [illegible]
Professores provisórios:
Dr. Aires Pedroso de Lima
Amândio João Mesquita Gomes [illegible], eng.
Dr. António Henriques.
Dr. António Braamcamp de [illegible] Silva.
Dr. António da Costa Rodrigues [illegible]
António Felgar, eng.
Dr.ª Emília Amélia dos Santos [illegible]
Dr. Fausto Gonçalves Pereira.
Guedes Pinto, eng.
Dr. José Fernando Alves [illegible]
Dr. Manuel da Rosa [illegible]
[illegible] Cruz Pedro, eng.
Maria Helena de Almeida, eng.ª
Maria Manuela Miranda Mayan[illegible]

Instituto de Medicina Legal

Edifício da Faculdade de Medicina

Telef. [illegible]

Director: Prof. Dr. Luís Augusto [illegible] Santos.
Chefes de serviço:
Dr. Aires Pedroso de Lima.
Dr. Flávio de Azevedo Osório [illegible] Gouveia.
Assistentes:
Dr. António Joaquim [illegible]
Dr. Elias da Silva Tavares Dias [illegible]
Dr. José de Oliveira [illegible]
Dr.ª Maria Teresa Rangel [illegible] Costa Bettencourt de Ávila.
Dr. Miguel Marques da [illegible] rata.

Conselho Médico Legal

Presidente: Prof. Dr. Augusto [illegible] Silva Vaz Serra.
Secretário: Prof. Dr. António [illegible] Amorim Robalo Cordeiro.
Vogais:
Prof. Dr. Albertino de Barros
Dr. António Henriques de [illegible] Vicente.
Prof. Dr. António Jorge [illegible] Gouveia.
Prof. Dr. D'Armada do Vale Pereira
Prof. Dr. Eduardo Henriques [illegible] Correia.
Prof. Dr. Fernando Pinto [illegible]
Prof. Dr. Henrique de Oliveira [illegible]
Prof. Dr. Luís Augusto [illegible]
Prof. Dr. Renato de Azevedo [illegible] Trincão

Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência

Delegação

Rua Augusta, 37, telef. [illegible]

Delegado: Dr. Guilhermino [illegible]
Subdelegados:
Dr. Amadeu José de Sousa [illegible] ques.
Dr. Manuel António de A[illegible] Azevedo e Vasconcelos

Tribunal do Trabalho

Rua Augusta, 37, 1.º

Telef. [illegible]

Juiz: Dr. Manuel Cordeiro de [illegible] Freitas.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
QUDOZE
Comments of AMAUTO-1 on Current Topics of Interest

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following comments of AMAUTO-1 reflect Cuban thoughts on the Czechoslovaquian situation, internal Spanish politics, and the effects of recent changes in the Spanish Government on the impending trade negotiations between Spain and Cuba.

a. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has been a disaster; however, criticizing the Soviet action would mean taking sides with the Americans. A friend may be criticized in private but publicly he should be defended. (QUDOZE, 19 November.) The Cubans have to side with the Soviets for military and economic reasons and because, whether right or wrong, they belong to the same ideological camp. Cuba had and still has enormous discrepancies with the Soviet Union, China, and the United States but weighing the differences Cuba is with Communism as opposed to Capitalism. (QUDOZE, 3 November.)

b. AMAUTO-1 was asked by his government to report on the new Spanish Government which Havana calls "Opus Dei". To a visiting Cuban official he admitted that he was at a loss to understand Spanish politics but attempted to define them. It is not true that the Spanish Government is in the hands of the Opus Dei. There are some men in the government who lean toward the Opus Dei but there are others of a very different leaning because they come from the Falangist ranks. These men (the Falangists) may go along with the Opus Dei line because they allow themselves to be "carried by the tide" but they are not of the Opus Dei. (QUDOZE, 19 November.)

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD [illegible]
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami [illegible]

....continued

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA - 25789	7 January 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

c. Concerning the impending trade negotiations with Spain, in addition to the economic problem the Cubans are now faced with another impediment which further delays the negotiations: the recent changes in the Spanish ~~government~~. It is difficult at this time for the Cubans to approach any Spanish official because of the climate of confusion among them. Most Spanish officials have no idea as to whether they will remain in their posts or will be replaced. Therefore, it is futile for the Cubans to press them for action on the negotiations. The most they can do is wait patiently until the situation is normalized. If the negotiations are not held within the 30-day expiration period of the agreement, it is possible that the present agreement can be extended for two months. This would be advantageous to the Cubans because during the first two months of the year they will be able to acquire all the goods they will need for 1970. (QUDOZE, 19 November).

fr Philip C
Helen B. NOTHDURFT

201-735296

GuTIMID
CSMA - 25713, 5 DEC 1969

Report No. 2061 31 October 1969
1 & 2 November 1969

[illegible] CALLS CUCA [illegible] (phon).
They agree to meet at the cafeteria de Huertas (phon)

[illegible] CALLS HIS [illegible] FRIEND CUCA [illegible]. They send kisses through the phone and talk of their great love for each other.

Report No. 2063 3 November 1969

FRANCO CALLS ROSENDO CANTO at his house. He's not in. Franco leaves the message that a letter has arrived from Canto's father and he'd like to give it to him.

FRANCO CALLS [illegible]. [illegible] mentions to Franco a letter signed by Curbelo which has been lost. In the letter Curbelo authorized the ticket of an American named COHEN (to go to Cuba).

Report No. 2066 3 November 1969

FERNANDEZ CALLS MIMI. He tells Mimi that Nilda (Ruiz) fainted at the Galerias Preciados, but that now she is at home resting.

RUIZ CALLS DR. HERNANDEZ. The doctor is not there. Ruiz talks to the doctor's wife. He says he is a little afraid, because Nilda has had five previous pregnancies and this is the first time she has had any trouble.

Report No. 2067

FRANCO CALLS DR. ROSENDO CANTO. Franco says that Sr. RUIZ wants

---

Nilda calls Espino on 11 November 1969, according to word she has had from Carmen ESPINO, young Guillermo RUIZ is much more contented in Cuba ~~thaxn~~ than he was (GUTIMID - CSMA-25713, 5 Dec. 1969).

FILE:
AMAUTO-1

ACC
A C.

NEW HOUSE MAID ([illegible]) FOR [illegible]'S

Report No. 2146 28, 29, & 30 November 1969

Item 3. SEVE [illegible] [illegible]. She says that the new house maid is about 50 years old, her hair is dyed and she is very skinny and bossy. SEVE doubts very much that she is going to be able to dominate "these wild lions" of Ruiz. She says that because of the children Maria's nerves have gone to pieces. She says that the other day FERNANDO hit the six year old, and that the child called Fernando "an obscenity". Another one of the little savages told Seve "go to -----", for no reason at all. Seve says that the mother is as bad as the children in this respect. They refer to Hilda as "the chula" and Seve says that evidently Hilda doesn't care whether the children bother the servants or not. Seve says she can't stand either Hilda nor the children. She then says that Hilda is expecting her sixth child in February.

Report No. 2149 2 December 1969

Item 3 ARISTIDES speaks with CONTRERAS and says: "We are going to have a meeting with the Deputy-Director of the EFE Agency. I know him. First we were going to have the meeting today, but he called me and said he was taking over as the new Director of the EFE Agency today. He continues saying that the meeting will be tomorrow at 730 in the afternoon. Aristides says, "I explained to him that the PRENSA LATINA correspondent in Ecuador was passing through Madrid, and that we would like to see him and exchange impressions with him, and he is going to see us tomorrow at 7:30PM". Contreras asks Aristides for

S E C R E T

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

Chief, Europe Division

Chief of Station, Santiago

FROM

Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT

AKULE/DBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMA 25624

1. On 7 or 8 December 1969, Subject, who is the Counselor of the Chilean Embassy in Madrid, invited the Cuban Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez to a luncheon to meet the wife (not identified by name) of Senator Salvador ALLENDE who reportedly was passing through Madrid. She arrived on the evening of 7 or 8 December and was to leave (destination unknown) on 14 December. TELLO said that RUIZ should meet ALLENDE's wife. RUIZ commented that in principal he envisioned no problem in meeting the woman, but that he would confirm the invitation on 9 December. TELLO went on to say that he invited a group of people to the luncheon including Alfonso SASTRE and Fernando RIESTRA.

2. Station traces note that Alfonso SASTRE Salvador was born on 20 February 1926 in Madrid, and is a graduate of the University of Madrid in philosophy and letters. He is a writer, anti-US and pro-Castro who participates in all types of activities of the Communist "intellectual" elements. His wife, Genoveva FOREST Tarrat was arrested in May 1962 for participating in demonstrations, refused to pay the fine and remained incarcerated for 20 days. SASTRE visited Havana on a number of occasions and reportedly was called to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid in July 1968 to interview Haydee SANTAMARIA.

3. There are no traces on RIESTRA.

Howard R. SACODER

2-2-

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
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CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA 25754	DATE 17 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER /Dafer [illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

Chief of Station, Madrid RW

TYPIC/AMAUTO/Cancellation of POA's

Reference: DIRECTOR 56464

1. Please cancel all clearances mentioned in Reference. Since AMAUTO-2's separation from AMAUTO-1's household and her immigration to the United States with her husband, AMAUTO-5, we no longer have an operational interest in her. As you know, AMAUTO-3 was used solely as an intermediary for a warm approach to AMAUTO-2. This was accomplished, and we have had no further contact with her. No Station contact was ever made with AMAUTO-4.

2. After the departure of AMAUTO-2 from AMAUTO-1's household, the Station soon learned of her replacement and this information was passed to the QUSEQUIN's. It was decided that the QUSEQUINs would attempt to recruit the new domestic, but for unknown reasons, contact was never made. We believe that there is a new domestic now working in the AMAUTO-1 household, but we have no details on her.

Howard R. Sacoder

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
✓2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - WH/Miami

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25710

DATE
5 December 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-845516, [illegible]

201-735246

CS copy filed in 201-845515

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Europe Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
TYPIC/QUDOZE/Juan TORROBA Gomez, Spanish Minister to Cuba

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 10 October 1969, Guillermo RUIZ Perez, Cuban Charge in Madrid dictated a letter to the Cuban Foreign Office setting forth his impressions of Juan TORROBA Gomez. These impressions by RUIZ can be interpreted as the preparation of a target study on TORROBA. The following is a verbatim text and translation:

El analisis que se realiza sobre las activadades desarrolladas por el Senor Juan Torroba y su -----, la falta de interes y comprension de parte de ----- nos da un conocimiento directo sobre las actividades de la Embajada de Espana en esa que nos puede ser muy util en nuestras relaciones. Antes de su llegada hemos tratado de ahondar en la personalidad del Senor Torroba y aparte de confirmar la buena opinion que los espanoles tienen sobre su persona, hemos conocido tambien que es hombre debil de caracter y que en esa medida pueda ser influenciado a pesar de su ----- personalidad (o capacidad). El cargo que desempena de sub-Director de Asuntos Consulares es en realidad un cargo de asesor en materias consulares pero sin mando. Es acortado la tesis de ayudarlo en su trabajo y aun llegar al extremo de que algun funcionario como el intimide con el de forma tal que esa debilidad de caracter y propension a la influencia ajena pueda servirnos a nuestros propositos. Es indudable que un ataque al Senor Torroba en el sentido de hacer deficil su tarea traeria como consecuencia inmediata una mayor influencia de aquellos que sin lugar a dudas estan interesados en que se convierta en -----. Por otra parte no consideramos posible que aun en el caso de que su trabajo no sea el mejor pueda hacerse una substitucion de otro funcionario que -----.

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS/WH,Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25692

DATE
28 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

Para poder resolverte el planteamiento que me haces de manejar por esta embajada la salida de los -----, te ruego me aclares el concepto del porque es ha producido un mal entendido. Todo lo que implique esta mas que alusivo a los problemas de Espana con Cuba a traves de esta embajada por supuesto redundara en nuestro beneficio. Un caso claro es la solicitud de la salida de ----- y su manifestacion de qu quizas -----. Pues la Embajada en Cuba ... (volume of radio increases effecting reception.)

TRANSLATION:

The study being made of the activities of Mr. Juan Torroba and his (word indistinct), the lack of understanding and interest on the part of (word indistinct), give us a direct insight into the activities of the Spanish Embassy there (in Cuba) which could be very useful to us in our relations (with the Spaniards). Before his arrival (in Havana) we tried to probe into the personality of Mr. Torroba and, in addition to confirming the good opinion that Spaniards have of him, we learned that he is weak in character and that from this angle he could be influenced despite his (word indistinct) personality. The position he held as Deputy Director of Consular Affairs (in the Spanish Foreign Ministry) was actually that of advisor on consular matters but he exercised no authority. The idea of helping him in his work is apt and could be carried to the point where some officer like himself (of similar category) could intimidate him in such a way that his weakness of character and susceptibility to outside influence would serve our purposes. There is no doubt that an attack against Sr. Torroba in the way of making his task more difficult would bring as an immediate result a greater influence on the part of those who are interested in having him become a (word indistinct). On the other hand we do not consider it possible even in the event that his work should not prove to be the best, that another officer could be substituted that (word or words indistinct).

In order to resolve the question of handling from this Embassy the departure of the (word indistinct), please clarify the reason why there has been a misinterpretation. Everything to the problems of Spain and Cuba through this Embassy will, of course, redound to our benefit. A clear case is the application for departure of (word indistinct) and his statement that perhaps (word or words indistinct) since the Embassy in Cuba...(volume of radio increase affecting reception.)

Howard R. SACODER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: CARL LUNSFORD:cs
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7144/1819
DATE: 21 November 1969

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WHE
INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN EUR6 CI/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 24 22 00z NOV 69 CITE DIRECTOR 56464

TO MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. OSMW-11585*

B. DIRECTOR 49352**

C. MADRID 8256 (IN 47801)***

1. HQS INFORMED THAT POA'S ON AMAUTO-2,3,4, AND 5 HAVE EXPIRED AND WILL BE CLOSED IF PRQ PART I AND II NOT FORWARDED BY END NOVEMBER. THESE AGENTS MAY NO LONGER PROVIDE ACCESS TO AMAUTO-1 NECESSARY FOR PROPER TARGETTING, BUT VIEW CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST IN AMAUTO-1 AND POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED REF C, REQUEST SOONEST EXPRESSION STATION INTEREST.

2. FILE: 201-845515, 845516, 845517, 845518, 735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENTS: *Detailed continued interest in AMAUTO-1 as a target, described some vulnerabilities, and requested comments on developing approaches.

**Notified field of expiration of POA covering AMAUTO-2 on 11 October 69 and requested expression of continued interest in him.

***Notified Hqs that AMAUTO-2 was being dismissed from household employment with AMAUTO-1 family (he is Cuban Charge Madrid). Also

(CONTINUED...)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE. VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 56464

TO PAGE TWO

said that A-2 was available for part-time work with wife of AMAUTO-1 and suggested therefore that Hqs not cancel POA. (Note: All subsequent AMAUTOs are possible access agents.)

DC/WH/COG W. [illegible]

E/IB/S Louis Rossi

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/FI/CI

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[illegible]		
2	Dick Wheeler		DW
3			
4	Lunsford		CL
5			
6	for AA AUTO file		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

DU-3

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

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FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Chile/Costa Rica/China

REPORT NO. 00-B(L) 322/06021-64

SUBJECT Manuel Tello, Chilean Diplomat/Anti-US, Pro-Communist Sympathies/Expected Prominence if Allende were Elected/Business Interests/Hector Burr, Chilean Consul in San Francisco

DATE DISTR. 15 September 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

X8 all

DATE OF INFO. Dec 63 - Sep 64

PLACE & DATE ACQ. -/Dec 63 - Sep 64

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, college student.

Source has been successful in a modest building construction operation, and appears to have access to investment funds. He is a new source. His cooperation is by way of a prominent US police official, long a friend of his family.

1. A [US] friend of mine and I first met Manuel Tello, then Chilean Consul General in San Francisco, late in 1963, ~~probably December~~, at the San Francisco Press Club. At that time, Tello was accompanied by several attractive young women, one of whom was his daughter, Carmen. Tello proved to be a gracious, polished diplomatic type and we all hit it off well together. As a matter of fact, we hit it off so well that Tello visited my friend's home from time to time, managed to interest him in a number of business ventures to be launched in Chile and later in Costa Rica.

2. Tello was quite active in the San Francisco area. Among his official interests were the sponsoring of a Chilean or pro-Chilean youth group, and an attempt to organize a group of businessmen able to finance commercial ventures in Chile. Integral parts of his plans were the Alliance for Progress funding and the recent California-Chile commercial and cultural programs. Ventures were to include the construction of several hundred thousand dwellings in Chile, a commercial fishing venture, to be based at Iquique, establishment of a fish meal plant also at Iquique, and the acquisition of a huge ranch or finca near Puntarenas in Costa Rica. The latter project, however, seemed more personally Tello's, whereas he was to be but one of several other investors in the others.

3. As months went on, suspicions of Tello's motives began to grow. Normal avarice is easily understood, but in the course of visits to my friend's home Tello began to hazard unmistakably anti-American expressions. We were to learn that he was an attorney and had come from an old and wealthy Chilean family, but was something of a black sheep. He spoke of his mother's apologetic references to him as "her Communist son". Tello claimed intimacy with Salvador Allende and made it clear that "when", not "if", Allende was elected president, Tello was to be extremely influential in the new hierarchy. Incidentally, he also stated

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
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S-NO U-NO

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

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The dissemination of this document is limited to [illegible] of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies [illegible] in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released [illegible] participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE [illegible] tions or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. [illegible]

emphatically that if by any remote chance Allende were not to win, there would be a revolution in Chile by November 1964. Tello claimed also that he had visited several times with Raúl Castro, and had met Fidel, all within the past year or so. He insisted that the US would recognize Cuba before the end of 1964. Tello said also that he was on good terms with important people in both the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments, and that both nations were anxious to have him as Chile's ambassador, but that he was not especially anxious to go. Another reference to Communist China was the possibility that Chile might have some small cargo ships built there.

1160

4. Tello's pro-Communist and anti-American feelings were shared with his daughter, Carmen, who claimed to have been a youth group leader in the University of Chile. Another daughter, Patricia, I believe her name is, was said to be even more intensely anti-US. Either she or her husband is connected with a Latin American organization, possibly the OAS or Pan-American Union. Another daughter is married to the director of personnel in the Fertica plant in Costa Rica.

5. At times, it was clear that Tello's avarice transcended his concern for the poor. Once when another American suggested that the building of the houses in Chile would give employment to many more Chileans if they avoided use of pre-fab units and pre-cut timbers, etc, Tello was not interested. He wanted to get in, get as much as possible, and get out as soon as possible. At times he referred to plans to live in Europe after he had made a few financial killings.

6. I have details on only one Chilean proposal, this a fish meal operation known as Cachagua. It was formed within the past year with an authorized capital of E850 thousand [approximately US$657,500], about half of which was paid in. The prime investors were said to be Horst Enrique Hagemann, Emilio Lannon Martinez, Gaston Pascal Leon, Cristian Casanova Subercaseaux, and Gonzalvo Subercaseaux Canartu. Its main office is in Santiago; its plant in Iquique. Somewhere behind the scenes was Tello.

7. Somehow, in a manner I do not pretend to understand, Tello really wanted an American "front-man" in order to withdraw earnings in excess of what the law permitted. His planning for an American's participation included marriage to his oldest daughter, Carmen, who was later involved in a shooting incident in San Francisco in June 1964, shortly after the departure of her father to his new post in San José, Costa Rica, where he is now Charge d'Affaires.

8. In Costa Rica, Tello seems to have considerable influence also. One of his schemes there is the acquisition of a huge ranch in the Puntarenas area. The property, now self-supporting, lies between the Pan American highway and the Gulf of Nicoya. He plans to develop it both for commercial and residential purposes with the operation of a gambling sanctuary in the to-be-established resort section.

9. Tello's successor as Chile's consular representative in San Francisco is Hector Burr. He appears to have the same anti-US bias as Tello. At the time of the supposedly self-inflicted gun shot wound of Tello's daughter, Carmen, Burr said, "This is an international incident. My government will demand an apology from the United States." It was our guess by this time that Burr was interested only in creating anti-US ill will in Chile so as to enhance the election possibilities of Allende.

- end -

TELLO Troacoco, Manuel CHILE
Sept. 14, 1955

The Subsecretary for Diplomatic Affairs of the Colombian Foreign Office, Dr. Ricardo Anaya, informed an Embassy officer on Sept. 12 that the La Republica article was accurate only insofar as it reported that Ambassador Vargas had returned to Chile. Dr. Anaya said that as far as he was aware Ambassador Vargas had gone to Santiago to make final arrangements for the visit to Chile of the Colombian War College, scheduled for September 14 to 29. The Chilean Embassy states that the Ambassador returned to Santiago accompanied only by his wife. First Secretary Sr. Manuel Tello Troacoco is Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

D-203, Bogota, Sept. 14, 1955 OUOnly

Tello Troncoso, Manuel

3F

ROUTINE

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -23651

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OCI FBIS DCS [illegible] AID USIA

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SECRET

02 20 50 APR 69

CITE TDCSDB-315/01333-69

DIST 2 APRIL 1969

COUNTRY CUBA/CHILE/FRANCE/SPAIN

DOI 25 MARCH 1969

SUBJECT PROPOSED TRAVEL OF CHILEAN SENATOR SALVADORE ALLENDE TO CUBA

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (27 MARCH 1969)

FIELD NO. OSM-9523

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE."

3/2

1. AS OF 25 MARCH 1969 CHILEAN SENATOR SALVADOR ALLENDE INTENDED TO VISIT CUBA ABOUT 5 APRIL FOR HIGH-LEVEL TALKS. (FIELD COMMENT: HIS CUBAN INTERLOCUTORS AND THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS WERE NOT KNOWN BUT THE LATTER APPARENTLY CONCERNED IN PART ALLENDE'S POLITICAL FUTURE.)

6F

2. PREPARATIONS FOR ALLENDE'S TRIP WERE MADE BY INTERMEDIARIES IN MADRID, INCLUDING COUNSELOR MANUEL TELLO TRONCOSO OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY AND CUBAN CHARGE GUILLERMO RUIZ PEREZ. CUBAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN -25651

TDCS DB-315/01333-69

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

2 April 69

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

RICARDO ESPINO MARTINEZ, WHO EXPECTED TO FLY TO HAVANA ON 26 MARCH, WAS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS THERE. TO AVOID POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, ALLENDE'S TRAVEL TO CUBA WAS TO BE CAMOUFLAGED BY AN INVITATION TO PARIS TO SPEAK ON 9 APRIL TO THE "FRIENDS OF UNESCO," WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO STOP IN CUBA EN ROUTE TO EUROPE.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (ALSO SENT SANTIAGO AND PARIS). CINCSO CINCLANT

Tello, Manuel

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL IN 6996 PAGE 2/2 CHILE

FONOFF INFORMS TELLO ASSIGNED COSTA RICA ON TDY PENDING ARRIVAL NEW CHILEAN AMBASSADOR. EXPECTED THAT TELLO WILL THEN RETURN HIS POST SAN FRANCISCO. THEY ASSUME HIS PHYSICAL PRESENCE CALIFORNIA AT THIS TIME IS DUE PERSONAL REASONS.

24 June '65

DUNGAN

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		[illegible]		S
2. Whaley				[illegible]
3. Lunsford				[illegible]
4.				
5. Ennis		Rec'd 22 May	22 May	E
6. Whalen				
7. Scott				
8. Daryl				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

2.3 — Check w/ Chile desk to see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle into AMAUTO-1. Dow. Maybe a name trace, but there's [illegible] like a [illegible] in himself.

[illegible] AMAUTO [illegible] p. 3 [illegible] TELLO [illegible] -1

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 7 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER: OSMA 25624

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
O AKULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
  2 - COS, Santiago — To OUT Pouch
  2 - C/WHD
  2 - C/EUR
  2 - COS/WH,Miami — To OUT Pouch

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA 25624

DATE
7 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-735296

Report No. 19[illegible] (continued)   7 October 1969
Item 17

[illegible], the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, Tel-70-05-50, Guillermo RUIZ wants to talk to Raul LEON. Ruiz says, "We had the meeting, that I told you about, today. There was no time to cancel it as your cable didn't arrive on time. Consequently I had to attend. Because I had no concrete instructions, I was limited to listening to their good wishes and to try to arrive at an understanding between us. The Marquise that conducted the meeting was very pleasant and conciliatory. When they started to talk figures, I avoided the issue. Then I said that this meeting would be nothing more than to make contact between us and that at the moment there was nothing more I could do. We agreed to hold another meeting on 17 October, at which time they would like to hear our ideas. I promised nothing, but that I would confirm the meeting by telephone. He (the Marquise?) said that this would give no time to discuss it.

Leon says "Did they say anything about the OLGA affairs?" Ruiz says "No, just ideas on other things, but they in no way mentioned the OLGA affair." Raul says "Just ideas in general". Ruiz says, "Just commercial ideas. They wanted to hear the Cuban ideas". Ruiz wants Leon to send him instructions for the next meeting. He wants to know if anyone is coming from Havana to attend the meeting.

NOTE: INFO OBTAINED FROM [illegible] FOR PERIOD
6 OCT - 24 OCT 1969.

OSMA-24636
7 NOV 1969

Report No. 1984 8 October 1969

HILDA CALLS A.M. Hilda dictates a telex to A.M. It is for "Mario GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI in Geneva." The telex says that Dr. Zoilo MARINELO and three other comrades are leaving on Swiss Air from Madrid at 4:10PM. (s) Ruiz.

Item # 5

HILDA CALLS DR. [illegible] (Medical doctor), Tel-276-77-46. She makes an appointment for Ruiz for today at 7:30.

Report No. 1985

Item # 5

SR. KIRCHOV (phon) CALLS SR. CORRALES from Germany. They speak about films, and Corrales says that Dr. Marinelo is arriving in Madrid today. He will try to see Marinelo and tell him that Sr. Kirchov's firm (A[illegible]-?) is interested in seeing him.

Report No. 1986 8 October 1969

Report No. 1987 9 October 1969

Item # 4

COMRADE [illegible] RAMOS OF ICAIC CALLS ESTEVEZ. Ramos says he is interested in talking to a person named Joaquin MARTI, because this person has offered to sell Cuba some films. He adds that the only thing they know about MARTI is that he is connected with [illegible] films. Estevez asks Ramos if Cuba is going to take part in the Iberoamericano film festival in October. Ramos has no word on this yet from Cuba. He is going to talk to ERRADI(phon) about it.

Report No. 1937(continued)

Item # 6

A CALL FROM A [illegible] FOR HILDA. Hilda answers and says that the RUIZ are leaving this afternoon for 15 days and won't be returning till the beginning of next month.

Report No. 1938 9 October 1969

Item # 3

Dr. PERIN CALLS HILDA RUIZ.

Hilda tells the doctor that yesterday she had to take Guillermo(Ruiz) to the doctor. Dr. Perin asks if he is ill. Hilda says not really but he has liver trouble and she is forcing him to go to the doctor.

Item # 4

[illegible] CALLS RUIZ FROM BRUSSELS.

Note.- While Ruiz is waiting for the call he can be heard saying to Horacio "The doctor says my liver is inflamed and that I must take a rest. So, I am going to Lisbon------".

Report No.1939 9 October 1969

Item # 3

CAPTAIN [illegible] CALLS QUESADA in Paris. Q: "Yesterday the delegate was here and I sent [illegible] to talk to him. He said he was going to London to wait for you and from there he is going to "that country/Spain/, and that within a week he was going to return and work with you here in Paris". Q. "I haven't seen him. I said that I would be in Milan, if he should happen to ask you". "We agreed to meet one night, but I had to go to Grenoble and he didn't come."

Item # 8(continued)

tells him that they are leaving for Madrid on Friday (October 17) on Iberia FLIGHT 161. He wants Damian to reserve rooms in Madrid for himself, [illegible], AGUILAR and CANDELA.

Report No. 2008 ——————— 15 October 1969

Report No. 2009 16 October 1969

Report No. 2010 16 October 1969

Item # 7

RUIZ IS TALKING WITH LEON IN HAVANA. Ruiz tells Leon that he has sent him a cable today telling him he is forwarding a report. He tells Leon also that he has planned another meeting for October 21, and that today he has received confirmation from those who are going to attend. But, now a personal problem has come up with his eldest son, and he would like to return to Havana. He says that he can see those people tomorrow and ask for another postponement of the meeting. He adds that if he goes to Havana that it will give him a better chance to talk to Leon. At first Leon refuses authorization for Ruiz to travel. Leon says he wants to discuss it first(he doesn't say with whom). Then he agrees and tells Ruiz that he may return to Havana. Ruiz says he is sorry not to be able to keep the meeting but that he will postpone it for Tuesday the twenty-eighth.

Report No. 2011 16 October 1969

Report No. 2012 16 October 1969

Report No. 2019 20 October 1969

Item # 10

EDMUNDO CALLS [illegible]. He says that he spoke with the Comrade and that it had no kind of importance whether it was 50 or 60 cycles because "that is definite". It is not coupled with anything to tape nor anything like that; it is not like the other one that was co-ordinated and had to go along with the voice. He says that they will send the thing tomorrow and he will be there when it arrives.

Report No. 2020 19 & 20 October 1969

Report No. 2021 20 October 1969

Report No. 2022 21 October 1969

Item # 1

A CALL [illegible] FROM [illegible] EL ROM[illegible]. Quesada tells Hilda that model [illegible]1750/Alpha Romeo/costs $2,200.00. She says that they will probably go and pick it up. Then she tells Quesada that Ruiz is in Cuba for a week because his mother is sick.

Item # 4

FRANCO CALLS SR. [illegible]. He says that Minister Domenech and the group are staying at the Hotel Gaya until they leave by Iberia (on the next available flight) for Cuba. He says they came in over the road via Irun.

Report No. 2023 21 October 1969

Report No. 2024 21 October 1969

Report No. 2025 21 October 1969

Item # 3

HILDA CALLS [illegible] (Note: Hilda has called many hotels in Vegetable Biology and Agriculture in [illegible], Spain, between 3 and 29 November. Franco says that Cuba is sending an agronomist engineer named Teodoro LOPEZ Betancourt.

Report No. 2035 24 October 1969

Item # 1

HILDA CALLS ESPINO. She tells Espino that Ruiz' mother is still ill. He wants to know if Ruiz will return on Tuesday in spite of that. Hilda says she doesn't know.

Item # 2

PAYRET CALLS [illegible] FROM [illegible] Payret tells him that the courier [illegible] will arrive today in Madrid on Flight 771 from Copenhagen and to please meet him at the airport.

File:
[illegible]

Report No. 2060 31 October 1969
Item # 4 1 & 2 November 1969

RUIZ CALLS TERCEIRO AT IBERPLAN (phon).

They greet one another very cordially, and Ruiz thanks him for sending the list. Terceiro asks how things were in Havana. Ruiz says fine in every sense, and adds "they are in the ten million ton harvest, now more than ever, as we are hitting the 'cyclamates' where it hurts". Terceiro asks " if you people paid for the campaign or not?" Ruiz says no, that luckily it was the American Department of Agriculture. He adds, "We have calculated that it will leave us, free, approximately one million tons of sugar. The price of sugar has reacted very well, and now a Sugar Conference is to be held in Geneva. You know we are going to get out propaganda now that will state "Only Cuban sugar does not cause cancer". Terceiro laughs, and says "some other problem yes, but not cancer." Ruiz says that the campaign has come at a perfect time for them because they have been struggling for years with the /Illegible; artificial sweeteners?/, especially in Japan, as they represent approximately one-half million tons. Japan was the country that used it most.

Terceiro says that he has begun to study the famous issue of the Chamber of Commerce. RAMON greets Ruiz and says that he would like to take a book to him and also to talk to him about a personal matter. It is in reference to a recommendation made by Ramon's father for some people in Cuba that are interested in going to Spain. Ramon continues, and says

Item # 4 (continued)

that he is going to Mexico and Venezuela in December and if he can combine it he would like to go to Cuba also. He says, "It will be the moment for IBERPLAN to become familiar with Cuban reality once and for all". Ruiz says he can see him next week.

Item #5

A PERSON (MALE CALLS and asks for "contact". Nilda says she does not understand his language. The man asks that if it is the Cuban Embassy, to please put him in "contact". Nilda says--4252. Ruiz talks to the man and says "Look, don't be a fool nor so idiotic we have grown up; we now have ten years of revolution, and we are not likely to fall into the kind of provocation that you are trying to do. You can tell that to whoever gives you orders or whoever is recording this conversation." The man asks Ruiz who he wants him to tell that to. Ruiz answers "Don't bother me any more. Tell it to the CIA or whoever gives you order, because probably it is the CIA or some other person. The one that gives you orders. Moreover, if you are tapeing this, so am I. I was waiting for your call. You just called a few minutes ago, so don't be an idiot." The man then says, "You think that the CIA gives me orders". Ruiz answers, "Most likely it is the CIA that gives you orders as the only enemy that Cuba has is the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency,don't be a fool." The man says, "You are very intelligent", and Ruiz answers, "It is not a question of intelligence. It is simply that in ten years we have learned something." The man then says, "Ten years,eh", and Ruiz answers "Ten years of revolution, ten years with guns in our hands." Then the man says, "In this moment do you have a gun in your hand." Ruiz answers, "Yes, we have a gun in our hands. We are always waiting for the CIA; morning, noon, and night, always with guns in our hands." The man: "If you think I am under orders of the CIA you are a little silly." Ruiz answers "Look, I don't want to continue this conversation. You are a fool. I,too, am playing the part of a fool, because the telephone in my embassy is completely intercepted, I imagine. Everyone is listening to us, so you are an idiot, and I am silly to talk to you. Therefore, goodbye sir, and please don't bother me again." Ruiz hangs up.

PEGGY CHECKING
IN QWPXL-1 201
FOR FOLLOW-UP
~~[illegible]~~ ON THIS
AS PROMISED PARA
2,

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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4		8	

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, DDP, ADDP, CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, SOD 6, FI 3, FI/D, IW

ACTION NO. 944

SECRET 301755Z OCT 69 CITE MADRID 9902 MADE SUSPENSE WH CDO

30 Oct 69 IN 76461

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC QUAXE QUTIMID

1. ON ARRIVAL IN MADRID 28 OCT FROM HAVANA, THE SPANISH CONSUL GENERAL, JOAQUIN (THOMAS) GARCIA, TOLD QUAXE-1 THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED INRA OFFICIAL WAS ASSASSINATED AROUND 20 OCT. DURING SAME WEEK THOMAS' CHAUFFEUR WAS IN VICINITY HOTEL CAPRI WHICH NEAR MININT BUILDING, AND HEARD SHOOTING. ONE OR MORE SHOTS STRUCK CONSUL'S CAR (CONSUL WAS NOT WITH CHAUFFEUR). CHAUFFEUR WAS NOT INJURED. ONE OF "REVOLUTIONARIES" APPROACHED CONSUL'S CAR AND CHAUFFEUR WAS THREATENED BY REVOLUTIONARY WHO WAS CARRYING SUB MACHINE GUN. REV SAID HE HAD JUST KILLED ONE PERSON AND DEMANDED BE DRIVEN OUT OF AREA. CHAUFFEUR DROVE INDIVIDUAL TO OUTSKIRTS OF CITY AND RETURNED TO SPANISH EMBASSY. THOMAS SAID THAT IN RECENT WEEKS SUCH EVENTS HAPPENING WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY.

BM

WH/C/OP

2. ABOVE IS INTERIM REPORT. THOMAS PROMISED GIVE DETAILS TO QUAXE-1 BEFORE RETURNING HAVANA.

3. THOMAS HAD CONVERSATION WITH AMAUTO-1 ON FLIGHT TO MADRID DURING WHICH AMAUTO-1 REPORTEDLY SAID THAT REASON FOR

File:
201-735296
30 Oct 69

CS COPY

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3 06 PM '69

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[illegible]DED

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 9902 SECRET

HIS QUICK VISIT TO CUBA WAS TO DISCUSS COMMERCIAL MATTERS BETWEEN CUBA AND SPAIN WHICH HAVE REACHED CRITICAL STAGE. (STATION PROCESSING LENGTHY CONVERSATION BY AMAUTO-1 RECEIVED ON QUDOZE RELATING TO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH SPANISH ON COMMERCIAL MATTERS. WILL POUCH INTEL REPORT ASAP.)

4. ACCORDING TO QUTIMID, AMAUTO-1 HAD TO VISIT HAVANA PRIMARILY TO SETTLE LEGAL DIFFICULTY IN WHICH SON INVOLVED. HOWEVER OF APPARENTLY EQUAL IMPORTANCE WAS TO CONSULT WITH JOAQUIN ALVAREZ REMENTOL AND OTHER MINCEX OFFICIALS ON FORTHCOMING SPANISH-CUBAN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS CURRENT CUBAN CONTRACTS WITH SPANISH FIRMS. AIR MANIFESTS CONFIRM AMAUTO-1 DEPARTURE FOR HAVANA 20 OCTOBER AND RETURN 28 OCTOBER.

5. FILE 201-735296 AND 65-2-10/9.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO: Chief of Station, Madrid

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: TYPIC/QUDOZE/AMAUTO/QUDOZE Transcripts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See Below

REFERENCES : A. UFAW-619, 14 October 1969
B. OSMA-25588, 17 October 1969

1. The AMEDITS have just completed the QUDOZE transcripts for the period 19 September - 13 October 1969. This was the second group of transcripts forwarded the AMEDITS for translation, per our trial period as mentioned in reference A, in order to make them more fully useful to different components at Headquarters. The take from the QUDOZE operation appears very interesting. We noted with interest that AMAUTO-1 discusses freely with his subordinates and privileged visitors subjects of a confidential nature, including matters that have to do with intelligence activities. Some of the discussions offer a number of operational leads which we can follow-up, such as the medical information given on 22 September 1969 in the morning hours.

2. The AMEDITS have suggested that as an aid to help them translate accurately and possibly more rapidly, they would appreciate receiving some original tapes in addition to the transcripts on a trial basis. Then when parts of the transcripts are not understandable to the translater he would have readily available reference for replay.

3. With the next transmittal of the next QUDOZE material, we would appreciate receiving both the transcripts prepared by the station and the actual tapes covering the same period of time. The complete package can then be forwarded to the AMEDITS for their use as mentioned above.

TERENCE A. MILENBACH

HENRY K. PURTIN

Distribution:
3 - COS, Madrid

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
X-Ref 201-735296	OSMW- 11629	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-6-114/2

Distribution:

1 - E/IB/S
1 - WH/COG/OPS
(Chrono)
~~2 - RID~~
1 - Originator

OFFICE: WH/COG/OPS	OFFICER: C. Lunsford:cs	EXT. 7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		James E. Flannery

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/CB		Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

WEAVER VAL
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

EN-129
GA 50
TUBE GT-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		4 NOV 1969		5
2. Ennis		4 20 NOV		E
3. Wheeler		18 NOV.		
Lunsford				CL
~~WH/COG/RR~~				MV
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5. C/COG/RR			5 Dec	RH
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17. RID/FI				

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS.

☐ [illegible] Records Officer Stamp and Signature Required Route to [illegible]

☐ Classify to

ICS File No. [illegible]
Route to [illegible], GA-50 for final processing

COPY OF TRANSLATION SENT WH/RR, WH/SIP AND AB/C DESK.

PLS CLASSIFY INTO RUIZ 201 FILE.

VW

04808

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 27 OCT 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER OSMA 25605

FORM 1-63 610c USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

1401

14-00000

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, EUR; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/QUDOZE
Mexican Journalist's Comments on Czechoslovakia

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI Only

Attached is an extract from a transcript of 16 October 1969 concerning a conversation held between a female Mexican journalist from the magazine "Siempre" and the Charge d'Affaires of the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Guillermo Orestes RUIZ Perez (201-735296).

Perry D. WACHAL

Attachment:
As stated, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w
2 - C/EUR, wo/att
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, h/w

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GROUP 1
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2cc sent to E/IB/S w/att
[illegible]

201-735296

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 25605

DATE
29 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~65-6-40/3~~

They had told him that someone was waiting to see him, and now a girl comes in: RUIZ was expecting her. He greets her. She is a correspondent of Siempre, the Mexican magazine, and Ruiz has arranged an interview for her with Mrs. [illegible] or TALMES(ph). This girl asks if she told him that she was going to Cuba. No, replies Ruiz, all she did was to send her "background". He asks her if she is carrying her magazine credentials. She always does, she says.

Ruiz tells her what she must talk about at the interview, about politics in Spain and its relations with the United States.- She must have her questions prepared before-hand, and even the possible replies. She must order them carefully as if they were unimportant, but with a socialist sense.

Ruiz explains to this girl that what is of interest is Spain, the superstructure, the railroads, the banks, the national organizations, but not the fundamental things, yet well tied up, all the way to the bone. He says that people here are soccer fans, but later you can ask, "What do you think about a socialist regime in Spain?" The thing is to stop people in the street, one at a time.

You must take into account that Paco is considered one of the most brilliant politicians of all times. He is sagacious, intelligent. If communism had triumphed here it would have been the first communist country in the world, and yet neither communism nor socialism has anything to do here while Franco is in.

The girl came from Czechoslovakia, and she talks about that country and of Poland, where she has not been, but they have told her a lot about it. She depicts life in Czechoslovakia as extremely sad. She had been there in 1963. She comments that what they did last year in Czechoslovakia was to set the country back tremendously, because that was the first time that people had taken an interest in national affairs. Society was so rotten that people rebelled, but the invasion caused such a great shock that people sunk into a state of apathy from which they are not coming out. They are heading for a crisis that not even the Soviets will be able to stand. People have no interest in their work. Machinery is far behind. The scale of wages is disastrous. The only people that make money are the physicians and the nurses, who charge for a visit the equivalent of a worker's monthly salary. Besides there is tremendous corruption. And so the wage scale, the old machinery, and the corruption make life unbearable. It must be taken into account that they crushed 200,000 persons and that 35,000 Party members are in jail under suspicion. Before, people stood in line to join the Party; now they tear up their Party cards in the street. Disillusionment is enormous. Marxism as conceived by Lenin or Marx is no longer applicable: it must be brought up to date and placed in the current scale of technological evolution and world production. No one in Czechoslovakia wants to go to the USSR. Everybody, especially the students, wants to leave for Austria or Germany. The black market is up to date. The definition is very sad.

Fidel's latest speech, published by Prensa Latina, was distributed through the Embassy, but they got hold of the copies and destroyed them. They say that leftist publications praise whatever they want or whatever interests them, and Fidel's speech was of no interest to them, since they did not analyze it thoroughly.

She says that there is a latent revolutionary sentiment throughout Europe. At the Sorbonne there are some powerful centers where they compare the performance of the Chinese and Asiatic outbreaks more than they do the Soviet ones.

This correspondent says that when she gets to Cuba she is going to visit FIDEL, because there is a trend of distrust of Cubans throughout Europe, because they think that they receive information only through one channel.

Upon hearing these somewhat anti-Soviet remarks on the part of the correspondent, Ruiz interrupts her and says they have to be on the side of the Soviets for two reasons: first from the military and economic point of view, and also because right or wrong they are on the same side of the fence and must fight against those on the other side. Cuba has had, and still has, great discrepancies with Russia, China, and the United States. In the face of all these discrepancies we are on the side of communism because we are against capitalism.

Ruiz says that in order to find out if you are a communist you must ask yourself if you agree with distribution of wealth and land, equitable distribution of production, respect for man, nationalization of industry. This is what counts.

At the end this girl says that the only truth is that unfortunately we Cubans cannot live in peace in any socialist country. Men like FIDEL and CHE, in a country of seven million people, going against the whole world all by themselves. You should see the treatment Fidel gets from the intellectual magazines in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Ruiz calls NILDA and tells her that this woman comrade is going to interview Mrs. TAMAMES or TAMAYO (ph) and asks Nilda what her personal opinion is about [the lady]. She says she has only seen her three or four times, and [asks] in what sense he means. Ruiz says that this woman comrade is from the

Mexican magazine, Siempre. Nilda tells him that this lady is very superficial and fickle. She is from Havana. The correspondent wants to know what opinion [they have] of her husband. They say he is "un poco mosca" [somewhat of a fly].

Then this correspondent wants to know the address of either a Mexican or the Mexican consulate. Ruiz says that if it is to exchange her Madrid-Mexico ticket for a Madrid-Cuba one, go by Fuencarral 45, and ANCOSO, a Spaniard, or PACHECO, a Cuban, will make the change for her. It seems she wants to leave on Monday. She wants them to take care of her Mexican visa because she says that if she goes it will not be timely, after what happened with Humberto CARRILLO. She says that OLIVARES is now in charge. She is going to Cuba now and will go to Mexico in 15 days.

Nilda comes in and gives her the home telephone number of the lady she is going to interview: 226-86-96.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, EUR; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/[illegible]
Mexican Journalist's Comments on Czechoslovakia

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI Only

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Perry D. WACHAL

Attachment:
As stated, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w
2 - C/WHD, w/att, h/w
2 - C/EUR, wo/att
2 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att, h/w

CS [illegible]

Rec. sent to E/IB/S w/att.
LAH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OMMA - 25005

DATE
20 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

They [illegible] told him that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] him, and now a girl comes in. RUIZ was expecting her. He greets her. She is a correspondent of Stern, the German magazine, and Ruiz has arranged an interview for her with Mrs. [illegible] or TAMAYO(ph). This girl asks if she told him that she was going to Cuba. No, replies Ruiz, all she did was to send her "background". He asks her if she is carrying her magazine credentials. She always does, she says.

Ruiz tells her what she must talk about at the interview, about politics in Spain and its relations with the United States. She must have her questions prepared beforehand, and even the possible replies. She must deal with them carefully as if they were unimportant, but with a socialist sense.

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Nilda comes in and gives her the home telephone number of the lady she is going to interview: 226-86-96.

24820

100

[illegible]

[illegible] Checoslovaquia [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

Good reading on Ruiz

[illegible]

[illegible]

b

a

CS COPY

H/w att to OSMA-25605

201-735296

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Carl Lunsford
WH/COG/OPS

EXTENSION: 7144

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/WH/COG/OPS			5	
2.				
3. C/WH/COG	[illegible]			
4.				
5. C/E/IB	6/10			
6.				
7. ~~C/EUR/IB~~				
8.				
9. RID/D&P				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T

TO
Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC/AMAUTO-1

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. MADRID 9655

B. DIRECTOR 40647

C. OSMA 24212

D. OSMA 24112

ACTION : See paragraph 5, below

1. Headquarters maintains its high interest in AMAUTO-1 as a long-range, in-place recruitment target. Much of this interest is kept alive by the excellent operational reporting done by Station Madrid over the past year, of which references C and D hereto are good examples.

2. Subject's position and total personality recommend him to us as a high-potential target. He is strongly intellectual and emotionally committed to an ideal. At the same time, he exhibts certain vulnerabilities which could be exploited. We believe, however, that AMAUTO-1 could be approached only in a classic sense: a rationally developed, long-range recruitment culminating in what would be essentially an intellectual and even ideological pitch. This course of action would take time and assets, but we think he would be eminently worth it.

3. First, his access not only is good now but seems destined to improve. Secondly, if he were our agent, he has the wit and the acuity to know what we want and submit information accurately based on requirements. Lastly, he is a strong personality who could be counted on to move flexibly but effectively within the target milieu.

Distribution:
  2 - COS, Madrid
  1 - COS, WH/Miami

CS C...

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMW - 11585

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DATE
7 OCT 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-735296

2 October 1969

Distribution:

1 - E/IB
1 - WH/COG/OPS
  (Chrono)
1 - WH/COG

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/COG/OPS
OFFICER: C. Lunsford cs
TYPIST:
EXT: 7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG		David A. Phillips
~~E/IB~~		

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: C/EUR/IB
DATE: Oct 6, 1969
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

4. As a recruitment target, however, AMAUTO-1 seems to present serious difficulties. He is strong-minded, opinionated, idealistic, and apparently committed to the revolution. On the other hand, there are certain things about him which could be converted into recruitment vulnerabilities. First among these is his apparent belief that the regime (read: the Revolution) is not making the best use of his talents. One cannot tell precisely whether this is the cause or result of his apparent basic emotional instability. During public appearances he displays polished manners and a pro-regime attitude; in private he frequently complains to his subordiantes that he did not ask for a diplomatic position, that he would prefer an industrial job, and that he believes his position to be more a handicap than a promotion. Secondly, he obviously desires personal prestige and luxurious living. While these traits do not mean so much in the case of a Cuban as compared to a Soviet or Chinese, hardships and economic mismanagement in Cuba do in fact create a contrast with his basic impulses. Thirdly, his spinal ailment has been diagonsed as incurable. While this may be true, he should realize that further examination by other medical men (while on a training mission in WOLADY, perhaps) could help him considerably. There may even be other vulnerabilities which further target study could expose.

5. We present these thoughts at the same time that we are fully aware of other operational pressures on Madrid's time and assets. Nevertheless, we would appreciate the Station's comments on further development of AMAUTO-1 as an in-place recruitment target. The first need would be the proper access agent, someone with a Jesuit-like intellectual training who can deal with him in the realm of concepts and philosophy as required. In any case, we would like continued target reporting on AMAUTO-1, as your time permits.

Terence A. MILENBACH

Henry K. PURTIN

201-735296

INSTRUCTIONS

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3. [illegible]				
4. [illegible]		9 Oct		[illegible]
5. [illegible]				[illegible]
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13.				
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17. ~~RID/PI~~				

COMMENTS

4-5: This [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] is jumping to conclusions. However, AMAUTO-1 is still a good target. Pls check the [illegible] mentioned [illegible] j.i.c., to give them results of the check.

TRACING COMPLETE 9/12/69

RYBAT

FILE AMAUTO-1

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE TITLE
	INDEX		FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296
DATE MICROFILMED			DOCUMENT DATE 10-1-69
			DOCUMENT NUMBER USMA 25530

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SEC

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid PCR

SUBJECT
RYBAT/TYPIC/QUTIMID/AMAUTO-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 23 September 1969 AMAUTO-1 called an unidentified Spanish woman who resided in Cuba for many years before returning to Spain. AMAUTO-1 noted that he visited the Spanish woman's cousin, identified as Esther CORRIPIO, while he vacationed in PBRUMEN and found everyone in good health. The unidentified Spanish woman asked AMAUTO-1 if there was much food available and the following dialogue began:

AMAUTO-1: Yes, everything is being resolved. But imagine to be free, one must pay a high price and the price must be paid. There is no other way.

WOMAN: What one wants, one must pay.

AMAUTO-1: It is very logical, but look, when one is a servant to the rich, the servant usually lives relatively well, but the servant continues as a servant. However, when one no longer wants to be a servant to the rich, one has to begin saving and the only way there is for the poor to save is to reduce (the intake) of essential foods, change the essential and begin to buy machines and to buy a series of things (cuestiones) and one day, we will become rich together. We can say we are rich when we have resolved all the problems, not only material problems, but spiritual, cultural, that is, when everyone can do and believe as he likes.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OSMA - 25530

DATE
1 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-735296

WOMAN: Oh! I don't do anything but talk of Cuba and I adore the country. I have a brother there who is a nurse and he says he is fine.

AMAUTO-1: Cuba gets into your blood. When I saw Esther she was a little thin, but was in good health.

2. We think the above is another good example of AMAUTO-1's passion for the good life. While he appears patriotic and openly supports the regime, we continue to believe that he would prefer a return to the relative freedoms enjoyed by his countrymen before the start of the revolution.

Howard R. Sacoder
Howard R. SACODER

INSTRUCTIONS

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3. Lindsey				
4.				
5. Ennis		Rec'd 22 22 May	May	E
6. Wheeler			5 Jan	
7. Best		22 May	23 May	CB
8. Daryl				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Mli

2-3: Check w/ Chile desk to see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle in AMAUTO-1.

Don. Maybe a name trace, but these lits seems like a tough nut in himself.

Copy for AMAUTO

C.h. pls put att. info on TELLO in A-1 file here.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 7 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER DSMA 25624

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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04827

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
AKULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santiago - To cc T Pouch
~~2~~ - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS/WH, Miami - To cc T Pouch

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OSMA 25624	7 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

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

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RECORDS SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TO : [No To]
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 01/01/0000
PAGES : 38
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
SUBJECTS : UNIT ID
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
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19 MAY 70

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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

(pica)

SECRET 19 22 23 Z [illegible] 70 CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY DO BASE LOS ANGELES INFO ROUTINE WH/MIAMI MADRID 035471

TYPIC AMAUTO

1. PLS DETERMINE ASAP PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND OCCUPATION OF MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, 935 BEACON AVENUE, APARTMENT 10, LOS ANGELES, APPARENTLY NO TELEPHONE. VIGOS WENT LOS ANGELES FROM MIAMI IN EARLY MARCH.

2. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Based on Madrid 1131 (IN 095999) request that access agent of WH/Miami be given much information about Subject as possible for sake of approach to Cuban target in Madrid.

AF
AR
IB
BX
HFD
FI

C/EUR/IB/S

C/WHD

JOSEPH BULIK
C/DO/I/B1

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

201-735296

19 May 70

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SECRET 191224Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1131 (MADR)

19 MAY IN 085999

~~19 M[illegible]~~

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 033355

1. WE BELIEVE THAT CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH AMAUTO-1 ALONE TOO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE SINCE AMAUTO-1 IS FREQUENTLY IN COMPANY SOMEONE FROM HIS STAFF OR HAVING LUNCH WITH SPANISH OFFICIALS OR BUSINESSMEN. MOREOVER, ENCOUNTER UNDER THIS SITUATION, WE FEEL, WOULD NOT PERMIT RELAXED EXCHANGE BETWEEN SAMKO AND AMAUTO-1. WE WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE:

AN LCC
AB X
IP
MS
BX
DES LFD
FI
WH/C/OF

A. ON ARRIVAL SPAIN VIA AERONAVES DE MEXICO FLIGHT 450 LEAVING MIAMI FRIDAY SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO HOTEL OF STATION SELECTION. STATION OFFICER WILL ALSO OCCUPY HOTEL IN ALIAS AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH SAMKO WILL BE MADE IN HOTEL. (INCIDENTALLY, BELIEVE NO NEED PACHANKIS ACCOMPANY SAMKO TO MADRID.)

B. EARLY SUNDAY AFTERNOON SAMKO WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO AMAUTO-1'S PRIVATE RESIDENCE. HIS EXCUSE WILL BE THAT HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO EMBASSY BUT WAS CERTAIN THAT

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201-735296

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PAGE 2 MADRID 1131 S E C R E T

EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSED. IN ADDITION, SINCE SAMKO SCHEDULED TOUR OF MADRID AND SUBURBS LEAVING EARLY MONDAY MORNING DECIDED MAKE EFFORT CONTACT AMAUTO-1 AT HOME RATHER THAN POSSIBLY MISS OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HIM. (SAMKO WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO SIGN UP FOR TOUR OF CITY TO LEND AUTHENTICITY TO STORY.) SAMKO WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED REPLY TO INEVITABLE QUESTION FROM AMAUTO-1: HOW DID YOU FIND MY ADDRESS? SAMKO'S REPLY WOULD BE THAT HE OBTAINED ADDRESS FROM IBERIA EMPLOYEE AT AIRPORT WHO SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME TRYING TO LOCATE AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE. (ADDRESS APPEARS IN DIP LIST AVAILABLE OVERTLY.) SAMKO WOULD FURTHER EXPLAIN, IF NECESSARY, THAT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW EMPLOYEE GOT ADDRESS, BUT KNOWS SHE MADE NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CALLS. WE CANNOT PREDICT AMAUTO-1'S REACTION TO THIS DIRECT APPROACH. HE MIGHT CLAIM PRESS OF BUSINESS OR OTHER COMMITMENTS THEREBY REFUSING SEE SAMKO IN HOME BUT MIGHT SUGGEST THAT SAMKO VISIT EMBASSY MONDAY MORNING. SAMKO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY THAT IF THIS WOULD NOT EMBARRASS AMAUTO-1 HE WOULD GLADLY CANCEL TOUR AND GO. TO USE STANDARD LINE

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PAGE 3 MADRID 1131 SECRET

THAT BECAUSE HE IS AMERICAN HE SHOULD NOT VISIT PBRUMEN EMBASSY, WOULD, WE FEEL, QUICKLY AROUSE AMAUTO-1'S SUSPICION. SAMKO'S APPROACH TO AMAUTO-1 RESIDENCE CAN BE MONITORED FROM HOMES OF TWO STAFFERS WHO LIVE WITHIN EYSHOT OF AMAUTO-1'S RESIDENCE.

C. AMAUTO-1'S PROBABLE SECOND QUESTION: HOW DID SAMKO KNOW HE WAS IN MADRID? REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT AND HELP FROM MIAMI. IDEALLY, SAMKO SHOULD BE ABLE SAY THAT A MUTUAL FRIEND OF BOTH AMAUTO-1 AND SAMKO WERE TOGETHER RECENTLY IN MIAMI AND AMAUTO-1'S NAME MENTIONED. SAMKO ASKED WHAT HAPPENED TO AMAUTO-1 AND FRIEND DISCLOSED THAT AMAUTO-1 NOW "AMBASSADOR" TO SPAIN. (SUBJECT WH/MIAMI (IN 085476) 7595 MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE "FRIEND" WHOSE NAME SAMKO MIGHT USE. STATION SUGGESTS THAT CONTACT BE MADE WITH SUBJECT IN LOS ANGLELES TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE KNOWS WHERE AMAUTO-1 IS. ALSO OBTAIN PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION, OCCUPATION IN LA AND PRIOR JOB IN MIAMI PLUS OTHER NOTABLE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COULD BE USED AS FILLER BY SAMKO TO SHOW THAT POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN AMAUTO-1'S COUSIN AND SAMKO.) IN ADDITON, SUGGEST

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ACTION UNIT FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 4 MADRID 1131 SECRET

PACHANKIS RE-CONTACT SAMKO TO ASCERTAIN NAMES OF PERSONS IN UNITED STATES WHO KNEW AMAUTO-1 AND FROM WHOM SAMKO OSTENSIBLY MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED INFORMATION OF AMAUTO-1'S MADRID ASSIGNMENT. WELCOME OTHER SUGGESTIONS AS REPLY TO ABOVE QUESTION.

2. LINE SAMKO WOULD TAKE AFTER FOOT IN DOOR SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY REHEARSED IN MIAMI BEFORE ARRIVAL MADRID BECAUSE OF OI- ELEMENTA MIAMI SHOULD CABLE WHAT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO SAMKO SO THAT STATION OFFICER COMPLETELY AWARE OF HOW SAMKO IS TO CONDUCT HIMSELF.

3. IN VIEW DESIRE TO INITIATE CONTACT BEFORE AMAUTO-1'S JUNE DEPARTURE SUGGEST CONTACT ABOVE PERSONS ASAP.

4. FILE 201-735296. GP-1

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CONF: WH 8 CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CS/DO, DO 5, FI 6, FI/D, IW, EUR 5 DCI, D/[illegible], DDP, [illegible], C/[illegible]

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(IN 079701)
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File: AMAUTO-1

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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18 18 00Z MAY 70

CITE TDCS DB-315/02487-70

DIST 18 MAY 1970

COUNTRY CUBA/SPAIN

DOI 4-6 MAY 1970

SUBJECT PROTESTS BY CUBAN EMBASSY IN SPAIN OVER ALLEGED ATTACKS ON CUBAN OFFICIALS

ACQ SPAIN, MADRID (EARLY MAY 1970) FIELD NO. OSM 10026

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE; FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS SENSITIVE AND USUALLY RELIABLE.

1. IN EARLY MAY 1970, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MADRID PREPARED A PROTEST NOTE TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER AN INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE BARAJAS AIRPORT IN MADRID BETWEEN CUBAN REFUGEES AND CUBAN OFFICIALS, IN WHICH BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. ACCORDING TO MINISTER GUILLERMO RUIZ, CUBAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, THE EMBASSY WILL CHARGE THAT SIX FUNCTIONARIES AND FOUR DIPLOMATIC COURIERS FROM HAVANA WERE PHYSICALLY ATTACKED ON 4 MAY AT THE AIRPORT BY DISAFFECTED CUBANS, ALL RESIDENTS OF SPAIN. THE NOTE STATED THAT "THIS COWARDLY AND UNJUSTIFIABLE AGGRESSION" ENDANGERED DIPLOMATIC

DOCUMENTS AND COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED ACT BUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AT BARAJAS. SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE ASKED TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF THESE INCIDENTS.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ANOTHER UNTESTED SOURCE WHO WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO THE 4 MAY INCIDENT, THE CROWD INCLUDED 23 MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND A NUMBER OF CUBAN EXPATRIATES MEETING AN IBERIA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA WHICH WAS CARRYING 75 CUBAN OFFICIALS AND 30 CUBAN REFUGEES. MAXIMO TORRES, FORMER MAYOR OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA AND A MAN OF OVER 60 YEARS OF AGE, ADDRESSED ONE OF THE ARRIVING CUBAN OFFICIALS, MISTAKING HIM FOR A REFUGEE. THE OFFICIAL REBUFFED HIM RUDELY AND A GENERAL ARGUMENT ENSUED AND BLOWS WERE EXCHANGED. HORACIO FUENTES MARTINEZ, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY, JUMPED FROM A NEARBY CAR AND PISTOL-WHIPPED ONE OF THE REFUGEES. AFTER THE POLICE ARRIVED, TORRES AND HIS WIFE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION.)

3. ON 6 MAY, ROBERTO FRANCO OLIVA, CUBAN CONSUL IN MADRID, COMPLAINED TO A SPANISH POLICE INSPECTOR CONCERNING THE INCIDENT AT THE AIRPORT AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SCENE AT THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN PREPARED BY THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AND "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES." THE INSPECTOR REPLIED TO THIS THAT SPANISH AUTHORITIES WERE

INVESTIGATING AND WOULD GIVE CUBAN OFFICIALS THE PROTECTION IN SPAIN WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE. HE SAID THAT THREE CUBAN REFUGEES HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND WOULD BE DEPORTED TO FRANCE. FOR THEIR PART, THE REFUGEES HAD SAID THAT HORACIO FUENTES HAD PULLED OUT A GUN DURING THE FIGHT, A CHARGE WHICH FRANCO DENIED AT LENGTH.

B. MANY OTHER ATTACKS HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY CUBAN OFFICIALS AT THE AIRPORT AND DAMAGE DONE TO THEIR PARKED CARS.

C. WHEN CUBAN SEAMEN ARE ARRESTED BY THE SPANISH POLICE IN THE CANARY ISLANDS THEY ARE INTERROGATED SEPARATELY IN THE POLICE STATION BY AN AGENT OF THE CIA WHO IS A CUBAN "GUSANO" (TURNCOAT).

D. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SPANISH REPUBLICANS AND SPANISH COMMUNISTS IN CUBA, THE SPANISH EMBASSY IN HAVANA IS NEVER MOLESTED.

E. FRANCO IS PREPARED TO ADVISE CUBAN PASSENGERS COMING TO SPAIN TO CARRY RAZORS FOR SELF DEFENSE. CUBAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO GO TO THE AIRPORT, SHOULD APPLY FOR LICENSES TO CARRY PISTOLS.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO AN OFFICIAL SPANISH SERVICE, CUBAN DIPLOMATS MAY APPLY FOR GUN PERMITS TO THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE PERMISSION. NON-DIPLOMATIC CUBANS MUST APPLY TO THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF

INTERNAL SECURITY (DGS) BUT WOULD PROBABLY NOT RECEIVE PERMISSION. TDCSDB-315/01741-70 REPORTED THAT AS OF 8 APRIL ALL CUBAN COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WERE CARRYING PISTOLS, AND THAT SOURCES OF KNOWN RELIABILITY HAVE NOTED THAT CUBAN DIPLOMATS ABROAD HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO CARRY A SMALL HAND WEAPON.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE.

(21)

ds

WHD [illegible] [illegible]

439

S E C R E T [illegible] MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI [illegible] ([illegible] ACTING) (WMIA)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

[illegible]005470

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A DIRECTOR [illegible]

B WH/MIAMI 7[illegible] (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 [illegible], [illegible] ([illegible] [illegible]), DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS [illegible] [illegible] AVE., APT 1[illegible], LOS ANGELES [illegible]15, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, [illegible] (GARCIA) [illegible], WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, [illegible] DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO [illegible].

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

18 May 70

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201-735296

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN EUR6 FI2 CI/OPS CI CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 298

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 151724Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7570 (NEBECKER ACTING)

WMIM

15 MAY 11 084149

DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 033355

B. UFAA-1978

1. IN MEETING WITH SAMKO ON 14 MAY, PACHANKIS MENTIONED POSSIBLE TRIP TO MADRID AS TOURIST TO HOLD "CHANCE MEETING WITH AMAUTO/1. SMAKO VERY ENTHUSED, FLATTERED HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED HIM, AND IN POSITIVE FRAME OF MIND FOR OPERATION. NO FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS MADE (EXPECT WE WOULD PAY EXPENSES ON TRIP) AND HE APPEARS TO BE MOTIVATED TO HELP COUNTRY AND OLD FRIEND. AT OUR REQUEST, SAMKO HAS APPLIED FOR NEW PASSPORT. INCIDENTALLY, HIS WIFE PASSED AWAY ON 6 NOVEMBER 1969.

2. WE ARE NOW IN POSITION TO DISPATCH SAMKO. PLS ADVISE WHEN HE IS NEEDED ON AMAUTO/1 APPROACH.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

OK, let's go. Do you think enough caution, "chance," and "non-political" etc. have already been written into this op?

NOT yet.

Amauto-1

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WH8 R/AN, C/OD, FI 2, EUR6

927

S E C R E T 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12 [illegible]

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN [illegible]
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ NFD
~~SI~~
WH/C/CA

COPY

201-735296
12 May 70

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER:mdu
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819/7144
DATE: 11 MAY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 21 06 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MADRID 033355

TYPIC AMAUTO

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 030893 B. UFAA-1978

1. VIEW REF B, HQS SANGUINE ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF "CHANCE" APPROACH BY SAMKO TO AMAUTO-1. AS REASONABLY WELL OFF RETIRED PERSON, SAMKO COULD NATURALLY GO TO MADRID AS TOURIST. HQS WONDERS WHETHER THIS WOULD HOLD WATER UNLESS WIFE ACCOMPANIED HIM. REQUEST MIAMI INVESTIGATE THIS POINT.

2. APPROACH BY SAMKO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT LEAD TO RECRUITMENT, BUT WOULD OFFER PERSONAL READING OF AMAUTO-1 BASED ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE WARM ENTREE PROVIDED BY FONDLY-REMEMBERED PAST ASSOCIATION. IF APPROPRIATE, SAMKO COULD PROVIDE LINK TO "OTHER WORLD" IN CASE AMAUTO-1 EVER NEEDED HELP. LATTER SCHEDULED TRAVEL HAVANA IN JUNE 70 AND RETURN MADRID PRIOR POSTING CUBA. JUDGING FROM AMBEDEW-1 AND AMDELAY-1 CASES, BRIEF RETURN TO CUBA MIGHT PROVE TURNING POINT IN ANY DECISION TO DEFECT. THEREFORE, ANY MEETING WITH SAMKO SHOULD BE PRIOR JUNE DEPARTURE.

AN	UU
AB	X
IN	
PS	
RX	
FD / DEC	NFD
FI	

3. IN EVENT POSSIBLE SAMKO TRAVEL TO MADRID, WE WOULD NEED

201-735296

CONTINUED...

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MAY 20 11 30 AM '70

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~~MAY 14 1 35 PM '70~~

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO

033353

PAGE TWO

LIST OF PLACES FREQUENTED BY AMAUTO-1 WHERE SAMKO WOULD HAVE CHANCE "BUMP INTO" HIM. IF MADRID HAS OTHER IDEAS, WELCOME ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO.

4. FILE: 201-735296.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Ref A said Hqs willing consider use of SAMKO to approach AMAUTO-1. Ref B gave results of Miami's contacts with SAMKO.

WH

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

EUR/IB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES E. FLANNERY
C/WH/COG

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4	Lunsford	8	

file AMAUTO

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR R/AN, C/OA, FI2, EUR6 drawing board

ACTION NO. 927

S E C R E T 121902Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7515 (NEBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, MADRID

12 [illegible]

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: DIRECTOR 030893

N

1. MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ OF PARA 3 REF IS COUSIN OF AMAUTO-1. HE WAS GIVEN CI DEBRIEFING BY AMOTIN-122 ON 24 FEBRUARY. VIGOS HAS NOT SEEN AMAUTO-1 SINCE 1963, HAS BEEN RECEIVING PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND IS HOMOSEXUAL. DUE TO LACK OF INFO FROM VIGOS, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE REPORT ON AMAUTO-1.

2. WILL HAVE PACHANKIS INTERVIEW FOR ANY POSSIBLE INFO MISSED BY AMOTS AND ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

FILE:
AMAUTO-1

SECRET

(21)

[redacted]

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file

WH8 ☐ FILE, RI ELLGRIAN a. alops FI2

439

SECRET 181022Z MAY 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7595 (REBECKER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

[illegible] 005470

REF A DIRECTOR 032693

B WH/MIAMI 7515 (4081546)

1. AMAUTO-1 COUSIN, MANUEL (VIGOS) PEREZ, DEPARTED MIAMI EARLY MARCH FOR LOS ANGELES. PRESENT ADDRESS IS 535 BEACON AVE., APT 10, LOST ANGELES 90015, NO TELEPHONE. ABOVE FROM RELATIVE OF VIGOS IN MIAMI, MERCEDES (GARCIA) DOBARROS, WHO DOES NOT KNOW AMAUTO-1.

2. AS INDICATED IN REF B, AMOTS DID NOT PREPARE SUMMARY ON AMAUTO-1 FROM VIGOS DEBRIEFING, DUE TO LACK OF INFO. ABOVE ADDRESS FORWARDED IN CASE HQS WISHES TO PURSUE.

3. FILE: 201-735296. GP-1

SECRET

— Given lack info, suggest only [illegible] [illegible]. What you think?

Answ. no interest.

AMAUTO-1

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ, GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-814891
MADR-01054
08 MAY 70

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS

UFAOIR

R 70C5190007

FILE IN 201-735296

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

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PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/
WEAVER VAL [illegible]-129
RID/AN GA 50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GI-7

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		[illegible] 24		S
2. Whaler				[illegible]
3. Linsford				[illegible]
4.				
5 Ennis		Rec'd 22 22 May	May	E
6 Wheeler		[illegible]		[illegible]
7. Best		22 May	23 May	CB
8. Daryl				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

TO ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Mli

2-3: Check w/ Chile desk to see who TELLO is. Maybe this finally is our handle with ANAUTO-1.

Don. Maybe a name trace, but name lists seems like a tough nut in himself.

copy for ANAUTO

c.c. pls get all info on TELLO in 201 file here.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	
	INDEX	

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-735296

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 7 Nov 69

DOCUMENT NUMBER DSMA 25024

04827

FORM 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santiago

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, Europe Division; COS, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
AKULE/QUTIMID/PBRUMEN/Manuel TELLO Troncoso

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 29 October QUTIMID reported a conversation between Guillermo RUIZ Perez, the Cuban Minister to Spain, and Manuel TELLO Troncoso, identified in the Diplomatic List as Counsellor of the Chilean Embassy, regarding the postponement until 31 October of a meeting they were to have on 29 October. We have no information on the purpose of the meeting. We note that TELLO arrived in Spain in January 1969.

Howard R. SACODER

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- ~~2~~ - C/WHD
- 2 - C/EUR
- 2 - COS/WH, Miami — To OUT Pouch

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	OSMA 25624	7 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296

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TO: Chief of Station, Madrid

INFO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSMW-11726

Forwarded herewith is a completed version by AMEDIT-2 of the study on Guillermo RUIZ Perez.

MICHAEL V. SLATINSKI

KENNETH B. TICINETO

Attachment: h/w

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSMW-11828

DATE: 8 MAY 1970

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-735296

(5 May 1970)

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DES	NFD
FI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Richard Wheeler pfd	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	5 May 70	James E. Flannery

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/EUR/IB		Louis Rosso Glenn A. Rounsevell

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7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RUIZ PEREZ, ORESTES GUILLERMO
201-735296
SEX M DOB ?

201-866054
UFAA-0[illegible]978
04 MAY 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO AS REPORTED BY SUBJECT OF 201-866054

R 7005110495

OSM

FILE IN 201-735296

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 587

SECRET 081046Z MAY 70 CITE MADRID 1054

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI ROME

TYPIC AMMEDIA QUDOZE

8 MAY IN 078059

1. FROM QUSEQUIN/QUDOZE 6 MAY:

A. CARLOS ALFARAS, CUBAN AMBASSADOR LEBANON AND SYRIA, TOLD ANTOLIN (PROBABLY ANTOLIN ALFONSO CASTENEDA), CUBAN EMBASSY ROME THAT HE (ALFARAS) AND WIFE SCHEDULED FLY MADRID/ROME 9 MAY IBERIA FLIGHT 358. ANTOLIN SAID THAT SALVADOR VILASECA, AMBASSADOR ITALY, IN CUBA FOR WEEK'S VACATION; EXPECTED RETURN ROME 6 MAY ALITALIA 366.

B. GUILLERMO RUIZ, CHARGE IN MADRID, SAID HE TRAVELING HAVANA MID-JUNE FOR A MEETING OF AMBASSADORS.

2. FILE 201-814891, 201-7352996, 201-759701. GP-1

SECRET

Extract for 201's

FILE:
RM 2u10-1

SECRET

ORIG: RICHARD WHEELER;pfd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R1819
DATE: 1 MAY 1970

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SECRET

TO MADRID ~~[illegible]~~ 17 [illegible] 70 WH/MIAMI CITE DIRECTOR 030893

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 7346 (IN 072939)

B. DIRECTOR 021639

DES | NFD
FI

1. REF A REPRESENTS LEAD TO AMAUTO-1 WHICH HQS WILLING PURSUE IF MADRID THINKS WORTH WHILE. ALTHOUGH SAMKO DID NOT INDICATE RELATIONSHIP WAS VERY DEEP, QUTIMID/QUDOZE TRAFFIC SEEMS TO INDICATE AMAUTO-1 LOOKED ON SAMKO WITH GREAT DEAL NOSTALGIA. MUCH DEPENDS ON MADRID'S OTHER PLANS THROUGH SUBJECT REF B (201-866047). REQUEST STATUS YOUR CONTACT WITH HIM AND PLANS.

2. RECENT REVIEW OF AMAUTO-1 TAPES BY AMEDIT-2 SHOW THAT AMAUTO-1 MAINTAINS CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH QUSEQUIN-82. AMEDIT-2 COMMENTS THAT QUSEQUIN-82 KNOWS AMAUTO-1 PERSONALLY AND SEES HIM RATHER OFTEN BUT PRESUMABLY IN LINE OF DUTY. HQS INTERESTED IN NATURE AND EXTENT THIS RELATIONSHIP. VIEW QUSEQUIN-82 COMMENTS REPORTED IN OSMA-23624, ATTACHMENT 1, STATION MIGHT USE THIS RELATIONSHIP TO APPROACH AMAUTO-1.

WODISH
3. / ~~[illegible]~~ REPORT DATED 27 MAR 70 WAS DEBRIEFING OF MANUEL

201-235296

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04 May 70
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BY: RID/EDI
CONF:
INFO: FILE, VR,

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(classification) SECRET

PAGE TWO
(date and time filed)

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

TO

CITE DIRECTOR 630193

(VIGOS) PEREZ, 30-YEAR OLD CUBAN WHO ARRIVED MIAMI BY AIR ON 20 FEB 70. VIGOS CLAIMS TO BE UNIDENTIFIED CLOSE RELATIVE OF AMAUTO-1 BUT HAS AMAUTO-1'S HISTORY SOMEWHAT GARBLED. VIGOS ALSO SAYS THAT ONE OSVALDO RUIZ PEREZ, DESCRIBED AS BROTHER OF AMAUTO-1, HAS ASKED TO LEAVE CUBA AND IS NOW IN CANE FIELDS. WH/MIAMI REQUESTED TO CHECK THESE LEADS.

4. FILE 201-735296. END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Ref A said that SAMKO, Miami butcher who old acquaintance of AMAUTO-1, has been located and willing travel to Madrid if necessary. Ref B is POA grant for one Carlos CARRASCO, whom Madrid plans to use somehow to get to AMAUTO-1.

MAY 1 8 '70

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/E/FI/CI

AC/EUR/IB Louis Rosso

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

5
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1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION
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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, European Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM
Chief of Station, Madrid

SUBJECT
QUTIMID QUDOZE
Sonia GOMEZ Aragon, Cuban MINREX Official

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: None, FYI. Please assign 201 number

References: A. MADRID 0473
B. WH/MIAMI 6576
C. DIRECTOR 011307

1. The following information about Subject's trip to Spain and her activities while here was obtained from QUTIMID and QUDOZE.

2. Subject arrived in Madrid on 10 February 1970. She traveled to Barcelona during the week of 23 February and returned to Madrid 6 March whereupon she then left for Portugal. She returned to Madrid on 17 March and waited for Guillermo RUIZ Perez' return from the Spanish/Cuban Commercial negotiations in Cuba. Sonia departed Madrid for Cuba on 27 March 1970. It appears that she intended to travel to Vienna, Austria next, since several cables were sent to Vienna from Madrid advising Sonia's travel status. During her stay in Spain, Sonia was in frequent contact with one Jose Agustin GOYTISOLO, Spanish writer in Barcelona, telephone 228-4063 (Station traces are OSBA 02385, 17 February 1965; OSBA 02718, 11 August 1967; and OSBA 02795, 1 March 1968). She was not known to have been in contact with any other locals and what little time she had for diversion she spent with the mission officers and their wives.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/EUR
2 - COS, WH/Miami

....continued

201-869482

CROSS REFERENCE TO 65-2-1079 65-6-44/4	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OSMA - 26218	DATE 13 May 1970
~~201-735296~~	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-735296 ~~201-~~

3. The purpose of Sonia's trip to Madrid was to discuss the 1970 work plan for the Embassy with the Charge, Guillermo RUIZ Perez. She also talked with the various Embassy officials, most probably to familiarize herself with their duties and to see if they had any problems. She pitched in and helped with the backlogged work of Orestes BARREDA and Horacio FUENTES and also helped with the cultural activities. For instance, she sent two cables to MINREX - one regarding the forwarding of movie posters for a March exhibit and another regarding the forwarding of a Cuban stamp exhibition by end March.

4. In their discussion of the 1970 work plan Sonia told RUIZ that they were going to plan the February, March, and April quarter. She showed him "an agenda for the control of planned and unplanned activities" and the general directives of the plan which included scientific information and political information, with specific directives (requirements) for Spain. RUIZ has to prepare for Havana a monthly report, then a quarterly summary, of the activities accomplished. Based on these reports the activities of the following quarter will be planned.

a. In line with the plan of scientific information, Sonia and RUIZ discussed the pros and cons of a Comite Cientifico-Tecnico which is to be set up in Madrid. RUIZ was of the opinion that the local (Spanish) Communist Party would try to infiltrate it and this would bring problems to the Embassy. Sonia pointed out the successes encountered in Switzerland and Sweden with such a committee even though at first there were problems which were later overcome.

b. Sonia showed RUIZ a commercial project which she planned to take to Portugal and asked him to read it because it was also of interest to the Cuban mission in Spain.

c. Sonia mentioned that the Plan of Information was still to be completed especially in the priority categories of livestock and economy.

d. They turned next to the topic of the budget. Sonia said that the budget for each mission had to be submitted before the end of April (every year) and no additional expenditures could be submitted for approval during the course of the year. Spain, Canada, and France, however, would be treated individually. Their special needs, such as acquisition of more office space, raises in cost of living allowances, etc., would be taken into consideration at any time.

5. During their various discussions RUIZ aired his complaint about the Visa Department in Havana saying that the department was practically worthless and that last year 76 cables regarding visas remained unanswered. Sonia defended the Ministry saying that it had a lot of work to do, but RUIZ replied that they wanted to work only 8 hours a day. They also discussed the scholarship situation. It seems that during an interview between PRIETO (Probably Jose PRIETO Benitez, Director of Foreign Relations of the DAP) and the Minister of Public Works, PRIETO was asked to provide a list of scholarship candidates to be considered and he had none. Sonia mentioned that in Belgium they also lost four scholarships because of this same reason.

6. According to QUTIMID Sonia GOMEZ Aragon is married to one Miguel (LNU) and has a daughter named Iliana. Sonia's mother is still living although appeared to be very ill at the time Sonia left for her trip to Madrid because Sonia cabled at least twice to Havana inquiring about the status of her mother's health. (TYLOTE reported that Sonia's home phone number in Havana is 7-4263.) Perhaps Headquarters can determine the full name of her husband by checking the reverse telephone listings. Sonia is attractive, intelligent, sertious-minded and reserved. The last time she visited Spain she stayed with Vera BORODOWSKI and was on the same type of mission as the present one - to discuss the Madrid Embassy's work plan. She also visited the Barcelona Consulate and the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon.

Helen B. NOTHDURFT

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) file

Since Headquarters has recently prepared an extensive analysis on RUIS for the information of addressees, an additional review has been omitted. However, the attached biographic study should be useful.

30 April 1970

NAME:	Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296) (NOTE: A comprehensive study/analysis on RUIZ was prepared in February 1970, see OSMW-11726.)
ALIAS:	Also uses Guillermo RUIZ Perez
DPOB:	10 February 1930, Havana
PRESENT POSITION:	Minister, Charge d'Affaires, Cuban Embassy, Madrid, since December 1967.
WIFE:	Nilda VECIANA Lopez (DPOB: 26 December 1934, Havana)
CHILDREN:	Five sons, and a sixth child due to be born April/May 1970, Guillermo, the oldest, in school in Cuba. Alejandro, Julio, Juan Carlos and Ivan with their parents in Madrid.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:	White, variously described as 5'5" - 5'7" tall, and 170-190 pounds, stout build; round face, fair complexion, blond slightly wavy hair, light-colored eyes (also reported as blue and green), wears glasses. No visible identifying marks. Well dressed.
PERSONALITY:	Perhaps a relative's description of RUIZ sums up his personality - "a man of many moods." He has variously been described as intelligent, mentally alert, competent, hardworking, and respected by his subordinates. Pleasant, easy going, nervous, quick-tempered, brusque but sincere, opinionated, strong-minded idealistic, self-confident. Has basic emotional instability, gives impression of being insecure in his position. At times sarcastic, indifferent, egotistical, cynical, serious, ungrateful and cold, who, paradoxically, appears friendly to some people. Outspoken, compulsive talker, articulate, limited vocabulary, swears a good deal.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

He can turn on considerable charm, where motivated. In contrast to his pleasant public image and acceptable language, private conversation is vulgar, swears continually and flies into rages.

Likes good living and spends money where it shows. Avid reader, keeps abreast of world events, shows willingness to accept whatever he deems to be good or useful from the outside world. Concerned with the image and prestige of Cuba in Spain. Emotionally committed to an ideal. An AMEDIT study summed RUIZ up as a realist. He speaks English and French. His wife, a teacher, always worked before going to Spain, and there works as a secretary and bookkeeper at the Embassy on an informal basis. Appears intelligent, competent, outspoken but solicitious and affectionate with her husband; interested in, and encourages him in his work. Appears to support the regime, but not a fanatic. RUIZ is the dominant personality of the two.

EDUCATION:

One reference states that he went to work at age 14, which suggests lack of formal education.
In 1960 as an employee of the Ministry of the Treasury, selected to attend a statistics course offered by CEPAL, which lasted two years.

One relative reported he completed elementary education at "Hermanos Maristas" school in Havana; did not know whether he attended high school, but said in early days of the Castro regime attended the University of

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

Havana.

Another relative said his primary and secondary education was received in private institutions, and that he has a degree in "political economics" from the University of Havana.

He is well versed in world affairs and has an understanding of international trade.

PREVIOUS POSITIONS: Vice Minister, MINCEX, 1964-1967.

Commercial Counselor, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Although he was accredited to that position in December 1963, travel indicates he was in Mexico from August 1963 to May 1964. Other references indicate he was in that position in September 1963.

Ministry of the Treasury. In April 1962 he was Chief of the Department of Construction Expenses Studies, Office of Financial Statistics of that ministry. He was with the ministry as early as 1960, when he was selected to attend the statistics course.

During the Batista regime he was in exile. Came to the U.S. sometime in the 1950's and apparently remained for some time before he left in February 1957, when, according to some reports, he entered Cuba clandestinely. Also reported to have been in exile in Mexico.

LNYUMA records show he came to U.S. on 8 November 1956 to see his brother, left 17 November for the Dominican Republic where he received five months military training. Returned to the

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

U.S. 5 April 1957, overstayed his time, and on 11 February 1958 was ordered deported; claimed he would be killed if he returned to Cuba and did not show for deportation. Subsequent investigation showed he was in Cuba as of 2 March.

POLITICAL ATTITUDE:

A member of the Cuban Communist Party, admitted on the recommendation of Armando HART Davalos, Secretary of Organization. Although he has been described as a militant Communist, a convinced supporter of the Castro regime and a fanatic Fidelista, there is evidence to dispute this image. An analysis of available information indicates that he is not a convinced Marxist, he cannot accept Party discipline, and that his character is basically incompatible with the system he serves.

His father is reported to be an old-guard Communist and a leader of the barber's union. A brother reported to be a member of DSE in 1946.

He expressed dissatisfaction with his position as a diplomat, feels his talents are wasted and would like a position in commerce or industry, where he considers he could better serve the revolution. Has criticized the bureaucracy and inefficiency in the government in Havana.

He has said that many Cuban diplomats want to stay out of Cuba, but it seemed to him that the Cuban government wanted to keep him (RUIZ) out of the way (i.e., outside Cuba). That LEON had appointed him, supported him, and they are good friends, but that he (RUIZ) does not like to work with a man who one does not get to know, nor to know what he is thinking. He said he felt as if he were in Miami.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS: In May 1964 AMMUG-1 reported RUIZ was a DGI case officer in Mexico for operations targetted against "some nearby area," and later identified his photograph as DGI member in Mexico.

In 1961 an emigre said RUIZ, with the Finance Ministry, was a Communist and G-2.

AMTIKI-1 said a letter from a friend in Cuba stated that RUIZ, then in Mexico, was a member of G-2, sent to try to infiltrate counterrevolutionary groups (1963).

In April 1968, RUIZ advised Aristides DIAZ Rovirosa on the use of disguises, the need to "live secretly" and commented on DIAZ' being "already clandestine."

The Cuban Ambassador to Geneva, in 1968, commented on RUIZ' refusal to accept DGI dominance of the Cuban Embassy, Madrid. (AMDELAY-1). In July 1969, AMBEDEW-1 said RUIZ was very dictatorial in his dealings with DGI officers.

CONTACTS: Not much is known of his contacts in Madrid, other than official. Is in touch with Ahmed LAIDI, Algerian Ambassador; Manuel TELLO Troncoso, Counselor of Chilean Embassy, Madrid; Alexandru PETRESCU, Romanian Minister to Spain and Carlos CARRASCO Munoz de Vera, a lawyer and personal friend.

TRAVELS:

1963: Aug. To Mexico

22 Nov. Mexico-Cuba

29 Nov. Cuba-Mexico

8 Dec. Cuba-Mexico

1964: 21 May. Mexico-Cuba

1967: 13 Dec. Cuba-Spain

1968: 15 Jan. Spain-Netherlands

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

	16 Jan.	Netherlands-Spain
	27 July	Spain-France
	31 July	France-Spain
	6 Aug.	Spain-Cuba (via Ireland, Canada)
	29 Aug.	Cuba-Spain
	21 Nov.	Spain-Cuba
	10 Dec.	Cuba-Spain
1969:	27 Feb.	France-Spain
	27 Feb.	Spain-Dominican Republic
	11 Mar.	Spain-Switzerland
	4 Aug.	Spain-Cuba
	17 Sept.	Cuba-Spain (via French West Indies, Azores)
	10 Oct.	Spain-Cuba
	29 Oct.	Cuba-Spain
	14 Nov.	Spain-UK
	16 Nov.	UK-Spain
	28-30 Nov.	Two-day trip by auto to San Sebastian and Burgos

6 Jan 70. To Italy, returning by auto.

Also claims to have been in North Vietnam as a member of a trade mission (QUDOZE).

ASSESSMENT: It appears that RUIZ might well be responsive to an approach, with consideration given to the manner in which it is undertaken, the timing and the person involved.

Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez

ACCESS:

MISCELLANEOUS:

Although RUIZ' health has been described as generally good, he suffers from a back ailment which resulted from a fall in 1955 and which has been diagnosed as incurable. Also he suffers from a liver ailment for which he takes medicine.

RUIZ is scheduled to return to Cuba in mid-1970, where he expects to be with MININT, rather than MINREX or MINCEX.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO
FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO.
798

S E C R E T 291535Z APR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 7346 (WMIM) 29 APR IN 072939

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID

TYPIC AMAUTO

REF A WH/MIAMI 7304 (IN 070131)

B UFAA-1978

1. SAMKO SHOWN PHOTOS OF AMAUTO-1 AND REMARKED, "WHY, THIS IS WILLIAM." REMEMBERED AMAUTO-1 AS NICE CLEAN-CUT BOY WITH HIGH IDEALS. WHILE THERE WAS PROBABLY FATHER-SON RELATIONSHIP, SAMKO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH.

2. SAMKO IS WILLING TO TRAVEL TO MADRID TO TALK WITH AMAUTO-1. HE HAS AN EXPIRED PASSPORT. WAS TOLD INTERVIEW WAS EXPLORATORY AND PACHANKIS WOULD RECONTACT IF SAMKO SERVICES WERE NEEDED.

3. POUCHING ABOVE CONTACT REPORT, ALONG WITH REF A CONTACT REPORT, VIA REF B.

4. FILE: 201-866054 AND 201-735296. GP-1

S E C R E T

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201-735296
29 Apr 70

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SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Madrid;
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC AMAUTO
Interview of Alexander SAMKO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2 below

References: A. DIRECTOR 026320,
B. WH/MIAMI 7304
C. WH/MIAMI 7346

1. Forwarded herewith are two contact reports submitted by Henry S. PACHANKIS on his interviews with Alexander SAMKO (201-866054) concerning Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296). Both contact reports are self-explanatory and were summarized in References B and C.

2. Please advise if WH/Miami should pursue the matter of contact between SAMKO and RUIZ in Madrid. If so, the Station suggests that PACHANKIS accompany SAMKO to Madrid as his handler.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachments:
A. Contact Report, 21 April 1970
B. Contact Report, 28 April 1970

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - COS, Madrid w/atts h/w (in dupl)
2 - Chief, EUR w/atts h/w (one copy)

MAY 4 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-735296	UFAA-1978	29 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-866054

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8 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible DRE Animus Towards President Kennedy

1. This memorandum makes record of a recollection which has been brought to mind in recent weeks since my return from Yugoslavia in late November 1966.

2. In Spring 1961, upon returning from Berlin I was assigned to JMWAVE. One of the cases on which I worked from then until shortly before my reassignment to Headquarters in late summer 1963 concerned funding of overseas elements of the DRE (Student Revolutionary Directorate) which had its main office in Miami (the case officer for this group during this period was Mr. Ross CROZIER, since resigned).

3. I believe that it is this group, the DRE, which has been referred to in investigations into the President's assassination as the Cuban Student Directorate, whose New Orleans representative is said to have had contacts with OSWALD.

4. I have assumed that, since the time I was transferred from Miami and scheduled for my next assignment as COB, 27 10 Zagreb, officers better and more recently informed than myself have probably examined in detail all aspects of the DRE involvement with OSWALD, in order to rule out any slight possibility that compromise of the CIA sponsorship of this organization might in any way embarrass the Agency. Recent news reports of investigations centering in New Orleans on the assassination have once again brought to mind the concern I felt in November 1963, by which time, however, I was far removed from current knowledge of the operation.

3/80

[illegible]

5. I do retain a distinct recollection that the DRE leadership, specifically Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha, whom I met several times, did hold sentiments of chagrin and embitterment that President Kennedy had not more forcefully pursued a "liberation" of Cuba. Whether or not this animus, which could be discerned as occasional signs of anger or of contempt or of discouragement, might have been translated into a wish for revenge, may be better known to other officers who dealt with this group after the summer of 1963.

[Calvin Thomas] 03
Calvin Thomas
SB/O/PT

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO OELA-37,729
TO Chief, WE INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 19-5
FROM Chief of Station, London		DATE 28 December 1962
SUBJECT KEYWAY/PBPRIME/SMOTH 01 Cuban Identified and Suspect Intelligence Officers		RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See para four		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. Attached hereto are three copies of a SMOTH prepared list of identified and suspect intelligence officers, compiled from SMOTH records but not including information derived from special intelligence sources. 01

01 2. Copies are being distributed to JAGUAR, SMABLE, ASIO (Australia), and JACONET. 01

3. As the list includes a considerable amount of information from KUBARK sources, SMOTH would be grateful if Headquarters would consider giving clearance to distribute copies of this study to "friendly Latin American and Western European liaison services". They have further asked whether it would be appropriate to pass a copy of this report to ODENVY. 24

4. London Station would appreciate a brief cabled reply to the request for further distribution of this information.

LAWRENCE L. HOLDY

Attachment: "Cuban Identified and Suspect Intelligence Officers"
3 copies

Distribution:
4-Chief, WE w/atts

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VEGA Perez →

201-337253
OELA-37,729
28 Dec 62

8/920

VALDES VALDES, Ramon

Born circa 1911.
Suspect I.S.

1961: Officer at G-2 Headquarters, Havana. Signs orders to view prisoners at La Cabana Prison.

Description: circa 5' 7" tall, heavy build, weight: 190 lbs. approx., short neck, scanty grey hair.

VAZQUEZ MONTENEGRO, Ramon

Suspect I.S.

1960: Member of Cuban Security and acted as bodyguard to President DORTICOS.

Reportedly travels on subversive missions in Latin America.

June 1962: Member of G-2 in the Cuban Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

VEGA PEREZ, Manuel
201-334253

Suspect I.O.

Diplomatic Attaché, Cuban Embassy, Mexico since June 1962.

Responsible for new "Committee in Defence of the Cuban Revolution".

Reported by defector to be former instructor at C-2 training school.

VELAZ (VELOZ), Lt. Anibal

Excerpt:
Attach to OELA-37,729
28 Dec 1962

[illegible]

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Winston, Henry
201-6887 Vol II of II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1966 —

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Third Agency Documents

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/11/75	3/17/75	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf
3 May		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf
23 May		JOHANNA SMITH	Smith
7 NOV. 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Third Agency Docs Henry Winston 201-6887 Vol II

14-00000

Third Agency Docs Henry Winston Vol II 201-6887

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

[illegible] 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on WINSTON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☑ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed ____________ ____________ ____________
(name) (title) (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ____________ ____________ 197__
(initials) (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-026287

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

There is information on an individual who may be identical with the subject of this 201 in OPS/ITG. For details call extension 5020.

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OF 201- 006887

SECRET

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WINSTON, HENRY
201-0006887 074-006-783/05
SEX M SX-23696/01
13 AUG 74
P56

MENTIONED IN DEBRIEFINGS OF SOVIET EMIGRES PDSOLE/1 AND PDSOLE/2.

DATE 04 DEC 75 09356242

201-0006887

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

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WINSTON, HENRY	
201-0006887	100-006-139/04
SEX M	CD-02099
	08 MAR 74
CIT USA	P2

RES USA. MENTIONED IN ANALYSIS OF STORY OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST BY JOHN GATES.

DATE 22 MAR 74 09083288

201-006887

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

RK ✓
TG
OBW ✓

PTTUZYUW RUFTRNR 1237 1291240-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZNR UUUUU ZYH

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FM FBIS VIENNA

TO RUFHYOA/VOA MUNICH

RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

FBVI

BT

UNCLAS LD 890 DE PUET

COPY TO LIAISON

WINSTON GRANTS INTERVIEW TO PRAGUE TELEVISION

AB51811 SEE AB51652 PRAGUE DOMESTIC CZECH 061130 [illegible]

LD82254 PRAGUE CTK ENGLISH 0820337

PRAGUE DOMESTIC TELEVISION SERVICE IN CZECH 1830 GMT 7 MAY 72 B

(INTERVIEW GIVEN TO PRAGUE TELEVISION BY HENRY WINSTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY, AFTER HIS MEETING WITH VASIL BILAK, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARY OF THE CPCZ CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON 6 MAY--RECORDED IN ENGLISH WITH CZECH TRANSLATION SUPERIMPOSED)

14-00000

(([illegible])) ((QUESTION)) [illegible] CHAIRMAN, WHAT IS THE REACTION
[illegible]
OF THE U.S. PUBLIC AND OF YOUR PARTY TO THE RECENT EVENTS

K

IN VIETNAM?

((ANSWER)) THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES IS ONE OF HORROR AT THE GENOCIDAL POLICY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IN INDOCHINA. THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES NOW IS A MOVEMENT OF THE MAJORITY. IT COMPRISES SEVENTYSIX 76 PERCENT OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES. IT UNITES PEOPLE OF VARYING POLITICAL VIEWS; BLACK, WHITE, BROWN, YELLOW, RED, AND IT IS A PROGRAM FOR THEIR UNITY. IT LEADS THEM TO UNITY AROUND THE PROGRAM FOR ENDING THE WAR NOW IN VIETNAM, FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS, AND A PROGRAM WHICH GIVES AND CREATES THE CONDITIONS FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY FREE FROM U.S. IMPERIALISM, BOMBS FROM THE AIR OR SHIPS AT SEA. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT GUS HALL, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO IS NOW OUR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE AND (CHARLES TYNER), CHAIRMAN OF THE LEAGUE FOR THE LIBERATION OF YOUNG WORKERS, WHO IS OUR VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE, WENT TO HANOI AND SAW WITH THEIR OWN EYES THE CRIMINALITY OF THE WASHINGTON PIRATES, WHO DROPPED BOMBS FROM THEIR [illegible] PLANES AND USED ALL KINDS OF GENOCIDAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

OF [illegible] CHILDREN. THE SAME [illegible]

THREE THOUSAND 3,000 VILLAGES DESTROYED BY BOMBS DROPPED BY THE PLANES OF U.S. MONOPOLISTS, BY B-57 AND B-52 PLANES. THREE THOUSAND VILLAGES MEANS THREE THOUSAND 3,000 LIDICES. THESE BOMBS ARE BEING DROPPED BY THE U.S. MONOPOLY BOURGEOISIE, WHICH DIRECTS NIXON AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM.

((QUESTION)) WOULD YOU TELL ME IN THIS CONTEXT WHAT IS THE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE IN THE UNITED STATES?

((ANSWER)) THE PEACE MAJORITY ABOUT THIS--I SPOKE IN THE UNITED STATES REFLECTS ITSELF IN GREETING THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE PEOPLE IN EUROPE IN GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET INITIATIVE AND IT IS HOPING TO CREATE A ZONE WHERE WORLD HUMANITY WILL NOTT AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THAT IS WHY YOU FIND SUCH STRONG SUPPORT FOR THIS INITIATIVE TAKING PLACE IN A THOUSAND DIFFERENT FORMS AND DEVELOPING FURTHER. THE AGREEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY HOLDS A PROMINENT POSITION ON WHICH THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE AS SUCH CAN UNITE AGAINST THE REVANCHISTS AND WARMONGERS AND ONCE AND FOR ALL PREVENT A WAR, WHICH COULD ONLY PRODUCE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF LIVES DESTROYED AND BURNED BY THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS.

((QUESTION)) THE CRISIS OF U.S. SOCIETY ALSO INVOLVES THE [illegible] EXAMPLE IS [illegible]

DAVIS. IT IS GENERALLY KNOWN THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, LIKE THE ENTIRE PROGRESSIVE PUBLIC, FULLY SUPPORTS THIS WELL-KNOWN U.S. COMMUNIST. IN YOUR OPINION WHAT WILL BE THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE TRIAL?

((ANSWER)) FIRST OF ALL I BRING GREETINGS FROM THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY, FROM THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF ANGELA DAVIS AND FROM ANGELA DAVIS PERSONALLY. MOST CORDIAL GREETINGS AND THANKS TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WHO SO COURAGEOUSLY AND SELFLESSLY STRUGGLE FOR THE FULL FREEDOM OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS, PERSECUTED BY THE MONOPOLISTS AND RACISTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

((QUESTION)) THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

((ANSWER)) ANGELA DAVIS' CASE IS A REFLECTION OF THE REACTIONARY PROFASCIST POLICY WHICH IS [illegible] IN THE COUNTRY, AND IT IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE CAMPAIGN OF EXTERMINATION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, AND IT IS PART AND A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE POLICY THROUGH WHICH THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS ALL POSSIBLE SORTS OF MILITARISTS AND REVANCHISTS IN WEST GERMANY AND THE APARTHEID GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. U.S. IMPERIALISM DOES NOTT SUPPORT ANY PROGRESSIVE REGIME ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD, BUT IT SUPPORTS ALL REACTIONARY REGIMES EVERYWHERE --THAT IS WHAT IN TERMS OF DOMESTIC POLICY LEADS TO THE STAGED

TRIAL OF ANGELA DAVIS, WHICH REFLECTS THE ATTACK OF THE [illegible] [illegible] FORCES ON DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES.

IT BEGAN WITH AN ATTACK ON ALL BLACK PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS WHY THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION IS NOW TAKING STEPS TO PACK THE SUPREME COURT IN SUCH A WAY THAT IS BECOMES A NIXON COURT, WHOSE RULINGS WILL BE TO RIP OUT ALL THE PROGRESSIVE PEACEFUL LEGISLATION OF THE CONGRESS AND EVERY PROGRESSIVE DECISION OF THAT COURT. AND THAT IS WHY EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO PREPARE THE APPROVAL OF NEW LAWS AND REGULATIONS WHICH ARE AIMED AT CURBING DEMOCRACY AND AT MAKING IT POSSIBLE NOTT ONLY TO WAGE THE WAR BEYOND THE SEA BUT ALSO TO SUPPORT FORCES INSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD CRUSH THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND CRACK THE UNITY OF THE WORKING PEOPLE. 071530 CG/BROWN/HA

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CPUSA CHAIRMAN WINSTON ENDS STAY IN CSSR

LD011915 PRAGUE CTK INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1812 GMT

8 MAY 72 L

((TEXT)) PRAGUE MAY EIGHT (CETEKA)--HENRY WINSTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, LEFT HERE TODAY AFTER A THREE-DAY VISIT.

HE WAS SEEN OFF BY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE WORLD MARXIST REVIEW.

Henry WINSTON

H C Winston

14-00000

BEFORE DEPARTURE, [illegible] SAID THAT THE TIME HE SPENT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM AGAIN WHAT SOCIALISM MEANS IN REAL LIFE. HE SPOKE WITH GREAT ESTEEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND SAID THAT THE UNITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HEADED BY THE USSR, AND THEIR PEACE INITIATIVE ARE GUARANTEES THAT PEACE WILL BE PRESERVED IN THE WORLD.

HE ALSO THANKED THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR THEIR SUPPORT OF ANGELA DAVIS, AND SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSIONS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE AN INSPIRATION FOR HIS FUTURE WORK.

[illegible]81612 COSTELLO/VS [illegible]/1932[illegible] MAY

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The Czechoslovak guests were cordially seen off on 5 May 1972 at Berlin-Schonefeld Airport by Herbert Malcherek, deputy head of the Agitation Department, and other collaborators of the SED Central Committee, as well as by representatives of the CSSR Embassy in the GDR.

POLITBURO MEMBER AXEN RECEIVES CPUSA LEADER WINSTON

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5 May 72 p 2 A

[Text] Berlin (ND)--On Thursday, Hermann Axen, Politburo member and SED Central Committee secretary, received Henry Winston, chairman of the CPUSA, who is currently in the GDR for a friendship visit, in the headquarters of the Central Committee. During the meeting, which was marked by a spirit of friendship and the close fraternal friendship between the two parties, the chairman of the fraternal U.S. party reported on the results of the 20th CPUSA Congress, the party's successes in the struggle for exercising its election rights in the presidential elections in November 1972, on problems of the struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggression in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and on the movement for the defense of Angela Davis.

Hermann Axen conveyed the greetings of Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, to Gus Hall, secretary general of the CPUSA, and to all U.S. communists, reassuring them of the continued fraternal solidarity of the SED and the GDR working people in their struggle for peace, democracy and social progress, for the defense of civil rights and the liberation of Comrade Angela Davis.

Hermann Axen extensively informed the U.S. workers leader about the implementation of the decisions of the Eighth SED Congress and the GDR's struggle for peace and security in Europe.

The talk once again confirmed the full agreement of the SED and the CPUSA on all basic questions of the struggle of the world communist movement and served the further deepening of the fraternal relations between the two parties.

At a very cordial meeting with representatives of the GDR Committee for Human Rights, Henry Winston, chairman of the CPUSA, movingly outlined the efforts of thousands of U.S. citizens in defense of Angela Davis.

BRIEFS

HONECKER VIEWS SOVIET FILM--The two final parts of the Soviet film epic "Liberation" are having their solemn first night in the GDR at the Kosmos Cinema in Berlin. Guests of honor at this event are First Secretary of the SED Central Committee Erich Honecker and USSR Ambassador Mikhail Yefremov. [Text] [East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German 1700 GMT 8 May 72 L]

GDR-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP EXHIBIT--Berlin--"Linked by Friendship--for the Happiness of our Peoples" is the motto of the exhibition which opened in Berlin on 8 May on the 25th anniversary of the German-Soviet Friendship Society. Guests at the opening ceremony were Klaus Gysi, GDR minister of Culture, M.T. Yefremov, USSR ambassador in the GDR, and a delegation of the Soviet Society for Friendship with the GDR. [East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2027 GMT 8 May 72 L]

Henry Winston

HENRY WINSTON

I. Personal History

A. Birth and Family Background

Henry Winston, a Negro, was born April 11, 1914, at Hattiesburg, Mississippi, to Joseph and Lucille Bingham Winston, both of whom were born in Mississippi. The family moved to Kansas City, Missouri, about 1927. Joseph Winston died there on October 28, 1958. He and his wife had been separated for many years.

Winston had several sisters and a brother, namely, Dora Humphrey, Lillie Belle Black, Roberta Smith, and Otis D. Winston. Another sister, Anna Lee McConico, is dead. Apparently none of Winston's family ever became affiliated with the CPUSA.

B. Marital Status

On May 2, 1941, Henry Winston and Edna Lerner, a white native-born New Yorker, were married in Brooklyn, New York. Edna was born April 23, 1918. Her father was born in Russia, and her mother in Austria. Henry and Edna have two children, Larry Douglas, born February 14, 1947, and Judith Anne, born September 25, 1950, both in New York City.

Who's Who of National Leaders
CPUSA 1969
SBC 57696 100-1-134

(WINSTON, HENRY
70)



HENRY WINSTON

Guy Owens, a Negro, was born March 5, 1934, in New York City, the illegitimate son of [illegible] Owens, although Henry Winston is often referred to as his father. He has been active in communist affairs since the late 1940s. At one time, he suffered a mental breakdown and spent some time in the Soviet Union, where he was hospitalized. He also attended school there. For a time, he lived with his mother and Winston, although he is currently living in Apartment 3-C, 150 [illegible] Street, New York City, and is unemployed.

C. Education

Winston attended Lincoln High School in Kansas City, Missouri, from 1928 to about 1930.

D. Employment

While in Kansas City, he worked at miscellaneous jobs from 1930 to 1932 before going to New York City. Since then, he has given his full time to CPUSA activities.

F. Foreign Travel

In November, 1933, Winston was sent to the Soviet Union by the CPUSA to attend the Lenin School, and remained at this school until May, 1935. In March, 1937, he revisited the Soviet Union.

Winston, accompanied by his wife, Edna, and their two children, went to the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1961. His wife and children returned to the United States in November, 1961, but Winston remained abroad for two and a half years. During this period, he underwent examination and treatment by Soviet doctors for his virtual blindness. On his return, he stated he had been to East Germany twice and had attended Congresses of the Communist Parties in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, in addition to having traveled extensively in the Soviet Union.

Winston has indicated that he has traveled to many socialist countries throughout the world, including Red China as well as Korea, Indonesia, and other places, where he had discussed the international communist movement and the problems connected therewith.

Winston with his wife, Fern, went to Santiago, Chile, in October, 1965, to attend the 13th Congress of the Chilean Communist Party as a delegate-observer.

In March, 1966, they traveled to the Soviet Union to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. They revisited that country in the Fall of 1967, as part of the official delegation of the CPUSA, to attend the 50th

Anniversary of the October Revolution [illegible] November of 1968, they returned to the Soviet Union [illegible] visited East Berlin.

Winston together with Gus Hall headed the CPUSA delegation to the World Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow beginning June 5, 1969.

F. Military Service

Winston was inducted into the United States Army on February 17, 1942, and honorably discharged on October 31, 1945, with the rank of Technician, Fifth Class. During much of his service he acted as a "public relations reporter" and was attached to the London Public Relations Office of the Negro Interest Section.

G. Health

On January 12, 1960, authorities at the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, where Winston was incarcerated, stated that he was ill and appeared to be losing his equilibrium. Later that month, Winston was examined by a neuropsychiatrist from Indianapolis whose findings showed that he had intercranial pressure which could be caused by a brain tumor or a brain hemorrhage resulting from high blood pressure. As a consequence, Winston was operated on February 2, 1960, for a benign tumor in the brain. A marked degree of incoordination of his gait was noted, and he was considered to be legally blind. On June 30, 1961, he was released from prison following commutation of his sentence by President Kennedy.

In August, 1961, there were indications that Winston very likely still had a brain tumor but had refused to undergo another operation because he was given only a fifty-fifty chance for survival. Soviet medical reports in early 1962 allegedly revealed that Winston's condition was much improved, that his vision was six per cent in his right eye and one per cent in his left, and that the tumor in his head had not spread. On March 12, 1963, Soviet doctors, after a complete physical examination, stated that the symptoms indicating a recurrence of Winston's brain tumor had completely disappeared.

In January, 1966, Fern Winston advised that doctors in the Soviet Union told Winston that he must return to that country for hospitalization and treatment twice a year for periods of four to six weeks. This treatment, consisting of injections, exercises, medicine, and diet, is supposed to reduce the blood pressure and enable Winston to see, at least, some contrast between dark and light.

Winston has claimed on numerous occasions that, while he was in prison, the Government doctors made a wrong diagnosis of his ailment and, as a result, he is now blind. On November 7, 1960, while in prison, Winston brought suit against the U.S. Government for one million dollars under the Federal Torts Claims Act, alleging that the failure of prison authorities to properly diagnose his condition and to treat him for a brain tumor had resulted in his becoming totally blind. On January 18, 1965, however, Winston's attorney, John Abt, said he was dropping this suit because of the difficulty of extracting the necessary information from prison authorities and because the time required would detract from Winston's public activities.

Winston reportedly suffers from some imbalance of his metabolism which causes him to have attacks of hiccups persisting for several days.

E. Current Address

Winston resides at 354 East 108th Street, New York, New York.

II. Communist Party Affiliations

A. History

Winston joined the YCL in January, 1931, and became a member of the CPUSA in the Summer of 1931. In December, 1932, he left Kansas City, Missouri, as a YCL delegate to the National Hunger March in Washington, D. C., and then proceeded to New York City, where he worked for the "Young Worker," official organ of the YCL.

In 1933, he was Chairman of the Harlem Youth Section of the Unemployed Councils and was later named Chairman of the Youth Section of the Unemployed Council for the New York City metropolitan area. From April through November, 1933, he was Section Organizer of the YCL in Brooklyn.

From November, 1933, to May, 1935, he was in the Soviet Union, where he attended the Lenin School. Upon his return to the United States, he became Organizational Secretary of the YCL in Cleveland and was named to the Ohio District Committee of the YCL. In March, 1936, Winston was named YCL National Organizational Secretary, and in May, 1937, was elected YCL National Administrative Secretary.

Winston was active in the YCL as editor of the "Young Communist Review," official magazine of the YCL, and as Director of the YCL Training School held at Camp Beacon, New York, during 1937 and 1938. He was reelected YCL National Administrative Secretary in May, 1939, and held this office until his induction into the Army in February, 1942.

Winston became a member of the CPUSA National Committee in June, 1940; was elected a member of the Communist Political Association National Committee while serving in the Armed Forces in 1944; and was renamed to the CPUSA National Committee in July, 1945. From October, 1945, to July, 1946, he served as Secretary of the Party's National Negro Commission. He was named a member of the editorial staff of "Political Affairs" in 1946. In July, 1946, he was elected a member of the Party's National Board and appointed CPUSA National Organizational Secretary. He held the latter position until his disappearance into the Party's underground apparatus in July, 1951.

Winston was a fugitive from July 2, 1951, following his failure to appear after being convicted of a violation of the Smith Act, until his surrender to authorities on March 5, 1956.

In August, 1961, Winston was elected to the CPUSA's National Executive Committee and was made CPUSA Vice Chairman.

On his return to the United States in February, 1964, after two and a half years abroad, Winston was elected a member of the Secretariat and the National Executive Board. At the 18th National Convention of the CPUSA in June, 1966, he was elected CPUSA National Chairman.

B. Current Activity

Winston is currently CPUSA National Chairman and a member of the Secretariat, the National Executive Board, and the National Committee.

C. Congressional Testimony

Winston testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 2, 1948, on behalf of the CPUSA in opposition to universal military training and the draft.

D. Indictments and Arrests

Winston was indicted on July 20, 1948, under conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act of 1940. He was tried, convicted, sentenced to five years imprisonment, and fined $10,000 but failed to appear in Federal Court for commitment to prison on July 2, 1951. He remained a fugitive until his surrender on March 5, 1956, as a result of which he received an additional three-year sentence for contempt of court. Winston remained in prison until his sentence was commuted by President Kennedy on June 30, 1961, for reason of health.

On August 3, 1961, the Department of Justice, in view of Winston's physical condition, dismissed the detainer against Winston which had been placed because of his indictment under the Smith Act. Winston's indictment under the Smith Act was dismissed on May 29, 1963.

III. Characterization

A. Physical Appearance

Winston is six feet tall. He is stockily built, weighing around 200 pounds. He has black hair, brown eyes, and a pockmarked face. He dresses neatly, wears a suit and tie, and appears to be well groomed at all times.

B. Habits and Idiosyncrasies

Because of his near-total blindness, Winston has to be led or driven around, except when he is at home or at CPUSA headquarters. His associates read to him, and in this way he is able to keep informed about national and world events and Party affairs.

Winston relishes his position as CPUSA National Chairman and the emoluments accruing from it. He does not lack for personal or material comforts. He can travel anywhere in the world anytime he desires. When he goes to the Soviet Union he is paid homage, catered to, and afforded all the medical attention he wishes.

Winston's wife, Fern, is said to have complained that she has no easy life because she frequently has to act as his nurse, secretary, and chauffeur and gets nothing in return from him except abuse. Gus Hall is reported to have helped patch up their marital difficulties and persuaded them to stay together.

C. Effectiveness as Party Leader

Winston occupies his top post in the CPUSA by virtue of the fact that Hall, when he became General Secretary, needed a prominent Negro Party leader to give him support because of his own lack of following among Party Negroes. Since Winston is now an important figure in the national leadership, Hall and other Negro functionaries are obliged to be attentive to and respectful of him.

Hall is apparently resentful that Winston is essential to his continuing Negro support in the Party and that he must necessarily treat Winston with deference. Hall reportedly would like nothing better than to have Soviet doctors keep Winston in the USSR for an indefinite period of time when he visits that country for a medical check-up, thereby preventing Winston from participating in CPUSA affairs. Hall is said to believe that Winston is mentally ill as a result of his brain tumor.

From Winston's earliest days in the communist movement until his release from prison, he--unlike many other Negro Party leaders--was not known to be arrogant or to press for special recognition or advantage because of his race. But on ascending to the highest level of national leadership, a change came over him. The old, affable Winston became imperious and demanding in inner Party circles and let it be known to all his associates in the National Office that he was an important figure. He made it obvious that he was to be consulted, with his opinion sought, and his approval obtained on all matters. To the office workers in the national headquarters, Winston is a terror; to associates and co-workers, he is arrogant and domineering.

Nevertheless, Winston is considered to be an effective and popular Party leader among the membership, white as well as black. He has an engaging personality and is always smiling or laughing. Because of his pleasant, cooperative demeanor, his rough humor and wisecracking, and his lack of temper, he enjoys an easy relationship with people. He seems to like everyone, and his friendly manner has ingratiated him with the rank and file.

In his rise to the top leadership, Winston was extremely careful to faithfully follow the Soviet and the prevailing CPUSA line at all times and to be in tune with the thinking of his superiors. While forceful and decisive in debate, he rarely displayed any independence or initiative, but hewed to the Party line. He avoided becoming angrily contentious in debate or discussion because he wanted to be on the side of those who counted most in terms of authority and leadership. He worked well with people on committees, but became firm when issues of moment were at stake and he knew the desires of higher officials. He never tangled with a person in higher authority or standing but went along as a "good guy."

Winston stays clear of personal intrigue and maneuvering. In the Party's Negro cadre, which is perpetually divided and rife with unending rivalry and backbiting, he strives to play the role of the middleman or the pacifier.

As a speaker, Winston is of the rough-and-tumble type who is a good agitator. He makes an effort to assume a dignified stance on the platform and seldom resorts to exaggerated oratorical antics.

He gives every indication--in speech and in vocabulary--of having had minimal schooling. His extempore language is choppy, disorganized, colloquial, and full of mispronunciation of even simple words. He has virtually no writing skill and is not known to have authored any type of document during his long career in the Party. Speeches, reports, and articles issued under his name are the work of ghost writers.

Winston, who was reelected National Chairman of the CPUSA at its recent 19th National Convention, is, along with Gus Hall, the type of loyal leader the Soviets want in the CPUSA at the present time.

HENRY WINSTON DENOUNCES U.S. POLICY IN INDOCHINA

Moscow TASS International Service in English 1916 GMT 2 Mar 71 L

[Text] New York March 2 TASS--The National Chairman of the U.S. Communist Party Henry Winston sharply denounced Washington's policy of escalating the war in Indochina and stepping up racialism and anti-communism in the United States. Speaking in the past few days at youth meetings over the radio and television in Connecticut he emphasized that if the United States had unilaterally intervened in the war it can and must withdraw from Vietnam in the same way.

This is pure demagogy when the administration talks of cutting military spending and of saving the lives of U.S. servicemen. The communists believe that not a cent should be spent on the aggressive war waged thousands of miles away from the shores of our country.

Henry Winston condemned the campaign of political persecution conducted by the U.S. authorites. I am quite sure, he emphasized, that the forthcoming trial of Angela Davis in California is a political conspiracy. I met Angela Davis a few days ago. After my talk with her I became even more convinced of the political character of this trial. The case of Angela Davis has been framed up by the racialist and anti-communist forces of the State of California.

201-006897

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The Washington DAILY NEWS points out that the 'Peace Corps' program, which costs taxpayers 100 million dollars annually, does not work, and recommends that the administration find better ways to use these funds.

Official Washington has in fact acknowledged the failure of the 'Peace Corps' activity. This is evidenced by the White House's decision to merge the Peace Corps with VISTA, so-called corps of teachers.

The activity of such centralized 'volunteer service', in the opinion of the White House, may bring greater returns for the invested dollars.

But the U.S. press casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of the administration's plans, and not without reason.

The fameless ten-year activity of the 'Peace Corps' made many in America convinced that no one, except for ideological saboteurs, needs this 'volunteer' organization.

HENRY WINSTON DESCRIBES U.S. RACIST POLICIES

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0903 GMT 27 Feb 71 L

[Text] New York Feb 27 TASS--Speaking at the law faculty of the Yale University in New Haven on Friday, National Chairman of the Communist Party of the United States Henry Winston has said that Nixon's policy, aimed at expansion of the war in Cambodia, Laos and other areas of Indo-China, is actually the racialist policy of American imperialism.

Henry Winston has emphasized that the policy of the present-day government of the United States becomes increasingly menacing. Henry Winston said this policy leads to intensification of racism and anticommunism as component parts of the programme, aimed at elimination of the resistance to the governments line.

Current reprisals against civil right fighters are only the beginning of a campaign which was launched with the aim of breaking the resistance of the Negro people. This campaign is now spearheaded against Angela Davis, a symbol of struggle against racism and anticommunism. These reprisals, if they are not duly rebuffed, will tomorrow spread to the whole of the American people, blacks and whites. The struggle in defence of Angela Davis and other political prisoners is, therefore, the matter of honour for all Americans, who cherish freedom and peace.

U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY ISSUES STATEMENT ON ANGELA DAVIS

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0810 GMT 28 Feb 71 L

[Text] New York, Feb 28, TASS--The National Womens Commission of the Communist Party of the USA issued the following statement for International Womens Day:

The vicious frameup persecution of Angela Davis by the Nixon-Agnew-Reagan axis is an attack upon the rights of all who struggle for peace, democratic rights and freedom from capitalist exploitation. In addition, Angela Davis shares the plight of all who would escape the yoke of racist oppression.

201-006887

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INDEX: ULYANOVSKIY FILE: OWARAQRP

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WINSTON, HENRY
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WINSTON, HENRY 201

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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

DATE 5 JUNE 1970
IN 097527
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following Intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 2

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COUNTRY: USSR/AFRICA

DOI: LATE APRIL 1970

SUBJECT: PLANS FOR WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING AND FOR MEETING OF AFRICAN COMMUNISTS

ACQ: NIGERIA, LAGOS (4 JUNE 1970) FIELD NO: ANL-2514

SOURCE: A NIGERIAN MARXIST WHO FORMERLY HELD A RESPONSIBLE POSITION IN THE BANNED SOCIALIST WORKERS AND FARMERS PARTY AND IS STILL ACTIVE IN OTHER PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS. HIS REPORTING ON COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA IS USUALLY RELIABLE AND ACCURATE. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH BASSEY, FATOGUN AND GOODLUCK AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

1. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO HOLDING ANOTHER MEETING OF WORLD-WIDE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES. A PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THIS MAY BE HELD IN BUDAPEST BEFORE

SECRET

THE END OF 1970. AMONG SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING WOULD BE WHETHER OR NOT TO CONVENE A MEETING OF AFRICAN COMMUNIST AND IF SO, WHERE AND WHEN IT SHOULD BE HELD. DURING A MEETING WITH THREE LEADING PRO-COMMUNIST NIGERIANS IN MOSCOW ON 30 APRIL 1970, POSTISLAV A. ULYANOVSKIY, A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CC-CPSU) URGED THEM TO CONSIDER ATTENDING THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE ALL-AFRICA MEETING (FIELD COMMENT: THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED IN TDCSDB-315/02646-70 ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS MEETING BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE CC-CPSU AND NIGERIAN TRADE UNION LEADERS W. O. GOODLUCK AND S. U. BASSEY AND NIGERIAN AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY OFFICIAL DAPO FATOGUN.)

2. THE IDEA OF AN ALL-AFRICA MEETING OF COMMUNISTS WAS INITIATED BY AFRICANS ATTENDING THE MEETINGS OF WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERS IN MOSCOW ON 21 AND 22 APRIL 1970. AMONG THE AFRICAN (SIC) COMMUNISTS ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE

IN 097527

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET

(classification) (dissem controls)

(FNU) WINSTON OF THE UNITED STATES AND DELEGATES FROM SOUTH AFRICA, MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA AND GUINEA-BISSAU.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (ALSO SENT KADUNA LONDON)

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM GP-1

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DELEGATION TO CUBA, CPUSA: (left to right) Ted Bassett, Sid Taylor, Henry Winston, Fern Winston, Ronald Stevenson, Juan Roque.

Blockade of Cuba hits U.S. consumer: Winston

W-201
206887

By TOM FOLEY

NEW YORK, Sept. 5 — American consumers pay more for sugar and steel because the United States does not have normal relations with Cuba, Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party, said today.

Brazil junta gives in

RIO DE JANEIRO, Sept. 5 (UPI) — The Brazilian government bowed today to the demands of a band of "very, very determined" men who kidnapped U.S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick and threatened to execute him.

The Foreign Ministry announced it would free 15 political prisoners as demanded. The announcement came barely an hour and 20 minutes before expiration of an ultimatum that presumably would have meant death for the 61-year-old envoy.

The ambassador was seized by a band of four men on a Rio de Janeiro street Thursday and the kidnappers set a deadline of 48 hours for their demands to be met. They repeated the ultimatum this morning but moved up the deadline for acceptance of their demands 2:50 p.m. (1:50 p.m. EDT) today.

The government announcement came at 12:30 p.m. (11:30 a.m. EDT) after it received a handwritten note from the ambassador to his wife saying that he was alive and well but asking the government to accede to what he called "very, very determined" men.

There had been two original demands—release of the unnamed prisoners and publication of the kidnappers' note, which denounced the government as a "dictatorship." The note was pub[illegible]

The Government has already [illegible]

command, the Foreign Minister and high national authorities.

"This way the responsibility will be completely upon the head of the kidnappers for the safety of Ambassador D. Burke Elbrick," the statement said.

The kidnappers were believed to be members of "MR8," guerrilla group made up mostly of Brazilian university students. The initials stand for Movimiento Revolucionaria and the "8" refers to the date of the death of Ernesto Che Guevara, the Cuban revolutionary killed in Bolivia Oct. 8, 1967.

Swiss protest Westmoreland planned visit

GENEVA — General Westmoreland, U.S. Chief of Staff, will make an official four-day visit to Switzerland beginning Sept. 11.

Westmoreland, formerly commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces in South Vietnam, will familiarize himself with the state of combat readiness of the Swiss armed forces, and will also inspect a number of Swiss military training centers.

"Voix Ouvriere" (Workers Voice), organ of the Swiss Party of Labor, reports that the progressive public in Switzerland has protested against Westmoreland's visit because he bears responsi[illegible]

Daily World 6 Sep 69

The economic blockade of Cuba not only affects that island but hurts the ordinary American by boosting monopoly prices on a number of items, including the steel and nickel that goes into his car and refrigerator, Winston pointed out. Cuba has 50 percent of the world's nickel deposits, he noted.

Winston gave his views to a press conference at Communist Party headquarters here a few days after his return from Cuba. He led a Communist Party delegation that visited every province in Cuba in August.

See editorial Page 7

The blockade of Cuba affects economic and political relations between U.S. and Latin America, he went on.

U.S. consumers hit

"It's not only a matter of sugar, but also steel, in terms of the U.S. Steel monopoly and trust," he said.

"It's not only sugar prices — Cuba is the world's second largest sugar producer — but even the price of lobsters."

Instead of receiving Cuban lobsters U.S. consumers get lobsters from the racist-fascist and apartheid regime of South Africa," Winston said. "This trade between U.S. and South Africa actually upholds a regime which opposes everything decent in the world."

He emphasized that reversal of the policy of the Nixon Administration towards Cuba is the only effective answer to achieving new relationships towards Latin America as a whole.

Scientific exchange affected

He said he was very happy to receive the [illegible] to Cuba by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba.

"There I was able to observe the crimes that U.S. imperialism has inflicted on the country and also the courageous manner in which the Socialist government of Cuba has undertaken to erase the effect of these crimes," he said.

The economic blockade of Cuba not only affects normal trade (sugar, steel, lobsters), but also scientific exchange, for example, Winston pointed out.

Doctors are prevented from going to Cuba, exchanging information, from helping to train technicians and other doctors, and from using textbooks, he added.

Life span rode

"Despite all this, some most inspiring developments in science are taking place in Cuba today," he said. "Despite this lack of scientific exchange, the life span in Cuba has [illegible]. Also in Cuba today there is not a single case of malaria, even though Cuba used to be known as the source of malaria fever. Cuba has combated malaria by using the Salk vaccine variety developed and produced by the Soviet Union.

"Now Cuba's main concern today is the battle for industrialization of the country," Winston said, stressing that the fight to produce 10 million tons of sugar is an important one in Cuba and will help it to meet international commitments and improve the mechanization of agriculture.

"Cuba is showing how a country can develop under socialism," he concluded. "This, in turn, is having a very dramatic effect on the rest of Latin America. This is why normalizing relations with Cuba is a prerequisite for developing normal relations with Latin America."

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authorized the [illegible] of the declaration and will authorize the transfer to a foreign country the 15 persons detained whose names will be indicated," the government said in a public statement.

The decision was taken after a meeting of the high military

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Black GIs anti-war action reported in South Vietnam

HANOI (LNS) — More than 100 black GIs staged an anti-war protest July 30 in the port base of Qui Nhon, in Kinh Hoa province, according to a report by the Liberation Press Agency of South Vietnam.

The report, as transmitted by Prensa Latina, said that the men marched from one end of the base to the other and also marched on the local airport. They reportedly "shouted slogans demanding peace, the end of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam and the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. troops."

At the airport, the black GIs battled with cops who tried to stop the demonstration.

Episcopalians vote $200,000 'reparations'

By RICHARD GREENLEAF

NEW YORK, Sept. 5 — Church leaders in the U.S. are still striving to evade the principles set forth in the Black Manifesto, even though some churches are making payments on the reparations account which the Manifesto holds they owe black Americans.

Such is the situation following this week's action by a convention of the Episcopal Church, which after two days of heated debate in South Bend, Ind., allocated $200,000 to the Black Economic Development Conference, the group which promulgated the Manifesto and has been seeking to collect payments on the $500 million it says the churches owe the Negro people for centuries of oppression.

The resolution adopted by the Episcopalians included a passage rejecting the "ideology" of the Manifesto.

The Rev. George M. Murray, Bishop of Alabama, said in the course of the debate: "I cannot vote for a group whose only record is this manifesto, a violent Marxist document."

But the resolution did recognize the Black Economic Development Conference as a movement for "organizing the self-determination" of the black community.

Evasion charged

The action followed by less than two weeks an address by the Rev. Lucius Walker, Jr., executive director of the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization, in which he charged that many churches and synagogues were seeking to avoid doing anything about the Black Manifesto.

Walker was addressing the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, meeting in Los Angeles. IFCO is the group which financed the meeting in Detroit earlier this year at which the BEDC was founded and the Manifesto formulated.

"After all the churches' rhetoric about love, brotherhood and justice," Walker said, "at many points it is flipping-out when the real proposition is put, acting like a young lady who knows what to do to get a young man's attention, then falling back on her virtue when the question's popped."

He suggested that recourse might be had to the UN or an international court of law.

The 1945 Paris Conference, he argued, established the validity of reparations being given to individuals rather than to nations.

One of the most fervent pleas made at the Episcopalians' meeting was that of the Rev. Junius F. Carter, Negro rector of Holy Cross Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh.

"I am sick of you," he cried. "You don't trust me, you don't trust black priests; and you don't trust black people."

American Petroleum Com-

en democrats and police ing the neo-Nazi election ngs occurred in Saarbrueck- Flensberg, Recklinghausen many other towns. A Civil mittee of Struggle Against Nazism has been formed. mands have been made by organizations that the NDP anned. The West German e Union of Employes is ng the most recent to do so.

es nationalized

NZIBAR — The government decided to nationalize all pri- buses. It will establish a owned transport service ch will include former bus ers who will be paid a fixed ry.

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lean election

NTIAGO — The Communist ty of Chile will run its own didate in next year's presi- tial election. The candidate's ne will be disclosed in Septem-

ge ban on fascists

ERLIN — The Union of Per- s Persecuted Under Nazism again demanded a ban on the fascist National Democratic rty in West Berlin. The West rlin NDP is preparing for a vention scheduled for October. Adolf von Thadden, NDP ehrer, will arrive in September oversee activities and to par- ipate in the rally in October.

The West Berlin city adminis- tion has not arrested NDP mbers who were involved in desecration of a monument to tims of fascist violence.

apid progress

CARACAS — The Communist rty of Venezuela, which was gal less than a year ago, cel- rated on August 8 its National y with meetings throughout country. The central gather- was in Maracay, where the st conference of Communists s held 32 years ago.

On October 1, the weekly Tri- na will become a daily.

hy wait' til tomorrow you can find out today's Daily World

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slovak TV and condemn the anti-socialist 2,000 words manifesto in June, 1968. D[illegible]k failed to do so, and this had a bad influence on the elections then being held for the proposed extraordinary Czechoslovak party congress in September.

[illegible] sidium that a date had been set for a meeting of all Warsaw Pact member states in July, [illegible] in the Polish capital. Cern[illegible] said that if he had known a date had been fixed, he would never have voted in the presidium that Czechoslovakia should refuse the

[illegible] what I have said, really carried out a two-faced policy. They behaved one way when negotiating officially and another way when they should have defended the collectively worked-out policy."

The "2,000 Words" manifesto

Continued on page 5

'Blockade must be ended,' --U.S. Communists in Cuba

W-201

Special to the Daily World

HAVANA, Aug. 28 — Henry Winston, national chairman of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. who is heading an American Communist delegation visiting here, issued the following statement:

U.S. imperialism, before the revolution, accounted for 75 percent of Cuba's imports and 66 and two thirds percent of all her exports.

How to strangle in infancy the greatest event of our time in this hemisphere was the main concern of the U.S. monopolists. They broke off diplomatic and trade relations.

The mass release of revolutionary energy, the unity and creativity established among the people of Cuba, demonstrated what a free people can accomplish.

They found reliable friends in the Soviet Union, other socialist states, and many other countries.

'Blockade will fail'

Socialism in Cuba continues developing.

The anti-Cuba policy of U.S. imperialism now includes the blockade. This policy, too, will fail.

HENRY WINSTON

Our delegation saw with their own eyes how an entire people is geared to the accomplishment of the main task of realizing within one year 10 million tons of sugar.

Simply put, this means the achievement of 20 billion pounds of sugar in 12 months. That kind of production could give more than 6 pounds of sugar to each of the 3 billion humans on this earth.

The enthusiastic fight for this goal grips the people. What this means in terms of Cuba is helping to lay the foundation for the most rapid development of industry and agriculture, which will be based on the latest scientific techniques, mass building of housing, schools; in short, an advance on every front.

The story of Camaguey shows concretely the boldness in the planning of construction and the mass undertaking in cadre-training to be able to manage this undertaking.

Hails Cuba's racial equality

Just imagine a plan which begins with the daily output of 11,000 liters of milk, to be increased to one million per day. And what then? The creation of a milk-processing plant in which all kinds of dairy products will be developed.

Such is the approach in every field.

Of great beauty is that racist practices ended with imperialism and among the many great lessons of this revolution is the equality established between black, white and mulatto.

The cause of Cuba must become the cause not only of Communists but of all democrats, anti-imperialists and radicals.

The story of Cuba must become known to the millions of our land. The economic blockade must go. This barbarity is the essence of U.S. imperialist policy. The people can and must compel the Nixon administration to put an end to this criminality.

Special to the Daily World

HAVANA, Aug. 28 — A U.S. Communist Party delegation, headed by national chairman Henry Winston has returned here from the interior of the country where it witnessed a tremendous mobilization in the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in a year.

The delegates returned last week from Camaguey, one of the main centers of the sugar industry.

Greeted by Cuban leaders

The 10-million-ton goal is the main economic task set by the Cuban Communist Party and the Revolutionary Government for achievement by the year ending July 26, 1970.

Earlier, after their arrival in Havana on Sunday, Aug. 10, the delegation visited other projects in the Isle of Pines and the provinces of Las Villas and Camaguey.

Receiving the U.S. delegation on their arrival were Commander Ramiro Valdes, 37, member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban C.P.; Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee and Commander Jesus Montane,

Continued on page 11

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Delegation of CP visiting Cuba

NEW YORK, Aug. 12 — An official, six-person delegation of the Communist Party, U.S.A., headed by national chairman Henry Winston, is now in Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban Communist Party. It is first such delegation since 1960.

"We are enthusiastic about the delegation and feel great pride in it and the reinforcement of warm, cordial cooperation between the Cuban Communist Party and ours," James Jackson, chairman of the International Department of the Communist Party, told the Daily World.

He recalled that Cuban President Fidel Castro himself had invited Winston to Cuba to recuperate after the eye operation Winston underwent in prison that resulted in loss of his eyesight. Castro offered to exchange 100 "gusanos" ("worms," a term applied to Cubans who turned against their own country in the service of imperialism) for Winston while in prison.

There have long been warm bonds between the Cuban people and the people of the U.S. Jackson said. The opportunity exists for a change in official relations between the United States and Cuba.

COMMUNIST STATEMENT

The Communist Party issued a statement today over the signature of James Jackson, chairman:

"The Communist Party delegation of American Communists headed by Henry Winston our national chairman, was officially elected by the national committee and brings to Cuba the warm, comradely greetings of our party and of the American people, who seek normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between our country and the first country of socialism in the Western hemisphere.

"Comradely relations between our party and the Cuban Communists under the leadership of Fidel Castro will be strengthened by this series of discussions which will contribute to a necessary campaign to end the boycott and reverse the present antagonistic policy of the United States toward Cuba.

"This delegation will have an opportunity to see socialism in process in Cuba and will exchange opinions in the two week period. They will report back to our party and to the American people."

HENRY WINSTON

Viet patriots hit 137 targets

Continued from page 2

tempt to outflank the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and get into position along its western border. The Pathet Lao counterattacked and captured the important air base of Muong Soui.

Fifteen miles south of Muong Soui lie the two secret CIA bases of Sam Thong and Long Thien held by the CIA, an estimated 1,150 U.S. Special Forces troops, and several Thai artillery units. Theoretically, the two bases are under the control of the Royal Lao General Vang Pao. Actually, they are controlled from the Special Forces headquarters in Udorn, Thailand.

•

Long Thien, in the mountains on the western edge of the strategic Plain of Jars, is Special Forces headquarters for Laos, containing the "Green Beret" supply and command center.

General Vang Pao, like the units under Special Forces command, is of Meo nationality.

The charges by Laos Premier Souvanna Phouma that "40,000 North Vietnamese" have invaded Laos in violation of the 1962 agreement on the neutralization of the country, are directly related to the fact that Sam Thong and Long Thien are threatened by Pathet Lao attack. It may be predicted that the closer the Pathet Lao get to the CIA "Green Beret" center, the louder Souvanna Phouma's cries will become.

Souvanna Phouma's charges of violations of Laos "neutrality" come from a man who approved the U.S. bombing of more than 70 percent of his own country over the last several years. The U.S. policy behind this bombing was once stated by an American diplomat in Vientiane: "To make progress in this country, it is necessary to level everything."

Romanian CP congress ends with call for socialist unity

BUCHAREST, Aug. 12 (UPI) — President Nicolae Ceausescu today ended Romania's 10th Communist party congress with a resounding cry for unity among socialist nations and in the world.

"Our unanimity is living proof

party and of socialism," he told the more than 3,000 delegates.

Ceausescu was re-elected to another four years as party secretary-general.

His closing speech brought the hall to its feet chanting "Ceau-

Hallie Donaldson memorial Aug. 24

SEATTLE, Aug. 12 — A memorial for the late Hallie Donaldson, artist, teacher and founder of the Washington Cultural Cooperative, is scheduled for Washington Hall

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BULKY

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DELETIONS, IF ANY:

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TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorized in writing by the same official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 2nd day of March 196

Georg F. Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William Murmann

File WIROGUE

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 30 September 1964

TIME: 1030 - 1400 hours

PLACE: Automobile in the Vicinity
of Kuhwaldstr.

ARTHUR A. LIFALL, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

WIROGUE called at approximately 0945 hours on the Stage I Ops phone and asked for Mr. Murmann. C.O. took the call and was advised that the caller was "Dave" and that he desired to speak to a colleague of Mr. Murmann at the earliest possible time. C.O. made arrangements to meet him in front of the safe house at 51 Kuhwaldstr which WIROGUE occupied during his 1 1/2 year association with HARVARD (this is no longer a HARVARD safe house). C.O. did not tell "Dave" his name over the telephone and indicated that he would be able to recognize "Dave". C.O. picked "Dave" up on the corner of Volta and Kuhwaldstr and drove a couple of blocks to a parking place where the conversation took place.

C.O. learned that WIROGUE was no longer employed by the Boehler Company in Munich. He apparently has had a couple of factory jobs since that job and is currently unemployed. According to "Dave" he is without work, without friends, without money and" only contacted Murmann's old office because he is at the end of his rope". Subject stated that he had tried hard to find suitable employment in Germany, but that there was absolutely nothing available which he could do. It was obvious that WIROGUE wished to renew his association with the AIS and that "intelligence work" was the only kind of employment for which he felt himself really qualified. When C.O. indicated to him that the employment possibilities had not changed since WIROGUE was told there was no possibility of future employment with the Agency, Subject said that the purpose of his telephone call was to advise us of his plans to go to Paris and attempt to contact the French Intelligence Service to which he would offer his services. He wished to find out if we would have any objections to his seeking employment from the French or possibly the British since we are apparently unable to utilize him further. C.O. said that obviously WIROGUE would do what he would do and that while we had no control over his actions it would seem a bit surprising that he would delibertely place himself in the hands of the French authorities where he was known to have a criminal record. WIROGUE implied that he would obviously tell all to the French and indicated that he was not concerned about any actions that they would take against him. He appeared sure in an extremely vague and confused way that the French Intelligence Service could use him.

In the course of the lengthy discussions WIROGUE let it be known that he was not very happy about the treatment he had received from the Americans--that he felt he had been dropped, and it appeared obvious to C.O. that if we had no further work for him he was threating to tell his story to the French authorities--a story which he presumably feels we would not like the French to know about. It should be stressed that at no time was the "blackmail threat" bluntly presented. It was merely that he wished to advise us of his plan to leave for Paris this date with this intention in mind and that he wished to determine if we had any "objections".

C.O. ~~xafxxxd~~ reviewed with WIROGUE the considerable efforts which had been made to assist him in establishing a new life here in the FEDREP-- a new life story, legal documentation, the ~~hopaxin~~ ~~kaak~~ opportunity to look for employment for a period of more than a year while receiving subsistence from us, etc. C.O. told Subject that he obviously had a good mind and was in good health and that--if he was unable to find some type of employment in the thriving West German economy that appealed to him ~~thexx~~ and satisfied him--he would probably be unhappy wherever he goes. C.O. discounted Subject's belief~~s~~ that "intelligence work" was the only thing for which he was suited. C.O. ~~sp~~ expressed the view that he should get his head out of the clouds and his feet on the ground--that he should find a job, however menial, and throw himself into it. At this point WIROGUE said that ~~xx~~ at one time he had told Mr. Murmann of his desire to become a driver or chauffeur but that Mr. Murmann told him he could find much more suitable employment. With a certain amount of disbelief C.O. pursued this topic with him telling WIROGUE that--if he ~~wasx~~ was really serious ~~thatxhe~~ in believing that this kind of employment would be satisfying to him, that it was the first sensible thought he had expressed in the course of the discussions and that C.O. would determine whether it would be possible to assist Subject in obtaining a West German drivers' license (Subject indicated that he had a Congo drivers' license when he arrived in Frankfurt although it was issued in another name). While Subject pretended to have a genuine interest in obtaining such employment-- and used this to refute C.O.'s accusation that he only wanted to start at the top and considered most kinds of honest employment as being beneath him--C.O. is highly skeptical of Subject's motives. WIROGUE was told to call ~~Mrkxxxxthixx~~ Mac (this is the only name which C.O. gave to WIROGUE) on the following day (Thursday, 1 October) and C.O. would ~~xx~~ let him know whether he could help him obtain a West German license. WIROGUE was quick to point out that

#42

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 April 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kaiserstr. and
Taunus Anlage

OKD
ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject who had invited him to meet for lunch. They had a drink together and then went to a Chineese restaurant.

At first C. O. was afraid that Subject was getting ready to ask a favor or present a problem but it turned out that he merely wanted to visit with C.O. whom he considers to be his only friend, at least in Frankfurt. He said that his work with the Munich firm is going very well and is coming along fine. He received his first month's salary and expects to go to Munich on the first part of May for consultations and would then, around 30 May, move to Munich permanently. C. O. told Subject that he would be leaving for the U.S. probably the first week in June and Subject asked if they could have dinner together at least one more time before he left.

Subject said he had signed the contract, details of which he had previously given C.O., but was sorry that he had not brought the contract with him and promised to show it to C.O. the next time they met. Subject thanked C. O. for all the help he had given him to enable him to make a new start and wanted the lunch to be a small token of his appreciation. He also paid C.O. 20 DM which had been loaned him a year and a half earlier and gave C.O. a small French cigarette lighter as a rememberance. C. O. dropped Subject off downtown and suggested they have lunch, perhaps the first or second week in May.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 18 March 1964

TIME: 12 o'clock

PLACE: Schultheis Restaurant

OKD
ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject in response to a telephone call in which Subject invited C. O. to lunch to help him celebrate a new stroke of fortune. WIROGUE told C. O. that the director of the firm in Munich (reported in previous contact reports) and his European sales representative had met with Subject and discussed the possibility of his association with the Munich firm. Subject said the following had been agreed on:

> Subject would receive 1500 DM a month salary, free living quarters in Munich, the cost of maintaining his apartment in Frankfurt, expense account, percentage of the profits realized from any of Subject's inventions patented by the firm, a work shop in Munich plus absolute personal freedom of movement regarding working hours, etc. etc.

C. O. told him that the above was very hard to believe, that he should have this in writing. Subject said that it was to be drawn-up and sent to him for his signature.

C. O., of course, expressed his delight with Subject's perspicacity and perspicuity and ~~least~~ last but not ~~last~~ least boundless gall. C. O. asked if this would mean he would be moving to the Munich area. Subject said that this was doubtful unless he could find a mechanic in the Munich area who would work as cheaply as Nagely with whom he is now associated. He intends to spend most of his time in Munich, however, and will come to Frankfurt once a month to oversee Nagely's work on the production models of his projects. Subject intends to do the research and development work in Munich with Nagely in Frankfurt making the finished model.

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C. O. told Subject that he should not forget he would be required to establish a Zweiter Wohnsitz. Subject said he would look into this as soon as the work shop in Munich was completed and ready for him.

Subject stated that C. O. was his only friend and that he would like to call him again soon and have lunch with him. C. O. told him he would be delighted to meet him whenever he has time. C. O. dropped Subject off downtown after congratulating him once again on his good fortune.

NOTE: C. O. is aware that Subject is basically a lonely man and does enjoy his company. He is also aware that Subject is staying in frequent touch because he feels he is operating in a society to which he really does not belong and associates himself more with things American.

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11 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

On 25 February 1964 the undersigned met with Clarence Schmidt and Art Stimpson of OCA Bonn to apprise them of the status of the WIROGUE case. Since Clarence S. was preparing to depart PCS, C.O.'s discussion was primarily with Art S., Clarence's replacement.

C. O. briefed Art on WIROGUE's background prior to recruitment and his activities while associated with KUBARK. C. O. reviewed HARVARD's attempt to prepare Subject for resettlement and said that we are now in a position to quit claim him and close the case and that we wanted to bring OCA up-to-date on the status of Subject's case and to find out if there are any loose ends from Bonn's point of view or HARVARD's which should be tightened up prior to cutting Subject loose.

C. O. explained that since December 12, 1962 when OCA received a query from the BFV regarding Subject, HARVARD had been trying to reach the point where Subject could be on his own. C. O. explained that we had realized that after the original political recognition interview fiasco had brought Subject to the attention of the BFV, that to enable Subject to emigrate from Germany or to stay here without continuing problems in the future would require preparing a complete life history for Subject with a new political recognition interview story. Both the Lebenslauf and a new interview story were prepared and copies of the old story were removed from the various files and replaced by the new. C. O. said that HARVARD had two questions for Bonn ~~and that~~ (1) at the time of the original BFV interest in Subject had OCA promised Subject would be resettled outside Germany? and (2) would OCA know if the BFV in Cologne had a copy of Subject's political recognition interview story?. Art brought out OCA's file on the case and said to answer the second question first it would appear from the detailed information contained in the BFV query that they

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were indeed in possession of a copy of the story. He went on to state that in answer to question (1) OCA's reply to the BFV was that Subject was of operational interest to AIS and would they please suspend their investigation until Subject is no longer of interest at which time OCA would automatically provide the BFV with the details of Subject's case.

C. O. said that John Wilms of the 513th MI Group at Camp King was reasonably certain that the BFV man in Zirndorf had only sent excerpts of the Sanders political recognition interview story to the BFV in Cologne, since so many cases of interest to the BFV are processed each month that only the bare outlines of a particular case would be sent on from Zirndorf. Art and Al W. said that if the original story had not gone to Cologne then a very detailed summary had gone.

We all agreed that unless Subject got into serious trouble in the future no problems would arise. In any event we could only wait and see what might come up.

OCA appreciated being brought up-to-date on the case and provided HARVARD C. O. with copies of the BFV 's original query and OCA's reply. C. O. promised to send OCA a copy of Subject's original and of his latest political recognition interview story and a copy of the Lebenslauf.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 March 1964

TIME: 1500 hours

PLACE: Oderweg & Glauburgstr.

2

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject as a result of a telephone call requesting C. O.'s assistance. Subject told C. O. that he had gone to the local police revier and had tried to register but that since he had neglected to take along a filled-out Anmeldebestätigung signed by the landlord he had been told to go get the form, fill it out properly and then return. The police had looked at his deregistration slip with the 2 March date indicated and had told him to waste no time since an individual is required to deregister and re-register within a period of 8 days and it was now the 10th of March. Subject said that since his rental contract dates from January 1 and that date is indicated on the registration slip, the police will question why he waited so long to register. C. O. told him that the answer was simple and that he wished Subject would not bother him with such small problems. C. O. told Subject to get an Anmelda form and fill it out and have his landlord sign that he moved into the apartment on 1 March ~~and explain to the landlord that~~ he had been deregistered as of 2 March. Subject said that he had already figured this out but that he wanted an excuse to meet C. O. and talk to him.

He showed C. O. a Munich Konto check for 4,000 DM which he had received for developing a device reported in previous contact reports and went on to say that his business trip to Munich had been reasonably successful. He had discussed the development of several new devices with the director of the Munich firm and was now in the process of working on another device for the firm. He had made arrangements whereby he would receive no payment for the new device but that the firm would use its sales outlet ~~[illegible]~~ to market ~~[illegible]~~ another invention of his for him. The firm had also asked Subject if he would be willing to come to Munich to live and work. Subject has agreed if the offer turns out to be worth his while. C. O. congratulated Subject and told him to continue the good work.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 March 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

14

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 51

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and gave him his new Reiseausweis expiring in 1966 and pointed out there was a restriction against going into business for himself. He was given his Lohnsteurkarten for '62, '63 and '64 plus his Abmeldebestatigung indicating his deregistration from 145 Hohemarkstr to 51 Kuhwaldstr on 2 March 1964. He was told to go to the local Police Revier and register.

Subject was given a copy of his new political recognition interview story and was asked if he had any questions regarding his legend. Subject replied that the story was so long he could not possibly memorize it completely. C. O. told him that the intent was to provide in detail any and all facts which in the future might be of importance to him in the conduct of his affairs.

Subject was asked about his plans for the future. His answer was that the Director of the firm (reported in contact report 17 February 1964) had invited him to come to Munich on 3 March 1964 to discuss, among other things, the possibility of employing Subject in the engineering department. This plus the fact that Subject has signed an agreement with BOHLER & CO. OPTICAL FACTORY, FF/M to act as an engineering consultant might enable him to realize his ambition, i.e. to have a position rather than an ordinary job.

C. O. quitclaimed Subject and wished him luck.

Subject asked that C. O. be sure to let the higher echelon know he appreciates all that has been done for him.

Subject said that although official contact is at an end he hoped that C. O. would not reject an invitation for a friendly get together from time to time. C. O. replied that if business matters permitted he would be glad to meet Subject.

Subject jovially announced that they would probably meet some day in the U.S. C. O. reminded him that any action on his part which would involve the taking of fingerprints could have dire consequence for him. C. O. went on to report what he had told Subject months earlier and that is:

[illegible]

Any attempt to immigrate to the U.S., Canada, Australia, etc. would bring him to the attention of INTERPOL.* On the other hand, he could immigrate to South America but it would be imperative that he first learn Russian if he is to pass himself off as a recent refugee from the Soviet Union. C. O. said he could see no reason to prevent Subject from visiting any country or even entering as a technical representative. C. O. told him that he is soundly, if not perfectly, documented and that we can do no better and that he should never forget that his fingerprints are the weakest links.

C. O. said good-by and parted company. Case closed.

NOTE: Normally **HARVARD** would provide a statement on one of our cover unit stationary letterheads covering the period of time Subject was in our custody and indicating that he was more or less professionally associated with the U.S. Army. Chief/HARVARD and C. O. felt that unless Subject requests such a letter it would be adviseable not to expose him to any more of our M.O. We can be sure that if Subject needs such a letter he will contact HARVARD.

* This of course is not true but does enable us to exercise some control.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 February 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

162

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 51

OKD
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject and paid him DM 800 final subsistence for March. C. O. emphasized that this would be the last time Subject would receive any money and that he must now arrange for a new source of income. Subject laughed and said he had the impression C. O. was anxious to get rid of him and also seemed to have doubts as to his ability to take care of his financial problems. C. O. laughed in turn and said he would indeed be glad to see Subject on his own and added that he had no doubts re: Subject's ability to get money but that he is only hoping Subject would use methods acceptable to society (chuckle).

Since Subject had both English and German versions of his legend, C. O. took the English copy with the explanation that if Subject should submit a Lebenslauf, in connection with a job application, the German version would be more appropriate.

C. O. picked up Subject's Reiseausweis and told him it would be returned to the authorities and a new one would be issued. This would eliminate the need for a renewal until 1966.

C. O. took Subject to lunch and dropped him off in the city after promising to see him on the 2nd of March.

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24 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

1. C. O. and Sam Markowtiz met with John Wilms, Special Liaison Advisor to the 513th MI Group at Camp King, to discuss certain problems connected with the WIROGUE case. C. O. told John that we are going to attempt to make a clean ~~brake~~ break with Subject this coming Friday but there were a few loose ends which had to be cleared up before we could take this final step. C. O. said that in reviewing the new political recognition interview story, we had noted that the new story did not incorporate the name change of Subject's father from Simon Sanders to Frank Simon Sanders. C. O. asked if the new copy would have to be changed or replaced. John made a note of what the change of name should really be and told C. O. ~~we~~ he'd have all the new copies changed to read Frank Simon Sanders. John said that this sort of thing happens from time to time; that it is just a simple error and will raise no eyebrows.

2. C. O. then brought up the point that Subject's Reiseausweis will expire in October 1964 and we and Subject were wondering if ~~Subject~~ would run into any problem when he went to the Polizei Presidum to get a Reiseausweis renewal. John said that there would be no problems that he could see: but to make sure that there is no slip-up, we should pick up Subject's current Reiseausweis and if Sam prepares the necessary Antrag, John will get us a new Reiseausweis within one or two days, dated with a current date. C. O. said he would pick up Subject's Reiseausweis and give it to Sam this week and Sam will prepare the necessary papers for a new Reiseausweis, plus a 1964 Lohnsteurkarte and a deregistration slip. If this works out, our plans to ~~brake~~ break with Subject will be accomplished this coming Friday.

3. C. O. then ~~pointed out~~ brought up the BFV's interest in Subject in late 1962 and mentioned to John we had received a query from Bonn indicating the BFV's interest in Subject, and contained what looked like excerpts from Subject's political recognition

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interview story. C. O. went on to say that we were wondering if a copy of the story might have gone to the BFV in Bonn, and that Wilms had missed one of the old copies when he recalled all copies recently and replaced them with the new story. John said that Camp Zirndorf processes 50 to 100 cases a month, one half of which are interest in one way or another to the BFV. He said that what had gone to Bonn was very likely an excerpt, that the entire story would not have been sent to Bonn. John went on to say that with the new copy in the file, if this excerpt should come to light in the future, a check would merely indicate that someone had made a mistake and the matter would be dropped. John added that he knows we are concerned about this case, but that he sees no reason why there should be any trouble of any kind. He said that the only problem will be if Subject himself comes to the attention of the authorities because of some shenanigans on his part.

Orme K. Daronnat

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 17 February 1964

TIME: 1345 hours

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject in what is now his apartment and which has been completely painted and wallpapered. C. O. gave Subject a copy of his Lebenslauf in German and a copy in English. He was told to read the story thoroughly and then to call C. O. later in the week when he was ready to discuss any points in the story not clear to him or to resolve any questions which he might have. C. O. said he would bring a Soviet realities expert with him who could answer any questions he might have. Subject gave C. O. his copy of the old political recognition interview story plus receipts which indicated he had paid 300 DM "Caution" and a rent receipt for 300 DM for the month of February. He also showed C. O. his rental contract for the 6 month period starting February 1, 1964. Subject gave C. O. a bill for 410 DM, cost of repairing his lower plate. C. O. gave Subject the money and told him to pay the bill and get the receipt stamped paid and return it to C. O. Subject was told that C. O. would pay him for the month of March, deregister him probably the latter part of the week, and give him the deregistration slip. He was also told C. O. would deliver his new political recognition interview story to him probably this week. Subject was not too pleased to hear that he would be deregistered because his Reiseausweis expires in October 1964 and Subject feels that it might not be renewed unless he is under the protection of the U.S. Army. C. O. said he feels there is no reason to worry unless Subject is not working and, thereby proving that he is not an industrious law-abiding citizen. Subject said that he has been trying to sell his inventions and told C. O. the following story:

Subject, in his wanderings about the city, had by accident met the Frankfurt representative of a Munich firm which manufactures a device called the "Starlettograph" which is used in the printing industry. Subject told the sales representative how his product could be improved and, as a

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result of their discussions, WIROGUE met the director of the firm. The director became interested in an advertising device which Subject has developed and asked him to prepare a good working model in time for the Hanover Fair in April. The director also asked Subject, if the company supplied him with one of their devices, would he be able to incorporate his ideas for improving the machine in time for the Hanover Fair. Subject claims that he told the director he would modify the machine by the end of March and if the device works properly he would expect payment of 20,000 DM. According to Subject, before the director returned to Munich he promised to send a device to Frankfurt immediately upon arrival. The name and address of the firm is:

Film-Klischee GMBH
München 22
Thierschstrasse 15

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 30 January 1964

162

TIME: 1000 hours

PLACE: AMCONGEN

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. and Subject met at the American Consulate since Subject's apartment (DRC's former safe apartment) is being painted. Subject told C. O. he had been staying at the Balmoral Hotel and would move back into the apartment on Friday evening, 31 January 1964. C. O. and Subject went to the apartment which is indeed being painted and ~~is being~~ repapered.

C. O. paid Subject DM 1,000, DM 800 of which is for subsistence and rent for February and the remaining DM 200 to be applied to the one month's rent in advance required by the landlord.

C. O. told Subject that all copies but one of his original political recognition interview story had been recalled and the German language version of his Lebenslauf was now being used to provide the basis for a new story. C. O. told Subject that as soon as the new story was prepared, copies placed in the various files and the one remaining copy of the old story removed from its file, Subject would be, for all practical purposes, his own boss.

C. O. told him that we have decided to help him get a new start by (1) paying the cost of having his dentures repaired, (2) by paying DM 200 on the DM 300 one month's rent in advance Subject must pay, (3) by providing DM 800 per month for subsistence and housing until he can be legally on his own, (4) by giving him at least one month's notice prior to termination and (5) by making him a present of all the household items now in the apartment including the iron, the vacuum cleaner, and the radio. Subject's rather perfunctory thank you was somewhat less than what C. O. had expected and when C. O. expressed surprise at Subject's lack of enthusiasm, Subject stated that he was most appreciative but was not very demonstrative.

SEC

[illegible]

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Subject said he had returned to Doctor Filner who said he could not work on Subject's dentures until approval was granted. Subject asked if we knew Doctor Feilner's estimate had been DM 750. C. O. said we knew and that he should go to the dentist who had given him the DM 400 estimate.

C. O. told Subject to obtain receipts for the one month's rental payment and for the February rental payment. He was also to call C. O. the week of February 2nd to arrange a meeting so that C. O. can pick up the receipts and Subject's copy of his old political recognition interview story.

SECRET

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

* USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE Chief, DRC	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE		COORDINATION
2			FILE
			INFORMATION
3			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
4			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE

REMARKS

I am in agreement with DARONNAT's attached suggestion. I feel we will be getting off cheap in paying:

A. For the dental work.

B. Household furnishings per attached list

C. 1-2 months subsistence.

Do you concur?

~~[illegible]~~

Concur

GE

FROM NAME OR TITLE Chief, Resettlement	DATE 27 Jan 64
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	TELEPHONE

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 895, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used. AGL (1) 10-50-650-07910

SECRET

27 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, HARVARD
FROM : ORME K. DARONNAT
SUBJECT : WIROGUE

Don, I suggest that we reduce the quantity of some of the items listed on the attached and make WIROGUE a present of the remainder as part of his resettlement.

I have been emphasizing to Subject over the past weeks that President Johnson's economy drive has affected all agencies and departments. Subject, therefore, has been conditioned not to expect money for BKZ or for furniture or a termination sum. Any or all of these would normally be provided in a case of this kind.

I feel that if we pay to have his lower denture repaired, approximate cost DM 400, make Subject a present of the household items listed, and continue to pay him subsistence for a month or two after we notify him he is on his own, we will, I believe, get rid of him as cheaply as possible and without serious complaints.

Orme

SECRET

[illegible]

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 January 1964

TIME: 1200 hours

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

1K2

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and paid him subsistence for the week ending 31 January 1964. He was told that we have received permission to increase his subsistence from DM 600 to DM 800 per month until his final resettlement. The extra DM 200 is to be applied to his rent. C. O. said that Subject would be paid DM 1000 on 31 January - DM 200 to be applied to one month's rent in advance, and the DM 800 to be rent (DM 200) and subsistence (DM600) for February.

C. O. said we were disappointed that he had decided to stay in his present apartment and take over the DM 300 rent. We had hoped he would be sensible enough to use this opportunity to save a little money. Subject's answer was that he feels that he should be able to afford the rent when he is turned loose and that if he can't afford that much rent he might as well be dead. Subject said he could not understand why C. O. was harping on the subject, that all he was asking for was one month's advance notice prior to being turned loose on his own. C. O. said he was willing to drop the matter as long as Subject did not come crying the blues to us later about needing money. Subject said that if things got really bad he would get a job. C. O. applauded and offered his congratulations but said he assumed this would only be a desperation measure. Subject did not like the joke.

WIROGUE proudly announced that he has made intensive efforts the last few weeks to sell 4 of his inventions. C. O., somewhat exasperated, told him he would never understand how such an obviously clever man could, for so many years, refuse to face up to his responsibilities to himself and society and live in a dream world of get rich quick schemes. Subject put on what is now a familiar act in which he acts terribly hurt because C. O. (his one true friend) does not have faith in him. C. O. told Subject that he is a great actor and added that he (C. O.) would think much more highly of him if he would think

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about going to work like any normal person and fiddle with his inventions at night. C. O. reminded him that if he had not been able to come up with a successful invention after 1 1/2 years of our patronage he should get his head out of the clouds and join the rest of us. By this time Subject was beginning to sulk so C. O. took him out to lunch. Later while taking a stroll, Subject stated that if the cold weather continued he was going to return to the Congo. C. O. hustled him into Woolworths and bought him some long underwear.

Subject asked if C. O. had been able to get permission to have his lower plate repaired. C. O. told him he was to go to Dr. FEILNER between 1130 - 1230 Wednesday the 23rd of January for an examination. FEILNER would supply us with an estimate. C. O. would then get a decision on whether or not we could help Subject with this problem.

C. O. dropped Subject off downtown.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 January 1964

TIME: 1115 hours

PLACE: Kuwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by and informed Subject we will not be moving him into any more of our housing, that housing suitable for him is occupied and would not be available for some time. C. O. told Subject that he will give him 800 DM a month instead of the usual 600 DM. He is to take care of housing himself. He was advised to get economy housing and try to save money since the President's economy drive was affecting our budget and C. O. could not promise what kind of help, if any, could be given Subject when he finally leaves our custody. Many months ago C. O. had told Subject that upon his final termination we would see what help could be given him towards apartment rental, dishes, furniture, etc. C. O. felt that it would be a good idea to tell Subject that he should not expect a great deal of help when he leaves us, that he might receive very little, if any.

The Kuwaldstr. [illegible] is [illegible] DM 300 [illegible] is a [illegible] for [illegible] "screaming" [illegible]

[illegible]

C. O. tried to discourage Subject from taking over the Kuwaldstr apartment, but Subject said he is working on an invention for the owner of the apartment and would try to swing some sort of deal. Subject asked if he could expect to receive some help if he had to pay rent in advance when he gets his new quarters. C. O. told him we would pay the first month's rent in advance but would require the receipt from Subject.

Subject said he would call C. O. as soon as he has made arrangements for living quarters for himself.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 January 1964

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by to see Subject and pay him two weeks subsistence. Subject asked C. O. what he intended to do regarding housing for him since the maids had told him the apartment would be given up 31 January. C. O. said he was aware that the apartment was to be given up and had hoped to get a month or two extension. C. O. went on to say that he felt that it could not be done and that he would talk to his housing people and would contact Subject early the following week.

C. O. told Subject that his Lebenslauf had been completed and was being translated into German. C. O. feels that the final step towards Subject's permanent resettlement can be taken within the next two months.

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Draft

7 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE
1100 hours

On this date Grady Elms, John Spiegler, Don McLaughlin, Bill Murray and John Wilms (Camp King) met to discuss the WIROGUE case. It was explained to Wilms that we have prepared a Lebenslauf for Subject and we are ready to take the next steps necessary for Subject's resettlement and that we wished to establish if, as Wilms told us some months ago, it would be possible to prepare a new political recognition interview story and replace the old copies with the new story. Wilms said it ~~was~~ would be necessary to recover ~~four~~ seven copies of the old story, ~~Camp King copy, the Criminal Police copy, Nuernberg copy and the copy in the hands of the BFV~~, but he felt that this could be done. It was decided that months ago when the BND became interested in this case that copies had probably not been made of the story, only extracts to include Subject's name, his birth date, probably the names of his parents and an extract of the reference ~~of~~ to Subject's activities with ~~the~~ a Georgian Resistence Group. It was decided, therefore, that this same information should definitely appear in the new Lebenslauf. This was to be taken care of by having Subject's father's name be Frank Simon Sanders (since Subject's name is Georg Frank Sanders and on the original story Subject's father's name is given as Simon Sanders the new story will indicate that Subject's father's full name is Frank Simon Sanders which will explain Subject's middle name as Frank). In the paragraph refering to Subject's detention by the militia ~~to~~ it was decided to make some reference to Subject's alleged activities in a resistence group. It is felt that if Subject's new story ever comes to light in the future, what was once reported as Subject's activity in a resistence group will be ~~taken~~ found to have been misread and ~~will only be~~ was only alleged activity in a Georgian resistence group. We all realize that if a [illegible] copy has been made of the old story there is nothing we can do about it anyway.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 13 December 1963

TIME: 1030 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in and paid Subject two weeks subsistence and after a short chat took him to lunch. C. O. and Subject spent several hours window shopping and just generally buming around. Subject's moral was greatly improved as a result and C. O. feels the time was well spent.

Subject said that he has been worried; that he knows he will be turned loose on his own soon and asked C. O., if possible, to let him have sufficient notice so he can make plans. C. O. told him that he would try to give him at least one month's notice.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 29 November 1963

TIME: 1030 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped by, paid Subject two weeks subsistence and thanked him for his note of sympathy regarding the death of President Kennedy.

Subject was told that his background story is complete and that we hoped we would soon be in a position to take positive steps toward his resettlement. Subject went into a long-winded explanation of why he thought it was wrong for a man to pay all his life for a crime when technically he had paid by serving his prison term. C. O. told him that unfair or not Subject's misdeeds have placed certain restrictions on his activities and nothing could be done to change that. He was reminded that with a new identity he will be in a position to establish himself and be a contributing member of society. Subject's answer was to the effect that he was not too happy to be contributing in Germany.

C. O. knows that the above is Subject's way of letting C. O. know he would like to be clean as a whistle, be able to use his true name and go back to France.

C. O. told him that all things considered he could be a lot worse off and should think about building his future.

Subject then stated that he would repay all the money we had spent on him. C. O. told him that we did not want the money repayed that he would only foul-up our books. He was told that the best way for him to repay the debt would be to work hard and lead a decent life.

C. O. left after promising to have lunch with Subject soon.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 November 1963

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

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Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject, paid him two weeks subsistence and provided cigaretts and coffee. He was told that unfortunately we have not finished his legend and it will be a few more weeks until we can try to replace the old story with the new. Subject said that he hoped that he can get started soon because he is getting nervous just hanging around and not being gainfully employed. He reminded C. O. that C. O. had supposedly promised him BKZ and help on new furniture when he finally moved out on his own. C. O. reminded him that C. O. had not promised him anything at all but had said he, the C. O., would find out if any help could be given Subject in this area.

Subject backed down and then stated that his wish had been to go to South America and that C. O. had promised him this would be arranged. C. O. told him that our intention had been to arrange this for Subject but that it is impossible to accomplish and the matter would have to be dropped. Subject was told, as he has been told several times, that if he desires to go to South America he will have to arrange it on his own and after he has built up some work experience here in the F.R.

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[illegible]

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

124

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 1 November 1963

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr Apartment

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in to see Subject, gave him cigaretts and 300 marks subsistence for the next two weeks. He was told that his legend is just about completed, that it is now being proof read and that our next step would be to have it accepted by the German authorities. When this has been accomplished all obstacles to his final resettlement will have been removed.

Subject said that he had been thinking a great deal lately about being turned loose on his own in the near future. He said that he hopes to have his latest invention perfected to the point where he will be receiving a substantial income at the time he leaves us. C. O. told him that it seemed liked he still is trying everything he can to keep from going to work, that he still is placing too much emphazis on "get rich quick" schemes. Subject denied that this was the case but C. O. does not believe him.

C. O. wished him luck in his plans but advised him that when it was time for him to be on his own he would not be given a long transition period. Subject said that up to now he has been working for the work shop owner without receiving pay of any kind but that sooner or later he would be receiving a check and asked what he should do when this happened. C. O. told him that he could see no problem in that if he cannot be paid in cash there is no reason why he couldn't take a check in the name of Sanders and cash it since he is registered at Camp King. Subject said that it might be in a kind of a check that is paid directly to ones bank account. C. O. told him that the answer to that was simple, that he should say that he has no bank account.

C. O. doesn't know what Subject was trying to get at but is sure that he has something in mind. He then asked C. O. to find out what the rent would be on the Kuhwaldstr apartment,

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 4 October 1963

TIME: 1015 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. dropped in and paid Subject two weeks subsistence and found him in high spirits. He has almost completed another invention which appears to be some type of advertising device which projects a pre-determined message on a screen. C. O. told Subject that he was in a hurry but would be glad to come by at a later date to see a demonstration of the device.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 20 September 1963

TIME: 1130 hours

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C. O. met Subject and paid him two weeks subsistence. Subject was in extremely good spirits and seemed quite pleased to see C. O. He stated that things are going better and better for him that the mechaniker with whom he is working had given him a new electric razor for having solved a difficult mechanical problem which had plagued the shop for some weeks. Subject said that he has managed to complete two of his inventions and, another device which he had been working on for the mechaniker had been completed and worked so well it had been sent to a display in France. Subject said that he is making more and more contacts among the technical people here in Frankfurt and that his worry now is that he might be offered a good job and won't be able to accept it since he will require a Lohnsteurkarte and a Versicherungskarte. He then asked C.O.'s advice as to what could be done regarding this problem. C. O. said that he is hoping to have an acceptable Labenslauf completed in the near future and as soon as that story is substituted for the old he will receive the necessary documents. At that point he will be free to do anything he wishes as far as work and housing is concerned.

NOTE: C. O. has the necessary tax and insurance cards in his possession but will not give them to Subject until his Lebenslauf and legal position in Germany is satisfactory. If C. O. gives Subject the documents now he would probably go to work and besides earning money would accept our subsistence without notifying C.O. Subject said he wanted C. O. to understand that he was not complaining, that he was indeed most grateful for the ~~training~~ support he has received over the past months, but he is just as eager as we are to be on his own making his way in life. C. O. said he understood and appreciated this fact and hoped that everything would be in order within the next couple of months.

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3 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Stage I

FROM : Chief, Resettlement Branch

SUBJECT : LEGEND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR WIROGUE'S RESETTLEMENT

1. Since May 1962 HARVARD has been attempting to work out a sound resettlement for WIROGUE. Headquarters had authorized HARVARD to assist Subject in his desire to immigrate to South America. As the first step in this program, Subject was interviewed at Camp King and a story adequate to insure West German political recognition was presented to the German interviewer. Certain details of this story aroused the interest of the German government and it was necessary for steps to be taken to kill this unwanted interest. This development would not in itself have been too much of a problem, but in subsequent investigation of the procedure to be followed for immigration to South America, HARVARD learned that applicants are screened very thoroughly, given aptitude tests, etc. etc. This screening is performed by ICEM who is charged by the South American countries with the responsibility for insuring that any immigrant is thoroughly desirable. It became obvious to HARVARD that Subject would require a legend sufficient to withstand detailed interviews and sufficient to qualify him in some profession on the basis of his actual ability - - the existing political recognition story does not provide this.

2. In discussions with Wilms and Wagner of the 513th, it was decided that a detailed life story should be prepared by CABEZONE and on the basis of this story a new political

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recognition interview should be written which would replace those copies of the old interview now in the various files. A reasonably complete legend previously prepared by Alex Lembersky is attached and with additional information can be used almost as is. Since this life story will be notional, it will have to be written up in sufficient detail and plausible enough to provide Subject with the information needed for the filling out of various future job applications, to stand-up under detailed interviews to which he may in the future be subjected and, if immigration ever takes place, to satisfy those requirements. HARVARD feels that this can only properly be prepared by a native born Russian. HARVARD, therefore, requests Chief, Stage I to assign a Stage I interrogator knowledgeable on the Soviet Union to prepare a life story to include a detailed escape from Georgia to Turkey.

3. We realize that this request could involve considerable work but due to the peculiar problems inherent in the WIROGUE case, it is vital that we prepare Subject for a new life as a completely different person. Only by doing the job properly now will we be able to place ourselves in a position to satisfactorily sever subject's dependence upon KUBARK and reduce to a minimum the need for future contacts.

G. Donald McLaughlin

Attachment:
  Legend

cc: Chief, DRC

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 23 August 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistence. Subject was very excited due to his success in applying for a patent, for a new type soup dish. Case Officer took great pains to praise Subject highly because he is aware that this has been a tremendous psychological boost for WIROGUE who was beginning to doubt his ability.

Subject for a long time has been attempting to get a patent but could not come by the necessary funds, approximately 200 DM. Case Officer asked him how he was able to swing this and was told the following story, some of which Case Officer already knew:

> During the months that Subject has been in HARVARD's hands, he has kept himself busy by inventing various gadgets and devices. Some months ago he made contact with a mechaniker, Alfred Naegele, who has a work shop on 25 Glauburgstr. Subject has had this individual make certain small parts which Subject was not able to make, due to a lack of tools. Over the past months, Subject has won the confidence of Naegele and has been exchanging his labor for permission to use the work shop facilities. Subject has also solved job problems for the work shop owner who has now begun to take on specialized jobs only because he has Subject's talent and ability available to him. Subject continues to help Herr Naegele gratuitously since he feels that in time he will make the contacts which will be of help to him when he is finally on his own. Subject told Case Officer that one of Naegele's contacts had prepared the technical description and application for Subject's soup dish invention without cost to Subject. Subject will pay off the cost by helping Herr Naegele. Subject feels he can use this same procedure to patent other ideas which he has.

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Case Officer noticed that on the patent application, Subject was listed as an engineer living at Kuhwaldstr 51. When Case Officer questioned him regarding the use of this Kuhwaldstr address Subject said that he felt it was necessary for the following reasons:

1. While riding with Naegele to the Taunus one day and passing Camp King, Herr Naegele had remarked that the Camp was the place where Americans trained commandos and others for work of a secret nature.

2. Since Case Officer had told Subject many months ago that we intended to give up the Kuhwaldstr apartment and he Subject wanted to do everything he could to make arrangements to establish himself on his own he had decided it would be best to use the Kuhwaldstr address because he would be receiving mail and did not want to inconvenience Case Officer by having him be a delivery boy.

3. Subject felt that the use of this address would not break security since he would not use that address for any official reason, e.g., police matters, etc., etc.

Case Officer still reamed Subject out thoroughly and told him that even though our attempts to maintain maximum security were probably 50% successful we should at least try. Case Officer finally realized he was fighting a losing battle and would succeed in antagonizing Subject and if nothing else make more difficulties for himself and told Subject they might as well drop the subject. Subject kept insisting that he would do nothing to jeopardize what Case Officer's organization was trying to do for him and assured Case Officer he thinks out very carefully what the results of any particular course of action might be.

Case Officer told Subject that he is trying to complete his legend and once everything is in order with the German government Subject would be in a position to establish himself. Case Officer told him that it is obvious his hopes for immigration to South America should be shelved for a good long time, that it would appear obvious Subject should establish himself here in Germany building up a work background and then if he so desired, immigrate. This would be without our help.

Case Officer said that his legend should be sufficient to satisfy any further inquiries he might run into. Subject asked what Case Officer's plans were for going to work and finding a place to live and asked what Case Officer's help would consist of. Case Officer told him that he would find his own employment and that since he would not know whether Subject should or would want to commit himself to a long term lease on an apartment, that Case Officer would probably recommend that Subject be given a couple of thousands of marks as a resettlement sum. This could be used by Subject at any time and in any way he sees fit but would eliminate the need for him to return to Case Officer for help towards an apartment, etc. Case Officer said his goal was to legalize Subject's case so that there would be no need for him in the future to come to us for help.

Subject asked just how good the legalization would be, would he be able to go to other countries and if not, then the exercise is a waste of time. Case Officer feels that the reason for Subject's question is that he would probably attempt to immigrate to the U.S. sometime in the future. Also he claimed that he brought up the question only to find out if he could go to other countries on a visitors visa if he makes contact with a firm that would require him to do so in the course of his duties. Case Officer told him that he would investigate these problems in due course but felt that Subject could probably get visitors or tourist permits to all the countries without any difficulty but if he applied for immigration to some country whose investigations require fingerprints and a check of Interpol, Subject would then be in trouble up to his ears (HARVARD has ascertained that Subject is not on file with Interpol but has not told Subject this since we may want to use the threat of being listed with Interpol as a future control.)

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REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 August 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Kubwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject was not in the best of spirits. He said he has lots of ideas but no one will talk to him unless he has a patent and since patents cost money he is becoming more and more frustrated.

Case Officer suggested that he try to locate individuals who put up capital for development and patent expenses for a percentage of the future earnings. Subject said he has been investigating this possibility but so far has had no success.

Case Officer told him to try to be patient that Case Officer hopes to have his legend finished in the near future and take steps for his complete legalization in West Germany.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROUGE

DATE: 26 July 1963

TIME: 1030

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. DARONNAT
, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

1. Case Officer dropped in to see Subject, gave him coffee, cigaretts, etc., and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject said that he had run into difficulty with his invention and has been busy redesigning certain parts. Some time ago Subject made contact with a man who has a work shop and does specialized developmental work for various factories in the area. Subject has from time-to-time had certain parts made in this work shop. Subject says that he no longer can afford to pay the price this man asks and has made a deal with him whereby he helps the man out in his work shop and receives the time as credit toward any job Subject wants done. Subject told Case Officer that if he needed to contact him at any time and did not find him at home he could be reached at 558925 by calling and asking for Mr. Sanders.

2. Case Officer told Subject that his Legend is coming along pretty well and Case Officer feels that with a little luck we will be able to take definite steps toward his more or less permanent resettlement. Case Officer promised to spend more time with Subject when they meet again two weeks from today.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 12 July 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr

Orme K. Daronnat
Orme K. DARONNAT
, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject; paid him SUBSISTANCE ~~some assistance~~ for the next two weeks and gave him cigaretts, coffee, booze, etc. Subject is still working dilligently on his invention (Electric Dictionary) which is making slow, but as he says, steady progress. He says it could go much faster but he is limited by a lack of money and therefore must be content with doing a little at a time. Case Officer asked him if he had heard from Braun. Subject answered no but was not surprised since the Chief of RESEARCH ~~Resettlment~~ and Development told him it could be several weeks before they contacted him. Case Officer said that he hoped that he could COMPLETE A WORKING MODEL of his invention because very likely no firm would really become interested unless he had a good working instrument to demonstrate. Case Officer told Subject that we had worked out a pretty good legend for him but there were a few necessary details to be added. Subject asked for an estimate as to how long his status quo would remain as is, because he would hate to be thrown out on the street without a chance to prepare for it. Case Officer told him that he had nothing to fear in this respect until his ~~that [illegible] the~~ story was ready and Camp King take ~~do~~ the necessary action Case Officer would then inform Headquarters that his recommendation is to resettle Subject on the local economy with a reasonable amount of BKZ and help toward the purchase of furniture. Subject asked if this entire processing would take six months. Case Officer said it was possible that in any event Subject would be given adequate time to establish himself; i.e. finding a job, etc. Case Officer promised to see him definitely within two weeks.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 June 63

TIME: 1145

PLACE: Kuhwaldstrasse

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

C.O. dropped into see Subject and paid him subsistence for the next two weeks.

Subject informed C.O. he had gone to the electrical firm BRAUN and had asked to see the Director of Research and Development. Surprisingly enough he was granted an audience with the "Great Man" and was allowed to explain his invention (electric dictionary). The Director was interested and told Subject he would discuss the idea with his engineering panel. If they were interested Subject would be contacted. C.O. said that he should negotiate for a job that resettling him in Germany would appear to be his best bet since he has more going for him here than he would in South America.

C.O. said he was working on his story (legend) and would recommend to Headquarters that Subject resettle in Germany with help toward BKZ and furniture.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 June 1963

TIME: 1300

PLACE: Kuhwaldstrasse

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS: C.O. met Subject and took him to lunch. He was told that C. O. was convinced that Subject should forget about emigrating to South America for the present and should concentrate on settling here in Germany. Co. O. pointed out that he spoke German and could probably get a good job here but that if he went to S. A. he had few real prospects and the fact that if he did not speak Russian he would be suspect in the eyes of the russian emigrees there.

C. O. told him that it was his opinion we should prepare a good story to replace the one he has now but to make sure that it would not require that he know a great deal of Russian so that if he should go to S. A. at a later date he would not have to study too long. C. O. said he would still notify Hqs. and see if they are willing to subsidize 6 mos. intensive Russian language training. If not we would concentrate on getting him established here and then at a later date discuss S. A. emigration. C. O. said he would also recommend that Subject be helped toward furniture and BKZ if he remains in Germany.

[redacted] [redacted]

WIROGUE

7 June 1963

1200 hours

Kuhwaldstr.

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him in an exceptionally good mood.

He remarked that he was bgginning to feel like a charity case and asked how long he would be on our hands. CO told him that there were three possibilities:

1. Subject could stay right here in Germany, find himself a job and CO would find out what help Headquarters would provide in the way of help toward an apartment and furniture.
2. Subject would have to study Russian for six months, since it is impossible for anyone to have been raised and worked in the Soviet Union without knowing some Russian. At the end of that time he would try to process him for S.A. (Subject was not told this but it is obvious that if he does not know Russian, once he gets to S.A., the first Russian he comes in contact with will realize he is not a bona fide refugee which would lead to trouble for Subject.)
3. There is a possibility he could be gotten to Chile. (John Wilms has suggested that through his contacts he might be able to get Subject to Chile, since the Chilean Ambassador owes him a favor.)

CO told Subject to think about the three possibilities and make and give CO his thoughts on the problem the next time they meet.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat

[redacted] [redacted]

28 May 1963

WIROGUE

Alex Lembersky and Bill Murray discussed the legend possibilities for WIROGUE -- It was established that since Subject speaks no Russian it is impossible to build a legend due to the fact that the simplest Arbeiter in the Soviet Union can speak some Russian.

It was decided that:

1. Rogue should be given an intensive course of Russian language instruction;
2. He be sent to Chile through John Wilm's connections, or;
3. He be told that nothing can be done for him and he be resettled on the local economy.

Orme K. Daronnat

WIROGUE

Tuesday 21 May 1963

C.O. explained to John Wagner (Camp King) that Subjects' story, on the basis of which pol. recog. was granted, was so ridiculous that no decent legend could be built around it. A good life story will be an absolute necessity if Subj. is to immigrate through ICEM & South America.

John W. suggested that the story be rewritten to satisfy our purposes. The story would then be prepared at Camp King for Rudy's signatures. The old story would then be removed from the KRIPO's and ZIRNDORF'S files and replaced by the new story.

C.O. suggested that the BFV might also have a copy. John said they would get it.

[redacted] WIPOGUE: in the [illegible] in Paris

Cop and AFRF have been informed that [illegible] is processed through them for immigration [illegible] should be a flap. Both Cop and AFRF [illegible] had any knowledge that this case [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 11/ 10 May 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Duronnat

Orme K. Duronnat , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him busy as usual working on his inventions. He was told that we are making slow but sure progress toward his eventual immigration. Subject said that he had been to the Zentralstelle fur Arbeitsvermittlung and had picked up some information re immfgration to South America. (CO took a look at the material and saw that it tended to verify the info that Jack R. had given us re immigration and work opportunities).

CO will see Subject again on Friday the 17th.

Thurs. 16

C.O. dropped by to tell Subj. he would not see him until 23 May.

Thurs. 23

C.O. took Subj. to Wiesbaden for his morale. After lunch and a walk in the park Subj. was returned to his apt.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 18 April '63

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO took Subject to lunch and found him to be in a reasonably good mood. CO told him that we were making slow but sure progress in solving the problems regarding his immigration. Subject said he would be patient but hopes that something will happen soon.

Memo for the [redacted] 9 April '63

Bill Murray [redacted] e him the backgr[redacted]
information on [redacted] point up the need for CARAVEL's
help. Chris said [redacted] out as much as possible the workings
of INTERPOL beside [redacted] check out the two names against
the Interpol files in [redacted]

9 April '63 - [redacted]

Chris called to [redacted] ard that Interpol Hdqtrs in Paris sends out a wanted list to every country in the world. This list includes the names of 1. Those to be arrested. 2. Those whose address is desired. 3. Those to be checked on periodically by the local authorities. Aperson appearing on the list stays on indefinitely. The list is follwed by fingerprints and a data card.

1630

Chris called to inform us that CARAVEL had called to inform him that Subject was not listed under the two names we had given him and since he was not in the German Interpol files was not in the Interpol files of any other country with the possible exception of Hdqtrs in Paris. CAREVEL will be going to Paris in the near future and can check the files since he has free access!

16 April '63

Bill M. asked Chris B. to have Dean W. to make sure that CARAVEL checks out WIROGUE'S names with INTERPOL in Paris when he goes there in the next few weeks.

9 May '63

Dean W. called to inform us that WIROGUE is not listed in the main INTERPOL files in Paris.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 April 1963

TIME: 1200

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Darcenat

Orme K. Darcenat , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO met Subject and found him to be in a blue funk. Subject said that he was somewhat less than pleased with his German documentation that as long as he stayed Germany and was under the protection of the German Government he had nothing to worry about. He feels that as long as the US Forces are here he has no problems but that as soon as we leave Germany will probably take a long look at the number of refugees here and take steps to encourage certain types to depart. Subject said that he could end up in all kinds of trouble. CO told him that in the first place the US Forces would be in Germany for a long time at least during his lifetime. In the second place Subject would be long gone before the Government changed it's attitude toward refugees.

Subject then said he was worried that when he got to S.A. the Columbian Government would probably check with the Soviet Gov't to find out if he was indeed an ex Soviet citizen. This would result in his being put in prison for entering the country under false pretenses. CO said there was no reason for the Columbian Government to check with the Sovs. Subject would arrive a bone fido immigrant fully checked out by the organization responsible ~~for~~ to the Columbian Govt. CO pointed out that the Columbian Govt would be crazy to alert the Sovs that one of their ex citizens was there with the possibility of having him recruited to work for the Sovs. Subject was still dubious but stated that he would go anyway since that is what we wanted. CO pointed out that he had requestd help in going to SA and that we had found it necessary to get him a Reiseausweis to accomplish this. He was told that it is too late now for him to have misgivings that what is done is done and he would have to accept it.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: Airogue

DATE: 29 March 1963

TIME: 1200

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS: CO met with Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. Subject asked about the status of his immigration processing and was told that it was not coming along as well as CO would like but there was nothing to done about it.

Subject is in no hurry to be out on his own seems to be enjoying his stay with us. CO is worried that Subject might be difficult to get rid of when the time comes to make his move.

CO promised to drop by sometime during the following week.

March 13th, 1963

A discussion held in Bad Godesberg on March 12th, 1963, between Mr. H. Heegard, Chief of ICEM Mission in Germany and Mr. J. Riley of AFRF revealed the following procedure taken by ICEM on refugee applicants for migration to South America under the ICEM Special Program:

1. Applicant, if a refugee, must be recognized under UN High Commissioner's Mandate as a bona fide political refugee. (Note: All refugees holding a Reiseausweis automatically fall under the Mandate.)

2. A detailed curriculum vitae of the applicant must be sent by AFRF to Mr. Heegard. ICEM emphasizes that all time be accounted for since "gaps" are not accepted.

3. Applicant must supply documentary proof of profession or skill. In lieu of such documents, a letter of testimony from a current employer describing job skills and qualifications of applicant will be considered.

4. ICEM will arrange to interview the applicant and to give tests to determine applicant's qualifications. ICEM will not accept tests which are made by other sources. The interview and test can be given in FF/M.

5. ICEM conducts its own security clearance on each applicant whether USEP or non-USEP case.

6. If applicant is found acceptable by ICEM, a work contract must be signed by the applicant prior to departure from Germany. ICEM has a placement service which arranges the job placement and obtains the work contract. This is a standard ICEM procedure. ICEM will not sponsor the applicant who does not sign a work contract.

7. The total procedure requires at least three months from the date the applicant's curriculum vitae is received by ICEM, Bad Godesberg.

8. ICEM does not accept payment of passage by applicants nor is there an ICEM loan grant. ICEM charges DM 210.-- for men between 18-51 for transportation including luggage. The charges for women's transportation amount to DM 165.-- (16-51 years old), DM 80.-- for children between 5 and 16 years old. Transportation of children under five is free of charge. The total transportation cost per family will not exceed DM 588.--.

9. ICEM Placement Service in South American countries will meet the migrant on arrival, introduce him to the employer, and ascertain that all is in order. In the event that an applicant leaves this work, ICEM placement service will assist him to find another job. The placement service does not give assistance after the second job is found.

10. Mr. Heegard stressed that each applicant is processed thoroughly to avoid sending an unqualified person to South America.

11. Basic Spanish, according to Mr. Heegard, can be learned by an applicant over a period of three months - at least three hours of instruction per week. This should be done prior to departure from Germany.

12. During the processing the applicant receives a pamphlet explaining the economic, social, political, etc. conditions of the country of his choice.

13. Mr. Heegard said that, in general, promotional opportunities are excellent in certain fields due to the lack of a qualified personnel.

14. The Special Program is the only one under which ICEM operates for foreign refugees desiring to emigrate from Europe to South America.

15. Professions and skills required in South America are: (COLUMBIA)
Electrical machine construction (Elektromaschinenbau): engineer, technician (drafting and operating), draftsman, master, cutting-tool maker (Schneidwerkzeugmacher), matrix maker for plastic material.
Metallurgy: Skilled foundry worker; moulder (metall foundry); rolling-mill worker and technician, casting mould matrix maker (Metallguss-form-Schablonenmacher).
Miscellaneous professions: Repair mechanic, photo-engraver, offset-retoucher, technician for plastic material, papermaker.

16. Professions and skills not required in South America:
Lawyers, office worker, specialist for commerce and sale, construction engineer, construction technician and construction worker, carpenter, leather manufacturer, waiter, servant, unskilled laborer.

17. HOUSING - ICEM does not find housing for the migrant but may give advice if needed.

18. ICEM BAD GODESBERG coordinates with ICEM GENEVA on the processing of an applicant.

19. S.A. job openings may be found at the ZENTRALSTELLE FÜR ARBEITSVERMITTLUNG, ESCHERSHEIMERLANDSTR. 1-7 FF/M. (ICEM GENEVA sends the job lists to the above organization).

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 13 March 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme A. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS: CO dropped in to see Subject and paid him two weeks subsistance. CO told Subject that there were two major hurdles to his immigration to Columbia. 1. ICEM would require that he be thoroughly interviewed and tested to establish just what his technical qualifications are. It would, therefore, be necessary that we be careful to build his work history around work which he not only could have been doing in the Soviet Union, but in which he could pass a practical examination and which the South American country needs and desires. Subject said that if his legend included schooling in electro-mechanical fields with the major portion of his work experience in development and improvement of devices and processes he could in fact pass any practical test and subsequent interview.

2. We must assume that he is listed with INTERPOL since the French would almost automatically inform other European countries of Subject's disappearance from France. Subject agreed that this was a major problem but one that he could not help with.

Subject has resigned himself to being processed as a regular immigrant and has said that he will do whatever we require.

Memo for the record WIROGUE 7 March '63

Blake Cox called to inform Harvard that some of ICEM's cases have a security chedk run on them which would include a check with Interpol. Blake will try to find which type of case is checked and why.

The investigation is handled by the Special Assistant to the Director of ICEM in Geneva.

Blake will also find out the name of the person who conducts the investigation and the office he is in. He will also check to find out if R.M. Gray is still there.

12 March '63

Blake called to inform us that R. M. Gray is now the PIO in Geneva. The special assistabt to the Director is Peter Regis. His assistant is Yarousch ? (retiredArmy Major). Blake said USEP cases are not checked as thoroughly as straight applicants to ICEM but he still cannot find out what decides if a case will be checked with Interpol.

14-00000

Memo for the record ZIRCOUE 1 March '63

This date Don McL. ~~and~~ and Bill K. discussed with Gus E. and Jack R. of AFRP the content of our conversation with Earl Blake Cox 27 Feb. Gus agreed with Blake's thinking and suggested that instead of writing for immigration information, either he or Jack would go to ICEM and personally discuss the immigration questions with the proper people.

Memo for the record WIROGUE 27 Feb. '63

On this date Bill M. and Don McL. discussed the Wirogue case with Earl Blake Cox(Chief, RMS, AMCONGEN Munich).

Blake was told that we have a case which we wish to help immigrate to South America. Blake was told that we had hoped to send Subject directly to ICEM(Subject cannot immigrate directly to South America but must have all arrangements handled through I CEM) but that in exploratory talks with Gus Elmendorf'(Chief, AFRP) Gus had been of the opinion that our case would be thoroughly investigated, interviewed, tested, etc.; procedures which we wished to avoid since they might bring to light the fact that our case was not the person he claimed to be.

Blake agreed that Gus was correct in his thinking that if Subject went to ICEM on his own he would be interviewed and trade tested for a special program set up by ICEM to supply SA with certain higher types of skilled specialists, e.g. ~~foreman~~ foremen, shop managers, etc.

Blake suggested that we make our case USEP eligible through AFRP and then refer him to ICEM. This procedure would probably give Subject more status in ICEM's eyes and eliminate some of the background investigation. Subject would also be referred as a self-payer meaning he would have the funds to pay his own transportation.

Blake asked if Subject would have a job waiting for him and was told that he would habe no job but would have a letter attesting to the fact that there was $3,000.00 being held for him insalary and bonuses which he had received while working for the Army. Blake thought this arrangement would be satisfactory.

Blake feels that coming to ICEM as a USEP case through AFRP Subject would probably be accepted without question since he would have been thoroughly checked out by Camp King and AFRF thus eliminating the need for investigatory action by ICEM.

Blake was on his way to Bad Godesberg and said he would try to find out without arousing suspicion whether or not a refugee is fingerprinted and with what authorities the fingerprints are checked. He would also find out if a security investigation is made and how

(over)

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 February 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwald Strasse

Orme K. [illegible], Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer worked with Subject discussing the vital statistics which would have to acquired for and memorized by Subject in order to supply the refugee organization with certain factual information necessary for his processing. This information would also be vital if in casual conversation Subject was to keep from drawing suspicion to himself when queried about his homeland, etc.

C/O said that he would be able to acquire the information Subject would need. Subject asked if with his name could it have been possible for his father to have come from one of the Baltic countries. C/O promised to find out and inform him at their next meeting.

28 February

1100

C/O dropped in to see Subject and informed him that he would very likely be processed for South America through a refugee organization. This would mean with a refugee organization behind him and USEP support he would not be subjected to the investigation, interviews, etc he would normally undergo if he went directly to ICEM.

C/O told Subject that arrangements would be made for him to start studying Spanish as soon as practical.

Subject was told that his name was a common one throughout the Baltic region and therefore, he would be able to discuss that part of his legend with confidence.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 12 Feb. ,63

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS: Subject told CO that he had gone to the Columbian Consulate at 10 am Hauptbahnhof and found it to be a one man, or rather, a one woman office. He said he found the representative to be a pleasant but rather incompetent German woman about 50 years of age. He told her that he was a refugee and wished to inquire about immigrating to Columbia. She told him that as an engineer he would have no difficulty being accepted but that he would have to contact the Ministry in Columbia through ICEM which would make all the arrangements, If everything worked out properly she would receive notification to issue a visa.

CO explained that it would be impossible for Subject to go to ICEM on his own. Subject was told that these developments would indicate that Subject should be processed as a regular refugee with a Volunteer Agency ~~case~~ and USEP support.

CO told Subject that he would advise Hdqtrs of the new developments and get permission to use the new approach to his resettlement.

Subject was advised to work on his legend until CO ~~would~~ came by on Friday.

[redacted] [redacted]

Memo for the record --- WIROGUE

European
11 Feb.'63 the undersigned asked Chief, CAMANTILLA why a refugee who applied for immigration to a South American Country would be referred by that Consulate to ICEM.

The answer was that ICEM handles the immigration processing for refugees in Europe going to countries overseas. This saves the individual country the expense entailed in maintaining immigration and welfare offices and staffs. If a refugee goes to ICEM on his own he would probably be referred to a welfare Agency or be processed by ICEM itself. This would mean forms to be filled out in detail and time consuming background checks.

If the Refugee is a Camantilla - USEP case most of the work would have been done by CAMANTILLA and would probably eliminate the need for the refugee to appear at I CEM in Bad Godesburg until the final stages of the processing.

GEHEIM!

11 February 1963

OC-5517

An
Das Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz
zu Hdn des Herrn Dr.Meier
Köln

BETRIFFT: Georg SANDERS, geb. 25.7.1919 in Tiflis, UdSSR

BEZUG: Dort. Schreiben vom 14 Dezember 1962 - IV A 4-112-P-50580-2/62

Subject is of continuing operational interest to AIS: Accordingly, it would be appreciated if your investigation were suspended. Should our operational interest be terminated at any time while Subject remains in the German Federal Republic, we will automatically furnish you with the details of this case.

C. W. Schmitz
CCA Liaison Officer

GEHEIM!

Translation of German report from the BFV to the American Embassy, OCA, z.H. Mr. C. W. SCHMITZ in Mehlem.

Concerning Georg SANDERS, ~~gebxx25x~~ born 25 July 1919 in Tiflis/USSR. Present residence in Oberursel/Ts, Hohemarkstr. 145.

Cross reference, none.

As of the 14th July 1962 SANDERS is in the custody of an U.S. organization in Oberursel. It was alleged that he had arrived on the same date as a tourist from East- to West-Berlin and defected there.

On the 28th of August 1962 he filed application for recognition as a foreign refugee.

On 29 August 62 he was interviewed, in the presence of a member of a U.S. organization, by the criminal investigation. During the interview SANDERS made untransparent statements concerning his defection.

Among other SANDERS said that he had been a leading member of a resistance group in the Soviet Union. Moreover he claimed that he evaded arrests by joining a Soviet tourist group with the assistance of friends.

The tourist group went on a guided tour of the Soviet occupied East zone of Germany. The group left Tiflis on the 10th of July 1962 arriving in East Berlin on the 14th of July 1962. Subject claimed that upon arrival to East Berlin he escaped immediately. However, SANDERS refused to make more detailed statements about his escape to West Berlin. Allegedly it was unknown to him how his friends had managed to place him into the tourist group.

We would be grateful if any communications or information concerning SANDERS inclusive a possible interview report would be forwarded to us.

14-00000

VS-Vertraulich

BUNDESAMT FÜR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ
Gesch.-Z.: IV A 4 - 112-P-50580- 2 /62
5 Köln 1, den 14 Dezember 1962
Postfach

VS-Vertr.

X

Durch Kurier

25083

American Embassy, OCA
z.H. Mr. C.W. SCHMITZ
Room III - 407

Mehlem

Betr.: Georg SANDERS, geb. 25.7.1919 in Tiflis/UdSSR,
z.Zt. wohnhaft in Oberursel/Ts.,
Hohemarkstr.145

Bezug: Ohne

SANDERS befindet sich seit dem 14.7.1962 in Obhut einer US-Dienststelle in Oberursel, nachdem er angeblich am gleichen Tage als sowj. Tourist von Ost- nach Westberlin geflüchtet war. Am 28.8.1962 stellte er Antrag auf Anerkennung als ausländischer Flüchtling. Am 29.8.1962 wurde er in Anwesenheit eines Angehörigen einer US-Dienststelle durch die Kriminalpolizei vernommen. Bei der Vernehmung machte SANDERS undurchsichtige Angaben über seine Flucht.

SANDERS führte u.a. an, in der UdSSR einer Widerstandsgruppe als führendes Mitglied angehört zu haben. Einer beabsichtigten Festnahme will er sich dadurch entzogen haben, in dem er sich von Freunden in eine sowj. Touristengruppe einschleusen ließ, mit der er zu einer Besichtigungsfahrt in die SBZ am 10.7.1962 aus Tiflis abgereist und am 14.7.1962 in Ostberlin eingetroffen sei. Er flüchtete angeblich unmittelbar nach seiner Ankunft in Ostberlin.

- 2 -

14-00000

SANDERS weigerte sich, nähere Angaben über seine Flucht nach Berlin-West zu machen. Angeblich ist ihm auch unbekannt, auf welche Weise ihn seine Freunde in die Reisegruppe einzuschleusen vermochten.

Für eine Mitteilung aller dort über SANDERS vorliegenden Erkenntnisse und die Überlassung einer möglicherweise vorliegenden Befragungsniederschrift wären wir dankbar.

Im Auftrag

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 Feb. 1963

TIME: 1505

PLACE:

Osme K. Dorrant, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Subject called to say that he had gone to the Columbian Consulate which was closed. He had, ~~talked~~ spoken, ~~[illegible]~~ with someone in the Consulate and had learned that everything regarding emigration could be done in FF/M. Subject will return to the Consulate on the 11th and expects to see C.O. on the 12th.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 Feb. 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat
Orme K. Daronnat
, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS: CO dropped by to see Subject and informed him that we had been informed that if Subject was still interested and could swing an immigration visa to South America we had authority to pay his way to SA and provide monetary support up to 125.00 per month until he is able to establish himself. Subject was quite surprised and pleased and wanted to know long he would receive the montkly payment. CO told him that this had been left up to CO's discretion who assureddSubject/~~h~~ that as long ~~he~~ as he diligently applied himself to finding work and was not too choosy he would continue to receive financial support.

CO and Subject agreed that Columbia seems to be the best choice. CO told Subject to go to the Columbian Consulate, Am Hauptbahnhof 10 and get as mach information as possible regarding immigration. He will attempt to find out if his processing can be done herein FF/M or if it will be necessary to go to Hamburg.

Subject was told that after he gets to SA, CO will maintain contact through the mail or someone in SA will maintain contact with him by letter drop.

Memo to the File

WIROGUE

On 5 Feb 63 CO went to Bonn to talk with OCA re the WIROGUE case and the BfV request for information on him.

CO discussed the case with KUBARK Staffer Clarence Schmidt (true name) and explained that it is true that a Georg Sanders processed through Camp King for his political recognition, but that his name, story submitted for his recognition, etc., were complete fabrications concocted by Camp King to ensure that WIROGUE receives his political recognition and Reiseausweis. Moreover since it ~~xx~~ is a fabrication that means that there are no reports of any kind which can be passed to the BfV. Finally it was explained by CO that since Subj is an agent (or rather was) and not a normal defector he of course did not go through Stage 1 and 2 processing at Cabezone and therefore there are no routine reports here that could be passed to the BfV.

Schmidt answered that the reason the BfV made an inquiry is that because subjs statement for his recognition indicated that he defected from the Soviet Union and read like a report of someone who ~~was being~~ debriefed by Cabezone. Moreover the story submitted for his recognition seemed so weak that it immediately drew the attention of the BfV , the German organization responsible for the security of West Germany.

Mr Schmidt then went into a long explanation of the function of OCA and its relationship to the rest of the Intelligence (US) Community and the BfV. He stated that as the sole coordinating body for the entire ~~IX~~ AIS community OCA is the sole office for liaising with the BfV and that any matter of interest of any component of the AIS community must be handled by OCA, whether it be written or oral. It is therefore shown in the present case that ~~that~~ since the BfV requested info on a Georg Sanders it sent the request to OCA with the realization that OCA would coordinate the matter with all the AIS components and moreover the answer passed to BfV would not be a KUBARK one (even though the BfV liaison people know OCA is primarily KUBARK) but a coordinated AIS one. It is for the above reason that OCA is very disturbed by the activity of Mr John Willms of Camp King who throughout the years has repeatedly refused to clear with OCA and handled any business he had with the BfV directly with the BfV and usually with the Chief of the BfV. CO had explained that even before he brought up the BfV inquiry on Sanders with Willms, Willms mentioned that he had already made an appointment tto talk with the Chief of the BfV and thus would take up the matter as a service to us. Schmidt answered that Willms uses these ruses as excuses to go to Bonn and butter up the Chief of the BfV.

In any event Schmidt stated that since he received the inquiry from the BfV he is obligated to answer it and in order to keep the BfV out of the case will inform it that Subj is of continuing operational interest to AIS. He requested that CO send him a cable stating that Subj is of ops interest and that it is contemplated that he will be resettled outside of Germany. This cable was sent to Bonn on 6 Feb 1963.

CO, upon return from Bonn, reported the above with Mr Lyack, Chief, Cabezone, who stated that though there is an agreement between the services and OCA, the Generals in Heidelberg back Mr Willms in his personal relations with the German services and thus this battle which has been going on for years will probably continue for several more years. In any event if the matter of Willms versus OCA comes up again it is strongly urged that Chief, Cabezone be queried as soon as possible.

David R. Reinbold
david r reinbold

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: ZIROGUE

DATE: 31 Jan. 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS: CO dropped in to see Subject and found him busy with one of his inventions. He was paid subsistance and given cigarettes and coffee. Subject was told that there was no news regarding his immigration. CO promised to drop by on Thursday the 7th.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

29 January 1963

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

On this date George List and the undersigned discussed CO's plans and thinking regarding WIROGUE's immigration to South America. Case Officer explained that since Subject is an exceptional case and not a bona fide refugee, we will not be able to take advantage of the normal immigration channels without taking the chance of being involved in fraud. Case Officer further explained that since WIROGUE's contact with the Consulate of his choice will not in any way be controlled by us, this immigration attempt will be a one shot operation and if it fails, we will not have a second chance because if he is turned down for immigration, any subsequent attempts he makes to immigrate will bring to light the fact that he had previously applied for immigration to another country. It is essential therefore that we plan for every contingency. Case Officer feels, based on HARVARD's experience, that when WIROGUE applies for immigration he will be required to give

(1) the name and address of his present employer and probably the name of his supervisor and telephone number.

(2) what type of work he has been doing;

(3) proof that he will be able to support himself for a minimum of two years at the rate of $125 a month.

(4) proof of his professional qualifications.

(5) birth certificate.

(6) detailed information regarding his employment and residence addresses in the Georgian SSR

(7) details of the war-time military service.

Police good conduct certificate

Case Officer said that early next week he will meet with Wagner and Willms of the 513th and explain the above. If it is possible he will get them to agree to provide the details of (1) above in the event the Consulate should call as part of the routine immigration processing. (2) above will be taken care of in the same manner. Regarding (3), Headquarters has given us authority to expend up to $3,000 and Case Officer will inform ~~appraise~~ 513th of this. They will be asked to provide a letter if required, stating that Subject has been associated with them (whatever cover organization they wish to use) since his defection in July '62 and has roughly $3,000 in salary and bonuses being held for him. Regarding (4) whether or not is is adviseable to provide Subject with proof of his professional qualifications will be discussed with the 513th. (5) above, a birth certificate will probably not be necessary since so many defectors do not have these documents with them. Information on employment and residences will be worked up by the Case Officer from past defector's BARs and with material available to SR 6. (6) above - this information may also be acquired through facilities of SR 6.

After discussions with the 513th, Case Officer will tell WIROGUE that we have been informed by Headquarters that if Subject still desires to immigrate to South America and is successful in immigrating, we have authority to provide financial assistance during the transistion period up to $125 a month. Since Case Officer knows WIROGUE, the next question will be, "How long will I receive this $125 a month?" Case Officer will reply, "Until you become satisfactorily established or we have reason to believe that you are not sincerely trying to establish yourself." Case Officer will tell him, ~~but only if absolutely necessary,~~ that ~~Subject~~ he could count upon a year's support, if it were necessary.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 January 1963

TIME: 1100

PLACE:

Orme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS: ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and paid him subsistence.

Subject's morale is high, but he would like to get some word soon on what is to be done with him. He was told that we had quired headquarters and asked them to advise as soon as possible and that there was nothing more we could do for the present.

SECRET

7B-SANDERS, Geo

Bob:

A trace of [illegible]-25083, 16 Jan 63, was NEGATIVE. John sent copies of the dispatch to DRC and CAT.

Attached is a copy of HARVARD's reply which states KUBARK interest.

Potential "missed traced" due to no carding although Subject has been known to KUBARKERs since August 28, 1962.

This result failure to card alias of WIROUGE. HQS. will now card Sanders as though true name, further compounding folly. Obviously, someone forgot to card alias of WIROUGE & records should be corrected.

J.M.Q.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 January 1963

TIME: 1130

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer picked up Subject, took him downtown and had lunch with him. Subject is in good spirits but would still like to receive word one way or the other of what will happen to him in the future. Case Officer told him that we had sent out a cable requesting an answer to our proposals.

SECRET

S E C R E T

9 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

Case Officer received a letter from Chuck Pettit, addressed to WIROGUE (George Sanders), Hohemarkstr. 145. Case Officer opened the letter and found it to be from a Lt. Zircle of the Transportation Corps. The Lt. mentioned that he and his friend had enjoyed their conversation with Subject at the Bahnhof a short time ago and had found him very interesting. The Lt. said he received a great deal of pleasure from meeting people such as Subject with such interesting backgrounds.

He suggested that he and Subject meet for dinner in the near future.

Case Officer took the letter to Bob Bullock, told him a little bit about Subject's past and suggested that something be done to prevent the Lt. from continuing his friendship with Subject, since Case Officer felt that WIROGUE would probably use the Lt. for whatever he could get out of him. Bullock said he would have CID contact the Lt. and tell him to lay off for his own good. Bullock promised to find out if the Lt. had given Subject his address and to advise him that if he should run into Subject, he should not mention having written a letter.

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 January 1963

TIME: 1515

PLACE: Kuhwaldstr. 55

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and pay him subsistence to 19 January. Subject is in good spirits and does not seem as restless as he usually is. He confided to Case Officer that he is hoping he won't have to do any running around regarding his immigration as long as the weather stays as bad as it is. He seems to be reasonably satisfied with his lot in life and only asked that the Case Officer drop by a little more often if possible because he gets lonely.

S-E-C-R-E-T

#52 Elbe Strasse
Frankfurt a. Main

3 January 1963

Mr. Georg Sanders
145 Hoenmark Str.
Oberursel
Frankfurt a. Main

Dear Mr. Sanders:

Just wanted to drop you this line to tell you again how much I enjoyed our conversation the other evening at the Bahnhof. My greatest experiences in Germany are the different people I meet, and it is always very pleasant to talk with someone such as yourself who has such an interesting background.

My friend felt rather silly at his attempted joke. The next time he either will have less to drink or will think more before clowning!

It would be a pleasure to see you again during my tour of duty in Frankfurt. Maybe if you have a free hour or so in the future you would want to have another supper in the Bahnhof!

Sincerely,

William D. Zirkle

William D. Zirkle
2/Lt, TC

MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1 NAME OR TITLE: DRC (Murray)
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION:
INITIALS:
DATE:
2
3 WIROGUE [redacted]
4

CIRCULATE
COORDINATION
FILE
INFORMATION
NECESSARY ACTION
NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME
SIGNATURE

REMARKS
Bill: We have handled this with Lt. Zirkle with no trouble at all —

Bob Bullock

FROM NAME OR TITLE:
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION:
DATE: 7 Jan
TELEPHONE:

DD FORM 95

Lt. William D. Zirkle
U. S. Army Trans Center
Frankfurt a. Main
ElbeStr #52

Internationale Frankfurter Messe
17-21. 2. 1963

-3.1.63-20
6

Herrn
Georg Sanders

Frankfurt a. Main - Oberursel

HoenmarkStr #145

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 19 December 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to deliver some Christmas cheer to Subject and gave him his Reiseausweis and Anmeldebestatigung. His HARVARD identity document was picked up.

Subject told Case Officer he had the feeling that Headquarters would advise us to turn him loose without any additional help from us and he was worrying because it would be difficult for him to get a job and apartment on very short notice. Case Officer told him that we are aware of this and that if it is recommended that he be resettled on the economy we are not in the habit of throwing people out in the street and that we would do everything we could to help him become integrated.

Subject was paid subsistence for two weeks. Case Officer promised to try to drop by the end of next week.

From time to time Subject tries to find out if Case Officer knows the details concerning Subject's past work for us and the reasons for our insistance that he was blown in the Congo. (A fact which he does not believe and therefore feels that the relationship was discontinued for other reasons.) Case Officer told Subject that he did not know and did not wish to know the details since in our job we are only told what is necessary for us to resettle the people for whom we are responsible.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 28 November 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject, who seems to be in good spirits and busy making preparations to make application for a patent on one of his brain-storms.

Subject was told that the details of his case had been submitted to Headquarters, that we were now prepared to move based on Headquarter's advise. Subject was told that we can only wait for the answer from Headquarters.

Subject has requested a German typewriter which will be delivered to him some time this week.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 21 November 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Dale informed Case Officer that he had taken clothing to Subject and had paid him subsistence as Case Officer had requested. He said that he had promised Subject that one of us would be by around the same time. He informed Subject that he could buy a scarf, a hat and a pair of shoes and we would pick up the tab.

Subject seems to be in good spirits but is eager to be on his way to South America or somewhere.

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 November 1962

TIME: 1230

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer picked up Subject and took him downtown, bought him lunch and then bought him several items of clothing which he badly needed. Subject was greatly pleased ~~and~~ although he cannot understand why we are doing so much for him. Case Officer explained that he is receiving nothing more than any other case what we are asked to help. Case Officer said that we were told originally by Headquarters to help Subject in any way that we reasonably could and that we with the cooperation of Headquarters are doing just that. Case Officer said that as far as he knows now, Subject will be helped to immigrate to South America and that we hope to send a dispatch to Headquarters explaining Subject's case as it now stands and we hope to receive soonest Headquarter's advice as to the future course of action we will take regarding Subject. Case Officer said that he hopes to be in a position within a week or two to advise Subject as to what we can and hope to do for him.

Case Officer said that in the final analysis if we do not help Subject to immigrate and he is turned loose on the economy, we would not throw him into the street, that he would be given a period of time in which to find a job and an apartment and that it is usually our procedure to help financially, at least the first month's rent and an additional subsistence payment until he receives his first paycheck. Subject was greatly relieved to hear this.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 November 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: 51 Kuhwaldstr.

OHMS K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in to see Subject and pay him weekly subsistence. Subject was extremely nervous and very upset. He said that the apartment is so quite that it is impossible for him to do any work on his inventions. There is no gas stove so that he can solder, no telephone and the only clothes that he has are summer clothes which he was wearing when he came to us from the Congo.

Case Officer told him that we would try to get something out this week and hoped to receive some indication from Headquarters as to our next step. Subject begged Case Officer to come by as often as possible so he would have someone to talk to. Case Officer rpomised to try to return on Friday, 16 November.

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REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 9 November 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to tell Subject that security advised us to move him before 1700 today. Case Officer told him he would be by after 1330 to pick him up.

Case Officer picked up Subject at 1400 and moved him to 51 Kuhwaldstr, top floor. Subject asked if he could unpack and spread out. Case Officer informed him that this apartment would also be given up, but he did not known when. He advised Subject not to spread out too far.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 23 October 1962

TIME:

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1 Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped by to see Subject and pay him subsistence for the week. He was advised that our legal department would possibly recommend a patent attorney if and when he needed one. He replied that he already had had an attorney recommended to him by a contact he had made during the course of developing his invention. Case Officer asked him for the names of the contacts which he had made and he gave Case Officer the following information.

He said he has made the acquaintance of a salesman representative for several factories specializing in small electrical devices. The mans name is Wilhelm Salzmann, whose address is Frankfurt/Main, am Tiergarten 52, telephone 492251. Subject said that this person had recommended a patent attorney by the name of Wilhelm Reichel, a Dr. Ing. Patentanwalt, Frankfurt/Main, Parkstr. 13, telephone 559165.

Subject told Case Officer that if he is lucky and his invention is successful prior to any definite arrangements we make for his immigration to South America, he will leave our custody and probably stay right here in Frankfurt. He said that he is aware he has commited himself to go to South America and will do so but all that he wishes to do if immediate success of his invention is not forthcoming, is to get a patent on his invention so he can negotiate at a later date from South America.

Case Officer feels that this is about the best we can expect from Subject. Case Officer has discussed this situation regarding the patent with John Morrison of the legal staff, who says that he will at least try to find out if this patent attorney is qualified and successful.

NOTE: Case Officer has learned that the patent laws in Germany are somewhat peculiar in that a patent attorney is a technical qualified man who can obtain patents on subjects in which he has specialized and for which he has received a specialized education but he is not an attorney in the sense that he can deal with any legal questions which arise in the course of patent procedures or litigation in patent matters. Normally, an individual who intends to get a patent will hire an attorney who will contact a patent attorney. Between the two of them they can handle all problems and procedures involving a patent. This also can be worked in reverse.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 16 October 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat
ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in and paid Subject one-weeks subsistence.

He is still buzy with his invention and is firmly convinced that he will make a million dollars. Subject seems perfectly content to stay in our custody and has not mentioned his proposed immigration to South America. It is obvious that he wants to finish his invention and try to sell it. If he is unsuccessful, Case Officer feels that he will probably want to immigrate immediately.

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 10 October 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

Case Officer dropped in and paid Subject 150 DM subsistence. He was told that we had finally received his Reiseausweis which means that for the first time in many years, he has legal documentation. The way is now clear for him to immigrate to South America.

He was told that Case Officer will send a cable to Headquarters, informing them as to the status of Subject's documentation and propose that steps be taken to begin Subject's processing for South America Case Officer said that he had several ideas as to how this should be done but in the final analysis would have to defer to Headquarters decision.

Subject asked if that meant he would be leaving soon. Case Officer told him it was his opinion that he would still be here in December.

Subject seems extremely content and satisfied ~~at the present, at least~~ with the status quo.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

File 492-813

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 3 October 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1 Apt 9

ORMS K. DARONNAT , Case Officer

COMMENTS:

CO dropped by to see Subject and paid him his weekly subsistence. Subject is happily engrossed in his latest invention and no longer seems impatient to leave HARVARD hands. Case Officer told Subject that we had received his Beschluss which indicates that the German authorities will issue him a Reiseausweiss. He was told that next week Case Officer will notify Headquarters that his documentation has been received based on his story that he is a recent refugee. We will further advise them that unless they have objections, we will start his processing for South America possibly with the sponsorship of one of the refugge organizations.

Subject agreed to this approach although Case Officer believes that he is hoping he will succeed in making himself financially independent by selling one of his inventions. If this should happen, Case Officer is sure that Subject will ask for his documentation and leave HARVARD housing and go on his own.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 17 September 1962

TIME: 1600

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1:Apt.9

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer
Orme E. Daronnat

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and pay him subsistance. He is very enthusiastic about his inventions and since he is occupied is reasonably happy. CO ~~proposed/to~~ promised to drop in later in the week.

21 September 1962

CO dropped in to see Subject to tell him that we were now reasonably certain that he would receive political recognition and his Reiseausweis. He was told that we are making good progress acquiring the information necessary for immigration and that soon he could start his processing. Subject is so wrapped up in his inventions that he seemed hardly to hear what CO was saying. CO sat him down and went over the events leading up to the present; that he had come to us for a job and when that had not been forthcoming had stated that his ambition was to be legalized and get citizenship by immigrating to a SA country. He was reminded that that is what we are striving to do but that we at this point are not sure how the immigration will take place. He was told that Hdqtrs may require that he immigrate on his own with us supplying the plane ticket and nothing more or he may possibly be helped by a refugee organization. CO said he did not know if or what kind of financial assistance would be given him. Subject said that he is grateful and wants to do whatever we desire

(over)

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: ~~14~~ 13 Sept. 1962

TIME: 1030

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

Orme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS:

CO dropped in to see Subject and found him all hopped up about his latest invention. He prefeerred not to discuss it with CO but says that he is so sure that it is a money maker that he intends to apply for a German patent as soon as he works out all the details. CO told him that he should hold off as long as possible but in any event he should remember that his name is Georg Sanders and that any business he conducts should be done using his Hohemarkstr. address. 145.

CO may be wrong but he feels that Subject is agreeing to immigrate to S.A. only in the hope that we will provide him with a stake of some kind.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 5 September 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1, Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO dropped by to see Subject and found him working on his latest invention. He has given up working on the device originally proposed by CO since he does not have sufficient tools and because some ~~///~~ of the parts ~~are~~ must be ordered from the US. CO encourages him as long as it keeps him busy and helps to pass the time.

Subject has an extremely inventive mind and has explained several of his ideas to CO. They would appear to have commercial value. Unfortunately Sugject has neither the money to develop them nor is he in a position to get involved with patents or manufacturers at the present time.

He seems reasonably happy with his present status but CO anticipates a hairy situation if upon applying for immigration to a SA country, Subject finds that the processing period takes a long time.

14-00000

Memo for the Record

28 August 1962

CO and Al Ph. met with Geo. L to discuss the Wirogue situation and to inform him what was being done or planned re Wirogue's resettlement.

Al reviewed the situation as it now stood and explained that Hdqrtrs proposal that Subject be issued a backstopped Fremdenpass was completely unsatisfactory since it would not stand up under anything but the most casual investigation. It was explained that Camp King had been ~~appraised~~ informed of only the necesaary details of Wirogues problem and had agreed that the approach should be cover story making Rogue a recent defector, an interview and political recognition. Geo. L agreed that this seemed to be the proper step and gave us the go ahead.

CO suggested that we have AFRF make official inquiry at the various SA Embassyesand Consulates for detailed material giving immigration requirements. This is deemed necessary because the information is not normally given out over the phone and Rogue can be trusted to give CO only that information which will serve his purpose. He is not above telling us that an immigrant musthave $ 5000.00 to be considered, etc. It is very important that Rogue have the right answers when he applies and is interviewed for Immigration. Geo. L agreed to CO's suggestions and proposed that CO have AFRF get started on this project soonest.

1400

Wirogue was taken to Camp King where he was 1st briefed on his story and then successfully interviewed. It is possible that Rogue will be completely documented within 2 or 3 weeks.

30 August

CO met with Gus E and Jack R and told them we were in need of detailed SA immigration requirements.

They agreed to get out an official inquiry to all the consulates and Embassys and attempt to find out the followings:

What documents are needed
What professions are indemand
How long is required for immigration processing
Does the immigrant need a certain amount of funds
Is a sponsor necessary or helpfull
What is the residence requirement for citizenship
What are the quota restrictions
Are there SA government agencies or private agencies who will help the Immigrant get started
etc.

Note: Rogue has already told CO that he cannot go to Argentina because he has "friends" there who would gladly turn him in to the authorities or make trouble for him in any way they could. Rogue prefers Vuenesuela if he has a choice.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 15 Aug. 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1;Apt.9

Crme K. Daronnat, **Case Officer**

Crme K. Daronnat

COMMENTS: CO picked up Subject and took him to lunch in the country ~~near Neu~~ Isenburg. Subject has been extremely edgy lately and it was felt by CO that a relaxing meal and 2 or 3 hours conversation might have a salubrious effect.

CO mentioned to Subject that if he were interested we might be able to find a radio or something along that line for him to build. Subject was very enthusiastic suggested that we get started soonest.

Subject was dropped off at his apartment and CO promised to come by as soon as he could find something to occupy Subject's time.

Subject was told that Hdqtrs had suggested Argentine for resettlement because they had no quota restrictions and were in need of technicians. Subject said that Argentine was out of the question since he had acquaintences there who would be happy to stir up any kind of trouble they possible could.

Subject suggests that he go to SA on a tourist visa. According to him it would be much easier after his arrival to apply for immigration since he already would be there. This reason is quite valid and sensible but CO knows that Subject has 2 quite different reasons for making this suggestion. 1. With a tourist visa he has visions of having us finance him from country to country until he finds exactly what pleases him and,2. He figures that with a tourist visa he can return to Europe without having committed himself irrevocably to immigration statuswith all it's attendant responsibilities for settling down, etc.

It is also obvious to CO that we cannot trust Subject to make inquiries himself at the various SA Consulates because he will tell us only those details which he wants us to know and unfortunately we hav eno way of checking since the Consulates will not give out information re immigration over the phone.

When the time comes CO feels that we may be able to get the information we need by working through AFRF.

Subject prefers Venezuela.

S-E-C-R-E-T

File 492813

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 8 August 1962

TIME: 1500

PLACE: Ostendstr. 1; Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. Daronnat, Case Officer

COMMENTS: Harvard CO and Al P. from TSS went to see Subject and informed him that Hdqtrs wishes his resettlement to be accomplished on the basis of documents as legalas possible. He was told that we will start the action necessary to get him a Fremdenpass and we hope a Reiseausweis. We explained that we must work very carefully and thoroughly that when he applies for a visa he must be prepared to give all the right answers since the SA consulates and Embassies do not give out immigration material without discussing the matter with the interested individual.

Subject is a bit sceptical that ~~all~~ everything can be backstopped but is willing to play ball. Al took some preliminary informationfrom Subject and will discuss our problem with Camp King. CK has indicated that they might be able to help us get Subject resettled, particularly in Chile.

Subject is becoming extremely edgy and Harvard CO is hoping that that this case will start moving soon.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WI ROGUE

DATE: 1 August 1962

TIME:

PLACE:

, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

1 August 1962 – Subsistance paid.

CO visited Subj at his apt and found him getting very restless over the delay in his South America processing. He stated he does not want to continue to receive support from us but wants to get someplace where he can start working and be on his own.

Subj stated that he called the German firm which expressed an interest in his going to the Congo and was told to have Geduld. He stated in very clear terms that he is tired of having Geduld and hopes that something will soon happen.

He mentioned again that he does not want to have the name dePaneshkhet. CO told him that when we get the go ahead on a SAmerican country we will discuss the whole document picture and related matters.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 25 July 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: [illegible]str 1/9

David [illegible], **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apt and paid him DM 100 subsistence for the period 29 July through 4 Aug.

Subj was told that a cable was received from Hqs indicating that the people are definitely thinking about his resettlement in South America and wanted to make sure whether or not he had a preference. That was why, it was explained to Subj, that CO called on 24 July and inquired whether or not he had this preference.

Subj mentioned that he had thought seriously about his name on his phony Austrian passport and concluded that if at all possible he would like to retain the name Rainer. CO mentioned that under no circumstances would it be Rainer and was glad when Subj didnot push the point. Subj mentioned however that when it is certain where he is going he will bring up the matter again.

To the list of documents he has previously claimed he needs (under his new identity) Subj added the International Drivers License.

Subj was most concerned about his future and asked all kind of questions to ascertain that everything will be laid on when he goes to South America. He brought up the matter of the officials in the S. American country sometime or another checking with the Austrians. CO replied that if anything ever comes up, the officials will not check with the Austrians but with the pertinent South American officials who will have been informed by us to make his entry and life in the new country a possibility. Subj seemed to buy this but expressed the fact that something could go wrong.

Before CO left Subj Subj informed him that he will go around to the Venezuelan, Chilean and Colombian Consulates and request tourist information.

WIROGUE, former REDSOX Agent Candidate and AF Division Agent, has been quitclaimed and resettled on the local economy. This dispatch covers the WIROGUE case from May 1962 to March 1964.

Subject arrived in FRANKFURT/MAIN on 22 May 1962 and immediately made telephone contact with CABEZONE. He had been guaranteed a meeting with a Fran KUBARK representative who, he had been told, would explore KUBARK employment possibilities for him. He in the meantime would be attempting to market a telephone answering device which he had invented, and conduct an investigation into the disappearance of 30 million francs which had been misappropriated by members of the Congolese Defense Ministry. KUBARK's reasons for establishing contact were dictated, however, by the need to relieve Subject of his KUBARK supplied false Austrian passport in the name of Reiner, the need to institute or suggest a course of action which would encourage him to establish himself as a contributing member of society and, above all, prevent his return to the Congo.

Subject was met by Stephen R. LACKLEN and Roscoe MOSIEN and put up in a safehouse. He was relieved of his documents under the pretext that they were to be photographed and he would not need them for the time being since he would be given an identity document for use during the period of time he would be in KUBARK custody. LACKLEN explained that as an administrative officer he was interested only in taking care of his immediate needs but soon however he would be introduced to one who's business would be to work with him in an attempt to resolve his problems.

Since it had been decided that Subject was primarily a resettlement problem, Orme K. DARONNAT of HARVARD was introduced to Subject. DARONNAT told Subject that he would be working with him during his stay in Frankfurt while we were awaiting word on whether or not his services were needed by the Government. Subject stated that his greatestwish was to work for the "Company". If this was not to be, he hoped he would be helped to legalize and immigrate to South America. He emphasized his obligation to complete his mission for the C.D.F. and claimed also he had to return to the Congo to conclude his contract even if we decided to employ him. C. O. told him our first order of business was to establish the need for his services and in the meantime he could attempt to market his invention.

HARVARD needed time to establish Headquarters interest in the amount and type of assistance Subject should be given. Also he was still an unknown quantity, restless, and from early cable traffic a potential troublemaker. In view of these considerations we were anxious to make his stay in Frankfurt reasonably pleasant and reduce his desire to return to the Congo; therefore, he was provided with subsistence and confortable quarters.

DARONNAT introduced David E. COULLIARD (MKTOPAZ) explaining to Subject that we would be wise to discuss documentation for him since a long time might elapse before we had the answer to Subject's possible employment with us and if the answer was negative, we should be prepared to take steps to legalize him. COULLIARD explained the merits of a Fremdenpass and a Reiseausweis; i.e., a Fremdenpass could be obtained without much difficulty but control and security would be limited to the time Subject remained registered at the place from which the Fremdenpass was issued. Therefore, the Fremdenpass might well be a short range solution unless Subject could get an immigration visa to desired country of resettlement in a short time. On the other hand the issuance of a Reiseausweis could completely legalize Subject, but would have to be issued on the basis of a false defection story and should not be done unless absolutely necessary. Subject stated that he hated Germans and no matter what happened would not stay in Germany. He suggested that he be helped to immigrate to the U.S., Canada, England, Australia, etc. C. O. told him that with his criminal record of arrest and imprisonment in France immigration to other than S.A. was out of the question and even this was in doubt. He stated if KUBARK employment was not possible he would hope to get legal documentation in the name of de Panaskhet (his brother's name) and take up legal residence somewhere.

By this time (June) HARVARD C.O. had an inkling that Subject was not eager to return to the Congo but surmised that his nuisance value might be such that he could parlay his position into something better. HARVARD C.O. felt that Subject's dislike for the Germans was real but was emphasized by him in order to benefit as much as possible from a prolongation of his new association with KUBARK. He also stated that he was willing to discharge any responsibility to the Congolese by mail, thereby confirming C.O.'s suspicion that he did not in fact want to return to the Congo and was only interested in prolonging his stay in FF/M and benefiting therefrom.

In July 1962 Headquarters advised HARVARD to provide Subject with resettlement assistance including help in immigrating to South America. Consequently, he was told that although we appreciated his past service the economy drive in Washington precluded employing him in any capacity. He was told that we were authorized to help him realize his stated desire to immigrate to S.A. but that we would not be able to "wave a magic wand" and have him settled there with a job and a rosy future. He was told we would help him in whatever areas we could but he would be expected to apply himself to the problem and drop all plans to return to the Congo.

Subject at this point was so discouraged by his inability to sell his invention, the realization that his services were not needed by KUBARK and weeks of inactivity that he willingly agreed to forego returning to the Congo and give up all documentation in the name of Reiner if something could be done to give him hope for the future.

Headquarters had recommended that Subject be resettled on the basis of a backstopped Fremdenpass; however, Clarance W. LEIBROCK (MKTOPAZ) and DARONNAT after much discussion of the relative merits of the types of documentation available, decided that only a Reiseausweis would stand up under the investigation of immigration authorities and in addition, it was felt that there was no guarantee Subject would be going to South America. Therefore, if he were required to stay in Germany for a prolonged period of time, it would be best to provide him with complete FEDREP recognition processing resulting in a Reiseausweis. A subsequent discussion with ODIBEX Camp King reps confirmed this reasoning and, with the concurrence of Acting Chief AD/FI, Subject was briefed by Camp King representatives and then interviewed for political recognition. He received political recognition on the basis of a fabricated story in which he purported to be a Georgian who defected from East Berlin while with a tourist group.

HARVARD felt that progress was now being made but a temporary setback resulted from a query initiated in December 1962 by CAVATA to OCA Liaison Officer Bonn requesting full traces, interrogation reports and all information available on Subject. David R. REINBOLD of HARVARD informed OCA by cable and in a subsequent visit to Bonn that Subject's name, George SANDERS, story submitted for recognition, etc. were complete fabrications to insure that WIROGUE received political recognition and a Reiseausweis. It was explained that WIROGUE was strictly a HARVARD agent resettlement case of no AIS ops interest and not a routine CABEZONE case. OCA stated that the political recognition interview story had naturally drawn the interest and attention of CAVATA.

OCA advised REINBOLD that CAVATA would be kept out of the case by being told Subject was of continuing AIS ops interest and HARVARD could go about its resettlement efforts.

Subject by this time had agreed to immigrate to any South American country with the exception of Argentina, where he claimed he had acquaintances who were not kindly disposed toward him. At first Subject suggested that he go on a tourist visa and apply for immigration status after his arrival. Although this suggestion was quite sensible and valid DARONNAT knew that his reasons were: 1) with a tourist visa, he had visions of having KUBARK finance him from country to country until he found exactly what would please him, and 2) he knew that with a tourist visa he could return to Europe without having committed himself irrevocably to immigration status with all its attendant responsibilities.

Available South American immigration data indicated that a prospective immigrant would have to have personal qualifications sufficient to make him an attractive prospect plus proof of financial solvency sufficient to provide self-support at the rate of $125 per month for two years. Headquarters approved the expenditure of $3,000 for this purpose and discussions with MKTOPAZ and Camp King resolved the necessary documentation problems.

Fully documented and armed with the assurance that there would be financial assistance available during his first months in South America, Subject applied at the local Colombian Consulate for permission to immigrate. HARVARD had hoped that letters of solvency and letters of recommendation would be sufficient to enable Subject to process with a minimum of red tape. This was not to be and Subject was informed he could only immigrate by processing through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

This problem was discussed with a cleared official from Refugee Migration Section AMCONGEN, Munich, and the Chief of CAMANTILLA. HARVARD was informed that European refugees immigrating to South America are processed through ICEM thereby eliminating the need for individual countries to maintain immigration offices and welfare staffs. Unfortunately, since

ICEM is responsible for the immigration processing, it is determined to pass only high level types and, therefore, conducts stiff security investigations and gives detailed interviews and job testing to all prospective immigrants.

By now it was apparant that if the disappointments and frustrations connected with this case were ever to end a reappraisel must be made to decide whether or not to go ahead and subject WIROGUE to several possibly very searching interviews. There was also the possibility he would be interviewed in Russian (practically non-existant) and Georgian (less than fluent). With these language deficiencies we knew he would be immediately suspect if interviewed by any recent refugee from the Soviet Union. We were hampered by not being able to insure Subject's smooth processing through ICEM, and by the fact that if we did help him to process we would be making USEP, ICEM and CAMANTILLA a party to fraud with the danger of any slip-up causing embarrassment to KUBARK, ODIBEX and to the Federal Republic. We were not sure that the aforementioned risks were worth taking and the problems worth trying to resolve when it was obvious to HARVARD C.O. that if Subject did get to South America and became disenchanted, his first stop would be the local U.S. Consulate or Embassy where he would ask to see the KUBARK representative and once again force KUBARK to become directly involved in his personal problems.

In spite of the hundreds of hours of Case Officer time, the many discussions necessary to pull together adequate information regarding immigration, etc., HARVARD was faced with the realization that to prepare Subject for South American immigration could take many more months. We were faced with the fact that until Subject was provided with a detailed life history containing the information required by prospective employers and/or immigration authorities he was not in a position to be resettled anywhere, let alone South America. We knew a new approach would have to be tried if HARVARD was ever to be in a position to satisfactorily sever Subject's dependence upon KUBARK and reduce to a minimum the need for future contacts. HARVARD C.O. felt that Subject should be told outright that immigration to South America was not practicable under the present circumstances and what would be done would be to provide him with a detailed life history with enough factual information needed for the filling out of any future job applications, to stand up under detailed interviews, and, if immigration ever took place, to satisfy immigration requirements.

DARONNAT told Subject that any South American immigration thoughts should be shelved, that he should work and establish himself in Germany and if he intended to immigrate in the future he would have to do it on his own. It was pointed out that he would have to study and learn Russian, that any professed Soviet refugee arriving in South America without Russian would be immediately suspect by the emigres there.

ODIBEX authorities at Camp King had readily agreed that Subject's original political recognition interview story did not provide the proper framework around which a decent legend could be built. It was agreed that given a detailed legend prepared to HARVARD's satisfaction ODIBEX could prepare a new political recognition interview story and would remove copies of the old story from the various FEDREP files and replace them with the new.

HARVARD's problem was explained to Chief, Stage I, CABEZONE who assigned Gerald H. BESDINS to prepare a life story to include a detailed escape from the Georgian S.S.R. to Turkey.

By ____________________ 1964, an excellent legend had been written, a new political recognition interview story prepared and substituted for the old and to HARVARD's satisfaction for the first time since Subject had arrived in HARVARD's custody, the way was clear for a final resettlement. DARONNAT informed Subject that the time had come to part company, that he was completely legalized and documented and was now in a position to take his place in society. Subject was given his legend in German, complete legal documentation, one month's final subsistence and, since he had taken over a dropped CABEZONE safehouse, was given dishes and various items to set up housekeeping. He was quitclaimed and warned that he should always keep in mind the consequences of any action on his part which would result in having his fingerprints taken. (Subject has often expressed the wish to immigrate to the U.S. or even Canada or Australia and with his new identity could probably do so. He has been told that these countries do thorough security investigations and a check with Interpol would disclose his true identity. HARVARD has established that Interpol has no interest in Subject but we feel his ignorance of that fact provides us with some control over any steps he might take to emigrate from Germany.) Subject has been told however that there is nothing to prevent him from visiting other countries or even entering as a technical representative.

HARVARD as the final step in the WIROGUE case has arranged through to be listed in for Subject so that any attempt to immigrate to any country will bring him to the attention of KUBARK and appropriate action can be taken.

In summary, everything has been done to insure Subject a successful future free from problems resulting from his "black" association with KUBARK. On the other hand, there is no reason for KUBARK to fear any future attempts by WIROGUE to return to the fold under veiled threats to reveal all. With his criminal background he is aware that he can be brought to the attention of French authorities. He also believes that KUBARK's position in the FEDREP is such that we have nothing to fear from any action on his part.

At the time of this writing Subject has a position as research and development engineer with a Munich firm. He allegedly receives DM 1500 per month, has an expense account and is to receive a percentage of all profits realized from the sale of any devices he develops. He expects to move to Munich permanently about the end of May 1964.

BIOGRAPHY OF GEORG FRANK SANDERS

1. **IDENTITY:**

   A. **FULL NAME:** Georg Frank SANDERS

   B. **NAME AT BIRTH:** Georg SANDERS, as featured in my birth certificate and all other Soviet documents. However, upon arrival in the West, I added to my first name the name of my father, Frank. While in the USSR when the patronymic was required, I was referred to as Georg Frankovich SANDERS.

   C. **OTHER NAMES USED:** I never used any other names but I was called by my mother by a Georgian diminutive 'Zhori', and by my Russian friends 'Zhora' or 'Zhorzh'.

2. **BIRTH:**

   A. **DATE OF BIRTH:** 25 July 1919

   B. **PLACE OF BIRTH:** Tiflis, Georgia, USSR. Tiflis is the old Russian name. The Georgian as well as the present official name is Tbilisi.

   C. **NATIONAL ORIGIN:** Georgian

3. **CITIZENSHIP:**

   A. **AT BIRTH:** Soviet. From 1917 (October Revolution in Russia) until 1921, Georgia was governed, from the downfall of Czarist regime, by Menshevists and partially occupied by Turk, German and British troops. Only in 1921 did the Soviet government in Georgia officially come to power. However, all persons born during this transition period were classified later as Soviet citizens.

   B. **PRESENT CITIZENSHIP:** Stateless

4. **RELIGION:** Orthodox (pravoslavnyy). Being raised in a godless society, I practiced my religion to a very limited extent in my youth, and, due to existing conditions in USSR stopped going to the Church in my adult life.

5. **SOCIAL ORIGIN:** Intelligentia (sluzhashchiy); my father was an engineer, and my mother - a white collar worker.

6. PROFESSION: Electro-technician, an equivalent of German 'Ingeneur without diploma' (no college graduate)

   A. LAST OCCUPATION: Chief electrician (starshiy elekto-tekhnik) with MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA RTS.

7. LAST RESIDENCE: Shota Rustaveli Street (ulitsa), #25 (private home of my common-law wife, Nina GANDELI) in MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA, Kutaisi Oblast, Georgian SSR.

8. MARITAL STATUS: Single. From 1946 to the time of my escape I lived in a common-law marriage with Nina GANDELI, nee TAKTASHVILI, born 1920. When I first got to know her, she was married to a post-office employee but her marriage was an unhappy one. Her husband was much older and the marriage had been arranged by her parents, old fashioned farmers from a distant village who were happy to marry their daughter off to a relatively educated and well-to-do man. By the time I was drafted into the service Nina and I were lovers. When I returned from the war, I moved in with her for her husband had been killed in action during World War II and she lived, with her daughter born during this time, in a small home inherited from her husband. Her parents were dead, and she worked as a mail carrier for she had very little education. During the later years of our life together, I discovered that Nina was having affairs with other men. This caused frequent quarrels at home, and made my life unbearable. Finally, the woman became pregnant, and since I was positive that it was not my child, I decided to end our relationship. This was one of the reasons for my defection. I have no children of my own.

9. PARENTS:

   Smi

   A. FATHER: Frank SANDERS, born circa 1885 in the Baltic area, came to Russia proper circa 1910 and worked as a civil engineer in the Baku, Batumi, and Tbilisi areas. In 1918, he married my mother in Tbilisi. He died in 1924 of an accident at his place of work. I do not remember my father at all, but knew from my mother that he was a very good and kind man, and was well liked.

   B. MOTHER: Maria SANDERS, nee KANTCHELI, born circa 1885 in a small village near the Azerbaydzhanian border in Tbilisi Oblast. She was an only child, and when her parents died of old age, within a few years of each other, she moved to Tbilisi and worked as a clerk in various private enterprises until she married my father. After her husband died, she went back to work. She changed her place of employment several times and the only job I can remember was her last employment as a cashier with the shoe-repair shop (artel) on Sovetskaya Ulitsa in Tbilisi. She died in 1934 of a heart attack.

10. BROTHERS AND SISTERS: None at present. I had a brother Leon born 1923 who died some six months after his birth.

11. OTHER RELATIVES: I knew that my father had relatives in the Baltic area but our family had no contact with them and I did not know any of them. I had no close maternal relatives, and the distant relatives in my mother's home village had no contacts with my family disapproving my mother's marriage to a 'foreigner' of another faith. I never visited the home village of my mother.

12. CLOSE FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES: I never had any real close friends, but I was somewhat closer to the following persons in town:

(1) Director of RTS, who was transfered in 1959 to Rustavi, Georgian SSR.

(2) Rayon veterinarian who had his office in the rayon veterinary clinic and travelled extensively in the rayon area visiting collective farms.

(3) Club librarian (a girl friend)

13. SPECIAL SKILLS: I like to invent gadgets and built up a relatively good home work shop

14. LANGUAGES: Georgian - native

Russian - from school and contacts with population in Russian speaking area and in the service.

German - from school and residence in Germany

English - from Technicum, home study and association with Americans in Germany.

15. FINANCIAL STATUS: None

16. EDUCATION HISTORY:

1927-1934 - Trudovaya Shkola #107 (10-year school, desyatiletka) located on the corner of Prospekt Mikhaylovskiy and Kirochnaya Ulitsa, in Tbilisi, (Presently PLEKHANOVA and MARDZHANISHVILI Streets, respectively.) Prior to 1927, it was the German Real Gymansium, but although converted into a srednyaya shkola at that time, the instruction was conducted in German, until 1930 when it changed to Georgian. The majority of the students were Georgians. Russian language instruction was given two hours a week and Georgian - one hour a week, until 1930. I completed seven years at this school and then due to the death of my mother, entered a technicum where I would be given board and quarters.

1934-1938 - Tbilisskiy Elektro-Tekhnicum, located on Sovetskaya Ulitsa in Tbilisi, in a two-story building with a yard where the shops and the students' hostel were located. In summer 1934, I submitted an application to this school supplemented with the seven-year school certificate and a photo. In July or August I passed the entrance examinations consisting of Mathematics, Physics, written and oral Georgian and Russian and when I saw my name posted on the school's bulletin board I knew I had been accepted. I paid no tuition and was given a small stipend just enough for a bare living. The hostel accommodations where I shared a room with three other students were free. On the first floor of the technicum building, near the school office, was located a students cafeteria where meals could be bought cheaply. The food was of poor quality. The female students of the school lived in a small annex on the same street, two or three blocks from the technicum.

For four years I studied physics, mathematics, history, English, Georgian language and literature, Russian language and literature, and from 1936 or 1937 - Constitution of the Soviet Union. The general subjects were on a high school level. Specialized subjects given at the technicum were technology of metals, theoretical mechanics, strength of materials, electrical machines, electro-techniques, electrical gears (privody), electrical measuring instruments, drafting. The students were also given military and physical training. Classes ran from September to July of each year; summer recesses I spent usually in near-by kolkhozes in a group organized by the technicum to help out farmers with their crops.

Examinations were held twice a year, prior to New Year and at the end of second semester, and were graded by the following system:

5 - Otlichno (excellent)

4 - Khorosho (good)

3 - Posredstvenno (satisfactory)

2 - Plokho (bad)

1 - Ochen plokho (very bad)

The first three were passing grades.

In the spring of 1938, I took the final examinations, oral and written, and was issued a diploma. It was a one-page certificate and indicated that I had attended the technicum for 4 years. It listed the grades I had received on the various subjects and showed that I was graduated as an electro-mekhanic.

All graduates were assigned to various places of employment where they had to stay not less than two years. This is a form of repayment for the money which the government spent on their education. I was sent to the MIKHA-TSKHAKAYA M.T.S. which in 1958 was converted into an R.T.S.

17. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:

1938 - 1941 and 1946 - until defection - - Mikha-Tskhakaya M.T.S. (Machine-Tractor Station), later converted into R.T.S. (Repair Technical Station) - Machino-Traktornaya and Remontno-Tekhnicheskaya Stantsiya, respectively. Mikha-Tskhakaya, referred to by the population simply as Tskhakaya, was the rayon center of Tskhakayskiy Rayon being renamed so after the famous Georgian Revolutionary Mikha Tskhakaya (the old name of the town was Akhal-Senaki and Akhal-Senakskiy Rayon, respectively). M. Tskhakaya was one of the organizers of the Georgian Communist Party. The town has now about 10,000 population and is located on the RR line Samtredia-Sukhumi (the main connection between Tbilisi and Moscow) with the junction to Poti, the Black Sea resort. The town is located between two large tributaries of the Rion River: Tsivi and Terakhi Rivers. On the latter, located a few kilometers from Mikha Tskhakaya, is situated a small hydro-power station where I was a part-time employee upon my return from World War II.

At the M.T.S. (which was in 1958 converted into R.T.S. after the machines and equipment were distributed to the local grain and grape producing collective farms with the sole responsibility of repair of these machines left with R.T.S.) I soon became the foreman of a small brigade of electro-mechanics responsible for the maintenance and repair of electrical parts for those agricultural and other machines. My starting salary was 400 or 500 rubles, but it was increasing rapidly and when I was drafted into the army, my salary was almost doubled by that time.

For personal reasons I returned to this town after my discharge from the service, and obtained my old job. I also got a job as electro-technician with the above described power station which supplied power for the town and the rest of the rayon. I was assigned this second job since there was a lack of qualified personnel after the end of the war. I worked in the second shift at the power station from 1947 until 1953 (when the position was filled by a young graduate of Kutaisi technicum) earning 700 rubles in addition to my basic salary with the R.T.S. Prior to my escape, my income was about 120 new rubles before deductions. I also had some additional week-end income from repairing electric household appliances, radios, etc., for the local citizens. The old currency was converted 10 to 1 in 1961.

18. MILITARY HISTORY

A. DRAFT BOARD REGISTRATION: In the summer of 1939 I received a notification from my rayon-voyenkomat (draft board) of my rayon and reported there on a specified date before the draft board, then I was sent in a group of other future conscripts to the rayon polyclinic for a medical check-up. I had lost the first joint of my left thumb and index fingers during an accident at the job, and when the findings of the medical examinations were reported to the draft board, I was rejected for active duty and deferred into the reserve. At that time my pripisnoye svidetelstvo (registration certificate) was exchanged for the military booklet.

B. INDUCTION DATE: On about 26 August 1941, I received a notice instructing me to report to the rayvoyenkomat on 27 August. I reported there and was notified to report for induction on the following day. Then I, with a group of either 80 or 100 conscripts from my rayon, was put on the train and via Tbilisi travelled to Baku, where the group was put in so called Salyanskiye Kazarmy (Salyany Barracks) located on the outskirts of Baku, on the highway to Salyany and the Iranian border.

C. BRANCH OF SERVICE AND SERIAL NUMBER: I served in the anti-aircraft artillery. I had no serial number (which is never issued in the Soviet Army).

D. BASIC TRAINING: I took basic training at Salyany barracks in Baku for a period of two months. One month I took the regular basic training, and the remaining month improved my qualifications as a car driver (I learned how to operate an automobile while working on electric detail on car repair at my M.T.S.). I can not recall the unit number where I went through the basic training. At that time the barracks were full of troops, basically infantry and artillery units which rotated quite frequently.

E. SPECIALIZED COURSES: One month's driver's training as mentioned above.

F. RESERVE STATUS:

Summer 1939	Rejected from the active duty for medical reasons and given reserve status.
Fall 1946	Discharged from the army and after submitting my travel and discharge papers to my Rayvoyenkomat was issued a new military booklet which contained an indication of my reserve status. I was never recalled for military training or duty of any kind after my final discharge from the service.

G. CHRONOLOGY OF MILITARY SERVICE:

In a group of other enlisted men, I was sent by train to the 2nd battery of the 253rd separate anti-aircraft artillery division (OZAD-ogne-zashchitnyy artilleriyskiy divizion). Commanding officer of the battery was Lt. VAKS. Commander of the vzvod upravleniya (administration platoon) of the division was Lt. ENDELADZE. Deputy divizion commander for political affairs was Capt. CHOKHA and politruk of my battery was Senior Lt. SAMARIN. Major Vlado (Vladimir) GURGENIDZE was the commanding officer of OZAD and in February 1943 he was also appointed the commander of the PVO (protivo-vozdushnaya oborona or anti-aircraft defense) in the town of Michurinsk. The headquarters of the division was located in Michurinsk, while the battery itself was stationed near the station TARASOVO near the settlement of Konskoye, 7 km. from Michurinsk and 6 km. from the six marshalling yards located at Kochetovka station. A higher HQ was in Tambov and was at first commanded by Col. CHERNYAVSKIY and later by Col. TSVETKOV, a demoted General.

When I first arrived in Michurinsk, I was assigned as a truck driver with the division's supply platoon (khoz-vzvod or khozyaystvennyy vzvod) commanded by Junior Lt. MAKAROV, but later I made the acquaintance of the above mentioned ENDELADZE, a countryman, and through latter's intervention was assigned as a personal driver to division commander GURGENIDZE, also a Georgian, who was later promoted to Lt. Col. and who kept me with him until I was discharged from the service.

H. **PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS:** After six months in the service, I was promoted to yefreytor (corporal), and at the end of my first year to Junior Sergeant. In 1944, I was made a sergeant.

I. **DECORATIONS:** None

J. **DATE OF DISCHARGE:** I was discharged from active military duty at the end of September 1946. I received my travel orders and per diem funds at my unit in Michurinsk and turned them in at my rayvoyenkomat. In 1955, I was given another medical check-up by orders of the voyenkomat and discharged from the reserve for medical reasons (same as before) and issued a so called belyy bilet (white ticket or permanent deferment from service).

19. RESIDENCES FROM BIRTH:

1919 - 1926	Several addresses in Tbilisi
1926 - 1934	Tbilisi, Kirochnaya Ulitsa #35, an apartment in a two-story house, formerly a private house, later taken over by the State ZHAKT (housing organization) enterprise. After my mother's death, I entered the local electro-technicum and moved to the students' dormitories.
1934 - 1938	Tbilisi, Ulitsa Sovetskaya, # not recalled, student hostel of Tbilisi Electro-Technicum.
1938 - 1941	Mikha Tskhakaya, Ulitsa Tsulukidze, #14. Here I rented a room in a private one-story house of a retired RR switchman, Ilya LORDKIPANIDZE, who had to rent a room in his house to boarders to supplement his pension. Ilya's wife, Keto (Catherine), for an additional charge took care of my laundry and cooked for me. The couple had no children of their own and treated me as their own son.

1941 - 1946	Army Service
1946 - 1962 (until defection)	Mikha Tskhakaya, Ulitsa Shota Rustaveli, #25, the private home of my common-law wife, Nina GANDELI. I was in love with her and had an affair with her before I went to war. During the war, I found out that Nina's husband was killed in action and decided to return to Tskhakaya to be near her. I moved in with Nina and continued to live with her without registering our marriage at the local ZAGS (registrar office for marriage, deaths and births). Although I insisted on legalizing our union, Nina was always opposed, being unhappy in her first marriage, and wanted to feel free to end the relationship at any time. For the last several years Nina, as I found out, was meeting other men during my absence from home. A rift between us developed and grew more and more with the passing of time. Being deprived of Nina's intimacy, I reacted by dating other girls. We were on the verge of separation many times but somehow made up. I tried desperately to resolve our problems since, when I still was very close to Nina, I made anti-regime remarks on several occasions and even planned a joint escape from the USSR. I was afraid to aggravate her too much in order not to push her into possibly reporting me to the militia. However, for some reason Nina did not want to break off with me completely, and one day announced that she was expecting a child and wanted to legalize our marriage. Since, I did not consider myself the father of the child and fearing black-mail by Nina, I decided to speed up my defection which I was planning anyway.

20. TRAVEL:

None except as described previously.

21. HISTORY OF ARRESTS:

In June 1962, I was approached by the rayon militia at my place of work and was taken to the militia offices where I was accused of being a long standing member of a Georgian resistance group and of making anti-government statements. Although I had actually made such remarks on occasions and was therefore guilty of the latter charge, I noticed that the militia did not have sufficient information on this subject and I denied all accusations. I could not figure out who was behind the report. After prolonged interrogation, during which I was extensively questioned on my biography, parents, army service, contacts, etc., I was released with the warning that I was not to leave the area for the time being and that I would be contacted in the near future by the militia. Except for this case, I was never arrested or detained by militia or security organs.

22. MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS:

I never belonged to the Communist Party. I was urged to join the Komsomol in 1937 while at the Tbilisi Elektro-Technicum, and was sponsored there by two of my class-mates, each of whom had more than two years of Komsomol standing. I submitted the application to the local Komsomol yacheyka (cell) and at a general meeting of the cell members my application was discussed and I told my life story and answered questions put to me by the members. After I was accepted, I received my membership card in about two months from the city rayon committee of the Komsomol in Tbilisi after which I had to attend meetings and pay very small dues. I never held any official position with the Komsomol organization. When I left Tbilisi, I had to deregister from the Tbilisi organization and register with the local organization at my new place of residence in Mikha Tskhakaya (usually referred to by the local population simply as 'Tskhakaya'). The same proceedure had to be repeated upon my departure to and discharge from the army (deregistration from the old organization and registration at the new place). Upon my return from the army to Tskhakaya, I never registered with the local organization again.

When I started to work in Tskhakaya, I was automatically enrolled in the prof-soyuz (trade unions) where I was a passive member paying my dues (something like 1% of my salary) to the trade union organizer of MTS (prof-org) and attending the obligatory meetings from time to time. I never took any advantage of trade union members privileges such as the cut-rate accommodations in rest homes (putevka v dom otdykha).

23. CONNECTIONS WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES:

I never had any contacts with intelligence services. I was never approached to serve in any capacity for Soviet security organs.

24. DEFECTION AND ESCAPE:

A. MOTIVATION:

In spite of being born and raised in a Communist country, I, at an early age began to understand that real freedom did not exist for the individual. It was also clear to me that personal advancement did not depend on talent and integrity but on the degree of one's political activity. I analyzed the Communist lies seeing reality so different from the official propoganda. During and after the war, I met people who visited Western countries and was able to benefit from the particles of truth about a different life there from the even sometimes very carefully worded reports of those people. After I purchased a good radio of 'Mir' make in 1956, I started to listen intensively to foreign broadcasts. For a long time I cultivated the idea of eventual escape from the USSR where I had no relatives, no family, no possibilities for advancement and a decent life. My anti-government sentiments which developed as time passed became stronger and stronger, and it became more and more difficult for me to hold myself back and not to express them openly, which I did anyway on several occasions. My involvment with the militia and the unfavorable developments in my personal life accelerated my plans for defection.

B. TECHNIQUES OF ESCAPE:

On 25 June 1962, three days after my experience with the militia, I left my residence at 0700 as I normally would to go to work. I walked out of town toward Samtredia. I wore my regular clothing, had 80 rubles and a small hand bag. I did not want to take the train being afraid of militia surveillance. After I walked two or three kilometers on the highway, I got a ride on a truck from a near-by collective farm which was headed in the same direction. I got off the truck downtown in Samtredia and paid the driver one ruble, then walked toward the railroad station. Here I purchased the ticket for Batumi and boarded the train at 1150 arriving in Batumi at 1415. I found a safe place and slept until dark. I started off on foot from Batumi and followed the sea shore until I reached the old shooting range about 1 1/2 or 2 km to the south. Here I entered the water at about 2200 hours, after destroying my passport (the rest of my documents were left at home) and burying my clothing and bag. I knew from previous study of a map at home that I had to swim some 18 km. to Turkish territory. I swam all night and was not sure if I had reached Turkish soil, but being exhausted, I came ashore at about 0300 or 0400 hours. The point where I stepped out was on the gradient of a steep slope. There I saw the silhouette of a hut and went in. There was an old discarded electric motor in the hut. From the Russian description on the motor, I understood that I was still in Russia. I hid in the underbrush near-by and spent the rest of the night and the following day there. When it was getting dark, I climbed the slope to observe the area. I walked for a while hearing voices in Russian coming from the shore. I saw a dark object on the sea which resembled a submarine. I continued walking near the shore and around 2200 or 2300 hours I entered the water and started to swim 3 km off shore and then parallel to it. When I came into the range of a search light which swept the sea, I submerged. When I came to the surface the search light swept over me but nothing happened and I knew I had not been discovered. I continued to swim until I was completely exhausted, and several hours before dawn went ashore and hid in a cave opposite two big rocks in the sea near the shore. I remained there until morning. The next morning I climbed up the slope where I saw a stone structure resembling a grave. I went in and observed the land around me from a small opening. I saw a large village which I later learned was Kemal-Pasha. I thought at first that a minaret was an observation tower. I also presumed that this was the village of Sarpi, still on Soviet territory. I was very thirsty and climbed down the hill to a near-by stream to drink water. I met an 11 or 12 year old boy whom I addressed in Russian but the boy drew away from me. Being still not sure as to where I was, I walked in the stream for a while to hide my footprints. Then I hid in the underbrush until it grew dark. I came out and went around the village to its opposite end. There I entered the town and knocked on the door of a house situated on a hillside. I called out in Russian. Even though I heard voices and footsteps in the house nobody opened the door. I climbed on the roof of a sort of stable in the courtyard and spent the night there. Early next morning I was awakened by noises in the courtyard. I saw several women and two men. I approached them and tried to make them understand by sign language that I had come from Russia. Meanwhile, some persons carrying sticks and axes came into the courtyard. I again tried to explain that I came from Russia and wanted to remain in Turkey. The men took me to the military authorities in Kemal-Pasha.

When I dived into the sea in Batumi, I was wearing swimming trunks, a belt and a pair of fins. There was a clasp knife in my belt, a sack needle for stinging myself in case of a cramp, my money in a nylon bag, three bars of chocolate, a compass and two Phenamin tablets to increase my energy in a separate nylon bag. Except for the occasional search light in the sea, which I avoided by diving, I did not encounter any other obstacles on my way.

I did not inform anybody about my escape plans and did not receive any help from anybody.

From Kemal-Pasha where I was given some clothing, I was taken by car to Erzerum and from there by train to Istanbul refugee center. I was there about a week and was taken to Germany with the assistance of US authorities on Friday 6 July 1962.

25 DOCUMENTS:

A. PASSPORT:

I received my first three-year passport at #17 militia (passport desk) office of Molotovskiy rayon of Tbilisi, where I resided at that time. The passport was a single sheet of paper with my photo and biographic data on it. In 1939 I exchanged it for a new five-year passport at the Mikha Tskhakaya rayon militia. This passport was of a regular booklet form and along with my photo and bio data, had a stamp of propiska (registration with militia) which stated the date of my arrival in this town and my residence address. When I was drafted to the army, I turned in my passport and military booklet to the rayvoyenkomat, and picked it up upon discharge from the service. At that time I received a new five-year passport from the same militia office with the propiska showing my new address. In 1951, I exchanged my passport for the new one which was valid for 10 years and which was exchanged for another 10-year passport in 1961.

B. MILITARY BOOKLET (Voyennyy Bilet):

See paragraph 18. In the army I had a service booklet (sluzhebnaya knizhka) which I turned in to my rayon voyenkomat upon return from the army.

C. LABOR BOOKLET (Trudovaya Knizhka):

I never possessed one since it was issued by one employer and turned in to the new employer when an individual changed employment. I never changed jobs.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: AIROGUE

DATE: 5 July 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Osterdstr. 1; Apt. 9

Orme K. Daronnat

Orme K. [illegible], Case Officer

COMMENTS: CO and Mr. Minor went to see Subject in response to a telephone call from him. His Major problem was that he was broke and needed money. CO gave him DM 100.00 to eat on for a week but Subject says that it's impossible to live on that amount.

It is obvious that he is getting edgy and wants some action from Hdqtrs. He was told that if anything is to done for him in S.A. it will require correspondence between our people in S.A. and Headquarters, that this will take time and there is nothing he can do but wait. Subject thanked us for our help and said he is sorry to cause us so much trouble.

12, 19, 26 July - subsistance paid.

S-E-C-R-E-T

File #192813

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: [illegible]

DATE: 28 June 1962

TIME:

PLACE: FFM Apt

David R. Reinbold
david r reinbold, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apartment and learned that though the German firm in Dusseldorf is interested in his invention, it nevertheless has not committed itself and desires to study it awhile. Subject indicated to CO that he has no intentions to wait until the Germans make up their minds. He was obviously discouraged by his inability to sell his invention and realization he is no longer needed by [illegible].

As the result of the above he commented that he is now anxious to go to South America or to any country where we can assist him legalizing. He even stated that since he has no funds from the sale of his invention he is not anxious to return to the Congo and say goodbye to his friends. He stated several times previously that the only reason he would return would be to see his friends, that he has no business to take care of, and that he could handle the personal matters through the mail.

CO informed him that he would inform Washington that subject is now ready and anxious to go to S America. Subj then brought up the fact that the Dusseldorf firm which he visited was very interested in taking advantage of his Congo background and send him there as a business representative. At first he would go strictly as a private individual working for a business firm, but that his status would change somewhat once the German Government would sponsor part of the firm's activity in the Congo. He stated that he has no real desire to return to the Congo for a German firm since such a step would in his mind indicate that he no longer is available for us. He would therefore rather go to a place of our choosing and be available any time he was asked to serve by Uncle Sam. He commented however that in the event we delay his leaving Germany unduly (in his estimation) he may be forced to take the offer made by the German firm. He made it clear that he did not mean this as a threat, but a straight resettlement fact since by taking the job in the Congo he would at least have a job, whereas by going to South America he has no job in sight.

Memo to the File [illegible]

On 26 June 62 Subj called and said that he had gone to Düsseldorf on 22 June and is returning there for further discussions on his invention on 27 June. He stated that the people there are interested in his invention and he hoped that xxxxxxxx something could soon be worked out.

He commented further that the person he brought the letter to (letter of introduction mentioned in previous reports) is with a German firm which is interested in the Congo and in contact with Congolese officials.

Subj will call CO upon his return to Frankfurt on 27 June 62.

David R. Reinbold
david r reinbold

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 22 June 1962

TIME: 0930

PLACE: Ostenstr 1/9

david r reinhold, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO met Subj at his apt and informed him that word was received from Washington that due to President Kennedys economy drive Subjs services were no longer needed. Moreover that we were highly appreciate of his past performances and devotion to us. Subj, who was very calm throughout the entire session, took the news very well and stated that he had expected to learn his above fate.

He commented that now that he will no longer be in our employ he is virtually without means to support himself since the only funds he has xx are the amounts given him by Mr Murmann. He said further that unless he sold his invention to someone in Germany he not only would not be able to support himself but could also not pay for his fare to South America. (See below) It was xxxxxfc therefore agreed that Subj should now make every effort to sell his invention here and to this effect he was given his letter of introduction to the Dr in Dusseldorf where he hoped to go today. If this does not succeed he will attempt to contact a few of the large electrical firms (such as Siemens, Braun, AEG) in the Frankfurt area. CO informed him that we will give him sufficient time for him to discover whether or not He will or can sell his invention in Germany. During this time he was told he could remain in our apt and continue to receive his subsistence from us. Subj answered that since he will not be working for us in the future he is very anxious to make his own way and will make every effort to get his business taken care of as soon as possible.

Subj was told that in the event he is not successful in selling his invention, we would inform our people in Washington that he is without funds and request financial assistance, especially to cover plane fare wherever he is going. He emphasized that if he does sell his invention he intends to pay his own way.

(over)

CO further commented that while Subj returns to the Congo to conclude his business (and on the way stop off in Geneva and Brussels to take care of his matter for the Defence Ministerium) we would upon his return given him a new passport, probably a second Austrian passport, but in the name of de[illegible]chet. We would moreover make xxx every effort to get him into a South American country where he, with a minimum of effort and difficulty could legalize and establish citizenship. Subj stated that he is or would be very thankful for this assistance. He then mentioned that he does not really have any business to take up for the xxxxxx Defence Ministry, but that was just a ruse to get him out of the country. Moreover that in the event he does not sell his invention he has no intention to return to the Congo since he will not have sufficient funds to pay for his retur trip to Germany.

•Subj promised to call CO upon his return from Dusseldorf.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFFCTOR

SUBJECT: [illegible]

DATE: 19 June 1962

TIME: 1400

PLACE: Ostendstr 1/9

david r reinbold **, Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

CO visited Subj at his apt and paid him DM 300 subsistence (and meals) for the period 11 June through 30 June 1962.

Subj stated that the firm in Dortmund was not interested in his invention stating that they would have to sell it so cheaply they could not make any money on it.

Subj asked if there was anything new. CO informed him that the ways of Hqs are often strange to understand but that there is evidence that something is being done since a telegram was received inquiring whether or not he had any preference as to where he may prefer to legalize in South America. He stated that he did not care where he lived, the important thing being that he would like to work for us anywhere in the world. He even mentioned Loos where he claimed he could be of some use.

CO informed Subj that for future planning he would like to know that in the event we would assist him in legalizing in S. America, but informed he that he would no longer have a job with us, whether he could get along on his own. He stated that though this would make him unhappy he would naturally have to make the best arrangements possible.

Subj though concerned about his future and indicating that he dislikes sitting around doing nothing nevertheless was not over bearing or demanding.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 14 June 1962

TIME: 1100

PLACE: Annex A

Orme K. Daronna
Orme K. Daronna, Case Officer

COMMENTS: Subject called to inform CO that he had heard from Dortmund regarding his invention but money had not been mentiondd and he was going there to see if he could get some action.

CO told him that Hdqtrs had informed us that they would try to have an answer to our questions and problems by the end of this week.

He was also informed that CO would be leaving on Saturday on vacation and that Mr. Minor would be working with him until CO returned. He was assured that Minor was aware of all the problems and knows the case thoroughly.

Subject might return on Saturday but if not he will contact Minor next week.

S-E-C-R-E-T

192913

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 5 June 1962

TIME: 1000

PLACE: Ostendstr. 4, Apt 9

Orme K. Darommat

ORME K. DAROMMAT, **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

Case Officer and a TSB Representative dropped in to see Subject and informed him that we had notified Headquarters the results of our discussion regarding documentation and had informed them of our and his thinking concerning this problem. He was told that there was nothing else to tell, that now we could only wait to get an answer with their suggestions. He was offered his old Austrian passport and identity papers so he could go to Geneva and Brussels to finish his assignment for the Congolese Defense Ministry. Subject said he was in no hurry to do this and therefore refused the passport, stating that he was hoping to hear from Dortmund regarding his invention within the next two weeks and this assignment he had to do could be done on his way back to Leopoldville. It is obvious that Subject's primary worry or concern is to get a job with us. Subject asked if his identity card could be renewed. Case Officer took the card and had it re-validated until 24 June and returned it to Subject.

Subject was also told that the cook would be taken from him for several weeks and that Case Officer would give him 100 DM to eat on. Subject was quite surprised and pleased.

Subject suggested that we investigate the possibility of his immigrating to Australia, Canada, England, etc. Case Officer said that his chances were nil, that the entrance requirements to these countries were extremely difficult to satisfy and that his best bet is probably South America.

Case Officer promised to return as soon as he had some free time or as soon as he heard something from Headquarters.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 29 May 1962

TIME: 1200

PLACE: 1/9 Ostendstr.

Orme K. Daronnat

ORME K. DARONNAT , **Case Officer**

COMMENTS:

David E. [illegible]

Case Officer and [redacted] introduced as Mr. Joseph LORTON, went to see Subject with the express purpose of discussing the various possibilities that might be available to document Subject as legally as possible.

Subject told CO that he had made contact in Dortmund under the name of de Panaskhet, whith a firm that was interested in his invention. They told him that since he did not have a patent this would pose a problem and offered him 5,000 DM for his idea. Subject told them he would give it to them outright for $10,000. Although they did not refuse his request, they told him they would think it over and discuss it with the boss and would have to make a patent search which would take up to 4 weeks. Subject told them to go ahead but not to try to pull any funny business since there were ways of proving that the idea was his and he could offer it to other firms. Subject will now wait to be contacted by this firm.

Case Officer told Subject that we had not heard anything from Headquarters regarding his re-employment by us. He asked if there was some way of finding out approximately how long it would take. CO told him this was very difficult, but we would see if we could make an educated guess.

Subject asked for a key to the mailbox since he will be receiving mail from his friends in Dortmund and possibly from the firm which he has contacted.

[illegible]

[redacted] then began discussing documentation with Subject along the following lines:

The type of documentation he would receive if any would depend upon the final decision from Headquarters as yet not received. We solicited suggestions from Subject as to solutions to the documentation problem. Apparently his immediate desire is to receive back his Austrian pass, finish his business in Europe and return to the Congo to clean up matters there.

The other or long range alternative would be, he would like to have especially if he is not employed by KUBARK, documentation of a legal nature in the name of David de Panaskhet with which he could surface anywhere in the world and take up legal residence. He himself suggested the possibility of our agency determining some South American country where suitable briberies are possible. He could acquire citizenship in a short period of time, if possible without his personal appearance there and acquire a passport from that country. Obviously this would mean finding some country where bribery would affect quick acqusition of citizenship and passport. He did not express any particular eagerness to accept German documentation unless he could get a Reiseausweis. We discussed the relative merits of a Fremdenpass and a Reiseausweis. We told him that if we could obtain a Fremdenpass with a minimum of change in his true life story, but the acqusition of a Reiseausweis would mean telling a big lie, which he personally took a dim view, but said he would do it if necessary. We said we thought we could get him a Fremdenpass without too much difficulty from controlled authorities but the effect of control and security of this passport would be limited to the time he remained registered at the place from which the Fremdenpass was issued. Therefore, the issuance of a Fremdenpass might well be a short range/ solution only unless he could obtain an immigration visa to the desired country of resettlement with~~out~~in a six-month period. In any event, the decision to obtain a Fremdenpass would rest on the decision made by Headquarters as to the final disposition of his case. In the event a Fremdenpass was to be obtained Subject was requested to sign all necessary forms and submit all necessary information for the completion of these forms, which he did. He was reassured again that no steps will be made to acquire a Fremdenpass without prior consultation with him.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT ON CONTACT WITH AGENT OR DEFECTOR

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

DATE: 24 May 1962

TIME: 1100 hours

PLACE: Ostendstrass

OKD

ORME K. DARONNAT, Case Officer

COMMENTS:

LACKLEN introduced DARONNAT as Mr. Murmann and explained that he would now be working with Subject. On the way to lunch DARONNAT explained that he and Subject would be working together to resolve whatever problems Subject might have. During lunch, conversation was limited mostly to Subject's views on the Congo situation and the solutions. He also expounded at great lengths on the ~~matter~~ nature of the Congolese and the Belgians whom he would appear to dislike intensely.

Upon return to the apartment Subject was told that we would like to get him West German documentation with political recognition. He was told that if we are successful he would be documented as legally as possible under the circumstances and would be in a position to begin a new life. Subject was very pleased but a bit skeptical that we could accomplish this. He was asked to think carefully about his desire to use the name David de Panaskhet since, if he was wanted for breaking parole in France, there could be a watch list for that name and it could be assumed that since Panaskhet was his brother's name, Subject might assume that name some day. Subject stated that someone was confused about his status in France, that he was not on parol and had, therefore, not done anything wrong in leaving the country. He said that the worst that could happen if he returned there would be for the authorities to ask him why he had left the town he had been confined to. His answer would be that since they had restricted his movements he had left the country (C. O. doubts that this is true but ~~would~~ did not raise any questions).

Subject was given a DRC identity card, number 596, in the name of David de Panaskhet. Since HARVARD is awaiting Headquarters proposal regarding Subject's resettlement, C. O. suggested that he investigate the possibility of marketing his telephone answering device.

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Subject stated that a woman friend of his in Dortmund knew him by his Russian name but if he visited her she would ask no questions which would pose a security or otherwise embarrassing problems for us. The man he proposed to visit in Dusseldorf to whom he had a letter of introduction, would have to be told his name is Reiner. C. O. told him to do what he thought necessary but to be careful since it would appear that his case was complicated enough without complicating it further. C. O. told Subject to call him when he returns from Dortmund and Dusseldorf.

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CONTACT REPORT

DATE: 23 May 1962, 1000 to 1145 hours

SUBJECT: WIROGUE **KUBARK OFFICER:** Stephon R. LACKLEN

1. As requested by AD/FI, LACKLEN met WIROGUE as scheduled in the CABELONE apartment at 100 hours on 23 May 1962. Roscoe H. MOSIEN accompanied to witness the meeting and assist later if necessary, in reconstruction of needed facts.

2. LACKLEN told WIROGUE that ~~he~~ had been sent a message to Washington with the highlights of the 22 May meeting. He said that this message probably could not be acted upon prior to 23 May due to the time difference between Washington and Frankfurt. He was advised that while we hope for some word today it was more probable we would not get an answer prior to 24 May. WIROGUE said that he understood the time delays in awaiting replies from Washington and expressed his satisfaction with our efforts to assist him.

3. LACKLEN told him the documents which he had loaned us were being photographed and would be returned to him as soon as possible. WIROGUE said he was in no hurry for his documents and for us to keep them as long as we needed them. He said he hated ~~it~~ being cooped up in this apartment and hoped that we could give him an interim pass which would permit him to go out on the street in Frankfurt. LACKLEN said that he was trying to obtain this pass as soon as possible, the photo WIROGUE gave 22 May was not proper with thw sport shirt and that he would have MOSIEN take more pictures the afternoon of 23 May with coat and tie. for the pass. LACKLEN explained that the delay in issuing the pass was simply getting another operational activity to release one of their cover passes for WIROGUE. LACKLEN assured him that we were moving as rapidly as possible and would make every effort to have a pass for him by 1700 23 May. LACKLEN said if this was not possible he would phone him at 1700 and probably have the pass the following morning, the morning of 24 May. WIROGUE agreed.

4. WIROGUE said that he wanted to travel to Dortmund and Dusseldorf to talk to people there about his telephone answering device. He would like to have a pass to facilitate this trip which would take two or three days. LACKLEN suggested WIROGUE "sit tight" until we had some information from Washington before making this trip. In this exchange of conversation WIROGUE mentioned that he preferred not to use his Austrian passport in Germany. LACKLEN took this entree and asked WIROGUE why didn't he get a real passport as it was obvious WIROGUE felt the Austrian passport was reaching the end of its usefulness. WIROGUE said he wanted more than anything else to legalize himself in any country, even the Congo. He said that he knew US citizenship was impossible because of his criminal record. LACKLEN asked him if he had ever considered German citizeship. (NOTE: In the discussion of a permanent recognition document, LACKLEN deliberately confused the terms economic recognition, citizehsip, political recognition,etc.) WIROGUE was not willing to spend the required five years residency in Germany to attain citizeuship or for that matter in any other country. LACKLEN mentioned that some German documentation might be obtainable, however, he knew

nothing about this. LACKLEN said that certainly with the large numbers of refugees that have come to West Germany in the past 15 years, there must be some means of getting documentation. LACKLEN said if WIROGUE would ~~xxx~~ officially ask him for German recognition that he would forward this request to Washington. LACKLEN made it very clear that we here in Germany could make no commitments, could do nothing on this matter or make another move on this case until we hear from Washington. WIROGUE said he clearly understood this and asked for German documentation in exchange for his Austrian passport, etc.

5. Later in the conversation WIROGUE mentioned he had a moral obligation to carry out his assignment for the Congolese army here in Europe and said he must give them some information by mail withing three weeks. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE how would a German recognition affect his dealings with the Congolese army. WIROGUE said he must return to the Congo for two or three days to conclude his contract with them. He would require his Austrian passport for this.

6. Throughout the conversation WIROGUE used the words, if "the service" does not have anything for me." ~~x~~ It is LACKLEN's opinion that WIROGUE believes it quite possible that KUBARK may not have an assignment for him and that if we can provide him with usable recognition documentation he might be [illegible] effectively terminated. The one problem still unclear, however, is how to obtain his agreement not to return to the Congo. The matter that we retain his Austrian passport will prevent him from returning to the Congo, but it will be very desirable to find a plausible reason by which we can make him see he must not return to the Congo.

7. LACKLEN requested and WIROGUE agreed to remain in the ~~x~~ apartment until the pass could be obtained. LACKLEN arranged for a maid to come in and cook his meals. French magazines were provided. It is believed he will be content in the apartment through 24 May.

8. Throughout the meeting WIROGUE continually ~~xxxxxxx~~ expressed his views on the Congo, documentation procedures and techniques, etc. LACKLEN suggested that he had very useful information that might be of ~~xx~~ interest to an expert in these fields and asked if he would be agreeable to talking with someone. WIROGUE said he would be very pleased to do so. LACKLEN made this pitch as a contingency by which we might tie up WIROGUE for several days in ~~x~~ "important" debriefings and delay ~~xxx~~ his pressing for an immediate solution. We might also describe delays as being caused by Washington ~~xxx xxxxxx~~ bureaucracy, something of which he claims to be very familiar with. During these debriefings it would be possible also to learn the extent fo his knowlegeability of KUBARK operations, personalities, etc. LACKLEN believes WIROGUE has quite an extensive knowledge of KUBARK. He has been handled by many people, in many places and in many ways.

9. Concerning WIROGUE's request that we ask Washington approval to explore the possibility of obtaining German recognition for him, he requested that if documentation could be obtained he would like it in the name of "David De Panaskhot". He said this was his brother's legal name in France. WIROGUE suggested also that the document include that he was also known previously as "David Teitzichvili" which is his real and true name from birth.

10. WIROGUE continued to show a complete satisfaction and contentment with our handling of his case so far. LACKLEN reiterated that we were "rolling along" as rapidly as possible and would make every effort to get an early reply from Washington. To further "substantiate" our desires to give him every assistance, LACKLEN offered to furnish him with the addresses of the Telefunken, Grundig and other electric factories in West Germany where he might sell his invention. WIROGUE said he would appreciate this, but that he also had letters of introduction to several firms in Dortmund and Dusseldorf. At the conclusion of the meeting, LACKLEN summed up the timetable for action as follow:

a. MOSIEN would return at about 1400 today to take needed pass photos and bring him some French reading material. ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE agreed to remain in the apartment until such a pass was available. LACKLEN would do his best to get it by 1700 today, but if not, early on 24 May.

b. When a pass was available WIROGUE could work out arrangements to go to ~~[illegible]~~ Dortmund, etc., however, it may be that his debriefing on the Congo, on documentation, etc. was of sufficient importance that he should be debriefed immediately.

c. To make his stay in the apartment as comfortable as possible he should suggest to the maid the types of foods he particularly enjoys.

d. We would continue to press Washington for authority needed to resolve his case.

11. WIROGUE understood the program and was quite satisfied. He is cooperative and LACKLEN believes will continue to be so as long as a logical and plausible program is presented. LACKLEN's next contact with WIROGUE will be by telephone at 1700 hours on 23 May when he will tell him the pass is not ready and arrange for another contact at 1030 hours on 24 May.

Stephen R Lacklen
STEPHEN R. LACKLEN

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CONTACT REPORT 22 MAY 1962

SUBJECT: WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE phoned Mr. Schneider (HORDWIN) at FC 553001 at 1420 hours 22 May advising that he was at the Frankfurt Main Bahnhof and wished to meet Mr. Schneidor. Mr. Schneider requested WIROGUE call back in ten minutes. HORDWIN advised Acting AD/FI that WIROGUE was in Frankfurt and requested what action was desired. Acting AD/FI advised HORDWIN to arrange pick up, billet subject in CABEZONE blown apartment and await further instructions. HORDWIN advised WIROGUE when he called back that Mr. Miller (LACKLEN) would meet him at 1500 hours at Track 15, Main Bahnhof. At Acting AD/FI's request LACKLEN first reported to his office to review passport photograph of WIROGUE and get further instructions. Acting AD/FI instructed LACKLEN to take him to the apartment and if feasible, obtain the passport and with extreme caution elicit any information regarding WIROGUE's purpose for coming to Frankfurt. DCOS came through the office at this time and was advised that LACKLEN and CABEZONE were carrying out this task.

2. WIROGUE was met as planned. He advised that he had already checked into the Hotel Savoy across the street. LACKLEN believed it most feasible to obtain the passport if he were in a CABEZONE apartment. If he were in the hotel, he may be reluctant to give up the passport, etc. WIROGUE was concerned at first about burdening us by living in our apartment but agreed to do so. Stephen R. LACKLEN using alias Mr. Edward Miller and Roscoe MOSIEN using alias Mr. Dale drove subject in CABEZONE car to #1 Ostend Strasse, apartment 9. This nice one-bedroom apartment with kitchen and bath and a living room is regarded as blown and is scheduled to be dropped in Fiscal 1963. The telephone number there is 492813. Contact instructions given WIROGUE in a FRAN cable were Mr. Schneider's number FC 553001 (ops phone located in HORDWIN's office) and the Annex A Guard Post number Northern 8766 for after hours. Both of these numbers should be changed as soon as feasible.

3. As soon as WIROGUE was settled in the apartment, LACKLEN described himself as an administrative officer who was meeting him seeing that he got settled in the new apartment and attending to any of his immediate needs. LACKLEN made it very clear that he had no authority to give him any committments or resolve his case. LACKLEN said, however, that he would like

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to take back to his boss some general information on what WIROGUE wanted in Frankfurt. This led WIROGUE to begin a long discussion of his problems in the Congo and his desires for a new assignment with the "Service". LACKLEN was trying to build up sufficient rapport by letting him talk, to find an opening by which he could obtain the passport.

4. WIROGUE advised that he had come from Leopoldville to Brussels and was fortunate enough to catch a connecting flight 22 May to Frankfurt. He explained he was in Frankfurt to talk with some old contacts in hopes they might have a job for him. He asked if Miller (LACKLEN) knew Mike. LACKLEN told him no. He said that he had arranged with the Congolese Minister of Defense to come to Europe to attempt to trace 30,000,000 Francs (sic) - rate 65/1 US Dollar which had been given to the Ministry of Defense officials to purchase airplanes. This money had been deposited in Swiss banks and disappeared. He showed LACKLEN an Order de Mission dated 17 May 1962 signed by the Secretary General of the Congolese Foreign Ministry identifying him for travel for the Congolese Government to as many countries in Europe as necessary. WIROGUE sounded resolved to complete this mission. He claimed, however, that this mission was simply a cover for his Frankfurt contact with the "Service".

5. WIROGUE talked about himself for about an hour and a half. Some of the highlights of this are:

a. About the investigation - a Belgian citizen, who had been in the Congo before independence and who was now a colonel in the Congolese Army and close to General Mobutu had gone to the American embassy to "name-check" WIROGUE. WIROGUE said he was not worried about this investigation (NOTE: LACKLEN was not asking these questions, but simply listening to WIROGUE and attempting to lead up to the request for his passport). WIROGUE felt the only way this Belgian colonel could pin him down was by contacting the Viennese diplomat representative in Leopoldville and through him checking WIROGUE's Austrian passport number. He mentioned that his friends in the Surete and Department of Defense Ministry had asked him for a police certificate from Austria. WIROGUE saw no problem in furnishing this. He could fabricate this with no trouble and was confidant it would be accepted because the Congolese officials would have no other such document to compare it with and had a practice of throwing records away.

b. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE what he would like to do, what type of work he was interested in. WIROGUE replied in a 30 minute presentation that he liked outdoor work with military operations like commando work. He liked to work inmilitary uniform or civilian clothes. He hated desk work. LACKLEN asked him if he would like to work in Communist China, Russia, Indochina, or Germany. WIROGUE replied by saying it depended on the job. He wanted a challenge. He said just give me a mission and I'll carry it out. Don't worry about his being arrested, killed or whatever, money was not important. LACKLEN again emphasized that he had no job in mind, but simply was trying to determine what WIROGUE was interested in, what his experience had been, and what he might be qualified to do. LACKLEN said that he would take this information back to his boss, who would have to contact Wishington. We here in Frankfurt knew nothing about him and had no file of his experience.

c. LACKLEN asked WIROGUE suppose there is no assignment for you? What would you like to do then? WIROGUE continued discussing his interest in working for the "Service" and indirectly made it clear he was not interested in a normal job and life. LACKLEN asked him what country he was a citizen of. WIROGUE stated that he was stateless. LACKLEN asked him what country he would like to live in if he had his choise, if he could have anything he wanted where would he like to go what would he like to do in a normal life? WIROGUE replied he didn't know, but he hated Germans and gave the impression that he was very content with his present status. At no time was it discussed or did WIROGUE mention employment, entry, or citizenship in the U. S. He also stated he could not go back to France due to some trouble which he then described as the bank robbery.

d. LACKLEN asked him if he was actually receiving a salary from the Congolese Government. He said he was making about 15,000 Congolese Francs per month and this was not enough to live decently on. He said his job in addition to this investigation he was conducting on the embezzlement of money that he was in effect the chief of the Congolese Air Force.

e. WIROGUE described his abilities in demolitions, commando work, liquidations, air operations and navigation and a general knowledge of "spy work". He also said that he was an expert on documentation and that he liked to work making phony documentation, water marks, etc. He also mentioned his telephone answering device which he made for $8.00 and wished to go to Dortmund, West Germany to attempt to market it.

f. During the course of the above conversation WIROGUE showed LACKLEN several documents to substantiate his claims of employment by the Congolese Government, etc. LACKLEN decided that the documentation interest of the "Service" in these Congolese documents would be the best entree to obtain his passport. LACKLEN attempted to display a shallow inflated interest in the water marks and stamps on the documents as an Admin Officer who had had a one week operational course and was really trying to get the documents to impress his boss. With each document LACKLEN commented about their simplicity and easy forging possibilities and how much the documents people would love to get ~~ax~~ their hands on this. WIROGUE loaned LACKLEN the following documents:

(1) Passport (Austrian) 090058
(2) Return Sabena Air Ticket 8096473 to Leopoldville
(3) Congo D ivers Permit
(4) Carte d' Indenitite D'Etranger
(5) [illegible] Pass from MINDEF/Congo re Technician Status (Civilian)
(6) Health Certificate
(7) Laissez Passer # 71-58. Congo Pass from Leopoldville to Brazzaville
(8) Laissez Passer as Major, Congo Army
(9) UN Pass (access to Royal Hotel, Leopoldville)
(10) Congo Certificate of Vaccination
(11) Order de Mission (17 May 62) by Secretary General Foreign Ministry
(12) Order de Mission to Brazzaville to apprehend a man signed by Joseph MATUBA, 26 March 62

(13) Attestation he is Attache (Technician) Congo Army by M. Kalongo, Sec. Gen. Ministry of Defense 28 December 61

6. LACKLEN asked if he could borrow these documents so they could be photographed as he was sure they were of extreme value. LACKLEN said that inasmuch as these documents were WIROGUE's property if he insisted he would have someone photograph the documents tonight and bring them back as fast as possible, but

it would be preferable to have it done on 23 May during the regular working day. WIROGUE said that he was in no rush for the documents and please go ahead, take our time, but he would like to have them back within 48 hours. He then said what would happen if I went out on the street tonight without documents? LACKLEN said that he could possibly give him a simple identity card as working with the American Army here, but requested that WIROGUE stay in the apartment tonight, there was food there and we would bring in anything he wanted, such as magazines, etc. WIROGUE said that he was tired, that he would take a bath and stay in the apartment. LACKLEN said that he would return at approximately 1000 hours 23 May and if WIROGUE had any problems call the emergency number he was given.

7. LACKLEN observed as WIROGUE was going through his wallet, attache case and pockets for various documentation which he thought we would like to photograph, an approximate 9" x 11" inch photostat black copy which identified as his birth certificate. During the course of the conversation, WIROGUE also said that he had a driver's license your people gave me with my passport and while mentioning his commission as a major in the Congolese army that he was able to obtain this rank by showing his German Army papers (sic). WIROGUE did not indicate whether these papers were given him or he obtained or made them himself. **

8. Incidentally, WIROGUE indicated he would go into Soviet Russia on his own, accomplish any mission we wished to assign him and return. All at his own risk, provided we would "help him". He also indicated exceptional interest in making phony documents, etc.

** LACKLEN did not ask him for these documents since they had apparently been provided by our "Service" and would be inconsistent with the story of the "Service's" interest in photographing Congolese documents, stamps, etc. It is believed that at the right moment WIROGUE could be taken elsewhere for lunch or some other excuse, that he would probably leave these documents in his apartment and we could take possession of them. However, when this is done and he misses them, the die is cast.

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SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS BY LACKLEN

1. LACKLEN feels his approach as a personnel officer representing his boss, trying to get facts which might be helpful in finding out what could be done to help WIROGUE was effective in establishing a proper rapport with him. LACKLEN repeatedly emphasized that he lacked authority, information, etc to make any committments or be any more than an intermediary to his boss, who himself was an intermediary with Washington. LACKLEN emphasized his "sincere" interest in helping WIROGUE.

2. LACKLEN believes WIROGUE has been very satisfied with his first contact in Frankfurt and will be cooperative until we advise him his passport, etc, will not be returned.

3. WIROGUE impresses LACKLEN as being the man described and possessing the personality and other traits described in the cables. It is believed that he can be a dangerous and difficult individual when "crossed". It is suggested that a clear course of action be established prior to advising WIROGUE his documents are not being returned as it is quite likely WIROGUE has planned or will plan his own course of action.

4. LACKLEN believes that WIROGUE can be delayed for two, three, four, or even more days with the story these documents, the stamps are terrific, "our people" are really excited about them and we would like to keep them longer, we would like to send them to Washington, etc. It may be that WIROGUE could be given an identification card similar to but not identical with ~~xx~~ those provided defectors describing the individual as in Army custody as an interim measure and clearly marked with an expiration date.

5. It may be important to note that prior to meeting WIROGUE LACKLEN had only read FRAN 0404 and made a 30 second perusal of LEOP 3939 and DIR 11783. LACKLEN did really not retain any data from the two incoming messages and certifies that he did not lead WIROGUE in the conversation but simply let him talk with ~~xx~~ the purpose of establishing rapport and obtaining the passport if possible.

6. At approximately 1755 hours LACKLEN returned to the DCOS's office and briefed the DCOS and Acting AD/FI on the meeting. Acting AD/FI sent an Ops immediate cable to LEOP DIR and routine toR FROB. A meeting was scheduled in the AD/FI office at 0830 23 May. Acting AD/FI's request LACKLEN notified Deputy Chief MKTOPAZ to attend the meeting. ~~Axxix~~ Deputy Chief MKTOPAZ came to CABEZONE at 1945 hours 22 May and inspected documents. Acting Chief, CABEZONE was advised.

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Stephen R. Lacklen

LEBENSLAUF VON GEORG FRANK SANDERS

1. IDENTITÄT:

A. VOR- UND NACHNAME: Georg Frank SANDERS

B. NAME BEI GEBURT: Georg SANDERS, wie ersichtlich aus meinem Geburtsschein und allen anderen sowjetischen Dokumenten. Bei Ankunft in den Westen habe ich jedoch den Namen meines Vaters, Frank, meinem Vornamen beigefügt. In den USSR, als das Führen des Vatersnamens verlangt war, wurde ich Georg Frankovich SANDERS genannt.

C. ANDERE NAMEN: Ich habe niemals irgendwelche andere Namen benützt, aber meine Mutter hat mich mit der georgischen Abkürzung meines Namens "Zhori" gerufen und meine russischen Freunde haben mich "Zhora" oder "Zhorzh" genannt.

2. GEBURT:

A. GEBURTSDATUM: 25. Juli 1919

B. GEBURTSORT: Tiflis, Georgien, USSR. Tiflis ist der alte russische Name. Der georgische Name als auch der gegenwärtige offizielle Name ist Tbilisi.

C. NATIONALITÄT: Georgier

3. STAATSBÜRGERSCHAFT:

A. BEI GEBURT: sowjetische. Von 1917 (Oktober Revolution in Russland) bis 1921 war Georgien nach dem Fall des zaristischen Regimes von Menschewiken regiert und teilweise von türkischen, deutschen und britischen Truppen besetzt. Erst 1921 kam in Georgien die sowjetische Regierung offiziell an die Macht. Jedoch würden alle Personen die während dieser Übergangszeit geboren wurden später als Sowjetbürger anerkannt.

B. GEGENWÄRTIGE STAATSBÜRGERSCHAFT: Staatenlos

4. RELIGION: Orthodox (prawoslawni). Da ich in einer gottlosen Gesellschaftsordnung aufwuchs habe ich meine Religion in meiner Jugend nur sehr begrenzt ausgeübt und habe später als Erwachsener vollkommen aufgehört in eine Kirche zu gehen wegen der bestehenden Bedingungen in den USSR.

5. GESELLSCHAFTLICHER URSPRUNG: Intelligenz (slushaschtschi); Mein Vater war ein Ingenieur und meine Mutter gehörte zur Gruppe der Kopf-Arbeiter.

6. Beruf: Elektro-Techniker, das würde ungefähr in Deutschland einem Ingenieur ohne Diplom, d. h. ohne Universitätsbildung, entsprechen.

A. LETZTE STELLUNG: Chef Elektriker (starschi elektotechnik) bei MICHA- ZCHAKAJA RTS.

7. LETZTER WOHNORT: Sdota Rustaveli Strasse (ulitsa) Nr. 25 (Wohnung meiner Lebensgefährtin Nina GANDELI) in MICHA-ZCHAKAJA, Kutaisi Oblast, Georgien SSR.

8. EHESTAND: Ledig. Seit 1946 bis zu meiner Flucht lebte ich mit Nina GANDELI zusammen, geboren 1920, Mädchenname TAKTASCHWILI. Als ich sie kennenlernte war sie mit einem Postangestellten unglücklich verheiratet. Ihr Mann war viel älter als sie und die Ehe war von ihren Eltern geplant worden. Die Eltern waren altmodische Bauern von einem entlegenen Dorf die froh waren ihre Tochter mit einem verhältnismässig gebildeten und wohlhabenden Mann zu verheiraten. Zu dem Zeitpunkt da ich in die Armee einberufen wurde war Nina meine Geliebte. Als ich aus dem Krieg zurück kam zog ich zu ihr, da ihr Mann im Zweiten

Weltkrieg gefallen war. Sie lebte mit einer Tochter, die währendessen geboren worden war, in einer bescheidenen Wohnung die sie von ihrem Mann geerbt hatte. Ihre Eltern waren tot und sie arbeitete als Briefträgerin da sie nur eine bescheidene Ausbildung genossen hatte. Während der letzten Jahre unseres Zusammenlebens fand ich heraus, dass Nina Beziehungen zu anderen Männern unterhielt. Das war der Anlass zu Streitigkeiten und das Zusammenleben wurde unerträglich. Dann erwartete sie ein Kind und da ich sicher war, dass es nicht mein Kind war, entschloss ich mich unsere Beziehungen zu beenden. Das war mit ein Grund für meine Flucht. Ich habe keine eigenen Kinder.

9. **ELTERN:**

A. VATER: Frank Simon SANDERS, geboren ungefähr 1885 im Baltikum; er kam ungefähr 1910 ins russische Gebiet. Er arbeitete als Ingenieur in Baku, Batumi und Tbilisi Gebiet. Er starb 1924 an den Folgen eines Arbeitsunfalls. Ich kann mich an meinem Vater nicht mehr erinnern, aber ich lernte von meiner Mutter, dass er ein guter und gütiger Mann war der allgemein beliebt war.

B. MUTTER: Maria SANDERS, Mädchenname KANTSCHELI, geboren ungefähr 1885 in einem kleinen Dorf in der Nähe der aserbaidshanischen Grenze im Tbilisi Oblast. Sie war das einzige Kind; als ihre Eltern im hohen Alter innerhalb weniger Jahre starben zog sie nach Tbilisi und arbeitete in Büros von verschiedenen privaten Unternehmungen, bis sie meinen Vater heiratete. Nachdem ihr Mann starb fing sie wieder an zu arbeiten. Sie wechselte ihre Arbeitsstelle verschiedene Male und die einzige Arbeitsstelle an die ich mich erinnere war die letzte Stelle die sie innehatte als Kassiererin in einem Schuhreparatur-Geschäft (artel) in der Sowetskaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi. Sie starb 1934 an einem Herzschlag.

10. GESCHWISTER: Keine Lebenden. Ich hatte einen Bruder Leon der 1923 geboren wurde und 6 Monate nach der Geburt starb.

11. ANDERE VERWANDTE: Ich weiss, dass mein Vater im Baltikum Verwandte hatte, aber unsere Familie hatte keinen Kontakt mit ihnen und ich kannte niemanden. Ich hatte keine nahen Verwandten mütterlicherseits und die entfernten Verwandten in dem Heimatdorf meiner Mutter unterhielten keinen Kontakt mit meiner Familie da sie die Ehe meiner Mutter mit einem "Ausländer" eines anderen Glaubens ablehnten. Ich habe das Heimatdorf meiner Mutter niemals besucht.

12. NAHE FREUNDE UND BEKANNTE: Ich hatte niemals nahe Freunde aber ich stand den folgenden Personen in der Stadt etwas näher:

(1) Direktor von RTS, der 1959 nach Rustavi in Georgien SSR versetzt wurde.

(2) Rayon Tierarzt, der sein Büro in der tierärztlichen Klinik des Rayons hatte und der viel im Rayon herumreiste um dort die Bauern zu besuchen.

(3) Bibliothekarin des Klubs (eine Freundin)

13. BESONDERE BEFÄHIGUNGEN: Ich liebe es kleine Dinge zu erfinden und mir im eigenen Heim eine gute Werkstatt einzurichten.

14. SPRACHEN: Georgische Sprache - Muttersprache

Russisch - von der Schule und durch Kontakt mit der Bevölkerund in russisch sprechenden Gebieten und als Soldat.

Deutsch - von der Schule und durch Aufenthalt in Deutschland

Englisch - Von der technischen Schule und durch meinen Kontakt mit Amerikanern in Deutschland

15. FINANZIELLE LAGE: keine

16. AUSBILDUNG:

1927-1934 - Trudowaja Schkola Nr. 107 (10- Jahre Schule, desyatiletka) die sich an der Ecke von Prospekt Michailowskiy und Kirochnaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi befand. (Zur Zeit heissen die Strassen PLECHANOVA und MARDSHANISCHWILI). Vor 1927 war es das deutsche Realgymnasium und obwohl es in eine srednjaja schkola umgewandelt worden war wurde der Unterricht bis 1930 in Deutsch abgehalten und erst von diesem Jahr an in der georgischen Sprache. Die Mehrzahl der Schüler waren Georgier. Bis 1930 gab es zwei Stunden in der Woche russischen Sprachunterricht und eine Stunde georgischen Sprachunterricht. Ich war sieben Jahre in dieser Schule aber wegen des Todes meiner Mutter wechselte ich auf die technische Schule über da ich dort wohnen konnte und verpflegt wurde.

1934-1938 - Tbiliskii Elektro-Technicum in der Sowetskaja Ulitsa in Tbilisi, ein zwei-stöckiges Gebäude mit Gärten wo die Werkstätten und Wohnheime untergebracht waren. Im

Sommer 1934 suchte ich um Aufnahme in dieser Schule an und überreichte das Schulzeugnis der sieben absolvierten Jahre und ein Photo. Im Juli oder August bestand ich die Aufnahmeprüfung über Mathematik, Physik und schriftliche und mündliche Prüfungen in georgischer und russischer Sprache. Als mein Name auf der Aushängetafel der Schule aufschien wusste ich, dass ich bestanden hatte. Ich musste kein Schulgeld bezahlen und bekam ein Stipendium welches gerade alles lebensnotwendige deckte. Der Aufenthalt im Schulheim, wo ich ein Zimmer mit drei anderen Studenten teilte, war frei. Im ersten Stock des Technikums, in der Nähe des Schulbüros, war ein Speisesaal wo man billig essen konnte. Das Essen war schlecht. Die weiblichen Studenten lebten in einem Nebengebäude in derselben Strasse, zwei oder drei Häuserblocks vom Technikum.

Vier Jahre studierte ich Physik, Mathematik, Geschichte, Englisch, georgische Sprache und Literatur; von 1936 oder 1937 an die Verfassung der Sowjet Union. Die Gegenstände wurden auf dem Stand einer"Höheren Schule" gelehrt. Dann gab es noch die folgenden spezialen Unterrichtsgegenstände: Technologie der Metalle, Theorie der Mechanik, Materialstärke, Elektro-Maschinen,elektrische Arbeitsverfahren, Elektro-Geräte, elektrische Messinstrumente, Zeichnen. Die Studenten wurden auch militärisch ausgebildet und körperlich ertüchtigt. Der Unterricht dauerte von September bis Juli. Die Sommerferien verbrachte ich gewöhnlich auf einem Kolchos mit einer Gruppe,die vom Technikum organisiert worden war, um den Bauern mit der Ernte zu helfen.

Die Prüfungen fanden zwei mal im Jahre statt, vor dem Jahresende und am Ende eines zweiten Semesters. Noten wurden nach dem folgenden System gegeben:

5 - Otlitschno (sehr gut)
4 - Choroscho (gut)
3 - Posredstwenno (genügend)
2 - Plocho (schlecht)
1 - Otschen plocho (sehr schlecht)

Die ersten drei Noten waren notwendig um versetzt zu werden.

Im Frühling 1938 hatte ich Abschlussprüfungen, mündlich und schriftlich und ich bekam ein Diplom ausgehändigt. Das Zeugnis war eine Seite lang und brachte zum Ausdruck, dass ich das Technikum 4 Jahre lang besucht hatte. Es enthielt die Noten für alle Gegenstände und zeigte, dass ich als electromechanic ausgebildet worden war.

Allen Prüflingen wurden verschiedene Arbeitsplätze zugewiesen an denen sie mindestens zwei Jahre zu verbleiben hatten. Das ist eine Art von Rückzahlung des Geldes, das die Regierung für die Ausbildung ausgegeben hatte. Ich wurde MICHA-ZCHAKAJA M.T.S. zugewiesen; der Name wurde 1958 in R.T.S. abgewandelt.

17. BERUFLICHER WERDEGANG:

1938-1941 und 1946-bis zur Flucht MICHA ZCHAKAJA M.T.S. (Maschinen-Traktoren-Station), später abgewandelt in R.T.S. (Reparatur-Technische-Station) . (Matchino-Traktornaja und bzw. Remontno- Technitscheskaja Stanzija). MICHA-ZCHAKAJA wurde von der Bevölkerung einfach Zchakaja genannt und war Rayon-Zentrum des Zchakajskii Rayon, so genannt nach dem berühmten georgischen Revolutionär MICHA ZCHAKAJA ((der alte Name der Stadt war ACHAL -SENAKI bezw. ACHAL - SENAKSKII Rayon). M. Zchakaja war einer der Organisatoren der georgischen kommunistischen Partei.

Die Stadt hat gegenwärtig ungefähr 10.000 Einwohner und befindet sich an der Eisenbahnstrecke Samtredia-Suchumi (die Hauptstrecke zwischen Tbilisi und Moskau mit Abzweigungen nach Poti, dem Badeort am Schwarzen Meer. Die Stadt liegt zwischen zwei Zuflüssen des Rion Flusses: Tsiwi und Terachi. Am Letzteren liegt ein paar Kilometer von M. ZCHAKAJA entfernt ein kleines Elektrizitätswerk wo ich nach meiner Rückkehr aus dem II.Weltkrieg zeitweilig arbeitete. Bei M.T.S. (welche 1958 in R.T.S. umbenannt wurde nachdem die Einrichtungen und Maschinen den lokalen Getreide-und Trauben- erzeugenden Kolchosen zugeteilt worden waren und als einzige Verantwortung die Reparatur dieser Maschinen mit R.T.S. verblieb). Ich wurde bald Vorarbeiter einer Gruppe von Elektro-Mechanikern, die für die Pflege und die Reparaturen der elektrischen Teile von landwirtschaftlichen und anderen Maschinen verantwortlich waren. Mein Anfangsgehalt war 400 oder 500 Rubel, aber es stieg schnell und als ich in die Armee einberufen wurde war mein Gehalt schon fast doppelt so hoch.

Aus persönlichen Gründen kehrte ich in diese Stadt zurück, nachdem ich aus dem Militärdienst entlassen worden war und ich erhielt meine alte Stellung wieder. Ich bekam dazu noch eine Stelle als Elektro-Techniker mit dem vorher erwähnten Elektrizitätswerk, welches Elektrizität für die Stadt und dem übrigen Rayon erzeugte. Ich erhielt diese Stelle zugewiesen, da nach dem Krieg ein Mangel an qualifizierten Arbeitskräften bestand. Ich arbeitete in der zweiten Schicht im Elektrizitätswerk von 1947-1953 (dann wurde die Stelle von einem jungen Absolventen des Kutaisi Technikums gefüllt). Ich verdiente dort 700 Rubel neben meinem Grundgehalt bei R.T.S. Vor meiner Flucht war mein Einkommen ungefähr 120 neue Rubel Brutto. Ich hatte zusätzliches Einkommen von Wochenend-Arbeiten für die Reparatur von Haushalt gegenständen,Radios usw. durch Einwohner der Stadt. Das Geld war 1961 10 zu 1 abgewertet worden.

18. MILITÄRISCHER WERDEGANG

A. REGISTRIERUNG FÜR MILITÄRDIENST: Im Sommer 1939 wurde ich von meinem rayon-wojenkomat (Rekrutierungsstelle) benachrichtigt, dass ich mich an einem bestimmten Tag dort einzufinden habe; von dort ging es mit einer Gruppe anderer zukünftiger Rekruten zu der rayon polyclinic für die medizinische Untersuchung. Ich habe den linken Daumen und Zeigefinger bis zum ersten Glied durch einen Arbeitsunfall verloren und als dies dem Rekrutierungsstelle mitgeteilt wurde, wurde ich für den aktiven Dienst als ungeeignet erklärt und der Reserve zugewiesen. Zu demselben Zeitpunkt wurde mein pripisnoje swidetelstwo (Registrierungs-Dokument) für ein Soldbuch ausgetauscht.

B. EINZIEHUNGSTAG: Ungefähr am 26 August 1941 wurde ich aufgefordert mich am 27. August beim raywojenkomat zu melden. Ich tat das und wurde aufgefordert mich zum Dienst am folgenden Tag zu melden. Mit einer Gruppe von ungefähr 80 bis 100 Rekruten meines Rayons fuhren mir mit dem Zug von Tbilisi nach Baku, wo die Gruppe in der sogenannten Saljanskije Kasarmi (S. Kaserne) untergebracht wurde, die sich am Stadtrand von Baku, auf der Strasse nach Saljani und zur iranischen Grenze,befand.

C. militärische EINHEIT und ERKENNUNGSNUMMER: Ich diente bei der Luftabwehr Artillerie. Eine Erkennungsnummer hat es bei der sowjetischen Armee nicht gegeben.

D. GRUNDAUSBILDUNG: Meine erste militärische Ausbildung erhielt ich in der Saljani Kaserne in Baku und sie dauerte zwei Monate. Einen Monat reguläre Grundausbildung und im zweiten Monat verbesserte ich meine Qualifikation als Autofahrer (Ich hatte gelernt wie man einen Wagen fährt während ich in der M.T.S. die elektrischen Reparaturen an Autos durchführte. Ich weiss die Nummer der Einheit nicht mehr in der ich meine Grundausbildung erhielt. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die Kasernen überfüllt, meistens Soldaten der Infantrie und Artillerie die immer wieder abgelöst wurden.

E. SPEZIALAUSBILDUNG: Einen Monat Fahrschule wie oben erwähnt.

F. RESERVE ZUGEHÖRIGKEIT :

Sommer 1939:	Aus Gesundheitsgründen untauglich für aktiven Dienst und der Reserve zugeteilt.
Herbst 1946:	Aus der Armee entlassen-nachdem ich meine Reise und Entlassungspapiere meinem Rajwojenkomat übergeben hatte erhielt ich ein neues Soldbuch welches meine Reserve Zugehörigkeit enthielt. Ich wurde nie mehr einberufen oder zu irgendeiner Übung eingezogen nachdem ich von meinem Militärdienst entlassen worden war.

G. CHRONOLOGISCHE AUFZEICHNUNG MEINES MILITÄRDIENSTES:

Mit einer Gruppe anderer Rekruten wurde ich mit dem Zug zu der 253. Separaten Luftabwehr Artillerie Division, 2. Batterie, gebracht (OSAD- ogne-saschtschitnyi artilleriski division). Der kommandierende Offizier der Batterie war Leutnant WAKS. Kommandant der wswod uprawlenje (Verwaltung, Zugsführer) der Division war Leutnant ENDELADSE. Stellvertretender Divisionskommandant für politische Belange war Hauptmann TSCHOCHA und politruk meiner Batterie war Senior Leutnant SAMARIN. Major Wlado (Wladimir) GURGENIDSE war kommandierender Offizier von OSAD und im Februar 1943 wurde er auch zum Kommandeur von

PWO (protiwo- wosdischnaja oborona) (Luftschutz) für die Stadt Michurinsk ernannt. Das Hauptquartier der Division war in Michurinsk, während die Batterie in der Nähe der Station TARASOWO bei der Siedlung Konskoje, 7 km von Michurinsk und 6 km von den 6 errichteten Gehegen bei Kochetowa (Station) lag. Ein hohes Hauptquartier war in Tambow und wurde erst von Oberst TSCHERKJAWSKI und später von Oberst ZWETKOW, einem degradierten General kommandiert.

Als ich zuerst in Michurinsk eintraf wurde ich erst als Lastwagenfahrer dem Verpflegungszug der Division zugeteilt (choswswod oder chosjajstwennyi wswod), kommandiert von Junior Leutnant MAKAROW. Später wurde ich mit dem oben erwähnten ENDELADSE bekannt, ein Landsmann von mir und wurde durch seinen Einfluss dem Divisions-Kommandeur GURGENIDSE, auch ein Georgier der später zum Oberstleutnant befördert wurde, als persönlicher Fahrer zugeteilt. Er behielt mich in dieser Position bis ich vom Militärdienst entlassen wurde.

H. BEFÖRDERUNGEN UND DEGRADIERUNGEN: Nach 6 Monaten Militärzeit wurde ich zum jefrejtor (Gefreiten) befördert, am Ende des ersten Jahres zum Unterfeldwebel und 1944 wurde ich zum Feldwebel befördert

I. AUSZEICHNUNGEN: keine

J. ENTLASSUNGSTAG: Ich wurde vom aktiven Militärdienst Ende September 1946 entlassen. Ich erhielt meinen Fahrbefehl und Reisegeld von meiner Einheit in Michurinsk, die ich später dem rajwojenkomat übergab. 1955 wurde ich nochmals ärztlich untersucht, auf Befehl vom vojenkomat und offiziell aus meiner Reservestellung entlassen, aus Gesundheitsgründen (so wie zuvor) und erhielt eine sogenannte belji bilet (weisse

Karte)oder dauernde Befreiung vom Militärdienst.

19. WOHNORTE SEIT GEBURT:

1919-1926	verschiedene Adressen in Tbilisi
1926-1934	Tbilisi, Kirotschnaja Ulitsa Nr. 35 eine Wohnung in einem 2-stöckigem Haus, welches früher privates Eigentum war und später SHAKT (Staatliche Häuserverwaltung) unterstand.Nach dem Tode meiner Mutter trat ich in das Elektro-Technikum ein, wo ich im Pensionat war.
1934-1938	Tbilisi, Ulitsa Sowjetskaja (Nummer nicht in Erinnerung), Studentenheim des Tbilisi Elektro-Technikums.
1938-1941	MICHA ZCHAKAJA, Ulitsa Tsulukidse Nr.14. Hier mietete ich ein Zimmer in einem privaten einstöckigem Haus, das einem pensionierten Eisenbahn-Weichensteller, Ilja LORDKIPANIDSE,gehörte, welcher ein Zimmer vermieten musste, um etwas zu seiner Pension dazuzuverdienen. Ilja's Frau Keto(Katherina) kümmerte sich um meine Wäsche und kochte für mich wofür ich extra etwas bezahlte. Das Ehepaar hatte keine Kinder und behandelten mich wie ihren eigenen Sohn.
1941-1946	Militärzeit
1946-1962 (bis zur Flucht)	Micha Zchakaja,Ulitsa Schota Rustaveli Nr. 25, die Privatwohnung meiner Geliebten Nina GANDELI. Ich liebte sie und hatte mit ihr ein Verhältnis bevor ich

in den Krieg ging. Während des Krieges hörte ich, dass Nina's Mann im Krieg gefallen war und ich entschloss mich nach Zchakaja zurückzukehren um in ihrer Nähe zu sein. Ich zog zu Nina und lebte mit ihr zusammen ohne unsere Heirat bei SAGS (Registrierstelle von Geburten, Heiraten und Sterbefälle) zu registrieren. Obwohl ich erst darauf bestand unsere Verbindung zu legalisieren wollte Nina es nicht, da sie in ihrer ersten Ehe unglücklich war; sie wollte frei sein um die Verbindung jeder Zeit lösen zu können.

Während der letzten Jahre fand ich heraus, dass Nina sich während meiner Abwesenheit von zu Hause mit anderen Männern traf. Unstimmigkeiten entstanden, die mehr und mehr wuchsen als die Zeit verging. Nachdem das Verhältnis mit Nina sehr kühl geworden war, fing ich an mich mit anderen Frauen zu treffen. Wir waren oft daran uns endgültig zu trennen, aber wir fanden immer wieder zusammen. Ich versuchte verzweifelt unser Problem zu lösen,denn ich hatte zu einem Zeitpunkt als wir uns noch sehr nahe waren Bemerkungen gegen die Regierung gemacht und ich plante sogar eine gemeinsame Flucht aus den USSR. Ich wollte sie nicht zusehr verärgern um sie nicht womöglich dazu zu bringen, dass sie mich bei der Militia anzeigte. Aber aus irgendwelchen Gründen wollte Nina nicht gänzlich mit mir brechen und eines

Tages teilte sie mir mit, dass sie ein Kind erwarte und dass sie unsere Heirat legalisieren möchte. Da ich mich aber nicht als der Vater des Kindes betrachtete und da ich Erpressung von Ninas Seite fürchtete entschloss ich mich meine Flucht, die ich ohnehin schon geplant hatte, zu beschleunigen.

20. **REISEN:**

Keine anderen als schon erwähnt.

21. **VERHAFTUNGEN:**

Im Juni 1962 kam dieMilitia zu mir und bracht mich von meinem Arbeitsplatz zu ihrer Dienststelle wo ich beschuldigt wurde ein langjähriges Mitglied einer georgischen Widerstandsgruppe zu sein und regierungsfeindliche Äusserungen gemacht zu haben. Obwohl ich solche Bemerkungen bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten gemacht hatte und deshalb schuldig im Sinne des letzteren Teils der Anschuldigung war, konnte ich fühlen, dass die Militia nicht genügend Informationen besass und ich verneinte alle Anschuldigungen. Ich konnte mir nicht denken wer dahinter steckte. Nach langen Verhören, bei denen ich über alle Einzelheiten meines Lebens, Eltern , Militärdienst, Kontakte, u.s.w. befragt wurde, wurde ich mit einer Warnung entlassen das Gebiet nicht zu verlassen und es wurde mir gesagt ich würde wieder von der Militia hören. Mit dieser einzigen Ausnahme bin ich nie verhaftet oder verhört worden, weder bei der Militia oder anderen Sicherheitsbehörden.

22. **MITGLIEDSCHAFT IN POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ODER ORGANISATIONEN:**

Ich gehörte niemals der kommunistischen Partei an. Mir wurde nahe gelegt 1937 Komsomol beizutreten während ich am Tbilisi

Elektro-Technikum war. Dabei wurde von zwei Klassenkameraden die Bürgschaft übernommen, jeder von den beider war schon mehr als zwei Jahre Mitglied . Ich reichte mein Gesuch bei der lokalen Komsomol jatschejka (Zelle) ein und bei einer Zusammenkunft der Zellenmitglieder wurde mein Aufnahmegesuch besprochen, ich erzählte meine Lebensgeschichte und beantwortete Fragen. Nachdem ich aufgenommen worden war, erhielt ich meine Mitgliedskarte in ungefähr zwei Monaten vom Stadt-Rayon-Komittee des Tbilisi Komsomol; darauf hin besuchte ich Versammlungen und zahlte kleine Beiträge. Ich hatte niemals eine offizielle Position bei Komsomol. Als ich Tbilisi verliess musste ich mich von der Tbilisi Organisation streichen lassen und mich am neuen Wohnort Micha Zchakaja (bei der Bevölkerung gewöhnlich nur "Zchakaja" genannt), neu eintragen lassen. Dasselbe geschah als ich in die Armee eintrat (Ausstreichen aus der alten Organisation und Einschreiben am neuen Wohnort). Als ich nach der Entlassung von der Armee wieder nach Zchakaja zurückkehrte liess ich mich nicht wieder in die lokale Organisation eintragen.

Als ich in Zchakaja zu arbeiten begann wurde ich automatisch in die (prof.-org) Gewerkschaft eingeschrieben, in der ich ein passives Mitglied war, das seine Beiträge (etwas wie 1% meines Gehaltes) an den Organisator der Gewerkschaft von MTS bezahlte und von Zeit zu Zeit einer Pflichtversammlung beiwohnte.Ich machte nie Gebrauch von den Vorteilen der Mitgliedschaft wie ermässigte Preise in Erholungsstätten (putewka v dom otdicha) .

23. VERBINDUNGEN MIT EINEM SICHERHEITSDIENST:

Ich hatte nie einen Kontakt mit einer Sicherheitsbehörde. Ich wurde auch nie aufgefordert in irgendeiner Art für den sowjetischen Sicherheitsdienst zu arbeiten.

24. FLUCHT

A. GRÜNDE:

Trotzdem ich in einem kommunistischen Land geboren und erzogen worden war begann ich doch schon frühzeitig zu verstehen, dass für die Einzelperson keine Freiheit bestand. Es war mir auch klar, dass persönlicher Aufstieg nicht von dem Talent und der Rechtschaffenheit eines Menschen abhing, sondern von dem Ausmass der politischen Betätigung. Ich sah durch die kommunistischen Lügen, da die Wirklichkeit so verschieden von der offiziellen Propaganda war. Während und nach dem Krieg traf ich Menschen die westliche Länder besucht hatten und ich war in der Lage Bruchstücke der Wahrheit über den Unterschied in den Lebensarten aus diesen Erzählungen abzuleiten, obwohl diese Berichte sehr vorsichtig vorgebracht wurden. Nachdem ich 1956 ein gutes Radio der"Mir" Marke kaufte hörte ich sehr oft ausländischen Stationen zu. Lange Zeit trug ich mich mit der Idee aus den USSR zu fliehen wo ich keine Familie, keine Verwandten und keine Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten hatte. Meine feindliche Einstellung zur Regierung wurde stärker und stärker mit der Zeit und es wurde für mich immer schwieriger mich zu kontrollieren und diesen Gefühlen nicht offen Ausdruck zu verleihen, was ich dann doch einige Male tat. Meine Erfahrung mit der Militia und die Entwicklung meines persönlichen Lebens beschleunigte meine Fluchtpläne.

B. TECHNISCHE EINZELHEITEN DER FLUCHT:

Am 25. Juni 1962, drei Tage nach meinen Erfahrungen mit der Militia, verliess ich meine Wohnung um 7 Uhr früh wie jeden Tag um in die Arbeit zu gehen. Ich verliess die Stadt zu Fuss in Richtung Samtredia. Ich trug meine normale Kleidung, hatte 80 Rubel bei mir und eine Handtasche. Ich wagte nicht den Zug zu nehmen da ich Angst hatte von der Militia überwacht zu werden. Nachdem ich 2-3 km auf der Landstrasse gegangen war, wurde ich von einem Lastwagen eines nahe gelegenen Kolchos mitgenommen, der in der gleichen Richtung fuhr. Ich verliess den Lastwagen in der Stadtmitte von Samtredia, zahlte dem Fahrer einen Rubel und ging zur Eisenbahnstation; hier kaufte ich eine Fahrkarte nach Batumi und nahm den Zug um 11.50der um 14.15 in Batumi ankam. Ich fand einen sicheren Platz und schlief bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich verliess Batumi zu Fuss entlang des Seeufers bis ich 1 1/2 oder 2 km südlich die alte Schiess-Stätte erreichte. Hier ging ich um ungefähr 22 Uhr ins Wasser, nachdem ich meinen Pass zerstört hatte (die anderen Dokumente liess ich zu Hause) und vergrub meine Kleider und Tasche. Ich wusste durch das Studium einer Landkarte, dass ich ungefähr 18 km zu schwimmen hatte um türkisches Gebiet zu erreichen. Ich schwamm die ganze Nacht und ich war nicht sicher ob ich schon türkisches Gebiet erreicht hatte , aber ich war erschöpft und schwamm ungefähr um 3 Uhr oder 4 Uhr früh zum Ufer. An dem Punkt wo ich ankam began das Ufer steil anzusteigen. Ich sah die Silhuette einer Hütte und ging hinein. Da fand ich einen alten elektrischen Motor, russisch beschriftet, woraus ich ersah, dass ich noch in Russland war. Ich versteckte mich in der Nähe im Gebüsch und verbrachte dort die Nacht und den folgenden Tag. Als es dunkel wurde, kletterte ich den Abhang hinauf um das Gelände zu überblicken. Ich ging ein Stück und hörte russische Stimmen die vom Ufer kamen. Ich sah einen dunklen Gegenstand auf dem Wasser,welcher wie ein Unterseebot aussah. Ich ging weiter am Ufer entlang und um ungefähr 22 oder 23 Uhr ging ich ins Wasser und schwamm 3 km hinaus und dann parallel zum Ufer. Als ich in die Reichweite eines Suchlichtes kam, das über dem Wasser spielte, tauchte ich unter. Als ich nach oben kam ging das Suchlicht gerade über mich hinweg, aber nichts geschah und ich wusste, dass ich unendeckt geblieben war. Ich schwamm bis zur Erschöpfung, einige Stunden vor der Morgendämmerung schwamm ich zum Ufer und versteckte mich in einer Höhle zwischen zwei Felsen im Meer in Ufernähe. Da verblieb ich zum Morgen. Am nächsten Morgen kletterte ich den Abhang hinauf,wo ich ein steinernes Gebilde sah, das wie ein Grab aussah. Ich ging hinein und schaute mir die Umgebung durch eine kleine Öffnung an. Ich sah ein kleines Dorf, später lernte ich, dass es Kemal-Pascha war. Erst dachte ich ein Minarett wäre ein Beobachtungsturm. Ich nahm an, es wäre das Dorf Sarpi noch immer auf russischem Boden. Ich war sehr durstig und kletterte den Hügel hinunter zu einem Bach um zu trinken. Ich traf einen 11 oder 12 jährigen Buben den ich russisch ansprach, aber der Bub lief weg. Ich war noch immer nicht sicher wo ich war, ich ging ein Stück im Bach um meine Fussabdrücke zu verbergen. Dann versteckte ich mich im Gebüsch bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich ging dann um das Dorf herum zum anderen Ende. Ich betrat das Dorf und klopfte an die Tür eines Hauses, das am Abhang eines Hügels lag. Ich rief in russischer Sprache. Ich hörte Stimmen und Fusstritte im Haus, aber niemand öffnete. Ich kletterte auf das Dach eines Stalles im Hof und verbrachte dort die Nacht. Früh am nächsten Morgen wurde ich durch Geräusche im Hof geweckt. Ich sah einige Frauen und zwei Männer. Ich näherte mich ihnen und versuchte mich durch Zeichensprache zu verständigen und zu erklären, dass ich aus Russland kam. In der Zwischenzeit waren Menschen mit Stöcken und Äxten auf den Hof gekommen. Ich versuchte wieder zu erklären, dass ich aus Russland käme und in der Türkei verbleiben möchte. Die Männer nahmen mich dann zu den militärischen Behörden in Kemal-Pascha.

Als ich in Batumi ins Wasser ging,hatte ich Schwimmhosen an, einen Gürtel und ein paar Schwimmflossen. Ich hatte ein Klappmesser im Gürtel, einen Sack Nadeln um mich zu stechen im Falle eines Krampfes, mein Geld war in einem Nylonsack, 3 Tafel Schockolade, ein Kompass und zwei Phenamin Tabletten um meine Energie zu heben, in einem anderen Nylonsack. Mit Ausnahme des Suchlichtes auf dem Wasser, das ich durch Tauchen zu umgehen suchte, gab es keine anderen Hindernisse.

Ich hatte niemanden von meinen Fluchtplänen erzählt und niemand hat mir dabei geholfen.

Von Kemal-Pascha, wo ich Kleider bekam,wurde ich mit dem Wagen nach Erserum gebracht und von dort mit dem Zug nach Istanbul ins Flüchtlingslager. Dort war ich eine Woche und wurde dann mit Hilfe von US Behörden am Freitag den 6. Juli 1962 nach Deutschland gebracht.

25. DOKUMENTE:

A. PASS:

Ich erhielt meinen ersten drei Jahre gültigen Pass von der

Militia Dinststelle Nr. 17 (Pass Abteilung) des Molotowski Rayon von Tbilisi, wo ich damals wohnte. Der Pass war ein einzelnes Blatt Papier und meinem Photo und den wichtigsten Daten. 1939 tauschte ich ihn gegen einen 5-Jahres Pass ein, bei der Militia des Micha Zchakaja Rayons ausgestellt. Das war ein Pass in der üblichen Buchform mit Photo und wichtigsten Daten und hatte einen propiska Stempel (Registration mit der Militia), welcher den Tag meiner Ankunft in dieser Stadt und meine Adresse enthielt. Als ich in die Armee eingezogen wurde, gab ich den Pass und das Militärbuch bei den rayonwojenkomat ab und bekam ihn nach meiner Entlassung wieder ausgehändigt. Darauf hin erhielt ich einen neuen 5-Jahres Pass von der gleichen Dienststelle mit propiska, welcher meine neue Adresse anzeigte. 1951 tauschte ich diesen Pass gegen einen neuen 10-Jahres Pass ein und 1961 gegen wiederum einen neuen 10 Jahre gültigen Pass.

B. MILITÄRBUCH: (Wojennii Bilet)

Siehe Para. 18. In der Armee hatte ich ein Soldbuch (slushebnaja knishka), welches ich meinem rayonwojenkomat nach meiner Entlassung aus der Armee übergab.

C. ARBEITSBUCH: (Trudowaja Knishka)

Ich besass keines, da es von dem Arbeitsgeber ausgestellt wird und wenn jemand seinen Arbeitsplatz ändert , dem neuen Arbeitsgeber übergeben wird. Ich aber habe niemals meinen Arbeitsplatz verändert.

TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorised in writing by the same official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 3rd day of March 1964

Georg F. Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William [illegible]

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Chilenische Generalkonsulat
Frankfurt am Main
Wendelsweg 64

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Chile interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Chile ansaessig sein muss, um die chilenische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt werden kann?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. O. Elmendorf
Executive Director

C H I L E

Translation from German

Letter from Consulado General de Chile

Question 1: see attachment

Question 2: Chilean citizenship can be obtained after a minimum of five years of residence in Chile.

Question 3: There is no immigration quota.

Question 4: Technical professions are in demand in the first place.

Question 5: It would be better if the immigrant could count upon some financial assistance.

Question 6: See Attachment

CHILE

Translation from German

Immigration Visa:

a) According to Chilean D.F.L. (Law Nr. 69) an immigration visa will be issued to persons willing to emigrate to Chile together with their families in order to undertake a selfsupporting work of technical nature or in an other special field. The visum gives the right of unlimited residence and execution of profession in Chile.

b) In case of the issue of an immigration visa the work factor is considered above the capital factor.

c) The belongings of the immigrant are, besides a low fee, free of duty, tax, and storage fees.

d) In order to file an application for an immigration visa the special conditions, outlined in Circular Nr. 3 have to be fulfilled. Especially the "Cartilla de Inmigracion" has to be furnished (forms are to be obtained at the Consulate). The "Cartilla de Inmigracion" is to be filed in duplicate and executed in Spanish.

e) Visa fees amount to DM 9.10 per passport.

List of luggage for an immigration visa

1) In case the application for an immigration visa is filed in Germany, the luggage list must be furnished with seven copies. For proper form see Circular Nr. 8.

2.) The luggage list can contain only personal belongings and material necessary for the applicant's profession, which were owned by the applicant before the immigration visa was issued and were produced in the applicant's homecountry. The items must be used. In some exclusive cases they may be new, however purchased before the issue of the visa.

3.) Items necessary for the execution of profession are such which serve the applicant in continuing the profession he has been executing while still in Germany.

4.) Household belongings can be imported, however only to an extent in accordance with the immigrant's situation.

5.) In exclusive cases the immigrant may also import a motor vehicle, truck, jeep, or smaller truck. Trucks and jeeps can be imported duty-free, for a delivery van 100% of the FOB-value are charged. Passenger cars or other vehicles cannot be imported. The immigrant can, however, import a tractor, should this be an item necessary to carry out his profession.

6.) The luggage must not contain items of art or luxury, such as valuable carpets, gobelins, music boxes etc.

General

1.) The Consulate sends out forms for application for an immigration visa only in such cases where exact details are already known and it seems likely that a visa will be issued. Application forms are not sent out solely upon request.

2.) In order to file a visa application we request to submit only those documents marked with a cross in Circular Nr. 3. The remaining documents are to be produced only at the time the visa will be issued. It is recommended to submit the documents necessary for filing an application in person at the Consulate after foregoing written announcement.

3.) In the case of written inquiries we request that a stamped envelop be enclosed with the inquiry.

4.) For apersonal appearance we request a written announcement for a working day, except Saturday, at nine AM.

5.) For the issue of the visa the presence of all persons involved is necessary (excluding children under 15 years of age.)

6.) Though the immigration visa is to be approved by the Chilean Foreign Ministry the Chilean General Consulate has the right to check the immigrant's data.

7.) For all types of visa an international certificate of small-pox vaccination is necessary. Such certificate is good for two years.

8.) Persons under 21 years of age need a permit by the father or the person in charge which must be certified by a notary, if the applicant intends to travel without his parents of the persons in charge of him.

9.) The Consulate does not assist in finding work. It is recommended that potential applicants contact the German language newspaper

CONDOR
Casilla 9469
Santiago de Chile

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE

FRANKFURT AM MAIN
64, WENDELSWEG
☎ 68 73 46

4-9-1962

EM/g

Nº 951

Ein[illegible]
-5. SEP 1962
Erledigt ....

An
American Friends of Russian Freedom
Incorporated
Frankfurt / Main
P.O. Box Nº 5005

Betr.: Auswanderung nach Chile

Sehr geehrte Herren!

In Beantwortung Ihrer Fragen vom 31. August können wir Ihnen folgende Auskunft geben:

1.- Einzelheiten über die Erteilung eines Einreise- bzw. Einwanderungsvisums bitten wir, unserem Circular 2 zu entnehmen.

2.- Die chilenische Staatsbürgerschaft erwirbt man, wenn man mindestens 5 Jahre ansässig war.

3.- Eine Einwanderungsquote besteht nicht.

4.- Gefragt sind vorwiegend technische Berufe.

5.- Es wäre besser, wenn der Einwanderer von irgendeiner Seite her mit finanzieller Unterstützung rechnen könnte.

6.- Siehe Circular 3.

Wir hoffen, Ihnen mit unserer Auskunft gedient zu haben und stehen weiterhin gern zu Ihrer Verfügung.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Enrique Melkonian C.
Konsul

CIRCULAR Nr. 2

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE
FRANKFURT/MAIN
WENDELSWEG 64
TEL.: 60 73 46

Frankfurt, den 4/9 1962

Sehr geehrte ~~Herr~~ ~~Frau~~ Frl. American Friends of Russian Freedom

Betrifft: Ihr Schreiben vom 31/8 1962

RICHTLINIEN FÜR DIE ERTEILUNG EINES VISUMS UND DIE EINREISE VON TOURISTEN

Wir erlauben uns, Ihnen nachstehend einige grundsätzliche Erklärungen über die Erteilung von Visa und die Einreise von Touristen in Chile zu geben. Ausländer können in Chile unter verschiedenen Voraussetzungen einreisen:

1) als Tourist
2) mit einem Arbeitsvertragsvisum (VISACION DE RESIDENTE SUJETO A CONTRATO)
3) als Studierender (VISACION DE RESIDENTE ESTUDIANTE)
4) zu einem längeren befristeten Aufenthalt (VISACION DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO)
5) als Einwanderer (VISACION DE INMIGRACION)

I. TOURISTEN

a) Auf Grund eines besonderen Abkommens zwischen Deutschland und Chile und eines besonderen chilenischen Gesetzes kann man in Chile zu einem Aufenthalt von höchstens 90 Tagen als Tourist ohne Visum einreisen. (In besonderen Fällen besteht die Möglichkeit, die Aufenthaltsdauer ein einziges Mal um weitere 90 Tage in Chile verlängern zu lassen).

b) Als Tourist kann man in Chile mit folgenden Unterlagen einreisen: Gültiger Pass ohne Visum, oder gültiger Personalausweis, aus dem der vollständige Name, Geburtsort und -datum, Staatsangehörigkeit, Beruf, Wohnort, Ausstellungsdatum und Gültigkeitsdauer hervorgehen, und der Stempel und Unterschrift der ausstellenden Behörde sowie ein Lichtbild des Inhabers enthält.

c) Außerdem ist ein von einem Amtsarzt ausgestellter Internationaler Pockenimpfschein mitzuführen, der 2 Jahre Gültigkeit hat.

d) Bei der Einreise ist die Rückpassage in das Herkunftsland oder die Passage für ein anderes Land vorzulegen, für das der Tourist eine Genehmigung zur Einreise besitzt.

e) Bei der Einreise in Chile erhält der Tourist eine "Tarjeta de Turismo" (Touristenkarte), die in zweifacher Ausfertigung auszufüllen ist.

f) Wer in Chile als Tourist einreist, kann dort keine bezahlte Tätigkeit ausüben. In Ausnahmefällen kann das Innenministerium in Chile eine Genehmigung für die Ausübung einer solchen Tätigkeit für eine Höchstdauer von 5 Tagen erteilen.

g) Personen, die als Touristen in Chile einreisen, können dort keine "VISACION DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO" beantragen (siehe Art. IV)

h) Als Touristen werden Personen angesehen, die als Erholungsreisende, wegen sportlicher Interessen, in Ausübung einer geschäftlichen Tätigkeit ohne Entgelt, aus familiären Interessen, etc. nach Chile kommen, ohne die Absicht zu haben, für immer im Land zu bleiben oder dort zu arbeiten.

i) Für eine Touristenreise brauchen keine konsularischen Formalitäten erfüllt zu werden.

j) Inhaber eines "Staatenlosen-Passes" können in Chile unter den gleichen Bedingungen als Touristen einreisen, wenn außerdem folgende Voraussetzungen erfüllt werden:

1) Der Reisepass muß von einer Behörde seines Aufenthaltslandes oder von einer von Chile anerkannten internationalen Stelle ausgestellt sein und alle für die Rückreise erforderlichen Transitvisa oder ein Einreisevisum in ein anderes Land enthalten.

2) Der Passinhaber muß im Besitz einer Genehmigung zur Wiedereinreise in sein gegenwärtiges Aufenthaltsland sein.

II. VISACION DE RESIDENTE SUJETO A CONTRATO (Einreise auf Grund eines Arbeitsvertragsvisums)

a) Dieses Visum wird Personen erteilt, die zur Erfüllung eines Arbeitsvertrages nach Chile fahren.

b) Es wird für eine Dauer von höchstens zwei Jahren erteilt. Das Ende des Vertrages bedeutet jedoch stets das Ende der Gültigkeitsdauer des Visums.

c) Zur Beantragung des Visums ist der Arbeitsvertrag vorzulegen, auf dem mindestens die Unterschrift des Arbeitgebers notariell beglaubigt sein muß. Der Vertrag muß eine Klausel enthalten, daß der Arbeitgeber sich in jedem Fall verpflichtet, die Kosten für die Rückreise des Arbeitnehmers zu übernehmen. Das Konsulat behält sich das Recht vor, eventuell eine Garantie für die Bezahlung dieser Kosten zu verlangen. Außerdem werden die in unserem Circular Nr.3 bezeichneten Unterlagen benötigt.

d) Bei Vertragsende kann von den chilenischen Behörden ein neues Visum oder die "Permanencia Definitiva" (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung) erteilt werden.

e) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

III. VISACION DE RESIDENTE ESTUDIANTE (Visum für Studienzwecke)

a) Dieses Visum wird Ausländern erteilt, die nach Chile fahren wollen, um dort an staatlichen oder staatlich anerkannten privaten Lehranstalten oder an Hoch- und Fachschulen zu studieren. Der Inhaber dieses Visums kann damit solange in Chile bleiben, wie er Studierender ist.

b) Es ist ihm nicht gestattet, ohne besondere vorherige Genehmigung des chilenischen Innenministeriums eine bezahlte Tätigkeit im Land auszuüben.

c) Unter besonderen Umständen kann der Inhaber dieses Visums evtl. mit einem Dauervisum in Chile bleiben. Nach einem zweijährigen Aufenthalt in Chile hat er das Recht, die "Permanencia Definitiva" zu beantragen (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung).

d) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

IV. VISACIONES DE RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO (Visum für befristeten Aufenthalt)

a) Dieses Visum wird Ausländern erteilt, die sich länger als 9o Tage in Chile aufhalten wollen und zu einem Verwandtenbesuch oder wegen anderer Interessen nach Chile kommen, oder wenn die chilenischen Behörden der Auffassung sind, daß der Aufenthalt in Chile von besonderem Nutzen für das Land ist. Das Visum berechtigt zu einem Aufenthalt von einem Jahr. Es kann innerhalb seiner Gültigkeitsdauer, jedoch nicht nachher verlängert werden. Nach Ablauf eines Jahres muß der Inhaber des Visums, wenn er in Chile bleiben will, die "Permanencia Definitiva" (Daueraufenthaltsgenehmigung) beantragen. Auch wer dieses Visum in Chile erhalten hat, muß die "Permanencia Definitiva" ein Jahr nach der Visumerteilung bzw. nach zwei Jahren seines dortigen Aufenthaltes beantragen.

b) Die ausländische Ehefrau eines Chilenen wird als Inhaberin einer Visación de RESIDENTE TEMPORARIO betrachtet, wenn sie mit einem chilenischen Pass nach Chile kommt oder im Pass ihres Ehemannes eingetragen ist.

c) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 36,2o pro Pass.

V. VISACION DE INMIGRACION (Einwanderungsvisum)

a) Nach dem chilenischen D.F.L. Nr.69 (Gesetz Nr.69) wird das Einwanderungsvisum solchen Personen erteilt, die mit ihrer Familie nach Chile auswandern, um dort eine selbständige Tätigkeit technischer Art oder auf einem sonstigen Spezialgebiet auszuüben. Das Visum berechtigt zu einem unbefristeten Aufenthalt und zur Berufsausübung in Chile.

b) Bei der Begutachtung der Vergünstigungen für Einwanderer wird der Faktor Arbeit vor dem Faktor Kapital bewertet.

c) Das Umzugsgut des Einwanderers ist, abgesehen von einer kleinen Gebühr, zoll- und steuerfrei und auch frei von Lagergebühren.

d) Zur Beantragung des Visums sind die besonderen Bedingungen zu erfüllen, die aus unserem Circular Nr.3 hervorgehen. Insbesondere ist die "Cartilla de Inmigración" vorzulegen (die Formulare werden vom Konsulat ausgegeben), die in zweifacher Ausfertigung mit Maschine in spanisch auszufüllen ist.

e) Die Visumgebühren betragen DM 9,1o pro Pass.

Bei der Anfertigung der Gepäckliste für ein Einwanderungsvisum ist folgendes zu beachten:

1) Wenn das Visum bei dem Konsulat beantragt wird, dann ist die Gepäckliste in 7 Exemplaren anzufertigen. Wird das Visum in Chile beantragt, so genügen 5 Exemplare, die bei Visumerteilung vorzulegen sind. Die vorgeschriebene Form geht aus unserem Circular Nr.8 hervor.

2) Die Gepäckliste darf nur Gegenstände zum persönlichen Bedarf und zur Berufsausübung enthalten, die vor Erteilung des Visums Eigentum des Einwanderers waren und aus seinem Herkunftsland stammen. Es muß sich um gebrauchte Gegenstände handeln. In Ausnahmefällen können sie neu sein, doch müssen sie vor der Visumerteilung erworben worden sein.

3) Unter Gegenständen zur Berufsausübung sind nur solche zu verstehen, die der Fortsetzung der Tätigkeit dienen, die der Auswanderer bisher in Deutschland ausgeübt hat.

4) Es können Haushaltsgegenstände mitgenommen werden, jedoch nur in einem der jeweiligen Situation des Einwanderers angemessenen Rahmen.

6) In Ausnahmefällen kann der Einwanderer ein Motorfahrzeug mitnehmen. Es kann ein Lastkraftwagen, Jeep, Tempowagen oder Lieferwagen sein. Lastkraftwagen, Jeep und Tempowagen können zollfrei eingeführt werden, jedoch für einen Lieferwagen sind 1oo% des FOB-Wertes zu zahlen. Personenwagen oder andere Fahrzeuge kann der Einwanderer nicht mitnehmen. Er kann jedoch auch einen Traktor mitnehmen, wenn dieser für seine Tätigkeit erforderlich ist.

7) Das Umzugsgut darf keine Kunst- oder Luxusgegenstände, wie z.B. echte Teppiche, Gobelins, Musikschränke, etc. enthalten.

ALLGEMEINES

1) Das Konsulat läßt nur in den Fällen den Interessenten Antragsformulare zugehen, wenn genaue Anhaltspunkte bekannt sind und mit der Möglichkeit einer Genehmigung zur Visumerteilung zu rechnen ist. Sie werden jedoch nicht auf Anfragen allgemeiner Art zugesandt.

2) Zur Beantragung eines Visums bitten wir nur die Unterlagen einzureichen, die in unserem Circular Nr. 3 angekreuzt sind. Die übrigen Unterlagen sind erst zur Visumerteilung vorzulegen. Zur Antragstellung empfehlen wir die Unterlagen nach vorheriger schriftlicher Anmeldung persönlich im Konsulat vorzulegen.

3) Bei schriftlichen Anfragen bitten wir in jedem Fall einen Freiumschlag beizufügen.

4) Um persönliche Auskünfte einzuholen, bitten wir um vorherige schriftliche Anmeldung für einen Werktag außer Samstag, 9 Uhr.

5) Zur Visumerteilung ist in jedem Fall die persönliche Anwesenheit der betreffenden Personen (mit Ausnahme von Kindern unter 15 Jahren) erforderlich.

6) Obwohl die Einreisegenehmigung vom chilenischen Außenministerium erteilt wird, behält sich das Chilenische Generalkonsulat das Recht vor, die Richtigkeit der gemachten Angaben zu prüfen.

7) Für alle Visumarten wird ein internationaler Pockenimpfschein benötigt, der von einem Amtsarzt ausgestellt sein muß. Seine Gültigkeitsdauer beträgt 2 Jahre.

8) Minderjährige (unter 21 Jahren) benötigen, wenn sie nicht in Begleitung des Erziehungsberechtigten reisen, eine notariell beglaubigte Einwilligungserklärung des Vaters oder sonstigen Erziehungsberechtigten, die die Reise ins Ausland und den Aufenthalt dort gestattet.

9) Das Konsulat nimmt keine Arbeitsvermittlung für Chile vor. Es empfiehlt Interessenten unverbindlich, sich an folgende deutschsprachige Zeitung zu wenden:

CONDOR
Casilla 9469
Santiago de Chile

Hochachtungsvoll

i. A.

Enrique Melkonian C.
Cónsul

Betr. Einwanderungsvisum

CIRCULAR N°3

CONSULADO GENERAL DE CHILE
Frankfurt/Main
Wendelsweg 64
Tel.: 68 73 46

To
American Friends of
Russian Freedom

Unterlagen für die Erteilung eines Visums

- 1) Reisepass. Die Gültigkeitsdauer darf frühestens 12 Monate nach der Visumerteilung ablaufen.
- 2) Polizeiliches Führungszeugnis der zuständigen Polizeibehörde (nicht mehr als 3 Monate alt).
- ~~3) Allgemeines amtsärztliches Attest (nicht mehr als 3 Monate alt).~~
- 4) Ärztliches Attest des Auswanderungslagers (Hanau, München oder Berlin) - wird nur für Einwanderungsvisum benötigt.
- 5) Internationaler Pockenimpfschein, vom Amtsarzt ausgestellt. (Nicht mehr als 2 Jahre und nicht weniger als 14 Tage alt).
- ~~6) Arbeitsvertrag mit notariell beglaubigter Unterschrift mindestens des Arbeitgebers und einer Klausel, nach welcher dieser sich verpflichtet, die Rückreisekosten des Arbeitnehmers zu tragen.~~
- ~~8) Gebühren DM 3[illegible],20 pro Pass.~~
- 7) 4 Passbilder (kein Fotomaton) 5 x 5 cm, auch für jedes Kind.
- 9) Gebühren DM 9,10 pro Pass.
- 10) Fragebogen in 2-~~[illegible]~~-facher Ausfertigung, mit Schreibmaschine ausgefüllt und mit Tinte Unterschrieben.
- 11) Lebenslauf in 2-~~[illegible]~~-facher Ausfertigung in spanischer Sprache, mit Maschine geschrieben und mit Datum und Unterschrift versehen.
- 12) Inhaltsaufstellung des unbegleiteten Reisegepäcks - Umzugsguts ~~5~~-7-fach, in spanischer Sprache, mit Maschine angefertigt (s.Circular N°8).
- 13) Dokumente, die Ihren Beruf bestätigen.
- 14) Schriftliche Referenzen.
- 15) Für Minderjährige (unter 21 Jahren) notariell beglaubigte Einwilligungserklärung des Vaters oder Erziehungsberechtigten, dass die Reise nach Chile und der Aufenthalt dort gestattet sind.

N.S. Durchgestrichene Angaben sind nicht zutreffend.

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Konsulat von Peru
Frankfurt am Main
Guiollettstrasse 10

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Peru interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Peru ansaessig sein muss, um die peruanische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisums ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im Voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Translation from German

Consulado del Peru

Frankfurt/Main
Guiollettstrasse 10

September 7, 1962

Re.: Immigration to Peru

Gentlemen:

1.) There are no special application forms for an immigration visa. The applicant appears in person at the nearest Consulate of Peru with the following documents:

a) Travel Document and 3 passport photos
b) Birth certificate
c) Proof that the applicant has sufficient means to pay for his transportation, as well as his living expenses for at least two years. As minimum living costs we figure 500 DM per month per person. A work contract can also be supplied as proof of the above.
d) Medical certificate issued by a health officer not more than 6 months before submission to the Consulate.
e) Certificate of small-pox vaccination, issued not longer than 2 years before submission to Consulate
f) Police waiver covering the past 10 years
g) Certificate of good conduct (Leumundszeugnis)

Visa fees amount to DM 180.— plus possible telegram fees.

2.) The citizenship of Peru can be acquired only if the applicant has resided without interruption for at least four years in Peru and can prove that he has served the country(?). Further 10 sponsors are required.

3.) We do not know about any restrictions under the immigration quota.

4.) We do not know any special professions in demand.

5.) See Paragraph 1 c

6.) See Paragraph 4

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Konsulat von Kolumbien
Frankfurt am Main
Am Hauptbahnhof 10

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Kolumbien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Kolumbien ansaessig sein muss, um die kolumbianische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/M., 7.8.1962

Anbei erhalten Sie eine Broschüre, aus der Sie alles erfahren können, was für Ihre Zwecke interessant ist.

Punkt 1(

Fragebogen kann Ihnen dieses Konsulat leider nicht zusenden, da ohne Anweisung des Aussenministeriums in Bogotá kein Visum ausgestellt werden darf. Anträge müssen in Bogotá vom evtl. Arbeitgeber gestellt werden.

Punkt 2)

Staatsbürgerschaftsfragen können vom Generalkonsulat in Hamburg beantwortet werden.

Punkt 3)

Anschrift: Vorletzte Seite des beigefügten Prospektes

Punkt 4)

siehe Punkt 3)

Punkt 5)

siehe Punkt 3)

Punkt 6)

siehe Punkt 3)

E[illegible]
-4. SEP 1962
Erl[illegible]

CONSULADO DE COLOMBIA
FRANKFURT

14-00000

Venezuela
has been closed
for immigration
since 1960

[redacted]

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Venezuela
Hamburg 13
Hagedornstrasse 22

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Venezuela interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Venezuela ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt.

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

**An das
Konsulat der Republik Ecuador
Frankfurt am Main
Taunusanlage 16**

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Ecuador interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Ecuador ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsangehoerigkeit Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Brasilianische Konsulat
Frankfurt am Main
Hochstrasse 53

Sehr geehrter Herr Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Brasilien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Brasilien ansaessig sein muss, um die brasilianische Staatsbuergerschaft zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt werden kann?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. O. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Jack
[illegible] a go
To B.M.

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Paraguay
Hamburg 13
Jungfrauenthal 24 I

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul!

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Paraguay interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Paraguay ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einwanderungsquote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

1209114

Translation from German

Consulado General del
Paraguay

Hamburg, November 26, 1962

American Friends of
Russian Freedom, Inc.
Frankfurt/Main
P.O. Box 5005

Gentlemen:

We acknowledge receipt of your inquiry concerning the immigration program for refugees and are glad to answer the following questions:

1.) For immigration a special immigration permit, issued by Instituto de Reforma Agraria, Asuncion, must be obtained. Only upon receipt of such permit we will issue an immigration visa. Citizens of various countries do not need any immigration visa since July 1962.

2.) Citizenship can be obtained upon an uninterrupted stay in the country for five years.

3.) There are no limitations as to an immigration quota.

4.) Preferred professions: farmers and craftsmen, as well as wealthy persons who wish to invest funds in the country.

5.) Every immigrant must have sufficient funds in order to take care of his integration.

6.) The immigrant must be absolutely healthy and must not be handicapped in any way.

Due to a tremendous work-load we were unable to answer your letter earlier.

Sincerely yours,

Consulat General of Paraguay
Hamburg

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Generalkonsulat von Bolivien
Hamburg 20
Heilwigstrasse 125

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalkonsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Bolivien interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einwanderervisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Bolivien ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Generalkonsulat von Bolivien

Hamburg, 7. Sept. 1962

An
American Friends of Russian Freedom
Incorporated
FRANKFURT / MAIN

Postfach 5005

Ei
1[illegible] SEP 1962
Erl.

Sehr geehrte Herren !

In Beantwortung Ihres Schreibens vom 31.v.M. muessen wir Ihnen leider mitteilen, dass wir Ihnen bei Ihrem Auswanderungsprogramm nicht behilflich sein koennen. Diese Auskuenfte wird Ihnen aber das

Ministerio de Inmigración
La Paz / Bolivien

beantworten koennen. Wir bitten Sie deshalb, sich direkt an das Ministerium zu wenden und zeichnen

hochachtungsvoll
GENERALKONSULAT VON BOLIVIEN
i.A.
(Lenhartz)

Frankfurt/Main
31. August 1962

An das
Vice-Konsulat von Uruguay
Frankfurt am Main
Hattersheimer Strasse 2

Sehr geehrter Herr Vice-Konsul:

Im Rahmen unseres Auswanderungsprogramms fuer Fluechtlinge haben wir einige Personen, die an einer Auswanderung nach Uruguay interessiert sind. Ich waere Ihnen daher sehr zu Dank verpflichtet, wenn Sie mich ueber folgende Punkte so eingehend als moeglich informieren wuerden:

1.) Vorgang zur Erwerbung eines Einreisevisums unter Beifuegung von Mustern saemtlicher erforderlicher Fragebogen.

2.) Anzahl von Jahren, waehrend derer der Betreffende in Uruguay ansaessig sein muss, um die Staatsbuergerschaft Ihres Landes zu erwerben.

3.) Hat Ihr Land irgendwelche Einschraenkungen in Hinsicht auf die Einreisequote?

4.) Welche Berufe sind gefragt?

5.) Muss der Einwanderer ueber eine bestimmte Mindestsumme an Geldmitteln verfuegen, ehe das Einwanderungsvisum ausgestellt wird?

6.) Anforderungen in Hinsicht auf den Gesundheitszustand des Einwanderers.

Fuer Ihr freundliches Entgegenkommen in der Erteilung der erbetenen Auskuenfte danke ich Ihnen im voraus.

Mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung

A. G. Elmendorf
Executive Director

Translation from German

Consulado del Uruguay
En
Frankfurt

September 21, 1962

Dear Mr. Elmendorf:

1.) See enclosed form (the form was not enclosed)

2.) Permanent residence in the country after legal immigration during three years for married persons, five years for single.

3.) There is no immigration quota. The immigration visa is issued by the Ministry of Interior through the immigration office.

4.) Mainly qualified farmers, craftsmen and technicians.

5.) No. However the immigrant must be able to support himself by his profession or private capital.

6.) A medical examination by the physician of the consulate is required.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [illegible], EDUARDO [illegible]
201-300614

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1960-1971

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
March 6	3-6		
3/13/78	3/13/78	Leslie Wizelman	Leslie Wizelman

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

24 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Eduardo WHITEHOUSE Insua

1. On 22 June 1971 Mr. Ed Sullivan, WH/Security officer, informed DC/WH/COG that he had been advised by SOD that Mr. WHITEHOUSE was in Miami and had some information which he would like to pass to the Agency. Mr. WHITEHOUSE, a Cuban, was a pilot during the Bay of Pigs Invasion and was under contract with the Agency from November 1964 to April 1965 as a pilot under the WITHRUSH Project in the Congo. He has not worked for the Agency since that time.

2. Mr. Sullivan requested SOD to have Mr. WHITEHOUSE use the Domestic Contact Service channel in Miami for passing his information to us.

3. File: 201-300614.

Chris Hopkins
WH/COG/SA

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: RICHARD HARRINGTON:ljo
UNIT: WH/2/HD&ES
EXT: 7163/1946
DATE: 23 JULY 1969

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY DKB PER ____ # ____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. Plans, cop. ADDP CS/DC S.O.G. ci/ops ci/ic2 FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 23287

23

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY TEGUCIGALPA, SAN SALVADOR

IUSTEER

2P

1. MORNING 23 JULY 1969, IUSTEER PHONED HQS CASE OFFICER AND STATED TEDDY WHITEHOUSE (201-300614) AND an UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN ATTEMPTING HIRE CUBAN PILOTS MIAMI AREA TO FLY F-51 AIRCRAFT TO EL SALVADOR. IUSTEER SOURCES, WHO WERE FOUR CUBAN PILOTS WHO REFUSED OFFER, SAID WHITEHOUSE AND ASSOCIATE BEGAN RECRUITMENT EFFORT CIRCA 14 JULY 1969. WHITEHOUSE OFFERING DEPOSIT $20,000 IN PILOTS BANK ACCOUNT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR EL SALVADOR IF PILOT AGREES FLY PLANE TO ELSALVADOR AND IN COMBAT.

RID
AB X
IP
FG
EX
DES NFD
FI
Cnf

2. IUSTEER PHONED INFO TO HQS CASE OFFICER WHEN UNABLE CONTACT WH/MIAMI. HQS ATTEMPTING RECONTACT IUSTEER VIA PHONE ORDER OBTAIN FOLLOWUP INFO INCLUDING IDENTITIES ANY PILOTS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED, NAME OF AMERICAN WHO WORKING WITH WHITEHOUSE, IDENTITY OF THEIR EL SALVADOR CONTACT, LOCATION OF PLANES, ETC. IUSTEER DUE DEPART MIAMI BY END OF WEEK AN~~D NOT AVAILAB~~LE TO WH/MIAMI AFTER 25 JULY 1969.

MICROFILMED
SEP 10 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

201-300614
23 JUL 69

(2) RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 33281

TO

PAGE TWO

3. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ADVISE ANY CONFIRMATION THIS REPORT AND ANY FOLLOWUP DATA FROM IUSTEER IF POSSIBLE OR OTHER SOURCES.

4. FILE: 201-283488 AND 201-300614.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SOD/AB Paul Gottke (in draft)

WH/COG

Robert H. Kiefe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

John C. Murray
JOHN C. MURRAY
AC/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION NAME CHECK
DATE: 7 APRIL 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE, ROGELIO ENRIQUE

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION NAME TRACE
DATE: 7 APRIL 1967
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO ROGELIO

Miami, Fla. August 23 1965

Mr. Gerald Sounders
P.O. Box 831
Miami, Fla.

Dear Jerry:

Wish to thank you for your personal concern and satisfactory solution obtained in the financial settlement of my case.

I consider it a privilege to have worked with you, cooperating in a small way to preserve Democracy in the Republic of Congo.

If I can ever be of service to the United States -beloved country of my ancestors- I would consider it a high honor.

Do let me hear from you and feel sure that I am your devoted friend.

Sincerely,

Eduardo J. Whitehouse

446 N. E. 39th St
Miami, Fla.

MICROFICHE

23 AUG 65

201-300614

201-

20 August 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief/KUCURL/HENGEN

FROM : Edward W. LORENTZ

SUBJECT : Eduardo Whitehouse

REFERENCE : Dir-35418

1. Edward W. LORENTZ met with Eduardo Whitehouse on 17 August 1965, relative to finalizing the Whitehouse claim for monies still due from his previous contract. LORENTZ emphasized that he was authorized to pay monies due per contract through 7 April 1965, plus a four day layover in Rome during Whitehouse's return to the U.S. This layover was due a Panam strike of which Whitehouse was inadvertently delayed through no fault of his own.

2. The aforegoing authority is based on ref and calculated as follows:

A. Base Pay for March - USD 800.

B. Base Pay 7/30 for April - USD 186.66 plus USD equivalent of USD 41.00 for actual expenses while 2½ days in Rome.

C. Total USD 1027.66.

3. Whitehouse although feeling that he should be allowed the full amounts due amounting to USD 1950.00 has accepted such adjudication of his claim. LORENTZ feels that possibly he was sufficiently satisfied that he received any funds, that probably in his sense of fair play that the case might be considered closed. For the record, what medical treatment received by Whitehouse amounted to under USD 200. To further complete the record the following attachments are enclosed:

A. Letter from Dr. Elkhoury.

B. Second letter from Whitehouse to Jack Anderson, Leop.

C. Letter from Whitehouse to LORENTZ.

D. Bills of actual charges in Rome.

E. Receipt from Whitehouse for final payment.

F. Station memo concerning newspaper inquiry.

7

20 Aug 65

201-300614

4. Less than 24 hours after facing Whitehouse to advise him that his claim of USD 1950 had been reduced to 1027.66, Whitehouse reacted with the newspaper media in an exemplary manner when he could have ~~reacted with~~ a adverse feeling. The Subject despite difficulties encountered in the field with KUBARK advisors appears to be man of honor and certainly under controlled situations is a professional pilot and could be an asset to KUBARK interests.

E. W. Lorentz

Edward W. LORENTZ

POLYCLINIQUE DU
DOCTEUR L. ELKHOURY
Avenue Vandenbeuvel
LEOPOLDVILLE - KALINA
Téléphone 3259
Boîte Postale 1778 Léo I

Le soussigné certifie avoir soigné Mr Whitehouse pour des troubles neuro-végétatifs accompagnés d'une forte hypotension.

Comme le traitement n'a pas amélioré son état de santé, je recommande à Mr. Whitehouse de rentrer dans son pays pour un repos d'un mois où il relèvera de soins médicaux spécialisés

Léo le 1-5-65

201- 300614

Miami, Fla. June 10th 1965

Col. Jack Anderson
Chief, Air Operations
Leopoldville
Congo.

Dear Jack:

Please find attached a copy of my letter to you of the April [illegible] 1965. The original and also a copy of W. [illegible] certificate suggesting my return to Miami for [illegible], were mailed to you c/o [illegible] Ltd. I was [illegible] to [illegible] George [illegible] the [illegible] letter was intercepted [illegible]. This [illegible] country does not constitute a U.S. mail violation, otherwise I would have turned the case to the F.B.I. for the investigation.

I respectfully request the opinion of this [illegible] action will be [illegible], since I am most interested in [illegible] about this case.

[illegible] to [illegible] I will [illegible] your [illegible]

[illegible] you will note that I [illegible] this c/o [illegible] it will reach you [illegible].

Sincerely,

[illegible]

cc:
Mr. J. C[illegible]

Jerry: Before you [illegible]

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

Miami, Fla. August 13 1965

Mr. Jerry Sounders
P.O Box 531
Miami Int. Airport
Miami, Fla.

Dear Mr. Sounders:

Three months have passed by since my return from Leopoldville and as I explained to you in our past meetings, the amounts corresponding to the basic pay of of March, April and up to the 13th of May, -when my contract expired- are still unpaid therefore leaving an outstanding balance of $1950.00 in my favor.

Although I appreciate your concern in this case, I wish to inform you about certain facts concerning my work in the Congo that will explain how every cent of the mentioned amount was earned.

When pilot Fausto Gomez was shot down near Bunia -Dec. 17th 1964- that Air Base became paralized as two of the pilots resigned and the only one remaining was ready to leave. Every one refused to take charge of the Bunia Base because of the proximity of the rebels, dangerous terrain, living conditions below standards, improper food, etc. Under these adverse circumstances I accepted the position of Chief Pilot and left the confortable quarters of Stanleyville. Arrived to Bunia Dec. 25th 1964 and next day reasumed full air operations against the rebels flying two and three missions per day as squadron leader with new unexperienced pilots. These pilots did not have shooting, combat manuvering instruction, therefore I instructed them and also in Dead Reckoning, instrument flying, etc. We hit the enemy day by day forcing them to retreat to the very border of Northeast Congo. M. Godefroid Munongo -Minister of the Interior- personally congratulated us for our accomplishements in behalf of the Congo.

When I became ill, due to improper food, parasites, etc,. I was ordered back to Leopoldville for medical treatment. Unable to recover and having lost 25 pounds, Dr. Elkhoury suggested me return to Miami for a more adequate treatment. Photostatic copy of certificate are attached. Left Leopoldville April 3 1965 with the understanding that my contract was not being cancelled. I sincerely believe that my work and dedication throughout the entire campaing in Northeast Congo deserved the full payment of the mentioned contract.

Your consideration to this matter would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

E. J. Whitehouse

cc: Mr. H. R. Telford
Mr. Robert Blake

VIA XX SETTEMBRE 30
TEL. 463038

App. N. [illegible]

Sig. WHITE HOUSE

T. Gruppo - Roma

Data [illegible] 19[illegible]	3	[illegible]	[illegible]				
Appartamento							
Arrangiamento ½	6200	6200	6200				
Domestici							
Piccola colazione			[illegible]				
Uova - Frutta			500				
Caffetteria		200	100				
Spremute			500				
Colazione							
Pranzo							
Ristorante							
Gelati - Pasticc. - Sandwiches							
Vini							
Liquori							
Birra		500	500				
Acqua Minerali							
Bibite							
Bar							
Autobus							
Bagni							
Cani							
Riscaldamento							
Biancheria - Stireria							
Telefono		50	50				
Totale del giorno	6200	[illegible]	[illegible]				
Riporto		6200	[illegible]				
Totale			[illegible]				
Pagamenti							
Totale							
Imposta d'entrata			[illegible]				
Bollo di Quietanza			[illegible]				
Servizio			[illegible]				
Totale Generale			[illegible]				

I Sigg. Clienti sono pregati di pagare il conto entro il giorno della presentazione.

ALBERGO REALE - Roma
VIA XX SETTEMBRE, 30

D. BONETTI Prop.

Camera N. 401

Sig. WHITEHOUSE

[illegible]	Telefono interurbano	1500
	I. G. E.	33
	Bollo	12
	TOTALE	1540

[illegible]

[illegible]

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

201-300614

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

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CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION

SOD 8 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/DZ, OS 2

S E C R E T 190048Z

19 AUG 65 IN 35137

DIR CITE WAVE 5105

CHAPPIE LITHRUSH SECUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 5104 (IN 35139)

IDENTITIES: A. JANICE MIYAYA, AKA JANICE ROMAN, CLAIMS
SECRETARY TO IDEN B.
B. ROBERT ROGERS, NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY.

S E C R E T

CFN 5105 5104 A JANICE MIYAYA AKA JANICE ROMAN B B ROBERT ROGERS NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

BT

SECRET

MICROFICHE

19 AUG 65

201-300614

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6 ☑ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, AF 7, WH/C 8, OS 2

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UNIT	TIME	BY

SECRET 190048Z

DIR CITE WAVE 5104

19 Aug 65 IN 35139

CHAFFIE WIRUSH SECUR PBRUMEN

LORENZ MIAMI SENDS.

1. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WAS CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE ON 18 AUG BY IDEN A REPRESENTING IDEN B REQUESTING AN INTERVIEW FOR PURPOSE OBTAINING BACKGROUND INFO ON PBRUMEN PILOTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROPOSED TRIP TO CONGO. WHITEHOUSE REFERRED IDEN A TO IUSTEER.

2. IUSTEER RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM IDEN A REQUESTING SAME INFO. IUSTEER ADVISED ALTHOUGH HE WAS ACQUAINTED WITH SOME PBRUMEN PILOTS IN CONGO HE HAD NO OFFICIAL CONNECTION AND COULD ADD NOTHING FURTHER.

[illegible]

3. INDICATIONS ARE IDEN B PROBABLY SAME SUBJ, WAVE 9805 (RYBAT).

4. [illegible] TO ADVISE POSSIBLE TRIP TO CONGO OF IDEN B AND ANY INDICATION PROBABILITY HIS DESIRE TO INTERVIEW WIRUSH PILOTS FOR SPECTACULAR PUBLICITY.

SECRET

IN, 5104 LORENZ EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE 18 AUG PBRUMEN A IUSTEER AND OFFICIAL B 9805 B

SECRET

MICROFICHE

19 AUG 65

201-300614

WAI

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W. WAI[illegible]:kaa
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4476
DATE : 12 AUGUST 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

84 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

13 AUG 65 17 [illegible]

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: VR . FILE ☑ RID COPY WH/C 8, AF 7, CI/OA

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 35418

201 W

CHAPP[illegible] WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 4430 (IN 21101)*

RE REF AND TELECON WITH LORENTZ 5 AUG, RECOMMEND [illegible] (W) BE PAID SALARY THROUGH 7 APR 65 (DATE RETURNED MIAMI) AND ALL MEDICAL EXPENSES DUE ILLNESS RELATED CONGO TOUR. HQS DEEMS THIS SETTLEMENT GENEROUS IN VIEW W PERFORMANCE IN CONGO, I.E., GROUNDED SIX WEEKS, RETURNED PRIOR EXPIRATION CONTRACT, PLUS FIELD EVALUATION AS MARGINAL PILOT AND TROUBLESOME [illegible] PROBLEM. REALIZE THIS MAKES W SHORT FIVE WEEKS SALARY; ON OTHER HAND KUBARK SHORT ELEVEN WEEKS HIS CONTRACTED SERVICES AS PILOT.

2. FYI, FROM REVIEW W 201 FILE, BELIEVE W REASONABLE ENOUGH ACCEPT ABOVE SETTLEMENT GRACEFULLY. DESIRE LORENTZ DO UTMOST SETTLE CASE PER ABOVE TERMS. HOWEVER, IF IT APPARENT W UNHAPPY ENOUGH TO CAUSE UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY, LORENTZ AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT UP TO TOTAL REMAINDER SIX MONTHS SALARY.

(13 AUG 65)

END OF MESSAGE

*Req Hqs decision re subj claims for back pay.

201-300614

SOD/AB/OPS/3 W Wainwright
WH/C/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

34 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C8, AF7, CI/OA

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

29 JUL 65 IN 21101

S E C R E T 29[illegible]43Z
WAVE-4430

DIR CITE WAVE 443[illegible]

CHAPRIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 31462

LORENZO MIAMI SENDS:

ADVY IF ANY HQS DECISION RELATIVE TO EDUARDO JULIO WHITEHOUSE REPEAT WHITEHOUSE CLAIM FOR BACK PAY HAS BEEN MADE?

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] LORENZO MIAMI EDUARDO JULIO WHITEHOUSE [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

29 JUL 65

201-300614

Subj 201 —

12 July 1965

TO: HENGEN

FROM: Edward W. LORENTZ

SUBJECT: Eduardo Julius Whitehouse

1. As we both know the Whitehouse case has been kicked around sufficiently that the finalizing of the case should be effected as soon as possible. My trip with Larry Murphy to Dow Leutcher's office, in my estimation didn't produce any effective decision. Mr. Leutcher's point of view was, if the man was due the money, pay him. If he was not due the money, don't pay him. I will give you the facts as I see them and if you feel that it is prudent to seek the advice of Jack Anderson for his opinion I'm sure it will be most helpful.

(?) 7937 [illegible] March

A. LEOP-7030 dated 30 ~~May~~, indicates receipt of (W) intention to terminate contract effective 13 May. Additionally, stipulates (W) incapacitated six weeks and requests authorization for immediate return and treatment. OK

[illegible] 31 Mar 65 [illegible]

✓ 2. Your 97928 of 1 April, concurs requests of Leop. Additionally, you stipulate to terminate contract the day the Subject departs Leop. Ok

3. LEOP-8028 of 2 April, stipulates that Leop. "terminating (W) contract and returning first available". Requires medical attention not available Leop. Malady due conditions advance basis complicated lack of proper medical attention and maltreatment.

B. Para 2 same message, indicated another medical case (Menedez) would remain Leop dispite fact "he can contribute nothing".

Yes, not so! Cable indicates man wants to get paid for 6 months.

4. LEOP-8054 states (W) departed 3 April, via PAA, transferring flight in Rome. (W) presented me with three days Hotel bills in Rome to cover what he considered evacuation flight plus PAA on strike. ?

5. LEOP-8117 dated 7 April, allowed Perez to depart 8 April and recommended approval to pay full salary till 25 April. (Opinion - is this a case of paying a man full salary on one hand while not paying another under the same circumstances)?

One wanted [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] would not!

6. DIR-99498 of 7 April, requested details of (W) medical case. O/C

"violation"

7. LEOP-7150 dated 28 May, stipulates (W) returned on violation not "Leop request". Instructed contact Heston to execute voluntary termination of contract not executed. (W) departure 3 April not at Leop request. (Opinion - in a contractual relationship it appears

(2) [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible]

12 JUL 65

201-300614

MICROFICHE

Check if in
both
cable - not
[illegible]

highly unlikely to "request" someone to leave or terminate written agreement. Wouldn't one direct in lieu of request)?

8. WAVE-0832 dated 16 April, gave medical evaluation which was reviewed by WAVE Medical personnel. (Opinion - in debriefing of Subject I was personally convinced this man was sick. Furthermore, (W) advised that he is in possission of medical report by Dr. El Khorury that it was manditory for (W) to be evacuated for adequate medical treatment.

9. WAVE-k457 dated 3 May, indicated (W) still under going continuous medical treatment.

10. On April 19, (W) signed our local Quit Claim Form, but recent conversation with the Subject indicated that he felt that although the Form was signed that the "company would live up to its promises".

11. There is no doubt that (W) was ill and based upon medical opinion, as late as 7 May, in my personal observation that the man was incompatiated from performing a full time job that based upon the fact that no definitive or written agreement was made prior to departure, that the Subject be paid in full for the six months term of his contract. (Opinion - there is know doubt in my mind that this man firmly believes that he is entitled to the salary based strictly upon the fact that he was "evacuated" not terminated.

12. I don't feel the man is unscrupulous enough to blackmail to obtain what he feels is truthfully his, but feel positive that he will speak to anyone of influence to assist in obtaining back salaries that he feels is his. Cite the five reasonably important personnel references that he lists on his Job Application Form. We are not dealing with the common type individual using vealied threats, but someone who is an intelligent individual who at one time exerted enough influence on Jack Anderson to appoint a Chief Pilot and further influence Gen. Lewis Walsh into taking action to hire some of his buddys.

Edward W. Lorentz
EDWARD W. LORENTZ

14-00000

file 201

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 15 June 1965 js

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, OPS/3/AB/SOD

ATTENTION: David Lamoureux

C# 201-300614

The file on WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

15 JUN 65

201-300614

1

FORM 12-63 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MICROFICHE

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SECRET

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[illegible]

SOD 6

RI FILE, WH/C 8, CI 6, [illegible], PG 2

28 May 65 IN 78194

LEOP-9150

S E C R E T 281822Z

DIR INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE LEOP 9150

[illegible] WITHOUT [illegible]

REF: DIR 12727

1. BASIC DETAILS REASON WHITEHOUSE (W) RETURN EXPLAINED LEOP [illegible], 8877, 7837. W RETURNED OWN VOLITION NOT LEOP REQUEST. INSTRUCTED CONTACT HESTON EXECUTE VOLUNTARY TERMINATION CONTRACT, NOT EXECUTED. W DEPARTURE 3 APRIL NOT AT LEOP REQUEST. W PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED STA INTENT TERMINATE CONTRACT END SIX MONTHS.

2. PROVIDING MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS PBPRIME CONFIRMED LOCAL DIAGNOSIS FEEL W ENTITLED MEDICAL EXPENSES. NO COMMITMENTS MADE RE MEDICAL BILLS OR SALARY.

S E C R E T

(9)

MICROFICHE

28 MAY 65

201-300614

(1)

14-00000

#96

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

25 May 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was seen by me 8 April 1965 for a return physical examination. All laboratory and Xray that date was relative the complete physical examination.

The $10.00 charge for treatment included injection, medicine and prostate massage. Ther was no extra Charge for sinus treatment.

Office visits from April 9th through 28th were primarily for his tenseness and apprehension. The only additional charge, relative his sinus condition, was a $20.00 charge for sinus Xrays on April 9, 1965.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, M.D.

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

MICROFICHE

25 MAY 65

201-300614

MESSAGE FORM 25

3 SECRET

ORIG: F. DALY:jg
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT: 4475
DATE: 20 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

ROUTING R/

1		5	
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21 MAY 65 15 24z

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE [illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: AF 6, WH/C 8, CI/OA, PG 2, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO [illegible] CITE DIR 12727

CHAPPIE WITHBUSH DBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 8028 (IN 36890)

PLS ADVISE PRECISE DETAILS RE WHITEHOUSE (W) TERMINATION. REF A INDICATES TERMINATION BEING ~~ACCOMPLISHED~~. HOWEVER W NOW STATES HE RETURNED TO PBPRIME AT LEOP REQUEST (WHILE STILL UNDER CONTRACT) FOR PURPOSE OF CONTRACT-PROVIDED MEDICAL TREATMENT. THEREFORE HE WANTS PAYMENT COVERING PRESENT MEDICAL BILLS AND BACK SALARY.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 Tom Baskett (Phone)

[illegible]

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/~~C~~OPS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

25 MAY 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MICROFILMED

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201-300614

14-00000

[illegible] 02845 [illegible]
18 May 65

[illegible], Ed

xo 201

Whitehouse required approximately twenty-five hours T-28 flight instruction Leop prior to field deployment. Functioned very marginally as Chief Pilot Bunia and continually requested transfer to multi-engine. Due to apprehension made himself physically and mentally incapable of tactical flight.

It is my opinion that he should not be considered for any future tactical operations and would not be acceptable for recontract in Congo operations.

[illegible]

xo 201

Functioned solely as C-46 co-pilot. Was one of the transport pilots, along with Joe Balboa and Vallicierge, that continually hampered transport operations. Is too old and not physically capable of enduring sustained field operations. Indicated desire to return to Congo, but do not feel he would contribute anything to flight operations. Limited to co-pilot only duties which not desirable this operation.

18 MAY 65

(1)

201-300614

14 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Air Branch

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Contract

1. On Wednesday, 12 May 1965, I discussed with Mr. Dow Letcher, OP/CPD, the WITHRUSH contract with which you are familiar and under which Eduardo Whitehouse served in the Congo. This is the standard contract for Cuban and European WITHRUSH pilot employees. Specifically, I was interested in learning from Mr. Letcher if he believed Paragraph 7 D could be applicable to the case of Mr. Whitehouse since Mr. Whitehouse desires assistance in paying medical bills for a physical disability (which may be temporary) which may have been incurred while he was serving with us in the Congo.

2. This memorandum makes record of the fact that, judging from what Mr. Letcher had to say about the WITHRUSH contract, and also in view of Mr. Ben DeFelice's recently expressed concern regarding the benefits aspects of that contract, action should be taken to review and, if necessary, revise the contract at the earliest possible date. This stems from the strong possibility that Cuban pilots who suffer injuries or disabilities while serving with WITHRUSH may wish, as in the case of Whitehouse, to claim benefits after the termination of the contract, for conditions which originated during the term of the contract.

3. On 12 May 1965 I provided Mr. Letcher with a draft form of a proposed WITHRUSH contract pertaining to rotary wing aircraft pilots only and asked that he review it and judge its adequacy.

Frank Daly
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - OP/BSD Attn: Mr. Ben DeFelice
1 - OP/CPD Attn: Mr. Dow Letcher
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

(1)

SOD/AB/OPS/3:F.DALY:kas(13 May 1965)

14 MAY 65

201-300614

MICROFICHE

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
UNIVERSITY CLINIC
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

7 May 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell

OFFICE PHONE: HI 6-6474
RESIDENCE PHONE: HI 8-5105

Mr. [illegible]

April [illegible], 1965 general physical exam....		$ 15.00
Chest X-ray $10. [illegible] $5. sedrate $5. ur. $2. Rx. injection, sinus treatment, P. massage, & medicine $10.00	=	32.00
electrocardiogram & (interp).......		15.00
April [illegible], office, sinus Rx. $5. & [illegible] sinus $20.00		25.00
April [illegible] & [illegible], sinus treatment $5.00 2	=	10.00
April 13, sinus Rx. & injection		7.00
April 14th, 15th, & 16th. sinus treatment $5.00 3	=	15.00
		$ 119.00

MICROFICHE

7MAY65

201-300614

(1)

8-2j. #42

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

7 May 1965

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse has had sinus trouble off and on for many years. This has been increased recently, probably due to pressure changes in aircraft.

It has been advised that he have a nasal operation for deviated septum. This structural defect is in no way related to his occupation.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, MD

William S. Pipor, M.D.

WSP:bk

7 MAY 65

201-300614

MICROFICHE

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET 21/30

GROUP 1

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

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FROM Jm WAVE

ACTION D/MS 2

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C 1, SOD 6, AFG, C/OA.

3 MAY 65 IN 58071

S E C R E T 032241Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1451

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH MEDIC PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE-0832 (IN 46796)

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. LOCAL CLEARED MEDIC TREATING EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE ADVISES SUBJ NOT RESPONDING TREATMENT ACUTE AND CHRONIC SINUSITIS. LOCAL ENT SPECIALIST RECOMMENDS SUBMUCOUS RESECTION FOR CORRECTION DEVIATED SEPTUM.

2. REQUEST HQS OPINION IF SURGERY CAN BE PERFORMED UNDER TERMS OF CONTRACT AND CITE SUBJ WAS MEDICALLY CLEARED PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR CONGO.

3. FORWARDING MEDIC REPORT VIA POUCH.

S E C R E T

CFN : SUBJS MEDICAL CONDITION.

SECRET

~~CALL BEN DEFELICE~~

FRANK –
I HAVE TALKED TO BEN DEFELICE CONCERNING THIS – WE HAVE THE ACTION NOW. PLZ SEE ME.
LARRY

MICROFICHE

3 MAY 65

201-300614

UAPA-0099

Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

Date: 29 [illegible]

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Crew Training Report

REFERENCE : DIR 85744, paragraph 3(D)

Forwarded herewith is subject report of training and pilot evaluation conducted by Carlisle B. FORNEGAR as requested per reference.

Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachment:
a/s h/w
s/c (Idens)

Distribution:
0 & 2-KUCURL
2-IUPAGAN

5

COPY

29 APR 65

201-300614

Attachment to Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WITHRUSH Crew Training Report

1. The object of the crew training was to test each pilot on his knowledge of the aircraft systems and emergency procedures and to check ride each pilot and give him refresher training as required.

2. The following named pilots received ground and flight training as listed below:

	Ground School and Training	Flight Hours
Iden A	10½	7+20
Iden B	10½	1+30
Iden C	10½	1+30
Iden D	6+00	4+30
Iden E	8+00	4+35
Iden F	10½	5+05
Iden G	26+00	7+20
Iden H	26+00	Obs. 10+40 - Trg. 8+05
Iden I	20+00	6+20

3. Evaluation of each pilot as follows:

a. Iden A - Had flown C-46 about 1200 hours before and was picking it up very nicely. I gave several engine out - single engine landing and go-arounds - no flap landing - emergency gear extension. Short field landings several ILS approaches.

b. Iden C - Was the pilot who cracked up the other C-46, plus he was unwilling to fly at night. I gave him 1½ hours of air time and recommended he be used only as a co-pilot on grounds of poor head work.

c. Iden B - He is an older pilot who would bounce the airplane and then sit there waiting for it to hit again, without adding power to let it down easy. He also wanted to feather the wrong engine after one was cut. Recommended he only be used as a co-pilot.

d. Iden D - He had been flying in and around Iden J for several years, however, in his training he was quite sloppy in his flying. he would not come within 20° of assigned heading turns at the begining.

Also he was very rough with the airplane in pitch control. On ILS approaches he would vary the manifold pressure from 12" to 30" to try and stay on the glide slope. On short field landing and take-off after about six of them he started approaching the procedures I was trying to show him, but I was convinced as soon as I left the area he would return to his own style of flying. I recommended that at the end of his six month contract which was about 30 days away he be terminated.

e. Iden E - This man had previous C-46 experience of about 2000 hours. He showed great interest and did a good job from the beginning. I recommended he be used as PIC in C-46's.

f. Iden F - This man was suppose to have had a good deal of experience, but his flying left very much to be desired. He had just been convalescening from amebic dysentery. He replied when asked, that he felt up to flying but his performance was very poor. He decided he still didn't feel up to flying and returned to the doctor's care.

g. Iden G - Had previous multi-engine experience and co-pilot time in the B-26's. He progressed satisfactory and with 7+20 hours was released to the field to fly in right seat to observe tactics and gain more experience before moving to left seat as PIC.

h. Iden H - Had limited experience, however, he was very interested and applied himself to the task of checking out in the B-26K. He was very helpful in reproducing power limitations and power setting for the CB-16-17 series engine and also reproduced the P&W pamphlet on the CB-16-17 series engines, which I had brought along as a training aid. This was made required reading material for all B-26 drivers. This man rode along as an observer while Iden G was being trained, which aided him when he started flying. I recommended he also be released to the field and ride the right seat to observe tactics and gain more experience before flying missions in the left seat.

i. Iden I - The Chief Pilot of the group is a very capable pilot who applies himself very well. He appears to be interested in improving the professional standards of his pilots. I had several rides with him (6+20) until I felt he would be able to instruct the rest of the pilots in the proper procedures to be used in the B-26K's.

4. The training program was quite curtailed by the restrictions to Iden K. Most of the pilots were required to remain out in the field to meet operational needs. Also only one B-26 was available in Iden K which

was in check till 18 March and then was not available two other days because of maintenance.

5. I recommend that Air Operations Officers be checked out in the equipment they are supervisors for in order to keep on top of their pilots proficiency. The pilots that are sent over should be screened better so as not to require so much training in the field.

Carlisle B. FORNEGAR

Separate Cover Attachment to

Dispatch No. UAPA-0099

Iden A - Fausto Valdes

Iden B - Jose Perez Menendez

Iden C - Francisco Valliciergo

Iden D - Efrain Morantes

Iden E - Castor Cereceda

Iden F - Theodore Whitehouse

Iden G - Rene Travieso

Iden H - Luis Ardois

Iden I - Jack Varela

Iden J - Africa

Iden K - Leopoldville

14-00000

Att. #42

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

28 April 1965

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

Check RIF No.#

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.
446 N.E. 39th St.
Miami, Fla.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse has been under treatment since 8 April 1965 for acute and chronic Sinusitis which has failed to clear.

He has been seen by Robert Oliver, M.D., ear, eye, nose and throat specialist who has recommended a submucous resection for correction of deviated septum.

I concur with the diagnosis and recommendation of surgery.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, M.D.

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

28 APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 26 April 1965 aal

TO: Chief, OPS/3/AB/SOD

ATTN: David Lamoureux

C NO. 201-300,614

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on 26 April 1965. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

26 APR 65

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(1)

MICROFICHE

201-300614

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

RE. FILE AF&L, DDP, WH/C8, D/MS2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 162353Z [redacted]

DIR CITE WAVE 8832

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH MEDIC PERUMEN

17Apr65 IN 46796

REF DIR 90498

Whitshire

DM

LORENTZ SENDS:

1. PX SUBJECT WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS EXCEPTED ELEVATED BP 150/104 CHRONIC ACUTE SINUSITIS, RESIDUAL AMOEBIASIS, ACUTE ANXIETY REACTION. RECEIVING MEDICATIONS THESE CONDITIONS UNDER LOCAL COVERT PHYSICIANS DIRECTION 2-3 TIMES WEEKLY.

2. LOCAL PHYSICIANS RECOMMENDATION SUBJECT HAVE MINIMAL ACTIVITY UNTIL SYMPTOMS ARE RELIEVED AND UNDER CONTROL. NO HOSPITALIZATION EXPECTED.

3. NO SIGNIFICANT FACTS IN DEBRIEFING ALTHOUGH SUBJECT CLAIMED HE RECEIVED "INJECTIONS" IN LEOP UNDER DOCTOR'S CARE THAT EFFECTED HIS NERVOUS SYSTEM. THIS FACT IS NOT INCLUDED IN MIAMI MEDIC REPORT.

4. FORWARDING DETAILED REPORT VIA POUCH.

SECRET Y ADVISE ON PHYSICAL EXAM

CFN

SECRET

17 APR 65

201-300614

1

[redacted] COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

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UNIT

TIME

BY

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION AF 7

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C 8, SOD 6

S
E C R E T 141345Z

14 APR 65 IN 44880

DIR CITE LEOP 8248

WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 01131 +

REF 100 USD ADMINISTRATIVE PAY AS CHIEF PILOT BUNIA.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

+ REQUESTED REASON [illegible] FOR WITHRUSH USD 100 BASE SALARY INCENTIVES.

14 APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

(1)

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-5474

9 April 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, Eduardo

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was seen by me yeaterday for a general physical examination. He holds a current F.A.A. Class II medical certificate issued by me 10 Nov. 1964.

Mr. Whitehouse related a history as follows: He has been out of the country for five months and had bloody diarrhea off and on for 2½months. He has had sinus trouble with pain and nasal discharge and increased symptoms with pressure changes. His weight loss has been 20 pounds. His prostate became inflammed and tender.

Results of yesterdays physical exam are as follows: Chest Xray was normal and consistant with one taken at this office 10 November 1964; E.E.N. & T. all normal; Heart - normal size, rhythm, sounds; Abdomen -negative including hernia; Thyroid - normal; Blood Pressure 150/104; pulse rate at rest - 74;

Electrocardiogram was within normal limits; urinaly-s sis - sug. - neg. alb. - neg. micro. - neg.; Sed Rate 3mm/hr.; Hbg. 14 gms. RBC 4,500,000 WBC 7,700 diff. - seg. 62 lymph. 31 stab. 4 mono. 3;

This patient is at present in an acute Anxiety State, has acute and chronic sinusitis, and seems to be recovering from what is probably chronic amoebic dy sentary. I found the prostate to be normal. His sinuses were treated with drops and diathermy. I asked that he keep a temperature chart, Durabolin 1cc was given i.m. and three other medicines were

(2)

9 APR 65

201-300614

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

WHITEHOUSE, Edwardo

given to be taken orally for treatment of his sinuses and his anxiety state.

Mr. Whitehouse is to return today for another sinus treatment, Xrays of the sinuses, and he is to bring in a specimen of feces. His treatment should continue approximately two or three times weekly until his sinuses are clear and medication relieves his anxiety state and nervousness.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, MD

William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

ORIG : F. DALY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 6 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM 26

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
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7 APR 65 18 10z

SIG CEN

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD-6
INFO: VR, FiLe, DDP, WH/C-2, AF-6, D/MS-2, CCS-3

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 99498

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

ADVISE FOLL RE WHITEHOUSE:

(1) CONDIT AS DETERMINED BY PHYSICAL EXAM,

(2) AMOUNT HOSPITALIZATION REQUIRED IF ANY,

(3) RESULTS DEBRIEFING IF SIGNIFICANT.

END OF MESSAGE

MS Mr Corrigan (Telecon)

AF/5

WH/C/MO Lee Moughan (Telecon)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

6 APR-65

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MICROFICHE
Copy N.

201-300614

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FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, AF6, WH/C 8, CCS 3, OP2, OF 3,

S E C R E T 041600Z

4 Apr 65 IN 37757

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE LEOP 8054

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

WHITEHOUSE DPTD LEOP 032145Z MIA VIA ROME LISBON SCHED DPT LISBON PAA 255, 4 MAR.

S E C R E T

CFN

4 APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

(1)

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ACTION SOD

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UNIT AF & SOD

TIME 1400

BY ZC

INFO VR. FILE, AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, CC 3, D/MS 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 021410Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 8028

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REFS: A. DIR 97928 *

B. LEOP 7937 (IN 33942)

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS REF A, TERMINATING WHITEHOUSE CONTRACT RETURNING FIRST AVAILABLE. REQUIRES MEDICAL ATTENTION NOT AVAILABLE LEOP. MALADY DUE CONDITIONS ADVANCED BASES COMPLICATED LACK PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION AND MALTREATMENT. ? mean incorrect medical diagnosis and subsequent treatment"?

2. PARA 2 REF B REQUESTED AUTHORIZATION RETURN SUBJECTS, TERMINATION CONTRACT NOT SPECIFIED. PEREZ RETURN REQUESTED LEOP CONVENIENCE, CAN CONTRIBUTE NOTHING REMAINING LEOP. DESIRES COMPLETE SIX MONTH CONTRACT TERMS.

S E C R E T

CFN

* Instructed Leop to terminate contract the day subj departs Leop.

SECRET

(2 APR 65)

201-300614

(1)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

29 SECRET

ORIG: [illegible] DALY:kas
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS3
EXT: 4475
DATE: 1 Apr 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
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TO: LEOPOLDVILLE . JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO: AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, VR, FILE

TO PRIORITY LEOP INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE DIR

97928

Whitehouse

DIR-97928

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 7937 (IN 33942)

1. CONCUR REQUESTS PARA 2 REF.

2. ~~BOTH CASES~~ IN EACH CASE TERMINATE CONTRACT DAY SUBJ DEPARTS LEOP. SINCE TERMINATION MUTUAL CONSENT, KUBARK PAYS RETURN TICKET COSTS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 ______ (phone)

AF/B&F ______ (phone)

WH/C/MO ______ (phone)

SOD/SECUR ______

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

1 APR 65

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

①

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MICROFICHE

201-300614

14-00000

12.4:42

201

I, EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE herein and hereby acknowledge that the contractor, during the term of the agreement consummated between us, effective NOV 13 1960 and terminated APRIL 3, 1965, has fulfilled all such commitments as outlined and authorized in subject agreement.

Therefore, in recognition of the good faith and good will of the contractor and the accord and agreement between myself and the contractor, with the termination of this agreement, I hereby release and forever discharge the Contracting Officer, all of his agents, employees and representatives, from any and all claims, demands, and liabilities in any form, or by any party, throughout the world, from services performed by me for the Contracting Officer under said agreement with the Contracting Officer.

I hereby promise I will not reveal activities, sponsors, or any other information that came to my attention due to the performance of my duties during the period of the contract, in writing or any other form.

APRIL 19/65
Date

Employee

Date

Witness

①

APR 65

MICROFICHE

201-300614

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FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP. WH/C 8 S. 6 CCS 3 D/M. 2 CI/OA

S E C R E T 30/0915Z

30 Mar 65 IN 33942

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 7937

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

1. NOTIFICATION INTENT TERMINATE CONTRACTS EXPIRATION SIX MONTH OBLIGATION TOMAS AFONT, 30 APRIL; GASTON RODRIGUEZ, 22 APRIL; JOSE MENENDEZ PEREZ, 26 APRIL; TED WHITEHOUSE 13 MAY.

2. WHITEHOUSE INCAPACITATED OVER SIX WEEKS AMOEBIC INFECTION, HIGHLY NERVOUS, NO STAMINA, CONTINUES LOSE WEIGHT. REQUEST AUTHORIZE IMMEDIATE RETURN PBPRIME DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT. PEREZ INCAPACITATED LAME BACK, THREE WEEKS REST PRESCRIBED, NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED RETAINING LEOP. REQUEST PERMISSION RETURN.

S E C R E T

CFN

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	ACT.	INFO	FILE
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1 copy back to [illegible]

31 MAR 65
MICROFILMED

201-300614

1

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GROUP 1

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FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT AF & SOD

TIME 1450

BY

VR. FILE AF 6, ADP, WH/C 8, DIM S 2, CCS 3, CI/OA

S
E C R E T 311505Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE LEOP 7977

31 MAR 65 IN 35132

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: LEOP 7937 (IN 33142) *

IUSTARK REPORTS WHITEHOUSE CONDITION GROWING PROGRESSIVELY WORSE. PLSE ADVISE PARA 2 REF.

* REQUESTED WHITEHOUSE BE RETURNED PBPRIME.

S E C R E T

CFN

X

(1)

31 MAR 65

MICROFILMED

201-300614

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2/1 SECRET

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FROM Leopoldville

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION SOD 6

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TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 6, AF 4,

S E C R E T 041736Z LEOP-6156

IN 53304

DIR INFO WAVE CITE LEOP 6156

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF DIR 74677

1. PER PARA ONE REF, CURRENT PBRUMEN PROBLEMS PRIMARILY RESULT:

   A. LACK OF INTESTINAL FORTUTUDE FOCUSED BY T-28 CRASH

   B. LACT OF SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL ALLOW R AND R, AVAILABLE PILOTS CONSTANTLY REQUIRED IN FIELD.

   C. LACK S AND R FACILITIES. SINCE CRASH HAS BECOME MAJOR CAUSE APPREHENSION AND DISSATISFACTION.

2. LEADERS ASSIGNED IN FIELD BELIEVED BEST QUALIFIED OF THOSE AVAILABLE:

   A. B-26 CASTAR CERICEDA

   B. T-28 STAN - TRISTAN GARCIA

   C. T-28 BUNIA - TED WHITEHOUSE

   TRAVIESO FROM PERFORMANCE TO DATE CONSIDERED WELL QUALIFIED. UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY VIEW FUTURE RESPONSIBLE ASSIGNMENT WHEN ACQUIRES MORE CONGO EXPERIENCE.

3. PER PARA TWO REF PILOTS.

   A. T-28 QUALIFIED. TRISTAN GARCIA, TOM AFONT, R. TRAVIESO, L. ARDOIS, M. RAMOS, T. WHITEHOUSE, G. RODRIGUEZ.

4 JAN 65

2

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

SECRET

201-300619

B. T-28 TRAINING LEG. PERON, MENDEZ, BRINGUIER, TUNON.

C. C-46. VALLICIERDO, MENENDEZ, MORANTES.

D. B-26. ALVEREZ, CERECEDA, VALDEZ, ROJAS, BERNAL, BLAZQUEZ.

SECRET

POOR QUALITY DOC

14-0000

MESSAGE FORM

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: DAVID C. L'AMOUREUX
UNIT: SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT: 7367
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ [illegible] 7-124-19/2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
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7
8

16 Nov 64 23 49z
SIG CEN

TO LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6
INFO: WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) DDP, WH/SA8, AF 4, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO: WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE DIR 64448

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 64156 *

DIR-64448

~~RE~~/REF SUBJECT QUALIFIED T-6 NOT T-28.

END OF MESSAGE

* ALL CUBAN PILOTS GIVEN SINGLE ENGINE TRANSITION AND EVALUATED FOR FLYING ABILITY PRIOR DEPARTURE PBPRIME.

SOD/AB/OPS/3

AF/5

16 NOV 64.

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

1)

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201-300614

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ACTION SOD6

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TO: UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, AF 4, CCS 3, CI/OPS, OP 3, OF 4, OS 2

SECRET 162259Z WAVE-4905

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 4905

16 Nov 64 IN 24444

CHAPPIE* WITHRUSH PBRUMEN DTEARN*

LORENTZ TDY MIAMI SENDS: (IN 22199)

REF A. WAVE 4730 (PARA 2)

B. LEOP 4729 (IN 23790)**

* See HB 90-4004 Re ACTION INDICATORS.

** Revalidate Ticket For Subject.

1. WHITEHOUSE AND MORANTES DEPARTING PAN AM FLIGHT 153 NOV 17. ETA LEOP 1800 NOV 18. PLS MEET.

2. MORANTES UNDER CONTRACT EFEECTIVE 1 OCT 64. THIS INFO FOR LEOP ONLY. PAID SALARY THROUGH END OF NOV. AUTHORIZED 15 KILOS EXCESS BAGGAGE AND WILL CLAIM UPON ARRIVAL.. NO OTHER ADVANCES. TRAVELING UNDER COLUMBIAN PASSPORT B-91770 WITH PBPRIME REENTRY PERMIT.

3. MORANTES BREIFED WOULD RECEIVE LOCAL CONTRACT UPON ARRIVAL. HAVE MAINTAINED STRICT NON ODYOKE APPROACH AND SUBJECT COOPERATIVE. HOWEVER REQUEST HESTON OR REP HAVE FORMALIZED CONTRACT INCLUDING HAZARD DUTY CLAUSE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN ILLUSION AND ALSO RE-BRIEF LOCAL SECURITY

SECRET

SECRET

16 Nov 64

201-300644

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 32

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LASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FROM ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

JMWAVE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, WE 3, AF 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/S 3

S E C R E T 151611Z

IMMEDIATE LEOP INFO DIR BRUS CITE WAVE 4855

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/FBRUMEN

15 Nov 64 IN 23669

LORENTZ TDY MIAM SENDS:

1. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WAS PURPOSELY CANCELLED FROM SABENA FLIGHT. WAS ADVISED BY SABENA NEW YORK QUOTE TO CONTACT CONGO CONSULATE BRUS FOR ISSUANCE OF VISA ON MONDAY UNQUOTE. ADDITIONALLY SOMEONE OF AUTHORITY INDEPENDENTLY RESCHEDULED SUBJECT FOR MONDAY DEPARTURE ALTHOUGH TICKED IN MIAMI CONFIRMED BRUS-LEOP SPACE ON SUNDAY.

2. HOLDING WHITEHOUSE NEW YORK PENDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION AND LEOP DIRECTION. CAN REVALIDATE TICKET VIA PAN AM IF ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE EFFECTED LEOP IN TIME FOR DEPARTURE ON 17 NOV.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

15 Nov 64

201-[illegible]

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

MESSAGE FORM 21

24 SECRET

ORIG : Dave Lamoureux
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS-3
EXT : 7367
DATE : 14/11/64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 7-124-18/2

ROUTING

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4		8	

14 Nov 64 17 42z

SIG CEN

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD-6 INFO DDP, WH/SA-8; AF-4, VR, File

TO LEOP INFO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE DIR 64156

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

DIR-64156

REF: LEOP 4609 (IN 20863) *

AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION OF POINTS RAISED IN REF REGARDING WHITEHOUSE ACCEPTABILITY, HQS DISPATCHED HIM TO CONGO. AGREE THAT CHIEF PILOT SHOULD BE CONSULTED, AND IN PAST WHEN THERE HAS BEEN DEFINITE ANTIPATHY BY PBRUMENS HQS HAS RESPECTED FIELD VIEWS. HQS HOWEVER DOING ALL POSSIBLE TO SUPPLY BEST QUALIFIED ([illegible] FROM DIMINISHING POOL) CANDIDATES, AND THE FIELD MUST WORK WITH THOSE THAT ARE AVAILABLE. FYI ALL CUBAN PILOTS ARE GIVEN SINGLE ENGINE TRANSITION AND EVALUATED FOR FLYING ABILITY PRIOR DEPARTURE PBPRIME. TOLD THEY TO FLY AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED BY SAO. WHITEHOUSE QUALIFIED T-28.

END OF MESSAGE

* WHitehouse NoT Desired BY CHief PiLoT At This Time.

FYI - This cable ~~was not written by~~ SOD/AB/OPS-3

SOD/AB/OPS-3 ✓

WH/SA/IOS ✓

AF/S

AF/COPS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD
14 Nov 64

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

201-300614

IN CONSIDERATION of my employment on the terms hereinafter set forth, I, Eduardo J. Whitehouse heroinafter called employee, hereby agree to the following conditions of employment:

1. That the term "employer" as used in this agreement shall be the Government of the Republic of the Congo, or any designated Department or Agency of said Government, or any Company or Agency that the said Government may designate.

2. That the service to be rendered by the employee under this agreement is to be an aircraft pilot, with no specific aircraft assignment.

3. That the term of employment under this agreement shall be for a period of one - 1 - year from November 13, 1964. During the first six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by the employer at any time by thirty - 30 - days written notice in advance to the employee. During the last six month term of this agreement, this agreement may be terminated by either the employee or the employer by thirty -30- days written notice in advance to the other party.

4. That the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Eight Hundred -$800.00- Dollars per month during the first six month term of this agreement. During the last six month term of this agreement, the employee shall be paid a basic, all inclusive, salary of Nine Hundred -$900.00- Dollars per month. That the employee shall be paid an additional Ten -$10.00- Dollars per flying hour each month, for all flying hours in excess of seventy flying hours per month.

5. That the employee accepts the responsibility of the payment of all applicable taxes on all income earned by him under the terms of this agreement.

6. That the employee shall be furnished round trip tourist class air transportation costs from Miami, Florida, to destination, and return, and all other expenses directly relating to the travel involved. In the event at the termination of this agreement, the employee accepts employment with an employer other than the Government of the Republic of the Congo, the return transportation cost shall not be paid said employee.

7. That the employee shall be provided with the following benefits during the term of this agreement:

a. A monetary benefit of $10,000 in the event of his death from any cause whatever during the term of this agreement.

POOR QUALITY DOCUMENT

13 NOV 64

201-300614

MICROFILMED

of his death by accidental means while aboard a tested aircraft while operating in a non war risk area and engaged in the performance of services under this agreement PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident.

c. An additional monetary benefit of $30,000 in the event of his death by accidental means while engaged in the performance of services under this agreement aboard an aircraft being tested as to its airworthiness or when the aircraft is operating in a war risk area, PROVIDED death occurs within 90 days of the accident.

d. That in the event the employee receives an injury or disability while directly engaged in the performance of services under this agreement, he will be entitled to medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amount as in the sole discretion of the employer is proper, PROVIDED said benefits shall not exceed a total of $20,000 for the same injury or disability.

8. That the employee agrees to undergo a medical examination within five calendar days after his return.

9. That the employee promise he will not reveal in writing or any other method, the activities, the sponsors, or any other facts that come to his attention by virtue of the performance of services under this agreement.

SIGNED AND SEALED BY me this 13th day of November, 1964.

-Seal-

ACCEPTED at Leopoldville, the Republic of the Congo, this ______ day of , 1964.

-Seal-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 42

☒ COPY ☐ DUPLICATE

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT SOD

TIME 2245

BY BP

TO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, AF 4, WE 6, OS 2, OF 4

IW, DO/H3,

S E C R E T 130052Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO PRIORITY DIR BRUS CITE WAVE 4730

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH SECUR DTEARN PBRUMEN

LORENTZ TDY MIAMI SENDS:

13 Nov 64 IN 22199

1. LUIS ARDOIS WITHRUSH PILOT SCHEDULED DEPART NEW YORK 12 NOV VIA SABENA 548; ARRIVE BRUS 13 NOV 0950. DEPART BRUS 13 NOV 2005 VIA SABENA 529; ARRIVE LEOP 14 NOV 0555. SUBJECT POSSESSES PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 11 NOV AND ADVANCED ONE MONTH SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCES. RECEIVED T-6 CHECKOUT.

2. EDUARDO WHITEHOUSE WITHRUSH PILOT SCHEDULED DEPART NEW YORK 14 NOV VIA SABENA 548; ARRIVE BRUS 15 NOV 0950. DEPART BRUS 15 NOV 1105 VIA SABENA 519; ARRIVE LEOP 15 NOV 1905. SUBJ POSSESSES PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 13 NOV AND ADVANCED ONE MONTH SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCES. RAPIDLY QUALIFIED T-6 AND IRREVOCABLY UNDERSTANDS FUNCTION AS LINE PILOT AND ACFT TYPE ASSIGNMENT FROM CHIEF PILOT.

S E C R E T

DOUBLE ACTION INDICATOR - See 90-400-1

MICROFICHE

SECRET

①

13 Nov 64

201-300614

14-00000

November 12 , 1964

I certify I have given Mr Eduardo Whitehouse Six Hours and Forty Five (6:45) minutes of dual instruction in North American AT-6D and I found him to be proficient and safe in this aircraft.

He is average in coordination and in my estimate his potential ability to fly tactics is limited.

I reccomed he should be given two more hours in this aircraft.

Rene Travieso
FAA CFI # 1425396

D

(12 NOV 64)

201-300614

MICROFICHE

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

10 Nov. 1964

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Florida 33148

Re: WHITEHOUSE, EDUARDO J.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Whitehouse was examined by me today for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical which he successfully passed and was issued a medical certificate.

At your request a Chest Xray and hemoglobin was done. The Chest Xray was normal and his hemoglobin was 16.2 gms. or 104.8%

Mr. Whitehouse was given the following injections: Typhoid-para-typhoid, Typhus, Small-pox, Cholera and Dipth.-Tet.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper, M.D.
William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

MICROFILMED

10 NOV 64

201-300614

PERSONAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Name of employee in full: Eduardo Whitehouse Insua

Person to be notified in case of emergency:

Name Brizeida Whitehouse
Relationship wife
Address 446 NE 39 St., Miami

Telephone FR4-2396

Designation of Beneficiary:

Name Brizeida Whitehouse
Relationship wife
Address 446 NE 39 St., Miami

Telephone FR4-2396

List all insurance policies:

Date of Policy	Company	Policy No.	Coverage	Beneficiary	Contain War Clause? Yes	No
	none					

Have you completed Last Will & Testament? yes
Date of Will: Nov. 10, 1964 Location of original: R. Hedell
Copy on file with:

Name and address of person holding Power of Attorney:

Date Nov. 10, 1964

Signature of Employee

MICROFICHE

10 NOV 64

201-300614

14-00000

SECRET

SOD 4-7385

4 NOV

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff/OS

SUBJECT : Request for Assistance with Cuban Nationals for Project WITHRUSH

1. The Special Operations Division and the African Division are interested in obtaining the services of the following individuals for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

	Name and Bio Info	Document Required
a.	Pedro Enrique MONTERO Resident Alien A-11885661 DOB: 2 April 1931 POB: Buena Vista, Las Villas, Cuba 201-761359	Re-entry Permit
b.	Ernesto PEDROSO Villanueva Refugee A-12490636 DOB: 31 March 1922 POB: Havana, Cuba 201-761343	I-512
c.	Eduardo Julius WHITEHOUSE Insua Resident Alien A-11241940 DOB: 14 March 1918 POB: Santiago, Cuba 201-300614	Re-entry Permit

2. All have POA's.

3. It is requested that you make necessary arrangements with the I & N Service to facilitate issuance of the appropriate documentation at their Miami Office.

4 NOV 64

SECRET

201-300614

4. Thank you for your continued cooperation.

Robert W. Gambino
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/AB/SOD
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - 201-761389
1 - 201-761343
1 - 201-300614 ✓
1 - SOD/Ab/OPS-3
1 - SOD/RI

SOD/AB/OPS/3:D.Lamoureux:mt (4 November 1964)

9-1253

SECRET

2 NOV 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : FBI Traces on 201-761343 and 201-300614

1. The following FBI Reports were reviewed by this office:

A. Anti - Fidel Castro Activities,
dated 12/11/61

B. Eduardo Julio Whitehouse Insua,
dated 4/5/60

2. No derogatory information was found concerning either individual. This information was given verbally to Mr. J. Dorsiny in your office, on 26 Oct 64.

Paul W. Gottke
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 4 - Addressee
1 - C/AB/SOD
1 - 201 - 761343
1 - 201 - 300614 ✓
1 - AB/OPS/3/SOD
1 - RI/SOD

AB/OPS/3/SOD:D.Lamoureux:jjf (30 October 1964)

2 Nov 64
201-300614

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG : DAVID C. LAMOUREUX:dgw
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 7357
DATE : 27 October 1964

MESSAGE FORM

27

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614
201-744343

ROUTING RI

1		5	
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4		8	

28 OCT 64 22 14z

SIG CEN

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6
INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, AF 4, RI/AN, CI/OA, VR, file

TO WAVE (FOR LORENZ) INFO CITE DIR

5 0 1 0 2

CHAFFIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN

REF: WAVE 8337 (IN 82076)*

DIR-60102

SUBJ'S 42 AND 44 GRANTED POA'S 26 OCT 64.

END OF MESSAGE

*Bio data on personnel.

SOD/AB/OPS/3

WH/SA/IOS

WH/SA/MOB

28 OCT 64

BRUCE CHEEVER
C/WH/SA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

PAUL V. GOTHIE
AC/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T

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201-300614

Copy No.

SECRET

Executive Registry
64 711[illegible]

Capt. Eduardo J. Whitehouse
446 N.E. 39th Street
Miami, Florida

Dear Captain Whitehouse:

Thank you for your views and observations contained in your letter of 22 October 1964. Your interest is appreciated.

Contrary to the information on which you base your desire to discuss Cuban matters, be advised that this agency is not rendering help to Cuban organizations. Thus it is believed that a discussion of this topic would not be of benefit to either of us.

Thank you again for your interest.

Harold E. Padgett
Assistant to the Director

DDP/WH/SA/MOB/PROP/JBOtt:ems (28 October 1964)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - ER
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/SA/ESEC
1 - OPS/3/AB/SOD
1 - WH/SA/MOB/PROP

MICROFICHE

1

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

28 OCT 64
201-300614

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
OPS/3/AE/SCD - D. Lamoureux

NUMBER: 201 - 300614

SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo J.

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 2 October 1964 crm

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For use as a pilot under Project WITHRUSH, as set forth in your request (form 772) dated 2 October 1964.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	26 October 1964

MICROFICHE

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

201-300614

(9)

Miami, Fla.Oct. [illegible] 1964

Executive Registry
[illegible]

Mr. John McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

I am one of the Cuban pilots survivor of the Bay of Pigs ill-fated invasion to Cuba. Flew several missions and talked with the four American pilots who died in the morning of April 19th 1961 while flying as volunteers for our cause.

Contrary to the general opinion that the CIA was to blame for that fiasco, I wish to express to you my admiration and gratitude for the excellent instruction received wile training in Central America and for those who gave up their lives for the cause of Democracy. A wrong and regretable decision by the Administration turned a positive victory into a shameful defeat for the Cubans and the United States.

I understand that certain Cuban organizations are receiving direct help from your Agency. Regret to inform you that most of them are unworthy of such help and not so long ago, their leaders were Castro's followers.

Would like the opportunity of discussing this matter personally with you for the welfare of both our countries.

Please accept the testimony of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

E. J. Whitehouse

Capt. Eduardo J. Whitehouse

446 N. E. 39th St
Miami Fla.
Tel. FR-4-2396

22 OCT 64
201-300614

14-00000

E. J. Whitehouse
[illegible] N. E. [illegible]9 St
Miami, Fla.

MIAMI,
OCT 2
1964
FLA.

8¢
U.S. AIR MAIL

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr. John McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL URGENT

FBI RESULTS

201 - 300614

Refer to data re EDUARDO JULIO WHITEHOUSE INSUA, sent 4/5/60, report dated 12/30/60?

Per Mr. Bludworth
21 October 1964
crm

100-9-14 (unevaluated) need date

DBF 45887

RID

21 OCT 64
201-300614

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29 RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUDOFF

31 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Panama City

ACTION SOD 6.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 1745 BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 7, AF 4, DDP, WH/SA 3, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 152100Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 4741

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF DIR 56647 *

15 OCT 64 IN 93958

1. NO TRACES SUBJ REF. CHECKED ALL LOCAL ODYOKE SERVICE PLUS YYABIDE. — PANAMANIAN SECRET POLICE

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

* RE EDWARD JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA.

201-300614

SECRET

1)

15 OCT 64

201-300614

ORIG : D. Lamouroux: jjf
UNIT : AB/OPS/3/SOD
EXT : 7367
DATE : 13 Oct 1964

MESSAGE FORM 25
24
S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
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14 OCT 64 17 50 z

SIG CEN

TO : PANAMA CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SOD-6
INFO : WH-7, DDP, WH/SA-8, C/CI, VR, FILE

TO PACY INFO CITE DIR 56647

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

1. REQUEST FIELD TRACES ON EDWARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN, DPB: 14 MAR 1918, SANTIAGO, CUBA. EMPLOYED BY PANAVEN AIRLINES, PANAMA, & [illegible] JAN 63 TO JUN 64.

2. LIAISON AUTHORIZED.

3. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

AB/OPS/3/SOD
C/WH/2/P Joseph K [illegible] for C/WH/2

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/AB/SOD

14 Oct 64

201-306619

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22 RI ☐ COPY ☐ DIRIIT

7 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO RI / DDP WH/CA2 CI/OPS VR FILE

SECRET 091144Z

9 OCT IN 90082

DIR CITE LEOP 3775

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 54684

NO STATION OR LIAISON TRACES.

SECRET

REQUESTED TRACES ON EDUARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN.

copy sent CIOA 13 Oct 64

SECRET

1)

9 OCT 64

201-300614

MICROFICHE

SECRET

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE	DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME	C OR 201 NO.
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	U.S. RESIDENCE
OVERSEAS RESIDENCE	
EMPLOYER	PROJECT

DIVISION OR STAFF	CASE OFFICER	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

PROPOSED USE 2C42

From CI/OA
To: OPS/3/IAB/SOD

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER *(Extension 5144)*	CCS FILE NO.

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

7 OCT 64

(1)

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS FILE OR 1-AREA DIVISION

CHIEF, CCS/NC OR DESIGNEE

FORM 2-64 2214

SECRET

MICROFICHE (6-42)

201-300614

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 7 Oct 1964 prc

TO: OPS/3/AB/SOD - D. Lamoureux

C NO. 201-300614

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward E. Brown

SUBJECT: WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo J.

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please furnish PANAMA trace results.

Sent Panama City 13 Oct 64

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

(1)

7 Oct 64

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

201-300614

MESSAGE FORM 22 RI ROUTING

ORIG: DAVID S. [illegible]:bgw
UNIT: SOD/AD/CPS/3
EXT: 7331
DATE: 2 OCTOBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300614

28 S-E-C-R-E-T

1		5	
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4		8	

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6 INFO: AF 4, DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, VR, FILE

TO LEOP INFO: CITE DIR 54654

CHAPPIE WIFHUSH FBRUMEN

1. REQUEST FIELD TRACES ON EDUARDO JULIUS WHITEHOUSE INSUA, CUBAN, DPB: 14 MAR 1918, SANTIAGO, CUBA. EMPLOYED BY AEROVIAS PALMA AIRWAYS IN CONGO FROM JULY 1961 TO SEPT 1961.

2. LIAISON AUTHORIZED.

3. PLS ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

5 OCT 64

SOD/AD/CPS/3

AF/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

MICROFICHE

AD/CCPS
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

BERNARD [illegible]
C/SOD/AS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-300614

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

①

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK Nº 150220

DATE 2 Oct 1964

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE) CI/SI
WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius 201-300614

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
14 March 1918 Santiago, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Public Relations Man
North Shore Villas - 6918 Indian Creek Dr.
Miami beach, Fla.
1 July 1964-present

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Pilot

[redacted]

TO

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME David C. Lamoureux
OFFICE DESIGNATOR OPS/3/WB/SOD
ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 39
EXTENSION 7367

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Pilot - Cubana Airlines	Havana, Cuba	Sept 4 43-Jan 1 59
Unemployed	Miami, Fla.	Jan 1 59-May 1959
Training camps		1960-1961
Pilot - Aerovias Panama Airways - Leopoldville	Congo	Jun 61-Sept 61
Pilot - Interocean Airways - Leopoldville	Congo	Sept 61-Sept 61
Insurance Salesman (own business)		1961-1963
Operations Manager - Pilot - for Panaven Airlines	Panama	Jan 1 63-Jun 1 64
Public Relations - North Shore Villas - 6918 Indian Creek Dr.	Miami Beach, Fla.	Jul 1 64-present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Took part in invasion to Cuba in 1961 as pilot.

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'11"	160	Blue	Blond	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Brizeida Whitehouse

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Edward L. Whitehouse
Mother: Maria C. Insua

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

OCT 13 2 31 PM '64

(2)

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.

MICROFILMED

SEE CSI 10-7

(2 OCT 64)

FORM 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET (over)

201-300614

SECRET

TO: David C. Lamoureux

13 Oct 1964
DATE

FROM: F I/D [redacted]

57

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 2 Oct 1964

TO:	X	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
		CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
		CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: David C. Lamoureux
OPS/3/AB/SOD
2 D 39

SUBJECT: *(True name)* WHITEHOUSE Insua, Eduardo Julius

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 300614

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Congo, Africa

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT: None

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY.

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 156219

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY WH		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD Congo
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

MICROFICHE

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
David C. Lamoureux	7367	Bernard J. [illegible], Jr. 2 Oct 64

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-300614 (9)

42

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.: 4-11 2?1 940
[illegible]

NAME [illegible] Eduardo Julius
FIRST MIDDLE
PHONE NUMBER UN55070 [illegible]2306
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 261-66-2326
☒ MALE
☐ FEMALE

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☒ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

PRESENT ADDRESS 6013 Indian Creek Dr. Miami Beach Fla
STREET CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS 446 N. E. 39th St Miami, Fla.
DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) 2-14-18
PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Santiago, Cuba
WEIGHT 5.11
COLOR OF HAIR Blond
HEIGHT 160
COLOR OF EYES blue
COMPLEXION light
DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS.

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: Re-entry permit
ISSUING AUTHORITY U.S. Dept.Justice
PLACE OF ISSUE Miami, Fla.
PASSPORT NO. A-11-241-940
DATE OF ISSUE Dec. 31 1963
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD 1 year

CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES ☐ NO ☒
NATURALIZED:
DATE
PLACE
NATIONALITY: Cuba
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

LAST FIRST MIDDLE

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	Gulf Coast Military Academy	1933-37	yes	
	Gulfport, Miss.			
COLLEGE	~~Havana, Business College~~	1938-39	yes	
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER WITH DATES				

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR RESEARCH WORK Aviation
VOCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LICENSE, CERTIFICATE, ETC.
WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish, Italian, French READ yes WRITE yes
U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) Cuban Airforce FROM: 1943 TO: 1945
TYPE OF DISCHARGE: Honorable
RANK: Col. [illegible]
PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES
ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.)

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES FROM	DATES TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	1959	[illegible]	Havana	Cuba
1959	1960	Biltmore Terr Hotel	Miami Beach	Fla. USA.
1960	1961	2324 S. W. [illegible] St.	Miami	Fla.
1961	1962	2051 S. W. [illegible]	"	"
[illegible]	[illegible]	446 N. E. 39th St.	"	"

SPOUSE (INCLUDE FIANCE AND PRIOR MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	6013 Indian Creek Dr.	House wife
[illegible] "	[illegible]	same	student
[illegible] "	6- 3-50	same	"

(CONTINUED ON OTHER SIDE)

23 SEP 64

201-304614

EMPLOYMENT — In the spaces provided below describe every position which you have held since you first began to work, including any active military service. Start with present position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 7-1-64	TO PRESENT TIME	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Public Relations	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 450.- PER YR. FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT North Shore Villas 6918 Indian Creek Dr. Miami Beach Fla			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR T. Benitez		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Promote business	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT still employed			
B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 1-1-63	TO: 8-1-64	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Operations Mgr.	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 700.- PER YR. FINAL $ 700.- PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Panavem Airlines, Panama.			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Carlos Maldonado		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Ops. Mgr. and Pilot.	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT had to ~~leave in~~ move to Panama.			
C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: 9-4-43	TO: 1-1-59	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Airline Pilot	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 100.- [illegible] PER YR. FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT Cubana Airlines - Havana Cuba			
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Jose Milanov		DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU Airline Pilot	
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT Political			

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☒ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO ☒ YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR: Pilot MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES. LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY DEFINITE INFORMATION REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
Col. Fed G. Hook, Jr.	U. S. National Guard Bureau, Washington	U. S. [illegible]
" Howard Slaten	Pease Airforce Base, New Hampshire	" "
" Timothy Donohue	Otis Airforce Base, Mass.	" "
Ernest. Horner	Fed. Aviation Agency, Miami Int Airport	F.A.A. Director
Mark. Kelly	C.A.S. Office, Miami Int. Airport	C.A.S. Director

FATHER'S NAME [illegible]	DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS New Smyrna Beach, Fla.	PRESENT OCCUPATION	
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible]	PRESENT NATIONALITY American	
MOTHER'S FULL NAME Maria [illegible]. Insua	DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY) Santa [illegible]
PRESENT ADDRESS 691 Indian Creek Dr. Miami	PRESENT OCCUPATION	
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	PRESENT NATIONALITY [illegible]	

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY Lucia [illegible] 47 Antilla Coral Gables HI- 6?05
NAME ADDRESS PHONE NO.

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts called for is cause for dismissal.

6-23-1964
DATE SIGNATURE

From June 1961 to Sept. 1961 contracted by A.A. Airlines to fly in the Congo, Africa.

Took part in the ill-fated invasion to Cuba in 1961 as pilot.

[illegible]
PERSONNEL CHECK LIST

42

Last / Metronymic / First

NAME: WHITEHOUSE / Insua, / Eduardo Julius

JOB: Pilot

201-NUMBER: 300614 Requested [illegible] (ON HAND)

C-NUMBER:

POA REQUESTED: 2 Oct 1964

GREEN LIST REQUESTED: 2 Oct 1964

RI TRACES REQUESTED: 30 Sept 1964

RI TRACES RETURNED: ~~NPII~~ ND 1 Oct 64

DIVISION TRACES REQUESTED: 2 Oct 64

DIVISION TRACES RETURNED: N.D. WH

FIELD TRACES SENT: CONGO INITIATED 2 Oct 64 Panama cable sent 13 Oct 64

FIELD TRACES RETURNED: WAVE N.D. Panama - N.D. per PACY 4741

MEMO TO CI/OA RE RI TRACES: 772

MEMO TO CI/OA RE DIV TRACES: 772 WH

MEMO TO CI/OA RE FIELD TRACES: 772 WAVE; will forward Congo Forwarded 13 Oct 64

POA GRANTED: OK per Jack Denning 26 Oct 64

CONTRACT SIGNED:

K
0
2
+

No Derog. FBI + I&N per WAVE 2532

MICROFICHE

201-300614 OK

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Eduardo J. Whitehouse (Capt.)

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying: Instructed by U. S. personnel for the invasion to Cuba in 1961.

B. Airline: Cubana Airlines
Panaven Airlines

C. Far East:

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW TITLE	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-46	50.-			
B. C-47	[illegible]50.-			
C. DC-4/C-54	[illegible]500.-			
D. DC-6				
E. DC-7				
F. Jet Transport (By Type)				
G. Amphibian (By Type)				
H. Flying Boat (By Type)				
I. Helicopter (By Type)				
J. Super Const. 1049-G.	[illegible]0.-			
K. Lockheed 10	[illegible]	[illegible].-		
L.				
M.				
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	13[illegible].-			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Hood	[illegible].-			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Actual	[illegible]7.-			
V. Total Night Time	[illegible]			
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months				
VII. Type Equipment in Past Six Months				

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
B.	"	[illegible]	"
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

DATE

SIGNATURE

201-300614

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. IV

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DC/AF				[illegible]
2. C/AF				[illegible]
3.				
4. AF/WEST				WA
5.				
6. ~~F. [illegible]~~				
7. AF/5				[illegible]
8.				
9. RI/CRO				[illegible]
10. RID/AN				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16. RI FI				
17. RID/FI				

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	[illegible]
RI/[illegible]	[illegible]
RI/IPS	[illegible]
RI/Files	

2-4: I still wonder whether he more trouble than he's worth. This is a handful for Leop.

Tom Lasky [illegible]

7-9: Please desensitize this document from the classification SECRET/RYBAT to SECRET.

E. M. Geiger
R.C. #358
AF/5

Un[illegible]ication

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-233477

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
16 MAR 1961

DOCUMENT NUMBER
ACLA 00491

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET ~~RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLW-[illegible]

TO: Chief, Africa Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: Unknown

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville R.B.-3

DATE: 1[illegible] March 1961

SUBJECT: Review of WIROGUE Project to Date and WIROGUE's New Position in Congolese Air Force

RE: "43-3" — CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Support of WIROGUE as indicated in para 5

REFERENCE(S):
A. DIR-29127, dated 12 March 1961
B. ACLW-132, dated 17 November 1960

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. This dispatch is to inform Headquarters of the main developments and problems concerning WIROGUE to date, and to set forth in detail Station thoughts and plans concerning WIROGUE.

2. WIROGUE, in his contacts with Robert B. Guthman, and in the last two weeks with Lester E. Salvach, has always presented a multitude of ideas which include a strong element of violence, mayhem or just plain larceny. In spite of being given a flat no, he has persisted in desiring a gun. When it was mentioned that these were hard to find, and that a pistol or rifle was in addition a dangerous thing for the Congolese to find on a white man, he said that that was all right, a machine gun would do. He even suggested the formation of a special force of whites, with himself as the leader, naturally, to "fight the Congolese in case of trouble." We concur with the description of WIROGUE in para 5, Ref B. except for the means to obtain the best results from him. When left to his own devices to implement any assignment, WIROGUE can all too often create more problems than he answers. His security consciousness is not outstanding from an operational point of view. Control is seemingly best when WIROGUE can talk over his problems at frequent intervals and discuss them with the case officer. The station has found it desirable to meet him with greater frequency than heretofore and to provide understanding (rather than sympathy), interest, encouragement but most of all guidance, and apply a steady checkrein to what are mostly rather wild ideas. Attachment A is a clear example of the type of activity WIROGUE tends to undertake if left on his own and the security risk he represents in such situations.

4P

3. In addition, WIROGUE's attitude and responsibility to [illegible] money leaves much to be desired. Headquarters' comment in Ref A concerning WIROGUE's "propensity for financial mismanagement" is fully realized by this station. To recap WIROGUE's financial misadventures briefly, he spent his money lavishly upon arrival, rented an extra apartment he didn't need, besides several stores for which he was not yet ~~prepared to use, has bought and sold at least three cars and is currently~~ driving a large Chrysler (in spite of being told at the time that it was far too conspicuous). When having depleted the original $400 loaned to him, he requested his $500 housing allowance in one lump sum. He now accepts the fact that he will receive the housing allowance in "little dribbles" (his words) but still feels that he was told he would get it in a lump sum payment. He has little to show from his initial loan for setting up a business, and even if provided with all necessary equipment he could probably not follow through without additional financial backing. The Station feels that no matter how much money he is provided, WIROGUE would manage to get into financial difficulties or at least spend all that he had available.

4. On 4 March 1961, WIROGUE telephoned and wished someone to meet him immediately. He explained, at the meeting, that at ~~[illegible]~~ the evening before he had met:

INDEX

PIERROT, Paul Arnold (MAJ)
Approximate DOB [illegible]
Major, Chief Congolese Air Force
[illegible]
[illegible]

2 att h/w (2+3)
#1 NSM [illegible]

CS COPY

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-28

[illegible] Mar 61
201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1 of 3

Speaks excellent English and French.
Lives with wife (name unknown) Western looking and Western habits, darker complexioned than PIERROT.
[illegible] - 233477

(WIROGUE typically referred to PIERROT as "the major" and said that he didn't remember his name. Later, WIROGUE, in spite of being briefed otherwise, continued to fail to obtain names of people with whom he dealt.) WIROGUE was to meet PIERROT the evening of 8 March at 1700 to discuss the possibility and details of his becoming administrative liaison officer under contract to the Congolese Air Force. PIERROT is interested in developing his own cadre of instructors, both for flying and mechanical work, to develop further the embryo group of 150 cadets currently more or less ready for flying training.

5. At meetings held 5 and 6 March WIROGUE supplied the following details concerning his new job: he was to meet the Minister of National Defense ad interim, Fernand KAZADI, on 7 March to sign a contract. He finally did meet KAZADI (whom WIROGUE knows only as M. le Ministre) on 9 March but no contract was yet signed. As of 15 March WIROGUE had not yet signed a contract but this is pending, he tells us, any day. (A copy of this contract will be forwarded to Headquarters when obtained.) The terms of the agreement include, he states, that he will provide through his European contacts at least three pilot instructors and three mechanic instructors within thirty days. (Thirty days from when is an open question.) More instructors will be needed at a later date, the possible total number being set at ten, five for flying and five for mechanical instruction. These instructors will be paid 20,000 Belgian Congo Francs a month plus 10,000 BCF bonus. WIROGUE will receive 25,000 BCF and 10,000 BCF bonus each month, with housing to be supplied in all cases. If the instructors have families, family transport in addition to their own will be provided by the Congolese government. In addition, medical care and a fifteen day vacation each year is to be provided. The work week is to consist of a 5½ day week.

DPD?

6. WIROGUE has said that he is totally dependent upon KUBARK support to supply the needed instructors. He also feels he must provide documentation to prove he is an ex-captain in the German Army and is quite anxious concerning this point. (Answered by para. 3, Ref A). WIROGUE also feels that the instructors should be other than PBPRIME in order to better back up his cover story, since PBPRIME instructors might point the finger of suspicion in his direction. One or two PBPRIME candidates, however could be included providing a proper cover story were provided. WIROGUE needs names of candidates as quickly as possible, though a dummy list of names "to whom he has written" can be supplied if either PIERROT or KAZADI become too insistent. All candidates must be French speaking. In addition, WIROGUE needs a good 35 mm. camera and feels that this was promised to him, with other equipment, and though his targeting has shifted he still has great use for it. Currently WIROGUE has one of ~~the station Leica's on short loan in order to photograph the N'Dolo Air-~~ port facilities for PIERROT.

7. Recruited instructors should be provided a means of outside contact with the Station separate from WIROGUE, which could be implemented if needed, at a later date. The actual hiring and correspondence relating to their contracts should be sent over to WIROGUE as though he were handling the entire matter himself on behalf of the Congolese government. The address which should be used for all correspondence on an overt basis is included with this dispatch as Attachment B, with the title of Major preceding the name provided in Attachment A of ACLW-192.

8. With a set salary from the Congolese Government, it is WIROGUE's wish to commence repayment of the $4,000 loan made to him for his business. Also, this particular situation could be fairly short-lived in view of United Nation's offer to the Air Force to assist in Congolese Air Force training. It is obvious that PIERROT and the Congolese Government are trying to develop several sources at once to guarantee training for their embryo Air arm, and the final outcome is difficult to determine. The Station is also aware that PIERROT and KAZADI could be using WIROGUE at this juncture to obtain instructors for the air force, but might ease him out

of their own accord later on, either deeming him not worth keeping because he is not a professional airman, or because he will have done something to antagonize them. Also, the Station or Headquarters may deem it advisable to ease him out of this job, as Headquarters has suggested in Ref A, after he has provided an entree for putting some instructors on the scene. We believe this situation represents a worthwhile gain, however, if WIROGUE does obtain the contract as presently constituted.

9. Attachment C provides some information concerning Paul Arnold PIERROT and the Congolese Air Force which was provided by the Air Attache, Leopoldville, and which has already been reported through their channels. PIERROT is obviously trying to develop a training program and build up the Congolese Air Force from several sources at once, and if several of these sources provide the desired aid it is debatable if his own program (with WIROGUE) would become very extensive or even be implemented. It is also possible that WIROGUE's role in the training picture could shift at any time. We feel that at this time we can only go along with developments as they occur and try to realize the maximum benefit from the situation. Headquarters will be kept informed of any changes in the situation, and be provided more specific data when available.

10. In all fairness to WIROGUE, it should be pointed out that until recently the station has not had the time to properly target WIROGUE. As he appears to be untrained in KUTUBE and KUCAGE operations, he requires a great deal of case officer time, an item which is in short supply in this station. We believe WIROGUE may develop into a worthwhile asset, if the time and attention he requires can be spent on him, however. The station is taking the appropriate steps in this direction.

Lester H. Salvack,
Lester H. SALVACK

16 March 1961

Attachments: 3, h/w

Distribution:
4-Hqs, w/attach

This man is a [illegible] except for one or two [illegible] things for which we would have no other candidate. KM

201-233477

Attachment B

1P

SECRET

B.P. 2949

Leopoldville,

Republic of the Congo

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

[illegible]

SECRET

ATT 2
ACLA-451

CS COPY

16 Mar.
201-233

1P

At. chment C

SECRET

SUBJECT: Paul Arnold PIERROT - Background Information provided by
Air Attache, Leopoldville

1 N'DOLO airport is currently being evacuated by the U.N.O.C. forces and turned over to the Congolese government for use by the Congolese Air Force There are some 150 cadets who have received some training and are considered ready for advanced training, but as of this time, have nowhere to be trained PIERROT has made extensive efforts to obtain aid from many sources to train these cadets The AIRA reports that PIERROT has requested aid from the Belgians, the British, United Nations, and asked the AIRA to request aid from the French for the Congolese Air Force. About 30 cadets are in training in Tunisia at the present time. On 11 March the AIRA recommended aid be extended to the Congolese Air Force, but under the auspices of the United Nations.

2 PIERROT also reported 11 March that he had 6 Moth and 9 Harvard T-6 aircraft being delivered near the end of March, and asked if the United Nations Command would allow them to enter the Congo. He even offered to let the planes remain under U.N. control.

3. PIERROT is a mulatto ahd claims to have a white grandmother in Dallas, Texas He was trained by the Belgians and claims to have flown C-47's and T-33 jet planes, though he has not been on flying status since 1956 due to goiter trouble At this time accurate bio data is not availalbe His assistant is Lt M.J. LEMAN who is reportedly completely devoted to PIERROT. PIERROT is personally ambitious and at one point in the fall of 1960, he approached TFELIDE authorities with a plan to take over the government if they would help him His plan was too transparent and weak for any serious consideration at that time.

MICROFILMED
FEB 12 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

ATT 3
ACLA - 491

SECRET

16 Mar 61
201-233177

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 08

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

413

DATE : 17 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK AT 1355 17 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

one copy

MAY 17 1745Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 36726

PRITY DIR FRAN CITE LEOP 3918 IN36726 RB

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 10710 (OUT 83490)

1. WIROGUE (W) STATED 17 MAY HE LEAVING VIA SABENA 21 MAY.

2. PER PARA 3 REF SHOULD LEOP OR FRAN INFORM W OF DANGER. NEED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FRAN SOONEST. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : E.N. KORN-PATTERSON/jr
UNIT : C/AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 16 May 1962

1644

ROUTING			
1	3	4	
2	C/AF	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

[illegible] 36z

TO : PRIORITY LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN [illegible]

2

Ail Copy

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 83494
OUT 83494

TO PRITY LEOP INFO FRAN PRITY CITE DIR 10710

10710

R.B

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: A. LEOP 3885 (IN 34623)

B. LEOP 3462 (IN 47511) (BEING RELAYED FRAN)

1. HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE (W) IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE. PURPOSE WOULD BE RETRIEVE HIS PRESENT DOCUMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUBSTITUTE PAPERS, PREFERABLY SUCH AS WOULD PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO AND AVOID POSSIBILITY FUTURE COMPROMISE TO KUBARK. W SHOULD BE TOLD HIS COMPLETE COOPERATION ESSENTIAL IF CONTACT TO BE CONTINUED AND THAT WE WILLING GIVE HIM LEGAL DOCUMENTATION ON THIS PREMISE. FRAN PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND CONTACT PLAN.

2. FYI RETRIEVAL AUSTRIAN PAPERS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. PROPOSE HOLD DISCUSSIONS FIRST TO DETERMINE W DESIRES AND OUR ABILITY MEET THEM. DEPENDING ON RESULTS OF TALKS WOULD OFFER W ONE OF FOLLOWING CHOICES DOCUMENTS IN EXCHANGE:

A. WEST GERMAN REFUGEE

B. THIRD COUNTRY PASSPORT (POLISH, CUBAN, DOMINICAN, ETC)

C. HIS ORIGINAL NOW EXPIRED FRENCH DOCUMENTS.

W SHOULD BE TOLD OF ABOVE ONLY BY FRAN CONTACT. BELIEVE MAY BE EASIER RETRIEVE PRESENT PAPERS IF HE REASONABLY CONFIDENT SUBSTITUTE DOCUMENTS BE

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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per CSN 43-43

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : PRIORITY LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

[illegible]

TO
INFO
CITE DIR [illegible]

MORE TENABLE.

3. RECOMMEND W BE TOLD OF DANGER HE FACES IN STAYING IN CONGO VIEW REF A INVESTIGATION AS ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE TO QUIT CONGO FOR GOOD.

4. LEOP AUTHORIZED CONVERT PROCEEDS OF W CAR SALE AT STATION RATE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *VIEW MALIERE INVESTIGATION, BELIEVED URGENT KUBARK PREVENT WIROGUE RETURN FRAN AS SUBJ USING KUBARK FALSE DOCS AND STA ALMOST CERTAIN BE INVOLVED IF ARRESTED.

C/06/AF Cavadine (phone)

TSD (Borninger by phone)

AF/B&F

FE/O Phelps (phone)

~~COORDINATING OFFICERS~~

AF/COP

RELEASING OFFICER

E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : ROBERT BOUCHARD
UNIT : AF/5 1664
EXT : 5032
DATE : 17 May 1962

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

file copy

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
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3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
DEFERRED	17 MAY 62 22 25z	
ROUTINE		
PRIORITY	SIG CEN	
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT83997

TO PRITY LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 11029

RB

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 3918 (IN 36726)

SUGGEST WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

EE/G (Phelps-phone)
CI/OG/AF (Cavadine-draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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201-233477

1589

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : P. Springer
UNIT : F/COP/FI
EXT : 5571
DATE : 24 May 62

ROUTING			
1	6	4	
2	Cof	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD [illegible] 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

1 one copy

OUT 86480

DEFERRED
2 ROUTINE 332

PRIORITY

TO PRITY FRAN LEOP INFO FROB CITE DIR 12520

Bob B

RYBAT WIROGUE TECH CABEZONE

REF. A.FRAN 0502 (IN 39623)
B.FRAN 0545 (IN 40229)
C.LEOP 3955 (IN 39724)

1. REF B APPEARS OFFER PROMISING APPROACH IF CAN BE RECONCILED WITH REF A, PARAS 3 AND 4. DOES WILLINGNESS WIROGUE ACCEPT BACK-STOPPED GERMAN REFUGEE DOCUMENTS MEAN HE NO LONGER OPPOSED REMAINING GERMANY? AGREE PARA 2 REF B PLOYS BUT INCLINED DOUBT SUBJECT WOULD BE DETERRED FROM RETURN TO CONGO BY THREAT OF ARREST, OR THAT SUBJECT WOULD WIND UP CONGO AFFAIRS IN "TWO OR THREE DAYS".

2. IF SUBJECT INSISTS HE MUST RETURN TO CONGO TO CONCLUDE GOC CONTRACT, BELIEVE WE SHOULD ACQUIESCE RELUCTANTLY AND HAND BACK DOCUMENTS FOR THIS PURPOSE ON THEORY IT BETTER TO HAVE FRIENDLY OR NEUTRAL TERMINATED AGENT IN CONGO THAN UNFRIENDLY ONE ELSEWHERE. FOLLOWING POINTS ALSO PERTINENT:

A. NO OTHER KUBARK COMPONENT INTERESTED WIROGUE SERVICES

B. THERE NO FEASIBLE MEANS PREVENTING HIS RETURN TO CONGO IF HE WISHES.

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 86480

PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE DIR 12520

C. HIS AUSTRIAN DOCUMENTATION, ALTHOUGH EXPOSABLE AS FRAUDULENT, CANNOT BE TRACED TO KUBARK. (HE TOLD IT "PURCHASED ON BLACK MARKET").

D. PROVISION OF SUBSTITUTE DOCUMENTATION PRIOR TO SUBJECT'S DISENGAGEMENT FROM CONGO WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE SITUATION AND RENEW OUR INVOLVEMENT.

5. IN AGREEING TO SUBJECTS RETURN TO CONGO PER ABOVE PARA, FRAN SHOULD CAUTION HIM NOT TO CONTACT LEOP AND TELL [redacted] HIM (HE MAY) COME BACK FRAN [redacted] FOR NEW DOCUMENTATION AND RESETTLEMENT (AND IF CONGO BUSINESS CAN BE CONCLUDED IN NEAR FUTURE.) SUBJECT SHOULD TAKE NECESSARY STEPS WHILE FRAN SO THAT NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE AVAILABLE ON HIS RETURN FROM CONGO.

6. LEOP: IF WIROGUE RETURNS, AVOID CONTACT BUT CONTINUE MONITOR ACTIVITIES AND INVESTIGATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTION FOR HANDLING WIROGUE CASE.

CI/OG/AF (J. Cavadine in draft)

SR/OPS

C/AF B. Fields

TSD (J. Borninger in draft)

FE/G

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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284

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 24 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 24 1512Z 62
ACTION CHANGE

PRIORITY

IN 40229A FRAN 0545

TO INFO CITE

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE.

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY WILLIAM PHELPS EE DIV EXT 7858 IN COORDINATION WITH MR SPRINGER AF DIV EXT 5564.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-253477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

PRIORITY

PCC 043KFP029

PP UKFPC

DE UKFPC 10

May

P 241002Z ZEA

BT

XXXXX ZEA

ZERO FIVE SIX WASH ZERO SIX SIX LEOP

SECRET

PRITY DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0545

RYBAT WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE

1. SECOND LACKLEN/WIROGUE MEET 23 MAY AMIABLE. W STATED HIS GREATEST DESIRE IS TO LEGALIZE HIMSELF. WILLING ACCEPT GERMAN DOCS IF BACKSTOPPED. CLAIMS HAS MORAL OBLIGATION CARRY OUT "CONGOLESE ARMY ASSIGNMENT IN EUROPE" AND MUST COME UP WITH ANSWERS RE 30 MILLION FRANCS WITHIN 3 WEEKS AND MAIL RESULTS CONGO. DESIRES RETURN CONGO THEREAFTER FOR 2-3 DAYS CONCLUDE CONTRACT WITH GOC.

2. OUR INTENTIONS HANDLE W AS HARVARD RESETTLEMENT CASE AND ISSUE BACKSTOPPED GERMAN DOCS. AS FIRST PLOY WILL TELL HIM WE HAVE WORD FROM VIENNA THAT OFFICIAL QUERY FROM CONGO HAS RESULTED IN DETERMINATION HIS DOCS PHONEY AND THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN CONGO. SECOND PLOY THAT EVEN ODYOKE ASSISTANCE COULD NOT FORESTALL ARREST SINCE PERIOD HIS WORK FOR US ENDED SEPT 61. WE HAVE NO CHOICE FOR HIS OWN PROTECTION KEEP HIS AUSTRIAN AND CONGOLESE DOCS.

SECRET

CFN: 0545 LCAKLEN/WIROGUE 23 W GERMAN DOCS CONGOLESE EURIPE RE 30 MILLION FRANCS 3 CONGO 2-3 GOC W HARVARD DOCS VIENNA ODYOKE NOT FORESTALL SEPT 61 NO CHOICE

BT

225

NNNN

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	360 23 MAY 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION:	C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF AT 1310 23 MAY)
INFO :	ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	5	4	
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MAY 23 1640Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 39724

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

PRITY FRAN DIR INFO PRITY FROB CITE LEOP 3955

R.B.

RYBAT WIROGUE CABEZONE

REF A FRAN 0495 (IN 39135)

B FRAN 0502 (IN 39623)*

1. FYI: PARA 3 REF A, ROUND TRIP TICKETS PROVIDED BY GOC FOR MEDICAL TRIP. REF B LINE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS TOLD LEOP.

2. WIROGUE PROBLEM SOLVABLE ONLY BY REMOVAL FROM SCENE IN SUCH WAY HE CANNOT RETURN. RESETTLEMENT IF HIS BURN AND BLOW TYPE SERVICES NOT NEEDED ELSEWHERE IS ONLY ANSWER LEOP CAN SUGGEST WHICH HAS CHANCE OF AVOIDING FLAP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADVISE PROPER ACTION IN VIEW SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION.

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

210

DATE : 23 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3 (COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK 0900, 23 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH-43-43 | copy

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

MAY 23 1247Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 39623

PRITY DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0502

RB

RYBAT WIROGUE TECHS CABEZONE

REF FRAN 0495 (IN 39135)**

1. WIROGUE STATED HE ARRANGED WITH CONGOLESE DEFMIN COME EUROPE ATTEMPT TRACE 30 MILLION FRANCS WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN DEFMIN OFFICIALS TO PURCHASE AIRPLANES. MONEY ALLEGEDLY DEPOSITED IN SWISS BANKS AND THEN DISAPPEARED. SHOWED ORDER DE MISSION (NOW IN OUR POSSESSION) DATED 17 MAY SIGNED BY SECGEN CONGOLESE FORNMIN. W CLAIMED HE INTENDS COMPLETE ABOVE MISSION BUT REAL REASON HE IN FRAN IS REESTABLISH CONTACT WITH "SERVICE" (OBVIOUSLY KUBARK WAS MEANT).

2. FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS NOW IN OUR POSSESSION BUT, BECAUSE OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH, UNABLE OBTAIN AUSTRIAN BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND DRIVER'S LICENSE WHICH GIVEN W BY MKTOPAZ AT TIME HIS PASSPORT RECEIVED:

A. PASSPORT (AUSTRIAN) 090058

B. RETURN SABENA AIR TICKET 8096473 TO LEOP

C. CONGO DRIVER'S PERMIT

D. CARTE D'IDENTITE D'ETRANGER

E. PASS FROM DEFMIN/CONGO RE TECHNICIAN STATUS (CIVILIAN)

DECLASSIFIED

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

F. HEALTH CERTIFICATE

G. LAISSEZ PASSER 71-58 (CONGO PASS FROM LEOPOLDVILLE TO BRAZZAVILLE

H. LAISSEZ PASSER AS MAJOR, CONGO ARMY

I. UN PASS (ACCESS TO ROYAL HOTEL, LEOP)

J. CONGO CERTIFICATE OF VACCINATION

K. ORDER DE MISSION (17 MAY 62) BY SECGEN FORNMIN

L. ORDER DE MISSION TO BRAZZAVILLE TO APPREHEND A MAN SIGNED BY JOSEPH MATUBA, 26 MAR 62

M. ATTESTATION HE IS ATTACHE (TECHNICIAN) CONGO ARMY BY M. KABONGO, SECGEN DEFMIN, 28 DEC 61.

3. AS STATED REF RAPPORT NOW EXCELLENT BUT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS TROUBLE WHEN W TOLD WE WILL NOT RETURN DOCS. HE ADAMANT HIS REFUSAL REMAIN GERMANY. SAYS CANNOT RETURN FRANCE BECAUSE OF ARMED ROBBERY CHARGE. WILLING ACCEPT ANY KUBARK ASSIGNMENT ANY PLACE IN WORLD INCLUDING FJSTEAL.

4. WE HAVE CA 48 HOURS COMPLETE ACTION BEFORE W BECOMES SERIOUS HANDLING PROBLEM. FLAP POTENTIAL VERY HIGH AND W KNOWLEDGEABILITY COULD BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING SHOULD HE DECIDE MAKE PUBLIC HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH KUBARK. PLS ADVISE PROPER ACTION IN VIEW SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION W DOCUMENTATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**WIROGUE ARRIVED FRAN 1400 22 JAN.

1761

ORIG: DON HUSCH
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5457
DATE: 22 May 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1 5
2
3
4
5
6

TO: FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

DECLASSIFIED

L – per CSN 4843

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 22 MAY 62 23 38z
ROUTINE
SIG CEN
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 85674
OUT 85674

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12057

12057

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: DIR 11783 (OUT 85235)

R.B.

CONTRARY REF SUBJECT RETURN CONGO NOT RPT NOT IN VIOLATION TERMINATION AGREEMENT. DID NOT DISREGARD PROMISE LAST SENTENCE PARA 2.

END OF MESSAGE

EE/G Wm Phl
TSD (Borninger-phone)
AF/5 Gardiner
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

AF/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]ESCH/jn
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5457
DATE : 21 MAY 1962

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
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☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

85235

Leop copy

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 11783

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

1. BACKGROUND INFO SUBJECT: BORN 20 DECEMBER 1919 TIFLIS, USSR. MIGRATED WITH PARENTS TO FRANCE 1921. MARRIED PARIS 1948, TWO CHILDREN, DIVORCED 1950. COMMITTED NUMEROUS CRIMES, CONVICTED LAST OF BANK ROBBERY FRANCE JANUARY 1953. RELEASED FROM PRISON DECEMBER 1955 ON PAROLE TO RESIDE ONLY HAUTES ALPES DEPT FRANCE. CONTACTED BY ARPADDLE ON SPOTTING MISSION IN EARLY 1958, INTERVIEWED OCTOBER 1958, AS RESULT SLATED FOR REDSOX PROJECT. GIVEN AEASPIC CRYPT, POA SEPT 1958, BROUGHT BLACK TO PBPRIME APRIL 1959. AFTER EXTENSIVE PM TNG, REDSOX MISSION POSTPONED, THEN CANCELLED ON JUNE 1960. GIVEN NEW TNG FOR TRANSFER TO ANOTHER COMPONENT. AUGUST 1960 ARRANGED TO RESETTLE IN MEXICO. PLANS CANCELLED AND TRANSFERRED TO AF DIV OCTOBER 1960. CRYPT CHANGED TO WIROGUE. FLOWN BLACK TO FRAN NOVEMBER 1960, FURNISHED AUSTRIAN PASSPORT, DRIVERS LICENSE, BIRTH CERTIFICATE. SENT ON OJT FROM FRAN TO LEOP DECEMBER 1960 FOR NEW OPS ASSIGNMENT. BECAME ADVISOR TO CONGO AF BUT RESULT OF SECURITY AND FINANCIAL TROUBLE WAS ORDERED RETURNED TO PBPRIME. RETURNED PBPRIME JULY 1961 AND SERVICES TERMINATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1961 AT FRAN. RETURNED CONGO, VIA BRAZZAVILLE IN VIOLATION OF TERMINATION AGREEMENT. AGAIN TOOK UP WITH CAS, FREQUENTED LEOP STATION IN EFFORT REVIVE KUBARK ASSOCIATION. [illegible] CAME TO ATTENTION VARIOUS AUTHORITIES AND STATION FEELS ACUTE SECURITY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
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TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: PAGE TWO

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 85235

TO INFO CITE DIR 11783

PROBLEM EXISTS. CLAIMING BE SENT BY CAF, SCHEDULED TO TRAVEL GERMANY 21 MAY 1962.

2. SUBJECT DESCRIBED AS EXTREMELY HARD TO CONTROL, SOLELY OUT FOR HIMSELF, POSSESSING SOCIAL SKILL AND ABILITY TO GET AWAY WITH GRATIFYING HIS OWN DESIRES IRRESPECTIVE OF OTHERS FEELINGS. REQUIRES AN UNUSUALLY COMPETENT, ALERT, STRICT, EVEN AUTHORITARIAN CASE OFFICER; HAS ABOVE AVERAGE MIND AND HAS, BY HIS RETURN TO CONGO, SHOWN DISREGARD FOR PROMISES MADE.

3. VIEW ABOVE, MAY REFUSE RELINQUISH DOCUMENTS. FRAN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO LEARN DESIRES RESETTLEMENT WITHOUT PROMISING HIM ANYTHING FOR THE MOMENT. MAY SUGGEST POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED DIR 10710 (OUT 83494) AS WORKABLE ALTERNATE DOCUMENTATION BUT INDICATE THAT, ALTHOUGH KUBARK OWES HIM NOTHING, WE RECOGNIZE HE IN PERSONAL DANGER IN CONGO AND MAY BE ABLE ASSIST. ALSO POINT OUT THAT HE HAS BEEN EAGER RETURN EUROPE AND ONCE BACK THERE HE SHOULD REMAIN. KUBARK CANNOT SAVE HIS NECK IF CONGO INVESTIGATION RESULTS DAMN HIM.

4. PLEASE ADVISE PROGRESS. FROB MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND FROM PREVIOUS HANDLING.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 Gardiner
TSD (by phono) Breninger (phone)
CI/OPS/AF J. Gardine
EE/C

C/EE

AF/COP

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 390
22 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450, 22 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
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MAY 22 1851Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 39135

OPIM DIR LEOP INFO FROB CITE FRAN 0495

R.B

RYBAT WIROGUE CABEZONE

REF A FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

B DIR 11029 (OUT 83947)

C LEOP 3939 (IN 38911)

1. WIROGUE ARRIVED FRAN 1400 22 JAN. MET BY STEPHAN R. LACKLEN WHO POSED AS ADMIN OFFICER INTERESTED IN DETERMINING REASON FOR TRAVEL GERMANY. W SAID HE HERE ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS CONGOLESE GOVT AND HAD DOCUMENTATION TO PROVE IT. W NOW IN BLOWN CABEZONE SAFE HOUSE.

2. LACKLEN ABLE ACQUIRE PASSPORT AND ALL OTHER DOCUMENTATION, EXCEPT BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND AUSTRIAN DRIVER'S LICENSE, UNDER PRETEXT NEED PHOTOGRAPH. RAPPORT EXCELLENT BUT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS PROBLEM WHEN W TOLD WE WILL NOT RETURN DOCS.

3. W INTERESTED REMAIN IN CLANDESTINE WORK BUT STATED UNWILLINGNESS REMAIN GERMANY. ABSOLUTELY NO COMMITMENTS MADE TO W. AIR TICKET (IN OUR POSSESSION) IS ROUND-TRIP LEOP-FRAN-LEOP. INTENDS RETURN LEOP AFTER COMPLETION OF MISSION.

4. DETAILS RE ABOVE INFO FOLLOWS.

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

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3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

FRAN 0495 IN 39135

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**HQS SUGGESTED WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

200
DATE : 22 MAY 62
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3(COPY ISSUED TO AF CABLE DESK 0835 22 MAY)
INFO : ADDP, C/PG, C/CI, C/CE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
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MAY 22 1235Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 38911

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR FRAN CITE LEOP 3939
RYBAT WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED WIROGUE BE INFORMED BY LEOP OF INVESTIGATION RISK.-

R. B

REF A FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)
B DIR 11029 (Cont 83797)*

1. WIROGUE (W) DEPARTED LEOP 21 MAY. DID NOT HAVE FIRM RESERVATIONS BRUS TO FRAN BUT SAID ETA 23 MAY. W WILL USE ALTERNATE CONTACT PLAN.

2. STATION EXCHANGED 60,000 BCF AT 144.5 STATION EXCHANGE RATE. W INFORMED RE INVESTIGATION PER REF B AND NOT IMPRESSED. ATTITUDE WAS; SO THEY LOOK UNDER THIS NAME, SO WHAT? HOWEVER, LEOP CONCERNED AND BELIEVES IS IMPORTANT FRAN PICKUP W DOCS AND PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO. W TOLD NOTHING MORE EXCEPT CONTACT ARRANGED.

3. LEOP DOUBTS W WILL BE WILLING GIVE UP HIS PRESENT DOCS, AS THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY PREVENT HIS RETURN TO CONGO. HE DOES NOT SEEM APPRECIATE THEY NOT BACKSTOPPED. SUSPECT FRAN MAY HAVE TO OFFER JOB, MONEY OR OTHER BAIT. W HOPEFUL HE WILL MEET OLD CONTACT AND THAT JOB WILL BE AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH LEOP DID BEST DISCOURAGE HIM. W CARRYING TELEPHONE ANSWERING RECORDER INVENTION WITH HIM WHICH HE WISHES TO PEDDLE. STUDY OF THIS MIGHT PROVIDE BAIT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED CSN 43-43

201-237477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : LICH GARDINER
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5033
DATE : 18 May 1962

1642

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

18 MAY 62 23 25z

SIG CEN

INITIALS

OUT 84498

OUT84498

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7

INFO : CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, EE 4, S/C 2

TO LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 11346

11346

RB

WIROGUE AQUATIC

REF: FRAN 0404 (IN 37347)

HQS WILL ANSWER. PARA ONE

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/G BPhelps in draft
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for Lgardiner
E.N. KOEH-PATTERSON
CAF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

394

DATE : 18 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/TSD 4 (AF CABLE DESK AND TSD NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1255, 18 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING
1
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3

MAY 18 1653Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 37347

OPIM DIR LEOP CITE FRAN 0404

RYBAT WIROGUE AQUATIC

RE DIR 10715 (OUT 93494) *

1. FRAN PREPARED MEET AND HOUSE SUBJ REF BUT REQUIRE INTENSIVE BACKGROUND INFO TO HANDLE CASE PROPERLY. AVAILABLE INFO FRAN RESULT MKTOPAZ SUPPORT 1960 GIVES INSUFFICIENT BACKGROUND FOR ASSESSMENT PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

2. SINCE HAVE GOOD PHOTO OF SUBJ, CAN MEET AT AIRPORT. PLEASE ADVISE DATE FLT NO AND ETA. MAN CARRYING LIFE MAGAZINE WILL APPROACH SUBJ AND ASK TO BE OF ASSISTANCE. ADVISE SUBJ TO REPLY HE EXPECTS TO BE MET BY MR SCHNEIDER. IF MEET AT AIRPORT ABORTIVE SUBJ CAN CALL MR SCHNEIDER MON-FRI 0830-1730 ON 553001 OR 5500 8766 AFTER WORKING HOURS AND WEEKEND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS FAVORS FRAN CONTACT FOR WIROGUE IF FRAN WILLING AND ABLE TO HANDLE.

14

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14 May 1962

SECRET

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

Subj: WIROGUE

Subject was originally considered for a REDSOX project that was subsequently cancelled. Throughout the file are recommendations that in dealing with the subject any station should assert very definite authority. For example, the recommendation of COB Frankfurt, 13/11/59:

> "The handling of subject from this point on must be ruthless and calculated...We would recommend against paying $ more than the absolute minimum he needs to survive until the mission is completed"

On 20 September 1960 Africa Division picked subject up for an assignment in the Congo. In conjunction with this mission, subject was furnished Austrian documentation, which, according to a Dir communication dated 29 November 1960, was to be used in order to travel from West Germany to Leo via Switzerland & Italy, and should be returned when no longer needed.

The Director's communication to Leo again reiterated that subject would take firm orders and should be dealt with in a positive manner. Unfortunately, shortly after arriving in the Congo subject got into financial difficulty, created security problems with his conduct, and then jumped into a new position with the CAF that moved so swiftly as to preclude any effective station direction.

On 30 June 1961 the Director recommended termination of subject since he was becoming too great a security risk. Subject was returned to the U.S., then was sent back to Frankfurt, given $2,000.00 pay and put on his own. There was no indication of any hard feelings on the part of the subject but it is admitted that he "wondered" why he was let go.

On 29 September 1961 subject turned up on his own in the Congo and began to approach station personnel with offers of help, no matter what the station wanted or where they wanted him. On 12 December 1961 the station admitted that subject is a security hazard of sorts and asked for some direction.

The Security Division at headquarters states that the documentation originally furnished subject were ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ retained by him since he had no other citizenship papers. Once these documents run out it will be impossible for him to renew them.

In the light of the generous termination terms, in the repeated statements to subject that KUBARK could not utilize his services, and the possible security hazard, it would seem best to completely sever any relationships with him. Judging from the psychiatric opinion, as well as opinions of personnel who have worked with subject, he fully understands ~~firm authority~~ and will not question stern authority.

201-233477

For this reason it is recommended that either one of the two following courses of action may be taken, preferably the first.

1. In very unequivocal language inform subject that his official connection to the U.S. interests in the Congo have been and continue to be nil. That continued contact with these interests could result in his apprehension (if for nothing else for possessing forged documents). Instruct him that he clearly understood that his relationship with this organization could be terminated under the terms of the contract and although we are appreciative of his past efforts, he is now on his own.

2. Bring him back to the U.S. and go forward with the original plan to resettle subject in Mexico. We made preliminary inquiries about this possibility 19 August 1960 before he came with Africa Division and the only thing that stopped the transfer plans was the possibility that he could be used in the Congo.

Solution number one runs the risk of having subject get disgruntled, and then running to the wrong people to tell all he knows. On the other hand, if the man reacts to direction as we are told he does this may be all that he needs to stay clear of the station. It is apparent that at some point in time he has to be given the gate.

Solution number two runs into the financial problem as well as dealing with an individual who is no longer connected with this organization. However, it does meet one of the "requirements" laid down by the COB in Frankfurt back in 1958, ie., "Given some money and a job he could be resettled in any South American country without difficulty". The second solution is inviting, if for no other reason, in terms of getting subject out of another difficult area.

3. The 3rd possibility is to bring him directly to a 3rd country + take the documents away from him there — then tell him he is on his own.

14-00000

[illegible]

Messages dealing with WIROGUE documentation duties:

DIR: 10389-7/2/61: "ref Frankfurt 2939 (In 25124). No action required Frank re: Termination. Meet and assist on arrival only"

[illegible] 192: 14/11/60: "Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME (see attachment A) Note, attach A describes the Austrian passport"

DIR: 06782: 25/10/60:
Tells Leo what jobs WIROGUE can do.

DIR: 08443: 27/10/60:
Asks for several blank Austrian birth or baptism certificates and fill in exemplars.
See Attached papers.

14-00000

109

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 14 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 0805 14 MAY)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
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MAY 14 1109Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 34623

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP 3885

~~bb~~
Bob B

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 3462 (NOT SENT FRAN) (IN 47511)*

1. CNA ADVISER LOUIS MALIERE INFORMED GUTHMAN HE CHECKING OUT WIROGUE (W). DOES NOT TRUST HIM. SAID W SUSPECT AS DRIVES EXPENSIVE CAR AND LIVES IN EXPENSIVE HOUSE. MALIERE SAID THUS FAR UNION HAS REPORTED NOTHING ON W. MALIERE ALSO QUERYING STAHL FOR W TRACES.

2. GOC HAS ASKED W FOR POLICE CLEARANCE FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. W TOLD THEM WOULD TAKE TIME AND SPOKE OF FORGING OWN. W HAS TOLD GOC MINISTRY DEFENSE HE NEEDS TO GO EUROPE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES AND GOC IS PAYING W ROUND TRIP. WIROOT IS ASKING W TO CHECK BANK ACCOUNTS IN BELGIUM AND SWITZERLAND FOR GOC OFFICIALS BOHULU AND BHUNDE WHO SUSPECTED OF GRAFT IN RECENT GOC AIRCRAFT PURCHASES. WIROOT IS GIVING W MISSION ORDER AND W STATES HE INTENDS CONTACT POLICE IN BOTH COUNTRIES FOR THIS PURPOSE.

3. W ASKED IF ANY WORD FOR HIM AND REQUESTED A CONTACT IN FRAN. SALVACK TOLD W CONTACT WOULD BE REQUESTED BUT COULD PROMISE NOTHING, CONTACT MIGHT BE REFUSED. W STATED IF NOTHING FOR HIM IN EUROPE WOULD RETURN CONGO. SAID HE READY TO LEAVE WEEK 14 MAY.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING

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LEOP 3885 IN 34623

LEOP VIEWS IN REF STILL VALID, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW PARA ONE ABOVE. W POSITION LEOP VERY WEAK. (HE BELIEVES HIS POSITION STRONG THOUGH ADMITS DOES LITTLE WORK.) VIEW MALIERE INVESTIGATION, BELIEVE URGENT KUBARK DO SOMETHING PREVENT W RETURN AS HE USING KUBARK FALSE DOCUMENTATION AND WE ALMOST CERTAIN BE INVOLVED IF HE ARRESTED.

4. STATION WILLING TO LAY ABOVE INVESTIGATION ON LINE TO W, EXPLAIN RISK HIS RETURN. CAR STILL ONLY ASSET OF VALUE W OWNS AND BEFORE TELLING W OF HIS DANGER NEED HQS ANSWER RE EXCHANGE FOR CAR IF HE SELLS IT AS REQUESTED PER REF. REQUEST PRITY HQS COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *GAVE LEOP ASSESSMENT OF WIROGUE.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: ACLA - 844 Pod

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: ACLA-844 2 apr 62

TO: Chief, AF

INFO: COS, Brussels
COS, Munich

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 2 April 1962

SUBJECT: Major Peter DE GROEVE

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY.

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCED

1. The recent purchase of three DC-3's and a DC-4 by the Congolese government is having continuing repercussions. This deal has been reported in detail through both TRELIDE and ODUNIT channels including the accusations of substantial graft which accompanied it. The most recent developments, however, have not yet, to the Station's knowledge, been reported by either of the above channels.

2. STAHL reported to HESTON in a meeting 28 February that WIROGUE is back with the Congolese Air Force. STAHL described him as an Austrian with a Belgian passport, formerly with the German commandos, who knows nothing about aviation. STAHL continued to say

> 201 Major Peter DE GROEVE (Advisor to Congolese Air Force ca. February 61 - March 62. Belgian. Involved in purchase three DC-3 planes from Iran Airways at price $125,000 per aircraft. Competent authorities stated comparable aircraft could be purchased $50,000 to $60,000 and predicted trouble from purchases.)

left the Congo with 14,600 pounds which, supposedly, was his share of some $140,000 reputedly made on the above airplane purchases. According to STAHL, DE GROEVE bribed someone at the Surete who then let him cross safely to Brazzaville.

3. On 30 March WIROGUE informed SALVACK that the GOC had put him in charge of investigating the above airplane purchases. His first real task is to arrest DE GROEVE and bring him back to the Congo. Congo (Brazza), however, refuses to cooperate and told WIROGUE when he queried them that DE GROEVE had requested political refuge. Besides, WIROGUE felt, the Brazza side of the river would be very hesitant to return a white man to the tender mercies of the Congolese in Leopoldville. DEGROEVE is supposedly in Pointe Noire waiting for a French ship to take him to Marseille, a voyage of some 20 days. WIROGUE is currently toying with various ideas for possibly kidnapping DE GROEVE in Pointe Noire.

4. Both WIROGUE and STAHL said DE GROEVE is wanted for rape in Belgium. WIROGUE said he had also stolen some money there, though STAHL's version was that DE GROEVE had debts amounting to 400,000 Belgian Francs. In either case, it is doubtful that DE GROEVE will return to Belgium.

Lester E. SALVACK

2 April 1962

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Chief, AF
1 - COS, Brussels
1 - COS, Munich

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible] OB

290
.TE : 23 MAR 62

: DIRECTOR

OM : LEOPOLDVILLE

I - 1 copy

:TION : C/AF 3

FO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
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MAR 23 1433Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 47511

DIR CITE LEOP 3462

L.G.

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE CONTACTS STATION AT PERIODIC INTERVALS. 19 MARCH W APPEARED DISCOURAGED AND A LITTLE DESPERATE. HE STILL WORKS FOR CONGOLESE AIR FORCE, MAKING 15,000 BCF PER MONTH. SAYS HE NEEDS MORE JUST TO LIVE. FEELS KUBARK USED HIM UNFAIRLY. W WANTS TRAVEL GERMANY AND ITALY TO TRY MAKE BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING HIS INVENTIONS. ALSO WOULD SEARCH FOR ANOTHER JOB. SAID HE STILL OWNS CAR FOR WHICH HE THINKS HE CAN GET ABOUT 260,000 BCF TO COVER COST TRIP.

2. STATION CONCERNED BY W PRESENCE LEOP AND POSSIBILITY HE COULD, IF FINANCIAL SITUATION BECOMES SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE, WORK FOR ANOTHER SERVICE. DOUBT HE WOULD COOPERATE WITH BLOC SERVICES BUT CANNOT BE CERTAIN. ALSO THERE IS POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT WORK FOR SMOTH, UNION, WIROOT, ETC. LEOP DOES NOT BELIEVE HE HAS YET TURNED TO OTHER SERVICES. APPEARS HOPE KUBARK WILL AGAIN TAKE HIM ON. (IN DISCUSSING DESIRE GO GERMANY SAID HE WOULD LIKE MEET WITH KUBARKER TO DETERMINE IF ANY JOB AVAILABLE FOR HIM. SALVACK FINESSED DIRECT REPLY THIS POINT BUT SAID LEOP NOT ABLE DO ANY MORE FOR HIM THAN ADVISE HQS OF HIS DESIRE.)

DECLASSIFIED

201-233477

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3. IF CONVERTING W MONEY WOULD GET HIM OUT OF LEOP PERMANENTLY STATION WOULD RECOMMEND MONEY REALIZED FROM CAR SALE BE CONVERTED AT CURRENT STATION RATE OF 125 BCF TO ONE DOLLAR. THIS WOULD GIVE W ABOUT 2,000 DOLLARS WHILE CONVERSION AT OPEN MARKET RATE WOULD GIVE HIM ONLY ABOUT 1400 DOLLARS. HOWEVER W STATED HE LIKES CONGO AND IF THINGS DID NOT GO WELL FOR HIM IN EUROPE HE WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LEOP. THUS COURTESY CONVERSION FOR W WOULD PROVIDE NO GUARANTEE HE WOULD NOT RETURN LATER. AS LONG AS W CARRYING FALSE KUBARK DOCUMENTATION HE WILL CONTINUE BE PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH KUBARK NO LONGER HAS OBLIGATION TO W, FACT HE IN CONGO ON KUBARK FALSE PAPERS CONTINUES MAKE HIM OUR BABY. (SHOULD CONGOLESE BECOME SUSPICIOUS AND TRACE HIM OR SHOULD ANOTHER SERVICE CHECK WITH AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS AND DETERMINE HE TRAVELLING ON FALSE PAPERS, THIS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO HIS ARREST. IN SUCH A CASE HE MIGHT REVEAL SOURCE OF DOCUMANTATION.)

4. BASIS LOCAL EXPERIENCE WITH W CANNOT RECOMMEND HIM FOR ANOTHER KUBARK ASSIGNMENT DESPITE FACT HE CLAIMS WANTS BE OF SERVICE ODYOKE, HOWEVER, OUR DILEMMA IS FACT HIS PRESENCE CONTINUES BE POTENTIAL SECURITY HAZARD. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HQS ADVICE RE POSSIBLE SOLUTION. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE CONVERT MONEY AT STATION RATE AND HAVE KUBARK GERMANY PICK UP HIS DOCUMENTATION WHILE HE IN GERMANY. THIS WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM RETURNING CONGO AS WOULD NO LONGER HAVE DOCUMENTATION IN NAME UNDER WHICH HE NOW LIVING IN CONGO. HOWEVER, THIS COULD ANGER W AND CAUSE HIM REVEAL EVERYTHING HE KNOWS.

5. REQUEST HQS VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

.G : R. Bouchard
NIT : AF/W/1
T : 4559
ATE : 20 Dec 61 1593

ROUTING
1
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20 Dec 61 23 42z

: LEOPOLDVILLE

M: DIRECTOR

F: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT82669

TO LEOP INFO DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43 CITE DIR 31302

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2690 (IN 40416)*

1. APPRECIATE THAT WIROGUE PRESENTS SECURITY PROBLEM AS WELL AS CONSTANT IRRITANT TO LEOP BUT FEEL HE WILL BE NO LESS A HAZARD IN ANOTHER AREA. ALSO DO NOT WISH ESTABLISH PATTERN GIVING HIM ONE WAY TICKET OUT EVERY TIME HE GETS IN JAM, PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS HIS OWN DOING.

2. SUBJECT GIVEN GENEROUS TERMINATION PAY CONSIDERING THAT WE ALSO WROTE OFF 4000 DOLLARS HE OWED US. HE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WE CEASING RELATIONSHIP.

3. AS LAST RESORT SUGGEST IF HE SHOULD POSE REAL THREAT WIROGUE BE REMINDED OUR KNOWLEDGE HIS BACKGROUND AND ABILITY DISCLOSE TO OTHER SERVICES. ALSO THAT HIS PRESENT DOCUMENTATION AT MERCY OUR DISCRETION. THIS OF COURSE ONLY INTENDED AS CONTROL FACTOR. DO NOT PROPOSE ACTUALLY CARRY OUT.

4. DO NOT WISH INJECT HIM IN REDSOX OPS OR ANY OTHER SEGMENT KUBARK.

This [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS RE WIROGUE.

AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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per CSN 43-43

201-233477

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : R. Bouchard
UNIT : AF/W/1
EXT : 4559
DATE : 20 Dec 61 1593

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☒
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: Bouchard

ROUTING
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20 DEC 61 23 42z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT82669

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31302

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2690 (IN 40416)*

WIROGUE as security problem Leop

RI COPY

ROUTING INITIAL
RI/AN
RI/FI
~~DCI~~
~~RI/~~ RI/FI

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

FORM 1389a

BRP

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 245
19 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
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DEC 19 1432Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 40416

DIR CITE LEOP 2690

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) REPORTED 16 DEC BUHULL BOHULU SAID DE GROEVE NOW IN TEHERAN BECAUSE PLANES THERE, NOT EUROPE. BUH~~O~~ULU AFRAID PURCHASE PLANES BECAUSE THEY NOT THOROUGHLY CHECKED, SENT DEGROEVE CABLE ORDERING HIM RETURN CONGO OR BE FIRED.

2. W SAYS HIS ENTIRE POSITION WITH GOC SHOT. HE DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH MONEY ON WHICH TO LIVE. IS LOOKING FOR JOB. ASKED IF ANYTHING ANYWHERE FOR HIM WITH KUBARK. W SAID HE NOW FEELS HIS RETURN TO CONGO MISTAKE. (STATION COULD NOT AGREE MORE). HE ONLY WANTED TO DO SOMETHING.

3. W HAS BEEN IN SPORADIC CONTACT AND HAS APPARENTLY GIVEN STATION ALL INFO HE COULD. WE FEEL W IS SECURITY HAZARD HERE AND WE

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
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PAGE 2

LEOP 2690 IN 40416

MAY EVENTUALLY BE FORCED PAY HIS WAY GET HIM OUT OF CONGO WITHOUT MAJOR FLAP. HAVE NOT PASSED HIM ANY MONEY BUT EVEN SO IT IMPOSSIBLE DUCK RESPONSIBILITY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. BEST ANSWER IF HE TO BE USED BY KUBARK HE BE USED IN REDSOX OPS BUT LEOP QUESTIONS WHETHER HE SUFFICIENTLY STABLE FOR ANY OPS WORK. ADVISE HQS IDEAS OR SUGGESTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

NO. 201-233477

DATE: 258 9 DEC 61

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW 2

INFO: COP, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Signature ☐

ROUTING

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DEC 9 1823Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35694

TDCS -3/495,601

DIR INFO BRUS PARI LOND LANT ELIZ (POUCH) CITE LEOP 2613

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE WIROGUE. MAIN SOURCE FOR PARA 2 IS SIMON BOHULU, CHEF DE CABINET FOR GOC DEFENSE MINISTRY.

FILED: 080900Z REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-623 CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT: CRITICISM AND DISSATISFACTION WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA) GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU

DOI: NOV-DEC 61. PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE, 7 DEC 61

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH CLOSE CONTACTS WITH CNA OFFICERS.

APPR. 3

COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS ON PAGE 2, LINE 7, THE PHRASE "AND KILLED [illegible] ORIGINALLY READ "WHICH RESULTED IN 44 KILLED."
SOURCE GRADE CHANGED FROM F TO C.

ROUTING INITIAL

AF/REG	4	AF/LEOP	1	WE/6/R	1
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1		
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1		
AF/W/RE	4				
AF/E/RE	5				

TDCS PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
JOHN R. EDWARDS

DATE DISTRIBUTED: DEC 9 2153Z 61

BASED ON: ACL 623 WIROGUE

LIAISON:

RI/FI

SECRET

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-233477

Copy No.

(35)

201-233477

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

RR Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/495,601

SUBJECT CRITICISM AND DISSATISFACTION CONCERNING CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA) GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU

DATE DISTR. 9 DECEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 35694

DATE OF INFO. NOVEMBER-EARLY DECEMBER 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 DECEMBER 1961)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 623

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE WEST EUROPEAN ADVISOR (C) TO HIGH-LEVEL CONGOLESE MILITARY OFFICERS.

1. MANY OFFICERS IN CNA (CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY)/HEADQUARTERS ARE DISSATISFIED WITH GENERAL MOBUTU. THEY COMPLAIN THAT HE FAILS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TAKE ACTION AND THAT SECRETS AND PLANS MADE BY CNA HEADQUARTERS SEEM TO BE KNOWN IMMEDIATELY BY OTHERS. (SOURCE COMMENT: PLANS MADE TO LAUNCH MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST KATANGA APPEAR TO BE KNOWN BY KATANGA FORCES ALMOST AS QUICKLY AS PLANS ARE MADE.)

(FIELD COMMENT: SECURITY IS UNKNOWN WITHIN THE CNA. THUS, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT "SECRET" INFORMATION GETS OUT.)

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: NO SPECIFIC PLAN IS KNOWN BUT FROM VARIOUS BITS OF CONVERSATION IT APPEARS SOME CNA OFFICERS WANT TO REMOVE MOBUTU AND REPLACE HIM WITH ANOTHER OFFICER. ONE NAME

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (35)

MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS A POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT IS MAJOR LEONARD MULAMBA.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: MULAMBA WAS DEPUTY CHIEF OF CABINET TO JOSEPH BUNGHE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE ADOULA GOVERNMENT OF AUGUST 61. HE WAS ARRESTED BY PRO-MOBUTU FORCES IN LULUABOURG IN FEBRUARY 1961. THE CNA FIRED ON LUMUMBISTS DEMONSTRATING FOR HIS LIBERATION AND KILLED 44.

MULAMBA, A KNOWN GIZENGA SYMPATHIZER, WAS FREED AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND.

4. FIELD DISEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

451

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE NO. 201-233477

DATE : 7 DEC 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW 2

INFO : COP, DDP 4, CA 2, CA/PMG, C[illegible] FI/INT 6, FI/D, AF 19, IOD [illegible] S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
[illegible] required ☑

ROUTING

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3		6	

DEC 7 1943Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34510

TDCS-3/495,332

PRITY DIR INFO BRUS PARI LOND ELIZ LANT CITE LEOP 2590

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE WIROGUE FROM SIMON BOHULU WHO JUST RETURNED FROM EUROPE WHERE HE WAS ON PLANE PURCHASING MISSION FOR CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. FOR LIAISON.

FILED: 071600Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-622

CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT PURCHASES FOR KATANGA AND CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (CNA)

DOI: 46 DEC 61 PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE, 7 DEC 61

COPY

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.
TRUDY PELISSIER, AF, CONSULTED AT 1605 HOURS, 7 DECEMBER 1961.
SOURCE GRADE CHANGED FROM F TO E.

						ROUTING	INITIAL
AF/RES	4	AF/LEOP	1	WE/G/R	1		
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1	WE/P	4		
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1	WE/R	1		
AF/W/RE	4			WE/E/R	2		
AF/E/RE	5						

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
X PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
JOHN R. EDWARDS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
DEC 7 2117Z 61

BASED ON: ACL 622 WIROGUE

LIAISON: *

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-233477

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 34510 LEOP 2590

TDCS

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH CLOSE CONTACTS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC) FROM CNA OFFICER (F). APPR 6.

RI COPY

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 4-58 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

14-00000

FILE NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

RE Indexing (check one): Marked ☐ None required ☐

Signature:

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/495,332

SUBJECT AIRCRAFT PURCHASES BY THE KATANGA GOVERNMENT

DATE DISTR. 7 DECEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 6 DECEMBER 1961

REFERENCES IN 34510

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 DECEMBER 1961)

APPRAISAL 6

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 622

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE WEST EUROPEAN ADIVSOR (C) TO HIGH LEVEL CONGOLESE MILITARY OFFICERS; FROM A CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICIAL (F).

1. THE KATANGA GOVT IS PURCHASING TEN HARVARD AIRCRAFT THROUGH COGEA NOUVELLE S.A., 225 RUE ROYAL, BRUSSELS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS A NEW PURCHASE AND THESE PLANES HAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT: NO OTHER DETAILS KNOWN.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1389
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1360
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE NO. 201-233477

ORIG : WELLES
UNIT : AF W
EXT : 3829
DATE : 1 DEC 61

1633

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

76672

TO INFO per CSH 43-43 CITE DIR 22033

LEOP

RYBAT/WIROGUE

REF: [illegible] PARA 5

Agree ref WIROGUE handling. Do not consider trip advisable. Appropriate authorities here now aware. W not likely speak with much authority and purpose and hence would treat with considerable reserve.

RI COPY

ROUTING INITIAL
RI/AN
RI/
~~RI/~~
RI/FI

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

201-233477

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(35)

SECRET

E : 2 DEC 61

: DIRECTOR

M : LEOPOLDVILLE

ION : C/AF 3

O : COP, C/DPO 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/BELL 5, C/WH 2, CABLE SEC, S/C 2

DEC 2 2232Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 31778

DIR CITE LEOP 2541

per CSN 43-43

Answered Welles 4 Dec

Negative Turn

RYBAT WIROGUE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF ACLA 667

1. ODACID IN RESPONSE TO ROUTINE TPELIDE REPORTING REQUESTED PER ODACID TEL 895 AVAILABLE INFO RE WIROGUE (W) PLANE-PURCHASING MISSION TO PBPRIME. ODUNIT REP WROTE REPLY TO ODACID 2 DEC WHICH MERELY ANSWERED ODACID QUERY. HE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO HIS HQS HE BELIEVES W TRIP OK AND WOULD BE INTERESTING FOR ODUNIT TO DEBRIEF W. ODUNIT REP ALSO TOLD W PEPRIME MIGHT PERMIT SALE AIRCRAFT, EVEN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, IF JOINT GOC/UN CONTROL OF SUCH AIRCRAFT WORKED OUT. W INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN PBPRIME WOULD SELL AIRCRAFT WITH NO "IFS".

2. W HAS RECEIVED CONFLICTING ORDERS FROM GOC TO GO PEPRIME

201-233477

SECRET

AND TO CANCEL TRIP. SAID IF VISA ISSUED HE READY GO PBPRIME TO SHOW HE CAN DO SOMETHING. WHEN ASKED WHAT HE WOULD DO HE SAID THAT UP TO KUBARK. (STATION BELIEVES WIZARD/4 MIGHT WELL DISCHARGE W IF LATTER MAKES TRIP WITHOUT DIRECT APPROVAL.) W TOLD ODUNIT REP HE IN INFLUENTIAL POSITION WITH WIZARD/4 BUT ADMITTED TO SALVACK THAT HIS POSITION VERY WEAK. SAID HE NEEDED HELP.

3. W FEELS STATION BLOCKING HIS TRAVEL PBPRIME BUT STATES AT SAME TIME HE NEEDS KUBARK BACKING. MONEY MADE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT BY GOC HAS BEEN DRAWN BY BUHULU WHO CONGOLESE REP SENT BY GOC TO PURCHASE PLANES IN EUROPE. W NOW ADMITS NO FUNDS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HE COULD USE BUT SAYS HE COULD EXPLORE AVAILABILITY PLANES. W ASKED IF HE HAD OBJECTIONS TO GOC BUYING FIGHTER PLANES FROM CUBA. HE SAID GOC HAD TO BUY THEM SOMEWHERE AND HE HEARD PLANES AVAILABLE THERE. SALVACK TOLD W THIS DEFINITELY BAD IDEA.

4. W OBVIOUSLY NOT IN GOC INNER CIRCLE BUT IS DESPERATELY TRYING TAKE SOME ACTION TO BUILD HIS OWN POSITION WITH GOC. STATION DOUBTS IF W WOULD EVER BE GOOD CHANNEL FOR KUBARK TO USE FOR THIS TYPE ACTION AND HIS AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE FOR PLANES VERY DOUBTFUL

AND CONFUSED, EVEN TO HIM. WIZARD/4 RECENTLY MENTIONED W TO

OUTHMAN, INDICATING DISPLEASURE WITH 'S FREE WHEELING TACTICS. AS RESULT HAVE NOT PASSED W ANY FUNDS AUTHORIZED DIR 25738.*

5. REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE RE ADVISABILITY W TRIP. ALSO REQUEST INFO WHETHER ODACID AND ODUNIT HQS ACTUALLY FAVOR TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(OUT 72570) RE HQS AUTHORIZATION REGARDING FUNDS WIROGUE)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: ACLA-667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO: Chief, AF

INFO: Chief, EE

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 29 November 1961

SUBJECT: 6 ZIBET/WIROGUE

RE: "43.3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE(S)

A. DIR 25730

B. ACLA 630 dated 19 October 1961

1. On 29 November 1961 WIROGUE told the undersigned that he felt his position vis-a-vis the Congolese Government was rapidly weakening. First, WIROGUE had endorsed sending one of the advisors with the Congolese Air Force to Europe to purchase planes and later found WIZARD/4 was at least cognizant of a second GOC representative sent to Europe on the same mission. WIROGUE made vague references to some 2,000,000 Congolese Francs of the 40,000,000 available for airplane purchases "going into someone's pocket." WIROGUE was incensed at the move of the GOC in sending a parallel mission to Europe and not informing him of it. He saw WIZARD/2 and asked about this other mission. WIZARD/2 apparently informed WIZARD/4 about WIROGUE's visit and since then, for a period of the last five days, WIZARD/4 has refused to see or talk to WIROGUE.

2. The GOC has also apparently proposed sending WIROGUE on an intelligence gathering mission to Katanga. WIROGUE asked if KUBARK were interested in this undertaking. We advised him strongly against this move and added we had no interest whatsoever in the project.

3. WIROGUE has also met the ODOATH representative and showed him the model submarine which was the subject of ACLA-630. The ODOATH representative evinced interest in this model and through the ODUNIT representative, whom WIROGUE has seen on several occasions and discussed the problem of purchasing planes for the GOC, the ODOATH representative was aware that WIROGUE has an Ordre de Mission signed by WIZARD/2 to travel to PBPRIME. He said for WIROGUE to inform him when he was ready to depart and he would arrange for WIROGUE to contact appropriate ODOATH people in PBPRIME to discuss the model.

4. WIROGUE approached GUTHMAN on November 24 and SALVACK on November 29 with a request whether he might be of use to KUBARK either in Africa or elsewhere in the world, and that he would like to be taken back into the fold. He is obviously concerned about his position in the GOC at this time and feels with the diplomatic relations being established between Belgium and the GOC that his position will become increasingly weaker. To reemphasize past assessments of WIROGUE, he is far too disorganized an individual to be an effective FI agent but would probably be useful where action is required but detailed accurate reporting is not. The station agrees with an early statement made concerning WIROGUE that he has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities but would add that these activities should be of an action type.

Lester H Salvack

Lester H. SALVACK

29 November 1961

Distribution:

Hqs - 4

CS COPY

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1284
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF AIR FORCE INCOMING STAFF MESSAGE
NUMBER C-215
FROM: USAIRA LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF AIR FORCE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

201-233477

ATE : 254
20 NOV 61

SECRET

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

CTION : IW 2

NFO : COP, DPD 4, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/ , FI/INT 6, FI/D, IOD 4, WE 4, , DD/I(L), AD/CI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ DD/I (A) None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 20 1642Z 61
21 1000

ROUTINE

IN 25011

TDCS 3/493,627

DIR INFO LANT ELIZ LOND BRUS PARI CITE LEOP 2463

INTEL

SUPDATA SOURCE WIROGUE. FOR LIAISON

FILED: 201030Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-605

CONGO REPUBLIC/KATANGA

SUBJECT: LOCATION OF KATANGA AIR FORCE (KAF) PLANES

DOI: 17 NOV 61 PADA CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE, 18 NOV 61

SOURCE: EUROPEAN (F) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC). APPR 3.

RI COPY

W COMMENT: NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.
GERTRUDE PELISSIER, AF DIVISION, CONSULTED AT 1545 HRS, 20 NOVEMBER.

ROUTING INITIAL

AF/REG	4	AF/LEOP	1
AF/W	2	AF/ELIZ	1
AF/E	1	AF/BRAZ	1
AF/W/RE	4		
AF/E/RE	5	WE/6/R	1

TDCS PRECEDENCE
[✓ ROUTINE]
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
Rudolph Zamula
RUDOLPH ZAMULA

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
NOV 20 2101Z 61

BASED ON:
ACL 605
WIROGUE
LIAISON:

SECRET

201-233477

FORM 4-58 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

(35)

14-00000

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one): More ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

OUNTRY REPUBLIC OF CONGO

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/493,627

UBJECT LOCATION OF KATANGA AIR FORCE (KAF) PLANES

DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 25011

ATE OF NFO. 17 NOVEMBER 1961

LACE & ATE ACQ. REPUBLIC OF CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (18 NOVEMBER 1961)

PPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 605

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

OURCE EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN (C) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT (GOC).

1. THE KAF FOUGA JET IS CURRENTLY BASED AT KOLWEZI. HOWEVER THE MAJORITY OF KAF PLANES ARE NOW BASED AT KISENGE, LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 70 KM EAST OF DILOLO. (SOURCE COMMENT: GOC OBTAINS INFORMATION OF KAF FROM DEBRIEFING TRAVELLERS, SENDING OUT GROUND PATROLS, ETC. THE GOC DOES NOT HAVE LIAISON INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH UNOC.) (FIELD COMMENT: IN ADDITION TO THE FOUGA THE BULK OF KAF AIRCRAFT PROBABLY CONSISTS OF 5 DORNIER 28'S, 2 OR 3 DOVES AND POSSIBLY ONE C-47.) IF THE GOC ACQUIRES PLANES AS IT IS SEEKING TO DO, ONE OF THE FIRST TASKS ASSIGNED WILL BE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER THE KATANGA TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION OF AIR FIELDS, NUMBER OF PLANES ON THE FIELDS AND TO GATHER GENERAL MILITARY INFORMATION. (FIELD COMMENT: OTHER SOURCES

RI COPY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORWARDED
RID/[illegible]IS

RECEIVED

DEC 12 3 33 PM '61

CLOSE TO THE GOC STATE ANY PLANES PROCURED BY GOC WOULD BE USED FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND TO ATTACK AIR FIELDS IN KATANGA.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

593
DATE : 17 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (C/AF TEMPO COPY [illegible]

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C[illegible]

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☒ None required ☐
Signature:

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ROUTING
29 NOV 1961
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NOV 18 01:52 61

PRIORITY

IN 24145

11

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2443

RYBAT WIROGUE

✓ SIMON ~~K~~FR BOHULU (201-311570), Cabinet Chief Defense Ministry (Leopoldville), has gone to Europe to buy planes for GOC

RI COPY

INDEX

ROUTING	INITIAL
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[illegible]	
RI/FI	

17 Nov 61

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FORM 6-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233477 (35)

2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational - WIROGUE Documents

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: ACLA-630, dated 19 October 1961

1. The two attached "laissez-passers" are being forwarded (USC) to the Station, per conversation with GUTHMAN, for return to Subject of the reference.

2. Concerning the submarine discussed in paragraphs 3 through 5 of the reference, we are in full agreement that Subject be put in direct contact with ODOATH. We have no desire to perpetuate KUBARK contact with Subject.

WBB
Walter B. BERWOLD

f/ WBB
Paul E. LEIGHTON

Attachments: USC Via TRUE NAME POUCH
2 documents as stated above

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Leopoldville w/a ~~h/w~~ USC

201-233477

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
16 Nov 61	2[illegible] NOV 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLN- 326

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477

ROUTING AF/W/1

AF/W/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/W/1	Robert Bouchard	mye	3829

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/W/1	Nov 18	E. O. Welles
C/AF/W		Lester C. Houck

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF		Bronson Tweedy

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

ORIG : WELLES
UNIT : AF W
EXT : 3529
DATE : Nov 22 61

1059

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
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23 NOV 61 [illegible] 42z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT 72570

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/DFD 4, C/CA, C/CI, S/C 2

TO LEOP (PRITT)
INFO
CITE DIR 25780

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE

CS COMMENT: *REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PROVIDE WIROGUE WITH REPRESENTATIONAL FUNDS ON MONTH TO MONTH BASIS.

REFS: LEOP 2443 (IN 24445) ; LEOP 2467 (IN 25284)*

1. PER PARA 5 SECOND REF:

A. YES BUT PREFER REIMBURSEMENT FOR EXPENSES AS INCURRED RATHER THAN SET FIGURE.

B. SWANSON NO LONGER EUROPE AND DO NOT WISH ENCOURAGE CONTACT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

C. COMPLEX MATTER. ALL SALES REQUIRE ODYOKE APPROVAL WHICH NOT FORTH-COMING UNLESS END USE CLEARLY FOR LEGITIMATE PURPOSES. GOC AIR FORCE UTILIZATION WOULD NOT QUALIFY.

D. [illegible] WIROGUE HAS AT PRESENT NOT [illegible] [illegible] AND SECURE ASSETS FOR INSERTION AND WHICH [illegible] [illegible] IF [illegible] [illegible] WISH KEEP UNKNOWN FROM WIROGUE IF POSSIBLE.
~~D. NEGATIVE.~~

2. OUR POSITION VIS A VIS PARAS 1 B-D ABOVE COULD OF COURSE CHANGE OVERNIGHT AND IF SITUATION BRINGS ABOUT CHANGE GROUND RULES WE CAPABLE STRENUOUS EFFORTS ASSIST GOC.

3. CAN ONLY ADVISE WIROGUE PURSUE EUROPEAN LEADS PER PARA 4 FIRST REF.

135 ~~4. [illegible] ODYOKE POSTURE TOWARDS CONGO.~~

B. Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
RELEASING OFFICER

C AF W 3 W
DFD C. YATES (PHONE)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

L. C. Hulick
C AF W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 541
20 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 2110 20 NOV 61)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
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NOV 21 0036Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25284

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2467

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT VIROGUE

REF LEOP 2443 (IN 24145)

1. VIROGUE (W) CONTACTED GUTHMAN 18 AND 20 NOV. AT FIRST MEETING CLAIMED HE NOW CLOSE ADVISOR TO WIZARD 4 BUT SAID TO MAINTAIN POSITION HE NEEDS KUBARK HELP. REQUESTED LEOP BRING HIS NAME INTO CONVERSATION WITH WIZARD 4 AND/OR OTHER WIZARDS AND REFER TO HIM AS OUTSTANDING GERMAN COMMANDO TYPE DURING WORLD WAR II. HE ALSO ASKED THAT KUBARK PROVIDE HIM WITH SMALL AMOUNT OF FUNDS WITH WHICH TO MEET REPRESENTATIONAL COSTS HIS JOB AND PROVIDE SMALL GIFTS FOR VARIOUS MEMBERS MILITARY WITH WHOM HE IN CONTACT. W POINTED OUT HE HAS ACHIEVED POSITION WHICH KUBARK HOPED HE WOULD ACHIEVE PRIOR TO TERMINATION. COMMENTED HE PREPARED DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE HELP ODYOKE BUT NEEDS AID PER ABOVE

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REQUEST AND GUIDANCE.

2. AT 20 NOV MEETING W SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM WIZARD 2'S OFFICE. ALLEGED WIZARDS 2 AND 4 WISH SEND HIM PBPRIME WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS TO PURCHASE MILITARY AIRCRAFT. WHEN QUESTIONED ON THIS SUBJECT HE STATED WIZARD 2 TOLD HIM OF SOVIET OFFER OF PLANES AND INDICATED HE WISHED OBTAIN PLANES ELSEWHERE TO AVOID BEING FORCED BY PUBLIC OPINION TO ACCEPT SOVIET AID OFFER (SEE LEOP 2452 (IN 14575)). W CLAIMS WIZARD 2 ADMITTED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CONTINUE REFUSING SOVIET OFFER FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME IF HE UNABLE OBTAIN PLANES IN WEST. W EMPHASIZED NEED FOR HIM TO OBTAIN PLANES AND PILOTS SOONEST IF ODYOKE WISHES AVOID HAVING VOID FILLED BY BLOC OR OTHER ANTI ODYOKE FORCES. HE AGAIN URGED KUBARK PUT HIM IN CONTACT SOONEST WITH SWANSON OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. INDICATED HE WOULD TRY AND SEE SWANSON WHILE ON WAY TO OR FROM PBPRIME.

3. ALTHOUGH W PROBABLY HOPES KUBARK WILL HELP HIM SOLIDIFY HIS POSITION BY FINDING PLANES FOR HIM TO BUY ON BEHALF GOC, HE GAVE IMPRESSION HE BELIEVES ODYOKE HAS ONLY VERY SHORT TIME (MEASURED IN DAYS NOT WEEKS OR MONTHS) TO MAKE DECISION TO AID GOC. AS USUAL W'S VIEWS WERE

reproduction by other than issuing office is prohibited.

NOT CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT OR ENTIRELY LOGICAL IN EXPOSITION. HOWEVER HIS FEELING OF URGENCY COINCIDES WITH VIEWS GUTHMAN HAS FORMED SINCE RETURN FROM MOST RECENT TDY. STATION PREPARING SEPARATE CABLE ON SUBJECT OF URGENT NEED FOR REVIEW ODYOKE POLICY TOWARD CONGO.

4. WHEN STATION RECOMMENDED W'S RECALL, IT WAS DONE IN BELIEF HE RISKED ARREST. LEOP ALSO ASSUMED HE WOULD NOT RETURN TO CONGO. UNFORTUNATELY LATTER ASSUMPTION DID NOT PROVE CORRECT AND ALTHOUGH WE NO LONGER OFFICIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS WELFARE IT MUST BE ASSUMED HE WILL TURN TO KUBARK FOR AID SHOULD HE FIND HIMSELF IN TROUBLE WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH WE NO LONGER HAVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIM, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT REFUSE ASSIST HIM SHOULD HE NEED HELP, PARTICULARLY IF ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO DENOUNCE STATION PERSONNEL. THUS, VIEW FACT HE HAS RETURNED TO CONGO AND IS IN POSITION WHEREBY HE MIGHT INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENT OF SITUATION, LEOP RECOMMENDS WE BE AUTHORIZED PROVIDE HIM WITH FUNDS (NOT TO EXCEED 5,000 BCF PER MONTH) FOR USE REPRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES. ALSO, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO PRODUCE GREAT AMOUNTS POSITIVE

INTELLIGENCE VIEW PAST PERFORMANCE, BELIEVE WE MIGHT AS WELL GIVE HIM SOME GUIDANCE AS CANNOT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AVOID CONTACT WITH

5. REQUEST FOLLOWING:

A. AUTHORIZATION PROVIDE W WITH REPRESENTATIONAL FUNDS AS SUGGESTED ABOVE ON MONTH TO MONTH BASIS.

B. HQS INSTRUCTIONS RE W CONTACT WITH SWANSON PER REF.

C. INDICATION AS TO WHETHER ODYOKE WILLING PERMIT PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN PBPRIME SELL PLANES TO GOC. (IN THIS RESPECT WISH NOTE THAT IF PLANES NOT OBTAINABLE IN PBPRIME GOC WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TURN TO OTHER SOURCES.)

D. INDICATION WHETHER HQS INTERESTED IN PROVIDING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALST TO SERVE AS PILOTS OR OTHER PERSONNEL FOR CONGO AIR FORCE.

6. WISH STRESS W NOW ACTING AS AGENT GOC AND IS NOT A CONTROLLED KUBARK AGENT. HOWEVER, HE SEEKING GUIDANCE AND IF AID PROVIDED BELIEVE HE WOULD ATTEMPT FOLLOW DIRECTIONS UNLESS SUCH GUIDANCE ENDANGERED HIS POSITION WITH GOC.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE CONTACTED SALVACK 15 NOV AND REQUESTED HE BE PUT IN CONTACT WITH ROLAND C SWANSON OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP.

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DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 874
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 21 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 881
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 25 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

DEPT OF STATE OUTGOING TELEGRAM NUMBER 895
TO: AMEMBASSY LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

14-00000

323

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 16 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7 (AF COPY SLOTTED 1215 16 NOV)

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/PS, FI, EE 4, OT, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 16 1543Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 23258

PRITY MUNI DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP 2441

UPHILL ZIBET

1. STAHL ARRIVED LEOP 12 NOV LANDING DORNIER 27 AT NDOLO AIRPORT. HE IMMEDIATELY ARRESTED AND HELD BY GENDARMERIE, AND CAR TRAINEES. WIROGUE SAID HE THERE AND ARRANGED STAHL RELEASE. THREE ADDITIONAL DORNIERS IN GERMANY TO BE GIFT TO GOC. ALL ABOVE INFO FROM WIROGUE.

2. HESTON, STAHL'S REGULAR CONTUMT, IS CURRENTLY ON VACATION UNTIL MID-DEC. STATION DOES NOT WISH TO DROP CONTACT THAT LONG DURING CRITICAL PERIOD CONGO. REQUEST MUNI ARRANGE NEW CONTACT WITH STAHL. WISH COME OR PHONE HESTON APARTMENT BETWEEN 1130 AND 1200 HOURS 22 NOV. ALTERNATE SAME TIME 9 NOV. ASK FOR MR PEEL. PLEASE ADVISE IF ABOVE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS ACCEPTABLE. (FYI SALVACK WILL MAKE CONTACT WITHOUT REVEALING TRUE NAME OR FUNCTION.)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FIGHT ONE FIVE WASH

[illegible]

Relay to Lord

AF Temps

TDCS-3/492,774

S E C R E T

IN20108

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2437

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 2355 (IN 18883)

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE REPORTED 9 NOV WIZARD 4 WISHES PURCHASE 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS AND 2 DC-4 TRANSPORTS. ACTING AIRA LOANED WIROGUE BOOK ON AIRCRAFT WHICH GOC STUDIED TO SELECT PLANES WANTED. WIROGUE SAID GOC SENDING TWO MEN TO ENGLAND ARRANGE PURCHASE WHICH MUST BE MADE IN TWO WEEKS. WIROGUE TO BEGIN WEARING CNA UNIFORM, BEING SENT LULUABOURG TO "STUDY SITUATION."

S E C R E T

CFN 2437 2355 WIROGUE 9 NOV WIZARD 4 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS 2 DC-4 AIRA WIROGUE GOC WIROGUE GOC ENGLAND CNA LULUABOURG

ET

121

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ADMIN

201-233477

14-00000

325

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 9 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED 1240 9 NOV)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FI/SPOG, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 9 1719Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20108

CITE

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2437

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 2383 (IN 18893) *

WIROGUE REPORTED 9 NOV WIZARD 4 WISHES PURCHASE 2 BRISTOL MARAUDERS AND 2 DC-4 TRANSPORTS. ACTING AIRA LOANED WIROGUE BOOK ON AIRCRAFT WHICH GOC STUDIED TO SELECT PLANES WANTED. WIROGUE SAID GOC SENDING TWO MEN TO ENGLAND ARRANGE PURCHASE WHICH MUST BE MADE IN TWO WEEKS. WIROGUE TO BEGIN WEARING CNA UNIFORM, BEING SENT LULUABOURG TO "STUDY SITUATION."

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS.

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

201-233477

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1157
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 9 NOVEMBER 1961
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 446
7 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 1550-7 NOV)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/IW 2, C/FI/SPOG, S/C 2 (SUSPENSE DD/I)

NOV 7 2011Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 18883

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2388 (BETTELHEIM [illegible])

[illegible]

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) CAME TPELIDE LATE AFTERNOON 7 NOV. SINCE AIRA, ASST AIR GONE, CALLED SALVACK. SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS. ONE PROSPECTIVE PILOT ALREADY INTERVIEWED. (W FORGOT NAME NATURALLY). ASKED GUIDANCE WHAT TYPE PLANE GOC SHOULD BUY. WIZARD 4 WANTS ANSWER MORN 8 NOV. SALVACK ONLY ANSWERED HE NOT AIR OFFICER AND W SHOULD TALK WITH ACTING AIRA, STOGNER. W SAID GOC HAS 100 MILLION BCF TO SPEND ON PLANES PILOTS MECHANICS.

2. WICLAM REPORTED GOC GENERAL STAFF IMPRESSED EFFICIENCY KATANGA ARMY AND DISCUSSING HIRING MERCENARIES THEMSELVES.

3. DEFER HQS FOR DISSEMINATION OF ABOVE. INFORMING GPOTHER IN CASE HE WISHES PASS UN.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET CSN 43-41

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

P 071711Z ZEA

ST

XXXXX ZEA

SEVEN NINE FOUR WASH

C/AE temp

B5

LD

SECRET

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2388 (BETTELHEIM AEZING)

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE (W) CAME TPELIDE LATE AFTERNOON 7 NOV. SINCE AIRA, ASST AIR GONE, CALLED SALVACK. SAID GOC WISHES PURCHASE 10 TO 12 LIGHT FIGHTER PLANES, HIRE MERCENARY PILOTS AND MECHANICS. ONE PROSPECTIVE PILOT ALREADY INTERVIEWED. (W FORGOT NAME NATURALLY). ASKED GUIDANCE WHAT TYPE PLANE GOC SHOULD BUY. WIZARD 4 WANTS ANSWER MORN 8 NOV. SALVACK ONLY ANSWERED HE NOT AIR OFFICER AND W SHOULD TALK WITH ACTING AIRA, STOGNER. W SAID GOC HAS 100 MILLION BCF TO SPEND ON PLANES, PIPLOTS, MECHANICS.

2. WICLAM REPORTED GOC GENERAL STAFF IMPRESSED EFFICIENCY KATANGA ARMY AND DISCUSSING HIRING MERCENARIES THEMSELVES.

3. DEFER HQS FOR DISSEMINATION OF ABOVE. INFORMING GPOTHER IN CASE HE WISHES PASS UN.

SECRET

201-233477

14. November 61

[redacted]

14 November 61 [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

Laisses Passer # D 8755 issued to Reiner, Georges

Laisses Passer # 58/1961 Oddiciel Passage Du Pool issued to Reinert.

above being sent to Leop this date for return to WIROGUE

Original signed
by Dan Niescier
201-233477

14-00000

ORIG : E. O. Wallecange
UNIT : AF/W/1
EXT : 3829
DATE : 10 Oct 61 1709

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	C/AF	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

10 Oct 61 [illegible] z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE FRANKFURT MUNICH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT56372

TO PRITY LEOP INFO ROUTINE FRAN MUNI CITE DIR 17004

RYBAT WIROGUE UPHILL

REF LEOP 2218 (IN 42712)*

NO DOUBT LEOP ADOPTING CORRECT POSITION AND MUST NOT GIVE WIROGUE [redacted] ANY ENCOURAGEMENT OR WAILING WALL FOR ANY ANTI-STAIL [redacted] ACTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

*RYBAT

EE/G [illegible]

AF/W/1

C/AF/~~[illegible]~~
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

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201-233477

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

FROM:

RID/A

21 NOV 1961

PUNCHED

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/AF/W		30 OCT 1961		
2.				
3. II/All	3106		30 Oct	Sar
4.				
5. Bouchard				B
6. Nieeman				
7.				
8. Pat				
9.				
10.				
11. RI/AN				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Can't Rogue simply go to ODOATH - all this does is perpetuate the KUBARK/Rogue connection

What about the Docs in Para 2?

201-233477

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT X | INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-233477

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER
ACLA 00630

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLA-630
TO Chief, AF INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Leopoldville		DATE 19 October 1961
SUBJECT [illegible]/WIROGUE Request for Documents		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Hqs guidance re model (para 5)		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. On 2 October 1961 WIROGUE telephoned Lester H. SALVACK and said that he had something important to discuss with him. WIROGUE requested SALVACK to come to his house in Binza, a suburb of Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE had two requests. The first was to ask "Dan" to forward the two laissez-paissez's which WIROGUE states he turned over to Dan and never got back. WIROGUE was quite emphatic that he needs these documents. SALVACK suggested that WIROGUE write a note stating exactly what he wanted and give it to him to forward. WIROGUE did and the note is forwarded as a separate cover attachment to this dispatch.

3. WIROGUE then showed SALVACK a model of a one man submarine on which he had been working in conjunction with a Belgian engineer (Identity #1) who is also a Congolese Air Force advisor. He claimed that this submarine would be capable of speeds up to 100 kilometers an hour on short runs, and would have a cruising distance of 500 kilometers. The model, being built to 1/7 scale, is approximately half completed, and, of course, has never been tested. WIROGUE said he had discussed this model and his plans fully when in Headquarters, and had made a full report concerning all details. SALVACK said that (1) he was not an engineer and (2) was in no position to make any promise or commitment. All that he could do was to report that the model was in the process of construction and to further report that WIROGUE wanted to make sure that the West got it instead of the Communist bloc.

4. WIROGUE expressed full willingness to show the model, and have his companion explain it fully, to anyone SALVACK wished to bring to WIROGUE's house. SALVACK made no commitment other than to report the conversation. (It should be noted that WIROGUE had never mentioned this item before to Station personnel, and told Salvack that neither he nor his companion had said anything to anyone in The Congo concerning it up to this point.)

5. If Headquarters is willing, the station suggests that the ODOACH attache be put into contact with WIROGUE concerning this item. He could conduct any necessary tests or experiments. Because of WIROGUE's past, however, and the nature of his documentation, the Station requests Headquarters guidance and approval prior to taking any action.

CS COPY

201-233477

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	[illegible]-630

6. On returning to The Congo WIROGUE crossed the Congo river from Brazzaville successfully in spite of the ferries being closed to all but diplomatic travel, but it involved a prolonged argument for more than an hour with the immigration authorities at the ferry landing. WIROGUE has never fully admitted what he did to successfully enter The Congo, though knowing the situation, he probably indulged in some small bribery. Since he had merely disappeared for a short while after mentioning that he might need medical attention, his Congolese Air Force job was still open. (There are many GOC advisory positions vacant, and for someone to obtain such a position with any sort of qualifications is not too difficult. When a position is vacated it is seldom refilled, certainly not quickly.) He has reiterated strongly at each of the three meetings SALVACK has had with him that he is willing to help PBPRIME any way possible.

Lester H Salvack.
Lester H. SALVACK

19 October 1961
Attachments: 1. WIROGUE letter, USC
2. Identity, USC

Distribution:

Hqs - 4, w/a USC

201-233477

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATT TO: ACLA-630

Att #2

IDENTITY: Peter de GROEVE

SECRET

ACLA-630

Separate Cover Attachments #1 and #2

h/w.

Chief, AF

201-233477

VIA AIR MAIL

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 580
9 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (AF COPY SLOTTED AT 1545-9 OCT)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/IW 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2, (SUSPENSE DD/I)

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 9 1928Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 42712

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN MUNI CITE LEOP 2218

RYBAT WIROGUE UPHILL

1. WIROGUE CONTACTED SALVACK 7 OCT. SAID CONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF) CHIEF PIERROT NOW PERMANENTLY OUSTED. ALSO SAID MALIERE TOLD HIM CNA PLANS PUT EUROPEAN IN CHARGE CAF AND CONSIDERING THREE PERSONS FOR POSITION: COL STAHL, WIROGUE AND CAPTAIN PETER DE GROEVE, WHO ALSO CAF ADVISER.

Card

2. WIROGUE ASKED PBPRIME REACTION AND INTEREST IN STAHL. SALVACK SAID STAHL WEST GERMAN AND PBPRIME WILLING SEE STAHL IN POSITION. SALVACK DENIED ANY ODYOKE CONTACT WITH STAHL OTHER THAN THROUGH AIRA. WIROGUE SAID HE WILLING SUPPORT STAHL AS LONG AS STAHL DID NOT TRY UNDERMINE HIS POSITION. ADDED HE THOUGHT HE COULD GET STAHL THROWN OUT OF CONGO IF ODYOKE SO WISHED. SALVACK TOLD WIROGUE ODYOKE DOES NOT DESIRE THIS AND SAID SUCH

SECRET

201-233477

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STEP MIGHT REBOUND AGAINS'

3. WIROGUE MET GUTHMAN ON STREET OUTSIDE TPELIDE 7 OCT. LEAVING COMPANION (WHOM GUTHMAN BELIEVES TO HAVE BEEN DE GROEVE) WIROGUE TOOK GUTHMAN ASIDE AND STRESSED THAT ODYOKE WOULD HAVE BETTER CONTROL OF CAF THROUGH HIM THAN THROUGH STAHL. GUTHMAN SIDESTEPPED ISSUE STRESSING ODYOKE HAD NO INTEREST UNDERCUTTING WEST GERMANS OR STAHL. WIROGUE AGAIN SAID HE IN GOOD POSITION AID ODYOKE AND WILLING DO SO IF REQUESTED.

4. WIROGUE VISITED AIRA 9 OCT TO DISCUSS SAME SUBJECT. AIRA DENIED ANY ODYOKE CONNECTION WITH STAHL BUT POINTED OUT STAHL WEST GERMAN AND PRO-WEST. THEREFORE IN ODYOKE INTEREST TO HAVE STAHL NAMED CHIEF CAF IF GOC FAVORABLE HIS NOMINATION.

5. WIROGUE SEEMS FEAR STAHL AND CONSIDERS STAHL THREAT TO HIS POSITION. (STAHL WOULD BE IN GOOD POSITION CHECK WIROGUE'S COVER STORY AND EXPOSE HIM AS IMPOSTER.) LEOP AND AIRA HAVE IMPRESSION WIROGUE WANTS TO OUST STAHL IF POSSIBLE AND WANTS PBPRIME BACKING FOR ACTION.

6. REQUEST ANY HQS GUIDANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

9 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur, Room 2009, I Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : TZITZICHVILI, David
#174 803

1. In response to your recent request, the Subject was escorted from Washington, D. C., to Frankfurt, Germany, as described in the attached report. A receipt for money passed to the Subject in Germany is enclosed. It is also understood that Mr. Daniel NIESCIUR received written acknowlegement from the Subject for the receipt of this money at the time of his departure from Washington, D. C.

2. No further action will be taken in this matter unless requested by you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

Attachment:
Report Dated 13 September 1961
with attached receipt

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

SECRET
WHEN WITH REPORTS

124 803

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Support Division

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

This data is the property of the Office of Security and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Headquarters Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Office of Security.

CONSISTING OF
One REPORTS

SECRET

#174 803

13 September 1961

GENERAL

On 7 September 1961, the SUBJECT, David TZITZICHVILI, and Case Officer Dan N. were met by the reporting agent at the Union Station in Washington, D. C. at 0900 hours. At this time the case officer explained to the SUBJECT that the reporting agent would have in his possession documents for SUBJECT and two thousand dollars in cash which was to be given to SUBJECT after their arrival in Frankfurt, Germany. At this time the SUBJECT executed a signed receipt for the money and documents and this receipt was kept by the case officer.

The SUBJECT and reporting agent departed Union Station, Washington, D. C. via Pennsylvania Railroad Train #174, the Colonial, and arrived at Trenton, New Jersey, at 1300 hours, 7 September 1961. The SUBJECT and reporting agent then proceeded via taxi-cab, Trenton, New Jersey, to McGuire Air Force Base, Wrightstown, New Jersey.

The SUBJECT and reporting agent departed McGuire Air Force Base via Military Air Transport Service BKA 31 at 2000 hours and arrived in Frankfurt, Germany, at 0830 hours at the Rhein-Main Airport on 8 September 1961.

After arrival at Rhein-Main Airport SUBJECT and the reporting agent proceeded via taxi-cab to downtown Frankfurt. At this time the money and documents were given to SUBJECT. He executed a signed receipt for this material which is attached to this report as Exhibit #1. After SUBJECT received the documents and money he departed the company of the reporting agent at the train station in Frankfurt, Germany.

During the course of the trip to Germany SUBJECT stated that he would possibly remain in Germany for a few weeks and that he was also contemplating moving to Switzerland or returning to the Congo. SUBJECT seemed well satisfied with the termination agreement and at no time displayed any dissatisfaction concerning his treatment during the past several months.

The reporting agent departed Frankfurt, Germany via Pan American Airlines Flight #73 at 1400 hours, 11 September 1961, and arrived at Washington, D. C. at 1930 hours, 11 September 1961.

This flight covered a distance of approximately eight thousand miles and the flight time was approximately seventeen hours.

Attachment: Exhibit #1

201-233477

EXHIBIT. #1

8 Sept 1961

Received from Joe B—— one envelope containing documents & one envelope containing $2000.00.

David Stegner

Ernest G. Mayfield

1677

ORIG : LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT : C/AF/W
EXT : 3939
DATE : 22 Sept 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING
4
5
6

22 SEP 61 31Z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE BRAZZAVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

WIROGUE

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT99815

TO LEOP (PRITY) INFO BRAZ (PRITY) CITE DIR 13499

RYBAT/WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 2988 (IN 33643)*

1. ATTITUDE AT TERMINATION ENTIRELY FRIENDLY AND APPEARED HONESTLY PUZZLED AS TO WHY DROPPED. BELIEVE JUST WANDERING ABOUT LOOKING FOR AN INTEL JOB. NO INFO ON WHO PAYING NOW AND HE HAS ENOUGH FUNDS RETURN ON OWN. OTHER DETAILS NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

Wot

2. GENERAL GUIDANCE IS THAT SINCE HE WILL BE NOTHING BUT MISCHIEF IN AREA, YOU SHOULD SUGGEST HE LEAVE. THERE ARE TO BE NO FURTHUR FUNDS INVOLVED. GRIN AND LOOK AWAY IF HE STAYS IN VICINITY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE ZAPPLEY MEETING WITH WIROGUE 22 SEPT AND QUESTIONS RAISED.

AF/W/12

AF/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

517

ATE : 22 SEP 61

Ↄ : DIRECTOR

ROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

2-1 copy

CTION : C/AF 3 (C/AF TEMPO SLOTTED AT 1550-22 SEP)

Chrono

IFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

cc:

cc:

cc:

SEP 22 1914Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 33643

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2088

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-48

RYBAT WIROGUE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

1. ZAPPLEY WHEN AT BEACH HOTEL BRAZ AFTERNOON 22 SEPT SAW WIROGUE GET OUT OF TAXI. WIROGUE GREETED ZAPPLEY SAYING HE "GEORGE." THEY TALKED BRIEFLY OF HOW TO CROSS RIVER WITH FERRIES CLOSED. WIROGUE ASKED IF BEST TO RETURN PARIS OR ENTER CONGO FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. WIROGUE SAID HE STILL HAD PERMIT ENTER AND LEAVE CONGO FROM MINISTRY DEFENSE.

2. THIS RAISES MANY QUESTION. WHAT WAS WIROGUE ATTITUDE ON TERMINATION? ANY INFO WHO PAYING WAY NOW? WHAT NAME AND PASSPORT HE USING? (IF HE PLANS USE OLD PERMIT FROM MIN DEFENSE THEN HE STILL USING SAME NAME AS WHEN HERE BEFORE.) DOES HE STILL HAVE FALSE PASSPORT ISSUED BY KUBARK. WHEN DID HE LEAVE PBPRIME AND WHAT WAS DESTINATION. POSSIBLE HE ON PAYROLL OTHER COUNTRY OR POSSIBLE HE WANTS BACK ON KUBARK PAYROLL. REQUEST HQS VIEWS AND GUIDANCE. END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ORIG : EStover 565
UNIT : AF/W
EXT : 8284
DATE : 21 September 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CABLE SECRETARIAT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7

INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

IN 32112 A GNVA 2486

TO INFO CITE DIR

PLS RELAY GNVA 2486 (IN 32112)* TO LEOPOLDVILLE. SLUG WI[illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

*RE GEORG REIGER.

AF/W/1

EE/9

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

[illegible]
C/AF/[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 310
20 SEP 61

REF

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 20 1421Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 32112

TO DIR INFO BERN CITE GNVA 2486

ZIBET INK

ON RETURNING GNVA FROM BRUS VIA FRAN, FRIGANZA MET EX-REDSOX CANDIDATE AEASPIC AT AIRPORT. HAD VERY SHORT CHAT. HE SAID HE "DROPPED IN FRAN", DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE DID WRONG, CARRYING DOCS IN NAME GEORG REINER, CAN BE REACHED THRU SAVOY HOTEL, FRAN. PLANS DEPART FRAN 21 SEPT FOR CONGO AS HAS NOTHING ELSE TO DO. WAS MAJOR, WILL BE AGAIN. ASSURED FRIGANZA ALWAYS WILLING HELP KUBARK. SENT BEST REGARDS "PAT".

END OF MESSAGE

[Dan [illegible] advising disposition the date of Dan's arrival]

JCB 21 SEP 1961

Paul ——— for your file.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 310
20 SEP 61

RFL

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE/4, SR 6, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value - Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 20 1421Z 61

25 SEP 1961

ROUTINE

IN 32112

TO DIR INFO BERN CITE GNVA 2486

not necessary to index 201 material

ZIBET INK

ON RETURNING GNVA FROM BRUS VIA FRAN, FRIGANZA MET EX-REDSOX CANDIDATE AEASPIC AT AIRPORT. HAD VERY SHORT CHAT. HE SAID HE "DROPPED IN FRAN", DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE DID WRONG, CARRYING DOCS IN NAME GEORG REINER, CAN BE REACHED THRU SAVOY HOTEL, FRAN. PLANS DEPART FRAN 21 SEPT FOR CONGO AS HAS NOTHING ELSE TO DO. WAS MAJOR, WILL BE AGAIN. ASSURED FRIGANZA ALWAYS WILLING HELP KUBARK. SENT BEST REGARDS "PAT".

END OF MESSAGE

David *TZITZIVILLI, stateless DOB 12 July 1918 - POB Gori, Georgia, USSR
alias Georg Franz *REINER DOB 25 July 1921 POB Salzburg, Austria.

Georg~~x~~ Franz *REINER - alias of David *TZITZIVILLI.

AEASPIC changed to WIROGUE

Amended

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	JH
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

415

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 8 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

L-1 copy

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: D/OS 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

SEP 8 1700Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 25782

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

DIR CITE FRAN 3578

RYBAT WIRCUGE SECUR TECHS

REF: DIR 10107 (out 93573) *

1. WIROUGE/1 AND ESCORT ARRIVED FRAN 8 SEPTEMBER 0830 LOCAL. SUBJECT TERMINATED SATISFACTORILY.

2. MR. JOSEPH BRANNIGAN ETD FRAN 11 SEPTEMBER PAA 73 1400 LOCAL. ETA NEW YORK 1715 LOCAL.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* .ITINERARY WIROGNE/1 AND ESCORT MR JOSEPH BRANNIGAN.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

COLITHO - PATD. BY MOORE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible] M. Holder
UNIT: OS/OSD/SB-SD/1
EXT: 4253
DATE: SEPT. 1961

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO: FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: D/OS 2
INFO: COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

6 SEP 61 18 13z
93573
SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

DESENSITIZED

TO PRITY FRAN INFO CITE DIR 10107

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

WIROGUE/1 AND ESCORT, MR. JOSEPH BRANNIGAN, DEPART MAGUIRE AFB 7 SEPT 1600 HRS LOCAL MATS EKA-31, AMD: WRI-FRF - 2 PT - 7769--RA-9. ETA NOT AVAILABLE. REQUEST FRAN MEET AND ASSIST. WIROGUE/1 WILL BE TERMINATED IMMED AFTER ARRIVAL FRAN. KURIOT ISSUED ~~WIROGUE/1~~ WIROGUE/1 ORIGINAL AUSTRIAN SERIES A PASSPORT WITH ALTERED SERIAL NUMBER IN NAME GEORG RKINER. THIS DOCUMENT FOR DISPOSAL USE. DETAILS POUCHED. BRANNIGAN REQUESTS RETURN RESERVATIONS MATS JET 48 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL FRAN.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS F. Y. Murphy
AF/N/2
TSD/IB By phone w/Kallander 9/5 - Mo
EE/ADMIN P. W. [illegible]
EE/6 CSR

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GEORGE WEIS
CEE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED

William F. [illegible]
for James P. O'CONNELL
C/OSD/OS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

4.14

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 7 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : D/OS 2 (OS CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1140 7 SEPT 61)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 7 1526Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25104

TO DIR INFO CITE FRAN 3530

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

RE DIR TOTO7 (OUT 93573)**

NO STATION RECORD WIROGUE/1. PLS FURNISH TERMINATION DETAIL OPIM.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FRAN MEET WIROGUE/1 AND EXCORT. WIROGUE/1 WAS TO BE TERMINATED UPON ARRIVAL.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG Marx M. Holder WK
UNIT OS/OSD/SD/1
EXT x-4263 1613
DATE 7 September 1961

TO : FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: D/OS 2
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

7 SEP 61 21 16z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT94114

TO CPIM - FRAN WVG INFO par [illegible] 43-43 CITE DIR 10389

RYBAT/WIROGUE/SECUR/TECHS

REF: FRAN 3530 (IN 25104)*

NO ACTION REQUIRED FRAN RE: TERMINATION. MEET AND ASSIST ON ARRIVAL ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

* Requested termination details Wirogue/1.

Mary M. Holder
FOR Ted Shackley
George Weisz by phone
C/EE/CPS WC
RELEASING OFFICER

OS/AAS telcord. Murphy
AF/W/2 telcord. Dan Niescier
TSD/IB telcord. Ka Clarke Walt Richardson by phone
COORDINATING OFFICERS

James P. O'Connell
C/OSD
by phone
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

414

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 7 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

1

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : D/OS 2 (OS CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1140 7 SEPT 61)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/AF 3, S/C 2

SEP 7 1526Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25104

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

TO DIR INFO CITE FRAN 3530

RYBAT WIROGUE SECUR TECHS

RE DIR 70707 (OUT 93573)**

NO STATION RECORD WIROGUE/1. PLS FURNISH TERMINATION DETAIL OPIM.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FRAN MEET WIROGUE/1 AND EXCORT.WIROGUE/1 WAS TO BE TERMINATED UPON ARRIVAL.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

176

DATE : 28 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

thermo Copy to Dan W.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 28 1501Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 19538

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1898

[illegible] per CSH 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

WIROGUE/1 KNEW VERY LITTLE RE STATION ACTIVITIES. HE AWARE GUTHMAN AND SALVACK TRUE NAMES AND ADDRESSEES. KNEW BETTELHEIM ONLY BY FIRST NAME. AWARE GUTHMAN IN CONTACT WITH WIZARD/4. WAS USED PASS MONEY TO WIBOTTLE IN HOSPITAL. STATION USING APARTMENT W/1 RENTED AS SAFE APARTMENT AND HAS POST OFFICE BOX UNDER W/1 NAME.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] per CSH 43-43

SECRET

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Copy No.

SECRET

22 AUG 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur, Room 2009, I Building

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : TZITZICHVILI, David
#174 803

1. In response to your request dated 6 July 1961, a safehouse facility was located and made available to you for an indefinite period beginning 12 July 1961.

2. No further action will be taken in this matter unless requested by you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

SECRET

201-233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ABCLT-247

TO: Chief, Finance Division

INFO: Chief, AF

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 27 JULY 1961

SUBJECT: Finance/WIROGUE
Transfer of Accountability-Ernest C. Maycrink

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Credit Advance Account

REFERENCE(S)

LEOP-1538	DIR-49325
LEOP-1568	LEOP-1599
DIR-48429	DIR-00712

1. On 7 July 1961 WIROGUE was advanced the sum of U. S.$100.00 for living expenses in Brazzaville while awaiting onward transportation to PBPRIME. (DIR-48429 requested WIROGUE return to PBPRIME). This is his only outstanding advance with Leopoldville Station. Receipt attached hereto.

2. DIR-49325 authorized Station to withhold money received from sale of personal car against outstanding advances. However, before his departure WIROGUE accounted for 11,580 BCF over what he owed the Station. The sum of 42,500 BCF from the sale of his automobile plus 11,580 BCF converted at 50/$1.00 (LEOP-1599 and DIR-49325) gave WIROGUE a credit of $1,081.60. In January 1961 WIROGUE was ordered to Thysville by the Station and was authorized $0.10 per mile for use of his personal car, therefore, 312.5 miles times $0.10 equals $31.25 leaving WIROGUE a credit of U. S. $1,112.85. (See attachment).

3. WIROGUE was paid his June salary of $500 on 26 June and also his housing for July ($250.00). (Station was notified on 1 July, DIR-48429 that WIROGUE was to return to PBPRIME). However, July rental was used in the final settlement of the lease for the usual damages claimed by local landlords and in lieu of 30 days termination notice. Receipt forwarded under Voucher: 1153.

4. Accountability in the amount of U. S. $100.00 is herewith transferred to Headquarters plus a credit of $1,112.85. As WIROGUE was specifically told he would have to account for the above $100.00 for living/traveling expenses Station did not subtract that amount from his credit.

18 July 1961

Angela R. Derricote

Attachments:
1. Receipt for $100, h/w
2. Thysville certification by Guthman, h/w
3. Coquilhatville estimate, h/w
4. Breakdown of advances and accountings, h/w

Distribution:
Hqs - 4, w/a a/s

21-233477

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

302

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE 17 JULY 1961

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO: CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING

JUL 17 18 38z 61

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 39898

TO DIR INFO POUCH LEOP CITE BRAZ 137

REF: DIR 00712 (OUT 76077)

WIROGUE

BRAZ MADE WIROGUE/1 ADVANCES OF 130,000 CFA FRANCS AND $100 ON 10 JULY 1961. POUCHING RECEIPTS FOR T/A HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* ADVISE ADVANCES MADE BY LEOP AND BRAZ WIROGUE/1 EXCLUDING $4000, HQS LOAN.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4618
DATE : 12 July 1961 1668

ROUTING			
1	4/10	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE BRAZZAVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

12 JUL 61 22 03z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT7[illegible]822

TO LEOP BRAZ INFO CITE DIR 00264

WIROGUE RYBAT

WIROGUE/1 ARRIVED 11 JULY.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

AF/W/2
AF/W/1

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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236

236 1.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 10 15 [illegible]

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

36589

DATE 10 JULY 1961

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1235 10 JUL)
(AF DIV NOTIFIED 1235 10 JUL)

INFO : FG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, OS 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE BRAZ 135

WIROGUE

1. IF FOR ANY REASON WIROGUE/1 NOT MET AT IDLEWILD AND HE GETS THRU IMMIGRATION SUCCESSFULLY ALONE, HE WILL GO TAFT HOTEL. IF NOT ABLE GET ROOM WILL LEAVE MESSAGE AT DESK FOR "MR WATSON."

2. IF THIS FAILS MAY POSSIBLY BE TRACED THRU NEW YORK FRIEND MARGARET LAGRUTTA. TELEPHONE TE6-0949.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

236

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 JULY 1961

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BRAZZAVILLE

ACTION: AF 7 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1235 10 JUL)
(AF DIV NOTIFIED 1235 10 JUL)

INFO : PG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

JUL 10 16 [illegible]

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

36589

TO DIR INFO CITE BRAZ 135

WIROGUE

1. IF FOR ANY REASON WIROGUE/1 NOT MET AT IDLEWILD AND HE GETS THRU IMMIGRATION SUCCESSFULLY ALONE, HE WILL GO TAFT HOTEL. IF NOT ABLE GET ROOM WILL LEAVE MESSAGE AT DESK FOR "MR WATSON."

2. IF THIS FAILS MAY POSSIBLY BE TRACED THRU NEW YORK FRIEND MARGARET LAGRUTTA. TELEPHONE TE6-0949.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 1

PRITY LEOP DIR CITE VIEN 9254

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1533 (IN 29021) C/AF

1. VIEN UNABLE PROVIDE CABLE REQUESTED REF FROM ANY REAL SCHOOL. BELIEVE EFFORT TO SEND CABLE FROM NOTIONAL SCHOOL WOULD BE QUICKLY DISCOVERED AND INVESTIGATED BY LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES. COULD PROVIDE LETTER ON UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA STATIONERY BUT NOT FROM AN ENGINEERING FACULTY. MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE LETTER ON VIEN TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE WHICH HAS ENGINEERING FACULTY. IF TIME PERMITS SUGGEST KURIOT MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE FORGED ENGINEERING DIPLOMA FROM AN AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OR PROPERLY CERTIFIED PHOTOSTAT OF SUCH.

2. IF VIEN TO ASSIST, NEED BACKGROUND INFO WIROGUE. IF HE IDEN REF? WHAT PASSPORT HAS HE? HAS HE LIVED IN AUSTRIA?

3. FOR DIR: A PHOTOSTAT OF AN AUSTRIAN ENGINEERING DIPLOMA IN METALLURGY FROM THE MONTANISCHE HOCHSCHULE LEOBEN IS IN ATTACHMENTS TO EAVA 25324.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 296
08 JULY 61 296

TO DIRECTOR

FROM BRAZZAVILLE

1-1 copy

ACTION: C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY ISSUED MR. DUNBAR, AF AT 1605 8 JUL)
(MR. DUNBAR NOTIFIED AT 1525 8 JUL)

INFO *COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, D/OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 8 19 17Z 61

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 36146

TO OPIM DIR INFO LEOP POUCH CITE BRAZ 133

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: DIR 48429 (OUT 71923)

1. WIROGUE/1 TO PARIS 10 JULY ON AIR FRANCE 410. FROM PARIS TO NEW YORK 11 JULY ON AIR FRANCE 011. ARRIVES IDLEWILD 2120 LOCAL TIME 11 JULY.

2. HAS NON IMMIGRANT MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA TYPE B-1 ISSUED BRAZZAVILLE WITH AGREEMENT GPILIAD.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

I.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

297

DATE : 8 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

L - 1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY ISSUED MR. DUNBAR AT 1605 8 JUL) (MR. DUNBAR AF, NOTIFIED AT 1525 8 JUL)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

per CSH 43-43

JUL 8 1800Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 36124

TO (PRIORITY) DIR INFO ROME BRAZ (POUCH) CITE LEOP 1629

RYBAT WIROGUE

WIROGUE/1 WENT TO BRAZ AFTERNOON 7 JULY. BRAZ HOLDING 72 HOURS AND WILL MAKE ALL TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AND WILL ADVISE HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

per CSH 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE	520 5 JUL 61
TO	DIRECTOR
FROM	LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION	C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1845, 5 JUL) (MR NIESCIUR, AF DIV NOTIFIED AT 1830, 5 JUL)
INFO	COP, C/CI, S/C 2

2 - 1 copy

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	Staff	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

JUL 5 2200Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34523

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1599

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF DIR 17181*

1. STATION PLANS EXCHANGE CONGO FRANCS REALIZED BY WIROGUE/1 IN SALE OF CAR AT RATE 50 CONGO FRANCS TO DOLLAR. HE STILL HAS OUTSTANDING LOAN $4000 MADE BY HQS. ALSO ORIGINAL HQS TRAVEL ADVANCE OF $1010 WHICH NEVER TA'D TO LEOP.

2. ADVISE SOONEST IF HQS WISHES ANY W/1 CAR MONEY WITHHELD AGAINST ADVANCES.

3. STATION WILL ADVANCE W/1 COST OF TOURIST TICKET PLUS $100 EXPENSES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

[illegible] 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 521
5 JUL 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1845, 5 JUL)
(MR NIESCIUR, AF DIV NOTIFIED AT 1830, 5 JUL)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

JUL 5 2200Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 34522

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY ROME CITE LEOP 1597

RYBAT WIROGUE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF DIR 48429 (OUT 71923)

1. CAN ARRANGE VISA WIROGUE/1 IN BRAZZA. MOST DIRECT FLIGHT PBPRIME PANAM FROM LEOP. LEOP RECOGNIZES NEED FOR MOST DIRECT TRAVEL W/1 BUT TO MAINTAIN SECURITY (PREVENT ANY FUTURE CHECK BY WILDCAT REVEALING W/1 TRAVEL PBPRIME) AND STILL PROVIDE 72 HOUR PRIOR NOTICE SUGGEST FOLLOWING:

A. W/1 DEPART 7 JULY FROM BRAZZA TO ROME VIA KLM.

B. W/1 BE CONTACTED ROME BY KUBARKER. WHEN WIROGUE RESERVATIONS ROME TO PBPRIME FIRM FORM NOTIFY HQS GIVING REQUIRED 72 HOUR LEAD TIME.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :		ROUTING	
TO :		1	4
FROM :		2	5
ACTION :		3	6
INFO :			

PAGE 2

IN 34522 LEOP 1597

2. LEOP WILL ADVANCE TRAVEL MONEY AND W/1 TO BUY OWN TICKET. ADVISE.

3. ROME: IF HQS APPROVES WILL NEED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS GAVE SUGGESTIONS AND GUIDANCE TO DECREASE RISK OF WIROGUE/1 ARREST AND POSSIBLE COMPROMISE KUBARK.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

175
7 JUL 61

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 0740 7 JUL '61. AF NOTIFIED AT 0740 7 JUL '61.)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

JUL 7 1045Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 35434

OPIM DIR ROME CITE LEOP 1615

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A. LEOP 1599 (NOT SENT ROME) (IN 34523)

B. LEOP 1597 (IN 34522)

NEED REPLY REFS SOONEST. WIROGUE/1 BEING HELD BRAZZA PENDING ANSWERS.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE	461 : 6 JUL 61
TO	: DIRECTOR
FROM	: ROME
ACTION	: C/AF 3*
INFO	: COP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	E/	4	
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3	Chn	6	

JUL 6 2058Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35125

DECLASSIFIED
per CSI 43-43

PRITY LEOP INFO DIR CITE ROME 4534 (SHERIDAN ACTING)

RYBAT ARGANDER AJAJA

REF LEOP 1597 (IN 34522)**

IF SUITABLE WIROGUE/1 COME EMBASSY HE CAN ASK AT RECEPTION FOR MR. HERBERT HOOKER. OTHERWISE HAVE HIM TELEPHONE HOOKER AT ROME 675915 GIVING NAME AS JOHN THOMAS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**IF HQS APPROVES, REQUESTED CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

DECLASSIFIED
per CSI 43-43

SECRET

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2

ORIG : Daniel Niesciur:eaf
UNIT : AF/W/2 1648
EXT : 4818
DATE : 30 June 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
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6

30 Jun 61 22 [z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

L - 1 copy

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, D/OS 2, S/C 2

Chrono

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 71923

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO BRAZ CITE DIR 48429

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: A. LEOP 1568 (IN 31066)
B. LEOP 1533 (IN 29021)

1. REGRET DELAY. AGREE RISK OF WIROGUE/1 ARREST AND POSSIBLE COMPROMISE TOO GREAT. TO PRECLUDE ANY REVELATION KUBARK INVOLVEMENT REQUEST W/1 RETURN PBPRIME. SUGGEST FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

A. HAVE W/1 OBTAIN PBPRIME VISA IN EITHER LEOP OR BRAZ. EITHER STATION SHOULD FACILITATE VISA ISSUANCE. HAVE HIM TAKE MOST DIRECT FLIGHT TO PBPRIME. DEPARTURE FROM BRAZ PREFERRED. NEED 72 HR PRIOR NOTICE TO LAY ON WITH IMMIGRATION AND KUSODA.

B. IF ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE W/1 WILL HAVE TO GO GERMANY THERE BE CONTACTED AND BROUGHT PBPRIME UNDER KUSODA ESCORT VIA MATS. THIS APPROACH COMPLICATED AND REQUIRES UPWARDS OF WEEK TO TEN DAYS TO ARRANGE.

C. EITHER PLAN WILL REQUIRE FULL DETAILS RE ROUTE, FLTS, PORTS OF ENTRY, ETA'S ETC.

(CONTINUED)

DESENSITIZED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Hiesciur:eaf
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 30 June 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 71923

TO INFO CITE DIR 48429

2. IN ANY EVENT IT ADVISABLE W/1 MOVE BRAZ FOR WEEK OR SO UNTIL ALL ARRANGEMENTS MADE.

3. FOR BRAZ: ARRANGE CONTACT AND TURN OVER WITH LEOP AND ASSIST IN ANY MANNER POSSIBLE. FYI W/1 REQUIRES FIRM HAND AND STRICT CONTROL.

4. ADVISE YOUR IDEAS HOW BEST TO PHASE OUT HIS CURRENT JOB AND LIQUIDATE HOLDINGS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE BACKSTOPPING WIROGUE SINCE WILDCAT IS MAKING DETAILED CHECK ON HIM.

AF/W/1

AF/W/2

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

1775

ORIG: D. [illegible]ESCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 4318
DATE: 15 June 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CI, S/C 2

16 JUN 61 23 37z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
X ROUTINE

OUT 67366
67366

TO: LEOP
INFO

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

CITE DIR 45917
45917

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF: LEOP 1487 (IN 24937)*

1. WIROGUE/1 SALARY AND HOUSING $750 PER MONTH. PRORATED MONTHLY OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES NOT TO EXCEED $150. TOTAL $900.

2. POUCHING INCREASE $3750 CAR THRU 30 JUNE 61.

END OF MESSAGE

*DESK COMMENT: Referenced cable is RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/B&F
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible] R. C. [illegible]
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

[illegible] 13

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 14 JUN 61
302

TO : DIRECTOR
copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3,

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

JUN 14 1607Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 24937

DIR CITE LEOP 1487

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A ACLW 206, ATT B 23 DEC 60

B DIR 17181 (out 54652)**

C DIR 18035 (out 56360)*

1. FROM REFS STATION ASSUMES WIROGUE TO BE PAID SALARY $500 MONTHLY PLUS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE $250, PLUS OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

2. OAR DATED 14 JANUARY 61 ALLOTS ONLY $2,000 THROUGH 30 JUNE 61.
$3750

3. REQUEST HQS SPECIFY LIMIT MONTLY EXPENDITURE AND ADVISE STATION OF ALLOTMENT AUTHORIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PREDATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

**DIR 17181 (OUT 54652) DISCUSSED WIROGUE CONTRACT, PAY $500 MONTH, $250 MONTH QUARTERS, AND $4000 OPS LOAN. PLACED WIROGUE ON PROBATION.

SECRET

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SECRET

456

DATE : 31 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
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MAY 31 2154Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 18147

DIR CITE LEOP 1395

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

ON 28 MAY WILDCAT/5 REQUESTED NAME CHECK FOR WIROGUE ON BEHALF WIROOT. APPARENT CAUSE WAS APPLICATION BY WIROGUE FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE CARD THOUGH STATION NOT AWARE HE APPLYING UNTIL NAME CHECK REQUESTED. WIROOT/2 SUPICIOUS MAJOR PIERROT WHO HAS BEEN IN OPPOSITION WIFLAT/3. THUS WIROOT SUSPICIOUS WIROGUE VIEW HIS CONTACTS WITH PIERROT. STATION REPLYING NO TRACES. DEPENDING ON DEPTH, CHECK COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR WIROGUE.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per

SECRET

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WIROGUE File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 2 MAY 1961

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRAN
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
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3 MAY 61 19 51z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT52348

CITE DIR 38033

TO FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN

38033

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET

REF: A. LEOP 1200 (IN 38501)
B. FROB 9126 (IN 37367)

DECENTRALIZED
per CSN 43-43

1. REGRET DELAY. FLUID SITUATION CONGO MAY PRECLUDE INJECTION KUBARK ASSETS IN CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. GOC STALLING ON CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT SINCE NO ONE WANTS ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY.

2. KUBARK INTEREST HAVING C/2 SUPPLY INSTRUCTORS TWO FOLD (A) PREVENT BELGIANS FILLING JOBS AND (B) INTEL PENETRATION, IF POSSIBLE. STILL HOPING ACCOMPLISH BUT PROSPECTS DIM.

3. IN EVENT CONTRACT IS SIGNED SUGGEST FROB CONSIDER FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

A. ALL SIX INSTRUCTORS C/2 AGREED FURNISH TO BE NON-BELGIAN FRENCH SPEAKERS.

B. ATTEMPT RECRUIT FROM THIS GROUP ONE OR TWO WHO LOOK GOOD OPERATIONALLY AS KUTUBE ASSETS. IF RECRUITED AUTHORIZE UP TO 800 DM PER MONTH AGENT SALARY WHILE IN CONGO. THIS IN ADDITION TO NORMAL SALARY INSTRUCTORS TO RECEIVE UNDER CONTRACT FROM CAF.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 2 MAY 1961

ROUTING

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3[illegible] 19 51z

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRAN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT52348

TO INFO CITE DIR 38033

38033

C. C/2 INVOLVEMENT BE KEPT AT MINIMUM.

D. ~~[illegible]~~ CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE TO BE FURNISHED BY LECP.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *RE CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT BEING DRAFTED BUT NOT SIGNED.

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF

GORDON STEWART, C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

D/EE/G/Ops HWN
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

General Information on WIROGUE/1:

A. Pertinent Biographical Information:

Pseudonym - Ernest G. MAYCRINK

Place of birth - Gori, Georgia, USSR

Date of birth - 12 July 1918

Sex - Male

Race - Caucasian

Religion - none

Marital status - Divorced (wife and 2 children - one son and one daughter)

Citizenship - Stateless

Education:

1922-24	Paris, Notre Dame, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Lycee Montagne, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of family address
1926	Viroflex, Lycee Hoche, uncomp., expelled for pranks
1926	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of address
1931	Paris-Vanves, Ecole Michelet, 6 mo comp, expelled for insubordination
1933-35	Chalon S. Marne Art et Metier, Technical Engineering School, attended one and one half years and expelled
1936-37	Paris, Ecole Brequet, Electro-Engineering, attended one year earned first half of Baccaularaute in electro technology then expelled
1938-39	Paris, School of Photography and Movies, trained as cine camera operator technician, left after one and three fourths of a two year course due to outbreak of WW II in November 1939

Military History:

Dec 1939 - Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion
Jan 1940 - Tunis, North Africa, 1st Cav. Reg. 1st Squadron, 4th Platoon
Feb 1940 - Sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion, pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit

SECRET

Mar-Aug 1940 - Barcares, assigned in Georgian unit
Aug 1940 - Paris, discharged at end of Franco/German hostilities

Employment History:

1942 - Paris, volunteered for work in Germany
Poelitz, worked for HIDRYER WERKE for one year as installation electrician
Paris, self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography
Berlin, photographer of metals for a factory which produces electrodes for welding instruments
Berlin, assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammuition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device he manufacture of device for automatic adjustment of cartridge cases
Meugelhein, driver mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corp.) Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.
1943 - Berlin, employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language
1946-47 - Paris, employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of proto-type model builder
1951-52 - Paris (in prison), devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison
1953 - Rion (in prison), devised and gave to prison administrator, invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator
Dec 1955 to Apr 1956 - Gap, employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator
1956-57 - Gap, invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market
1958 - Ambert, invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns
1959-60 - U.S., devised and passed drawings for two pieces of equipment for use in Project AESENTINEL
July 1960 - U.S., presently working on a low-cost telephone answering device

Occupational Specialities:

Mechanical electrical engineering
Cine or portrait photography
Research and innovation of labor/cost saving devices

Languages and Dialects:

French - native
German - very good
Georgian - fluent spoken; reading and writing good
English - speaking and writing fair; reading fluent
Spanish - speaking and writing poor; reading good
Russian - poor

Special Skills:

Experience in document forgery
1942 - Achen-Berlin, altered own documents
1942 - Berlin-Paris, filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Made other authentications stamps for other people interested in travel across German held territory
1943-44 - Berlin, fabricated stamps and cachets for travel documents. Used photo techniques for changing and/or aging pictures in documents. Also reassembled old false passports to form new ones, as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

B. Operational Information:

1. Circumstances of Recruitment -

The agent was first contacted in October 1958 as a result of a lead from AEPADDLE. He was recruited in April 1959 by the Frankfurt Station, for a REDSOX operation. There had been some difficulty in the initial recruitment, since it could not be resolved as to whether or not he could work amicably with another agent in the proposed operation. After psychological assessments and LCFLUTTER examination, it was decided to recruit subject. He was assigned the crypto AEASPIC. In April 1959 subject was brought to the DOB, via a HBRAINBOW flight. Subject was trained in the AESENTINEL project for a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team. This project was postponed for a year. In the interim he was assigned to TSD, where he was employed at a covert site, involving the cataloguing of specific information from East German Documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. On 17 June 1960, it was decided that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out. On receipt of this information SR/DOB endeavored to place subject elsewhere, where his training would be beneficial. The African Division expressed interest and had agreed to utilize him as a result of assessments. During the period from the 21st of October until dispatch, subject will be carried on COA funds.

SECRET

2. Security Flaps -

A. During the latter part of WW II subject was arrested by the German police for forgery. He was not unduly held by the criminal investigation branch of the police but passed on to the Gestapo. Subject was brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. Later he was tried and sentenced to death. For some unknown reason he was moved from jail to jail, concentration camp to concentration camp! While in prison he resorted to a "ruse de guerre" and told the Germans his father had invented a motor that could run without gasoline. He offered to draw the designs of the motor and was able to stall long enough to be liberated by components of the advancing U.S. Army.

B. In 1946-47 subject and an accomplice committed two robberies of jewelry stores.

C. In 1949 subject robbed a bank of 1,000,000 Fr. fr. His accomplice was apprehended and shortly thereafter confessed, implicating subject. Subject was apprehended while attempting to cross the Franco-Spanish border. He was sentenced to ten years in prison of which he served only five, receiving parole for good behavior. Upon release in 1955, he was exiled on parole to Gap, France where he worked as an architect.

D. To our knowledge there is no indication that subject is known to be associated with KUBARK.

SECRET

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

376

DATE : 11 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : CCG 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, [illegible], S/C 2 R/Bouchard

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐

MAY 11 1615Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 49373

DIR INFO ELIZ PARI CITE LEOP 1304

C/S COMMENT: *POA GRANTED IDEN, RECRUITMENT AS CONTRACT AGENT POSSIBLE AND REQUEST HE BE CONSIDERED FOR UNOFFICIAL COVER ASSIGNMENT.

REF DIR 38541 (OUT 53269)*

1. IN PRESENT POLITICAL FLUX STATION FEELS AIR KATANGA POSITION FOR SUBJ REF WOULD BE TENUOUS AND POSSIBLY SHORT-LIVED. THERE ARE TWO POSITIONS LEOP WHERE IDEN WOULD BE HIGHLY USEFUL.

2. WICLAM PILOT DUE DEPART LEOP ~~END OF~~ JUNE. NEED REPLACEMENT. STATION REVISING WICLAM PROJECT SO REGULAR CHARTER BUSINESS ESTABLISHED. HOWEVER THIS ONLY ~~PART~~ TIME. SECOND POSSIBILITY PER WIROGUE SUGGESTION. WIROGUE UNCERTAIN RE SALARY BUT STATES CAN ARRANGE SUBJ BE INTRODUCED PROPER PEOPLE. AS AIR FORCE LACKS PILOTS STATION BELIEVES SUBJ COULD EASILY MAKE SELF INDISPENSIBLE, ACHIEVING POSITION WHERESDE ABLE PROVIDE INTEL ON MILITARY, SPOT, AND GATHER GENERAL INTEL FLYING AROUND CONGO. WOULD PREFER USE SUBJ LATTER POSITION WITH POSSIBLE HELP ON WICLAM PLANE, PROVIDING HQS HAS NO OBJECTION CROSSING OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-233477

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Copy No.

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2303
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 9 MAY 1961
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	481
DATE :	24 APR 61
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION :	C/AF 3
INFO :	COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

2 - 1 copy

ROUTING

1		4	
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APR 24 2047Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 41144

DIR CITE LEOP 1226

REF A DIR 36207 (out 98503)x

B LEOP 1200 (IN38501)

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE REPORTS HE CURRENTLY ACTING AS ONLY INSTRUCTOR CAF CADETS. IN SPITE OF DUBIOUS QUALIFICATION WIROGUE TEACHING THEORY NAVIGATION, READING MANUALS ON SIDE TO STAY AHEAD. PIERROT STILL CHIEF CAF BUT REFUSES TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY OR ACTION. ENTIRE CAF PROGRAM SLOWLY DISINTEGRATING.

2. WIROGUE BELIEVES SHOULD PERSON CAPBALE TEACH FLYING APPEAR LEOP AND ASK FOR POSITION INSTRUCTOR CAF HE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY HIRED OBVIOUSLY KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CAF CAPBABLE OF PAYING SALARY AND LIABLE TO BE SLOW MAKING PAYMENT. THIS IS STILL OPENING

SECRET

14-00000

FOR ASSET.

3. UNOC CONTACTS WITH GOC ON REORGANIZATION CNA AND SUPPORT FOR TRAINING LIMITED SO FAR TO EXCHANGE NOTES. NO DECISIONS YET TAKEN. UNOC POLICY PER LEOP 1141 IS SUPPORT ANY ACTION CAF ABLE TAKE ON ITS OWN. SUGGEST TRIAL OF SINGLE RECRUITED ASSET APPEARING IN LEOP AND BEING PUT IN TOUCH WITH CAF BY WIROGUE. NO ASSETS CAPABLE THIS ACTION CURRENTLY ON SCENE. PER REF A DOUBT IF UN WOULD HIRE BUT WOULD GIVE BLESSING TO CAF HIRING.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4813 1655
DATE : 27 APRIL 1961

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 C/AF/W 4
2 5
3 6

1 copy

27 Apr 61 21 56z

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT 50644 OUT50644

per CSN 43-43

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 37204

37204

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: LEOP 1226 (IN 41144)*

1. PROCRASTINATION GOC SIGN CAJEEP/2 CONTRACT AND INABILITY PIERROT ASSUME RESPONSIBLE CONTROL CAF AND ITS PROGRAM REDUCES PROSPECT INJECTING KUBARK ASSETS INTO TRAINING SCHOOL.

2. WILL ATTEMPT LOCATE SUITABLE ASSET REQUESTED PARA 3 REF ALTHO BELIEVE SITUATION TOO DUBIOUS TO ENSURE THIS MUCH OF A LONG-RANGE INTEL PENETRATION. ORIGINAL CONCEPT WAS TO PREEMPT BELGIUM PARTICIPATION IN CAF AND INTEL MISSION SECONDARY. THIS APPARENTLY NO LONGER CASE.

3. AS YOU AWARE NECESSARY TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT ANY WIROGUE PROPOSAL.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *WIROGUE BELIEVES SHOULD PERSON CAPABLE TEACH FLYING APPEAR LEOP AND ASK FOR POSITION INSTRUCTOR CAF HE WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY HIRED, OBVIOUSLY KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CAF CAPABLE OF PAYING SALARY AND LIABLE TO BE SLOW MAKING PAYMENT.

per CSN 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET RYBAT

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

625

DATE : 19 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : COP, CA2, CA/EAG, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, IW 2, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

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APR 19 2230Z 61 7W

ROUTINE

IN 38653

TDCS

TO INFO CITE

DIR INFO BRUS LANT PARI CITE LEOP 1203

INTEL

SUPDATA PA

1 (ALSO RECEIVED 6) WIROGUE DURING STAFF MEETING, PARA 2, WIROGUE

FILED 191340Z

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

ACL-444

LEOPOLDVILLE, CONGO REPUBLIC

SUBJECT BELGIAN SIPORT OF CONGOLESE AIR FORCE

DOI 18 APR 61. PADA LEOPOLDVILLE REPUBLIC OF CONGO 18 APR 61

SOURCE EUROPEAN ADVISER (F) TO CONGOLESE MILITARY. APPR 2.

IWOG COMMENT:

THE ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS [illegible] HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

BASED ON:

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

LIAISON:

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

REPORT NO. TDCS

COUNTRY

DATE DISTR.

SUBJECT

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 38653

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

FIELD REPORT NO.

APPRAISAL

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. DURING A CONGOLESE MILITARY STAFF MEETING INCLUDING CAPTAIN BABIA, AIDE TO GENERAL MOBUTU, AND MAJOR PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT, CHIEF OF THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF), THE QUESTION WAS RAISED WHO IS PAYING FOR LARGE SHIPMENT OF CAF SUPPLIES. BABIA CONFIRMED THAT LT. COL MARLIERE, BELGIAN ADVISOR TO MOBUTU AND FORMER SENIOR FORCE PUBLIQUE OFFICER, PAID FOR THE SUPPLIES ON BEHALF OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT. (SOURCE COMMENT: BELGIANS ARE BEGINNING SUPPLY EVERYTHING TO CAF WITHOUT COST.) (FIELD COMMENT: QUANTITY, TYPE AND PRICE OF MATERIAL NOT KNOWN TO SOURCE. ANOTHER CONTACT (F) STATED BELGIANS NOW BRINGING IN EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO HELP TRAIN CAF.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

To: [illegible]

From: [illegible]

Subject: Trip to Congo

Dear Stan,

Just a brief rundown on the Congo business. I arrived on the Monday following Easter and of course it was a holiday so didnot and was not contacted until the following day (Tuesday). By that time I had an agreement ready and in the hands on the Congolese Air Force on Wednesday. On Thursday we met with the Minister of the cabinet and he indicated all was in order and that the papers would be signed the following day (Friday). On Friday nothing happened so we sweated out Saturday, again nothing happened so there was nothing to do but wait until Monday. By this time I had talked with Sabena and got a free ticket on them from Leopoldville to Brussels so that I'd have more flexibility. On Monday there was still no action and again gave them the benefit of the doubt by remaining until Tuesday when I could have gotten a 707 flight on Monday night direct to Brussels. On Tuesday I left Leopoldville in the afternoon, proceeded to Brazzaville and ~~that~~ waited 10 hours for the delayed KLM flight (DC-7), finally leaving at 3 AM and arriving in Frankfurt at 1900 that night

As I told you, Major Reiner is an Austrian who acts as an adviser to the Congolese Air Force. Major Pierrott, commander of the air force is young and ambitious. At the present time there is nothing but a shell and instructors are badly needed. There are, according to Pierrott, 8 AT-6's and 7 Tiger Moths on order which will give them a total strength of 9 of each aircraft. They expect to put a total of 120 cadets into training. I talked along the lines of a package deal on training but this didn't sink in. They just want to get started and go in to detail later. As you can well imagine, the government structure in the Congo is very shaky and it will be a long time before the U. N. forces leave and things settle in a normal manner. For example, there could be a change in the govt., including Pierrott, any day and this could be followed by any number of changes in the weeks following. Any contract we sign could be thrown out by a new government. In addition there is also a good possibility of renewed violence which might throw everything in a turmoil.

Without going in to detail, following are the more important points of the agreement:

1. Air Force retain us for purpose of hiring personnel for purpose of training mechanic and pilot personnel.
2. Air Force pays transportation of personnel from point of hire to Leopoldville and return plus any travel done in the Congo.
3. Air Force pays (to the bank in Ely) $1,000.00 for my expenses such payment to made within 20 days after signing agreement.
4. Initially, 3 mechanic and 3 pilot instructors will be hired and Air Force will accept persons of German, Swiss, French or English nationality
5. Pay of personnel will be responsibility of Air Force and mechanics will receive $770.00 or $650.00 plus room. Pilots will receive $870.00 ~~kr~~ plus flying pay which is figured at $50.00 for each 25 hours flown (they anticipate pilots will fly 25 hours per month) or $750 plus room plus flying pay. In addition, all personnel will be furnished their noon meal except on weekends when they are not working.
6. Personnel will be able to transfer one half of their pay to country of residence---this figures out at $385.00 and $455.00 re-

7. We received 10% over actual cost of purchases made on behalf of Air Force except aircraft on which we are paid 2% over cost.

8. Air Force will pay us a fee of 10% each month on total salaries of employees. It was agreed that individual salaries would be averaged at $650.00 each. This payment to be made on the first of each month by transfer to the Ely bank.

9. We obtain insurance in amount of Sterling 3500 for each employee and Air Force pay the acutal cost.

10.

As you can see, it is a simple agreement and one which will not make us rich. They indicated they would want one film strip machine and available training films for mechanics and pilots.

It appears that there will be a great deal of ~~EXX~~ contract flying for the UN in the Congo for some time to come. As I told you, Interocean and TMA are doing the most with Interocean having six DC-4s flying 1500 hours per month and TMA doing nearly 300 with two aircraft. TMA will pull their aircraft out in the next ten days for the Haj and it would seem that your man in New York might be able to work something out whereby we could replace them and remain in the Congo.

Living accomdation are good in Leopoldville. Villas rent from $100.00 on up with a nice place for about $175.00. This would be a three or four bedroom place with all the facilities. If we had crews there, they could live together as I'm sure none of them would want to take families. Food is expensive but no more so than in Tripoli. Car gasoline sells at a little over 40 cents a gallon which isn't bad. Nothing is being imported in to the country so things could get real serious in the next 4 to 6 months. American cigaretts are not available and Belgian brands are not plentiful. There is a money black market for hard currency and you can get anywhere from 65 to 90 Congo francs for a dollar whereas the legal rate of exhange is 50 to a dollar. The Time correspondent was caught changing money and the Embassy had quite a time getting the thing straightened out.

Under ordinary circumstances (except for contracting with the UN) I wouldn't think of signing a contract with the Congolese govt. at this time. However, with things as they stand this is a good way to get our foot in the door and could open up other fields in West Africa. Perhaps Carma would like to make a trip out there as our representative!!!

Wish the situation in Jordan were better---I'll give you as much done as possible after my arrival. I've heard nothing more from the Congo so will probably be leaving on Monday for Cairo.

Best regards,

18 April 61

WIROGUE UPDATE

MEMO FOR THE RECORD:

1. CARTER YATES CALLED THIS DAY AND PASSED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RE THE CONTRACT WHICH CAJEEP/2 PRESENTED TO THE CONGOLESE:

a. Would furnish six French speaking instructors immediately. Three more at a later date.

b. Would furnish one electronic training device which flashes still pictures onto a screen and describes the action in the local language.

c. In return the Congolese would reimburse CAJEEP/2 $1000.00 for his trip to Leopoldville and 10% of the salariesof the instructors for handling the administration of the project.

d. Also 2% commision on any aircraft which CAJEEP/2 would be asked to purchase.

2. CARTER INSTRUCTED THE COVER COMPANY NOT TO ALLOW CAJEEP/2 TO MAKE ANY AIRCRAFT PURCHASES WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. THE COVER COMPANY ACEDEDTO THE REQUEST.

3. INFORMATION AS TO SALARIES OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE UNKNOWN.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 19 APR 61 487

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

DECONTROLLED
per CSH 43-43

APR 19 1838Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 38501

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE LEOP 1200

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 34146 (out 94186)

B FROB 9126 (IN 37367)

1. CAJEEP/2 HIGHLY COOPERATIVE WHEN LEOP. CONTRACT DRAFTED BUT NEVER SIGNED DUE FLUID POLITICAL SITUATION.

2. KAZADI GOC MIN DEFENSE RECALLED BY KALONJI TO SUD KASAI JUST WHEN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. ADOULA IN ADDITION TO MIN INTERIOR TOOK OVER POST DEFENSE. AIR FORCE (CAF) DIRECTLY UNDER DEFENSE BUT 11 APR PIERROT, CHIEF CAF, LEFT LEOP FOR WEEK. RETURNED 17 APR WITH STATUS OF CAF IN GOC STRUCTURE VERY UNCERTAIN. STRONG POSSIBILITY IT MAY BE PUT UNDER COMMAND MOBUTU AND ARMY.

DECONTROLLED
per CSH 43-43

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

585
DATE : 17 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

APR 17 2141Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 37367

[illegible]ILED 1343

DIR LEOP ~~INFO~~ FRAN CITE FROB (GROVEN ACTING) 9126

RYBAT WIROUGE ZIBET

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED NEGOTIATIONS WITH CAJEEP/2 FOR CONTRACT TO SUPPLY NON-PBPRIME PILOTS AND MECHANICS FOR CONGOLESE AIRFORCE SCHOOL IN CONGO

REF: A. LEOP 1169 (IN 34729)

B. DIR 34146 (OUT 94186)*

1. CAJEEP-2 PHONED AT WIESBADEN HOME BY FOB STAFFER ASMR. RIEDER ON 14 APRIL. HE AGREED INFORM US WHEN CONTRACT SIGNED AND ON FUTURE TRAVEL.

2. ON 17 APRIL CAJEEP-2 PHONED TO CONFIRM HE LEAVING FOR MIDDLE EAST. HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT CONTRACT BUT PRESUMES WILL BE SIGNED BEFORE HIS RETURN TO WIESBADEN CIRCA 1 MAY.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MORE DETAILS ON REF B REQUEST FOR RECRUITMENT OF SELECTED CONGO JOB APPLICANTS. ADVISE LANGUAGE CAPABILITY DESIRED OR SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR PROPOSED RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS WITH GUIDANCE ON SALARY COMMITMENTS AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 38501 LEOP 1200

3. AT THIS POINT DIRECTION GOC, AND MIN DEFENSE GOING HIGHLY CONFUSED. NO SINGLE AUTHORITY WILLING TO TAKE ACTION AND HAND OF BELGIANS OBVIOUS BEHIND CURRENT PROCRASTINATION.

4. IF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENT CONTRACT WILL INFORM IMMEDIATELY. IN PRESENT SHUFFLE WIROGUE STILL CAF ADVISER BUT POSITION MUCH WEAKER THAN WHEN KAZADI MIN DEFENSE. DEPENDING ON DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE BY BELGIANS WIROGUE COULD EASILY LOSE POSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED CAJEEP/2 NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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2873
DATE : 12 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

2-1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

APR 12 1519Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34729

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE LEOP 1169

RYBAT WIROGUE

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

REF DIR 34136*

1. CAJEEP/2 DEPARTED LEOP 12 APR. WILL REMAIN WIESBADEN UNTIL 17 APR. HE THEN HAS BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST. INFORMED WOULD BE CONTACTED IF CONTRACT SIGNED.

2. KALONJI RECALLED ACTING MIN DEFENSE KAZADI WHO LEFT FOR SUD KASAI 11 APR. ADOULA WHO ALREADY MIN INTERIOR NOW ALSO DEFENSE. SAID DISCUSSED CONTRACT WITH ILEO WHICH THEY FAVOR BUT HAVE NOT SIGNED. AT LEAST PART OF REASON IS FEAR ANY CONGOLESE MINISTER COMMIT HIMSELF TO POSITIVE ACTION. IF CONTRACT SIGNED BY 16 APR CABLE NOTIFICATION TO CAJEEP/2 WILL SET IN MOTION IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACT.

3. FOR HQS: DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE. POSSIBLY DIR 34146 (OUT 94186) INTENDED.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

614

DATE : 11 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

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APR 11 2038Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34307

per CSH 43-43

DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE FROB (CROWEN ACTING) 9095

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET CAECLIPSE

REF: DIR 34146 (OUT 94186)*

FOB ABLE HANDLE PARA 2 REF. CAJEEP-2 CAN CALL MR. RIEDER, FRANKFURT CIVILIAN 558433 DURING WORK HOURS AND IDENTIFY SELF AS TRUE NAME. REQUEST CAJEEP-2 ADDRESS OR TELEPHONE NUMBER GERMANY IF PREFER CONTACT INITIATED BY FOB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED FROB TO CONTACT CAJEEP/2 UPON RETURN WIES MID APRIL TO OBTAIN NAMES AND BIO DATA ON CANDIDATES FOR CONGO JOBS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

656

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : ~~4818~~ AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 10 APRIL 1961

ROUTING
1
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4
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6

10 APR 61 22 22z

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRANKFURT

2-1 copy

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 94186 94186
PRIORITY

per CSN 43-43

TO (PRITY) FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 34146

JIROGUE RYBAT ZIBET

1. CAJEEP/2 (IDEN) PRESENTLY LEOP NEGOTIATING CONTRACT TO SUPPLY NON-PBPRIME PILOTS AND MECHANICS FOR CONGOLESE AIRFORCE SCHOOL IN CONGO. LEOP STATION POSING AS INTERESTED TPELIDE OFFICIALS IN CONTACT C/2 WHO NOT FORMALLY AWARE BUT PROBABLY SUSPECTS KUBARK INVOLVEMENT, ~~BUT PROBABLY SUSPECTS AND CAN BE MADE AWARE CUR-~~ ~~INTEREST.~~ NO OBJECTION MAKING C-2 WITTING KUBARK INTEREST.

HWN

2. REQUEST FROB CONTACT C/2 UPON RETURN WIESBADEN MID APRIL TO OBTAIN NAMES AND BIO DATA ON CANDIDATES FOR CONGO JOBS WITH OBJECT IN SOME CASES OF THEIR RECRUITMENT AS KUBARK AGENTS. IF LEAD TIME SUFFICIENT WOULD PREFER RECRUITMENTS BE MADE BY FROB PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR LEOP. EXTENT OF C/2 INVOLVEMENT SHOULD BE KEPT MINIMUM.

3. FOR LEOP: INFORM C/2 CONTACT WILL BE MADE WIESBADEN. C/2 GRANTED OA 12 FEB '60 FOR SUCH CONTACTS.

END OF MESSAGE.

HWN CHIEF/EE/G

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818 1657
DATE : 10 APRIL 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : FROB, LEOPOLDVILLE INFO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

10 APR 61 22 22z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT 94187 ~~34187~~

TO (PRITY) FROB, LEOP INFO FRAN CITE DIR 34147

34147

WIROGUE RYBAT ZIBET

REF: DIR 34146 (OUT 94188)

IDEN ROLLAND C. SWANSON.

END OF MESSAGE.

CHIEF/EE/

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

039

DATE : 9 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR L-1[illegible]

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1100, 9 APR 61)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

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APR 9 1338Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 33155

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1155 per CSH 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF LEOP 1128 (IN 30853)*

1. KANDOLO MINISTER TO SIGN CONTRACT. DETAILS SETTLED BUT TYPICAL CONGOLESE PROCRASTINATION. SWANSON DELAYED DEPARTURE TWICE BECAUSE CONTRACT NOT YET SIGNED BUT IS SETTING 11 APR AS FIRM DEPARTURE WHETHER CONTRACT SIGNED OR NOT. GCC INFORMED.

2. HAVE NOT MENTIONED SUGGESTION PARA 3 REF TO SWANSON. WAITING APPROVAL.

3. WIROGUE REPORTED 9 APR STAHL EXPECTED ANY DAY. IF POSSIBLE WILL ARRANGE THEY NOT MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN.

[illegible]

[illegible] 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

293 RLG

CLASSIFIED MESSAC

SECRET

DATE : 7 APR 6:

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 0835, 7 APR 61)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

2-1 copy

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

APR 7 1301Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 32207

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1141 BETTELHEIM ACTING

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1140 (IN 31740)

SWANSON DISCUSSED CONTRACT WITH UNOC ACTING CHIEF AIR COL. PIEROTTI. (

PIEROTTI STATED UNOC POLICY TO GIVE FULL SUPPORT PIERROT AND CAF AND AS LONG AS NO BELGIANS OR PBPRIMER INVOLVED AS ADVISORS UNOC IN FULL ACCORD. SWANSON MEETING AMBASSADOR TO CLEAR AIR COMPLETELY.

PIERROT ?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED STATION INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SWANSON REP OF EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY OF PBPRIME PARENT COMPANY NOW IN LEOP NEGOIATING CONTRACT WITH CAF.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

467 J0

DATE : 6 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED C/AF 1430, 6 APR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

APR 6 1921Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 31740

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1140 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF LEOP 1128 (IN 30553)*

1. STATION INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SWANSON REP OF EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY OF PBPRIME PARENT COMPANY NOW IN LEOP NEGOIATING CONTRACT WITH CAF. THIS PRESENTED AS DEAL STRICTLY BETWEEN GOC AND COMPANY WITH NO MENTION KUBARK INTEREST. AMBASSADOR CONCERNED BECAUSE MAY BE AGAINST 21 FEB RESOLUTION UN. AMBASSADOR STATES CAN NOT APPROVE OR BACK SWANSON IF HE DOES NOT OBTAIN UNOC APPROVAL OF CONTRACT.

2. AMBASSADOR TOLD OUR INTEREST ONLY AROUSED LAST COUPLE DAYS WHEN SWANSON APPEARED. WE INTERESTED IN WHO INSTRUCTORS ARE AND KIND OF DEAL MADE WITH CAF.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3. STATION INSTRUCTING SWANSON CLEAR WITH UNOC BEFORE PROCEEDING. THOUGH SWANSON PBPRIME NO OTHER PBPRIME CONNECTION SHOWS. SITUATION SUCH UNOC DECISION THIS TIME UNCERTAIN AND ENTIRE OP MAY BE SHORT CIRCUITED.

4. AMBASSADOR FEELS STRONGLY THIS MATTER TO POINT HE STATED MIGHT HAVE TO REMAND SWANSON PASSPORT IF DEAL MADE WITHOUT UNOC APPROVAL. VIEW ABOVE, SUGGEST HQS NOT DISCUSS WITH STATE PENDING OUTCOME SWANSON-UNOC TALK.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE OBTAINING NAMES AND BIO DATA OF CANDIDATES. COULD ALSO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CANDIDATES FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

DATE : 295 JO
5 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED C/AF, 1000, 5 APR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-copy

APR 5 1314Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 30853

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1128 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF A. DIR 33071 Out 91606*

B. DIR 32895 Out 91094

1. WILCO. WIROGUE NOT GOING EUROPE USING ALIBI SWANSON VISIT HERE PRECLUDES NEED. RE PARA 4 REF A WIROGUE REPORTS COL STAHL CANCELLED TRIP LEOP LAST MOMENT FOR UNKNOWN REASON.

2. CONTACT WITH SWANSON DELAYED UNTIL REF A RECEIVED. LONG INITIAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN WIROGUE AND SWANSON HELD 4 APR WITH SALVACK AS TPELIDE REP. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON STRAIGHT BUSINESS DEAL CONCERNING INSTRUCTORS NEEDED, PAYMENTS, CONTRACTS, LIFE INSURANCE, AVAILABILITY, WORKING CONDITIONS, ETC. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCKS NOW ARE METHOD SIGNING CONTRACTS AND COST PLUS CLAIM ON SWANSON'S PART. SWANSON WILLING NEGOTIATE AND MAKE DEAL BUT DOES

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

LEOP 1128 IN 30853

NOT WISH APPEAR TOO EASY. WIROGUE DISCUSSING POINTS WITH PIERROT 5 APR AND WILL MEET SWANSON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AFTERNOON 5 APR.

3. SWANSON STATES HAS TWO PEOPLE READY IMMEDIATELY AND REMAINDER SOON. OBVIOUS FROM STATEMENTS AND SITUATION HE AWARE AT LEAST PBPRIME INTEREST BUT STATION CONCURS HE APPEARS DISCREET. SUGGEST CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED FOR SWANSON WIESBADEN WHICH WOULD EXPEDITE OBTAINING NAMES AND BIO DATA OF CANDIDATES. COULD ALSO PROVIDE ACCESS TO CANDIDATES FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT. SWANSON ETD 6 APR.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SINCE UPHILL INVOLVED, CONFUSED AS TO WHY PIERROT ASKING W/1 CONTACT COL STAHL.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : DANIEL MIESCIUR 1616
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4018
DATE : 4 APRIL 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO : LEOPOLDVILLE L
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : *COP, S/C 2

4 APR 61 21 54z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE ~~91968~~
PRIORITY
OUT 91968

PER CSN 43-43

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 33214

33214

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: A. LEOP 1120 (IN 29880)
B. DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)
C. DIR 33071 (OUT 91606)

INSTRUCTIONS REFS B AND C STILL STAND.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

PER CSN 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/WEST
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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498

DATE : 3 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1940 3 APR)
(MR. NIESCIUR, AF, NOTIFIED AT 1935 3 APR)

INFO : *COP, S/C 2

APR 4 0025Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 29880

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1120 (BETTELHEIM ACTING)

per CSN 43-40

WIROGUE RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

REF A. LEOP 1112 (IN 29376)

B. DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)**

**SWANSON UNWITTING KUBARK RELATIONSHIP THIS CASE BUT HAS FULL SECURITY CLEARANCE AND HAS BEEN CONTACT KUBARK GERMANY IN PAST.

1. WIROGUE RECEIVED CABLE FROM SWANSON LATE 2 APR GIVING ETA 3 APR. CABLE STATES SWANSON STAYING BRAZ SINCE NO VISA LEOP. WIROUGE REQUESTS STATION REP BE PRESENT AT MEETINGS BUT STATION NEEDS KNOW DEGREE SWANSON WITTING AND COVER FOR STATION REP BE PRESENT. IF SWANSON UNWITTING THIS COULD BLOW OP. PLAN WIROGUE CONTACT SWANSON 4 APR BRAZ.

2. FULLY RECOGNIZE DANGERS WIROGUE COVER IN GERMANY BUT WITH UPHILL REPS APPEARING IN LEOP WIROGUE AND COVER WILL BE PUT TO TEST ANYWAY. WISH EMPHASIZE WIROGUE DIRECTED GO EUROPE BY CAF AND STATION FEELS IT NECESSARY WIROGUE OBEY FOR PROPER DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS.

SECRET (END OF MESSAGE)

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur:mye
UNIT : AF/W/2 1661
EXT : 4618
DATE : 3 April 1961

ROUTING
1 [illegible] 4
2 [illegible] 5
3 [illegible] 6

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

1 copy

3 APR 61 23 32z

PRIORITY
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRITY LEOP INFO CITE DIR 33071

33071

WIROGUE RYBAT

par CSN 43-43

REF: A. LEOP 1112 (IN 29376)
B. MUNI 5132 (IN 28066)
C. LEOP 1069 (IN 25118) PARA 3

1. OUR FIRST INTEREST CNA AIRFORCE IS TO SEE THAT IT FILLED BY NON-BELGIANS. ALL THINGS BEING POSSIBLE WE WOULD ALSO LIKE AN INTELL PENETRATION AND STILL HOPE FOR THIS BUT IN VIEW PRIORITY WILL NOT INTERFERE DIRECT GERMAN CONTRIBUTION.

2. SINCE SWANSON UNWITTING (ALTHO PROBABLY SUSPECTS KUBARK INTEREST) YOU WILL HAVE TO ENSURE VIA XX WIROGUE/1 THAT YOU REPRESENTED IN DISCUSSIONS. ASSUME ROLE OF TPELIDE OFFICER ASSIGNED TO THIS TYPE DEVELOPMENTS ADEQUATE EXPLANATION TO SWANSON WHO REPORTEDLY DISCREET. HIS COMPANY CONFIRMED THAT A CABLE IN FRENCH HAD BEEN SENT W/1 ON 28 MARCH AND SWANSON PRESENTLY IN LEOP.

3. W/1 NOT ORIGINALLY CAST FOR ROLE TYPE HE HAS ASSUMED. WE DEFINITELY NOT WILLING PERMIT HIM FREE WHEEL IN EUROPE MAKING CONTACTS A/O CONTRACTS AT WILL. INDEED UNLESS A CLOSE AND HARD HAND IS KEPT ON HIM HE MAY LIKELY END UP MORE OF A LIABILITY THAN AN ASSET. WE AWARE HE HARD HEADED AND SMART AND REALIZE CO WILL HAVE TO BE ON HIS TOES AND EQUALLY HARDHEADED BUT HE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET OUT OF HAND AND OUR READING IS THAT HE WILL RESPECT THIS

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dan Niesciur:rye
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 4818
DATE : 3 April 1961

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 91606
DIR 33071

TO INFO CITE DIR

TREATMENT.

4. SINCE UPHILL INVOLVED WE CONFUSED AS TO WHY PIERROT ASKING W/1 CONTACT COL STAHL, COL STEIN AND UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL (PRESUMABLY UTILITY) IN MUNICH TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF SINCE PER REF B COL STAHL NOW IN CONGO SUPPOSEDLY DISCUSSING SAME TOPIC UNLESS W/1 UNAWARE THIS FACT AND TRYING TO PLAY OWN ANGLE. ALSO IT IS NOTED THAT PER REF C PIERROT TOLD W/1 "THEY IN CONTACT COLONEL GERMANY WHO COULD CHECK INSTRUCTORS". THIS MAY WELL BE UPHILL AND IF SO NAMES SWANSON IS PLANNING TO SUGGEST ARE BONA XXX FIDE INSTRUCTORS WITHOUT INFERENCE UPHILL AND WITHOUT KUBARK AFFILIATION.

5. IN OUR VIEW W/1 INVOLVEMENT WITH UPHILL PORTENDS DIFFICULTIES FOR HIM EVEN DISASTER IN OUR USE OF HIM SINCE AS YOU KNOW W/1 DOCUMENTATION FALSE AND THIS AND HIS ALLEDGED MILITARY SERVICE IN GERMAN ARMY CAN EASILY BE CHECKED BY UPHILL.

6. DETERMINATION POSSIBLE EXIT WIROGUE THIS CASE TO BE MADE AFTER WE INFORMED RESULTS SWANSON/WIROGUE CONVERSATIONS. REPEAT THESE MUST BE MONITORED AND CONTROLLED.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 072 2 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 3 0830Z 61

SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 29376 A LEOP 1112

TO INFO CITE

CS COMMENT:

CORRECT PARA 1 TO READ:

"1. IN ANSWER REF A PARA 2 WE PREFER WIROGUE REMAIN LEOP BUT HE WORKING FOR CAF AND ORDERED EUROPE. NOW GIVEN SECOND TASK TO CONTACT GERMAN OFFICERS COL (FNU) STAHL (L) (SEE MUNI 5132 (IN 28066)), COL (FNU) STEIN, AND UNIDENTIFIED GERMAN GENERAL MUNICH. HE TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF INCLUDING TYPES AND QUANTITY AVAILABLE, PRICE, METHOD AND TIME OF DELIVERY, THOUGH HE NOT TO ACTUALLY MAKE DEAL. TO PREVENT LEAVING THIS MATTER UPHILL, DOES HQS WISH PROVIDE NAMES OTHER ARMS DEALERS. MAY BE DIFFICULT KEEP WIROGUE LEOP IF KAZADI AND PIERROT DETERMINED HE GO GERMANY."

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

628

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF AT 1530 2 APR
DR. HOUCK, AF NOTIFIED AT 1610, MR NIESCIUR, AF,
NOTIFIED 1615 2 APRIL)

INFO : ~~COP~~, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

APR 2 1933Z 61

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 29376

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP 1112

REF A. DIR 32895 (OUT 91094) ##

B. DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)

1. IN ANSWER REF A PARA 2 WE PREFER WIROGUE REMAIN LEOP BUT HE WORKING FOR CAF AND ORDERED EUROPE, NOW GIVEN SECOND TASK ~~FOR (PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~ TO CONTACT GERMAN OFFICERS COL (FNU) STAHL (L) (SEE MUNI 5132), (IN 28066) COL (FNU) STEIN AND UNIDENTIFIED GERMAN GEN~~A~~ERAL MUNICH. HE ~~(PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~ TO DISCUSS ARMS FOR CAF INCLUDING TYPES AND QUANTITY AVAILABLE ~~(PORTION GRABLED WILL FORWARD)~~ PRICE, METHOD AND TIME OF DELIVERY THOUGH HE NOT TO ACTUALLY MAKE DEAL. TO PREVENT ~~(PORTION GARBLED WILL FORWARD)~~ LEAVING THIS MATTER UPHILL, DOES HQS WISH PROVIDE NAMES OTHER ARMS DEALERS.

MAY BE DIFFICULT KEEP WIROGUE LEOP IF KAZADI AND PIERROT DETERMINED HE GO GERMANY

2. ~~NR2~~. REQUEST CLARIFICATION REF B. IF SWANSON NOT WITTING KUBARK RELATIOSHI.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

THIS CASE WHAT HAS HE BEEN TOLD AND WHAT IS STORY FOR ORIGINAL CONNECTION PER PREVIOUS TRAFFIC. ONE LEVER USED BY WIROGUE TO BECOME PIERROT ADVISER WAS STORY HE HAD CONTACTS TO PROVIDE INSTRUCTORS. IF SWANSON ESTABLISHES DIRECT CONTACT PIERROT THIS COULD EASILY UNDERCUT WIROGUE INFLUENCE.

3. WISH URGE IF POSSIBLE RECRUIT AT LEAST ONE EACH MECHANIC AND FLYING INSTRUCTOR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL LEOP. FULLY APPRECIATE TIME FACTOR AND DESIRE PREEMPT ANY EFFORT ON PART PIERROT TO PROCURE INSTRUCTORS BY OTHER CHANNELS. IF WIROGUE AND SWANSON SETTLE ON NAMES THERE IS

~~IS~~ POSSIBLE TIME FOR HQS TO CHECK OUT PROSPECTIVE INSTRUCTORS AND MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH. ALTHOUGH CONGOLESE HAVE BIG IDEAS AND HOPE NEED MORE INSTRUCTORS, THIS MAY NOT BE CASE. IF WE RUSH IN ALL ? NONKUBARK ASSETS WE MAY FIND OURSELVES WITH EXPENSIVE OP OVER WHICH WE HAVE LITTLE CONTROL AND WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE LITTLE FOR KUBARK.

4. IF FEASIBLE SUGGEST HQS DELAY SWANSON TRIP AND HAVE HIM CABLE WIROGUE IMMEDIATELY TO MEET HIM IN EUROPE. ALSO, PLEASE ADVISE

SOONEST WHAT COVER STORY USED WITH SWANSON RE WIROGUE AND COVER HQS SUGGESTS SALVACK OR GUTHMAN USE IF PRESENT WIROGUE/SWANSON MEETINGS. IF SWANSON COMES LEOP IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTEND ALL MEETINGS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING WIROGUE COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQNECTAR CABLES.

**DID NOT WANT WIROGUE WANDERING IN EUROPE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Dr. L.C.Houck
UNIT : C/AF/W
EXT : 3939 1530
DATE : 1 April 1961

ROUTING			
1	afw	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

1 APR 61 17 41z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

1 - copy

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 91094
94

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 32895
32895

RYBAT WIROGUE

per CSN 43-43

REFS A LEOP 1102 (IN 28638)
B DIR 32696 (OUT 90734)

1. ASSUME REFS CROSSED. AS YOU NOTE SWANSON ENROUTE LEOP.

2. IN ANY EVENT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT WANT WIROGUE WANDERING IN EUROPE.

3. FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE WISH ALL MEETINGS TO BE IN AREA AND CONTROLLED BY KUBARK STAFF PERSONNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

References RYBAT

per CSN 43-43

B Tweedy
BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK
C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

4

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

8 492
DATE : 31 MAR 61

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF 1610-31 MAR)
(AF CABLE DESK NOTIFIED AT 1605-31 MAR)
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

L-1 copy

MAR 31 2053Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 28638

PRITY DIR INFO BERN FRAN CITE LEOP 1162

RYBAT WIROGUE

par CSN 43-43

REF DIR 31932 (NOT SENT BERN FRAN) (out 87945)

1. AT MEETING 31 MARCH WIROGUE REPORTED PIERROT AND KAZADI HAVE ORDERED HIS TRAVEL GERMANY TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIRING AND TRANSPORTATION RONGOLESE AIR FORCE (CAF) INSTRUCTORS. HE SHOULD DEPART WEEK 3-7 APRIL VIA UAT AND CURRENTLY INTENDS TRAVEL GENEVA THEN GERMANY. LOCATION IN GERMANY DEPENDS ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH SWANSON FROM WHOM HE HAS NOT YET HEARD AND WITH WHOM ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE BEFORE DEPARTURE. SWANSON CABLE NEEDED SOONEST.

2. WIROGUE TO ALSO MEET CAF CONTACT IN GERMANY WHOSE NAME AND LOCATION STILL NOT KNOWN. WIROGUE BEING PRESSURED TO OBTAIN THIS INFO.

3. STATION BELIEVES WIROGUES ACTIVITIES EUROPE SHOULD BE

SECRET

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CLOSELY GUIDED. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL KUBARK CONTACTS BE ARRANGED GENEVA AND GERMANY. CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS NEEDED. EXACT ITINERARY WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN KNOWN.

4. FOR HQS: PIERROT HIGHLY CONCERNED OVER POOR CAF SECURITY AND WIROGUE CURRENTLY IN FULL CHARGE ARRANGE AND TIGHTEN CAF SECURITY. HAS REQUESTED FULL GUIDANCE FROM STATION. STATION FEELS SECURITY SYSTEM AND SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE BASED ON WW ROMAN TWO GERMAN ARMY PATTERN IN KEEPING WIROGUE COVER. REQUEST DISPATCH ANDY BACKGROUND MATERIAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED WIROGUE DEVELOPMENTS.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: DANIEL NIESCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 4818 1604
DATE: 31 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: *COP, S/C 2

ROUTING
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31 MAR 61 20 43z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 32696

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: A. LEOP 1086 (IN 26480)
B. LEOP 1087 (IN 27093)**
C. LEOP 0957 (IN 15023)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT YQUECTAR CABLES.
**ASSUMED THERE KUBARK RELATIONSHIP WITH SWANSON OR COMPANY AND AT LEAST SOME OF GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS RECRUITED OR RECRUITABLE.

1. KUBARK IN CONTACT WITH PARENT COMPANY OF WHICH SWANSON FOREIGN REP STATIONED WIESBADEN AND ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP ITS SUBSIDIARY. SWANSON UNWITTING KUBARK RELATIONSHIP THIS CASE BUT HAS FULL SECURITY CLEARANCE AND HAS BEEN CONTACT KUBARK GERMANY IN PAST.

2. SWANSON INFORMED HOME OFFICE HE PLANNING VISIT LEOP O/A 1 APR TO DISCUSS PERSONNEL, TRAINING SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRACTS. WILL CABLE ETA TO WIROGUE/1.

3. SWANSON WILL HAVE LIST OF BONA FIDE GERMAN INSTRUCTORS WHICH IF ACCEPTABLE TO PIERROT WILL GO CONGO SOONEST. NONE OF THIS GROUP WILL BE RECRUITED KUBARK AGENTS SINCE TIME TOO SHORT. BUT AS NEED INCREASES FOR MORE INSTRUCTORS OR FOR REPLACEMENT OF FIRST GROUP KUBARK CAN THEN INJECT RECRUITED AGENTS THRU SWANSON'S PLACEMENT SERVICE. THIS PHASE OF EXERCISE DESIGNED TO PREEMPT ANY EFFORT ON PART OF PIERROT TO PROCURE INSTRUCTORS UNILATERALLY.

4. TO PRECLUDE FURTHER W/1 DEALS STRONGLY URGE GUTHMAN BE PRESENT IN ANY DISCUSSIONS W/1 HAS WITH SWANSON OR CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT W/1.

END OF MESSAGE.

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLA-515

TO: Chief, KURIOT

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: Unknown

VIA: Chief, AF

FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE: 28 April 1961

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/Operational/WIROGUE
Transmittal Receipt for Documents

ACTION: For Your Information

No indexing required

REF: ACLA-258, dated 30 March 1961

Transmitted herewith is one copy of the signed receipt for authentication materials as requested in reference.

Lester H. SALVACK

28 April 1961

Attachment: as stated above, h/w

Distribution:
4-Hqs, w/attach

201-233477

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

RYBA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION		ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, LEOPOLDVILLE

INFO.

FROM Chief, KURIOT

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

SUBJECT AQUATIC/OPERATIONAL/WIROGUE
Transmittal of Documents for WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DIR-29127

1. Transmitted herewith are two WW II German documents (attachment A) issued to subject which will substantiate his background legend as a former Wehrmacht Captain. Attachment B gives particular information of entries on the documents which you may use for briefing subject.

2. It is requested that these documents be returned to this office when no longer needed operationally. Please sign and return one copy of the enclosed receipt for authentication materials.

WALLACE F. JACCOMY

Enclosure: (1 envl.) UNDER SEPARATE COVER
A. documents with receipt
B. information

Distribution:
3 - COS, Leopoldville, w/encl. UNDER SEPARATE COVER

201-233477

DATE TYPED: 30 MARCH 1961

DATE DISPATCHED:

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ACLW-258

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: REF: AQUATIC

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TSD/IB/FS#4	JOSEPH BORNIGER	rc	3391

1 - TSD/SRS, wo/encl.
2 - AF/W/1, w/encl. A
1 - IB files
1 - IB/FS#4

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/W/1		Coordinated by phone w/Dan Niesciur

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ASSTC/TSD AUTH		CHARLES J. RYAN

RYBAT

RYBAT

SECRET

DOCUMENTATION FOR GEORG REINER

per CSH 43-43

MILITARY CERTIFICATE

1. Military Certificate issued by the 8th Grenadier Training Brigade. (Infantry) The designation O.U. on the right hand top corner means "Ortsunterkunft", it is the place of issue-which during war time did not specify a town or area due to security consideration. It merely means the place where the unit was physically stationed at the time the document was issued. The certificate states that Capt. Georg Reiner, born 25. July 1921 in Salzburg has lost his regular military pay book on 2.2.1944 on account of enemy action. A new book has not yet been issued.

SOLDBUCH ERSATZ

2. The Soldbuch Ersatz (Pay book substitute). (a) Front Section (Soldbuch-Ersatz) indicates that document was issued to Capt. Georg Reiner, born on 25. July 1921 in Salzburg, his dog tag number is 214739, his nearest of kin, his father Franz Reiner, lives in Salzburg, Siebenbürgerstr. 2. (b) The Section (Orden und Ehrenzeichen) indicates that he received a medal for having been wounded on 9.12.42. (c) The Section (Beurlaubungen über fünf Tage) shows that he was granted a leave for over five days. It was a convalescent leave which entitled him to free transportation. The lower portion of the same section indicates that he received some shots for dysentery (Ruhr) and was vaccinated. The other side of the document shows the following from right to left.

- a. Clothing record.
- b. Issuance of rationed shaving cream and soap.
- c. Name of military unit to which he belongs.

3. It is requested that subject sign document on space provided. (Soldbuch Ersatz name over Eigenhändige Unterschrift.) DO NOT use ball point pen. Have subject practice "his name" several times before affixing to document.

RYBAT

per CSH 43-43

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MUNICH
ACTION : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Chrono
cc:
cc:
cc:

MAR 30 23[illegible]

ROUTINE

IN 28066

LEOP INFO DIR FRAN CITE MUNI 5132

per CSN 43-43

KAPOK ZIBET ZRAMBER UPHILL

REF LEOP 1094 (IN 27411).

1. FYI, UPHILL'S MIL ADVISOR TO CONGO DEPARTING FOR TWO WEEK TRIP LEOPOLDVILLE 30 MARCH. HE WILL HAVE DISCUSSIONS NESTOR WATUM AND MOBUTU, REVIEW CONGO MIL SITUATION, AND ACCEPT FOR CONSIDERATION HIS HQS ANY REQUESTS FOR AID. HE EXPECTED RETURN MID APRIL FOR CIRCA THREE WEEKS FURTHER DISCUSSIONS UPHILL PRIOR RETURNING LEOPOLDVILLE OFFICIALLY START HIS ASSIGNMENT. HE WILL BE DOCUMENTED IN CONGO AS LT. COL. STAHL. HIS TRUE NAME IS MEISTER AND HE PROBABLY IDEN WOLF MEISTER, BORN 12 MAY 1928 IN BONN, ACTIVE FOR UPHILL SINCE AUGUST 55. (DIR: SEE MUNI 3234 AND RELATED TRAFFIC.) (IN-[illegible]) NOTE SHOULD BE NO KUBARK EFFORT CONTACT STAHL THIS TRIP.

2. HAVE ALSO LEARNED UPHILL INTEL ADVISOR NOW BEING TRAINED

SECRET

per CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[illegible] ASSIGNMENT CONGO, PROBABLY WILL DEPART EARLY MAY. HE IS KURT [illegible], ALIAS BOCHOLT, BORN 27 MARCH 1911 IN BERLIN/NEUKOELLN, FORMER KRIMINALKOMMISSAR AND SECURITY MAN FOR CHANCELLOR ADENAUER. ([illegible] SEE EGMA 51362.)

[illegible] FOR DIR: COMMENTS PARA 4 DIR 33615 FOLLOW IN EGMA 54242.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HEARTILY CONCURRED ADVISABILITY ESTABLISHING CONTACT [illegible] PERSONNEL IN CONGO. BELIEVED LOCAL EXCHANGE INFO USEFUL FOR KUBARK AND UPHILL.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 332
29 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 0935 29 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

x-copy

ROUTING
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6

MAR 29 1408Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 27093

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1087

IN27093

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: DIR 31932 (out 88945)*

1. ASSUME THERE IS KUBARK RELATIONSHIP WITH SWANSON OR COMPANY AND AT LEAST SOME OF GERMAN INSTRUCTORS RECRUITED OR RECRUITABLE. PREFER RECRUITMENT INSTRUCTORS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL CONGO.

2. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN MR. ROLAND C. SWANSON AND WIROGUE/1 RE THE CONTRACTING OF PILOTS AND MECHANICS.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: D. [illegible]
UNIT: AF/W/2 1589
EXT: 3939
DATE: 28 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
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PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 28 MAR 61 19 37z
ROUTINE
P PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN
INITIALS

88945

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31932

31932

REF: A. LEOP 1011 (IN 20574)
B. LEOP 1069 (IN 25118)

per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

1. MR. ROLAND C. SWANSON, EUROPEAN REP OF ARAB DEVELOPMENT CORP WHICH SPECIALIZES IN CONTRACTING PILOTS AND MECHANICS WILL SEND WIROGUE/1 CABLE WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. INSTRUCTORS WILL BE GERMAN ON SIX MONTH CONTRACT.

2. PLS ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *KAZADI AND CROWD PUSHING FOR IMMEDIATE RESULTS AND TEND TO BLAME WIROGUE THAT PROGRAM HAS NOT STARTED.

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

43-43

[illegible] C. [illegible], C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

438

DATE : 28 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR L-1copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1420 28 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

MAR 28 1900Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 26480

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1086

RYBAT

WIROGUE

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

REF LEOP 1069 (25118)

1. WIROGUE INFORMED BY PEIRROT 27 MARCH CAF SCHOOL WILL DEFINITELY BEGIN 3 APRIL. AT SAME TIME ASKED IF HE COULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR EUROPE TO GET INSTRUCTORS AND AGAIN QUERIED FOR NAMES OF PEOPLE TO WHOM HE HAD WRITTEN. HAS STILL NOT OBTAINED NAME OF GERMAN COL WHO IS CONGOLESE CONTACT BUT CAF WILLING TO BYPASS.

2. WIROGUE WORRIED BECAUSE THUS FAR HE HA S EABEEN ALL TALK AND NO RESULTS. PRESSURES ON WI RO JRGUE FROM WIFLAT/3, KAZADI AND PIERROT GREATER ALL THE TI ZME. GOC CLAIMED CAN GET INSTRUCTORS HERE WITHOUT PASSPORTS. IF SOME NAMES SUPPLIED CAN STALL BUT WITHOUT ANY NAMES SITUATION FOR WIROGUE BECOMING VERY DIFFICULT. WIROGUE BELIEVES

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

IF PROJECT DOESN'T RECEIVE SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY HE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE AREA. STATION DOUBTS PROBLEM QUITE THIS SERIOUS.

3. ADVISE ACTION TACAN SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

364

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AF 1711 25 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

y - 1 copy

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

MAR 25 2050Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25118

PRITY DIR CITE LECP 1059

IIN25118

RYBAT

WIROGUE

[illegible] per CSH 43-43

REF: A. DIR 31327 (OUT 87351)

B. ACLA-491

1. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE LEARNED BY WIROGUE FROM CONGOLESE ON ALMOST DAILY BASIS. REF B CONTAINED ALL INFO THEN AVAILABLE. AND SHOULD BE IN HQS. IN TYPICAL CONGOLESE MANNER KAZADI AND CROWD ARE PUSHING FOR IMMEDIATE RESULTS AND TEND BLAME WIROGUE THAT ENTIRE PROGRAM DID NOT START DAY AFTER THEY HAD IDEA. THEY TOLD HIM THEY WILL BEGIN 1 APR.

2. IN ADDITION TO ADVANTAGE OF KUBARK ASSETS BEING INSERTED INTO ARMED FORCES PER LECP 1011 THE REQUEST FOR WIROGUE TO DEVELOP CAF INTEL ARM HAS POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING CONGOLESE INTEL NET WHICH

SECRET

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WOULD BE RESPONSIVE KUBARK DIRECTION THROUGH WIROGUE. THIS ENTIRE OP DEPENDS ON DEGREE OF TRUST CONGOLESE HAVE IN WIROGUE. STATION FEELS THIS PROJECT IS EMMINENTLY WORTH PRIORITY SUPPORT AND WILL COLLAPSE IF NOT PROVIDED. WIROGUE REPORTED 25 MARCH HIS FINAL CONTRACT COULD NOT BE SIGNED UNTIL DOCUMENTATION RECEIVED.

3. TO GAIN TIME SUGGEST HQS ARRANGE SEND CABLE IN FRENCH TO IDEN FROM POSSIBLE CANDIDATE WHO HAS AVIATION CONTACTS. IF POSSIBLE SHOULD BE BACKSTOPPED SINCE KAZADI AND PIERROT INFORMED WIROGUE THEY IN CONTACT COLONEL IN GERMANY WHO COULD CHECK INSTRUCTORS. WIROGUE HAS BEEN TOLD TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO. IDEALLY ONE INSTRUCTOR AVAILABLE NEAR 1 APR WOULD SATISFY MOST CURRENT PRESSURES IF ASSURANCES OF REST FORTHCOMING SOON COULD BE GIVEN PIERROT AND KAZADI.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* IN 20574

**PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TO RECRUIT NON-PBPRIME INSTRUCTORS.

400

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 25 MAR 61

L-1078

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMFO COPY SLOTTED AF DIV 1820 25 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

MAR 25 1754Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 25054

TO | INFO | CITE LEOP 1070

PER CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR

RYBAT

WIROGUE

RE LEOP 1069 (IN 25118)

IDEN: MAJOR G.F. REINER, B.P. 2949, LEOPOLDVILLE.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T PER CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

416

DATE : 23 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR 2 - 1 copy

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1320 23 MAR)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1

2

3

4

5

6

MAR 23 1807Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 23793

TO (PRIORITY) DIR INFO CITE LEOP 1052

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A LEOP 1011 (IN 20574) 8

B ACLA 491

1. WIROGUE SHOWED STATION DRAFT DOCUMENTS FROM MINISTRY NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLINING NEW CONGO AIR FORCE (CAF). DRAFTS LISTED FOUR MECHANICS INSTRUCTORS IN FIELDS MOTORS, RADIO ELECTRICITY AND INSTRUMENTS EXPECTED BY END OF MARCH. ALSO SHOWED WIROGUE AS CONTACT BETWEEN CAF COMMANDING OFFICER AND EUROPEAN PERSONNEL, TO STUDY ADMIN MODIFICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY, AND BEGIN SERVICE FOR OPS CONTROL AND SECURITY SERVICE.

2. WIROGUE BEING PRESSURED BY PIERROT AND KAZADI FOR RESULTS HIS EFFORTS RECRUIT INSTRUCTORS. ALSO ASKED FOR DOCUMENTATION. WIROGUE REQUESTED WE PROVIDE AT LEAST A CABLE ANSWER IN FRENCH FROM POINT

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SECRET

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IN GERMANY IN RESPONSE TO HIS HYPOTHETICAL LETTER THAT SOMEONE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING OFFER.

3. GOOD POSSIBILITY WIROGUE POSITION WILL BE JEOPARDIZED BY HIS NOT PRODUCING INSTRUCTORS. REALIZE TIME ELEMENT SH~~I~~ORT BUT CONGOLESE ANXIOUS DEVELOP CAF RAPIDLY. ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WIRGUE NOW HAS ATTESTATION AS ADVISOR WITH RANK OF MAJOR TO CONGOLESE AIR FORCE SIGNED BY KAZADI.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: D. [illegible]
UNIT: AF/WEST/2
EXT: 4818
DATE: 23 MARCH 1961

1772

ROUTING
1 [illegible] 4
2 [illegible] 5
3 [illegible] 6

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE [illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 23 MAR 61 23 13z
☒ ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS

OUT 87351

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 31327

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

31327

WIROGUE [illegible]

REF: LEOP 1011 (IN 20574)

1. PRESENTLY INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY TO RECRUIT NON-PBPRIME INSTRUCTORS. DO NOT BELIEVE FIRM COMMITMENT CAN BE GIVEN UNTIL COMPLETE RUN DOWN POUCHED BY YOU RECEIVED AND REVIEWED.

2. IN INTERIM HAVE WIROGUE DELAY PIERROT.

END OF MESSAGE.

B. Tweedy

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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399

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 17 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

Lurry

ACTION : C/AF 3 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR AF AT 1345 17 MAR 61)

INFO : COP, C/DPD 4, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

MAR 17 1834Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20574

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 1011

per CSCI 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 29127 Out 82330

1. COMPLETE RUNDOWN POUCHED 17 MAR. WIROGUE NOW HAS ATTESTATION AS ADVISOR WITH RANK OF MAJOR TO CONGOLESE AIR FORCE SIGNED BY KAZADI. CONTRACT NOT YET SIGNED.

2. WIROGUE ASKED BY PIERROT IF HE WOULD GO EUROPE TO HIRE INSTRUCTORS. WIROGUE WILLING BUT NEEDS INSTRUCTORS SET UP FOR HIM. WHEN ASKED TIME ELEMENT WIROGUE SAID BY END OF MONTH.

3. PIERROT ALSO ASKED WIROGUE TO CREATE CONGOLESE AIR INTEL ARM

4. STATION BELIEVES USE KUBARK RECRUITED INSTRUCTORS WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT MEANS INSERTING ASSETS INTO ARMED FORCES AND DEVELOPING AIR FORCE INTO HIGHLY TRAINED AND DISCIPLINED UNIT WHICH COULD BE USED

SECRET per CSI 43-43

TO SUPPORT POLITICAL FORCES FRIENDLY ODYOKE. THE SO CALLED AIR INFANTRY UNIT OF ABOUT 242 MEN WHICH TO BE FORMED WOULD PROVIDE STRONG FORCE BY LOCAL STANDARDS AND COULD PROVIDE BALANCE OF POWER. ALSO, INSTRUCTORS WOULD BE IN POSITION GATHER INTEL THROUGHOUT CONGO, PARTICULARLY IF WIROGUE SETS UP AIR INTEL UNIT.

5. URGE HQS GIVE CAREFUL COSSIDERATION THIS OPS POSSIBILITY. REALIZE WIROGUE NOT BEST ASSET FOR THIS WORK BUT IF MR. HECKATHORNE NOT USED ELIZ, BELIEVE THIS WOULD OFFER EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY INSERT HIM AS SCHOOL CHIEF. PLS ADVISE HQS VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RYBAT SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 10 MARCH 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/DPD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

1 copy

ROUTING
1 AF/W
2 [illegible]
3 CHRON

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 10 MAR 61 23 11z
R ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN
INITIALS

OUT82330
OUT 82330

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 29127 29127

WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: LEOP 0957 (IN 15023)*

C/S COMMENT: *OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR F PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY.

1. REF RECD AFTER WIROGUE HAD TO SIGN CONTRACT. ASSUME HE NOW HAS JOB. WHAT IS HIS SALARY? IF LARGE REDUCES CONTROL ELEMENT. ALTHOUGH DO NOT DOUBT WIROGUE CAN HANDLE JOB AND ACKNOWLEDGE NEED FOR ENTREE OF INSTRUCTORS HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS RE PERMITTING WIROGUE ASSUME POSITION WHICH WOULD ENTAIL HANDLING OR MANIPULATING LARGE SUMS OF MONEY WITH APPARENTLY SLIGHT PROVISIONS TO RESTRAIN HIS ACTIVITIES. AS YOU AWARE THIS VIEW SUPPORTED BY WIROGUE'S PROPENSITY FOR FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT OR AT LEAST RASHNESS. FOR THIS REASON IT MIGHT BE WISE TO PHASE WIROGUE OUT OF This JOB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. IN INTERIM WE BELIEVE THERE IS GAIN INVOLVED FOR US AND THINK CIVILIAN PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND MECHANICS CAN BE RECRUITED BY US IN THIRTY DAYS IF NEEDED. KUBARK PREPARED BEAR DIFFERENTIAL IN SALARY BETWEEN WHAT CONGOLESE WILLING TO PAY AND PBPRIME STANDARDS.

3. KURIOT PREPARING DOCUMENTATION BACKSTOPPING WIROGUE'S STORY. WILL POUCH SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE.

DPD (Para. 2) TSD (Para. 3)
C. Y[illegible] by phone C. Calendar by phone

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GL[illegible] FIELDS, C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

RYBAT SECRET

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

350

DATE : 9 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : COP, DPD 4, CA 2, CA/EAG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, IW 2, FI/D, WE 4, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 9 1648Z 61

7-W

ROUTINE

IN 16135

BRUS INFO DIR CITE LEOP ~~0967~~

WIROGUE

ZIBET

AIRA LEOP KNOWS PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT, HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE, ATTEMPTED PURCHASE 6 AUSTERS, 12 BRISTOLS, 6 SPITFIRES AND 8 T-6 PLANES IN BELGIUM IN DEC. DOES NOT KNOW IF DEAL CONSUMMATED OR WHAT ACTUALLY PURCHASED. NEED ALL POSSIBLE INFO CONCERNING CONGOLESE PURCHASE OF AIRCRAFT. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 07 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : DDP 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 7 1946Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 15023

DIR CITE LEOP 0957

WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE IN CONTACT PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT WHO DESIGNATED HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. PIERROT OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR FOR PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY. WIROGUE TO SEE DEFENSE MINISTER 7 MAR TO SIGN CONTRACT.

2. WIROGUE TO PROVIDE NAMES AND ATTEMPT HIRE THREE PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND THREE MECHANICS WITHIN 30 DAYS WITH TRANSPORTATION, HOUSES AND SALARY OF 30,000 BCF PER MONTH PAID BY CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. MORE INSTRUCTORS NEEDED LATER.

3. IF WIROGUE ACCEPTED NECESSARY KUBARK SUGGEST INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL WITH WIROGUE AS CHANNEL FOR HIRING. WIROGUE STATES HE NEEDS DOCUMENTARY PROOF TO SUPPORT STORY HE EX-CAPTAIN GERMAN ARMY.

SECRET

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 15023 LEOP 0957

4. STATION HAS RESERVATIONS WIROGUE ABILITY FILL JOB BUT BELIEVE HE CAN PROVIDE INITIAL ENTREE FOR INSTRUCTORS. FORESEE NO EXCEPTIONAL RISK EITHER KUBARK OR CLYCKE AND RECOMMEND HQS APPROVAL. IF DISAPPROVE

POSSIBLE TO STOP ACTION IN NEXT DAY OR SO. IF APPROVE PLS PROVIDE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

W. Riese Document File

ITINERARY OF Reiner, Georg Franz FROM ______ TO ______

PASSPORT

COUNTRY	TYPE	ISSUED	SERIES & NUMBER
Austria	Ordinary	26.8.55	B 546226

DATE	PAGE	DESCRIPTION	COUNTRY	PLACE	REMARKS
21.Dec.55	5	Exit cachet Vienna Schwechat AP	Austria	Schwechat	
21.Dec.55	5	Entry cachet France	~~Austria~~	Orly	
29.Dec.55	5	Exit cachet	France	Orly	
29.Dec.55	5	Entry cachet	Belg.	Melsbroek	
19.Feb.56	5	Exit cahhet	Belg.	" "	
19.Feb.56	6	Entry cachet	Austria	Schwechat	
24.Jun.59	7	Entry Cachet	France	Orly	Exit chachet Schechat not normally entered AF Flight 733 Wenesday Lv. 06:50 Vienna, Arv. Orly 12:25
14.Jul.59	7	Exit cachet	France	Orly	AF Flight 732 Tuesday Lv. 17:35 Arv. Vienna 20:55
14. Jul.59	7	Entry cahet	Austria	Schwechat	
11.March 60	9	Residence permit for West Berlin valid for three month	W.Berlin		Such permits are given for various dates.
10.Jun 60	11	Residence permit for West Berlin valid for six month	W.Berlin		NOTE: Normally border entry/exit cachets are not entered in Austrian Passports for travel between West Germany and West Berlin.
26.8.60	13	Passport revalidation	Austria	Vienna	

SECRET

GENERAL INFORMATION TO BE NOTED

Subject was issued the following documents:

1. Austrian (Ordinary) Passport Nr. 546.226 in Vienna at the main Passport Office located in Wien I, Postgasse 9, which is near the main Post Office and also near Schwedenplatz. As noted in the passport entries, document was issued in 1955 and was valid until 1960, when it was again renewed for another five years. The lack of exit and entry cachets of very frequent travel to Germany and Berlin is explained by the fact that generally since late 1955 Austrians entering Germany no longer were stamped in or out. For this reason, Subject can claim that he made many trips to Germany and back each time remaining as long as three months without special permits. (Austrians need a residence permit only when they remain more than three months at one time.) As noted above, that passport was first issued by the main Passport office, however, the renewal was obtained at a sub station, Wien IV, Taubstummengasse 11. This can be explained by the fact that at that time subject lived in that part of Vienna after he returned from Berlin.

2. Austrian Drivers Permit:

This document was obtained in Vienna in 1956 and is valid for an indefinite time. Section B, which is not crossed out indicates that he is authorized to drive ordinary private cars not in excess of 3500 kg. (No trucks etc.) Reverse left hand portion shows fee stamp of 6 schilling has been paid. Normally this section also indicates authority on which permit was issued, but since this is his first permit no such entry is made.

3. International Certificate of Vaccination:

When subject contemplated travel outside Europe, he felt it best to obtain a vaccination certificate normally required in many countries. He could have obtained the blank document from a travel agency who directed him to go and have proper entries made for smallpox and yellow fever. At the suggestion of the travel agency he went to see Dr. Ladislaus Tomsich, General Practitioner, Wien III, Marokkanergasse 133. This Doctor, had the necessary vaccines for smallpox and yellow fever and he took both vaccines on 12 November 1959. Smallpox vaccinations are generally valid for three years. The yellow fever shots are good for 6 years.

4. Baptismal Certificate:

This document was issued in Salzburg, the place where subject was born.

During the war years subject lost all his papers and so in 1954 he returned to Salzburg to obtain a copy of his baptismal certificate. Entries indicate that certificate was issued to Subject showing his fathers name as Reiner, Franz, catholic, Geologist having lived at time of subjects birth in Salzburg, Siebenbürgerstr. 2, that his father was born on 24. 4. 1899 in Vienna and that he was married in Vienna on 23. 6. 1920.

Entries for his mother indicate her name as Maria Anna, nee Nielitz, catholic, born on 20 August 1900 in Vienna.

The name of subjects God-Parent was Walter Klenner, who also was a catholic and his profession was Engineer from Slazburg. The priest who performed the baptism was Erich Igertz, Chaplain. The document was dated 23 August 1954 in Salzburg-Müllegg.

201-233477

5. Letter indicated acceptance for employment in West Berlin.

For business reasons in accordance with cover legend, subject has been in and out of Germany ever since 1955. By 1958 subject became interested in seeking employment in Berlin. He was in contact with the construction firm of Arthur Döll and Son and after he wrote to them on 24. 7. 58 he received a reply that this firm was willing to give him a job as an engineer. Since he indicated in his letter to the firm that he was about to come to Berlin anyway, the firm of Döll suggested to him that he should stop at their office and sign a formal work contract.

Signatures to be applied by Subject:

1. Passport: Page three below picture on space provided. Regular pen and dark ink. No ball point pen.
2. Drivers Permit: Between entries 4 and 5 next to picture and turning document to write name from entry 5 to 4.
3. International Certificate of Vaccination: This document should be signed in ink on inside cover page in space provided.

No signature required for the other two documents.

EXPLANATION OF THE PASSPORT ENTRIES

Inside front cover: Contains cachet indicating that Subject paid 20 Schilling to obtain passport.

PAGE 1: This page contains Passport Serial "B" Nr. 546226. The Dues Stamp of 6 Schilling also indicates payment despite the fact that the opposite page shows 20 Schilling. This is the normal procedure. The ink written number is the accession number of the passport office and the last two numbers indicate that the document was issued in 1955. Further entries indicate name and profession and nationality of bearer to be Austrian.

PAGE 2: Entries on this page indicate the following: Occupation as Engineer, that he was born in Salzburg on 25 July 1921, his present place of residence is Vienna. It is further indicated that the shape of his face is oval, his eyes brown and hair color brown. Special identifications marks indicate the tips on his thumb and index finger are missing.

PAGE 3: This page shows the picture of bearer including the dry seal for authentication over the picture. Below is the space for subject to affix his signature. The bottom of the page shows a wet authenticating seal and the signature of the person who issued the document.

PAGE 4: This page indicates that the passport is valid for all countries of the world, that it is valid until 25 August 1960 and was issued in Vienna on 26 August 1955. The last entry indicates that passport was renewed until 24 August 1965 for such entry please see page 13.

PAGES 5, 6, & 7: These pages show various entry and exit cachets of simulated travel undertaken by subject. (For further explanations see attached sheet for travel.)

PAGE 9: This entry is a residence permit for West Berlin and valid for three months. (Austrians normally don't need a permit for any stay in Germany unless they stay more than three months.) This permit was obtained in West Berlin from Div. II Berlin Police. The fee paid was one DM. It was invalidated when a new residence permit was obtained.

PAGE 11: This page indicates a second residence permit for Berlin which was placed in the passport when the permit on page 9 expired. It was validated for six months at this time, and again the fee was one DM. Valid from 10 June until 11 December 1960.

PAGE 13: This page indicates that the Passport was revalidated in Vienna at the Police Station at Vienna-Wieden. This Police Station is located at Taubstummengasse 11, Wien IV, and is located west of the Schwarzenberger Park. Entry shows 6 Schilling fiscal stamp, but a payment of 10 Schilling had to be made for revalidation. Document is valid until 24 August 1965.

201-233477

Virginia MacIntyre
940 25th Street, N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.
FEDERAL 3-6338

} Potomac House

Address of WIROGUE/1's local girl friend.

201-233497

DEPT OF STATE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1889
FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE: 11 MARCH 1961
CLASSIFICATION: OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: NONE GIVEN
DEPT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN

WIROGUE

10 mars 1961

ATTESTATION.-

Je soussigné KAZADI Fernand, Ministre de la Défense Nationale, engage à titre de Conseiller Technique d'Etat Major de la Force Aérienne, Monsieur REINERT. Il est adjoint à ce titre à Monsieur PIERROT.

Fait à Léopoldville, le 10-3-61

RÉPUBLIQUE DU CONGO — COMMISSARIAT A LA DEFENSE NATIONALE

KAZADI

201-233477

RI/W

WIROGUE
file

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, C&L Branch, Finance Division

SUBJECT: WIROGUE Loan

REFERENCE: Your memorandum to Chief, Africa Division, same subject, dated 6 March 1961.

1. As requested in reference, and in accordance with the terms of the fiscal annex to project WIROGUE, there is attached herewith an acknowledgment of the $4,000 received by the agent concerned.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that this amount, currently charged to the project's advance account as a result of Bern T/A 217, be cleared and set up in a memorandum account.

THEODORE M. FRANSEN
Chief, Africa Division Support

10 March 1961

SECRET

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 07 MAR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : DDP 4, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAR 7 1946Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 15023

DIR CITE LEOP 0957

WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE IN CONTACT PAUL ARNOLD PIERROT WHO DESIGNATED HEAD CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. PIERROT OFFERED WIROGUE JOB ADMINISTRATOR FOR PILOT AND MECHANIC INSTRUCTORS WITH RANK OF MAJOR IN CONGOLESE ARMY. WIROGUE TO SEE DEFENSE MINISTER 7 MAR TO SIGN CONTRACT.

2. WIROGUE TO PROVIDE NAMES AND ATTEMPT HIRE THREE PILOT INSTRUCTORS AND THREE MECHANICS WITHIN 30 DAYS WITH TRANSPORTATION, HOUSES AND SALARY OF 32,000 BCF PER MONTH PAID BY CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. MORE INSTRUCTORS NEEDED LATER.

3. IF WIROGUE ACCEPTED NECESSARY KUBARK SUGGEST INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL WITH WIROGUE AS CHANNEL FOR HIRING. WIROGUE STATES HE NEEDS DOCUMENTARY PROOF TO SUPPORT STORY HE EX-CAPTAIN GERMAN ARMY.

201-233477

SECRET

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Copy No. 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 15023 LEOP 0957

4. STATION HAS RESERVATIONS WIROGUE ABILITY FILL JOB BUT BELIEVE HE CAN PROVIDE INITIAL ENTREE FOR INSTRUCTORS. FORESEE NO EXCEPTIONAL RISK EITHER KUBARK OR CLYCKE AND RECOMMEND HQS APPROVAL. IF DISAPPROVE POSSIBLE TO STOP ACTION IN NEXT DAY OR SO. IF APPROVE PLS PROVIDE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

656

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET RYBAT

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 26 JANUARY 1961

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CI, S/C 2

WIROGUE

ROUTING			
1	AAFW	4	
2	Sery	5	
3	C/Aln	6	

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED 26 JAN 61 20 27z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIGOCEN

INITIALS

OUT67004
67004

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 22428
22428

per CSI 43-43

REF: LEOP 0692 (IN 35283)

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. AGREE UNDESIRABLE CROSS OPS. HOWEVER, MIGHT BE ADVISABLE HAVE WIROGUE TAKE FLYING LESSONS CONTINGENCY BASIS. IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT EXCITING UNDUE ATTENTION, THIS AUTHORIZED. HAS HE PLAUSIBLY ESTABLISHED HIMSELF?

2. WHO IS MORENY/

3. EXPLORING OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

END OF MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED
[illegible] 43-43

201-233497

G. Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS, AC/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET RYBAT

LESTER C. HOUCK, C/AF/WEST
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

247

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 28 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 28 2201Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 37414

WIROGUE

TO DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0713

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE DIR 22428 (OUT 67004)*

SEE DIR 12756 (OUT 95037), LEOP 114 (IN 26424) AND LEOP 0344 (IN 44477).

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WHO IS MOREN?

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Kalinowski Houck

491

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 JAN 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1 [illegible]	4
2 [illegible]	5
3 [illegible]	6

JAN 24 2123Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35283

WIROGUE

DIR CITE LEOP 0692

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY HAVE WIROGUE TAKE FLYING LESSONS LOCALLY. TOTAL COST APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND FRANCS.

2. VIEW PROBABLE USE STATION PLANE (WHICH NOW HELD NICLAM NAME) FOR CLANDESTINE MISSIONS, BELIEVE ADVISABLE HAVE CLEARED KUBARKER PREPARED FLY PLANE. MOREN WILLING FLY AT THOUSAND FRANCS PER HOUR BUT NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS HAS PERMANENT JOB. THUS STATION HAS CONTACTED BUT HAS NOT ATTEMPTED RECRUIT. REALIZE WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TIME FOR WIROGUE OBTAIN ADEQUATE TRAINING AND OBVIOUS DISADVANTAGE CROSSING WIROGUE-NICLAM OPS. THUS IF TRAINED AND CLEARED PILOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE, LEOP HAPPY USE IN PLACE WIROGUE. PLEASE ADVISE.

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

END OF MESSAGE 43-43

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. NIESCIUR 598
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8254
DATE : 9 January 1961

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/C S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	CEN
2		5	
3		6	

9 JAN 61 21 47 Z

PRECEDENCE
- ☐ DEFERRED
- ☐ ROUTINE
- ☒ PRIORITY INITIALS
- ☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT61228

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 19918

WIROGUE RYBAT 19918

1. ADVISE WIROGUE/1 BERN ACCT BALANCE NOW 13 SWISS FRANCS. FUTURE CHECKS WILL NOT BE HONORED.

2. REQUEST YOU DETERMINE IF FUNDS EXPENDED FOR COVER BUSINESS. IF NOT WHAT WAS PURPOSE.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1 RB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

Attachment A

NAME: David TZITZICHVILI

PLACE OF BIRTH: Gori near Tiflis, Georgia, USSR (DOB 12 July 1918

NATIONALITY: Georgian

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: Stateless

RELIGION: None

MARITAL STATUS: Divorced. (Subject's ex-wife, one son and one daughter are living at the present time in France. Subject has not seen them since 1950.)

PRESENT ADDRESS: Living under the name David HERVARD, 225 24th St., N.W. Apt. 202, Washington, D.C. "The Potomac House"

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 42 year old, male, Caucasian, 5'6" tall, slight of build (130 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding top and front, swarthy complexion, agile and in perfect health.

EDUCATION:	1922-4	Paris	Notre Dame	uncompleted, change of family address
	1925	Paris	Lycee Montagne	uncompleted, change of family address
	1925	Paris	Ecole Communale	uncompleted, change of family address
	1926	Viroflex	Lycee Hoche	uncompleted, expelled for pranks
	1926	Paris	Ecole Communale	taken back, uncompleted change of family address
	1931	Paris-Vanves	Ecole Michelet	6 months completed, expelled for insubord.
	1933-5	Chalon-S. Marne	Art et Metier	Technical Engineering School. Attended 1½ years, then expelled.
	1936-7	Paris	Ecole Breguet	Electro-engineering School. Attended 1 year,

SECRET

201-233477

earned first half of baccalareate in electrotechnology, then expelled.

1938-9 Paris School of Photography and Movie — Trained as cine camera operator technician. Left after 1-3/4 of 2 yr course due to outbreak of WWII in Nov. of 1939.

Occupational Specialty: Mechanical Electrical Engineering
Cine or Portrait Photography
Research and innovator of commercial labor/money saving devices,
Electro mechanical or photographical in nature.

See paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 of Employment History for examples.

Military Service: Dec. 1939, Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion.
Jan. 1940, Tunisia North Africa, in 1st Cav. Reg., 1st Squadron, 4th platoon.
Feb. 1940 - sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion. Pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit.
Mar.- Aug. 1940, Barcares. Assigned in Georgian unit.
Aug. 1940 - Paris. Discharged after the end of Franco/German hostilities as Private First Class.

Languages and Dialects: Speaks, reads and writes --
French -- native
Georgian -- fluent spoken, read & write good
German -- good
English -- reads fluently, writes fair, speaks fair
Spanish -- reads good; speaks & writes poor
Russian -- poor

Employment History:

1. 1942 Paris Volunteered for work in Germany.
2. Poelitz, Germany Worked for HIDRYER WERKE on contract for one year as installation electrician.
3. 1942 Paris Self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography.
   1942 Berlin Photographer of metals for a factory which produced electrodes for welding instruments
4. 1942 Berlin Assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device re manufact. of device for automat.adjustment of cartridge cases.
5. 1942 Berlin Mügelheim Drivers mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corps). Drove truck during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.

6.	1943	Berlin	Employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language.
7.	1946-7	Paris	Employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of prototype model builder. Earned roughly 4 dollars an hour American scale plus commission work extra.
8.	1951-2	In prison, Paris	Devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison.
9.	1953	In prison in Riom	Devised and gave to prison administrator invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator.
10.	Dec.1955-Apr.1956	Gap	Employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator.
11.	1956-7	Gap	Invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market.
12.	1958	Ambert	Invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns.
13.	1959-60 Sept-May	U.S.	Devised and passed drawings for 2 pieces of equipment to be used for Project AESENTINEL.
14.	1960, July	U.S.	At present Subject is devising a low-cost telephone answering device.

Experience in Forged Documents:

May 1942	Achen,- Berlin	Falsified his own travel documents by use of pen to change effective dates.
1942	Berlin - Paris	Filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Then made other falsified stamps for other people interested in travel across German-held territory.
1943-4	Berlin	Constructed and used various falsified travel documents stamps copied from old travel documents for various people to travel throughout Germany. Used certain photo techniques for changing and/or ageing pictures in documents. At same time Subject also reassembled falsified old passports to form new ones as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGBT-2160

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO Chief, Finance Division
INFO Atten: Peter G. Sclopp

FROM Chief of Station, Bern

DATE 23 December 1960

RE 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT RYBAT SGFLAG
African Division Operation

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] 43-43

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. This is intended as an interim report on the financial aspects, to the extent that we know them as factual, on the African Division operation, the identity of which is made clear by the enclosed thermofax copies. We hesitate to write directly to AD because of the sensitive nature of the activity and ask that Sclopp pass the information to the interested persons. Previous cable traffic has informed Headquarters as to the general conduct of the financial activity to date; this is concerned with the details.

$4,000.00 deposited with B&F, Bern		Swfs 17,213.95
Letter of Credit obtained for Reiner	Swfs 12,000.00	
Commission & expenses	45.50	
Reiner's check No. 3403 cashed in Bern	265.00	
" " " 3404 " " "	130.15	
" " " 3405 " " "	100.00	
" " " 3406 " " "	100.00	
" " " 3407 " " "	160.00	12,800.65
		4,413.30

Check no. 3401 left with Graham to ensure withdrawal of funds in B&F
Check No. 3402 has not yet cleared, nor has check no. 3408; perhaps were not negotiated

Letter of Credit returned by Hofhuis to B&F, subsequently cancelled. Reiner had drawn against L/C in Leopoldville to the amount of Swfs 400.00. L/C cancelled in the amount of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -		11,600.00
		16,013.30
Check No. 3409 written by Reiner, given to Hofhuis and returned by letter to B&F with instructions to "hold pending instructions"	Swfs 12,000.00	
Check No. 3410 (same situation as above)	3,000.00	15,000.00
Balance now in B&F (Reiner) acct		1,013.00 **

** As yet, no expenses for B&F telephone call to Leopoldville and/or any other related expenses charged. Balance in a/c will be affected accordingly.

2. A copy, each, of two letters dated 13 and 14 December 1960 written by Hofhuis are enclosed for information of interested persons. Will Sclopp please pass.

DESENSITIZED
per [illegible] 43-43

GRAHAM

Enclosures:
As stated
Distribution:
3-FD(Sclopp) w/encls.

EGBT-2160

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

INFO.
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational/ZIBET/WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
See Below
HBPA-4890, dated 12 October 1960

1. This is to advice you that subject of reference has been transferred to the African Divisiem and been assigned the cryptogram WIGROGUE/1. The latter is presently in Leopoldville and all correspondance received through your accommodation address is to be pouched to COS, Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE/1 was instructed to send only unregistered letters and to instruct his correspondents to do the same.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COB, Sao Paulo
1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
1 - COS, Leopoldville

DATE TYPED
22 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 2? 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
~~HBFW-2312~~ 2572

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

1 - RI
1 - WH/2B
1 - AF/W

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur	say	8294

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W		Edward Welles
C/AF		Bronson Tweedy
WH/2B		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

513

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: D. Niesciur
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 8284
DATE: 22 December 1960

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ~~C/AF 3~~

INFO: COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3	[illegible]	6	

23 DEC 60 15 59z

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED		
x	ROUTINE		
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT56360
OUT 56360

TO LEOP INFO

CITE DIR 18035
18035

RYBAT WIROGUE

REFS DIR 17181 (OUT 54652)
LEOP 0512 (IN 20986)

VIEW PREVIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AUTHORIZE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edw Welles
for C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

513

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. Niesciur
UNIT : AF/[illegible]/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 22 December 1960

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	23DEC60 15 59z
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OUT 56360
OUT 56360

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 18035
18035

RYBAT WIROGUE

REFS DIR 17181 (OUT 54652)
LEOP 0512 (IN 20986)

VIEW PREVIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AUTHORIZE MONTHLY PAYMENTS ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/2
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for C/AF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

20-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 165
22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
2
3

DEC 22 -332 [illegible]

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 0512

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 17181 (out 54652)*

1. PER LEOP 0475, (IN 18739) WIROGUE/1 STATES TOLD HE TO REQUEST THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM ON ARRIVAL. DOES ~~(PORTION GARBLED, WILL FWD)~~ REF MEAN STATION TO PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY. ADVISE. WIROGUE/1 ARGUES HE NEEDS LUMP SUM PAYMENT TO PURCHASE NEEDED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AS WELL AS PAY RENT.

2. ACLS 149 NOT YET RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1

2

3

4

DATE : 423
22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILEE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, S/C 2

DEC 23 2129Z 60
SERVICE

PRIORITY

IN 20986 A LEOP 0512

TO INFO CITE

RYBAT WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: COMPLETE PARAGRAPH 1 LINE 3 TO READ:

"...DOES REF MEAN STATION TO PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY..."

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

RYBAT ①

To: Chief of Station, Leopoldville
From: Chief AF
Subject: Operational WIROGUE-1
Action: See below
Ref:

Not sent

1. WIROGUE/1 had been dispatched in accordance to the plan outlined in reference A. It is assumed that contact had been made. As is often the case, a number of questions have undoubtably arisen in R mind or have be raised by ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE/1. In anticipation we will attempt to answer the more obvious ones.

2. At the onset we are forwarding under separate cover the FPO for WIROGUE/1. This will furnish a fair outline of subjects previous background and KUBARK affiliation.

3. With respect to the subject of salary and allowances, he is to receive $500.00 per month payment by the Station. Date of payment should be on the first of each month. A flat sum of $3000.00 per annum is to be given to subject for housing and allowances. This sum can be a flat payment of $3000.00, or may be broken down into quarterly payments, and is not accountable.

4. In the course of your relationships with

~~[illegible]~~

WIROGUE/1, the subject of which will undoubtedly arise. He wants to purchase one for his job. It was suggested to him that under the present circumstances in the Congo it would not be wise to consider such a purchase until he has ascertained for himself the situation and then only after carefull discussions with you. I'm sure he will discuss the matter with you in the near future. Note that no provision had been made in the project for a vehicle.

5. WIROGUE/1 had an affaire de coeur while in Washington, D.C. Although he might not discuss it openly with you, he did indicate that he would like to continue contact with ~~the~~ girl. While in Germany he asked if it were possible to arrange for a letter drop in Germany, under an alias he employed while in PBPRIME, to which she could write, the letter drop service in the letter pouched to Leopoldville for delivery. In the return mail he would write a letter, post date it, give to you for transmittal to FROB for putting into the normal mail channel. If you wish to initiate such a channel a request to FROB would be in order. Incidentally the lady in question had been checked out by KUSODA and nothing derogatory was reported.

This would create the impression that subject is in Germany.

6. An arrangement similar to the one described above is in existance whereby WIROGUE/1 writes through the

5927

Station in Rio . has learned was set up by SR and allows WIROGUE/1 contact with relatives in France. He says he used an alias ostensibly because he had jumped bail and settled in Brazil hence avoiding detection by the police.

7. Prior to WIROGUE/1's departure for Leopoldville he received, in addition to a letter of credit for $3000.00, a travel advance of $1010.00 plus 62.00 D.M. Signed receipts for these amounts were received and are being retained at headquarters. A travel order covering his stay in Europe and travel to Leopoldville has been cut.

8. WIROGUE/1's instructions were to make contact and place himself under your management. He was cautioned not to partake in any operational activity without your approval. Further a great deal of time was spent explaining the necessity of living his cover and maintaining operational security.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE
201-233477
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

WIROGUE

201-23347

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 12 Dec 1964

RID/201 C/K
Initials

The following documents have been removed from this dossier and forwarded as indicated to further processing:

Sent to RID/MIS	Sent to RID/AN
ACLW - 192 - 17 nov 60	now in Vol III
HBPW - 2372 28 dec 60	in Vol. IV
ACLW - 266 23 dec 60	in Vol V
EGCA - 18888 12 dec 62	in Vol. V

This list is to be destroyed after documents are returned to RID/Files

S-E-C-R-E-T

Mr. Ernest C. Maycrink

Dear Mr. Maycrink:

Effective 31 October 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

   (a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

   (b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under ~~this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization~~ to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

RM

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for authorized operational travel. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and, when authorized, while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

[illegible] 53477

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1). If, in the performance of activities under this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Government will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its sole discretion deems proper provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of activities hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $5000 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragraph (1) above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such payment is to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to whom payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under this agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient manner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an area mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by the United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover venture in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture must be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing your activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture the Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing promissory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an account in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against that deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Government shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative overseeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may retain any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearly understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement is the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official cover capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this organization.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By sixty (60) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination or expiration of this agreement will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Ernst G. Maycrink
Ernest G. Maycrink

WITNESS: Charles R. Roistale

APPROVED: ______________________

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

SECRET EGFA 32152 10 OCT 1960

FROM: RI/AN	NO. EGFA 32152
	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3. SR/DOB	2[illegible] OCT 1960		
4. Dan Rescior [illegible] Div. 2110 I Bldg.		26/oct/60	
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

For Dave's file
FYI re Gran. doc.
Maybe you can use some of this info for Dave's docs. K.

AEA /1

201-233477

11 oct 60

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956 O - 476731

SECRET

REDWOOD/REDSOX/AEACRE

S/C

ENCL A TO EGFA 32052

TO Chief, SR

FROM Chief of Base, Frankfurt

SECRET

Attachment to EGFA

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment Report

Date 6 April 1959

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact: Friganza as Maj. Michael Long
Rostedt as George Fowler

Notes on Contact:

Rostedt and Friganza took the night train to Paris, arriving morning 6 April, and discussed the AEASPIC case with the Paris station. Rostedt briefed COS/Paris and others on current REDSOX. Rostedt and Friganza departed to meet Subject at about 1130 hrs., taking extreme precautions against surveillance.

Subject did not appear at the rendezvous at 12 hours. We waited until 1230 hours when Friganza decided to visit Annick to determine if Subject had been delayed. En route to Annick Friganza changed his mind and returned to the rendezvous (Georges V) where he saw Rostedt with Subject. Subject had apparently gone to the Georges VI rendezvous, (which is understandable considering the hurried circumstances of the previous parting when the rendezvous was discussed), had waited perhaps 1/2 hr. and then decided he had better check the Georges V. On arrival at the Georges V Rostedt immediately recognized him, approached the taxi which Subject had left and re-entered, looked hard at Subject who caught the significance of Rostedt's extraordinary attentions, ordered the taxi around the corner, paid him his due fare, and re-joined Rostedt. It was at this moment that Friganza returned on intuition.

The trio then went to lunch, taking a circuitous route by foot and taxi. Over lunch from about 13-15 hours Rostedt had an opportunity to acquaint himself with Subject and to put to Subject several questions concerning willingness and the job.

After lunch Friganza and Rostedt decided that under the circumstances it would be advisable to keep Subject in Paris rather than risk his arrest travelling between Paris and Ambert or returning to Gap to have his carte d'identite revalidated. Accordingly while Rostedt spent the next 1½ hrs. or so with Subject, Friganza returned to the Paris Station where he asked for the use of 13 rue Weber safehouse. Paris Station had committed the safehouse for the night of 6 and 7 April as well as the morning of 8 April but beginning late afternoon 8 April the house was assigned for the use of AEASPIC. Arrangements were made to have Platipodis who knows Subject to be at the safehouse at 1630 hours (alternate 2330 hrs.) on 8 April. Subject was instructed to go to the safehouse, ring 3 longs, 2 short, whereupon he would be admitted by Platipodis. He was likewise given the name John Sandor and told that in the event of unavoidable inquiry he should claim that he had been lent the apartment by Tom Brown, a friend of John Sandor. He was instructed not to answer the phone and not immediately to answer the door. If after persistent ringing he felt obliged to answer the door, he should pretend he had drunk too much wine, was sleeping heavily, and should come to the door appearing groggy. Subject was further instructed to stay in the safehouse during daylight hours and to venture out at night only if necessary to buy food, eat, etc. He was told that Friganza would return for him sometime between 13 and 16 April.

Between 6 and 8 April Subject will stay with Annick. During the day he will avoid the house, going to movies, etc., appearing only at night to sleep.

Subject was paid Francs 49,874 (exactly $100).

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

SECRET

2 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station, Germany
Attn: Deputy for Operations

FROM : Chief of Base, Frankfurt

SUBJECT : Application for Issuance of Bundesrepublik Personalausweis for Operational Use

1. Personal Details on the Person to whom Issued:

(a) Last name: Ludeau
(b) First name: Martin
(c) Birthdate: 18 September 1919; Trier
(d) Citizenship at birth: German
(e) Height: 174 cm.
(f) Color of eyes: Brown
(g) Glasses: No
(h) Build: Mittel
(i) Weight: 56 kg.
(j) City of residence: Anything convenient
(k) Place of Issuance of BdPA: Anything convenient.

2. Reason for Request: This document may be needed to bring AEASPIC from France to Germany. It would be used only after discussion with Dexter E. Rostedt from AEACRE and with the approval of Chief of Base, Frankfurt and Chief of Station, Paris to move Subject in this fashion. I have checked to determine whether Subject can move without considerable danger in this fashion and if it is customary; he can and it is.

3. Subject will need no other documents, being that this will be a one time use to cross at Strasbourg. This document is being requested in the event that it is needed for the 6 April meeting in Paris with Subject. Per cables from Headquarters Rostedt is empowered to decide whether Subject should be brought to Germany and if so, it would save one extra trip to Paris if this document were carried by the undersigned to the 6 April meeting so that he could be brought directly to Germany.

4. Photographs have already been given to the MKTOPAZ officer.

Anthony H. Friganza

Approved: /s/ R H Alixson
Deputy for Operations, COS

SECRET

Attachment to EGFA

RED SOX Spotting and Assessment
Report

Date 25 March 1959

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

The undersigned arrived in Paris on the morning of the 25th of March and went to the safehouse where the LCFLUTTER operater had spent the night and was shortly to meet Subject at the Cafe Les Sport near the Port Maillot. Subject passed by as we were having coffee and according to instruction s waited elsewhere. We left while the operator collected Subject and took him to the house, enabling us to return at about 11 hours.

Subject was dismissed for lunch at about 1145, whereupon the operator and the undersigned returned to the Embassy office where after a quick lunch the questions for the examination were written. The operator met Subject, returned to the house, and began the examination at about 1430, it having been agreed we would appear at the safehouse promptly at 1630. We did this to find that the operator had not concluded the examination but there was sufficient time to continue which he did. The examination was completed about 1845 hours, whereupon we were informed by the operatcr that in his opinion Subject was not attempting to deceive on any important points, even though some of the more prosaic aspects of his biography continue to defy logical acceptance.

We then discussed future meeting arrangements with Subject: Subject will appear in front of the Cafe Georges V on the Champs Elysees at 1214 and 16 hours on 6 April. He will wait for five minutes in front of the cafe but will not enter. If we are not there he will return for the alternate. In any event alternate contact will be made through Annick. Subject was instructed to clear up his affairs in Ambert and be prepared to depart for Germany; however, it was also explained to Subject that we were not authorized to make a final commitment to Subject and that much as we regretted this, this would be left until 6 April. Subject was paid Francs 15,500 for which no receipt was obtained since we were in a hurry to catch a plane for the Hague. If Subject has any difficulties he will write Annick. He will not return to Gap. He expects to stay with Josef Dassaud in Ambert until the night of 5 April when he will travel to Paris by train. It was further agreed that on or about 4 or 5 April Subject will have sent a letter to Annickfor "Mike" in which he will conform his arrival and in double talk inform us if he has had any trouble.

We discussed with Platipodis of the Paris station the need to send "Maurice" to Annick on 4 or 5 April to see if Subject had written.

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

S E C R E T

Attachment to EGFA ________

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment Report

Date ________________

Subject: AEASPIC
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

20 March 1959: Upon the receipt of DIR ________ the undersigned borrowed a car from the Paris station on 19 March and drove that night to Moulins, arriving about 9 o'clock. From the principal hotel in this town a call was made to Subject who was informed that we would arrive at Ambert at about 12 o'clock, and we agreed to meet at the railroad station at 1200 hours. We proceeded to Vichey where we changed clothes and bathed and arrived at Ambert about 1220 -- Subject was waiting. He returned the car lent by Dassaud, one of his business partners, to the residence cum work shop at 14 rue St. Josef. We waited outside for Subject who came out, got into the car and we drove to a restaurant which we left immediately as it was too crowded and returned on foot to 14 rue St. Josef house where our conversation was held. Incidentally, Subject showed the undersigned around the work shop and demonstrated how the machine and the ________ for it are made. One cannot help but marvel at Subject's ingenuity and ability as a tinkerer and pseudo-sort of engineer. He said they are producing about 300 a month, sell a few more than this at 48,000 francs a piece (nearly $100). However, Subject gets no income other than pocket money, free room and board where he now lives, and will not receive any until the capital outlay of his other two partners has been amortized. Taking the bull by the horns we explained to Subject the delay: A telegram had been sent to "certain colleagues" in Paris who were supposed to write a letter to be forwarded to Subject. The man to whom the telegram was sent was on leave and upon return he was not notified of the telegram we sent; consequently, Subject was not informed as he should have been. We are terribly sorry and hope that Subject would appreciate such a minor matter. In any event we reminded Subject that he had not een promised a letter on or about 1 February but rather told that he could expect o hear from us then. Subject agreed this was so.

Subject was far less interested in explanation than a decision. He rhetorically asked whether he was acceptable, adding he was obliged to assume he was not, and commenting that although there are "many two legged people in America also" he thought he was probably a unique persom from the point of view of language ability, experience as an operator in dangerous situations, etc. We replied thus: One man (the psychologist) has already come all the way from the States just to see Subject and another was on his way. From this Subject could fairly conclude the importance "Headquarters" attaches to Subject's candidature and that far from being a dead issue, Subject's prospects were good, although all depended on him.

We then turned to the matter of Subject coming to Paris. Subject explained that Paul ( ) had been sent by the Paris station to Annick and had not done very well. He had failed to convince Annick that he was sent by Mike (Friganza) and apparently although we did not go into the details of this, he did not get the message straight. In any case Subject immediately said that he could come to Paris anytime although he would be obliged to travel illegally. This because he had permitted his identity document to expire as of 14 February 1959. However, Subject felt he could make the journey by train without being caught because the police are not checking most trains. He did not want to travel by car because he had heard there are occasional road blocks (this may be true for the undersigned ran into one on the drive from Paris to Ambert). Subject also said he could stay as long as need by but it was absolutely essential that he not be obliged to stay at a hotel -- he could either stay with Annick or at a place put at his disposal by us.

____
Case Officer

Attachment to EGFA ______

REDSOX Spotting and Assessment
Report

Date ______

Subject:
DOB:

Address:

Cover for Contact:

Notes on Contact:

Knowing that the LCFLUTTER operator could get to Paris in two days we asked Subject to take the train on the morning of 21 February. He agreed to do this. He said it would be necessary for him (if he is accepted) to return to Ambert once more; it will not be necessary for him to return to Gap. After discussing this and paying Subject Francs 10,000, we drove by the railroad station where Subject hecked on train schedules and we parted. In regard to the lapse of the validity Subject's documents Subject said: After the 7-10 January meeting in Paris he had driven back to Ambert; he did not return to Gap; he has been living illegally in Ambert since his return from Paris on 11 January. He has failed to extend his document because he calculated he would leave France before the document expired. Subject surmises that if he were obliged to return to Gap he might be able to talk his way out of trouble but he might be given two weeks in jail as a sharp reminder of the necessity to validate documents promptly.

March
21 ~~XXXXXXXX~~1959: Subject was met by the undersigned at the Gare Austerlitz at 2040 hours. Henry C. Ladue of the Paris station counter-surveilled the meeting and our progress from the station by foot and then by metro to the Severes Babylon station. Ladou is certain that our meeting was not surveilled. After going our own way from Ladou, we took a taxi to the Opera, switched taxis and then went to the safehouse in the rue Weber 14. After Subject washed and shaved we drove in the car provided by the station to Les Halles where we had dinner at the Pied de Cochon. We returned to the apartment at about 20 hours, talked for another hour or so while ving a drink, and then retired. During this conversation Subject was encouraged d prompted to develop thoughts on a variety of matters which we hoped would tend give us better grounds on which to assess him. Nothing of particular operational or biographic significance was discussed.

22 March 1959: After breakfast Subject was asked to wait until we returned. We went with Ladou to the airport to meet the LCFLUTTER operator. After the operator arrived we decided on a program and returned to the apartment and suggested that Subject spend the afternoon on his own and agreed on a 2230 rendezvous not far from Port Maillot and the safehouse where Subject was met. We walked to the safehouse and retired at about midnight.

23 March 1959: We arose at 8, left the apartment by about 8:40, walked to a cafe where we breakfasted, and then per arrangement passed the corner of Port Maillot and rue Malakoff at which time the LCFLUTTER operator observed us and followed us to the apartment. We showed Subject upstairs and left the apartment where we met the operator and took him upstairs and introduced him as Mr. Brown. After a very brief introduction with no explanation, we absented ourselves from the room while the operator reviewed Subject's biography in preparation for the LCFLUTTER examination. At about 1245 hours Subject left the apartment on his own, it having been agreed to meet him on the Avenue Grand Amee in front of the Tout Bien cafe. The FLUTTER operator returned to the Paris station office with us where it was agreed that the undersigned would go to Germany and return to Paris on 24 or 25 March. The operator met Subject at the rendezvous and took him to the apartment. After making arrangements for tickets, etc., we returned to the apartment where we interrupted Subject and the operator. During this brief meeting Subject was paid a further 39,000 Francs, making a total of Francs 49,000 or $100. He was instructed to spend the night of 23 and 24 March chez Annick and we would return to see him again on 25 March.

Anthony H. Friganza
Case Officer

S E C R E T

No security flaps although the potential is there for a beautiful one: Our false identity documents together with Subject's lack of any legal documentation is raw material sufficient for this.

ERAL LECLER

Dr Hendryck S. Vincent

Im Trutz Frankfurt 13/I

Frankfurt (Main)

West (Deutschland)

Abs. John Winters
136 Champs Elysées
Paris (8°)

Liber Mike

Was ist nun zu hause? Ich habe seit lange zeit schon keine nachricht bekommen zeit die letzte brief. 5.15.

Ich möchte gerne wissen ob ich balt was kriegen werde oder wie lange muss ich noch erwarten um ich sicher zu sein. Eine datum, z.b. spät, 15 tage vor oder nach, wenn mehr pünktlichkeit ist nicht möglich.

Schreiben sie an Amick (unter e Umschlage) sie macht das weiter, weil ich bin nicht mehr in meiner alter adresse (fur weningsten noch 15 tage).

Eine telegram wurde noch besser.

Freundschaftlich.

P.S. Meine adresse ist bei Amick wenn sie verlangen.

Subject: [redacted] DAVID Dates of interview: 8, 9, 10 Jan 1959

1. Subject was met in Paris by the case officer and examiner and submitted to an intensive preliminary psychological examination. He was examined via a French interpreter. The interpreter has been requested to submit his own assessment to the undersigned.

2. Subject is 40 years of age. He was born on the 12th of July, 1918, in Georgia, USSR. At that time Georgia was a free country and not part of the USSR.

3. Subject regards his parents as "nobles" and he feels that their status had a great influence on his behaviour in the period which followed the family's immigration into France in 1921.

4. Subject feels he acquired a certain prejudicial class attitude and abided by the principle of noblesse oblige. In other words he feels that if you pretend to be something, you have to act accordingly. His concept of nobility has evolved into a concept of dignity and pride in his work.

5. The family left Georgia when the Subject was three. They fled before the Soviet invasion. Subject feels that his real existence began at this point. Because the father had provided himself with certain monies, the family was able to live comfortably and even opulently. However, the vicissitudes of life brought the family progressively to material degradation and financial difficulties which greatly influenced Subject's way of thinking thereafter. Whereas the family had previously lived in an artificial feudalistic way, life became tough. Subject feels that the family was brought into more direct contact with reality and that this was not necessarily a bad influence.

6. Subject actually did not want to leave Georgia. He felt it was a flight rather than a tactical retreat. Apparently he has never been able to accept this humiliating defeat and it may be that part of his current motivation for affiliation involves his perception of an opportunity to take countermeasures against the Soviets. He is a person who cannot tolerate being beaten in competition.

7. Subject was a non-disciplined child and was in constant rebellion against his teachers whom he felt did not discriminate intelligent children or pay him sufficient individual attention. Apparently his rebellious behaviour was his way of getting attention. He felt his teachers were too distant and automatically unpleasant. He engaged in practical jokes and was an activist in the school situation. As a result he was kicked out of one school after another and has a history of attending 18 different schools. The least that can be said of this strange behaviour is that he was undisciplined and has always refused to abide by the conformist attitude of his peers. On the contrary he has always felt compelled to do those things not normally done by others. The 18 schools, generally speaking, represent frustration, the seeking of an aim to pursue, and the hope that his ideal would crystallize and materialize. Subject is rather abstract in this respect. Generally, it would seem that his ideal is first of all material and perhaps also moral comfort and security. However, he has always regarded his society, through his disappointments and mortifying experiences, as ~~a~~ wicked and selfish in its majority. Since he felt society was selfish and mean, he expressed his dissatisfaction in the form of aggressive and destructive behaviour. Apparently Subject was a precocious child and he experienced disillusionment in his family and in society. It is as if he suddenly discovered to his great disappointment that there was no Santa Claus.

8. At first Subject felt his disillusionment was unique and peculiar to his particular life experience, but he soon discovered that his discontent was characteristic of others. He experienced this fighting attitude within himself and he reflected it in his non-conforming behaviour.

9. His mother reacted to his behaviour with over-affectionate solicitousness. She wasn't actually able to determine the reasons for his internal distress, but she was aware something was taking place within him. The mother was apparently a marked conformist who insisted that Subject abide by the social order. She took him to a psychiatrist because of his behaviour problems and because she did not advise him of what she was doing and got him to a psychiatrist on a subterfuge, and because Subject did not agree with the psychiatrist's conclusions, he did not benefit by this experience. This indicates to us that in handling Subject it

would be wise not to approach him as if he were the problem, but to permit him to maintain his posture that he is right and society is wrong. In other words we must avoid doing what his mother did to him.

10. Subject has always indulged in a sort of introspection and self-analysis, the purpose of which was to determine how to realize his aspirations. Another aspect of his system of ideals proceeds from the life concept of chivalry which he feels his parents inculcated. This involves the defense and the protection of the oppressed and the weak. It is sort of a Robin Hood concept which he attributes to himself. This chivalrous ideal is active to date. He feels that many people need help and he has always wanted to help others in order to help himself. In other words he is motivated to helping others in order to obtain love and affection. This need for love and affection is probably the most primary of his motives.

11. In respect to the flight of the family from Georgia, Subject feels he was too young to understand it. However, he feels he revolted against it. His idea is that one must fight, surpass and conquer. As a young boy he felt he was much stronger than several million men. This is extremely important as regards utilization of his services. First of all he is self-motivated to succeed out of a spirit of revenge, and secondly he is self-confidant and optimistic that he will succeed despite the hazards of the undertaking. He is like a man who wants to kill an elephant -- all he wants from us is a high-powered rifle -- then he feels he would be equal to the elephant.

12. Subject also seems to reflect disappointment in his father as a personal ideal. He regards his father as a very independent person, kind but profoundly selfish, but who would nevertheless give you the shirt off his back. His father was fond of the children, loved the whole family and was happy when he saw others happy. However, Subject is convinced that if his father had succeeded, none of the things that happened in his life would have come to pass. He feels that his mother's suicide is a direct consequence of his father's failure to succeed.

13. When his father and sister returned to Georgia, Subject was driven to despair by the breaking-up of the family. The death of his mother and the departure of his father and sister was quite a threat to his security.

He tried to hold his father back and even threatened him that because of a French law according to which a foreigner must pay his taxes before he leaves the country, the father ran the risk of being arrested. When he told this to his sister, she became angry with him and replied that the father was mature enough to act as well as possible. Subject's attempt to prevent his father from leaving was conflictual for him because it represented an interference with his father's desire and project. This experience taught him that when his father had taken a decision, he would carry it through at any cost. As it happened, the result was the disintegration of the family. If Subject found himself in the same situation today, he would act in exactly the same way.

14. The father apparently returned to Georgia because he wanted to die in Georgia. Subject feels that his father was doing something important to realize his objectiv~~ity~~e or to achieve his purpose. However, he feels his father accepted defeat by returning to Georgia to die. The mother did not go with the father and apparently was at her wits end after the father left. Subject regards his mother as the axle of the family and when he lost her through suicide, he feels she deserted him.

15. Subject's sister followed her father to Georgia out of a spirit of affection and sacrifice. She felt that her father needed her and Subject feels she was a tributary of his mistakes. The sister has a Ph.D. in languages and taught courses in school. At the time of Stalin the children would say "we have done this and that thanks to Stalin" and she would reply "you are individuals and you have done this or that without Stalin." As a result she was arrested and sent to a concentration camp. With the change of regimes she obtained her freedom and got her job back.

16. The sister's husband returned to Russia also and Subject believes that because he had served in the German army he may have been sent to a concentration camp. He feels the intellectual level of the brother-in-law is lower than that of the sister. The brother-in-law apparently has an inferiority complex. He emigrated to France at a much later date and apparently could not adapt himself and regretted having left Russia.

17. Subject's brother, [illegible] (?), is an architect in Gap. The brother is an independent person who is conservative and probably

conforming. He has not distinguished himself in any extraordinary fashion and Subject unconsciously compares himself with his brother. It is likely that he and his brother were rivals for the mother's affection and, whereas Subject feels that his brother is jealous of him, it is likely that Subject is jealous of the brother's accomplishments. He feels that whenever he succeeds his brother is jealous. Subject is also identified with his brother in a complex and interesting way. For example, he feels that both he and his brother love the same type of women. He is not able to say much about his brother except that he is kind, somewhat vain, and that he is fond of his brother. However, it is likely that his brother may have been indirectly instrumental in Subject's recruitment. It may also be that his brother regards Subject as "Peck's bad boy" or the black sheep of the family and is interested in surpassing him as regards accomplishment or success.

excelling

18. Subject was the baby of the family and still is. Whereas he was born in 1918, his brother was born in 1916 and his sister in 1915. Subject was more expressive of affection, particularly for his mother, whereas his brother was more timid, shy, and independent. When the brother saw Subject getting the mother's attention, he tried to replace Subject. This sibling rivalry may continue to date, for example, the brother learned that Subject was seeing a girl whom he knew. The brother advised the girl to leave Subject alone.

19. Subject denies he is jealous of his brother. He admits his brother has been successful but in his own sphere. Subject's new found philosophy is not to accept the fact that he has been unsuccessful, but to try to explain why he has not. In other words he seems to be motivated to obtain greater knowledge of himself.

20. Subject does not consider himself as a Georgian; this is of no importance to him. He regards the flight from Georgia as a defeat and as a loss of the motherland which he has never accepted. He feels he was a Georgian as a child but the most important aspect is that he feels he was defeated by the necessity of the family's flight from Georgia. He offers as an analogy the fact that he was committed to prison; this was a defeat for him. In other words he was not bothered by the prison life but by the fact that he made a wrong calculation in taking on a bad associate and con-

sequently being arrested and imprisoned. Therefore defeat appears to be the first factor in his life experience.

21. At a certain time in his childhood Subject lived near some former Georgian resistants who were fighting against the Soviets. Subject regarded these persons as uneducated but nevertheless ______________ and affectionate. He feels he certainly must have been influenced by the exciting stories which they told him about their fights and many exploits. He feels he must also have been impressed by their patriotism. He feels they expressed themselves in a warm and enthralling manner which exalted and deeply impressed him. He feels this particular association may account for his passion which he always puts in the execution of whatever he undertakes. One of the principal determinants of this man's behaviour is apparently the very strong desire to succeed and accomplish.

22. Subject feels that throughout his school experience perhaps only one or two professors understood him. These particular professors ~~thought~~ considered that it was often necessary in life to "swallow" a great deal of useless "stuff" so that thereafter certain essential problems could be more easily digested. Subject feels that these professors were superior and that he understood them, whereas he regarded the others as apparently idiotic or worthless.

23. Subject was influenced by heroes whom he heard about such as Lindbergh, Edison, Hitler, Einstein, and several others. He realized that if such people existed, it meant that the possibility to act either for good or for evil also existed. He did not identify with any one hero in particular but always wished that he could have been one of them. He did not actually want to be one of them, but wanted to resemble heroes in general. Subject always ~~remains~~-- remembers certain great men mentioned in history. He feels that these great men gave him the concept that a certain order was necessary for the level of the people. However, it appears he was disillusioned in these men and his ideals were shaken because he later learned to his dismay that they could commit abject or monstrous acts. Subject feels he has made many mistakes in life but however big these mistakes may be, he does not feel they have reflected his basic character. He feels that his character was basically based by the desire to become a worthwhile individual, even at the cost of behaving wrongly. He feels that if the only criterion for judging a man ~~is~~ are his

achievements, then he is a failure.

24. Subject feels that apart from the academic progress at school, he learned that it was necessary to communicate, to express himself, to understand and to explain. He feels that these are necessary for one to be a member of society.

25. Subject feels his mother was a major influence in his life. He is disappointed in his mother because he feels he loved her but she deserted him through suicide. He feels she sacrificed herself completely for the children and that she killed herself because she no longer knew how to distribute love and care. Subject began to lose regard for his father from the time he realized that his father was not giving his mother affection. However, he identifies with his father in the respect that both never achieved anything significant and that they both may have disappointed the mother. Subject misses his mother's love and he feels his life was broken up when she died. He found himself completely alone and all his illusions disappeared. He tried to find affection through others. He feels the need for affection is a big part of himself but on the other hand "I am a complicated person."

26. Subject claims he has learned the difference between a man and a woman. This is likely to have a good deal of meaning to him, particularly as regards his relationship with his mother. He regards women as allogical and to be determined by a psycho-feminine education. This is enough to tip us off that he should not be exposed to handling by females.

27. Subject claims he has learned from his personal experience in life rather than from the experience of others. In other words he has educated himself in the school of life and has derived little from the actual formal school situation. For example, he claims his mother's opinions had importance only at the time she was rendering her opinions; thereafter they were not influential as far as he was concerned. This may be important as regards training. It is likely that he would prefer to proceed with the task in actuality rather than to learn about performing the task through the experiences or training of others.

28. Subject joined the French Foreign Legion at the beginning of the war. As a foreigner and as an [illegible] he was subject to

mobilization into the French army, but he felt the authorities took an awful long time to make a decision in connection with him. Because of this, he joined the Foreign Legion and left immediately for North Africa feeling that thus he was becoming a member of a famous unit and at the same time fulfilling his obligations toward the French military service. In the beginning he was satisfied but later he was of the opinion that France was an incoherent mess, and he bitterly regretted that he had become acquainted with people who obviously did not know what they wanted. This experience did not have a great influence on his character except that it expressed a profound dislike for irresolute persons. This indicates that Subject is an impatient fellow who desires immediate action as regards his interest. He is impatient with postponement and unless he is dealt with promptly, he may satisfy his interests elsewhere. However, in the current instance he has no alternative and he is forced to go along with normal procedures which he may regard as a waste of time, but will accept.

29. Subject feels that he married because he regarded marriage as necessary to build a family and to make a home. He feels his marriage was a mistake because, even though he understands the value of the principles involved, principles which were inculcated by his father, it is ridiculous to marry just for the sake of principles without the necessary sentiments. He feels that at the time he was merely abiding by precepts of his father without thinking of the possible consequences. However he soon discovered, in fact, a family did not represent anything at all , and that creating the family was aggravating the incoherence and the division of society. In view point getting married meant building a wall around himself. It also meant that instead of finding a partner who complemented him, all that he obtained from the partnership was a ________________ reflection of himself. He feels that the so-called spiritual intimacy is a fallacy. He claims that, sexually speaking, women are necessary but he fails to say why it is necessary to build a separate world with it.

30. As was explained above, the reasons for his marriage are connected with his family education. He does not regard his marriage as a complete fiasco. He regards his wife as very nice. He thinks he was nice, too.

They got along fairly well with one another but did not live very comfortably. He did not feel there was any evolution in the marriage and he admits to his debit that he married his wife because he wanted to experience what it meant to have children. Actually, however, he did not want children. However, he assumed that the marriage would produce a child whom he had exactly imagined. In other words he wanted an exact reproduction of himself. He obtained a daughter who was beautiful, always laughing, but because of his separation after his arrest, he has ignored what has happened with the child. His wife also had a second child by Subject who was born while he was in jail and Subject knows nothing at all about the second child. Subject met his wife in a model makers shop and believes she liked him immediately. However, if he were to do it again, he would not marry.

31. During the war when Subject was in Germany, he got involved in a false documents business and created a gang which he led. The purpose of the group was to repatriate or liberate war prisoners. The black market was a worthless branch, technically speaking, of the organization. Its only purpose was to solve financial problems. However, it is true that the black market reached such a magnitude that a person who was interested only in making money would have found it quite satisfying and sufficient in itself. As a whole, the technical efficiency of his gang satisfied him. They had freedom of motion and security. Subject was arrested because of a carelessness or a slip,not in the actual functioning of the gang, but rather on the part of one of the men whom they were helping.

32. Through this experience Subject learned that it was very interesting to know the weaknesses of authorities and to play these weaknesses or forces against one another. His emotions corresponded to a joy of being the sole master of his actions and moves. He feels that if he were to find himself in this sort of situation again, he would act in exactly the same way.

33. When Subject was arrested by the Gestapo, he was considered by the Germans to be a very important prey. He played the game and led the Germans to believe that he was an important prey in the hope that such belief would give him certain advantages. Although he realized he could be shot for only one-half of what he had done and that it was

disadvantageous for him to exaggerate in order to mix the treks and confuse the German authorities, this gave him a chance not to mention certain partners whom he made it appear as negligible. He continued this game until he saw that the end was near. For example, there was a great need of gas in Germany and he figured he could gain time by telling the Germans he had invented a very interesting motor which they could profitably use. The Germans took his offer into consideration and postponed his execution. Shortly thereafter he was liberated by the Americans.

34. This vignette indicates that Subject has the developed capacity of a con man and that he is capable of imaginatively talking himself out of rather tight situations. This, of course, is an outstanding qualification as regards the requirements of the project.

35. Subject attacked a bank in 1950. At the time he was married and was the father of one child. He was working in a model makers shop and although he was not well off, he was earning a decent living. However, because of his love for risk and out of friendship for another fellow, he agreed to participate in the bank attack. Apparently the other fellow trusted Subject because he knew of Subject's war activities and he figured that because Subject had been able to accomplish certain illegal activities that he was quite capable of attacking a bank. The attack was carefully planned. Because there were only two on the team they were compelled in view of the smallness of his staff to give extra attention to their plan.

36. According to Subject he was close to this young friend who solicited his financial assistance. At first, Subject felt that the other fellow was crazy to dare to attack a bank. He also had the normal twinge of conscience and asked himself the question "is it right to do harm by robbing a bank?" Subject never felt that the two alone would be able to attack the bank successfully. Consequently, they determined to knock over a jewelry shop first. At each point in the developments Subject wanted to withdraw from the whole deal by saying "if my mother learned of this, she would die." They postponed the job indefinitely. However, his mother died in the meantime and his friend again approached him and told him that now that his mother was dead, there was no longer such a danger. Subsequently they knocked over the jewelry store.

37. Subject's chief motivation for such an activity appears to be the following: (a) Friendship. Apparently Subject will do anything for a friend. (b) Action. Apparently Subject relishes novelty and excitement and daring-do. Apparently he is a Jesse James type. (c) Emotional outlet for success of planning. Apparently Subject indulges himself in problem-solving and obtains a compulsive satisfaction if his plans succeed. In other words, he is motivated to carry out such an action because of his displaced interest in successfully engineering and accomplishing a job. (d) Money. Subject apparently is not motivated for material reward. In the case of the robbery his friend got 3/4 of the take and Subject got 1/4. Subject was content not to spend his money freely because his wife might become suspicious.

38. However, the friend returned after having spent his money. Previously Subject had told him "you got your money for the marriage; now leave me alone." However, the friend had not married and was now desirous of robbing a bank in order to finance another intended marriage. Subject agreed that this would be the last job. They cased the joint very carefully and then committed the act. The other fellow apparently threw his money around, was arrested, and squealed. The police came to Subject's place, found a ___________, and he was arrested, in his flight to the Spanish border. Subject was fleeing to the Pyrenees because he had learned that his bank deal partner had been arrested and had talked, and that the police were after him. Subject voluntarily admits that he lost control over himself and that he had failed to plan in case he failed and had to flee. He had not foreseen or prepared himself fur such a consequence. If he were to find himself again in the same situation, he would prepare an escape even if it were only necessary for the satisfactory planning of the project.

39. However, the question which arises in this examiner's mind is why Subject panicked in his flight. It could have been that he unconsciously wanted to get caught and to be punished in order to relieve his guilt. If this is so, then important consideration should be given to this aspect of Subject's personality as regards planning the project.

40. When he was jailed by the French police he was somewhat depressed by the fact that he had greatly disappointed his close relatives and because he was looked upon as a noisy and rash fellow rather than as a man capable of carrying out a crime.

41. Subject feels he failed badly when he was arrested by the Germans and also when he was arrested by the French. He feels these two failures are consequences of the poor manner in which he chose his friends. He feels it is now up to him to take all the necessary precautions in order to avoid the same pitfalls in the future.

42. There have been times in this man's life when he felt that the entire world seemed to conspire against him and when everything seemed to collapse before him. Yet he has always felt there were ways to get out of a mess principally by virtue of working. He continues to believe that unless a man is so weak both physically and morally, it is always possible for him to get back on his feet or at least to hope that this is possible. Consequently, even when he was broke, Subject always believed there was a possibility to fight and conquer. It is likely he will always have hope and optimism.

43. As regards his philosophy on the two projects which involved liberating French prisoners and the bank attack, he was betrayed by another. Actually, however, he could not have become angry at these persons because he felt his betrayal was unimportant. However, these persons lost his esteem because he feels there are certain moral values which he holds dear~~ly~~, namely friendship. This would indicate that he is more in contempt of himself for having miscalculated than angry with the other person for having betrayed him. However, Subject does not feel that any of his mistakes, regardless of their size and consequence, have serious consequences as regards his near or distant future. There is no question that his mistakes have seriously reduced his circumstances of life, but he is optimistic and it is likely he regards this assignment as a golden opportunity which not only permits him a chance of success, but does not censure him for his past deeds. Consequently, he feels that to be discouraged about the future is nonsense for if there is a future, there is hope.

44. Although Subject has seen many things in his life and has had many opportunities to become angry, he feels he has never completely lost self control. He feels he has always been the master of his actions at all times and that these actions could have been changed by his own volition.

45. If Subject has ever been ashamed of himself, it must have been when his behaviour was wrongly interpreted by persons whom he loved or who loved him.

46. Subject tends to become embarrassed and confused when certain persons who ask or accept something from him display too much gratitude. In other words, too large a dose of affection will unseat Subject despite the fact that he continually solicits affection.

47. Subject has continually deceived and disappointed his mother because every time she started him in a new school, she made him promise he would behave nicely, but each time he was thrown out of school. He is convinced she wanted this for his good and not for the satisfaction of having a peefect child. However, it is likely that the mother's over-solicitousness was actually compensatory for her basic rejection of Subject. Therefore, she wanted him to be perfect so that she could love him. Consequently, it is unlikely that she did things for him, but she did things with him for herself. In other words, she wanted him to be perfect so that he could be worthy of her love. He was not perfect, probably did not obtain her love, and consequently is continually seeking the love of other persons. However, he cannot accept this fact as regards his mother and denies she did not act in his interest. One of his chief defenses is denial, that is, simply assuming the attitude that such and such was not true when he probably believes it was true.

48. Subject's actions are often impulsive and unreasoned. Such irrational behaviour usually takes place with another person despite the fact that there may be no particular tie or affection between him and the other person. Subject is unable to explain why this is so and intellectually realizes that any explanations which he might offer are not sufficient to explain such behaviour and his emotional state. In other words, this man's impulsiveness and tendence to behave irrationally and to his own disadvantage and in his own disinterest amounts to a compulsion which is sufficient to determine his behaviour but which is unconscious and not

available to rational analysis, or even awareness. In this respect he is propelled by an uncontrollable force. This is an important point of consideration as regards his utilization in this project.

49. Subject's left index finger and thumb are missing. He lost these in an explosion. This occurred in Germany when he was involved in the repatriation deal. After the bombing of Berlin he picked up among the ruins an unexploded bomb of British origin and took it home to salvage the explosive which he might use in various ways. While he was removing the detonator which was probably stuck in its receptacle, the detonator exploded in his fingers. Subject does not regret the fact that he tried to dismantle the bomb because he feels he has learned that one should keep his hands away from certain things. The explosion occurred so quickly that there was no immediate pain but the people around him became panicky. He remained cold blooded and gave the order to remove all things which were there because the explosion undoubtedly alerted the police. The police came and he explained that he had played with a fountain pen which had burst. The policemen strongly advised him never again to pick up objects dropped by the enemy. They took cognizance of his declarations and went away. The Red Cross took care of his wounds.

50. Subject does not think he will be very different in the future from what he is now. However, he feels his material situation will have improved. He does not mean financially but socially. He naively hopes that the workd w ll change and there will be no discrimination. He also hopes to acquire, if necessary, a nationality in which case he will feel he actually belongs to society. However, he feels that society is anxious to stamp and label individuals and it may be that he would prefer to be an individualist who is outside of society than to be a member of society who is required to conform. Since this person lives in the present, it is very difficult for him to imagine what his future will be.

51. Despite the fact that this man is motivated by rather vivid ideals, he still strikes the examiner as a practical realist who thinks and acts in a matter of fact manner. He has experienced a good deal of life and he is quite sophisticated.

52. Subject feels that a friend would regard him as unstable, affectionate, and a day dreamer.

53. Subject feels that a critic would say of him that the majority of his commercial undertakings have brought results which are considerably lower than hoped for. Consequently, he feels he is either an optimist or a joker, or else his views on the possibilities of accomplishing things are not very healthy.

54. In his defense he emphasizes that in his opinion the value of an achievement does not consist of its spectacular magnitude or in its multiplicity. For example, he feels it s not necessary to say "good morning" 100 times in order to understand the meaning and purpose of "good morning." Also he does not feel it is necessary to mass produce a machine in order to fully understand its function. However, he realizes that, commercially speaking, it is more rational to mass produce the machine but the repitition does not interest him. In his opinion the creative idea and the prototype have a much greater value and importance than the setting up of the factory which will popularize the prototype. To illustrate his feeling further he is of the opinion that one single thought from a great thinker appears to him to be much more valuable than the millions of books which are published yearly.

55. In describing himself Subject reveals that he always tries his hardest to keep his promises. He also feels that he sometimes appears to talk somewhat rashly but he feels this is due to the fact that he thinks fast and he is able to see quickly the components and the essence of a problem in its various prospectives. He is able to rapidly synthesize. In other words he learns extremely fast and he gets the point immediately. He is so quick that he will understand what you are trying to say before you finish the sentence.

56. Subject is unable to see himself in terms of what he would like to be. In order for him to display himself, it would be necessary that he would be another person altogether. However, he feels that, everything relative, perhaps he should show more strength of character, be a little more compromising, more realistic, and less sentimental. However, this would imply that he would then find himself in an environment in which there was no room for sentiment -- in which case his personality would

out of place.

57. It is Subject's experience that his friends love him for what he is. He likes his friends as they are, probably because they are as they are. The idea of attempting to change a friend is unthinkable for him. He loves them for their bad points as well as their good points.

58. Subject is an optimist but also a pessimist. He feels he will never be able to reach his ideals because his material ideal (social reform) is so distant that he would need to lead many __________ in order to attain it. It might be unfair to call this man a pessimist; it is more likely he is a realist and perhaps a cynic.

59. This man denies that he has any interest or emotional attachment to France at this time. However, it is likely he was patriotic at the time of the war. Since he has been branded a criminal and has been deprived of certain rights and privileges, he now perhaps feels rejected and in turn is rejecting France as his fatherland. Nevertheless, he strikes the examiner as a true Frenchman -- he thinks and feels like a Frenchman and is certainly not a Russian in his personality. It is likely that he identifies the French authorities with the police. He cannot tolerate rejecting attitudes. He is like an outsider who is looking in. It may be he has the "sour grapes" attitude by which he feels that since he cannot have what he wants, it is not too good anyway.

60. Subject is not a planner. Despite his interest in invention and the fact that he has pulled off a number of capers, he is more of an instigator, a leader, and an executor. In order for him to be successful in future projects, it is necessary that someone else plan and then tell him exactly what to do.

61. Subject is currently involved in the invention business which he started alone. He is the owner and exploiter of several patents and certain persons are financially and technically interested in his inventions. He is faced with a problem at this time. He is involved in the initial and preliminary phases with us and consequently is put on the fence as regards his invention business. Furthermore, if he were to join us, he would relinquish everything to his business partners.

62. This person will open himself up readily to an open personality. He will be secretive with an inhibited or secretive personality. Consequently, the best person to work with this individual is a direct, expressive and visible personality.

63. This person's social drives seem to involve: (a) General improvement of living conditions for everybody; in other words he is a humanitarian. He is not necessarily an activistic social reformer. (b) Improvement of his own standard of living. He has an inclination to better things and he feels this is the disease of all inventors.

64. Subject expresses himself freely, is discursive, voluble, and is able to carry on a conversation indefinitely. This is typically French but, in particular, it represents an oral characteristic. In other words, he is all mouth. He both expresses himself orally and he is driven by desire to obtain oral supplies by incorporation. What this means is that he will eat you up.

65. Subject reflects superior intelligence, is capable of abstract conceptualization, and is able to deal in symbols.

66. Subject is a narcissistic character who feels that because others don't love him, he needs to love himself. In other words, he is quite in love with himself and acts accordingly.

67. Subject tends to rationalize and to offer socially acceptable reasons for his individualistic behavior.

68. Subject strives chiefly for emotional satisfaction.

69. Subject is ~~an~~ altruistic but at the same time he is selfish. He will do things for the community with the hope of getting something out of it for himself. Both of these drives merge in a unitary fashion. He is motivated by both at the same time.

70. Subject denies nationalistic motives for his actions and prefers to regard them as being primarily humanitarian. Subject is action-oriented and loves to take risk and gets a kick out of excitement and adventure.

71. Subject acts because he thinks he is right.

72. Subject acts because he thinks he will succeed and because he regards what he undertakes as important. He is egotistical in this regard.

73. Subject needs to prove to others that he is successful. He is self confident in his prowess but is insecure that others may not regard him as adequate as he feels he is.

74. It is interesting to note that Subject participated in the release of the 13 French prisoners not out of patriotic motives, but to satisfy his taste for action. If they were German prisoners, he would have done the same thing. Actually, Subject admired the German army, had sympathy for Germans, but did not wish the French to be harmed. This is quite paradoxical but understandable in terms of the Subject's personality. His emotionalized ideals are not defined in terms of politics or nationalities, but are determined by a vague desire to help others who need it. This combination can mislead him and get him into difficulty; for example, his accomplice in the bank robbery.

75. Subject is a rank individualist. He is a non-conformist. However, he realizes he must cope with the community, must sacrifice for the ____________ of the community, and must not harm others. In this regard it is unlikely that Subject has ever committed physical assault, nor is it likely that he would in the future. No matter what the other person is or represents to Subject, he is still a human being whom Subject respects.

76. Although Subject is basically an exhibitionist, he is not inclined to bragging or to exhibit himself in a transparent or patent fashion. He is too sophisticated. However, he needs attention and is likely to do things in order to get attention. This is what he did in 18 schools.

77. As was previously mentioned, Subject helped French prisoners get back to France during the war. He thought it was the right thing to do but did not do it just for France. He was paid for it but he gave his money to help the prisoners. In terms of his hierarchy of motives, it is likely that this person acts according to what he considers to be right. He also expresses self pride in doing the outstanding, the difficult,

and for which he is not necessarily being paid. He acts out of principle, with no special reason. He helped the French prisoners despite the fact that he had sympathy for the Germans. However, his sympathy for the Germans was based on the fact that some Georgians had relatives in Germany and he preferred that the Germans would defeat the Russians.

78. Another reason he helped the French prisoners was that he felt that they were suffering and because they were suffering, he wanted to relieve them by helping them return to their country. Thus he was bent on nurturance. He always stands ready to help someone who is in need.

79. Subject's motivation for afilliation is positive, spontaneous, voluntary, and intense. He likes the Americans but finds it a bit difficult to analyze this sentiment. He feels the Americans have made certain political mistakes but they reflected a fundamental and basic sincerity which he likes. He understands the United States has political interest but he is willing to go along out of admiration for the sincerity of the Americans. He is not looking for special compensation. Generally, he is quite willing to do what is asked without rational reasons. In other words, his motivation is typically emotional and is understandable in terms of his character organization. He feels that a person is capable of doing anything for love of nothing. He is inclined to put things on a personal basis. He doesn't belong to any community. He feels his early years in Georgia have had no effect on his way of thinking or on his way of perceiving life. He likes the liberty which exists in America and the fact that people are treated as individuals rather than as numbers.

80. Subject's motives are genuine and are compatible with his outlook on life. They are not necessarily original or sophisticated but they are personal and therefore bona fide. Furthermore, Subject is really on the shelf in Gap. He is controlled in his movements and is restricted in his aspirations and consequently is unable to realize his freedom and to develop himself as an individual. Consequently, the assignment represents a unique opportunity for him to rise above his present restricted level of existence.

81. Subject is a very sensitive person and he attaches great importance to events of life.

82. Another important characteristic is his curiosity and his interest for experimentation

83. Another interesting proclivity is Subject's tendency to assume blame for the mistakes of others even when he is not necessarily guilty. As a child he was gifted but undisciplined and an unsuitable student who couldn't concentrate and adapt to the school situation. As a result he was always in trouble but, more interestingly, he was always glad to assume responsibility for the anti-social actions of others. Whether he did this for masochistic reasons or because he wanted to obtain the approval of others for whom he sacrificed is difficult to determine. What is true, however, is that he will submit himself for punishment even though he has not done wrong. He may do this out of friendship in order to have others feel greatful to him. He has the attitude he should be punished for doing wrong, but should not be degraded for doing right. Subject has always realized that he has needed help as regards his emotional problems. He likes to be helped materially, not as and itself (?) but because material help involves the implication of moral help. For example, a dentist in Gap offer~~r~~ed to help Subject in his inventions without asking for advantages. This means a lot to Subject. He attaches small importance to money and he derives a tremendous satisfaction out of helping others or being helped.

84. Subject reflects a tremendous vitality that has, in the past, expressed itself through false attempts such as the bank robbery, etc. He feels he is not being used as he should and that there is a power within himself, a creative urge of movement, a power of realization. It is highly emotionally charged and he feels he is capable of doing much more than he has in the past. Although he feels he is a complicated person, he does not feel he is difficult to understand.

85. Subject likes to act intelligently and sensibly. He strives for efficiency. For example, ~~he is~~ if a person were to ask him to open a window, he feels it is up to him to decide as regards the proper method. The efficiency plus the results are his rewards. Consequently, he likes practical work which involves an intellectual effort.

86. Subject has a highly developed verbal intelligence and he is able to amplify and elaborate on his ideas.

87. Prior to the last session on the 10th of January Subject was routinely contacted by the French police who were investigating his activities in Paris at this time. As a result of this contact, he was markedly apprehensive and pre-occupied with the seriousness of this visit by the police and was not able to freely devote himself to psychological analysis as heretofore. The important point here is that Subject is an extremely alert and vigilant person. His primary motive is, of course, self-preservation and he is likely to over-react and to become emotionally upset with provocation. He needs the guiding influence of a more mature and experienced person who is in control of the situation.

88. Another important aspect of his relationship with us appears to be the fact that he consciously or unconsciously feels he has "arrived" and is acceptable to us. In other words he feels that perhaps a decision has been made which is in his favor. This reflects his own desire to be accepted together with his estimation of the situation.

89. This individual, despite his past exploits, is not necessarily a hostile person. In other words he will not do harm nor will he hurt others who are weaker than himself. He will act out of exigency but he will deliberately avoid being sadistic or wantonly cruel.

90. For some reason Subject exhibits a marked degree of loneliness and isolation at this time. He seems to be seeking companionship.

91. Subject prefers to work alone as regards technical research, but as regards the execution of an operation he prefers to be with someone or part of an organization. He knows he can rely upon himself when he is alone and that others had been unreliable in his past. However, if it is necessary for him to work with two or more individuals, he will accept it.

92. Subject admits of physical inferiority feelings by virtue of his size and strength but he denies he has feelings of intellectual inferiority. He depends more upon his mental faculties than upon his physical. "I have no fear of an elephant if I have a gun."

93. Subject is a stubborn fellow who does not like to be defeated and he strives to conquer.

94. Subject always looks for causes. He is no magical thinker but tends to be rational and realistic despite his strong emotional re-activity which can be almost explosive at times.

95. Subject particularly strives not to be regarded as bad or evil. In fact, he is not a criminal type but is a neurotic character who has expressed his conflicts and difficulties in non-conforming behaviour. At the same time he is not anti-social. He is a person who has differences of opinion and conflicts with the social order.

96. Subject does not regard himself as an expert or ____________. He realizes his short comings and he hopes his ___________ will be complemented by training.

97. Subject relies quite heavily upon humor for relief of tension and as a defense against the development of anxiety and inter-personal relationships.

98. An important aspect of this man's personality and history would appear to be his so-called accident proneness. He is like the cat in the Disney film who, while chasing the mouse and having his entire attention directed to the catching and incorporation of the mouse, inadvertantly gets himself run over by a truck. His first reaction to being splattered by the truck is one of disappointment as regards not arriving at the goal; i.e., catching the mouse. He thereupon acts upon feelings of revenge on the mouse for having caused his unfortunate accident. In addition, this example signifies that Subject is likely to keep his eye too much upon the goal and insufficiently upon the hazards involved in reaching the goal. It may be argued that Subject's philospphy in his past operations are related in some manner to his lack of attention to such details. His history is that of the unlucky cat who manages to get himself run over successfully.

99. This person can be quite discomposed by the surprise of unexpected occurrences.

100. Despite defeat Subject is able to pick himself up, figure things out, start all over in a more systematic way, and continue in his pursuit of his goal. Consequently, he does learn by experience. His mistakes are

chiefly due to the fact that he is or has been "stupid" or impulsive -- stupid, impulsive, immature and inexperienced.

101. Subject is capable of experiencing melancholy or depressive mood swings. However, he maintains a gay facade and he attempts to relieve his depressive feelings with lightness. Underneath the gay appearance, however, is seriousness. One of the chief motives is his curiousity. He seeks the unknown but when he approaches the unknown, he experiences a certain feeling which he recognizes as a threat to his emotional security and he is ambivalent about proceeding or withdrawing. He has an internal fear of something which he doesn't know or understand. Because of this it may be necessary to provide him with firm support, guidance, and consideration of all the possible eventualities. He has a fear of getting himself into something which he cannot get out of and his immediate reaction is to turn around and go away without having solved the problem. Consequently, he needs a person of greater intelligence who is able to help him to evaluate the realities of his situation or predicament. It must be kept in mind that his self-preservation is stronger than his desire to solve problems.

102. Subject is likely to be loyal to a superior and may even be critical of himself in relation to the superior. In other words, he would like to be as useful as possible in order to express his loyalty, but may feel inadequate in that he requires the protection of his superior.

103. This person puts no stock in emblems or signs of rank or reputation. He regards such signs as identifying labels only and is not impressed or motivated for glory symbols. If he were to accomplish an outstanding feat, he would not want a medal -- all he would want was a remark from an important figure to the effect "well done, thank you." He feels it is sufficient only for him to know he has done well.

104. Subject will attempt to assume leadership on the team but it may be that if his partner is superior, he would be a better follower than he would be a leader of a less adequate person. He is more of a dependent than independent person in terms of his inter-personal relationships; furthermore, he acts on sentiment and impulse and consequently his judgment is questionable. This would indicate that he would work better with a more sober-minded, calculating individual. He is likely

to work best with a person whom he respects and with whom he enjoys a friendly but authoritative relationship.

105. There is no reason why this person cannot be handled by an experienced, mature case officer.

106. In view of the supposed length of the mission, it is likely that a short term operation would be more compatible with Subject's assets and liabilities than a long term affair.

107. As regards the requirements of the project, it is understood that the more desirable qualifications would reflect intelligence, resourcefulness, mechanical talent, small man team ability, infiltration-exfiltration capability, good health, physical stamina, and motivation. Subject satisfies all these criteria. The other factors which he exhibits do not necessarily vitiate his positive features.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

235

DATE : 17 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3 (MR HOUCK AF DIV NOTIFIED 1515 17 DEC)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

per CSN 43-43

DEC 17 1856Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 18739

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP 0478

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A. DIR 16116 (Out 52272)

B. BERN 6595 IN 15973)

C. BERN 6537 (IN 49492)*

1. WIROGUE EOD 2 DEC. HESTON MADE INITIAL CONTACT AND GUTHMAN NOW HANDLING. WIROGUE GIVEN FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. BUILD COVER DURING INITIAL PERIOD. THIS RESPECT, WIROGUE SAID PLANNED SET UP SHOP WITH AUTOMATIC CAMERA TO TAKE IDENTIFICATION PICTURES. SAID WOULD INSTALL POLAROID CAMERA SO CLIENT COULD PUSH BUTTON AND TAKE OWN PICTURE. GUTHMAN AGREED THIS WORTH EXPLORING, AS WOULD APPEAR PROVIDE INEXPENSIVE COVER.

B. WIROGUE TOLD TRY SPOT PERSONS FOR SURVEILLANCE TEAM, INTEL ASSETS (WITH EMPHASIS ON ORIENTALE PROVINCE) AND PM ASSETS. HE TOLD SUBMIT NAMES ANY LIKELY CANDIDATES TO STATION FOR TRACES PRIOR MAKING APPROACH.

2. QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD". WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKING FOR PBPRIME SERVICE.

3. QJWIN INTRODUCED WIROGUE TO HOFHUIS. WIROGUE CASHED IN LETTER CREDIT WITH HOFHUIS TO GET GOOD EXCHANGE RATE. QJWIN REPORTS WIROGUE HAS PURCHASED THREE AUTOMOBILES SINCE ARRIVAL LEOP: CHRYSLER FOR 85000 FRANCS, CITROEN FOR 25000 FRANCS AND TRIUMPH FOR 110000 FRANCS. WIROGUE TOLD QJWIN HE SOLD CITROEN FOR 15000 FRANCS BUT IT STILL PARKED NEAR HIS HOTEL.

4. AT 13 DEC MEETING WIROGUE SAID HE PURCHASED CHRYSLER FOR 75000 FRANCS. MADE NO MENTION PURCHASE OTHER CARS. ALSO SAID HAD RENTED TWO STORES, ONE IN LEOP EUROPEAN CITY FOR 14000 FRANCS PER MONTH AND ONE IN NATIVE CITY FOR 6000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ALSO HAS SIGNED CONTRACT FOR APARTMENT FOR 8000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ASKED GUTHMAN FOR THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE WHICH HE CLAIMS HQS CASE OFFICER TOLD HIM HE WOULD RECEIVE IN LUMP SUM. GUTHMAN REFUSED, SAYING WOULD HAVE OBTAIN HQS APPROVAL PAY RENTAL ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM.

5. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN GUTHMAN TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. GUTHMAN WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION KUBARK.

6. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PUT HIM IN STAN ONCE MENUCHIN RETURNS TO TRY OBTAIN IMMEDIATE INTEL THAT AREA.

7. REQUEST HQS INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR 1300Z, 19 DEC RE GIVING WIROGUE YEARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE. LATTER CLAIMS NEEDS THESE FUNDS VIEW CAR PURCHASE IN ORDER SET UP COVER MECHANISM. IF WIROGUE TO REMAIN, BELIEVE MUST GIVE HIM AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, AS BELIEVE HE SHORT FUNDS. ALSO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS RE WIROGUE PAY. LATTER SAYS HIS CONTRACT CALLS FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PER MONTH. SAID HE NOT PAID FOR NOVEMBER. STATION GAVE HIM ONE PAYMENT FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. HOWEVER WISH HQS CONFIRMATION THIS CORRECT AND AUTHORITY PAY HIM IN DOLLARS PER HIS REQUEST. (WANTS DOLLARS AS BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE WHICH USED BY MOST PERSONS HERE TWENTY TO FORTY PERCENT BETTER THAN OFFICIAL RATE).

8. NOT ABLE PICK UP LETTER CREDIT PER REF A. WIROGUE SAID HAD GIVEN IT TO HOFHUI FOR RETURN TO BANK AFTER MARKING IT CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

SECRET

D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

19 DEC 60 20 21z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

OUT54652

OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181

17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*

PER ACLS 149

1. WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT CALLS FOR:

A. FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH BEGINNING ONE NOV. TO BE PAID IN FIELD. YOUR DISCRETION TO PAY IN DOLLARS. HE NOT PAID FOR NOV PRIOR TO DISPATCH. OBTAIN RECEIPTS AND CHARGE PROJECT.

B. THREE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUARTERS ALLOWANCE PER ANNUM, NON ACCOUNTABLE.

C. FOUR THOUSAND DOLLAR OPS LOAN TO SET UP COVER BUSINESS TO BE REPAID FROM PROFITS. ALSO MUST ACCOUNT FOR ONE THOUSAND TEN DOLLAR TRAVEL ADVANCE RECEIVED.

2. INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE CONTACT AND FOLLOW GUTHMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS IMPLICITLY. ALSO REPORT ACCURATELY ALL CONTACTS OR POTENTIAL AGENTS AND NOT MAKE ANY APPROACHES OR COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.

3. SHARE GUTHMAN'S CONCERN AND RECOMMEND TELL WIROGUE HE ON PROBATION AND MUST TOE THE MARK OR ELSE RECALL AND TERMINATION. POINT OUT IF NECESSARY HE LIVING UNDER FALSE DOCUMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO CONTINUED

[illegible] OUT 54652

[illegible] 21

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 54652

TO
INFO FI CSN 43-43
CITE DIR 17181

17181

*DESK COMMENT: Reference HYBAT

Edward Welles

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1 W
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD G. WELLES
A/CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

$4,000.00

18 November 1960

PROMISSORY NOTE

On the first day of December 1965 I promise to pay to bearer Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00). Value received.

Georg F. Reiner

George Franz Reiner

201-233477

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] - 17-1	[illegible]5017	811

EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change
9. Allowances
10.

DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION

PAYMENTS and/or REFUND DUE	DESCRIPTION
500.00	[illegible]
500.00	[illegible]
500.00	[illegible]

REFUNDS DUE FROM EMPLOYEE

ACTION DATA

EFFECTIVE DATE DAY	MO	Y	CO. DE	EFFECTIVE DATE DAY	MO.	Y	CO. DE	ADDL. COMP. P/P	P/P	C/T	N/D	HOL.

* ASTERISK Denotes other than Normal Salary

			NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	TOTALS
1500.00		1500.00			

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-233477

(30)

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT WIROGUE

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☒ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
X	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION AF
	AMENDMENT	
	RENEWAL	BRANCH AF/[illegible]
	TERMINATION	DESK AF/Republic of Congo
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Daniel [illegible] EXTENSION [illegible]

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY [illegible]	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED		FY	AMOUNT
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 November 1960 TO 31 October 1961	$ 17,250		1961	$13,250
			1962	$ 4,000
	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	1132-2621-5017		

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE DDP/PG	DATE 22 Nov 60

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	~~SSA-DDS~~	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	DDP/PG

FORM 5-60 849 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

201-233477

(5)

Trained in use

INCENDIARY KIT

201-233457

1. Time fuse (50 ft roll)		Ft.	50
2. M1 time pencil	Red	Ea	5
	White	Ea	5
3. Crimper		Ea	1
4. Tape (30 ft roll)		Ea	2
5. Knife		Ea	1
6. Demo carrying bag		Ea	1
7. Fuzee matches		Pkg	10
8. Twine		Ball	1
9. PTI	Red	Ea	6
	White	Ea	6
	Green	Ea	6
10. AN-M14		Ea	4
11. M2 Thickener (5lb can)		Ea	2
12. Firestarter (5/can)		Ea	4

WIROGUE //
Trained in ~~[illegible]~~ use of these items.

DEMO KIT

1. C-3		Blk	16
2. Time Fuse		Ft	100
3. Cap J-1		Ea	50
4. Primacord (100 ft coil)		Ft	200
5. M2 Fuse lighter		Ea	10
6. M1 Time pencil	Red	Ea	6
	White	Ea	4
7. Tape (30 ft roll)		Ea	6
8. Knife		Ea	2
9. Crimpers		Ea	2
10. Bag, carrying, demo		Ea	3
11. Fuzee matches		Pkg	10
12. M1 pull firing device		Ea	5
13. M1A1 pressure firing device		Ea	5
14. M1 firing device		Ea	5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

13 DEC 60

FROM : BERN

ACTION : C/FD 2

INFO : C/AF, S/C 2*

1 of 1

DEC 13 1146Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 16252

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

[illegible] CITE BERN 6597

[illegible]

REF DIR 10116 (OUT 52272) **

1. INTEGRITY/1 PHONING HOFHUIS ABOUT 1500 HOURS 12 DECEMBER TO SAY WILL PAY CHECK.

2. WE PROPOSE LEAVE BALANCE REINER ACCOUNT WITH INTEGRITY INTACT. WHEN CHECK CLEARS AND LETTER CREDIT RECEIVED AND CANCELLED WILL REDUCE ACCOUNT BY 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

3. HAVE ASSURED INTEGRITY/1 WILL HONOR LETTER CREDIT EVENT NEGOTIATED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

**INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD ADVISE HOFHUIS THAT CHECK IS GOOD.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

M. J. A. HOFHUIS
B.P. 1691
Leopoldville
Republique du Congo

Leopoldville, 13 Decembre 1960

Bank und Finanz Institut
Neuengasse 1
Berne
Suisse

Messieurs,

Sous ce pli je vous prie de vouloir trouver un chèque N° 3.409, tiré sur votre Banque par Monsieur Georg F.Reiner et d'un import de S.frs 12.000.- (douse mille francs suisses). Ce chèque a été fait à mon nom.

Je vous envoie également la lettre de crédit N° 101, datée le 29 Novembre 1960, émise au nom de Mr.Reiner pour un montant de douse mille francs suisses. La valeur de la dite lettre est actuellement Sfrs 11.600. Cette lettre a été annulée par une lettre de Mr.Reiner dont je vous prie de vouloir trouver l'original ci-jointe.

Je me réfère egalement à la conversation téléphonique de hier, par laquelle je vous ai demandé s'il y avait provision suffisante pour couvrir le chèque N° 3.409. N'ayant pas reçu votre communication téléphonique au jourd'hui, je suppose que l'affaire est en règle. Toutefois je vous remercie pour votre intervention.

Entretemps je vous demande de tenir à ma disposition le montant de douse mille francs suisses. Dès réception de votre confirmation à ce sujet, je vous ferai parvenir les instructions ultérieures.

En vous remerciant à l'avance pour votre prompte attention, je vous prie d'agréer, Messieurs, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

H.Hofhuis

H. J. A. HOFHUIS

Leopoldville, 14 Decembre 1960

Bank und Finanz Institut A.G.
Neuengasse 17
Berne
Suisse

Messieurs,

Suite à ma lettre du 13 courant, je vous envoie sous ce pli également un chèque N° 3.410, tiré sur votre Banque par Mr. F.G.Rainer et pour un montant de Sfrs; 3.000.-

Voulez vous avoir l'obligeance de garder egalement le montant de ce chèque à ma disposition. Au cas, ou il y aurait une manque de provision, je vous demande de me retourner le chèque n° 3.410.

Au plaisir de lire votre confirmation à ce sujet, je vous prie d'agréer, Messieurs, mes salutations distinguées.

H.Hofhuis

C/o L.B.Folé & C°
B.P. 7697
Leopoldville
Rep. du Congo

SOCIÉTÉ DE BANQUE SUISSE
SWISS BANK CORPORATION · SCHWEIZERISCHER BANKVEREIN · SOCIETÀ DI BANCA SVIZZERA
(VOIR A FACE A LA LISTE DE NOS SIÈGES ET SUCCURSALES ET LEURS ADRESSES TÉLÉGRAPHIQUES)

LETTRE DE CRÉDIT No. A [redacted]

Valable jusqu'au 31 mai 1961 [illegible]

BERNE -- 29 novembre 1960.

A nos correspondants figurant sur la page No. 3.

Messieurs,

Nous avons l'honneur de vous recommander à votre [illegible] le porteur de la présente

Monsieur Georg Franz REINER

et de le accréditer auprès de vous pour une somme totale de

fr.s. 12,000.-- [illegible] DOUZE MILLE FRANCS SUISSES

//

Veuillez [illegible] tre [illegible] jusqu'à concurrence de cette limite les sommes qu' il vous demande ra XXXX [illegible]

[illegible] en exemplaire.

En même temps [illegible] de cette page [illegible] pour le remboursement les [illegible] dans cette lettre de crédit [illegible]

[illegible] tre [illegible]

[illegible]

Société de Banque Suisse

201-233477

SWISS BANK CORPORATION · SCHWEIZERISCHER BANKVEREIN · SOCIETÀ DI BANCA SVIZZERA

LETTRE DE CRÉDIT N° [redacted]

valable jusqu'au 11 Mai 1961 inclus

BERNE, le 29 Novembre 1960.

A nos correspondants figurant sur la page No. 3.

Messieurs

Monsieur Georg Franz REINER

1° accréditif [illegible] pour une somme totale de

frs.s. 12,000.-- DOUZE MILLE FRANCS SUISSES

//

tro

il ra xxxx

tro

Société de Banque Suisse

201-233477

WIROGUE Cover Story

DOB: 1921 25 July
POB: Austria,

1. Father took to France 1921.
2. Place of Residence Versaille,
3. Lyceum in Versaille 1926 - 1938
4. Data on father
   Franz Reiner
   Geological engineer
   Occupied by petroleum & coal concern
   in the valley de la Mur (South Austria)
   and Zterdorf (for petroleum)
   He studied in Berg schule in Freiberg
   Germany near Dresden.
5. Anschluss 11 Mars 1938
6. Returned to Austria Dec 1938
7. Joined Hitler Youth 1939
8. 1939 October joined Germany army
9. Stuttgard preliminary training
10. April 1940 assigned to training school
    for Wehrmacht in Headquarters Berlin
    Assignment teach french,
11. 1944 - Sargent
12. 1944 - Western front - during Battle of Bulge

201-233477

You were wounded and taken prisoner
by Air Forces. (82nd Airborne Div)

13. You were were in Prison camp France
until March 1946.

14. After 1946. Clermont - Ferrant, France
employed in

15. Return Austria 1948. Father still living
Mother dead.

16. 1948 - 1953 ARTS et METIERS (Chalons/Marne)

17. 1953 - 1955 Paris Rue de Vaugirard.

18. 1955 - Return Wien

TSD/TRAINING EVALUATION

NAME WIROGUE

DIVISION AF/W/1

SUBJECT Tutorial Secret Writing

DATES TRAINED 2-4 November 1960

1. During the three-day period WIROGUE received some six hours training in the operational usage of Secret Writing, covering the specifics of his own components of the two SW systems assigned for his operation. The instruction was given in an AF safehouse and was presented entirely in English.

2. In consonance with his own requirements the agent was given a briefing in the principles and practices of SW as a clandestine means of communication in covert operations,--plans at this writing envisage the use of SW only for emergency commo. It was repeatedly emphasized that the success of an SW letter depends 50% upon the unobtrusive "normalcy" of the open text and 50% upon the preparation of the SW text itself.

3. Terminal Evaluation --

a. WIROGUE demonstrated that he could adequately prepare letters bearing a carbon-type secret ink which would meet operational requirements. He is a very meticulous worker and possesses a high degree of manual dexterity--ambidextrously, yet!

b. He quite adequately mastered the development procedures for his assigned receiving system.

4. The agent's training specifically covered the following:

a. Writing techniques with a carbon-type ink

b. Scorch development of SW

c. Standard defense measures for carbon-ink writing

d. Use of glancing light in defensive and offensive examination for SW

e. Relative placements of the SW and overt texts on the lettersheet

f. Discussion of cover letters and indicators.

201-233477

5. The operational supplies passed to the Instructor by SAB were issued to WIROGUE at the completion of the training.

CI/CE Reflections:

1. WIROGUE in the opening phases of the instruction indicated (from a sense of modesty, I presume) that he was completely unfamiliar with SW. During training sessions the caliber of his questions, observations and even of some of the steps in SW technique which he independently suggested for use all definitely indicated to the writer that he was quite familiar and/or somewhat experienced in SW practices.

WILLIAM C. LITTLE, Instructor
TSD/TRNG/Technical School

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Africa

SUBJECT: General - Administrative
Specific - Contract - Ernest G. MAYCRINK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed for your information and retention is a copy of Ernest G. MAYCRINK's contract.

PAULA T. HENNEGAR

DUDLEY G. FOSHEE
8 December 1960

Attachment:
Contract - MAYCRINK

Distribution:
2 - Leopoldville

201-233477

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 8 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED: 10 DEC 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: ACLS-149

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Mr. Ernest G. Mayerick

31 October

Dear Mr. Mayerink: ~~[illegible]~~

31 October

Effective ~~[illegible]~~ 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

|| 3. Travel. ?

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

201-233477

5. Repayment. It is recognised that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1) If, in the performance of activities under this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Government will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability benefits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its sole discretion deems proper; provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of activities hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, willful misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $5000 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragraph (1) above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such payment is to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to whom payment by the U. S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under this agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient manner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an area mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by the United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognise and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover venture in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture must be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing your activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture the Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing promissory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an account in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against that deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Government shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative overseeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may retain any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearly understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement is the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by

you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official business capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this organization.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of ~~[illegible]~~ 1 November 1960, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By ______ actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Ernest G. Mayerink

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BERN

ACTION : C/FD 2 (MR GRAHAM, FD, NOTIFIED 1812 12 DEC 60)

INFO : C/AF, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 12 2246Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 15973

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

OPIM DIR LEOP CITE BERN 6595

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 13116 (NOT SENT LEOP) (out 95707)

BERN 6537 (IN 49492)

1. BY CHANCE DURING VISIT GRAHAM WITH INTEGRITY 1 LATTER'S OFFICE 1530 HOURS MONDAY 12 DEC INTEGRITY 1 RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM LEOPOLDVILLE FROM A FNU HOFHUIS.

2. HOFHUIS TOLD INTEGRITY 1 HE HAD HIS POSSESSION CHECK SIGNED BY GEORG F; REINER FOR SWISS FRANCS 12,000. ALSO HAS LETTER CREDIT PAYABLE REINER AND SAID REINER GAVE TO HIM FOR SECURITY UNTIL CHECK PAID. HOFHUIS ASKED INTEGRITY 1 IF HE WOULD PAY CHECK. WHILE HOLDING HOFHUIS OTHER END PHONE INTEGRITY 1 ASKED GRAHAM FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

3. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES GRAHAM TOLD INTEGRITY 1 TO STALL HOFHUIS BY TELLING HOFHUIS WOULD PHONE HIM AT LEOP 2839 (WHICH NUMBER SUPPLIED BY HOFHUIS) AND SAY IF WOULD PAY CHECK. HOFHUIS SAID WOULD WAIT EXACTLY 24 HOURS FOR INTEGRITY PHONE CALL.

4. HOFHUIS WOULD NOT TELL INTEGRITY WHY HE HAD REINER'S

DESENSITIZED

SECRET per CSN 43-43

CHECK AND LETTER CREDIT. HOFHUIS SAID REINER STAYING HOTEL ASTRID.

5. REQUEST IMMED ADVICE ON WHETHER OR NOT INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD TELL HOFHUIS HE WILL PAY CHECK BEARING MIND LETTER OF CREDIT IS IRREVOCABLE AND INTEGRITY 1 OBLIGED PAY FACE AMOUNT EVEN IF CHECK HONORED.

6. OBVIOUSLY REINER NOT AWARE HE CANNOT WRITE CHECK AGAINST LETTER OF CREDIT. SHOULD LEOP REACH REINER AND LEARN WHAT REINER TRYING TO DO? WHY DOES NOT REINER NEGOTIATE LETTER CREDIT LOCAL BANK? WE FEAR SERIOUS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS JEOPARDIZING OUR SOURCE IF CHECKS WRITTEN REINER FLOAT AROUND LEOPOLDVILLE OR NEGOTIATED BY HOFHUIS BY MEANS ILLEGAL PRESENT CONGO GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT SGFLAG CABLES.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: MR GRAHAM
UNIT:
EXT: 55
DATE:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: BERN LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: *C/FD 2

INFO: C/AF, S/C 2

1 copy

PRECEDENCE

☐	DEFERRED	3 DEC 60 01 35z	
☐	ROUTINE		
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
☒	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT52272
OUT 52272

TO 6P1m BERN LEOP INFO [redacted] CITE DIR 16116
16116

RYBAT WJ ROGUE

par CSH 43-43

RE BERN 6537 (IN 15973) **

1. INTEGRITY 1 SHOULD ADVISE HOFHUIS CHECK IS GOOD. CASH CHECK AND RETURN LETTER CREDIT TO REINER.

2. FOR LEOP. CONTACT REINER, PICK UP LETTER CREDIT AND POUCH BERN FOR DISPOSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

**. [illegible] REFERENCE. POSSIBLY BERN 6595 (IN 15973).

R Grah

MR GRAHAM, FD
BY DIRECTION
MR HOUCK, AF

[redacted]
par CSH 43-43

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

587

TE : 29 NOV 60

: DIRECTOR

OM : BERN

TION : C/EE 3

FO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DE[illegible] CSN 43-43

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 29 2233Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 49492

LEOP INFO DIR CITE BERN 6537

RYBAT WIROGUE

1. WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. WILL CONTACT. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,020 SWISS FRANCS.

2. ROISTADE ETA HQS 1 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED

201-233477

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT

IB MEMO NO. 5238
29 November 1960

[illegible]
per CSN 43-43

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa West/2

ATTENTION : Mr. Daniel Niesciur

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Austrian Documentation for WIROGUE

1. This is to confirm the handcarrying of the following Austrian Documentation by Mr. Daniel Niesciur on 18 November 1960:

a. Austrian Passport No. 546226
b. Austrian Driver's License
c. International Certificate of Vaccination
d. Baptism Certificate
e. Business Letter from Arthur Döll and Son, Berlin
f. Pocket Litter - Brouchers, Austria, West Berlin
g. General Information on Documentation Cover Story
h. Itinerary as reflected in Passport
i. Explanation of Passport Entries
j. Instruction for Signing Documentation

2. The documentation (above items, a,b,c,) is to be aged after WIROGUE has signed them. It is our understanding that WIROGUE will use subject documentation to travel from West Germany to Leopoldville, Congo, via Switzerland and Italy.

3. It is requested that the subject documentation be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed for operational purposes.

C. Tapikre,
for CHARLES YECH, JR.
CHIEF, TSD/IB

Distribution:
Original and 1 - Addressee

[illegible]TIZED
[illegible] 43-43

201-233477

SECRET RYBAT

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

778

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: FRANKFURT, FROB

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 7

INFO: COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	24 Nov 60 00 08z
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT95876
95876

[illegible] Per CSN 43-43

TO FRAN, FROB INFO CITE DIR 13266
13266

WIROGUE RYBAT

PLS ADVISE CHARLES ROISTADE THAT BERN DISCOVERS CANNOT ISSUE LETTER OF CREDIT CONGO FRANCS. MIGHT CONSIDER GERMAN DM's BUT TAKE UP WITH BERN STATION.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/AF/[illegible]
DC/EE/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~CHIEF~~, EE/OPS/W
RELEASING OFFICER

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

P.O. Box 54
Canal Street Station
New York 13, N.Y.

SECRET

22 November 1960

TO : Chief, Africa Division
ATTEN. : Daniel R. Niesciur AF/W/2 2110 I Building
FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)
SUBJECT : LETTER ADDRESS
229496

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 9 November 1960 requesting the establishment of a post office box in New York City in the name of Clifford N. MIRKINSON

2. This will confirm advice furnished your office on 18 November 1960 that the requested address has been established as follows:

Clifford N. MIRKINSON
Post Office Box 54
Canal Street Station
New York 13, New York

3. This address will be maintained for an indefinite period and will be serviced twice weekly. Daniel R. Niesciur extension 8284 will be notified upon receipt of mail.

4. Non-registered, first class and air mail, bearing the above address as a return address, may be mailed by you at any convenient letter box in the area where this facility is established. Registered mail and parcel post should be forwarded to this office for secure mailing. Any mail having special security significance should be coordinated with this office prior to mailing. Mail bearing the above address as a return address should not be handled by the Central Mail Room.

5. It is requested that you advise this office when the above address is no longer of use to you. Any inquiries concerning this facility should be directed to the SB/3 Desk of this office, Room ~~IXXX~~ 1409 I Building, Extension 3933.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White
Victor R. White

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

TO: TSD/IB

DATE 18 November 1960

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. ________ DATED ________ AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ________

Affidavit of Identity in Lieu of Passport No. 05721 issued to David SLEZNER

____
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

WIROGUE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

17 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

ATTENTION : Monetary Branch

SUBJECT : Opening Bank Account for Georg Franz REINER

1. It is hereby requested that an account be opened and a sum of four thousand dollars be deposited in a bank in Switzerland under the name of Georg Franz REINER. Subsequently a letter of credit in the amount of 150,000 Belgian Congo Francs ($3,000.00) is to be provided REINER, in Switzerland.

2. To facilitate the transaction and expedite this request, Messrs. Daniel R. Niesciur and Georg Franz Reiner will be in Bern on 28 November. Mr. Niesciur will contact the station and will act as an intermediary between the Bern Station and REINER who is a contract agent.

3. Your assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, AF Division

SECRET

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

2778

ORIG: LESTER C. HOUCK
UNIT: C/AF/WEST
EXT: 3939
DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: FRANKFURT, FROM
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 7
INFO: COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 24 Nov 60 03 08z
[X] ROUTINE
PRIORITY — INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

OUT95876

CITE DIR 13266

13266

TO FRAN, FROM INFO

WIROGUE RYBAT

PLS ADVISE CHARLES ROISTADE THAT BERN DISCOVERS CANNOT ISSUE LETTER OF CREDIT CONGO FRANCS. MIGHT CONSIDER GERMAN DM's BUT TAKE UP WITH BERN STATION.

END OF MESSAGE.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

C/AF/W
DC/EE/G
COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~CHIEF~~, EE/OPS/W
RELEASING OFFICER

BRONSON TWEEDY, C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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Copy No.

349

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 22 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : *COP, C/EE 3, S/C 2, D/OS 2

NOV 22 1955Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 46297

DIR CITE FRAN 7456

FJDUST WIROGUE

REF DIR 12432 (OUT 94095)

MR PAUL R FENNIG ETD FRAN 1630 LOCAL 23 NOVEMBER VIA MATS FLIGHT 424. ETA ANDREWS 0900 LOCAL 24 NOVEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION SAME AS REFERENCED CABLE.

SECRET

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

DATE : 216 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

NOV 18 1726Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 44534

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

PRITY DIR INFO FRAN LEOP CITE FROB 8223

~~RYBAT~~ ZIBET WIROGUE CATARSI

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

REF DIR 11912 Out 93109

1. SAFE HOUSE AVAILABLE. CALL MILITARY 3324 AND ASK FOR ED OR DAVE. IDENTIFY SELF BY TRUE FIRST NAME. IF AFTER 1730 CALL ED FRANKFURT CIVILIAN 521813 OR DAVE 523466.

2. DESIRE PRIOR MEET WITH ROISTADE FOR BRIEFING ON CASE BEFORE ASSIGNING SAFE HOUSE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: ROISTADE WOULD REQUIRE SAFE HOUSE FOR FIVE DAYS TO QUARTER AND BRIEF WIROGUE PRIOR TO LATTERS DISPATCH.

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

201-233477

SECRET

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Copy No.

670

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

670

ORIG: D. [illegible]
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 3966
DATE: 16 November 1960

TO: [illegible]
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3 *
INFO: COP, C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1	Alw	4	
2		5	
3	Cinap	6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	NOV 18 23 24 '60
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

94095
OUT94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432
12432

WIROGUE FJDUST KYBAT
RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

WIROGUE AND KUSODA ESCORT MR. PAUL R. FENNIG ~~[illegible]~~ DEPARTING ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE AT 1500 HRS 21 NOV VIA MATS AIRCRAFT NUMBER 423. ETA FRAN 22 NOV AT 1540 HRS LOCAL TIME. PLS MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONFIRMATION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR FJDUST NOT USED.
**STATED WIROGUE WAS BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP LATE NOVEMBER.

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

OS/KB
EE/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Daniel Niesciur, AF/W/2

NO. ACLW-192

DATE 22 NOV 15 Nov. 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/AF/WEST	15 NOV 1960	16 NOV 1960	
2.			
3. Chief, Africa Division			
4.			
5. AF/RI	18 NOV	1960	
6.			
7. RID/CRO	21 NOV [illegible]		
8.			
9. RID/DP	2/1		
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 56

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROCESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational
WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED, REFERENCES

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)
B. LEOP 0225 (IN 36750)

1. The plans and development of the WIROGUE project have reached a point whereby a summation of the progress made and the plans for the future is in order. At this writing it is anticipated that WIROGUE/1 will be on the Leopoldville scene on the first of December.

2. WIROGUE/1 had originally been recruited in Europe for a REDSOX operation. He was flown to PBPRIME "black" and underwent an extensive training program. This included survival, small arms and other similar type PM training. After a year of such training the project failed to materialize, as a result subject was preparing for resettlement in South America. The AF/Division took interest in WIROGUE/1 and after an assessment decided that with his peculiar background, talents and general makeup he could effectively be utilized along the lines cited in reference A. On 21 October 1960 the case was transferred officially to the Africa Division.

3. Since that date to the present, every effort has been made to psychologically orient WIROGUE/1 for this assignment and to prepare him operationally for its fulfillment. To insure the security of the operation, prevent any identification with ODYOKE and/or KUBARK, and to preclude any unexpected uncovery of WIROGUE/1's past which would associate him with his pre-KUBARK life, a number of basic steps were taken. These were:

a. WIROGUE/1 underwent plastic surgery, which changed the shape of his nose.

b. A toupee had been made for his constant use. This and the plastic surgery have altered him sufficiently to obviate any recognition.

Distribution:
2-Leopoldville

201-233477

DATE TYPED
14 Nov, 1960

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLW-192

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. AGLX-192

c. Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show that WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME. (See separate cover attachment A).

4. It is planned at this time to take WIROGUE/1 "black" to Germany. There he will be met by the undersigned, given his Austrian documentation, contact instructions and letter of credit, stripped of any PBPRIME clothing or personal effects, and dispatched. He is to proceed to Leopoldville on his own and upon arrival make contact. The cover assignment for subject is temporarily left open, although he has been told to look into the prospects of opening a photo or general repair shop. He has actually done photographic work but the decision on this we will leave to your on-the-spot judgment. The letter of credit for three thousand dollars is to be used to finance this venture. There will also be a reserve of one thousand dollars in a Swiss account should expenses necessitate a greater outlay. This money will constitute an non-interest bearing, operational loan which must be repaid by WIROGUE/1 from profits over a period of years. All other profits after the loan is paid off will be WIROGUE/1's.

5. A word about the manner of man with whom we are dealing. He is a small, energetic individual, who has displayed shrewdness, cunning, ingenuity and inventiveness. He has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities. Excitement and intrigue are important factors in his life, he relishes it and as a result may be a little delicate to handle. WIROGUE/1 likes order and clear cut chains of command. He admires the Prussian approach and as a result will take orders even if he may disagree. It is important to him to have the trust and confidence of his case officer. If in his own mind he feels assured of this and is confident of the professional KUTUBE-type competence of the CO, he will reciprocate in kind. He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. One last thought which may be useful. Best results will probably be gotten if, when given an assignment, he be permitted to accomplish it in his own way. The latter is connected with his idea of trust and confidence. ?

CHARLES H. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment A (under separate cover)

FORM 10-57 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO ACLW-192

[illegible]
per CSH 43-43

1. An Austrian passport, birth certificate and drivers license have been prepared for issuance containing following biographic data:

Name: George Frans REINER
POB: Salsburg, Austria
DOB: 25 July 1921
Fathers name: Frans REINER
Mothers name: Marianna nee ZIELITZ
Occupation: Engineer
Marital status: single
Height: 1 meter 70 centemeters
Weight: 58 kilo's
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown

Distinguishing marks: tips of forefinger and thumb right hand missing. Identical fingers left hand scarred.

2. Documents will reflect travel only in Europe, with no indication of PBPRIME tenure.

[illegible]
SECRET per CSH 43-43

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: WIROGUE

TYPE OF ACTION		XX FI/CI	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Africa	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Leopoldville	
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH AF/W/2	DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Daniel Miesciur	
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 2108	BUILDING I	EXTENSION 3629

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/AF/W	Lester C. Houck	3 Oct.				
C/AF/P&P	Charles Garity Charles Garity	3 Oct				
C/AF/SS	Theodore M. Fransen T. M. Fransen	10/4/61				
AF/COP/FI	Paul Springer Paul Springer per	10/10/61				
C/AF	Bronson Tweedy	10-10-61				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

DDP/PG	Thomas E. Kelly	11 Oct 61				

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
	30 Sept 61	$ —	196	$
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(5)

Termination

1. Project: WIROGUE

2. Objectives:

   A. To provide a long term, deep cover asset in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas.

   B. To establish a principal agent in the Republic of Congo, in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities.

   C. To provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover.

3. Reason for termination:

Subject's poor performance and lack of operational security coupled with his possible arrest by the Congolese authorities necessitated the removal from the area of WIROGUE/1. Once this was accomplished there was little or no possibility to continue the project.

4. Effectiveness of project:

WIROGUE/1 did manage to establish himself in a position of potential value and therein implement the objectives of the project. However the local situation curtailed his effectiveness and his lack of appreciation of the need for operational security ended his usefulness.

5. Date of Termination:

7 September 1961.

6. Status of Commitments:

No commitments were made to WIROGUE/1 and quit claim was procured.

7. Plans for disposition funds, etc:

WIROGUE/1 was paid a flat sum of $2000.00 which constituted his termination bonus, was given his documentation and transported to Germany where contact was broken. He had been given a letter drop with SR/DCB for future contact. It was agreed that he would keep CIA apprised via the [redacted] drop.

8. Risks: *

The only outstanding risk which WIROGUE/1 may present to CIA would be the identification of current members of the Leopoldville Station to a hostile service. The possibility of this occuring is remote since there is still a hope on W/1 part to work for CIA in the future, however, it does exist. There are no other risks in our judgment.

9. Cost:

$2000.00	termination bonus
250.00	Transportation to Germany
2900.00	write-off unpaid balance of ops loan
$5150.00	Total

10. NA

11. NA

* It is now learned subject has returned to Leopoldville. Although subject stated that he would not cause any trouble, his presence in Leopoldville may cause complications.

DD/P 0-6117

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project WIROGUE (Approval)

AF - Leopoldville

1. The attached project, originating in AF Division, is presented for approval for the period 1 November 1960 through 31 October 1961. The purpose of the project is to establish a long-term deep-cover asset in the Republic of Congo in the form of a foreign national contract agent who will open a small business in Leopoldville.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $17,250 from the DD/P-AF Division budget: $13,250 in fiscal year 1961 and $4,000 in fiscal year 1962, subject to the availability of funds. The funds requested included $9,000 salary and allowances; $1,250 travel expenses; $5,000 operational loan; and $2,000 operational expenses.

3. The attached project outline sets forth the background and concept of the project and is accompanied by a fiscal annex. The agent, WIROGUE/1, is a stateless person who was recruited and trained for a REDSOX operation involving a black mission to the USSR under Project AESENTINEL. That project was postponed for a year and in June 1960 was abandoned. In the interim WIROGUE/1 has been working with TSD at a covert site in cataloging information from East German documents and developing or improving methods for picking locks. WIROGUE/1 was born in Georgia, USSR, in 1913. He spent the period from 1922 until World War II in Paris, France. He served in the French Foreign Legion, volunteered in 1942 for work in Germany and spent considerable time in German prisons and concentration camps as a result of being arrested for forgery. He has a prison record for burglary in France subsequent to World War II. He has had schooling and experience in mechanical engineering, as a camera technician and in commercial photography.

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

He also has invented various labor saving and photomechanical devices. He has had practical experience in the forgery and fabrication of documents. WIROGUE/1 was brought to the U.S. "black" for training in connection with the AESENTINEL operation. It is contemplated that he will be flown "black" to West Germany where he will be surfaced as an Austrian citizen with a legend of having worked in various concerns in West Germany subsequent to World War II. ~~He~~ will proceed to Leopoldville where, with a $4,000 operational loan, he will open a small photo or repair shop which it is expected will give him a degree of freedom of movement and provide for covert contact. It is estimated that there is a need for technicians in the Republic of Congo at the present time. The project has been coordinated with the Chief of Station, Leopoldville.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components concur in recommending renewal. Both CI and FI Staff express certain reservations in view of the background and adventurous nature of the agent, and emphasize the necessity of exercising firm operational and personal control over him at all times.

5. I recommend approval of Project WIROGUE as presented, and endorse the observations of the Staffs noted in paragraph 4 above.

fr S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

18 NOV 1960
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline WIROGUE
Fiscal Annex

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff
For CI Staff -s/C. Tenney

SECRET

SECRET

PROJECT ACTION COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM: WIROGUE/1

OPERATING DIVISION: AF/W/1

FIELD STATION: Leopoldville Republic of Congo

TARGET AREA: Republic of Congo

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Daniel Niesciur

ROOM NO 2110 I

EXTENSION 8284

DATE 16 November 1960

1. Authority is requested to obligate $17, 250.00 from the DDP/AF Division Budget: $13,250.00 FY 61 and $4,000.00 FY 62. The funds to cover the amount requested FY 61 will be absorbed within the Division current budget allocation. Period of project is from 1 November 1960 to 31 October 1962.

2. An OA, C-73532 was granted on 11 March 1959, and amended 3 October 1960.

3. Form 689 is attached.

COORDINATION:

C.W. Tenney DC/CI/Ops (see note in routing sheet)
16 Nov 60

Chief, AF/West

Chief, AF Support

Chief, AF/FI

Glenn Fields
Chief, AF Division

11-16-60
Date

SECRET

[redacted] [redacted]

SECRET

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM - WIROGUE/1

1. Area of Operations and Purpose

Republic of Congo (former Belgium Congo) - engage in operational support activity.

2. Objectives

A. To provide a long term, deep cover asset in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas.

B. To establish a principle agent in the Republic of Congo, in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities.

C. To provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover.

These objectives are in line with the RMD.

3. Personnel

A. Pertinent Biographical Information:

201-0233477

Pseudonym - [redacted]

Place of birth - Gori, Georgia, USSR

Date of birth - 12 July 1918

Sex - Male

Race - Caucasian

Religion - none

Marital status - Divorced (wife and 2 children - one son and one daughter)

Citizenship - Stateless

Education:

1922-24	Paris, Notre Dame, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Lycee Montagne, uncomp., change of family address
1925	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of family address
1926	Viroflex, Lycee Hoche, uncomp., expelled for pranks
1926	Paris, Ecole Commule, uncomp., change of address
1931	Paris-Vanves, Ecole Michelet, 6 mo comp, expelled for insubordination

SECRET

1933-35 Chalon S. Marne Art et Metier, Technical Engineering School, attended one and one half years and expelled

1936-37 Paris, Ecole Breguet, Electro-Engineering, attended one year earned first half of Baccaularaute in electro technology then expelled

1938-39 Paris, School of Photography and Movies, trained as cine camera operator technician, left after one and three fourths of a two year course due to outbreak of WW II in November 1939

Military History:

Dec 1939 - Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion
Jan 1940 - Tunis, North Africa, 1st Cav. Reg. 1st Squadron, 4th Platoon
Feb 1940 - Sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion, pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit
Mar-Aug 1940 - Barcares, assigned in Georgian unit
Aug 1940 - Paris, discharged at end of Franco/German hostilities

Employment History:

1942 - Paris, volunteered for work in Germany
Poelitz, worked for HIDRYER WERKE for one year as installation electrician
Paris, self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography
Berlin, photographer of metals for a factory which produces electrodes for welding instruments
Berlin, assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory director for labor saving device he manufacture of device for automatic adjustment of cartridge cases
Muegelheim, driver mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corp.) Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wall by Germans.
1943 - Berlin, employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language
1946-47 - Paris, employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of proto-type model builder
1951-52 - Paris (in prison), devised and sold on the French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison
1953 - Rion (in prison), devised and gave to prison administrator, invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator
Dec 1955 to Apr 1956 - Gap, employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator
1956-57 - Gap, invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market

1958 - Ambert, invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns
1959-60 - U.S., devised and passed drawings for two pieces of equipment for use in Project AESENTINEL
July 1960 - U.S., presently working on a low-cost telephone answering device

Occupational Specialities:

Mechanical electrical engineering
Cine or portrait photography
Research and innovation of labor/cost saving devices

Languages and Dialects:

French - native
German - very good
Georgian - fluent spoken; reading and writing good
English - speaking and writing fair; reading fluent
Spanish - speaking and writing poor; reading good
Russian-poor

Special Skills:

Experience in document forgery
1942-Achen-Berlin, altered own documents
1942-Berlin-Paris, filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Made other authentications stamps for other people interested in travel across German held territory
1943-44-Berlin, fabricated stamps and cachets for travel documents. Used photo techniques for changing and/or aging pictures in documents. Also reassembled old false passports to form new ones, as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.

B. Operational Information:

1. Circumstances of Recruitment -

The agent was first contacted in October 1958 as a result of a lead from AEPADDLE. He was recruited in April 1959 by the Frankfurt Station, for a REDSOX operation. There had been some difficulty in the initial recruitment, since it could not be resolved as to whether or not he could work amicably with another agent in the proposed operation. After psychological assessments and LCFLUTTER examination, it was decided to recruit subject. He was assigned the crypto AEASPIC. In April 1959 subject was brought to the DCB, via a HBRAINBOW flight. Subject was trained in the AESENTINAL project for a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team. This project was postponed for a year. In the interim he was assigned to TSD, where he was employed at a covert site, involving the cataloguing of specific information from East German Documents, and developing and/or improving tools and methods for picking locks. On 17 June 1960, it was decided that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out. On receipt of this information SR/DOB endeavored to place subject elsewhere, where his training would be beneficial. The African Division expressed interest and had agreed to utilize him as a result of assessments. During the period from the 21st of October until dispatch, subject will be carried on OOA funds.

2. Security Flaps -

A. During the latter part of WW II subject was arrested by the German police for forgery. He was not unduly held by the criminal investigation branch of the police but passed on to the Gestapo. Subject was brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. Later he was tried and sentenced to death. For some unknown reason he was moved from jail to jail, concentration camp to concentration camp. While in prison he resorted to a "ruse de guerre" and told the Germans his father had invented a motor that could run without gasoline. He offered to draw the designs of the motor and was able to stall long enough to be liberated by components of the advancing U.S. Army.

B. In 1946-47 subject and an accomplice committed two robberies of jewelry stores.

C. In 1949 subject robbed a bank of 1,000,000 Fr. fr. His accomplice was apprehended and shortly thereafter confessed, implicating subject. Subject was apprehended while attempting to cross the Franco-Spanish border. He was sentenced to ten years in prison of which he served only five, receiving parole for good behavior. Upon release in 1955, he was exiled on parole to Gap, France where he worked as an architect.

D. To our knowledge thereis no indication that subject is known to be associated with KUBARK.

3. Agent's knowledge of sensitive matters - has met the following KUBARKERS:

Anthony H. FRIGANZA (P)
Patrick B. NEWENS (P)
Peter K. WINSHIP (P)
Dexter E. ROSTEDT (P)
Fred KIRKPATRICK (T)
George F. MUNS (T)
Michael RAE (T)
Charles R. ROLSTADE (P) Mr. Dan
Paul E. LEIGHTON (P) Dr. Johns

Subject does not know that he is working for KUBARK. He knows that he is connected with some intelligence organization, e.g., ODIEEX. He does not know anything about KUBARK organization nor its modus operandi.

4. Security of meeting sites, communications, etc:

These will have to be worked out in the field by subject's case officer. In general it is proposed to have him be surfaced in Germany as an Austrian and from there, making his own way to Leopoldville. There he is to establish a small repair or photo shop. This would provide a natural reason for his CO or anyone to visit him under the guise of cvert business. Longer meetings would be held clandestinely as determined by his CO. All communication channels will have to be worked out in the field. However until contact is established, a secure emergency channel with Headquarters is being established. This channel is to be used only in the event subject finds himself stranded or for dire emergency.

5. Security:

The agent is very security conscious and will follow any direction in the interest of secuirty

6. Control:

On this point here are several aspects for consideration. He is under contract to us and although he is not too interested in money, he does enjoy its benefits and realizes that it will continue so long as he does a good job. The more important built in control is the fact that he will be under false documents, and being stateless, he is completely dependent on KUBARK to perpetuate his quasi legal existence and to eventually legalize his status. Added to this is the control which stems from the prospect of resettlement in another country. This would give him status as a citizen. Realizing these points, subject is more than willing to play ball with us.

7. Prior contacts with any security service:

As stated in 3B (2) above, the only brush subject has had in the past was with Gestapo and French police. These were prior to his recruitment by KUBARK and were not as a result of I.S. activity.

8. Training of agent:

He had received training in covert black border operations. In addition, he is being trained in small arms and demolition.

9. Cover effectiveness and the operation of the cover facility:

Subject will open a small photo or repair shop, which will give him a degree of latitude in movement and a cover for covert contact. Subject has undergone plastic surgery in order to change his appearance, also a toupe was made to further assist in the changing of his outward appearance. This action was designed to preclude any possibility of recognition by former French associates, particularly since he is to pass as an Austrian. The cover facility, as stated, will offer access to all classes of people, it will provide a natural means for contact, and will permit subject to make trips under the guise of business travel.

WIROGUE/1 will be required to set himself up in business. The dearth of qualified technicians will help facilitate his opening an establishment. WIROGUE/1 will need capital to set himself up, buy needed supplies and have working funds. For the purpose of providing him with funds to establish and open this cover business, we will advance him $4000.00 as an operational loan, to be secured with a non-interest bearing promisary note. An additional $1000.00 will be held in reserve, should he need more money. Ostensibly it will represent his own savings, and will be deposited in a Swiss bank. Provision will be made to pay this money back from his profits. After the loan is paid off, WIROGUE is to keep the profits he may make.

He will initially transfer $1000.00 to a bank in Leopoldville. We are certain that he will not abscond with the funds, since his documentation will be false and his pay and allowances total $8500 per annum, he would therefore stand to lose a great deal more than he would gain.

Being a contract agent, there is ample control if he shows signs of spending too much time in the pursuit of profits from his cover business.

His salary and allowances will be paid in part to a personal account in Switzerland (separate from his business account). This money will ostensibly also represent his savings. The remainder will be paid directly at the station.

C. Security Estimate:

WIROGUE had been recruited in France and exfiltrated black from West Germany to SR/DOB. He has had no known I.S. connections in the past. He will be surfaced in West Germany and will proceed to Leopoldville. He will be documented as an Austrian.

4. Background

The need for various technicians to stabilize the chaotic conditions in Leopoldville coupled with an urgent need for controlled assets in that city gave rise to this project. WIROGUE's particular talents, experience, ability and training open up a wide varietyof possibilities.

5. Evaluation

There will be a need for WIROGUE to establish and live his cover. This is anticipated to take several months. Hence he will become operational in early 1961. However, it is reasonable to expect that the station will undoubtedly place him in covert role much sooner. Nonetheless, we do not anticipate any FI take prior to mid 1961.

6. Coordination

Coordination at Headquarters is being effected with FI Staff, Finance Division and SSA/DDS.

7. References

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) RYBAT
B. DIR 08783 (OUT 86555) RYBAT
C. DIR 08443 (OUT 85967)

8. Timetable:

His covert training will be completed by 15 November 1960. He will be briefed on his cover story, documents, contact instructions, etc., 15-18 November 1960. On/about 18-20 November he will be flown black to West Germany. There he will spend 5 to 7 days to familiarize himself with Germany, receive his final briefing and obtain a visa, then depart for Leopoldville arriving o/a 1 December in Leopoldville. Once there he will require 1-2 months to look over the business possibilities and establish himself.

9. Approval Period and Cost

A. Approval is requested for one years starting 1 November 1960.

B. Following is breakdown of the costs:

1.	Salary at $500.00 per month	$6000.00
2.	Per diem during travel	250.00
3.	Travel to Leopoldville	1000.00
4.	Operational loan	5000.00
5.	Operational expenses	2000.00
6.	Allowances (flat sum)	3000.00
	Total	$17250.00

10. Emergency Situation

In all present and anticipated conditions with the exception of a hot war, the agent will have clandestine means of communication with his CO in the ODACID installation and with Headquarters. For contingencies an emergency SW system has been given to agent for direct communication with Headquarters.

S E C R E T

FISCAL ANNEX

Project WIROGUE-LOAN

Purpose: The objective of this project is to provide a long term, deep cover asset, a contract agent, WIROGUE/1, in the Republic of Congo and adjacent areas in order to build a covert net in support of operational activities and to provide an asset for utility support for KUBARK personnel under official cover. For cover purposes, WIROGUE/1 will establish his own business, a small photo or repair shop, which will give him a degree of latitude in movement and a cover for covert contact.

To assist WIROGUE/1 in establishing his business KUBARK will loan him up to $5,000 on his personal notes, non-interest bearing and due on demand. The initial loan will be in the amount of $4,000. An additional $1,000 loan will be made when, in the opinion of the Chief, Africa Division, it is required and necessary for the business to continue and operate.

Funding: Up to $5,000 in U.S. currency or the equivalent in foreign currencies may be advanced to WIROGUE/1 as loans. The loaned funds will be passed to WIROGUE/1 in a manner agreeable to Chief, Africa Division and Chief, Finance Division. All funds loaned to WIROGUE/1 will be secured by U.S. dollar, non-interest bearing notes payable to bearer on demand. Such notes will be prepared by or approved by the Office of General Counsel. It is anticipated that an initial $4000 will be deposited in a Swiss bank, ostensibly representing his own savings, by KUBARK, Monetary Branch.

Accounting and Write-off: WIROGUE/1 will be required to sign receipts for all funds loaned to him. Finance Division is authorized to accept these receipts as a charge to expense and to set up the loans payable in a memorandum account without a due date. The notes signed by WIROGUE/1 shall be transmitted to Finance Division for safekeeping. Repayment of the loan shall be made from business profits. WIROGUE/1 will be required to submit quarterly income and expense statements on his cover business and also copies of all tax returns filed in connection with his cover business. A copy of all income and expense statements and tax returns will be forwarded to Finance Division. It shall be the responsibility of the Chief, Africa Division to determine when profits warrant payments on the leans and to effect such repayments.

For purposes of control and collection, WIROGUE/1 will be required to sign blank checks on his Swiss and African business bank accounts.

Glenn Fields
Chief, Africa Division

Concur:
11/16/60
Chief, Finance Division

Approved: 17 NOV 1960
Frank P. Bishop SSA/DDS

S E C R E T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. HIESCTUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 3966
DATE : 15 November 1960

637

637

TO : FROB
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED

PER CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
[✓ ROUTINE]
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS
INITIALS

16 23 1
CABLE

OUT 93109

OUT 93109

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11912

11912

ZIBET WIROGUE RYBAT

REF: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)*

1. CHARLES R. ROISTADE (IDEN) ETA FRAN 21 NOV. WILL REQUIRE SAFE HOUSE FOR FIVE DAYS TO QUARTER AND BRIEF WIROGUE PRIOR TO LATTERS DISPATCH. PLS ASSIST.

2. 1200 DOLLAR ADVANCE AUTHORIZED ROISTADE. T/A HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

*DESK COMMENT: Ref RYBAT.

EE/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

PER CSN 43-43

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 3966
DATE : 15 November 1960

633

638

TO : FROB
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : FRAN, LEOP COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 15 23 22 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT93110
OUT 93110

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11913

11913

REF: DIR 11912 (OUT 93109)

IDEN: DANIEL NIESCIUR

END OF MESSAGE

Signal Center: Pls. ref attached cable

KE/C
CAF/W
AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/KE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

SECRET

9 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Support Division

ATTENTION : Mr. John Lavery

SUBJECT : Obtaining Post Office Box

1. It is hereby requested that a Post Office Box be opened in the New York City area under the name of Clifford N. MIRGINSON. The number and location of the box will be required prior to 18 November 1960. Servicing of the letter box will be required twice a week since its only function will be to serve as an emergency communication channel.

2. Any action pertaining to the letter box, and any letters received, should be refered to Mr. Daniel R. Niesciur, AF/W/2, X8284.

Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-233477

SECRET

DATE : 2 NOV

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

NOV 2 1715Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 36750

Rogue

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

DIR CITE LEOP 0225

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)*

1. WIROGUE ONE APPEARS BE JUST WHAT DOCTOR ORDERED. UNLESS HE CAN GET VISA RAPIDLY EUROPE, SUGGEST HE COME CONGO WITHOUT VISA. CAN GET FORTY-EIGHT HOUR VISA LEOP ON ARRIVAL PENDING RECEIPT LONGER VISA. BELIEVE LETTER OF CREDIT FROM EUROPEAN BANK IN AMOUNT ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND BCF WOULD PROVIDE PROOF HE WOULD NOT BECOME CHARGE OF STATE. ALSO SHOULD HAVE ROUND TRIP TICKET.

2. CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS: HE TO CALL GUTHMAN AT HOME (3315) OR TPELIDE ASAP AFTER ARRIVAL INTRODUCING SELF AS GUSTAVE. GUTHMAN WILL SUGGEST MEETING FOR DRINK. ACTUAL TIME OF MEETING TO BE TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME SET ON PHONE. MEETING PLACE WILL BE IN FRONT MAIN POST OFFICE. WIROGUE ONE SHOULD HAVE BOOK IN LEFT HAND AND UNLIGHTED CIGAR IN MOUTH. GUTHMAN WILL ASK IN FRENCH IF TELEPHONE OFFICE OPEN, ADDING HE HOPES PLACE CALL TO CHICAGO. WIROGUE ONE REPLY TO BE HE NOT CERTAIN RE PHONES AS HE THERE TO CABLE VIEN ANNOUNCING HIS ARRIVAL CONGO.

3. COVERS SUGGESTED REF APPEAR OKAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED THAT WIROGUE, CONTRACT AGENT BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP IN LATE NOV, BEING DOCUMENTED AS AUSTRIAN TO DEPART PBPRIME BLACK FOR SURFACING IN WEST GERMANY

SECRET

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE:

TO: Mr Niocieur

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS:

Your copy

FROM: C/AAS

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM [illegible]

2. Nº 2614

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS *(Check as appropriate)*

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT *(Per annum)* $ [illegible]	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $ [illegible]	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED *(Allowances, etc.)*.	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN *(Date)* [illegible]

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☒ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☒ YES ☐ NO

NAME OF COUNTRY [illegible]

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY *(Cryptonym)* N/A

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☑ COVERT *(If covert only, omit rest of this item.)* ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX *(Check one)*

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY.

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED

13. MARITAL STATUS *(Complete as appropriate)*

☒ SINGLE	☐ MARRIED	☐ WIDOWED	☐ DIVORCED
DATE OF MARRIAGE	DATE OF DEATH	DATE OF DECREE	☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED
			☐ ANNULLED

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE *(Country)*

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE *(Omit self and spouse)* N/A

RELATIONSHIP *(No names)*	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE

15. REMARKS SUBJECT, FOR [illegible] AND PURPOSES, IS A FIELD AGENT, COVERED BY PROJECT WIROGUE

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE [illegible] 61

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE 12 Apr 61

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT *(Explain when not signed)*

DATE

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)* N/A

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

Conditions

① Wants $3000.00 ← Three thousand to include this months salary

② Austrian documents

③ Ticket - Europe

④ Must have money prior to departure

⑤ Wants $200.00 now and one week here in U.S. before departure.

Claims that he would have earned $22500.00

Congo -	$15000.00
US	7500
	$22500

3000.00

Two months salary	1000.00
Bonus	1000.00
What is owed him	1000.00
	3000.00

14-00000

695 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. HIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 3966
DATE : 27 October 1960

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

Chrono
cc:
cc:
cc:

ROUTING	
1 AF/W	4
2	5
3 Chrono	

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED	OCT 28 2049Z 60 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X ROUTINE	
PRIORITY	INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86554
OUT 86554

(Sent to Desk, [illegible] informed [illegible])

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 08782

08782

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

WIROGUE RYBAT

1. WIROGUE (IDEN) CONTRACT AGENT BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGMENT LEOP IN LATE NOV. ENVISION USE AS UTILITY AGENT SUCH AS, (1) ORGANIZING AND CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE TEAM (2) INTERCEPTION OF POUCHES (3) BLOWING UP BRIDGES AND/OR (4) EXECUTING OTHER ASSIGMENTS REQUIRING POSITIVE ACTION. HIS UTILIZATION NOT TO BE RESTRICTED TO LEOP INDEED MAY BE SUBJECT CALL OTHER AFRICAN STATIONS ALTHOUGH EXPECT HIM TO BE RESIDENT LEOP.

2. HE IS INVENTOR, PHOTOGRAPHER, ARCHITECT, FORGER AND FORMER BANK ROBBER WHO HAS SERVED TERM IN PRISON. VERY INGENIOUS OBSERVANT, SHREWD GLIB AND RELISHES INTRIGUE AND DARING DO. THE LATTER PLAYS IMPORTANT PART IN HIS CHARACTER. HE LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER. FOR CERTAIN TASKS THIS MAN UNUSUALLY QUALIFIED AND SEEMS TO BE DISCREET. ASSESSMENT OVER TWO YEARS IS THAT HE IS RELIABLE AND "HONEST". DELICATE TO HANDLE FOR MUST HAVE TRUST IN HANDLER AND HIS PROFESSIONAL CE COMPETENCE AND WILL RECIPROCATE IN KIND. VIEW THIS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WISH ONLY GUTHMAN HANDLE ~~CERTAINLY~~ at least IN INITIAL STAGES.

3. BEING DOCUMENTED AS AUSTRIAN TO DEPART PBPRIME BLACK FOR SURFACING IN

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

-2-

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

OUT 86554
DIR 08782

TO INFO CITE DIR

WEST GERMANY. FROM THERE TO PROCEED ON OWN. PLANS TO OPEN PHOTO OR GENERAL REPAIR SHOP FOR COVER PURPOSES.

4. HE IS FORTY ONE. SPEAKS FLUENT FRENCH AND GERMAN. FAIR ENGLISH. TRAINED IN SMALL ARMS DEMO AND OTHER PHASES OF PM ACTIVITY.

5. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS, AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS.

6. ALL TRAFFIC TO BE TYBAT.

END OF MESSAGE

G Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS
AC/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

69

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: ~~D. HIESCTUR~~
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 27 October 1960

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/AF 3
INFO: COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

cc
cc
cc

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	OCT 28 2049Z 60 REC'D CABLE SECT.
X	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT86555
OUT 86555

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 08783 08783

~~RYBAT~~

REF: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

IDEN: DAVID TZITZICHVILI
DOB: 12 JULY 1918
POB: TIFLIS, GOERGIA, USSR
CIT: STATELESS

END OF MESSAGE

Signal Center: Pls. ref attached cable.

G. Fields
GLENN D. FIELDS
RELEASING OFFICER

DECLASSIFIED
AF/W/1 No 43-43
COORDINATING OFFICERS

LESTER C. HOUCK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

JOSEPH BORNIGER:rc
TSD/IB/FS/4
3391
27 OCTOBER 1960 579

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	CAREL
2		5	
3		6	

FRANKFURT

DIRECTOR

TSD 4

FI 2, EE 4, AF 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	27 [illegible] 18 [illegible]	
X	ROUTINE	[illegible] CABLE [illegible]	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT85967

FRAN INFO BRLN CITE DIR 08443

OUT 85967
08443

AQUATIC WIROGUE

1. CAN YOU PROVIDE FOLLOWING: SEVERAL BLANK AUSTRIAN BIRTH OR BAPTISM CERTIFICATES AND FILL IN EXEMPLARS? VIENNA PREFERRED. SEVERAL DM 1 FISCAL STAMPS "POLIZEIPRAESIDIUM BERLIN" FOR BERLIN ISSUED "AUFENTHALTSERLAUBNIS"?

2. NEED AT KURIOT 14 NOVEMBER LATEST.

-End of Message-

C/Africa West by phone w/Dan Hiesciur B
C/EE by phone w/Mr. Thomas Lucid CWK

CVS Roosevelt
C. V. S. ROOSEVELT
C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Charles J. Ryan
CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSD/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. 2

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

FIELD DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD

INSTRUCTIONS: Routing designations, either individuals or units, are to be placed in the "TO" column. Comments are to be numbered to correspond to the number in the "TO" column. Each comment is to be underlined with a line drawn across the "COMMENTS" column. Each recipient of the attached document is to place his initials in the proper space following the corresponding numbered routing. The date the document is forwarded to the next routing is to be placed in the proper column. The last routing on this sheet shall be the unit in which the basic document is to be filed. If the holding unit is other than the central files, the central file shall be the next to the last routing to insure proper control clearance. THIS DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD IS TO REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE BASIC RECORD DOCUMENT AS A PERMANENT RECORD.

FROM: SR/DOB/P.Crookham:cc
1062 J X-8331

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: SR/DOB/60-2079

DOCUMENT DATE: 26 Oct. 60

ACTION SUSPENSE DATE:

TO	LOCATION	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Chief, AF Div Attn: Dan Nesciur AF/West				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				

DOCUMENT PROCESSING DATA

INDEXED

ABSTRACTED

FILE NUMBER

FORM NO. 861
1 DEC 55

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED (40)

SECRET

SR/DOB/60- 2079

26 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

ATTENTION : Dan Nesciur

SUBJECT : CIA personalities known by alias to REDSOX agent, David Durvard (a).

1. The following personalities, listed in true name and alias, are known by AESENTINEL REDSOX agent David Durvard in the alias listed.

2. Subject is unaware of the CIA affiliation of these personalities. The period of time over which Subject was connected with these individuals was from May 1959 through October 1960.

3.

True Name	Division/Staff	Alias
Perry Crookham	SR	Pat Cook
Fred Kirkpatrick	SR	Fred Komer
Edward L. Ross, Jr.	SR	Clint
William R. Romer	SR	Little Bill
Myron Toloczko	SR	Marty Adams
B. J. Johnson	SR	B.J.
Ray Hanchulak	SR	Ray
Col. Edw. Podworny	SR	Col. Ed
Gordon Mothes	SR	Tom
Mortimer Love	SR	Mike or Max
George Fill	SR	Mister George
Joe Chacho	SR	Joe
I. H. McCormick	SR	Hal
C. McCrory	SR	Mack
Joseph Betza	SR	Joe Bowman
Roy Petersen	SR (~~contract~~)	Big Roy
Geoffrey Cratch	SR (contract)	Geof
Janie Cratch	SR (contract)	Janie
Henry Wynne	SR (contract)	Henry
Kathleen Wynne	SR (contract)	Kathleen
Logan Phillips	SR (contract)	Logan
Allie Logan	SR (contract)	Allie
O. H. Todd	O. Security	Hank
Casmiro Barquin	DPD	Chick
Major Aderholdt	DPD	Heinie
Per Stoen	OTR	Thor
Paul Belkin	OS/IRD	Paul
Joseph Bukowsky	Med. Staff	Joe
Dale Haynes	O. Commo	Dale
Alvin Naumann	TSD	Al
Morgan Schrader	WH	Morgan
Dr. J. Houck	AF Div.	Dr. John
Glenn Fields	AF Div.	Mr. Glenn

201-233477

SECRET

4. For any further information please contact Perry Crookham on Extension 8331.

Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

OURCARD, DAVID

IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE

NUMBER

CARRY THIS COPY WITH YOU. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RECEIVE THE INJECTIONS ON THE DATES DUE.

VACCINE	DOSE	DATE DUE	DATE GIVEN
SMALLPOX REACTION	Immune	reac 3Oct60	22Sept60
TYPHOID	1st		3Oct60
	2nd		
	3rd		
TETANUS	1st		
	2nd		
	STIM	25Sept60	25Sept60
TYPHUS	1st		3Oct60
	2nd		
	STIM		
CHOLERA	1st		
	2nd		
PLAGUE	1st		
	2nd		
DIPHTHERIA	1st		
	2nd		
	3rd		
	4th		
SALK		25Sept60	25Sept60
OTHER VACCINES			
YELLOW FEVER LOT NUMBER	3Oct60		
SCHICK			

FORM NO. 616 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 56

(+1)

4511c (c)

IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE

NUMBER DAVE

CARRY THIS COPY WITH YOU. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RECEIVE THE INJECTIONS ON THE DATES DUE.

VACCINE	DOSE	DATE DUE	DATE GIVEN
SMALLPOX REACTION			30 JULY 59
TYPHOID	1st	30 JULY	30 JULY 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG. 59
	3rd	23 AUG. ~~27 AUGUST~~	3 SEPT. 59
TETANUS	1st	30 JULY	30 JULY 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG. 59
	STIM		
TYPHUS	1st	6 AUGUST	6 AUG. 59
	2nd	19 AUGUST	19 AUG. 59
	STIM		
CHOLERA	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
PLAGUE	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
DIPHTHERIA	1st	—	—
	2nd	—	—
	3rd	—	—
	4th	—	—
SALK	1st	6 AUGUST	6 AUG. 59
OTHER VACCINES	2nd	27 AUGUST	3 SEPT. 59
YELLOW FEVER LOT NUMBER			
SCHICK			

FORM NO. 616 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 MAR 56

(+1)

SECRET

No. C-73532

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, AF/W/1 - Edward O. Welles

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of AEASPIC

_______________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 3 Oct 1960.

In view of Subject's complicated personal background, he should be controlled and supervised as closely as possible under the circumstances in order to avoid embarrassment to the Agency.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 Nov 1960

Distribution:
  Orig. to Addressee
  1 to Files

dea

SECRET

FORM 7-58 124 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

201-233477

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2075

19 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/2B

ATTENTION: Mrs. Murray

SUBJECT: Transfer of Agent Accommodation Mailing Address responsibility from SR/DOB to Africa Division

REFERENCE:
A. DIR 45223 (OUT 98152)
B. SAOP 1036 (IN 32746)
C. SAOP 702 (IN 3009)

1. Subject to your concurrence, responsibility for the accommodation mailing address for SR/DOB agent AEASPIC (David de Panaskhet), which was arranged for by your office, will be transferred to the Africa Division which is now utilizing this agent.

2. The agent accommodation mailing address in Brazil is as follows:

Eduardo Callo
Caha Postal 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo, Brazil

3. The Africa Division case officer responsible for this agent is Dan Nesciur, 2110 I Building, extension 8284.

4. This office extends its appreciation for the expeditions manner in which you have arranged for and maintained this accommodation address.

5. For any further information regarding this please contact Dan Nesciur, extension 8284 or Perry Crookham, extension 8331.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

201-233477

4-00000

SECRET

WIROGUE
File

19 OCT 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Security

ATTENTION : Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : WIROGUE (formerly AEASPIC) CI/OA No. #73532

1. It has been called to our attention that the parole for subject is to expire on 20 October 1960. The African Division has taken over the case and plans to have subject out of the country by 20 November 1960. Hence a 30 day extension of the parole is requested.

2. WIROGUE is presently quartered at:

Dominion Towers
1201 South Court House Road
Arlington, Virginia
Apartment 109

3. For any further information, please contact Daniel R. Niesciur, X8284.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

AF/W/1:DRN:say:17 Oct 1960

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - AF/RI
- 1 - AF/W/1

SECRET

201-233477

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : SCO (Mr. Leutscher)

DATE: 19 Oct 60

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: ASPIC (C)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found physically qualified for the proposed assignment.

Donald W. Farley
Administrative Officer

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SR/DOB (Kirkpatrick)
1 - OD/MS

SECRET

301-233477

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Lester Houck !		SEP 25 1960
2	AF Division/West		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
J. Kirkpatrick - SR/DOB	

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1 APR 55 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used. (40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955—O-342531

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 19 Oct 60

TO: Jan Nescur
~~SR/DOB (Kirkpatrick)~~

ROOM NO. 2110 ~~1062~~

BUILDING ~~J~~ I Bldg.

REMARKS

WIROGUE

Jan,
You'll want this for Janes 201 file

FROM: AO/OD/MS

ROOM NO.

BUILDING 2714 I

EXTENSION 3347

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957 O-439445

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2055

29 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Transfer and Quartering arrangements for AEASPIC

1. This is to confirm a discussion between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB and your office regarding transfer and quartering arrangements for AEASPIC, David Durvard (a), and the interest expressed by Dr. Lester Houck of Africa Division re acquiring AEASPIC as a long term asset for that division.

2. In compliance with a request made of this office by Africa Division, it is understood your office has agreed to the temporary quartering of AEASPIC in a furnished safe apartment located at apartment 307, 5741 Colorado Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This office, with your concurrence, has agreed to lend the use of this apartment for a period of about two weeks, effective 28 September 1960. At present AEASPIC is visited once a week and/or as the need arises. AEASPIC has his own salary for food and public transportation. The same cover arrangements exists under this arrangement as existed when Subject lived at 925 25th Street, N.W., in his own apartment. The cover arrangement is that David Durvard (a) is a technical associate of Fred K. Komer (a) (i.e. an SR/DOB case officer) self-employed, manufacturers commissioned representative.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

201-233477

SECRET

23 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Physical exam/Immunization for David Durvard (a)

At 1000 hours 28 September David Durvard (a) in the company of an SR/DOB case officer attended a full physical exam at the offices of a cleared, witting doctor, Dr. Robert G. Bullock, 2221 North Buchanan Street, Arlington, Virginia. Dr. Bullock indicated to this case officer his preliminary opinion that Subject was in perfect health. Medical records to this effect will be forthcoming. Mr. Durvard (a) also received the first in a series of immunization shots preparatory to a projected assignment in the West African theater. Mr. Durvard, with his case officer will return to Dr. Bullock's office on 4 October at 10:00 a.m. for a second series of immunization shots. Medical records other than those reflected in Mr. Durvard's (a) 201 file will be kept in the Medical File Room (Central Building) under his crypto. A copy will also be kept in AO/OD/MS under pseudo.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

SECRET

201-235477

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/ A 1

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

rec: CWH

3 & 4: PLS NOTE, 201 FILE now RESP. OF AF DIV.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. SR/DOB		20 OCT 1960		
4.				
5. AF Div Dan Nescior	2110 I	27 OCT 1960		
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

HBPA-04890

201-2[illegible]

[illegible] OCT 60

ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS

TO [illegible]

AF/West [illegible]

FILE TITLE

P

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201. 233 [illegible]77

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

12 oct 1960

DOCUMENT NUMBER

HBPA 04890

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET

HBPA-4890

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief, WHD
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

FROM: Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

SUBJECT: Operational/REDWOOD/AEACRE
Accommodation Address

ACTION REQUIRED: As requested in para. 1

REFERENCE: HBPW-2021

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-233477

FIELD FILE NO: 10-6-5.4

12 October 1960

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference, the Base has been servicing the accommodation address at least once a week through the services of ALLOMETER-2 who rented this post office box under an alias. On 7 October 1960 the Base forwarded a letter which ALLOMETER-2 had picked up the day before. This letter was registered, and ALLOMETER-2 was obliged (for the second time) to make a personal appearance before the responsible persons and to sign (in alias) an acknowledgment of receipt. If it is at all possible to send these letters unregistered the Base would much prefer that this system be adopted. ALLOMETER-2, over a period of years, has rented many different post office boxes under different names, and the Base considers it a definite security hazard if he is forced to identify himself in the manner required by the registration of these letters.

2. Headquarters attention is called to the fact that the letter which the Base forwarded on 7 October 1960 was postmarked in Europe on 12 August 1960. Even in the light of the notoriously slow Brazilian postal system, the Base cannot explain such a long delay in transit for air mail. Such a delay has been typical of almost every letter the Base has received in the past six months. The Base has no reason to disbelieve ALLOMETER-2 in his repeated assertions that he services the box at least once a week.

Lucian W. Fabsik
Lucian W. FABSIK

10 October 1960

Distribution:
- 5 - Headquarters
- 2 - Rio
- 2 - Files

EDM

201-233477

CS copy

[illegible] - not assigned

Chief of Base, Frankfurt | 1[illegible] October 1960

Chief, SR; [illegible]/AEQUIRK
AENSPIC 1

MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

For your Information

1. The [illegible] Soviet branch files on AENSPIC 1 were destroyed this date; material not previously forwarded to Headquarters is transmitted under separate cover attachment to this dispatch.

2. A list of the official correspondence destroyed with the file is given below:

EGMA 7178, 10 July 1958
[illegible]997, 8 August 1958
[illegible]547, Sep 1958
DIR [illegible]055, September 1958
DIR [illegible]763, September 1958
DIR [illegible]875, October 1958
EGMA 28034, 13 November 1958
DIR 04094, December 1958
FROB 2928, December 1958
FROB 2958, December 1958
FROB 2978, December 1958
FROB 2977, December 1958
FROB 3089, January 1959
FROB 3090, January 1959
PARI 4625, January 1959
DIR [illegible]455, January 1959
EGMA [illegible]887, 20 January 1959
FROB 3376, February 1959
FROB [illegible]25, February 1959
FROB 3477, February 1959
DIR 13127, February 1959
FROB 3501, February 1959
EGMA 25336, 24 February 1959
DIR 14843, March 1959
FROB 3707, March 1959
DIR 16768, March 1959
FROB 3734, March 1959
PARI 5377, March 1959
FROB 3763, March 1959
DIR 17342, March 1959
DIR 17554, March 1959
PARI 5409, March 1959
DIR 18040, March 1959
PARI 5504, March 1959
FROB 3977, April 1959
FROB 4001, April 1959
DIR 21727, April 1959
PARI 5705, April 1959

[illegible] K. CARRES

APPROVED: Gerald D. [illegible]

ATTACHMENT (Under Separate Cover):
Attachment A - AENSPIC 1 Papers

CS COPY

201-233477

SECRET

TO : Chief, SR

ATTENTION: SR/DOB

SUBJECT : AEASPIC

As a result of conversations between representatives of this Division and SR/DOB, transfer of AEASPIC to Africa West's jurisdiction is agreed on following his present period of training.

Africa Division will assume full responsibility for his handling. To that end, we are obtaining quarters, have had discussions with Alien Affairs Staff, and have taken steps to regularise AEASPIC clearance status for his intended assignment.

As the exact date of transfer is not yet determined, it is requested that Mr. Kirkpatrick maintain contact with Mr. Wells, on extension 3829 to handle final transfer arrangements.

SR's cooperation on such matters as shots, training, quartering and a new physical examination are appreciated.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-235477

201 -

SECRET

TO : Chief, CI/OA Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Ray McConnon

SUBJECT : Future Utilization of AEASPIC

1. Subject is currently in the process of being transferred from the jurisdiction of SR to AF, in all probability for a field assignment in the Congo.

2. Accordingly, it is requested that your records be altered to reflect this change and also, that the necessary steps are taken to amend his OA (C-73532) to permit use by this Division.

3. For further information regarding subject, please contact Edward O. Welles, Africa West, on extension 3829, who will temporarily be handling this case.

Bronson Tweedy
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

201-253477

1. Occupational Specialty: Mechanical Electrical Engineering

Cine or Portrait Photography

Research and innovator of commercial labor/money saving devices

Electro mechanical or photographical in nature.

See paragraphs 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 of Employment History for examples.

2. Military Service: Dec. 1939, Paris, volunteered for French Foreign Legion.

Jan. 1940, Tunisia North Africa, in 1st Cav. Reg., 1st Squadron, 4th platoon.

Feb. 1940 - sent to N.C.O. training course in Legion. Pulled out to be reassigned to all-Georgian unit.

Mar. - Aug. 1940, Barcares. Assigned in Georgian unit

Aug. 1940 - Paris. Discharged after the end of Franco/German hostilities as Private First Class.

3. Employment History:

1. 1942 - Paris - Volunteered for work in Germany.

2. Poelitz, Germany, Worked for HIDRYER WERKE on contract for one year as installation electrician.

3. 1942 - Berlin Photographer of metals for a factory which produced electrodes for welding instruments

1942 - Paris Self-employed at photo shop. Portrait photography.

4. 1942 Berlin Assembly line worker in Berlin factory producing steel ammunition belts. Received commendation from factory

		director for labor saving device re manufact. of device for automat. adjustment of cartridge cases.
5.	1942 Berlin " Mugelheim	Drivers mechanics course for the NSKK (Nazi Party Motorized Corps). Drove trucks during construction of Atlantic wal. by Germans.
6.	1943 Berlin	Employed with SCHUPOLIZEI as translator French-German language.
7.	1946-47 Paris	Employed by Architects Carre Associated as electrical installation planner and constructor of prototype model builder. Earned roughly $4 an hour American scale plus commission work extra.
8.	1951-52 In prison, Paris	Devised and sold on French market a pocket automatic transit indicator. Received cash settlement for this while in prison.
9.	1953 In prison in Rion	Devised and gave to prison administrator invention for making cardboard boxes. Device was built and used by prison administrator.
10.	Dec. 1955-Apr. 1956 Gap	Employed by M.D. as X-ray machine maintenance technician and operator.
11.	1956-57 Gap	Invented, patented and sold a calendar device to the French commercial market.
12.	1958 Ambert	Invented and patented a commercial advertising device, photo-mechanical in nature. Models built and sold to French advertising concerns.
13.	1959-60 Sept-May U.S.	Devised and passed drawings for 2 pieces of equipment to be used for Project AESENTINEL.
14.	1960, July U.S.	At present Subject is devising a low cost telephone answering device.

4. Experience in Forged Documents:

May 1942 Achen, - Berlin	Falsified his own travel documents by use of pen to change effective dates.
1942 Berlin - Paris	Filled in German travel blank forms. Altered old German authorization stamp for travel forms. Then made other falsified stamps for other people interested in travel across German-held territory.
1943-44 Berlin	Constructed and used various falsified travel documents stamps copied from old travel documents for various people to travel throughout Germany. Used certain photo techniques for changing and/or ageing pictures in documents. At same time Subject also reassembled falsified old passports to form new ones as well as counterfeited German financial vouchers.



Physical Description

Subject is described as 42 year old male Caucasian, 5'6" tall, of slight build (136 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding in front, swarthy complexion. Subject is extremely agil and in perfect health. He is an ex-French foreign legionnaire and survivor of German concentration camps.

Evaluation

Subject's case officer agrees with Agency Assessment that he possesses the traits of a born clandestine operator and would be an apt candidate for any black mission which requires:

1. able-bodiedness
2. ability to assimilate easily (allowing for his physical features)

3. innate sense of locational direction
4. superior intelligence and reasoning power
5. ability to comprehend and apply instruction rapidly
6. willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission
7. basic technical and mechanical applied or theoretical abilities
8. ability to improvise and "know how" disturbingly American in character.

Motivation

Subject's motivation is based on personal loyalties rather than monetary gain. Subject has little regard for the value of his money, and must be strongly urged to set aside a part of his earnings. Subject has a strong distaste for the Communist regime and has observed the effects of it at first hand. Subject indeed goes a step farther, subscribing to the "Untermensch" theory re the Russian people.

?

Language Capabilities

Subject speaks, reads, writes:

French	-	native
Georgian	-	fluent
German	-	good to fluent
English	-	reads fluently, writes, fair, speaks fair
Spanish	-	reads fair, speaks poor, understands fair

Subject has exhibited good subordination to his case officer, intelligent security precautions re his personal habits, and the ability to quietly fit into an American urban existance. For any further information please call Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, X-4705.

13 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report

1. On 8 September 1960 the undersigned accompanied by SR/DCB case officers Perry Crookham and Fred Kirkpatrick met with David Tzitzichvili (201-233477) in a SR/DCB safe house. The purpose of this meeting was to assess David for possible use by JMARC. The subject was aware he was being interviewed as the same procedure had been used previously by a representative of the African Division.

2. The subject has led an exciting and diverse life. The SR Division brought him to the United States (black) to train for a mission which has subsequently been cancelled. At the present time the SR Division is making arrangements for the resettlement of the subject in Latin America, probably in Mexico. However, due to the training this agency has given the subject SR feels he should be utilized by the DD/P if possible.

3. Observing David for some two hours and listening to his story the undersigned feels there may be some use of him by JMARC. David is a smooth talker who has obviously told his story many times to the satisfaction of his listeners. He elaborates on the exciting and bizarre parts of his life and tends to gloss over those sections he feels that are common to everyone.

4. The subject has been in the United States for some time. This time has been spent in training for a specific mission which never came to pass. Recently he has been engaged in "make work" programs to pass the time. This could well explain his apparent impatience and desire to do something. In his own words he wishes to prove that he is capable of accomplishing a task assigned to him. He asks for a chance to surveil someone, to take clandestine pictures, even to assassinate someone. He very nearly begged to be given a pitch during this meeting.

5. The subject is a stateless person. He is in the United States black and could be completely unattributable if necessary. He desires citizenship and a chance to settle down in one spot. He prefers U.S. citizenship but is not adamant on this. However the basic motivation appears to be love of excitement. The subject gives a very good appearance of the classical adventurer. He relates his past exploits in wartime Europe as motivated by the thrill of duping the existing authority.

file in
201-233477

6. It is the undersigned's opinion this individual could be used as a singleton agent in JMWAVE. Mr. Bill Romer and Mr. Gordon Mothes of WH/4/PM have at one time been case officers of this individual for SR/[illegible]. WH/4/PM has the 201 folder at the present time.

MORGAN SHRADER
WH/4/PM

14-00000

19 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mexican Resettlement Arrangements for AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC

1. At 1400 hours, 19 August, SR/DOB case officer, Fred Kirkpatrick and Jerry Pochron from Defection Coordinators Office of CIA met with Clay Calendar and Jim Myers of TSD/IB re documentations arrangements and travel routing for possible resettlement of AESENTINEL agent AEASPIC. The following arrangements were proposed by Mr. Calendar and Mr. Myers for SR/DOB's consideration. TSD/IB suggested that Subject be sent by black flight from here to West Germany, and there surfaced with an altered Greek passport which TSD/IB now has available. A suitable cover story would of course be incorporated re the possession of a Greek passport by Subject, while Subject has no Greek language capability. Since this passport is a valid one, (and was, in fact, purchased by TSD/IB) and is therefore backstopped in name, Subject could apply at the Mexican Embassy in West Germany for a Mexican tourist visa by presenting this passport. Once in Mexico, Subject could request emigration action upon declaration of intent to become a Mexican citizen and upon submitting proof of sponsorship by an employer in Mexico City.

2. Upon your concurrence, Mr. Pochron will arrange for Mr. Kirkpatrick to meet with Mr. Coolidge, the CIA contact used for introducing agency designees into Mexican private industry. Mr. Pochron has already talked with Mr. Coolidge on two occasions and has passed him Subject's file. From their talks, Mr. Pochron has assured me that this arrangement is entirely feasible, Gillete Company of Mexico City being cited as one possibility.

3. AEASPIC would then openly proceed to purchase plane tickets in West Germany for Mexico City and upon arrival there, would be waiting for him. The time table for this entire operation was estimated at about five weeks. Of course we did not discuss Subject's monetary maintenance for the interim period of travel, nor until Subject could begin earning his own living.

201-239477

4. Mr. Pochron expressed his concern and the concern of Mr. Pennington of Alien Affairs Staff about the knowledgibility of Subject re pass Agency tie-in and Agency assets. It will of course be our job to assure Security that Subject is not knowledgable and will entail a minimum of risk to transport and to resettle in Mexico. In view of this concern, all arrangements offered for DOB's consideration by TSD/IB were tailored to afford step by step denial or participation by the U. S. Government. In effect, all items procured by Subject for resettlement could just as easily be obtained on the European black market as well as from this Government. Subject will in effect be briefed and taken by German Station asset to obtain his documents ostensibly on the black market. Monies due Subject would be withheld pending destination arrival. The letter head and supporting sponsorship documents to be used by him for ultimate employment in Mexico would be prepared in such a manner as to be either legitimate or forged. In addition it was suggested that Subject be closely handled and advised by someone known to him to ensure the security aspect both to Subject and to this agency.

5. The meeting was closed by TSD/IB's request to be informed whether these arrangements in theory meet with the approval of SR/DOB, and Office of Security. Mr. Kirkpatrick was assured that Documentation aspects by TSD/IB could be accomplished within one week upon authorization by SR/DOB. With your permission Fred Kirkpatrick will proceed to affirm Mexican employment arrangements for AEASPIC.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

Concur on these [illegible]
arrangements that we proceed.
And agree tie-in later. For
suggest we [illegible] possible.
[illegible] - suggest we briefly
The record [illegible] to Fred [illegible] that this agent
prepare a memo (no details) to [illegible] that former agent the future
this plan (no details) will be closed in [illegible] relationship of
so that they [illegible] resettlement case be available in [illegible] the
as a [illegible] who might again be [illegible] Mexican [illegible] I believe [illegible] would
also arrange he get travel documents (later [illegible]) [illegible] emergency
African [illegible] Congo or
be interested in [illegible] job in
him to a [illegible]
other areas

Mike

SECRET

SR/DOB/0-2011
25 July 60

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CDC

ATTENTION : Jerry Pochron (1306 [illegible] x4454 [illegible]?

SUBJECT : Biographical Information Necessary for Possible Resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox Agent David TZITZICHVILI (T).

1. On 21 July 1960, SR/DOB Case Officer Fred Kirkpatrick talked with Jerry Pochron of your office re enlisting your assistance in the possible resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox contract agent David TZITZICHVILI (T) in the region of South or Central America. At the request and as per outline of Mr. Pochron, this office has prepared the following biographic information. See Attachment A.

2. Subject is living in the general Washington D.C. area under the supervision of an SR/DOB Case Officer and is readily available for any further debriefing your office deems necessary.

3. Subject remains on a quasi legally backstopped arrangement of Alien Affairs Staff until 20 October 1960.

4. For any further information please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, on extension 4705 or 8331.

PERRY E. CROCKMAN
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

201-233477

24 June 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Biographic Information/Case Officer Evaluation of
David TZITZICHVILI, alias David DURVARD

Biographic Information

David TZITZICHVILI was born 20 December 1919 in Tbilisi, Georgia, where he lived with his parents until 1921. Subject at that time moved to France with his parents. Subject grew up in France and therefore speaks native French (Parisian). Subject does not have French citizenship, however, and must be classed as stateless. Subject earned the first part of his baccalaureat at Breguet (electro-engineering), then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of WWII. Subject fought in N. Africa until French capitulation in 1940, at which time he was discharged to return home to Paris. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker. He worked there primarily as an industrial electrician. While in Germany he assisted French officer P.O.W.'s to escape, aiding them with cleverly falsified papers, stamps, cachets and even uniforms. It is interesting to note that while subject attended school at Breuguet, he also attended the Technicum for Cinematography. It was from these past studies at the Technicum that subject was able to develop techniques to apply to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets. Subject was betrayed to Germans, arrested, and sentenced to death for espionage. Subject was able to drag this case out by implying the existence of a large British run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the U.S. Army and returned to Paris. Subject lived there in relative quiet until he, together with a war-time friend, robbed a Paris bank of a sizeable amount of money. Subject and accomplice were apprehended by the Sureté on 11 July 1950, sentenced to prison, but released some five years later for good behavior and on the basis of their war record.

It is interesting to note that while in prison, subject invented a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory. Upon discharge from prison in December of 1955, subject lived, worked and was paroled to his brother in Gap, France. It was while there that subject was contacted by this agency and subsequently brought to this country for use as one of two agents for Project AESENTINEL.

Subject is presently residing in his Wash. D.C. apartment and is readily available for any interviews.

Subject is engaged in his safe office in several technical gimmicks which could be of value to this Agency. Two of his ideas have been passed forward to TSD for development/exploitation. TSD has expressed interest in another of his ideas, the plans for which have just been completed.

Alien Affairs Staff of Immigration/Naturalization has extended subjects' backstopped residence status until 20 October, 1960.

Physical Description

Subject is described as 41 year old male Caucasian, 5'6" tall, of slight build (136 lbs. average weight), long face, long nose, dark brown hair, balding in front, swarthy complexion. Subject is extremely agile and in perfect health. He is an ex-French foreign legionnaire and survivor of German concentration camps.

Evaluation

Subject's case officer agrees with Assessment that he possesses the traits of a born clandestine operator and would be an apt candidate for any black mission which requires:

SECRET

1. able-bodiedness
2. ability to assimilate easily (allowing for his physical features)
3. innate sense of locational direction
4. superior intelligence and reasoning power
5. ability to comprehend and apply instruction rapidly
6. willingness to undertake an extremely hazardous mission
7. basic technical and mechanical applied or theoretical abilities
8. ability to improvise and "know how" disturbingly American in character.

Motivation

[illegible]

Subject's is ~~ideological~~ more than monetary. ~~That is to say,~~ Subject has little regard for the value of his money, and must be strongly urged to set aside a part of his earnings. Subject has a strong distaste for the Communist regime and has observed the effects of it at first hand. Subject indeed goes a step farther, subscribing to the "Untermensch" theory re the Russian people.

Language Capabilities

Subject speaks, reads, writes:

French - native
Geogian - fluent
German - good to fluent
English - reads fluently, writes fair, speaks fair

Subject has exhibited good subordination to his Case Officer, intelligent security precautions re his personal habits, and the ability to quietly fit into an American urban existence. For any further information please call Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, X-4705.

SECRET

A-4

5 July, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Upper Dentures for AEASPIC

On 1 July, 1960 AEASPIC was fitted with a full set of upper dentures by Dr. H.F. Bogan, an Agency cleared dentist, located at 17th and "K" St. in downtown Washington D.C. Cost of $150.00 was borne by SR/DCE and satisfied the agent contract clause stipulating that Subject be maintained in physical capacity sufficient to undertake Project AESENTINEL. Dental appointments and consultations were initiated before the postponement of Project AESENTINEL on 17 June 1960.



NAME David Durvard (a.) 17 June 1960

ADDRESS

PHONE NO.

REFERRED BY

DATE	NO.	OPERATION	HRS.	DR.	CR.
		Part upper [illegible]			
		replacing [illegible] [illegible]			
		upper [illegible]			
		Partial [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]			

Dr. Bogan
17th & K St.

FORM 2822 THE S. S. WHITE DENTAL MFG. CO. NO. 7 RECORD CARD

[illegible]-233477

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division
ATTN : SR/DOB

DATE: 20 July 1960

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT: AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532

1. In your memorandum of 14 September 1959, No. 1730, you requested suspension of the subject's twenty-four hour custody until he resumed training about 1 August 1960. Your memorandum of 5 July 1960, No. 1996, indicates he will be placed in a safe-house for training about the last of July 1960, and that he will continue his present unescorted status on occasional weekends.

2. This Office has no objection to that procedure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

CH Pennington
C. H. Pennington
Chief, Alien Affairs Staff

SECRET

12 Aug 60.

Copy furnished WH Division (Gordon Ercolles) for review by Colonel Frank Eagan for further WH use.

JC

14-00000

[illegible]

SR/[illegible]

29 June 1960

29 June 60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of [illegible]

ATTENTION : Chief [illegible]

SUBJECT : W/T Training for SR/[illegible] contract agent [illegible]

1. It is requested that [illegible] assessment and subsequent W/T training be instituted [illegible] for SR/[illegible] contract agent [illegible]. [illegible] training [illegible] necessary in order to round out Subject's [illegible] for operational [illegible] by interested SR/[illegible] components.

2. Subject to your concurrence, it is anticipated [illegible] W/T training will be given Subject [illegible] located in the down-town D.C. area, and then [illegible] beginning 1 August 1960. Training [illegible] until Subject is a qualified operational W/T [illegible].

3. Transportation [illegible] instructor to and from the training sites will [illegible].

4. For any further [illegible], please contact [illegible], SR/[illegible], Extension 5331.

[illegible]
Acting Chief, SR/[illegible]

TC/[illegible]

Distrib.: O & 1 - addressee
2 - SR/DOS
1 - SR/[illegible]

201-233477

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TTT-M-60-476

DATE: 1 AUG 1960

TO : Chief, Soviet Russia Division/DDP
ATTN : Chief, SR/DOB

FROM : Chief, Telecommunications, Training and Techniques Staff/OC

SUBJECT: W/T Training - Agent AEASPIC

REF : SR/DOB 60-1990, 29 June 1960

1. This will confirm recent discussions held between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick of your Office and Mr. Lee Jungen of my Staff relative to the proposed W/T training of AEASPIC. As was explained by Mr. Jungen, W/T training of an agent on a full or part-time basis, is contingent upon the approval of a specific project with supporting communications annex. While we have on occasion participated in "holding" training of agents without benefit of a definite requirement, current operational commitments now make this impossible.

2. Should a definite requirement for the operational utilization of AEASPIC develop we will arrange for the W/T aptitude assessment and training. Prior to our initiating such action, it is requested that a representative of your Office discuss operational details with an appropriate Foreign Division within the Office of Communications. This will enable us to tailor subsequent training in terms of specific equipment and procedures as required by the project. In this respect, further information can be obtained by contacting Mr. Lawrence Eisler on extension 8137.

Robert A. Bloom
ROBERT A. BLOOM

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

201-235477

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

FIELD DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD

INSTRUCTIONS: Routing designations, either individuals or units, are to be placed in the "TO" column. Comments are to be numbered to correspond to the number in the "TO" column. Each comment is to be underlined with a line drawn across the "COMMENTS" column. Each recipient of the attached document is to place his initials in the proper space following the corresponding numbered routing. The date the document is forwarded to the next routing is to be placed in the proper column. The last routing on this sheet shall be the unit in which the basic document is to be filed. If the holding unit is other than the central files, the central file shall be the next to the last routing to insure proper control clearances. THIS DOCUMENT ROUTING AND ACTION RECORD IS TO REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE BASIC RECORD DOCUMENT AS A PERMANENT RECORD.

FROM: SR/DOB

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER:

DOCUMENT DATE:

ACTION SUSPENSE DATE:

TO	LOCATION	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER INITIALS
1. Lou Seckles Ed McMahon	1102 I	29 Jun	
2.			
3. SR/DOB	1062 J		
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			

COMMENTS

NO INTEREST

DOCUMENT PROCESSING DATA

INDEXED

ABSTRACTED

FILE NUMBER

FORM NO. 861
1 DEC 55

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED (40)

24 June 1960

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201-233477

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SECRET

Translater for French Letters

Nick Letsou

1104 "J" Bldg.

French Desk, W.E. X 3857

Check for S/W in letters

Mr. Callander

TSS Photo X 8315

Accommodation Address for David

Mrs. Murray, WH 2 B, X 8495

Accommodation Address for David:

Letters to France;

Eduardo Calle
CAXA POSTAL 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo Brasil

Letters to Hq. for David;

Robert P. Hague
P.O. Box 8028
South West Station
Wash. 24, D.C.
U.S.A.

201-233477

INSTRUCTIONS

MEMORIZE THE FOLLOW. AND DESTROY THIS PAPER:

NAME: David Durvard

OCCUPATION: Consultant Electronic Engineer

You are staying in Apartment #109, ground floor at Dominion Towers, at 1201 South Court House Road, Arlington, Virginia. You were given the use of this apartment by Mr. Powol Browning, who lives at 3145 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.. Mr Brownings telephone number is Federal 3-5081. Should any one question you tell them to contact Mr. Browning who is a business associate of yours.

SECRET

201-233477

30 juin Cabanis

Cher "Eduardo" .. Je suis si occupée que même en attendant la possibilité de mettre un timbre sur cette enveloppe je me mets à écrire comme au bon vieux temps ! Savoir où se baladent nos lettres du 7, 9 et 11 mars ! Arriveront-elles jamais ? Si elles traversent les océans vont-elles jusqu'à arriver dans votre boîte - qui sait, c'est énervant de ne pas être sûre ! Ici la vie s'aggrave chaque jour et bientôt nous serons obligés comme les chiens et chats de dénicher notre nourriture dans les poubelles ! Ce n'est pas drôle .. Colette ne trouve pas de travail ... Annick doit attendre la bonne partie des couturiers .. Edith est embarrassée de ses petits [illegible] et ne peut travailler en ce moment. Nelly a débuté comme vendeuse débutante, avant-hier qu'est-ce que ça donnera .. et quel salaire aura-t-elle ! Moi .. je ne compte pas seulement pour mes 81 ans qui m'accablent. Le pain de chaque jour commence à avoir le goût du rare et on ne voit pas d'issue - Victor en principe doit partir à la montagne après demain pour 6 mois pour [illegible] tout sur le dos sans ~~[illegible]~~ même de croûtes : et cela jusqu'en septembre ! il ne s'en fait pas lui !

Jeudi 24 .. Il pleut le temps est terriblement sombre assorti à nos idées .. pour comble j'ai perdu 10 frs dans la cuisine ce matin et cela me gêne vraiment le cafard de plus en plus s'implante et la misère la plus complète s'acharne sur nous - Nelly n'a pas travaillé sous une pluie battante .. Colette broie du noir car elle ne peut trouver de travail et cependant c'est plus qu'urgent .. je m'arrête n'ayant plus rien à dire. Loulou est venu en faisant hier son père va très mal et on ne sait au juste ce qu'il a .. je crois que Loulou craint un cancer au poumon ! Odile est venue nous dire au revoir car elle part en vacances de Sagnes la Vaccarda !

2 Avril un long arrêt dans ma lettre pour savourer les catastrophes qui nous tombent sur le dos ! sans que nous puissions y parer .. Armand est sans salaire Colette est sans travail. Nelly en qui reposait notre dernier espoir est depuis hier sans travail .. La personne qui l'avait demandée comme [illegible] a jugé bon de lui donner 5000 frs par quinzaine mais pas de quoi à payer les [illegible] pour les courses qu'elle lui fait faire .. aussi elle cherche autre chose et nous restons le bec dans l'eau .. avec en plus un commandement d'arrêt-saisie pour les cotisations que Victor n'a pas payées .. après avoir juré que c'était payé depuis Novembre .. et voilà ... chaque jour une nouvelle surprise aussi agréable Lundi on nous coupe l'eau, le gaz et l'électricité je me demande ce qui nous restera .. les deux

[illegible] [illegible] pleure et encore pas tué ! En
ce moment la vie est tellement dure pour
tout le monde qu'on ne peut rien obtenir ..
tout le monde vous a écrit. mon cher D, mais
que seront devenues nos lettres ! Envolées dans
les nuages ! Ce qui sera le sort de celle-ci ?
Atchiko a encore une fille . Sophie . ce que
Mathilda doit jubiler ! . Colette a écrit pour
donner votre adresse .. Mme [illegible] vous
demande de vos nouvelles, elle a déménagé
a acheté un charmant appartement au 19 de
l'avenue Victoria .. et elle l'installe . magnifiquement
de [illegible] l'amoncellement de choses !
elle est de plus en plus [illegible] .. Juliette a
grossi .. Eugène roule sur l'or, il est à
Magida où il cherche à acheter une villa
et un appartement à Paris .. il revient du
Tchad où il a [illegible] trouvé une mine
d'or ! Il en a de la chance ! Je ne l'ai
pas encore vu. Sur ce je m'arrête .. on
sonne .. encore des réclamations .. Ce que
je puis en avoir marre, marre, marre.
Je vous embrasse, mon cher D pour moi,
pour toute la famille bien affectueusement

Mémé

11744

PARIS 101
-2 4 60 16h
R. DE LA GLACIÈRE (13e)

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
160
POSTES
020

Senor Eduardo Costa
Caixa postal 11744 Lapa
Sao Paulo
Brazil

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

du Buito 30 rue Pabanis XIV
Paris France

9 Mars 60   30 rue Cabanis Paris XIV

Cher Dat, voilà j'ai voulu avoir la réponse avant de me voir précipiter, j'ai lorsqu'on de nombreuses pages pour vous remettre dans le bain et finalement j'arrivais bonne dernière .. de même une lettre arrivée car j'étais tout à fait de tomber sur l'étranger du Dard .. mais sa te sera faite .. pour trouver moyen d'être au bout du monde alors une lettre réclamant lui retenir et tout ce qu'elle réclamait .. alors me voici (ce qui est bien exagéré à la poste)) l'une a 85 f. l'autre mais aussi plus 55 f. enfin en troisième à une autre poste a fini par arriver à 105 f. je vous l'envoie maintenant. Je crois que Colette qui a sacrifié les doigts en votre honneur a à peu près tout dit .. Mentalement l'inverse dans laquelle nous nous agitions avec des rhumes carabinés ou jette dans la maison sans fin ou se balade avec des bouillottes dans les mains ou sur le dos. Armand est parti se présenter dans différentes maisons pour du boulot ... Gaby est allé couvrir des lots de travail pour récolte [illegible] pour croiser .. toute Genia est hors de la [illegible] .. c'est le [illegible] de la jeunesse elle est hors d'atteinte des agitations de l'ère je ne peux que la féliciter .. Je vieillis .. je vieillis mon pauvre Dat 80 ans! ça n'est pas drôle vous savez! Enfin j'attends avec impatience tous les détails de votre existence .. on a fait tant et tant de suppositions .. on a vécu dans l'attente perpétuelle de nouvelles et

enfin allés arrivant. Adios! au diable
avez-vous parlé à nous? voici les moments fin
Hélène et Nelly de faire monter de l'eau y avoir
en espagnol. Le pays est-il bien que sont
les gens sont-ils sympathiques? Ici l'atmosphère
de la maison est celle d'une écurie où il y
a des ânes sans foin .. on ne se bat pas mais
on brait à toute force .. Si c'est dans
ses moyens au mois de Juin de prendre 15
jours de vacances à Colette .. pour l'amour
du Ciel faites, ~~car~~ son caractère change, il
s'aigrit .. elle critique tout .. ne trouve rien
de bien et vraiment nous aurions besoin d'une
il est vrai qu'elle a tant d'occasions d'être ennuyée
embêtement, emmerdée ... etc etc -
ce n'est plus la joyeuse atmosphère habituelle
Parlez de venir au mois pour les problématiques
fiançailles de Nelly .. en Octobre dit-on.
mais je crois bien que cela n'arrivera jamais
Ramsay n'est pas dans notre ambiance il
lui manque la dignité, le flair, le
tact .. c'est le [illegible] en plein.
Fut-ce [illegible] que cette lettre arrivera avant
l'autre. J'en profite pour vous embrasser
pour tous ces mois passés et assez tard
mon affection
Mémé



③

1961
GENERAL LECLERC

Señor Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal (11766 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
Brazil

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

9 mars 60   40 rue Cabanis Paris XIV

Cher Dat. Voilà j'ai [illegible] avec la [illegible] je me suis précipitée et ai [illegible] pour vous remettre dans le bain et finalement j'arrive bonne dernière. Le même [illegible] une lettre arrivée est j'étais tout [illegible] 25 fr de timbres une [illegible] sur l'enveloppe de Noël. mais la [illegible] pour trouver moyen d'être au bout du monde alors une lettre [illegible] par bateau [illegible] tant est qu'elle [illegible] .. alors me voici (on est très bien renseigné à la poste)) l'un dit 85 f. l'autre mais non plus 55 f. enfin un troisième a une autre poste a [illegible] arrivée a 105 f [illegible] maintenant. Je crois que Colette [illegible] dans les doigts en votre honneur a a peu près tout dit. Seulement l'hiver dans laquelle nous nous agitions avec des rhumes carabinés ou gelés dans la maison sans feu ou se balada avec des bouillottes dans les mains ou sous les draps. Armand est parti [illegible] dans différentes maisons pour du boulot... Gaby est allée coudre des [illegible] pour [illegible] 99 jours pour [illegible] Irène est hors de la [illegible] [illegible] de la famille elle est hors d'atteinte des agissements de [illegible] que [illegible] . Je [illegible] je [illegible] Dat 80 ans ! ce n'est pas [illegible] vous savez [illegible] j'attends avec impatience tous les détails de votre existence .. on a fait tant et tant de suppositions .. on a vécu dans l'attente perpétuelle de nouvelles et

SR/DOB/60-2055

29 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Transfer and Quartering arrangements for AEASPIC

1. This is to confirm a discussion between Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB and your office regarding transfer and quartering arrangements for AEASPIC, David Durvard (a), and the interest expressed by Dr. Lester Houck of Africa Division re acquiring AEASPIC as a long term asset for that division.

2. In compliance with a request made of this office by Africa Division, it is understood your office has agreed to the temporary quartering of AEASPIC in a furnished safe apartment located at apartment 307, 5741 Colorado Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This office, with your concurrence, has agreed to lend the use of this apartment for a period of about two weeks, effective 28 September 1960. At present AEASPIC is visited once a week and/or as the need arises. AEASPIC has his own salary for food and public transportation. The same cover arrangements exists under this arrangement as existed when Subject lived at 925 25th Street, N.W., in his own apartment. The cover arrangement is that David Durvard (a) is a technical associate of Fred K. Komer (a) (i.e. an SR/DOB case officer) self-employed, manufacturers commissioned representative.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

CS-1236 (Coolidge)
22 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible resettlement of SR/DOB Redsox Agent

REFERENCE: SR/DOB/60-2011, 25 July 1960

1. As a result of referenced memorandum and in line with conversations held between the undersigned and various members of SR/DOB, the undersigned met with Mr. Gross, president of the Gillette Razor Blade Company in the Company's offices in Boston on 15 September 1960. It was explained to Mr. Gross that the Agency had a resettlement problem and that they wished to invite the cooperation of the Company in the resettlement in Mexico City of an asset for whom we wished to find employment.

2. Mr. Gross, after posing several questions, agreed in principle that the company would be willing to supply such agent with employment in their Mexico City factory. However, he wished to discuss it with the General Counsel and also to look into the laws of Mexico dealing with the period of employment and what provisions there were for disassociating themselves with such man should he prove completely unsatisfactory. It was then explained to Mr. Gross that the Agency would like to be able to supply the agent with a reasonable facimile of a Gillette letterhead together with a message which would offer him employment upon his arrival in Mexico City. Again Mr. Gross approved of it in principle, but requested that a copy of the letter be shown him prior to its dispatch.

3. Upon return to headquarters, the undersigned talked with Mr. Fred Kirkpatrick of SR/DOB and explained to him what was needed to satisfy the requests of Mr. Gross. Mr. Kirkpatrick explained that within the last 48 hours a different division had evidenced interest in the agent and were picking him up for their use so that there would be no further need of the offer of employment from Gillette.

4. The undersigned will see Mr. Gross on 21 September 1960 to explain the situation and thank him for his offer of cooperation.

FRANCIS L. COOLIDGE

201-233477

FLC/mg
cc: Chief, SR/DOB

SECRET

20 September 1960

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

At 1430 hrs., 19 September 1960, Mr. Lester Houck and Mr. Edward Welles, both of Africa Division, were accompanied to SR/DOB covert site to discuss full transfer of the remaining AESENTINEL agent, AEASPIC, to Africa Division.

Present for SR/DOB were Mike Rae, C/SR/DOB; Perry Crookham, Dep. C/SR/DOB (AESENTINEL Project Case Officer);and Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB Case Officer.

Mr. Houck and Mr. Welles expressed an avid interest in picking up AEASPIC on contract for operational assignment in Africa Division. This office agreed to expedite insofar as possible the handing over of AEASPIC and, at the request of Africa Division, to assist in certain pre-training.

SR/DOB has agreed to arrange for AEASPIC certain clandestine training and processing (demolition, small arms, medical/immunization) in consonance with Subject's projected assignment.

This action will obviate any Mexican resettlement procedures for AEASPIC.

Fred Kirkpatrick

SECRET

201-235477

S-E-C-R-E-T

Administrative Officer
Operations Division, Medical Staff
2714 I Building, Ext. 3597

Appointment made under the name of: David Durvard (A)

Examining Physician: Dr. Robert G. Bullock
2221 North Buchanan Street
Arlington, Va.

Day and Date: Wednesday, 28 Sep

Hour: 10 A. M.

X 1. Subject submits a completed Form 89 (in Alias) to examining physician at the time of appointment. Signature is required on Form 89.

X 2. For both Subject and/or Dependents:
With the exception of Item numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 25, [illegible], and 35, all Items on Form 89 are to be completed. When applicable, details of previous illnesses or surgical procedures are to be supplied.

3. When physical examinations for Dependents are required, completed Forms 89 on each Dependent (in ______) are submitted to examining physician at the time of appointment. Signatures are required. Parents may sign for children.

4. When physical examination for Dependents are not required, completed Forms 89 on each Dependent are submitted to AO/OD/MS. Signatures are required.

5. Immunizations must be current to meet Agency Medical Standards. Previous immunization records on both Subject and/or his Dependents are submitted to AO/OD/MS. Only authenticated records are acceptable. This office will determine immunization requirements for the area of assignment.

X 6. AO/OD/MS provides examining physician with immunization requirements for the Subject and/or his dependents. When immunizations have been completed, the examining physician will give new immunization cards to Subject. (Cards with Covert doctor's signatures do not provide traveler with an authenticated record. These should never leave the United States.) The new immunization cards are returned to AO/OD/MS. This office will arrange for properly documented immunization cards.

X 7. Following a covert physical examination, Subject and/or his Dependents' medical records will be kept in Medical File Room (Central Bldg.) under his ~~Pseudo~~ Crypto. A copy of Subject and/or his Dependents' immunization records will be kept in AO/OD/MS, under Pseudo. All reference to Subject or Dependents should be made by his ~~Pseudo~~. Crypto.

Lee Highway, turn right one block beyond Glebe Road. "Medical Center" sign. Parking area provided.

201-233477

SECRET

20 September 1960

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SR/DOB has agreed to arrange for AEASPIC certain clandestine training and processing (demolition, small arms, medical/immunization) in consonance with Subject's projected assignment.

This action will obviate any Mexican resettlement procedures for AEASPIC.

Fred Kirkpatrick

SECRET

201-233477

30 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mexican Resettlement Arrangements for AESENTINEL Agent AEASPIC

1. At 1330 hours, 26 August SR/DOB case officer Fred Kirkpatrick met with Clay Calendar and Jim Meyers of TSD/IB and Frank Coolidge of Office of Security Contacts. At this time a name for AEASPIC was agreed on and then passed on to Mr. Coolidge so that he in turn could ascertain the job possibilities for AEASPIC's possible Mexican Resettlement. The name agreed on for AEASPIC was Dimitrius I. Difonas, a Greek name to fit his Greek passport. TSD/IB is ready to draft and arrange all necessary Greek documentation for AEASPIC as soon as a job offer through Mr. Coolidge's Office can be firmed up, which should come about in early September. SR/DOB is to furnish TSD/IB passport type photos with negatives. This has already been arranged for with Hal McCormick of this office.

2. SR/DOB case officer, Fred Kirkpatrick with Clay Calendar of TSD/IB is presently engaged in writing a cover story/ biography to fit the new identity of AEASPIC. AEASPIC is as yet unaware of any resettlement arrangements. It is hoped AEASPIC can be utilized by some component of the DD/P, however if not, then these resettlement will go through as per plan.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

201-233477

SECRET

26 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Personnel for Contingency Force

1. There is presently in the Washington area an individual who appears to be suitable for the JMARC Contingency Force. The undersigned was, at one time, Case Officer of subject and believes that he is readily adaptable to the program. Subject is a Contract Agent of SR/DOB who was trained for a specific black mission into Russia during 1959. His nationality is Russian, however, he is now stateless and prior to being recruited had been living in France. Subject's background appears to qualify him as he has served in the Red Army, the French Foreign Legion and in addition has received various training including para-military, while under Agency sponsorship. Subject is unwitting and has good non-U. S. attributility.

2. SR would like to see Subject utilized in some capacity as he represents a large investment in time, training and money. SR now has nothing for subject as his intended mission was scrapped prior to dispatch because of the then forthcoming visit of KRUCHEV to the U. S. Also, subject's resident permit will expire in October at which time, unless he is continued on contract status, he will be re-settled in South America.

3. Attached you will find B1 and Case Officer evaluation of subject.

G Mothes
Gordon Mothes
WH/4/PM

Attachment

201-235477

SECRET

24 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Biographic Information/Case Officer Evaluation of
David TZITZICHVILI, alias David DURVARD

Biographic Information

David TZITZICHVILI was born 19 July 1918 in Tbilisi, Georgia, where he lived with his parents until 1921. Subject at that time moved to France with his parents. Subject grew up in France and therefore speaks native French (Parisian). Subject does not have French citizenship, however, and must be classed as stateless. Subject earned the first part of his baccalureat at Breguet (electro-engineering), then entered the Foreign Legion at the beginning of World War II. Subject fought in N. Africa until French capitulation in 1940, at which time he was discharged to return home to Paris. In 1943 he went to Germany as a voluntary worker. He worked there primarily as an industrial electrician. While in Germany he assisted French officer P.O.W.'s to escape, aiding them with cleverly falsified papers, stamps, cachets and even uniforms. It is interesting to note that while Subject attended school at Breuguet, he also attended the Technicum for Cinematography. It was from these past studies at the Technicum that Subject was able to develop techniques to apply to photo-mechanical forging of documents, stamps, and cachets. Subject was betrayed to Germans, arrested, and sentenced to death for espionage. Subject was able to drag his case out by implying the existence of a large British run net of which he was a part. In 1945 he was liberated by the U. S. Army and returned to Paris. Subject lived there in relative quiet until he, together with a wartime friend, robbed a Paris bank of a sizeable amount of money. Subject and accomplice were apprehended by the Surete on 11 July 1950, sentenced to prison, but released some five years later for good behavior and on the basis of their war record. It is interesting to note that while in prison, Subject invented a machine for making cardboard boxes. This machine was actually built for one of the prison administrations and put into operation at the prison factory. Upon discharge from prison in December of 1955, Subject lived, worked and was paroled to his brother in Gap, France. It was while there that Subject was contacted by this agency and subsequently brought to this country for use as one of two agents for Project AESENTINEL.

Subject is presently residing in his Washington, D.C. apartment and is readily available for any interviews.

Subject is engaged in his safe office in several technical gimmicks which could be of value to this Agency. Two of his ideas have been passed forward to TSD for development/exploitation. TSD has expressed interest in another of his ideas, the plans for which have just been completed.

Alien Affairs Staff of Immigration/Naturalization has extended Subject's backstopped residence status until 20 October 1960.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ernest G. Mayerink

DATE: 20 May 1959

FROM : Special Contracting Officer

SUBJECT: Record of monthly salary paid subject employee

Date	Cash paid	Deposited to Escrow account	Balance Due	Initial
20 May 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$450.00	E. M.
20 June 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$900.00	E. M.
20 July 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$1350.00	E. M.
20 Aug 1959	$50.00	$450.00	$1800.00	E. M.
20 Aug 1959	~~[illegible]~~	$1000.00	$2800.00	E. M.
MONTHLY	SALARY DISPOSITION ACCORDING TO CONTRACT			
21 Aug 1959		-50.00	2750.00	E. M.
27 Aug. 59		-100.00	2650.00	E. M.
2 Sept. 59		100.00	2550.00	E. M.
11 Sept. 59		-200.00	2350.00	E. M.
23 Sept. 59	+500.00		2850.00	E. M.
24 Sept. 59		-100	2750.00	E. M.
1 Oct. 59		-100	2650.00	E. M.
9 Oct. 59		-50	2600.00	E. M.
19 Oct. 59		100.00	2500.00	E. M.
26 Oct. 59		100.00	2400.00	E. M.
19 Oct. 59	400.00		2800.00	E. M.
29 Oct. 59		200.00 111.23347)	2600.00	E. M.

DATE	WITHDRAWAL		BALANCE	INITIAL
1 Nov 59	$200.00		$2400.00	C.T.
3 Nov 59	1800.00		600.00	E.M.
13 Nov 59	590.00	To Finance Officer: 4 Months Rental November - February	10.-	E.M.
			0 -	E.M.
29 Nov 59	$400.00	($400.00) Oct. to Cash, Nov Salary	$410.00 ~~10~~ -	E.M.
7 Dec 59	$410.00	Cash	0	E.M.
21 Dec 59		($400.00) Cash Salary, Nov.-Dec.	400.00	E.M.
20 Jan 60		($400.00) Cash Salary, Dec.-Jan.	0	E.M.
20 Feb 60		($400.00 [illegible]) Cash Salary, Jan-Feb.	$[illegible]0.00	E.M.
1 Mar. 60		Remainder Cash Salary Jan-Feb	$75.00	E.M.
10 Mar. 60		Remainder Cash Salary Jan-Feb.	$75.00	E.M.
20 Mar 60		Cash Salary Feb-Mar.	400.00	E.M.
20 April 60		Cash Salary Mar-April	400.00	E.M.
27 Apr 60		Cash drawn	75.00	
20 May 60		Cash Salary April-May	400.00	E.M.
20 June 60		Cash Salary May-June	400.00	E.M.
20 July 60		Cash Salary June-July	400.00	E.M.
20 Aug 60		Cash Salary July-Aug	400.00	E.M.

14-00000

Chief, SR Division
Mr. O.H. [illegible], Room 1062 J Building
Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

McINTYRE, Virginia
#216867

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 6 May 1960, requesting National Agency Checks on the above Subject.

2. Attached hereto is our report of investigation of 1 June 1960. Records at ACSI and [illegible] were negative and FBI has no investigation conducted. You may also note that credit bureau reports reflect the last name for the Subject to be McINTYRE.

3. This memorandum is not to be considered as a clearance or an approval for Subject's use in any capacity. No dissemination of this information should be made outside of Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security.

4. This matter is now considered closed unless an additional request is received from you.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall

Attachment
Invest Rpt dtd 1 June 60

21-23477

14-00000

FILE NO. 216567 1 June 1950

216567 1 June 60

SYNOPSIS

Credit at Washington, D. C. favorable. Police at Washington, D. C. negative. Subject's Social Security Number is 577-16-4277. No additional biographical information was obtained.

REPRODUCED [illegible]

201 233477

#218557

1 June 1960

CREDIT:
(In Washington, D. C.)

On 16 May 1960, the Subject's name was searched through the files of Stone's Mercantile Agency, Incorporated, 1119 H Street, Northeast, by Special Agent Albert J. M., and revealed a credit report dated 22 January 1960, which reflects the following:

Name: Mrs. Virginia C. Mc_____

Age: About 45 - 50

Marital Status: Separated (no details)

Residence: 2500 K Street, Northwest (Potomac House Apartments)
since 1958

Former Residences: 3210 Wisconsin Avenue, Northwest
2500 K Street, Northwest

Previous Employments: From about 15 February 1955 to about 31 January 1957 employed by Gelman Construction Company, Investment Building, as a resident manager at $150.00 per month, plus apartment.

On 17 May 1960, the files of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, 222 6th Street, Northeast, were searched in the name of the Subject and reflected the following information on one William E. _____ and spouse, as one Virginia Mc_____:

The date of the most recent credit report was 10 June 1958, which reflected Subject's age as 37, her address as 901 16th Street, Northwest, with one year renting from a Mrs. [illegible]. Subject's spouse's employment was listed as Diamond Cab Company as a driver for two months, at about $60.00 per week. Subject's spouse was previously employed with the Austin Tobacco Company in South Carolina. Subject's employment was listed as being at Apartment House "1600" at 1600 16th Street, as a switchboard operator since April 1957 at $100.00 per month. Subject has three satisfactory accounts, with a high credit of $38.00, and was said to be [illegible] from South Carolina.

This file contained no additional information in regard to the Subject.

#215867

POLICE: (CRIMINAL AND SUBVERSIVE RECORDS)
(At Washington, D. C.)

On 27 May 1960, the files of the Metropolitan Police Department, Central Repository, were searched in the name of the Subject with negative results.

GENERAL:
(At Washington, D. C.)

On 20 May 1960, attempts to develop biographical information on Subject proved negative at the District of Columbia Drivers License and Violation Bureau, and the Columbia Glass and Mirror Company, 3232 M Street, Northwest, a former place of employment of the Subject.

On 20 May 1960, information obtained at the Gelman Company, Investment Building, 15th and K Street, Northwest, reflected that Subject worked for the company during 1956 and 1957, and left to work for F. B. Sheparis Real Estate Agency. Her social security number, 577-16-4297, was learned through this source.

[illegible]/ary

SECRET

SR/DOB/60 1996

5 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OS/Alien Affairs Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Pennington

SUBJECT: Change of Living Quarters, Case of AEASPIC, CI/OA No. C-73532

1. Background:

Subject was brought to the United States via HBRAINBOW flight on 20 April 1959 for training preparatory to dispatch on a black mission into the USSR as a member of a REDSOX team. CI/OA Division approved (No. C-73532) on 11 March 1959. This mission has been postponed as of 17 June 1960.

2. In view of the effort and expense devoted to the recruitment and training of AEASPIC, SR Division has deemed it worthwhile to give Subject certain limited additional training prior to operational utilization by another component of the DD/P. To facilitate this end it is requested that subject, towards the end of July, 1960, be permitted to be moved to an SR/DOB safehouse on the outskirts of Washington, D. C. Subject will remain there until final disposition of his case. Although Subject has conducted himself in an exemplary manner re his personal habits and sense of security, final disposition of Subject can be better accomplished in a more controlled installation.

3. It is anticipated that final resolvement of the case of AEASPIC, i.e. operational utilization by another component of the DD/P or resettlement, will be accomplished by 20 October 1960, the date approved by OS/Alien Affairs Staff whereby AEASPIC can legally remain backstopped in the United States.

4. It is further requested that AEASPIC be permitted to continue to spend occasional week-end free time unescorted within the limits of the greater Washington, D. C. area.

5. Subject will continue to be advised and guided by an SR/DOB Case Officer re Subject's personal life and habits.

201-233477

6. Subject will be authorized no access to transportation other than public and/or occassional rides afforded him by his Case Officer in an SR/DOB vehicle.

7. Subject's safe office will be terminated and vacated at the same time as his apartment.

8. For any further information please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB on extension 3331.

PERRY E. CROOKHAM
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

14-00000

SECRET

SR/DOB/60- 1990

29 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Communications

ATTENTION : Chief OC/TTT

SUBJECT : W/T Training for SR/DOB contract agent AEASPIC

1. It is requested that W/T aptitude assessment and subsequent W/T training be instituted at your earliest convenience for SR/DOB contract agent AEASPIC. This training is deemed necessary in order to round out Subject's clandestine training for operational utilization by interested DD/P components.

2. Subject to your concurrence, it is anticipated that W/T training will be given Subject at a safe office located in the downtown D.C. area, and then continued at an SR/DOB safehouse beginning 1 August 1960. Training is to be maintained until Subject is a qualified operational W/T communicator.

3. Transportation for the communications instructor to and from the training sites will be provided by SR/DOB.

4. For any further information, please contact Fred Kirkpatrick, SR/DOB, Extension 8331.

PERRY E. CROOKHAM
Acting Chief, SR/DOB

PC/gc

Distrib.: O & 1 - addressee
✓2 - SR/DOB
1 - SR/DOB chrono

SECRET

201-233477

23 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discontinuance of Project AESENTINEL for 1960

1. On 17 June 1960, SR/DOP was informed telephonically by Quent JOHNSON, COP/SR (Acting Chief SR/Div.) that Project AESENTINEL would not be carried out this year (1960).

2. The feasibility/practicability of carrying out this project at a later date would of course depend on the line of United States policy vis-a-vis countering the Soviet threat.

3. After due consideration, SR/DOP has taken steps to terminate one of the two AESENTINEL agents, AEBUTTER/3. As regards the other agent, AEASTIC, it is felt that he could be of definite service to this Agency in some similar capacity. This office is presently engaged in finding a job for AEASTIC.

FRED KIRKPATRICK

201-233477

7 May 1960
30 Rue Cabanis
Paris XIV

Hurrah! At last, at last everything happens... even a letter from Fat! How we have waited for this one because it's the only one we have received. We heard here and there... Ajibo has a letter. Fat is in South America ... Fat wrote Atchiko ... and then, nothing for us! We thought this was dirty, you know Fat. In spite of everything, we did not think for one moment that you could have forgotten us! How is that for confidence! Well, you're alive but so far away... This morning we all enjoyed your short letter...but it should be a very long one to make us pardon you for one year's silence. Do you understand? One whole year without knowing anything; imagining the worst and with each ——— our thoughts came to naught in search of Fat, the lifelong friend! You certainly have some nerve to speak of Mimi who grumbles. All that has changed now. I no longer grumble; I keep still. It's Colette who gripes and criticizes endlessly, and makes you three times more irritable. It goes without saying that she has excuses - but so have we. For years she has not had any vacation and is crushed by worries, is unemployed, and doesn't have a cent. Not only is it not funny, it's also disgusting. We hoped until the last minute for your presence at Nina's wedding, which was strictly Russian... the facade at least, but also the reverse side! 230 people, an excellent buffet, champagne, (cruchon?) etc.... Georgian dances and an atmosphere so wonderful that the solemn 2nd lieut. Monestier lost his feet and danced (dragged on by Stanko) the Georgian Dance! There are pictures to prove it which are in the hands of Nina and Bernard. These two are living the perfect love, with a capital A. Bernard is charming in every way. The Monestiers have given generously but we should do the same. Victor who had promised 90,000 gave 50,000. Aunick must have loaned her father 80,000 on Esti's pay and Bernard loaned 50,000 to your father-in-law. With Nina gone we have lived on Aunick's salary with debts more debts. (vaste?) having stated that didn't have a cent until Esti, angry after 18 months without leave sent, for his wife. Aunick departed for Algeria by plane asking her father to pay back the money loaned without leaving us anything to live on. Vic didn't have any money, but the day after Aunick left, he went on vacation to the Balearic Islands with Laridge and a certain Barbara! Nelly, no possibility of vacation or anything. We don't even speak about it. I had to borrow from everywhere to live until Aunick returned. 1½ months afterwards without lodging and not able to find (illegible) They came to live here in one room, and they both working, but Esti has to take time off very often for examination, plans, etc... therefore Aunick gives us 20,000 per month. Colette made a few dresses. Nelly took her beauticians course and soon got her diploma. She looked for a job which she could not find. She was too young (she's 18 years old.) This is just to show you our joy of living. and the change in character of Colette who (illegible) for nothing and makes life expensive for us. On top of everything I had an operation last year. Since January, Victor has spent two weeks in the hospital and he's going for five months to the mountains. Leaving us to pay the rent. the gas, the electricity, the water, and if that isn't enough, the taxes. (which he forgot). This is our debt-ridden life. Whole days without heat, without light even without bread; and when will this end? If Colette only found work, and Nelly too, but nothing — nothing. I'm looking for those religious houses where we can ask for admittance, but great catastrophes like Fréjus and Agadir take up all the possibilities. This gives you an idea of my weakness, and I'm 60 years old. I can no longer work as I used to and, as for my friends, except for (illigible) who payed for Nelly's studies Bribri who is faithful but no longer has much money... that's all. The worst thing is the lack of heat. This gives you a few details on the joyous life that all give of us are leading here. As for Nina, she's out of all this.

201-233477

She has an easy life and rather fashionable life. Her husband is at her feet, it is wonderful for her. Aunick also has a wonderful husband, but with us there is financial trouble. (Illegible) on life Cabinis style! Hopy (illigible) like his father... he bites people whom he doesn't like. He's the darling of Colette Then there is the Cat Poussy who chases the mice which infest the kitchen. Now that you're up-to-date, describe your life to us quickly. How long have you been there, and why has it taken so long to write? Can you come easily? But November or December is quite distant. Don't you think that I'll leave for the other world without seeing you. They're talking about the engagement of Nelly with Ramez for October. This time there is no reason why you should miss it. You knowing now that we've found you again it's out of the question for us to leave you in peace.

You know if you can help us out don't holdback for these past two months have been the most terrible in our life. If in June you can give Colette the possibility of at least a two-week vacation. You will be doing a pious deed. It will do her good morally and physically. If you come back that will buck her up. She needs it badly.

She was 45 years old yesterday. Her sons-in-law Maguy and Loulou, both same, the faithful ones. With this I have bothered you enough, for this time but I wanted to put you in the swim again after a year.

???

I kiss you have all the months without any news. Don't start that over again.

The whole family is going to write you. Even lazy Colette but what wouldn't we do for you.

MIMI

7 Mars

Paris XIV

Hourrah ! enfin enfin tout arrive.. Même une lettre de Dat ! ce que nous l'avons attendue celle-là car c'est la seule que nous ayons reçue et d'ailleurs dire parce que là... Yibo a eu une lettre Dat est en Amérique du Sud... Dat a écrit à Ychiko.. et puis rien pour nous ! on l'a trouvait [illegible]. Vous voyez Dat ! malgré tout on n'a pas perdu une seule minute qu'on vous voudriez nous donner ! ce que c'est que la confiance tout de même.. enfin vous êtes vivant mais si loin.. ce matin on a dégusté tous ensemble le petit bout de lettre.. mais il en faudra une bien longue pour nous faire [illegible] un silence d'une année.. vous vous rendez compte ? une année sans rien savoir.. en supposant le pire et à chaque moment notre pensée allant dans le vide à la recherche de Dat l'ami de toujours ! Vous avez un certain toupet de parler de Guinness qui grogne... c'est changé maintenant je ne grogne plus, je me tais.. c'est Colette qui rouspète, critique sans cesse à vous mettre les nerfs 3 fois par jour en pelote.. évidemment elle a des excuses mais nous aussi.. Depuis dix années elle n'a pas eu de vacances est écrasée par les embêtements, n'a pas de travail et pas une miette d'argent ce n'est certes pas drôle mais écœurant. On a espéré jusqu'à la dernière minute votre venue au mariage de Nina qui était formidablement réussi. La famille au moins mais l'univers ! 230 personnes, buffet excellent champagne Cruchon etc. danses exquises et une ambiance si formidable que le [illegible] Monsieur [illegible] a perdu pieds et a dansé (entraîné par Stanko) la danse [illegible] ! il y a des photos à l'appui que détiennent Nina et Bernard. Tous en fêtant la parfaite [illegible]

201-233477

avec un grand A .. Bernard est charmant en tous
points. Les Monestier ont largement payé mais nous on a
dû en faire autant .. Victor qui avait [illegible] 90.000
en a donné 60 .. Arnault a dû prêter à sa fille 80 000 fr
sur la [illegible] de [illegible] et Bernard a prêté 50.000 à son beau-père.
[illegible] [illegible] .. nous avons bien vu en dehors d'Arnault [illegible]
dettes et [illegible] .. Victor après [illegible] n'avait pas un sou
quand il a [illegible] après 18 mois. [illegible] promotion a [illegible]
sa femme .. Arnault est [illegible] en [illegible] par avion
[illegible] à sa [illegible] l'argent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 99 [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] n'avait pas d'argent .. on le [illegible] [illegible]
départ d'Arnault .. il partait en vacances aux Baléares ~~avec~~ [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] une certaine Barbara X .. Nelly pas [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] .. mais on n'en parle pas. J'ai [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] et [illegible] pour Victor [illegible] retour
d'Arnault .. mais [illegible] .. sans logement et ne [illegible] [illegible]
chercher une [illegible] d'[illegible] .. ils se sont installés ici dans la
chambre et [illegible] tous deux .. mais [illegible] doit [illegible]
très [illegible] pour ses [illegible] [illegible] etc .. alors Arnault
nous donne 2000 par mois .. Colette a fait quelques [illegible] Nelly
les études d'esthéticienne et aussitôt ses diplômes [illegible]
à la recherche d'une situation qu'elle n'a pas trouvée .. on
la trouve trop jeune (elle a 18 ans) alors en [illegible] ..
Ceci uniquement pour t'indiquer .. notre joie de vivre ..
et le changement de caractère de Colette, qui [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] pour un rien et nous rend souvent la vie dure ..
Tous combien j'ai dû être opéré l'année dernière ..
Depuis janvier Victor a passé 2 mois à l'hôpital et il va
partir 6 mois à la montagne .. nous [illegible] à
payer loyer gaz électricité eau et par dessus le marché
les impôts (qu'il a eu ... !) . Voilà notre vie des dettes
partout .. des fourneaux sans feu, sans lumière puisque sans [illegible]
et quand cela finira-t-il ?.. si Colette trouvait du travail
et Nelly .. mais rien .. je cherche les [illegible] [illegible]
on demande notre pitance .. mais les grandes
catastrophes comme Fréjus et Agadir [illegible] toutes [illegible]

II

les possibilités .. alors fais toi une idée du tableau et j'ai 80 ans je ne puis plus agir comme avant et ces amis !! à part Jeanette qui a payé les études de Nelly .. Bébé qui est fidèle .. mais n'a plus beaucoup d'argent maintenant .. c'est tout. Le pire je crois c'est le manque de fric .. Ceci te donne quelques détails sur la pauvre vie que nous menons tous les cinq. Irène est, elle, hors d'affaire vu facilité assez mondaine mais à ses pieds c'est épatant pour elle .. Annette mariée épatant aussi mais avec nous grands soucis financiers. — Pépé sur la Vie Cabanis. Hippy, lui, est propre pas comme ton père .. il mord les pieds qui ne lui plaisent pas .. est le chouchou de Colette .. puis il y a le chat Soussy .. qui chasse les souris qui infestent la cuisine. Maintenant que tu es au courant raconte vite vite ta vie .. depuis quand es-tu là-bas ? pourquoi as-tu mis si longtemps à donner signe de vie ? Peux-tu venir facilement ? mais Novembre ou Décembre c'est loin cela .. Ne t'avise pas de [illegible] partir pour l'autre monde avant de te voir ! On parle des fiançailles de Nelly avec Baney pour Octobre .. Cette fois pas question que tu manques tu sais ! maintenant qu'on t'a retrouvé pas question de te laisser en paix !

Tu sais si tu peux nous dépanner ne te gêne pas car ces mois passés ont été les plus terribles de notre existence et ce n'est pas pu dire ! Si tu peux en fin donner la possibilité à Colette d'aller au moins 15 jours en vacances, tu feras une œuvre pie, cela lui fera du bien au moral et au physique .. et si tu viens cela la remettra d'aplomb. Elle en a un rude besoin !

Lili a eu 65 ans hier .. ses gendres, Graguy et Loulou sont tous venus — les fidèles. Sur ce je t'ai assez embêté pour une fois, mais j'ai voulu te remettre dans le vieux bain après 1 an !

Je t'embrasse pour tous les mois passés sans nouvelles .. ne recommence pas surtout !

Toute la famille va t'écrire même la paresseuse Colette .. mais que ne ferait on pas pour toi !.

Toute ma vieille affection

Meimi



10,37

ERAL LECLE

Señor Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11.744 (Lapa)
São Paulo
Brasil

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

exp: [illegible] du [illegible] 30 rue Cabanis
Paris France


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

Recommandé

PARIS XIV
AV. GENERAL LECLERC (14e)
7 V 63 13

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
0165
POSTES
PR 003

Senôr Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11.746
Sao. Paulo
Brazil
Amérique du Sud

R
PARIS XIV
AV. LECLERC
No 471

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

dr. Pinto 30 rue Cassette Paris France.

DR. LAPA
24-5-60
SP
BRASIL



30 rue Cépré
[illegible] Paris XV

Cher Dat (Eduardo)

Je me demandais si le Brésil existait... si les Indiens l'ont repris .. si la poste est inventée là-bas ? s'il existe des facteurs ... des timbres et des habitants ?.. surtout ils pas logés dans la lune ? 7 lettres envoyées !. pas une réponse ! Vous pouvez gémir que l'on ne vous écrit pas !!... Je risque une dernière fois avec recommandation sinon qu'espérer ? Colette a écrit 2 fois .. Annick 2 fois, moi [illegible] !. Nelly 2 fois Nina 1 fois ! avec des noms différents c'est tout de même extraordinaire .. car j'espère bien que vous êtes vivant ! Inutile de vous parler de notre vie et situation ... c'est tout

à fait insupportable et incompa-
tible au genre humain ! Sur ce
je termine .. aurais-je la
même sorte de silence ?

On vous embrasse toutes
avec toute notre vieille affection

Mimi

Je voudrais mettre
dans le cas où elle
vous arrivera .. Pour
vous annoncer la
mort d'un [illegible] cousin
[illegible] .. Achille
était là et nous a dit
vous avoir écrit aussi
et n'avoir jamais eu
de réponse.
Mme l'Université [illegible] est
morte aussi .. Si
J'ai obtenu [illegible] également
ce [illegible] un pour mon
[illegible] .. tous les [illegible]
[illegible] ..
Si cette lettre n'arrive
pas .. c'est à recommencer.
Bien vos amitiés
[illegible] [illegible]

30 rue Cabanis
Paris 14

Dear Dat (Eduardo)

I am asking me if Brasil is realy existing,if the planes have find him...if the mail is invented there... are they in the moon? We have send 7 letters.No answer.You may cry that are not wreiting to you...It is the last one.Colette had written twice,Annick twice,I have four time,Nelly twice,Nina once,with different name.That is extraordinary...because I hope you are still alive. It is no necessary to talk about our life...That is all.. I open again my letter to telling you your oncle Keresselidz is dead. Atchiko was here and said he had written also and had never received an answer.

Mme Kwinitadze is dead and also Mr Galoblichvili,one of this day that will be my turn...will I see you again before.?

If that letter didnot arrive,I give up.

We are kissing you all of us.

Grandma.

201-233477

Paris, March 7, 1960

Very dear Eduardo,

We were beginning to wonder if you were still on this planet or if you had ~~integrated~~ emigrated to the moon!

Since the note that you sent me a few days after your departure, we haven't had any news from you. I never received your first letter and I was even very angry for ~~Lulu~~ Loulou had told me that Ach had received news of you and that you were in South America. As for Nathela I really don't know if she received your letter but I am going to write her a note. As for the others I don't know their address. Be so kind as to give it to me so that I can carry out your orders!!! Time passes with incredible swiftness and unfortunately life is so monotonous! Apart from Nina's marriage, which was a great success and during which we had a very good time, there's nothing very interesting. Nina and Bernard found an apartment very near the house at Bd. Auguste Blanqui almost at the corner of the rue de la Santé, the building which is behind the little gas station at the end of a long alley-way. Catch on! As for Titi and Aunick they are still at home but would like to find a place of their own.

You're exaggerating when you say Hopy the "pisser" which is completely wrong. You should instead say Hopy the "biter" for he bites ~~quickly~~ easily unfortunately! Yesterday evening the whole family was gathered including ~~Lulu~~ Loulou and Maguy to celebrate (word missing) three days alas! 45 summers! The atmosphere was very friendly; and just this morning, a letter from you bright and early. It's an extraordinary piece of luck that it's still in one piece as it was pouring out when I shouted a letter from you. You can be sure of getting news from the whole family and I thank you for loving us so sincerely! My august former husband has just

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caught double pneumonia again, he'll be laid up at least until September which has plunged us all into (free translation) our ears in debt -- a matter of money naturally! Therefore, I'd like to tell you that your letter makes me very happy. You should certainly be framed with the most beautiful frame that exists in this whole wide world for there ~~is~~ are surely no two like you has far as we are concerned naturally. May heaven take it into consideration toward the remission of all your sins, amen! Ouf!!!

I stopped this letter yesterday evening when Odile came to visit me to wish me a happy anniversary with a bouquet of flowers. She stayed for dinner as well as Maguy and all three of us went to the movies to see an old film which was very funny "You Can't Take it With You" in which James Stewart was still young.

What else is there to tell you, you know our life...nothing has changed. So, I impatiently await another letter from you telling us what you are doing with many details. It would be really nice if you could be here for the end of the year. In the meantime I kiss you affectionately.

Coco

Paris le 7 Mars 1960

Très cher "Eduardo"

Nous commencions à nous demander si tu étais toujours sur cette planète ou bien si tu avais émigré dans la lune !

Depuis le petit mot que tu m'as envoyé quelques jours après ton départ nous n'avons aucune nouvelles de toi. Je n'ai jamais reçu ta dernière lettre et j'étais même assez inquiet car Loulou m'avait dit qu'Ach avait reçu de tes nouvelles et que tu étais en Amérique du Sud. Quant à Nathalie j'ignore totalement si elle a reçu ta lettre mais je vais lui écrire un petit mot. Pour les autres j'ignore leur adresse. Sois gentil de me la donner pour que je puisse exécuter tes ordres !!! Déjà 10 mois que tu es parti, le temps passe à une vitesse incroyable et pourtant la vie est d'un monotone !

201-233477

A part le mariage de Nina qui a été très réussi et où nous nous sommes beaucoup amusés rien de bien intéressant.
Nina et Bernard ont trouvés un appartement tout près de la maison Bd Auguste Blanqui presque au coin de la rue de la Santé l'immeuble qui est derrière le petit poste d'essence au fond d'une grande cour. Tu vois ! quant à Tété et Annick ils sont toujours à la maison mais voudraient bien trouver un gîte à eux.
Tu exagères de dire Hopy le "pisseur" ce qui est tout à fait faux tu devrais plutôt dire Hopy le "mordeur" car il mord facilement malheureusement.

Justement hier soir toute la famille était au grand complet plus Loulou et Maguy pour fêter ... trois fois hélas ! mes 45 printemps ! l'ambiance était très chaleureuse et juste ce matin à la première heure une lettre de toi c'est une chance extraordinaire qu'elle soit encore i/

entièrement car c'était une avalanche quand
j'ai reçu ~~[illegible]~~ ta lettre de toi
Tu peux être certain d'avoir des nouvelles
de toute la famille et je te remercie
de nous aimer si sincèrement !

Mon auguste ex-mari a repiqué une
double pneumonie il en a eu une
pour [illegible] en Septembre ce qui nous
a plongé tous dans le caca
jusqu'au cou question fric
bien entendu ! aussi j'aurai autant
te dire que ta lettre ! nous plonge
dans les délices — tu es certainement
à encadrer avec le plus beau cadre
qui puisse exister dans ce vaste
monde car il n'y a sûrement pas
deux types comme toi .. à notre égard
bien entendu .. que le ciel t'en
tienne compte pour la rémission de
tous tes péchés . ainsi soit-il ! ouf !!

J'ai arrêté cette lettre hier soir au moment
de la visite d'Odile qui venait me
souhaiter mon anniversaire avec un

bouquet de fleurs. Elle est restée dîner ainsi que Maguy et nous avons été toutes les trois bien sagement au cinéma voir un vieux film très marrant "Vous ne l'emporterez pas avec vous" où l'on voit un James Stewart tout jeune.

Que te dire d'autre tu connais notre vie... rien n'a changé aussi j'attends avec impatience une autre lettre de toi-toi nous racontant ce que tu fais avec force détails.

Ce serait drôlement chouette si tu pouvais être là pour la fin de l'année en attendant je t'embrasse bien affectueusement

Coco



Exp C. Honsenki 30 Rue Cabanis, Paris XIV

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1960
R. DE LA GLACIERE (13e)

PARIS 101
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R. DE LA GLACIERE (13e)
10h

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
*105
POSTES
SP 020

Monsieur Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 11744 (Lapa)
SAO PAULO
BRASIL

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION



7
MAR
1960

Paris, 24 March

Hi Kid,

I hope that unlike myself you received my letter. Since the mailing of the last letter a sensational event occurred in the family. A fourth daughter for Atch, Sophie, born on March 13th. As you asked me, I sent them your address and my congratulations.

Yesterday Loulou came by for a few minutes in the afternoon to give us some very bad news. His father's condition is very bad. We are afraid it is a tumor of the lung. Unfortunately, when one says tumor, one often means cancer! I hope to God that I am mistaken. Little (eligible) the cousin of Ramaz had a fine boy named Christophe; and that's the latest news!

The children should write you every day, but if you want to chew them out, here is Nina's address: Mme. Monestier, 159 Bd. Auguste Blanqui, Paris 13.

Nelly has been working since last Monday in a very stylish and terribly expensive little shop. The job of sales clerk seems to agree with her. It is a store for expensive lingerie at the corner of rue Miromesnil and St. Honore.

I am writing you all curled up in the corner of the kitchen for we are out of heat and today, after a few days of radiant sunshine it is raining in torrents!

What crimes must I have committed in a previous life to lead such an ugly life!

Write us quickly and tell us what you are doing. We know nothing, since your last letter never arrived! I am waiting impatiently for some news from you. In the meantime, I kiss you affectionately.

Coco

Paris le 24 Mars

Cher Vieux

J'espère que contrairement à moi-même, tu as bien reçu ma lettre. depuis le départ de cette dernière il est arrivé un événement sensas dans ta famille une 3ème fille à Abel Sophie née le 17 Mars. Comme tu me l'avais demandé je leur ai envoyé ton adresse... et mes félicitations.

Hier Loulou a passé quelques instants dans l'après midi pour nous annoncer une bien triste nouvelle, son père va très mal il doit avoir les résultats des radios aujourd'hui on a peur d'une tumeur au poumon et malheureusement qui dit tumeur, dit bien souvent cancer! Fasse le ciel que je me trompe!..

La petite Manana, cousine de Ramaz. a eu un beau garçon dénommé "Christophe"

et voilà les dernières nouvelles !
Les enfants doivent t'écrire tous les jours mais si tu veux les eng.... voici l'adresse de Nina : Mme Monestier
159 Bd Auguste Blanqui
Paris XIII.

Nelly travaille depuis lundi dernier dans un petit magasin très chic et horriblement cher. Le métier de vendeuse a l'air de lui convenir. C'est un magasin de lingerie de luxe au coin de la rue Miromesnil et St Honoré.

Je t'écris recroquevillée dans un coin de la cuisine car nous sommes sans feu et aujourd'hui, après quelques jours d'un soleil radieux, il tombe un vrai déluge !

Quels crimes ai-je bien pu commettre dans une vie antérieure pour mener une vie aussi moche !

Écris nous vite et raconte nous ce que tu fais, nous ne savons rien puisque ta première lettre n'est jamais arrivée !

J'attends de tes nouvelles avec impatience et en attendant je t'embrasse affectueusement

C. Hamsik. 20 Rue Cabanis Paris XIV

6

PARIS XIV - AV. DU GENERAL LECLERC
25 III 60 17

FRANCE
*105
POSTES

Monsieur Eduardo Callo
Caixa postal 1174 (Lapa)
SAO PAULO
BRAZIL

VIA AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

Paris, March 25, 1960

Dear "Eduardo,"

Everybody was very happy to hear from you again. You know that Mimi and Mama have already written you as well as, undoubtedly, Nina and Nelly. Therefore, I'm the very last to write you but that doesn't mean that I don't think of you.

It's almost a year ~~since~~ you left. Time passes rather quickly in spite of everything. Everybody must have already told you the most important news. So much the worse if I talk nonsense.

Last August 15 I went to meet Titi in Algeria. We returned together early in October. A whole year passed without our seeing each other, but with letters every day, and we found each other as if we had parted the day before, or almost. It was funny to see Titi exercising his functions as a second lieutenant with a section under his orders. What a pleasure to find myself with him there. Now when Bebert and company speak of military service I can join them. The life of an officer's wife is not so bad. One is spoiled! The first month we were at the sea shore. Since I love the heat this was just the thing for me! Titi left every morning at 5 o'clock to join his section 25 km from the place where I was staying and returned only at 4 o'clock in the afternoon; — the weeks passed quickly except for the beach — and still we could not go very far because of the guerrillas! In short, apart from going out to lunch, I stayed, so to speak, shuttered up in my room waiting for the return of my lord and master. I tried to go swimming alone, but the city and the beach were full of soldiers and I gave up quickly. You cannot imagine, I think, what it's like to eat alone as a woman in a restaurant dining room full of soldiers. I did not dare to raise my eyes from my plate and, to feel looked at while eating, makes you become clumsy. Hardly

201-233477

any women except some middle-aged ones who gave me side ways glances. There was plenty of youth but then too they looked at me like a China doll. That's enough for my "military service".

Titi went back to the school of fine arts, he's coming along fine. Unless someone offers him a wonderful position he will continue at the school. It will be very long! He also works for an architectural firm. Finally you know the procedure having almost been in it yourself, we are looking for an apartment. We would like to have a home of our own. Certain people don't understand why we want to leave la rue Cabanis since there's enough room there. First of all there isn't that much! We have to queue up for the bath room; if Titi wants to walk around in his shorts he can't do it (it's not that he is accustomed to doing this sort of thing) and the people can hear everything that's going on in the room. And then again it's very understandable that we want to have a place of our own which we will furnish as we like and where we will live as we like. To spend a full day in bed or to eat at one o'clock in the morning, etc.--and then, too, there is also a little friction between Mama and me. I'd like to shake her up. If you can do it by letter don't hesitate. She's getting bitter how can she do otherwise. She does nothing or next to nothing and she's letting herself go. She could be so cute if she did what's necessary to get thin, and despite her 45 summers she's still well-built. What she needs is a man to take care of her, to take her out and pull her out of her comatose or almost comatose state. I shake her up often but as for me I am abrupt and sometimes I say what should not be said. I'd like to find her a part-time job, something pleasant which would cause her to get out, take a walk, see people, etc. Evidently the house is less gay than previously and, nevertheless, we are still here. What will it be like when only Nelly will remain who is hardly ever here because she goes out with Ramas. And then there's another thing; people criticize Mama because they see her with nothing to do -- I allow myself to criticize, but I refuse to hear others do it.

The Bebert ~~Monastaire~~ Monestier's are almost next door to us, exactly in the building across the street from the metro Glaciere. They found an apartment; but, hold on to yourself 1,600,000 francs deposit. It's crazy. It's their ~~great friend~~ grandfather who loaned them the money which they are paying back at the rate of 10,000 francs per month. They have received many gifts and are completely furnished. We see them frequently. Nelly went to a beaut~~icien~~y school which lasted three months. She liked it very much, but after ~~going~~ getting out, she didn't find a job. Through one of my friends I found her a job as a beginning sales clerk while waiting, but perhaps at the end she'll like being a sales clerk better. She's been working since Monday. Nina is still in the same job. She's waiting impatiently for Bernard to make enough money so she won't have to work.

Mimi is still the same fortunately. As for me, I've changed professions. I am a model. Don't laugh. Evidently I am beginning in this career, but I hope it will work out. One can earn a lot of money and it's a tiring business but pleasant and feminine and a lot more interesting than ~~the~~ a job as secretary where you rest your behind on a chair all day. I began at the beginning of November and I worked until the month of March. I've been unemployed since then, but I'm doing a lot of looking around to find something. The mannequin "cabines" are formed only toward the end of May. I must make some photo tryouts next week. Photography brings in much more. If only it works out I'd like it very much.

What more can I write you! We see Louis and Nathela quite often. Nathela has changed jobs and is now earning 150,000 francs a month. Not bad! Hurry up and write us and tell us about the things you're seeing. Do you like Brazil?

My dear Eduado I am going to leave you. Write quickly if you can. I give you a big kiss and hope to do it for good one of these days.

Amick

201 233477

Paris le 25 Mars 1960

Mon vieux "Eduardo"

Tout le monde a été bien content de recevoir de tes nouvelles. Je sais que Mémé et Maman t'ont déjà écrit ainsi sans doute que Nina et Nelly. Je suis donc le dernier à t'écrire mais cela ne veut pas dire que je ne pense pas à toi.

Presque un an déjà que tu es parti. le temps passe malgré tout assez vite. Tout le monde a dû déjà te raconter le principal. toujours [illegible] racheté.

Le 15 Août dernier je suis parti rejoindre T.T. en Algérie, nous sommes rentrés ensemble les premiers jours d'octobre. Un an entier sans nous voir mais avec des lettres chaque jour, et nous nous sommes retrouvés comme si nous nous étions quittés la veille ou presque. Cela faisait drôle de voir Titi dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de sous-lieutenant avec une section sous ses

41-233477

autres. quel plaisir de me retrouver avec lui là bas. Maintenant, lorsque ces messieurs Bilbert et Cie parlent service militaire je puis me joindre à eux. La vie de femme d'officier n'est pas si désagréable. On est chouchoutée! Le premier mois, nous étions au bord de la mer. Moi qui aime la chaleur j'étais servie! T.T. partait tous les matins à 5h rejoindre sa section à 25 Km de l'endroit où j'étais et ne rentrait qu'à 4h de l'après midi. Les environs sont vite épuisés à part la plage et encore on ne pouvait guère s'éloigner, à cause fellaghas. En résumé, à part sortir au déjeuner je restais pour ainsi dire cloîtrée dans ma chambre attendant le retour de mon Seigneur et Maître. J'ai bien essayé d'aller me baigner seule, mais la ville la plage était inondée de soldats [illegible] tu ne peux, je crois, t'imaginer ce que c'est que de manger, seule femme, dans une salle de restaurant, au milieu de militaires. Je n'osais lever les yeux de mon assiette et me sentais regardée pendant que l'on mange. Il faut devenir maladroite. Presque pas de femmes à part des bonnes femmes d'un certain âge qui me regardaient de travers. Il y avait bien de la jeunesse mais là aussi on me regardait en chien de faïence. Assez parlé de "mon service militaire"

T.t. s'est remis à l'École des Beaux Arts. Cela marche. A moins qu'on lui propose une situation mirobolante, il continue l'École. Ce sera long! Il travaille également chez des Architectes. Enfin tu connais le [illegible] ayant été aussi presque déclaré. Nous recherchons

3/

un appartement. Nous aimerions être chez nous. Certaines personnes ne comprennent pas que nous voulions quitter la rue Cabanis puisqu'il y a de la place. D'abord, il n'y en a pas tant que cela! il faut faire la queue pour la salle de bains, si T.T. a envie de se ballader en petite tenue il ne le peut pas (ce n'est pas qu'il soit coutumier du fait) et puis l'on entend tout ce qui se passe dans les chambres. Et puis enfin, c'est bien compréhensible que nous ayons envie d'un endroit à nous, que nous arrangerons selon notre goût et où nous vivrons selon notre goût. Passer une journée entière au lit ou dormir à 1h du matin etc...

Et puis il y a quelques frictions entre Maman et moi. J'ai envie de la revoir, si tu peux le faire par lettre ne te gêne pas. Elle s'aigrit. le moyen de faire autrement elle ne fait rien ou presque, et se laisse aller. Elle serait si chouette si elle faisait ce qu'il faut pour maigrir car malgré ses 45 printemps, elle est encore très bien. Ce qui lui faudrait c'est un homme qui s'occupe d'elle, la sorte et la tire de son état comateux ou presque. Je la secoue souvent mais moi je suis brusque et je dis parfois ce qu'il ne faut pas dire. Je voudrais lui trouver un travail à mi-temps, quelque chose d'agréable qui l'oblige à sortir à se pomponner, à voir des gens etc... La maison est évidemment moins gaie qu'avant et nous sommes pourtant encore là ! que sera-ce lorsqu'il n'y aura plus que Nelly qui n'est presque jamais là, sortant avec Ramaz. Et puis il y a aussi une chose, les gens critiquent Maman, à la voir rester sans rien faire - Je me permets moi de critiquer, mais je refuse d'entendre les autres le faire.

Les Bibert Monestier sont presque à côté de nous, exactement dans l'immeuble en face du métro Glacière. Ils ont trouvé un appartement mais avec, Tiens-toi bien 1 million six cent mille francs de reprise. C'est fou. C'est le grand-père qui a prêté l'argent qu'ils remboursent à raison de 10.000 francs par mois. Ils ont reçu beaucoup de cadeaux et sont meublés et montés en vaisselle. Nous les voyons souvent. Nelly a fait une école d'esthéticienne qui a dans 3 mois. Cela lui plaisait beaucoup. Mais en sortant, elle n'a trouvé aucune place. Par une de mes amies, je lui ai trouvé une place de vendeuse débutante en attendant. Mais peut-être finalement, être vendeuse, lui plaira mieux. Elle travaille depuis lundi. Nina est toujours dans la même boîte. Elle attend avec impatience que Bernard gagne assez pour ne plus travailler.

Mimi est toujours la même, heureusement! quant à moi, j'ai changé de métier. Je suis mannequin, ne rigole pas. Je débute évidemment dans la carrière mais j'espère que cela marchera, on peut gagner beaucoup d'argent et c'est un métier fatigant mais agréable et féminin. Et bien plus

7

maintenant que le métier de secrétaire où l'on reste le derrière sur une chaise toute une journée.

J'ai commencé au début du mois de Novembre et j'ai travaillé jusqu'au début du mois de Mars. Je suis en chomage depuis, mais je fais des tas de démarches pour retrouver quelque chose. Les cabines de mannequins ne se forment que fin Mai. Je dois faire des essais de photos la semaine prochaine. La photo rapporte encore plus. Pourvu que cela marche. Cela me plait beaucoup!

Que te raconter encore! Nous voyons assez souvent Louis et Nathela. Nathela a changé de boîte et gagne maintenant 150.000 - par mois. ce n'est pas mal!

Dépêche-toi d'écrire et de nous raconter ce que tu vois ! le Brésil te plait-il ?

Mon vieux "Eduardo" je vais te laisser, écris vite si tu le peux.

Je t'embrasse très très fort et souhaite te faire poin de bon un de ces jours.

Annick.

PARIS XIV - 117
AV. DU GENERAL LECLERC
25 III 60 15

REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
* 215
POSTES
FR 200

⑨

Monsieur Eduardo CALLO
Caixa postal 11744 (Lapa)
Sao Paulo
BRASIL

PAR AVION
AIR MAIL


ELITE
GOMMAGE
TROPICAL
MARQUE DÉPOSÉE
MADE IN FRANCE
OPAULO

Paris 29 March 1960

My old " Eduardo"

Everybody was very happy for receving news from you. I know that Grand-ma and Mother have already written and also Nina and Nelly.XXX Therefore I am the last one,but that don't mean I am not thinking to you.

It is Nearly one year you are gone but nevertheless the time pass very fast. Everyone must have already told you the principal, does no matter if I wander.

Past 15 august,I join TITI(husband) in Algeria,and went back together in the early days from October.One xxxwhole year without seen each other but one letter every single day and we met again like we never were separat or almost.That funny to see TITI in him s/lieutenant fonctions,comanding a section. Such plaisur to see him again.Now when those gentlemen are speaking military duty I may join them.

Officer's wife life is not so desagreable after all.We are pampered.The first month we were on the beach.I like warm wether and had more as I was asking for. TITI was living at 5am every morning to joining him section 25 km (16 miles) from where I was and return only at 4 p.m.The resources were fast drained off.The beach,and even we could not go very far because the fellaghas! In short ,going to eat for lunch that was all,Iwas almost inclosed in my room waiting the return of my Lord and Master. I have try,all right,to going swim alone,but the town,the beach was flooded with solders.I had given up very fast.

I don't think you can imagined a woman alone in a restaurant room eating surrounded with solders.The felling from every eyes watching you make the people clumsy.There were very few women which were looking to me not very friendly. Enough speaking from my "military duty".

TITI has been return at Ecole des Beaux-Arts. If no one will proposing him a very good job he will he is determin to follow the school.That will be long. Some time he is working for some architects.We are looking for an apartement,we will like to be in our own.Few peoples do not undersand why are wishing to live this place.Mother and me have sometime few words and we are not always agree.I wish to shake her a little,and if you could do that,with a letter do not be afraid.She will be so nice if she only would try to be thiner.I think she need a man who can take a care of her,remove her from that comatose spirit. I did shake her several time but I am to abrupt and I am saying what I must not .I would like to find a job for her,which will oblige her to go out side and see peoples.

The house is less merry today than before,but what will be when Nelly will take off.She already goes almost every days with Ramaz. And something else too,peoples are criticizing Mother because she is not doing anything.I may criticize but I forbid to the others to criticize my mother.

The Monestiers are living not far from here,exactly in the building who face the subway Glaciere.They have found an apartement but with 1 million six hundred thousand francs for the key.Crazy is not? The grand father loan the money and they repay him with 10 000 frs a month.They have xxxxxx receive many present for the mariage and they have furniture and everything they need. XXXXXXX We see them very often.

Nelly follow an esthetiq's school but she has not found job yet in that line,so she work as salesmaid since monday.Nina is still working in the same company. She is waiting that Bernard earn more money to quit the job.

Meme is always in the same shape,fortunatly. I am mannequin now. Don't laugh at me.I hope this job will go very good.Fatiguing job but agreable and feminin.Certainly much more intersting xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx than secretary.Have your behind one whole day is not very funny. I must make some photo test next week.It is xxxx possible to earn more money with that and I like it very much.

What can I say more.We have seen Nathela and Louis.Nathela now earn 150 000 frs a month.That is not so bad.

Rush us a letter and tell us what are you doing? How like you Brasil.

My old"Edouardo"I will live you now and write us if you can

I kiss you very very strongly and hope I will be able to kiss you for good some of this days.

ANNICK

41-233477

Very dear "Eduardo"

We wre starting to asking us if you were still on this planet or on the moon.

Since your little word sended right after your departur we were without news.I had never receive ~~myar~~ your first letter and was a little mad after you because Loulou told me that Athico had news from you and you were in Soutn-America.I ignore completly if Nathela nas receive your letter but I willwright to her. I ignore also where live the others people and I will be glade if you can give them adress.Already 10 month since you are gone.The time past with an incredible speed.Beside Nina's marige,which was ~~x~~ very well,nothing interesting.

Nina and Bernard have found an apartement very close from our house,Boulevard Auguste Blanqui,corner rue de la Sante,the building which is standing behind the gas-station.You see ?

TITI and Annick are still with us but wish to find some place to go.

Yesterday evening the whole family was together plus Loulou and Magy to celebret my 45 springs and just this morning a letter from you.It was lucky your letter was still in one pice when I screamed 'a letter from you'

You can be sure to receive news from the whole family and we thank you for your love for us.

My august husband had catched again a double-pneumonia and that will keep him until september,therefore that plonge us in dificulties to the neck....and you may imagine with which happyness I have read your letter. You are certainly the only one to be like that in our world. God bless you and ~~xx~~ must take account for the remission of your offences...Alleluia !

I have stop this letter yesterday evening.Odile and Magy were here,we had diner together and went to the movie.James Steward was starring.

What say next,you know our life,nothing is change.I am waiting impatiently another letter of you to tell us what are you doing. That will be so nice if you could be here for the end of the year .Until then I kiss you lovingly.

COCO

Paris 24 March

Dear Old

1

I hope you have receive my letter .Since then a sensationa event happend .Born march 14 th,a 4th daugter for Atchico,name Sophie.As you ask me ,I have send to him your adress ...and my congratulations.

Yesterday Loulou stop by us few ~~minutes~~ moment to tell us that him father is going very bad and that can be lung cancer.We are hoping it is not.

Little Manana,Ramaz cousin,give birth to a beautifull baby ,boy,is name is Christophe.Those are the latest news.

This is Nina'S adress ;

Madame Monestier
159 Bd.Auguste Blanqui. Paris 13

Nelly is working as salesmaid since Monday in a linin-cloth shop very expensive one corner rue Miromesnil and St.Honore.

I am ~~xxxi~~ writing in the kitchen because the heating is off and today after few suny days it is cold and rainy.

What crime have I done to live such life.

Speed us a letter and tell us what are you doing.Your first letter had never arrived.

I am wating impatiently news from you and until then I kiss you lovingly.

COCO

Three letters from the Grand-mother

General meaning; I am geting old, the life is difficult, what are you doing, Nina's mariage was a success.
Morality: Send money soon as possible.

Meme Grand-ma.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

235
DATE : 17 DEC 60
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE
ACTION : C/AF 3 (MR HOUCK AF DIV NOTIFIED 1515 17 DEC)
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 17 1856Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 18739

OPIM DIR CITE LEOP 0478

RYBAT WIROGUE

File QJWIN

Baron does not wont

REF A. DIR 16116 (Out 52272)
B. BERN 6595 (IN 15973)
C. BERN 6537 (IN 49492)*

1. WIROGUE EOD 2 DEC. HESTON MADE INITIAL CONTACT AND GUTHMAN NOW HANDLING. WIROGUE GIVEN FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. BUILD COVER DURING INITIAL PERIOD. THIS RESPECT, WIROGUE SAID PLANNED SET UP SHOP WITH AUTOMATIC CAMERA TO TAKE IDENTIFICATION PICTURES. SAID WOULD INSTALL POLAROID CAMERA SO CLIENT COULD PUSH BUTTON AND TAKE OWN PICTURE. GUTHMAN AGREED THIS WORTH EXPLORING, AS WOULD APPEAR PROVIDE INEXPENSIVE COVER.

B. WIROGUE TOLD TRY SPOT PERSONS FOR SURVEILLANCE TEAM, INTEL ASSETS (WITH EMPHASIS ON ORIENTALE PROVINCE) AND PM ASSETS. HE TOLD SUBMIT NAMES ANY LIKELY CANDIDATES TO STATION FOR TRACES PRIOR MAKING APPROACH.

2. QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN

SECRET

REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD". WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKING FOR PBPRIME SERVICE.

3. QJWIN INTRODUCED WIROGUE TO HOFHUIS. WIROGUE CASHED IN

LETTER CREDIT WITH HOFHUIS TO GET GOOD EXCHANGE RATE. QJWIN REPORTS WIROGUE HAS PURCHASED THREE AUTOMOBILES SINCE ARRIVAL LEOP: CHRYSLER FOR 85000 FRANCS, CITROEN FOR 25000 FRANCS AND TRIUMPH FOR 110000 FRANCS. WIROGUE TOLD QJWIN HE SOLD CITROEN FOR 15000 FRANCS BUT IT STILL PARKED NEAR HIS HOTEL.

4. AT 13 DEC MEETING WIROGUE SAID HE PURCHASED CHRYSLER FOR 75000 FRANCS. MADE NO MENTION PURCHASE OTHER CARS. ALSO SAID HAD RENTED TWO STORES, ONE IN LEOP EUROPEAN CITY FOR 14000 FRANCS PER MONTH AND ONE IN NATIVE CITY FOR 6000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ALSO HAS SIGNED CONTRACT FOR APARTMENT FOR 8000 FRANCS PER MONTH. ASKED GUTHMAN FOR THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE WHICH HE CLAIMS HQS CASE OFFICER TOLD HIM HE WOULD RECEIVE IN LUMP SUM. GUTHMAN REFUSED, SAYING WOULD HAVE OBTAIN HQS APPROVAL PAY RENTAL ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM.

5. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN GUTHMAN TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. GUTHMAN WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION KUBARK.

6. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT

ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE PUT HIM IN STAN ONCE MENUCHIN RETURNS TO TRY OBTAIN IMMEDIATE INTEL THAT AREA.

7. REQUEST HQS INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR 1300Z, 19 DEC RE GIVING WIROGUE YEARS RENTAL ALLOWANCE. LATTER CLAIMS NEEDS THESE FUNDS VIEW CAR PURCHASE IN ORDER SET UP COVER MECHANISM. IF WIROGUE TO REMAIN, BELIEVE MUST GIVE HIM AT LEAST ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS, AS BELIEVE HE SHORT FUNDS. ALSO REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS RE WIROGUE PAY. LATTER SAYS HIS CONTRACT CALLS FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PER MONTH. SAID HE NOT PAID FOR NOVEMBER. STATION GAVE HIM ONE PAYMENT FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. HOWEVER WISH HQS CONFIRMATION THIS CORRECT AND AUTHORITY PAY HIM IN DOLLARS PER HIS REQUEST. (WANTS DOLLARS AS BLACK MARKET EXCHANGE RATE WHICH USED BY MOST PERSONS HERE TWENTY TO FORTY PERCENT BETTER THAN OFFICIAL RATE).

8. NOT ABLE PICK UP LETTER CREDIT PER REF A. WIROGUE SAID HAD GIVEN IT TO HOFHUI FOR RETURN TO BANK AFTER MARKING IT CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* WIROGUE 1 ETA LEOP 2 DEC. HAS LETTER OF CREDIT FOR 12,000 SWISS FRANCS.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

REQUEST NO:

REQUEST DATE:

FROM:
RID/Files
G C 52

EXTENSION

NO. RS

DATE 29 April 69

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. RID/ARD/RCU			WJ	BULKY unprocessed field material
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				CALL RID FILES, EXT. 6867 FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS CENTER JOB NO. 69-492 BOX NO. 2
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15. RID/Files G C 52				FILE IN 201-233477

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (OP-24) ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

1P

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Germany

INFO: PCB EE BCB EGO, EGF, EGS

FROM: Chief of Base, Bonn

SUBJECT: [illegible] CAVATA
[illegible] Soviet Refugee Georg SANDERS

ACTION: COS, BCB Traces

1. The following report, and a request for full traces, has been received from the BfV:

"Since 14 July 1962,

Georg SANDERS ex-USSR BfV Trace request
[illegible] 25 July 1919 in Tiflis, USSR
Present Address: Oberursel [illegible]

has been in the protection of a US Service in Oberursel, after allegedly breaking away from a Soviet tourist group and fleeing from East to West Berlin. On August 28, 1962, SANDERS made application for recognition as a foreign i.e. non-German, refugee. The following day, in the presence of a member of the U.S. Service, Subject was examined by the Criminal Police. In the hearing, he made ambiguous statements concerning his flight. Subj claims [illegible] in USSR resistance group [illegible] tourist group and [illegible] SANDERS alleged that he was a leading member of a resistance group in the Soviet Union. He claims he avoided [illegible] through the assistance of friends who arranged for him to join a Soviet tourist group which left Tiflis on 10 July 1962 for a sightseeing tour in [illegible] arrived in East Berlin on 14 July 1962 and SANDERS allegedly [illegible] after his arrival. Subj applied 28 Aug. 62 for recognition [illegible]

"SANDERS declined to offer more specific information concerning his flight to West Berlin. Allegedly, the manner in which his friends were able to arrange for his trip is also unknown to him.

"We would appreciate all information on SANDERS available to you, as well as copies of any interrogation reports which have been issued since his arrival at Oberursel.

2. There are no local traces. Copies of the BfV report are being sent to the ID USAREUR representative, OCA, since it would appear that [illegible] the 513th INTC.

Judith G. Frisell
Judith G. Frisell

Dist:
2 COS-G
2 PCB
1 EE
2 BCB

DATE TYPED: 16 Jan 63

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: EGNA-25063

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201 5 1?/7
FP: X SANDERS

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

CS COPY

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

HQ COPY

DISPATCH

66-266/26 Box 5 Folder 9-23 5.8.79 GESP

SECRET

CO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

ZIZISCHWILLI, /FUERST/
201-0233477
SEX M DOB 02 MAY 19
POB USSR, TIFLIS

201-0233477
MUNI-05728
06 APR 66

< W GERMANY, KOELN.
AKA SANDERS, GEORG FRANK
BND SECURITY TRACE REQUEST
SUBJ IN CONTACT W/BND STAFFER

WAS ZIZISCHWILLI, FUERST
DATE 12 JUN 75 CORR CARD

04823438

WIROGUE/1

201-0233477

5/C 29/7

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

14-00000

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO 201-233477

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MUNICH

ACTION EE 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, RI/AN

AN [illegible] EUR 6/CE

~~INDEXED~~ [illegible]

MATCHED

S E C R E T 061243Z

EGN L-GO

BONN INFO DIR CITE MUNI 5728

6 APR 66 IN 91195

1f (45)

CATIDE UJVAULT

1. CATIDE REQUESTS SECURITY TRACES ON FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI, AKA GEORG FRANK SANDERS, BORN 2 MAY 19 IN TIFLIS, USSR, RESIDING KOELN, WHO IN CONTACT WITH CATIDE STAFFER. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY SUBJ CATIDE BELIEVES HE KUBARK EMPLOYED. PLS ADVISE.

201-233477

F

Koelner

2. NO MUNI TRACES SUBJ.

3. INDEX ZIZISCHWILLI.

MICROFILMED
MAY 1 4 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

S E C R E T

CFN: 5728 FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI AKA GEORG FRANK SANDERS 2 MAY 19 TIFLIS USSR KOELN KUBARK PLS NO MUNI

85

SECRET

201-233477

L. Cap. [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT CATIDE / UJVAULT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO. 32u - 5 - 25 / 7
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FRAN-3145 (IN-92897)
	4. DATE 8 Apr 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Ref: Muni 5728 (IN-91195)

Subject ref was Harvard Agent Disposal Case WIROGUE. He dropped without prejudice on 8 June 1964

201-233477

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

1. SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

CATIDE CABEZONE WIROGUE

?

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	32W	5	25	7

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. BONN-2534 (IN 92176)

4. DATE 7 April 66

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-233477

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

REF: MUNI-5728 (IN 91195)

1. RE REF WIROGUE FORMER CABEZONE DISPOSAL CASE. CAVATA PREVIOUSLY INFORMED OUR INTEREST IN SUBJECT HOWEVER BACKGROUND NEVER PASSED TO GERMANS.

2. DEFER FRAN RESPONSE TO CATIDE. RECOMMENT WE ADMIT FORMER INTEREST IN SUBJECT BUT ADVISE CATIDE WE HAVE NO CURRENT INTEREST IN HIM AND RECOMMENT THEY KEEP HIM AT ARMS LENGTH.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
CATIDE UJVAULT	2. RI FILE NO.	32W	5	25	7	
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. MUNI-5728 (IN-91195)				4. DATE 6 April 66	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.		9. EVALUATION		
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
201-233477

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

1. CATIDE REQUESTS SECURITY TRACES ON FUERST ZIZISCHWILLI, AKA GEORG FRANK SANDERS, BORN 2 MAY 19 IN TIFLIS, USSR, RESIDING KOELN, WHO IN CONTACT WITH CATIDE STAFFER. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY SUBJ CATIDE BELIEVES HE KUBARK EMPLOYED. PLS ADVISE.

2. NO MUNI TRACES SUBJ.

3. INDEX ZIZISCHWILLI.

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-233477

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM BONN EE/6

ACTION EE6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, DE7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT 2

C .SIFIED MESSAGE D TOTAL COPIES

SECRET 3

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

ECRET 101632Z

FRAN INFO DIR GMNY CITE BONN 2067 10 MAR 66 72218

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

CAVATA REPORTS WIROGUE LOST HIS JOB 25 JAN 66 EITHER FOR LOAFING OR CARELESSNESS. HE AND HIS EMPLOYER AGREED ON THE SEPARATION. HIS PRESENT EMPLOYMENT IS UNKNOWN TO CAVATA.

SECRET

CFN 2067 CAVATA WIROGUE 25 66 CAVATA

BT

SECRET

201-233477
10 Mar 66

14-00000

S E C R E T

Chief, KURIOT/AB   ZX

Chief of Station, Germany   Chief, EE C/AF

Chief, COB/Frankfurt

AQUATIC/WIROGUE/Transmittal of Original Documents - WIROGUE-1

REFERENCE: A. DIR 10710, 16 May 1962
B. LEOP 3462, 17 May 1962
C. DIR 11783, 22 May 1962
D. DIR 12530, 24 May 1962

Forwarded herewith are the original documents of WIROGUE-1 which were taken from him in May 1962 as indicated in references. They include the Series [illegible] Austrian passport which was completed by KURIOT for WIROGUE's operational use. These documents were recently turned over to the undersigned by AB/Legal Section who had retained them while procuring a backstopped Reiseausweis for Subject. We forward them to you for your interest and retention. Only a copy of the Austrian Reisepass has been retained in our files.

Jacob D. DABARO

APPROVED: ______________________
Maurice R. THEDANS

Attachment:
One Envelope

Distribution:
3-C/KURIOT/AB, w/att
2-COS/Germany, w/o att
1-Chief, EE, w/o att
1-Chief, AF, w/o att

EGTA-18973   5 January 1964

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING

PRO. POSE	ACTION	ACCOM. PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, Sao Paulo

INFO
Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Operational/ZIBRT/WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
See Below
HBPA-4890, dated 12 October 1960

SEC CSN 43-43

1. This is to advise you that subject of reference has been transferred to the African Division and been assigned the crypto~~graph~~ WIGROGUE/1. The latter is presently in Leopoldville and all correspondence received through your accommodation address is to be pouched to COS, Leopoldville.

2. WIROGUE/1 was instructed to send only unregistered letters and to instruct his correspondents to do the same.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COB, Sao Paulo
1 - COS, Rio de Janeiro
1 - COS, Leopoldville

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
22 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
DEC 28 1960

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
~~HBPW-2312~~ 2372

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477
201-233477

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

SEC CSN 43-43

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur	say	8284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W	Dec 21/60	Edward Welles
C/AF	Dec 21/60	Bronson Tweedy
WH/2B	23 Dec 60	

DEC 18 15 02 PH '61

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	12/27/60	

4 - RI
1 - WH/2B
1 - AF/W

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/	C N
RID/AN	
RID/	
RID/FS	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T
RYBAT

PROCESSING		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

per CSN 43-43

SUBJECT
Operational/WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
See Below
A. ACLW-192, dated 14 November 1960
B. LEOP,0478, dated 17 December 1960
C. DIR-17181, dated 19 December 1960

1. A dispatch had been prepared outlining the various administrative and operational details pertinent to the WIROGUE project. Receipt of reference B negated its value and we prepared this one in its stead. Suffice it to say that all steps outlined in reference A were accomplished and he was dispatched with the specific instructions outlined in paragraph 2 of reference C.

2. During WIROGUE/1's association with the undersigned, the subject of a vehicle was raised by him. He stated he needed one to accomplish his mission. It was suggested to him that under the present circumstances in the Congo it would not be wise to consider such a purchase until he has discussed it fully with you and received your concurrence. If he did purchase a vehicle after receiving your approval, then he would have to do it from his own funds and not use funds made available to him to establish his cover business. Obviously he has violated the suggestions.

3. While WIROGUE/1 was in the employment of REDWOOD, there was a communication channel set up between him and his family. This was an arrangement with a letter drop in Sao Paulo. He would write a letter, post date it, and give it opened to the Case Officer who would pouch it to the COB, Sao Paulo for mailing. Letters to WIROGUE/1 would come to a post office box in Sao Paulo where it would be serviced by ALLOMETER-2 and pouched to the Case Officer. We leave it to your discretion, as to whether or not you wish to continue this type of arrangement. Nonetheless, under separate cover, attachment A is a letter for WIROGUE/1 which was received through this channel.

4. I am sure that WIROGUE/1 will undoubtedly want you to set up a similar arrangement through Germany for him so that he may communicate with a female acquaintance of his in PBPRIME. We are not adverse to the idea of his having such a channel, but only on the condition you are able to censure

DATE TYPED
21 Dec 1960

DATE DISPATCHED
2? DEC 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLW-206

CLASSIFICATION
per CSN 43-43
S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477
201-233477

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/W/2	D. Niesciur	say	8284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
A/CAF/W	Dec 22/60	Edward O. Welles Edward O. Welles
DEC 19 15 02 PH '84		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF	12-23-60	B. Tweedy Bronson Tweedy

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/[illegible]	
[illegible]	

the letters. Again we leave it to your discretion.

5. Separate Cover attachment B contains a sterile copy of the FPO.

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment:
  A - Letter for WIROGUE/1
  B - Project Outline for WIROGUE

Distribution:
  Orig. & 2 - Leopoldville
    [redacted]
    1 - AF/W/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

per CSH 43-43

PROCESSING

PRO CESSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT Operational
WIROGUE/1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

A. DIR 08782 (OUT 86554)
B. LEOP 0225 (IN 36750)

1. The plans and development of the WIROGUE project have reached a point whereby a summation of the progress made and the plans for the future is in order. At this writing it is anticipated that WIROGUE/1 will be on the Leopoldville scene on the first of December.

2. WIROGUE/1 had originally been recruited in Europe for a REDSOX operation. He was flown to PBPRIME "black" and underwent an extensive training program. This included survival, small arms and other similar type PM training. After a year of such training the project failed to materialize, as a result subject was preparing for resettlement in South America. The AF/Division took interest in WIROGUE/1 and after an assessment decided that with his peculiar background, talents and general makeup he could effectively be utilized along the lines cited in reference A. On 21 October 1960 the case was transferred officially to the Africa Division.

3. Since that date to the present, every effort has been made to psychologically orient WIROGUE/1 for this assignment and to prepare him operationally for its fulfillment. To insure the security of the operation, prevent any identification with ODYOKE and/or KUBARK, and to preclude any unexpected uncovery of WIROGUE/1's past which would associate him with his pre-KUBARK life, a number of basic steps were taken. These were:

a. WIROGUE/1 underwent plastic surgery, which changed the shape of his nose.

b. A toupee had been made for his constant use. This and the plastic surgery have altered him sufficiently to obviate any recognition.

Distribution:
2-Leopoldville

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/201	C/H
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/FG	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

Distribution:
1 - AF/West/2
1 - C/AF/West

CROSS REFERENCE TO [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
14 Nov. 1960	[illegible] NOV [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
ACLW-192

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-233477
201-233477

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
AF/West/2	Daniel Niesciur	hm	8284

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/AF/W		Lester C. Houck

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF	11-16-60	Bronson Tweedy

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (60) per CSH 43-43

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ACLW-192

c. Documentation prepared with accompanying cover story to show that WIROGUE/1 is an Austrian and who has never had ODYOKE connections, nor ever been in PBPRIME. (See separate cover attachment A).

4. It is planned at this time to take WIROGUE/1 "black" to Germany. There he will be met by the undersigned, given his Austrian documentation, contact instructions and letter of credit, stripped of any PBPRIME clothing or personal effects, and dispatched. He is to proceed to Leopoldville on his own and upon arrival make contact. The cover assignment for subject is temporarily left open, although he has been told to look into the prospects of opening a photo or general repair shop. He has actually done photographic work but the decision on this we will leave to your on-the-spot judgment. The letter of credit for three thousand dollars is to be used to finance this venture. There will also be a reserve of one thousand dollars in a Swiss account should expenses necessitate a greater outlay. This money will constitute an non-interest bearing, operational loan which must be repaid by WIROGUE/1 from profits over a period of years. All other profits after the loan is paid off will be WIROGUE/1's.

5. A word about the manner of man with whom we are dealing. He is a small, energetic individual, who has displayed shrewdness, cunning, ingenuity and inventiveness. He has a peculiar turn of mind which lends itself remarkably to nefarious and extra-legal activities. Excitement and intrigue are important factors in his life, he relishes it and as a result may be a little delicate to handle. WIROGUE/1 likes order and clear cut chains of command. He admires the Prussian approach and as a result will take orders even if he may disagree. It is important to him to have the trust and confidence of his case officer. If in his own mind he feels assured of this and is confident of the professional KUTUBE-type competence of the CO, he will reciprocate in kind. He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalise all actions. One last thought which may be useful. Best results will probably be gotten if, when given an assignment, he be permitted to accomplish it in his own way. The latter is connected with his idea of trust and confidence.

CRR

CHARLES R. ROISTADE

PAUL E. LEIGHTON

Attachment A (under separate cover)

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO ACLW-292

1. An Austrian passport, birth certificate and drivers license have been prepared for issuance containing following biographic data:

Name: George Franz REINER
POB: Salzburg, Austria
DOB: 25 July 1921
Fathers name: Franz REINER
Mothers name: Marianna nee NIELITZ
Occupation: Engineer
Marital status: single
Height: 1 meter 70 centemeters
Weight: 58 kilo's
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Brown

Distinguishing marks: tips of forefinger and thumb right hand missing. Identical fingers left hand scarred.

2. Documents will reflect travel only in Europe, with no indication of PBPRIME tenure.

CS p

DESENSITIZED

201 - 233477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGOA-18888

TO
Chief, AF VIA Chief, EE

INFO
Chief, WH

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
32W-120-o12/01

FROM
Chief of Station, Germany

DATE
12 December 1962

SUBJECT
RYBAT/WIROGUE
Final Resettlement of WIROGUE

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. WIROGUE has received political recognition from the West German government and is fully documented in the name of Georg Frank Sanders. This was accomplished with the cooperation of ODIBEX on the basis of the fabricated story stating that Subject is a Georgian who defected from East Berlin on 14 July 1962 while with a tourist group. It was necessary to acquire political recognition for Subject because this was the only sure means to backstop him if and when he applies for immigration to South America. A Fremdenpass would not withstand the investigation required by immigration authorities.

2. All the South American Consulates in West Germany were contacted with the assistance of CAMANTILLA in an attempt to collect information which would enable HARVARD to select the most likely country to which Subject could immigrate based on his personal preference, opportunities for emigrants, immigration requirements, etc. Columbia, Chile or Peru offer the best possibility.

3. The next step will be for Subject to apply to the appropriate Consulate and begin his processing. Prior to having Subject take this step HARVARD will require Headquarters guidance and thinking regarding the following:

a. Subject as a prospective emigrant will have to furnish proof of employment or proof of financial solvency. Subject's West German documentation indicates that he is an engineer. This does not mean that he is a diplomaed engineer but rather a master mechanic. This is borne out by the details of his falsified life history and in fact by Subject's actual skills in electrical and mechanical fields. HARVARD feels that Subject can satisfy any South American Consulate that he is experienced enough in electrical and mechanical fields to be of value to the economy of the South American country of his choice. Once Subject is admitted to South America, HARVARD has no doubt that he can find employment if he desires it. The ideal solution, however, would be for Subject to have a firm offer of employment prior to his immigration. If KUBARK can arrange this, HARVARD feels that Subject's immigration could be practically assured. Subject could seek employment through the German language newspaper in Santiago, Chile but HARVARD feels that no South American firm would take the chance of hiring him sight unseen unless he were a highly qualified specialist.

b. If proof of employment cannot be provided, proof of solvency is the next requirement. Only one of the South American countries has stated what it considers to be the minimum proof of solvency. The prospective emigrant must show that he has the funds to subsist for two years at the rate of $125.00 per month. HARVARD feels that to deposit $3,000 to Subject's account would be a grave mistake. HARVARD has no doubt that Subject is capable of taking the money and departing for parts unknown unless there were sufficient inducements awaiting him in South America. HARVARD could probably arrange for a letter attesting to the fact that Subject has $3,000 being held for him. Subject could have been working for ODIBEX as a consultant since his defection. The $3,000 would be bonuses and salary.

CS COPY

201-2 33477

53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT-[illegible]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

HQ COPY

per CSN 43-43

HQ COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EGOA- 18888

c. HARVARD has not considered processing Subject for immigration through a bona fide refugee organization in order not to involve Subject with the United States Escapee Program and to keep from making a refugee organization a party to fraud with the possibility of embarrassing complications if the immigration does not come off properly. Working through a refugee organization would mean additional paper work and additional problems which for the present would indicate that this immigration avenue should not be considered except as a last resort.

d. When filling out his application forms Subject will have to provide employment and residence addresses consistent with the dates when he was supposedly living and working in the Georgian S.S.R. His wartime military service will have to be covered also. HARVARD feels that this information can be acquired through the facilities of SR/6 when needed.

4. HARVARD is of the opinion that Subject has committed himself to going to South America partly because he will do anything which will prolong his association with KUBARK and partly because he is hoping to realize some personal or financial profit from the exercise. HARVARD has followed the theme that Headquarters deisre is to help Subject and that it can best be done by completely legalizing him. Political recognition is the first step but we desire further that he be helped to immigrate and after 5 years acquire citizenship. Subject has asked HARVARD if he would receive financial help during the transition period in South America. He was told that we could only guarantee his plane fare, that Headquarters would decide how much and what kind of additional help he would receive if any.

5. Subject rejects the idea of staying in Germany except as a last resort. It is possible that because of his irritation with his inactivity Subject may simply request his German documentation and leave HARVARD's custody.

6. Subject has been in HARVARD's hands since 22 May 1962 and has been costing us 100 to 150 DM per week, plus many hours of case officer time. Request earliest Headquarters advice per para 3 above.

Carl T. Updill

CARL T. UPDILL

APPROVED: HYN

HENRY Y. NEMETH

Distribution:
2 - C/AF
2 - C/EE
2 - C/WH

DEC 19 15 02 PM '62

FORM 10-57 (40) 53c USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

DECLASSIFIED

CSN 43-43

CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

ORIG : D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE NO. 201-233477

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: P. Ailwright

OUT54652

19 DEC 60 20 21z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE
PRIORITY
~~OPER~~ OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181
17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*

RI COPY

ABSTRACT		INDEX
DATE 19 Dec 60		

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	MB

FORM 1-58 1389a

201-233477

(35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

D. NIESCIUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 8284
DATE : 19 December 1960 536

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

19 DEC 60 20 21z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

OUT54652

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
PRIORITY
~~OPIM~~ OUT 54652

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 17181
17181

RYBAT WIROGUE

RE: LEOP 0478 (IN 18739)*

PER ACLS 149

1. WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT CALLS FOR:

A. FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH BEGINNING ONE NOV. TO BE PAID IN FIELD. YOUR DISCRETION TO PAY IN DOLLARS. HE NOT PAID FOR NOV PRIOR TO DISPATCH. OBTAIN RECEIPTS AND CHARGE PROJECT.

B. THREE THOUSAND DOLLAR QUARTERS ALLOWANCE PER ANNUM, NON ACCOUNTABLE.

C. FOUR THOUSAND DOLLAR OPS LOAN TO SET UP COVER BUSINESS TO BE REPAID FROM PROFITS. ALSO MUST ACCOUNT FOR ONE THOUSAND TEN DOLLAR TRAVEL ADVANCE RECEIVED.

2. INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE CONTACT AND FOLLOW GUTHMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS IMPLICITLY. ALSO REPORT ACCURATELY ALL CONTACTS OR POTENTIAL AGENTS AND NOT MAKE ANY APPROACHES OR COMMITMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.

3. SHARE GUTHMAN'S CONCERN AND RECOMMEND TELL WIROGUE HE ON PROBATION AND MUST TOE THE MARK OR ELSE RECALL AND TERMINATION. POINT OUT IF NECESSARY HE LIVING UNDER FALSE DOCUMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

ABSTRACT	INDEX

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

PER CSN 43-43

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE TWO CONTINUED

13 [illegible] 21z

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT54652

OUT 54652

TO INFO per CSN 43-43 CITE DIR 17181

17181

*DESK COMMENT: Reference RYBAT

Edward Welles

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/W/1
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD O. WELLES
A/CAF/W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

165

DATE : 22 DEC 60

FILE : [illegible]-2339

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: D. C. Wright

DEC 22

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 2512

RYBAT WIROGUE

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	HB
~~RID/MIS~~	
~~RID/PS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

RI COPY

ABSTRACT | INDEX

DATE 22 Dec 1960

FORM 1309a

(35)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

165

DATE : 22 DEC 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/PG, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	AF/W	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 22 1433Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 20986

PRITY DIR CITE LEOP 0512

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF DIR 17181 (out 54652)* (IN 18739)

1. PER LEOP 0478, WIROGUE/1 STATES TOLD HE TO REQUEST THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS QUARTERS ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM ON ARRIVAL, DOES (PORTION GARBLED, WILL FWD) PAY ALLOWANCE IN LUMP SUM OR MONTHLY. ADVISE. WIROGUE/1 ARGUES HE NEEDS LUMP SUM PAYMENT TO PURCHASE NEEDED HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS, AS WELL AS PAY RENT.

2. ACLS 149 NOT YET RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED WIROGUE/1 CONTRACT.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-233477

Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

153

DATE : 1 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value: Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: B. Albright

MAY 1 1427Z 61

ROUTING

IN 41329

TO DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE FRAN [illegible]

RYBAT WIROGUE ZIBET

RE FRAN 9126 (IN 37367)

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	HB
RID/MIS	G
~~RID/PS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX
DATE	1 May 1961	

FORM 1-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

153

DATE : 1 MAY 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 C/10
2 Staff
3 Chron
4

MAY 1 1427Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 44329

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

TO DIR LEOP INFO FRAN CITE FROB 9191

RYBAT WIROUGE ZIBET

RE FROB 9126 (IN 37367)*

PLEASE REPLY PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *WOULD APPRECIATE MORE DETAILS ON REQUEST FOR RECRUITMENT OF SELECT CONGO JOB APPLICANTS.

DECLASSIFIED per CSN 43-43

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No:

297

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 23 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
File this copy as indicated ☐
~~Branch copy filed as indicated~~ ☒
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Initials:

B. Albright

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 23 1543Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34165

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

DIR CITE LEOP 2098

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 07961 (Out 89123)*

B LEOP 2088 (IN 33643)**

ROUTING	INIT
RID/AN	1/3
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

RI COPY

ABSTRACT	✓ INDEX

23 Sept 1961

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

.297

DATE : 23 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION : C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

2-1 copy

Corono

cc:

cc:

cc:

ROUTING

1 4

2 5

3 6

SEP 23 1543Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34165

DIR CITE LEOP 2098

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT WIROGUE

REF A DIR 07901 (Out 89123)*

B LEOP 2088 (IN 33443)**

1. SALVACK MET WIROGUE (W) WHEN HE CROSSED RIVER ON SPECIAL FERRY FROM BRAZ EVENING 22 SEPT. WIROGUE FREINDLY THOUGH CONSIDERS MANY PBPRIME ACTIONS SENSELESS. W CARRYING KUBARK PROVIDED FALSE DOCUMENTATION AND ON PRODUCING OLD MINISTRY DEFENSE PASS WAS LET INTO CONGO AFTER LONG ARGUMENT WITH GOC IMMIGRATION OFFICIALS.

2. REGRET HQS DID NOT PICK UP WIROGUE'S FALSE PASSPORT. MAIN REASON FOR HIS RECALL WAS FEAR WILDCAT 5 WOULD TRACE HIM AND DISCOVER NO SUCH PERSON EXISTED. ONLY CHANGE NOW IS THAT KUBARK NO LONGER HAS OBLIGATION TO HIM.

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

3. W STATES HE TOLD HQS CONTACTS HE RETURNING CONGO SO SHOULD BE NO

SECRET

201-233477

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SURPRISE. HAS SOME LETTERS HE WISHES SALVACK FORWARD TO HIS HQS CONTACT "DAN". SAID HE WAS GOING TO CALL EITHER GUTHMAN OR SALVACK IMMEDIATELY TO LET THEM KNOW HE IN LEOP. SWORE HE WOULD NEVER DO ANYTHING AGAINST PBPRIME AND IF HE COULD BE OF ANY HELP ANY TIME WAS WILLING. REALIZED FULLY HE ON HIS OWN IN CONGO AND KUBARK UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO HIM. SAYS HE INTENDS REMAIN CONGO AND MAKE LIVING HERE.

4. W WILL PHONE SALVACK IN FEW DAYS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* STATED WIROGUE BEING TERMINATED AND REQUIRED TO LEAVE PBPRIME.

**RE ZAPPLEEY MEETING WITH WIROGUE BRAZ.

14-00000

FILE NO. 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : H. ROBERTS
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5457
DATE : 3 AUGUST 1962

1653

1653

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF. : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Index: ☐ Marked ☐ None required ☐

PER CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

3 AUG 62 21 34z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ([redacted])

CITE DIR 27679

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REFS: A. FRAN 1854 (IN 33838)

B. DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

ROUTING
RID/AN HS

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX
DATE 3 Aug 1962

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-43

201-233477

201-233477

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

14-00000

201-233477 ✓

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. HIESCTUR
UNIT : AF/W/2
EXT : 3966
DATE : 15 November 1960

637
637

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	16 23 1
X	ROUTINE	CABLE
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : FROB

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. C/AF 3

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

FI RID

S. Allwright

per CSN 43-43

OUT 93109
OUT 93109

TO FROB INFO FRAN LEOP CITE DIR 11912
11912

ZIBET WIROGUE RYBAT

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	1.13
[illegible]	
[illegible]	

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	16 Nov 1960

per CSN 43-43

CS COPY

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : Jo Albright
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 November 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 233477

SECRET

2

ROUTING R1			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : BRUSSELS FRANKFURT GERMANY BONN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF7

INFO: CDC, FI, FI/D4, CI, CI/OPS, EE4, WE6, VR
FILE

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

19 Nov 64 22 06z

SIG CEN

TO BRUS INFO FRAN GERY BONN CITE DIR

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

55345

REF FRAN 0130 (IN 22140)*

IF BRUS APPROACHED BY NIGALES, No Point Denying ~~[illegible]~~ WIROGUE (W/1) KUBARK CONNECTION. REVIEW OF W/1 KUBARK CAREER INDICATES COULD DO LITTLE IF ANY DAMAGE IF HE REVEALED ACTIVITIES. SUBJ TERMINATED 1962 AND KUBARK HAS NO FURTHER INTEREST. FOR BRUS: RELAYING DIR 57443.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	KAC
RID/MIS	
RID/RA	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

201-233477

ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	
DATE	19 Nov 64		

* Fran defers Dir for guidance should Subj reveal true background.

C/CI/OPS/WE

WE/2 John Stein (in draft)

C/WE/2

EE/C

CAF/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas F. Thiele
C/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

AF/COP

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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FORM 1-64 1389a CANCELS PREVIOUS EDITIONS. REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. (35)

10. 201-233477

670.

ORIG: D. HIRSCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 3966
DATE: 16 November 1960

(570)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3 *

INFO: COP, C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
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RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	Nov 18 23 24 '60	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

94095
OUT94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432

12432

WIROGUE PJDUST RYBAT
RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

ROUTING	
~~[illegible]~~	#13
[illegible]	
~~[illegible]~~	
[illegible]	

RI COPY

ABSTRACT | INDEX
18 Nov 1960

FORM 4-56 1389a (35)

201-233477

14-00000

670

ORIG: W. HIESCIUR
UNIT: AF/W/1
EXT: 3966
DATE: 16 November 1960

620

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3 *

INFO: COP, C/EE 3, D/OS 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	NOV 18 23 24 '60	
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

94095
OUT94095

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12432

12432

WIROGUE FJDUST RYBAT

RE: DIR 08782 (OUT 86554) **

WIROGUE AND KUSODA ESCORT MR. PAUL R. FENNIG ~~FENNIES~~ DEPARTING ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE AT 1500 HRS 21 NOV VIA MATS AIRCRAFT NUMBER 423. ETA FRAN 22 NOV AT 1540 HRS LOCAL TIME. PLS MEET.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *CONFIRMATION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR FJDUST NOT USED.
**STATED WIROGUE WAS BEING GROOMED FOR DEEP COVER ASSIGNMENT LEOP LATE NOVEMBER.

05/5B

ER/G
CAF/W
AF/W/1

C/EE/OPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRONSON TWEEDY
C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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14-00000

201-233477 ✓

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: D. NIESICUR
UNIT: AF/W/2
EXT: 3966
DATE: 15 November 1960

633

638

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FROB

file RID

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

B. Albright

INFO: ~~FRAN~~ COP, ~~LEOP~~ C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE			
	DEFERRED	NOV 16 23 22'60 REC'D CABLE SECT.	
X	ROUTINE		
	PRIORITY	INITIALS	
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT93110
OUT 93110

TO: FROB   INFO: FRAN LEOP   CITE DIR 11913

11913

REF: DIR 11912 (OUT 93109)

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	HB
RID/	JR
DE	

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

16 Nov 1960

CS COPY

201-233477

14-00000

TOTAL COPIES 32 RI 4 COPY ☐ DIRECT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	5	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION EE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TO: UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, WE 6, CI/OPS, CAC, FI/D 4, FI, CI, AF 4, TSD 6

27 Nov 64 IN 31538

30

SECRET 271658Z

BRUS INFO DIR GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 3483

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF: A. DIR 65345

B. FRAN 3129 (IN 22167)

201-233477

1. WISH POINT OUT SINCE NEITHER CATIDE NOR CAVATA AWARE SUBJ REFS' TRUE BACKGROUND OR PAST KUBARK CONNECTIONS, REVELATION THIS TO THEM BY NIGALES COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING AND POSSIBLY HARM MKTOPAZ ODIBEX CHANNEL FOR OBTAINING POLITICAL RECOGNITIONS FROM FEDREP.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE REQUEST BRUS, IN EVENT APPROACHED, ADVISE FRAN PRIOR ANSWERING NIGALES SO THAT COORDINATED REPLY MAY BE FORMULATED.

SECRET

SECRET

201-233477

2

SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM C/? [illegible] 4 (AC)

ACTION FRANKFURT

INFO CE 6

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CDG, FI, FI/D4, AF4,

added AF3 (action) in

S E C R E T 121709Z

DIR INFO BRUS GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0129

201-333477

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF A [illegible]

43 - $84 57448 (NOT SENT BRUS)

13 Nov 64 IN 22167

B FRAN 0130

1. FRAN ADVISED BY ODIBEX THAT LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES RECEIVED ROUTINE INTERPOL QUERY RE WIROGUE (BRUS: SEE REF B FOR IDEN) WHO ARRESTED 6 NOV AND CURRENTLY IN BRUS JAIL ON CHARGE ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. ROUTINE REPLY SENT BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONFIRMING THAT REFERENCED TRAVEL DOCUMENT WAS ASSIGNED TO PERSON BY NAME OF WIROGUE AND THAT THEY HAD NO INFO RE ANY PRIOR POLICE RECORD.

2. WHILE NO FURTHER QUERY ANTICIPATED, ODIBEX IN POSITION, SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE IN FUTURE RE SUBJ'S AIS CONNECTION OR TRUE BACKGROUND, HAVE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF BACKGROUND OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HE PROVIDED FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION PURPOSES. ONLY ADMITTED AIS CONNECTION WOULD BE ROUTINE CURSORY PROCESSING THROUGH CAMP KING.

S E C R E T

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC 2230 12 NOV 64

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

13 NOV 64 078 2/10 **SECRET**

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : FRANKFURT
ACTION : AF 7
INFO : EE 4 UR FILE

ACTION CHANGE

FRAN 0129 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 22/678 (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : EE (DIVISION)

TO : AF (DIVISION)

BY : J. BARTLET 7576 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH: J. ALBRIGHT 5387 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13

17 Nov 64 07 9 2410 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : AF 7

INFO : EE 4 VR FILE

ACTION CHANGE

FRAN 0100 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 22140A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : EE (DIVISION)

TO : AF (DIVISION)

BY : J. BARTLET 7576 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : J. ALBRIGHT 5267 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

P/10

[illegible] A/C

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
FRANKFURT

ACTION
FE 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE CDC, WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D4, AF 4
[illegible] (AF 7) (ACTION) VR

S E C R E T 121709Z

BRUS INFO DIR CMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0130

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

RE FRAN 0129 (IN 22161)

13 Nov 64 IN 22140

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN) IS FORMER REDSOX AGENT CANDIDATE AND AFRICAN DIV AGENT WHO RESETTLED BY HARVARD JUNE 64. PRIOR KUBARK RECRUITMENT HE SERVED PRISON TERM IN FRANCE FOR BANK ROBBERY. DURING TWO YEAR RESETTLEMENT PERIOD IN FRAN SUBJ GIVEN NEW NAME AND NEW LIFE STORY. ON BASIS THIS NAME AND FABRICATED STORY, SUBJ GRANTED RECOGNITION BY FEDREP. IN EARLY OCT SUBJ RECONTACTED HARVARD AND MADE BLACKMAIN ATTEMPT IN ORDER GET BACK ON PAYROLL.

2. IT POSSIBLE SUBJ MAY REVEAL TRUE BACKGROUND TO BELGIAN AUTHORITIES. SHOULD BRUS BE APPROACHED THIS MATTER, FRAN DEFERS DIR FOR GUIDANCE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

27 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM FRANKFURT

ACTION ~~EE~~ AF

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE CDC, WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D 4, ~~AF 4~~ EE 4

S E C R E T 121709Z

BRUS INFO DIR GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0130

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

13 Nov 64 IN 22140

RE FRAN 0129 IN 22767

1. SUBJ REF (IDEN) IS FORMER REDSOX AGENT CANDIDATE AND AFRICAN DIV AGENT WHO RESETTLED BY HARVARD JUNE 64. PRIOR KUBARK RECRUITMENT HE SERVED PRISON TERM IN FRANCE FOR BANK ROBBERY. DURING TWO YEAR RESETTLEMENT PERIOD IN FRAN SUBJ GIVEN NEW NAME AND NEW LIFE STORY. ON BASIS THIS NAME AND FABRICATED STORY, SUBJ GRANTED RECOGNITION BY FEDREP. IN EARLY OCT SUBJ RECONTACTED HARVARD AND MADE BLACKMAIN ATTEMPT IN ORDER GET BACK ON PAYROLL.

2. IT POSSIBLE SUBJ MAY REVEAL TRUE BACKGROUND TO BELGIAN AUTHORITIES. SHOULD BRUS BE APPROACHED THIS MATTER, FRAN DEFERS DIR FOR GUIDANCE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

201-283477

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FRANKFURT

ACTION ~~[illegible]~~ AF 7

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE WE 6, CI, CI/OPS, [illegible], FI, FI/[illegible], ~~[illegible]~~

[illegible]

ROUTING

RID/AN

RID/[illegible]

~~RID/22~~

RID/

RID/FI

~~DESTROY~~

SECRET 121709Z

DIR INFO BRUS CMNY BONN CITE FRAN 0129

CABEZONE HARVARD WIRO73

[illegible]

43-- 584 57448 (NOT SENT BRUS)

B FRAN 0130

FRAN 0129

13 Nov 64 IN 22167

1. FRAN ADVISED BY ODIBEX THAT LOCAL POLICE AUTHORITIES RECEIVED ROUTINE INTERPOL QUERY RE WIROGUE (BRUS: SEE REF B FOR IDEN) WHO ARRESTED 6 NOV AND CURRENTLY IN BRUS JAIL ON CHARGE ATTEMPTED ROBBERY. ROUTINE REPLY SENT BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES CONFIRMING THAT REFERENCED TRAVEL DOCUMENT WAS ASSIGNED TO PERSON BY NAME OF WIROGUE AND THAT THEY HAD NO INFO RE ANY PRIOR POLICE RECORD.

2. WHILE NO FURTHER QUERY ANTICIPATED, ODIBEX IN POSITION, SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE IN FUTURE RE SUBJ'S AIS CONNECTION OR TRUE BACKGROUND, HAVE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF BACKGROUND OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HE PROVIDED FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION PURPOSES. ONLY ADMITTED AIS CONNECTION WOULD BE ROUTINE CURSORY PROCESSING THROUGH CAMP KING.

SECRET

* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC 2230 12 NOV 64

SECRET

201-283477

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO.

FROM
Chief, AF Division

SUBJECT
Summary of Information on Subject of 201-233477

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI
FYI

References: A. PARI 6754, 6 October 1964

B. Dir 57448, 16 October 1964

1. Iden was born in 1918, in Georgia, USSR. He emigrated to France with his family when he was three years old. He was a clever, precocious child during his lycee education in France and was frequently dismissed by school directors who did not appreciate his temperamental performance. He also attended several engineering colleges but apparently never graduated. In 1939, he volunteered for the French Foreign Legion and was sent to Tunisia. The occupation of France in 1941 ended his military career. He was demobilized and returned to Paris.

2. Subject claimed that he wanted to fight for France, but he did not wish to join a collective resistance organization. He decided to act on his own so he joined a labor force being recruited in Paris to go to Germany. For awhile he worked in a synthetic gasoline plant in Boelitz near Berlin. Later he was employed as a driver for the NSKK. During this time, he began his career in black marketing and document forging. He claimed that he forged passes into and out of Germany and did it to help imprisoned French officers to get back to France. It is felt that the ulterior motives might still have been love of excitement and wish to make money. He also claimed that he did not work for the French Resistance, although it was possible and probably that they gave him orders to fill. He did mention working through intermediaries and cut-outs, so its possible that he did actually work with the Resistance but did not want to tell us. Eventually Subject was arrested by the German regular police for his activities, and later brought to Berlin where he was interrogated for several months at Gestapo Headquarters. He ended up by spending time in jails and concentration camps. He was finally liberated by the U.S. Army.

3. After the thrill and excitement of the war years was passed, Subject could not settle down to a routine existence. So he joined up with an acquaintance who he says convinced him of the necessity to make more money. They decided to commit robberies. One was successful. Unfortunately for Subject, the other was not. His friend was apprehended and confessed. Subject spent the next five years in various rather notorious prisons in France.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFPW-38334	DATE 4 NOV 1964
29 October 1964	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-233477 201-233477

ROUTING

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
[illegible]	[illegible]		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
1/3		[illegible]

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

He was then paroled to his brother and was living near Marseilles. He attempted to go into business using some of the inventions that he had conceived during his confinement in prison. His personality and intense drive and self-confidence quickly gained him a business partner with capital to invest in a cinematographic color reproduction system that was patented and earned decent profits for the two of them. Subject was still on parole and tied to his elder brother's "self-righteous indulgence," however. It was shortly after this that Subject was approached by a member of KUBARK who was following up on Subject as an ops lead furnished by a cousin in [illegible]. Subject was favorably assessed and removed black from France because of travel restrictions imposed by his parole status.

4. The rest of Subject's career has been generally summarized in DIR 57443. We are also attaching a copy of EGOA-21573 for information on Subject's most recent activities.

5. Subject has been described as being very ingenious, observant, shrewd, glib, and one who relishes intrigue and daring. The latter play a very important part in his character. He learns quickly and carries out any assignment without regard for danger. His drawbacks, as enumerated by his case officers, are that he is headstrong, impulsive and constantly needs new interests, has an ego that feeds on recognition and triumphs, a low frustration point at unpredictable times, would probably "fall in love" with his CO which would make agent turn over difficult, and that he would be difficult to dispose of if he became disenchanted, i.e. Subject is a handling problem.

A. H. S.

Alice H. SHAMASKO

Kenneth N. PECHINGPAUGH

Attachments:
1 cy EGOA-21573, h/~~u/s~~/c #1
Identity - u/s/c #2

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS/Pari w/atts h/a & u/s/c

201-233477

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BY

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J.B.

~~transfer to AF~~

S E C R E T 061741Z

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY BONN CITE PARI 6754

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)

STATION HAS NO RECORD EGOA-21573 OR WIROGUE CRYPTO

6 OCT 64 IN 88108

PLS ADVISE IDEN AND APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

Sally Hogan
FYI

SECRET

ORIG : Jo Albright
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 October 1964

MESSAGE FORM 34
28 SECRET

☐ INDEX
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RI ROUTING

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SIG CEN

TO FRANKFURT PARIS GERMANY BONN

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: AF 7

INFO EE 4, WE 6, SR 7, CI, CI/IPS, FI, FI/D 4, CDC, VR, FILE

TO ~~[illegible]~~ FRAN INFO: ROUTINE PARI GRMY BONN CITE DIR 57448

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)*

*WIROGUE TRYING STICK KUBARK FOR MORE MONEY.

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS BASED ON REMARKS MADE BY WIROGUE'S PAST CO'S. CONCENSUS ~~OF OPINION~~ IS THAT SUBJ COULD DO VERY LITTLE DAMAGE, IF ANY AT ALL, IF JOINED OTHER SERVICE.

2. DURING PERIOD WHEN SUBJ UNDER SR DIV CONTROL, CO HAD PERSONAL, DAILY EXTENDED CONTACT WITH HIM. CO BELIEVES SUBJ HAS INNATE DESIRE WORK FOR INTEL SERVICE AS IT CONSONANT WITH PAST LIFE FULL OF DARING, ADVENTUROUS ACTS. IDEA OF "LEGALIZED SPYING" APPEALS TO SUBJ AS IT PUTS HIM IN IMPORTANT, UNIQUE, PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY. CO BELIEVED HE GENUINELY SINCERE IN WANTING TO DO SOMETHING FOR KUBARK AS HE ENJOYED ROLE AS LOWER ECHELON ACTION AGENT. WHILE IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE SUBJ THREATENING WORK FOR OTHER SERVICE AS BARGAINING TACTIC FOR ADDITIONAL KUBARK FUNDS, CO RECALLS THAT MONEY NEVER HAS BEEN PRIMARY END FOR SUBJ AS HE ALWAYS FELT ENOUGH MONEY WOULD COME FROM SOMEPLACE TO SUSTAIN HIM FROM ONE VENTURE TO ANOTHER. DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SUBJ EXPECTS TO BE ACCEPTED BY FRENCH IS. HE KNOWS VERY WELL HE WOULD BE INCARCERATED FOR VIOLATING PAROLE. HIS PRIDE AND PROBABILITY OF CENSURE AND RIDICULE FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN FRANCE WOULD DISSUADE HIM IN END. PROBABLY DOES NOT WANT MORE MONEY, BUT RATHER NEW DOCUMENTS AND IDENTITY IN SOME THIRD COUNTRY SO THAT HE CAN RETURN

CONTINUED

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM

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ROUTING

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

CONF:

INFO

TO

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CITE DIR 57448

AND WIN ACCLAIM AND RECOGNITION FROM FAMILY AND FRIENDS. HAS ALWAYS HAD GREAT DESIRE TO "SURPRISE" EVERYONE BACK HOME WITH NEW DOCUMENTS, NEW IDENTITY, PLASTIC SURGERY, ETC.

3. DURING SR DIV PHASE OF SUBJ CAREER, HE IN WASHINGTON D.C. AREA UNDERGOING TRAINING FOR S AESENTINEL PROJECT. KNEW ALL HIS HANDLERS BY ALIASES. DURING TRAINING CONDUCTED IN SAFEHOUSE IN VIRGINIA, KNEW OPERATING PRINCIPLES AND HANDLED SCALE MOCK-UP OF ELINT GEAR TO BE USED AESENTINEL. HAD TRAINING IN BASIC AND ADVANCED FIELDCRAFT, INCLUDING SMALL ARMS, BASIC TRADECRAFT TECHNIQUES AND ERAT PRACTICES, ~~SOVIET~~ RUSSIAN LANGUAGE, SOVIET INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES, M.O. OF KGB BORDER TROOPS, AESENTINEL OPS PLAN, AIR INFILTRATION-EXFILTRATION TECHNIQUES INCLUDING AIRCRAFT FAVORED FOR THIS. SUBJ ABSORBED SOVIET REALITIES, BORDER TROOPS M.O. AND BASIC TRADECRAFT QUICKLY AND WITH GREAT APPLIED ~~EE~~ FLEXIBILITY.

4. DURING LEOPOLDVILLE EAN PHASE, SUBJ KNEW VERY LITTLE RE STATION ACTIVITIES. KNEW COS AND TWO CASE OFFICERS TRUE NAMES. AWARE OF COS CONTACT WITH GENERAL MOBUTU BECAUSE HE WORKING WITH CONGO AIR FORCE. SPENT MOST TIME THERE TRYING DEVELOP CONTACTS. ~~[illegible]~~ OTHER OPS HE MIGHT HAVE DISCERNED WOULD BE OUTDATED BY NOW DUE TO RAPIDLY CHANGING EVENTS IN CONGO.

END OF MESSAGE

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C/WH
CAF/5
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C/EE
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9 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Albright, AF/5

SUBJECT : 1. Informal Character Assessment of WIROGUE During the Period July59-Nov 1960
2. Suggested Considerations for WIROGUE Resettlement Phase
3. Damage Report Contribution

1. The following observations and comments are intended to represent an informal personality assessment and factors in consideration of resettlement for AESPIC, now WIROGUE. It is based on a period of training and handling prior to anticipated dispatch--early July59 through late November 1960. These thoughts are based on personal daily extended contact as trainer/agent handler with Subject as a member of prospective cross-border team for implementation of REDSOX Operation AESENTINEL. One member was re-assessed operationally unsuitable, which left a team of 2 agents, both of which Undersigned continued to handle. It is hoped that this assessment may be of some benefit to the AF Desk Officer, who requested it the day of this writing. It is intended that Subject's demonstrated suitability for AESENTINEL, an infiltration-exfiltration operation into difficult terrain in the Soviet Union, will serve as a mechanism rather than an end in illustrating Subject's general abilities and limitations for the task at hand. An attempt has been made to present this material in subject categories considered operationally meaningful. Quoted passages in Part I are Subjects own or the closest approximation memory permits.

2. It is my considered opinion that the Subject as of this writing has the highest personal and professional regard for Undersigned. I do also consider that, although thoughtful handling and self assuredness were prerequisite agent control factors during this case, Subject did not cause an uncomfortable amount of special handling problems. The senior Project Officer was Mr. Perry Crookham, C/DOD/DOB during the training and holding prior-to-dispatch phase of the operation.

3. Subject Background and Chronological Association Factors Deemed Operationally Significant

A. Subject is an approximately 49 year old eithnic Georgian fluent in Georgian, French, German and English. Subject emigrated to France with the remains of his family during the pre-Lycée stage of his life. His father, a TBILISI University academician and intellectual of some note , elected to stay in Soviet Georgia, during which period Soviet dominance in the West Caucasus was fairly well solidified. Subject considers that his fathers decision was made of

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his own free will but which nevertheless disappointed Subject greatly, as he greatly admired him, despite the fact that Subject's fathers decision was responsible for the suicide of his mother, whom Subject greatly loved. Undersigned believes that Subject's anguish in memories of his parents was genuine. Subject was a clever though precocious child during his Lycée education, and frequently was dismissed by school directors who did not appreciate his temperamental though erratically brilliant performance. Subject, during this stage of development, probably tried as hard as ever in his life to conform to the rules of society, which during that stage of French national education practices, would probably seem quite strict by American middle school practices. Subject greatly desired academic/professional recognition in imitation of his father. These feelings were especially frustrating because of his quick mind and seeming natural ability for mechanical and electrical theory and principals. I do not believe he ever has learned to consider conventions of living anything more than a tiresome game to be played when there is no alternative. Subject's quick mind, and early appreciation, recognition and adaptance of guile did much to ensure the necessary understanding of French culture for moderate success in that country. Subject who is an unusual looking man even by French standards, has no trouble in identifying with the under-privileged elements of French society. Subject is temporally bald, hooked nose, short, slender, bandy legged, wiry, and of dark complexion but possessed of a dry, caustic wit eager to laugh and contribute in the Caucasian spirit of comarderie to those whom he considers worthy of friendship. Subject, however, makes real friends cautiously, and has conciously established for himself personality assessment criteria that would do justice to many successful senior FI or CE C/O - agent handlers.

B. World War II offered Subject the welcomed opportunity to show his ability and ingenuity by engaging in black market affairs in luxury items and travel documents in German-occupied France. Subject would wistfully recount stories of his escapades during that period, which, after really getting to know Subject, seemed to be entirely possible. Subject admired the Germans as "worthy opponents", particularly their efficiency and ability to act decisively whether the problem be tactical or strategic. An extended period of German encarceration (until war's end) did nothing to alter his opinion. Wars' end left Subject bored and unfulfilled. The excitement and thrill of "the game" were gone and Subject's unsettled, numb confusion was for quite another reason than most of Europes milling thousands of displaced and shattered families. Therefore, it was not long before Subject and a close friend from his black market days decided on a daring daylight bank robbery in one of the suburban centers of France. Subject contends he planned the robbery from start to finish, and needed only someone to help. Subject and his accomplice carefully cased a bank, stole a heavy truck and during the height of the business day backed the truck full speed in reverse through the large street level plate glass window. Subject said he hopped out of the truck with an automatic weapon, while "the people were frozen solid", gathered up the money and was away quickly. Subject said the scheme failed because his accomplice went to the cache-site to get some of the money to spend before it was safe to do so. His accomplice was apprehended and in time broke down and implicated Subject. Subject said he was not bitter at his betrayer, but rather professed a genuine admiration for French interrogation techniques. Subject served a difficult confinement of 5 years, and was paroled to an older brother in Marseilles, as I recall.

C. Subject said that he began at that point to appreciate the futility of violent actions, while opposing the authority of society. He therefore attempted to go into business using some of the inventions that he had conceived during his confinement in prison. His winning personality and intense drive and self-confidence quickly gained him a business partner with capital to invest in a cinematographic color reproduction system that was pattened and earned decent profits for the venture. Subject was still on parole and tied to his older brother "self-righteous indulgence", however. It was shortly after this that Subject was approached by a member of the AIS who was following up on Subject as an ops lead furnished by a cousin in the US who was a moderately successful lawyer, and who had been long since recruited as an agent spotter for eithnic Georgians. Subject was favorably assessed and removed back from France, because of travel restrictions imposed under his parole status. I believe that this opportunity rekindled his old feelings of exhilaration and grateful enthusiasm for the opportunity to perform his deeds of doing for an authority, sanctioned by a national state, in this case the AIS.

D. Here at last, he considered, was a secure source of backing and support for his natural outlets. Subject always considered the Agency as ~~an equal~~ business partner, ally, and protector. He was therefore a grateful, sincere "tool" who thoroughly enjoyed his role as lower echelon action agent. Subject now probably feels like an equal partner.

E. He was a willing pupil, physically active -- since the job called for physical endurance -- and looked on self-denial and fatigue recognition as a point of honor. Undersigned was never a poor athlete, however, was bested on numerous occasions at whatever the field problem. Subject absorbed Soviet Realities, Border Troops M.O. and basic tradecraft quickly and with great applied flexibility.

F. It was during this period that Subject began to confide regularly and in depth to Undersigned. Subject would often tell Undersigned, "Fred, you must believe me, I want to do something." "I will do anything you tell me to do, only tell me." "You (meaning the Agency) want me to kill somebody. - Okay! I do it anyway you say." I believe Subject was genuinely sincere, and that this was neither an attempt to impress his C/O or a trust/assurance maneuver.

G. When an indefinite hold was placed on AESENTINEL by higher Agency authority, one team member was re-oriented and placed on conservation in a cover job. Undersigned ultimately conducted this agent back to his Scandinavian home where resettlement was achieved with a minimum of arrangements, however, Subject was transferred to AF Division for projected operational use in central Africa. This, if memory serves, was accomplished in late 1960.

4. Personal Qualities and Motivation Factors of Possible Operational Exploitability

A. Natural intelligence, resourcefully inventive

B. Mechanical ability, to include photography and gadgetry

C. A certain acumen and shrewdness

D. Concious guile and a "clandestine mind"

E. Physical stamina, and vitality to include extremely good eyesight

F. Probably capacity to withstand hostile interrogation and/or physical stress-privation

G. A sincere exponent of "the end justifies the means"

H. Atheism

I. A winning personality when need be

J. Present and potential language ability

K. Lack of racial prejudice

L. Fierce loyalty to his C/O once respect and friendship are established.

M. Possible self-destruction rather than blow the job in denied area op.

N. Good independent action agent on short term ops.

O. Anti-Communist

P. Moderate drinker

Q. Keen observer and excellent memory for faces and names

R. Self-confidence to a fantastic degree

5. Personal Qualities Considered Operationally Disadvantageous

A. Natually intelligent but headstrong

B. Physiognomy easily remembered

C. A blind spot in intuitive friendships, to possible include trusted female paramour

D. Impulsiveness, and nervous energy that needs constant new interests outlets. An opportunist

E. Lack of moral convictions and basic values many of which are divorced from reality.

F. Ego that feeds on recognition and triumphs. (probable inferiority complex)

G. Poor assessment of the value of money ("easy come, easy go")

H. Possible inclination to alter ops plan to conform to Subjects appreciation of the situation, in field situation.

I. Probably prove to "fall in love" with his C/O, which might make agent turn over difficult. This probably would be more basis for successful relationship.

J. Probably poor P/A--probably has little objective confidence in subordinates

K. Low frustration point at unpredictable times or occasions.

L. Difficult to dispose of if he ever becomes disenchanted

6. WIROGUE Resettlement Considerations

A. AF/5 representative has requested comment from Undersigned on WIROGUE's apparent reluctance at resettlement attempts in Frankfurt a/M which are underweigh at the present time, I believe. It is undersigned's understanding that Subject has threated to work for the French Service if resettlement negotiations do not proceed to Subject's liking. Speculation has been that this is probably a bargaining tactic to gouge an appreciable amount of additional dollars in his resettlement claim. Undersigned considers this a quite valid assumption, and entirely attributable to Subject. Subject probably views this threat as particularly critical in view of the seeming political/economic conflict with the French, and appreciates by now one of the differences between the AIS and the IS of a fascist and/or totalitarian state.

B. However, Undersigned would like to suggest the following interpretation for whatever value may be in it. I suggest that money, per se, is not the primary end that Subject is striving for now, just as it never seemed to be his primary concern throughout his life. I believe that Subject genuinely enjoys clandestine operations, at least, his conception of clandestine operations. Subject probably would prefer to work for the AIS or possibly the W. German Service because he has a genuine fondness for the people and many aspects of the culture of both countries. The idea of legalized, or at least internationally tolerated, "Spying" offers the opportunity to legitimize, and thereby rationalize, Subject's [illegible] that he is protecting his equity in an important, unique, "professional" category.

C. Subject, during the period of Undersigned's exposure, always considered that if he had money-fine, if not, then enough would come his way from someplace to sustain him from one venture to the next. Subject felt that the acquisition of money would be a by-product of his opportunist schemes and technical inventions in pursuance of his main goal-personal recognition for personal achievements and triumphs.

D. I believe Subject does not expect to be accepted in his offer of employment with the French Service, but rather to let our minds jump to the next logical step-the full meaning of the result of such an attempt on his part. Subject knows very well that he has violated his parole and would be encarcerated on his return. I believe his pride and the probability of censure and ridicule of family and friends in France would disuade him in the final analysis.

E. Subject is a most excellent chess player. I have never won from him, nor have I ever seen him lose a game. I consider that Subject has thought this line of action out thoroughly. It is apparent that he is willing to gamble his quit claim settlement on something that I believe he has specifically in mind--possibly the offer of new documents and identity in some third country. He has always had a great desire to "surprise" everyone back home (i.e. Paris): with new documents, a new identity, plastic surgery, etc. I do not believe that what he wants is necessarily more dollars, but rather for the AIS to once again help him (as co-partner) to achieve his aim of acclaim, success and recognition, possibly this time to family and friends in France.

F. I do not believe that Subject could ever be physically intimidated. He lost half his front teeth to German interrogators and the other half to French prison guards. Additionally, he does possess a defiant spirit that sometimes comes through as sheer obstinacy to friends.

G. If it is considerd worthwhile, I believe an attempt should be made to locate a C/O locally who has handled him in the past. A C/O for whom Subject has respect as a higher echelon and whom he considers understands him. I suggest that this C/O interview Subject in an uncontrolled environment to determine what it is that Subject really wants. To best of my recollection, Subject thought highly of Monty Love (T), the C/O that helped pitch him and who brought him out Black from France. Monty was to go to one of the German Stations or bases the last time I saw him in late 1959.

8. Damage Report Contribution

A. The following constitutes Undersigned's contribution to a damage report that may well be needed in view of Subject's posture in the matter at hand. It covers only that time sequence during which Undersigned actively handled Subject.

B. This span constitutes:

early July 59 - late Nov 1960

C. At that time Undersigned was a junior C/O on the AESENTINEL Project which was to be prepared and launched from the ZI by SR/DOB, a covert site ops base ~~in~~ formerly in the District of Columbia.

D. In early July of 59, Undersigned as "Fred" and George Fill (SR Staffer) as "Mr. George" met Subject and his teammate "Al" who arrived at Natl. Airport, D.C. with their agent handler and trainers. The group had returned from several weeks of survival training in Alaska, and consisted of:

Subject	"Little David" (A)
Gregg Ross (T)	Mr. Gregg (A)
"Al" (agent team mate)	"Big Al" (A)
Bill Rohmer (T)	Bill (A)

E. We drove immediately to a Safehouse in the Virginia countryside and conducted training, holding and orientations from that site until the operation was placed on indefinite conservation and ultimately cancelled becasue of the Powers U-2 incident.

F. Safehouse keepers were an elderly married couple - "Geof and Janie." There were approximately 6 DOB QP vehicles exposed to Subject.

G. During this holding period another C/O and several agent handlers were there on regular occasions:

Perry Crookham (T)	"Mr. Pat" (A)
Myron Toloczko (T)	"Ski" (A)

Ray Hanchulak (T)	"Ray" (A)
Gordon Mothes (T)	"Gordon" (A)
Joseph Betza (T)	"Joe" (A)
Col. Podwornyy (T)	"Pod"

H. Subject knew the operating principles and handled the scale mock-up of the ELINT gear to be used on AESENTINEL. Subject was exposed to training in:

(1) Basic and Advanced Fieldcraft, to include small arms.

(2) Basic tradecraft techniques and practices

(3) Soviet Russian language training

(4) Soviet interrogation techniques

(5) M.O. of KGB Border troops

(6) AESENTINEL Ops. plan

(7) Air infiltration-exfiltration techniques, to include aircraft favored for this.

9. For further information or clarification please call Fred Kirkpatrick, extension 6587.

Fred Kirkpatrick

Fred Kirkpatrick
SR/O/PT

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DIR INFO FRAN GMNY BONN CITE PARI 6754

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

REF FRAN 9367 (IN 84943)

CRYPTO

STATION HAS NO RECORD ESOAR21573 OR WIROGUE CRYP[illegible] IN 88100

PLS ADVISE IDEN AND APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND. NO INDEX.

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PRIORITY DIR INFO PARI GMNY BONN CITE FRAN 9367

10 OCT [illegible] IN 64943

CABEZONE HARVARD WIROGUE

RE EGCA 21573

1. WIROGUE CONTACTED HARVARD TO ADVISE HE CURRENTLY WITHOUT JOB, MONEY, FRIENDS AND HOPE FOR FUTURE. SAYS HE HAS TRIED HARD FIND AND RETAIN SUITABLE EMPOLYMENT BUT UNFITTED FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN INTEL WORK. SINCE PBPRIME UNABLE PROVIDE HIM FURTHER ASSIGNMENT IN THIS FIELD HE PLANS PROCEED PARI AND OFFER SERVICES TO FIS. STATED PURPOSE HIS CONTACT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE ANY OBJECTIONS HIS SEEKING SUCH EMPLOYMENT.

2. HARVARD CO CONFIRMED THAT THERE NO POSSIBILITY OF RENEWING HIS AIS ASSOCIATION. WIROGUE ALSO TOLD THAT, WHILE WE UNABLE PREVENT HIM FROM TAKING PROPOSED ACTION, DOING SO WOULD BE AT OWN RISK SINCE FRENCH AUTHORITIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT ONLY DISBELIEVE HIS STORY OF PAST AIS CONNECTIONS, BUT WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST HIM FOR PAST CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. SUBJ OUTWARDLY APPEARED TO DISCOUNT THESE WARNINGS.

DC/[illegible]

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ABSTRACT

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3 52 JUN 64

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DOCUMENT DATE
4 JUN 1964

DOCUMENT NUMBER
EGOA 21573

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TO
Chief, AF

INFO.
Chief, EE; WH; SR; KUPLUM

FROM Chief, Coordination & Support Base, Frankfurt

SUBJECT WIROGUE
Final Resettlement of WIROGUE 201-233477

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. WIROGUE, former REDSOX agent candidate and African Division agent has been quitclaimed and resettled on the local economy. This dispatch summarizes the WIROGUE case from May 1962 to March 1964.

2. Subject arrived in Frankfurt/Main from the Congo on 22 May 1962. KUBARK's reasons for establishing contact were dictated by the need to relieve Subject of his KUBARK-supplied false Austrian passport, the need to institute or suggest a course of action which would encourage him to establish himself as a contributing member of society and, above all, prevent his return to the Congo.

3. Subject appeared to be primarily a resettlement problem, therefore, Orme K. DARONNAT was assigned the Case Officer responsibility.

4. Since adequate documentation was a primary consideration for successful resettlement, Subject was briefed on the relative merits of the types of FEDREP documentation available. Although Headquarters had recommended a backstopped Fremdenpass, subsequent discussions between DARONNAT and MKTOPAZ FRAN representatives indicated a Reiseausweis to be the proper document for permanent resettlement. With the cooperation of ODIBEX Camp King representatives, Subject was interviewed and granted political recognition on the basis of a fabricated story in which he claimed to be a Georgian who defected from East Berlin while with a tourist group.

5. The WIROGUE case suffered a temporary setback when in December 1962 the BUNDESVERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ (BFV), the West German organization responsible for the internal security of the FEDREP became interested in Subject and requested all available information. HARVARD briefed OCA Bonn that Subject was strictly a HARVARD agent resettlement case whose name, recognition interview story, etc were complete fabrications to insure his receiving political recognition and a Reiseausweis. OCA advised the BFV that Subject was of continuing AIS interest and HARVARD resumed its resettlement efforts.

201-233477

(Continued)

DATE TYPED 4 June 64	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGOA-21573	

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 32W-120-12/1

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HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
32W-120-012/01

6. By summer 1963 detailed South American immigration data had been acquired. This disclosed that Subject's language deficiencies, background, knowledge of the Soviet Union, and work history were insufficient to guarantee his smooth processing through the INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION (ICEM). Our investigation also pointed up the fact that until Subject was provided with a detailed life history containing the information required by prospective employers and/or immigration authorities, he was not in a position to be resettled anywhere, let alone South America. As a result, HARVARD's plans to process Subject for immigration had to be cancelled, at least temporarily.

7. A CABEZONE Stage I C.O. was given the task of preparing a life story containing the factual information needed for the filling out of job applications, to stand up under detailed interviews and, if South American immigration ever took place, to satisfy immigration requirements. This legend was given to ODIBEX Camp King representatives who prepared a new political recognition interview story, arranged for the removal of copies of the old story from the various FEDREP files and replaced them with the new.

8. For the first time since Subject had arrived in HARVARD's custody the way was clear for a final resettlement. Subject's Reiseausweis was renewed and he was quitclaimed and advised to work and establish himself in Germany. He was told that nothing more could be done for him and that immigration to South America at anytime in the future would be without KUBARK assistance.

9. HARVARD has done everything to insure Subject a successful future free from problems resulting from his "black" association with KUBARK. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that KUBARK will not have to become involved with any of Subject's future problems. It is also unlikely he will attempt to coerce KUBARK with threats to reveal all. With his criminal background he is aware that he can be brought to the attention of the French authorities. He also believes that KUBARK's position in the FEDREP is such that we have nothing to fear from any action on his part.

10. At the time of this writing Subject has a position as research and development engineer with a Munich firm. He allegedly receives DM 1500 per month, has an expense account and is to receive a percentage of all profits realized from the sale of any devices he develops. He expects to move to Munich permanently about the end of May or June 1964.

11. HARVARD has arranged with CSB Data Processing Branch to publish a noforn drop notice under Subject's documented name so that any attempt to immigrate to any country will bring him to the attention of KUBARK and appropriate action can be taken.

12. It is suggested that Headquarters arrange to apprise HARVARD of any inquiries regarding Subject under his documented name or any of the names listed in Attachment C.

ORME K. DARONNAT

APPROVED:
FREDERICK K. UMNODE

16 JAN

Attachments:
A. Recognition Interview Story (USC)
B. Termination Agreement (USC)
C. Iden List (USC)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - AF, w/atts (USC)
1 - EE, w/o atts
1 - WH, w/o atts
1 - SR, w/o atts
1 - KUPLUM, w/o atts

201-233677

[illegible] Kommissariat
- Bad Homburg v.d.H. -

s.Zt. Oberursel/Ts., den 23.8.1962

In Begleitung eines Dolmetschers erscheint der angebliche ausländische Flüchtling

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Georg Frank S a n d e r s,
geb. am 25. Juli 1919 in Tiflis/Georgien/UdSSR.,
wohnhaft in Oberursel/Ts., Hohemarkstr. 145,
Beruf: Elektroingenieur,
Staatsangeh.: ungeklärt, fr. UdSSR,
Eltern: Simon S. und Maria geb. Kantscheli,
beide verstorben,

und erklärt wie folgt:

" Ich weiß, weshalb ich heute hier befragt werden soll. Mein Dolmetscher hat mir auch gesagt, daß ich die Wahrheit angeben soll, da sonst die Gefahr besteht, daß meine Anerkennung als ausländischer Flüchtling gefährdet ist.

Ich wurde als ältestes Kind meiner Eltern geboren. Ich hatte noch einen Bruder, der aber kurz nach der Geburt verstorben ist.

Mein Vater war von Beruf Ingenieur, ist aber bereits im Jahre 1924 verstorben. Ich selbst kann mich an meinen Vater nicht mehr erinnern. Meine Mutter ist im Jahre 1934 an einem Herzschlag verstorben. Sie war zuletzt Kassiererin in einem Schuhreparatur-Geschäft in Tiflis.

Meine Schulzeit begann im Jahre 1927, wo ich an meinem Geburtsort bis 1934 die dortige Deutsche Schule besuchte. Es war eine Schule, in der nach deutschen Gesichtspunkten unterrichtet wurde. Wir bedienten uns zu damaliger Zeit der deutschen Sprache und hatten nur wenige Stunden, wo wir in der georgischen Sprache unterrichtet wurden.

Im Jahre 1934 kam ich, nachdem ich durch eine Prüfung die Befähigung nachweisen mußte, zum Elektro-Technikum in Tiflis, dem auch ein Internat angeschlossen war. Die finanziellen Mittel für diese Schule brauchte ich nicht aufbringen, sondern hatte ein Stipendium.

An dieser Lehranstalt studierte ich vier Jahre Physik, Mathemati
Geschichte, Englisch und Literatur.

- 2 -

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT A TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

CS COPY

Encl 1 EGOA 21573

201-233477

Neben der eigentlichen Fachausbildung erhielten wir auch eine vormilitärische Ausbildung, in der Körperschule mit eingeschlossen war. Während der Sommerferien waren die Studenten meist auf einer Kolchose beschäftigt, um so an der Bergung der Ernte mitzuhelfen.
Im Frühjahr 1938 hatte ich meine Abschlußprüfung. Ich bestand diese und erhielt mein Diplom.

Schon von der Lehranstalt wurden uns Arbeitsplätze zugewiesen. Wir mußten uns zu diesem Zweck auf zwei Jahre verpflichten. Ich würde sagen, daß damit eine gewisse Rückzahlung der uns gewährten Gelder zum Zwecke des Studiums geleistet werden sollte. Ich selbst kam zur Maschinen-Traktoren-Station, die später in Reparatur-Technische-Station umbenannt wurde. Mein Arbeitsplatz befand sich in Zschakaja.

Am 28. August 1941 wurde ich zur russischen Armee eingezogen. Ich kam nach Baku. Es handelte sich um eine Flakeinheit, die in der Saljanskiji Kaserne untergebracht war. Nach meiner zweimonatigen Grundausbildung wurde ich als Kraftfahrer ausgebildet.
Zum Schluß meiner Dienstzeit war ich Fahrer des Divisionskommandeurs, Oberstleutnant GURGENIDSE.
Im Jahre 1944 wurde ich zum Feldwebel befördert. Mit diesem Dienstgrad habe ich auch 1946 die Armee verlassen. Es war im September. Ich kehrte wieder an meinen früheren Arbeitsplatz zurück, den ich bis zu meiner Flucht innehatte.

Nun zu meinen Fluchtgründen:

Trotzdem ich in einem kommunistischen Land geboren und erzogen worden war, begann ich doch schon frühzeitig zu verstehen, daß für die Einzelperson keine persönliche Freiheit bestand.
Es war mir auch klar, daß persönlicher Aufstieg nicht von dem Talent und der Rechtschaffenheit eines Menschen abhing, sondern von dem Ausmaß der politischen Betätigung. Ich erkannte die kommunistischen Lügen, da die Wirklichkeit so verschieden von der offiziellen Propaganda war. Während und nach dem Kriege traf ich Menschen, die westliche Länder besucht hatten und ich war in der Lage, Bruchstücke der Wahrheit über den Unterschied in den Lebensarten aus diesen Erzählungen abzuleiten, obwohl alle diese Berichte sehr vorsichtig vorgebracht wurden.

Ich hörte schließlich auch noch westliche Sender, um mich zu orientieren. Meine feindliche Einstellung zum Kommunismus wurde immer stärker und es wurde für mich immer schwieriger, mich mit meinen Redensarten zu kontrollieren und diesen Gefühlen nicht offen Ausdruck zu verleihen.

Im Juni 1962 kam schließlich der Sicherheitsdienst zu mir an meinen Arbeitsplatz. In der anschließenden Vernehmung wurde ich beschuldigt, ein langjähriges Mitglied einer georgischen Widerstandsgruppe zu sein und regierungsfeindliche Äußerungen getan zu haben. Obwohl ich solche Äußerungen bei verschiedenen Gelegenheiten gemacht hatte und deshalb schuldig im Sinne des letzteren Teils der Anschuldigungen war, konnte ich fühlen, daß der Sicherheitsdienst nicht genügend Informationen besaß. Ich verneinte deshalb alle Anschuldigungen.
Nach langem Verhör wurde ich in meine Wohnung entlassen und erhielt die Auflage, meinen Wohnsitz nicht zu verlassen. Außerdem wurde mir erklärt, daß ich später vom Sicherheitsdienst noch hören würde. Alle diese Umstände ließen in mir den Gedanken der Flucht kommen. Ich lebte fortan immer in der Angst, vom Sicherheitsdienst verhaftet zu werden. Nach reiflicher Überlegung setzte ich am 25.6.62, also drei Tage nach dem Verhör, meine Fluchtabsichten in die Tat um.
Wie an jedem Tag, so verließ ich auch zu gewohnter Zeit, gegen 07.00 Uhr, meine Wohnung. Anstatt aber zum Arbeitsplatz zu gehen, verließ ich die Stadt in Richtung Samtredia. Den Zug getraute ich mir nicht zu benutzen, weil ich der Meinung war, daß dieser überwacht wird. Nach etwa 2 oder 3 Kilometer wurde ich auf der Landstrasse von einem Lastwagen aufgenommen, der mich nach Samtredia brachte. Dort bestieg ich dann schließlich den Zug nach Baku, der gegen 14.00 Uhr ankam. Ich versteckte mich in der Folgezeit bis zur Dunkelheit. Ich ging am See entlang. Nach etwa 2 Kilometer Fußmarsch vernichtete ich meinen Paß (Personalausweis) und vergrub meine Kleidung. Ich mußte nämlich von diesem Ort versuchen, schwimmend türkisches Gebiet zu erreichen. Es mag unglaublich klingen, aber ich schwamm bis gegen 04.00 Uhr früh. An Land gekommen, wußte ich nicht, wo ich mich befand. In einer Hütte fand ich aber Gegenstände, aus denen ich annehmen mußte, mich noch innerhalb des sowjetischen Teritoriums zu befinden.

Ich versteckte mich wieder und wartete bis zum Abend. Ich ging schließlich wieder ins Wasser und schwamm nun der Küste entlang. Ich mühte mich wieder die ganze Nacht ab, ohne daß ich genau wußte, wo ich mich befand. Im Morgengrauen ging ich wieder an Land. Ich hielt mich zunächst in einer Höhle versteckt. Im Laufe der nachfolgenden Stunden tre traf ich einen Knaben von etwa 11 oder 12 Jahren. Von ihm erfuhr ich, daß ich mich auf türkischem Gebiet, in der Nähe von Kemal-Pascha befand. Da ich immer noch nicht Sicherheit hatte, versteckte ich mich weiterhin zwei Tage. Der Not gehorchend, näherte ich mich schließlich der Ortschaft Kemal-Pascha. Mit meinen russischen Sprachkenntnissen konnte ich mich den herbeigekommenen Personen nicht verständlich machen. Man bedrohte mich mit Stöcken und Äxten, bis ich sie schließlich überzeugen konnte, daß ich aus dem russ. Gebiet käme und um Hilfe bitte. Männer der Ortschaft übergaben mich schließlich den militärischen Behörden in Kemal-Pascha.

Bei meiner Flucht war ich lediglich mit einer Badehose bekleidet. An den Füßen hatte ich Schwimmflossen. Weiter trug ich ein Klappmesser bei mir, mit dem ich mich im Notfalle verteidigen wollte. -

Durch türkische Behörden kam ich nach Erserum und von dort nach Istanbul, in das Flüchtlingslager. Am 6.7.62 übernahmen mich US-Behörden, die mich noch am gleichen Tage nach Deutschland brachten.

Das ist die Wahrheit. Ich bitte, mich als ausl. Flüchtling anzuerkennen, weil ich aus politischen Gründen und aus Angst vor Verfolgung meine Heimat verlassen habe.

Ich bin bisher noch nicht bestraft.

Wegen meiner Zukunftsabsichten befragt, erkläre ich, daß ich auszuwandern gedenke. Es ist aber auch nicht ausgeschlossen, daß ich mich in Europa niederlasse.

Das ist alles, was ich von mir aus und auf Befragen sagen kann.

Die in russischer Sprache geführte Verhandlung habe ich verstanden und bestätige die Richtigkeit durch meine Unterschrift.

G. Sanders
v. g. u.

Geschlossen:
Rögner
(Rögner) KOM

201-233477

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1P

TERMINATION AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that a contractual relationship has heretofore existed between him and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ("the Government"). The Government has fully and completely satisfied all of its obligations to the undersigned.

The undersigned on behalf of himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns hereby releases and forever discharges the Government, its officers, agents and employees from any and all debts, claims, benefits or demands arising out of the above mentioned contractual relationship.

The undersigned fully understands and appreciates the fact that the prior relationship between the parties and all information and knowledge acquired in the course of said relationship (particularly with reference to persons and methods employed by the Government) are the property of said Government and constitute military secrets affecting its security. The undersigned knows and understands that these are protected by German Law under the provisions of Annex A to the Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government is highly appreciative of the excellent services heretofore rendered by the undersigned. However, to preserve the security above mentioned, it is further understood and agreed that both parties shall hereafter disavow that the relationship ever existed.

The undersigned further agrees he possesses no right, title or interest in any information or knowledge arising out of said relationship and he further solemnly swears that he will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, conduct or any other means the fact of said relationship nor any such knowledge or information arising therefrom except as authorised in writing by the same official of the Government as that who witnesses this oath.

Frankfurt/Main, this 3rd day of March 1964

George F Sanders (L.S.)

WITNESS:

William [illegible]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT B TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

CS COPY

En/2 EGOA 21573

201-233477

14-00000

1P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT C TO
DISPATCH NO. EGOA-21573
DATED 4 JUNE 1964

IDEN LIST

DAVID de PANASKHET

GEORG REINER

DAVID TZITZICHVILI

MICROFILMED
JUN 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Encl 3 EGOA 21573

201-23[illegible]

14-00000

file WIROGUE

EXCERPT FROM EGOA 21181 -- HARVARD RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY FOR JANUARY 1964:

WIROGUE

Subject's new legend has been translated into German and given to the ODIBEX Camp King representatives who will use it as the basis for a new political recognition interview story. As soon as the new story is completed copies will be placed in the various files to replace copies of the old story. At this point, Subject's documentation will be completely in order and actual resettlement should be accomplished in a few days.

201-233477

SECRET

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 30 September 1963

I. DEFECTOR CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-109	Subject moved out of HARVARD housing during the month after having located appropriate employment with CAMANTILLA'S assistance. The results of Subject's T.B. tests were obtained on 24 September and are negative. He will continue in his current job and concentrate on further English study until December when he will again be considered for immigration to the U.S. under P.L. 86-648.
DS-129	Through the assistance of MKTOPAZ and ODIBEX, Subject received his Fremdenpass and was interviewed for FEDREP political recognition. Shortly after being turned over to CAMANTILLA, who is assisting him in his efforts to obtain local employment, the need for additional interrogation arose. While his job hunt was, therefore, slightly delayed, it should recommence shortly. Due to the sensitive nature of Subject's documentation problem (having been previously granted refugee recognition by another country), HARVARD will continue to maintain contact with him until the Reiseausweis is issued.
IDEN-271*	Subject immigrated to the U.S. 19 September 1963 without HARVARD assistance or CAMANTILLA sponsorhip.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

DS-130	Profession: Electro-technician; designer of high voltage power circuits Rec'd by HARVARD: 20 September 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Czechoslovakian Age: 27 No of Dependents: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and declassification

SECRET

201-233477

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-130 (Cont)	HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 414 has already been completed. He is scheduled to depart 28 October 1963 via an ICEM flight for New York where CAMANTILLA will meet and assist. Until this departure date he will occupy HARVARD housing and continue his study of English.
DS-133	Profession: Mechanical Engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 30 September 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Polish Age: 30 No. of Dependents: 0 Resettlement Officer: Arthur A. LIFALL HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Immigration to Canada (see EGOA 20576, dated 24 September 1963).

C. Former Defector Resettlement Cases (or Cases Still in Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period:

DS-924	Camp King informed HARVARD that Subject had applied for a Reiseausweis renewal in order to visit the FEDREP. Headquarters' answer to HARVARD's query re adviseability of issuing renewal will be passed to the appropriate authorities, thru Camp King, when received.
DS-125	While immigration to the U.S. under P.L. 86-648 was initiated for Subject and his family (see EGOA-20570, 18 September 63), HARVARD now feels his best chances for U.S. entry, in view of his long C.P. membership, is under P. L. 414 first preference (see FRAN 2170). Preliminary discussions have been held with AMCONGEN and an advisory opinion will be obtained.
DS-127	Application for U.S. immigration under P. L. 86-648 has been formally turned down by the local I&NS office. CABEZONE is currently awaiting Headquarters reaction to EGOA-20573, 19 September which recommends P. L. 110 handling.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category IC.

II. AGENT CASES:

Case Name	Action Taken
A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:	
CAHAVOC - 1	Subject continues to be of interest to FOB and will occupy HARVARD housing until he is successful in his attempts to find an apartment on the economy.
WIROGUE	Background material for Subject's new legend has been acquired with the assistance of Stage I. HARVARD hopes to begin the final stages of Subject's resettlement in the near future.
IDEN-264*	Subject immigrated to the U.S. 5 September 1963 on PAA FLT #73.
IDEN-272	The initial stages of FEDREP political recognition have been completed. Subject's position has been legalized to the extent that he is now looking for employment on the economy.
IDEN-274	With the assistance of CAMANTILLA Subject commenced his photographic training in Hamburg on 10 September. Upon completion of his schooling (in early 1964) he will be given the monetary grant awarded by Headquarters as compensation for his eight-year imprisonment.
B. Received During Reporting Period:	
NONE	
C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During Reporting Period:	
AEBLANKET-2	HARVARD C. O. ORME K. DARONNAT and former HARVARD C. O. DAVID R. REINBOLD visited Subject at her request. She asked for help for a girlfriend who had become involved in possible foreign intelligence activities in the local area. Arrangements were made for REINBOLD to introduce an FOB/CE C.O. to Subject.
AEPOLE-25	Additional correspondence has been exchanged with Subject in connection with his attempting to establish with FEDREP authorities that he contributes to the support of his children living in the USSR.

DIHESITANT	At the request of FOB/SAT, HARVARD has been in contact with AMCONGEN FRAN to establish most expeditious way for Subject to be processed for immigration to the U.S. Immigration is complicated by the fact that Subject and wife are residing in another country and for security reasons must not be processed at the U.S. Consulate located in that country.
TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDEN-238,241, 242	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of IDEN 238 a monthly subsistence payment of DM 150.
IDEN-239 & 240	HARVARD arranged for a meeting between the local representative of CAMANTILLA and an FOB/SAT C. O. to discuss the possibility for continued financial assistance to Subjects through U.S.E.P.
IDEN 263	The New York office of CAMANTILLA has brought to HARVARD's attention the recurring difficulties which it has had with Subject. This problem was discussed with FOB/SAT and a summary of the situation forwarded to Headquarters in FROB 5827.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category IIC.

EXCERPT FROM EGOA 20791 (HARVARD Resettlement Summary)

October 63

WIROGUE

Subject's new legend has been prepared and will be used to provide the details for a new FEDREP political recognition interview. The next step will be to arrange to have the new interview story substituted for the old thus paving the way for Subject's permanent resettlement.

201-133477

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGOT-20212

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, EE

INFO
Chief of Base, Bonn

FROM
Chief, Coordination & Support Base/Frankfurt

DATE
9 September 1963

SUBJECT
CABEZONE/HARVARD
Backstopping of Resettlement & Disposal Cases

ACTION REQUIRED
FYI

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES
A. FRAN 6399
B. BONN 4139
C. EGOS 11325
D. EGOT 18868

1. References represent an initial misunderstanding of the problem of WIROGUE which is now being clarified.

2. The problem of backstopping of resettlement and disposal cases has been carefully reviewed by elements of CSB concerned including CABEZONE, MKTOPAZ and CATHINK. In this connection there is attached a copy of a memorandum dated 27 August 1963 from Chief/MKTOPAZ which outlines the current situation. As will be noted MKTOPAZ has and will expand its capability for procurement of operational documents independent of the 513th ICG. It is believed that the present procedures for backstopping of resettlement and disposal cases should be continued. In theory an independent capability is desirable but not really practical at this time. Creation of an independent capability for backstopping resettlement cases would require duplication of the procedures and practices now followed by Mr. Willms of the 513th ICG. In addition, we would not have the advantage of hiding our cases from the Germans among other Army disposal cases. Furthermore, USAREUR has requested notification prior to contact with any German officials of any sensitive cases which we may desire to handle without military assistance--see USAREUR letters dated 7 August 1961 and 23 March 1962, attached. With considerable effort it would be possible to backstop some of our resettlement and disposal cases directly with German officials. It would be quiet difficult, however, to prevent the Army from learning of such action which is contrary to the USAREUR request.

3. It is possible that the FEDREP will enact new legislation on the control of non-German refugees. Likewise, new FEDREP emergency laws may affect this type of case. We will keep this situation under review and in the event the circumstances change will initiate appropriate action.

NORRIS D. WALLACH

Attachments: (H/W)
1. Memo dtd 27 Aug '63
2. USAREUR Ltr dtd 7 Aug '61
3. USAREUR Ltr dtd 23 Mar '62

Distribution:
2 - C/EE w/atts
1 - COB/Bonn w/o atts

201-233477

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

☐ CONTINUED

Follow #1 to Richmond

Turn RIGHT off #1 on #161 approximately 2 miles before you reach Richmond City limits.

Follow #161 over 5¢ toll bridge to #360.

Turn right on #360 to #153.

Turn left on #153 to #460.

Turn RIGHT on #460 to Blackstone.

Turn LEFT on road to main gate - Camp Pickett

At Main Gate - call Bldg. No. 2813. Operator will place call. Escort will meet you at main gate.

Bldg. 2813 - Ext. 4120

ask for:
SKI
KAY
ROY

201-233477

Leopoldville October 3

Dear Dan

As you can see I am back to Leo and in the same time to my job in the Air Force. I have crossed the river from Brazzaville to Leo without any trouble though that was and still is closed to anyone without a diplomatic passport.

So far so well but I have to ask you to send me back, soon as possible my two Laisser Passer I have show you when I was at Alban Towers Hotel. Those laisser-passer are very important for my own security and my travelling and it will be almost impossible to find two other new identification cards like that. The situation is a little tense and troubled. The white peoples are nervous because the feeling of insecurity between Gizenga's growing influence and the today's Government failure to find the right solution for the present complet disorganisation of this country and his ruin for the [illegible] of the Soviets. When I came back to my office everybody was happy to see me again and the secretary of the Defense minister told me "What happen to you Mr Reiner, we are glad to have you here now, we need you very much (?!!). I hope your health is good now.

Meanwhile I have seen Norman and I have let him know what I was doing now. I suppose he will make his report to you. If you want take contact with me you can always write to however or if you would like another way for some reason you can write to

Monsieur Georg Reiner
B.P. 2949
Leopoldville/Congo.

This is my mail-box. I'll be glad to do any thing in my possibility.

Give my best regard to Pat and please give him my adress also to Max wich I have seen in Frankfurt/Main just two days befor my departure at the Airport.

I hope you are in good health.

George.



ATTACHMENT #1

201-231077

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
NO INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
CROSS REFERENCE TO FILE NO.
FILE RID__DESTROY__RET. TO BRANCH
SIGNATURE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: ~~E~~ AF

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, ~~AF 4~~, SR 6, S/C 2
EE4

S E C R E T 191510Z

FRAN INFO DIR FROB CITE BONN 4350

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

19 MAR 1963 IN39733

REF FRAN 7437, (NOT TO FROB) (IN 88755)

SUGGEST MOST DISCREET WAY OBTAIN INFO REQUIRED IS QUERY TO CARAVEL.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *STATED FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
AF/7	
DESTROY	

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

201-233477

DEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-233477
NO INDEX-CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
CROSS REFERENCE TO FILE NO.
FILE RID__DESTROY__~~RET. TO BRANCH~~ X
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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2		5	
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ACTION: ~~FE 6~~ AF/9

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, ~~AF 4~~, FE 4, SR 6, S/C 2

SECRET 181611Z

BONN INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7407

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

18 MAR 1963 IN88799

REF FRAN 6489 (IN 62960)*

1. FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL. CAN BONN DISCREETLY MAKE THIS DETERMINATION?

2. NO FRAN TRACES UNDER NAMES DAVID TZITZICHVILI OR DAVID DE PANASKHET DPOB 20 DEC 1919 TIFLIS, USSR.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CAVATA BE ADVISED WIRAGE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	M
RID/MIS	H
~~RID/OPS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
AF/7	
~~DESTROY~~	

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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RI COPY

SECRET

ATE : 6 FEB 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : FRANKFURT

CTION: EE 6

NFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	5	4	ci/cip
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 6 1511Z 63

ROUTINE

John

BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6489

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE
REF BONN 4139 (IN 60901) *

IN 62960

1. ORDER KEEP CAVATA OUT OF WIROGUE CASE THEY MAY BE INFORMED WIROGUE IS OF CONTINUING OPS INTEREST TO AIS. HOWEVER AS HARVARD EXPLAINED DURING OCA VISIT BONN 5 FEB WIROGUE WAS AND IS STRICTLY RESETTLEMENT CASE OF NO AIS OPS INTEREST.

2. SUGGEST CAVATA ALSO BE ADVISED WIROGUE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

West Germ Internal Security Service

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED INFORM CAVATA THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

201-233477

SECRET

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 2 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	5	5	
3	6	6	

FEB 2 1419Z 63

ROUTINE

John

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR BRLN CITE BONN 4139

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS *IROGUE

REF FRAN 6399 (IN 60224)

IN 60901

1. SINCE THIS IS APPARENTLY A KUBARK CASE AND ORIGINAL QUERY CAME FROM CAVATA TO KUBARK ELEMENT OCA, FAIL UNDERSTAND NEED FOR TRANSMITTING REPLY TO CAVATA VIA 513TH REP. ALSO DO NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY CONTACT CAVATA CHIEF IN RESPONSE ROUTINE WORKING LEVEL CAVATA QUERY. THIS MAY BE ATTEMPT ON WILLMS PART TO FIND EXCUSE VISIT CAVATA CHIEF.

2. IF THIS ROUTINE CABEZONE CASE FEEL STAGE I DEBRIEFING AND ASSESSMENT WHICH NORMALLY PASSED CAVATA WILL SATISFY LATTER'S NEEDS. ON OTHER HAND IF KUBARK HAS CONTINUING OPERATIONAL INTEREST AS PARAGRAPH 2 IMPLIES WE CAN INFORM CAVATA ACCORDINGLY THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *FRAN ASKED BONN ADVISE IF DESIRES WILLMS CHECK IN WITH BONN PRIOR VISIT CAVATA.

201-233477

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
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DATE : 1 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, S/C 2

6

FEB 1 1420Z 63

ROUTINE

John

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

Soft file

IN 50224

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE

REF EGNA 25083

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE WIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE FILE NO. 201-235477

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 1 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, [illegible] 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐
None required ☒
Signature: [illegible]

FEB 1 1420Z 63

ROUTINE

4/6 201-

IN 60224

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS WIROGUE

REF EGNA 25083

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE WIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
[illegible]	W
[illegible]	H.
~~[illegible]~~	

201-233477

FORM 4-58 1389a

SECRET

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FILE NO. 201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : John Kelly
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] January 1963

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 [illegible] 31 09.

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, CDC, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature: J Kelly

DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12271

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE 12271

[illegible] AF/5 [illegible]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

RI COPY

INITIAL
RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~RID/CS~~
RID/FI
~~RID/FI~~
~~DESTROY~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

FORM 1389a (35)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : John Kelly
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : [illegible] January 1963

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, CDC, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

22 JAN 63 01 09z

~~SIG CEN~~

DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 12271

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

12271

REF EGOA 18388

1. HQS RECOMMENDS IMPLEMENTATION PARA 3 B REF. NOT TO EXCEED $3,000. CONCUR ODIBEX LETTER ATTESTING TO SOLVENCY AND MONTHLY PAYMENTS RATHER THAN LUMP SUM.

[illegible]

AFRCA AND 2. HAVE CAPABILITY PROVIDE IN GENERAL TERMS INFO REQUESTED PARA 3 D REF IF LEGEND AND SPECIFIC DATES SUPPLIED.

JK

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

DC/EE/G/B
AF/B&F
AF/5
SR/6/Support

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/EE

RELEASING OFFICER

AF/COPS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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Copy No.

201-233477

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 10 JAN 63 JM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT C/AF-3

ACTION: ~~C/EE 3~~ AF/5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

C/EE-3

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
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JAN 10 1423Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 47630

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

TO DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 5867

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

See AF/5 Soft file

RI COPY

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

201-233477

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 071 10 JAN 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3

INFO : C/EE 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2 6	5
3	6

JAN 10 1821Z 63

ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 47630 A FRAN 5867

TO INFO CITE

John

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY A. STEEL, EE, EXT. 6023 IN COORDINATION WITH SANDRA STEEL, AF, EXT. 5032.

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

201-233477

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 10 JAN 63 JM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JAN 10 1423Z 63

ROUTINE

IN 47630

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-43

TO DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 5867

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

PLS REPLY EGOA-18888.

END OF MESSAGE

John ?

DECLASSIFIED
per CSH 43-43

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

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S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 January 1963

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject's papers for employment with the Bundeswehrsprachdienst are still being processed. In the meantime Subject continues to occupy HARVARD housing.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject's housing problem remains unchanged. There is no indication when the problem will be solved.
DYMARGIN-3	REINBOLD	Subject's political recognition and Reiseausweis are expected early in February. At that time the case will be closed.
* WIROGUE	DARONNAT	HARVARD will begin making arrangements for Subject's South American immigration processing.
IDENTITY-264	DARONNAT	HARVARD expects Subject's visa to be issued in March.
IDENTITY-266	REINBOLD	Subject will remain in HARVARD housing until his father, CANDARE-3, locates housing of his own.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Profession: Electrical engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 15 January 1963 From: CABEZONE Age: 34 Nationality: Czech Resettlement Aims: United States Immigration Evac. Code: B Subject will be processed for immigration to the United States under PL-414.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
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downgrading and declassification

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

	ROUTING		
		4	
		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GENEVA

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, WH 3, C/FE 6, RF 2

per CSN 43-43

S E C R E T 091615Z

FRAN INFO DIR BERN CITE GNVA 5574 (MIDDAUGH ACTING) 11 9 Aug 63 IN 96722

INK WIROGUE ~~RYBAT~~

Wirogue Soft

REF EGOA 19782

1. REGRET DELAY RESPONDING REF. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU STILL INTERESTED CONVERSATION WITH INSTRUMENT 17. LATTER SLATED LEAVE GNVA NEAR FUTURE FOR PCS ICEM HONGKONG.

2. INDEX 201-116033.

S E C R E T

201-233477

per CSN 43-43

GROUP 1
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14-00000

WIROGUE

Soft file

SECRET

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 31 July 1963

I. DEFECTOR CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-102	Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under PL-110 is continuing and it is expected that he will depart in the near future.
DS-105*	Subject immigrated to CANADA 8 July 1963 on ICEM ship MS ARCADIA. Case closed.
DS-108	Subject continues to study English while his processing for immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act is completed. He will give up his job in Ruesselsheim early next month and return to Frankfurt.
DS-109	Subject's processing for immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act has been deferred until December 1963. Due to a change in the right lung, discovered while comparing recent and earlier x-rays, the U.S.P.H.S. has requested the deferment until sputum tests and future x-rays indicate the condition stabilized or eliminated.
DS-129	Arrangements are being made through ODIBEX for Subject to receive FEDREP political recognition. CAMANTILLA will then assist in finding a job and housing on the local economy. In the meantime Subject is taking German language lessons.
IDEN-271	Subject's life story has been prepared with appropriate changes regarding his defection in Ireland. The story will be presented to FEDREP authorities for political recognition and Subject will be found work and housing on the local economy.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

NONE

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

201-233477

SECRET

C. Former Defector Resettlement Cases (or Cases Still in Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period:

DS-964	HARVARD has learned through CAMANTILLA that Subject and wife have returned to the U.S. where both have found employment and are now apartment hunting.
DS-984	At Subject's request HARVARD made arrangements to obtain a duplicate of the deregistration form covering Subject's move from Frankfurt to Neuss in July 1962.
DS-999	Subject and family are being assisted in obtaining West German citizenship.
DS-127	Subject's Communist Party membership was discussed informally but at some length with the local ODURGE chief. Since the latter believed that Subject's membership would, according to the strict interpretation of the law, be ruled voluntary, processing for immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 110 has been requested.

* Resettled during the reporting period. Subject will not appear on next month's or subsequent HARVARD reports unless and until some new unforeseen aspect of the case arises requiring additional HARVARD action. In this event the case will be listed and the new action described under Category I C.

II. AGENT CASES:

Case Name	Action Taken
A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:	
CAHAVOC-1	Subject has begun to look for an apartment on the local economy. In the meantime he will continue to occupy HARVARD housing.
WIROGUE	Subject's legend is being rewritten and when finished will provide the basis for a more plausible political recognition story. HARVARD hopes that with the substitution of the new story for the old, positive steps can be taken for Subject's resettlement.
IDEN-264	The morale problem created by the slow moving quota under which Subject is registered for U.S. immigration has required HARVARD to register her for immigration under the Parolee Act. It is expected that Subject will receive her visa in August or September but the Parolee Act will be used in the event the quota continues to remain unchanged.

IDEN-272	HARVARD has been informed that Subject, under no condition, should be allowed to return to Austria. ODIBEX is exploring additional possibilities for Subject to stay and work in the FEDREP without restrictions.
IDEN-274	Subject has been enrolled in a 3 month photography school located in Hamburg. It commences in early September and is designed to prepare students for taking the examination for the masters certificate in photography, a must for someone working in this field in the FEDREP. In the interim, Subject is studying photography on his own, utilizing borrowed MKTOPAZ equipment.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

NONE

C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During Reporting Period:

TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDEN-238, 242, and 244	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of IDEN-238 a monthly subsistance payment of DM 150. The family has been on vacation during the last three weeks.
IDEN-247	Subject contacted HARVARD for the second time in recent weeks. She was visited and the new information passed on to BOB as before (See EGOA-20258, 22 July 1963).
IDEN-267	At Subject's request HARVARD arranged to obtain a duplicate of the deregistration form covering Subject's move from Frankfurt to Neuss in August 1962.

HARVARD

SUMMARY OF RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

1 - 31 May 1963

I. DRC CASES:

A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-102	A firm offer of employment with ODIBEX is anticipated. Subject will then be processed for immigration to the U.S. under PL-110.
DS-108	Subject has a room and temporary employment in Rüsselsheim. He continues to study English while awaiting immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act. He was interviewed on 24 May by an Immigration and Naturalization Service Officer and will presumably receive a visa upon completion of the INS checks.
DS-109	Subject has a room and temporary employment in Rüsselsheim. He continues to study English while awaiting immigration to the U.S. under the Parolee Act. He was interviewed on 24 May by an Immigration and Naturalization Service Officer and will presumably receive a visa upon completion of the INS checks.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-120	Profession: Aircraft Mechanic and Pilot Rec'd by HARVARD: 31 May 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Bulgarian Age: 23

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

201-233477

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-120 (cont)	No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Arthur A. LEFALL HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy While Subject aspires to be a U.S. military jet pilot, this is -- from many angles -- unrealistic. It is believed that Subject may, in time, be able to obtain an aircraft mechanic's job in West Germany and possibly a commercial pilot's license. This will probably have to be preceded by work as an automobile mechanic while learning the German language.
IDEN-271*	Profession: Mathematician Rec'd by HARVARD: 7 May 1963 From: CABEZONE Nationality: Czech Age: 40 No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy Subject will be processed for political recognition and appropriate FEDREP documentation. He has been made USEP eligible and through CAMANTILLA will be helped to find work and housing on the local economy.

C. Former Cases (or Cases Still in DRC Stage II) Requiring HARVARD Action During the Reporting Period.

DS-782	HARVARD, at the request of FOB, contacted AMCONGEN Frankfurt to determine the status of Subject's visa application. It was learned that the case can not be written up until necessary checks are completed. It would appear that the case will not be submitted to Washington for at least three weeks.

Case Name	Action Taken
DS-999	Subject and family were forwarded application forms for filling out and return in connection with their obtaining West German citizenship. Subject's new address was pouched BOB in response to the latter's request.
DS-105	Subject visited the Canadian Consulate in Cologne on 30 May to initiate arrangements for his immigration. HARVARD had briefed him on this trip beforehand in accordance with the information contained in OTTA 0710. He was treated extremely well and all went very smoothly. It appears that he will be able to immigrate shortly after completion of his Stage II debriefing.
IDEN-265	At the request of Subject, HARVARD returned several of his original documents providing proof of schooling.
IDEN-273*	While Subject's limited handling by CABEZONE is being completed, HARVARD has initiated the procurement of the necessary West German documentation to allow him to remain and work in West Germany. He will be turned over to CAMANTILLA who will assist him in obtaining employment.

II AGENT CASES:

Case Name	Action Taken
A. On Hand at Beginning of Reporting Period:	
CAHAVOC-1	Subject began work on 15 May at DM 714 monthly. He will not receive permanent assignment and housing allowance until the end of his probationary period. It is possible, therefore, that he will remain in HARVARD housing until that time.

Case Name	Action Taken
WIROGUE	HARVARD with the assistance of Stage I is attempting to work up a suitable legend for use in immigration to South America consistent with Subject's political recognition interview.
IDEN-264	Subject has found work on the local economy at DM 500 monthly. She will continue to stay in HARVARD housing until her visa is issued and immigration can take place.

B. Received During Reporting Period:

IDEN-272*	Profession: Tool Designer Rec'd by HARVARD: 21 May 1963 From: Vienna Station Nationality: Hungarian Age: 27 No. of Deps: 0 Resettlement Officer: Orme K. DARONNAT HARVARD Resettlement Aims: German Economy Subject will be processed for Aufenthaltserlaubnis and registered. He will be picked up as a refugee case by CAMANTILLA and helped to find work and housing on the local economy.

C. Former Agent Resettlement Cases Requiring HARVARD Action During The Reporting Period:

AEPOLE-25	HARVARD continues to assist Subject in his efforts to establish, for West German income tax purposes, that he has helped contribute to the support of his ex-wife living in the USSR.
DIO-14	A request was received from the State of Maryland asking for information on Subject, who immigrated to the U.S. under PL-110 in January 1956. Since all of Subject's records were transferred with him, the inquiry was referred to Headquarters in EGOA-19903, 28 May 1963.

Case Name	Action Taken
DMMARGIN-3	In response to a query from BOB, HARVARD provided clarification on the purpose and handling of Subject's Einweisungverfuegung.
TULANCE-1	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local post box and is cabling Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements the gist of each letter received.
IDENTITY-238, 241 and 242	HARVARD maintains periodic contact with this family and continues to pay the widow of Identity-238 a monthly subsistence payment of DM 150.
IDENTITY-270	Additional West German documentation (Abmeldebestaetigung, Versicherungskarte and Lohnsteuerkarte) were obtained during the month and forwarded to BOB. Subject is currently being processed for West German recognition.

* See Separate Cover Attachment for true name.

III. MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITY:

A. Effective 10 May 1963, Arthur A. LIFALL, Chief, HARVARD, became the Station Case Officer for Project CAMANTILLA (See EGOA-19737).

B. A request for a provisional and full covert security approval on the local ODURGE officer who does the actual interviewing of HARVARD's candidates for immigration has been initiated. CSA has already been obtained on the local ODURGE chief. The additional clearance should allow us to develop an even better working relationship with these officers than has existed heretofore. When received, it is planned to brief both individuals in greater detail on CABEZONE/HARVARD operations.

Under Separate Cover Attachment to EGOT-19339, dated 3 June 1963

IDENTITY 271	JANOS, Ludvik (FRAN-8548, 2 May 1963)
IDENTITY 272	SOS, Zsigmund (FROB-4732, 30 April 1963)
IDENTITY 273	RADISAVLJEVIC, Radisav (FRAN-9305, 31 May 1963)

14-00000

DISPATCH

TO: COS, Geneva INFO: Chief, EE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH	EGGA 19702 EGGA-19702
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201- 323-120-012/01
FROM: Chief of Station, Germany	DATE 24 April 1963 24apr63
SUBJECT: WIROGUE/Resettlement	(CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: See Para 10	
REFERENCES: DIR 24971, dated 15 March 1963	

1. In May 1962 HARVARD took over the task of resettling WIROGUE, a former REDSOX agent candidate and later African Division agent. Per WIROGUE's request and with Headquarters concurrence, HARVARD agreed to help subject in immigrating to South America.

2. Subject was relieved of his documents (Austrian passport in alias and not backstopped) and the first steps were taken to prepare for eventual immigration. It was decided that subject would require documentation which would stand up under the investigation of immigration authorities. Therefore, he was given a new name and with the help of [illegible] and ODIBEX received a Reiseausweis and political recognition from the West German Government. The latter was granted on the basis of a fabricated story in which subject purports to be a defector from the Georgian SSR who escaped while with a tourist group in East Berlin.

3. With documentation in order, subject was sent to the local Columbian Consulate to apply for permission to immigrate, as HARVARD had hopes that subject would be able to process on his own with a minimum of red tape by bypassing refugee organization channels and by having letters of recommendation and letters of solvency. This was not the case, and the Columbian Consulate informed subject he could immigrate only by processing through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

4. Due to the nature of this case and certain inherent problems, e.g., subject has a criminal record in France and was a long-time resident there, speaks less than fluent Georgian, speaks no Russian even though his story for political recognition indicates he was a lieutenant in the Soviet Army, has no real profession although he is self-taught in the electro-mechanical field and is confident he can pass a job test as master mechanic, etc, it was imperative that the specific details of ICEM processing be learned in order to find out and be prepared for the problems which would certainly arise if he immigrates through ICEM.

5. HARVARD discussed the basic outline of the problem with the Chief, Refugee Migration Section, American Consulate General, Munich and Chief, CAMANTILLA, and established that subject's processing through ICEM would include a security investigation and detailed interviews and job testing, since ICEM is determined that only "high level" types will immigrate through them to South America. HARVARD proposes to continue with the immigration plans and, although Chief RMS and Chief, CAMANTILLA have been most helpful and have been able to learn ICEM procedures taken on refugee migration applicants, they have been forced to refrain from appearing too inquisitive.

201-233477

[illegible] HARVARD [illegible] that INSTRUMENT 17 as former special assistant to the director of ICEM might be able to help with advice regarding the type of investigation which will be run on subject and possibly be in a position to stop the investigation, especially if it included a check with INTERPOL.

7. HARVARD has been able to establish that subject is not on record with INTERPOL except possibly in France and hopes to have this checked out through CARAVEL within the next month.

8. HARVARD had also hoped that INSTRUMENT 17 might have details of the ICEM mechanism which would be desirable to know for a case of this type, especially since a slip-up might cause embarrassment for KUBARK, ODYOKE and the Federal Republic. With these inside details we would be in a better position to prepare subject for his interview, or, if necessary, to drop the immigration plans. We feel it extremely important to know how many interviews subject will undergo, how searching these interviews will be, the probability that subject will be interviewed in Russian or in Georgian (subject speaks German and fairly good English), what preparations can be made to insure that the processing runs as smoothly as possible, how intensive is the job testing, etc.

9. HARVARD had felt that Charles T. HORDWIN's personal friendship with INSTRUMENT 17 might result in much more additional information regarding the above than would be the case with a meeting between Orme K. DARONHAY and INSTRUMENT 17 alone. Hence CARKZONA cable 7283 to Geneva.

10. It appears HORDWIN's presence is no longer required and therefore it is requested that, if INSTRUMENT 17 is in a position to supply the kind of "inside ICEM" information HARVARD needs, an appointment be made with INSTRUMENT 17 for Orme K. DARONHAY to discuss this problem with him, unless Geneva feels it is in a position to do so on HARVARD's behalf.

ORME K. DARONHAY

APPROVED.

ARNOLD J. LYACK

Distribution:
2 - COS, Geneva
2 - Chief, EE
~~2~~ - Chief, AF
2 - Chief, WH

RYBAT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 034 19 MAR 63 7/10

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : BONN

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 20 1654Z 63
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 89733A BONN 4350

TO ~~[illegible]~~ INFO file Wirogue w/ file CITE

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY BILL BRENDLE EE IN COORDINATION WITH JOHN KELLY AF EXT 5457.

201-233477

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 18 MAR 63 1101/21

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: AF 7

INFO : EE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1 5

2

3

4

5

6

MAR 20 1654Z 63
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 88799A FRAN 7407

TO INFO CITE

file Wirogue soft file

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM EE TO AF BY BILL BRENDLE EE IN COORDINATION WITH JOHN KELLY AF EXT 5457

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

John

SECRET 131611Z

BONN INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7407

HARVARD LCIMPROVE WIROGUE

file dual file

REF FRAN 6489 (IN 62960)*

18 MAR 1963 IN88799

1. FOR RESETTLEMENT PURPOSES IT IMPORTANT HARVARD KNOW WHETHER WIROGUE LISTED INTERPOL. CAN BONN DISCREETLY MAKE THIS DETERMINATION?

2. NO FRAN TRACES UNDER NAMES DAVID TZITZICHVILI OR DAVID DE PANASKHET DPOB 20 DEC 1919 TIFLIS, USSR.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CAVATA BE ADVISED WIRAGE WILL PROBABLY BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE GERMANY.

201-233477

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

1

020/22 MAR 63 8/10

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET 0

ROUTING

1	5	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ATE : 1 FEB 63

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : FRANKFURT

CTION: EE 6

NFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, S/C 2

ADDED: AF 3 (ACTION)

FEB 1 1420Z 63 5

ROUTINE

PRITY BONN INFO DIR BRLN CITE FRAN 6399

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS VIROGUE

IN 60224

not file

REF EGNA 25283

1. SUBJ REF IS HARVARD AGENT DISPOSAL CASE VIROGUE REGISTERED CAMP KING WHERE HE PROCESSED 28 AUG 62 FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN ORDER LEGALIZE HIM FOR RESETTLEMENT.

2. CASE DISCUSSED WITH MR. JOHN WILLMS WHO WILL VISIT BONN 5 FEB AND WILL TAKE MATTER UP DIRECTLY WITH CHIEF, CAVATA TELLING HIM THIS AIS CASE AND ASK HIM NOT PURSUE.

3. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY IF YOU DESIRE WILLMS CHECK IN WITH YOU PRIOR HIS VISIT CAVATA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	2 FEB 63
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	BONN
ACTION:	EE 6
INFO :	CI, CI/OPS, FI, CDC, TSD 5, AF 4, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	ACJ m	5	
3		6	

FEB 2 1419Z 63

ROUTINE

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR BRLN CITE BONN 4139

HARVARD LCIMPROVE CAVATA TECHS *IROGUE

IN 50901

file Desk

REF FRAN 6399 (IN 60224)

1. SINCE THIS IS APPARENTLY A KUBARK CASE AND ORIGINAL QUERY CAME FROM CAVATA TO KUBARK ELEMENT OCA, FAIL UNDERSTAND NEED FOR TRANSMITTING REPLY TO CAVATA VIA 513TH REP. ALSO DO NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY CONTACT CAVATA CHIEF IN RESPONSE ROUTINE WORKING LEVEL CAVATA QUERY. THIS MAY BE ATTEMPT ON WILLMS PART TO FIND EXCUSE VISIT CAVATA CHIEF.

2. IF THIS ROUTINE CABEZONE CASE FEEL STAGE I DEBRIEFING AND ASSESSMENT WHICH NORMALLY PASSED CAVATA WILL SATISFY LATTER'S NEEDS. ON OTHER HAND IF KUBARK HAS CONTINUING OPERATIONAL INTEREST AS PARAGRAPH 2 IMPLIES WE CAN INFORM CAVATA ACCORDINGLY THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *FRAN ASKED BONN ADVISE IF DESIRES WILLMS CHECK IN WITH BONN PRIOR VISIT CAVATA.

201-233477

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 December 1962

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject's papers for employment with the Bundeswehrsprachdienst are still being processed. In the meantime Subject continues to occupy HARVARD housing.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject is still trying to line up his own housing in the Frankfurt area. In the meantime he, his wife and son are living in a HARVARD apartment.
DMMARGIN-3	REINBOLD	Profession: Barber Rec'd by HARVARD: 27 December 1962 From: BOB Age: 42 Nationality: Yugoslav Resettlement Aims: Local economy Evac. Code: B Subject was processed for his West German documentation and recognition as a bona fide political refugee. He received his Fremdenpass on 27 December 1962 and will get his recognition and Reiseausweis sometime in January 1963. At that time the case will be closed.
WIROGUE	DARONNAT	HARVARD is awaiting Headquarter's advice regarding the implementation of Subject's S.A. immigration.
IDENTITY-264	DARONNAT	AMCONGEN Frankfurt has advised HARVARD that Subject's visa should be issued in late February or early March.
IDENTITY-266	REINBOLD	Subject, the son of CANDARE-3 is helping his parents find housing in the Frankfurt area. He is still gainfully employed.

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-233477

IDENTITY-268	REINBOLD	Subject's refugee processing has been delayed due to the fact he is under 21 years of age and thus necessitates special consideration and treatment. It is expected, however, that he will have his Notaufnahmeverfahren sometime in January 1963.
DS-987	REINBOLD	It is still hoped that Subject's parole processing will be completed in time to enable him and his wife to make the 31 January 1963 ICEM charter flight.
DS-990	REINBOLD	Subject seems to be getting along well on his job as a technical assistant with a construction company. Through CAMANTILLA he is studying German and plans are being made to enroll him in a special school which will enable him to receive his diploma as a geodetic engineer. In the meantime, Headquarters will be queried Re ops interest in Subject to determine whether he should remain on present job or consider employment with RFE or VOA.

SUPPORT CASES

TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	HARVARD continues to maintain contact with Subject through our local postbox. Headquarters and other appropriate KUBARK elements are being kept advised of Subject's status Re: political asylum, etc.
IDENTITY-238, 241, 242	REINBOLD	Steps are being taken to work out the method of payment to the family for the DM 42,000 approved by Headquarters for housing.

DS-856	DARONNAT	Subject is seen from time to time for purposes of identifying pictures of people of Ops interest.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Subject's processing for immigration to the United States under PL-414 is continuing.
DS-998	DARONNAT	Subject's processing for immigration to the United States under PL-414 is continuing. His papers will not be submitted to AMCONGEN until he is re-interviewed by KUBARK staff psychiatrist in January 1963.

RESETTLEMENTS AND DISPOSALS

TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	Subject has been documented and moved to Switzerland where he has requested political asylum. Subject will be handled as a support case until he receives asylum or is permanently resettled.
IDENTITY-269	REINBOLD	Subject's federal refugee processing was completed on 18 December 1962 when he received his Notaufnahmeverfahren. No difficulty is expected with his C Schein processing. Case considered closed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HARVARD

MONTHLY RESETTLEMENT SUMMARY

1 - 31 October 1962

AGENTS AND IDENTITIES	CASE OFFICER	STATUS
CAHAVOC-1	DARONNAT	Subject has registered with the police and is busily engaged in seeking employment.
CANDARE-3	REINBOLD	Subject flew to Berlin on 18 October to close out his personal matters and arrange for his move to Frankfurt.
TULANCE-1	DARONNAT	In view of OLDMOOR's inability to expend time on TULANCE's resettlement, HARVARD will go ahead, after receiving permission and guidance from Headquarters, with plans to attempt to resettle Subject per DIR 33746.
WIROGUE	DARONNAT	Subject will continue to receive subsistence and housing while the details of his S.A. immigration are worked out.
IDENTITY 264	DARONNAT	Subject has submitted new x-rays to the Public Health Service and must await final decision from Paris. In the meantime, Subject is convalescing from a recent appendicitis operation.
IDENTITY 266	REINBOLD	Subject flew to Berlin with his father, CANDARE 3. He continues to be gainfully employed.
IDENTITY 268	REINBOLD	Profession: Mechanic Rec'd by HARVARD: 1 October 1962 From: BOB Age: 19 Nationality: German HARVARD Resettlement Aims: Local economy Evac. Code: B Subject was assisted in filling out his application form for his Giessen processing and advised on how to procede Re obtaining his West German personal documentation and employment. Once his Giessen processing is completed the case will be closed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

201-233477

DS-989	REINBOLD	Profession: Machine construction engineer Rec'd by HARVARD: 4 October 1962 From: CAPEZONE Age: 34 Nationality: Polish Religion: Roman Catholic HARVARD Resettlement Aims: United States See Resettlements and Disposals.
DS-990	REINBOLD	On 1 November 1962 Subject will be turned over to CAMANTILLA which has made him USEP eligible and arranged to have him study German full time for one month. Prior to the end of November 1962, it is hoped that Subject will be employed by TPFEELING which has expressed an interest in him, or employed on the local economy with a German engineering firm.

SUPPORT CASES

IDENTITY 238, 241, 242	REINBOLD	An all out effort is being made to solve the family's housing problem discussed by HOFSOOS, REINBOLD and the BEVISIONs on 4 October 1962. Steps will also be taken to assist IDENTITY 241 in finding suitable employment.
DS-856	DARONNAT	Subject is seen from time to time for purposes of identifying people of Ops interest.
DS-987	REINBOLD	Word was recently received from Headquarters indicating that Subject and his family's immigration under PL 86-648 can soon be initiated.
DS-992	REINBOLD	It has been decided that due to a previous agreement, KUBARK, under no circumstances, will intervene on behalf of Subject in his immigration.
DS-997	DARONNAT	Although Subject is still in Stage II, processing for immigration to the United States under PL 414 has begun.
DS-998	DARONNAT	Although Subject is still in Stage II, processing for immigration to the United States under PL 414 has begun.

RESETTLEMENTS AND DISPOSALS

DS-974	DARONNAT	Subject and family immigrated to the United States on 2 October 1962 under PL 414. Case closed.
DS-982	DARONNAT	Subject obtained housing and employment on the local economy. Case closed.
DS-989	REINBOLD	Subject immigrated under PL 86-648 on 30 October 1962 via ICEM Flight MISAB 121193. PAIRC, as sponsor, will handle his resettlement. Case closed.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : N. Roberts
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 August 1962 1729

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
2	CEP	5	
3	Chr	6	

TO : FRANKFURT INFO: LEOPOLDVILLE (BY POUCH)

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : ~~C/AF 3~~

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/WH 5, S/C 2

1 copy

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

~~OUT 65370~~

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ~~(BY POUCH)~~ CITE DIR 29622 29622

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: DIR 27679

WISH DRAW WIROGUE ATTENTION TO REPORT ARGENTINA ACCEPTING IMMIGRANTS WITHOUT QUOTA RESTRICTIONS. SEEKING FARM AND SKILLED WORKERS, REFUSING WHITE COLLAR. GOOD LIVING CAN BE MADE IN PROVINCES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *OUT 62136, RE RESETTLING WIROGUE.

201-233477

C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/I/EPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/AF/5
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

ORIG : N. Roberts
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032
DATE : 13 August 1962 1729

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : FRANKFURT INFO: LEOPOLDVILLE (BY POUCH)

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/EE 3, C/WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
☐
RI file this copy as indicated. ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

[illegible] 15z

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 65370

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ~~(BY POUCH)~~ CITE DIR 29622 2[illegible]

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: DIR 27679

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
RID/PI	
[illegible]	

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG. N. ROBERTS
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5457
DATE : 3 AUGUST 1962

1652
1653

VO

ROUTING
1
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3 AUG 62 21 34z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF 3

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/~~LSD 2,~~ C/EE 3, [redacted] S/C 2 / 10

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP ([redacted]) CITE DIR 27679

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

RB
NR.

REF: A. FRAN 1854 (IN 33838)

B. DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

1. PER REF B, KURIOT STRONGLY URGES BACKSTOPPED FREMDENPASS BEST LONG RUN VEHICLE RESETTLE AND LEGALIZE WIROGUE (W). WITH FREMDENPASS W COULD EVENTUALLY BECOME CITIZEN OF SELECTED COUNTRY. HQS FEELS W SHOULD OBTAIN OWN RESIDENCE VISA USING FREMDENPASS OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION. SUGGEST COLOMBIA OR BRAZIL BEST AREAS BUT QUESTION HINGES ON WHERE W CAN GET SELF ACCEPTED. KUBARK ABILITY AID LEGALIZATION LIMITED AND BEST HAVE LEGALIZATION BEGIN NOW BACKSTOPPED TO WITHSTAND LATER CHECKS FROM COUNTRY OF CHOICE.

2. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRIES MENTIONED REF A PLUS BRAZIL REQUIRE FOUR TO FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCY. TO ENTER AND REMAIN RESIDENCE VISA REQUIRED WHICH MUST BE RENEWED PERIODICALLY. ALL COUNTRIES QUERIED SAID NEED APPLICATION AT CONSULATE, EXPLANATION OF FINANCIAL MEANS, MANNER INTENDED TO MAKE LIVING, AND POLICE CERTIFICATE FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

3. HQS SUGGESTS COUNTRIES OF W INTEREST MIGHT BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO AGRICULTURAL AMBITIONS RATHER THAN BUSINESS OR INDUSTRIAL PURSUITS. W ONCE MENTIONED HE INTERESTED OPENING CHICKEN FARM IN CONGO. SINCE W MUST SHOW PLAN FOR EARNING LIVING SUGGEST SIMILAR LINE WITH SAMERICAN COUNTRY APPROACHED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

5-62

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE TWO

31 [illegible] 21 34z

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 62136

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 27679

FOR RESIDENCE VISA FOR MOST SYMPATHETIC HEARING.

4. SHOULD BE STRESSED FROM BEGINNING THAT ONLY KUBARK CONTACT AFTER W SUCCESSFULLY RESETTLED WILL BE LETTER DROP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *QUERIED SUBJ RE PREFERENCE S AMERICAN COUNTRY AND STATED THAT WILL GO ANYWHERE.

C/EE

~~[illegible]~~

AF/COP/

WH/FI/CPS

ES/G

E.N. KORN-PATTERSON
CAF/5

TSD COORDINATED IN DRAFT BY Jos. BORNIGER

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DUMMY CABLE FORM

DATE ____________

[✓ OUT] IN 62136

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

[✓ DIR] STA 27679

TO FRAN

INFO LEOP

DISTRIBUTION

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4.
5.
6.

ACTION ____________

CLASSIFICATION: S TS KAPOK [✓ RYBAT] LAURICLE

REF ____________

SUBJECT ____________

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

SECRET

FORM NO. 586a REPLACES FORM 59-163A
1 APR 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(44)

tg
~~AHR~~
FILE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: WIROGUE RESETTLEMENT S AMERICA

DATE: 31 July 1962

FROM: Norm Roberts

I contacted Mrs. Geery, WH/FI Ops, x 3289, Rm 3D4404, for initial discussion concerning resettlement of WIROGUE in some South American country. She in turn brought Mr. Paul Paxton, D/C WH/FI/OPS, into the discussion. They agreed that AF was approaching the correct channel but were not inclined to thank us for our gift.

IN 33838 suggested WIROGUE preferred Venezuela, Chile or Columbia for resettlement. WH stated Chile is out, principally because for a foreigner to establish a legitimate business in face of government regulations is very difficult if not impossible. The same applies but to a lesser extent with Venezuela which is also a more troubled area. Mrs. Geery and Mr. Paxton both expressed the fear that WIROGUE might only add to Venezuela's troubles.

x 3613
Rm 3D0001

The next step in this problem is to talk to Mr. Marlowe Duffin, D/C BR/I (Columbia and Venezuela) in WH and obtain his reaction. Mrs. Geery wishes to be included in this talk. Brazil was mentioned as the most likely resettlement area but the areas mentioned would be explored first. In any case, the concurrence of the COS involved would have to be obtained.

We all concurred that the less contact, no matter how indirect, had with WIROGUE the better for all concerned. Mr. Paxton suggested any payments made to WIROGUE might be done from Germany through an international bank thus alleviating the station of even this responsibility. It would also be one less clue to WIROGUE that our representatives might be in the area.

SECRET

201-235477

Mr. E. [illegible] F/[illegible]

SECRET

(7 [illegible])

2. Meeting 1400, Norm Roberts, Mrs. Geery and Marlowe Duffin.

Mr. Duffin's viewpoint was that he could not prevent AF sending WIROGUE to any of the countries, but did feel some other division besides WH should assume the responsibility in case of a flap. He pointed out that WH stations were small enough so it would not be difficult for a fairly clever individual to identify the COS and probably the case officers in a station. In this case, and should WIROGUE attempt to apply pressure through such knowledge, Mr. Duffin wished someone besides a WH field officer to "take WIROGUE by the scruff of the neck and tell him to move on."

I insisted, however, that no matter how heavy the pressure became all any field officer could do was to make a denial, plausible or otherwise. Mrs. Geery suggested that perhaps SR, since they had originally recruited WIROGUE, should assume such responsibility. (She is hardly realistic but anything is possible.)

A second suggestion made by Mr. Duffin is worth further consideration. He stated that WH has had continual difficulty in establishing contract agents in business throughout SA. However, these countries tended to be much more receptive to people planning agricultural pursuits and he felt resettlement and possibility for livlihood would be much greater should WIROGUE approach the country or countries of his choice with some agricultural proposition. I remember WIROGUE mentioned that he had investigated the possibility of chicken farming in the Congo. Such an approach in SA might (a) make him more acceptable as an immigrant to that country and (b) provide a long term basis to make him self-supporting.

I did promise to keep Mr. Duffin and Mrs. Geery informed of any further actions taken concerning WIROGUE which would affect their area. It was also at least strongly implied that either Columbia or Brazil might be the best areas, though the final choice essentially rests on what country WIROGUE can enter.

SECRET

14-00000

465

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 24 JUL 62 DJM

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/EE 3, S/C 2**

1 copy

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1	4
2 Copy	5
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JUL 24 1840Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 33838

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 1854.

RE DIR 24958 (out 57642)***

R.B. ans by N.R 8/3/62

SUBJECT QUERIED RE PREFERENCE SAMERICAN COUNTRY AND STATED THAT THOUGH WILL GO ANYWHERE WE ABLE FACILITATE LEGALIZATION INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP HE PREFERS VENEZUELA CHILE OR COLOMBIA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR ZIBET USED.

**DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

***FOR WIROGUE RESETTLEMENT.

WIROGUE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1562

ORIG : ROBERT BOUCHARD
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 5032 1563
DATE : 19 July 1962

ROUTING
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23 JUL 62 19 39z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/AF 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, S/C 2 , C/EE 3 / copy

[illegible] per CSN 43-43

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 57642
~~OUT 57642~~

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 24964 24964

~~RYBAT~~ HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

K.B.

REF: A. FRAN 1467 (IN 23745)

B. LEOP 4255 (IN 24232)

1. ATTEMPTING DETERMINE SAMERICAN COUNTRY MOST SUITABLE FOR SUBJECT RELOCATION BUT DIFFICULT WITHOUT HAVING SOME IDEA WIROGUE PREFERENCE.

2. AGREE IN PRINCIPLE PAY TRAVEL COST TO RESETTLEMENT AREA. PREFER NOT GIVE LUMP SUM FOR INTERIM EXPENSES PER PARA 3C REF A AND CONCUR PARA 2 REF B. ANY CASE FINAL DECISION DEPENDS ON AREA SELECTED. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EE/C
RELEASING OFFICER

AF/5 Lgardner
~~EE/C/OPS~~
TBB (Boerniger-phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Paige, Jr.
AF/COPS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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per CSN 43-43

201-233477

Copy No. 1

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : ROBERT BOUCHARD
UNIT : AF/5
EXT : 6032 1563
DATE : 19 July 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

23 JUL 62 19 39 z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/AF 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, S/C 2, C/EE 3

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 57642

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 24964

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF: A. FRAN 1467 (IN 23745)

B. LEOP 4258 (IN 24232)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/	
RID/	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201 233477

FORM 4-56 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

297

DATE : 6 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: C/FE 2 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
S	4
2	5
3	6

JUL 6 1501Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 24232

~~R.B.~~
~~D.M.~~

DIR INFO FRAN CITE LEOP ~~4255~~

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

REF FRAN 1467 (IN 23745) **

1. URGE WIROGUE DOCUMENTATION BE PICKED UP AND HELD AND THAT STEPS BE TAKEN PREVENT HIM RETURNING CONGO PER PARA 2 REF.

2. VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE SUGGEST WIROGUE NOT BE GIVEN LUMP SUM BUT THAT FUNDS BE USED AS CARROT AND DOLED OUT ONCE HE REACHES RESETTLEMENT AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.

**WIROGUE STATED GERMAN FIRM WHICH KNOWS HIM AS REINER IS INTERESTED IN SENDING HIM TO CONGO AS BUSINESS REP.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

201-233477

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

485

DATE : 5 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 S
2 CCP
3
4
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6

JUL 5 2036Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23745

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

one copy

R.B.

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 1467

RYBAT HARVARD TECHS WIROGUE

1. SUBJ WITHOUT FUNDS AND DISCOURAGED BY INABILITY SELL INVENTION AND REALIZATION NO LONGER NEEDED BY ODYOKE. IS THUS READY AND ANXIOUS LEAVE GERM SOONEST AND GO ANYWHERE WE ABLE ASSIST HIM. EVEN WILLING FOREGO RETURN TO CONGO AND GIVE UP ALL DOCUMENTATION IN NAME REINER.

2. SUBJ STATED GERM FIRM WHICH KNOWS HIM AS REINER IS INTERESTED IN SENDING HIM CONGO AS BUSINESS REP. THOUGH RATHER GO WHERE WE DECIDE HE INDICATED ANY UNDUE DELAY OUR PART MAY FORCE HIM TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER GERM OFFER.

3. DESIRE HQS ADVICE RE:

A. FRAN 1188. (IN 15516) ?

B. PERMISSION PAY SUBJ'S TRAVEL COSTS TO RESETTLEMENT AREA. I think we or Harvard will have to bear

C. WHETHER HE SHOULD RECEIVE LUMP SUM OF MONEY TO HOLD HIM OVER UNTIL SELF SUFFICIENT OR WHETHER HE WILL GET HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL HELP IN RESETTLEMENT AREA. depending, not probably

depending upon attitude of people where he goes, I would say probably not. Set up two way contact, letter drops in Germany to announce whereabouts

END OF MESSAGE

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3-1-25

1858

BOB:

Action for this cable (FRAN 1467) assumed by this branch. Mr. Phelps on German desk said the only restriction on action at the moment is how much money we, AF/5, are willing to put out.

Next, called Mr. Kallander, TSD, ext 3391. I agreed to contact him again if and when we got down to facts as to just what documentation papers we would require. However, he pointed out that it would first be necessary for us to clear such action, ie., putting this character into a country, with the area desk involved. Furthermore, he indicated that this may not be too easy a task given WIROGUE's background, etc. Once we get clearance from an area desk, he says we should sit down with the area desk, TSD, and AF/5 to determine the best documentation and method of resettlement. OK? Joe Boeninger X-3137
Clay Callender X-3391

201-233477

520

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 22 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/AF 3

INFO : C/TSD 2, S/C 2

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING			
1	5	4	
2	Copy	5	
3	Chron	6	

JUN 29 1646Z 62
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

FRAN 1188 IN 15816 A

TO INFO CITE

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

Gardner RB

C/S COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM TSD TO AF BY KALLANDER, TSD, EXT 3391 IN COORDINATION WITH MR. KORN-PATTERSON, AF, EXT 5571.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. 1

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

232
DATE : 22 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/TSD 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	S	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 22 1158Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 15816

DIR INFO [illegible] CITE FRAN 1155

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

~~R.B.~~
D. M.

REF A. DIR 17426 (OUT 94704)
B. DIR 15543 (OUT 91968)
C. FRAN 8805 (IN 46445)

1. RE REF A: HARVARD HAS INFO ON SOUTH AMERICAN CIT REQUIREMENTS DATED AUG 59. SUBJ HAS NO PREFERENCE S/AMERICAN COUNTRY BUT DESIRES GO ONLY WHERE WE ABLE FACILITATE LEGALIZATION INCLUDING CITIZENSHIP.

2. ISSUANCE SERIES A AUSTRIAN PASSPORT, WITH WHICH SUBJ SHOULD BE ABLE OBTAIN OWN TOURIST VISA, WOULD ALLOW ENTRY INTO GIVEN SAMERICAN COUNTRY BUT SOME KUBARK CONTROL OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY TO PREVENT BACKCHECKING IF SUBJ INTENDS REMAIN. PLEASE ADVISE KUBARK CAPABILITIES PREVENT SAMERICAN OFFICIALS CHECKING AUTHENTICITY SUBJ BACKGROUND EITHER IN GERMANY WITH AUSTRIA CONSULATE OR DIRECTLY WITH AUSTRIAN GOVT.

3. WE AWARE SOME S AMERICAN COUNTRIES ISSUE PASSPORTS FOR NON CITIZENS. COULD KUBARK INTERCEDE TO OBTAIN SUCH NON CIT PASSPORT AFTER SUBJ HAS ENTERED GIVEN COUNTRY.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 15816 FRAN 1188

TO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**IF HARVARD DOES NOT HAVE INFO RE SOUTH AMERICA CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS KURIOT WILL PROVIDE IF FRAN REPORTS COUNTRIES OF INTEREST.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : Clayton V. Kallander:mlv
UNIT : TSD/IB/FS-4
EXT : 3391
DATE : 15 June 1962

1502

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 JUN 62 13 37z

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/TSD 2

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, S/C 2 one copy

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 94704
OUT 94704

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 17406 17406

RYBAT VIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

Don M.

REF DIR 15840 (OUT 91968)

IF HARVARD DOES NOT HAVE INFO RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS KURIOT WILL PROVIDE IF FRAN REPORTS COUNTRIES OF INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD COMMENT: Will reply re South American citizenship requirements by Telex.

C/EE/G/OPS Bill Phelps, by phone CVK

C/AF/OPS Paul Springer, by phone CVK

SIDNEY GOTTLIEB
A CHIEF, TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED
COORDINATING per CSN 43-43

C. J. Ryan
CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSD/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1732

ORIG : William W. Phelps
UNIT : EE/G/Ops
EXT : 7858
DATE : 8 June 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/EE 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 91968

TO FRAN INFO LEOP CITE DIR 15840

~~RYBAT~~ WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

REF FRAN 0805 (IN 46446)

1. CONCUR PARA 2.

2. RE NEW AUSTRIAN DOC, WILLING AGREE IF THIS BEST ~~XXX~~ SOLUTION, BUT REQUEST EXAMINE QUESTION WHETHER BACK-STOPPED FREMDENPASS WOULD NOT SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR EMIGRATION FROM FEDREP WHILE AVOIDING PROBLEMS PARA 1 REF. WILL REPLY RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS BY TELEX ~~WEEK~~ WEEK OF 11 JUNE.

AF is resp. for this

END OF MESSAGE

✓ AF/OPS (Mr. Springer phone)
✓ TSD (Mr. Boerniger phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/CCPS
RELEASING OFFICER

Wm Phelps
EE/G/Ops
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible]

1732

ORIG : William W. Phelps
UNIT : EE/G/Ops
EXT : 7858
DATE : 8 June 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	S	4	
2	Cir	5	
3		6	

TO : FRANKFURT LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

Z

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OCT 9 1968

TO FRAN INFO LEOP DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43 CITE DIR 15840

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

held for WIROGUE

REF FRAN 0805 (IN 46446)

1. CONCUR PARA 2.

2. RE NEW AUSTRIAN DOC, WILLING AGREE IF THIS BEST ~~XXX~~ SOLUTION, BUT REQUEST EXAMINE QUESTION WHETHER BACK-STOPPED FREMDENPASS WOULD NOT SERVE AS VEHICLE FOR EMIGRATION FROM FEDREP WHILE AVOIDING PROBLEMS PARA 1 REF. WILL REPLY RE SOUTH AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS BY TELEX ~~XXXX~~ WEEK OF 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/OPS (Mr. Springer phone)
TSD (Mr. Boerniger phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

EE/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

Wm Phelps
EE/G/Ops
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-233477

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

566

DATE : 5 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

Cue Springer Fri-AM (5571)
Bowringer TSD

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 5 2046Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46446 ✓

DECLASSIFIED PER CSN 43-43

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 0805

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

ANS. by WP 8 Jun 62

1. SUBJECT NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT W GERMAN DOCUMENTATION UNLESS POLITICAL RECOGNITION FOLLOWS. BELIEVE FABRICATION LIFE HISTORY IN ORDER OBTAIN RECOGNITION TOO RISKY IN THIS CASE SINCE SLIGHTEST FLAP COULD PLACE KUBARK IN EMBARRASSING POSITION VIS A VIS FEDREP AUTHORITIES AND ODIBEX LIAISON.

2. INTEND RETURN AUSTRIAN PASSPORT AND IDENTITY PAPERS AS TEMPORARY MEASURE PERMIT SUBJECT CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS FOR CONGOLESE DEFMIN AND RETURN CONGO IN ORDER FORMALLY ABROGATE CONTRACT WITH GOC. WILL INFORM SUBJECT NO KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE BUT WE WILLING REDOCUMENT HIM WITH AUSTRIAN OR OTHER PASSPORT IN NAME DAVID DE PANASKHET, WHICH HE CONSIDERS HIS TRUE NAME. HE WILL KNOW NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING HIS RETURN FRAN.

3. SUBJECT HAS STATED DESIRE RESETTLE IN SOUTH AMERICA. UNDERSTAND PASSPORT WOULD PROBABLY BE BACKCHECKED WITH COUNTRY OF ISSUE SHOULD SUBJECT DECIDE REQUEST PERMANENT RESIDENCY OR CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-233477

GUIDANCE RE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN VARIOUS SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND ADVISABILITY OF ISSUING NEW AUSTRIAN PASSPORT.

4. REQUEST REPLY PRIOR COB 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

566

DATE : 5 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION: C/EE 3

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, CDC, C/TSD 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

DECLASSIFIED
per CSN 43-43

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUN 5 2046Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46446

DIR INFO LEOP CITE FRAN 0805

RYBAT WIROGUE HARVARD TECHS

R.B.

1. SUBJECT NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT W GERMAN DOCUMENTATION UNLESS POLITICAL RECOGNITION FOLLOWS. BELIEVE FABRICATION LIFE HISTORY IN ORDER OBTAIN RECOGNITION TOO RISKY IN THIS CASE SINCE SLIGHTEST FLAP COULD PLACE KUBARK IN EMBARRASSING POSITION VIS A VIS FEDREP AUTHORITIES AND ODIBEX LIAISON.

2. INTEND RETURN AUSTRIAN PASSPORT AND IDENTITY PAPERS AS TEMPORARY MEASURE PERMIT SUBJECT CARRY OUT ASSIGNED TASKS FOR CONGOLESE DEFMIN AND RETURN CONGO IN ORDER FORMALLY ABROGATE CONTRACT WITH GOC. WILL INFORM SUBJECT NO KUBARK EMPLOYMENT AVAILABLE BUT WE WILLING REDOCUMENT HIM WITH AUSTRIAN OR OTHER PASSPORT IN NAME DAVID DE PANASKHET, WHICH HE CONSIDERS HIS TRUE NAME. HE WILL KNOW NEW DOCUMENTATION WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING HIS RETURN FRAN.

3. SUBJECT HAS STATED DESIRE RESETTLE IN SOUTH AMERICA. UNDERSTAND PASSPORT WOULD PROBABLY BE BACKCHECKED WITH COUNTRY OF ISSUE SHOULD SUBJECT DECIDE REQUEST PERMANENT RESIDENCY OR CITIZENSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-239477

GUIDANCE RE CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS IN VARIOUS SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND ADVISABILITY OF ISSUING NEW AUSTRIAN PASSPORT.

4. REQUEST REPLY PRIOR COB 11 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III
(Vol II)
201-259910

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 1967 - THRU DEC 1973

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OTHER AGENCY REPORTS (FBI, ETC.)

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/3/78	3/3/78	DAN Hardway	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

201-259910

VOLUME II: January 1967 - September 1973

CLOSED

SEE VOLUME III: January 1974 -

2.47

14-00000

DISPATCH

	CLASSIFICATION SECRET / RYBAT	PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, [illegible] NN

SUBJECT
D [illegible]/Possible Illegal Arms Shipments to the Caribbean

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCE: UFPA-1338, 13 September 1973 3P

1. Station passed referenced information to Customs on 13 September 1973. Initial checks by the Station with the FBI, DEA, and Customs revealed no information on the individuals mentioned in reference (Donald Henry, John Brooks and John Brown). Customs was in agreement with the Station's suggestion that a Customs telephone number should be passed to Henry and the case should be put into Customs hands.

2. Henry called Customs on 13 September 1973. A meeting was arranged for that afternoon. Before the meeting took place, however, a Customs officer recognized the name of Brooks as possibly being one of his contacts. Henry was thus met by two Customs officers. On returning from their meeting, the Customs officers notified the Station, and a meeting was arranged to see them on 14 September 1973. Customs provided the following information on Donald Henry.

a. Donald Henry is about 52 years old. He is from Michigan. He lived and went to school in Canada. He moved to Florida about fifteen years ago. He has resided in the Keys for about seven years.

b. Henry was described by Customs as a braggart. They felt, however, that his offer of assistance was genuine. Customs stated that Henry always had a quick answer for any question asked of him, but when the questions got down to specifics his answers were vague.

c. Contrary to initial information, Henry does not have a boat or an airplane. Customs noted, though, that Henry probably has easy access to one. Neither does Henry have an FAA license for flying multi-engine aircraft, although he told Customs he was capable of flying them. Henry has known John Brooks (an alias used by one John Wilbur)

/Continued/

E2 I[illegible]

Dist: 3 - C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO D- 1[illegible]-5[illegible]1	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFPA-1349	DATE typed 22 September 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET / RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]-11-11/3

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

for about a year. (John Wilbur is described in further detail below.) Henry said he met Wilbur through their association with the Atlantis Dive Center, Inc., Miami, Florida, where Wilbur is employed and where Henry has had a working relationship for some time. The Atlantis Dive Center is owned by one Haley Ricard (no Station traces). Ricard, Customs reported, is an unsavory character involved in smuggling activities and would not hesitate to shoot anyone who gets in his way.

d. Henry told Customs that when he bumped into Wilbur at the Atlantis Dive Center recently, they started talking about various ways they could make money. Wilbur told Henry that he (Henry) could smuggle arms for him over to Abaco, and they started discussing that possibility. During the conversation, Henry asked Wilbur who he would be working for. Wilbur mentioned the name of Bobo Brown. He told Henry that Brown, an ex-Special Forces U.S. Army Major, had set up a branch of Defense Systems, Inc., on Abaco for Mitchell L. Werbell, III. Wilbur also intimated that EMERALD was aware of the operation and condoned it. Customs noted that Henry did not pick up the name Bobo or Brown until after they had mentioned a Special Forces major, at which point Henry professed to remember his name.

e. Henry also told Customs, when asked why he had called EMERALD, that he had telephoned the FBI first and was told by them that his information was not in their jurisdiction and was given the phone number for EMERALD. Later, Henry changed his story to the effect that he said he looked in the Miami telephone directory to get the FBI's number and called EMERALD ([illegible]) instead because the latter's number was under the FBI's. (Comment. Not true, both numbers are listed under U.S. Government but on separate pages.)

3. As for John Brooks, Customs reported that this name is an alias used by one John Wilbur, who is about 35 years old. Originally from Massachusetts, Wilbur has been in Florida for several years. He has been in touch with Customs for approximately three years. He was initially brought to Customs' attention over a narcotics case. ~~At the time,~~ Wilbur was working/informing for the FBI, infiltrating both right and left wing youth organizations. He was also dating an airline stewardess who was involved in narcotics smuggling from South America. When Wilbur found out about this illegal activity, he told the FBI who, in turn, put him in touch with Customs.

4. Customs described Wilbur as an ultra-right winger and a soldier-of-fortune who is impressive looking and a smooth talker. Customs said Wilbur is also a fabricator. As an example, they mentioned that Wilbur would read an article in a magazine and shortly thereafter would try to pass it off as his information. He would also contact Customs and tell them every rumor he heard in the hopes that one of the stories would be true so that he could collect a reward. Customs said that although Wilbur is a fabricator and rumor collector, he is dangerous and would do anything for money.

5. Customs noted that Wilbur enjoys playing the role of a man with important contacts and likes to flash money around. They also noted that about four months ago he began living with a rich divorcee. She is in the real-estate business and inherited property in the Keys (Duck Key Motel) from her family. Customs stated that she receives about $2,000 a month

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

alimony and supposedly has about $400,000 in the bank. She has set Wilbur up in an apartment and furnishes him with spending money. Customs also said that Wilbur seems to be sort of paranoid in that he constantly mentions BKHERALD, not naming BKHERALD as such but referring to it as "the company," "the driving force behind democracy," and so forth.

6. According to Customs, Wilbur began working for Underwater Sports of America, Miami, Florida, as a salesman in the early 1960's. At the time, reported Customs, Underwater Sports was engaged in contractual work for BKHERALD concerning training during preparations for the Bay of Pigs. The last contact Customs had with Wilbur was about three weeks ago. They plan to see him again in the next few days and will attempt to get his side of the story.

7. Customs stated that in spite of the inconsistencies in Henry's story they felt he was making a legitimate offer to assist and thus advised him to proceed along the following lines:

a. Re-contact Wilbur and tell him that he was prepared to fly arms to Abaco, but he would have to see the "front money" first. Customs commented that if Wilbur produces the money, they would have a case; if not, the whole episode could probably be chalked up to Wilbur's delusions.

b. After re-contacting Wilbur and if Wilbur comes up with the money, Henry should attempt to convince him of the necessity of a dry run. If a dry run is not possible, then he is to go ahead with the operation. Arrests would be made by Customs in the States after the arms have been placed in the aircraft and after the personnel involved have boarded the plane.

8. Customs has promised to keep the Station apprised of the case, especially as it pertains to the Bahamas and other areas in the Caribbean.

Alvin C. Thornbrue
Alvin C. THORNBRUE

200-11-1/8

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible] follow-up contacts [illegible] information; however, [illegible]

James [illegible]

B 201-259910
~~B 201-259910~~
B - 201-776952
B - 201-823964
B - 201-769473

RECORD COPY FILED IN 200-11-11/8

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

265

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 259910

17 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Arms Shipment to Abaco Island, Bahamas

1. On 27 August 1973, Alvin C. [illegible] discussed with LNWAR a case involving the possible violation of the [illegible] Act, more specifically, the transportation of weapons to Abaco Island in the Bahamas.

2. LNWAR is aware of [illegible] in connection with the dissidents on Abaco [illegible] he has been in touch with one Al Sakolsky, a Miami [illegible] reputed organized crime connections. They are aware of [illegible] regarding the shipping of weapons to Abaco [illegible] have been having. They are also aware of [illegible]'s contact [illegible] (201-[illegible]) and [illegible] William [illegible] who have been involved in weapons dealings. [illegible] both [illegible] to Abaco Island, and apparently both refused to assist [illegible].

3. [illegible], on the other hand, has a [illegible] Prime Minister PINDLING. Apparently [illegible] in the Bahamas which had burned down, and he [illegible] PINDLING for the blame because [illegible] had backed the opposition party. [illegible] has a boat named the "Carry Scott III", which could transport a large shipment of weapons. The boat had been in dry-dock for approximately three months, until approximately 20-21 August, when it went [illegible]. LNWAR lost track of it for a couple of days, then sighted it and lost it again. Since approximately [illegible] August, the "Carry Scott III" has not been sighted again.

4. In line with the possibility of a transfer of weapons to the "Carry Scott III" taking place at sea, LNWAR has been looking for a boat which would be capable of handling the transfer at sea. One such vessel was located, the "[illegible]" ([illegible]). The "[illegible]" is a [illegible] vessel that [illegible] U.S. Navy Patrol Boat and is capable of hitting speeds of [illegible]. It was bought in [illegible] by one [illegible], who [illegible] is making $2,000 monthly payments on it. LNWAR noted that it [illegible] to be much too expensive a boat to be used for fishing purposes as claimed.

RECORD COPY

SECRET/RYBAT

[illegible] a gulf. [illegible] "Larry Scott III" [illegible] Around [illegible] August, [illegible] the traps on board the "[illegible]fish." [illegible] ship immediately turned around and [illegible] August, the crew loaded another [illegible] lobster traps aboard [illegible] However, they did not sail until [illegible] August, when [illegible] the Miami River where they are now docked.

[illegible] has the following information concerning MC GILL and [illegible]:

a) [illegible]

[illegible] did not [illegible] W [illegible] involved in [illegible] claimed to be working with [illegible] invasion [illegible] PRESIDENT OF PIONEER PICTURES, INC.

ASSOCIATE OF HEWITT MC GILL

[illegible]

ASSOCIATE OF [illegible]

ASSOCIATE OF [illegible]

[illegible]

MARRIED TO [illegible]

HUSBAND OF [illegible] SISTER TO HEWITT MC GILL

SECRET/RYBAT

2.65

[illegible]

[illegible] who [illegible] of [illegible] ([illegible]). [illegible] spent [illegible] the Miami area during the fall of [illegible], in an attempt to dig up information pertaining to [illegible] operations for a book he was supposedly writing. Among some of [illegible]'s friends were [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and a [illegible] who was also noted as a friend of [illegible]'s. [illegible] during [illegible]'s stay in Miami ([illegible] September [illegible]), and [illegible] (see para 7) was noted as being in contact with [illegible].

[illegible]. [illegible], in a conversation of [illegible] August, stated that when the "[illegible]" sailed from its berth on the Miami River, they were going to stop and search it. If nothing was found, they would release it and probably notify the appropriate [illegible] authorities, advising them to put the vessel(s) on "lookout."

[illegible] days later, [illegible] was contacted regarding the status of the "[illegible]". According to [illegible], the "[illegible]" had [illegible], was stopped and searched, and when nothing was found, it was allowed to continue on its way. [illegible] added that the appropriate [illegible] officials had been contacted.

SECRET/RYBAT

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200-11-11/8

FBI document dated
12 Sept 1973 from Miami
Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas

Bureau File: MM 105-21382

FBI document dated
27 July '73 from Miami.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matter - Bahamas

Bureau File - MM 105-21382

FBI document dated 30 July '73
from Tampa, Fla.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger

FBI document dated
3 July 73 from New York

Re: Mitchell LivingstonWer Bell III
Edwin Marzer
Internal Security - Bahamas

14-00000

FBI document dated
25 June '73 from New York

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Wer Bell III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas

FBI cable dated 2 July
1973

DIRECTOR 62-108665 (date
6-29-73)

from Miami 105-5082

Re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
Internal Security - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

FBI cable
2 July 1973
(6/28/73)
TO- Acting Director (62-108665)
FROM- Atlanta (105-5082)
re: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Edwin Marger
IS - Bahamas
Neutrality Matters - Bahamas

FBI 62-108665

16 June 1973

Re: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III
Internal Security - Bahamas

itch WerBel : Gunsmith to the 'Right' Side

oger Williams

'ng is excerpted by per-
Atlanta magazine.

'HE DRIVEWAY that
hrough the country estate
'en age boys. They were
' handsome in the tradi-
' fashion, and they looked
'e quiet, leafy setting But
camouflage suit and car-
stol in each hand; the
'M 3 "grease gun" tucked
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'n propelling himself vig-
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Livingston WerBell III
iwas, ex-soldier of for-
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id Geoff chatted lightly
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sniper rifle, one of his
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VC in six months," he
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t Uncle Sam. That's the
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'er, young Mitch and
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n Mitch began firing a
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ms weapons given to him by friendly forces in Vietnam, he said, and they were shipped to the States for display in military museums.

Not surprisingly, WerBell has often been called an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, a charge that angers him only when it is leveled too vehemently. It is not that he has anything against the CIA. He just doesn't, he says, happen to be one of its boys. His paramilitary work, which consists of advising and sometimes directly assisting foreign governments, is done in the employ of what he calls "an independent group of well-intentioned, patriotic Americans." The Birch Society? The Minutemen? A bunch of far-right Texas millionaires? WerBell won't say, other than to insist that it is not the CIA.

It hardly matters, for according to WerBell, it is all in the service not only of freedom and anticommunism but of the U.S. government; he does not supply or advise or fight for regimes not bearing the State Department seal of approval. A heavy percentage of his merchandise goes directly to the U.S. government, which distributes it to its own forces that need silent or exotic weapons. The balance is sold to friendly governments, either directly or through the good offices of the "independent group." He says he does not sell to individuals, not even if they're certified anticommunists.

WerBell takes pains to point out that he is no ordinary arms broker. That is, he is not one of those shadowy figures who sell weapons to both sides at exorbitant prices or who take possession of contraband shipments on the high seas. "We've always adhered to a basic policy: There is only one friend of the United States in a given area, and we deal only with that friend."

What does WerBell peddle? A range of firearms from machine guns to desk-sized cannons, from the meanest-looking weapons to innocent looking swagger sticks that fire a bullet or even a small rocket; an array of techniques — "systems," he calls them — that will help an American soldier or a foreign army hold off insurgent forces, and occasionally, his personal services.

These services present WerBell at his most shadowy. Serving as a combatant in the armed forces of a foreign nation is against U.S. law, and WerBell is understandably reluctant to admit having done so. He describes himself in such terms as "paramilitary" and "adviser," but acquaintances suspect he has been in the thick of the fighting a number of times. He may even have zapped an insurgent or two.

Corporate Setup

THE HEADQUARTERS for his

In Operational Negation of Insurgency and Countersubversion, tied in with Environmental Industries, and began in earnest to develop a line of military hardware. Sons Mitch IV and Geoff became integral parts of the firm. Mitch IV was already a bona fide counter-insurgent. As a 15-year-old, he had spent considerable time with Dad in the Dominican Republic, specializing in underwater probing for safe landing sites. Geoff, two years younger, barely missed out on a Cuban foray; his father took him to Miami a few years ago, but the plans fell through.

One day I sat in WerBell's office as Geoff displayed a number of Military Armament's most unusual weapons. He brought out "the Stinger," a cigar-shaped tube three inches long, weighing 2½ ounces, that fires a .22 caliber cartridge. Nothing visible suggests a gun, and the bullet, on its way out, dislodges a thin plug that disguises the hole at the end of the tiny barrel. WerBell commends the Stinger to secret agents who get caught with the goods and must take "the last resort," that is, shoot themselves.

In the same exotic category is the swagger stick, bound in leather, with silver studs. By pushing between two studs, one can fire a 22 or, with a special model, a small rocket. The bodyguard of Dominican strongman Gen. Antonio Imbert used the rocket model to blast would-be assassins a few years ago. Then there is a small, brass-fitted cannon. It makes a handsome knick-knack for a soldier-politician's desk. It fires, with one simple finger movement, a bullet that will quiet an unruly visitor. More traditionally military is WerBell's "special long-range knocker-outer," a redesigned Remington 9-millimeter rifle that "will plug 'em in the eye at 200 meters."

The bulk of WerBell's business is in sound suppressors and Ingram Model submachine guns. Suppressors can be used on large as well as small weapons, and in fact have been used effectively on the wicked-looking Vulcan machine guns mounted on American helicopters in Vietnam. The Australian Army Journal ran a story calling the Sionics suppressor "superior to anything previously used ... (with it) it is now possible for the sniper to fire from relatively short ranges, especially when using subsonic projectiles."

WerBell is so enthusiastic about the Ingram Model submachine guns (there are two models, taking different sized cartridges) that he predicts they will eventually make "obsolete every individual weapon in the world." The U.S. Army, he says, is now looking carefully at the Ingram models with an eye toward making them standard equip-

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weapons for the U.S. Army and other counterinsur-

WerBell recovered from a leg injury.

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dedicated to killing people. Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is bankrolled by some of the East's most prominent investment houses; he is its director of international operations. He is also president of a subsidiary called Military Armaments Co., Inc., and because he is in Powder Springs, Military Armaments is there, too. (Behind Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is "a third shadow of which E.I. is a subsidiary"—another tantalizing hint of the CIA.)

Military Armaments may well be a unique American enterprise. Nobody else, WerBell says, is in the business of designing special purpose weapons on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 submachine gun that young Mitch demonstrated on the firing range.

'Cottage Industry'

INGRAM WORKS in a well-equipped machine shop-lab attached to the main house on the estate, which WerBell likes to call "the farm." WerBell's office is next door to the shop. Its walls are so loaded with weapons that it is a wonder they do not collapse. There are knives and spear guns and pistols and rifles and machine guns, dozens and dozens of them, some purchased, some won in combat, some presented by the appreciative recipients of WerBell's counterinsurgency techniques.

WerBell, who has a sense of humor, calls his enterprise a "cottage industry" and likens himself to "a country doctor . . . I can fall out of the living area upstairs right down to the office." Upstairs is the domain of his German-born wife Hildegard, a pleasant, gray-haired woman who has borne WerBell six children and put up with his rather unusual way of life. (When he left for the Far East in 1968, he said he'd be gone for a year or more, and he was.)

A Military Profile

MITCHELL WERBELL is a short, wiry man of 52, quick with a quip and quite sensible until he begins talking about communism or other social issues. He has the face and bearing of a Prussian officer, an image he cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympathies. He has been quoted as saying, "Communism is a substitution of a peasant dictatorship over the aristocracy—I prefer the aristocracy." He is without question an elitist. Not surprisingly, his elite is composed of superpatriots and military men.

Mitchell WerBell was born in Pennsylvania, shortly after his Russian-American father and his Scottish-born mother arrived in the U.S. at the end of World War I. His parents traveled a good deal, here and abroad, and Mitch traveled with them, picking up his education as he went. He got a degree in journalism from the University of Pennsylvania. In World War II, he joined the OSS, and served with a unit behind Japanese lines in China, rising to the rank of captain and acquiring a taste for guerrilla-type warfare he would never lose.

WerBell moved to Atlanta shortly after the war and went to work in advertising in a department store. Soon he was head of the department, and soon after that he went on his own.

In the mid-'50s, WerBell pulled out of his agency and then formed his own public relations firm. "I'd already been drifting into international PR," WerBell says, "using my family background. I had tremendous contacts in Europe, and I moved into the Far East, too." How much of this moving in was military, WerBell won't say, but his business took on more and more of what he calls a "geopolitical" flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America. "I realized that in counterinsurgency, the primary problem was a lack of depth in weaponry. People say, 'Win the hearts of the enemy, and you'll win the fight.' That's a lot of bull. The best way to get their hearts, if they're the enemy, is to shoot 'em and cut the hearts out."

While he experimented with weapons—quietly, to avoid problems with the federals—WerBell proceeded with his personal brand of geopolitics. He made himself available to anticommunist regimes that wanted help in fighting off one band of insurgents or another. In the process, he became friendly with a number of Latin America's political strongmen. They were delighted to discover a Norte-Americano who felt as they did about the need for stable, anticommunist regimes, especially their regimes, and who had both the savvy and the guts to help preserve them.

His first major paramilitary operation was in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 revolt. He was, of course, on the side of the government, which was fending off allegedly Communist insurgents; the United States was on its side, too. WerBell wound up in the midst of the fighting. He was the second Dominican government man to reach the Ozama River, scene of the major battle.

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 16 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

Vietnam Superhawk

IN THE LATE '60s, WerBell turned his attention to Southeast Asia. He is, of course, a superhawk on Vietnam, and would be happy if the U.S. were also fighting communism in all its neighboring countries. He was in Thailand, "working closely with the supreme command," for months, promoting the sales of his weapons and systems. "I showed them things like surveillance equipment and night vision equipment, stuff that lets you surprise the hell out of the bastards." Did he do any fighting himself? WerBell chuckles. "I ain't supposed to be shooting the stuff, just demonstrating how to shoot it."

Three years ago, WerBell's weapons business became promising enough for him to go into it full time. He organized a firm called Sionics (for Studies

JAN 13 71

Armaments makes the case, too), complete with suppressor and six magazines.

Business Is Business

DOES WERBELL feel a twinge of conscience about providing the world with such deadly and efficient weapons? No. "I see no reason to be concerned," he says. "We're supplying a certain product that is unfortunately a part of the civilized world. As long as people exist, there's going to be an arms business. I don't see much difference between our supplying arms to combatants and a surgical supply house supplying gauze to bind up the wounds inflicted."

There is his anticommunist argument, too. WerBell is fighting the Communist menace; it is a fight that must be won and weapons are needed to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion, Powder Springs was not named in honor of WerBell and his enterprise. WerBell, in fact, stays as aloof from the local community as possible. His house is so well-stocked, it is practically self-sufficient save for occasional trips to the grocery and liquor stores. There has been, from time to time, anti-WerBell feeling in Powder Springs. WerBell declares, "The hell with it. Who cares? I tell 'em I'm prepared to purchase their property if they don't like the area."

He does not suffer from loneliness, however. There is a steady stream of visitors and customers, foreigners as well as Americans. A few weeks ago WerBell's son-in-law, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, flew in from Ohio, mainly to see what was new around the shop; he hadn't been by in several months, he said, "and things change awfully quickly around here." The day I was there, the colonel and WerBell swapped ideas on ridding the State Department of no-win policy makers and on bringing the enemy to its knees, or its grave, in Vietnam.

WerBell recalls with relish one particular visitor. He came from the State Department a few years back, and according to WerBell, he said, "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Georgia." WerBell's reply? "You can't print it. It was all in Anglo-Saxon words." But that was the old, swashbuckling WerBell. The new, low-profile WerBell says with a grin, "My present policy is that I agree with that theory completely. Period."

If actions to the contrary speak too loudly, they, like WerBell's weapons, can always be suppressed by the man himself. Meanwhile, Mitch and his "independent group" march on.

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

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THE MIAMI HERALD SUNDAY MAGAZINE

July 1, 1973
Vol. 7 No. 25

THE COVER: Arms dealer Mitchell Livingston WerBell III lives in an 007 world of guns and intrigues. Among the guns is his briefcase with a built-in machine gun that fires whenever the right button is pushed. Among the intrigues is his present preoccupation with what happens to Abaco when the Bahamas goes independent this month. For the full story, turn to Page 18. Photograph by John Pineda.

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Father Nicola vs. The Devil

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Photographs by John Pineda







Facing page.
Mitch WerBell III in the upstairs gun room of his Georgia home. Behind him, left to right, are son-in-law Paul Routhier, a retired Air Force colonel and president of WerBell's Defense Systems International, Bennett Bintliff, Defense Systems' chairman of the board; and son Mitchell. Top left, moving clockwise: A uniformed WerBell employee practices firing a weapon on the Georgia estate-armory; a belt buckle that doubles as a knife, à la agent 007. Mitch WerBell IV points out Abaco on a map of the Bahamas

POWDER KEG AT POWDER SPRINGS

The flamboyant son of a Cossack colonel, Mitchell WerBell III has been involved in several Caribbean adventures and misadventures. Now, as the Bahamas nears independence, the wealthy arms-dealer has his sights set on Abaco . . .

By William R. Amlong

"Do I look like a guy who has to se himself as a soldier of fortune?"

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III is th son of a cavalry colonel in the Russia Imperial Army. He has stayed, more o less, in the family business: bedevilir Bolsheviks. And now he sees himself no as some ragtag gunrunner, but as a ver substantial figure in the shaping of worl affairs through free-enterprise geo politics.

His disclaimer about not looking like soldier of fortune, however, doesn't qu mask his point: for that is indeed wh Mitch WerBell looks like — or at leas what a montage of James Cagney, Al Guinness and Walter Mitty would lo like. There's the walrus moustache an the khaki bush jacket with the should patch of the First Airborne Division the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. monocle and a swagger stick are ke handy. The overall impression is that th man just stepped out of the Briti officers' mess in old Burma.

But he is not in Burma, nor in Vi

Three uniformed ex-military men, all under the employ of WerBell, line up for target practice at the Powder Springs compound



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POWDER KEG

Continued

nam, nor even in one of the sugarcane fields of South Florida, where counter-revolutionaries are wont to drill and target-practice for yet another assault on Castro's Cuba. Rather, he is sitting in the upstairs gun room of his home in Powder Springs, Ga., a 66-acre estate-armory situated amidst the rolling red-clay hills and pine forests 25 miles northwest of downtown Atlanta. It is a place where the pastoral air is occasionally shattered by the flashing of a red light that goes on whenever the electronic gate is opened, by the staccato barking of machine guns from the test firing range or by the pulsating roar of a combat helicopter hovering low overhead on a test flight.

It is from this base of operations that, it appears, Mitch WerBell has been meddling again, this time in the affairs of the about-to-become sovereign state of the Bahamas.

His activities — although no one is completely sure just what they entail — have prompted Bahamas Prime Minister Lynden Pindling to denounce WerBell and attorney Edwin Marger, an associate, on the floor of the Bahamian Parliament. Pindling called them "international fortune hunters" with "designs on the territorial sovereignty of the Bahamas."

Werbell's involvement in the Bahamas — as an advisor to a faction that wants the island of Abaco either to remain a Crown Colony or to become a separate nation when the rest of the Bahamas becomes fully independent on July 10 — has also prompted some concern by the U.S. State Department's Caribbean Affairs Desk.

It is not a completely unfamiliar experience to WerBell to have elements of the United States government at least concerned — if not outright displeased — with some of his free-lance foreign-policy maneuvers. He relishes recalling how a visitor flew down to Georgia once to give him the message: "The functions of the foreign policies of the United States are the business of the State Department in Washington, not of Mitchell WerBell in Powder Springs, Ga." In another incident, a congressional subcommittee questioned him about his role in an aborted attempt to launch an invasion of Haiti from South Florida.

The subcommittee, the investigations arm of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, was concerned with the role played in the invasion preparations by CBS News. The network was attempting to film a documentary on the military coup being planned by an alliance of Haitian and Cuban exiles. The Haitians wanted to topple Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier; the Cubans wanted to establish an anti-Castro base in Haiti. CBS was steered into the project by Andrew St. George, a free-lance journalist-adventurer who also introduced Producer Jay McMullen to WerBell in the process.

The network, after spending upwards of $170,000 on the proposed documentary, *Project Nassau*, decided to scrap it. "As it is," a CBS News vice president wrote in a Dec. 13, 1966, memo, "we see simply the non-adventures of a rag-tag crew next to whom Duvalier himself looks good, a gang openly flouting U.S. law, in the end to no purpose."

The answers to "why" WerBell got involved are, in the language of the subcommittee report, "at variance" with each other:

Answer No. 1: " . . . I felt then and I feel now, and I will always feel that any effort or any activity that any American can give to a group that is attempting to kill the boil and cancer of communism in the Western Hemisphere deserves every effort. This was my fundamental reason for going into it. This was why I agreed to assist them and why I did everything I could to assist them up to the point where I felt the whole program was ridiculous."

Answer No. 2: "I took this whole project as a rather entertaining comedy. I'm afraid I approached it in this connection and I continued to do so. I felt that this was a very amateurish attempt at something which I didn't know really what was going on, and it was an interlude of entertainment as far as I'm concerned."

The role he played is also unclear. From the point that CBS entered the situation in May of 1966, WerBell appeared at various times to be a network consultant, a CIA operative, a CIA operative impostor, a leader of the invasion, a U.S. government spy on the invasion, a gunrunner and a wired-for-sound observer in an attempt to shake down the Haitian consul in Miami for $200,000 to call off the invasion.

Suffice it to say that the entire episode was typified by the fact that the 68-foot sloop *Poor Richard*, a boat WerBell had leased for the expedition, was repossessed while WerBell and others had it docked at the Ocean Reef motel in Key Largo. "The boat never had anything on it ex-

cept a few good, long drinking sessions," WerBell told congressmen.

Nevertheless, the U.S. government raided the training area for the would-be invaders, seized their arms and arrested them in January, 1967, about two months after WerBell had gone home. Seven persons were indicted for conspiring to violate U.S. neutrality laws — including WerBell. Charges against WerBell, however, were dropped on orders of then-Attorney General Ramsey Clark.

WerBell now declines to discuss the mechanics of how the charges against him were dropped, except to say that he was "in constant contact with the government" during his participation in the invasion attempt and that he "did nothing wrong." In 1970, however, WerBell told an Atlanta magazine writer, "When you work for the company, they take care of you."

"The company" is generally used as a euphemism for the Central Intelligence Agency — an arm of government WerBell says now he has never had anything to do with, except to sell it some guns. The company he was talking about, he says, was CBS. Over the years, however, WerBell has spoken often of his association with the Company. Producer McMullen quoted WerBell to the congressmen as saying he had "previous experience" with "the company." "And when I asked him what company he meant, he said the CIA," McMullen said.

"Everybody always gets that impression about any goddam thing we do," WerBell says. It is a conclusion that is neither difficult nor illogical. It may not, however, be accurate.

But what, then, was Mitch WerBell, wearing camouflage fatigues and a shoulder-holstered rocket pistol, doing in the lead tank — which is where he claims he was — in the Dominican Republic that summer of 1965 as government forces double-timed it to the Ozama River? The tanks were attempting to capture as much territory as possible before a noon cease-fire took effect; instead, they were beaten back by ill-armed rebels at the bridge.

Or what was he doing in Vietnam in 1968, with what WerBell claims was "the simulated rank of major-general" supplied by the U.S. Air Force as he demonstrated his firm's revolutionary silenced sub-machine gun to a South Vietnamese general?

To questions such as these, WerBell's standard reply is, "I guess I'm just lucky." More than just luck, however, WerBell's propensity for being in the crucial place at the crucial time seems to stem from a combination of machismo, the profit motive, a knack for developing [illegible] radical weaponry and a plug-in to the Old Boy Network.

The Old Boy Network — "And don't you ever kid yourself that there isn't such a thing," says WerBell — is the cloak-and-dagger types' answer to the union hiring hall. It is a loosely structured help-wanted-situation wanted grapevine. "I became friends with a bunch of guys who are now four- and five-star generals," recalls WerBell of his days as an OSS captain behind Japanese lines in World War II.

Memorabilia of the OSS days and subsequent adventures hang in WerBell's home and in his psyche. The walls of both his upstairs den and downstairs "war room" are decorated with dozens of hunting (upstairs) and military (downstairs) weapons. Six unsheathed swords are mounted on the door of the liquor cabinet. Two glass display cases in the den, each locked, contain handguns ranging from standard .45 automatics to single-shot assassination pistols. Daggers, bayonets and throwing knives fill the in-between spaces as bric-a-brac. Photographs of short, slant-eyed generals hang on walls and stand on tables. Between two wild boar heads above the den entrance is a framed certificate from the Vietnamese Airborne.

The biggest war souvenir, though, isn't on WerBell's wall. It is in his head — the way a man of 55 acts after more than 20 years of being in and on the fringes of violent conflicts. Some of it, obviously, is affectation. Some of it is genuine. And some of it just seems strange to an outsider

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

Thus the sincere man does not do or say that which he would be ashamed of were it brought to light. His uprightness of spirit enables him to walk upright and confident among his fellowmen. His presence is a strong protection, and his words are direct and powerful because they are true. Whatever may be his work, it prospers. - James Allen

it seems that everyone associated with WerBell takes gun in hand for target practice at one time or another. Bennett Bintliff, chairman of the board of Defense Systems International, plays marksman with a handgun

POWDER KEG

Continued

to the world of a fellow like Mitch WerBell.

But there it is: the bush jacket and the monacle. The belt buckle that conceals a "survival knife." The electronic gate and the two guard dogs, a German shepherd named Fritz and a Doberman called Mal (for Evil). The electronic sweep by the two phones to detect transmitting or bugging devices. The Scotch whisky, poured neat — no water, no ice.

WerBell drifted into his present line of work during the mid-1950s after a brief but flourishing post-war career in advertising; he joined and rose to the head of the advertising department of Rich's, a major Atlanta department store. He then founded his own ad firm. His first step was to get involved in international public relations and anti-communism: one of his clients, he says, was the Batista government. From there, he eased into the arms and intrigue business.

WerBell's talent for designing weapons recalls that of Q., the fictional British Secret Service armorer for Ian Fleming's super-spy, James Bond. At his Powder Springs retreat, WerBell has designed a submachine gun disguised as a briefcase, an effective noise-and-flash suppressor for automatic weapons, a cigar that fires a single bullet and a swagger stick that is actually a mini-rocket launcher.

WerBell's sorties into strife-torn areas appear at times to be merely the business trips of a traveling salesman whose line happens to be machine guns. At other times, however — such as during the Dominican revolt and in Thailand — his purpose seems to be less clear.

His gullet warmed by a few gulps of neat whisky, WerBell will recount some of these past adventures, albeit reluctantly and in vague terms because of the new, sober image he is attempting to project. But as the camouflage outfit hangs next to the dark suit in WerBell's closet, the flamboyance of the old gunrunning and tank-riding Mitch WerBell every now and then surfaces in the behavior of the conservative geopolitical advisor, Mitchell L. WerBell III.

While in London recently, as Parliament prepared for the final vote endorsing Bahamian independence, WerBell let it be known to a reporter for the *London Daily Mirror* (circulation five million) that he was: 1) four-square for the cause of the Council for a Free Abaco, and 2) recruiting British mercenaries "for a project I have in mind." Abaco? "Who said it was Abaco?" said WerBell. The fruit of the interview was a front-page story headlined: "Mutiny in Paradise . . . The Island That Wants to Stay British . . . A Call Goes Out for Mercenaries."

Such were the initial tactics in the Battle of Abaco, a cause that, for awhile in the British press, seemed second in anticipated ferocity only to the Catholics-vs.-Protestants strife in Northern Ireland. Joining WerBell as a comrade-in-press release was Lt.-Col. Colin (Mad Mitch) Mitchell, a right-wing House of Commons member and a hero of the Battle of Aden during his days with the Argyle & Sutherland Highlanders. Mitchell, who was muttering to the British press about secret missions to Abaco and the such, recently visited WerBell in Powder Springs, WerBell said.

While there are some people who admire flamboyance such as WerBell's, there are others who don't. Among those others are WerBell's former business associates, a group of New York investment bankers who bought WerBell and Bennett B. Bintliff, an associate, out of the Military Armament Corp. (MAC) that the pair had founded. "He's been headline press all over England, and we're just a quiet little manufacturing company," said Rosser Scott Reeves III, chairman of the board of MAC's parent company, Quantum Corp. "He's a loudmouth. Basically, when you're dealing with a country, the country would like to see responsible executives who are discreet, who will transact business — not tell war stories."

Reeves, however, says he doesn't dislike WerBell — he just doesn't want to be associated with him in the arms business. "I like him a great deal. He's amusing and he's a character. But letting him run Colt or letting him run MAC is like turning loose a high-school hot-rodder to run General Motors."

WerBell and his associates in Powder Springs have now reincorporated under the name of Defense Systems International Inc. and have hired away several of MAC's former weapons specialists. They are not overly fond of Reeves and his people either. "Tunnel vision" is one phrase they use to describe MAC's preoccupation with gun sales.

Defense Systems International, they say, does not suffer from such tunnel vision. They are deeply involved in geopolitics — whatever geopolitics are. And from the list of activities that WerBell and his partners tick off, geopolitics seems to be about anything they want it to be: arms sales, military advice, investment banking, economic development, security work, public relations, international lawyering.

The people who hire the firm, WerBell says, "are interested in an organization that's capable of doing the political, geopolitical, clandestine and economic operations that we're capable of. We operate

WILLIAM R. AMLONG is a Herald staff writer.

in 22 different countries. If somebody said to us tomorrow, 'We need a complete government, from a minister of health to a minister of welfare to the guy who presses the buttons to make the elevator go,' we could do it."

Just how much demand there is for prepackaged governments — or how much capability Defense Systems International has for providing them — is uncertain. What the firm would appear to have an obvious capacity for, however, is warfare. Its president and chief administrator is WerBell's son-in-law, Paul Routhier, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant-colonel who also doubles as the company's air-war expert. On the staff are various other ex-military types, ranging from a Marine sergeant to several retired colonels. Among its activities, says Routhier, is the sale to smaller, U.S.-approved nations of armament packages, including not only hardware but also training.

What Defense Systems International does not do, its principals insist, is to make wars or shoot people themselves. If they did, they say, they could go to jail for violating U.S. neutrality laws. Nor does it sell the guns to shoot people with, unless the U.S. State Department approves, they say. And the State Department isn't about to approve the sale of any arms by WerBell to the Abaconian secessionists. No matter, says WerBell. "We have no intention of arming Abaco in any shape or fashion. Anyway, they have more arms down there than we have here."

So why, then, is there a photograph lying about of the Hon. W. E. Errington (Eric) Watkins, a member of the Bahamian Parliament from Abaco, clenching a cigar between his teeth and test-firing one of WerBell's silenced submachine guns? The answer may well be far from sinister: as a tourist drinks beer when he visits Busch Gardens, a visitor to WerBell's house does not normally leave without firing off a clip or two through the machine gun. It is an instrument of which WerBell is duly proud: a rapid-fire automatic weapon that, when equipped with the silencer, makes about as much noise as an electric typewriter.

The novelty of WerBell's weaponry aside, however, there remain the questions of how WerBell got involved with the Free Abaco faction, what he is doing for it and how he is getting paid.

The leadership of the Council for a Free Abaco appears to be composed of two men, Watkins and Charles (Chuck) Hall. Watkins, the chairman, is a retired Bahamas policeman and former Nassau resident. He was elected to the House of Assembly from Abaco on the Free National Movement ticket last September. He says he has known WerBell for some 20 years. Hall, a Nassau TV- and radio-store owner, is a direct descendant of the white Tories who settled Abaco immediately after the American Revolution rather than be separated from the British Crown. He says he was referred to WerBell through persons he met while organizing a demonstration against allowing Air Cuba to service the Nassau airport. "The people I met there, basically right-wing, were able to put me on to WerBell." Hall is secretary of the council.

With a budget that they will describe no more specifically than to say it is less than $50,000 and made up entirely of small contributions from Bahamians, the group is paying WerBell and Marger an undisclosed fee through Zeta, a dummy corporation founded solely for the Abaco venture. Why it was necessary to establish such a company is unclear. Of its name, WerBell says, "I think it's Greek for war."

But just what the Zeta Co. or Operation Zeta — it's referred to as both — is doing for the Abaconian secessionists is somewhat uncertain. So far, there has been some lobbying of Parliament in London by Marger, a lawyer with U.S. lobbying experience and a background in international law, but about as un-British a fellow as there is. There have been some saber-rattling press releases to the British newspapers. There have been conversations with Mad Mitch. And there has even been note of the plight of the Abaconian secessionists on the editorial page of the *Atlanta Journal*: three sympathetic columns written by John Crown, a retired Marine



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POWDER KEG

Continued

officer and acquaintance of WerBell's who was introduced to Watkins. There is also some talk about approaching the Organization of American States and the United Nations. And about a referendum on Abaco July 9 — the day before Bahamian independence — on whether to unilaterally declare Abaco a free nation. "We are putting to bear all our activity and friends to tell the world, 'Here's a country that doesn't want to go this way,' " says WerBell.

The accuracy of that assessment of feeling on Abaco can be questioned. Many of the Abaconians who originally opposed separation from the Crown abandoned the movement as fruitless in December, when the British government decreed that the Bahamas — all of the Bahamas — would become independent. Nor was there ever complete opposition throughout Abaco to the Pindling government and independence: of the two Parliament members elected by the island's 6,500 residents, the one other than Watkins is a Pindling supporter and a backer of independence. The impetus for the Free Abaco movement, both Pindling and Minister of External Affairs Paul Adderly have charged, comes from outside the Bahamas. "I still think that what they are basically involved in is the stealing of land," Adderly said in a recent interview. And indeed, the majority of the people on Abaco know very little of WerBell and Marger outside of what they read in the British press.

WerBell says his motivations are strictly anti-communist. A far right-winger — he described himself to a newsman as "to the right of Attila the Hun" — WerBell sees the Bahamas as islands ripe for communism. "Every goddam single symptom that was present in Cuba exists in the Bahamas today," he says.

WerBell's opinion of the Pindling government and of the Bahamas' political climate is one which many observers of the Bahamas do not share. Although the overwhelming majority of the islanders are black and have become very assertive concerning racial equality during the past decade or so, the Bahamas have been deeply influenced by English tradition. The Anglican and Baptist Churches, both conservative institutions, are heavily represented. And the U.S. government is ardently courting Pindling as a friend.

But WerBell, son and heir of a Cossack colonel, sees the rise of Bolshevism where others see the peaceful emergence of a new democratic nation. And the question is whether or not to take him seriously as he sits in Powder Springs with his bush jacket and walrus moustache, talking of hiring mercenaries and of naming a company after what he thinks is the Greek letter meaning war.

The State Department, meanwhile, is keeping a close watch. "You can't write a man off as a clown," said one source, "if he has a warehouse full of arms. We take him seriously enough to want to know what he's up to." [T]

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
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
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TO
Chief of Station, Port Louis

INFO

FROM
Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT
Headquarter's Traces on the Military Armament Corporation.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
AR: As Stated in Paragraph Three
Reference: Port Louis 12011, 17 May 1973.

1. There are no Headquarter's traces on Dr. George A. Winkler, but there are traces on the Military Armament Corporation and its Board Chairman, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III (201-259910). In 1967 WerBell organized a firm called SIONICS, Incorporated (Studies in Operational Negation of Insurgency and Counter Subversion), specializing in producing silencers. In 1970, WerBell merged with Quantum Ordnance Bankers and the new firm was named the Military Armament Corporation with WerBell as Chairman of the Board.

2. WerBell was born on 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He served in the OSS and was of interest to BKHERALD in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-Castro plotters in the Dominican Republic. He was granted a POA in August 1959 but this was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and it was suspected that he was using BKHERALD funds to promote personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself as LNBUZZ connected and as a BKHERALD employee. Mr. WerBell's lengthy 201 file shows a long history of his appearing in areas and situations where he can make a fast buck. He is characterized as unscrupulous, a "wheeler dealer", and a promotor of grandiose schemes. WOTACK advises that the arms WerBell offers for sale are of good quality, but that the selling price is considered excessive.

3. In that Mr. WerBell is a WODUAL citizen, the above information should not be passed to CGPAT/1. However, the Station could inform CGPAT/1 that the Military Armament Corporation has an unsavory reputation and, although it may have permission from NVIDEA to export arms, it has no LNBUZZ connections and that any dealings with the corporation should be approached with extreme caution.

Luther S. PENAGELIA

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
VWVAPOR/Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

Forwarded under separate cover is a report from LNERGO dated 12 September 1973 on Subject.

Louise B. PERLBINDER

Attachment: U/S/C

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, WH/Miami, w/att., u/s/c

E2 IMPDET CL BY: 019722

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFPW-784	DATE Typed: 12 October 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-0259910

1 - 201-0259910
1 - WH/7/Car Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/7/Car	Esther Lucero:ar		4133/1249

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/7	12 X 73	E. James McTighe

FORM 1-62 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MFG. 8-72

DISPATCH

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A ← ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE → ALIGN

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP
030001Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
403810

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE FI/..., FI, AR 6, CI/SO,

DISSEM BY: 38

PER ___ # ______

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO ______
X IP FILES

TO: WH/MIAMI.

VWVAPOR

(#53419)

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY STATE 80538 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. BRITISH EMBOFF WASHINGTON GAVE NOTE TO DEPARTMENT ON BEHALF OF BAHAMAS GOVT (GOBI) ON 27 APRIL 1973 RE NEW REPORTS IN UNITED KINGDOM CONCERNING TWO PEOPLE INVOLVED ANTI-BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE ACTIVITIES. REPORTS IDENTIFY TWO PEOPLE AS U.S. CITIZENS. THEY ARE EDWIN MARGER, FORTY-FOUR YEAR OLD ATTORNEY, WHO CLAIMS REPRESENT "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO," AND MITCHEL BELL, (SIC) FIFTY-FIVE YEAR OLD ARMS DEALER. GOBI HAS UNCONFIRMED INFO THAT MARGER IS FLORIDA ATTORNEY AND BELL PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC, POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA. "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO" UNKNOWN TO GOBI.

B. NEWS REPORTS SAY BOTH MEN ARRIVED UK CLAIMING REPRESENT ABACO CITIZENS WHO WANT REMAIN BRITISH, AND INTERESTED HIRING BRITISH MERCENARIES THO NEITHER MAN SAID MERCENABRIES INTENDED FOR ABACO.

AN LIC
CAN
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WH/DC/AD

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RECORD COPY

2.51

02 MAY 73

201 259910

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 OF PAGES 3

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE: DIRECTOR 403810

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

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PER ____ # ________

C. GOBI REPORTED THIS INFO SINCE ACTIVITIES, IF TRUE, MIGHT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST GOBI.

D. GOBI REQUESTS U.S. GOVT INQUIRE INTO CONDUCT THESE TWO MEN RE REPORTED ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOBI, TAKING ACTION AS NECESSARY.

E. STATE COMMENT LABELLED FYI: ARMS DEALER IS MITCHEL WERBELL OF POWDER SPRING, GEORGIA, WHO KNOWN TO DEPARTMENT AS ADVENTURER WHO INVOLVED IN SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN OTHER CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES. END FYI.

2. FOLLOWING SUMMARY NASSAU 546 DATED 27 APRIL 1973 (POUCHING COPY):

A. MIN EXT AFF ADDERLEY GAVE INFO COPY STATE 80538 TO EMBOFF IN NASSAU WITH COMMENT THAT GOBI NOT ASKING UK AUTHORITIES TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS.

B. ADDERLEY SAID ABACO LEADER LEONARD THOMPSON AND MR. STRATTON, ONE OF MAIN FINANCIAL BACKERS OF ABACO MOVEMENT, ASSURED PM RECENTLY THEY NOT SUPPORTING SECESSION THROUGH VIOLENCE. (EMBOFF COMMENT: THIS IN LINE WITH INFO RECEIVED THAT MODERATE ELEMENTS ON ABACO DISASSOCIATING FROM EXTREMISTS AROUND ERRINGTON WATKINS.

DATE:
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EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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INFO: FILE

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PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
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C. NASSAU "GUARDIAN" 27 APRIL 1973 HAS CABINET OFFICE PRESS RELEASE WITH NOTE TEXT, AND REPORTS THAT ABACO ERRINGTON WATKINS AND FRIEND, CHARLES "CHUCK" HALL, IN LONDON SEEKING SUPPORT FOR "COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO."

D. SAME ISSUE HAS WATKINS'S DENIAL HE IN LONDON FOR MERCENARIES OR THAT HE WOULD RESORT TO OR CONDONE VIOLENCE. HE SAID HE LOBBYING HAVE BAHAMAS INDEPENDENCE BILL AMENDED TO EXCLUDE INDEPENDENCE FOR ABACO AND SAID WILL DO EVERYTHING LEGALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY TO ACHIEVE WISHES AND DESIRES OF PEOPLE. WATKINS SAID GOBI CHARGES WERE EFFORT TO DISCREDIT HIM.

E. DEPARTMENT COMMENT: PROMPT RELEASE OF NOTE TO LOCAL PRESS AND RADIO SUGGESTS IT EXERCISE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSUMPTION.

3. POUCHING SUMMARY EXTENSIVE FILE ON WERBELL (201-259910).

4. FILE 201-259910. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 2 MAY 1973
ORIG: EASTON C. WARNER: KMS
UNIT: WH/7/CAR
EXT: 7493/1956

AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

2,51 William
C/WH/7
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 019722

14-00000

FBI cable dated 7 May '73
Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
IS - GREAT BRITAIN

14-00000

FBI document dated 13 June '73.
from Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Edwin Marger;
Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

14-00000

FBI document dated
16 Mar 73
(re- mitchell Werbell)

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 25 1972
MICROFILMED

302449

SECRET

DTG:	FROM: STAFF	TO: DIRECTOR	MSG

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: 1/36 PER: C1 # 6
CONF: C/WH6 INFO: FILE, VR, FILE DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI
clci, c/wh/c 2, c/fi,

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 055672
UN-SECR

TOTAL COPIES 9

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, INFO WH/MIAMI

RYBAT PLMHCYSS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 20752 (IN 654371)

B. MEXICO CITY 20754 (IN 654378)

1. MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS DIRECTOR OF QUIANTON CORP WHICH PARENT COMPANY OF MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER DEALER AND PROMOTOR OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE ENTRUST WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING ENTRUST FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA.

2. ENTRUST HAS SPENT LAST TEN YEARS DISCLAIMING WERBELL WHO HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF [illegible] AND ENTRUST. IT PROBABLE THAT WERBELL USING CAMARGO AND TORRES AS FRONT MEN FOR

ORIG		UNIT		DATE	
AUTH		UNIT		SIGNATURE	
RELEASE		UNIT		SIGNATURE	

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT.	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT.
B201-272522		CS COPY		17 AUG 1972	
B201-292213					

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201-259910

ORIGINATING MESSAGE

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DIG:	MSG: STAFF	CITE: DIRECTOR	302449

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ # ________

CONF INFO RF, VR, FILE

TOTAL COPIES

HIS OPERATIONS BECAUSE WERBELL SO BADLY BURNED WITH UNLUTE. ALL ABOVE MAY BE PASSED BNDD WITH CAVEAT THAT IT NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL LNLUTE CITIZEN.

3. TRACES ON BAUMGART PENDING. WILL FORWARD WHEN RECEIVED.

4. FILE: 201-259910; 201-294213; 201-292522. E2 IMPDET UN-SK

SISH.H

ORIG: [illegible]	UNIT: [illegible]	DATE: [illegible]	
AUTH: [illegible]	UNIT: [illegible]	SIGNATURE: [illegible]	
RELEASE: [illegible]	UNIT: [illegible]	SIGNATURE: [illegible]	

OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT	OFFICE	COORDINATORS	INIT
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			

[illegible] OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

FBI document dated
18 April '72
(re: Mitchell L. Werbell, III –
Assoc. w/ Haitian exiles)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: John K. Greaney Assistant General Counsel	EXTENSION 7521	NO. DATE 8 November 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. General Counsel			LRH	1-3. I have reviewed the attached transcript and find nothing classified. I feel, however, it would be advisable for Ermal Geiss to sign the reply since WerBell's counsel has sent me written interrogatories in this proceedings. Lawrence R. Houston Lawrence R. Houston General Counsel CONCURRENCE: Deputy Director for Plans
2.				
3. DD/P 3C34 Hqs.		8 Nov 71		
4.				
5. DD/SEC 4E60 Hqs.				
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FORM [illegible] ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Dept of the Army
Memo for: Deputy Asst Secty of Defense
From: Security Policy + Review Branch
Subj: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston III OSDNO. 69 59
Dated 6 Oct 71

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1618
11 NOV 1971

Mr. George MacClain
Director, Information
Security Division
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. MacClain:

Subject: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III
OSD No. 69-59

In accordance with your request of 13 October 1971, the Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed the Official Report of Proceedings in the subject case. The Official Report of Proceedings does not contain any information pertaining to the CIA which should be classified.

It should be noted, however, that the lack of classification does not mean the CIA subscribes to or validates the testimony contained in the Official Report of Proceedings and this review should not be interpreted as an endorsement by this Agency of the statements contained therein.

Returned herewith is the Official Report of Proceedings.

Sincerely,

ERMAL P. GEISS

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

Enclosures
- Memo fr Examiner, ISCRD, 9/22/71
- ISCRD memo, 9/23/71
- ISD memo, 9/27/71
- Army response, 10/6/71
- Vol 1, OSD No. 69-59
- Vol 2, OSD No. 69-59

2.46

201-259910

Office of the Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 13 Oct 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III - OSD No. 69-59

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Memo dated 22 Sep 71

Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 6959

Office of Ass't. Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 23 Sep 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Memo dated 27 Sep 71
Subj: WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III, OSD No. 69-59

GROUP 1

(When Filled In)

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

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BY: 8 PER

File Werbell

ACTION: C/FE 4

FILE, VR. C/PLAN, DDP, ADDP, C/FE/VNO 4, C/FE/LOC 2, C/FI 2, C/CI, C/SAVA, D/SECUR 4, C/SOD 3 ⑬

ACTION NO. 124

S E C R E T 121148Z NOV 71 CITE BANGKOK 24725 (SEGERQUIST ACTING)

DIRECTOR PHNOM PENH VIENTIANE SAIGON

RYBAT SECUR

REF: DIRECTOR 88114 (KNOTAL)

12 Nov IN 467962

1. MR. MITCHELL A. WERBELL, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY AN ELEMENT OF WERBELL'S GEORGIA BASED FIRM OF SIONICS WHICH REPORTEDLY WENT BANKRUPT), IS BACK IN BANGKOK ATTEMPTING TO SELL HIS WARES (MACHINES PISTOLS AND SNIPER RIFLES). THE REF MESSAGE CITES THE FACT THAT HQS HAS A LENGTHY 201 ON SUBJECT (201-259910) AND THAT HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER-DEALER AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS ON OCCASION ALLUDED EITHER TO BEING AN LNLUTE REP OR HAVING LNLUTE BACKING.

2. SUBJECT MET WITH SEVERAL LNCUFF OFFICERS ON 5 NOV 71 AND RELATED THAT HE WAS ATTEMTING AGAIN TO INTEREST THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING HIS PRODUCTS. SUBJECT CLAIMS TO BE PERSONAL FRIEND OF AIR CHIEF MARSHAL DAWEE AND THAT HIS SAMPLE WEAPONS WERE CONSIGNED TO DAWEE IN ORDER TO BRING THEM INTO THAILAND. 3. SUBJECT ADVISED LNCUFF THAT GEN. KRIANGSAK HAD ORDERED

[illegible] 13 Nov 71

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TION NO.

PAGE TWO BANGKOK 24725 SECRET

ONE HUNDRED MACHINE PISTOLS AND TWENTY SNIPER RIFLES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH H.S.H. ADMIRAL DISKUL, CHIEF AIDE DE CAMP TO H.M. THE KING AND CLAIMS HE WILL SELL HIS MACHINE PISTOL TO THE ROYAL PALACE GUARDS. FURTHER CLAIMS HE WILL HAVE AUDIENCE THIS WEEK WITH H.M. THE KING.

4. FOLLOWING HIS CURRENT THAILAND VISIT, ON 16 NOV 71 SUBJECT AND MR. JASON M. STONE (201-096998) PLAN TRAVEL PHNOM PENH. PLAN TO CONTACT MR. LADD AT PHNOM PENH. ACCORDING LNCUFF SUBJECT PLANS CONTACT CAMBODIAN MIL. AUTHORITIES FOR POSSIBLE WEAPONS SALES. SUBJECT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITEMS FOR GEN. POKSAMAN IN BANGKOK.

5. MR. JASON M. STONE IS HEAD OF BANGKOK BASED FIRM OF ASSOCIATED CONSULTANTS COMPANY LTD. HE IS CHINESE, WHO WORKED WITH WERBELL IN SEA DURING WWII. SUBJECT NOW REPRESENTS BELGIAN ARMS FIRMS AND IS REP FOR PILATUS PORTER AIRCRAFT.

6. FOLLOWING PHNOM PENH VISIT WERBELL PLANS TRAVEL TO LAOS IN A PILATUS PORTER, PROBABLY WITH STONE.

7. DUE RESTRICTION ON PASSING DEROG ON U.S. CITIZEN, BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO FOLLOW IS CAREFUL ADVICE TO LOCAL

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AGE THREE BANGKOK 24725 SECRET

IAISON THAT SUBJECT HAS NO OFFICIAL LNLUTE RELATION

ND CAUTION SHOULD BE EXERCISED IN ANY BUSINESS DEAL. GP-1

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* C/S APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

SECRET

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14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 71-1570

REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

28 October 1971

Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr.
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division
Suite 602, Lynn Building
1111 North 19th Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Mr. Henretta:

I am returning herewith the Interrogatories sent with your letter of October 26, 1971 and which I have executed before a Notary Public as requested.

Since the xerox copy of Mr. Joseph Liebling's letter did not contain some of the formalities that were in the original, I have noted this in my answer to Interrogatory III.

I trust this takes care of what you need.

Very truly yours,

s/ Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

Encl. - Interrogatories

2-22

INTERROGATORIES

Section 1001, Title 18, United States Code. Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any Department or Agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.

I.

Please state your name, address and professional position and indicate how long you have served in this position.

ANSWER:
Lawrence R. Houston, Esquire
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
General Counsel
Twenty-four years

II.

In your official capacity as General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, did you receive a letter dated February 16, 1971 from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense?

ANSWER: Yes

III.

Attached to these interrogatories is a three page document marked "Gov. Ex 14". Are pages 2 and 3 a xerox copy of the letter referred to in Question II?

ANSWER: Yes. The xerox copy does not have handwritten salutation, signature or printed letterhead; however, the text of the original and the xerox copy have been compared and found to be identical.

IV.

If the Answer to III. is in the affirmative did you subsequently respond to this letter?

ANSWER: Yes

V.

If affirmative, is page one of the attachment, "Gov. Ex 14", a xerox copy of your responding letter to Mr. Liebling?

ANSWER: Yes

7.42

VI.

If affirmative, is the information in the letter dated 23 February 1971 (in answer to the questions posed in the letter dated 16 February 1971) true and correct to your best knowledge and belief?

ANSWER: Yes

The foregoing answers to the Interrogatories made by me are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston

Subscribed and Sworn to before me
a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this [illegible]
day of [illegible] 1971.

[illegible]
Notary Public
Fairfax County Va

My Commission Expires May 12, 1973

2.42

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Review Division

Letter dated 26 Oct 71

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L. III, Docket No. 228

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III (MIM-056-71)

FROM:
Deputy Director, DCS
912 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2265

NO. OGC 71-6387

DATE 15 March 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. John K. Greaney, OGC 7D01 HQ				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

MIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service 10 March 1971

ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/css

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

M

Gun Shipment Figures Played Dramatic Roles

By Bruce Galphin
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 2—The two top officials of an Atlanta firm under investigation for receiving guns shipped from Vietnam through Eglin Air Force Base in Florida are no strangers to controversy or dramatic situations.

One was actively involved in plans to set up an anti-Castro base in Haiti, and both were in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 American intervention to put down a revolution.

Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing firm, was indicted 2½ years ago on charges of violating a federal law forbidding preparation of a military expedition against a friendly nation from American territory.

The indictment against WerBell and six others was made after customs agents raided an island camp near Marathon, Fla., where they seized a small arsenal of weapons and found 75 battle-clad exiles and Americans.

Not on Island

WerBell himself was not on the island at the time of the raid.

Only four weeks after WerBell was accused, the U.S. attorney in Miami announced the charge was being dismissed "on the authority of the attorney general" (Ramsey Clark). The federal attorney, William A. Meadows Jr., said he could not make any further comment on why the charge was being dropped.

WerBell commented wryly that he was unhappy because "I've lost my one claim to notoriety."

At the time of the indictment, WerBell was quoted by the Atlanta Constitution as admitting an "extremely combatant role" in the anti-Castro base plans.

The federal indictment had alleged a conspiracy to ship guns and munitions from Atlanta and New York to Miami.

But WerBell told a reporter at the time of the indictment that he had withdrawn his support from the Haitian base plan when it appeared to be headed toward direct military action.

"If I'm called upon again to fight Communists in the western hemisphere, I'll do it," he said. "Anything I've done has served the best interest of the United States."

"I've been involved in anti-communist activities a long time," he said. "I've helped the Dominican government fight the Communists."

Aided Newsman

In the Dominican action two years before, WerBell was credited with pulling a wounded American newsman out of a bullet-riddled car in Santo Domingo. The newsman, Miami Herald photographer Doug Kennedy, had been accidentally wounded by U.S. Marine gunfire.

Fred N. Brown, president of Sionics, also was in the Dominican capital at the time, as an official for an American development corporation.

At one point during the fighting, he said a few days afterward, he and some 200 other Americans were "lined up against a wall" by armed revolutionaries at a Santo Domingo hotel.

He said the rebels were looking for Cuban nationalists, and that he managed to slip inside the hotel, where American embassy officials negotiated safe conduct. He was evacuated by helicopter to a U.S. warship.

"The Communist movement has actually defeated itself" by forcing the United States "to adopt such a firm policy," he commented at the time.

Both the Dominican fighting and the Marathon raid occurred before WerBell and Brown founded Sionics.

An Air Force officer at Eglin is under investigation for his role in three shipments of small arms from Vietnam. WerBell denied reports that the weapons were intended for right-wing anti-Negro groups and said he himself, while in Vietnam had had the captured weapons sent to Atlanta via Eglin for laboratory research.

1969

2.37

201-259910

Viet Arms Shipment to Fla. Aired

By Bruce Galphin
Washington Post Staff Writer

ATLANTA, Dec. 1 — An Atlanta weapons manufacturer said today that he and not an Air Force officer was responsible for three now-controversial shipments of small arms from Vietnam to Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.

And, said the businessman, Mitchell L. Werbell III, "We were trying to do a favor for everybody.

"It's a shame they have taken a nice officer like (Lt. Col.) Paul Marriott and made a scapegoat of him. Marriott didn't even know about it."

Marriott, chief assistant of the Eglin Armament Laboratory, is under investigation for his role in the gun shipments. The Air Force has not yet released a report on findings of its investigation.

Werbell is vice president of Sionics, an Atlanta weapons research and manufacturing company.

He said he spent time in Vietnam supervising the testing of flash and sound suppressors manufactured by his firm. While he was there, he said, various South Vietnamese organizations and military officials gave him guns.

Werbell said he was interested in testing the Sionics suppressors on captured Russian-designed AK-47 machine guns, and that he sent a crate back to the states via Eglin. They were officially registered, were delivered to Atlanta and are now "in various stages of disassembly in our laboratory," he stated.

Washington Post - 2 December 1969

2-36

201-259910

Memo from OGC
23Feb71
OGC-71-0248
Request concerning
affiliation of
WerBell + C.I.A.
(answered "NO")

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Hon. Joseph J. Liebling

Joe: You may already know it, but if you do not, WerBell's lawyer, Edwin Marger, has taken this line before. He was counsel for a British pilot, Hawke, who was tried in Buffalo in 1966 for flying B-26s to Portugal without export licenses. Marger developed the theory that these flights had CIA approval and support. This was totally untrue as we testified at the trial, but Marger seemed convinced that he had a case. He seems to be easily convinced by his clients.

Let me know if you want anything more.

s/Larry
23 February 1971
(DATE)
2.25

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

OGC 71-0248

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 February 1971

The Honorable Joseph J. Liebling
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Security Policy)
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Mr. Liebling:

Re: WerBell, Mitchell L., III

In response to your letter of 16 February 1971 concerning Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III's alleged affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, we have investigated the matter thoroughly, and based on all the information available, the answer is "No" for each of your questions numbered 1 through 6.

You should be advised that Mr. WerBell voluntarily contacted a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency's Domestic Contact Service in Coral Gables, Florida, and at Mr. WerBell's initiation furnished voluntary information for the period 16 December 1965 - 19 November 1966 with eleven contacts. It should be noted that the function of the Domestic Contact Service is to receive information which individuals feel is of interest to the United States Government. The office is overtly listed in the telephone book under the Central Intelligence Agency and, therefore, is readily available for contact.

If Mr. WerBell suggests an affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency, he is hereby authorized to divulge the details of his alleged affiliation in the hearing so that he may not use ostensible security as a means of avoiding answering questions.

Sincerely,

Lawrence R. Houston

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

201-259910

Office of Ass't Secretary of Defense
Letter dated 16 Feb 71
Re: Werbell application for an industrial security clearance.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
REGISTRATION REQUEST

FROM:
FI/DCG/INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER
2 E 03

EXTENSION
5045

NO.
ISRM 36075

DATE
~~21 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. IP/201 Section GA 20		22 Mar		
2.				
3. IP/[illegible] FD/ GB 34				5 - 3: PLEASE RUSH ABSTRACTING
4.				
5. FI/ISR 2 E 03				201- 259910 ABSTRACT X INDEX DATE ~~21 MAR 1972~~ 22 MAR 1972
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				233

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

UTILIZATION		RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISRM NO.	201 NO.

No Record in FR/Index. 23 March 1972

25-9910

100-[illegible]

SIGNATURE Loretta Keighly

DIVISION FR/31

DATE 23 March 1972

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

I S R LOG

NATIONAL FILE NO.		DATE	
	NEW		RE-REGISTRATION
	UTILIZATION		RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY DC No Record 3/24
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISRM NO.	201 NO.

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

I S R LOG

NATIONAL FILE NO.		DATE	
	NEW		RE-REGISTRATION
	UTILIZATION		RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISRM NO.	201 NO.

No Objection to Registration. DCS reserves the right to contact subject in accordance with its responsibilities under NSCID 2, DCID 2/3 and 2/3; but will waive this right by mutual agreement if his intended use so requires.

SIGNATURE ~~DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE~~

Operational Support Staff, 900 Key

[illegible]

DIVISION

DATE 22 Mar 72

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(20-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

ADDRESSEE REMARKS

I S R LOG

NATIONAL FILE NO.		DATE	
	NEW		RE-REGISTRATION
	UTILIZATION		RE-CHECK

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS SPACE

TO: DCS	TO: SECURITY
TO: DO	TO: CCS
ISRM NO.	201 NO.

no CCS objection
23 Mar 72
Jo [illegible]
for Chief/CCS/CCB

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

DATE

FORM 4-70 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2.33

(20-38)

DW-7

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CHECK ONE

CS COPY

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ne Alden
T/ISR
-03 Ext. 5345

REQUEST FOR ☒ REGISTRATION ☐ DE-REGISTRATION

DEADLINE: 1400 HRS., 24 MARCH 1972

ISRM NO. 36,075

DATE 22 MARCH 1972

~~XX~~ NEW | RE-REGISTRATION | X UTILIZATION | RE-CHECK

201 NO. 259910

NAME (Last, First, Middle) WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III

US

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS WER-BELL

DATE OF BIRTH CA 1918

PLACE OF BIRTH Pennsylvania

CITIZENSHIP USA

RESIDENCE Highway 360, Powder Springs, Cobb County, Georgia

PRESENT EMPLOYER Defense Systems, Inc., Powder Springs, Georgia

OCCUPATION President

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFYING DATA

Past Emp: Rich's Dept. Store, Atlanta
Former OSS Officer in CBI Theater, WW II

TRACE RESULTS

RID/INDEX REMARKS

N/ 3-23-72 SAS

RID/CE REMARKS

RESULTS

TO: S & DR

DATE 24 March 72

NATIONAL FILE NO. 238852 Army

1. The ISR has no record of a current operational interest in Subject. This is not a registration.

NOTE: This request for registration in the ISR was changed to a utilization check at the request of Mrs. Goodall, USAFAC, 24 March 1972.

EVB

23 MAR 1972

DROP DATE

REASON DROPPED

CS COPY

SIGNATURE

SECRET

IW CW

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SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

AGENCY MESSAGE

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ______ BY ______ AT ______ Z

ACTION UNIT
WH 11

INFO: FILE, VR, ADDO, DDO/DO, IP/AN, IW, FI 5, DDO, SA 4,
CI, CI/PS, CI/OPS, SOD 3.

ACTION #
498

T 330389 PAGE 01 IN 953234

TOR:201526Z JUN 73 WHIM 18806

SECRET 201451Z JUN 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/05249-73
UFP-921

CITE WH/MIAMI 18806

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL VWVAPOR

SUPDATA - VWAGALLEY/VWKNOB-1 IN MEETING IN NASSAU 15 JUNE 73.
VWKNOB-1 AND VWKNOB-2 INDEPENDENTLY SAID REAL TROUBLE MAKERS RE ABACO WERE U.S. MUNITIONS DEALERS ASSOCIATED WITH MITCHELL WARBELL IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA. CLASSIFIED BY TURNER D. SAUNORAS. INDEX WATKINS. FILE: 189-9-1. UFP-921.

FILED 201451Z

SECRET

2.56 201-259910 201 Werbell

● ROUTINE

IN 953234

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA ~~XXXX~~ SDO ONE CRS

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/05249-73

DIST 20 JUNE 1973

COUNTRY BAHAMA ISLANDS

DOI 15 JUNE 1973

SUBJECT ANTICIPATION THAT ABACO SECESSIONISTS WILL NOT RESORT TO VIOLENCE

ACQ 16 JUNE 1973

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BAHAMIAN SERVICE.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAHAMAS DOES NOT ANTICIPATE ANY VIOLENCE AND/OR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS DURING THE INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. TROUBLE IS NOT EXPECTED FROM THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO AND ERRINGTON WATKINS, LEADING SPOKESMAN FOR THE ABACO SECESSIONISTS AND FORMER FREE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (FNM) MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. TROUBLE MAY, HOWEVER, OCCUR AFTER INDEPENDENCE.

2. WATKINS IS CONSIDERED TO BE AN ERRATIC PERSONALITY WHO COULD TAKE EXTREME ACTION IF ABACO WERE IGNORED BY THE GOVERNMENT AFTER INDEPENDENCE OR NOT GIVEN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

SECRET

256

FORM 4-73 3007 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

IN 953234

TDFIR-314 05249-73

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN THE MEANTINE, WATKINS VALUES HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WISHES TO REGAIN HIS PARLIAMENTARY SEAT. HE, THEREFORE, IS NOT LIKELY TO ATTEMPT ANY VIOLENT ACTION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED ON 13 JUNE 1973 THAT WATKINS HAD BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. ON 15 JUNE THE BAHAMAS PRESS REPORTED THAT WATKINS HAD DECLARED HIMSELF AN INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE IN PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE COUNCIL FOR A FREE ABACO WOULD BE CONVERTED INTO A POLITICAL PARTY.)

3. (BAHAMIAN SERVICE COMMENT: IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WATKINS' NEW POLITICAL PARTY WILL BECOME A SIGNIFICANT FORCE IN THE BAHAMAS. A FEW OTHER FNM MEMBERS, INCLUDING POSSIBLY SIR ROLAND SYMONETTE, CLEOPHAS ADDERLEY AND MICHAEL LIGHTBOURN, MAY JOIN THE NEW PARTY, ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE ALSO EXPELLED FROM THE FNM. IN THE FUTURE, A THREE PARTY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE PROGRESSIVE LIBERAL PARTY, THE OPPOSITION FNM AND THE NEW WATKINS PARTY MAY EMERGE IN THE BAHAMAS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1), (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. SECRET

Trace Request from AF OSI
Case # 04D74 (24C) 3232
[illegible]
Dated 8 May 70

14-00000

FBI document dated 5 May 70
From Atlanta, Ga.
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
werbell, III
Sionics Lab
Route I, Powder Springs,
Georgia

FBI document
dated 13 Mar '70
Bureau file: (NI) 62-108665
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell,
III – Neutrality Matters

26 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Washington Evening Star Article entitled "The Story of CBS and the Plot to Invade Haiti" which appeared in the 26 February 1970 Edition

1. Subject article reported that a CBS cameraman, James WILSON, had contacted CIA agents in Houston while on a space shot assignment in 1966, and that the CIA had informed the FBI, who called on WILSON and referred him to U.S. Customs.

2. WH Division has ascertained that on 30 June 1966, a James WILSON called the CIA Duty Officer of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) office in Houston, Texas, and subsequently related a story about a proposed plot being staged in the U.S. to invade Haiti and overthrow the Duvalier Government, and that CBS had convinced the parties involved that they should allow CBS to photograph and televise a Special Program on the preparations. WILSON requested and received assurances from the DCS officer that he would not be identified as the source of this information.

3. On 6 July 1966, WH Division sent a blind memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State which forwarded a resume of WILSON's story to the DCS, without identifying the source. The memorandum stated that the source's motive for disclosing this information was to alert the U.S. Government to a potentially embarrassing situation if it were involved in an insecure operation. The JMWAVE Station also passed a resume of this information to the U.S. Customs Bureau in Miami.

4. Except in connection with this report, there is no record of any operational involvement by the Agency with WILSON.

201-259916

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SOD/GB

SUBJECT : Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 30 January 1970

1. WH/7 conveyed the substance of your first memorandum on this subject to the FBI, which has now advised us that the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, and the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division of the Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, have both had recent investigative interest in WERBELL's activities.

2. Under these circumstances, WH/7 suggests that LTC Cochrane be advised to inform an appropriate USAF security office of Mr. WERBELL's statements. This should insure that any follow-up inquiry concerning those statements would be properly coordinated with such other investigations as may be in process.

David L. Smock
C/WH/7

201-257910

SOD 70-138

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

REFERENCE: Memorandum for C/WH/7, Same Subject, dated 15 January 1970

1. On 28 January 1970, Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Vice President of SIONICS, Inc., told LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, that he had not been contacted by any interested representative of the U.S. Government concerning the information pertaining to Haitian plotting passed previously. Mr. WerBell said that his reference to the plan being initiated in Canada is a blind and that the plotting is based in Haiti. He also stated that he has been approached to provide the equivalent of five million dollars worth of arms to the group and that the plotting has French backing.

2. The above information was received from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, and is provided to WH/7 for disposition and action. This information, to the best of our knowledge, has not been acted upon by SACSA; however, Mr. WerBell is concerned that no action is being taken or apparent interest shown.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2 26

20 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

REFERENCE : Memo from C/SOD/GB to C/WH/7 dtd 15 Jan 1970
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. Andrew Bacuzzi, SOD/GB, advised 19 January 1969, after my phone call to Mr. Barquin pointing out the third Agency aspect of the Werbell report, that Col. Williamson has checked with his friend Col. Cochrane, and that the latter stated he had taken no other action with this info and intended to take none. Col. Cochrane apparently regards the info as being none of his own official business and was telling his friend (Williamson) about it as a private citizen.

2. Suggest we just use Williamson as the source.

James P. Mullen
C/WH/7/HT

Distribution:
1 - 201-259910
1 - 100-9-16
1 - WH/7/HT Chrono

2.25

201-259910

SOD 70-057

15 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/7

SUBJECT: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti

1. The Vice President of SIONICS Inc., Mr. Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, contacted LTC Barney Cochrane, USAF, assigned to SACSA, in early January 1970 and said that he learned of the existence of plans for a special clandestine operation based perhaps in Canada against President Duvalier's regime within the next four months. Mr. WerBell said that he believes this effort has a good chance of success since it is well financed and directed. Mr. WerBell conveyed to LTC Cochrane that he is willing to reveal all that he knows concerning the organization and its plan to interested U.S. authorities.

2. The above information was obtained from LTC Cochrane by LTC Charles Williamson, USMC, assigned to SOD/GB. SOD and the Office of Security have an extensive file on Mr. WerBell who has a long history of worldwide involvement in borderline and sometimes illegal international gun deals. It is felt by LTC Cochrane that Mr. WerBell's story is plausible and warrants further investigation. Mr. WerBell's motive for revealing this type of information at present could be an effort to relieve pressure on his firm and himself for gun deals that did not conform to U.S. export control regulations and are being investigated and warrants pending.

3. To the best of our knowledge, no action has been taken on this information by SACSA.

Casimiro Barquin
Chief, Ground Branch
Special Operations Division

2.34

Cable from FBI dated 22 Jan 70

Subj: Mitchell Livingston WerBell III, Internal Security - Haiti

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

RG: R. LEHMAN:gt
IT: WH/7/HT
T: 1349-5595
TE: 19 JAN 1970

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
[illegible] PER [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-259916

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 19 50 Z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 003879

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY - HAITI

MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S CSCI 316/02323-69 DATED 27 JUNE 1969; SUBJECT: WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III, A COPY OF WHICH WAS SENT TO YOUR BUREAU.

2. IN EARLY JANUARY 1970, A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WERBELL HAS STATED THAT HE KNOWS OF PLANS FOR A SPECIAL CLANDESTINE OPERATION AGAINST PRESIDENT DUVALIER'S REGIME IN HAITI SCHEDULED TO OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS. WERBELL SAID THE OPERATION, WHICH MIGHT BE BASED IN CANADA, IS WELL FINANCED AND DIRECTED AND, IN HIS ESTIMATION, HAS A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. SOURCE SAID WERBELL EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REVEAL ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO INTERESTED U.S. AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE PLANS AND THE ORGANIZATION BEHIND THE CLANDESTINE OPERATION.

Continued. . .

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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2, 22

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ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
________ PER ________ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

ONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 003879

SOURCE COMMENTED THAT WERBELL'S MOTIVE FOR REVEALING THIS INFORMATION TO U.S. AUTHORITIES AT THIS TIME MAY BE THE HOPE OF RELIEVING PRESSURE ON HIS FIRM AND HIMSELF FOR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BELIEVED TO BE PRESENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS.

3. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY REFLECT THAT WERBELL IS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC., OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS BY YOUR BUREAU IN CONNECTION WITH HIS NUMEROUS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS AGENCY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH YOUR BUREAU CAN OBTAIN CONCERNING THE ALLEGED OPERATION REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: Memo for C/WH/7 from C/SOD/GB
Subject: Possible Clandestine Planning Involving Haiti
Dated : 15 January 1970

C/CI/LIAISON

C/WH/R ________
SOD/GB ________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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222

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501-259916

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible]7 JUN 1969

TO: Chief, Counterintelligence Division
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General, USAF

1

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

1. Reference is made to your request dated 28 May 1969 concerning Subject, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The files of this office contain the following information.

2. According to a summary report dated 19 March 1969, compiled from numerous documents, Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 when it was discovered that he was involved with anti-CASTRO plotters in the Dominican Republic. Further investigation disclosed Subject to be unscrupulous--a wheeler-dealer and promoter of grandiose schemes, with a history of materializing in areas and situations where he can make a quick profit. The report also revealed that Subject, in his foreign dealings, had misrepresented himself as an employee of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. In March 1969 Subject was in Thailand conducting or attempting to conduct business with the Royal Thai Government.

CSCI-316/02323-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Department of State

CC: Defense Intelligence Agency

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

RID/CE: JKS/MB/nkc
BASED ON: DIR-88114, 19 March 1969 (to Bangkok)
FILE IN: 201-259910*

SECRET

201-259910

Trace Request from AF, Counterintelligence Division,
Directorate of Special Investigations

File No 04D 74 (24c) 3232 dated 28 May 69

SECRET - TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - FTBA-33,068

DATE - 30 JUNE 1969

FILM - NONE

INDEX - NONE

FILE - NONE

TO - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

SUBJECT - 0 SIONICS INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REF - FTBW-16321

1. STATION HAD SEEN PUBLICATION CITED PARA ONE OF REF.

2. WERBELL FIRST CAME TO ATTENTION OF STATION IN LATE MARCH 1969, WHEN HE WAS IN CONTACT WITH BPP IN BANGKOK. AFTER RECEIVING DIR 98114 IN RESPONSE TO OUR TRACE REQUEST, WE SUGGESTED TO BPP THAT THEY WOULD DO WELL TO AVOID HIM. WE HEARD NOTHING OF HIM FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, IN LATE APRIL AND EARLY MAY HE WAS BACK IN THE SPOTLIGHT AND, WE DISCOVERED, IN TOUCH WITH A VARIETY OF RTG AND U.S. MILITARY ELEMENTS. WE PROMPTLY PASSED THE GIST OF HIS REPUTATION TO KEY PERSONALITIES IN THE MISSION INCLUDING AMBASSADOR, DEFENSE ATTACHE, ARPA, SA/CI, U.S. ARMY CIC, OSI AND J-2 MACTHAI. WE PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPONSORED IN ANY WAY BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HIS NAME HAS COME UP CONSISTENTLY FOR PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND WE HAVE PULLED VERY FEW PUNCHES IN DESCRIBING HIM, EITHER TO AMERICANS OR THAIS. IN FACT, WE WROTE A MEMORANDUM EXPRESSING OUR RESERVATIONS, PASSED IT TO J-2 MACTHAI, AND SUGGESTED HE BRIEF THE J-2 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCORDINGLY. WE ALSO SENT A BURN NOTICE MESSAGE, BANGKOK 3055, TO ALL FE STATIONS.

3. AFTER DYNAMIC BEGINNING, WERBELL IS NOW SUFFERING EXPECTED

[illegible]

~~DEFERRED~~

CS COPY

201-259910

SETBACKS. THE EMBASSY HAS REFUSED TO ENDORSE HIM AND HIS PRODUCTS. MACTHAI HAS AGREED TO FURNISH TO RTG SOME OF THE ITEMS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO PEDDLE, AND RTG HAS COOLED CONSIDERABLY RE SIONICS PARTICIPATION IN ANY ASPECT OF COUNTER INSURGENCY EFFORT. WERBELL'S RUNNING MATE, M/GEN WATSON, HAS ALREADY LEFT THAILAND. WERBELL IS SUPPOSED TO LEAVE SHORTLY. WE WILL MISS HIM.

I'll bet

EDGAR N. DANAGE

DISTRIBUTION VIA TELEPOUCH

2 - CHIEF, FE DIVISION

2.19

State Dept. Telegram
BANGKOK 8458 dated 25 June '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

ITEM NO - FTBW-16301

FILE NO - 201-259910

DATE - 23 JUNE 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, BANGKOK

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

SUBJECT- SIONICS, INC. PROPOSAL TO RTG FOR SNIPER TRAINING
PROGRAM

ACTION - NONE

REFS - A. DIRECTOR [illegible]114
B. DIRECTOR [illegible]
C. BANGKOK 3055 (IN 66602)

1. POUCHING PRIORITY UNDER TM 403749 COPY OF SIONICS PROPOSAL ''NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST THREAT IN THAILAND'' OBTAINED LOCALLY FROM LNREAD WHICH STATION MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE SEEN.

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3. REALIZE THAT STATION IS NOT IN POSITION TO EXERT VETO OVER SIONICS PROPOSAL BUT FEEL IT INCUMBENT UPON WOFIRM TO APPRISE SA/CI, MACTHAI, AMBASSADOR AND ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES ON WERBELL'S BACKGROUND AND OUR VERY STRONG RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF THIS PROPOSAL TO CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY ''TO THE DEFEAT OF COMMUNIST TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION IN THAILAND'' AS ADVERTISED, AND EVEN STRONGER RESERVATIONS RE ANY OFFICIAL INVEOLVEMENT WITH WERBELL.

4. FURTHER CHECK OF 201 FILE INDICATES SUBJECT REFS ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE IN APRIL 1943, WAS COMMISSIONED 2ND LIEUTENANT IN SIGNAL CORPS JUNE 1944 AND ASSIGNED TO CHINA-BURMA THEATER. SUBJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO OSS FROM APRIL UNTIL DECEMBER 1945 WHEN HE RETURNED TO WOLADY AND WAS DISCHARGED AS 1ST LIEUTENANT. IN ADDITION TO FOUR CAMPAIGN MEDALS, SUBJECT WAS AWARDED SOLDIERS MEDAL FOR PERSONAL HEROISM EXHIBITED IN SAVING THE LIFE OF CHINESE SOLDIER WHO FELL INTO ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMER. RECORD INDICATES NO FURTHER MILITARY SERVICE.

JOHN [illegible]

ATTACHMENT, U/S/C

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Robert D. Kennedy

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Robert D. Kennedy

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CFE William E. Nelson

23 June 1969

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STATE 101507 dated 20 JUNE '69
Subject: Export License for
Ingram Submachine Gun

State Dept. Telegram
BANGKOK 8235 dated 20 June '69
(re: import license)

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State Dept. Telegram
STATE 087398 dated 29 May 69
Subject! Starlight Scopes and
Silencers

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AN ~~am~~	
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ABSTRACT X	

1. WE HAVE BEEN PLAGUED FOR SOME WEEKS NOW BY MR. MITCHELL L. WERBELL III, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF R AND D OF SIONICS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, HAS A VARIETY OF WEAPONS TO DISPLAY, CLAIMS TO BE A RETIRED COLONEL, AND LAST WEEK INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS CHIEF OF WOFIRM IN THAILAND.

2. WERBELL HAS A HISTORY OF SHOWING UP IN TROUBLE SPOTS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FAST BUCK. HE IMPLIES THAT HE IS U.S. GOVT CONNECTED AND PRESENTS A DEMONSTRATION OF A VARIETY OF EXOTIC WEAPONS THAT NEVER FAILS TO IMPRESS. REF DESCRIBES HIM AS AN UNSCRUPULOUS OPPORTUNIST WITH A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS.

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CW

3. WERBELL IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, BORN 1919, SERVED IN OSS, HAS SHAVEN HEAD AND HANDLEBAR MUSTACHE. REF ADVISES THAT FULL DETAILS OF HIS BACKGROUND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON SINCE HE IS U.S. CITIZEN. HOWEVER, STATES THAT LIAISON CAN BE INFORMED, SHOULD HE APPEAR IN YOUR AREA, THAT HE HAS AN UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO U.S. GOVT CONNECTIONS, AND ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.

4. FOR SAIGON: WE UNDERSTAND THAT WERBELL RECENTLY VISITED SAIGON AND DID HIS THING WITH GEN. ABRAMS, WHO WAS SUITABLY IMPRESSED, AND WERBELL IS NOW SETTING UP A SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM.

JUN 18 69

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SIONICS

[illegible] PEACHTREE STREET N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309 (404) 873-3072

26 May 1969

Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, RTAF
Bangkok, Thailand

Dear Air Chief Marshal Dawee:

Sionics, Inc. is pleased to submit this proposal in response to the urgent requirement to neutralize the communist terrorist threat in the border areas of Thailand. This requirement was first brought to our attention during the recent trip to threatened border areas of Thailand made by yourself, Air Vice Marshal Manob, and Major General Prasart, accompanied by our field representative to Thailand, Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III.

This urgent requirement was of course further discussed with you during your recent visit to Washington to attend the funeral of General Eisenhower.

In consequence we have prepared a pilot program with the objective of neutralizing the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand. We have entitled the program "Neutralization of the Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand" with short title NCTTT. In scope the NCTTT encompasses five major phases and spans a twelve month program. Basically we offer a proven program based, in part, on the outstandingly successful U. S. 9th Division Sniper Program in the Delta of Vietnam. Finally, and most importantly, this program is also based on Special Operations programs executed by members of the Sionics organization during wartime, counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations executed in South Asia, Europe, South America, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

We have selected a team of highly qualified experts whose combined capabilities represent all the disciplines required to the planning and execution of this program.

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In view of the above, Sionics, Inc. assures you that the full resources of the Corporation will be provided for the successful performance of this work. We look forward to the opportunity of serving the Royal Thai Government in order to contribute to the defeat of Communist terrorism and subversion in Thailand.

With Warm Personal Regard and Respect.

Sincerely,

Sionics, Inc.

Fred N. Brown

Fred N. Brown
President

2,12

A PROGRAM
FOR THE
NEUTRALIZATION OF THE
COMMUNIST/TERRORIST THREAT
IN THAILAND

VOLUME I: OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL

16 May, 1969

Prepared for: Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya
Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Supreme Command, [illegible]
Bangkok, Thailand

Prepared by: [illegible]ONICS, INC.
Atlanta, Georgia

2

PROPRIETARY NOTICE

The data furnished herein--

shall not be disclosed outside the Royal Thai Government or the United States Government or be duplicated, used or disclosed in whole or in part for any purpose other than to evaluate this proposal, provided that if a contract is awarded to this offeror as a result of or in connection with the submission of such data, these Governments shall have the right to duplicate, use, or disclose this data to the extent provided in the contract. This restriction does not limit these Governments' right to use information contained in such data if it is obtained from another source.

SIONICS, INC.
Atlanta, Georgia

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[illegible] INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This proposal is presented by SIONICS, Inc. in response to urgent requirements to neutralize the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand as voiced by responsible members of the Royal Government of Thailand.

We have examined the problem in detail and have concluded that the unique capabilities of SIONICS, Inc. can provide one answer to stopping Communist terrorism in Thailand. We have either worked on, are working on, or will soon become involved in projects of this type, which will insure immediate working knowledge of the essential elements for problem solution.

We have established firm liaison with the Royal Thai Government and U. S. Government organizations in Thailand to include Supreme Command Headquarters, MRDC, U. S. Embassy, USOM, ARPA, JUSMAG, MACTHAI, MACV. Additionally, SIONICS has established wide and successful relationships with U. S. Government and industrial organizations concerned with the problem.

In consequence, it is considered that SIONICS, Inc. would be fully capable of executing the program proposed and of expanding it to help solve the final problem of arresting Communist subversion in Thailand. It is our opinion that the methodology format, and related matters are well described in this proposal. Our task will be to field a team of professional and highly qualified military technicians, backed by appropriate support and resources, that will be fully capable of executing this plan to the complete satisfaction of the Royal Thai Government. To

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this and we have personnel immediately available that represent a solid blend of counter-insurgency operational experience and technical knowledge.

In view of the nature of the problem, this proposal is basically an outline plan indicating how the operation will be accomplished. This volume presents our operational proposal, along with a proposed management plan, a summary of corporate experience, and the resumes of the military and technical personnel SIGNICS, Inc. proposes to assign to the effort. The Cost Proposal is submitted separately as VOLUME II.

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II. PROBLEM

To provide a plan which will contribute to the neutralization of the Communist terrorist threat in Thailand.

III. PROBLEM DISCUSSION

A. Fundamental Requirements for Problem Solution

[illegible], Inc. consider that the basic success of this plan will depend in large measure of fielding a team of knowledgeable individuals who:

1. Know Thailand and the considerable Communist threat to its border areas,

2. Know the principal personalities in the Royal Thai Government (RTG) concerned with neutralizing the Communist threat,

3. Know the principal U. S. Government officials in Thailand, South Vietnam, and Washington, D. C. concerned with assisting the RTG in neutralizing this threat,

4. Fully understand the threat of Communist terrorism and subversion and possess the knowledge and skill to counteract this threat,

5. Know and be able to apply firsthand the tactics, techniques, organizational and training procedures, and weapons and equipment techniques/employment to defeat this threat, and

6. Possess long experience and proven skills in defeating an insurgent threat.

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B. Systematic Introduction of Military Judgement

By definition the neutralization or defeat of Communist terrorism consists of the specialized application of counter-insurgency operations by the employment of intelligence; psychological operations; hunter-killer operations to include jungle, mountain, air, riverine, border, and village security operations; communications; logistics; specialized training and equipment, and other techniques. SIONICS, Inc. considers that the techniques designed by our Corporation to neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand is based on sound past experience in this field and would lead to the development of a wide-spread organization and system within the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF), the Border Patrol Police (BPP), and the Thai National Police (TNP) to counteract this threat throughout the country.

Establishment of a system and organization to neutralize the Communist threat cannot be accomplished without reliance on sound and informed military judgement based on proven techniques. SIONICS, Inc. has pioneered in the development of these techniques which permit the systematic development and use in analysis and execution of military and technical judgement.

The techniques and equipment developed for this purpose are designed and operate for the "usual or normal" case in which they will be used under combat conditions. The capability that accrues from the employment of these techniques and equipment in unusual or peculiar situations should be considered a bonus effect rather than an expected mode of operation.

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6. Critical Factors Related to Solving the Problem

Operational planning for successful counter-insurgency operations requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy, weather, terrain, friendly force operations and capabilities, and intimate knowledge of the population within the operational area. Additionally, one of the critical factors in counter-insurgency operations is the psychological operations effort that must be geared with any operation of this type. The key to success of these operations is to identify, infiltrate, block, ambush, harrass, and otherwise neutralize the enemy. The basic concept of operations is to strike him when he is most vulnerable, in his rear areas, when he is moving to his objective, or just before he commences his attack. In order to operate in this environment special operational detachments, or hunter-killer teams, will be needed. The individuals that man these teams as well as those who command and direct them, will have to be specially trained, equipped, organized, and, above all, psychologically prepared for these operations.

As a final note this operation to be successful must be fully supported by the Royal Thai Government, the Chief U.S. Mission to Thailand, Chief JUSMAG, and COMUSMACTHAI/MACV.

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[illegible] PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Objective

To arrest or neutralize Communist terrorism in the border areas of Thailand.

B. Program Title

Neutralization of Communist Terrorist Threat in Thailand (NCTTT).

C. Scope

The scope of this program encompasses a twelve month, five phase operation as follows:

Phase I - Planning, preparation, and installation of Training Center.

Phase II - Selection of personnel, organization of first RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) and Training Program.

Phase III - Insertion of Platoon into Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility, initiation of Hunter/Killer operations, organization, training and insertion of two additional SO H/K Platoons.

Phase IV - Evaluation of operations to include amending operational concepts, organization, planning, logistics and administration.

Phase V - Expansion of operations with three SO H/K Platoons. Continuance of operations to include deep penetration missions. Preparation for further expansion of NCTTT as required.

D. Schedule

See Figure 1.

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SIONICS, Inc. will have immediately available a team of selected military and technical experts to work on the project. These personnel, led by Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III, SIONICS Field Representative in Thailand and Vietnam, will be backed by appropriate civilian technical personnel who would provide expertise as required in the general fields of sniper and special operations training and the maintenance of the operational equipment and weapons. The Corporation would assign these people to projects in accordance with their individual capabilities.

Program Schedule -- See Figure 1 (NCTTT Program Schedule, Twelve Months).

During the first week after initiation of the program, Mr. WerBell, as program manager, will meet with selected Supreme Command and Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) personnel for the initial establishment of NCTCT planning and organization of the joint MRDC/SIONICS Operations Planning Group (JSOPG). At this time he will receive an indoctrination orientation and guidance from appropriate Supreme Command and MRDC personnel. Coordination, communications channels and liaison requirements will be established. In this regard, it is anticipated that a period of from two to three weeks will be required for this initial planning and the establishment of basic and detailed joint operational plans.

During the next two weeks period, joint activity will consist of the selection of appropriate Sniper Training Team personnel from RTA units and Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon personnel from appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP

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units in Thailand. In this regard, the Sniper Team should be drawn if at all possible from the ten previously trained sniper personnel presently on duty with the Black Panther Division in Vietnam. These personnel were trained in the U. S. 9th Division Sniper Training Program in the Vietnam Delta. During this Phase personnel will be organized into the SO H/K Platoon structure.

During the period 6th through the 12th week, Platoon personnel would be undergoing the sniper training program consisting of basic firing positions and integrated acts of shooting. Additionally, during this period, JSOPG would establish standing operating procedures and effect the liaison with appropriate RTAF, BPP and TNP units in the joint Tactical Area of Operations Responsibility (TAOR) selected for the pilot program for the First Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. Thus, at the end of the third program month, the first teams would be selected, organized, trained and ready for insertion into the TAOR.

During the next phase, the operational phase, the three Hunter/Killer teams of the First Provisional SO H/K Platoon would be inserted into the TAOR and established with appropriate Thai military and para-military border control units. At this time SIONICS advisory and technical personnel would be working closely with appropriate JSOPG opposite numbers in order to insure proper employment of the teams. It is important to note here, however, that at no time would SIONICS team personnel be expected to actually direct or enter into operational activities of the Special Operations Hunter/Killer

2.12

team. On the contrary, they would be enjoined and prohibited from entering into any form of combat activity whatsoever.

During the operational phase, (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th months) [illegible] personnel would follow closely SO H/K Team activities and conduct with their Thai counterparts continuous evaluation of team activities. During the entire Operational Phase continuing evaluation of the NCTTF Program would be carried on. At some time between the 5th and 6th months a mutual decision would be made with MRDC officials for recommendations to be made to the RTAF Supreme Command for the expansion of team activity and the inclusion of the two additional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoons into a Special Operations Hunter/Killer Company for further operations and protection for additional villages. These operations would be continued to include deep penetration operations as appropriate and permissible providing the RTG obtains permission for across the border operations "in hot pursuit" of Communist terrorists. During the entire insertion and operational phase, it is to be underscored that psychological operations will be conducted at all times in conjunction with Special Operations Hunter/Killer Team activity. The final three months of the 12 month NCTTF program schedule would be devoted to further expansion as necessary of Special Operations Hunter/Killer team activity and/or organization of further Special Operations Hunter/Killer Companies for employment throughout the border areas of Thailand.

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I. Organization and Management (See Figure 2)

Because of the importance which SIONICS, Inc. attaches to the proposed program, we will keep close top management cognizance of this project. The responsible officer (Mr. WerBell) is a Director and Vice President of SIONICS and will report directly to the President of the Corporation. In this manner, we can assure you that to the extent necessary, the full resources of the Corporation can be made available to guarantee a fully satisfactory program.

In managing this project we proposed to guarantee continually and consistency throughout the entire period of this effort. The key to this, of course, rests with the personnel assigned. Frequent changes in personnel will be avoided, and if changes are required, because of new skills being required, replacement personnel will be phased in with adequate overlap wherever possible. A full resume on Mr. WerBell may be found in Part VI of this proposal. It is to be noted that he has had considerable experience in the counter-insurgency field, having served in South Vietnam and the Far East for SIONICS since September of 1968. He has had long experience in weapons and clandestine operations dating back to World War II at which time he was a parachute unit Commander of a Special operations group in OSS units operating in the Far East. Since that time he has been continuously interested in development of exotic weaponry and is the holder of several patents in this field. Since 1958, he has devoted practically all of his time in anti-communist activities throughout Central and South America

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[illegible] has advised a number of Central American governments on counter insurgency activities and development of weapons techniques for this purpose.

The Program Manager would be assisted by a staff of extremely competent experts chosen from his wide cognizance and knowledge of counter-insurgency experts throughout the free world. He would be assisted when necessary by Major General Harold E. Watson, Director of BIONICS and in charge of technical planning. His knowledge and background in corporate planning, world-wide government, and corporate contracts is considered invaluable to the BIONICS group.

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IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General Concept

The purpose of this program will be to strike the Communist insurgents where they are most vulnerable and to mesh the operations of selected Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams into present Royal Thai Government ongoing Counterinsurgency Programs based on the proven and historic causes of victory over the Communists:

Aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics.

Removal of sections of the population thus depriving insurgents of contact with the people.

Removal of the support of the population.

In attacking Communist terrorist vulnerability, the Special Operations Hunter/Killer program will be designed to operate against the enemy and concentrate on the following categories of insurgent vulnerability:

1. Insurgent base area system which, although fragmented, is a coherent complex of combat, combat support, and combat service support facilities and activities which embrace populated as well as remote areas. In this, Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will, in the final phases of the operation, be directed to attack or operate on the perimeters of insurgent base area systems.

2. Insurgent combat units in avoiding prolonged combat may use escape routes that will subject them ideally to ambush by Hunter/Killer Teams. In this, the classic principals of "the hammer and anvil operation" will be employed. Helicopter

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[illegible] deployment of Special Operations Hunter/Killer [illegible] will aid in effective and swift team ingression and with- [illegible] at the [illegible] moment.

3. Special Operations Hunter/Killer Teams will operate within the border areas and village complexes in order to operate directly within the population against and within which Communist terrorists operate.

4. Operational Phasing

1. Phase I - Planning, Preparation, and Installation of Training Center.

Initiation of planning by SIGNICS Program Manager with the Supreme Command and Hq. Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) selected personnel. Establishment of a Joint MRDC/SIGNICS Special Operations Planning Group (JSOPG) to develop detailed plans for the organization, training and operational employment of an RTG Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon. In this, the JSOPG may be expanded to include selected personnel from JUSMAG, USOM, and ARPA as required.

b. Training Center and Program

(1) Establishment of the Training Center

A RTG Sniper School and Special Operations Training Center will be established at a location to be designated. As a basis for school personnel, a team of one officer and ten NCO's will be selected. In order to save the five to six weeks required to train this team it will be necessary to draw this team from the ten members of the RTA Black Panther Division who

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graduated from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. One member of the team must be an experienced [illegible] familiar with M-14 accurizing techniques. Additional MTA officers and NCO personnel will be required to staff the Center with instructors in special operations, artillery fire adjustment, navigation, map reading and deception operations. A certain number of Training Center command administrative personnel will also be required.

(2) Training Facility

A sniper training facility will be constructed to accommodate 30 students. The facility should include a 40 point firing range and adjacent classrooms. The range should be built with target facilities at 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters. A moving target should be built on the 300 meter butt in addition to the fixed targets at that position.

c. Equipment

(1) The sniper teams of the SO R/K Pltn. will be equipped with National Match Grade M-14 rifles obtained by urgent [illegible] request to JUSMAG. These rifles are glass bedded into impregnated stocks which are impervious to water. The rifles are carefully tuned to provide a high degree of accuracy.

(2) The accurized M-14 rifles will be equipped with a 3-9 variable power adjustable ranging telescope sight (ART). The telescope is mounted in conjunction with a ballistic cam. The sight reticle includes a pair of stadia lines. By varying the power of the telescope until the stadia lines define a 30 inch area on the target, the ballistic cam

2.12

[illegible] the sight to the proper elevation for that distance. Errors due to range estimation are virtually eliminated with this system. As an alternate the M-14 accurized rifle could be equipped with the M84 telescope. These sights are a fixed 2.2 power telescope with a post reticle. Using the M84 the sniper must accurately estimate the gun target range and either hold over the target or adjust the elevating mechanism on the sight to the estimated range.

(3) For night operations at least one half of the sniper rifles will be equipped with the VARO Starlight Scope. VARO Starlight Scopes will be mounted on the M-14 rifles at the sniper school and zeroed during training. The sniper retains his own scope/rifle/suppressor combination during subsequent operations. This procedure assures retention of zero even though the sight is dismounted during daylight operations and remounted for night operations.

(4) The ammunition used in sniper training and combat must be 7.62mm U. S. National Match Grade.

(5) All M-14 sniper rifles will be filled with the SIONICS-MAW-2 noise suppressor. (See Inclosure 1 for complete description). As noted above, each student will retain his own rifle/scope/suppressor combination during subsequent operations.

(6) Additional to the basic sniper rifle/scope/suppressor combination, the SO H/K Pltn. will be equipped with alternate noise suppressed weapons on as required by the

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[illegible] ammunition, demolition, and individual equipment will also be provided as required.

2. Phase II – Organization and Training

a. Selection of Personnel

The JSOPC will, during the 4th and 5th week select a total of 80 highly qualified and motivated personnel. Students accepted into the sniper program will be selected from volunteers. Those who are selected must have 20/20 vision, have qualified as an expert rifleman and be well motivated soldiers. Experience in competitive marksmanship is preferred but is not mandatory.

b. Organization

See Figure 3.

The first RTC Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon will be organized into a Platoon Headquarters and three Hunter/Killer teams as shown. Double Slotting will be authorized during Phase II to provide for an estimated 30% attrition rate. This figure is based on the average attrition rate at the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School in Vietnam. Thus, total training strength will be 2 officers, 12 NCO's, and 66 Junior NCO's or enlisted men for a total of 80 officers and men. Operational strength will be as shown on Figure 3.

c. Training Program

Prior to selection and organization of selected student candidates for the RTC Provisional Special Operations Hunter/Killer Platoon (SO H/K Pltn.) a training program will be prepared and rehearsed with the following as basic precepts:

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(i) The training will be of six weeks duration and include basic firing positions, and the integrated act of [illegible], trigger squeeze, breath control, sight alignment, and sight picture. Students will be taught the techniques of estimating lead and engaging moving targets. Instruction will be provided on the methods for estimating wind over extreme ranges so that a firer can off set his point of aim to place the bullet on target. Following this, students will learn the methods of zeroing M-14 accurized rifles equipped with the adjustable ranging telescopic sight (ART), the VARO Starlight Scope or the fixed power M84 telescopic sight, and the SIONICS-MAW-2 suppressor. Night firing will be included in the course and each student will learn to engage targets with his starlight scope at ranges of 150, 300, and 600 meters.

(ii) In addition to marksmanship training, students will be schooled in adjustment of artillery fire, day/night land navigation, map reading, and deception operations (See Table A). Each of these subjects is important to the sniper. He frequently must select his position from a situation map and then travel to that location at night. It is essential that he select the optimum position, know his position in relationship to friendly units and be able to navigate to his preselected position. The ability to accurately adjust artillery fire is important to a sniper. He frequently must adjust illuminating rounds skillfully so that illumination is placed on target in such a manner as to illuminate the target and not compromise

2.12

the sniper's position or that of an adjacent friendly unit.

(iii) Qualification firing will be conducted during the last week of the course. Silhouette targets will be engaged at 150,300,600 and 900 meters with eight targets being engaged by each man during two qualifying courses. Ten points will be awarded for a first round hit and five points for a second round hit. A maximum score is 160 points. A minimum qualifying score is 130.

(iv) Experience gained from the U. S. 9th Division Sniper School shows that approximately 50% of the students successfully complete the course. Thus, at least double the number of final candidates required should be selected to attend the school.

d. Equipment

See Figure 4.

3. Phase III - Development and Insertion of Hunter/Killer Teams, Initiation of Operations

a. Insertion (See Figure 5.)

During this phase the First RTG Provisional SOT H/K Plt. will be inserted into a Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility (TAOR) under operational control of a Royal Thai Army or Border Patrol Police unit. The Platoon will operate under operational control of the RTA or BPP Commander who will be advised in the employment of the Special Operational Team and the three Hunter/Killer Teams by selected members of the JSOPG.

212

B. Initiation of Operations:

Initially and until fire [illegible] are established, [illegible] will be ordered to carry out the following type missions:

(1) Ambush patrols:

Snipers from H/K Teams will be attached to [illegible] or PF units and deployed with ambush patrols. This technique has been the most successful method of employment. Two techniques will be used extensively:

(a) Snipers accompany a platoon ambush. When employed with a platoon ambush, the snipers will remain close to the platoon command post. When an element of the platoon observes enemy activity, the snipers are alerted to that location. They then engage selectively at night with the starlight scope and MAW-A2 suppressors or with the ART scope and MAW-A2 suppressor during daylight. If there is but one Viet Cong in the area, he is taken under fire by a sniper. In this way the ambush position and location of automatic weapons are not compromised due to the quiet operation of the rifle. When a group of communists approach the killing zone, the snipers engage the leaders and radio operators while the platoon fires into the general kill zone. Another technique will be used in an ambush is that of having the snipers fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone. Snipers are also used to engage the enemy who probe the ambush site in order to attempt to draw fire

2.12

prematurely. This avoids the disclosure of automatic weapons positions and detonation of Claymore mines or other anti-disturbance/warning devices.

(i) Snipers with Security Element in Ambush. The second method of employment will be that of placing snipers and a five to eight man security element in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area will be selected by the NTA or BRP commander after considering enemy activity in the area and the advice of the sniper team. The team will then be moved to a NTA or BRP forward position where it is joined by the security element equipped with M-16's, an M79, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The sniper/ambush position will be occupied just prior to dark and selected to provide maximum range of fires and location within a reasonable distance from a friendly unit. The snipers maintain continuous surveillance of the area. Eye fatigue at night is minimized by having the snipers alternate use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The M79 is an especially useful weapon at the sniper/ambush position. As an example, the enemy frequently have been observed in a tree line or vegetated area in which a shot was not possible due to low light level. Using tracer fire and by directing M79 fire into the area, the security element forced the enemy to move and expose themselves to subsequent sniper fire.

(ii) Stay-Behinds

H/K Teams trained for long range operations will be extremely effective in engaging enemy ambushers who follow

2.12

[illegible] unit as it moves from one location to another. In this case a sniper team with a 5-8 man security element is selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit will travel and pick off the enemy as they follow in ambush. Snipers with their telescope sights and MAW-2 suppressors will be able to engage the enemy at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the enemy will usually not be cautious about his cover and concealment. Thus, he presents an excellent target for the H/K team.

(iii) Off-Set

(a) A VARO Xenon search light will be used to illuminate covertly an area with pink light. The starlight scope is sensitive to a portion of the infrared band that is pink and near the visible light portion of the spectrum. By using a pink filter on a Xenon search light an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This phenomena will be used in two types of sniper activity: village or perimeter security and ambush operations. Employment of the rifle/scope/suppressor combination will frequently result in the enemy receiving many casualties before he has been taken under fire.

(b) Ambushes will be conducted by placing a searchlight equipped 1/4 ton vehicle 1200 to 1500 meters from a road intersection. Snipers equipped with starlight scopes and MAW-2 suppressors will be placed 300 meters from the intersection and maintain radio contact with the searchlight operator. The sniper

2.12

will control the covert illumination of the intersection and surrounding area. When the communists appear in the kill zone they will be engaged by the sniper team. Thus, by off-setting the sniper team from the searchlight and placing the searchlight and 1/4 ton vehicle in a position remote from the ambush site, the enemy in the kill zone will not be alerted by the noise of the running vehicle engine.

(c) The VARO pink light/sniper combination will be employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a 1/4 ton vehicle responds to radio equipped sniper teams in positions either on the perimeter or on ambush positions outside the perimeter. The background noise of a village or fixed base camp usually conceals the noise of the engine and activity of the searchlight crew. In forward base camps the searchlight remains in the center of the base camp and, by swinging its beam through 360 degrees, covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. With this method it is again essential that the sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew. The pink light is particularly useful during the dark of the moon period.

(iv) Counter Sniper

H/K Teams are effective in countering enemy sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M49 Spotting Scope, will search the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas. A recent example, in Vietnam, is

2.12

night of a unit, after having been fired on by a Viet Cong sniper from long range, deployed its sniper team. The team searched the tree line with its optical equipment and the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree at 720 meters distance. While one team member judged the wind using the M49 spotting scope, the other man fired one round, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

(v) Night Hunter Operations

Night Hunter Operations will be conducted to mark targets. A sniper team of 2 men placed in a lead helicopter observe the ground with the starlight scopes mounted on their rifles. When the enemy is sighted, the snipers engage with tracers. Helicopter gun ships, following at a higher altitude then engage the targets. Artillery HE and illumination are adjusted on target as necessary.

(vi) Special Operations

The Special Operation Team, sniper-trained, will be employed under Platoon Commander control for coup-de-main, sabotage/demolition, and sniper activities against the enemy as dictated by the situation and requirements of the [illegible]/SPF unit counter-terrorist plan.

2. Subsequent Operations

As experience is gained with combined Sniper team and host unit [illegible] or SPF operations, the Special Operations and Hunter/Killer Teams will gradually expand operations to fulfill their basic roles -- that of independently operating teams moving silently to interdict, ambush and destroy the enemy

2.12

[illegible] he moves close to his chosen targets. Local [illegible] or other indigenous tribesmen will be recruited as trackers and [illegible] [illegible] teams operating much the same as did the Malayan jungle trackers with British hunter/killer teams in Malaya from 1955 to [illegible].

c. Psychological Operations

Hunter/Killer operations in conjunction with RTA and BPP units, or with RTG Mobile Training Units must include provision for comprehensive psychological operations. There is no method better designed to strike terror into the heart of the communist terrorist than to see his comrades-in-arms killed, as if by magic, by a silent bullet fired from some "unknown" and distant source. Thus, the inherent long-range flexibility and effectiveness of the rifle/scope/suppressor/sniper combination must be exploited to its fullest. Rumor campaigns, 'silver bullet' propaganda, leaflet drops, airborne loudspeaker "talking bird" operations, and other classic psychological operations techniques must all drum home the theme that the communist terrorist is no longer safe in his sanctuary areas nor does he enjoy the classic guerrilla initiative as he once was taught to believe. Aggressive hunter/killer operations combined with astute and massive psychological operations will be employed to destroy communist terrorists will to fight and, most importantly, to discourage local indigenous tribesmen from joining communist ranks.

2.12

4. Phase IV - Evaluation

The NCTTT Program will be subject to close and continuing evaluation by a MRDC Test and Evaluation Team organized and fielded by the JSOPG. Comprehensive records and test data will be gathered and analyzed in order to amend operational concepts and organizations as well as administrative, logistical, and training techniques as required. The Test and Evaluation Team should adhere to accepted principles of field experimentation as appropriate; e.g., the evaluation should be an elaboration of common sense and convenient ordering of evaluation matters so that the Hunter/Killer Teams encounter minimum interruptions.

Upon completion of the Evaluation Phase the T&E Unit will make appropriate recommendations to MRDC for continuation and expansion of the NCTTT Program beyond the 12 month planned period.

5. Phase V - Expansion of Operations

See Figure 1.

As indicated on Figure 1, preparation for the Expansion of Operations Phase commences in the tenth week of the NCTTT with the organization of the Second RTG Provisional SO H/K Platoon. The six-week training program for the Second Platoon starts the 13th week upon graduation of the First Platoon. The second Platoon deploys in the 18th week and conducts Phase III operations as described in Paragraph D above.

Commencing with the 14th week, the Third Provisional RTG SO H/K Pltn. is organized commencing training the 18th week, and Phase III operations the 24th week.

2.12

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At the end of Phase III there will thus be three [illegible] Platoons totalling, three Special Operations and 9 Sniper [illegible] Teams operating against the communist terrorist in the field.

At the end of Phase III (end of 8 months) and following recommendations of the WPDC T&E Team, the Supreme Command will have two options.

(a) Organize the three platoons into a Provisional SO [illegible] Company (See Figure 6) and continue further operations, or

(b) Reassign Special Operation Teams to RTA, BPP, and [illegible] units as required and continue further operations.

During the final three months of the RCTTT Program, operations will be progressively expanded to provide for protection of additional villages. Operations will be continued deep into enemy controlled areas utilizing helicopter or parachute insertion techniques. HALO parachute insertion techniques will be employed in areas where the enemy is especially vigilant. Operations should be carried out whenever possible to ambush, attack, harrass, and pursue the enemy as far as 10 to 20 miles inside the borders of LAOS, providing RLG permission is obtained. In order to accomplish this, safe areas should be established within friendly [illegible] or other indigenous tribal villages for team rest, recuperation, and eventual extraction by helicopter or [illegible] aircraft. Wherever possible, similar operations should be conducted across the BURMESE border.

2.12

6. Future Operations

At the end of Phase V the NCTTT should have proved itself as one of the most effective counter-insurgency programs available to the RTG. As an example, in 6 months operations the 72 snipers of the U. S. 9th Division attained over 600 confirmed kills, the majority of which were made at night with the M-14 rifle/Starlight Scope/SIONICS-MAW-A2 suppressor combination. In effecting this admirable record, 1.37 cartridges were expended per kill. At the current cost of 28¢ for one National Match cartridge, this averages to 38¢ per kill. This is obviously an oversimplification, but it highlights an extremely successful and economical method of countering communist terrorism along the borders of Thailand.

As a final note, this type of operation is as yet in its nascent stages. Complete operational techniques that will result from execution of the 12 month NCTTT will undoubtedly disclose additional and more effective techniques of killing or neutralizing communist terrorists in Thailand and will contribute immeasurably to bringing stability and RTG control into its border areas.

2.12



FIGURE 1 - OPERATIONAL SCHEDULE

NCTTT

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
NCTTT MANAGEMENT
SCAF
ACM DAWEE
DIR. EDUCATION & ENGINEERING
VAN MANOB
PRASART
LIAISON AS RQD WITH:
RT ARMY
RT AIR FORCE
RT NAVY
BPP
TNP
etc.
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP
SIONICS
Mr. M. Werbell
(To be Desig.)
SCAF
(To be Desig.)
(To be Desig.)
OTHERS
As Req:
JUSMAG
USOM
ARPA
etc.
LIAISON AS RQD WITH:
USMACTHAI
ARPA
MACTHAI
MAC V
etc.
TRAINING CENTER
Sniper School
Sp. Opns. Instrs.
PLANNING & OPNS GROUP
1st ETG.PROV.SP.OPNS.
HUNTER/KILLER PLTN
TEST AND EVALUATION GROUP

FIGURE 2 - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT NCTTT

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON


SP OPNS
HUNTER KILLER
PLTN HQ:
1 Lt. Pltn Ldr
1 NCO - Pltn Sgt.
1 NCO - Gunsmith
1 Jr. NCO/EM-RTO
SP OPNS TEAM
1 NCO - TM CH
9 Jr. NCO - EM-
Sniper/DEMOL
HUNTER-KILLER TEAM
1 NCO - TM CH
9 Jr. NCO/EM - SNIPERS

[illegible]
1 O
4 [illegible]
33 Jr. NCO/EM

4? total

FIGURE 3 - RTG PROV. SO H/K PLTN.

RTG-PROVISIONAL - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
HUNTER/KILLER PLATOON

LIST OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

1. PLATOON HEADQUARTERS (1 Set)

a. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

2 M-14 Accurized Rifles
2 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alternate)
2 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
2 VARO Starlight Scopes
2 M-16 w/MAW-A1 Sup.
1 PRC-25 or Eqiv. Radio Trans./Recvr.

b. PLATOON WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT POOL (1 Set)

8 M-16 x/MAW-A1 Sup.
8 M-10 Ingram SMG w/Sionics Sup.
8 Pistol (To be desig.) w/Sionics Sup.
5 Cases B-40 Mini-Hand Grenades
10 Cases HALFA 35mm Phosphorus Grenades
1000 Rounds .38, .45 or 9mm Flare Bullets
Demolition and Incendiary Equipment and Supplies as required

c. SO H/K OR H/K TEAM EQUIPMENT (4 Sets)

9 M-14 Accurized Rifles
9 ART Sniper Scopes (M-84 Scope, Alt.)
9 Sionics MAW-A2 Suppressors
9 VARO Starlight Scopes
1 PRT-4 Radio Transmitter
9 PRT-9 Helmet Radio Receivers
Demolition and Incendiary Supplies and Equipment as required

FIGURE 4 - EQUIPMENT

2.12

NCTIT
TACTICAL AREA OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(TAOR)
TYPICAL H/K TEAM AREA DEPLOYMENT


LAOS
MEKONG RIVER
THAILAND
RTA or BPP Unit H/K ATCHD
RTA or BPP •• Unit H/K ATCHD
AREA NORTH
RTA or BPP Unit ATCHD
•• HQ H/K
•• HQ H/K
AREA WEST
AREA EAST
RTA or BPP •• Unit H/K ATCHD

FIGURE [illegible] - TAOR

RTG PROVISIONAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS HUNTER KILLER COMPANY


II
SP OPNS
HUNTER KILLER
••
CO HQ
1 Capt. Co. Cmdr.
1 Lt. XO
1 1st Sgt.
1 Jr. NCO/EM-RTO
•••
SPEC OPNS
HUNTER KILLER

STRENGTH

5	O
19	NCO
100	Jr. NCO/EM
124	Total

FIGURE 6 -RTG PROV. SO H/K COMPANY

212

PART I: Planning, Preparation, and Training Phases

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: ____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase I: Planning, Preparation and Installation of Training Center, through
Phase II: Organization and Training

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rate):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level:	
_______ man-mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$___________
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level:	
_______ man mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$___________
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level;	
_______ man-mos. @ $_________ av. per man-mo.	$___________
Total billable salaries:	$___________
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ________%	$___________
Overtime premium pay Estimated at ________%	$___________
Office and Secretarial:	$___________
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$___________
Travel:	$___________
Long-distance communication charges:	$___________
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	$___________
FIXED FEE (7%)	$___________
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$___________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U. S. Government official channels.

2.12

PART II: Operational and Evaluation Phase

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED: ______ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase III: Deployment, Insertion and initiation of Operations, through
Phase IV: Evaluation of Program

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technician level: ______ man-mos. @ $__________ av. per man-mo.	$__________
Total billable salaries:	$__________
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at ______%	$__________
Overtime premium pay Estimated at ______%	$__________
Office and Secretarial:	$__________
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$__________
Travel:	$__________
Long-distance communication charges:	$__________
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	$__________
FIXED FEE (7%)	$__________
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$__________

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

2.12

TIME AND COST ESTIMATE

TIME PERIOD COVERED:_____ months

PERFORMANCE DURING PERIOD: Phase V: Expansion of Operations

ESTIMATE OF PROJECT COSTS

	Totals
Salaries (direct charges at actual rates):	
Program Director, Senior Technical Advisor level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Assistant Director, Technical Advisor, or Engineer level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Gunsmith, Armorer, or Technical level: _____ man-mos. @ $_____ av. per man-mo.	$_____
Total billable salaries:	$_____
Salary related costs (Employee insurance, Overseas pay incentives, sick leaves, etc. Estimated at _____%	$_____
Overtime premium pay Estimated at _____%	$_____
Office and Secretarial:	$_____
Purchased expendable materials and services:	$_____
Travel:	$_____
Long-distance communication charges:	$_____
TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS	$_____
FIXED FEE (7%)	$_____
TOTAL: Estimated Costs and Fixed Fee	$_____

ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT

To be negotiated at a later date depending on availability of arms and equipment through Thai or U.S. Government official channels.

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: FE 4 INFO FILE, VR. RI/AN FI 2 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 03 15 15Z May 69 CITE DIRECTOR 93804

TO BANGKOK

PBRAMPART

REF DIRECTOR 88114

1. WE NOTE LNSHOE QUERY DATED 2 MAY TO ITS HQS ASKING FOR TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL. WISH TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION REF WHICH REPLIED TO RECENT STATION REQUEST FOR TRACES ON WERBELL. SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH PASS GIST OF REF ON FYI BASIS TO LOCAL LNSHOE REPS.

2. [illegible] FILE: 201-259910.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD William Johnson CI/OPS/FE (Telecord)

William W. Wells
ACFE

CS COPY

Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

201-259910
3 May 69

2.11

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RELEASING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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(National Military Command Center
Message Center)

98952

2 May 69 (6 May 69)

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Action: DIA-20

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UNIT: FE/TBL/T
EXT: 1421
DATE: 27 March 1969

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The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: Edward Early
R.O. #276 - Unit FE/TBL/T
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 20 22 Z 28 MAR 69

CITE DIRECTOR 88114

TO BANGKOK

~~[illegible]~~

AR/CI/FI		
PS		FE/TBL
ABSTRACT X		

REF: BANGKOK 0411 (IN 16820)

1. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 FILE ON SUBJECT REF WHO HAS LONG HISTORY OF POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE HE CAN MAKE A FEW FAST BUCKS. HE IS CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, A WHEELER AND DEALER, AND A PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE HAS A REPUTATION FOR LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS AND IS HIGH PRESSURE ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION MAN. HE WAS OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID 1959 WHEN HE BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED TO FURNISH WOFIRM WITH INFORMATION ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CARRIBEAN. HE WAS GRANTED A POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS WAS CANCELLED IN OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFORMATION PROVED TO BE OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT HE WAS USING WOFIRM FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. HE HAS SUBSEQUENTLY ATTEMPTED TO PASS HIMSELF OFF AS REPRESENTATIVE OF LNHARP AND WOFIRM. HE WAS BORN 1918 IN PHILADELPHIA AND DID

CS COPY /CONTINUED/

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 93114

SERVE WITH OSS DURING WORLD WAR II. HE HAD OWN ADVERTISING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS BUSINESS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA WHICH WENT BANKRUPT IN 1959. TRACES ON HIS CURRENT FIRM NEGATIVE.

2. ABOVE CANNOT BE PASSED TO THAIS SINCE SUBJECT REF IS WOLADY CITIZEN, HOWEVER YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM APPROPRIATE LIAISON CONTACTS THAT SUBJECT IS REPUTED TO HAVE UNSAVORY REPUTATION, HAS NO CONNECTIONS WITH LNHARP DESPITE ANY INTIMATIONS HE MAY MAKE TO CONTRARY, AND THAT THAIS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO OBSERVE EXTREME CAUTION RE ANY DEALINGS WITH HIM.

3. FILE: 201-259910

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/FE

William E. Nelson
/s/ CFE

Clifton R. Strathern
CFE/TBL

CW

01 SEP 1970

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DIRECTOR

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON MITCHELL L. WERBELL III AND HIS FIRM SIONICS, 1655 PEACH TREE ST., N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA. WERBELL IS HERE OFFERING TO SELL THE LATEST FIREARMS TO RTG. HE HAS PRESENTED SOME OF THESE WEAPONS TO THE KING.

S E C R E T

18 MAR 1969

Chief
D/C
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
Chrono

WITHIN 24 HOURS

Traces v'9

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Ralph M. Jusell Employee Activity Branch 3 E 49, Hdqtrs.	EXTENSION 7720	NO. DATE 26 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

For your information.

NR on Baker in OS files.

RAH

5-7 please index

5-9 please file 201-259910

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201-259910

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, OP/RD

DATE: 4 March 1968

4 MAR 68
XAAZ 28107

FROM : L. L. Curran

SUBJECT: BAKER, Bruce Arman

On 7 February, this gentleman telephoned my office. His address is:

Mr. Bruce Arman BAKER
11379 President Drive, N. E.
Blaine Village, Minnesota

∆ U.S.A CIT: U.S.A

Mr. Baker stated that he has been in contact with a Mr. MITCHELL WERBELL, III of Powder Springs, Georgia. 201-259910

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is in the business of manufacturing weapons and delivering them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker understands that Mr. Werbell does this for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Baker says that Mr. Werbell is a supposedly reputable man. Baker understands, from Werbell, that Baker will have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for Werbell.

Mr. Baker has served in the military. He has had some paramilitary training. He belongs in a "jump club" and now participates in "freefall", etc. He has a Morse Code proficiency and a Radio License Second Class. He has Spanish language proficiency and would be willing to collect for us.

This man persists on pursuing me re this CIA/Werbell relationship. I tell him I don't know a thing about it. It seems he has a smuggling record when he was 17 and he's afraid this may keep him from getting this Werbell "CIA" clearance.

L.

L. L. Curran

MICROFILMED
AUG 30 1968
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LLC:sb

Baker requests no contact on his wife re this deal. She is not witting. L

201-259910

PHOTOGRAPHS BY [illegible]

When war breaks out anywhere in the world, former OSS man Mitch WerBell is eager and able to supply weapons to either side—or both. And he's only one of several high-flying operators in a dark and growing trade

the deadliest salesman

Newsfront

BY ANDREW ST. GEORGE

It is entirely possible, as claimed, that none of America's high-ranking officials received any advance warning of the outbreak of hostilities which ended in Israel's "blitzkrieg" victory over her Arab neighbors. But at least *one* American authority on modern warfare did. He is a ruddy, moustached, ramrod-backed, onetime OSS operative named Mitchell Livingston WerBell III. Two days before the Middle East fighting began last June, he left his Georgia country manor an hour before daybreak, drove the 25 miles to Atlanta airport in 19 minutes and boarded a jet for New York hand carrying a large, square valise which had been custom-made for him in Germany.

In Manhattan, WerBell checked in at the City Squire Inn, went to a double room still carrying the valise, and set it between his legs while he made several phone calls to numbers he looked up in a slim leather notebook. Precisely at noon, he reentered the elevator and pushed the "lobby" button with the unhurried cool of someone absolutely certain that a chauffeur-driven limousine is waiting downstairs—which he was; which *it* was.

A couple of hours later, after crossing Manhattan and boarding a private yacht

WerBell relaxes, above, at plush Puerto Rico hotel between arms deals. Note holster gun on l.h. opp. page.

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

Mitch WerBell and two aides look over route on map prior to a night delivery of weapons somewhere in the Caribbean.



For another Caribbean mission, small boat is towed close so that arms can be transferred for speedy run to the shore.

on the East River, WerBell finally opened his valise and displayed its contents: a half-dozen missile guns, both hand and shoulder weapons, which fire a small, self-guided rocket instead of the conventional bullet. WerBell had designed and built some of them himself.

Around him, crowding the yacht's stateroom, solid-looking, somber men watched intently as WerBell demonstrated the new firearms' awesome potential. Later that evening, recalling the demonstration over a drink back in the city, WerBell would describe his nautical hosts only by saying, "They were . . . let's just call them very important friends of Israel. They'd been warned that within days the Mideast would be at war. They were there to make sure that one way or another Israel got a crack at the very best weaponry there is. Not just for the campaign ahead, but for the stand-off which is bound to keep the Middle East under tension for years."

Clandestine meetings like this are part of Mitch WerBell's stock in trade. He is a firearms broker of the new breed known as M.M.'s—munitions manipulators. In a world of localized wars—from Yemen to

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

Arms brokers are a curious blend of past and present. Here WerBell, dashing as a Prussian noble, tests MBA rocket pistol.



WerBell, who likes to design arms as well as sell them, examines some of his collection in the "weapons room" of his Georgia home.

"[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]"

Angola to Bolivia—M.M.'s are the new V.I.P.'s of international politics. It is their business to know even before diplomats do where tensions are brewing that bring potential customers. Their most satisfying status symbol is the discovery that somewhere on the globe their merchandise is shooting away, back and forth, on *both* sides of the same conflict.

Heading south from Miami, one's first look at the Bahamas schooners and converted subchasers plowing the blue water with cargoes of arms from such dealers, recalls nothing so much as the rum-running boom of Prohibition years. But a diligent student soon discovers that alcohol and armaments have little in common; the munitions business is a vast, worldwide trade influencing the destiny of governments, nations, political parties—and the men who command them.

Take the recent assassination attempt against Santo Domingo's military strong man, Gen. Antonio Imbert. Driving homeward on Henriquez Urena Street, General Imbert suddenly saw seven silver stars spurt across the windshield of his Cadillac. Even before

[*Continued on page 73*]

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shapes, not an unusual pattern to find in various parts of the world today.

On the mound prairies, ice formed in the cracks. As the ice built up, more soil was shoveled up into the polygons of earth and the cracks themselves widened. Finally the earth blocks froze too. When a big thaw set in, the ice in the cracks thawed faster than the earth blocks and flowed away, leaving big polygons of earth standing on the prairies.

What happened next is what happens to a melting ice cube. Its outside edges melt away first so that the cube dwindles into a sphere. The polygons of earth went through the same process. The corners of the earth blocks thawed faster than the sides. Then, while the cores were still frozen, the whole area was submerged for a short time by an ice-choked flood river. The rush of water swept away the thawed material and when the water subsided, what was left were dome-shaped Mima mounds.

In areas where the running water had covered them for only a short time, the mounds were big. Where the water flowed longer, more thawing took place and the mounds were small.

A very satisfying theory. But as usual, other scientists have picked flaws in it. For one thing, they question if the area had the sort of climate which Ritchie describes. They say it was not much colder during the mound-forming period than it is today. And they doubt if the prairies were swept by a flood of water deep enough to cover all the mounds. It would have had to be over 100 feet deep.

Some of the critics are gopher-theory men. The pocket-gopher theory has been around for 25 years, gaining supporters steadily. It particularly excites biologists, because if Mima mounds really turn out to have been made by gophers, they would be the most extraordinary structures (if not the biggest) ever made by any mammal except man.

The gopher possibility first occurred to Walter W. Dalquist back in 1941 when he was making a survey of the mammals of southern Washington. He later developed the theory with Victor Sheffer, a biologist with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.

As they point out, wherever there are Mima mounds, there are also gophers, with the exception of Mima Prairie where the finest mounds of all are found. And at one time there were gophers on Mima Prairie, too. Evidence proves it.

The gopher they are talking about is a small brown animal, looks rather like a rat, and is called a "pocket" gopher because it has a fur-lined pocket in its cheek for carrying around food and nest material.

This is the way the biologists explain the gopher theory. As the Vashon ice sheet retreated and vegetation grew up in its wake, pocket gophers began moving in from the south, probably only advancing a hundred feet or so in a gopher generation. Finally at the southern end of Puget Sound, they ran into a new young evergreen forest which had sprung up ahead of them.

Gophers will not live in the shade of a forest so instead of pushing on farther, they dug in on the prairies. As a protection against predators they dug deep.

Each Mima mound represents what at one time was the "territory" of an ancient gopher family. When they built their foraging tunnels, they kept on dragging a little more soil back toward the home site than they took away from it. After thousands of years, those infinitesimal amounts of soil would have built up into a Mima mound. The mysterious mound roots which extend into the gravel below the mounds are abandoned gopher tunnels which have filled up with black silt.

"But not all Mima mounds have mound roots," opponents of the theory point out. They carp at other details, too. As one geologist wrote, "After diligent search, more than 50 stones, ranging in size from two to 20 inches in diameter have been found inside the mounds, well above their base." And how could any gopher shove a stone the size of a football up to the top of his nest?

What the next theory will be is anybody's guess, but the ultimate touch of confusion has already been added. There are those who say the Mima mounds are growing. Nor is this a new idea. Over 30 years ago, farmers in the area started talking about it. "Sure they're growing. When I was a kid they were level with the top of the chicken coop. Now they're several inches taller."

The growing theory cannot be passed off with a hearty chuckle either. Some keen observers have been taking the idea seriously—Doctor Sheffer, for one—although nobody can prove scientifically whether they are growing, shrinking or staying the same. In fact, only one thing is sure about the whole Mima hassle. If something is not done soon, there will not be many Mima mounds left to puzzle over. Acres of them have been leveled for farming. Still others have been dug up for gravel pits and cut through for highways and railroads. Not that the conservation-minded State of Washington would ever let them disappear entirely. A good thing, too. Because if those mystery mounds really are growing, we are going to have more puzzles to grapple with—like what on earth is making them grow bigger? And where, by all that is sane, are they going to end? —Jean Muir

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THE DEADLIEST SALESMEN

[*Continued from page 43*]

he heard the stutter of silencer-equipped submachine guns, he knew that a long-anticipated event was taking place—an attempt was being made to kill him.

To duck the assassins' bullets, the general dropped sideways. His arm snaked behind the front seat of the limousine where his own submachine gun hung in a rack. But Imbert's life was saved by a different and wholly unexpected sort of weapon.

In the escort jeep, the general's chief bodyguard, Maj. Marino Garcia, flicked a spring-loaded switch on the brown leather swagger stick under his arm. The stick—suddenly converted into a miniature missile launcher—spat forth a high speed .50 caliber rocket projectile. With a chilling "*SWOOSH*" the small missile from the most powerful handgun now in existence blew apart the windshield of the attackers' Oldsmobile. The car turned and fled.

Outside the island confines of the Dominican Republic (where it set off yet another national crisis), nobody heard the news of the ambush with greater interest than WerBell. He was delighted by General Imbert's escape. He has warm personal relations with a number of Latin strong men, and the portly Dominican warlord has been an especially close friend. And it was WerBell who had invented and delivered the shooting stick that apparently saved the situation. Moreover, WerBell discovered, from a detailed description of the assassins' guns, that the ambush weapons, too, came from a lot he had passed on to the Dominican armed forces some years earlier.

In relation to the total worldwide munitions trade the equipment supplied by the private dealers is a drop in the sea—the world turnover in munitions is estimated at 350 billion dollars a year. Still, munitions manipulators like WerBell account for the fastest-growing portion of this vast business.

"The impact of private arms shipments into the underdeveloped world has been sensational," wrote military specialist Jack Raymond of *The New York Times* last year. "So fragile are the instruments of government, so slender, sometimes, their base of popular support, so vulnerable are they . . . that the timely arrival of some mysterious arms merchant can mean survival of one regime or the fall of another. . . ."

One week last March, 230 Americans were killed in Viet Nam. During the same week in Latin America, where undeclared guerrilla warfare rages in half-a-dozen countries, the death toll was near 300.

These guerrilla conflicts are no longer waged with fowling pieces and cane blades. "The guerrillas are as well armed as the government troops," the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency revealed recently. "Often, the guerrillas' weapons are more modern. And they fire thousands of rounds in each encounter."

The regular armies, in turn, are growing anxious to reestablish their traditional overwhelming superiority in firepower. Hard pressed, they are turning to controversial ordnance—napalm, harsh nauseous gases, special infantry rockets built to smash entire houses—which must often be bought in the black market.

Down briefly from its World War II peaks, the munitions business began to rise again in the late 1940's. For a while, however, large well-organized corporations controlled most of it. A firm called Interarmco, for example, had become a worldwide octopus by 1958. Independent operators found that it was often possible to cooperate with Interarmco, but seldom to compete with it. Then in the late spring of 1958, the U.S. State De-

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"This is okay, but when are you going to teach me to chase wimmen?"

partment did an odd, little-publicized thing: it suddenly revoked licenses to export munitions to the Cuban government of President Batista.

General Batista had long been one of Washington's favorite clients, but Cuba was racked by internal disorders. The State Department had decided as a political gesture to curtail the flow of arms to him. By 1958 the official U.S. line on selling firearms had become completely confused. An old friend would be suddenly denied a paid-up munitions shipment, an ostensible outcast in, say, the Middle East, would be suddenly invited to bid on some coveted hardware.

The great corporations were hamstrung by the State Department's vacillations. Independent ordnance salesmen moved into the vacuum. Less troubled by red tape and day-to-day policy changes, they were prepared to make deals and deliver goods swiftly. A new prototype of global gun merchant emerged—the successful munitions manipulator. He came wearing custom-made English tropicals and a platinum-banded watch. He talked in the vernacular of the British officers' mess, adopted by the whole international firearms fraternity.

M.M.'s cover a broad spectrum. They range from the officially licensed, eminently respectable WerBell to a mysterious, Hungarian-born munitions salesman, whose lifelong skill in using false documents is believed to have inspired the Continental underworld term *Hundertpässler*, i.e. man of a hundred passports.

With some exceptions, successful M.M.'s seem to share an upper-class or military background. They often arrive at the munitions business through years of devotion to firearms as gun collectors or tinkerers. Mitch WerBell was still a gun hobbyist, who planted and shipped tropical fruits for a living when he developed—in his home workshop—what is today considered the finest muzzle silencer on the international market.

Sure political instinct and diplomatic skill are essential in the successful manipulation of munitions.

Andrew McNaughton, scion of Canada's most distinguished military dynasty and a former RAF squadron leader turned arms dealer, explained: "The fellows who got somewhere in this business all started out with a common insight. The big corporations had grown used to dealing with governments, but the independents, who were a lot smaller and quicker on their feet, recognized that it was easier to deal with government *departments*.

"Someone, say, had a nice order for machine guns . . . from, perhaps, a group of Kurdish freedom fighters who carry their hundred-dollar bills rolled as thick as a telephone book. Then he had a nice offer from, say, an arms firm in Hamburg to fill the order: MG-34 machine guns, almost as good as new—*better* than some—a spare breech thrown in for $220 each, belted ammo with it, tracer-spaced, $25 per thousand rounds—everything very nice. Except that to move the shipment out of West Germany and around the world, you needed a quiet little okay from Washington. Why? Because that's the way modern bloc politics works, I suppose. Anyhow, you went to Washington, clear-eyed and trusting, and the State Department said, 'No.'

"Now the big corporation might try a little wire-pulling. If it got another 'No,' it might quit for a while. But the independents had discovered that if you got a 'No' from the State Department, you could often go to the CIA, or the DIA, the military intelligence establishment, and get a 'Yes'—provided you were small enough and savvy enough to do it quietly and kick no furniture on the way. Of course, it is a bit trickier this way, turning the trick. You have to charge more. But then you often make a bit more, too."

This seems to be a point on which most M.M.'s agree. Charles Mevs, a philosophical Haitian ("Indicted, but never convicted, my friend!") put it this way: "Everyone knows that small countries are changeable. They have many subsequent governments. A lot of the big corporations had learned to live with that. But the small independents appreciated something else—that big powers tend to have many *simultaneous* governments."

Mevs grinned a huge, white, triumphant grin. "It's the same East and West. Think not? Russia? England? France? No difference, my friend. Remember last year the Moroccan government went to the French Foreign Office trying to extradite one of their exiles, Ben Barka? Yes? And the French Foreign Office said, '*Non, non,* our traditions of political asylum . . . the sacred freedom of choice . . . and *patati,* and *patata.*' So the Moroccans went to the invisible government, to French Intelligence. And they made a little deal. And French Intelligence just said, 'How d'you want this Ben Barka delivered, bagged or crated?' Eh? No difference, my friend."

It is a fact, shared by governmental insiders around the world, that great-power politics have seen a resurgence of old-fashioned Machiavellianism. Take the curious case of John Richard Hawke, 29, a bearded Britisher from Cornwall who, after eight years in the RAF, has turned up as an M.M. doing ferry flying by appointment—bomber planes and bombsights a specialty.

One day early last year, Eugenie Anderson, a U.S. representative in the United Nations, spoke in the General Assembly. She seemed to be promising that this man Hawke would go to prison for a long, long time. It appeared a curious UN undertaking—Hawke had not yet been convicted of anything. He still hasn't been. But the background of the matter illuminates the workings of modern munitions dealings.

Portugal, a NATO member in need of some ground-support planes for its forces in Angola and Mozambique, had approached Washington with a request to buy 29 B-26 Invader bombers. At the State Department's suggestion, the request was turned down; the U.S., in the United Nations, had promised not to purvey supplies for "colonial wars." But there were other agencies in Washington more favorably disposed to Portugal, perhaps because they were troubled by the Angolan guerrillas, perhaps for other reasons. At any rate, the situation was ready-made for experienced M.M.'s. The total deal involved over three million dollars.

There now appeared a disting[illegible] French aristocrat, wearing the *L[illegible] Honneur;* a hard-bodied Australian [illegible]craft broker operating from [illegible] some mechanics [illegible] perhaps a risk [illegible]

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("Sparrow"); some special radio rigs for clandestine communications, and a pilot: John Hawke. In short order Hawke was flying over the Atlantic in the first of the seven bombers he was to deliver to Portugal in less than three months. Ostensibly headed for Bordeaux, France, he flew instead to a Portuguese air base where he was met by the Comte de Beaumont, representing a Swiss munitions firm.

Hawke was paid $5,000 for each flight. Although expenses ate up two-thirds of the fee, the deal seemed satisfactory. "Those planes had bomb racks, armor plating, ready gunports—there could be no question in anyone's mind what they were for," he told a visitor recently in Miami. Nevertheless, a question of sorts arose in *some* minds. One day Hawke was arrested and charged with violating the U.S. Munitions Act by exporting bombers without written State Department approval.

At the trial, the prosecution maintained that the United States government had neither known about, nor countenanced Hawke's flights. The pilot had a lone defender: Edwin Marger, a Miami lawyer-pilot, who has been developing munitions law into a specialty. Marger proved that U.S. intelligence did have tacit knowledge of the plane exports to Portugal.

Ferrying his third B-26, Hawke had flown into a pea-soup fog over Washington and blundered across a prohibited zone over the White House. The Federal Aviation Agency radioed up an urgent order to land. When Hawke put the B-26 down at Washington National Airport, he was inspected and questioned. By using the code word "Sparrow," Hawke got clearance to continue his flight. After Hawke's arrest, there seemed to be no proof that the incident ever occurred. The original FAA report of the incident had mysteriously vanished. But Marger finally managed to come up with a copy of the report. Together with the Customs declaration for the same plane, it proved the lawyer's point sufficiently to bring an acquittal.

"The jury realized some official hanky-panky must have been involved," Marger explained, "and they felt Hawke should not be made the goat."

Marger, however, appreciates the American dilemma: "Keep in mind," he says, "what a variety of roles a great power must play. In the UN it must play the benign anticolonialist. At an international conference, the principled pacifist. In the legislature, the protector of its domestic armaments industry, whose congressional friends resent restrictions on exports. In a secret emergency meeting with some battle-weary Latin president, it must be the powerful antiguerrilla leader. In its own National Security Council, it must be the champion of worldwide strategic interests. And so forth—there's no way to reconcile all this in public. That's where the M.M.'s come in, and very usefully, too."

Such geopolitical factors do not concern most munitions merchants. Dominick de Fekete von Altbach und Nagyrevath is an arms dealer who in name and background seems straight out of a Graustarkian novel. A former cavalry subaltern of the Royal Hungarian Horse Artillery, he worked his way up in the firearms business because it satisfied his two lifelong interests: guns and money.

After World War II, De Fekete, a suave, handsome cosmopolite who spoke five languages, rose to quick eminence in the European contraband business. In the early fifties, he moved his headquarters to South America and turned to the munitions business. He concentrated on foolproof methods of delivering contraband by sea.

De Fekete's clientele was divided equally between rebels and governments—frequently in the same country.

"With rebels you have an easier sale," he once told a friend. "They want whatever you can get for them. But with governments you have an easier delivery."

Such an expert trader along the "Mosquito Coast" as Andrew McNaughton confirms that doing business with arms-hungry banana regimes demands a rather large variety of special skills. "The first time I went to Cuba—before Castro—with a very nice list of secondhand military merchandise," McNaughton recalled, "I thought it would be a simple sales deal. But it wasn't.

"I was offering first-rate stuff at bargain prices," McNaughton explained. "Belgian ceramic-jacketed hand grenades by the hundred at $1.75 each; surplus Garands with spare clips at $41; English Staghound armored cars under $11,000. It was precisely what the Cubans needed and the generals with whom I had daily meetings could barely conceal their interest.

"Then, one evening there was a knock on my hotel room door. It was the Cuban C in C's secretary, Pancho. He told me my wares were satisfactory, but why hadn't I given the general a price list? 'What do you mean?' I said. 'We've been talking prices for five days.' Pancho just grinned. 'You know, McNaughton,' he said, 'you're an imbecile, but you're a pilot and I like pilots—I'm a pilot myself. Let me show you what a price list is.' "

In the tropical weapons trade, McNaughton learned a "price list" is the most important sales gimmick. For each item, three different prices must be listed. One is the current market price of the item in question, brand-new, retail: for an M-1 rifle this might be $100. The second price shows the amount for which the weapon had been purchased: in the case of an M-1 rifle, offered as surplus by a government which had bought it in 1946 and warehoused it ever since, the original price may have been a lot lower, say $80. The third figure is the real sales price which the salesman is asking for his surplus item—in the case of the same rifle, this real sales price might be $50.

"To close the deal, you must conclude by making up two bills of sale," said McNaughton. "One lists the current, brand-new market price—this goes to the general's auditors. The second bill of sale

"First, let me congratulate everyone for the fine turnout. . . ."

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If it's the surplus price, the real price you're getting—this goes into the general's pocket. Into the general's pocket also goes the difference between the two prices—in the case of the hypothetical M-1, $50 on each rifle."

The staple of the private arms trade is the assortment of weapons known as Old Reliables. These are hardy perennial items of ordnance which sell steadily everywhere from the Congo to Cochabamba. There is, for example, the 20mm. automatic cannon, priced anywhere from $100 to $650. Delivery price will depend on condition, availability, accessibility of ammunition and shipment difficulties (open or clandestine?).

Other longtime favorites are the Browning Automatic Rifle (from $95 to $350); the big-bang M-1 Garand rifle ($10 to $155); the Enfield No. 4, popular because of its low price (around $25); the Madsen .30 cal. machine gun ($200 to $550); the infantryman's Big Daddy: the .50 cal. Browning machine gun ($100 to $1,000), and the 57mm. recoilless rifle, which will convert a launch into a warship at close range and in the jungle can make a guerrilla platoon's firepower equal regimental artillery (from $1,400 to $3,000). Mobile perennials are the B-26 bomber, the Staghound armored car and the T-28 jet trainer.

But it is the modern, hard-to-get weapons, kept in short supply by political considerations, which are in greatest demand. The U.S. developed M-79 grenade launcher, which looks and handles like a stout, single-barrel shotgun but fires a 40mm. grenade shell or bazooka rocket with riflelike accuracy, commands up to $1,700, ammo extra. There is great interest in the science-fiction MBA rocket guns which fire small, self-guided ballistic missiles at twice the velocity of the blockbuster magnum cartridges—and without explosion or recoil. The experimental *Fechette* [illegible] light bombs, which explode with a cloudburst of thousands of tiny barbs, are coveted by militarists and "freedom fighters" alike, as are the fantastic new image-intensifying and heat-seeking superscopes, which let the rifleman see and shoot as well at midnight as at noon.

This curious mixture of old and new weapons is reflected in the personality of the successful M.M.'s. For all their [illegible] interest in munitions technology, their personal outlook tends to be curiously old-fashioned. Perhaps because of an inner identification with adventurous types of a bygone past, they tend to affect charming, eccentric, turn-of-the-century manners. This is true even of such old-style pistol-packing characters as Rolando Masferrer, who is often called the Caribbean's most feared gang lord. An astonishingly literate, brilliant, erratic Cuban who was raised in the United States and graduated at the head of his law school class, Masferrer has been fascinated by violence since his first taste of it at 19, in the Spanish Civil War. He left half his left foot in Spain, but came out of the hospital an officer of the International Brigade and for years afterward lived the life of an international Communist Party enforcer.

After World War II, Masferrer swung to the right and became a newspaper tycoon, senator, cattle magnate and overlord of the Caribbean's biggest gang of gunmen. Now living in the United States, he is a colorful demonstration of the mysterious ways of munitions manipulation. While officially restricted to residence in the State of New York, he managed to equip, in Miami, a 300-man Haiti invasion army with everything from infantry boots to a B-25 bomber. Now under indictment for this stunt, Masferrer is awaiting trial in the Miami Federal court.

The last time the U.S. government tried to convict him on similar charges, he got the case thrown out of court—much like Hawke—by pointing out that "I wasn't doing anything the government was not doing, too."

Other hazards in the trade can be more worrying. Since the Korean War, at least 20—and possibly twice as many—M.M.'s have been murdered. The "Red Hand," a notorious French right-wing organization, is believed to have killed seven private arms dealers in five countries simply to keep down the flow of arms to Algerian rebels during the last years of French colonial warfare. One of them, a Swiss ammunition smuggler named Maurice Leopold, was killed with a poisoned arrow.

Masferrer usually carries under his arm a paper bag containing reading material, some Ramon Allones cigars, and a fully loaded National Match Colt .45 automatic pistol. His two bodyguards carry the same model of pistol in empty cigar boxes which they place beside their napkins when dining in a restaurant.

Right now Africa, where live bullets have been known to replace coins as the preferred tender, is the most fertile private firearms market. Latin America comes next with a huge turnover in hardware of every kind. Comparative volume is hard to establish, because the same firearms travel back and forth repeatedly, from country to country, continent to continent, wherever supply and demand may take them.

The trajectory of such firearms from factory to firing line can be fantastically far-flung. The following history has been put together of a 20mm. cannon sold to Haitian rebels last year. The cannon was made in Finland during World War II and used on the Soviet front. In the late forties, it was sold in a lot to an Interarmco agent in exchange for some carloads of Sten guns. Shipped to Italy, it was taken over by Dominick de Fekete in one of his first weapons ventures and sold to the Israeli Haganah. In 1950 it returned to De Fekete in the mixed lot of surplus Israeli hardware consigned to Costa Rica. In 1955, it made a second transatlantic trip back to the Mediterranean, where agents of the Algerian FLN were waiting for it in Tunis. In 1960 it went overseas again, to Panama, and thence north to the United States in a shipload officially described as "Deactivated War Souvenirs." It was then sold to Cuban rebels for delivery by airdrop to the Sierra Escambray mountains, but something went wrong with the delivery and the cannon ended up firing instead in Santo Domingo. In 1965 it was brought back to Miami in a mysterious converted subchaser known as the *Texana*. Later the same year, it was acquired by Rolando Masferrer. In mid-1966 Masferrer sold it, in a mixed boatload of light weapons, to a group of rebels preparing to invade Haiti under the leadership of a Catholic priest.

In a quarter of a century, the cannon has seen action in a half dozen wars—big and small—and brought sizeable profits to each M.M. who has bought and sold it. And how do these arms dealers feel about their business.

Mitch WerBell summed up the attitude of the fraternity when he told a visitor recently:

"Please don't call me a 'merchant of death.' All it is really, is that I've been fond of guns all my life. Guns don't kill people, [illegible] people kill people, and always have, long before anyone invented the [illegible]."—Andrew St. George



"Hello, Harry? [illegible]. I'd like to apologize for saying I wouldn't marry you if you were the last man on earth. . ."

25

FBI document dated
11 May '67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell —
Haiti

FBI document dated
2 May 1967 from New York
re: Ralph Lauro Serrano

FBI document dated
12 June 1967 from New York
re: Chet Gray

FBI document dated
11 JAN '67
re: Wer Bell, Mitchell Livingston, III

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

tchell Livingston WERBEL III
201-259910

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WERBELL, [illegible] LIVINGSTON, III
(VOL. I)
201-259910

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN. 1964 THRU FEB. 77

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OTHER AGENCY REPORTS (FBI, ETC.)

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3/3/78	3/3/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

VOL. [illegible]

201-259910

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INFORMATION REQUEST

SUBJECT OR OTHER INDIVIDUAL INDEXED IN THIS DOSSIER IS INVOLVED IN A REQUEST UNDER

(CHECK ONE)

☒ PRIVACY ACT
☐ FOIA
☐ OGC/OLC
☐ OTHER (Specify nature of request under remarks)

SUBJECT OF REQUEST: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III	FILE NO. 201-259910

DOCUMENT SYMBOL, NO. & DATE (If request is on other than subject of 201)

REQUEST NO.: P76-28	DATE COMPLETED APRIL 1977	DATE APPEALED (If applicable)

REMARKS

DO NOT FILE ABOVE THIS FORM

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM FROM THIS FILE

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FORM 10-76 3955

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PAGE 1

22-4

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DATE-TIME GROUP 0220012

CITE CIA

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 960121

CONF: C/LA8 INFO: FILE C/IP/ams, C/LSN/10, C/PCS, C/PCS/ITC 2, ACC/000, C/OMS 2, C/CI, D003, 000/00

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132

TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//ATTN: R K MCHARGUE/GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION. Y

SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS Y

CIR-316/00302-77 Y

SUBJECT: BOMBING OF FORMER CHILEAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES: NAME TRACE, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III Y

REF: FBI CABLE REQUEST DATED 14 JANUARY 1977 Y

1. THE FILES OF THIS AGENCY CONTAIN CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ON MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III, BORN 8 MARCH 1918 IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. THE MAJORITY OF THE INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED BY YOUR BUREAU. THIS AGENCY PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE FBI WITH INFORMATION ON WERBELL UNDER CSCI-3/773317 OF 24 OCTOBER 1962, SUBJECT WERBELL, MITCHELL L., AND CSCI-316/02323-69 OF 27 JUNE 1969, SUBJECT WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III. IN ADDITION, THIS AGENCY FURNISHED YOUR BUREAU WITH MEMORANDA CONCERNING SUBJECT MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL III DATED 27 JUNE 1974, 1 AUGUST 1974, 9 AUGUST 1974, AND

DATE:
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[illegible] C/CA/SOG
[illegible] TO [illegible]

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12 AUGUST 1974. Y

2. WERBELL HAS NEVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THIS AGENCY NOR DOES [redacted] THE AGENCY HAVE ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HIM. WERBELL WAS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER WITH THE OSS DURING WORLD WAR II AND SERVED IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE. IN AUGUST OF 1959, THIS AGENCY [redacted] CONSIDERED USING WERBELL AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, PARTICULARLY CUBA, BUT TERMINATED ITS CONSIDERATION OF HIS POSSIBLE USE IN OCTOBER 1959 WHEN IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS OF LITTLE VALUE AND IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT HE WOULD USE THE PROPOSED CONNECTION WITH THE AGENCY TO PROMOTE HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS. Y

3. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1962 REPORTING ON WERBELL REVEALED THAT HE VISITED SEVERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND APPEARED TO BE CONTACTING OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING RECOGNITION OF (A) [redacted] "DE FACTO" CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE CALLED THE "UNITED ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF CUBA." IN DISCUSSIONS WITH NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, WERBELL CLAIMED THE PROPOSED CUBAN EXILE GOVERNMENT

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HAD THE SUPPORT OF NINETY SEPARATE CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATIONS AND 186,000 CUBAN EXILES. HE ALLEGEDLY OFFERED A NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL [redacted] $100,000 TO OBTAIN THAT GOVERNMENT'S RECOGNITION OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. Y

5. IN DECEMBER 1965, WERBELL SPOKE TO A MIAMI CONTACT OF THIS AGENCY AND TOLD HIM THAT HE AND SIX CUBAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES HAD ORGANIZED A GROUP, INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY TWENTY CUBANS INSIDE CUBA, TO PERFORM A COMMANDO OPERATION IN CUBA IN EARLY JANUARY 1966. THEIR PRIMARY MISSION WAS THE ASSASSINATION OF CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO, WITH THE SECONDARY MISSION BEING THAT OF BLOWING UP THE POWER GENERATORS THAT SUPPLY THE ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA. WERBELL, AT THE TIME, STATED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET THE "GREEN LIGHT" FROM THE CIA TO PROCEED WITH THE MISSION, AND INFERRED THAT THE MISSION WOULD BE ABORTED IF SEUCH APPROVAL WAS NOT OBTAINED. {NOTE: THIS AGENCY WAS NOT IN CONTACT WITH WERBELL IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER IN THIS ENDEAVOR.] Y

6. IN EARLY 1969 WERBELL WAS IN THAILAND REPRESENTING HIMSELF AS VICE PRESIDENT OF SIONICS, INC. OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA. HE DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A COUNTERINSURGENCY EXPERT, CLAIMED TO BE A RETIRED

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COLONEL, AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF AT A LOCAL NIGHTCLUB AS THE CHIEF OF CIA IN THAILAND. {NOTE: WERBELL WAS NEITHER ~~[illegible]~~ THE CIA CHIEF OF STATION IN THAILAND NOR ~~[illegible]~~ AFFILIATED WITH CIA IN ANY WAY.} WERBELL ATTEMPTED TO SELL EXOTIC WEAPONS TO THE THAIS AND TO TRAIN THEM IN COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE. Y

7. WERBELL ALLEGEDLY OPERATES THROUGH A NUMBER OF FRONT BUSINESSES, ONE OF WHICH IS CALLED THE CENTRAL INFORMATION AGENCY {CIA}. IN SOME OF HIS DEALINGS WERBELL BROADLY HINTS THAT HE HAS CONNECTIONS WITH THIS AGENCY. Y

8. THIS AGENCY HAS INFORMATION FROM THE FBI CONCERNING ~~[illegible]~~ SOME OF THE TYPES OF WEAPONRY THAT ~~[illegible]~~ WERBELL PURPORTS TO SELL. ~~THIS~~ THE [illegible] INFORMATION THE AGENCY HAS ARE PRESS CLIPPINGS ~~INFORMATION WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE~~ TO YOUR ~~[illegible]~~ ~~REQUEST~~ ARE FORWARDING TO YOU. Y

~~9. IF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION IS FOUND IN OUR FILES ON THIS SUBJECT IT WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOUR BUREAU.~~ Y

9 ~~10~~. CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B {2[illegible]}. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.H

DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1977 ~~[illegible]~~
ORIG: BILL WAGNER:MM
UNIT: C/LA/SB/CH
EXT: 1471

C/LA/SB

C/LA/COG/OPS- WM. DEVINE {IN DRAFT}

SOG/G/MSS- ~~D. BLOOMFIELD {IN DRAFT}~~ R. Young

AGC/[illegible]

C/PCS/LSN
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CONFIDENTIAL

OGC 77-0704

1 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

ATTENTION : Associate Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : Walter T. Lloyd
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. As you are aware, on the instruction of United States District Judge Peter Fay (Miami, Florida Division), incident to the Drug Enforcement Administration's prosecution of Subject for conspiracy to import and distribute multi-ton loads of marijuana, the undersigned made a detailed review of the files of this Agency concerning Subject in August 1976. This examination was to ascertain any data that ran to Werbell's guilt or innocence of the offense charged and any other data reflecting the nature of the relationship between Werbell and the U.S. Government. This latter requirement was grounded on the Court's view that Werbell's voluntary reporting to the Agency and any government condonation of his activities might be exculpatory in the eyes of the jury.

2. In response, we reviewed the files, identified Agency contacts with Subject and prepared two affidavits: one regarding non-employment by Mr. B. DeFelice and the second regarding Werbell's relationship to the Agency by the undersigned. Copies are attached. During the trial the first affidavit was shown to counsel for Werbell by DEA counsel, Mr. Sam Sheres, at which point defendant's counsel stipulated that Werbell was never a formal employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sheres subsequently returned the affidavits to the undersigned at the conclusion of the trial.

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3. Regarding the relationship of Werbell to the Agency, as approved by the Deputy Director, the undersigned appeared before Judge Fay in his chambers on 31 August and under oath answered questions of the Court concerning Werbell. A copy of the transcript of that proceeding is attached. You will note that Judge Fay requested that all pertinent government records be made available to the Court for its inspection. Accordingly, copies of Agency files were reproduced, culled for "Brady-type" documents, excised to protect sources and methods under the "SWP case criteria" and reviewed and approved by Assistant DD/O on the evening of 1 September. These processed documents were then handcarried to Miami by the undersigned on 2 September.

4. The undersigned advised Judge Fay at 0830 hours on 2 September that I had in my possession copies of all of the Agency files on Werbell, had culled them as to possible "Brady" documents and was prepared to review them with the Judge at his convenience. He was on the bench with a tight schedule and asked that the possible Brady documents first be reviewed by Karen Atkinson, the principal counsel for the prosecution. The undersigned subsequently briefed Atkinson on the nature of data in the possible Brady documents. This resulted in a significant reduction in the number of possibles. The undersigned gave Atkinson copies of the four unclassified OGC documents related to the DOD revocation of Werbell's security clearance in 1971. In addition, Office of Security documents edited and approved for release to Werbell under his Freedom of Information and Privacy Act request (Tabs A and B of OS response), consisting of media publications and security investigative data, were also provided Atkinson. Due to counsel for Werbell raising an issue on Werbell's use of a boat named "Venus" belonging to CIA, a declassified copy of the OS short investigative report outlining data concerning Werbell's use of the Venus to transport arms was also provided Atkinson. The related OS Headquarters assignment document was not provided. Related DDO documents on the ownership of Venus by the "JURE" Cuban group were mentioned to Atkinson but not made available.

5. While the above documents were provided the Department of Justice with the understanding they could be passed to Counsel for Werbell due to subsequent events noted below, it is not certain that this occurred. Specifically, the undersigned declined to release additional "Brady" documents without consultation and instructions

from the Court. The requested meeting was put off by Judge Fay and defendants subsequently rested their case. The DOJ had little else to add and the case went to the jury about noon on 3 September. All the remaining copies of Agency documents were returned to Headquarters by the undersigned the evening of 3 September. On 4 September the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty." As a result, the bulk of "Brady-type" Agency documents on Werbell was not provided to counsel for Werbell and Judge Fay reviewed no Agency documents. It should be noted all copies of documents taken to Miami were excised in accord with the "SWP case criteria" and on return to Headquarters, these were destroyed by the undersigned.

6. As a related matter, on 16 November Mr. Arthur Egbert of the Internal Security Division of the DEA contacted the undersigned seeking background information on Werbell. The undersigned suggested Egbert first review the files of the FBI on Werbell as most of the data we have is contained in FBI reports. Should FBI data be insufficient for his needs I suggested he seek access to our files in DDO and Office of Security via the normal DEA Department of Justice liaison channels.

Walter T. Lloyd

Walter T. Lloyd

Attachments:
- (1) Affidavit - DeFelice
- (2) Affidavit - Lloyd
- (3) Transcript of Hearing of USDC for Southern District of Florida, August 31, 1976.

cc: Jerry Brown, SAG/OS, w/o atts
Ed Montgomery, LD/SRCH/DDO, w/o atts

OGC 76-0844

24 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOG
Chief, DCD
Chief, LA Division

11 1003

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbel III

1. I was advised by the Justice Department on 23 February that Werbel has been indicted and the trial is scheduled to begin on 29 March in Miami, Florida. The charges relate to importing and distributing quantities of marijuana. With Werbel's propensity to raise his past affiliations with the Agency, we can anticipate problems during this trial. An additional problem is presented because Werbel is defended by Edwin Marger who was the defense attorney for John Hawk in the B-26 case in Buffalo, New York in 1966. It was Edwin Marger who subpoenaed the CIA General Counsel as a defense witness.

2. The Justice Department has received information that a person either currently or formerly affiliated with the CIA has been participating in Werbel's meetings with his attorney. It would be appreciated if all addressees could review their holdings on Werbel and determine if there is any validity to any recent contacts with him. I would urge that instructions be sent to Miami that no, repeat no, contact with Werbel take place between now and the beginning of the trial.

3. It would be helpful if each addressee could prepare a summary of the various contacts Werbel has had with CIA in the past. Please check to see if you have any information on a Colonel Bayard who was killed in Atlanta, Georgia during the summer of 1975. Bayard, reportedly an associate of Werbel's, had previous contacts with the Agency. It would be appreciated if your responses could be received by close of business 2 March.

John K. Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

3.44

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6-2

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PAGE OF PAGES 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

DATE-TIME GROUP
2702002

CITE
WASHINGTON

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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IP [illegible]		[illegible]

TO: LA/MIAMI.

FROM: LA/CAR

SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTONE WERBEL III

REF: WFPA-1860, 9 JUNE 1975

1. MITCHELL LIVINGSTONE WERBEL III, WHO IS ONE OF THE PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE DEA REPORT QUOTED IN THE REFERENCE, HAS BEEN INDICTED ON CHARGES RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA.

2. WHILE WE HEAVE SO FAR UNCOVERED NO BKHERALD CONNECTION WITH WERBEL, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT A PERSON EITHER CURRENTLY OR FORMERLY AFFILIATED WITH BKHERALD HAS BEEN PARTICIPATING IN WERBEL'S MEETINGS WITH HIS ATTORNEY.

3. FURTHERMORE, SINCE WERBEL HAS IMPLIED (APPARENTLY FREQUENTLY) IN THEPAST THAT HE HAS HAD BKHERALD CONNECTION OR SUPPORT IN HIS QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES, LARGELY INVOLVING ARMS AND AMMUNITION, THERE IS A [illegible] POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT ATTEMPT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO IMPLICATE BKHERALD IN HIS CURRENT PROBLEM. WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT YOU COMPLETELY AVOID WERBEL OR ANYONE

DATE:
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27 Feb 76

RECORD COPY

201-259910

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DEFERRED TELEPOUCH WASHINGTON

CONF: INFO: FILE

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CLAIMING TO REPRESENT HIM SHOULD HE ATTEMPT SOME CONTACT WITH THE STATION. (DCD/MIAMI WILL RECEIVE SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS.) Y

4. THE COS HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE FOREGOING AND CONCURS. Y

5. FILE: 201-259910. E2,IMPDET.H

DATE: 26 FEB 76
ORIG: L. BURNETT/JP
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AC/LA/CAR

DC/LA/CAR

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DIRECTOR

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TO: FR/NEW YORK INFO NICOSIA.Y

KEYWAY FORRES

REFS: A. FR/NEW YORK 33363 |IN 758465| (BEING RELAYED TO NICOSIA)

B. DIRECTOR 769406 NF 20 1978

C. DIRECTOR 670514 Q (NOT NEEDED NICOSIA)Y

1. PRIOR TO RECEIPT REF A, HQS ADVISED BY SECRET SERVICE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN REF B CASE CONCERNING EMMANUEL KASSELAKIS AND STAVROS SYKOPETRITIS AND THAT KASSELAKIS STORY NOW CONSIDERED TO BE BOGUS. SECRET SERVICE FURTHER ADVISED THAT KASSELAKIS PROVIDED OTHER INFORMATION WHICH ALSO CONSIDERED SUSPECT CONCERNING ARMS TRANSACTIONS AND THAT THIS INFORMATION PASSED TO NEW YORK BASE. SECRET SERVICE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT REF A INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM KASSELAKIS.Y

2. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY GEORGE STRATOS.Y

3. FOR FR/NEW YORK: WEEBLER UNDOUBTEDLY IS MITCHELL L. WERBELL (201-259910) OF REF C.Y

4. SAMUEL SCRIVENER JR., WASHINGTON ATTORNEY, EMPLOYED BY BKHERALD IN EARLY 1950'S AS CONSULTANT.Y

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DIRECTOR

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5. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY DOMINICAN COMPANY.

6. FILE: 201-889547; 201-257910; X REF 201-060338. E2 IMPDET.

anw

DATE: 10 DECEMBER 1975
ORIG: DAVIS/WARD/AMU
UNIT: E/GC
EXT: 1441

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7-71 MFC. 2/75

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S E C R E T 021759Z DEC 75 STAFF

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CITE FR/NEW YORK 33363

TO: DIRECTOR.

KEYWAY FORRES

1. LOCAL SECRET SERVICE REPORTS FOLLOWING FROM INFORMANT OF ESTABLISHED RELIABILITY. ONE GEORGE STRATOS, LOCAL GREEK-AMERICAN ORCHESTRA LEADER, VISITED CYPRIOTE AMBASSADOR DIMITRIOU IN WASHINGTON CA. 28 NOV TO SOLICIT HIS WILLINGNESS PURCHASE 25 THOUSAND M-16 RIFLES AT $215 EACH, TRANSACTION TO BE CONSUMATED OUTSIDE U.S. DIMITRIOU DECLINED ON GROUNDS PRICE BUT REQUESTED STRATOS SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR MANUFACUTRE AND SALE OF "HIGH-POWERED MARK I AND II HAND GUNS". WEAPONS WOULD BE MANUFACTURED BY DOMINICAN COMPANY, TELEPHONE NUMBER 532-1019 RPT 532-1019. STRATOS AGREED WORK UP DETAILS.

2. ADDITIONAL DETAILS PROVIDED BY INFORMANT: ONE OF NINE PARTNERS OF STRATOS IS ONE MITCH WEEBLER, WHO STRATOS CLAIMS IS FORMER BKHERALD. STRATOS WASHINGTON ATTORNEY IS SAM SCHREIVNER (PHON), TELEPHONE (222) 296-2950. STRATOS CLAIMED M-16'S AND 462 M-60 MACHINE GUNS HE ALSO WISHES SELL REPRESENT U.S. ARMS LOST INDOCHINA.

3. SECRET SERVICE OFFICER (WHO OF GREEK BACKGROUND) REPORTS STRATOS WAS CLOSE TO PAPADOPOULOS GOVERNMENT AND NOTES THAT LARGE

S E C R E T

3,41

7-71 MFG. 2/75

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T 584725 E1A377 PAGE 02-02 IN 758465

TOR:021835Z DEC 75 NYFR 33363

AMOUNTS OF U.S. ARMS WERE DISCOVERED MISSING FROM GREEK ARMORIES WHEN NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK INVENTORY IN 1974.

4. NO FILE: E2 IMPDET

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The Owner of Guns Seized In 1974 Will Sell Them

MARIETTA, ~~Ga.,~~ Sept. 4 (AP)—Mitchell L. WerBell 3d of Marietta has agreed to quit the arms trade, which in the past has frequently involved him in international intrigue.

In a deal worked out yesterday before a Federal judge, Mr. WerBell agreed that he would stop manufacturing and selling guns if the Government allowed him to sell $325,000 worth of arms seized by Federal agents last December.

The guns, called "the largest collection of private guns in the world" by Mr. WerBell and Federal attorneys, include 2,000 machine guns and silencers.

Mr. WerBell said his company, Defense Systems International, Inc., would continue "to do what we have always done—serve this country."

He said he and his sons have plans to sell radios, electronic equipment and military supplies not covered by the agreement.

NY TIMES 5-9-75

3,40

FBI
[redacted] [redacted] CABLE
DATED 25 JUNE 1975
SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON
WERBELL III WILLIAM MARTIN
BELL NEUTRALITY MATTERS -
GRENADA

FBI document dated 8 July 1975
from Atlanta, Ga.

3 Newspaper Articles Appearing in
The Atlanta Constitution forwarded.

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TELEPOUCH

[illegible] E1A497 PAGE 01 N 34586

TOR:091404Z JUN 75 UFPA-1860

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO: UFPA-1860

FILE NO : 200-11-11/17; 196-9-1

DATE : 6 JUNE 1975

TO : CHIEF, LATIN AMERICA DIVISION

FROM : ACTING CHIEF OF STATION, LA/MIAMI

SUBJECT : DEA/MIAMI REPORT ON POSSIBLE PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA

1. STATION HAS RECEIVED A REPORT FROM DEA/MIAMI ON A POSSIBLE PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA. STATION CONSIDERS THE REPORT SUSPECT BUT HAS SUGGESTED TO DEA THAT SINCE FBI AND STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE AN INTEREST IN SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE REPORT THAT A COPY OF IT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM. STATION ALSO PASSED TO DEA A LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THEIR USE WHICH MIGHT ASSIST THEM IN OBTAINING FURTHER DETAILS ON THE PLOT AND HAS OFFERED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH PERTINENT INFORMATION THAT MIGHT COME TO OUR ATTENTION THROUGH STATION SOURCES. CORRECT NAME OF THE PROMINENT CITIZEN OF GRENADA MENTIONED IN PARA 3 OF THE REPORT IS KEN MILNE.

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CS copy to LA/NARC 10 Jun 75

196-9-1

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE REPORT, DEA MIAMI SEC-5-75-0-253, OF 4 JUNE, SENT TO DEA HQS AND FIELD STATION BALTIMORE AND ATLANTA; DEA HQS REQUESTED PASS TO CARACAS REGION: "SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL III., ET AL FILE NO. G1-75-0105:

"IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING A MARIHUANA SMUGGLING CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION, MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III., ET AL, G1-75-0105, THE MIAMI REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT HAS UNCOVERED INFORMATION CONCERNING A PLAN TO OVERTHROW THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA.

"THE PLAN, AS OUTLINED BELOW, IS A COMPOSITE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM ONE WILLIAM BELL, A DEFENDANT IN THE SUBJECT INVESTIGATION, VIA HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH UNDERCOVER AGENTS AND A COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL.

"THE PLAN CALLS FOR THE LANDING OF 36 ARMED MEN ON GRENADA DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF A SATURDAY IN MID OR LATE JULY 1975. THE REVOLUTIONARIES WILL APPEAR TO BE SCOTTISH MERCENARIES, BUT IN FACT WILL BE AMERICANS. THE LANDING TIME WILL COINCIDE WITH THE NORMAL SHUT DOWN TIME OF THE ISLAND'S RADIO STATION. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE LANDING GROUP

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TELEPOUCH

T[illegible] 214497 PAGE 03 N 34535

TOR:291434Z JUN 75 UFPA-1850

WILL BE THE RADIO/COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, AIR AND SEA PORTS. BELL WILL HEAD AN ASSASSINATION SQUAD WHICH WILL BE DIRECTED TO KILL 21 POLITICAL AND GIVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES. THE PLAN ANTICIPATES HAVING FULL CONTROL OF THE ISLAND BY THE TIME THE ISLAND'S RADIO STATION WOULD NORMALLY GO BACK ON THE AIR ON SUNDAY MORNING. THE COST OF THIS OPERATION IS REPORTED TO BE 3 MILLION DOLLARS. ONE KEN MILL OR MILLS (PHONETIC), A PROMINENT CITIZEN OF GRENADA IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONTRIBUTED ONE HALF MILLION DOLLARS TO THIS OPERATION, AND WILL BE PUT UP AS THE HEAD OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IF THE TAKEOVER IS SUCCESSFUL. BELL STATES THAT HE WILL BE ASSUMING CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE AGENCIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. BELL IS BELIEVED TO BE MANUFACTURING WEAPONS AND PARTS FOR WEAPONS, WITHOUT SERIAL NUMBERS, FOR THE OPERATION AT DEFENSE WEAPONS INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH INC., P.O. BOX 771 DEERFIELD BEACH, FLORIDA, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRM'S MANAGEMENT. WERBELL'S ROLE IN THE OPERATION IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

"WERBELL, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON III, WHITE MALE,

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TELEPOUCH

T 276121 EIA497 PAGE 04 W 34595

TOR:091424Z JUN 75 UFPA-1869

U.S. CITIZEN, A FORMER WWII OSS OFFICER, BORN 3/8/18 AT PHILADELPHIA, PA., 5FT 6 1/2 INCHES TALL, 155 LBS., BROWN HAIR, BLUE EYES, RUDDY COMPLEXTION, GRADUATE OF FORK UNION MILITARY ACADEMY, RICHMOND, RA., AND THE CHARLES PRICE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM (EXTENSION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA), AND RESIDENT AT POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA. WERBELL DOES NOT HAVE AN FBI CRIMINAL RECORD, ALTHOUGH A 7/1/73 MIAMI HERALD TROPIC MAGAZINE ARTICLE REPORTED THAT HE AND SEVEN OTHER PERSONS HAD BEEN INDICTED FOR CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE U.S. NEUTRALITY LAWS, BUT THAT THE CHARGES WERE DROPPED ON THE ORDERS OF THEN ATTORNEY GENERAL RAMSEY CLARK. HIS INDICTMENT WAS REPORTEDLY THE RESULT OF HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH A HAITIAN REVOLUTIONARY GROUP DURING 1966. A 1974 ESQUIRE MAGAZINE ARTICLE DESCRIBES WERBELL'S INVOLVEMENT IN A COVERT POLITICAL MOVEMENT TO GAIN INDEPENDENCE FOR THE ISLAND OF ABACO IN THE BAHAMAS. WERBELL IS ALLEGED TO BE A REGISTERED DEALER AND/OR MANUFACTURER OF WEAPONS.

"BELL, WILLIAM MARTIN, WHITE MALE, BORN 6/27/28, 6FT 2 INCHES TALL, 230 LBS., GRAY HAIR, NORTH CAROLINA DRIVERS'S LICENSE NUMBER 2198095; RESIDING AT 4412 WATERBURY ROAD.

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S E C R E T

TELEPOUCH

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA; BELIEVED TO BE AN EX-MARINE CORPS PILOT AND OWNER OF THE MARINE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, US ROUTE 1 - NORTH, RALEIGH, N.C.; BELL HAS BEEN ARRESTED BY THE RALEIGH PD ON THE FOLLOWING CHARGES: CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE - 1973; AND ISSUING A WORTHLESS CHECK - 1967. BELL DOES NOT HAVE AN FBI CRIMINAL RECORD.

" IN APRIL 1975, IN ALLEGED FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY, WERBELL CONTACTED AN MIAMI R/O COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL AND REQUESTED THE C/I'S ASSISTANCE IN SMUGGLING MULTI-TON QUANTITIES OF COLOMBIAN MARIHUANA INTO THE U.S. MIAMI R/O U/C AGENTS, ACTING AS PILOT/SMUGGLERS AND COLOMBIAN SOURCE OF SUPPLY, HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH WERBELL AND BELL CONCERNING THE FINANCING, AIR SMUGGLING AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARIHUANA. OTHER INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE CONSPIRACY TO DATE ARE WALLY GILLIS, BELIEVED TO BE SUBJECT OF NADDIS RECORD NUMBER 121267, AND A RICK STEVENS AND A WILLIAM JORDAN, WHITE MALES, 20'S; NO ADDITIONAL ID DATA AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.

"CONSPIRACY INVESTIGATION IS CONTINUING. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATIVE TO NEUTRALITY VIOLATIONS WILL BE FORWARDED

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TELEPOUCH

T 276101 EIA497 PAGE 06-06 H 34585

TOR:0914042 JUN 75 UFPA-1860

UPON RECEIPT, ONE U/C AGENT (PILOT) HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY BELL TO TAKE PART IN THE GRENADA OPERATION.

"S.R.F. MIAMI BRIEFED VERBALLY CONCERNING GRENADA INFORMATION THIS DATE. A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION WILL BE FURNISHED TO U.S. CUSTOMS, ATF, AND S.R.F. AT MIAMI. JOHN A. LUND JR., REGIONAL DIRECTOR".

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24 March 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Alleged Activities of Walter Mackem

1. During the week of March 9, I lunched with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Dyckman is a former Agency staffer currently employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. During the course of our luncheon conversation, the name of Walter Mackem came up. Dyckman told me that Mackem, a JOT classmate of ours, had been fired by the Agency. According to Dyckman, Mackem is now employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. In addition, according to Dyckman, Mackem is involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as "the new land project" seeks to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this paramilitary adventure again. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly takes place in Georgia not far from Atlanta.

2. This is the extent of my conversation with Dyckman on the above subject and I have no further information or details concerning this.

Joseph P. Hayes
Joseph P. Hayes
SE/PCH

Orig - OS/SAG
1 - SE/SEC
1 - LA/SO
1 - Hayes

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STAFF 191757Z DIRECTOR 670514

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TO: FR/NEW YORK. Y

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REF: FR/NEW YORK 30417 |IN 511214| Y

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO. OTHER THAN CONFIRMATION THAT IT LICENSED DEALER OF ARMS LOCATED IN/TIRLEMONT, [illegible]- BELGIUM AND THAT IT IMPORTED FROM NEW YORK TO BELGIUM A SILENT SUB-MACHINE GUN WHICH LATER SHOWED UP IN SPAIN CONNECTED WITH BASQUE ASSASSINATION. Y

2. MICHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS PARTNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC. OF POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, A LICENSED ARMS DEALER. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA. HQS HAS LENGHTY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER-DEALER AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID-1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF

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RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE 2

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STAFF

DIRECTOR 670514

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LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING BKHERALD FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. EVER SINCE, BKHERALD HAS BEEN DISCLAIMING WERBELL ~~WHO HAS~~ REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF LNBUZZ AND BKHERALD. SINCE MUCH OF BKHERALD INFO ON WERBELL ORIGINATES LNERGO, WE SUGGEST LNERGO REP/NEW YORK PERFORM TRACE THROUGH HIS OFFICIAL CHANNEL. (ABOVE INFO MAY NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL WODUAL CITIZEN.) Y

3. ONLY TRACE ON MITCHELL WERBELL IV IS THAT HE ALSO INVOLVED IN/FATHER'S ARMS BUSINESS TRADE. HE HAS HAD NO CONNECTION WITH BKHERALD. Y

4. FILE: 201-918287, E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 17 MARCH 1975
ORIG: WENDY RAHMAN
UNIT: NE/ARN/I
EXT: /R 1386

C/FR/B2

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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T 831008 EIA365 PAGE 01 IN 511214

TOR:041600Z MAR 75 NYFR 30417

S E C R E T 041335Z MAR 75 STAFF

CITE FR/NEW YORK 30417

TO: DIRECTOR,

AJAJA FORRES

REF A. UNDW-6325

B. FR/NEW YORK 30022 (IN 473676)

1. SUBJ REFS, ALA-AL-DIN AL-TAYYAR OF THE IRAQI MUN, IS STILL OF CURRENT INTEREST TO FBI WHICH HAS HIM UNDER PERIODIC OBSERVATION. TAYYAR HAS BEEN IN BAGHDAD ON HOLIDAY FOR PAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND FBI HOPES MAKE OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN NEW YORK IN NEXT WEEK OR SO. DURING 25 FEB MEETING WITH FBI COUNTERPARTS, TERPOS AGAIN REITERATED BKHERALD INTEREST IN TAYYAR SAYING HE DEFINITELY WOULD LIKE CONTACT TAYYAR IF FOR SOME REASON FBI DECIDED NOT TO. FBI CONTACTS SAID MATTER WOULD BE RESOLVED ONE WAY OF ANOTHER IN NEXT FEW WEEKS AND THEY WOULD ATTEMPT ASSIST TERPOS IN THE CONTACT IF FBI GAVE TAYYAR UP.

2. FBI ALSO INFORMALLY ASKED FOR TRACES OF FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS/ COMPANIES WHICH REF B CONTACT OF TAYYAR (WILLIAM APIKIAN) HAS CONTACTED RE PURCHASING ARMS:

A. MITCHELL WEBELL, III AND IV

S E C R E T

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7-71 MPG. 3/74

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T 831008 EIA365 PAGE 02-02 IN 511214

TOR:0416002 MAR 75 NYFR 30417

DEFENSE SYSTEMS

POWDER SPRINGS GEORGIA.

LNERGO SOURCE SAID WERBELL (EITHER OR SON) FORMERLY WORKED FOR BKHERALD. ALSO MADE OFF THE CUFF REMARK THAT "DEFENSE SYSTEMS CO" SOUNDED LIKE BKHERALD FRONT ORGANIZATION.

B. EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO.

BELGIUM

FBI HAS INFO FROM BELGIUM SECURITY THAT LEMMENS AND CO. IN THE PAST HAS PROVIDED ARMS FOR THE IRA AND THE BASQUE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

3. FILE: 201-0918287. E2 IMPDET

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The Amazing New-Country Caper

by Andrew St. George

Capitalist revolution, the ultimate solution

For the first time in history, the successful managers of America's economy—its entrepreneurs, financiers, merchandisers, investors—are talking rebellion. A kind of rebellion, anyway. There is no call to subvert the Republic, only to abandon it. In increasing numbers, America's most affluent and active elites are threatening to withdraw their funds, their assets, ultimately even themselves and their families from the centers of the U.S. economy, which many of them seem to consider done for. Nicholas von Hoffman, the acerbic and preternaturally foresighted columnist of *The Washington Post*, found that in some of mid-America's best executive clubs, "There is talk of buying gold coins and keeping them in the office safe, of owning a piece of land to retreat to when the trouble starts." The hero of the year's most durable best seller, *You Can Profit From a Monetary Crisis*, by Harry Browne, is "Peter Panic," the quintessential American small investor. He is in flight from his own national economy. Transferring every penny he owns from U.S. investments into Swiss banks and South African gold stocks, Peter Panic practically doubles his worth from 1970 to '73; then he is ready to take the most important step—to find himself a secluded rural retreat to weather the nation's coming troubles.

But retreat *where*? That's the basic problem none of these doomsayers grapples with. A seventy-five-thousand-dollar-a-year man who pulls up lock, stock and bond investments to move to a secluded farmhouse may find there a measure of protection from random violence—or he may find, if real trouble starts, that in his isolation he's utterly defenseless.

Unless, of course, he has planned ahead—as far ahead and as carefully as the originators of what one can only call, for the moment, the Abaco Plan (it remains to be seen by events, of course, whether the Abaco planners were as wise and prescient as they were farsighted and careful). The originators of the Abaco idea were the first to implement the urge to abandon America with a concrete design, including a destination, provision for personal and financial safety, monetary reward and even a Utopian social program. Though the men behind Abaco are nearly the opposite of the commune-seekers of the late Sixties and early Seventies, their objectives are much the same. They seek a way out and a return to fundamental values, but their most fundamental value is the proposition that each of them should be many times a millionaire, untroubled by inflation.

By the time you read this, the men of Abaco may have accomplished the first stages of their program (in which case you will have read about them in the newspapers)—or they may have failed and be in the process of regrouping. But I'd like you to meet them as I did, at a lunch in Washington, D.C., last May.

"Cry 'Havoc!' and let slip the dogs of War"?

No, sir! Not here in Duke Zeibert's place you don't; this well-bred Washington restaurant admits no animals. Not even if they're wearing eighty-dollar Church's shoes. Not even if they happen to be the familiar old two-legged war hounds who were made immortal in the Shakespearean line, and who are being made fashionable again this year by the success of Frederick Forsyth's latest book, *The Dogs of War*.

Here we are in 1974, murky, angst-ridden, confusing old '74, and with Forsyth's novel a best seller, hailed as "soon to be a major movie," deferentially praised for its "reportorial realism," more and more people are talking about "the dogs of war" as if they knew what the phrase meant: an international conspiracy of financiers and killer commandos who wage mercenary mini-wars in the quest for maxi-payoffs. What nonsense! A drink at Duke Zeibert's polished bar will give us a better view of reality than Fred Forsyth's collected works.

Take Mister Mitchell Livingston WerBell here, a ruddy, jovial, moustached chap, sipping his preprandial Tanqueray martini extra dry. It's obvious that if there were anything doggy or bellicose about WerBell, he wouldn't be lunching where he is—at the head of the old Duke's prize front corner table.

Or take the tall, well-tailored man sitting next to WerBell. It is plain at a glance that he looks and—having just been overheard asking, "May I have the pickles, please?"—sounds like a patrician

7,33

London clubman. And that's just what he is: Robert Hamilton, Baron of Belhaven and Stenton, a distinguished member of the House of Lords.

In fact, a good look at the legendary Mitch WerBell—millionaire firearms tycoon, designer of the world's best muzzle silencer, adventurer, friend of dictators and C.I.A. agents, manipulator of the luck of small nations—and at the seven men who are his luncheon guests today reminds us that, in real life, the strategy of private wars demands, first of all, *finesse.*

In Forsyth's telling, "the dogs of war" get together only to make hard-boiled conversation about "knocking off an entire republic" with the aid of World War II machine pistols laboriously concealed in oil drums. WerBell's world is different. A top executive of Defense Services International, Military Armaments Corporation and Sionics Inc., he designs and manufactures his own weaponry, which are recognized all over the world as the most sophisticated small arms obtainable. Having acquired a taste for irregular warfare as an O.S.S. commando leader behind Japanese lines in World War II, WerBell is rumored to have taken a hand in a long string of mini-wars since then, from the South China Sea to the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. But WerBell frowns on crass badinage, especially with food. At Zeibert's the table talk is mostly about gastronomy today, in part because the dill sours and soft-shell crabs are truly remarkable, in part because the host at the neighboring table is Clifton Daniel, the silver-haired Washington bureau chief of The New York *Times.*

But by the time coffee and Courvoisier arrive, Daniel and his party depart. WerBell lights a finely veined Montecruz double corona. "I talked to the island today," he says, and suddenly the table is all attention.

The island"—that's what this lunch is all about. The island is Abaco; not yet an independent republic, nor a center of commerce and finance, but by no means a negligible coral hump, either. In fact, Abaco is the second-largest landmass in the Bahamas—Great Abaco and Little Abaco, surrounded by a sprinkling of small reefs and cays, over seven hundred square miles of fertile tropical paradise. Mitch WerBell and his guests have come to Washington to discuss a project straight out of a Forsyth script: the take-over of Abaco—an action that will allow these men to get themselves and their money profitably out of the U.S.

To be sure, any resemblance to popular fiction stops short with the basic idea. Commando politics is dead. It will no longer do to break open a case of bootleg hand grenades and storm the palace. In fact, Abaco *has* no palace. What it does have is six to seven thousand native inhabitants who lead lives ranging from quiet stagnation to mute poverty.

To be conquered, Abaco must be attacked—that fundamental aspect of territorial expansion has not changed in four thousand years—but in an age of psychological warfare, motivational research, subliminal propaganda and behavior modification, the tactics must be different. WerBell's first assault on Abaco has been psychological. With great skill and ruthless persuasiveness, the citizens of Abaco are convinced, step by step, that they must become an independent nation; that becoming an independent nation is the greatest, most rewarding thing in the whole wide world; that it is *they,* the citizenry of Abaco, who must urgently need and demand and fight for status as a self-governing commonwealth.

"I talked to the island for almost an hour this morning," WerBell repeats gently, now that everyone around the table is watching him with close attention. "They finally got the slips. They've already distributed half of them. They'll make a one-spot run this weekend and see how they score. They think it'll be sixty to sixty-five percent."

No translation is needed. As the Watergate tapes have demonstrated, men who share a secret scenario come to share a secret language, as if by osmosis. WerBell's remarks reveal that he has had a long-distance conversation this morning with one of his chief operatives on Abaco, using a clear phone line—i.e., a connection involving untapped phone numbers. (If the conversation had not involved a key agent on Abaco, and if the phone had been suspect, the conversation would have been brief.)

The agent on the island—most likely C. R. "Chuck" Hall, who has served as WerBell's principal operative on Abaco during most of the Summer of 1974—reported that the special courier who occasionally arrives from Miami aboard a small amphibian seaplane, bringing consignments which the Nassau authorities are not supposed to see, had delivered a shipment of blank survey forms. These polling slips, devised by a prestigious U.S. opinion-research firm, are to monitor sentiment on Abaco in favor of independence—not just once, but week by week, as WerBell's psywar campaign unfolds.

Furthermore, WerBell learned this morning that a test sampling focused on a single Abaco settlement, perhaps Marsh Harbour or Fox Town, had been scheduled by his agents on Abaco for the coming weekend. The organizers expected to poll between sixty and sixty-five percent in favor of independence—an impressive score, reflecting the fact that the covert political campaign of WerBell and Co. is in its sixth month.

Are these people *serious?* They are indeed—not merely serious but experienced, powerful and farsighted. Three of WerBell's luncheon guests are former C.I.A. career officers, all three recently retired from its clandestine services branch, where they acquired invaluable experience in the manipulation, dismantling and rearranging of governments. John Muldoon, who is WerBell's principal agent in Washington, has served as a PolAd—a political adviser—in Vietnam and Africa. Walter Mäcken has seen similar duty in a number of Southeast Asian countries, and Ted Roussos, a tanned, greying man, has been a senior C.I.A. clandestine services official in the Mediterranean—Italy, the Balkans, above all Greece—for almost twenty years before he retired last year to join, ostensibly, the management of the Astor, Washington's best Greek restaurant, long owned by his family.

These men are not war hounds or gunslingers. Their ethos and telos thrust not toward violence but toward *control.* They are technetronic conflict managers—planners, organizers, and only occasionally the manipulators of violent action. Muldoon is a tall, pink, deep-chested Irishman faithfully cast in the mold from which most of the chief inspectors of large American police departments seem to spring. Mäcken looks like an Ivy League graduate instructor, blond, button-down, horn-rimmed, alert, with a Hong Kong Racquet Club tie to match his navy blazer. The pipe-smoking Roussos, in his flawlessly cut English tropicals, demonstrates what the French mean when they say

3.31

distingué—the aging Charles Boyer plunked in a spy scenario, looking not so much the part of James Bond as his enigmatic superior, M. All three follow WerBell's briefing with small nods and half smiles of approval.

WerBell talks on, his eyes on the pearl-grey ash of his cigar, his growly voice low. There's work to be done—lots of it. The day known as U.D.I.—that is, the date when Abaco breaks away from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence—is tentatively set for New Year's Day of 1975. The operations required to seize control of the island have been disguised as the "uprising" of an "autonomous, locally organized independence movement" with such amazing skill that none of the world's major press has spotted what is going on. A number of seemingly local organizations and deceptively "ad hoc" groups have sprung up to handle those activities that cannot be kept from public view—propaganda, organization, and so forth. There are: the Abaco Independence Movement (known as A.I.M.); the Abaco Development Council; Friends of Abaco; the "Prosperity '74" Economic Conference on Abaco.

Every one of these cover organizations has been clandestinely created, financed and managed from WerBell's headquarters in Powder Springs, a suburb of Atlanta. To coordinate their activities—propaganda, recruitment, proselytization, the importation of distinguished guest speakers from the U.S. who preach the independence gospel buttressed by a variety of economic and political promises—a carefully camouflaged "forward headquarters" has been set up in Miami. A large, deceptively suburban house at 1666 S.W. Twelfth Street hides a high-powered SSB radio station, a "dispatch center" for handling cargo traffic with Abaco via a small seaplane, and a halfway house for promising independence militants who are discreetly flown to Miami. On arrival, the independence activists are either enrolled in political indoctrination courses held in Miami, or, having been provided with plane tickets under various cover names, they are flown farther north to a training base near Atlanta, where they receive paramilitary training under the command of a former U.S. infantry officer, Col. Robert Bayard.

Col. Bayard, a tall, leathery man in the Gary Cooper mold, with grey eyes and a shock of reddish brown hair, is the officer in charge of "special personnel." Young, muscular, unattached Abaconian independence enthusiasts, whose commitment to the cause of U.D.I. is especially strong, are given seven weeks of supersecret instruction in the use of small arms, demolition devices and other commando skills at the proving grounds of Mitch WerBell's arms company. Proving grounds? Well, WerBell makes plenty of gadgets that bear testing. His companies produce a deadly sniper rifle, "accurized," automated, utterly silent, with the built-in capability of plugging a beer can at a thousand yards—"We guarantee *this* much," says WerBell—and a special sighting device which enables the rifleman to fix his target day or night. With Gordan Ingram, WerBell has designed and produces the incredible Ingram, a miniaturized submachine gun no larger than the familiar .45 service automatic, eight hundred rounds per minute, the whole shooting match about as noisy as a very fast Ping-Pong match—"pac . . . pac . . . pacpacpac"—the barrel is a patented WerBell silencer. There is plenty of "sophisticated equipment" to test. But among visitors who have been invited there more than once, the place—electronic security fencing, the dog patrols, the imperious warning signs, the helipad for combat choppers, the airstrip for the company Learjet—among people who call Mitch by his first name, the place is known as "the farm."

Training special personnel is a rigorous regime, and Col. Bayard keeps himself in shape; at Zeibert's he takes grilled liver and a single beer, and lunches in silence, seldom intervening in the discussion, occasionally glancing at his wrist chronometer—he must be back at the farm by nightfall, and as a mere colonel, he must "fly commercial"—no Learjets pre-warmed on the ready strip.

Setting out the final phases of the Abaco take-over campaign, Wer-

Abaco's head honcho: millionaire, ideologue and philosopher Michael C. Oliver.



ABACO NATIONAL LAND TRUST

LAND ENTITLEMENT CERTIFICATE

SPECIMEN ONLY

Ah, yes, the seven thousand native inhabitants; after the revolution, every Abaconian will get a certificate like this one, worth one acre of homestead land absolutely free.

3 33

Bell sounds as smoothly and playfully Machiavellian as the senior account executive of a medium-sized ad agency plotting a tricky but not really *make-or-break* media blitz. The support of the locals is essential: "To get it, we're gonna change their self-image." It's easy; just listen. We're gonna use only the *truth:* Abaconians think of themselves . . . . well, as people of *modest* means. In reality, they're beggars hunkered on a mountain of gold. And this is by no means another hollow hype. No effective psywar concept is.

Stretching across the central and southern reaches of Abaco there are 300,000—*three hundred thousand*—acres of undeveloped prime land, potentially, and by no means unrealistically, worth hundreds of millions of dollars. This is virgin soil. Under British colonial rule these were crown lands, reserved for the sovereign, and now, under the newly self-governing Bahamas Commonwealth, administered by the Pindling government in Nassau, they're still government land, strictly no trespassing for private citizens.

Just suppose, the scenario goes, that on January 1, 1975, good old torpid hung over "sorry-general-the-switchboard-is-closed" New Year's Day, Great Abaco and Little Abaco and all the lesser cays, reefs and coralback adjacent thereto, declare themselves an independent republic. This vast virgin acreage would be—*up for grabs.* Every native-born Abaconian could line up for his divvy.

"Will he get it?" asks Ted Roussos at the restaurant.

"Ohoho, you bet your boots," says WerBell. "Here, see if I can find this stuff. . . ." He flips through his attaché case, custom-made by Peal's of London, pulls out some gold-rimmed, elaborately printed bonds. "Here. . . the Abaco National Land Trust Beneficiary Share Certificate. And here's the other gizmo, the Land Entitlement Certificate. This says every native Abaconian adult gets his one-acre homesite free and clear after independence. And on the beneficiary share, he'll get some of the major lease revenues. Here's the tender, lays it all on the line. You bet they'll get a share. Provided, the tender says right here, '*Provided that the political situation in Abaco is just and fair.*' "

"Just and fair," says Roussos softly. "Of course, just and fair. If the National Land Whatnot gives each native a one-acre homesite, it will give them all, man, woman and children all together, one percent of their own land. Who will decide what's *just and fair?*"

"Ah . . . probably I will."

There he is . . . the low voice, the bony figure in the forty-nine-dollar Robert Hall drip-dry suit, the jacket bulge between chest and armpit contouring not the familiar shoulder holster but a Hewlett-Packard minicalculator: Mike Oliver *likes* sitting at the far end of the table with a notebook beside the butter plate. He has lunched here prudently and salubriously on nothing but cold fish and iced tea and with a health-conscious frown for the vapor of two-dollar cigars, staring intently at every speaker in turn, now staring at Ted Roussos over the remains of his cold jellied salmon with the deep-eyed concentration of a man whose daimon senses a challenge. "You have a good point, a small point but a good point. 'Just' and 'fair' are only words until somebody decides what they are supposed to mean. On Abaco, I will decide. That's the *big* point, isn't it?"

Right you are, Mike. Chesty Mitch WerBell and Big Jack Muldoon and Smart Walt Mäckem and Courtly Lord Belhaven in their bespoke three-hundred-dollar suits and club ties and hand-rubbed Peal's cases, and Bob Bayard in his craggy silence, and all the other N.C.P. staff (New-Country Project is what *that* stands for) and special personnel drawing contract pay on or about Abaco are ultimately only meant to enforce what Mike Oliver considers just and fair and desirable. Ted Roussos knows it, too; he resigns from the project the day after the luncheon meeting. But no one else does. Why should they? Mike Oliver is here, after all, not just as the founder and constitutional creator of a perfectly serious American new-country movement, but in representation of a powerful syndicate of financial backers. It is, above all, Oliver who is making independence an imminent reality for the citizens of Abaco, most of whom have never heard his name.

But among the driven, troubled, questing financiers of America, Oliver is more than a name. To many business leaders he's a miracle worker, a minor prophet on the crumbling walls of the city, a far-sighted sentry registering the approach of the forces of darkness. For a specter is haunting America—a new apparition of four space-age horsemen: Inflation, Unemployment, Depression and Chaos. And providentially, at this critical juncture in mid-1974, Michael C. Oliver, in association with Mitchell WerBell, offers the driven rich an alternative: not just some backcountry hidey-hole, but citizenship and residence in an entirely new country; a newborn commonwealth wholly dedicated to the protection of private wealth and the survival—indeed, the *revival*—of the classic free-enterprise system.

Long before the Dow hit the five hundreds, and coffee went up to fifty cents a cup, long before old people began eating dog food and farmers dumping their calves into ditches, Mike Oliver foresaw that the free-enterprise economy was doomed in America. It sounded strange at first, coming from Mike Oliver, this single-minded belief in devaluation, decline and fall, for in the mid-Sixties the dollar was still the fixed star of the economic firmament, the U.S. economy was booming, and Oliver himself seemed the very embodiment of the American dream of success: a European immigrant to the U.S. at eighteen, he had made his first million by thirty (real-estate development, construction) and 1965 saw him living on a charming wooded estate in Nevada with a pretty wife named Betty and three lively children. Approaching fifty, Oliver was the president of several medium-sized corporations, a settled, influential community leader and the employer of a ravishingly beautiful secretary named Vicky Jo Todd, who was crowned Miss Nevada in 1970. Yet for almost ten years, where other businessmen and economists saw only progress and prosperity, Oliver divined a long-range trend toward depression and disaster.

Worldwide travel and an intense reading of economics helped convince him by 1965 that, as he told a visitor years later, "They're going to screw up the money." He felt certain that debauchery of the dollar would lead to political crisis, inflation, and ultimately to some sort of dictatorship.

"Once I saw that the dollar was kaput, that whatever the government did would only make matters worse, I dumped my stocks and bonds and switched to a strong position in gold coins. Everyone laughed, except my friends; my friends said I'd gone crazy. Well, as you know, it turned out that I'd made some pretty sharp bets in the money market, and instead of calling to suggest where I could get some psychotherapy, my friends called to *(Continued on page 151)*

(Continued from page 64) ask where I was getting my investment tips. And, while I began making some real money by '69-'70, it wasn't because I had good financial advice. Just the opposite was true: all the investment advisers and trust officers and analysts and forecasters and market consultants were betting the other way, they couldn't read the handwriting even when their noses were against the wall, and so—I beat the market. Let me tell you, not many people do. And the way it happened, it wasn't any tips or charts or portfolio managers; what really happened was that by 1965 I'd become a student—a *disciple*, really—of Professor Ludwig von Mises."

Professor von Mises, the longest-lived (ninety-two), most prolific (nineteen books) and least self-effacing economist of the Austrian School founded by Bohm-Bawerk, died in 1973 in New York City (where he'd been teaching since 1940) just as, after a half century of obscurity and neglect, his teachings began to enjoy a renaissance here, much the way Karl Marx came into vogue in Eastern Europe at about the time the siege guns of the Red Army became audible in the distance.

Had more people listened to Von Mises in time, there would be more gold millionaires like Oliver today, and although not many did, the professor's tiny coterie of admirers often compared him in epochal stature to Karl Marx—a Marx of ultraconservative capitalistic convictions, of course.

Von Mises was a polymath and his teachings are complex, but some of the principal doctrines are not difficult to grasp. Von Mises believed that human freedom and laissez-faire capitalism were one and the same thing. He had passionate, sacramental faith in the market, not as a mere institution—the sort of vulgar "computer" seen by Keynesians which the government can tinker with whenever it needs to—but as a metaphysical process which regulates all human affairs. Much as one cannot hope to fix a fine watch with a bung starter, Von Mises was convinced that government could not intervene in economic affairs, in the providential workings of the market, without causing damage. "Interventionism" was a self-defeating, vicious circle: the first governmental intrusion into business necessitated a second to stem the ravages of the first, then a third one to undo the worst consequences of the second; then a fourth intervention to alleviate the trauma of the third . . . Von Mises despised "interventionists," the whole brainless, sniveling lefty lot of economists, bankers, policy planners, sociologists, who advocated governmental participation in *anything* with an economic aspect; he even opposed free public education above the grade-school level. And Von Mises was evangelical in his belief that unless mankind learned to value, adopt and defend laissez faire capitalism as its paramount social system, it was headed for chaos and slavery.

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Antonio Y Cleopatra.

Chaos and tyranny—that is what Mike Oliver foresaw as early as [illegible], the inevitable result of America's "interventionist" and "collectivist" fiscal debauchery. That he made millions of dollars in gold profits along the way did not really reassure Oliver, it merely confirmed his premonitions. Of course, the profits helped: to people who tend to think in terms of money—that is, most of us—they seemed to prove that Oliver had something.

To tell the world what he had, Oliver wrote a book in 1968: *A New Constitution for a New Country*. Printed privately, never noticed in a book review, written in pedestrian declaratory style, the book has thus far sold 19,400 copies through the mail—proving that there does exist that contradictory thing, a genuine underground best seller.

The subtitle on the cover reads: "Has the Time Come To Abandon the United States?" Oliver's answer is a firm "Yes." The book tells why, and how. "The United States can no longer be saved from severe crisis. . . . Though not yet under complete tyranny, prevalence of totalitarian ideas and increased use of suppressive measures prove that the end of freedom is in sight [in America]. . . . [Only] those who arrange for a timely departure will escape the coming horror."

The book is not a tract; it's a plan of action. If Ludwig von Mises is indeed the Karl Marx of monetary libertarianism, and Harry Browne, the best-selling author who invented Peter Panic, perhaps its Bakunin, its prolific pan-destructionist, then Mike Oliver is its Fidel Castro—the ultimate militant who redefines the doctrine in terms of total action. Browne's book, advocating that self-sufficient people withdraw to "retreat homes" for safety, has snowballed into an all-season best seller; but it's Mike Oliver who is about to show them how to do it.

"The person with self-respect has a right to preserve his life and freedom," Oliver's book reassures the reader. "But he has no duty to stay in a country whose government policies will destroy him."

The country Oliver is describing isn't Nazi Germany; history is a cruel joker—this time around, it's the United States. "Means for effective action to save freedom in the United States in the foreseeable future no longer exist. Thus, the freedom-loving person has no choice: leave, or be destroyed."

Fortunately, "a surprising number of nearly uninhabited, yet quite suitable places for establishing a new country still exist. . . . The exact location of the new country cannot be revealed at this time. Yet, one has but to look at the western hemisphere to find that places for establishing a new, *fair-sized* country still exist."

And now, that "fair-sized country" has been found. Its conquest is within Mike Oliver's reach. How things have changed in the few years since 1968! A powerful consortium of frightened new-country seekers, wealthy and influential men who would have laughed at Mike Oliver's strictures a short while ago, are supporting his campaign with money and anything else that might be required. Whatever you need, Mike; just say the word, Mike. And the most important acquisition of Oliver's well-endowed New-Country Project has been the meeting and the alliance with Mitch WerBell and *his* semi-business, paramilitary organization. Now it's the Oliver-WerBell organization, at least so far as Abaco is concerned. Special personnel are interviewed, recruited, briefed: Walter Mackem, the scholarly young ex-C.I.A. officer leaves for the Bahamas on his first assignment. Big John Muldoon rents a suite in the Lafayette Building in midtown Washington. Ralph McMullen is dispatched to Miami, along with a pale, quiet former British intelligence officer known only as Grant who is a communications specialist hired to run wireless traffic with the WerBell-Oliver organization's agent network on Abaco . . . *coded* wireless traffic, five-digit groups and all that jazz, the way a proper intelligence station does it. The skeptical Ted Roussos is soon replaced with another U.S. ex-intelligence officer who is not merely enthusiastic, this lean young hard-charger named Charles Boyle, he is, best of all *black*; off he goes to work among the silent, sun-wrinkled fishermen and lobster trappers of Abaco.

And yet who but Mike Oliver is destined to comprehend it, to encompass it, to direct it all? Who but Oliver understands that the campaign for Abaco is not another banana-republic land grab, that this is an ideological, yes, a *moral* movement? Who makes sure that the ideas of free enterprise and unfettered market capitalism find *some* expression in every leaflet, pamphlet or newsletter that the Oliver-WerBell organization produces for distribution on Abaco? AIM DEMANDS CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WHICH WILL ELIMINATE THE POWER OF GOVERNMENT TO ARBITRARILY LIMIT PERSONAL RIGHTS! AIM DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE END TO GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES. AIM DEMANDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'LAND TRUST!'

Do the silent, bare-legged men and women of Abaco really demand all this? Why ask? Mike Oliver has it all thought out for them. *Auteur* of a remote-controlled independence scenario, he means to be a *bon patron*—not just the remote manipulator, but in time the efficient and productive manager of the affairs of Abaco. One question remains to be settled here at lunch.

"We are sure that our special personnel will seize and hold control on Abaco when U.D.I. comes," Oliver says, turning directly to Lord Belhaven. "What I'm still worried about is the attitude of the British government. The Pindling regime in Nassau will urge military intervention by the British when they realize that their constabulary is no match for our men. We want to be sure that intervention does not take place. Do you think you can do it?"

Lord Belhaven is an urbane, unflappable veteran of over ten years in the House of Lords. He is an enormous improvement over the first British lobbyist Oliver attempted to retain to represent the interests of the Abaco campaign in London—a Scotsman named Colin Mitchell with a reputation for being mean-tempered and overbearing, a late lieutenant colonel of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who was serving a term in Parliament as a Conservative.

Colin "Mad Mitch" Mitchell was a shock. Brought over to WerBell's Atlanta estate on the usual all-expenses-paid trip to meet some of Abaco's sponsors, Mitchell turned out to be abrasive and relentlessly acquisitive. To help Abaco along, he wanted a large fee . . . a very large fee. His visit was not a success.

Lord Belhaven is different. Keeping an eye on Oliver, calmly but as carefully as the American is watching *him*, he decides not to explain the complexities of influencing Her Majesty's Government. "Oh, absolutely," he tells Oliver with an encouraging smile. "Not to worry. I don't think London really cares what happens in the Bahamas, you know—too many bloody miseries at home. I've already tabled a question on Abaco for next week in the House, and we'll keep up the pressure, I'll promise you that. By the time U.D.I. is due . . . no, I don't think we should worry too much about serious trouble from London."

"Well, U.D.I. is all set: New Year's Day," says Oliver. His face is suddenly different; the intense stare turns into a warm, almost affectionate grin. "Until then, good luck, everybody, and back to work. There's lots to be done."

The men rise in silent agreement. The *Tischgespräch* is over: within twenty-four hours the Oliver-WerBell organization is back in high gear. The path to U.D.I. is lined with a thousand tasks; connections to be coupled, mingled parameters separated, contingencies replanned, "operational capabilities" to be "actuated."

Robert Anthony Carmichael Hamilton, thirteenth Baron of Belhaven and Stenton, jets back to London overnight, pensively sipping Isle of Islay Scotch in a front-cabin V.I.P. seat. A fortnight or so is spent planning and tabling motions, and on June 10, at half past two of the clock, with the House of Lords reassembled after the Whitsun recess, the Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack, the Bishop of Portsmouth having read the proper prayers, Lord Belhaven rises to address the peers of the realm in a voice of singular gravity:

"My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government what representations they intend to make to the Government of the Bahamas urging them to cease their harassment of the people of Abaco."

Lord Goronwy-Roberts, parliamentary undersecretary of state, stands to respond for the government: "My Lords, the Abaco Islands are an integral part of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, which became an independent sovereign

State on July 10, 1973. It would [illegible] therefore, be appropriate for Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to seek to intervene in the internal affairs of the Bahamas."

Lord Belhaven and Stenton: "My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply and appreciate what he says. . . ." And although the people of Abaco have not, on the recent record, demonstrably suffered harassment, and Lord Belhaven knows it, there is a subliminal sense in which it's all quite true. To lure the government into proclaiming and reiterating the principle of nonintervention in the newly independent Bahamas is one of the subtler goals of Lord Belhaven's strategy.

Lord Goronwy-Roberts is densely, gratifyingly energetic about it all: "My Lords, this is the case of an independent country. . . . My Lords, independence is independence." If that dictum hardens into dogma, if only by sheer force of repetition, the Oliver-WerBell organization will have a free hand on Abaco: Washington, for its part, is not likely even to consider intervention. In the meanwhile, Lord Belhaven has once again, as on a number of previous occasions, impressed upon the House of Lords that the plucky, oppressed little Abaco *suffers*.

In Powder Springs, Georgia, where Col. Bayard is sweating five special personnel trainees from Abaco down at the machine-gun range behind the fishpond of Mitch WerBell's farm, it is nine o'clock in the morning. Dusty, strained, popeyed from the jabbing of rapid-fire recoils, the colonel and his boys, whose diurnal "duty tour" begins at six a.m., take a break. In boxy little electric carts of the sort used by golfers, they roll silently across the close-cropped lawn of the WerBell estate, up to the manor house where they draw "midmorning rations"—country ham sandwiches, pecan biscuits, cold milk in fourteen-ounce glasses. Then it's down to the rifle range for three hours of marksmanship instruction with a remarkable training device devised by WerBell himself: a standard 7.62 N.A.T.O. military rifle converted to fire .22 long-rifle cartridges. It's a low-cost, low-noise, practically recoil-free way to teach a man how to hit a Dr Pepper can at seventy-five yards with a military firearm, and it works: the men who make it through this drill are thereafter known, in the special WerBellian nomenclature compounded from the lingo of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the intelligence establishment's invisible war, as "sniper qualified." They are, too.

Six hundred miles or so southward as the courier plane flies, the Oliver-WerBell organization's Miami headquarters is humming with activity. Vicky Jo Todd, the long-legged, melting-diamond-eyed Miss Nevada of 1970—who, having married one of Mike Oliver's young vice-presidents, is now known nonprofessionally as Mrs. Ralph McMullen—is busy preparing a "packet pickup" for the pilot who makes the biweekly liaison-plane run to Abaco. Into the carefully masking-taped cargo cartons go letters to agents on Abaco; spare parts for a shortwave set on the blink; books (Ayn Rand: *For the New Intellectual*); packages of bumper stickers and windshield stickers for panel trucks apostrophizing the Pindling government's incompetence and corruption, written by Oliver's executive assistant Dave Scholl; and bunches of other goodies best shipped directly and informally since they would only annoy the Bahamas government if spotted passing through the regular customs channels.

Two weeks have passed since that table d'hôte at Duke Zeibert's, and Mike Oliver, having flown more than twenty thousand miles, is back in Washington at the Gramercy Inn (single room, $28.50) talking on the phone to Mitch WerBell, who is also back in Washington but at the grand luxe Madison Hotel (Monroe Suite, $95 daily). Oliver is expecting an important visitor—important because, however well devised and executed the Abaco plan may be, it cannot succeed without investors and colonists—new citizens for an all-new country. This afternoon there is to be a "participant briefing" for just such a prospect. He is Frank Bond of Baltimore, owner of Holiday Spas, a far-flung physical-culture chain. Bond, a spectacularly successful young tycoon known to hold strong libertarian views, has expressed his interest in buying a share of the Abaco project, and I am able to sit in on the briefing while Oliver explains his dreams for the future of Abaco.

Frank Bond arrives late, after eleven at night, accompanied by a short, greying lawyer and an air of coiled impatience. Bond is young, unexpectedly young for a self-made millionaire, slim, dark, dressed in a black suit which looks rich but somehow too *nouveau*. He has already had at least one long talk with Oliver, but the attorney, as he puts it, "knows from nothing" about Abaco. It's just as well, for assembled to greet the two potential participants there are Col. Bayard, Mitch WerBell and of course Oliver—a synergized trio wound up to deliver a socko briefing.

The lawyer begins with the usual question about Abaco as a potential tax shelter, and Oliver fields it with practiced ease.

"Keep in mind what we are building on Abaco is not a tax-shelter nation," he says. "It's a tax-free nation. Have you read any of our planning papers? Have you seen my book? The constitution? No? Well, *maybe* Frank told you"—the lawyer shakes his head dubiously. "Anyhow, basically what we are structuring on Abaco is this . . . maybe I better read it to you from the constitution . . . '*Preamble: We, the people of Abaco*' . . . and so on . . . here '. . . *that the only true and proper function of government is to protect its citizens from force and fraud, and that the government is limited to that function only.*' And here on the next page: '*Government is limited to protection against force and fraud, and may not impose any social or economic structure upon any persons or entities within its jurisdiction* . . .' because, you see, we say here further down that government [illegible] . . *hired by participants to protect* [illegible] *personal rights against external and internal force and fraud.*'"

"What you mean to say . . ." says the lawyer.

"Well, for instance, you see what we mean if you go to page thirty-eight." Oliver overrides him. "Here Article Twenty-seven says—this is *Fiscal Matters*—that '*No government agency, branch or level shall pass any law, regulation or other restriction with the effect of establishing a legal tender or otherwise requiring the acceptance of any form of money, currency, coin or other medium of exchange; except as provided by voluntary contracts or by mutual consent voluntarily arrived at between persons or entities.*' And here, down at paragraph four: '*The financing of government activities shall be accomplished by voluntary payment of premiums by persons wishing to participate in the services of government. . . .*' Do you follow what this means? First off: the government of the independent Republic of Abaco will have no power to issue money. This is *very* important, more important than . . . Frank knows how important this is. Private financial houses will issue all our money and they'll guarantee it. There will be no Federal Deposit Insurance on Abaco, no government loan guarantees or banking regulations. Nothing like the Federal Reserve. No central bank, as you can see—no central bank, no involvement with the International Monetary Fund."

"The money will be backed in gold," says the lawyer questioningly.

"The money will be *in* gold, at least some of it," says Oliver. "Some of us who were the first participants have drawn up the charter for a bank, and we will issue the 'rand,' the basic unit containing .23 troy ounces of gold—a handy medium-sized coin worth about fifty dollars at present rates. Named after Ayn Rand, you understand, not after the South African rand. There'll be quarters and perhaps quintals, the quintal worth just about ten dollars. Then of course we'll have to have paper money, backed either in gold or other stable assets. All fully gold-convertible—you want your wages in gold, you just pay the issuer a visit."

"And if an issuer defaults . . ." says the lawyer softly.

"They won't default," says Oliver. "The assets will have to be there, covering the value of the issue, and if there's any funny business, it's long jail terms for everybody and his accountant—that would be first-degree fraud. But of course self-regulation will probably suggest that issuers carry bankruptcy insurance for triple safety—*privately* written insurance, mind you."

"And public services—I'm thinking of the police, the judges, garbage collection, you know what I mean—those will be financed by whom?" asks the lawyer.

"They'll be financed by voluntary premiums," says Oliver. "Voluntary in the sense that you go shopping voluntarily—nobody rattles handcuffs at you to make you buy groceries, but you buy some just the same, week after week.

Those who pay the yearly premiums will be known as 'participants' and they'll be entitled to the services the government provides; those who don't, won't be. Whatever services private business can provide competitively will be left to private enterprise."

"Like the police?" the lawyer smiles. "There's a cute deal—if you don't pay your premiums, they can't arrest you for overtime parking."

"Well, no. Not really," says Oliver. "They can't arrest you for overtime parking *anyhow*, because this government won't have the right to tell you how long you should stop your car at the curb—why should it? But if you're guilty of force or fraud, you'll be arrested whether you are a paid-up participant or not. What a nonparticipant won't have will be the right to conduct civil litigation, to set up a surrogate trust, to collect damages on a tort, and so forth."

"What sort of a government will it be, anyhow?" asks Bond. "I mean as an organization. How will it be run?"

"Well, in some ways it'll run just like the government here," says Oliver. "Just like the U.S. Government. The constitution calls for a bicameral legislature. An assembly elected on a proportional basis and a senate. And there, you see, the similarity stops. Abaco will have no foreign service like the State Department, only trade representatives in countries where business demands it. It will have no public school system. Beyond the fourth grade, there'll be only private schools, privately maintained."

"No school system," says the lawyer. "Why not?"

"Because what is called the school system in the United States is really an indoctrination system," says Oliver. "It's a system for bureaucrats to brainwash young people in favor of collectivism and statism."

"And socialism," says Bond approvingly.

"Yes. In the high schools and colleges, in favor of outright socialism," says Oliver. "This is not to say Abaco won't have an educational system of its own kind, but every school will have to be financed privately, by the families of the students or private benefactors. It will mean, here and there, some hardship, some long-term borrowing, maybe—and *that* will be made feasible at very low interest, I expect—but collectively it will mean the survival of freedom in its one essential provenance—in the minds of the next generation. Because, you see," Oliver holds his bony finger before his face to silence all interruptions, "Abaco is not going to be another banana republic. That's not the point; I wouldn't spend an hour's time just to make some money that way. The point is that the Republic of Abaco will be, first of all, a moral experiment, a place where we'll try to keep individual freedom alive even if it doesn't survive in America."

"But won't you need an army?" says Bond doubtfully.

"Oh, sure, Abaco will have its armed forces," says Oliver. "We will call them peace-keeping forces, because that is what they will be. Abaco will never make war on another land. All voluntary, of course. Here soldiers start out all wrong. They are made to swear a mortal oath and stand to attention for the national anthem. Abaco won't have a national anthem, because the government of Abaco will have no suprapersonal, para-legal, special powers. It will function only as the hired servant of the participants who pay for it. The Abaco peace-keeping volunteers won't be made to salute any metaphysical emblems, or take theistic pledges the government has no right to invoke; they will sign a two-year or five-year or any-year contract, as the conditions may demand, just like any hired craftsmen. I suspect it will be a damn good little force."

"Well," says the lawyer, who has been glancing at his watch with rude frequency. "Well, Frank, if you think. . . ."

"Yes," says Bond, rising too, "we gotta go. Call you in the morning, Mike, and we'll talk."

"One more question," says the lawyer. "You got the natives, five, ten thousand natives. . . ."

"Seven thousand," says Mitch WerBell, "maybe eight or nine at the most, if some who are working in the hotels in Nassau return after independence."

"Right, say eight thousand natives," says the lawyer. "How can you be sure they'll buy all this—vote for your constitution and all that? After all, the place *belongs* to the natives."

"Well, we're training quite a few natives with leadership potential," says WerBell. "Political indoctrination, and so on. They'll organize a following, maybe half the population, that'll go along with us, vote the way they're supposed to. And Bob here, Colonel Bayard, he's also training some natives with good potential, except he's training *his* boys how to shoot at a moving target without missing. And we figure the natives who won't buy what we tell 'em—they'll listen to Bob Bayard's boys."

"Fine, call you tomorrow, nice to've metcha, bye. . . ." And Frank Bond and his counsel are gone. Mike Oliver is depressed. "God almighty, I talk too much. . . . What do you think, Mitch?" For an instant, he is as drained as an actor after the performance. "Shoot, Mike, you were *great*. . . ." WerBell is gung-ho as ever, but Oliver is already peeling off his shirt. "I'm going to bed. G'night everybody."

But at breakfast it's a different story. "Frank called before eight this morning—he's really turned on," says Oliver. "He's putting up ten thousand cash as a sort of foothold on Abaco, he said, and next week we'll talk serious money. He *loves* the project."

"As long as it looks like a good deal," WerBell growls in a hung over voice.

"That's what his lawyer said," Mike says happily. "And I told them, no, as long as you care for freedom, because *that's* the big point. And you know what Frank said? He said, 'Mike, you are *absolutely* right.'" ■

THE WINNING OF CHER

(Continued from page 85) Records; Cher was with Sonny. They were already separated but Geffen didn't know this; he promptly fell in love. In September of 1973, the only date in his life that he remembers with any accuracy, Geffen, Bob Dylan and Robbie Robertson of The Band went to see Neil Young's show at Geffen's club, the Roxy. A friend told him Cher was alone and wanted to join them. "Cher said, 'Let's get together for dinner,' and we were never apart since," says Geffen with a small preen in his voice. After the taping of the last Sonny and Cher show, David and Cher surfaced together at the Grammy Awards. That produced the famous butterfly-emergent picture of Cher, bare midriffed, in white with a butterfly over one ear and another in her cleavage, and a shaved-for-the-occasion Geffen, in his sharpie tux, on her arm. It was Cher who talked him into the Corniche Rolls with the wire wheels. Cher who threw out all his shirts and dressed him. And now because of Cher and their mutual psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Grotjahn, he can go into this boutique on the Strip and have the two $345 suede jackets fitted and ask if they have a third so he will have *one in every possible color.*

While Cher brought him to this California ostentation and flat-out American exuberance, Ahmet Ertegun influenced Geffen in another way. Ahmet was so composed in his power, so relaxed at handling the totally wrecked rock stars who'd come crashing off planes, fall into his arms, rip the shirt off his dignified back and expect to be taken home for dinner. Even now with Ahmet, at a time when they still expect to be cochairmen of the Atlantic/Asylum board, Geffen gets that Brooklyn-boy look on his face as though he is going to ask, "Is this an ashtray?" before dumping his cigarette. His whole New York world of the high-up Pierre suite and the chauffeured car that is waiting, motor running, for Mr. Geffen when he emerges from Ahmet's town house at two a.m. is blown, and he is back to the time when he had gone to Ahmet in 1968. It was the second or third time they'd met, and Geffen, then managing Laura Nyro and supporting them both, was broke and trying to sell Ahmet an artist. Ahmet asked what it would take to keep Geffen going for a year. Geffen said fifty thousand dollars, naming the figure he had been making when he ran the Ashley Famous music department, the figure that represented wealth to him when he was a busboy in the Catskills and being rich meant having a Cadillac and living on Ocean Parkway. "If you earned fifty thousand dollars a year, that was the most any man could possibly ask for, and that was my goal," Ertegun took out his checkbook and wrote Geffen a personal check. He never allowed Geffen to pay it back. That was style. "He bought me for life," Geffen says. "Every artist I ever came up with after that I gave to Ahmet. I signed Crosby

3 33

25 January 1975

SUBJECT: Press Reports of Ex-CIA Employees Involvement with Persons under Congressional Investigation

1. Press reports of Sentator Lowell P. Weicker's investigation of CIA's involvement with other government agencies surfaced the contact of Lucien Conein of DEA, a former employee, with an electronic manufacturer named Michael Morrisey. The same reports have also tied Morrisey with a Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, III, who, according to our files, has claimed United States Government and CIA connections in the past. According to DEA, WerBell recently invoked the Fifth Amendment when appearing before Senator Jackson's Subcommittee investigating DEA on whether or not he supplied arms to Robert Vesco. Also, while not mentioned in the press, at least one retired CIA staffer and possibly two others may have been involved with Conein and Morrisey. The ex-staffer is John P. Muldoon, a friend of Conein's, who currently is a private security specialist who has dealt with Morrisey in the purchase of audio sweeping devices for his business. Muldoon was retained by WerBell during first half of 1974. The other two, Walter J. Mackem, an acquaintance of Conein's, and a Theodore J. Roussos, both of whom were in contact with WerBell for possible employment in a scheme to promote the secession of the Bahamian Island of Abaco, an enterprise publicized in February 1975 issue of Esquire by Andrew St. George.

2. We have no information in our files on the B. R. Fox Company or the Fox Company principals mentioned in the press accounts. We were, however, told by DEA that Mr. Sandy Smith, Time magazine reporter, was working on a story to the effect that the late Bernard Spindel, former owner of the Fox Company, was previously involved in "wire tapping for the Teamsters Union and providing explosive devices for organized crime." Although Mr. Smith did not allege that either CIA or DEA were associated with the Fox Company or Spindel, our DEA source said that Mr. Smith had no intention of dropping the story and we can expect further press coverage.

3. In conclusion, there has been no CIA involvement with the B. R. Fox Company or with Michael Morrisey. Moreover, Mr. WerBell's claims of CIA affiliation or support over the years are simply not true.

3.32

25 January 1975

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WerBell III (201-259910)

1. Mitchell Livingston WerBell, who appeared in recent press reports has for over a period of ten years been claiming to be a representative of the United States Government and of CIA. The facts do not support this contention.

2. CIA first learned of WerBell in July of 1959 when he contacted General Cabel indicating knowledge of Cuban and Dominican affairs. Mr. Thomas J. Flores of LA Division was put in contact with WerBell and considered using him as an FI asset. A POA was granted on 7 July 1959 for this purpose. By October 1959 it was apparent that he did not have the access to information as hoped and he apparently looked upon his association with CIA as a means of furthering his various business schemes. All contact was then severed.

3. From that time until the present Mr. WerBell has cropped up in a number of nefarious activities whereby he inferred he had CIA connections or support. He was reported to have been involved in arms sales to Nicaragua and Guatemala, in efforts to gain recognition by certain South American countries of the Cuban Government in Exile, and in an abortive scheme to invade the Republic of Haiti in 1966. He also turned up in Thailand where he contacted the COS purporting to be a counter-insurgency expert. In 1971 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense queried the Agency re Mr. WerBell, asking if WerBell had a contractual agreement or association with the Agency, as Werbell was awaiting a hearing before a Department of Defense Examiner related to his participation in the aboritve Haiti invasion. The Office of the General Counsel placed the matter in perspective. Subsequently, he contacted the Agency to request intercession on his behalf to have his security clearance reinstated which DoD revoked because of his Haitian caper. He was told this could not be done. In 1971 he again appeared in Thailand attempting to sell arms. In 1973 he was under investigation by U.S. Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and by the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas. In this connection WerBell contacted three ex-CIA employees, John P. Muldoon, Walter J. Mackem and Theodore Roussos in a scheme to involve them in the activities of an organization called the Friends of Abaco (FOA) which is advocating the secession of the island from the Commonwealth of Bahamas.

3.32

All three inviduals reported their involvement with the WerBell group and had sought guidance from the Agency. In May and June they were advised to break all ties with WerBell. On 27 June 1974 the FBI was formally apprised of WerBell's overtures for their collaboration in the effort to bring Abaco's secession. In September 1974 WerBell reportedly went to Greece to sell arms to the Greek Government. Most recently WerBell reportedly appeared before Senator Jackson's Sub-Committee investigating DEA and had taken the Fifth Amendment on the question of whether or not he had supplied arms to Robert Vesco.

3.32

STATE DEPT. CABLE NASSAU 179
DATED 30 JAN '75
Subject: LOCAL REACTION TO ESQUIRE
MAGAZINE ARTICLE ON ABACO

FBI cable dated 24 JAN '75

subject: Aladdin M. AL-TAYYAR
Internal Security - IRAQ

14-00000

DEA Was Offered Explosive Devices

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

An Alexandria "electronics" firm attempted to sell an official of the Drug Enforcement Administration "assassination devices" designed to carry explosives in such unlikely places as a telephone handset, a cigarette pack or a flashlight.

The official, Lucien Conein, had gone to the firm last spring to inspect electronic surveillance equipment that DEA wanted to purchase, according to an agency spokesman, Robert H. Feldkamp. Conein and a second DEA official, Cyril Frank, also observed a demonstration of the explosive equipment but did not buy any of it, according to Feldkamp.

A catalogue of equipment apparently sold by the company, B. R. Fox, describes several devices designed to carry explosives triggered by time, movement, mechanical pressures, light, or audio mechanisms.

The catalogue states, "The devices have been designed and manufactured for sale to authorized agencies of the United States government, specifically intended for application outside of this country . . . The information contained herein is classified by the manufacturer for U.S. government use only. The handling and storage of this material should be done so mindful of its sensitive nature."

Feldkamp said that Conein and Frank observed a demonstration of "several" devices although Feldkamp said he did not know which devices they saw. Conein, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, is acting chief of special operations and field support for the DEA's office of intelligence. Feldkamp said that Conein's office is the operational arm of the intelligence division and devises ways to penetrate illegal drug operations.

Conein was not available for comment. Feldkamp said that Frank "said emphatically that the demonstration was not requested."

Conein's reaction to the demonstration, Feldkamp said, was, "'Very interesting. However, that's not why I'm here.'" Asked why the demonstration was made by the salesman, whom Feldkamp said he could not identify, Feldkamp replied, "Like any good salesman, the guy was trying to make a sale. He was told DEA has not, will not, does not purchase that type of equipment."

The DEA did buy "a hundred bucks worth" of electronics surveillance equipment, which Feldkamp said is "frequently used (by the DEA) under court order."

Asked why Conein watched the demonstration, Feldkamp said, "You'd probably do the same thing out of curiosity or whatever."

Conein, a longtime employee of the CIA, left the agency in 1968 and joined the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, DEA's predecessor, as a consultant in June, 1972, according to Feldkamp. According to testimony during the Senate Watergate committee hearings, Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. attempted to use Conein as part of an effort to discredit Daniel Ellsberg publicly.

According to Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.), who released information about the incident, Conein speculated that the Fox firm may have thought that Conein was still at the CIA.

Conein apparently did not report the demonstration of the equipment to anyone at the DEA. Weicker said he told DEA Administrator John R. Bartels about the matter on Monday and Bartels "was as shocked and aghast as most people would be." Weicker commented, "Things have come to a pretty sorry pass when people start peddling this stuff to law enforcement agencies and nobody thinks it strange. Bugging equipment can be used legally. There's no way this equipment can be used legally."

Feldkamp said "it wouldn't be within the purview of DEA as a narcotics agency" to review the legality of the explosive equipment.

A cover memo dated June 10, 1974, written on B.R. Fox stationery by a person Weicker identified as Mike Morrissey to Mitchell WerBell III, a Georgia armaments dealer, states that equipment in an accompanying catalogue of explosive equipment "was demonstrated to Lou in this office about three weeks ago . . . I bring this to your attention in case you have not yet seen the material. It is a listing of equipment that is available and planned for Lou up here."

WerBell, who said he made and sold silent automatic weapons to foreign countries with the approval of the federal government, said he had never seen Morrissey's memo because a former employee had intercepted it before WerBell could see it.

WerBell said that he had talked yesterday to both Morrissey and Conein. Conein, WerBell said, told him the equipment had never actually been made. "Lou's not in the assassination business and neither am I," WerBell said.

Morrissey could not be reached for comment.

Barbara Fox Spindel, whose home address is listed as the address for B.R. Fox Laboratories, said in a telephone interview last night that she had served as president of the company, founded by her late husband, but that she had disassociated herself from it last March because she and Morrissey could not get along. She said Morrissey withheld information from her about the firm's business.

Mrs. Spindel said that B. R. Fox is no longer functioning, that she knew nothing about the explosive devices and that she had never seen the catalogue [illegible] them. [illegible] Mrs. Spindel [illegible]. "We were [illegible] surveillance devices. That's [illegible]."

Mrs. Spindel said she had received several calls [illegible] "I don't even know what company [illegible] are talking about. That's the worst part of all this," she said.



LANDSLIDE IN CANADA—This is all th... mains of a street in Asbestos, a mining

Cuba Seeking Trade For 'CIA Agent'

United Press International

Cuba is willing to release an alleged CIA agent in exchange for a woman who has been in an American jail for 20 years after taking part in a shooting spree by Puerto Rican nationalists in Congress, officials said yesterday.

So far, the officials said, there is no indication as to how the administration will respond to the offer by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Castro's offer was interpreted as a deliberate effort to ingratiate himself with Puerto Rican nationalists who are opposed to continued U.S. possession of the island.

The woman, Lolita Lebron, 55, was one of four Puerto Rican nationalists who fired pistols at random from a [illegible] in the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] to C[illegible] [illegible] was convicted of [illegible] and was given a [illegible] prison sentence.

3.21

Washington Post

23 January 1975.

IA Agent Contacted on Alexandria Firm's Assassination Equipment

masson
Staff Writer

ug official ier Central ency opera- d of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. has been mentioned in connection with an attempt by an Alexandria firm to sell assassination equipment to the U.S. government.

Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr., R-Conn., disclosed today that Lucian Conein, director of special projects for the Drug Enforcement Administration, viewed the equipment manufactured by the now-defunct Alexandria electronics firm. But Conein denies he ever even considered buying any of the equipment.

Weicker released a catalogue of the devices which included such things as exploding cigarette packages and electronic booby traps for telephone receivers. The equipment was manufactured by the B. R. Fox Laboratories, which Weicker said went out of business three weeks ago.

THE SENATOR, a former member of the special Senate Watergate committee, charged that the existence of the catalogue and Conein's involvement in the incident raise serious new questions about the operations of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

He also questioned a statement by Conein that the DEA planned to purchase only electronic eavesdropping devices from Fox.

"I told the senator that," Conein said. "Yeah, I saw this (assassination) stuff. So what? I've seen a lot of that kind of thing in my day."

Conein was a long-time CIA operative before moving to the DEA with the assistance of Egil Krogh, former head of the White House plumbers for whom Hunt worked.

In July 1971, Conein had a three-way telephone conversation with Hunt and Charles W. Colson, former White House aide who pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice charges in the trial of David Wilsberg. A transcript of the conversation is contained in evidence amassed during the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry.

The conversation centered on activities in Saigon prior to the coup that ousted former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Conein was a high-ranking CIA operative in Saigon at the time of the 1963 coup.

HUNT LATER used some of the information obtained from Conein as background for fabricating State Department cables that implicated the late President John F. Kennedy in Diem's assassination. Hunt was working for the Nixon White House at the time.

The catalogue released by Weicker included a memorandum to Mitchel Werbell III identified by Weicker as a Georgia arms manufacturer and apparent soldier of fortune. The memo was written by Michael Morrissey, co-owner of the Fox Laboratories, according to Weicker.

In the memo, Morrissey states that the catalogue "was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein." He later states that "some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this (Alexandria) office about three weeks ago." The memo was dated June 10, 1974.

The memo said the catalogue contained a "listing of equipment that is available and planned for Lou up here (Washington)."

WEICKER SAID the memorandum itself raised doubts about Conein's statement that he had not considered purchasing any of the assassination devices. And he said it stirred questions about whether Conein still was working with the CIA despite his retirement from that agency in 1971.

The catalogue lists its "astro" equipment this way:

"The devices have been designed and manufactured for sale to authorized agencies of the United States government, specifically intended for application outside of this country.

"The items offered are either concealed into everyday-type objects or packaged simply as 'black box' pieces of equipment with no labels or identification on the outside other than the necessary actuator switches and sensors. Upon request, this equipment can be delivered in a 'sterile' condition for foreign use," the brochure continues.

"ALL EQUIPMENT in our 'astro' category is manufactured to the highest standards in terms of reliability, dependability, lifetime, and performance under most weather variations," the catalogue states.

It then states: "The information contained herein is classified by the manufacturer for U.S. government use only."

SLOPPY REPORTER!
SHOULD BE DANIEL ELLSBERG

THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1975

U.S. Aide Was Briefed on Assassination Techniques

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22—A top official of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration said today that he had been briefed on what have been described as electronic assassination techniques by a private manufacturer of wiretapping and bugging equipment.

The official, Lieut. Col. Lucien Conein, acting director of the special operations and field support section of D.E.A.'s international intelligence division, said that he received the briefing in May, 1974, from representatives of the now defunct B. R. Fox Company.

Colonel Conein said he had not asked for the briefing and had no interest in the equipment.

Several law enforcement officials and Senate investigators said that this was the first time they had seen evidence that a domestic Federal agency would even look at assssination equipment.

Served in Saigon

According to the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in the Indochina war, Colonel Conein was a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon in 1963 and served as liaison between the United States Government and forces that deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem'

Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, who has een conducting an investigation of C.I.A. involvement with other overnment agencies, said that be has a copy of the catalogue of nstruments described to Colonel Conein.

When questioned by a reporter, Mr. Weicker described the devices as "used for assassination, pure and simple."

"There is no place in this country for this sort of thing," he added.

Mr. Weicker said that he had brought the catalogue to the attention of John Bartels, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and that he had interviewed Colonel Conein and the colonel's deputy, Searl Frank. He said that the officials had assured him that the agency had not purchased any of the devices.

Senator Asks Question

The Senator said that he had been told that the agency's men had done nothing to encourage the manufacturer to think that he might make a sale to their agency.

"My question was, why in the hell didn't they do something to discourage him," Mr. Weicker said.

One of two men who briefed Morrissey and an unidentified New York man on behalf of the Fox Company, which had offices in Alexandria, Va., and New York City. Mr. Morrissey said that he had presented details on the company's electronic surveillance equipment and what the catalogue calls "astro equipment."

Senator Weicker has obtained a memo that he said was from the files of the B. R. Fox Company, written to an official of a Georgia arms manufacturer, that says:

"Enclosed is a catalog which was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein. I wrote out this line of 'astro' equipment with you and Lou in mind, and because of the nature of the devices, it is not being given to anyone else . . . Some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this office about 3 weeks ago."

Memo Is Signed 'Mike'

The memo was dated June 10, 1974, and was signed 'Mike."

It is part of the evidence that has caused Mr. Weicker to question whether the relationship between Colonel Conein and the assassination equipment manufacturer was a casual one.

When asked by a reporter about the memorandum, Colonel Conein said that he was shown it during an interview with Senator Weicker.

"I told him I had no idea the context in which it was written, and hat I had not known Mr. Morrissey [before the sales demonstration]. I said if I was him [Senator Weicker], I would turn the memorandum over to the F.B.I. and let them investigate. I told him I would be glad to take a polygraph on the matter."

Colonel Conein said that he had listened to a detailed presentation on the booby-trap, assassination devices, but he did not "discourage" the manufacturer because he presumed that as a licensed electronics company it had the authority to produce the explosive devices.

Colonel Conein told Senator Weicker, as he had a reporter, that despite the presentation of the assassination gear, he had selected B. R. Fox out of several companies to provide bugging equipment. To make this purchase, Colonel Conein ignored the presentations of several better-known concerns.

Mr. Bartels, the agency administrator, said that he was conducting an internal inquiry into the transaction.

Mr. Morrissey identified a copy of the catalogue obtained by The New York Times as a photostat of one that he typed in the spring of 1974. The informal catalogue said that the material could not be

metal rectangular modules. One screw at each end secures top on unit. Top is removed to pack inside with explosive."

Mr. Morrissey said that he had prepared three copies of the catalogue, and that two copies were in the hands of Federal officials. He declined to identify the two officials or the Government agency they were connected with.

Mr. Morrissey also declined to identify the person who had introduced him to Colonel Conein. The colonel said that he could recall how he had learned of the Fox concern but that its name might have come from an acquaintance in Washington.

Mr. Morrissey, who said that he had a degree as an electronics engineer, said that he designed the equipment in early 1974 as an outgrowth of his work in the field of wiretaps and room bugs.

Mr. Morrissey, who also described himself as a lawyer, said thal ibmebeedtmmhevmf said that he believed the equipment he designed, which he said was an electronic triggering device, was legal as long as it was not armed with an explosive. He said that it had nonlethal applications to trigger burglar alarms and other "anti-intrusion" equipment.

He said that he would consider selling such devices only to the Federal Government. He added, however, that he does sell electronic surveillance equipment to local police.

Mr. Morrissey said that the Fox Company was dissolved in November, 1974, as a result of maangement differences. He saidw that he had shared management and control of the company with Mrs. Barbara Spindel. The name Fox was Mrs. Spindel's maiden name, Mr. Morrisey said. He said that he continued to sell electronic surveillance equipment as an individual.

Mrs. Spindel confirmed that the company was no longer in existence and said that she was unaware Mr. Morrissey had circulated a catalogue for such devices. Her husband, the late Bernard Spindel, who formed the B. R. Fox Company, was often quoted as a wiretap expert.

Several law enforcement officials and electronic experts who were interviewed indicated that the devices as described in the catalogue appeared usable only for assassinations or for the booby-trapping of premises.

One veteran industrial security expert said that he saw no domestic market for the devices with private companies. "Even on military installations or high security Government agencies, these types of booby-traps would be inappropriate, you'd never know who you might injure," this source said.

Colonel Conein said that he became a consultant to the Bureal of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 1972 and became a full-time official of D.E.A. in December, 1973. His nace came up in Watergate committee testimony when it was disclosed that one of the Watergate burglars, E. Howard Hunt Jr., had met with Colonel Conein. Mr. Hunt at the time was gathering information to prepare bogus cables that implicated President Kennedy in President iDem's assassination in 1963.

[illegible]

[illegible]

audio equipment and going over the devices described by Senator Weicker in detail.

Colonel Conein, asked about the briefing, said that he had not solicited the briefing on assassination aspects of Fox's equipment, and "I wouldn't touch that stuff with a 10-foot pole."

He continued: "That stuff is only good in a war, and who's got a war? It was very sophisticated stuff. They had a telephone that could be triggered by remote control. If the wrong person picked up the phone, you'd blow him up."

Colonel Conein said that he had found the material "fascinating" but that he had said nothing to encourage the idea that the agency would purchase such equipment. He said that he had purchased about $500 worth of audio equipment from the B. R. Fox Company, which he said could be used for bugging.

The equipment he bought, he said, cannot be used in the United States without a court order but is for use in D.E.A.'s foreign operations. He said, however, that the gear had not been used, and "I still have it in my safe."

The briefing for Colonel Conein was conducted by Mr.

experiment. The following are excerpts on each item available:

¶"Telephone handset insert. Miniature activator with time delay . . . use inside telephone handset. Automatic charge fired at—SEC following lifting of instrument handpiece.

¶"Cigarette pack — antidisturbance explosive. Electronics and explosive module packed inside cigarette pack. When the pack is lifted or moved in any manner, the explosive is set off."

¶"Modified flashlight . . . antidisturbance unit. Standard Everyready 2D cell flashlight has antidisturbance electronics concealed inside where batteries have been removed. Remainder of the battery space is packed with explosive."

¶"Remote-controlled, light-activated sensor. Unit delivers a predetermined charge across its output terminals, when activated from a remote location according to its pre-set code. Use with explosive for firing upon the occurrence of certain conditions relating to light intensity."

¶"Booby-trapped, M-16 explosive clip. Use: A mechanically activated electronic charge circuit is built into a common military item. Upon removal of the single round in the magazine, either by firing or by hand removal, the explosive concealed in the magazine is detonated."

¶"Fragmentation ball — antidisturbance unit. Unit is similar in its operation as the anti-disturbance flashlight, BRF model FD-2. The exception is in the type of explosive charge . . ."

¶"Explosive black box modules. . . . Flat black finish on

14-00000

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 1975

U.S. Aide Was Briefed on Assassination Techniques

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
Special to The New York Times

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Senator Lowell P. Weicker Jr., Republican of Connecticut, who has een conducting an investigation of C.I.A. involvement with other overnment agencies, said that he has a copy of the catalogue of nstruments described to Colonel Conein.

When questioned by a reporter, Mr. Weicker described the devices as "used for assassination, pure and simple."

"There is no place in this country for this sort of thing," he added.

Mr. Weicker said that he had brought the catalogue to the attention of John Bartels, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and that he had interviewed Colonel Conein and the colonel's deputy, Searl Frank. He said that the officials had assured him that the agency had not purchased any of the devices.

Senator Asks Question

The Senator said that he had been told that the agency's men had done nothing to encourage the manufacturer to think that he might make a sale to their agency.

"My question was, why in the hell didn't they do something to discourage him," Mr. Weicker said.

One of two men who briefed Col. Conein, Michael Morrissey, told a reporter that he had met with him for three hours, showing him audio equipment and going over the devices described by Senator Weicker in detail.

Colonel Conein, asked about the briefing, said that he had not solicited the briefing on assassination aspects of Fox's equipment, and "I wouldn't touch that stuff with a 10-foot pole."

He continued: "That stuff is only good in a war, and who's got a war? It was very sophisticated stuff. They had a telephone that could be triggered by remote control. If the wrong person picked up the phone, you'd blow him up."

Colonel Conein said that he had found the material "fascinating" but that he had said nothing to encourage the idea that the agency would purchase such equipment. He said that he had purchased about $500 worth of audio equipment from the B. R. Fox Company, which he said could be used for bugging.

The equipment he bought, he said, cannot be used in the United States without a court order but is for use in D.E.A.'s foreign operations. He said, however, that the gear had not been used, and "I still have it in my safe."

The briefing for Colonel Conein was conducted by Mr. Morrissey and an unidentified New York man on behalf of the Fox Company, which had offices in Alexandria, Va., and New York City. Mr. Morrissey said that he had presented details on the company's electronic surveillance equipment and what the catalogue calls "astro equipment."

Senator Welcker has obtained a memo that he said was from the files of the B. R. Fox Company, written to an official of a Georgia arms manufacturer, that says:

"Enclosed is a catalog which was put together only after we started working together with Lou Conein. I wrote out this line of 'astro' equipment with you and Lou in mind, and because of the nature of the devices, it is not being given to anyone else . . . Some of this equipment was demonstrated to Lou in this office about 3 weeks ago."

Memo Is Signed 'Mike'

The memo was dated June 10, 1974, and was signed "Mike."

It is part of the evidence that has caused Mr. Weicker to question whether the relationship between Colonel Conein and the assassination equipment manufacturer was a casual one.

When asked by a reporter about the memorandum, Colonel Conein said that he was shown it during an interview with Senator Weicker.

"I told him I had no idea the context in which it was written, and hat I had not known Mr. Morrissey [before the sales demonstration]. I said if I was him [Senator Weicker], I would turn the memorandum over to the F.B.I. and let them investigate. I told him I would be glad to take a polygraph on the matter."

Colonel Conein said that he had listened to a detailed presentation on the booby-trap, assassination devices, but he did not "discourage" the manufacturer because he presumed that as a licensed electronics company it had the authority to produce the explosive devices.

Colonel Conein told Senator Weicker, as he had a reporter, that despite the presentation of the assassination gear, he had selected B. R. Fox out of several companies to provide bugging equipment. To make this purchase, Colonel Conein ignored the presentations of several better-known concerns.

Mr. Bartels, the agency administrator, said that he was conducting an internal inquiry into the transaction.

Mr. Morrissey identified a copy of the catalogue obtained by The New York Times as a photostat of one that he typed in the spring of 1974. The informal catalogue said that the material could not be delivered for two weeks after order and was for sale only to the United States Government. The following are excerpts on each item available:

¶"Telephone handset insert. Miniature activator with time delay . . . use inside telephone handset. Automatic charge fired at—SEC following lifting of instrument handpiece.

¶"Cigarette pack — antidisturbance explosive. Electronics and explosive module packed inside cigarette pack. When the pack is lifted or moved in any manner, the explosive is set off."

¶"Modified flashlight". . . antidisturbance unit. Standard Everyready 2D cell flashlight has antidisturbance electronics concealed inside where batteries have been removed. Remainder of the battery space is packed with explosive."

¶"Remote-controlled, light-activated sensor, Unit delivers a predetermined charge across its output terminals, when activated from a remote location according to its pre-set code. Use with explosive for firing upon the occurrence of certain conditions relating to light intensity."

¶"Booby-trapped, M-16 explosive clip. Use: A mechanically activated electronic charge circuit is built into a common military item. Upon removal of the single round in the magazine, either by firing or by hand removal, the explosive concealed in the magazine is detonated."

¶"Fragmentation ball — antidisturbance unit. Unit is similar in its operation as the anti-disturbance flashlight, BRF model FD-2. The exception is in the type of explosive charge . . ."

¶"Explosive black box modules. . . . Flat black finish on

3.26

FBI cable dated 16 JAN '75

Subject: Aladdin N. AL-TAYYAR
INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ

FBI document dated 31
DEC 1966, Bureau File
2-156, Re: Rolando Arcadio
Masferrer Rojas, Internal
Security - Haiti - Cuba;
Neutrality Matters
(From Miami)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/LA/CAR	17	SP
2	DC/LA/CAR	17 OCT 1974	
3	[redacted]		
4	C/LA/CA (info)	17 OCT	
5	DC/LA (info)		
6	C/LA/CAR CAR	6 NOV 1974	

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mike Absher is an old friend of Ted Roussos and originally introduced Roussos to Jim McTighe and Al Ramos in June. Absher is considering picking up ROUSSOS on contract for the EUR/Greek Desk.

Ruth

File: Wirkellis 201

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
3.22	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Theodore Roussos on 31 August 1974

1. During subject meeting Mr. Roussos told me that Mr. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III called him from Atlanta on 29 August and again on 30 August. Werbell told Roussos that he was leaving for Athens on Saturday, 31 August in order to try to sell arms to the Greek government. Werbell wanted Roussos to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. Werbell indicated that the total deal could reach $5,000,000. Roussos told Werbell that he would check with his "friends" (the Agency) before giving Werbell an answer. Werbell asked Roussos to see if his "friends" were in favor of such arms deals or not. Roussos had generally explained this call to me on the telephone on 29 August. My reaction on the telephone was negative to Roussos' participation in such a deal, and he had conveyed this negative reply to Werbell by telephone before Roussos and I met personally on 31 August.

2. During our personal meeting, Roussos explained that Werbell intended to pursue arms sales legally and via the required U.S. Government channels. He said that Werbell does have the capabilities to design and produce weapons because of his access to arms factories. I told Roussos that Werbell's business activities were his own concern. I strongly advised against his getting involved in this deal. I explained to him the problems which the U.S. Government was having in Greece and the current wave of anti-Americanism and press attacks against the CIA. If Roussos as a former CIA officer well known in Greece became involved in such a venture, a flap of substantial proportions was likely complete with widespread press play. Roussos understood and agreed not to get involved.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 035682

SECRET

He said Werbell would probably call him from Athens that weekend and he would give Werbell a final negative reply. Werbell planned to meet with Greek Defense Minister Averoff. Roussos said that if the U.S. wanted to stop this deal that we should contact Averoff directly. From what Werbell said, Roussos believes the arms requested by the Greeks would be for guerrillas and not main force units.

Kenneth M. Absher

K. Michael Absher
AC/E/GC

Distribution:
1 - Werbell 201
1 - Roussos Personnel File

SECRET

9 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

1. Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, who served briefly with the OSS in WWII, has been engaged for the past several years in arms dealings and swash-buckling promotional activities which have brought him to the attention of various government agencies. He has always remained within the law by a fine edge. His latest scheme involves a Movement for the Independence of Abaco, an island to the East of the Bahamas. For this he has obtained apparently substantial financial support from wealthy Americans and from a British Lord.

2. Werbell operates through a number of front businesses in Washington, D.C. and in Marietta, Georgia, where he owns one outfit named Central Information Agency (CIA). In all his dealings, Werbell broadly hints that he has current connections with the Agency. We have just learned that Werbell may be in possession of a one-line note from you, stemming from a chance meeting with you at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "good to see you again."

3. Three retired Agency employees are currently employed by Werbell in various capacities. This past spring these employees sought contact with the Agency basically to report their concern over the legality of Werbell's activities. We quickly established that the matter was outside our charter and asked these retirees to report directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We also furnished the Bureau with all the pertinent information in our files. It is to be noted that somewhere in Werbell's scheme of things there appears the ubiquitous Andrew St. George, who plans to write a story on Abaco for True magazine.

/s/ David A. Phillips

file: 201-259910

David A. Phillips
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

SECRET

Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

DDO/C/WH/7/A.Spera:cab/1497 (9 Aug 74)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec. Registry
2 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - CI/OPS
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - C/OS/SSD/SB
2 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
1 - C/WH/7
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 201-259910
1 - 189-9-1
1 - WH/7 (Friends of Abaco)

SECRET

FBI document from Atlanta, Ga
dated 9 Aug. 1974
(no FBI file)

Subject: Mitchell-Livingston Werbell
III

SECRET

14 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from John MULDOON

1. Approximately 1655 hours, 13 August 1974, a call was received on C/WH/7's extension, 351-4221 by the Secretary, Miss Annamarie Ruppert. She answered the extension by number and the male voice asked to speak to Mr. McTighe. The secretary asked who was calling and the caller replied "John MULDOON." The secretary then replied that she was sorry but Mr. McTighe couldn't be reached. In response to MULDOON's query, "Why not?" and before the secretary could reply, MULDOON became obstinate and asked who he was speaking to. Miss Ruppert replied "his secretary" and then added that Mr. McTighe was away. When MULDOON asked where he was, the secretary replied that she was not at liberty to discuss that. Then MULDOON asked to speak to McTighe's deputy and was told that there was no one around whom MULDOON could speak to. (C/WH/7 was on leave and AC/WH/7 was in the PMC meeting.) MULDOON apparently didn't believe this reply but then asked when McTighe was expected to return. The secretary replied "within a few weeks" (McTighe is on TDY) and then asked if she could take a message to give to McTighe upon his return. MULDOON became belligerent at this point, apparently thinking he was getting the 'run around' and replied, "just tell him to talk to Jack Anderson" and hung up.

2. AC/WHD was briefed on the above telephone call at 1740 hours, 13 August. He decided no action should be taken on 13 August, but would like to meet with C/WH/7, Al Spera, on 14 August.

3. At 0950 hours, the following met with AC/WHD: Mr. Natzke, Mr. Wedemeyer, Mr. Spera and Miss Lehman. In view of C/WHD's previous decision that no further Agency contact should be made with MULDOON, RUSSOS, or MACKEM it was decided that no one would return MULDOON's call. However, AC/WHD would brief ADDO, Mr. Blee, on the above threat, and WH/7 would ask OPS/LIAISON to telephonically pass to the FBI the fact that MULDOON again contacted the Agency and threatened to go to "Jack Anderson." A copy of this memorandum is being sent to OPS/LIAISON for this purpose.

3.19

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

Subject: Telephone Call from John MULDOON

4. At AC/WHD's request, WH/Security rechecked the files on the three former Agency employees to determine whether they were Staff Employees. All three were former Staff Employees. MULDOON retired on medical disability; RUSSOS retired and then was rehired on a contract basis in February 1971 and contract terminated in September 1973; and MACKEM was "separated as excess" in October 1973. This information was passed to AC/WHD to brief ADDO.

Ruth Lehman

Ruth Lehman
Acting Chief, WH/7

DDO/WH/7/R.Lehman:cab/1956

Distribution:
Orig - WH/7 (FOA File)
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR
1 - 189-9-1
1 - OPS/LIAISON

3.19

14-00000

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO 74-4099

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to TDFIRDB-315/07634-74, dated 10 August 1974, which reported on the growing concern of the Bahamian Government about renewed secessionist activity in Abaco. In addition to the information in reference, the official Bahamian service, which was the source of the above report, also provided a representative of this Agency on 7 August 1974 the following text of a memorandum it prepared for the Secretary of the Bahamian Cabinet:

> "Please be advised that on 3 August 1974, information has been received from our overseas contacts that Chester ZOCHOWSKI, alias Chester GARY, has recently been in touch with Mitchell L. WERBELL, and has reported that WERBELL is still planning unspecified revolutionary activity in Abaco. It is also reported that he has the support of some former U.S. Government employees and that he is trying to recruit a former Special Services officer to promote revolutionary activity in Abaco (the name of Robert ARMSTRONG has been put forward as a possibility). There is also a suggestion that Robert VESCO might be financing some of the activity."

2. The "overseas contact" described above was identified by the Bahamian Service as the British MI-5 representative in Washington, D.C. The Bahamian Service did not identify the "U.S. Government employees" referred to above.

3,18

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

3. The files of this Agency reflect that Robert ARMSTRONG and Chester ZOCHOWSKI are known to your Bureau and their involvement in this matter has been reported in previous correspondence to this Agency. Although the Bahamian Service reported ZOCHOWSKI's alias as "Chester GARY," it is believed that this refers to "Chester GRAY."

4. The above information is being furnished to your Bureau for whatever action and further dissemination you deem appropriate. The information, however, may not be discussed with any foreign nationals, including the British and the Bahamians.

FOR THE ~~DEPUTY~~ DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David H. Blee
David H. Blee

CIRA-0444-74

3.18

14-00000

DDO/WH/7/CAR/A. Ramos & E.Rhoad:cab/7493/1956 (12 August 1974)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - FBI
2 - OPS/LSN
1 - CIOPS/WH
1 - 201-259910
1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 189-9-1
1 - E/BC
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO
1 - DDO/Registry
1 - WH/7/FOA File

BASED ON: WH/Miami 22274 (In 330060) dated 9 August 1974
OBJ: KIB

3.18

FBI document from San Diego
dated 7 August, 1974
(no FBI file)
Subject: mitchell Livingston werbell,
III

14-00000

SECRET/SENSITIVE

[illegible] 74-4068

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 August 1974; Subject: "Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III, Internal Security - Abaco; Neutrality Matters - Abaco;" your reference (CI-3) 62-108665.

2. Authorization is granted for your Bureau to disseminate the attachment to Reference (your Bureau's memorandum dated 22 July 1974 at Atlanta, Georgia, concerning Subject) to the Department of State, the Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. We would, however, appreciate your limiting the description of source AT T-1 as being simply another government agency.

3. This Agency is most appreciative of your Bureau's handling of this sensitive matter and particularly the opportunity afforded this Agency to coordinate prior to further dissemination of this material.

4. We will be most interested in receiving any additional information concerning this matter which may come to your Bureau's attention.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

David H. Blee

CIRA-0439-74

3.17

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/CAR/Ruth Lehman:ar:7493/1956 (9 August 1974)

Distribution:
  Orig. & 1 - FBI
  2 - OPS/LSN
  1 - CIOPS/WH
  1 - 201-259910
  1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
  1 - C/WHD
  1 - WH/Security
  1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
  1 - 189-9-1
  1 - C/DCD
  1 - ADDO
  1 - DDO
  1 - DDO/Registry
  1 - FOA File

BASED ON: FBI Memorandum dated 6 August 1974
Subject: "Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III,
Internal Security - Abaco; Neutrality Matters -
Abaco;" your reference (CI-3) 62-108665

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.17

FBI document dated 6 Aug, 1974
from Washington D.C.
Bureau file - (CI-3) 62-108665
Subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matters - Abaco

CONFIDENTIAL

DX-ccc43

30 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: (C)Mitchell Livingston Werbell and His Employment of Former CIA Employees

REFERENCE: CIRA-0371-74; Subject: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III.

1. On 29 July 1974, William McDonnell, FBI liaison officer, delivered the attached FBI memorandum to OPS/LSN. In delivering this memorandum, McDonnell stated that whereas the last sentence of paragraph 3 reads "by individuals described as former United States Government employees," Gray actually said that Werbell had indicated that he was being assisted by former CIA employees. The FBI chose to use the term "former United States Government employees" in the attached memorandum in order to 'make the memorandum less sensational.'

2. This memorandum should be read in conjunction with CIRA-0371-74, subject: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, dated 27 June 1974.

3. The FBI requests authorization to forward a copy of CIRA-0371-74 to the Department of Justice. As this memorandum was forwarded to the Bureau for its information only, your views on its passage to the Department of Justice are solicited. The FBI plans to ask the Department of Justice if the Department wishes the Bureau to investigate Mitchell Warbell for possible violation of the Neutrality Act.

Signed: Francis G. Coleman

F. I. G. Coleman
C/OPS/LSN

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054698

30 July 74
30 July 74
201-259410

DDO/OPS/LSN/FIGColeman/ck (30 July 74)

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, OS/SSD
1 - WH/Security
1 - WH/7/CAR
1 - IP/AN - 201-259910
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - OPS Reading Board

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

6 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

REFERENCE : A. Conversation between Mr. William McDonnell, FBI Liaison Officer and Mr. F.I.G. Coleman of this Agency on 29 July 1974.

B. FBI New York Report dated 19 July, Subject as above.

1. Authorization is granted for your Bureau to pass a copy of CIRA-0371-74 dated 27 June 1974, Subject as above, to the Department of Justice for its use. We wish to make it clear that the former Agency employees mentioned in paragraph 2 of that report: John Patrick MULDOON and Theodore John ROUSSOS, provided their information voluntarily with the intent of seeking the advice of this Agency on the legality of the proposed venture of the Friends of Abaco (FOA). Both men were advised to avoid contact with the FOA and to report their contacts to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. This Agency has not initiated any further contact with the individuals named above or with Walter Joseph MACKEM, the third former employee approached by the FOA. MACKEM, however, did himself contact this Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. He was

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

3.14

201-259910

informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to your Bureau. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to your Bureau.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David A. Phillips

David A. Phillips

CIRA-0432-74

3.14

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/CAR/Albert Ramos:cm:7493/1956 (5 August 74)

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - FBI
    1 - OPS/LSN
    1 - CIOPS/WH
    1 - 201-259910
    1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
    1 - C/WHD
    1 - WH/Security
    1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
    1 - 189-9-1

BASED ON: C/OPS/LSN Memo to C/WHD dated 30 July 1974
Subject: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL and his Employment of Former Agency Employees

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.14

[illegible] SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami XX

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WERBELL, III

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. For your background information, attached under separate cover is one copy each of the following documents concerning Subject:

a. CIRA-0371-74 dated 27 June 1974 — ?

b. LNERGO New York memo dated 19 July 1974

2. In forwarding the 19 July New York memo mentioned above, LNERGO reported that in the last sentence of paragraph 3, GRAY actually said that WERBELL had indicated he was being assisted by former BKHERALD employees. LNERGO chose to substitute LNSUZZ in order to 'make the memo less sensational.'

3. A copy of CIRA-0371-74 is being passed to the Department of Justice.

Wilma R. VAN SCOY

Attachments:
As stated above, u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, WH/Miami (w/atts, u/s/c)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010116

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFPS-419

DATE: 5 August 1974

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-259910 [illegible]

Internal Distribution:
1 - WH/REG w/o att
1 - 201-259910 w/1-b above
1 - WH/7/CAR chrono w/o att
1 - 189-9-1 w/1-b above
1 - WH/7/CAR/Friends of Abaco File w/o att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
DDO/WH/7/CAR	Ruth Lehman	cgm	7493 1954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7	5 AUG 1974	Alfonso Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

3.13

DISPATCH

FBI document dated 19 July 1974
from New York
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III
Internal Security - Abaco
Neutrality Matter - Abaco

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUG 1974

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Intelligence Division

FROM: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Traces Requested by Mr. Wayne Frankenfield

1. This memorandum is in response to trace requests made by Mr. Wayne Frankenfield of the General Investigative Division on 29 July 1974.

2. The files of this office reveal no pertinent identifiable information on:

Advance Security Corporation of Atlanta, Georgia
Howard GIBSON of Georgia
Security Defense System of Marietta, Georgia

3. Nothing is known of the Central Investigative Agency, except as reported by the FBI.

201-0259910

4. The files of this office contain considerable information on Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, born 8 March 1918 in Philadelphia, Pa. The majority of this information was received from the FBI. This office previously furnished the Bureau information on Werbell under CSCI-3/773317 of 24 October 1962, subject WERBELL, Mitchell L.; and CSCI-316/02323-69 of 27 June 1969, subject WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III.

5. Werbell has never been employed by this Agency nor does the Agency have any operational interest in him. As a 2nd Lieutenant in the Signal Corps in the China-Burma theater in WW II, Werbell was assigned to OSS from April to December 1945. In August 1959, this office considered using Werbell as a source of information on revolutionary activities in the Caribbean area,

3.12

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054698

RECORD COPY

01 Aug 74

[illegible] 201-259910 CIS/LSN

particularly Cuba, but terminated its consideration of his possible use in October 1959. From December 1965 to November 1966, Werbell contacted this Agency's Domestic Collection Division in Coral Gables, Florida to voluntarily offer information.

6. Werbell has been assessed as an unscrupulous wheeler-dealer, a promotor of grandiose schemes, a man who lives beyond his means, and a high pressure advertising and promotion man. He has repeatedly misrepresented himself as both an employee of the U.S. government and the CIA. As an arms dealer, he has been involved with numerous Latin American governments and exile groups since the late 1950's and is now involved in Bahaman affairs. In 1969, he was in Thailand, attempting to sell the government arms and a program to neutralize the communist threat in that country.

7. Werbell operated a public relations firm in Atlanta which went into bankruptcy in 1959. He subsequently became Vice President and Director of Research and Development of SIONICS, Inc. of Atlanta, Georgia and later became a partner in Defense Systems International of Powder Springs, Georgia.

8. For further information on Werbell, you are referred to the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

201-0930354

9. The indices of this office reflect a Stephen Van CLEAVE, President of Intelligence Services, Ltd., Suite 11-B, 130 West Wieucea Rd., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia; telephone AC 404-255-7493. The document concerning Van Cleave is charged out, and we are seeking to locate it.

/00-301\

10. John Patrick MULDOON is, as stated in our CIRA-0371-74 of 27 June 1974, subject Mitchell Livingston Werbell III, a former Agency employee. For further information on Muldoon, you are referred to this Agency's Office of Security.

CIR-316/01815-74

C/OPS/LSN/FIGColeman/ck (1 August 1974)

Distribution:
O&1 - Addressee
2 - OPS/LSN
1 - IP/AN

3.12

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate General Counsel, OGC

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III

REFERENCE : Your memorandum of 24 February 1976, Subject as above.

1. Per reference request, we are forwarding information in our files concerning contacts that have taken place between this Agency and WER BELL.

2. The following is a summary of all DDO contact directly with WER BELL which took place in 1959:

a. A 6 July 1959 Memorandum to C/WH Division signed by Thomas J. Flores stated that General Cabell called Flores to report that WER BELL had called him. WER BELL discussed with General Cabell a trip WER BELL had taken to the Dominican Republic and offered to come to Washington at his own expense to discuss the trip. No commitments were made to WER BELL by General Cabell.

b. A 7 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. J. Flores stated that WER BELL was met in Washington, D.C., by Flores who discussed with WER BELL information concerning the Dominican Republic, Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and General Pedraza.

c. A 8 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. J. Flores stated that on 8 July 1959 Flores called WER BELL to set up an appointment. During the meeting, WER BELL was told that the United States would not support any revolutionary activities by General Pedraza. He was also told that the U.S. will observe its international obligations concerning Cuba and Pedraza, and that

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[illegible]

the U.S. would not overlook any violations by Pedraza or his followers of the neutrality laws. Flores said that the Agency had some interest in the possibility of his (WER BELL's) working for us as an intelligence gatherer under terms to be negotiated after we obtained a security clearance on him. Flores pointed out that the Agency was not attempting to limit his actions in connection with the Dominican Republic, nor was it assuming any responsibility for those matters he carried out in his own behalf. Flores dictated a Secrecy Agreement to him and had him sign it.

d. A 9 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that Subject called him on 9 July 1959 from New York. WER BELL gave Flores further information on Loos, fnu, the representative of a Colonel Frei, fnu, of the Swiss army who had 1,000 men available for duty as soldiers.

e. A 20 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that WER BELL called Flores from Miami on 20 July to ask about the Agency picking up the tab for his forthcoming trip to the Dominican Republic. They discussed his clearance which had not come through.

f. A 3 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Martha R. Tharpe reported that on 24 July 1959 WER BELL called for Mr. Thomas J. Flores. Since Flores was on leave, Tharpe took the call. WER BELL gave Tharpe further information concerning Pedraza and Batista. Tharpe called WER BELL back that evening to tell him that if he obtained further information to report it to Mr. Justin Gleichauf, OO Contacts Representative in Miami, until Mr. Flores returned to Washington.

g. A 5 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores stated that WER BELL phoned him on 5 August 1959 to ask if there was any news on his clearance. WER BELL said he wanted to go to the Dominican Republic soon, and would like CIA to pick up his expenses. He was told there was no

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news. Flores and WER BELL discussed the Dominican Republic and Cuba. On 3 August Flores phoned WER BELL and told him that his clearance had not been granted and that he should not predicate his activities on the expectation of the clearance at any given time. WER BELL said that the Pedraza group was air lifting and dropping material into Cuba.

h. A 9 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores reported that WER BELL called Flores on 9 September 1959 to provide information on Cuba. He was told by Flores that his clearance had not yet been processed.

i. According to a 23 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by T. J. Flores, WER BELL called Flores on 9 September 1959 to ask if his clearance had come through since he wanted the Agency to finance his trip to the Dominican Republic. He was told it had not. WER BELL told Flores about some people who had been discussing the counterfeiting of U. S. dollars and Cuban pesos for use in connection with Cuban revolutionary activities. He was told by Flores to contact the FBI. On 13 September WER BELL had phoned Flores at home to say that the FBI had referred him to the Secret Service on the counterfeiting aspect, and that no one seemed particularly interested in the gun running. The Secret Service asked him to go to Miami at his own expense to obtain further information on the matter and WER BELL asked Flores' advice. Flores said that he could not influence him one way or the other since he was not in a position to direct his activities, but felt he might be better off to take no action. He was told that Flores would be in touch with him as soon as he had any further information concerning our possible use of him.

j. A 13 October 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Thomas J. Flores states that WER BELL phoned him on 25 September 1959 to report on Cuba. On 2 October 1959, Flores talked with WER BELL by phone and terminated the relationship.

3. The following undated memorandums are also contained in WER BELL's file:

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a. A Memorandum for the Record signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores on 13 August 1959 to discuss Cuban activities in Miami. This memorandum also records that WER BELL phoned Flores again on 26 August 1959 at which time activities in the Dominican Republic and Cuban activities in Miami were discussed. WER BELL also asked about the status of his clearance, and was told it had not yet come through.

b. A letter signed "W" addressed to "Tom" gave "W's" location and some information concerning Batista and Castro. (This letter is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

c. A Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores and gave his location. The status of WER BELL's clearance was discussed and Flores told him it had not yet come through. WER BELL gave Flores some information concerning Batista. (This memorandum probably is in the 1959 time frame.)

d. An unsigned report, apparently from WER BELL, gave a summary of his contacts and activities during a trip to the Dominican Republic. (This report is probably in the 1959 time frame.)

4. A 17 December 1963 dispatch from Station Santo Domingo reported that Station NOC Officer Joseph Luna recently met WER BELL in Santo Domingo. No further details of the meeting were reported.

5. According to the CS file on WER BELL, three former Agency employees were contacted in 1974 by WER BELL and other representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco (FOA), a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The three former employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick Muldoon, retired from CIA on 20 March 1972.

b. Theodore John Roussos, retired from CIA on 31 July 1970. He was rehired on a contract in February 1971. His contract was terminated in September 1973.

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c. Walter Joseph Mackem, separated from CIA on 31 October 1973.

6. Mr. Muldoon contacted Agency employee E. James McTighe on 22 May 1974. Mr. Muldoon told Mr. McTighe that he was nominal Vice President of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." He presented Mr. McTighe with a report containing the essential data he possessed concerning WER BELL and other members of FOA whom he had met on 17 and 20 May 1974 in Washington, D.C. According to Mr. Muldoon, WER BELL had hopes of establishing gaming casinos, hotel and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U. S. tourist crowd. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas, however, WER BELL is apparently *persona non grata* in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appeared to be contingent on Abacan independence. Mr. Muldoon reported that at least on two occasions WER BELL made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with the Agency in the activities of the FOA in support of its independence. On several occasions, WER BELL introduced Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Roussos as active Agency officials, implying that either the Agency or the United States Government supported the aims of the FOA. WER BELL also proposed to Messrs. Muldoon and Roussos in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study was to include interviews with citizens of Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. In default of the collaboration of either Muldoon or Roussos, WER BELL hired Mr. Walter Joseph Mackem, a former Agency friend of both Muldoon and Roussos. According to WER BELL's file, Mackem later in 1974 contacted the Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. Mackem was informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to the FBI. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to the FBI.

7. On 24 March 1975, Mr. Joseph P. Hayes, assigned to SE/PCH, reported that during the week of 9 March 1975, he talked with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Mr. Dyckman is a former Agency employee employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. According to Dyckman, former Agency employee Walter Mackem was employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. He is also involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as

"the new land project" sought to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in the paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this adventure. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly was to take place in Georgia, where WER BELL is based.

8. On 31 August 1974, Mr. Roussos met with Mr. K. Michael Absher, who at that time was AC/E/GC, and told him that WER BELL was leaving for Athens on 31 August to sell arms to the Greek Government. WER BELL wanted Roussos to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. Roussos told WER BELL that he would check with CIA before giving him an answer. WER BELL asked Roussos to see if the Agency was in favor of such an arms deal or not. Mr. Absher strongly advised against Roussos' getting involved in this deal. Roussos told Mr. Absher that he understood and agreed not to get involved. Roussos said that WER BELL would probably call him from Athens and he would give WER BELL a final negative reply.

9. On 22 July 1974, the FBI reported that WER BELL may be in possession of a one-line note from former CIA Director William Colby stemming from a chance meeting with the Director at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "Good to see you again." This note was apparently used by WER BELL to suggest that he and Mr. Colby were good friends. This information was passed on to Mr. Colby on 9 August 1974.

10. According to reporting from several Stations, WER BELL and Arthur L. Smith (a cohort of WER BELL's) were in several Central American countries during August and early September 1962. Their principal activity appeared to be contacting officials of the governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a de facto Cuban Government in exile called the "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba." In discussions with Nicaraguan Government representatives, WER BELL claimed the proposed Cuban Government in exile had the support of 90 separate Cuban exile organizations and 186,000 Cuban exiles. WER BELL offered a representative of the Nicaraguan Government $100,000 to obtain that government's recognition of the Cuban Government in exile. The group claimed to have its headquarters at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. While in Guatemala, Smith claimed that the group had a man in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., whom they pay $6,000 per year "to keep them advised."

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11. In December 1965 WER BELL contacted a Miami DCD asset and told him that he and six Cuban exiles in the U. S. had organized a group, including approximately 20 Cubans inside Cuba, to perform a commando operation in Cuba during early January 1966. Their primary mission was the assassination of Fidel Castro, with the secondary mission of blowing up the generators that supply electricity to Havana, Cuba. WER BELL, at the time, stated that he was trying to get a "green light" from CIA to proceed with the mission, and inferred that the mission would be called off if such approval was not obtained.

12. On 7 February 1966 the Miami office of the FBI reported that WER BELL had been in contact with various news agencies concerning an alleged plan to assassinate Fidel Castro, and reportedly also had discussed the plan with Mr. Richard Phillips, Public Affairs Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. WER BELL claimed to have a group of some 500 men infiltrated into Cuba and said that they were ready for action to overthrow the regime immediately following the assassination of Castro. According to the FBI, WER BELL gave the impression that he is acquainted with many high government officials, both in the U. S. and other countries, and implied that his assassination plan had been approved by CIA.

13. According to a memorandum in WER BELL's file, on 7 February 1968, one Bruce Arman Baker telephoned an employee of this Agency and said he had been in contact with WER BELL. Mr. Baker said that WER BELL was in the weapons manufacturing business and delivered them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker said that he understood that WER BELL does this for CIA. Mr. Baker said that he understood from WER BELL that he would have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for WER BELL. Baker said that he was afraid that his past smuggling record might keep him from getting a CIA clearance.

14. WER BELL came to the attention of the Bangkok Station in early 1969 when he went to Thailand representing himself as Vice President of Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia. He described himself as a counterinsurgency expert, had a variety of weapons to display, claimed to be a retired colonel, and introduced himself at a local nightclub as Chief of CIA in Thailand. WER BELL attempted to sell arms to the Thais and also to a variety of U. S. military elements. Station Bangkok passed the gist of his reputation to key personalities in the U. S. mission and the Thai Government stressing that he was not sponsored in any way by the U. S. Government.

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15. WER BELL was also the subject of two memorandums signed by Lawrence R. Houston. Mr. Houston, answering a request from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on 23 February 1971, denied WER BELL's alleged affiliation with the CIA. On 28 October 1971, Mr. Houston wrote Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr., of the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, to return notarized Interrogatories previously sent by Mr. Henretta.

16. We have no information on Colonel Bayard except news articles reporting his death which were forwarded by the FBI.

17. Per your request, we have sent instructions to the LA/Miami Station that there should be no contact with WER BELL.

Nestor D. Sanchez
Acting Chief
Latin America Division

DDO/LA/CAR/Cari/D. Geisler:rb Ext. 1956 (3 March 76)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - DDO
1 - ADDO
1 - DDO/Reg
2 - C/LA
1 - C/LA/CAR
1 - LA/CAR/Cari chrono
1 - 201-259910

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012913

3.45

FBI document dated 24 July 1974 from Las Vegas
Subject: Mitchell Livingston
Werbell, III

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

27 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

1. Reference is made to your Bureau's File No. MM 105-21382, Subject as above, and your Bureau's reporting on Subject's involvement with the "Abaco Independence Movement" (AIM) in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.

2. For your information only, three former employees of this Agency were contacted in June 1974 by representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco," a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. Contact was initiated by Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, an international arms dealer, and a naturalized Lithuanian named Michael OLIVER, both of whom attempted to involve the former Agency employees in the Abaco Independence Movement (AIM), of which your Bureau is familiar. The three former employees contacted are:

a. John Patrick MULDOON
DPOB: 25 August 1937, Washington, D. C.
Retired from this Agency on 20 March 1972
Address at time of retirement:
4305 Kentbury Drive
Bethesda, Maryland

CLASSIFIED BY 010116. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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201-259910

SECRET/SENSITIVE

b. Theodore John ROUSSOS
DPOB: 14 July 1919, Washington, D. C.
Retired: 31 July 1970
Address at time of retirement:
2918 Hardy Avenue
Wheaton, Maryland
Note: ROUSSOS was rehired on a contract basis in February 1971. His contract was terminated September 1973.

c. Walter Joseph MACKEM
DPOB: 13 December 1937, Omaha, Nebraska
Separated: 31 October 1973
Address at time of separation:
2609 N. Potomac
Arlington, Virginia

3. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III, the principal owner of the arms manufacturing firm Defense Systems International and an international arms dealer, has been encouraging a group of Bahamian citizens on the island of Abaco who seek to secede from the Bahamian Commonwealth. In this affair WERBELL has been collaborating with a group based in Miami called the "Friends of Abaco." Active in the Friends of Abaco is Michael OLIVER, a wealthy land developer residing at 2089 El Rancho Drive, Carson City, Nevada. OLIVER, a naturalized U. S. citizen, was born Moses OLITSKI on 11 December 1928 in Lithuania.

4. In encouraging persons in Abaco to seek independence of Nassau, OLIVER's apparent motive is to establish a prototype government based on principles of free enterprise expounded in a paperback book which he has authored called "A New Constitution for a New Country" (Fine Arts Press, Reno, Nev. - 1968). WERBELL, on the other hand, has privately expressed a desire to establish a tourist mecca on Abaco to include hotels, recreation facilities and gambling casinos. Officials of Holiday International, a Baltimore firm specialized in recreation and health spas, have been briefed by WERBELL and OLIVER recently on the Abaco movement. Robert A. C. HAMILTON, 13th Lord of Belhaven and Stenton and a member of the

Friends of Abaco, on 10 June 1974 sponsored a resolution in behalf of the Abaco Independence Movement on the floor of the British House of Lords, following conversations with WERBELL in Washington in late May.

5. Despite the seeming innocence of the enterprise, however, we have observed that WERBELL, in particular, has made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with this Agency in the activities of the Friends of Abaco in support of Abaco's independence. On several occasions, involving at least two former officers of this organization, MULDOON and ROUSSOS cited above, WERBELL has introduced them as presumably active Agency officials in such a fashion as to imply, according to the persons involved, that either this Agency or the United States Government supports the aims of the Friends of Abaco.

6. Most recently, WERBELL has proposed to both retired officers in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study would include interviews with citizens on Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. To be included in the investigation is research on the probable reaction in the United Nations Organization to a petition from political groups in Abaco for support on independence, notably any parallels to be found in precedents such as the Biafra secession from Nigeria.

7. Andrew ST. GEORGE, a nationally known free-lance writer, has become active in WERBELL's organization and claims to be preparing an article on WERBELL and the Abaco movement for publication in True Magazine. ST. GEORGE has participated in the several meetings that WERBELL, OLIVER and their associates have had with the two retired Agency officers, Mr. John MULDOON and Mr. Ted ROUSSOS.

8. In default of the collaboration of either MULDOON or ROUSSOS, WERBELL and OLIVER have hired Walter Joseph MACKEM, a former Agency friend of both MULDOON and ROUSSOS.

9. John MULDOON is currently employed as the Washington representative of the firm Security Consultants International, a subsidiary of the Atlanta (Ga.) detective agency, Central Investigative Agency. ROUSSOS is not employed.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

/s/ David A. Phillips

David A. Phillips

CIRA-0371-74

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

DDO/WH/7/E. James McTighe:ar/4221/1497/ (26 June 1974)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - FBI
1 - OPS/LSN
1 - CIOPS/WH
1 - 201-259910
1 - C/OS/SSD/OSB
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Security
3 - O/PERSONNEL for MULDOON, ROUSSOS, and MACKEM's personnel files
1 - WH/7/CAR Chrono
1 - 189-9-1

BASED ON: Memoranda for the Record dated:

22 May 1974
21 June 1974
22 June 1974
26 June 1974

SECRET/SENSITIVE 3.9

SECRET

24 Aug 74

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Agency Retiree's Involvement with Abaco Independence Group

1. Through the intermediary of Robert Brown, DC/EA, and retired staffer Jack "Red" Stent, I was put in touch on 22 May 1974 with John MULDOON, another retired staffer who is now nominal vice-president of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." Muldoon made the contact with me apparently on the advice of Bob Brown and Red Stent whose counsel he sought in an effort to protect himself from the possible implications of his involvement with a group promoting the independence of the Bahamian Commonwealth island of Abaco. We met at 1100 hours at "Tony's" on L street and 18th N.W. in downtown Washington. Red Stent was there to introduce me to Muldoon but he did not participate in the discussion.

2. Muldoon presented me with a typewritten report containing the essential data he possessed concerning a group of individuals with whom he had met on Friday, 17 May 1974 in Washington. Attending the meeting with Muldoon on that occasion were Mitchell WERBELL III (aka "Mitch Three"), Lord and Lady BELLHAVEN (alleged British peers), Mike OLIVER (a wealthy electronics tycoon of European, possibly French, origin who currently resides in Carson City, Nevada), Howard HANDELMAN (Washington correspondent of "U.S. News and World Report"), Renee (lnu) (the evening's object of Werbell's seemingly voracious affections) and an employe of the Library of Congress whom Muldoon chose not to identify to me. At a subsequent meeting on Monday, 20 May 1974, Muldoon had lunch with WERBELL and free lance writer Andrew St. GEORGE who is also involved with WERBELL in the Abaco independence enterprise. The Werbell group is known as the "Friends of Abaco" (already documented as such in our files).

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SECRET

3. A knowledge of the background of the principals is essential to a comprehension of the affair as recounted by Muldoon:

a. Island of Abaco - From available file information we know that Abaco is a small island at the north end of the Bahamas archipelago a short distance off the Florida coast, which was populated in 1785 by British Loyalists and their Black slaves fleeing the United States following independence. The island remains about 50% white. Openly apprehensive in anticipation of the Bahamas' independence from Great Britain, the residents of Abaco, both white and black, have found themselves - since independence - the object of apparent antagonism and administrative neglect on the part of the Pindling government, which has fueled talk of secession from Nassau rule. This talk has been institutionalized in an indigenous organization headed by a white, Charles "Chuck" HALL, and called the Abaco Independence Movement (AIM). HALL is a resident of Marsh Grove, the country cross roads which poses as the metropolitan capital of Abaco; he frequently visits Miami where he meets with Werbell.

b. Mitchell WERBELL III - A Philadelphian, WERBELL was a member of OSS in the Far East during World War II where, according to Muldoon, he came to know the Director and Lou Conein. Werbell currently a resident of Atlanta, now is president of an international arms peddling firm called Defense Systems International (DSI). In addition to industrial security systems, according to MULDOON, DSI sells automatic weapons (including a miniature machine pistol with a silencer) and bomb-booby-trapped items of various sorts (e.g., a tennis ball with a fuse which is automatically activated when you stop playing) and other James Bondian accessories. Werbell hopes to establish gaming casinos, hotels and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U.S. tourist crowd available for easy ferrying from nearby Miami. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Michael Pindling, however, Werbell is apparently permanently persona non grata in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appear to be contingent on Abacan independence.

c. Mike OLIVER - The financial angel of the "Friends of Abaco," Oliver's origins and auspices are somewhat obscure to Muldoon. OLIVER claims to have spent time in a Nazi concentration camp during World War II; he speaks excellent French; he has a pet political theory which he has published. He is seeking some political entity where he can put his theory into practice to illustrate to the U.S. government that it is worth practicing in this country. In contrast to his colleague Mitch Three Werbell, however, he seems adamantly opposed to establishing a gambling empire.

d. Lord and Lady BELLHAVEN - A member of the British House of Lords, BELLHAVEN plans to make a speech there, following his return to London on 22 May 1974, castigating the British government for allowing Abaco to be abused by Nassau. BELLHAVEN appears to be identical with Robert Anthony Carmichael HAMILTON, born 27 Feb 27, the 13th Lord of BELHAVEN and STENTON. His wife is the former Elizabeth Ann MOSELEY, daughter of the late Colonel Arthur Henry MOSELEY (whose claim to fame remains to be probated). This information comes from several tomes on the English peerage which were researched for me by Sally Ann Brown of E/BC.

e. Howard HANDELMAN - The U.S. News and World Report correspondent also has contacts with the Agency, a fact which concerns Muldoon.

f. Central Investigation Agency - An Atlanta detective Agency established a few years ago by Howard COSGROVE, a former Georgia police officer specialized in narcotics operations who was apparently fired from the force for reasons unknown to Muldoon. COSGROVE retains a 26% interest in the CIA (sic); Mitchell WERBELL IV ("Mitch Four") holds another 26% and a remaining 6% interest is held by the nominal president of "CIA," a retired Army colonel named Byer or Briar. The "CIA" has in turn established Security Consultants International, as a Washington-based wholly owned subsidiary. SCI's specialities are anti-audio sweeps and electronic surveillance using devices developed by one David MORISSEY, an electronics engineer who collaborates with MULDOON & "CIA."

4. The incident which alarmed Muldoon occurred during the Friday gathering of the individuals mentioned in paragraph two. Muldoon was palmed off by Werbell at this gathering as an "official of the CIA (Central

Intelligence Agency, in this instance)" who was there to attest to the fact that neither the CIA nor the U.S. Government is opposed to Abacan independence. His interlocutors, despite Muldoon's protests that he was retired from CIA and in no way represented U.S. government interests respecting Abaco, seemed anxious - he felt - to accept his presence there as evidence of U.S. government endorsement of the Abacan independence movement.

5. Muldoon took some pains to gain reassurance that he would not be pinpointed by Werbell as the source of this information if any action were taken on it. I assured him that, apart from the particular incident on 17 May 1974, the general outlines of WERBELL and his activities and aspirations for Abaco have already been reported by two or three other sources. Since there is nothing the Agency can plausibly do at this juncture about WERBELL's apparent effort to con his supporters into thinking that the CIA was backing the Abaco independence venture, I told Muldoon I planned merely to make his side of this story a matter of record and let it go at that.

6. To cap off the story, Red Stent invited us to lunch at the Class Reunion on Eye Street and 18th. When Muldoon and I arrived to meet Stent we found him ensconced at a corner table with three other people. Red rushed over to inform us that he would be introducing me as a colleague of his from AEROJET. He then presented me to WERBELL, Werbell's date Patricia BOTOND and Cecil BROWNLOW of "Aviation Weekly." WERBELL, looking for all the world like Jerry Colonna, was intent on the task of seducing Miss BOTOND, who happened to be promoting a convention for the Atlantic Union organization, a political enterprise which is an offshoot of the World Federalists Movement. Miss BOTOND, as it turned out was reared in Shanghai, China, at the same time as Stent. Red had attended school with her brother - the German School in Shanghai. Miss BOTOND had been expelled from the German school in the late 1930s for having had anti-Nazi doodles in her copybook. Brownlow had helped Red obtain aerial photos of the ChiCom consulate compound in Geneva in the early 1960s when Red was stationed in Paris. When Werbell had wearied of the reminisences of Stent and Botond and had managed to hustle his prey off to a private table, Stent revealed to BROWNLOW that I was not AEROJET but CIA. Fortunately my name was mumbled at the introduction so that no one could have repeated it. No one in fact seemed interested.

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7. Following lunch Muldoon left with a colleague for a meeting at the Justice Department to determine whether in sweeping Embassy buildings in Washington he must register as an agent of a foreign government (whichever it might be). Brownlow went about his business. Stent paid for the lunch. I returned to what Stent whimsically refers to as the "Funny Farm." My only regret is that George Orwell could not have joined us for that lunch.

E. James McTighe
DC/WH/7

DDO/WH/7/E.James McTighe:sdf (24 May 74)
Distribution:
Orig - DC/EA
1 - 189-9-1
① - 201-259910
1 - C/WH/7
1 - DC/WHD

458 126
1
7 July 1965

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: BOTOND, Istvan

BIRTH: 17 Aug 1921, Hungary

CITIZENSHIP: USA, Naturalized, May 12, 1962

ADDRESS: 2152 Wyoming Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.

MARITAL STATUS: BOTOND, Patricia, Nee: POTTER

CHILDREN:
BOTOND, Krisztina; b. c1960
BOTOND, Andrew; b. c1962
Step-Children:
  Lila; b. c1948
  Christopher; b. c1947

EMPLOYMENT: Architect/Urban Designer. The Perkins & Will Partnership, Washington, D.C.

EDUCATION:
1955: Palatine Joseph Polytechnic University, Budapest, Hungary
1961: Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass

TRAVEL: Extensive

PAPERS: F.I.C.A.: 074-32-6419

DATA DATED: Not Dated

3.7

ISTVAN BOTOND, A.I.A.
Architect/Urban Designer
2152 Wyoming Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20008 (202) DUpont 7-7525

Age: 43
Born: August 17, 1921, Hungary

Citizenship: U.S.A. (Naturalized, May 12, 1962)

Marital status: Married
Wife: Patricia Potter Botond (U.S.A.)
Children: Krisztina, 3 1/2 years
Andrew, 2 years
(Lila, 16 years, and Christopher, 15 years, from wife's previous marriage are not fully dependent)

F.I.C.A. 074-32-6419

• • • •

Education:

Dipl. Architect
Palatine Joseph Polytechnic University,
Faculty of Architecture and Engineering,
Budapest, Hungary, 1955

Master of Architecture in Urban Design
Harvard University, Graduate School of Design,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961

Registered Architect

New York State	# 8181
District of Columbia	# A-1576
NCARB Certificate	# 4936

Professional Affiliation: Corporate Member,
American Institute of Architects, Washington Metropolitan Chapter

Awards: 1954, Fourth Prize for replanning of a bombed city square and neighborhood in Debrecen, Hungary (co-designer)

1961, Scholarship at Centro Internazionale di Studi di Architettura "Andrea Palladio," Italy

Languages: English, Hungarian, German, French (acquaintance)

Travel: The Bahamas '58; Europe '59, '62, '65; Canada '61, '62; U.S. Virgin Islands '63, '65; Bermuda '63

Interests: Music, photography; sports: skiing, tennis

3.6

Publications: Magyar Epitömüvészet ("Hungarian Architecture") -- monthly
Jan. '56: Airport and Buildings (Diploma thesis)
July '58: Furniture Factory in Debrecen, Hungary

Harvard University Library
Factors that Shape the City: Case Study -- Budapest

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

June 1963 - Present

The Perkins & Will Partnership, Architects
Washington, D.C.

Head of Design Department

Responsible and involved in every design job as guide and critic. In addition to administrative duties (Personnel, Budget, Schedules, etc.), active designer of two major projects:

a) University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
Teaching Hospital and Ambulant Patient Facilities
First stage ready for bid
Est: $ 7,500,000

b) Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Research Laboratory Building for Medical Sciences
Working drawings under preparation
Est: $ 5,400,000

Other Department works:

Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Main Entrance
Bid: $ 3,700,000

Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Clinical Research II Buildings
Est: $ 1,800,000

George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Long Range Plan

Doctors" Office Building, Washington, D.C.
Est: $ 2,600,000

Virgin Islands Medical Centers: St. Thomas, St. Croix
Est: $ 14,000,000 each

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

December 1956-June 1963
(Absent ten months for Post-Graduate Studies)

I.M. Pei & Associates, Architects & Planners
New York, New York

Architect Designer/Planner

Hotel Denver Hilton: design work and detailing of precast exterior and store fronts

M.I.T. Earth Science Building: preliminary design and planning work

Union Station area project, Toronto, Canada: site analysis and feasibility studies

"Financial Plaza," Downtown Toronto, Canada: preliminary studies for a banks and office buildings project

Weybosset Hill, Urban Renewal Project, Providence, R.I.: Urban Designer in the Planning Team

Newhouse Communication Center, School of Journalism, Syracuse University, New York: consultant on precast exterior system

Town Center Plaza, Southwest Washington, D.C.: site study for extension of a newly constructed Housing-Shopping project.

• • • •

Prior to December 1956

Various architectural positions in Hungary (part-time during University years.)

Final year: (August 1955-November 1956) Head of Architectural Department in the Regional Planning Bureau for Northeast Hungary. Duties similar to present position.

General Investment Corporation
Throughout the Pacific
SUITE 400 / 1451 SOUTH KING STREET / HONOLULU, HAWAII 96814 / PHONE 949-4733 / Cable Address: GENINVCO

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
Rm. 508 ,677 Ala Moana
Honolulu, Hawaii 96814

Att'n: Neil Leitner

Neil,

We have a financial statement on Oliver-Roza Corp., dated 10/23/69 by Chalk & Joerg, CPA's, 717 North Curry St., P.O. Box 1060, Carson City, Nevada, 89071.

An appraisal of an "Oliver Subdivision" by Noble T. Murray, Real Estate Appraiser & Consultant, 2345 Camas Rd., Carson City Nevada.

Michael Oliver, an Electronic's Engineer, of 2089 El Rancho Drive, Carson City, Nevada, is President of at least two corporations, author of "A New Constitution For A New Country"; had a committment from Whitehall Securities Corp., 138 Main St. OceanPort, New Jersey, to his Vanguard Corp. to underwrite the sales of 500,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 per share; deal fell thru because British or Dutch governments failed to come thru with tax relief.

Sincerely,

Leo F. Jonick

See Mr Stemmerman
if I can't find.

LFJ/mba

3.5

STARTED RATING

65 52 04-712-3096 OR 48 MAR 14 1969 N
VANGUARD CORP LAND DEVELOPMENT 1968 N Q

2089 EL RANCHO DR
CARSON CITY NEV 89701
TEL 702 882-2483

SUMMARY	
PAYMENTS	UNDETERMINED
EMPLOYS	3
RECORD	CLEAR

MICHAEL OLIVER, PRES
MORRIS C. DAVIS, V PRES
BETTY S. (MRS. M.) OLIVER, SEC-TREAS
DIRECTORS: THE officers and L. A. Whitmore, Joseph A. Foss Jr, Dr. R. B. Williams, Dr. R. Meiers, Arthur L. Bonike, and Robert Johnson.

PAYMENTS Suppliers for this operation were not located during current investigation. Oliver's personal payment record is satisfactory.

HISTORY On Mar 19 1969, M. Oliver, president, was unavailable for an interview. One outside source submitted the following statement from Michael Oliver, personally, dated Apr 25 1968:

Cash	$ 8,200	Accts Pay	$	150
Accts Rec	1,300	Owing Autos		3,200
Coin Collection & Stocks	6,000			
Current	15,500	Current		3,359
R E	327,000	Mtgs		27,047
Autos	5,900	NET WORTH		318,003
Total	348,400	Total		348,400

Unsigned.

-----0-----

Real estate includes interest in Oliver-Roos Corp of $289,000; Carson City residence, $23,000; house at San Diego, Calif, $15,000. Statement was obtained from outside sources.

On Mar 18 1969, Oliver was unavailable for an interview.

Details on this business were not available in outside quarters. One outside source reported that operations are currently in the formative stages.

HISTORY Incorporated in Nevada Nov 1 1968; authorized capital, $500,000. MICHAEL OLIVER, born 1920, married. 1965 to starting this concern, engaged in land development, as an officer in Oliver-Boza Corporation. Prior to that, was associated with the Philco Corp. in Palo Alto, Calif. Prior to that, employed by Volt Tech Corp., at San Diego. The directors are residents of the State of CVlifornia; antecedent informationis not currently available.

OPERATION Operates in the land development field. Full scope of operations not learned. ~~There are no~~ employees, (including officers) ~~apart from the officers~~. LOCATION: Headquarters are maintained at Oliver's residence, owned by Mr. & Mrs. M. Oliver
3-19 (200c 6)

3.4

THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATEVER.

[illegible]

SIC	D-U-N-S	©DUN & BRADSTREET, INC.	STARTED	RATING
65 52	OLIVER ROSA CORP	CD 48 APR 28 1971 LAND DEVELOPMENT	1965	NQ

2089 EL RANCHO DR
CARSON CITY NEV 89701
TEL 702 882-2483

MICHAEL OLIVER, PRES
FRANK ROSA, JR, V PRES
BETTY S (MRS M) OLIVER, SEC-TREAS
DIRECTORS: The Officers and Robert R Johnson

SUMMARY

PAYMENTS	UNDETERMINED
EMPLOYS	4
RECORD	INCOMPLETE

PAYMENTS Suppliers for this operation were not located during current investigation. Oliver's personal payments record is satisfactory.

FINANCE On April 28, 1971 officers were absent.

Reporter estimates are:

Real estate $ 290,000

REAL ESTATE	TITLE	VALUE
Residence of Olivers	Oliver/Wife	$23,000
House, San Diego	Oliver/Wife	15,000

Further current financial estimates are unavailable. Concerning a personal statement of Michael Oliver, dated April 1968, total assets were listed at $348,400 and net worth at $318,003. Net worth of Oliver centered heavily in real estate.

Operations of the concern appear to be profitable. Full extent of operations unknown. Fire insurance details not learned. Business is well established and affairs appear to be kept in order.

BANKING Bank facility not learned.

HISTORY Incorporated Nevada on Nov 5 1965, authorized capital $200,000 with 20,000 shares at $10 per share.

M OLIVER born 1920, married. Was associated with the Philco Corp in Palo Alto, Calif. Prior to that, employed by Volt Tech. Corp at San Diego. Is presently also the president of a Vanguard Corp.

B OLIVER born 1925, married. Is bookkeeper of concern.

Antecedents of Rosa Jr and Johnson lacking.

RELATED CONCERN: Vanguard Corp. same address, established 1968, operates also in land development. Extent of inter-company relations unlearned.

OPERATION Operates in the land development field. Business non-seasonal. Employs 4 including directors. LOCATION: Headquarters are maintained at Oliver's residence, owned by Mr and Mrs M Oliver.
4-28 (88c 3)

3,4

THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN ANY FORM OR MANNER WHATEVER.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

20-3

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 222323Z DIRECTOR 516809

CONF: EA/CO4 INFO: FILE IP/AN EA4 EA/VNO4 LSN/ID LSN/ML C/OPS C1/OP2

DISSEM BY: 47

PER ___ #______

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO ________

0 IP FILES

TO: HONG KONG, INFO BANGKOK, SAIGON.

TAPPER/CO STRYLIC

1/File

REFS: A. HONG KONG 30865 [IN 163687]

B. SAIGON 74819 [IN 164169]

C. SAIGON 74809 [IN 163286]

D. BANGKOK 55098 [IN 165474]

E. SAIGON 74890 [IN 166221]

1. HQS FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING ON BENNETT B. BINTLIFF (201-885931), SUBJECT OF REF A REQUEST:

A. EARLY APR 1971, DEPARTMENT OF ARMY VIA INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER EXPRESSED OPS INTEREST IN BINTLIFF AS A "SOURCE ASSET" INVOLVED IN ARMY OPERATION 1201-02, ACTIVATED 25 MAR 1966, WHICH WAS THE CONUS FIELD STATION, A SUBORDINATE ELEMENT OF U.S. ARMY FIELD ACTIVITIES COMMAND. HOWEVER, ARMY DROPPED ITS INTEREST IN BINTLIFF WITHOUT PREJUDICE 13 OCT 1972. DPOB LISTED AS 17 FEB 1928, AUSTIN, TEXAS. BINTLIFF ALSO LISTED AS PRESIDENT, QUANTUM CORP., 444 MADISON, NEW YORK, AND VICE PRESIDENT, MILITARY ARMAMENT CORP., L'ENFANT PLAZA N., WASHINGTON, D.C.

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

3.3

File in 201-259910

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 59271

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

516809

CONF: INFO: FILE

DISSEM BY:

PER #

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0 IP FILES

B. BINTLIFF, AT ONE TIME, WAS AN OFFICIAL OF SIONICS CORP., 1655 PEACH TREE STREET, N.E., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WHICH LISTS MITCHELL L. WERBELL III AS VICE PRESIDENT. 201-259910 (WERBELL, ON WHOM HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 FILE, IS CHARACTERIZED AS AMERICAN ADVENTURER, UNSCRUPULOUS WHEELER DEALER, AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. WERBELL WAS INVOLVED IN GUNRUNNING AND MERCENARY VENTURES IN CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND AND FALSELY IMPLYING BKHERALD CONNECTIONS.) BINTLIFF AND WERBELL WERE INVOLVED IN FUNDING MERCENARY EXPEDITION ON ABACO ISLAND, BAHAMAS. (WERBELL 201 FILE)

C. FBI REPORT MM105-21382, 17 JULY 1973, INDICATES BINTLIFF NOW OWNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, WHOSE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR IS PAUL J. ROUTHIER, A RETIRED U.S. AIR FORCE LT. COL. AND WERBELL'S SON-IN-LAW.

2. RE BBRW FIRM MENTIONED IN REF C, CHECK OF ATLANTA TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SHOWS LISTING FOR BINTLIFF, BAYARD, ROUTHIER, WERBELL AND CO., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, WHICH LISTS SAME ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER AS DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL (DSI). DSI ALSO HAS ADDRESS LISTING AT 4321 MACLAND-DALLAS, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, WHICH IS RESIDENCE

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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PAGE 3 OF PAGES 3

SECRET

CONF: INFO: FILE

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PER ___ # ______

516 809

201-254910 [illegible] 23 Mar 73.

CLAIMED BY BINTLIFF AND WERBELL.

3. WHAT LITTLE INFO HQS HAS RE BINTLIFF IS INCONCLUSIVE; HOWEVER, IF JUDGMENTS CAN BE MADE BY COMPANY HE KEEPS, DEALINGS WITH HIM SHOULD BE APPROACHED WITH CAUTION. WHILE ABOVE BACKGROUND INFO ON BINTLIFF AND WERBELL CANNOT BE PASSED TO LIAISON BECAUSE OF THEIR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, STATION CAN PASS STRYLIC PARA 2E TELEPHONE DIRECTORY INFO AND INDICATE THAT BINTLIFF HAS UNSAVORY CONNECTIONS AND MAY FALSELY CLAIM U.S. GOVT AFFILIATIONS.

4. FILE: 201-685931. E2, IMPDET.H

EA/TBL/T: ROBERT SAVAGE/DRAFT/
EA/JNO/SVN: BRUCE RUBEN/DRAFT/
LSN/ISR: EVERETT BARNES/DRAFT/

DATE: 21 FEB. 74
ORIG: JOSEPH MARRA/RVW
UNIT: CH/HTH
EXT: 6770/1968

ROBERT D. BROWN, JR.
AC/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

3,3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES H. KELLY, JR.
DCEA/CH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 59271

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ [illegible]RNAL [illegible] ONLY ☐ CON[illegible]ENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Sensitive

FROM: [illegible]IC COLLECTION DIVISION
Support Branch/Operational Support Section
Room 900, Key Building - ext. 2268
Mr. Evan Ames

EXTENSION:

NO. Case 61168

DATE 22 January 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/7/C 3 B 0001 Hqs.			
2.			
3. DC/WH/7			
4. C/WH/7		4	SP
5. Lehman ~~[illegible]~~ BJ			
6. Easton			
7. Ettin (Pouch copy to Miami)			
8. Annex - File : 189-9-1 w/[illegible] sheet			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.		3.2	

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached report was sent in by DCD/Miami. A copy has been passed to WH Station in Miami.

(MIM-00-E-324/00268-74)

2 to 3 & 4:
this type of info. should be passed to the FBI. As far as I can ascertain, DCD doesn't do it. - Do you think WH/S should pass it? The [illegible] has [illegible] on all the [illegible] in the report. Beth

No. But ensure, if need be with OPS/LIAS help, that DCD does appropriate dissem or whatever they do.
SP

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 9, 1973

Interim Report - Period of
12/3/73 - 12/9/73

RE: Current Bahamian Situation

At Miami, Florida

Results of the Inquiry:

The following people were contacted by the writer:

Jay Mallin (December 3, 1973.) Mallin states that to the best of his knowledge there are only two groups known to be active in the Abaco Movement--the group that WerBel (Mitchell Livingston WerBel III) is associated with and a group being headed up by a Bob Brown.

Brown is currently in Washington and is about to return to his home which is in Boulder, Colorado. Mallin indicated that if anything were about to occur Brown would certainly be in the Miami area.

Brown is a white American and an ex-Special Forces type. He has formed a group of ex-Special Forces Specialists that in Mallin's opinion "could really raise Hell." Brown, according to Mallin, has been working for Chuck Hall. However, Hall is also aligned with WerBel.

3.2

Mallin states t[illegible] all of the planning sessions [illegible]r Brown's group have been held in the living room of Mallin's Coral Gables home.

Brown's group is all white but he has been in contact with some of the local Blacks in Abaco. The Blacks have had no formal training nor do they possess the proper weapons for any sizable operation. In order to obtain weapons and training the Blacks have made friendly overtures to Brown's group.

Mallin stated that some of the local Blacks could move on their own but he believes that it would be highly unlikely.

Mallin speculated that U.S. Mafia money may be being spent in the Bahamas in order to finance the overthrow of Pindling's government to stop the seizure of the casinos. He did not have any evidence to substantiate the theory.

In answer to a direct question from the writer Mallin further commented that Paul Bethal is totally out of the Abaco situation. Bethal's only role, according to Mallin, was the one meeting he arranged for WerBel, Hall, a Michael Lightbourne (Phonetic) and George Wackenhut. Bethal, Mallin further stated, trys to give people the impression that he has very high level connections including members of the National Security Council and that he prepares papers and other briefings for the Council. Mallin states that this is not true, that Bethal in fact has no such contacts.

Mallin went on to say that WerBel would not get involved with anything that would jeopardize his U.S. government contracts especially the sale of his silencer to the Army. In addition, according to Mallin, WerBel is a CIA informant and would advise the Agency of his activities. On December 9, 1973, Mallin was recontacted by the writer. Chuck Hall travels to Miami a great deal and contacts Mallin when he does. Mallin said his last contact with Hall was about two months ago. Hall's supporters are mainly white although there are a couple of [illegible]cks. Hall is publishing a mimeographed newsletter under the name of the Abaco Independent Movement.

Mallin indicated that, "the whites cannot do anything in Abaco without everyone knowing about it."

There has been a series of thefts of weapons in the Bahamas and Mallin believes that Black militants could possibly be involved. Mallin further believes that there may in fact be a Black militant group operating in the Abaco area.

Mallin stated that, "WerBel's bringing in of Colin Mitchell was just a lot of noise." He went on to say Mitchell did not accomplish anything.

David W. Wike, Associate Security Director, University of Miami. Wike has not heard of any unusual activity in the Bahamas. In answer to a direct question from the writer Wike stated that the only member of the University community known to be travelling to the Bahamas frequently is a student who is a suspected narcotics dealer. Also, no prominent Bahamian personalities or members of their families are known to be attending the University.

John L. Curtin, Dade County Public Safety Department. Curtin states that, "the trouble has been building for the last six to eight months." He believes a direct assault would have to be made on Nassau itself in order to accomplish the desired objective of stopping the seizure of the casinos. Curtin further stated that the Mafia has been "buying guns like crazy." On December 5, 1973, Curtin was recontacted due to the fact that he had dinner with a prominent Bahamian businessman who is known to be in the lumber business. This businessman is white but is well liked by the Blacks in the Bahamas. His identity is unknown to the writer.

This businessman stated that there is definitely increased activity but that no specific date for any overt action has been mentioned.

This businessman believes that Mafia money is an important factor and that Blacks will be hired to do the actual fighting if there is any fighting. He views the casino issue as the crucial one. He believes Blacks who are opportunistic will seize upon the casino issue to obtain weapons and money from the Mafia and attempt to seize power.

Dr. David Cartano, Sociology Instructor, University of Miami. Cartano was contacted due to his being a past member of the Institute for the Study of Change. When he first became associated with the Institute he was introduced by Mallin as being a Bahamian specialist.

Cartano could not contribute anything pertinent to this inquiry. He has not renewed his contacts in the Islands in over one year's time. He does have two Bahamian students in one of his classes but neither of them has mentioned anything of any significance. He doubts their value as sources.

Gordon O. Rothwell, Chief of Security, Sheraton Four Ambassadors Hotel. Rothwell could not contribute anything pertinent to this inquiry. In addition no prominent Bahamians are presently or have been recently in the hotel.

W. Bruce Wrightson, Chief of Security, Sheraton Royal Biscayne Hotel. No prominent Bahamians are presently or have been recently in the hotel.

A confidential local law enforcement source indicated that an attorney in West Palm Beach is selling automatic weapons. He is free lancing and has a small warehouse with two separate alarm systems installed on the warehouse.

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

OSS-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/OSS)

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate Desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

EPRyan for DDAmes/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
IP Files

FILE: 201-25819

2.1

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010630

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

201-257710

DCD memo to Miami field office.

Dated Jan 74

WICKES, A.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WICKES, ALASTAIR
201-801702

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10-30 19 SEPT 78		WENDY COLLINS	Wendy S Collins

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

200-006-485/03
PARI-33753
13 NOV 72

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUPRENUK NOTED SPELLING SUBJ NAME IN REPORT GIVEN AS WEEKS FRENCH PHONETIC RENDERING OF WICKS

R 7301180251

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 801702

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Disem. No., etc. - if applicable)

WEEKS, ALISTAR
201-8017C2
SEX M DOB ?

CIT RHODESIA ?
OCC MERCENARY
LOCATED ON IBIZA ISLAND IN THE BELEARIC ISLANDS ASSOCIATED W/COL. PETERS AND MIKE HOARE

200-011-010/05
DBD -19954
30 JUL 71
FBI

R 7109230296

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 801702			

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

1-801702

(James)
WICKS, Alastair /Major/

DOB: 17 November 1917

POB: England

Citizenship: Rhodesian

Jul 66 Address: 38 Montague Square
London W 1

Mar 67 Address: 199 Bickenhall
Mansions
London W 1
(listed under Janis Morris)

Mercenary in Katanga gendarme, 1961

Former RAS (Rhodesian Air Services) official

Recruiter of South Rhodesian mercenaries for Tshombe forces - 1964

2nd in Command to Mike HOARE in 5 CDO
Left Leopoldville Dec 1965 at termination of mercenary contract for Johannesburg.

One of mercenaries involved in July '66 plot to overthrow MOBUTU (although still in the pay of MOBUTU)

Also, tried to involve Michael HOARE in the plot. He offered HOARE 20,000 L for 6 month contract and rank of full Colonel.

Recruiting Officer in South Africa for Tshombe's forces..'66

Unwitting SMOTH contact - 1966

Went to London in October 1966

Unscrupulous and undependable

201-801702

WICKS, Alastair

PRET 2818
(IN 31010)
30 Sep 1963

Early Aug Subject came from Salisbury with msgs for PUREN from Pierre LAUREYS and Jack Malloch (of Rhodesian Air Services). LAUREYS was arranging for Malloch to fly out arms and ammo to Royalists in Yemen. Malloch was to get contract to fly arms from Europe to Yemen also. PUREN was to proceed w/plane via Salisbury to Yemen as official observer for South African Defense HQS.

AHS 1016
CS DB 312/641-64
18 Sep 1964

Alastair WICKS, former RAS official, returned to Salisbury to begin the recruitment of Southern Rhodesians for service as mercenaries with TSCHOMBE's forces in the Congo. In newspaper ad calling for recruits, interested parties were requested to call Salisbury 55715, which is the numbdr listed for WICKS in S. Rhodesian telephone directory.

KINSHASA 0864
(IN 17389)
9 Mar 1967

HOARE stated he going London about 12 March to check on Yemen deal. HOARE had previously received letter from Alastair WICKS in London offering him job with good pay and conditions. He believes this job concerns Yemen.

AZPA 2201
16 Mar 67

Attached a letter from WICKS to HOARE, indicating WICKS unable to develop proposition further. HOARE estimates that the WICKS proposition relates to recruitment of mercenaries for service in Yemen. His only basis for this is development reported in AZPA 2200.

201-801762

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, Africa Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, PRETORIA		MICROFILM
SUBJECT OPERATIONAL/SECAROB -- Letter re Mercenary Affairs		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: AZPT - 2258, 4 March 1970

1. Forwarded herewith is the substance of the latest letter received by SECAROB/1 from subject of 201 - 801702 re mercenary affairs and Zanzibar.

2. During ref trip, PHILBROOK will discuss this letter with SECAROB/1 for further clarification and forward the results to Headquarters.

Kenneth H. PHILBROOK

Attachment h/w
letter

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - C/AF w/att

CS COPY FILED IN 201 - 3465[illegible]

201 - 801702

CROSS REFERENCE TO ~~201 - 801702~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER AZPA - 3050	DATE 5 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201 - 346685~~

14-00000

H/W ATT TO AZPA - 30 . 5 March 70

We are still held up in one business and I have had to call in my own supplies to give an estimate as the previous one, who was virtually unknown to me, did not seem to understand the importance of security in the industrial field today. This in fact should suit us better as I am sure I can do a better deal for us with our own man.

I have had to put off my departure for one week as a result of this as it was important to keep my fingers on the pulse at this moment. I have a meeting with the partners tomorrow when I hope to get things moving and a firm proposal sent to bankers.

I mentioned to the partners that you had some novel ideas to solve the delivery problem and in view of the possible extra cost, they have asked me to get an outline from you as to what your ideas are, both from the point of view of additional expense which, if adopted, would need to be included in the budget and also to give some added encouragement since this particular problem comes up again and again and so far I have refused to be drawn on the subject though you know my first ideas. I think a letter to the Club Nautico will reach me safely though it would obviously be inadvisable to mention the Spice Islands.

I hear there is much afoot in your part of the world and both Brazzaville and the Sudan have been mentioned, also another operation. I hope you will not return to that sort of thing -- at least until we have fully explored the possibilities of the new company.

(dated 25 February 1970)

CS COPY FILED IN 201-346655

201-801702

CS COPY

MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES: 58 20

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ORIG: NANCY BLAKE
UNIT: AF/4/N
EXT: 6963
DATE: 9 February 1968

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BY 15 PER
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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☑ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☑ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-801762 B-201-051875
INFO: FILE VR EUR 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS

(classification)

SECRET

AN	EI	
TS/	~~2869~~	AF 4/N
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

CITE DIRECTOR 74281

LAGOS INFO: LONDON

KRHOLLY

REFS: A. LAGOS 9510 (IN 38143)
B. LONDON 3161 (IN 39172)

FN WICKES 201

3P

1. FOLLOWING HQS TRACES ON ALASTAIR WICKES PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JAMES ALASTAER EDMOND WICKS. WAS MERCENARY IN KATANGA GENDARME, 1961. IN JULY 1964, RETURNED TO CONGO AS SECOND IN COMMAND TO MICHAEL HOARE'S WHITE MERCENARY GROUP. WAS LOCAL MERCENARY RECRUITED FOR TSHOMBE IN SALISBURY. MAJOR IN HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT OF 5TH COMMANDO IN CONGO FEBRUARY 1965. RESIGNED FROM 5TH COMMANDO IN DECEMBER 1965, WENT TO JOHANNESBURG ACTING AS MERCENARY RECRUITING OFFICER IN SOUTH AFRICA. WAS ONE OF THE MERCENARIES INVOLVED IN JULY 1966 PLOT TO OVERTHROW MOBUTU BY FORMER CONGOLESE PRIME MINISTER MOISE TSHOMBE INVOLVING THE 5TH COMMANDO MERCENARIES. IN JULY 1967 WICKES REPRESENTED JACK MALLOCH'S AIR TRANS AFRICA IN LONDON. FUNCTION IN LONDON DESCRIBED AS LIAISON WITH AUTAIR OF LONDON AND TO ARRANGE MERCENARY FLIGHT TO CONGO. HOWEVER, THESE OPS HAVE VIRTUALLY CEASED. AUGUST 1967 WICKES INVOLVED IN MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. WAS IN LISBON,

MICROFILMED
FEB 27 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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9 ~~B~~ 2868

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(date and time filed) (reference number)

PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 74281

NEGOTIATING WITH PORTUGUESE ABOUT SENDING ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENT MERCENARY MAJOR JEAN SCHRAMME.

2. NAVICAR JOHN MALLOCH PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JACK MALLOCH, FORMER PILOT IN KATANGA AIR FORCE. IS NOW HEAD OF AIR TRANS AFRICA IN RHODESIA. COMPANY HAS BEEN IN FINANCIAL TROUBLE SINCE 1966. IN ORDER TO KEEP IN BUSINESS, IT APPEARS MALLOCH HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO ACCEPT CONTRACTS WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY ILLEGAL. IN AUGUST 1967 HE OPERATED TWO CONSTELLATIONS AND A DC-4, LAST MENTIONED USED ON FREIGHT SERVICES FROM LUANDA, ANGOLA, AND LISBON, AND ON OPERATIONS FROM SAO TOME TO BIAFRA [redacted]. IN LATE AUGUST, MALLOCH FLEW 39 BELGIAN AND FRENCH MERCENARIES INTO PUNIA VIA LUANDA IN A DC-6. HAD AT HIS DISPOSAL FOR THE AIRLIFT ONE DC-7, TWO DC-4'S, AND ONE DC-3. WAS WORKING WITH ALASTAIR WICK~~E~~S IN THE MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT. JOHN PETERS ATTEMPTED TO TIE HIS EFFORT WITH THAT OF WICK~~E~~S AND MALLOCH, AND THEY [redacted] TENTATIVELY AGREED TO A PLAN TO FLY REINFORCEMENTS TO SCHRAMME TO SERCRAF PLANTATION AT UVIRA. NO INFORMATION ON EITHER WICK~~E~~S OR MALLOCH IN FILE AFTER AUGUST 1967, ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN THEY CONTINUE ASSOCIATION WITH BIAFRAN AIRLIFT.

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 74281

TO

PAGE THREE

3. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS CITED REF A. ABOVE CAN BE PASSED KRHOLLY/4.

4. FOR LONDON: HEADQUARTERS HAS NO INFORMATION WALLERSTEINER; PLEASE FORWARD LAGOS YOUR TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C J Baker
AF/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

AF/5

E/BC/UK E.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/AF/4

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4		9	
5		10	

S E C R E T 131043Z FEB 68 CITE LAGOS 9590 LAGS

13 FEB 68 IN 50136

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

KRHOLLY

REF: A. LAGOS 9510 (IN 32143)
B. LONDON 3161 (IN 39172)
C. LAGOS 9550 (IN 44363)
D. DIRECTOR 74125

AN K
PS AF/4/N
ABSTRACT X

APPRECIATE REF. HOWEVER, STATION'S ORIGINAL QUERY (REF A) NOT ANSWERED. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

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201-801702
13 FEB 68

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14.

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702 007-009-011
SEX M DOB ? LUND-01001
20 AUG 67
CIT ? UEG -00291
OCC ? P1
FORMER MERCENARY MAJOR WHO IS STILL IN LISBON, NEGOTIATING WITH PORTUGUESE ABOUT SENDING ASSISTANCE TO DISSIDENT MERCENARY MAJOR JEAN SCHRAMME.

ACLUPLOBRAHSAZP R 6708293294

FILE IN 201-801702

15.

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9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE SUMMARY OF TWO PLANS FOR OVERTHROW OF CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT.

007-009-011
BRUS-09865
13 AUG 67
OBB -07301
P5

OELACL

R 6708254987

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE MERCENARY PLANS TO OVERTHROW CONGOLESE
GOVERNMENT

201-346685
8RUS-09868
13 AUG 67
P1

OELACL

R 6708255679

FILE IN 201-801702

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AF/345/RE - ~~MARY~~ GORMLEY

31 Thanks

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S E C R E T 280930Z CITE SALISBURY 2573 28 JUL 67 IN 21140

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, KINSHASA, PRETORIA, LONDON

REF: DIRECTOR 23009

ACCORDING BRICK/1, WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM CAPT. O'DONOVAN, OPS MANAGER OF CENTRAL AFRICAN AIRWAYS, WICKS. WICKS REPRESENTS AIR TRANS AFRICA IN LONDON, WAS THERE ON 12 JULY, AND NO INDICATION HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEFT LONDON. FUNCTION IN LONDON DESCRIBED AS LIAISON WITH AUTAIR OF LONDON AND TO ARRANGE MERCENARY FLIGHT TO CONGO. HOWEVER, THESE OPERATIONS HAVE "VIRTUALLY CEASED" AND AIR TRANS AFRICA NOW APPEARS TO RELY SOLELY ON AIRLIFTING PETROL FROM FRANCISTOWN, BOTSWAN TO LIVINGSTON, ZAMBIA USING COMPANY'S TWO FRANCISTOWN-REGISTERED DC-4'S.

S E C R E T

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: R. Rideout:cjs
UNIT: AF/5
EXT: 5032
DATE: 26 July 1967

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BY 28

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XREF 201-[illegible]

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 23009

26 22 21Z

TO SALISBURY INFO BRUSSELS KINSHASA PRETORIA LONDON

REF: PRETORIA 5ICS 5015 (IN 16565)

1. BRUSSELS 9749 (NOT SENT SALISBURY) REPORTS JOHN R. LATZ CAME BRUSSELS NINE MONTHS AGO AND CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS SALES INSPECTOR BY ETS FOURCROY SA, 119 RUE STEYLS, BRUSSELS, A WHOLESALE LIQUOR DISTRIBUTOR.

2. WIGEAR LAST SAW LATZ CIRCA 10 JUNE. SAYS LATZ LEFT KINSHASA CIRCA AUGUST 66 (LNGOLD TRAFFIC AT TIME CONFIRMS THIS) PASSED THROUGH BRUSSELS ON WAY VISIT FAMILY LONDON; THEN VISITED BROTHER COTE D'AZUR FRANCE. LATZ SETTLED BRUSSELS FALL 66 WITH FOURCROY AND HAS NOT TRAVELED AFRICA SINCE.

3. WIGEAR NOTED LATZ MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH ALASTAIR WICKES, WHO WIGEAR BELIEVES STILL EMPLOYED BY RHODESIAN AIRLINES AND TRAVELS SALISBURY-LONDON. DOES SALISBURY HAVE ANY INFO WICKES' ACTIVITIES?

END OF MESSAGE

AF/2

E/BNL/B

E/BC/UK

AF/COPS

AF/5

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

— 10/23

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FILE VR, EUR 8, DDP, [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, CI/[illegible], CI/[illegible], [illegible], [illegible], FI, FI/INT 2, [illegible]

S E C R E T 081812 Z CITE KINSHASA 0864

9 MAR 67 IN 17389

DIRECTOR INFO PRETORIA, LONDON

SECAROB

1. ON 3 MARCH 1967 SECAROB/1 HAD MEETING WITH HASLANGER AND REPORTED FOLLOWING ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH WISTATIC/1.

A. SECAROB/1 TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO GET WISTATIC/1 TO FOCUS ON WHAT GDRC WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM FOR PHASING OUT THE 5 COMMANDO AND FOR RECRUITING NEW MEN IN ENGLAND. BASED ON WISTATIC/1'S ATTITUDE THAT SECAROB/1 WAS SOMETHING OF A CAD FOR BRINGING UP MONEY MATTERS, SECAROB/1 TOLD WISTATIC/1 HE HAD NO INTENTION OF PHASING OUT 5 COMMANDO UNLESS THIS FOLLOWED UP WITH RECRUITMENT OF 400 MEN FROM ENGLAND WITH EVENTUAL EXPANSION THIS FORCE TO 800 MEN, MOST OF WHOM WOULD BE ARTISANS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN; AND FINALLY SECAROB/1 TO BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP TOURISM INTHE EASTERN CONGO. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION SECAROB/1 STATED THAT HE NOW HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT BEING AX MAN FOR THE 5 COMMANDO BECAUSE HE HAS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE GDRC WILL PERMIT HIM TO CARRY OUT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS PROGRAM.

[illegible] K1NSHASA 0364 S E C R ET SECRET B. TO SECAROB/1'S SUGGESTION @ WISTATIC/1 THAT MOBUTU

OUT IN LNHARP ON THE PHASE-OUT OF THE 5 COMMANDO DUE TO THE WITHRUSH POSITION IN ALBERTVILLE, WISTATIC/1 REPLIED "WE [illegible] THE [illegible] [illegible], ARE YOU? WE DON'T LIKE THEM" (ASSUME WISTATIC'S "WE" REFERS TO HIMSELF AND DELPERDANGE.)

C. SECAROB/1 ADVISED WISTATIC/1 THAT PETERS COULD BE A DIFFICULT MAN TO HANDLE IF DISBANDMENT OF 5 COMMANDO NOT PROPERLY HANDLED. WISTATIC/1 SAID HE SAW NO DIFFICULTIES HERE. (SECAROB/1 LATER STATED HE DID NOT FEAR PETERS BECAUSE THE LATTER STILL HAD A SERGEANT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS COMMANDING OFFICER, SECAROB/1. HASLANGER CAUTIONED SECAROB/1 AGAINST TAKING PETERS TOO LIGHTLY.)

D. WISTATIC/1 COMPLAINED TO SECAROB/1 ABOUT SECAROB/1 NOT HAVING GIVEN HIM A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION BACK IN SEPTEMBER 1966. WISTATIC/1 SAID HE HAD INTENDED USE LETTER ALONG WITH OTHERS TO PREVENT HIS REMOVAL AND THAT OF GENERAL DELPERDANGE FROM THE CONGO BY THE BELGIAN ARMY. SECAROB/1 CONCLUDED HIS DISCUSSION OF WISTATIC/1 WITH THE COMMENT THAT WISTATIC/1 KNOWS THE CONGO AS FEW MEN DO AND THAT HE IS A SENSITIVE MAN WITHOUT COURAGE. SECRET

2. CONCERNING THE OAU MEETING IN SEPTEMBER, SECAROB/1 EMPHASIZED THAT MOBUTU TOLD HIM THAT IT HIS INTENTION TO GET PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS OF OAU TRANSFERRED TO THE CONGO. FURTHER THE GDRC WISHES TO BE A STRONG MILITARY POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA. WITH THIS COMBINATION MOBUTU HOPES THAT THE GDRC WILL BE THE LEADING POWER IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND POSSIBLY IN ALL OF AFRICA.

3. WHILE CONFIRMING HIS WILLINGNESS TO DISBAND THE 5 COMMANDO IF LNHARP WANTS HIM TO DO SO, SECAROB/1 EMOTIONALLY TOLD HASLANGER THAT HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR LNHARP AND WOTACT; HE WAS OUR MAN AND WOULD BE EVER LOYAL TO LNHARP WHICH HE BELIEVES MUST EXERCISE MORE INFLUENCE IN AFRICA; LNHARP HAS ALWAYS BEEN FAIR TO HIM; AND THAT WITHOUT WOFACT THE 5 COMMANDO COULD NEVER HAVE DONE ITS JOB. PRIOR TO LEAVING HASLANGER'S HOME SECAROB/1 LEARNED THAT HASLANGER MIGHT BE LEAVING THE CONGO AROUND AUGUST 1967. SECAROB/1 STATED THAT IF GUTHMAN AND HASLANGER WERE TO LEAVE THE CONGO HE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TAKE ON HIS NEW JOB SINCE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO HIM AND WERE IMPORTANT IN IMPLEMENTING HIS NEW PROGRAM. SECRET

SECRET

4. FINALLY SECAROB/1 STATED THAT HE GOING LONDON ABOUT 12 MARCH TO CHECK ON THE YEMEN DEAL. HE SUGGESTED LNHARP MIGHT WANT HIM TO GO TO YEMEN AND THAT HE WOULD DO SO IF LNHARP DESIRED IT. HE NOT ENCOURAGED BUT TOLD TO REPORT FULL INFO THIS SUBJECT. (SECAROB/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ALASTAIRE WICKES IN LONDON. LETTER STATED THAT JOB AVAILABLE WITH GOOD PAY AND CONDITIONS. SECAROB/1 BELIEVES JOB CONCERNS YEMEN. HE KNOWS THAT (FNU) STERLING, OF LONG RANGE DESERT GROUP FAME, HAS LARGE GROUP OF MERCENARISG IN YEMEN.)

5. INSTRUCTED SECAROB/1 TO CHECK WITH PRETORIA ON HIS RETURN SOUTH AFRICA 4 MARCH.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

4-00000

☐ INDEX

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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[illegible] 2

(CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 20 22 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 61200

TO LONDON PRETORIA KENSHASA

WIQUIT

REFERENCE A. KINSHASA 9412 (IN 55542)

B. SALISBURY 2305 (IN 59841)

1. HQS NOTES THAT NAME ALASTAIR WICKS HAS NOT APPEARED IN RECENT SECAROB/1 REPORTING OF WIQUIT/1 PLOTTING. DURING SUMMER PLOTTING WICKS ALLEGEDLY ONE OF PRINCIPALS INVOLVED. REFERENCE B, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT WICKS CONTINUES BE INVOLVED IN WIQUIT PLOTTING. WOULD APPRECIATE PRETORIA STATION DEBRIEF SECAROB/1 AT NEXT REGULAR MEETING ON WICKS PRESENT WHEREABOUTS AND ACTIVITIES.

2. HQS HAS ALSO NOTED THE ABSENC [illegible] ANY SMOTH REPORTING TO WOFACT ON THE MACHINATIONS OF WIQUIT/1 GROUP. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR LONDON STATION TAKE THIS UP WITH SMOTH AND SOLICIT THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MONITORING ACTIVITIES AND CONTACTS OF PETERS, WICKS, AND POSSIBLY JOHN TERRENCE PEET, SUBJECT

continued....

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[illegible] E. Myrick
AF/3

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FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

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(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 61200

TO

DIRECTOR 36997 AND 38456.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE KINSHASA STATION POUCH DETAILED DEBRIEFING REPORT PEET TRIP AND HIS CONTACTS WITH WIQUIT/1 GROUP. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE PRETORIA STATION POUCH DETAILED REPORT OF SECAROB/1 RECENT TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/AF

CAF/5

AF/2

John G. Roberts
C/EUR/COPS

E/BC/UK John G. Roberts

AF/COPS

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5. ANALYST | 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN | 11. DATE

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WICKS, ALISTAIR
201-801702
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-346685
UELA-46585
18 NOV 66
P1

SECARUB/1 SAW SUBJ SEVERAL TIMES DURING HIS LONDON VISIT NOW OFF PAYROLL AND LIVING AT 199 BICKENHALL ST, LONDON, W. 1 TEL HUN 1729. SECAROB/1 DOES NOT HAVE HIGH REGARD FOR SUBJ MILITARY CAPABILITY.

ACLAZP

R 6707191852

FILE IN 201-801702

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FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

TO Chief of Station, Kinshasa	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief of Station, Pretoria	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief Africa Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT Handwriting Analysis - Alastair WICKS	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: AZPA - 2084, 9 August 1966

Action Required: For Your Information

The letter forwarded via reference was submitted to WOACRE for handwriting analysis. The results are forwarded herewith for your information.

Jerry O. MEDLISH

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
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1 - COS, Pretoria (w/att.)

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OCT 1966

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	ACLW - 1733	21 October 1966 201-801702
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-801702

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
AF/5	E. Myrick	cjs	5032

2 AF/5
1 AF/2
1 TSD/BAB

AN/FI
~~RQ DESK~~
ABSTRACT X INDEX

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/BAB	26 Oct	John
AF/2	25 Oct 66	

OCT 25 10 AM '66

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AF/5	3 Oct	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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ACTION AF 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE VR, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/DA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6

AN K	~~FI~~	AF/5
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT		~~INDEX~~

19 Oct 66 20824

SECRET 190837Z CITE PRETORIA 5118

KINSHASA INFO DIRECTOR

SECAROB

REF: PRETORIA 5111 (IN 17694)

RE REF WICKS TOLD SECAROB/1 HE RETURNING LONDON IN THREE DAYS. ALSO REPEATED RUMOR HEARD IN SALISBURY THAT UNIDENTIFIED AMERICANS RECRUITING MERCENARIES IN SALISBURY FOR PURPOSES OF COUP TO REPLACE MOBUTU WITH BOBOZO.

SECRET

SECRET

201-801702
19 Oct 66

SECRET

12 October 1966

TSD/BAB MEMO #226-66

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, AF/5

ATTENTION : Mr. Earl R. Myrick

SUBJECT : Handwriting Analysis -
Alastair Wicks

REFERENCE : AF/5 memo dated 29 Aug. 1966

1. Attached herewith is the handwriting assessment report on subject as requested by reference. The report was prepared by Mrs. Thea Hall of this office. Any comments or criticism would be appreciated.

2. The data supplied is insufficient for further psychological assessment. If contact reports and personal observations of subject's manner and behavior become available, we could produce a more precise assessment oriented to subject's performance in intelligence activities.

William C. GOSWOOD (P)
Chief, TSD/BAB

Attachments:
Report &
h.w. sample

SECRET

[illegible]

Handwriting Assessment Report

Alastair Wicks AF

The writer seems to be a very clever individual of a high intellectual level who handles his affairs in a independent manner. Endowed with a good intelligence, he is well educated and cultured. He has not only absorbed but, also, assimilated the material he has read and studied and utilizes it in a purposeful fashion. His thinking is clear, logical and versatile. His intellectual faculties are well trained and differentiated, and, to a large extent, they support his practical talents and interests constructively. He discards superfluous matters, and, whenever possible, he deals with only the vital points in a problem or a situation. He possesses impressive mental agility with well developed analyzing and synthesizing faculties. He is quite intuitive and senses instinctively the implications of happenings around him.

He is an alert and astute observer of small details which he relates correctly to their larger aspects. Being quite resourceful, he combines imagination with sober matter-of-factness. He follows prescribed rules and regulations when absolutely necessary and, whenever possible, exercises his mental independence. He forms his own opinion and judgment and keeps his own counsel in making decisions. He may accept somebody else's suggestions that he considers suitable for his purposes but he is not actually influenced by others. At times, he may deliberately make somebody feel as if he is seeking his advice and following it, but, in reality, he does what he considers best. He is very critical and evaluates by high standards. He can be very outspoken in his criticism or he can cautiously withhold it depending on his appraisal of the circumstances. His interests cover small items of information to large size projects and operations. While he notices everything that is going on, he can concentrate on his work. When required, he can switch quickly from one task to another. His memory functions well and he can reproduce facts easily.

The writer has administrative ability on a supervisory level. Within a military setup, he could take orders as well as issue them, although he prefers the latter. He can be systematic and methodical in his approach. He can work out a blueprint of an intricate undertaking and supervise its proper execution. He will quickly and easily adapt to fluctuations in a situation and change his tactics accordingly.

He is skillful in manipulating numbers, and he can think in large terms and transactions. Apparently, he is quite interested in money, and he seems to know how to get the best possible advantage out of a financial transaction.

He possesses great facility in expressing himself orally and in writing. He can make his points palatable and can be quite convincing in his arguments. Also, he can formulate his ideas and purposes in different ways, depending on with whom he is dealing. He should have talent for learning foreign languages. He is a gifted person who will exploit his talents in line with the demands that are put before him. He also seems to have physical training and skills. He has a natural feeling for form, sound and color. He probably has developed artistic appreciation and may have an artistic hobby, possibly music.

Emotionally, the writer is complex but fairly well balanced. Innately impressionable and sensitive, he has hardened himself in the course of his life in order to be less vulnerable. He has his feelings and impulses under fairly good control and avoids being carried away by them. In his private life, though, he may tend to be somewhat excitable and irritable. He is self-centered and most interested in his personal advantage. This is a trait that he tries to cover up by being smooth and pleasing in his dealings with people. He possesses natural psychological understanding and can be very diplomatic. He manages to appear outgoing and social while basically he is quite reserved and detached. He seems to avoid emotional involvements in order to preserve his objectivity.

His appearance is poised and sophisticated, and he knows how to handle himself under different conditions. Being an independent and sophisticated individual, he has developed his own philosophy and code of ethics by which he lives. He does not seem to have any qualms about doing things that would not be conventionally acceptable. He is very broad-minded about himself and others, and he detests pettyness, even in wrongdoing. The purpose justifies the means for him as long as the transaction takes place on a large scale. He is most skillful in practicing various types of deception and he is quite adroit in manipulating people and situations. He is very active and could have "his fingers in a number of pies." He is emotionally somewhat strained, but he has sifficient stamina to support his general functioning.

The writer is apparently an unusually talented person who could function in different types of positions. He could be a military officer, a business executive, a politician, an intelligence agent or he could be a diplomat. He would not be suitable for any kind of routine work, but he is well qualified for mentally challenging assignments--the more challenging the better. He is a diligent worker who is somewhat vain in showing off his competence. He likes to demonstrate how successfully he can carry out a complicated and delicate job. When he is willing to accept an assignment, one can expect a high quality of work performance, but anybody who would expect loyalty from him would probably be disappointed.

TSH/sf
October 3, 1966

No [illegible] tion
of [illegible]
dissem[illegible] coordi-
nation with [illegible].

SECRET

29 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Technical Services Division
Behavioral Activities Branch

SUBJECT : Request for Psychological Assessment

1. Attached is a photographic copy of a letter which is being submitted to your office for analysis of the handwriting and possible psychological assessment of the writer. Unfortunately, the original of this letter is not available. Hopefully the quality of the attached copy will be adequate for your purposes.

2. If any further information is required, please contact Earle R. Myrick, Africa/5, Room 7c18, extension 5032.

Michael S. Thompson
Acting Chief, Africa/5

[illegible]

SECRET

AZPA - 2084

35 Montagu Square
London W.1.
3 July 66

Dear Willie.

I know you will have been wondering what is going on, but up to now I have not been able to say much. Briefly the story is as follows. After our talk, which confirmed my own feelings, I returned to Salisbury where in effect I said no dice with J.P. They accepted this and I suggested you for the job. I pointed out to them that quite apart from the known disparity in ability, the fact that your loyalty was known to be 100% must be worth everything in a business of this nature and that in terms of L.S.D. you were obviously worth twice as much as J.P. They said they would consider the matter. I was then told that it had been decided to get rid of J.P. one way or another and that they would like to bring you in. I told them I was very pleased but that any negotiations must be done with you direct. Finally, at a last meeting it was decided to do much more ground work — what I had been demanding from the start — and that there would be a standstill for about 2 weeks. I thereupon informed them that I would return home here as (a) I wanted to see the family and (b) I thought it was better than hanging about. I have now had a message to say there will be a delay of 2 to 3 months but that it is still definitely on. In the meantime I am to remain on full salary — to which I have no objection!

Please write to me in general terms as to whether you continue to be interested and whether you approve of the line taken on yourself. It is of course possible that you may have been contacted direct in which case I would be interested to know

Please accept my thanks to you and Phyllis for a most enjoyable stay — I do hope we didn't really keep [illegible] awake so late.

Nan sends her love to you both and hopes to see you again one of these days.

Yours, [illegible]

P.S. What news the book? Can I hammer your publishers for you?!

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1) TOTAL COPIES 7

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ACTION AF 7

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UNIT AF

TIME 1935Z

INFO FILE VR CS/DO EUR 8 CI C/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 C/OA

11 AUG 65 IN 74712

WICKS

LOND 5108

S E C R E T 111555Z CITE LONDON 5135

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, KINSHASA, PRETORIA INFO [redacted] LUMBUMBASHI,

BUKAVU, BRUSSELS

ZIBET WIQUIT SECAROB SMOTH

REF DIRECTOR 26813

[redacted] AF/5 C INDEX ABSTRACT

1. AT 11 AUGUST MEETING, SMOTH CONFIRMED THEY HAD HAD INDIRECT CONTACT WITH WICKS IN PAST, BUT THAT HE WAS UNWITTING SOURCE. CONTACT MAN PRESENTLY UNAVAILABLE, BUT THEY PLAN PUT HIM BACK IN TOUCH WITH WICKS ABOUT 17 AUGUST, IN HOPE HE CAN ELICIT INFORMATION AS TO WICKS' FUTURE PLANS, ETC.

2. MEANWHILE SMOTH HAVE ASKED SPECIAL BRANCH (DIRECTLY, NOT THROUGH JAGUAR) TO COVER WICKS, BUT TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT LOCATED HIM. WE URGED THEM TO FOLLOW UP RETURN ADDRESS ON LETTER, OFFERING MAKE AVAILABLE FLAT NEXT DOOR OCCUPIED BY FEMALE STATION PERSONNEL AS OP IF DESIRED. ONE PROBLEM IS PRESUMPTION WICKS TRAVELLED ON U.K. PASSPORT, IN WHICH CASE IMMIGRATION WILL HAVE NO RECORD HIS ENTRY OR INTENDED ADDRESS. HAVE ADDRESSEES ANY CLUE AS TO DOCUMENTATION ON WHICH WICKS TRAVELLING?

201-801702

11 Aug 1966

3. WITHOUT INDICATING ANY KNOWLEDGE FUTURE PLANNING REFLECTED REF, WE SPECULATED ALOUD AT POSSIBILITY SECAROB/1

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 LONDON 5128 SECRET

MIGHT VISIT U.K. NEAR FUTURE, SINCE HE CONTINUED BE IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH WICKS AND WAS "KNOWN INTERESTED FIND PUBLISHER FOR BOOK." BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY OBTAINING SMOTH SUPPORT FOR WOFACT CONTACT WITH SECAROB/1 SHOULD HE VISIT, BUT SMOTH WILL WANT TO KNOW AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE OF HIS TRAVEL PLANS. THIS ALSO APPLIES TO PETERS, SHOULD WE LEARN HE TO VISIT U.K. AGAIN. BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW KEEP SMOTH FULLY AND PROMPTLY INFORMED ON ALL BRITISH PLAYERS IN THIS GAME, NOT ONLY FOR USUAL REASONS BUT TO ENSURE THEY PUT OUT MAXIMUM EFFORT ON COVERING THEM.

4. WILL ADVISE SEPARATELY RE EMERGENCY CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECAROB/1.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-801702
X-REF TO FILE NO. R 201-346685
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ (81) TOTAL COPIES 39

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[redacted]

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UNIT AF TIME 1625Z BY G

INFO
FILE VR, CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, EUR 8, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/REG, CA 2, CA/PROP

PRET

11 Aug 66 IN 74584

S E C R E T 111342Z CITE PRETORIA 4955

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY KINSHASA, LONDON, ROUTINE LUBUMBASHI BUKAVU BRUSSELS

WIQUIT SECAROB

REF: A. PRETORIA 4953 (IN 74361)

B. DIRECTOR 26818*

WILL COMPLY REF B WHICH RECEIVED AFTER REF A SENT

S E C R E T

* RE LETTERS FROM WICKS AND WICKS MENTIONED COUP STILL ON AND ASKS SECAROB/1 SUPPORT.

AF/S/C

~~INDEX~~ X

SECRET

1P

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WICKS

201-801702
11 Aug 66

R 201-346685

(35)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-801701

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-346685

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1 TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

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FROM: DISSEM BY #4

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AF	1906	G

INFO: FILE VR, CS/DO, EUR8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2

LOND 5089

S E C R E T 101758Z CITE LONDON 5089 10 AUG 66 73951

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, KINSHASA INFO PRETORIA, LUMBUMBASHI, BUKAVU, BRUSSELS

1P

[redacted] [redacted] AP/5

[redacted]

ACT X

ZIBET WIQUIT SECAROB

REF A. DIRECTOR 26716

B. LONDON 5082 (OEL-45,310) (IN 73893)

C. KINSHASA 7090 (IN 72211)

MICROFILMED
SEP 2 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. HAVE DISCUSSED WICKS PRESENCE LONDON WITH SMOTH AND REQUESTED THEM ATTEMPT COVER HIS ACTIVITIES HERE ON BASIS COMMENTS REF C. PLEASE NOTE PER REF B SMOTH HAVE BELATEDLY CONFIRMED HIS INVOLVEMENT FROM SOURCE IN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT QUARTER.

2. SMESPY HAS ACKNOWLEDGED UNOFFICIALLY THAT MSOTH HAS HAD CONTACT WITH WICKS IN PAST AND IS NOW DEBATING WHETHER APPROACH HIM ON FRIENDLY BASIS STEMMING FROM PREVIOUS CONTACT OR ASK JAGUAR ATTEMPT COVER HIM FROM DISTANCE. MEETING 11 AUGUST 1130 HOURS TO DISCUSS FURTHER AND TRY HELP THEM DECIDE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER TIDBITS PASSABLE AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

ET

B. 201-346685

201-801701
10 August 1966

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO: FILE VR, CS/DO SUSPENSE, AF, CDO, EUR 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CS/SG-O, FI/SPG

6 AUG [illegible] 71600

S E C R E T 061915Z CITE PRETORIA 4941

IMMEDIATE KINSHASA PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LUBUMBASHI,
BUKAVU, BRUSSELS, LONDON, CAPE TOWN

346685

WIQUIT SECAROB

1. SECAROB/1 HAS RECEIVED LETTER FROM WICKS DATED 31 JULY RETURN ADDRESS 56 MONTAGUE SQUARE LONDON W1 SAYING WICKS HAS RECEIVED WORD THAT WICKS REMAINS ON FULL SALARY AND COUP DELAYED FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS. SECAROB/1 SHOULD REPLY IN GENERAL TERMS IF HE STILL INTERESTED.

2. SECAROB/1 NOTES HE WAS INTERESTED LISTENER TO WICKS ON 11 JULY. DID NOT TAKE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

But fixed press conf.

3. SECAROB/1 REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON CONTENT HIS REPLY TO WICKS. MEANWHILE IS MAILING WICKS LETTER TO PRETORIA.

4. ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT, POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SECAROB/1 UPCOMING DEALINGS WITH WICKS, SECAROB/1 ON 5 AUGUST RECEIVED FROM WIMARO/4 AIR TICKET TO LONDON, PROMISED WHEN SECAROB/1 LEFT CONGO, AND WOULD LIKE USE IT. THIS SUGGESTS SECAROB/1 MEETING LONDON WITH WICKS.

5. SECAROB/1 BOOK TURNED DOWN. RETURNED FROM PUBLISHER 5 AUGUST.

6. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-? ✓ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE ✓ TOTAL COPIES 22
X-REF TO FILE NO. D 7-9-11
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SECRET

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RUSSELL BY 7

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR C/EUR 4 C/CI C/CA 2 C/FI 2 C/SOD 3 C/FI/INT 2 ADDP DDP

26 JUL 65 IN 63928

S E C R E T 261255Z CITE SALISBURY 1934

DIRECTOR INFO PRETORIA LUANDA BRUSSELS LONDON LUBUMBASHI BUKAVU

RYBAT VIQUIT

REF DIRECTOR 22250 *

ERICK/1 LEARNED 25 JULY ALISTAIR WICKS LEFT LAST WEEK FOR TWO WEEK VISIT LONDON. MISSION UNKNOWN.

S E C R E T

*(REQUESTED INFORMATION ON FLATTERS OUTSIDE CONGO) ESPECIALLY THOSE IN RHODESIA

BT

WASH S/C NOTE: HQS SIGCEN NOT AUTHORIZED
AUTOMATICALLY RELAY THIS
MSG TO * LUANDA
FORWARD FORM 12 IF RELAY
REQUIRED.

SECRET

WICKS

AN FI
PS IDENT
ABSTRACT X INDEX

14-00000

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Alastair WICKS

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

4. CITIZENSHIP
?Rhodesian, South African, British

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Mercenary in the Congo

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 173910

DATE 31/7/64

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME B.A.Metcalf
OFFICE DESIGNATOR AF/5
ROOM, BUILDING 7C-18
EXTENSION 5032

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☒ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Mercenary	Congo	Aug 64-present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
Any

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CS! 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

28 July 66
DATE

TO: B. Metcalf

a3

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES. Reviewed by you 27 Jul 66.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MOSS	536	HX185	24	01	78			DFF -67223
SUBJECT		BADGE NO.	D.	MO.	YR.	TYPE	CODE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
			REQUEST DATE			CONTROL		

REQUESTER IDENTIFICATION CARD

Enclosed are the APERTURE CARD(S) for document(s) you requested.

OFFICE	ROOM	TUBE	PHONE
IP/EIS	GA10	DW7	9245

REQUESTER	SUBJECT	TYPE REQUEST
FOLTZ LINDA	MOSS	362

Form 2000a 6-63

S-E-C-R-E-T (WHEN FILLED IN)
CL. BY: 007622

SECRET

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UNIT AF TIME 1232 BY C

INFO FILE, VR, DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, CI/OPS, C/EUR 4, C/EUR 3, C/WH/SEC, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/FI/SPG, C/CA, [illegible]

R - 26

S E C R E T 150713Z CITE PRETORIA 4882

IMMEDIATE KINSHASA INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, BRUSSELS, LUBUMBASHI, BUKAVU

~~[illegible] 57345~~

RYBAT WICUIT

15 Jul 66 IN 57044

REF: DIRECTOR 19340 *

1. WICKS PHONED HOARE 14 JULY FROM SALISBURY WITH PROPOSITION HOARE TO RECEIVE 20,000 POUNDS FOR SIX MONTH CONTRACT, ETC. TASK WOULD BE COORDINATION OF MILITARY EFFORT IN KATANGA AGAINST REACTION BY ANC. RANK FULL COLONEL. HOARE STALLED AWAITING ARRIVAL MICHELL WITH REF GUIDANCE.

2. WICKS CLAIMED HE ATTEMPTING POSTPONE COUP UNTIL 27 JULY TO PERMIT RECRUITMENT ADDITIONAL MERCENARIES SO AS ELIMINATE NECESSITY RELIANCE ON PETERS. WICKS REGISTERED KENTUCKY HOTEL SALISBURY. PETERS REGISTERED PARK LANE HOTEL. PETERS PARTICIPATING IN [illegible] DELIBERATIONS ON AD HOC BASIS.

3. HOARE ACCEPTED REF GUIDANCE EVENING 14 JULY. STATED THIS CONFIRMED HIS UNDERSTANDING COYNE 1 POSITION AND HE WILL NOT ACCEPT WICKS PROPOSITION. POINTED OUT PERSONAL LOYALTY TO PUGH 2 PARAMOUNT DESPITE GLITTERING OFFER. HOWEVER HIS FINANCIAL POSITION HAS DETERIORATED RAPIDLY AND HE NOW IN NEED SOME ASSISTANCE. HOARE

SECRET

REQUESTS IF POSSIBLE SOME COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF ABOVE OFFER. HE AVAILABLE FOR ANY TASKS TO COUNTER COUP.

4. HOARE STATED IF COUP TO PROCEED 17 JULY, WICKS AND PETERS WILL RETURN JOHANNESBURG 15 JULY AND DEPART JAN SMUTS AIRPORT 16 JULY WITH FORTY THREE EX-5 COMMANDO TYPES RECRUITED JOHANNESBURG SINCE 4 JULY. PLANE WILL PROCEED TO STAGING AREA AT HENRIQUE DE CARVALLO.

5. HOARE SUGGESTED KINSHASA INFORM MOBUTU OF PLOT. IN ORDER TO HAVE INSIDE MAN NEAR MOBUTU, KINSHASA COULD SUGGEST MOBUTU SEND HOARE REQUEST VISIT HIM AT ONCE OR HE COULD GO TO MOBUTU ON OWN INITIATIVE. HOARE WOULD ASK MOBUTU DISBAND 5 COMMANDO AT ONCE IN VIEW THEIR DISLOYALTY, PETERS' RACKETS, PAYMENTS TO FICTITIOUS MEN, MURDER OF VAN OPPENS AND BURGNETT, STEALING OF PT BOAT, ETC. THIS DISBANDMENT VITAL TO MOBUTU SECURITY AND AS SAFEGUARD AGAINST REPEAT PLOT. WOULD RECOMMEND REPLACE 5 COMMANDO AND POSSIBLY 6 COMMANDO WITH NEW GENDARMERIE FORCE RECRUITED IN U.K. HOARE COULD DO THIS AND ATTEND TO INITIAL TRAINING, ETC. MOBUTU WOULD INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH OAU BY DISMISSING [illegible] MERCENARIES. NEW FORCE WOULD SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO MOBUTU. SIMILAR MARINE UNIT COULD BE RECRUITED.

6. HOARE ADDED THE MALUBA WILL REVOLT IN RETALIATION FOR KIMBA EXECUTION IF TSHOMBE SUCCEEDS. ALSO, BELIEVES UMHK FUNDS DEPOSITED

SALISBURY OR JOHANNESBURG.

3

7. MORNING 15 JULY HOARE PHONED MICHELL TO ADVISE HE TALKED TO WICKS IN SALISBURY PREVIOUS NIGHT. TURNED DOWN WICKS PROPOSITION BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. WICKS SAID PETERS HAS PULLED OUT AND IS IN LONDON. PLANNING FOR COUP CONTINUES TO PROCEED SALISBURY. TARGET DATE NOW 21 JULY. NO INDICATION ANY PLANS FOR MOVEMENT RECRUITS FROM JOHANNESBURG AS YET.

8. NO FURTHER INFO ON ROLE MALUMBA, IDENS OTHER MAJOR CONGOLESE FIGURES INVOLVED, OR DEGREE INVOLVEMENT SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN PLOT. PARTICIPATION SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA GOVERNMENTS BEING HANDLED BY SECURITY SERVICES AS INDICATED. PROOF OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION LACKING. URGE UTMOST PROTECTION HOARE AS SOURCE SINCE HIS POSITION AS U.K. CITIZEN IN SOUTH AFRICA MOST TENUOUS.

9. PRETORIA HANDLING DISSEM IN INTEL FORMAT.

SECRET

BT

CS COMMENT: *Requests Station to express to Hoare deep appreciation for ODYOKE (I) information on coup planning and forwards a number of reasons for ODYOKE policy remaining in support of a unified and stable Congo for passage to Hoare.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WICKS, ALASTAIR	201-275439
201-801702	KNSH-06462
SEX M DOB ?	13 JUL 66
	ACA -00145
CIT ?	P2

OCC ?
FORMER MAJOR IN FIFTH COMMANDO WHO
RESIGNED FROM FIFTH COMMANDO IN DEC 65.
RE ALLEGED PLANS FOR COUP D'ETAT BY FORMER
CONGOLESE PRIME MINISTER MOISE TSHOMBE
INVOLVING FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES.

R 6609221054

ACEACBAZPAHSG88CEL

FILE IN 201-201702

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
9-67

SECRET

(7-46)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Rhodesia/South Africa/Congo (L)/Zambia

REPORT NO. CS -311/03210-66

SUBJECT Additional Congo Mercenary Flights

DATE DISTR. 4 March 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 2 February 1966

PLACE Rhodesia, Salisbury

DATE ACQ. (5 February 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. AHS-1314

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) Reserve officer who obtains information from reserve officer briefings and from officials of air services. His previous reporting on mercenaries recruited and sent to the Congo has proved reliable. He is pro-U.S. He obtained this information from Captain Jack MALLOCH, head of Air Trans-Africa.

As of 2 February a total of eight mercenary flights had been completed to the Congo since the first of this year, with personnel drawn largely from Johannesburg who have been joined by small groups of Rhodesians from Salisbury. Major Alistair WICKS, former deputy commander of No. 5 Commando, is now acting as mercenary recruiting officer in South Africa. Each of the eight flights carried out by Air Trans-Africa transported 70 mercenaries. One additional flight of approximately the same number is still to be undertaken.-

1. Source Comment: Air Trans-Africa has sent one DC-4 aircraft to Zambia where it has been registered and is now engaged in the oil lift.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR

CINCMEAFSA # (Also sent London, Lusaka, Pretoria, Cape Town, Leopoldville)

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

23/4 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

WE Af/2/SA

WASH S/C NOTE: HQS SIGCEN NOT AUTHORIZED AUTOMATICALLY RELAY THIS MSG TO SLBY FORWARD FORM 12 IF RELAY REQUIRED

S E C R E T 281345Z

28 FEB 66 IN 64278

DIR INFO LEOP SLBY CITE PRET 4684 (STRAUB ACTING)

1. ASSISTANT ARMA LEOPOLDVILLE VISITED OFFICE 23 FEB PURSUANT TO ACSI REQUEST FOR BI ON MICHAEL HOARE AND ALLISTER WICKS. REQUESTED REFERENCE NUMBERS ANY BI WE HAD SENT IN SO HE COULD PASS THEM TO ACSI. TOLD HIM WE HAD NO SUCH BI, BUT RECALLED THAT PRESS HAD CARRIED CONSIDERABLE INFO ON HOARE BACKGROUND WHICH MIGHT BE AVAILABLE AT KUBARK HEADQUARTERS. AS FOR WICKS, WE UNDERSTOOD HE RHODESIAN, BUT HAD NO INFO OTHER THAN FACT HE INVOLVED IN AIR LIFT OF MERCENARIES.

2. VISITOR SAID HE PROCEEDING DURBAN AND MIGHT CONTACT HOARE WHILE THERE.

S E C R E T

CFN 4684 ARMA LEOPOLDVILLE 23 FEB ACSI BI MICHAEL HOARE ALLISTER WICKS BI ACSI NO SUCH BI INFO HOARE KUBARK RHODESIAN NO INFO DURBAN

28 Feb 66

201-346685

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE

22 DEC 64 19903

201-346285

S E C R E T 221210Z

DIR INFO LEOP CITE PRET 4577

IN 19903

1. SAW SECAROS/1 AND 2 ON DEC 17 AND 18. SECAROS/1 (S) ADVISED IS PURCHASING HOME IN PIETERMARITZBURG AND NEEDS MONEY COMING TO HIM. STATED ONLY MONEY HE HAD RECEIVED WAS $150 IN LEOP TO PURCHASE TICKET FOR WIFE. IS THIS CORRECT. IF NOT WHEN DID HE GET OTHER $55. HE RECALLED THAT EMPLOYMENT WITH KUBARK BEGAN 1 JANUARY 1965. HE APPARENTLY IS BASING THIS ON PRET 3749 IN WHICH HE POINTED OUT HAD INTENDED QUIT ON 31 DEC, HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY KUBARK LEOP TO RETURN WHICH HE AGREED TO DO. ACTUAL AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF PAY WAS 10 JANUARY 1965. UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY PLAN TO PAY HIM $9,503 LESS $150 AS TOTAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS.

2. S AGREED FOR PMPW TO REVIEW ANY PUBLICATION BY HIM. WE DISCUSSED HIS BOOK WHICH MUST BE SUBMITTED TO PUBLISHERS BY 31 MARCH. IT WILL NOT INVOLVE CONGO POLITICS AND HE WILL NOT HAVE "ONE MEAN THING TO SAY ABOUT ANYONE". WE WILL DO PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF OUTLINE AND PROGRESS OF BOOK IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS TO BE SURE THAT HE DOES NOT GET INTO FINAL STAGES WITH SOMETHING OBJECTIONABLE REQUIRING TOTAL RE-WRITE. WE WILL DO FINAL REVIEW PRIOR SUBMISSION MANUSCRIPT.

SECRET

3. HIS PERSONAL PLANS OTHER THAN URITING BOOK ARE TO SAIL TO LOURENCO MARQUES FOR UEEK THEN LATER TO MAURITIUS, AND AFTER STORM SEASON IS OVER IN 1966 TO SAIL ACROSS ATLANTIC TO UEST INDIES AND FLORIDA.

4. UE UARNED HIM THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES UAS HE TO GET INVOLVED IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS AND THIS INCLUDED ANY RECRUITMENTS, TRAINING OR ANYTHING ELSE. HE AGREED. UITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF ANY POSSIBLE FUTURE USE BY US, UE ASKED HIM IF HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE IN TRAINING MEN FOR GUERRILLA TYPE ACTIVITIES. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT. UHILE THIS DISCUSSION UAS TOO VAGUE TO PLAN ON, UE THINK HE UOULD DO NEARLY ANYTHING UE ASKED HIM TO.

5. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING RE MOBUTU'S REFUSAL TO TELL HIM GOODBY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT ASK TO SEE MOBUTU. UICKES UANTED TO SEE MOBUTU AND AFTER CONSIDERABLE URGING S UENT TO POUIS AND ASKED IF MOBUTU UOULD SEE UICKES. POUIS ANSUERED NO SINCE MOBUTU UAS VERY BUSY. POUIS TOLD S THAT HE COULD SEE MOBUTU IF HE HAD ANYTHING NEU TO TAKE UP. S REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOTHING. HE ADVISED THAT BOTH HE AND MOBUTU REGARDED THEIR LUNCHEON AFTER MOBUTU HAD TAKEN OVER AS GOODBY. UICKES UAS VERY MAD AND TOOK A BUNDLE OF PAPERS FOR MOBUTU TO SIGN IN ORDER GET TO SEE HIM. UICKES UAS REFUSED ADMITTANCE. SECAR03 UAS COMPLETELY RELAXED ON SUBJECT. COULD HE POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT UICKES IN LEOP 2863, IF NOT HE CERTAINLY HAS RECONSIDERED HIS VIEUPOINT.

6. S IS NOT INTERESTD IN RETURNING TO CONGO AT THIS TIME. UE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT HE DO SO, BUT AT SAME TIME HE DOES NOT EXCLUDE

POSSIBILITY IF NEEDED. HE STATED THAT HE DELIBERATELY MADE HIS DEPARTURE APPEAR TO BE ABSOLUTELY FINAL IN ORDER TO NOT UNDERCUT PETERS IN HIS NEW COMMAND. HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS ANY IDEA THAT HE WOULD RETURN, PETERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE MERCENARIES. HIS WHOLE DISCUSSION INDICATED THAT HE INVISIONS THAT HE MAY RETURN. S ADVISED THAT HE HAD INSURED PAY FOR THE MERCENARIES THROUGH 31 DEC BUT HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THINGS WOULD GO AFTER THAT.

7. SECARC3 WAS HIGH IN HIS PRAISE OF HIS CASE OFFICER WHOM HE REGARDED AS VERY HELPFUL AND REGRETTED NOT BEING ABLE TO BID FAREWELL TO COS LEOP.

8. AS AN ASIDE, S CAUTIONED THAT WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE LEOP'S VIEW THAT MOBUTU WAS FRIENDLY TO KUBARK IS WRONG. HE STATED THAT HE HAD HEARD MOBUTU TALK TOO OFTEN FOR THERE TO BE ANY DOUBT THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE KUBARK. S HAS NO IDEA WHAT THE BASIS OF THIS DISLIKE IS AND THINKS THAT IT IS PROBABLY A COUNTER-REACTION TO THE GREAT SERVICES THAT KUBARK HAS RENDERED TO THE CONGO. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A PECULIARITY OF MOBUTU'S CHARACTER.

9. S DOES NOT AT ALL EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY TSHOMBE BECOMING ONE OF MOBUTU'S MINISTERS. HE SAID THAT MOBUTU HAS BEEN ACCEPTING SOME ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FROM TSHOMBE. AS TO KASAVUBU, S FEELS THAT HE ALSO MIGHT AT A LATER DATE BECOME A MINISTER UNDER MOBUTU EVEN THOUGH HE APPEARS TO BE FINISHED AT THIS TIME. HE BELIEVES THAT A COMBINATION OF MOBUTU, TSHOMBE AND KASAVUBU WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE CONGO.

10. S'S SON HAS COMPLETELY RECOVERED, HOWEVER, S HAS HAD A SEVERE ATTACK OF MALARIA.

USDAO Document - not listed
DATE: 11 December 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FILE CLASSIFICATION: Not listed

SUBJECT: Not listed

THIRD AGENCY

STATE DOCUMENT A 180
DATE: 18 Nov 65 FROM: AMCONGEN JOHANNESBURG
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
FILE NO: NOT LISTED
SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN MERCENARIES IN THE CONGO

THIRD AGENCY

14-00000

0 SEP 65 (When Filled In)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

37

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 1 14425-13 TDCS 314/13362-65

DATE OF INFO. 27 SEPTEMBER 1965 DISTR. 28 SEPTEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

SITREP AS OF 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (27 SEPTEMBER 1965) REF IN 61285

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL ARREST OF TWO SOMALIS IN ALBERTVILLE. FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 3936

THIS IS AN ALBERTVILLE SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1965 BY CAS.

1. ON 27 SEPT 1965 A COLUMN OF THE FIFTH COMMANDOS (5 CDO) REACHED LULIMBA AND WAS PREPARING TO MOVE TOWARDS LUBONDJA ON 28 SEPT. THIS COLUMN LED BY MAJOR ALISTAIR WICKES HAD 3 OF ITS MEN WOUNDED DURING THE MOVEMENT FROM BENDERA TO LULIMBA (SOURCE: PILOT DEBRIEFING. CONGOLESE AIRFORCE AIRCRAFT HAVE HAD THE ONLY CONTACT WITH THE FIFTH CDO SINCE 26 SEPT).

2. ON 27 SEPT, CONGOLESE AIRFORCE PILOTS OBSERVED A 5 CDO [illegible], WHICH LANDED [illegible] OF BARAKA, ENTERING BARAKA. THIS SAME

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SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE [✓ OCR] ORR OO EXO

14-00000

SECRET IN [illegible] TDCS 314/13902 [illegible] PAGE 5

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE CONGO) CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT ELISABETHVILLE LONDON BRUSSELS BUKAVU BUJUMBURA DAR ES SALAAM [illegible]).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

UNIT WAS LATER SEEN LEAVING BARAKA APPARENTLY WITH THE INTENT OF UNLOADING BARGES WHICH WERE ARRIVING NORTH OF BARAKA. (SOURCE: PILOT DEBRIEFINGS).

3. ON 27 SEPT A FATAC C-47 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED IN ALBERTVILLE TO SUPPORT THE ANC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE CONGOLESE REBELS NORTH OF ALBERTVILLE. THIS AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED TO RESUPPLY ISOLATED UNITS AND TO DROP SURRENDER LEAFLETS. FOUR, 7 TON TRUCKS, HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO OPS SUD TO CARRY SUPPLIES FROM ELIZABETHVILLE TO ALBERTVILLE (SOURCE: LT COL HARDIENNE PRINCIPAL ADVISOR TO OPS SUD).

4. ON 25 SEPT 1965 THE TOWN OF LUSANGI FELL INTO REBEL HANDS. NO DEFINITE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE AS TO THE SIZE OF THE ATTACKING FORCE OR THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE DEFENDING ANC TROOPS. (SOURCE: HARDIENNE).

5. ON 27 SEPT 1965 TWO SOMALI CITIZENS WERE ARRESTED AT THE HOTEL DULAC, IN ALBERTVILLE. THIS HOTEL SERVES AS THE PRINCIPAL BILLET FOR THE EUROPEAN ADVISORS TO THE ANC IN ALBERTVILLE. THE SOMALIS PAPERS WERE FOUND TO BE IN ORDER AND THEY WILL PROBABLY BE RELEASED ON 28 SEPT.

6. ON 27 SEPT 1965, THE OPS SUD ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS PLANS TO MOVE TO BENDERA AT THIS SAME TIME THE NINTH COMMANDO BATTALIONN IS TO MOVE FROM LULIMBA TO MAKUNGU AND KATSHOKA. TWO DAYS LATER THE FIFTH INF BN IS TO COMMENCE ITS ADVANCE FROM BENDERA TO MAKUNGU, KATSHOKA, YUNGU AND KABIMBA. (SOURCE: HARDIENNE).

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: AF C/D

FROM: C/BARTVILLE

ACTION:

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☒ ☐

TIME: 1640

BY: D

INFO: FILE, VR. SOD6

S E C R E T 271641Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO LEOP ELIZ CITE ALBV 0252 [illegible] 41050

SECAROB

REF ALBV 0267 (IN 40706)

1. MAJOR WIKES FIVE CDO XO RETURNED FROM LEOP AND REPORTED TO SECAROB-1 AND TROOPS AT FULL MUSTER FOLLOWING:

A. GENERAL MOBUTU EAGER SEE FIVE CDO PROBLEMS SOLVED.

B. NEW FIVE CDO PAY SYSTEM HAS BEEN EFFECTED WHERE PAY [illegible] FROM LEOP DIRECTLY TO A JOBURG BANK THUS COMPLETELY [illegible] BRUSSELS. THIS SYSTEM SAID WIKES WOULD PERMIT VERIFICATION OF PAY TRANSFER WITHIN FEW DAYS.

2. SECAROB-1 THEN COMMENTED TO TROOPS HE WAS COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH RESOLUTION OF PAY PROBLEM AND IT WAS TIME TO GET ON WITH THE WAR. ALL HIS TROOPS HAVE APPARENTLY ACCEPTED NEW DEAL. MORALE APPEARS GOOD.

3. SECAROB-1 THEN CONFIRMED HIS SATISFACTION PRIVATELY TO MAZUTIS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0252 0267 MAJOR WIKES CDO XO LEOP SECAROB-1/)&-634-) .97757 [illegible] SECAROB-1 MAZUTIS

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

2 SECRET

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FROM ALBERTVILLE

ACTION AF ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF

TIME 1020

INFO

FILE VR CI/OA SOD 6 FI FI/INT

S E C R E T 271140Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO LEOP ELIZ CITE ALBV 0260

SECAROB 27 Aug 65 IN 40746

REF DIR 38395

1. REF MESSAGE PASSED TO SECAROB-1 (E1) BY MAZUTIS AT 1100Z, 27 AUGUST. S1 AGREEABLE WAIT AND TAKE NO FINAL ACTION UNTIL GUTHMAN RETURNS.

2. MAJOR VICKES DUE ALBV 1400Z, 27 AUGUST WITH REPORT HIS LEOP MISSION CONCERNING PAY QOSOLVE (AS RCVD). S1 INTENDS REPORT THIS WORD TO TROOPS IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. WILL ADVISE IMMEDIATE S1 AND TROOP REACTION.

S E C R E T

CFN 0260 38395 SECAROB-1 S1 MAZUTIS 1100Z 27 S1 NO FINAL GUTHMAN MAJOR VICKES ALBV 1400Z 27 LEOP QOSOLVE AS RCVD S1 S1

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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43 SECRET

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FROM
LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
AF 7 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT AF TIME 1245

INFO
FILE VR, SUSPENSE AF, CSDO, ADDP, WE 8, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, FI/SPG, IW

S E C R E T 261352Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY ALBV CITE LEOP 0776 (LAMPRIGHT ACTING)

SECAR08

40041

25 Aug 65 IN 40041

1. COL WILLIAMS INFORMED STATION THAT ON MORNING 26 AUGUST LOGIEST AND MAJOR WICKES HELD MEETING WITH MOBUTU RE 5TH COMDO PAY PROBLEM. AFTER ARRANGING FOR LOAN FROM DIRECTOR NATIONAL BANK NDELE, MOBUTU CALLED IN PAY MASTER AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS PAY SOME, UNSPECIFIED, PORTION OF OUTSTANDING PAY IMMEDIATELY. WICKES THEN WENT TO BANK TO INSURE THAT TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO JOHANESBURG WAS MADE. WILLIAMS FELT THIS ONLY STOP GAP MEASURE AND PROBLEM LIKELY COME UP AGAIN IN A FEW WEEKS.

2. WILLIAMS ALSO SAID THAT 80 MERCS KILLED SO FAR IN CONGO AND GOVT OBLIGATED PAY FAMILIES ONE MILLION BELGIAN FRANCS FOR EACH DEATH. ALTHOUGH CONGOLESE BUDGETED FOR DEATHS THEY DID NOT BELIEVE DEATH RATE WOULD BE SO HIGH.

3. WILLIAMS INFORMED HIS REP ALBV 26 AUG TO NOTIFY HOARE. WICKES HAS PROBABLY NOTIFIED HOARE DIRECTLY.

4. PLS PASS ABOVE TO GUTHMAN.

SECRET

SECRET SECRET IN 40041 PAGE 2

CFN 2776 COL WILLIAMS 26 LOGIEST MAJOR WICKES MOBUTU RE 5TH COMDO
NDELE MOBUTU VICKES JOHANESBURG WILLIAMS A WILLIAMS 80 MERCS
ONE MILLION BELGIAN FRANCS CONGOLESE NTR BELIEVE WILLIAMS ALBV
26 AUG HOARE WICKES HOARE PLS GUTHMAN
BT

SECRET

14-00000

27 AU 65 [illegible] 73

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

TDCS 314/1658-65

DISTR. 26 AUGUST 1965

DATE OF INFO. 25 AUGUST 1965

SUBJECT

REVERSAL OF HOARE'S DECISION NOT TO
RESIGN HIS COMMAND AND LEAVE THE CONGO

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (25 AUGUST 1965)

REF TDCS-314/[illegible]-65

IN 39572

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM LT. COL. MICHAEL HOARE.

1. ON 25 AUGUST 1965 LT. COL. MICHAEL HOARE, CO OF THE MERCENARY FIFTH COMMANDO, STATED THAT HE HAS NOW DECIDED THAT IF PAY PROBLEMS ARE NOT SETTLED TO HIS SATISFACTION BY 27 AUGUST, HE WILL GO TO LEOPOLDVILLE ON 29 AUGUST AND TENDER HIS RESIGNATION DIRECTLY TO PREMIER TSHOMBE. SHOULD TSHOMBE NOT INSTITUTE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO AMELIORATE THE FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS, HOARE SAID THAT HE WILL LEAVE THE CONGO ON 2 SEPTEMBER. HOARE SAID THAT HIS PRIDE NECESSITATES CARRYING THROUGH THE THREATS HE HAS MADE TO RESIGN.

2. HOARE ALSO STATED THAT HE HAS INFORMATION THAT HIS SECOND IN COMMAND, MAJOR ALISTAIR WICKS, HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO STEP INTO THE BREACH SHOULD HOARE MOVE OUT OF THE PICTURE. FURTHER, HOARE STATED THAT ON 25 AUGUST, 19 MEN MUTINIED OVER THE QUESTION OF ONE OFFICER BEING SACKED. HOARE HAS PLACED THESE MEN UNDER ARREST AND IS SHIPPING THEM TO

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

DIA/NMCC S/OCI 2

CINCMEAFSA

STANLEYVILLE AND OUT OF THE CONGO. (FIELD COMMENT: THE FOREGOING APPEARS TO BE PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HOARE'S SUDDEN REVERSAL OF HIS POSITION REGARDING RESIGNATION.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE CONGO) CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE, ELISABETHVILLE, BUKAVU, LONDON, BRUSSELS)

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

19

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) 14309-168

TDCS - 314/11599-65

DATE OF INFO. 21 AUGUST 1965

DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1965

SUBJECT

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (21 AUGUST 1965)

REF IN 37310

FIELD REPORT NO. ACA 29

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM LT. COLONEL MICHAEL HOARE.

1. ON 21 AUGUST 1965, LT COL MICHAEL HOARE, CO OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO, STATED HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MAJOR GENERAL MOBUTU TO THE EFFECT THAT MOBUTU PLANNED TO COME TO ALBERTVILLE 24 AUGUST TO DISCUSS FIFTH COMMANDO PAY PROBLEMS. HOARE NOTED HOWEVER THAT MOBUTU FREQUENTLY DID NOT KEEP HIS PROMISES AND THEREFORE HOARE WAS SENDING HIS DEPUTY, MAJOR ALISTAR WICKS, TO LEOPOLDVILLE. WICKS ON 23 AUGUST WILL PRESENT MOBUTU WITH PAY AUTHORIZATION FORMS FOR MOBUTU'S SIGNATURE. HOARE SAID IF MOBUTU OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS HAD NOT SIGNED THE PAY AUTHORIZATIONS

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
D/OCI 2 CIA/NMCC

AND ARRANGED FOR TRANSFER OF MONIES BY 27 AUGUST, THEN HE WOULD HAVE TO INFORM HIS MEN THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHEN THE PROBLEM WOULD BE RESOLVED.

2. HOARE FURTHER STATED THAT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE TO GIVE HIS MEN PROMISES AND HAD TOLD THEM HE WOULD HAVE A DEFINITE ANSWER ABOUT THEIR PAY BY 28 AUGUST AT THE LATEST. HOARE COMMENTED THAT HE EXPECTS A LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN IF THE PAY AUTHORIZATIONS ARE NOT SIGNED, AND HE CANNOT HONESTLY TELL THE MEN THAT MONEY WILL SOON BE DEPOSITED TO THEIR SOUTH AFRICAN ACCOUNTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY (ATTACHE COMISH) CINCMEAFSA. ALSO SENT LONDON BRUSSELS ELIZABETHVILLE BUKAVU.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

[illegible] 3010

SECRET

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4		8	

ACTION [illegible] ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ [illegible] ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT AF TIME 2110 BY DO

INFO FILE [illegible]

20 AUG 65 IN 36553

S [illegible] #153

CORRECTED COPY

[illegible] ELIZ CITE ALBV [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] ON HIS RETURN ALBV 19 AUGUST REPORTED THAT [illegible] HAD STATED THAT IF SI DEMANDS RE PAYMENT OF [illegible] WERE NOT MET IN NEXT SEVEN DAYS AND HE DECIDED TO LEAVE [illegible]

[illegible], THAT [illegible]

"PULL OUT COMPLETELY ALSO".

[illegible] DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE BUT SI DEFINITELY UNDER [illegible] THAT SHOULD HIS DEMAND NOT BE MET THEN THE US WOULD [illegible] TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. IN ADDITION [illegible], SI TOLD [illegible] AND NOTED IT WAS TOP SECRET.

[illegible] IF THE PAYMENT OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES [illegible] PROBLEM AND COULD RESULT IN DIS- [illegible] IT, COULD NOT COVERT FUNDING BE CONSIDERED [illegible] IS DEVISED BY THE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: Albertville

ACTION: C/AF 4

☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI, [illegible]

TIME: 1548

BY: g

CORRECTED COPY TO FOLLOW

S E C R E T 191300Z

PRIORITY LEOP DIR INFO ELIZ CITE ALBV 0240

RYBAT [illegible]

20 AUG 65 IN 36558

1. [illegible] B-1 [illegible] ON [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ 19 AUGUST REPORTED THAT [illegible]MISH COL WILLIAMS HAD STATED THAT IF SI DEMANDS FOR PAYMENT OF SALARIES WERE NOT MET IN NEXT SEVEN DAYS AND HE DECIDED TO LEAVE THE CONGO, THAT "THE AMERICANS WOULD PULL OUT COMPLETELY ALSO".

2. ALBV FINDS THIS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE BUT SI DEFINITELY UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT SHOULD HIS DEMAND NOT BE MET THEN THE USIHZBZU USE THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. [illegible] TO WITHDRAW [illegible] AND NOTED IT WAS TOP SECRET.

3. [illegible] IF THE PAYMENT OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO MERCENARIES [illegible] A CONTINUING PROBLEM AND COULD RESULT IN DIS[illegible] [illegible] UNIT, COULD NOT COVERT FUNDING BE CONSIDERED AT LEAST ~~AS LONG~~ UNTIL A WORKABLE PAYMENT SYSTEM IS DEVISED BY THE CONGOLESE. REALIZE POLITICAL PITFALLS INVOLVED BUT IDOVE TOTALLY INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE FIFTH COMMAND IN CONGO, SOONER OR LATER THIS ~~THE~~ POSSIBILITY MIGHT HAVE TO BE FACED.

S E C R E T

[illegible] IN 36558 Pg 2.

CFN 0240 SECARO3/1 SI ALEV 1
3:9.8 [illegible] (2598 [illegible] I RE NOT MET

CONGO AMERICAN SI NOT BE US KEIGHLORD SI MAJOR WICKS A NOT COVERT

A CONGOLE [illegible] CONGO

BT

1000 2 JUL 65 SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

14-57-187 2

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/SOUTH AFRICA

TDCS -314/09208-65

DATE OF INFO. JUNE 1965

DISTR. 1 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

DEVELOPING CONFLICT REGARDING UTILIZATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FIFTH COMMANDO

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, ALBERTVILLE (29 JUNE 1965)

REF IN 03075

FIELD REPORT NO. ACA 2

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER FROM MAJOR ALISTAR WICKES, ACTING COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE FIFTH COMMANDO.

1. ON 29 JUNE 1965 MAJOR ALISTAR WICKES, TEMPORARY CO OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FIFTH COMMANDO (5CDO) CITED BITTERLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SIXTH COMMANDO PERSONNEL FROM ALBERTVILLE AND ADJACENT AREAS AT THE TIME OF THE ARRIVAL OF ADVANCE PERSONNEL OF THE (5CDO) IN EARLY JUNE 1965. HE STATED THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS MAKING IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO RESPOND TO LOCAL CONGOLESE ARMY (ANC) REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IN THE ALBERTVILLE AREA. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO INSTRUCTIONS FROM LT. COLONEL MICHAEL HOARE, (5CDO) CO WHO NOW IN SOUTH AFRICA PREPARING TO RETURN TO THE CONGO WITH APPROXIMATELY 200 NEW RECRUITS.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC

2. WICKES PLACED THE BLAME FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE (5CDO) ON BELGIUM INFLUENCE AND MACHINATIONS AND NOTED THAT HOARE WOULD BE EXTREMELY DISPLEASED WITH DEVELOPMENTS. THE AGREEMENT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE (5CDO) TO ALBERTVILLE HAD NOT BEEN PLANNED TO INCLUDE SUPPORT TO ANC GARRISONS IN THE AREA BUT ONLY FOR TRAINING OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND THE IMMEDIATE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY THRUST INTO FIZI BARAKA AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY COMISH (ATTACHES), CINCMEAFSA.

(ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE, ELISABETHVILLE)

END OF MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NUMBER 2821007965
DATE: 2 JUNE 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Allistair
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO: NOT LISTED

SUBJECT: PROBLEMS AFFECTING 5th Bde Operations,
Northern Congo

THIRD AGENCY

WICKS, Alistair

W

26 April 1965 AFRICA

Olenga Statements on Army Progress

Cairo MENA in Arabic 1920 GMT 25 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Cairo--Passing through Khartoum (en route to Cairo--ed.), General Olenga issued a statement saying that the forces of the Congolese revolutionary army are in control of the front adjacent to the Sudanese borders and that the liberational army is moving freely in the area that falls under the control of the revolutionaries.

In his statement, Olenga said that the forces of the liberation army are in control of the left bank of Stanleyville and that the Simbas will occupy the eastern bank of Stanleyville at the appropriate time.

The statement says that the liberation army forces have foiled Tshombe's attempts to carry out elections in the main Congolese towns and adds that the two aims of the liberation army are to get rid of imperialist domination in the country and to impose the authority of the people before September 1965. The statement also affirms that the morale of Tshombe's forces and that of the mercenaries has fallen.

General Olenga and Mr. Kanza will hold contacts with officials in Cairo to explain to them the recent developments in the Congo.

REBELS SAY EMISSARIES SENT TO TALK WITH TSHOMBE

London REUTERS in English 1224 GMT 25 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Cairo--Four Congolese insurgent emissaries have been sent to Leopoldville for talks with Prime Minister Moise Tshombe on a peaceful settlement of the Congo problem, an insurgent source said here today. The source said the emissaries had been dispatched by the president of the "Congo National Liberation Committee," Bocheley-Davidson, who is now in Cairo.

The source said that because of divisions in the insurgent ranks, the Sudanese Government had informed them it could no longer allow the transport of arms or equipment through its territory to their forces. The source also said the UAR Government had told the insurgent leadership it was ceasing arms shipments and cutting off financial help because there was no evidence of a united insurgent government.

CIA FBIS 27 Middle East,
Africa & West Europe
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SALISBURY SOURCE CONFIRMS HOARE'S RESIGNATION

Paris AFP in French 2230 GMT 23 April 1965--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Text) Salisbury, 23 April--Major Mike Hoare, commander of the number five unit of South African mercenaries serving the Leopoldville Government, has turned in his resignation, an unimpeachable source of Salisbury has confirmed. Major Hoare, nicknamed "mad" [illegible], will undoubtedly leave the Congo together with his adjutant, Major Allistair [illegible] of Rhodesia, and perhaps most of the 300 men in his unit. Their last six-month contract expires 1 May, anyway.

FORM 3010

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INFO VR. FILE C CI/OPS CI/OA FI

S E C R E T 031341Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO DIR CITE PRET 4123 3 MAY 65 IN 57771

REF: LEOP 6591 (IN 57003)

1. SECAROB/2 (S/2) AND BABY LEFT FOR DURBAN AFTERNOON 3 MAY. STAYING AT MOTEL EVENING 3 MAY AND ARRIVING DURBAN 4 MAY. WICKS HAS BEEN CALLING S/2'S MOTHER BUT NO ONE INCLUDING HER MOTHER KNEW WHERE SHE WAS. SHE WELCOMED REF AND WILL CALL WICKS FROM DURBAN.

2 FYI: ADVISE S/1 THAT S/2 IS DELIGHTED HE STAYING ON. SHE REALLY FEELS THAT FOR HIS OWN HAPPINESS HE MUST SEE JOB THROUGH.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

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UNIT

TIME

BY

S E C R E T 011700Z

PRIORITY PRET INFO DIR CITE LEOP 8591

1 May 65 IN 57003

SECAROB

REF: A. PRET 4117 (IN 56425)

B. LEOP 8589* NIY

SECAROB/1 (S) WAS INFORMED THAT WIFE AND BABY STAYING WITH PUBH. S MOST APPRECIATIVE. ASKED THAT WIFE BE TOLD HE DUE TO RETURN PROBABLY AROUND BEGINNING JUNE FOR ONE MONTH LEAVE. ALISTAIR WICKS WILL FILL IN S WIFE ON S CURRENT SITUATION. PER REF B, WICKS LEFT ON LEAVE 30 APRIL, TO CONTACT S WIFE IN DURBAN. S EXPECTS WICKS WILL LEARN SHE IN PRET AND WILL CONTACT HER WITHIN NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.

S E C R E T

file

*CFN NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC AS OF 1520, 1 MAY 65.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NUMBER 2821004865
DATE 26 Feb 65
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: 5th Commando Personnel

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GROUP 1

020525 Intelligence Information Cable

136[illegible]-66

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) TDCS -314/01625-65

DATE OF INFO. THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY 1965 DIST. 9 FEBRUARY 1965

SUBJECT

MERCENARY ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (4 FEBRUARY 1965) REF IN 73954

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 40,338

AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN, EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING AND RELIABLE, FROM ALISTAIR WICKS."

1. MAJOR MIKE HOARE, COMMANDER OF 5 COMMANDO, CONGOLESE GOVT MERCENARY FORCE, TOGETHER WITH HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALISTAIR WICKS, RETURNED TO STANLEYVILLE AREA OF CONGO TO RESUME OPERATIONS DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF JANUARY. THEIR RETURN FOLLOWED FURTHER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRESIDENT TSHOMBE DURING WHICH TSHOMBE ACCEPTED RECOMMENDATIONS PUT TO HIM IN STRONG TERMS BY HOARE AND ASSURED HOARE OF HIS CONFIDENCE IN HIM.

2. THE MERCENARY FORCE LEADERS WERE CONFIDENT THEY COULD NOW DEAL WITH THE NORTHERN CONGO SITUATION PROVIDED THE 300 ADDITIONAL MERCENARIES, WHOSE ENGAGEMENT TSHOMBE HAS ACCEPTED, ARE BROUGHT INTO

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SECRET [illegible]

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC

ACTION AND PROVIDED THE FORCE IS EQUIPPED WITH A MINIMAL NUMBER OF HARD-SKINNED VEHICLES. THESE ARE REGARDED BY THE FORCE COMMANDERS AS INDISPENSABLE IN THE FACE OF IMPROVED ARMAMENT WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPLIED THE REBEL FORCES AND WHICH HAS ALREADY INFLICTED UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES ON MERCENARIES USING CONVENTIONAL TRANSPORT.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT LEOPOLDVILLE PRETORIA BRUSSELS KHARTOUM ELISABETHVILLE CAPE TOWN).

(END OF MESSAGE)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NUMBER: 1821001665
DATE: 28 Jan 65
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO. NOT LISTED

SUBJECT: Visit to Kamina Base on 25 & 27 January 1965

SECRET C Hoare

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

No. 0602163

TO

Chief, Africa Division

FROM

Chief of Station, Leopoldville

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	USE
	French language version of report pouched under TM 0602162	

DATE 24/1/65

SIGNATURE

Teresa J. BELGREDAN

SECRET

C.D.L.

Date : dimanche 24 janvier 1965

A la suite de l'invitation de Latz, j'ai donc rencontré le colonel Hoare, en présence de John Latz et du major WICKS (ou WEEKS), dans la chambre du colonel au Memling.

VICKS

Hoare m'a expliqué qu'il souffrait d'un manque de liaison avec Tshombe lorsqu'il (Hoare) se trouvait en opérations et que bien souvent il était obligé de revenir à Léo pour traiter directement avec Tshombe. Je lui ai suggéré de laisser en permanence un officier à Léo, parlant français, officier bien sûr qui aurait toute sa confiance.
Hoare m'a répondu qu'il n'avait pas d'officier à lui répondant à ces exigences; mais qu'à son retour de congé il avait appris que l'on avait désigné un officier belge, le capitaine [illegible], pour servir d'agent de liaison entre Tshombe et lui. Il m'a demandé mon avis sur cet officier que Latz et moi connaissions très bien.

([illegible] est le mari de l'ancienne secrétaire de Tshombe, Monique [illegible]; durant la sécession katangaise, il travaillait au Ministère de l'Information à Elisabethville où il se distingua par sa totale incompétence. Revenu à Léo en août 64, il a attendu en vain que Tshombe lui trouve une fonction. En désespoir de cause, il s'est engagé à l'A.N.C. où il a reçu le grade de capitaine - je suppose qu'il est lieutenant de réserve à l'armée belge).

Je n'ai pu que répondre que je considérais ce choix comme peu judicieux.

Hoare m'a alors demandé si, en cas où il aurait des problèmes importants à traiter avec Tshombe et qu'il ne pourrait revenir lui-même à Léo, si j'acceptais qu'il m'envoie un de ses officiers pour traiter avec moi et que j'en réfère ensuite à Tshombe. J'ai évidemment accepté.

Hoare m'a encore confirmé l'arrivée des 325 mercenaires.

SECRET

22 [illegible] 64940

[illegible]

[illegible] INFO PRIORITY [illegible] CITE [illegible]

(IN 6[illegible])

[illegible] TAPE CANNOT REACH [illegible] IN TIME FOR TALKS WITH SEGAROD/1 [illegible] FOLLOWING IS FILL-IN ON REF BASED ON TAPE REF AND FOLLOW- [illegible] TOTAL INFO FROM TAPE WHICH WILL NOT BE FORWARDED.

[illegible] PARA 2 REF, THREE [illegible] ARE CARLOS HUYGHE, PETER [illegible] MICHEL [illegible]. ALL [illegible] DISCUSSED BY [illegible], [illegible] FIRST TIME HUYGHE [illegible] WITH [illegible]. IN BALANCE OF [illegible] CONFUSED IN THAT TWO GERMANS INVOLVED. WE PROBABLY MISSED [illegible] TWO WHILE CHECKING MACHINE ANSWERING TELE- [illegible]. "[illegible]", [illegible] AGENT IN CONGO WITH [illegible]", IN [illegible] GERMANY. [illegible] INFORMED PRI- [illegible] ACTIVITIES. [illegible] OFFICIAL AND GIS REP [illegible] IS FRIEDRICH WILHELM [illegible], [illegible] TO S/1 BY HUYGHE. [illegible] MEN FOR [illegible] STATION. HAS THUS FAR [illegible]. LATTER WELL QUALIFIED [illegible] UNIT. [illegible] S/1. SECOND IS TO [illegible] BASE AT [illegible]. THIRD IS PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

[illegible], [illegible] WILL PRODUCE [illegible] NEWSLETTER FOR MERCENARIES AND DEPENDENTS. THIS OFFICE WILL BE RUN BY JOHN LATZ. FOURTH PRIORITY ITEM WILL BE SETTING UP OF LIAISON OFFICE IN JOHANNESBURG, WHICH IS REASON FOR S/1 RETURN TO SOUTH AFRICA IN TEN DAYS. IT [illegible] BRIDGE WILL OCCUPY THIS SLOT. WE NOT CLEAR WHETHER [illegible] THESE RECRUITS AND USE EXISTING MEN HE HAS ENOUGH TO SET UP ADMIN STAFF.

4. AMERICAN MISSIONARY PARA 6 REF IS MRS. KLEINSCHMIDT, WHO [illegible] YEARS CONGO AND STATIONED ADI, LEAVING VIA ARU AND JUBA [illegible]. SHE SAYS THAT CONTRARY TO GENERAL BELIEF, ARMS LANDED [illegible] FORMER AIRFIELD ARE NOT TRANSSHIPPED TO ARUA. INSTEAD [illegible] BY CAR, BICYCLE AND FOOT DIRECT TO ADI OVER ROAD NOT SHOWN [illegible]. SHE SUSPECTS THAT CHIEFS RESIDENCE IN ADI USED AS AMMO DUMP. (ACCORDING S/1 KLEINSCHMIDT IS ALL-ROUND EXPERT ON NORTHEAST [illegible]. WE HAVE ADDRESS AND CAN DEBRIEF FURTHER IF DESIRED. SHE [illegible] STATES MARCH 65).

5. S/1 APPROACHED BY MAJOR CHARLES KEARNEY, EX SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE, (SAAF) ON 23 JAN. KEARNEY, WHO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ON [illegible], OFFERED TO TAKE OVER "21 SQUADRON" AND TO OBTAIN [illegible] STAFF AND EQUIPMENT FOR IT "UNOFFICIALLY" FROM SAAF. [illegible] STAFF WOULD BE GIVEN LEAVE TO ENABLE THEM TO JOIN MERCENARIES. IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER KEARNEY HAD AUTHORITY MAKE THIS OFFER. [illegible] NO COMMITMENT TO KEARNEY, AS THIS WOULD BE MOBUTU DECISION. [illegible] POINTED OUT SA INVOLVEMENT WAS POLITICAL DYNAMITE, AND SUGGESTED S/1 DISCUSS FURTHER WITH HQS. S/1 AGREED.

SECRET

USARMA Document # 88945
DATE: December 1964
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: Confidential
FILE N.: Not Listed From: Leopoldville

SUBJECT: Not listed

USARMA Document 06615
DATE: 23 January 1965
SUBJECT: WICKS, Alister
CLASSIFICATION: Confidential
FILE #: Not listed FROM: Leopoldville

SUBJECT: Not listed

THIRD AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REPORT NO. 2821017164
DATE: 30 May 64
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO. NOTLISTED

SUBJECT: 21st Support Squadon

THIRD AGENCY

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INFO VR, FILE, [illegible] FI, FI/D, FI/INT, [illegible] 6, CI/OA, [illegible] SUSPENSE 2

S E C R E T 191715Z 19 Oct '64 ??

PRIORITY LEOP INFO ELIZ DIR CITE PRET 3602 IN 95557

REF: LEOP 4037 (IN 95176)

1. BY LETTER TO MRS. PUGH DATED 8 OCTOBER SECAROB/2 ADVISED SHE IN EXCELLENT CONDITION. SHE WAS CONFINED TO BED WEEK PREVIOUS LETTER DUE TO USUAL "HEART BUSINESS" BUT OTHERWISE EVERYTHING IS GOING EXCELLENTLY. DOCTOR CONFIRMS THIS AND ADVISES THAT BABY SHOULD ARRIVE ABOUT 17 NOVEMBER. LETTER NOT CLEAR ON FOLL POINT BUT APPARENTLY DOCTOR HAS REQUESTED SECAROB/1'S BLOOD GROUP. PLS ADVISE IF POSSIBLE.

2. SECAROB/2 RECEIVED CALL FROM JOHANNESBURG 6 OCT FROM DES BARNES, WHO SAYS HE IS IN CHARGE JOHANNESBURG OFFICE AND THAT PATRICK O'MALLEY HAS BEEN RELIEVED. BARNES WAS SENDING DONALD GRANT TO SEE SECAROB/2 ON 7 OCT BUT HE DID NOT ARRIVE. ASK SECAROB/1 FOR BACKGROUND ON BARNES AND GRANT.

3. FOLL INTELL IN SECAROB/2'S LETTER WHICH LEOP CAN USE OR KILL. DIFFICULT TO SOURCE HERE PLUS FACT MAY BE OUTDATED BY MORE RECENT

SECRET

INFO. "AS OF 25 SEPTEMBER PAY WAS BIG PROBLEM OF MERCENARIES, INCLUDING SECAROB/1 HIMSELF. FOUR MERCENARY COMMANDO UNITS ARE THE FIELD. THEY ARE LOCATED AT BUKAVU, LISALA, GEMENA, INGENDE. THERE ARE THREE LEFT AND ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR ONE HUNDRED MORE MEN. THESE MEN WILL ARRIVE SOON AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM ARE BEING MADE BY SECAROB/1 PERSONALLY, SINCE ALISTAIR WICKS AND PATRICK O'MALLEY HAVE MADE SUCH A MESS OF PREVIOUS RECRUITING. THE MERCENARIES ARE GENERALLY IN GOOD SPIRITS AND SECAROB/1 ESTIMATES THAT THE REBELS WILL BE SUBDUED IN ABOUT SIX WEEKS IF HE IS ALLOWED TO USE HIS JUDGEMENT IN FIGHTING. SECAROB/1 BELIEVES THAT THE BELGIANS ARE NOT ANXIOUS FOR THE WAR TO BE OVER TOO SOON AS THEY ARE BUILDING UP ANOTHER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THE CONGO WITH DOZENS OF OFFICERS AND MEN RUNNING HEADQUARTERS AND LOGISTICAL TEAMS."

SECRET

4-00000

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

COUNTRY CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) TDCS [illegible]-64

DATE OF INFO. 5 SEPTEMBER 1964 DIST. 8 SEPTEMBER 1964

SUBJECT
1. CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF MERCENARIES AT KAMINA BASE.
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF MERCENARIES AT THE BASE
3. FRICTION BETWEEN HOARE AND [illegible] ([illegible])

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (7 SEPTEMBER 1964) REF IN 69548

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2001

A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (F), FROM AN EX-KATANGESE MERCENARY (C), FROM HOARE.
APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS OPINIONS);
3 (THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS).

(Possibility of Mobutu-led coup against PM Tshombe)
(Much dissatisfaction w/ Mobutu in Army)

1. ON 5 SEPTEMBER 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MAJOR MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT WHILE STILL IN ALBERTVILLE EARLIER THAT WEEK HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU TO CANCEL ALL IN-COMING DRAFTS OF MERCENARIES. HOARE IMMEDIATELY SENT TELEGRAMS TO PATRICK O'MALLEY IN JOHANNESBURG AND ALASTAIR WICKS IN SALISBURY TO STOP RECRUITING. ON 3 SEPTEMBER, HOARE FLEW FROM ALBERTVILLE TO KAMINA BASE, WHERE ON 4 SEPTEMBER HE MET WICKS, WHO ARRIVED ABOARD A DC-3 WITH 32 MEN JUST AS HOARE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR LEOPOLDVILLE. WICKS EXPLAINED THAT HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS HAS ARRIVED TOO LATE;

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AS/CI 2

THAT THE MEN HAD ALREADY SIGNED CONTRACTS; AND THAT BY 7 SEPTEMBER THERE WOULD BE A TOTAL OF 700 MERCENARIES AT KAMINA: 440 ALREADY THERE, 260 TO ARRIVE. (FIELD COMMENT: A MERCENARY ROLL CALL FROM KAMINA BASE DATED 30 AUGUST SHOWED A TOTAL STRENGTH THEN OF 216.)

2. HOARE DESCRIBED THE GENERAL LEVEL OF THE MERCENARIES AT KAMINA AS "EXCEPTIONALLY GOOD". SOME 20, HE SAID, HAVE BEEN WEEDED OUT AND SENT BACK FOR VARIOUS PHYSICAL DEFICIENCIES. THE REST ARE YOUNG, ADVENTUROUS AND EAGER. THERE IS ONE PLATOON OF 25 PARATROOPS, "EXCELLENT SOLDIERS." HOARE FOUND THE QUARTERS ASSIGNED HIS MEN UNSATISFACTORY AND TOOK OVER THE LARGEST AND BEST BUILDINGS ON THE BASE: THREE BUILDINGS BUILT AROUND A QUADRANGLE AND, HE SAID, EASILY DEFENDED IF NEED BE. HOARE ADMITTED THAT THE EQUIPPING AND ARMING OF THE MERCENARIES IS GOING VERY SLOWLY. HE HAD MANAGED, HOWEVER, TO GET EACH MAN A RIFLE AND AMMUNITION; MOST EQUIPMENT COMES FROM BELGIUM.

3. DURING THE MORNING OF 5 SEPTEMBER, HOARE SAID, HE SAW COLONEL FREDERIC VANDERWALLE, MILITARY ADVISER TO CONGO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE. VANDERWALLE, WHO ACCORDING TO HOARE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO BE PLEASANT, GREETED HIM WITH, "WHY DON'T YOU OBEY INSTRUCTIONS; I SAID, NO MORE MEN. HOARE SAID THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE FELT THE MATTER SHOULD BE TAKEN UP DIRECTLY WITH MOBUTU. HOARE, VANDERWALLE AND BELGIAN AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN THEN MET WITH

MOBUTU. WHEN MOBUTU ASKED THE SAME QUESTION, HOARE REPLIED, "YOU ASKED FOR 1,000 MEN. I HAVE GOT THEM, AND I CAN'T STOP NOW. WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO?" MOBUTU REPLIED, "WE CANNOT EQUIP OR ADMINISTER 1,000 MEN AT ONE TIME. YOU MUST REDUCE YOUR UNIT TO 250 MEN AT ONCE."

4. AFTER RELATING THE ABOVE, HOARE COMMENTED THAT HE BELIEVED THE DECISION TO REDUCE THE MERCENARY FORCE IS MOBUTU'S AND VANDERWALLE'S. HE THINKS THAT MOBUTU FEARS THAT THE 1,000 MEN AT KAMINA BASE WOULD BE LOYAL TO TSHOMBE PERSONALLY "IN THE EVENT OF AN UPHEAVAL." ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY "AN UPHEAVAL", HOARE SAID THERE WAS "EVERY POSSIBILITY" OF A "COUP DE FORCE" AGAINST TSHOMBE, ENGINEERED BY MOBUTU WITH THE SUPPORT OF CHIEF OF STATE JOSEPH KASAVUBU. AT THE SAME TIME, DISSATISFACTION WITH MOBUTU IS COMING TO A HEAD WITHIN THE ANC, AND THERE IS "SOME POSSIBILITY" OF AN OFFICERS' UPRISING AGAINST HIM.

5. HOARE CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING THAT THE ANC/COMMAND SEEMS TO HAVE "NO HEART" IN WHAT IT IS TRYING TO DO. FORCES ARE TOO THINLY SPREAD, AND LEADERSHIP IS INADEQUATE. VANDERWALLE IS "NO TACTICIAN, BUT BASICALLY WEAK, UNSURE OF HIMSELF, TECHNICALLY INADEQUATE AND TOO EASILY INFLUENCED, PARTICULARLY BY A CERTAIN (FNU) WATTIER, THE HEAD OF A SMALL GROUP OF BELGIAN MERCENARIES." (SOURCE (EX-KATANGA MERCENARY) COMMENT: HOARE AND VANDERWALLE ARE OBVIOUSLY

SECRET

AT LOGGERHEADS AND DISAGREE ON PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING.

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, PRETORIA, ELISABETHVILLE, SALISBURY)

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY LEOP CITE PRET 3498

REF: DIR 46470

1. ASSUME YOU DO NOT WANT RECAPITULATION ALL REFERENCES ON THIS SUBJECT. GENERALLY PUREN AND MERCENARIES WHO WERE RECRUITING HERE PRIOR TO THE RETURN TO CONGO HAD NO MONEY BUT WERE ALWAYS EXPECTING BIG TRANSFER FROM TSHOMBE. EVIDENCE THIS IN SECAROB DIARY REFERRED TO PRET 3476 IS STATEMENT REGARDING TSHOMBE'S 18 JULY CABLE TO PUREN "CASH CASH TSHOMBE OWES HIM ABOUT SIX THOUSAND POUNDS". AT ANOTHER POINT IN DIARY AFTER TSHOMBE HAD TOLD SECAROB PROCEED WITH BUILDING UP MERCENARIES, SECAROB NOTED "TOLD HIM WE MUST HAVE THE CONTRACT BY NOON FRIDAY SO THAT MY MEN COULD RETURN TO SALISBURY AND JOHANNESBURG TO BRING UP THE SMALL ARMY. RATES OF PAY MUST BE FINALIZED, NO TICKET NO LAUNDRY". AT ANOTHER POINT "MEANWHILE HAVE HAD FIFTEEN THOUSAND POUNDS TRANUFERRED TO JOHANNESBURG TO PAY FOR AIR CRAFT REPAIRS, TRAVEL TICKETS, MEN'S PAY ADVANCES, ETC." AT ANOTHER POINT HE NOTED THAT HE WAS SENDING O'MALLEY TO JOHANNESBURG AND NICKS TO SALISBURY BUT "THEY WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR MY OKAY" I.E. SIGNING OF CONTRACT. SEE PRET 3476 RE SENDING JULIA (PUREN) JOHANNESBURG WITH THE MONEY. IN VIEW ABOVE PLUS PREVIOUS DISSEMS WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE THAT TSHOMBE IS PAYING MERCENARIES.

SECRET

2. [illegible] [illegible] CABLE THAT MERCENARY RECRUITING HAS BEEN [illegible] IN SOUTH AFRICA. THIS MEANS THAT THOSE WHO WILL BE SIGNED UP [illegible] WILL BE FROM APPLICANTS PRIOR 2 SEPT. IT DOES NOT [illegible] [illegible] MERCENARIES WILL GO FROM SA BUT SHOULD RESULT [illegible]IZING [illegible] THE PUBLICITY ORIGINATING IN SA. WOULD SUMMARY NEWS STORY PRIME MINISTER'S SAYING RECRUITMENT GETTING OUT OF HAND AND SHOULD BE STOPPED UNLESS ETC. PLUS INDICATION RECRUITS BEING TAKEN FROM IMMIGRANTS BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE TO TSHOMBE OR IS THIS AVAILABLE.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CABLE NO. 171
DATE: 31 Aug 64
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
FILE NO.: CONTROL 26155

SUBJECT: SR MARCENARIES

THIRD AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CABLE NO. 26128
DATE: 28 August 1964
SUBJECT: WICKS, ALISTAIR
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
FILE NO.: CONTROL: 24529

SUBJECT: NOT LISTED

THIRD AGENCY

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, AF	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, Leopoldville Chief of Base, Elizabethville		MARKED FOR INDEXING ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Pretoria		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
O SECAROB Diary

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are photostatic copies of first two installments of SECAROB's Diary which was furnished by Mrs. SECAROB.

2. Most of this is of value only as background since it had already been reported. We will cable the intelligence in future installments if it has not already been reported.

HENRY V. PUGH

ATTACHMENT:
Photostatic copies of diary

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Chief, AF
1 - COS, Leopoldville
1 - COB, Elizabethville

1 Attach

CS COPY

201-346685

Date Typed: 28 August 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	AZPA-1685	[illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-346685

DIARY

A resume of the first 22days.

[illegible] 40 men to Jan Smuts airport prepared to leave for Leo at 7.30 pm on the evening of Fri 24th July. Owing to a last minute hitch – no clearance of security for Rhodesian Air Services DC 4 the carriers – we did not take off. Following morning clearance came from Salisbury but a call from Leo (Puren) told us to stand by until further orders as Tshombe was on tour and no decision had been taken.

I left for Leo on the evening of Sat 25th July. Met at the airport by Puren and Vicks. No visa trouble when we showed the telegram – the one Tshombe sent Puren on 18th July (arrived 20th–) saying come at once avec tout personnel tous arrierees [illegible] regles. The last part must have done Purens heart good as Tshombe owes him about £5000 he says.

Booked in at the Hotel Memling, Leo and met Dave Sutherland, Errol Kingman, Jerry Hodges, Peter Mackintosh, all of them are pilots. I am regarded as a pilot. The press were keen on to us and we made a pact with them; no mention of our presence and we give them the news when it breaks.

A whole week passed when Tshombe was still on tour in Kivu and Stan and then returned only to go to [illegible] for a day. Despite utter frustration we were completely ignored by the Palace and no message reached us. Meanwhile we tried every scheme to reach Tshombe mostly via the kitchen door, but without luck. Dave Sutherland sensing a frost returned to Joburg on 23th.

Met a friend of a friend of mine on Monday 27th .
Another week passed during which we met dozens of dignitaries none of any great importance. [illegible], close to Tshombe, has his ear as a result of past ,loyalties in Madrid and now expecting the Ministry of Information presently held by [illegible] Ministre. Typical of many such who are here to collect. Herbert Fauntleroy Julian, see Time Mag. 7 Aug. here to collect 24,000 dollars from Tshombe left after 21 days without seeing him. General [illegible] now out in the cold down to Colonel protesting loudly that he always faced the front, not like others by telephone. [illegible] scar on his face caused by Jeep accident. A spent force. Ex Katanga Minister Kibwe also [illegible] now small beer. Met Minister [illegible] from Katanga tells me no currency left in the till in Eville. Waited 1 6 days to see T and left without seeing him. Tshombe overworked and understaffed. Country being run by three men – Tshombe Mobutu and Munongo in that order. Decisions made clearly at the top but lack implementation for lack of staff.

Met Munongo. Not quite the firebrand he was in Katanga 61 but still a powerful and ruthless man quite capable of forming a secret police on the Russian pattern. Somehow feel he is doing this already.

Invasion at Mushie near [illegible] by 300 soldiers of ex Colonel Pakassa a terrorist ex Kindu responsible for the murder of the Italian airmen

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Attach #1
HZPA 1685

201-346683

Leo calm but Army dealt with the matter quickly, capturing documentary proof in [illegible] that these rebels are Chinese assisted and based in Brazza. Fizzled out but Tshombe made capital of it and gave out to the world that he warned neighbouring countries of meddling in Congo's affairs.

Situation on all fronts deteriorating rapidly. Feel terrible frustration because not [illegible] off. [illegible] and after weeks of inactivity know that Tshombe will still want a rapid result. He needs a major success soon desperately. Stanleyville falls and Paulis threatened. Rebel advances in Katanga as far as Kabongo NE of Kamina Base and west as far as Luluabourg. In Katanga Jeunesse march on Manono and sack the town including Geomines mess and all the factories and mines. Mitwaba threatened. In the East Baudouinville retaken by ANC and an advance begun on Kapona.

Morale in the ANC at its lowest ebb. Recently ANC motored into battle in the Kivu area "in reverse" gear, literally. Another time Mobutu personally took command and was left high and dry when his men deserted him, and saved only by a timely Captain shouting "forward men if only to save your general". Despite this Mobutu still not disenchanted with his army.

Journalist of a German paper visited Albertville and told me he had seen Soumialot. Town occupied by large number (1000 possibly?) Jeunesse and even boys of 12 and 14 were armed. S. tired and looking beaten. No contact with his "friends". European hostages numbering about 200 (I think this exaggerated) free to roam around town but not to leave. S. has threatened that if white mercenaries are used against him he will chop the lot. [illegible] Belgiques. Clever move and the fact that there are over 700 Belgian civilians in the Congo has forced the Belgians to forbid the use of their troops. Harriman Spaak pact apparently states that no Americans and no Belgians to be used, but western world plainly anxious for the mess to be cleared up. Military situation not desperate despite what it may look like on a map. Essential realise the average villager is a peaceful man wanting only a quiet life. Whoever bears arms will force him to side with them and provide food and even men. When the tide turns the same thing applies. The hard core rebels have to be rooted out and destroyed. The retaking of towns will look spectacularly like success but the manner in which ANC performs its occupation duties will be the acid test. At the moment they are a miserable failure. Munongo told me he had resuscitated Kongolo with 8 tons food and 35m francs. Three days later after a battalion of ANC had been moved in by Mobutu (opposing Munongo's suggestion of Katangaise) the village was deserted again, no money and no food, ANC had run riot killing and looting and raping. Some fun. Here lies the root cause of the trouble in rehabilitation.

Gerry and Julian (Gerry's wife) had tea with Munongo on Sunday 9th. I was invited but feel Gerry outmanoeuvred me for some reason.

However gave me detailed account of the [illegible]. [illegible] understand why Tshombe has not called us yet, suggests pressure of other business. Says he will [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] this week and let the world press know that SA [illegible] and [illegible] are the Congos real friends. Says he can prove Algerian, Ethiopian and Ghanaian troops are in the [illegible] fighting. I wonder. Certainly the rebels are well armed [illegible] because they are using the arms left by ANC when they ran away. Fantastic story that there was a move afoot to quarter the Congo into four separate sovereign states and that he and Tshombe would welcome it. Bitter about broadcast made by [illegible] head of Int Red Cross in which he asked the nations of the world to [illegible] [illegible] and to recognise his government.

Just as I was beginning to lose heart Tshombe made his decision. Sent for me 0930 TUESDAY Aug. Bring the men at once, see Gen Mobutu. Saw Mobutu. Anticipated some resistance to the idea but fears totally unfounded. [illegible], charming, efficient, powerful. Back to Tshombe to finalize details of contracts, rates of pay etc. Appointment for [illegible]. Red carpet all the way. Car at our disposal, laisser passer, everything.

Next day - nothing. Spent the entire day in the hotel waiting to be called. Whole damn thing is positively medieval.

Next day, Thursday sense of urgency restored to Mobutu and Tshombe and red carpet laid out again. Saw Tshombe twice and drank beer with him in the evening whilst he discussed his escape from Kipushi in 1962! Very convivial but too tired to finalize our contracts. Tomorrow at 10. Meanwhile Mobutu getting anxious and has done what he can. Alerted General Bobozo who is waiting for me in Kamina. I am to fly there tomorrow DC 6. Assures me all materiel, transport, planes etc are there. Complet autonomie d'action Major pour vous. I got him to say it three times to make sure I had not misheard him. No Belgians, mon general. D'accord. Thank God for that. Force Aerienne to be under my command 15 pilots, chef des pilots Puren. Jerry took it very well but I do not intend to play a heavy role there. Got my task from Tshombe personally - give me back the Congo, Manono Kabalo Nyunzu Albertville Uvira and [illegible] - waving a fat hand and laughing. T looks fit despite sleeping very little. Eyes shining a smile for everybody. A diplomat in the world [illegible]. Told him we must have the contract by noon Friday so that my men could retrun to Salisbury and Joburg to bring up the small army. Rates of pay must be finalised, no ticket no laundry. He laughed Get as many white troops as I want he said. I told him we would begin with 200.

Friday: today. Waited all morning for Tshombe and Mobutu! Finally

DIARY

15th August 64.

Hedges and MacKintosh arrived at lunch time from Luluabourg. Their first mission has been a miserable failure so far. Two Harvards took off yesterday at 1340 to blast the rebels at a point outside L where they are threatening to overwhelm an important ANC training establishment where we understand the ANC have run away and left valuable equipment. When approaching L this morning Kingman came down with the wind and piled up the Harvard on the dirt at the side of the run way breaking one wing, a wheel and jerking off two of the guns in their nacelles. Gerry then sent Hedges and Mac back by Air Congo and stayed behind with Kingman to complete the mission today in theother Harvard

Summoned to the Palace at 1300 hrs. Mobutu arrived at 1335 and we gave him the pro forma contract we had prepared for the enlistment. Ushered in to the presence 1930 hrs. Present Munongo, Tshombe, Mobutu, Lindaka (Security Minister), Julia and myself. Tshombe mad as hell with Julia. Why does it take five visits to get the smallest thing fixed etc. Julia answered him back.

Finally put a straight question to me - was I satisfied with the Katanga contract of 1961, yes or no. I said Yes but owing to the Cost of living expected higher rates. Tshombe pointed to the Index clause and said that took care of the devaluation of money. I insisted on a written contract which they drafted and signed there and then. Have orig. Next Mobutu very agitated wanted to know why was I not in Kamina where Gen Bobozo was waiting for me and why were the SA men not there as promised today? Explained. Now a bombshell from Tshombe. How long would it take to bring one thousand men? 1000. I said a month. Get them aussi vite que possible. Outlined tactical position. Must crush the rebels, now, now, and smashing fist on table. Mobutu then drew map on table and showed me the position. Took piece of paper and wrote down my orders. First - Manono, Kongolo, Albertville, Uvira. Next Bukavu. Next Stan. Gave me 6 Group Mobile units, 200 in each unit, ANC, asked me to keep one of my platoons with each group. Can it be done he asked. Replied yes, if you give me the materiel and force aerienne. Agreed to everything. Stayed and had supper with Tshombe. Told him how Churchill had called Wingate and told him to conquer Burma - you are my man of destiny said Churchill. Now you command me to give you the Congo, I am your man of destiny. He was visibly moved and shook me warmly by the hand followed by the [illegible]. Tshombe said you will succeed. I have great confidence in you, I [illegible]. I was deeply moved myself that fate should have chosen an insignificant man such as me to be their instrument to reshape the Congo and perhaps leave a mark on Africa for many a decade; possibly even keep it free of communism and all its

General told me to wait at the hotel as they were busy with the agenda for Soapy Williams who arrived early this morning. Will see me this evening at 1800 hrs. Meanwhile have had £1500 transferred to Johannesburg to pay for aircraft repairs, travel tickets, mens pay advances, etc and arranged for [illegible] to go to Joburg with O'Malley (who arrived here 7 days ago at my request) and [illegible] to go to Salisbury. Priority must now be given to getting the men quickly to Kamina Base.

Gerry beside himself with excitement today. Tshombe has given him a special mission. Nobody else will do it. Two Harvards to strafe a position near Luluabourg. Details when they get to a field near there. Saw them off at lunch time. Hodges and Mackintosh in one, Puren and [illegible] in the other still wearing civilian clothes, no helmets, no parachutes and what look like pretty rough kites. Puren has plenty of guts but little judgement. I hope he gets through OK. Task will take three days.

2200 hrs.

Soapy Williams has taken up T's time since 1500 hrs and we have been waiting ever since. Have the money but the contracts have not been OK'd. In the (interdistance) am sending O'Malley to Jo'burg 0030 Al Italia with Wicks on to Salisbury. They will have to wait for my OK. If all goes well tomorrow [illegible] will fly to Jo'burg via [illegible] (that on the we live in) & business can begin on Tuesday. Latest Wednesday. I am expecting first lift of 50 men within 7 days. Received £100 each (3 of us) in [illegible] being advance pay.

Attach #1
HZPA 1685

201-341685

Left the palace after longest interview yet - 2 hrs.

Flying Kamina first flight in army plane. Issued instructions for the recruitment 1000 men immediate.

Sending J[illegible] Joburg tomorrow via Brazza with the money.

Everything now depends on speed recruitment.

Wrote Buys for assistance on security side. If this can be eased even slightly recruitment will be easier.

Coming Joburg myself in army plane in about 8 days time. Must find 15 signallers capable of working [illegible] net over 600 miles otherwise I am done. May try army. May try Americans but must have them absolute no priority. Prefer latter chaps if it can be done sub rosa. Will contact friend I know for opinion.

Attach #1

HZPA 1685

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY [illegible]
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

201-346[illegible]

WICKES, ALASTAIR

201-801702

SEX M DOB 17 NOV 17

SRHO

CIT RHODESIA

OCC MERCENARY

REF KNSH-06803, 25 JUL 66

TYPE NAME T

OCC CODE ?

OI CODE ?

< REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

XRef

AKA WICKS, ALAISTAIR.

AKA WYCKS, ALAISTAIR.

AKA WICKS, JAMES ALISTAIR /MAJ/.

ONE OF THE MERCENARYS INVOLV IN PLOT JUL 66 TO OVERTHROW MOBUTU.

138038

007007003A01A08ACE- 6607281822

WICKS, ALASTAIRS

201-346685

SEX M DOB ?

PRET-04882

15 JUL 66

CIT ?

OCC ?

< RHODESIA, SALISBURY

ONE OF PLOTTERS IN JULY 1966 PLANNED COUP TO OUST MOBUTU. REGISTERED AT KENTUCKY HOTEL, SALISBURY. SEE FILE 7-9-11, FOR ADDL INFO.

138540

AE1028ACEAC8 6608121628

WICKS, /MAJ/

007-009-011

SEX M DOB ?

DEF -02128

26 FEB 65

CIT ?

DEFENSE

OCC ?

P2

MBR HQS DETACHMENTS.

SUBJ ON PERSONNEL ROSTER FOR THE 5TH COMMANDOS AS OF 17 FEB 65. MOST PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN NEWLY RECRUITED IN SO AFRICA AND SO RHODESIA, ALTHOUGH BY NATIONALITY THEY COME FROM MANY DIFFERENT COUNTIRES IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

Hard copy requested

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

138536

6504231579

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION: IW (COPY ISSUED TO IW AT: 1940, 12 AUG BP)

INFO: DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, CA/O 4, AF 17, WE 6, VR.

TDCS-314/01482-64

AUG 12 2324Z 64 IN 49806

S E C R E T 122000Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO IMMEDIATE PRET ELIZ PRIORITY BRUS SLEY STRI

ROUTINE PARI CITE LEOP 2411 (BLANDA[1] ACTING)

INTEL WITHUNDER SECAROB

SUPDATA: PHLEGAR[2] FROM SECAROB[3]. DEFER PRET ON PASSAGE TO SMOTH[4].

NO INDEX. FILED: 122000Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ACL-2788. CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/SOUTH AFRICA/SOUTHERN RHODESIA

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FROM TSHOMBE AND MOBUTU FOR CONCENTRATION OF 15 MERCENARY PILOTS AND 200 MERCENARY GROUND TROOPS AT KAMINA; PRESUMED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN; PREPARATIONS.

DOI: 11 AUGUST 64

PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE 12 AUGUST 64

APPR: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY

IW COMMENT:

CSDO: PLS PASS TO SIG CENTER FOR ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION.

Passed to T/C 2155 12 Aug - BP

AF/REG	4	TDCS PRECEDENCE	
AF/[illegible]	2		ROUTINE
AF/345/RE	5	x	PRIORITY
AF/[illegible]	1		
AF/2/RE	5		

RELEASING IWO:

W. Stecler Bass

W. STECLER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
13 AUGUST 1964
0148Z

BASED ON: ACL 2788
WITHUNDER; NP/SECAROB

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECR

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO:

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2

IN 43806

TDCS

REFLECT TH FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM)

SOURCE: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B), FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C), FROM HOARE.

S/C NOTE: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO SLBY HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH. SIG. CEN. A RELAY REQUEST ON FROM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

IN COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

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LIAISON:

SECRET

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

TDCS -314/01482-64

DATE OF INFO. 11 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 13 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

INSTRUCTIONS OF TSHOMBE AND MOBUTU FOR CONCENTRATION OF MERCENARIES AT KAMINA; PRESUMED PLAN OF CAMPAIGN; PREPARATIONS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (12 AUGUST 1964)

REF

IN 49806

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM A FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE.

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2788

APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM) *

— 1. ON 11 AUGUST 64, EUROPEAN MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT AT 0915 HOURS THAT SAME MORNING, PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE HAD SENT A CAR TO PICK UP HIM AND MERCENARY AIR COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND WIFE, FOR AN 0930 APPOINTMENT. THEY WAITED UNTIL 1000 HOURS AND THEN SAW TSHOMBE FOR "EXACTLY FOUR MINUTES". THIS WAS HOARE'S FIRST INTERVIEW WITH HIM SINCE ARRIVING IN THE CONGO ON 25 JULY. THE GIST OF WHAT TSHOMBE SAID WAS, "HOW SOON CAN YOU BRING YOUR MEN IN? THIS IS VERY URGENT, AND WE WANT YOU IMMEDIATELY." (FIELD COMMENT: THE MENTION OF "YOUR MEN" IS OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO OTHER EUROPEAN MERCENARIES STANDING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

AD/CI 2

STATE/FO

WH SIT ROOM	DIRNSA(PROD WO)	STATE
CNO(OP922Y)	DFI/ACSI	NIC
DIA CIIC	JCS	AFSSO

(OCI)

BY TO COME TO THE CONGO.) TSHOMBE THEN WROTE A PASS IN HIS OWN HAND AND SENT HOARE AND THE PURENS IN A STAFF CAR TO SEE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU. HOARE COMMENTED, "WE RECEIVED RED CARPET TREATMENT ALL THE WAY."

2. THEY SPENT HALF AN HOUR WITH MOBUTU, DURING WHICH PERIOD TSHOMBE TELEPHONED, TO MAKE SURE THEY WERE THERE AND TO TELL THEM TO REPORT BACK TO HIM AFTER THEIR TALK WITH MOBUTU. HOARE SAID THAT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING MOBUTU WAS "CHARMING AND MOST COOPERATIVE, AGREEING TO EVERYTHING." HE APPEARED "MORE ENTRENCHED THAN EVER" AND "IN FULL CONTROL (SIC) OF THE SITUATION."

3. MOBUTU SAID THAT HOARE, THE MERCENARY PILOTS AND 200 ADDITONAL MERCENARIES ARE TO BE FLOWN TO KAMINA. MOBUTU THEN TOLD PUREN HE COULD HAVE 15 PILOTS. PUREN IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED A LIST OF SEVEN PILOTS WHO HAD BEEN WITH HIM IN KATANGA IN 1961 AND ARE NOW WAITING IN LONDON AND BRUSSELS. TO HOARE'S SURPRISE, MOBUTU QUICKLY STARTED PUTTING THROUGH LONG-DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALLS " AND IN TWO HOURS THE JOB WAS DONE." THESE SEVEN, PLUS THE THREE NOW IN LEOPOLDVILLE (JAMES HEDGES, ERROL KINGMAN AND PETER MACKINTOSH), PLUS PUREN, LEAVE FOUR STILL NEEDED. PUREN IS SENDING TO JOHANNESBURG FOR THEM. HOARE COMMENTED THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE SIX T-6'S AVAILABLE IN LEOPOLDVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE A MISTAKE. FOUR ARMED T-6'S ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE FROM LUANDA ON 8 AUGUST,

BUT THEIR CONDITION IS UNCERTAIN SINCE PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT THEY HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. EIGHT MORE ARE EXPECTED FROM LUANDA. THERE ARE ALSO SIX T-6'S SUPPLIED BY THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. THESE LATTER ARE NOT ARMED; THE FIRST ONE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED AND READY TO FLY DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING 9 AUGUST.)

4. MOBUTU OFFERED HOARE THE RANK OF MAJOR, WHICH HE ACCEPTED WITH THE PROVISO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BELGIAN OF SUPERIOR RANK IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. AS AGREED WITH MOBUTU, THE COMMAND LINE WILL RUN FROM TSHOMBE TO MOBUTU TO MAJOR-GENERAL LOUIS BOBOZO TO HOARE; AND THE WHOLE FORCE WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANC. HOARE SAID HE HAS CHRISTENED THE OPERATIONAL UNIT "FIVE COMMANDO-ANC." BOBOZO, HE ADDED, IS NOW WAITING FOR HIM AT KAMINA; AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, WILL BE FLOWN THERE ON THE NIGHT OF 12 AUGUST. HOARE SAID HE IS PREPARING A LIST OF THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HE WILL NEED AND CLAIMED THAT MOBUTU AGREED, "WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO," THAT THE LIST COULD BE AMENDED AFTER HOARE HAD PERSONALLY CHECKED OUT THE SITUATION.

5. HOARE SAID THAT THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS HE SEES THEM ARE TO BE MANONO, KONGOLO AND ALBERTVILLE. HE PLANS TO SEND PATRICK O'MALLEY, WHO ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE ON 8 AUGUST OSTENSIBLY AS A JOURNALIST BUT ACTUALLY ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, BACK TO JOHANNESBURG ON 12 AUGUST "TO GET ON WITH RECRUITING, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT

ON A SATISFACTORY CONTRACT." (FIELD COMMENT: SEE ACL-2764 ( ) FROM THE SAME SOURCE FOR AN EARLIER REFERENCE BY HOARE TO O'MALLY AS HIS "CONTACT MAN" WITH THE MERCENARIES ON CALL IN JOHANNESBURG.) HOARE WANTS THE FIRST PLANELOAD OF MEN FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO ARRIV AT KAMINA BY 17 AUGUST AND THE BALANCE WITHIN 10 DAYS. HE PLANS TO SEND WICKS TO SALISBURY ON 16 AUGUST TO RAISE 30 MEN THERE.

6. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT, HOARE SAID THAT THE ONE USED IN 1961 IS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY AS A MODEL FOR A NEW ONE AND WILL HAVE TO BE AMENDED IN "CERTAIN RESPECTS". ONE NEW CLAUSE THAT HOARE INTENDS TO HAVE INCLUDED IS THAT HE MUST BE ABLE TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT "ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT." HE ADDED THAT HE FORESEES NO DIFFICULTY WITH MOBUTU ON THIS SCORE.

7. AFTER THE INITIAL HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH MOBUTU ON THE MORNING OF 11 AUGUST, HOARE AND THE PURENS RETURNED TO SEE HIM AT 1530 HOURS THE SAME DAY. MOBUTU WAS JUST THEN LEAVING TO SEE TSHOMBE, AND THE GROUP FOLLOWED. THEY WERE KEPT WAITING UNTIL 1900 HOURS WHILE MOBUTU AND TSHOMBE CONFERRED IN PRIVATE. WHEN THEY WERE FINALLY RECEIVED, THEY PRESENTED MOBUTU WITH AN ESTIMATE OF EXPENSES TO BE INCURRED WHICH HE READ OVER AND APPROVED.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

14-00000

#31

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

TDCS DB-315/00489-64

DATE OF INFO. 17-20 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 21 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

1. EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF 40-60 MERCENARIES AND THE PROJECTED ORGANIZATION OF THE MERCENARY STRIKING FORCE
2. PLAN FOR ATTACK ON ALBERTVILLE AND SUBSEQUENT OBJECTIVES
3. COOPERATION FROM BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISORS TO ANC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (20 AUGUST 1964) REF

IN 57075

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B); FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C), FROM HOARE. APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE'S STATEMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS VIEWS AND THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM).

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2822

1. ON 20 AUGUST '64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT MRS JEREMIAH PUREN, WIFE OF THE MECENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER, HAD ARRIVED IN JOHANNESBURG FROM LEOPOLDVILLE ON 17 AUGUST WITH THE CONGOLESE GOVT FUNDS NEEDED TO PROCEED WITH MERCENARY RECRUITING. ALTHOUGH HOARE HAS HAD NO NEWS OF HER MOVEMENTS SINCE THEN, HE CONFIDENTLY EXPECTS THE FIRST DRAFT OF MERCENARIES, BETWEEN 40 AND 60 OF THEM, ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, TO ARRIVE AT KAMINA BASE FROM JOHANNESBURG ABOARD A RHODESIAN AIR SERVICES FLIGHT ON 21 AUGUST. SOME OF THEM WILL HAVE BEEN RECRUITED IN JOHANNESBURG, SOME IN SALISBURY. BILLETS, EQUIPMENT AND

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE OCR EXO

DC AD/CI

SUPPLIES ARE READY FOR THEM. HOARE HIMSELF PLANS TO FLY TO KAMINA EARLY ON 21 AUGUST. ON ARRIVAL THERE, HIS FIRST TASK WILL BE TO SET UP A HEADQUARTERS CAPABLE OF HANDLING AN INFLUX OF UP TO 100 MEN AT A TIME.

2. HOARE THEN SAID THAT HIS PRESENT PLAN IS TO FORM FIVE COMMANDOS OF 100 MERCENARIES EACH (COMMANDOS "A" THROUGH "E"). EACH IS TO HAVE AN ARMORED SPEARHEAD IN THE FORM OF A "FERRET" OR OTHER LIGHT ARMORED CAR; AND ALL COMMANDOS WILL HAVE TO OPERATE UNDER HOARE'S CONTROL, SINCE HE HAS NO ONE ELSE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING SUBORDINATE COMMAND AT THIS TIME.

3. HOARE SAID HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE IS ALBERTVILLE, WHICH HE PLANS TO TAKE FROM THE LAKE. HE HAS CHRISTENED THE ATTACK "OPERATION WATCHCHAIN" AND HAS DISCUSSED IT IN DETAIL WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU AND WITH COLONEL GUY LOGIEST, RANKING BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISER TO THE ANC. MOBUTU, ON 19 AUGUST, CONCURRED FULLY IN THE PLAN AND SAID ALL NEEDED SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ONCE. HOARE THEN ASKED HIM FOR RECONNAISSANCE PLANES, FOR USE IN THE ALBERTVILLE AREA, WHICH BELGIAN OFFICERS HAD REFUSED HIM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO KAMINA. MOBUTU GAVE HIS AGREEMENT TO THEIR USE. ON 20 AUGUST, LOGIEST "ENTIRELY APPROVED" OPERATION "WATHCHAIN". HE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS WITH HOARE THE CRITICAL SITUATION OF THE BELGIANS IN ALBERTVILLE, WHERE SOME 30 ARE IN PRISON AND SOME 150 OTHERS AT LIBERTY

IN THE TOWN. REFERRING TO THIS CONVERSATION, HOARE SAID IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE WHOLE TOWN BE TAKEN AT ONCE AND NOT PIECEMEAL, SINCE OTHERWISE THE REBELS WILL HAVE TIME TO KILL THE EUROPEANS. HE THEN REVEALED, IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, H-HOUR FOR THE ATTACK ON ALBERTVILLE AS 0300 HOURS 30 AUGUST. "NO ONE HAS THIS INFORMATION, NOT EVEN MOBUTU." THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES WILL BE THE AIRPORT, THE HOTEL DU LAC AND THE WHARF. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE ACL-2755 ((TDCS-314/01366-64) FOR A GARBLED VERSION OF HOARE'S INITIAL PLANNING FOR THIS OPERATION.)

4. AFTER ALBERTVILLE, HOARE'S TENTATIVE OBJECTIVES ARE FIZI AND UVIRA, "ALL IN LINE WITH THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL PLAN SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY MOBUTU." AFTER UVIRA, "THE REAL WAR" STARTS, THE OBJECTIVES BEING BUKAVU AND STANLEYVILLE. HOARE SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW MOBUTU ON 19 AUGUST, HE HAD ASKED HIM "WHAT SHALL I DO WITH (GASTON EMILE) SOUMIALOT, (PIERRE) MULELE AND OTHER REBEL LEADERS IF CAPTURED. SHALL I SHOOT THEM OR TAKE THEM PRISONER?" MOBUTU'S ANSWER WAS, "I DON'T WANT TO HEAR ABOUT THESE THINGS," WHICH HOARE SAID HE INTERPRETS AS TACIT AUTHORITY TO KILL THEM.

5. HOARE THEN SPOKE ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH BELGIAN MILITARY ADVISERS TO THE ANC. ON 19 AUGUST, BELGIAN AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN, WHOM HOARE DESCRIBED AS AN "UNPOPULAR LITTLE MAN, IDLE AND IRRITABLE ALTHOUGH PROBABLY QUITE CAPABLE," SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE HOARE "EVERY ASSISTANCE."

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

TDCS DB-315/00189-64

57075

PAGE 4

THAT SAME DAY, BELGIAN ARMY COLONEL F P MARLIERE, WAS "EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE," ALLOWING HIM TO EXAMINE AVAILALBE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. HOARE WAS ASTOUNDED TO DISCOVER 20 NEW AMERICAN-BUILT ASSAULT BOATS AND 15 NEW 25-HP ENGINES, WHICH HE WILL USE IN THE ASSAULT ON ALBERTVILLE. HOARE LISTED HIS REQUIREMENTS AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SUPPLIES TO BE TRANSPORTED TO NDJILI AIRPORT FOR AIRSHIPMENT TO KAMINA BASE BY C-130. (FIELD COMMENT: THE BOATS AND ENGINES WERE EN ROUTE TO KAMINA BY AIR ON 21 AUGUST.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO : CI/OPS, FI/I 2, IW, VR

S E C R E T 216932Z

ELIZ INFO DIR LEOP CITE [illegible] 3665

REF: ELIZ 3660 (IN 54040)

NO TRACES LATZ. SECARCS HAS HIGH REGARD FOR VICKS AND PERSONALLY PICKED VICKS FOR HIS DEPUTY. 21 [illegible] IN 56965

S E C R E T

* RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO LEOP HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH SIG CEN. A RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: ELIZABETHVILLE

ACTION: AF 7

INFO: [illegible]

S E C R E T 151130Z [illegible]

DIR INFO LEOP PRET SLBY LOND CITE ELIZ [illegible]

SECAROB

REF: ACE 2394

IN 54240

1. SECAROB (S) SAID HE HAS ENGAGED JOHN LATZ AS LOCAL INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN S AND ALISTAIR WICKS IN ORDER KEEP HIM S; ABREAST OF MERCENARY PICTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA. CHANNEL WILL BE FROM WICKS TO LATZ TO BELGIAN MAJOR COCHAUX (ADVISOR TO ANC G-4) TO BELGIAN CONGEN TO S IN KAMINA. (OBVIOUSLY SUCH CHANNEL WILL KEEP LOTS OTHER PEOPLE IN PICTURE AS WELL.) FYI BELGIAN CONGEN HAS DIRECT RADIO COMMO WITH KAMINA BASE. S SAID HE PICKED LATZ BECAUSE HE OLD FRIEND OF WICKS.

2. LATZ IS LONG TIME RESIDENT ASSOCIATED PRESS CORRESPONDENT AND HAS BUSINESS INVESTMENTS EVILLE. BRITISH SUBJECT. HAVE NO DEROG INFO.

3. REQUEST ADDEES TRACES LATZ, ESPECIALLY INDICATIONS ANY INTEL CONNECTION NOTABLY SMOTH. SAME FOR WICKS.

4. ELIZ VIEW REPORTS LIKE REF SHOULD NOT BE PASSED SMOTH (OR ERUS LIAISON).

S E C R E T

S/C NOTE: R

• Relay of this cable to [illegible] has been [illegible] [illegible] required

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

LEOPOLDVILLE

ADDP, ADD P, CA, CI, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS
CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WE 6, AF 17, VR.

TDCS -314/01684-64

S E C R E T 161113Z AUG 15 1719Z, 64 IN 52051

INFO PRET ELIZ BRUS STRI PART LOND CITE LEOP 2475 (BLANDA ACTING)

INTEL WITHUNDER SECAROB

SUPDATA: PHLECAR FROM SECAROB. DEFER PRET ON PASSAGE TO SMOTH.

NO INDEX. FILED: 161113Z. REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGIN DISSEM

ACL-2505 CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)

SUBJECT: RECONNAISSANCE MISSION FOR MERCENARY PILOTS

DOI: 14 AUGUST 64

PADA: CONGO REPUBLIC, LEOPOLDVILLE 15 AUGUST 64

APPR: 2

SOURCE: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B), FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C).

CS NOTE: *RELAY OF THIS CABLE TO ELIZ HAS BEEN STOPPED BY WASH. SIG. CEN.

RELAY REQUEST ON FORM 12 IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT RELAY.

* COMMENT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

XX ROUTINE

PRIORITY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 16 AUGUST 2232Z 64

BASED ON: ACL-2505 WITHUNDER/(SP-SECAROB

LIAISON:

S E C R E T

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO REPUBLIC

TDCS-314/01684-64

DATE OF INFO. 15 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 16 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

RECONNAISSANCE MISSION FOR MERCENARY PILOTS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (15 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 52651

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2805

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM AN EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C). APPRAISAL: 2

1. AT 0900 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN, MRS. PUREN AND THE MERCENARY PILOTS, JAMES HEDGES, ERROL KINGMAN AND PETER MACKINTOSH, ATTENDED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION GIVEN AT CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) HEADQUARTERS BY BELGIAN COLONEL (FNU) BOUZIN. FROM WHAT THE PILOTS SAID AFTERWARDS, THE PURPOSE OF THE BRIEFING WAS TO PREPARE THEM FOR A MISSION TO WHICH CONGO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE. THEIR REMARKS INDICATED THAT IT WAS A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE VICINITY OF LULUABOURG, WHERE THERE IS AN ANC TRAINING SCHOOL THAT MUST BE HELD AGAINST THE REBELS. BOUZIN REPORTEDLY TOLD THE PILOTS THAT LULUABOURG

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SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

IS STILL IN ANC HANDS, ALTHOUGH SURROUNDED BY REBEL FORCES.

2. AFTER THE BRIEFING, THE PILOTS INQUIRED AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FLYING EQUIPMENT: HELMETS, PARACHUTES, MAPS, ETC. BOUZIN REPLIED, "THE AMERICANS HAVE IT. WE WILL TRY TO GET IT FROM THEM." THOSE AT THE BRIEFING REPORTED THAT BOUZIN HAD TRIED TO DISCOURAGE THEM AND CONDUCTED HIS BRIEFING IN THE MOST SKETCHY FASHION. PUREN AND THE OTHER PILOTS THEN WENT TO NDOLO AIR FIELD TO PREPARE FOR THE MISSION. MRS. PUREN RETURNED TO THE MEMLING HOTEL.

3. AT 1300 HOURS, PUREN AND KINGMAN TOOK OFF IN ONE OF THE T-6'S, HEDGES AND MACKINTOSH IN ANOTHER. BOTH PLANES WERE COMPLETELY STRIPPED DOWN: NO HELMETS, NO PARACHUTES, NO RADIOS, NO ARMS, NO MAPS; BUT PUREN INSISTED ON GOING. BEFORE THE PLANES TOOK OFF, MRS. PUREN GAVE EACH OF THE FOUR MEN $250 WHICH SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM ANC COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU THAT SAME MORNING. SHE KEPT THE SAME AMOUNT FOR HERSELF AND DISTRIBUTED THE SAME AMOUNT ALSO TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING: MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, AND PATRICK O'MALLEY.

4. THE TWO PLANES WERE SUPPOSED TO HAVE RETURNED LATE ON 14 AUGUST, BUT AT 0100 HOURS 15 AUGUST, HOARE DISCLOSED PRIVATELY THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING AND EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED TO THE FOUR MEN.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: Name | OFFICE | ROOM | PHONE | TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) 01

5. 201 NO. E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
M2			
M2			
M2			
M2			
M2			
M2			

7. SEX F1 ☐ M ☐ F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F2

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP H1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SRL K1

14. OI CODE W1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1 25 DATE K1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE 01

19. ACTION DESK CODE 01

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES 01 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO.

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

14-00000

WICKS

BUT THEIR CONDITION IS UNCERTAIN SINCE PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT THEY
HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR AT LEAST A YEAR. EIGHT MORE ARE EXPECTED
FROM LUANDA. THERE ARE ALSO SIX T-6'S SUPPLIED BY THE ITALIAN AIR
FORCE TO THE CONGOLESE AIR FORCE. THESE LATTER ARE NOT ARMED;
THE FIRST ONE SHOULD BE ASSEMBLED AND READY TO FLY DURING THE
WEEK BEGINNING 9 AUGUST.

4. MOBUTU OFFERED HOARE THE RANK OF MAJOR, WHICH HE ACCEPTED
WITH THE PROVISO THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO BELGIAN OF SUPERIOR RANK
IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. AS AGREED WITH MOBUTU, THE COMMAND LINE WILL
RUN FROM TSHOMBE TO MOBUTU TO MAJOR-GENERAL LOUIS BOBOZO TO HOARE;
AND THE WHOLE FORCE WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANC. HOARE SAID HE
HAS CHRISTENED THE OPERATIONAL UNIT "FIVE COMMANDO-ANC." BOBOZO,
HE ADDED, IS NOW WAITING FOR HIM AT KAMINA; AND THERE IS A POSS-
IBILITY THAT HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, WILL
BE FLOWN THERE ON THE NIGHT OF 12 AUGUST. HOARE SAID HE IS PRE-
PARING A LIST OF THE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT HE WILL NEED AND CLAIMED
THAT MOBUTU AGREED, "WITHOUT ACTUALLY SAYING SO," THAT THE LIST COULD
BE AMENDED AFTER HOARE HAD PERSONALLY CHECKED OUT THE SITUATION.

5. HOARE SAID THAT THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS HE SEES THEM ARE
TO BE MANONO, KONGOLO AND ALBERTVILLE. HE PLANS TO SEND PATRICK
O'MALLEY, WHO ARRIVED IN LEOPOLDVILLE ON 5 AUGUST OSTENSIBLY AS
JOURNALIST BUT ACTUALLY ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, BACK TO JOHANN[illegible]
[illegible] ON 12 AUGUST [illegible] SUBJECT TO [illegible]

14-00000

#83

SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE)/TANGANYIKA/ SOUTHERN RHODESIA

TDCS-314/01366-64

DATE OF INFO. 3-5 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 6 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

TSHOMBE'S DECISION TO USE THE MERCENARIES/HOARE'S (mercenary commander) PLAN FOR SEIZING ALBERTVILLE/ ACTIVITIES OF VICKS AND DEMARD (other mercenaries)

(Committee of Natl Liberation plans to massacre Europeans if mercenaries are used)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (5 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 44755

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2755

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B); FROM EX-KATANGAN MERCENARY (C); FROM PUREN AND HOARE, AS INDICATED. APPRAISAL: 3.

1. ON 5 AUGUST 64, JEREMIAH PUREN, ONE OF THE WHITE MERCENARIES NOW IN LEOPOLDVILLE, SAID PRIVATELY THAT MARCO KALIBIONA, CHEF DE CABINET TO PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE AND HIS LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE MERCENARIES, HAD SEEN HIM AND JAMES HEDGES AT 1900 HOURS. KALOBIONA TOLD THEM THAT TSHOMBE, INTERIOR MINISTER GODEFROID MUNONGO, AND CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER IN CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU HAD MET THAT SAME DAY AND DECIDED THAT THE EUROPEAN MERCENARIES WOULD BE USED, AND THAT PUREN WOULD BE IN CHARGE OF THE AIRFORCE. (INFORMANT COMMENT: KALIBIONA IS VERY CLOSE TO TSHOMBE AND HAS ACCESS TO HIM AT ALL TIMES.)

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SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

OCI, AD/CI 2

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI)

2. ON 5 AUGUST, MICHAEL HOARE, MERCENARY COMMANDER, SAID PRIVATELY THAT KALIBIONA HAD TOLD HIM ON 3 AUGUST THAT MOBUTU INTENDED TO USE THE WHITE MERCENARIES IN THE DEFENSE OF STANLEYVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: STANLEYVILLE FELL TO THE REBELS ON 5 AUGUST.) IN RELATING THIS, HOARE COMMENTED THAT THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN THIS FASHION WOULD HAVE BEEN "FATAL" AND THAY THEY WOULD ALL HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED.

3. ON THE SAME OCCASION, HOARE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE CURRENT "HESITATION" OVER USING THE MERCENARIES MIGHT END WITH THEIR ALL BEING ASKED TO LEAVE. HOARE CLAIMED THAT THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE DELAY IS BELGIAN PRESSURE. THE REASON FOR THE PRESSURE IS THE THREAT BY INSURGENT LEADER GASTON EMILE SOUMIALOT, COMMANDER IN THE EASTERN CONGO, TO KILL THE 100 EUROPEANS NOW HELD IN ALBERTVILLE IF THE MERCENARIES GO INTO ACTION. HOARE COMMENTED THAT "IF THE SITUATION WARRANTS," HE INTENDS TO ASK MOBUTU TO APPOINT HIM TO HIS STAFF IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE WILL THEN SUBMIT A PLAN FOR THE RECAPTURE OF ALBERTVILLE. HE WILL ASK MOBUTU FOR 100 MEN AND AUTHORITY TO USE APPROXIMATELY 10 EUROPEANS. (INFORMANT COMMENT: PRESUMABLY THE NUCLEUS OF THIS GROUP WOULD BE THE MERCENARIES ALREADY IN LEOPOLDVILLE.)

4. THE PLAN WOULD INVOLVE THE USE OF THE LAKE TANGANYIKA STEAMER, "BARON DHANIS". HOARE WOULD USE IT AS A TROOPSHIP; HE CLAIMS IT CAN CARRY 500 MEN FOR A SHORT HAUL. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE THE SHIP APPROACH ALBERTVILLE FROM THE NORTH, VIA UVIRA AND KIGOMA,

AND POSSIBLY CONTINUE ON TO MOBA, WHICH IS ON THE LAKE, NEAR BAUDOUINVILLE. (FIELD COMMENT: THE PLAN, AS RECEIVED AND OBVIOUSLY INCOMPLETE, IS CONFUSING. UVIRA IS IN REBEL HANDS. KIGOMA IS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LAKE IN TANGANYIKA. PERHAPS, HOARE MEANT THAT THE FORCE ABOARD THE "BARON DHANIS" WOULD ATTACK UVIRA BEFORE PROCEEDING TO ALBERTVILLE.)

5. HOARE'S SECOND-IN-COMMAND, ALASTAIR WICKS, WHO LEFT LEOPOLDVILLE ON 1 AUGUST FOR JOHANNESBURG IS NOW IN SALISBURY. FROM THERE HE HAS TELEPHONED THAT RHODESIAN AIR SERVICES (RAS) IS NOW "SQUARED AWAY". (INFORMANT COMMENT: THIS MUST BE A REFERENCE TO EARLIER PLANS TO USE THE RAS TO SUPPORT THE MERCENARY ACTIVITIVE IN THE CONGO.)

6. THE FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY, "BOB" DENARD IS NOT IN YEMEN AS REPORTED. HE IS ACTUALLY IN PARIS, RECRUITING MEN THERE FOR SERVICE IN YEMEN.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

(END OF MESSAGE)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM C/AF 3 (AF NOTIFIED AND COPY TUBED AT:1430, 31 JUL 64 LMG)

TO ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR.

S E C R E T 271112Z

31 JUL 64 IN 40108

PRIORITY PRET INFO PRIORITY DIR CITE DURB 0293

RYBAT/SECAROB

REF DURB 0289 , N34860

1. SECAROBS WIFE DELIVERED AIRLETTER POSTED JOBURG 24 JULY. STATES SECAROB ACTUALLY LEFT JOBURG EVENING 25 JULY, CARRYING LETTER. OMALLEY STILL IN JOBURG, TALKED TO HER ON PHONE 26 JULY.

2. SUMMARY LETTER FOLLOWS: LEAVE THIS EVENING RHODESIA. AIR SERVICE CHARTER DC-4, CAPTAIN MULLOCK. WHOLE AUTHORIZATION FOR MOVEMENT RESTS ON ONE TELEGRAM FROM TSHOMBE WHICH COLONEL BUY'S(SECURITY) HELD WAS AMBIGUOUS. TOUCH AND GO UNTIL 1400 HOURS WHEN BUYS FINALLY GAVE GO AHEAD.

3. PUREN-ROT HIS SOUL-HAD PROMISHED CONTACT SECURITY THIS MORNING, INSTEAD LEFT LAST NIGHT WITH WICKS, HEDGES, AND A FEW PILOTS INCLUDING MACKINTOSH. PUREN VERY UNPOPULAR WITH SECURIITY AT MOMENT, OUR SELVES ALSO.

4. ABOUT 45 MEN, ALL OTHER RANKS, FLY WITH ME TONIGHT. EXPECT SECOND FLIGHT WILL BE IN 7-10 DAYS TIME. MEANWHILE BUSY DENYING WHOLE THING TO THE PRESS WHO HAVE THE STORY, PROBABLY FROM ONE OF THE MEN IN PUB. INEVITABLE.

SECRET

[illegible] OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

SECRET [illegible]

[illegible] QUITE [illegible]

[illegible] EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION WORK.

EN LOOK A MUCH BETTER BUNCH THAN LAST TIME. INCLUDES
FEW GERMANS, SHOULD MAKE GOOD SOLDIERS. TOO MANY ITALIANS,
IL LET YOU KNOW HOW THEY SETTLE DOWN. GORDON AND OMALLY OBEYED
DIRECTIVES THANK GOD, PUT EMPHASIS ON YOUNG AND ACTIVE MEN,
VENTEROUS SPIRITS, MILITARY EXPERIENCE SECOND. WILL SOO
IEW THAT. MY FIRST ORDER WAS OFF ALL BEARDS, INC [illegible] OWN.

ECRET

SECRET

WICKS, James Alistair RHODESIA W

James Alistair Wicks, was probably born 17 November 1917 in England. (Note: this date is not confirmed.)

Was a mercenary in the Katanga gendarme, 1961.

In July 1964, he returned to the Congo as a member of Michel Hoare's white mercenary group -- was second in command to Hoare.

So: DDP files, 2 November 1965, Confidential.

WICKS, Alistair

SOUTH AFRICA

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

SECRET

46

14-00000

197 NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CONGO REPUBLIC / SOUTH AFRICA

TDCS-314/01683-64

DATE OF INFO 15 AUGUST 1964

DISTR 16 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

FAILURE OF TSHOMBE TO SIGN MERCENARY CONTRACT; FAILURE OF MRS. PUREN TO LEAVE FOR JOHANNESBURG AS PLANNED; DISPATCH OF WICKS AND O'MALLEY.

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (15 AUGUST 1964)

REF IN 52636

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM EX-KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE.
APPRAISAL: HOARE PROBABLY MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THEY PROBABLY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE FACTS AS HE KNEW THEM.

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL-2503

1. ON 15 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT, DESPITE THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE ON 13 AUGUST, THE LATTER DID NOT CONVOKE HIM, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND ALASTAIR WICKS, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND MRS. PUREN ON 14 AUGUST TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS ON PAY AND ALLOWANCES AND SIGN A CONTRACT FOR THE 250-300 EUROPEAN MERCENARIES TSHOMBE WISHES BROUGHT TO THE CONGO. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR THE EVENTS OF 13 AUGUST, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH TSHOMBE GAVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE, SEE ACL-2799.) (TDCS-314/01799-64)

2. NEVERTHELESS, AT 1200 HOURS, MRS. PUREN WENT TO THE OFFICE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

OD/1 AD/CI 2 EXO

OF CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU TO DISCUSS THE FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATION OF THE MERCENARIES ALREADY IN LEOPOLDVILLE AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO RECRUIT THE OTHERS STILL NEEDED. AT 1730 HOURS, SHE SUDDENLY PRODUCED FROM HER HANDBAG A CHECK FOR THE EQUIVALENT IN BELGIAN FRANCS OF APPROXIMATELY 9,000 POUNDS STERLING, DRAWN ON A BELGIAN BANK, WHICH SHE SAID SHE HAD RECEIVED THAT MORNING FROM MOBUTU BUT WHICH SHE HAD WAITED UNTIL THAT MOMENT TO MENTION. AT FIRST, HOARE SAID, IT SEEMED IMPROBABLE THAT THE CHECK COULD BE CASHED. HOWEVER, THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF MOBUTU, MRS. PUREN FINALLY MADE CONTACT WITH A "HIGH-LEVEL SURETE OFFICIAL" WHO CASHED THE CHECK IN U.S. DOLLARS, IN FIFTY-DOLLAR AND ONE HUNDRED-DOLLAR BILLS. (FIELD COMMENT: A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, A HIGH-RANKING NATIONAL SURETE OFFICIAL, REPORTS THAT THE CHECK IN QUESTION WAS FOR 1,1[illegible],000 BELGIAN FRANCS, PAYABLE BY THE BANQUE NATIONALE DE BELGIQUE TO MISS J.F. RENOUPREZ. RENOUPREZ IS MRS. PUREN'S MAIDEN NAME.)

5. HOARE THEN SAID THAT, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF HER HUSBAND'S ABSENCE ON A SPECIAL MISSION, SHE DID NOT FLY TO JOHANNESBURG WITH THE MONEY ON THE 14 AUGUST ALITALIA FLIGHT AS SHE HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED. (FIELD COMMENT: FOR DETAILS ON THE MISSION, SEE [illegible]-2025) (TDCS-314/01684-64) SHE IS NOW KEEPING THE MONEY IN A SATCHEL IN HER LEOPOLDVILLE HOTEL ROOM. AT 2300 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST, HOARE DECIDED THAT, IN SPITE OF TSHOMBE'S FAILURE TO SIGN THE MERCENARY CONTRACT, WICKS AND [illegible] WOULD

THEMSELVES GO ON THE FLIGHT AS SCHEDULED. THEY LEFT, AND MRS. PUREN WILL "PRESUMABLY" FOLLOW ON 19 AUGUST, THE NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHT. HOARE EXPLAINED THAT THE CONTRACT IS ALL DRAWN UP, LACKING ONLY THE FINAL PAY RATE AND TSHOMBE'S SIGNATURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: HOARE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THAT HE IS ASKING FOR A BASE PAY OF 140 POUNDS STERLING PER MONTH FOR THE ENLISTED MEN, WITH ALLOWANCES THAT COULD BRING THE TOTAL UP TO 225 POUNDS STERLING.)

4. ON HOARE'S INSTRUCTIONS, O'MALLEY WILL PROCEED AT ONCE FROM JOHANNESBURG TO SALISBURY AND STAND BY THERE FOR FURTHER WORD BEFORE STARTING RECRUITING. WICKS HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO START RECRUITING IMMEDIATELY IN JOHANNESBURG.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

#183

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO / SOUTH AFRICA / RHODESIA

TDCS -314/01739-64

DATE OF INFO. 13 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1964

P.M

SUBJECT FURTHER MERCENARY NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOBUTU AND TSHOMBE; PLANS TO PROCEED WITH RECRUITING; HOARE'S VIEW OF THE SITUATION

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CONGO, LEOPOLDVILLE (14 AUGUST 1964)

REF

IN 51452

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) FROM A FORMER KATANGA MERCENARY (C) FROM HOARE.

FIELD REPORT NO. ACL 2799

APPRAISAL: 2 (THAT HOARE MADE THESE STATEMENTS AND THAT THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT HIS OPINIONS AND THE FACTS AS HE KNOWS THEM)

1 LATE ON 13 AUGUST 64, MERCENARY COMMANDER MICHAEL HOARE SAID PRIVATELY THAT AT 1030 HOURS THAT SAME DAY, HE AND ALASTAIR WICKS, HIS SECOND-IN-COMMAND, MERCENARY AIR FORCE COMMANDER JEREMIAH PUREN AND MRS PUREN MET WITH CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH MOBUTU. THE PRINCIPAL DECISION REACHED WAS THAT HOARE'S MERCENARY FORCE, WHEN FORMED, WOULD BE "AUTONOMOUS". (FIELD COMMENT: PRESUMABLY THIS MEANS IT WOULD NOT BE BRIGADED WITH OTHER ANC UNITS.) THE OTHER DECISION REACHED WAS THAT MRS PUREN WOULD GO TO JOHANNESBURG SOON TO ADMINISTER THE [illegible] POUNDS STERLING TO BE DEPOSITED IN A BANK ACCOUNT THERE FOR THE MERCENARIES.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

(FIELD COMMENT: FOR AN EARLIER REFERENCE TO THIS FUND, SEE ACL-2788 (TDCS-314/01482-64).

2. AT 1230 HOURS, HOARE, WICKS AND THE PURENS SAW PREMIER MOISE TSHOMBE. THE MEETING LASTED "EXACTLY TEN MINUTES." TSHOMBE ASKED PUREN IF HE WOULD ACCEPT THE MISSION OUTLINED BY MOBUTU ON 11 AUGUST. PUREN "EAGERLY" DID SO. HOARE COMMENTED THAT THIS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN THE SOLE REASON FOR TSHOMBE'S HAVING WISHED TO SEE THEM. TSHOMBE, HE SAID, APPEARED "WILDLY EXCITED." (FIELD COMMENT: FOR DETAILS OF THE MISSION, SEE BELOW AND ACL-2788 (TDCS-314/01482-64).)

3. AT 1500 HOURS, THEY AGAIN SAW MOBUTU, WHO TOLD THEM THAT A SECOND APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN MADE FOR THEM WITH TSHOMBE FOR 1700 HOURS, TO SETTLE THE LAST DETAILS AND SIGN THE CONTRACT. HOWEVER, AT 1700 HOURS THEY WERE TOLD TO RETURN TWO HOURS LATER. THEY RETURNED AT 1900 HOURS, FOUND MOBUTU WAITING AND, AT 1920 HOURS, WERE ALL ADMITTED TO TSHOMBE'S PRESENCE. TSHOMBE GAVE THEM INSTRUCTIONS TO "RETAKE THE CONGO": MORE SPECIFICALLY, MANONO, KONGOLO, ALBERTVILLE, UVIRA, STANLEYVILLE, IN THAT ORDER. HE PROMISED ALL SUPPORT, WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS OF ANY KIND, WHICH, HOARE LATER COMMENTED, WAS "RATHER DISTURBING AND A BIT TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING." HOARE ALSO NOTED THAT NEITHER TSHOMBE NOR MOBUTU SEEMED PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AS TO HOW THE JOB WAS DONE PROVIDED IT WAS DONE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TDCS-314/01739-64

IN 51[illegible]

PAGE 3

WHEN THE QUESTION OF THE CONTRACT CAME UP, TSHOMBE APPEARED UNWILLING TO COPE WITH IT THEN AND MADE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT FOR THEM, FOR 1000 HOURS ON 14 AUGUST. TSHOMBE SEEMED TO HOARE "FIT BUT EXTREMELY TIRED."

4. HOARE SAID THAT WICKS, PATRICK O'MALLEY AND MRS PUREN WILL GO TO JOHANNESBURG ABOARD THE 14 AUGUST ALITALIA FLIGHT. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOW LESS URGENT FOR WICKS TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO KAMINA, AS PLANNED, BUT THAT RECRUITING CONTINUES TO HAVE A HIGH PRIORITY. IN JOHANNESBURG ON 15 AUGUST, WICKS WILL ALERT THE MEN WAITING THERE AND SHOULD BE ABLE, HOARE ESTIMATED, ARRANGE TO HAVE 50 OF THE 220 READY TO FLY TO KAMINA BY 18 AUGUST AND 30 MORE BY 21 AUGUST. LATER ON 15 AUGUST, WICKS WILL FLY ON TO SALISBURY, WHERE HE IS TO RECRUIT AS MANY MEN AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LESS THAN 30. HOARE SAID HE HAS CLEARANCE FROM THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA SECURITY SERVICE FOR THIS ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT THE "FIRST 120 ARE VITAL," THAT HE WOULD TAKE AT LEAST ANOTHER 60 BUT COULD USE "AS MANY AS WICKS CAN RAISE."

5. MRS PUREN WILL RETURN TO LEOPOLDVILLE ON 17 AUGUST. THE PURENS AND THE MERCENARY PILOTS WILL PROBABLY REMAIN HERE UNTIL [illegible] AUGUST. [illegible] PRESENT PLANS GO THROUGH, HOARE EXPECTS TO GO TO KAMINA [illegible] ABOARD A [illegible] THE [illegible] OF [illegible] AUGUST.

6. AFTER RELATING THE FOREGOING, HOARE, WHO APPEARED RELAXED AND ENTHUSIASTIC, SAID HE IS "ABSOLUTELY DELIGHTED" AT THE WAY THE OPERATION IS SHAPING UP AND REFERRED TO IT AS "THE FINEST JOB [illegible]

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14-00000

HOPE FOR." AMONG THE VARIOUS ADVANAGES ARE THE FACT THAT "NO BELGIANS" ARE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE ANC COMMAND AND THAT HE WILL HAVE A "HOT LINE" DIRECT TO MOBUTU. HE NOTED THAT ADEQUATE WIRELESS SETS ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THAT THESE MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT "THE DIFFICULTY WOULD NOT BE IN TAKING TOWNS BUT IN HOLDING THEM ONCE TAKEN." HENCE THE NECESSITY FOR TRAINING GARRISON TROOPS TO TAKE OVER WHEN THE MERCENARY FORCE MOVES ON. HE HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED TO MOBUTU THAT HE COME PERSONALLY TO KAMINA TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS OWN ARRIVAL THERE. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD "A VERY HIGH OPINION" OF MOBUTU'S CAPABILITIES.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

File No. 5.3, Pg. 1573 (Millard)

Date 24 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Car/PP

ATTENTION: T. Cobb

SUBJECT: Michell Livingston WERBELL - C-78785

Central Cover Division concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Division to maintain an accurate register of current 24 nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Division/Nonofficial Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. 24

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
Chief, CCD/NC

cc: CI/OA

SECRET 137

2/Rs

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MEMORANDUM TO: WH/C/OPS

SUBJECT : Call from Mr. Dick Philips (State)
Regarding the Arrest of AMLEO-3

1. Mr. Dick Philips said that he received a call from Mitchell L. WER-BELL about the arrest of AMLEO-3. The following information is contained in CIA files regarding Mr. WER-BELL:

"Subject was born March 1918, in Philadelphia. He served in the OSS during World War II and later opened a public relations and advertising firm in Atlanta. During the past three years he has entered various import/export ventures in Latin America and Florida. He was in the Dominican Republic during the past summer. He is well-known to this Agency and is categorized as unscrupulous and a promoter with grandiose schemes. Although he has offered to work for us, he has never been used. He claims close ~~friendship~~ with many Latin American political and military figures."

2. The three Cubans that WER-BELL reported arrested are Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3), Gilberto Fondora and Miguel Ramos. These men were crew members of the JURE mother vessel VENUS. From JMWAVE reports it appears that AMLEO-3 was attempting to exfiltrate his family, using the VENUS, when he was caught by Cuban security forces on 3 September 1965.

03

Bryan Mills
C/WH/C/MO/PM

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14/OCT/63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 2 [illegible]

12-62
ROUTING

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3			

TO : ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, RF, VR

SIG CEN

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ROUTINE

RI COPY

CITE DIR 75462

TO PRTY ROME (NO NIACP) INFO

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 71153 (25/SEPT/63) *

AMWHIP DUE ROME WEEK OF 13 OCT AND WILL CONTACT STATION PER OLD CONTACT PLAN.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT:* ROME SHOULD NOT EXPECT AMWHIP PRIOR WEEK OF 13 OCTOBER.

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	3
RID/MIS	4
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

03

WE/4 [illegible]

WE/5 [illegible] 03

R. Hanna
~~THOMAS THIELE~~
C/WH/
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S E C R E T

14-7

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2[illegible]

FORM 1389a

3/BR

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AMWHIP/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MENGER/mva
UNIT : DC/WH/4/I
EXT : 5559
DATE : 21 AUGUST 1963

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
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21 Aug 63 21 28z

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 2, FI, EE 4, SAS 8, RF 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 62932

KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF ROME 9965 (IN 01475)*

1. RECENT TALKS WITH AMWHIP 1 IN NEW YORK RE TRAVEL PLANS INDICATE PLANS BUSINESS TRIPS EUROPE THREE FOUR TIMES ANNUALLY SPENDING CIRCA TWO WEEKS EACH TRIP IN ITALY. ROUTINE BUSINESS MATTERS CAN BE EXPECTED OCCUPY CONSIDERABLE PORTION HIS TIME IN ITALY. WHILE AMWHIP 1 CONSIDERED ASTUTE ASSET WITH GOOD POSSIBILITIES ACCESS PBRUMEN TARGETS ITALY, HQS DOUBTFUL HE CAN MEET STA NEEDS FOR ASSET WHO IS READILY AVAILABLE FOLLOW UP LEADS, DEVELOP CLOSE RAPPORT TARGET PERSONALITIES IN RESIDENCE OR IN TRANSIT, MAKE PITCHES WHEN CHANCE ARISES. NECESSARILY LONG INTERVALS BETWEEN HIS STAYS ITALY WILL BREAK RHYTHM OF OP DEVELOPMENT AND MAKE HIM UNAVAILABLE TO ASSESS RECRUIT WHEN LEAD MATURES IN MATTER OF WEEKS.

2. ALSO SINCE HQS USES AMWHIP 1 OTHER AREA OPERATIONS, IT NECESSARY GUARD AGAINST CONTAMINATING HIS CLEAN REPUTATION WITH PBRUMEN REGIME THROUGH COMMENDABLE BUT OVERLY ZEALOUS EFFORTS HIS PART TO DO MOST FOR STA IN TIME AVAILABLE. FYI, WHILE CONSIDERED SHREWD SOPHISTICATED, HE HAS TOUCH OF COMMON PBRUMEN WEAKNESS OF BELIEVING HAND WILL NEVER BE CAUGHT IN COOKIE JAR AND CAN ALWAYS EXTRICATE SELF WITH PLAUSIBLE DENIAL.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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FROM: DIRECTOR
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PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 63932

3. CONCUR STA DECISION FUMARISCA.

4. PRIOR FINAL DECISION BELL, WISH SUGGEST ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, I.E., RECRUITMENT IDEN C OF DIR 44488, 4 JUNE 63. IDEN C HAS POA, IS VOUCHED FOR BY AMWHIP 1, AND EXPECTS TRAVEL ROME AT LEAST ONE WEEK PER MONTH TO ATTEND TO AMWHIP STORE. NEGATIVE FACTORS ARE HE IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO KUBARK REGARDING OP POTENTIAL, SUITABILITY FOR AND INTEREST IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. ON POSITIVE SIDE, AMWHIP 1 SAYS HE MOTIVATED HELP ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITY, AND HE PROBABLY PERSONA GRATA PBRUMEN TYPES ON SAME BASIS AS AMWHIP SINCE, UNLIKE BELL, DID NOT DEFECT PUBLICALLY AND NOT BEEN OVERTLY ACTIVE ANTI-REGIME MOVEMENTS. FURTHER, HIS PROXIMITY ROME AND FREQUENT VISITS WOULD GIVE STA CHANCE TRY HIM OUT BEFORE COMMITMENTS AND, IF STA FINDS HAS APTITUDE AND IS WELCOME PBRUMENS ITALY, HE COULD BE CALLED DOWN ON SPUR OF MOMENT FOR SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ADDITION TO REGULAR VISITS.

5. MAIN PROBLEMS WITH BELL APPEAR TO BE (A) LACK PROOF HIS ACCEPTABILITY TO PBRUMENS (B) COVER TO BE USED HIS PERMANENCE ROME. IDEN C SEEMS OFFER POTENTIAL MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN AMWHIP 1 AND BELL. COVER IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED. PROXIMITY IS ADEQUATE FOR REGULAR DEVELOPMENT TARGETS. ACCEPTABILITY TO PBRUMENS AND APTITUDE FOR WORK CAN BE TESTED WITHOUT MAKING DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS, AS WOULD BE CASE WITH BELL.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FROM : DIRECTOR
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INFO :

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☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 62932

6. IF STA WISHES CHECK IDEN C OUT, RECOMMEND FOLLOW UP SOONEST SINCE MAY STILL WISH FALL BACK ON BELL. SUGGEST STA OFFICER SHOULD TRAVEL SUISSE VISIT IDEN C OUTLINE PROPOSALS. NOTE HOWEVER HQS DOES NOT WISH AMWHIP 1 NAME BE USED. REALIZE THIS MAKES APPROACH BIT MORE DIFFICULT BUT BELIEVE IDEN C WELL AWARE ODYOKE INTEREST OBTAIN HELP ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES PBRUMEN OPS AND WILL ACCEPT STORY HIS NAME AROSE DURING CHECK BY ODYOKE OF PBRUMEN EXILES RESIDENT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND VISITING ITALY PERIODICALLY. THOUGH KUBARK SUISSE HAS NO CONTACT IDEN C, PLS CABLE BERN GNVA INFO DIR PLANNING IF STA DECIDES VISIT IDEN C AND COORDINATE ON ARRIVAL SINCE THEY MAY WISH USE LOCALLY IN ADDITION TO OR IN LIEU OF ITAL USE.

7. FYI: IF IDEN C UNSUITABLE AND WISH PROCEED WITH BELL, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SEND HIM ROME TDY PRIOR FINAL COMMITMENT TO ASCERTAIN CAPABILITIES AND ACCEPTABILITY PBRUMENS THERE. WHILE FINAL COVER FOR RESIDENCE WOULD BE RESPONSIBILITY STA AND DEVIGIL WOULD ATTEMPT ARRANGE COVER FOR TDY THROUGH KUVEST. KUVEST INDICATES SUCH COVER POSSIBLE THOUGH HAVE NOT TALKED CONCRETE TERMS PENDING DECISION IDEN C AND DEFINITE NEED FOR BELL.

END OF MESSAGE

*Rome prefers defer decision on BELL to get better reading AMWHIP/1 possibilities.

SAS/MOB - Mr. Wainwright (coord in draft)
WH/5 - Mr. Sherman

C/WH/INT

AC/WH/4

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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4/18

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AMWHIP

WW 03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT:tw
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 18 JUNE 1963

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TO : ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

19 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMWHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO "THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF AMWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS". WW

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON AGENT NOW PBRUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/4/S. Munger 03

WE/S

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

WILLIAM TYNG
AC/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

18-14

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER
UNIT : WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 13 JUNE 1963

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14 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
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TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CCS 2, SAS 8, S/C

(a)

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 47139

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KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF ROME 9337 (IN 55801)*

1. NO TRACES KARIN ESPINOSA. 06

2. MANY TRACES HER HUSBAND MIGUEL ANGEL ESPINOSA BRAVO, BORN 29 SEPT 1902 HAVANA, FORMER CUBAN AMB NORWAY. DIPL CAREER BEGAN 1931 WHEN ASSIGNED ROME AS THIRD SECTY. LATER SERVED MADRID BRUS BERLIN MEXI. TOLD ODACID OFFICER IN JAN 60 COULD NO LONGER SUPPORT CASTRO GOVT BUT DID NOT INTEND RESIGN FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. ARRIVED BUENOS AIRES MAY 61 AS CUBAN EXILE AND BECAME MEMBER ANTI-CASTRO GROUP THERE. OTHER INFO AVAILABLE IF DESIRED BY ROME STATION.

06 06 06

END OF MESSAGE

*WITHAM met AMWHIP/1 Rome. Latter offered use of new business as cover and said had hired Karin ESPINOSA.

06

Thomas P. Thiele
C/WE/INT

SAS/EOB - Mr. Armstrong (coord in draft)
WR/6 - Mr. Sherman 03

C/WE/4 03

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

8/8R

FILE NO. 201-267956

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

03 hy

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVE
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 3 JUNE 1963

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CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-267956
X-REF TO FILE NO.
SIGNATURE Stephen Munger
03

4 JUN 63 13 26z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 2, FI, SAS 8, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 44488

KEYWAY PERUMEN AMWHIP

1. AMWHIP/1 (IDEN A), LONG TIME KUBARK ASSET FOR PERUMEN OPS, WILL VISIT ROME 5 TO 15 JUNE TO OPEN JEWELRY STORE IN IDEN B. HAS OFFERED BE OF SERVICE TO STA IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE INCLUDING FURNISHING COVER IN NEW STORE. THOUGH LEFT PERUMEN EARLY 1961, REMAINS PERSONA GRATA TO REGIME SINCE GAVE AID TO CURRENT REGIME DURING PRE-REVOLUTION DAYS AND TOOK NO OVERT OPPOSITION STAND. IS CONSIDERED BY CURRENT REGIME AS A POLITICAL BUSINESSMAN AND CAN ENTER OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS MEET WITH PERUMEN DIPLOMATS. FOR EXAMPLE, PLANS RENEW PERUMEN PASSPORT AT EMBASSY, PARIS, ON CURRENT TRIP.

2. IN PARTNERSHIP WITH IDEN C WILL OPEN JEWELRY STORE ROME. SAYS IDEN C FULLY TRUSTWORTHY ANTI-REGIME AND COULD BE MADE WITTING OF ARRANGEMENTS MADE ROME IF SO DESIRED. IDEN C WAS WITTING SOURCE OF PBPRIME ODUNIT ATTACHE IN PERUMEN PRIOR 1961.

3. AMWHIP/1 IS PARTNER IN NEW YORK OF IDEN D WHICH IS CLOSELY TIED TO IDEN E OF MILAN. COULD ALSO OFFER COVER IN IDEN E BUT BELIEVES THIS LESS SECURE SINCE HE HAS MORE DIRECT CONTROL OVER ROME JEWELRY STORE.

201-267956

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	SS
RID/MIS	//
~~[illegible]~~	
RID/ 6 JUN 1963	

CS COPY

12 1 19 PM '83

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ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☐
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PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 44735

4. RECOMMEND STA ESTABLISH CONTACT SOONEST DISCUSS VARIOUS OPS PROBLEMS POSSIBILITIES, INCL COVER FOR PERUMEN OPS SUPPORT ASSET AS PLANNED. IF COVER FOR SUBJ DIR 38810 STILL UNRESOLVED, STA SHOULD RAISE PROBLEM WITH AMWHIP/1, REALIZING THOUGH THAT LATTER MAY BE RELUCTANT OFFER COVER IN OWN FIRM TO PERSON WHO BROKE CLAMOROUSLY WITH REGIME. STA MAY ALSO WISH ASK AMWHIP/1 VISIT OFFICIAL PERUMEN INSTALLATIONS ROME FOR MEETINGS ASSESSMENTS TARGET PERSONALITIES. STA SHOULD FEEL FREE DISCUSS ALL OTHER PERUMEN PROBLEMS DESIRED. IN ALL ABOVE, STA MUST ABIDE BY AMWHIP/1 JUDGEMENT. NOTE LATTER IS NOT PRINCIPAL AGENT TYPE OR RECRUITER. HAS BEEN HIGHLY VALUABLE AS WITTING INFORMANT, SPOTTER, OPS SUPPORT TYPE.

5. AMWHIP/1 WILL STAY WITH IDEN F. CAN BE REACHED THERE OR PREFERABLY THROUGH IDEN B MANAGEMENT. IN MILAN CAN BE REACHED THROUGH IDEN E. OFFICER MAKING CONTACT SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF AS FRIEND OF BILL THOMPSON AND REFER TO THOMPSON'S TALK WITH AMWHIP/1 OF 31 MAY IN NEW YORK. SHOULD USE ENGLISH IN INITIAL PHONE CONTACT. AMWHIP/1's ENGLISH AND ITALIAN ARE FAIR BUT RECOMMEND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS BE HELD IN AMWHIP NATIVE LANGUAGE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS CO.

SAS/EOB Mr. Wainwright (in draft) 03
WE/5

C/WE/IN

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FILE NO. 201-267956

03

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ORIG : [E. [illegible] I. [illegible]]/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 3 JUNE 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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03

4 JUN 63 13 26z

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XX ROUTINE

TO : ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, S/C

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 44489

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488

IDENTITIES OF REF:

IDEN A - CARLOS TEPEDINO GONZALES, BORN 11 OCT 1924 CUBA NOW RESIDENT NEW YORK CITY

IDEN B - CAVALIERI HILTON HOTEL

IDEN C - JUAN VENTURA VALNER, BORN 10 APR 1914 COSTA RICA, NATURALIZED CUBAN NOW RESIDENT GENEVA, SUISSE ✓

IDEN D - TISHMAN AND LIPP INC., JEWELRY MANUFACTURERS

IDEN E - CARLETTO INC., JEWELRY MANUFACTURERS

IDEN F - DR. A. ROMANO, VIA CICCERONE 44, ROME

201-267956

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	S.S
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
5 JUN 1963	
DESTR	

END OF MESSAGE

03

SAS/KCD Mr. [Wainwright] (in draft)
WE/5

C/WE/4

03

Thomas P. Thiel
WE/INT

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25 03

ORIG : NAT SCOTT/mak
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 5 NOVEMBER 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

MESSAGE FORM
S E C R E T

ROUTING
1
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7
8

TO : PARIS 15-4

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF. WH/SA 8 INFO DDP, WE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3, VR, FILE

5 Nov 64 21 07z

SIG CEN

TO PARI 15-4 INFO. MADR 15-2 CITE DIR

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP MHVIPER

62066

REF: PARI 7350 (IN 17041) *
20-4

1. BY ALL MEANS TRY TO GET STUDY AND FORWARD TO HQS.

2. IF UNABLE OBTAIN OPENLY, ADVISE HQS MEANS TO BE USED BEFORE UNDERTAKING CLANDESTINE APPROACH.

END OF MESSAGE

* Two volume study on Cuban Transport System.

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
[✓ EC]	RETS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	WE

FM WH 15-1

WH/SA/EOB
03
WE/5
03 F. Pierre (by phono)
WE/3

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

5-5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	(Bill Wainwright) 03		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6	(Bryant) 03		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

RE attached on AMWHIP-1 and (Siegelman) 06

Please get word to A-1 that if X.he sees 06 (S) to get as much info from him on his current situation in Brazil, who he knows in Cuban community and Cubans he knows in Cuba. Naturally, without exposing his (A-1's) connections with us.

WH/5 will handle contact with (Charlie Davis) 03 and subsequent contact, if any, with (Siegel.) 06

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Roc B.	

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

6|PV

SECRET

Chief, WHD X

Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

PBRUMEN
Subject of 201-728615

06

[Daniel Siegel or Siegelman.]

AR: Paragraph 2.

Refs: A. HBRW-5816
B. HBRA-11177

1. Subject applied for, and was granted on 29 April 1964, a 15-day tourist visa to the United States. He told the consular officer that he planned to leave on about 10 May for France, where he planned to stay for a month or more before going to the United States. He plans to contact the following friends there:

Mr. and Mrs. Henri Masliah
110-33 72nd Ave.
Forest Hills 75
New York

Mr. and Mrs. John Duys
1 East 66th St.
New York 21, New York

Mr. and Mrs. H. Gilbert Smith
Dockboard
2 Canal St.
New Orleans, La.

and in Cuba

2. If Subject also contacts AMWHIP-1, it is requested that the latter debrief him on his PBRUMEN contacts here and, if he appears to be operationally useful, that a contact be set up in Rio de Janeiro, as requested in Reference B.

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jcd
30 April 1964

Harry V. WITHERBY

HBRA-12952

MAY 1 1964

JPV

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24 S-E-C-R-E-T

03

ORIG: (RPLIFRE)
UNIT: WE/3
EXT: 5798
DATE: 20 APR 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MOB INT SS SB
IOS FETS AP
RPTS CI CA
CI SI HP HH
SEC NS

TO : PARIS ROME FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WE 2

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, DC/WH/SA 5, VR

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

~~(DELD)~~

TO / PARI INFO ROME FRAN CITE DIR 17976

DESENSITIZED KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: PARI 3887 (IN 72764)* 24

1. RISK TO (LIAISON) EQUITY BY UNRETRIEVABLE EQUIPMENT PROPOSED REF OP CONSIDERED OVERRIDING FACTOR. LIMITED LIFE BATTERY INSTALLATION PLUS SECURITY AND 24 (LIAISON) HISTORY 02 (UNSOX) ALSO FACTORS ~~[illegible]~~ WHICH MILITATE AGAINST QUICKIE OP WITH NUMEROUS RISKS. ADDITIONALLY, 01 (UNION) ALMOST CERTAINLY RETAINS CONTACT 02 (UNSOX) 8 AND VIEW LATTER'S POSITION HE WANTS AVOID ALL TROUBLE WITH 02 (HB)FAIRY, HIS APARTMENT NOT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR LP.

2. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER INDUCTIVE TAP ON PRESENT 02 (UNSOX) WIRES LEADING TO SECURE LP AS ALTERNATE POSSIBILITY.

3. AMWHIP ONE WILL RETURN PARIS APPROXIMATELY 15 MAY FROM ~~[illegible]~~ ROME. POSSIBILITY THEREFORE EXISTS MOUNT SIMILAR OP AFTER ADEQUATE PLANNING ACCOMPLISHED AND WITH NON-ATTRIBUTABLE EQUIPMENT.

4. FOR ROME: DO YOU HAVE EQUIPMENT SIMILAR TO SRT 24 AND BATTERIES TO OPERATE OF ITALIAN MANUFACTURE? IF YES PLEASE DESCRIBE EQUIPMENT AND BATTERY SIZES TO PARI.

~~C/WE, BPP~~
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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EXT :
DATE :

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

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30 APR 61 15 58z

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO PARI INFO ROME FRAN CITE DIR 17976

RYBAT

5. ALSO SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER USING NON-ATTRIBUTABLE BATTERIES MADE FRAN IF ROME CANNOT PROVIDE.

*Proposal to mount audio targetted against ~~UN~~SNAFU/19. 02

03

TSD/AOB (E. BRENNAN) (PHONE)

WE/4 03

WE/SPO R. WALSH (PHONE)

WH/SA/EOB W. TYNG (PHONE)

CI/TC J. MERTZ (PHONE)

03 FI/OPS (R. CRAVEN) (PHONE)

03 WE/5 (R. LOETSS) (PHONE)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas F. Thiele

C/WE/INT
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SECRET

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 22/APRIL/64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
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23 Apr 64 16 55z

TO : ROME
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH/SA 8
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RE 4, S/E E 4, VR

MOB	INT	SS	SB
	IOS	PERS	AR
	RETS	LOG	CA
	SI	FF	HH
		SEC	NS

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 16358

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP/1

AMWHIP/1 ARRIVING EUROPE 26 APRIL FOR THREE WEEK'S BUSINESS TRIP, INCLUDING KUBARK ERRANDS PARIS, GENEVA. WILL ARRIVE ROME CIRCA 5 MAY AND CONTACT STATION VIA USUAL CHANNEL TO ASCERTAIN ANY SERVICES ROME MAY WISH.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB 03
WE/4 Stephen I. Munro 03
WE/5/C FRC Locke 03

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

22-15

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WNJ 03

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ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:sw:
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

17 APR 64 18 08z

TO. : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

MOB INT SS S3

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15094

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 PROCEED GNVA.

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARI)*

1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP/1 (IDEN) UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRTY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP/1 AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL.

2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO. 06

END OF MESSAGE 03

WH/SA/EOB

WE/5/C RC Loeb 03

WE/3 03

WE/4 03

EE/SA/S

WH/SA/SO/NS

W H O'Brien
~~BRONSON TWEEDY~~
D C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

12-3

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SECRET WH/SA #64-750

13 October 1964

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : AMMUG/1 Operation 06
Meeting with [Colonel PORRES] Saturday,
10 October 1964

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 13 October 1964 06
concerning briefing of [Colonel Peralta]

06 1. Following the meeting described in the reference, [Colonel Porres] requested a separate meeting which was held on Saturday, 10 October 1964. [Andy Rogers of the Guatemalan 03, 16-2 Station] was present at the meeting.

2. During the meeting 24 the matters covered on the previous day with the [Chief of State] were reviewed and the specific action to be taken was indicated with agreement on the following points:

24

A. Special treatment should be given to the ["Caso Asiatico" and the "Caso Hombres Ranas"] which involved 06 [Yon SOSA,] [Luis Augusto TURCIOS Lima,] 06 06 [Manuel JOSUE Ortega Paz,] and one (fnu) (lnu) whom we will be able to identify if shown a photograph. Every effort should be made to identify the last-named person and then to recruit all four of them. Meanwhile, all information available concerning them should be collected and furnished to the [Station] for forwarding 16-2 to Headquarters. The object in each of these cases should be to achieve contacts with them for the purpose of effecting recruitments. If required, we will have a Cuban who knows the individuals and whom they believe to be a Cuban Intelligence officer go to 16-2 [Guatemala] for the purpose of contacting them under controlled conditions which will permit us to monitor the conversation during the time that he poses as still active in Cuban Intelligence. Following this, the recruitment attempt would be made in each case possibly by one of our officers if the circumstances at the time indicate that this procedure would be most likely to be a success.

B. Without waiting for the outcome of effort to recruit the four individuals described above, the Guatemalan government should bend every effort to locate all those individuals (possibly as many as 200) who have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, and to arrest them. Maximum publicity should be given to the arrests once they have been questioned. Hopefully declarations will be made by some of them which will assist in effective propaganda use of their arrest and their involvement in subversion on behalf of the Castro government. They should be interviewed separately and, if possible, some with greater potential should be doubled so that they may serve to keep us informed of plans for subversion in the future. 24

11

C. The Guatemalans should keep us advised at every stage of the progress made in the cases so that we may lend assistance when appropriate.

06

3. Colonel Porres said that he understood the importance of the case and would do his utmost to follow through in line with the action proposed above. He said that although he does not have a large organization, it is secure and is capable of collecting information and of arranging for the arrests and interrogation.

06 06

06 4. Colonel Porres discussed three other cases (the ALFARO case, 06 the case of Luiz Ramirez, 06 and the case of Nestor JORDI Chambonyer. Rogers said that full details concerning the 06 ALFARO case had been sent to Headquarters. 24 This is the same case 24 which according to the Chief of State 24 involved a Mexican courier acting on 06 behalf of the Cuban intelligence service. Colonel Porres said that this individual is still in jail in Guatemala. 11 The 06 Jordi and 06 Ramirez cases are being made the subjects of separate memoranda.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

16/PV

HMMA 64-[illegible]

13 October 1964

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: AMMUG-1 Operation 24
[Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Peralta]

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 9 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. [Chief of State Colonel Peralta] [Minister of Government Colonel Serrano] 08, 06 08, 06 [and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porres] attended for the [Guatemalans.] [Paul Loeb and Andy Rogers of our Station] were present. 08, 06 11 03, 03, 16-2

2. At the request of the [COS, Paul Loeb,] I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the [Guatemalans] to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the [joint operations] we undertake [are compartmented within the Guatemalan government] (and, in fact, discussed by the [Guatemalan government] exclusively with our representatives in the field). 27, 03 11 24 24 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, the DGI operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and operations in [Guatemala.] The [President] lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DGI intelligence requirements [for Guatemala and the Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" file.] 24 24

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained our aims in exploiting the information with regard to the [recruitment] aspect, [the CA play,] and the control of [subversion.] In this connection I asked for [close cooperation and coordination of activities,] promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our [travel lists and watch list.] 24 24 24 24 24

19/PV

24

5. With reference to the ZAPOTE case, because
of the developments and plans in El Salvador, I explained
briefly the status of the 24 DALTON case and the possibility
24 of his being transferred to Guatemala. (This was in line
with the discussion in El Salvador 24 which included our Chief 27
of Station, the President and the President's intelligence 08.06
advisor, Colonel MEDRANO.) I asked that the Guatemalan 24
government take no action unless requested by President 24
RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, if DALTON 24
is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to
24 DALTON in Guatemala.)

24

6. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

24

c. The extent to which Guatemala has lived up to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has 24 cooperated in efforts against Castro; 24 and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;

d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

16/71

11

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing, and of its exploitation;

24

j. Reference to the case of the Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala (the ABRAZO case). 24

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

06

7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities. 24

06

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, Peralta asked for a copy of the EEI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

SECRET

6/pv

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INFO [illegible] FILE

S E C R E T 302217Z

DIR CITE SALV 5312

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG

30 Sep 64 IN 84511

REFS A. SALV 5303 (IN 83009) ✗

B. DIR 53322

1. LANGOSCH AND AMMUG 1, ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER SAW JUNAVE 1 MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER. JUNAVE 1 TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2 REF A. DENIED KNOWING AMMUG DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND BEGGED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE ANEW.

02

2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM JUNAVE 1 WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE RELEASE AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE INSOFAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETTED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST AMMUG TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOUBLED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COVER RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA.

SECRET

318Q

3. AS MATTERS STAND MOST IMPORTANT TO PROTECT KUBARK EQUITY IN 02 JUWAVE-2 WHO OF GREAT PROMISE. THIS OP COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT AMMUG EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF KUBARK TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF 02 JUWAVE 2, PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT TO PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER 02 JUWAVE 2 IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRUDENT INTERVAL KUBARK CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORTS 01 AGAINST OTHERS EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH 24 LIAISON DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS.

4. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF GUERRILLEROS TRAINED IN CUBA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO AMMUG. IN ADDITION TO BENEFITS OF CA PLAY, SOME OF THOSE DETAINED MIGHT BE DOUBLED AND TARGETTED AGAINST GUERRILLA GROUPS OR PGT.

5. APPRECIATE REF B TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH JUHILL-1 AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT. 01, 08

SECRET

01
* JUHILL-1 AGREED [illegible]
[illegible] WHEN [illegible] JUWAVE-1.
02

7/5R

14-00000
104-10183-10262 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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[illegible] FILE

S E C R E T 232137Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE SALV 5301 IN-82908

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG 25 SEPT 64

REFS A. SALV 5296 (IN 82314

B. DIR 52859 *

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFS COS AND LANGOSCH MET JUHILL 1 MORNING 23 SEPTEMBER IN COS OFFICE TO BRIEF HIM ON JUNAVE 2 RECRUITMENT, IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. JUHILL 1 WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND AGREED EMPHATICALLY ONLY HE AND PRESIDENT WOULD KNOW [illegible] RECRUITMENT AND THEY WOULD MAKE NO RECORD OF IT. DURING [illegible] LANGOSCH POINTED OUT JUNAVE 2 IS MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL TARGET BECAUSE HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO COMMIE PARTIES SALV AND OTHER CENTR[illegible] COUNTRIES, IS POPULAR UNIVERSITY AND STUDENT LEADER, [illegible] UAR MILITARY COMMITTEE, TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO COMMIE [illegible] SUCH AS AT MOSCOW, PRAGUE, MEXI, CARA AND BRITISH GUIANA, HAS SOV CONTACTS, WAS TRAINED AND RECRUITED BY DGI, AND ALTHOUGH STILL ONLY 27 YEARS OLD HAS BEEN PCES MEMBER SINCE 56 [illegible] POTENTIAL IN PARTY; BUT THAT ANY INDISCRETION COULD [illegible] IN LOSS OF JUNAVE 2 AND ALL HE COULD PRODUCE FOR YEARS TO COME.

2. LANGOSCH SAID ONE OF HIS AGENTS WHO ALREADY HAS LEFT SALV

SECRET

ARRANGED CONTACT WITH 02 JUWAVE 2. 01 JUHILL 1 ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION, MADE NO DEMANDS, OFFERED ALL HIS FACILITIES AND UTMOST COOPERATION TO KUBARK. COS AND LANGOSCH BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN NO SECURITY PROBLEM TO DATE.

3. DO NOT PLAN HIT ANY OTHER TARGETS SALV AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT 02 JUWAVE 1, AS 02 JUWAVE 2 OP TOO IMPORTANT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION TO KUBARK PRESENCE OR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. PLAN TO CONTINUE JUWAVE 1 INTERROGATION AND RECRUITMENT EFFORT. HIS SILENCE AND 02 COLLABORATION IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO FOR FOREGOING REASON. 01 JUHILL 1 AGREES HANDLE EXACTLY AS KUBARK WISHES.

4. HAVE NOT SPECIFIED AMOUNT OF REMUNERATION TO 02 JUWAVE 2 EXCEPT THAT IT WILL INCLUDE PAYING COST OF FURTHER STUDIES OF BROTHER IN WHATEVER COUNTRY KUBARK CONSIDERS BEST FROM VIEWPOINT OF ADEQUATE SCHOOL OR INSTITUTE AS WELL AS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT. AFTER GRADUATION MED SCHOOL, BROTHER HAS SPECIALIZED IN CANCER RESEARCH 08 ESPECIALLY 08 BREAST CANCER. NOW COMPLETING WORK AT IDEM AND EXPECTED RETURN SALV OCTOBER. HAVE TOLD 02 JUWAVE 2 BROTHER MUST HAVE SCHOOL AND OTHER RECORDS TO ESTABLISH COMPETENCE IN APPLYING FOR ADMISSION. [illegible] ASAP SUGGEST SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS OR RESEARCH INSTITUTES [illegible] BROTHER SHOULD APPLY AND WHERE PREFERABLY KUBARK SECURELY CAN FACILITATE RAPID ACCEPTANCE, TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTED MEANS PAYING [illegible]. BROTHER SPEAKS ONLY SPANISH BUT HAS READING KNOWLEDGE [illegible] FRENCH. HAVE TOLD 02 JUWAVE 2 BROTHER MUST BELIEVE [illegible] PAID BY 02 JUWAVE 2 AND ACCEPTANCE AT INSTITUTE OR GRANTING OF SCHOLARSHIP ARE STRICTLY ON OWN MERITS.

S E C R E T

[illegible] (?)

12/BR

RETURN TO CIA
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : 7 [illegible]
ACTION : WH 7
INFO : DDP, WH/SA 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, VR

5 SEP 64 IN 68373

S E C R E T 042223Z
DIR CITE TEGU 5633
DYBOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG
REF: TEGU 5625 (IN 66562)
FOLLOWING FROM LANGOSCH

1. PBSWING CHIEF AND LANGOSCH HAD PRIVATE MEET MORNING 4 SEPT WITH [CHIEF OF STATE COL. OSWALDO LOPEZ] 08, 06 LANGOSCH BRIEFED ON DGI OPS AND ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING INFO ON [MARIO SOSA N. 'ARRO] 06 [MAGLIO MORENO ESPINAL] 06 [LUIS BANEGAS] 06 AND [ANTONIO FERNANDEZ IZA TIRLE] 06 WHO USES HONDURAN DOCS IN NAME [MIGUEL MANCIA MADRID] 07 ALSO FURNISHED RECENT [TRAVEL LISTS] 24 AND COPY OF DGI [REQUIREMENTS ON HOND.] 24 06

2. [LOPEZ] 06 EXHIBITED KEEN INTEREST, REVIEWED ALL NAMES, SAID HE KNEW SOME PERSONALLY INCLUDING [SOSA] 06. PROMISED PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON ALL [HONDURANS] THROUGH PBSWING CHIEF AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS LEND FULL COOPERATION. SAID GOVT HAS ABOUT 25 COMMIES UNDER ARREST AND HAS HAD TO RELEASE OTHERS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE BUT

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11/6R

CAPABLE OF MAKING ARRESTS OF PEOPLE LIKE SOSA IF THEY ENTER COUNTRY AND 24 WILLING MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO ODYOKE. HOWEVER, 06 LOPEZ DECRIED LACK OF SECURITY AND COMPETENCE 24 IN HIS GOVT STATING:

A. HE MUST KEEP MATERIAL FURNISHED IN PERSONAL POSSESSION OR OWN HOME BECAUSE OFFICE IS NOT SECURE.

B. MOST PEOPLE IN GOVT INCLUDING THOSE IN INTEL AND POLICE ARE NOT SECURE EITHER BECAUSE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BRIBES OR NOT ABLE SAFEGUARD ANY CONFIDENCES.

C. NOBODY IN GOVT IS TRAINED TO COPE WITH DGI OPS.

D. GENERALLY GOVT PERSONNEL FAR LESS ASTUTE THAN 06 SOSA AND OTHER COMMIES.

3. 06 LOPEZ MENTIONED FELIX OYUELA, CHIEF ARMY INVESTIGATOR, AS ONLY TRUSTED AND REASONABLY COMPETENT PERSON BUT ADDED OYUELA TOO BURDENED WITH OTHER DUTIES. THEREFORE, SEEK SUITABLE CANDIDATE WHOM 06 LOPEZ WILL PROPOSE TO PESWING CHIEF SO SUCH PERSON COULD BE TRAINED AND DEVOTE TIME TO SUBVERSIVE AND ESPIONAGE MATTERS.

SECRET

* CONCERNED [illegible] DIRECTIVES ON [illegible]

7/8R

G [illegible] Ops

19 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/SI

VIA : Chief, WH/PO/A

SUBJECT : AMMUG/1 Operation
Target Analysis and Non-surfacable Leads

1. Reference is made to your memorandum date 16 June 1964 requesting Target Analysis Summary Reports on leads to be exploited and lists of those leads which the Branch desires not to be surfaced to the Intelligence community.

2. Attached are separate lists for each appropriate Central American and Caribbean country detailing nationals of each country whose names have been mentioned or otherwise cropped up during the debriefing of AMMUG/1. WH/2 considers, at this time, that it is not feasible nor desirable to surface any of these leads to the intelligence community, pending a final determination as to the feasibility of pursueing some of these leads for operational exploitation. Those leads which are determined to be of no operational potential will be released to your office on a continuing basis for surfacing to appropriate agencies.

3. Attached also are seven completed Target Analysis Summary Reports on:

a) Francisco Javier MELLA Pena

b) Jaime DURAN Hernando

c) Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Sehuroer

d) Jean Norbert MONTERO

e) Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas

f) Roque DALTON Garcia

g) Noel GUERRERO Santiago

These individuals represent immediate targets on whom we have already undertaken action. We anticipate that certain selected other individuals from the lists cited in paragraph one above will become targets, and accordingly, are in the process of examining and investigating these. As these individuals are culled through, Target Analysis Summary Reports shall be prepared and forwarded to your office.

26

[John M. Whitten]
C/WH/2

Attachments:
Target Analysis Summary Reports
AMMUG/1 Leads Not to be Disseminated

Distribution:
0 & 1 - C/WH/SA/CI (w/atts)
1 - WH/PO/A (w/atts)
3 - WH/2 (w/atts)

1/pv

14-00000

Dominican Republic Leads Not to be Disseminated AMMUG/1 Operation

Francisco Javier MELLA Pena

Jaime DURAN Hernando

Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Sehuroer

Elpidio RUIZ (this is an alias of "TIBURON" - true name still not known)

David Onelio ESPAILLAT Campos

Francisco Eleuterio RAMOS Peguero

Francisco Elizardo RAMOS Peguero

Teresa Inocencia ESPAILLAT Hernandez

Jose Bienvenido GUERRA Nouel

Hector Augusto CABRAL Ortega

Leopoldo Ariosto GRULLON Ruiz

Jose CASSA Logrono

Silvano LORA Vicente

Ilander Zanoni SELIG Belmonte

Ana Mercedes ESPINAL de Castro

Baldemiro CASTRO Garcia

Marcelino GRULLON Jimenez

Benito ALEJO German

Jorge BOTELLO Fernandez

Rafael Francisco TAVERAS Rosario

Hugo TOYOS Vargas

Cayetano Armando RODRIGUEZ Del Prado

Antonio Emilio Jose DIA Conde

Simon BOLIVAR

Arturo Rafael ESPAILLAT Rodriguez

Carmen E. HERNANDEZ de Faxas

Ernesto LOPEZ Molina

Maximo LOPEZ Molina

KEY- AMMUG 1 KNOWS - X

El Salvador Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

✓ Roberto BARCIANO Marin GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Raul Fernando ESCOBAR Melendez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Carlos Alberto FLORES Hernandez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

~~Juan Ramon LOZANO Rosales~~ ALIAS OF ROBERTO BERCIANO MARIN

✓ Carlos MARTINEZ Ortiz DEAD - GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Ricardo Augusto MARTINEZ Vanegas GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Ivan Danilo RODRIGUEZ Leon GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Lisandro RAMIREZ Solis GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Pedro RODRIGUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Ciro Arturo RUIZ Torres GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ([redacted] 02 CRIN IN CONTACT WITH)

✓ Victor Manual SANCHEZ Bonilla GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

~~Rafael CONTRERAS Molina~~ PSEUDO OF VICTOR SANCHEZ BONILLA

✓ Arturo ALFARO Fuentes GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Raul Antonio VARGAS GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Andres Antonio VELASQUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

Roque DALTON Garcia

TA ✓ Manuel Antonio CALERO GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING & GUN RUNNING & EXPLOSIVES

TA Jose Alberto CARRILLO Calderon KNOWN TO AMMUG 1 & [redacted] 02 CRIN-1 (AGENT)

✓ Jose Salvador Rosales GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

TA Ricardo CASTRO Rivas AGENT ? [redacted] 02 CRIN-1 IN CONTACT WITH CASTRO

✓ Francisco DURAN Cardano GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Freddy Guerra GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Armando LOPEZ Mantiel GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Jose Antonio GARCIA Rivera GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

3/3v

✓ Pedro SANTACRUZ Castro GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

✓ Ruben MARTI. Guardado GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

? Raul Concepcion Morales NO RECORD IN AMMUG-1 INDEX WH/SA/CI

✓ Jose MANCIA Martinez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY
INDIVIDUAL NAMED RICARDO MARTINEZ REC'D TRAINING IN CUBA

Ricardo ~~MARTINEZ~~ NAME USED BY ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO

✓ Jesus Antonio PAZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

✓ Rita RAMIREZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY

~~Pedro AREVALO Melgar~~ ALIAS OF JESUS ANTONIO PAZ

TA 06 [Jorge Federico BAIRES] AGENT ? AMMUG-1 KNOWS - 02 [VJ]GRIV-1 IN CONTACT WITH SUBJ.

✓ Ana Leticia BARLAZA (BARRAGA?) Quiroa GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X

? Raul Castellanos MENTIONED IN WH/[illegible] HAS SURMISED TO MEET AMMUG-1 IN MEXICO

TA 06 [Tomas GUERRA Rivas] 201 [247812] 08 AGENT 06 ACE[illegible]

TA (201-[751265]) 08 06 [Alejandro MONTANO Gomez] OR [Gomez MONTANO] KNOWN TO AMMUG 1 AS 02 [VJ]GRIV-1

06 [Rafael ACEVEDO Blanco] ACCO ADDRESS IN ZAPOTE CASE 08

06 [Jose Manlio ARGUETA Canas] 201 [262561] 08

SECRET

11/RV

SECRET

Guatemala Leads Not to be Disseminated AMMUG/1 Operation

Antonio JOHN Marcos

✓ Julio CARRERA Sierra G/W

✓ Francisco CRUZ Figueroa G/W

✓ Victor Manuel CUELLAR Carranza G/W

Bernardo DIAZ Mendez G/W only

✓ Rolando HERRERA Hernandez G/W

✓ Marco Antonio LEONI Aguilar G/W AMMUG-1 KNOWS

✓ Edgar Roberto LOBO Dubon G/W AMMUG 1 KNOWS

✓ Jose Aquiles L. MORALES G/W AMMUG-1 KNOWS

Manuel Josue ORTEGA Paz

✓ Angel PALENCIA Sanchez G/W ONLY

Ricardo Arturo GUZMAN (pseudo: Alberto SANTOS Melgar)

Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman

Mario BARRIENTOS

Manuel GALICH

Carmen ROMEROSO Sosa

Fernando SOSA Pol

Marco Antonio YON Sosa

Luis Augusto TURCIOS Lima

Francisco AMADO Granados

Alicia MOYA de Amado

Jose Manuel FORTUNY

Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin

Isabel POHL Romero de Sosa

Jose ROSALES

Nelida TURCIOS

SECRET

SECRET

Haiti Leads Not to be Disseminated

AMMUD/1 Operation

Jorge Norbert MONTERO

Rene DEPESTRE

(Unknown) "PITIN"

SECRET

Honduras Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

Maglio MORENO Espinal

Mario SOSA Navarro

Luis Randolfo BANEGAS

SECRET

Nicaragua Leads Not to be Disseminated AMRUG/1 Operation

Noel GUERRERO Santiago

Professor TORRES (probably Edelberto TORRES Espinoza)

Silvio MAYORGA (or MALLORCA)

Ernesto MARTINEZ

German PALACHI Baca

Efrain SANCHEZ

Carlos A. TINOCO Montiel

Marvin CASTRO

Felix MONTERREY Dobil

Elicio Dtharinto GONZALEZ Moreno

Alejandro ALEGRIA Bermudez

Juan Jose GARCIA Lorio

Eli ALTAMIRANO

Bayardo ALTAMIRANO Lopez

Ivan BACA

Alejandro BERMUDEZ

Anibal LORIO Garcia

Enrique MARENCO

Orlando QUANT Quintana

Rolando QUANT

Monterrey REYES

Rodolfo ROMERO Gomez

Efrain SANCHEZ Sancho

SECRET

Panama Leads Not to be Disseminated **AMMUG/1 Operation**

Thelma KING

Jorge TURNER

(Unknown) "Luis Sonrisa Case" - 2 male guitarists

SECRET

Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report — **AMHUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Francisco Javier MELLA Pena aka Francisco Xavier MELLA Dona aka "Pichi"

I. Significance of Target

a) Cuban Intelligence Service Connection

MELLA has been identified as a Singleton Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic, trained as a frogman, and also in S/W and ciphers. His exact mission on behalf of the CIS is not known.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

Subject is a member of the Castroist revolutionary Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). The APCJ is not a Communist Party *per se*; however, its present, dominant leaders are Marxist-Communist in their political direction. The APCJ is presumed penetrated by actual Communists, and is known to receive moral and material support from Cuba.

c) Information Which Could be Obtained

1. His exact mission on behalf of the Cuban Intelligence Service. What information is he required to furnish to the Service? The reason for this information.
2. What persons will he use to acquire this information? Will they all be unwitting?
3. What is his exact role as a frogman? (for arms caches, demolition etc..)
4. Information on his accomodation address in France. Additional information on his accomodation address in Jamaica.
5. Information on the relationship between Cuba and the APCJ and plans for the Dominican Republic.
6. Information on other Cuban IS agents known to him.
7. Doubling (see III for more details).

II. Current Location

Hermanos Miralles No. 5, Madrid, Spain (since February 1964, when he went there from Cuba. In Madrid, he was joined by his Dominican girl-friend, Xiomara SALADIN Decillo, whom he married there. Neither has yet returned to the Dominican Republic.) His last known address in the Dominican Republic is Avenida Independencia No. 55, Santo Domingo.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. The only information on MELLA was acquired in April 1963 when he transited Mexico enroute to Cuba. At that time MELLA became quite upset when "salio a Cuba" (left for Cuba) was stamped in his passport. Accordingly, with this being the only past information on Subject, we would be starting from "scratch".

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife: Xiomara SALADIN Decillo, Dominican citizen (no information)

Father: Luis MELLA, Dominican citizen (no information)

Mother: Noemi (nee unknown) de MELLA, Dominican citizen (no information)

(The Santo Domingo Station is presently conducting an investigation of his relatives)

b) None known to be in the United States.

V. Biographic

Date of Birth: 25 February 1937
Place of Birth: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Citizenship: Dominican Republic
Languages: Native Spanish (only language capability known to us at this time)
Physical Description: 5' 10" tall
1[illegible]0 pounds
black hair (cut short - but not crew-cut)
dark brown eyes
swarthy complexion
Photograph: Is available at the Desk
Other pertinent Data: MELLA would be described as "pretty". He has no mustache and does not shave.

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

a) 02 [illegible]TH/19 - Lives in same apartment building area as Subject. Has furnished some information on Subject and his girl-friend, which he obtained through normal contacts.

b) Jaime DURAN Hernando 06 - Operational Lead only (see separate target sheet). He is close to MELLA and also could lead us to a still unifentified CIS agent "TIBURON" who used DURAN as an unwitting courier for the delivery of microfilm to Cuba.

c) 02 [illegible]GROSS/1 - Although not a leader of the APCJ, he has good access to the APCJ's extremist "circle". He has been used with extremely good results for information on other Cuban targets of interest.

VII. Evaluation:

a) As was stated above, MELLA is completely new to us. However, the Station is currently conducting an investigation of MELLA in an effort to determine his vulnerability for recruitment/defection.

b) With the present ruling Dominican Triumvirate, Subject could be arrested if he came to security notice, not only in his position with the CIS but also if he became involved in any subversive Communist activities. In the event he is arrested he undoubtedly would be deported.

3/PJ

Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Jaime DURAN Hernando aka Jaime DURAN Hernandez aka "Jimmy"

I. Significance of Target

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

Subject is not a Cuban Intelligence Service agent, but did receive guerrilla training in Cuba.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

DURAN is Secretary-General of the pro-Castro Agrupacion Politica de Catorce Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Movement) in the Dominican Republic, and is a member of that faction of the APCJ favoring the training of its members to direct the future of a socialist government.

c) Subject is a close friend of Francisco Javier MELLA Pena, an identified Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic. Subject was also used as an "unwitting" courier by a still unidentified Cuban IS agent "TIBURON" in the Dominican Republic. Subject unwittingly carried to Cuba for "TIBURON" in September 1963, a match-book containing microfilm.

d) Utility - Penetration of the 14 June & plans & intentions of the Cubans vs D.R.

II. Current Location

Believed to be in Cuba. Has been there since September 1963.
Last known Dominican Republic address: Espaillat #20, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. (Also see VII - Evaluation)

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife - Gloria ACEVEDO de Duran, Dominican citizen (no information)
No other relatives known.

b) No known relatives in the U.S.A.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: 17 June 1933
Place of Birth: Jarabacoa, Dominican Republic
Citizenship: Dominican Republic
Language ability: Native Spanish (only ability known to us at this time)
Physical description: (requesting from the Station)
Photograph: Is available at the Desk

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

OZ
[illegible]OTH/19 - Lives in the same residential section as DURAN. Has furnished some information on Subject, which he obtains through normal contacts.

OZ
[illegible]ROSS/1 - Has provided numerous reports on DURAN's activities within the APCJ.

OZ
[illegible]UNG/1 - Has provided brief information on Subject's activities within the APCJ and his travel to Cuba.

VII. Evaluation

In that we presume that DURAN is a hard-core Communist and at present have scant information for a target assessment, immediate prospects for recruitment are virtually nill. Requirements can be levied on OZ [illegible]ROSS/1 since he is a controlled source; information could be elicited from OZ [illegible]OTH/19 and possibly from OZ [illegible]UNG/1. As developed, leads from foregoing could be followed up on, but, as indicated above, we will be starting at the bottom of the ladder on DURAN as an operational target.

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6/PN

Cuba - Dominican Republic

Target Analysis Summary Report — **AMCOG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Schuorer alias Nelson BARET Disla aka "Pupo"

I. Significance of Target

In that Subject lives in Cuba he could be extremely valuable to WH/SA and WH/2/Dominican Republic.

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

PEGUERO is the APCJ (Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio - 14th of June Political Group) representative in Cuba acting as focal point between the APCJ and the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI).

b) Communist Party Affiliation

APCJ representative in Cuba. Subject has been reported as a member of the pro-Castro faction of the APCJ since 1961 when he was exiled in Curacao.

c) Information Which Subject Could Furnish

1. Subject could furnish information on the relationship between the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ.
2. Information on the APCJ as a party, plans, members etc.
3. Information on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel known to him.
4. Possible operations of the Cuban Intelligence Service against the Dominican Republic.
5. Possible information on matters of interest to WH/SA within Cuba.
6. Doubling as a penetration of the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ.
7. Information on Dominicans being trained in Cuba, not only in guerrilla training, but as agents.

II. Current Location

Lives in Habana, Cuba (address unknown). In Cuba he goes by the name of Nelson BARET.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. No information on his activities since 1961 is known.

IV. Family and Relatives

a) Wife - Gisela SENCION de Peguero, daughter of former Dominican Consul in Curacao.

b) Children - one daughter (name and age unknown), and one son (name unknown) born in Habana, Cuba in December 1963.

c) Father - Isaias PEGUERO Perez (deceased)

d) Mother - Tulia (nee unknown) de PEGUERO (no additional information)

e) Brother - Nelson Ramon PEGUERO Sehuorer (deceased)

f) Sisters - Sobeya O. PEGUERO Schourer and Maria A. PEGUERO Sehuorer (no additional information)

g) No relatives known to be in the United States.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: 14 January 1929
Place of Birth: San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic
(NOTE: when travelling uses Dominican passport issued 28 July 1963 in the name of Nelson BARET Disla, date and place of birth: 23 January 1939, Dominican Republic; occupation: student)
Citizenship: Dominican Republic ? possibly changed to Cuban.
Language ability: Native Spanish; others not known.
Physical Description: 5'7" tal
150 pounds
brown-skinned
black eyes
wears eyeglasses
wears moustache

Photograph is available of him and also the real Nelson BARET Disla

Other pertinent data: Laboratory Technician

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

We have several sources reporting on activities of the APGJ, its members etc. within the Dominican Republic. 02 [illegible]ROSS/1 and/or 02 [illegible]TH/1? could be used to elicit information on PEDUERO through their normal contacts. 02 [illegible]ROSS/1 is being used at this time to report on other Cuban targets.

VII. Evaluation

While there is no information on hand to indicate Subject is approachable, the fact that he is in Cuba, known to AM-UG/1 - whom might approach him - and has been identified to us he becomes of operational interest. Obviously our objective is to continue our interest and collect what information we might, awaiting the day for his exit from Cuba. At that time more definitive action might be considered. His importance as a source of information on inside Cuba and that country's intention and capabilities on the Dominican Republic cannot be discounted and merit our continued alertness to his activities and whereabouts.

3/A

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Roque DALTON Garcia

I. Significance of Target

DALTON is a recruited agent of the Cuban DGI. He has been trained in guerrilla warfare, s/w, radio transmission, and radio reception. AMMUG/1 claims that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCES. AMMUG/1 characterized Subject as having excellent contacts within the DGI in Cuba. Subject is in contact with Mauricio de la Selva Venegas, the Salvadoran intermediary, in Mexico City. In view of the above, Subject could be expected to furnish considerable information on both the PCES in El Salvador and his activities for the DGI.

II. Current Location

Subject was deported from El Salvador to Mexico in late January 1964. On 16 June 1964 Subject was spotted by the Salvadoran National Police in San Salvador, and is now under surveillance. Exact address will be obtained by the San Salvadoran Station.

III. Vulnerabilities

AMMUG/1 lists Subject as his leading candidate for recruitment by us. His reasoning on this is that Subject is not highly motivated, has a weakness for women and the easy life, and a generally weak nature. AMMUG/1 says that Subject is very intelligent, but never showed a real desire to learn during his Cuban training. Subject was given 600 dollars to purchase a radio receiver upon his return from Cuba, but he apparently spent the money on himself.

IV. Family and Relatives

Father (deceased) was U.S. citizen. One of Subject's three brothers fought for the U.S. in Okinawa. A sister, Margarita, is Mexican citizen who now is in Cubaas a student.

V. Biographic Data

DOB: 14 May 1935
POB: San Salvador, El Salvador
Nationality: Salvadoran
Language Ability: Native Spanish; others not known
Physical Description: Height 1.68 meters; long thin face; black eyes; two gold teech; thinlipped; black hair parted on left side.
Photo Available: Yes

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

Subject is known 24 personally by AMMUG-1 16-26 and by 02 JUGRIN-1, recently recruited agent of San Salvador Station. Subject is presently under surveillance by the National Police in San Salvador (Station has unilateral penetration of 24 the police who might be used as a lead into Subject).

VII. Evaluation

From AMMUG-1's assessment of Subject, based on personal knowledge and observation, it would appear that Subject would not be a too difficult target to hit. However, some of his personal characteristics which have made him a handling problem for the DGI would presumably make him a handling problem for us. His failure to perform for the DGI since October 1963 might mitigate against our use of him which would include, presumably, resumption of his s/w channel. Nonetheless, AMMUG-1's claim that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCES (news to us) makes him an operational target for that reason alone.

4/PV

Haiti

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMHUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Jean Norbert MONTERO

I. Significance of Target

a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service

At this time Subject is not an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service. He is currently in Cuba seeking assistance from the DGI for the training of Haitians in guerrilla warfare activities for an eventual thrust against Haiti to oust President Francois DUVALIER.

b) Communist Party Affiliation

Secretary-General of the Haitian Liberation Front, a newly formed party, with the ultimate aim of merging the two communist parties of Haiti. /Sensitive information available at the Desk indicates that this party is Moscow influenced./

c) Information which Subject Could Furnish

1. Subject could provide valuable information on the Haitian Liberation Front, i.e., its members, plans, status with the USSR/Cuba etc.

2. Information on the USSR/Cuba position with respect to Haiti.

3. Information on USSR/Cuba influence and penetrations of Haitian exile circles.

4. Information on Cuban's relationship with President Francois DUVALIER.

5. Information on Haitians now in Cuba and/or the USSR.

II. Current Location

As of April 1964 he was living at the Hotel Calina in Habana, Cuba. His permanent residence is believed to be in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic where he has been in exile.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

None known. He is strongly anti-DUVALIER. In that many Haitian exile circles are somewhat down on the United States as a result of the unsuccessful September 1963 invasion of Haiti, it is possible that Subject merely turned to the "left" for assistance in overthrowing DUVALIER. It is however quite feasible that he would cooperate with the United States if he felt we were taking an anti-DUVALIER stand.

IV. Family and Relatives

None known.

V. Biographic Data

Date of Birth: Unknown
Place of Birth: Haiti (?)
Citizenship: Haitian
Language ability: Native French or Creole; very little Spanish
Physical description: [illegible] feet tall
1[illegible]0 pounds
wears moustache
Negro
Photograph is not available
Other pertinent data: None

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

a) [02 [illegible]LACH/1 - [Haitian exile leader in the Dominican Republic who 24 housed the MONTERO exile group in 1963.]

b) [02 [illegible]USH/1 - [Haitian exile in the Dominican Republic who stayed 024 with MONTERO in the Dominican Republic in 1963.]

c) [02 [illegible]/1 - [Asset in 024 Haiti] who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding MONTERO.

d) [02 [illegible]ION/1 - [Asset in 24 Haiti] who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding MONTERO.

VII. Evaluation

a) Until information has been gleaned from the assets cited in VI above regarding MONTERO's vulnerability to recruitment little can be done. However, as was pointed out in III above, it is highly probable that Subject merely turned to Cuba for assistance in overthrowing President DUVALIER of Haiti.

8/17N

b) Subject is not subject to arrest when he returns to the Dominican Republic, unless of course, his activities with the Cubans become known. In any event he definitely would not return to Haiti, as he would immediately be imprisoned and most probably tortured and killed.

Target Analysis Summary Report **AMMUG/1 Operation**

SUBJECT: Noel GUERRERO Santiago (201-81510)

I. Significance of Target

GUERRERO is presently in Mexico and is "intermediary" between Cuban IS and the FLN in Nicaragua. His Cuban Intel pseudo is Andres Madariaga. AMMUG-1 saw him in Mexico in March 1964 regarding funds which the DGI had provided the FLN. According to AMMUG-1 GUERRERO is involved in "Hijos de la Tempestad" which also involves three or four other DGI agents. AMMUG-1 also reported that GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. By other sources he has been described as one of the main Communists in Central America. He was in Cuba in 1959 to get Cuban aid from the revolutionary movement against Nicaragua. He was formerly a member of the Communist Party in Mexico. He was a cell leader in Corinto and advisor to the Stevador's Union.

II. Current Location

He is presently in Mexico. He was a political exile in Honduras in 1959. He has travelled extensively throughout Central America and may have been clandestinely in Nicaragua in July 1963.

III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection)

AMMUG-1: GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him, and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. Among AMMUG-1 documents is a critique of the abortive incursion in Nicaragua in July 1963 by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Quant Quintana which blames GUERRERO for its failure. GUERRERO's own account admits certain mistakes and tries to justify others. However, it must be borne in mind that GUERRERO is a long time

Communist, anti-Somoza revolutionary.

IV. Family and Relatives

Wife: Ofolia Chacon
Brother: Dr. Eloy GUERRERO Santiago, suspected Communist, says Noel is Communist. Eloy is anti-Somoza, has spent time in jail.
Father: Jose F. GUERRERO Castillo, resident of Leon (DOI: 1955)

V. Personalia

DOB: 12 April 1914
POB: Leon, Nicaragua
Nationality: Nicaraguan
Languages: Spanish and English
Religion: Professes none
Education: 2 courses first year law
Photo: Available in Biographic Register
Physical description: 5'3', grey hair, dark brown eyes, complexion triqueno claro (light brunette).'

VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection

AMMUG-1 knows him personally, was in contact with him in Mexico in March 1964.

VII. Evaluation

In 1942 or 1947 (reported both ways) GUERRERO was expelled from the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) according to another member of the PCM (LIMOAN) who was a recruitment candidate (but dropped), and who said that GUERRERO might then be amenable to recruitment. Apparently no attempt was made to recruit him. He has been recorded throughout the years since as an active Communist revolutionary and was exiled from Nicaragua for revolutionary activities in 1959. Also in 1959 he went to Cuba and was active there in preparing for the revolutionary movement in all Latin America. He apparently was working for Cuban IS at the time of the abortive revolutionary attempt against Nicaragua in 1963, as a document provided by AMMUG-1 written by Madariaga (GUERRERO's psuedo) attempts to point out reasons for its failure. Another document written by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Quant blames "Andres" (GUERRERO) for its failure. GUERRERO, however, must still be in the good graces of the Cuban IS, if he is an agent in the "Hijos de la Tempestad" and serves as "intermediary" to the FLN, or remnants which may be reorganizing. It seems highly unlikely that GUERRERO would be receptive to either recruitment or defection. AMMUG-1 knows him personally and met with him in Mexico in March 1964. It would appear that AMMUG-1 could furnish more information about his contact with GUERRERO which would be helpful in an assessment of GUERRERO.

There is a report that GUERRERO was in Nicaragua clandestinely in 1962. He would undoubtedly be arrested should he return there and his presence discovered by the Nicaraguans.

NOTE: This is not a complete target analysis and should not be used as such.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO: Chief of Station, [Bogota] 16-11

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/Operational Photograph of "Comandante William"

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AS STATED

REFERENCE: UFGA-27105

RETURN TO CIA
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It is requested that the photograph of "Comandante William" be shown to the AMBINGO's for possible identification. Subject claimed to have received two years' pilot training at San Antonio de los Banos Air Base, reportedly sometime in 1965 and 1966, and may have worked as a Cubana pilot. While he was in Cuba he used the name Ernesto Castro Moro. Please notify [Bogota Station] 16-11 of the results.

Constance M. QUILHOT

Distribution:
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1 - COS/[Bogota] 16-11

201-749651

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	SECRET	201-749651

15 March 1967

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1 - WH/3/C
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS	[I. GALLIHER] 03	mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/CICS		H T Mahoney Harry T. Mahoney
WH/COG/MO		[illegible] 03
C/WH/COG.	17/[illegible]	[illegible]
ADC/WH/3/[illegible]	17 Mar 67	[illegible] 03

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
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[illegible]		[illegible]	

7/920

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AMMUG/1 701

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SECRET 081542Z CITE [SANTO DOMINGO] 2554 16-10 8 JUL 67 · 73441
DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, [CARACAS] 16-17
REF: [SANTO DOMINGO] 2561 16-10 (NOT SENT JMWAVE) (IN 73380)*
~~KAPOK~~ DYVOUR PBRUMEN

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1. OTHER TOPICS MENTIONED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CUBANS AND MR-1J4 REPS, AND NOT INCLUDED IN REFERENCE DUE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT, WERE:

A. [PICHI MELLA] 06 CASE. CUBANS TOLD DOMINICANS TO REVIEW ALL THE "COMPANEROS" WHO WERE IN CUBA WITH [PICHI] 06 AND TO BE CAREFUL WITH AND "VIGILAR" [MELLA] 06 THEY ADD THAT [MELLA] 06 MUST MOVE AND AVOID MEETING WITH THE "TIPO" ANYMORE. NEXT SENTENCE SAYS, "IMPORTANTE: AJUSTICIAMIENTO DE VICTOR". VICTOR ALSO REFERRED TO AS AGENT OF CIA AND TRAITOR.

B. DOMINICANS ALSO DISCUSS "GRUPO FRANCES" WITH CUBANS. CUBANS SAY THAT THEY BELIEVE GROUP IS COLLABORATING WITH FRENCH AND YANKEES (CIA) BECAUSE OF THE EASE WITH WHICH THEY GET THINGS DONE. CUBANS ADD THAT THESE PEOPLE (GRUPO FRANCES) GOT IN TOUCH WITH MR-1J4 THROUGH LUIS GENAO AND FIDELIO DESPRADEL.

C. CUBANS SAY THEY ARE INVESTIGATING CONTACT THAT GENAO (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) MADE A FEW MONTHS AGO IN NEW YORK

1

7/90

PAGE 2 SANGO DOMINGO 2564 S E C R E T SECRET

WITH MEMBERS MR-1J4 (WIDOW MINAYA). CUBANS ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT PROBLEM OF GENAO AND WHO TO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM IN MR-1J4. NO INDICATION THAT THIS GENAO IDENTIFIABLE WITH LUIS GENAO ESPAILLAT.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH RELAY REFERENCE TO JMWAVE.

3. FOR JMWAVE: REFERENCE WAS LISTING AND DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENTS CONFISCATED FROM [DOMINICAN COMMUNIST COURIER FERNANDO DE LA ROSA BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS] 24

S E C R E T

BT

* SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL TYPES AND CATEGORIES OF INFO AVAILABLE TO STATION FROM [FERNANDO DE LA ROSA] CASE AND FROM CONFISCATED PAPERS. 06

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MESSAGE FORM
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[redacted]

XX ω.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

ORIG : JOHN A. CASTORO/EIh&K RID
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EXT : 2640 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 7 DECEMBER 66 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-749651

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8 19 22 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58190

TO JMWAVE

AMMUG/1
201

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: JMWAVE 4480 (IN 54041)

1. RE PARA ONE REF, (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) MAIN OFFICE LOCATED IN BALTIMORE. REF PROVIDES ALL INFO NECESSARY FOR WOGAME ANSWER CREDIT QUERIES. 29

2. RE PURCHASE OF HOME, HQS RECOMMENDS AMMUG/1 DEFER DECISION UNTIL QUESTION HIS WOFACT FUTURE DEFINITELY SETTLED. FYI: LANGOSCH HAS REQUESTED AMMUG/1 SERVICES (IN FRANKFURT) BUT QUESTION NOT YET DETERMINED. DISPATCH FOLLOWING. 24

END OF MESSAGE

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/FI 03
WH/C/MO 03
COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES 03
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

8-2
SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SEC/EG 4, CCS 3, C/OA, C/OPS 201

AN FI
ABSTRACT X

S E C R E T 062311Z CITE WAVE JMWAVE 4480

ES

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011

6 Dec 66 IN 54041

1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE LATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 USED AS STATUS COVER 29 (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCHER WITH SALARY $600 29 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE (BALTIMORE COMPANY) AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH, COMPANY. REQUEST HQS CLARIFY.

2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OTHER PBRUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE REVISED AMMUG/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STATUS COVER. 29 STATION NEGLECTED INFORM WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. (SCHEAFFER) EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN 1 JAN 66. THERE WAS NO INTERIM EMPLOYMENT.

CS COPY

3. SEVERAL OTHER CREDIT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED BY 29 (SCHEAFFER) HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS BE REASON FOR PRESENT

SECRET

201-749651

6 Dec. 1966

5/PN

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 S E C R E T

CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO EXPEDITE CLOSING PURCHASE.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Jack Flynn	3/23	JF.
2	Hal [illegible]		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☑	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FYI

I've been asked to brief
the [illegible] [illegible] your [illegible]
mostly and [illegible] [illegible].
([illegible] [illegible] like to participate)
not participate - would like to talk to
you on this. J

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE

Hal

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FORM NO. 237 2-61 Use previous editions (40)

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT : Covert Training for member of CIWOOD 01 organization

REFERENCE : Proposed Training Curriculum for CIWOOD 01 Trainees From CC/OS/TR

1. 01 It is requested that covert training be given to the CIWOOD trainees listed below for the period of 8 March - 30 April 1965. This will be the second group of CIWOOD 01 trainees under this program which was initiated by the 11 Venezuelan Desk of Branch Three of WH Division through 03 Mr. Rawleigh Taylor, Chief, Covert Training, in September 1964. The first group has been given an 8 weeks covert course ending on 26 February 1965. The trainees will be in Washington under the notional cover of "participating in military training courses" or possibly a "purchasing mission" for their Government. As such, they will not be formal liaison visitors and will not be expected to enter Headquarters buildings, except for one day training in the R & S Building, or to meet Agency officials.

2. Project CIWOOD 01 is a Caracas 16-17 Station liaison 24 activity which has as its objectives the establishment 24 of a liaison relationship with the Venezuelan Armed Forces Intelligence Service, (SIFA) 24 to permit CIA to improve the efficiency and capabilities of SIFA and provide CIA access to its intelligence take, and to eventually recruit a member of SIFA. 24 Jacob B. HURSCHWOOD, a Staff Agent under non-official cover in Caracas is 16-17 providing advice and guidance to SIFA and is obtaining intelligence information in return. 24 It is believed that covert training can help improve the efficiency and

14/20

24

internal security of SIFA which will enable this organization to more effectively combat the extremist guerrilla and terrorist activity fomented by the 11 Communist Party of Venezuela with aid and encouragement 11 from Cuba. Venezuela is getting maximum attention from Castro in his effort to bring about communist take-over in Latin America. Besides the inherent value of the training itself, the granting of the training will help IMMSCHOOL improve his daily operational association with SIFA and enhance his opportunity of making a success- 24 ful recruitment in the future. Orientation in Counter 24 Insurgency is also being included to give SIFA officials a greater awareness of the problem and thus to lay the ground work for future work in this field.

03

3. The responsible desk operations officer for this course will be Mr. William E. Cavan, who will be known to the trainees as "Bill Cabal", the same identity he used with the first group. An Agency serviced telephone number, 638-3120 has been arranged and will be given to the trainees as a number where "Bill Cabal" can be reached in an emergency. 03 This number is serviced 24 hours a day and Mr. Cavan is immediately notified to call the persons who asked for him at that number. Mr. Cavan 03 is located in room 382613 of Headquarters Building, extension 4521.

4. The following is pertinent biographic data on the trainees:

a. Lt. Colonel Mario FAJARDO Lobato 06

DPOB: La Guaira, Venezuela, 25 September 1923 08

Marital Status: Married 9 April 1949. Has three small children.

10

Formal Education: High School, Caracas (dates unknown). A graduate of the 08 Venezuelan Military Academy in 1950. Attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1958 and studied English at American University. In 1961 09 he attended the Argentine Army 08 School of War for approximately 12 months.

14/20

Language Ability: Spanish and some English. (English listed as "fair")

Present Status: Chief of Administration of SIFA 08

Area Knowledge: Has visited the USA and Argentina

Previous Intelligence Training: None indicated, but has probably had some intelligence training either in the 08 Venezuelan Army or his Argentine 11 course.

Other: RURSCHWOOD considers Fajardo 06 as a potential 24 recruit on return to Venezuela and suggests he be given special attention. 11

b. Major Luis Alfonso OCHOA 06

DPOB: 9 September 1928, Las Dantas, State of Bolivar, Venezuela 08

Marital Status: Married 1952, has 5 small children

Formal Education: High School, Caracas 10, 1946-1950. Entered the Venezuelan military 08 service in 1948 and has taken intermediate and advanced courses in the Venezuelan Infantry 08 School. He has commanded rifle platoons and infantry companies and has been an instructor in the Infantry School of the Venezuelan Army. 08

Language Ability: Only native Spanish

Present Status: SIFA 08 Official; exact title not indicated.

Previous Intelligence Training: not indicated

c. Lt. Colonel Raul JIMENEZ Gainza 06

DPOB: 16 December 1932, San Felipe, State of Yaracuy, Venezuela 08

Martial Status: Married - wife is Matilda Abreu de Jimenez 06

16/20

Formal Education: Not listed, but probably a graduate of the Venezuelan 08 Military Academy.

Language Ability: Not indicated

Present Status: Deputy Director of SIFA 08

Previous Intelligence Training: Not indicated

Area Knowledge: Not indicated.

Other: 06 Jimenez has recently been named Deputy 08 Director of SIFA and should be given deference as the leader of the group.

d. Lt. Colonel Solis Antonio MARTINEZ 06

DPOB: 3 August 1926, San Luis, State of Falcon, 08 Venezuela

Martial Status: Married, three children

Formal Education: High School, 10 Caracas 1940-1944; 08 Venezuela Military Academy 1944-1947 (graduate). Also completed specialized courses in Infantry 08 Tactics and Tank Warfare, as well as the course of study given by the Superior War College of the 08 Venezuelan Ministry of War. He has served in a variety of capacities within the Venezuelan 08 Army since 1947, commanding everything from platoons through battalions as well as instructor 08 of artillery. He has seen action against the guerrillas in the 08 State of Falcon. He served in 08 Colombia dates unknown, as a member of the Venezuelan mission to "Operation America". 08

Language Ability: Native Spanish, reads but does not speak or write English. His competence in understanding English is given as "fair".

Area Knowledge: Subject's only travel outside of Venezuela was to Colombia.
11 11

Previous Intelligence
Training: None indicated but probably has had some intelligence training during his military 08 career.

08 29
Other: He is Chief of Investigations of the SIFA, and will probably return to this position. It is possible that he is aware of Station's 24 police liaison with Venezuelan political 24 police (DIGEPOL), without knowing the details of the relationship.

06 5. POA's for training have been granted for Fajardo 06 and Martinez and are pending for OCHOA 06 and Jimenez 06. It is assumed that the trainees are aware of the Agency affiliation of HURSCHWOOD 24 and that the training will be conducted by CIA. The Director of SIFA is aware of HURSCHWOOD's CIA association and was also received by the DCI on 21 July 1964 during a visit to the U.S.

6. Training Requirements: The training should be held in a safehouse, conducted in Spanish and on a full time basis. The suggested dates are from 8 March through 30 April 1965, which have been approved by Chief, Covert Training, OS/TR. The trainees will use notional military training cover during the training period, and it is not anticipated they will enter Headquarters building. They will be taken into the R & S Building for a one-day indoctrination in Seals and Flaps and Audio Surveillance. Requests for this entrance will be covered in a separate paragraph. A one-day orientation course in Counter Insurgency is also discussed in a subsequent paragraph as well as an extensive two-week course in Flaps and Seals for Major Ochoa at a TSD Safe House.
06 16-17

7. Requirements for OTR/OS/Covert Training: Station Caracas has submitted the following recommendations as areas which should be covered in the training of these officers: OTR/OS/Covert Training may modify and/or adapt the list as necessary.

a. The Organization of Clandestine Activities

b. Security

c. Observation and Description (Casing)

1460

d. Surveillance

e. Agent Acquisition
   1. Spotting
   2. Assessment
   3. Recruitment
   4. Training
   5. Management
   6. Termination

f. Clandestine Communications

g. Counter Intelligence

h. Interrogation

i. Reporting

j. Intelligence Research and Analysis

8. It is requested 06 that Ground Branch of SOD make the services of Colonel Valeriano available for a one-day orientation in the latest techniques used in the field of counterinsurgency. The trainees are well aware of the general problems and history of fighting guerrillas and are actively engaged in operations at the present. It is suggested that the instructions stress use of intelligence in combatting guerrilla groups and means of procuring it to include the creation of intelligence nets among peasants in the afflicted areas. It is also believed that any current information on modifications in the tactics of Mao Tse-tung would also be of value as would be examples of the use of psychological warfare programs against the guerrillas and the intellectual leaders of the communist party, considered as the moving force behind the guerrilla movement in Venezuela. It is proposed that Mr. Cavan, 03 who would use the alias of "Bill Cabal", take the trainees to the office of Valeriano 06 and that Valeriano 06 be introduced as a consultant of CIA who is very knowledgeable of counterinsurgency problems. 06 Valeriano, as a member of the International Police Services Academy, has talked to other Latin American officials on this problem as part of his overt duties. It is believed his talks will make SIFA 29 more aware of the threats of insurgency movements and also lay the ground work for possible future association with SIFA 29 or the Venezuelan 06 Government in the counterinsurgency

field. Through Mr. 03 Ellis, Chief of the Ground Branch of SOD, and Mr. Wall, of the same branch, one-half day orientation course was given to the first trainees who suggested that a full day would be sufficient due to the level of the above trainees and the experience they have in this field.

9. 03 Arrangements have been made with Mr. Luria and Mr. Fritz Nekol of TSD/Training to provide Major Luis 06 Alfonso Ochoa with a Flaps and Seals course for the period of 19-30 April at a TSD Safe House. It is believed the Flaps and Seals course will benefit CIA because it will offer HURSCHWOOD the opportunity to maintain closer contact with Ochoa 06 who will be responsible for this type activity 29 in SIFA. SIFA 29 proposes to make a concerted effort in the letter intercept field to keep better informed of the extreme leftist efforts to overthrow the 11 Venezuelan government, and it is felt that HURSCHWOOD can keep abreast of the operation. Because of SIFA's 29 responsibilities, it is believed that the more efficient effort that SIFA 29 can make in this field will result to the benefit of CIA. 06 Major Ochoa would take the first six weeks of the covert training course then devote the last two weeks to the Flaps and Seals course.

10. It is also requested that TSD/Training provide a one-day course in Audio Surveillance and Flaps and Seals for the other three trainees at the R & S Building. This should be a very general briefing with the least possible emphasis on complicated, expensive equipment that might be later requested by the trainees. It is believed this general introduction will give the SIFA 29 trainees some idea as to approaches and problems involved in these fields as well as the pitfalls that should be avoided. This one-day course was given to the first three trainees who appeared impressed with the concepts exposed to them. This subject has also been discussed with Mr. Luria and a firm date has been selected for the training. The OTR instructor will accompany the trainees and act as translator.

It is requested that CI/OA obtain permission for the visitors to enter the R & S building for this training which is scheduled for the 19th of April.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Concurrences:

DC/CI

DDP Training and Qualification Review

03
WH/3/V/WECAVAN:lp (24 Feb. 65)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/TRO
1 - CI/Staff
1 - FI/OPS
2 - TSD/TRNG
1 - SOD/Ground
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/Plans
2 - WH/3(V) 08

SECRET

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

RETURN TO CIA
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Exhibits

1 Cuban pp in name of Fernando MONTERO [illegible]
issued to [Fernando MONTERREY Pérez] 06
Nicaraguan, trained in guerrilla
warfare in Cuba 1963

2 Cuban pp in name of Carlos PEREZ Ramos
issued to [José Antonio GARCIA Rivera] 06
aka [Carlos MIRELLOS Ramirez] 06
Salvadorian, trained in guerrilla warfare
in Cuba 1963

3 Cuban pp in name of Sergio PERAZA Ortiz
issued to [Pedro 06 SANTACRUZ Castro]
aka 06 [Rigoberto LOPEZ Pérez]
Salvadorean, trained in guerrilla warfare
in Cuba 1963

4 Cuban pp in name of Juan GONZALEZ Pérez
issued to [Francisco DURAN Camacho] 06 Guatemalan,
trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba 1963

5 Cuban pp in name of [illegible] Lima
issued to [[illegible] 06 [illegible] Guatemalan]
trained in guerrilla warfare in Cuba 1963

6 Report on [illegible] 06 [[illegible]] 15 Mar 65

Exhibits

7. DGI Case file "ZAPOTE" containing

a) Data on 3 agents
   ① [Roque DALTON Garcia] 06
   ② [Alejandro [illegible] Gomez] 06
   ③ [Jose Alberto CALDERON Carrillo] 06

b) SW instructions
   ① Legal ltr. signature for agent + Case Officer
   ② Accommodation address + description of occupant

c) CO means
   ① SW + 2-way radio
   ② Reactivation of [illegible]
   ③ Fixed dates
   ④ Advance of funds

d) Contact plan for [MONTANO] 06
   ① Place of meeting - primary
   ② Signal - telegram with key phrase
   ③ Recognition signals
   ④ Alternate meeting site
   ⑤ Signal - telegram with key phrase
   6 Recognition signals

e) Concealment device [illegible] for [DALTON] 06

f) Itinerary for [DALTON] 06

g) Communications means for [MONTANO] 06

h) Itinerary for [MONTANO] 06

i) " " [CALDERON] 06

9/90

j) Clandestine commo: micro from hq to Mexico (3)
 ① Plain text
 ② Substitution
k) Clandestine commo: memo from Mexico to hq
l) 3 envelopes used for SW message, message forwarding it from Mexico (letter drop), request for lab exam, lab reports
m) Clandestine message hq to Mexi warning [illegible]
n) Case officer complaint to [illegible]
o) Clandestine message from hq to Mexi

8. Translation of ZAPOTE case file contents in inner envelope

9. Chart of DG I organization

10. English [illegible]

11. Ops CS dissemination

OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 8 February 1966 - 31 December 1970

ALIAS DOCUMENTATION AND TRAVEL

(21)

FORM 10-75 2731 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 006457

ULV 14 June 76

14-00000

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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DISSEM BY PER #

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ACTION UNIT
TSD

INFO

FILE, VR RI/AN, WH 8, DDP

ACTION NO.
538

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 0697

DITC

31 Dec 70 235964

U

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG AQUATIC

REF: DIRTECH 0696 (IN 236095)

IDENTITY MR LESTER L RHODES
6716 EDSAL ROAD
SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22151 GP-1

S E C R ET.

END OF MESSAGE

ORIG: DONALD KATER ACOP/TSD

LEASING OFFICER KONALD KATER TSD/COP

FI

CS COPY

31 Dec 70

201-749651

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT TSD

INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH 8, DDP

ACTION NO. 539

114

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 73 CITE DIRTECH 3696

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMYUG AQUATIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9915

SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1.

S E C R E T

2 JAN [illegible] 236095

V Day

SECRET

31 DEC 70

31 December 1970
WH/COG - 70-447

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Ruffner

SUBJECT : Amendment of OA for AMMUG/1

It is requested that the Operational Approval for AMMUG/1 (201-749651) be amended to permit his operational use outside the United States.

Bernice Turbeville
WH/COG/OPS

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - Originator

31 Dec 70

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Turbeville

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 888

31 DEC 70 IN 235662

SECRET 311239Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2755

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR THE HAGUE LONDON

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2743 (IN 234495)

1. LIAISON TRAVEL LIST DATED 21 DECEMBER SHOWS ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ LEFT FOR CASABLANCA ON THAT DATE. LIAISON LISTS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE.

2. FILE 201-865545M GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

31 Dec 70

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 881

S E C R E T 311131Z DEC 70 CITE THE HAGUE 8901

WHMIAMI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

31 DEC 70 IN 235592

592

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 09883 (IN 234350)

1. DEPENDING ON NATURE AND DEGREE WH/MIAMI INTEREST SUBJECT REF, WOULD RECOMMEND WATCHLISTING WITH DUTCH LIAISON WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE TIMELY INFORMATION ON SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL, RESIDENCE WHILE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ONWARD ITINERARY. OTHERWISE, STATION WILL AT BEST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE AFTER THE FACT TRAVEL DATA. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER WATCHLISTING DESIRED.

2. WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WATCHLISTING WILL SIGNAL JKLANCE INTEREST, ALTHOUGH WE ESTIMATE LITTLE IF ANY LIAISON CONCERN. ALSO THAT STATION MUST, IN GENERAL, LIMIT OVERALL VOLUME WATCHLISTING REQUIREMENTS.

3. FOR DIRECTOR. RECOMMEND HQS BE ALERT TO TRACES SUBJECT REF IN MATERIAL FORWARDED UNDER ONHA-37367 AND RELATED.

4. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

31 Dec. 70

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

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1	CCG	5	OPS
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3		7	RP
4	~~[illegible]~~	8	

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 942

S E C R E T 311721Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9914

31 DEC 70 IN 235845

THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

TYPIC

REF: THE HAGUE 8991 (IN 235592)

1. AFTER WEIGHING REF CONSIDERATIONS AND OUR NEED TO NAIL DOWN SUBJECT'S LOCATION, REQUEST THE HAGUE WATCHLIST SUBJECT OF REF WITH DUTCH LIAISON.

2. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1

S E C R E T

31 Dec 70

FORM 2/36 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 21-1

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DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT 648   INFO   FILE, VR 2/ON, EUR 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 722

Hold for further [illegible] from [illegible]

S E C R E T 291714Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2743   29 DEC 70 IN 234495

LONDON, WH/MIAMI INFO THE HAGUE, PARIS, DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUTIMID

REF: WH/MIAMI 09383 (IN 234350)

1. RE PARA 1 REF, ON 21 DECEMBER ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART CALLED DIONISIO ARRANZ TREMOLS, CUBAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN LONDON, AND TOLD HIM HE LEAVING THAT DATE FOR LONDON. LLOMPART, WHO TRAVELLING WITH EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVEREZ, WAS TO BE ME~~Y~~T BY ARRANZ AT AIRPORT.

2. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, BLANQUITA (PROBABLY BLANCA CALVET, ADMINISTRATOR CUBAN COMMERCIAL OFFICE LONDON) CALLED RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND SAID SHE LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT. RODRIGUEZ ASKED BLANCA NOT GIVE UP APARTMENT IN LONDON WHICH THEY SCHEDULED GIVE UP 1 JANUARY SO THAT HE MIGHT USE IT.

3. BOTH ARRANZ AND BLANQUITA ASKED RODRIGUEZ ABOUT HIS BROTHER'S EYESIGHT TO WHICH RODRIGUEZ REPLIED HE GETTING ALONG QUITE WELL.

4. FILE 201-8655547. GP-1

S E C R E T

29 Dec 70

SECRET

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DEC 29 2 55 PM '70

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO. 715

S E C R E T 291422 DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 09883

IN 234350

PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE, PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID

TYPIC

REF: MADRID 2727 (NOT SENT PARIS)

(L 233739)

1. REQUEST THAT JAGUAR: A.) CONFIRM LONDON ARRIVAL OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. B.) IF POSSIBLE, PROVIDE PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS.

2. FOR THE HAGUE: REQUEST YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA.

3. FOR PARIS: REF REPORTED THAT RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MADRID FOR LONDON ON 21 DECEMBER AND INDICATED THAT HE PLANNING A 40-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP INCLUDING A POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE. NO SPECIFICS AVAILABLE. REQUEST THAT YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA.

4. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

29 Dec 70

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION   CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

WH

1555

FILE, VR

013

28DEC70 [illegible]

S E C R E T 281527Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2727

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, THE HAGUE, LONDON

TYPIC

REFS: A. MADRID 2715 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (IN 231249)

B. DIRECTOR 397508 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON)

C. WH/MIAMI 9865 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (IN 232901)

1. ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART SCHEDULED DEPART MADRID FOR LONDON 21 DECEMBER 1970. QUTIMID REVEALS HE PLANNING 40-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP AND MENTIONED POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE (DATES NOT SPECIFIED).

2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

28 Dec 70

EDITIONS

11

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BY: ____ AT: 1530 Z

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 539

SECRET 241437Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9865

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

24 DEC 70 232901

TYPIC

REF MADRID 2715 (-23249)

1. PLS PROVIDE ANY INFO AVAILABLE ON PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP1.

SECRET

24 Dec 70

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 54 ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

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ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR ADAN DO4 CDC CI/IC2 CAS CA/PROP CA/REG DDP ADDP CSDO F2

ACTION NO. 742

S E C R E T 161847Z SEP 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 8936 (KOPAN D1)

DO BASE NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR

18 SEP 70 IN 166076

TYPIC AMROSE DOMOPS

REFERENCE: DO BASE NEW YORK 8155 (N160121)

1. STATION WENT THROUGH FILES OF AMMUG-1 AND AMDAUB-1 AND HAD OUTSIDE OFFICERS CONTACT THEM TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF REF PROPOSAL.

2. AMMUG-1 AND STATION FEEL THAT ANY PUBLICITY GIVEN HIM AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY BE DETRIMENTAL. HE IS HAPPILY SETTLED AND DOES NOT WANT HIS PAST BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS NEIGHBORS OR PERSONS HE WORKS WITH.

3. AMDAUB-1 ON THE OTHER HAND IS SETTLED BUT CURRENTLY HAS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS DUE TO INACTIVITY CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS, FAMILY PROBLEMS, ETC., ALL OF WHICH ARE NOT CONDUCIVE FOR ANY INTERVIEW.

4. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING WE FEEL THAT THE TIME IS NOT PROPITIOUS FOR ANY ARTICLES

AN
AB
IN
FS
BX
DES NFD
FI

files

201-802332

~~[illegible]~~

SECRET

File: 201-749651

~~[illegible]~~

1 Sept. 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 8936 SECRET

TO BE PUBLISHED AT LEAST ON THESE TWO DEFECTORS.

5. FILE: 201-354406. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-749651

14-00000

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-378

FILE NO - 201-749651

DATE - 22 MAY 1970

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - NO

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - CITIZENSHIP OF AMMUG-1

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - UFAX-14 DATED 13 JAN 70
UFAW-771 DATED 3 FEB 70
UFAA-1844 DATED 6 MAR 70

WH
AB
FI

1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMUG-1.

2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION.

Joyce K. Jawgiel
JOYCE K. JAWGIEL

DISTRIBUTION
3 - COS, WH/MIAMI

COORDINATE:

C/WH/COG/OP

WH/COG/OP/Geisler:kgb 22May70
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1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - Originator

CS COPY

C/WH/COG

22 May 70
201-749651

DISPATCH S-E-C-R-

TO Chief of Station, WH/Miami	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

Reference: UFAW-878

Attached is a copy of Bill No. HR 17740 which may be passed to Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera.

Joyce K. JAWGIEL

Distribution
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att herewith

CS CO

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAW-883	DATE 3 JUN 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

28 May 1970

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ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OP/Daryl Geisler		kgb	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OP	25/5	Glenn Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	28/5	James Flannery

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11 69 (40)

DISPATCH

3 Jun 70

91st CONGRESS
2d SESSION

H. R. 17740

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 20, 1970

Mr. RODINO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

For the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, who was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on July 2, 1964, shall be held and considered not to be within the classes of persons whose naturalization is prohibited by the provisions of section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

III

CS COPY

H/watt to UFAW-853

201-749651

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAW-373

FILE NO - 201-749651

DATE - 22 MAY 1970

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - NO

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - D CITIZENSHIP OF AMMUG-1

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - UFAX-14 DATED 13 JAN 70
UFAW-771 DATED 3 FEB 70
UFAA-1344 DATED 6 MAR 70

1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMUG-1.

2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION.

JOYCE K. JANGIEL

DISTRIBUTION
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COORDINATE:

FI

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C/WH/COG/OP

C/WH/COG

201-749651
22 May 70

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

AMMUG /1/
201-749651
SEX M DOB ?

201-824335
UFAA-01982
04 MAY 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN CSR

R 7005080080

FILE IN 201-749651

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, WH/Miami			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Status of AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: Para 2, below

References: A. UFAX-14
B. UFAW-771
C. UFAW-730

1. Forwarded herewith is the most recent contact report from Hensry S. PACHANKIS concerning AMMUG-1.

2. As indicated, PACHANKIS broke the bad news contained in Reference B on AMMUG-1's citizenship. AMMUG-1 apparently took the news as well as could be expected. Nevertheless, the Station would appreciate periodic notice on the status of AMMUG-1's case so we may keep him informed on any progress.

3. In regard to Reference C, PACHANKIS probed in the area of wife problems and never really resolved the situation. PACHANKIS seemed to think, however, that the wife is still living with AMMUG-1.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w

MAR 6 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1844	DATE 2 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

[illegible] February 1970

SUBJECT: Contact Report [illegible]

1. A-1 was visited on [illegible] February 1970 [illegible] [illegible] to continue [illegible] usual [illegible] [illegible] discussed [illegible]

A. [illegible] the most [illegible] possible [illegible] of the status of his application for citizenship. [illegible] Company representatives consulted his case with Department of Justice [illegible] Naturalization [illegible] that under [illegible] A-1 is not eligible for citizenship until [illegible] with the CGT [illegible] due to his previous [illegible] the Company [illegible] to obtain a waiver of the clause in the law that prohibits his immediate citizenship. I pointed out that this is a lengthy process, not to mention uncertain, but that every effort is being exercised to render a happy ending. I asked him to be patient and trust us. I also made it known that if he had occasion to leave the country on business, we would gladly help in obtaining his re-entry permit. To further soften the blow, I assured him that this clause in the law does not affect his present status as a legal resident.

B. A-1 was naturally a bit set back by the decision, but did not express any anger. Instead, he said he understood and was hopeful we could resolve the problem. (I hope so too.)

C. A-1 was at home with [illegible] the house was in order and very clean. I asked about his wife [illegible] she was fine. I tried to draw him out [illegible] but he did not go beyond this and I thought it would look too conspicuous to [illegible]. On the three previous occasions that I visited A-1 in the early morning (0730 hrs) his mother in law is usually there and offers me coffee. She was not there today, but this is not in itself significant since she could have been out shopping.

D. A-1 was shown the pictures of Ismail [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. A-1 does not recognize the pictures or the names.

HARRY G. [illegible]

HW att 1 DFFR 1844

CS COPY

201-749651

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
Information from AMMUG-1 on Hector and Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

References: UFAA-1774

1. On 26 February when Henry S. PACHANKIS met with AMMUG-1 (201-749651) on his citizenship problem, information on the following two brothers was obtained:

Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart
(201-276598)
Cuban Ambassador to East Germany

Roberto *RODRIGUEZ Llompart
CIT: Cuba
DOB: 22 October 1932
POB: Regla, Havana, Cuba
OCC: Government

2. This information was as follows:

a. AMMUG-1 was asked if he had anything new to report, He brought up a most interesting case, one which could prove to be a valuable lead.

b. AMMUG-1 has known the RODRIGUEZ family since his childhood in Regla (a small town across the bay from Havana). The father had been a bolita banker during the Batista era.

c. AMMUG-1 was very friendly with RODRIGUEZ' two sons:

Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart
DPOB: c. 1934 in Regla, Havana, Cuba

Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart

CS copy filed in 201-865547

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

MAR 6 197

201-749651

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-749651	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-1845	DATE 3 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-276598

d. During the middle and late 1950s, Roberto had been a salesman for the Burroughs flour company and had stayed clear of the political picture in Cuba.

e. During the same period, Hector had been a student in the University of Havana, under Raul ROA, and had taken part in some revolutionary activities. He had been arrested and beaten by the Batista police for his anti-government actions and his father had sent him into exile in the US.

f. When Castro came into power, the father was a potential "war criminal" for his illicit dealings. AMMUG-1, who was in the police force in the initial stages of the revolution, states that he deleted an incriminating page from the father's dossier (showing he paid off the police to run his bolita operation) and thus saved him from prosecution.

g. AMMUG-1 continued to be close to the family, especially with Roberto, "whom I saw every day and ran around with." Roberto never entertained the revolution. As late as 1962-63, "We used to talk quite openly and frankly. He was always against the revolution and the communists. He worked in the Ministry of Industry because his brother got him the job, but he had only one idea in his head: to get out of Cuba and come to the US. He was even plotting to get out by boat. He had a US visa for many years and had visited here many times."

h. When AMMUG-1 defected, he lost contact with Roberto. But, about two weeks ago a neighbor from Regla came to Miami on the Freedom Flights. (COMMENT: This undoubtedly refers to Cuban refugee Segundo CASCUDO Gonzalez. Reference forwarded the AMOT debriefing of CASCUDO on Roberto.) When AMMUG-1 asked about Roberto, the neighbor said that he understood that Roberto, "was assigned in a foreign Embassy." The refugee could not say what country Roberto was in.

i. This news prompts AMMUG-1 to comment: "This would be a most interesting person to talk to. I don't think that he has changed his original way of thinking. I believe he took the job to get out of Cuba, and because of the influence of his brother Hector. I know he will talk to me and there is no telling what this man is capable of doing if someone approached him."

j. Roberto is (or was) married to:

Zulema (lnu)
DPOB: c. 1934 in Cuba

They had two children and the wife was even more anti-Castro than Roberto.

k. Hector, the other brother, was a rabid revolutionary when AMMUG-1 last saw him in c. 63-64. He had joined the Castro bandwagon at the outset due to his revolutionary activities during the Batista era and his closeness to Raul ROA. In c. 1960-61-62, Hector was closely aligned with "Che" GUEVARA and served in his entourages, even on foreign junkets. "He was very close to Che and traveled abroad a lot. He and I were good friends—he used to bring me gifts when he returned from trips—but you couldn't even insinuate any opposition to the revolution, he was so fierce for it. I hear that he is the Ambassador to Germany; I guess through his friendship with Raul ROA. I doubt if he has changed, but I can talk to him in complete confidence—perhaps not like I could Roberto—but I could know how he thinks".

3. Since Roberto appears to be an excellent recruitment target, we will have him watchlisted with a view toward having AMMUG-1 make an approach to him at the first opportunity. Although Hector appears far less vulnerable, we will consider an approach to him should he be transferred to a Free World country.

4. Please open a 201 file on Roberto.

Melvin D. KERSCHEN

14-00000

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

I

ACTION UNIT: WH8

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN. EUR6 CI CI/OPS FI2.

ACTION NO. 549

S E C R E T 032035Z MAR 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 6665 3 MAR [illegible] 70

DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, PARIS

M

TYPIC UNCOSMIC

REF: A. PARIS 4569 (IN 01578)

B. DIRECTOR 059504 (NOT SENT PARIS) (IN 01367)

C. WH/MIAMI 6046 (NOT SENT PARIS)

D. UFAA-1845 (NOT SENT PARIS, MADRID)

1. WH/MIAMI HAS GOOD ASSESSMENT FROM AMMUG-1 (201-749651, DGI DEFECTOR IN 1964) ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART, SUBJECT OF REFS. AMMUG-1 HAD CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ROBERTO, WITH WHOM HE GREW UP IN REGLA, HAVANA. IN 1962 AND-63, THEY TALKED QUITE FRANKLY AND OPENLY. ROBERTO ALWAYS TALKED AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. HE HAD ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA--TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO STATES, EVEN BY BOAT. AMMUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE HE COULD HAVE CHANGED AND ONLY HOLDS CURRENT GOC POSITION because ~~BOUSE~~ OF BROTHER, HECTOR (201-276598), WHO IS AMBASSADOR IN EAST GERMANY. AMMUG-1 IS SURE ROBERTO WILL TALK WITH HIM.

2. AMMUG-1 SAID HECTOR WAS RABID REVOLUTIONARY

~~CS COPY~~

SECRET

CS copy filed in 201-276598

[illegible]

201-749651

14-0000

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FILE, VR

ION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 6565 S E C R E T

AND CLOSE TO RAUL ROA. ALSO HAD BEEN CLOSE FOLLOWER OF CHE GUEVARRA. AMMUG-1 COULD ALSO TALK TO HECTOR IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE, BUT NOT WITH SAME CONFIDENCE AS WITH ROBERTO.

3. DIRECTOR: POUCHING REF D, WHICH IS DEBRIEFING OF AMMUG-1 ON ROBERTO AND HECTOR.

4. MADRID: PLS PUT BOTH BROTHERS ON WATCHLIST. ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN PUTTING AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH ROBERTO WHEN HE TRAVELES TO EUROPE AGAIN.

5. PARIS: PLS QUERY UNCOSMIC-1 FOR ANY FURTHER DETAILS HE CAN RECALL ABOUT TALKS WITH ROBERTO (REF A).

6 FILE 201-276598 AND 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-749651

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, WHD

EXTENSION:

NO.:

DATE: 9 FEB [illegible]

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDP	10 FEB 1970	13 Feb 70		
2.				
3. Legislative Counsel				
4. Ex/Ex Dir	17 Feb	17 Feb		
5. ~~EA/DDCI~~ DDCI				
6. ER				
7. C/WH				
8.				
9. C/WH/COG	19 FEB 1970			
10. DC/WH/COG	19 FEB 1970			
11. C/WH/C/OPS				Note, Miami mw.
12. Daryl				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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SECRET

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Executive Registry
70 5 5

WH/COG 70-46

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph three for the approval of the DDCI.

2. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera is a former Cuban national who defected to the United States in Nova Scotia, Canada on 21 April 1964. At that time he was an intelligence officer in the General Directorate of Intelligence, the Cuban external intelligence agency. He was brought to the United States under the provision of Section 7 of Public Law 110 (CIA Act of 1949). He has never been a member of the Communist Party, but due to his service in the Cuban external intelligence organization he is not eligible to petition for naturalization until ten years after the date of his defection, or 1974.

3. Mr. RODRIGUEZ desires to become a naturalized U.S. citizen at the earliest possible time and has requested assistance from this Agency. We request that a private bill be submitted to Congress waiving the ten-year provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in his case, enabling him to become a U.S. citizen after five years of residence. It is recommended that you authorize the Legislative Counsel to seek a private bill for RODRIGUEZ' relief.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SUBJECT: Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

4. Biographic Data and a Detailed Justification and Assessment on this case are attached.

J Horton
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments: (A) Biographic Data
(B) Detailed Justification and Assessment

Concur ______________________ [illegible]
Legislative Counsel Date

Concur ______________________ 13 Feb 70.
Deputy Director for Plans Date

The recommendation in paragraph 3 is APPROVED:

R. E. Cushman, Jr. 17 Feb 70
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera was born on 6 February 1937 in the City of Havana, Cuba, the son of Carlos RODRIGUEZ Ferrer and Josefa LAHERA Marrero. RODRIGUEZ' wife, Luisa Nelia RODRIGUEZ y Timoneda, born 24 August 1934 in Regla, Havana, and her two children by a former marriage, Vicente Maximiliano HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 19, and Francisca Luciana HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 17, legally entered the United States on 11 May 1965 and reside with Subject in Miami. Her parents, Pablo RODRIGUEZ Escobar and Sara TIMONEDA Valdes now reside in the United States.

2. RODRIGUEZ attended Escuela Publica #46, first to sixth grade; Primaria Superior #19, seventh and eighth grade; Artes y Oficios (Construction Civil) one year; and Instituto de Habana for two years.

3. Subject was a member of the Cuban Rebel Army from 1957 to 1961, during which time he advanced from the rank of Private to Lieutenant. He was imprisoned at Castello Principe, Cuba, from 14 July 1957 to 11 February 1958 for participation in sabotage and propaganda activities on behalf of the 26th of July Movement. He then joined Fidel CASTRO's forces in the Sierra Maestra and remained there until the end of 1958 when he returned to Havana upon the fall of the BATISTA Government. He was a precinct lieutenant of the Cuban National Police from November 1959 to December 1961, at which time he resigned from the Army under which he had held his position in the National Police. He was out of work until April 1962 at which time he was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade where he remained until he became a staff member of the General Directorate of Intelligence in August 1963. He was a member of this organization until his defection in Ottawa, Canada, on 21 April 1964, when he left his plane which was enroute from Cuba to Prague.

SECRET

4. Soon after RODRIGUEZ joined the General Directorate of Intelligence, he found he could no longer submit to having his thoughts and actions circumscribed by controls which deprived him of liberty and self respect nor continue to support the Cuban Government or be a part of its intelligence activities; he therefore planned to defect as soon as the opportunity arose. After deciding to leave Cuba permanently, he began a systematic collection of documents at the General Directorate of Intelligence Headquarters. He brought these documents with him to the United States as proof of Fidel CASTRO's subversive activities in Latin America.

5. Subject is 5 feet 2 inches tall, weighs approximately 130 pounds, has a medium build and erect posture. He has a long face, medium complexion, black hair and brown eyes.

DETAILED JUSTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence he had collected during the preceeding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/defection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts can be used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action and psychological warfare operations.

2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service.

3. The medical and psychiatric examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems.

4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and has recently applied for employment with an airline company. It is believed that he would be a solid, responsible citizen.

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Citizenship of AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFAX-14

1. On 27 January, Alien Affairs Staff advised that under Section 313 of Immigration and Naturalization Act, AMMUG-1 cannot become an American citizen until after 10 years from April 1964. While normal Cuban exile must wait five years, Communist party members must wait 10 years. AMMUG-1's position as "intelligence officer" is considered a "meaningful extension" of CP membership.

2. In view of AMMUG-1's distinguished service to RVROCK, WH Division will submit a memorandum through appropriate channels requesting authorization to submit a bill to Congress to reduce AMMUG-1's waiting period from ten to five years. At this writing, we do not know how long this processing will take but will keep you advised.

3. Paragraph 2 above is our intention and we naturally cannot guarantee approval at this time. If a special bill is passed by Congress, AMMUG-1 will go through routine application for Naturalization with RVROCK guidance.

James M. HAMMERSFAHR

Distribution:
3 - WH/Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-771

DATE
3 [illegible] 1970
28 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

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ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	R. Ennis	mamd	5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Glenn O. Brown

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		James E. Flannery

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SECRET TELEPOUCH

UFAX-14

DISP NO - [redacted]
FILE NO - 201-749651
DATE - 13 JANUARY 1973
INDEXING - NO
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI
SUBJECT - U REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE ON CITIZENSHIP
- FOR AMMUG/1
ACTION - PARA 5, BELOW
REFERENCE - NONE

1. AMMUG/1 HAS A STRONG INTEREST AND NEED TO BECOME A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN. HE HAS MADE APPLICATION TO AVIANCA AIRLINE, WHICH IF ACCEPTED, WILL REQUIRE HIM TO TRAVEL TO COLOMBIA. HE HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT PVROCK WILL ATTEMPT ASSIST HIM IN OBTAINING HIS PAPERS.

2. AMMUG/1 HAS NOT FILED AN APPLICATION FOR NATURALIZATION LOCALLY BECAUSE HE IS AWARE THAT HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY, ADDRESSES IN THE STATES, EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES, POLITICAL BACKGROUND, AND OTHER QUESTIONS IN DELICATE OPERATIONAL AREAS. HE REALIZES THAT HE CANNOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT PVROCK TUTORING. WH/MIAMI HAS BROACHED THIS SUBJECT, IN A GENERAL WAY, WITH LOCAL IMMIGRATION AND WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, WE WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE ON THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

3. A REVIEW OF AMMUG/1'S HISTORY WILL

UFAX-14

SECRET [redacted] PAGE ONE

SHOW THAT HE WAS BROUGHT INTO STATES BLACK FROM CANADA IN APRIL 1964. HE WAS DEBRIEFED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BY HQS AND THEN SETTLED IN MIAMI. HE WAS NOT PUT ON A COVER PAYROLL UNTIL 1965 AND THEN TERMINATED ABOUT YEAR LATER, AT WHICH TIME HE BEGAN OVERT JOB. THUS, WOULD FACE EMBARRASSING PROBLEM OF ANSWERING DETAILED IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS ON ENTRY AND EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND, NOT TO MENTION PREVIOUS AMSTAFF EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO DEFECTION.

4. AMMUG/1 HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT SHOULD HE HAVE THE OCCASION TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WH/MIAMI IS IN A POSITION TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF A REENTRY PERMIT IN A SHORT TIME. OUR LIAISON CONTACT IN LOCAL IMMIGRATION HAS ASSURED US ON THIS POINT.

~~1~~5. PLS NOTE THAT HENRY S. PACHANKIS IS IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH AMMUG/1 AND IS CURRENTLY DEBRIEFING HIM ON THE CUIS NAMES PROVIDED BY AMBEDEW/1. A DISPATCH ON THESE DEBRIEFINGS IS UNDER PREPARATION.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE REQUEST THAT HEADQUARTERS INITIATE ACTION WITH IMMIGRATION TOWARD GRANTING AMMUG/1 HIS NATURALIZATION PAPERS. PLS FORWARD ANY QUESTIONS THAT AMMUG/1 CAN PROVIDE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IF IT WOULD PROVE TO BE MORE EXPEDITIOUS, WH/MIAMI HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO SPONSORING A TRIP TO

UFAX-14

WASHINGTON BY AMMUG/1 TO HELP RESOLVE ANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED ON THE ABOVE. ALSO, A PROMPT REPLY TO ANY ACTION HEADQUARTERS CAN TAKE ON AMMUG/1'S CASE IS REQUESTED. THE AGENT IS MOST ANXIOUS TO LEARN OF ANY PROGRESS THAT IS MADE TOWARD HIS CITIZENSHIP.

MELVIN D. KERSCHEN

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VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

UFAX-14

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DISPATCH

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TO: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

On 30 December 1969, AMNIP-1 reported that AMMUG-1's wife called him on the day before Christmas and informed him that her father had been hospitalized with a heart attack and that AMMUG-1 had left her. AMNIP-1 called AMMUG-1's place of employment in Miami on the day after Christmas and was informed AMMUG-1 was not working that day. AMNIP-1 left a message for AMMUG-1 to call him but as of 30 December had not heard from AMMUG-1. AMNIP-1 commented that he thought AMMUG-1's wife was a little unbalanced mentally and although her parents are now in the United States and she has no real ties left in Cuba, that she is interested in returning to Cuba.

Howard A. TRECKLER

Distribution:
  2 - COS, WH/Miami

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAW-730	DATE 6 JAN 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

2 January 1970

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/COG/Chrono
1 - WH/COG/OPS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	J. Piccolo	mli	7144

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/COG/OPS		Lawrence B. Sulc

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OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		James E.

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WHMIM

S E C R E T 312113Z JAN 69 CITE WH/MIAMI 2582

31 JAN 69 IN 84063

m

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 69780

1. CONTACT WITH AMMUG-1 WAS REESTABLISHED 31 JANUARY BY PACHANKIS FOR WH/MIAMI WHICH HAD NEVER PICKED UP CONTACT FROM JMWAVE. PACHANKIS HAS MEETING WITH AMMUG-1 SCHEDULED FOR NIGHT 3 FEBRUARY TO SERVICE REF REQUEST.

2. FILE 201-287019 X REF 201-749651.

S E C R E T

AN CY
AB

19-6-10-/3
31 Jan 69

SECRET

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ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI/OA, Secur-4

S E C R E T 29211Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2567

29 MAY 68 IN 21190

DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02905

CORRECTED ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD DELIVERED AMMUG/1 20 MAY. PREVIOUSLY ISSUED CARD BEING POUCHED UFGA-30127, 28 MAY.

S E C R E T

BT

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT	✓	~~INDEX~~

201-749651
29 May 1968

SECRET

C/WHD

DISPATCH

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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AKULE/PBRUMEN
Alien Registration Cards: AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: UFGS-10530, 9 May 1968

Referenced Alien Registration Card (corrected) was given AMMUG-1 on 21 May 1968. Forwarded under separate cover is the card formerly issued him.

Julian T. Procario
Julian T. PROCARIO

Attachment: U/S/C [illegible]
As stated

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD w/att usc
2 - WH/COG w/o att

MAY 28 1968

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-30127	DATE 22 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651 201-749651

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MATERIALS REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-749651
Vol. II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 31 Dec 70 - 13 Apr 74

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO

ROOM: 3C36

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2 JULY 78		CHUCK BERK	Charles Berk
27 JULY 78		CHUCK BERK	Charles Berk
14 AUG 1978		CORNWELL	Cornwell
6 NOV 78		BETSY WOLF	Betsy Wolf

MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

E

Volume II

Jan. 71 -

OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 2 January 1971 - 10 April 1972

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

FBI, 6 April 1978

I&NS, 19 April 1971

14-00000

/27/ SECRET FR?: STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CI-4, DDO/DO, EA-8,
EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS-2, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, PCS/LSN, (34/P)

78 0552087 PAGE 001
TOT: 130012Z APR 78 DIRECTOR 204604

SECRET
STAFF 130010Z DIRECTOR 204604
TO: IMMEDIATE LA/MIAMI INFO PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL REAM

REF: LA/MIAMI 28157 0527676

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH NVCANOPY THEY HAVE ADVISED THAT
THEY ARE INTERESTED IN A PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW WITH SLANK-1 (S-1)
AND DEPENDING ON ITS OUTCOME WILL MAKE A DETERMINATION IF THEY
DESIRE S-1'S CONTINUED CONTACT WITH SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA (SA).
PACHANKIS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RTACTION OBVIOUSLY
HAS NO OBJECTION TO HIS COOPERATION WITH NVCANOPY. PACHANKIS
ALSO SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RTACTION HAS NO INTEREST
IN HIS (S-1'S) CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP WITH SA.

2. A REVIEW OF THE FILES OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM
PACHANKIS CURRENTLY IN ACTIVE CONTACT INDICATES THAT NVCANOPY
APPROVAL WAS SOUGHT AND GRANTED IN EACH CASE, WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF DEFECTORS SUCH AS SLANK-1 WHO HAD BEEN HANDLED
AS A DEFECTOR ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE FILE HE NEVER OFFICIALLY
GRANTED THIS STATUS UNDER PL 110. HQS DOES NOT COORDINATE
EACH INDIVIDUAL MEETING NOR IDENTIFY OFFICER HANDLING CASE
TO NVCANOPY.

3. FILE: 201-299243; 201-749651. E2, IMPDET.>
LA COMMENT: REF QUERIED HQS REGARDING FBI OR CIA INTEREST IN
S-1 PLAYING ROLE OF CONFIDANT TO ALDEREGUIA.
ORIG: LA/CO (SMITH/SPEED X1819/1325); COORD: AC/LA/CO/EA
(HARRINGTON), AC/LA/PHNCR (PORN), PCS/LSN (   ),
C/LA/CARI (BURNETT), C/LA/CAR (GREIG); AUTH: DC/LA/CO (LATRASH).
REL: C/LAD (WARREN); CL BY: 012034.<

749651

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

50/22/ DISSEM PER SO[illegible]132 SECRET CRP: NON-AGENCY

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: FILE, RF, C/CI-2, C/IP/DMS, C/LSN/ID, C/PCS, ODPD-D, (15/P)

78 0530497 PAGE 001
TOT: 080750Z APR 78 ~~CIA 202417~~

S E C R E T
080750Z CIA 202417
TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
CIR-316/ 01514-78
SUBJECT: TOMCAT; ESP-CUBA-PANAMA; RA-CUBA-PANAMA
REFS: A. FBI TELETYPE DATED 052028Z APRIL 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

B. CIR-316/00260-75, DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1975, CAPTIONED "SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA, ALSO KNOWN AS "EL GALLEGO" INTERNAL SECRUITY-CUBA.

1. WITH REGARD TO CLARIFICATION OF SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA'S ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PARTICULARLY WITH CIA, REFERENCE B ADVISED THAT HE WAS OF INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY IN 1960 WHEN WE WERE INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ASSISTING IN HIS EXFILTRATION FROM CUBA. HOWEVER, HE TOOK ASYLUM IN THE URUGUAYAN EMBASSY IN HAVANA ON 3 JULY 1960 AND DEPARTED THE SAME DAY FOR CURACAO. AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN MIAMI IN FEBRUARY 1961, THIS AGENCY WAS BRIEFLY IN CONTACT WITH HIM BUT OUR INTEREST WAS DROPPED PARTLY BECAUSE HIS UNCLE, ONE OF THE LEADING FOUNDERS OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS THEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA AND ALDEREGUIA'S TRUE LOYALTIES WERE UNKNOWN. THIS AGENCY HAS HAD NO INTEREST IN OR CONTACT WITH ALDEREGUIA SINCE THAT TIME.

2. VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA DPOB 6 FEBRUARY 1937, HAVANA, CUBA WAS A FORMER DGI STAFF OFFICER WHO DEFECTED ON 21 APRIL 1964 IN HALIFAX NOVA SCOTIA. HE WAS DEBRIEFED AND HANDLED THROUGH NORMAL DEFECTOR CHANNELS AND WAS THE SOURCE OF NUMEROUS CSCI'S CONCERNING THE DGI IN 1964 AND 65. HE WAS USED OPERATIONALLY IN RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS AGAINST DGI OFFICERS DURING 1964-1967. HE WAS TERMINATED IN JULY 1967, AND WAS CONSIDERED, BUT NEVER USED, FOR ANOTHER RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT IN 1971. SINCE 1971 RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY CIA OPERATION IN MIAMI OR ELSEWHERE. JOSEPH NORRIS IS THE ALIAS OF A CIA REPRESENTATIVE WHO PERIODICALLY DEBRIEFS RODRIGUEZ ON PERSONALITIES AND METHODS OF THE DGI. THERE IS NO OTHER CIA INVOLVEMENT WITH RODRIGUEZ.

316/01514-78

3. THIS AGENCY WILL QUERY ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN MIAMI TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER.

SECRET

8 Apr 78

201-749651

SECRET

NON-AGENCY

78 0530497 APR 19 8 47 AM '78 PAGE 002
TOT: 080750Z APR 78 CIA 202417

RECEIVED

4. CLASSIFIED BY 012034. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.>
ORIG LA/CD/CI SPEED X1325; COORD LA/CARI BURRET;
LA/PHNC/P PORN; ADC/LA/CD KEENAN AUTH C/LAD
WARREN; REL AC/PCS/LSN KUNH CL BY 012034.

A P MAY 3 '78

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

55/25/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 2214Z PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (837) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CI-4, EPS/EG-2,
IP/DYS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, SIA, SIA/IC, (25/W)

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76 0527670 PAGE 001 IN 0527670
TOR: 072209Z APR 78 LMIM 28158

S E C R E T 072142Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 28158

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL REAM

REF: LA/MIAMI 28157 0527676

IDEN A: WILLIAM WALTON
FBI SPECIAL AGENT

IDEN B: JACK COGSWELL, A WEST PALM BEACH
RESIDENT WHO SA SAYS WAS A RETIRED U.S. NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 78

END OF MESSAGE SECRET 201-749651

55/89/ SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , ,

ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 2216Z PRECEDENCE STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (836) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, C/SIA, C/SIA/IC, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, LSN/ID, ODPD-D, (25/W)

78 0527676 PAGE 001 IN 0527676
TOR: 072206Z APR 78 LMIM 28157

S E C R E T 072142Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 28157

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY.

NIACT DIRECTOR

WNINTEL REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 201936

1. DURING THE YEARS THAT PACHANKIS HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1 (S-1), FORMERLY AMMUG-1, FROM 1965 TO 1978, PACHANKIS HAS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT S-1 WAS EVER IN CONTACT WITH NVCANOPY. SINCE 1969 IT HAS BEEN PACHANKIS' UNDERSTANDING THAT NVCANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED EVERY TIME PACHANKIS HAS MADE AN OPERATIONAL CALL ON A U.S. PERSON IN THE MIAMI AREA. PACHANKIS HAS NEVER BEEN EXPOSED/INTRODUCED TO NVCANOPY IN MIAMI. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED TO NVCANOPY REPS IN NEW YORK CITY WHILE ON TDY TO FR/NEW YORK (CIRCA 1974). PACHANKIS HAS ALSO MET AN NVCANOPY AGENT IN NEWARK, NEWJERSEY UNDER THE ALIAS OF JOE NORRIS.

2. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN HANDLING S-1 SINCE EARLY 1970. SEVERAL TIMES OPERATIONS ALMOST CAME OFF BUT HQS DECIDED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO PRESERVE S-1'S SECURITY. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH CONTACT WITH S-1 EXCEPT FOR A CHRISTMAS CALL OR A ROUTINE COG REQUIREMENT.

3. SLANK-1 CALLED PACHANKIS ON 6 APRIL AND REQUESTED MEETING TO REPORT FOLL:

A. SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA (SA) HAS BEEN S-1 FRIEND SINCE 1955 IN CUBA. THEY CONSPIRED AGAINST THE BATISTA REGIME WHILE IN THE RANKS OF THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT.

B. S-1 HAD NOT SEEN SA IN ALMOST FOUR YEARS WHEN THEY COINCIDENTALLY MET ON A MIAMI STREET IN 1965 (LESS THAN YEAR AFTER S-1'S DEFECTION FROM DGI). FROM 1965 UNTIL FEB/MARCH 1978, THEY HAD INFREQUENT THOUGH CORDIAL ENCOUNTERS IN MIAMI.

C. AFTER SA'S RECENT ARREST IN MIAMI BY NVCANOPY ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES, SA HAS BEEN A CONSTANT VISITOR TO S-1'S HOME. SA HAS OSTENSIBLY BEEN SEEKING "TEA AND SYMPATHY" FROM S-1.

RECORD COPY SECRET

7 Apr 78

201-749651

SECRET

STAFF

CLAIMING HE HAS BEEN FRAMED BY NVCANOPY. WHILE S-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE SA, S-1'S "CI MIND" AND CURIOSITY HAVE COMPELLED HIM TO CONTINUE CONTACT WITH SA. IN RECENT WEEKS SA HAS INTRODUCED S-1 TO IDENS A AND B.

4. S-1 WANTS TWO POINTS MADE CLEAR TO RTACTION AND NVCANOPY. ONE, S-1 HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN SA'S APPARENT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. TWO, S-1 VOLUNTEERS TO SERVE AS SA'S CONFIDANT IF NVCANOPY AND/OR RTACTION CONSIDER S-1 CAN DO GOOD IN SUCH A ROLE. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. STATION HAS NO FILES ON S-1 AND THEREFORE CANNOT COMMENT ON NVCANOPY KNOWLEDGE OF RTACTION'S PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH S-1. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NVCANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF PACHANKIS' ACTIVITIES IN ALIAS JOE NORRIS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AT THE HQS LEVEL.

6. FILE: 201-(SLANK-1). E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Calvin - SPOB (Spec Payroll) x 2135 called re SLANK/1 (201-749651) formerly encrypted AMMUG/1 — He has old (16 Oct 75) MOC which not touched since AUG/76 and wants to know status of case ie — is SLANK/1 being paid — is he terminated — etc.

Since this was case handled by Pachanki's we will check the file and let Calvin know — have ordered the file in Melissa Walsh name.

RH
13 Apr 77

ANK/1 true name is Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LAHERA

Informed "Calvin" on 15 April 77 that SLANK/1 is still on active contract, not receiving any salary, but could be paid if & when used in an operation. No problems here. SPOB will keep his contract in an active folder.
RH 15 Apr 77

30 JUL 1976

NOTE: WE WILL NOT ASK FOR A DEVISED FACILITY FOR SLANK/1 UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED HE WILL BE USED AGAIN.

LA/COG/EA

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

SUBJECT: Engagement of SLANK-1 (201-749651)

1. Term and Project Charge: Subject has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project SLEEPER. The effective date of the oral contract is 16 Oct 1975.

2. Security Approval: An OA for the operational use of Subject outside the U.S. was granted on 6 Jan 1971.

3. Citizenship: Subject is a United States Citizen.

4. Compensation: Subject is reimbursed for travel expenses and is given a salary replacement for any time he is required to be absent form work at the request of the Agency. The salary reimbursement will not exceed $40 a day. He may be awarded cash bonuses for services rendered. He may also be given gifts from time to time, the individual value of which will not exceed $50.

5. Taxes: Subject is obligated to pay U.S. taxes and should be issued a Devised Facility Form 1099 at the end of each tax year.

6. Quarters and/or Subsistence:
    a. Subject is not furnished quarters or subsistence.
    b. No commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses.

7. Operational Expenses: Subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses such as entertainment of operational contacts, phone calls, cover expenses, etc., upon submission of proper accounting for such expenses.

LX-4200

16 Jul 76

SECRET

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 025231

RECORD COPY

201-749651

8. Contingent Obligations: Although no commitment to this effect has been made to Subject, should the security of Subject or his family become threatened because of activities undertaken by him at the request of this Agency, this Agency would have an obligation to reimburse Subject for expenses required to reduce that threat, including expenses needed to relocate Subject and his family and, if necessary, to supplement his income while he is establishing a new residence and employment.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to Subject.

SIGNED: ________________
Case Officer

REVIEWED: ________________

APPROVED: ________________
Field Contracting Officer

Attachment:
Non-Staff Personnel Data Sheet

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - LA/Personnel w/att
1 - Vital Documents w/att
1 - LA/COG/Chrono
1 - 201-749651
1 - LA/B&F

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE
16 July 76

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. SUBMIT FOR:
   - A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
   - B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR MOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)* RODRIGUEZ LaHera, Vladimir		SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 2 Jun 1937
MARITAL STATUS M	NO. DEPENDENTS 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH (wife) 6 Feb 1937 24 Aug 1934	NATIONALITY U.S.
LAST MEDICAL EXAM			
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Amended OA 7 Jan 1971	JOB TITLE		COMPONENT
CONTRACT CATEGORY B	EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Oct 75	EXPIRATION DATE Indefinite	SALARY
GRADE EQUIVALENT	PROJECT OR FAN O		

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY		X
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE		X
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT		X
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS		X
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)* If forced to move for security reasons,		X
CIA would help with expenses.	X	

NON-CIA EDUCATION

Escuela Publica #46	1st-6th Grade
Primaria Superior #19	7th-3th Grade
Artes y Oficios (Construcion Civil)	1 Year
Instituto de Habana	2 years toward bachelor degree

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
Aug 63-Apr 64	Ministry of Foreign Relations	Havana, Cuba	Intel Off	
May 65-Dec 66	Scheaffer Advertising Co	Miami, Fla	Market Researcher	$600 mo.
Dec 66-CA Dec 74	Marriot Corp	Miami, Fla.		
Dec 74-Present	Metro Transit Authority	Miami, Fla.	Bus Driver	$13,000 yr.

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Apr 64-Nov 67	Agent	B	Washington, D.C. & Miami	AMMUG	$600 mo.	
Jan 69-Present	Informant	B	Miami, Fla.	SLEEPER	WAE	

14-00000

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC DISCLOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV): KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES.

Cuban Intelligence Service

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

At present, subject is not involved in any activities that require him to use a cover. If and when he travels abroad, he will use business or personal cover appropriate to the mission involved.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

No known limiting factors

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

Headquarters plans to use Subject to contact and approach Cubans of operational interest to LA/COG.

Pls Pouch to HQS

SECRET

28 April 1976

Q 201-749651

1. For the Record: SLANK-1 (S-1) has purchased ~~a home~~ at:

2931 SW 19th Terrace
Miami, Florida

tel: (305) 443-3027.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

		FILE IN PROGRAM
[illegible]	X	ABSTRACT
		INDEX
[illegible]		CHECK FOR FILMING
[illegible]		[illegible] NO. (2, 3)
		[illegible] CODE
		CUSTODIAN (11)
		[illegible] (3)
~~[illegible]~~		FOR FILING
LA/C/OP		

LX-4130

SECRET

RECORD COPY

28 Apr 76

201-749651

PLS CABLE HQS; INFO CARACAS

SECRET

C/OG/LA

27 March 1976

1. At 27 March meeting, PACHANKIS discussed latest CARACAS Station requirements with SLANK-1 (S-1).

2. S-1 not seen SLPAT-1 (F-1) since c. 1964, thus unable provide updated assessment. S-1 does not know F-1's wife.

3. S-1 considers highly improbable F-1 would accept private meeting via phone. F-1 could be suspicious of S-1's motives and might round up own welcoming committee for confrontation.

4. S-1 confidant a direct street meeting -one on one- would offer best opportunity to communicate Agency offer to F-1.

5. S-1's second choice would be home approach, were it known F-1 was alone or only with wife.

plan.
who can adapt to any Station name/

6. S-1 is disciplined, discreet, devoted, plucky professional. Prepared take up to
States will go anywhere, anytime to cooperate.
5 days sick leave without pay to participate approach to F-1.
Could leave Miami on Saturday, returning latest Sunday following week. S-1 is Amcit and has US passport. S-1 needs c. 1 weeks prior notice to prepare for CARACAS TDY.

7. S-1 reviewed names of Cubans on latest Diplomatic List. Only positive was: Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (the Ambassador) who former DGI colleague of S-1.

cabled

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

fl SLANK-1 201

SECRET

3 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SLANK-1

In reviewing SLANK-1's file for possible leads to targets of interest the following names were selected:

1. Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart (201-865547)
2. Ricardo ESPINO Martinez (201-818437)
3. Federico CRESPO Moreira (201-894397)
   (in Peru since January 1973)
4. Rafael MIRABAL Fernandez (KDACOUSTIC-1) (201-812117)
   (Mexico - February 1967)
5. Manuel CARDONELL Duque (201-279604)
   (Capt. Pol. worked with M-1)
6. Armando "Ulises" ESTRADA Fernandez (201-809440)
7. Ramon Cesar CUENCA Mintoto (201-328945)
   (PCS Caracas - October 75 (DGI))
8. Roque DALTON Garcia (201-215097)
   (DSE - now in Havana)

Individual files of subject now being reviewed. If one or several of these subjects appears recruitable, a plan will be written up explaining "plan of action."

Wilfred O. CLOWER

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 025231

SECRET

3 Feb 76

18 November 1975

SUBJECT: Change of Address and Phone of SLANK-1 (S-1)

1. S-1 has informed me via a letter to my PO Box that he has moved once again and has a new phone. Please record:

610 SW 19th Road
Miami
telephone (305) 858-3043.

HSP

18 Nov 75

file SLANK-1 201
201-[illegible]51

14-00000

Ref: DIR 759487

29 October 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1 (S-1)

1. S-1 was met on the evening of 28 October, at his Miami apartment, to inform him of the following:

   A. His old DGI chum, Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montoto, appeared to be settling down for an extended stay in Caracas.
   B. Consequently, our people had decided to study him in depth and decide at a later date what action, if any, could or should be taken against him. i.e. to pitch or not to pitch.
   C. Our office had asked me to thank him for his offer to assist in any operation and would keep him in mind in any future plans. S-1 was grateful to hear these words and reiterated his willingness/availability to help out in this or any other Operation.

2. I thought this to be the most diplomatic and effective way to treat this issue. I wanted to give him an answer yet not say we didn't think him the most likely candidate. S-1 has always been PRESENT when we needed volunteers. He longs to get back in the "business" and there is no doubt he can do the job. They don't come any "gutsier." We never know when we'll need him and its good to know he is there.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

For Slank-1
201-749651

29 OCT 75

14-00000

PRIORITY - PLEASE

Ry. DIR 754594
CARACAS 28265

16 October 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was visited on the evening of 15 October, at his new address (5501 NW 7th St, apt 106E) same phone (443-5463) to discuss recent HQS requirements.

2. S-1 was excited to learn his old boss: Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montoto is in Caracas. "I just knew he had to be there because the Cuban Ambassador (Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo) was my boss in the DGI (c. 1963-64) and 'Cesar' was above us both." (In other words, in c. 1963-64, CUENCA was superior in rank to both S-1 and HERNANDEZ -the present Cuban Ambassador to Venezuela.) (CUENCA was know as Cesar to his coworkers/friends).

3. S-1 is seriouslsy ready, willing and able to partake in any Agency Operation against CUENCA and/or HERNANDEZ. S-1 is an AMCIT and has a valid US passport. His only consideration is obtaining the proper permission from his employers. This is a matter which the Agency MUST solicit for him. As previously reported, S-1 workes for:

Metro Transit Authority (bus driver)
3300 NW 32 Avenue, Miami.

The persons to be contacted at MTA, to grant S-1 the necessary leave are:

Mr. FNU CROSS and
Mr. M. C. BUTLER

4. The ball is in our court. You cannot ask for a more dedicated/motivated/educated (re the DGI) than S-1. S-1 will be ready to travel the minute Agency obtains necessary permission from MTA.

5. Re: "FERNANDEZ" -the Yemen based Cuban military instructor- S-1 reports NEGATIVE. (SLARSTICK-1 had previously reported NEGATIVE)

6. Whatever decision HQS takes, would appreciate being informed so we can notify S-1. He is most dedicated/valuable assest and we owe him this courtesy. In past, he has been alerted and we have failed to notify him of abortions, and left him hanging in mid air.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

For filing in
201-749651
16 Oct 75

[illegible]

S-1 [illegible]

S-1's daughter was 5 years old yesterday and I took the [illegible] a small gift. [illegible]

S-1 continues [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] S-1 [illegible] of himself.

[illegible]

For the record: S-1 has a new phone [illegible]. S-1 has my [illegible] in the event he wants to contact me.

Henry S. [illegible]

201-749651 (IP)

~~F [illegible]~~ SLANK-1

201-749651

28 February 1975

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was contacted on the evening of 27 February, at his Miami home (2761 SW 24th Terrace, tel: 443-0155) re his availability to approach his old friend, Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart.

2. As on all previous occasions when we have asked for S-1's collaboration, S-1's answer was AFFIRMATIVE. The only condition is that we obtain his employer's permission to be absent from his present job. He is not entitled to vacation until c. August 1975.

3. S-1 is presently employed as a bus driver for the:

Metro Transit Authority
3300 NW 32nd Avenue
Miami.
Tel: 633-9736.

The persons who must grant the permission are, in this order of rank:

H. I. CROSS

B. L. WALLACE

M. C. BUTLER

4. S-1 has a valid US passport. And, he can be available to travel the moment his superiors grant him the leave without pay we request.

5. I have again thanked him for his sincere/loyal cooperation. I have promised to keep him abreast of developments.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 3/74

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ACTION UNIT CA10

ACTION #

INFO RF FILE VR IDN CI/CP2 DDO2

T 022297 EIA861 PAGE 01 IN 509121

TOR:281857Z FEB 75 LMIM 23060

S E C R E T 281830Z FEB 75 STAFF

CITE LA/MIAMI 23060 (ENNIS ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 661166

1. SLANK-1 CONTACTED BY PACHANKIS 27 FEB 75.

2. AS IN THE PAST, S-1 INDICATED HE IS WILLING TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO SUBJECT PER REF. S-1 IS NOW EMPLOYED WITH THE LOCAL METRO TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND IS NOT DUE A VACATION UNTIL AFTER MID-1975; THEREFORE ANY ABSENCE FROM WORK MUST BE REQUESTED BY BKHERALD AND APPROVED BY ANY ONE OF HIS SUPERIORS (H.I. CROSS, B.L. WALLACE, M.C. BUTLER -- IN ORDER OF DESCENDING AUTHORITY).

3. S-1 HAS VALID U.S. PASSPORT AND CAN TRAVEL WHEN NEEDED.

4. FILE: 201-0749651. E2, IMPDET.

SGL

LA/C/FI

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

28 FEB 75
201-749651

OUTGOIN MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 262113Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 661166

CONF: LA 10 INFO: FILE 10/IAN,

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 38.
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0 IP FILES #

TO: LA/MIAMI.Y

REAM Y

1. HQS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF USING VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA/(201-749651) IN APPROACH TO HIS OLD FRIEND ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART (201-865547).Y

2. REQUEST PACHANKIS DETERMINE PRESENT WHEREABOUTS OF RODRIGUEZ LAHERA AND WHETHER OR NOT HE WILLING AND AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN APPROACH.Y

3. FILE: 201-749651, 201-865547. E2, IMPDET.H

PROGRAM
ABSTRACT
LA/C/LA

B-201-865547

26FEB75

201-749651

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1975
ORIG: MARY MUSGRAVE:CB
UNIT: LA/COG/OPS
EXT: 9229

C/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

RECORD COPY

C/LA/CAR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 061393

14-00000

JUAN

21 December 1974

SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1)

1. S-1 was met on the afternoon of 21 December, for abrief social call, to pay our respects and present him with a bottle of Scotch for the Christmas season.

2. S-1 was grateful not only for the gift but to see we had not forgotten him. His home life seems to have settled down after some rocky periods earlier in the year and he has a new, more secure position as bus driver for the Metro Transit Authority here in Miami. As previously reported, he has also taken the Postal Service exams and would accepted a letter carrier's job if it is offered to him.

3. As always, S-1 is ready to assist us in any way that he can. If Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart should ever come out again, S-1 can be counted on to make an approach. All that we would have to do is to contact his employers and obtain the necessary permission.

Henry S. PACHANKIS.

(File: SLANK-1 201-
+ 0749651
Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart
201
21 Dec 74

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE OF PAGES 1

ry-1

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 232254Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 613425

CONF: C/LAS INFO: FILE C/PLAN, C/EUR6, C/CI/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 28
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0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY MADRID.Y

RYBAT REAM SLASH Y

REF: MADRID 24401 |IN 395143| Y

1. APPRECIATE MADRID'S OFFER ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1. HOWEVER, WISH STAND-DOWN FOR MOMENT ON OP, SINCE WE SEE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS USING ONLY NAME OF SLANK-1. Y

2. SLANK-1 DISAPPEARED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. HENRY S. PACHANKIS, WHO IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1, PRESENTLY N.Y. WHERE INVOLVED OTHER OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, AND UNABLE RETURN MIAMI TRY TRACK DOWN SLANK-1. WE HOPE DO SO WHEN PACHANKIS RETURNS MIAMI, AND WILL THEN THINK IN TERMS OF SLASH-1'S NEXT TRIP OUT.Y

3. FILE: 201-365547. E2 IMPDET.

LA COMMENT: REF OFFERED CO MADRID TO APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME SLANK-1 {CHILDHOOD FRIEND OF SLASH-1} AS BONA FIDES.

SLANK-1
201-749651

DATE: 23 OCT 74
ORIG: JOAN SILVERLIEB:NMF
UNIT: LA/COG/OPS
EXT: 9229

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

C/LA/COG
C/E/IB/S
[illegible]
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/LA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CL BY:
23 Oct 74

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T 513726 EIA516 PAGE 01 IN 395143

TOR:231726Z OCT 74 MADR 24401

S E C R E T 231651Z OCT 74 STAFF

CITE MADRID 24401

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

[redacted] REAM SLASH

REFS: A. MADRID 24341 (IN 390775)

B. DIRECTOR 611511

1. QUTIMID OF 21 OCTOBER REPORTS THAT SLASH-1 WILL BE IN MADRID FOR TEN OR FIFTEEN DAYS. CUBAN EMBASSY IS REQUESTING 20 DAY VISA FOR HIM. SLASH-1 IS IN MADRID NEGOTIATING WITH THREE SPANISH FIRMS FOR COMPLETE EQUIPMENT OF PLANTS FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF MINES. NO INDICATION YET OF WHERE SLASH-1 STAYING BUT EXPECT ASCERTAIN THROUGH QUTIMID.

2. ASSUME FROM REF B THAT SLANK-1 NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR APPROACH TO SLASH-1. IF HQS DESIRES, MADRID STATION WILL ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME OF SLANK-1 AS BONA FIDES.

3. FILE: 201-0365547. E2 IMPDET.

71-119651

SLANK-1 201

SECRET

23 Oct 74

SECRET

B. SLALOM-1 -- He is close to Nestor RAMIREZ, a CUBAPESCA Representative who is currently in Tokyo. SLALOM-1 states RAMIREZ is approachable because RAMIREZ is definitely not a Communist, and he thinks very much like him (SLALOM-1).

C. SLANK-1 -- He mentioned to PACHANKIS that he had been close to Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart, a Cuban Mining Official who often travels to Mexico and Canada.

D. Gustavo MAS -- Brother-in-law of the current Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. MAS has advised PACHANKIS that he is willing to help us only to the extent of determining the feelings of his sister and the Ambassador at any given time, but no more. He will not accept any remuneration from us and will foot his own bill to visit his sister.

E. SLCOOL-1 and SLACE-1 -- In describing the former, PACHANKIS referred to him as from another generation, i.e., of the ROA class, who could possibly be used with any older Cuban officials that might still be around. He cautioned however, that SLCOOL-1 had undergone a delicate cancer operation two years ago which might impede his usefulness. As concern SLACE-1, PACHANKIS suggested that we were probably better off forgetting him. He described SLACE-1 as very problematical and then went on to add such adjectives as avaricious, sly, secretive, and a person inclined not to follow-through on any task given him.

6. PACHANKIS believes that much can be done with the above defectors against the targets mentioned and, himself, is anxious to get involved in another recruitment operation as soon as possible.

Frank C. Esquivel
WH/COG/FI

SLANK-1
201-749651

memo [illegible]
27 July 74
[illegible] Pachankis - 201

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T 147660 EIA780 PAGE 01-01 IN 265330

TOR:291938Z MAY 74 WMIM 21838

S E C R E T 291828Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 21838

TO: PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REAM FHABOVE

REF: OTTAWA 23304 (IN 264930)

IP

JUN 28 1974

1. REGRET TO ADVISE THAT SLANK-1 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR OPS TRAVEL UNTIL 9 JUNE 1974. HIS EMPLOYER INDICATED WILLINGNESS FREE SLANK-1 FOR TRAVEL FOR USG UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES; HOWEVER, TWO OF SLANK-1 FELLOW WORKERS CURRENTLY ON JURY DUTY AND EMPLOYER REGRETFULLY UNABLE LIBERATE SLANK-1 FROM WORK COMMITMENT UNTIL 9 JUNE.

2. FILE: 201-332726, ~~201-865547~~, 201-314229. 201-749651

E2 IMPDET

ko

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WH/4/E1

B201-865547

RECORD COPY

S E C R E T

201-749651

29 May 74

29 May 74

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T 038889 E1A064 PAGE 01-01 IN 226286

PRECEDENCE

TOR:171957Z APR 74 WHIM 21548

S E C R E T 171953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 21548 (BEARDSLEY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MADRID.

AKULE REAM

REF: DIRECTOR 538829

1. PACHANKIS IN TOUCH WITH SLANK-1 WHO WILLING TO TRAVEL. SLANK-1'S NEW EMPLOYER WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTACTED BY STATION SECURITY OFFICER TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR LWOP. OBTAINING INFO ON NEW EMPLOYER TO START CLEARANCE PROCEDURE.

2. FILE: 201-2865447, E-2, IMPDET.

Ko

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201-749651

17 APR 74

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DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM
TO	Chief of Station, WH/Miami
INFO.	
FROM	Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	Study of Cuban Defectors
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

Reference: UFAA-4701, 11 January 1973

Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a personality assessment report prepared by Lawrence B. SELJACK (P) concerning AMMUG-1.

Linda N. QUASHNOCK

Attachment:

Assessment report U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att U/S/C

RECORD COPY

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 008335

CROSS REFERENCE TO	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	UFAW-1709
DATE	30 MAY 1973 23 May 1973
CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
HQS FILE NUMBER	201-749651

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DDO/WH/COG/41:MBingham	MBingham	rf	1819

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		Lawrence Sternfield

Distribution:
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1 - 201-749651
1 - Originator

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FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO - UFAS-2195

FILE NO - 201-749651

DATE - 29 AUGUST 1972

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJECT - AKULE/TYPIC/AMMUG-1

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - UFAT-3304, 21 AUGUST 1972

1. AMMUG-1 WILL BE ADVISED REGARDING INTERVIEW BUT THE PROCESSING MAY TAKE 3-6 MONTHS DEPENDING ON WORK-LOAD MIAMI INS.

2. E2, IMPDET.

WANDA F. BREMSON

DISTRIBUTION -

3 - COS, WH/MIAMI /BY TAPE/

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Originated by: Vivian Barry,
WH/COG/OS X4163

Released by:
C/WH/COG

2 e54555

S E C R E T

SECRET Ammug-1

WH/COG/242-72

28 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff

SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera

It is requested that Subject be processed for naturalization. I&NS forms, completed and signed by Subject, are attached.

Vivian Barry
WH/COG/OS

2 [illegible]

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: WILLIAM STURBITTS:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/OS
EXT: 4163 R. 1325
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1972

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CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR. 10/AQ, CLC, CCSD, [illegible], SECURITY

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SECRET 17AUG72 20 36Z CITE DIRECTOR

TO WH/MIAMI

302184

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 301165

1. COPY AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL, (PRIVATE LAW 92-92, 30 JUNE 72) TM NO. 538651 IN 28 AUG 72 POUCH.

2. FILE: 201-749651. E2, IMPDET.

END OF MESSAGE

201-749651
17 August 1972

CS COPY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIGINATING MESSAGE

15AUG72 23 30z

S E C R E T

DTG: | MHI [illegible] | DIRECTOR | MRN 301165

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CONF WH 8 INFO RF VR FILE (IP/AN) SECUR 4 OLC CCS2 C/SO

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

301165

CLASSIFIED BY: E2, IMPDET, WH-SISM

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WH/MIAMI.

TYPIC AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 15472 [IN 683346]

1. AMMUG-1 SHOULD COMPLETE INS PAPERS AND STATION FORWARD COMPLETED PAPERS TO HQS, ATTN: OTIS C. VIGEANT. TYPIC HQT WILL PREPARE MEMO AND FORWARD PAPERS TO ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF FOR INS HQS PROCESSING.

2. EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. WILL POUCH TO STATION WHEN RECEIVED.

3. FILE 201-749651. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

B

AN JAS
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(FI)

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201-749651
15 August 72

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ACTION NO. 763

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CS-Hopkins

S E C R E T 141555Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15470 WH/M

DIRECTOR.

6 S 3 3 4 6

4

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 291693

B. UFAT 3301

1. MR. JAMES TILLMAN OF LOCAL INS CONTACTED STATION AND INFORMED US THAT AMMUG-1 HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR ASSISTANCE IN INITIATING NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS (WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ALTERED TILLMAN OF POSSIBLE AMMUG-1 CONTACT FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE).

2. TILLMAN STATED HE NOT AUTHORIZED ASSIST AS PRIVATE CITIZENSHIP BILL HANDLED BY HIS CENTRAL OFFICE WHICH MUST ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL OFFICE FOR ACTION. TILLMAN INFORMED US THAT HE GAVE AMMUG-1 VARIOUS FORMS TO COMPLETE AND RETURN TO STATION. COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BKTRUST HQS ATTENTION ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF WHICH SHOULD REVI AND THEN FORWARD ON TO INS CENTRAL HQS. INS HQS WILL THEN ADVISE LOCAL OFFICE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE, AFTER WHICH AMMUG-1 WILL BE GRANTED CITIZENSHIP.

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WH/COG

3. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST WHETHER ABOVE PROCEDURE CORRECT

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14 Aug 72
201-749651

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PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 15470 SECRET

AND WHAT ELSE MUST BE DONE SO WE CAN ADVISE AMMUG-1 WHAT TO DO WHEN HE, AND HE WILL VERY SHORTLY, CONTACTS US.

4. ALSO REQUEST DATE WHEN WE CAN EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL.

5. FILE: 201-749651. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH NO UFAT 3301

DATE 20 JULY 1972

FILE 201-749651

TO CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAMI

SBUJECT TYPIC/AMMUG - AMMUG/1 REENTRY PERMIT

REF DIRECTOR 289809

FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER IS AMMUG/1'S REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVFYP TO I&NS.

STANLFY F. SPECKLER

ATTACHMENT: USC (VIA POUCH 2460(7)6 1972)

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 C/WHD: W/ATT USC

EX-2 APDIR, WN-SISM.

SECRET

SECRET

T/N/P

USC ATTACHMENT TO UFAA-3301 (TELEPOUCH)

TO: C/WHD

FROM: COS, WH/MIAMI

SECRET

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CHRIS HOPKINS:cb
WH/COG/OS
4163
19 July 1972

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 19 JUL 72 23 42z CITE DIRECTOR 291693

WH/MIAMI

REF: WH/MIAMI 15074 (IN 649499)

1. PRESIDENT SIGNED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL (P.L. 92-92) 30 JUNE. A-1 MAY NOW INITIATE NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS.

2. FILE: 201-749651. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

Chris file (Alice)

OLC Pat Carpentier (telecord)

C/WH/SEC

WH/SS

WH/FI

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

CAMILLE BATHE
DC/WH/COG

19 July 72

201-749651

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CHRIS HOPKINS:ak
WH/COG/OS
4163 R. 1325
14 JULY 1972

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(date and time filed) 14 JUL 72 20 28z

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 289809

WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMMUG

1. WOBONE HAS REQUESTED AMMUG-1 REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVERY I&NS. PLS POUCH SOONEST.

2. FILE: 201-749651. Ex. 2, AP DIR, WH-SISM;

END OF MESSAGE

AN
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[illegible]

DCI

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES [illegible]

CLASSIFIED BY SIGNER

14 July 72
201-749651

OS/AAS John Rooney (telecoord)
WH/SEC
WH/SS ✓

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

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Al

John Rocrey, CS/AAS, called. He wants A[illegible]1's reentry permit returned to him for delivery to INS. Al Amori was supposed to do this, but apparently did not.

Bernice

p.s. [illegible]UG is Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera, request would be made to Miami.

Bernie

Will you please handle this for me? Am

201-749651

Cable sent to WH/Miami 14 July 72

14 July 72

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ACTION UNIT
WH8

INFO

FILE, VR, 1P/[illegible], OLC, CI/OPS, [illegible]

ACTION NO.
632

S E C R E T 301456Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15075 UIMEN

649500

DIRECTOR.

AXLE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: Iden to WH/MIAMI 15074 (IN 649499)

IDEN: VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA GP-1

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30 Jun 72
201-749651

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY: 29/30 PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

WH8

ACTION NO.

565

FILE, VR, PLAN, OLC, CI/OPS, SECURY

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S E C R E T 301456Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15074 [illegible]

649499

DIRECTOR.

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 283581

1. AMMUG-1 PLANS NO LEGAL NAME CHANGE. WILL FILE NATURALIZATION PETITION AS IDEN.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

Iden in WMIM 15075

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30 Jun 72

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RIG: CHRIS HOPKINS:dh
NIT: WH/COG/OS
XT: 4163/1325
TE: 26 JUNE 1972

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Y 28 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. OLC SEC 4 C/OP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 27 JUN 72 21 41z CITE DIRECTOR

WH/MIAMI 283581

TYPIC AMMUG

1. SENATE PASSED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE EXPECTED WITHIN 6 TO 10 DAYS. PLS ADVISE IF A-1 PLANS LEGAL NAME CHANGE AT TIME HE FILES PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.

2. FILE: 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

/COG/COMMENT: The Office of Legislative Counsel wants to know if A-1, a DGI officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964, plans to change his name when he files petition for naturalization in near future.

OLC Mr. Carpentier (Telecoord)

WH/F1

201-749651
27 June 1972

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DISSEM BY: 35 PER ______

ACTION UNIT: WH8
INFO
FILE, VR, IPAN, SECUR4

ACTION NO. 166

S E C R E T 271[illegible]Z JUN 72 STAFF

CITE WH/MIAMI 15039

27 JUN IN 646464

DIRECTOR.

AKULE TYPIC AMMUG

REF: DRIECTOR 250368

1. REQUEST STATUS AMMUG/1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WHICH PER REF BEING CONSIDERED BY SENATE.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

IN
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201-749651
27 June 1972

SECRET

A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., October 6, 1971.

A–13721684.

Hon. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez La-Hera, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary.

The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his ineligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as proscribed in section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 29, 1964.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND F. FARRELL,
Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FROM IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FILES RE H.R. 2076

The beneficiary, Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, a native and citizen of Cuba, was born on February 6, 1937. His parents and two brothers are natives, citizens and residents of Cuba. He married Marion Cuca-Calla, a native and citizen of Cuba, on August 13, 1959, in Havana, Cuba. This marriage was terminated by divorce in October 1959. There was no issue of this union. On December 17, 1963, the beneficiary married Luisa Rodriguez-Timoneda, a native and citizen of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba. She was born on August 24, 1934, in Havana, Cuba, and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. One child, Luisa, was born of this marriage on May 25, 1970, in Miami, Fla., and is a citizen of the United States. Mrs. Rodriguez' marriage to Vicente del Rosario Hernandez-Garcia on September 3, 1949, in Havana, Cuba, was terminated by divorce October 14, 1963. Two children were born of this marriage in Havana, Cuba, Vincente Maximiliano, on August 21, 1950, and Francisca Luciana, on January 7, 1952. The boy died in Miami, Fla., in 1968 and the girl became a naturalized citizen of the United States on September 2, 1971. Mrs. Rodriguez and her two daughters reside with the beneficiary in Miami, Fla.

The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his

native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife is employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $85. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $33,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500.

The beneficiary arrived in the United States from Canada on April 29, 1964, at Thousand Islands Bridge, N.Y., and was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 7, 1966, his status was changed to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and the date of his admission recorded as of April 29, 1964.

On his alien registration form the beneficiary listed employment with the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Cuban Government from August 16, 1963, until April 21, 1964, just prior to his defection. He also showed military service in the Cuban Rebel Army from February 4, 1959, until December 20, 1961.

The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation.

Private bill H.R. 17740, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted.

The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is of the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted.

○

Chris Hopkins
3038

P. L. Carpentier OLC

Calendar No. 841

92D CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
No. 92-880

VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LaHERA

JUNE 19, 1972.—Ordered to be printed

MR. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2076]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of the bill is to enable Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera to file a petition for naturalization, notwithstanding the fact that he was formerly a member of a proscribed organization.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The beneficiary of the bill is a 35-year-old native and citizen of Cuba, whose status was adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien on November 7, 1966, retroactive to April 29, 1964, the date on which he was paroled into the United States from Canada. He resides in Miami, Fla., with his wife, a lawful resident alien, and two daughters. The beneficiary was employed in Cuba with the General Directorate of Intelligence, and served in the Cuban Rebel Army. Without enactment of the bill, the beneficiary would be unable to petition for naturalization until 1974.

A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
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House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary.

The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his ineligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as proscribed in section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 29, 1964.

Sincerely,

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Commissioner.

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The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife is employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $85. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $33,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500.

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The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation.

Private bill H.R. 17740, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted.

The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted.

○

5 APR 1972

DETAILED JUSTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT

1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaVera has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) he had collected during the preceeding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/defection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts have been used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action, psychological warfare and recruitment operations.

2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, and objective operational testing since, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service.

3. The psychiatric and periodic medical examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems.

4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and for the past two years has been working for the Marriott Corporation, specifically

201-749651

as manager of the airlines' catering division in Miami. He is pleased with this new occupation. There is every reason to expect that he would be a responsible and loyal citizen.

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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION

DISPATCH NUMBER: UFAA - 4021

DATE: 7 April 72

ENCLOSURE NUMBER:

PAGE NUMBER: 1

PARAGRAPH NUMBER: 2

SECURITY REGULATION(S) VIOLATED

FR 10-315, 1 July 53 Para 2 b (1) (a)

SUBSTANCE OF VIOLATION

Ref: UFAA 4018
UFAA 4019
UFAA 4020

Use of crypt + True identity in same pouch. Specifically this is the use of "Cuban defectors" in dispatch and sending the dispatch in pouch which has other dispatches of same format and basic subject, but using the crypt for Cuba.

RID. ANALYST

FORM 6-64 2244 SECRET (36-43)

DISPATCH

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XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Paris OFP

1P

INFO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division; Chief, European Division

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/Photographs of Cuban Diplomats in Paris

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPW 46605, 2 March 1972

1. The photographs of Petra Concepcion *Barragan Garcia (201-854152), Carlos Esteban *Ramos Frias (201-877551), Maria Victoria *Caignet Urena (201-826455), Pedro *Lara Zamora (201-888367) and wife and Marco *Campanioni Tamayo (201-886144) and his wife were reviewed with [redacted] defector [redacted] on 6 April 1972 with negative results.

2. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris -OP
3 - Chief, WHD
2 - Chief, EURD [illegible] E/F/H

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 13 1972
MICROFILMED

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TO
Chief of Station, Ottawa

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;Chief,EUR

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/SMABOVE-Felix M. MILIAN Pantoja (201-883219)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OCOA-16803, 14 March 1972

1. The photographs of Felix M. Milian Pantoja (Subject) and his wife, Luisa M. Gonzalez Sabio, were reviewed with AMMUG-1 on 6 April 1972. While GONZALEZ was familiar to AMMUG-1 he could not provide any information on her. He did not, however, recognize Subject.

2. We will review the photographs of Subject and his wife with the other defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and advise you of any positive results.

3. Station is most appreciative of the high quality photographs that we have recently been receiving from SMACT via SMABOVE.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
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  3 - Chief, WHD
  2 - Chief, EUR

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CS [illegible] 883219

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-749661

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-4018

DATE
Typed: 7 April 1972

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-883219

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division;
Chief, European Division

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
[illegible]/[illegible]-Rolando MENESES de la Hoya (201-771827)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPA 97498, 23 February 1972

Copies of the original photographs of Rolando Meneses de la Hoya and his wife, Sara Manresa Gonzalez, which were forwarded to us by Headquarters, were reviewed with AMSTAFF defector AMMUG-1 on 6 April 1972 with negative results. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

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2 - Chief, EURD

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ORIG: ALBERT J. AMORI:GHD
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 1617/5010
DATE: 31 MARCH 1972

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CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, C/AII,

(elite) (pica)
(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

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TO WH/MIAMI
AMMUG

1. HOUSE PASSED AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. BILL NOW IN SENATE. MAY TAKE ANOTHER MONTH BEFORE DECISION REACHED.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

1 Apr 72
201-749651

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

LAURENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 24 February 1972

3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Garner J. Cline, Counsel, Subcommittee No. 1, House Judiciary Committee, who told me that there would be no problem with the Democratic objector relating to H. R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera. Mr. Donald Benn, Associate Counsel of the Judiciary Committee, has not touched base as yet with the Republican objector but will do so before the private calendar is called on 7 March.

~~Mr. Cline told me also that the Davis bill, H. R. 5176, was formally tabled by the full Committee in its meeting of 22 February. The tabling was without discussion on the basis of an adverse recommendation by the Subcommittee. See Memo for Record dated 11 February 1972 on A. Trevor Gallaher.~~

Ammug - 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCERPT FROM JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Drury Blair, Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee staff, who told me that due to the primaries in the Chairman's home state he did not believe that any further meetings of the Subcommittee will be held until mid June. H. R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, is on the agenda for the next Subcommittee meeting. Miss Chris Hopkins, WH Division, has been advised.

LaHera -
Vl. Rodriguez

Pat Carpentier
Legislative Counsel

X 9207

for US citizenship

Bill for waiver of 10 yrs. waiting period has passed the House & is in the Senate.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

G: BERNICE TURBEVILLE:ak
IT: WH/COG/FI
T: 7265 R. 9229
TE: 16 FEB 72

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

WH/2 INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 172372Z 02 CITE DIRECTOR 233810

WH/MIAMI INFO: MADRID

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 13554 (IN 538389)

1. AGREE WITH REF CRITERIA FOR FURTHER PURSUIT AMETROPIA/1 CASE.

2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENT: Miami suggests we not position AMMUG/1 for possible contact with AMETROPIA/1 until he is PCS or TDY long enough to permit an orderly approach.

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749651 — [illegible]

JAMES E. FLANNERY
AC/WHD

E/IB [illegible]

L[illegible]NCE [illegible]FIELD
C/WH/COG

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR, P/AN, EUR6, FI, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

ACTION NO. 173

S E C R E T 152120Z FEB 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13854

15 FEB IN 538389

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF MADRID 15657 (IN 532605)

1. APPRECIATE REF INFO ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR PRIORITY TARGETS RIGHTFULLY TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THIS RATHER ELUSIVE ONE AND SUGGEST THAT WE STAND DOWN ON ANY EFFORT TO POSITION AMMUG-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT. THIS, UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT RODRIGUEZ IS PCS OR IN A TDY STATUS LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY APPROACH.

2. FYI: AMGAME-1 WHO KNOWS RODRIGUEZ, ASSESSES HIM AS BEING A WORTHWHILE TARGET AND POSSIBLY RECRUITABLE.

3. FILE: 201-865547, 201-816552, 201-749651. GP1.

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FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CS COPY

CS COPY FILED IN 201-865547

SECRET

15 Feb 72

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

TYPIC/Fernando Otero Espino (201-824860)

Reference: HMMA 41468, 16 December 1971

1. While AMGAME-1 immediately recognized the photograph of Subject which was forwarded in Reference, AM[illegible]-1, AM[illegible]-1 and AM[illegible]-1 did not. We will review the photograph with AM[illegible]-1 and advise any positive results.

2. Forwarded herewith is a debriefing report from AMGAME-1 on Subject. If after reviewing this report, Mexico City has any additional requirements for AMGAME-1, we will be glad to service them.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Report, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City w/att, herewith
2 - Chief, WHD without att

CS COPY FILED IN 201-824860

749651

Typed: 21 January 1972

201-831373, 201-802332,

201-749681, 201-816852

UFAA-3771

201-824860

21 Jan 72

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR, PLAN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI,

ACTION NO 257

S E C R E T 172143Z JAN 72 CITE WH/MIAMI 13595 17 JAN IN 515283

OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC SMABOVE

REF A OCUA 16526

B UFAA 3597

1. PRIOR TO FEBRUARY CONFERENCE WE INTEND TO REVIEW ALL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PBRUMENS STATIONED CANADA WITH THOSE AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE DEFECTORS WHO ARE RESPONSIBILITY OF WH/MIAMI. PLEASE FORWARD ANY AVAILABLE COPIES OF I.D. PHOTOS FOR INDIVIDUALS LISTED REF B.

2. FYI: VALUE OF SUCH A REVIEW IS UNDERLINED BY AMMUG-1'S RECENT RECOGNITION OF JORGE DE LA VEGA VIGNON (201-815356) VIA SUCH A PHOTO. UNFORTUNATELY, AMMUG-1 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY VEGA AS BEING INTEL.

3. FILE: 201-815356, 201-749651, 19-2-16. GP1.

S E C R E T

[illegible]
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

CS COPY FILED IN 19-2-6

2

SECRET

17 Jan 72

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, WH/Miami
P[illegible]/Fernando Otero Espino (201-824860)

Reference: HMMA 41406

AM[illegible]-1 did not recognize the photograph of Fernando Otero Espino which was forwarded by Reference. The photograph will be shown to AMDAUB-1, AMA[illegible]-1, AMGAME-1 and AMCARD-1 at the first opportunity.

Eustace D. KLOCK

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201-749651

UFAA-3735

Typed: 10 January 1972

~~201-694669~~

14-00000

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Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Chief of Station, WH/Miami

PBRUMEN/Enrique Gomez Carliz (201-777321)

REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMA-41339, 13 December 1971
B. HMMA-40515, 7 June 1971

1. AMMUG-1 failed to identify the picture of Enrique *Gomez Carliz which was forwarded in Reference A. We will of course, review the photograph with the other AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE defectors who are the responsibility of the WH/Miami Station and advise you of the results.

2. According to paragraph 3 of Reference A, Subject is to be found at the extreme right of the photograph. While it is entirely possible that we are mistaken, the individual at the extreme right of the photograph bears little resemblance to the KMFOAMAN-1 photograph of Subject which was forwarded to us via Reference B.

3. We would appreciate if if you would review the photographs which were forwarded via References A and B and reconfirm that they are indeed of Subject. We are forwarding as attachments to this dispatch, copies of the photographs which we received to facilitate this task.

Eustace D. HEDOCK

Attachments: Photographs, h/w

Distribution:
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CS COPY [illegible] 201-777321

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201-749651	UFAA-2734	TYPED: 10 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201-777321





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Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
Chief of Station, WH/Miami	MICROFILM

ECT PDRUMEN/Nelson Quesada Rivero (201-836379)

ON REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES:
A. HMMA-41292, 16 November 1971
B. HMMA-41414, 16 December 1971
C. HMMA-41353, 13 December 1971

1. The delay in responding to Reference A's request that a picture of Subject be reviewed with the appropriate assets was due to the fact that prior to the receipt of the Reference B photographs, we lacked a good picture of Subject. We felt that the picture of Subject, #143 in Volume II of the Cuban Mugbooks, was something less than satisfactory for the purposes of positive identification.

2. Immediately upon the receipt of the Reference B photographs, the undersigned reviewed with AMMUG-1 the one of Nelson *Quesada Rivero with negative results. AMGAME-1, however, did recognize the name of Quesada and identified him as being AMSTAFF. Needless to say, we will show AMGAME-1 the photograph of Subject at the earliest opportunity to determine how well he knows him and if warranted, will debrief him in detail on Subject.

3. The Reference B photograph of Subject will be reviewed with the other AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE assets residing in the JMCOBRA area and we will promptly inform you of the results.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

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③-C/WHD

CS COPY 201-836379

2 749651

REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-749651 201-816552	UFAA-3732	TYPED: 7 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-836379

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, P/AN, EUR 6, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, DDP, ADDP (10)

ACTION NO. 259

S E C R E T 291300Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15141 23 Nov IN 479487

2P

[illegible] SER.
FEB [illegible] 1972
MICROFILMED

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA/AMUG

REF/ MADRID 15135 (IN 478415)

1. AFTER QUTIMID CONVERSATIONS INDIATED AMETROPIA-1 DUE ARRIVE EACH DAY 23-25 NOVEMBER, SUBJECT FINALLY APPEARED 26 NOVEMBER. QUSEQUIN AT AIRPORT DID NOT NOTE ARRIVAL AND STATION COGNIZANT ONLY THROUGH QUTIMID MONITORING AFTERNOON 27 NOVEMBER. AFTER NEGATIVE QUSEQUIN-37 CHECK OF HOTELS NORMALLY FREQUENTED BY CUBANS, PHONE CALL TO HOTEL CONDE DUQUE (WHERE CUBANA AIRCREWS STAY) RECEIVED ANSWER THAT TARGET HAD CHECKED IN 26 AND LEFT 27 NOVEMBER. (AIRLISTS LATER SHOW TARGET WENT TO HAVANA ON 28 NOVEMBER AND LIAISON AFTER-ACTION CHECK CONDE DUQUE REVEALS OTHER CUBAN DIP WITH SAME PATRONYM HAD REGISTERED AND DEPARTED ON DATES SPECIFIED).

2. AMMUG-1 LEAVING FOR NEW YORK BY IBERIA 951 ON 29 NOVEMBER AND ETA MIAMI 1900 HOURS ON EASTERN 027. ADVANCED $100 (T/A MIAMI) TO COVER PURCHASE NEW TICKET SINCE FULL VALUE RETURN TRIP GOOD ONLY FOR PERIOD LONGER THAN 17 DAYS.

3. TARGET'S EVASIVENESS MAY REFLECT TIGHTENED MEASURES

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~~[illegible]~~	
FI	

B201-865547

CS COPY

SECRET

201-749651

29 Nov 71

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 15141 SECRET

FOR AMWHEN DEFECTION. HE DID NOT STAY AT USUAL HOTEL. QUSEQUIN TRAVEL CONTROL PROCEDURES OBVIOUSLY DEFICIENT. AMMUG-1 GAVE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE AND APPEARS MORE EAGER THAN EVERY TO ATTEMPT PITCH.

4. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP-1.

SECRET

11 JAN 1972

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR IP/AN, C/VR6, C/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 087

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JAN 27 1972
MICROFILMED

PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 261713Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15135

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI 26 Nov IN 478415

TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: DIRECTOR 205025

1. AMMUG-1 MET WITHOUT HITCH MORNING 25 NOVEMBER. STILL NO SIGNS OF AMETROPIA-1. QUTIMID TRAFFIC 25 NOVEMBER SHOWED CONVERSATION BETWEEN JOSE MARTIZEZ OF COMPANIA EUROPA DE MANUTENCION CONTINUA AND CACHON IN COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHERE LATTER ADVISES THAT A/1 DEFINITELY DUE THAT DAY (BUT NO OTHER CALLS INDICATING HE ACTUALLY ARRIVED). LIAISON WILLING TO COOPERATE ONLY SO FAR AS PROVIDE TWICE-DAILY CHECK HOTEL AROSA ROSTER AND ALERT FROM AIRPORT IF A/1 SPOTTED ARRIVING, BOTH CHANNELLED THROUGH QUSEQUIN/37, BUT NOT WILLING TO APPROACH MARTINEZ (WHO DOES NOT APPEAR TO KNOW MORE THAN WHAT IS TOLD BY COMMERCIAL OFFICE ANYWAY). QUFLUTE-1 HAD ONLY FALSE ALARM TO REPORT BUT NO OTHER INDICATIONS.

2. STATION KEEPING CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMMUG-1 AND TRYING TO DETERMINE A-1 PRESENCE SOONEST.

28

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CS COPY

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201-749651

26 Nov 71

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MADRID 15135 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-749651; 201-865547. GP1

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INFO FILE, VR Eur6. RPAN. CI, CIops 6 (9)

TION NO. 265

SECA 4

S E C R E T 231908Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13192

WHMIAMI

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

23Nov IN476216

TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 15114 (IN 476162)

1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AMMUG-1 FOLLOWS: HT: 64", WT: 140, HAIR: BLACK, AGE 34, FACE: THIN AND SLIGHTLY MARKED.

2. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1

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23 Nov 71

201-749651

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BY ____ AT 1545 Z

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT 2078

ACTION NO 331

FILE, VR IP/AN SD/P FI SECUR 2/ CI/OPS FI

EUR 6 10

S E C R E T 191502Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15090

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

IN 473565

TYPIC AMETROPIA QUTIMID

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 13096 (IN 470042)

B. MADRID 15035 (IN 469867)

1. ACCORDING TO QUTIMID CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO CUBAN OFFICIALS, AMETROPIA-1 LEFT LONDON FOR MONTREAL EARLY MORNING 19 NOVEMBER, WILL RETURN TO LONDON 21 NOVEMBER AND PLANS TO ARRIVE MADRID 23 NOVEMBER. ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS STILL INDEFINITE BUT MADE INQUIRIES ABOUT 26 NOVEMBER CUBANA FLIGHT TO HAVANA. (NO HOTEL RESERVATIONS YET MADE BUT WILL ADVISE ASAP WHEN INFORMATION ABAILABLE.)

2. DEFER TO ADDEE JUDGEMENT WHETHER AMMUG-1 TRIP SHOULD BE MADE ON BASIS THIS INFORMATION. IF AFFIRMATIVE, STATION WILL ASSIST ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

3. FILE 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1.

S E C R E T

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201-749651
19 NOV 71

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR IP/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, SECUR 4 (7)

ACTION NO. 284

S E C R E T 151712Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15035 MADR

15Nov IN 469867

DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA QUTIMID

REF: MADRID 15010 (IN 467099)

1. PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SPANISH BUSINESSMAN AND AMETROPIA-1 IN LONDON INDICATES A-1 DEFINITELY WILL SEE SPANIARD IN MADRID BUT AFTER WEEK ENDING 20 NOVEMBER. SINCE CONVERSATION DID NOT MENTION ANY DEADLINES WE HAVE NO TIME FRAME WHITHIN WHICH AMMUG-1 MIGHT BEST TRAVEL TO MADRID.

2. FILE 201-749651. GP-1.

S E C R E T 201-865547

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DOC. MICRO. SER.
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ORIG: ALBERT J. AMORI:ghd
UNIT: WH/COG/FI
EXT: 7141/1819
DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1971

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 4/51 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF. WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12NOV71 00 35z CITE DIRECTOR 200657

WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMMUG

REF WH/MIAMI 13055 (IN 466569)*

1. HOUSE SUB COMMITTEE FAVORABLY APPROVED BILL FOR AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP. BILL NOW GOES TO FULL COMMITTEE AND LATER TO HOUSE FOR FINAL ACTION.

2. FILE 201-749651. GP-1.

END OF MESSAGE

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WH/COG Comment: REF REQUESTED OUTCOME OF BILL TO GRANT AMMUG-1 U.S. CITIZENSHIP.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

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INFO FILE, VR, IP/AN, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 252

S E C R E T 101851Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 13055

WMIM

10 Nov 71 IN 466569

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

1. WOULD APPRECIATE OUTCOME OF HQS DISCUSSIONS RE AMMUG-1 BEING GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP. IF THERE HAVE BEEN ANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS STATION WOULD LIKE TO PASS THEM ON TO AMMUG-1.

2. FILE: 201-749651. GPI.

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10 NOV 71
201-74965

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DEC 17 1971
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INFO FILE, VR P/AN EUR6 SECUR4 DDP CS/DO CI/OPS FI

ACTION NO. 766

S E C R E T 050842Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID MADR 14969 5 Nov IN 462511

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF DIRECTOR 197498

1. AS OF COB 4 NOVEMBER NO INDICATION FROM STATION SOURCES CONCERNING AMETROPIA-1 RETURN NOR DID HOTEL AROSA (HIS USUAL RESIDENCE) CLAIM TO HAVE RESERVATION IN HIS NAME.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

*RELAYED TO AIRTECH PER DIR 198194.

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5 NOV 71
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ACTION NO. 91

FILE VR , I/I ,W, EUR 6, SECUR 4, C/OPS

SECRET 031835Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 14955
MADR

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO LONDON, DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMTROPIA

3 Nov IN 460684
B

REF: WH/MIAMI 13330 (IN 460121)

1. APPRECIATE OFFER BUT STATION CAN HANDLE AMMUG-1.

2. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP1

SECRET

AB

Ammug-1

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201-749651

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FROM:

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PAGE BRIAN
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GI-879
GA50
TUBE GT7

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COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/C		27 OCT 1971		
2. DC/WH/C			28	
3. C/WH/C/FE			29	
4. Marshall		1 Nov		R
5. Albright		1 Nov 71		KEO
6. Judy F.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

Didn't go to MADRID

– could you please do traces on CRESPO, Thanks Ken

[illegible]

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 27 19[illegible]
MICROFILMED

68765

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-749651

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
12 OCT. 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFAA 03472

FORM 610a

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
0 TYPIC Cuban Officials in Madrid

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFAW-1246

1. AMMUG-1 did not recognize the photograph of Manuel Ignacio *Quesada Santinach (201-327266), which is contained in Volume I of the Cuban Mugbook.

2. AMMUG-1 recognized two names from the listing of Cuban officials in Spain, which was forwarded by OSMA-27086 of 24 May 1971. They were Ricardo *Espino Martinez (201-818437) and Federico *Crespo Moreira. AMMUG-1 commented that he had known Espino quite well and that he was in periodic contact with him from April 1961 to May of 1963. AMMUG-1 added that Espino used to be the director of an import house in Cuba, but was unable to recall the name of this firm. AMMUG-1 stated that he had known a Federico Crespo Moreira from his days in the Cuban police. According to AMMUG-1 Crespo worked underneath him from 1959 to January 1961 when both men were transferred to the Army. AMMUG-1 commented that Crespo was given the rank of sergeant. AMMUG-1 last saw Crespo around early 1962. AMMUG-1 added that Crespo was a Caucasian, would be about 32 years of age and that the last time he saw him, Crespo had blondish hair, was about 5'9" tall and weighed about 170 pounds. Station files list Crespo's DOB as being 9 August 1940 which dovetails with AMMUG-1's information.

3. AMCARD-1 information on the subject(s) if any, will be forwarded in the immediate future.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
OCT 27 1971
MICROFILMED

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-327266 201-818437

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-3472

DATE
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Typed: 6 October 1971

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HQS FILE NUMBER
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ACTION NO. 556

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 1 1971
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 271313Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12082

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 17236 (IN 387237)

WMIM

387716

1. DUE TO DOCUMENT PROCEDURAL COMPLICATIONS, AMMUG-1 DID NOT DEPART FOR MEXICO CITY AS PLANNED. IN LIGHT OF INFO CONTAINED REF, AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED REMAIN IN MIAMI.

2. IN ADDITION TO DEBRIEFING OF AMSLOUCH-6 AND AMSLOUCH-7, REQUEST THAT KLOOCK TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR IN DEEPTH FAMILIARIZATION WITH PBRUMEN PERSONALITIES, ACTIVITIES AND MODUE OPERANDI IN MEXICO CITY.

Kloock

3. FILE: 201-872345 AND 201-749651. GP-1

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B 201-872345

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27 Jul 71
201-749651

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S E C R E T 262019Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17230

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

W/Miami 201-749651

26 JUL IN 387183

26/7/71

1. EUSTACE D. KLOOCK ARRIVED PER REF.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP-1

SECRET

BOSCH FERNANDEZ, AURORA

MIRABAL-FERNANDEZ, RAFAEL

(VON DER) PAHLEN, PETER

(USC AIG)

RAMIREZ LOPEZ, VINCENTE

RODRIGUEZ LAMEAR, VLADIMIR

IP/ICI X

IP/CRY

IP/MB

IP/CRO

26 JUL 71

~~201-749657~~

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SECRET 221324Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12035 WMIAMI 22 JUL 71 IN 384361

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF A DIRECTOR 162399 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

B WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

1. PER PERMISSION GRANTED REF A, EUSTACE D. KLOOCK WILL TRAVEL MEXICO CITY PER REF B.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP1.

SECRET

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 1 1971
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B 201-812117
B 201-872345

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22 Jul 71
201-749651

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: Lawrence Sternfield:bj.
UNIT: C/WH/COG
EXT: 1945
DATE: 21 JULY 1971

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BY 23 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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CONF: W/18 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CSDO, FI, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 21 JUL 71 19 36Z CITE DIRECTOR 02399

6

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI

TYPIC AMROSE AMSLOUCH

REF: WH/MIAMI 12022 (IN 383676)

1. RE PARA 1 OF REF PERMISSION GRANTED.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117; 201-872345.

END OF MESSAGE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

4

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CS COPY

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/COG

21 Jul 71

B 201-812117

201-749651

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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B 201-872345

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PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT WHA8 — INFO — FILE, VR RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 953

S E C R E T 211628Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 12022 (SADELLY ACTING)

WMIM 21 JUL IN 383676

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE AMSLOUCH

REF WH/MIAMI 11983 (IN 380663)

1. FOR DIRECTOR: REQUEST PERMISSION FOR EUSTACE D. KLOOCK TO TRAVEL IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS TO MEXICO CITY ON AMMUG-1/AMSLOUCH-6 OPS. TRAVEL INFO AS FOLLOWS: DEPART MIAMI AT 1730 HOURS 25 JULY VIA PAA FLIGHT 552 WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MEXICO CITY AT 2105 HOURS.

2. AMMUG-1 WILL UTILIZE SAME PAA FLIGHT ON 26 JULY WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT 1935 HOURS.

3. FOR MEXICO CITY: REQUEST THAT IF POSSIBLE, YOU MAKE RESERVATIONS PER ABOVE SCHEDULE FOR KLOOCK IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS AT EITHER HOTEL BRISTOL OR MONTEJO AND RESERVATIONS FOR AMMUG-1 IN HIS TRUE NAME AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC. KLOOCK WILL CONTACT STATION MONDAY MORNING. APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT.

4. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GP1.

S E C R E T

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B-201-872345

B 201-812117

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21 Jul 71

201-749651

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ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR ~~C/CA~~, SECUR4, C/OPS, FI

ACTION NO 622

S E C R E T 162042Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11983 WMIM

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

16 JUL IN 380663

TYPIC AMROSE

REF MEXICO CITY 17155 (IN 379734)

1. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, SUGGEST WE SET 26 JULY AS TARGET DATE FOR AMMUG-1'S TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY AND THAT HE TRAVEL IN TRUE NAME VIA FAIRLY DIRECT ROUTE. NO MATTER WHAT TRANSPIRES WITH AMSLOUCH-6, KLOOCK WILL BE IN MEXICO CITY 26 JULY TO DIRECT AMMUG-1, IN CONCERT WITH MEXICO CITY.

2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117. GP1.

S E C R E T

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ACTION NO. 991

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
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S E C R E T 101740Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17120

MEXI

DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

10 JUL IN 376059

TYPIC AMROSE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 17033 (IN 368344)

B. DIRECTOR 155185

C. WH/MIAMI 11878 (IN 374346)

D. DIRECTOR 158728

1. REF C ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS SHOW AMMUG-1 TRIP HERE CANNOT BE GIMMICKED. HE'LL BE MARKED FROM FIRST MOMENT FOR WHAT HE IS. APPARENTLY, THIS IS OF NO PARTICULAR CONCERN TO WH/MAMI OR AMMUG-1 HIMSELF. THIS BEING CASE, DO NOT SEE WHAT WE HAVE TO LOSE BY GOING AHEAD. THERE NOTHING THAT SENSITIVE OTHERWISE IN PROCESS, INCLUDING KDTUCK-18 CASE, WHICH SHOULD BE AFFECTED BY AN AMMUG-1 APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1 IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. LETS'S ELABORATE JUST A BIT FURTHER ON OUR QUERY OF PARA 2G, REF A, AND WH/MIAMI COMMENT OF PARA 2G, REF C. IF AMMUG-1 CAN MANEUVER TO SEE KDACOUSTIC-1 UNDER PRIVATE, RELAXED CIRCUMSTANCES (ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT), WE CERTAINLY HOPE HE'LL GO BEYOND MERELY OFFERING HIMSELF AS CHANNEL FOR DEFECTION. (KDACOUSTIC-1 KNOWN STATION OFFICERS PERSONALLY AND HOW TO REACH THEM.) WE'D

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10 Jul 71

201-812117

SECRET

201-749651

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 17120 S E C R E T

LIKE AMMUG-1, AS AN OLD, KNOWLEDGEABLE COLLEAGUE, TO ENGAGE KDACOUSTIC-1 IN MEANINGFUL IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, COMPARE NOTES ON MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES, ELICIT RE PERSONAL LIFE, GIVE US A BETTER INSIGHT ON AN UNCOMMUNICATIVE TARGET AND, THUS, A BETTER ASSESSMENT. THIS WOULD BE WORTH THE TRIP, EVEN IF AMMUG-1 OTHERWISE REJECTED.

3. ASSUME AMMUG-1 READY TO GO WITHIN THIS OF NEXT MONTH. COULD AMMUG-1 VISIT BE COMBINED WITH ONE OF HOBBERLIN'S VISITS RE KDTUCK-18 (PARTICULARLY IF AMMUG-1 LOOLS LIKE HE MIGHT BE HANDLING PROBLEM)?

4. FILES: 201-749651; 201-802117. GP-1

S E C R E T

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RIG: L. Laser
NIT: DC/WH/1
XT: 7375/9354
ATE: 9 July 1971

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S E C R E T 9 JUL 71 21 00z CITE DIRECTOR 158728

WH/MIAMI, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: WH/MIAMI-11378 (IN 374346)

1. GIVEN STATION WH/MIAMI AND MEXICO CITY ENTHUSIASM FOR REF OP, HQS CONCURS IN PROPOSAL TO LAY NECESSARY GROUNDWORK FOR AMMUG-1 AND KDACOUSTIC-1 MEETING. GARDALPHE WILL DISCUSS WITH STATION ON ARRIVAL.

2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-862117.

END OF MESSAGE

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 10 1971
MICROFILMED

WH COMMENT: Ref recommended GARDALPHE delayed for AMMUG-1 trip to Mexico to contact KDACOUSTIC-1.

B 201-862117

9 Jul 71
201-749651

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COG
COORDINATING OFFICERS

John C. Murray
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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AUG 10 1971
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S E C R E T 081503Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11878 (W MIA) 8 JUL IN 374346

4

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 155185

B. MEXICO CITY 17033 (IN 328344)

1. WHILE WE UNWILLING GO TO THE MAT TO PLACE AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1, THIS IS A CASE WHERE WE HAVE A GOOD ACCESS AGENT AND BELIEVE WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE LET THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT/DEFECT AN AMSTAFF OFFICER PASS US BY. WHILE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IS PROBABLY QUITE SLIM, WE FEEL POTENTIAL REWARD WELL WORTH THE MINIMAL EFFORT INVOLVED.

2. FOR MEXICO CITY: FOLLOWING INFO GEARED TO QUESTIONS RAISED PARA TWO REF B:

SUPERVISOR, MARRIOTT IN FLIGHT SERVICES

B. YES

C. NO

D. MARCH 1964 MEXICO CITY AS CO-WORKERS IN AMSTAFF SECTION

E. YES

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8 Jul 71

SECRET

B 201-812117

201-749651

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 11878

F. NO, BUT THEN IT IS NOT OUR OBJECTIVE THAT AMMUG-1 OFFER KDACOUSTIC-1 A JOB.

G. BELIEVE WE CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT IF AMMUG-1 DOES APPROACH KDACOUSTIC-1 THAT THE LATTER WILL ASSUME THAT AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN SENT BY LNFORT/JKLANCE. THIS BEING SO, BELIEVE AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1 AND ASSURE HIM THAT IF HE EVER DECIDED TO DEFECT FROM PBRUMEN, THAT AMMUG-1 CAN SERVE AS HIS CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO LNFORT. THIS OF COURSE SAME RATIONALE BEING USED IN THE AMBEATNIK-1/AMMEDIA-1 RELATIONSHIP

H. AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY REASON FOR GOING TO MEXICO WILL BE TO CONTACT KDACOUSTIC-1.

AUG 18 71

CY

I. NO

3. IN VIEW OF MEXICO CITY'S BELIEF THAT KDACOUSTIC-1 WILL RETURN PCS PBRUMEN THIS SUMMER, RECOMMEND WE PRESS FORWARD AND WITH THE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK TO EFFECT MEETING BETWEEN AMMUG-1 AND KDACOUSTIC-1.

4. FILE: 201-749651 AND 201-8~~3~~2117. GP-1

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: L. Laser:nlh
UNIT: DC/WH/1
EXT: 7375/9354
DATE: 28 June 1971

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CONF: [illegible] INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

S E C R E T 28 Jun 71 23 37z CITE DIRECTOR 155185

TO WH/MIAMI INFO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: WH/MIAMI 11787 (IN 366332)

1. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH APPROACHES UTILIZING CUBAN DEFECTORS DOES NOT LEAD US TO BE SANGUINE REGARDING PROPOSED OP AGAINST KDACOUSTIC-1, ESPECIALLY USING "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" PLOY. WHILE RISK IN SUCH AN ATTEMPTED APPROACH IS MINIMAL, WE WOULD FAVOR DELAYING OP IN HOPES OF DEVELOPING MORE UP-TO-DATE INFO ON THE TARGET'S VULNERABILITIES AND POSSIBLE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION.

2. FOR MEXICO CITY: HAS KDTUCK-4 OR OTHER STATION ACCESS AGENTS DEVELOPED ANY SIGNIFICANT INFO ON KDACOUSTIC-1 RECENTLY?

3. FILE: 201-812117, 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

pls file — 201-749651

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/1

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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28 Jun 71

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TUBE GT7

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COMMENTS

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1971
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3-6: Since AMMUG-1 is an active asset, someone should be assigned as his (AMMUG-1) Hqs CO. There seems to be some confusion about who in COG should take action on such a case. [illegible]

[illegible]

6 to 7, 8, 9: In view of the domestic aspects of this, I think the C/O should be [illegible].

55845T

FILE TITLE

l

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	X	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-749651
	INDEX		

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 28 [illegible] 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER UFAA 03131

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: [illegible]

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TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC/Future Use of AMMUG-1

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUL 13 1971
MICROFILMED

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. During JKLANCE's most recent attempt to contact AMETROPIA-1 via AMMUG-1, it became readily apparent that the cover story AMMUG-1 utilized with his immediate superior was unsatisfactory from two points: First, it did not permit us the operational flexibility so necessary in an approach of this sort and secondly, if AMMUG-1 had not returned when he did, his job security would have been jeopardized.

2. To correct the above deficiency, WH/Miami has arranged the following with the Miami Field Office (MFO): In the future, if we again utilize AMMUG-1 to approach a PBRUMEN official, we will ask that the MFO arrange to have one of their representatives from their Headquarters component contact the appropriate senior official of AMMUG-1's company. This senior official will in turn notify AMMUG-1's immediate superior that AMMUG-1 is to be permitted to travel on matters of importance to the Department of Defense.

3. Transmitted under separate cover is a copy of a memorandum we received from the MFO concerning the above arrangements.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Memo, u/s/c via True Name Pouch

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c

12 Jul 71 CS RV

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-865547	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-3131	DATE JUN 28 [illegible] 21 JUNE 1971
	CLASSIFICATION [illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-749651

18

3 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Station, WH/Miami

FROM : MFO

ATTENTION : Security Officer

SUBJECT : Ralph NOSEDA

1. Reference your memorandum OS 189-71.

2. Pursuant to your request this office contacted a senior official of the Marriott Corporation in Washington, D.C., who approved the travel to Europe of a Miami based Marriott employee who is affiliated with WH.

3. The Marriott official, Mr. James McALLISTER, contacted his Miami representative, Mr. Ralph NOSEDA, and advised NOSEDA that your asset was free to travel to Spain on short notice.

4. NOSEDA was advised by McALLISTER that this was a matter of interest to the Department of Defense. NOSEDA, to the best of our knowledge, has not been approached by anyone else in Miami or Washington on this matter since the initial call from McALLISTER in March.

REUBEN O. HARVELL

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JUL 13 1971
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201-749651

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ACTION 623

S E C R E T 2[illegible]Z JUN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 11787

26 JUN IN 366332

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

TYPIC AMROSE

REF: CS-311/04132-71

1. DURING HIS RECENT TDY TO MEXICO CITY ON THE KDTUCK-16 OPERATION, WOODROW G. HOBBERLIN DISCUSSED WITH TERENCE D. SISTONE OUR PROPOSAL TO USE AMMUG-1 TO APPROACH KDACOUSTIC-1. AMMUG-1, WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH KDACOUSTIC-1 DATES BACK TO 1954, ASSESSES KDACOUSTIC-1 AS ONLY FEIGNING LOYALTY TO THE PBRUMEN REGIME AS HE IS BASICALLY AN OPPORTUNIST.

2. WHEN PROVIDED WITH GIST OF INFO CONTAINED REF AND ASKED TO CATEGORIZE KDACOUSTIC-1, AMMUG-1 COMMENTED THAT KDACOUSTIC-1 WOULD HAVE TO BE GROUPED WITH THOSE WHO HAD COME UNDER FIRE FOR BEING SOMETHING LESS THAN RABID REVOLUTIONARIES. WHILE AMMUG-1'S APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1 WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ASSUME THE FORM OF AN "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" WE ARE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN ANY IDEAS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE TO DEVISE A LESS CONTRIVED APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1.

3. REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PROPOSAL.

4. FILE: 201-812117, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
C TYPIC/Review of Cuban Mugbooks Volumes II and III with AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Eustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMMUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 7 1971
MICROFILMED

Attachment: Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

03 07

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFAA-3054	21 MAY 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		201-749651

14-00000

DOC. MICRO. SER.
JUN 7 1971
MICROFILMED

CONTACT REPORT

AGENT AMMUG-1 PLACE: AMMUG-1's home

CASE OFFICER: Eustace D. KLOOCK DATE: 1630-1700, 19 May 1971

FUNDS PASSED: None

[illegible] as provided by Subject of 201-749651

1. At the time and place indicated above, I reviewed with AMMUG-1 Volumes II and III of the Cuban Mugbook, with the following results:

Volume II

Armando U. FR *Estrada Fernandez (201-809440) Photo #39

AMMUG-1 correctly identified the pseudo of Estrada as being "ULISES". AMMUG-1 added that he had last spoken with Estrada in February of 1964.

✓ No 201
German Miguel *Ramos [illegible] Photo #42

AMMUG-1's only comment was that he wasn't sure if Ramos was his correct name.

Roque FR *Dalton Garcia (201-215097) Photo #118

AMMUG-1 commented that he had spoken with Dalton in September of 1964

Manuel FR *Carbonell Duque (201-739084) Photo #159

AMMUG-1 commented that he knew Carbonell from circa 1960, when Carbonell was a captain in the police.

Volume III

AMMUG-1 did not recognize any of the photographs contained in Volume III of the Cuban Mugbook.

2. AMMUG-1 was also shown the photograph of Luis FR *Martinez Menocal (201-769095) which was forwarded in UFAW-1118 of 7 May 1971. While AMMUG-1 thought the face familiar, he was unable to identity the photograph.

3. In addition to the above, AMMUG-1 was also shown the photographs of the following individuals with negative results: Jorge FR *Solis Garcia (201-838320) and Sergio FR *Tolon Valdes (201-754447).

CS COPY

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Atch to UFAA 3054

201-749651

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

XX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Review of Cuban Mugbooks Volumes II and III with AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Eustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMMUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed.

Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment: Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-3054

DATE
21 MAY 1971

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

14-0000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
TYPIC
Visit of U.S. Immigration Official to AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI only.

1. During the undersigned's most recent meeting with AMMUG-1, the agent stated that a Mr. Rex M. Griffin, an investigator of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had visited him on 13 April 1971. According to AMMUG-1, the purpose of Griffin's visit was to inquire into AMMUG-1's present welfare and to determine his relationship to Mr. Rodino. (COMMENT: Mr. Rodino is the sponsor of H.R. #2076 which will expedite AMMUG-1's application for U.S. citizenship by waiving the standard waiting period.) When asked about his relationship with Mr. Rodino, AMMUG-1 simply explained that Mr. Rodino was a friend of his from Washington.

2. Griffin explained that the reason that he wanted to talk to AMMUG-1 personally, was the fact that nearly all of the information surrounding AMMUG-1 was held in INS's office in Washington. He added that the information that was held by the Miami office was closely held and access to the files was severely restricted. During his visit, Griffin asked AMMUG-1 if he noticed any unusual interest in his comings and goings, to which AMMUG-1 replied negatively.

3. In view of above, believe it reasonable to assume that Griffin suspects that JKLANCE is somehow involved with AMMUG-1. This position is concurred in by Station Officer who maintains liaison with the Miami office of the INS.

4. AMMUG-1 characterized Mr. Griffin's visit as being very pleasant and commented that he was "muy amable". In sum, there does not appear to be any need for intervention on AMMUG-1's behalf or on that of the Station. If the need does arise, we will promptly inform Headquarters.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

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GROUP 1
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA - 2951	DATE Typed: 19 April 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 749651

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXXX MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT: TYPIC/DGI-DSE Officials Known to AMMUG-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is a contact report prepared by Eustace D. KLOOCK on his most recent meeting with AMMUG-1. During this meeting, Volume I of the Cuban Mugbook was reviewed with AMMUG-1. The individuals AMMUG-1 was able to identify are listed in paragraph 2 of the attached contact report. It is requested that all the names be indexed.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w

1Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 019-5-30
019-5-42

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFAA-2925

DATE: 13 April 1971

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~201-[illegible]~~ 201-949651

14-00000

SECRET

HP

MICROFILMED
MAY 3 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9 April 1971

CONTACT REPORT — **CASE OFFICER:** Eustace D. KLOOCK Ⓚ

AGENT: AMMUG-1 — **PLACE:** AMMUG-1's home

DATE/TIME: 6 April 1971, 1530-1800

[Identified by subject of 201-749651]

1. On 6 April 1971 I reviewed with AMMUG-1, Volume I of the Cuban mugbooks. He identified the individuals listed in para 2 below. Un less otherwise noted, the following general comments apply to all: That he knew them quite well and the last time he saw them was 1963-1964, usually in Mexico.

2. Arsenio FR FRANCO Villanueva (201-346425). According to AMMUG-1, FRANCO is G-2, and is one of the individuals he approached (at our behest) during the Pan American games which were held in Puerto Rico in 1966. He commented that FRANCO dismissed AMMUG-1's initial approach out of hand stating that he was a Marxist-Leninist. According to AMMUG-1, while a follow up was supposed to be made in Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer who was accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it.

Jorge E. FR GARCIA-BANGO Dirube (201-736492). AMMUG-1 commented that GARCIA-BANGO was the other individual that he tried to approach during the Pan American games. Like FRANCO above, while a follow up was planned for Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it.

L X 710201 Cit Cuba 91

Eclio LOBAINA Lobaina. AMMUG-1 commented that he did not know LOBAINA very well. He added that he used to be AMMUG-1's instructor in firearms at the Police Academy.

SECRET

CS COPY

H/w att to UFAA-2925

201-749651

lo 201

Rolando PASTOR Rodriguez - possibly identifiable with Armando FR PASTOR Rodriguez (201-300074). AMMUG-1 last saw PASTOR about 1962 when he was attached to the Administrative Department of the Police Department.

Ramon Cesar FR CUENCA Montato (201-328945). AMMUG-1 identified CUANCA as being DGI.

Rafael PAEZ Perez - possibly identifiable with Rodolfo FR PAEZ (201-334244).

Fernando FR RAVELO Renedo (201-765244). AMMUG-1 correctly identified "RAVELO" pseudo as being "FERMIN"

Manuel FR VEGA Perez (201-334253). According to AMMUG-1, in 1963, VEGA was the DGI desk officer for Nicaragua.

Joseph Parker FR MORRAY (201-345987)

Ramon FR SINOBAS Casado (201-334249). AMMUG-1 said that he knew SINOBAS fairly well.

Carlos Sixto FR CHAIN Soler (201-349576)

Juan Guido FR LICEA Figueredo (201-876266). AMMUG-1 identified LICEA as being a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico

Augustin FR YASSELLS Gonzalez (201-345986). AMMUG-1 identified YASSELLS as a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico.

Mario FR OIZ Falgueria (201-737654).

Jose Raul FR VIERA Linares (201-328953). AMMUG-1 said that his DGI pseudo was "Gomez", and that he was stationed in Bolivia from 1962-1963.

Felipe FR LLAUDI Hernandez (201-742052). AMMUG-1 commented that LLAUDI's DGI pseudo was "ROBANE".

Oswaldo FR RELOBA Penechet (201-737138).

Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew RODRIGUEZ quite well and when RODRIGUEZ was in Mexico he used to handle HYSAGE-1.

Julian FR NOVAS Fernandez (201-747936)

No 201

Guillermo ARASTAGUIA Fundora. AMMUG-1 commented that ARASTAGUIA was a TSD technician and that his DGI pseudo was "RENE".

[illegible] correct?

Pedro FR FARINAS Diaz (201-728234). AMMUG-1 commented that FARINAS' DGI pseudo was "OTONIEL".

[illegible]

Elpidio FR INTERIAN Comezanes (201-745393). AMMUG-1 correctly identified INTERIAN as being a DGI code clerk. CO Comment: INTERIAN is presently stationed in Santiago, Chile.

Jose FR LAIN Martin Gonzalez (201-750250). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew LAIN quite well and that in 1963, LAIN used to be stationed in the Cuban Consulate in Merida.

Jose Benigno FR MEDINA Plasencia (201-756652). AMMUG-1 identified MEDINA as being a TSD technician and an expert photographer.

[illegible]

No 201

Andres Nicolas AROMA Ramos. AMMUG-1 commented that his DGI pseudo was "ERNESTO".

Orestes Guillermo FR RUIZ Perez (201-735296). According to AMMUG-1, RUIZ was in Mexico in 1964 where he was in contact with Noel GUERRERO, a member of the Nicaraguan FSLN.

Jose Miguel FR FERNANDEZ Roa (201-730852)

Guillermo FR SALGADO Alvarez (201-331825). AMMUG-1 correctly identified him as a diplomatic courier.

Angel FR TATO Ramirez (201-351544)

Teudys FR TRUTIE-Matilla (201-733681). AMMUG-1 identified him as a TSD technician.

Angel PIFERRER No 201

Santiago PEREZ num refs.

Orlando FR PRENDEZ Gutierrez (201-330002)

(201-758151)

Luis Norberto FR HERNANDEZ Curbelo. AMMUG-1 commented that HERNANDEZ had been a friend since 1950. He added that HERNANDEZ, along with Saul FR GONZALEZ (201-756664) were the ones who recruited him for the DGI.

Rogelio FR MONTENEGRO Guasp ((201-747803))

Chaf~~els~~ik Homero FR SAKER Zenni ((201-335014))

AMMUG-1 commented that the name listed for the picture, Manuel RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, was incorrect. His real name is Gines Silvio FR GORRIZ Castroman (201-761475). (CO Comment: RODRIGUEZ is an alias used by GORRIZ.)

Jose L. FR POSADAS Torres (201-334245)

Manuel Eugenio FR VEGA Perez ((201-334253))

201-749651

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, WH/Miami

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Cuban Mugbook

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFAA-2768, 1 March 1971

1. Your request to show the Cuban Mugbooks, Volumes I and II, to AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 is approved.

2. Per Reference, paragraph 2, Headquarters will forward such photographs of Cuban officials to WH/Miami.

3. We are planning a slight change in the new Cuban Mugbook (Volume III). This Mugbook will be distributed earlier (i.e., after 100 photos have been collected rather than after 500 as was the case with Volume II) and in looseleaf binders. As new sections of the Volume III are compiled, probably in groups of 100 photos, they will be sent to the Stations concerned to be added to Volume III. Incidentally, as a result of your comment on the most recent Mugbook, we are sending an alphabetical listing for Volume II to the Stations which received this Mugbook.

Thornton V. CARUANA

Distribution:
3 - COS, WH/Miami

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-831373

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAW-1070

DATE
19 MAR 1971

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-749651

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	W.J. Devine:pae		5061

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

(16 March 1971)
Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/CHRONO
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - Originator
1 - RID/D&P

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG		

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FILE, VR KE/BN, EUR-6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2

S E C R E T 012129Z MAR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10595 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC ANETROPIA

IN 276573

REF A MADRID 3167 (IN 275331)

B MADRID 3151 (NOT SENT LONDON) (IN 276371)

C MADRID 2716 (NOT SENT LONDON) (IN 231253)

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 749651

1. APPRECIATE REFS. WH/MIAMI STILL KEENLY INTERESTED IN POSITIONING AMMUG-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH ANETROPIA-1.

2. LONDON: REF B REPORTED THAT QUTINID REPORT OF 26 FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT ANETROPIA-1 EXPECTS TO COME TO MADRID "WITHIN FEW DAYS" AND THAT HE WAS STAYING IN LONDON AT ~~THE~~ HOME OF EUGENIO GONZALEZ. WH/MIAMI BELIEVES THAT GONZALEZ IS POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ. STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON GONZALEZ WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO JAGUAR:

A. GONZALEZ'S NAME WAS INCLUDED IN A LIST IDENTIFYING COMMUNISTS/INFORMERS WHO WERE EMPLOYEES AT THE U.S. ROYAL TIRE CO. IN HAVANA (AMFAST-13

IT CUBA

[redacted]

COPY FILED 201-865517

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

1 Mar 71

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14-00000

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PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 10595 S E C R E T

REPORT OF 26 NOV 1965) AND

B. DPOB: CIRCA 1915, CAMAGUEY. EARLY MEMBER OF THE MILITIA AND A SUPPORTER OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. (UFGA 3725, 5 APRIL 1962) STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON A EUGENIO GONZALEZ WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH EUGNIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ: (A) CHIEF SUBSECTION I-2/SPECIAL STEESL/OF CUBAMETALS (UFG 5352, 15 JUNE 1964); (B) AKA "LA MOSCA" HEAD OF PAYMENT, SUB-SECTION OF THE GENERAL CONTROL SECTION OF THE CONSOLIDATED PETROLEUM ENTERPRISE (ECP) OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES (MININD) (AA-4434, 12 JAN 1967) AND (C) ASSISTANT MANAGER OF CUBAMETALS, HAVANA (SF/1/212/R215-67). PER REF C, GONZALEZ ARRIVED MADRID FROM CUBA ON 16 DEC 1972 IN COMPANY WITH AMETROPIA-1. HE UTILIZED PP EF 67128.

3. REQUEST YOU CHECK WITH JAGUAR TO TRY AND DETERMINE GONZALEZ'S LONDON RESIDENCE AND/OR AMETROPIA-1'S TRAVEL ~~TRAVEL~~ PLANS.

4. FILE: 201-565247 AND 201-749651. E2.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-749651

DISPATCH

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, WH/Miami

SUBJECT
C TYPIC/Cuban Mugbook

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Request permission to show AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 Cuban mugbooks, Volume I and II.

2. We have noted that on a number of occasions in the past, photographs of Cuban officials which have been obtained by our various Stations abroad, are generally sent only to Headquarters. We request that when Headquarters does receive such photographs that WH/Miami be provided with a copy. It should be borne in mind that barring over-riding security considerations, it is our intention to show such photographs to AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 for possible identification.

Eustace D. Kloock
Eustace D. KLOOCK

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
B 201-831373

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFAA-2768

DATE
[illegible]
Typed: 26 February 1971

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
~~1 201~~-749651

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 18/04/73

X-REF. SHEET

X-REF.	SYM NUMBER	DOC. DATE	CLASSIFICATION
201-0749651	WMIM-17543	26 FEB 73	201-086554

26 Feb 71

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT (S) IS CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.

201-749651

S-E-C-R-E-T

BERNICE TURBEVILLE:ak
WH/COG/OPS
7144 R. 1819
1 FEBRUARY 1971

MESSAGE FORM
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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 02 22 22z FEB 71 CITE DIRECTOR 107366

MADRID INFO: WH/MIAMI

~~RYBAT~~ AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: MADRID 2964 (IN 256286)

1. CONCUR. PLS SUPPLY TRAVEL DETAILS 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE AS REQUIRED BY LNYUMA.

2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-865547

201-749651
2 Feb 71

JOHN SHERWOOD
EUR/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

AC/WH/COG
EUR/IB
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR C/CI/SI, C/EUR 5, C/CA, C/FI 2

ACTION NO.: 092

S E C R E T 021731Z FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2971 (MADR)

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: A. LONDON 7630 (IN 256355)

B. WH/MIAMI 0234 (IN 206343)

1. AMMUG-1 SCHEDULED LEAVE MADRID FOR NEW YORK ON 3 FEBRUARY VIA IBERIA FLT 951. ONWARD FLIGHT NEW YORK TO MIAMI 3 FEBRUARY VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLT 25.

2. STATION PROVIDED AMMUG-1 WITH 150 U.S. DOLLARS ON 2 FEBRUARY WHICH HE WILL ACCOUNT FOR IN MIAMI.

3. FILE 201-865~~647~~ 547; 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

2 FEB 71 257392

1P

MICROFILMED
MAR 5 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2 FEB 1971

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FEB 1 2 44 PM '71

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

FILE, VR c/RI/AN, c/EUR 5, D/SECUR 4, c/CI

ACTION NO. 890

S E C R E T 011752Z FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2964

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM

1 FEB 71 IN 256264

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 0228 (IN 256017)

1. IN VIEW COMPLETE ABSENCE INDICATIONS AT STATION OF AMETROPIA-1 TRAVEL, UNLESS OTHER STATIONS CAN PROVIDE CONCRETE TARGET ETA MADRID WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS BELIEVE AMMUG-1 SHOULD RETRUN HOME 3 FEBRUARY.

2. FILE 201-865547; 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

1 Feb 71

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO FILE, VR c/RI/AN, c/EUR 5, D/SECUR 4, c/CI

ACTION NO. 903T

S E C R E T 019138Z FEB 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0254 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY LONDON, DIRECTOR, STOCKHOLM

1 Feb 71 256343

PBRUMEN AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: MADRID 2964 (IN 256264)

1. CONCUR PLAN OUTLINED REF.

2. FILE: 201-865547: 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

1 Feb 71

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FEB 1 2 06 PM '71

~~File~~ 5

~~[illegible]~~ R Turker

72

S E C R E T 011413Z FEB 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0228 (SADELLY ACTING)

PRIORITY MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM

1 FEB 71 256017

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

1. AMMUG-1'S WIFE SAID 31 JANUARY THAT AMMUG-1'S EMPLOYERS CALLED HER ON 27 JANUARY TO INQUIRE WHEN AMMUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK. AS AMMUG-1 HAD TOLD HIS EMPLOYERS THAT HE HAD TO VISIT A SICK RELATIVE IN NEW YORK, SHE REPLIED THAT THE RELATIVE'S CONDITION WAS STILL GRAVE AND THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW JUST WHEN AMMUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK.

2. FOR MADRID: WE ARE RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW AMMUG-1 AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE AMMUG-1'S JOB SECURITY WHICH COULD IN TURN ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS ROLE FUTURE OPS. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD SET A CUTOFF DATE ON AMMUG-1'S PRESENT TDY IF AMETROPIA-1 REMAINS UNLOCATED. APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS THIS MATTER.

3. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

1 Feb 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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ACTION UNIT ~~924~~ c/WH8 INFO FILE, VR c/RI/AN c/CI/CS c/CI c/FI 2

ACTION NO. 924

S E C R E T 011700Z FEB 71 CITE LONDON 7830

MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI STOCKHOLM DIRECTOR

1 FEB 71 256358

c

RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 0228 (IN 256017)

1. AS POSSIBLE INPUT TO HELP ANSWER REF, JAGUAR CONTINUE TO REPORT AS OF 1600 HOURS LOCAL, THEY HAVE NO INFO TO SHOW AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K.

2. FILE: 201-365547; 201-749651.

GP-1

S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE. VR. C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/FI 2, C/CI

ACTION NO. 5(C)

S E C R E T 281502Z JAN 71 CITE LONDON 7711

PRIORITY MADRID INFO STOCKHOLM WH/MIAMI DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

28 JAN 71 253864

REF MADRID 2915 (IN 251591)

4

B

1. OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS ON ZASIS AMMUG/1 ARRIVAL MADRID, STATION HAS PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON JAGUYR TO PROVIDE MORE TIMELY INFO ON ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE OF WATCHLISTED CUBANS AND HAVE CITED AMETROPIA/1 AS A CASE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO JKLANCE.

2. AS OF 1500 HOURS LOCAL, JAGUAR MAINTAINED THERE NO RECORD AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K. JAGUAR HAS ALERTED BAIRN TRANSCRIBERS AND HAS PROMISED TO REPORT TO STATION ASAP ANY INFO ON FUTURE PLANS FOR PRESENT WHEREABOUTS ~~AMMUG/1.~~ AMETROPIA

3. AS MADRID KNOWS, BEA ON STRIKE AND IT POSSIBLE ~~AMMUG/1~~ AMETROPIA ONWARD TRAVEL DELAYED.

4. FILE 201-865547. GP-1

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR [illegible], C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, D/SECUR 4

ACTION NO. 441

S E C R E T 271528Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1389

27 JAN 71 IN 253082

PRIORITY MADRID INFO WH/MIAMI DIRECTOR LONDON

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 2915 (IN 251591)

1. TELEPHONE CALL MADE TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE. SUBJECT WAS ASKED FOR IN FULL NAME BUT RESPONSE WAS "RODRIGUEZ" NO HERE. NO OTHER DETAILS WERE OBTAINABLE.

2. NOTE CUBAN COMMERCIAL CONSEILLER NAME ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS.

3. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

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27 Jan 71

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C/WH 8 FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI
300 D/SECUR 4

S E C R E T 260951Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2915

PRIORITY LONDON, STOCKHOLM INFO WH/MIAMI, DIRECTOR

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

26 JAN 71 251891

REF: A. WH/MIAMI 2114 (IN 248101)

B. MADRID 2317 (IN 242980)

1. WOULD APPRECIATE ATTEMPT BY ACTION ADDEES CONFIRM OR DENY PRESENCE AMETROPIA-1 LONDON OR STOCKHOLM THROUGH PRETEXT PHONE CALL(S) COMMERCIAL OFFICE. AMMUG-1 NOW MADRID AND STATION HAS NO INFO AVAILABLE AS OF MORNING 26 JANUARY RE WHEREABOUTS AMETROPIA-1. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE 201-365547. GP-1

S E C R E T

26 Jan 71

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JAN 23 7 23 AM '71

Marshall

Turbelli

DISSEM BY 41 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH5

FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI2

ACTION NO. 112

S E C R E T 231035Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2898

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

23 Jan 71 IN 250488

RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: MADRID 2881 (IN 248307)

1. AMMUG-1 MADE CONTACT WITH STATION MORNING 23 JANUARY PER REF.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

23 Jan 71

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI, CI/OPS

ACTION NO. 028

S E C R E T 221603Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1375

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO PRIORITY MADRID, ROUTINE DIRECTOR, LONDON.

22 JAN 71 246998

REF: WH/MIAMI 0037 (246530)

1. RE REF REQUEST LIAISON REPORTS AS OF 22 JANUARY 71 THEY HAVE NO RECORD OF ANYONE BY NAME OF SUBJ REF ENTERING SWEDEN. HOWEVER, NOTE IT POSSIBLE FOR PERSON TO ENTER SWEDEN WITHOUT IT BEING RECORDED BY AUTHORITIES PARTICULARLY IF HE COMES SWEDEN VIA OTHER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRY IN WHICH CASE CONTROLS ON ENTERING SWEDEN ARE LIMITED OR NON EXISTENT.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

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22 Jan 71

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10-63 EDITIONS

IV

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 2-1

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BY: d AT: 1815 Z

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ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

ACTION NO: 861

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ACTION COPY

TURBEVILLE

INFO: FILE, VR C/CI/AN, C/EURS, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 211300Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2885

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

21 JAN 71 IN 249203

RYBAT TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: ~~WH/MIAMI 0137~~ (IN-249149)

1. AMJUG-1 HAS RESERVATION AT HOTEL PLAZA, LOCATED PARQUE ESPANA 2.

2. FILE 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

21 Jan 71

14-00000

FORM 3020 10-69
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG 8.7

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/AN, C/CI/S, C/CI/C/FG2, DDP, ADDP TURBEVILLE

ACTION NO.: 555

S E C R E T 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0138 21 JAN 71 IN 249150

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 0137 (IN 249149)

IDENTITY: HECTOR RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART

CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY GP-1

S E C R E T

21 Jan 71

IG: BERNICE TURBEVILLE:pfd
IT: WH/COG/OPS
T: R1819
ATE: 21 JAN 1971

MESSAGE FORM
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ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

ONF: C/WH8 INFO FILE, VR. C/RI/AN, C/EUR5, C/CI, C/FI2, DDP, ADDP, CS/RO, D/SECUR4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 21 JAN 71 23 15Z CITE DIRECTOR 04225

TO PRIORITY WH/MIAMI, MADRID

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF: WH/MIAMI 0137 (IN 249149)

1. AGREE WITH REF OPS PLANNING.

2. FILE 201-865547 AND 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN H. SHERWOOD
C/EUR/COPS

EUR/IB

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

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FORM 3020 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 8

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BY: ______ AT: 1721 Z

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ACTION UNIT: c/WH8 INFO FILE, VR c/R/AN c/CI 5, c/CI c/F2 DDP, ADDP

ACTION NO. 556 TURBEVILLE

S E C R E T 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 0137

IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT PBRUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG

REF A MADRID 2551 (IN 248307)

B DIRECTOR 103557

21 JAN 71 249149

1. WHILE THE OPERATIONAL CLIMATE/SITUATION WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN YOUR FINAL DECISION AS JUST HOW AMMUG-1 WILL APPROACH AMETROPIA-1, WE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: (A) AMMUG-1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMETROPIA-1 AS A FRIEND/CONFIDANT DATES BACK TO THEIR CHILDHOOD. WHILE AMMUG-1 ALSO KNEW AMETROPIA-1'S BROTHER, IDENTITY, HE WAS CLOSER TO AMETROPIA-1: (B) THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP STILL EXISTED WHEN AMMUG-1 LAST SAW AMETROPIA-1 IN 1963; (C) AMMUG-1 STILL FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT AMETROPIA-1 WILL TALK TO HIM IF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF; (D) AMMUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT AMETROPIA-1 IS A LOYAL SUPPORTER OF THE AMTHUG-1 REGIME; (E) ACCORDING TO AMMUG-1, THE ONLY THING AMETROPIA-1 WANTED IN LIFE WAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME TO WOCORK; (F) THAT TO HAVE AMMUG-1 PHONE

21 Jan 71

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 6-?

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 0137 SECRET

AMETROPIA-1, WHERE AMETROPIA-1 WOULD HAVE THE CHANCE TO REFUSE CONTACT, IS PROBABLY THE LEAST DESIRABLE APPROACH. AMMUG-1'S ASSESSMENT OF COURSE IS BASED ON OBSERVATIONS NOW EIGHT YEARS OLD.

2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMETROPIA-1 SHOULD BE BURDENED WITH ANH CLANDESTINE COMMO AT THIS POINT. REFER TO MADRID TO SUPPLY AN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS OR OPS PHONE NUMBER AS APPROPRIATE IF OP DEVELOPS SUCCESSFULLY. WE EXPECT THAT IF AMETROPIA-1 ACCEPTS THE PITCH, HE WILL ASK JUST WHAT HE WILL GET IN RETURN AND PROBABLY HIS CHANCES FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY COMMITMENT RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK CAN OR SHOULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME. RATHER THAT HE BE TOLD THAT POSSIBILITY FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE EXTENT OF HIS COOPERATION WITH JKLANCE. IF THE QUESTION OF MONETARY RECOMPENSE IS RAISED AMMUG-1 SHOULD INDICATE SALARY (WE ARE THINKING IN THE RANGE (300 TO $500) WILL BE PUT IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT.

3. WH/MIAMI WILL INFORM AMMUG-1 THAT THE GUIDANCE

FORM 3020 10-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

MFG 8.7

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 WH/MIAMI 0137 SECRET

FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY STATION MADRID. FOR MADRID: AMMUG-1 WILL DEPART MIAMI ON EASTERN FLIGHT 20, 1400 LOCAL ON 22 JANUARY FOR NEW YORK. HE WILL DEPART NEW YORK AT 1900 LOCAL ON IBERIA FLIGHT 952 SAME DAY AND WILL ARRIVE MADRID 0730, 23 JANUARY. DOES STATION MADRID HAVE OPS PREFERENCE FOR AMMUG-1 HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS IN MADRID?

4. FORWARDING SEPARATELY REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH AMETROPIA-1.

5. FILE: 201-855547; 201-749651. GP1.

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FORM 1320 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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1600 Z

WH 8

FILE, VR [illegible] EUR 6 [illegible] Secret

710

S E C R E T 231522Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2331

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR ROUTINE LONDON STOCKHOLM

PARIS

20 JAN 71 [illegible] 087

TYPIC AMETROPIA

REF: WH/MIAMI 2114 (IN [illegible])

1. RE REF, HAVE AM[illegible]-1 CALL [illegible] 2X-3408 EXT [illegible] AND ASK FOR "SERGIO" ON WORK DAYS BETWEEN [illegible] AND 15[illegible]-1630 AND WEEKENDS BETWEEN [illegible]-1300 HOURS.

2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1

S E C R E T

B.T

201-865542

File: 20 Jan 71
201-749651

SECRET

No. 201-749651

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG/OPS - B. Turbeville

Operational Approval is hereby amended in the case of AMMUG/1 ____________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows:.

Subject's OA is amended herewith to authorize his operational use outside the United States as set forth in his PRQ Part II dated 13 February 1965, per your memorandum request of 31 December 1970.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ John E. Howard

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 6 January 1971 lc

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FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(9)

6 Jan 71

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MESSAGE FORM
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S E C R E T

RIG: B. [illegible]VILLE:mll
NIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 7141/1819
ATE: 5 JANUARY 1971

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

TO WH/MIAMI 6 Jan 71 00 20z CITE DIRECTOR 099417

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR-097508

1. AMMUG-1 OA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 5 JAN FOR OPS USE OUTSIDE U.S. AS SET FORTH IN PRQ DATED 1965.

2. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED AMETROPIA-1.

3. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651.

END OF MESSAGE

12

MICROFILMED
JAN 20 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

4

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE
AC/WH/COG

6-Jan 71

B 201-749651

201-865547

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~~[illegible]~~

TURBEVILLE

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE. VR. C/RI/AN, C/EUR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2,

ACTION NO. 187

L

SECRET 052216Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 9956 5 JAN IN 237892

PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID

RYBAT TYPIC
REF A LONDON 7124 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE, MADRID) (IN 237738)
B THE HAGUE 8910 (IN 237605)

1. FOR LONDON: OUR INTEREST IN ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART IS BASICALLY OUR ASSESSMENT THAT HE IS RECRUITABLE. THIS ASSESSMENT PROVIDED US BY ONE OF RODRIGUEZ'S CLOSEST FRIENDS WHO IS PRESENTLY RESIDING UNITED STATES. BRIEFLY STATED THIS ASSESSMENT INDICATES THAT RODRIGUEZ HAS TALKED AGAINST THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO ASSESSOR, RODRIGUEZ HAD ONLY ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA AND THAT WAS TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO THE STATES.

2. WE DO NOT THEREFORE, HAVE ANY DEROG INFO PER SE. HERE FOLLOWS A BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY ON RODRIGUEZ: DPOB: 22 OCT 1932, REGLA, CUBA. IN OCTOBER 1968 RODRIGUEZ APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF MINING INDUSTRY SUPPLY UNIT, UNDER MINISTRY OF MINES, FUEL AND METALLURGY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT SUBJECT OWES HIS POSITION TO HIS BROTHER, HECTOR, WHO IS PRESENTLY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: HT: 64 INCHES, WT: 110 LBS, HAIR: STRAIGHT BLACK.

SECRET

5 Jan 71

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9956 SECRET

3. FOR THE HAGUE: DPOB AAS PER PARA TWO. IN JUNE 1970, RODRIGUEZ WAS REPORTED AS HOLDING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PPT D/67/587, ISSUED HAVANA 6 SEPT 1967.

4. FILE: 201-865547. GP1.

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ACTION UNIT: WH 8

ACTION NO. 118

INFO: FILE, VR, EUR6, RI/AN, C/OPS 6

S E C R E T 051722Z JAN 71 CITE LONDON 7124

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC

5 JAN 71 237738

REF WH MIAMI 09883 (L 234350)

1. IN ORDER MAKE STRONGER CASE WITH JAGUAR FOR COVERAGE OF RODRIGUEZ, WOULD APPRECIATE SHORT SUMMARY DEROG INFO FOR PASSING JAGUAR SINCE LONDON HAS NO TRACES.

2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1

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5 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIC
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JAN 5 2 04 PM '71

~~Marshall R~~
~~Albright R~~
TURBEVILLE

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR Eur6. RI/AN ci ci/ops. ci/icz. G

ACTION NO. 101

SECRET 051550Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 8910

5 JAN 71 237005

WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON

TYPIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9914 (L235845)

1. STATION HAS REQUESTED LIAISON WATCHLISTING SUBJECT REF AND RELATED ON WHOM WE HAVE ONLY FULL NAME. TO INCREASE CHANCES EFFECTIVE LIAISON ACTION, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT DPOB AND, IF AVAILABLE, PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER.

2. FILE: 201-865545. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

5 Jan 71

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, WH 8, DDP

ACTION NO. 539

S E C R E T 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 0696 DITC

IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG AQUATIC

REF: WH/MIAMI 9915

SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1.

S E C R E T

2 JAN [illegible] 236095

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2 Jan 71
201-749651

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ROUTING	
1 PI/PROP	4
2	5
3	6

406
DATE : 26 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH 5, S/C 2

OPS SFT

SEP 26 2021Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 35514

FT 490 IN 35514

DIR INFO RIMM CITE WAVE 3143

JMZIP KUCAGE AMICE

REF DIR 05764 PARA 2 (OUT 85641)+

1. WAVE PLANS START ACROSS BOARD TRAINING AMICE INFILS NEAR FUTURE AS FOLLOWS: 04

A. DANILO POZO CASTRO, PDOB SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS, HAVA PROV 23 NOV 1928. FATHER: JESUS. MOTHER: ISABEL. NO WAVE TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY. 06 06

B. EUSTIQUIANO GARCIA LEZCANO, PDOB MARTI, PROV MATANZAS. 3 DEC 1914. FATHER: JOSE MARIA. MOTHER: ANGELA. NO WAVE TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY. 04 06 06

C. MIGUEL A. DIAZ ISALGUE, PDOB MATANZAS, PROV MATANZAS. 14 FEB 1937. FATHER: MIGUEL ANGEL. MOTHER: DOLORES. WAVE REFS: UFGA 1783. NO DEROG INFO. SUBJ INFIL AND EXFIL CUBA WITH EXPERIENCE CLANDESTINE OPS PRIOR 17 APR 61. IMPRISONED AND RELEASED. FORMERLY MEMBER MD., CURR CLAIMS NO POL AFFIL. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY.

D. OSCAR OLIVA CANTU, PM TRAINEE (6450) (201-297742) WAVE 4433). 04 08 08

E. JUAN ESPINOSA GONZALEZ PM TRAINEE (7157) POA REQUESTED 04 08

13/PJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

IN 35514 WAVE 8143

WAVE 5218. SHIPPED JMWAVE 1 APR 61. (201-323322).

04 08

F. FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ ELEJALDE, TRAV 637.) (201-291775) 08

2. REQUEST POAS SUBJECTS A, B AND C AND ASSESSMENT CABLED UPON COMPLETION TRAINING. 04

3. REQUEST POA JESUS RIERA FERRO, PDOB HAVA 13 MAY 1933. FATHER: JESUS 06 MOTHER: FLORA 06 NO WAVE TRACES. LOCAL ODENVY TRACE UNDERWAY. SUBJECT IS CANDIDATE FOR W/T TRAINING AS A [illegible] RADOP. PRQ PART ONE FOLL IN DISP.

ON OUTGOING BE SURE
TO INCLUDE RIMM AS INFO
AND NOTE TO RIMM AUTHORIZING TNG.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *HQS AWAITING WAVE PLAN INITIATE CAMPAIGN PREVENT EXECUTION AMHING/1.

**CABLES PRE-DATE CS FILES. COPIES MAY BE SEEN IN S/C ARCHIVES.

Copy No.

5/pn

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29

COMMUNITY OF NATIONS FUND
SUITE 2004, 347 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
MURRAY HILL 6-5121

February 20,1963

See

Mr. Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue
1343 N E Miami Court
Apartment 17
Miami 32, Florida

Dear Mr. Diaz:

This will confirm our previous discussions with you wherein we agreed to employ you at the rate of $200.00 per month to commence March 1st. As was explained to you at our last meeting we are engaged in a study to determine the effect of large scale migration on given communities and the dislocations that result therefrom.

We feel that the Miami area is unique in that the dislocations caused by the influx of so many of your fellow countrymen furnishes an excellent opportunity to conduct this study.

It is anticipated that you will spend a large portion of your time in our New York offices, however; it will also require a substantial amount of travel on your part.

If you are still in agreement with this proposal please advise me as soon as possible. I would like to begin this study on March 1st.

Very truly yours,

06

Roger Joyce

2/PJ

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E-2-Paris 03

MESSAGE FORM
2 SECRET

ORIG : A.D. Rohlfing/bh
UNIT : WH/C/CA/EW
EXT : 4550
DATE : 2 June 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	Ew	5	FI-TC
2		6	CA
3	mc	7	0
4	AG-F6→	8	

TO : (PARIS)(BRUSSELS)(MADRID) JMWAVE
15-4 15-5 15-2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C P INFO: FILE WE 6 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CI/IA
FI FI/INT 2

15-4

TO (PARI) INFO: (BRUS)(MADR) WAVE CITE DIR
15-5 15-2

TYPIC KEYWAY MHVIPER
20-4

REFS: A. (PARI) 1448 (IN 80372)
B. (PARI) 0299 (IN 38992)
20-4

15850

1. PRESUME CANDIDATE MENTIONED REF A NOT FOR PURPOSES TRAVEL TO HAVANA AS PER REF B BUT RATHER FOR CONTACT WITH PACETTE ONLY. AMWHIP-1 UNABLE COME UP WITH CANDIDATE IN TIME FOR HAVANA TRIP MENTIONED REF B.

2. HQS WILL DEFER INVOLVING AMWHIP-1 WITH PACETTE PENDING OUTCOME (STATION) ATTEMPTS AT CONTACT.
15-4

END OF MESSAGE

AMWHIP 1f.1c

03

03
WE/3 (Silsby) (phone)
WE/20 (Kalzahn) (phone)
WE/5 Rati (phone)
WH/C/MO Cini (phone)
WH/C/FI 03 (Webster) (phone)
WH/C/CA

C/WE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

5
4
3
2
1

RELEASING OFFICER 2-17 COORDINATING OFFICERS SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

14/PV

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SECRET

AMWHIP/1
file

2 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBUNNY-1 (201-775391) and AMWHIP-1 (201-267966)

DATE: 25 May 1965, 1900-2030 hours

PLACE: Office of AMWHIP-1, 31 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.

PRESENT: AMBUNNY-1, AMWHIP-1, and DAMICONE using alias of Al MARIN

1. I had introduced AMBUNNY-1 and AMWHIP-1 to each other 24 May but the office was crowded, so there was very little opportunity to discuss operational matters. We met again on the above date, after business hours, and we were able to meet in private. Although AMWHIP told me that he was delighted with AMBUNNY-1 herself, as he said the "Cubans like that kind of girl -- not too fancy", he thought that her background -- particularly her previously working for the U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, would make the operation very risky. He said that if it were discovered that AMPUNNY-1 was a penetration of the UNSNAFU-19 office (by the Cubans) his connection with ODYOKE would then be revealed, with the result that all his "connections" with UNSNAFU-19, and "Habana" would be lost. AMWHIP-1 opined that he thought it likely that the Cubans would check her out in Bolivia. 08

2. AMWHIP suggested the possibility of using a cutout to introduce AMBUNNY-1 to the UNSNAFU-19 installation. He said he would explain in detail at a later time, what he meant, obviously not wanting to reveal any more than necessary to AMBUNNY-1.

3. Also, AMWHIP-1 stated that he was unable to travel to Paris before mid-June, as he had some relatives coming to visit him from Italy. After checking with DI UBALDO, I subsequently informed AMWHIP-1 and AMBUNNY-1 that the
15-4 Paris operation was off. Both expressed relief. I told AMBUNNY-1 that she could most likely still be utilized in
12-2 Rabat, and that we would discuss the possibilities at a later date.

SE

Norris W. Damicone

7IPN

14-00000
104-10183-10439 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contact Report. Meeting with AMWHIP-1

DATE : 21 May 1965, 1300-1430 hours

PLACE : National Airport

PRESENT: Subject and DiUbaldo as Breitheim

1. On 20 May I phoned Subject and requested that he travel to Washington to discuss the background of his discussions with 02 UNSNAFU-19 from which stemmed the suggestion that A-1 supply a French-English-Spanish speaking secretary to 02 U-19's mission in Paris. The meeting was quite short for as it turned out, the discussion between Subject and 02 U-19 on the topic of secretaries, which had taken place in March 1965, ~~and~~ had been little more than a casual sort of thing devoid of any specifics whatever and, in particular, devoid of any commitment by either party to proffer or to accept a profferred body. Nevertheless, Subject felt quite certain that slots would still be open in 02 U-19's mission and that a recommendation from him would suffice to effect favorable action by U-19. 02

2. I sketched AMBUNNY's qualifications stressing the fact that she had gone to school in the U. S., had worked here, and had done a hitch as a social secretary for the American Ambassador in La Paz. 08 Subject drew the obvious conclusions that it might be difficult to dummy up AMBUNNY's labenslauf adequately to prevent her from being "discovered" by the Cubans. At any rate, since she was our only candidate, Subject agreed to meet with her in New York so that together they could thresh out the pragmatics of the problem. The meeting was set for 22 May. Al Marin (alias) would participate in this meeting.

AMWHIP/1
file

6/PV

3. For the record, I should like to note that in the two and a half years since I had last seen Subject he had aged over 15 years. When I last saw him he was a round-faced, dark-haired, boyish person and has now been transformed into a very grey, very puffy, 50 year old man though I understand his chronological age is something short of 40. These observations ~~had~~ nothing to do with anything except they might indicate that Subject is living under a great strain. I derived the impression, which coincides with that I obtained the first time I met with Subject, that he is constitutionally oblique in his approach to matters. He is a very difficult person to corner. I am firmly convinced that to date in this operation, if it may be called that, we have never come close to placing Subject in the corner and that it is high time we do so. I do not imply that he is a man of ill will, rather that instinctively he is a man who slides off problems until such time as he feels he has sufficient evidence or is in the right posture to solve them. I should think it would be our task to exploit these natural capacities while at the same time attempting to assure that Subject is not sliding away from us.

Sidney P. Di Ubaldo

3 July 1962

Skip file fully

TO: NKH

FM: AMS

RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in OLLA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

2. With regard to candidates spotted by QJWIN, the two whom he spotted in Italy a year and a quarter ago can probably be used if needed, if we can accept the assessments of them by the Trieste Base contract agent, Magonetti. Magonetti's assessment is contained in OIRA 27542 dated 10 May 1961. The names of the two French candidates are contained in OLLA 1426 dated 15 December 1961. No action has been taken on these names regarding tracing or anything else. My handwritten notes attached to that dispatch contain fuller descriptions of the two people than appear in the dispatch.

03

3. The other spotting effort that can be made is through Hank Manfredi (TN) in Rome. Hank was well briefed on the qualifications desired and the security precautions to be observed in the spotting activity. COS Rome has a copy of the qualifications and restrictions in his safe; however, if Manfredi is told to proceed with his contact in Florence, I suggest that he be re-briefed in detail.

03

4. Frankly, all the rest of the paper in the file is crud except for the pay receipts, which are assembled in one envelope. I have already given you the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given the QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963.

5. The details which have yet to be worked out are

a. The precise method of contact with QJWIN

b. The system of drawing funds for payments to him

c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

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2/BR

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME CHECK, DOCUMENT SERVICE, AND PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)	DATE (Submitted by requester) Feb 20 9 42 AM '61 20 Feb 61

FROM: (Requesters name) ① T McHale D3	BRANCH FI/D/Ops	ROOM 2512 RIT	EXTENSION 3661

TO	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS	CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS
RID/INDEX	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	Pls call when Ready g & ~~-attached~~
REQUESTER	[illegible]	[illegible]		②	
RID/FILES					
REQUESTER				③	
RID/DRS					
RID/201					
RID/ANALYSIS					
RID/MIS					
RID/INDEX					

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME BESTA e	GIVEN NAMES Lamberto
SPELLING VARIATIONS	
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, sex, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.) Owns Export-Import firm LABE (or LABEX) in Milan
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 8 May 1918	
CITIZENSHIP Italian	RESIDENCE 23 Via Teodosio, Milan, Italy

RID/INDEX TO REQUESTER	COMMENTS
☒ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION	
☐ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED	

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BE SURE ALL SUBJECT INFORMATION IS CORRECT

① Type or print all entries.

② On receipt of index card reproductions: draw a green diagonal line across items you don't want RID to obtain for you.

③ Edit (use green) the Copyflo listing to reflect: (a) Cards to be destroyed (green D). Examples: referenced document has been destroyed; less informative than a retained card leading to the same information; referenced information not significant. (b) Corrections and additions, including ∞ when card reflects all facts in document. (c) OK all cards that are correct as typed.

Could this trace be consolidated into an existing or new 201 file? ☐ yes ☐ no. (If yes, complete the following - no other form required.)

1/BR

201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION

201 -	(201 number will be supplied by RID. If new 201 number has been obtained by desk, note it in this space.)
OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS	

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED		FILE TO BE KEPT		ACCESS RESTRICTED		RESTRICTION (If any)
☐ YES	☐ NO	☐ RID	☐ DESK	☐ NO	☐ YES →	

ALWAYS RETURN THIS FORM WITH COPYFLO OF CARD REPRODUCTIONS. IF YOU HAVE REQUESTED A 201 PARTIAL CONSOLIDATION, ALSO RETURN PERTINENT DOCUMENTS.

14-00000

BESTA, FNU
DOB ?

CIT ?

043-006-004
OIR -13754

TS 107273
PIO
SER. 7889

ALLEGED ITALIAN AGENT IN MILAN

Can't locate in RI

[illegible]

ordered

Trying to locate in RI

BESTA, Lamberto

43-5-1-4334
CI 4-374
4 Apr 55
Att.

ue14.

BESTA, Lamberto

MILA 136
(IN 29925)
24 Mar 54

[illegible]

BESTA, Lamberto

[illegible]
(CIRA-[illegible] A)

Files are attached with pertinent items clipped....

Lamberto BESTA

April 1955 : Resident of Milan at Via Teodosio 23, collaborated for brief period with DEMIGOD Demigod regarding clandestine traffic in strategic materials. Lives by trafficking in cigarettes and other things - not excluding dope. Also maintains contact with head of 29 French intelligence in Italy in political field. Person of doubtful honesty, braggart and capable of carrying out any kindof activity for money. (Source Demigod)

15-22

March 1954: 11 Ital service (Min of Int) offered to turn over to Milan station full control of PIC operation in which BESTA was involved. Hqs warned "heads off" because of BESTA's extremely bad reputation - he has been implicated in all sorts of contraband traffic as well as reputation of completely ~~mmmmm~~ unanchored intelligence operator.

Nov 1953: He was an attempted double agent operation b/ 11 Ital service into Yugo I.S.

Have NOT as yet read State Despatches Referred to in Hunt list "check"

41BR

3 July 1962

TO: WKH

FM: ANS

RE: ZRRIFLE

1. Per our discussion of 2 July 1962, I expect that we shall proceed to transfer QJWIN to Baden-Baden per the proposal in OLLA-1463 dated 2 February 1962. LUXE/0489 dated 19 June 1962 stated that COS would have the full details of the capital outlay required by 23 June; however, the information has not been received as of 3 July. The last cable to the Station, DIR 18391 told COS to contact you directly on his arrival on 16 July.

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04 04

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c. An emergency contact for him (this should probably be COS LUXE).

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3/BR

6. Despite COS LUXE's viewpoint, I happen to know that QJWIN can do more spotting in Corsican circles whenever we want him to.

AMS

The candidate: no name used; circa 43-45, 1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders, circa 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond hair combed straight back thinning in corners, thinning on top, rosa complexion, no eye color noticed, worker's hands, nose thin and curved outward a little, thin lips; chin full but not fat, makes impression of a handwerker; has been in prison Sante twice (burglary) - name does not begin with A,B,C,D - otherwise would have gone to Fresne prison; not known whether convicted; has own car; free to travel; 5 years POW in Germany; M. impression: good nerves; composed; can open usual safe; would work with someone previously unknown to him; M. would use him; willing to use gun; did not ask money; Hugo wants his cut. Lives 250-300 km from Paris; legal occupation unknown. Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo out with money. This candidate ready any time. Has no passport, but can get one. Can also get passport under phoney name. M. Likes this one as candidate

Saw G and G's candidate 28 Aprilwith lokal in Paris; G contacted this candidate directly; candidate Henri ; description: circa 45 - 48, 1.75 - 1.78; dark brown hair; full, deep on forehead; shiny and combed back; half part on right; brown complexion; not quite square face; brown eyes; heavy eyebrows dark brown w/verbindung between eyebrows; bridge of nose depressed, nose somewhat small; normal ears; mouth schrag when he speaks; small scars on left cheek and small scar running from middle of nose on left side; brown hair on hands, no (rings); well dressed; hands well kept; fingertips (squared): smokes (French +) Ami cigarettes; not a drinker; lives Paris; frequents Bar Le Corsaire, 110 Ave de Suffren; can be found there every day from 4:30 PM; specialist in safes - own tools; also holdups; in Sante prison; belonged after war to Lyon St. Etienne underworld; gave some facts of this which M knows to be true; wanted to know if should be armed for job - ready to go to the end; has a colleague with whom wants to work; not behind iron curtain and not in France; would be expensive; has expired passport, but no sweat in renewing it; M impression - would follow orders; better action man than Hugo's candidate, but not sure whether has safecracking experience to extent Hugo's man has; Has car - Dauphine, beige (?) #2461HS75 (Paris #); not married. M can contact him at tel SUF 46-90-- this is the bar. M told him two weeks to three months (also told Hugo's man the same but Gaillord's candidate wants to know in few weeks whether still hope. Could bring both candidates together into a team.

2 MAY:

1) Santelli could not locate his cousin. Trip to Marseille after telling Hugo + [illegible] their contacts - lived in Hotel Du Globe, Marseille.

2) Santelli met Palazzoni Jean, married: ca 42-43, works on RR in Marseille - lives in [illegible], no(?) children, solid person, can keep his tongue, has done holdups, never caught, not exaggerator, good connections in Corsican underworld in Marseille; ht 1.70-1.172, medium build, top of head bald, hair on sides is brown, oval face, brownish complexion (dust not dark), brown eyes, moderate cigarette smoker, French + Corsican, POW 40-45, working for RR a few years, lives 7 or 8 Rue St. Therese; is close friend of Santelli;
→ is now looking for candidates; [illegible] purpose in meeting him again. S. + P. looked for a Felix Carboni (?), professional burglar, Corsican, lives in Marseille, has a brother who was arrested by police in a holdup. P. still looking for Felix.

P. understands completely what is sought.

3) Hugo: spent a few hours today in Transport Alb. (c/o Tobal) – Mme Juliette Jacquillard, 155 Rue de Charonne, Paris XI Tel. ROQ 06-45; met Hugo 29 Apr (called him from Marseille to see if candidate available) re: candidate; dinner with Hugo & the candidate 1/2 - 3/4 hour: ~~[illegible]~~

M. Angers
Hugo II
[illegible]

The candidate: no name used; ca. 43-45, 1.75-1.78, strongly built, broad shoulders, ca 85 kilos, slightly oval full face, blond hair combed straight back thinning in corners, thinning on top, rosa complexion; no eye color noticed, workers' hands, nose thin & curved outward a little, thin lips; chin full but not fat, ~~[illegible]~~ makes impression of a hardworker; ~~[illegible]~~ has been in prison Santé twice: name does not begin with A, B, C, D – otherwise would have gone to Fresnes prison; not known whether

burglar

convicted; has own car; likes to travel; 5 years POW in Germany; M. impression: good nerves, composed, can open used safe; would work w/ someone presented, unknown to him; M. would use him; willing to use gun; did not ask money; Hugo wants his cut. Lives 250-300 km from Paris; legal occupation unknown. Contact thru Hugo; can cut Hugo out ~~of~~ w/ money. This candidate ready any time. Has no passport, but can get one. Can also get ~~p~~ passport under phony name. M. likes this one as candidate.]

4 Saw G. + G's candidate 28 Apr nite hotel in Paris; G contacted this candidate directly; candidate's ~~Henri~~ [illegible]; description ca 45-48, 1.75-1.78; dark brown hair full, tip on forehead, shiny, combed back, half part on right; brown complexion; not quite square face; brown eyes; eyebrows thick dark brown w/ verbindung between eyebrows;

from Lyon

bridge of nose depressed, nose somewhat
small; normal ears; ~~[illegible]~~ mouth
schräg when he speaks; small scars on
~~[illegible]~~ left cheek + small scar running
from middle of nose on left side;
brown hair on hands, no rings,
well dressed; hands well kept;
finger tips [illegible]; smokes
[illegible] cigarettes; not a drinker;
lives Paris; frequents Bar Le
Corsaire, 110 Rue de Suffren;
can be found there every day from
4:30 PM; ~~[illegible]~~
specialist in safes – own tools;
also holdups; in Santé prison;
belonged after war to Lyon-St-
Etienne underworld; gave some
facts of this which M knows
to be true; wanted to know
if should be armed for job –
ready to go to the end; has a

M. with him ca 2 hours

colleague whose to work; not
behind iron curtain whom wants to + not in France;
would be expensive; ~~not~~ has
expired passport, but no question
renewing it; M. impression: would
follow orders; better action man
than Hugo's candidate but not more
whether has experience to
extent Hugo's man has. Has car:
Dauphine, beige(?), # 2461 HS 75
(Paris #); not married. M. can
contact him at tel: SUF 46-90 —
this is the bar. M. told him
2 wks to 3 mos (also told
Hugo's man the same) but
Hallord's candidate wants to
know in few weeks whether
still hope. Could bring both
candidates together into a
team. [

promising man

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00704-64
SUBJECT (fnu) RELOVA
DATE DISTR. 1 September 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
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DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments:

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.

24

2. An [official Jamaican source] in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXXX	CCR	FBI 2
	REP	CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/[CANADA]	1		LX-1650
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/[BRITISH]	1	1	NO PROJECT(AMMUG/1
WH/SA/R	1					L/WASH/[BR]	1	1	CSCI-316/00704-64
WH/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1				
WH/WAVE	1								COORDINATING

TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1
LIAISON *

..K:LD:swk
CI/R&A

201-737138

4/PV

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.

4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.

24

5. An official Canadian source, in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penicitet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/63/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2419, Santa Fe Banch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commerical Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberta MENDUCA.

6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOBA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

> In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1/pv

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00699-64
SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez
DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.

24

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2

REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

[illegible]/SA/EOB	[illegible]	WE/[illegible]	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1		LX-1645
[illegible]/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1	V	CSCI-316/00599-64
[illegible]/SA/R	1					L/WASH/FBI	1	U	NO PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
[illegible]/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1				
[illegible]/[illegible]AVE	1								COORDINATING / RELEASING

TOTAL 16 MAR 1965 [illegible]/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1
LIAISON *
MMK:LD:swk CI/R&A

FORM NO.

201-747936

4/P

His wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/80 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.

4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiguani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.

5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI 316/00693-64
SUBJECT Jose FERNANDEZ
DATE DISTR. 21 August 1964
NO. PAGES 3
REFERENCES
DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

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Do Not Reproduce

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source identified a photograph of Comandante Jose FERNANDEZ and said that his nickname is "El Gallego." FERNANDEZ is the chief of all army training schools from cadets up. He is not connected with Cuban Intelligence.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

Headquarters Comments

1. In a report dated 11 May 1960, from an untested source, it was reported that one Jose FERNANDEZ, possibly identical with the above Subject, was a Cuban Ambassador on an arms buying missions in Rome.

2. In June 1962 a Cuban national, untested, whose father was an old army friend of Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," reported the following information:

> FERNANDEZ is Chief of Artillary Schools in Habana Province; he frequently gives lectures on artillery weapons at a School for Members of the Western Army (La Escuela para los Miembres de Ejercito Occidente).

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2

REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI/LIA	1	IE/CANADA	1		LX-1639
WH/SA/MOB	1	WE/MADR	2	CI/R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1		ND PROJECT(AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R	1					L/WASH/BR	1		CSCI-316/00693-64
WH/SA/CI	4			RID/AN	1				
WH/WAVE	1								

TOTALS WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2), CI 4, RID 1
LIAISON #
COORDINATING
RELEASING WMK:LD:wk CI/R&A

201-333216

16 MAR 1965

He was a captain in the army during BATISTA's time and was in prison for his party in the 4 April Movement until his release by CASTRO. FERNANDEZ was not known to be a Communist and, at the time of this report (1962), was not considered to be one. He attended artillery schools in the United States (dates and places unknown) and speaks English well. He is well educated and well trained for the position he holds. He is often referred to as "El Gallego Fernandez." FERNANDEZ allegedly was chief of the operation against the invaders of Playa Giron in April 1961. He was described as having been born about 1921, being six feet one inch tall, 185 pounds, having light grayish eyes, light brown hair, a fair complexion, white even teeth, and an oval face. He speaks with a Castillian accent.

3. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 17 July 1962, stated that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ was the Chief of the Seccion Preparacion y Organizacion Combativa (Section for the Preparation and Organization of Warfare - SPOC), the Cuban Army's key man for defense against invasion, and the military brains of the country. He had access to all secret information. FERNANDEZ received his instructions exclusively from Fidel and Raul CASTRO with whom he is in personal contact. He received his military education in the United States. He is intelligent and reportedly not a Communist.

4. A Cuban national, untested, reported in September 1962, that the facilities of the Military Academy at Camp Managua were being utilized as a training center for officers, officer-candidates and non-commissioned officers. Major Jose FERNANDEZ, aka "El Gallego," has an office on the ground floor of the first building as you enter the camp. FERNANDEZ and a General Enrique LISTER prepared all the training schedules, pamphlets, and training aides, as well as joint exercises in which air ground (armor and infantry) have participated.

5. In a 14 November 1962 report, an untested source said that Comandante (fnu) FERNANDEZ is the only Cuban official who is completely within the confidence of the Soviets with respect to the military fortifications of the Habana area.

24

6. [An official Spanish Service] in a report dated 18 May 1963, stated that an unidentified "usually reliable source" said that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ, known as "El Gallego," is the one who made the preparation for CASTRO's trip to the Soviet Union in February 1963. FERNANDEZ arrived in Habana from Moscow two days before CASTRO's surprise departure.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

4/PV

7. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 7 August 1963, stated that she did not think FERNANDEZ was a Communist as he has always had Catholic tendencies but that he is a correct soldier and puts the military above everything. He is divorced and his ex-wife is living in Miami with their two daughters, Francis, born in 1951, and Alicia, born in 1955.

06

8. A source who is a [high ranking Cuban military] officer who has good contacts among Cuban officials (he has not submitted many reports, but they appear to have been accurate) reported in September 1963 that Major Jose Ramon FERNANDEZ Alvarez, Chief of Training, General Staff of the Cuban Rebel Army, is anti-Communist and a military type in the strictest sense of the word. He sticks to his military duties and scrupulously avoids politics; he keeps himself completely isolated from all political elements. He is proud of his present status and thankful to CASTRO for it; for fear of losing it he appears unwilling to undertake any kind of activity against the CASTRO regime. CASTRO is undoubtedly knowledgeable of FERNANDEZ' attitude and has sufficient confidence in him to retain him in his present position. CASTRO also is aware that he has few officers with the military discipline, know-how, and experience possessed by FERNANDEZ.

1/PV

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS CI 316/00643-64
SUBJECT	Guillermo ARASTAGUIA	DATE DISTR.	11 August 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	CSCI-3/779,803 CS-311/00115-64
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. August 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

1. Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, pseudonym "Rene," is the chief of the Department of Technical Operational Support (MI) in the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI). He was formerly the secretary of Ramiro VALDES in the Departamento de Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security - DSE), but ARASTAGUIA was a follower of Anibal ESCALANTE and because of a problem concerning ESCALANTE and because ARASTAGUIA was believed to be a homosexual, VALDES transferred him to the DGI. ARASTAGUIA went to the Youth Festival in Helsinki as a representative of the DGI and has traveled to Moscow three times.

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2. ARASTAGUIA was born in 1934, is about five feet seven inches in height, has blond hair and green eyes. He is fat, has a chin that juts out, lips that are somewhat sunken, and has a rather high pitched voice and seems effeminate. 1,2,3

Headquarters Comments

24

1. A report dated 6 October 1960, from an official Ecuadorean source, provided a list of Cuban Communists. One Guillermo ARRASTIA, aka "Rene," possibly identical with Guillermo ARASTAGUIA, was included and described as a first lieutenant,

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO =	I&NS						

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

WH/SA/EOB	WE/5/B 1	CI/LIA 1	IF CANADA		IN-1631
WH/SA/MOB 1	WE/MADR 2	CI/R&A 3	IF BRITISH		NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/P 1			1 USSL BR		CSCI-316/00643-64
WH/SA/CI 1		RID/AN 1			
WH/SA/INT SET					COORDINATING RELEASE

TOTAL COPIES WH/SA 7,(1), WE 1 (2), CI4, RID 1

LIAISON

WH/SA/MOB

executive in G-2. ARRASTIA was reported to have the confidence of Raul CASTRO and Ramiro VALDES; and he was VALDES' righthand man in G-2.

2. An official roster listing the military staff personnel comprising the Intelligence Department, G-2, of the Cuban Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) was received by a representative of this Agency from an untested source in a report dated 1 March 1961. Included on this list was one First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRASTIA Fundora, possibly identical with Guillermo ARRASTAGUIA.

3. In a report dated 28 October 1962, a list of identified and suspected Cuban intelligence officers was included, the list was received from an official liaison service.[24] One First Lieutenant Guillermo ARRATIA (or ARRASTIA) Fundora was included on the list and described as an identified intelligence officer on the G-2 Headquarters staff.

104-10185-10171

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 261703Z CITE GUAT[redacted] 6281
21-2

DIRECTOR

26 May 66 IN 25182

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED HGGW-3947 CLEARED FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON? IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO COL ARRIAGA. PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL COPY FOR STATION RETENTION.

22
24
06
16-2

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN PI
ABSTRACT X

NNNN

19-6-102/4
25 May 1966

5/PV

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT **SECRET**

Memorandum

[illegible] Support File

TO : Chief, WH Division DATE: 21 August 1964
ATTN : Barney Hildago

FROM : Chief, Safehouse Branch

SUBJECT: Safehouse #405

REQUISITION: Your requisition for a domestic safehouse (Req. 64-9) routed to us through the Central Cover Staff (CCS 263) has been met by the following property in the manner herein described.

PROPERTY: A two bedroom furnished apartment, (Apt. G-32) 24 located in the 24 (Summit Hills Apartments) located at (16th Street) 24 and (East-West Highway,) 24 (Silver Spring, Md.) 10

LESSOR: (Summit Hills Apartments 24 East-West Highway), (Silver Spring, Md.) 10

LESSEE: Mr. (Roger McK. Shea) 06 a security cleared attorney with offices located at (2041 Wilson Blvd.) 08 Arlington, Virginia. Office Telephone (JA 4-5510.) 08

LEASE: The lease is on file in the Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics. The terms are for a six month period from 1 July 1964 through 31 December 1964.

COVER STORY: Mr. (Shea) 06 has leased the apartment for his client Mr. V. Rodriguez who is in the Washington Metropolitan area and is associated with the (Inter-University Committee for Political and Social Action.) 29

CASE OFFICER: As stipulated by you, Mr. Barney Hidalgo has been designated as the responsible case officer. Any future change in case officer must be reported promptly to the Safehouse Branch.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS: All obligations 06 for rent, utilities, and other related expenses, will be paid by Mr. (Shea) the lessee cutout. Bills received at the Safehouse should be passed to the Safehouse Branch upon receipt.

(Edward U. Denison
EDWARD U. DENISON) 03

Orig. - Addressee
1 - OL/RECD/SHB Official file

OL/RECD/SHB/(JPRyan)bj/3683
03

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

[illegible]

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC
16th Street & East-West Highway.
Silver Spring, Md.

AMMUG
SUPPORT
FILE
B

REMINDER

August 17, 1964

06

Dear Mr. Roger Shea 8500 16th St., #G-32

According to our records, your rent due August 1, 1964 - $210.00 has not been received by this office. This, no doubt, is an oversight on your part and we will appreciate your check by return mail to cover same.

In this connection, you are advised that all rents are due and payable in Full by not later than ten (10) days after same becomes due, and your cooperation will be appreciated.

Thanking you, we remain,

29

SUMMIT HILL PROPERTIES, INC.
Silver Spring, Maryland

Frank [illegible]

Managing Agents

21 Aug 64

NOT Paid
as of 21 Aug
03 John Ryan promised
would pay in CASH
TODAY
B

4/RN

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

Case 4983

TO: TSD/IB DATE ______________

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. A3 7002 DATED 12 Aug 64 AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WH/SA/Memo 64-620 3 Aug 64

07

Ernesto Jesus GARCIA Guzman

31

Ecuadorean PP # 19406

Ecuadorean Vacc Cert. #4314 31

31 I&NS Form I-94 (showing arrival in U.S. 28 July 1964.)

Nota: We are also returning subject's Cuban Documents as follows:

1. Cuban Dipl. PP No. D/64/139
2. Cuban Ord PP 22560
3. Cuban Int. Vacc.Cert. 296598
4. Negative of subject

____
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/IB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/IB when no longer needed.

TSD/IB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061 SECRET

5/PV

AMMUG/1 1 July 1964

Memo for the Record:

On 1 July 1964 AMMUG was transferred from safehouse #2 to the new apartment located at (8500 16th Street, Silver Springs, Maryland.) 24 On arrival at the apartment, about 1430, the quarters were not ready and the furniture had not been put in place. The apartment was ready at 2000 the same day. AMMUG's apartment does not have a phone nor was it furnished with kitchen utensils. Sheets, a radio, and kitchen utensils were purchased by AMMUG.

Miss Petrowski has made arrangements for the installation of a telephone.

Daniel Flores

VIVIAN:- 22 June

Following situation re Laddie:

1- He wants ~~xxx~~ balance of his May pay NOW.

03 06

2- (John Ryan) and (Roger Shea) are waiting for word from you

29

in order to call the people at (Summit Hill Apartments)

and give them 3 day notice before Laddie can move in.

29

(Summit Hill Apts) also would like to know (when notice

is given) what type beds to furnish apt with (double or

single-Lad does not care which.)

4/N

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SAFEHOUSE FOR AMMUG-1

03

1. The undersigned called Mr. John Ryan of the Safehouse Procurement Section on 15 June 1964 to arrange for the Safehouse for AMMUG-1 at Summit Hill Apartments, 8484 16th Street, Silver Spring, Maryland.

24

03

2. Mr. Ryan called on the morning of 16 June 1964 to say that a deposit had been placed on Apartment G-32 at 8500 16th Street, Summit Hill Apartments, Silver Spring, Maryland.

24 24, 10

06

3. Security has been notified and the apartment is now being checked. If everything goes well Mr. Roger SHEA, Attorney in Arlington, Virginia will sign the lease beginning 01 July 1964. The lease will be for Vladimir Rodriguez Lahera.

Vivian A. Petrowski

6|PV

30 June 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: IN &S CARD

Called Mr. Knott in the Alien Affairs Staff for AMMUG-1's INS card. He will check with them to see if things are moving. As far as he knows they are trying to get MUG's file which might still be at the border.

Appt'ment set for 10AM 2 July for fingerprint

24

SUBJECT: SAFE APARTMENT AT SUMMIT HILL

AMMUG-1 to move in on the 1st of July. Called there today to check if everything is ready. Will pick up lease from lawyer today and hand carry there tomorrow. Lou DeSanti and Daniel Flores taking MUG out ther tomorrow. BUYING linens for the apartment out of ops expenses.

O.K. MUG moving in.
will take lease & check
for remaining July rent
($160.00) with him.

1/pv

SECRET

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

26 JUN 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : Mr. Leonard Libby, WH/SA/CI

THRU : Mr. Walter Richardson
Room GH 44

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : COVERT SITE 24
Apartment G 32
Summit Hills Apartments
8500 16th Street
Silver Spring, Maryland
#353 598

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 19 May 1964 to the Chief, Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics. This memorandum requested the procurement of a safehouse to be occupied by a Latin American. The safehouse was to be located in the Bethesda, Maryland area.

2. This will confirm verbal security approval provided the Safehouse Procurement Branch by this office for the use of the Subject Covert Site. Forwarded herewith is a report dated 18 June 1964 of the security survey conducted on the Subject premises. Your attention is directed to Section VI on Page 2 of this report which lists possible security hazards. This is brought to your attention so that you will be able to take appropriate action to prevent any compromise of activities at the Subject Covert Site.

3. For your information a search of Office of Security Indices in the names of the individuals listed in the attached report has failed to reveal any additional noteworthy or derogatory information identifiable with them.

4. Under no circumstances may classified material be stored in the Subject Covert Site. In addition, the Subject Covert Site may not be loaned to or utilized by another component of the Agency without the prior concurrence of the Central Cover Staff, the Safehouse Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics and this office.

2/PV

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

5. It is requested that the attached report be returned to this office in a sealed envelope marked, "To Be Opened By Addressee Only" when your office has no further need for it.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

Attachment:
Report dated 18 June 1964

cc: Central Cover Staff
Safehouse Procurement Branch

SECRET

OFFICE OF SECURITY

Support Division

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[illegible]

CONSISTING OF

REPORTS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

FILE NO. [illegible] DATE 18 June 1964

SYNOPSIS

I.

The SUBJECT SITE is located in the east wing on the ground floor of an apartment building known as [illegible]60 16th Street 24 The building is located 24 in a large apartment development known as Summit Hills Apartments and is located a short distance off of 24 16th Street, a main 24 Washington thoroughfare, and East-West highway, Route [illegible] 24 Transportation and personal service facilities are readily available. Telephone service is on an individual subscriber basis. Fire and police protection are adequate. Only possible security hazard noted for SUBJECT SITE is the proximity of SUBJECT SITE's windows to possible penetration from automobiles parked in an adjacent parking lot and people located at ground level on the outside of the SUBJECT SITE. Biographical data on the occupants of apartments in proximity to SUBJECT SITE are contained in the body of the report.

5/PV

FORM NO. 1125

REPORT NO.

SECRET

CSR 598

II. DESCRIPTION OF AREA

The SUBJECT SITE building is located in a modern, middle-class apartment development known as 24 Summit Hills Apartments, which is located along a main thoroughfare of Washington, D.C., 16th Street 24 and Route 24 10, East-West highway. The SUBJECT SITE building is located in Montgomery County, Maryland. To the south of the SUBJECT SITE building is another apartment building known as [illegible] 24 16th Street [redacted], Summit Hills Apartments, 24 which is located approximately fifty yards south of the SUBJECT SITE building. Between [illegible] 24 16th Street 24 [redacted], and SUBJECT SITE building is located a large parking lot. Access to this parking lot, which is parallel to the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE BUILDING, can be gained from either East-West highway 24 Route 10 24 by proceeding in a westerly direction or from 16th Street 24 a divided highway, which allows entrance to the parking lot for southbound vehicles only. To the west and north of SUBJECT SITE building are additional apartment buildings and parking areas. To the east of SUBJECT SITE building 24 is 16th Street [redacted]. SUBJECT SITE building is laid out in the form of a cross with wings extending north, south, east, and west. SUBJECT SITE is located in the extreme southeast corner of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. D.C. Transit bus service is available along East-West 24 highway and at the parking lot located in close proximity to SUBJECT SITE is a bus stop for D.C. Transit. This parking lot is located directly north of the east wing of SUBJECT SITE building. Taxi cab service is also available. Complete personal services are located approximately ½ mile away in Silver Spring, Maryland, 24 which can be reached by traveling east on Route 10. A bulk of parking area for automobiles surrounds the SUBJECT SITE building.

III. DESCRIPTION OF SITE

No interior inspection of the SUBJECT SITE was conducted. SUBJECT SITE may be entered through the main lobby entrance and from an outside entrance located midway on the south side of the east wing of the SUBJECT SITE building.

12/PN

SECRET

14-00000

382 598

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground level of the SUBJECT SITE building. Two elevators are located at the rear of the lobby and a stairway to all floors of SUBJECT SITE building is located at the extreme east end of the east wing.

IV COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Telephone service is provided by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company on an individual subscriber basis.

V. FIRE AND POLICE PROTECTION

Police protection is afforded by the Montgomery County Police Department which has a substation located on Georgia Avenue in Silver Spring, Maryland. Fire protection is afforded by the Silver Spring Fire Department.

VI. POSSIBLE SECURITY HAZARDS

SUBJECT SITE is located on the ground floor of SUBJECT SITE building (below ground level) and, thus, SUBJECT SITE's windows are at ground level. Visual and technical penetration may be possible from the land area surrounding SUBJECT SITE building and from the parking lot located approximately fifteen yards to the south of SUBJECT SITE building and SUBJECT SITE. No other security hazards were noted and the closest building to SUBJECT SITE building is approximately fifty yards away.

VII. OUTLINE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit A - diagram depicting SUBJECT SITE building and area surrounding it.
Exhibit B - diagram of ground level floor of SUBJECT SITE building.

VIII. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Apartment G 10.

06

This apartment is occupied by one Michael R. SCHRIER born 1922 in Maryland and married to Joan. SCHRIER 06 has been employed for [illegible] years as an investigator by Paul M. SACHS, [illegible]520 Connecticut Avenue, NW, who is further
08

3/17/

383 598

described by credit sources as an attorney specializing in investment 06 counseling. 08 Additional information indicates that SCHRIER previously 08 resided at 08 [illegible]18 Perry Place and was previously employed by The WIGWAM General 08 wig shop. No detrimental credit information, police information, or House Committee on Un-American Activities records were reflected in the name of SCHRIER or his wife.
06

Apartment 118 (located directly over SUBJECT SITE) 06

06

This apartment is the residence of Esther JOLLES, white female born 22 December 1892 in Russia and her daughter, Mildred JOLLES, 06 white female for whom two dates 09 of birth are listed: 17 May 1924 09 and 2 March 1917, born New York. 06 Esther JOLLES is the widow of Joseph I. JOLLES 06 whom Montgomery County Health Department records reflected died of natural causes on 22 June 1960. Mr. 06 JOLLES was formerly the president of the Maryland Belt Parkway 08 Development Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland, and the North 08 Portal Construction Company. A previous address of 4505 08 15th Street, NW, is reflected for Joseph I. JOLLES, 06 Mildred JOLLES 06 and Esther JOLLES. 06

06 Immigration and Naturalization records reflected that Esther JOLLES received 09 a certificate of citizenship through derivative means on 15 March 1961. Esther JOLLES 06 is not a naturalized citizen but received her certificate of citizenship through her father. Her Immigration and Naturalization file, derivative number A-402705, alien number 12145777 08 is located in Baltimore, Maryland. Esther 06 JOLLES is employed as a homemaker. Credit sources reflect a credit rating ranging from poor to satisfactory in the name of Joseph I. 06 and Esther JOLLES. 06

06 06

Mildred JOLLES, daughter of Esther JOLLES, is employed as an analyst by the Quartermaster Corps, Department of the Army, Pentagon. An additional address of 08 Second and D Streets SW, is also reflected for Mildred 06 JOLLES' employment. Mildred JOLLES 06 came to Washington from New York on 31 August 1942, is single, and has no dependents. Credit sources reflect poor to satisfactory credit rating 06 in the name of Mildred JOLLES. 06 No record for either Mildred JOLLES or Esther JOLLES was reflected at appropriate police agencies 06 and the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

ESC lez

SECRET

35/PV

SECRET

RECEIPT FOR AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS

DB CASE NO. 4763

TO: TSD/DB

DATE

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING AUTHENTICATION MATERIALS TRANSMITTED WITH MEMO NO. AB#6891 DATED 27 May 1964 AND PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH Refs: A,B,C,D,E,F, & G of AB MEMO #6891, 27 May 1964

Jaime Sanchez Papo (Alias)

31
1 -(Mexican Drivers License) No. 436747
1 - 1961(Mexican Voters Cert) No. 6215
31

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NOTE: Authentication Materials must be returned to TSD/DB as soon as the intended operational use has been fulfilled; unused documents, whether filled in or blank, must be returned to TSD/DB when no longer needed.

TSD/DB should be notified if any of the Authentication Materials are destroyed, lost, or for any other reason can no longer be returned.

D-061 SECRET

2/R/

28 MAY 1964

SECRET

Libby

20 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: REJECTION OF AN APARTMENT FOR AMMUG-1

24

1. The apartment at Hunting Towers , Apt #731 West, Mount Vernon Avenue (Blvd.), Alexandria, Virginia was rejected because it has been exposed to the following KUBARK staffers and agent assets:

a. Mr. Dolf Luim with AMDIXIE-1 a Cuban who is the 10
08 Manager for Vanedadis Magazine and lives in Bogata, Columbia.

b. Mr. Mike Kline with AMTOUT a principal agent in New York. 03

c. Horace Speed with AMCASH who is in New York. 03

d. Lou De Santi with AMNIP-1 and Dr. Winston.

2. Due to the foregoing we find it necessary to request that another apartment be secured for AMMUG-1.

for Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI

Distribution:
1 - WH SA/Logistics
1 - AMMUG-1 File
1 = WH SA/CI Chrono

Excluded [illegible]

SECRET

5/PN

20 MAY 1964

19-6-102/2

14 May 1964

Memorandum for the Record: Safehouse for AMMUG-1

03

1. Per verbal agreement with Mr. Ray Scoefield this date, it was decided to use the following safehouse presently available for immediate use.

24

HUNTING TOWERS
MT. VERNON BLVD.
APT. #731-WEST
ALEXANDRIA

Reminded C/WH/SA/CI that address is too well known.
L

03 03 03

2. This apartment was viewed by C/WH/SA/CI yesterday and considered adequate for AMMUG-1. Undersigned and Mr. Scoefield will inventory household equipment on 19 May 1964 (tentatively) and move A-1 into the abovementioned quarters a day or two thereafter, depending upon when WHD Staffers are finished debriefing A-1. Mr. Scoefield advised that he will inform Mr. John Ryan, Safehouse Branch, X3683, that it will no longer be necessary for the Branch to inquire re prospective apartments for A-1 in the N.W. section of Washington, per WH/SA 64-376 dated 6 May 1964

L
Libby
WH/SA/CI

1cc 201-749651/ Support

14 MAY 1964

5/PN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : L.LIBBY:pap
UNIT : WH/SA/CI
EXT : 4431
DATE : 11 MAY 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

7 1/30 SECRET

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH/SA 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 6, WH 7, VR

11 MAY 64 22 05z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR

AQUATIC PBRUMEN AMMUG

20506

REF: MEXI 9336 (IN 78050)*

IN 81839

31 1. KURIOT PREPARING TWO DOCUMENTS FOR REF CASE. FOR DRIVER'S LICENSE REQUIRE FULL FACE NEGATIVE, NAME AND SIGNATURE SPECIMEN IN ALIAS, DOB OF ASSET TO BE USED IN RECOVERY OF MAIL. FOR VOTER REGISTRATION 31 ASSUME "EMPLEADO" WILL SUFFICE FOR OCCUPATION.

29 [illegible]

2. PLS FORWARD AIR MAIL ASAP TO TRAVELERS ADVISORY SERVICE, P.O. BOX 8064, S.W. STATION, WASHINGTON, 24, D.C.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REF RYBAT.

for C/WH/SA/CI UKube
WH/3/Mexi - Dick Scott 03 (by phone)
TSD/AD/ M.Walker, (by phone)
WH/SA/EOB 03

W Wood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11-20

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

11 May 64

5/IN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

MOB	INTOUTIBS		SB
	IOS	PERS	AB
FOB	RPTS	LOG	CA
CI	SI	BF	HH
		SEC	NS

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 5 (WH/SA NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1425-7 MAY 64)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/WH 5, VR

7 MAY 64 IN 78050

S E C R E T 071753Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 9336

RYBAT TYPIC AMMUG

REF DIR 19477

1. SEE NO DIFFICULTY REF PLAN. MEXI OFFICER CAN CARRY LETTER AND INSTRUCTIONS TO MNTY. (OR BRIEF TDY MNTY OFFICER IN MEXI).

2. BELIEVE BEST HQS PREPARE MEXI IDENTITY DOCUMENTS 31 AS STATION HAS FORWARDED ALL EXEMPLARS. MOREOVER STATION LACKS FACILITIES FOR REPRODUCTION AVAILABLE HQS. VOTER'S REGISTRATION 31 AND DRIVER'S LICENSE 31 SHOWING ANY MEXICO CITY ADDRESS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND SUFFICIENT FOR RECOVERY MAIL FROM GENERAL DELIVERY.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *AMMUG-1 ANXIOUS WRITE WIFE IN CUBA AND TELL HER HE OK.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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3/R

Temp copy in C/S file

AMMUG-1 file

7 May 64

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E 40

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FROM 35/11

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/PS, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, CS/SGO, ADDP, DDP, SECURY

16-24

S E C R E T 021952Z CITE [MONTEVIDEO] 5282 16-20 3 Nov 67 IN 85636

16-23

DIRECTOR INFO [SANTIAGO] JMWAVE [RIO DE JANEIRO]

16-23

REFERENCE: [SANTIAGO] 5331 (IN 83968)

1. IF REFERENCE REQUEST CARRIED OUT WISH CONSIDER HAVING AMMUG-1 ALSO VISIT [MONTEVIDEO] 16-24 FOR SIMILAR PRESENTATION. IF PLAN FEASIBLE, REQUEST EVALUATION AMMUG-1'S POTENTIAL IMPACT, BOTH AS PERSON AND TIMELINESS HIS INFORMATION, FOR PRESENTATION BEFORE [MINISTER 06 OF INTERIOR] AND [CHIEF 06 OF AVALANCHE.]

2. BELIEVE SUCH BRIEFING IN NEAR FUTURE MIGHT ASSIST US IN CONTINUING EFFORTS CONVINCE [GOU] 08 NEED YM SUPPORT NEWLY CREATED [DIRECTORATE 06 OF INTELLIGENCE] UNIT FIRST OF ITS KIND AND FIVE [AVALANCHE 08] OFFICERS SOON TO RETURN FROM WOFIRM TRAINING AND BEGIN OPERATIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

10/80

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99

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99

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 191645Z CITE SAN SALVADOR 6756

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

19 Apr 67 IN 48874

REFS: A. SAN SALVADOR 6727 (IN 32525)
B. SAN SALVADOR 6711 (IN 20433)

1. SUBJECT REF A NOT YET LOCATED BY NATIONAL GUARD BUT STATION WOULD LIKE AMMUG-1 TO STAND BY IF POSSIBLE FOR THIS AND OTHER OPERATIONAL POSSIBILITIES INVOLVING DGI TRAINED SALVADORANS KNOWN TO AMMUG-1.

2. AT OUR REQUEST JUSLOOP-1 HAS ORDERED ARREST OF JOSE REMBERTO CARRILLO CALDERON (201-750959). STATION PASSED CARRILLO'S ADDRESS IN AHUACHAPAN. PLAN IS TO HAVE CARRILLO BROUGHT TO ISOLATED NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS IN SAN SALVADOR WHERE HE WILL BE INTERROGATED AND RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTED FOR JOINT OPERATION AGAINST PCES.

3. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO (201-751265) IS SUBJECT OF REF B RECRUITMENT INDUCEMENT LETTER. WAS ARRESTED BY POLICE ON 29 MARCH 1967 FOR NOT POSSESSING LEGAL IDENTIFICATION CARD. UNILATERAL AGENT JUMUD-13 CANNOT PROMISE THAT GOMEZ CAN BE DETAINED ANY LONGER SINCE LEGAL HEARING ~~YNG~~ HAS BEEN HELD AND HE IS TO BE RELEASED AS SOON AS RELATIVES

Mana

SECRET

20/RS

PAGE 2 16-26 SAN SALVADOR 6756 SECRET

POST NOMINAL BOND. IMMINENT RELEASE EXPECTED. 6C JUMUD-13 SAID HE THOUGHT HE COULD ARREST 04 GOMEZ AGAIN 15 DAYS AFTER RELEASE AND HOLD HIM IN JAIL OVER WEEKEND TO ALLOW 16-26 STATION TO MAKE RECRUITMENT PITCH. 6C JUMUD-13, HOWEVER, NOT VERY DEFINITE IN HIS OFFER AND SINCE HE HAS NOT BEEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE AGENT IN THE PAST, 16-26 STATION PREFERS COMPLETELY UNILATERAL PITCH. AS SOON AS 04 GOMEZ IS RELEASED AND RELOCATED, WE WILL REQUEST AMMUG-1 PRESENCE 16-26 SAN SALVADOR TO MAKE UNILATERAL PITCH. IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY TO FALL BACK ON JOINT RECRUITMENT PITCH IN JAIL, AMMUG-1'S SERVICES WILL STILL BE NEEDED.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

8/Rs

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ACTION
WH 8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, [illegible] FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 251700Z CITE GUAT[redacted] 6231 21-2

25 May 66 IN 25182

DIRECTOR

IS AMUG-1 DEBRIEFING (SPANISH VERSION) FORWARDED HGGW-3947 22 CLEARED FOR PASSAGE TO LIAISON? 24 IF SO, PLAN GIVE PRESENT COPY TO COL ARRIAGA. 06 PLS ADVISE. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS SEND ADDITIONAL COPY FOR STATION. 76-2 RETENTION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

AN FI

ABSTRACT X

NNNN

19-6-102/4
25 May 1966

5/80

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-311/01258-65
SUBJECT	Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Haiti	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1965
		NO. PAGES	6
		REFERENCES	CS-311/00115-64 CS-311/00345-64
DATE OF INFO.	1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	June 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXXX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT	I&NS							

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2307
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/01258-65

CI/LS 13 (for AF/OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)

TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3, LIAISON #
nil 23(33), AF 8(8), EE 8(10), FF 12(8), NE 7(19)

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CS-311/01258-65

Hdqrs Dissem

WH/COPS	1
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WH/1	1
WH/2	13
WH/3	1
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WH/4	1
WH/5	1
WH/6	1
WH/R	1
WH/SA/EOB	5
WH/SA/MOB	5
WH/SA/R	4
WH/SA/Int	1
WH/SA/CI	30
WH/SA/SO/NS	1
CI/Staff	5
CI/Liaison	1
CI/R&A	3
RID/AN	1
AF/1	1
AF/2	1
AF/3	1
AF/4	1
AF/R	3
AF/CI	1
EE/K	1
EE/SA	1
EE/BR	1
EE/YA	1
EE/H	1
EE/P	1
EE/C	1
EE/IIS	1
FE/PMI/I	1
FE/JKO/JO	1
FE/JKO/K	1
FE/VNC/VN	1
FE/R	4
FE/CI	4
NE/AA/L&S	1
NE/AA/AP	1
NE/AA/E	1
NE/AA/I	1
NE/5/P	1
NE/6/C&I	1
NE/Intel	1
SR/CI	1
SR/CI/K	1
SR/RR	1
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WE/BC	1
WE/R	1

Field Dissem

WH/MEXI	1
WH/MNTY	1
WH/MRID	1
WH/SDOM	1
WH/PIBO	1
WH/POSN	1
WH/KNGS	1
WH/PRIN	1
WH/GORG	1
WH/MANA	1
WH/SJOS	1
WH/SALV	1
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WH/GUAT	1
WH/LAPA	1
WH/BOGO	1
WH/QUIT	1
WH/GAYA	1
WH/LIMA	1
WH/CARA	1
WH/BUEN	1
WH/COBA	1
WH/MONT	1
WH/ASUN	1
WH/SAGO	1
WH/RIOD	1
WH/CURI	1
WH/BRIL	1
WH/SAOP	1
WH/BHIA	1
WH/BEHO	1
WH/LGRE	1
WH/RECI	1

99

WH/SA/WAVE	5
AF/ALGI	1
AF/ORNA	1
AF/RABA	1
AF/CASB	1
AF/ACCR	1
AF/CNRY	1
AF/BAKO	1
AF/DARE	1
EE/VIEN	1
EE/SBUR	1
EE/CYRU	1
EE/ATHE	1
EE/SLON	1
EE/BERN	1

99

EE/GNVA	1
EE/ZURI	1
EE/HAMB	1
EE/KAVA	1
FE/DJAK	1
FE/MEDN	1
FE/SURA	1
FE/TOKY	1
FE/OKIE	1
FE/SEOU	1
FE/SAIG	1
FE/KOBE	1
NE/COLO	1
NE/NEWD	1
NE/BOMB	1
NE/CALC	1
NE/MDRS	1
NE/KUWA	1
NE/KAHI	1
NE/DACC	1
NE/LAHO	1
NE/RAWL	1
NE/BAGH	1
NE/BEIR	1
NE/DAMA	1
NE/ALEP	1
NE/JIDD	1
NE/DAHA	1
NE/TAIZ	1
NE/CAIR	1
NE/ALEX	1
WE/BRUS	1
WE/COPE	1
WE/HELS	1
WE/OTTA	1
WE/ROME	1
WE/MILA	1
WE/HAGU	1
WE/OSLO	1
WE/LISB	1
WE/MADR	1
WE/BARC	1
WE/STOC	1
WE/LOND	1
WE/PARI	1

99

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	11	1
IE/British	11	1
L/WASH/BR	11	1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

6/PV

13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:
   a. Military pacts.
   b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).
   c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.
   d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:
   a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.
   b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.
   c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:
   a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.
   b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.
   c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:
   a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.
   b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:
   a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the

possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.

c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counterrevolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.

b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.

c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.

b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.

c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.

d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.

c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.

d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Yugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.

c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.

d. Need of collaborators for information.

e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.

b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.

c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.

b. Coupist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornei, his ties, etc.

c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.

d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.

e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N. and on the military attachés in the Latin American countries.

f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

a. Eclesiastical Hierarchy.

b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.

c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.

d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.

e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.

f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.

g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

a. U.N.

b. OAS and JID.

c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries.

d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

a. North American investments and their influence on the country.

b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.

c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.

d. Level of unemployment.

e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.

f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.

g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.

b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.

c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.

d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.

e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-311/00466-65

SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic

DATE DISTR. 11 January 1965

NO. PAGES 8

REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00345-64

DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XN	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT I&NS								

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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CS-311/00466-65

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CS-311/00466-65

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WH/SA/Int	1
WH/SA/CI	30
WH/SA/SO/NS	1
CI/Staff	5
CI/Liaison	1
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NE/AA/L&S	1
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AF/CNRY	1
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EE/VIEN	1
EE/SBUR	1
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WE/PARI	1

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Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP) ''	1
IE/British ''	1
I./WASH/BR ''	1

GPV

Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. **Collective Action.**
   - a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.
   - b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.
   - c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.
   - d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.
   - e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.
   - f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.
   - g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.
2. **Status of Leftist Forces**
   - a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.
   - b) Possibility for armed struggle.
   - c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.
   - d) Publications--circulation.
   - e) Repression against leftist forces.

f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.

g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.

h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).

i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.

j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement: groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.

k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.

l) Relations of exiles with the insurrectional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.

b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).

c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.

d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.

e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.

f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.

g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.

h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.

i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

   a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.

   b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.

   c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.

   d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.

   e) In the case of China and the USSR.

   f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.

   g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.

   h) As regards Peace.

   i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.

   j) Internal status of the Party.

   k) Forces.

   l) Leaders (information concerning them).

   m) Disagreements.

   n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.

   ñ) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.

   o) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.

   p) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.

   q) Work for solidarity with Cuba.

   r) Publicity media.

   s) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.

   t) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

   a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces; names, assignments, and functions.

c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil; type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.

b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.

c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.

d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.

e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.

f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.

g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.

b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.

c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Points discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.

e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.

f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.

g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country: its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.

h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.

b) Participation in the government.

c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.

d) Organizations of a fascist type: relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.

e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.

f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.

g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.

h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.

i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.

j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.

b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

a) Alliance for Progress.

b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.

b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.

c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.

d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).

e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.

b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy

a) United States investments (new and old).

b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.

c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.

d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

e) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.

f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.

g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

a) Character of the government, program, international policy.

b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.

c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.

d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.

e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S E C R E T
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COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CSCI-316/01228-64
SUBJECT Fernando FUENTES Coba
DATE DISTR. 2 October 1964
NO. PAGES 2
REFERENCES

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DATE OF INFO. 1964
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. October 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Fernando FUENTES Coba was a lieutenant in the Cuban Police Force and worked in the Confidential Department under Commander Efigenio ALMEJEIRAS, Chief of Police. Although source cannot verify it, he heard that FUENTES was discharged from the police force because of problems relating to drugs. The last source heard of FUENTES, he was working in a printing establishment in Halifax, Canada. Source described FUENTES as being about five feet eight inches tall and 160 pounds.1,2,3,4,5,6,7

Headquarters Comments

1. Included with a report dated 27 November 1959, was a complete list of the personnel employed by the Departamento Tecnico de Investigaciones (Technical Department of Investigations - DTI) as of 6 November 1959. Included on the list was one Sargeant Fernando FUENTES Cobas who worked in Bureau "A," the section responsible for foreign intelligence operations for the Policia Nacional Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary Police - PNR).

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS						

(Note field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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WH/SA/MOB	1	WE [MADR] 5-2	2	CI/R&A	3	LE [BRITISH]	1	ii	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1)
WH/SA/R	1					L/WASH [BR]	1	ii	CSCI-316/01228-64
WH/SA/CI	1			RID/AN	1				
WH/WAVE	1								COORDINATING / RELEASING
TOTALS	WH/SA 7 (1), WE 1 (2). CI 4, RID 1							LIAISON #	WHK:LD:swk CI/

201-265067

4/PN

2. An untested source gave a representative of this Agency a copy of a list of regulations issued on 15 May 1960 by the National Revolutionary Police, which came under the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, for the discipline of members of the Servicio Secreto Revolucionario (Cuban Revolutionary Secret Service - SSR). This document was signed by Fernando FUENTE Coba, Chief of the Confidential Section of the General Command of the National Revolutionary Police.

3. In a report dated 19 May 1962, an untested source, who was a guide and interpreter for the ICAP, a Cuban government agency which handled the needs of foreign visitors to Cuba, said that First Lieutenant Fernando COBAS was chief of the DTI until sometime in 1960 when he started working for the Tourist Police, a part of the PNR. In January or February 1961, COBAS transferred to the Transit Police.

4. In a report dated 20 September 1962, an untested source reported that Fernando FUENTES Covas was with the Policia Transita (Transit Police) in the DTI.

5. Another office of this Agency, in a report dated 26 December 1962, reported that Fernando FUENTES Coba, a Cuban national, had been convicted in 1957 of violation of the United States immigration laws. FUENTES was engaged in forging birth certificates to assist Cuban nationals to enter the United States as Puerto Ricans. FUENTES moved to Miami, where he became an ardent Castrista. In July 1959, he served as a provocateur in luring an American flyer, Rafael del PINO, to Cuba, ostensibly to smuggle someone out of Cuba. Because of his success in luring del PINO back to Cuba, where he was badly wanted by the Castro regime, FUENTES received an important position in the Confidential Bureau of the Cuban G-2, and for a time served as chief of the Bureau.

6. On 29 January 1963, a source whose reliability cannot be determined, reported that he had seen Fernando FUENTES Coba, described as a Castro agent, debark from the SS Shirley Lykes on 25 January 1963, at Port Everglades. 24

7. An official BRITISH liaison service reported on 25 February 1963, that Fernando FUENTES Coba was born on 21 June 1928, in Habana, Cuba. FUENTES was a former permanent resident of the United States from 1946 to 1949, and served in the United States Army. At the time of this report FUENTES was described as a photographer with the Tourist Commission in Habana. Source, in a report dated October 1963, reported that FUENTES was settled in Halifax, Canada, and had obtained temporary employment.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CSCI-316/00704-64
SUBJECT	(fnu) RELOVA	DATE DISTR.	1 September 1964
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1964		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Washington, D. C. August 1964	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

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The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

(fnu) RELOVA, pseudonym "Wilberto," is an officer of the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) in Cuba. He resides at Calle 15 number 2419, Reparto Juan Manuel Marquez, Palya de Santa Fe, Mariano, Habana. 1,2,3,4,5,6

Headquarters Comments

1. An airline passenger manifest revealed that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet, probably identical with the above Subject, left Mexico for Habana on 8 July 1963 and was the holder of Cuban passport number D/63/415.

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 16 October 1963, stated that Osvaldo RELOVA, the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, arrived in Kingston on 14 October 1963. He was in Kingston for one week and lived at the Cuban Consulate office. RELOVA was reportedly making an inspection trip. RELOVA was born on 13 August 1930, in Habana. His home address was given as 15H 2419 Santa Fe, Habana. He carried Cuban passport number D/63/415, issued in Habana on 17 June 1963.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REP CINCLANT	CINCSO #	I&NS						

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH/SA EOB	1	WE 5 R	1	CI LIA	1	IE CANADA	1		~~LX-4650~~
WH SA MOB	1	WE MADR	2	CI R&A	3	IE BRITISH	1	\\	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1
WH SA R	1				1	WASH BR	1	\\	CSCI-316/00704-64
WH SA CI	4			RID/AN	1				
WH WAVE	1								COORDINATING

4/BR

3. In a report dated 19 October 1963, source unknown, it was stated that one Osvaldo RELOVA Penichet was appointed administrator of "Envases del Cerro, S.A." firm, located on Calzada del Cerro Avenue, Habana.

4. A fairly reliable source, in a report dated 23 October 1963, revealed that Osvaldo RELOVA, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada, left Kingston for Toronto on 21 October 1963, on TCA flight number 885.

5. An official Canadian source, in a report dated 26 November 1963, said that Osvaldo RELOVA Penicitet, born on 13 August 1930, was not the First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Canada as previous reports stated. Rather, RELOVA, who was a frequent visitor to Canada, traveled as an "Embassy Inspector." He carried Cuban Diplomatic passport D/63/415 with Mexican visa number OF-7090; he had no Canadian visa. The address on his passport was given as 15/3 number 2419, Santa Fe Banch (sic), Habana. RELOVA entered Canada on 16 August 1963, destined to visit Jesus YANES Rodriguez, Cuban Commerical Attache in Montreal. He departed Canada for Mexico on 25 August 1963, in the company of Alberta MENDUCA.

6. A former Cuban Intelligence officer who has been living in the United States since 1963 and whose reporting over the past nine months has proven reliable, gave the following information on 21 July 1964, on Osvaldo RELOBA Penechet (presumably identical with RELOVA):

> In early 1961, RELOBA was an administrator of a section of the Consolidated Hardware Stores and annexes. In late 1961 he went to see source to get help with an investigation on a Mr. BARRAL, Administrator of the Consolidated (sic). RELOBA was requesting source's aid in the belief that source was still working for G-2; source did not tell him otherwise. RELOBA is a new Communist who wants to be more than MARX and is trying to instruct everyone around him. Source said that RELOBA was born about 1934, is 164 pounds, five feet nine inches in height, has a medium thin build, a long face, and a long thin neck. He has dark eyes, black hair, is partially bald, and has a small, thin mustache.

11BR

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Julian NOVAS Fernandez

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00699-64

DATE DISTR. 27 August 1964

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

RETURN TO CIA
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DATE OF INFO. 1964

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Washington, D. C. August 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comments

The following report is one of a series containing personality information provided by the source and includes supplemental information from the records of this Agency.

It is requested that the addressees take no action on any of the individuals mentioned in the personality reports without first checking with this Agency.

Source was shown a photograph of Julian NOVAS Fernandez and source identified him as a Cuban Intelligence Officer. Source saw NOVAS at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964 and assumed he was a functionary there. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

Headquarters Comments

1. Although source saw Julian NOVAS Fernandez at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in March 1964, the records of this Agency reveal that source was probably in error in assuming that NOVAS was assigned to that Embassy and it is more likely that he was just passing through. The following traces by this Agency is the basis for this conclusion.

2. An official Jamaican source, in a report dated 24 March 1964, stated that Julian NOVAS Fernandez arrived in Kingston, Jamaica, on 18 March 1964, to take up his duties at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston as Commercial Attache. Source said that NOVAS has the appearance of an American and speaks excellent English. Since his arrival he has been especially occupied with girls. It should be noted that

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2

REP CINCLANT CINCSO # I&NS

Note. Field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

WH SA/EOB	1	WE/5/R	1	CI LIA	1	IR CANADA	1	LX-1645
WH SA/MOB	1	WE MADR	2	CI R&A	3	IE/BRITISH	1	CSCI-316/00699-64
WH SA/R	1					L/WASH/BR	1	NO PROJECT (AMMUG/1)
WH SA/CI	1			RID AN	1			
WH WAVE	1							

TOTALS
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LIAISON #

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RELEASING
WMK:LD:swk
CI/R&A

4/BR

his wife did not accompany him and source speculated that her arrival may be delayed in view of NOVAS' present inclination for feminine diversion.

3. In a report dated March 1964, this same source said that Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the Cuban Commercial Attache at the Cuban Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, was born on 2 September 1938, in Habana, Cuba. He carried diplomatic passport D/64/90 which was issued in Habana on 20 February 1964. His home address was given as Carman No. 18, Vibora. He arrived in Kingston from Mexico on 18 March 1964, on Mexicana Flight Number 305.

4. This same source, in a report dated 28 April 1964, stated that the wife of Julian NOVAS Fernandez, the recently arrived Cuban Commercial Attache, arrived in Kingston on 22 April 1964, via Mexico. Her name is Amarilis Marta VALDES Hijuelos and she was born on 19 May 1937, in Jiquani, Oriente, Cuba. VALDES has been indisposed since her arrival in Kingston; this is probably due to her advanced pregnancy. Her home address in Cuba is Avenida 31, Number 3622, Habana. She carried diplomatic passport D/64/239, issued in Habana on 9 April 1964.

5. This same source, in a report dated 9 May 1964, noted that the salary and allowances of the new Cuban Commercial Attache, Julian NOVAS Fernandez, suggests that he is the new Cuban Intelligence Service chief in Jamaica, succeeding Gerardo SANCHEZ Robert.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-311/01258-65

SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in Haiti

DATE DISTR. 4 February 1965

NO. PAGES 6

REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00345-64

RETURN TO CIA
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DATE OF INFO. 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. June 1964

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in Haiti, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia -- DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN).

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: HAITI

Priority:

1. Plans of aggression against Cuba.
2. Progressive political forces.
3. Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.
4. Movement for solidarity with Cuba.
5. Strategic information.
6. The Communist Party of Haiti. (Party of Popular Accord.)

Important:

7. Relations with the United States.
8. Internal politics of the country.
9. Social situation.
10. Internal situation of the Armed Forces.
11. The Church.
12. Functions, characteristics, and information on members of the foreign service and the accredited diplomatic corps in the country.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XXX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT I&NS								
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

For Distribution See Attached Page

LX-2307
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/01258-65

CI/LS 12 (for AF/OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)

TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH/SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3,
WH 23(33), AF 8(8), EF 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)

LIAISON #

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CS-311/01258-65

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WH/R	1	
WH/SA/EOB	5	
WH/SA/MOB	5	
WH/SA/R	4	
WH/SA/Int	1	
WH/SA/CI	30	
WH/SA/SO/NS	1	
CI/Staff	5	
CI/Liaison	1	
CI/R&A	3	
RID/AN	1	
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AF/R	3	
AF/CI	1	
EE/K	1	
EE/SA	1	
EE/BR	1	
EE/YA	1	
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EE/IIS	1	
FE/PMI/I	1	
FE/JKO/JO	1	
FE/JKO/K	1	
FE/VNC/VN	1	
FE/R	4	
FE/CI	4	
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WH/SAOP	1	
WH/BHIA	1	
WH/BEHO	1	
WH/LGRE	1	
WH/RECI	1	
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AF/ORNA	1	
AF/RABA	1	
AF/CASB	1	99
AF/ACCR	1	
AF/CNRY	1	
AF/BAKO	1	
AF/DARE	1	
EE/VIEN	1	
EE/SBUR	1	
EE/CYRU	1	99
EE/ATHE	1	
EE/SLON	1	
EE/BERN	1	

EE/GNVA	1	
EE/ZURI	1	99
EE/HAMB	1	
EE/KAVA	1	
FE/DJAK	1	
FE/MEDN	1	
FE/SURA	1	99
FE/TOKY	1	
FE/OKIE	1	
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FE/SAIG	1	
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NE/NEWD	1	
NE/BOMB	1	
NE/CALC	1	
NE/MDRS	1	
NE/KUWA	1	
NE/KAHI	1	
NE/DACC	1	
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NE/BAGH	1	
NE/BEIR	1	
NE/DAMA	1	
NE/ALEP	1	
NE/JIDD	1	
NE/DAHA	1	
NE/TAIZ	1	
NE/CAIR	1	
NE/ALEX	1	
WE/BRUS	1	
WE/COPE	1	
WE/HELS	1	
WE/OTTA	1	
WE/ROME	1	
WE/MILA	1	
WE/HAGU	1	99
WE/OSLO	1	
WE/LISB	1	
WE/MADR	1	
WE/BARC	1	
WE/STOC	1	
WE/LOND	1	
WE/PARI	1	

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	11	1
IE/British	11	1
L/WASH/BR	11	1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11/BR

13. The press.
14. Operative data.

Necessary:

15. Condition of the national economy.
16. Governmental structure and functions of its organs.

Essential:

1. PLANS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA:

   a. Military pacts.

   b. Operations within the OAS (Organization of American States) and the JID (Junta Inter-Americana de Defensa - Inter-American Defense Board).

   c. Possibilities of a break with Cuba by the countries which have diplomatic relations with her.

   d. Possibilities of isolation through the application of Inter-American Treaties such as the Treaty of Rio and the Punta del Este agreements.

2. PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL FORCES:

   a. The Party of Popular Accord (PEP), strength, organization, leaders. Information on the same. Programs, ties with foreign leftist political parties. Propaganda methods. Attitude toward the Cuban Revolution.

   b. Other political organizations. Leaders, information on the same. Forces, propaganda methods, programs. Ties.

   c. Contact and knowledge, reaction to political and economic changes in Cuba.

3. ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARD THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:

   a. Toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

   b. With regard to Cuban-Soviet relations in questions affecting Cuba and world peace.

   c. With regard to accusations that Cuba is a base of Communist aggression against the Latin American countries.

4. MOVEMENT FOR SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA:

   a. Find out whether the Solidarity Movement has been organized, in what form it functions, who its directors are, etc.

   b. Find out the possibilities for demonstrations of active solidarity that the progressive organizations can offer.

5. STRATEGIC INFORMATION:

   a. Because of its nearness to our coasts and favorable position for carrying out any kind of action against Cuba, the search must be undertaken for information concerning the possibility that imperialism is using this island as a base of operations against our country.

b. Because of the lack of information to guide the search for concrete data and information, the established principle must be followed of working along the departmental lines, common to all sections of the Department.

c. Notwithstanding what has been previously mentioned, we deem it advantageous to point out several important questions on which work must be begun immediately.

BASES OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS:

a. Localization of camps or bases of operations of counterrevolutionary launches. Characteristics of the same. Ships encountered in this. Nationality of the individuals forming the crew of the ships, armaments of the same, plans and objectives of their attacks, and date when they will be carried out.

b. Counterrevolutionary organizations which will participate in these activities, elements which will be in charge of the same, names, and functions.

c. Utilization of Dominican elements (Trujillo followers) in this work.

ARMED FORCES OF HAITI:

a. Organizations of the Armed Forces, units and troops, armaments, transport, and bases, commanding officers of the same. Budgetary allotments.

b. Military agreements of a secret nature signed by Haiti with the United States for the Latin American countries. Terms of the same. Established agreements.

c. Utilization of the territory of Haiti for carrying out Latin American army manoeuvres. Dates of the same and armies which are participating. Troops.

d. Military concentrations of any type which are carried out on Haitian territory. Armies, units, and troops. Date.

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF HAITI. (PARTY OF POPULAR ACCORD):

a. Attitude toward the Second Declaration of Havana.

b. Attitude concerning Cuban-Soviet relations.

c. Attitude toward the lines followed by Cuba in the national and international political systems.

d. Attitude with regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement:

In the case of China and the USSR.

In the case of Albania and the USSR.

With regard to Jugoslavia-China-USSR-Albania.

With regard to peace.

With regard to peaceful coexistence.

e. Internal situation in the Party of Popular Accord:

Forces.

Activities.

Disagreements.

Leaders (information on the same).

f. Relations with leftist forces:

Disagreements.

Possibilities of uniting all of the leftist forces.

g. Methods of combat officially adopted by the party.

h. Work of the party in the cities and the countryside, tending toward the creation of revolutionary awareness in the people.

i. Relations of the party with the bourgeois parties.

j. Solidarity work with the Cuban Revolution.

k. Publicity media which the Party organizes.

l. Repression endured by the party at the hands of the Duvalier dictatorship. Status of the party with regard to legal and illegal operations.

m. Relations of the party with the Dominican Popular Socialist Party and the Communist Parties of other Latin American countries.

Important:

7. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES:

a. Alliance for Progress, Peace Corps.

b. Relations with North American credit organizations.

c. North American military assistance, role of the American military mission.

d. The North American Embassy. Information on the Ambassador and Embassy personnel.

e. Activities of the North American Intelligence corps.

8. INTERNAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY:

a. Existing bourgeois political parties: composition, forces, propaganda methods, leaders, information on the same. Programs.

b. Relations of the bourgeois political parties with the "Yankee" Embassy, the monopolies, and the churches.

c. Political organizations, information on the same, origin, ties. Orientation.

d. Need of collaborators for information.

e. Where the political parties obtain funds.

9. SOCIAL SITUATION:

a. Conflicts of economic origin manifested as racial demands. Leaders, information on the same.

b. Economic and political predominance of racial groups. Relations of these groups with the "Yankee" Embassy. Leaders, information on the same.

c. Worker, student, and peasant organizations. Structure, strength, and orientation. Leaders, information on the same.

10. INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES:

a. The armed forces. Structure. Social composition, organizations, equipment. Troops. Barracks or encampments.

b. Coupist (coup d'état) groups within the Armed Forces. Information on Colonel Ornei, his ties, etc.

c. Military relations of Haiti with other Latin American countries.

d. Ideological training of the Armed Forces. Material and reasoning used.

e. Information on soldiers who are in the International Organizations of the JID and U.N.; and on the military attachés in the Latin American countries.

f. Restrictive bodies; organization and activities.

11. THE CHURCH:

a. Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.

b. Situation between the native and foreign clergy.

c. Participation of the Church in the internal political life of the country. Governmental opposition.

d. Influence of the Church among the popular sectors; workers, peasants, students.

e. Campaigns of the Church against Cuba, arguments.

f. Relation of the Church with the plans of the United States.

g. Influence of the Church on education in the country.

12. FUNCTIONS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INFORMATION ON MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN THE COUNTRY:

a. U.N.

b. OAS and JID.

c. Officials in and from the Latin American countries..

d. Information on the internal political life of the country, obtained in diplomatic circles.

13. THE PRESS:

a. Information on journalists and the existing dissemination organs. The possibilities of using the journalists both in the country and abroad, for our work.

14. OPERATIVE INFORMATION:

a. Possibilities of illegally penetrating into the country and taking advantage of the proximity of the eastern coasts of Cuba.

Necessary:

15. CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY:

a. North American investments and their influence on the country.

b. Belgian investments and their influence on the country.

c. Other foreign capital and its influence on the country.

d. Level of unemployment.

e. Exports and imports, levels and characteristics.

f. Characteristics of domestic capital. Economic areas of major investment, its relationships with foreign capital.

g. Haiti's position with regard to Central American economic integration.

16. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS:

a. Relations between the Presidency and the Ministries.

b. Information on personages closest to and most influential with Duvalier.

c. The Congress. The most outstanding figures. Relations with the Government, the "Yankee" Embassy, and the monopolistic enterprises.

d. The Judiciary persons holding high positions. Important laws. Restrictive laws. Relationships between the Judiciary and other authorities.

e. Information on officials having authority over areas of the country.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U S C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CS-311/00466-65
SUBJECT Policy Guidance Directives for Cuban Intelligence Representatives in the Dominican Republic
DATE DISTR. 11 January 1965
NO. PAGES 8
REFERENCES CS-311/00115-64
CS-311/00[illegible]
DATE OF INFO. 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ. June 1964
FIELD REPORT NO.

RETURN TO CIA
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A former Cuban intelligence officer who served with the Cuban Intelligence Service until April 1964.

Headquarters Comment. The following is a translation of a document which Source provided containing the policy guidance directive for Cuban intelligence representatives in the Dominican Republic, prepared by the General Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion General de Inteligencia--DGI), MA Department. The MA Department no longer exists as such, having been divided into two departments: Illegal Department (Ilegal) and National Liberation Department (Liberacion Nacional -- LN). It may be noted that this directive was prepared during the régime of Juan Bosch Gaviño.

DIRECTIVES OF THE M-A SECTION
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO (sic)

Priority

1. Collective action.
2. Status of leftist forces.
3. Dominican Republic Armed Forces.
4. Dominican Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano).
5. Training camps and operations bases.
6. Counterrevolutionary organizations.
7. Repressive corps and CIA Santo Domingo.
8. Status of political parties or groups.
9. Solidarity with Cuba movement.
10. Relations with United States.
11. Church.
12. Armed forces internal situation.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	XX	OCR	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT I&NS								
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)								

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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LX-2158
NP (AMMUG-1)
CS-311/00466-65

CI/LS 12 (for AF OSI, ACSI, ONI, SY, FBI, DIA - 2 each)
TOTALS IE 3, CI 21, RID/AN 1, WH/SA 46(5), SR 4, FI 3, WH 23(33), AF 8(8), EE 8(10), FE 12(8), NE 7(19)
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WH/COPS	1
WH/PO/A	1
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WH/1	1
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WH/6	1
WH/R	1
WH/SA/EOB	5
WH/SA/MOB	5
WH/SA/R	4
WH/SA/Int	1
WH/SA/CI	30
WH/SA/SO/NS	1
CI/Staff	5
CI/Liaison	1
CI/R&A	3
RID/AN	1
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AF/R	3
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EE/YA	1
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EE/P	1
EE/C	1
EE/IIS	1
FE/PMI/I	1
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FE/VNC/VN	1
FE/R	4
FE/CI	4
NE/AA/L&S	1
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WH/BHIA	1
WH/BEHO	1
WH/LGRE	1
WH/RECI	1

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WH/SA/WAVE	5

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FE/KOBE	1

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NE/NEWD	1
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WE/MADR	1
WE/BARC	1
WE/STOC	1
WE/LOND	1
WE/PARI	1

99

Liaison Dissem

IE/Canada (RCMP)	1
IE/British	1
L/WASH/BR	1

11BR

Important

13. Functions, characteristics, and personal data on members of the foreign service, and of the accredited diplomatic corps.
14. The press.

Necessary

15. Status of the national economy.
16. Structure of the government and functions of its organs.

INFORMATION GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES
COUNTRY: SANTO DOMINGO

Priority

1. Collective Action

   a) Political and military agreements adopted by regional organs against Cuba in which the Bosch government participates. Meetings in which the government's participation in the adoption thereof may be agreed on. Dominican government proposals on the Cuban case, and collective aggression.

   b) Participation of the government in troops in the aggression, units which would participate in the aggression, their chiefs and strength.

   c) Joint military maneuvers which may be held in Dominican territory by Latin American armies. Participating armies and units thereof.

   d) Military concentrations of Latin and Yankee armies, objectives thereof; presence therein of Cuban mercenaries, their conditions, U.S. Sol. (sic; soldiers?) such as mercenaries of the Plaza Giron type, etc.

   e) Plans of provocations devised by the Dominican government in order to show Cuban Government intervention in the country's internal affairs.

   f) Measures on travel to or from Cuba.

   g) Possibilities for break in relations by countries that may have relations with Cuba.

2. Status of Leftist Forces

   a) Progressive forces: organization, leaders, strength, position, and argumentation in the revolutionary struggle.

   b) Possibility for armed struggle.

   c) Contradictions and degree of unity among the leftist forces.

   d) Publications--circulation.

   e) Repression against leftist forces.

f) Contact with leftist forces in order to know their viewpoints regularly, at all times, and when we may need it, especially on political and economic changes which may take place in Cuba.

g) Student, peasant, and labor movements. Organization, strength, leaders, relations with the leftist forces, degree of unity.

h) U.S. and Church penetration in the mass organizations (labor, peasant, student).

i) Possibilities of spontaneous manifestations of struggle.

j) Possibilities of guerrilla movement; groups, organizations, leaders, weapons, popular support, relations with the leftist forces.

k) Struggle in the city: groups, leaders, form of work, role of the labor and student movement, relations with the leftist forces, and with groups operating in the countryside.

l) Relations of exiles with the insurrectional movement.

3. Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic

a) Organization of the Dominican Armed Forces, units, and strength of the various corps. Bases, barracks, weapons, and transport of the Armed Forces. Locations.

b) Budgetary allocations of the Armed Forces; allocations to each branch (Navy, Air Force, and Army).

c) Existing bilateral agreements with the United States of a secret nature.

d) Secret or public military pacts entered into by Santo Domingo with countries in the Caribbean area, agreements by them concerning special arrangements.

e) Yankee military missions. Names, ranks, and functions of their members, their duties.

f) Armed Forces units with anti-guerrilla training, their strength, time spent in anti-guerrilla training, instructors giving it, weapons, and transportation in the possession of the units. Leaders of the units.

g) Other battalions or special units (parachutists, Rangers), units and strength, their leaders, transport, and weapons.

h) Changes in armament; quantity and characteristics of the new weapons acquired.

i) Participation by Dominican units in Central American or Caribbean military maneuvers, units participating, strength, their leaders.

4. The Dominican Communist Party (Dominican Popular Socialist Party, PSPD)

   a) Attitude toward the Second Havana Declaration.

   b) Attitude toward Cuban-Soviet relations.

   c) Attitude toward Cuba's political activities of a national or international nature.

   d) Position in regard to the disagreements in the international Communist movement.

   e) In the case of China and the USSR.

   f) In the case of Albania and the USSR.

   g) As regards Yugoslavia, China, the USSR, and Albania.

   h) As regards Peace.

   i) Regarding peaceful coexistence.

   j) Internal status of the Party.

   k) Forces.

   l) Leaders (information concerning them).

   m) Disagreements.

   n) Relations with other leftist forces, disagreements, possibilities for unification.

   ñ) Methods of fighting officially adopted by the Party.

   o) Attitude of the Party toward the elections.

   p) Relations with the bourgeois parties and the government.

   q) Work for solidarity with Cuba.

   r) Publicity media.

   s) The establishment of permanent and temporary contact with the PSPD.

   t) Relations of the PSPD with other Latin-American Marxist parties.

5. Training Camps and Operational Bases

   a) Location of training camps for Cuban mercenaries, number of mercenaries in them. Type and duration of training, organizations participating in it. Plans and missions of the elements being trained. Leaders of the camps. Place where the Cuban mercenaries go, recruitment locations. Participation by national elements in the training of mercenaries of foreign nationality.

b) Presence of counterrevolutionary elements in the Dominican armed forces: names, assignments, and functions.

c) Location of counterrevolutionary operational bases on Dominican soil: type of bases. Water craft or aircraft present on them. Counterrevolutionary organization which appears at the head of them. Elements participating. Type of water craft and their characteristics. Their weapons, objectives, and plans of attack; dates when they are to be carried out.

6. Counterrevolutionary Organizations

a) Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations which are functioning in Santo Domingo; their leaders. Their contact with government personnel, especially with people in the new régime who are responsible for establishing such contact.

b) Contact by the Bosch government with the magazine Bohemia in Exile of Miguel Angel Quevedo; financial support given it by him, and through whom.

c) Contact with Carlos Prío and elements linked with the PRC; assistance to them. Contact with the counterrevolutionary organizations; contact with the political parties; elements through which it is effected.

d) Methods of communication by the elements in Santo Domingo with the counterrevolutionary centers in Miami; through whom the communications are established, and what means are used for this purpose.

e) Obtaining documents which prove that the Dominican government gives economic assistance to the counterrevolutionary elements.

f) Counterrevolutionaries who are now working in the Dominican state apparatus or in Yankee aid institutions; disagreements between them and the Dominican workers.

g) Connections between the counterrevolutionary organizations and the Trujillo régime. Documents proving these connections.

7. Repressive Bodies and CIA, Santo Domingo

a) Repressive bodies which function in Santo Domingo. Their functions. Activities carried on by them. Their leaders and principal officers. Working methods. Plans and objectives.

b) Intelligence organizations functioning in Santo Domingo. Leaders. Elements abroad. Their duties and functions. Activities carried on. Plans and objectives of Dominican Intelligence, principally against Cuba. Trujillist elements still functioning inside this body; duties and functions.

c) Cooperation between the Dominican repressive bodies and those of the Latin American countries, especially those of Central America.

d) Meetings held with them, dates, and personnel participating in the meetings; locations. Points discussed, agreements arrived at against Cuba, and the Movement of National Liberation. Plans and objectives of the national security forces with regard to the Movement of National Liberation, means and resources mobilized, agents infiltrated into the political movements, repressive methods prescribed.

e) Contacts with Interpol. Cooperation with it. Restrictive measures regarding trips to Cuba. Agents.

f) Foreign advisers of the repressive forces and intelligence bodies; names, ranks, and positions; their functions; cases in which they have participated.

g) Leading functionaries of the CIA in the country; its office. Plans and objectives it pursues in Santo Domingo.

h) Nationals who are working for the CIA; names, ranks, and positions. Their methods and plans. Purpose of their work.

8. Status of the Parties or Political Groups

a) Their present status in regard to composition, strength, penetration, factions, leaders, programs, etc.

b) Participation in the government.

c) Relations of the political parties with the Embassy, the monopolies, the Church, and the Armed Forces.

d) Organizations of a fascist type; relations with the government, the Yankee Embassy, the Church; leaders, members, structure, anti-Communist campaign, arguments, attacks upon Cuba.

e) Provenience of the funds of the political parties.

f) Attitude of the political parties toward the Cuban Revolution.

g) Toward the Second Havana Declaration.

h) In regard to Cuban-Soviet relations, in questions which affect Cuba and world peace.

i) Concerning rightist and extreme rightist groups.

j) Reactions to the economic and political changes taking place in Cuba.

9. Movement for Solidarity with Cuba

a) Possibility of active demonstrations in favor of Cuba: groups, leaders, strength, organization, participants, relations with the forces of the left and other progressive forces.

b) Repression directed at the movement for solidarity with Cuba.

c) Propaganda campaigns for and against. Periodicals; themes.

10. Relations with the United States

a) Alliance for Progress.

b) The American Embassy. Information on the activities of the Ambassador and the personnel of the Embassy. Relations with the reactionary organizations. Relations with the Church. Government functionaries in close contact with the Embassy.

11. The Church

a) Ecclesiastical hierarchy. Information concerning it.

b) Attitude and disagreements between the national clergy and foreign countries.

c) Participation by the Church in the internal politics of the country.

d) Secular organizations of the Church (such as young people, Catholic labor, Catholic knights).

e) Penetration of the Church into the educational system of the country on various levels.

12. Internal Status of the Armed Forces

a) Information on the military chiefs and the activities they carry on. Groups they observe. Trends and disagreements.

Important

13. Functioning; Characteristics and Information on Members of the Foreign Service of the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Country

a) United Nations, Organization of American States, the JID /Inter-American Defense Board/.

b) Latin American functionaries in this country. To work with the diplomatic circles accredited to the country.

14. The Press

a) Information on journalists and dissemination organs. Possibility of making use of them. Journalists in the country and abroad.

Required

15. Status of the National Economy

a) United States investments (new and old).

b) Participation by the national oligarchy in the economy. Industry, commerce, agriculture.

c) Utilization and location of Trujillo's property.

d) Trend of the level of unemployment.

e) Relations of the country in regard to Central American economic integration.

f) Possibility of a new economic policy of the United States monopolies in the country.

g) Need for obtaining collaborators who will inform us periodically on economic questions.

16. Structure of the Government and Functioning of its Apparatus

a) Character of the government, program, international policy.

b) Relations between the Presidency and the ministries.

c) Functioning of the Congress. Most prominent figures. Relations with the Yankee Embassy. Representation of the bourgeois parties and the social classes.

d) The judiciary: personages occupying high positions; important laws. Repressive laws. Relations of the judiciary with the other authorities.

e) Information on personalities connected with Juan Bosch.

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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH 15-3
Chief of Station, [Madrid] 15-27
Chief of Base, [Barcelona]; Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT [redacted]/Operational
AMMUG/1 Identification of Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

Reference: [OSBW] 1022
23

1. As requested in paragraph 2 of reference AMMUG/1 was queried for any information he might have on Manuel ESTEVEZ Perez. AMMUG/1 was unable to identify the name.

15-27

2. [Barcelona]: If a photograph of the Subject is available, it is suggested that a copy be sent to WAVE to show AMMUG/1 for possible identification.

[redacted]

Distribution:
2 - WH/C 15-2
2 - COS/[MADR]
2 - COB/[Barcelona] 15-27
2 - C/WE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 16 Aug 65

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-22811

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

6/BR

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27 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

16-26

FROM San Salvador

ACTION WH8

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INFO

VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, SOD6

SECRET 201440Z 21-26

DIR INFO MEXI WAVE CITE [SALV] 5513

WH DIV CUBA

[redacted] ANNUS

20 JAN 65 IN 63642

REF A) [HSSW] 2195 (NOT SENT MEXI, WAVE) 22

B) DIR-7501 75605

C) DIR-74952

D) [SALV] 5469 (IN 52564) 21-26

06

1. AMBASSADOR DECLINING FOLLOW UP APPROACH TO [PRESIDENT RIVERA] PENDING RECEIPT OF MEXI GOVT REACTION TO [redacted] SURFACING. Cuban Defector HE UNDERSTANDABLY WARY OF GETTING [RIVERA] 06 TOO ENTHUSED OVER PROPOSAL WHEN ADAMANT MEXICAN REJECTION OF SURFACING MIGHT TORPEDO OP.

21-26

2. WHILE [SALV] FEELS [illegible] PAPER RECEIVED REF A WILL MAKE INTERESTING PRESENTATION, WE NOT CLEAR ON WHO SLATED TO PRESENT IT. ASSUME [illegible] PRESENTED BY [redacted] Dept State AT REQUEST [GOES] AND [illegible] [redacted] Cuban defection, WITH LATTER THEN BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO [illegible] FURTHER DEBRIEFING. 16-26

RE [illegible] [redacted] Director [illegible]

3. ~~[illegible]~~, [STATION] FEELS IT WOULD BE UNDESIREABLE SURFACE NAMES OF S/W TRAINEES FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

SECRET

91BR

SECRET

JN63642
page 2

11
A. [GOES] WOULD HAVE TO ARREST ALL PERSONS MENTIONED OR
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT [GOES] 11 DOES NOT BELIEVE Defector [redacted] INFO. ALTHO
06 [RIVERA] INDICATED THAT HE WILLING TO MAKE THE ARRESTS, [STATION] 13-26
INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THROUGH DUE FEAR OF
STIRRING UP [SALVADORAN] 11 LEFTISTS, AND LACK OF JURIDICAL GROUNDS
FOR PROSECUTION.

B. ALTHO Defector [redacted] HAD KNOWLEDGE THAT AT LEAST 75 SALVADORANS RECEIVED G/W TRAINING BETWEEN APRIL 1963 AND APRIL 1964, HE WAS ABLE TO FURNISH ONLY 35 NAMES. OF THESE, LESS THAN HALF ARE KNOWN TO BE TRUE NAMES. WE THUS FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO MENTION ANY OF THE G/W NAMES, STAND ON THE 75 FIGURE, AND IMPLY THAT Defector [redacted] HAS MADE NAMES OF ALL 75 AVAILABLE TO
11 [GOES] WHO PRESUMABLY AWAITING PROPITIOUS TIME TO ROUND THEM UP.

C. G/W TRAINEES HAVE BEEN INACTIVE SINCE RETURN FROM CUBA AND ONLY RECENTLY STEPS BEING TAKEN BY FUAR MILITARY COMMISSION TO REACTIVATE THEM. SINCE Asset [redacted] IN KEY POSITION TO REPORT ON THIS BUILDUP, THERE IS GOOD CHANCE OF PASSING [GOES] 11 INFO AT LATER DATE WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO CATCH WHOLE GROUP RED HANDED WITH EVIDENCE ON WHICH THEY COULD BE PROSECUTED. Defector [redacted] INFO COULD BE USED AT THAT TIME TO BOLSTER [GOES] 11 CASE.

SECRET

816R

SECRET

JNV 6

16-26

4. RE DGI INTEL AGENTS SALVADOR, STATION RECOMMENDS Affected [redacted] MENTION IN TESTIMONY (PAGE 55 OF DRAFT PAPER) THAT CUBANS HAVE RECRUITED SALVADORANS AS INTEL AGENTS AND SURFACE Target [redacted] CASE (Dalton [redacted]) DOSSIER AS EXAMPLE, WITHOUT MENTIONING Target [redacted] OR Target [redacted] CASES. THIS WOULD AVOID SURFACING OF assets [redacted], WHO WOULD PROBABLY TURN INTO HOSTILE AGENT VIS-A-VIS 16-26 STATION IF HIS NAME MENTIONED. SURFACING OF Target [redacted] CASE SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY ARREST OF Dalton [redacted] Target [redacted]', AND Target [redacted] BY GOES. 11

5. RE PAGE 55 OF DRAFT OAS PAPER, WE RECOMMEND DELETION OF DGI ESTIMATE THAT GOES 11 PLANNING AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA. [illegible] TO 16-26 STATION KNOWLEDGE IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR PROP PURPOSES OF PAPER.

16-26

6. IF FOREGOING RECOMMENDATIONS APPROVED BY HQS, STATION ENVISAGES FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY SUBJECT TO GOES 11 APPROVAL:

A. GOES 11 KICKS OFF OPERATION BY ARRESTING PRINCIPALS IN Target [redacted] CASE, WITH TERSE ANNOUNCEMENT TO PRESS THAT GOES 11 HAS EVIDENCE OF EXTENSIVE CUBAN PLOT WHICH IT TAKING TO OAS.

B. IN OAS [illegible] REVEALS THAT AGENT HAS GIVEN THEM DETAILS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE EFFORT IN EL SALVADOR AND

SECRET

1/BR

IN 63642
Page 4

PETITIONS [redacted] Dept State TO MAKE [redacted] defector AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY.

C. IN RESPONSE, [redacted] Dept State DISTRIBUTES REVISED DRAFT OF REF A PAPER FOR STUDY BY CAS MEMBERS.

D. [redacted] Defector THEN IS MADE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

7. REQUEST COMMENTS.

SECRET

CFN

130

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDBADGER Vol III
Support

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25 Jan 1962 - 13 Nov 1964

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26-6-75	6/26	D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
6/27		D HARDWAY	D Hardway
		HARDWAY	Hardway
~~[illegible]~~		~~[illegible]~~	~~Hardway~~
11/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway

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Older

KDBADGER 50-6-75/2

SUPPORT

LIENVOY SUPPORT 50-6-75/2
JANUARY 1962 - DECEMBER 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 3-68 2593

MESSAGE FORM 15

28 ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : 4506
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-91/2

ROUTING

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13 Nov 64 PRIORITY
13 Nov 64 23 54z
SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CI/IPS, OS 2, VR, FILE

TO PRIORITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 640913

LITEMPO

REF: MEXI 1538 (IN 20864)*

1. ONLY POSSIBLY IDENTICAL TRACES MRS SHAPIRO ARE IN HMM 191 AND HMMA 2525. ODIBEX REPORTS 1948 WHICH CANNOT BE LOCATED (BELIEVED ONLY REPORT TRAVEL BETWEEN MEXI AND US) REPORTS ON ROSA ACKERMAN DE SHAPIRO BORN BOZALIA RUSSIA ON 8 MARCH 1909 (MEXI GOVT SHOULD HAVE FILE ON HER).

2. ONLY PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE TRACE LIPPMAN WAS KUTWIN CENSORSHIP REPORT 1942 WHICH LISTS HIM AS CONNECTED REAL ESTATE AND CONTRACTING FIRMS NEWARK NEW JERSEY. HE WAS CONNECTED WITH INDUSTRIAS DE DEFENSA IN HABANA CUBA WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS UNDERTAKING PROMOTIONAL SCHEMES INVOLVING SHIPBUILDING, DOCK FACILITIES, AND DEFENSE WORK.

3. KUSODA IS MAKING LOCAL CHECK. AFTER OBTAINING HUSBAND'S FIRST NAME AND SOME ~~KAKXKXM~~ BACKGROUND WILL CHECK VOLUMINOUS FNU SHAPIRO TRACES RI AND CARDS ON HUSBAND. UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY DO NOT PLAN AT THIS TIME CHECK ODENVY, ODURGE OR ODIBEX. IF THESE AGENCIES WOULD HAVE INFO WE WOULD HAVE TO REQUEST SPECIFIC PERMISSION PASS TO MEXI OFFICIALS.

DL

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		5	
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142

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 64013

WH COMMENT: *LITEMPO-2 requested info on SHAPIRO and LIPPMAN who reside New Jersey and who are suspected espionage agents.

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

C/WH/1

JOHN HORTON
C/WH/POA

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MESSAGE FORM

3/ ~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 31 AUGUST 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	55
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1 SEP 64 15 29z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: TSD 6, CCS 3, OP 2, VR

TO MEXI   INFO: CITE DIR 48308

REF: DIR 44882

RUTSAY ETA 8 SEPT EAL FLIGHT 305. NO NEED MEET, REQUEST RESERVATIONS. WILL PHONE AREHART DIRECTLY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Ref gave AREHART instructions for Hqs contact re his travel to U.S.

Lemay/Support 2

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

A. Spera
[illegible]/1
[illegible]
DATE: 14 AUGUST 1964

MESSAGE FORM

27 ~~S E C R E T~~

☐ INDEX
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ROUTING

1	①	5	
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TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: TSD 6, C/IC 2, VR Bustos

17 z

~~DEFERRED~~

TO: MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 42430

LIENVOY/TECHS

REF: HMMT-4748

NEWTON T. RUTSAY AVAILABLE FOR TDY 10 TO 28 SEPT. ETA FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

Lienvoy Support

WH/Pers/Benthall (by phone)

C/TSD/AOB/Yech (by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S E C R E T~~

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Copy No

10 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Services Division

ATTENTION : Chief, TSD/AOB

SUBJECT : Request for TDY Replacement for Arnold F. AREHART.

1. WH Division requests your cooperation in providing a TDY replacement for Arnold F. AREHART as Case Officer and technician for the LIENVOY tap center in Mexico City. AREHART has requested three weeks home leave, from 10 to 28 September, to drive his older son to the States to enroll him in his freshman year of college. AREHART has kept his leave plans to a minimum so that his TDY replacement will need to be on loan from Headquarters for as short a time as possible.

2. The Division had offered to provide an operations officer as a TDY replacement but Mexico City Station has requested that a technician be sent instead since the burden of AREHART's job is the maintenance of equipment along with the protection of CIA's interests inside the LP. WH Division suggests that your release of Mr. Charles Deck for this assignment would be ideal if he is available, as no overlap would be required since he is already knowledgeable of this operation. The Station was also very pleased with the work done by Mr. Deck on his last TDY to Mexico.

3. Because of the critical role the LIENVOY Project plays in the Station's whole operational picture, and because of the importance the smooth-functioning of the LP is to our liaison with top-level Mexican officials, your assistance is requested. If Mr. Deck is not available, any other suitable candidate would be acceptable. Please inform Mr. Bustos, WH/1/Mexico, X-4506, -4507 of your decision, as we would like to be able to inform Mexico as soon as possible as to whether a TDY replacement will be available.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/DF/CBustos:kte (10 August 1964)

Distribution:
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         1 - WH/1/Mexico
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XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TDY Replacement for Arnold F. ARNHART (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMW-12750 dated 17 July 1964

1. Arnold F. ARNHART (ps) would like to depart from Mexico on 10 September 1964 for home leave and return about 26 September 1964. He does not wish longer leave since it will be necessary to take his younger son out of school. His older son will be entering college in the United States which is the reason ARNHART requested leave at this time.

2. A technician would be preferable to an operations officer as a temporary replacement for ARNHART as the burden of the job will be maintenance of equipment and protection of KUBARK interests inside the LP. Since ARNHART will be away three weeks, it is requested that Headquarters reconsider sending a technician. The technician will be better able to do the job if he has Spanish; this, however, is not essential as certain LIEN[illegible] speak English.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-4743

DATE
28 July 1964

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Replacement for Arnold F. AREHART during Home Leave

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA 23522

1. Referenced dispatch which reflected the Station's appreciation of Newton T. RUTSAY's high level of performance during his recent TDY in Mexico and requested his return TDY was brought to the attention of the appropriate KURIOT officials.

2. Unfortunately, RUTSAY will not be available to replace AREHART during the latter's home leave period in the fall of 1964, and KURIOT has no one else they can release for a prolonged period this fall. Since the leave probably will only be about two months, Headquarters wonders whether a technician is absolutely required. Does the Station believe that an operations officer, with some Spanish and who could merely take over the administrative work and make the Station contacts, could fill in during this period?

3. We are not sanguine that a replacement can be made available particularly since the man will of necessity need to be "exposable" to liaison, but will try our best to find one. In the meantime, please forward the exact dates it is desired the hoped for man should be in Mexico to allow for adequate overlap.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-75/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
CS COPY HMMW-12741

DATE
17 JUL 1964

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

1 - CS
1 - Chrono

	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RI/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/1	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	C. Bustos-Videla:	KTF	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/AOB		McBee in draft

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIENVOY SUPPORT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Arnold F. AREHART asked that his TDY replacement inquire at Headquarters regarding the status of his request for equipment which the Station forwarded to Headquarters as Requisition No. 359-19-64. Headquarters has shipped to Corpus Christi the items he requested in connection with the Revere (shipped 20 April), and the Heath and Allied items were shipped on 7 May. The Ampex and B-10 items have not yet been received at Headquarters from the supplier. Headquarters will pouch all items from these that weight and size will permit, the remainder will have to be shipped to Corpus Christi. In view of the equipment listed in LGIS 6020, 18 May 1964, which is also awaiting pickup at Corpus Christi, perhaps there will be a flight soon.

2. It is requested that the above information be passed to AREHART.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-75/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12611

DATE
27 MAY 1964
21 May 1964

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/LOG		P. Pike (draft)

ROUTING INITIAL
Distribution:
1-RI
1-Chrono
1-WH Log
RID/
RID/MIS
RID/
~~RID/~~
WH/3/M
DESE

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

26 May

26 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD/AOB

SUBJECT : LIENVOY TDY Report

1. TDY support of the LIENVOY operation in Mexico City was provided by this office during the period 23 April to 15 May 1964. The Staff Agent, ARNOLD F. AREHART who manages this operation underwent surgery for a hernia on the 24th of April. The undersigned assumed the responsibilities and performed the duties associated with the LIENVOY operation during AREHART's convalescence. He was incapacitated for duty from 23 April until 12 May. His operation was successful and recovery was normal. AREHART returned to work on 12 May in a weakened condition and three days of overlap was allowed to provide assistance with the more strenuous and tiresome chores.

2. The LIENVOY installation was found to be in excellent condition. The operating personnel were well disciplined and their procedures were well organized. The daily work was being accomplished in a business like and efficient manner. AREHART has done a commendable job in establishing and maintaining this highly productive operation,

3. The equipment in this installation has been in use fifteen hours a day for over four years. As the result of good maintenance practices it is in good shape and functioning well. The minor difficulties encountered during the shake down period have been overcome and equipment maintenance and repair pose no significant problem There was no loss of coverage on any line during the three week TDY.

4. The following observations and recommendations are included herein to improve KURIOT services to the Field and to aquaint responsible officers with technical discrepancies.

A. Pertinent technical information is not being communicated to AREHART.

~~SECRET~~

B. The drying up of the ball point pens in the B-10, Dial Recorder has been a constant nuisance since the beginning of this operation. The pressure sensitive tape was the obvious answer to this problem, but the first ten rolls of pressure tape were received after nearly four years of struggling with the defective pens. It is recommended that pressure sensitive tape be supplied to this operation for future use.

C. The ten rolls of pressure sensitive tape received during this TDY were wound backwards on their spindles.

D. The tires on the idler wheel of the B-10 are drying and cracking and fail to obtain adequate traction on the flywheel. This causes tape feed problems. It is recommended that three dozen new idler wheels be pouched to AREHART immediately. Several of the defective idler wheels are available in this office for inspection.

Charles O. Deck
TSD/AOB

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD/AOB/OSS/WH
1 - WH/3/M 3B0003/Charlotte Bustos
1 - TSD/LOG
1 - TSD/AOB/TRO
Charles O. Deck/3330/jlm

Field Requisition 554-19-24
30 January 1964

B/10 Parts:

12 each SR-1 Bias Supply silicon rectifiers, General Electric # 1N 1695

26 Tubes ~~6XX~~ 6X5

12 each K-2 Feed Solenoids

24 Small Springs for Drive Motor Special.

19 MAY 1964 - Vendor supposed to obtain items & direct commission. As agreed, 2 weeks to test and pack.

AMPEX PARTS:

12 Each R-137 Centralab -BA-011-123

2 each Alignments Tapes--Part # 6-0 3 3 4

19 MAY 1964 - Proc. trying to obtain delivery date from vendor. Scheduled for 29 May, but not firm.

4 each J-201-S Plugs
4 each P-101-P Plug
4 each P-102-S Plug
4 each J-202-P Plugs

6 each C-203 Motor Capacitors, Electrolytic 2,5mf, 220 V.
6 each R-202 Resistors. 20k ohms

REVERE PARTS

36 Spare pressure pads TR-2601. shipped 29 April
6 each Instant Stop arms (new type)
12 each Tape counter drive belts A-30-11101 " " "
12 each Take up belts TR-7809 " " "

TEST EQUIPMENT:

Heathkit Catlog . Fall and Winter 1962-1963

Heathkit Transistor tester Kit IM-30 " " "
Capacitor Checker Kit IT-11 " " "
Visual-Aural Signal Tracer Kit T-4 " " "
Oscilloscope Kit IO-10 " " "
Scope Demodulator prob kit Kit 337C " " "
Low Capacity scope Prob Kit PS-1 " " "
Harmonic Distortion Meter Kit HD-1 " " "
Resistance subsitution Box Kit RS-1 " "
Condenser Subsitution Box Kit CS-1 " " "

22 Jan-64

Allied Catalog # 220--1963

Page 197
3 each TS-AJ Tape Splicers Cat # 8~~22~~8CH-195 shipped 7 May
2 each TS-45 TapeSplicers Cat # 80R-192 " "
6 each splicing Tape Cat 80R-203 T-373 3/4 inch " "
6each Splicing Tape Cat 80R-155 ST-500--1/2 inch " "
Page 323
Resist-O-Chest 2M-788 mfd type number 43 " " "

Page 394.
Cable Splacing cord ## 49F-246 1/2 lb. " " "

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 151924Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE MEXI 7782

REF EMBTEL 1583 DATED 14 JAN 54

15 JAN 64 IN 99238

1. NOTE CHARGE BOONSTRA REPORT OF VICENTE SANCHEZ GAVITO (MEXICAN AMBASSADOR TO OAS) CONVERSATION IN WHICH SANCHEZ GAVITO SAID "VENEZUELAN PROBLEM IS CRITICAL FOR GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO. ALTHOUGH FONOFF HAS NOTT SEEN ANY OF THE EVIDENCE ON ORIGIN ARMS CACHE, SAID FONOFF HAS RECEIVED RELIABLE INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT EVIDENCE OF CASTRO ORIGIN IS CONVINCING."

2. BELIEVE "RELIABLE EVIDENCE" LIKELY THAT GIVEN TO LITENSOR BY SAMUEL K. CASTELON IN DECEMBER BRIEFING.

S E C R E T

file [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET
FOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TIME REC'D CABLE SEC: 1700

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION-S/S TELEGRAM OR LIMIT DISTRIBUTION MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION: DEPTEL 1071 to Mexico City

ROUTED TO

DCI
D/DCI
AD/CI
DDI
AD/NE
DDP
ADDP
C/SAS
C WH
CS/RF

ATTENTION ALL RECIPIENTS: THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS FURNISHED TO THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ONE COPY OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT. REPRODUCTION IS PROHIBITED. THE CABLE SECRETARIAT HAS ROUTED THIS DOCUMENT AS SHOWN TO THOSE WHO HAVE A NEED TO KNOW. EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO SEES THIS MESSAGE SHOULD SIGN AND INDICATE THE DATE OF HANDLING. THIS COVER SHEET MUST BE KEPT ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT UNTIL THE DOCUMENT IS DESTROYED. THE COVER SHEET MUST BE RETAINED BY THE RECIPIENT FOR 30 DAYS AFTERWHICH IT MAY BE DESTROYED WITHOUT ANY RECORD OF DESTRUCTION.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON SEEING TELEGRAM	DATE
JC King	18 Dec 63
R. W. Herbert	18 Dec
B. Reichhardt Bet	

file [illegible]

RETAIN COVER SHEET FOR 30 DAYS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

EXP FORM BY
CABLE SEC, O/DCI, 17 APR 63

0 3 ? 6

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

33

Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY IMMEDIATE 1071
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE 829
AMEMBASSY CARACAS 577 IMMEDIATE

DEC 17 12 29 PM '63

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

CARACAS PASS WARD ALLEN

035

FYI. 1. In connection Venezuelan complaint to OAS, discussions in Standing Group of NSC have identified two alternatives for cooperative system surveillance and interception of vessels and aircraft engaged in transporting arms for subversive purposes to Latin America (especially Caribbean area) directly or indirectly from Cuba. Difference between alternatives centers on need for OAS authorization for use of force in international waters.

2. Alternative A would require OAS authorization use of force in connection with visit-and-search in international waters against selected Cuban vessels and selected vessels OAS countries. It would be a cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search in international waters on a selective basis, with force to be used if necessary. Visit-and-search and, if resistance met, force would be applied by naval units of US or of cooperating OAS countries against selected vessels suspected of transporting arms from Cuba, directly or indirectly.

Drafted by: ARA/CCA:JHCrimmins:dr/ars 12/12/63 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S:Mr. McKesson

Clearances: White House - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

3. Alternative B would not require OAS authorization use force inasmuch as visit-and-search would take place only within territorial waters. It would be a cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search only within the territorial waters of an OAS country, with force to be applied, if necessary, by that country's forces or by forces of another OAS country acting under a bilateral agreement. Control of suspect vessels destined for non-OAS country or territory (e. g. British Guiana) would depend on cooperation that country.

4. In both alternatives interception or seizure of suspect aircraft would be carried out only in territory of OAS country of destination by forces of that country or of another OAS country acting under a bilateral agreement.

5. Comparison of alternatives:

(a) Alternative A would be much harder to sell to OAS countries than Alternative B because authorization for use of force rquired.

(b) Alternative A would be somewhat more effectiv both in fact and as deterrent than Alternative B, although both can be circumvented.

(c) Alternative A would constitute harassment of Castro whereas Alternative B is purely defensive.

(d) Alternative A would incur substantially greater risks of escalation than Alternative B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(e) Alternative A would be more expensive in terms of US units required than Alternative B.

6. Kind and number of additional measures which we would seek in OAS would vary with choice between alternatives. For example, our tentative thinking is that minimum OAS package acceptable to US under Alternative A would be: authorization use force; condemnation Castro regime; and reaffirmation and invigoration anti-subversive measures. Under Alternative B, minimum package now estimated to be: defensive system with search and seizure within national territory; condemnation; reaffirmation anti-subversive measures; and obligatory break in air and surface communications between OAS countries and Cuba.

7. We consider attitude Mexico and Brazil critical. OAS vote authorizing use force in which one or other did not join would be politically undesirable. END FYI.

8. Action requested

Chief of Mission should take first opportunity of conversation with FonMin on other matters to explore discreetly and informally indicating he acting personally and without instructions the probable receptivity of GOM (GOB) to an OAS resolution authorizing use force. Ambassador should proceed on assumption report OAS investigation committee

strongly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

strongly confirms Venezuelan charges and will be basis propaganda campaign to alert OAS governments and public opinion.

Report soonest.

GP-3

END

BALL

PPPP -

7615

MEXICO

12 December 1963

TELLO SCORES OAS POLICIES, CUBA EXCLUSION

Havana in English to Europe 2020 GMT 11 December 1963--E

(Text) Mexico City--Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello criticized the Organization of American States, saying that it is in a state of crisis. Tello also criticized the exclusion of Cuba from that organization. In the interview with the Mexican daily NOVEDADES, Foreign Minister Tello said that Cuba's exclusion from the OAS is not in conformity with the OAS charter. He said that the charter does not contemplate the exclusion of any member state.

Referring to the present international situation of the OAS, Tello emphasized that an organization which does not base itself on friendship, cooperation, and tolerance is likely to face a crisis. The Mexican foreign minister stated that in the present state of the OAS, the elements or bases for the organization to strengthen democracy do not exist. He pointed out that contrary to agreements adopted at Chapultepec and Bogota, almost all the present Latin American representatives to the OAS are also their countries' ambassadors in Washington.

JAUREGUI INTERCEDES FOR BOLIVIA HOSTAGES

Lima AFP in Spanish 2337 GMT 11 December 1963--P OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpts) Mexico City--Arturo Jauregui, secretary general of the Regional Inter-American Workers Organization (Organizacion Regional Interamericera de Trabajadores--ORIT), sent a personal request to Bolivian Vice President Juan Lechin on behalf of the foreigners held at Catavi as hostages.

The cable says: "I appeal to your labor union principles in the name of the 28 million ORIT member workers in favor of the hostages. These persons are well known as democrats working in favor of the spirit of humanity and social economic progress. The Bolivian revolution," the message adds, "demands that its prestige and vindication be held high."

- 0 -

DIPLOMAT'S RETURN--Swiss Ambassador to Mexico Fernand Bernoulli returned to Mexico after several months' absence. (Mexico City Radiodifusora Comerciales Spanish 2030 GMT 10 December 1963--P)

PUEBLA BUDGET--The Puebla municipal budget for 1964 shows an increase of 5 million pesos over that of the current year. (Mexico City Radiodifusora Comerciales Spanish 2030 GMT 10 December 1963--P)

RRRR 1

PANAMA

12 December 1963

PLAN OF TERRORISM IS UNFOLDING

David La Voz del Baru in Spanish 2100 GMT 11 December 1963--P

(Station commentary)

(Text) It appears as if a preconceived plan of terrorism, not known before in Panama, has been unleashed since members of our armed forces were at Fort Gulick. The barbarous death of labor leader Aguilar, beaten and kicked in Puerto Armuelles; the beating of Indian Labor Leader Palacios Salinas; the denunciation through a newspaper of a labor leader who was hanged and beaten in Colon; another case in Boquete; and many other known cases constitute pathetic proof of the plan.

If the objective of the wave of persecution is to attack the ideas of men with bullets, sticks, imprisonment, and other similar measures, it is a stupid move, because ideas are fought with ideas. If some of the humble class try to protest in defense of their rights, they are called communists. The privileged classes have used frequently this pretext against the working classes. If we analyze the situation we will see how the privileged classes have maintained their own monopolistic organization.

The oligarchic groups have greatly increased. Yesterday they could be represented in the two or three existing parties which were directed and governed by them; today, they have seen the need to increase the number of political parties, as much as 20 in a small country, in order to control the public administration. Each party is formed by a privileged family whose only wish is to continue its life of leisure and luxury. This kind of life calls for plenty of money, so in order to obtain the money they need they increase each day the taxation of the poor, who must pay and thus sink deeper into poverty, disease, and ignorance.

If the people do not have work, they cannot earn money; and if they do not have money they cannot pay taxes. If the people try to organize in self-defense, they are accused of being communists, and they are fought with sticks. If the cause of all the evils of democracy is communism, the solution is obvious. We all know who invented communism, and who is living according to it and upholding it. The way to fight communism is to open sources of work to build schools, hospitals, and better roads.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
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: DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (TEMPO FOR WH SLOTTED AT 2050-16 DEC 63)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

S E C R E T 171113Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7410

16 Dec 63 IN 81818

RYBAT

ATTN GALBOND

REF MEXI 7400 (IN 81653)

NO NIGHT ACTION

1. PEAK AND COS MET WITH LITENSOR ALONE AND WITHOUT SINGLE INTERRUPTION FOR ONE HOUR.

2. MEETING AT LITENSOR HOME.

3. LITENSOR INTENSELY INTERESTED, PEAK DID EXCELLENT PRESENTATION OF ENTIRE STORY.

4. LITENSOR SAID HE HAD HAVE "VERY LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF STORY FROM VENEZUELANS" PRIOR TO THIS BRIEFING. HE WAS CONVINCED REPEAT CONVINCED THAT CASTRO GUILTY AND SAID AT END "CUBAN COMMUNISTS WILL NOT STOP WITH THIS DEFEAT".

4. LITENSOR BEING GIVEN COPIES OF PAPERS AND PHOTOGRAPHS BROUGHT BY PEAK; HE INDICATED WISHED TO USE THESE.

6. NO MENTION OF ANY BRIEFING OF TELLO BY ANY OF THREE.

7. BOTH PEAK AND COS BELIEVE BRIEFING A SUCCESS.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

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14-00000

CLA FIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

: DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH CD NOTIFIED AND COPY TUBE.. .. 1615-16 DEC 63)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

SECRET 162007Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7400

RYBAT

REF: MEXI 7391 (IN 80849)*

16Dec63 IN 81653

ATTENTION: GALBOND

1. LITENSOR RETURNED MEXI LATE MORNING 16 DEC.

2. COS AND PEAKE HAVE APPOINTMENT WITH LITENSOR 1645 HRS MEXICAN TIME ON 16 DEC "FOR AS LONG AS YOU WISH".

3. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *BELIEVED EARLIEST DATE FOR LITENSOR BRIEFING WOULD BE 17 DECEMBER.

~~SECRET~~

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

ch

SECRET 151956Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7399

1. WISH CALL HQ ATTENTION TO FACT THAT FOLLOWING STATION ACTIVITIES SUSPENDED FOR TRADITIONAL CHRISTMAS VACATIONS DURING PERIODS INDICATED:

A. LIEMVOY 22-29 DEC

B. LIMUD 14 DEC-1 JAN

C. LIKAYAK/2 22-29 DEC

D. LIEMBRACE ON STANDBY

E. LITEMPO ACTIVE, BUT AT "SLOW PACE".

16 DEC 63 IN 81702

2. ADDITIONALLY MOST GOVT SERVICES DRASTICALLY CURTAILED DURING HOLIDAYS INCLUDING ISSUANCE TRANSIT VISAS. THUS STATION WILL FOR ROUGHLY TWO WEEKS BE VIRTUALLY UNABLE CALL ON MANY USUAL SUPPORT POINTS EXCEPT IN EVENT EXTREME EMERGENCY.

SECRET

Liemvoy
Legajo

~~SECRET~~

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downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : B. Reichhardt:rg
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 12 Dec 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

30 SEC~~RET/~~RYBAT

Destroy

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : Mexico City
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

13 DEC 63 18z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 88863

RYBAT REF MEXI 7353

1. IN ADDITION TO REFERENCE REPORT, FBIS REPORT OF 11 DECEMBER SAYS TELLO, IN INTERVIEW WITH NOVEDADES, CRITICIZED OAS CLAIMING IT IN STATE OF CRISIS AND THAT CUBA'S EXCLUSION FROM OAS IS VIOLATION ITS CHARTER. THESE REPORTS SUGGEST TELLO DELIBERATELY ATTEMPTING PRE-ESTABLISH MEXICAN POLICY WITH REGARD CENSURE ACTION AGAINST CUBA. IN VIEW IMPORTANCE MEXICAN POSITION THIS RESPECT, THESE REPORTS MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN HERE AND IT FELT NECESSARY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION COUNTER TELLO TACTICS IN WAY THAT WILL RESULT IN MEXICAN SUPPORT FOR STRONGER OAS ACTION.

2. HEADQUARTERS HAS CONVINCING INTELLIGENCE FROM VENEZUELAN SOURCES AS WELL AS OUR OWN WHICH SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT ARMS DISCOVERED IN VENEZUELA ARE DISTINCTLY CUBAN. A NUMBER OF WEAPONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR CUBAN ARMY. ARMS DISCOVERED IN GENERAL WERE OF A TYPE AND IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO SUPPORT PLAN FOR TAKE-OVER OF CAPITAL CITY OF CARACAS. THEIR APPEARANCE IN VENEZUELA TIES IN SPECIFICALLY WITH KNOWN FALN PLANS WITH REGARD TO LOCATION AND TIMING. THE LATTER SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM CAPTURED FALN MEMBERS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SEC~~RET/~~RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET/R Y B A T~~

G :
T :
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E :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

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M: DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

NF:

O :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 88863

NOT YET SURFACED BY VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. ABOVE INFORMATION PRESENTLY UNDER PREPARATION FOR VISUAL PRESENTATION WILL BE SENT NEXT BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

3. HEADQUARTERS' REQUESTS THIS INFORMATION BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF LITENSOR IN MANNER CONVINCE HIM BEYOND DOUBT OF CUBAN ROLE IN VENEZUELAN TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES. TO MAXIMIZE EFFECT IT FELT THAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO VENEZUELAN SOURCES TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

4. ADVISE IF YOU SEE COMPLICATIONS THIS APPROACH AND DO NOT HESITATE SUGGEST OTHER ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN TO REVERSE TELLO STAND.

5. DRAFT OF THIS MESSAGE WAS SHOWN TO AMB. MANN.

END OF MESSAGE

*IN 78207 - According to Manuel Tello, the Mexican position on the censure of Cuba by the OAS is "set."

WH/CA H. PEAK (IN DRAFT)

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET/R Y B A T~~

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR REICHHARDT WH/3 NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 2100-13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR, C/CI

SECRET 140035Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7808

14 Dec 63 IN 80445

RYBAT

REF DIR 88863 *

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED INFO RE CUBAN ARMS DISCOVERED IN VENEZUELA BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF LITENSOR.

1. COS CAN OF COURSE DELIVER REF INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO LITENSOR. SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT SUCH CLANDESITNE PASSAGE DOES NOT PLACE GOM IN POSITION WHERE POSITIVE COOPERATION OTHER OAS NATIONS, STIMULATED.

2. CERTAINLY GOV REALIZES MEXICAN POSTURE THIS MATTER EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. WOULD NOT GOV THEN BE WILLING SEND MEMBER BETANCOURT'S STAFF TO MEXI FOR PERSONAL MEETING LITENSOR TO PRESENT NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE INTERNATION SURFACING? SAME VENEZUELAN REP COULD HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER LITENSOR MEETING. THIS WOULD INSURE FULL PRESS COVERAGE, WITH EDITORIAL FOLLOW-UP BY STATION ASSETS. PERHAPS GOM WOULD FEEL FORCED TAKE MORE POSITIVE STAND BECAUSE OF FEAR LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION REACTION.

3. SHOULD GOV REP HAVE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING INTERVIEW LITENSOR COS MIGHT BE ABLE EXPEDITE.

4. IN ANY EVENT COS CAN DO SHOULD PARA TWO ACTION BE UNFEASIBLE.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 13 Dec 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

~~RYBAT~~
SECRET

Destroy

		4	
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3		6	

13 DEC 63 23 10z

TO : Mexico City
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
IMMEDIAT

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 89143

REF: DIR 88863

RYBAT

1. IT HAS NOW BEEN DECIDED TO SEND MR. HERSCHEL PEAK WITH THE VISUAL PRESENTATION AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION AND WOULD LIKE HIM TO DO THE ACTUAL BRIEFING IN SPANISH.

2. WHEN COULD A MEETING BE SET UP FOR CURTIS AND PEAK TO SEE LITENSOR? PEAK XXXXXXXX AVAILABLE TO LEAVE SUNDAY EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 305 TO ARRIVE MEXI 10:05. ADVISE BY NOON 14 DEC RE MEETING SCHEDULE.

3. AMB MANN THINKS A BRIEFING OF FORMIN TELLO WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL. AMB EXPECTS RETURN MEXI ON SEVENTEEN DEC. HIS PRESENCE MIGHT FACILITATE TELLO BRIEFING.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]

J C King
J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET ~~RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

mo ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : ~~C/WH 5~~ (MR. REICHHARDT, WH, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1620, 14 DEC 63)BP

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR

14 Dec 63 IN 80849

SECRET 141917Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7391

REF A MEXI 7389 (IN 80468)

B DIR 89143 *

RYBAT

1. BELIEVE EARLIEST DATE FOR LITENSOR BRIEFING WILL BE TUESDAY, 17 DECEMBER.

2. HE OUT OF MEXICO CITY UNTIL LATE NIGHT 15 DECEMBER, REPORTEDLY HAS FULL SCHEDULE ON 16 DECEMBER.

3. WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY WHEN ABLE CONTACT LITENSOR PERSONALLY.

4. SUGGEST PEAKE ARRIVE ANY CONVENIENT TIME ON 16 DECEMBER, WILL MEET HAVE RESERVATIONS.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *HAVE DECIDED TO HAVE MR. HERSCHEL TO DO THE DEBRIEFING.

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (MR REICHHARDT WH/3 NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 2120-13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/0 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 140138Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7389

14 Dec 63 IN 80468

RYBAT

REF A DIR 89143

B MEXI 7385 (IN 80445)

1. FOREIGN MINISTER TELLO HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF ARMS CACHE IS "A FRAME UP". MEXI STATION BELIEVES APPEARANCE OF PEAK OR OTHER UNKNOWN KUBARKER MIGHT ONLY INCREASE THIS DISBELIEF.

2. REF B APPARENTLY CROSSED REF A. STATION REQUESTS HQS GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION PROPOSAL THAT BETANCOURT SEND PRE-BRIEFED REPRESENTATIVE. ONLY IN THIS MANNER CAN FULL PUBLIC EXPLOITATION BE ACHIEVED BY STATION, REGARDLESS OF REACTION OF LITENSOR AND INDIVIDUAL MEXICANS.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/SR 4, D/OP, RF 2

Extra copy

SECRET 311932Z

31 JUL 63 IN 90739

DIR CITE MEXI 5570

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXI 3466 (SEE PARA 3) (IN 69474)
B. MEXI 1338 (SEE PARA 2) A
C. HMMS 3009

1. FEINGLASS CANNOT REPEAT NOT DO SPANISH FROM TAPES.

2. THIS HAS PUT STATION ON SPOT SINCE HAD INTENDED USE FEINGLASS DO RUSSIAN AND SPANISH ON SOVIET EMBASSY TAPES AND HAD UNDERSTOOD AS RESULT SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS REPEATEDLY LEVIED BY STATION THAT HE HAD SPANISH.

3. FEINGLASS HAS SENT WRITTEN MEMO TO COS STATING HE WILL BE UNABLE DO SPANISH UNTIL AFTER REPEAT AFTER SOMETHING LIKE ONE YEAR OF ADDITIONAL STUDY.

4. COS HAD INSISTED REPEATEDLY THAT SAFARANO REPLACEMENT BE ABLE DO SPANISH WELL ENOUGH TO GIVE TO LITENSOR. FEINGLASS WAS SENT BY HQS TO STATION WITH STATION UNDERSTANDING THIS TRUE.

5. COS ATTEMPTING FIND ADDITIONAL WORK TO GIVE FEINGLASS BUT ALL WORK EXCEPT RUSSIAN TRANSLATION WILL BE CLERICAL AND HE HIGH PRICED CLERK. SEE REF B FOR TIME RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS TAKE.

GROUP 1
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~~SECRET~~

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6. FEINGLASS IS CONSCIENTIOUS AND IT COS OPINION HE NOT TO BLAME FOR STATION MISUNDERSTNDING HIS LINGUISTIC CAPABILITIES.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN CIA CABLE REFERENCE FILE.

50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ 1

ORIG : W.H. CARLEY:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 24 July 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-75/2

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

24 Jul 63 16 38z

DEFERRED SIG CEN

R ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/IC 2, RI/AN, SAS 8, RF

RI COPY

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 5644:

56443

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 5412 (IN 81732)*

SUGGEST CURTIS RAISE QUESTION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAKE WITH DAINOLD WHILE LATTER MEXI. IN VIEW FACT THAT URQUHART (WHO ALSO NOW IN MEXI) IS PRINCIPAL END USER SUCH TAKE, DYVOUR FEELS THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SORT OUT WHAT VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS NECESSARY FOR SAS PURPOSES AND WHAT ARE MEXI STATION CAPABILITIES HANDLE TRANSCRIPTION LOAD.

RI COPY

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Ref stated that SAS wanted verbatim transcriptions of LIENVOY PBRUMEN take and LIENVOY present staff could not handle.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
R	
RI/FI	
DESTROY	

SAS/SO/AR

WH/COPS

33

WH3/Mex

W. Rood
J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
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J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

FORM 4-63 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

RI COPY

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Copy No.

50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CCS 2, OP 2, RF 2

S E C R E T 221903Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5458

REF DIR 55581

22 Jul 63 IN 84648

1. AREHART WILLING REMAIN MEXI LONG AS NEED EXISTS. DID NOT REQUEST EXTENSION OR ANOTHER TOUR FOR TWO REASONS:

A. HE DISAPPOINTED THAT HQS DID NOT CONSIDER HIM FOR PROMOTION WHICH STATION FEELS HE CERTAINLY DESERVES AFTER THREE YEARS COMMENDABLE SERVICE IN VERY DIFFICULT OUTSIDE SENSITIVE JOB.

B. HE WARY HIS COVER STATUS SHOULD NEXT PRESIDENT NOT BE CONFIDANT LIELEGANT AND IT NECESSARY DISMANTLE LIENVOY.

2. MEXI AGAIN REQUESTS AREHART BE PROMOTED. PLS ADVISE. WILL SUBMIT NEW PRQ WHEN FUTURE LIENVOY KNOWN AND SIX MONTHS PRIOR AREHART DESIRE REASSIGNMENT.

3. ANSWERING OTHER QUESTIONS REF IN SEPARATE CABLE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED STA DISCUSS POSSIBLE ONE YEAR EXTENSION WITH AREHART.

GROUP 1
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~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C. [illegible]:dc
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : [illegible]940
DATE : 18 July 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO Destroy

~~S E C R E T~~

19 Jul 63 20 47z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : RI/AN, OP 3, RF

DEFERRED SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 55521

REF: HMMT 3863*

1. REQUEST STATION DISCUSS POSSIBLE ONE YEAR EXTENSION WITH AREHART. KUDOVE CAREER SERVICE ~~[illegible]~~ HAS APPROVED. IF THIS NOT ACCEPTABLE REQUEST HE EXTEND TIL DECEMBER WHEN LIENVOY AND LICAPER FUTURES WILL BE DETERMINED PER MEXI 5412. (IN 81732) AT PRESENT NO HANDY PROSPECT FOR REPLACEMENT AREHART. IF LICAPER CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, HORSFALL CAN REPLACE AREHART. CABLE DECISION AREHART.

2. IN VIEW STATION STAND ON LICAPER CITED MEXI 5412 SHOULD HDQS WITHHOLD REQUISITION FOR NEW LIENVOY EQUIPMENT UNTIL NOTIFIED BY STATION?

3. WILL CABLE LATER RE HORSFALL ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *PRQ on AREHART.

CS/PD/S/A PANEL Mr. Moss (in draft)

C/WH/PERS
WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. King
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

J. M. Whitten
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~S E C R E T~~

GROUP 1
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Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
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: DIRECTOR

OM : MEXICO CITY

TION: WH 8

FO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, CCS 2, SAS 8, RF 2

S E C R E T 172217Z

IN51732

DIR CITE MEXI 5412

17 JUL [illegible]

REF DIR 52792

1. MUCH IMPRESSED WITH HORSFALL. TRANSCRIPTION TESTS VERY SATISFACTORY. BELIEVE LINGUISTIC CAPABILITY AND EXPERIENCE BUEN AND BANG QUALIFY HIM EXCEPTIONALLY WILL FOR LICAPER SUPERVISOR OR LIENVOY IF IT CONTINUES. APPEARS CAPABLE ADAPTING MEXICAN PECULIARITIES AND NOT AVERSE BEING CUT OFF FROM OFFICIAL COLONY.

2. MAIN QUESTION ONE OF TIMING. KNOW HE EAGER RETURN HERE AND GET SETTLED. HOWEVER FEEL UNDESIRABLE EXPOSE HIM LIENVOY PERSONNEL IF HE TO WORK ULTIMATELY IN LICAPER. DO NOT WISH LOSE HIM HOWEVER AND CAN GUARANTEE KEEP HIM BUSY DOING PBBAND TRANSLATIONS FOR LITENSOR AND LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAPES WHICH WOULD REMOVE FROM LIENVOY FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE ARE TOLD SAS WANTS THESE VERBATIM WHICH LIENVOY PRESENT STAFF CAN NOT HANDLE.

3. STATION REQUESTS THEREFORE RETURN HORSFALL HERE SOON AS FEASIBLE IN TOURIST STATUS. WOULD LIVE IN FURNISHED QUARTERS UNTIL NEW PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE NAMED (EARLY OCTOBER AT LATEST) AND FATE OF LIENVOY AND LICAPER KNOWN. AT THAT TIME CANDIDATE CONCERNED WOULD ARRANGE COVER AND HORSFALL STATUS WOULD CHANGE FROM TOURIST AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS COULD BE BROUGHT IN. PLEASE .

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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AUTHORIZE HORSFALL BUY COMPACT QP VEHICLE HERE AT 41,000 PESO CEILING. WHEN PERTINENT HQ SHOULD ARRANGE HAVE HIS PIANO SHIPPED HERE TO SOMEONE STILL ELIGIBLE RECEIVE IT.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ORVILLE R. HORSFALL WILL ARRIVE MEXI 1243 HOURS WEDNESDAY 10 JULY.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
KAPOK SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIENVOY Tapes for Training

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMT-3694

Returned under separate cover are the 15 tapes which were furnished Headquarters for training purposes.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
15 LIENVOY Tapes u/s/c

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-2960

DATE
18 June 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico/Bustos:dd			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	19 JUN 1963	J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, S/C 2

S E C R E T 102344Z

IN36488 11 MAY 1963

DIR CITE MEXI 4544

RYBAT

ATTN: KNIGHT AND GALBOND

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO ASST SECY MARTIN:

(MESSAGE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSCP 210-313 CABLES. DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

SECR

DATE: 10 MAY 63
FROM: MEXICO CITY
TO : DIRECTOR

RECD: MAY 11 0156Z 63
ROUTINE
IN 36488

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO ASST SECY MARTIN:

"LOPEZ MATEOS, WHO IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN OPINION, HAS ASKED WIN SCOTT FOR COLLECTION OF U.S. VIEWS ON HIS RECENT LATIN AMERICAN DENUCLEARIZATION PROPOSAL. RECENTLY SCOTT FURNISHED LOPEZ MATEOS EUROPEAN NEWS CLIPPINGS ON HIS TOUR, PARTICULARLY WEST BERLIN WALL INCIDENT. WHICH SEEMED TO DISTRUB LOPEZ MATEOS BECAUSE HE WAS PRAISED BY EAST GERMAN PRESS BUT CRITICIZED BY WESTERN PAPERS. ON NEW REQUEST SCOTT TOLD LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABLE FURNISH ONLY U.S. NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE AND REACTION ON DENUCLEARIZATION AS HE, SCOTT, DOES NOT DEAL AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ON SUCH POLICY MATTERS.

"BECAUSE OF (A) LOPEZ MATEOS' SENSITIVITY TO OPINION ABROAD; (B) FACT THERE HAS BEEN NO REACTION FROM US OTHER THAN DEPT PRESS RELEASE AND YOUR CONVERSATION WITH CARRILLO FLORES (DEPT CIRCULAR TELEGRAM 1878); AND (C) FACT THAT SOVIET, CUBAN AND POLISH AMBASSADORS HERE HAVE PUBLICLY COMMENTED FAVORABLY ON PROPOSED DENUCLEARIZATION, I SUGGEST WE CONSIDER FOLLOWING:

"PREPARE A CAREFUL STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON, ALONG LINES YOUR REMARKS TO CARRILLO FLORES, COMMENTING AS FAVORABLY AS POSSIBLE ON LOPEZ MATEOS'S DENUCLEARIZATION PROPOSAL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF

MEXICO CITY

IN 36488

OUR OWN POLICY POSITION WHICH I'M SURE HAS BEEN CAREFULLY WORKED OUT. THIS STATEMENTCOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO SOME SPECIFIC U.S. OFFICIAL OR TO UNIDENTIFIED HIGH OFFICIAL. IF APPROVED, SUGGEST BE SENT DIRECTLY TO SCOTT VIA CAS FOR CAS FOR DELIVERY TO LOPEZ MATEOS."

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ORIG : C. BUSTOS
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 25 APRIL 1963

☐ INDEX 3
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : PG 2, CI/OA, CCS 2, S/C

26 APR 63 20 41z

DEFERRED
SIG CEN
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35426

REF: MEXI 4238 (IN 21625) *

1. WHEN HMMT 3380 RECEIVED AT END JAN FOR BUDGET REASONS HQS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY SUBMIT LIENVOY PROJ AMENDMENT NEEDED TO PURCHASE NEW EQUIP. ESTIMATED COST FOR EQUIP WAS ROUGHLY $20,000. HQS ORIGINALLY UNDERSTOOD OLD EQUIP WOULD BE USED IN PROPOSED LITEMPO TAP CENTER AND CE UNIT.

2. WHEN HQS RECEIVED HMMA 20890 IN MID MARCH SAYING LITEMPO WOULD USE MEXICAN EQUIP AND STATION WAS SUBMITTING PROJ OUTLINE, HQS CONTINUED HOLD LIENVOY REQUEST TO REVIEW ENTIRE LITEMPO/LIENVOY TAP CENTER PROBLEM. HQS STILL AWAITING LITEMPO TAP PROJ.

3. IN VIEW LARGE COST HQS WONDERS WHETHER SECURITY STILL CALLS FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIP. HQS HAS RECEIVED NO WORD ON PROPOSED LIENVOY MOVE SINCE AUGUST 1962.

4. SO THAT HQS CAN AGAIN REVIEW REQUEST FOR LIENVOY EQUIP PLS SUBMIT SOONEST PROJ ON LITEMPO TAP UNIT AND MORE DETAILS OF PROPOSED LIENVOY MOVE. CANNOT JUSTIFY REPLACING EQUIP IF SITE NOT TO BE CHANGED, AND PREFER WAIT UNTIL FISCAL 64.

Lienvoy Support

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : C.
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1262
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

page 2

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 27426

5. RELATED PROBLEM IS COVER FOR TARASOFF. PLS NOTIFY HQS YOUR DECISION AND DESIRED ETA DATE. SEE MEXI 3466.**

END OF MESSAGE

**WH Comment: When can Station expect LIENVOY equipment?

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 69474)

R W Herbert
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/COPS W Hood
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

14-00000

M. Judkins

c.c. LIENVOY support

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : M. JUDKINS:sd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT. : 5940
DATE : 22 APRIL 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : Chief, MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, FI, TSD 5, S/C

25 APR 63 18 58z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35066

REF: MEXI 4201 (IN 19807)*

1. HQS APPROVES LOAN OF ONE STERILE SPARE B-10 DIAL PULSE RECORDER TO DURKIN.

2. HQS URGES CLOSE SUPPORT TREASURY/NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. MEXI MAY PROVIDE DURKIN WITH OCCASIONAL LIFEAT COVERAGE PROVIDED NO LIFEAT TAKE GIVEN TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *William J. Durkin, Treasury rep assigned to Mexico investigating narcotics traffic, approached Station re dial recorder for phone tap on Mexican target.

TSD BRUCE LA ROSE (BY PHONE)
CI/OPS FRANK HUGHES F.M. Hughes
~~WH/COPS~~
CI/R&A/TC

J.C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	4
	5
	6

ACTION: [illegible] 8

INFO [illegible] 4, S/C 2

IN21625

S E C R E T 192345Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4238

20 APR 1963

REF HMMT-3383, 21 JAN 63

STATION WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHEN IT CAN EXPECT TO RECEIVE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED IN REF.

S E C R E T

LIENVOY
Thru
553-57/54-63

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

!

034 3.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
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ATE : 6 APR 63 24

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : BONN

CTION: C/WH 8

IFO : ADCP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/EE 3, S/C 2

APR 6 1921Z 63
SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

BONN 4460 IN 12661 A

O INFO CITE

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT:

COMPLETE ADDRESS LINE TO READ:

"OPIM BRLN INFO OPIM DIR MEXI FRAN PARI CITE BONN 4460"

K

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
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ACTION: C/WH 5*

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

3

SECRET 061700Z

OPIM MEXI BONN INFO DIR FRAN CITE BRLN 2433

IN12861

6 APR 1963

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.
**NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1730 6 APR.

REF BONN 4463 (NOT TO MEXI OR DIR) **

1. REF INDICATES ROMERO ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM MEXI THAT HE WOULD BE CONTACTED BRLN UPON ARRIVAL. WISH ADVISE ALL ADDEES THAT PRESIDENT MATEOS AND PARTY TOTALLING SEVENTY REPEAT SEVENTY VISITING BRLN SUNDAY 7 APRIL FOR TOTAL OF ONLY SIX HOURS, ARRIVING VIA CHARTER PANAM AIRCRAFT CIRCA 1000 HOURS LOCAL, WHERE WILL BE MET BY MAYOR OF BRLN ALBERTZ AND OTHER CITY OFFICIALS, WILL TOUR CITY, SEE WALL, VISIT MEXICO PLATZ, ATTEND LUNCH HOSTED BY SIEMENS FACTORY. PARTY DEPARTS 1600 HOURS LOCAL. AT NO TIME ARE ANY AMERICANS INCLUDED IN PARTY. SEE NO OPPORTUNITY AND LESS REASON ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ROMERO ESPECIALLY IN ABSENCE ANY MESSAGES FOR PRESIDENT MATEOS. NOTE PARTY IN BONN PAST THREE DAYS WHERE IT EVIDENTLY QUITE POSSIBLE APPROACH ROMERO IF SUCH NECESSARY. CANNOT IN ANY CASE MAKE APPROACH CLANDESTINELY SINCE WELCOMING PARTY AND BERLIN CITY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT VISIT.

2. BONN: VIEW ABOVE REQUEST YOU ADVISE ROMERO ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT BRLN PRECLUDE SECURE CONTACT WHICH IN ANY CASE SEEMS UNNECESSARY VIEW SHORTNESS VISIT. UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ADVISED TO CONTRARY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPT APPROACH ROMERO.

SECRET

K

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
30 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5*

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2**

SECRET 060800Z

DIR INFO MEXI BONN CITE HAGU 3620 6 APR 1963

REF DIR 25991 ***

IN12890

1. STATION ATTEMPTS OFFER SERVICES TO PRESIDENT FRUSTRATED BY

A. LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES WITH ROMERO. SPANISH SPEAKER CALLED HOTEL TWICE 3 APR WITH COMPLETE LACK OF RESPONSE ON PART PERSON WHO SAID HE WAS ROMERO.

B. ATTEMPTED CONTACT COL GRAMOS LATER 3 APR AND WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER ENGLISH SPEAKING COLONEL CARDUNAS THAT GRAMOS WAS IN MEXICO CITY.

C. UPON CALLING ROMERO AGAIN 4 APR WAS TOLD HE WAS NOT REGISTERED THERE.

2. REGRET FAILURE MAKE CONTACT BUT PRESUME THAT IF PRESIDENT HAD NEEDED STATION SERVICES HE WOULD HAVE HAD AIDE CALL NUMBER ALREADY PROVIDED IN HAGU 3494. (IN 90740)

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

***RE MEXICAN PRESIDENT MAKING TRIP TO GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS IN MARCH AND APRIL. DESIRES TO SEND MESSAGES THRU KUBARK CHANNELS HQS AUTHORI CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY RUMERO AND ADDRESSEE STA.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
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ACTION: C/WH 5* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1630 6 APR 63 BP)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 062006Z

OPIM BRLN MEXI INFO OPIM HAGU PRITY DIR CITE FRAN 7941

RYBAT

8 APR 1963

IN12901

REF BRLN 2433 (IN 12561) **

BONN 4463 ***

IN VIEW REFS, AS ROMERO HAS REQUESTED HE WILL BE FURNISHED TELEPHONE NUMBER IN BERLIN FOR EMERGENCY USE, ON 7 APRIL THUS ELIMINATING NECESSITY FOR PERSONAL CONTACT BY BOB. ROMERO WILL BE GIVEN BOB OFFICE NUMBER BY WYKOFF FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND CAN GIVE HIS NAME STATING HAS MESSAGE TO LEAVE.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**RE MEXICAN PRESIDENT OFFICIAL VISIT TO ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES.

***NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1715 6 APR 63.

K

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 4 4/3

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 6 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT: 0415 6 APRIL 63)JA

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 052739Z

OPIM MEXI BRLN INFO OPIM BONN PRITY DIR PARI HAGU CITE FRAN 7936

RYBAT

6 APR 1963

IN 12640

REF MEXI 4031 (IN 99541)

DIR 25991

1. CONTACT MADE AT BONN EVENING 5 APR WITH ROMERO WHO WITH PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS AT THE TIME. PRESIDENT MATEOS TOOK WYKOFF ASIDE AND APOLOGIZED FOR MIXUP AT PARIS STATING HIS PEOPLE WERE AT FAULT AND WERE JUST BEING VERY CAREFUL. PRESIDENT STATED HE HAD NO MESSAGES FOR RELAY TODAY BUT WOULD LIKE TO ASK A FAVOR. SAID ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT KNOWN PUBLICLY THAT HE AND HIS PARTY ARE GOING TO BERLIN, AND IN FACT HAVE DENIED IT, THEY ARE PLANNING TO DO SO ON AFTERNOON 6 APRIL AND WOULD LIKE THE SAME SERVICE THERE AS HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO HIM BY WYKOFF AND WITTENBERGER. WAS ADVISED IT WOULD BE ARRANGED. MATEOS SAID ALL THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN MAKING CONTACT IN BERLIN WOULD BE FOR THE PERSON CONTACTING ROMERO TO SAY HE WAS A FRIEND OF WIN SCOTT. MATEOS AND ROMERO STATED THEY PLANNING TO STAY IN BERLIN AT HOTEL KEMPINSKI, INDICATING WOULD BE THERE A DAY OR SO AND MAY BE RETURNING DIRECTLY TO MEXICO CITY FROM BERLIN.

2. BERLIN: BACKGROUND TRAFFIC BEING RELAYED OPIM. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS OF MEXICO MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT FRANCE, GERMANY

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

AND HOLLAND MARCH AND APRIL. COS MEXI IS IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ODACID. LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS MEXI IN PARI, BONN, HAGUE WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT. LOPEZ WILL WANT TO SEND AND RECEIVE MESSAGE THROUGH KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND ALSO KUBARK MEXI. HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE COMMO. HQS AUTHORIZED CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY ROMERO AND KUBARK STATIONS TO PICK UP AND DELIVER MESSAGES. ROMERO SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND STATION OFFICER MUST USE ALIAS. INITIAL CONTACT TO ROMERO CAN BE MADE USING WIN SCOTTS NAME AS DESCRIBED. PARI HAS USED NAME WITTENBERGER IN CONTACTING ROMERO AND THE NAME JOHN WYKOFF WAS USED IN BONN. FURTHER DETAILS FOLLOW.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1 [illegible]
2
3
4
5
6

ACTION: C/WH 8 (COPY TO WH (ACTION) AND EE (INFO) 0600 6 APRIL 63)JA

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

S E C R E T 061030Z

OPIM BRLN INFO OPIM DIR MEXI FRAN CITE BONN 4460

RYBAT

6 APR [illegible]

IN12661

REF FRAN 7936 (IN 12641)

1. LOPEZ AND PARTY NOW DEPARTING BONN FOR BRLN 0740 HOURS 7 APR.

2. LAPOLLA AS WYKOFF TALKED AT BONN TO ROMERO NOT LOPEZ. LAPOLLA APOLOGIZED TO ROMERO FOR MIXUP AT PARIS RATHER THAN LOPEZ APOLOGIZING TO LAPOLLA.

3. FOR BRLN: DUE TO ROMERO PRESS OF BUSINESS PHONE CALLS MAY NOT ESTABLISH CONTACT. MAY BE NECESSARY TO CAMP IN HOTEL LOBBY AND CONTACT ROMERO ENTERING OR LEAVING AS WAS DONE AT BONN.

4. FOR FRAN: LAPOLLA AND THOMPFORD WILL REMAIN BONN UNTIL LOPEZ DEPARTURE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 *

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 021552Z

** OPIM MEXI INFO DIR BONN HAGU PARI CITE FRAN 7814

RYBAT

REF PARI 7113 (in 97152)

2 APR 1963

IN99428

RE PARA THREE REF SHOULD WE CONTACT GRAMOS OR ROMERO.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**SUGGESTED MEH IDENTIFY GRAMOS SINCE HE VERY DEFINITE THAT HE AV COURANT ON CONTACT AND THAT ROMERO NOT.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]	4	
[illegible]	5	
	6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 021745Z

OPIM FRAN INFO ROUTINE DIR BONN WASH CITE MEXI 4031 (OUSLER ACTING)

RYBAT

REF: FRAN 7154 (IN 82003)*

2 APR 1963

IN99541

APPRECIATE ATTEMPT CONTACT ROMERO. IF THIS DIFFICULT OR IMPOSSIBLE THEN CONTACT GRAMOS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WE AND WH COPIES SLOTTED AT 1400 29 MAR OJ)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 291638Z IN 97152

PRITY MEXI INFO PRITY DIR BONN FRAN ROUTINE HAGU CITE PARI 7113

RYBAT 29 MAR 1963 IN97152

REF PARI 7092 (IN 96410)*

1. REGRET HAVING TO REPORT THAT SOLUTION OF MYSTERY OF TWO WITTENBERGERS IS CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF LEFT AND RIGHT HANDS OPERATING IDEPENDENTLY: I.E., UNCOORDINATED EFFORT BY TWO STATION OFFICERS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT. CONFUSION ON PART OF MEXICANS CERTAINLY UNDERSTANDABLE.

2. NIGHT 28 MARCH TELEPHONE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH LT COL GRAMOS WHO IMMEDIATELY STATED HE PERSON PARI SUPPOSED BE TALKING TO AND ROMERO NOT AWARE WHAT GOING ON. GRAMOS STATED WOULD RETURN CALL TO CASE OFFICER DURING NIGHT. DID NOT DO SO. TELEPHONE CONTACT EARLY MORNING 29 MARCH PRODUCED RESPONSE FROM GRAMOS TO EFFECT HE HAD NO NEED OUR SERVICES.

3. SUGGEST MEXI IDENTIFY GRAMOS SINCE HE VERY DEFINITE THAT HE AU COURANT ON CONTACT AND THAT ROMERO NOT.

4. FOR BONN, FRAN, HAGU: HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT KUBARK CONTACT SPEAK SPANISH.

5. HOPE WILLARD C. CURTIS IN DUE COURSE WILL APOLOGIZE TO ROMERO IN OUR BEHALF FOR MIX-UP.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**RE ALLEGED WITTENBERGER AND "OTHER WITTENBERGER".

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
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ACTION: C/WH 5(WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1500, 28 MAR OJ)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 281839Z

OPIM MEXI INFO OPIM DIR PRITY FRAN BONN ROUTINE HAGU CITE PARI 7092

RYBAT

REF A. PARI 7042 (NOT SENT BONN HAGU) 95070

IN96410

B. MEXI 3947 (IN 95542)

1. FURTHER REPEATED EFFORTS CONTACT ROMERO HAVE BEEN TOTALLY FRUSTRATED BY AIDE TO ROMERO, LT. RODRIGUEZ, WHO REFUSES PERMIT "WITTENBERGER" TALK TO ROMERO, EVEN WHEN HE AVAILABLE, WHICH IS RARE BECAUSE OF NUMEROUS OFFICIAL CEREMONIES. WHEN WETHERILL CALLED MORNING 28 MARCH, RODRIGUEZ SAID ROMERO HAD JUST TALKED TO WITTENBERGER AND MADE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM FOR FIVE O'CLOCK SAME AFTERNOON. WHEN WETHRILL SAID THIS IMPOSSIBLE, R INSISTED HAD BEEN PRESENT DURING CONVERSATION.

2. WETHERILL CALLED AT 1800 HRS, ASKED IF ALLEGED WITTENBERGER HAD APPEARED ON SCHEDULE. RODRIGUEZ COUNTERED BY ASKING NAME WETHERILL'S SECRETARY. GAVE HIM FIRST NAME. R SAID WOULD CALL BACK, AND HAS NOT DONE SO. BELIEVE THIS IS END OF THE LINE. ONLY ALTERNATIVE AT THIS POINT IS TO ABANDON COMPLETELY SECURITY WHICH ALREADY BADLY LACERATED.

3. ONLY EXPLANATION WE CAN OFFER FOR STORY OF "OTHER WITTENBERGER" IS THAT RODRIGUEZ AND ROMERO DECIDED WETHERILL/WITTENBERGER WAS CRACKPOT, AND APPROPRIATE GIVE HIM SOME OF OWN MEDICINE.

A

4. IN LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE SUGGEST RECONSIDERIYNDWYAULIPFBMTHER STATIONS TRYING CONTACT ROMERO. HOPE MEXI WILL EVENTUALLY LEARN TRUE STORY "OTHER WITTENBERGER", SINCE NOT IMPOSSIBLE FRENCH (WHO UNDOUBTEDLY

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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ACTION:

INFO :

IN 96410 PARI 7092

MONITORING PALAIS D'ORSAY PHONE) HAVE BEEN PLAYING GAMES, ALTHO THIS HARDLY MAKES SENSE.

5. WE THOUGHT MEXICANS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE SO FRIENDLY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED WYKOFF AND STRATFORD CALL ROMERO SAY FRIENDS OF WINSTON SCOTT'S IN MEXI AND ASK IF CAN BE OF SERVICE TO PRESIDENT AND SAY WELL CALL AGAIN.

S/C NOTE: PORTION GARBLED-BEING SVCD.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

-1-5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 092
28 MAR 63 21

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

MAR 29 0130Z 63
SERVICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 96410 A PARI 7092

TO INFO CITE

RYBAT

C/S COMMENT: COMPLETE PARA 4, LINES 1 AND 2 TO READ:

"4. IN LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE SUGGEST RECONSIDER DESIREABILITY OTHER STATIONS TRYING CONTACT ROMERO. HOPE MEXI WILL EVENTUALLY LEARN TRUE..."

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3 W

20-37

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 281902Z

OPIM FRAN INFO DIR BONN PARI HAGU CITE MEXI 3967

RYBAT

28 MAR 1963 IN96402

REF FRAN 7672 (IN 95990)*

YES.

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IS DATA PARA ONE REF 5 APR.

Leroy Duggan

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12/4 SECRET

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 231052Z

OPIM MEXI INFO DIR BONN PARI HAGU CITE FRAN 7672

IN 93990

28 MAR 1963

RYBAT

REF MEXI 3947 (95547)*

IS DATA PARA ONE REF 5 APRIL?

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *RE DATE LOPEZ MATEOS SCHEDULED ARRIVE IN BONN.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1 c/wh/3
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6

SECRET

ACTION: C/WH 5 (C/WH COPY SLOTTED AT 0655 27 MAR 63 JA)

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

SECRET 271104Z

27 MAR 1963

OPIM DIR INFO OPIM MEXI ROUTINE FRAN CITE PARI 7042

RYBAT

REF DIR 25991 *

IN95070

1. HAVING DETERMINED THAT ROMERO STAYING WITH LOPEZ MATEOS AT OFFICIAL GUEST RESIDENCE, PALAIS D'ORSAY, WETHERILL TRIED CONTACT HIM BY PHONE EVENING 26 MARCH. TALKED TO UNIDENTIFIED MEMBER ENTOURAGE WHO SAID ROMERO NOT THERE BUT RETURNING SHORTLY. WETHERILL GAVE NAME WITTENBERGER, FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO, TIO, ETC. CALLED BACK LATER, GOT SAME MAN WHO SAID HAD GIVEN WITTENBERGER NAME TO ROMERO, WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE IT, OR KNOW WHO SENOR BLANCO WAS. WOULD NOT PUT ROMERO ON PHONE WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION OF WHAT BUSINESS WITTENBERGER HAD WITH ROMERO. IN VIEW INCREASINGLY AWKWARD SECURITY SITUATION, WETHERILL BROKE OFF CONVERSATION.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY DELIVERED PERSONAL NOTE TO PALAIS D'ORSAY FOR ROMERO SUING SAME RECOGNITION NAMES AND GIVING TWO PHONE NUMBERS FOR CONTACT, ONE EMBASSY, ONE HOME. HAVE HEARD NOTHING.

3. MEXI: PLS GIVE US SOME FURTHER IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL WE CAN USE ON PHONE WITH ANY ONE WHO ANSWERS PHONE IN PRESIDENTIAL SUITE. WAS ROMERO ACTUALLY GIVEN NAME WITTENBERGER?

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OD COS MEXI IN ADDRESSEE CITIES WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT. WILL USE KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

23 **SECRET**

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 271949Z

PRITY FRAN INFO DIR PARI BONN HAGU CITE MEXI 3947 IN95547

RYBAT

27 MAR 1963

REF FRAN 7605 (NOT SENT HAGU)(IN 94458)

1. PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS SCHEDULED ARRIVE IN BONN AT 1200 HOURS (BONN TIME) GO TO INFORMAL LUNCH AT 1300 HOURS.

2. HE AND PARTY STAYING AT KOENIGSHOF.

3. REAL NAME OF CONTACT IN MEXICO IS WINSTON SCOTT. ROMERO KNOWS PERSONALLY AND IS AWARE PRESIDENT IS CONTACT AND FRIEND.

4. PRESIDENT'S MAIN CONCERN IS FOR MESSAGES FROM MEXICO IF REPEAT IF ANY SENSITIVE MATTERS LOCALS (ONE OF WHOM ACTING CHIEF OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT) WHO CONTACTS OF SCOTT WISH SEND TO HIM BY KUBARK CHANNELS.

5. PRESIDENT GIVEN NAMES OF FRIENDS OF SCOTT (PER DIR-25991) IN PARIS, BONN, HAGUE, BUT, FROM PARIS, IT OBVIOUS HE HAS NOT BRIEFED ROMERO.

6. SUGGEST, THEREFORE, WYKOFF AND STRATFORD CALL ROMERO SAY FRIENDS OF WINSTON SCOTT'S IN MEXICO AND ASK IF CAN BE OF SERVICE TO PRESIDENT AND SAY WILL CALL AGAIN.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ANY WORD IF ARRIVAL DATE NOW ANTICIPATED OF LOPEZ MATEOS IN BONN AND NAME IF HOTEL HE PLANNING TO STAY THERE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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5	
6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 271634Z

OPIM PARI INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3944

REF: PARI 7042 (IN 95070)

IN95416

27 MAR 1963

1. REAL NAME IS WINSTON SCOTT. ROMERO KNOWS PERSONALLY AND IS AWARE PRESIDENT IS CONTACT AND FRIEND.

2. PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ADVISED OF CHANNELS AND NAMES OF CONTACTS IN PARIS, BONN, HAGUE. HE OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT BRIEFED ROMERO.

3. SUGGEST BONN, HAGUE MERELY LEAVE NAME AND SAY WILL CALL AGAIN TO SEE IF MESSAGE.

4. PRESIDENT'S MAIN CONCERN WILL BE FOR MESSAGES FROM MEXICO IF REPEAT IF ANY SENSITIVE MATTERS LOCALS (ONE OF THEM ACTING CHIEF OF MEXICAN GOVT) WHO CONTACTS OF SCOTT WISH SEND TO HIM BY KUBARK SECURE CHANNEL.

5. LITEMPO/2, LIELEGANT AND LIERGO ALL AWARE OF CHANNELS TO PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE AND WILL USE IF HAVE SUCH MESSAGES.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**REQUESTED FURTHER IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL COULD USE ON PHONE WITH ANYONE WHO ANSWERS PHONE IN PRESIDENTIAL SUITE.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12 15 SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO ~~ADDP~~, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 261348Z

PARI INFO BONN DIR MEXI CITE FRAN 7605 26 MAR 1963 IN94458

RYBAT OOLONG

REF DIR 25991 *

DO YOU HAVE ANY RECENT WORD OF ARRIVAL DATE NOW ANTICIPATED OF LOPEZ MATEOS IN BONN, AND NAME OF HOTEL WHERE HE PLANNING TO STAY THERE. WE HAVE DATE OF 5 APRIL AND WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THIS IF POSSIBLE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**CONCERNED EUROPEAN TRIP OF LOPEX MATEOS.

Lienvoy/Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/WH 5* 1

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 201455Z

MEXI DIR CITE HAGU 3494

RYBAT 21 MAR 1963 IN90740

REF DIR 25991

CONFIRMING RECEIPT REF INSTRUCTIONS HAGUE PHONE NUMBER IS 11 32 10.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**REQUESTED STERILE PHONE NUMBER FOR CONTACT FOR ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEAOS.

Lienvoy/ [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ORIG : D. C. [illegible]
UNIT : OC ED
EXT : 6477
DATE : 20 MARCH 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
C/WH/3 4
5

20 MAR 59 22 03z

TO : BONN, PARIS, HAGUE, MEXICO CITY INFO: LONDON, FRANKFURT

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: D/OC 2

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 2, S/C

SIG CEN

☐	DEFERRED
☐	ROUTINE
	[✓ PRIORITY]

TO BONN, PARI, HAGU, MEXI INFO LOND, FRAN CITE DIR 26254

RYBAT OOLONG

REF DIR 25991 (NOT SENT LOND, FRAN)

1. RYBAT REF ALERTS ADDEES TO OFFICIAL VISIT THEIR COUNTRIES BY ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, MARCH AND APRIL. ALSO AUTHORIZES AND SETS UP ARRANGEMENTS FOR LOPEZ SEND/RECEIVE MESSAGES THRU KUBARK CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND KUBARK MEXI.

2. FOR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ALL CONCERNED ON COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES, FOLLOWING IS ESTABLISHED.

A. ALL TRAFFIC FROM FIELD (LOPEZ LOCATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED MEXI INFO DIR; OPIM; RYBAT; WITH PILOT "FROM LOPEZ."

B. ALL TRAFFIC TO FIELD (LOPEZ LOCATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED TO STATION INFO DIR; OPIM; RYBAT; WITH PILOT "FOR LOPEZ."

C. COMMUNICATORS WILL ZFF ALL TRANSMISSIONS. IF CIPHER TEXT SHOULD BE RECEIVED FOR TRANSMISSION, A ~~ABOVE~~ STILL APPLY.

3. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD KUCLUB PERSONNEL BE USED PICK UP OR DELIVERY TRAFFIC.

6

OC-AD OC-S/C OC-ED EE WE WH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

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D/CO
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ORIG : C. BUSTOS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 19 MARCH 1963

☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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19 MAR 63 23 12z

~~SIG CEN~~

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO : BONN PARIS HAGUE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, D/OC 2, S/C

TO ~~[illegible]~~ BONN PARI HAGU INFO OPIM MEXI CITE DIR 25991

RYBAT
FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION
REF: MEXI 3810 (IN 87887)*

1. ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, MEXICAN PRESIDENT, MAKING OFFICIAL VISIT ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES MARCH AND APRIL. COS MEXI IS IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ODACID. LOPEZ REQUESTED NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS MEXI ~~[illegible]~~ IN ADDRESSEE CITIES WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH PLACE DURING VISIT.

2. LOPEZ WILL WANT TO SEND AND RECEIVE MESSAGES THROUGH KUBARK COMMO CHANNELS TO AND FROM HIGH MEXICAN OFFICIALS AND ALSO KUBARK MEXI. HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE COMMO.

3. HQ AUTHORIZES CONTACT BETWEEN LOPEZ SECRETARY ROMERO AND ADDRESSEE STATIONS TO PICK UP AND DELIVER MESSAGES. ROMERO SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND STATION OFFICER MUST USE ALIAS AND GIVE ROMERO STERILE PHONE NUMBER OR OFFICE PHONE NOT READILY TRACKABLE TO KUBARK. IDENTIFY SELF AS "FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO," OR "FRIEND OF TIO", NAMES WHICH LOPEZ USES TO REFER TO COS MEXI. INITIAL CONTACT TO ROMERO CAN BE MADE BY PHONE OR IN PERSON AFTER HE ARRIVES AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD UNDER CONDITIONS AS SECURE AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, TO AVOID IDENTIFYING

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12-62

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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : PAGE 2
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 25991 25991

KUBARK PERSONNEL TO MEXICANS.

4. STATIONS SHOULD USE THESE ALIASES:

HAGU	BILL STRATFORD
PARI	JOE WITTENBERGER
BONN	JOHN WYKOFF

5. ALTHOUGH ROMERO IS KNOWN TO HAVE HAD FREQUENT AND FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH SUCH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FIGURES AS LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND WITH MEXICAN COMMUNISTS, MEXI CONSIDERS HIM NOT A BAD SECURITY RISK AND HAS PASSED INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL THROUGH HIM FOR SOME TIME.

6. FOR MEXI: PLS PASS ABOVE ALIASES TO ROMERO, CABLE LOPEZ ITINERARY TO ALL ADDRESSEES AND IF POSSIBLE WHERE TELEPHONE CONTACT CAN BE MADE TO ROMERO. PLS TELL HIM KUBARK NOT ABLE PROVIDE ANY COMMO FACILITY AT BELGRADE AND WARSAW.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Pres Adolfo Lopez Mateos req names of friends of COS in Paris, Belgrade, Warsaw, Bonn and the Hague who would contact ~~him~~ ~~HIM~~ his private secretary Humberto Romero (Perez) at each of these places during visit.

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FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PAGE 3

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☐ ROUTINE

TO
INFO
CITE DIR
25991

COORDINATIONS
WH/3
WE/2
EE/G
C/WH/3
C/WE
DC/EE
WH/COPS

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

J. C. KING
C/WHD

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ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1315 /16 MAR/LMG)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 161600Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3810

RYBAT LIENVOY

16 MAR 1963 IN87887

REF DIR 25228*

1. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS REQUESTED ON 16 MARCH NAMES OF FRIENDS OF COS IN PARIS, BELGRADE, WARSAW, BONN AND THE HAGUE WHO COULD CONTACT HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY HUMBERTO ROMERO (PEREZ) AT EACH OF THESE PLACES DURING VISIT.

2. PRESIDENT WANTS THIS CHANNEL SO THAT LIERGO[1], LITEMPO/2[2], LIELEGANT[3] AND CURTIS[4] CAN SEND HIM "SECURELY" ANY MESSAGE THEY CONSIDER OF INTEREST. (NOTE: PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT HE DOES NOT TRUST HIS OWN FOREIGN SERVICE CHANNEL AND SAID IS AFRAID OF HIS COMMUNICATION LINKS FOR VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION.)

3. REALIZE THIS DIFFICULT REQUEST MAKE OF HQS BUT WOULD APPRECIATE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN VIEW OF PRESENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP.

4. PERSONS CONTACTING ROMERO COULD USE "FRIEND OF TIO" OR "FRIEND OF SENOR BLANCO" SINCE PRESIDENT FREQUENTLY REFERS TO CURTIS[4] AS "TIO" AND AS "SENOR BLANCO" OF " BLANCO DIPLOMACIA."

5. APPRECIATE EARLY REPLY.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * Headquarters forwarded briefing material for LITENSOR(5) European trip which the Mexico City station may select, edit and translate the material it considers most appropriate.

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ACTION: C/WH 5 (COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1415, 15 MAR LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

S E C R E T 151710Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3789

RYBAT BEDOX

15 MAR 1963

IN87153

REF A. DIR 24811

B. HMMW-11374

1. STATION RECD S/C ATTCH TO REF B 13 MAR 63 IN POUCH NUMBER 7854. NO STATION RECORD RECEIPT OF COVERING DISPATCH.

2. PLEASE SUMMARIZE CONTENT OF REF B AND CABLE SOONEST TO STATION.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

SECRET

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GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 MARCH 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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43

ROUTING

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15 MAR 63 22 54z

DEFERRED SIGCEN
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, S/C

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 25228

RYBAT ~~[illegible]~~ LITENSOR

REFS: A. HMMW-11374*
B. MEXI 3789 (IN 87153)**

1. REF A POUCHED BY ERROR 14 MAR. SUMMARY AS FOLL:

A. MATERIALS PREPARED BY KUMONK AND KUWOLF. TO EXPEDITE POUCHING HQS DEFERS FURTHER EDITING TO MEXI. MEXI MAY SELECT, EDIT AND TRANSLATE MATERIAL IT CONSIDERS MOST APPROPRIATE.

B. ATT A IS LIST OF REFS TO PERTINENT ARTICLES IN SPECIFIC ISSUES CURRENT INTEL WEEKLY SUMMARIES.

C. ATT B CONTAINS KUWOLF PREPARED MATERIALS NOT SENT MEXI EXCEPT CUBA ITEM. THESE MAY BE USED TO PROMOTE ODYOKE POSITION ON COMMON MARKET, BERLIN PROBLEM, CUBA, ETC.

D. ATT C COMPILED BY KUMONK. INCLUDES BIO SKETCHES ON OFFICIALS EACH COUNTRY WITHIN WHOM LITENSOR WILL PROBABLY MEET DURING TRIP. MEXI MAY NOT PASS BIO INFO THROUGH WHICH LINE IS DRAWN.

LIENVOY

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COPS

WH COMMENT: *Forwarded LITENSOR BRIEFING MATERIALS
**Requested cable summary of Ref A

J. C. KING
C/WHD
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ORIG : C. BUSTOS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 14 MARCH 1963

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TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

15 MAR 63 20 42z

SIG CEN

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R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24990

HYBAT LITENSOR

REF: MEXI 3575 (IN 75331)*

IN ADDITION BRIEFINGS REQUESTED BY SUBJECT, SUGGEST COS GIVE SUBJECT GENERAL CI DEFENSIVE BRIEFING INCLUDING USE TECH DEVICES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *LITENSOR has asked for briefing papers on trip.

CI/OO/WI F. HUGHES (IN DRAFT)
WI/COPS W

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 5[illegible]
DATE : 13 MARCH 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SIG CEN

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PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 4, S/C

FACT/

TO 1 MEXI INFO CITE DIR 24811

RYBAT BEDOX

REFS: A. HMMW-11374

B. MEXI 3743 [illegible]

1. LITENSOR BRIEFING PAPERS POUCHED REF A 8 MAR. ETA 11 MAR.

2. FOLL SUMMARIZES BACKGROUND AND POLICY RE RAPACKI PLAN:

A. THE POLISH PROPOSAL FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE INTRODUCED AT 2 OCT 57 SESSION OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, ADAM RAPACKI. ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR POLISH GOVERNMENT HE FORMULATED PROPOSAL: SHOULD EAST AND WEST GERMANY AGREE TO BAN ON PRODUCTION AND STORAGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORIES, POLAND WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY INTRODUCE IDENTICAL BAN ON HER TERRITORY. RAPACKI DID NOT MENTION CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT HEAD OF CZECHOSLOVAK UN DELEGATION, SPEAKING AFTER RAPACKI, SUPPORTED PROPOSAL, DECLARING HIS COUNTRY WOULD JOIN AGREEMENT, EXTENDING BAN OVER HER ~~TERRITORY~~ TERRITORY TOO. EAST GERMANS SUBSEQUENTLY WARMLY ENDORSED THE PROPOSAL.

B

B. RAPACKI'S PROPOSAL OBVIOUSLY CLEARED AND COORDINATED WITH SOVIET LEADERS PRIOR TO INTRODUCTION. MOSCOW PROMPTLY REPORTED THE PROPOSAL APPROVINGLY AND SOVIET PRESS STRESSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY PEOPLES

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TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
PAGE 2
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INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 24811 24311

OF EUROPE, WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON DISARMAMENT AND CESSATION NUCLEAR TESTS, AND WOULD "HELP IMPROVE RELATIONS AND BRING CLOSER TOGETHER" THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

C. THE PROPOSAL WAS FORMALIZED IN 9 DEC 57 POLISH GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM, PRESENTED BY RAPACKI TO US, BRITISH, AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS IN WARSAW. SOVIET PREMIER BULGANIN PROMPTLY ENDORSED PROPOSAL IN SERIES OF LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

D. IN 1958 RAPACKI MODIFIED HIS PLAN, ALLEGEDLY TO MAKE IT MORE PALATABLE TO WESTERN POWERS. NEW VERSION PUBLISHED NOV 58 , CALLED FOR TWO-STAGE PROGRAM IN WHICH: (1) CURRENT NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND BASES WOULD BE FROZEN AND PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BANNED IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND (2) EXISTING NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND WEAPONS WOULD BE ELIMINATED AS PART OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT FOR THE FOUR-NATION AREA. REVISED VERSION ALSO CALLED FOR "AIR AND GROUND CONTROL" WITH NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN CONTROL SYSTEM.

E. POLISH LEADERS HAVE SINCE 1957 PRESSED FOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON RAPACKI PLAN. SHORTLY AFTER OPENING OF GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE POLISH

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

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INFO :

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☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 24811

DELEGATION SUBMITTED MEMO URGING CREATION NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MEMO BASICALLY FOLLOWS LINES OF FORMER PROPOSALS RAPACKI PLAN. SOVIET DELEGATION IS CURRENTLY URGING GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TAKE UP QUESTION NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF WORLD.

F. SINCE RAPACKI PLAN INTRODUCED HAS HAD STRONG SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW. SOVIETS HAVE EVEN URGED EXTENDING ZONE TO INCLUDE BALTIC AND BALKAN COUNTRIES. SOVIET LEADERS UNDOUBTEDLY VIEW PROPOSAL AS MEANS ELIMINATING GERMAN POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND REMOVING US MILITARY POWER AND INFLUENCE FROM WEST GERMANY -- ONE OF MOSCOW'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

G. US STRONGLY OPPOSES RAPACKI PLAN, VIEWING IT AS BLOC DEVICE TO NEUTRALIZE GERMANY, DEEPEN AND EVEN PERPETUATE DIVISION OF GERMANY, AND TO SECURE DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO BE MILITARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO WEST. US MILITARY POWER IN EUROPE WOULD BE DIMINISHED WITHOUT A CONCURRENT DECREASE OF SOVIET STRENGTH. IT WOULD WEAKEN NATO.

H. WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALSO VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED TO RAPACKI PLAN, AND ALL SUCH "DISENGAGEMENT" PLANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR SAME REASONS. BONN ALSO CONSIDERS SUCH PROPOSALS AS SINISTER AND SUBTLY INTIMIDATORY TO WEST GERMANS, WHO DO NOT CHOOSE BE DEALT WITH AS IF THEY INERT OBJECTS, AND

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ORIG : N. JUDKINS
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FROM : DIRECTOR
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INFO :

PAGE 4

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TO INFO CITE DIR 24811 [illegible]

WHO DETECT IN SUCH SCHEMES A CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THEIR EVENTUAL COMMUNIZATION.

I. PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF RAPACKI PLAN BY MEXICAN PRESIDENT WOULD MARK FIRST SUCH SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY GOVERNMENT LEADER OUTSIDE SOVIET BLOC HIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE WIDELY PROPAGANDIZED BY POLES AND SOVIETS AND COULD SET PRECEDENT FOR THEM TO SECURE SUCH APPROVAL BY OTHER NONBLOC LEADERS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED INCLUDE POINTS THAT COULD BE MADE BY COS TO DISSUADE LITENSOR FROM POSSIBLE PUBLIC BACKING OF RAPACKI PLAN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP POLAND.

EE/P
C/EE/P
WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

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re. ~~[illegible]~~
/ LIENVOY support

Prepared by Tom Cauler and CCI for LITENSOR briefing - See Cable 14 Mar 63

13 March 1963

The Rapacki Plan

1. The Polish proposal for a Central European nuclear-free zone was introduced at the 2 October 1957 session of the UN General Assembly by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki. Acting as spokesman for the Polish Government, he formulated the proposal: should both East and West Germany agree to a ban on the production and storage of nuclear weapons on their territories, Poland would simultaneously introduce an identical ban on her territory. Rapacki did not mention Czechoslovakia, but the head of the Czechoslovak UN delegation, speaking after Rapacki, supported his proposal, declaring that his country would join the agreement, extending the ban over her territory, too. The East Germans subsequently warmly endorsed the proposal.

2. Rapacki's proposal had obviously been cleared and coordinated with Soviet leaders prior to its introduction. Moscow promptly reported the proposal approvingly and the Soviet press stressed that such an agreement would be welcomed by the peoples of Europe, would facilitate agreement on disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests, and would "help improve relations and bring closer together" the two German states.

3. The proposal was formalized in a 9 December 1957 Polish government memorandum, which was presented by Rapacki to the US, British, and French ambassadors in Warsaw. The then Soviet Premier, Bulganin, promptly endorsed the proposal in a series of letters to heads of governments throughout the world.

4. In 1958 Rapacki modified his plan, allegedly to make it more palatable to the Western powers. The new version of the plan, published in November 1958, called for a two-stage program, in which: (1) current nuclear stockpiles and bases would be frozen and production of nuclear weapons would be banned in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, and (2) existing nuclear stockpiles and weapons would be

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eliminated as a part of a general disarmament agreement for the four-nation area. The revised version of the plan also called for "air and ground control" with NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participating in the control system.

5. Polish leaders have since 1957 pressed for a formal agreement on the Rapacki plan. Shortly after the opening of the Geneva disarmament conference in March 1962, the Polish delegation submitted a memorandum urging creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. The memorandum basically follows the lines of the former proposals of the Rapacki plan. The Soviet delegation is currently urging that the Geneva disarmament conference take up the question of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world.

6. Since the Rapacki plan was introduced, it has had strong support from Moscow. The Soviets have even urged extending the zone to include Baltic and Balkan countries. Soviet leaders undoubtedly view the proposal as a means of eliminating German power in Central Europe--one of Moscow's major foreign policy objectives.

7. The US strongly opposes the Rapacki plan, viewing it as a Bloc device to neutralize Germany, to deepen and even perpetuate the division of Germany, and to secure de facto recognition of East Germany. Implementation of the proposal would also be militarily disadvantageous to the West. US military power in Europe would be diminished without a concurrent decrease of Soviet strength. It would weaken NATO.

8. The West German government is also vigorously opposed to the Rapacki plan and all such "disengagement" plans in Central Europe for the same reasons. Bonn also considers such proposals as sinister and subtly intimidatory to the West Germans, who do not choose to be dealt with as if they were inert objects, and who detect in such schemes a creation of conditions for their eventual communization.

9. Public endorsement of the Rapacki plan by the Mexican president would mark the first such specific approval by a government leader outside the Soviet Bloc. His endorsement would be widely propagandized by the Poles and the Soviets and could set a precedent for them to secure such approval by other nonbloc leaders.

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NFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, S/C 2

SECRET 122215Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 3743

RYBAT BEDOX

13 MAR 1963 IN84727

REF MEXI 3575 (W 75331)

1. SUGGEST INCLUDE IN MATERIAL REQUESTED REF POINTS THAT CAN BE MADE BY COS TO DISSUADE LITENSOR FROM POSSIBLE PUBLIC BACKING OF RAPACKI PLAN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP POLAND. PARTICULARLY WISH PRESS THIS POINT SINCE LITENSOR, WHO ANXIOUS BE RECIPIENT NOBEL PEACE PRIZE, MIGHT OTHERWISE BE TEMPTED REACT FAVORABLY TO SUCH A PROPOSAL. NOTE POLISH SEJM JUST MADE PUBLIC DECLARATION IN FAVOR MEXICOS AIMS FOR DISARMAMENT.

2. IF ABOVE MATERIAL CANNOT BE POUCHED IN TIME MEET 15 MARCH DEADLINE PLS CABLE HIGHLIGHTS AND POUCH REST.

3. LITENSOR ON 11 MARCH EXPRESSED AGAIN HIS INTEREST IN BRIEFINGS. REQUEST ETA MATERIALS REQUESTED REF.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND.

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DISPATCH

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PROCESSING		
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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : KUWOLF/LITENSOR Briefing Materials

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACT: As required.

REF: MEXI 3575
DIR 21965

1. Headquarters is sending herewith materials which KUMONK and KUWOLF staffs have prepared for a briefing of LITENSOR on countries he will soon visit. In order to expedite the pouching of these materials we are not taking time to edit them into a finished product at Headquarters. We are providing more materials and references than will be necessary for this briefing. The Station may select, edit and translate the information it considers most appropriate.

2. Attachment A. This is a list of references to pertinent articles in specific issues of the "Current Intelligence Weekly Summaries."

3. Attachment B. With the exception of the item on Cuba, these KUWOLF-prepared materials were not sent to Station Mexico City. They may be used to promote the ODYOKE position on the Common Market, the Berlin problem, Cuba etc.

4. Attachment C. KUMONK compiled these materials. They include a current description of the situation in each country involved and biographic sketches on many of the officials with whom LITENSOR will probably meet during his trip. The biographic information has been taken from KUBARK and ODACID files. The Station should not pass any biographic information through which a line has been drawn on these attachments.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KDBIOCCK
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 4

Attachments:
A. List of References, H/W
B. KUWOLF-Prepared Material, H/W
C. KUMONK compiled material, H/W

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, MEXICO CITY, W/ATTS. A,B,C.

DATE TYPED	7 Mar. 63
DATE DISPATCHED	8 MAR 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	HMMW-11374
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	50-6-75/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mex	Judkins	ds	5940

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CA/PROP	7 Mar 63	R. Ratliff by phone
OCI/SIDO	7 Mar 63	T. Loller by phone
FI/INT/IB	7 Mar 63	C. Harris by phone
WH/CA/PROP	7 Mar 63	R. Chamberlain

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/D		J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WOMOLD		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT LIENVOY/Forwarding of Trainee Evaluation		

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

1. Forwarded as a split transmission are copies of the Evaluation of Trainees prepared by Lee R. MYLECHRAINE for passage to LIRAMA and LITEMPO-8.

2. The attached document was translated into Spanish in the LIENVOY LP by LIENVOY-5 on 11 February 1969 for passage.

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-175/2
Box: 19 Fold: 5

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment (Via Split Transmission):
Evaluation of Trainees Report
1 - Left Side, h/w
2 - Right Side, u.s.c.

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/atts
2 - C/WOMOLD, w/atts

DATE 27 Feb 69

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36437	DATE 12 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/2

[illegible] 1969

EVALUATION OF TRAINEES

1. Identification of Course: Basic Tradecraft [illegible] Activities

2. Date of Course : 13 January - 7 February 1969

3. Location of Training : Calle Tabasco #228, Colonia Roma, Postal Zone 7, MEXICO, D.F.

4. Names of Trainees :

   1. Felipe TREJO Gonzalez, Lt. Col., Mexican Army, Age 46.
   2. Leonardo LOPEZ y Lopez, Age 23.
   3. Mariano CHAVARES Molina, Captain, Mexican Army, Age 39.
   4. Felix LOZANO Rangel, DFS, Age [illegible].
   5. Javier MANCERA Fuentes, DFS, Age [illegible].
   6. Esteban GUZMAN Salgado, DFS, Age
   7. Ladislao SALINAS Alor, Captain, Mexican A[illegible] Age 31.
   8. Jorge MARGAIN Ortiz, Captain, Mexican Army, Age 29.
   9. Rogelio Rafael GARZA Hernandez, Lieutenant Mexican Army, Age 26.

5. Evaluation of Traineos:

1. The three DFS trainees, LOZANO, MA[illegible] and GUZMAN, because of their previous training and experience in security activities of the DFS, more readi[illegible] stood the training materials and lectures pre[illegible], and they were better able to incorporate the [illegible] learned into the field exercises conducted by [illegible] Again, because of their previous experience a[illegible]

SECRET

H/W ATT. #1 + S/C ATT #2A HMMA-36437

50-6-75/2

they out performed the other trainees in surveillance, counter-surveillance, debriefing, interrogation and in all other aspects of tradecraft that were covered. These three worked harmoniously with the remainder of the group and made every effort to pass along to them as the occasion arose the good practices learned from their own experiences in security work. All three are considered to be intelligent, alert, imaginative, industrious, and dedicated, and it is the writer's opinion that it would be a pleasure to work with them. All three undoubtedly have a good basic understanding of the typical mission of a national security service, and they know how a security service should go about its work and activities.

2. TREJO - Subject is a career Mexican Army officer and has had no previous experience in intelligence or security work. Throughout the course he was punctual, demonstrated a keen interest in the work, and took an active part in all classroom discussions and street exercises. It did appear, however, that in his discussions with his fellow class members he was usually quite opinionated and argumentative which might possibly indicate some inability on his part to get along well with his fellow workers in the unit. Based on his participation in the class as well as his written work, it is believed that he has a fairly good understanding now of the typical mission of a security service, and the tradecraft principles involved in security service work.

3. LOPEZ y LOPEZ - the only civilian in the group, excluding the DFS trainees, is the youngest of the trainees and appears to have the least formal education. Although he did not participate in the classroom discussions as energetically as did most of the others, he did ask questions from time to time and generally did a good job in all exercises carried out by the group. He appeared to lack some of the drive and imagination necessary to become an effective operator and handler of agents. He appeared rather reserved in his relations and conversations with others in the group, but the writer never noted any friction between him and others. It is suggested that he might best be used as the "office keeper" and/or person in charge of the files. Somewhat surprisingly, he did a fairly good job on the reporting exercises. His written work is neat and well organized.

.../

4. CHANTRES - Subject is an intelligent, alert, imaginative and conscientious man, and it is believed that he will make a valuable contribution to the work of the unit. He participated actively in the classroom discussions and field exercises and made a real contribution to both. On exercises where he was in charge, he got along well with those working with him, and his planning and execution of the exercises indicated clearly that he is able to apply the lessons learned to the practical work. CHANTRES, it is believed will develop a real interest in security work and would, after some experience, become an effective operator. It is believed, also, that he would be able to supervise others in such a way as to cause them to work together effectively and as a team. His written exercises were well prepared, indicating that he not only learned from the classroom reading and discussion but that he also spent considerable time on them.

5. SALINAS - Subject seems to possess an average aptitude for security work. Like the others, he was always punctual, took an active part in the field exercises, but was somewhat less aggressive in the classroom discussions. He prepared his written exercises in an acceptable manner. Assuming that he should develop a real interest in security work, it is believed that he would make a worthwhile contribution to the work of the unit. He got along well with the others, including the occasions when he was in charge of exercises.

6. MARGAIN - Like SALINAS, Subject is capable and intelligent, and he gets along well with his fellow co-workers. His usefulness to the organization, it is believed will depend on the interest he develops in security work after the unit begins operations. As in the case of CHANTRES, MARGAIN in discussions and in field exercises seemed to give more consideration to the security factors involved in particular actions than did the others. Many of his questions in the classroom were related to security factors involved in recruiting and handling of agents, operation and conduct of surveillance activities, and the possibility of compromises that might result in embarrassment to the sponsor. It is believed that he would give careful consideration to any proposed operational activity from a security point of view before execution of the tasks involved. His written exercises were well prepared, indicating that he gave them considerable time and attention.

.../

7. GARZA - Subject, the youngest of the Army group, is a very intelligent, alert and conscientious young man. He possesses considerable drive, initiative and imagination, and on numerous occasions came up with ideas on proposed exercises. His written exercises were well prepared, and he did a good job on the field problems. Given his youth he might be prone to take unnecessary risks, but it is believed that with some experience and time he will make an excellent officer. Like all the others, he accepts criticism readily and on all occasions when observed by the writer he got along well with his fellow workers.

6. COMMENTS

1. The above comments, it should be noted, are based on a rather short observation period; they should be considered accordingly. The size of the group, somewhat larger than usual for one instructor, necessitated that the instructor spend less time with each trainee than usual. The writer appreciated the opportunity to work with the group and enjoyed it tremendously. He considers them a fine group of men and feels that with time and experience they will make a valuable contribution to the work they will be charged with.

2. In accordance with the expressed wishes of their supervisor, the following suggestions and recommendations are being made. Assuming that no additional men will be added to the unit for the time being, it is suggested that [illegible] might be made deputy chief of the unit, and [illegible] chief of operations. Assuming that additional men are to be added later, it is suggested that the remaining three excluding LOPEZ y LOPEZ, might be made section chiefs. GARZA seems to have a more than normal interest in surveillance, and thus might be given that responsibility. SALINAS might best fit as section chief of the group charged with operations against Communist and extremist groups, while MURCAIN might best fit as section chief in charge of exile activities. These comments are based almost exclusively on their apparent interests, based on questions asked and comments made during the classroom discussions and the writer does not mean to suggest that they should be [illegible] to the above proposed assignments.

3. Finally, the writer wishes to thank those responsible for excellent cooperation and support provided during the training course. The cooperation and support provided facilitated the orderly conduct of the course considerably.

.../

4. A copy of all the training materials was left with LOPEZ y LOPEZ for the unit. It is strongly suggested that an effort be made within the next three or four weeks to review the materials in a more or less formal classroom situation. Furthermore, it is suggested that until such time as the unit begins operations, the unit plan and carry out surveillance and other exercises designed to improve their capability.

DISPATCH

S E C R E T
[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, WOMOLD

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIENVOY/Completion of Training Report (Training Cryptonym-DAVALILLO)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : DIRECTOR-65355, 12 January 1969

1. As indicated in Reference and other communications, a training request was made by the Station and approved by Headquarters, to train a group under the LIENVOY Project to follow up on leads produced by the joint LIENVOY operation and presumably other Mexican Government unilateral sources. Lee R. MYLECHRAINE, WOMOLD instructor who was assigned to the Mexico City Station until 8 July 1968, was selected as the instructor. MYLECHRAINE arrived in Mexico City on 9 January 1969; the training began on 13 January and ended on 10 February 1969. The training was conducted at a training site, Calle Tabasco #228, Colonia Roma, Postal Zone 7, Mexico City, provided by LIENVOY-2 and LIELEGANT; the building in which the training site apartment is located is owned by LIELEGANT, and the latter and LIENVOY-2 have their offices there. The unit, upon completion of the training, will use the apartment in which the training was conducted for their offices.

Continued.....

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-173/74
Box: 29 Fold: 5

Attachment:
[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, via split transmission, w/att
2 - C/WOMOLD, via split transmission, w/att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36431

DATE
12 February 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/2

2. The LIENVOYs had originally requested that five (5) of their men be trained. However, upon arrival in Mexico City and just prior to the scheduled beginning of the training they requested that they be permitted to add one man and that two men be included in the class from the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). In the latter case, they submitted three names but said that only two of the three would be expected to attend the class. As it turned out all three of the latter group turned up, thus bringing the class to nine (9) students, five (5) Army officers, one civilian from the LIENVOY group, and the three DFS men. Following is a list of the trainees:

(1) Felix LOZANO Rangel, DFS, age 35.
(2) Javier MANCERA Fuentes, DFS, age 33.
(3) Esteban GUZMAN Salgado, DFS, age 33.
(4) Leonardo LOPEZ y LOPEZ, age 23.
(5) Felipe TREJO Gonzalez, Lt. Col., Mexican Army, age 46.
(6) Mariano CHANTRES Molina, Captain, Mexican Army, age 39.
(7) Ladislao SALINAS Alor, Captain, Mexican Army, age 31.
(8) Jorge MARGAIN Ortiz, Captain, Mexican Army, age 29.
(9) Rogelio Rafael GARZA Hernandez, Lieutenant, Mexican Army, age 26.

3. The training objective of the program was to familiarize the trainees with the basic tradecraft principles and techniques involved in the conduct of clandestine activities, with primary emphasis on the work and activities of security services. Although largely tutorial in nature, numerous exercises were conducted in Mexico City, including two live problems which will be explained later in this dispatch, to further familiarize the trainees with the techniques involved in surveillance, counter-surveillance, personal meetings, deaddrops, interrogation, and investigation. The course included discussion and reading material on opposition to clandestine activities, organization and functions of a security service, personal, physical and organization security; cover, concealment and compartmentation, as well as the basic operational skills of observation, description, casing, surveillance, and elicitation and interviewing. Considerable time was spent on reporting and clandestine communications, as well as on agent acquisition and agent handling.

4. With the agreement of LITEMPO-12 (who said verbally that he had consulted with LITEMPO-4) and LIENVOY-2, the three DFS trainees detained Hector SENTIES Rodriguez, who is known to have had clandestine contact with the Soviets, for interrogation. He was detained on the street near his home on the early morning of 4 February 1969 and interrogated throughout the day at a motel, the Palo Alto, located at Km 14 on the Mexico City-Toluca highway. The other six (6) trainees were able to overhear the entire interrogation but did not actually take part for security reasons. They did not see SENTIES, nor did the latter see them. In line with the discussions and reading material, this live interrogation was of great value to them. Also, on 3 February 1969 LIENVOY-2 passed along to MYLECHRAINE a good lead concerning Carlos PEREZ Aguirre, a young Mexican who also has contact with the Soviets and Cubans. Unfortunately, only one-half day could be spent on investigating

this lead, but even this was of value to the trainees. One trainee was required to make a pretext telephone call, another team of two made a neighborhood check, and the remainder were divided into teams to check with Transito, the Ministry of Defense, the Social Security Institute and the Metropolitan Police. Except for the last team, all picked up some information of value, and the information and its significance in terms of the projected investigation of PEREZ was discussed with them.

5. The performance of the class as a whole was remarkably good. The three DFS men, because of their previous training and experience, were able to absorb and understand the lectures and reading material much more quickly than the others. None of the others had any previous training or experience in intelligence or security work. However, they were keenly interested, actively participated in classroom discussions and field exercises, and all prepared their written work in an acceptable manner. The instructor reviewed all written work with them, as well as plans for meetings, etc., and this proved most helpful. Somewhat unusual for Latins, all students were punctual; there were some very small and unimportant delays, but for the most part these were due to the exceedingly difficult traffic situation in Mexico City or to other reasons apparently beyond their control. No student was absent from classes during the entire training period, and no student was late for more than 45 minutes or an hour.

6. In summary, the instructor and the Station feel that the training objective was accomplished, and that the trainees, although not yet experienced operators, have a sufficient enough understanding of the basic tradecraft principles and techniques to permit them to begin operations. They are all intelligent and alert men, and except for LOPEZ y LOPEZ all have an Army background. CHANTRES is quite imaginative and resourceful, but also quite cautious and concerned about the possibility of flaps and compromises. He gets along well with all his fellow workers, and undoubtedly has real leadership qualities. TREJO is somewhat talkative, opinionated and argumentative, and may have trouble supervising others, but he, too, demonstrated considerable imagination and resourcefulness. GARZA, the youngest of the Army group, appeared to be the most pro-American, is very imaginative, and possesses considerable drive and energy. On one occasion he had the instructor out to lunch at his home, where he lives with his wife (they have no children). He commented on numerous occasions about his many (almost annual) shopping trips to San Antonio, where his wife has a number of close relatives. GARZA, it is believed, would probably be the most susceptible to development and possible recruitment of the group.

7. Except for the remarks in paragraph 6 above, no individual assessment will be forwarded herewith. The instructor has prepared a memorandum on each man, including the DFS group, setting forth his observations and opinions, as well as any information he was able to obtain on the trainees.

8. MYLECHRAINE used the name "Sr. Tomas" with the trainees; so far as is known they did not learn his true name, nor were they aware where he was living in Mexico City. Likewise, they are not aware that he has served previously in Mexico. There were no incidents involving security during the training period, and no other incidents or events that should be reported.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY DKR PER ______

ACTION ci WHS ☐ RID COPY

465

ASSIGNED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

24

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

INDEX ☐

CLASSIFY TO

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

INFO. FILE, VR. c/Ca/SO c/TSD3 c/CI c/FI2

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
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3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

MEXI

S E C R E T 262208Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0378 (LANGDON ACTING)

DIRECTOR

26 MAY 69 IN 65913

[redacted] WOACRE LIENVOY LIRAMA

REF : HMMA 36573, 8 APRIL 1969

1. ON 25 MAY GENERAL LUIS (GUTIERREZ) OROPEZA, JEFE DEL ESTADO MAYOR PRESIDENCIAL, AGAIN REQUESTED THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE TO REPLENSIH TRAINING MATERIALS PROVIDED PER LOGISTICS 9780. ORIGINAL REQUEST REPORTED IN PARA 2 (B) OF REFERENCE.

2. GUTIERREZ OROPEZA INDICATED THAT REPLACEMENTS COULD BE BROUGHT INTO MEXICO CITY WITH SAME ASSURANCES AS WHEN ORIGINAL SHIPMENTS ARRIVED.

3. PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 50-6-75/2.

S E C R E T

Removed from Project KUBARGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/2
JOB # 73-125/74
Box: 19 Fold: 2

Kenney file

CS COPY

SECRET

26 May 69
50-6-75/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : JUDKINS:ds
UNIT : WH/3/MEX 24
EXT : 5940
DATE : 1 MARCH 1963 24

TO : MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

4 MAR 63 23 11z

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 21965

T
RYBAT 21965

REF MEXI 3575 *

HQS PREPARING AND WILL POUCH LITENSOR BRIEFING PAPERS IN ENGLISH. PAPERS WILL INCLUDE SOME REFS TO PERTINENT DATA ALREADY AVAILABLE AT STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 75331 (LITENSOR HAS ASKED FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON VARIOUS COUNTRIES NAMED.

C/WH/3
WH/COPS

J. C. King
C/WH/D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Forrest Shivers
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

75331

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

FEB 27 0411Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3575

IN75331

RYBAT

REF A DIR 35657

B MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND, WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND.

2. CURTIS WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING HEADQUARTERS CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AND BELIEVE HQS MAY WISH ATTEMPT INFLUENCE LITENSOR ON CERTAIN POINTS IN SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

3. WILL NEED REPLY SOON AND, IF HQS WISHES PREPARE PAPERS, APPRECIATE RECEIPT BY 20 MARCH.

Legal Matters

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LITENSOR Request for Information on Ammunition for ZAPATA Movement.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMW-11256

Forwarded herewith is a bureau report containing additional information on the reported shipment of ammunition from Brownsville, Texas to Mexico.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
DBA-31071, 7 Jan. 63

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att

1 - RI W/Att
1 - Chrono W/Att

DATE TYPED: 23 Jan. 63

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11266

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-332-249
50-6-75-2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST: WH/3/Mex/J.R. Reeves:ds

EXT.: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/D		J. C. King

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 8 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/MS 2, S/C 2

DEC 8 1908Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 32097

DIR CITE MEXI 2787 IN32097

REF DIR 03898*

RYBAT LIENVOY

1. COS HAD TWO HOURS ALONE WITH LITENSOR AND LITEMPO/2 ON 5 NOV AT WHICH TIME LITENSOR VIGOROUS AS EVER. HE THIN; BUT HE SAID THIS ON DOCTOR'S ORDERS TO LOSE WEIGHT. COS HAS NOTICED LITENSOR MUCH THINNER AND HAS AGED RAPIDLY IN FOUR YEARS IN PRESENT POST; BUT NO EVIDENCE HIS SLOWING DOWN.

2. ON 8 DEC COS TALKED WITH LIELEGANT WHO SAW AND TALKED WITH LITENSOR AT A WEDDING ON NIGHT OF 6 DEC. LIELEGANT SAYS LITENSOR IN EXCELLENT HEALTH.

3. STATION WILL REPORT ANY INDICATIONS ILL HEALTH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DESIRED COS COMMENT ON REPORT THAT LITENSOR IN ILL HEALTH/

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 308
3 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1320 3 DEC LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, S/C 2

DEC 3 1753Z 62

PRIORITY

IN28460

PRITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2733

RYBAT/LIENVOY

1. LITENSOR VIA LIELEGANT ASKED COS FOR A REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXICO.

2. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT REPLY COS SHOULD GIVE; ALSO, REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE AMB MANN OF REQUEST AND REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Reeves

ORIG: J.R. Reeves:jm 1018
UNIT: WH/3/Mexico
EXT: 5940
DATE: 30Nov62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

30 NOV 62 45z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

TO CPIM MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02182

REF DIR 01719*

1. ODENVY ADVISED HQS 30 NOV FOLL:

A. NO IDENTIFYING DATA RE ORTIZ.

B. LAWYER REPRESENTING DIAZ INFANTE IS NORMAN LUCHS.

C. ODENVY REPORTS REFLECT THAT DIAZ INFANTE IS MENTALLY UNBALANCED CON MAN. THEY TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION REF REPORT.

2. HQS ALSO MADE INFORMAL INQUIRY OF ODACID MUNITIONS CONTROL AND ODBOON. NEITHER HAVE ANY INFO ON SUCH LARGE SHIPMENT OF AMMO FROM BROWNSVILLE TO MEXICO. BOTH EXPRESSED CONCERN THIS REPORT AND REQUESTED ANY ADDITIONAL INFO OBTAINED BY KUBARK.

3. VIEW ABOVE INFO, HQS PLANNING NO FURTHER ACTION.

4. IF STATION DESIRES FURTHER INVESTIGATION, HQS NEEDS ANY ADDITIONAL INFO AVAILABLE RE LETTER AND ORIGINAL REPORT. ALSO IS ORTIZ KNOWN TO MEXI GOVT OR LITENSOR OR IS HE UNKNOWN INFORMANT.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Reeves:jz
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO
INFO
CITE DIR [illegible]

WH CMT * Hqs requesting ODENVY investigate report of large shipment ammo from Brownsville to Diaz Infante followers.

C/S COMMENT: RE REQUEST FOR TRACES ON J. ORITZ.

WH/COPS

CI/LIA - J. Roman (by phone)
T. Flynn (by phone

CI/OG/WH/F. Hughes (draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : J. R. Reeves :j:
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 6284
DATE : 28 Nov 62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

1767

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

29 Nov 62 00 34z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO OPIM MEXI INFO CITE DIR 01719

REF MEXI 2688 (IN 25823)*

NO HQ TRACES SUBJ REF. REQUESTING ODENVY INVESTIGATE REPORT AND PASS RESULTS TO KUBARK HQ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE LTR FROM J. ORITZ RE AMMO BOUND FOR DIAZ INFANTE FORCES TO STAGE ANTOTHE REVOLUTION
WH CMT: * Attached

CI/STAFF- Mr. Hunt (draft)

WH/COPS

W Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 363
28 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1225 28 NOV 62)/OJ

NFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 28 1720Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 25823

OPIM DIR CITE MEXI 2688 IN25823

1. MORNING 28 NOV LIELEGANT GAVE CURTIS COPY LETTER ADDRESSED LITENSOR WITH PERSONAL REQUEST FROM LATTER FOR URGENT AND IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION.

2. LETTER POSTMARKED 24 NOV 1962 FROM J ORTIZ 285 LOS ROBLES AVENUE, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA, QUOTE CHECK INTO REPORT OF AMMUNITION FROM BROWNSVILLE, TEXAS, PORT FILLING 22 RAILROAD CARS (960 TONS) BOUND FOR DIAZ INFANTE FORCES TO STAGE ANOTHER REVOLUTION. A LAWYER REPRESENTING HIM IS NORMAN FUCH. THIS MEETING WAS IN OFFICES MILLIKIN AND MONTGOMERY IN PASADENA (CALIF) UNQUOTE.

3. VIEW THIS PERSONAL REQUEST BY LITENSOR REQUEST HQS IMMEDIATE TRACES, INVESTIGATION AND REPLY OPIM. NO STATION TRACES SUBJECTS BUT EXTENSIVE FILE ODENVY REPORTS MARCO ANTONIO DIAZ INFANTE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

, 064

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 30 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, D/OL 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 30 0642Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 48632

DIR CITE MEXI 2372

RYBAT/LIENVOY

(ALSO RCVD 207)

1. REQUEST TWO REVERE 224/TAPE RECORDERS WITH "Y" TYPE CORDS AND TWO NEW-TYPE IMPULSE RECORDERS MODEL B-10 WITH CONNECTIONS IN REAR BE SENT MEXICO SOONEST.

2. NEED EQUIPMENT TO DETERMINE MODIFICATIONS NECESSARY FOR NEW LIENVOY INSTALLATION.

3. WILL ORDER REMAINING EQUIPMENT WHEN NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARE DETERMINED AND WHAT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IS NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

50-6-75

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : A.C. DELANEZ
UNIT : OCI
EXT : 7454 1605
DATE : 25 SEPTEMBER 1962

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

25 SEP 62 21 22z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: AD/CI 2
INFO : ADDP, C/CA, C/WH 2, DD/I, S/C 2

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38585

RYBAT PBBAND

REF: DIR 37635 (OUT 79205)

FOR PASSING TO LITENSOR

1. SOVIET PROPAGANDA ~~SEME~~ CONTINUES TO CHARGE THE US WITH "AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS" TOWARDS CUBA AND CARRIES DETAILS IN SOVIET ~~EK~~ NEWSPAPERS CONCERNING ALLEGED PROVOCATIVE FLIGHTS BY US PLANES OVER SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS ENROUTE TO CUBA. WHILE MOSCOW CONTINUES TO MANIFEST GENUINE CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE US ACTION TO INTERDICT SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO CUBA, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN HIS 21 SEPTEMBER UN ADDRESS NOTED WITH SATISFACTION PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED AT THE PRESENT TIME. MOSCOW IS EVIDENTLY TRYING TO BUILD A CASE TO SUPPORT ITS CHARGES IN THE UN THAT THE US IS GUILTY OF "PROVOCATIVE ACTIVITIES" THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

2. RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUGGEST THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS STILL NOT COMMITTED TO A FIRM COURSE OF ACTION ON BERLIN AND CONTINUES TO PROBE AND ASSESS WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET MOVES. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOSCOW SEEMS INTENT ON CONVINCING THE ALLIED POWERS THAT IT HAS NOT RETREATED FROM A COMMITMENT TO A UNILATERAL SETTLEMENT IF NEGOTIA-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 80565 DIR 38385

-2-

TO INFO CITE DIR

TIONS LATER IN THE YEAR FAIL TO PRODUCE RESULTS.

3. BUILDUP OF CHICOM FORCES IN TAIWAN STRAITS SPRING AND SUMMER 1962 LEFT PEIPING IN STRONGER MILITARY POSITION THERE BUT POSTURE REMAINS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. CHINATS, THOUGH STILL ~~X~~ TALKING ABOUT RETURN TO MAINLAND, ARE UNLIKELY TO LAUNCH ANY OPERATIONS LARGER THAN SMALL-SCALE INTELLIGENCE PROBES IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BOTH SIDES ADHERE TO BASIC POLICY POSITION THAT "TWO CHINAS" SOLUTIONS/ IS ~~EX~~ OUT OF THE QUESTION, AND THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION IS DESTRUCTION, ABSORPTION RIVAL REGIME.

4. INDIA-CHINA: RECENT CLASHES ON ASSAM-TIBET FRONTIER HAVE REFOCUSED ATTENTION ON EASTERN END OF HIMALAYAN BORDER~~XX~~ AND HEIGHTENED SINO-INDIAN TENSION; SKIRMISHING LIKELY TO CONTINUE BOTH IN LADAKH AND NORTHEAST, BUT ONSET OF WINTER CONDITIONS IN MID-OCTOBER AND APPARENT RELUCTANCE OF BOTH SIDES TO EXTEND FIGHTING MAKES OUTBREAK OF LARGE-SCALE HOSTILITIES UNLIKELY.

5. INDIA-PAKISTAN: DESPITE PERIODIC TENSIONS OVER BORDER INCIDENTS~~X~~ AND LACK OF PROGRESS ON KASHMIR DISPUTE, RELATIONS ARE RELATIVELY STABLE AND ~~THE~~ THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF MILITARY ACTION.

6. JAPAN: NO CHANGE IN JAPANESE SECURITY SITUATION. VISIT OF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 80565 DIR 38385

TO INFO CITE DIR

KENZO MATSUMURA, RULING PARTY ELDER, TO PEIPING HAS ENCOURAGED OPTIMISM OVER PROSPECT FOR INCREASED TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA DESPITE CHICOM INSISTENCE ON LINKING POLITICS AND ECONOMICS.

7. PHILIPPINES: PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL'S ~~X~~ PROMISED DOMESTIC ACTION~~XX~~ PROGRAM HAS MADE LITTLE REAL PROGRESS AS YET, BUT HE HAS MAINTAINED THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY EMPHASIZING HIS ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN.

8. INDONESIA: EARLY CABINET CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, BUT INDONESIAN POLICY WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARING TO TAKE OVER CONTROL OF NEW GUINEA FROM THE UN NEXT MAY, AND OTHERWISE IS PRECCCUPIED WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

END OF MESSAGE

NOTE TO CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE FURNISH COPY TO OCI

ww/3/mef

for 1. Chief, WH/3

2. WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

f/ CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. O. WEBB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : John M. Whitten:js
UNIT : CWH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 20 Sep 62

1528

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

21 SEP 62 15 46z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 8
INFO : CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT79205

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 37635

REF MEXI 1979 (IN 25427)*

DIR 35657 (OUT 75740)** OF 12 SEP WAS SENT IN ANSWER TO YOUR REQUEST FOR SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR LITENSOR. ALL OF IT MAY BE PASSED TO HIM. WILL BRING IT UP TO DATE ON 26 OR 27 SEP AS YOU REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested additional cable report of whatever COS can pass to LITENSOR to arrive Mexi 26 or 27 Sep.
**PBBAND - Moscow statement re Cuba, situation in Japan and Indonesia, etc.

for J. C. KING
C/WHD

for NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

WH/COPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 060
19 SEP. 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO . ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	mexi	5	
3		6	

SEP 20 0446Z62

ROUTINE

IN 25427

DIR CITE MEXI 1979 (OUSLER ACTING)

IMMEDIATE ACTION

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. PARA FOUR REF* PLS CABLE REPORT SOONEST.

2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL CABLED REPORT TO ARRIVE MEXI 26 OR 27 SEPT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MEXI REQUESTED CABLED SITUATION REPORT OF WHATEVER COS CAN PASS PERSONALLY TO LITENSOR.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG : A.C. DELANEY
UNIT : OCI
EXT : 7454 1601
DATE : 12 SEPTEMBER 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 SEP 62 21 59z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : AD/CI
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/NE 3, C/FE 6, C/SR 4, C/WH 5, C/TFW 5, DD/I, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT75740

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35657

R RYBAT PBBAND

REF MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. MOSCOW'S STATEMENT OF 11 SEPTEMBER ON CUBA APPEARS DESIGNED TO ADVANCE VARIETY OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES, FOREMOST AMONG THEM BEING TO DETER US FROM ACTIVE INTERVENTION IN CUBA. ALTHOUGH STATEMENT AGAIN USED VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE TO AVOID CLEAR-CUT COMMITMENT TO DEFEND CUBA IN ALL CONTINGENCIES, IT HAS FURTHER ENGAGED SOVIET PRESTIGE IN ENSURING SURVIVAL OF CASTRO REGIME. AS BEFORE, HOWEVER, USSR IS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE IMPRESSION CUBA IS UNDER PROTECTION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR AND MISSILE POWER.

STATEMENT WAS ALSO CALCULATED TO ENABLE MOSCOW TO CLAIM FULL CREDIT FOR HAVING PROTECTED CUBA IF NO US-SUPPORTED INVASION OR INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING MATERIALIZES. IN ADDITION TO THIS DETERRENT EFFECT, MOSCOW APPARENTLY IS ATTEMPTING TO CHECK GROWING CONCERN IN US AND LATIN AMERICA OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS IN CUBA. IT STRESSED DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT BEING FURNISHED CUBANS XX AND IMPLICITLY DENIED ANY SOVIET INTENTION TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BXXXX BASES IN CUBA.

STATEMENT, MOREOVER, CONVEYED INDIRECT ASSURANCE THAT USSR WILL

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RELEASING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

598

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT75:40

-2-

TO INFO CITE DIR 35457

NOT CONFRONT US WITH SIMULTANEOUS CHALLENGES IN BOTH CUBAN AND BERLIN. IT SUGGESTS THAT LEADERS INTEND TO POSTPONE FURTHER SERIOUS BERLIN TALKS UNTIL LATE THIS XX YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR, TO GIVE THEMSELVES TIME TO XXX ASSESS IMPACT ON WESTERN POSIT OF PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON US "AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS" IN UN AND OF MANEUVERS TO INVOLVE UN IN BERLIN SETTLEMENT.

2. CHICOM MILITARY BUILDUP IN STRAITS IS REGARDED AS PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE AND CHINATS ARE SHOWING RELUCTANCE TO UNDERTAKE PROVOCATIONS THAT MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILITIES, RECENT U-2 INCIDENT NOTWITHSTANDING.

3. ALTHOUGH SINO-INDIAN BORDER REMAINS TENSE WITH RECURRENCE OF SMALL-SCALE SKIRMISHES, CHANCE OF ANY LARGE-SCALE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IS REMOTE; SKIRMISHING LIKELY TO CONTINUE UNTIL ONSET OF WINTER, 5-6 WEEKS HENCE.

4. IN JAPAN, SITUATION IS QUIET; LEFTISTS APPARENTLY CONSIDER PRESENT INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES LACK POTENTIAL FOR CREATING PUBLIC DISTURBANCES.

5. INDONESIAN SITUATION HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL FOLLOWING AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS FOR SETTLEMENT OF WEST NEW GUINEA ISSUE UNDER UN AUSPICES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/[illegible] 7

W. O. Webb
W. O. WEBB
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

087

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 11 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DJAKARTA

ACTION: FE 8 (FE TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0345, 11 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

SEP 11 0639Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 19949

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE DJAK 8352

REF A DIR 34266 Out 73366*

B DJAK 8837 Cu-18892

C/S COMMENT: *FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING FRIENDLY SERVICE ONLY REQUESTED STATION CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 SEPT.

1. IN ABSENCE REPLY REF B DJAK APPRAISING SITUATION IN WAKE WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT AND ASIAN GAMES AS FOLLOWS.

2. INDON OFFICIALDOM INDULGING IN STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER FINAL REALIZATION TWO LONG SOUGHT OBJECTIVES OF WEST IRIAN AND ASIAN GAMES. OUTCOME OF WHICH EMINENTLY PLEASING TO THEM. SUKARNO IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS AND OBVIOUSLY RIDING HIGH IN FULL CONVICTION HIS PERSONAL AND AUTHORITARIAN POLICIES OF MOBILIZING POPULACE TO CONFORM TO OBJECTIVES OF GUIDED DEMOCRACY ARE BEING JUSTIFIED. ONLY PERSISTENT CLOUD ON HIS HORIZON IS DEBILITATED ECONOMY, WHICH HE NOW MARSHALING STATE APPARATUS TO RECTIFY. ACTUAL PROCEDURES SUKARNO WILL ADOPT TO ATTEMPT RESOLVE SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS STILL UNCLEAR. HE WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT BY ALLEVIATING ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND INJECTING SOME VIGOR INTO ECONOMY HE WILL BE ABLE CIRCUMSCRIBE WHATEVER LATENT OPPOSITION THERE MAY STILL BE TO HIS REGIME.

3. WESTERN INITIATIVES IN REACHING WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT SATISFYING INDON CLAIMS HAS HAD IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF REDRESSING PRE-SETTLEMENT

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

IMBALANCE OF INDONS PRO-BLOC ORIENTATION. WHETHER THIS NEW BALANCE WILL BE TIPPED IN FAVOR WEST PROBLEMATIC AND DEPENDS ON FURTHER WESTERN INITIATIVES AND CHARACTER OF BLOC COUNTER OFFENSIVE. TWO INDON SCHOOLS THOUGHT PRZVAIL. ONE CONSISTING MIDDLE LEVEL BUREAUCRACY APPARENTLY SEE OUTCOME WEST IRIAN ISSUE AS PROPELLING INDONESIA CLOSER TO WEST. OTHER, WHICH REPORTEDLY INCLUDES ELEMENTS PALACE GUARD AND SUCH PEOGESSIONAL STATE PHILOSOPHERS AS RUSLAN AEDULGANI, SEEMS TO BELIEVE SOME OVERTURES TO BLOC NECZSSARY IN ORDER BLUNT ANY IMPRESSIB THAT QHST IRIAN SETTLEMENT WILL COMPROMISE INBON VERSION NEUTRALISM TO ADVANTAGESWEST.

4. INTERNALLY, VAST AND DISCIPLINED PKI (INDONESIA COMMUNIST PARTY), ORGANIZATION SOMEWHAT QUIESCENT AND SEEMINGLY STILL AWAITING GUIDELINES FGOM MOSCOW OR PEKING ON TWISTS THEIR SUBVERSION SHOULD TAKE IN WAKE WEST IRIAN SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, PKI OBSERVED ADDING TO MOMENTUM FORM DEMOBILIZING ARMY AND LESSENING ARMY INFLUENCE, WHICH MAIN OBSTACLE PKI AMBITIONS, IN INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS. INDON MILITARY COUNTERING THIS MOMENTUM BY SEEKING GUIDE LIMITED DEMOBILIZATION IN MANNER CALCULATED PRESERVE THEIR STATUS UNDER GUIDED DEMOCRACY AS ONE OF FOUR MAIN FUNCTIONAL GROUPS CONTROLLING INDONESIA'S FORTUNES.

5. SUKARNO GIVING NO IMPRESSION HE INTENDS LIBERALIZE HIS AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. ON CONTRARY HIS RETOOLING OF "LIBERAL" ELEMENTS FROM GOVT BUREAUCRACY BEING INTENSIFIED AND NEW IMPETUS BEING GIVEN TO NATIONAL FRONT AS SUKARNO'S CATCHALL AND MAIN POLITICAL INSTRUMENT FOR CONTROLLING AND GUIDING ENERGIES OF EMASCULATED POLITICAL PARTIES (PKI EXCEPTED) AND FUNCTIONAL GROUPS TO CONSOLIDATE PRECEPTS GUIDED DEMOCRACY.

(END OF MESSAGE)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

110

SECRET 110

DATE : 8 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DJAKARTA

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 8 0649Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 18892

DIR CITE DJAK 8837

REF DIR 34266 (out 73306)*

DJAK UNCLEAR WHAT TYPE SITREP WANTED. IN VIEW PRESSURE OTHER WORK WE WONDER WHETHER HQS COULD NOT DO A BETTER TAILORED AND MORE COMPLETE JOB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUEST STA CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 DEPT.

Forget one!

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

028

DATE : 7 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 2 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2315, 7 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 8 0245Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 18811

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 1888

RYBAT

REF DIR 33992 Out 72932 *

1. LITENSOR NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL AFTER 17 SEPT. HE TRAVELLING OUTSIDE MEXICO CITY.

2. COS WITH AMB MANN AND MATERIALS SENT (WHICH NOW IN SPANISH) WILL HAVE MEETING WITH LITENSOR (PRIVATELY) PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE.

3. APPRECIATE HQS HELP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *MR HENRY HECKSHER AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 10-17 SEP FOR BRIEFING OF LITENSOR.

[illegible] in needed.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : HENRY D. HECKSHER
UNIT : CFE/PIA
EXT : 5426
DATE : 5 SEPTEMBER 1962 1771

TO : DJAKARTA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: FE 8
INFO: FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

5 SEP 62 23 55z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT73306

TO DJAK INFO CITE DIR 34266

FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFING FRIENDLY SERVICE ONLY REQUEST STATION CABLE SITREP INFO MEXI 10 SEPTEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

LIENVOY

Orrin Magill
DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, FE DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

WH (Telecoord w/ Mr. V. Gresham)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

HENRY D. HECKSHER
CHIEF, FE/PIA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

15

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG.: Vernet Gresham:js
UNIT: WH/COPS
EXT.: 7743
DATE: 5 September 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

5 SEP 15 85z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

72932
72932

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 33992
33992

RYBAT

DIR 31814 (OUT 69116)*

1. MR. HENRY HECKSHER AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 10-17 SEP FOR BRIEFING OF LITENSOR.

2. ADVISE DATE MOST CONVENIENT TO LITENSOR AND COS.

3. AS COS AWARE MR HECKSHER HAS EXCELLENT AREA KNOWLEDGE OF INDONESIA, PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. HE WILL REQUIRE INTERPRETER ASSISTANCE FROM COS.

4. FYI MR. HECKSHER DEPARTING WITHIN FEW DAYS ON TRIP TO CERTAIN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER PROJECT. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY AS SOON AS FEASIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT *Stated Hq would notify Station when selection of expert in area knowledge firmed up.

Liaison Support

CFE/PIA ✓ Hecksher (in draft)

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J. R. Reeves:js
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 23 August 1962

..77

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6 , S/C 2

24 AUG 62 00 10z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT69116

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31814

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1773 (IN 10046)*

1. BRIEFING PAPERS POUCHED AS ATTACHMENT TO ~~HMMW~~ 10862 DATED 20 AUG.

2. DUE AREA KNOWLEDGE AND LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT, SELECTION OF EXPERT STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION. WILL NOTIFY STATION WHEN ~~selection~~ SELECTION FIRMED UP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *LITENSOR now tentatively plans depart on Far East Trip 26 Sep.

LIFENCY / [illegible]

for RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

WH/COPS RKD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 062
23 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 23 03-22 62

ROUTINE

IN 10046

DIR CITE MEXI 1773

REF DIR 26750 [illegible]

RYBAT

1. LITEMSOR NOW TENTATIVELY PLANS DEPART FOR PHILIPPINES (STOPOVER), INDONESIA, JAPAN, INDIA ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

2. APPRECIATE IF HQS COULD P/ACI BRIEFING PAPERS ON INDONESIA, JAPAN AND INDIA; STATION WILL TRANSLATE.

3. WILL CABLE WHEN DEFINITE PLANS AVAILABLE.

4. RE PARA 2 REF COS CAN INTERPRET AT MEETINGS IF EXPERT COMES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS PREPARED OFFER BRIEFING PAPERS PER AND CONCURRED EXPERT COMING MEXI.

LIENVOY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

WH/Mexi

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSED		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Briefing Papers for LITENSOR

ACTION REQUIRED : See Para 2 below

REFERENCES : MEXI 1469, 21 July 1962

1. Forwarded herewith are the briefing papers on the Communist Movement in Japan, India and Indonesia as requested in reference.

2. These studies were prepared by KUDESK and are forwarded for translation by the Station. Also, it is requested that the Station review the studies and sanitize them for passage to LITENSOR as appropriate.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Briefing papers:
1 ea: Japan, India, Indonesia

Distribution:
O&l - COS Mexico City, w/attachments

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED
20 Aug 62

DATE DISPATCHED
23 AUG 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10862

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-209529

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

ORIG : LEE G. NORRIS:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 August 1962

1590
30

5-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

17 AUG 62 21 03z

DEFERRED ~~SIG CEN~~
ROUTINE

OUT 66927
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO MEXI (OPIM) INFO CITE DIR 30[illegible]

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1693 (IN 46148)*

1. WOLLENSACK EQUIPMENT NOT SUITABLE AND NO OTHER NEW EQUIPMENT TYPES AVAILABLE. RECOMMEND TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE.

2. IF TRIP CAN NOT BE DELAYED, WE WILL ATTEMPT ENTERTAIN AND DIVERT LIENVOY 2 WITH ARSHART'S HELP. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: Requested Hqs show LIENVOY-2 Wollensack equipment for New L.P.

TSD/ACB John Castro (in draft)

WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
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Holman
NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

342

DATE : 16 AUG 62 DMCL

TO : DIRECTOR.

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1525 16 AUG 62)

INFO : *ADDP, C/CI, S/C 2

AUG 16 1922Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 46497

TO (PRIORITY) DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1711

REF DIR 29996 (OUT 66087)**

SEE MEXI 1693. (IN 46148)

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**RE INFO THAT AREHART AND LIENVOY 2 COMING WASH 17 AND 22 AUG.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

ORIG : J. WHITTEN
UNIT : DC/WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 15 August 1962

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

15 Aug 65 22 22z

OUT66087

~~SIG CEN~~

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 66087

PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, S/C 2

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 29996

RYBAT LIENVOY

UNDERSTAND FROM MULFORD THAT ARKHART AND LIENVOY 2 COMING WASH 17 AND 22 AUG TO DISCUSS NEW LIGHT EQUIPMENT FOR PROJECT. HAS THIS BEEN DELAYED OR CANCELLED IN VIEW OF MEXI 16917* ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *(IN 45535) LI TEMPO-2 HAS ASKED COS SET UP TELEPHONE TAP OPERATION.

/S/

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET RYBAT~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

C47

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 29 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 6, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 30 0447Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 11121

DIR CITE MEXI 0415

REDCAP

REF DIR 00232 Out 65709

INFO PARA ONE REF PASSED LIELEGANT, AND ALSO TO AMB.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONTAINED INFO SEMEN TARASOVICH BAZAROV.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

7 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Outside Translator

1. It is requested that you contact the appropriate Career Boards to try to locate candidates to fill the job now being held by George Misko in Mexico City, but under deep cover. He must have the following qualifications:

a. Languages: Russian (fluent), Czech (fluent), Spanish (would be expected to bring proficiency of Spanish up to good). Also provide names of candidates having only Russian and Spanish.

b. Job: translating telephone tap tapes

c. Age: any age acceptable

d. Sex: male or female but male preferable

e. Grade: grades 9 through 12 should be considered

f. Security: Would be sent to Mexico City to work in a basehouse with Mexican liaison personnel and one KUBARK Staff Agent. Must be willing to expose himself as KUBARK to Mexican Government.

g. Cover: Would be provided by Mexico, could bring family and limited household effects. Will have no contacts with Embassy or have any Embassy privileges.

h. Type of Employee: Career Agent or Contract Agent preferred. If not available, Staff Agent or Contract Employee Type B would be suitable.

2. Any questions on this request should be directed to Charlotte Bustos-Vidala, WH/3/Mexico, X2555.

3. It is the intention of this desk to slot this new employee into a LIENVOY slot and vacate the Station/Embassy slot for another FI Case Officer.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - LIENVOY/Support
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT: LIENVOY (2135-5701-5170) Mexico

Staff Agent: AREHART, Arnold F.

		FY 1962	FY 1963
Approved: 1 July 1961 - 31 January 1962	**$40,340**		
(Pending) 1 February 62 - 31 Jan 1963	**25,482**	**$65,822**	**$39,758**

SUPPORT EXPENSES:	Salary	5,000	
	10% S.A. Premium	500	
	Equalization	250	
	Retirement	326	
	Housing	2,100	
	Education	400	
	AREHART auto upkeep & travel	4,900	
	AREHART home leave travel		2,000
	Salary and cover travel for AREHART and family	8,330	11,670
	Total Support Expenses	21,806	13,670
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES:		44,016	26,088
	TOTAL	$65,822	$39,758

~~SECRET~~

( ) (WH/3/Mexico

ISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Material for Passage to Liaison
101 Questions to a Guerilla Fighter

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached are two copies of General Alberto Bayo's book (in Spanish) for use in briefing or training agents or members of security forces with which we have liaison. This book is a "do-it-yourself" guide to paramilitary and sabotage techniques. It demonstrates Cuban support for such activities and the need for training in counter-measures by friendly security forces.

2. Headquarters has recommended that all WH Stations have one or more of these books, especially those where official or unofficial liaison exists with a security force.

3. If Station Mexico is interested in this book, a limited number of copies can be obtained. Prior to releasing any of these copies, Headquarters must know the individual and service receiving the book thereby allowing its clearance release.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City, w/att

DATE TYPED
25 Jan 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
26 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-2218

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

25 January 1962

SUBJECT: Request for LIENVOY Project Renewal

1. In accordance with the new policy of charging all costs in connection with Staff Agents to Station Support and not to a project, there is an adjustment required in the budget figures quoted in the attached memorandum requesting project renewal.

2. The LIENVOY Project should be approved for a total of $43,240; $17,152 for fiscal year 1962 and $26,088 for fiscal year 1963. Funds totaling $8,330 in fiscal year 1962 and $13,570 in fiscal year 1963 will be transferred to Mexico City Support to fund Arnold F. ARNHART, Staff Agent.

Distribution:
1 - LIENVOY/Support
1 - LIENVOY/Dev & Plan

104-10187-10009

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDFACTOR Photographic Surveillance Operation
Folder 11, 50-6-74/3 Operations

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1958 thru 1973 (terminated)

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Archives (Job no. 78-970)

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible]	[illegible] 73	Dan Hardway	Dan Hardway
28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUNE		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
25 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
10/31	10/31	Hardway	Hardway
15 NOV. 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12-21-78		JENZMAN	Jenzman
[illegible]		Berk	Berk

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JOB 78-855 BOX 36

423009

307227

RETIRED FILE
DESENSITIZED
per CSI-70-17

FOLDER 7

KDFACTOR
/3 OPERATIONS

File No 50-6-74/3

Other Agency Documents
(2 Enclosed)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

(Headquarters component) WH/1	**SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION**
TO : IP/AN	
TO : (Station/Base) Mexico City	FROM: (Division) WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
	COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT	050	006	074/3

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION				5. DISPOSITION			
☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)	☒	RETAIN	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN				

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)	8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
HMM	050

9. **FILES ACTION**

☒	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
23 July 1973	50	06	74/3

RM -63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______

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AGENCY MESSAGE

CTION UNIT
WH8

CTION #
923

INFO RF. FILE VR. C/AN, DDO, SBS, FI
ADDO, CI, CI/OPS, CI/TC

T 180863 PAGE 01-01 IN 895416

TOR:192050Z APR 73 MEXI 23439

S E C R E T 191915Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 23439

TO: DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, PANTECH.

REDLEG KDALCOVE TECHS

REF: MEXICO CITY 22902 (IN 550655) 50-6-74/3

factor

1. O KDALCOVE PHOTO EXPERIMENTS NOW CONCLUDED. TEST PHOTOS AND INSTALLATION DETAILS ARE BEING FORWARDED BY DISPATCH ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO INSTALL CLOSED CIRCUIT TV TO MINIMIZE OPERATOR FATIGUE AND MAXIMIZE OP EFFICIENCY. ALTHOUGH STILL TROUBLED AT TIMES BY TRAFFIC AIR POLLUTION, OVERALL PRODUCT IS GOOD QUALITY AND FULFILLS OUR REQUIREMENTS.

2. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH TDY MKSPICE TECHS, TV SYSTEM ENSTALLATION APPEARS FEASIBLE. ALSO GOOD POSSIBILITY THEY MAY HAVE NEEDED EQUIPEMENT WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE ON EXTENDED LOAN BASIS. IF APPROVED, MKSPICE PHOTO TECH WOULD BE REQUESTED ASSIST IN INSTALLATION.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/2. E2, IMPDET.

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~E3~~
~~SX~~
~~DES~~ STD
~~FI~~
C/WH/1

S E C R E T

RECORD COPY

50-6-74/3
19APR73

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible], DDO, ADDO, C/CI, [illegible], [illegible], C/SB5

ACTION NO. 792

S E C R E T 060033Z MAR 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22902 (ROSTEDT ACTING)

ALEXI

TO: DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, PANTECH.

RYBAT REDLEG KDALCOVE TECHS

REF: MEXICO CITY 22495 (IN 820452)

850655

Dd

AS
AB
XI
PS
EZ
~~DES-NPD~~
~~FI~~
WH/1

1. KDALCOVE PHOTO BASEHOUSE OPERATIONAL 1 MAR 1973. KDALCOVE-1 AND -2 GIVEN ON SITE TRAINING AND BRIEFING 28 FEB BY OLIVER J. MANKUNAS AND STATION TECH CHARLES F. HIPPEN. KDALCOVE-1 TOOK FIRST OPERATIONAL FILMS FOLLOWING DAY AND PRODUCT WAS RETRIEVED USING KDALCOVE-2 AS CUTOUT. ALTHO EARLY MORNING PHOTOS WERE EXCELLENT QUALITY, HEAVY BUILDUP OF TRAFFIC AIR POLLUTION BY MID-MOARNING SERIOUSLY AFFECTED PHOTO DEFINITION. BEFORE DAYBREAK 5 MAR, MANKUNAS AND HIPPEN AGAIN RETURNED TO PHOTO SITE TO TEST VARIOUS FILTERS AND SPEED SETTINGS IN EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE PROBLEM. TEST PHOTOS TAKEN WITH DARK ORANGE HAZE FILTER SHOWED IMPROVEMENT AND PRODUCED USABLE PRODUCT. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE EXPERIMENTING TO OBTAIN OPTIMUM RESULTS. TEST PHOTOS AND INSTALLATION DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED BY POUCH.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

6 MAR 1973

Factor

50-6-74/3

CS COPY

SECRET

ORIG: R. SWIDER:lf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 9354
DATE: 5 February 1973

MESSAGE FORM
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BY 13 PER ____ # ____

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 15 1973
MICROFILMED

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR 367346

07FEB73 17 02z

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYLOTE REDLEG KDALCOVE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 22495 (IN 820452)

B. DIRECTOR 362309

1. APPRECIATE REF (A) DETAILS. CONCUR IN YOUR PLAN.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 50-6-58/3. E2, IMPDET. WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE.

AN
AB
DESIGNED

WH COMMENTS: Ref A requested Mexico City provide details desirability one safesite over another. Ref B complied with Ref A request.

DIV/D CIB Anita Potocki - in draft

Factor

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

50-6-58/3

RAYMOND J. SWIDER
AC/WH/1

50-6-74/3

7 FEB 1973

WARNING NOTICE
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AND METHODS INVOLVED

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MAR 19 1973
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ACTION UNIT
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FILE, VR cIPLAN DDP ADDP CS/DO c/SB 5 c/WH 8
c/a c/FI 2

ACTION NO.
578

S E C R E T 310036Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22495 MEXI

820452

M

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT TYLOTE REDLEG KDALCOVE

AN
AB
IN
PS
DB
~~DES~~ : NFD
~~FI~~
WH/1

REF A. DIRECTOR 362309

B. MEXICO CITY 22429 (IN 815792)

1. IN RESPONSE REF A QUESTION, AVAILABILITY IS MAIN FEATURE, BUT EASE IN ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY ARE ALSO FACTORS INFLUENCING OUR PROPOSAL TO COMBINE PHOTO OPERATION WITH KDVAULT TECHNICAL OPERATION. APARTMENT UNDER EARLIER CONSIDERATION WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL PROBABLY SOMETIME IN MAY, AND WE DO NOT NOW HAVE ANY SUITABLE CANDIDATES TO TAKE POSSESSION WHEN IT BECOMES AVAILABLE. COMBINING BOTH OPERATIONS WILL REDUCE NUMBER ASSETS INVOLVED, COSTS, AGENT MEETINGS AND PROJECT ADMIN. SECURITY WILL BE ENHANCED BECAUSE TWO ACTIVE SITES IN SUCH CLOSE PROXIMITY CKPOLAR INSTALLATION WOULD DOUBLE COVER PROBLEMS AND DOUBLE NUMBER OF CLANDESTINE MEETINGS TO RETRIVE PRODUCT.

2. IN SUM, BOTH APARTMENTS IN QUESTION HAVE ESSENTIALLY SAME DESIRABILITY FEATURES FOR KDVAULT OPERATION. HOWEVER,

CS COPY

SECRET

31 JAN 1973

050-6-58/3

50-6-74/3

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 22495 S E C R E T

BELIEVE ACQUIRING BOTH APARTMENTS FOR SUPPORT ACTIVITIES NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF MANPOWER DRAIN AT TIME WE NEED EMPHASIS ON RECRUITING MORE AND BETTER ACCESS AGENTS AGAINST PRIORITY TARGETS.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 50-6-58/3. E2 IMPDET.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

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~~CWH~~ 4/SB

BY: D AT: 1635 Z

DISSEM BY 12 PER

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

FILE, VR C/IPAN C/SB5 C/CI

ACTION NO 668

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PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 151606Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 22308 (ROSTEDT ACTING) MEXI

807463

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 10 1973
MICROFILMED

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

RYBAT REDLEG KDFACTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 358750

B. MEXICO CITY 22307 (IN 806421)

1. APPRECIATE YOUR RAPID RESPONSE PER REF A. SUBJ REFS HAS OTHER COMMITMENTS WHICH PRECLUDE HIS OCCUPANCY THIS APARTMENT. HE WILLING SIGN LEASE, BUT IN VIEW HIS POTENTIAL FOR OTHER OPS WE ARE RELUCTANT HAVE HIM DO THIS. THUS, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED KDADAGE-42, IN ALIAS, TO TRY AND TIE UP APARTMENT LONG ENOUGH TO ENABLE US FIND SUITABLE CANDIDATE TO LIVE IN APARTMENT AND PERFORM DESIRED OPERATIONAL TASKS. THIS MAY BE FEASIBLE SINCE PRESENT APARTMENT TENANTS DID NOT FOLLOW THRU ON ORIGINAL PLANS TO VACATE 14 JAN. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS. VIEW ABOVE, YOU DO NOT NEED TO AMEND POA AS REQUESTED REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3; 201-906628. E2, IMPDET.

S E C R E T

WH/1

D 201-906628

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50-6-74/3
15 ~~16~~ JAN 1973

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CSDO

BY: 6 AT: 0215 Z

DISSEM BY 25 PER

PRECEDENCE

ACTION UNIT C/WH8

INFO FILE. VR/ C/IPLAN, C/CI, C/FI2, C/SB5, CSDO

ACTION NO. 565

S E C R E T 130139Z JAN 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY MEXI 22307 (ROSTEDI ACTING)

806421

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT REDLEG KDFACTOR

DOC. MICRO. SER.
APR 10 1973
MICROFILMED

AN
AB
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PS
CX
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WH/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 328305

B. MEXICO CITY 21273 (IN 727027)

C. MEXICO CITY 21713 (IN 761220)

1. REQUEST YOU AMEND POA ON SUBJECT REF A AND GRANT POA ON HIS WIFE TO PERMIT THIS COUPLE TO OCCUPY AND USE APARTMENT CITED BELOW FOR OBSERVATION AND PHOTO POINT AGAINST CKPOLAR MISSION. SUBJECT REF A NO LONGER NEEDED FOR USE OUTLINED REF B SINCE ANOTHER MORE SUITABLE CANDIDATE AVAILABLE. NEED FOR URGENT APPROVAL EXPLAINED BELOW.

2. APARTMENT IS ON THIRD FLOOR OF MENTIONED REF C BUILDING WITH EXCELLENT VIEW CKPOLAR MAIN GATE. TEST PHOTOS TAKEN AND INDICATE SITE SUITABLE FOR USE. THIS SITE WILL REPLACE FORMER KDABSINTHE PHOTO BASEHOUSE. KDADAGE-42 BRIBED RENTAL SECRETARY TO HOLD APARTMENT FOR HIM UNTIL 15 JANUARY. SAID HE HAD OUT OF TOWN FRIENDS INTERESTED THIS LOCATION. WE DOUBT HE CAN PERSUADE SECRETARY TO KEEP APARTMENT OFF RENTAL MARKET BEYOND 15 JANUARY.

3. MARRIED COUPLE ORIGINALLY VETTED BY US AND HELD IN RESERVE

D201-906628

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 22307 SECRET

FOR THIS PHOTO OPERATION (SUBJECTS OF REF C) WERE, AS YOU KNOW, DIVERTED LAST WEEK TO OCCUPY LP FOR MPCHEEK AUDIO OPERATION.

4. WE HAVE NOT YET ASKED SUBJECT REF A AND WIFE IF THEY ABLE AND WILLING RUN PHOTOPOINT FOR US, BUT OLIVER J. MANKUNAS WHO KNOWS THEIR PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION BELIEVES THEY WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY.

5. REQUEST APPROVAL PROCEED BY PRIORITY CABLE. NEED APPROVAL PRIOR COB 13 JAN. SUGGEST ASSIGN NEW CRYPT TO THIS OPERATION. WILL FORWARD COMPLETE PRQ I AND II ASAP.

6. FILE: 50-6-74/3 201-906628 E2, IMPDET.

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INFO. Chief, Soviet Bloc Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 March 1972 through 31 July 1972

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCE : HMMA-41,734, 10 March 1972 (Previous Report)

INTRODUCTION

1. The KDFACTOR Project has been terminated because of developments reported in other channels. This will be the last of the operational reports forwarded to Headquarters and primarily a wrap-up of developments to date.

OPERATIONS

2. The KDFACTOR Project supported two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation. Operations from the KDLITERAL surveillance point were suspended on 4 July 1972, the equipment removed on 7 July, and the operator, KDFACTOR-2, terminated the same date. Operations from the KDABSINTHE surveillance point were suspended on 28 July, the equipment removed on 29 July, and termination of KDFACTOR-5 and his family accomplished the same date.

ADMINISTRATION

3. Oliver J. MANKUNAS continued to have responsibility for inside administrative chores and agent handling throughout the period. Processing of the photo product was accomplished inside the Station.

PERSONNEL

4. The project included five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operated the KDLITERAL basehouse. KDFACTOR-5 operated the KDABSINTHE basehouse with the assistance of his wife KDFACTOR-6 and his two sons KDFACTOR-8 and -9. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 have served BKTRUST in their photo specialty since 1957.

CONTINUED . . .

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FILE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3 Factor

5. KDFACTOR-2 will continue to reside in the KDLITERAL building, as part of his termination agreement, until probably sometime in December when he will move to new quarters of his own. The KDLITERAL building (MEXI-03, Unit 15) is part of the KDVAULT complex of buildings which will be disposed of as reported in other channels. If this occurs before December, KDFACTOR-2 will move at the time of disposal.

6. KDFACTOR-5 and his family will vacate the KDABSINTHE apartment o/a 31 August. KDABSINTHE is located in a building owned by KDABBEY who plans to dispose of his equity in the property in the near future.

PRODUCTION

7. KDLITERAL: Before being closed down, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, was the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He provided an average of three rolls of film a week and provided weekly written reports based on his visual observation of the target area.

8. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced an average of six rolls of film a week and was our principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, especially "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR was also our main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

9. In addition, KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both provided detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. With the loss of this combined coverage, it will be difficult to identity personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements in and out of the compound. The two surveillance points also provided periodic photo studies of the MHHARSH installation itself with emphasis on coverage of the construction changes and modification or additions made to the communications antenna system.

SECURITY

10. We were gratified to receive the very favorable Headquarters KDFACTOR security review which was forwarded as HMMW-19,061, 28 June 1972. There is no need for further comment.

PROBLEMS

11. Only the developments reported in other channels.

FINANCES

12. KDFACTOR Project termination costs have been charged to FY 1972 with the exception of rent payments and utility costs which are being charged to FY 1973. The breakdown of agent termination costs is as follows:

KDFACTOR-2	$102,000
KDFACTOR-5	29,575
KDFACTOR-6	35,380
KDFACTOR-8	8,112
KDFACTOR-9	19,592
TOTAL	$194,659 pesos ($15,572.72 USD)

PLANS

13. Not applicable.

EVALUATION/OBITUARY

14. We believe the KDFACTOR Project represented a professional

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-42,197

collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

Oliver J. Mankunas

Oliver J. MANKUNAS

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible], CI, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION # 978

S E C R E T 102318Z APR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19452 MEXI

DIRECTOR

KDFACTOR

10 Apr IN 582033

REF: DIRECTOR 252261

1. BRUCE H. FERNALD MET MONTHLY WITH RAYMOND H. GERENDE FROM JULY 1970 TO MAY 1971 TO PAY TEN INSTALLMENTS OF TERMINATION BONUS. LAST MEET WAS 4 MAY 1971. ALL IMPORTANT INFO ON PROBLEMS OF GERENDE AND WIFE (FORMERLY LIEMPTY-19) WAS REPORTED BY CABLE DURING THIS PERIOD, EXCEPT FOR NEWS THAT GERENDE VISITED HOLLAND DURING CHRISTMAS 1970 WHEN HAD AMICABLE VISIT WITH WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. GERENDE IS OWNER OF HOUSE RENTED AUGUST 1970 BY STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. HE STILL TEACHING ENGLISH TO EMPLOYEES OF TWO LOCAL FIRMS AND APPEARS FINANCIALLY PRESSED SINCE CLASS SCHEDULE REDUCED RECENTLY FROM SIX TO TWO HOURS PER DAY. STILL DRINKS, BUT APPARENTLY IN MODERATION. HAS INDICATED HE MIGHT VISIT WIFE IN HOLLAND THIS SUMMER. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE GERENDE HAS VIOLATED HIS SECRECY AGREEMENT OR PROBED INTO LNLUTE STATUS OF GARDALPHE.

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SECRET

10 April 72

50-6-74/3

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 19452 S E C R E T

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

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ORIG: Julie Paulas
UNIT: WH 1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167
DATE: 6 APRIL 1972

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 252261

TO MEXICO CITY

KDFACTOR

REF: A. HMMW-18,773, 23 DECEMBER 71
B. HMMA-41734, 10 MARCH 72

1. IN ORDER COMPLETE REF A KDFACTOR SECURITY REVIEW RE KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF TERMINATED AGENTS AND FAMILIES, STATION REQUESTED FURNISH BRIEF SUMMARY OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES FROM TERMINATION IN JUNE 1970 TO PRESENT. ABOVE INFO NEEDED PRIOR TO COB 11 APRIL, IN ORDER PROVIDE NEEDED DETAIL TO REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

AH
A C
X
FI

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A requested an updated security review of KDFACTOR Operations and knowledgeability of terminated agents and families. Reference B is Station answer to Reference A. Reference B lacks detail regarding GERENDE, who handled KDFACTOR up to late 1970, present activities.

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LAWRENCE C. LASER
AC, WH/1

50-6-74/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

7 April 72

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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, Soviet Bloc Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 September 1971 through 29 February 1972

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-41,028, 17 September 1971 (Previous Report)
B. HMMW-18,773, 23 December 1971

OPERATIONS

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the past six months to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation.

ADMINISTRATION

2. Oliver J. MANKUNAS continued to have responsibility for inside administrative chores and agent handling throughout the period. Bruce H. FERNALD, who previously handled the assets, is the alternate case officer and would be available to take over agent meeting responsibilities in the absence of MANKUNAS. Processing of the photo product is accomplished inside the Station. Agent meetings have now been cut to a minimum, and the processing of the product and delivery to the consumer has been speeded up.

PERSONNEL

3. The project includes five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operates the KDLITERAL basehouse and has been employed in this capacity since 1957. KDFACTOR-5 operates the KDABSINTHE basehouse with the assistance of his wife KDFACTOR-6 and his two sons, KDFACTOR-8 and -9. KDFACTOR-5 has also served BKTRUST in this capacity since 1957.

PRODUCTION

4. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, continued to be the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He produced 55 rolls of

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	HMMA-41,734	10 March 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-41,734

film and provided weekly written reports based on his daily visual observation of the target area.

5. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced 100 rolls of film and continued to be the principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, with special attention given to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR also continued to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

6. KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both continue to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. Without this combined coverage, it would be difficult to identify personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements and activities. In addition, the two surveillance points provide periodic photo studies of the MHHARSH installation itself with emphasis on coverage of any construction changes and any modification or additions made to the communications antenna system. Both sites are also available to service special support requests as required. During the period, KDLITERAL performed a number of special photo surveys and a three-week frequency sweep requested by WOACRE.

SECURITY REVIEW

7. There were no known problems of security relating to the project. In response to Reference B request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that project security is sound. The project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long-time residents of the area. All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLed. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their ~~BKTRUST~~ employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence.

8. The only termination of a project asset in recent years was KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the photo product from both surveillance points. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated amicably in March 1971. We still maintain periodic contact with him; and his brother, KDADAGE-14, continues to be one of our more valued MHHARSH access agents. KDFACTOR-1 is a reputable physician with a wide circle of friends, and on a number of recent occasions he has been very helpful when we have taxed his expertise in his field or requested background information on people in the medical profession. Although KDFACTOR-1 processed the photo product, he was not knowledgeable of the exact surveillance point locations. Delivery and pickup of the finished product was always accomplished by an outside case officer.

9. Contact is maintained with only two of the five assets. KDFACTOR-2 and -5, both of whom are responsible for the operation of their respective basehouses. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 are met weekly to obtain the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE product for timely processing and analysis by the Station. Meetings with KDFACTOR-2 are car pickups at periodically changed locations in the suburbs. Meetings with KDFACTOR-5 consist of car meetings early in the morning along his route of travel to his overt job. These meetings last only long enough to pick up the product, provide new supplies, and pay salaries, rents, utility bills, etc. Emergency contact plans are on file at the Station and have been forwarded to Headquarters on both KDFACTOR-2 and -5. KDFACTOR-6, -8, and -9 are members of KDFACTOR-5's immediate family and could be contacted through him using his emergency plan.

10. We have taken action recently to guard against the contingency that one of the present sites might be blown, and alternate

means might be required to continue the KDFACTOR coverage. In February 1972 an apartment became available in the same building complex which houses the KDABSINTHE installation. Through the cooperation of KDABBEY-1, we were able quietly to rent the apartment and install elements of the KDCALVERT team as residents. This location affords as good, if not better, vantage point for continuing photo coverage in the event the present KDABSINTHE location becomes untenable. We are also exploring alternate locations for KDLITERAL to solve the problem we face with this element of KDFACTOR coverage (see below).

PROBLEMS

11. The only known problem connected with the project is a product of mother nature which is threatening the effectiveness of KDLITERAL coverage. Approximately two years ago MHHARSH personnel planted eight small trees along the edge of the terrace leading to the garden. These trees have flourished and now have grown to the point where KDFACTOR-2, the KDLITERAL operator, estimates he only has a year more of effective operational capability. We are studying ways of solving this problem and will forward a separate dispatch to Headquarters on the topic in the near future.

FINANCES

12. There have been no changes in anticipated project expenses shown below for FY 1972 and FY 1973.

SALARIES	FY 1972 (USD)	FY 1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-2	5,280	5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	2,165
	11,856	13,042
BASEHOUSE RENT		
MEXI-03, UNIT 15	400	400
MEXI-132	3,550	3,840
	3,950	4,240
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES		
Basehouse utilities	750	800
Property maintenance & replacement	500	500
Christmas bonuses	988	1,087
	2,238	2,387
TOTAL EXPENSES	18,044	*19,669

PLANS

13. No changes in the project are contemplated.

EVALUATION

14. The support provided by the KDFACTOR Project to the Station REDTOP Program is indispensable. We believe the project represents a professional collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

*Reflects anticipated salary raises and higher rent on MEXI-132 based on projected cost of living increase over two-year period.

Oliver J. Mankunas
OLIVER J. MANKUNAS

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Operational Report, 1 March through 31 August 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

REFERENCE : HMMA-40,227, 8 March 1971 (Previous Ops Report)

OPERATIONS

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the past six months to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) directed against the MHHARSH installation.

ADMINISTRATION

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of the project until early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Ops Support Section back to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative chores, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD who had previously handled the assets. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed his responsibilities. MANKUNAS also took over agent meetings when FERNALD left on home leave on 25 June and will continue to handle the project assets in the future.

3. Processing of the photo product is now accomplished inside the Station by Phemia B. CHAUVEAU. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly did all the processing in an outside safehouse/darkroom, was terminated amicably in early March 1971, and at that time the responsibility was turned over to CHAUVEAU. The new arrangement has proven to be more than satisfactory. Agent meetings have now been cut to a minimum, and the processing of the product and delivery to the consumer has been speeded up considerably.

PERSONNEL

4. The project includes five salaried assets. KDFACTOR-2 operates the KDLITERAL base house and has been employed in this capacity since 1957. KDFACTOR-5 operates the KDABSINTHE base house

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DATE
17 September 1971

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with the assistance of his wife, KDFACTOR-6, and his two sons, KDFACTOR-8 and -9. KDFACTOR-5 has also served JKLANCE in this capacity since 1957.

PRODUCTION

5. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL, through KDFACTOR-2, continued to be the source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers. He produced 76 rolls of film and provided weekly written reports based on his daily visual observation of the target area.

6. KDABSINTHE: Operated by KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTHE produced 167 rolls of film and continued to be the principal source for information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, with special attention given to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons and political exiles. This segment of KDFACTOR also continued to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

7. KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE both continue to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. Without this combined coverage, it would be difficult to identify personnel assigned to the MHHARSH installation or to monitor their daily movements and activities.

SECURITY

8. There were no known problems of security relating to the project. The termination of KDFACTOR-1 should pose no security problem: Contact was broken amicably, and it is highly probable that he would be more than willing to help out again if his services are needed. Of the remaining assets, all five have been SGSWIRLED in the past. They derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their JKLANCE employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence.

9. Contact is maintained with only two of the five assets, KDFACTOR-2 and -5, both of whom are responsible for the operation of their respective base houses. Both KDFACTOR-2 and -5 are met weekly to obtain the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE product for timely processing and analysis by the Station. Meetings with KDFACTOR-2 are car pickups at periodically changed locations in the suburbs. Meetings with KDFACTOR-5 consist of car meetings early in the morning along his route of travel to his overt job. These meetings last only long enough to pick up the product, provide new supplies, and pay salaries, rents, utility bills, etc. Emergency Contact Plans are on file at the Station and have been forwarded to Headquarters on both KDFACTOR-2 and -5. KDFACTOR-6, -8, and -9 are members of KDFACTOR-5's immediate family and could be contacted through him using his emergency plan.

PROBLEMS

10. There were no known problems connected with the project during the reporting period.

FINANCES

11. The termination of KDFACTOR-1 and the subsequent elimination of outside photo processing costs accounts for the drop in anticipated project expenses shown below for FY 1972 and FY 1973.

SALARIES	FY 1972 (USD)	FY 1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-2	5,280	5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,901

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-41,028

SALARIES (con't)	FY-1972 (USD)	FY-1973 (USD)
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	2,165
	11,856	13,042
BASE-HOUSE RENT		
MEXI-03, UNIT #15	400	400
MEXI-132	3,550	3,840
	3,950	4,240
MISC. EXPENSES		
BASE-HOUSE UTILITIES	750	800
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE & REPLACEMENT	500	500
CHRISTMAS BONUSES	988	1,087
	2,238	2,387
TOTAL EXPENSES	18,044	19,669*

PLANS

12. No changes in the project are contemplated.

EVALUATION

13. The support provided by the KDFACTOR Project to the Station REDTOP Program is indispensable. We believe the project represents a professional collection effort being run securely and successfully against a sensitive target with a minimal expenditure of funds and case officer time.

*Reflects anticipated salary raises and higher rent on MEXI-132 based on projected cost of living increase over two year period.

Oliver J. Mankunas

Oliver J. MANKUNAS

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Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

ACCT./FINANCE KDFACTOR/KDVAULT--FY 71 Safehouse Expenses

Reference: HMMT-11016, dated 16 July 1971

1. Headquarters has analyzed the KDFACTOR and KDVAULT project charges to Sub-Object Class 2353, as requested in reference. These projects have received credit for the rent refunds recorded on the vouchers mentioned in paragraph 5 of reference.

2. Attached, for the Station's information, is a breakdown of the expenses charged to these projects under S.O.C. 2353. These totals equal the total expense reported on the 30 June 1971 ASR. The Station will note that all expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the safehouses are included under this Sub-Object Class.

3. The Station's method of handling the MEXI-03 rent accounting is completely satisfactory to Headquarters.

Patrick W. MAYSTON

Distribution:
3-Chief of Station, Mexico City

Attachments:
As Stated Above

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FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT KDFACTOR/KDVAULT- Expense Credit for KDABBEY Refunds of MEXI-03 Rents		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

1. Upon reviewing Station's Obligation Status Reports from Headquarters, it has been noted that there apparently have been no credits entered for KDABBEY's net rent refunds on MEXI-03

2. MEXI-03 is owned by JKLANCE, with KDABBEY as the ostensible owner. Each month the Station gives the occupant of Units #11, 13, 15 and 17 of MEXI-03 their rent for the month in advance, which they then pay to KDABBEY's agent. Originally this agent was KDVAULT/2, who was witting of the rental arrangement and neither received nor paid rent on Unit #11, which he occupied. Since his termination in April 71, Unit #11 has been occupied by KDVAULT/9, who is not witting of the arrangement. The current occupancy and rent structure for MEXI-03 is:

UNIT #	OCCUPANT	MONTHLY RENTAL	PROJECT CHARGED
11	KDVAULT/9	1,700.00MN	KDVAULT
13	KDVAULT/3	1,650.00MN	KDVAULT
15	KDFACTOR/2	1,430.00MN	KDFACTOR
17	KDVAULT/5	1,540.00MN	KDVAULT

3. At the end of each quarter, KDABBEY submits to the Station an accounting recording the rents received on the four units of MEXI-03, and the expenses incurred for property taxes, rent receipt stamp taxes, municipal water charges, maintenance and repairs, and similar items during the quarter. The difference between the rents paid to and the expenses incurred by KDABBEY as ostensible owner of MEXI-03, is refunded to the Station by KDABBEY with the quarterly accounting.

.....continued

Distribution: Orig & 2 - Chief, WH Division

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT 11016	DATE 16 July 1971
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	HMMT 11016

4. When monthly rents are paid to KDVAULT/3, 5 and 9 and KDFACTOR/2, they are expensed to the appropriate project and entered in a KDABBEY Memorandum Account. When KDABBEY's refund is received, it is recorded as a credit to expense pro-rated between KDVAULT and KDFACTOR, and the Memo Account is cleared.

5. The vouchers recording expense credits from KDABBEY rent refunds for FY 1971 (with one more refund to be made) are: Vou. 10634, 23 Oct 70 (July-Sept); Vou. 11023, 12 Jan 71 (Oct-Dec); and Vou. 11575, 10 May 71 (Jan-Apr).

6. It is requested that recording of these vouchers at Headquarters be reviewed, since Station's analysis of the Obligation Status Reports figures as of 31 May 1971 indicate that no such expense credit has been recorded for KDVAULT or KDFACTOR in S.O.C. 7353 or any other S.O.C. for Vou. 10634 and Vou. 11023, both of which should have shown up by the 31 May OSR.

7. If there is some particular reason why the KDABBEY refund of MEXI-03 rents has not been credited to expense, or if Headquarters wishes the Station to handle the MEXI-03 rent accounting in another manner, please advise.

Norris A. DESSIMOZ

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

S/C SPLIT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID

LUNGER TED
RID/AN
EXT. 4239

GN-993
GA30
TUBE GT7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1		29 MAR 1971	29 MAR 1971	
2. DC		29 MAR 1971		
3. C/WH			29/3	
4. Wheeler				
5. Kravcov			7 APR 1971	K
6. WH/B+F				
7.				
8.				
9. WH/CONTRACTS		21 April	21 April	WSK
10.				
11.				
12. WH/1/Kravcov		~~[illegible]~~ 24		K
13.				
14. File				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

COMMENTS

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note termination of KDFACTOR-1. Gives us $4,000 we can use someplace else.

We can use it, plans now.

4-5: How soon will this $ be available? Any extra termination expenses?

5-6: note termination + resulting savings.

5-9: FYI.

9-12 Thanks for the opportunity to review. Looks as though security could be improved ~~and~~ as well as savings in time.

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	~~ABSTRACT~~	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
	~~INDEX~~	50-6-74/3

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 8 MAR 71

DOCUMENT NUMBER: HMMA 40227

87637

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

3P

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR/
Operational Report for the Period 1 October 1970 - 28 February 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-39679, 28 October 1970 (Previous Operational Report)

GENERAL

1. The KDFACTOR Project continued throughout the period to support two visual and photographic surveillance points (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTH) directed against the MHHARSH installation and to support the related photo processing of the product.

2. The Station is presently taking steps to terminate KDFACTOR-1 the photo processor and move this phase of the operation into the Station.

3. Primary responsibility for the operational and administrative handling of Project KDFACTOR was transferred on 1 December 1970 to the Operational Support Section, and handling of the KDFACTOR personnel was turned over to Howard T. BAGAUS on 2 December 1970.

MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

4. KDFACTOR-5: This agent is met by BAGAUS at 0800 each Tuesday morning at one of four different sites near the Anillo Periferico in Polanco, some three miles from the Station. The modus operandi used with this agent is basically the same as previously used by Bruce H. FERNALD. All meetings are held in the case officer car, and after the meetings, KDFACTOR-5 resumes his trip to work.

Continued....

Attachments: (Split Transmission)
1. Right Side - H/W
2. Left Side - USC
3. IDENTITY - USC

Dated 25 MAR

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att
2 - Chief, SBD, w/att
[illegible]

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-40227

DATE
8 March 1971

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-40227

5. KDFACTOR-2: He is met at 1630 every Tuesday by BAGAUS. in several new widely spaced sites. Modus operandi is basically the same as that described in the previous operational report for FERNALD, and after the meeting, KDFACTOR-2 proceeds to his cover job.

6. KDFACTOR-1: After meeting with KDFACTOR-2, BAGAUS drives via round-a-bout route to a location several blocks away from the KDFACTOR-1 medical office, where he leaves his car and walks to the office (taking counter-surveillance precautions on the way). BAGAUS, as FERNALD previously, uses the notional cover of either a pharmaceutical salesman for "Laboratorios del Norte" or that of a patient while waiting in the outer office. The waiting period normally depends upon whether KDFACTOR-1 is in at the time, or whether he is in the middle of an operation at the hospital. (Waiting periods vary from immediate admittance to the KDFACTOR-1 office to several hours). The average period is about twenty minutes. A decision was reached in the Station to terminate this asset and to transfer this phase of the operation to the Station itself, in the interest of speed, security, and cost. This termination is planned for early March 1971, at which time, the processing will be done in the Station.

SECURITY

7. There have been no known security problems during this reporting period.

PRODUCTION

8. KDLITERAL: During this reporting period, KDLITERAL through KDFACTOR-2 has again been the principal source of within-the-compound photographic coverage of PCS and TDY MHHARSHERs producing 129 rolls of film. During the period covered, a great change of PCS personnel at the MHHARSH installation took place, and KDLITERAL played a leading role in assisting the Station in identifying the new members of the installation, through not only photographic coverage, but through detailed visual reporting also. In addition to reporting on the activities of the different individuals in the target installation, KDLITERAL has also reported on significant construction changes in the compound such a recent change in the antenna configurations on the roof of the main building. During this period, KDLITERAL has been specifically targetted against AEJEFE, on whom which a special report has been submitted.

9. KDABSINTH: Operating through KDFACTOR-5, KDABSINTH produced 158 rolls of film. It provided the Station with information on visitors to the MHHARSH installation, giving special attention to visits of "WOCORK-type" persons. KDABSINTH continues to fulfill requirements from the various sections of the Station who have requested fixed surveillance of political exiles, etc., to determine if these individuals are in contact with the MHHARSH installation. This segment of KDFACTOR continues to be the main source of information on MHHARSH license plates and automobiles.

10. Both KDLITERAL and KDABSINTH continued to provide detailed "attendance sheets" on all MHHARSH personnel. In addition, they provided reports on the activities and associates of IDENTITY who was on TDY in Mexico from 15 October through 4 November 1970. During this period both units were also involved in surveilling the movements of an AEKICK technician, (201-838166) who periodically makes trips to other Latin American countries on short notice.

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

PLANS AND CHANGES

11. With the exception of the termination of KDFACTOR-1 (paras. 2 and 6) there are no further changes contemplated in this operation during the next reporting period. It is expected that the termination of KDFACTOR-1 will represent about $4,000 US in yearly savings for the operation, and that the previous two week photo

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-40227

processing backlog will be narrowed to a week at the longest.

Howard T. BAGAUS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

50-6-74/3

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

1P

SECRET

USC ATT. #3 TO HMMA-40227, 8 MARCH 1971

IDENTITY - Viktor Nikitovich KRESOV, no 201
AEKICK Office of the Executive
Action Department

MICROFILMED
MAR 29 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

S/C ATT 1 to HMMA-40227

50-6-74/3

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN NOV 4 12 PM '70 RECEIVED RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID.

PYAN, DONALD ER-899
RID/AN CA-50
EXT. 4239 TUBE GT-Z

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/1		12 Nov 1970		[illegible]
2. DC		13 NOV 1970		L
3. C/WH/1				[illegible]
4. Wheeler		18 NOV 1970		[illegible]
5. Kravcov				K
6.				
7. SB/X/WH			8/12	DD
8.				
9. WH/1 Kravcov			8 DEC 1970	K
10.				
11. CI/OPS/WH			10 Dec 70	[illegible]
12.				
13. WH/1/Mexico				A
14. ~~WH/CR~~	[illegible]	15 Dec	15 Dec	J
15.				
16.				
17. RID. FI				

COMMENTS

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How do you all feel about para 12? (semi-annual progress reporting)

5-7: Concur.

3-2 & 4. Semi-annual reporting OK with me. Check SB and see if they agree. [illegible]

4-5: Since you are the one to follow this, I'll leave the question of semi-annual reporting to you. On a project such as this, perhaps the rules might be bent just a bit. Pls check regs to see if quarterly reports are demanded (I think they may be). In any case, your answer should tell them o.k., but there should be sufficient other reporting to enable us to follow the project adequately. You should also check SB & see how they feel. — Concur - DD

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT ✓	FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
	INDEX	50-6-74/3
DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	28 Oct 70	HMMA 39679

124979

SECRET (40)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT LIEMPTY Project/Operational Report, 1 July - 30 September 1970		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-39188, 10 July 1970

B. HMMW-17950, 10 June 1970

OPERATIONS

1. The LIEMPTY Project continued throughout the period to support two visual and photographic surveillance points directed against the MHHARSH installation and to support the related photo processing of the product.

a. LICALLA is the designation of that portion of the Project that covers surveillance of the rear and garden area of the MHHARSH installation. It operates from one of the units (MEXI-03) of the LIMESA, Station-owned properties, and it includes only one agent: LIEMPTY-9.

b. LILYRIC is the designation of that portion of the Project covering surveillance of the front entrance of the MHHARSH installation. It includes LIEMPTY-13 as the key member of the basehouse team, supported by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, who is the main photographer, observer and log-keeper, and their two sons, LIEMPTY-26 and -27 who assist in photography, maintenance of arrival and departure logs on target personalities, and preparation

Continued......

Attachments: (Split Transmission)
1. Right-hand Side - h/w
2. Left-hand Side - USC
3. Middle - USC

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Distribution:
(2) - Chief, WHD, w/atts a/s
2 - Chief, SBD, w/atts a/s

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39679	DATE 28 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39679

of the typewritten reports submitted to the Station. The basehouse (MEXI-132) is located near the front of the MHHARSH installation and it is owned by LIMOUSINE. (Contrary to Reference B Project Renewal, LIMOUSINE is the actual, not "ostensible", owner of this property. Please see HMMA-33814, 8 January 1968, for full details of the various property transfers, destruction and re-construction of buildings and re-locations of operations connected with the Project, past and present.).

c. Photo processing is accomplished by LIEMPTY-4 except in special cases when prints are required quickly and are processed within the Station. LIEMPTY-4 has a darkroom located in the rear of his medical office and he handles the work after normal office hours with patients.

2. Outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD handles the three key agents of the Project (LIEMPTY-9, -13, and -4). He meets with each once a week for passing requirements, paying agent and sub-agent salaries, rents and other expenses, providing supplies, and retrieving the product. Inside case officer Timothy M. ARCHBOLD handles the internal administration of the Project and is the Station contact with FERNALD.

MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

3. LIEMPTY-13: He is met by FERNALD in the early hours of Tuesday mornings at about 0730 in Polanco, an area far from the basehouse. LIEMPTY-13 parks his car and walks through a central park on Calle Horacio where he is intercepted within a ten-block distance by FERNALD, driving his car. During a drive together, instructions and product are passed between them and, once a month, LIEMPTY-13 is paid his salary and the salaries for LIEMPTY-14, -26 and -27. After drop-off LIEMPTY-13 returns to his car and proceeds to his full-time job, thus avoiding any direct route back to the basehouse operation.

4. LIEMPTY-9: After completing his surveillance workday from 0800 to 1500 hours, he completes his written reports and drives to meet FERNALD at around 1630 hours, also on Tuesdays. The location of car meetings varies but remains within a quiet, fairly secluded section. After leaving FERNALD, LIEMPTY-9 proceeds to his cover job at a brother's automobile dealership for the remainder of his day, again avoiding any direct route from FERNALD back to the basehouse.

5. LIEMPTY-4: After receiving the unprocessed take from LIEMPTY-9 and -13, FERNALD prepares instructions, as suggested by log entries that accompany the take, and goes to LIEMPTY-4's medical office waiting room in the late afternoon. For these meetings, FERNALD appears to be a pharmaceutical salesman or a patient and gets to see LIEMPTY-4 only after all other visitors have departed. At each meeting, FERNALD delivers films from both LICALLA and LILYRIC for processing and retrieves the processed take that he had left the week before. While this arrangement means that some of the product (those photos taken soon after meeting with LIEMPTY-9 and -13) are almost two weeks old when received at the Station, we have not found this to be unacceptable. When speed is of the essence in special circumstances, the Station WOACRE technician can handle the processing.

SECURITY

6. With the exception of the potential problems connected with the Raymond H. GERENDE/LIEMPTY-19 divorce, of which Headquarters is aware, there are no known problems of security connected with this Project.

ASSIGNMENTS/PRODUCTION

7. During the period of this report, LIEMPTY-4 processed approximately 142 rolls of 36-exposure film. Roughly one-third comes from LICALLA and the remainder from LILYRIC which commands the better view and more trafficked approach. In addition to this routine workload, LIEMPTY-4 was called upon frequently for additional prints and enlargement of special targets or interest.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA), in addition to his picture-taking (perched for seven hours daily atop a ladder arrangement to see above the heightened garden wall), regularly provides a detailed "attendance sheet" and a monthly summary of MHHARSH personnel activities. The photos are an indispensible tool in the day-to-day REDTOP operations program, providing photo identifications of PCS and TDY MHHARSHers and assisting to determine probable RIS affiliation based on observed associations within the compound. The detailed "attendance sheet" helps in keeping track of MHHARSHers present, their patterns and changes in pattern of activities. This information is often the principal tool in PBRAMPART activities, assisting in identifying the probable MHHARSH contacts of double agents despatched to the MHHARSH installation.

9. Following are some sample requirements which were levied on LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period:

a. weekly reports of work being done at the installation by YERSHOV and PANOV (DIRECTOR 025386), TDY construction workers since May 1970.

b. special reports on the activities of AEMERGER who was under the microscope prior to home leave departure in July 1970.

c. reports on the activities and associations of Mikhail Vasilyevich UMNOV (201-819913), TDY AMTORG representative from New York who is of JKLANCE and LNERGO interest.

d. watch for the arrival of Viktor Nikitovich KRESOV, AEKICK officer of Executive Action Department.

e. confirm arrival and provide details of activities and associations of Subject of 201-866272 (Moble ANGUS), LNERGO/LNREAD double agent.

f. special report on AETURNKEY throughout the period. (LIEMPTY-9 is given a target for concentrated coverage and reporting over a two or three month period at a time.)

10. LILYRIC was provided with the same requirements as LICALLA (paragraph 9 a-e, above). LILYRIC is the main source of license plate and automobile information both on MHHARSHers and on visitors to the installation, and has a standing requirement to report by phone the arrivals of all obviously WOCORK citizens. One such individual, who now visits regularly, has been tentatively identified as the language instructor of the MHHARSH Ambassador's son and a potential lead which we will investigate.

promising

CHANGES

11. Effective 1 July 1970, all of the agents of the Project received salary increases (HMMA-39548, 10 October 1970) for a net increase of $2,184.00 U/S/D per year.

12. Unless Headquarters believes that quarterly reports of operations are essential for an understanding of the functioning

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39639

of the Project, the Station proposes to report semi-annually hereafter, on 31 October and 30 April, including sufficient financial and other data in April to assist in preparing project renewals. The value of the Project for both REDTOP and other Station operations has been well documented over a long period of time. There have been no recent additions or changes in either personnel or basehouse properties and none is contemplated. Any significant events which might affect the Project's operation, such as the GERENDE divorce, will, of course, be reported separately.

13. The basic operation of the Project remains the same with only spot requirements in support of specific objectives changing from time to time.

Timothy M. Archbold
Timothy M. ARCHBOLD

[illegible]

HMMA-39188

LEFT SIDE H/W

RIGHT SIDE U/S/C

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Project Operational Report, 26 March - 30 June 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-38700, 25 March 1970
B. HMMW-17950, 12 June 1970

1. With the termination of Raymond H. GERENDE, effected on 26 June 1970 and described in HMMA-39129, 29 June 1970, the LIEMPTY Project now consists of the operations of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photo base houses and the photo processing of LIEMPTY-4. Outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD handles all agents, normally on a once per week basis, and passes the take to his Station contact. Operational funds are passed to FERNALD by his Station contact, and FERNALD pays all agent salaries, rents, and other expenses. The elimination of GERENDE has resulted in some loss of efficiency, since base house personnel cannot regularly be met as frequently as in the past. This can mean a delay of up to two weeks in receipt by the Station of photos. However, LILYRIC and LICALLA personnel have standing requirements to report by telephone visits of Americans, and they are also alerted in advance whenever possible to forthcoming TDYs of MHHARSH visitors, so that arrangements can be made for special meetings and speedy processing of photos. Normally, all photos are developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4. When speed is of the essence, however, negatives are sent into the Station for processing by the WOACRE technician. Thus, while GERENDE's loss is a serious one in certain respects (he was, on the local scene, talented, knowledgeable, and experienced), LIEMPTY production has not suffered greatly.

Attachment:
1. Left side h/w
2. Right Side u/s/c

received by KIDIAN on 23 July 70

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION

[illegible]

CS COPY

Distribution:
2 - C/WH w/left side h/w and right side u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/left side h/w and right side u/s/c

Copy sent to SB/X/WH

LIEMPTY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-39188	10 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓5 - 74/3

2. As far as the security problem is concerned, the generous termination settlement awarded to GERENDE has probably removed whatever small temptation there may have been on his part to be indiscreet about his former association. Although GERENDE has certain character weaknesses which emerged as a lack of dedication and a feeling that he could get by with as little work as possible, the Station believes that he is basically not an irresponsible person, and that he realizes not only that he has an obligation to respect security, but that he also realizes that he has been treated fairly and with great patience. He has offered his services for the future, and he was told that we appreciated the offer and did not want to lose complete touch with him, but for now he should devote himself to getting a good job.

3. As for GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, she also appeared to be grateful for the termination bonus which she had been granted (and which she was told had not been carved out of what was due GERENDE). On the other hand, she has less reason to be loyal to JKLANCE, and her mental stability is somewhat open to question. Therefore, she poses a greater threat to LIEMPTY security than does GERENDE. At the same time, she knows much less about Station operations and personnel than does GERENDE. Furthermore, it is not likely that she would (a la Mrs. LIROCKET-1) go directly to the MHHARSHers with her information. What she might do is reveal to her lawyer that GERENDE had worked for LNPURE and therefore had income to which she might feel that she is entitled. Since GERENDE is no longer employed and therefore no longer has regular income (except for monthly payments of the termination bonus, which she has agreed in writing not to claim), this threat has also been lessened. Theoretically, however, she could expose LIEMPTY and LIFEAT techniques (since she has been a LIFEAT transcriber), but she could not, as far as we know, expose any currently employed agents, with the exception of LIEMPTY-4, who is married to GERENDE's sister. (None of the above assessment of the possible security threat posed by LIEMPTY-19 is changed by her 8 July visit to JKLANCE Headquarters.)

4. There have been no changes in the functioning or activities of the LICALLA base house. In addition to the routine photos, "attendance reports," and special concentration on the activities of various individuals (most recently AETURNKEY), LIEMPTY-9 responded to a number of spot requests. For instance, it was LICALLA coverage which was instrumental in helping to identify the AEGRIP officer who came to Mexico City to meet an LNREAD agent (see MEXICO CITY 2820, 30 March 1970) and to establish that the TDYer spent most of his time in the company of other AEGRIP officers. Also, when the AEKICK inspectors finally arrived early in April, LIEMPTY-9 was able to establish that their principal "escort Officer" appeared to be AETURNKEY. LIEMPTY-9 was also alerted to watch for the arrival of the subject of DIRECTOR 042120, 12 June 1970 (and has not, as of this writing, seen any sign of him). Perhaps the most useful contribution during the reporting period was the updating of a sketch of the back of the MHHARSH Embassy, identifying the persons he most often sees at each window. Used in conjunction with the AEMIDRIFF debriefing (and her knowledge of the inside), this helped us come up with as accurate a view as we have ever had of the location of various offices and officers within the MHHARSH Embassy.

5. There have also been no charges in the functions or activities of the LILYRIC base house personnel. Photos and logs of daily comings and goings were routinely furnished. The logs once again proved their value by indicating that the subject of MEXICO CITY 3389, 8 June 1970, was probably lying when he said that he had meetings with AETURNKEY at certain times on certain dates.

50-6-74/3

The logs showed that AETURNKEY might have made the first meeting, but would certainly have been late for it. For the alleged second meeting, however, the log showed that AETURNKEY was in the MHHARSH Embassy for the entire period of the meeting (subject of MEXICO CITY 3389 later amended his story to say that AETURNKEY had not made the second meeting). LILYRIC personnel were quick to spot the subject of MEXICO CITY 3542, 25 June 1970, making visits to the MHHARSH Embassy, and reported these visits by phone even before the Station had learned, from LIENVOY, of this person's telephone call. Several other visitors of apparent WOLADY nationality were also routinely reported to local LNERGO, along with a request for license plate resolution if a WOLADY license plate is spotted. Late in June, LILYRIC was alerted to report the possible visit of a person who had made a phone call to 201-087316, offering the latter some "interesting information." LILYRIC spotted and photographed a person who may be identical with the caller, and attempts are now under way to resolve this.

6. LIEMPTY-4 continues to handle all photo developing and printing (except when certain prints are needed quickly), and in spite of his leg injury, from which he is now recovered, he did not miss any deadlines. The fact that GERENDE has been terminated is not expected to affect his relationship with the Station, even though he is married to one of GERENDE's sisters. FERNALD has established good rapport with him, and he has stated that GERENDE's problems are not his and will have no effect on his association.

7. The above recital of LILYRIC and LICALLA activities would seem to indicate a heavy CI emphasis. Actually, this is not the case. While CI is an important by-product, not only for ourselves but also in support of walk-in operations run by other agencies, the day-in day-out bread and butter photo and fixed surveillance information is of great importance to our positive operations. The data base which has been built up and maintained by LIEMPTY facilities, along with the services of LIENVOY, LIFEAT, and LIEMBRACE, give the Station an impressive support apparatus which is vital to our program.

8. With respect to the approved project renewal forwarded with Reference B, we have the following comments:

a. Through an oversight, we neglected to report in Reference A that LILYRIC base house rent was raised as of 1 January 1970 to an annual rate of $3,360.00 (USD).

b. LICALLA base house rent was raised, effective 1 July 1970, to an annual rate of $1,373.00 (USD). (Reference B shows that this figure has already been requested for FY 1971.)

c. As indicated in Reference A, salary increases for all remaining LIEMPTY personnel will probably be recommended in the near future.

d. The GERENDE dark room rent (MEXI 137) is now being paid to LIEMPTY-4. Pending the completion of GERENDE's new house the lab work was being done temporarily in LIEMPTY-4's office. With the suspension, and now the termination of GERENDE, it became necessary to make this a permanent arrangement, and the Station felt it only fair to pay LIEMPTY-4 this fee ($80.00 USD per month), not only for the use of his space but also for increased water and electric bills (particularly the latter) resulting from his having to develop, print, and dry the photos. GERENDE was paid through December 1969, and in June 1970 LIEMPTY-4 was paid retroactively for the period 1 January to 30 June 1970. It is planned to continue the monthly payments, so this item should be restored in the next project renewal request.

e. Regarding vehicles, MV 2947 (not MV 2823) was sold in FY 1970. MV 2823 is the LIENTRAP vehicle, and is still in use. It is, however, used in the LIEMBRACE Project and the maintenance expenses ought to be charged to LIEMBRACE, just as are the salaries of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, who operate the LIENTRAP vehicle.

9. The changes noted above do not involve large amounts of money, and are also to some extent offsetting. Therefore, it is not likely that these changes will require additional funds for FY 1971 over the amount approved.

10. As requested in Reference B, following are emergency commo plans as worked out by FERNALD:

a. LIEMPTY-4: Spanish should be used when talking to his secretary; Spanish should also be used, preferably, when talking to LIEMPTY-4. In view of his profession and the uncertainty of his working schedule, the person making the contact should go unannounced to his medical office at Carlos B. Zetina 73 between 1700 and 1830 hours. In the waiting room there is a secretary and the caller should tell her that he was referred by "Sr. Victor de los Laboratorios del Norte" and wants to see the doctor. When admitted, the officer should tell LIEMPTY-4 that he is certain the doctor remembers Sr. Victor. LIEMPTY-4 will answer affirmatively. For positive identification, the officer will show the last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-4. LIEMPTY-4 needs no positive identification, because his diplomas with pictures are exposed in visible places in the waiting room.

b. LICALLA (LIEMPTY-9): Spanish only should be used. After 1630 hours but before 1800 hours, phone to his place of cover business (phones: 6-56-15-44 through 48) and ask for LIEMPTY-9. Caller should identify himself as a friend of in having some property
Victor and state his own interest would like to discuss insured through him. Add that the caller Arrange date and the matter with him over a cup of coffee. Prearranged place: time (about 1700 hours) of meeting. in the Woolworth Store at Reforma, near the Reforma Hotel, will have a briefcase hardware and tools department. LIEMPTY-9 in the same hand. (or attache case) and a rolled up newspaper get a tape measure

PASSWORD: Officer: Please, where can I I need it for my
calibrated in inches?
Club.

LIEMPTY-9: You should have no problem in finding
one.

For positive identification the officer will show last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-9. LIEMPTY-9 will pull out of his briefcase a Monterrey Insurance Co. application form with his name written in the upper right corner. The first and third Tuesday of each month LIEMPTY-9 will be walking in front of SEPS-Paris Restaurant, on the Insurgentes side, from 1620 to 1630 hours, with his briefcase as stated above. Password and identification are as stated above.

c. LILYRIC (LIEMPTY-13): Spanish only should be used. Phone his place of work (5-20-60-20, ext 367), his secretary usually answers, and ask LIEMPTY-13 if he received the present his friend Victor sent him, because Victor has not heard from him for some time. LIEMPTY-13 will answer negatively re the present. The caller will request a meeting with LIEMPTY-13 because he wants to be able to tell Victor how his friend the Ingeniero was. Arrange date and time of meeting. Place is prearranged: in the Koala Restaurant-Cafeteria at the corner of Ejercito Nacional and Moliere (Gigante Super Market parking lot). LIEMPTY-13 will be sitting (or standing) in

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-39188

the waiting area holding a medium sized manila envelope in one hand and two addressed but unsealed airmail envelopes in the other.

PASSWORD: Officer: Can I catch a bus for Santa Monica here?

LIEMPTY-13: I am not very sure, but I will ask somebody.

For positive identification, the officer will show last salary receipt signed by LIEMPTY-13. LIEMPTY-13 will show a folded box of Colgate tooth paste. On the second and fourth Thursday of each month, LIEMPTY-13 will be walking in front of the above-mentioned Koala Restaurant-Cafeteria, on the Ejercito side, from 1330 to 1340 hours. As a recognition signal he will hold the three envelopes as described above, except that if it is ~~raining,~~ he will have all envelopes in one hand but arranged so that the two airmail envelopes will be easily visible. Password and identification are as stated above.

Vincent P. Rizzuto

Vincent P. RIZZUTO

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NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

50-6-74/3

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ACTION UNIT SB 8

INFO FILE, VR WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2,

ACTION NO. 549

S E C R E T 162216Z APR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2984

DIRECTOR

16 APR 064392

REDTOP AETARGET AEKICK

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 025386

B. MEXICO CITY 2962 (IN 063471)

1. ACCORDING TO LILYRIC AND LICALLA, LOCALLY HIRED PAINTERS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED AT MHHARSH INSTALLATION SINCE MONDAY 13 APRIL, PAINTING MAIN BUILDING. THERE HAS BEEN NO DELIVERY OF MATERIALS SUCH AS DESCIBED PARA 4 REF A.

2. FILE 201-854249. GP-1

S E C R E T

File: [illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 November 1969 - 25 March 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-38119, 18 November 1969 PRIORITY

SUMMARY

1. The LIEMPTY Project has thus far survived the absence from duty of its principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, as well as the threat to the security of the Project represented by GERENDE's marital problems. Bruce H. FERNALD has been handling all Project personnel since early December 1969, when GERENDE was deactivated and placed on half-pay. No problems have resulted from this, other than a delay in the receipt of photos (FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY personnel as frequently as GERENDE was). The security threat will remain as long as GERENDE's estranged wife has it within her power to expose GERENDE's RVROCK connection and the type of work he was engaged in. She has continually promised not to do this, and thus far she has kept her word.

2. The LIEMPTY product continues to be a valuable one for the Station. It continues to play an important CI role (particularly for LNERGO and LNREAD) but its greatest value, as far as the Station is concerned, is in the positive field. Two recent examples underline this: The early (and thus far only) debriefing of AEMIDRIFF was accomplished almost exclusively by showing her photos of all MHHARSH Embassy personnel and getting from her a character sketch on each individual. These photos were all obtained by LILYRIC and LICALLA. Secondly, LIEMPTY observations (as opposed to

Attachment:
Reports u/s/c

Distbituion:
2 - C/WH w/att u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/att u/s/c

LIEMPTY/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38700	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

photos) played an important role in our total coverage of AESEASICK during the recent operational activity undertaken against AESEASICK. In short, LIEMPTY remains a highly effective and highly useful support asset, whose product is obtained in order to be used operationally, not simply collected for the files.

GERENDE

3. The GERENDE problem is unquestionably a serious one. We are forwarding under separate cover copies of several memoranda prepared by GERENDE. One outlines the history of his marital problems, another describes the current legal situation, and a third outlines proposals for a settlement. There is no hope of reconciliation. The Station's position with GERENDE from the start has been that he must agree to an amicable settlement with his wife in order to insure that she would not feel forced to take steps which would jeopardize the security of Station operations. For this reason, the Station insisted from the beginning that any financial settlement with his wife would have to take into account the fact that he was receiving a certain salary from RVROCK, and that he could not fairly keep this salary out of the settlement on the grounds that his wife could make no legal claim to that salary. GERENDE's wife was made aware of our position on this, and she was grateful, even though she realized that this arrangement was strictly informal. The Station felt that GERENDE could not be allowed to use his RVROCK salary as a weapon in the dispute with his wife, because if he did, she could hardly be expected to refrain from exposing his connections. Indeed, events have shown that GERENDE's wife is a vindictive woman, and if it had not been clear to her that she, as well as GERENDE, would lose money if he loses his job, she might have blown the whistle long ago. GERENDE, for his part, would have preferred to keep his RVROCK salary entirely out of the picture. Eventually, however, he agreed that the Station position was fair, and he said he would conform.

4. The attached memoranda from GERENDE are, in the Station's opinion, basically fair accounts. In the beginning, the Station was inclined to give GERENDE's wife (LIEMPTY-19) the benefit of the doubt, largely because her description of GERENDE's character weaknesses came as no surprise (particularly his tendency to procrastinate, even when his marriage was at stake). Early in the conflict, LIEMPTY-19 contacted RIZZUTO and asked point blank what she could tell her lawyer about GERENDE's salary. She was told she could not mention the RVROCK portion under any circumstances, and that if she told anyone that GERENDE had any connection with LNPURE, the connection would be denied and GERENDE would be terminated. She appeared to accept this gracefully, even though it meant she would have to scale her support demands down to the level of GERENDE's overt income (GERENDE's monthly salary from RVROCK was over 7,000 pesos; he earned an additional 4 to 5,000 pesos teaching English, and he has since rented their house, for which he is receiving slightly less than 7,000 pesos monthly). Subsequently, LIEMPTY-19 was told that the Station would see to it that as long as GERENDE continued to receive an RVROCK salary, he would give her the same proportion of this salary that the courts determined should be paid from his overt income. This, of course, was strictly an informal arrangement, one which would stop the minute GERENDE stopped receiving a salary. Later, as LIEMPTY-19's position hardened and her vindictiveness began to rule her actions, LIEMPTY-19 was reminded by the Station that the longer it took for an amicable solution to be reached, the greater was the chance that GERENDE would lose his job. If she persisted in having him arrested (which she succeeded in doing twice), his job would be jeopardized. While she continued to repeat sweetly that she had no intention of causing his termination, and had never breathed a word to a soul about his RVROCK affiliation, her attitude was in fact jeopardizing his job and if he lost his job, she and the children, as well as GERENDE, would lose income. Her attitude is

doubly disappointing in view of the fact that as she became more and more unreasonable, GERENDE was moving in the other direction.

5. The outcome can still not be predicted. As can be seen from GERENDE's memos, the two sides are still far apart on a number of points, including specifically money. LIEMPTY-19 insists on 10,000 pesos per month. GERENDE is willing to pay 5,000. GERENDE is currently on half-pay, which means that his total (all source) monthly income is around 14,000 pesos. From this, he would not only have to pay the amount which is finally agreed upon, he must also continue payments of 2500 pesos per month to LIEMPTY-19's father (paying off a loan obtained to build their house). The complicating factor is the uncertainly of GERENDE's future with RVROCK. The Station has maintained for some time that it is impossible to continue to pay GERENDE his full salary solely torun the LICALLA and LILYRIC basehouses. Now that FERNALD has absorbed this duty with only small inconvenience and some loss of timeliness, it makes even less sense to put GERENDE to work only to do this. GERENDE has long been aware of the Station's thinking in this regard, and prior to the current personal crisis he had been told that he would have to work harder at a greater variety of tasks in order to retain his position. As Headquarters is aware, he had been given additional tasks, and, as reported in reference, he had begun to respond very well. There has never been any question of GERENDE's ability. As we have previously stated, he is personable, intelligent, bilingual and binational, and has had good training and experience in certain fields. On the other hand, there has long been doubt about his seriousness of purpose, his initiative, and his ambition. The "reversal of roles" which he describes in one of the attached memos, which took place when he was confined to his home as an LP keeper, did more than cause domestic problems -- it apparently deprived him of the discipline of a daily job. His well-deserved reputation for being lazy was earned years ago.

6. The question which must be answered is whether or not to terminate GERENDE. He can be useful to the Station, but the Station has learned to get along without him. What are the security hazards involved? The general range of his knowledge is described in paragraph 5 of reference. If all of this were blown, the loss to the Station, particularly in terms of support operations against the MHHARSH target, would be considerable. The Station does not believe that GERENDE would deliberately expose any of this, but it is impossible to predict what LIEMPTY-19 might do, particularly since she would feel that she had nothing to lose, having already lost a possible source of income through the termination. GERENDE's termination bonus would probably be in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars. Presumably LIEMPTY-19 is aware of the fact that he would get such a bonus, although the Station has never discussed this with her and the possible division of such a bonus between the two of them has never been mentioned.

LICALLA

7. The LICALLA basehouse continues to function without changes, except for the fact that Bruce H. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings with LIEMPTY-9 are held once a week at pre-arranged times and places (well away from the MHHARSH area). Occasionally special meetings are called, by phone, by FERNALD, if special coverage is desired (as in the AESEASICK case, for example). There have been no problems, operational or personal, involving the basehouse or LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period. LIEMPTY-9 provided 1,728 photographs during the reporting period, and in addition to his regular reporting on observed activities of MHHARSH personnel, he provided special coverage as requested. This "special coverage" consists of his observations of a selected individual -- who does he spend his time with, how is he behaving, when was he present (or absent), etc. LIEMPTY-9 spends over 40

hours a week just watching (and photographing) MHHARSH personnel, and over the years he has gottento know them, and their habits, very well. He can spot unusual or atypical behavior, and when he is asked to put a certain individual under close scrutiny, his comments can be very useful. Newcomers, no matter what their cover, will frequently gravitate to their IS colleagues in the "safety" of the MHHARSH back yard, thereby enabling us to make tentative AEKICK or AEGRIP identifications. TDYers can often be linked up with their internal escort officers. In the case of specific targets, LICALLA special coverage can sometimes give clues to personal relationships which can be exploited. During the reporting period we had special coverage on AESEASICK (to determine any changes in pattern following the AEMIDRIFF defection and following the operation against him -- and in both cases LICALLA did report some change in pattern); 201-305870 (for much the same reason, although here the evidence was not as clear); AEPOLYP (to gather information on his patterns and his associations); AETAKEOFF (for the same reason); and 201-838166 (to find out if he did, in fact work in the "restricted area" and who his associates were, a requirement which was quickly satisfied). Also, LICALLA has been asked to report on the arrival and activities of TDYers such as the AEKICK security inspectors (he is not, of course, told that "security inspectors" are expected -- he is told of the expected arrival of visitors, and he can spot a visitor or newcomer immediately), the possible arrival of 201-314616 and, currently, to attempt to identify, at least by association, the person who went out to meet an LNREAD agent (subject of MEXICO CITY 2741, 17 March 1970). The value of LICALLA to the REDTOP program in Mexico City can scarcely be overstated.

LILYRIC

8. There have been no changes during the reporting period of the operation of the LILYRIC basehouse activity, except that Bruce H. FERNALD took over the handling of the LILYRIC personnel from GERENDE in early December. FERNALD normally meets only LIEMPTY-13, at pre-arranged sites and times (also well away from the MHHARSH area), once a week for pick-up of the films and reports. He occasionally meets LIEMPTY-14 (LIEMPTY-13's wife) when LIEMPTY-13 may be out of town. The LILYRIC coverage is a family enterprise with the work equally divided among LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27, who split up the hours of duty so that there is uninterrupted coverage Mondays through Fridays from 0800 to 1800 hours, and 0800 to 1500 hours Saturdays. (Extra-hour or week-end coverage may be requested as necessary, and the LILYRIC personnel responded to the Station request for such extra coverage during the AEMIDRIFF and AESEASICK cases.) The family has continued to provide reports during the reporting period on all activity centered on the front entrance of the MHHARSH Embassy. Such coverage included, as in the past, daily logs on the comings and goings of MHHARSH officials, up-to-date recording of MHHARSH license numbers, special activities and visitors (particularly Americans, of whom five were spotted and reported on during the reporting period), and some 3,500 photographs. As an example of the value of LILYRIC coverage, within one week of the change of license plates at the MHHARSH Embassy (a biannual change affecting all of Mexico, with new numbers bearing no relation to the old), LILYRIC had provided a complete list of the new numbers (along with the cars to which the plates are assigned). Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify AESEASICK's companions during his last few days in Mexico. Without LILYRIC, identification of the new license plates would have taken months and would have handicapped our operations. LILYRIC has also provided special coverage of the visit of a Latin American CP representative, and is currently watching for the two AEKICK security technicians, 201-314616, and the man who went to meet the LNREAD agent. Also, LILYRIC has reported on visits of Mexican students and the identity of the MHHARSH representatives who deal with them or hand out literature to them. In short, LILYRIC's services, even though the

MHHARSHers undoubtedly assume we have a LILYRIC-like facility, and act accordingly, are another vital element of the REDTOP program.

LIEMPTY-4

9. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to develop and to print all of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs. He has been met regularly by Bruce H. FERNALD (taking over for GERENDE) since 26 November 1969. The first few meetings at that time (late November and early December) were arranged by FERNALD by telephone to LIEMPTY-4 and primarily concerned LIEMPTY-4's reports on GERENDE's family problems and related security arrangements. Since mid-December, LIEMPTY-4 resumed a regular schedule (usually weekly) of meetings at pre-arranged sites and times. LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station to which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). FERNALD can change meeting plans by directly calling LIEMPTY-4. The only personal problem directly involving LIEMPTY-4 was surgery on his knee which required his wearing a full cast on his leg for over six weeks. During this period when LIEMPTY-4 has been unable to drive, FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-4, for the exchange of LICALLA/LILYRIC films and prints, at LIEMPTY-4's office, under a suitable pretext and with appropriate security precautions. LIEMPTY-4's services are invaluable since the Station could not, on a continuing basis, process the LIEMPTY material in its own photo lab.

SECURITY

10. Other than the security problems inherent in GERENDE's personal problems, there have been no security problems during the reporting period.

FUTURE PLANS

11. As for GERENDE, the Station has reached the conclusion that he must be terminated. This is not an easy decision to make, nor will it be easy to confront GERENDE with this decision. He has, after all, devoted 15 years of his life to RVROCK. However, as noted above, in spite of his talents the Station has been able to get along without his services. Furthermore, the constant security risk posed by his wife is, frankly, an unacceptable risk. To try to molify her by promising her a portion of his salary is probably unworkable in realistic terms, particularly since her attitude has progressively hardened. The Station, therefore, intends to terminate GERENDE prior to the end of FY 1970. GERENDE's contract calls for a termination bonus of one month's salary per full year. This would come to $8,750 (USD). For various reasons, including the need to preserve the security of the operation by ensuring that the termination is amicable, it will probably be necessary, as stated in paragraph 6, to give GERENDE about $10,000 (USD). Furthermore, it will be necessary to inform LIEMPTY-19 of the termination, and, to keep her from revealing what she knows, she will undoubtedly have to be given some money herself. The Station does not believe that it would be equitable or sound from a security point of view to use the money which GERENDE himself has earned for this purpose. Therefore, while the figure will remain negotiable, the Station believes that the sum of $2,500 (USD) would be a reasonable amount. Total obligations for FY 1970 in the LIEMPTY Project are currently estimated at slightly less than $33,000 (USD). The Project has been approved in the amount of $38,970 (USD) leaving unobligated approximately $6,000 (USD). It is therefore requested that the LIEMPTY Project be amended for FY 1970 to provide an additional $8,000 (USD) to be used in the GERENDE termination. Funds will be available at the Station.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38700

12. Regarding the project renewal for FY 1971, as far as LICALLA, LILYRIC, and LIEMPTY-4 are concerned, no changes in procedure are planned. The product is useful, it is as timely as present circumstances permit, and the personnel involved are doing their jobs well. The only change foreseen is an increase in salary for some, if not all, of these agents. The most recent salary increases took effect in May 1968. LIEMPTY-4 has not had an increase since January 1967, and LIEMPTY-13 since January 1964. Increase in cost of living alone would be sufficient justification to raise salaries, but in the case of these agents their consistently excellent work deserves to be rewarded. These salary increases will probably range between 10 and 20 percent.

13. As for other project expenses, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will no longer be funded under LIEMPTY, but have been transferred to LIEMBRACE effective 1 July 1970. Real estate expenses should remain fairly constant, with perhaps a slight allowance for inflation. The rent on GERENDE's dark room (MEXI 137) will no longer be paid with his termination. MV-2823 will be sold or otherwise disposed of and should not be included in the project for FY 1971. Equipment and operational expenses should remain constant.

Vincent P

for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

SECRET

15 March 1970

TO : Case Officer and Chief of Station

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Background and Status Report of Present Marital Conflict

1. While this is not intended to be a full exposition of my personal and private life over recent years, I would like to make known some of the factors that have, from my point of view, led up to the present situation.

2. I realize that the interests of the organization and the interest of the individuals who may have opportunity to come in contact with my case dictate as little personal involvement as possible in the lives of agents. Indeed, the requirements of security, compartmentation and efficiency prescribe the modus operandi and, to a great extent the modus vivendi, of agency personnel not only in the sense of earning a living but also in manner of living. Ideally, the less said about an agent's private life, the better, but, as the years go by, changes may occur which go unreported or unnoticed and which may bring about unexpected events and repercussions. When a person has been working for the Station, as I have, for fifteen years with little or no personnel handling problems, no security flaps, no obvious problems on the job, and something comes up like the abrupt separation of my wife (LIEMPTY-19) and me with the personal and potential security risks it has entailed, I feel that some explanation is necessary. Should it be in order, I would like this explanation to reach not only my present case officer and Chief of Station but also the former Chief and officers with whom I have had the privilege to work over the years.

3. I would like to give thanks, in advance, for the patience and understanding that have been shown me thus far. Whatever the final outcome, I know that people have been bending over backward to be helpful and patient in hopes of an early solution to the conflict.

4. Back in September 1959, shortly after our wedding in late 1958, my wife and baby girl, were moved, by the agency, into a

SEC ATT 1 TO HMMA-38790

SECRET

50-6-74/3

spacious, carpeted, furnished apartment near the DIZTAG Embassy, which served intermittently as a listening post-basehouse for the agency. At the time, LIEMPTY-19 was working as the manager of the bookstore at the University of the Americas and, at the same time, studying for a B.A. in philosophy. Those were happy times. We received a two-month leave, went to Europe, the Rome Olympics and visited LIEMPTY-19's family in Holland. Back in Mexico, when the base was in operation I stayed home a lot (one of the requirements), minded the dial and tape recorders and the baby -- an unfortunate reversal of marital roles. After exactly five years the basehouse was closed down and we lost rent, LIEMPTY-19's salary and my mother's salary which she had been receiving as part-time basehouse keeper. My mother and youngest sister gave considerable help in taking care of the baby while LIEMPTY-19 worked and when we went to Europe and left the baby with them. This was during the first three years at the base until we had our second child, Christopher.

5. We moved to a small apartment in Lomas and, to supplement the loss of salary and rent allowance, the Station began paying 1,000 pesos a month for the use of a dark room I had built on the roof of the building. We had our third child, Madeleine, unplanned, two months after settling in the two-bedroom apartment. The apartment need not have been so small but we had chosen it for its location and style and because it was to be a temporary stop until we could find something better. We missed going to the Olympics in Tokyo which we had planned to do (1964) and instead began negotiating to buy a home building site at Rio Escondido but when the deal fell through, we decided to go on leave to Europe again, this time with the two older children, leaving the baby with my sister. We visited with LIEMPTY-19's parents in Holland (they had moved back to Holland after having lived in Washington, D.C., since 1943) and the two children stayed with them while LIEMPTY-19 and I made side trips. Traveling is LIEMPTY-19's greatest love in life. Upon our return to Mexico (I came back two weeks earlier), LIEMPTY-19 was so depressed at leaving Europe and being back in Mexico she was emotionally and physically inaccessible for about six weeks. She had not fully adjusted to living in Mexico or to settling down and becoming a housewife. Our cramped quarters, way of living, lack of money, my job, my irregular hours and habits, my Friday night poker games, the three children, all these got her down.

6. In the fall of 1965 after our return from Europe I began teaching English to beginners in the adult education program at the American School in the evenings. This started as a two-hour a week moonlighting experiment but by early 1966, through student contacts made at the school, I had branched out to teaching at the offices of Carnation Milk Co., Singer Sewing Machine, and Richardson-Merrell Drug Co. for a total of about twenty hours per week. LIEMPTY-19, meantime, was working part-time at the Hamilton School in Lomas where the two older children were attending. The family finances improved and I was able to convince LIEMPTY-19 that

the best thing to do was to invest in land and build a house big enough for our growing family which by now had a fourth child on the way. With three friends as partners, I entered on a land-buying deal which turned out to be complicated as we bought the land in the form of company stock. The company was liquidated and the assets were distributed, as land, to the four partners. I paid for our share with the proceeds from the sale of a small lot I had been paying for since 1955. LIEMPTY-19 was at first reluctant to tie us down with a house but when we finally got the papers and land deed straightened out, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the project and the building which began in August 1967. While LIEMPTY-19 supervised the construction, I worked during September and October almost full-time for the Olympic Organizing Committee and the group from Czechoslovakia which came to train in the pre-Olympics. My father-in-law deposited money in Mexico to help us with the major part of the financing of the house. We used $286,500 pesos of his money and about $60,000 that LIEMPTY-19 and I had saved and got the house finished enough to move in in March 1968. We were very short on furniture and shortly after moving in bought three bedroom sets, an automatic washer and even a piano. Naturally, cash was scarce, dirt was plentiful. The yard was a pile of rubble, the carpentry work had just begun, there were no closets, the house was unpainted. Thereafter, we did things on the house as the money came in: continued with carpentry, finished the driveway, put in grass, built a fence and front gate.

7. Six months after moving in came time for the Olympics and I worked, unofficially this time, with the water polo team from Australia. LIEMPTY-19 worked for the month with the Dutch and Belgian radio and TV group. LIEMPTY-19 was, once again, caught up in the atmosphere of being among Europeans and doing something exciting and out of the routine of home and children. She fell in love with the Australians as well, and for several months all she could talk of was that we should move to Australia. I gave it some thought but decided that we had neither the money to invest nor the youth and technical training to make it as pioneers "down under" and, on the other hand, family, friends, a house, and job seniority here in Mexico.

8. Toward the end of 1968, LIEMPTY-19 decided it was time for me to move out of the master bedroom as she could no longer face that aspect of our married life. For several months we tried this but it did not work out for me. One night in March 1969 after we returned home from a party, she asked me to help her undress and when she, once again, refused to have anything to do with me, I got rough with her, prompting a decision on her part, which she had already been pondering, to visit her parents in Holland as soon as possible. Her father provided the plane fare and she left in April for the United States to visit her brother and sister and Holland, for what she said would be a five week trip. She stayed away ten weeks. The four children remained with me, the maid, and

my mother who came to help three days a week. Upon her return, LIEMPTY-19 bore an air of resignation rather than of enthusiasm and, again, as on her previous return from Europe, was physically down and mentally unhappy. When asked about her thoughts on Australia she said that if she had wanted to live in Australia, she should have married an Australian. The separation had not improved our intimate relationship.

9. In August I was to take five weeks' leave and go with the children to Astro-World in Houston and visit my mother's family in South Carolina. When I suggested postponing making monthly payments on her father's loan until December when the Christmas Bonus would cover the back debt, in order to make the trip, she was adamant. saying that if I did not have the cash for going, I should not take leave. I borrowed from my life insurance policy and left with the three youngest children. Adriana had a touch of hepatitis and joined us three weeks later. After spending the month in South Carolina, we returned to Mexico to find that LIEMPTY-19 had very much enjoyed her solitude. We had already talked about divorce before her trip to Holland in the spring. I had told her that I would not consider parting with the children and she said she would consider leaving them to me if I would settle the debt to her father as well as give her a substantial share of what she considered was her part of the house. The title of the house was in my name and had been since the buying of the land. LIEMPTY-19 said I could mortgage or sell the house but that the money was what she was mainly interested in. I told her that the sale of the house was not financially wise in its unfinished state and that the house and land are very likely to appreciate sharply over the next three or four years considering the housing developments going on in the area. Added to this was the sentimental attachment to the house and area. A mortgage, on the other hand, for the amount of her father's loan plus what she was asking, was something I could not afford considering the more than 12 percent cost of such a mortgage in Mexico.

10. At the same time, during September 1969, that we were going through the above-mentioned discussions, LIEMPTY-19 was taking a course at Japan Airlines to become a tour guide and group leader for trips to the Orient as early as November 1969 and, certainly, to Expo '70 in Osaka during the spring and summer of 1970. She received a diploma to that effect. I told her that if she wanted out of the marriage and wanted to be free to travel it was all right by me but that the children would stay with me and I would continue to repay her father at the agreed rate ($2500 per month and 5 percent per year). She then sought legal advice from an old friend, Dutch lawyer Guillermo Floris Margadant who, in turn, steered her to a young woman lawyer, Dra. Berta Martinez, who must have advised LIEMPTY-19 that under the local legal system the only way to try for a sizable cash settlement and considerable support was to hang on to the children because LIEMPTY-19 made a radical "about-face" in her attitude concerning them and she now said that she could not

"abandon" the children. I refused to visit her lawyer with her saying I was not interested in getting divorced, whereas she said that her mind was made up and that we would have to split up.

11. Things came to a head on the night of 12 November when I got home around 9 PM and she suggested we have a drink and talk things over. I mixed some martinis and she began laying down the terms under which she thought we should get divorced, i.e. I should move out of the house, mortgage to pay back her father's money, grant her custody of the children and support of 2,000 pesos per month per child ($8,000). I said I would not get divorced under those conditions and we discussed and argued in the kitchen for about three hours, killing a bottle of gin in the process. We went upstairs and when I tried to make up to her she tried to rouse the children, unsuccessfully, and then tried to leave the house which I would not let her do. She got hysterical, phoned a neighbor, Uta de la Hoz, then she went into the front yard and awakened the next door neighbors, Walter Hurley and his wife, and asked to go to their house. A few minutes later, Uta and her husband Guillermo came and LIEMPTY-19 went with them to their home two blocks away. About a half-hour later I walked up to Uta's to ask LIEMPTY-19 to come home but was told that she was busy phoning her lawyer and would not return.

12. The following morning I took the children to school as usual and my sister Marcia (LIEMPTY-4's wife) picked them up and took them to her house where I joined them for lunch. LIEMPTY-19 came by in the late afternoon while my sister was out, picked up the children saying she was taking them home, failed to do so, then disappeared and was not to be found.

13. It was the subsequent action taken by LIEMPTY-19 in dropping her lawyers and taking on the services of Bernabe Jurado, the most notorious penal attorney in Mexico, that led to the potential security hazards that ensued.

50-6-74/3

9 March 1970

TO : Case Officer

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Status Report

The present situation of the marital conflict between GERENDE and his wife (LIEMPTY-19) is as follows:

1. GERENDE is living at his mother's apartment at 99 Carlos B. Zetina Street, Apartment 9. He has rented a three-bedroom apartment at Tornel 3 corner with Pedro Antonio de los Santos where he has stored the household effects and furniture removed from his former address at Ladera 39, Lomas de Bezares.

2. The house at Ladera 39 is rented to an executive of Chrysler Corporation International, Dr. Leon MARKIEWICZ, his wife, and fifteen-year old daughter, all of Argentine nationality. The monthly rent is 6,700 pesos M/N and the contract is for two years, beginning 1 February 1970.

3. LIEMPTY-19 and the four children are apparently still living at the residence of the Netherlands' Ambassador, Baron Schelto Van Heemstra at Peña 360, Jardines del Pedregal. It seems fairly certain they are at that address from things that the two older children, Adriana and Chris, have said to GERENDE on the last two occasions he has seen them. They have been there since 5 December 1969. LIEMPTY-19 has denied that she has a fixed address and says that she is staying with "friends."

4. LIEMPTY-19 is continuing to use the services of Bernabe Juardo as her lawyer and, through him, is pressing for even more advantageous terms in the divorce than she had asked in November. Please see the attached copy and translation of the latest proposal made by Juardo on 4 March 1970.

5. The charges and accusations made by LIEMPTY-19 against GERENDE are still not completely resolved and are as follows:

   a. Insults, threats and attempted homicide -- this charge rests at the 5° Juzgado Penal, 2ª Corte Penal located at

[illegible] 50-6-74/3

Lecumberri. The judge is CRUZ Mellado. These charges have not been pressed since they were originally made on 13 November 1969 by LIEMPTY-19. The ruling on these charges, should the case come to trial, must be made by three judges of the 2ª Corte Penal composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Juzgados Penales. The judge of the 6° Juzgado is Lic. QUIRAZCO, an alumnus of GERENDE's lawyer, Jorge Mario MAGALLON. Together they have, on two occasions, been to speak to Judge CRUZ Mellado who agreed not to issue an arrest warrant and who has, finally, called for a hearing on 16 March (subsequently postponed) at 10:00. MAGALLON has given GERENDE assurances that the charges are likely to be dismissed.

b. Fraud -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 and her lawyer on 11 December 1969, the day after GERENDE left the Villa Obregon jail after having spent a week there for disobeying a court order. (The court order had consisted of an unfounded request to have GERENDE expelled from his house and to have LIEMPTY-19 reinstated there with her father, as the temporary custodian of the children. GERENDE refused them admission under those terms, hence disobeying the Villa Obregon judge's order, so the judge's secretary arbitrarily ordered, on the spot, a 10-day detention. Subsequently, the judge, LUCAS del ARENAL, was forced to lift the detention after seven days and dismiss himself from the case and divorce proceedings as incompetent. The judge has had to face charges of collusion from and with the lawyers of both parties, i.e. Magallon and Jurado. The charge of fraud rests at Mesa 31ª of the Procuraduria del Distrito Federal. The Public Ministry Agent in charge of that table is Jorge GUTIERREZ Cruz. LIEMPTY-19 claims that the money lent to her and GERENDE for building the house at Ladera #39 was actually loaned to buy the house and that GERENDE, knowing they were married under the separate property marriage clause had wrongfully placed the property in his name only, thereby committing fraud. Actually, the land was bought by GERENDE before Christmas 1965 in a complicated transaction involving three other partners: Robert Bancroft WHITEHOUSE, John (Dick) RENNA, and James Walter HURLEY, and each of the partners placed the property in their respective names with the complete knowledge of their spouses. Later the land was subdivided and after nineteen months the deeds were issued. LIEMPTY-19 supervised and prodded the notary who made the transaction and she was perfectly aware that the property was in GERENDE's name. In August 1967 when construction of the house began, LIEMPTY-19's father's money was used which he had deposited in Mexico for the purpose. Since January 1969, according to the terms of the loan agreement, GERENDE has been paying it off and has receipts from LIEMPTY-19 to show for it.

GERENDE has presented both the land deed ("escritura") pre-dating the construction of the house and the receipts showing up to date payment of the loan at the "Mesa 31ª." No further action has been taken by LIEMPTY-19 or her lawyer on this matter but the charge has not finally been settled and is still pending. The charge is, of course, unfounded and is awaiting the proper "lubrication" in order to be filed away.

c. Neglect -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 in December 1969 at the 7° Juzgado Mixto de Paz claiming that GERENDE had abandoned LIEMPTY-19 and the children to their fate and that they were utterly destitute. GERENDE was not notified of this charge and on 9 February after attending a hearing at the Villa Obregon Juzgado (see below), once out on the sidewalk, Judicial police agents detained GERENDE, took him to the Procuraduria and from there to Lecumberri. This process involved being finger-printed and mugged. The following day GERENDE was out on a 2,000 pesos bond and three days later, 13 February, the justice of the peace (a woman) formally set GERENDE free for lack of evidence. GERENDE and Magallon went back on 5 March to pick up the bond money and see if Jurado had appealed but he had not and, apparently, that matter is closed.

6. On 14 November 1969, one day after LIEMPTY-19 disappeared from home taking the children with her, GERENDE brought charges against her for minor lesions and showed medical proof thereof. The hearing of 9 February after which GERENDE was detained, was called by Villa Obregon judge Bonfilio SEGURA. GERENDE reiterated the charge, LIEMPTY-19 denied it, the judge ruled against her, ordered her to prison but since the injuries were minor, it does not require privation of liberty and she must only go and sign-in once a week.

7. LIEMPTY-19 is at present teaching school at the Edron Academy on Caleri Street in San Angel Inn. The two older children are going to school there. During the latter part of November, all December and half of January, the children did not attend any school. On three occasions GERENDE has been to the school at 13:30 to try to speak to LIEMPTY-19 and see the children. LIEMPTY-19 has objected to this and the meetings have been short and fruitless except for GERENDE learning that they are still staying at the Dutch Ambassador's. GERENDE's last visit there was on 3 March (Tuesday).

8. After the Villa Obregon judge dismissed himself from the divorce proceedings, according to standard procedure, the case went to Coyoacan and Xochimilco respectively where the judges, in turn, excused themselves from the case and it has finally come to reside at the 1st Juzgado Civil in the D.F. The judge is Olda CORREA (woman) and has the reputation of being tough and pretty straight. Since LIEMPTY-19 has not given an address where divorce suit papers can be served her, the suit has not yet been initiated on GERENDE's part. LIEMPTY-19, on the other hand, has not had

GERENDE served with papers though his current address is known, apparently because she is still seeking a voluntary divorce along the lines and terms which are stated in the accompanying set of proposals. GERENDE cannot begin to accept these proposals in their present form as they are patently unfair and hardly a point to beginning bargaining from.

50-6-94/3

8 March 1970

The following proposals were made to GERENDE on 4 March 1970 (Monday) by LIEMPTY-19's lawyer, Bernabe Jurado, through a mutual friend, Licenciado Carlos Heyn, to wit:

TERMS under which the problem of [LIEMPTY-19] and [Raymond H. GERENDE] could be solved.

1. The right (patria potestad) to the minors would be kept by both the mother and father.

2. The guardianship and custody of the four children is entrusted to the mother. The father may visit the children once a week between 10:00 and 19:00 hours; he may take them out once a month and will return them to the mother's address before 19:00.

3. The father is obliged to pay the mother the sum of 10,000 pesos MN, in advance, per month beginning with the month of November 1969, since which time he has not given the mother or children any money at all.

4. This agreement will be raised to the level of a formal public writ the day it is signed by both parties.

5. Both spouses agree to divorce voluntarily under the terms of this agreement.

6. Upon termination of the divorce procedure, by mutual consent, both parties will desist from the civil and penal actions that either might have initiated against the other.

7. Both spouses are obliged to attend punctually the meetings that the legal procedure establishes as well as grant the guarantees demanded by the Public Ministry and acting Judge for the approval of this agreement and granting of the divorce.

8. In order that the father may visit his children and take them out, the mother is obliged to give notice of every change of address.

9. With the exception of the one day a week that the father may visit the children and the one day a month when he may take

SEC ATT 3 TO HMMA 38,706 3 COPY 20-6-74/3 them out, the father contracts the obligation of absolutely abstaining from calling on the mother's address, so that she may carry on her life freely without neglecting her children.

10. While the voluntary divorce is being processed, the mother and children will live at ______________________ and, as above stated, to satisfy their needs, the father will make the first monthly payment of $10,000.

11. Neither the father nor the mother may take the children out of Mexican territory without the authorization of the other.

12. Since GERENDE owes the parents of LIEMPTY-19 the sum of $286,500 plus agreed-on interest, minus whatever payments he has been able to make, the said GERENDE is obliged to mortgage the house at 39 Ladera, Lomas de Bezares in this city, precisely during the course of the divorce procedure by mutual consent as established in the antecedent clauses and before the divorce is granted so that LIEMPTY-19's parents are reimbursed on their loan or on the outstanding unpaid balance.

13. The expenses of making this agreement a formal writ as well as the fees of B. Juardo will be paid by GERENDE but these will be fixed in an equitable manner by Carlos Heyn to whose decision both will submit.

14. In case of failure to comply with any of the clauses of this agreement at any time or for just one time, either by GERENDE or LIEMPTY-19, both agree to expressly establish the following sanctions and terms:

15. If GERENDE is the one who violates any clause just one time, he will forfeit the house at Ladera 39 to the mother and children, LIEMPTY-19, Adriana Juliette, Christopher Ramon, Maria Madeleine, and Laurence Fernando, and said property will belong to the above mentioned persons.

16. If LIEMPTY-19 is the one who violates the terms of this agreement for just one itme, she will lose the custody of children in favor of the father or whatever person he designates for the guardianship and custody of the minors.

17. Since LIEMPTY-19 has to establish an appropriate place to live, in the company of her four children, both parties agree that the household effects will be turned over by GERENDE, to LIEMPTY-19 for that purpose, as well as the automobile she has been using throughout the marriage.

Mexico, D.F., 4 March 1970

NOTE: GERENDE's lawyer advised him not to make a counter proposal. His comments on the above terms are as follows (keyed to above):

1. OK

2. Visitation rights everyday at any time; he may take them out overnight once per week.

3. Will pay 5000 pesos per month, to begin with date of settlement (i.e. not retroactive)

4. OK

5. OK, assuming that agreement is reached on terms

6. OK

7. OK

8. OK

9. Revise to agree with GERENDE's version of paragraph 2

10. OK, except payment is to be 5000 pesos.

11. OK

12. No. GERENDE prefers to continue paying off under the terms of the loan agreement with LIEMPTY-19's father. Later, if a mortgage can be obtained at an acceptable interest, GERENDE might consider this.

13. No. GERENDE and LIEMPTY-19 will each pay their own lawyers.

14. See below

15. Not acceptable

16. Not acceptable (in context of paragraphs 14, 15, and 16)

17. She may receive household effects, but not the car.

55-6-24/5

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12

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: REDLEG LIEMPTY/LNEASE Double Agent Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. Director 016547
B. MEXICO CITY 2741

1. Per Reference A, LNEASE case Bruce DAKAR (LNEASE Case No. 127-41) was passed to LNERGO who plans to use DAKAR within WOLADY. No additional details are available.

2. Headquarters appreciates Station's support on the case of Frank CAMDEN and the LIENTRAP details forwarded in Reference B. We will keep the Station apprised of any additional developments in CAMDEN's case.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

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DIRECTOR

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LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 018246

1. POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT 26 MARCH. REGRET DELAY WHICH DUE PRESS OTHER ACTIVITIES REDTOP FIELD.

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TO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 014964*

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2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref requests latest LIEMPTY Progress Report.

LIEMPTY

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1
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6 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: SB/RMO

VIA : SB/X/WH

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Product Supplied to SB/Division Through LIEMPTY and LIENVOY Operations

1. It is requested that an evaluation of the product supplied by the LIEMPTY photographic surveillance operation targeted against the Soviet Embassy, and the LIENVOY joint telephone tap operations targeted against the Soviet, Polish, and Czech Embassies be submitted to this office. These evaluations will be presented with the current Projects LIEMPTY and LIENVOY renewals; they are also desired for use in operational discussions with Mexico City Station.

2. As a guide, whenever possible, these evaluations should relate through the use of overall statistics and/or specific instances in which the product has been deemed useful by the SB/Division.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - SB/RMO
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - WH/1/Chrono
1 - LIEMPTY Project✓
1 - LIENVOY Project

ORIG: W. R. Hazen
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 6 March 1970

MESSAGE FORM
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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, c/fin, c/ops, c/ca2, c/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

SECRET 06 19 10z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 014961

TO MEXICO CITY

LIFEAT LIEMPTY

REF: A. HMMA-37892
B. HMMA-38119

1. PLEASE SUBMIT LIFEAT AND LIEMPTY PROGRESS REPORTS SOONEST.

2. FILE: 50-6-32/3, 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Ref A reports LIFEAT progress 1 June through 31 August 1969. Ref B reports LIEMPTY progress 1 January through 31 October 1969.

LIEMPTY

JOHN R. HORTON
ACTING CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
HMMA-38274	23 December 1969	50	120	2	

DOC. SUBJECT

SEMI-ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR SB OPERATIONAL PROGRAM 1 JUN TO 30 NOV

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

1a. LIEMPTY: No change.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.	50	6	74	3
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle) LIEMPTY OPERATIONS	201-			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(7-46)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 January - 31 October 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

SUMMARY

1. There has been no change in the operating procedures of the two LIEMPTY base houses, LICALLA and LILYRIC, or in the use made of the product. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as Project principal agent, and renewed attempts have been made to broaden his activities, to include additional agent handling and the following up of ops leads. After a slow start, some progress has been made, but GERENDE is now involved in divorce proceedings with his wife. This situation is steadily worsening and represents a potential security risk to LIEMPTY and other Station operations.

GERENDE

2. As Headquarters is aware, the Station has for some time tried to get additional mileage out of GERENDE. The Station has long recognized GERENDE's not inconsiderable talents: He is personable, fluent in two languages (to the point where he can pass either as a Mexican or an American with no trouble), he has considerable experience in support activities, he has knowledge of the local scene which would be hard to duplicate, and he is completely at the Station's disposal. He has also worked for RVROCK for close to 15 years, in effect making a career of RVROCK, and the Station believes that this long period of service imposes on RVROCK an obligation to see that he is fairly treated and provided with benefits which would not otherwise be due an agent with less longevity. On the other hand, GERENDE has picked up some bad habits--he is not punctual, his written reports leave much to be desired, and worst of all, he lacks drive and ambition.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38119	DATE 18 November 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-38119

3. After several largely abortive attempts to get GERENDE to follow up operational leads (and after noting, at the same time, a fine job he did in recruiting LIRICE-13), the Station decided to present GERENDE with what amounted to an ultimatum: Following a six-week leave at the home of relatives in the US, he was told that in recognition of his past services he was being given a salary increase to $7,000 US per annum (which may not seem like much until it is realized that GERENDE pays no taxes on this, and has the use of a QP car, to boot). He was also told that he would be given a number of leads to follow up (in some cases persons to whom he had natural access; in other cases leads which he would follow up under cover and in alias), as well as agents to handle (in alias). It would be up to him to take advantage of this opportunity to perform up to his level of ability; if he did so, Headquarters would be willing to work out an annuity program which would relieve his worries about eventual retirement. If he did not put out, he could expect to be terminated by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE expressed his gratitude and his willingness to put his shoulder to the wheel, and, in fact, he has done so. In October 1969 he took over the handling of LIANVIL-1 from Oliver G. SCANTLING, and the Station has started to give him leads to follow up. His performance has improved in every way--his punctuality has improved, his written reports are continually improving, and he has made the effort to devise approaches to the various leads and to start to follow up on them.

4. The Station was therefore highly encouraged, until 24 October, when GERENDE reported that his wife wanted a divorce. The problem is basically one of incompatibility of personalities, exacerbated by the fact that GERENDE's operational activities resulted in his being home more often than a man who works a normal office day. GERENDE's wife had taken a long vacation alone earlier in the year, visiting her parents, and the leave taken by GERENDE, referred to above, followed his wife's return and did not include her. Both times GERENDE had the four children. Thus the news of the divorce request did not come as a real surprise. The problem, however, is that both parties want custody of the children, and the dispute becomes daily more bitter and more violent. The station has taken the position that security of GERENDE's operations must be preserved at all costs, hoping, of course, that the divorce can be avoided. At this writing, the outcome cannot be guessed. If the bitter fight results in the surfacing of GERENDE's RVROCK employment, LILYRIC and LICALLA are faced with at least some threat of exposure. The MHHARSHers are quite aware that a LILYRIC-like facility exists; whether they suspect LICALLA is a moot question. LICALLA is in many ways more useful, and the MHHARSHers could put it out of business very easily by making their wall higher. Little could, or probably would, be done to prevent LILYRIC from functioning.

5. Other than LIANVIL-1 and the LIEMPTY assets directly handled by GERENDE (LILYRIC and LICALLA personnel and LIEMPTY-4) other Station assets whose security might be affected by GERENDE's current problems include LIENTRAP, LIRICE-13, and the PCM OP. GERENDE is also aware of the fact that some sort of operation, presumably technical, is or has been conducted from the LIMESA complex; he is aware of the existance and knows some of the members of the LIEMBRACE team (LIEMBRACE-1, -2, and -4, among the currently active), and he knows of the existance of LIENVOY and LIFEAT. His wife is LIFEAT-19 and has been a substitute transcriber as late as late 1968, and his mother was LIFEUD-19 (a former LIFEAT basehouse keeper, inactive since June 1964). GERENDE also knows SCANTLING, David M. WILSTED, and Raymond L. BARCENAS, as well as current Station officers Vincent P. RIZZUTO and Bruce H. FERNALD (the latter in alias). He has also met Andrew E. PELLEMENT, who used an alias. In his 15 years, GERENDE has worked in almost every phase of the Station's support activities, and even though in recent years he has been pretty much restricted to LIEMPTY, his knowledge of activities and assets which are still current is considerable. It is too early to judge the outcome of GERENDE's problems, but the Station is making every effort to see that security of operations is not affected by whatever decision is reached.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-38119

LICALLA

6. The LICALLA base house has continued to function as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 continues to be a conscientious recorder of events. In addition to providing about 3,500 photos during the reporting period, as well as comments on events and relationships which are noted by him, he had provided special coverage as requested on various targets of interest, such as AETAKEOFF. During GERENDE's absence on leave, LIEMPTY-9 was handled by SCANTLING.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have continued to provide full-time coverage of the MHHARSH Embassy front entrance, providing daily logs of the comings and goings of all officers, and about 9,000 photos during the reporting period. The LILYRIC base house reported on the visits of Americans ten different times, and provided special coverage in connection with AEBURBLE, SCLEASE-2, and one other LNERGO walk-in case. LILYRIC personnel were also handled by SCANTLING during GERENDE's absence.

LIEMPTY-4

8. As in the past, LIEMPTY-4 has done the developing and printing of all LICALLA and LILYRIC photos, and most of the LIENTRAP production. LIEMPTY-4 was handled by FERNALD during GERENDE's absence.

COMMENTS

9. LIEMPTY coverage of the MHHARSH installation continues to be a useful tool in the Station's operations against the MHHARSH target. One IA in the Station spends several hours per week processing the take, keeping mug book and files up to date, checking the information in the logs against other reports when required (to determine whether or not an agent or contact entered the MHHARSH installation as claimed; or whether an AEGRIP or AEKICK officer was out of the installation at a particular time, etc.) and analyzing the LICALLA production for insight into personal relationships. Useful by-products include continual up-dating of MHHARSH license plates and observation of demonstrations outside of the Embassy and renovations within the grounds. Furthermore, in GERENDE the Station has been attempting to develop an outside asset with considerable flexibility, who has been used to make recruitments and assessments as well as handle agents. GERENDE's personal problems are placing his own career in jeopardy and pose a potential security hazard to LIEMPTY and other Station operations. This is a problem which will be dealt with and resolved in the next reporting period and prior to the next Project renewal request.

for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
δ LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 July through 31 December 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-35080, 22 July 1968

SUMMARY

1. There have been no basic changes in the operation of the project during the reporting period. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as principal agent, handling the personnel of the two base houses, LILYRIC and LICALLA, and performing other additional tasks. On 27 December 1968, consistent with our effort to get as much of the support activity as possible handled by outside officers, direct agent-handling responsibility for GERENDE and the LIEMPTY project was turned over to Bruce H. FERNALD. Vincent P. RIZZUTO remains as alternate and as FERNALD's inside contact.

GERENDE

2. Until the introduction of FERNALD, there was no change in the meeting arrangements with GERENDE. Meetings were held on an average of three times per week until October, when LIEMPTY-19 (GERENDE's wife) was relieved of the responsibility of transcribing the Spanish-language portions of LIENVOY coverage of the BEDOX installation. Thereafter meetings averaged twice per week, the main business being the transfer of LIEMPTY base house material and discussion of base house business.

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc SB/X/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36272

DATE
22 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓50-6-74/3

3. GERENDE's agent handling responsibilities within the LIEMPTY project remain as previously reported. He had also handled ERFAIN-3 until the latter's termination in August 1968. He developed a good relationship with ERFAIN-3, and he showed that he is quite capable, with proper case officer guidance, of providing useful service to the Station in the handling of agents beyond the support type to which he had been limited in the past. The Station intends to try to expand this role, with due regard for security and for GERENDE's limited experience. Furthermore, the Station still has every intention of using GERENDE selectively in cultivation and development of operational leads, as outlined in reference. No such leads were found for GERENDE during the reporting period (among other reasons, we have no intention of giving GERENDE a lead simply for the sake of giving him something to do), but as soon as a suitable lead is uncovered, it will be passed to GERENDE.

4. GERENDE was particularly useful during the Olympic period. While he did ~~not get a~~ job with the Olympic Committee as he had hoped, his wife was employed as a translator by the European television networks who had come to cover the games. This, plus other personal contacts, gave GERENDE a certain amount of access to Olympic facilities. Both GERENDE and his wife helped considerably in the distribution of AEEGGHEAD material, and GERENDE performed a number of miscellaneous tasks assisting the Station in various Olympic responsibilities.

5. GERENDE has also been used in support of JMROD operations, such as making mail pick-ups and delivering material and making phone calls to AMBASSCON. Following the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia, GERENDE was asked to cover a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy, and he wrote a good report which was used in Embassy briefings. Recently, GERENDE has enrolled at the University of the Americas to work for an M.A. in contemporary Mexican history. The Station will explore the possibility of his getting access to persons or information of interest on the University campus.

LICALLA

6. LIEMPTY-9's work (in the LICALLA base house) was inhibited in July due to the construction of a maid's room near his working quarters. During the reporting period, however, he took a total of 2,217 operational photos. His regular reporting and commentary continued as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 is a steady and dependable performer, and his unique vantage point remains the source of the most interesting and revealing photos as well as often very informative reporting.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have been able to keep the LILYRIC base house manned on a regular basis from 0800 to 1800 hours weekdays and 0800 to 1500 hours on Saturdays, with other hours coverable upon request. This has proven to be a far better arrangement than depending on LIMITED for some of this coverage. In addition to the 6,763 operational photos taken during the reporting period and the daily fixed surveillance reports, LILYRIC reporting is of considerable help in compiling current vehicle and license plates lists, PCS arrivals and departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations or protests, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc., all of which have obvious CI importance. It was LILYRIC photos which made it possible for LNERGO to identify the Subject of 201-841520, who had been in clandestine contact with AEGRIP officers. LILYRIC also reported on a half dozen other American (or American appearing) visitors, some of whom it was possible to identify through tracing license plates.

Charlie - [illegible]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-36272

LIMITED

8. As reported in Ref, LIEMPTY-6 has been terminated and the LIMITED base house closed. All equipment has been turned in, and it can truthfully be said that due to the continuing quality performance of LICALLA and LILYRIC, LIMITED has not been missed at all.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4 continues to process all photos made by the base houses. In addition, 101 enlargements were made during the reporting period, and 210 prints for LIENTRAP. The quality of LIEMPTY-4's work is good, and he rarely misses his routine deadlines.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 9-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
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October 22, 1969

Contact Report
Subject: RHGerende
Date/Place of Meet: Oct 22 at the CH at 0945 hrs.

1. Prearranged routine meet and G was late. In fact G requested that our meets be scheduled for 0940 hrs, because the traffic conditions in the area he must past coming to meets are bad and are still getting worse. He has no way of starting the trip to the meet before 0900-0905 hrs because he has an English class from 0800 - 0900 hrs.

Next Meet: Oct 24 at the Delicatessen at 0940 hrs.

2. G gave me his LILYRIC and the LICALLA contact reports with corresponding attachments. He also brought some prints.

3. G handed in an accounting for his RF.

4. Separately he handed in a contact report on his meet with Jose GONZALEZ. Returned with the report is instruction material which PELLEMENT prepared for G. We discussed briefly the instruction which was selfexplanatory.

5. I was obliged to put some pressure on concerning the WUITENAU report which he did not bring as he promised. In fact he has done some work on W, but did not get all the info he believed he could get.

6. I spoke to him again about VARGAS case (just as I did 2-3 weeks ago) and this time G was rather convinced that he would not be able to work his way to V smoothly and he advocated a direct (cold) approach. I told him to put on paper what he did thus far concerning VARGAS and what were his suggestions. Will the trick work, I do not know.

6. I told him to ascertain with Base Houses whether the personnel had plans for Xmas leave including himself and ~~submitted~~ submit it for approval. I requested a list of presents including booze and cost . At the end I gave him the news that there will be no turkeys this year.

RHFernald

Ack B. Hayn w/the

LI ~~CALLA~~ EMPTY OPS

21 October, 1969 (Tuesday)

To : CO
From : Gerende
Subject : LICALLA Contact Report

time : 1630
place : Hotel

Operational : L-9 reports two new couples at club.

Production : two rolls: C-2432, 33; KOL report; notes.

14-00000

21 October, 1969 (Tuesday)

To : CO
From : Gerende
Subject : LILYRIC Contact Report

time : 0745
place : LAKE

Operational : L-13 had nothing special to report.

Production : fiver rolls: Y-3205, 06, 07 ,08 09; logs for 14-20 October

	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
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SUBJECT [illegible]		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: [illegible]

REFERENCES : A. [illegible]
B. [illegible]

1. [illegible] 1968. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

		DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		50-6-74/3

616 BD/BD/BD/Pm

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 12 DECEMBER 1958 616

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 2
INFO : COP, C/FI, C/FI/D, C/TSS 2, D/OC 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
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☐ ROUTINE
☒ PRIORITY — INITIALS: Res for RND
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS:

DEC 12 22 36 Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

OUT53675

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 04467

[redacted]/LIMESA/LIMUST

REF MEXI 2940 (IN 36921)*

1. TRAVEL LIMUST 2 AND 3 TO ARIZONA AUTHORIZED UNDER LIMESA. SUGGEST THEY REMAIN ARIZ FOR HOLIDAYS UNTIL FURTHER NOTIFICATION BY EDLLAND. COVER STORY: RETURNING HOME FOR HOLIDAYS, POSSIBLY TO BE CALLED TO COVER HQS FOR CONSULTATION AND TRAINING.

2. LIEMPTY PROJ MUST BE AMENDED INCLUDE LIMUST 2 AND 3 AND AUTHORIZE TRAINING TRIP. HQS WILL PREPARE AMENDMENT PROJ, CONTRACTS, AND CLEARANCES. NEED SOONEST DETAILS LOCAL COVER TO BE USED LIMUST/2.

3. HQS MUST GET STAFF APPROVAL INCLUDE LIMUST 2 INTO LIEMPTY BEFORE CAN AUTHORIZE TRAVEL TO HQS AND TRAINING. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *MEXI SEARCHING FOR SUITABLE COUPLE FOR RECRUITMENT TO USE IN LIMUST.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: de-Kyher
Signed: Gloria Raimer
R.O. #000 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

COORDINATION:
CCD/NC/Biladeau (BY PHONE)
FI/OPS/PROJECTS/REDFORD (BY PHONE)

Liempty/Dev. Plans

R.N. Dahlgren

R.E. GOMEZ, AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/~~III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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50-6-74/3

14-00000

SECRET

[redacted]

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is
authorized: [illegible]
18 November 1958
Signed: [illegible]
Note: [illegible] coordinate
if appropriate.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Division D

SUBJECT : Limesa/Limust

1. Some attention should be devoted, if it has not already been, to the dangers involved in this operation and particularly to what countermeasures the target may institute, or may already have instituted.

2. One current danger certainly exists, to wit, the existence of project Licalla base, which is in the group of buildings comprising the Limesa complex. One of the agents at Licalla base is known to one of the Lipstick agents arrested in the summer of 1958, and it is, hence, possible that both the host government and the target knows of Licalla. It is suggested that perhaps Licalla should be terminated. The reason has been advanced that this should not be done since the agent would be suspicious and in any event Licalla might serve as a red herring for Limesa. It is believed that the Licalla agent could be gotten out of this operation without arousing his suspicion. The Station could mount an obvious tail on him; when he reported it, he could be told he had probably been made and that, hence, the operation should no longer continue. The agent has been a good one and could be used elsewhere on some other work. Licalla house is going to be repaired soon. This might be a good opportunity to stop work there and let some innocent party rent it. That would be a better red herring.

3. Concerning the manner in which Limesa houses were acquired by the Station, it should be kept in mind that the purchase mechanism was identical with that used in Limited. The watchman at Limited knew an American owned it and told this to what to him must have seemed a casual visitor to the premises when it was under repairs. We should, therefore, assume the targets know an American owns it and that it is blown. Therefore, we should also assume that if the targets have conducted any sort of an investigation of Limesa houses, they may well have discovered that the same ultimate owner is involved. So far as is known, the bank which fronts for the purchases has not been checked to see if any inquiries have been made. We must agree the targets have the capability to find out who the front owner is--the bank-- and from there could possibly establish the identity of the owner, Limousine. Limousine and his firms have also been used as cover for other Station agents and operations apart from Limesa and Limited.

SECRET

[redacted]

56-6-44/3

[redacted]

4. It should not be forgotten that a person tried both to rent and buy Limesa properties earlier in the year after we owned them. So far as we know, a check on this person was not productive of suspicious data, but the question arises as to how thorough the investigation was. Possibly the name the man gave when making inquiries was false, meaning that in effect the right person has never been investigated at all. Knowing that the targets have in the past shown some interest in the Limesa buildings, it is not beyond the realm of reason that this man was sent by them. The story he gave for wishing to rent the house--because it was handy and close to a certain school--is identical with the story used by the Station to cover rental of Licalla almost next door.

5. Even granting that the true ownership of Limesa has not been discovered by the targets, they have various recourses through which to establish the identity and activity of the occupants thereof. The following possibilities suggest themselves:

a. Enter into litigation with Limesa owner over exact boundaries or other pretext, demanding property be surveyed. On court order, Limesa could be inspected thoroughly.

b. Undermine target side of Limesa walls, leading to possible condemnation of property by local government or necessity various repairs, etc.

c. Sabotage of electricity (causing fire) or water or sewage, necessitating entry into Limesa of outside persons, who could be infiltered by target agents.

d. Ramming by vehicle, with similar results, police, firemen, etc.

e. Complaint to medical authorities on filth, refuse, etc., leading to inspection by health authorities.

f. Various other approaches might be discussed.

6. One general recommendation can be made: sensitive material should be used and kept in a crypt, and a good one, rather than in the relatively insecure special room now planned as the operational room.

7. Beyond this, every effort should be made to see to it that the operators have good cover. The idea of clothing them in local clothing is excellent and shows right thinking in that direction.

[redacted]

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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TO: Chief, WH

INFO: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: C LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 November 1967 through 30 June 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-33459, 8 November 1967

Summary

1. During the reporting period, the project's principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, was assigned additional tasks, aimed at broadening his usefulness to the Station. These tasks included spotting and assessment as well as the handling of a recruited agent, ERFAIN-3.* GERENDE did well, and it is believed that a new dimension has been opened for him, and by the same token, the Station has, in effect, gained a new asset. The LIEMPTY base houses continued to produce at their usual rate and with their usual effective support to Station REDTOP operations. The LIMITED Base House and its operator, LIEMPTY-6, were terminated on 31 May 1968. Termination was decided upon partly to save money and partly because advancing age had measurably decreased the reliability and effectiveness of LIEMPTY-6's work. LIEMPTY-26 was rehired, which permitted the LILYRIC Base House to give us the same total hours of coverage as LILYRIC and LIMITED had together in the past.

.........continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc SB/O/WH

* [illegible]
ERFAIN/[illegible] is being
[illegible]!

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GROUP 1
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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-35080

DATE: 22 July 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/3

GERENDE

2. During the reporting period, the case officer has been meeting GERENDE an average of three times per week. Meetings are usually pre-arranged, at various sites and times. Meetings average 20 to 30 minutes. GERENDE turns over to the case officer negatives, prints, logs, and other reports which he has picked up from the base houses since the previous meeting, along with brief contact reports on his meetings with base house representatives. Reports on other operational activities are also turned in and discussed, and GERENDE is given instructions, notes for the base houses, and negatives for any enlargements which may be desired by the Station. Also, LIENVOY tapes and transcripts are exchanged at each meeting. (The departure of LIACUTE-1 at the end of April 1968 left the Station without a BEDOX transcriber. As a temporary solution, pending the return of LIACUTE-1 or the recruitment of another BEDOX transcriber, GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, has been hired at the rate of 31.50 pesos per hour to transcribe the Spanish language portions of the tapes. She does the work in her home, and GERENDE transports the tapes.)

3. GERENDE has the direct agent-handling responsibility for the following LIEMPTY agents: LIEMPTY-4 (photo-processor; met twice per week); LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED; met once per week until termination); LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27 (LILYRIC; LIEMPTY-13 normally met twice per week -- in his absence LIEMPTY-27 makes meetings); and LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA; met twice per week). He is responsible for directing their work, paying them, and handling all of the administrative problems which may develop. To judge from the results, GERENDE has excellent rapport with these agents and is able to get a consistently high performance rate from them -- particularly LICALLA and LILYRIC personnel.

4. As noted in reference, GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee, which we found a useful side benefit. His MHRAVEL activity during the reporting period has been minimal, but we expect it to start picking up again. GERENDE has conducted a few discreet inquiries and investigations for us within the MHRAVEL complex, and we have instructed him to try to get an assignment which will keep him as close to the FJSTEAL delegation as possible.

5. Reference also pointed out that GERENDE had performed nicely in the cultivation and development of an operational lead, and that the Station planned to give GERENDE more of the same. Furthermore, GERENDE's standing assignments (LIEMPTY base houses, MHRAVEL activity, and occasional support of JMROD requirements) were not challenging enough or occupying enough of GERENDE's time. GERENDE is rather firmly committed to WOFIRM by virtue of the fact that he has worked for WOFIRM for over 15 years and has no other outside employment of any consequence. By the same token, he was, through no fault of his own, doing less work for WOFIRM than at any time in his career. GERENDE's operational exposure through the years dictated more and more restrictions on his activity, for sound security reasons. The solution to GERENDE's problem (lack of a promising future) and the Station's (not getting its money's worth) seemed to be to give GERENDE additional tasks which he could handle under suitable cover and with due regard to security precautions. Since most of GERENDE's support activities had been against the FJSTEAL target, particular care would have to be taken in committing him further in this direction. It was decided, therefore, that his principal retooling would be in a non-FJSTEAL field.

CS COPY

6. In line with the above reasoning, GERENDE was introduced to Andrew R. DOSCHER on 17 February 1968. The idea was that GERENDE would be trained to assist DOSCHER in some of his operations against Central American targets. GERENDE's principal duty thus far has been to take over the handling of ERFAIN-3, under DOSCHER's close supervision and guidance. GERENDE has performed quite creditably in this task. He seems interested in the work and has learned quickly. On the other hand, an apparently ingrained habit of procrastination has resulted in dilatory reporting. If GERENDE can overcome this (and both case officers are working hard to teach GERENDE the importance of prompt and complete reporting) there seems to be every reason to believe GERENDE will develop into a competent agent handler.

7. GERENDE was also given the task of locating and developing (in alias) a girl who, per LIENVOY, was being cultivated by AERODENT. Although GERENDE had to be continually reminded of the assignment, he did an excellent job of meeting the girl and gaining her confidence. It is quite likely that he could have recruited the girl as an access agent against AERODENT, but as this point was reached another operation against AERODENT was launched and it was not felt that attempting to recruit the girl would serve any useful purpose, for the time being at least (among other things, there was no indication that she had had any contact with AERODENT for some months). The only flaw in GERENDE's performance was the time it took him to get around to doing the job. It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time GERENDE had a number of pressing personal matters to attend to, including overseeing the completion of his new house, which he finally moved into on 10 March 1968, even though construction is still not entirely completed.

8. Among other assignments completed by GERENDE in the reporting period were the renting of an apartment for use as a listening post; and initiating a relationship with a Russian translator working for the MHRAVEL committee.

LICALLA

9. The star of the LIEMPTY show, as far as quality of performance is concerned, continues to be LIEMPTY-9. His favorable location and his perceptiveness continue to result in revealing photos and equally revealing commentary. In addition to the 2,908 operational photos taken during the reporting period, he has provided daily, weekly, and monthly summaries and notes, semi-monthly attendance reports (of PJSTEAL personnel spotted by him), various special reports, and special intensive coverage of the following: 201-120123; 201-107668; 201-271102; and 201-305870. As of 1 May 1968 LIEMPTY-9's salary was raised from 4,000 pesos to 4,500 pesos per month. LIEMPTY-9 was also given permission to have a maid's room constructed on the roof of his apartment. The original maid's room is LIEMPTY-9's photo point. The maid, who has been with the family for 11 years (since she was 10) either sleeps in the hall, where she is in the way, or in the bedroom of LIEMPTY-9's nine-year old son, which LIEMPTY-9 feels is beginning to be not a proper arrangement. The room will be built at a point on the roof away from the PJSTEAL installation (so as to arouse as little suspicion as possible), and the fact that the maid will be seen going in and out of the room regularly should quiet any suspicions which may arise. Construction work put LICALLA out of action starting 24 June, but it is expected that the work will be finished by 20 July.

LILYRIC

10. LILYRIC's performance continues to be prolific -- 8,568 operational photos in the reporting period. Again, it

should be pointed out that this blanket coverage is useful insurance that all activity is caught. Combined with the daily fixed surveillance reports on all members of the FJSTEAL installation, the Station can safely say that its coverage of FJSTEAL installation ingress and egress is complete during working hours (and any extra hours which the Station wishes covered). Since 1 May LILYRIC has been on duty 57 hours per week: 0800-1800 weekdays and 0800-1500 Saturdays. Commensurate with their new schedule (and the return of LIEMPTY-26 to the active roster), the total monthly LILYRIC salary has gone from 4,900 pesos per month to 6,000 pesos per month (LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27, are of course, father, mother, and two sons). The fixed surveillance reports are used on a daily basis, since the Station constantly has operational interest in knowing whether a particular FJSTEALER was "in" or "out" at a particular time, and if out, who he went with, what time he left, etc. In addition, LILYRIC has standing instructions to notify GERENDE (and GERENDE the Station) immediately when American-appearing visitors come to the FJSTEAL installation. Eight such visits were noted in the reporting period, along with a number of other visitors who, for one reason or another, attracted the special attention of LILYRIC.

LIMITED

11. LIEMPTY-6 slowed down noticeably in the reporting period. He was ill several times, his surveillance reports were occasionally inaccurate, and his photographic work was poor. With the assurance that LILYRIC would be able to take up the slack (and give us better coverage for less money) the decision was made to terminate the LIMITED base house. While we are thereby denied some of the flexibility which we have had in the past, it is likely that LIEMPTY-6 would slowly have faded out of the picture anyway. While he was in there, he produced 911 operational photos, as well as daily fixed surveillance reports. Following his termination (a report of which is being forwarded separately) LIEMPTY-6 took a trip to Europe and has now started working full-time in the insurance business for his son-in-law, where he has gained a new lease on life. In other words, the termination couldn't have been more amicable. LIEMPTY-6 vacated the LIMITED apartment (he said he could not afford to keep paying the rent) and it is no longer available to the Station.

PHOTO LAB

[illegible]

12. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to process all LIEMPTY photo work. In addition to developing and making contact prints of all photos mentioned above, he made 778 enlargements of various shots. The photo lab is still in his office, pending the completion of GERENDE's house.

Vincent P. [illegible]
for/Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]-11 has started working with the [illegible] team when he is not occupied with [illegible] activities and has adapted very well. Also his morale is better because of his increased activity.

[illegible] 35038
16 July 58

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief/WHD XX

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LIEMPTY-11

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As Indicated

1. The placing of LIEMPTY-10 and -11 and the LIENTRAP vehicle under the operational responsibility of LIEMBRACE-1 has been beneficial to both of these capabilities. As has been previously reported, several surveillance assignments could not have been successfully accomplished without the dispatching assist of LIENTRAP.

2. In regard to this combination of assets there have been two weaknesses:

a. The LIENTRAP operators unfamiliarity with the LIEMBRACE radio usage and surveillance tactics.

b. Full use of LIEMPTY-11, (LIEMPTY-10 services 28 P.O. boxes on a thrice a week basis. This plus the regular LIENTRAP activity keeps him sufficiently occupied).

continued......

Distribution:
③ - Chief/WHD

201-11[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
50-6-72/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 34608

DATE
8 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119930

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 34608

3. In order to overcome the above mentioned weaknesses, The Station proposes that LIEMPTY-11 be used part-time with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. He also will continue his LIENTRAP activities. This activity will enable the Station to make greater use of LIEMPTY-11's time and also give complete familiarity with radio usage and surveillance tactics. LIEMBRACE-1, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 all are in agreement with this proposal.

4. LIEMPTY-11 has an Operational Approval granted on 14 September 1955 for use on the LIPSTICK team. The Station assumes that this OA will allow his use on the LIEMBRACE team. If this is not the case, the Station requests that his OA be amended to allow for such usage.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
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		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, SB

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 August through 31 October 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-32721, 7 August 1967

1. On 25 July 1967, Raymond H. GERENDE, principal agent for the LIEMPTY project, was introduced to his new case officer, Vincent P. RIZZUTO. The major reason for the change in case officers was to bring the LIEMPTY project into the section which it is largely designed to support, the REDTOP section. In the three-month period covered by this progress report, GERENDE was met by the case officer 32 times. Meetings were normally prearranged, with times and sites varied (with the introduction of the new case officer, most of the former regular meeting sites were dropped and new ones substituted). Meetings were occasionally arranged via telephone, in which case a prearranged code was used. Due to GERENDE's MHRAVEL activity (see below) it was not always possible to stick to a fixed meeting schedule.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTYs-4, 9, and 13 on a twice-a-week basis, and LIEMPTY-6 once per week during this period. These meetings were prearranged. As explained below, GERENDE no longer meets LIEMPTY 10.

......continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc To SB/c/wH

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33459	8 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or its assets during the period of this report.

LICALLA

what is done with these

4. LIEMPTY-9, the operator of the LICALLA base house, provided 1,289 operational photographs during this period. In addition, he provided fixed surveillance reports, sighting reports, and special notes and comments. LIEMPTY-9 has proven himself to be a reliable and perceptive reporter of the events he observes. For this reason, he has been asked to provide special coverage on various individuals of interest, or on particular days when coverage is desired. The Station has found the LICALLA reports to be consistently useful in determining the presence, activities, and personal associations of target personnel. In part this is due to the location of the LICALLA base house, but it is also due to the interest, effort, and judgement of LIEMPTY-9 himself. [illegible]

LILYRIC

these too

5. The LILYRIC base house has been a prolific provider of operational photos, 4,014 having been submitted in the period under review. While there is occasionally superfluous coverage of visiting sports and cultural delegations (and LILYRIC personnel have been instructed to be more selective in this respect) the blanket coverage afforded by this base house guarantees that nothing will be missed during normal working hours. The fixed surveillance reports are voluminous, highly accurate, and quite valuable. On three separate occasions during the reporting period LILYRIC alerted the Station to the presence of American visitors at the target installation.

LIMITED

6. The efficiency of the LIMITED base house has suffered a slow decline. LIEMPTY-6 has been out of action for short periods because of illness and a physical examination. The physical, however, showed that he is in good health and we look for an improvement in his performance in the next reporting period. His surveillance reports are not entirely reliable due to a tendency to assume that the normal occupant of a certain car is, in fact, in that car. His photos, however, continue to be useful. 314 were provided in the period under review.

and these

LIENTRAP

7. As noted in HMMA-33279, 13 October 1967, the LIENTRAP photo vehicle, operated by LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is now in direct contact with LIEMBRACE-1, leader of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. This arrangement, which began in mid-August 1967, has proved to be a very happy one operationally. In addition to permitting more flexible use of LIENTRAP for Station requirements across the board, it has left GERENDE more time to devote to other duties (see below).

PHOTO LAB

8. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to process the photos taken by the base houses, and in addition made 269 enlargements in the period under review. During this period, the photo lab was moved to LIEMPTY-4's office because of renovations going on in GERENDE's house. LIEMPTY-4 processes the photos after working hours, and keeps the equipment and photos locked away during the day. As LIEMPTY-4's office is in his home, the equipment and photos are not left unguarded over night.

GERENDE

9. As reported in reference, GERENDE had been developing

a possible access agent to LIRING. This eventually culminated in an attempted recruitment of the prospect by GERENDE. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, GERENDE exhibited considerable resourcefulness and operational skill in developing the target to a point where the recruitment attempt was possible. We plan to use GERENDE in similar roles in the future as opportunities arise, and for this reason we plan to document him with a set of false Mexican documentation as well as a set of false American documentation. GERENDE is collecting exemplars and getting the background information needed, and once the necessary data are assembled, Headquarters (WOACRE) support will be requested.

10. GERENDE has continued to provide support for the JMROD operation as needed.

11. In September and October 1967 GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee. He was able to get assigned as aide to the DIZTAG delegation. In this capacity he was able to supplement very nicely the information and support being provided by Jeremy S. HODAPP. This foot-in-the-door came in very handy, and is expected to be even more valuable in 1968, if GERENDE can get the position again. While the job was rather time-consuming we believe that it was well worth it.

12. In connection with his duties with MHRAVEL, as well as in connection with the fact that his WOFIRM activities are nearly 100% against the FJSTEAL target, GERENDE was given a very general briefing on the Station's REDTOP program. It is our hope that, in having a better idea of what the Station is trying to do in this field, GERENDE will be able to make an even greater contribution to that program than he has in the past.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/3

[illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible]

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Investment

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local investment

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– (Can be done

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Can Budget Stand

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TO Chief/WHD		☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING ☐ MICROFILM
INFO.		
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the Period 1 May through 31 July 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMA-32068, 23 May 1967 (Previous Progress Report)

1. From 1 May through 31 July 1967, 26 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project. With the exception of one unscheduled meeting, meetings during this period were prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied. The unscheduled meeting was arranged via telephone using a prearranged open code. During the absence of GERENDE, two operational meetings were held with Oliver G. SCANTLING, alternate Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and four with LIEMPTY-4, photo lab operator. All of these meetings were prearranged.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -9, -10 and -13 on a twice a week basis and with LIEMPTY-6 on a once a week basis during this period. GERENDE's meetings with these assets were all prearranged. SCANTLING met with LIEMPTY-9 and -13 on two occasions and with LIEMPTY-6 once during the absence of GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief/WHD

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201's marked — blue pencil copies made; on file	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32721	DATE 7 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32721

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during this period. Effective 1 July 1967 LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-11 were given slight salary increases, because of their increased activity.

4. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or the assets involved during the three months under review.

LICALLA

5. This basehouse, the operator of which is LIEMPTY-9, provided 1277 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of PJSTEAL. LIEMPTY-9 also prepared fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes and comments.

LILYRIC

6. The LILYRIC basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2854 frames of operational photograph during the period. The LILYRIC basehouse operators continued to prepare fixed-surveillance reports on each member of PJSTEAL and turned these in on a weekly basis. LIEMPTY-27 resumed his duties on 1 July as scheduled and this basehouse has now reverted to its normal hours of coverage. (See reference relative to the absence of LIEMPTY-27.)

LIMITED

7. The LIMITED Basehouse, operated by LIEMPTY-6, produced 279 frames of operational photographs plus weekly fixed surveillance reports on each of the members of PJSTEAL. The LIMITED basehouse was closed from 17 through 22 July because of the illness of LIEMPTY-6. During this period LIEMPTY-6 did very little radio-alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team because of the variation of the surveillance team's activities.

LIENTRAP

8. The LIENTRAP mobile photo vehicle had a decrease in activity during this period because of the dismantling of the old LIENTRAP vehicle and the modification and installation of equipment in the new vehicle. The old LIENTRAP vehicle was used to cover photographically all of the residences of opposition elements in Mexico City. As in the past LIENTRAP provided photographic coverage of addresses of the local Communist parties, residences of members of other Hemisphere parties and several PBRUMEN targets. A total of 332 frames of operational photographs were provided by LIENTRAP.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the LIEMPTY photo lab, processed all of the operational photographs mentioned above as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 299 frames of photographs of special interest taken by the basehouses. LIEMPTY-4 does the photo processing on Tuesday and Thursday nights.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE started the development of a possible access agent to LIRING and also continued to provide support for the JMROD operation. These task being aside from his regular LIEMPTY duties. GERENDE was on vacation from 25 May through 4 June 1967.

11. There will be one administrative change during the coming period when Vincent P. RIZZUTO will assume the Case Officer responsibilities for GERENDE/LIEMPTY. No problems are envisioned in this change over. No other significant changes are planned.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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DISPATCH

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TO
Chief/WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/ Progress Report for the period 1 February through 30 April 1967

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References : HMMA-31354, 13 February 1967 (Previous Progress Report)
HMMA-31636, 20 March 1967 (JMROD/LIEMPTY)

1. During the period 1 February through 30 April 1967, 30 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY support project. These meetings were all prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied to avoid establishing a pattern. No emergency or unscheduled meetings were held with GERENDE during this period.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -6, -9, -10, -11 and -13--basehouse, photo lab and photo truck operators--twice a week during this period. Meetings with these assets were prearranged and were held at varying times and in different sections of the city.

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during the period under review.

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Distribution:

③- Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 32068	23 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 32068

4. There were no known security incidents during the period covered in this report. As a precautionary measure, the LIEMPTY basehousekeepers were instructed to maintain increased vigilance in their respective areas and buildings and to be prepared to evacuate any incriminating equipment and papers on a moment's notice. This was done because of the renewed interest in the assassination of President Kennedy which in turn brought forth comments in the press about photographs taken of Oswald during his visit to Mexico. On three occasions during this period, LIEMBRACE-3 surveilled the operational meetings between GERENDE and LIEMPTY-6. This was done in order to try to ascertain if any FJSTEAL personnel were taking measures to verify the activities of LIEMPTY-6. LIEMBRACE-3 reported that all of the meetings he covered appeared to be clean of hostile surveillance. (NOTE: Headquarters is aware of the interest FJSTEAL has taken in LIEMPTY-6. LIEMBRACE-3 does not know the exact location of LIMITED/LIEMPTY-6, although he is aware of the existence of this asset because of the radio alert system used by the surveillance team when working the FJSTEAL target. In order to avoid LIEMBRACE-3 surveilling LIEMPTY-6 to the exact address, LIEMBRACE-3 was instructed to surveill GERENDE when he departed the meeting site and to report to GERENDE after LIEMBRACE-3 was convinced that there was no hostile surveillance and after they had departed the meeting area.)

LICALLA

5. During this period LIEMPTY-9, operator of the LICALLA basehouse, provided 1112 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of FJSTEAL. All photographs provided by LIEMPTY-9 were accompanied by fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes. LIEMPTY-9 is a perceptive individual and his special notes and comments are considered to be of great value by the interested section in the Station. LICALLA coverage was suspended during the period 19 through 25 March while LIEMPTY-9 was taking a well-deserved vacation. The cover of the LICALLA basehouse appears to remain good, with no undue attention devoted to it by FJSTEAL personnel.

LILYRIC

6. This basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2553 frames of operational photographs during the review period. LIEMPTY-13 is employed full-time and most of the coverage is provided by LIEMPTY-14, and -27, although during this period, LIEMPTY-14 carried the largest share of the workload. In March the hours in which LIEMPTY-27, a medical student, attended school were changed from the afternoon to the morning. This schedule change will remain in effect until the end of June 1967. LIEMPTY-14 does not have the mental composure to remain on the job for the hours needed to provide full-time coverage and her homekeeping duties often interfered with her working hours. In order to alleviate this problem, the working hours of LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED were increased and those of LILYRIC/LIEMPTY-14 decreased. No serious loss of coverage resulted from this temporary change in working hours. The salary of LIEMPTY-27 was cut in half for the period of time in which he will not be providing continual assistance to the Project.

7. LILYRIC remains as the main source of information on WOLADY and other foreign visitors to FJSTEAL.

LIMITED

8. LIEMPTY-6, the operator of the LIMITED basehouse, provided 684 frames of operational photographs during the three month period. LIEMPTY-6 also spent a great deal of time alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team during this period because of the AEQUALITY-1 operation. LIEMPTY-6 was on vacation from 8 through 23 April and coverage from this basehouse was suspended during this period. As mentioned above, LIEMPTY-6 now is working longer hours in order to relieve LIEMPTY-14. LIEMPTY-6 does not know why his hours were increased.

9. On one occasion during this period LIEMPTY-6, while alerting the LIEMBRACE team on an FJSTEAL target, noted that a WOLADY subject had entered FJSTEAL on foot. He alerted the team and they were able to surveill the subject and identify him through records at the hotel where he was staying.

CS COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA - 32068

LIENTRAP

10. The LIENTRAP photo surveillance truck was targetted against a purported forged document processing center, members and addresses of the local Communist parties and their front groups, members of other Hemisphere parties, BEDOX personnel in Mexico City and the DIZTAG Commercial Office. In covering these targets, 948 frames of operational photographs were produced. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, LIENTRAP operators, serviced, on a thrice weekly basis, over 20 postal boxes which are used as accomodation addresses by the Mexico City Station, other field stations and Headquarters.

11. LIEMPTY-4 who operates the LIEMPTY photo processing lab, processed all of the above mentioned operational photographs as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 227 frames of photographs of special interest.

12. Raymond H. GERENDE continued to provide support for the JMROD operation as well as carrying out his duties as the Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project.

13. GERENDE is planning to take a 14 day vacation starting in late May. During his absence Oliver G. SCANTLING will replace GERENDE as the Principal Agent and contact for LIEMPTY-6, -9, -10, -11 and -13. The Station Case Officer will be in contact with LIEMPTY-4. SCANTLING knows all of the assets whom he will handle and has worked with them in the past, but has not met LIEMPTY-4.

14. As approved by Headquarters, the present LIENTRAP vehicle will be replaced by a new Ford "Econoline" truck in the near future. Before the old LIENTRAP vehicle is sold, it will be used to cover residences of the FJSTEAL/NYXIS opposition who are living in Mexico City.

15. No significant operational or administrative changes, other than those mentioned in this dispatch, are planned for Project LIEMPTY for the coming period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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	SECRET	NO CONTINUED	3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION	
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TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIEMPTY
Progress Report for the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References :
A. HMMA-30687, 28 November 1966 (Previous Progress Report)
B. HMMA-30956, 28 December 1966 (SGSWIRL of LIEMPTY-10)
C. HMMW-15157, 13 January 1967 (Project Renewal Approval)
D. HMMA-31164, 24 January 1967 (LIEMPTY Security)

GENERAL

1. Project LIEMPTY is a support project which provides information of CI/CE interest on the FJSTEAL installation, FJSTEAL personnel, visitors to FJSTEAL, both indigenous and foreign, and photographic coverage of various targets deemed of interest by the several operational sections within the Station. The Project has eight active agents plus Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent; two vehicles, GERENDE's QPV and the LIENTRAP photo truck; a photographic processing laboratory; and, three basehouses, LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, operators of the photo surveillance truck, also acquire and service P. O. boxes used operationally by the Station, Headquarters and other Stations.

2. On 9 December 1966 Luke B. MARSCHALEK (p) assumed Case Officer responsibilities for the LIEMPTY Project. MARSCHALEK was introduced to GERENDE in true name and GERENDE is the only member of the LIEMPTY complex whom MARSCHALEK has met. There were no problems during the change of Case Officers and none are envisioned in the future.

continued...

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WHD

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31354

DATE
13 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS

3. During the period under review, 30 meetings were held with GERENDE by the Project Case Officer. Meeting sites and times were varied to avoid establishing a pattern and most meetings were scheduled at the previous meeting. Several unscheduled meetings were held during this period and were arranged by the Case Officer telephoning GERENDE to establish the meeting time and site. Times and sites are coded when discussed by telephone and are arranged in such a way as to appear to be a normal conversation. Telephone calls to GERENDE are made from pay booths located away from the LNPURE installation.

4. GERENDE held twice weekly, clandestine meetings with LIEMPTY-4, -6, -9, -10, -11 and -13. These regular meetings are all prearranged and are held at various sites and at various times of the day so that meetings correspond with the regular habits and movements of the basehousekeepers and LIENTRAP operators.

5. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY project performed in a most satisfactory manner during the period under review. LIFEUD-4 has been extremely efficient in developing and printing negatives provided by the other assets.

PRODUCTION AND ACTIVITIES

6. LICALLA. During this period LIEMPTY -9, operator of the LICALLA basehouse, provided 1,239 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden of the PJSTEAL installation, the area where many of the officers, family members and visitors congregate. This coverage is especially valuable because the officers are usually at their leisure and often gather into functional groupings. LIEMPTY-9 is very observant and his comments and notes are considered of great value to the Station. All photos provided by LIEMPTY-9 are accompanied by a fixed-surveillance report.

7. LILYRIC. This basehouse is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14, and -27 with LIEMPTY-14 and -27 providing most of the coverage because of the full-time outside employment of LIEMPTY-13. During this period the LILYRIC basehouse provided 2,716 frames of operational photographs covering the only vehicle and pedestrian entrance into the target installation. All photographs were accompanied by fixed-surveillance reports on individual members of the staff of the target installation. The operators are often able to provide the license plate numbers of vehicles used by visitors to the target installation, which in many cases help to identify the visitor.

8. LIMITED. The operator of the LIMITED basehouse is LIEMPTY-6. The LIMITED basehouse also provides coverage of the only vehicle and pedestrian entrance to the PJSTEAL installation, but from a different angle, and the comments made relative to coverage in the section on LILYRIC also pertain to LIMITED. The LIMITED basehouse provided 557 frames of operational photographs during this period. LIMITED also serves as the radio alert for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, although the practice of using a radio alert is being decreased. On two occasions during this period LIEMPTY-6 was alerting for the team in a deception exercise, since the team was not working the PJSTEAL target. This was done on instructions from the Station and LIEMPTY-6 was not told that these were deception exercises.

9. LIENTRAP. During this period as in the last reporting period, the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance unit was targetted mainly against the local Communist parties as well as members of other Hemisphere parties who are living or are in exile in Mexico. The LIENTRAP operators are LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 and during this period they produced 564 frames of operational photographs. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 also service over 20 postal boxes which are used as accomodation addresses by the Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other field stations.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE. Aside from his regular duties as the Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project, GERENDE also provided valuable assistance in the furtherance of objectives involved in the JMROD operation. In this regard, Thomas G. URQUHART, Headquarters officer, held approximately seven operational meetings with GERENDE during this reporting period.

SECURITY

11. LIEMPTY-10 and -11 were afforded a SGSWIRL interview on 8 December 1966. There were no outstanding problems indicated in the results of the interview of LIEMPTY-11. The results of LIEMPTY -10's interview were discussed in Reference B.

12. A general security review of the LIEMPTY Project was forwarded in Reference D.

13. There were no known security problems or incidents during this period which may have jeopardized the operation or the assets involved in the Project. RJSTEAL interest in LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED was discussed in Reference D and apparently is a continuing matter.

PLANS

14. During the coming period no significant operational or administrative changes are planned, since the Project is producing in a timely and satisfactory manner.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Security of LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

1. In December 1966 Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project, was asked to prepare a security resume, including his opinions, on the security of the LILYRIC, LIMITED and LICALLA Basehouses vis-a-vis Soviet knowledge of their existence. The following paragraphs contain a slightly edited version of GERENDE's report, which was received on 28 December 1966. Station comments follow GERENDE's and are so noted.

LILYRIC

2. In its present new location LILYRIC is the newest of the photo bases under my control. According to LIEMPTY-13, there has been no indication of interest of any sort by the Soviets in the family's move to the new apartment nor was there in the past any show of interest or peculiar behavior on their (Soviet's) part with regard to the old base and the possibility that they might be under photo surveillance.

3. The cover for the work carried on by this base is good since the wife, LIEMPTY-14, who does most of the work has no trouble in justifying her presence at home all of the time. The son, LIEMPTY-27 is a medical student and attends his classes regularly and can justify his hours as study hours. (He continues to be an excellent student and was exempted from examinations at the end of this, his second year in medical school. Actually, he studies most of the night). LIEMPTY-13 requires no cover as he has a full-time job as production manager for a large concern and he usually makes his meetings with GERENDE on his way to or from work.

continued...

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3 - Chief/WHD

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31164

DATE
24 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

4. The set-up in the old as well as the new base is the following: The equipment - camera, scope and tripod - is mounted in one bedroom behind venetian blinds with one slat removed. This room is locked to keep servants or any chance intruder from entering. The operators do not spend all their time behind the camera, but go to the adjoining bedroom where a table and typewriter are set up and where the daily logs are transcribed, knitting done, or some other activity that does not require full concentration is carried out. The curtains and blinds in this room are kept partially or fully open to allow good visibility and provide a normal appearance. Most of the daily movement of the Soviet personnel is followed from this room and when it is necessary to take pictures of visitors, unknown persons or newly arrived Soviets, the operators go to the other room and use the pre-set equipment.

5. GERENDE's Comment. It seems to me that any careful observation by the Soviets would have revealed the tell-tale position of the venetian blinds in both the old and the new bases. I have no doubt that the Soviets realize they are under photo surveillance. The move by the family from the old to the new building must surely have been noted by the Soviets. Possibly the Soviets think the family is working with the local authorities due to LIEMPTY-13's former association with the Mexican Army.

6. Station Comments. The Station agrees with GERENDE that careful observation by the Soviets would have revealed the missing slat in the venetian blinds and also the fact that these blinds are seldom open. The Station also agrees that the Soviets realize that they are under photo surveillance. This was pointed out recently when a Soviet shielded an LNERGO walk-in when they passed the front gate of the Embassy and made a sign to the walk-in indicating that they could be seen by someone watching with a telescope from the buildings across the street. Also, as Headquarters is aware, there have been numerous comments by residents of Mexico City to the effect that anyone entering the Soviet Embassy is photographed; however, seldom has it been rumored that the "Americans" are doing it, which might indicate most people believe the Mexican Government is doing any such photographing and thereby reaffirming GERENDE's statement that the Soviets possibly believe the Mexican Government runs the base.

7. Given the assumption that the LILYRIC base is blown, the Station at this point does not plan to terminate or revamp the LILYRIC installation. Any operational change by the operators would be spotted by the Soviets and if the Base were closed the Soviets would start looking for a new installation. The LILYRIC Base is performing a useful function and it is believed that it will continue to do so. The Soviets have had opportunities to complain to the Mexican Government about being monitored photographically and have not seen fit to do so and it is believed that they probably will not do so unless there is a radical change in Soviet and/or Mexican policy. The Station has instructed GERENDE to take every precaution during his meetings with LIEMPTY-13 to assure that LIEMPTY-13 does not lead the Soviets to him and thereby jeopardizing other operations, especially LICALLA.

LIMITED

8. The operator of the LIMITED Base, LIEMPTY-6, is, to my knowledge, the oldest hand in the photo surveillance of the Soviet target and possibly the most likely to be "burned". His residence for years at the former Base (now the site of the new LILYRIC building) and his move to the present base could not have gone unnoticed by the Soviets. His cover is that of an insurance salesman, but he actually does not work at the cover and is at a disadvantage in trying to explain his source of income. At times, in years past, he had to afford full-time coverage from the base, which allowed him no time to engage in credible cover activities.

9. GERENDE Comments. I do not believe that LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED is a security risk; however, his present means of working from an open door leading to his balcony probably can be spotted by the Soviets. LIEMPTY-6 is extremely cautious about checking himself for surveillance when making meetings.

50-6-74/3

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10. Station Comments. The same Station comments made in reference to LILYRIC also apply to LIMITED. Also, the use of LIMITED as the radio alert base for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team has weakened the security of this base. In regard to LIMITED, LICOWL-1 has reported that the Soviets are very interested in LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED and that so many Soviets have talked to him (LICOWL-1) about LIEMPTY-6 that he is convinced that the Soviets have a "fear" and an "obsession" about LIEMPTY-6. LICOWL-1 reported on 3 January 1967 that the Subject of 201-744341 and the Subject of 201-756168 asked him on 19 December 1966 for full details known to him about LIEMPTY-6 and Subject of 201-756168 went so far as to say that he believes that LIEMPTY-6 is "watching the Soviets".

LICALLA

11. When the Soviets raised the height of the wall in their backyard about two years ago, they could have blocked completely the view of this base's working window by making the wall a few inches higher. Since they did not do this, it would seem to indicate that they are not aware that their activities are being monitored from this point. On the other hand, in recent months LIEMPTY-9, the operator, has reported that activities in the back yard have been curtailed more and more. For example, the women no longer congregate there daily, the school children enter their classes by a route not visible to LIEMPTY-9 and the trees and shrubs have not been trimmed in years, making LIEMPTY-9's view poor in most directions. LIEMPTY-9 says that he has never noticed any undue interest in his house or his activities by the Soviets. Access to the operating room can be seen from the window which LIEMPTY-9 believes to be the commo room in the target installation.

12. The cover for this base is that of a normal residence. LIEMPTY-9's cover work is that of a car and insurance salesman in a local automobile agency in the afternoon only. LIEMPTY-9 does work in his cover. LIEMPTY-9's cover for the use of the operating room is that he does accounting work for client firms. The door is kept locked at all times and LIEMPTY-9 never allows the servant to enter, even for cleaning purposes. The equipment is kept locked in a trunk within the room when not in use and all logs and photos are kept in a safe located in LIEMPTY-9's bedroom closet.

13. GERENDE Comment. I believe the Soviets are aware of the photo surveillance being carried out by this base due to the position of the window and the curtains during the hours when LIEMPTY-9 is operating.

14. Station Comment. The Station does not believe that this photo base is known to the Soviets. This belief is based on the fact that the LICALLA coverage is excellent and there has been no indication that the Soviets act for the benefit of observers while they are in the backyard. It is interesting to note that the Soviets made no effort to "protect" the LNERGO walk-in mentioned in paragraph 6 above during a visit to the backyard and LICALLA did obtain photographs of the walk-in. The school children no longer pass through the backyard because the location of the school was recently changed and the children now go by another route. The Station has instructed GERENDE to take every precaution in order to protect the security of the LICALLA base.

15. As a general comment pertaining to the security of the bases involved in Project LIEMPTY, it should be noted that the Soviets are aware of the fact that LIMOUSINE is the owner/builder of the new LILYRIC building. LIMOUSINE is also the owner of the LIMESA complex, through a holding company.

16. The Station realizes that most of the details reported in this dispatch are known to Headquarters; however, the Station wanted to make the opinions of the Principal Agent and the Station a matter of record in a consolidated form.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, WHD			MARKED FOR INDEXING
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INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 August through 31 October 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMA-29775, dated 15 August 1966

B. MEXICO CITY-8526, dated 12 September 1966

C. HMMA-30203, dated 3 October 1966

D. MEXICO CITY-8807, dated 10 October 1966

E. HMMA-30403, dated 26 October 1966

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND REPORTING

A. The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 May through 31 July 1966, was forwarded to Headquarters as Reference A. Noteworthy interim Project activities were reported in References B. through D. while Mexico City Station's Request for the Renewal of Project LIEMPTY was forwarded with Reference E.

B. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors. This activity was in consonance with various sections of the RMD as approved for Station Mexico City. The above cited program was accomplished through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses. In addition, the LIEMPTY Project provided effective support to other Station and Headquarters (i.e. AMROD and AMLETTER) activities through the exploitation of the LIENTRAP mobile/photographic unit and the LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

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3-Chief/WHD

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LIEMPTY

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30687	28 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 30687

2. AGENT COMMUNICATIONS, CONTACT AND PERFORMANCE

During the period under review, Raymond H. GERENDE was seen 2[illegible] times in regular operational meetings by the LIEMPTY Project case officer. No basic changes other than the regular preplanned variations in meeting sites and times were made in the Project communication channels. The up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDE (see HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966) remains in effect. All regular contact with the active LIEMPTY agents (LIEMPTYs -4, -6, -9, -10, -11, -13, -14, and -26) was maintained via Raymond H. GERENDE. GERENDE met each of the above cited agents, with the exception of LIEMPTYs -14, and -26, two times each week in clandestine meetings. The operational performance of all active LIEMPTY agents, including GERENDE was most satisfactory. The performance of LIEMPTY-4 in assisting the local WUACRE section with its photographic processing was outstanding.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

A. SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, the LIEMPTY Project continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used by the Station in its planning and operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a particularly reliable tool for: following the daily comings and goings of the LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to and confirming the identifications of new LIMERICK staffers and also visitors to the LIMERICK installation; providing leads to the relative rank and the specific intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction and physical changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; and providing a reliable check on various Station and LNERGO access agents. During the quarter under review, Project LIEMPTY basehouses provided 5,003 frames of operational photographs (169 rolls) as well as 1,290 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering the movements of the LIMERICK staffers.

B. LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was again targetted heavily against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly Haitian, Guatemalan and Honduran Communist exile leaders now resident in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated and/or new identification photographs which are of value to both the JMTIGER and the Station recruitment/penetration program. This apparat provided a total of 237 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to this LIENTRAP unit regularly serviced 23 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other field Stations.

C. LIMITED - During this quarter, the LIMITED basehouse provided 724 frames of operational film as well as daily physical surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of all LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of that installation during the evening and week-end hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehousekeeper, working from his excellent visual vantage point, dispatched the LIEMBRACE surveillance team via radio on several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

D. LILYRIC - During this reporting period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 2,859 frames of operational photographs covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section above, but during the morning and afternoon hours. In October the LILYRIC personnel (LIEMPTYs -13, -14, -26 and -27) successfully completed the move into the new LIMOUSINE building. While some photographic coverage was lost during the move, LILYRIC coverage at present is back to normal (see also paragraph 4 of Reference A.).

E. LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided both physical observation and photographic coverage of the garden and patio of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage LICALLA produced 1,183 individual photographs (of which 80 were color prints used in the Station's "mug book") as well as regular daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA- 30637

F. LIEMPTY-4 - With the exception of the color prints, all of the above cited operational film provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. In order to alleviate some of the pressure caused by recent adjustments in the Station's WOACRE section, LIEMPTY-4 also processed approximately 200 photographic enlargements which normally would not fall within the scope of this project.

G. Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full time principal agent for Project LIEMPTY, operating as the cut-out to the above cited basehouses and bearing the first echelon agent handling responsibility for all active personnel. In addition, GERENDE via hard leg work and his translating ability, made numerous and essential contributions to the AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY AND PLANS

A. There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the personnel therein. Station plans to afford LIEMPTYs-10 and -11 SGSWIRL examinations during the ensuing period. All other active LIEMPTY agents have been SGSWIRLed during the past year.

B. No significant operational or administrative changes are planned for the ensuing period since this Project is producing in a satisfactory and regular manner.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

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DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Identification of Florida License Plate 1-105538

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: For your information
References: A. MEXI-8361, 24 August 1966
B. DIR-31174, 27 August 1966
C. MEXI 8394, 26 August 1966

MICROFILMED
SEP 19 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Contained herein is supplemental information to Reference B.

2. Florida lincese plates 1-105538 were registered to Lewis *WOLSHIN for use on a 1964 Ford.
DOB: 1908 N.CITY USA

3. JMWAVE investigation revealed that WOLSHIN was born in 1908 and is presently residing at 1684 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida with his wife Olga A. *WOLSHIN. Their telephone number is 887-7907. He has been employed as a Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County since 1953. He had a satisfactory credit rating. Police checks in Miami indicated the following arrest record:

a. In 1934 he was arrested in New York City for felonious assault. The charge was later reduced to simple assault.

b. In 1941 he was arrested in Savanah, Georgia for investigation of auto larceny. He was released to New York.

c. 1941 arrested in New York City for violation of probation.

d. 1947 arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada for peddling without a license.

e. 1951 arrested in New York City for petty larceny.

4. Neither RI nor WOBONE indices contained information on WOLSHIN or his wife.

5. Permission is granted to pass the above information to LNERGO. We are also making it available to their Headquarters.

Laura J. UTSTINE

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, JMWAVE

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO SS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14857	DATE 12 SEP 1966 1 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

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COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/Security		Mr. Hannah
SR/O/WH	2 Sept	
WH/C/FI	8 Sept	

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RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1		J. Fisher

ABSTRACT INDEX

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

29 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1

ATTENTION : Jane Zerance

SUBJECT : Identification of License Tag 1-105538

1. Identification of the above captioned license tag was made by JMWAVE security. They have furnished the following information.

2. The license tag is registered to Lewis Wolshin, born 1908; is residing at 684 SE 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida. The tag was issued on a 1964 Ford. Wolshin's wife is Olga A. Wolshin; he has been employed as Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County, Florida, since 1953. A credit check was conducted in Wolshin's name, and a October 1964 report indicated biographic data as listed above. He had been known to the credit bureau since 1951, had satisfactory credit, and no derogatory information was available. Police checks in Miami, Florida, indicated the following arrest record:

1934	New York City	Felonious assault charge reduced to simple assault
1941	Savannah, Ga.	Investigation of auto larceny, released to New York
1941	New York City	Violation of probation
1947	Las Vegas, Nev.	Peddling without license
1951	New York City	Petty Larceny

SECRET

GROUP 1
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file LIEMPTY
50-6-74/3

Wolshin's telephone number at Hialeah, Florida, is 887-7907. The Office of Security Indices has no record of Wolshin or his wife Olga.

Richard J Hannah

Richard J. Hannah
WH/Security

14-00000

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

13 SEP 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Visitors to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

1. A usually reliable source reported that an American looking couple visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1200 to 1230 hours on 23 August 1966. They were driving a Falcon bus bearing Florida tags 1-105538 (white numerals on blue.)

2. Investigation revealed that the plates were registered to Lewis WOLSHIN for use on a 1964 Ford.

3. WOLSHIN was born in 1903 and is presently residing at 684 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida with his wife Olga A. WOLSHIN. Their telephone number is 887-7907. He has been employed as Pool Manager or Assistant Park Manager by Dade County since 1953. He had a satisfactory credit rating. Police checks in Miami indicated the following arrest record:

1934	New York City	Felonious assault charge reduced to simple assault.
1941	Savannah, Georgia	Investigation of auto larceny, released to New York
1941	New York City	Violation of probation
1947	Las Vegas, Nevada	Peddling without license
1951	New York City	Petty larceny.

~~ANAL~~	~~PI~~	LV4/1
~~FS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X		~~INDEX~~

4. This Office has no information on the above-mentioned individuals.

5. The information contained herein has been passed to your representative in Mexico City and may not receive further dissemination by your Bureau without prior approval of this Office.

CSCI-316/04400-66

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50-6-74/3

CSCI-316/04400-66

1 September 1966

BASIC: MEXI-8361, 24 Aug 66
DIR-31174, 27 Aug 66
MEXI-8394, 26 Aug 66

PROJ : LIENVOY/LILYRIC

LIAISON: --

FILE: 50-6-74/3)

(Distribution & coord., next page)

CSCI-316/04400-66

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WH/1/Jane Zerance/nr/1 September 1966

14-00000

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ACTION

26 AUG 66 IN 84385

S E C R E T 262305Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8394

DIRECTOR

WOMUSE

REF MEXICO CITY 8361 (IN 82664) *

REF CAR WAS FALCON BUS, NOT VOLKSWAGEN.

S E C R E T

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* RE AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE WHO VISITED SOVIET EMBASSY 23 AUG.

LIEMPTY OPS

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: J. Ze[illegible]nce/kaw
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 26 August 1966

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(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 27 1440Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 31174

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

REF: MEXICO CITY 8361 (IN 82664) NOT SENT JMWAVE

1. FLORIDA TAG 1-105538 REGISTERED LOUIS WOLSHIN DOB 1908 OF 684 S. E. NINTH AVE., HIALEAH. WIFE OLGA A. EMPLOYED AS POOL MGR OR ASST PARK MGR BY DADE COUNTY SINCE 1953. SATISFACTORY CREDIT. POLICE RECORD 1934 TO 1951, FIVE ARRESTS INCLUDING LARCENY, ASSAULT, VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND PEDDLING WITHOUT LICENSE. NO HDQS TRACES. PERMISSION GRANTED PASS LNERGO.

2. JMWAVE: SOLUTION TO LICENSE PLATE OF AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE VISITING SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY 23 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY OPS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/SEC - Mr. Hannah,
(by phone)
WH/C/CICS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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FILE VR, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 242020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8361

24 Aug 66 E 2864

DIRECTOR

WOMUSE

1. LILYRIC REPORTS AMERICAN LOOKING COUPLE VISITED SOVIET EMBASSY 23 AUG FROM 1200 TO 1230 HOURS. WERE DRIVING CAR, BELIEVED VOLKSWAGEN BUS, WITH WHITE ON BLUE FLORIDA TAGS 1-105538.

2. WILL ADVISE LOCAL LNERGO.

3. PLEASE CABLE SOLUTION TO LICENSE PLATE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

WOLSHIN

cy of cable sent Jerry Mullane - 25 Aug 66

LIEMPTY OPS

3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
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TO
Chief/WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 May through 31 July 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMA-28938, dated 13 May 1966

B. MEXICO CITY 7533, dated 6 June 1966

C. DIRECTOR 12138, dated 14 June 1966

D. DIRECTOR 19940, dated 14 July 1966

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES, REPORTING and ACTIVITIES.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 February through 30 April 1966, was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim project activities and levied requirements were contained in references B. through D. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This activity was in consonance with and represented partial fulfillment of various sections of the RMD as approved for Station Mexico City. The above cited program was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, as well as the LIENTRAP mobil photo unit. In addition the LIEMPTY Project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (i.e. AMROD and AECUTLET) activities and other Station operations through the regular exploitation of the LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29775

DATE
15 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

2. AGENT COMMUNICATION, CONTACT AND PERFORMANCE.

During the period under review, GERENDE was seen 25 times in regular operational meetings by the LIEMPTY Project case officer. No basic departures, other than the regular pre-planned changes in meeting sites and time, were made in the regular and alternate communication channels. The up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDE as forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966 remains in effect. During the period under review, the emergency contact arrangements pertinent to LIEMPTYs -4, -6, -9, -13 and -14 were reviewed by GERENDE and the respective agents. The operational performance of all active LIEMPTY agents was highly satisfactory. As per usual, GERENDE turned in the solid operational performance which the Station has come to expect from this long-time contract agent.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

A. Summary - Throughout the reporting period, the LIEMPTY Project continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used by the Station in its operational planning against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a particularly reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; providing leads to the relative rank and the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; and providing a reliable check on various Station and LNERGO access agents. During the quarter under review, Project LIEMPTY basehouses provided a record 5,722 frames of operational photographs (184 reels) as well as approximately 1,200 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering the movements of the LIMERICK staffers.

B. LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly exile Communist leaders now resident in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated identification photographs of Communist officers which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. This apparat provided 282 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to the LIENTRAP unit also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters and other Field Stations. In July, the LIENTRAP unit was repainted and completely overhauled.

C. LIMITED - During this quarter, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,215 frames (47 reels) of operational film as well as daily physical surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of all LIMERICK personnel, at the front gate of that installation during the evening and weekend hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher for numerous LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

D. LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided a record 3,301 frames (99 reels) of operational photographs covering the same area and targets as noted in the LIMITED section above, but during the morning and afternoon hours. As noted in paragraph 5 of reference A., Station completed the rearrangement of the LIMITED-LILYRIC working hours, based on the recent recruitment and clearance of LIEMPTYs -26 and -27. The LILYRIC basehouse now provides photographic and physical surveillance coverage from 0800 hours through 1700 hours, while LIMITED provides coverage from 1700 hours to 1930 hours on weekdays. LIMITED also provides morning coverage on Saturdays and Sundays.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-29775

E. LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage, LICALLA produced 1,206 individual photographs as well as regular daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

F. MISCELLANEOUS - All of the above cited operational film provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY Photo Lab. During this period, LIEMPTY-19 provided translations of numerous articles and documents in support of other Station activities not directly related to Project LIEMPTY.

G. Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cut-out to the above-cited basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the related personnel, as well as handling the operators of the LIENTRAP unit (LIEMPTYs -10 and 11), LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-19. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY case officer. It should be noted that GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY AND PLANS.

A. There had been no known incidents during the reporting period which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the personnel attached thereto.

B. In order to alleviate a portion of the pressure caused by the recent major adjustment in the Station's WOACRE section, the LIEMPTY photographic base, during the ensuing period, will process various Station photographic requirements which normally do not fall within the realm of this Project.

C. It is anticipated that the LILYRIC personnel (LIEMPTYs -13, -14, -26 and -27) will move into the new LIMOUSINE building during the forthcoming period. Little, if any, coverage will be lost during this move. Other than noted above, no significant operational or administrative changes are planned for the ensuing period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

ATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
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TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief/KUSIOT

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/AMROD
Examination of Envelopes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-29002, 20 May 1966

Examination of the five envelopes sent as attachments with reference shows possible evidence of tampering on one envelope, while the other four show no evidence of tampering. For your convenience we are attaching a xerox copy of the envelope which showed evidence of tampering.

Neil A. Cocayne
Neil A. COCAYNE

Attachment: (1 envl)
1. Xerox copy of envelope

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City, w/att.

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[illegible]
CF3

50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14695 CS COPY	30 JUN 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

1 - RI, w/o
1 - TSD/Registry, w/o
1 - WH/1, w/o
1 - WH/C/CA/PA, w/o
1 - TSD/CCG/OPS

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
TSD/CCG/OPS	CDBrammer	mah	27 June 1966	x2922

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1	24 Jun 66	W. Fredrick (by phone), x3654
WH/C/CA/PA	21 June 66	Pat Johnson (in draft)

ANY / FI
FS / DESK
ABSTRACT / INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/TSD/CCG	27 JUN 1966	John S. Foster

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

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TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report
1 February through 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-28322, dated 17 February 1966
B. DIR-81875, dated 20 February 1966
C. MEXI-6479, dated 7 March 1966
D. MEXI-6611, dated 22 March 1966
E. MEXI-6668, dated 28 March 1966
F. MEXI-6794, dated 6 April 1966

Action Required: For Your Information.

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT REPORTING AND ACTIVITY

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report, covering the period 1 November 1965 through 31 January 1966 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim operational and security activities and developments were included in references B. through F. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This activity was in consonance with, and represented partial fulfillment of various sections of the RMD as approved for Mexico City Station. The above-cited progress was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses as well as the LIEMTRAP mobile photographic unit. In addition, the LIEMPTY project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (particularly the AMROD operation) and Station activities

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28938	13 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/3

through the exploitation of the LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

2. AGENT COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTACT

During the period under review, GERENDE was seen 33 times in regular operational meetings by the undersigned, and on 2 occasions by the local KURIOT representative, Hugh T. FRANCOTTE. The meetings between FRANCOTTE and GERENDE were attended by the LIEMPTY Project Case Officer and dealt with the installation of a new PAKO print dryer in the LIEMPTY photo laboratory. In addition, GERENDE met four times, for extended periods, with LCFLUTTER examiner Daniel R. HOSKIER when he served as the interpreter for the LCFLUTTER examinations afforded LIEMPTYs, -6, -9, -14, -13, -26, and -27. No basic departures, other than the regular preplanned changes in meeting sites and times, were made in the regular and alternate communications channels to GERENDE. It should be noted that an up-dated and revised emergency communication system for contact with GERENDE was forwarded to Headquarters as HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966. This plan includes both verbal and physical bona fides and supersedes previous arrangements.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS

a) SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; verifying or providing leads to the relative rank and specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes in the LIMERICK physical plant; providing a check on reports of Station and ODENVY access agents. During the three month period under review, Project LIEMPTY's basehouses provided 3,967 frames of operational photographs (146 rolls) as well as 650 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering this target.

b) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting-sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, specifically the leaders of the strike group at the National University. LIENTRAP provided up-to-date photographs of numerous Communist officials, which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. This unit provided 330 operational photographs, while the personnel attached to this unit also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters, and other field Stations.

c) LIMITED - During this period, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,147 frames (45 rolls) of operational film and daily observation reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of that installation during the afternoon and rush-hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher for several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations.

d) LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 1,660 frames (56 rolls) of operational photographs, covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, the LILYRIC personnel prepared a detailed report on the daily comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the majority of this Project's physical surveillance reports.

e) LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families and visitors congregate. In providing this coverage, LICALLA produced 1160 individual photographs as well as regular, daily reports on the salient activities in this area.

f) LIEMPTY-4 - All the above cited operational film (160 rolls, 4,297 frames) provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photo lab. As noted in paragraph 2 above, a new semi-automatic PAKO print dryer was recently installed in the photo laboratory. With the installation of this dryer, the Station's modernization of the LIEMPTY photo laboratory has been completed. (See paragraph 5 of HMMA-27653, dated 17 November for the details of this program).

g. Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the related personnel as well as handling the operators of the LIENTRAP mobile unit, LIEMPTY-4, and LIEMPTY-19, a Station asset (translator) carried under Project LIFEAT. Gerende's overall assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings each week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should be noted that GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD deception operation.

4. SECURITY

There have been no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY. During the period under review, LIEMPTYs -6, -9, -13, -14, -26, and -27 were afforded LCFLUTTER examinations, all with satisfactory results.

5. CHANGES AND PLANNING

As noted in paragraph 5 of reference A, Station is in the process of increasing the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided by the LILYRIC operations during the week-days. At present, the LILYRIC personnel are providing coverage from early morning to late afternoon, while LIMITED is providing week-end coverage. After the LILYRICs have moved into the new LIMOUSINE building, it is anticipated that they will be able to provide complete dawn to dusk coverage, the Station's ultimate goal.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

to be a memorandum from the [illegible] Office of Naval Construction to the Mexican Secretary of the [illegible] concerning the departure from Mexico City of the Chief of Naval Construction for the port of Mazatlan on official orders. The Station is attempting to determine just how the Soviets obtained this memorandum.

During April 1965, the American Embassy Protection and Welfare officer advised the Station that he had received a call from the States from a Mr. James Green, Sr. concerning his son, James C. Green, Jr. and a friend of his son's, Grant W. Crayne. He said that according to Mr. Green, his son and Crayne had called Mr. Green and told him that they were going to the Soviet Union. The two men later visited the U. S. Embassy and were interviewed by a Station officer. The following day on 12 April, Subject reported that two Americans (who fitted the descriptions of Green and Crayne) had visited the Soviet Embassy that same day. This fact was subsequently confirmed by LIMITED. LIEMBRACE surveillance was placed on the two men and this eventually led to their arrest and deportation from Mexico.

Also during the reporting period, Subject reported an incident which the Station felt could be used to discredit the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the local population. The story, which is factual, was placed in the newspaper La Prensa by LILISP-E during July 1965. An English language translation of the article follows :

La Prensa, 19 July 1965 (Editorial page)

"The Men 'Made in Moscow'"

. . "The men made in Moscow lack sensibilities, are forbidden, because of their Marxist beliefs, to aid the suffering or to help those in need. On 3 July of this year, in front of the Russian Embassy, a Mexican was hurt by a large lamp which had been placed above the gate to the Embassy and which fell on him due to the strong wind. The wounded man, bleeding profusely, begged the Russian guards who were but a few feet away from a telephone to call the Red Cross. The guard answered that the Embassy was not responsible for the force of the wind and that the man should move on his way and not bother him. At this point, some local workers and students began to gather about the wounded man and several of them asked that the Russian guard telephone the Red Cross. The Soviet guard again refused this request and also refused the students permission to use the guard-house phone themselves. Meanwhile, the bleeding man had lost consciousness and the students demonstrated their feelings toward this monstrous lack of charity by shouting (names) at the Russians. The Russian answered (in Spanish) that the accident was of no interest to the Embassy and besides no one there spoke Spanish. A good Communist has no reason to show pity in the face of misfortune. deformers that they are, lacking sensibilities, they cannot find the goodness to pity anyone. . . . ."

8. Concerning the possible security questions raised by the Station in HMMA-27692 of 12 November 1965, the Station would like to comment that no new doubts concerning LICOOL-1 have arisen since this dispatch was written. We plan to give LICOOL-1 a LCFLUTTER test during March 1966.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Project LIEMPTY Progress Report
1 November 1965 through 31 January 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HMMA-27653, dated 17 November 1965

B. MEXI-5390, dated 23 November 1965

C. MEXI-5401, dated 24 November 1965

D. MEXI-5421, dated 26 November 1965

E. MEXI-5452, dated 30 November 1965

1. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ACTIVITY AND REPORTING

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report covering the period 1 August through 31 October 1965 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Salient interim activities and developments were included in references B. through E. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity. This was achieved through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and the LIENTRAP mobile unit. In addition, the LIEMPTY project provided essential support to various other Headquarters (particularly the AMROD operation) and Station activities through the exploitation of the LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

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3 - Chief, WH Division

Empty
50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28322

DATE
17 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS

During the reporting period, GERENDE was seen 34 times in regular operational meetings by the undersigned and on 5 occasions by the Headquarters' AMROD operations officer, Thomas G. URQUHART. All meetings were regularly rotated among eight selected sites. No basic departures were made from the standard meeting modus operandi; however, new contact arrangements, for meetings under emergency conditions, are being worked out with GERENDE.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS

a) SUMMARY - Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the vast majority of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This activity is in direct support of, and in consonance with, the current RMD as approved for the Station. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; verifying the relative rank and specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers; keeping the Station abreast of construction changes of the LIMERICK physical plant; and verifying reports of Station access agents. During the period under review, the LIEMPTY basehouses produced 4,212 photographs (149 rolls) as well as 640 pages of fixed surveillance reports covering this target.

b) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was targetted against leaders and meeting-sites of the local communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity. Specifically, LIENTRAP provided up-to-date photographs of numerous communist officials, which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's penetration/recruitment program. The LIENTRAP unit and personnel also regularly serviced 21 postal accommodation addresses used by Mexico City Station, Headquarters, and other field Stations. The LIENTRAP unit provided a total of 404 operational photographs.

c) LIMITED - During the reporting period, the LIMITED basehouse provided 1,412 frames (54 rolls) of operational film and daily observation reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the installation during the afternoon and early evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the radio dispatcher on several LIEMBRACE surveillance operations. The value and need of the LIMITED fixed-radio dispatching base has been explained in detail in previous LIEMPTY Progress Reports.

d) LILYRIC - During this period, the LILYRIC basehouse produced 1,542 frames (54 rolls) of operational photographs, covering the same area and targets noted in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the majority of this project's physical surveillance reports.

e) LICALLA - Throughout this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families, and visitors congregate. In covering this area, LICALLA produced 1,258 individual photographs as well as regular reports on the activities of various officials of special interest to the Station.

f) LIEMPTY-4 - All the above noted operational film (155 rolls, 4,616 frames) provided by the basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4 at the LIEMPTY photo processing base. As noted in reference A., much of the LIEMPTY photographic lab equipment was scheduled to be replaced during this period. With the advice of the local KODAK representative, both the LIEMPTY lab's film washing system and strip printer were replaced. In addition, a new semi-automatic drum-type print dryer was ordered by the Station for installation in this base during February 1966.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28322

g) Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, GERENDE served as the full-time LIEMPTY P/A, operating as the cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bearing the agent handling responsibility for the operators of the LIEMTRAP mobile unit as well as LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-19, a Station asset (translator) carried under Project LIFEAT. This overall assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings per week (in addition the 34 meetings held with the Project Case Officer). GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation. It should be noted that GERENDE's alertness in spotting the PBRUMEN surveillance of one of the AMROD accommodation addresses, undoubtedly saved this sensitive deception operation from exposure by the opposition.

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS

Other than the attempted PBRUMEN surveillance of the AMROD accommodation address noted above (which was neutralized by GERENDE's alertness), there have been no known incidents which adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While several minor administrative problems arose, all such matters were resolved locally.

5. CHANGES AND PLANNING

a) One major operational change is planned for the ensuing period. Upon completion of the new LIMOUSINE structure (see HMMA-25352, dated 10 February 1965), the Station will move the present LILYRIC basehouse personnel (LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26 and 27) into that edifice rather than the LIMITED (LIEMPTYs 6 and 7) personnel as originally planned. Ancillary modifications are: 1) To increase the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided by the LILYRIC operators (dawn to dusk) during the week days and 2) have LIMITED provide photographic and physical surveillance coverage on week-ends only, while remaining on daily stand-by for radio-dispatching assignments. These changes were dictated by the following considerations:

1) The new LIMOUSINE building will offer a much better vantage point for both photographic and physical surveillance than does the present complex which houses the LILYRIC and LIMITED bases. Therefore, the Station feels that the personnel occupying this new base should be those possessing the highest technical skills and also those able to provide the most thorough and complete coverage. Since the LIMITED base now has only one trained operator while the LILYRIC basehouse has three, the LILYRIC group is indicated.

2) Because it appears that the coverage of the LIMERICK installation will be a long-range and continuing requirement, the Station desires to staff the new base with personnel of long-range potential. Since LIEMPTY-6 is now almost 60 years old, it is obvious that he does not possess this potential; however, the LILYRIC agent complex happily combines experienced personnel with youthful agents.

3) Finally, the social and financial status of the LILYRIC personnel is much more compatible and consistent with the environment of the new building than is that of the LIMITED family.

While it is anticipated that these modifications and changes will initially cause various administrative and operational problems, it is believed that all such adjustments can be handled locally.

b) The requisite copies of the PRQ Part II pertinent to LIEMPTY-26 were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-27593, dated 8 November 1965 along with a request for a full Operational Approval for Subject for use as a cut-out to the LILYRIC basehouse. LIEMPTY-27 was granted a Provisional Operational Approval on 26 January 1966 for use as a part-time basehouse keeper/operator at the LILYRIC installation.

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28322

c) Other than noted above, there have been no major administrative, operational, or personnel changes during the reporting period.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4

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ATE : 18 Nov 65

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2 SECRET

20 Nov 65 16 11z

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~~SIG CEN~~

FI

O MEXI INFO CARA CITE DIR 59668

REF CARA 3029 (IN 94102)*

HQS APPROVES MR. MOREHOUSE STOPPING BY MEXI FOR DISCUSSIONS ON USES OF SURVEILLANCE PANEL TRUCKS. WILL ARRIVE MEXI SOMETIME LATTER HALF WEEK 22 NOVEMBER. WILL PHONE CABOT AT HOME OR OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. NO NEED MEET ~~[illegible]~~ NOR MAKE RESERVATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

*Cara requested permission Morehouse visit Mexi on brief TDY for latest methods and problems encountered in use surveillance panel truck.

Lempit/op

OC/SPS/CMT/D.Millhorn (draft)
WH/3/Venezuela

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Acting, Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT Project [illegible] Progress [illegible]
1 August [illegible] 31 October [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

References: A. [illegible], 10 August [illegible]
B. [illegible], 12 August [illegible]
C. [illegible], 26 August [illegible]
D. [illegible], 1 September [illegible]
E. [illegible], 1 October [illegible]
F. [illegible], 6 October [illegible]
G. [illegible], 26 October [illegible]

1. [illegible]

The [illegible] visitors, [illegible] (particularly [illegible]) [illegible] of the [illegible] Principal [illegible].

2. [illegible]

a) In [illegible], the [illegible] returned to [illegible]. (See reference [illegible]) operational [illegible].

b) [illegible] G. [illegible], the regular operational meetings [illegible] Headquarters [illegible] officers. [illegible] normal.

Continued...

Distribution:
[illegible] - C/WHD

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]	17 November [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION [illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-[illegible]

7. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, [illegible]

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This activity is in direct support of, and in accordance with, the present RMD as approved for Mexico City Station. The LIEMPTY coverage has proved to be a most reliable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing leads to, and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers. During the period under review, the LIEMPTY basehouses produced 146 rolls ([illegible],666 individual frames and photographs) of operational pictures as well as approximately 675 pages of fixed surveillance reports dealing with this target. In addition, the LIEMTRAP mobile photo unit provided 441 photographs of other targets of interest to the Station. Specific examples of the contributions made by each component of Project LIEMPTY to the fulfillment of the RMD follow:

a) LIEMTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIEMTRAP mobile unit was targeted against leaders and safe-sites of the local communist parties and visiting or exile communists. Specifically, the LIEMTRAP unit verified the location of a PCM safehouse, provided up-to-date photographs of numerous individuals of interest to the Station Case Officer directing the communist party recruitment program, and, in addition, regularly serviced nineteen postal accommodation addresses used by the Station and Headquarters.

b) LIMITED - During the reporting period, LIMITED provided 1,[illegible] frames (66 rolls) of operational film and daily surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the fixed-radio dispatcher on four [illegible] surveillance operations. The crucial need for the LIMITED fixed-radio dispatching base has been amply explained in previous LIEMPTY Progress Reports.

c) LILYRIC - During the reporting period, the LILYRIC basehouse produced 1,766 frames (50 rolls) of operational film, covering the same targets noted above in the LIMITED section, but during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the large majority of this project's physical surveillance reports. In addition, LILYRIC provided special reports on: all commercial deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation; the number, description, and apparent assignment of each official LIMERICK vehicle; and reports on construction activity within the installation.

d) LICALLA - During this period, the LICALLA basehouse provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers, their families, and visitors congregate. In this effort, LICALLA produced [illegible] individual photographs as well as regular reports on the activities of various LIMERICK officers of special interest to Station Mexico City. In addition, LICALLA is at present preparing a special series of photographs in response to a KUTUBE/D request.

e) LIEMPTY-4 - Throughout this period, all operational film (166 rolls, 4,0[illegible] frames) provided by the three fixed basehouses as well as the LIEMTRAP mobile unit was developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4. Given the condition of the processing equipment, which is now being replaced, LIEMPTY-4's finished product was extremely satisfactory.

f) Raymond H. GERENDE - During the reporting period, with the two-week exception noted in paragraph 2, GERENDE served as the full-time cutout to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and had the agent handling responsibility for the operators of the LIEMTRAP mobile unit as well as LIEMPTY-4. This assignment involved at least twelve clandestine agent meetings per week as well as the corollary administrative/financial responsibility. GERENDE also made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive [illegible] operation.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-27[illegible]

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS.

There have been no known incidents during the period under review, which adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While various minor administrative questions arose, the Station was able to resolve all such matters locally.

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) In response to the Station's request, DIR-50873, dated 16 October 1965 granted a POA to LIEMPTY-26 for use as a cutout to the LILYRIC basehouse. LIEMPTY-26 was met by GARENDE and was used operationally during the absence of the regular LILYRIC cutout, LIEMPTY-13. The PRQ Part II and full OA request pertinent to LIEMPTY-26 will be submitted prior to 15 November 1965.

b) As in the past period, Station plans to continue to emphasize the quality of the LIEMPTY photographic product. To this end, much of the photographic lab equipment is being replaced and discussions are being held with the local KURIOT representative, Hugh T. FRANCOTTE, concerning the replacement of the basehouse cameras.

c) Other than noted above, there have been no major administrative, operational, or personnel changes during the reporting period.

for
R L EASBY

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

J1 SECRET

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, ADDP, C/WH6, C/CI,

S E C R E T 230047Z 1965

DIR CITE MEXI 5135 23 OCT IN 78370

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF DIR 51315

REF LTR MAILED AS REQUESTED 22 OCT.

S E C R E T *INSTRUCTED MEXI TO MAIL LETTER

CFN 5135 51315 REF LTR MAILED AS REQUESTED 22 OCT

BT

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: De-Kept

Signed:

R.O. #330 - Unit WH/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

File
LIEMPTY
50-6-74
ops

23 OCT 65
50-6-74/3

X

C-Anderson

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

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ROUTING			
1		5	
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ORIG : Charles W. Anderson:new
UNIT : C/WH/C/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4197 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 2 September 65 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-20481

SECRET

2 SEP 65 20 06z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, ADDP, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI 2

~~SIG CEN~~

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
authorized: [illegible]

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 40022

Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #C30 - Unit WH/4/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF MEXI 4616 (IN 43897)

1. AGREE SUSPENDING PO BOX SERVICING FOR TIME BEING BUT DESIRE VISUAL CHECK OF NONOALCO BOX 10 OR 11 SEPTEMBER 1965

2. PLEASE HOLD ALL LETTERS FROM THAT BOX TILL URQUHART ARRIVAL.

3. DESIRE COMMENTS ON COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AT TIME LIEMPTY-10 SERVICED NONOALCO 25 AUGUST.

4. ASSUMING L-10 POSSIBLY IDENTIFIED AT THAT TIME AND NOW UNDER SURVEILLANCE DESIRE HE MAKE DAILY VISITS GOBERNACION AND PROCURADURIA DEL DF BEGINNING SOONEST. HE TO TRY GIVE IMPRESSION HE LOOKING TO MEET SOMEONE OR WAITING FOR APPOINTMENTS.

5. WISH STAFFER, PEUVION IF POSSIBLE, VISIT NONOALCO PO BOX SECTION TO SEE IF LETTERS SIMILAR TO THOSE RETRIEVED 25 AUGUST ARE VISIBLE IN ANY OTHER BOXES.

6. WHAT WAS DATE STAMPED ON THE 25 AUGUST LETTER THAT WAS NOT MARKED "LIBRE DE POPTE?"

Liempty/5?

7. HISTORY OF LOST TEST LETTERS PLUS INCIDENT REPORTED IN REF INDICATES NONOALCO BOX UNSUITABLE FOR AMROD OP. REQUEST LIEMPTY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 2-9

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

25 Sep 65
50-6-74/3

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG :
UNIT : ☐ INDEX
EXT : ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 40022

ASSET GET ASAP NEW BOX IN A PO NOT SO FAR ASSOCIATED WITH AMROD, USING FALSE NAME AND ADDRESS. WOULD PREFER BOX AT MAIN PO IF POSSIBLE. AGENT MAY HAVE TO MAKE GIFT TO HEAD OF PO STATION OR SUBSTATION IF BOXES IN SHORT SUPPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

J Flores
for
William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/C/CA
WH/1. (Mrs. Bustos in draft)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J Flores
for
John T. Flynn
ADC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report 1 May through 31 July 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. HMMA-26027, 5 May 1965
B. HMMA-26243, 4 June 1965
C. MEXI-4167, 16 July 1965
D. MEXI-4248, 26 July 1965

1. REPORTING AND BACKGROUND.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY progress report covering the period 1 February through 30 April 1965 was forwarded as reference A. Significant interim developments and activities were included in references B through D. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity, through the daily photographic and fixed surveillance coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA photographic basehouses and the frequent use of the LIEMTRAP mobile photo unit. In addition, this project provided other essential operational support to various Station and Headquarters activities through the utilization of the services of long-time contract agent Raymond H. GERENDE.

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

a) On 22 May 1965, the Principal Agent for Project LIEMPTY, Raymond H. GERENDE, departed Mexico for a two month period of well-deserved vacation. As per pre-planned arrangements, GERENDE's operational, administrative, and agent-handling tasks were turned over as follows:

To Oliver G. SCANTLING (P): Agent handling and funding of the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and the LIEMTRAP mobile unit;

To the LIEMPTY Case Officer - agent handling and funding of the LIEMPTY photo-lab/dark room; and the local AMROD responsibility.

SCANTLING was chosen for this turn-over and the accompanying workload since he had previously handled all but one of the agents involved and because he was familiar with the objectives and overall modus operandi of the LIEMPTY project. The above noted operational assignments will again be levied on GERENDE upon his return to Mexico in early August 1965.

Continued...

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3 - C/WHD

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-26996

DATE
12 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

b) Prior to [illegible]'s departure, he was seen by the undersigned [illegible] times in regular, operational meetings. After that date, Oliver G. SCANTLING was seen on twenty-five occasions and LIEMPTY-[illegible] (the photo-lab/safehouse keeper) nineteen times by the undersigned in connection with the operational [illegible] meeting requirements of this project. SCANTLING in turn met with each base-house keeper and with the LIENTRAP operator twice weekly. All meeting times and sites were rotated regularly during the period under review, and no basic departures (other than noted above) were made from the standard modus operandi of the LIEMPTY project.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, ACHIEVEMENTS.

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to provide the majority of the operational photographs and surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. This coverage has proved to be a most reliable and viable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers. During the period under review, Project LIEMPTY produced 160 rolls (3,833 frames) of operational photographs as well as approximately 700 pages of fixed, physical surveillance reports dealing with this target. In addition, LIEMPTY produced 203 operational photographs of other targets of interest to Station Mexico City. Specific examples of the contributions made by each component of Project LIEMPTY to the fulfillment of the relevant portions of the Station's Related Missions Directive, follow:

a) LIENTRAP - Throughout this period, the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit was targeted against leaders and installations of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM), visiting communist leaders, and other targets of special operational interest. Specifically, the LIENTRAP unit verified the current addresses and provided up-to-date photographs of two prominent Nicaraguan communists exiled in Mexico; photographic coverage of an Embassy of interest to KUTUBE/D for use in operational planning; and provided photos of the individuals and an installation linked with the local Spanish Republic Royalists. LIENTRAP produced a total of 203 operational photographs and regularly serviced seventeen postal accommodation addresses used by the Station and Headquarters.

b) LIMITED - During the period covered by this report, LIMITED produced fifty-seven rolls (1,672 frames) of operational photographs and regular surveillance reports covering the daily arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and their visitors at the front gate of the installation in question, during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper served as the fixed radio-dispatcher for three LIEMBRACE surveillance operations targeted against LIMERICK IS officers as well as serving as the spotter and dispatcher for five LIEMBRACE surveillances directed against PBPRIME nationals who visited the LIMERICK installation (see MEXI-4247, MEXI-4248, and MEXI-4250, all dated 26 July, for details).

c) LILYRIC - During the reporting period, the LILYRIC base produced sixty-three rolls (1,652 frames) of operational film, for the same purposes as noted above in the LIMITED section, during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LILYRIC prepared a weekly report on the comings and goings of each LIMERICK staffer and contributed the large majority of the project's physical surveillance reports. Finally, LILYRIC provided special reports on all commercial deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation.

d) LICALLA - During this period, the LICALLA base provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, an area where many of the officers and their families congregate. In this effort, LICALLA produced forty rolls (1,110 frames) of operational photographs which were most useful to the Station in determining or confirming the intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK staffers. On [illegible] May [illegible], Harvey C. [illegible] and Joseph M. [illegible] made movie and audio tests from the LICALLA base in support of local and Headquarters operational planning (see reference B. for details).

4. SECURITY AND PROBLEMS.

There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which have adversely affected the security of the LIEMPTY project or the related agent personnel. While various minor administrative and personnel problems arose, the Station was able to resolve all such problems locally.

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) Station Mexico City plans to have Raymond H. GERENDE reassume the agent-handling and administrative responsibilities that he previously had, upon his return to Mexico in early August 1965. As previously noted in reference A, SCANTLING has been removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY and integrated into the LIRAZOR project.

b) Other than noted above, no major administrative or operational changes are planned for the ensuing period.

for Cornelius L. Pennion
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Project LIEMPTY/Progress Report 1 February - 30 April 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. HMMA-25352, 10 February 1965
B. HMMA-25536, 11 March 1965
C. MEXI-3138, 19 April 1965
D. MEXI-2892, 24 March 1965
E. MEXI-2727, 8 March 1965

1. REPORTING AND BACKGROUND.

The last regularly scheduled LIEMPTY Progress Report covering the period 1 November 1964 through 31 January 1965 was forwarded to Headquarters as reference A. Significant interim developments and achievements of LIEMPTY were included in references C. through E. The Project Outline for LIRAZOR, which when approved, will provide for the maintenance of long-term contract agent Oliver G. SCANTLING who is now carried under Project LIEMPTY, was submitted for headquarters approval with reference B. Throughout the period under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, the LIMERICK personnel and their visitors, as well as various targets of opportunity, through the daily photographic coverage provided by the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA photographic basehouses and the frequent use of the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit. In addition, this project provided other essential operational support to various Station and Headquarters activities through the utilization of the services of long-time contract agents Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING.

2. AGENT CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS.

During the reporting period, the primary LIEMPTY principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE was seen forty-two (42) times in operational meetings by the undersigned, while principal agent Oliver G. SCANTLING was seen twelve (12) times. Other than frequent and intentional variations in meeting times and sites, no changes were made in the Project's communication systems. All operational contact with the action/sub-agents of the LIEMPTY Project was maintained through Raymond H. GERENDE.

continued...

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3 - C/WHD

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50-6-74/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26027	5 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PROGRESS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

Throughout the reporting period, Project LIEMPTY continued to produce the majority of the operational photographs used in Station Mexico City's KUDESK operations against the LIMERICK target. This coverage has proved to be a reliable and viable tool for: following the daily movements of the LIMERICK personnel; providing and confirming identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors; and verifying the relative rank and positions as well as the intelligence service connections of various LIMERICK officers. Specific examples of the contributions of each LIEMPTY Project component to the fulfillment of the Related Mission Directive, as approved for Mexico City Station, follow:

a) LIENTRAP - Throughout the reporting period, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit was targeted extensively against the leaders and installations of the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Partido Popular Socialista, and other exile or visiting communist leaders. In mid-April 1965, the LIENTRAP unit provided an up-to-date photograph of ESLIME-1 which was passed to a visiting KUBARK staffer for his use in the recruitment attempt of ESLIME-1. Not only did this photograph serve as a means of identifying the target for the recruiter, but also served as bona fides for the recruiter during the successful recruitment of this communist/exile guerrilla. (See reference C. for details.) Overall, the LIENTRAP unit produced 49 rolls of 35 mm film which will be or have been used in support of planned recruitment attempts, and in providing identifications, locations or contacts of various targets of interest.

b) LICALLA - During the period under review, the LICALLA installation provided photographic coverage of the garden and patio area of the LIMERICK installation, where many of the personnel congregate. In this effort, LIEMPTY-9, the LICALLA basehouse keeper provided 52 rolls of 35mm still photographs which were most useful to the Station in determining or confirming the intelligence service affiliation of various LIMERICK staffers by their constant association and conversations with other known intelligence officers. In addition, LICALLA provided special physical surveillance reports on all deliveries made to the LIMERICK installation, the presence of suspect audio technicians, and the changes in the patterns of activity of various LIMERICK personnel. On 23 March, Dudley R. GHASTER, KURIOT specialist, entered LICALLA for an on-site survey in support of a sensitive technical operation being planned by the Station and Headquarters. (See reference A, paragraph 3, e. and reference D. for details.)

c) LIMITED - During the reporting period, LIMITED provided 57 rolls of operational film and daily surveillance reports covering the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel and visitors at the front gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and evening hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-6, the LIMITED basehouse keeper, served as the fixed radio dispatch base for five LIEMBRACE surveillance operations covering known or suspect LIMERICK intelligence officers or their contacts. Because of the protective security provided to the LIMERICK installation by local "Services" it would be impossible to provide LIEMBRACE surveillance of LIMERICK staffers without the LIMITED radio dispatching. LIMITED (as well as LILYRIC) also provided confirmation of the visit of subject of reference E (a PBPRIMEr in contact with a LIMERICK intelligence officer) to the LIMERICK installation. (See reference E. for details.)

d) LILYRIC - During the period covered by the report, LILYRIC produced 73 rolls of operational film covering the comings and goings of LIMERICK personnel and visitors to that installation during the morning and early afternoon hours. In addition, LIEMPTY-14, the LILYRIC basehouse keeper, provided approximately 300 pages of physical surveillance reports, covering the movements of LIMERICK personnel.

e. Oliver G. SCANTLING - SCANTLING was married in mid-February and honeymooned until late March; consequently, SCANTLING was "out of action" for approximately one-half of the reporting period. During the remainder of this period, however, SCANTLING continued as the alternate contact of LICASA-1, the principal agent in the LICASA LAURICLE operation, as well continuing to handle the PBRUMEN access agent he had recruited in January 1965 (see reference A, paragraph 3). In addition, at Headquarters' request, SCANTLING re-cased the United Arab Republic Embassy in support of a sensitive operation now in the planning stage.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26027

f) Raymond H. GERENDE - Throughout this period, GERENDE continued as the Station's full-time cutout to the LIMITED, LICALLA, and LILYRIC basehouses as well as maintaining the cutout/agent handling responsibility for the LIENTRAP mobile photo unit and the LIEMPTY photographic-processing basehouse. GERENDE again made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation as well as servicing numerous postal accommodation addresses.

4. SECURITY.

There have been no known incidents during the reporting period which have adversely effected the security of the LIEMPTY project. Various refinements have been made in the cover story to be used (if necessary) to explain the relationship between the case officer and GERENDE. (See also paragraph 2 re: meeting times and sites.)

5. PLANS AND CHANGES.

a) As noted in reference A. it had become obvious that many of the operational assignments levied on Oliver G. SCANTLING were falling outside the proper scope of Project LIEMPTY; consequently a new Project was prepared to cover the Station's relationship with SCANTLING. This Project Outline (Project LIRAZOR) was submitted for Headquarters' approval with reference B. and SCANTLING will be removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY upon receipt of Headquarters' approval of LIRAZOR.

b) GERENDE plans to take a well-deserved vacation from late May through July 1965. Station intends to have SCANTLING handle the photographic basehouses and the LIENTRAP unit (since SCANTLING is already witting of all but one of those LIEMPTY agents) while the LIEMPTY Case Officer will handle LIEMPTY-4 and the photographic basehouse.

c) Other than noted above, there are no major administrative or operational changes planned for the ensuing period.

Cornelius L. Pennison
for
Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 5-60 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

LIEMPTY cy

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FROM Mexico City

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UNIT

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BY

INFO VR. FILE, *AddP, C/FI, C/FI/D, C/TSD-2, D/OC-2

S E C R E T 091920Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2732 EASBY ACTING

9 MAR 65 - IN 19376

LIMESA LIMOUSINE

REF HMMA 25310

1. LIMOUSINE REPORTS CONSTRUCTION WILL BEGIN ANY DAY ON NEW LIMITED HOUSE. AWAITING LAST OF GOM PERMITS. LIFEUD-6 HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO LIMOUSINE BOOKKEEPER ABOUT POSSIBILITY RENT ONE OF NEW APARTMENTS.

2. IN TRYING TRANSFER FIDEO COMISO FROM NOW DEFUNCT BANCO DE LA PROPRIEDAD DE LA INDUSTRIA TEXTIL TO ANOTHER BANK, LIMOUSINE DISCOVERED BANKS NOW NOT ACCEPTING THIS TYPE FIDEO COMISO. HENCE HE OBLIGED TO TAKE DIRECT TITLE TO PROPERTY. TITLE TRANSFER CHARGES BASED ON PERCENTAGE OF PROPERTY ✓BALUE AND HE MUST PAY ALMOST 22,000 PESOS TO HACIENDA. OWING REAL ESTATE COMMITMENTS AND CASH OUTLAY ON LIMITED BUILDING, HIS CASH POSITION SHORT. ASKS IF CAN DELAY INITIAL PAYMENT OR 45,000 PESOS 90 DAYS.

3. RECOMMEND HQ APPROVAL.

S E C R E T

CFN *Dissem Applicable To RYBAT, Limesa Limout

SECRET

file Limousine-201

make cc for LIMITED LIEMPTY/100

14-00000

(A)

C. Bustos
WH/1
4006, 4507
15 Jan 65

MESSAGE FORM

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

21 SECRET

19

ROUTING

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4		8	

MEXICO CITY

~~IMMEDIATE~~
~~ROUTINE~~
PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO OGC2, CL4, DDS, BPA, VR, FILE

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO CITE DIR 77743

REF: MEXI 2159 (IN 58393)*

1. APPROVAL GRANTED SELL TO LIMOUSINE LIMITED PROPERTY UNDER ~~XXXX~~ TERMS OUTLINED PARA ONE REF.

2. PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

A. LIMOUSINE TO DRAW UP LEASE WITH APARTMENT OCCUPANT FOR THREE YEARS WITH RENTAL AT 2,300 PESOS PER MONTH, WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PROVISOS:

(1) OPTION TO RENEW FOR SUCH ADDITIONAL PERIODS YOU SEE FIT WITH RENTAL ESTABLISHED BASED ON NEGOTIATIONS CONSISTENT WITH RENTALS PAID BY OCCUPANTS OTHER APARTMENTS.

(2) PROVISO BINDING LIMOUSINE'S SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS.

B. DRAW UP SEPARATE CONTRACT WITH LIMOUSINE OUTLINING AGREEMENT PARA ONE REF AND FORWARD SIGNED COPY HDQS. AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR CREDIT RENTAL OFFSET TO KUBARK BY LIMOUSINE PLUS RETURN TO KUBARK OF ANY MONTHLY RENTAL PAYMENTS MADE BY APARTMENT OCCUPANT TO LIMOUSINE FOR PERIOD FREE RENTAL IF SUCH IN FACT MADE. ALSO DETERMINE WHAT WILL HAPPEN RENTAL OFFSET AGREEMENT SHOULD LIMOUSINE RETIRE, DIE OR PROPERTY LEAVE HIS CONTROL

END OF MESSAGE

(See page 2)

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MESSAGE FORM

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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
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ROUTING

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~~IMMEDIATE~~
PRIORITY

TO : MEXICO CITY

PAGE # 2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR 17743

*WH Comment: LIMOUSINE AGREES PAY $12,000 FOR LIMITED, 60% IN CASH, REMAINDER WITHIN THREE YEARS. NEED REPLY BEFORE COB 15 JANUARY.

WH/LOG J. Jwisniewski
OL/RECD/Ed ~~Dennison~~
OL/Warfield
OGC/Connell (phone) see OGC 65-0119
WH/PO/A

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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OCC 65-0119

14 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

ATTENTION: Mr. Edward Denison

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY, LIMOUSINE

REFERENCE: Mexi 2159

1. In conversation with the Headquarters officer concerned with LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE affairs, this Office was apprised of the fact that the proposed transaction, outlined in reference cable, would be executed without recourse to advice on the legal aspects of the sale under Mexican law and with no intention to make LIMOUSINE's commitment to this Agency legally binding. It is further intended that LIMOUSINE's "promissory notes" be unsecured.

2. Should the proposed transaction be carried out in this manner, this Agency would be unable to enforce LIMOUSINE's promise to pay his debt, and would have no legally cognizable instrument to present to an executor of his estate should he die before meeting his obligations to us. In addition, our right to continued possession of the apartment would be tenuous at best.

3. Thus it is planned to convey real estate appraised at $14,448 in exchange for $7,200 and a collection of unenforceable, unsecured promises. It is hard to believe that in this case, operational security precludes closer protection of Agency assets.

/s/ Peter J. Connell

PETER J. CONNELL
Office of General Counsel

cc: C/WH/1
Operations Officer

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE, OL 4, C/[illegible] 2, BPA

S E C R E T 121921

12 JAN 65 58393

DIR CITE MEXI 21[illegible]

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF DIR 74928

1. LIMOUSINE AGREED FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE OF 10,000 DOLLARS PAYABLE IN PESOS. SIXTY PERCENT IN CASH.

B. 50,000 PESOS CASH ON BEGINNING CONSTRUCTION (ABOUT 15 FEB).

C. BALANCE CASH PAYMENT ON COMPLETION CONSTRUCTION (AROUND 1 JULY).

D. BALANCE OF 50,000 PESO DEBT REPAYABLE WITHIN 3 YEARS FROM COMPLETION CONSTRUCTION.

E. AS PARTIAL INCOME TO PAYMENT ABOVE AMOUNT, RENT OF 2300 PESOS MONTHLY TO BE WITHHELD FIRST THREE YEARS. RENTAL RATE NOT TO CHANGE DURING THIS TIME AND THEREAFTER AT RATE NO DIFFERENNT FROM OTHER APARTMENTS SAME BUILDING FOR PERIOD 10 YRS OR UNTIL KUBARK TERMINATES ARRANGEMENT.

2. LIMOUSINE PREFERS CLEAN TRANSACTION UP SOON AS POSSIBLE AND HOPES PAY OFF [illegible] AMOUNT WITHIN FIRST YR.

3. LENGHT TERM KUBARK OPTION ON PROPERTY NOT SPECIFICALLY AGREED WITH LIMOUSINE, BUT NO REASON BELIEVE HE WOULD

SECRET

Liempty/Ops

14 5 8 393 97.

NOT AGREE TO ANY TERM WE STIPULATE. ONLY JOKER MAY BE LENGTH TIME HE REMAINS ACTIVIE IN FIRM AS HE NOW 65.

4. REQUEST HQ COMMENTS BY 15 JAN AS WOULD LIKE BE ABLE START DEMOLITION BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR U.S. 17 JAN.

SECRET

CFN

MESSAGE FORM 17

SECRET

ORIG : A. [illegible]
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 31 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1	/	5	FI
2		6	CA
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4 Jan 65 01z
ROUTING

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO OGC-2, OL-4, BPA, VK, File

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 74920

LIBERTY LIMOUSINE

Bustos

REF: MEXI 2025 (IN 40408) *

1. NINE TO TWELVE THOUSAND DOLLARS CONSIDERED REASONABLE NEGOTIATION LIMITS WHICH INCLUDES DISCOUNT.

2. REEMPHASIZE PREFERENCE LUMP SUM PAYMENT AND ENSURE OCCUPANCY RETENTION RIGHTS.

3. IF LUMP SUM PAYMENT NOT POSSIBLE CLOSING SALES PRICE SHOULD BE NEAREST TO UPPER LIMIT WITH BULK/AS (MINIMUM 60%) DOWN PAYMENT AND REMAINDER THROUGH WITHHOLDING MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF AGREED LIMITED RENT AS MEANS PARTIAL ENFORCED PAYMENT.

4. ADVISE BEFORE CLOSING. PESOS ACCEPTABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

* STA Needs Clear Indication HQS Limitation For Negotiation.

WH/LCG J. Julesiewski

OL/RECD Bill Cabanis/John Stephens

OL ~~[illegible]~~

OGC

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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FROM MEXICO CITY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 7

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TOI UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DL 4, BPA

S E C R E T 232247Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2625

Log

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

23 Dec 61 IN 48408

REF DIR 72229

1. WHILE CANNOT PREDICT HOW LIMOUSINE WILL REACT TO REF, STATION NEEDS CLEAR INDICATION HQ LIMITS FOR NEGOTIATION. WOULD PREFER HAVE THIS PRIOR DISCUSSION REF WITH HIM. HE AND STATION UNDERSTAND MUST CLEAR FINAL AGREEMENT WITH HQ PRIOR PROCEEDING, BUT WISH AVOID HAVING TO BOUNCE SERIES OF PROPOSALS OFF HQ.

2. REQUEST HQ PROVIDE STATION WITH SOME LIMITS ON "LOWER SALE PRICE" WILLING ACCEPT ALSO ON WHAT IS CONSIDERED REASONABLE DISCOUNT RATE. HQ CAN BE SURE STATION WILL GET BEST DEAL POSSIBLE. PRESUME BY "OFFSET AGAINST MONTHLY RENTAL AGREEMENT" HQ MEANS WITHHOLDING AGREED LIMITED RENT AS MEANS PARTIAL ENFORCED PAYMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 17

52 SECRET

ORIG: C. Bustos-Videla:jah
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4507
DATE: 18 Dec 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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18 DEC 64 23 40z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO: Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: OL 4, BPA, OGC 2, File, VR

TO MEXI

INFO:

CITE DIR 72229

REF: MEXI 1898 (IN 41069)

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

1. HQS APPROVES/NEGOTIATION SALE LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE ~~[illegible] NECESSITY AND ACCOMMODATION TO KUBARK OVERRIDING KUBARK FINANCIAL INTERESTS [illegible]~~ ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. KUBARK INTERESTS BE PROTECTED TO UTMOST WITH LIMOUSINE ASSURANCES KUBARK WILL CONTINUE HAVE OCCUPANCY RETENTION RIGHTS. ASSURANCE MAY REQUIRE SEPARATE LONG TERM RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENT WITH KUBARK RESERVING RIGHT CANCEL ANYTIME. HQS REALIZES FIXED RENTAL PRICE NOT FEASIBLE UNDER LONG TERM LEASE AND THEREFORE LEASE COULD PROVIDE FOR INITIAL FIXED RENTAL WITH A SLIDING SCALE ADJUSTMENT THEREAFTER.

B. SINCE PROMISSORY NOTE FOR 180,600 PESOS WOULD BE UNSECURED WITH FINAL PAYMENT NOT DUE UNTIL JAN 1972, HQS PREFERS TOTAL PAYMENT FOR LIMITED AT OUTSET RATHER THAN WAIT 6½ YEARS.

C. REALIZING LIMOUSINE'S POSSIBLE FINANCIAL STRAIN MAKE SUCH LARGE PAYMENT INITIALLY, HQS WILLING ACCEPT LOWER SALE PRICE AT REASONABLE DISCOUNT RATE. IF LIMOUSINE UNABLE LIQUIDATE WITH ONE

CONTINUED

LIEMPTY 4/8P

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DATE :	☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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ROUTING

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TO :

FROM DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

PRIORITY

CONF: INFO

TO INFO: CITE DIR 72229

LUMP SUM PAYMENT AT ENHANCED REDUCED PRICE, WILL ACCEPT COMBINATION PAYMENT AT REDUCED RATE WITH GREATER PORTION PAYABLE AT SETTLEMENT AND REMAINDER AS OFFSET AGAINST MONTHLY RENTAL AGREEMENT.

2. HQS FEELS ABOVE PROVISOS IMPORTANT AVOID SUBSEQUENT IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE TOTAL LOSS EVENT LIMITED SUBSEQUENTLY PASSES FROM LIMOUSINE'S OR HIS ESTATE'S CONTROL.

3. ADVISE TERMS FOR FINAL APPROVAL PRIOR CONCLUDING AGREEMENT. wyk

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Log/McMahon (draft)
OL/RECD/John Stephens (draft)
OL/RECD/Dennison (phone)

R. W. Herbert
DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
CHIEF WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

065

DATE : 24 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0300, 25 OCT) WCJ

INFO : DD/P, ADDP, DDP/SIT 3, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D, C/FI/INT, C/IW 2, C/SR 4, C/TFW 5, DD/I, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
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OCT 25 0432Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 45628

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 2292

[redacted] LIEMPTY-3

REF A DIR 43984 out 89913

B DIR 43877 out 89777

23 OCT SUBJ MET SOV COMMERCIAL OFFICE EMPLOYEE VALERIY ALEKSANDROVICH ANDRIANOV AND ELICITED FOLL RE CURRENT CUBA SITUATION: ANDRIANOV SAID HAD READ PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DECLARATION BUT DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE WAR. ELABORATELY DENIED THAT CUBA HAS SOV MISSILES, SAID PHOTOS OF SAME FABRICATED AND FOR PROVOCATIVE PURPOSES. SAID KHRUSHCHEV WOULD ANSWER PROVOCATION, HOWEVER NOT WITH MISSILES BUT WITH WORDS, JUST WORDS, NOBODY WANTS WAR. ANDRIANOV CONCLUDED WITH MARXIST LINE THAT SOVS DIDN'T NEED WAR, THAT COURSE OF HISTORY HAS SEEN DOWNFALL OF FEUDALISM, THAT DOWNFALL CAPITALISM INEVITABLE AND SOCIALISM WILL SECCEED.

END OF MESSAGE

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #1 - Unit [illegible]
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

50-6-74/3

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50-6-74/3

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE: LIEMPTY/3

ORIG : MELVIN BECK
UNIT : SR/10/LA
EXT : 2733
DATE : 24 January 1962

SECRET

1611

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO : MEXICO
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

26 JAN 62 21 08z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT94732

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 37936

REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF: MEXI 9880 (IN 13260)*

1. HQS WILL AUTHORIZE FUNDING SALAZAR PER PARA 2 REF, PROVIDED PROOF CAMPOS TRIP PATON WELDING INSTITUTE PAID FOR BY SOVS AND SALAZAR ACTUALLY INVITED PARTICIPATE, AND FUNDING SALAZAR CAN BE PLAUSIBLY ACCOUNTED FOR EYES OF CAMPOS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATES.

2. DUE ATTITUDE CAMPOS, AND CERTAINTY HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO USSR KNOWN TO KGB, BELIEVE ADVISABLE FURTHER ASSESS HIS SECURITY. SAME VEIN, AVOID NECESSITY INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION CAMPOS EXPENSES.

3. PLS FORWARD DETAILS SALAZAR RECRUITMENT. REFER HMMW 10395 ADDITIONAL DETAILS HQS GUIDANCE OP, INCLUDING WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS WELDING INSTITUTE PENDING CLARIFICATION RECRUITMENT. EXTENDING POA'S SALAZAR AND CAMPOS.

END OF MESSAGE.

Hmma-18236

SR COMMENT: * Request hqs decision whether station proceed with op, assuming necessity to entirely fund SALAZAR expenses.

LIEMPTY/3

SR/COP

WH/3/Mexico
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

ACSR/10
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SR via Chief, WH

Operational/[illegible]
Francisco CAMPOS Herrera and Guillermo SALAZAR Polanco

Action Required: See Para 5
REF: HMMA 16039

1. The prospective [illegible] trip of above Subjects was discussed with Gerald F. [illegible] at Headquarters in light of the current [illegible] policy which is in the process of being formulated. We are still very much interested in Subjects' trip and agree with [illegible] that SALAZAR appears to be the principal target, rather than CAMPOS. However, we wish to note that the underwriting of the trip for SALAZAR is contingent on the fact that he and CAMPOS will spend a period of time at the Institute in a capacity other than that of a sightseeing tourist. If at all possible, it would be useful to determine the exact nature of the invitation made by the Soviets to CAMPOS in late 1960 and the manner in which the inclusion of SALAZAR was broached to the Soviets. It is noted that the letters forwarded as attachment to HMMA-16?09 do not indicate that an invitation has been extended.

2. There are requirements of intelligence interest on the Electro-welding Institute imeni Paton in Kiev which Subjects, because of their qualifications and technical knowledge, may well be able to fulfill. The Institute is the major center for welding research in the USSR. It has been identified in overt Soviet literature as having solved problems of mechanical arc welding with a flux of austenitic steel which is resistant to great heat, acidity, and rust. This was reportedly in connection with the development of contemporary rocket engineering. The Paton Institute undoubtedly is engaged in solving problems related to welding in guided missile technology.

CONTINUED

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1? Jan 1962

25 JAN 1962

HMMW - 10[illegible]

201-239372
201-27416?

SECRET

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SR/10/LA Arlene Waldron kf 2733

3 - WH/3
1 - WH/MR
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ACSR/10

WH/3

Item 13

3. The below are preliminary specific requirements on the Paton Institute which will be supplemented at a later date if the operation materializes. They may assist the case officer in assessing Subjects' potential to fulfill requirements of this nature.

a. Obtain information concerning new welding apparatus for, as well as new applications of, the following welding and cutting technology:

(1) Electron beam-welding or cutting
(2) Friction welding
(3) Ultrasonic welding for fine wire and thin strips - exotic metals
(4) Explosive welding
(5) Plasma arc - as used in cutting, coating and welding operations
(6) Vacuum chambers associated with welding

b. What types of automatic welding equipment, using an inert gas such as argon, has the Paton Institute developed? Give any details concerning these equipments such as model designation, characteristics, when and by whom designed and where the equipment was sent.

c. Is the Paton Institute working on the solution of problems related to the welding of special alloys, particularly aluminum, titanium, and stainless steel? Which laboratories of the Institute are working on these problems? Who are the engineers and designers working on these problems? (Two alloys known to be used in the Soviet missile program are AMG-[illegible] aluminum alloy and EI-[illegible] stainless steel).

d. Can the source elicit any information from Soviets at the Institute as to problems related to welding technology in the missile and space programs which was solved by them?

e. Identify other facilities (plants and institutes) with which the Paton Institute is associated, and in what manner. Identify personnel of the Welding Institute who are on detached duty at other facilities. Identify location of their detached duty, the facility, purpose, and dates of such duty. (Note: For example two engineers from the Paton Institute received awards in October 19[illegible]0 for participation in the equipping of the newly constructed Metallurgical Plant named Lenin in [illegible], a plant possibly involved in ICBM production). Source should try to determine what work these two personalities performed to merit receiving awards and also work performed by other engineers on detached duty to plants as indicated above.

4. In reply to Paragraph [illegible] of reference, both of the books which were forwarded to Headquarters for evaluation are already available to appropriate [illegible] offices.

5. Requests for extension of POA's on Francisco CAMPOS Herrera (POA expired [illegible] January 19[illegible]) and Guillermo [illegible] (POA expired 3 January 19[illegible]) have been initiated. The POA on Pedro Jose CAMPOS Herrera has been cancelled. Please advise if the station wishes the POA which expired [illegible] December 19[illegible], for Howard Carl [illegible] to be extended.

6. In accord with a forthcoming more stringent legal travel policy, it is advised that the station attempt to provide essential information represented by PRQ I and II before the extended POA's expire. In the same vein, attention is directed toward the security status of Francisco CAMPOS Herrera, who has exhibited an attitude since [illegible] in his dealings with the Soviets that is open to suspicion. We must assume that the KGB is aware of the correspondence between CAMPOS and Institute.

WILLIAM A. [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-8573

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-58/5

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE: 1960

SUBJECT - LIMESA/LIMUST/LICALLA

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-14477

Transmitted herewith are the six best rolls of LICALLA film.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

9 March 1960

Attachments:
6 rolls of film
1 log (nine pages)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
~~1~~ - Subject

WH/3/Mexico/O.R. BYNAM:jmh

WR
RPIS
ID/ARU

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: De-Rybat
Signed: Gloria Palma
R.O. (CS) - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Removed from Project KDFACTOR
CS Classification: 50-6-74/3
JOB # 73-855/64
Box: 35 Fold: 3

DECLASSIFIED

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-14793
[redacted]-1762

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 8 April 1960

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal Comments

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCE(S) HMMW-8515, 25 February 1960

1. It would appear from paragraphs 2a and 2b of reference that KUDESK and KUTUBE Ops have not been completely informed of the background of the LIEMPTY Project and its agent-requirements. At the time HMMA-14093 (Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY) was written, it was assumed that the Mexico Desk and KUTUBE/D could answer any additional questions, based on reports and dispatches not normally available to the senior staffs, which might be raised during the renewal process.

2. In answer to paragraph 2a, Oliver G. SCANTLING first contacted Inez PARADA de Moreno in early 1957 to fulfill a KUTUBE/D requirement. He visited her as an architect interested in viewing the LIMERICK installation from the building where she lives. He was socially acquainted with her brother, a Catholic Priest, and knew the family to be unquestionably anti-Communist. However, it would be imprudent on the Station's and SCANTLING's part to assume that PARADA does not at least suspect that some anti-LIMERICK intelligence service is involved. PARADA suggested during SCANTLING's initial visit that he could return at any time for further observations. This was reported by SCANTLING on 21 March 1957 and it does not seem appropriate to query him again on the pretext for his recent visits.

3. While HMMA-14093 correctly referred to LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA as "photographic basehouses," the Station would like to emphasize that photographic coverage is only one of their functions (please see HMMA-12095, 4 February 1959). LIMITED is used as a radio dispatch base for automobile surveillance teams in addition to physical surveillance of persons entering the front gate. Their photography is negligible compared to their other duties. The LILYRIC base performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate, perhaps because the vantage point for taking the pictures is from the second floor and above the street traffic which partially blocks LIMITED photographs. LILYRIC also does individual reports on LIMERICK personnel entering and leaving the main gate. LICALLA is used almost exclusively to identify LIMERICK officials and to support KUTUBE/D requirements in connection with the LIMESA/LIMUST Project. As an indication of the effectiveness of LICALLA photographic coverage, the Mexico Station has all the LIMERICK officials identified. Before this base was activated more than two-thirds of the LIMERICK officials were unidentified. In order to support other operations, it is considered essential that the Station identify all LIMERICK officials. In this respect, LICALLA has provided most of the necessary information. The retention of this base is also considered vital to the security of the LIMUST portion of the LIMESA Project.

4. The Station does not agree that the color photography and moving pictures are a luxury. Color slides were made for identification purposes and have proved useful, particularly in identifying facial features and skin coloring. The motion pictures were made at Headquarters suggestion (Please see HMMW-7687, 29 May 1959 and HMMW-8438, 26 January 1960).

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[redacted]K	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14793 [redacted]K-1762

5. In conclusion, the Station would like to point out that the "photographic basehouses" represent an integral and significant part of the Station's counterespionage effort against the LIMERICK installation. These bases do not produce Foreign Intelligence and should not be considered in such a light.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

6 April 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET, [redacted]
KUBARK ONLY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14045
[redacted]1257

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/3

TO
Chief, WH Division
INFO

DATE
6 November 1959

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 Security Incident - Liaison with ODENVY

ACTION REQUIRED
See paragraph 6 below.

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-13951 (KAPOK-1705) 16 October 1959

30 NOV 59

1. On 13 October 1959 it was learned from source that the local ODENVY chief got a priority cable from his Headquarters asking why data concerning the Mexican apprehension of the (KUBARK) truck and photographer had not been reported to the U. S. Ambassador locally. The statement was made that "such matters as this should be immediately reported to the Ambassador."

2. This cable resulted from the report the ODENVY office sent in on the incident from the knowledge they had - as reported in reference.

3. The local ODENVY chief replied to his Headquarters that he did not agree that matters concerning KUBARK operations should be reported by ODENVY to the Ambassador.

4. Source stated that the cable was obviously a result of the KUBARK/ODENVY headquarters "ill feeling" which presently exists and which source believes is primarily (and principally) attributable to the article in TRUE magazine of September 1959.

5. Source is LIMEW.

6. It is requested that under no circumstances should the information contained herein be disseminated in any form whatsoever outside KUBARK.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

WCCurtis/vps
30 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
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R.O. #030 - Unit [illegible]
Note: If destruction, cite
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50-6-74/3

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET, [redacted]
KUBARK ONLY

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMA-13951
[redacted]-1705

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-74/3
50-6-74/8-a
JCK

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

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Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 30 October 1959

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 Security Incident

ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters information only.

RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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REFERENCE(S)

1. At 1110 hrs., 20 September 1959, while on an operational assignment, LIEMPTY-10 and the LIENTRAP vehicle were temporarily detained by the Servicio Secreto de Mexico (Mexican Secret Service). LIEMPTY-10 was held under unofficial custody for approximately 26 hours before his release was obtained. There follows below an account of the more important details pertaining to this incident.

2. LIEMPTY-10 was instructed on 17 September to case the area surrounding the Theatre Iris, located at Donceles 36, preliminary to undertaking a photographic surveillance of all persons entering and leaving the theatre between the hours of 0930 and 1200 hrs., 20 September. In this instance, the Station's target was a pro-Cuban rally sponsored by the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos (CEM). The Station had received information that many of the leading Mexican and Central American Communists would attend this rally and that this was an opportune time to establish which ones did attend and to collect their photographs. The Station did not know that the Mexican Secret Service would also be covering this meeting for the purpose of preventing a Communist-inspired demonstration.

3. The Station was advised at 1730 hrs., 20 September, by Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), the Principal Agent who handles LIEMPTY-10, that L-10 was being held by the Secret Service. Immediately following this notification, Allen W. WARE (ps) was requested to contact Philip K. TESSAROLO (ps) and request him to implement procedures through a criminal lawyer to effect the release of L-10. TESSAROLO was contacted and briefed at 2200 hours and immediately began attempts to locate a reliable criminal lawyer. However, as sometimes happens in an emergency situation, his two most appropriate contacts were out of town. It was not until the following morning at 0700 hrs. that TESSAROLO located another reliable lawyer who agreed to handle the case.

4. Since GERENDE was known to L-10 and since the Station could not be sure how much L-10 might be forced to tell the Secret Service, GERENDE was given the following instructions:

A. To disconnect immediately the LIFEAT/LIVERY lines in the base where he and his wife were living and to move all equipment to another safe location. It was believed appropriate to take this precaution even though L-10 did not know the location of the LIVERY base, the telephone number of the base, or even that GERENDE was living at a place other than his mother's residence in another part of the city.

B. To collect and deposit with his Case Officer any compromising papers presently in his possession.

C. To make a security inspection of the outside photographic lab at his mother's house.

D. To phone L-10's wife and inform her that procedures were underway to obtain L-10's release and for her not to become upset and talkative.

E. To suspend all operational contacts until L-10 was released and the extent of compromise was determined.

5. During the evening of 20 September the Station LIFEAT Case Officer was advised that GERENDE had been directed to disconnect the LIVERY lines and to transfer all LIFEAT equipment to a safe location. To further insure the security of LIVERY, all LIVERY lines were pulled externally during the early morning of 21 September.

6. At approximately 1000 hrs., 21 September, LIMEW informed the Chief of Station that a contact of his (LIMEW's) had just informed him that L-10 (true name) and the LIENTRAP vehicle were being held by the Secret Service. LIMEW stated that if L-10 was one of KUBARK's agents he would attempt to have his contact in the Secret Service obtain his immediate release. LIMEW was told that L-10 was, in fact, a KUBARK agent and that the Station would very much appreciate his efforts to effect his release. A short while later LIMEW again contacted the Chief of Station and informed him that it would be necessary for documented ODACID official personally to contact a Commandante fnu LIMON of the Secret Service and that L-10 would then be released. According to LIMEW, L-10 had told the Secret Service that he was carrying out his operational photographic assignment on a contract basis for ODACID; therefore, an ODACID official would have to establish L-10's bona fides.

7. As the Station learned later, the Secret Service agents were roughing up some of the individuals attending the rally; consequently, they were endeavoring to make sure that no photographs were taken which could be used against them by the Communists. L-10 and L-11, the LIENTRAP driver who left the scene before he was detained, were just preparing to leave the area after taking five rolls of film when a Secret Service agent demanded a search of the vehicle on the suspicion that it contained Communist propaganda. L-10, his camera with telephoto lens and the film were then discovered in the rear of LIENTRAP. It was at this time that L-10 was accused orally by the police officers of being a Soviet agent and later of being a local Communist agent. After being taken to Secret Service Headquarters, L-10 told LIMON, in private, about his association with ODACID and emphasized that he certainly was not a Communist agent. LIMEW's source (possibly Commandante LIMON), believing that there may be some truth in L-10's statement, contacted LIMEW. Based in part on assumption and in part on fact, this is the Station's opinion as to how ODENVY became involved in the case.

8. The Station, realizing that LIEMPTY-10 had not committed an illegal act by taking photographs, decided that WARE should personally visit LIMON and request L-10's release. WARE contacted LIMON and the sub-jefe of the Secret Service, Raul MENDIOLEA Cerecero, about 1230 hrs., 21 September, identified himself as an ODACID official and told them that L-10 did from time to time perform photographic assignments for ODACID, particularly in the field of local Communist activities. WARE also told LIMON and MENDIOLEA that L-10 was never permitted to do any task which was illegal under Mexican law and that if he had done so it was certainly not under the auspices of ODACID, but on his own volition. They implied that L-10 had not done anything illegal and that all they wanted to be sure about was that L-10 was not a Communist agent. L-10 was immediately released and the LIENTRAP vehicle returned to him with all equipment intact, including the five rolls of undeveloped film.

9. While WARE was on his way to see LIMON at the Secret Service Headquarters, the Chief of Station was advised by the ODACID Security Office that L-10 was being detained by the Secret Service. The Security Office was told that WARE was presently investigating the matter and should be at the Secret Service Headquarters at that time. By coincidence, WARE was talking to MENDIOLEA when the ODACID Security Office phoned to inform him that WARE was taking care of the matter. It was learned later that MENDIOLEA is a brother-in-law of the local investigator employed full time by the ODACID Security Office. This was how ODACID became involved in the incident. To the best of the Station's knowledge, the ODACID Security Officer has said nothing more about the incident and, at the time, did not attach any particular significance to it or seem especially concerned about

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L-10's statement that he did some photographic work for ODACID. There was no newspaper or other publicity pertaining to L-10 or LIENTRAP.

10. During his visit to Secret Service Headquarters WARE discovered that L-10 had not been booked or formally charged with an illegal act and that neither LIMON nor MENDIOLEA could recall L-10's name. L-10 was not placed in jail during the 26 hours he was at Secret Service Headquarters but, rather, was permitted to remain in the Secret Service agents' duty room. No bribes were necessary to obtain his release; however, per LIMEW's request, $500.00 pesos were given to LIMEW to give to his source. LIMEW said that in addition to notifying him about L-10's detention, the source was also responsible for all equipment and film being returned intact to L-10.

11. TESSAROLO was advised, as soon as LIMEW became involved in the case, that the criminal lawyer should not pursue the matter any further. Two bottles of scotch whiskey were given to the lawyer through TESSAROLO for the few tasks he had already performed.

12. After his release, L-10 reported that he was not interrogated and that he did not reveal any data about other operations he has worked on nor did he give the names of anybody connected with operational activities. Based on the developments in the case, the Station has no reason to doubt the veracity of L-10's statement. L-10 was reprimanded for his use of statements to the Secret Service about being employed by ODACID. He was told that the revelation of such employment was to be made only by the Station and that henceforth he is never to use such a cover story. L-10 was also reprimanded for his lack of judgment in remaining in an area where there was a strong concentration of police; it is believed safe to assume that L-10 will never make this same mistake again.

13. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that L-10's use of the ODACID employment story is possibly responsible for his not being interrogated and thus compromising other operations and individuals. This case has pointed out to the Station the desireability of having casual contacts in the Secret Service and other local police-type organizations so that the Station, rather than ODACID and ODENVY, is the first to learn of incidents of this type. Considering the multifarious activities handled by the Station, it must be assumed that the police will occasionally apprehend an agent and that the Station must be geared to handle such emergencies.

14. The Station is allowing a one month's cooling off period for the LIENTRAP vehicle and LIEMPTY-10. The vehicle will then be painted another standard color and re-registered in the State of Mexico. After these security precautions are observed, the Station sees no reason why carefully selected photographic surveillance operations should not continue with L-10 as a wiser and more prudent LIENTRAP operator.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
15 October 1959

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3 Hqs

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-12095
[redacted]-1543

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-74/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

JAN

DATE: 4 February 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report - July thru Dec 1958

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
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ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information and files only.

REFERENCE(S):

R.C. 4030 - Date 6/7/4/K

SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS

1. During the period covered by this report, a new Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, assumed operational direction of several LIPSTICK assets (Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H. GERENDE, LIMITED, LICALLA, LIENTRAP and several support agents), the LIJERSEY surveillance team and the LILYRIC Base. The Station has continued to use SCANTLING, primarily, to follow up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases; however, no positive returns have been realized from his prodigious efforts except the collection of a considerable amount of operational information. GERENDE performed his principal agent responsibilities for the photographic bases, LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY and until 10 December 1958 handled the LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exile operations. The LIJERSEY surveillance team has been used sparingly for pretext investigations and routine static surveillances; however, a principal agent, Simon D. CLACKETT, is currently being trained in Headquarters to assume the full-time direction, control, training and development of the LIJERSEY team. The new project, LIEMPTY, combining all the assets discussed in this report was submitted to Headquarters on 8 October 1958 with requested project year approval period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. An operational security review of Raymond H. GERENDE's activities was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - OLIVER G. SCANTLING SEGMENT

2. Agent Information - Oliver G. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent. On two occasions during the past six months SCANTLING has indicated to his Case Officer that he would like to resign from his overt position and devote full time to his KUBARK operational duties; however, the Case Officer has discouraged him from doing this on the basis that he has more long-range potential when his cover occupation is legitimate. Of course, SCANTLING would be more valuable if he could work full time for the Station, but not sufficiently so to warrant his resignation from his overt job (his monthly salary in his overt job is in excess of $800.00 U. S.). The only significant limitation that SCANTLING has evidenced to his present Case Officer is his occasional delay in preparing written reports of investigations and other matters requiring reports for the files. However, this limitation gradually is being overcome and it is expected that SCANTLING's reports will continue to be factual, comprehensive and soon will be promptly submitted.

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3. Security Developments - SCANTLING is constantly under a considerable amount of exposure and pressure when following up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFEAT and the photographic bases. Since time is always of the essence when using such perishable leads, SCANTLING frequently is directed to make approaches to individuals performing services for the LIME RICK target after routine, and sometimes only cursory, investigation. Therefore, the possibility always exists of his entanglement in an undesirable security incident. This necessarily

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is a calculated risk which both SCANTLING and the Station must take if penetration of the primary target is achieved, whether technically or by a recruitment in place. It is to SCANTLING's credit that he has not yet become involved in an incident which the Station feels has compromised him and/or alerted the target of KUBARK's many operational efforts against them. The closest SCANTLING has come to being compromised and to being identified as a PBPRIME agent stems directly from the LIPSTICK surveillance team flap of June 1958. The office used by the surveillance team was rented by SCANTLING in his true name at the time that he was leader of the team. Not the slightest indication, however, has been uncovered which points to SCANTLING as a target of investigation by a local police service. SCANTLING and the Station have been alert and will continue to watch closely for any sign of local police and other opposition interest in his activities.

4. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly discussed below are some of the many operational activities in which SCANTLING participated during the period covered by this report:

D-ZR

A. Juan *CASTRO (201-[illegible]) - SCANTLING continued seeing CASTRO through September 1958 following the last faint glimmers of mounting the original LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation through CASTRO. As late as September 1958 possibilities still existed, or appeared to exist, that CASTRO would complete his work in the primary LIMERICK office and that it might be possible to install MKLIGHTING. While CASTRO, through SCANTLING, was the principal source of this information, portions were also confirmed by LIFEAT. During July, August and September 1958, SCANTLING had approximately eight meetings with CASTRO. In late September 1958 LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was using personnel under the supervision of one of their regular local employees, Antonio *ZEPEDA (201-239821), to complete some of the work CASTRO was supposed to finish and that other contractors were doing jobs around the target area which CASTRO would normally have been expected to do had he still been in the employ of the target. Also, LIMITED and LIFEAT confirmed that the LIMERICK target had lost interest in CASTRO - he was not seen visiting the target installation nor did the target people attempt to get in touch with him. In view of this, SCANTLING was instructed to cease all contact with CASTRO as of 1 November 1958.

B. Pablo *MON Rosas (201-237525) - During the period covered by this report SCANTLING had two interviews with MON Rosas. SCANTLING's most recent report was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11143, 1 October 1958. Unquestionably the Station has identified Mon Rosas as the technician who services LIMERICK safes and locks. SCANTLING will continue his development of MON Rosas (please see HMMA-11711, 10 December 1958).

C. Octavio *VIDALES (201-237524) - SCANTLING's activities in connection with this LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation were summarized in HMMA-11397, 29 October 1958, and previous correspondence.

D. HERRERIA GABELICH - This is the firm that made the steel vault door for the LIMERICK installation. SCANTLING made two visits to this firm's workshop and succeeded in obtaining enough information to make an

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accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIMERICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.

E. Casing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West German Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregarious manner permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropriate cover story, and retain minute details which later he commits to paper and emerges with a comprehensive floor plan and important construction data.

F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with this target from the casing standpoint provides the Station with an unparalleled source of information about LIMERICK construction activities, modifications and reasons for same. All of the LIMERICK casing reports on file in Headquarters are the product of SCANTLING's unusual ability and knowledge. Consultations with Station Officers about LIMERICK construction have been of benefit to the Station during this reporting period and they will continue to be of worthwhile importance.

G. Routine Investigations and Surveillances - Although the Station has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveillances, SCANTLING is still used in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and clandestinity. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick Kirschhoff (201-43645) of LCMAYFOWL interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on investigations (see HMMA-11749, 17 December 1958).

H. ESGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the cutout with ESGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and dependable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ESGEM-15 one; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.

I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administrative matters connected with L/3. Doris M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Station had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the operational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLGO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILLGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's unusual personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO's and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems.

J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - During GERENDE's absence from

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Mexico City in December 1958 and January 1959, it was considered appropriate for SCANTLING to handle LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Although this procedure defeats some compartmentation principles, it was the only manner in which the Station could maintain efficiency with the three operations listed above. SCANTLING has known the agents involved with LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP for several years. In fact, he was at one time the agent in charge of these three operations.

5. Operational Methods Evolved During the Period - The VIDALES operation (see paragraph 4 (C) above) indicated to the Station the necessity for thorough briefings and discussions with the agent making an approach to a target. This can hardly be described as a new operational method, but it does serve to illustrate the minimum efforts that should be followed. The forthcoming LINIMENT IV operation wherein SCANTLING must recruit the landlord of the target's building is offering SCANTLING and the Station the opportunity to prepare thoroughly for SCANTLING's recruitment pitch. The excellent documentation prepared by KURIOT and the story being created by SCANTLING and the Station should increase the batting average on SCANTLING's cold approaches. (See HMMA-11366, 22 October 1958, and HMMW-7038, 21 November 1958, for additional details on this Subject).

In a general sense, one other conclusion can be made about any Station's support apparatus - where technical and photographic operations are possible, the utility of the information obtained is enhanced considerably by accurate, comprehensive and timely casing reports. SCANTLING, as previously mentioned, is an excellent asset for this type of support.

6. Administration - SCANTLING's contract expires on 15 February 1959. As of that date SCANTLING will have received an annual salary of $3,600.00 U.S. for two years. The Station plans to raise his annual compensation to $4,000.00 U.S. No other significant administrative problems exist.

7. Outlook for Future Development - Station plans call for the continued utilization of SCANTLING in the same manner as he is presently being used. The Station will keep SCANTLING as an independent asset and, it is hoped, resist the temptation to make him a principal agent in charge of numerous sub-agents. It is believed that SCANTLING is the type of support asset that can be worthwhile to the Station for many years to come and that every effort should be made to protect his security and value to KUBARK.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - RAYMOND H. GERENDE SEGMENT

8. Agent Information - Aside from the agent information given in HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958, the only significant development was GERENDE's December 1958 marriage to a U. S. educated girl of Dutch citizenship. The $500,00 U. S. for the purchase of two plane tickets as a wedding gift to GERENDE was designed to impress GERENDE with the fact that KUBARK thinks highly of him as an individual and that KUBARK has a great interest in his intelligence career. GERENDE is at the age and stage in life where he is beginning to wonder just what the future holds for him. In the near future, the Station will propose a salary raise for GERENDE

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and request a new contract that provides for some type of retirement benefits - perhaps similar to the Civil Service Retirement program for KUBARK employees.

9. Security Developments - Again, the information on this subject was covered adequately in HMMA-11368. GERENDE was relieved of his LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles duties on 10 December 1958. This, of course, was in line with recommendations contained in HMMA-11368 and represents a definite security improvement. GERENDE was told that LIFEAT/BGMORNING was being terminated because it had not been productive of enough significant information and that LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles was being terminated because the occupants of the target apartment had moved (Note: This was true where the Cubans are concerned.) Additional security improvements will be made when Simon D. CLACKETT returns to Mexico and relieves GERENDE of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team.

10. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly reviewed below are the separate operational activities which GERENDE managed during the period covered by this report:

A. LIMITED - This base functioned smoothly, securely and efficiently during the period July through December 1958. The base operator, LIEMPTY/6, demonstrated his usual competence and devotion to duty. In addition to the primary objective of taking photographs of individuals of interest, L/6 also prepared detailed daily logs on the arrivals and departures of all target personnel, weekly reports of workers activities at the LIMERICK installation, performed three one-man surveillances of Mexicans working at LIMERICK in an effort to identify them by name and home address, and provided SCANTLING with information on LIMERICK construction. During this six-month period, LIEMPTY/6 took approximately 800 photographs from the LIMITED base.

B. LILYRIC - This base is operated by LIEMPTYs/13 and 14, with LIEMPTY/12 serving as a cutout between the base and GERENDE. LIEMPTY/14 does most of the photography and reporting for the base since LIEMPTY/13 has a regular job and is not on the premises during regular daytime working hours. L/14 devotes approximately six hours (0800-1400) each day to photography and the remaining time is spent preparing reports. The Base personnel compile individual logs on each target personality indicating their arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation (Note: These reports are filed in the appropriate Station 201 file and are available to Station officers in analyzing a target personality's pattern of daily activity). LILYRIC also prepared a weekly report on workers activities at the Club and reports the license plate numbers of all vehicles discharging or picking up individuals at LIMERICK. (Note: These license plate numbers are then checked out through LIVESTOCK/2 for the owners names and addresses - in case of immediate or later operational interest.) During GERENDE's recent absence from Mexico City, OUSLER met directly with LIEMPTY/12. During this period approximately 2,000 photographs were taken from the LILYRIC base.

C. LICALLA - While LILYRIC and LIMITED are excellent bases for photographing individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation, the LICALLA base is the Station's best source of photographs of LIMERICK

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employees. LICALLA is so situated that photographs can be made of target personnel in the garden area of LIMERICK. LIEMPTY/9 is the base operator for LICALLA and in the Station's opinion performs his job in an outstanding manner. As reported in HMMA-11368, LIEMPTY/9 is the brother of former LIPSTICK/47 (the first LIPSTICK surveillance team member arrested in June 1958). No repercussions, or indications of any impending ones, have resulted in this family relationship. This, certainly, is the major security problem faced by L/9 during this reporting period. L/9 and his family soon will have to vacate the LICALLA base for the period of time required to remodel it. The Station is quite sure that L/9 does not know that his covert employer owns the LICALLA base and the three adjoining houses and every effort is being made to preserve this secret from L/9. (See HMMA-12032, 28 January 1959, for a more detailed explanation.) Of course, during the remodeling of LICALLA there will not be any LICALLA reporting or photographs. In addition to taking approximately 2,500 photographs during this six-month period, the LICALLA base also prepared weekly reports on LIMERICK garden activities. These reports indicate which LIMERICK employees are seen together each day, which vehicles different employees are accustomed to using, construction activities and other matters which appear of significance to L/9.

D. LIENTRAP - LIENTRAP continues to be a worthwhile Station asset. Approximately 1,400 clandestine photographs have been made of numerous targets during this reporting period and LIENTRAP type activities will undoubtedly remain one of the Station's best investigative assets. As explained in the Field Project Outline, forwarded to Headquarters on 8 October 1958, the Station is of the opinion that the LIENTRAP vehicle should be replaced as soon as possible. Nearly four months have elapsed without receiving Headquarters authority to replace the vehicle. The security situation is even more acute now than at the time of the request. LIEMPTYs 10 and 11 do an excellent job on LIENTRAP operations.

DH 13232

E. LIJERSEY - This operation can be characterized as somewhat dormant for the July - December 1958 period. Because of GERENDE's other important activities, he did not have the time to train and work with the surveillance team. Also, the Station considered that it would be stretching security just a bit too far to have GERENDE engaged in surveillance at the same time that he was handling the photographic base houses and performing monitoring chores for LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. The expected arrival of Simon D. CLACKETT in April and his relieving GERENDE of LIJERSEY will enable the Station to train, within a year, an efficient mobile surveillance team. At present, LIEMPTYs/15, 16 and 17 compose the LIJERSEY team.

F. LIFEAT - Until 10 December 1958 GERENDE served as monitor in the base house containing LIFEAT/BGMORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles. In addition to living in the base house, GERENDE also transcribed the majority of the BGMORNING and Cuban Exile tapes. He performed these jobs satisfactorily even though his efficiency was handicapped by numerous other duties. Relieving GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties enables him to devote more time to his other operations with a corresponding increase in the security of all his activities.

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-12095
[redacted]-1543

TO

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

G. LIEMPTYs/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of developing and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OUSLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GERENDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.

11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIJERSEY and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were combined into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.

12. Outlook for Future Development - Although not meaning to be repetitive by discussing again those recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GERENDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. With the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GERENDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GERENDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written communications procedures, by thoroughly debriefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detailed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photographic techniques. GERENDE will continue to be used on occasional sensitive investigations to rent operational hotel rooms and to perform other services for the Station which will not impair the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life into the LIJERSEY surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first rate investigative group to support other Station operations.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
31 January 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

4 FEB 1959
50-6-74/3

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/WH

SUBJECT: Case Officer Assignments in Mexico

1. ISR Staff has told Rio Station to remove their liaison case officer from handling their Number One clandestine operation.

2. Why should we not do this in the case of Mexico where Estancona is handling LIVESTOCK-2 (Station's most overt and dangerous agent) and LIFEAT (unilateral telephone tap)?

3. Incidentally, telephone taps in Mexico are limping along with about half the target coverage of a year ago.

Charles W Anderson
CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

1 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY

On this mammoth project, I have only two ideas:

a. Should LICALLA be terminated? It is a possible threat to LIMESA.

b. Gerende should be taken off all LIFEAT work.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

What's new on Sancho's replacement?

Okay

29 Oct 1958

TO: WH/Personnel

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Staff Agent to fill RAP-8100 Slot in Mexico City

1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a Staff Agent to fill the RAP-8100 IO (FI), GS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOWER (p).

2. ~~This~~ This Agent ~~should~~ [illegible] be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, especially in physical surveillance techniques. [illegible] He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets. ~~and~~ He will ~~give his~~ be given full responsibility for organizing an effective physical surveillance team.

3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing the functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to ~~his~~ other tasks.

SECRET

23 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH

SUBJECT : Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in Mexico

REFERENCE : WH/FI Memorandum of 14 October 1958

1. The subject of the recruitment of a physical surveillance team in the United States for use in Mexico as well as other areas within WH has long been a topic of discussion at Headquarters. While it is palpably ridiculous to consider the use of a surveillance team recruited and trained in the United States and based in Mexico, operationally in other areas in Latin America, there is some merit, at least in theory, to the proposal in 2a of reference. Although one of the basic factors in the make-up of any surveillance team is that its members must be indigenous to the area of operation, it would be possible to recruit such a team as suggested in 2a and use this team in Mexico. However, I believe this would be time-consuming and very expensive for the following reasons:

a. Machine runs have already been made to spot candidates within the Agency of the Mexican/American type for the LIMESA/LIMUST project, with negative results.

b. In order to make it attractive to young men of the caliber desired, we would have to offer some kind of a career with a starting salary of somewhere between the GS 7 and GS 9 level, plus travel and allowances. Without attempting to even estimate this cost one can see that the figures for a team of fifteen would run into six digits.

c. It would take a minimum of three months for a recruiter to move into the southwest area and spot, contact, develop and recruit a team of fifteen.

d. Once a team of suitable candidates was recruited and cleared, it would then take a minimum of another three months to train these candidates in basic trade craft and surveillance techniques.

e. Upon completion of the training period, the candidates would have to be moved individually into the area of operation to become familiar with this area, the language, people, and atmosphere in general, etc. This would take another three months minimum.

f. After completion of the area familiarization period, the team would have to be assembled and put through various surveillance exercises as a unit to check them out prior to actual operations.

14-00000

g. There would be other problems confronting such a team from a security standpoint, such as cover credentials, which would always pose a threat to the operation.

2. To sum up, it would appear that the proposal in 2a of reference is not feasible because of the time and expense involved plus the always latent security hazard.

3. I agree with paragraph 2 b of reference. Not only should the personnel of the surveillance team be recruited at the station, but as outlined in paragraph 3 it should be relatively easy to find suitable candidates. For example it is proposed under the new LIEMPTY project (this consists of the remainder of the non-blown LIPSTICKs and the LIJERSEYs) to recruit a physical surveillance team. Two of the station's outstanding indigenous agents, Scantling and Gerende, are under this project and both are capable of spotting, developing, and recruiting agents.

4. I agree with paragraph 3b, c, and d, and believe that Headquarters should make every effort to find an experienced and competent case officer to fill Clower's slot as the outside surveillance case officer.

John B. Brady
WH/III/Mexico

14 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CWH

SUBJECT: Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in Mexico

1. On 8 October 1958 a meeting of representatives of SR Division and CI Staff was held, attended by the undersigned, to discuss means for building up physical surveillance assets in Mexico. The SR and CI representatives pointed out that their current and projected work on BGMORNING and their cases requires a considerable strengthening of physical surveillance assets, and it was the consensus that these assets would be used far into the future on Soviet targets. It was further agreed that since the LIPSTICK operation has encountered difficulties this year, new assets should be sought.

2. Various approaches to the problem were discussed, the most viable of which were as follows:

a. Recruiting of teams or basic elements for teams in the Mexican colonies of the southwestern U. S.

b. Dispatch of a new case officer to Mexico with the sole and specific duty of developing and running the new teams.

c. A combination of a and b.

3. Initially, it is believed the dispatch of a new case officer to Mexico would be the most successful and give the best immediate results, for the following reasons:

a. Headquarters and Station records contain the names of numerous cleared contacts or contacts who could be cleared and through whom introductions could be made to persons suitable for surveillance work. Hitherto these have not been fully exploited owing to the heavy workload on Station personnel and the unimpaired functioning till recently of the LIPSTICK group. Some of these contacts were felt out as recruiters and spotters in years past but the matter was never pushed since the need was not so great as now.

b. A new case officer is needed because the present Station staff is still too busy to devote the amount of time needed to build carefully and train thoroughly the new assets.

c. The new assets will require the full time direction and coordination of a case officer who has no other responsibilities. In this connection, it would be advisable to try to select, train and utilize at least twelve new agents as soon as possible.

d. In brief, a replacement of the former physical surveillance leader is indicated, but a more mature and competent case officer is needed.

4. Plan a, recruitment in the U. S., should not be dismissed from consideration. It would take longer than the other plan but might be beneficial in enabling the new agents to be trained in the U. S. They would then have to spend time getting into Mexico and familiarize themselves with operations and operational climate there. This plan, however, presents a problem as to who is to do the recruiting and training in the U. S. SR Division has offered to be of whatever assistance they can, but there is no indication they could do any better at this than WHD.

5. It may be of interest to you to know that the SR representatives said the best work done anywhere in the world on the BGMORNING case, which has wide international ramifications, was done by LIKAYAK-2 in Mexico.

Charles W. Anderson
CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 cc - CWH
2 cc - WH/FI

4. **EQUIPMENT:** 1 QP auto
Photographic Equipment

5. **PROJECT ACTIONS:** First approved in 1958, the FY 1971 Renewal Request was submitted in April 1970.

6. **COST:**

FY	APPROVALS
1966	$45,300
1967	41,500
1968	45,000
1969	43,500
1970	49,468 (Estimated Obligation)
1971	23,635 (Request)

SUMMARY OF CURRENT PROJECT COSTS: FY 1970

Salaries and Bonuses	$40,580.00
Real Estate, Utilities and Rent	6,188.00
Car Maintenance	1,200.00
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500.00
Supplies	1,000.00
TOTAL	$49,468.00

UNINDEXED DOCUMENT

NOTE: ... cards for this document cannot be made until it is returned to RI

Dusty Rhoad X-8569	DOCUMENT NO. HMMA-11263
	DOCUMENT DATE 8 Oct 58

INSTRUCTIONS: Desk assistance is required to index the attached document for the reason(s) checked below. Please take the required action, checking the appropriate block(s) under desk comments below, and return to RI/AN within three (3) working days from date of receipt. You may retain one carbon for a working copy pending return of the processed document. If exceptional circumstances make it impossible to meet the deadline, call the analyst whose name appears above to arrange an alternate due date.

REQUIREMENTS

☐ ORIGINATOR REQUESTS REVIEW FOR INDEXING BY HEADQUARTERS DESK

☐ REQUIRES TRANSLATION OR TRANSLITERATION

REQUIRED: ☐ 201 ☐ PROJECT ☐ CASE FILE BE OPENED

☐ REQUIRES 201 NUMBER OF CRYPTONYM

OTHER (Specify)

SUSPENSE DATE 14 Oct 58

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/3/MEX				
2. attn. C. Zehrung				
3.				
4. RI/AN				
5. RI/~~AN~~				

RID/Refiled

COMMENTS

Copy Detached HMMA-11257

Please indicate RI file # for this dispatch & return to RI/AN. If HMMA-11257 has not been classified, please return it also to RI/AN for processing.

30-6-74

File Empty

DESK COMMENTS

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING NEEDED

☐ FILE OPENED AS NUMBER

☐ TRANSLATED OR TRANSLITERATED

☐ 201 NUMBER OF CRYPTONYM IS

OTHER (Specify)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF DESK OFFICER

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-11263

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6- /1

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 8 October 1958

SUBJECT: Operational/Assignment of Cryptonym

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE(S): HMM-A-11257

LIEMPTY

Cryptonym number 476 has been assigned to the project outline forwarded as an attachment to the referenced dispatch.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

QNO/cps

7 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Hqs
- 2 - Files

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III

TELEPHONE:

NO. HMM-A-3995

DATE 16 Jan 57

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
1. Condon		24 Jan	24	mpe		cc det. for LIPSTICK/LICALLA.
2. Brender		25 Jan	25	LB		KAPOK
3. Brady		25 Jan	25	JB		# 3+7 require answers. Cable approval request in P-7 sent 7/2
4. Shaw		24 Jan		RBS		BY HAND
5. FLYNN				JD		
MARELIUS				Cambrelis		Copy det.
6. STD/Harter	1501 L	7/8/56	7/8/56	HH	2059	
7. CI/OPS Wright	1604 L		read.	Eng		
8. SR/CE Silver	2052 J		5/6/57			
9.						~~Chuck~~ file
10.						~~[illegible]~~
11.						
12.						
13.						
14. WH/~~Archive~~	1026 B.H.		22 1957			
15. WH/III BRADY						20-6-74/3

FORM NO. 610 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 51-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 15—61155-6 (40)

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-3992
KAPOK-492

SECRET [redacted]

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized:

DATE 16 January 1956

Signed:

R.O. #C30 - Unit 44/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

TO Chief, WHD

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC LIPSTICK/LICALLA

REF: a. MEXI 360; b. DIR 38861

1. On 16 December 1955 the daily check of property which this Station may desire to use for operational purposes(LICOOL run) showed that a house adjacent to the LIMERICK target installation was vacant. LIPSTICK-19 was contacted immediately to investigate the property. He reported that it was a one-story house(duplex) in very poor condition which was being repaired by the owner for rental. He further reported that from the maid's room on the roof a clear view of the entire LIMERICK compound was possible and, if he had understood the LIMERICK language, he would have been able to understand several conversations which were going on between LIMERICK officers in the game area of the compound. LIPSTICK-19 also reported that from the roof of this house it was a distance of only approximately fifty feet to the LIMERICK building across flat roofs with no obstructing partitions except for a small wall and several strands of barbed wire, all totalling about four or five feet high between the last roof and the LIMERICK building.

2. Based upon this favorable report, reference A was sent immediately to Headquarters requesting authorization to rent the house. Two days later reference B was received granting approval to rent the house. Consequently, LIPSTICK-21(the only cleared married man available to the Station, with the exception of LIBERTY, who would fit into the area) was approached and requested to rent the house. This posed a considerable problem to LIPSTICK-21, since the house has only two bedrooms and he already had two children, and at that very time his wife was in the hospital giving birth to a third child. Further, he had a very comfortable house (a duplex which he shared with his brother-in-law at a pre-devaluation rent) which he would never be able to again acquire after this operation was terminated. He did, however, agree to take the house and it was

SECRET [redacted]

56-6-74/3

apparent to all concerned that his decision was based upon loyalty to this Station and dedication to the fight against Communism. It is hoped that this unselfish and devoted act of LIPSTICK-21's will be made a matter of permanent record.

3. The reason for LIPSTICK-21 to move from very comfortable quarters at less rent into cramped quarters at a higher rental needed some explanation for his friends and relatives. There is a very fine private school approximately one block from this house which LIPSTICK-21 had often mentioned as the best in the city for his children, and consequently he told everyone that the reason for moving was to be as close as possible to this school so that his children could attend. It should be noted in this respect that, in reality, LIPSTICK-21 had been sending his children to one of the best public schools in Mexico City at no cost. Under the present circumstances, he will have to pay tuition at the private school because it is the only decent school in the area and it provides excellent cover for his residence in the area. It is requested that Headquarters authorize this Station to assist LIPSTICK-21 in the payment of his children's tuition for the above stated reasons. Approximate cost of the tuition would be $20.00 U.S. per child per month, or a total for LIPSTICK-21 of $40.00 US per month. Authorization is requested to assist LIPSTICK-21 by payment of $30.00 U.S. per month.

4. The house is one of a series of one-story houses that extend from the LIMERICK building to a four-story apartment building on the far corner. The fronts of the houses are all directly on the sidewalk with the doors opening onto a one-step stoop. The backs of the houses and the walls of the back patios all abut the compound of the LIMERICK installation. The rear windows of the house face a patio which ends in a brick wall. This brick wall is not as high as the roof of the house, ending about four feet below the level of the roof. There are stairs which ascend from this patio to the roof where the maid's quarters are situated. About halfway up these stairs one can turn and obtain an unrestricted view of the LIMERICK compound. However, the maid's room offers the best operational possibilities since it provides concealment for the observer and his equipment, plus a more advantageous view. LIPSTICK-21 told his maid that she would have to sleep out at a local pension since he needed her room for his radio experiments. This is a plausible story since LIPSTICK-21 is known to be an enthusiastic radio amateur.

5. The maid's room has a door that faces across the roofs in the direction of the LIMERICK installation and one window which faces across the house roof toward the street. A view of the LIMERICK compound is obtained by an observer who is back in the room looking through the partly opened door. Some better method of observation will be worked out which will eliminate the security hazard of a door partially opened at all times of operation.

6. At present we plan to allow LIPSTICK-21 considerable time to get settled securely into his new quarters before starting any operational efforts. After this waiting period is over and we feel that we can securely commence operations, we plan on using the base for the following efforts:

a. A supplementary photographic base. In this connection the request for additional Exactas and spotting scopes previously made should be expedited. It is anticipated that much operation information will be developed by this photographic work showing the various associations between the people when they are at play in the compound which can never be determined from the LIPSTICK-LIMITED coverage. Visitors who seldom leave the compound do engage in social activity within the compound and can be photographed for possible identification by the AEDIPPERS. Items which are loaded into the automobiles for transportation to unknown points may be identified through this coverage. Further, should LIPSTICK/LIMITED be terminated for any reason, we would be able to continue some coverage from this base.

b. Observation by LIPSTICK-21 of the buildings and the activities in the compound will furnish valuable information on the daily living habits of the residents and their guests.

c. The LIPSTICK/LIDOMINO base, presently being occupied by LINCHPIN, is about 75 yards away from the LIMERICK target while LIPSTICK/LICALLA is only about fifty feet. This base may assist the Headquarters technicians, who periodically use the LIPSTICK/LIDOMINO base, for reasons of proximity and the use of their equipment from a different direction. The exact use of the LIPSTICK/LICALLA base in this respect must be determined by the Headquarters technicians who are familiar with the equipment used.

d. Conversations in the LIMERICK compound are audible to someone who is listening from the maid's room. Naturally street noises and extraneous sounds interfere considerably with this eavesdropping so that the employment of some parabolic microphone and recorder must be used for optimum results.

e. Should future operations provide the opportunity to install a transmitter microphone (resonant cavity) in some item carried into the LIMERICK target, LIPSTICK/LICALLA would serve as an excellent base since it has direct line of sight to the back of the LIMERICK target.

f. Preliminary investigation reveals that the possibility does exist that physical access may be obtained to the LIMERICK target from LIPSTICK/LICALIA. This investigation will be intensified and a full report, together with available photographs, will be sent to Headquarters for study by **FEARSON** and NILES as to the feasibility of this type of operation.

7. As stated in paragraphs two and three above, LIPSTICK-21 has undergone considerable personal sacrifice to accommodate this Station in this operation. It has always been the practice to pay a base house operator a starting salary of approximately $120.00 U.S. per month, since the work of operating a base house is almost full-time. LIPSTICK-21 now earns $64.00 U.S. for work of approximately four hours per day. It is therefore requested that this Station be authorized by cable to increase the salary of LIPSTICK-21 to $120.00 U.S. per month.

Matthew S. Dingley
Matthew S. DINGLEY

Distribution:

3 - Wash
2 - Files

MSD/gfb

46-6-44/3

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH

TO :

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO : (Station/Base)

FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES. SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	74/03

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐ OPEN FILE
☐ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
XX AMEND FILE TITLE
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☐ RETAIN
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION

☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☐ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R O.

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R O (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Louise W. Armstrong
RID/AN

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

050	006	074/03

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION				DATE 24 October 1958
FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Fehrung	COMPONENT WH	BUILDING Barton	ROOM NO. 2120	TELEPHONE 2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/ Operations

4. ACTION REQUESTED

☒	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.
☐	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.
☐	CLOSE FILE
☒	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
☒	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
☐	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER	3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER
50 (Mexico)	6 Operational

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS ☐

2. FIELD STATION(S)

3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S)

7. ENDORSEMENT	8 APPROVAL
THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS. C. E. Zirung RI ANALYSIS	REQUEST APPROVED [illegible] FOR CHIEF, RI
EFFECTIVE DATE 29 Oct [illegible] 1958	RI CASE TITLE NUMBER [illegible] 6 715 NS

FORM NO. 812 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 DEC 56

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

Ros-Videla:jah

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

October 1964

Mexico

DIRECTOR

WH 8 INFO SR 7, PG 2, CI/OA, CI/OA, VR, FILE

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☒ FILE RID

23 Oct 64 20 39z

SIG CEN

MEXI INFO CITE DIR

53997

LIEMPTY

REF: MEXI 1307 (IN 96996)*

1. HDQS AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT LIMITED BLDG SHOULD BE RAZED RATHER THAN REPAIRED. YOUR PARA THREE PROPOSAL OF COMMERCIAL INCOME NETTING VENTURE WOULD IMMEDIATELY MAKE THIS ASPECT OF LIEMPTY A PROPRIETARY WITH ATTENDANT SPECIAL ADMIN HANDLING. UNLESS THERE ARE OVERRIDING SECURITY AND OPS CONSIDERATIONS WE PREFER NOT DO THIS. HOWEVER IF FINAL DECISION IS TO BUILD STORE AND TWO APARTMENTS, HDQS SUGGESTS LIMITED BE MADE SEPARATE (FROM LIEMPTY) PROPRIETARY SUPPORT PROJ IN ORDER REDUCE CONFUSION OF TWO TYPES ACCOUNTING UNDER ONE PROJ.

2. HDQS STRONGLY BELIEVES PREFERABLE SOLUTION WOULD BE MERELY REBUILD HOUSE ON SAME LAND FOR OCCUPANCY BASEHOUSE KEEPERS. THIS WILL NOT INVOLVE PROPRIETARY. ALSO WOULD BE MORE SECURE FROM STANDPOINT SOV COUNTERMEASURES.

3. ALTERNATE SOLUTION IS SELL LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE AT FAIR MARKET VALUE DETERMINED BY INDEPENDENT APPRAISAL WITH UNDERSTANDING HE BUILD AN APARTMENT ON SECOND FLOOR WHICH HE WILL LET US ON LONG TERM LEASE.

EXEX CONTINUED..........

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a REP[illegible]ION BY OTHE[illegible] T[illegible]N[illegible]CE IS PROHIBI[illegible] Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T

ORIG. C. Bustos-Videla:jah
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :
Nov 13 7 21 PM '59

FROM: DIRECTOR

Page 2

CONF: INFO

TO INFO CITE DIR

58997

4. BLUEPRINTS FOR ANY BUILDING TO BE CONSTRUCTED WITH KUBARK FUNDS MUST RECEIVE HDQS APPROVAL. THIS APPROVAL AND PROJ AMENDMENT MUST BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO ANY COMMITMENT FUNDS. ESTIMATED TIME FOR TOTAL APPROVAL AFTER RECEIPT PLANS IS HOPEFULLY TWO MONTHS. THE HOUSE SHOULD NOT BE RAZED UNTIL APPROVAL GRANTED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *LIMITED photo basehouse which we purchased 1958 is deteriorating and Station suggests raze building and rebuild with store on 1st floor and two apts upstairs at cost of $55.000.

WH/BF Carter (draft)
SR/C/WH (draft) L. Thayer
CI/OPS (draft) Overjorde B
DDP/PG (draft) Hernandez B
WH/FI/Horton (draft)
C/WH/SS/Brooks (draft)
WH/Log/McMahon (draft)

WH/COPS Wood

W Wood
RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

W. S. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

KDFACTOR Project Amendment and Termination

FROM:

H.E. Mulloy
Henry E. Mulloy, WH/1/FI

EXTENSION: 1973/4167

NO.

DATE: 26 April 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1	26	26		FY 72 FUNDS AVAILABLE
2. WH/B&F	26 Apr.	27 Apr		
3. WH/LOG		27 Apr 73	K	
4. WH/SS		5-1-73		
5. WH/Plans/Erna	1 May			
6. ~~C/WH/RR~~				
7. ~~C/WH/TRS~~				
8. C/WH/FI	1 [illegible] 1973		✓	
9. C/WH/Plans	15 May 73			
10. A C/WHD	5/14/73			
11.				
12. MPS/BG/FI		29 MAY 1973		BY HAND
13. WH/1/FI				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT **KDFACTOR**

☐ CA
☒ PP/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 2, FY 72	BRANCH WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	DESK Mexico
X	TERMINATION	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Henry E. Mulloy — EXTENSION 4167
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDO	DATE APPROVED 25 May 1973	AMT THIS ACTION $ 7,246	FY 19 72 19	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION $ 36,090 $
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971	TO 30 June 1972	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 2 to Project KDFACTOR approved in the amount of $7,246, increasing the project's authorization from $28,844 to a revised total of $36,090 for FY 72; termination of Project KDFACTOR approved effective 30 June 1972.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG

DATE 29 MAY 1973

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPB		1	DIV. OR STAFF BF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	1	MPS/BG

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

22 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Operations

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Amendment and Termination of Project KDFACTOR

1. Project KDFACTOR supported a visual and photographic surveillance operation in Mexico City targetted against the Soviet Embassy. Assets included five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites. Termination of this project, effective 30 June 1972, was the result of a security review which revealed that the VWBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations.

2. Agent termination was accomplished without any immediate difficulties; however, continued security will depend on the terminated agents' silence. In the event there is a compromise, the risk of damage to the Station's relations with the Mexican Government should be minimized because of the compatible nature of KDFACTOR's operations.

3. The ADDO approved Amendment No. 1 to the project in the amount of $9,844 for FY 1972 to provide for the agent terminations, but an overrun of $7,246 occurred as the result of miscalculation of termination costs. This project action requests this additional sum of $7,246 to cover these expenses.

4. The FI Staff recommends approval of this amendment/termination request.

L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment:
Project

Reviewing officer:
FI/OPS - Stephen Roll

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006138

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	PROJECT CRYPTONYM KDFACTOR

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/C		CA	
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division		
X	AMENDMENT NO. 2	FIELD STATION Mexico City		
	RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH One	DESK Mexico	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Henry E. Mulloy H.E. Mulloy		DATE 26 Apr 73
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E05	BUILDING Hqs	TEL. EXT. RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray for	26 Apr	26 Apr		
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck	26 Apr 73	27 Apr		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		5-1-73		✓
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha		14 May 73		
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson				
A C/WHD	James E. Flannery for James E. Flannery		5-14-73		✓

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
FI Staff			22 May 73	X	
CI Staff	/s/ Frank W. Hughes		22 May 73		X
C/CCS/PRG	/s/ Gale W. Allen		21 May 73		X
C/MPS/BG	Paul A. Mazzo	24 May 73	24 May 73		X

ALL FUTURE
ACTIONS ON
THIS PROJECT
[illegible]
APPROVED BY
[illegible] /DDO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 72	$ 7,246	19 19 72	$ $36,090

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
ADDO	William E. Nelson	25 May 1973

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director
For Operations

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Amendment and Termination Request.

1. The KDFACTOR Project (until 1970 encrypted as the LIEMPTY Project) was initially approved in 1958 to provide financial and material support for visual and photographic surveillance operations targetted against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In June 1972 the project supported five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites.

2. The KDFACTOR Project was approved by the ADDO in the amount of $19,000 for FY - 72 and $20,000 for FY - 73. Per DIRECTOR 285255, dated 30 June 1972, the ADDO approved Amendment NO. 1 to the KDFACTOR Project in the amount of $9,844 for FY - 72 to provide for costs of agent terminations.

3. The decision to terminate all agents and facilities under the KDFACTOR Project was based on a security review of the project activities which indicated that the VWBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations, including the target, the location of the surveillance sites, and probably the true names and former cryptonyms of the agents covered by the project.

4. The cost of terminating the agents under the KDFACTOR Project amounted to $15,573; the cost of closing down the two basehouses under the project was $1,412. The total amount charged to the KDFACTOR Project in FY 72 was $36,090 which is $7,246 over the approved authorization of $28,844. The overage was incurred in terminating the agents and facilities associated with the KDFACTOR Project. Although Amendment No. 1 to the project was approved in the amount of $9,844 to cover the cost of terminating the agents in the

26 Apr 73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

project, the actual payments made by Mexico City Station per the terms of each Memorandum of Oral Commitment (MOC) and in accordance with Mexican law and custom exceeded the estimate for termination costs made by Headquarters at the time the Amendment was requested. Termination payments made to each agent are as follows:

KDFACTOR-2	(Recruited 1956)	$8,160
KDFACTOR-5	(Recruited 1956)	2,366
KDFACTOR-6	(Recruited 1956)	2,830
KDFACTOR-8	(Recruited 1965)	649
KDFACTOR-9	(Recruited 1966)	1,568

The long tenure of three of the terminated agents, the relatively high monthly salary of KDFACTOR-2 ($440) plus the computation of the termination payments in accordance with Mexican law and custom were the primary reasons that the final agent termination costs amounted to $15,573.

5. All agent terminations were accomplished in an amicable manner. No visible security risks were apparent at the time of the terminations although any one, or all, of the terminated agents may at some future date decide to divulge to an interested party the details of the KDFACTOR Project operations. KDFACTOR-2, KDFACTOR-5, and KDFACTOR-6 have worked in photo surveillance operations for the Station since 1956 and, therefore, obviously have considerable knowledge of targets, former safesites, personnel, and modus operandi of the Station. However, since the KDFACTOR Project was not concerned with incompatible operations or targets, we believe the risks of damage to Station relations with the Mexican Government in the event of exposure of the KDFACTOR Project operations by a terminated agent are within acceptable limits.

6. It is requested that the KDFACTOR Project be amended to provide the sum of $7,246 for FY - 72 to cover the costs of terminating five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites under this project.

7. It is also requested that the termination of the KDFACTOR Project be approved effective 30 June 1972.

James E. Flannery

James E. Flannery
AC/WHD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Proj

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
KDFACTOR

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/C	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division	
X	AMENDMENT NO. 2	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
	RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH One	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Henry E. Mulloy	DATE 26 Apr 73
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E05 · BUILDING Hqs · TEL. EXT.	RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray				
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck				
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright				
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha				
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson				
C/WHD	Theodore G. Shackley				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 72	7,246	19 72	$ 56,090

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
ADDO		

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director
For Operations

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Amendment and
Termination Request.

1. The KDFACTOR Project (until 1970 encrypted as the LIEMPTY Project) was initially approved in 1958 to provide financial and materiel support for visual and photographic surveillance operations targetted against the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In June 1972 the project supported five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites.

2. The KDFACTOR Project was approved by the ADDO in the amount of $19,000 for FY-72 and $20,000 for FY-73. Per DIRECTOR 285255, dated 30 June 1972, the ADDO approved Amendment No. 1 to the KDFACTOR Project in the amount of $9,844 for FY-72 to provide for costs of agent terminations.

3. The decision to terminate all agents and facilities under the KDFACTOR Project was based on a security review of the project activities which indicated that the VWBLANKET principal knew the basic details of the KDFACTOR operations, including the target, the location of the surveillance sites, and probably the true names and former cryptonyms of the agents covered by the project.

4. The costs of terminating all the agents in the KDFACTOR Project amounted to $15,573.00 which was considerably more than had been initially estimated when Amendment No. 1 for FY-72 was requested and approved. The total amount charged to the KDFACTOR Project in FY-72 was $36,090 which is $7,246 over the project's authorization of $28,844. The overage was incurred in terminating agents and facilities associated with the KDFACTOR Project; the effective date of all terminations was 30 June 1972.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 055372

5. All agent terminations were accomplished in an amicable manner. No visible security risks were apparent at the time of the ~~terminations~~ although any one, or all of the terminationed agents may at some future date decide to divulge to an interested party the details of the KDFACTOR Project operations. KDFACTOR-2 and KDFACTOR-5 have worked in photo surveillance operations for the Station since 1957 and, therefore, obviously have considerable knowledge of targets, former safesites, personnel, and modus operandi of the Station. However, since the KDFACTOR Project was not concerned with incompatible operations or targets, we believe the risks of damage to Station relations with the Mexican Government in the event of exposure of the KDFACTOR Project operations by a terminated agent are within acceptable limits.

6. It is requested that the KDFACTOR Project be amended to provide the sum of $7,246 for FY-72 to cover the costs of terminating five agents and two basehouse surveillance sites covered by this project.

7. It is also requested that the termination of the KDFACTOR Project be approved effective 30 June 1972.

Theodore G. Shackley
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Salaries				
KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

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	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
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KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
KDFACTOR Project Renewal

FROM: Fred Kravcov
WH/1, 3E05

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.:

DATE: 28 October 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1/FI/CI	28 Oct			FY 71 FUNDS AVAILABLE
2. C/WH/1		29/10/71		FY 72 FUNDS AVAILABLE
3. C/WH/B&F	29 Oct 71	1 Nov		FY 73 FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE
4. C/WH/SS	1 Nov.			
5. ~~SB/X/WH~~ C/WH/FI	3/11/71 15/11/71			– [illegible] no problem on this one.
6. C/WH/Plans	11/19/71			
7. [redacted]				
8. C/WHD		'71		
9. WH/FI	16	'71		
10.				
11. MS/BG	19 NOV 1971	15 DEC 1971		
12.				
13. WH/FI	16 DEC 1971			
14. C/WH/1				
15. C/WH/1/FI/CI				– Pls advise field requesting action suggested by ADDP

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PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT **KDFACTOR**

☐ CA
☒ PI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT	
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF	WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 1, FY 72	BRANCH	WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	DESK	Mexico
	TERMINATION	CASE OFFICER	J. Murray
	EXTENSION	EXTENSION	6955
	OTHER		

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP	DATE APPROVED 30 June 1972	AMT THIS ACTION $ 9,844	FY 72 FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION $ 28,844 $
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971	TO 30 June 1972	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 1 to Project KDFACTOR app roved, as per DIR 285255, in the amount of $9,844, increasing the project's authorization from $19,000 to a revised total of $28,844 for FY 72.

SIGNATURE MPS/BG	DATE 25 JUL

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPB		1	DIV. OR STAFF BF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT IDFACTOR

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

ACTION	**COMPONENT**
NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF: WH
AMENDMENT	
X RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ BIENNIAL	BRANCH: WH/1
TERMINATION	DESK: Mexico
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Fred Kravoov — EXTENSION: 4167
OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY: ADDP	DATE APPROVED: 10 December 1971	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1971	TO 30 June 1973	$ 39,000	19 72	$ 19,000
			19 73	$ 20,000
		FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE MPS/BG (Signed) E. M. [illegible]	DATE 15 [illegible]

H [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

1	PPB	1	DIV. OR STAFF OF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 1
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE 17 Dec 71

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (~~BASE~~) Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT KDFACTOR PAN 2135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION 15 Nov 71 TO 30 Jun 73 AMOUNT $ 39,000

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	FY-72	FY-73
RENEWAL	X	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	19,000	20,000
EXTENSION				
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	—	—
AMENDMENT		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE	19,000	20,000
OTHER				

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT KDFACTOR

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

ACTION		COMPONENT
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION OR STAFF WH
X	AMENDMENT No. 1, FY 71	BRANCH WH/1
	RENEWAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ BIENNIAL	
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Fred Kravcov · EXTENSION 4167
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP	DATE APPROVED 10 December 1971	AMT THIS ACTION $ 4,260	FY 19 71	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION $ 27,890
			19	$
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1970	TO 30 June 1971	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Amendment No. 1 to Project KDFACTOR approved in the amount of $4,260, increasing the project's FY 71 authorization to a revised total of $27,890.

SIGNATURE (Signed) [illegible]
MPS/BG

DATE 15

[illegible] notif list

DISTRIBUTION

1	CPB		1	DIV. OR STAFF BF OFFICER	1	CASE OFFICER	3	MPS/BG

FORM 11-70 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

20 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : FI Project LIEMPTY
FY 1970 Amendment
FY 1971 Renewal

REFERENCE : C/FI Memorandum for ADDP, dated 19 May 1970, subject: "Renewal of Project LIEMPTY."

1. On 22 May 1970 I approved this action for the amounts requested [illegible] with the understanding that the termination payments to [illegible] and his wife will be on a monthly basis as described in paragraph 4 of reference.

2. Messrs. John C. [illegible] and [illegible] M. [illegible] attended the project meeting.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

ADDP Comment of 26 May 70

SECRET

FAN ACCOUNT TREND REPORT
30 NOV 1972

FAN NUMBER: 35-1009 TITLE: KOFACTOR OFFICE: WESTERN HEMIS DIV

BUDGET AREA:
BUDGET COUNTRY: MEXICO

CATEGORY: COLLECTION INTELL
SUBCATEGORY: CLANDESTINE

ELEMENT: CLOSE OPS SUPPORT
SUBELEMENT:

	1972	1973				1974	1975
	ACTUAL	OPERATING	ACTUAL	% OBLG	BAL REMAIN	ESTIMATE	ESTIMATE
RENT COMM & UTIL							
2353 SAFEHOUSES	5,220	5,540	1,056	19.1%	4,484	5,540	
TOTAL	5,220	5,540	1,056	19.1%	4,484	5,540	
OTHER SERVICES							
2553 AGENT B&G	16,626	1,000	695	69.5%	305	1,000	
2554 AGENT C&A	12,404	3,780			3,780	12,780	
2557 OPEXP S&M	203	230			230	230	
2559 OPEXP OTHR	62	100			100	100	
TOTAL	29,295	5,110	695	13.6%	4,415	14,110	
SUPPLIES							
2608 PHOTO		350			350	350	
2699 PROP ENC	350						
TOTAL	350	350			350	350	
TOTAL FAN 35-1009	34,865	11,000	1,751	15.9%	9,249	20,000	

SECRET

8 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Renewal of Project KDFACTOR
in 1972 for $19,000
in 1973 for $20,000

1. This project covers photo and visual surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. One observation post covers the front gate of the building, and another covers the rear gate and walled compound. Five salaried agents man the sites, four in front and one in back. An official cover case officer collects the take (rolls of film and logs of visitors) once a week by car meetings with the OP keepers. The films are developed and printed inside the Station.

2. The production from this operation has consistently been rated high by the Bureau (which is the principal customer in the field), by other Government agencies and by SB Division. Photosurveillance of a Soviet Embassy might not be a high priority target in some countries. But the fact that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is a large and active one and the fact that its primary target is operations against the United States make our effort important and valuable. This is the operation that produced the photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy in 1962.

This is in error,
D/IG,
17 Apr 77

3. This seemingly straightforward operation has not always been so uncomplicated. Both sites have been in operation and served by the same OP keepers for more than a dozen years. At one of the sites the OP keeper's wife and children take turns manning the equipment. A now-terminated principal agent was divorced several years ago from a wife who knew a lot about the operation. Some desk officers believe that the medical doctor who for years was supposed to be developing the films was simply too busy to do so and that the work was probably done by his uncleared secretary. Family relationships keep cropping up among supposedly compartmented agents. All of this is in the files but not in any one place. We

believe it is time for the Station to make an updated security review of the operation with particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families. We also believe that the Station should now address itself to the contingency that the present sites or personnel will be blown and to investigate alternative means of continuing their valuable coverage.

4. The ADDP last approved this project in May 1970 with the condition that termination payments to the principal agent and his divorced wife be made on a monthly basis. This condition has been met.

5. The budgets requested for the next two years are simple and straightforward. Salaries and the traditional bonuses for the five paid agents come to about $13,000. Rent and utilities on the two observation posts come to $5,600. The small balance is for operational expenses. This project action also requests amendment of the FY 1971 budget by $4,260 to cover that part of the cost of termination bonuses to the principal agent and his divorced wife which could not be absorbed by the project. The total of the termination bonuses was $12,500.

6. This is a valuable and productive project which helps fulfill a Priority A-1 Station requirement. The FI Staff recommends approval.

Arthur C
f L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

PROJECT KDFACTOR

MPS/BG/FI/AFKatein:dr (13 DEC 71)

Distribution:

O & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADD/P
1 - WH/1
1 - FI/OPS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - C/CCS/PRG
1 - MPS/BG/FI

SECRET

SECRET

14 DEC 1971

DD/P 1-5899

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: FI Project KDFACTOR
FY 1971 Amendment No. 1
Biennial Renewal
Proposal for Fiscal
Years 1972 and 1973

1. On 10 December 1971 I approved subject actions in the amounts specified below:

a.	FY 1971 Amendment No. 1	- For $4,260, increasing the project's FY 1971 funds authorization (from $23,630) to $27,890.
b.	FY 1972 Renewal	- For $19,000 *
c.	FY 1973 Renewal	- For $20,000

2. I ask that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, giving particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families as discussed in paragraph 3 of referent memorandum.

3. Also, I ask that you provide me (via MPS/BG) with a memorandum report summarizing the results of the above (paragraph 2) security review by 31 March 1972.

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

*Amended by DIR-355356 in amount of $9,544, and
Total $28,544.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: KDFACTOR

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/C	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division
X	AMENDMENT NO. 1 FY-71	FIELD STATION: Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1972 & 73	BRANCH: One — DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Fred Kravcov — DATE: 28 Oct 71
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E05 — BUILDING: Hqs — TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	29/10/71	29/10/71		
C/WH/B&F	Lunsford O. Healy	29 Oct 71	1 Nov 71		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		1 Nov 71		
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		18/11/71		
C/WH/Plans	John R. Cassidy ✓		11/19/71		
C/WHD	William V. Broe for James E. Flannery		19 NOV 1971		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/X/WH	Haviland Smith Haviland Smith		3/11/71		✓
FI Staff	/s/ Arthur C. Close		8 Dec 71	x	
CI Staff	Frank Hughes /s/		8 Dec 71		x
CCS/PRG	Charles Beckman /s/		26 Nov 71		x
*With the conditions as stated in my memorandum dated 14 December 1971					
	(DD/P 1-5899)				
f C/MPS/BG	Paul A. Meyer	9 Dec 71	9 Dec 71		

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT. THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 JUly 1970	30 June 1971	4,260	71	27,860
1 July 71	30 June 72	$ 19,000	1972	$ 19,000
1 July 72	30 June 73	20,000	1973	$ 20,000

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr. *	10 Dec 71

FORM 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

KDFACTOR - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1972, Cost $19,000 and FY 1973, Cost $20,000

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1971	$23,635	$27,586

Changes:

1. The processing of photographs obtained through this project now is performed inside the Station. KDFACTOR-1, who formerly processed the take in an outside safehouse, was terminated amicably in early March 1971. Security and efficiency have been increased by this change. KDFACTOR-7 was terminated in 1970, but the termination payments were made during FY 1971 causing an increase in that years obligations.

2. Howard T. BAGAUS handled the administration of this project to early April 1971 when project responsibility reverted from the Operations Support Section to the REDTOP Section. At that time Timothy H. ARCHBOLD assumed the inside administrative supervision, and agent meetings were turned over to the outside case officer Bruce H. FERNALD. When ARCHBOLD departed PCS on 7 June 1971, Oliver J. MANKUNAS assumed responsibility for this project, including agent meetings.

Accomplishments:

1. This project has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage of personnel and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet Embassy. A total of 530 rolls of film were produced during the reporting period. U.S. citizens, visitors, and TDY personnel are given special attention. Identifications of license plates and automobile descriptions as well as drivers and their companions are identified under this project. Additionally, attendance sheets are maintained to establish who is at the Embassy on any given day and hour.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

These photographs and reports have contributed operational support to the Station's Soviet operations which is not attainable elsewhere. For example, whenever the Soviets change all their license numbers the Station is able to compile a new, complete roster within a matter of weeks.

Costs:

1. General: $19,000 is requested for FY 1972 and $20,000 is requested for FY 1973. It is also requested that the Project be amended for FY 1971 in the amount of $4,260 to provide for the termination of KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDFACTOR is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operational Program in the amount of $23,735 for FY 1972 and $24,182 for FY 1973.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1971 Estimated Obligations	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Salaries				
KDFACTOR-2	$ 5,280	$ 5,280	$ 5,808	$ 5,808
KDFACTOR-5	1,728	1,728	1,901	1,901
KDFACTOR-6	2,112	2,112	2,323	2,323
KDFACTOR-8	768	768	845	845
KDFACTOR-9	1,968	1,968	2,165	2,165
KDFACTOR-1	4,400	-0-	-0-	-0-
KDFACTOR-7	2,500	-0-	-0-	-0-
Bonuses	1,374	1,088	1,087	1,087
	$20,130	$12,944	$14,129	$14,129
Base houses				
Rents	$ 6,022	$ 4,350	$ 4,240	$ 4,240
Utilities	400	750	800	800
Maintenance	200	500	500	500
	$ 6,622	$ 5,600	$ 5,540	$ 5,540

Misc Expenses				
Ops entertainment	$ 165	$ 300	$ 100	$ 100
Auto maintenance	80	100	100	100
Ops expenses	590	56	131	131
	$ 835	$ 456	$ 331	$ 331
Total Expenses	$27,587	$19,000	$20,000	$20,000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign funds. No non-JKLANCE funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses are provided in the FY 72 and FY 73 budgets.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station by the case officer and transferred during clandestine meetings. Receipts are obtained for all disbursements according to JKLANCE regulations.

7. Annexes: None.

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

SECRET

DD/P 22735

26 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : FI Project LIEMPTY
FY 1970 Amendment
FY 1971 Renewal

REFERENCE : C/FI Memorandum for ADD/P, dated 19 May 1970, Subject: "Renewal of Project LIEMPTY."

1. On 22 May 1970 I approved subject action for the amounts requested with the understanding that the termination payments to GERENDE and his wife will be on a monthly basis as described in paragraph 4 of referent.

2. Messrs John C. Murray and Charles M. Bounds attended the project meeting.

Cord Meyer, Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI/ALKatein/sw

Distribution:

O & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADD/P
1 - FI/OPS
1 - CI/OPS
1 - WH/1
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - CCS/PRG
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - MPS/BG

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION: X FI/C ☐ CA ☐

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division
1	AMENDMENT NO. FY 70	FIELD STATION: Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 19 71	BRANCH: One — DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry JB — DATE: 10 April 70
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E05 — BUILDING: Hqs. — TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	pr John C. Murray	10 APR	10 APR		x
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	10 APR 1970	4/13		✓
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		4-13-70		
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		20/4/70		
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore	21 APR 1970	4/21		
C/WHD	William V. Broe	21 APR 1970	21 APR 1970		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/WH	LEE G. PIESTDES	14/4	14/4		x
FI Staff	Frank B Fielden	19 MAY 1970	19 MAY 1970	✓	
CI Staff	/S/ Frank W. Hughes		11 May 70		
CCS/PRG	/S/ Charles Beckman		8 May 70		
DDP/NSP	/S/ Gerard Droller		24/4/70		
C/MPS/BG			20 May 70		

APPROVAL

PERIOD		AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1969	30 June 1970	$ 10,499	1970	$ 49,468
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 23,635	1971	$ 23.635

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	22 May 70

FORM 5-68 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

LIEMPTY - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1971, Cost $23,635.

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1966	$43,145	$36,294
1967	45,000	42,082
1968	42,185	42,158
1969	43,520	41,416
1970	38,970	49,468 (Projected)

Purpose:

Project LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The aim is to identify and cover the movements of persons entering and leaving the Embassy, including Soviets and visitors. The intelligence collected through such activity contributes to the Station's overall Soviet operations program, mainly in support of Priority A-1, but to some extent, Priority A-4, of the Operating Directive for Mexico.

Description:

1. The Project operates through two fixed basehouse surveillance posts, a small photographic laboratory, a principal agent, and six sub-agents. A team of four sub-agents, operating from a basehouse, maintains visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy front entrance. One sub-agent, operating from a second basehouse, covers an area in back of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. These units photograph all persons moving in or out of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for processing at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is processed and printed, the principal agent passes the finished product, plus written reports and logs, to the Station case officer. A brief description of each unit, each agent and his role in the operation follows.

2. LILYRIC (MEXI-132) is a basehouse located near the front of the Soviet Embassy. This house has been in operation since October 1966. It is rented through LIMOUSINE (201-5762), a cleared American businessman. He is the ostensible owner of record and, as the landlord, collects rent from the tenants and then passes it to the Station case officer. LIEMPTY-13 and his family (see paragraph 3 below) live in the LILYRIC house and conduct their surveillance operation from it during daylight hours (0800-1800).

3. LIEMPTY-13 (201-119961) is the key member of the LILYRIC basehouse team. He maintains contact with the principal agent and does some photographic work. However, because LIEMPTY-13 is employed outside as an industrial engineer, he is unable to spend much time operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and most of this work is done by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, and their sons, LIEMPTY-26 and LIEMPTY-27 (see paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 below).

4. LIEMPTY-14 (201-167567) is the main photographer and observer at the LILYRIC basehouse. She works closely with her husband, LIEMPTY-13, in running the operation, including the preparation of observation reports and logs. She also does the LILYRIC housekeeping, as any housewife would do.

5. LIEMPTY-26 (201-762111), the son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a student at the Mexican Technological Institute. In his spare time he operates the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and helps LIEMPTY-14 in maintaining the arrival and departure logs of target personalities.

6. LIEMPTY-27 (201-762112), another son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a prep school student. He assists in operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment and transcribes notes into a finished typewritten log of events.

7. LICALLA (MEXI-03) is a basehouse located behind the Soviet Embassy. It has been in operation since 1957. The building, a four-unit affair, collectively known as LIMUST, is Agency owned. It was purchased through LIMOUSINE in September 1957, and the property is in his name. The LICALLA site is occupied by LIEMPTY-9 (see paragraph 8 below) and he runs the surveillance operation from it.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (201-136454) is the only agent operating from the LICALLA site. He does all the photography, maintains logs and prepares observation reports. He also maintains contact with the principal agent. LIEMPTY-9 is a part-time insurance salesman and is self-employed in the accounting business, which he conducts at the LICALLA site.

9. Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) has been the principal agent for this project. He is a Mexican national contract agent who is self-employed as an English teacher and also works as a salesman for a light bulb manufacturer. GERENDE has been mainly responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents, passing instructions to them, and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He has also paid them and handled all other administrative matters. He is being terminated by the end of FY 1970 for security reasons (see Problems, paragraph 1).

10. Bruce H. FERNALD (P) (201-008189) replaced GERENDE (see paragraph 9 above) as the project's principal agent in early December 1969. FERNALD, a U.S. citizen born in June 1915, operates under non-official cover as a retired immigrant. He is responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He also handles administrative matters, including agent salary payments. FERNALD is financially covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

11. The LIEMPTY photographic laboratory (MEXI-137) is located in a room at GERENDE's residence. It is equipped to process the photographs taken by the LIEMPTY surveillance units. The work is done by LIEMPTY-4. (See paragraph 12 below). Since GERENDE will be terminated by the end of FY 1970, the Station is taking steps to establish a new LIEMPTY photographic laboratory at a new safesite.

12. LIEMPTY-4 (201-117967) processes all the photographic film taken by the LIEMPTY photographers and makes the number of prints required. He does this work at night in the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. He is self-employed as a medical doctor, and he is a brother-in-law of GERENDE, in whose home the laboratory is located.

Changes:

1. The LIENTRAP mobile unit, consisting of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is being removed from Project LIEMPTY and placed under Project LIEMBRACE, which supports a unilateral physical surveillance team. The purpose of this change is to increase the size of the LIEMBRACE team in order to meet a growing demand for operational surveillance support from the various Station operating sections. The transfer will become effective at the beginning of FY 1971 and both FY 1971 project budgets have been adjusted to cover financial aspects of the change.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE was removed as the LIEMPTY principal agent in early December 1969 owing to a security problem (see Problems, paragraph 1). He was replaced on 9 December 1969 by Bruce H. FERNALD, a career agent operating under cover as a retired immigrant. The change has caused some delay in the receipt of photographs because FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY agents as frequently as GERENDE had met them, but operational effectiveness is not significantly reduced by this delay. The key issue is that security and reliability of the principal agent have improved considerably.

Accomplishments:

1. Project LIEMPTY has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage (Monday through Saturday) of the front entrance and rear areas of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. All Soviet personnel and their visitors entering or leaving the Embassy have been photographed. In addition, visual surveillance reports were prepared when appropriate. These photographs and reports have contributed essential operational support to the Station's Soviet operations program.

2. Recently, LIEMPTY photographs were exclusively used to produce an updated mugbook on Soviet officials in Mexico. The book has been loaned to the FBI, AF/OSI and the 902nd Military Intelligence Group for operational use in debriefing their agents engaged in dangle operations and double agent operations against the Soviet services in Mexico City. One 902nd controlled agent was identified from an LIEMPTY photograph taken when the agent tried to contact the Soviets at

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Similarly, an AF/OSI controlled agent scheduled to meet a Soviet contact was unable to do so owing to illness, but LIEMPTY photographed another person who appeared at the meeting site and this person is believed to be the agent's Soviet case officer. Such coverage has been helpful to the 902nd, AF/OSI and the FBI in running their controlled double agent operations against the Soviets in Mexico.

3. Within one week after a biannual change of license plates on Soviet Embassy vehicles, LIEMPTY had provided a complete list of the new tag numbers, along with a complete identification of the vehicles. Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify the companions of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, a known KGB officer, during his last few days in Mexico.

4. LIEMPTY has also determined that newcomers to the Soviet Embassy frequently gravitate to groupings with their RIS colleagues in the "safety" of the Embassy backyard. This fact enabled the Station to make certain tentative KGB and GRU identifications. In addition, certain TDYers have been linked up with their escort officers and clues to personal relationships have occasionally been exploited.

5. In the field of Soviet patterns of activity and associations, LIEMPTY has been able to report accurate changes in certain specific cases. LIEMPTY coverage showed that NIKITIN, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, changed his activity pattern following the defection of Raisa Yerofeyevna KISELNIKOVA, former secretary in the Commercial Mission in Mexico. The same applies to Oleg NECHIPORENKO, a Second Secretary at the Embassy and a known KGB officer. LIEMPTY also provided information on the patterns and associations of Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV, a known KGB officer and on Valeriy Vladimirovich SOKOLIN, a known GRU officer. Coverage of Vladimir Viktorovich GORDEYEV, a suspect KGB officer, showed that he did, in fact, work in a "restricted area" at the Soviet Embassy and also established who some of his associates were. In the case of Oleg Konstantinovich IGNATYEV, who had arrived in Mexico City from Caracas, Venezuela, LIEMPTY was able to observe IGNATYEV entering and leaving in the company of Svyastoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, Press Attache and First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. IGNATYEV also visited the Soviet Embassy

several other times during his stay in Mexico City and had contact with other known Soviet intelligence officers while visiting. This kind of information is a basic contribution to the Station's continuing efforts to identify and assess certain Soviets for possible recruitment or defection.

6. At Headquarters, the Soviet Bloc Division uses LIEMPTY photographs, particularly photographs of Soviet Embassy officials, for identification purposes in connection with defector cases. The LIEMPTY material also keeps the Station's Soviet section up-to-date on which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy, which ones have been away; who has used which car; who has been in contact with whom; and other similar information useful in the conduct of Soviet operations.

Problems:

1. A security problem has developed involving Raymond H. GERENDE. According to GERENDE, his wife wants a divorce, apparently based mainly on incompatability of personalities. The problem basically is that both want custody of the children and this has sparked a dispute that has become more bitter and violent daily. In addition, the monetary settlement is in dispute. The problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency. Thus, if the case does go to court, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Even if the case does not go to court, GERENDE's wife could expose him as an Agency employee. Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort is being made by the Station to have both parties settle the divorce out of court, and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the project. After weighing all factors, it has been decided that continued employment of GERENDE is not an acceptable risk, and the decision has been reached to terminate him by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE will be paid a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years service, about $1,250 more than the $8,750 his contract calls for, in order to ensure that the termination is amicable and thereby preserve

project security. In addition, his wife, LIEMPTY-19 will be given $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing what she knows about project operations. The FY 1970 budget is being amended to cover this amount.

2. Other aspects of security continue relatively unchanged. All the agents still have jobs to backstop their Agency wages. The Station is compartmented from the action agents through FERNALD, whose contact with the sub-agents is reasonably well covered by his status as a retired immigrant. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 and LITEMPY-13 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings are held once each week at pre-arranged times and places, well away from the target area. Occasionally emergency meetings are called, by phone, if special coverage is desired. FERNALD also meets LIEMPTY-4 to exchange films and prints. These meetings are held weekly at pre-arranged times and places. FERNALD can change meeting plans by calling LIEMPTY-4 directly by telephone. In addition, LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station through which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). The Station case officer maintains weekly clandestine contact with FERNALD in order to manage the operation and collect the product.

Coordination:

Ambassador McBride has not been briefed on Project LIEMPTY.

Future Plans:

1. The surveillance units are expected to continue to produce valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and visual surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations, and habit patterns of persons frequenting the Soviet Embassy, including Soviet officials. Operational procedures and the project mechanism will continue as it has in the past, except that Bruce H. FERNALD, a new principal agent, will be in charge of the operation (see Changes, paragraph 2).

2. The Project does not include an up-dated plan for emergency contact during violent action or government overthrow. The Station has been requested to prepare an updated emergency contact plan and submit it to Headquarters in the first FY 1971 quarterly progress report.

Costs:

1. General: $23,635 is requested for FY 1971. It is requested that the project be amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY-19.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIEMPTY is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $40,000. Funds for the FY 1970 amendment will be absorbed in the current WH Division's finance allocation.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
Raymond H. GERENDE Salary	$ 6,500	$ -0-	$ -0-
LIEMPTY-4 Salary	2,400	2,640	2,640
LIEMPTY-9 Salary	4,320	4,752	4,752
LIEMPTY-10 Salary	4,224	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-11 Salary	2,736	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-13 Salary	1,536	1,690	1,690
LIEMPTY-14 Salary	1,824	2,006	2,006
LIEMPTY-26 Salary	672	739	739
LIEMPTY-27 Salary	1,728	1,901	1,901
LICALLA Safehouse Rent (MEXI-03)	1,248	1,373	1,373
LILYRIC Safehouse Rent (MEXI-132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
Safehouse Utilities	1,100	1,200	1,300
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI-137)	960	-0-	-0-
MV-2823* and 2947 Maintenance	1,200	600	600
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500	500	500
Photographic and Other Supplies	1,000	1,000	1,000
Christmas Bonuses	2,140	2,354	2,354
LIEMPTY-19 Termination Bonus	2,500	-0-	-0-
GERENDE Termination Bonus	10,000	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	$49,468	$23,635**	$23,735

*MV-2823 to be sold in FY 1970 and not replaced.

**Decrease from FY 1970 figure due to GERENDE termination. His replacement is covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

14-00000

4. Foreign Currency: There is no special need for foreign currency. No non-CIA funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses to all agents totaling $2,354 for FY 1971, and termination pay in an amount to be determined by the agents record and length of service.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station case officer to FERNALD, and from FERNALD to the sub-agents. The transfer of funds takes place under clandestine meeting conditions, and appropriate security measures are always taken.

7. Accountability: FERNALD accounts in detail to his case officer, who in turn submits receipts to the Station and certifies that funds were spent to cover expenses for which it was intended.

8. Annexes: None

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION: X FI · CA

NEW PROJECT APPROVAL

AMENDMENT NO.

X RENEWAL FY 19 71

EXTENSION

TERMINATION

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division

FIELD STATION: Mexico City

BRANCH: One

DESK:

CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry

DATE: 10 April 70

ROOM NO.: 3E05

BUILDING: Hqs.

TEL. EXT.: RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES		MEMO ATTACHED	
		IN	OUT	YES	NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray				
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want				
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright				
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch				
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore				
C/WHD	William V. Broe				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)		DATES		MEMO ATTACHED	
		IN	OUT	YES	NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 23,635	19 71	$ 23,635

APPROVING AUTHORITY: A/DDP

SIGNATURE:

DATE:

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

LIEMPTY - Mexico City, Mexico -- Photographic Surveillance Team Support -- FY 1971, Cost $23,635.

Fiscal Year	Approved	Obligated
1966	$43,145	$36,294
1967	43,000	42,082
1968	42,185	42,158
1969	43,320	41,416
1970	38,970	49,468 (Projected)

Purpose:

Project LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The aim is to identify and cover the movements of persons entering and leaving the Embassy, including Soviets and visitors. The intelligence collected through such activity contributes to the Station's overall Soviet operations program, mainly in support of Priority A-1, but to some extent, Priority A-4, of the Operating Directive for Mexico.

Description:

1. The Project operates through two fixed basehouse surveillance posts, a small photographic laboratory, a principal agent, and six sub-agents. A team of four sub-agents, operating from a basehouse, maintains visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy front entrance. One sub-agent, operating from a second basehouse, covers an area in back of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. These units photograph all persons moving in or out of the specific target areas. They also maintain logs and provide written reports on observed activity. All of this material is passed to the principal agent, who passes the film to another sub-agent for processing at a laboratory equipped for that purpose. After the film is processed and printed, the principal agent passes the finished product, plus written reports and logs, to the Station case officer. A brief description of each unit, each agent and his role in the operation follows.

2. LILYRIC (MEXI-132) is a basehouse located near the front of the Soviet Embassy. This house has been in operation since October 1966. It is rented through LIMOUSINE (201-5762), a cleared American businessman. He is the ostensible owner of record and, as the landlord, collects rent from the tenants and then passes it to the Station case officer. LIEMPTY-13 and his family (see paragraph 3 below) live in the LILYRIC house and conduct their surveillance operation from it during daylight hours (0800-1800).

3. LIEMPTY-13 (201-119961) is the key member of the LILYRIC basehouse team. He maintains contact with the principal agent and does some photographic work. However, because LIEMPTY-13 is employed outside as an industrial engineer, he is unable to spend much time operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and most of this work is done by his wife, LIEMPTY-14, and their sons, LIEMPTY-26 and LIEMPTY-27 (see paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 below).

4. LIEMPTY-14 (201-167567) is the main photographer and observer at the LILYRIC basehouse. She works closely with her husband, LIEMPTY-13, in running the operation, including the preparation of observation reports and logs. She also does the LILYRIC housekeeping, as any housewife would do.

5. LIEMPTY-26 (201-762111), the son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a student at the Mexican Technological Institute. In his spare time he operates the LILYRIC photographic equipment, and helps LIEMPTY-14 in maintaining the arrival and departure logs of target personalities.

6. LIEMPTY-27 (201-762112), another son of LIEMPTY-13 and LIEMPTY-14, has been a prep school student. He assists in operating the LILYRIC photographic equipment and transcribes notes into a finished typewritten log of events.

7. LICALLA (MEXI-03) is a basehouse located behind the Soviet Embassy. It has been in operation since 1957. The building, a four-unit affair, collectively known as LIMUST, is Agency owned. It was purchased through LIMOUSINE in September 1957, and the property is in his name. The LICALLA site is occupied by LIEMPTY-9 (see paragraph 8 below) and he runs the surveillance operation from it.

8. LIEMPTY-9 (201-136454) is the only agent operating from the LICALLA site. He does all the photography, maintains logs and prepares observation reports. He also maintains contact with the principal agent. LIEMPTY-9 is a part-time insurance salesman and is self-employed in the accounting business, which he conducts at the LICALLA site.

9. Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) has been the principal agent for this project. He is a Mexican national contract agent who is self-employed as an English teacher and also works as a salesman for a light bulb manufacturer. GERENDE has been mainly responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents, passing instructions to them, and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He has also paid them and handled all other administrative matters. He is being terminated by the end of FY 1970 for security reasons (see Problems, paragraph 1).

10. Bruce H. FERNALD (P) (201-008189) replaced GERENDE (see paragraph 9 above) as the project's principal agent in early December 1969. FERNALD, a U.S. citizen born in June 1915, operates under non-official cover as a retired immigrant. He is responsible for maintaining contact with the LIEMPTY agents and collecting the product for passing to the Station case officer. He also handles administrative matters, including agent salary payments. FERNALD is financially covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

11. The LIEMPTY photographic laboratory (MEXI-137) is located in a room at GERENDE's residence. It is equipped to process the photographs taken by the LIEMPTY surveillance units. The work is done by LIEMPTY-4. (See paragraph 12 below). Since GERENDE will be terminated by the end of FY 1970, the Station is taking steps to establish a new LIEMPTY photographic laboratory at a new safesite.

12. LIEMPTY-4 (201-117967) processes all the photographic film taken by the LIEMPTY photographers and makes the number of prints required. He does this work at night in the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. He is self-employed as a medical doctor, and he is a brother-in-law of GERENDE, in whose home the laboratory is located.

Changes:

1. The LIENTRAP mobile unit, consisting of LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11, is being removed from Project LIEMPTY and placed under Project LIEMBRACE, which supports a unilateral physical surveillance team. The purpose of this change is to increase the size of the LIEMBRACE team in order to meet a growing demand for operational surveillance support from the various Station operating sections. The transfer will become effective at the beginning of FY 1971 and both FY 1971 project budgets have been adjusted to cover financial aspects of the change.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE was removed as the LIEMPTY principal agent in early December 1969 owing to a security problem (see Problems, paragraph 1). He was replaced on 9 December 1969 by Bruce H. FERNALD, a career agent operating under cover as a retired immigrant. The change has caused some delay in the receipt of photographs because FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY agents as frequently as GERENDE had met them, but operational effectiveness is not significantly reduced by this delay. The key issue is that security and reliability of the principal agent have improved considerably.

Accomplishments:

1. Project LIEMPTY has provided continuous daily photographic and visual coverage (Monday through Saturday) of the front entrance and rear areas of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. All Soviet personnel and their visitors entering or leaving the Embassy have been photographed. In addition, visual surveillance reports were prepared when appropriate. These photographs and reports have contributed essential operational support to the Station's Soviet operations program.

2. Recently, LIEMPTY photographs were exclusively used to produce an updated mugbook on Soviet officials in Mexico. The book has been loaned to the FBI, AF/OSI and the 902nd Military Intelligence Group for operational use in debriefing their agents engaged in dangle operations and double agent operations against the Soviet services in Mexico City. One 902nd controlled agent was identified from an LIEMPTY photograph taken when the agent tried to contact the Soviets at

the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Similarly, an AF/OSI controlled agent scheduled to meet a Soviet contact was unable to do so owing to illness, but LIEMPTY photographed another person who appeared at the meeting site and this person is believed to be the agent's Soviet case officer. Such coverage has been helpful to the 902nd, AF/OSI and the FBI in running their controlled double agent operations against the Soviets in Mexico.

3. Within one week after a biannual change of license plates on Soviet Embassy vehicles, LIEMPTY had provided a complete list of the new tag numbers, along with a complete identification of the vehicles. Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify the companions of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, a known KGB officer, during his last few days in Mexico.

4. LIEMPTY has also determined that newcomers to the Soviet Embassy frequently gravitate to groupings with their RIS colleagues in the "safety" of the Embassy backyard. This fact enabled the Station to make certain tentative KGB and GRU identifications. In addition, certain TDYers have been linked up with their escort officers and clues to personal relationships have occasionally been exploited.

5. In the field of Soviet patterns of activity and associations, LIEMPTY has been able to report accurate changes in certain specific cases. LIEMPTY coverage showed that NIKITIN, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, changed his activity pattern following the defection of Raisa Yerofeyevna KISELNIKOVA, former secretary in the Commercial Mission in Mexico. The same applies to Oleg NECHIPORENKO, a Second Secretary at the Embassy and a known KGB officer. LIEMPTY also provided information on the patterns and associations of Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV, a known KGB officer and on Valeriy Vladimirovich SOKOLIN, a known GRU officer. Coverage of Vladimir Viktorovich GORDEYEV, a suspect KGB officer, showed that he did, in fact, work in a "restricted area" at the Soviet Embassy and also established who some of his associates were. In the case of Oleg Konstantinovich IGNATYEV, who had arrived in Mexico City from Caracas, Venezuela, LIEMPTY was able to observe IGNATYEV entering and leaving in the company of Svyastoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, Press Attache and First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. IGNATYEV also visited the Soviet Embassy

several other times during his stay in Mexico City and had contact with other known Soviet intelligence officers while visiting. This kind of information is a basic contribution to the Station's continuing efforts to identify and assess certain Soviets for possible recruitment or defection.

6. At Headquarters, the Soviet Bloc Division uses LIEMPTY photographs, particularly photographs of Soviet Embassy officials, for identification purposes in connection with defector cases. The LIEMPTY material also keeps the Station's Soviet section up-to-date on which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy, which ones have been away; who has used which car; who has been in contact with whom; and other similar information useful in the conduct of Soviet operations.

Problems:

1. A security problem has developed involving Raymond H. GERENDE. According to GERENDE, his wife wants a divorce, apparently based mainly on incompatability of personalities. The problem basically is that both want custody of the children and this has sparked a dispute that has become more bitter and violent daily. In addition, the monetary settlement is in dispute. The problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency. Thus, if the case does go to court, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Even if the case does not go to court, GERENDE's wife could expose him as an Agency employee. Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort is being made by the Station to have both parties settle the divorce out of court, and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the project. After weighing all factors, it has been decided that continued employment of GERENDE is not an acceptable risk, and the decision has been reached to terminate him by the end of FY 1970. GERENDE will be paid a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years service, about $1,250 more than the $8,750 his contract calls for, in order to ensure that the termination is amicable and thereby preserve

project security. In addition, his wife, LIEMPTY-19 will be given $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing what she knows about project operations. The FY 1970 budget is being amended to cover this amount.

2. Other aspects of security continue relatively unchanged. All the agents still have jobs to backstop their Agency wages. The Station is compartmented from the action agents through FERNALD, whose contact with the sub-agents is reasonably well covered by his status as a retired immigrant. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 and LITEMPY-13 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings are held once each week at pre-arranged times and places, well away from the target area. Occasionally emergency meetings are called, by phone, if special coverage is desired. FERNALD also meets LIKMPTY-4 to exchange films and prints. These meetings are held weekly at pre-arranged times and places. FERNALD can change meeting plans by calling LIEMPTY-4 directly by telephone. In addition, LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station through which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). The Station case officer maintains weekly clandestine contact with FERNALD in order to manage the operation and collect the product.

Coordination:

Ambassador McBride has not been briefed on Project LIEMPTY.

Future Plans:

1. The surveillance units are expected to continue to produce valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and visual surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations, and habit patterns of persons frequenting the Soviet Embassy, including Soviet officials. Operational procedures and the project mechanism will continue as it has in the past, except that Bruce H. FERNALD, a new principal agent, will be in charge of the operation (see Changes, paragraph 2).

2. The Project does not include an up-dated plan for emergency contact during violent action or government overthrow. The Station has been requested to prepare an updated emergency contact plan and submit it to Headquarters in the first FY 1971 quarterly progress report.

Costs:

1. General: $23,635 are requested for FY 1971. It is requested that the project be amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY-19.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIEMPTY is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $40,000. Funds for the FY 1970 amendment will be absorbed in the current WH Division's finance allocation.

3. Project Budget:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
Raymond H. GERENDE Salary	$ 6,500	$ -0-	$ -0-
LIEMPTY-4 Salary	2,400	2,640	2,640
LIEMPTY-9 Salary	4,320	4,752	4,752
LIEMPTY-10 Salary	4,224	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-11 Salary	2,736	-0-	-0-
LIEMPTY-13 Salary	1,836	1,690	1,690
LIEMPTY-14 Salary	1,824	2,006	2,006
LIEMPTY-26 Salary	672	739	739
LIEMPTY-27 Salary	1,728	1,901	1,901
LICALLA Safehouse Rent (MEXI-03)	1,248	1,373	1,373
LILYRIC Safehouse Rent (MEXI-132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
Safehouse Utilities	1,100	1,200	1,300
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI-137)	960	-0-	-0-
MV-2823* and 2947 Maintenance	1,200	600	600
Property Maintenance and Replacement	500	500	500
Photographic and Other Supplies	1,000	1,000	1,000
Christmas Bonuses	2,140	2,354	2,354
LIEMPTY-19 Termination Bonus	2,500	-0-	-0-
GERENDE Termination Bonus	10,000	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	$49,468	$23,635**	$23,735

*MV-2823 to be sold in FY 1970 and not replaced.
**Decrease from FY 1970 figure due to GERENDE termination. His replacement is covered under Project AEMAGNIFY.

4. **Foreign Currency:** There is no special need for foreign currency. No non-CIA funds are used.

5. Commitments: Christmas bonuses to all agents totaling $2,354 for FY 1971, and termination pay in an amount to be determined by the agents record and length of service.

6. Funding: Funds are hand-carried from the Station case officer to FERNALD, and from FERNALD to the sub-agents. The transfer of funds takes place under clandestine meeting conditions, and appropriate security measures are always taken.

7. Accountability: FERNALD accounts in detail to his case officer, who in turn submits receipts to the Station and certifies that funds were spent to cover expenses for which it was intended.

8. Annexes: None

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

FROM: WH/1/Robert Hazen

EXTENSION: 4167

NO.:

DATE: 10 April 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1		10 Apr 10	cmg	1-2: Please take the extra FY 70 funds from Project LIARNICA. cmg
2. C/WH/B&F	10 APR 1970			
3. C/WH/LOG	4/13	4/13		
4. C/WH/SS		4-13-70		
5. SB/X/WH			✓	FY 70 FUNDS AVAILABLE
6. C/WH/RE		4/15	m	Funds included in the FY 71 Ops Program.
7. C/WH/FI	15 APR 1970			6-7 Not applicable
8. C/WH/Plans	21 APR 1970	4/21		
9. C/WHD	21 APR 1970		J. H.	
10. WH/FI	22 APR 1970			
11. DFS/B6/FI 21 APR 1970	28 MAY 1970			Field informed and copy sent via HMM-W-17950.
12.				
13. WH/FI 303113	[illegible]			
14. WH/1				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO:
NPS/BG/FI-CI
Projects
3 C 43

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FUNDS:
FY 70 Amendment $10,498
FY 71 Renewal $23,635

CASE OFFICER: Jack Barry

EXTENSION: 4167

ROOM: 3 E 05

RECEIVED DDP/PG: 23 Apr 70

FORWARDED: 23 Apr 70

DEADLINE:

RETURNED:

DIVISION: WH

STATION: Mexico City

TARGET AREA: Mexico

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS	X	CCS	X	OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT		-				NSP
X	AMENDMENT		DCI		/D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable operational support project. The Staff desires to be kept informed on all security developments and repercussions resulting from the divorce problems of Gerende (P) and his wife. The Staff urges the Station to continue its all-our efforts to keep this divorce out of the courts.

CI STAFF DIV.
DATE 12 MAY 1970

DATE: 11 June 1970

REVIEWING OFFICER:

FORM 8-67 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20)

19 MAY 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

1. WH Division requests renewal of Mexico City Station's Operational Support Project, LIEMPTY, for $23,635 for Fiscal Year 1971 and a $10,498 amendment for FY 1970 to cover termination payments to a former Principal Agent and his wife. Last year LIEMPTY was approved for $38,970. One agent termination and the transfer of the cost of a mobile surveillance unit to another project are responsible for the reduced FY 1971 request.

2. LIEMPTY supports a visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It includes a Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE (P), and 6 subagents who maintain two separate safehouses, one in front and one in the rear of the Soviet Embassy, from which anyone entering or leaving the Embassy can be observed and photographed. The various members of the team handle and service the photographic equipment, develop and print photographs, keep observation reports and logs, including the arrival and departure of target persons, and maintain the two safehouses mentioned above.

3. This project does not provide positive intelligence, except incidentally. It is designed to furnish a running account, both photographic and in writing, of all Soviet Embassy personnel and their visitors arriving at, or leaving, the Embassy. Photographs taken by LIEMPTY personnel were used to produce an updated "mugbook" on Soviet officials in Mexico which has been loaned to other US security agencies for operational use in activities targeted against Soviet services in Mexico City. LIEMPTY agents also provided information which enabled the Station to identify the companions of known KGB officials, to identify the habit patterns of new arrivals at the Soviet Embassy and provided a wealth of other information of operational value concerning Soviet Embassy activities.

4. A security problem, resulting in a Station decision to restrict the activities of GERENDE, place him on half pay, and replace him with a career agent (a valuable asset who

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

also handles SB operations) arose during the project year. GERENDE has been having marital difficulties which may end in divorce. Along with other incompatible features of the marriage, which have resulted in numerous family fights, there have been long, bitter and violent arguments as to who will have custody of their 4 children and concerning a monetary settlement. The Station has become involved in these altercations because GERENDE's wife is knowledgeable of his CIA relationship and could, if she chose to do so, expose him as an agency employee. She has promised to keep quiet but there is no assurance that she will do so. In view of the risk involved, should GERENDE's wife expose his agency relationship and in view of the fact that, despite his 15 years of service and his undisputed ability and experience, other unfavorable qualities militate against his retention, the Station is considering terminating GERENDE. It is proposed to pay him a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years of service in accordance with Mexican law and his wife $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her quiet. After discussion with the desk, FI Staff believes that, if GERENDE is paid the $10,000 termination money, it should not be given to him in one lump sum but should be paid on a monthly basis, the amount per month to be determined by the Station, thus eliminating the possibility of his squandering it all at once and possibly coming back for more of the same. The same procedure should be followed in the $2,500 payment to his wife. In both cases at least an element of control is assured in that both GERENDE and his wife will know that continued receipt of their monthly payments will depend upon their continued loyalty to the agency. In the meantime, we feel this man, whose morale, and ability have been seriously affected by his marital strife, given time, can perhaps be rehabilitated and once again become a valuable Station asset. This would ensure his continued loyalty and give him an income out of which to pay his alimony. Aside from the foregoing there were no other problems, security or otherwise. All meetings between the case officer and the new Principal Agent are held under secure conditions, or more often if necessary, at prearranged dates, times and places. Meetings between the P/A and the subagents are held under similar conditions. The Station has been requested to submit an updated emergency recontact plan to be included in the first FY 1971 quarterly program report for this project.

5. Agents' salaries, safehouse rentals, motor vehicle maintenance and travel, property maintenance and Christmas bonuses will total $23,635. Despite the security aspects related to the marital difficulties of the erstwhile P/A,

this is an excellent operation which has been described by the Station as representing a highly effective and highly useful support mechanism. SB Division has stated that, although relatively inexpensive, it is a very worthwhile and valuable project. FI Staff recommends approval with the stipulation that the recommendation with respect to payment of termination bonuses to GERENDE and his wife be carried out.

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 2
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE [illegible] 70

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION (BASE) [illegible]

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT [illegible]

FAN [illegible]

TYPE OF ACTION

PERIOD OF ACTION [illegible] TO [illegible] 70

AMOUNT $ —

NEW ___

RENEWAL ___

EXTENSION ___

TERMINATION ___

AMENDMENT ___

OTHER ✓*

PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR 38970

TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL [illegible]

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE 500

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE [illegible]

* Funding reduced to $36500

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Jacobs

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FUNDING

NO. 1
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE [illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION ~~(BASE)~~ Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT LIEMPTY

FAN 0135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION

PERIOD OF ACTION [illegible] TO [illegible]

AMOUNT $ [illegible]

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	-
RENEWAL	✓	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	[illegible]
EXTENSION			
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	530
AMENDMENT		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE	[illegible]
OTHER			

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIEMPTY

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Al Malone — EXTENSION 6954
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED $ 38,970	FY 1970	AMOUNT $38,970
		196	

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1969 TO 30 June 1970

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 0135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG (Signed) E. M. [illegible]

DATE 1[illegible] AUG 1969

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	MPS/BG

FORM 849 6-66 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(3)

SECRET

5 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG

SUBJECT : FY 1970 Renewal of Project LIEMPTY for $38,970

1. Project LIEMPTY, now in its eleventh year, is the Mexican Station's operation which provides visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy from safehouses at the front entrance and back of the building, as well as from a mobile unit. All Soviet personnel and their visitors coming to the Embassy are photographed. From 1 November 1967 to 31 December 1968, approximately 21,367 photographs were taken and thousands of pages of surveillance reports were completed by personnel in this project. SB Division is pleased with the quantity and quality of the photographs and the Station finds them useful for operational purposes against the SB target. During the past year several U.S. citizens entered the Soviet installation in Mexico City and their photographs were identified by the FBI. There is a good relationship between the Station and the FBI in Mexico City and appropriately sterilized photographs are passed locally.

2. There have been no significant security problems.

3. The only changes in the project have been the elimination of one of the safehouses, which was used as an observation post, and termination of the agent who attended it. No real loss resulted from this change since the safehouse was so located that photographs taken from it overlapped those taken from another safehouse. The agent who serviced the facility was getting too old to do an efficient job and was terminated amicably. Also during the past year a new agent was added to the project.

4. Total funds requested for FY 1970 are $38,970. Salaries and legally required bonuses for nine agents come to $30,080; safehouse rental and maintenance amounts to $6,188; maintenance of two vehicles, $1,200; and photo and operational expenses, $1,500. FY 1969 approval was for $43,520 and estimated obligations for this period are $43,500. A new, $5,000 vehicle was purchased in FY 1969 and none is needed in FY 1970 which accounts for the reduction in costs for the present year.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. Project LIEMPTY contributes substantially to the Mexican Station's SB effort. The occasional identification of U.S. nationals in contact with the Soviets could have an important bearing on National Security. The operation is handled by an experienced and capable, outside contract agent under the direction of a Station officer which provides good security and personnel economy. It is a well managed and productive operational support mechanism necessary to Station operations. FI Staff recommends approval.

Peer de Silva

Peer de Silva
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO:
MPS/BG/FI-CI
Projects
3 C 43

PROJECT LIEMPTY	FUNDS $38,970		
CASE OFFICER Al Malone	EXTENSION 6954	ROOM 3 E 04	RECEIVED DDP/PG 27 May 69 FORWARDED 27 May 69
DIVISION WH	STATION Mexico	TARGET AREA MEXICO CITY	DEADLINE RETURNED

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS	X	CCS	X	OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT						OPSER/P
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (Not to go forward to the Division)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (To go forward to the Division)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable operational support project.

CC SENT DIV.
DATE 10 July 69

DATE 10 July 1969

REVIEWING OFFICER

FORM 8-67 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

50-6-74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH One	DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Al Malone	DATE 4 April 69
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E04 · BUILDING Hqs.	TEL. EXT. RED 9041 BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	for W. J. Kaufman	4/4/69	4/4/69	✓	
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	4/7	4/7		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson		10 Apr 69		✓
C/WH/FI	James B. Noland		18 April 69		
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	21 APR 1969	20/4		
C/WHD	William V. Broe	12 MAY 1969	24 MAY 1969		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
SB/X/WH	L. MAESTRES	14-4	14-4		✓
C/FI Staff		5 JUN 1969	5 JUN 1969	✓	
CI Staff	/S/ F. W. Hughes		10 Jul 69		
CCS/PRG	/S/ Walter M. Pillsbury		5 Jun 69		
OPSER/P	/S/ Gerard Droller		28 May 69		
C/MPS/BG		11 Aug 69	11 Aug 69		

ALL FUTURE ACTIONS OF THIS PROJECT REQUIRE APPROVAL OF DD/P OR ADD/P

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
			196	$
1 July 1969	30 June 1970	$ 38,970	1970	$ 38,970

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	15 Aug 69

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

2[illegible] JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal (FY 1970)

1. Renewal is requested for the LIEMPTY Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 (FY 1970) in the amount of $38,970. Funds are available in WH Division. $45,000 was programmed for FY 1970.

2. LIEMPTY is a project supporting Soviet operations of the Mexico City Station. It provides for two basehouses, a photo surveillance vehicle, and personnel for photographic and visual surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. Presently, two fixed surveillance points near the Embassy provide the location from which the photographs are taken and observers are stationed. One basehouse is adjacent to the rear of the Embassy, where Soviet officials meet, play and work. The other basehouse is across the street from the front of the Embassy and gives a direct view of every person entering or leaving. There is also a mobile photographic unit (a VW van) which is now used in support of all Mexico City Station operations and in conjunction with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team (used primarily against Soviet targets). Raymond H. GERENDE, an indigenous contract agent, is the principal agent of the operation and meets daily with the basehouse keepers and subagents.

3. LIEMPTY contributes significantly to the Station's Soviet operations program and is considered an essential element of the Station's support apparatus. During the period 1 November 1967 through 31 December 1968, approximately 21,367 photographs were taken. In response to a request to SB Division for an evaluation of the project, the following comment was received: "There are few such sources of high resolution photographs of Soviets, especially giving good side views. These photos are welcomed by SB Division since they furnish a steady flow of up-to-date identity data..." The photos are useful to the Station in confirming the identities of Soviet personnel and visitors to the

Embassy, some of whom are U. S. citizens. During the past year, several of these U. S. citizens were identified with the help of the photos (which were passed to the FBI). Furthermore, the movements and habits of the Soviets are studied, and more knowledge is acquired on their friends and associates, especially Mexican nationals. This information is useful in target studies. For example, the senior TASS representative, a known KGB officer, is a recruitment target. He is under intensive operational scrutiny for leads developed from knowledge of his activities and contacts. LIEMPTY support is an integral part of this current developmental activity.

4. During the past year, one of the three basehouses was closed, leaving two, and the agent attending it was terminated. This was done because the agent was becoming less effective with age, and because there was some overlap between the photos taken from this basehouse and those of another. The termination was amicable, and the working hours of the personnel of the other basehouse were extended slightly. Another agent was also hired to help. This new agent is of the same family as the rest of the personnel occupying the basehouse, and no additional security risks are anticipated from this addition.

5. There have been no security or administrative problems. The Station and GERENDE are constantly on the alert for any sign that the Soviets are aware of the surveillance activities. While it is quite possible that the Soviets are aware of the surveillance, so far indications are that they are at least not fully aware, since no effort is made by them to avoid being photographed, even when having meetings with contacts in the rear of the Embassy.

6. Approval is recommended of this valuable operational support project.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

LIEMPTY Project Renewal for FY 1968

FROM: WH/1/Nancy Perkins

EXTENSION: 6954

NO.

DATE: 13 December 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1				
2. C/WH/B&F		12/28		FY 68 FUNDS AVAILABLE Project has 2 vehicles on TVA. If "rental of vehicles" is on a continuing basis exceeding 90 days, will require additional slot on TVA. DWS To the best of branch knowledge, rental of vehicles would be on an ad hoc, short term basis. NP.
3. C/WH/Log C/WH/Support	2 Jan 68	1/2		
4. SB/O/~~QUH~~ SB.0001 C/WH/RE	3 Jan 68 8 JAN 1968			
5. C/WH/4/FI	12 JAN 1968			
WH/EXO	23 JAN 1968			
6. C/WHD	29 JAN 1968		E	
7. WH/FI	30 [illegible]			
8. MPS/BG/FI	30 JAN 1968			
9. WH/FI 3D3113	14 [illegible] 1968			
10. WH/1/Nancy Perkins				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT [illegible]

☐ CA
☒ FI CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION	
	NEW PROJECT
	AMENDMENT
X	RENEWAL
	TERMINATION
	EXTENSION
	OTHER

AREA

DIVISION WH

BRANCH WH/1

DESK Mexico

CASE OFFICER Nancy Perkins

EXTENSION 6954

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 December 1967 TO 30 June 1969

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED $ 69,725

FY	AMOUNT
1968	826,205
1969	43,520

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 8135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE MPS/BG

DATE [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1		1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	4	CASE OFFICER	[illegible]	MPS/BG

FORM 8-66 849 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(5)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH One · DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Nancy Perkins · DATE 21 Dec 67
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3B 4403 · BUILDING Hqs · TEL. EXT. RED 9041 · BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES		MEMO ATTACHED	
		IN	OUT	YES	NO
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman		21 Dec 67		
C/WH/B&F	Elliott C. Want	12/27	[illegible]		✓
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson		2 Jan 68		✓
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar		[illegible]		
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	JAN 1968	27/1/68		
C/WHD	William V. Broe by	29 JAN 1968	30 JAN 1968		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES		MEMO ATTACHED	
		IN	OUT	YES	NO
SB/O/WH	Jonathan S. Hanke	3 Jan 68	3 Jan 68		✓
FI Staff	/s/Robert E. Anderson		8 May 68		
CI Staff	/s/Frank W. Hughes		26 Feb 68		
C/MPS/BG			9 May 68		

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Dec 67	30 June 69	$ 69,725	1968	$ 26,205
			1969	$ 43,520

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	10 May 68

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

SECRET

Fi LIEMPTY - DIP

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

PROJECT LIEMPTY	FUNDS $69,725 (12 mos)		RETURN TO: NPS/BG/FI-CI Projects 3 C 43
CASE OFFICER Nancy Perkins	EXTENSION 6954	ROOM 3 B 4403	RECEIVED DDP/PG 1/30 FORWARDED 1/30 DEADLINE 2/13 RETURNED
DIVISION WH	STATION Mexico City	TARGET AREA Mexico	

ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL		REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS		CCS		OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/INT						
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/0						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable project. The Staff strongly urges that the Station continue to be constantly alert for any Sov. interest in the project's agents and installations and in particular any Sov. investigation or activities against same--also, Station contingency plans should be formulated to cope with such Sov. interest or activities.

CC SENT DIV.

DATE 27 Feb 65

DATE	REVIEWING OFFICER

FORM 8-67 526 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI
8 May 68

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT : LIEMPTY WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal (19 mos.) 1 Dec 67 - 30 Jun 69

PURPOSE : An operational support project providing three basehouses and a mobile surveillance unit to monitor primarily the Soviet Embassy, its personnel and its visitors, by physical and photographic surveillance.

BACKGROUND: The project covers three properties near the Soviet Embassy (two in front of the Embassy's sole entrance and one behind the garden) from which visual and photographic surveillance is carried out. It also covers a darkroom and a mobile photographic truck. Some of the project personnel are used at times for miscellaneous support tasks such as servicing postal boxes and for counter-surveillance and other protective services.

PROGRESS: During the past year the project provided nearly all of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in the Station's operations against the Soviet Embassy and its personnel. SB Division says, "This rather unique operation has unquestionably made a major contribution to the increasingly effective Soviet Operations program of the Mexico Station."

The project produces primarily operational data and counterintelligence information. It provides leads, evidence of which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy and which ones have been away, who has used which car, who has been talking to whom or going out of the building with whom. (One photograph from this project was ✓ used in the Warren Commission Report.)

FUNDS : $69,725 (19 mos.) (Programmed FY 69 $46,000)

	FY 68 (7 mos.)	FY 69
Salaries (9) and bonuses	$19,475	$32,020
Vehicle maintenance	1,165	2,000
Rent and utilities	4,665	8,000
Equipment	300	500
Operational expenses	600	1,000
	$26,205	$43,520

SECRET

SECRET

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 66 - 30 Nov 67	$45,000
	1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66	41,500
	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS: FI and CI Staffs concur.

SECRET

8 NOV 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

1. WH Division requests renewal of LIEMPTY for the 19-month period 1 December 1967 through 30 June 1969 in the amount of $69,725. While this represents a slight reduction on a pro rata basis from the $45,000 for which LIEMPTY was approved for the 12-month period starting 1 December 1966, it reflects a proportionately modest increase in cost for the 19-month renewal period over the estimated total disbursement of $40,130 for the past project year. This will provide for small salary increases to meet the rising cost of living for certain of the agents involved in the project who have not received raises in some time as well as for slightly higher rental fees for the various basehouses. The project, now in its tenth year, is designed primarily to provide for the collection of operational information on the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, including the identification and movements of its personnel and visitors. To this end, LIEMPTY provides for the maintenance and exploitation of three basehouses for fixed visual and photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and a mobile basehouse in the form of a panel truck used for mobile photography against the Polish Embassy, leaders and meeting sites of local communist parties, and other targets of opportunity. An important corollary objective of LIEMPTY is operational support in the form of countersurveillance for Agency personnel and operations, including those of other bases and stations as the needs and requirements of the Mexico Station permit. The funds requested include $43,520 for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 and an additional $26,205 to cover the period 1 December 1968 through 30 June 1969. The latter funds are asked for in a supplemental request to put the project on a fiscal year basis.

2. A long-term contract agent and eight other support agents are involved in the management and operation of the

LIEMPTY facilities and in surveillance activities directed at the primary Soviet target. Some of these agents are used also in dark room photographic processing, letter drop, and, on occasion, moving surveillance activities.

3. This project is only part of the complex of Mexico City Station instruments for meeting requirements from a number of U.S. agencies, including the FBI. It is clearly an effective, well-managed support operation serving important needs.

4. No major or significant changes in LIEMPTY personnel or operational techniques have been introduced nor have there been any known incidents adversely affecting the security of the project or its personnel since the previous project renewal period. As a unilateral operational support effort, LIEMPTY continues to be a most useful station asset supporting a number of station activities. In spite of small increases in costs as discussed above, the project is considered to be holding the line on cost and personnel.

5. The objectives of project LIEMPTY are in direct support of priority A objectives 1, 2, and 4 of the current Operating Directive for Mexico. It is considered by SB Division to have made significant contributions to the Station's well developed, high priority Soviet Operations Program. During the past year the various LIEMPTY basehouse installations produced valuable information in the form of photographic coverage and physical surveillance reports on the daily movements, personal associations and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest. In numerous instances this coverage confirmed the specific intelligence service connections of Soviet officers in the Embassy. Often the identities of Mexicans and nationals of other countries in contact with the Soviets were established. The mobile panel truck unit was exploited regularly to provide information on not only the Soviets but also the Cuban target as well as local Communist Party targets.

Glenn Fields
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

14-00000

LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWALS
THROUGH FY 1968

(RENEWALS FOR FY 1969 AND
FY 1970 ARE IN PROJECT
RENEWAL FILE)

SECRET

MPS/BG/FI
11 Jan 67

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIEMPTY . WH - Mexico City

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal 1 Dec 66 - 30 Nov 67

PURPOSE: Provides stationary surveillance against the Soviet Embassy and a mobile photographic basehouse which is used primarily against the Polish Embassy and local Communist party leaders.

PROGRESS: Three basehouses (LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA) provide coverage of both the front and rear of the Soviet Embassy. Throughout the past renewal period each operational component contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on the Station. In the first nine-month period approximately 17,000 individual frames of operational photographs were provided from the fixed basehouses. These served to confirm the identities of Embassy personnel and their visitors and provided detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest. The mobile unit (LIENTRAP) provided over 1,000 individual photographs. Of particular value were photographs of local and exile Communist leaders. Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continued in the role as principal agent for Project LIEMPTY. His overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY project case officer.

PROBLEMS: In mid 1966 LICOWL/1, who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy, reported that a Soviet official had approached him and asked him to inform on his neighbors. Reportedly the Soviet named LIEMPTY/6 of the LIMITED basehouse by name and also asked about the tenants of the building housing LILYRIC. However, in view of LICOWL's previous history of lying, it is difficult to assess exactly what the Soviets requested and just what LICOWL/1 may have told them. The Station is still looking into this development.

SECRET

FUNDS : $45,000 $29,020 in FY 67 $15,980 in FY 68

Programmed for $45,000 FY 67

Salaries:	
GERENDE	$ 7,000
Others (8)	23,900
Vehicle maintenance (2)	5,000
Rent and utilities	7,600
Equipment maintenance and replacement	500
Miscellaneous operational expenses	1,000

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66	$41,500
	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 61 - 30 Nov 62	49,500
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF COMMENTS: FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

CI STAFF: Strongly urges the Station to continue its close monitoring of Soviet interest in the installation buildings and attempts to obtain information on sensitive project personalities. The Station should devise necessary contingency plans of action to eliminate any security hazards if it is determined that the Soviets are intensifying such efforts and could be getting "too close" to the project installations, personalities and activities.

14-00000

SECRET

8 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: MPS/BG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

1. This action seeks renewal of Project LIEMPTY covering Mexico City Station's stationary surveillance basehouses aimed against the Soviet Embassy. The activity will cost $45,000 for the period 1 December 1966 to 30 November 1967. Approval is recommended.

2. Project LIEMPTY has been in being for nine years. At present it supports three stationary basehouses near the Soviet Embassy and a mobile photographic basehouse. These are used to obtain photographic coverage and logs of Soviet movements and visitors to the Soviet Embassy. The mobile basehouse is used also to cover meeting sites of the local communist parties and targets of opportunity.

3. A principal agent and eight agents are used in the LIEMPTY activity. The agents are variously employed as basehouse keepers, photo lab technicians and surveillance operators.

4. Security has been generally good although one incident occurred in mid 1966 which may have some impact on the future security of the operation. An approach was made to an agent of the Station, who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy, to report on his neighbors among whom are some of the LIEMPTY agents. One, LIEMPTY-6, was mentioned by name. The Station is watching this development carefully.

4. The LIEMPTY activity proved its worth during the past year when check was made on conflicting stories told by two Station agents. The LIEMPTY surveillance reports proved that one of the agents was lying about his contacts with the Soviets. LIEMPTY is well managed and continues to serve an important Mexico City Station need.

Robert E. Andersen
ROBERT E. ANDERSEN
Acting Chief
Foreign Intelligence

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: **LIEMPTY**

	TYPE OF ACTION	X FI CI ☐ CA ☐ OTHER	
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1967-68	BRANCH: One	DESK:
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla	DATE: 18 Nov. '66
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 332 · BUILDING: Ames · TEL. EXT.:	RED: · BLACK: 3654

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	[illegible]	
C/WH/B&F	~~Robert Carter~~ Robert D. Carter	9/25/66	
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	6/10-66	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	12/12/66	
C/WHD	William V. Broe by J. [illegible]	12/10/66	

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
FI Staff	-s/Robert E. Andersen	6 Jan 67		X		6 Jan 67
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes	16 Dec 66				
C/MPS/BG		13 Jan 67				

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 December 66	30 Nov 67	$ 45,000.00	1967	$ 29,020
			1968	$ 15,980

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
A/DDP		1[illegible]

FORM 2-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

(5)

SECRET

10 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for a total of $45,000: $29,020 for FY 1967 and $15,980 for FY 1968. The Project is included in the FY 1967 Operational Program for $45,000. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. LIEMPTY covers stationary surveillance basehouses targeted against the Soviet Embassy. These basehouses provide photographic coverage and logs. Two of the basehouses (LIMITED and LILYRIC) cover the activity in the front of the Embassy, and LICALLA provides coverage of the back courtyard area. The LIEMPTY project also covers a mobile photographic basehouse in the form of a panel truck which is used against the Polish Embassy where we have no permanent surveillance basehouse, and against other targets of opportunity.

3. The value of Soviet Embassy photographic coverage during the past year was proven when the logs maintained by LILYRIC were used to double check on an operation involving LIRUSTIC-1 and LICOWL-1 who had told conflicting stories of certain events concerning the activity of some Soviets. Through the surveillance reports of the LIEMPTY Project against the Soviet Embassy, it was proven without a doubt that LICOWL-1 (who had just taken a polygraph without apparent deception) was lying about his contacts with the Soviets.

4. The LIENTRAP mobile photographic basehouse was targeted against leaders and meeting sites of the local Communist parties as well as other targets of opportunity, particularly exile Communist leaders now residing in Mexico. LIENTRAP provided up-dated identification

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GROUP 1
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declassification

photographs of Communist officers which are of value to both the JMTIGER program and the Station's recruitment/penetration program. The LIENTRAP personnel also regularly service twenty-one postal accommodation addresses used by the Mexico City Station.

5. One development which may affect the security of the LIEMPTY basehouses of LIMITED and LILYRIC occurred in mid 1966 when LICOWL-1 (who owns a small store near the Soviet Embassy) reported that a Soviet official, AEQUALITY-1, had approached him and requested him to inform on his neighbors. Reportedly the Soviet named LIEMPTY-6 (of the LIMITED basehouse) by name and also indicated all the tenants (unnamed) of the new building which now houses LILYRIC. The Soviet pinpointed the building by saying the one being built by a person who fit perfectly the description of LIMOUSINE. LICOWL-1 did not indicate that the Soviet reflected any interest in LIMOUSINE. The occupants of the LILYRIC basehouse were not mentioned. LICOWL-1 indicated to his Station contact that the only person he really suspected in the neighborhood was LIEMPTY-6 (of LIMITED) who doesn't go to work, is always typing, lives comfortably, and owns a car. He claims to have heard it rumored that LIEMPTY-6 was working for the Americans. (Since LIMITED is equipped with a radio and tips off the Station's surveillance team when it is used against Soviet targets, Headquarters has already assumed that the Soviets have identified this basehouse.) LICOWL-1 also listed several persons named by the Soviet who had no connection whatsoever with CIA.

6. The Station instructed LICOWL-1 not to become an informant on his neighbors. According to LICOWL-1, he therefore told AEQUALITY-1 he did not have time to collect the information the Soviet wanted. However, in view of the lies LICOWL-1 has been caught in, it is difficult to assess exactly what the Soviets asked of LICOWL-1 and just what LICOWL-1 may have told the Soviets. The Station is still looking into this development.

7. WHD recommends renewal of this Project.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

PREVIOUS PROJECT ACTION

SECRET

DDP/FG/FI
9 Feb 66

PROJECT BRIEFING

PROJECT: LIEMPTY — WH - Mexico

ACTION : ADD/P approval of renewal — 1 Dec 65 - 30 Nov 66

PURPOSE: To provide support for mobile and stationary photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and a dispatching base for a physical surveillance team.

PROGRESS: Assets included under the project include three basehouses which provide front and rear views of the Soviet Embassy, and a panel truck equipped for spot photo coverage. Raymond H. GERENDE (p), principal agent, meets the basehouse keepers regularly, maintains regular contact with the mobile photo unit and with the developing and processing base. He also performs many other support functions.

The photographs from all these operations have been of value to the Station in operational planning, for identification by surveillance teams, for mug books, and for Headquarters permanent files. The Station believes that this operation is essential to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the RMD.

FUNDS : $41,500 — $25,520 in FY 66 — $15,980 in FY 67

(Programmed for $50,000 in FY 66)

Salaries	
GERENDE	$ 7,000
Basehouse keepers (3)	10,100
Mobile unit operators (2)	7,000
Lab personnel (2)	3,600
Cut-out	2,200
Vehicle maintenance (2)	2,000
Rent and utilities	7,600
Equipment maintenance	1,000
Miscellaneous ops expenses	1,000

SECRET

PREVIOUS APPROVALS:	1 Dec 64 - 30 Nov 65	$45,300
	1 Dec 63 - 30 Nov 64	49,700
	1 Dec 62 - 30 Nov 63	49,900
	1 Dec 61 - 30 Nov 62	49,500
	1 Dec 60 - 30 Nov 61	53,000
	1 Dec 58 - 30 Nov 59	95,380

STAFF COMMENTS : FI and CI Staffs concur in renewal.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	CT CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION	XX	FI/CI		CA		OTHER
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere				
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City				
Y	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH 1		DESK Mexico		
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER C. Bustos-Videla			DATE	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. GH-43	BUILDING Hdqs	TEL. EXT.	RED 9325	BLACK 4506

CONCURRENCIES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	11/29	
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	2 Dec 65	
WH/SS	W. E. Brooks	12/3	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar Thomas Polgar	16/12	
WH/EXO	Donald Marelius	28/12/65	
C/WHD	William V. Broe	30/12/65	

CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED		
				YES	NO	DATE
FI Staff	-s/Robert E. Andersen	4 Feb 66		X		4 Feb 66
CI Staff	-s/Frank W. Hughes	7 Jan 66				
C/DDP/PG		11 Feb 66				

APPROVAL

PERIOD		AMOUNT OF ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
FROM	TO			
1 Dec 1965	30 Nov 1966	$ 41,500.00	1966 1967	$ 25,520.00 $ 15,980.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY Assistant Deputy Director for Plans	SIGNATURE	DATE 11 FEB 1966

FORM 6-65 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

4 FEB 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY Renewal

1. FI Staff recommends approval of the renewal of Project LIEMPTY. This project, costed at $41,500., supports the following Mexico City assets: a panel truck used for mobile photography, three base houses for fixed photographic surveillance, a contract agent manager and eight support agents. One of the base homes is used as a control point to dispatch a surveillance team. (The latter is not a part of the project, however.)

2. The LIEMPTY target is the Soviet Embassy and Soviet activities in Mexico City. LIEMPTY is part of the complex of station instruments by means of which requirements from a variety of U.S. agencies are met. One of the sites provided pictures later used in the Warren Commission Report, and the publication of the report created a security hazard. The Station moved the site and it is now back in operation.

3. The possibility of Soviet intercept of radio commo to the surveillance team has been carefully weighed recently by SR, the desk, O/C and TSD. The decision to accept the risk appears to have been taken with due deliberation.

4. This is clearly an effective, well-managed operation serving an important need. We recommend renewal without hesitation.

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

30 DEC 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Renewal Request

1. Renewal is requested for the LIEMPTY Project for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for a total of $41,500; of this amount, $25,520 should be alloted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967. This Project has been programmed in FY 1966 for $50,000. The last Project Renewal was approved at $45,300. Funds are available within WH Division.

2. The security of this Project appears to be good. The LIENTRAP photo truck was repainted a different color in January 1965 to preserve the security of this vehicle which operates extensively in the same general areas. There have been no apparent ramifications from the publication of the LIMITED Photograph in the Warren Commission Report in September 1964.

3. LIENTRAP is one of two mobile photo surveillance units at the Station, both of which are used extensively because of the many requirements for spot photo coverage of diplomatic installations, agent meetings, and current identification photos of targets among others.

4. Although there are three stationary photo basehouses under this Project all targeted against the Soviet Embassy, there is very little duplication of effort, and the coverage of this Embassy would be weakened through the termination of any of them. LICALLA covers the rear of the Embassy (garden and parking lot) and is in a unique position to observe informal meetings and activity there. In May 1965 a thorough assessment was made of this basehouse to determine whether an audio installation could be based here, directed against these garden conversations. It was determined that due to the high incidence of street and other noises, this was not practical. TSD and SR Divisions are conscious of this requirement, however, and if any new equipment is developed which might make this operation more feasible it will be tested. LIMITED and LILYRIC which both cover the front entrance, provide coverage during different parts of the day, and LIMITED also serves as a fixed radio

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

dispatching base for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team.

5. The photographs from all these operations are of value to the Station in their operational planning, for identification by surveillance teams, for mug books, which are often used by surveillance teams and singleton agents in identifying Soviets, and for Headquarter's permanent files.

6. With reference to the FI Staff comment made last year at the time of the Project renewal that the radio dispatching from the LIMITED installation might have made this base a target for the RIS, the problem was discussed in depth with the Office of Communications, TSD, and SR Divisions. The Station has been alert to the Soviet's monitoring capability and they have developed a signaling system and intercar communications system that will leave the LIEMBRACE surveillance cars on the air for a minimum of time, and with limited open conversation. The result of Headquarters and the Station's research on this problem resulted in the conclusion that, if a surveillance team is to operate with automobiles, radios must be used if there is to be efficient surveillance, and regardless of what presently available type of scrambling or coding is used, radio is susceptible to monitoring by the opposition. It was therefore concluded that if the Station is to use the LIEMBRACE team against members of the Soviet installation, LIMITED must continue to be used as the radio dispatching center and the risk factor must be accepted until some new, more secure yet efficient commo system is devised.

7. The reporting on the administration of this Project is handled through regular quarterly progress reports. The appropriate Soviet, CP, or other Case Officers handle the reporting and exploitation of the product. During the past year there were no positive intelligence reports from this Project.

8. Both SR and WH Divisions recommend renewal of this Project.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

ODP 1-0581

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Renewal)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961. The project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support and exploitation of other Mexico City Station operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $53,000 from the DD/P-WH Division budget: $31,900 in fiscal year 1961, and $21,100 in fiscal year 1962, subject to the availability of funds. The amount includes $38,000 compensation for two principal agents, one clerical support agent on an hourly basis, and eleven surveillance and support agents; $7,000 operational expenses (safehouse procurement, post office boxes, rented automobiles, purchase of information, vehicle maintenance, and operational travel); $2,500 replacement, repair and maintenance of photographic equipment; and $5,500 basehouse rental, utilities, and maintenance.

3. The field's renewal request, supported by a covering memorandum of the Division, sets forth accomplishments of the project in the past year in terms of objectives and estimates effectiveness. It is noted that one principal agent, Simon D. CLACKETT (p), resigned in October 1960, and the four-man surveillance team previously handled by him will be transferred to project LITEMPO, consequently being omitted from LIEMPTY in this renewal. Three basehouses continue to be operated under the project: (a) LIMITED, which compiles daily logs on arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation, together with attendance lists of LIMERICK employees, and handles the radio dispatch of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel and targets

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of opportunity. This basehouse also provides photographic coverage, concentrated on visitors. (b) LILYRIC which provides clandestine photographs particularly of visitors to, as well as employees of, the LIMERICK installation, prepares weekly reports on LIMERICK employees and their wives, and reports on license numbers of all cars visiting the installation. (c) LICALLA, which concentrates on photographic coverage of LIMERICK employees and their families, as well as providing observation on the apparent positions and jobs of the target employees, and as well as personnel changes. Additional photographic coverage is provided by the mobile LIENTRAP vehicle. Principal agent Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continues to coordinate basehouse activities; principal agent Oliver G. SCANTLING (p) continues to be an independent asset used to follow-up and exploit operational information on target personnel and installations, to case various installations of interest, to acquire property, etc. SCANTLING has managed the surveillance team being transferred to LITEMPO in the interim following the resignation of CLACKETT. The Station notes that activities at the LICALLA basehouse were suspended in September 1960 as the result of the arrest of a knowledgeable TSD technician in another area and it is not known precisely when it will be possible to resume these operations. The Station believes that the GERENDE segment is now operating under optimum arrangements and SCANTLING will soon be relieved from his interim responsibility for the surveillance team being transferred to LITEMPO and can concentrate more on his investigative and casing activities. It is not planned in the coming year to expand project activities.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components concur in recommending renewal. FI Staff notes the Division's assurance that the transfer of the unilateral surveillance team to LITEMPO will not affect its independent status, and remarks that the current project review presents a clearer picture of the usefulness of the several segments than the previous one.

SECRET

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

S. M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: COP-DD/P 3 FEB 1961
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
FI Memorandum

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For CCG -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

SECRET

25 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/COPS

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

FI Staff recommends renewal, with the assurance of the desk that the transfer of the unilateral surveillance team to LITEMPO will not affect its independent status. This review presents a clearer picture of the usefulness of the several segments than the previous one.

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

SECRET

8 JAN 60

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Renewal)

WH - Mexico

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1959 through 31 November 1960. The project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support and exploitation of other Mexico City operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $84,910 from the DD/P-WH Division operating budget: $48,485 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425 for fiscal 1961, subject to the availability of funds. These sums include $61,910 compensation for five contract agents (three of whom serve as principal agents for segments of the project), and sixteen support agents; $3,500 for vehicle maintenance and commercial carrier travel; $7,500 for operational equipment; $5,000 for maintenance of three safehouses; $2,000 for additional safehouse, post office box, and vehicle rental; $1,000 exchange commodities; $2,000 "key" money, broken contracts, etc.; and $2,000 for the purchase of information, documents, payment of bribes, etc.

3. The attached renewal request, prepared in the Division and supported by a project review prepared in the Field, reviews the activities of the project during the past year and present a detailed breakdown of the funds requested. The project operates in three segments: (a) Contract agent Oliver G. SCANTLING is an independent asset who is used to follow-up and exploit operational information on target personnel and installations, to case various installations of interest, acquire property, etc.; (b) a photographic surveillance team, under principal agent Raymond H. GERENDE, utilizing three houses or apartments and one photo truck; and (c) a physical surveillance team under principal agent Simon D. SLACKETT, consisting of three trained members at the present time. The attached renewal request reviews the activities and accomplishments of the project in terms of these three segments and in relation to project objectives. SCANTLING's contribution to the collection of operational information pertaining to Soviet personnel and installations is regarded by the Station as unique. He also

trained CLACKETT in radio controlled mobile surveillance. SCANTLING also has rendered valuable support to the LITACIT operation having gained entry to the target under a fabricated cover. He has also cased and prepared reports on the LITABLY target in preparation for future operations and performed investigations of numerous other Station targets of opportunity. He investigated many leads from other audio-surveillance operations enabling the Station to maintain current data on various Soviet contacts and resulting in a recruitment attempt which, while unsuccessful, is believed to indicate future potential along this line. He has further been used to develop radio procedures for the mobile teams and to rent various properties in support of other Station operations. The GERENDE segment, using three base houses for photography, produced upwards of 12,000 photographs during the year. One base has recently begun taking motion pictures of Soviet personnel in the course of conversation which have been forwarded to FI/D for possible exploitation by lip reading analysis. This segment also operates the mobile radio surveillance vehicles. A mobile photography surveillance truck has been used during the project year for coverage of various Station targets which do not warrant the establishment of permanent photographic bases. GERENDE has also served to rent post office boxes, hotel rooms, etc., in support of other Station operations. During the past project year CLACKETT, who returned to Mexico in early April 1959 after Headquarters training, spent the following two months being trained by SCANTLING in mobile surveillance techniques. He then undertook training of a four member team which was judged ready for operational use toward the end of the project year. Two additional contract agents, Wilma J. FIORDALISI and Louise J. MACRINO, performed translation and support functions.

4. Appropriate staff components concur in recommending renewal.

(a) CI Staff notes that the CI value of the project is difficult to judge since it appears that much of the material produced remains in the Station for exploitation. However, CI Staff remarks that the value of the project should be increased when the CLACKETT surveillance team enters into active operation. CI Staff suggests that the Station be queried as to the pretext or circumstances under which SCANTLING frequently visits Inez Perada de Moreno, the occupant of the property adjacent to the Soviet installation.

(b) FI/OPS notes that while the project review presents a clear picture of the aims and objectives of the various segments, it does not provide, except in the case of SCANTLING, detailed indication of the value or usefulness of the other segments, particularly the photographic activity. FI/OPS requests that the Station provide such an appraisal during the first quarter of 1960. FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness. FI/OPS notes that, in the absence of further proof of usefulness, the color photography and moving pictures appear to be an unnecessary luxury. FI/OPS commends the careful handling of the CLACKETT segment and requests that the next project action include examples of the team's progress.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented with attention to the staff comments in paragraph 4 above.

W. Lloyd George
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Approved: Richard Helms JAN 8 '60
COP-DD/P Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/K. Brown
For C/CCD -s/F. Youngblood

9 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Purchase of One Automobile and Increase of LIEMPTY TVA by One

1. According to the Project Renewal Request for LIEMPTY from the Mexico City Station, they plan to increase the LIEMPTY surveillance team during the coming year by two agents. To maintain the efficiency of an enlarged team, they will require one additional automobile.

2. It is requested that the TVA for LIEMPTY be increased by one automobile and that the Station be authorized to purchase locally this automobile for use under the LIEMPTY Project.

J.C. King
C/WHD

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SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT LIEMPTY	2. SENIOR STAFF	
	4. AREA	
	A. DIVISION	WHD
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)	B. BRANCH	III
☐ A. NEW TVA	C. DESK	MEXICO
☐ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door used passenger American or foreign		4	5
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)				
(2)	Panel truck		1	1
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		5	6

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER JAMES S. BURWELL James S. Burwell	DIVISION WH/LOG	DATE 11 Dec. 1959	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN. PAUL E. ARNESON	DIVISION WH/SUPPORT	DATE 11 Dec 1959
8. APPROVED			9. AUTHORIZED		
BY DIRECTION OF DDP		DATE 12/1/60	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S		DATE

FORM NO. 1116 TEST
1 NOV 58

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Amendment

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: J. B. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 23 June 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560.00 per year. His last salary increase was granted on 1 September 1957. The date, 18 March 1955, has been suggested by the Station as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits. The Station believes that this benefit will provide GERENDE with the necessary incentive to make KUBARK a career and at the same time will give the Station an additional element of control.

2. As pointed out in the LIEMPTY Project Approval, GERENDE, an indigenous agent, is one of the Station's most valuable assets. He has a responsible full time job as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Money was already allocated in the LIEMPTY Project approval for the salary increase. With the effective date of 18 March 1955, for the termination clause, GERENDE will already have accrued $1,520 (his salary is $4,560 per year) if he should resign today. The LIEMPTY Project, as approved, has sufficient funds to cover this cost if it is necessary to obligate this amount during the present Project year. Therefore, no additional funds are requested.

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

for C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

Approved for Transmittal: RBGomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

Approved: RBGomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

16/VII/59
Date

Attachments:
Folder with past approval
Envelope with true name

Concur: Richard W. Kline
Chief, FI/OPS

Approved:
for Chief, FI

Date: 14 July 59

Senior Staff Coordination
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown

SECRET

SECRET

27 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Foreign Intelligence

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Amendment)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in the WH Division, provides the services of a surveillance activity to support Mexico City operations and is approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. It is presented for your approval of amendment to include the addition of a contract agent, Louise J. MACRINO, to furnish administrative support, and also to formalize a special commitment made to one of the two principal agents, Oliver G. SCANTLING. A contract prepared in the Field and signed by the agent permits the payment of one year's salary to him or his assigned heirs in event of loss of life or total disability if incurred in the performance of duty. This has not previously been included in the project.

2. The LIEMPTY project has authorization for the expenditure of $95,380. No additional funds are required for the amendment. Sufficient funds remain in the project to absorb the salary expenses for MACRINO and funds to cover the extra year's salary for SCANTLING will not be requested until such time as they are needed.

3. Memoranda prepared in the WH Division supporting the request for amendment are attached, summarizing the important factors involved. These detail SCANTLING's performance and provide a resume of MACRINO's past activities in behalf of the Agency.

4. Staff Components have concurred in amendment to Project LIEMPTY.

5. I recommend approval of amendment of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

Benjamin A. G. Fuller
Chief, FI/OPS Division

Approved: THKaramessines
Chief, Foreign Intelligence

30 March 59
Date

Attachment:
Project Outline LIEMPTY

Staff Coordination:
For C/FI/OPS -s/V. Hoffmann
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For DC/CCD/NC -s/F. Youngblood

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Amend LIEMPTY Project to Include a Special Benefit for Oliver G. SCANTLING (ps) and to Include Louise J. MACRINO (ps)

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME J. B. Brady
ROOM 2114 Barton Hall
EXT. 2555 or 3152
DATE 5 March 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to give Oliver G. SCANTLING a special benefit of one year's salary to him or his assigned heirs in the event of loss of life or total disability if incurred in the performance of duty. This benefit was included in a contract prepared in the field and signed by Subject on 15 February 1957. The contract was not submitted to Headquarters for approval until December 1958. The Station and WH Division do not want to delete this benefit from Subject's contract at this time and we feel Subject deserves this benefit.

2. SCANTLING, a civil engineer, is a Mexican citizen, who is 40 years old. He was granted an Operational Approval on 2 December 1954. SCANTLING began his employment with KUBARK as a footman on the LIPSTICK physical surveillance team and gradually became a driver of a surveillance automobile, then team leader. As team leader he was responsible for the operational deployment and administrative direction of the entire LIPSTICK team, three automobiles, four photographic and radio dispatching basehouses and the attendant mobile and stationary radio equipment. He collated the fragmentary surveillance reports into finished intelligence reports for study by the Case Officer. SCANTLING developed into a fine investigator and has obtained information where other Station investigative assets have failed.

3. Almost all of SCANTLING's time now is spent following up leads obtained from telephone intercepts and photographic surveillances. From July through December 1958 he made approaches to individuals performing services for the Soviet Embassy and he made a detailed casing report of the West German Embassy. In addition, he conducted many routine investigations and surveillances. The Station plans to have SCANTLING attempt to recruit the landlord of the proposed basehouse for a LINIMENT (FI/D) operation. SCANTLING no longer handles the surveillance team and the Station plans to continue to use him as an independent asset. SCANTLING has in his possession official credentials of the Federal Security Police (DFS). He has used these credentials in making contacts with targets of various sensitive Headquarters' operations (i.e., LCMAYFOWL).

4. As a graduate engineer who has spent at least ten years in house construction in Mexico, he has been invaluable to the Station in submitting detailed casing reports, including detailed and professional plans of technical targets. He has been commended by TSS for the support role he has played for them. He has submitted several casing reports on the Soviet Embassy and is an unparalleled source of information to the Station for information about the Embassy's construction activities, modifications and reasons for same.

5. For your information there is attached the Station's review of SCANTLING for the period July through December 1958. It is believed you will find this report of interest and further support the justification outlined above for the granting to SCANTLING of the special death and disability benefit. This agent assessment states "Oliver O. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology, and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has a full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent". SCANTLING has excellent cover as half-owner of a local firm which manufactures farm instruments and he represents the high calibre of person which KUBARK requires for the institution of their long-term resident agent program.

6. The LIEMPTY Project (now approved for $95,330) will not be amended at this time to include an extra year's salary for SCANTLING ($4,000). In the event it becomes necessary to fulfill this commitment during the project year, and if the expense cannot be absorbed by the present project authorization, an amendment will be submitted.

7. It is also requested that effective 1 March 1959 the LIEMPTY Project be amended to include Louise J. MACRINO, a Contract Agent, who is a Station support asset. Her OA was reinstated on 8 August 1958 (C-41152). She was formerly included under Project LIFEAT. However, the Station requirements for general translation work increased to the extent that it was necessary to use MACRINO to translate reports other than those originating from LIFEAT. It was therefore decided it would be more appropriate to include her under LIEMPTY. She does typing of reports and non-sensitive translations. She is paid on an hourly basis of $2.00, an estimated yearly salary of $3,500. The Station stated that the present LIEMPTY Project could absorb the expense of her salary for the remainder of the Project year.

Robert M. Dahlgren
R. A. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

R E Gomez
R. E. Gomez, AC/WHD

13 / March / 59
Date

Attachments:
Folder with LIEMPTY Project Approval
Envelope with true names
HMMA 12095 (1 copy) KAPOK

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P 16 JAN 1959

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY (Approval)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for your approval for an initial period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. The project provides for the development of operational information through physical and photographic surveillance operations in support of other Mexico City operations, particularly those targetted at Soviet personnel and installations. Previously these operations were conducted for the most part under Projects LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY. They are incorporated in this new project because of the June 1958 compromise of LIPSTICK and to accomplish a more orderly administration of certain operational support assets.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $95,380 from the DD/P-WH Division operating budget: $65,580 for the current fiscal year and $29,800 in fiscal year 1960, subject to the availability of funds. These estimates include: (a) funds for the compensation of the presently-recruited fifteen action and support agents, six new agents, and two principal agents: Raymond H. GERENDE (p) (LIEMPTY/1, formerly LIPSTICK/20) and Oliver G. SCANTLING (p) (LIEMPTY/2, formerly LIPSTICK/19); (b) funds for the compensation, travel, allowances and Headquarters' training of two contract agents, Simon D. CLACKETT (p) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (p), his wife, who are hereby transferred from Project LIMESA; (c) funds for operational expenses and equipment, including the purchase of four new or used vehicles as replacements for previously authorized vehicles and their maintenance, and a CP vehicle for SCANTLING; (d) the rent, utilities and maintenance of safehouses; and, (e) other appropriate operational expenses.

3. The attached Field Project Outline, a covering memorandum from the Division, and an addendum to the Project Outline, review the personnel assets and facilities transferred from the LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY operations following the partial compromise of LIPSTICK in June 1958 and describe the concept of the physical and photographic surveillance operations to be conducted under this project directed primarily at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. These surveillances provide photographs and other operational data of persons entering and leaving the building or present in the garden area, and through additional foot and mobile surveillances, investigative information concerning their contacts and destinations. Agent personnel, particularly the principal agents, are used also to conduct separate investigations, make recruit-approaches to

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individuals of operational interest, and to rent rooms, and apartments and perform other support activities. The fixed surveillance bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, have been in operation for almost three years without having been in any compromising situations insofar as the Station knows. The LIPSTICK unit, a panel truck equipped with cameras, etc., is considered a particularly valuable asset by the Field. As a replacement for a staff agent, Wilfred O. CLOWER (p), who directed and trained the LIPSTICK surveillance team, the husband and wife team of CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are proposed as qualified individuals to recruit, train, and direct the new LIEMPTY surveillance team and maintain its records. Appropriate notional cover was arranged for them while in their previous project, LIMESA, as they reside in Mexico under true names. One of the principal agents, GERENDE, will have no contact with the new surveillance team, but will be used to conduct special investigations, counter-surveillances, and for other support activities.

4. The CI Staff comments that LIEMPTY provides several types of physical surveillance, all of which provide information of CI interest, and as a support mechanism, a production review is not appropriate or necessary. The CI Staff states further, that with the compromise of the LIPSTICK surveillance team the Mexico City Station lost its only reliable and efficient surveillance team, LIEMPTY representing the Station's effort to replace that asset. Because of the great number of CI targets in Mexico City, the CI Staff believes it is essential that the Station be given the opportunity, through this project, to build another surveillance team capable of operating against sensitive targets. Additionally, the CI Staff believes the case officer should work at devising ostensible sources of incomes for the agents which will stand the scrutiny of friends, relatives and less friendly forces.

5. FI/OPS suggests that the Division consider a gradual reduction of the considerable financial and personnel commitments in this project in view of the favorably developing LIENVOY liaison relationship. FI/OPS believes that a smaller, more manageable support group, with greater Station emphasis on selectivity of tasks and targets could well result in more effective CI and FI productivity.

6. I recommend approval of the project and the transfer of the contract agents as outlined above. The Division is requested to take cognizance of the suggestions of the CI Staff and FI/OPS in the paragraphs above relative to the security and the overall direction of the surveillance activities to make them more efficient.

Benjamin A G Fuller
BENJAMIN A. G. FULLER II
Chief
FI/OPS Division

Thos Karamessines
/ W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

16 JUN 1959
Date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
Addendum to Project Outline

Staff Coordination:
For C/CI Staff -s/R. Brown
For C/FI/OPS -s/V. Hoffmann
C/CCD/MC -s/F. Youngblood

14-00000

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MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere

STATION: Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: J. B. BRADY
ROOM: 2120 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 15 December 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps) under the LIEMPTY Project effective 1 January 1958. No additional funds are required.

2. It is also requested that the LIMESA Project be amended to delete from this Project these two Contract Agents effective 1 January 1958.

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
Charles W. Anderson, WH/FI

for R Gomez
J. C. King, Chief, WHD

16 Dec 1958
Date

Attachments:
Memorandum (in quad)
Envelope with true names

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Request for Amendment to LIEMPTY Project

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps), U. S. citizens and contract agents, under this Project in place of the Staff Agent written into the field project outline. At the same time it is requested that the LIMESA Project be amended to delete these contract agents from the latter project.

2. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are now approved under the LIMESA Project. They were recruited in the United States to occupy a sensitive LIMESA basehouse. Because of the sensitivity of the operation and the equipment to be installed in the basehouse Headquarters decided U. S. citizens should be used. The Station said appropriate documentation and backstopping could be secured for those agents so they could be given false identities under which they could live while they occupied the basehouse.

3. MEXI-2777 (IN 26519), of 14 November 1958, notified Headquarters that security factors and difficulty in obtaining adequate documentation and backstopping precluded the use of U. S. citizens under LIMESA and requested permission to use indigenous agents for this operation. After discussions between John BRADY, Chief of the Mexican desk, with the LIMESA/LIEMPTY Case Officer in Mexico City, and discussions between representatives of FI/D, OC, TSS, and WH at Headquarters, Headquarters concurred in the field's operational decision to use indigenous agents in the LIMESA Project. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI received only a very superficial briefing regarding the LIMESA Project. It is not believed Subject's limited knowledge of this sensitive operation will pose a security hazard.

4. Construction on the LIMEST houses is being kept about two weeks from completion until indigenous agents can be cleared and recruited. The delay in completion is normal because all construction money in Mexico has become extremely tight because of the recent presidential inauguration.

5. The Station believes CLACKETT will be an excellent replacement for Wilfred O. CLOWER (ps), former Staff Agent under Project LIPSTICK, who directed and trained that surveillance team. CLACKETT has shown a remarkable aptitude for clandestine operational activity and surveillance and investigative work in particular. He also is interested and enthusiastic in undertaking this assignment for KUBARK. The Station needs a good bilingual agent to recruit, train, direct, and develop a strong dependable physical surveillance team under LIEMPTY.

6. Clearances and Contacts: CLACKETT was granted a PCSA on 23 July 1958. A POA/CA for use under LIMESA was requested on 19 August 1958. FIORDALISI was granted an OA for use under LIMESA on 14 November 1958. Requests have been submitted to amend their clearances for use under LIEMPTY. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI have signed contracts effective 1 September 1958. The sensitivity of the LIMESA Project required them to leave their young son in

SECRET

the United States. Because of this a special benefit of periodic trips to their home in Arizona was included in their contracts. Under LIMESA their quarters were to be provided. An amendment has been requested to their contracts deleting the special benefit and adding educational and quarters allowances.

7. Motivation and Control: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are extremely patriotic and highly motivated as evidenced in their willingness to undertake the LIMESA Project and be separated from their son. They have indicated they are more than willing to do whatever is requested of them, no matter what personal sacrifices and hardships are required. Their complete livlihood is dependent on their KUBARK income.

8. Tasks: CLACKETT will recruit, train, and direct the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station hopes to develop this team into a major Station support asset. He will receive instructions and direction from the Station Case Officer. FIORDALISI will be used to do all the clerical and administrative work for the LIEMPTY surveillance team.

9. Communication and Contact: CLACKETT will contact the Station Case Officer in a clandestine manner. All necessary security precautions will be taken. CLACKETT will also contact his surveillance agents under a cover which will be determined later by the Station and CLACKETT. In view of his Mexican background, CLACKETT can pass as a Mexican. Details of communication and contact arrangements with KUBARK will be arranged by the Station. Under LIEMPTY CLACKETT will be contacted by the same Case Officer he is now contacted by under LIMESA. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI will be in direct contact with relatives and friends in the United States. The cover company has, until now, been serving as a letter drop and contact point for emergency messages.

10. Cover: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI entered Mexico on United States documentation and it is planned they will continue to live in Mexico under true name. CLACKETT has a notional cover as a public relations consultant which was established by CCD/NC to use with friends and relatives in the U. S. The same cover story can be adopted to cover their proposed use under LIEMPTY vis-a-vis their United States friends. The Station is working on local cover for CLACKETT to use in Mexico.

11. Anticipated Costs: It is anticipated that the following expenses will be incurred by CLACKETT and FIORDALISI:

Compensation:			
CLACKETT	($7750/yr)	7100	
FIORDALISI	($4000/yr)	3700	
			10,800
Allowances:			
Educational allowance		320	
Quarters	($2500/yr)	2500	2,820

14-00000

Travel:		
PCS	300	
TDY to Headquarters for training (including 30 day per diem at $12 per day)	648	948
	Total	14,368

A total of $14,470 was included under the LIEMPTY Project approval request submitted on 24 November 1958 for a Staff Agent; therefore, no additional funds are required.

SECRET

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.

2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIENTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photographic surveillances.

3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorized for Oliver G. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.

4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the LIJERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 2041. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIENTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT LIEMPTY		2. SENIOR STAFF	
		4. AREA	
		A. DIVISION	WH
3. TYPE OF ACTION *(Check one)*		B. BRANCH	III
☒	A. NEW TVA	C. DESK	Mexico
☐	B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passenger American of foreign		0	4
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER *(List below)*			
(1)	truck, panel, American or foreign mfg.		0	1
(2)				
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		0	5

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER James S Burnell	DIVISION WH	DATE 26 Nov 1958	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE 18 Nov 58
8. APPROVED			9. AUTHORIZED		
BY DIRECTION OF DDP Benjamin A. G. Fuller for C/FI		DATE 20 Jan. '59	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S		DATE

FORM 9-57 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-36)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO : (Station/Base)
Mexico City

FROM: (Division)
WH

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
050	006	074/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
☐ OPEN FILE
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE
☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
☒ RETAIN
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
050

9. FILES ACTION
☒ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☒ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11 ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Palmis #630

12 COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13 RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE
23 July 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER
50 06 74/1

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	Termination of KDFACTOR Project
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

REFERENCE: HMMA-42,197

This is to advise you that the formal termination of the KDFACTOR Project was approved by the Associate WOMACE on 25 May 1973.

James B. KARDENETZ

DISTRIBUTION: 2-COS,Mexico City

E2 IMPDET CL BY:055272

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-19467	DATE 1 JUN 1973 TYPED: 31 May 1973
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

1-WH-1/FI
1-IP

AN
AB X
~~FI~~
~~FI~~
~~FI~~
WH/1/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/FI	Henry Mulloy	cc	1973

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	31 May 73	Raymond Swider R. Swider

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG 11 69 (40)

DISPATCH

14 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: KDFACTOR Project Amendment and Termination

1. The KDFACTOR Project, which provided photographic surveillance from two vantage points of the Soviet compound in Mexico City, was determined to be compromised due to the VWBLANKET case. The five agents were terminated in July 1972, but the base houses could not be terminated until January 1973 because it was necessary to sell one and the termination of the second was tied to the termination of KDABBEY who owned the second base house. It was necessary to pay rent for several extra months until these other terminations could be effected.

2. The base houses and agents have now all been terminated and the Station already has rented a replacement safehouse with new agents to provide the same coverage (KDALCOVE).

3. Approval of the amendment and termination of Project KDFACTOR is recommended.

Herbert W. Natzke
Acting Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Summary of KDFACTOR Project Security Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under split transmission for your information is a copy of the KDFACTOR security review. Also included are two memoranda containing C/WOLENS and C/WOMUSE comments on the security review.

Roger W Bicego
Roger W. BICEGO

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Left Side - herewith
2. Right Side - U/S/C

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
~~HMMW-19061~~

DATE
28 JUN 1972
~~TYPED: 21 June 1972~~

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

1-WH/1 Chrono
1-IP Files

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WH

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	John Davis	cf	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1		John C. Murray

(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
FG. 11 69

DISPATCH

SECRET

9 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG/FI

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review

1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.

2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.

3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.

Frank W. Hughes
C/CI/OPS/WH

Distribution:
Orig. & 3 - MPS/BG/FI
1 - WH/1/Mexico ✓
2 - CI/OPS/WH

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

8 - MAY 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Security Review of Project KDFACTOR

1. At the time you approved the renewal of Project KDFACTOR in December 1971 you asked that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, which provides photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. You asked that particular attention be paid to terminated agents and their families. The Station has made a security review and a detailed report on the findings, from Chief, WH Division, is attached.

2. The report discusses the history of the operation, describes security problems of the past and steps taken to remedy them, and discusses the security and operational situation of the agents presently covered by the project. The report notes that the two operational sites and their associated agents are compartmented from each other and that processing the film is now being done inside the Station. One section of the report discusses in detail the assets who were formerly involved in these operations but have been terminated. The final section of the report describes current security practices and notes that an alternate photographic surveillance site has been procured and is available for use should the present one be compromised.

3. The report demonstrates that the security of the operation is being kept up to high standards and that there are no potential security threats from former agents that the Station is not aware of. The FI Staff believes that the Station's security review and the attached report satisfy the requirements of your request.

L. A. Campbell
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment

SECRET

9 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : MPS/BG/FI

SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review

1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.

2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.

3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.

Frank W. Hughes

Frank W. Hughes
C/CI/OPS/WH

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DD/P 72-1719

17 APR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : FI Project KDFACTOR, Security Review

REFERENCE : ADDP Memo (DD/P 1-5899) to C/WHD dated 14 December 1971

1. In response to reference the following is a summary of the KDFACTOR security review:

The Station summary of the KDFACTOR Project security is as follows:

"There were no known problems of security relating to the Project. In response to the Headquarters request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that Project security is sound. The Project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long-time residents of the area. All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLED. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their Agency employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence".

The Headquarters desk has also reviewed the security of the KDFACTOR Project and agrees with the Station that the security is sound. In fact, as presently constituted, the KDFACTOR Project is well compartmented, and each of the two KDFACTOR photo basehouses (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) is run by long-term assets who draw a minimum of suspicion in their operational activities. Terminated assets could possibly expose the existence

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declassification

of this project, but that seems unlikely from the Headquarters review of terminated agents witting of present KDFACTOR operational activities. A Soviet investigation of property ownership around the Soviet Embassy and their awareness that the Soviet Embassy was under photographic surveillance in the past could result in a Soviet investigation of the activities and contacts of KDABBEY-1, the owner of an apartment building and four houses close to the Soviet Embassy. It is doubtful that KDABBEY-1's activities, which do not inter-relate with the activities of the KDFACTOR agents, would in any way expose the KDFACTOR Project operational activities.

2. A brief history of the KDFACTOR Project:

The KDFACTOR Project had its origins in the LIJERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects, both active in the mid-1950's. In 1958, after the arrest of two LIPSTICK surveillance team members, it was decided to break off the more sensitive, uncompromised LIPSTICK assets manning and supporting two basehouses for photo surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. These assets were consolidated with one photo basehouse against the Soviet Embassy and one surveillance team from the LIJERSEY Project into a new project (LIEMPTY), which was approved on 16 January 1959. The LIEMPTY Project, renamed the KDFACTOR Project in 1971, consisted of three photo basehouses, two viewing the front of the Soviet Embassy (LIMITED and LILYRIC) and one viewing the rear garden of the Soviet Embassy (LICALLA), plus a mobile surveillance team (LIENTRAP) tied closely with the LIMITED basehouse, which was the radio control point for dispatch of the LIENTRAP.

In 1959 the LIENTRAP surveillance vehicle and two team members were arrested at the scene of a Cuban demonstration in Mexico City. A Station review of the security implications of this incident stated that it did not materially affect the security of the project nor expose any of the LIEMPTY basehouse operations. (Note: As the basehouse operations were compartmented, the only exposure possible from this incident would have been of the LIMITED basehouse, which is no longer in existence.)

The LIEMPTY Project operated substantially as above until the Warren Commission report was published in late 1964. In this publication was a picture of a person entering the Soviet Embassy taken from the LIMITED basehouse. The LIMITED photo basehouse was closed in September 1964, and all photographic surveillance was suspended as a security precaution. In January 1965 the LIMITED basehouse was relocated, and ✓

later that year the building it had previously been in was razed by the owner, KDABBEY-1. From 1964 on it must be assumed that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City believes it is under regular photographic surveillance.

Further project changes took place in 1966 when the LILYRIC basehouse was relocated to another apartment with approximately the same view. In May 1968 the LIMITED basehouse was terminated and LIEMPTY-6, the basehouse keeper, retired. This affected the LIENTRAP coverage of Soviet vehicular movement monitored and directed from the LIMITED basehouse. With the closing of LIMITED and the Station decision to replace Raymond H. GERENDE, Mexican national contract agent who handled the LIEMPTY Project since its inception, the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance team was underemployed, and the decision was made to move it to the LIEMBRACE Project. This was done in early 1970, soon after GERENDE had been relieved of operational responsibilities in December 1969.

The photo processing of the KDFACTOR (formerly LIEMPTY) film take is now being done by the Station. In the past, it was done by the Station, by GERENDE, and by KDFACTOR-1, who was terminated amicably in early 1971. The building housing the KDLITERAL (formerly LICALLA) photo basehouse was purchased in 1957 by KDABBEY-1 for the Station. KDLITERAL is in a row of four houses all owned ostensibly by KDABBEY-1 but actually by the Agency. This row also houses a basehouse for FID's KDVAULT Project. The apartment building housing the KDABSINTHE (formerly LILYRIC) photo basehouse is owned outright by KDABBEY-1, who has been most cooperative in assisting the Station in maintaining and occasionally moving (1965 and 1966) photo basehouses. The LIMITED photo basehouse was also located on KDABBEY-1's property when it was active.

The individual basehouse operations are and have always been compartmented one from the other. The only points of breakdown in the compartmentation have been: (a) the LIMITED basehouse was linked to the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance; (b) KDFACTOR-1 was processing films from all the basehouses and could, therefore, be aware of their exact locations; (c) GERENDE was aware of all aspects of the KDFACTOR operation, and has since been terminated; (d) Oliver G. SCANTLING, Station contract agent retired in 1971, was aware of the KDFACTOR Project through his past work with LIEMPTY-6 and with GERENDE on KDFACTOR Project activities; and (e) the fact that the two present basehouse properties are owned by KDABBEY-1, who is witting of the locations and general activity of both KDFACTOR basehouses.

3. Agents and Case Officers presently active in the KDFACTOR Project: ✓

As of March 1972, Oliver J. MANKUNAS is the case officer responsible for handling the operations of KDFACTOR; Bruce H. FERNALD is the alternate case officer. The following is a list of active agents in the KDFACTOR Project:

A. KDFACTOR-2 (201-136454)
DATE OF OA: 27 December 1956
DATE SGSWIRLED: 27 April 1966
PRESENT POSITION: KDLITERAL Basehouse Operator
COVER: Accountant for a local bus line - works cover job in the evenings.

B. KDFACTOR-5 (201-119961)
DATE OF OA: 9 May 1956
DATE SGSWIRLED: 2 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: KDABSINTHE Basehouse Operator
COVER: Industrial engineer - works cover job during the day.

C. KDFACTOR-6 (201-167567)
DATE OF OA: 16 October 1967
DATE SGSWIRLED: March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Wife of KDFACTOR-5.
Co-KDABSINTHE Basehouse Operator
COVER: Housewife

D. KDFACTOR-8 (201-762111)
DATE OF OA: 29 November 1965
DATE SGSWIRLED: 3 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Son of KDFACTORs-5 and 6.
Part-time KDABSINTHE Basehouse Keeper/Operator.
COVER: Part-time shopping (shopper) investigator for Sears Roebuck de Mexico.

E. KDFACTOR-9 (201-762112)
DATE OF OA: 27 July 1966
DATE SGSWIRLED: 3 March 1966
PRESENT POSITION: Son of KDFACTORs-5 and 6. Part-time KDABSINTHE Basehouse Keeper/Operator.
~~COVER:~~ Medical student

F. KDFACTOR-10 (201-254181)
DATE OF OA: 14 September 1959
DATE SGSWIRLED: Not tested
PRESENT POSITION: Non-salaried. Wife of KDFACTOR-2, (KDLITERAL).
COVER: Housewife

G. KDABBEY
DATE OF OA: 28 April 1954
DATE SGSWIRLED: Not tested
PRESENT POSITION: Non-salaried. President of Construcciones Aztlan. Owner and landlord of KDVAULT and KDFACTOR basehouses.

Regarding the security of the above active KDFACTOR agents, the KDLITERAL basehouse is handled by KDFACTOR-2 with the assistance of his wife, KDFACTOR-10. They have a long-time maid and a 13-year-old son who lives with them in the basehouse. Neither the son nor the maid is believed to be witting. The photographic equipment is kept in a locked room, and the product is kept in a locked safe. KDFACTOR-2 was recruited by KDCALVERT-1, who is an active, long-term Station agent in the KDCALVERT Project and who is not considered a threat to KDFACTOR-2's security. KDFACTOR-2's activities are also known to his brother, the former LIPSTICK-47, who was one of the two LIPSTICK surveillance team members arrested in 1958 and who gave the police considerable information regarding LIPSTICK surveillance activities. LIPSTICK-47 was terminated in late 1958 and is believed to have withheld from the police the information regarding KDFACTOR-2 and the KDLITERAL basehouse. KDFACTOR-2 and his family have occupied the KDLITERAL basehouse since 1957 and have been discreet and security conscious in their dealings with neighbors and relatives.

The KDABSINTHE basehouse is manned by KDFACTOR-5, his wife KDFACTOR-6, and his two sons KDFACTOR-8 and KDFACTOR-9. The SGSWIRL of 2 March 1966 went into detail on who is witting of KDFACTOR-5's work for the Station. The result was that his immediate family, including a married daughter who no longer lives at the basehouse, are aware of the photographic operation. KDFACTOR-5 was recruited by LIEMPTY-12, a U. S. citizen with a private company in Mexico City who is no longer working with the Station but who is considered patriotic and no threat to KDFACTOR security.

4. Terminated Agents Possibly Affecting Present Project Security:

A. Raymond H. GERENDE

GERENDE is a Mexican citizen and was a contract agent until his termination on 26 June 1970. He had been employed by the Station intermittently since 1955 and was used almost exclusively in support activities. Since the start of the LIEMPTY Project in 1958 GERENDE had been directly involved with this project serving as cutout to the basehouses, carrying and processing films, and giving general direction to the project as principal agent. In 1969, after years of excellent service with the Station, GERENDE had serious marital problems which ended in separation from his wife, KDFACTOR-7. From December 1969 to June 1970 GERENDE was not used operationally but was maintained on half pay with the hope the divorce proceedings would be completed quickly. When it became apparent the divorce would drag on interminably, the Station reluctantly terminated GERENDE and his wife. Bruce H. FERNALD, career agent, met with GERENDE monthly from July 1970 through May 1971 while paying him his termination bonus in ten installments. GERENDE is still living in Mexico City, where he owns some property and has an income as an English teacher to employees of two local firms. He visited his wife and children in Holland in December 1970. It appears he may now be financially pressed as his English class schedule has been cut back. The Station as of 10 April 1972 had no information that would indicate GERENDE has violated his secrecy agreement.

There is an indication that GERENDE came to the attention of the Soviets in 1968. A Mexican walk-in to the FBI office in Mexico City, who was later interrogated by the Federal Security Police in 1970, said that in 1968 he had been employed by the Soviet Embassy Second Secretary, Oleg Masksimovich Nechiporenko (201-305870), to investigate persons working with the Mexican Olympic Committee. The persons investigated included GERENDE, who apparently became a specific target of Soviet investigation. It is unclear from the report of the Federal Security Police how far the Soviet investigation of GERENDE had proceeded. Nechiporenko was PNG'd from Mexico in March 1971. GERENDE's possible exposure to the Soviets could have been through his work on the Olympic Committee as a translator or through his work for the Station, which used him for a wide range of support tasks against the Soviet and Cuban targets.

B. KDFACTOR-7 (wife of GERENDE)

KDFACTOR-7 is a Dutch citizen and the former wife of GERENDE. She returned to the Netherlands in July 1970 with her children. She had served as a support agent assisting GERENDE. She is believed witting, in general terms, of GERENDE's activities regarding the KDFACTOR Project. She was terminated on 26 June 1970 and signed both a secrecy agreement and quit claim. After termination it became apparent that she had considerable hard feelings toward both the Agency and GERENDE over financial problems between her family and GERENDE. While the Station was not directly involved in all the financial problems, the Station was involved in regard to her divorce claims against GERENDE's salary, a large part of which came covertly from the Station. In July 1970 KDFACTOR-7 came to the Agency Headquarters and complained about her financial settlement. In September and November 1970 she wrote two letters directly to the Agency on the same subject. In late 1970 she also asked a Hague Embassy political officer to put her in contact with the Agency; however, she did not tell him the nature of her business. In January 1971 the Agency contacted KDFACTOR-7's brother, a U. S. Army civilian with a "Top Secret" clearance living in Alexandria, Virginia, and was able to resolve the financial misunderstandings with KDFACTOR-7. In January 1971 the Hague Station reported KDFACTOR had, without Station influence, obtained a job as social secretary with the Department of State at the Embassy. It is believed that this job has probably solved many of her financial problems and should also inhibit her from exposing her past work with the Mexico City Station, as such exposure could jeopardize her job. The Embassy in the Hague was briefed in general terms on KDFACTOR-7's background.

C. KDFACTOR-1

KDFACTOR-1 is a Mexican citizen and the brother-in-law of GERENDE. He was hired by the Station in 1956 to assist GERENDE in processing the photographic take of the KDFACTOR Project (at that time the LIPSTICK Project and later the LIEMPTY Project). KDFACTOR-1 was later assisted in processing the photographic take by his wife, LIEMPTY-5, who is GERENDE's sister. KDFACTOR-1 was terminated in March 1971, and the photographic processing previously done by KDFACTOR-1 is now done in the Station. The termination was amicable and largely due to delays in film processing as KDFACTOR-1's medical practice expanded. There does not appear to be any security problem in the termination of KDFACTOR-1 as he is discreet and also a close relative of GERENDE. The security of processing the film in KDFACTOR-1's medical office was good as KDFACTOR-1's wife, LIEMPTY-5, was assisting him with the processing and with the security of the darkroom.

D. LIEMPTY-5

LIEMPTY-5 was hired by the Station in 1957 to assist KDFACTOR-1 with the processing of KDFACTOR films. She is the sister of GERENDE and wife of KDFACTOR-1. She was terminated along with KDFACTOR-1 in March 1971. Due to her close relationship with GERENDE and KDFACTOR-1, she is not considered a threat to the Project Security.

E. Oliver G. SCANTLING

SCANTLING is a Mexican citizen who worked as a Station agent from 1954 until his termination without prejudice in February 1971. SCANTLING is in an excellent financial position and has assisted the Station in recent years largely because his strong motivation to work against the Communists. SCANTLING worked as a surveillance team leader from 1954 to 1957 and then in the LIEMPTY (KDFACTOR) Project from 1958 through 1966. He was the cut-out to LIEMPTY-6 and a back-up principal agent for GERENDE. SCANTLING's termination was amicable, and he is not considered a security problem to the Station or the KDFACTOR Project.

F. LIEMPTY-6

LIEMPTY-6, a Mexican citizen and long-term Station asset, was retired in May 1968. He had manned the LIMITED photo basehouse with his wife and son assisting him. He had been working with the Station since 1954, but age and ill health had reduced his efficiency. LIEMPTY-6 knows GERENDE and SCANTLING, but is not aware of the names or locations of any of the present KDFACTOR agents and basehouses. While he could give information on his participation in KDFACTOR activities up to 1968, he has no motive to do this and is apparently happily retired on his Agency termination bonus plus some financial assistance from his son-in-law. He is not considered a threat to the security of this Project.

There was one indication that the Soviets were seeking out the LIMITED photo basehouse and may have had suspicions concerning LIEMPTY-6. This was a report by KDADAGE-10 that in mid-1966 Stanislav Sergeyevich Silnikov (201-271103), a Soviet Embassy guard, asked KDADAGE-10 to report on his neighbors near the Soviet Embassy. Silnikov expressed interest in all the occupants of the new apartment building which houses the KDABSINTHE photo basehouse, but did not mention the KDABSINTHE basehouse keepers by name. Silnikov did name specific persons he was interested in and these included LIEMPTY-6. KDADAGE-10, of unknown reliability, said he did not give Silnikov any information, but added that, between himself and the Station, he suspected LIEMPTY-6 and had heard it rumored he worked for the Americans. In 1966 Headquarters already assumed the Soviets were aware of the LIMITED basehouse because it was used for radio direction of the LIENTRAP mobile surveillance. In any case, the Soviets apparently took no action prior to the closing of the LIMITED basehouse and the relocation of LIEMPTY-6 in May 1968. It is believed this incident has no implications that would threaten the security of current KDFACTOR assets.

5. Current KDFACTOR Security Practices:

The two photo basehouses, KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE remain compartmented, as they have been throughout the history of the Project. The Station case officer responsible for the project meets weekly with KDFACTOR-2, responsible for the KDLITERAL basehouse, and with KDFACTOR-5, responsible for the KDABSINTHE basehouse. In these meetings he picks up the product, provides new supplies, pays salaries and handles miscellaneous administrative matters. These are car meetings usually held in early morning or at night and the pickup points are changed regularly. Meeting time is kept to a minimum and meetings are prescheduled whenever possible. The photographic product is processed in the Station, thus increasing the security and timeliness of its handling over the past practice of having KDFACTOR-1 process it in his office darkroom. The case officer only meets with KDFACTOR-2 and KDFACTOR-5; however, in emergencies other witting family members of either basehouse can be contacted and met. In case the present sites or personnel are compromised, the Station has rented another apartment in the building housing the KDABSINTHE basehouse and has installed members of the KDCALVERT Project as residents. This new apartment offers as good a vantage point for photographic coverage as the KDABSINTHE and could quickly be activated if for any reason the KDABSINTHE basehouse becomes untenable.

Theodore Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

NOTED: Cord Meyer Jr.
ADD/P

12 May 72
Date

14-00000

SECRET

14 DEC 1971

DD/P 1-5899

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: FI Project KDFACTOR
FY 1971 Amendment No. 1
Biennial Renewal
Proposal for Fiscal
Years 1972 and 1973

1. On 10 December 1971 I approved subject actions in the amounts specified below:

a. FY 1971 Amendment No. 1 - For $4,266, increasing the project's FY 1971 funds authorization (from $23,630) to $27,896.

b. FY 1972 Renewal - For $19,000

c. FY 1973 Renewal - For $20,000

2. I ask that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, giving particular attention to the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families as discussed in paragraph 3 of referent memorandum.

3. Also, I ask that you provide me (via MPS/BG) with a memorandum report summarizing the results of the above (paragraph 2) security review by 31 March 1972.

Cord Meyer

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

ADDP MEMO of 14 December 1972

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
0 Project LIEMPTY FY 1971 Approval

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: DIRECTOR 038379

1. Project LIEMPTY has been approved for FY 1971 in the amount of $23,635. It has also been amended for FY 1970 in the amount of $10,498 (from $38,970 to $49,468) in order to cover termination payments to Raymond H. GERENDE and his wife, LIEMPTY/19. The approval carried a WOMACE caveat that termination payments to GERENDE and his wife must be made on a monthly basis as described in the referenced cable.

2. In submitting the project renewal request we wrote in paragraph 2 under Future Plans that the Station would submit up-dated emergency contact plans. Please submit these plans in your first quarterly progress report for FY 1971 so that we can meet our obligation to the approving authorities.

3. A copy of the approved FY 1971 renewal request is being forwarded by split transmission for your files.

Spencer N. HUTCHINS

Attachments:
1 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, left portion h/w
2 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, center portion usc
3 - LIEMPTY Project Renewal, right portion usc

Distribution:
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LIEMPTY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-17950	10 June 70 12 JUN 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 050-006-074/1

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

AN [illegible]
AB X
[illegible] EDI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	W.R.Hazen	lmr	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	10 June 70	John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-65 WH/1 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

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FUNDING

NO. 3
(DOCUMENT # FOR THIS PROJECT)

DATE 1 June '70

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO: CHIEF OF STATION ~~(BASE)~~ Mexico City

ATTENTION: FINANCE OFFICER

INFO:

PROJECT LIEMPTY FAN 0135-1009

TYPE OF ACTION PERIOD OF ACTION 1 July 69 TO 30 June 71 AMOUNT $ 54,133 21

NEW		PREVIOUS ACTION IN THIS FISCAL YEAR	53,110	
RENEWAL	✓	TOTAL FISCAL YEAR APPROVAL	47,463	~~26,635~~
EXTENSION			500	
TERMINATION		FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE	43,768	500
AMENDMENT	✓	FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE		~~23,135~~
OTHER		subject [illegible] by FY71 funds.		

CHIEF, WH/B&F

HQS USE ONLY

PROCESSED	APPROVED	TYPE OF ACTION	PERIOD	AMOUNT

File LIEMPTY
Development & Plans

SECRET
(When Filled In)

WH/1

SECRET

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIEMPTY

☐ CA
☒ FI/CI

☐ PROPRIETARY
☐ SUBSIDY
☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Jack Barry EXTENSION 4167

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP

PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1970 TO 30 June 1971

TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
$23,635	1971	$23,635
	196	

FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL 1135-1009

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE (Signed) E. M. [illegible]
MPS/BG

DATE 28 MAY 1970

DISTRIBUTION

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WH/1

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT **LIEMPTY**	☐ CA ☒ FI/CI	☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
X	AMENDMENT	
	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/1
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	
	OTHER	CASE OFFICER Jack Barry — EXTENSION 4167

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY ADDP	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED	FY	AMOUNT
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1969 TO 30 June 1970	$49,468	1970	$49,468
		196	
	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	0135-1009	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

Project amended for an additional $10,498 for FY 70.

SIGNATURE
MPS/BG
(Signed) E. M. Harms

DATE [illegible] 1970

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ACTION UNIT WH8　INFO FILE, VR RI/AN. SR8.

ACTION NO. 986

S E C R E T 192359Z MAR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2766

DIRECTOR

20 MAR 70 IN 046440 M

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 018246

1. POUCHING LIEMPTY REPORT 26 MARCH. REGRET DELAY WHICH DUE PRESS OTHER ACTIVITIES REDTOP FIELD.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1

S E C R E T

LIEMPTY - 10 & 11 out - take all away.

[illegible] LIEMBRACE [illegible]

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Approval (FY 1970)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

Project LIEMPTY has been approved in the amount of $38,970 for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970. Of the total FY 70 amount, $38,470 is authorized for field use, and $500 will be retained for Headquarters use.

Anthony B. WELDRAKE

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HMMW - 17472

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE
12 SEP 1969
9 September 1969

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

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CHRONO - 1

AN JB
AB X
IN
PS
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PI
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	J. J. Barry	nks	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	10 Sept	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

-21

SECRET

17 March 69
Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station ~~(Base)~~ Mexico City

~~INFO~~: Attn: Finance Officer

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN: 9-35-1009

TYPE OF ACTION:

✓ OTHER Reduction in funding
____ NEW
____ RENEWAL
____ EXTENSION
____ AMENDMENT
____ TERMINATION AND DATE ____

PERIOD OF ACTION: ____ AMOUNT ____

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	FY 69	FY
THIS ACTION:	--	
PREVIOUS ACTION:	43520	
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	43520	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE:	7200	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:*	36320	

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

3-6-74

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	PROCESSING ACTION MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
- A. HMMA-33458, 8 November 1967
- B. HMMA-33614, 6 January 1968
- C. HMMW-16419, 21 May 1968
- D. HMMA-35080, 22 July 1968
- E. HMMW-16984, 13 January 1969
- F. HMMA-36272, 22 January 1969
- G. MEXICO CITY 9439, 11 March 1969

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover by split transmittal is a request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY for FY 1970. Funds in the amount of US$38,970 are being requested.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #1 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Attachment:
1. Project renewal request, right side h/w
2. Project renewal request, left side u/s/c;

[illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WH w/att h/w and u/s/c
2 - C/SB w/att h/w and u/s/c

2 ATT

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	HMMA-36710	14 March 1969
X	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 50-6-74/1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Re-Review
Signed: Olivia Palmore
R.O. #630 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

[illegible] BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
[illegible]

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X

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H/W ATT #1 + S/C ATT #2 to HMMA-32710

50-6-74/1

PROJECT LIEMPTY

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its eleventh year of existence, is to collect operational information on the FJSTEAL installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationary/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms, and personnel are as follows:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of FJSTEAL personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the FJSTEAL physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with FJSTEAL personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the FJSTEAL intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of LNFORT.

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance, and/or other protective services to KUFIRM personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. The LIEMPTY Project is the cornerstone of the Station's operational program against the FJSTEAL target and as such is completely responsive to Priority A-1 of the Station's Operating Directive.

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the above cited framework.

During the Project year Project LIEMPTY provided all of the fixed operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against the FJSTEAL installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. CHANGES

A. Operational

1. The major change during the preceeding period has been the closing of the LIMITED basehouse and the termination of LIEMPTY-[illegible]. This has resulted in considerable financial saving with no loss in efficiency--to the contrary, as a matter of fact. The major reason for the change was the fact that LIEMPTY-[illegible] was growing less reliable with age. He was not always able to be on the job, and when he was, his fixed surveillance reporting was occasionally inaccurate, and his photography was often poor. There had been considerable overlap between LILYRIC and LIMITED reporting, and with the closing of LIMITED, the LILYRIC working hours were extended slightly so that full working hours of the FJSTEAL installation continued to be covered. The only disadvantage to this arrangement is that the vantage point of the FJSTEAL installation which had been shared by LIMITED and LILYRIC will now go uncovered during periods of annual leave by LILYRIC personnel (the LILYRIC personnel are all members of one family and normally take their leave together).

2. There have been no changes in the operating procedures and techniques of LIEMPTY-9 in the LICALLA basehouse. The refinements described in the previous Project Outline have been effective and have been maintained. The same can be said of LIENTRAP, which has become a much more flexible tool since its partial integration into the LIEMBRACE team. There have been no changes in LILYRIC procedures, other than expansion of coverage to include the entire working week.

B. Financial - LIEMPTY-9 was granted a salary increase, effective 1 May 1968, in recognition of his excellent job performance. LIEMPTY-14 and -27 were granted salary increases on 1 May 1968, largely as compensation for the extra hours they agreed to put in to insure full-time coverage of the FJSTEAL installation by LILYRIC. Memoranda of Oral Agreement covering these three salary increases were forwarded with HMMA-34573, 2 May 1968. Finally, LIEMPTY-11 was granted a salary increase effective 1 January 1969, in recognition of his increased work load with the LIEMBRACE team. MOA was forwarded with HMMA-3[illegible]131, 23 December 1968.

C. Personnel

1. As noted above, LIEMPTY-6 was terminated effective 31 May 1968 in connection with the closing of the LIMITED basehouse. Termination was completely amicable, and LIEMPTY-6 received a generous termination bonus.

2. LIEMPTY-26 was hired as of 1 May 1968 to help LILYRIC personnel maintain their expanded coverage. No security factor is involved, as LIEMPTY-26 is part of the same family as the rest of the LILYRIC personnel. LIEMPTY-26 had been granted an OA in 1965 and had been used sporadically since that time.

3. An amendment to GERENDE's contract has been requested. This amendment would guarantee GERENDE termination benefits equal to those provided for by Mexican law, in the event of GERENDE's termination by WOFIRM. The amendment would also provide GERENDE with a graduated scale of benefits should he decide to resign. See HMMA-36312, 27 January 1969, for details.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Until its termination, the LIMITED installation provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the FJSTEAL installation. During the seven-month period from 1 November 1967 through 31 May 1968, the LIMITED base provided 911 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 1,000 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the Project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the FJSTEAL installation. The LILYRIC basehouse provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY Project. During the 13-month period from 1 November 1967 through 31 December 1968, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 15,331 operational photographs and several thousand pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all FJSTEAL officers. As a specific example of the importance of LILYRIC coverage, it was LILYRIC photos which made possible the identification of a WOLADY citizen who had been in clandestine contact with an AEGRIP officer. This information was turned over to LNERGO, which was pursuing the case. In general, LILYRIC provides the Station with a large percentage of the CI raw material collected on the FJSTEAL target, such as automobile license numbers, PCS and TDY arrivals ~~and~~ departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc. This information also has positive operational value, but its most important use is as the major source of identification of FJSTEAL personnel and of information on their movements. The Station has frequent requests from LNERGO which can only be fulfilled by LIEMPTY coverage, and this "permanent and complete record" of FJSTEAL activities is invaluable for servicing the CE requirements of both WOFIRM and LNERGO.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 13-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the FJSTEAL installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided 5,125 individual photographs as well as numberous surveillance and observation reports. These reports included daily, weekly, and monthly summaries of activities, semi-monthly attendance reports (of FJSTEAL personnel), various special reports, and special intensive coverage of targets selected by the Station. It should be noted that the LICALLA basehouse allows Station Mexico City to observe the FJSTEAL personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours. The LICALLA installation has become the most valuable of the basehouses, not only because of its unique vantage point but also because of the perceptiveness of LIEMPTY-9. His surveillance reports have frequently given us valuable insight into personal associations among the FJSTEAL personnel and have enabled us to introduce greater flexibility and effectiveness into the entire LIEMPTY operation. LICALLA reporting has the greatest positive operational value since it provides raw material for use in target selection. Finally, the LICALLA CP is occasionally used in support of various technical operations conducted from the LI[illegible]SA complex.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA, and LILYRIC) provided approximately 21,367 individual frames of operational photographs during the 15-month period reviewed above. This photographic coverage, linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of FJSTEAL personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of FJSTEAL staffers and their visitors (some of whom are ECLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various FJSTEAL officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical, and surveillance operations.

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit

1. During the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic unit covered 40 photographic assignments in support of Mexico City Station's FJSTEAL, PBRUMEN, and Communist Party operations. An average of two to three days is spent on each assigned target, usually rotating the time of day the coverage is provided. The LIENTRAP operators, LIEMPTY-10 and -11, have consistently turned in a useful and excellent quality photographic product.

2. In addition, while not on an assignment, both operators have regularly assigned duties. LIEMPTY-10 has the responsibility for obtaining, renewing, and servicing most of the Station's accommodation addresses. The addresses are serviced three times a week. LIEMPTY-11 has been serving part-time for the past year as the seventh member of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team and has performed well in this capacity.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent

During the period under review, Raymond H. GERENDE continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIMITED, LILYRIC, and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 10 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive JMRCP operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances. He is used to make independent investigations and neighborhood checks. He assisted the Station in its MHRAVEL program. As a part of the Station's effort to broaden GERENDE's horizons and to take better advantage of his capabilities, GERENDE was made the handling officer for ERFAIN-3 under close case officer supervision. Similar tasks are envisioned for GERENDE in the future--agent handling as well as the spotting and assessment of operational leads. These tasks are all assigned with due regard for GERENDE's primary responsibilities, with the aim of getting the optimum use out of a capable and experienced field contract agent.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project, with the exception of the phased-out LIMITED basehouse, contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance of Project personnel and the overall contributions of this Project, the Station strongly recommends that this Project be continued during the forthcoming Project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

During the Project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel. The termination of LIEMPTY-6 caused no problems, nor did the construction of a maid's room on the roof of the LICALLA installation, adjacent to LIEMPTY-9's photo point. There is no indication that FJSTEAL personnel had any suspicions about the construction work. The exposure of a LIEMBRACE surveillance vehicle (see MEXICO CITY 9283, 28 February 1969) caused momentary concern because the vehicle had been bought from a dealer where LIEMPTY-9 has a part-time job. Along with all other employees of the auto dealer, LIEMPTY-9 was questioned about the purchaser of the car. While LIEMPTY-9 was worried because he knew the purchaser of the car and was able to guess what had happened, the investigation was dropped and the case closed without any adverse effect on LIEMPTY-9 or the LICALLA basehouse.

5. LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS

A. The changes made in the period under review have been largely technical. With the exception of a continued expansion of non-LIEMPTY-oriented operational activity by GERENDE, there are no significant operational changes contemplated. LIEMPTY is a project designed to support the Station's REDTOP program and is useful only as long as it supports that program effectively. The Station believes that the support has been effective, and that the product of the operation is valuable. Occasional minor changes will undoubtedly be made in response to specific requirements and to continual efforts toward improvement, but continuing emphasis on the FJSTEAL target for the foreseeable future means, among other things, that the LIEMPTY Project, in essentially its present form, will continue to be a necessary part of the Station's program.

B. No need for expansion, in terms of personnel or facilities, is foreseen, but costs will probably climb slowly but steadily to permit salary increases and to keep up with the rising cost of living as it affects utilities and supplies. Replacement of GERENDE's QI vehicle (which was not foreseen in the previous Project outline, as this was originally written by the Station to cover the period ending 30 November 19[illegible]) became necessary late in FY 19[illegible]. The current Project is being written on the assumption that the vehicle was in fact replaced in FY 19[illegible] and that no further replacement will be necessary in the foreseeable future.

7. COSTS

A. FY 1969 - Project LIEMPTY was approved for FY 1969 in the amount of 43,590 dollars. Station records project spending for FY 1969 at almost exactly that figure. Semi-monthly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the Project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately three hours of case officer and eight hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative, and analytical requirements of this project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE.)

B. FY 1970 - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 38,970 dollars for FY 1970 (this figure represents roughly a 10 percent decrease from the amount programmed for the previous Project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, inflation may result in rising cost of utilities and supplies, and salary increases may be granted as indicated above. A detailed breakdown of Project expenditures for FY 1969, 1970 and 1971 follows.

SECRET [redacted]

	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971
SALARIES			
		7000	7400
Raymond H. GERENDE (P/A)	$ 6,500	$ 6,500	$ 6,500
LIEMPTY-4 (photo processor)	2,400	2,400	2,400
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA)	4,320	4,320	4,320
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP)	4,224	4,224	4,224
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP)	2,616	2,736	2,736
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC)	1,536	1,536	1,536
LIEMPTY-14 (LILYRIC)	1,824	1,824	1,824
LIEMPTY-26 (LILYRIC)	672	672	672
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC)	1,728	1,728	1,728
LIEMPTY-8 (LIMITED; Termination payment)	2,750	-0-	-0-
Christmas bonuses	2,140	2,140	2,140
Contingency for possible salary increase	500	2,000	4,000
SUB-TOTAL	$31,210	$30,080	$32,080
REAL ESTATE			
GERENDE Dark Room Rent (MEXI 137)	$ 960	$ 960	$ 960
LICALLA (MEXI 03)	1,248	1,248	1,248
LILYRIC (MEXI 132)	2,880	2,880	2,880
S/H Utilities	1,000	1,100	1,200
SUB-TOTAL	$ 6,088	$ 6,188	$ 6,288
VEHICLES			
MV-2 06 maintenance	$ 400	$ -0-	$ -0-
MV-2823 maintenance	600	800	1,000
Purchase of new MV and maintenance	4,000	400	500
SUB-TOTAL	$ 5,000	$ 1,200	$ 1,500
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment	$ 200	$ 500	$ 500
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of post office accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund	$ 1,000	$ 1,000	$ 1,000
TOTAL	$4[redacted]	$38,970	$41,370

SECRET [redacted]

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit semi-monthly accountings for all Project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active Project agents. However, under these circumstances, it is highly probable that the activities of this Project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28533, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

50-6-74/1

SECRET

12 March 64
Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION

TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station ~~(Base)~~ Mexico City

~~INFO~~: Attention: Finance Officer

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN: 9135-1309

TYPE OF ACTION:

✓ OTHER Redistribution of funds $4000 transferred to Funds available for Hqs use for car purchase.

___ NEW

___ RENEWAL

___ EXTENSION

___ AMENDMENT

___ TERMINATION AND DATE ___

PERIOD OF ACTION: ___ AMOUNT ___

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	FY 64	FY
THIS ACTION:	–	
PREVIOUS ACTION:	43520	
TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:	43520	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE:	4200	
FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:*	39320	

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

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50-6-74

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DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY

1. PREPARATION LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST DELAYED DUE RIZZUTO'S RECENT TDY HQS. WILL POUCH 18 MARCH,.

2. FILE 50-6-74/1.

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City,

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: Book Dispatch No.6769, 25 November 1968

This is a routine reminder that the LIEMPTY Project Renewal for FY 1970 will be due at Headquarters 14 March 1969.

Norris W. DAMICONE

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WH/1	Al Malone	nrg	4167

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WH 1

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/1	9 Jan. '69	W. J. Kaufman

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MFG. 1-66

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TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Approval of Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Project LIEMPTY has been approved for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 June 1969 in the amount of $69,725. Of the total, $26,205 would be disbursed in FY 1968, and $43,520 in FY 1969, representing no change in the funding you requested. $550 is retained for Headquarters use during FY 1968, and $200 (for photographic equipment) in FY 1969.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

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DATE	23 MAY 1968 21 May 1968
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HQS FILE NUMBER	50-6-74/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Perkins	rc N Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
CHRONO

AN[illegible]
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[illegible]
WH/1
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

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C/WH/1	21 May 68	W. J. Kaufman

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Date

NOTIFICATION OF PROJECT APPROVAL ACTION
TO FIELD FINANCE OFFICER

TO: Chief of Station (Base)

INFO:

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FAN:

TYPE OF ACTION:

NEW

[✓ RENEWAL]

EXTENSION

AMENDMENT

TERMINATION AND DATE

PERIOD OF ACTION: AMOUNT

FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL: FY FY

THIS ACTION:

PREVIOUS ACTION:

TOTAL FISCAL YEAR PROJECT APPROVAL:

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR HQS USE:

FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FIELD USE:*

*TO BE USED AS A GUIDE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF OBLIGATION AUTHORITY.

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CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

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TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, SB Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover by split transmission is a request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968. Funds in the amount of $43,520 are requested for the project year; $26,205 to be alloted in FY 1968 and $17,315 in FY 1969.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: de-Kapok
Signed:
R.O. #030 - Unit
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Vincent P. Rizzato
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
A - Project Renewal Request, right side (herewith)
B - Project Renewal Request, left side (under separate cover)

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/atts. A & B
2 - C/SB, w/atts. A & B

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CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-33455

DATE: 8 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/1

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30 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director Plans

SUBJECT: Supplementary Appropriation for LIEMPTY

It is requested that the figures in the attached field project renewal be amended and that an additional $26,205 be approved to cover the period 1 December 1968 through 30 June 1969 in order to carry the LIEMPTY Project to the end of a fiscal year. This sum is identical to that requested for a similar period in 1968 as there is no present justification for projecting any change in the financial requirements. The supplement would bring the cost of LIEMPTY to a total of $69,725 for 19 months.

by Jacob D. Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #330 - Unit WH/4/R
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

1. Renewal of Project LIEMPTY for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 in the amount of $43,520 is hereby requested. $26,205 would be spent in FY 1968 and $17,315 in FY 1969. The project was budgeted for $45,000 for FY 1968; funds are available within the Division. Estimated costs for the coming project year are a little less than the amount programmed for the previous year and a little more than what was actually disbursed.

2. LIEMPTY is designed to provide physical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It covers three nearby properties (two in front of the Embassy's sole entrance and one behind the garden) from which visual and photographic surveillance are carried out by experienced personnel. The project also covers a darkroom where a technician processes the photographs. In addition to collecting this basic information on a primary target, certain of the LIEMPTY personnel are also available for miscellaneous support tasks, such as servicing postal boxes, and running fixed and moving surveillances. The photo truck which comes under the project is used on other targets as well, such as CP members, satellite embassies, and Latin American exiles. One of the basehouses is also used as a radio dispatch point for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, but this function has been minimized during the past year in an effort to prevent Soviet interception of the signal.

3. a. The Mexican desk asked the appropriate operational component of SB Division for specific comment on the value of LIEMPTY, and received the following:

> "This rather unique operation has unquestionably made a major contribution to the increasingly effective Soviet Operations program of the Mexico Station. On the positive side its principal value lies in the identification of the Mexican and

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> third national contacts of the Soviets, from which we must select and develop the access agents so vital to our operations against the Soviet human target. LIEMPTY also provides us with a much clearer picture of the inner relationships and activity patterns within the Soviet mission itself, which in turn facilitates effective targeting. The CE value of a LIEMPTY type project as a monitor of real and potential agent contacts is of course obvious. It is important to note that LIEMPTY is not, as might be the case in stations of lesser overall capability, a simple case of photography (or observation) for the record. Rather it is an important facet of a concerted high priority effort to get at and recruit individual Soviets."

b. Station reporting has been in a similar vein. Information produced is largely for operational purposes and we often lack detail as to specific utility in a given situation, although we can produce statistics on numbers of photographs produced and numbers of pages of surveillance notes. It is clear that the FBI is an interested customer and they have received from LIEMPTY a great many reports on American callers at the Soviet Embassy, and valuable support to double agent operations.

c. During a conversation on 8 December 1967, the officer who heads the station's SB section told the branch that LIEMPTY is basic and essential to all of his branch's operational planning, that he "grabs the LIEMPTY material first thing in the morning" and studies it for leads, evidence of which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy and which ones have been away, who has used which car, who has been talking to whom or going out of the building with whom, etc. etc. New additions to the Embassy staff can be tabbed as KGB or GRU by their associates, their activity patterns and the cars they drive. (The I.S. men are often away from the Embassy, while the legitimate FSO's tend to spend more time in their offices. The KGB, GRU and regular diplomatic groups seldom cross lines but stay within their own tight groups.) When double agents are turned over from one case officer to a new one, known to them only in alias, we are often able, through surveillance and photographs, to establish the true identity of the new case officer, as was done in the case of AEGIMMICK in the spring of 1967.

4. In assessing the security of the operation, the station assumes that the Soviets realize that they are being watched, as was evidenced by a Soviet officer's trying to shield an FBI-directed walk-in from observation. There have been rumors that anyone entering the Soviet Embassy is photographed, but no allegations that the Americans are doing it have come to our attention; the probable assumption is that the Mexicans are doing this. A former source who lives in the neighborhood was asked on several occasions what he knew about LIEMPTY/6, one of the safehousekeepers, and the Soviets have said they think he is watching them. On the security of the LICALLA safehouse there is a difference of opinion. GERENDE, the outside case officer, thinks the Soviets are aware that they are being observed from this post, but station disagrees and produces good justification for its views, citing the fact that the above-mentioned FBI walk-in was not shielded when led into the back garden which LICALLA overlooks. We have no evidence that Soviet interest is any threat to the operation; rather it may be assumed that they accept the surveillance as a fact of life.

by Jacob D. Esterline

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

SECR[redacted]

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO

STATION MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

RS COPY

8 Nov 67
50-6-74/1

X

SECRE[redacted]

S/C ATT. #2 to HMMA-33455 _ R.S. of H/W ATT. #1 to HMMA-33455

PROJECT LIEMPTY

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its tenth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the FJSTEAL installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationary/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms and personnel are as follow:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of the FJSTEAL personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the FJSTEAL physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with FJSTEAL personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the FJSTEAL intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of LNFORT.

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance and/or other protective services to WOFIRM personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. These objectives are in consonance with operational directives and Headquarters requirements as received by Station Mexico City.

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the above cited framework. During the project year Project LIEMPTY provided nearly all of the operational photographs and physical surveillance reports used in Mexico City Station's operations targeted against the FJSTEAL installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. CHANGES

A. Operational - Since the institution of the changes described in the previous renewal request, it has not been found necessary or desirable to make further major changes. The following minor changes in operational technique have been made in an effort to obtain continued improvement in the finished product:

1. LIEMPTY-9's proven effectiveness as an observer (see paragraph 3 A (3) below) has enabled us to institute a system of special coverage on specific FJSTEAL personnel of interest, or special coverage of specific time periods of interest. The purpose is to permit the Station to gain greater insights into the activities and personal associations of certain individuals, or in overall activities during a certain time period. No change in LIEMPTY-9's overall working hours has been made; rather, flexibility has been introduced.

2. Flexibility has also been introduced into the handling of LIENTRAP, which is now working more closely with the LIEMBRACE team in order to take greater advantage of targets of opportunity. To this end, LIEMBRACE-1 has been placed in direct contact with LIENTRAP, relieving Raymond H. GERENDE of this responsibility and permitting GERENDE to devote time to MHRAVEL activity (see sub-paragraph (3) below).

3. In September and October 1967 GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee. This position gave him direct access to FJSTEAL and other delegations of interest, and supplemented the Station's MHRAVEL program. It is expected that GERENDE will obtain MHRAVEL employment again in 1968.

B. Financial - LIEMPTY-4 and -11 were granted salary increases effective 1 July 1967. Memoranda of Oral Commitment were forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-32584 and HMMA-32585, 20 July 1967. There was no change in the salaries of the remaining LIEMPTY agents.

C. Personnel - None.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Throughout the past project year the LIMITED installations provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the FJSTEAL installation. In addition, the LIMITED base provided for a fixed radio dispatching station which was used to support the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Due to the stringent security measures instituted in the immediate vicinity of the FJSTEAL installation by local security forces, normal stake-outs by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the radio dispatching support from the LIMITED radio base, which allows the LIEMBRACE team to work from adjacent safe areas, secure surveillance coverage of this target can be provided. During the 12-month period from 1 November 1966 through 31 October 1967, the LIMITED base provided 1,834 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 2,500 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the FJSTEAL installation. The LILYRIC base provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY project. During the 12-month period cited in the LIMITED section above, the LILYRIC base provided 12,137 operational photographs and several thousand pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all FJSTEAL officers.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 12-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the FJSTEAL installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided 4,917 individual photographs as well as numerous surveillance and observation reports. It should be noted that the LICALLA base allows Station Mexico City to observe the FJSTEAL personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours. The LICALLA installation has become the most valuable of the three, not only because of its unique vantage point but also because of the perceptiveness of LIEMPTY-9. His surveillance reports have frequently given us valuable insight into personal associations among the FJSTEAL personnel and have enabled us to introduce greater flexibility and effectiveness into the entire LIEMPTY operation.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA and LILYRIC) provided approximately 18,888 individual frames of operational photographs during the 12-month period of the past project year. This photographic coverage, linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of FJSTEAL personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of FJSTEAL staffers and their visitors (some of whom are WOLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various FJSTEAL officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical and surveillance operations.

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit

1. Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile photographic support unit was regularly exploited and used by Station Mexico City, not only on the FJSTEAL target, but also for PBRUMEN and Communist Party operations as well as the JMTIGER program. Over 2,000 operational photographs were provided. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel and unit was used regularly to service and obtain various postal accomodation boxes used by Mexico City, Headquarters and other field stations.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent

During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, Raymond H. GERENDE, continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIEMPTY, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities of the LIENTRAP unit (until mid-August 1967 - see paragraph 2 A (2) above) and for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances. He is frequently used to make independent investigations and neighborhood checks. As noted above, he contributed significantly to the Station's MHRAVEL program. Finally, he approached, developed and eventually attempted to recruit an agent for use in PBRUMEN operations.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station strongly recommends that this project be continued during the forthcoming project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

During the project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel.

5. LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS

A. As noted above, the technical and operational changes made in the past year have been effective and have resulted in a product which is as closely geared to operational requirements as possible. While no major changes are contemplated, every effort will be made to continue to improve the product, including greater use of GERENDE as an independent investigative asset, and as a spotter and assessor of selected agent candidates. Such utilization of GERENDE will be kept compartmented from other personnel of the LIEMPTY project and will normally be handled by GERENDE in operational alias.

B. The LIENTRAP vehicle has been replaced, and no major changes in personnel or material are contemplated. Salaries of LIEMPTY personnel will be reviewed, and it is foreseen that the rising cost of living will compel us to recommend salary increases for certain of the agents who have not received raises in some time.

7. **COSTS**

A. Past Project Year - Project LIEMPTY was previously approved for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for the amount of 45,000 U.S. currency. Station records indicate that through 31 October 1967, Project LIEMPTY has expended 37,040 in the field. It is estimated that a total of 40,130 will be expended in the entire project year. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately 5 hours of case officer and 10 hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE).

B. During Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 43,520 U.S. currency for the period 1 December 1967 through 30 November 1968 (this figure represents a slight decrease from the amount programmed for the previous project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, an increase in the rental of the various basehouses may be encountered as well as the above-cited expectation of salary increases. Of the amount requested above, 26,205 dollars should be allowed for fiscal year 1968 and 17,315 dollars for fiscal year 1969. A detailed breakdown of the project expenditure by category and by fiscal year follows:

SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)		FY 68	FY 69
Raymond H. GERENDE (P/A)........	$ 7,036		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)...........	2,600		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse keeper)...............	3,848		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keepter).............	4,160		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP operator)..	4,576		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP operator)..	2,704		
LIEMPTY-13 (Cut-out to LILYRIC).	1,664		
LIEMPTY-14 (LILYRIC basehouse keeper)..............	1,872		
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC operator)...	1,560		
	$30,020	$18,475	$11,545
Contingency for possible salary increases................	2,000	1,000	1,000
TOTALS..............	$32,020	$19,475	$12,545

		FY 68	FY 69
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE			
MV 2606 (GERENDE)	$1,000		
MV ~~2889~~ 2823 (LIENTRAP)	1,000		
	$2,000	$1,165	$ 835
REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)			
LILYRIC	$3,200		
LIMITED	2,000		
LICALLA	1,800		
Photo Lab	1,000		
	$8,000	$4,665	$3,335
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment	$ 500	$ 300	$ 200
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of post office accomodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund	$1,000	$ 600	$ 400
TOTALS	$43,520	$26,205	$17,315

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active project agents. However, under the circumstances described above, it is highly probable that the activities of this project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28333, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Renewal of LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

This is a reminder that LIEMPTY will be up for renewal on 1 December. Please try to let us have your draft at least a month before that time.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15759

DATE
1 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

AN | FI
ABSTRACT ★ | ~~INDEX~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas N. Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	9/1	J. Fisher

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION

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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
ↄ LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-30403

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 13 January 1967 for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 for a total of $45,000. Of this, $29,020 is for FY 1967 and $15,980 is for FY 1968.

2. At the Station's convenience, Headquarters would appreciate receiving a sketch showing the exact position of the LILYRIC and LIMITED Basehouses in relation to the target building. We would also like to have a description of LIMOUSINE's new building--how many floors, how many apartments on each floor, who occupies the other apartments (or stores), and exactly where the LILYRIC base is in the building.

3. You are requested to continue reporting any unusual interest displayed by the target in the LIEMPTY Basehouses.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

23 JAN 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15157

DATE
18 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

GROUP 1 [illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT X
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. Bustos-Videla	nao	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1/18	W. J. Kaufman

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG 1-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO: DDP/PG FI-CI Projects 3 C 43

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FUNDS: $45,000

CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla

EXTENSION: 3654

ROOM: 332 Ames

RECEIVED DDP HQ: 12 Dec 66

FORWARDED: 13 Dec 66

DEADLINE: 27 Dec 66

RETURNED:

DIVISION: WH

STATION: Mexico City

TARGET AREA: Mexico

	ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL	REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI/OPS	X	CI/OPS		CCS		OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP		/NT						
	AMENDMENT		DCI		/						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this very valuable Project. The Staff strongly urges the Station to continue its close monitoring of Soviet interest in the installation buildings and attempts to obtain information on sensitive project personalities. The Station should devise necessary contingency plans of action to eliminate any security hazards if it is determined that the Soviets are intensifying such efforts and could be getting "too close"to the Project installations, personalities and activities.

CC SENT DIV.

DATE 16 Dec 66

DATE: 16 Dec 1966

REVIEWING OFFICER: W. Hughes

FORM 7-63 526 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(13-20-40)

SECRET [redacted]

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

CASE OFFICER: Cornelius L. Peuvion
Cornelius L. PEUVION

STATION: MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION: Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

26 of 46

CS COPY SECRET [redacted]

50-6-74/1

IE ATT. #1 to HMMA-30403

R. Side ATT #1 to HMMA-30403

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A. The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its ninth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation, its personnel and visitors, as well as related targets of opportunity through stationary/mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through use of the LIEMPTY installations, mechanisms and personnel are as follow:

1. To provide detailed operational information pertaining to the daily movements and activities of the LIMERICK personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the LIMERICK physical plant and visitors to the premises.

2. To collect operational information on persons associated with LIMERICK personnel and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with the LIMERICK intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of [illegible].

3. To provide operational support, counter surveillance and/or other protective services to WOFACT personnel and operations, as may be levied upon the Station or as may be deemed necessary.

B. The above objectives are to be fulfilled through continued maintenance and exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIEMTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GERENDE. These objectives are in consonance with and represent partial fulfillment of the following sections of the current Related Mission Directive (RMD) as approved for Station Mexico City:

PRIORITY A
Section 1, subsection f
Section 2, subsections b & e

PRIORITY B
Section 1, subsection a
Section 2, subsection a

C. Throughout the Project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the framework of the above cited sections of the RMD. During the last 10 months Project LIEMPTY provided the vast majority of the operational photographs (approximately 16,000) and physical surveillance reports (4,000) used in Mexico City Station's operations targetted against the LIMERICK installation and personnel. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions to the RND will be found in Section 3 below (EFFECTIVENESS).

2. **CHANGES.**

A. Operational - As noted in the previous Request for Project Renewal, the former LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE, who as per formal agreement with the Station, demolished the old structure and constructed a new edifice. While it was initially contemplated to place the LIMITED (LIEMPTYs -6 and -7) personnel in the new building and to retain the same, equal division of workload between LILYRIC and LIMITED, it was later decided to move the present LILYRIC basehouse personnel (LIEMPTYs-13, -14, -26 and -27) into the new base instead, along with the following ancillary modifications:

An increase in the hours of both the photographic and physical surveillance coverage provided from the new base by the LILYRIC operators (0800-1600 hours) during the weekdays and to have the LIMITED base provide photographic and physical surveillance coverage from 1600-1830 hours on weekdays and from 0900-1300 hours on weekends. These changes were dictated by the following considerations:

1. The new LIMOUSINE building offers a much better vantage point for both photographic and physical surveillance than does the present complex which houses the LILYRIC and LIMITED bases. Therefore, the Station felt that the personnel occupying this new base should be those possessing the highest technical skills and also those able to provide the most thorough and complete coverage. Since the LIMITED base now has only one trained operator while the LILYRIC basehouse has three, the LILYRIC group and a revision of working hours was indicated.

2. Because it was apparent that the coverage of the LIMERICK installation would be a long-range and continuing requirement, the Station desired to staff the new base with personnel of long-range potential. LIEMPTY-6, now almost 60 years old, does not possess this potential; however, the LILYRIC agent complex happily combines experienced personnel with youthful agents.

3. Finally, the social and financial status of the LILYRIC personnel is much more compatible and consistent with the environment of the new building than is that of the LIMITED family.

The above-cited revised work schedule was initiated in July 1966 and the actual movement of the LILYRICs into the new base began in late September 1966.

[redacted]

B. Financial - After a detailed review of the then-existing LIEMPTY agent salary structure, selected agents (LIEMPTYs -6, -9, -10, and -11) were granted salary increases effective 1 January 1966. Formal notification and revised memoranda of oral commitment were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-28,136, dated 25 January 1966. There was no change in the salaries of the 8 remaining LIEMPTY agents.

C. Personnel

1. During the Project year under review, LIEMPTY-6, -9, -13, -14, -26 and -27 were afforded their initial SGSWIRL examinations, all with satisfactory results.

2. LIEMPTY-26 was granted an OA effective 29 November 1965 for use as a cut-out to the [illegible] basehouse (HMMW-14177, dated 9 December 1965). LIEMPTY-26 has been actively used during the past Project year for the above-stated purpose.

3. LIEMPTY-27 was granted an OA on 27 July 1966 for use as a part-time LILYRIC basehouse operator (HMMW-14757, dated 1 August 1966). While LIEMPTY-27's heavy university schedule has thus far precluded his regular use by the Station, it is anticipated that subject will be regularly employed after the end of the present school term.

3. EFFECTIVENESS.

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively and concretely to the fulfillment of the operational tasks levied on Station Mexico City by the RMD and other directives. High-lights of the accomplishments and the achievements of each component are cited below:

A. Fixed Basehouses

1. LIMITED

Throughout the past Project year (with the change in working hours noted in paragraph 2 above), the LIMITED installation provided daily photographic coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the LIMERICK installation. In addition, the LIMITED base provided for a fixed radio dispatching station which was used continually to support the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Due to the stringent security measures instituted in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation by local security forces, normal stake-outs by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the radio dispatching support from the LIMITED radio base, which allows the LIEMBRACE team to work from adjacent safe areas, secure surveillance coverage of this

[redacted]

[redacted]

target can be provided. During the 9-month period from 1 November 1965 through 30 July 1966, the LIMITED base provided 3,775 frames of operational photographs. In addition, the LIMITED base provided over 1,000 pages of physical surveillance reports.

2. LILYRIC

During the Project year under review, the LILYRIC installation provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the LIMERICK installation. The LILYRIC base not only provided the majority of the operational photographs produced by the LIEMPTY project, but also provided the most detailed physical surveillance reports. During the 9-month period cited in the LIMITED section above, the LILYRIC base provided over 6,500 operational photographs and 3,000 pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of all LIMERICK officers.

3. LICALLA

During the above cited 9-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the LIMERICK installation and its garden and patio area. This coverage provided over 3,600 individual photographs as well as numerous surveillance and observation reports. It should be noted that the LICALLA base allows Station Mexico City to observe the LIMERICK personnel during their off-duty and recreational hours.

B. Summary of Fixed Basehouse Effectiveness

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LICALLA and LILYRIC) provided approximately 17,000 individual frames of operational photographs during the first 9-month period of the past project year. Within the last year, this photographic coverage linked with the physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse, has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

1. Following the daily comings and goings of LIMERICK personnel and indigenous employees.

2. Confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors (some of whom are WOLADY citizens).

3. Ascertaining and verifying the relative rank and position as well as indicating the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers.

4. Providing detailed reporting on the movement and habit patterns of selected targets of special interest.

5. Providing physical facilities for the support of various operational, technical and surveillance operations.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. The Mobile Photographic Unit.

1. Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP Mobile photographic/support unit was regularly exploited and used by Station Mexico City. This unit provided over 1,000 individual photographs and was used in support of Station operations and activities. Of particular value to Station Mexico City and the JMTIGER program were numerous photographs of local and exile Communist leaders provided by LIENTRAP. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel and unit was used regularly to service and obtain various postal accommodation boxes used by Mexico City, Headquarters and other field stations.

D. Raymond H. GERENDE - LIEMPTY Principal Agent.

During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, Raymond H. GERENDE, continued in his role as the Project LIEMPTY principal agent. GERENDE operated as the full-time cut-out to the LIEMPTY, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses and bore the first echelon agent handling responsibility for the related personnel. In addition, GERENDE continued to bear the contact and handling responsibilities of the LIENTRAP unit and for the operator of the LIEMPTY photographic developing/processing laboratory, LIEMPTY-4. GERENDE's overall operational assignment involved at least 12 clandestine meetings per week, in addition to his meetings with the LIEMPTY Project case officer. It should also be noted that GERENDE made numerous and essential contributions to the sensitive AMROD operation and assisted the Station greatly with his detailed area knowledge in many instances.

E. Overall Effectiveness

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY Project contributed regularly and significantly to the fulfillment of Station Mexico City's operational program. Based on the continued excellent performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station strongly recommends that this project be continued during the forthcoming project year as an essential element of the Station's operational support apparatus.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY.

During the Project year under review there were no known incidents which adversely affected the security of Project LIEMPTY or the related personnel. The only significant problem encountered in the operation and administration of this project stemmed from the physical move of the LILYRIC personnel to the new base in the LIMOUSINE building. Numerous delays arising from the faulty performance of the local contractors and construction crews hampered a timely relocation of this base. However, it is anticipated that the new LILYRIC base will be in full operation by the end of October 1966.

[redacted]

5. LIAISON AND INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION.

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY.

6. PLANS.

A. As outlined in paragraph 6 of the Station's previous request for the renewal of Project LIEMPTY, a program was undertaken to reequip and modernize the LIEMPTY photographic processing base. During the past year, a significant portion of the equipment used in the developing and processing laboratory was replaced. As a result of this program, negatives and photographic prints of much higher quality are now being produced. Consequently, only minor changes in the operation of the photographic laboratory and its equipment are contemplated for the ensuing period.

B. The present physical condition, mileage and frequent use of the LIEMTRAP unit dictates the immediate replacement of this unit. Station Mexico City has received Headquarters approval for the replacement of this vehicle.

C. Other than noted above, Mexico City plans no significant operational, administrative or personnel changes, since it is generally felt that this Project is now operating at its optimum size and in a highly satisfactory manner. After 1 January 1967, the Station will review the existing LIEMPTY personnel salary schedule and consider possible raises, again on a selective basis or specifically keyed to the rising cost of living.

7. COSTS.

A. Past Project Year - Project LIEMPTY was previously approved for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for the amount of 41,500 U.S. currency. Station records indicate that thus far, Project LIEMPTY has expended 30,598.13 in the field. It is estimated that approximately 1,500 dollars has been expended by Headquarters, principally in the acquisition of new equipment for the LIEMPTY photographic laboratory. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by Raymond H. GERENDE to the Station finance officer via the Project case officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures made in the field. It is estimated that approximately 12 hours of case officer and 5 hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this Project. (This figure does not include the 40 hour-week put in regularly by Raymond H. GERENDE).

B. Ensuing Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of 45,000 U.S. currency for the period 1 December 1966 through 30 November 1967 (this figure represents only a slight increase over the amount programmed for the previous Project year). While no large expenditures are anticipated for the replacement of photographic equipment during the forthcoming period, an increase in the rental of the various basehouses will be encountered as well as the above-cited replacement of the

[redacted]

LIENTRAP unit. Of the amount requested above, 29,020 dollars should be allowed for fiscal year 1967 and 15,960 dollars for fiscal year 1968. A detailed breakdown of the Project expenditure by category and by fiscal year follows:

SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)

		FY 67	FY 68
Raymond M. GERENDE (P/A)	$ 7,000		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse-keeper)	3,900		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keeper)	4,000		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIENTRAP operator)	4,400		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIENTRAP operator)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-26 (Cut-out to LILYRIC)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC basehouse-keeper)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-27 (LILYRIC operator)	2,000		
	$30,900	$19,150	$11,750

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

		FY 67	FY 68
MV 2606 (GERENDE)			
MV 2279 (LIENTRAP unit replace)		(3,500)	
	$ 5,000	$ 4,315	$ 665

REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)

		FY 67	FY 68
LIMITED	3,000		
LILYRIC	1,800		
LICALLA	1,800		
Photo Lab	1,000		
	$ 7,600	$ 4,430	$ 3,170

EQUIPMENT

		FY 67	FY 68
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment			
	$ 500	$ 375	$ 125

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

		FY 67	FY 68
Purchase of film; rental of PO accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles; contingency fund			
	$ 1,000	$ 750	$ 250
TOTAL	$45,000	$29,020	$15,960

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all Project expenditures with appropriate receipts or certifications. There will be no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.

A. In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete or enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the majority of the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B. In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime openly hostile to LNFORT, limited contact could probably be maintained with the majority of the active Project agents. However, under the circumstances described above, it is highly probable that the activities of this Project would be somewhat curtailed.

C. Revised and up-dated emergency contact plans for use with Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-28355, dated 21 February 1966 and HMMA-28252, dated 9 February 1966).

[redacted]

Att #1 HMMA-30403

50-6-74/1

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Chief of Station, Mexico City

Acting Chief, WH Division

LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The LIEMPTY Project forwarded in HMMA-27569 expires on 30 November 1966. The renewal request should be forwarded to Headquarters by 1 November.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LIEMPTY CB
50-6-74/1

15 SEP 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HMMW-14856	1 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/C.	Bustos-Videla	/kaw	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	15	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	9/1	J. Fisher

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ef of Station, Mexico City

OM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 27569, 2 November 1965

1. The LIEMPTY Project was approved on 11 February 1966 for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 for a total of $41,500; $25,520 for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967.

2. There were no changes made in the Station's request for renewal, and no recommendations were made by the coordinating and approving authorities.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

17 February 1966

Bustos
LIEMPTY
50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER CS COPY HMMW 14343	DATE 21 FEB 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mep			4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1	2/17	J.H.V. Fisher

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2.

1. Station Mexico City's Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1965. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover in split transmission is the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

2. It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be renewed for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966 in the amount of $41,500. Of this total, $25,520 should be allotted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967.

for Willard C. CURTIS

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #[illegible] - Unit: [illegible]
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

Attachment:
Left hand side h/w
Right hand side u. s. c.

Distribution:
③ - C/WHD w/att h/w & u. s. c.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-27369

DATE
2 November 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

SECRET [redacted]

REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

PROJECT LIEMPTY

1. CURRENT OBJECTIVES

A) The overall objective of Project LIEMPTY, now in its eighth year of existence, is to collect operational information on the LIMERICK installation and personnel, as well as related targets of opportunity, through stationary and mobile photographic and physical surveillance mechanisms. Corollary objectives which are to be fulfilled through the use of the LIEMPTY installations and personnel are as follow:

1) To provide operational information pertaining to the daily activities and movements of the LIMERICK personnel, particularly those individuals of intelligence interest, as well as information on the LIMERICK physical facilities and visitors to the premises.

2) To collect operational information on persons associated with LIMERICK and on individuals known or suspected to have connections with opposition intelligence services or other hostile groups which are inimical to the interests of ODYOKE.

3) To provide operational support, countersurveillance, and other protective services to Station personnel and operations as may be deemed necessary.

B) The above objectives are to be fulfilled through the continued exploitation of the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA basehouses, the LIENTRAP mobile unit, and the services of long-time contract agent, Raymond H. GEREDE. These objectives are in consonance with and represent partial fulfillment of the following sections of the current Related Mission Directive (RMD) as approved for Mexico City Station:

PRIORITY A

Section 2, subsection b.

PRIORITY B

Section 1, subsection a.
Section 2, subsection a.

C) Throughout the project year under review, Project LIEMPTY continued to contribute directly and significantly to the fulfillment of the Station's and Headquarters' requests and requirements for coverage of various targets falling within the framework of the above cited objectives of the RMD. Specific examples of the LIEMPTY Project's progress and contributions to the RMD will be found in Section 3., EFFECTIVENESS.

SECRET [redacted]

2. CHANGES

A) Administrative - As noted in the regularly submitted LIEMPTY progress reports and the previous Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY (Section VI, subsection D), during the past two years it had become obvious that many of the operational assignments levied on Oliver G. SCANTLING (covered by Project LIEMPTY during six months of the past project year), while completely within the realm of the WHD, were falling outside the proper scope of Project LIEMPTY; consequently, a new Project was prepared by the Station and approved by Headquarters to cover KUBARK's relationship with and the support of SCANTLING. SCANTLING was therefore removed from the aegis of Project LIEMPTY on 1 May 1965 and integrated into the new close support Project LI[illegible]OR.

B) Operational - As noted in the previous Request for Project Renewal, all operational activity was suspended in late September 1964 at the LIMITED basehouse because of the potential security ramifications stemming from the overt publication of a LIMITED photograph in the Warren Commission Report. The Station subsequently acquired an apartment in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation and moved the LIMITED basehouse keepers into this temporary location. After a prudent cooling-off period, all LIMITED operational activities (photographic, physical surveillance, and radio dispatching) were re-initiated from the new location in early January 1965. During the interim period, and as a result of separate correspondence with Headquarters, the former LIMITED property was sold to LIMOUSINE, who as per formal agreement with the Station, demolished the old structure and began construction of a new edifice. Included in this formal agreement with LIMOUSINE is the proviso that one floor of the new building will be reserved for the sole use of Station Mexico City. Upon completion of the new structure, the LIMITED personnel and operational activity will be securely transferred from the temporary apartment to the new, more ideally located LIMOUSINE building.

C) Finance - After a detailed review of the then-existing LIEMPTY agent salary structure, 3 selected agents (LIEMPTY-9, LIEMPTY-11, and LIEMPTY-14) were granted salary increases effective 1 February 1965. (Formal notification and the pertinent revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment were forwarded to Headquarters with HMMA-26252, dated 1 June 1965). In addition, as per the Headquarters prepared contract ammendment, Raymond H. GERENDE was granted a salary increase effective 1 July 1965. There was no change in the salaries of the eight remaining active LIEMPTY agents.

D) Personnel - LIEMPTY-26 was granted a POA on 15 October 1965 for use as a cut-out to the LILYRIC basehouse. PRQ II information is being compiled and will be submitted in the near future. LIEMPTY-26 was actively used after receipt of the POA.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period under review, each operational component of Project LIEMPTY contributed actively to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the WHD and other Headquarter's requests. Highlights of the accomplishments and achievements of each component follow:

A) LIMITED - Throughout the past project year, with the exception noted in paragraph 2, section B. above, the LIMITED installation provided daily photo coverage and physical surveillance of the main gate of the LIMERICK installation during the afternoon and early evening hours. (During the morning hours, the LIMITED basehouse keepers prepared the typewritten surveillance reports and photographic logs covering the previous day's activities). In addition, the LIMITED installation provided a fixed radio dispatch base, used regularly to support the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Because of the tight security measures instituted by the local security forces in the immediate vicinity of the LIMERICK installation, normal stakeouts by this unilateral team are precluded. However, with the support of the LIMITED radio base, which can dispatch the team from adjacent safe-areas, secure and effective surveillance coverage of this target can be provided. During the ten-month period from 1 November 1964 through 30 August 1965, the LIMITED base provided 150 rolls of 35mm operational still photographs, which provided the Station with approximately 2,970 individual frames. In addition, the LIMITED base provided bi-weekly physical surveillance summary reports.

B) LILYRIC - The LILYRIC installation also provided extensive photographic and fixed visual surveillance of the front of the LIMERICK installation throughout the period under review, during the morning and early afternoon hours, with evenings being spent in the preparation of written surveillance reports and photographic logs. During the ten-month period from 1 November 1964 through 30 August 1965, the LILYRIC basehouse provided 5,060 individual frames (226 rolls) of 35mm operational photographs. In addition, the LILYRIC basehouse keeper provided 1,060 pages of physical surveillance reports covering the daily movements of the principal LIMERICK officers.

C) LICALLA - During the above-noted ten-month period, the LICALLA installation provided photographic and physical surveillance coverage of the back of the LIMERICK installation, the garden and the patio area. This coverage produced 153 rolls of 35mm film, which produced 4,174 individual photographs as well as bi-weekly physical surveillance summaries. In addition, various Headquarters specialists made night-time entries into the LICALLA basehouse for on-site clandestine surveys in support of a potential sensitive technical operation.

SUMMARY OF FIXED BASEHOUSE EFFECTIVENESS

The fixed LIEMPTY basehouses (LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA) thus produced over 12,000 individual frames of operational photographs during a ten-month period within the last year. This coverage linked with the related physical surveillance reports prepared by each basehouse has proven to be a most reliable and viable tool for:

i) following the daily movements of LIMERICK personnel;
ii) providing and confirming the identities of LIMERICK staffers and their visitors (some of whom were PBPRIMErs);
iii) verifying the relative rank and position as well as the specific intelligence service connection of various LIMERICK officers;
iv) provided detailed reporting on the movement patterns of selected targets of special interest; and
v) providing physical facilities for the support of various technical and surveillance team operations.

D) LIENTRAP - Throughout the period under review, the LIENTRAP mobile unit was heavily used and exploited by Station Mexico City. This unit provided 1,797 individual photographs of various targets of operational interest to Mexico City Station, particularly local Communist leaders and installations as well as various communist exiles now residing in Mexico City. In addition, the LIENTRAP personnel regularly serviced approximately twenty postal accommodation boxes used operationally by Mexico City, Headquarters, and other stations.

Specifically, the LIENTRAP unit:

i) provided and serviced accommodation boxes for the sensitive AMROD operation;
ii) provided photographic/casing coverage of an embassy of interest to KUTUBE/D for use in operational planning;
iii) provided up-to-date photos of individuals and an installation linked with the Spanish Republican (loyalists) group in Mexico; and
iv) provided identifications, locations, and contacts of various local and exile communists in support of recruitment/penetration programs directed against the Partido Comunista Mexicano, the Partido Popular Socialista, and various exile communist leaders.

E) OLIVER G. SCANTLING - During the six-month period in which he was covered by the LIEMPTY Project (see paragraph 2, section a.) Oliver G. SCANTLING contributed heavily to the fulfillment of the RMD. Specifically, SCANTLING: Served as the alternate Station contact to LICALLA-1, the singleton agent in a sensitive and productive LAURICLE operation; prepared numerous detailed casing reports three of which were in support of KUTUBE/D operational programs; conducted several pretext investigations; successfully recruited and handled an agent with access to the PBRUMEN Embassy, which resulted in two technical penetrations (LITOMANCE) of that hostile installation; made essential contributions to the AMROD operation in the form of translations and physical leg-work; and handled various LIEMPTY agents during the absence of the regular LIEMPTY Principal Agent, Raymond H. GERENDE.

F) RAYMOND H. GERENDE - During the period under review, with the exception of short vacation periods, GERENDE continued in his role as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent. This assignment entailed regular meetings with the LIERIC, LICALLA, and LIMITED basehouse keepers (or cutouts to these bases); regular contact with the operators of the [illegible] mobile photo unit; regular contact with the LIEMPTY photographic developing and processing base; and numerous operational tasks in support of the [illegible] operation. Specifically, this effort involved at least twelve clandestine agent or Case Officer meetings per week, the first echelon financial accountability for the expenditure of $36,000 per annum, in addition to various cover-job duties.

SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS

As outlined above, each individual operational component of the LIEMPTY project contributed significantly and regularly to the fulfillment of the overall operational program levied on the Station by the RMD and other directives. Based on the fine performance and overall contributions of this project, the Station concludes that this operation is essential to the fulfillment of the RMD and should be continued during the forthcoming year.

4. PROBLEMS AND SECURITY

The only significant operational/security problems which confronted the LIEMPTY project during the period under review, were those which stemmed directly or indirectly from the overt release of the clandestine LIMITED photographs published in the Warren Commission Report. The precise damage occasioned locally by the public disclosure of this clandestinely acquired information still cannot be measured. However, time-consuming personnel moves, with the attendant loss of coverage and additional cost as well as otherwise unnecessary expenditures of Station time and effort were required by this incident. (See paragraph IV of the 1964 LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request for details). Other than the above affair, there have been no operational, administrative, or personnel problems which the Station could not readily and securely resolve.

5. LIAISON AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Not applicable to Project LIEMPTY

6. PLANS

A) As further implementation of a program initiated during the latter portion of the past project year, Mexico City Station will continue to give increased emphasis to improving the quality of the photographic product from the LIEMPTY basehouses. While no concomitant reduction in the quantity of photographs is anticipated, the Project Case Officer, with the assistance of the local KURIOT representative will continue to emphasis the quality rather than the number of photographs. An ancillary objective of this program is to replace a significant portion of the equipment now used in the LIEMPTY developing and processing lab. Much of this equipment is over eight years old and no longer lends itself to the production of high-quality negatives or photographic prints. The total cost of this equipment replacement program is not expected to exceed $300 and sufficient funds have been included in the cost section of this renewal request.

B) Other than noted above, Mexico City Station plans no other significant operational, administrative or personnel changes, since it is generally felt that this project is now operating at its optimum size and in a completely satisfactory manner. After 1 January 1966 the Station will review the existing LIEMPTY salary schedule and consider possible raises, again on a selective basis.

7. COSTS

A) Past Project Year - Station records indicated that Project LIEMPTY expended $30,549.99 during the ten-month period from 1 December 1964 through 30 September 1965. Bi-weekly accountings with pertinent receipts and/or certifications were submitted by CIRENDE and SCANTLING to the Station finance officer via the project Case Officer for all LIEMPTY Project expenditures. It is estimated that approximately fifteen hours of Case Officer and five hours of analyst time is required each week to fulfill the operational, administrative and analytical requirements of this project.

B) Ensuing Project Year - It is requested that Project LIEMPTY be approved in the amount of $41,500 for the period 1 December 1965 through 30 November 1966. (The project was previously programmed for $30,000; [redacted] Of this amount, $25,520 should be allotted for FY 1966 and $15,980 for FY 1967. A detailed breakdown of project expenditures by category and by fiscal year follows:

SALARIES (INCLUDING CHRISTMAS BONUS)		FY 66	FY 67
Raymond H. GERENDE (F/A)	$7,000		
LIEMPTY-4 (photo lab)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-5 (photo lab assistant)	1,000		
LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED basehouse-keeper)	3,900		
LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA basehouse keeper)	4,000		
LIEMPTY-10 (LIEMTRAP operator)	4,400		
LIEMPTY-11 (LIEMTRAP operator)	2,600		
LIEMPTY-26 (Cut-out to LILYRIC)	2,200		
LIEMPTY-13 (LILYRIC basehouse keeper)	2,200		
	$29,900	$18,400	$11,500
VEHICLE MAINTENANCE			
MV 2606 (GERENDE) MV 2279 (LIEMTRAP unit)			
	$2,000	$1,190	$810
REAL ESTATE (RENT, UTILITIES)			
LIMITED (to include moving costs)	3,000		
LILYRIC	1,800		
LICALLA	1,800		
PHOTO Lab	1,000		
	$7,600	$4,430	$3,170
EQUIPMENT			
Maintenance and replacement of photographic equipment	$1,000	$750	$ 250
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES			
Purchase of film; rental of PO accommodation boxes; rental of vehicles;contingency fund			
	$1,000	$750	$250
TOTAL	$41,500	$25,520	$15,980

C) As in the past, Raymond H. GERENDE will submit bi-weekly accountings for all project expenditures with appropriate receipts and certifications. There are no requirements for foreign currency beyond the Station's capability to provide.

8. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

A) In the event of civil disorders or the evolution of complete or enforced neutrality on the part of the host government, it is now believed that regular operational contact could be maintained with the active LIEMPTY agents via Raymond H. GERENDE or in his absence, Oliver G. SCANTLING.

B) In the most unlikely event of the establishment of a regime hostile to ODYOKE, limited contact could probably be maintained with the active project agents through GERENDE or SCANTLING. However, under the conditions described above, it is doubtful whether this project would be able to operate against more than one-or two selected targets.

C) Emergency communications plans for Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H. GERENDE are on file in the Station and at Headquarters (see HMMA-15982 and HMMA-15981, of 25 November 1960). In addition, in late 1964, a review was held with all active agents of their recontact plans and verbal recognition signals.

Encl 1 HMMA-20052

50-6-71/1

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM
Mexico City

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

PAGE 1 OF 2

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

31

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UNIT WH/C TIME 1220 BY [illegible]

INFO
FILE, VR, ADDP, C/WH 6, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 012240Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 4616

1 Sep 65 IN 43837

[redacted] TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY.

1. LIEMPTY-10 RETRIEVED TWO LETTERS NONALCO BOX 25 AUG 65 WHICH GERENDE PASSED STA NEXT DAY. BOTH LETTERS ADDRESSED IN NAME OF BOX HOLDER (AN ALIAS OF L-10) AND CONTAINED RANDOM NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS. G AND STA INITIALLY FELT THESE PROBABLY SCANTLING TEST LTRS AND HELD SAME PENDING G' RETURN FROM GUADALAJARA 31 AUG.

2. SCANTLING EXAMINED LTRS 1 SEPT AND STATED THEY DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT HIS TEST LTRS. FURTHER EXAMINATION REVEALS ENVELOPES TYPED ON SAME MACHINGE AND ONE BEARS NO POSTMARK OR STAMPS ONLY NOTATION LIBRE DE PORTE. STA ASSUMES THESE LTRS PROBABLY SENT BY LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND THAT BOX COMPROMISED. DOUBT AMRIFT-1 COULD ARRANGE FOR INSERTION OF LIBRE DE PORTE LTR.. L-10 AND G SUSPENDING ALL LIEMPTY ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS SERVICINGS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

3. ADVISE.

S E C R E T

RECORDS C[illegible] SECRET

The following action is authorized: de-Kajrk

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #C30 - Unit WH/4/R

Note: If [illegible], cite reason and coordinate if appropriate.

[illegible]

50-6-74/1

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Expiration

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
REFERENCE: HMMW-13,350

The LIEMPTY Project expires on 30 November 1965. Please forward the renewal request so that it reaches Headquarters by 1 November.

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LIEMPTY
files
50-6-74/1

02 SEP 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-13,941 OS CO24

DATE
1 September 65

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-78/1

RI
Chrono

WH/1

ORIGINATING
OFFICE OFFICER TYPIST
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mep
EXT
4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
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RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL
C/WHD
DATE
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
William V. Broe

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (10)

DISPATCH

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CLASSIFICATION
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TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 24650

1. The LIEMPTY Project Renewal request forwarded in reference, was approved on 29 January 1965 for the period 1 December 1964 through 30 November 1965 for a total of $45,300; $27,675 for FY 1965 and $17,625 for FY 1966.

2. At the time of approval, Assistant KUDOVE stated he expects this project to live within the sum authorized for the year, and that there will be no amendment for additional funds.

3. As you were informed in HMMW 13282 in the dispatch on the LIEMBRACE Project Renewal, KUTUBE is interested in the problem of hostile monitoring of any radio communications from LIMITED. You should remain alert to this problem, and inform us if Headquarters can be of any assistance in helping you maintain communications security.

4. You are reminded that the LIEMPTY Project, as approved, only covers the salary for Oliver G. SCANTLING through 31 May 1965. It is suggested that a separate project be written to cover SCANTLING if his new duties do not fall entirely under any other approved project.

John N. CORNISH

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 13350

DATE: 8 FEB [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/1

RI
Chrono

ROUTING	INITIALS
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~~RID~~	
~~RID/~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/1
OFFICER / TYPIST: CBustos-Videla:jah
EXT: 4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PO/A		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WHD
DATE: 3 Feb
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: RAFORD W. HERBERT

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Removal of Oliver G. SCANTLING from Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-24650 dated 29 October 1964

1. As per section VI, ~~subsection~~ E, of the attachment to Reference (the Request for the Renewal of Project LIEMPTY), Station Mexico City is at present preparing a formal Project Outline to cover KUBARK's relationship with and the operational activities of Oliver G. SCANTLING. This activity involves the conduct and support of various operations targetted primarily against the local Soviet Bloc and PBRUMEN installations.

2. It is requested that Headquarters assign a cryptonym and a four-part file number in the 50-6 series for this proposed project.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD

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50-6-74/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25254	27 January 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

SECRET

STAFF REVIEW OF FI/CI PROJECT

RETURN TO: DDP/PG/FI-CI Projects 3 C 43

PROJECT: LIEMPTY

FUNDS: $45,300

CASE OFFICER: Charlotte Bustos-Videla

EXTENSION: 4506

ROOM: 3 B 2607

RECEIVED DDP PG: 29 Dec 64

FORWARDED: 31 Dec 64

DEADLINE: 14 Jan 65

RETURNED:

DIVISION: WH

STATION: Mexico City

TARGET AREA: Mexico

	ACTION		APPROVAL LEVEL	REVIEWING COMPONENTS							
	APPROVAL		DIVISION OR STAFF	X	FI OPS	X	CI/OPS	X	CCS		OTHER
X	RENEWAL	X	DDP	X	INT						
	AMENDMENT		DCI		D						
	EXTENSION										
	TERMINATION										

ROUTING OFFICE COMMENTS

COMMENT FOR INTERNAL STAFF USE (*Not to go forward to the Division*)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (*To go forward to the Division*)

The CI Staff concurs in the renewal of this extremely valuable CI/CE operational support project.

CC SENT DIV.
DATE 25 JAN 1965

DATE: January 1965

REVIEWING OFFICER: Frank [illegible]

FORM 7.63 526 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-40)

17 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EXO

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY

Renewal of this project is recommended. This operation continues to carry out the same type of activity it has engaged in for a number of years and its product continues to be important to our efforts against the Soviets and Communist Party in Mexico. The Station should carefully select the new operational assignment of Oliver G. SCANTLING so as to make best use of this long-time asset's considerable clandestine experience.

John Horton
C/WH/PO/A

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: C. Bustos-V
UNIT: WH/1 X4506
EXT:
DATE: 4 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
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ROUTING
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ROUTINE

TO: Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: OL 4, BPA, PGZ, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 68601

LIEMPTY

REFERENCE: MEXI 1799 (IN 35305)*

1. WE DO NOT PLAN MEET LIMOUSINE. PLS PROVIDE INFORMATION REQUESTED DIR 68139** AFTER NEGOTIATING WITH HIM AND BEFORE CONCLUDING AGREEMENT.

2. ANTENNA ROTATOR REQUESTED IS BEING POUCHED WEEK 7 DECEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY

OL/RECD/Edward Denison (phone)

WH/Log/McMahon (phone)

WH/PO/A

WH Comment:
*LIMOUSINE in States this week and probably could be reached if Hdqs wished discuss sale of LIEMPTY property in person. Station indicates LIEMPTY would be sold at land value only as house value not pertinent since house to be razed. Asked whether Antenna Rotator would arrive Station by Christmas.
** Headquarters approves in principle selling LIMITED property to LIMOUSINE. Advise complete sales price for hdqs concurrence prior to concluding agreement with LIMOUSINE. Also attempt determine at least approximate rental cost for LIMITED apartment and advise.

RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WHD

W. J. [illegible]
Chief, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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31 SECRET

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FROM Mexico City

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

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INFO VR, FILE, OL 4, RPA, PG 2

E C R E T 031833Z

IR CITE MEXI 1799

13 DEC 64 IN 35305

MMEDIATE ACTION

IEMPTY LIMITED LIMOUSINE

EFS A MEXI 1762 (IN 31737)

B DIR 68139 *

* HQS APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE SELLING LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE.

1. LIMOUSINE IN PBPRIME HIS WEEK. PROBABLY COULD BE REACHED THROUGH MATHEW P. DINGHLEY IF HQ DESIRES PERSONAL DISCUSSION. AS STATED REF A, FIRST FIGURES GIVEN REPRESENT LAND VALUE WHICH ONLY ONE WORTH CONSIDERING FOR PURPOSE THIS SALE. HOUSE VALUE NOT PERTINENT SINCE HOUSE TO BE RAZED. OWING AGE OF HOUSE, DOUBTFUL SALE OF MATERIALS VILL EVEN COVER DEMOLITION COSTS. APARTMENT RENTAL NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL LIMOUSINE RETURN AND DECISION MADE AS TO SIZE AND CONFIGURATION OF APT.

2. IF ANTENNA ROTATOR REQUESTED IN HMMA-24630 NOT ALREADY OBTAINED, AND AN OTHER SEFVICEABLE ROTATOR AVAILABLE FROM SURPLUS, PLEASE UBSTITUTE. REQUEST ADVISE IF CAN BE SHIPPED TO BE HERE BEFORE CHRISTMAS.

S A C R E T

SECRET

LIEMPTY

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 17

33 SECRET

ROUTING R/

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ORIG: C. Bustos Videla:mmd
UNIT: WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT: 4507 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 1 December 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50 6 74/1

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO OL 4, BPA, PG 2, VR, FILE

30 DEC 64 03z
ROUTINE
SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 68139

LIEMPTY LIMITED

REF: MEXI 1762 (IN 31737)*

HDQS APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE SELLING LIMITED PROPERTY TO LIMOUSINE. ASSUME THIS IS AT TOTAL TAX VALUE INCLUDING LAND AND HOUSE. PER PARA TWO REF, WE APPROVE HIS DEFERRING PAYMENT OF LAND VALUE FOR THREE YEARS. ASSUME HE WILL PAY HOUSE VALUE IMMEDIATELY. ADVISE. COMPLETE SALES PRICE FOR HDQS CONCURRENCE PRIOR TO CONCLUDING AGREEMENT WITH LIMOUSINE. ALSO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE AT LEAST APPROXIMATE RENTAL COST FOR LIMITED APARTMENT AND ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SEP Carter
C/WH/SS Brown
WH/LOG Mc[illegible]
WH/FI
OL/RECT [illegible] Denison

WH COMMENT: *According to Office of Logistics information the original purchase price in 1955 was $12,000 and the Station made $3,500 of repairs and renovation.

R. W. Herbert for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

[illegible] J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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3 SECRET

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FROM Mexico City

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, PG 2

SECRET 272340Z

DIR CITE MEXI 1762

LIEMPTY

CP

28 Nov 64 IN 31737

REF DIR 65696 (IN 96996)
MEXI 1307, 20 OCT 64

1. STATION HAS TWO BANK EVALUATIONS OF PROPERTY, ONE BY BANCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO OBTAINED BY SCANTLING IN PSEUDO AND OTHER BY BANCO AZTECA AT LIMOUSINE BEHEST. RESPECTIVE EVALUATIONS ARE: LOT 185,266 AND 180,600 PESOS; TOTAL TAX VALUE 255,575 AND 249,242 PESOS WHICH OF COURSE INCLUDES PRESENT HOUSE. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN TWO APPRAISALS NOT SUFFICIENT WORRY ABOUT SINCE FOR BUILDING PURPOSES ONLY LAND VALUE PERTINENT, AND DIFFERENCE HERE LESS THAN 5000 PESOS, SO BELIEVE CAN DISREGARD OTHER FIGURES.

2. LIMOUSINE HAS ALSO HAD PLANS MADE FOR 4 STORY BUILDING ON PROPERTY, GROUND FLOOR COMMERCIAL AND THREE FLOORS OF APTS, ONE OF WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE RESERVE FOR LIMITED AND ALTER AS STATION WISHES. SMALLER BUILDING NOT DEEMED WORTHWHILE INVESTMENT. COST STUDY SHOWS BUILDING COULD PROBABLY BE PUT UP FOR ABOUT 535,900 PESOS, OF WHICH LIMOUSINE COULD BORROW ABOUT 433,000 FROM BANK. JUDGES BUILDING COULD BE FINISHED WITHIN 5 MONTHS OF BEGINNING DEMOLITION PRESENT STRUCTURE. LIMOUSINE WOULD PUT UP

SECRET

FROM OWN FUNDS WHATEVER NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT BANK LOAN. IN ORDER REGAIN BULK OF OWN INVESTMENT, WOULD LIKE DEFER PAYMENT TO US OF LAND VALUE FOR 3 YEARS. MEANWHILE ALTHO WILL REQUIRE ANOTHER APPRAISAL FROM BANK MAKING LOAN, THIS WILL PROBABLY NOT DIFFER MUCH. FOR PURPOSES GENERAL AGREEMENT BELIEVE AVERAGE OF ABOVE TWO APPRAISAL FIGURES FOR LOT CAN BE TAKEN FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

3. LIMOUSINE NOT YET AWARE OF INDEPENDENT EVAL, BUT WILL INFORM HIM IN ORDER ARRIVE AT FIRM FIGURE FOR NEGOTIATION IF HQ APPROVES IN PRINCIPLE.

4. NOTE THIS SOLUTION IDEAL FOR STATION, SINCE RETURNS PROFIT OF ALMOST 5000 DOLLARS ON ORIGINAL INVESTMENT AND RELIEVES KUBARK OF ONUS OWNING AND ADMINISTERING PROPERTY AS WELL AS GIVING LIMOUSINE FAVORABLE CHANCE PROFIT WITHOUT ANY COST TO KUBARK.

5. WHILE RENT OF LIMITED APARTMENT NOT SET, KUBARK CAN COUNT ON GETTING FAIR SHAKE. DO NOT BELIEVE RENT FIGURE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN DECISION.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 12

24 SECRET

ORIG: Bustos-Videla:jah
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 27 Nov 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

ROUTING

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TO: Mexico City
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH-8
INFO: PG-2, VR, File CP

27 Nov 64 20 33z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO PRTY MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 67069

LIEMPTY

SINCE PROJECT MUST BE SUBMITTED BY 30 NOVEMBER REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY TO DIR 65696, 20 NOVEMBER 1964.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: DIR 65696 of 20 November 1964 requested Station to XXXXXXXX clarify question of whether the LIMITED basehouse was to be razed and rebuilt or moved. Costs must be included in project renewal.

Liempty Dal

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 20 November 1964

☐ INDEX 34
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

ROUTING
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20 Nov 64 21 45z
ROUTINE
SIG CEN

TO : Mexico City
CP
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE, PG 2, C/CA

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

55696

LIEMPTY

REF: DIR 58997*

SINCE ANY MONEY REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTION COSTS LIMITED BASEHOUSE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN PROJ RENEWAL, AND IN VIEW COMMENTS PARA SIX A OF HMMA 24650 LIEMPTY PROJ RENEWAL REQUEST, PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER YOU PLAN ANY ACTION ON REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Gave hdqs ideas on advisability of razing and reconstructing building containing LIMITED basehouse.

Liempty P+P

J Horton
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION
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PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION PUSHED
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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO :

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED : FYI

REFERENCES : HMMW-10391, 31 Jan 62

The LIEMPTY project will expire on 30 November 1962. The Station is requested to forward its renewal request as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/1

DATE TYPED
27 Sep 62

DATE DISPATCHED
4 - OCT 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10951

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74 /1

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	f
RID/MIS	gm
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3 Mexi	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/3/Mexico - OFFICER: Lee G. Norris: TYPIST: js - EXT: 5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	26 SEP 1962	J. C. King

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 17999, 31 October 1961

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 12 January 1962 for a total of $49,500; $29,500 for FY 1962 and $20,000 for FY 1963. The renewal request submitted in HMMA 17999 was approved without change.

2. Attached for the Station's information and records is a copy of the memorandum prepared at Headquarters forwarding the Station's request for renewal. Please note how Headquarters broke down the cost structure into fiscal years. Next time the project is submitted for renewal, it is requested that this breakdown be supplied by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City, w/att.

~~RI, w/o att.~~
WH/Registry, w/o att.
WH/3/Mexico/chrono, w/o att.

RI/FI

DATE TYPED
28 Jan 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
31 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 10391

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C/Bustos	rmr	C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King 10391

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION PURSUED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE : HMMW-10074, 8 September 1961

The LIEMPTY Project will expire on 30 November 1961. The Station is requested to forward its request for renewal as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

ROUTING | INITIAL
RI/AN
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RI/FI

DATE TYPED
2 Nov 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
3 NOV 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10209

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. T. Furney	baf	C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	11-2-61	J. C. King 10209

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-17999
[redacted]-1930

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/1

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
31 October 1961

SUBJECT
- LIEMPTY Project Renewal

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Renewal of Project.

REFERENCE(S)

Attached are the requisite number of copies of the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

30 October 1961

Attachment:
As stated above.
Even pages herewith.
Odd pages under separate cover.

Distribution:
(3) - WHD (with five copies of attachment):
2 - Files (with one copy of attachment)

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: Ce Kapok
Signed: Elena Palmer
R.O. #030 - Unit WH/4/R
If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY

TYPE OF ACTION		☒ FI/CI	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: WH	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL: FY 1962	BRANCH: 3	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: J. G. Heyn	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 1013 / BUILDING: Barton Hall	EXTENSION: 2555/3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	John G. Heyn John G. Heyn					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman Ned P. Holman	21 NOV 1961				
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter Robert D Carter	22 NOV 1961				
WH/PO/A	Clarke W. Simmons	[illegible]				
C/WH	J. C. King by Jacob D. Esterline	12-5-61				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 December 1961	30 November 1962	$ 49,500	1962	$ 29,500
			1963	$ 20,000

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG/FI/Proj		

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

50-6-74/1

(5)

14-00000

DD/P2-0234

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY (Renewal)

WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 December 1961 through 30 November 1962. This project provides for physical and photographic surveillance operations in support of Mexico City Station operations, particularly those directed against Soviet personnel and installations.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $43,500 from the DD/P-WH Division budget: $23,500 in fiscal year 1962, and $20,000 in fiscal year 1963 subject to the availability of funds. This estimate includes $33,500 for salaries of three contract agents and eleven indigenous agents; $3,500 for operational expenses, including QP vehicle operation and maintenance, new safehouse procurement, post office boxes, purchase of information, and rental of vehicles; $1,000 for repair, maintenance, and replacement of photographic equipment; and $5,500 for maintenance of three safehouses.

3. The attached request for renewal discusses project activities in the past period. Contract Agent Oliver G. SCANTLING (p), serving as an investigator, has continued to follow-up on leads developed from other operations; has been the primary source of information on residences of Soviet Embassy personnel; has provided investigative information on several cases of CI interest; and has trained surveillance assets in Monterrey. He also handled the LINLUCK surveillance team during the time Contract Agent Simon J. CLACKETT (p) was absent from Mexico. The project segment under the direction of Contract Agent Raymond H. GERENDE (p) continued to collect operational information on the Soviet Embassy through photographic surveillance; and to provide operational support

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50-6-74/1

to the Station in the form of rental of safe-quarters, counter-surveillance, and procuring and servicing letter drops. The Division feels that both aspects of the project are worthwhile to the Station's activities. It considers that the project is now operating at optimum size and does not plan to expand. In the coming period efforts will be made to refine and better use the existing organizational arrangements.

4. Appropriate Special Staff elements recommend renewal of this project.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIEMPTY as presented.

S. M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: Richard Helms
COP-DD/P

12 JAN 1962
Date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIEMPTY
FI Memorandum

Staff Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/J. Baine
For CI Staff -s/F. Hughes
For CCG -s/J. Southard

50-6-94/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY

Foreign Intelligence Staff recommends approval of the renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

50-6-74/1

SECRET

21 November 1961

LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1962 through 30 November 1963 for a total of $49,500; $29,500 for Fiscal Year 1962 and $20,000 for Fiscal Year 1963. These amounts can be broken down as follows:

	FY 1962	FY 1963
Salaries	24,000	15,500
Transportation	1,100	900
Operational Expenses	3,900	3,100
Operational Equipment	500	500
Totals	29,500	20,000

2. It is not anticipated that any training will be required during the next project year.

3. Emergency recontact instructions for Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING are on file at Headquarters.

4. This project is primarily a support asset and does not provide positive intelligence.

5. WH Division strongly recommends renewal of this project which covers some of the most valuable investigative and support assets available to Mexico City Station.

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50-6-74/1

SECRET/[redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

FIELD CASE OFFICER
Quinton N. OUSLER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

The attached project action is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1961 through 30 November 1962.

SECRET/[redacted]

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SECRET/[redacted]

Review of Project LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND PRODUCTION

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." SCANTLING has continued (See the last two Project Reviews forwarded as attachments to HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959, and HMMA-15979, 18 November 1960) to provide worthwhile information pertaining to this objective.

a. During the past year SCANTLING has continued to be used to follow up leads produced by LIENVOY. For example, operational information recently indicated that the LIMERICK target was using the services of a Mexico City firm to repair safes. Through discreet investigation SCANTLING was able to identify the firm, its location and the name of the owner in the event that we later wished to make an approach to him or to exploit this information in another manner.

b. SCANTLING is still the Station's primary source for keeping current records on the residences of the many LIMERICK personnel in Mexico City. This is accomplished in several ways; the most important being SCANTLING's follow up of all LIENVOY leads which indicate the LIMERICK people are interested in renting a given piece of property. (See previous project renewal request for additional details).

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." SCANTLING is very useful for collecting information on other Station targets:

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[illegible] HMMA-17[illegible]

50-6-[illegible]

a. On the basis of a request to the Station from the ODACID Chief, SCANTLING was sent to Puebla to be an eyewitness to the 4 June 1961 Catholic inspired anti-CASTRO demonstrations. Not only did SCANTLING obtain the desired information, and samples of many of the leaflets used, but he prepared his report for the Station in time for the COS to give the ODACID Chief a briefing at 1000 hrs., 5 June 1961. SCANTLING does an excellent job on this type of assignment due principally to his ability to observe and report objectively.

b. SCANTLING was instrumental in establishing that Fernando LLANES Cavero and his wife were living at a local Mexico City address. This case has been of considerable counterespionage interest to Headquarters.

c. SCANTLING has continued his contributions to the Paul Frederick KIRSCHHOFF case by periodic interviews with the subject's neighbors and associates.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings, and surveillances." SCANTLING has contributed to this objective both directly and indirectly as will be noted by the examples listed below:

a. SCANTLING devoted a lot of time to the surveillance and attempted recruitment of Abel ARTEAGA, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban Embassy. SCANTLING talked with ARTEAGA several times and undoubtedly was primarily responsible for the later success of the recruitment made by another Station agent.

b. Some additional time was devoted to the Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez case in February 1961 when SCANTLING determined that GONZALEZ was still in Mexico City. See the last renewal for additional details on this case.

c. In connection with the above objective SCANTLING has performed numerous pretext and neighborhood investigations for the Station. SCANTLING also does most of the local investigations requested by ODACID and other ODYOKE components.

d. SCANTLING spent six weeks during July and August of this year giving tradecraft and surveillance training to LIPAILS 5 and 7 from Monterrey. Although this is not a direct contribution to the above objective, it is considered sufficiently related to mention here.

4. In addition to his contributions to the above objectives, SCANTLING is used for miscellaneous support requirements from the Station. For example, SCANTLING is now handling LIEMBROIL-2 and will continue to do so until the return of LIMOTOR-14 in June 1962. Also, during the past project year, SCANTLING handled the LIRICE surveillance team until July 1961 when Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) returned to Mexico City. SCANTLING is also used to spot and rent safe houses and apartments for other Station operations.

5. As stated in the preceeding Requests for Project Renewal, although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY Project objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses." Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA, contribute to this objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute to the above objective. There has been no change in the coverage as described in the 1960 Request for Project Renewal.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." The LIENTRAP operation, handled by GERENDE, is still the major contributor to this

objective. In addition to performing numerous photographic assignments in support of other Station operations, LIENTRAP devoted nearly four months, on a fulltime basis, to coverage of the LIERODE operation. For several weeks the entire "take" from the LIERODE target was recorded from the LIENTRAP vehicle. Later, the LIENTRAP agents operated the LIERODE technical gear from the initial LIERODE stationary base.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE is used frequently to rent hotel rooms and apartments for other Station operations and activities. GERENDE's comprehensive area knowledge and personal operational capabilities combine to make him an extremely valuable Station asset for such support activities. GERENDE also procures and services post office box letter drops for the many Station operations requiring them.

4. The quality and quantity of operational information produced by the photographic bases and other activities under GERENDE's control and supervision is considered worthwhile. The Station concludes, therefore, that this segment of the LIEMPTY Project should be continued.

C. Relationship to Related Mission Directive Objectives:

As stated in the previous project renewal, it can readily be noted that Project LIEMPTY has provided support to many Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furthereance of the Related Mission Directive. The project has not produced any positive intelligence nor has it been intended that it should do so. The project's sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

II. CHANGES

There have been no changes in the LIEMPTY Project during the past project year except that SCANTLING relinquished control of the LIRICE (formerly LIJERSEY) surveillance team in July 1961 in accordance with previous plans.

III. EFFECTIVENESS

There has been no change in Project LIEMPTY which would alter the validity of the remarks made in Section III of last year's project renewal request.

IV. PROBLEMS

The security problem in connection with the LICALLA operation, which was described in last year's renewal request, is still present but has not caused any known difficulty. At Headquarters suggestion in HMMW-9736, the LICALLA base was reactivated on 29 May 1961. The base operator has been cautioned to be ever alert for any unusual incidents which might indicate that the base has been compromised. This is the only problem experienced by the LIEMPTY Project during the past project year.

V. PLANS

The Station considers that the project is now operating at its optimum size and does not plan to expand it during the coming year. Rather, efforts will be devoted to refining and better utilizing the existing project organizational arrangements.

VI. COSTS

A. Past Project Year - Station finance records indicate that Project LIEMPTY expended $21,458.00 during Fiscal Year 1961 (1 December 1960 - 30 June 1961) and has thus far during Fiscal Year 1962 (through 30 September 1961) expended about $11,000.00. It is anticipated that about $8,000.00 will be expended during the last two months (October and November 1961) of the project year. This will make a total expenditure during the project year of about $40,500.00, or some $12,500.00 under the budget estimate of $53,000.00.

B. Ensuing Period - Of the total $49,500.00 budget, itemized below, $29,500.00 should be expended during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1962 and the balance, $20,000.00 should be expended during Fiscal Year 1963. Normal accounting procedures will be used for all expenditures.

AGENT	U.S. $ PER ANNUM	
Raymond H. GERENDE	$ 5,520.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING	5,000.00	
Louise J. MACRINO (@ $2.02 per hour)	1,500.00	
LIEMPTY-4	2,200.00	
LIEMPTY-5 (@ $1.75 per hour)	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-6	3,000.00	
LIEMPTY-7 (No Salary)	-0-	
LIEMPTY-8	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-9	3,000.00	
LIEMPTY-10	3,900.00	
LIEMPTY-11	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-12	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-13	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-14	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-19	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-24 (No Salary)	-0-	
Christmas Bonuses 1961	2,580.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 39,500.00

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES		
Maintenance of MV-2279, 2284 and 2286.	$ 2,000.00	
Procurement of Safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles.	1,000.00	
Purchase of information, identification documents, and bribes.	500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		3,500.00

OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT		
Repair, maintenance and purchase of replacement photographic equipment.	$ 1,000.00	
SUB-TOTAL		1,000.00

REAL ESTATE

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 3,000.00	
*LICALA	1,500.00	
LILYRIC	1,000.00	
SUB-TOTAL		5,500.00
GRAND TOTAL		$ 49,500.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

VII. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

Please refer to last year's request for project renewal and HMMA-15982, 23 November 1960, and HMMA-15981, 23 November 1960

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50-6-74/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	[illegible]
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The LIEMPTY Project will expire on 30 November 1961. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched to reach Headquarters by 1 November 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH3/Mexi/Chrono

ROUTING
RI/AN D.K.
RI/TY J
WH/3/MEXICO
~~[illegible]~~

DATE TYPED
6 September 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
8 SEP

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-10074

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	J.A. Brooke 7 Sept 61 J.A.Brooke bj	AC/WH3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING /s/ Holman 10074

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMA-14793, 8 April 1960

1. The LIEMPTY Project Renewal was approved on 3 February 1961 for a total of $53,000; $31,900 in fiscal year 1961 and $21,100 in fiscal year 1962.

2. No comments were made by the coordinating Staffs.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED 13 February 1961	DATE DISPATCHED 15 FEB 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-9491	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3 Mexico	C. [illegible]ehrum	new	C/[illegible]/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	2/14/61	Paul P. Payton

[illegible]/[illegible]
C/WH/Mexico
BR
TY
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USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Request for Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: See below

REFERENCE: HMMW-8515, 25 February 1960

Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1960. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 15 November 1960

DATE DISPATCHED: 18 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9261

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-74/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

[illegible]
~~2~~ - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono

BR

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	R. Hultslander	bj C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	[illegible]	J.C. KING. Paul P. Paxton

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 61(3) WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-15979 [redacted]-1842

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 18 November 1960

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - Renewal of Project

REFERENCE(S)

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

Attached are the requisite number of copies of the Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

16 November 1960

Attachment:

As stated above. (Even pages forwarded herewith)
(Odd pages under separate cover)

Distribution:

3 - WHD (with five copies of attachment)
2 - Files (with one copy of attachment)

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: de-Keyed

Signed: [illegible]

R.O. #630 - Unit WH/1/R

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY
HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
OPERATING DIVISION: WH
Charlotte L. Zehrung
FIELD STATION: Mexico City
ROOM NO.: 1015 Barton Hall
EXTENSION: 2555/3162
TARGET AREA: Mexico
DATE: 13 December 1960

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961 for a total of $53,000; $31,900 for fiscal year 1961 and $21,100 for fiscal year 1962. The LIEMPTY Project was programmed for $85,000. During the past project year, approximately $59,880 was obligated.

2. This Project provides operational support to the Station and is not a source of positive intelligence. Examples of operational data developed through this project are given in paragraph I of the attached Station Review of Project LIEMPTY. There have been no disseminations made at Headquarters of intelligence produced through LIEMPTY.

3. The only training provided LIEMPTY personnel during the period under review was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. He is being given training in basic flaps and seals techniques so that the Station will have a trained agent outside the Station who will be able to provide this service if required. No further training for GERENDE or any of the other LIEMPTY agents is being contemplated for the coming year.

4. Attached for the information of the Staffs is a dispatch from the Station (HMMA-14793) dated 8 April 1960 which answers the questions raised at the time of the last renewal.

5. With reference to Paragraph VII, Emergency Condition, contained in the attached Project Review, the Mexican desk has on record in the permanent file of Raymond H. GERENDE and Oliver G. SCANTLING, the details of emergency recontact instructions which have been agreed upon between the Station and each Agent.

6. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed on the basis of the attached Project Review.

COORDINATION:

Ned P. Holman
Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

C. W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WHD Proj. Officer

Approved for Transmittal : R. W. Herbert /for
J. C. King, C/WHD

12/30/60
DATE

ATTACHMENTS: (4)
- Review of Project LIEMPTY
- Copy of HMMA-14793
- Form 680
- Folder with past renewals

SECRET / [redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY

(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

COVER SHEET

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY FIELD CASE OFFICER Quinton N. OUSLER

STATION Mexico City CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis Willard C. CURTIS

The attached project action is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1960 through 30 November 1961.

[illegible] -HMMA-15979 SECRET / [redacted] CS COPY [illegible] 74/1

SECRET/[redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY
(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND PRODUCTION

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." SCANTLING has continued (See the last Project Review forwarded as an attachment to HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959) to provide worthwhile and significant information pertaining to the above objective. There follow a few examples of SCANTLING's production:

a. A detailed casing of the LIMERICK electrical power supply was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-14496, 12 February 1960. The production of this type of operational information, which takes several weeks to compile accurately, illustrates the unusual talents possessed by SCANTLING together with his valuable contributions to the Station's operational information collection effort.

b. SCANTLING has been used frequently to follow up leads produced by LIFEAT/LIMERICK (now produced by LIENVOY). For example, in May 1960, LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was having considerable contact with an AGENCIA ROBLES concerning the handling of incoming and outgoing shipments. By discreet investigation, SCANTLING was able to provide the Station with additional pertinent information about the address, owner and type of business engaged in by the firm. Such information then becomes readily available for exploitation should a LIMERICK shipment of particular interest come to the attention of the Station.

c. SCANTLING is the Station's primary investigative asset for keeping track of current residence addressees of LIMERICK personnel. The Station considers it important from the counterespionage standpoint to maintain information on the location of all

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LIMERICK residences. In addition, specific targets are continually considered for LICOOL installations. A recent example of SCANTLING's efforts in this connection would be the spotting and acquisition of the LIMOTOR base in the same apartment building with LITALOK -1. Contributions of this type operational information are quite time consuming due to the necessity for checking out several apartments that a LIMERICK individual may initially be considering as a residence.

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." As indicated below, SCANTLING is also extremely useful for collecting information on targets other than LIMERICK:

a. In March 1960 SCANTLING was instrumental in locating property adjacent to the LITABBY installation which the Station has since rented in anticipation of initiating photographic and technical operations. SCANTLING was able to accomplish this assignment only after a thorough casing and pretext investigations of the several pieces of property appropriate for such operations.

b. SCANTLING is also used to follow up sensitive leads in connection with LIFEAT and LIENVOY production from LITABBY and sister targets (See example as to type under I,A,1, b and c above).

c. SCANTLING was used as an investigative asset to determine the local address and exact employment of Gordon William GROVES (201-220025), a counterespionage case of interest to Headquarters and ODENVY.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments debriefings, and surveillances." As examples of SCANTLING's contribution to this objective, the following cases are listed:

a. SCANTLING devoted a considerable amount of time to his attempts to locate Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez, a known agent of a Communist Country. He followed various leads on GONZALEZ from March to August 1960 before

GONZALEZ was finally identified and his Mexico City home and business addresses were ascertained. See HMMA-15626, 9 September 1960, for further details on this case.

b. The preliminary investigative work on a KUSODA case of priority interest was conducted by SCANTLING. During this investigation it was necessary for SCANTLING to travel to Aquascalientes, Guanajuato and Minatitlan to obtain the information required by Headquarters. See the attachments to HMMT-1416, 20 May 1960, for the results of the investigation.

4. In addition to his contributions to the above objectives, SCANTLING is used for miscellaneous support requirements of the Station. For example, SCANTLING handled several of Raymond H. GERENDE's (ps) operations while the latter was away from Mexico City during August and September 1960. Also, SCANTLING has been managing the LIJERSEY surveillance team since the departure of Simon D. CLACKETT in August 1960. It is hoped that SCANTLING can be relieved of this assignment as soon as the LITEMPO project is approved. SCANTLING has also been used to spot and rent safe houses for various Station operations, a valuable operational support service.

5. As stated in the preceeding Request for Project Renewal, although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY Project objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses." Together with their extensive photographic coverage of the LIMERICK target, the photographic bases also contribute other types of operational information:

a. LIMITED - This base compiles daily logs indicating all arrivals, departures and, where possible, identities of every person visiting or working at the LIMERICK target.

This information is particularly useful in keeping track of LIMERICK personnel and assisting with the identification of visitors to the installation. Also, LIMITED maintains a summary attendance list of LIMERICK employees on a daily basis; this enables the Station quickly to ascertain the presence or absence of an employee on any given day. Finally, one other significant service is performed by this base, the radio dispatching of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel and targets of opportunity. LIMITED's photographic coverage is still concentrated on visitors, as opposed to employees, to the LIMERICK installation. A recent example of the base's contributions to Station efforts is the case of Joseph Ralph MAURI. In this case, a LIENVOY lead indicated that an American might visit the LIMERICK target on a certain day. The base was alerted to dispatch the radio-controlled surveillance team on any person appearing to be an American. The results of this assignment were indicated in MEXI-6392 and several other cables. LIMITED was also able to provide photographs, which when compared with photographs provided by Headquarters, left no question as to MAURI's identity.

b. LILYRIC - This base's output of high-quality clandestine photographs has been in about the same quantity as last year. In addition, the base operator, LIEMPTY-14, prepares weekly reports on LIMERICK employees and their wives. LILYRIC also performs the assignment of noting and reporting the license plate numbers of all cars bringing visitors to the LIMERICK installation. LILYRIC photographs also are concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed to employees. It should be noted that LILYRIC operates for photographic coverage during the hours from daylight to 1400 hours each day of the week except Sunday. The LIMITED base maintains photographic coverage from 1400 hours to darkness each day except Sunday.

c. LICALLA - As reported in previous correspondence, the LICALLA base contributes to the collection of operational information through photographic coverage of LIMERICK employees and their families. Also, the base operator, LIEMPTY-9, supplies extremely worthwhile information pertaining to the apparent positions and jobs of the target employees. He accomplishes this objective by careful observation and analysis. LICALLA also maintains a daily attendance roster of all LIMERICK employees. LICALLA coverage of the target, both photographic and physical observations, enables the Station to keep abreast of LIMERICK personnel changes, a vital contribution to the Station's counter-espionage effort.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." The LIENTRAP operation, handled by GERENDE, is the major contributor to this objective. It has been possible for LIENTRAP to take photographs and to perform pretext investigations in support of numerous Station activities. The cases listed below are cited as examples:

a. In the case of Cesar GONZALEZ Sanchez (see I, A, 3, a, above) LIENTRAP was able to procure photographs of GONZALEZ at his Mexico City residence which, when compared to Headquarters provided photographs, left no doubt that GONZALEZ was the subject of interest to Headquarters.

b. LIENTRAP confirmed the identity of Olga CASTILLO de Ledon, a frequent visitor to the LIMERICK installation and an ardent supporter of the present Cuban regime, through a pretext investigation of the residents of an apartment building where CASTILLO was believed to live. Later, LIENTRAP supported the results of the investigation with excellent photographs of the subject.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE is used frequently to rent hotel rooms and apartments for other Station operations and activities. GERENDE's comprehensive area knowledge and personal operational capabilities combine to make him an extremely valuable Station asset for such support activities. GERENDE also procures post office box letter drops for the many Station operations requiring them.

4. It is the Station's conclusion that the money and case officer time expended on this segment of the LIEMPTY project is worthwhile and should be continued in view of the quality and quantity of operational information produced.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity." During this project year the LIJERSEY surveillance team under the direction of CLACKETT began contributing to the Station's support efforts through pretext investigations and physical surveillances. Some examples of the team's work are listed below:

a. Rafael TISCHLER Guzman (201-64372) is a Guatemalan Communist which the team had under surveillance from November 1959 to April 1960. The surveillance, together with information acquired from other sources, eventually resulted in an unsuccessful recruitment attempt on TISCHLER.

b. Pericles FRANCO Ornes (201-64546) - FRANCO is a Dominican of interest to the Station. The LIJERSEY team devoted portions of five months, January to May 1960, collecting information on subject through physical surveillance.

c. Jose Maria "Chema" LOPEZ Valdizon (201-   ) was the subject of a physical surveillance during May and June 1960. LOPEZ was later deported from Mexico through the efforts of LITEMPO-2.

d. CLACKETT and the LIJERSEY team performed numerous pretext investigations on Station targets of opportunity and on three separate occasions during the project year served as a counter-surveillance escort for Station officers in other operations.

2. CLACKETT, just prior to his resignation in August 1960, spent about five weeks giving tradecraft and operational skills training to LITEA-1. Although not specifically covered by the project objectives, this ability on CLACKETT's part is considered a significant contribution to the Station's support efforts.

3. In view of CLACKETT's resignation, which was effective 31 August 1960, and the proposed transfer of the LIJERSEY team to the LITEMPO project, this segment of the LIEMPTY project will not be renewed. However, for the record, it is considered that the CLACKETT segment of LIEMPTY was worthwhile and the expenditure of Station assets in connection with LIJERSEY operations were justified.

D. Relationship to Related Mission Directive Objectives:

It can readily be noted that Project LIEMPTY has provided support to many Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furtherance of the Related Mission Directive. The project has not produced any positive intelligence nor has it been intended that it should do so. The project's sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

II. CHANGES

A. Simon D. CLACKETT

The unexpected resignation of CLACKETT in August 1960 has necessitated the decision as how best to utilize the LIJERSEY surveillance team and still benefit from the training and experience gained by the team during the past year. As explained in the LITEMPO project outline, it was decided that the LITEMPO Staff Agent would have the time, the need and the requirements to handle and manage the LIJERSEY team on a regular basis; consequently, the Station believed that such a solution to this problem would permit the Station to continue to profit from CLACKETT's past efforts.

B. Oliver G. SCANTLING

Since CLACKETT's departure, SCANTLING has been handling the LIJERSEY team as an interim measure pending Headquarters approval of the LITEMPO project. SCANTLING has been exposed to, and likewise knows, only one of the team members, LIEMPTY-20. SCANTLING is known to L-20 only by an alias.

C. Personnel Changes

1. LIEMPTY-15 - Member of the LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-2.

2. LIEMPTY-16 - Member of the LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-3.

3. LIEMPTY-20 - Assistant Team Leader of LIJERSEY surveillance team - Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-1.

4. LIEMPTY-25 - Most recent addition to the LIJERSEY surveillance team. Transferred to Project LITEMPO and cryptonym changed to LITED-4.

5. There have been no other personnel changes within the LIEMPTY project, excepting the resignations of Simon D. CLACKETT and Wilma J. FIORDALISI.

III. EFFECTIVENESS

A. General comments pertaining to the value of the project efforts to the Station's needs - The Station is of the opinion that its operations are only as good as the support mechanisms backstopping and contributing to them. The availability of unilateral support agents and organizations, such as the LIEMPTY Project, to investigate leads and to collect operational information is an indispensable ingredient to the Station's espionage and counterespionage objectives. The Station would be seriously handicapped in its operational activities should the support services of such agents as GERENDE, SCANTLING and the agents under their control be suddenly made unavailable.

B. LIMERICK Target - The basis for most of the Station's counter-espionage activities directed against the LIMERICK target require detailed knowledge of the identity, activities and fellow associates of LIMERICK personnel. The LIEMPTY photographic basehouses undoubtedly provide more of this type information than any other Station operation. The production from LIEMPTY photographic bases and from the LIENVOY project provide the Station with the large majority of LIMERICK leads.

C. Targets of Opportunity - The immediate availability of independent assets to perform investigations, photographic assignments and other essential types of support services in connection with Station targets of opportunity represent an operational advantage which this Station considers highly significant. It is due to such LIEMPTY assets that an agent can be sent to distant areas in Mexico to do investigations, that photographs can be made of individuals and places which are of operational interest and apartments and hotel rooms can be acquired in fictitious names in support of sensitive operations and activities.

D. Although the progress and success of any support project depends upon requirements from other Station operations, it must be concluded that Project LIEMPTY has indeed been effective during the past project year.

IV. PROBLEMS

A. Security - The activities of the LICALLA base were suspended in September 1960 as a direct result of the arrest of three KURIOT technicians by the Cuban Government. One of the technicians was known to have knowledge of the four LIMUST units (LICALLA is located in one of these units) and the Station considered it appropriate to suspend photographic operations pending resolution of the situation. At this time, there is no indication when LICALLA operations will be resumed. The LICALLA base operator has reported that there have been no unusual inquiries or other suspicious actions which might indicate that LICALLA has been compromised to LIMERICK personnel; however, such a possibility will exist until the release of the three technicians. No other security problems have occurred during the past year.

V. PLANS

A. Processing of Photographs - During the past year considerable progress has been made in the Station's handling, i.e., sorting, indexing, identifying leads and filing, of photographs produced by the several bases.

B. Photographic Techniques - The previous LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request indicated that the Station planned to try new techniques using HY-PAN film in night photography. HY-PAN film was used on a trial basis during daylight hours with poor results. Almost invariably, prints from HY-PAN negatives were too grainy and, consequently, were of little use in producing good identified shots of individuals. In view of these experiments, night photography has not yet been attempted. It should be noted that Eastman Kodak's new TRI-X PAN film, which all bases and LIENTRAP now use, is superior to any film previously used by the Station for clandestine photography. The quality of all base photographs have been increased considerably as a direct result of this new film.

C. General Comments - The Station believes that the GERENDE segment is now operating under optimum organizational arrangments and there are no plans for expansion contemplated at this time. It is expected that SCANTLING will soon be relieved of his interim responsibility for the LIJERSEY team and can concentrate more on his investigative and casing activities. The transfer of the LIJERSEY team to Project LITEMPO reduced Project LIEMPTY activities by an appreciable amount. It is not planned, during the coming year, to expand present LIEMPTY activities.

VI. COSTS

A. Past Project Year - Station finance records indicate that Project LIEMPTY expended $19,120.91 during Fiscal Year 1960 (1 December 1959 - 30 June 1960) and has thus far during Fiscal Year 1961 (through 31 October 1960) expended $16,734.69. Contract Agents salaries and allowances paid by Headquarters bring the total expenditures for 11 months of the project year to approximately $50,000.00. An additional $4,000.00 will be obligated during the 12th month of the project year. This will bring total project expenditures to about $54,000.00 for the entire project year.

B. Ensuing Period - Of the total $53,000.00 budget, itemized below, $31,900.00 should be expended during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1961 and the balance, $21,100.00, should be expended during Fiscal Year 1962. Normal accounting procedures will be used for all expenditures.

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AGENT	U.S. $ PER ANNUM	
Raymond H. GERENDE C-32143	$ 5,040.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING C-26803	4,560.00	
Louise J. MACRINO C-41452 (@ $2.02 per hour)	2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-4 C-51872	2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-5 C-58482 (@ $1.75 per hour)	1,500.00	
LIEMPTY-6 C-29948	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-7 No Salary C-31075	-0-	
LIEMPTY-8 C-31074	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-9 C-56699	2,800.00	
LIEMPTY-10 C-5598	3,600.00	
LIEMPTY-11 C-41439	2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-12 C-36226	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-13 C-46945	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-14 C-61168	1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-19 C-74579	1,000.00	
LIEMPTY-24 No Salary C-75022	-0-	
Christmas bonuses all personnel	2,500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 38,000.00

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

Maintenance of MV-2279, 2284 and 2286.	$ 2,000.00	
Operational Travel	500.00	
Procurement of Safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles.	2,000.00	
Purchase of information, identification documents, and bribes.	2,500.00	
SUB-TOTAL		$ 7,000.00

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OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Repair and maintenance of camera equipment.	$ 500.00		
Purchase of replacement photographic equipment and supplies.	2,000.00		
SUB-TOTAL		2,500.00	

REAL ESTATE

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 3,000.00		
*LICALLA	1,500.00		
LILYRIC	1,000.00		
SUB-TOTAL		5,500.00	
GRAND TOTAL			$53,000.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

VII. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

As regards the requirement listed in CSI-F No. 230-60, Annex A, for communications arrangments in the event of "Emergency Conditions," the Station does not anticipate that this project would or could continue to function under its present objectives. However, both principal agents, SCANTLING and GERENDE, would very possibly be worthwhile sources of information to maintain contact with under any adverse conditions. Both of these agents identify themselfs, in terms of ideology, motivation and perspective, more as Americans than as Mexican nationals (which they are). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that SCANTLING and GERENDE would become valuable contacts in any emergency situation.

CS COPY

The Station is aware that the previous project renewal stated that emergency communications arrangments were being made. The Station has finally obtained the U.S. addresses of relatives through whom GERENDE and SCANTLING could be contacted under most situations. This information will be forwarded separately.

COPY

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-8515

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-74/1

DATE:

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED Paragraph 2 - Please submit detailed review of - usefulness and value of the photo basehouses. Are three justified?

REFERENCE(S) HMMA-14093, 13 November 1959

1. The LIEMPTY Project was renewed on 8 January 1960 for the period 1 December 1959 through 31 November 1960 for a total of $84,910; $48,485 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425 for fiscal year 1961.

2. The following staff comments were made during the renewal process:

a. KUDESK notes that the CI value of the project is difficult to judge since it appears that much of the material produced remains in the Station for exploitation. However, KUDESK remarks that the value of the project should be increased when the CLACKETT surveillance team enters into active operation. KUDESK suggests that the Station be queried as to the pretext or circumstances under which SCANTLING frequently visits Inez Parada de Moreno, the occupant of the property adjacent to the Soviet installation.

b. KUTUBE/OPS notes that while the project review presents a clear picture of the aims and objectives of the various segments, it does not provide, except in the case of SCANTLING, detailed indication of the value or usefulness of the other segments, particularly the photographic activity. KUTUBE/OPS requests that the Station provide such an appraisal during the first quarter of 1960. KUTUBE/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness. KUTUBE/OPS notes that, in the absence of further proof of usefulness, the color photography and moving pictures appear to be an unnecessary luxury. KUTUBE/OPS commends the careful handling of the CLACKETT segment and requests that the next project action include examples of the team's progress.

3. The TVA approval for the additional vehicle was forwarded under Dispatch No. HMMS-1211. The MV number assigned by JBECHO is MV 2320. The usual Delegation of Procurement authority is being forwarded by JBECHO channels.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

19 February 1960

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Log
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico Chrono
- ~~1 - RI~~

WH/3/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

25 Feb 60

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]K

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14093
[redacted]K-1733

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/1

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
13 November 1959

SUBJECT
Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED
Renewal of Project LIEMPTY

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

- ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
- ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

Attached is a review of Project LIEMPTY activities during the past year.

Renewal of the project is requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNOusler/vps
10 November 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/5 copies of attachment

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: [illegible]
R.O. #C39 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

50-6-74/1

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT: Project LIEMPTY Renewal

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER

Name C. Zehrung
Room 2121 Barton
Ext. 2555
Date 9 December 1959

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1959 through 30 November 1960 for a total of $84,910.00; $48,485.00 for fiscal year 1960 and $36,425.00 for fiscal year 1961. LIEMPTY was last approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380; of which it is estimated $74,259 has been obligated.

2. It is requested that the Project be renewed on the basis of the Project review prepared by the Station which is attached.

3. The security incident referred to in paragraph IV.B on page 6 of the attachment, occurred on 20 September 1959. While on an operational assignment LIEMPTY/10 and the LIENTRAP vehicle were temporarily detained by the Servicio Secreto de Mexico (Mexican Secret Service). At the time of the incident the LIENTRAP vehicle was carrying out an assignment of photographing a Cuban rally which it was expected would be attended by many of the leading Mexican and Central American Communists. The police were also covering the meeting for the purpose of preventing a Communist-inspired demonstration and they searched LIENTRAP believing it might contain Communist propaganda. When they saw the film they seized the film, the truck and LIEMPTY-10 with the belief the Communists had filmed some rough-handed techniques used by the police against some persons attending the rally. LIEMPTY-10 was held under unofficial custody for approximately 26 hours before his release was obtained. When a member of the Station using State Department cover intervened with the police on behalf of LIEMPTY-10, the film, LIENTRAP, and all the equipment were also returned in tact. LIEMPTY-10 had not been interrogated and had not been formally charged or booked. Although the FBI representative and the U.S. Embassy Security Officer also learned of the incident, the Station does not believe that this incident has materially effected the security of the Project. The Station, however, is allowing a one month's cooling off period for the LIENTRAP vehicle and LIEMPTY-10.

Attachments:
- Project review (in quad)
- Envelope with past renewals
- Memo Justification of Purchase of Auto
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

f. R.N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C.W. ANDERSON, WH/FI

for J.C. KING, C/WHD

14/XII/59
DATE

SECRET/[redacted]

PROJECT REVIEW

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

FIELD CASE OFFICER Quinton N. OUSLER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Based on the attached REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY, it is requested that the Project be renewed for the period 1 December 1959 through 30 November 1960.

SECRET[redacted]

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

SECRET/[redacted]

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIEMPTY
(For the Purpose of Project Renewal)

I. PRODUCT OF THE PROJECT

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities." During the past year SCANTLING has devoted a significant amount of time to the furtherance of this project objective. Although other Station operations and personnel are also concerned with the collection of operational information about LIMERICK personnel, SCANTLING's contributions are unique as to type and complement information received from other sources. For example, SCANTLING is used primarily as the source of information about LIMERICK physical facilities. He is constantly on the alert for building modifications, construction activities and the kinds of outside services utilized by the LIMERICK installation. He regularly visits Inez PARADA de Moreno, the occupant of property adjacent to LIMERICK, for the purpose of obtaining a close view of the interior grounds of LIMERICK and to debrief Senora de Moreno about any unusual activities which she may have observed. At the present time SCANTLING is preparing a thorough casing report on the electrical power supply used by LIMERICK and all other residences and establishments in the same block. This operational information is intended for KURIOT's use and will show all transformers in the block, electrical meters for measuring the amount of electrical power used and the precise points where wires enter each property. Because of his other sensitive activities and because other operational activities provide adequate coverage, SCANTLING has been used sparingly for physical surveillances and investigations which might conceivably impair his future usefulness to the Station. During the time he spent training Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) in radio controlled mobile surveillance, SCANTLING did perform some surveillance work at the LIMERICK installation; however, it was concerned mostly with briefing CLACKETT on dispatching techniques and the procedures used for the control of several vehicles on a surveillance team using two-way radios.

2. "To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico." By far the most important contribution made by SCANTLING in connection with this project objective has been his support to the LITACIT operation and just recently actually gained entry to the LITACIT target using a pretext cover story. During this visit SCANTLING managed to collect highly valuable operational information about the security of the installation, which has added materially to KUBARK's knowledge about ~~the~~ target. SCANTLING has also cased and prepared reports on the LITABBY target in anticipation of mounting

SECRET/[redacted]

a photographic surveillance and in initial preparation for a future LINIMENT type activity. SCANTLING has performed investigations of numerous other Station targets of opportunity which, depending on their significance, have been reported in separate correspondence.

3. "To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings and surveillances." This objective was included in the LIEMPTY project because SCANTLING is used to follow up LIFEAT leads and leads obtained from the LIEMPTY photographic bases. During the past year SCANTLING has investigated a quantity of leads obtained from the above sources. The information resulting from these investigations has enabled the Station to maintain current data on the various firms used by the LIMERICK target and in one instance, Octavio VIDALES (201-), caused the Station to make a recruitment pitch in an effort to carry out a technical penetration of the LIMERICK target. Although VIDALES was not recruited, the Station anticipates that SCANTLING will some day be successful in just this type of activity. SCANTLING is the Station's principal source for the follow-up of LIFEAT/LIMERICK and LIEMPTY photographic base house leads as they pertain to the primary target.

4. Not covered by a specific project objective but, nevertheless, of significant importance to the Station are SCANTLING's contributions to the overall Station support efforts. In addition to the extensive training given to CLACKETT, SCANTLING also prepared a detailed and sophisticated radio dispatch procedure for use by the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. He devised a superior method for numbering streets which enables the radio surveillance team to specify a location without reference to street names and areas. The entire radio dispatch code, when used properly, practically defies identification as the conversations of a clandestine surveillance team. From the standpoint of Station security, SCANTLING conducted an investigation of LIVESTOCK-2 based on two leads which were 30 years old and reported significant information which contributed to the Station's final decision to terminate LIVESTOCK-2. SCANTLING's other support activities consist of renting hotel rooms and apartments in fictitious names, supporting operations such as LICOOL-12 by performing sentry duty and by serving as a capable and responsible cutout between the Station and agents from other geographical areas.

5. Although SCANTLING's LIEMPTY objectives can never be completely fulfilled, it is the Station's opinion that SCANTLING has made important and valuable contributions to LIEMPTY Project objectives specifically and to other Station activities in general. SCANTLING's production, measured against monetary expenditures, case officer time and other intangible factors, unquestionably justifies his continuation as an integral part of Project LIEMPTY.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through the use of photographic base houses." This continuing objective is carried out by three photographic base houses, LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA. During the project year, LIMITED produced approximately 3600 photographs and LILYRIC about 4500 pictures of individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK target. Most of these photographs were of non-LIMERICK individuals of which only a small, but significant, percentage could be identified through license plate checks or other types of routine investigation. The LICALLA base produced approximately 4300 photographs during the year. Most of the LICALLA photographs were of LIMERICK employees and their families and have been of considerable value in maintaining current and accurate listings of LIMERICK personnel in Mexico. The LICALLA base has recently begun taking motion pictures of LIMERICK personnel conversing in the garden area. These movies are being forwarded to KUTUBE/D for the possible exploitation of lip reading analysis. The LIMITED base, in addition to its photographic assignment, is also used as the radio central for dispatching the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on LIMERICK personnel targets. All bases make routine reports on the daily attendance of LIMERICK employees at the installation which facilitates the Station's reporting on the arrival and departure of LIMERICK personnel. Also, the bases devote time to reporting the personal associations among the numerous LIMERICK employees. Some of this latter type information is valuable from the standpoint of confirming that LIMERICK intelligence officers have a tendency to associate with their colleagues.

2. "To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity." This is a broad objective and one which is contributed to by the LIENTRAP operation. LIENTRAP is used to provide photographic coverage of important Station targets which do not justify a more permanent photographic base. During the period under review, LIENTRAP has been used for the timely coverage of various Central American exile group activities, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL) headquarters, several counterespionage targets, the LITACIT and LITABBY targets and other one-time operations of intelligence interest. The operational information produced by LIENTRAP is used by the Station for increasing operational knowledge about a target and, when appropriate, has been incorporated in separate reports to Headquarters with other information about specific targets.

3. "To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances." GERENDE, because of his area knowledge and operational acumen, is used frequently by the Station for renting hotel rooms and apartments in fictitious names for use on other Station operations. He is also the Station's principal procurer of local Post Office boxes for use as letter drops. This objective pertains entirely to the operational support of other Station operations and is an invaluable ingredient to the security of important Station activities.

4. The production of operational information as represented by LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP is an important adjunct to the Station's coverage of the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity. It is the Station's conclusion that the expenditure of KUBARK assets, i.e., money and case officer time, is justified and that these activities should be continued.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment (discussed in relation to project objectives):

1. "To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity." Very little production has been realized from this objective in terms of CLACKETT's contributions. CLACKETT returned to Mexico in early April 1959 after receiving surveillance, tradecraft and photography training in Headquarters. He then spent the rest of April, May and part of June being trained by SCANTLING in mobile surveillance techniques. Then LIEMPTYs 15, 16, 17 and 20 were placed under his supervision and he began training these agents in the arts of foot surveillance and mobile surveillance. This team, known as the LIJERSEY team, is just beginning to show the excellent effects of CLACKETT's intensive training sessions. Although LIEMPTY-17 has resigned and the team consists of only four agents, including CLACKETT, the Station believes that the team will be ready within the next month to begin its contributions to the above objective.

2. Based on the training time devoted to CLACKETT and to the LIJERSEY team and the anticipated production during the coming project year, it is the Station's opinion that this activity should be continued.

II. EXTENT TO WHICH THE RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN FURTHERED.

Project LIEMPTY has provided support, in varying ways, to a majority of Station operations and in this manner has been a contributing factor to the furtherance of the Related Mission Directive. The project is not intended nor designed to produce positive intelligence; its sole purpose is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations.

III. PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING Segment:

1. SCANTLING's duties and responsibilities are basically the same now as they were when the original LIEMPTY project outline was submitted. Since SCANTLING is the only major factor in this part of LIEMPTY, progress, other than covered in the above section on production, can be measured only by the fact that SCANTLING is a year older and has acquired a few more helpful tricks of the trade

and, consequently, has increased his own operational abilities.

2. Insofar as future planning is concerned, SCANTLING will continue to devote the greater portion of his time to the LITACIT operation. In addition, he will continue his work against the LIMERICK target, i.e., investigating LIFEAT and photographic base house leads in connection with the objectives of the LIEMPTY and LIMESA projects. The Station still plans to maintain SCANTLING as an independent Station asset free from the responsibilities of supervising other agents and operations.

3. SCANTLING will probably continue providing administrative support to LIEMPTY-3 (now covered under the LICOOL project), but will not be responsible for the operational direction of L-3.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE Segment:

1. During the past year the three photographic base houses have been trained in the use of a faster type film (HY-PAN) to facilitate the taking of photographs on dark cloudy days. One base, LICALLA, has made tests and recently begun making 35mm color slides using the new fast type Ektachrome film. This film is now processed in the Mexico Station dark room which heretofore was not possible. It is the Station's opinion that a few color photographs of target personnel will be useful for identification purposes. The LICALLA Base has also, during the past year, begun taking 16mm motion pictures in color with the expectation that Headquarters can eventually provide lip reading analysis of conversations taking place in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

2. Other operational progress has been made in connection with relieving GERENDE of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team. This now leaves GERENDE with a sufficient amount of time to supervise all photographic base houses, LIENTRAP and the outside photographic laboratory.

3. Future planning in relation to this segment does not call for expansion. Rather, the Station plans to perfect some of the photographic procedures now in use and to experiment with night photography possibilities using the fast HY-PAN film with telephoto lens of varying lengths. GERENDE will also concentrate on increasing the security and communications procedures used with each base.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT Segment:

1. CLACKETT's assumption of responsibility for the LIJERSEY surveillance team has been a progressive step for the development of an additional and much needed support asset. Although the LIJERSEY team has been in existence for several years, it was only during the past year, with the assignment of

CLACKETT, that an intensive effort was made to train the team members and to place them under the supervision of a full time team leader. As mentioned above, CLACKETT has done an excellent job during the past few months in getting the team ready for future operational assignments.

2. The Station plans, during the coming year, to increase the strength of the LIJERSEY team by at least two agents and one car. This would then give a total LIJERSEY complement of six agents and three radio cars. The Station will continue to take all necessary precautions not to rush the development of the team nor to give it assignments which are too complicated and too difficult. It is anticipated that the team will begin some surveillance work within the next month on targets connected with plans for an expanded Communist Party penetration program.

IV. PERFORMANCE OF PRINCIPAL AGENTS IN TERMS OF PRODUCTION, SECURITY AND COVER.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING - As should be expected from a well trained and motivated agent, SCANTLING's production during the period under review was excellent. His production is in the category of operational information rather than positive intelligence and is based on leads and investigations given him by the Station. He never fails to do a thorough and detailed job on all assignments given to him. He is an unusually valuable principal agent. There have been no security problems or developments during the past year in connection with SCANTLING's assignments. Likewise, his cover is very good and places him in a position to maintain his work for KUBARK for many years to come.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE - Since GERENDE's marriage in December 1958, his performance has improved to a marked degree. He has become one of the Station's most dependable agents in terms of promptness for meetings, completing operational assignments as rapidly as possible and in doing any task, regardless of how menial it may be. Insofar as the Station and GERENDE know, his cover with LISTERINE's firm has held up very well. In fact, GERENDE recently was able to negotiate a sales contract with a customer having a very large sales capacity for the product manufactured by LISTERINE's firm. This, of course, endears GERENDE to LISTERINE in addition to contributing to GERENDE's cover employment. The only significant security incident pertaining, in part, to GERENDE was in connection with LIENTRAP (please see HMMA-13951, 16 October 1959, for details).

C. Simon D. CLACKETT - CLACKETT's performance has definitely measured up to the standards expected by the Station. He has proved that he is conscientious, dependable and very quick in grasping the details of clandestine activities. He will undoubtedly continue to improve his personal performance as he gains more experience. There have been no security problems or incidents in connection with CLACKETT's assignment to this Station. Although the notional cover provided by Headquarters has held up very well during the past few months, the Station had hopes of placing him in LILABEL's firm and obtaining Inmigrante papers for him. However, for reasons mentioned in other correspondence, this cover arrangement did not work out. The Station is continuing efforts to locate another suitable local cover job for CLACKETT.

V. CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION.

A. Oliver G. SCANTLING - The Station Case Officer meets with SCANTLING on the average of three times each week. For regular meetings, a total of eight prearranged contact points are used alternately with SCANTLING "walking the beat" and being picked up by the Case Officer in the latter's car. This procedure enables both the agent and the case officer to check themselves and to check each other for possible surveillance. Meetings are generally of short duration, seldom more than 30 minutes, and are held in the car. It is possible for SCANTLING to get in touch with his case officer by telephone, and vice versa, in case an unscheduled meeting is necessary. SCANTLING and the Station are currently working on the details of an emergency means of contact utilizing SCANTLING's wife's relatives in PBPRIME. Headquarters will be advised of these arrangements to facilitate contact with SCANTLING in the event Mexico is overrun by hostile forces and contact with the Station is severed.

B. Raymond H. GERENDE - GERENDE's Case Officer meets with him five times each week. Meetings are conducted in the Case Officer's car using the same procedures as outlined above. GERENDE and his Case Officer have a total of 11 contact points in different areas of the city and generally hold their meetings during the early morning hours, usually about 0800. As in the case of SCANTLING, GERENDE and his Case Officer are preparing an emergency contact procedure which will facilitate Headquarters communications with him through his relatives in PBPRIME Headquarters will be advised of these arrangements just as soon as they are completed.

C. Simon D. CLACKETT - The Station Case Officer meets with CLACKETT on the averageof three times each week. The same type of communications procedures as used for SCANTLING and GERENDE are employed with CLACKETT.

VI. PERSONNEL.

A. Personnel dropped from the Project:

1. LIEMPTY-3 - Now carried under the LICOOL Project.

2. LIEMPTY-17 - Resigned. Termination report forwarded to Headquarters.

3. LIEMPTY-18 - Wife of LIEMPTY-3. Now carried under the LICOOL Project.

B. New personnel not previously listed under the Project:

1. LIEMPTY-19 - Position: Support Agent. Wife of Raymond H. GERENDE. OA granted 13 August 1959 per HMMW-7988, dated 19 August 1959, and amended per DIR-41523, 26 August 1959. See PRQ, Parts I and II, for additional information. C [illegible]

2. LIEMPTY-20 - Position: Agent member of LIEMPTY/LIJERSEY surveillance team. OA granted 2 July 1958 per HMMW-6572, dated 12 July 1958. See PRQ, Parts I and II, for additional information.

3. LIEMPTY-24 - Position: Wife of LIEMPTY-9. She does not receive a salary nor does she actively participate in LIEMPTY-9's activities. OA granted 14 September 1959 per HMMW-8099, dated 25 September 1959. [illegible]

VII. ESTIMATED COST OF PROJECT FOR COMING YEAR.

Compensation: (Note: Sufficient funds are indicated to provide for later justified raises to agents.)

AGENT		U. S. $ PER ANNUM
Raymond H. GERENDE		$ 4,560.00
Oliver G. SCANTLING		4,200.00
LIEMPTY-4		2,000.00
LIEMPTY-5 at $1.75 per hour		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-6		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-7	No Salary	- 0 -
LIEMPTY-8		1,500.00
LIEMPTY-9		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-10		3,600.00
LIEMPTY-11		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-12		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-13		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-14		1,400.00
LIEMPTY-15		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-16		1,800.00
LIEMPTY-19		1,000.00
LIEMPTY-20		1,000.00
Wilma J. FIORDALISI		4,040.00
Louise J. MACRINO at $2.02 per hour		2,500.00
LIEMPTY-24	No Salary	- 0 -

Four additional agents at $2,000 per year		$ 8,000.00	
Simon D. CLACKETT -			
Salary	$ 7,750.00		
Quarters	1,800.00		
Education Allowance	360.00		
Travel	1,000.00	10,910.00	$ 61,910.00

Operational Expenses:

Automobiles (4 cars and 1 truck) (Maintenance, operational expenses, replacement of parts.)	$ 3,000.00	
Travel of agents by commercial carrier	500.00	3,500.00

Operational Equipment:

Purchase of one used auto for LIJERSEY Surveillance Team	$ 3,500.00	
Purchase of one base radio for LIJERSEY Team	1,000.00	
Repair and maintenance of radio and camera equipment	1,000.00	
Purchase of new photographic equipment and supplies	2,000.00	7,500.00

Real Estate:

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses:

*LIMITED	$ 2,500.00	
*LICALLA	1,500.00	
LILYRIC	1,000.00	5,000.00

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

Funds for procurement and servicing of additional safehouses, post office boxes and renting automobiles	2,000.00

Exchange commodities (required as good will gifts)	**$ 1,000.00**
Damages (broken contracts, "key" money to obtain locations in choice areas, rent deposits, etc.)	**2,000.00**
Purchase of information, purchase of identification documents, payment of bribes, etc.	**2,000.00**
TOTAL	**$ 84,910.00**

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-8136

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-74/1

DATE: 6 OCT 1959

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY/Request for Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED : See below

REFERENCE(S)

Project LIEMPTY expires on 30 November 1959. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 November 1959.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

1 October 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/M.C.HAWKINS:ngs

CS COPY

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW 7899

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-119523
50-6-74/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY Project Amendment
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED

RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. On 16 July 1957, an amendment to the LIEMPTY Project was approved granting permission to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560 per year. No additional funds were requested for the Project.

2. A request to amend GERENDE's contract to include the benefits listed above has been submitted. You will be notified when the contract has been amended.

3. A copy of the approved Project amendment is attached for your information and records.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
OLIVER G. CALBOND
The following action is authorized: de-Rybat
Signed: Gloria J Palmer
R.O. #630 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

21 July 1959

Attachment:
- 1 - (RYBAT)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/III/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
- 1 - Subject
- 2 - RI/CRO

WH/III/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

50-6-74/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMW-7522

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-74/1

TO
INFO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)
HMMA-12236

1. The LIEMPTY Project Amendment was approved on 30 March 1959 to include the addition of a contract agent, Louise J. MACRINO to furnish administrative support to the Project, and also to formalise a special commitment made to Oliver G. SCANTLING. No additional funds were approved under this amendment.

2. Attached for the Station's information and records is a copy of the approved project amendment request.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 April 1959

Attachment:
2 pages (KAPOK)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City (w/a)
- 1 - WH/Mailroom (wo/a)
- 1 - WH/Mexico (wo/a)
- 1 - RI (wo/a)

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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PAGE NO.

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7342
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-163574 50-6-74/1
FROM : Chief, WH		DATE 20 FEB 1959
SUBJECT : Operational/LIEMPTY-20		RE: "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None, for your information.		

REFERENCE(S): HMMA-12114, 6 February 1959 ([illegible])

1. Headquarters appreciates the reference dispatch which forwarded a revised PRQ, Part II, on LIEMPTY-20 and requests that Operational Approval be amended for his use under the LIEMPTY Project. In view of the fact that the Station plans to use Subject in a surveillance capacity, his original clearance, granted on 2 July 1958, authorizes use under the LIEMPTY Project.

2. [illegible] has been notified of Subject's present Project status and has been requested to note the change of cryptonym.

3. In view of the fact that the Station has not made any outstanding commitments to LIEMPTY-20 and because the LIEMPTY Project authorizes the recruitment of a surveillance team, it is not necessary to take formal action to include Subject under the Project at this time.

WALTER S. [illegible]

16 February 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
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- 1✓ 50-6-74/1

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50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-12236

TO Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-85613
50-6-74/1

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
19 February 1959

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Louise J. MACRINO

RE "433" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Extend Subject's contract and include under LIEMPTY

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-7263, 13 February 1959

1. The Mexico City Station regrets overlooking the expiration of MACRINO's contract. During recent months, she has been able to work only a limited amount because of ill health (primarily a heart condition). Most of her work during the past eight months has been devoted to typing selected information reports on report mats and doing routine non-sensitive translation work.

2. It is requested that MACRINO's contract be renewed for one year with the same salary and other provisions. She can appropriately be placed under the LIEMPTY project as a Station support asset. For project administrative purposes, she is being assigned the LIEMPTY/23 cryptonym. Station believes that sufficient LIEMPTY funds are already available to cover her salary payments during the remainder of the LIEMPTY project year.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
19 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

File 50-6-74/1
Liempty/[illegible]
Place

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
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PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-12155

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-233889
50-6-74/1
201-229407

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DATE: 11 February 1959

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

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SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/Change of Cryptonyms

ACTION REQUIRED: Change cryptonyms as requested below.

REFERENCE(S): HMMW-7257, 30 January 1959, Paragraph 5.

It is requested that the cryptonyms of the individuals named in paragraph five of reference be changed to LIEMPTY/21 and LIEMPTY/22 respectively.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
9 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

1) Noted crypt books
2) " cards
3) " WH/Reg
4) " WH/CA

50-6-74/1

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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3 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/OPS

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY Project

1. Reference is made to your comments on the LIEMPTY Project which was approved on 16 January 1959.

2. The LIEMPTY Project provides for the development of the former LIJERSEY surveillance team, the maintenance of photo surveillance bases, and other support facilities for the Mexico City Station. In their review of the Project before it was approved, FI/OPS suggested that WH Division consider a gradual reduction of the considerable financial and personnel commitments in this project in view of the favorably developing LIENVOY liaison relationship. FI/OPS believed that a smaller, more manageable support group with greater emphasis on selectivity of tasks and targets could well result in more effective CI and FI productivity.

3. The Mexican desk wishes to point out that rather than reducing the assets carried under the LIEMPTY Project, WHD believes that this project is an extremely important one and should receive Headquarters support. The only other Station surveillance teams, LIVESTOCK and LIEMBRACE, are both known to the Mexican authorities. Therefore LIEMPTY remains the Station's only secure surveillance asset. It is a very small untrained unit at present, but through this project it will be developed into a useable, valuable asset.

4. We are not passing FI/OP's comment to the field, because WH Division believes that unilateral assets should not be reduced in favor of liaison. First, the liaison has not yet been firmly established. Secondly, even with a good liaison relationship, the Mexican services must be considered anything but secure, and certainly could not be trusted with any sensitive operations. Thirdly, because of its proximity to the United States, and the activity of hostile intelligence groups there, the Mexico City Station is called upon to support many very sensitive operations which we would never wish to reveal to the Mexican authorities.

5. Experience in other Latin

5. Experience in other latin American countries where liaison has been established, has shown that many Station's tend to reduce their unilateral operations and capabilities in favor of the liaison. Under these circumstances, the production of the Stations have often been at the mercy of the liaison service and a change in the attitude of the service toward cooperating with this Agency has left these Stations virtually helpless. We certainly cannot recommend that the Mexico Station reduce any of it's unilateral support assets in favor of a proposed liaison relationship.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject File

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:jck

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-7257

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-229407
50-6-74/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

DATE: [illegible]

FROM : Chief, WHD

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT : Operational/LIEMPTY Project Approval

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES:
HMMA-11257

1. The Field Project Outline submitted with HMMA-11257 was approved on 16 January 1959 without change, for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380; $65,580 for the current fiscal year and $29,800 for fiscal year 1960.

2. An amendment to the original request for project approval was submitted before the original project was approved. This amendment requested approval to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps) under the LIEMPTY Project effective 1 January 1959 and remove them from the LIMESA Project. The funds designated in the original FPO for the undesignated Staff Agent were used to cover the expenses for CLACKETT and FIORDALISI. Therefore no additional funds were requested for the project in this amendment. The approval on 16 January 1959 included this project amendment. A copy of the amendment request is being forwarded for your information and records.

3. Among the Staffs' comments on the LIEMPTY Project, the following recommendations were made. KUDESK suggested that the Case Officer should work at devising ostensible sources of incomes for the agents which will stand the scrutiny of friends, relatives and less friendly forces.

4. An amendment to CLACKETT's contract has been requested to allow for a quarters allowance. The educational allowance requested in paragraph 11 of the project amendment was disapproved because CLACKETT was a Contract Agent. The Quarters Allowance of $2,500 was turned down because it was too high in relation to CLACKETT's salary. Therefore, a quarters allowance of $1,800 has been approved and will be written into CLACKETT's contract. If, however, operational and cover reasons require CLACKETT to rent an apartment larger than the one he would normally obtain under his allowance, the Chief of Station can authorize the extra rent as an operational expense which will not be considered as compensation for CLACKETT and therefore not subject to federal income tax.

5. Please advise Headquarters whether you wish to have the cryptonyms for CLACKETT and FIORDALISI charged to LIEMPTY's.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

26 January 1959

Attachment: Project amendment (RYBAT)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
~~2~~ 1 - RI (50-6-74/1)

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WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EMM-A-11257
[redacted]X-1472

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6- /1

TO
Chief, WH Division
INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
8 October 1958

RE '433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
Operational
LIEMPTY Field Project Outline

ACTION REQUIRED
Headquarters expeditious approval of LIEMPTY

REFERENCE(S)
MEXI 2239, 29 August 1958
DIR 41362, 18 September 1958

1. Attached is the LIEMPTY field project outline, a new Station support project which supersedes the LIJERSEY Project and several portions of the LIPSTICK Project.

2. In addition to approval of LIEMPTY, Headquarters is requested to change the agent cryptonyms as indicated in Section 9 of the attached field project outline.

3. Also, it is requested that the Station be advised of the new LIEMPTY RI file number.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Encls. (Odd pages herewith
Even pages USC)

QNO/bct
2 Oct 58

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: as - Kapok
Signed:
R.O. #630 - Unit WH/1/R
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

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50-6-74/1

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PAGE NO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM : LIEMPTY

DIVISION : Western Hemisphere

STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: John B. Brady
ROOM: 2112 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 24 November 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380.00.

2. WH/Personnel has been requested to locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-8100 slot formerly under the LIPSTICK Project. This slot will be transferred to the LIEMPTY Project and will be filled by a person who will be responsible for the directions of the physical surveillance team under this project.

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Charles W. Anderson
C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

R. Gomez
for J. C. King, C/WHD

2 Dec, 1958
Date

Attachments:
FPO (in quad)
Form 680 (in quad)
Table of Vehicular Allowance
Justification for Purchase of Automobiles
Envelope with true names

Att to HMMA-11257

SECRET

50-6-74/1

[redacted]

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

STATION Mexico City

FIELD CASE OFFICER Quinton N. CUSLER

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

Willard C. Curtis

1. The attached project outline is presented for approval for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959.

2. Headquarters is requested to select a suitable contract or Staff Agent to replace Raymond H. GERENDE as leader of the LIJERSEY surveillance team. From the security standpoint, it is essential that GERENDE be relieved of this responsibility. The individual selected by Headquarters to fill the slot formerly occupied by Wilfred O. CLOWER (BAP-8100) should have had experience in surveillance operations and should speak Spanish fluently.

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/ [redacted]

52-6-74/1

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
[redacted]-1472

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

PART I

1. Area of Operations

The general area of operations will be Mexico and the specific area will be Mexico, D.F., Mexico.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide a mechanism for the development of operational information in support of other Station operations. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

3. Background

As the reviewing authorities will be aware, this project includes several operations which were formerly carried under Projects LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY. Partially as a result of the June 1958 LIPSTICK compromise, when three surveillance team members were apprehended and placedin custody by the Mexican Police, and additionally as a means for the orderly administration of assets, this new project is submitted.

There follows below a background sketch of the separate support assets, excluding details concerning personnel which will be discussed later in the outline, which the Station proposes for inclusion in LIEMPTY:

LIMITED - The LIMITED Base is located in such a position across the street from the LIMERICK installation that photographs can easily be made of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK main gate. These photographs are later developed and printed by LIEMPTY-4, then returned to the LIMITED operator for the proper annotations. After receipt of the photographs by the Station, the Case Officer reviews them for LIMESA leads, newly arrived LIMERICK personnel, local and other nationals of possible operational interest and PBPRIME citizens who have visited LIMERICK.

KUBARK owns the property housing the LIMITED Base, having purchased it in mid-1955; however, the ostensible owner is LIMOUSINE, to whom LIEMPTY-6 pays his rent each month through LIMOUSINE's bank.

LIMITED, with LIEMPTY-6 as base house operator, has been operating for nearly three years and has not yet been involved in a compromising security situation. Prior to April 1955, when Headquarters authorized the purchase of the LIMITED Base, the Station rented the Base and used LIPSTICK-7 (later LIMESTONE-6 in LIFEAT Project and now terminated) as the operator. This arrangement was in effect for about two years.

[redacted]

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

LILYRIC - This Base has been in operation for about two and one-half years and is located in an apartment building acros s the street from the LIMERICK installation. As in the case of the LIMITED Base, LILYRIC takes photographs of persons entering and leaving the main gate of the LIMERICK installation. The LILYRIC photographs are handled in the same manner as the LIMITED pictures. In addition to taking photographs, the LILYRIC operators also prepare daily logs on the activities of each LIMERICK employee, record the license plate numbers of most cars carrying people to and from the LIMERICK installation, and prepare an observation diary on all target personnel seen each day. (This permits the Station to tell when a target personality is out of town or not working for some other reason.)

The LILYRIC Base was originally acquired and made operative to provide for continuous coverage of the target in the event LIMITED is ever compromised. This is still the primary value of having two bases cover the same portion of the target. LILYRIC is compartmented from LIMITED and with the possible exception of GERENDE could probably weather any security flap involving LIMITED. Obviously, there is some duplication in the work of LIMITED and LILYRIC; however, the insurance value of having two basis is quite apparent.

LILYRIC has been operating for about two and one-half years and insofar as the Station knows, no compromising security situations have arisen.

LICALLA - The LICALLA Base is located in a position where photographs can be taken of people within the LIMERICK garden area. In addition, the operator of the LICALLA Base submits weekly reports on LIMERICK construction work, daily logs showing when a target individual was seen that day, and reports showing the association of target individuals with one another. LICALLA photographs are processed and handled in the same manner and by the people who handle the LIMITED and LILYRIC pictures.

The LICALLA Base was acquired and operations began about two and one-half years ago with the primary purpose of obtaining additional operational information concerning LIMERICK personnel, and operational leads which could be exploited for the physical penetration of the LIMERICK installation. Approximately one year ago the LICALLA Base was purchased by KUBARK through LIMOUSINE. LICALLA will probably remain at its present location and will continue to submit photographs and reports of the same type as are now being submitted. Other than the fact that LIEMPTY-9, the LICALLA operator, is the brother of former LIPSTICK-47, no security problems are currently known to the Case Officer. However, reports from LIPSTICK2 12 and 30, the local police, the attorneys involved in the case, the foreign embassy concerned and the LCFLUTTER tests give no indications that LIEMPTY-9 was ever mentioned during the LIPSTICK flap.

LIENTRAP - This is a panel type truck equipped with cameras, telescopic lens and other types of photographic equipment. It has been used during the past two years as an investigative asset. The truck is parked about 75 yards from a target of interest (usually a residence or apartment building) and the photographer in the rear of the truck photographs individuals or things of interest to the Station. LIENTRAP is a valuable asset for any station to have and has enabled this Station to get pictures of individuals which could have been obtained in no other way. LIEMPTYs-10 and 11 operate LIENTRAP.

[redacted]

50-6-74/1

[redacted]

The major security threat to LIENTRAP is the fact that it has been operating for about two years in all parts of the city and should soon be replaced by a truck of a different make. Provision for this is made in Section 15 of this Field Project Outline.

LIJERSEY - This is presently an approved project; however, it is believed advisable for administrative efficiency to include the LIJERSEY assets within the framework of the LIEMPTY Project. Other than LILYRIC, which has already been discussed, LIJERSEY consists of a foot surveillance team with three members, LIEMPTYs-15, 16 and 17. LIEMPTYs 15 and 16 have been employed for about one and a half years and LIEMPTY-17 for about one year. They have not developed into as competent a surveillance team as the LIPSTICK team was and probably never will become as good. The LIJERSEY team has been used mostly for stationary surveillances and observations of people of interest. LIEMPTY-17, however, has also been used as a pretext investigator. He has excelled at this type of work and the Station continues to use him in this capacity. The Station has been reluctant to use the LIJERSEY team as much as it could have been used because of the close association of the team with GERENDE and, in turn, GERENDE's knowledge and work on LIFEAT and the LIPSTICK surveillance team. The Station plans to recruit several agents of a type and social level more suitable for all types of surveillance work than the present LIJERSEY team.

Oliver G. SCANTLING - SCANTLING has been associated with KUBARK for several years in a number of different capacities. He was originally used as a member of the LIPSTICK surveillance team and later was head of the same team. He has been used to train new agents in the techniques of surveillance and investigation, to acquire office space and apartments for the Station's operations and to conduct investigations and make recruitment approaches to individuals of operational interest to KUBARK. SCANTLING is currently being used by the Station as an investigator of LIMESA leads and is still actively pursuing the LIMESA/MKLIGHTING operation. SCANTLING also maintains regular contact with LIEMPTY-3 and monitors his elicitation effort against the LICOOL-6 target. In this connection, both SCANTLING and LIEMPTY-3 meet regularly with Doris M. KILLGO for operational guidance. (Note: Please see the LICOOL Field Project Outline for additional details on LICOOL-6).

4. References:

a. LIPSTICK Project Outline and operational papers.
b. LIJERSEY Project Outline and operational papers.
c. Dispatch to follow in next pouch, Subject: Review of Raymond H. GERENDE's operational activities.

5. Objectives:

Oliver G. SCANTLING's activities:

a. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities.

b. To collect operational information pertaining to other targets of

[redacted]

[redacted]

opportunity, foreign official installations and personnel of intelligence interest operating in Mexico.

c. To exploit operational leads through recruitments, debriefings and surveillances.

Raymond H. GERENDE's activities:

d. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through the use of photographic base houses.

e. To collect operational information and identify operational leads pertaining to Station targets of opportunity.

f. To provide operational support to Station operations, i.e., rent hotel rooms and apartments, and conduct counter-surveillances.

Staff Agent's activities:

g. To collect operational information and to identify operational leads pertaining to the LIMERICK target and Station targets of opportunity.

6. Targets:

Oliver G. SCANTLING - The primary target is, of course, the LIMERICK installation and personnel. However, SCANTLING devotes most of his time to following up LIFEAT leads which pertain to services provided the LIMERICK installation by individuals and firms, e.g. construction engineers, floor waxing firms, safe experts, furniture makers, interior decorators, etc. To an extent, these are considered targets of opportunity and it would be impossible to list specifically what future targets will be available. One specific target which SCANTLING is concerned with is the occupant of the LICOOL-6 apartment; however, LIEMPTY-3, whom SCANTLING handles, should more correctly be given credit for information produced on this target.

Raymond H. GERENDE - LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA all have as their target the LIMERICK installation and personnel, plus any local nationals and PBPRIMERS who visit LIMERICK. LIENTRAP is concerned with targets of opportunity and follow-up investigations on operational leads obtained from other Station and Headquarters sources. The same targets apply to the LIJERSEY surveillance team as apply to LIENTRAP.

7. Tasks:

Field Case Officer - Quinton N. CUSLER

a. Supervise and direct the operational activities of Raymond H. GERENDE, Oliver G. SCANTLING, and the staff agent.

b. Provide guidance and maintain supervisory responsibility for all agents under GERENDE, SCANTLING and the staff agent.

[redacted]

c. Coordinate support requests from other Station Case Officers which involve either GERENDE, SCANTLING or the staff agent.

d. Process (indexing, traces, etc.) the photographic and other information from the LIEMPTY outside photographic assets.

e. Prepare operational and administrative correspondence pertaining to LIEMPTY.

Principal agent - Oliver G. SCANTLING:

a. Perform one man surveillances and investigations to identify individuals of operational interest.

b. Perform comprehensive and detailed casings of installations of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

c. Provide administrative support and some operational guidance to LIEMPTY-3.

d. Recruit individuals which have physical access to the LIMERICK installation (basically in support of LIMESA).

e. Spot prospective agent candidates for possible later use by the Station.

Agent - LIEMPTY-3

a. Cultivate and elicit information from the occupant of the LICOOL-6 apartment.

b. Where possible, broaden his contact with the LIMERICK people for the purpose of obtaining information concerning LIMERICK commercial matters in Mexico and to identify LIMERICK personnel who may be susceptible to defection and/or recruitment in place.

c. Support the LICOOL-6 technical operation by operating the recording machines and occupying the monitoring base as his family quarters.

Principal Agent - Raymond H. GERENDE

a. Manage and act as the Case Officer's principal in the supervision of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY surveillance teams (until relieved by new staff agent) and LIEMPTYs 4 and 5.

b. Set up and maintain proper clandestine communications procedures with all agents under his supervision.

c. Review periodically all aspects of his operations for possible security, personnel and management problems.

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Prepare monthly activities reports for all projects under his supervision.

e. Perform investigations on targets of opportunity as directed by the Case Officer.

f. Until a replacement is located, monitor and process the LIFEAT BGMORNING and LIFEAT Cuban Exiles taps.

LIMITED Base House Operator - LIEMPTY-6

a. Photograph individuals of interest who enter and leave the LIMERICK installation through the main gate.

b. Prepare logs and other reports on individuals of interest who visit and/or work at the LIMERICK installation.

c. Maintain the cover of the Base as a family residence.

LILYRIC Base House Operators - LIEMPTYs 13 and 14

Same tasks as the LIMITED Base House Operator

Agent - LIEMPTY-12

a. Serve as a cutout between GERENDE and LIEMPTY-13, the LILYRIC Base House Operator.

b. Insure proper tradecraft procedures are employed by the LILYRIC base.

c. Spot and report on individuals who would make suitable agent recruits for the Station.

LICALLA Base House Operator - LIEMPTY-9

a. Photograph individuals of interest who appear in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

b. Prepare logs and other reports on individuals of interest who visit and/or work at the LIMERICK installation.

c. Maintain the cover of the Base as a family residence.

LIENTRAP - LIEMPTYs 10 and 11

a. Perform photographic and other investigative assignments as directed by the Station through GERENDE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Protect the security of LIENTRAP and report all operational security developments involving the operation.

Staff Agent (to be selected by Headquarters)

a. Assume operational responsibility of the LIJERSEY surveillance team from GERENDE.

b. Develop the present LIJERSEY assets into a useable surveillance asset.

c. Train new surveillance team members in the art of discreet physical surveillance, including static, foot and mobile methods.

d. Spot, and where feasible, recruit new surveillance team members.

LIJERSEY Surveillance Team - LIEMPTYs 15, 16 and 17

a. Perform surveillances, pretext investigations and other investigative assignments as directed by the Station through GERENDE.

b. Strive constantly to improve their individual and collective investigative techniques.

Support Agent - LIEMPTY-4

a. Process and print film from LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP.

Support Agent - LIEMPTY-5

a. Translate and type material as received from the Station through GERENDE.

8. Coordination:

This project will not require coordination with other field stations.

9. Personnel:

a. Pseudonyms and cryptonyms

(1) Raymond H. GERENDE, aka LIEMPTY-1 (formerly LIPSTICK-20),
Position: Principal agent - Contract Agent

(2) Oliver G. SCANTLING, aka LIEMPTY-2 (formerly LIPSTICK-19),
Position: Principal Agent Oral Contract effective February 1955.

(3) LIEMPTY-3 (formerly LIPSTICK-32), Position: Agent.

(4) LIEMPTY-4 (formerly LIPSTICK-38), Position: Support Agent

[redacted]

(5) LIEMPTY-5 (formerly LIPSTICK-40), Position: Support Agent

(6) LIEMPTY-6 (formerly LIPSTICK-14), Position: Agent, LIMITED Operator
Case contract effective 1 November 1957.

(7) LIEMPTY-7 (formerly LIPSTICK-27), wife of LIEMPTY-6.

(8) LIEMPTY-8 (formerly LIPSTICK-28), son of LIEMPTY-6. Case contract effective 1 December 1955

(9) LIEMPTY-9 (formerly LIPSTICK-39), Position: Agent, LICALLA operator.

(10) LIEMPTY-10 (formerly LIPSTICK-2), Position: Agent, Photo truck operator.
Case contract effective May 1955

(11) LIEMPTY-11 (formerly LIPSTICK-24), Position: Agent, Assistant photo truck operator.

(12) LIEMPTY-12 (formerly LIJERSEY-5), Position: Agent, cutout and spotter.
U.S. citizen.

(13) LIEMPTY-13 (formerly LIJERSEY-2), Position: Agent, LILYRIC Base House operator.

(14) LIEMPTY-14 (formerly LIJERSEY-12), Position: Agent, Assistant LILYRIC Base House operator. Wife of LIEMPTY-13.

(15) LIEMPTY-15 (formerly LIJERSEY-4), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

(16) LIEMPTY-16 (formerly LIJERSEY-8), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

(17) LIEMPTY-17 (formerly LIJERSEY-13), Position: Agent, LIJERSEY surveillance team member.

b. Personal Data:

Personal data on all personnel listed above have previously been provided to Headquarters, either in projects LIPSTICK or LIJERSEY or in each individual's PRQ, Parts I and II.

c. Operational Approvals:

(1) Raymond H. GERENDE, OA granted 29 February 1955, per HMMW-2067, dated 14 March 1955. C-32743

(2) Oliver G. SCANTLING, OA granted 2 December 1954, per HMMW-1894, dated 29 December 1954. C-26803

(3) LIEMPTY-3, OA granted 10 August 1956, file number C-46955, per HMMW-3412, dated 24 August 1956.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(4) LIEMPTY-4, OA granted 4 October 1956, file number C-51872, per HMMW-3593, dated 12 October 1956.

(5) LIEMPTY-5, OA granted 8 May 1957, file number C-58482, per HMMW-4521, 15 May 1957.

(6) LIEMPTY-6, OA granted 23 September 1954, per DIR 19215, 30 September 1954. C-24948

(7) LIEMPTY-7, OA granted 11 October 1955, per HMMW-2610, dated 25 October 1955. C-35075

(8) LIEMPTY-8, OA granted 14 October 1955, per HMMW-2622, dated 27 October 1955. C-35074

(9) LIEMPTY-9, POA granted 27 December 1956, file number C-56699, per HMMW-3940, dated 10 January 1957. OA dated 14 March 1957

(10) LIEMPTY-10, OA granted 10 April 1953, per HMMW-557, dated 23 April 1953. C-5578

(11) LIEMPTY-11, OA granted 14 September 1955, per HMMW-2542, dated 4 October 1955. C-41439

(12) LIEMPTY-12, OA granted 14 July 1955, per HMMW-2384, dated 22 July, 1955. C-36226

(13) LIEMPTY-13, OA granted 9 May 1956, per HMMW-3113, dated 22 May 1956. C-46945

(14) LIEMPTY-14, OA granted 16 October 1957, per HMMW-5402, dated 29 October 1957. C-61163

(15) LIEMPTY-15, OA granted 30 July 1956, and 15 December 1957 file number C-48284, per HMMW-3359, dated 8 August 1956.

(16) LIEMPTY-16, OA granted 14 February 1957, file number C-54098, per HMMW-4124, dated 20 February 1957.

(17) LIEMPTY-17, OA granted 23 September 1957, per HMMW-5282, dated 1 October 1957. C-62507

10. Cover:

a. Raymond H. GERENDE is the only LIEMPTY agent who has cover provided by KUBARK. GeRENDE ostensibly is a salesman for LISTERINE's firm. However, he seldom spends any time pursuing his cover occupation, since his operational activities are so numerous and time consuming. GERENDE's cover with the LISTERINE firm was arranged by the Station and, so far, has been adequate for GERENDE's needs.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, is known only to GERENDE and SCANTLING. It would not be possible to develop a suitable cover story that would apply to the frequent meetings between the Case Officer and the Principal Agents; therefore, meetings are clandestine and are usually conducted in the Case Officer's car. However, suitable cover stories have been developed between the Case Officer and SCANTLING and between the Case Officer and GERENDE involving background information as to how we met and how our friendship developed, to be used in the event the Case Officer is apprehended with either of the Principal Agents.

c. None of the status cover occupations of any of the LIEMPTY agents is completely compatible with his operational activities. Action cover stories are decided upon before each assignment and devised to complement each agent's status cover as closely as possible. Base House operators, of course, generally conduct operational assignments within the confines of their quarters; consequently, the need for action cover stories is reduced. Appropriate cover stories exist between GERENDE and the agents in his network and between SCANTLING and LIEMPTY-3.

11. Contact and Communication:

Appropriate clandestine communications arrangements exist between the various echelons of LIEMPTY. At the present time these plans consist of regular and rapid-non scheduled (emergency) means of contact. GERENDE and SCANTLING are both in the process of preparing detailed written communications plans for their respective agents which include complete regular, alternate and rapid-non scheduled meeting arrangements. Provisions will also be made in these plans for oral recognition signals and physical bona fides that will enable a person unknown to the agent to contact him should the need ever arise. The Case Officer is currently working on a Warning System of Communications which will permit the expeditious exfiltration of GERENDE and SCANTLING from Mexico should a security situation arise which would necessitate this.

12. Control and Motivation:

a. Control - All LIEMPTY agents are local nationals. GERENDE and SCANTLING, both of whom spent a great deal of their childhood years in PBPRIME and still have relatives living in PBPRIME, are in many respects more pro-PBPRIME than many PBPRIME citizens. In the past, both GERENDE and SCANTLING have evidenced a high degree of loyalty to Matthew S. DINGLEY, their former Station Case Officer, and appear to be devoting that same loyalty to the present Case Officer. The control over GERENDE and SCANTLING stems directly from their pro-PBPRIME beliefs and their personal loyalty to their past and present Case Officers. The control over other LIEMPTY agents is based in part on pro-PBPRIME attitudes and on the financial remuneration and good handling they received from GERENDE and SCANTLING. Realistically, control over LIEMPTY agents is based on mutual understandings and confidence among individuals and should any agent decide to denounce PBPRIME or KUBARK, as the case may be, there is not much that the Station could do.

b. Motivation - With the exception of GERENDE and SCANTLING, whose primary motivations are ideological, financial compensation seems to be the basic motivational factor surrounding LIEMPTY agents.

[redacted]

13. Equipment and Other Support:

~~No special equipment or other support is required at this time.~~
See budgetary data sheet, pages 3-4 of [illegible] annexes.

14. Timetable:

The agents and operations listed in this project have previously been carried under the LIPSTICK and LIJERSEY Projects. It is the Station's understanding that the LIPSTICK Project was extended to 1 December 1958 to give the Station time to submit LIEMPTY. The LIJERSEY Project expires in 1959 or upon approval of LIEMPTY.

The LIEMPTY Project represents a major operational support asset of the Mexico City Station and, as such, will run for an indefinite period of time.

[redacted]

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

15. **Estimated Cost:**

Compensation:
(Note: Sufficient funds are indicated to provide for later justified raises to agents.)

Agent		US $ Per Annum	
Raymond H. GERENDE (to allow for possible raise)		$ 4,560.00	
Oliver G. SCANTLING		4,200.00	
LIEMPTY-3		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-4		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-5 @ $1.75 per hour		2,400.00	
LIEMPTY-6		2,400.00	
LIEMPTY-7 No Salary		- -	
LIEMPTY-8 No Salary		- -	
LIEMPTY-9		2,000.00	
LIEMPTY-10		3,600.00	
LIEMPTY-11		2,500.00	
LIEMPTY-12		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-13		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-14		1,250.00	
LIEMPTY-15		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-16		1,800.00	
LIEMPTY-17		1,800.00	
Six additional agents @ $2,000		12,000.00	
Staff Agent (to be selected by Hqs)			
Salary	$8,330.00		
Quarters	2,500.00		
Education Allowance	640.00		
Travel	1,000.00		
Shipment of HHE	2,000.00	14,470.00	
Sub-total			62,380.00

Operational Expenses:

Automobiles (3 autos & 1 truck) Maintenance, operational expenses, replacement of parts.	2,500.00	
Travel of agents by commercial carrier	500.00	
Sub-total		3,000.00

[redacted]

[redacted]

Operational Equipment:

Replacement of 2 LIJERSEY autos (MV-2148 & MV-2147)	6,000.00	
Replacement of SCANTLING's QP auto (MV-2041)	3,000.00	
Replacement of LIENTRAP (MV-2138)	2,500.00	
Purchase of 1 used auto for LIJERSEY surveillance	4,000.00	
Purchase of 3 two-way radios & one base radio for LIJERSEY team	2,500.00	
Repair and maintenance of cameras and radio equipment	500.00	
Purchase of new photo equipment and supplies	2,500.00	
Sub-total		21,000.00

Real Estate:

Rent, utilities and maintenance of following safehouses: Per Annum

* LIMITED	500.00	
*LICALLA	1,000.00	
* LILYRIC	1,000.00	
Sub-total		2,500.00
Funds for procurement and servicing of additional safehouses, post office boxes, or renting automobiles		2,000.00
Exchange commodities (required as godwill gifts)		500.00
Damages (broken contracts, "key" money to obtain locations in choice areas, rent deposits, etc.)		2,000.00
Purchase of information, purchase of identification documents, payment of bribes, etc.		2,000.00
TOTAL		$ 95,380.00 U.S.

*LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts.

[redacted]

50-6-74/1

14-00000

[redacted]

HMM-A-11257
KAPOK-1472

16. Special Problems and Commitments:

a. No commitments, expressed or implied, have been made to any LIEMPTY agent by the present Case Officer, except as stated in the project outline and/or in the contracts of GERENDE and SCANTLING.

b. In the event of compromise to the local government of any LIEMPTY agent, KUBARK is morally responsible for doing all within its power, and within the limitations of security, for resettling or otherwise taking care of the LIEMPTY agents.

c. No special benefit commitments have been made to any LIEMPTY agent except those contained in the contracts of GERENDE and SCANTLING.

d. A change of government or political conditions in Mexico will not affect this project. It is a unilateral effort on the part of KUBARK.

CS COPY

[redacted]

50-6-74/1

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH

TO :

TO : (Station/Base)

FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3–ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6–ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE

ITEM 7 AND 8–USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10–ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11–A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	74/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

	OPEN FILE		CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
X	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

	RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY): HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST): 50

9. FILES ACTION

	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED		UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

[illegible]

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Louis V. Armstrong RID/AN

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

050	006	074/01

FORM 812 12-63 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38 1–CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 October 1958

FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Zehrung

COMPONENT	BUILDING	ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE
WH	Barton	2120	2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/ Development & Plans

4. ACTION REQUESTED

☒	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.	
☐	CLOSE FILE	
☒	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK)	WH/III/Mexico
☒	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK).	WH/III/Mexico
☐	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.	

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER: 50 (Mexico)

3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER: 6 Operational

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS: A

2. FIELD STATION(S): MEXI

3. HDQRS COMPONENT(S): WH/III/M

7. ENDORSEMENT

THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS.

C Zehrung
RI/ANALYSIS

EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 October 1958

8. APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED

[illegible]
FOR CHIEF, RI

RI CASE TITLE NUMBER

50	6	71//	N.S.

FORM NO. 812 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 DEC 56

SECRET

(36)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KDBADGER Vol VI
Operations

INCLUSIVE DATES: 3 Jan 1962 - 19 Dec 1963

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LA/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26.6.78	6/26	D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
6/27/78		D. Hardway	D Hardway
26 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	D. Hardway
27 JULY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
~~15 NOV 78~~		~~[illegible]~~	
11/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12-21-78		[illegible]	[illegible]

14

15.

[illegible]S MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

FORM
3-62

KDBADGER 50-6-75/3

OPERATIONS

LIENVOY OPERATIONS 50-6-75/ VOL
JANUARY 1962 - DECEMBER 1963

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~	XX	PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO	Chief, SR Division:		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT LCIMPROVE/LIENVOY - Terro de WANSTRAM or WANSTROHM (phonetic)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment A are two LIENVOY transcripts of 12 November 1963 and two LIENVOY transcripts of 13 November 1963 which Headquarters may consider for transmittal to Station Stockholm.

2. Forwarded under separate cover as Attachment B is a photograph of an unidentified male (who was accompanied by an unidentified female whose photograph the Station asset did not obtain) who visited the Soviet Embassy at 1400 hours on 12 November 1963. The Station believes this male is identical with Subject since the male in the photograph is the only unidentified male who was also accompanied by a woman and, secondly, this male appears to be a nordic type. The Station recognizes, however, that Subject may have only claimed to be a Swede for cover purposes.

3. The following is the comment made by Douglas J. FEINGLASS, the Station's LIENVOY translator, concerning Attachment A:

> "The exact spelling of this name could not be determined. He started by saying that it is - W - Ä - N.. and then stopped, emphasizing the two dots above Ä. It is very strange that he, being a Swede did not seek the aid of his Swedish Consulate, but applied to the Soviet Embassy and asked for a man, whom he met by chance (?) in a restaurant. But stranger still is the response of the Embassy officials, who went out of their way to find a ship for him. Usually requests of this nature are brushed aside and quite often in a very rude manner. Judging from his non-British accent and almost flawless English, he must have lived in the United States or Canada for quite some time." (The Station REDWOOD officer agrees with FEINGLASS' comment regarding the usual reluctance of Soviet Embassy officials to help in a matter of this type.)

4. Station Mexico has no record of any member of the Soviet Embassy travelling to Oaxaca during this period.

5. Station Mexico has no traces on Subject.

D w/o S/C
RID/AN Jam

CS COPY

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att A & B (u/s/c)
1 - SR w/att A & B (u/s/c)

CROSS REFERENCE TO T: SR/CI/A	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-22630	DATE 19 December 1963
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HQS FILE NUMBER Unknown

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIENVOY-8 C-78604 OA 17 Oct 1959

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference:
A. HMMW-12027 dated 23 Oct 1963
B. HMMA-21331 dated 10 May 1963
C. HMMA-20408 dated 19 December 1962

1. Station Mexico regrets the confusion over the status of LIENVOY-8. He was terminated 29 February 1960. An Agent Service Record is attached.

2. The cryptonym LIENVOY-8 in HMMA-20408 dated 19 December 1962 should have been LIENVOY-6. Headquarters noted that LIENVOY-6 had been omitted and called this to the attention of the Station in HMMW-11457 dated 4 April 1963. It was not noticed at that time that LIENVOY-8 had been included in error in the project renewal request instead of LIENVOY-6.

Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Agent Service Record

Distribution:
3 - WH, w encl

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22449

DATE
7 November 1963

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-118406

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - NOVEMBER 1963

HMMs	MEXIs	HMMAs
HMM 8054	MEXI 7137	HMMA-22518
HMM 8046	MEXI 7133	HMMA-22472
HMM 8041	MEXI 7127	HMMA-22452
HMM 8039	MEXI 7119	HMMA-22449
HMM 8030	MEXI 7106 (HMM 8079)	HMMA-22422
HMM 8026	MEXI 7068	
HMM 8019	MEXI 7065	
HMM 8018	MEXI 7033	
HMM 8004	MEXI 7028	
HMM 8002	MEXI 7010 (HMM 8067)	
	MEXI 7000 (HMM 8057)	
	MEXI 6975	
	MEXI 6972	
	MEXI 6955 (HMM 8047)	
	MEXI 6937 (HMM 8045)	
	MEXI 6848 (HMM 8008)	
	MEXI 6840 (HMM 8001)	
	MEXI 6838 (HMM 8000)	
	MEXI 6830 (HMM 7994)	
	MEXI 6813 (HMM 7990)	
	MEXI 6810	
	MEXI 6805	
	MEXI 6790	
	MEXI 6757 (HMM 7973)	
10 +	24 +	5 = 39

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters information.

Reference: HMMA-22135, 13 September 1963.

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during September 1963.

2. Target Lines - September 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of September:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alfonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
13-21-14	
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunez
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams

(continued)

Enclosure:
Production Report

Removed from Project
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold:

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22267

DATE
8 October 1963

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/3

10-29-69	– Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	– C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	– D.F.S. (disconnected 18 September 1963)
35-36-52	– Politica (Revista- Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	– Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy (disconnected 23 September 1963)
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy (apartment of Ramon Sinobas disconnected on 23 September 1963 when apartment became vacant)
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy
20-38-98	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 18 September 1963)
20-68-69	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 23 September 1963)
20-68-23	Yugoslav Embassy (connected 23 September 1963)

Headquarters will note from the above that three lines were disconnected in order to cover three Yugoslav lines. Two of the lines which were disconnected were Cuban Embassy lines, both were not in use by the Cubans. One was in the apartment which had been vacated by Ramon Sinobas and not occupied by other Cubans. The other was a telephone in the Cuban Embassy which was never answered. The Cubans are trying to get Sinobas' line moved to the Embassy. They have also asked for the telephone company to repair 14-92-14. As soon as these lines are working again, coverage of two of the Yugoslav Embassy lines will be dropped in order to pick up all the Cuban lines which are presumed to have a much higher priority.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information

The Station continues to receive full transcripts in Spanish on the Cuban lines (three), the Soviet Embassy lines (five), and as of 18 and 23 September the Yugoslav lines (three). These transcripts are received each morning for the day before. During September, the LIENVOY monitors transcribed 1396 pages in addition to the daily resumen.

The outside translators now working on LIENVOY transcripts are Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, who is used for almost any backlog which begins to occur.

David B. SCHLAGETER, field contract agent, who transcribes the Czech take.

Victor W. OBOLD, career agent, who transcribes the Yugoslav portion of the Yugoslav take.

Douglas J. FEINGLASS, staff agent, who continues to transcribe the Russian language portion of the Soviet take.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information

Two leads from LIENVOY of operational interest in September 1963 were:

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
	~~S E C R E T~~ / [redacted]T	HMMA-22267

a. On 2 September 1963 a Russian speaking female contacted the Soviet Embassy and asked for Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, KGB. She identified herself by name and as a professor from New Orleans. She gave the address of her apartment and asked for a meeting. This lead was promptly followed up by station investigative assets who identified the woman and learned that she was attending a philosophers' conference at the University of Mexico. She returned to the United States on 17 September. All available information was forwarded to Headquarters for passing to ODENVY.

b. MEXI-6135 reported the contact between an unidentified Czech woman and the Czech Embassy.

5. **Liaison**

On 18 September 1963 Oliver G. GALBOND and Willard C. CURTIS met with LIELEGANT and LIERGO. They also saw LIELEGANT on 20 September.

6. **Security**

There were no security problems during this month.

7. **Technical**

There were no technical problems which AREHART could not handle.

8. **Personnel**

Robert B. RIGGS continues to meet Arnold AREHART each morning before 0800 hours to receive all LIENVOY tapes and trascripts from the previous day. The daily meetings with Victor W. OBOLD and David B. SCHLAGETER, the two EE translators, were transferred on 18 September 1963 from the Station EE case officer to the KURIOT technician, Gregory D. PARMUTH who delivers and receives reels and transcripts from them each day. PARMUTH also acts as a cutout for Douglas J. FEINGLASS.

Paul V. LEVISTER, Headquarters KUTUBE officer, visited the Station from 22 September to 1 October to consult with LIENVOY and LIFEAT case officers in preparation for a report to be written on the two projects as examples of tap operations which produce both positive intelligence and operational leads.

9. **Production**

There is attached a list of reports,cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		S E C ~~R E T~~ / [redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	3.

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - SEPTEMBER 1963

MEXIs	HMMAs	HMMs
MEXI 6333 (HMM 7812)	HMMA 22194	HMM 7793
MEXI 6332 (HMM 7810)	HMMA 22193	HMM 7783
MEXI 6319 (HMM 7804)	HMMA 22159	HMM 7770
MEXI 6302 (HMM 7801)	HMMA 22149	HMM 7767
MEXI 6271 (HMM 7787)	HMMA 22135	HMM 7742
MEXI 6215 (HMM 7761)	HMMA 22116	HMM 7725
MEXI 6205 (HMM 7760)	HMMA 22115	HMM 7724
MEXI 6135	HMMA 22066	HMM 7723
MEXI 6133 (HMM 7743)	HMMA 22052	
MEXI 6129 (HMM 7741)		
MEXI 6107		
MEXI 6104 (HMM 7736)		
MEXI 6097 (HMM 7728)		
MEXI 6042 (HMM 7711)		
MEXI 6038 (HMM 7708)		
MEXI 6034		
MEXI 6030 (HMM 7706)		
MEXI 6029 (HMM 7707)		
18 +	9 +	8 = 35

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3

PERSONALITY BRIEF

1. **General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio**

As a pro-Communist, anti-United States former (1934-1940) President of Mexico, CARDENAS plays an important role in the political activities of Mexico by virtue of his being the spirtual leader of a great part of the Mexican left. His leftist sympathies appear to fall primarily with the current regime in Cuba (He alledgedly is a close personal friend of Fidel CASTRO), secondarily with Communist China, and lastly with the USSR.

2. Braulio MALDONADO Sandez

MALDONADO is a politically unscrupulous pro-Communist former Governor of Baja California. He is a national leader of at least three Mexican leftist organizations: (1) FEP (People's Electoral Front), united single front of Mexican Communists and Leftists; (2) MLN (National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-U.S., pro-Cuba Communist Front; and (3) CCI (Independent Peasants' Center), radical, anti-Mexican Government organization. Having been banished from Mexico until after the 1964 elections for anti-government activities, MALDONADO is currently in Europe and seeking admittance to the USSR, obstensibly to visit his daughter who is a student at the Friendship University in Moscow.

3. Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde

AGUILAR is a prominent pro-Communist Mexican intellectual who is the titular head of the MLN (National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-U.S., pro-Communist front. He is a full-time professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico and maintains active contact with several international leftist and Communist figures. He has recently travelled to Cuba and Warsaw.

4. Jorge Leonidas TAMAYO Castillejos

TAMAYO is a Communist professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He is a leading member of many Communist front activities in Mexico including the CMP (Mexican Peace

50-6-75/3

Committee), the MLN (National Liberation Movement), and the CEM (Circle of Mexican Studies). He has been in contact with several leftist figures of various echelon, including Gen. Lazaro CARDENAS, the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Polish, Soviet, and Chinese Communist officials. TAMAYO's son has studied in Warsaw and travelled to the USSR and Communist China.

5. Jose David ALFARO Siqueiros

ALFARO, one of Mexico's most prominent artists, has been imprisoned for eight (8) years as a consequence of the role he played in the Communist-inspired railroad stike of 1959. He is a leader of the PCM (Mexican Communist Party) and has visited the Soviet Union. He fought for the Loyalist Army in the Spanish Civil War and was later arrested in Mexico for complicity in the murder of Leon TROTSKY's secretary. ALFARO has a long history of pro-Communist, anti-U.S. leanings.

6. Roberto ROMERO Adams

ROMERO is an informant for the Cuban Intelligence Service in Mexico.

7. Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero

Pro-Communist professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, GONZALEZ Pedrero has contributed to the writing or editing of at least five (5) leftist publications in Mexico. He is a member of the National Committee of the MLN, has alledgedly received training in the Soviet Union, and has travelled to Cuba twice in recent times.

8. Ignacio ACOSTA Lagunas

Pro-Communist ACOSTA, a lawyer, is an aide of General CARDENAS and a leading member of the MLN. He frequently has contact with high-level personnel of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. His political activities include travel to Cuba and the Soviet Union, aid in the management of the Communist Trade Fair in Mexico, and a great deal of participation in promoting sympathy for the Cuban Revolution in Mexico.

9. Direccion Federal de Seguridad - Federal Security Police

The principal functions of this security unit are to: (1) Provide a plain-clothed security detail for the President, (2) maintain an extensive telephone tap activity on both the Rightist and Leftist political opposition forces, and (3) perform investigations and arrests of primarily political offenses. The unit's agents are largely poorly trained, insecure, and unreliable. Their professional characteristics are best described as being dishonest, cruel, and abusive. The position, at this moment, of Manuel RANGEL Escamilla as Director General of DFS is precarious.

10. Politica

A Marxist anti-U.S. semi-monthly magazine published in Mexico, Politica is printed by Talleres Graficos de Mexico, the same shop which prints La Voz de Mexico. In addition to the modest revenues derived from a circulation of 15,000 to 25,000, Politica is financed by the Soviet Embassy, the MLN, the PPS, and possibly, the Cuban Embassy. As an indication of the Mexican government's assessment of the capability of this magazine to influence public opinion, it is worthwhile noting that Politica frequently experiences a great degree of difficulty in printing and circulating itself due to the government's repressive efforts.

11. Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN)

Organized under the influence of the PCM in August 1961, the MLN today is dedicated to the furtherance of the mutual interests of its adherents who are found primarily in the ranks of the PRI, the PPS, the PCM, the CNC and the UGOCM. The MLN's objective is to gain leftist political representation in the government by inciting PRI to accept leftists into its camp. As a consequence of this objective, the mission of MLN is to generate evidence of popular leftist sympathy by means of fomenting agitation among the popular, labor, and peasant masses.

12. Confederacion de Trabajadores de la America Latina (CTAL)

The CTAL has recently been replaced by the CUTAL (Single Confederation of Latin American Workers). Until recently, the pro-Communist, CTAL, which is described as being the liaison bureau of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) whose headquarters are in Prague, was headed by Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano.

13. Prensa Latina

Operating directly under the Cuban Communist regime, Prensa Latina is obstensibly a press service. In reality, however, it is the official propaganda organ of the Cuban Government. Prensa Latina works closely with Tass, the Soviet Agency; with Hsinhua, the Chinese Agency; and with Cetepka, the Czechoslovakian Agency.

50-6-75/3

~~SECRET~~

X

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

: Chief, WH Division

: Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garvin (201-68248)

Refs: A. HMMW-11838, 16 August 1963

B. HMMA-22262, 8 October 1963

1. Reference is made to your question about the type information needed on GUTIERREZ. Headquarters is interested in "current" information on his activities, and especially on his travels and his contact with Manuel VEGA Perez, Chief of G-2 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The comment on HMM-7289 regarded only the non-dissemination of the report, and was not intended to discourage the Station from reporting information on meetings between GUTIERREZ and VEGA.

2. Headquarters would appreciate receiving, on a continuing basis, pertinent information on GUTIERREZ extracted from the LIENVOY take.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Mexico City
- 1 - COS, Guatemala

24 October 1963

HMMW-12049

~~SECRET~~

201-68248

2 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Foreign Intelligence

SUBJECT: TDY to Mexico City

1. After taking a good look at LIENVOY and LIFEAT, I would agree with the persons I talked with in Mexico; they maintain that any well-run tap operation should produce substantial intelligence information, provided the targets are of intelligence interest, and provided also there are people at the station who look for it and are able to recognize it. The case of LIFEAT is interesting in this respect: It has been deprived of its most productive lines in favor of LIENVOY, and yet its intelligence production compares favorably, with that of the other productive taps, except LIENVOY.

2. Mexico has people who can detect any little item of intelligence significance. This includes the Chief of Station, who goes over the highlights of the previous day's take every morning and marks certain items for action by station case officers or reports officers. The reports officers work on copies of the take at the same time.

3. There are several aspects of LIENVOY that make it an excellent operation and an outstanding producer of intelligence. I will describe them in detail when my notes get here from the station. The principal factors in the success of LIENVOY seem to be the following.

a. The agreement made with top Mexican officials, unlike many such agreements elsewhere, is as much in effect today as it was at the start: the targeting is not based on personal politics; the intercept staff has stayed on the job; the equipment is considered to be on loan from CIA.

b. The native monitoring staff has reached a peak of effectiveness that everyone at the station praises very highly.

c. The station is organized to handle the take speedily as soon as it comes in. The Chief of Station, the case officers, the reports officers, all work on it at the same time and exchange views on hot items. They do not let reports backlogs accumulate.

d. Each new item on a target person is linked to a past history; what appears as a fragmentary bit in a conversation becomes a meaningful development in a continuous story. Continuity on the job makes this possible.

e. The equipment is kept in good working order by complete cleaning and checking of each unit once a month. The 32 units in use today are those installed in 1959.

4. A detailed description of LIENVOY and its counterpart LIFEAT should provide good models with which to compare other tap operations. It should give criteria for good procedures. It should give some idea of the desirable size of such operations, considering the available targets, the size of the station, and the other tasks and operations of the station. It should show what the station puts into its tap operations and what it gets out of them. LIENVOY and LIFEAT are an interesting example of two interacting operations, one joint and the other independent.

5. My stay in Mexico was as interesting and fruitful as it was enjoyable. And I hope it was not too great a burden on the station.

gc

cc: C/WH/3

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : J.M. WHITTEN:jpm
UNIT : WH/3
EXT : 5613
DATE : 16 Sept 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

17 SEP 63 15 23z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, RF, VR

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 68906

RYBAT LIENVOY

IDEN IN BRILLARD MESSAGE TO CURTIS TRANSMITTED BY GALBOND IS MR. GERARD CAMPAGNA.

END OF MESSAGE

Lienvoy/oro

WH/COPS

J.C. KING
CWHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J.M. WHITTEN
CWH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM ~~Chief of Station, Mexico City~~

SUBJECT Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters' information.

Ref : HMMA-22005, 23 August 1963

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during August 1963.

2. Target Lines - August 1963.

There were no changes in the target lines during this reporting period. The Yugoslav lines have not yet been connected but one of them should be operating by the end of September.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

HMMA-22000 dated 21 August 1963 transmitted the first group of copies of transcripts against the Cuban lines. Since that time, carbon copies have been forwarded to Headquarters on a weekly basis.

Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, has eliminated the backlog of some fifty reels from the Russian lines and at the present time is working on the Polish LIFEAT coverage which Woodrow GABBOTT (ps) has not been able to handle. HORSFALL will be used in this capacity only until the Station has a higher priority job for him or until his permanent assignment is determined.

There has been no change in Douglas J. FEINGLASS' assignment since the last progress report.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information.

The following are some (not all) of the exploitations during August 1963 of leads from LIENVOY:

a. LIENVOY contributed support to the REDWOOD AEJUMBO operation during this period by confirming several contacts between the principals involved. Details of this case have been reported by the Station SR Case Officer.

b. On 8 August LIENVOY reported indications that an unnamed

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-22135

DATE
13 September 1963

GROUP 1
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HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/13

DIZTAG diplomat stationed in Caracas planned to travel alone by plane to Mexico City via Panama carrying a diplomatic pouch for turnover in Mexico and return to Caracas with diplomatic mail received from DIZTAG couriers in Mexico. This was reported to Headquarters, Caracas, and Panama as a possible opportunity to obtain or copy these pouches. (MEXI-5681)

c. On 7 August this project revealed contact between the Partido Popular Socialista and the Soviet Embassy. Roberto JARAMILLO Flores, national leader of the Juventud Popular Socialista, the youth organization of the Marxist Partido Popular Socialista, arranged for an urgent meeting with Nikolaiy Sergeyevich LEONOV, Third Secretary and Cultural Officer of the Soviet Embassy. It will be recalled that LEONOV went to the Soviet Union and acted as interpreter for Fidel CASTRO on his visit there earlier this year. MEXI-5705 transmitted a report on JARAMILLO's contact with LEONOV.

d. On 5 August LIENVOY reported the presence in Mexico of one Doctor Paul BARAN who was in contact with Cuban Embassy officials and prominent Mexican Marxist intellectuals. BARAN appeared to be on a trip throughout South America. A check of Station files revealed that this was probably identical with Paul Alexander BARAN, Russian born naturalized U. S. citizen and professor of economics at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California. BARAN has visited Mexico in the past and made contact with American Communists and Mexican leftists. This information was sent to Headquarters in MEXI-5735 for dissemination to ODENVY.

e. On 12 August William ROSE, who identified himself as a student from the United States studying at the University of Mexico (UNAM) asked for an interview with Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). ROSE claimed to have letters of introduction to LOMBARDO from labor leaders in the United States. A check of Station files revealed William Maurice ROSE, 1474 Federal Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, as a student at the UNAM. This report was sent to Headquarters in MEXI-5752 for dissemination to ODENVY.

f. On 1 August Henry WALLSCHMIDT, 3662 Carrington Avenue, Los Angeles, California, contacted the Soviet Embassy and volunteered his services to them. The details of this contact were forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-21905 for dissemination to ODENVY.

g. On 7 August a person who claimed to be a U.S. citizen with a name which sounded like ARNERO contacted the Soviet Embassy and referred to a previous visit at the Embassy when he discussed information on ship movements. He also asked for asylum and made an appointment to see Oleg NECHIPORENKO, Soviet Vice Consul and KGB officer. A person of American appearance was photographed by LIEMPTY at the time of the arranged appointment. A sanitized copy of this photograph together with information from LIENVOY was passed locally to ODENVY. MEXI-5784 forwarded the report to Headquarters.

h. On 9 August LIENVOY reported that an American pilot with wife and small son were at the Cuban Embassy trying to get a visa to go to Cuba. MEXI-5794 reported details for Headquarters. ODENVY was advised locally after receiving Headquarters' authorization.

i. LIENVOY covered the activities of Barry Terry PRIMUS, New York actor who was expelled from Mexico on 19 August for participating in Marxist-Communist public disturbances on 18 August. See MEXI-5854 and 5855 for further details.

j. On 20 August Moe FISHMAN, Secretary of Veterans of the Lincoln Brigade in the U.S. asked the wife of David Alfaro SIQUEIROS how the Brigade could help free SIQUEIROS. FISHMAN also made an appointment to meet with Margarita NELKEN, prominent Spanish Communist exile. MEXI-5864 transmitted this report to Headquarters for dissemination to ODENVY.

5. Liaison.

As reported in reference Willard C. CURTIS met with LITENSOR to arrange for a sensitive PBRUMEN case on 15 August 1963. The case is still pending.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	~~SECRET/[redacted]~~	HMMA-22135

6. Security.

There were no security incidents within the project during this month.

7. Technical.

There were no technical problems which AREHART could not handle.

8. Personnel.

There have been no changes in personnel since the last report.

9. Production.

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - AUGUST 1963

MEXIs	HMMs	HMMAs
MEXI-5977 (HMM 7698)	HMM 7694	HMMA 21964
MEXI-5976 (HMM 7697)	HMM 7690	HMMA 21963
MEXI-5892	HMM 7672	HMMA 21958
MEXI-5864	HMM 7665	HMMA 21940
MEXI-5863	HMM 7653	HMMA 21936
MEXI-5856	HMM 7650	HMMA 21931
MEXI-5855 (HMM 7644)	HMM 7635	HMMA 21910
MEXI-5854	HMM 7640	HMMA 21905
MEXI-5803	HMM 7631	HMMA 21900
MEXI-5794	HMM 7627	HMMA 21874
MEXI-5789	HMM 7610	
MEXI-5783 (HMM 7633)	HMM 7602	
MEXI-5782 (HMM 7632)	HMM 7599	
MEXI 5757	HMM 7598	
MEXI 5753	HMM 7597	
MEXI 5752	HMM 7595	
MEXI 5705 (HMM 7609)	HMM 7585	
MEXI 5675 (HMM 7601)	HMM 7583	
MEXI 5672	HMM 7581	
MEXI 5644	HMM 7567	
20 +	20 +	10 = 50

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

LIENVOY [illegible] ops
13 September 1963

Mr. Whitten:

I just learned that Mr. George sent his note to Mr. Scott directly to Colonel King. The note mentions my pseudo, Paul V. Levister. Perhaps Col. King would want to jot down my true name somewhere, GERARD CAMPAGNA.

I read our LIENVOY Project file yesterday and got excellent additional information from Tig Puckett. It's always encouraging to get into such good operations.

Jerry Campagna

Next week I would like to read further into LIENVOY and LIFEAT, especially the monthly reports and the disseminated reports.

12 September 1963

Dear Willard:

This may seem to you like a voice out of the void, but I always carry in my mind your repeated invitations to visit you and remember clearly your acquaintance and kindness to my brother. Strangely enough it seems to continue to be true that the only escape from this jail-like desk is back to my old area where I never expected to return--I even had one this Spring. Just now I have a specific reason for wanting to visit your place, that is, in addition to our own personal reasons.

For some time I have been bent on trying to push for more positive information from taps and audio. I realize that it is taken for granted around the world that the purpose of taps and audio is for operational leads, particularly in the KUDESK field.

In one or two places in the world, positive production is outstanding and we have been making a study for some time trying to see why it works in some cases and not in others. One of the outstanding examples is LIFEAT and especially LIENVOY. These seem to be far ahead of other similar operations around the world even though they seem to approach the problem somewhat similarly. It occurred to me that we might find out what makes yours so especially effective by having one of my people go to your station for a few days to talk with you and your officers and get the detailed story. I could then take another look at the other operations and see what's missing or what's wrong. I'm sure this would be of great help to the place as a whole. If you agree, I will send Paul V. Levister (Iden), the editor of our Foreign Intelligence Series (our Staff doctrinal papers, the first few of which have been dispatched to you). He could be in Mexico City on or about 23 September, or any time thereafter that is more convenient for you and your people. Could you let us know your reaction by cable, and if it's favorable, when you would prefer to have Levister arrive. We would confirm his ETA by cable.

Galbond is leaving tomorrow to make a visit down your way and I have asked him to be kind enough to pass this to you. The desk here concurs in our interest subject to your approval.

file LIENVOY jps

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division
INFO:
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY
ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action: None. For Headquarters Information.

Reference: HMMA-21845, 30 July 1963

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during July 1963.

2. Target Lines - July 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of July:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunez
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams

(continued)

Enclosure:
Production Report

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

50-6-75/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO:
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-22005
DATE: 23 August 1963
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Films Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

On 7 August 1963 the Station EE case officer requested LIENVOY coverage of the Yugoslav lines. Arrangements are being made to put these lines in within the near future.

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

The Station continues to receive full transcripts in Spanish from ten lines (five Cuban Embassy and five Soviet Embassy). DIR-60764 dated 13 August 1963 asked the Station to send to Headquarters one copy of the full transcripts from the Cuban Embassy lines. These are being forwarded on a weekly basis. The first group is being forwarded as an attachment to HMMA-22000 dated 21 August 1963. If they do not please Headquarters officers who desire them, it is requested that the Mexico Station be promptly advised with any suggestions for changes.

On 6 August 1963 Orville HORSFALL, staff agent, arrived in Mexico to work presently as a unilateral monitor but eventually as the supervisor of a tap center either under LIENVOY or LITEMPO. He has established himself outside and is presently at work eliminating the backlog of Soviet tapes.

Douglas J. FEINGLASS continues to do the Russian from LIENVOY, the Russian from two LIFEAT lines on Soviet targets, and the Russian from the LIPAWN audio operation. In addition, FEINGLASS sends clipped transcripts to the Station ready for 201 files.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY Information.

HMMW-11831 dated 6 August 1963 indicated that Headquarters was not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from LIENVOY. The outside staff agent, Arnold AREHART has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to Robert B. RIGGS inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk (meeting for coffee or lunch). RIGGS meets AREHART within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases is information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval.

Other leads appear in the full transcripts or daily resumen. They also are exploited by the Station case officer responsible for the target where the lead appears. For example, on 12 August 1963 Boris KAZANTSEV, recently arrived Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and former defection target in Mexico, called his wife at their residence. The number was not listed but was immediately checked by Raymond GERENDE who determined that the number was the switchboard of the apartment house where KAZANTSEV and several other families live. The reason the Station checked out this number was to put unilateral coverage on it if possible; however, the switchboard was beyond the Station's capability to handle.

Maryknoll priest Felix McGOWAN contacted the Cuban Embassy on 31 July 1963. MEXI-5565 reported details of this contact. This cable was sent to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

Professor WEBB (fnu) of the University of Louisiana contacted Mexican Communist Jorge L. TAMAYO Castillejos, prominent Mexican Marxist intellectual and professor at the University of Mexico, and arranged to meet with him on 31 July 1963. MEXI-5568 reported this contact to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

Bartolo (fnu) contacted former Governor of Baja California, Braulio MALDONADO Sandez on 16 July 1963 regarding the sale of Cuban pesos. MEXI-5569 reported this contact to Headquarters for dissemination and action by ODENVY.

5. Liaison

On 15 August 1963 Willard C. CURTIS met with LITENSOR to arrange for a sensitive PBRUMEN case (MEXI-5789 reported the details of this meeting).

6. Security

There were no security incidents within the project during this month.

7. Technical

There were no technical problems during this period.

8. Personnel

Orville HORSFALL's arrival is the only change in personnel since the last report and he is handled as an independent agent by the Station, with no LIENVOY personnel aware of his presence in Mexico. Robert B. RIGGS sees HORSFALL daily to deliver and pick up tapes.

9. Production

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

~~SECRET~~

SECRET [redacted]

PRODUCTION - JULY 1963

MEXIs	HMMAs	HMMs
MEXI-5570	HMMA-21824	HMM-7542
MEXI-5569	HMMA-21802	HMM-7539
MEXI-5565	HMMA-21762	HMM-7502
MEXI-5532	HMMA-21742	HMM-7501
MEXI-5487	HMMA-21709	HMM-7500
MEXI-5465 (HMM-7547)	HMMA-21693	HMM-7499
MEXI-5459	HMMA-21681	HMM-7498
MEXI-5458 (HMM-7543)	HMMA-21673	HMM-7497
MEXI-5457 (HMM-7544)	HMMA-21672	HMM-7496
MEXI-5452	HMMA-21669	HMM-7495
MEXI-5438	HMMA-21655	HMM-7486
MEXI-5412		HMM-7481
MEXI-5377 (HMM-7525)		HMM-7480
MEXI-5353 (HMM-7524)		HMM-7478
MEXI-5351 (HMM-7523)		
MEXI-5340		
MEXI-5334		
MEXI-5296		
MEXI-5295 (HMM-7403)		
19 +	11 +	14 = 44

SECRET [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. MEXI 5448
B: MEXI 5487

1. The referenced cables describe two recent incidents in which the Mexico City Station made use of LIENVOY information to take investigative or punitive action against security suspects. The first reference reported the identifying and "trapping" of a PBPRIME citizen who was offering his services to the Cuban Embassy, and the second reported the deporting of a Cuban IS agent identified by LIENVOY material.

2. In both of these cases, there seems to have been departure from the extreme caution with which the Mexico Station has always handled the LIENVOY material. Admitting that the cables do not set out enough facts to enable us to make a final judgment, we still feel a little uneasy about this use of LIENVOY material. In the first case, the Station sent an agent to the suspect's hotel, posing as a Cuban Embassy official to "trap" him into revealing his intentions. The scheme, which was admittedly clever, succeeded, but we were concerned about what would have happened if the Cubans themselves had decided to contact the individual. Would not the LIENVOY operation have been exposed to some extent? We grant that the Cubans and other bloc personnel in Mexico City may suspect LIENVOY exists, but they do not know it --- yet. Incidentally, we had no traces on the PBPRIMER involved.

3. The second case involved the detection, apprehension and deportation of a Cuban IS agent whose whereabouts were learned through LIENVOY. From the few facts we know about this case, we cannot really judge the possible risk to LIENVOY. The Mexico Station created LIENVOY and has always guarded its security with scrupulous care. Has there been a change?

4. Finally, please note that both these cases should have been reported to Headquarters before action was taken. In general, arrests, deportation, trapping, or other action against security suspects should be approved by Headquarters, except where in the opinion of the Chief of Station, the added time needed would seriously impair ODYOKE security or the security of our operations. The Mexico Station has always done this, and the coincidence of two recent cases where it was not done inspires us to query you. Please let us know your views.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KOBSOGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-195/74
Box: 35 Fold: 6

Distribtuion:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11831	7 AUG 1963 6 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	HQS FILE NUMBER None LIENVOY/OPS 50-6-75/3

1 - CI/OPS/WH
1 - C/WH/3
1 - WH/3/MEXI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
C/WH/3	John M. Whitten:cmy		5613

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/WH	6 Aug 63	Frank Hughes

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	SIGNATURE
C/WH		J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER: HMMW-11811

DOC. DATE 5 Aug 63

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-75/3

BY IP/ARD/RPU ON 23 Nov 73 AND FORWARDED TO IP/ANP ✓

IP/EDI ____ BECAUSE

IP/PH ____

IP/FILES ____

1. It was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file # 50-6-75/1
6. It was indexed document.
7. KAPOK

DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~ | HMMA-21845

TO : Chief, WH Division
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT : Monthly Operational Report for Project LIENVOY
ACTION : For Headquarters information.
REF : HMMA-21530 dated 14 June 1963

Hqs File No: 50-6-75/4
No Indexing Required

1. There follows the monthly operational report for Project LIENVOY activities during June 1963.

2. Target Lines - June 1963.

The following lines were covered during the month of June:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunez
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams
10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Manuel Marcue Pardinas)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Films Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

3. Processing of LIENVOY Information.

Of the lines covered, all are of interest to KUBARK and approximately one half of them are exclusively for KUBARK. The LIENVOY tap center monitors continue to prepare daily summaries of significant items from all lines. In addition, they prepare full transcripts in Spanish for ten lines (five Cuban Embassy lines and five Soviet Embassy lines). These transcripts are used by the Station Case Officers for Cuban and Soviet operations in following leads of interest.

FORM 53a | CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ | ☒ CONTINUED | PAGE NO ONE

Encl. -1

CS COPY

50-6-75/3

On 5 June 1963 Douglas J. FEINGLASS, Staff Agent, arrived in Mexico to replace Howard G. SAFARANO, the Station translator for Russian language conversations appearing on LIENVOY and LIFEAT lines. SAFARANO departed PCS on 18 June thus freeing an inside slot for use by an operations officer. FEINGLASS' usefulness to the Station is handicapped by his inability to transcribe the Spanish portion of the reels from the Soviet coverage. This, despite Headquarters assurance that he could do these transcriptions. However, he has settled into outside living conditions with a minimum of difficulty. For the present, a monitor from the LIENVOY tap center is transcribing the Spanish portion of the above take. There is a Station backlog of Soviet tapes numbering about 50 which accumulated during the period when FEINGLASS was trying unsuccessfully to transcribe the Spanish. The backlog is being retained until Orville HORSFALL arrives. In addition to the Russian transcriptions, FEINGLASS also clips the transcripts for individual dossiers thus relieving the Station Case Officer for Soviet operations of a clerical task. After the arrival of HORSFALL, the Mexico Station will review requirements for outside translators and make recommendations for future use of FEINGLASS.

In early June to support the AMROD operation, the Station requested full transcripts of the Cuban Embassy lines. In addition, Thomas G. URQUHART (ps) while on temporary duty in Mexico was given access to the LIENVOY tap center to review the traffic on a current basis.

4. Exploitation of LIENVOY information.

Coverage of the Cuban, Czech, and Soviet Embassies provided details of their personnel, their contacts, travel and other useful CE data. In most all cases of official travel, LIENVOY gave the Station advance information when reservations were made. Confirmation of the travel is, of course, obtained through the LIFIRE project.

The traffic is reviewed for English speaking persons who might be U.S. citizens making contact with Soviet or Soviet Satellite Embassies for political or other reasons. On 20 May 1963 an English speaker identifying himself as Albert Kennedy called the Soviet Embassy and requested political asylum for himself, his wife and seven children. Subsequent investigation revealed that he was also a protection case at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Appropriate U.S. agencies were advised of Subject's contact with the Soviet Embassy.

5. Liaison.

During this reporting period there were no meetings between the Chief of Station KUBARK and LITENSOR; however, regular contact was maintained with LIELEGANT and LIERGO.

6. Security.

There were no security incidents within the project during this month. As reported in MEXI-5170, 26 June 1963, the true name of a KUBARK case officer was revealed to the Cuban Embassy by a caller who refused to identify himself. From the transcript it appeared that the Cuban Embassy was not interested in making contact with the caller who claimed to have details of KUBARK operations in Mexico.

7. Technical.

Arnold AREHART, staff agent, has kept the equipment working effectively. As Headquarters is being advised by separate cable, the Mexico Station does not plan to replace the present LIENVOY equipment until the next Presidential candidate is named, assuming of course that this will occur within the next few weeks.

8. Personnel.

On 17 June Robert B. RIGGS resumed meeting Arnold AREHART and routine case officer functions for LIENVOY. Gregory PARMUTH meets Douglas J. FEINGLASS daily to deliver and receive the Soviet Embassy traffic. PARMUTH's assistance in obtaining living quarters and necessary sterile office furniture was responsible for the ease with which FEINGLASS was able to settle into his ~~outside~~ staff agent status.

In the opinion of Thomas G. URQUHART, who has spent some time inside the tap center, Arnold F. AREHART is doing a commendable job in the management of the center. In addition, AREHART has a general awareness of the take from each line. When leads of interest appear, he notifies the Station immediately so that action can be taken.

Willard C. CURTIS contacts LIENVOY-2 when the Station desires contact with the Mexicans directly or when AREHART is absent.

9. Production.

The volume of paper produced by this project is hardly reflected in formal disseminations, operational cables, and dispatches which numbered 39 during June. The daily summaries, the transcripts from two Czech lines, five Soviet lines, and five Cuban lines are retained for background use in Station files. They could be more fully exploited for reporting purposes if personnel were available.

There is attached a list of reports, cables and dispatches forwarded to Headquarters during this month.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
1/3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

30 July 1963

LIENVOY PRODUCTION

June 1963

MEXI's	HMMA's	HMM's	
MEXI 5170	HMMA 21647	HMM 7466	
MEXI 5169 (HMM 7465)	HMMA 21594	HMM 7467	
MEXI 5128	HMMA 21593	HMM 7461	
MEXI 5111	HMMA 21540	HMM 7457	
MEXI 5089	HMMA 21530	HMM 7448	
MEXI 5072	HMMA 21487	HMM 7442	
MEXI 5071 (HMM 7437)	HMMA 21474	HMM 7435	
MEXI 5066 (HMM 7426)	HMMA 21464	HMM 7405	
MEXI 5048 (HMM 7415)		HMM 7403	
MEXI 5035 (HMM 7412)		HMM 7401	
MEXI 4998 (HMM 7404)		HMM 7335	
MEXI 4966		HMM 7383	
		HMM 7378	
		HMM 7374	
		HMM 7369	
		HMM 7367	
		HMM 7364	
		HMM 7363	
		HMM 7360	
12	8	19	= 39

Excluded from automatic

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, RF 2

file 50-6-75/3
LIENVOY Ops

S E C R E T 281754Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5498

26 JUL 63 IN 87722

REF DIR 56443*

AGREED HERE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS NOT NEEDED ROUTINELY. RESUMES ALERT CASE OFFICERS TO CONVERSATIONS MAY WANT IN FULL. TAPES CAN BE FARMED OUT TO AREHART OR OTHER CONTRACT PERSONNEL OR HANDLED BY STAFFER CONCERNED. URQUHART AGREES THIS SATISFACTORY FOR HIS PURPOSES AND UNAWARE OTHER SAS NEEDS THIS TIME.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED CURTIS RAISE QUESTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTIONS OF LIENVOY PBRUMEN TAKE WITH DAINOLD WHILE LATTER MEXI.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

[illegible] IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief, SAS

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Transmittal of LIENVOY Resumens

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

TYPIC

REF: DIR 43214

Attached, for addressees, are copies of the LIENVOY Resumens for 9, 10, and 11 May 1963.

Willard C CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD, w/att
✓2 - C/SAS, w/att e & 1 cc w/att to SAS/ESC
4 - Files

CS COPY FILED IN 5-6-6-25/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED
13 June 1963

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21580

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-20461
P - 579

14-00000

[illegible]
jueves 9 mayo 196[illegible]. 1.

07:58 El Ing. J[illegible] I[illegible] pregunta por el periodista [illegible] [illegible]. La sirvienta dice que todavía se encuentra dormido. [illegible] deja el siguiente recado: "que no vaya a la cita que tenía hoy en el despacho pues se acordó cancelarla hasta que yo hable con él".

09:46 VICTOR [illegible] pregunta al [illegible] que si ya leyó la [illegible], refiriéndose al artículo de hoy en la revista Siempre de [illegible]. [illegible] asiente y agrega que se necesita [illegible], pero que sin embargo tiene un párrafo muy bueno, donde dice que [illegible] lo regañó. Continúa [illegible] diciendo que le responderá con argumentos objetivos y sin meterse para nada en la cosa personal, aprovechando el [illegible] para volver nuevamente sobre la Ley Electoral. Cambiando de tema VICTOR pregunta que qué le pareció la [illegible], refiriéndose al artículo de él en Siempre. [illegible] opina que [illegible] bueno y que es lo mejor que [illegible] de este número, agregando que "de allí hubiera podido salir un cuento [illegible], [illegible] de la jerarquía y demás; el artículo es muy [illegible] y [illegible]mente por el retrato a [illegible], [illegible] por el [illegible] en todo". VICTOR comenta que lo de [illegible]. [illegible] dice que lo "[illegible]". [illegible] dice que "[illegible] de [illegible] llama la atención". [illegible] también [illegible] a VICTOR que "de lo otro luego platicamos, pues en principio ya se aceptó la integración de nuevos miembros; ayer [illegible] la reunión, y aunque no se discutieron individualmente [illegible] detalles, sí se aceptó en principio la idea".

09:55 [illegible] JULIO pregunta a la Embajada Cubana por [illegible]. Al contestar [illegible] pregunta a su vez a JULIO [illegible] cosas que le mandó. JULIO asiente y agrega que "[illegible] gusto que las cosas se han resuelto". [illegible] lo que le extrañaba era que [illegible]...... [illegible] que pasó fué que por desgracia [illegible] anterior [illegible] con [illegible] interés en verlo "porque tengo [illegible] pero van [illegible] se cerrado". [illegible] mismo lugar que JULIO señaló la vez [illegible]. [illegible] que sea en otro lugar como por ejemplo [illegible] en las calles de Misisipi por el cine [illegible] como él tiene un cargo sumamente [illegible] tiempo y le gustaría que fuera lo más pronto posible. [illegible] responde que ahora mismo como a las 10:[illegible]. [illegible] aclarando que está vestido con un traje gris [illegible].

10:[illegible] [illegible] Lomas, pregunta por el Lic. [illegible]. La [illegible] informa que no está y que tardará [illegible] en regresar a México, pero sugiere a JULIO [illegible] las oficinas de Medellín, pues allí hay personas que atiendan cualquier asunto.

10:46 CLARA PORCEL ofrece a la Embajada Cubana, 6 cajas de medicamentos, pidiendo a LLAGOSTERA mande a recogerlas. Así lo hará.

(NEW)

10:55 El tico JUAN CARLOS FERNANDEZ, desde Prensa Latina y por encargo de [illegible] se comunica al Hotel Fremont con la Sra. TIRSI para decirle que debe alojarse en la casa de [illegible], donde seguramente estará más cómoda. La TIRSI indica que llegó hoy en la madrugada en lugar de a las 21:00 hs. y se extraña de que de Río no les hayan enviado un cable comunicándoles su llegada. [illegible] dice no haber recibido nada y lo lamenta, pues hubieran ido a esperarla.

11:23 [illegible] pregunta a la hermana de [illegible] si el mexicano [illegible] tiene solicitud de visa. La hermana después de consultar con [illegible] indica que sí y que [illegible] ordenó la autoricen por ser amigo de [illegible].

11:35 El Sr. [illegible], que dijo ser amigo de [illegible], pregunta por el nombre completo del nuevo Embajador de Cuba en México. [illegible] se lo proporciona. El Sr. [illegible] quisiera concertar una entrevista con él, pues "tengo algo importante". [illegible] informa que el señor [illegible] todavía no ha llegado a México. [illegible] entonces quisiera ponerse en contacto con el Agregado Militar. [illegible] indica que no hay. [illegible] esperará entonces a que llegue el nuevo Embajador.

12:00 [illegible] de Prela México para el siguiente [illegible] Prela N.Y. atención [illegible], se encuentra aquí [illegible], compañera de [illegible]. Ve si es posible que [illegible] le envía por telégrafo su visa para que pueda salir en el vuelo de mañana. Saludos J. [illegible].

12:25 [illegible] S.M. [illegible], indica a [illegible] que la acompañe esta tarde, a la conferencia de [illegible] en la Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas, pues [illegible] tiene interés en asistir ya que tratará el tema de "[illegible] la Paz". [illegible] con gusto irá ya que estos actos "le hacen sentirse en ambiente".

14:25 El Cap. [illegible] manifiesta a la [illegible] que en las oficinas de Medellín hay una [illegible], pero ninguno de los dirigentes se presenta y ya se acaba la [illegible].

[illegible] En vista de [illegible] con [illegible] a la [illegible] Gral. [illegible] y ésta se encontraba [illegible], [illegible]...

RESUMEN
jueves 9 mayo 1968. -3.

Vasquez Gomez

1624 ELENA se puso en contacto con [illegible], quien manifiesta que la carta que quedó de enviarle al General no la mandará hasta la semana entrante, ya que casi todos estos últimos días ha estado muy enfermo. ELENA así se lo comunicará al Gral. CARDENAS. P-1993

14:28 ELENA VAZQUEZ-GOMEZ comunica al Lic. [illegible] AGUILAR y al Dr. GUILLERMO MONTAÑO, de parte del Gral. CARDENAS, que mañana por ser día de las madres no resultaría cómodo que se vieran, además de que el General tiene otro compromiso previo. Por tal motivo los espera el sábado a las 12:00 hs. en su casa de Andes. Ambos aceptan estar presentes. (5757)
Posteriormente el Dr. MONTAÑO indica al Lic. LUIS [illegible] FERRERO que en vista de que el sábado tendrá que ir a casa del Gral. CARDENAS se pospone la reunión que tenían prevista. (7354) 7752

14:34 VICTOR RICO GALAN queda en desayunar mañana con [illegible] a las 09:30 hs. en Sanborn's de Durango.

19:09 ALONSO AGUILAR dice a NACHO ACOSTA que ELENA tiene un texto y le pide que haga el mismo favor de ayer. NACHO indica que ya lo recogió y lo distribuyó. AGUILAR comenta que está bien, pues es una cosa que tiene actualidad. 2152

19:41 FERNANDO GAMBOA felicita calurosamente a ANGELICA ARENAL DE SIQUEIROS por el documento de hoy, es excelente. ANGELICA le pregunta que si leyó lo del mitote que se armó con la ida allí (ANGELICA fué a la sesión plenaria del Congreso de Procuradores con un ramo de rosas). FERNANDO asiente. ANGELICA dice que la cosa está un poco cambiada, pero estuvo sensacional. FERNANDO la felicita nuevamente " qué bueno que no te desanimes". ANGELICA comenta que " no, tengo que seguir luchando", y agrega que a DAVID le pareció magnífico el documento [illegible]. FERNANDO indica que le escribió [illegible] CARDENAS, y a pesar " de que andamos con muchos líos, parece que vamos por buen camino, de eso estoy seguro". (P-448) (6004)

Arenal Siqueiros

21:14 Desde la Escuela de Ciencias Políticas, LUIS [illegible] dice a HEBERTO CASTILLO quien se encuentra en el [illegible], que está platicando con los estudiantes y quieren ir a Salvador 36. HEBERTO no los puede esperar pues tiene un compromiso a las 22:00 hs. LUIS pone a HEBERTO en contacto con el estudiante VALERO. HEBERTO explica que en la última reunión se llegó al acuerdo de que el Comité del D.F., sea absorbido por el Comité Nacional " y como a mí me nombraron encargado de la Comisión de Organización del Movimiento, quiero ponerme en contacto con ustedes para llevar adelante lo de las brigadas, así como para que inviten a muchachos serios y responsables que quieran dar parte de su tiempo al Movimiento". VALERO propone conversar ampliamente el sábado en la C.U.

U.N.A.M.

[illegible]
Viernes 10 mayo [illegible] copy p 1

2.5

09:50 Una mujer con acento norteamericano que dice ser amiga de [illegible], pide al Lic. [illegible] le ayude en un problema muy urgente. AGUILAR le propone verse esta tarde a las 17:30 hs. en la planta baja del edificio del Movimiento. La mujer concurrirá.

copy to p-1371

manuel 7721 copy p!

09:50 Un estudiante de la Universidad, con acento sudamericano, manifiesta a [illegible], a la Embajada cubana, que necesita verlo porque necesita despachar unas cosas. [illegible] le sugiere verse mañana a las 07:50 hs. El estudiante acepta esa hora, pues más tarde tiene clase. Ambos quedan de verse como de costumbre "en el número uno". [illegible] copy p

copy to U.N.A.M. file 50-16-3

12:00 Un ayudante de [illegible] se comunica al 27-28-61 (Rodolfo [illegible] Sánchez, Mar Blanco, 69-5) y dice al Sr. [illegible] que " estamos esperando la propaganda". [illegible] indica que ya está lista y que dentro de un rato se las llevará.

12:09 [illegible], de Ovaciones, quisiera que el Lic. [illegible], quien representa un sector fuerte en la política, le hiciera unas declaraciones sobre las pastorales que acaban de publicarse. [illegible], después de consultar, dice que como la cosa es de mucha importancia, mañana se reune la dirección del Partido y el lunes se sabrá qué declaraciones van a expedir.

copy p-1671

12:16 El Gral. [illegible] saluda al Lic. [illegible] y le agradece la atención que tuvo con el [illegible] de la Comisión, así como la indicación que le hizo sobre cómo resolver el problema. [illegible] dice que fué de acuerdo con la propia indicación del Lic. [illegible]. Agrega que estima mucho el honor de llamarlo, y le brinda la oportunidad de conocer el interesantísimo programa de [illegible] para la Comisión del Río Balsas. [illegible] dice que son programas del señor Presidente por el deseo que tiene de ayudar a Oaxaca y sobre todo aquella parte de la Mixteca que es una de las zonas más erosionadas que hay en el país, y de gente con mucha pobreza; y el programa se presentó por la iniciación del señor Presidente para este año. Le agradece sus frases de estímulo, lo saluda afectuosamente y se pone a sus órdenes. [illegible] replica que al contrario "soy yo quien está a las suyas, oficial y privadamente".

copy to p-1493

copy p 5420

copy p 270 5315

7331

13:02 [illegible], de Prensa Latina, dice a [illegible], de la Revista Política, que fué a hablar con [illegible], del Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda y "se trataba nada más de darme una orientación anónima sobre el voto que dio México, y no quiere él que se publique bajo su nombre, ve?". [illegible] comprende y cree que debe haber servido la información. [illegible]

12

5315 [illegible]A dice que como no. Agrega que [illegible] insistió en que quiere una colección completa de la Revista Política, pero parece que sólo hay ya encuadernada. RAQUEL va a ver éso. ANAYA pasará por las oficinas de la Revista hoy a las 16:30 hs.

1034

16:00 RAFAEL ayudante del Lic. BRAULIO MALDONADO pregunta a la imprenta Laura, sita en Fernando Alva Ixtlixochitl 145-A si el libro del Lic. MALDONADO ya ha sido empezado. El sobrino del Sr. DIAZ informa que ya y que pueden mandar a recoger una muestra para que lo lea, corrija y dé su autorización, además de que necesita le mande algo de dinero.

17:52 BUENAVENTURA REYES pide a MANOLO, del Consulado de Cuba en Veracruz que tome nota de que en comunicación num. 0361 de fecha 6 de mayo se le concedió visa de turista a AIDA MARIA QUIJANO [illegible]. Cambiando de tema BUENAVENTURA indica que irá a pasar el domingo a Veracruz pues "me hace falta ver a mi gente", por tal motivo saldrá el sábado en la noche en el autobus y regresará el domingo en la noche por avión. MANOLO toma nota de todo.

3578

18:10 El Lic. [illegible] TOLEDANO comentó con MARIA TERESA [illegible] que ayer tomó parte en una Mesa Redonda, que él en principio creyó se trataba de una conferencia solamente, pero resulta que como a las 6 de la tarde lo llamaron para recordarle que debería asistir a la Mesa Redonda. En fín así lo hizo y no obstante que en el mediodía se sintió enfermo al salir del Instituto Francés ya se sintió perfectamente. Agrega que él nunca en su vida había ido a dicho Institutot y tenía interés en ver qué clase de público asistía y grande fué su sorpresa al ver allí a SILVA HERZOG, [illegible] y [illegible] y unos cinco o seis historiadores pero afortunadamente todo salió bien.

1671

375

18:15 ARRIAGA del periódico EL DIA tiene interés en saber qué resolvió el Lic. [illegible] de concederle una entrevista. MARIA después de consultar indica que el Licenciado saldrá de la ciudad a descansar y que el lunes lo esperará a las 13:00 hs.

18:24 ADRIANA LOMBARDO pregunta a MARIA [illegible] que si el documento que hicieron esta mañana los compañeros fué revisado por "el maestro". MARIA no sabe y comunica a ADRIANA con su papá. ADRIANA pregunta que si va a ir a ver a ese señor. LOMBARDO responde que le hablaron para pedirle su opinión acerca del asunto y que él tiene la impresión de que Solidaridad está pidiéndola, pero que tal vez lo hayan mandado llamar para preguntarle cuales son sus pretensiones y le ofrezcan otra cosa. Probablemente le pregunten que extensión necesita. ADRIANA pregunta que si quiere que le mande esos datos. LOMBARDO dice

762

C. pgt. Adriana Lombardo (P-762)

que no es necesario que solamente se les dé por teléfono. ADRIANA indica que se necesitan dos salones, uno para teatro y cine y otro para conferencias, por lo menos 10 salones de clase, otro cuarto para biblioteca y lo que es indispensable es un salón para los compañeros que viene de fuera a estudiar los cursos intensivos, pues "el año pasado tuvimos en un cuarto de 3x3 a ocho compañeros". LOMBARDO toma nota de todo esto. Cambiando de tema ADRIANA informa que hoy en la mañana habló con el Lic. [illegible] y éste le dijo que no había tenido oportunidad de entregar el oficio al Lic. PALMARES, así que ADRIANA sugiere a su papá que llame directamente al Lic. PALMARES.

6081 / [illegible] Noe C. pgt.

20:33 A las 18:05 FERNANDO CARMONA preguntó a ESTELA AGUILAR por ALONSO. ESTELA informó que salió hace un momento, que iba a poner gasolina al coche y de allí iba al M.L.N. donde tenía una cita. CARMONA dice que no ha llegado al Movimiento, pues incluso no hay quien abra las oficinas. ESTELA se alarma. Posteriormente ESTELA ha estado tratando de comunicarse a las oficinas del M.L.N. sin lograrlo. A las 20:33 CARMONA vuelve a preguntar a ESTELA por ALONSO. ESTELA indica que no lo ha localizado y que él tampoco ha llamado a la casa y esto ya la está preocupando, agregando que esperará una hora más.

C. pgt. Alonso Aguilar (P-2152)

RESUMEN
sábado 11 mayo 1963. 1.

1671

LOMBARDO Toledano

copy to P-1671

03:30 FERNANDO CARMONA comenta con el Lic. AGUILAR que anoche estuvo preocupado. Este indica que se fué a tomar un café con la norteamericana con quien tuvo una cita, al café Florida [illegible]. Cambiando de tema FERNANDO pregunta que si vió el último número de Avante. AGUILAR niega. CARMONA agrega que "el ilustre Licenciado vuelve a meterse con nosotros". AGUILAR pregunta que en qué forma. CARMONA dice que negando nuevamente que el PPS esté en el M.L.N., además trae una entrevista que el Lic. LOMBARDO le cedió al Saturday Evening Post "de lo más chistosa" y CARMONA hasta ha pensado en [illegible] en su artículo. AGUILAR dice que es muy raro, pues él vió hace unos días un documento de la J.G.C.M. de Altar Son. en que manifiestan no comprender la actitud de sus dirigentes en contra del M.L.N. y hasta califican dicha actitud de anti-patriótica. CARMONA lamenta no tener dicho documento en su poder pues podría utilizarlo para atacarlos en su artículo. AGUILAR no está de acuerdo con CARMONA ya que eso sería tanto como colocar a estas gentes contra la pared y "nuestra actitud debe ser al contrario, debemos tratar de irnoslos ganando a ellos y a todos los que se pueda". CARMONA dice que entonces solo colocaría contra la pared al Lic. LOMBARDO, pero que de todas maneras le gustaría que AGUILAR revisara el próximo artículo antes de entregarlo. AGUILAR está de acuerdo y a las órdenes de CARMONA.

09:03 El tico JOSE CARLOS FERNANDEZ que trabaja en Prensa Latina, pregunta al francés [illegible] si se interesa por la suscripción del boletín diario informativo de Prela. C[illegible] manifiesta que desea además del Boletín un intercambio de noticias. FERNANDEZ comenta que el precio para las noticias es mayor cuando se trata para periódicos "además de que la agencia nuestra no está controlada por nosotros, sino la controlan de La Habana". C[illegible] dice que desea la información ya que es corresponsal de la Asociación Extranjera de Prensa y del Movimiento de Liberación Franco-canadiense. FERNANDEZ responde que podría arreglar que la tarifa del Boletín, Panorama Económico y Siglo XX sea especial. C[illegible] acepta y pide a FERNANDEZ pase a Benjamín Franklin [illegible] depto. 5 para que le entregue el cheque y que los periódicos se los envíe a la [illegible] de su esposa que está en las calles de Av. Jalisco [illegible]

(NEW)

10:20 [illegible], desde la casa del Lic. [illegible], pregunta por [illegible]. La esposa de éste informa [illegible] Sr. [illegible] pregunta que si podría [illegible] algunos trabajos (de imprenta). La señora no sabe pero [illegible] primeramente a la Imprenta. Posteriormente [illegible] logra ponerse en contacto con [illegible] y éste manifiesta que ya va para la casa de BRAULIO.

RESUMEN
sábado 11 mayo 1963 2.

10:40 RAMIREZ con acento centroamericano pregunta a VEGA de la Embajada de Cuba que si en el avión de ayer no llegó nada acerca de su visa. VEGA sin contestar a su pregunta le indica que venga a la Embajada, pero que adelante media hora a la que habían fijado. RAMIREZ allí estará.

12:10 RAQUEL necesita con urgencia para el próximo número de Política fotografías de las reuniones que ha habido en la Asociación Mexicana de periodistas en relación a la Paz y además todos los discursos de FIDEL CASTRO en Rusia. Con relación a lo primero BORGES se las proporcionará. Con respecto a lo segundo ALBERU procurará conseguírselos y en caso contrario sugiere a RAQUEL se ponga en contacto con [illegible] a su casa. Posteriormente ALBERU indica a [illegible] que ya le tiene una revista Bohemia y dos periódicos cubanos que contienen algunos de los discursos de FIDEL en Rusia, solo que se los facilitará en calidad de préstamo pues son de TERESA PROENZA. RAQUEL mandará a [illegible] por el material.

13:39 La Dra. MATILDE [illegible] CANO pregunta a ESTELA AGUILAR que si no sabe si el Dr. [illegible] es miembro del M.L.N. pues desde antier lo sacaron de su cuarto en el Hospital Colonia unos agentes de la Procuraduría y se lo llevaron, incluso del mismo hospital se han interesado mucho por su paradero pero no han sabido nada. ESTELA dice que ese nombre no le suena, pero de todas maneras lo pondrá en conocimiento de ALONSO.

7324

15:53 [illegible] MAIZ, de la Embajada Cubana, se comunica con el gachupín [illegible] y le indica que lo han destinado nuevamente aquí; que lo han ascendido y está mejor en todo sentido; que llegó ayer procedente de Cuba. Agrega que ha estado tratando de comunicarse con ANTONIO [illegible], pero no le contestan en el banco; y pregunta que si se siguen reuniendo los miércoles. [illegible] responde que sí. MAIZ irá el próximo miércoles para reunirse con los amigos.

20:34 FERNANDO CARMONA pregunta a ANGELICA ARENAL DE SIQUEIROS que cómo se encuentra DAVID. ANGELICA dice que más o menos pasándola, pues no hay ninguna cosa ni ninguna novedad por el momento. CARMONA comenta que "por cierto la semana que entra quiero ver si publicamos ese papel de que te decía; todo depende de que podamos juntar los centavos". Cambiando de tema dice que sería bueno que DAVID tuviera en la celda uno de esos aparatos inalámbricos "Walky Talky" para poder comunicarse con todos. ANGELICA pregunta que si realmente se podría. CARMONA no lo sabe bien, pero sería cosa de que ANGELICA lo consultara con un amigo que sepa; por ejemplo el hijo de [illegible] CIZABAL, que es un buen electrónico, pues a lo mejor sí se pueda. Agrega que esos aparatos tienen un radio como de 5 kiló-

David ALFARO Siqueiros
P-448

metros. ANGELICA dice que le alcanzaría hasta la casa y sería fantástico; lo malo es que estarían hablando todo el tiempo y ya no habría ni acción ni trabajo porque élla iba a estarle preguntando a cada rato que cómo se sentía. CARMONA cree que sí habría acción, pues DAVID a cada rato estaría preguntando qué pasó con el abogado; qué pasó con CARMONA; qué pasó con ALONSO, etc. ANGELICA dice que sería tremendo; pero si además le arreglaran un sistema para que DAVID "hablara con todos ustedes!". CARMONA comenta que si éso fuera posible, ya sería lo de menos. ANGELICA cambia de tema e indica que de todas maneras quisiera platicar con CARMONA la semana entrante, porque DAVID insiste en una serie de cosas, desde el punto de vista de la cosa electoral, y ANGELICA quisiera cambiar impresiones. CARMONA arguye que "nosotros tenemos una posición allí que ojalá que él entienda mejor". ANGELICA argumenta que independientemente de éso, élla cree que sí hay algo que se puede hacer. CARMONA dice que "estamos en la enésima fase de reorganización; pero es que no tiene remedio; éso hay que entenderlo; en ésto hay que armarse de paciencia; algunos compañeros pierden la paciencia, de los nuestros mismos muy buenos, como MONTAÑO por ejemplo.....yo hasta le decía: mire Doctor, cien mil veces hemos examinado estas cosas y doscientas mil más las vamos a tener que examinar si no las resolvemos bien; éso no tiene remedio". ANGELICA de todas maneras quisiera conversar con CARMONA. Este arguye que "pero estamos en pleno proceso de reorganización y espero que en dos o tres semanas se va a sentir ésto. A partir del mes que entra yo me voy a hacer cargo del periódico, con el ánimo de hacerlo muy modesto pero que salga quincenalmente". ANGELICA dice que éso será formidable, y a ver si la semana entrante se ven un ratito, pues élla le quiere plantear algunas cosas bastante interesantes. CARMONA acepta.

ALFARO 440 6a1

20:45 MANUEL TAMAYO, desde Calexico, Calif., quiere comunicarse con BRAULIO MALDONADO. CARLOTA la esposa dice que éste no se encuentra en la Capital. MANUEL dice que llegó con felicidad y llamaba a BRAULIO para ver si éste ya se comunicó con el JANIS a Casa Grande, Arizona, pues es muy urgente que así lo haga "y me escriba a mi lo más pronto que pueda para ver si le dijo al JANIS lo que yo le digo en la carta que le mande". CARLOTA dice que BRAULIO ya recibió su carta, pero que va a estar fuera de México unos 10 días. MANUEL dice que están puestos para lo que sea. CARLOTA indica que por allá ha mandado BRAULIO varia propaganda, folletos y todo éso. MANUEL dice que está bien, pues él necesita de éso. Termina deseándoles buena suerte.

21:02 Una mujer que dice llamar desde el Restaurante Jan[illegible] en Culiacán, manifiesta que [illegible] quiere hablar con BRAULIO MALDONADO. CARLOTA indica que está fuera de la ciu-

[illegible]
sábado 11 mayo 963 4

dad. La mujer pregunta que si se encuentra por ahí RAFAEL, un muchacho que viene de Culiacán a buscar a [illegible]O. CARLOTA dice que aquí a la casa no, que tal vez a la oficina, pero que allí no tienen teléfono. Asimismo le recomienda que le diga a ese señor ENRIQUE [illegible] que esté pendiente, porque el Licenciado les va a llegar por allá, pues va a recorrer muchos lugares; va hasta Sonora.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the May 1963 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines as of 31 May:

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
43-01-85	Melquiades Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams
10-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
46-09-50	D.F.S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)

Removed from Project KOBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

50-6-75/3

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
12 june 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
14 June 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-21530

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-75/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

93 pages of daily resumes
53 reels of Czech Embassy taped conversations
120 reels of Soviet Embassy taped conversations
57 pages of Cuban Embassy transcriptions
41 pieces of miscellaneous material

There was a total of 544 reels of taped conversations recorded during the month.

C. Exploitation of Material

A sample of LIENVOY coverage was the uncovering of a harrassment operation against the Embassy by the use of forged routine forms to embarrass the Embassy and known anti-Communists. (See MEXI 4659 and HMMA-21431).

D. Security

No known security problems.

E. Technical

None

F. Production

During May, LIENVOY produced the fifty-two (52) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was also obtained.

G. Liaison

Chief of Station has seen LITENSOR twice during May and these meetings were reported in MEXI-4544 dated 10 May 1963 and MEXI-4631 dated 22 May 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

CS COPY

~~SECRET~~

PRODUCTION FOR MAY 1963

MEXIs

MEXI-4795
MEXI-4788
MEXI-4781
MEXI-4754
MEXI-4724 (HMM 7328)
MEXI-4718 (HMM-7327)
MEXI-4710
MEXI-4809
MEXI-4659
MEXI-4652 (HMM-7295)
MEXI-4635 (HMM-7290)
MEXI-4623 (HMM-7289)
MEXI-4616
MEXI-4598
MEXI-4596
MEXI-4572 (HMM-7273)
MEXI-4490
MEXI-4474

18

HMMAs

HMMA-21431
HMMA-21413
HMMA-21401
HMMA-21397
HMMA-21395
HMMA-21345
HMMA-21343
HMMA-21320
HMMA-21290
HMMA-21288
HMMA-21281
HMMA-21278

12

HMMs

HMM-7351
HMM-7350
HMM-7349
HMM-7347
HMM-7322
HMM-7319
HMM-7317
HMM-7306
HMM-7301
HMM-7299
HMM-7298
HMM-7297
HMM-7288
HMM-7286
HMM-7284
HMM-7276
HMM-7256
HMM-7254
HMM-7253
HMM-7250
HMM-7235
HMM-7234

22 = 52

~~SECRET~~

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

50-6-75/3

ENCL #1 HMMA-21530

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO
FROM: Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT: LIENVOY Coverage of Cuban Embassy
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACT: FYI

REF: HMMA-21068, 12 April 1963

1. Returned herewith are two reels of LIENVOY coverage of the Cuban Embassy which were forwarded to Headquarters by the referenced dispatch.

2. Three conversations, including the SINOBAS/SCANTLING contact on 8 April 1963 have been excised from EC 11, 8 April, for retention at Headquarters. The conversations immediately before and after the SCANTLING contact were taken out so as not to pinpoint possible interest in that contact.

3. The Station's support in providing these documentary materials is greatly appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

Attachment: 1.
As stated above h/w

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11540

DATE: 1 May 1963 3 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓ 50-6-75/3

1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/Carlez:dd			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/EE		C. Anderson (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DESENSITIZED

PROCESSING	
	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨	ABSTRACT
▨	MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO : Chief of Station, Panama

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIENVOY Coverage of Cuban Embassy

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

FYI

1. Forwarded herewith are brief digests of Cuban Embassy calls monitored through LIENVOY during the first days of April 1963 by Thomas G. URQUHART.

2. A copy of this dispatch with attachment is being sent to COS Panama at his request because of that Station's interest in ARELLANO.

3. Owing to the occasional lack of logging, it was not always possible to ascertain the exact date a particular conversation took place. Hence, some of the summaries are attributed to a period greater than one day.

END OF DISPATCH

Removed from Project KUBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JCB # 73-175/77
Box: 29 Fold: 6

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City, W/Att.
1 - COS, Panama, W/Att.

DATE TYPED: 1 May 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 13 MAY 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-11541

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/

1 - RI
1 - Chrono, W/Att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexi/Carley:ds			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OPS/EE	1 May 63	C. Anderson (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWHD		J. C. King

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS WHICH MAY BE USED

DISPATCH

SECRET

HIGHLIGHTS OF LIENVOY COVERAGE OF CUBAN EMBASSY, EARLY APRIL 1963

2 or 3 April 63

A man whose name sounds like "Specia" calls Vega, says he must see him very urgently. They will meet at 1400 or 1430.

Victor Rico Galan holds what appears to be social chatter with Sinobas. They mention a mutual friend (unnamed) and note things are getting better.

A man identified only as Horacio calls Buenaventura (Reyes). They talk about hotels and agree to meet at the Embassy at 1730.

The Bolivian Embassy calls for Sinobas about the case of a man named Arrellano or Arellano. Sinobas is out. Bolivian Embassy asks to be called back at telephone 14 08 56.

(Comment: Arrellano is of special interest to PACY)

Maria Lourdes de la Pena calls for Teresa Proenza, who is out. On a further conversation mention is made of Maria Elena (Vazquez Gomez?) and the two parties agree to meet at 2030 at some place located at the corner of Hamburgo and Genova.

Teresa Proenza calls to the fronton for Jose Luis "Azamendi" (probably a jai-alai player). He is out. She leaves a message for him that there is a letter for him at the Cuban Embassy for his daughter and he can come for it.

Vicente Rojo calls Proenza about the bulletin. An envelope was left at the Embassy gate.

Mirna Torres calles Buenaventura Reyes and they hold a sociable talk. She wants to send a package and letter (probably to Cuba) and they discuss the arrival of the plane 6 April. She says she will bring the things to the Embassy before that.

The Bolivian Embassy calls for Sinobas. He is out. (This probably has to do with the Arellano case).

Miss Gomez Sanchez calls for Sinobas, who is out.

Dr. Jaime Brana (visiting Cuban doctor) calls Hotel Carmen room 40 for someone and gets no answer. He then asks for the Cuban nurse in apt. 5, whose name is Graciela "Guty". She is also out. Brana says he wants to speak with Marta Valdez, something about the medical congress.

Brana calls Dr. Fausto Trejo, with whom he seems to have some social relationship. Trejo is out. Brana asks the woman who answers if he left a Czech notebook from KOVO firm at their home. She looks and says she does not see it there.

SECRET

Guillermo Gomez calls for Vega. Gomez is the man who left a letter this morning, which was a letter Vega asked for. Their business seems to have to do with passport and visa details. Gomez travels a lot and will call back when in town, possibly tomorrow.

A number of calls show that Heberto Jorrin, the gate man, has a local girlfriend he sees quite often and who also visits him at the Embassy. Her name is not known.

4 April 1963

Elena Vasquez Gomez and Teresa Proenza agreed to dine this evening.

Teresa Proenza spoke to someone about a passage to Cuba for one Margarita Calderon.

Celia Pascual, telephone 25 10 32, describing herself as the sister of Sara, calls Teresa Proenza. Celia says she can take some things over to "Edith" when she goes (presumably to Cuba). Someone's mother is sick.

(Comment: This could refer to Edith Buchaca, whose preoccupation with her mother has been noted in the past).

5 April 1963

Ascue in Havan calls Mariano Garcia. The connection is very poor and the Havana end is hard to understand. They mention travel approval for Rafael (?) Hernandez at telephone 35 44 35 and mention something was arranged for Eduardo Rodriguez de la Vega.

A woman identifying herself only as Socorro calls for Vega about a matter she says he already knows of. He is out.

An American or Canadian calls long distance and says he plans to leave wherever he is, probably Los Angeles, Cal., via Western Airlines, for Mexico.

Immediately after this call someone in the Embassy mentions reservations for Fred Brown from Canada.

Sinobas calls Tomas Marentes, who is out. Sinobas leaves the message that "Ramon called". (Marentes may be the former Governor of Yucatan. He has a plan to send money or passages to someone in Cuba. Sinobas is very anxious to help him and makes a lot of calls about how to do it. Marentes has told Sinobas he has a son working for Humberto Romero at the Presidencia, indicating the son is at Sinobas's disposition. How much this is a matter of mere courtesy could not be determined).

Arellano (the Bolivian deal) calls for Sinobas, who is out, and then asks for Vega. He asks Vega if there is any news, and Vega tells him to drop by on 7 April.

Miss Gomez Arias calls for Sinobas. He is out but will be right back.

One Mario or Mariano Zevada or Cobada for Sinobas. They talk about a plan the caller had to send money for passages to someone in Cuba and how the bank in Cuba has stated it is impossible.

Sinobas calls the Bolivian Ambassador about Arellano, who is going to travel from one country to another.

Dolores Gomez Arias to Sinobas (first name basis). She seems to be a journalist, says she wants to meet him to tell him some things.

6 April 1963

No conversations of salient interest noted.

7 April 1963

Largely taken up with several conversations between Jorrin and his girl-friend.

8 April 1963

Angel Hidalgo calls in for Vega, who is out. It appears Hidalgo and a couple of others are to drop by the Embassy in connection with passports and visas.

An unidentified man inside calls Cubana de Aviacion about a Canadian named Fred Brown who was around to ask about a visa. The man at Cubana says that he knows nothing of the matter.

Armona calls Fred Brown at the Hotel Agnes. He is paged in the restaurant. Armona and someone else will drop by the hotel for Brown at 1645. Brown speaks very little Spanish.

14-0000

71 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (COPY ISSUED TO SAS AT 1630 19 APR DD)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

cc Lienvoy

S E C R E T 191845Z

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 4227

RYBAT TYPIC

19 APR 1963

IN21426

REF A DIR 33114

B DIR 32471*

1. ON 17 APR 63, AT 1035, SCANTLING CALLED RAMON SINOBAS AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WENT EMBASSY ON 18 APR BUT SAW MANY STRANGE PEOPLE IN AREA AND WAS AFRAID ENTER. SINOBAS THEN ASKED SCANTLING GET TOGETHER WITH HIM SOME PLACE OUTSIDE EMBASSY ON 19 APR, SUGGESTING A CAFE. SCANTLING THEN TOLD SINOBAS THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR SINOBAS TO FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS IN HIS LETTER THAT HE SENT ON 7 APR 63. SINOBAS TELLS SCANTLING THAT THIS IS WHAT HE WANTS TO TALK ABOUT. SCANTLING GUARANTEES SINOBAS THAT IF HE FOLLOWS INSTRUCTIONS IT WILL BENEFIT BOTH SINOBAS AND HIM. SINOBAS THEN ASKED SCANTLING CALL HIM 20 APR AND THEY CAN AGREE ON TIME AND PLACE TO TALK. SCANTLING THEN TOLD SINOBAS THAT IF SINOBAS IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ONE OF HIS SUPERIORS. IN REPLY SINOBAS SAID THAT WAS SCANTLING'S PROBLEM NOT HIS. SCANTLING CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE WOULD CALL SINOBAS ON 20 APR. (LIENVOY B/2).

2. SCANTLING'S WRITTEN REPORT RE CONTACT WITH SINOBAS 17 APR SUBSTANTIALLY SAME.

3. STATION COMMENT: FACT SINOBAS REQUESTED SCANTLING CALL HIM 20 APR POSSIBLY DUE EXPECTED ARRIVAL MANUEL VEGA OR AMSTET-1 19 APR

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2 IN 21426

CUBANA FLIGHT. CUBANA FLIGHT 19 APR CANCELLID UNTIL 20 APR GPU VR MVAHLHLMIDBXSOHYPNTQM FVCCALL SINOBAS MORNING 20 APR AND ASK FOR MEETING SOMETIME BEFORE 1230 AS HE LEAVING TOWN THAT TIME. IF SINOBAS AWAITING ARRIVAL VEGA OR AM-1 ABOVE MIGHT PROVOKE SINOBAS MAKE REMARK RE SAME. IF SINOBAS AGREES MEET SCANTLING LATTER WILL NOT MAKE MEETING BUT STATION WILL STAKE OUT MEETING PLACE.

4. REGISTERED LETTER PER REF B MAILED 18 APR USING RETURN ADDRESS OROPEZA P.O. BOX.

5. RECORDING LIENVOY PER PARA 6 REF B BEING POUCHED.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HAVE SCANTLING CALL SINABAS EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE USING NAME JUAN OROPESA.

14-00000

DISPATCH

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following is the January 1963 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines as of 31 January

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde (out)
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castellejos (out)
28-79-67	Andres Armona
48-14-76	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Calindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero (out)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-05	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
46-64-24	D.F.S. (out)
46-11-30	D.F.S. (out)
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina (out)
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main-Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-59-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

DATE TYPED: 15 Feb. 1963

DATE DISPATCHED: 19 Feb. 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-20737

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-75/3

(Continued)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	HMMA-20737

15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative) (out)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In January, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 47 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 10 pages from the Cuban lines, 26 pages from the Czech lines and 57 pages from the Soviet lines. Thirty two pieces of other information were also received.

A total of 285 reels of recording tape were used during the month. (Note F, Technical).

C. Liaison

The Station continues to provide LITENSOR with situation reports on the Red Chinese-Indian border dispute.

D. Exploitation of Material.

Examples of information provided by LIENVOY were the beginnings and organization of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI) (see MEXIs 3041 and 3053) and the contact made by a Hollywood television station with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in order to set up an interview with Fidel Castro. (see MEXI 3244).

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

The LP was inoperative from 8 January until 18 January. Workmen installing street lights in the neighborhood of the LP cut the cable leading from the telephone central to the LP in several places. Instead of replacing the damaged cable with a new one, telephone company workmen painstakingly repaired it. By the end of the month there were still seven lines out of operation.

G. Production

During January, LIENVOY produced twenty-three (23) reports listed in the attachment. In addition the usual quantity (except for the ten days lost by inoperation - see E above) of CE and biographic materials were obtained.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

PRODUCTION FOR JANUARY 1953

MEXI's	HMM's	HMMA's
MEXI 3244	HMM 6909	HMMA 20494
MEXI 3230 (HMM 6977)	HMM 6911	HMMA 20508
MEXI 3053	HMM 6915	HMMA 20511
MEXI 3041 (HMM 6918)	HMM 6916	HMMA 20564
MEXI 3031 (HMM 6917)	HMM 6933	
MEXI 3020 (HMM 6913)	HMM 6952	
MEXI 3014 (HMM 6910)	HMM 6954	
	HMM 6957	
	HMM 6961	
	HMM 6962	
	HMM 6958	
	HMM 6971	

7 + 12 + 4 = 23

14-00000

File — [illegible] support

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 27 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

FEB 27 0411Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3575

IN75331

RYBAT

REF A DIR 35657

B MEXI 1919 (IN 20593)

1. LITENSOR HAS ASKED VIA LIELEGANT FOR ANY BRIEFING PAPERS KUBARK CAN GIVE ON FRANCE, YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND, WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND AND ENGLAND.

2. CURTIS WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING HEADQUARTERS CAN MAKE AVAILABLE AND BELIEVE HQS MAY WISH ATTEMPT INFLUENCE LITENSOR ON CERTAIN POINTS IN SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES.

3. WILL NEED REPLY SOON AND, IF HQS WISHES PREPARE PAPERS, APPRECIATE RECEIPT BY 20 MARCH.

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-49

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the December 1962 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target Lines, as of 2 January

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
28-79-67	Andres Armona
48-14-76	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-06	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C. T. A. L.
46-64-24	D. F. S.
46-11-30	D. F. S.
35-36-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)

Removed from Project KDBUDGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 75-173/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

(Continued)

DATE TYPED 15 Jan. 1963	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-20508	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-75/43	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

15-63-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In December, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 70 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 38 pages from the Cuban lines, 30 pages from the Czech lines, and 77 pages from the Soviet lines. Fourteen pieces of other material were also received.

The LP was closed for the holidays from 21 December until 2 January.

C. Liaison

As gifts for Christmas, LIELEGANT was given a small, portable Sony television receiver by the Station. He was also given a religious statue by the employees in the LP to which the Station donated part of the cost.

Arnold F. AREHART, LP technician, gave LIELEGANT a paper weight made of plastic with United States coins showing in the center of the weight.

D. Exploitation of Material

Samples of intelligence obtained during the month was the attempt of Vicente Lombardo Toledano to arrange for the entry of a Chinese Communist trade delegation visiting in Brazil to enter Mexico (see MEXI 2839, 14 December 1962), and Japanese Embassy calls on Lombardo Toledano and Lazaro Cardenas to arrange interviews with them for a Japanese professor named (fnu) KATO (phonetic) (see MEXI 2881, 18 December 1962).

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

No technical problems were encountered that could not be handled.

G. Production

During December, LIENVOY produced thirty (30) reports listed in the attachment. As usual, much CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As indicated above.

Distribution:
~~3~~ - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - DECEMBER 1962

HMMA's	MEXI's	HMM's
20367	MEXI 2727	HMM 6873
	MEXI 2739	HMM 6875
	MEXI 2749	HMM 6876
	MEXI 2775	HMM 6878
	MEXI 2813	HMM 6880
	MEXI 2815	HMM 6883
	MEXI 2839	HMM 6888
	MEXI 2843 (HMM 6884)	HMM 6892
	MEXI 2848 (HMM 6885)	HMM 6893
	MEXI 2880 (HMM 6891)	HMM 6896
	MEXI 2881 (HMM 6890)	HMM 6898
	MEXI 2890 (HMM 6895)	HMM 6899
	MEXI 2891 (HMM 6894)	HMM 6905
	MEXI 2894 (HMM 6897)	HMM 6906
	MEXI 2937 (HMM 6902)	

1 + 15 + 14 = 30

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report for Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

The following is the November 1962 report for Project LIENVOY:

A. Target lines, as of 1 December

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-40	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
28-79-87	Andres Armona
48-14-75	Enrique Cabrera
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
43-15-05	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta Lagunes
19-15-05	Roberto Romero Adams (Cuban target)
11-29-69	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C. T. A. L.
46-64-24	D. F. S.
46-11-30	D. F. S.
35-35-52	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
46-60-15	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Main Entrance)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)

KOBADGER.
Removed from Project
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-125/74
Box: 39 Fold: 6

53-6-75/3

(Continued)

DATE TYPED
17 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20395

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	~~SECRET/~~ [redacted]	HMMA-20395

15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
45-61-80	Czech Embassy
45-61-81	Czech Embassy

B. Material Processed

In November, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 131 pages of daily resumes from all lines, 78 pages from the Cuban lines, 47 pages from the Czech lines and 110 pages from the Soviet lines. In addition, all of the Soviet and Czech tapes were turned over for the translations of the Russian and Czech conversations. Thirty pieces of miscellaneous material were also received.

C. Liaison

In addition to the PB Band reports passed to LITENSOR, the Station also passed situation reports to him on the India-Red Chinese border war. LITENSOR requested the Station to check a report which LITENSOR had received that 22 boxcars of ammunition was being shipped into Mexico from the United States. (See MEXI 2683)

On 5 November 1962 Chief of Station met with LITENSOR at the request of Ambassador MANN. LITENSOR had LITEMPO/2 sit in on the meeting. Ambassador MANN prepared a memorandum based upon a Department of State cable which The Ambassador asked Chief of Station to read to (but not to leave with) LITENSOR. When Chief of Station told LITENSOR that he was to read the telegram (which concerned GPIDEAL's statements and position on Cuba) to him, LITENSOR asked if he could dictate what Chief of Station read to him into his (new) dictaphone. This he did. Both LITENSOR and LITEMPO/2 were pleased with the strong, definite and concise position of GPIDEAL. They were also grateful that Ambassador MANN had got permission to give them this report.

D. Exploitation of Material

Samples of information obtained during the month shed some light on the private life of Carlos Lechuga, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, (see MEXI 2701) and the involvement of Braulio Maldonado Sandez in the uprisings in the State of Guerrero. (See MEXI 2713)

E. Security

There were no known security problems.

F. Technical

Likewise, there were not technical problems.

G. Production

During November, LIENVOY produced the eighteen (18) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: As stated above.
Distribution: 3 - C/WHD w/att; 2-files

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - NOVEMBER 1962

HMMA's	HMM's	MEXI's
HMMA-20140	HMM-6853	MEXI-2713 (HMM-6871)
HMMA-20169	HMM-6864	MEXI-2647
HMMA-20262		MEXI-2646
HMMA-20268		MEXI-2616
		MEXI-2489
		MEXI-2486
		MEXI-2483
		MEXI-2465
		MEXI-2462
		MEXI-2443
		MEXI-2433 (HMM-6833)
		MEXI-2414)

4 + 2 + 12 = 18

[illegible] 1
Excluded [illegible] automatic
[illegible]

50-6-74/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SR Division, Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/REDCAP/REDSKIN

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith in attachment is a self-explanatory LIENVOY report which may be of interest to the recipients.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment
As stated

Distribution
2 - WH w/2
1 - SR w/1
1 - KUDESK w/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
11 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20367

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~[illegible]~~

[illegible]

15 Oct 62
LIENVOY

[illegible] asks Zinverdiger if he will be at th[illegible] [illegible] the hotel? Yes. [illegible] came at [illegible] [illegible] called Grinacher but he wasn't in. [illegible] says [illegible] was told that permission was given /for the visas/. [illegible] Mexican Embassy to get the visas. [illegible] says he will [illegible] to the phone. Kent takes phone. [illegible] says [illegible] Embassy should come over with the passports. [illegible] /Mexican Embassy/ asks that "I" come over [illegible] "Can I go there?" [illegible] says that he can. [illegible] that everyone report there. Kent says that [illegible] each come personally to the Embassy. [illegible] asks if there [illegible] at the Embassy. No. Kent says that the Cubans [illegible] in the person needed. [illegible] Kent - [illegible] - [illegible] think [illegible]. [illegible] /is flying out tomorrow. [illegible] doesn't know. [illegible] says that Kaplan is not with the [illegible] "passports" [illegible] with [illegible]. [illegible] says "[illegible]" [illegible] /Kent Kaplan/Flying with [illegible]/ about their [illegible] that since "he" is not included in the group [illegible] can't [illegible] can't give "your" consent. [illegible] says that if "you" [illegible] if Kent has any objection [illegible] says that the next is [illegible]. "[illegible]" and [illegible] "they" will be there a day. [illegible] doesn't know [illegible] thinks they have [illegible]. Kent will [illegible] when the other group is leaving. Leaving on the 17th [illegible].

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SR Division, Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/LIENVOY Product

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-19729, 31 August 1962

Action: See below.

The Station would appreciate a positive or negative reply to the proposal made in reference (and in much earlier correspondence) regarding the assignment of a TDYer to analyze and collate the Soviet LIENVOY product.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

50-6-75/3

Distribution
2 - WH
1 - SR
1 - KUDESK

2cc to SR/10

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~S~~

DATE TYPED
10 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20351

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

cc. Hunt

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: J. R. Reeves:j.
UNIT: CWH/3/Mexico
EXT: 6284
DATE: 4 Dec 62 1781

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

4 Dec 62 23 39z

TO: MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO: ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRTY GMEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 02975

02975

RYBAT LIENVOY

REF MEXI 2733 (IN 28460)*

1. CONCUR COS ADVISE AMB MANN RE LITENSOR REQUEST AND KUDARK REPLY.

2. SUGGEST FOLL FOR PASSAGE LITENSOR ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXI:

> CURTIS UNDERSTANDS AREVALO SEEING VARIETY PEOPLE WITH ALL POLITICAL VIEWS INCLUDING NUMBER OF REPUTED COMMUNISTS. ONE OF THESE WHO SAID TO BE INTIMATE ASSOCIATES IS VICENTE SAINZ, COSTA RICAN JOURNALIST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Request Hqs advise what reply COS should give LITENSOR on AREVALO activities & associates. Also, req permission advise Amb Mann of req from LITENSOR & reply.

WH/3/CAN
WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

308

DATE : 3 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (COPY ISSUED TO WH AT 1320 3 DEC LMG)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, S/C 2

DEC 3 1753Z 62

PRIORITY

PRITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2733 IN28460

RYBAT/LIENVOY

1. LITENSOR VIA LIELEGANT ASKED COS FOR A REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO IN MEXICO.

2. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT REPLY COS SHOULD GIVE; ALSO, REQUEST PERMISSION ADVISE AMB MANN OF REQUEST AND REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

REMOVAL SLIP

DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER HMMA-20193

DOC. DATE 15 Nov 62

THE CS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS REMOVED FROM THIS FILE # 50-6-75/3

BY IP/ARD/RPU ON 23 May 73 AND FORWARDED TO IP/ANP ✓

IP/EDI

IP/PH

IP/FILES

BECAUSE

1. It was KAPOK and unprocessed.
2. It was RYBAT and unprocessed. ✓
3. It was EYES ALONE and unprocessed.
4. It was DEFERRED.
5. It was classified into file # __________
6. It was an indexed document.
7. __________

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 630
31 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1800 31 OCT BAS)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, DDP/SIT 3, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, TFW 5, S/C 2

OCT 31 2319Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 49959

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 2396

REF MEXI 2397 (IN49964)*

ATTN: BRENT, KNIGHT, GALBOND[6]

1. INFO REPORTED IN REF CONFIRMED BY PERSONAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN COS AND LITENSOR[2], LIELEGANT[4], LIERGO[3], LITEMPO/2[1] AND HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ. ALSO, LITEMPO/2[1] POSITION CONFIRMED BY LIENVOY[5] REPORT OF HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GALINDO OCHOA AS CITED IN REFERENCE. LITEMPO/2[1] STATEMENTS TO GALINDO OCHOA AMOUNT TO MEXICAN PRESS GUIDANCE THEME.

2. ALL ASSURED COS MEXICO 100 PERCENT WITH U.S.A. HOWEVER, ROMERO POINTED OUT HIS "CHIEF" MUST BE CAREFUL WHAT HE SAYS AND TO WHOM HE SPEAKS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comment: *Reference attached.

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG. : John M. Whitten:jz
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 19 Oct 62 1697

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

19 OCT 62 21 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO: ADDP, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT89106

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 43543

RYBAT

NO "OFFICIAL" REACTION YET FORMULATED HERE, BUT AS ODACID CABLES AND DISPATCHES FROM VARIOUS POINTS ON LOPEZ MATEOS ITINERARY FILTER IN TO EMBASSY, MEXI ITSE~~XX~~LF MAY WANT TO DISTILL SOME MEANINGFUL AND HELPFUL "COMMENT" WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO LIELEGANT AS THE "OFFICIAL" REACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

to President Mateos' trip to FE & to his speeches at various places.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

WH/COPS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ 10

DATE : 594
18 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 18 2052Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 41954

DIR CITE MEXI 2236

RYBAT 594 IN41954

1. LIELEGANT ASKS IF COS CAN GET WASHINGTON "OFFICIAL" REACTION TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS' TRIP TO FAR EAST AND TO HIS SPEECHES AT VARIOUS PLACES.

2. COS PROMISED TO ASK BUT EXPRESSED DOUBT THIS FORTHCOMING.

3. PLEASE CABLE REPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of September 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez (Out)
23-85-25	Alonso Aguilar Monteverde (Out)
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
11-63-34	Ramon Sinobas
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
45-15-06	Enrique Gonzales Pedrero (Out)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C. T. A. L.
46-64-24	D. F. S.
46-11-30	D. F. S.
21-11-01	Politica (Revista - Marcue) (Out)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy

Removed from Project KUDOINGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

(Continued)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
11 Oct. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19990
[redacted]-1959

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
✓ 50-6-75/2

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

45-61-81	Czech Embassy
45-61-80	Czech Embassy (Out)

B. Material Processed

In September, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 97 pages of daily resumes, 11 pages of resumes from the Cuban lines and 28 pieces of other material. There were also provided 125 pages of resumes from the Soviet lines and also 74 reels with the Russian conversations. In addition, there were 18 reels from the Czech lines.

C. Exploitation of Material

The following are examples of LIENVOY coverage:

1. A "George Sherman" contacted the Cuban Embassy about meeting with the Cuban Ambassador Carlos Lechuga. Sherman said that he knew Lechuga in Washington. (See MEXI 1925, 12 September 1962).

2. A "Gabino Fernandez", an employee of the Secretariat of the Presidency, made an appointment with Ramon Sinobas, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, because Fernandez wanted to speak to Sinobas before Fernandez went to Cuba for a visit. (See MEXI 1967, 18 September 1962).

D. Liaison

Briefing papers which were pouched by Headquarters according to DIR 31814 were provided to LITENSOR. LITENSOR requested a further situation report on his forthcoming trip to the Far East. He was ready to call off his trip if KUBARK felt that the world situation was gloomy. (See MEXI 1919, 11 September 1962).

E. Security

There were no security problems for the month of September.

F. Technical

None.

G. Personnel

A PRQ was forwarded to Headquarters for a POA on Guadalupe Hermosillo Quiroz in HMMA-19809.

H. Production

During the month of September, LIENVOY produced the forty-nine (49) reports listed in the attachment. The usual large amount of CI/CE personality and operational material was obtained in addition to the (attached) disseminable reports.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment: As stated above.
Distribution: 3 - WHD w/att; 2-files

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION - SEPTEMBER 1962

HMMA's	HMM's	MEXI's
HMMA-19729	HMM-6703	MEXI-1871 (HMM 6707)
HMMA-19743	HMM-6704	MEXI-1899
HMMA-19747	HMM-6705	MEXI-1904
HMMA-19791	HMM-6709	MEXI-1905
HMMA-19795	HMM-6720	MEXI-1919
HMMA-19804	HMM-6722	MEXI-1925
HMMA-19846	HMM-6723	MEXI-1946
HMMA-19848	HMM-6724	MEXI-1952
HMMA-19858	HMM-6726	MEXI-1967 (HMM-6730)
HMMA-19864	HMM-6733	MEXI-1979
HMMA-19868	HMM-6735	MEXI-1984 (HMM-6736)
HMMA-19878	HMM-6738	MEXI-1990
	HMM-6739	MEXI-2024
	HMM-6743	MEXI-2063 (HMM-6756)
	HMM-6744	MEXI-2072
	HMM-6745	
	HMM-6746	
	HMM-6747	
	HMM-6749	
	HMM-6750	
	HMM-6754	
	HMM-6759	

12 + 22 + 15 = 49

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50-6-75/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

004 JO

.TE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CCG 2, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 2 0333Z 62

DUPLICATE AND SERVICED COPY

ROUTINE

IN 31052 A MEXI 2087

DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2087

RYBAT

REF: A. DIR 38428 (OUT 80619;)B MEXI 2049 (IN 29411)1. PLAN BRIEF RATIGAN AS FOLLOWS:

A. BACKGROUND RICARDO JOSE ZEVADA AND ALEJANDRO CARRILLO MARCOR AND SUGGEST RATIGAN OBSERVE WHO THEIR CLOSEST CONTACTS IN PRESIDENTIAL PARTY, DEGREE THEIR ACCESS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER RANKING MEXI OFFICIALS, AND IDENTITIES ANY OBVIOUS FOREIGN CONTACTS IN COUNTRIES VISITED.

B. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS IN OFFICIAL PARTY WHO EXPRESS ANTI-U.S. AND/OR PRO CASTRO SYMPATHIES.

C. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEM BE CLOSEST TO PRESIDENT.

D. ALL INFO HEARD ABOUT IDENTITY NEXT MEXI PRESIDENT.

2. ABOVE REQUIREMENTS ARE GUIDES ONLY AND STATION AWARE THAT RATIGAN PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE DEGREE ACCESS TO REPORT OTHER THAN FRAGMENTARY INFO. NEVERTHELESS MEXI WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFO DEVELOPED BY RATIGAN.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

086

DATE : 2 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : ADDP, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

OCT 2 0638Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 31995

DIR CITE MEXI 2096

1. NAVAL ATTACHE ADVISED THAT REAR ADMIRAL R.C. BENITEZ, U.S.N. (RET), WILL ACCOMPANY MEXI PRESIDENTIAL PARTY ON COMING TRIP.

2. BELIEVE BENITEZ IS EXECUTIVE WITH PAN AM LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION IN MIAMI.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. BUSTOS
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 6066
DATE : 1 OCTOBER 1962 1681

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO : MEXICO CITY, ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, S/C 2

1 Oct 62 23 11z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT62691

TO PRTY MEXI INFO ROUTINE ROME CITE DIR 39735

RYBAT

REFS: HONG 3795 (IN 30763)*
MEXI 2087 (IN 31052)**

1. ACCORDING LATEST INFO AVAILABLE, RATIGAN (IDEN A OF DIR 38423) WILL NOT ACCOMPANY PANAM CHARTER BUT COMPANY HAS ORDERED HIM ~~XXXXXX~~ PRECEDE CHARTER BY ONE STOP AT ALL TIMES. WILL NOT TRAVEL MEXI.

2. REGRETTABLY KUBARK WILL NOT HAVE COVERAGE VIA RATIGAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: RATIGAN plans to travel Mexi late 1 Oct and Mexi Station can reach at Hotel Reforma or Panam Station Manager at airport.

** Sets forth Station requirements for RATIGAN.

R. W. Herbert
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WE/4 Wyatt (in draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

283

DATE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : C/WE 2, S/C 2

SEP 29 1907Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 31052

DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2087

PORTION GARBLED - BEING SVCD

RYBAT (PORTION GRBLD WILL FWD)

A. BACKGROUND RICARDO JOSE ZEVADA AND ALEJANDRO CARRILLO MARCOR AND SUGGEST RATIGAN OBSERVE WHO THEIR CLOSEST CONTACTS IN PRESIDENTIAL PARTY, DEGREE THEIR ACCESS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER RANKING MEXI OFFICIALS, AND IDENTITIES ANY OBVIOUS FOREIGN CONTACTS IN COUNTRIES VISITED.

B. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS IN OFFICIAL PARTY WHO EXPRESS ANTI-U.S. AND/OR PRO CASTRO SYMPATHIES.

C. IDENTITIES INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEM BE CLOSEST TO PRESIDENT.

D. ALL INFO HEARD ABOUT IDENTITY NEXT MEXI PRESIDENT.

2. ABOVE REQUIREMENTS ARE GUIDES ONLY AND STATION AWARE THAT RATIGAN PROBABLY WILL NOT HAVE DEGREE ACCESS TO REPORT OTHER THAN FRAGMENTARY INFO. NEVERTHELESS MEXI WILL APPRECIATE ANY INFO DEVELOPED BY RATIGAN.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 [illegible]

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002

DATE : 29 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HONG KONG

ACTION : C/WH 5* (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 2345, 28 SEP)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

SEP 29 0310Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 30763

PRITY DIR INFO PRITY MEXI CITE HONG 3795

RYBAT

RE DIR 38928 (out 81430)**

REF MESSAGE PASSED TO RATIGAN WHO STATES ARRIVING MEXI LATE ON 1 OCTOBER (MEXI TIME). HAS REQUESTED RESERVATIONS AT HOTEL REFORMA; IF STATION CANNOT REACH AT HOTEL, CONTACT PANAM STATION MANAGER AT AIRPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR DYVOUR USED.

**REQUESTED HONG CONTACT AND TELL RATIGAN HE WILL BE CONTACTED ON ARRIVAL MEXI BY STATION REP WHO WILL DISCUSS HIS COOPERATION WITH KUBARK ON MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S TRIP.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
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declassification

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002

DATE : 27 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (TH COPY SLOTTED AT 2345 26 SEP-DD)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 27 0318Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 29411

PRITY DIR INFO ROME CITE MEXI 2049

RYBAT

REF DIR 38428 (out 80619)*

1. MEXI HAS REQUIREMENTS AND WILL CONTACT PER REF.

2. WILL FORWARD QUESTIONS GIVEN TO HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATED IF MEXI HAS ANY REQUIREMENTS FOR IDEN A IN CONNECTION LOPEY TRIP, STATION CAN CONTACT HIM IN MEXI THRU PANAM APR OFFICER. CABLE HQS WHETHER STATION PLANS MAKE CONTACT SO IDEN A CAN BE INFORMED IN HONG TO EXPECT KUBARK CONTACT MEXI.

K

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

ORIG : Charlotte Bustos:jb
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 27 Sep 62

1587

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : HONGKONG MEXICO CITY ROME

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

27 SEP 62 19 15z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT81[illegible]

TO PRTY HONG INFO MEXI ROME CITE DIR 39[illegible]

RYBAT

LEROY K. RATIGAN NOW HONG STAYING PENINSULA HOTEL THRU 29 SEP. PLS CONTACT AND TELL HIM HE WILL BE CONTACTED ON ARRIVAL MEXI BY STATION REP WHO WILL DISCUSS HIS COOPERATION WITH KUBARK ON MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S TRIP. MEXI CONTACT WILL IDENTIFY SELF AS FRIEND IDEN.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/CH/MO/HK-Mcalpine (draft)
CWE/4
CWH/3
WH/3/Mexico
WH/COPS

Desmond FitzGerald
C/FE

for J. C. King
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SEC~~RET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : Bustos:js
UNIT : WH/3/[illegible]
EXT : 5790
DATE : 27 SEPT 62

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

27 SEP 62 19 15z

TO : HONGKONG
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/WE 2, S/C 2*

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT01[illegible]31

TO PRTY HONG INFO CITE DIR 3[illegible]29

REF DIR 38923 (OUT 81430)

IDEN IS MR. JOSEPH DISTEFANO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

Desmond FitzGerald
C/FE

J. C. King
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. BUSTOS 1618

UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO 1618

EXT : 6026

DATE : 25 SEPT 62

TO : MEXICO CITY, ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, ~~S/C 2~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

25 SEP 62 22 38z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED

☐ ROUTINE

OUT 80119

TO PRITY MEXI INFO ROME ROUTINE CITE DIR 38128

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1773 (IN 10046)*

1. IDEN A, PANAM SECURITY OFFICER ROME HAS JUST BEEN ASSIGNED ACCOMPANY PANAM PLANE CHARTERED BY MEXI PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS FOR FAR EAST TRIP. IDEN A LEAVES FOR HONG KONG TODAY, WILL ARRIVE MEXI APPROX 30 SEPT WHERE CAN BE CONTACTED AT PANAM OPERATIONS OFFICE.

2. IDEN A, KUBARK AGENT (FORMER STAFFER) OFFERS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE DURING LOPEZ TRIP.

3. IF STATION MEXI HAS ANY REQUIREMENTS IT WISHES PLACE ON IDEN A IN CONNECTION LOPEZ TRIP, STATION CAN CONTACT HIM IN MEXI CITY THRU PANAM OPS OFFICER USING NAME IDEN B, KUBARK STAFFER, IN INTRODUCTION.

4. PLS CABLE HQS WHETHER STATION PLANS MAKE CONTACT SO IDEN A CAN BE INFORMED IN HONG KONG TO EXPECT KUBARK CONTACT MEXI. PLS POUCH HQS COPY INSTRUCTIONS PASSED IDEN A.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: President Lopez Mateos plans dep for Far East trip on 26 September 1962.

C/WE/4

FE/CH/Flitcroft (phone)

C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : Bustos
UNIT :
EXT : 1619
DATE : XX6X9X

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/FE 6, S/C 2

8 Z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT80620

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 38429

RYBAT

REF DIR 38428 (OUT OUT80619)

IDEN A MR. RICHARD MCNAMARA

IDEN B MR. JOSEPH DISTEFANO

J. C. KING
C/WHD

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

089
DATE : 18 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : TAIWAN

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 18 0709Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23955

DIR INFO MEXI CITE TAMI 5255

PSYCH

REF DIR 35994 (out 76277) *

DISCUSSED REF WITH GIO AND THEY REPORTED GRC FOREIGN MINISTRY AWARE MATEOS ASIAN TOUR BUT WILL NOT INVITE TAIWAN BECAUSE GRC EMBASSY MEXICO REPORTED MATEOS SCHEDULE VERY TIGHT AND HE ONLY RECIPROCATING VISITS OF NEHRU, SUKARNO AND IKEDA TO MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS REQUESTED TAMI PROCEED PER HQS BELIEF KUBARK ROLE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROMPTING GRC TO ISSUE INVITATION THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : A.D. WEDEMEYER:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940 1678
DATE : 12 Sept 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

13 SEP 62 22 14z

TO : TAIPEI MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FE 6, S/C 2

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☑ ROUTINE

OUT76277

TO TAMI INFO MEXI CITE DIR 35994

REFS: A MEXI 1899 (IN 19806)*
B TAMI 5098 (19908)

ROLE

1. HQS BELIEVES KUBARK/SHOULD BE LIMITED TO PROMPTING GRC TO ISSUE INVITATION THROUGH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AS MOVE IN BEST INTERESTS CHINA REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN UN. GRC SHOULD BE TOLD LOPEZ MATEOS WILL PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTY ADDING TAIWAN VISIT TO SCHEDULE AT THIS DATE BUT IN ANY CASE GESTURE WOULD BE BENEFICIAL GRC CAUSE.

2. REQUEST TAMI PROCEED PER PARA 1 ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: LIELEGANT states LOPEZ Mateos should be invited to Taiwan but schedule is now so advanced it may be difficult to add Taiwan visit.

C/WH/3 ________
FE/CH/IO ________
WH/C/CA P. Oberst (in draft)
WH/COPS ________

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

002 JO
DATE : 12 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 2345 12 SEP)

INFO : ADOP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2

SEP 12 0321Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 20593

RITY DIR CITE MEXI 1919

TYBAT

1. LITENSOR (VIA LIELEGANT) ASKED ON 11 SEPTEMBER FOR AN UP TO DATE SITUATION REPORT FROM KUBARK. THIS BECAUSE OF NEWS STORIES SOVIET ATTITUDE.

2. ACCORDING LIELEGANT, LITENSOR WILL, IF KUBARK FEELS WORLD SITUATION GLOOMY, CANCEL VISIT TO FAR EAST.

3. COS WILL ADVISE AMB MANN PERSONALLY OF REQUEST FROM LITENSOR.

4. APPRECIATE CABLED SITUATION REPORT OF WHATEVER COS CAN PASS PERSONALLY TO LITENSOR.

END OF MESSAGE

LIENVOY/OPP

K

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 SEP 62
575

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CA 2, CI, CA/PEG, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FE 6, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Index (check one) Marked ☐ Note required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 11 0118Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 19806

DIR INFO TAMI CITE MEXI 1899

REF DIR 34954 (out 74407)

ON 10 SEPT COS CONTACTED LIELEGANT WHO STATES:

A. PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS SHOULD BE INVITED TAMI;

B. LIELEGANT WILL PUSH FOR AT LEAST A BRIEF VISIT TO TAMI IF INVITATION RECEIVED.

C. SCHEDULE IS NOW SO FAR ALONG IT MAY BE DIFFICULT ADD TAMI, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT'S DESIRE BE OUT OF MEXICO AS BRIEFLY AS POSSIBLE AND MAKE TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE MATEOS' ASIAN TOUR.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/[illegible]~~	
RID/FI	

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

051

DATE : 11 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : TAIWAN

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 11 03412 62

ROUTINE

IN 19908

DIR INFO MEXI CITE TAMI 5098

PSYCH

REF DIR 34954 (OUT 74407)

STRONGLY ENDORSE PROPOSED APPROACH GRC RE MATEOS VISIT TAIWAN. BELIEVE VISIT WOULD PRESENT EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY PROMOTE FAVORABLE GRC INTERNATIONAL IMAGE, PARTICULARLY IN LATIN AMERICA. FEEL WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF INVITATION AND ACCEPTANCE MATEOS VISIT COULD BE LAID ON ASAP IN ORDER EXPLOIT VISIT RE CHINA REPRESENTATION ISSUE IN UN. ALSO FEEL TRIP WOULD HELP OFFSET ADVERSE PROPAGANDA RE GRC WITHDRAWAL DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION LAOS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STATION VIEWS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY STATION PROMPTING GRC TO INVITE PRESIDENT MATEOS TO INCLUDE TAIWAN IN HIS TOUR.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

ADW

ORIG : A.D. WEDEMEYER:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 7 Sept 1962 1865

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 SEP 65 00 44z

TO : TAIPEI MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, NE 4, FE 6, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

OUT74407

TO TAMI MEXI INFO CITE DIR 34954

1. MEXICAN PRESIDENT LOPEZ MATEOS PLANNING 15-20 DAY ASIAN TOUR STARTING 10 OCT IN NEW DELHI FOLLOWED BY VISITS TO TOKY, DJAK AND POSSIBLY MANI.

2. REQUEST TAMI AND MEXI VIEWS BY 12 SEPT RE ADVISABILITY TAMI STA PROMPTING GRC TO INVITE LOPEZ MATEOS TO INCLUDE TAMI ON TOUR.

END OF MESSAGE

FE/CH/IO L. Hickcox (in draft)
C/WH/3
WH/COPS

for DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SR Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Transmittal of LIENVOY Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith in Attachment is a self-explanatory LIFEAT report of 28 August. The local speaker is Vladimir Ivanovich SAMOKHIN, Chief of the Soviet Information Bulletin; the Moscow speaker is fnu KALUGIN..

2. The attached report is the first known instance to the Station of Moscow direction of the Bulletin in the informal manner described in the Attachment. The Station will forward any future similar reports.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

2-WHD, w/2 RECD RI/AN 25-[illegible]
2-SRD, w/2
2-Files, w/1

2cc: SR

50-6-75/3

CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 Aug. 1962	4 Sept. 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19741

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

1 att

75/Sam/61
28Aug62

In /From Moscow/ MD calling from Moscow introduces himself to Samokhin as Kalugin. Kal says that he is in the office that prepares material for Sam to turn over to the press. Kal wants to have better contact with Sam. Kal says that Sam has to give his preferences to Kal on the kinds of articles that he wants for the press. Kal will be calling Sam to the telephone about two times a month. And then Sam can tell Kal what his preferences are in the way of articles. Secondly, Kal wants Sam to to be more observing in informing Kal what is being printed in /Mexico/. That these articles be sent to Kal. Kal says "we" see that there is considerable that is being printed /in Mexico/. But whatever Sam sends to Kal is very irregularly sent. Sam says that "we" always gave quarterly reports. Now Sam is being asked for monthly reports. /seems there part of conversation missing/ Kal says for Sam to send him a two-word cable saying when Sam wants Kal to call. Then Kal will call Sam. For instance, if Sam has anything to request, then he could send the cable. Kal asks if, for instance, Sam has any questions right now. Sam says yes, he would like Kal to send him material on the cosmonauts. Sam wants general material by specialists. Kal says that much has been sent to Sam. Sam says unfortunately, no. Not enough. Sam says it would be well if Kal could get together articles by Nikolayev and Popovich themselves. With their signature to the articles. For instance, a greeting to the Mexican reader. "And with their signature /to the article/." Kal asks if Sam wants this addressed to the reader "of our periodical?" Sam says no, simply to the Mexican reader. This can be published any periodical. Kal will do this. Sam says he wants articles on the situation of education – the middle education, the special education, and higher education. These articles to be based on specialists writing them. Not popular articles. Sam wants information of middle, higher and technical schools. "We are being asked for such material." Sam would also like articles on culture and art. Articles not about some specific art or cultural matter, but the problems in culture and art. Sam wants that more specialized articles be sent to him. Articles for the speacialized reader. Kal understands. Sam then asks when his replacement will be coming. Kal can't answer that. Kal says that he will call Sam on the 10th. Kal will try to give Sam an answer. Sam says he would like very much articles by Nikolayev and Popovich. Sam wants the photos of them also. Kal repeats that he wants very much commentary articles, Sam says this is very difficult to do for the month. "Because not so much is published." Kal asks that nevertheless everything be send for the month that is published. Kal asks Sam to send these articles by air mail. Very well. Kal says that there articlos that have to be answered. Sam asks Kal to give his regards to the comrades.

In Sokolovskaya asks Samokhin if she can come over. Yes.

Samokhin asks Yegorov if there will be any mail today. Yog says no.

31 Aug 62

att. to HMMA 19741

CS COPY

50-6-75/3

75/Sam/61
28Aug62

In /From Moscow/ ND calling from Moscow introduces himself to Samokhin as Kalugin. Kal says that he is in the office that prepares material for Sam to turn over to the press. Kal wants to have better contact with Sam. Kal says that Sam has to give his preferences to Kal on the kinds of articles that he wants for the press. Kal will be calling Sam to the telephone about two times a month. And then Sam can tell Kal what his preferences are in the way of articles. Secondly, Kal wants Sam to [illegible] to be more observing in informing Kal what is being printed in /Mexico/. That these articles be sent to Kal. Kal says "we" see that there is considerable that is being printed /in Mexico/. But whatever Sam sends to Kal is very irregularly sent. Sam says that "we" always gave quarterly reports. Now Sam is being asked for monthly reports. /seems there part of conversation missing/ Kal says for Sam to send him a two-word cable saying when Sam wants Kal to call. Then Kal will call Sam. For instance, if Sam has anything [illegible] to request, then he could send the cable. Kal asks if, for instance, Sam has any questions right now. Sam says yes, he would like Kal to send him material on the comments. Sam wants general material by specialists. Kal says that much has been sent to Sam. Sam says unfortunately, no. Not enough. Sam says it would be well if Kal could get/[illegible]/ together articles by Nikolayev and Popovich themselves. With their signature to the articles. For instance, a greeting to the Mexican [illegible] reader. "And with their signature /to the article/." Kal asks if Sam wants this addressed to the reader "of our periodical?" Sam says no, simply to the Mexican reader. This can be published any periodical. Kal will do this. Sam says he wants articles on the situation of education - the middle education, the special education, and higher education. These articles to be based on specialists writing them. Not popular articles. Sam wants information of middle, higher and technical schools. "We are being asked for such material." S m would also like articles on culture and art. Articles not about some specific art or cultural matter, but the problems in culture and art. Sam wants that more specialized articles be sent to him. Articles for the speacialized reader. Kal understands. Sam then asks when his replacement will be coming. Kal can't answer that. Kal says that he will call Sam on the 10th. Kal will try to give Sam an answer. Sam says he would like very much articles by Nikolayev and Popovich. Sam wants the photos of them also. Kal repeats that he wants very much commentary articles, Sam says this is very difficult to do for the month. "Because not so much is published." Kal asks that nevertheless everything be send for the month that is published. Kal asks Sam to send these articles by air mail. Very well. Kal says that there articles that have to be answered. Sam asks Kal to give his regards to the comrades.

In Sokolovskaya asks Samokhin if she can come over. Yes.

Samokhin asks Yegorov if there will be any mail today. Yeg says no.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SR Division; Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Soviet LIENVOY Product

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action: See paragraph 4 below

1. Transmitted herewith, for purposes of Headquarters familiarization, is a typical one day LIENVOY product of the Soviet lines. (Note that the Station has additional LIFEAT coverage on the personal lines of Colonel Aleksandr Georgiyevich SIDOROV and Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, and on the office line of Vladimir Ivanovich SAMOKHIN).

2. Except for the weekend period, the Spanish language transcript reaches the Soviet case officer on the day following the actual transcription - at the most usually two days after the transcription. The Station's Russian language translator transcribes the Russian language portions immediately, and this product reaches the Soviet case officer about an hour or two after receipt of the Spanish reporting. Simultaneously, flimsy copies of the above have been given to the reports officer and to other interested Station officers. The first copy is kept in a Station chrono file, for purposes of permanent record. It is annotated for ZOHAR purposes.

3. The Soviet officer, Lucy A. Dillinger, and other officers, read the product quickly for the immediate purpose of obtaining exploitable LCIMPROVE or other operational leads, and/or reportable intelligence. After this initial scanning, the product is literally cut up, with each clipping of significant conversation sent to COS and to various Station officers for their information and/or action. Whenever pertinent, the actual LIENVOY clip is sent to Headquarters, for information or action - or a summary of the clip is sent to Headquarters in dispatch form. Each clip is eventually routed to the Station's registry where indexing and filing is completed.

4. The Station finds that this Soviet LIENVOY clipping program provides the files on the individual Soviet staffers with a rather good picture of their activities and personality. (These individual files are of course augmented with information derived from double agent operations, LIEMPTY reporting, Headquarters provided information, ODACID reporting, newspaper clippings and other miscellaneous reporting). In many cases, however, the backbone of a Station file on a Soviet may derive principally from bits and pieces of LIENVOY product.

50-6-75/3

2 - WHD, w/1 att.
1 - SRD, w/1 att.
1 - KUDESK, wo/att.
2 - Files

1cc w/att
cc SR/IC

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
30 Aug. 62	31 Aug. 62

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS CO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19729

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19729

Category station files receive the clips pertaining to Soviet commercial activities, propaganda activities, Soviet contacts, etc. Very often, a single clipping may have to be copied to be sent to the files of several individual Soviets and/or to one or more category files.

5. Unfortunately, the Station does not have sufficient personnel available to analyze and collate periodically the LIENVOY and other Station product in the individual Soviet files for transmittal to Headquarters for its information; or possibly more important, for eventual transmittal to another Station where a Soviet from Mexico City is reassigned. Headquarters attention is directed again to MEXI-9885 of 17 January 1962 and allied correspondence regarding the desirability of having a trained Headquarters TDYer work on these materials at the Station. Headquarters may now wish to reinvestigate the possibility of finding a qualified staffer for this TDY assignment.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Lee

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

537
DATE : 27 AUG 62 DMCL ~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 28 0100Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 12381

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1797

RYBAT/LIENVOY

REF DIR 30536 (OUT 66927)*

TRIP CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RECOMMENDED (LIENVOY-2) TRIP BE POSTPONED.

Rienvoy ors 1

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

.ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SEC~~RET RYB~~AT

(~~)

ORIG : LEE O. NORRIS:jp
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 August 1962

1590
20

5-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 2, S/C 2

17 Aug 62 21 03z

DEFERRED ~~SIG CEN~~
ROUTINE

OUT 66927
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO MEXI (OPIM) INFO CITE DIR 30536

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1693 (IN 46143)*

1. WOLLENSACK EQUIPMENT NOT SUITABLE AND NO OTHER NEW EQUIPMENT TYPES AVAILABLE. RECOMMEND TRIP BE POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE.

2. IF TRIP CAN NOT BE DELAYED, WE WILL ATTEMPT ENTERTAIN AND DIVERT LIENVOY 2 WITH AREHART'S HELP. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH CMT: Requested Hqs show LIENVOY-2 Wollensack equipment for New L.P.

TSD/AOB John Castro (in draft)

WH/COPS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SEC~~RET RYBA~~T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 064
16 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

AUG 16 0349Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 46148

DIR CITE MEXI 1693

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1691, PARA 5 (IN 45535)*

1. STATION SUGGESTS AREHART AND LIENVOY-2 TDY HQS WEEK BEGINNING 20 AUG. AREHART TO ARRIVE 20 AUG FOLLOWED BY L-2 ON 22 AUG. PURPOSE TO STUDY AND SELECT SMALLER RECORDING GEAR (PROBABLY WOLLENSACK) FOR LIENVOY USE. PLAN MOVE LIENVOY BASE INTO LIELEGANT OFFICE WHERE PREVIOUSLY LOCATED TO INCREASE OP SECURITY AND OVERALL EFFICIENCY. THIS WAS PROPOSED BY LIELEGANT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, BUT STATION CONSIDERATION EXPENSE NEW GEAR DELAYED SUGGESTION UNTIL REF PROPOSAL AROSE.

2. BELIEVE TWO DAYS ADEQUATE TIME L-2 REMAIN HQS. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL TRIP.

File 50-6-75/3

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *PARA 5 MEXI SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY PRESENT LIENVOY GEAR COULD BE USED BY LITEMPO.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

643

DATE : 9 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2 mext	5
3	6

AUG 9 2311Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 42833

DIR CITE MEXI 1652

REFS A EMBTEL 460, 8 AUG 62

B EMBTEL 418

RYBAT

1. AT AMB MANN'S REQUEST CURTIS GAVE REPORT RE CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS TO LITENSOR ON 3 AUGUST.

2. ON 8 AUGUST LITENSOR SENT WORD TO CURTIS VIA LIELEGANT THAT CUAUHTEMOC CARDENAS WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF "WATER COMMISSIONER" IN THE MEXICALI AREA. (NOTE: SEE MEXI 1637 (IN 415 RE MEETING ON NIGHT OF 7 AUGUST BETWEEN LAZARO CARDENAS AND LITENSOR. CURTIS BELIEVES MATTER OF CUAUHTEMOC ATTEMPT DISCUSSED AT THIS MEETING.)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : J. R. REEVES 1638
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940 4208
DATE : 31 JULY 1962

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2

31 Jul 00 21 38z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT60676

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 26750

RYBAT

REF: MEXI 1469 (IN 32427)*

1. HQS PREPARED PROVIDE BRIEFING PAPERS PER PARA 3A REF AND CONCUR EXPERT COMING MEXI PER PARA 3B REF.

2. ASSUME COS WILL BE ABLE PROVIDE HQS SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO COMPLETE BRIEFING PAPERS AND MAKE EXPERT AVAILABLE. IS SPANISH NECESSARY FOR LITENSOR MEETINGS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: COS would greatly appreciate Hqs assistance on briefing papers and expert to brief LITENSOR if Indonesia trip materializes.

CI/ICG/Paul Burke (in draft)
WH/PO/A
WH/COPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

M Holman
N. P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSH 43-43

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMMA-19432
[redacted]-1906

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-75/~~4~~ 3

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 July 1962

SUBJECT Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY

RE "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of June 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
20-83-46	General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
24-18-18	Braulio Maldonado Sandez
21-81-32	Gustavo Solorzano (Not being used)
11-42-48	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
24-61-75	Jorge L. Tamayo Castillejos
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca (Cuban Embassy)
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
12-13-37	Ricardo J. Zevada (Out of order)
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzales Pedrero (Out of order)
11-16-48	Ignacio Acosta
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
46-12-70	C.T.A.L. (Out of order)
46-64-24	D.F.S.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
21-11-01	Politica (Revista - Marcue)
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
11-21-93	Cuban Embassy (Out of order)
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Out of order)
45-61-81	Czech Embassy
45-61-80	Czech Embassy

CSB
X
IP/ARO

Removed from Project KDBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 29 Fold: 6

B. Material Processed

In June, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 163 pages of daily resumes, 63 pages of transcript from the Cuban Embassy lines, 48 tapes from the Czech Embassy Lines, and 98 tapes and the transcriptions of the Spanish conversations from the Soviet Embassy lines. In addition, there were 29 other pieces of material from the LP.

C. Exploitation of Material

From the material processed above the following were some examples of pro- and anti-Communist information:

✓ 24 JUL 1962
✓ 50-6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO ONE

RECORD COPY

The Cuban efforts at propaganda in Mexico in which the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico conferred with Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, and suggested to him that Fidel Castro write a short message to the Mexican people in Siempre on its ninth anniversary of publication (see HMMA 19399).

The negative treatment to a Czech commercial representative by Mexican Immigration authorities (see HMMA 19158).

The refusal by the Pan American Institute of Geography and History of the Organization of American States to permit Teresa Proenza Proenza, Third Secretary and Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy, to attend the meeting held by it (see HMM 6438).

The embarrassment caused by the ~~immoral behavior~~ of Mexican female delegates to the Cuban 26 July celebration held in Havana in 1961 according to Manuel Marcue Parinas of the periodical Politica as told to Teresa Proenza Proenza.

D. Liaison

With the approach of the GPIDEAL visit to Mexico 29 June - 1 July, liaison activities greatly increased. COS visited LITENSOR on 28 June. LITENSOR assured that there would be no problems in the GPIDEAL visit and the safety of GPIDEAL was guaranteed and in the hands of LITENSOR. At this meeting LITENSOR indicated his annoyance with the Cubans. (See MEXI 1253).

LIELEGANT turned over to the Chief of Station a list of persons who were put under surveillance in connection with the GPIDEAL visit. The list also indicated those who were arrested. (See MEXIs 1244 and 1264).

At a meeting held on 28 May 1962, the Chief of Station, LIELEGANT, and LIENVOY/2 met with LIENVOY/1 and obtained his agreement to hire LIENVOY/14 to work under LIENVOY/3 as a technical inspector in Telefonos de Mexico. The purpose in putting LIENVOY/14 in this capacity is to have a man who would be more available to the LIENVOY Project and who "would see what others might be tapping telephones" in Telefonos de Mexico. Furthermore, LIENVOY/1 agreed to see to it that LIENVOY/14 would have "the range and authority" to do the work.

Putting LIENVOY/14 as a technical inspector within Telefonos, could create problems for the LIFEAT Project. At the same time WILSTED is restudying the LIFEAT system, improving it, tightening up the security and alerting the base houses to watch for any abnormal activity on present taps. It has been understood by the LIENVOY case officer that this has been done and it will be reported from time to time in future LIENVOY reports.

E. Security

For a report on security of the LIENVOY site for June 1962, see paragraph 2 E of HMMA-19319 (RYBAT-1397) dated 10 July 1962.

As was stated at the end of that paragraph, any surveillance or security threat of the LIENVOY basehouse or personnel can eventually be handled, should this be found necessary, by Chief of Station to LITENSOR.

F. Technical

The floor in the LP was recently covered with a linoleum which has greatly contributed to keeping the dust out of the recording machines and in excellent working condition. According to Arnold F. ARHEART, the LIENVOY technician, the machines are operating at top efficiency.

G. Personnel

The personnel remains the same as reported in the previous report.

H. Production

Production for the month of June was higher than usual. This increase was primarily due to the GPIDEAL visit. There were seventy-four (74) reports from LIENVOY material during June 1962. These are listed in the attachment.

Willard C. CURTIS

23 July 1962

Attachment:
LIENVOY Production - June 1962

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ATE : 022
20 JUL 62

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION: C/WH 5

NFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

JUL 21 0405Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 32427

DIR CITE MEXI 1469

RYBAT

REF DIR 22662 (Out 53750)*

1. POINTS IN REF TAKEN UP NIGHT 18 JULY WITH LITENSOR[1] IN MEETING ATTENDED BY LIELEGANT[2].

2. LITENSOR[1] OBVIOUSLY NOT REPEAT NOT HAPPY ABOUT HAVING GOT HIMSELF INTO POSITION OF POSSIBLE VISITS. LIELEGANT[2], AFTER MEETING, EXPRESSED BELIEF LITENSOR[1] WILL NOT MAKE VISITS, WILL FIND REASONS POSTPONE.

3. LITENSOR[1] ASKED COS FOR:

A. BRIEFING PAPERS ON COMMUNISM AND IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES WHO ARE COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNISTS IN INDONESIA, JAPAN AND INDIA. HE REFERRED TO PAPERS GIVEN HIM PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO SOUTH AMERICA IN JANUARY 1960.

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 32427 MEXI 1469

B. POSSIBILITY OF AN EXPERT "LIKE SR BROOKE" COMING TO MEXICO CITY TO MEET WITH HIM AND COS JUST PRIOR TO HIS "TAKE-OFF" IF HE DOES MAKE TRIP (LIKE "BROOKE"--CEDRIC PAPATE DID PRIOR TO SOUTH AMERICAN VISIT).

4 COS WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE ON PARA THREE IF TRIP MADE.

5 WILL ADVISE WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: Hqs. furnished reasonswhy the visit to Sukarno was a bad idea.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

14-00000

ASW

ORIG : AL WEDEMEYER
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 6026
DATE : 12 JULY 1962

1582
1582

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

12 JUL 62 15 31z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 53750

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/CI/IC, C/FE 6, S/C 2

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO CITE DIR 22662
22662

RYBAT

REF MEXI 1359 (IN 26600)*

1. HQS CONCURS WITH PROPOSAL IN PARA 3 REF.

2. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LITENSOR[1], COS[2] MAY AT HIS DISCRETION INDICATE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY VISIT TO SUKARNO A BAD IDEA:

A. SUKARNO IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST DUTCH IN NEW GUINEA AND HAS THUS FAR FRUSTRATED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

B. DUTCH ARE MEMBERS OF FAST GROWING AND ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET. MEXICO IS SEEKING TO INCREASE TRADE WITH COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES AND TO OBTAIN INVESTMENT CAPITAL FROM THEM. BELIEVE MEXICOS INTERESTS WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY TRIP LIKELY TO OFFEND COMMON MARKET COUNTRY.

C. CONSIDER THIS POOR TIME FOR LITENSOR[1] THROUGH HIS PRESENCE GIVE SUKARNO BENEFIT HIS AND HIS COUNTRY'S PRESTIGE.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: LITENSOR[1] planning visit SUKARNO in late Oct or early Nov. Amb MANN mentioned to COS[2] he personally believes this visit not good. COS[2] suggests he can tell LITENSOR that "my chiefs think visit to SUKARNO this year a bad idea." Request Hqs comments.

C/FE
C/WH/3
WH/C/CA
WH/COPS

RICHARD HELMS
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

VERN T. GRESHAM
AC/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 261
10 JUL 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, S/C 2, C/FE 6

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	
3		6	

JUL 11 1058Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 26600

DIR CITE MEXI 1359

ATTN BRENT AND KNIGHT

RYBAT

1. COS HAS LEARNED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE (LIELEGANT)[1] THAT LITENSOR[2] PLANNING VISIT SUKARNO IN DJAKARTA IN LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER.

2. AMBASSADOR MANN MENTIONED TO COS THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THIS VISIT NOT GOOD.

3. COS HAS TENTATIVE APPOINTMENT TALK OVER LIENVOY[3] OPERATIONAL WITH LITENSOR[2] ON 13 JULY. CAN, IF HQS APPROVES, TELL LITENSOR[2] THAT "MY CHIEFS THINK VISIT TO SUKARNO THIS YEAR A BAD IDEA".

4. PLEASE ADVISE. SUGGEST CONSULT WITH DAINOLD[4].

FE/

END OF MESSAGE

Forward in [illegible] with [illegible]

LIENVOY/[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Expency ops

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-19319
RUL-T-1892

HQS FILE NO.
50-1-16

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
10 July 1962

SUBJECT
Mexico City Station Security

ACTION REQUIRED
None; for your information.

RE "O T" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
A. HMMS 2430
B. MEXI 0346

1. As requested in reference, the station has polled all Station Case officers for possible or confirmed cases of surveillance while making operational contacts. The poll indicated five (5) cases of surveillance during recent months. For the sake of clarity and to give Headquarters an exact idea of the circumstances surrounding each incident, this report will treat each case individually with station comments pertinent to each case.

2. The five cases of possible or confirmed surveillance, related in the first person, are as follows:

A. Lewis J. SHOQUIST: 15 May 1962

"Following a meeting with Francis R. HEGARTY at the Hotel Alameda this date I noticed a Mexican standing quite close to us as we were discussing innocuous subjects just before parting. This fellow moved over and joined another Mexican who was standing at the Juarez Avenue entrance to the Alameda Hotel. I called HEGARTY's attention to these two and suggested that he leave, being very careful to check himself, while I checked these fellows to be absolutely certain they were interested in us. HEGARTY crossed Juarez and took a cab. Neither of these Mexicans showed any interest in his movements or made any type of observable signal. I walked back into the Hotel and spent about five minutes browsing at the magazine shop then left the hotel by the side entrance. As I departed I glanced toward Juarez Avenue and saw one of the same two fellows who had been at the Juarez entrance nudge the other and call his attention to me. These two fellows had moved in order to check both hotel entrances from the same spot. I walked to an arcade directly across from the hotel entrance and pretended to be looking in shop windows. I saw both Mexicans position themselves so as to observe the arcade. I made no attempt to dump the surveillance, being interested instead, in determining definitely that I was the target. As I moved out of the arcade, the two above fingered me to another pair of Mexicans who followed me as I moved through the Las Americas parking lot to Calle Independencia. For the next hour and one half to two hours I took these boys on a long tour, mostly on foot. I checked them by starting up streets then changing my mind and doubling back, following an erratic pattern as if shopping aimlessly, stopping in bookshops for periods during which they were forced to stand around somewhat obviously outside, etc. Briefly, it can be summarized by saying that there were at least five members of this team definitely on the surveillance, two others I am quite sure were involved, and one other about whom I am not absolutely sure. When, in my mind, there was no doubt whatsoever that I was the target I caught a taxi and headed toward Reforma Avenue, then to Rio Tiber St., and then toward Melchor Ocampo Street. As if changing my mind, I had the driver cut over to Sullivan St. to Shirley Courts where I went in and had lunch. During the cab ride I did not spot car surveillance but, shortly after my arrival at Shirley Courts, I saw three new men not previously on the job, whose actions indicated they were on me. I paid my bill, went into the bathroom for a minute then left through the covered garage and out into Villalongin St. in back of Shirley Courts. Once

FORM 10-57 53

SECRET RYBAT

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
ONE

out of the Courts, I walked rapidly out of sight of the exit and checked myself for the next ten minutes but could detect no further surveillance. I then walked up to Reforma, caught a cab, got out across the street from the Roble Theater, walked into the drug store at the Hotel Reforma, then out the front entrance, down to Woolworth's, through Woolworth's to the back entrance, up to Pasaje Latinoamericano, into the Pasaje where I stopped at a small counter shop to check as I made a purchase, then retraced my steps to Calle Madrid, on up to Reforma where I turned into the Reforma entrance to Sanborn's, checked for surveillance, then into the Embassy by the entrance from Sanborn's through the perfume section. There is no doubt whatsoever that these men were on me. The surveillance was not sophisticated from the standpoint of keeping me unaware, but was a very persistent one with these men not getting lost on the simpler tricks. Regardless of who is controlling these fellows, I have cancelled all operational contacts for today and will contact HEGARTY, Oliver Q. WIMPHEN and Simon D. CLACKETT tonight or early tomorrow morning to set up entirely new contact arrangements with each. I plan to make my contacts either early in the mornings or later at night in areas where surveillance can be spotted easily. I will instruct all agents to be unusually careful in checking before making any meetings, either with other agents or with me and that if there is any suspicion of surveillance skip the contact and check later at the alternate contact point in each case, if clear by the time of the alternate meeting. I called HEGARTY from a pay phone last night and set up an early morning contact with him to check on whether or not he was followed when he left the Hotel Alameda yesterday. HEGARTY said that he checked carefully but that there was no indication of interest in him. This is quite a relief since it now appears that I must have been picked up at the Embassy and that I, not HEGARTY, was the target. I cautioned HEGARTY to be even more careful than ever in his approaches to the LINLUCK safehouse and told him that, in our contacts, I was setting up entirely new contact arrangements immediately and that we would not use previous points uptown again. HEGARTY was told that we would use previously agreed upon points in the Polanco-Lomas area, that each point and time for the next meeting would be agreed upon at the previous one to avoid phone use as much as possible, and that most of our meetings would be held before 0900 hours or, when that not feasible, after dark. I suggested that he also inform LINLUCK that I had been under surveillance of some persistence and that he (LINLUCK) should be even more careful than ever in his contacts with HEGARTY, and in his approaches to the safehouse. I met WIMPHEN and CLACKETT later that same morning and made similar new contact arrangements with them and advised them of the even greater need for caution. I also advised them to park at least two to three blocks from points of contact and walk in, checking carefully before and after parking to be sure they are not surveilled and, if there is any suspicion of surveillance, do not make contact but make the alternate later if clear by them."

B. Algernon O. FORTYUNE, 16 November 1961

The abovementioned noted on the night of 16 November 1961 at approximately 2100 hours what seemed to be a suspicious situation in attempting to service the LINLUCK safehouse. As indicated on the attached diagram, the subject parked his automobile two blocks away as indicated on the diagram and approached the target by way of Panuco Street. In the approach run the subject noted a blue Fiat parked at the corner of Lerma and Hudson Streets with two male occupants. As the undersigned, on foot, approached the corner of Panuco and Hudson he noticed another Fiat parked at the very corner with three occupants. Remembering the other Fiat at the end of the block, which was quite visible from the corner of Panuco and Hudson, the undersigned decided to delay entry into the safehouse and casually walk down the block. The undersigned cut across Hudson Street to avoid walking close to the parked car and as he walked on Lerma, noticed the presence of a slow moving car behind him. This did not arouse too much suspicion since this area apparently specializes in street walkers and the local "tenorios" cruise the streets looking for them. As the undersigned reached the parked Q.P. car at the corner of Lerma and Duero the slow moving auto came abreast of the car and the driver almost stopped and stared at the undersigned as he attempted to unlock the car to depart the area. By this time the undersigned got suspicious and attempted to read the license plate, but the plate illumination bulb was out on the suspicious vehicle. The undersigned got in his own car, started down Lerma, passed the suspicious car which immediately fell in behind the undersigned. Not convinced yet of the intent of the following car, the undersigned drove toward Mississippi and made like he was continuing down on Lerma. At the last moment the undersigned swerved into Mississippi, narrowly missing getting clobbered by a vehicle coming down Mississippi. The suspicious vehicle, who was right behind, had to gun his auto to get out of the way so that he had to go straight across Lerma. The undersigned noted as he made the sudden turn into Mississippi that the other vehicle braked as soon as he passed Mississippi and, it seemed to the undersigned, was backing up toward Mississippi. At this point the undersigned poured the coal into the old Green Hornet and left the area. The undersigned then went to the Polanco Bowling Alley instead of home, bowled for approximately an hour and then returned at 2300 hours to inspect the area of action once more. The area was completely free of any parked autos. The undersigned cruised around the area for approximately 35 minutes but could not spot either one of the two Fiats.

Conclusions: (a) As previously stated, there may have been nothing to this incident, and perhaps the autos in question were merely the joy cars looking for customers, but at any rate the set-up looked suspicious therefore the undersigned did not service the safehouse in question.

(b) Douglas NISLEY reported to the undersigned that his records that a suspected Polish intelligence agent, Josef DEJ, resided at Hudson 11, two doors down from the LINLUCK safehouse. It is possible that the surveillance may have been on DEJ and that the undersigned blundered into an unpleasant situation.

(c) LINLUCK reported on 14 November 1961 that it was possible that he was under surveillance and it is possible that he was followed to the safehouse.

Francis R. HEGARTY, the regular case officer handling LINLUCK made the following comments pertinent to FORTYUNE's report of possible surveillance:

"On 22 November, HEGARTY visited safehouse at Rio Hudson to remove the typewriter and paper and inform the maid in charge that he intended to leave the apartment on the following day and also to arrange for the payment of the light bill which was due. After arranging these matters, HEGARTY left the safehouse and purposely took a circuitous route to his car, which had been parked more than a block away on another street. HEGARTY turned two corners and crossed two streets and detected an individual, Mexican in appearance, approximately six feet tall, 170 lbs., brown hair, ruddy complexion, wearing a tan suit and open sport shirt, and carrying a manila folder in his left hand, walking about 30 feet behind him. HEGARTY walked past his car and turned a third corner and walked rapidly to the middle of the block and then turned in his tracks. When HEGARTY reached the last corner he had turned he almost ran into the individual described above. The man opened his eyes wide, hesitated in mid-stride, but then kept on walking in the direction he had been going. HEGARTY walked to his car and after making sure that the individual did not turn back, immediately left the area." HEGARTY is certain that the safehouse at Rio Hudson was not under surveillance up until 10 November, the last time he visited it previously, and that the surveillance is on the house and not on himself.

Station Comment: See 2 a (Conclusions) above. In a later check of this area by HEGARTY, he could detect no surveillance either stationary or moving. SHOQUIST, however, instructed him to get a new safehouse for LINLUCK meetings immediately following his 22 November report and for neither he nor LINLUCK to go near the Rio Hudson safehouse again.

C. Andrew F. MERTON, 1 June 1962

"On 1 June 1962, while leaving a meeting with LITAU-1, I detected what could have been a possible surveillance. The meeting was in the Cafe Blanca on Juarez Avenue, between Lafragua Street and the Caballito Monument. Upon leaving the meeting, to which I had arrived "clean" to the best of my knowledge, I noted a peculiar flash of expression in the face of a tall, young, dark-haired man apparently waiting in the doorway for something. I had left the meeting first, leaving LITAU-1 to pay the check. Upon noting the expression I had a hunch that something funny might be going on. I turned right out of the door of the cafe and walked the short distance to the corner of Juarez and Reforma, doubling around the corner to the right. This left me on the north side of Reforma headed west in which direction I walked about a block. Two good-looking girls passed me headed south, and observing a good old Latin custom, I suddenly swiveled my head to watch them from the rear. I noted that my tall, dark-haired young man was behind me. As he noted that I could see him he suddenly turned right into a store which sells roof water tanks, a fairly obvious maneuver, or so it appeared. I resumed my way towards the Embassy but at a very slow pace [illegible] interest in the show windows. A few minutes later my friend passed me briskly walking towards Reforma and La Fragua, which latter street he crossed, eventually turning left and crossing the Reforma itself. I did a little counter-surveillance myself but soon lost the subject who disappeared somewhere down Avenida M Morelos. My "surveillant" was about 25 to 30 years old, dark tan skin, youthful looking, well-dressed in a dark suit and slightly nervous in his actions. While the whole matter could be coincidence, his action in dashing into the store, not just turning in as if engaged on legitimate business, made me suspect him all the more. If he were really a surveillant, he must have been on LITAU-1 rather than myself, since the Station had been alerted as to possible surveillance and I was checking myself".

D. Jeremy L. NIARCOS

Jeremy L. NIARCOS reported sometime in May, 1962 that he had spotted what definitely seemed like a one-man surveillance on him. Since he is presently on home leave the submission of a detailed report on the incident will be deferred until his return to duty.

E. Arnold F. AREHART/LIENVOY

"On Friday 15 June 1962, at approximately 0930, the concierge noticed two men standing on the corner of Tonala and Chihuahua, who seemed to have an unusual interest in the activity of the L.P. They were standing directly across the street from the L.P. One of the men was tall and thin with a mustache, well dressed and appeared to be about 30 or 35 years of age. The other was a short fat man and wore a white shirt coat of the Veracruz type and appeared to be around 50 years of age. They stood on the corner of Tonala and Chihuahua for about an hour and showed a great deal of interest in the activity of our building. Around 1030 hours the tall man left and later returned in a 1953 Fiat model 1800, with a brown body and a beige top with District Plates number 21-73-26. Both of these men then proceeded to observe our installation from the car, and from time to time appeared to be making notes on the comings and goings of the installation, as well as making notes on the cars used by the personnel of the L.P. At about 1200 hours AREHART left the L.P. to make a phone call and to see if any attempt would be made to follow any one leaving the building. No attempt was made to follow AREHART, however, his actions were observed from the car through the rear view mirror. Upon AREHART's return to the building it was noticed that the men appeared to be making notes in a small note book. Finally, around 1330 the tall man drove off in the car and the fat one took up a new position, about 50 to 100 feet down the block on Chihuahua where he could observe the front door of the LP. Around 1500 when the first shift was leaving, LIENVOY 16 left to go to lunch and was followed down Chihuahua. On spotting the surveillance he returned to the office. Just as he returned to the office LIENVOY 2 returned to the office and was told of the incident. LIENVOY 2 and LIENVOY 16 immediately approached the fat man (who had also returned to his former position), and asked him to explain his action of the day. They also asked him to identify himself. He showed them a driver's license with the name MARIANO VERA GONZALEZ. This information was checked at the Department of Traffic and found to be the license of another person. At this time it was decided to establish a stake out at the Traffic Department in order to discover and identify anyone who might show an interest in the names and addresses of the cars used by our installation. On the 16th of June, Unit "C" (Victor) informed LIENVOY 2 that around 1300 hours an old fr friend of his, Guillermo MUNEZ SANCHEZ, who was an agent of the Secret Service of the Police Headquarters, showed up and said that he was looking for a Mister CHOVO in order to obtain some information about the owner of a car with District Plates 723 (LIENVOY 2). Victor suggested that they check the files for the information. However, the information was not available. During their conversation Guillermo MUNEZ stated that he worked as a supervisor of the medical services of the Central Department and showed Victor his credentials signed by Dr. Julian GARZA TIJERINA. He also said that he had another job at the Health Department. While they were talking, another agent passed by and asked MUNEZ to give his regards to Colonel Manuel [illegible] Therefore, we suspect that Guillermo [illegible] is a member of an investigation group headed by [illegible], whose aim is [illegible] political information for Lic. ERNESTO URUCHURTU or to another [illegible], that reports political information to Dr. ALVAREZ AMEZQUITA. Since the 15th there have been no further attempts to place our [illegible] under surveillance that have been noticed. The attempted covert surveillance of the 15th was a crude operation and something we would expect to read about in a dime novel or a comic book; and certainly was not carried out by any one who had been trained in surveillance."

(Note: Any surveillance of LIENVOY basehouse or personnel can be handled, should this be found necessary, by COS to LITENSOR.)

3. Station Comments: The Station is unable to make any definitive conclusions relative to the reported surveillance incidents described above. It is not the Station's intention to minimize the seriousness of opposition surveillance attempts; nevertheless, it has not been possible to arrive at any substantive decision concerning which police or intelligence service is interested in the actions of Station Case officers. Based only on the above information, the Station, in fact, cannot be sure that Station officers are the only targets of surveillance in [illegible]. It is entirely possible that other ODACID employees have been under surveillance, but because of a lack of awareness of this investigative technique have not observed such actions. All Case Officers and operational personnel have been alerted to watch for and to report any surveillance attempts made against them. Headquarters will be advised promptly should the Station be able to derive any patterns of action pertaining to the above or any future incidents of hostile surveillance.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
1 - Chief, KUBARK
2 - Files

SECRET/RYBAT

POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE ENCOUNTERED IN SERVICING [illegible] SAFE HOUSE

LEGEND: ▭ - : POSSIBLE HOSTILE AUTOS (TWO FIATS)
▬ ▬ : PATH OF AUTOS
▭ : FORTUNE AUTO
- - - : PATH OF FORTUNE AUTO
o o o o : FOOT PATH OF FORTUNE



MELCHOR OCAMPO
← ONE
ONE WAY →
SAFE
HUDSON
(ONE WAY →)
ATOYAC
(→ ONE WAY)
PLATA
(ONE WAY →)
DANUBIO
(→ ONE WAY)
LERMA (ONE WAY →)
(ONE WAY →)

~~SECRET / RYBAT~~

LIENVOY/OPS

604

DATE : 2? JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (MR WHITTEN WH NOTIFIED [illegible] SLOTTED AT 1910-28 JUN)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/CA, C/CI 2, C/[illegible] 2, C/SR 4, C/TFW 5, D/OS 2, S/C 2

JUN 2? 2244Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 19328

OPIM DIR CITE MEXI 1253

RYBAT/JMPOOL

REF DIR 19654 (Out 98598)*

1. CURTIS[1] SAW LITENSOR[2] ALONE [illegible] HOURS ON 28 JUNE. THIS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR W[illegible] [illegible] SUCH VISIT GOOD IDEA.

2. CURTIS[1] FOLLOWED LINE SUGG[illegible] IN REF AFTER EXPRESSING TO LITENSOR[2] KUBARK[3] AND AMBASSADOR'S [illegible] FOR PREPARATIONS AND MUCH WORK HE PUTTING INTO PLANS TO MAKE GPIDEAL[4] VISIT SUCCESS.

3. LITENSOR[2] EXPRESSED THANKS F[illegible] BRIEFING AND THEN SAID "PLEASE ASSURE GPIDEAL[4] PERSONALLY VIA [illegible] CHIEF THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM. TELL HIM I PERSONALLY [illegible] FULLY AWARE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AND I PERSONALLY [illegible] ALL PRECAUTIONS. SAY TO HIM THAT HIS SAFETY IS [illegible] I GUARANTEE IT"

C

4. LITENSOR THEN TOLD CURTIS THAT "OFF RECORD" HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT CALL IN SOVIET AND CUBAN AMBASSADORS AND WARN THEM WITHOUT DECLARING THEM PERSONAE NON GRATAE. WHEN CURTIS SAID THIS WOULD MAKE OUR WORK MUCH EASIER LITENSOR LAUGHED HEARTILY BUT SAID NOTHING IN REPLY.

5. LITENSOR TOLD CURTIS "OFF RECORD" THAT HE VERY ANNOYED AT STUPIDITY OF CUBANS BECAUSE:

A. THEY STUPIDLY SENT BLAS ROCA HERE JUST PRIOR TO GPIDEAL VISIT; AND

B. PRENSA LATINA INTERFERING IN STUDENT ACTIVITIES AT UNAM (NOTE: THIS FROM LIENVOY).

6. CURTIS INTENDS PURSUE PRENSA LATINA MATTER AND HOPES GET LITENSOR CLOSE OFFICE IN MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *In view of indications of Soviet/Cuban involvement in plans against GPIDEAL (4), Headquarters suggested COS consider meeting LITENSOR (2) regarding the safety of GPIDEAL (4).

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-19233 [redacted]-1880
TO Chief, WH Division INFO	DESENSITIZED	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-75/3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	per CSN 43-43	DATE 19 June 1962
SUBJECT Monthly Activities Report on Project LIENVOY		RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		
REFERENCE(S)		

The following is the report on the LIENVOY Project for the month of May 1962:

A. Target Lines

20-30-18	Gral Lazaro Cardenas (Out of Order)
24-18-18	Lic. Braulio Maldonado (Out of Order)
20-83-46	Gral Lazaro Cardenas (Out of Order)
21-81-32	Lic Solorzano
46-12-70	C.T.A.L.
11-42-48	Ing Jorge L. Tamayo (Out of Order)
28-79-67	Ramon Cesar Cuenca
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy
45-59-52	David Alfaro Siqueiros
21-11-01	Revista Politica (Marcue)
14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
45-61-81	Chechoslovakian Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
24-61-75	Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
46-64-24	D.F.S.
46-11-30	D.F.S.
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
13-21-14	Francisco Galindo Ochoa
46-60-16	Prensa Latina
13-33-37	Ricardo J. Zebada
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy
43-15-06	Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero (Out of Order)
25-09-14	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
11-16-48	Lic. Ignacio Acosta
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy
45-61-80	Chechoslovakian Embassy
11-21-93	Cuban Embassy (Out of Order)
10-29-69	Movimiento Liberacion Nacional
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy

IP/ARD

Removed from Project KUBADGER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 23-175/74
Box: 27 Fold: 6

B. Material Processed

In May, the LIENVOY LP provided the Station with 152 pages of daily resumes, 47 tapes from three Czech lines and 93 tapes from four Soviet lines. The Spanish transcriptions of the tapes from the Soviet lines were also provided. In addition, 60 transcriptions were provided from the Cuban lines. The Station also received 22 other pieces of material from the LP.

C. Exploitation of Material

An example of the LIENVOY coverage was the long distance call from Habana indicating that a high-level functionary of the Cuban Government

FORM 10-57 (40) **53**	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/~~[redacted]	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO TWO

14 JUN 1962
50-6-75/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19233 [redacted]-1880

was ill. (See MEXI 0822, 17 May 1962).

D. Liaison

During the period under review the Chief of Station maintained regular contact with LIELEGANT and other individuals connected with the Project.

E. Security

There were no evident security problems for the month of May.

F. Technical

As usual, the equipment in the LP was checked and cleaned. However, during the month several of the lines were out of order. The Cuban Embassy was apparently still working on its telephonic system within the building. Other lines which were out of order were probably due to the inherent problems of the telephone company.

G. Personnel

There was no change in the personnel for the month and it kept the same schedule of work as reported for April.

H. Production

During May, LIENVOY produced the forty-five (45) positive intelligence reports indicated in the attachment and the usual volume of CI/CE personality and operational material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

18 June 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att
2 - Files

50-6-75/3

~~SE~~

LIENVOY PRODUCTION FOR MAY 1962

MEXI 0690 (HMM 6354)
MEXI 0700 (HMM 6360)
MEXI 0705
MEXI 0724 (HMM 6366)
MEXI 0725 (HMM 6365)
MEXI 0737 (HMM 6371)
MEXI 0739
MEXI 0745 (HMM 6376)
MEXI 0748 (HMM 6377)
MEXI 0785 (HMM 6385
MEXI 0789 (HMM 6388)
MEXI 0795 (HMM 6380)
MEXI 0800
MEXI 0819 (HMM 6394)
MEXI 0822
MEXI 0830 (HMM 6401)
MEXI 0831 (HMM 6400)
MEXI 0836 (HMM 6404)
MEXI 0849 (HMM 6407)
MEXI 0868 (HMM 6409)
MEXI 0876 (HMM 6414)
MEXI 0903
MEXI 0935 (HMM 6428)
MEXI 0954 (HMM 6431)

HMMA 19068
HMMA 19072
HMMA 19091
HMMA 19098
HMMA 19100
HMMA 19104
HMMA 19107
HMMA 19111

HMM 6347
HMM 6348
HMM 6351
HMM 6361
HMM 6362
HMM 6363
HMM 6372
HMM 6382
HMM 6383
HMM 6406
HMM 6408
HMM 6412
HMM 6425

24 + 8 + 13 = 45

atto HMMW-19233

50-6-75/3

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] DESENSITIZED	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-19153 [redacted]-1879
TO Chief, WH Division INFO Chief, KURIOT		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-75/3
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 5 June 1962
SUBJECT LIENVOY/Photos of LP		RE "43 3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

RYBAT

Transmitted herewith for the visual appreciation, information, and retention of the addressees are photos of the LIENVOY LP.

Willard C. CURTIS

5 June 1962

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att
1 - KURIOT w/att
2 - Files

Removed from Project KQBARKER
CS Classification: 50-6-75/3
JOB # 73-175/74
Box: 49 Fold: 6

50-6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53 (10)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED

[redacted]

13 JUN 1963

TO: ① - C/OPS/WH [redacted] ________
(1a) - CI/o-pa
② - TSD/audio ________

③ - WH/3 - Connie ________

④ - WH/3/mexi - Jane ________

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

Removed from Project KDBADGER
Classification: 50-6-[illegible]/3
73-175/14
Box: 29 Fold: 6

[redacted]



14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE 337
1 JUN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON .

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 1 1555Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 44395

DJAX INFO DIR CITE SAIG 9792

REF MEXI 0950 (IN 44345)*

ON OFF CHANCE THAT IN SPITE OF REF STEADMAN SUCCEEDS IN LATCHING ON TO ALBARRAN AS HE PASSES THROUGH SAIGON, SUGGEST DJAX PROVIDE NAME OF STATION OFFICER EVENTUALLY TO BE GIVEN TO ALBARRAN TO PASS ON CONTACT AS NOTIONAL FRIEND OF STEADMAN. THIS WOULD BE DONE ONLY IF DEEMED DESIREABLE AFTER MEETING THE MAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *LIELEGANT UNABLE CONTACT ALBARRAN PRIOR DEPARTURE.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE 572
31 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: FE 8*

INFO : CI/OPS, WH 7, S/C 2, CI/IC 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JUNE 1 0022Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 44048

SAIC INFO DIR DJAK CITE MEXI 0530

REFS A SAIG 9766 (IN 43751)

B MEXI 0526 (IN 42599)

1. LIELEGANT UNABLE CONTACT ALBARRAN PRIOR DEPARTURE. ALBARRAN SAID TO HAVE LEFT MEXICO ABOUT 26 MAY.

2. LIELEGANT DOES NOT KNOW ALBARRAN PERSONALLY; STATION HAS NOTHING TO ADD TO REF B.

3. EXCELSIOR OF 24 MAY CONTAINED ANNOUNCEMENT ALBARRAN BEING SENT INDONESIA AS AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR KOBIRD USED.

**QUERIED IF LIELEGANT EVER GOT TO ALBARRAN.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 264
31 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, S/C 2.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 31 1345Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 43751

MEXI INFO DIR DJAK CITE SAIG 9766

REF DJAK 7829 (IN 40807)*

SAIG 9632 (IN 41003)

1. GUILLERMO CONTRERAS GARCES, OFFICIAL OF RELATIONES EXTERIORES, IS IN SAIG ALLEGEDLY ON PLEASURE TRIP BUT ACTUALLY SOUNDING OUT POPULARITY OF DIEM GOVERNEMENT AND GENERALLY LOOKING AROUND. ARRIVED 28 MAY LEAVES ABOUT 3 JUNE.

2. ACCORDING TO CONTRERAS, ALBARRAN IS NOW IN TOKYO BEING BRIEFED BY AMBASSADOR CASTROVALLE (WHO UNTIL NOW ALSO ACCREDITED TO INDONESIA), PLANS ARRIVE IN SAIG FOR BRIEF STOPOVER O/A 8 JUNE.

3. DID LIELEGANT EVER GET TO ALBARRAN PER PARA 2 MEXI 05267 (IN 16996)

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *ODUNIT ATTACHE MEXI ADVISED ATTACHE HERE ON 21 MAY THAT MEXI AMB-DESIGNATE TO INDON LOPEZ WOULD DEPART SHORTLY TAKE UP POST.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMM-A-19105
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 29 May 1962
SUBJECT LIENVOY Targets		RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED For your information		

REFERENCE(S) HMM-W-10,620

1. An error was made by the person preparing HMM-A-18,752 (RYBAT-1833) or by the typist who chose the DFS list of taps (in HMM-A-18,246) instead of the correct LIENVOY list of targets.

2. The only explanation available is that with a change of Case Officers (Malcolm Q. EDELAND departed to become COS, Tegucigalpa), and with the delay in writing monthly reports on LIENVOY and lack of familiarity with the operation, the error was made--either by the drafting officer or by the typist.

3. This error will not occur again.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

26 May 1962

DISTRIBUTION
~~3-WH~~ Division
3-Files

LIENVOY/OPS

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

50 6-75/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

CS COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM

Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

LIENVOY Targets

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Per paragraph 3

REFERENCE : HMMA-18752, 23 March 1962 (KYBAT)

1. Referenced dispatch listed the target lines for LIENVOY for December 1961 and January 1962. Your attention is drawn to the fact that the targets listed coincide exactly with the list of IWS tape furnished in HMMA-18246 dated 1 December 1961.

2. The February 1962 LIENVOY target listing also furnished in referenced dispatch appears to be correctly labeled LIENVOY.

3. Your comments on paragraph one above are requested.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
8 MAY 1962	17 MAY 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMW-10620

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

50-6-75/3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

1 - Subject
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~RID/FS~~
~~RID/FI~~
WH/3M
~~DESTROY~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. Z. Bustos-V.	mrd	AC/Mexi	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	9 MAY 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 3-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 306
28 APR 62 08

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TFW 2 (C/TFW COPY SLOTTED AT 1730 28 APR 62)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI, C/WH 2, S/C 2

APR 28 2143Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 26974

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 0669

RYBAT GYROSE PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 06337 (OUT 76339)*

1. LIERGO ADVISED COS ON NIGHT OF 27 APRIL THAT LITENSOR HAD WRITTEN PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT DORTICOS ASKING THAT URRUTIA BE GIVEN SAFE CONDUCT TO MEXICO.

2. LIERGO HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS WITH LITENSOR PRIOR TO COS TALK WITH LIELEGANT.

3. LIERGO PLANS NOW TO TELL LITENSOR MORNING 28 APRIL OF COS REQUEST AND TO SUGGEST THAT LITENSOR SEND SECOND LETTER AS IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-UP.

4. LITENSOR'S REQUESTS ARE FOR URRUTIA AND HIS FAMILY ONLY AND DO NOT INCLUDE OTHER ASYLEES IN MEXICAN EMBASSY IN CUBA.

Lienvoy!

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5. BOTH LIERGO AND LIELEGANT PROMISE TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY ON REPLY FROM DORTICOS.

6. COS HAS NOT ADVISED AMBASSADOR OF ABOVE. SHOULD HE?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *HQS HAS DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH ODACID IN ATTEMPT ASSESS IMPACT IN EXILE COMMUNITIES PBPRIME.

069

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1 ~~[illegible]~~	4
2 [illegible]	5
3	6

DATE : 30 MAR 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, COP, C/CI, C/FI, C/WH 2, S/C 2*

MAR 30 0542Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 11142

DIR CITE MEXI [illegible]

RYBAT PBPRUMEN

REF: DIR [illegible] (Out 65710)**

1. COS IN CONVERSATION WITH LIELEGANT ON 25 MARCH BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF ASYLEES IN MEXICAN EMBASSY IN HABANA. LIELEGANT SAID INCLUDED IS FORMER "PRESIDENT" MANUEL URRUTIA LLEO.

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION LIELEGANT STATED FEELS LITENSOR WOULD MAKE PERSONAL REQUEST FOR SAFE CONDUCT OF URRUTIA IF COS GOES TO LITENSOR WITH SUGGESTION.

3. COS RECOMMENDS HE BE AUTHORIZED SEE LITENSOR AND MAKE REQUEST.

4. ICOULD LITENSOR BE TOLD URRUTIA COULD GET U.S. VISA IF BROUGHT MEXICO AND IF WISHED GO U.S.A.?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT GYROSE PBRUMEN CABLES.
**HQS REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE CURRENT FEASIBILITY AND BEST CHANNEL OF APPROACH TO LITENSOR FOR REQUEST HE ATTEMPT ARRANGE SAFE CONDUCT OUT OF CUBA FOR EX-PRESIDENT MANUEL URRATIA.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

26 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Task Force Washington

ATTENTION : John Caswell

SUBJECT : Feasibility of Effecting Release of Manuel URRUTIA, Ex-President of Cuba, Political Exile in Mexican Embassy, Havana

1. The Mexico City Station has the capability of approaching LITENSOR (Iden A) and requesting him to attempt to arrange for a safe conduct pass for Subject. The approach to LITENSOR can be made through three different channels; LITEMPO/2, (Iden B), LIELEGANT (Iden C), and LIEMGO (Iden D). Also, a direct approach by the COS to LITENSOR could probably be arranged if so desired by Headquarters for operational security reasons.

2. No assessment on the success of an approach of this type can be made because of the Mexican interest and position re Cuba.

3. If a decision is made to attempt to obtain a safe conduct pass for Subject, it is recommended that the COS Mexico City be informed in detail of Headquarters minimum and maximum goals and that he be requested to recommend the best channel to LITENSOR.

NED F. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - LITENSOR
1 - Chrono
1 - Hold File

WH/3/Mexico:JRReeves:mr/2555 (26 Mar 62)

IDENTITIES

Iden A - President of Mexico

Iden B - Minister of Interior

Iden C - Special Advisor to President

Iden D - Minister of Social Security

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 012
28 FEB 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/EE 3 **

INFO : DDP, COP, C/CA, C/FI 2, C/FI/SIG, C/IOD 2, C/SR 4, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

FEB 28 0359Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 34469

DIR INFO GNVA BERN CITE MEXI 0200

IN34469

RYBAT ZRSKATE

REF: DIR 42379 (out 52315)*

1. NAMES OF MEXI DELEGATION TO REF CONFERENCE NOT AVAILABLE AS YET. IT PROBABLE HOWEVER LUIS PADILLA NERVO, MEXI UN DELEG WHO NOW IN MEXI FOR PRIVATE GOVT CONSULTATION, (PRESUMABLY FOR ZRSKATE PREPARATIONS) WILL PARTICIPATE AS INFLUENTIAL MEMBER MEXI ZRSKATE GROUP.

2. FYI: MEXI PRESS 27 FEB PUBLISHED PRES LOPEZ MATEOS MESSAGE TO KRUSHCHEV RE MEXICAN POSITION AT REF CONFERENCE, CALLING FOR (A) PRELIMINARY MEETING OF COUNTRY DELEGATES AND REPS: (B) WITH BASIC ACCORD AND RESOLUTIONS REACHED IN (A) ABOVE, CONFERENCE OF CHANCELLORS TO BE HELD FOR FINAL AGREEMENT AND RATIFICATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * HQS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE REVIEW STA POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL ASSETS POSSIBLY ATTENDING 18 NATION DISARMAMENT CONF. GENEVA 14 MARCH 62. KUDOVE NEEDS PRECISE INFO CONCERNING STA ASSETS WITHIN DELEGATIONS.

**ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 065 20 FEB 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TSD 2

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 20 0709Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 30585

DIR CITE MEXI 0144 (WARE ACTING)

AQUATIC/LIERODE/MKTRAP

1. FAILURE OF AUDIO IN ONE SRT-9 AT LIERODE MAKES IMMEDIATE MKTRAP INSTALLATION HIGHLY DESIRABLE.

2. LATEST INVESTIGATION REVEALS TARGET TELEPHONE IS ERICSSON MODEL DBJ 510-512 WITH DIAL IN BASE.

3. INITIAL TESTS WITH MP-4 AND 4 LAYER DIODES INDICATE DEFINITE SUPERIORITY IN AUDIO QUALITY TO BASIC MKTRAP CIRCUITRY AND FEASIBILITY CONCEALMENT IN INSTRUMENT HANDLE.

4. LINE TO TARGET REPORTED BY GOOD AUTHORITY AS 2.7 MILES NUMBER 20 CABLE PAIR WITH SERIES CONNECTION AT CENTRAL. PLAN INITIAL PHASE OF INSTRUMENT INSTALLATION AND LP EQUIPMENT TESTS USING LIFEAT.

5. IN VIEW POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR SHORTER LINE LENGTH AND QUESTION OF SECURITY OF SERIES CONNECTION OVER EXTENDED PERIOD AT CENTRAL OFFICE, STATION CONSIDERING USE LIENVOY ENGINEER AFTER INITIAL PHASE FOR CABLE SPLICE TO SHORTEN LINE TO 1000 FEET. THIS WOULD REVEAL LOCATION PRESENT LIERODE BASE TO LIENVOY BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY REVEAL TECHNIQUE. STATION, NOT LIENVOY, WOULD CONTROL BASE AND PRODUCTION.

6. REQUEST HQS COMMENT:

Lienvoy/cp

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

MEXI 0144 IN 30585

A. USE LIENVOY AS DESCRIBED.

B. USE OF MP-4 WITH 4-LAYER DIODE.

7. STATION RECOMMENDS APPROVAL PARA 6 DUE IMPORTANCE TARGET PLUS FACT INSTALLATION MAY HELP CONTRIBUTE KUTUBE/D REQUIREMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

002

DATE : 16 FEB 62 WCJ

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : COP, ~~C/CA~~, C/CI, C/CI/IC 2, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, C/IOD 2
S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 16 0340Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 28751

DIR CITE MEXI 0125

RYBAT

1. COS, AT AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST, SAID TO LIELEGANT, LIERGO AND TO LIENVOY/1 THAT AMBASSADOR CONSIDERED FONMIN MANUEL TELLO SPEECH AT PUNTA DEL ESTE (SAYING MARXISM LENINISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN HEMISPHERE) WAS A "GOOD STEP FOR MEXICO". COS SAID, HOWEVER, THAT DEEDS NOW NEEDED TO SHOW MEXICANS ARE WILLING TO TAKE ANTI-COMMUNIST, ANTI-CASTRO STAND.

2. ON 15 FEBRUARY LIELEGANT AND LIENVOY/1 REPORTED (SEPARATELY) FOLLOWING:

A. PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS HAS CANCELLED THE INTENDED GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY TO "SIEMPRE" TO ALLOW FERNANDO BENITEZ (COMMUNIST WHO FIRED FROM "NOVEDADES" NEWSPAPER) TO CONTINUE WRITE SUPPLEMENT ON CULTURE IN MEXICO. (NOTE: IF TRUE THAT THIS INTENDED SUBSIDY CANCELLED PROBABLY PARTIALLY DUE TO FACT THAT LATEST ISSUE COMMUNIST MAGAZINE "POLITICA" ATTACKED PRESIDENT AND BENITEZ IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTOR.)

B. ALONSO AGUILAR MONTEVERDE, LEADING MEXICAN MARXIST, HEAD OF MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL,

HAS BEEN FIRED FROM HIS

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 28751 MEXI 0125

GOVERNMENT JOB IN TREASURY.

C. VICTOR MANUEL VILLASENOR, MARXIST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT OWNED DIESEL NACIONAL BEING FIRED.

3. THE ABOVE CITED AS "DEEDS" BY BOTH SOURCES.

4. LIENVOY/1 FURTHER REPORTED THAT MEXICO WILL BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND NOW ONLY NEEDS "INCIDENT". LIENVOY/1 SAID HUMBERTO ROMERO (SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT) SAID PRESIDENT SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING "INCIDENT" SHOWING CUBAN EMBASSY INVOLVED WITH RAILWAY WORKER'S UNION AND DECLARING "SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS PERSONAE NON GRATA" AND THEN BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

5. ABOVE REPORTED TO AMBASSADOR ORALLY.

6. WILL CABLE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18571 RYBAT 31813
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 9 February 1962
SUBJECT Examples of Marxist Textbooks used in Mexican Schools		RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED PRIORITY: See paragraph 3 below.		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCES		

PRIORITY

1. Attached are copies of:

a. "Breviario de Cultura Economica" (Segunda Edicion-1960) written by (Marxist) Francisco BARRERA Valdes and, as can be seen on the inner first page, approved by the Textbook Commission of the Ministry of Education as the textbook in beginning economics courses in Mexican public schools.

Notes: i. This book is pure Marxism. Pages 19, 43, 44 and many others distinctly praise Marxism and condemn capitalism and capitalist countries (particularly England, the U.S.A. and France).

ii. Also attached is a copy of the work notebook for this text.

iii. This book and its Marxist contents has been called to the attention of LITENSOR, LIERGO and others by COS. To date, however, the approval of this textbook has not been withdrawn.

b. "Cuba, Despertar de America", written by (Marxist) Ramon RAMIREZ Gomez, who is one of the most important professors of economics in the School of Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (U.N.A.M.). This book, which is pure Marxist, praises Castro's Cuba, Communist China and Marxism and condemns the U.S.A. This book was published officially by the National University of Mexico in 1961 and is used in the School of Economics there.

Note: Ramon RAMIREZ Gomez was one of the professors primarily responsible for expelling Luis Felipe COELLO Macias and Guillermo VELEZ Pelayo from the U.N.A.M. because they took part in anti-Castro, anti-Communist activities on 26 July 1961 (see HMMA-17935 and HMMA-18407).

2. Another textbook which is Marxist and which has been the subject of considerable publicity recently is "La Unidad de Trabajo y Estudio" by Clara O. CARDOUNEL, Professor at the Escuela Normal de Matanzas, Cuba, 1960. This book was one of the issues that provoked a mass demonstration against the leftist policies of Governor Eduardo LIVAS Villarreal of Nuevo Leon. (See MEXI-0842 and MEXI-0833.)

3. It will be recalled that on the evening of 31 January 1962 Thomas A. BRENT requested copies of the two (2) textbooks listed in paragraph 1. above, from COS. He wished to consider using them in presentations to (a) ODACID and (b) possibly to certain Senators and Congressmen.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachments

9 February 1962

Distribution: 3 - Hqs w/atts; 4 - Files

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/WH/3		21
2	[illegible] ~~J. C. King, C/WH~~		
3	Austin ~~Sriever, Assistant~~ to ~~the Director~~		23 Feb 62
4			
5	WH/3/Mexico, 1015 Barton Hall		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

2 - 3: In accordance with your conversation with the Mexican Desk, it is requested that you bring the attached dispatch to the attention of the Director. The information in the dispatch and the attachments are furnished in response to a request made by the Director (see Paragraph 4).

[illegible]
Handed to DCI
on 23 Feb 62,

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☒	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.
1 APR 55

(40)
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1959—O-342531

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

MFD.
FEB. 60

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/3				[illegible]
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. C/WH/3				[illegible]
6. WH/3/Mex		23·II·23		[illegible]
7. Burton				
8. Bustos				B
9. Reeves		1 Mar		[illegible]
10. O'Hara			1 M[illegible]	[illegible]
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

6: Base should have been on distribution of this.

(Okomfax)
Copy put in CP Penetrations file.

file LCN 10/175

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID FOR MICROFILMING BEFORE IT IS FILED. IF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RESTRICTED, CHECK HERE ○ RESTRICTED TO ______
Unit Designation

Indexed

16.

17.
RID/ME/FI 1035 L

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
[illegible]

DOCUMENT NUMBER
HMMA 18571

FORM 3-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-18909
RYBAT #1919

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
26 January 1962

SUBJECT
Cuban Embassy Activities

ACTION REQUIRED
For information.

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE
MEXI-9961, Para. 3

1. Attached is a copy of a long conversation obtained by LIERODE on 18 January 1962.

2. The conversation is amongst: Jose Antonio PORTUONDO Valdor, Cuban Ambassador; Berta PORTUONDO (his wife); Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (PORTUONDO's secretary) and a Mexican visitor. The visitor pretends to be a student from the Instituto Politecnico Nacional (IPN). The two women--and later PORTUONDO--accuse the Mexican of being a provocateur; and PORTUONDO lectures him on the Cuban Embassy's policy of non-intervention in Mexico.

3. On 23 January 1962 LITALUS/2 reported the visit by one MOTA (new--five months), agent of the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS). LITALUS/2 showed the case officer a copy of MOTA's report on his visit to the Cuban Embassy and his conversation there. (The DFS, according to LITALUS/2, do not believe the report!)

4. A copy of the portion of the tape with this (MOTA) conversation was played for LITEMPO/2. He found it extremely interesting and said the Cuban Ambassador "protested his innocence too much".

5. If Headquarters approves (as requested in reference) a copy of the attached will be given to LITEMPO/2 for him to "make public" as material collected by him. This and the additional materials specified in reference would, it is hoped, have sufficient impact to cause the Mexicans to break relations with Cuba.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

25 January 1962

Distribution:
3 - Hqs w/att
4 - Files

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

☐ CONTINUED

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-18490 RYBAT [illegible]
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 23 January 1962
SUBJECT Cuban Embassy Activities		☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters information.		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES

a. MEXI-9853
b. DIR-35831
c. MEXI-9913
d. MEXI-9914

1. Attached are copies of:

a. Transcript of the LIERODE tape of 24 November 1961. This is an authentic tape and transcript. The tape was sent to Headquarters with HMMA-18290; it was returned to Mexico City Station on 15 January (see DIR-35297).

b. "Transcript" of "IPN Student/Portuondo" conversation of "1 December 1961". Note: A conversation of almost this content took place on 11 December 1961 between an IPN student and Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (Portuondo's secretary).

c. Copy of a "photograph" of Teresa PROENZA Proenza, Cultural Attache, in a student riot of 12 July 1960.

d. A copy of a "page" from a personal file on Angel BOAN, (then) Director of Prensa Latina in Mexico City. This "page" is dated 17 July 1961.

e. A brief summary on Francisco DELGADO Garcia. This is an authentic case which was handled by LITEMPO organization and this summary was promised merely as a reminder.

2. Both the tape and transcript of 1.a. have now been furnished to LITEMPO/2. This is authentic.

3. Only the "transcript" of 1.b. was given to LITEMPO/2. This, it was felt, had to be supplied because the Ambassador made a commitment concerning PORTUONDO (Cuban Ambassador) personally paying students at I.P.N., Note: The real tape was of a conversation between Xiomara SANCHEZ Robert (Portuondo's secretary) and an IPN student. No tape exists for this; and LITEMPO/2 will be told it has been erased if he requests it.

4. The "photograph" of Teresa PROENZA Proenza in the student riot of 12 July 1960 (see 1.c. -- and the attached) is a montage made by the capable Station photographer. A copy of this was given by COS to LITEMPO/2.

5. The "page" from the personal file on Angel BOAN, then Director Prensa Latina, Mexico City was put into that file by this Station at the time the file was furnished (for two hours one night) by LIFIO. A copy of this "page" (see 1.d. and attached) was given to LITEMPO/2.

FORM 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

6. The summary of the case of Francisco DELGADO Garcia is authentic and is a case of LITEMPO/2's organization handled.

7. Finally, LITEMPO/2 was orally reminded of the material furnished (personally) to LITEMPO/2 by Manuel VILLAFANA Martinez, Air Attache, Cuban Embassy, who defected. A tape of the interview between LITEMPO/2 and VILLAFANA Martinez was made—and the Station still has a copy.

8. The Ambassador was allowed to believe that all of the above material is authentic.

9. The Ambassador hopes that this material which now has been shown to LITENSOR by LITEMPO/2 will be helpful in convincing Mexico that they should break relations with Cuba. The Station feels that this cooperation in the effort to impress LITENSOR and LITEMPO/2 with these (which were said to be "some examples") illustrations of Cuban interference in the internal affairs of Mexico was good political action for ODYOKE and with the Chief, ODACID.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Attachments (3)

22 January 1962

Distribution:
  3 - Hqs w/att
  2 - Files

SECRET

23 January 1962

If this Headquarters and the Department of State approve, the Chief of Station plans to give to Minister of Governacion Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz:

a. A tape recording of a long conversation of one MOTA, a DFS agent, with Cuban Ambassador PORTUONDO, his secretary and Mrs. PORTUONDO. MOTA entered the Cuban Embassy on 18 January 1962, pretending to be a Politechnic student. The Cubans called MOTA a provacateur and loudly protested their innocence, saying they had not intervened in Mexican internal affairs. (The Chief of Station has played this tape for DIAZ Ordaz, who remarked, "They protest too much.")

b. A tape recording of a conversation between a group of Colombian revolutionaries and Ambassador PORTUONDO, in which the former said an armed insurrection had already begun in practice in Colombia. They said the Colombian revolution was a part of the Cuban and Mexican revolutions and asked for solidarity and collaboration of all revolutionaries. PORTUONDO said he would send their report to Habana so that Cuba would have news of the situation and know who they are.

c. A faked copy of a page from the personal file of Angel BOAN of Prensa Latina, who is now in Cuba.

SECRET

Lienvoy/ops

SECRET

25 January 1962

The following message has been received from Mexico City:

For King and Sayre from Ambassador Mann:

1. As you know, some weeks ago we became convinced that only chance of getting Mexico to break relations with Cuba would be on basis Cuban intervention Mexican internal affairs. This of course was on assumption two thirds Rio treaty vote could not be obtained at Punta Del Este.

2. With this objective in mind Dept and CAS authorized me to turn over materials described in IN 12549 to appropriate Mexican official. I chose Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz.

3. DIAZ Ordaz has informed CAS that he discussed this evidence with Lopez Mateos who expressed surprise and interest. We discount Lopez Mateos statements because as you know he has much better evidence of Cuban Embassy intervention which he keeps strictly to himself and has never told Cabinet about. The evidence we turned over to DIAZ Ordaz has psychological importance because President is now aware that DIAZ Ordaz also knows part of the story. He can never be sure that DIAZ Ordaz will not use this to support his own anti-communist convictions if a showdown between the Commies and anti-Commies should occur in Mexico.

4. DIAZ Ordaz has asked me through CAS whether I would have any objection if the information we furnished him were made public should an appropriate occasion arise in the future. He said there would be no mention of the U.S. Govt and that Gobernacion would present the evidence as collected by it.

5. I recommend that CAS and Dept authorize me to inform DIAZ Ordaz that we have no objection on the basis outlined by him. Reason for my recommendation is that on the one hand we lose little by blowing the microphone operation since battery is scheduled to expire soon in any case. We believe we are in a position where we can safely deny that we had anything to do with placing microphone. In this connection DIAZ Ordaz obviously believes our story that we picked up signal by routine dialing of different frequencies and that microphone was presumably placed by Soviets to check on their satellites. On other hand affirmative answer to DIAZ Ordaz will also implicitly suggest the possibility that the time may come when we ourselves might wish to make this information

SECRET

Lienvoy/Lopo

public. I can think of no better incentive to Lopez Mateos to break relations with Cuba than possibility Mexican public might eventually become aware of extent to which Mexico has tolerated Cuban intervention in spite of its vaunted devotion to the doctrine of non-intervention.

6. Finally I wish to say that I realise all of these maneuvers involve some risk to U.S. but I believe resurgence of Communist influence in last two months requires unusual counteraction on our part.

7. DIAZ Ordaz has returned material to CAS for safe keeping and it is now in our possession. He claims he made no copies and we believe this probably true.

14-00000

053

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 JAN 62 JO

TO : DIRECTOR.

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (C/WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0140, 25 JAN)

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING
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JAN 25 0534Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 17168

CITE

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9961

RYBAT

REFS A MEXI 9960 C IN 17139

B HMMA-18490

1. RECOMMEND HQS CONCUR IN AMBASSADOR MANN'S REQUEST IN REF A.

2. FOR HQS INFO HAVE AUTHENTIC LIERODE TAPE OF LONG CONVERSATION OF ONE MOTA, DFS AGENT WHO ENTERED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 18 JAN 62, PRETENDED BE POLITECHNIC STUDENT, HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR PORTUONDO, HIS SECRETARY AND MRS PORTUONDO. CUBANS CALLED MOTA PROVOCATEUR AND LOUDLY PROTESTED THEIR INNOCENCE, NON-INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MEXICO. COPY OF THIS PLAYED FOR LITEMPO/2 BY COS. LITEMPO/2 SAID "THEY PROTEST TOO MUCH".

LIENVOY/op

K

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

3. POUCHING COPY THIS TAPE TO HQS.

4. IF HQS AND ODACID APPROVE COS WILL GIVE LITEMPO/2:

A. COPIES OF TWO AUTHENTIC TAPES (ONE OF PARA TWO ABOVE AND COLOMBIAN TAPE OF REFERENCE B).

B. COPY OF PAGE FROM PERSONAL FILE OF ANGEL BOAN (WHO NOW IN CUBA) FROM PRENSA LATINA.

5. STATION WORKING ON PROCUREMENT ADDITIONAL AUTHENTIC MATERIAL; IN PARTICULAR, HOPE HAVE CONSUELO ESPERON, MEXICAN THIRTY-YEAR EMPLOYEE CUBAN EMBASSY, INTERVIEWED BY LITEMPO/2 PERSONALLY. ESPERON HAS REPORTED (TO LITAMIL/2) THAT MEXICAN STUDENTS BROUGHT INTO CUBAN EMBASSY FOR INDOCTRINATION AND IN SOME TALKS CUBAN OFFICIALS HAVE EVEN TALKED AGAINST MEXICAN GOVT.

6. STATION WILL NOT RETURN PHOTO OF TERESA PROENZA (SEE REF B) TO LITEMPO/2. STATION WILL NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE ANY FAKED MATERIAL EXCEPT 3 B ABOVE, WITHOUT PRIOR HQS APPROVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

ORIG : J. G. HEYN
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO 1616
EXT : 2555
DATE : 29 JANUARY 1962

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

~~FILE NO.~~ 50-6-75/3

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature Chatn

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT95532

TO : MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 38386

REF: MEXI 9950 (IN 17139)* MEXI 9961 (IN 17168)**

RYBAT

ROUTING | INITIAL
D.K
~~DESTROY~~
RI/FI

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

041

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 25 JAN 62 30

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 0030, 25 JAN)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, S/C 2 *

ROUTING

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JAN 25 0429Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 17139

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9960

RYBAT

FOR GALBOND AND SAYRE FROM AMBASSADOR MANN:

1. AS YOU KNOW, SOME WEEKS AGO WE BECAME CONVINCED THAT ONLY CHANCE OF GETTING MEXICO TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA WOULD BE ON BASIS CUBAN INTERVENTION MEXICAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS OF COURSE WAS ON ASSUMPTION TWO THIRDS RIO TREATY VOTE COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AT PUNTA DEL ESTE.

2. WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND DEPT AND CAS AUTHORIZED ME TO TURN OVER MATERIALS DESCRIBED IN MEXI 9855 TO APPROPRIATE MEXICAN OFFICIAL. I CHOSE GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ.

IN 12549

3. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS INFORMED CAS THAT HE DISCUSSED THIS EVIDENCE WITH LOPEZ MATEOS WHO EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND INTEREST. WE DISCOUNT LOPEZ MATEOS STATEMENTS BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW HE HAS MUCH BETTER EVIDENCE OF CUBAN EMBASSY INTERVENTION WHICH HE KEEPS STRICTLY TO HIMSELF AND HAS NEVER TOLD CABINET ABOUT. THE EVIDENCE WE TURNED OVER TO DIAZ ORDAZ HAS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE BECAUSE PRESIDENT IS NOW AWARE THAT DIAZ ORDAZ ALSO KNOWS PART OF THE STORY. HE CAN NEVER BE SURE THAT DIAZ ORDAZ WILL NOT USE

LIENVOY

SECRET

HIS TO SUPPORT HIS OWN ANTI-COMMUNIST CONVICTIONS IF A SHOWDOWN BETWEEN THE COMMIES AND ANTI-COMMIES SHOULD OCCUR IN MEXICO.

4. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS ASKED ME THROUGH CAS WHETHER I WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION IF THE INFORMATION WE FURNISHED HIM WERE MADE PUBLIC SHOULD AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION ARISE IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO MENTION OF THE U.S. GOVT AND THAT GOBERNACION WOULD PRESENT THE EVIDENCE AS COLLECTED BY IT.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT CAS AND DEPT AUTHORIZE ME TO INFORM DIAZ ORDAZ THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OUTLINED BY HIM. REASON FOR MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT ON THE ONE HAND WE LOSE LITTLE BY BLOWING THE MICROPHONE OPERATION SINCE BATTERY IS SCHEDULED TO EXPIRE SOON IN ANY CASE. WE BELIEVE WE ARE IN A POSITION WHERE WE CAN SAFELY DENY THAT WE HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH PLACING MICROPHONE. IN THIS CONNECTION DIAZ ORDAZ OBVIOUSLY BELIEVES OUR STORY THAT WE PICKED UP SIGNAL BY ROUTINE DIALING OF DIFFERENT FREQUENCIES AND THAT MICROPHONE WAS PRESUMABLY PLACED BY SOVIETS TO CHECK ON THEIR SATELLITES. ON OTHER HAND AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO DIAZ ORDAZ WILL ALSO IMPLICITLY SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TIME MAY COME WHEN WE OURSELVES MIGHT WISH TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION PUBLIC. I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER INCENTIVE TO LOPEZ MATEOS TO BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA THAN POSSIBILITY MEXICAN PUBLIC MIGHT EVENTUALLY BECOME AWARE OF EXTENT TO WHICH MEXICO HAS TOLERATED CUBAN INTERVENTION IN SPITE OF ITS VAUNTED DEVOTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION.

6. FINALLY I WISH TO SAY THAT I REALIZE ALL OF THESE MANEUVERS INVOLVE SOME RISK TO U.S. BUT I BELIEVE RESURGENCE OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN LAST TWO MONTHS REQUIRES UNUSUAL COUNTERACTION ON

OUR PART.

7. DIAZ ORDAZ HAS RETURNED MATERIAL TO CAS FOR SAFE KEEPING AND IT IS NOW IN OUR POSSESSION. HE CLAIMS HE MADE NO COPIES AND WE BELIEVE THIS PROBABLY TRUE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION ON THIS CABLE ASSIGNED PER MR HOLMAN, WH.

110

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	20 JAN 62
TO :	DIRECTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION:	C/WH 5
INFO :	DCI, D/DCI, DDP, S/C 2*

ROUTING

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JAN 20 0834Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 14775

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9914

REFS A DIR 36178 (OUT 91068)**

B MEXI 9913 (IN 14761)***

C/S Comment: ** Hqs. asks if fabricated portions contain elements which Amb. Portuondo could deny or prove false

RYBAT

1. SEE REF B FOR DETAIL AND PARTIAL ANSWER TO PARA ONE OF REF A. AMBASSADOR, IN 12 JAN MEETING WITH LITEMPO-2, DID STATE THAT COS COULD PROVIDE TAPES OF TRANSCRIPTS SHOULD THEY BE NEEDED. COS LATER COVERED, HOWEVER, BY STATING TO LITEMPO-2 THAT HE THOUGHT SOME TAPES HAD BEEN ERASED. THIS STALL WAS STRENGTHENED BY FIRM STATEMENT THAT COLOMBIAN STUDENT TAPE WOULD BE AVAILABLE (IT HAS SINCE BEEN DELIVERED TO LITEMPO-2). AS INDICATED IN REF B, STATION WILL FIND PRETEXT NOT DELIVERED TAPES OTHER THAN AUTHENTIC COLOMBIAN.

2. RE PARA 2 REF A: PORTUONDO CAN CERTAINLY DENY ANY OR ALL OF MATERIALS, AUTHENTIC OR FABRICATED. ONLY WAY HE CAN PROVE REPEAT PROVE FALSITY IS BY PROVING HIS PRESENCE AT PLACE OTHER THAN EMBASSY AT TIME OF CONVERSATION. THIS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE HE THERE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION PER ORIGINATOR.

*** Transcript of Amb. Portuondo's conversation with the Colombian [illegible] tape recently returned to the station by Hqs.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE [illegible] OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

113

DATE : 20 JAN 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, S/C 2

ROUTING

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JAN 20 0802Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 14761

RITY DIR CITE MEXI 9913

R'BAT

REFS A MEXI 9855 (IN 12549) *

B DIR 35831 (OUT 90998) **

C/S Comment: * Ambassador Mann informed LITEMPO/2 (2) that State Department had certain information on Cuban intervention in Mexican internal affairs.

1. AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE SAID "TRANSCRIPTS" INSTEAD "TAPES" N BEGINNING SENTENCE PARA TWO A OF REF A. TRANSCRIPT OF PORTUONDO CONVERSATION WITH COLOMBIANS IS ACCURATE RESUME OF AUTHENTIC TAPE RECENTLY RETURNED TO STATION BY HQS. THIS TAPE WILL BE PASSED LI^{2}TEMPO-2 AFTERNOON 19 JAN. SECOND TRANSCRIPT REFERRED TO BY AMBASSADOR SAME SUB PARAGRAPH WAS FABRICATED BY STATION AND BASED ON STATION KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL VISIT TO PORTUONDO BY POLITIECHNIC STUDENT. NO TAPE EXTANT NOR HAS EXISTED OF THIS TRANSCRIPT. CONTENT THIS TRANSCRIPT NOT PERTINENT EXCEPT FOR INCRIMINATING STATEMENT QUOTED BY AMBASSADOR CONCERNING PAYMENT TO STUDENTS.

2. THE "GENUINE" DOCUMENT MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR IN PARA TWO B OF REF A IS STATION FABRICATION. DURING MONTH OF AUGUST 1961 LI^{1}FIC PROVIDED STATION WITH PRENSA LATINA PERSONAL FILE OF ANGEL BOAN, THEN MEXI DIRECTOR GENERAL. WHEN FILE WAS PHOTOGRAPHED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT STATION INSERTED PHOTO OF FAKE MEMORANDUM DESCRIBED IN REF A. PHOTOS OF FILE, INCLUDING FAB-

LIENVOY/am

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

ROUTING			
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IN 14761 MEXI 9913

RICATION, PASSED GOM. THE FAKE MEMO DESCRIBED PAYMENTS TO UNNAMED MEXICANS IN VARIOUS GOVERNMENT OFFICES. (IT WAS A SECOND COPY THIS FABRICATION, ALONE, WHICH WAS PASSED TO LITEMPO-2[2] ON 13 JAN).

3. CONCERNING PARA TWO C OF REF A: THIS WAS STATION FABRICATED MONTAGE SHOWING PROENZA AS A MEMBER OF CROWD DURING STUDENT RIOT OF 12 JULY 1960. "ORIGINAL" OF FABRICATION WAS PASSED TO LITENSOR[3] VIA LIELEGANT[4] SHORTLY AFTER.

4. PARA TWO SUB PARAS D AND E REFER TO WRITTEN "REMINDERS" OF COVERTLY RECOGNIZED INSTANCES OF CUBAN INTERVENTION ALREADY KNOWN TO GOM. THEY DESCRIBE AUTHENTIC CASES.

5. REPEATING, ONLY AUTHENTIC TAPE OF BONA FIDE COLOMBIAN STUDENT CONVERSATIONS IS AVAILABLE THIS TIME TO LITEMPO-2[2]. STATION BELIEVES "POLITECHNIC" TAPE, WHICH DOES NOT EXIST, WILL NOT BE REQUESTED. SHOULD THIS BE, STATION WILL STALL.

[redacted]

6. POUCHING COPIES OF ALL ITEMS GIVEN TO LITEMPO-2[2].

C/S Comment: ** Hqs. requested a detailed description of the materials passed to LITEMPO/2 (2).

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

SECRET

LIENVOY Project Costs

For the period 1 February 1962 through 31 January 1963, it is estimated that the LIENVOY Project costs will be approximately $65,240. Of this total it is estimated that $26,350 will be spent in fiscal year 1962 and $38,890 will be spent in fiscal year 1963.

Agent Salaries:	FY 62	FY 63	Totals	
LIENVOY/2	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/9	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/5	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/6	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/7	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/11	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/12	1,200	1,680	2,880	
LIENVOY/14	800	1,120	1,920	
LIENVOY/15	260	364	624	
LIENVOY/16	800	1,120	1,920	
2 sub-agents run by LIENVOY/2 @ $120 per month	1,200	1,680	2,880	
Total Agent Salaries	10,660	14,924		25,584
Xmas Bonus: one months pay		2,132	2,132	
Contingency fund for new agents or severance pay	952	1,332	2,284	
Total Bonus and Contingency Fund				4,416
Total Salaries, Bonus, and Contingency funds	11,612	18,388		30,000
Operational Expenses	830	1,170	2,000	
Local Purchase supplies and equipment	1,040	1,460	2,500	
Upkeep 3 QP vehicles	780	1,020	1,800	
Rent--Intercept Center	600	840	1,440	
Archart Home Leave Travel		2,000	2,000	
Safehouse rental	1,040	1,460	2,500	
Entertainment and gifts to Mexican Govt. officials	1,250	1,750	3,000	
Salary and cover travel for Archart and family	8,330	11,670	20,000	
Total	13,870	21,370		35,240
Total Project Funds	25,482	39,758		65,240

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

050

DATE : 6 JAN 62 WCJ

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED WH AT 0145, 6 JAN)

INFO : *DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, C/CA, S/C 2

ROUTING			
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JAN 6 0629Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 47593

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9793

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO SECRETARY WOODWARD:

(MESSAGE CONTINUES NEXT PAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

**(IN 45081) - Ambassador Mann suggested that the State Department and CAS give the Government of Mexico (GOM) concrete and irrefutable evidence of Cuban intervention in order to bring about GOM diplomatic break with Cuba.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE: 6 JAN 62
FROM: MEXICO CITY 9790
TO: DIRECTOR

RECEIVED: JAN 6 0629Z 62
PRIORITY
IN 47593

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR MANN TO SECRETARY WOODWARD:

"RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED SOONEST RELAY TO TELLO DETAILS ON CUBAN INTERVENTION (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED) SET FORTH IN MY MESSAGE. (SEE MEXI 9759).**

"I BELIEVE SUCH DOCUMENTED INFORMATION WILL IMPRESS TELLO.

"EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED VARIOUS REPORTS FROM FRIENDLY GOM OFFICIALS THAT HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN DIPLOMATIC BREAK WITH CUBA.

"NOW HAVE SOLID INFORMATION THAT BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR REPORTE TO HIS FON OFF DECEMBER 29 THAT TELLO TOLD HIM GOM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN NEAR FUTURE. WHILE I CANNOT ESTIMATE CHANCES OF BREAK, POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT WHATEVER INFORMATION I CAN GIVE TELLO MAY CAUSE HIM TO MOVE EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER JANUARY 22".

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

The following cables re passing information to Tello on which he can base a break in relations with Cuba and letting Ambassador use what material he wants to pass to Tello, all cables to be found in C/WH office only.

MEXI 9855 RYBAT

MEXI 9857 (IN 12170) - 16 January 1962 RYBAT

DIR 33993 (OUT 87630) - 8 January 1962 RYBAT

DIR 38531 (OUT 90571) - 17 Jan. 62 RYBAT

✓LITENVOY/ops

LITENSOR

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : J. O. HEYN
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 3 JANUARY 1962

1744

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

4 JAN 62 01 0

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH 5

INFO : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

~~SIG CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 86

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 33285

REFS: MEXI 9759 (IN 45081)*; MEXI 9767 (IN 45810)**

RYBAT

REF PROPOSALS BEING DISCUSSED WITH ODACID. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Ambassador Mann proposed pass certain telephone conversation transcripts to Foreign Minister TELLO as evidence of Cuban interventionist activities in Mexico.

** Station planning a series of operations to influence Mexico's vote at OAS Conference.

LIENVOY (05)

Raford Herbert
RAFORD HERBERT, AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

N. P. HOLMAN, C
AUTHENTICATING

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

E : 505
2 JAN 62

: DIRECTOR

M : MEXICO CITY

ION : C/WH 5

O : COP, C/CA, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
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JAN 3 0335Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 45810

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 9767

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXI 9738, PARA 5 (IN 43769)

B. DIR 32614 (OUT 85101)#

1. PRESENT STATION PLANNING REF IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PREPARATION FOR AMBASSADOR MEXICAN VERSION CUBAN SUBVERSIVE PAPER, FOR PASSAGE TO TELLO.

B. PLAN FABRICATE ON TAPE PHONEY CONVERSATION OF CUBAN AMBASSADOR FOR INSERTION LIENVOY MECHANISM.

C. ATTEMPT PERSUADE LONGTIME MEXICAN EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY DEFECT AND MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT CONDEMNING CUBANS FOR INTERFERENCE MEXICAN AFFAIRS. (SUBJ HAS INDICATED DESIRE ABANDON JOB BUT NOT YET AGREEABLE TO PUBLIC STATEMENT).

D. FAILING PUBLIC DEFECTION ABOVE SUBJECT, ATTEMPTING THROUGH SUBJECT OBTAIN INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS OR PROPAGANDA FROM EMBASSY SUITABLE FOR SENSATIONAL EXPLOITATION. EXAMPLE: SUBJECT CLAIMS CUBANS RUNNING "INDOCTRINATION" CLASSES FOR MEXICAN YOUTHS WITHIN EMBASSY BUILDING.

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ROUTING

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TE :

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PAGE 2

IN 45810 MEXI 9767

E. ALL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS PERMITTING, ATTEMPTING ARRANGE "CRASH" OF AUTOMOBILE OF CUBAN DIPLOMAT ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. "CRASH" TO INVOLVE SPECIAL UNDER-CAR DEVICES WITH WEAPONS AND PROP EXAMPLES "PROVING" CUBAN INTERVENTION IN LOCAL LABOR PROBLEMS. FYI: MEXICANS NOW SUSPECT RODRIGUEZ ENGAGED IN CASTRO KUCAGE-TYPE OPS.

2. WELCOME HQS COMMENTS ON ABOVE PLANNING AND ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT : "VIEW POSSIBILITY MEXICAN GOVT MAY BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA DESIRED DISCUSS CONTENTS REF A THIS CABLE WITH STATE DEPT.

SECRET

SECRET

3 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Operations Proposed by Station Mexico City to Influence Mexico to Break Relations with Cuba.

1. In addition to the proposal advanced by Ambassador Mann to pass certain telephone tap transcripts to high Mexican officials, Station Mexico City has just forwarded the following suggested operations designed to influence the Mexican Government to break relations with Cuba prior to the OAS Conference:

A. To prepare the Mexican "version" of the paper on Cuban Subversive Activities for the Ambassador to pass to Foreign Minister TELLO.

B. To fabricate on tape a phoney conversation by the Cuban Ambassador and insert it into the joint telephone tapping operation we operate for the President.

C. To attempt to persuade a longtime Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy to defect and make a public statement condemning Cubans for interference in Mexican affairs.

D. Should it not be possible to have the Subject above make a public defection, attempt through him to obtain incriminating documents or propaganda from the Cuban Embassy that are suitable for sensational exploitation. The Subject has claimed that the Cubans are running "indoctrination" classes for Mexican youth within the Embassy building.

E. If security considerations permit, attempt to arrange a "crash" of the automobile of the Cuban diplomat Rogelio RODRIGUEZ. The "crash" would involve a special under-car device containing weapons and propaganda examples to "prove" Cuban intervention in local labor problems.

2. In view of the highly sensitive nature of the operations proposed above and their timing (prior to 22 January) as related to the forthcoming OAS conference and the announced visit of President Kennedy to Mexico, it

SECRET

is suggested that these operations be discussed with the Department of State in detail. This may be an inopportune time for such activities, since the Mexican Government is likely to scrutinize with special care all events, whether bonfide or contrived, in the intervening period before 22 January.

Ned P. Holman
Chief, WH/3

104-10187-10071 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RETURN TO CIA
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SECRET

[redacted]

S E C R E T 280759Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SALV 5296
[redacted] AMMUG
Indicator
REF SALV 5294 (IN 53345)

CIA officer / asset

1. MEETING [redacted] AND [redacted] AT HOTEL SAFESITE LASTED 1015 TO 1440 HOURS 27 SEPTEMBER. [redacted]

24 [Police Liaison] [Intel Liaison] 24

2. SO FAR NEITHER [redacted] NOR [redacted] AWARE OF THIS OR REF MEETINGS.

[Liaison] 24 24 asset CIA

[redacted] AND [PRESIDENT] KNOW [redacted] IS [redacted] TARGET AND, AS HOS AWARE, HAVE COOPERATED IN PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT HIM AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN EXPLOITING AMMUG LEADS. IN ADDITION asset [redacted] HAS BEEN CONTINUING TARGET FOR [both liaison] 24 [redacted] FOR LONG PERIOD AND LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. HENCE THERE IS HIGH RISK [both liaison] 24 [redacted] COULD DISCOVER [redacted] CONTACT IN FUTURE HANDLING. IN VIEW OF FREE HAND GIVEN [redacted] IN THESE OPS BY [PRESIDENT] 24 AND [Police Liaison] 24 [redacted], SUCH DISCOVERY COULD DAMAGE [redacted] AND ALL USG [redacted] RELATIONS. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, ALTHOUGH [redacted] MUCH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIS asset [redacted] OP UNILATERALLY, WE DEEM IT PRUDENT TO INFORM [Police Liaison] 24 [redacted] AND PRESIDENT, REQUESTING THEY MAKE NO RECORD OF RECRUITMENT AND SIMPLY ACCEPT FUTURE REPORTS AS COMING FROM TRUSTWORTHY SENSITIVE SOURCE, LEAVING MANAGEMENT TO [redacted].

3. IN LONG INTERVIEW asset [redacted] GAVE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO ON [illegible] ACTIVITIES AND HIS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES AND

SECRET

9/PV

RMEN. HIS INFO SEEMS SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE ALTHOUGH HE HAS WITHHELD
HER INFO. UNDERSTANDABLY HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT ENTRAPMENT, [redacted]
PLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT TO REMUNERATE HIM, SECURITY LEAK LOCALLY
ICH HE FEARS COULD RESULT HIS DEATH. HE INDICATES WILLINGNESS
NTINUE IN PARTY ACTIVITIES SALV, ATTEND CONFERENCES, STRENGTHEN
TACTS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES, STRIVE GAIN HIGH PARTY POSTS,
ALERT FOR INTEL ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND Cuba [redacted] ACTIVITIES.

INFO FROM [redacted] INCLUDES FOLL:

A. HE ARRANGED MOSCOW TRAVEL RECENTLY [redacted] FOR FOUR
LVS, LETTING THEIR PARENT GROUPS MAKE SELECTIONS. THOSE
LECTED WERE RENAN RODAS LAZO, PEDRO RAUL FARFAN MEDRANO,
ERTO ARMIJO NAVARRETE AND ONE OTHER WHOSE NAME HE COULD NOT
CALL.

B. HE BELIEVES PCES CENTRAL COMMITTEE INCLUDES SHAFICK HANDAL,
RGE ARIAS GOMEZ, RAUL CASTELLANOS FIGUEROA BUT SAYS HANDAL
ONLY ONE WHOM HE KNOWS ON PCES EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

C. PARTY PSEUDOS FOR SELF, HANDAL AND CASTELLANOS RESPECTIVELY ARE
[redacted] PEDRO AND FERNANDEZ. HOWEVER HANDAL PSEUDO NOW CHANGED
ANOTHER WHICH COULD NOT RECALL.

D. HE AND JOSE MANLIO ARGUETA BOTH WERE TRAINED BY Cuban [redacted] INTEL;
HAD GW TRAINING ALSO.

E. PCES HAS ESTIMATED 600 MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH THIS HIS GUESS RATHER
N HARD INFO. WELL ORGANIZED IN SAN SALV BUT WEAK IN COUNTRY
ANIZATION DESPITE MANY CAMPESINO MEMBERS.

F. FUAR PRACTICALLY INACTIVE.

G. PCES HAS SUPPORTERS FOR CHICOM LINE AS WELL AS SOV LINE BUT
FERENCES HAVE NOT CAUSED SPLIT. LEADERS FAVOR SOV LINE.

H. ROQUE DALTON NOT MEMBER OF PCES NOW BUT [illegible] AND [illegible] ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DISAPPEARANCE. THEY ARE TRYING EXERT PRESSURE ON GOVT THROUGH [illegible], WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT HIS EXPULSION FROM COUNTRY RATHER THAN HAVE HIM LANGUISH IN SOME LOCAL JAIL. GOVT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT DALTON ARREST OR LOCATION.

I. HE A PCES MEMBER CONTINUOUSLY SINCE 1956. HIS SUSPENSION WAS ORDERED BECAUSE HE TOOK ASYLUM IN MEXI EMB 29 JANUARY 63 BUT WAS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE HE GAVE SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF CONDUCT ON ARRIVING MEXI FEW DAYS LATER.

4. IN LINE PARA 1 REASONING BELIEVE BEST TO INFORM [Police liaison 24] [redacted] MEETING WITH HIM SCHEDULED 0900 HOURS LOCAL TIME 28 SEPTEMBER. REQUEST HQS VIEWS BY 0830 HOURS.

5. NEXT [illegible] [redacted] MEETING 1000 HOURS 29 SEPTEMBER. NEXT Dalton [redacted] MEETING MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER AFTER [Police liaison 24] [redacted] MEETING.

SECRET

asset [redacted] [illegible] EVENING 25 SEPT CIA officer [redacted] [illegible]

Asset [redacted].

Contacted in Salvadoran prison

[redacted] [illegible]

CIA action

2/PV

RETURN TO CIA
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WH/SR # 64-749

15 October 1964

MEMORANDUM

24

SUBJECT: [redacted] CUBAN DEFECTOR Operation
Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Peralta
11

1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday 6 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. Chief of State Colonel Peralta, Minister of Government Colonel Serrano and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porres attended for the Guatemalans. [redacted] TWO CIA OFFICERS WERE PRESENT

06.08.06.08.24

2. At the request of the [redacted] SENIOR CIA OFFICER I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence community operates, of the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the Guatemalans to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the joint operations we undertake are compartmented within the Guatemalan government (and, in fact, discussed by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our representatives in the field). 24

3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, the DGI operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and operations in Guatemala. The president lent close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the DGI intelligence requirements for Guatemala 11 and the Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" file.

24

4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained our aims in exploiting the information [redacted] In this connection I asked for close cooperation and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our travel lists and watch list.

10JN

[redacted]

11

h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence;"

i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the briefing and of its exploitation;

24 24

j. Reference to the case of the Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala [redacted]

11

k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present.

7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta, 06 I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the 11 OAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities.

29 06

8. At the conclusion of the meeting, Peralta asked for a copy of the DGI requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further.

[redacted]

[illegible]

8/18

ANOTHER 11

2. With reference to [redacted] case, because of the developments and plans in El Salvador, I explained briefly the status of the DALTON case and the possibility of his being transferred to Guatemala. 11 (This was in line with the discussion in El Salvador which included our [redacted] OFFICER [redacted], the President and the President's intelligence 24 06,08 advisor, Colonel MEDRANO.) I asked that the Guatemalan 11 government take no action unless requested by President 06 RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, if DALTON 06 is transferred, one of our people probably would talk to 06 DALTON in Guatemala.) 11

06,08

3. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:

a. His own long experience in the OAS, in Cuba and in Central America;

b. His early warnings about Castro--which were disregarded;

c. The extent to which Guatemala 11 has lived up to its obligations in the OAS; to which it has cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;

d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries;

e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;

f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries;

g. The need for action against Mexico;

SECRET

14/R

14-00000
104-10187-10109

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SECRET

[redacted]

☐ ☒ SLOTTED ☐

S E C R E T 280059Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SALV 5296
[redacted]
WHDIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
REF SALV 5294 (IN 53348)

IN 02214

CIA OFFICER — CUBAN TARGET
1. MEETING [redacted] AND [redacted] AT HOTEL SAFESITE LASTED 1015 TO 1440 HOURS 27 SEPTEMBER. [redacted]

24 [CHIEF INTEL SERVICE] — [LIAISON] 24
SO FAR NEITHER [redacted] NOR [redacted] AWARE OF THIS OR REF MEETINGS.

[Chief INTel service — 24 — Cuban Target — CIA
[redacted] AND PRESIDENT] KNOW [redacted] IS [redacted] TARGET AND, AS HQS AWARE, HAVE COOPERATED IN PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT HIM AND OTHERS

CUBAN DEFECTOR — CUBAN TARGET
INVOLVED IN EXPLOITING [redacted] LEADS. IN ADDITION [redacted] HAS BEEN

24 (LIAISON — [INTel Service]24
CONTINUING TARGET FOR [redacted] AND [redacted] FOR LONG PERIOD AND LIKELY TO

N — 24 [LIAISON] — [INTEL SERVICE]24
REMAIN SO. HENCE THERE IS HIGH RISK [redacted] AND [redacted] COULD DISCOVER

CIA
[redacted] CONTACT IN FUTURE HANDLING. IN VIEW OF FREE HAND GIVEN

CIA — 24 — [INTEL Service]24
[redacted] IN THESE OPS BY [PRESIDENT] AND [redacted], SUCH DISCOVERY COULD DAMAGE

CIA — US. GOVT — O
[redacted] AND ALL [redacted] RELATIONS. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, ALTHOUGH

CIA officer — CIA Officer — Cuban Target
[redacted] AND [redacted] MUCH DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THIS [redacted] OP UNILATERALLY,

[Chief INTel Service]24 — 24
THEY DEEM IT PRUDENT TO INFORM [redacted] AND [PRESIDENT] REQUESTING THEY MAKE NO RECORD OF RECRUITMENT AND SIMPLY ACCEPT FUTURE REPORTS AS COMING FROM TRUSTWORTHY SENSITIVE SOURCE, LEAVING MANAGEMENT TO

CIA
[redacted]

Cuban Target
2. IN LONG INTERVIEW [redacted] GAVE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO ON PCES ACTIVITIES AND HIS RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES AND

SECRET

rl/PV

CUBA [redacted] HIS INFO SEEMS SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE ALTHOUGH HE HAS WITHHELD OTHER INFO. UNDERSTANDABLY HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT ENTRAPMENT, CIA [redacted] COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENT TO REMUNERATE HIM, SECURITY LEAK LOCALLY WHICH HE FEARS COULD RESULT HIS DEATH. HE INDICATES WILLINGNESS CONTINUE IN PARTY ACTIVITIES [redacted], ATTEND CONFERENCES, STRENGTHEN CONTACTS WITH OTHER COMMIE PARTIES, STRIVE GAIN HIGH PARTY POSTS, BE ALERT FOR INTEL ON GUERRILLA WARFARE AND CUBAN [redacted] ACTIVITIES.

3. INFO FROM Cuban Target [redacted] INCLUDES FOLL:

A. HE ARRANGED MOSCOW TRAVEL RECENTLY (SEE SALV 5248) (IN 72[illegible]) FOR FOUR SALVS, LETTING THEIR PARENT GROUPS MAKE SELECTIONS. [redacted] RO[redacted]

B. HE BELIEVES PCES CENTRAL COMMITTEE INCLUDES SHAFICK HANDAL, JORGE ARIAS GOMEZ, RAUL CASTELLANOS FIGUEROA BUT SAYS HANDAL IS ONLY ONE WHOM HE KNOWS ON PCES EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

C. PARTY PSEUDOS FOR SELF, HANDAL AND CASTELLANOS RESPECTIVELY ARE [redacted]. HOWEVER HANDAL PSEUDO NOW CHANGED TO ANOTHER WHICH COULD NOT RECALL.

D. HE [redacted] TRAINED BY CUBAN [redacted] INTEL; HE HAD GW TRAINING ALSO.

E. PCES HAS ESTIMATED 600 MEMBERS, ALTHOUGH THIS HIS GUESS RATHER THAN HARD INFO. WELL ORGANIZED IN SAN SALV BUT WEAK IN COUNTRY ORGANIZATION DESPITE MANY CAMPESINO MEMBERS.

F. FUAR PRACTICALLY INACTIVE.

G. PCES HAS SUPPORTERS FOR CHICOM LINE AS WELL AS SOV LINE BUT DIFFERENCES HAVE NOT CAUSED SPLIT. LEADERS FAVOR SOV LINE.

H. ROQUE DALTON NOT MEMBER OF PCES NOW BUT PCES AND STUDENTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS DISAPPEARANCE. THEY ARE TRYING EXERT PRESSURE ON GOVT THROUGH DEPUTIES, WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT HIS EXPULSION FROM COUNTRY RATHER THAN HAVE HIM LANGUISH IN SOME LOCAL JAIL. GOVT HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING ABOUT DALTON ARREST OR LOCATION.

[redacted]

24

4. IN LINE PARA I REASONING BELIEVE BEST TO INFORM [redacted] (CHIEF INTEL SERVICE) MEETING WITH HIM SCHEDULED 0900 HOURS LOCAL TIME 28 SEPTEMBER. REQUEST HQS VIEWS BY 0830 HOURS.

5. NEXT CUBAN TARGET [redacted] MEETING 1000 HOURS 29 SEPTEMBER. NEXT DALTON [redacted] MEETING MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER AFTER (INTEL SERVICE) 24 [redacted] MEETING.

S E C R E T

ASSET [redacted] ARRIVED EVENING 26 SEPT. CIA officer [redacted] MEET WITH CUBAN Target [redacted].

2/17/

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SECRET

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SAN SALVADOR

FROM: WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT WH TIME 1745 BY RP

TO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, SR 7, FE 4, VR, FILE

S E C R E T 282130Z

IN-82908

PRIORITY DIR CITE SALV 5301

28 SEPT 64

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted]

REFS A. SALV 5296 (IN 82314)

B. DIR 52899 *

24

1. IN ACCORDANCE REFS CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CIA OFFICER [redacted] MET SALVADORAN INTEL CHIEF [redacted] MORNING 28 SEPTEMBER IN CIA OFFICER [redacted] OFFICE TO BRIEF HIM ON CUBAN TARGET [redacted] RECRUITMENT, IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. 24 (SALV INTEL CHIEF) [redacted] WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND AGREED EMPHATICALLY ONLY HE AND (PRESIDENT) 24 WOULD KNOW OF RECRUITMENT AND THEY WOULD MAKE NO RECORD OF IT. DURING [illegible] CIA OFFICER [redacted] POINTED OUT CUBAN TARGET [redacted] IS MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL TARGET BECAUSE HE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO COMMIE PARTIES SALV AND OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, [redacted] AND [redacted].

SOURCES + METHODS

2. CIA OFFICER [redacted] SAID ONE OF HIS AGENTS WHO ALREADY HAS LEFT SALV

SECRET

3/PN

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE **SECRET** IN 53968 PAGE 2

CUBAN ASSET [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] 24
ARRANGED CONTACT WITH [redacted] [redacted] ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION, MADE NO DEMANDS, ORDERED ALL HIS FACILITIES AND UTMOST
CIA CIA OFFICER CIA OFFICER
COOPERATION TO [redacted]. [redacted] AND [redacted] BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN NO SECURITY PROBLEM TO DATE.

3. DO NOT PLAN HIT ANY OTHER TARGETS SALV AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT
DALTON CUBAN TARGET
[redacted], AS [redacted] OP TOO IMPORTANT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION
CIA
TO [redacted] PRESENCE OR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. PLAN TO CONTINUE
DALTON
[redacted] INTERROGATION AND RECRUITMENT EFFORT. HIS SILENCE AND COLLABORATION IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO FOR FOREGOING REASON.
24 [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] CIA
[redacted] AGREES HANDLE EXACTLY AS [redacted] WISHES.

4. [redacted]

SOURCES + METHODS

SECRET

* ONLY ALTERNATIVE APPEARED CUT IN [PRESIDENT] 24 AND [redacted] [SALV. INTEL CHIEF] 24

SECRET

4/IV

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 1/1

SECRET

[redacted]

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
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3	6

SALV (IMMEDIATE)

OM: DIRECTOR

NF: WH 8

FO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI, VR

20 SEP 64 39 z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

(IMMEDIATE) SALV INFO CITE DIR 52399

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR

[redacted]

REF: SALV XXXX 5296 (IN 83514)

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, ONLY ALTERNATIVE THIS POINT APPEARS

24
BE CUT IN PRESIDENT [redacted]

[redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FROM SAN SALVADOR
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ACTION WH 8
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT
TIME
BY
INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CA 2, CA/PEG, SOD 6, VR, FILE

S E C R E T 302210Z

DIR CITE SALV 5312
WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted]

30 SEP 64 IN 84511

REFS A. SALV 5333 (IN 83009) *

B. DIR 53380

1. CIA OFFICER [redacted] AND CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted], ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER SAW DALTON [redacted] MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER. DALTON [redacted] TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2 REF A. DENIED KNOWING [redacted] CUBAN DEFECTOR DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND BEGGED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE ANEW.

2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM DALTON [redacted] WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE RELEASE AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WRONG ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE INSOFAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETTED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOUBLED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COVER RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA.

SECRET

3. AS MATTERS STAND MOST IMPORTANT TO PROTECT CIA [redacted] EQUITY IN Cuban Target [redacted] OP OF GREAT PROMISE. THIS OP COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT Cuban Defector [redacted] EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF CIA [redacted] TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF Cuban Target [redacted] PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT TO PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER Cuban Target [redacted] IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRUDENT INTERVAL CIA [redacted] CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AGAINST OTHERS [EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH LIAISON] 24 DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS.

4. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF GUERRILLEROS TRAINED IN CUBA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted]. [redacted], SOME OF THOSE DETAINED MIGHT BE DOUBLED AND TARGETTED AGAINST GUERRILLA GROUPS OR PCES.

5. APPRECIATE REF B TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH [redacted] [LIAISON AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT.] 24

S E C R E T

[redacted]

2/PV

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

FROM 16-26
SAN SALVADOR

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO DDP, WH/SA, [illegible]

SECRET 012257Z

21-26
DIR CITE SALV 5320
WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTOR
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

21-26
REF A. SALV 5312 (IN 84511)

10[illegible]05307

B. DIR 53383

SALVADORAN ASSET
1. REF MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH [redacted] NIGHT 30 SEPTEMBER. HE CONCURRED IN ALL RESPECTS SAYING WOULD DISCUSS TIMING [redacted] WITH PRESIDENT. 24 ARRANGED FOR [redacted] TO GO BACK TO SOLITARY CONFINEMENT SAME NIGHT.
DALTON

CIA OFFICER 16-2
2. PENDING DEVELOPMENTS, [redacted] PLANS RETURN HQS AFTER GUAT STOP. THEREFORE BEST HOLD OFF [redacted] TRAVEL.
CUBAN EXILE ASSET'S

SECRET

5/PV

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: 4

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

8 Sept 1964

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

08 Sep 64 47z

TO SAN SALVADOR
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF. WH 8
INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

SALV INFO. CITE DIR

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEF
[redacted]

48058

REF SALV 5238 (IN 69136)*

24

GRATIFIED AT EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF BRIEFING TO PRESIDENT, BUT CONCERNED AT KEY ROLE OF [redacted] (Police) 24 URGE STATION BE AS TOUGH AS RELATIONS PERMIT IN INSISTING ON PROFESSIONAL HANDLING AND NOT BACKWARD IN POINTING OUT SECURITY BREACHES AND FUMBLES. PERHAPS STATION WILL SEE CHANCE TO DEMONSTRATE TO RIVERA THAT [redacted] (Police) 24 IS INCOMPETENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CIA OFFICERS

24 CHIEF EMBASSY

WH COMMENT: *Station SALV advised Hdqs of meeting between Chief [redacted] and Salv President concerning Cuban subversion and use of [redacted]s material. Station stated President desired [redacted] only local other than himself to be witting of [redacted] and information presented.

24 Police 24 CUBAN DEFECTOR ~~OFFICERS~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

6/90

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[redacted]

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24 SECRET

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1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM San Salvador

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WH-6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TOI UNIT TIME BY

INFO DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, FI, VR

S E C R E T 252035Z

DIR CITE SALV 5289 25 SEP 64 IN 81621

WH DIV CUBA CUBAN DEFECTORS

[redacted]

REF SALV 5284 (IN 80883)*

24 [CHIEF SALVADORAN INTEL]

1. DISCUSSED [redacted] REF WITH [redacted] [redacted] 24 [WAISON] [redacted] THEN HE DISCUSSED WITH CHIEF [redacted] INFORMING LATTER 24 [PRESIDENT] WANTS ONLY SUCH ACTION AS CIA [redacted] ADVISOR REQUESTS AND THIS ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY 24 [CHIEF SALV. INTEL] [redacted] 24 [Chief SALV. INTeL] [WAISON] 24 [redacted]

2. [redacted] SAYS [redacted] WILL MOVE DALTON [redacted] SOONEST TO HOUSE WHERE CIA OFFICER [redacted] CAN SEE ALONE.

3. MEANWHILE STATION ARRANGING THROUGH SALVADORAN ASSET [redacted] FOR CIA OFFICER [redacted] TO MEET CUTOUT TO CUBAN TARGET [redacted]. IF CUTOUT STORY VERIFIED, PLAN HAVE CIA OFFICER [redacted] MEET CUBAN TARGET [redacted] SOONEST.

S E C R E T DALTON

*Re [redacted] INTERROGATION

SECRET

6/PV

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MESSAGE FORM

[redacted]

30 SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

EXT: 5501
DATE: 3 September 1964

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

3 SEP 64 ... 43z

SIG CEN

TO: SAN SALVADOR

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

TO SALV INFO CITE DIR 47146

[redacted] WH DIV, CUBA, CUBAN DEF.

REF SALV 5232 (IN 65051)*

24 01

[redacted] INTEL SERVICE CHIEF LIGION

HDQS FEELS IT IMPORTANT THAT [redacted] ALSO ATTEND PRESIDENT 06 RIVERA BRIEFING, SINCE Police Chief [redacted] WILL MOST LIKELY TRY MOVE IN ON CUBAN DEFECTOR [redacted] LEADS AND TAKE FULL CREDIT. ~~SUGGEST [illegible] HEADS SALV POLICE [illegible] TO ATTEND [illegible].~~

END OF MESSAGE

06

WH COMMENT: *SALV will arrange briefing for President Rivera to be given by [redacted] on [redacted] information. CIA Officers CUBAN DEF,

[redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

[redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[redacted]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

4/90

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MESSAGE FORM

[redacted]
WH/2 CICL
6026
27 August 1964

SECRET

SAN SALVADOR GUATEMALA CITY

DIRECTOR

WH 7

DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/IA, FI, CCS 3, VR

SALV GUAT

DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMMUG

REF DIR 45535

45536

STAFF EMPLOYEES

1. [redacted] WILL TRAVEL SALV AND GUAT UPON COMPLETION TEGU MINISTERS MEETING FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH STATIONS. HDQS WANTS STATIONS TO SET UP BRIEFINGS FOR [PRESIDENT 06 RIVERA] AND [CHIEF GOVT 06 PERALTA] AND ROUNDTABLE TALKS ON CUBAN SUBVERSION BOTH COUNTRIES. SUCH TALKS IDEALLY WOULD ALSO INCLUDE STATION CHIEF AND LOCAL [24 LIAISON] CHIEF, AS WELL AS [redacted] STAFF EMPLOYEES [redacted] REQUEST ADDRESSEES VIEWS SUCH CONTACTS.

STAFF EMPLOYEE

2. FOR SALV: [redacted] WILL EXPLORE WITH YOU POSSIBLE PITCHES TO [redacted] AMMUG LEADS. PENDING OUTCOME SUCH EXPLORATIONS, HDQS PREPARED MAKE AMMUG ONE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY FOR PITCHES.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
[illegible]	

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/PO/A

C/WH/SA/CI

[redacted]
C WHD

C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RI COPY

SECRET

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Copy No

1389a

3/20

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, London
[redacted]
Chief, [redacted], Frankfurt (Attn: [redacted])
COS, Germany

TECHS

Chief, [redacted]

[redacted]/Operational

Transmittal of Debriefing Report on use of Fraudulent International Travel Documentation by Cuban Intelligence. Case 4819.

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Transmitted herewith is a debriefing report on use of Fraudulent International Travel Documentation by Cuban Intelligence for passage to the local [liaison service.] 24

[redacted]

HQS OFFICER

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment : 1 envl.
As Stated

Distribution:
3 - COS, London, w/att. (3 copies)
2 - Chief, [redacted], wo/att.
2 - COS, Germany, wo/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[redacted]	OSLW - 21363	13 July 1964
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
[redacted]			[redacted]

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
[redacted]		[redacted]
[redacted]		[redacted]
[redacted]		[redacted]

RELEASING

1/90

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : PANAMA CITY [redacted]
ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED 1840 [redacted] (4 DO) staff employee
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/RA, FI, WE 6, WH/SA 8, AR

S E C R E T 022035Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 3363

[redacted] AMMUG

IN 74652

REF: A. DIR 18730 *

B. OTTA 1639

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED REPLY TO DIR
*CABLE IS MORE THAN A YEAR

1. TRACES REF B (WHICH RECD 2 MAY) INCLUDE FOLL ONLY:

A. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA AND ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ. FORWARDED IN PACY 3312. (IN 71483)

B. JULIO DAMAS VASQUEZ. PROB IDENTICAL TO JULIO DAMASO VASQUEZ. HZP-3054, 15 MAY 59, REPORTED AS CUBAN CITIZEN, MEDICAL STUDENT LACKING ONE YEAR STUDY FOR DEGREE WHO JOINED SIERRA MORENA REBEL FORCES, APPOINTED ARMY DOCTOR WITH RANK OF CAPTAIN, CAPTURED AT PORTOBELLO. HZP-3854, 29 AUG 60, REPORTED AS WORKING WITH CUBAN G-2, OFFERING POSITION WITH RADIO REBELDE TO PANAMANIAN FRIEND.

C. FNU SOSA MAY BE MARIO SOSA NAVARRO, REPORTED HHTA-1534, 7 AUG 59, AS HONDURAN COMMIE THEN CHIEF OF AUTO SALES DEPT OF FIRM KNOWN AS RENE SEMPE; SEC GEN OF TEGU REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF PCH, ACTIVE IN COMMIE AFFAIRS GUAT 1953-54, MEXI 1954-57 (SEE [redacted]). OR MAY BE PABLO ARMANDO SOSA RAMIREZ, HONDURAN, PDOB LA CEIBA, HONDURAS, 8 AUG 34, OCCUPATION: RAILROAD WORKER. ARRIVED KINGSTON,

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

JAMAICA, 22 MAY 63, FROM HAVA EN ROUTE TEGU WITH PASSPORT 23465 ISSUED HONDURAS 19 APR 63 (KNGS-622). **

D. ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO. HMT-627, 31 JULY 62, REPORTS ONE ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS A CITIZEN OF HONDURAS INVOLVED IN COMMIE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES TEGU. HZPA-11329, 9 JUNE 61 REPORTS ALEJANDRO GOMEZ AS NAME ON LIST CARRIED BY IUS DELEGATE.

E. RICARO MARTINEZ. HZPA-13234, 9 MAY 63, REPORTED RICARDO AUGUSTO MARTIÑEZ AS SALVADORAN, PDOB SANTA ANA, SALV, 23 JUNE 36, OCCUPATION: BRICKMASON, RESIDENCE INDEPENDENCIA NO. 76, SANTA ANA, AS POSSIBLE TRAVELLER TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRY MARCH 63.

2. RE REF A, STA CAPABILITIES INCLUDE [redacted]; DIRECT CONTACT WITH [redacted]; UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY (LIMITED BY SIZE OF TEAM) [redacted]; [redacted]

24

(IN [illegible]) (IN [illegible]) (IN [illegible])

3. PLS ADVISE EXTENT TO WHICH OTTA-1603, 1609, 1611 NAMES CAN BE:

A. DISCLOSED TO PANAMANIAN LSN FOR TRAVEL WATCHLISTING.

B. DISCUSSED WITH [redacted]

S E C R E T

C/PN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Technical Surveillance Soviet/Satellite Agents

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES
HMMW-10893

1. Station fully agrees with Headquarters concerning the value of concentrating LIFEAT or LIENVOY coverage on suspected and/or known Soviet, Satellite and Cuban agents residing in Mexico City. The Station in the past has undertaken this type coverage and will continue such coverage in the future as LIFEAT and LIENVOY facilities become available for assignment to these targets. As Headquarters is aware, this Station can and will cover any possible target Headquarters considers of high enough priority to cover.

2. For example, Carmen BRUFAU Civit was covered for 1956, 1957, 1960 and 1961; the results were not considered of sufficient value to continue the coverage.

3. Presently, Elena VASQUEZ Gomez, one of the persons referred to in reference, works for General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio, pro-Communist former President of Mexico. Coverage of CARDENAS by LIENVOY means a certain amount of coverage of VASQUEZ Gomez.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
4 - Files

50-6-32/1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 Aug. 1962	31 Aug. 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19700

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-19129, 1 June 1962

1. Project LIFEAT has been renewed for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00.

2. Please note that this means a cut of $3,193.00 from the Station's original request for $102,193.00 to $99,000.00. WHD was allocated $99,000.00 for this Project for FY 63.

3. This reduction was made by reducing "Miscellaneous Op Expenses" from $4,000.00 to $807.00.

4. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUDESK reiterated that the facilities of this Project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite and Cuban intelligence services in Mexico. KUDESK notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City
1 - WH/3/Mexi Chrono

50-6-32/1

DATE TYPED: 31 July 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 3 AUG 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]-10803

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ROUTING RI	INITIAL
RID/AN	f
RID/NIS	[illegible]
~~[illegible]S~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3 Mexi	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Lee G. Norris	nr	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PO/A		Ruth Geary

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	3 AUG 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

14-00000

SECRET

2-3592

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Renewal)
WH - Mexico City

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is presented for renewal for the period 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963. The project supports a unilateral telephone tap operation which provides daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico City and personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups.

2. Authority is requested to obligate $90,000 from the DD/P-WH Division budget in fiscal year 1963, subject to the availability of funds. Of this amount $18,807 is estimated for administrative salaries; $43,415 for field agent salaries; $20,928 for basehouse rentals; $15,000 for equipment; $2,100 for local transportation; and $500 for miscellaneous operational expenses.

3. The Field Project Outline and review which are forwarded by the Division with a covering memorandum, give a clear description of the project activity and accomplishments. The project has been in continuous operation since 1951, starting with a single tap against the Soviet Legation in Mexico City and now covering as many as thirty lines in a given month. The project is staffed by an "outside" case officer (Career Agent David M. WILSTED (p) of Project LIMOG), four contract agents who do administrative work, and twenty-one field agents including monitors and linemen. During the past year the project provided coverage of the home phones of three Soviet Intelligence officers, the Polish Embassy, the Yugoslav Embassy, major firms dealing in the transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba, American Communists in Mexico, and exile and revolutionary groups in Mexico. CI information was obtained and additional security was provided Station operations. Although coverage of the official Soviet and Czech installations became a joint operation with the Mexican Government in LIENVOY, Project LIFEAT remains available to resume coverage of these installations should a change in the local government or its attitude to CIA participation necessitate such change.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

For the future, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike" operations which will require access to telephone centrals and cables. It is the opinion of the Station that the support provided the Station operations, the CI/CE information, and the ability to cover sensitive targets without revealing our interest to liaison services justifies the expenditure of funds, time, and personnel under this project. The overall performance of all agents in the complex continued to be good; no security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved.

4. Appropriate Special Staff components recommend renewal. The FI Staff notes that the project continues to be a most useful operational asset of the Station and in addition has produced thirty-seven positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning the illegal transshipment of goods to Cuba. FI/D comments that one item of direct interest to FI/D was received from Project LIFEAT and that the technical coverage of the diplomatic installations would afford valuable assistance to the planning and conduct of any FI/D endeavor to mount operations. The CI Staff reiterates that the facilities of this project could and should be used for the coverage of known or highly suspected agents of the Soviet/Satellite/and Cuban Intelligence services in Mexico. CI notes that some twenty of these agents have been documented in detailed target studies which were forwarded to the Station.

5. I recommend renewal of Project LIFEAT and invite the Division's attention to the recommendations of CI Staff in paragraph 4 above.

L. M. Hines
L. M. HI[illegible]S
Chief, DDP/PG

Approved: TH Karamessines 27 July 62
[illegible] date

Attachments:
Project Outline LIFEAT
FI Memoranda

[illegible] Coordination:
For FI Staff -s/J. Laine
For CI Staff -s/[illegible]. Harnes
For FI/INT -s/[illegible]. Estes
For TSD -s/[illegible]. Strange
For FI/D -s/V. Leichliter

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

19 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

THROUGH: DDP/PG

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT Renewal

FI Staff recommends renewal of Project LIFEAT. This unilateral audio effort continues to be a most useful operational asset of the station as indicated by the specific examples furnished in the renewal request. In addition, it produced 37 positive intelligence disseminations, six of which were of particular interest concerning illegal transhipment of U.S. goods to Cuba.

LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Attachment
Project

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

9 July 1962

Project LIFEAT WH/Mexico

(Audio Operation)

1. FI/INT files contain 37 positive information disseminations attributed wholly or in part to Project LIFEAT during the year 1 July 1961 through June 1962. They were concerned principally with contacts between Mexican Communists or leftists and Cubans or individuals of the Soviet Bloc, and with the travel of Latin Americans to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. Six reports of particular interest consisted of information on Transcontinental S.A., a company allegedly engaged in the illegal transshipment of US goods to Cuba. Other reports of significance dealt with the contacts and activities of former Guatemalan President Juan Jose AREVALO Barmeja, now living in Mexico. There was reporting on Nicaraguan and Spanish exile activity in Mexico and on the revolutionary sentiment and expectations of other Latin American nationals.

2. LIFEAT has provided positive intelligence of value and of relevance to customer requirements and to objectives of the PNIO. It has been pointed out in the renewal request that the production of positive information is incidental to the projects primary function as a support and CI/CE operation.

3. RENEWAL IS RECOMMENDED.

Hayden Estey

HAYDEN ESTEY
Chief, FI/INT/RE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Cryptonym	Div.	Station
LIFEAT	WH	Mexico City

Type of Project

Provides Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for 11 years.

Case Officer	Ext.	Room & Bldg
Lee G. Norris	5940	3 B 0003 Hq

Project Evaluation

New	x Renewal (No. of Yrs. old)	
Amendment Extension	Approval Period	
	From	To
	1 July 1962	30 June 1963

Comments and Recommendations

KUDESK/ICG concurs in the recommendation that the LIFEAT Project renewal request be approved.

Date of Evaluation	Signature of CI/ICG Reviewing Officer	Signature of Chief, CI/ICG
13 July 1962	Wade E. Thomas	L Metzl by [illegible]

Form 1490

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION		X	FI
			CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: WH Division	
	AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1963	BRANCH: WH/3	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Lee G. Norris	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO: 3 B 0003 · BUILDING: Hq	EXTENSION: 5940

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM (AS ATTACHED) YES	NO	DATE
CWH/3/Mexico	John M. Whitten					
CWH/3	Ned P. Holman NHolman	19 JUN 1962				
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter Robert D Carter	21 JUN 1962				
WH/PO/A	Clark V. Simmons by	26 June 1962				
C/WHD for	J. C. King	26 June 1962				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1962	30 June 1963	$ 99,000.00	19	$
			1963	$ 99,000.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG		

FORM 8-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~SECRET~~

19 June 1963

LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

1. It is requested that the attached LIFEAT Renewal Request be approved for the period of 1 July 1962 through 30 June 1963 in the amount of $99,000.00, all of which falls within FY 1963. $99,000.00 was programmed for FY 1963 in the WHD allocation.

2. This Project provides the Mexico City Station with a unilateral telephone tap operation which has been in existence for the past 11 years.

3. While the primary object of this Project is not the production of positive intelligence, it was in whole or in part the source of 30 positive information disseminations. In addition to this production and support of other Station operations, it provides ODENVY with information concerning the American Communist Group in Mexico.

4. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this Project since it is believed the operation would cease in case a situation should arise where they would be applicable.

5. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated during the renewal period.

6. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the attached field request. WH Division has cut the field request from $102,193.00 to $99,000.00.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT
G-E-53

EXTENSION

NO. 73-175/77 Bx: 30

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1/FI 3E05				Please attach Basic to the attached doc - Basic is still classified to file # 50-6-32/1 per IP/files -
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11. RETURN TO: IP/ARD/RETIRED PROJECTS UNIT				per our memo - we have retired volumes dating back thru 60-61 so we don't have the document here. WH/1/FI (our files date back to 1969)
12. G-E-53 ATTN: Dale				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

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PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Coverage

As noted in last year's Project LIFEAT renewal request, LIFEAT coverage of the official Soviet installation was discontinued on 22 June 1960 when the parallel liaison project LIENVOY assumed coverage of this target. In early January 1962 LIFEAT undertook coverage of the home phones of three of the most active Soviet Intelligence officers. This was in response to the continuing Station CI program which includes the monitoring of Soviet contacts, and the guidance received from KUDESK Staff at the time of the last LIFEAT renewal. As of this date, this coverage has not been active for sufficient time to fully evaluate its usefulness. However, it is believed that such coverage has the potential to add materially to the Station's effort in the CI field. Although not designed to provide positive intelligence, some by-product of this type has been obtained. Samples are as follows:

HMM-6364, 8 May 1962 (Briefing of Mexican Pro-Marxist Journalist by Soviet Embassy)
HMM-6382, 15 May 1962 (Mexican Traveller to the USSR)
HMM-6376, 11 May 1962 (Refutation of Rumors that Soviet Cosmonaut TITOV will visit Mexico)

B. Polish Embassy

LIFEAT has remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target. The information provided to the interested Case Officer has in the past been described as "unique" and "invaluable". This description holds with equal emphasis for the present as well as the past. Selective examples of the valuable positive intelligence product of this coverage are:

HMMA-17448, 28 July 1961 (Henryk POTASZ)
HMMA-17647, (LIFEAT/LAURICLE), 25 August 1961
HMMA-17694, 1 September 1961 (Irena Halina ZORAWSKA)
HMMA-17876, 29 September 1961 (Movement of Polish Nationals)

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- HMMA-18058, 27 October 1961 (Satellite Trade in Mexico)
- HMMA-18074, 31 October 1961 (Activities of Polish Embassies in Mexico and Brazil)
- HMMA-18913, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugenlusz SKOTNICKI)
- HMMA-18915, 27 April 1962 (RYBAT/Eugenlusz SKOTNICKI)
- HMM-5743, 7 July 1961 (Possible Purchase of Ships from Poland)
- HMM-5894, 14 September 1961 (Trade Between Mexico and Poland)
- HMM-5921, 26 September 1961 (Polish Plans to Buy Zinc from Mexico)

C. Cuban Coverage

LIFEAT was able to provide coverage of major firms dealing in U.S. goods transshipment via Mexico to Cuba. This technical operation not only provided initial leads which alerted the Station to these companies, but also was able to provide continuing information on the daily activities of the companies involved. Coverage of certain Cuban personages arranging for illegal transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba was also provided including their contacts and general activities. Samples of the positive intelligence production from this Cuban commercial coverage are as follows:

- HMMA-18073, 31 October 1961 (Ruben SAUREZ Y Alvarez, Representative in Mexico of the Cuban Bank of Foreign Commerce)
- HMMA-18538, 2 February 1962 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
- HMM-5883, 26 September 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities)
- HMM-5915, 22 September 1961 (Transcontinental, S.A.)
- HMM-6012, 14 November 1961 (Mexican Firm Shipping U.S. Goods to Cuba)
- HMM-6220, 27 February 1962 (Lorenzo L. SAUNDERS, Vice President of Transcontinental, S.A.)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the raw take has been partially processed by them. During the period July 1961 through May 1962, approximately 680 reels of take were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and general activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM).

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Typical examples of the reporting based on LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM are:

HMMA-17318, 3 July 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17388, 14 July 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER, Maria WICHER)
HMMA-17389, 14 July 1961 (Carl SEBORER)
HMMA-17419, 21 July 1961 (Clarina OVERGAARD, Anders OVERGAARD)
HMMA-17455, 25 July 1961 (Dalton TRUMBO, Cleo TRUMBO)
HMMA-17611, 18 August 1961 (Noah SEBORER/Albert MALTZ/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-17760, 12 September 1961 (Maurice ZEITLIN)
HMMA-17806, 19 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-17855, 26 September 1961 (U.S. Citizens Travel to Cuba)
HMMA-17860, 29 September 1961 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-18097, 3 November 1961 (Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18492, 23 January 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)
HMMA-18827, 10 April 1962 (Albert MALTZ/Noah SEBORER/ Charles SMALL)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico, which information is of the greatest value to the Station and not available from other sources. The emphasis of the LIFEAT effort in this area has been directed toward coverage of Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, and more recently Spanish Republican exiles. The product has been most rewarding in this coverage. Examples of productivity in this past project year:

HMMA-17489, 4 August 1961 (Alejandro GALINDO)
HMMA-18420, 5 January 1962 (Teodora MARTEN Rodriguez)
HMMA-18468, 16 January 1962 (Travel of Salvadorans to Cuba)
HMM-5920, 26 September 1961 (Activities of Nicaraguan Exiles in Mexico)
HMM-6142, 18 January 1962 (Plans of Guatemalan Army Officers to Attempt Coup)
HMM-6191, 17 February 1962 (Guatemalan Revolutionary Activity)
HMM-6230, 2 March 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo in Mexico City)
HMM-6292, 2 April 1962 (Return to El Salvador of Colonel Oscar OSORIO)
HMM-6311, 13 April 1962 (Contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo)

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HMM-6344, 1 May 1962 (Activities of Spanish Republicans in Exile)
HMM-6349, 4 May 1962 (Views of Juan Jose AREVALO on Peruvian Presidential Candidate)
HMM-6359, 4 May 1962 (Contact Between Claudio SANCHEZ de Albornoz, President of the Council of Spanish Republic, and Juan Simeon VIDARTE, Spanish Exile in Mexico)
HMM-6379, 11 May 1962 (Opinion of Spanish Republican Exiles on Current Strikes in Spain)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

By its latest Related Mission Directive, Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continue to lie in the field of CI/CE matters. LIFEAT was able to provide a valuable contribution in the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. Coverage included that on Carlos Humberto ILLESCAS, who is acting in a covert liaison capacity between the CP and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Besides the continuing operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided:

HMM-5742, 7 July 1961 (Travel of Mexican Leftists Behind Iron Curtain)
HMM-5836, 18 August 1961 (Activities of Mexican Student of the University of Peoples' Friendship)
HMM-5977, 24 October 1961 (Interview of Prominent Marxist with Polish Conselor)
HMM-6322, 20 April 1962 (Contacts between Carlos FUENTES Macias, Mexican Communist Writer, and Polish Diplomats)
HMM-6337, 27 April 1962 (Activities of Ernesto AYALA Mercado, Bolivian Ambassador to Mexico)
HMM-6377, 11 May 1962 (Scholarship for Study in Warsaw to Jorge TAMAYO, Jr., Mexican Marxist Intellectual)

G. Operational Support and Leads Provided other Station Operations

During the past project year LIFEAT continued actively supporting Mexico City Station through production of leads unobtainable through other assets and generally providing other Station operations the secure support only available through a unilateral telephone tap operation. The following is a selected list, together with a brief description, of major contributions of operational support and leads provided through LIFEAT:

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LIFEAT/Cuban: The most noteworthy LIFEAT contribution to Station efforts in the Cuban operations field was that of providing leads pinpointing the activities of Transcontinental, S.A. in the illegal transshipment of U.S. materials to Cuba via Mexico. LIFEAT was able to continue coverage of the activities of this company despite the efforts of the company to lose itself in the Mexican business community by changing the name it operated under to Inversiones Mexicanas, S.A. and changing its location and telephone number. Valuable information on the commercial commodities needed by the Castro regime, methods and contacts used in their procurement, and information on the contacts of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico were obtained.

LIFEAT/Czechoslovakian: LIFEAT coverage of the home phones of two Czech intelligence officers provided some leads to their contacts, but more importantly, provided greater security to KUBARK when one of their CIS officers, Miloslav CECH, was singled out for a defection attempt. Through LIFEAT "livemonitoring" of both the original and followup defection attempts, the KUBARK assets were provided maximum protection from possible attempts by CECH to alert his coworkers or arrange entrapment of the KUBARK personnel involved.

LIFEAT/Polish: Probably the most "classic" example of the use of a telephone tap in providing a lead which could develop into a vital penetration of the Polish intelligence occurred recently in the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT provided the initial leads which made the Station aware of the possibilities of an operation and has continued to provide vital information for Station's development of the operation. It is the Station's opinion that this one instance of service by LIFEAT was well worth the cost of the entire project for the year. (Full information forwarded in MEXI 0462 and MEXI 0463). Also of great interest to the Station were the LIFEAT provided leads which revealed Jan SLUSARZ, Attache of the Polish Embassy in Mexico, had purchased an automobile which had been stolen in the U.S. and driven to Mexico. In this operation, in which a defection attempt was considered, LIFEAT provided not only the initial leads, but also daily operational information vital to the Station's efforts in this case.

LIFEAT/Yugoslavian: In this coverage of the Yugoslavian Embassy LIFEAT is providing the basic data necessary in establishing operations against this target. Since the Station is expanding its coverage of Yugoslavian activities, much vital data on personalities, contacts, and services obtained by the target establishment must be provided. It is this exact type of coverage that LIFEAT is geared to provide in addition to the operational leads which will be forthcoming as this coverage progresses. The interested case officer, noting LIFEAT is his only present source of information, feels the take which LIFEAT provides and will

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continue to provide in this area is vital and basic to the mounting of any operations against the Yugoslav target.

LIFEAT/Soviet/Double Agent: LIFEAT support has provided needed supporting information in backing Station double agent operations. In this area the success of the operation is obviously dependent upon the veracity of the agent. LIFEAT provides information which enables the interested case officer to determine the veracity of the agent involved. LIFEAT also provides a needed check upon the activities of the double agent.

LIFEAT/Spanish Republican: LIFEAT coverage of Spanish Republican exiles in Mexico City have enabled the Station to monitor the activities of the various groupings of the exiles, including the projected attempt on the life of the senior ODACID official in Mexico. LIFEAT has covered personalities of exile factions both involved in planning this attempt and those opposed to it. Coverage of targets in this area also enables the Station to keep abreast of the plans and activities of the various groups which make up the Spanish Republican exile community in Mexico City.

LIFEAT/CI-CE Coverage: LIFEAT leads in this area are exploited in the reporting of travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba and Iron Curtain countries, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and Leftists, to Cuba. Through coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) LIFEAT has provided ODENVY with an increasing amount of information on the leftist activities of relatives and friends of the ACGM who reside in the U.S. One of the noteable items in this regard is providing data on the overt and covert efforts of the blacklisted "Hollywood Ten" to regain their former status in the U.S. film industry.

Finally, and certainly not of least importance, Station security has been enhanced through LIFEAT periodic coverage of former Station assets, like LIVESTOCK-1 and LIVESTOCK-2, who could be a danger to particular Station operations or personnel. Monitoring of certain terminated agents is considered especially valuable where these agents were involved in the more sensitive operations.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information and leads, and the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest

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to the liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. As it has been noted in the past, that even with the Station's envolvement in the parallel, but liaison, LIENVOY operation, a change in attitude by the present local government administration or a change in government administrations could end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason, LIFEAT, in addition to maintaining its present heavy coverage, must be available to once again undertake coverage of the official Soviet and Czech official targets in Mexico City. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward supporting Station operations and CI/CE mission rather than toward targets which would provide positive intelligence, leaves it readily available for recall into the Soviet-Czech coverage. It is the Station's firm opinion that the LIFEAT project provides a substantial and vital contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a list of the HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1961 through May 1962 as a by-product of the project's prime responsibility of providing support to Station operations.

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 14,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1961 through May 1962. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered per month being 20, with a high in March 1962 of 28 lines covered.

III. Planning for the Future

As was indicated at the time of the last project renewal, LIFEAT hopes to remain uncommitted to coverages that require the expenditure of a great portion of LIFEAT resources but provide coverage of but one target...such as Soviet Embassy coverage. It is added emphatically, however, that should the need arise for LIFEAT to again assume such responsibilities, it is fully able to do so. Until such time LIFEAT will continue to enjoy greater flexibility in the employment of its assets, especially in the areas in which the Station does not wish to reveal its interest or operations to the liaison forces involved in the LIENVOY operation.

As to particular areas of operations, the Station has hopes of employing LIFEAT assets in "hot mike operations which require access to telephone

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centrals and cables. The feasibility of using LIFEAT in this type of operation has already been proven, in a recent operation with the LIERODE installation as a target. Seven reels of "hot mike" take were obtained in test runs on checking both the operation (including installation of the "miked" instrument in the office of the head of the LIERODE official installation) and the equipment which was of radical design and conceived and built by the KURIOT technician assigned to Mexico City Station under deep cover. Unfortunately, before continuous operation could get underway, the LIERODE installation decided upon complete renovation of its telephone system, including the installation of a switchboard. This, at least temporarily, precludes further operation against this particular target, unless a direct line is installed there. However, it is the intention of the Station to attempt coverage of other targets of interest. In these plans LIFEAT plays the key role in installation, line and series cross maintenance, basehouse procurement and maintenance, and processing of take. From the brief test runs via the LIERODE operation noted above, it is believed that "hot mike" operations, supported and maintained by LIFEAT, can greatly aid the Station in its coverage of responsibilities under its present Related Mission Directive.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted 8 September 1961 for FY 1962 in the amount of $98,973.00. The proposed budget for FY 1963 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline Renewal Request, Part II, and totals ~~$102,168.00.~~ ~~98,993.00~~ 94,000.00

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individuals contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

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Even now with the shift of operational emphasis to Station operations support, it is thought significant to include a list of HMM's produced through April 1962 (10 months of the project year) as a by-product in the LIFEAT operation.

HMM 5742
HMM 5743
HMM 5836
HMM 5883
HMM 5894
HMM 5915
HMM 5920
HMM 5921
HMM 5960
HMM 5975
HMM 5977
HMM 5985
HMM 5987
HMM 6012
HMM 6015
HMM 6142
HMM 6162
HMM 6191

HMM 6220
HMM 6230
HMM 6266
HMM 6292
HMM 6311
HMM 6322
HMM 6337
HMM 6340
HMM 6344
HMM 6349
HMM 6359
HMM 6364
HMM 6376
HMM 6377
HMM 6379
HMM 6382
HMM 6390

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PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. Area of Operations

This operation is run from Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located within Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, LIFEAT stresses flexibility of coverage with support of Station operations and CI/CE coverage receiving the greatest emphasis.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originated on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of a single tap and has grown in the past eleven years to coverage of as many as thirty lines in a given month.

The LIFEAT Project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK contract employees with the majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eleven years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 83,500 (estimate) pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet-Satellite Bloc and more recently with the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of the exile groups and local Communists.

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With the LIENVOY's assumption of coverage of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian official installations in July 1960, LIFEAT assets were released from continuous coverage of these two targets. These assets were then employed in direct support of Station operations--a role ideally suited for a unilateral operation such as LIFEAT, and extremely important to the security and success of Station operations. LIFEAT, after spending much of Project Year 1961 - 1962 programing to this new role and redirecting its assets, has now adjusted to this role and is fully employed in this vital assignment.

4. References

a. HMMA-17199, 12 June 1961 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1962)
b. HMMW-10085, 14 September 1961 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1962)

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information of the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

c. To support specific Station operations, especially in the recruitment, defection, Communist Party penetration and counter-intelligence fields.

d. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

e. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

f. To collect information on exile groups and individuals active in Mexico.

g. To provide coverage of targets of opportunity in Mexico City in support of Station objectives and Headquarters' requests.

6. Targets

For objectives a and b:

a. Selected Soviet intelligence officers home phones.

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b. Selected Satellite officials office and home phones.

c. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

For objective c:

d. Selected telephones as requested by Station Case Officers in support of their going and/or projected operations.

For objective d:

e. Telephone conversations from residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

For objective e:

f. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective f:

g. Telephone conversations from the residences or offices of prominent exile leaders or their contacts in Mexico City.

For objective g:

h. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all matters pertaining to the operational management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of special operational phases of LIFEAT coverages.

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d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operations.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project - LIENVOY, is closely coordinated between the responsible Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, thereby assuring that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation.

9. Personnel

a. Career and Contract Agents

(1) David M. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.
(2) Wayne C. DRABAND (201-255095), outside assistant to David M. WILSTED. DRABAND was introduced into the LIFEAT operation in November 1961 as a replacement for Ralph B. RAFANELLI who was transferred from Mexico PCS in the fall of 1961. His OA was amended 14 November 1961 to cover his use in the LIFEAT Project. Although DRABAND possessed only limited knowledge of clandestine activity when first employed, under WILSTED's instruction and Case Officer guidance, plus his own willingness and capacity for work, it appears he will prove a valuable addition to the LIFEAT complex.

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(3) LIEMBRACE-8 (201-111616) has been introduced to the LIFEAT operation as a standby technician backup to WILSTED, but will be actively employed in the operation only in the event of WILSTED's prolonged absence or incapacity. If and when such action is necessary, LIEMBRACE will then be carried under Project LIFEAT. LIEMBRACE-8's OA was amended to reflect this assignment on 7 April 1962.

(4) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT processor/translator and former basehousekeeper who can be temporarily reassigned basehousekeeping duties.

(5) Olga A. PARFINIK (201-117978), LIFEAT processor/translator. OA for LIFEAT employment dated 28 September 1954.

b. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)
(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951 (201-117971)
(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)
(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)
(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)
(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)
(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)
(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)
(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)
(10) LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)
(11) LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)
(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)
(13) LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)
(14) LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)
(15) LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)
(16) LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)
(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)
(18) LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)
(19) LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)
(20) LIFEUD-22, (formerly LILILLY-1), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962 (201-288248)
(21) LIFEUD-23, (formerly LILILLY-2), amendment of OA requested 24 April 1962, (201-305604)

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c. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), staff agent, was reassigned PCS after completing his second tour in Mexico on 8 October 1961.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), LIFEAT processor, has given notice that due to her planned return to the United States for necessary eye surgery during June 1962, her employment with LIFEAT must be terminated. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement have been executed.

(3) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), employed by LIFEAT only for standby support during the past year and one half, now is employed for support and clerical work for MKCHARITY.

(4) LIFEUD-20, (formerly LIMITATION-5), (201-102308), and LIFEUD-21, formerly LIMITATION-6 (201-117981) will be terminated as of the end of the present LIFEAT project year (30 June 1962). Plans for use of this couple as basehousekeepers were cancelled when LIFEUD-22 and LIFEUD-23, who are more desirable choices, became available for LIFEAT use. Termination has been discussed fully with these indigenous agents, and termination arrangements were accomplished on a friendly and mutually agreeable basis (as in all LIFEAT terminations, separation is made on the basis of Mexican custom and/or law).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of personnel who have been previously employed in the LIFEAT operation. With the new agents employed since the last project renewal, cover is as follows:

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a. Wayne C. DRABAND has natural cover of a retired U.S. civil servant presently in Mexico with his wife, an employee of a U.S. government agency.

b. LIEMBRACE-8 has natural cover of a retired U.S. businessman of many years residence in Mexico City.

c. LIFEUD-22 has natural cover of a Cuban exile employed by a Mexican firm in Mexico City. He works regular hours at his cover employment and partakes in LIFEAT activities before and after work and during lunch hours.

d. LIFEUD-23, the mother of LIFEUD-22, has natural cover of housekeeper for her son and performs her LIFEAT duties only in their home.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officer and the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. Entrance to the basehouses by other than the basehousekeepers is made only on the basis of strict necessity; such as need for equipment repair, installation for new line coverages, or line coverage cut off.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents. Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

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13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Security

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. In contrast to previous years, there was no instance of telephone work crews approaching a basehouse to check or remove the tap lines running to that basehouse. Some of the "crosses" made in the telephone centrals have been removed by the central's workmen, but these are of no danger to the operation unless a full investigation is made of one of these unusual connections. During the past project years no such investigation has been undertaken, and no suspicion of the LIFEAT linemen has been revealed to date.

As for the past few years the telephone company is continuing its efforts toward modernization of the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off of the unused overhead "dead lines" and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will continue to cause security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that these problems are not insurmountable. To meet this challange to LIFEAT security and to prepare for the day when access to telephone distribution lines is further reduced by their placement in underground cables, LIFEAT has recently succeeded in having one of its linemen (LIFEUD-2) selected to attend a four month special course in cable work. When he completes this course (in July 1962), LIFEUD-2 will have working access to all cableways and cable termination boards in Mexico City. This access will be invaluable from both the present security and operational standpoints as well as for the future when LIFEAT will be forced to tap directly from the underground telephone cables. As a standard procedure the LIFEAT personnel continuously work to devise new methods to increase security, as well as train in security procedures, so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. Training

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for the experienced personnel are handled primarily by the "outside" case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

[redacted]

16. Equipment and Support

As noted in last year's renewal request, LIFEAT equipment is generally old and much of it is now obsolete. With funds provided in last year's renewal, LIFEAT (within the past month) has begun to acquire some new equipment, particularly audio recorders. A review of the equipment situation in the LIFEAT setup has convinced both WILSTED and the responsible Case Officer that a near-complete modernization program of the equipment used in LIFEAT must be undertaken during the coming project year. The local KURIOT technician has on a number of ocassions expressed his amazement at the superior product produced by LIFEAT with the outmoded and ancient equipment (in terms of use hours) which the LIFEAT complex had to rely on. Therefore, with the funds requested in Part II of this renewal request, LIFEAT should be completely equipped with adequate gear, particularly audio and dial tape recorders, by the expiration of FY 1963. Admittedly, there is involved large, one-time expenses in complete replacement of such expensive items during a single project year. However, it is a necessary move, due entirely to great wear borne by the equipment. This wear is now causing such a rash of breakdowns that the outside principal agent must spend a disproportionate amount of his time in maintenance work.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and as a vital Station operational support asset, it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

/

[redacted]

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 196~~2~~3. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($US 1.00 equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Changes in estimated costs for particular items will be noted. These reflect not only the continued inflationary trend in the Mexican economy, but also the shift in operational emphasis from prime coverage of Soviet/Satellite activities to support of Station operations. In this latter case particular line coverage is of shorter duration, causing greater expense in installation and removal of tap lines and crosses. In the agent salary category total expense in contract agent salaries has been reduced somewhat, due primarily to dropping certain contract agents, while expenses for field agent category has risen, due to the granting during past project year of long overdue salary raises to all but three LIFEAT field agents.

a. Salaries

(1) Career and contract agents

David M. WILSTED (GS-12 equivalent) no expenses included in Project LIFEAT as he is supported entirely by Project LINOG		
Wayne C. DRABAND	$ 5,300	
LIEMBRACE-8 (since this agent is not used actively in LIFEAT, and is carried only as standby technician while employed under MKCHARITY he will continue to be funded out of other appropriate project.)		
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,400	
Olga A. PARFINIK	4,500	
Replacement for Olivia N. GLADMON	3,600	
		$18,800

(2) Field Agents

LIFEUD-1	5,860
LIFEUD-2	2,750
LIFEUD-3	1,960

[redacted]

LIFEUD-4	2,115	
LIFEUD-5	3,650	
LIFEUD-6	3,500	
LIFEUD-7	2,640	
LIFEUD-8	2,785	
LIFEUD-9	2,115	
LIFEUD-10 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-11 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-12 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-13 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-14	3,650	
LIFEUD-15	845	
LIFEUD-16	1,585	
LIFEUD-17 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-18 (no salary)		
LIFEUD-19	1,500	
LIFEUD-22	2,400	
LIFEUD-23	1,800	
LIFEUD-1's assistant	160	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay) and gifts where necessary	4,100	
		$43,415

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX III	2,688	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,500	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3.072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX to replace ANNEX I	2,000	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary rental increase when lease renewed	1,200	
		$20,828
e. Purchase of new recorders and dial tape recorder for necessary replacement/modernization	12,250	

ENCL -1- HMMA-19129

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f. Local purchase of replacement parts, wire, expendable supplies (as paper, paper tape, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons, wrapping paper, manila envelopes) and emergency and special equipment	800	$13,050
g. Transportation		
QP car used by DRABAND	500	
LIFEUD-7, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-8, car rent	500	
LIFEUD-14, car rent	300	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	300	
		$ 2,100
h. Miscellaneous ops expenses (Included loss of rent deposits, fund for medical expenses and/or fatalities, termination payments *, bribes, expenses involved in moving and setting up basehouses, and expenses of covering targets of opportunity.)	~~4,000~~ ~~800.00~~ 807.00	
GRAND TOTAL		~~$102,193~~ ~~98,993~~ 99,001.00

NOTE: Station programed LIFEAT at $US 105,948 for FY 1963.

* All terminations of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of the termination.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-10085, 14 Sept 1961

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1962. Please forward renewal request to arrive in Headquarters no later than 1 June.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
  2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED 3 April 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 6 - APR 1962
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-10563
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/1

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono	
RID/AN	
[illegible]	
WH/3M	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	Sara Prosser	nr	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	4 APR 1962	J. C. KING

10563

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information only

REFERENCE : HMM-A-17199, 12 June 1961

1. The LIFEAT Project was renewed on 8 September 1961.

2. LIFEAT Project was approved for $98,973. Please note that this means a cut of $12,700 from the Station's original request for $111,673. The cut at Headquarters was made for several reasons: 1) to fall within the approved programed figure of $99,000; 2) during FY 1961 only approximately $81,000 was obligated and since no expansion was planned, an increase of almost $30,000 could not be justified; 3) to keep the approving authority within KUDOVE.

The cuts were made in the following places:

	Station request	Approved
Equipment:		
Local purchase	$ 2,500	$1,800
New equipment	4,500	2,500
Other Ops expenses	15,000	5,000

3. KUTUBE and KUDESK Staffs concurred in recommending renewal. KUTUBE/D remarked that the project included coverage of highly selective KUTUBE/D interests through technical means and stated that the project provided several items of operational interest not otherwise obtainable, as well as operational leads and background data useful in target assessment. KUDESK Staff reiterated that coverage should continue to be given to carefully selected known or suspect Soviet/Satellite agents in support of the Station's intensified KUDESK type program.

END OF DISPATCH

DATE TYPED
14 Sept. 1961

DATE DISPATCHED

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-W-10085

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono

D. K.

WH/3/Mexico

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C. L. Bustos-Videla	mrd	3162

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

FORM

(40)

DISPATCH

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

PROJECT LIFEAT	☐ CA ☒ FI/CI	☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDY ☒ DIRECT

ACTION		AREA
	NEW PROJECT	DIVISION WH
	AMENDMENT	
X	RENEWAL	BRANCH WH/3
	TERMINATION	DESK Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: C. Bustos-Videla EXTENSION: 3162
	OTHER	

AUTHORIZATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY C-DD/P	TOTAL AMOUNT APPROVED $ 90,973	FY 1962	AMOUNT $90,973
		FY 196	
PERIOD OF APPROVAL FROM 1 July 1961 TO 30 June 1962	FINANCIAL CODE SYMBOL	2135-7001-5906	

CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL

SIGNATURE DDP/PG	DATE 11 SEP 1961

DISTRIBUTION

1	FINANCE DIVISION	1	~~SSA-DD/S~~	1	BUDGET DIVISION	1	OPERATING DIVISION CHIEF OF SUPPORT	1	CASE OFFICER	2	DDP/PG

FORM 5-60 849 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(5)

~~SECRET~~

PROJECT ACTION

LIFEAT

TYPE OF ACTION		
☐ NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION WHD	
☐ AMENDMENT NO	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
X RENEWAL FY 1962	BRANCH 3	DESK Mexico
☐ EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Charlotte Bustos-Videla	
☐ TERMINATION	ROOM NO 1015 BUILDING Barton Hall	EXTENSION 3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
AC/WH/3/Mexico	Steward D. Burton					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	John G. Reyn					
C/WHD	J. C. King					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 July 1961	30 June 1962	$ 98,973	1962	$ 98,973.00
			[illegible]	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
DDP/PG/FI/Proj		

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

~~SECRET~~

(5)

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1961 through 30 June 1962 for a total of $98,974. This project has been programmed for $99,000 and funds are available in WH Division for FY 1962. During the last fiscal year approximately $81,000 was obligated.

2. No training programs for any LIFEAT personnel are anticipated for the renewal period.

3. Any number of emergency conditions could be listed which might affect the smooth running of this operation. Among them would be the break in diplomatic relations or hot war between Mexico and the United States or the discovery of this unilateral asset by the Mexican Government. Emergency recontact instructions have not been established for the agents of this project since it seems likely that the operation would cease in case of such conditions and the agents would be of no further value.

4. This project was the source of 128 intelligence reports during the past year, 85 of which were disseminated. The remainder were used for Headquarters background only since the information was either partially previously reported, overt, or of no interest to customer agencies. The following evaluations were received:

"Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba" - State Department said this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and that the information was new and useful.

"Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and useful as new information. USIA commented that the same report was of major importance.

"Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes" - OSI reported that this dissemination was of little importance and that the information was already sufficiently known. ORR said that it was of moderate importance and more details were required.

"Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials" - State Department said that this report was of moderate importance and the information was new and useful. They expressed a continuing interest in this type of reporting.

"New Policy of the Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico" - ORR reported that this information was new but only of moderate importance.

5. WH Division recommends renewal of the LIFEAT Project based on the field request attached. WH Division has cut the field's original request for $111,673 to $98,974.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
[illegible]
[redacted] [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-32/1

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
12 June 1961

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE: "43 I" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
As noted

REFERENCE(S)

1. Forwarded herewith and under separate cover for Headquarters processing is the LIFEAT Project Renewal Request covering FY 1962. This consists of a comprehensive review of Project LIFEAT for the period July ~~1960~~ through June 1961, and a Project Outline divided into Parts I and II.

2. It is noted that the total of funds requested for the coming project year exceeds that granted for the past year, but it is felt that the additional funds are necessary, and realistically reflect the needs of the operation.

3. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for the period July 1961 through June 1962 in the amount of $111,673.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

9 June 1961

Attachment:
Project Renewal h/w and u/s/c

Distribution:
~~4~~ - Headquarters w/4 cys att h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

AN
AB
IN
PS
BY
DES NFD
FI
A-D

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JFK # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 2

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

50-6-32/1

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE (PARTS I AND II)

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

CASE OFFICER Edward P. Sechen
Edward P. SECHEN

ASSISTANT CASE OFFICER Jeremy Niarcos
Jeremy L. NIARCOS

STATION MEXICO CITY

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT REVIEW

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT technical surveillance of the Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone lines was discontinued on 22 June 1960 for security reasons. The withdrawal of LIFEAT from coverage of this target hinged on the 20 June 1960 suggestion by LITENSOR to Chief of Station, Mexico City, that the liaison tap operation LIENVOY undertake operations against the Soviet/Satellite targets located in Mexico City. In order not to reveal to LITENSOR that a unilateral tap operation was already providing coverage of these targets, it was necessary for the Chief of Station to agree to LIENVOY extending its coverage to include Soviet/Satellite operations. LIFEAT immediately severed its coverage of both Soviet and Polish phones so as not to jeopardize the continuing unilateral LIFEAT operation and the personnel involved therein. No security breach resulted from the switch from LIFEAT to LIENVOY coverage due largely to the thoroughness and speed of the LIFEAT personnel. LIFEAT security and compartmentation was not harmed to any degree whatever. (Note: LIFEAT again resumed coverage of the Polish Legation--now Embassy--when it developed that LIENVOY did not have the ready capacity to provide "take" from both the Czechoslovakian and Polish official installations.)

B. Polish Embassy

During the past project year, LIFEAT remained the primary source of information on this target and the only successful, continuing penetration of the target, technical or otherwise. The interested Case Officer has described the LIFEAT contribution as "unique" and "invaluable". Examples of the positive intelligence product of the LIFEAT/Polish coverage are:

HMMA-15431, 3 August 1960 (Aleksander BEKIER)
HMM-5133, 22 August 1960 (Promotion of Polish Minister in Mexico
   to Rank of Ambassador)
HMM-5144, 24 August 1960 (Polish Minister of Shipping to Attend
   Mexican Independence Celebration)
HMM-5186, 22 September 1960 (Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish
   Travel Officials)
HMMA-15696, 28 September 1960 (Jan SLUSARZ)

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

HMMA-15722, 30 September 1960 (Piotr WASILUK's Order for Tape Recorder)
HMM-5338, 9 December 1960 (Appointments to Polish Missions in Latin America)
HMMA-16255, 11 January 1961 (Gita STEN)
HMMA-16306, 20 January 1961 (EXCORN/RYBAT)
HMMA-16467, 15 February 1961 (Possible Polish Sponsored Audio Operation)

C. Cuban Embassy

The emphasis of the LIFEAT operation during the past year has been placed on coverage of Cuban official, intelligence and propaganda activities. Direct support of Station operations in the JMZIP area has rendered immeasurable assistance to the responsible Case Officers. On various occasions LIFEAT support has involved extended periods of live-monitoring target telephones, thereby providing excellent security for Station assets taking part in sensitive operations. LIFEAT/Cuban coverage has also enabled the Station officers to check the veracity and activities of various penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy, again providing increased operational security and increased exploitation of these agent assets. Although LIFEAT has been employed primarily as an operational support asset in the Cuban area, the following are examples of the valuable and abundant positive intelligence production furnished by LIFEAT:

HMM-5044, 9 July 1960 (Oil From Mexico For Cuba)
HMMA-15499, 17 August 1960 (AMSHAD-1)
HMM-5101, 10 August 1960 (Canadian Delegates to Cuban Youth Congress)
HMM-5207, 6 October 1960 (Dissension at Cuban Embassy in Mexico)
HMM-5330, 9 December 1960 (Cuban Propaganda Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5398, 4 January 1961 (Activities of Prensa Latina, Cuban News Agency)
HMM-5541, 17 March 1961 (Cuban Commercial Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5573, 7 April 1961 (Cuban Request for Mexican Co-sponsorship of UN Resolution)
HMM-5592, 19 April 1961 (Recruitment of Mexican Technicians to Work in Cuba)
HMM-5613, 28 April 1961 (Collection of Medicines for Shipment to Cuba)
HMM-5627, 3 May 1961 (Links Between Cuban Embassy and Pro-Cuba Demonstrations in Mexico City)
HMMA-17001, 12 May 1961 (Travel of U.S. Citizens to Cuba
HMM-5647, 17 May 1961 (Visit of Cuban Petroleum Technicians to Mexico)

D. American Communists in Mexico

As in the past, most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed by them. During the period July 1960 through May 1961, approximately 280 reels of raw "take" were passed to local ODENVY for their processing. The most valuable information gleaned from coverage of the targets in this field continues to deal with contacts, travel, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reporting based on the LIFEAT coverage provided in this area during the past project year:

HMMA-15467, 10 August 1960 (Travel of Noah SEBORER and Family)
HMMA-15481, 12 August 1960 (Marianne de PERALTA (nee YAMPOLSKY)
HMMA-15917, 9 November 1960 (Berthe Neham SMOLIKOFF)
HMMA-16051, 30 November 1960 (Paul STEVENSON, aka Pablo O'HIGGINS)
HMMA-16111, 9 December 1960 (Max SPARER)
HMMA-16179, 21 December 1960 (Albert MALTZ)
HMMA-16214, 30 December 1960 (Samuel J. NOVICK)
HMMA-16328, 25 January 1961 (David HALPERIN)
HMMA-16342, 25 January 1961 (Enos Regnet WICHER)
HMMA-16404, 3 February 1961, (Noah, Anna, and Robert SEBORER)
HMMA-16565, 1 March 1961 (Margaret Larkin MALTZ)
HMMA-16747, 29 March 1961 (Enos and Maria WICHER)
HMMA-16802, 7 April 1961 (Noah and Anna SEBORER)

E. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continues to provide data on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. The bulk of the LIFEAT effort in this field was directed toward the coverage of the Nicaraguan exiles, and the results were most rewarding in this area. Examples of productivity:

HMM-5264, 2 November 1960 (Nicaraguan Exile Activities in Mexico)
HMM-5197, 27 November 1960 (Edelberto TORREZ Espinoza)
HMM-5275, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Honduran Leonel Roberto SAVILLON to Cuba)
HMM-5376, 30 December 1960 (Travel of Nicaraguan Communist)
HMM-5386, 6 January 1961 (Views of Salvadoran Ambassador on Political Situation in El Salvador)
HMM-5452, 8 February 1961 (Americans in Nicaraguan Revolutionary Movement)
HMM-5549, 24 March 1961 (Use of Cuban Embassy as Guatemalan Communist Channel for Messages to Cuba)
HMMA-17025, 17 May 1961 (Travel of Guatemalans)

F. Counter-Intelligence Information

Mexico City Station's major responsibilities continued to lie in the field of CI/CE matters during the past year, and LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution toward the attainment of the Station's objectives in this field. In particular, coverage of the following known

Communists added much to the Station's efforts: Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO; Carmen BRUFAU Civit; and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. Besides the operational support in the CI/CE field, the following informational reporting was provided by LIFEAT:

HMM-5154, 31 August 1960 (Activities of Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, Mexican Marxist Leader)
HMM-5333, 9 December 1960 (Clara Porcet de GUERRERO)
HMM-5339, 9 December 1960 (General Lazaro CARDENAS del Rio)
HMM-5533, 10 March 1961 (Activities of the Latin American Peace Conference)
HMM-5652, 19 May 1961 (Communist Support of Student Demonstration at Puebla)
HMM-5655, 19 May 1961 (Meeting of Luis MARTINEZ Menocal with Communists in Mexico)

G. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the past project year, LIFEAT continued to support Mexico City Station through the timely production of useful leads, notably in the field of Cuban operations, and provision of continuing support to other Station operations. The following is a selective list of the use made of leads provided by LIFEAT:

LIFEAT/Cuban: In this phase of the LIFEAT operation the most important operational function has been the use of LIFEAT leads in checking the veracity and activities of the KUBARK agents in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. LIFEAT live-monitoring was employed in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega to determine the success of this suspected Cuban penetration of the AMIRON program in contacting Cuban officials or pro-Cuban Mexican officials while he was held in custody by Mexican authorities and Station assets. In another case LIFEAT provided leads which enabled Station assets to monitor a clandestine meeting between a member of the Cuban Embassy staff and one Manuel ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART), a fugitive from ODYOKE and a potential CASTRO agent, and ultimately return ROJAS to ODYOKE jurisdiction. LIFEAT was also able to determine the whereabouts of another suspected CASTRO agent, Oscar RODRIGUEZ Moruna. LIFEAT leads and support provided increased security for Station assets involved during the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, CASTRO "propaganda" minister, and provided leads for KUCAGE play on the reaction to the defection within the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

LIFEAT/Polish: LIFEAT provided vital support in the BECORN recruitment attempt which increased the security of the operation and gave a quick and secure means of evaluating the chances of success of the operation. In this effort, LIFEAT support included long periods of live-monitoring three separate telephone lines. LIFEAT leads also pointed out a local cafe which is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the

Mexico City area. It has been determined through LIFEAT leads that this cafe is headquarters for a suspected Polish technical operation directed against an official U.S. installation in Mexico City. LIFEAT also provided support for a Station mounted audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. Through LIFEAT leads proper support for the operation was arranged.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was exploited in covering travel of important Communists, particularly to Cuba, and the travel of U.S. citizens, especially Communists and leftists, to Cuba. Travel plans of American Communists were provided to ODENVY well in advance of the actual travel. Activities of local Communists and their participation in demonstrations and CASTRO-support projects was shown through LIFEAT information.

H. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided other Station operations, the CI/CE information, and in particular the ability of the unilateral LIFEAT operation to cover sensitive targets without revealing Station interest to liaison forces, well justify the expenditure of funds, time, personnel, and security risk. It is to be noted that even though the Station is involved in the parallel LIENVOY liaison operation, a change in the attitude of the local government or the change in local government administration could well end KUBARK participation in that liaison project. For that reason LIFEAT must be available to resume the coverage of the Soviet/Satellite targets which it previously provided. It is recognized by the Station that the LIFEAT complex, if allowed to disintegrate, could not be readily reorganized if need for its services in the Soviet/Satellite field was required at a future date. Therefore, LIFEAT's present orientation, though toward targets of a CI/CE nature rather than for providing positive intelligence, leaves it available for instant recall into the field of Soviet/Satellite operations. Of necessity, LIFEAT operations in certain areas have been curtailed to some extent and total coverage reduced during the trial period when guide lines were being formed in relation to operating with a parallel but liaison operation (i.e., LIENVOY). However, it is the Station's opinion that even with the temporarily reduced coverage provided by LIFEAT, this project still provides a substantial and essential contribution in fulfilling the several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

I. There is attached a complete list of the [illegible] produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1960 through May 1961 (see attached page).

II. Progress of the Operation

The objectives of the LIFEAT Project are of a continuing nature and are therefore not considered for fulfillment during any given period of time. For this reason percentage figures as to completion of project objectives cannot be drawn. However, an indication of the coverage provided in working toward fulfillment of the objectives can be noted in that 12,000 pages of raw text were produced in the period July 1960 through May 1961. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the average number of lines covered being 12. Generally, this coverage can be broken down as follows:

Cuban Embassy and related lines	4	
Polish Embassy and related lines	3	
American Communists	2	
Targets of Opportunity	3	
	12	TOTAL

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion provided by Headquarters in renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1961 (FY and project year coincide), the Station is expending every effort to maintain LIFEAT as a secure, compartmented, unilateral operation even though on the presently reduced scale, so as to have readily available for service this flexible support asset with its proven capacity for coverage of almost any target in Mexico City. Also in line with Headquarters suggestion LIFEAT will attempt to increase its coverage of those individuals suspected of maintaining clandestine contact with the RIS.

In the future, the unilateral LIFEAT operation, with the removal from its responsibility the coverage of the Soviet and Czech lines, will tend to be more flexible, with greater percentage of its capacity available for shifting to new targets as they are presented, and able to adjust readily to new situations. It is noted that this may result in a lower quantity of positive intelligence production, but will increase the CI/CE production which has always been basic to the LIFEAT project.

IV. Performance of Agents

The overall performance of all agents employed in the LIFEAT complex continued to be good during the period of the project review, with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not solved by the personnel involved. Since the success of the LIFEAT operation depends largely upon the security of its personnel, Headquarters clearances and evaluation of new personnel will continue to be sought on those new additions who pass a strict field assessment.

V. Expenditures

Approval for renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted in August 1960 for the FY 1961 in the amount of $98,901.00. The proposed budget for FY 1962 is broken down in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II, and totals $98,973.00.

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those noted in the project outline submitted herewith and in the individual contracts and oral agreements (memoranda of oral agreements were forwarded as necessary) of the various LIFEAT personnel.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

The following is a complete list of the 118 HBMs which were based wholly or in part on LIMEAT supplied material during the period July 1960 through May 1961. This represents a 21% increase over the same period of last project year. However, with LIMEAT termination of Soviet and Czech coverage, a drop in the total HBM production can be expected during the coming project year.

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~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This operation is run from the Mexico City Station and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to provide, unilaterally, daily information on the activities of official foreign installations in Mexico and the personnel thereof, as well as coverage of the activities of selected individuals and groups in response to both Station needs and Headquarters requests. Presently, coverage of the official Cuban and Polish installations have top priority in the LIFEAT operation.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations under this authority occurred on 18 January 1951, and the operation has run continuously from that date. The project was opened with the installation of one tap and has grown in the past ten years to continuous coverage of from 12 to 20 lines.

The LIFEAT project is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with the greater majority of personnel being indigenous controlled agents.

During the past ten years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 76,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's specific objectives, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc and more recently with the activities of the Cuban representatives in Mexico. In addition, LIFEAT has been of considerable value in monitoring the activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), as well as the activities of exile groups and local Communists.

4. References

a. HMMA-15252, dated 29 June 1960 (LIFEAT Renewal Request for FY 1961)

b. HMMW-9086, dated 8 September 1960 (Approval of LIFEAT Renewal for FY 1961)

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

5. Objectives

a. To identify Satellite intelligence personnel in Mexico and to provide information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on the Satellite officials both as to their activities as well as information of biographic nature.

c. To identify Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico as well as determine the activities of Cuban officials which are inimical to the interests of the U.S.

d. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide daily coverage of their activities.

e. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexican, active in Mexico, and to identify them and their associates and activities.

g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

For objectives a and b:

a. Selected Satellite officials' office and home phones.

b. Selected private phones being used by known and suspected Satellite intelligence personnel.

For objectives c and d:

c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy, including long distance calls from Havana, as well as selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

For objective e:

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and pro-Communists.

For objective f:

e. Telephone conversations from residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective g:

f. Telephone conversations originating from residences or offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective h:

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward F. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT personnel; staff, contract and indigenous.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases of LIFEAT coverages in the field of Polish, Cuban, and American Communists operations.

d. Coordinate information received from the LIFEAT coverage with other Station operations, and coordinate as necessary with the Station personnel responsible for the parallel LIENVOY operation.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over warehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station operational support asset, is closely coordinated with other operations of the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other geographical area, but they are advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principal "outside" Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. Coordination with the parallel, but liaison project, LIENVOY is closely organized within the Station in two fields: (1) the daily checking between Case Officers of both projects, particularly relating to the division of coverage between the two operations, to assure that the unilateral LIFEAT operation will not be endangered by the indigenous personnel of the LIENVOY operation; and, (2) the daily processing of LIENVOY/Soviet "take" by the LIFEAT processor and basehousekeeper Carol K. ZINSMEISTER. The Station believes this latter point does not "cross" operations unnecessarily since ZINSMEISTER's long and discrete service within the LIFEAT complex gives her both the sense of security and the background necessary for secure processing of the Soviet "take". (Note: The processed Soviet material is not returned to the liaison forces after receipt from ZINSMEISTER, but is returned to the Station where it is summarized by Station personnel and then passed to liaison as having come from KUBARK Headquarters.) ZINSMEISTER is equally valuable, and indeed essential, in her LIFEAT basehousekeeper assignement because of her experience in dealing with the security problems arising from conducting a technical basehouse, as well as her ideal natural cover as wife of one of Mexico's foremost medical doctors.

9. Personnel

a. Staff agents

Ralph B. RAFANELLI (201-176295), who for the past four years has functioned as the assistant to the "outside" Case Officer for the LIFEAT operation, completes his second tour in June 1961 and will return to Headquarters PCS during the fall or early winter of 1961. It is planned to replace him with a locally recruited person, ODYOKE citizen if possible, who possesses natural commercial cover. Several candidates are presently being considered for this position. As soon as the Station is able to determine the best qualified individual, full PRQ I and II and clearance request will be forwarded for Headquarters processing.

b. Contract Agents/Employees

(1) David H. WILSTED (201-009195), principal "outside" Case Officer.

(2) Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751), processes tapes and performs clerical duties.

(3) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968), LIFEAT basehousekeeper (ANNEX IV) and processes all tapes from LIENVOY/Soviet "take".

(4) Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710), presently employed only on a standby basis for LIFEAT support.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

c. Field Agents

(1) LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950 (201-182704)

(2) LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951 (201-117970)

(3) LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953 (201-117971)

(4) LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953 (201-117743)

(5) LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953 (201-117744)

(6) LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954 (201-117978)

(7) LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954 (201-117980)

(8) LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955 (201-119521)

(9) LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956 (201-117984)

(10) LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-114085)

(11) LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595)

(12) LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113569)

(13) LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833)

(14) LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972)

(15) LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315)

(16) LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786)

(17) LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114086)

(18) LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370)

(19) LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (201-262488)

(20) LIMITATION-5, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-102308)

(21) LIMITATION-6, OA amended for LIFEAT 20 March 1961 (201-117981)

d. During the past project year the following personnel were dropped from Project LIFEAT:

(1) Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) was dropped in July 1960 when she returned to PEPRIME with her husband upon his resignation from KUBARK.

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(2) Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) is now employed exclusively as an outside contact for the Station's Satellite Case Officer and should no longer be considered as a member of the LIFEAT complex.

(3) Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) was terminated as an active agent in June 1960 at his own request and with the concurrance of the Station. Agent quit-claim and secrecy agreement were obtained. No security problems are considered likely to occur since KAWOHL's parents continue to be employed as basehousekeepers for LIFEAT and are dependent upon continued LIFEAT salary for their livelihood. At the time of the termination, it was realized that he would continue to enter the basehouse which his parents controlled, and therefore his clearance was amended to reflect this situation. (Reference: HMMA-15946).

10. Operational Clearances

See Section 9 above.

11. Cover

There are no changes in the cover of the personnel presently employed in Project LIFEAT from that noted in previous project renewals.

12. Contact and Communications

Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officers and the agents employed in the project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varying patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by Case Officers is done in cars ostensibly owned by the agents residing in those basehouses. Entrance to the basehouses on foot by other than the basehousekeepers is made only in emergency situations.

Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

Alternate and emergency communications have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from the security and utility standpoints. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of arousing the suspicions of the residents of areas in which meetings are held.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Security

During the past project year there were no incidents which were beyond the capability of the personnel immediately involved to isolate and remedy immediately. One basehouse was closed for "cooling off" after a telephone company work party came to the basehouse to check the lines running to it. This party was stalled long enough to cut back the "tap" lines at the roof level and the house cleared of all compromising equipment and material. Later the work party entered and checked the lines which proved to be "dead" lines. The extra lines were then removed and the work party left the premises and there was no further trouble. (Note: In Mexico City there is much "dead line" running throughout the city which causes no end of difficulty for the telephone company in installation and repair work. Therefore, the phone company assigns work parties to various areas to clean up the extra unused "dead lines" in order to bring a degree of organization to the telephone system. This work is now being pursued vigorously and is approaching completion in large areas of the city.) The basehouse involved in the above incident has now been moved to a different location and is back in operation.

At the present time the telephone company is making a general effort to modernize the Mexico City telephone system. This effort includes changing from overhead lines to underground cables, cleaning off the unused overhead "dead lines", and installation of new equipment throughout the city. These innovations will cause increasing security problems for the LIFEAT complex, but it is believed that the problems are not insurmountable. Part of the solution will of necessity involve the use of a greater number of basehouses to diversify the coverage and to reduce the number of lines running to any one basehouse. This will cause an increase in expense for the project, but is considered desirable and necessary. It may eventually be necessary for LIFEAT to enter the underground cables in order to provide access to selected targets and maintain the security of the basehouses. The LIFEAT personnel are continually working to devise new methods as well as maintaining training in security so as to continue the high level of security enjoyed by LIFEAT in the past.

15. Training

Initial training of new personnel and continuing refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the "outside" Case Officer, David H. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintenance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

16. Equipment and Support

As has been mentioned in last year's renewal request, much of the LIFEAT equipment, upon whose reliability the success of the information collection is based, will require replacement in the near future. The great percentage of the equipment has been in long and continuous service, while much of the special equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present diminishing commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT with the attendant large, one-time purchase expense.

17. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951, and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

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12 June 1961

PROJECT LIFEAT

PROJECT OUTLINE, PART II

18. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for Fiscal Year 1962. All figures are U.S. dollars per year ($1.00 U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos). Some increases in particular items will be noted. These reflect the increased cost of living and especially the continuing rise in rental costs in the Mexico City area, plus the necessity of moving basehouses for security reasons discussed in Part I of this Project Outline.

a. Salaries

(1) Staff and contract personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9 (for maximum of 6 months)		
Salary	$3,500	
Quarters	1,150	
Deep Cover Differential	525	
Replacement for RAFANELLI	4,000	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	5,500	
Plus 10% raise	550	
Olivia N. GLANTON	4,200	
Leona C. GANDARA	900	
		$20,325

(2) Field agents

LIFEUD-1		$5,760
LIFEUD-2		2,496
LIFEUD-3		1,776
LIFEUD-4		1,920
LIFEUD-5		3,648
LIFEUD-6		3,500
LIFEUD-7		2,400
LIFEUD-8		2,400
LIFEUD-9		1,920
LIFEUD-10	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-11	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-12	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-13	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-14		3,648
LIFEUD-15		768
LIFEUD-16		1,440
LIFEUD-17	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-18	(no salary)	
LIFEUD-19		1,200

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

LIFEUD-1's assistant	144	
LIMITATION-5	760	
LIMITATION-6	300	
Due to the continuing rise in ~~the cost of~~ living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed agents have not received the pay raise reflected in last year's project renewal, it will be manditory to grant an across the board 10% pay raise during FY 1962.	3,400	
Christmas bonus (in accordance with local customs, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary.	3,200	
		$40,680

b. Basehouse Rentals

ANNEX I (formerly LIMERICK Main Base)	$2,200	
ANNEX IV	2,760	
ANNEX VI	2,200	
ANNEX VII	1,728	
ANNEX VIII	3,072	
ANNEX IX	2,880	
ANNEX X	2,688	
ANNEX to be selected	2,500	
c. Basehouse utilities and expenses	2,000	
d. Allowance for customary (for Mexico City) 10% rental increase when lease renewed	2,000	
		$24,028

e. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$1,800	
New equipment, especially recorders and reels	2,500	
		$4,300

f. Miscellaneous

(1) Expendable supplies such as paper, carbon paper, paper tape, manila envelopes, wrapping paper,	$2,000

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

(2) Transportation

RAFANELLI's QP car	$600	
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675	
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675	
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290	
ZENSMEISTER mileage	400	
(3) Other operational expenses (covers loss of rental deposits, fatalities, medical expenses, termination payments,* expenses involved in moving and setting up base-houses, expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity)	5,000	
		$7,640
GRAND TOTAL		$98,973

* Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

	ACTION	ACTION FINISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1961. It is requested that your recommendation for renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED
18 April 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
19 APR 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-9689

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/1

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

XXX

1 - RI
1 - WH/Mexico
1 - WH/Mailroom

INITIAL

RI/FI

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	N. Walton	AC/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	18 APR 1961	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
HMM-W-9086

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
50-6-32/1

DATE
S [illegible]

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Operational
LIFEAT Project Renewal

RE "433" -- (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Per paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S)
HMM-A-15252, 29 June 1960

1. The LIFEAT Project was approved on 26 August 1960 for a total of $98,901. Headquarters reduced the original request from the field to bring the total Project budget more in line with the programmed figure of $90,000 and the actual obligations of the previous year, which were only $73,884. The following changes were made on the field's request:

	Field Request	Approved
Salaries: Ralph B. RAFANELLI (to reflect legislative pay raise)	$ 6,505.00	$6,995.00
Miscellaneous Operating Expenses	25,000.00	9,000.00

2. Staff comments on the Project renewal request were:

a) KUTUBE/OPS said that the Station is to be commended on its handling of the requested Bloc coverage by LIENVOY while maintaining LIFEAT capability and limiting coverage to those lines most profitable. KUTUBE noted the increased emphasis on exploitation of operational information. In order to continue this aspect of the operation, the Station is faced with the difficult problem of selectivity in targeting and processing take from these two large projects. Every possible effort should be made to increase the efficiency of processing to maintain LIFEAT at its present high level. In KUTUBE/OPS's opinion, LIFEAT personnel and capability must be carefully maintained in face of the easier but less secure LIENVOY.

b) KUDESK stated that this unilateral asset should be continued despite the fact that we are running a similar operation with the local government. It is hoped that the Station will soon be able to use this asset in the investigation of individuals known to be in clandestine contact with the RIS, for the purpose of determining whether or not they may be recruited.

c) KUTUBE/D notes that the project has been of high value.

3. Attached for the information of the Station is a copy of the memorandum prepared in WH to transmit the project for approval.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

CS COPY

Attachment: 1 (3 pages), KAPOK
Per paragraph 3

2 September 1960

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

Hqs Distribution:
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

WH/3/Mexi/CLZehrung:mrd

50-6-32/1

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

14-00000

Subject [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT
OPERATING DIVISION: WHD
FIELD STATION: MEXICO CITY
TARGET AREA: MEXICO CITY

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
Charlotte L. Zehrung
ROOM NO: 2121 Barton Hall
EXTENSION: 2555 or 3152
DATE: 22 July 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1960 through 30 June 1961 for a total of $98,901.00. Last fiscal year the project was approved for $123,830 of which $73,884 was obligated. The approved programmed figure was $90,000 for Fiscal Year 1961. The extra $ 9,000 required would come from the following programmed projects:

LIHUFER - $2,000
LIVERY - $1,000
LIENVOY - $6,000

2. Subsequent to the preparation by the Station of the attached Project review and renewal request for LIFEAT, the following situation developed in Mexico which has directly affected the entire LIFEAT Project. At a meeting with the Chief of Station on 25 June 1960, LITENSOR asked the Station and LIELEGANT to immediately begin covering the Soviet, Polish and Czech Embassy under LIENVOY. LITENSOR suggested that the Mexicans translate the Spanish and that the Station forward the tapes to Washington for translation of the Russian, Polish and Czech portions. The Chief of Station had no alternative but to express great interest in the coverage of targets of such importance. In order to protect the security of the LIFEAT operations, the Station stopped the LIERICK and LITHAS (LIVERY had not been in operation for the past six months for security reasons) coverage on 22 June, prior to the LIENVOY activation. It was determined that LIENVOY would cover 5 Soviet and 2 Czech lines. The take continues to be processed by LIEHFISTER and LIELIPECH. The LIENVOY monitors extract from the Spanish only the most important points for the daily resumens which are passed to LITENSOR. LIELEGANT has been told we will inform him of pertinent information obtained (ostensibly from Headquarters processing) of the Soviet and Czech text for passing to LITENSOR. LIFEAT will continue its unilateral coverage of Polish and other targets of interest.

3. The Station does not anticipate any problem connected with the exploitation of leads since LIELEGANT has evinced no interest in this matter. In view of the lack of language capabilities by the Mexicans and our ability to control what is passed (ostensibly from Headquarters), the Station sees no problems arising from the present arrangement.

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4. The Station does not intend to cut down on independent LIFEAT operations since there are plenty of targets to keep both LIENVOY and LIFEAT occupied.

5. The LIFEAT Project was the source of 99 positive intelligence reports, 72 of which were disseminated. Those not disseminated were considered by Headquarters to be of value for operational background or were outdated. IRR made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Interest in Procurement of Naphthalene from Czechoslovakia," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Commercial Activities," of value, probably true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Soviet Plans to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency," of little importance.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful as new information.

The Department of State made the following evaluations of LIFEAT reports:

"Mexican Efforts to Sell Sugar to the USSR," of value, possibly true, and of importance to receive further reports.

"Purchase of Soviet Tractors by Mexican Government," of slight value.

"Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton," of average value, useful in confirming other reports.

6. The Station used LIFEAT information in the preparation of memoranda directed to the Embassy and FBI representatives in Mexico in reply to local requests for information. During the period July 1959 through May 1960, 154 memoranda were furnished the Embassy and 69 memoranda were furnished the FBI based on LIFEAT information.

7. WH Division feels that the positive and CE information received from LIFEAT is invaluable. Most of the information is not available from other Station assets. Reports on travel and the identification of target personalities often serve to confirm information previously received. LIFEAT assets also have been used effectively to check on recently-terminated agents to ascertain that the termination was secure. LIFEAT also has been used to check on reports by double agents that they have contacted or been contacted by their respective Soviet or Satellite contacts.

8. Information received from LIERODE is passed to WH/4 and any operations undertaken on the basis of such information are closely coordinated with that Branch.

~~SECRET~~

9. Information received from the LITMUS, LIVEXI, and LIMERICK phases is supplied the EE and SR Case Officers at the Station for exploitation of leads and extracting of pertinent background information. At Headquarters there is close coordination between EE, SR and WH on the dissemination of positive reports and the operational exploitation of CE/CI leads. C/EE/C stated on 18 July 1960 that the Czech desk fully endorses the renewal of the LIFEAT Project and that they have found the information obtained from this project to be especially useful in following the movements of persons of interest and the activity and identification of target personnel. Please see attached memoranda from EE/P and SR which express their support of this project renewal.

10. Project BESMOOTH, which supports Woodrow D. CALDOT, who processes the LITMUS take, is coordinated with Project LIFEAT.

11. Emergency recontact instructions will be arranged with the agents under this project if a situation which might require such instructions threatens Mexico.

12. It is requested that the LIENVOY Project be renewed on the basis of this memorandum and the attached review and renewal request prepared by the Mexico City Station.

COORDINATION:

Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

C. W. Anderson, WHD/Proj/Officer

Approved for Transmittal: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Approved: J. C. King, Chief/WHD

Date

Attachments:
Station Project Review and Renewal Request
Folder with past renewals
Memorandum from SR Division
Memorandum from EE/C
Form 680 (in quad)
Envelope containing true name

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15252
[redacted] 1796

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/1

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 29 June 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE: 43 (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE(S):

HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959

1. There is attached a comprehensive Review of Project LIFEAT for the period July 1959 through June 1960 and a Project Outline divided into Part I and Part II for easier processing.

2. It is to be noted that the amount requested in the attached renewal request, $114,411, is $19,419 under that amount approved for Project LIFEAT for the past project year. Station Mexico feels this reduction in cost will not adversly affect the operational impact of the project.

3. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1961 in the amount of $114,411.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

23 June 1960

Attachments:
1. Odd pages (five copies) - attached herewith.
2. Even pages (five copies) - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with five copies of odd and even pages)
3 - Files (with complete project renewal request)

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FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

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PAGE NO

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PROJECT REVIEW AND PROJECT OUTLINE

PARTS I AND II

Cryptonym LIFEAT

Case Officer Edward P. SECHEN

Station MEXICO CITY

Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

Assistant Case Officer Jeremy L. NIARCOS

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PROJECT REVIEW - PROJECT LIFEAT

I. Product of the Project

A. Soviet Embassy

1) Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past project year, the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT has provided detailed and continuing reports on the increased Soviet efforts to participate in Mexican commercial markets. The following is a partial but representative list of the reports submitted on this subject.

HMM-4322, 12 June 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4567, 6 November 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.
HMM-4855, 1 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Cotton.
HMM-4857, 6 April 1960, Soviet Purchase of Mexican Pineapple.
HMM-4858, 6 April 1960, Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency.

2) Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

Project LIFEAT provided coverage of many of the Soviet Diplomatic activities in Mexico. It was able to show the relationships maintained between the Soviet and Satellite missions in Mexico, as well as the increased official contact between the Cuban and Soviet governments.

MEXI-4304, 21 August 1959, Meeting os Soviet and Cuban Ambassadors to Mexico.
HMM-4618, 20 November 1959, Increased Relations of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico with the Latin American Diplomatic Missions.
HMM-4768, 8 February 1960, Preparation of Soviet Propaganda in Mexico for Shipment to Cuba.

3) Soviet Cultural Activities:

LIFEAT has provided detailed information concerning the Soviet cultural activities in Mexico. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-4415, 5 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Soviet Exposition to Mexico.

[illegible] CS COPY ~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

HMM-4449, 28 August 1959, Soviet Plans to Bring Pyatnitskiy Chorus to Mexico from Canada.

HMMA-14677, 16 March 1960, Soviet Cultural Activities.

4) Background Information on, and Movement of, Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT information, the Station has been able to maintain a current roster of the Soviet Embassy personnel assigned to Mexico. LIFEAT has been further utilized to give information on job assignments within the Soviet Embassy, and to determine in advance departures, arrivals, and replacements of Embassy personnel. Large quantities of background personality information concerning the official and private lives of members of the Soviet staff were also provided.

HMM-4323, 11 June 1959, Scheduled Travel of Soviet Officials.
HMMA-14065, 6 November 1959, Activities of Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Ivanovich BAZYKIN.
HMMA-13614, 24 August 1959, Retirement System for Soviet Diplomats.

5) Goods and Services:

Throughout the past year, LIFEAT information has been of use to Project LIMESA. Of particular note have been leads concerning various properties in which the Soviets were interested.

6) Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associations and related activities has been reported as necessary.

B. Czech Legation*

Information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review was essentially the same as that obtained from the Soviet Embassy. Although this target was covered only from July 1959 to January 1960 (due to the security problem posed by extensive telephone company cable renovation work in the vicinity of the basehouse serving the target), valuable intelligence was gained during the period of actual coverage. Examples of reports from this source are:

HMMA-13295, 10 July 1959, Czech Legation Activities.
HMMA-13522, 14 August 1959, Czech Embassy Activities.
HMM-4513, 30 September 1959, Czech Interest in Importing Mexican Copper.
HMMA-13919, 9 October 1959, Czech Diplomatic Couriers.
HMM-4576, 6 November 1959, Czech Plans to Setup Commercial Company in the Free Zone of Curacao.

(*Czech Legation raised to Embassy status during July 1959)

C. The Polish Legation

The type of LIFEAT information gathered on the Polish Legation closely parallels that gathered from the Soviet and Czech targets. LIFEAT remains the primary source of information on this target.

HMM-4458, August 1959, Proposed Mexican Art Exhibit in Poland.
HMMA-13718, 11 September 1959, Influence of Polish Minister on Mexican U. N. Voting.
HMM-4482, September 1959, Polish Commercial Interest in Cuba.
HMM-4544, 23 October 1959, Polish Commercial Activities.
HMMA-14843, 20 April 1960, Activities of Polish Technical Investigators.
HMMA-15055, 27 May 1960, Activities of Alexander BEKIER.

D. American Communists in Mexico

Most of the targets in this group have been covered at the request of ODENVY, and the production has been partially processed by them. Approximately 370 reels were passed to ODENVY for their processing during the period June 1959 - April 1960. The most valuable type of information obtained on these targets deals with travel, contacts, and activities of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM). The following is a sample of the reports furnished through coverage of this target group.

HMMA-13792, 25 September 1959, Albert and Margaret MALTZ.
HMMA-14191, 4 December 1959, Albert MALTZ.
HMMA-14885, 27 April 1960, Maria WICHER.
HMMA-15135, 10 June 1960, Noah SEBORER.
HMMA-15144, 15 June 1960, Maria WICHER.

E. Cuban Embassy

LIFEAT has provided timely information on the activities and personalities of the Cuban Embassy. Of particular interest has been the indications provided by LIFEAT of closer relations and increasing contact between the Cuban and Soviet officials in Mexico. LIFEAT was also able to provide a firm indication of the Soviet-Cuban announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations two weeks in advance of the actual event. Examples of LIFEAT Cuban coverage are:

HMM-4489, 24 September 1959, Recall of Cuban Military Attaches in Mexico.
HMM-4649, 4 December 1959, Pro-Cuba Publication in Mexico.
HMM-4907, 27 April 1960, Projected Joint Announcement by Cuban and Soviet Governments.
HMM-4919, 29 April 1960, Travel to Cuba of Soviet Ambassador in Mexico.

F. Exile and Revolutionary Activities

LIFEAT continued to provide information on the exile and revolutionary groups active in Mexico. Coverage of the Nicaraguan Communist exiles was particularly rewarding for the operational information provided.

HMM-4317, 12 June 1959, Letter from a Guatemalan Communist Concerning the Seventh World Festival of Youth.
MEXI-4271, 13 August 1959, Travel of Nicaraguan Communists.
HMM-4450, 4 September 1959, Nicaraguan Revolutionaries' Efforts to Meet a Former President of Mexico.
MEXI-4488, October 1959, Travel of Dra. Concepcion PALACIOS Herrera, Nicaraguan Communist.
HMM-4967, 25 May 1960, Activities of Rafael RAMIREZ Delgado.

G. LAURICLE Information

During the period of the project review, LIFEAT, as in the past, continued to contribute materially to several matters of LAURICLE interest.

H. Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters continued to constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives during the review period. Project LIFEAT was able to provide a substantial contribution to the attainment of these objectives. Of particular note in this respect has been coverage provided on known Communist Party members, especially valuable being that provided on Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos.

I. Operational Leads and Support Provided Other Station Operations

During the period covered by this project review, LIFEAT continued to support the Mexico City Station through its timely production of leads which were especially useful, and in most cases essential, in assuring the success of other Station operations. The following is a list, necessarily selective, of the use made of leads from, and support of other projects rendered by Project LIFEAT.

LIFEAT/LIMERICK: 1) Of special note is the support provided to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation. Leads and information rendered by LIFEAT enabled the responsible Case Officer to prepare adequately for this recruitment attempt of an officer of the Soviet Embassy. Following the actual attempt, LIFEAT/LIMERICK was used as a security device to protect the Station assets employed in the operation. 2) As noted in I A. (5) above, Project LIMESA was provided with continuing support by Project LIFEAT. Notable among the information and leads provided were those concerning specific properties which the Soviets were interested in renting and/or buying. 3) LIFEAT has provided a check on double-agent LITARDY-1, giving verification of his activities and contacts. A similar check has also been provided on the activities of informant LIPAGAN-1.

LIFEAT/LIVERY: 1) This phase of LIFEAT closely supported the projected LITACIT physical penetration operation aimed at the LIVERY establishment in Mexico City. LIFEAT provided essential information on the rosters of night duty officers as well as background information on the target. 2) LIFEAT/LIVERY provided support for the installation of technical surveillance against LITACH. Without the information provided by LIFEAT, this operation would have been extremely hazardous at best, and probably would have been entirely impossible.

LIFEAT/LITMUS: 1) LIFEAT provided information which lead to the successful recruitment of agent BEYAN who was in a position to provide information on BESOOT. 2) LITMUS leads also lead to the attempted, but unsuccessful, recruitment of one Una WARREN, believed to have been a contact of Polish officials in Mexico. 3) LIFEAT leads also lead to the surveillance of a clandestine meeting of Alexander BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico. Due to the advance notice of the meeting given by LIFEAT, MKCHARITY was given time to plan technical coverage of the meeting and prepare especially fabricated equipment for this coverage. 4) LIFEAT was also responsible for the discovery of the location of a Polish Intelligence basehouse. This information was operationally important to the responsible Case Officer.

LIFEAT/LIERODE: In this phase of the LIFEAT project leads have been most rewarding in terms of agents actually recruited and operations supported by LIFEAT provided information. 1) LIERODE produced leads which were directly responsible for the recruitment of agents LITANGO-1 and LITAMIL-3, while providing security check and information which have increased the value of agent LITANGO. 2) The defections of LITAINT-1 and LITAG-1 were greatly aided by LIFEAT leads and information. The internal reaction to the defections in the target establishment were also readily available through LIFEAT. 3) At present LIERODE is providing coverage, both from a security and informational standpoint, of the attempt to place a recruited agent as Mexico-based advisor to a high official of the Cuban Intelligence. This operation is largely dependent upon LIFEAT leads and support for security coverage of the agent's activities. 4) LIFEAT/LIERODE has been unusually successful in providing information which has enabled the Station to identify nearly all the Cuban agents operating in Mexico. Due to the increasing importance of the Cuban target, these revelations are of utmost importance.

Coverage of a CI/CE nature was provided by LIFEAT targeted against a recruited member of the Mexican Communist Party, and has produced leads on semi-clandestine travel of party members behind the Iron Curtain, as well as providing a check on the veracity of the agent.

Project LIFEAT has been employed also in support of the highly sensitive LIEMIT operation.

J. Conclusion

It is the opinion of the Mexico City Station that the support provided to other Station operations, the CE information obtained, and the positive intelligence gathered by Project LIFEAT well justify the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of funds, personnel, time and security risk. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

K. There is attached herewith a complete list of HMMs produced from LIFEAT provided material during the period July 1959 through May 1960. (See attached sheet.)

II. Progress of the Operation

Since the Project LIFEAT objectives are unique in that they are of a continuing nature and not designed to be fulfilled within a given period, no statistics can be cited from which a percentage of coverage on each objective can be calculated. A general indication can be given of the coverage provided by the project when it is noted that approximately 15,000 pages of raw text were provided in the July 1959 to May 1960 period. LIFEAT has been in daily operation during the review period with the number of lines covered varying from 12 to 18. Generally, these can be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	5 lines	
Polish Legation and Polish Counselor	3 lines	
Czech Legation (Embassy)	2 lines	(Coverage suspended January '60 for reason given in I. B above)
American Communists	2 lines	
Cuban Embassy	3 lines	
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines	

III. Planning for the Future

Following the suggestion and guidance provided by Headquarters when renewing Project LIFEAT for FY 1960, the Station plans to limit its coverage to no more than twenty lines at any given time, with the possible exception of targets of opportunity which could be covered for short periods in addition to the normal coverage. The coverage of Soviet and Satellite installations will remain basic to LIFEAT and will be exploited to the maximum degree possible. Due to the increased importance of information on Cuban activities, coverage of the Cuban Embassy and personnel staffing the Embassy will be increased during the coming project year. Targets of Opportunity will continue to be exploited as permitted by personnel, equipment, and access limitations.

IV. Performance of Agents

The general overall performance of the agents employed under LIFEAT continued to be good with security being stressed in all phases of the operation. No security problems were encountered which were not readily solved by the personnel concerned. Since a high degree of security is required for the operation of LIFEAT, it is planned that any possible agent candidates will be thoroughly screened and Headquarters clearance obtained before they are in any way approached for operational use.

V. Expenditures During the Period Under Review

Approval for the renewal of Project LIFEAT was granted on 16 July 1959, for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960, in the amount of $123,830. ~~In its continuing attempt to provide practical economy without decreasing operational efficiency, Station Mexico submits the itemized proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1961 (contained in the attached Field Project Outline, Part II) in the amount of $114,411, a reduction of approximately $19,000 from the previous year's approved budget.~~

VI. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the project outline submitted herewith and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

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The following is a complete list of the 97 HMMs which were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT supplied material during the period July 1959 through May 1960.

HMM-4351
HMM-4355
HMM-4358
HMM-4364
HMM-4387
HMM-4388
HMM-4397
HMM-4399
HMM-4407
HMM-4415
HMM-4425
HMM-4447
HMM-4449
HMM-4450
HMM-4451
HMM-4452
HMM-4457
HMM-4458
HMM-4459
HMM-4460
HMM-4481
HMM-4482
~~HMM-4484~~
HMM-4485
HMM-4489
HMM-4493
HMM-4520
HMM-4534
HMM-4539
HMM-4550
HMM-4563
HMM-4575
HMM-4544
HMM-4567
HMM-4572
HMM-4513

HMM-4576
HMM-4582
HMM-4588
HMM-4589
HMM-4591
HMM-4613
HMM-4614
HMM-4618
HMM-4631
HMM-4636
HMM-4637
HMM-4640
HMM-4649
HMM-4667
HMM-4672
HMM-4678
HMM-4691
HMM-4703
HMM-4704
HMM-4706
HMM-4707
HMM-4710
HMM-4711
HMM-4712
HMM-4718
HMM-4724
HMM-4726
HMM-4729
HMM-4737
HMM-4742
HMM-4761
HMM-4762

HMM-4979

HMM-4768
HMM-4771
HMM-4790
HMM-4803
HMM-4836
HMM-4843
~~HMM-4849~~
HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904
HMM-4907
HMM-4918
HMM-4919
HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4958
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975

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PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT LIFEAT

PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This project is run from the Mexico City Station, and is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. **Purpose**

The purpose of this project is to determine Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, dated 20 November 1959, Priority A, Objective one.

3. **Background**

Project LIFEAT was originally approved on 3 October 1950 as a unilateral telephone tap operation. Actual initiation of operations was on 18 January 1951, and the project has run continuously from that date. The project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap, and has been expanded to the present average coverage of 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation completely independent from any liaison arrangement. It is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past nine years, Project LIFEAT has produced more than 64,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically, and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of the American Communist community residing in Mexico City as well as activities of Cubans and exiles in Mexico.

4. **References**

a. HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959, Renewal Request for FY 1960.

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b. HMMW-7955, 14 August 1959, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1960

5. **Objectives**

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information of Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information of the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect biographic information on Cuban officials assigned to Mexico and provide coverage of their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Mexican Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

g. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

h. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

i. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. **Targets** (as related to project objectives)

For objectives "a" through "d",

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.,

For objective "e",

c. Telephone conversations from the Cuban Embassy and selected telephone calls from residences of Cuban officials.

For objective "f",

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists and prominent pro-Communists.

For objective "g",

e. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists residing in Mexico City.

For objective "h",

f. Telephone conversations originating from the residences of offices of prominent exile leaders in Mexico City.

For objective "i",

g. Telephone conversations which can be monitored from targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Jeremy L. NIARCOS

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract, and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness of and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY, LIERODE, and the American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIFEAT/LIMERICK with other Station Mexico operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses, equipment, and training of personnel assigned to the LIFEAT operation.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT, primarily a Station support operation, is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area, but they are kept advised of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG which supports the principle outside LIFEAT Case Officer, David M. WILSTED, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT.

9. Personnel

a. Staff Agents:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover (201-176295)

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

1. David M. WILSTED (201-009195) - principle outside Case Officer. Career Agent
2. Alice M. CAILLETEAU (201-119967) - clerical work C-47041
3. Olivia N. GLADMON (201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work C-46946
4. Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take. C-24742
5. Wallace L. KAWOHL (201-033959) - basehouse operator C-3977
6. CSR-24 June 1958 → Leona C. GANDARA (201-225710) - LIFEAT clipping. C-61657
7. Woodrow D. GABBOTT (201-14465) - processor for LITMUS tapes under Project LESMUTH

c. Field Agents:

1. LIFEUD-1, OA granted 17 October 1950, (201-183704) C-739
2. LIFEUD-2, OA granted 14 August 1951, (201-117970) C-1412

3. LIFEUD-3, OA granted 14 December 1953, (201-117971) C-7152
4. LIFEUD-4, OA granted 1 October 1953, (201-117743) C-6970
5. LIFEUD-5, OA granted 16 December 1953, (201-117744) C-7496
6. LIFEUD-6, OA granted 28 September 1954, (201-117978) C-30465
7. LIFEUD-7, OA granted 21 October 1954, (201-117980) C-31921
8. LIFEUD-8, OA granted 31 March 1955, (201-119521) C-33172
9. LIFEUD-9, OA granted 27 April 1956, (201-117984) C-45672
10. LIFEUD-10, OA granted 13 September 1956, (201-114085) C-50464
11. LIFEUD-11, OA granted 21 August 1956 (201-113595) C-50455
12. LIFEUD-12, OA granted 6 August 1956 (201-113596) C-50157
13. LIFEUD-13, OA granted 13 September 1956 (201-115833) C-50750
14. LIFEUD-14, OA granted 26 September 1956 (201-117972) C-32015
15. LIFEUD-15, OA granted 19 January 1957 (201-126315) C-54096
16. LIFEUD-16, OA granted 2 July 1958 (201-222786) C-70322
wife of LIFEUD-14 → 17. LIFEUD-17, OA granted 13 August 1956 (201-114036) C-63107
wife of KAWCHL → 18. LIFEUD-18, OA granted 2 October 1957 (201-185370) C-50457
19. LIFEUD-19, OA granted 18 May 1960 (HMMA-14933) (201-262488)
mother of Raymond H GERENDE (LIEMPTY) assists with LIVERY basehouse. C-79349

d. No personnel were dropped from the project during the past project year.

10. Operational Clearances:

See section 9 above.

11. Cover

The cover of personnel employed in Project LIFEAT remains the same as noted in the last project renewal.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact is maintained between the Case Officers and the agents in this project. These contacts are made in a clandestine manner with varing patterns established for car pickups, foot contacts, and emergency meetings. Pre-arranged signals are employed in setting and accomplishing the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of the basehouses by the Case Officers and Principle Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents, except in the case of LIVERY basehouse where the agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to basehouses on foot by other than the residents of the house is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephone contact concerning the project and with the agents is kept to a minimum. Pre-arranged open code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged and are reviewed frequently by the personnel using them.

d. These systems of contact and communication appear suitable for the project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are reviewed periodically and are changed frequently to decrease the possibility of discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation are primarily based on two factors: ideology and financial gain. A secondary factor is the fear of reprisal from the local police should discovery occur.

14. Training

Initial training of new personnel and refresher training for experienced agents is handled primarily by the outside case officer, David M. WILSTED. Minor repair and maintainance of equipment as well as emergency security procedures are stressed and continually reviewed with the agents.

15. Equipment and Support

It is believed that much of the technical equipment upon which the continued successful collection of LIFEAT material depends will require replacement in the near future. The largest percentage of this equipment has been in nearly continuous operation from the initiation of the project in January 1951 and much of this equipment is no longer being manufactured. When present limited commercial stocks of replacement parts are exhausted, new units will be required for LIFEAT.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following are the estimated costs for FY 1961. All figures are U.S. dollars per year. ($1.00 dollar U.S. equals 12.50 Mexican pesos) Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, and especially to the expected increase in rental costs that is a chronic feature of the Mexico City scene, a moderate increase in some LIFEAT costs will be noted, ~~even though the overall total requested is $10,419 under that approved for FY 1960.~~

a. Salaries:

1. Staff and contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI GS-10	995.00
Salary	$ 6,~~505.00~~
Quarters	2,304.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER (salary)	5,500.00
Alice N. CAILIETEAU (salary)	2,000.00
Olivia N. GLADMON (piecework)	4,200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL (salary)	1,728.00
Leona C. GANDARA (salary)	900.00

$ 23,137.00
490.00
$ 23,627.00

2. **Field Agents**

LIFEUD-1		5,760.00
LIFEUD-2		2,496.00
LIFEUD-3		1,776.00
LIFEUD-1's helper		144.00
LIFEUD-4		1,920.00
LIFEUD-5		3,648.00
LIFEUD-6		3,500.00
LIFEUD-7		2,400.00
LIFEUD-8		2,400.00
LIFEUD-9		1,920.00
LIFEUD-10	No Salary	
LIFEUD-11	No Salary	
LIFEUD-12	No Salary	
LIFEUD-13	No Salary	
LIFEUD-14		3,648.00
LIFEUD-15		768.00
LIFEUD-16		1,440.00
LIFEUD-17	No Salary	
LIFEUD-18	No Salary	
LIFEUD-19		960.00

Due to the continued rise in the cost of living, plus the fact that the majority of the above listed field agents have not received a pay raise in recent years even though the work load increased and the quality of work performed has imporved, it is anticipated that the 10% over-all pay raise provided for, but not given, in FY 1960 will be necessary in FY 1961:

3,200.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom, this amounts to one month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary:

3,000.00

$ 38,930.00

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b. Basehouse rentals, utilities, and expenses:

LIMERICK Main Base	$ 1,920.00	
LIVERY Relay Base	504.00	
ANNEX IV	2,760.00	
ANNEX VI	1,920.00	
ANNEX VII	1,728.00	
ANNEX VIII	3,072.00	
ANNEX IX	2,880.00	
Proposed Relay Base	480.00	
Plus 10% customary increase in rent when lease contract renewed	1,600.00	
		$ 16,864.00

c. Equipment:

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$ 2,500.00	
New equipment such as reels and recorders	3,000.00	
		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous:

1. Expendable supplies such as paper, paper tape, etc.	2,000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP Car	600.00
ZINSMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00

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3. Other operational expenses (covering loss of deposits, fatalities, termination payments*, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses, expenses in covering targets of opportunity)	~~25~~ 9,000.00	
		$ ~~29,930.00~~ 13,930.00
GRAND TOTAL		$ ~~114,411.00~~ 98,901.00

---

*Any termination of indigenous personnel will be in accordance with Mexican law and will include lump sum separation settlement, transportation and moving expense payments, and any bonus due at the time of termination.

[illegible]

50-6-32/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

253

DATE : 23 JUNE 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : RG 2, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Jun 24 18 05 60

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 16026

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 5782

REF: DIR 35879 (OUT 38257) *

FORWARDING LIFEAT RENEWAL TWO POUCHES 29 JUNE 1 JULY DUE KAROK CLASSIFICATION. [illegible] COMING ALONE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST.

Lifeat / [illegible]

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 2555
DATE : 21 JUNE 1960

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : [illegible], CI/IC 2, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	JUN 21 23 46 '60
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT88257
OUT 88257

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

35879
35879

REQUEST LIFEAT PROJ RENEWAL SOONEST. ADVISE POUCHING DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat Durrell

R. D. Johnson
J.C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

Ned P. Holman
N. P. HOLMAN, AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

20 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Renewal of WH Division FI/CI Projects over $100,000

1. There is set forth below a list of WH Division FI/CI Projects, with an authorization of over $100,000, which expire as of 30 June 1960:

Project	Authorization
LIFEAT	$123,830

2. Possibly renewal actions are already in course of preparation for the above projects. If not, however, it is strongly urged that appropriate project action be submitted as soon as possible, and in any event not later than 15 July, so that these renewals can be submitted to DDCI for approval in timely fashion.

3. The same request applies to any other WH Division FI/CI projects, currently authorized for amounts under $100,000, if renewal will request authorization in excess of that figure.

S.M. Hines
S. M. HINES
Chief, DDP/PG

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7955	
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1	
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE [illegible]	
SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal		RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED : Exploitation of LIFEAT leads			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)			

1. The LIFEAT Project renewal submitted in HMMA-12936 was approved on 16 July 1959 for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $123,830 for fiscal year 1960. The Station will note that monies requested for the support of Woodrow D. GABBOTT (ps) were subtracted from the request made by the Station for project funds. GABBOTT is supported by the BESMOOTH Project, an EE support project.

2. The following staff comments were made when the Project was submitted for approval:

a. "RQM has continued its rating of "C" on the disseminated positive information from the Project, noting a slight increase in the disseminations, and commenting that it provides interesting information to customers on the nature and extent of Bloc commercial activities in Mexico, data useful in economic analyses, and reports on exile activities in Mexico.

b. "KUTUBE/D recommended renewal of LIFEAT observing that the leads produced by the operation have been of operational value to LAURICLE activities conducted in Mexico City in the past year. KUTUBE/D comments also that the Project has afforded and can be expected to continue to afford CE protection from time to time for activities of particular LAURICLE interest.

c. "KUTUBE/OPS has observed that Project LIFEAT has been a most useful operational asset in the Mexico City Station for the past nine years, continuously providing KUBARK with a window into important targets. KUTUBE/OPS requests that the next project renewal point out what agent recruitments by the Station have resulted from or been supported by the operational information secured by the project.

d. "KUDESK commented that it well known that Mexico is being used by the RIS as a base for third country operations directed against the United States. Over a period of years LIFEAT has supplied valuable leads which have resulted in the identification of a large number of persons in clandestine contact with RIS officers; further investigation in several cases produced information which strongly indicated that the persons involved were actively assisting the RIS. While such information is, of itself, of interest and importance, our responsibility in the CI field imposes the obligation to determine what those persons are doing for the RIS and this can be done only by recruiting and doubling them. It is therefore suggested that LIFEAT leads and reports of investigations based on them be reviewed for the purpose of selecting a limited number of the more promising targets. Thereafter, Station assets including LIFEAT should be used to obtain the operational data necessary to determine that a target is recruitable, and then a pitch should be made. Much time and effort will be required for such a program, but the potential rewards fully justify it, and the value of LIFEAT, as a CI asset, will be materially increased.

3. Chief, KUTUBE, in recommending the Project for renewal to Deputy Director, KUBARK, requested that at the time of the next Project renewal, the Division should review the relationship and coordination of Project LIFEAT operations with those active and proposed under Project LIENVOY.

50-6-32/1

4. In addition to the formal comments cited above, during the process of obtaining approval for LIFEAT, the Project was subject to various and sundry criticisms in its present form. Therefore, Headquarters suggests that the Station bear this in mind and during the coming year make every effort to increase the operational value of this Project. If the LIENVOY Project is a success operationally and the leads are followed up and developed, WH Division anticipates that it will encounter difficulty in obtaining approval of a similar Project as large and as expensive as LIFEAT unless it is demonstrated to the complete satisfaction of Headquarters that the expense involved in the LIFEAT Project is justified and that the results of the exploitation of project developed leads prove useful in attaining the Station CS objectives. Among the comments received are:

a. Although the purpose and objectives of the project as stated in the FPO call for the collection of information, the operational intent is to make use of this information for an eventual recruitment of Sino-Soviet and Satellite diplomats and/or their contacts. It is realized that diplomats who are susceptible to defection or recruitment in place are few and far between and that the Station is always alert for such targets and is conscientious in their development. However, the Case Officer should keep in mind the more easily accessible and more vulnerable (though secondary) targets, i.e. the many contacts, friends, employees, etc. whose development could well lead to the primary targets. Headquarters feels it is this secondary category where more emphasis can be made. The recruitment in place of such individuals could be extremely valuable for the entire CI/CE program of the Station.

b. The lack of development and exploitation of leads from LIFEAT operations has been raised many times. In view of the limited reporting to Headquarters on the exploitation of operational leads, it has been difficult to state whether the leads are being followed up, who the targets are, and whether consideration is being given to recruitment approaches. Headquarters requests that in each monthly summary the Station supply more info under the section labeled "Exploitation of Leads". The statement "leads resulting from LIFEAT information are followed up by other Station assets" is meaningless without some explanation of the lead follow ups. Headquarters would like to know the names and some operational information concerning the persons who seem to be of most interest and who have been under investigation during the period covered by the monthly summary.

5. On page 6 of your covering memorandum on the FPO (HMMA-12936), you indicate that during the coming year the Station expects to expand its coverage to approximately 24 lines. Headquarters would like to suggest that consideration be given to limiting coverage to a number of lines which can be effectively exploited.

6. It is requested that Headquarters be informed in more detail in all cases where information obtained through LIFEAT has been used to support other important Station operations.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

6 August 1959

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO HMMA-13145

TO Chief, WHD

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 50-6-32/1

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

19 June 1959

SUBJECT LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Note new cryptonyms

REFERENCE(S) HMMW-7761, 10 June 1959

1. Agent Service Records are being submitted on LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22 and LIMESTONE-10. LIPSTICK-17 and LIPSTICK-22 were unable to remain in Station's jurisdiction due to the health of a minor child and have returned to the north of this country.

2. Through oversight*LIQUATION-4(201-185370, OA of 2 Oct. 1957) who is now carried as LIFEUD-17 and*LIMITATION-7(201-114086, OA No. C-50457 dated 13 August 1956) and who is now carried as LIFEUD-18 were omitted from the Project Renewal Request. It is requested that their names be added to the list of Project personnel. They are not paid a salary but due to the occupation of their spouses are witting of the LIFEAT activity.

not eadable

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

GFB
16 June 1959

Distribution;

3 - HQS

50-6-32/1

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT Renewal

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
Name: J. E. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555 or 5172
Date: 15 June 1959

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1959 through 30 June 1960 for a total of $135,145.00.

2. Attached is the Field's Project Review, together with a revised Project Outline, which clearly set forth the present status of the Project. It is believed that the activity described herein continues to justify the time and expense involved, and hence merits renewal for the forthcoming year.

3. In March 1959 we asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their evaluation of the usefulness of information on American Communists which originated from LIFEAT and whether they wished to continue receiving such information. On 2 April 1959, the Federal Bureau of Investigation replied that the information has been of value to them from intelligence and investigative viewpoints and they wish to continue receiving such information.

4. LIFEAT was the source of information concerning the plans of Albert MALTZ and his wife for their trip to Europe and behind the Iron Curtain in May, June and July 1959. Through LIFEAT we learned that they were planning to try to contact Alfred Kaufman STERN and his wife Martha Dodd STERN and Maurice and Edith HALPERIN, American Communists who fled behind the Iron Curtain during the past two years. Based on information made available through LIFEAT, Headquarters has made arrangements for the MALTZ' to receive baggage searches and discreet surveillances at various points on their trip.

5. The Czech and Polish Desks in EE Division and the appropriate Desk in SR Division were asked to comment on the value of LIFEAT to them. All desks agreed that LIFEAT was a very valuable source of general background information on the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomats and often provided information which could be obtained through no other source. The Czech Desk commented that LIFEAT was of most value as a support asset to the Station, providing leads which might be developed into operational assets by the Station personnel. In May 1959 the Polish Desk sent

Woodrow C. GABBOT (re-see LIFEAT personnel section) to Mexico PCS to process the take from the LITHUS phase of LIFEAT. They feel that with this Contract Agent processing LITHUS, this phase will greatly increase in value during the coming year. GABBOT will be in a position to call operational leads to the attention of the Station Case Officer immediately for exploitation. SR noted that LIFEAT has been an invaluable support asset for [illegible] and has been at times the only source of information for the important SR operation.

6. The State Department evaluated LIFEAT reports on the following subjects to be of value and probably true. They wish to continue receiving reports on these subjects.

"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"
"Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee"
"Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico"

ORR evaluated a report on "Soviet Attempt to Barter Equipment for Mexican Coffee" and a report on "Polish Embassy Interest in Mexican Copper Concentrates" to be of value.

Attachments:
FRD (in quad)
Folder with past approvals
Form 610 (in quad)
Envelope with true names

[illegible] Wallgren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, AC/FI

J. C. King, C/WH

Date

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMM-7761

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1

DATE 10 JUN 195

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : LIFEAT/LIFEAT Agent Status

ACTION REQUIRED See Below

REFERENCE(S) : HMMA-12936, 22 May 1959 (KAPOK)

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. According to Headquarters records, LIPSTICK-17, LIPSTICK-22, LIQUATION-4, and LIMITATION-7 have been cleared for use in the LIFEAT Project. Since the above mentioned agents are not included in the LIFEAT Field Project Outline, you are requested to notify Headquarters whether or not you wish their clearances to be kept active for future use in the Project. Please forward Agent Service Records on those who have been terminated.

2. You are also requested to submit an Agent Service Record for LIMESTONE-10 who, according to the referenced dispatch, was terminated last year for security reasons.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

5 June 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
- 1 - RI

M Therrien

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM | USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS | CLASSIFICATION | PAGE NO

~~SECRET~~

5 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : Change of Cryptonyms for LIFEAT Indigenous Personnel

The following agents under the LIFEAT Project have been assigned new cryptonyms as follows:

LIMEWATER	OC 739	LIFEUD-1
LIMEWATER-1	C-50649	LIFEUD-2
LIMEWATER-2	C-54357	LIFEUD-3
LIMITATION-3	OC 6970	LIFEUD-4
LIQUATION	OC 7495	LIFEUD-5
LILACE	C-30405	LIFEUD-6
LIMESTONE-4	C-31019	LIFEUD-7
LIPSTICK-18	C-33182	LIFEUD-8
LIMESTONE-8	C-45672	LIFEUD-9
LIMESTONE-9	C-50464	LIFEUD-10
LIQUATION-2	C-50455	LIFEUD-11
LIPSTICK-35	C-50157	LIFEUD-12
LIPSTICK-37	C-50750	LIFEUD-13
LIQUATION-1	C-38015	LIFEUD-14
LIQUATION-3	C-54096	LIFEUD-15
LIMEWATER-6	C-70322	LIFEUD-16

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jlc

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-A-12936
[redacted]-1631

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/1

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 May 1959

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal Request

RE "43 J" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1960

REFERENCE(S): REF: HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.

2. Part I of the Outline has been revised this year. Station Mexico felt that with the number of revisions which have been made since a complete project renewal request was submitted for FY 1958, this was warranted. It should be noted that for purposes of uniformity all indigenous personnel in the LIFEAT complex have now been given on cryptonym and at present this breakdown goes from /1 to /16. Any future personnel changes will be added to this numbering series.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1960 for the amount indicated herein.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: 1. Odd pages(5 sets)
2. Even pages(5 sets) S.C

AN	4172
AB	X
IN	
PS	
BY	
DES	LFD
PI	
419	

Distribution:

3 - HQS w/5 sets atts

FPS/DFB
21 May 1959

Remove from Project: 50-6-32/1
CS Classification:
JOB # 73-7517Z
Box: Fold:

50-6-32/1

FORM 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. **Product of the Project**

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities;

During the past year reports submitted from screening the LIFEAT/LIMERICK take of the two established Soviet commercial offices have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market. Following is a list of a few of the reports submitted as a result of the intelligence gained from this source;

HMM-[illegible], 27 Aug. 1958 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 21 Jan. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

MEXI-[illegible], 2 Feb. 1959, Identity of Soviet Technician

HMM-[illegible], 18 Feb. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 18 Mar. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 10 Apr. 1959, Commercial Contact of USSR and Poland in Mexico

HMM-[illegible], 17 Apr. 1959, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico.

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities;

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-A-11723, 17 Dec. 1958, Soviet Embassy Reception on 7 Nov. 1958

HMM-A-11794, 24 Dec. 1958, Soviet Delegates to Inauguration of President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

52-6-32/1

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with cultural activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-A-11594, 26 Nov. 1958, Soviet Representative at World Film Festival Held in Mexico City, 10-28 Oct. 1958 - Ivan A. PYRYEV

HMM-A-12225, 25 Feb. 1959, Soviet Participants in Pablo CASALS International Competition Held in Jalapa 18 Jan. - 1 Feb. 1959

HMM-3923 , 31 Dec. 1958, Pablo CASALS Participants

HMM-4004, 2 Feb. 1959, Pablo CASALS Competition Participants

MEXI-3634, 2 Apr. 1959, Contact with Chinese Ballet Troupe

d. Movement of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel currently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected and has also been a factor in determining job assignments and replacements for departing personnel.

e. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided for Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operational value in identifying regular and/or occasional local and foreign contacts of the Soviets. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-A-12295, 4 Mar. 1959, Soviet Contacts in Mexico - Haile ATSBEHA, Ethiopian

HMM-A-11838, 7 Jan. 1959 - Orville M. MULLIKIN

f. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials;

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned to Mexico. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g., HMM-A-11463, 5 Nov. 1958, Activities of Yevgeniy M. POPOV, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, June 1957 - October 1958; HMM-A-11569, 10 Dec. 1958, Boris G. PUTILIN, Employee, Military Attache Office, Mexico City; HMM-A-12755, 30 April 1959, Boris M. STRELTSOV, and HMM-A-12000, 28 Jan. 1959, Aleksandr M. BROVKIN.

g. Goods and Services;

Information on Goods and Services obtained from LIFEAT was used in Project LIMESA.

h. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy;

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. Representative of the reports submitted from this information are the following personnel reports;

HMM-A-12069, 4 Feb. 1959, Alois LICEK

HMM-A-12067, 4 Feb. 1959, Jaroslav KREJZA

HMM-A-12091, 4 Feb. 1959, Bedrich PISTORA and

HMM-A-12128, 11 Feb. 1959, Oldrich SPORCR.

The Polish Legation

Information on this installation parallels that on the Czech and Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish Legation has been procured from LIFEAT. Following are examples of reports from this source;

HMM-A-12420, 18 Mar. 1959, Contacts of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor

HMM-A-10883, 20 Aug. 1958, Mieczyslaw WLODAREK, Polish Minister

HMM-A-12376, 11 Mar. 1959, Antonio O. MARCEYNSKY

HMM-A-12393, 11 Mar. 1959, Polish Legation publication.

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information concerning the Communist Party in Mexico and the Communist front organizations in Mexico was obtained from LIFEAT. Information from LIFEAT has been invaluable in supplementing agent coverage of the front-organizations which exist here. Examples of this type reporting include;

[illegible] CP [illegible]

HMM-A-11411, The Narciso BASSOLS Family and Polish Legation

HMM-A-11412, 5 Nov. 1958, Travel of Narciso BASSOLS.

American Communists in Mexico

Most of these targets have been covered at the request of ODENVY and the production has been partially processed by them. A total of 572 reels was provided them for processing during a 10-month period ending 30 April 1959. Samples of the reporting done from this source include;

HMM-A-12719, 24 April 1959, Noah and Anna SEBORER

HMM-A-12013, 28 Jan. 1959, Anna and Noah SEBORER

HMM-A-12460, 20 Mar. 1959, Albert MALTZ

HMM-A-11851, 7 Jan. 1959, Albert MALTZ.

Foreign Dissident Groups in Mexico

LIFEAT provided partial coverage of Cuban exile groups and gave current information on the status of the "26 July Movement" prior to its overthrow of the BATISTA government in Cuba and has continued to provide information on the current status of the Cubans in Mexico.

LAURICLE Information

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

Counter-Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed to the attainment of these objectives. The two BGMORNING installations have provided valuable information for the responsible Case Officer on the matters involved therein.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station believes that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 10,000 pages of raw text in 10 months are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period in July and August 1958, following the termination of members of the James O. AYCALL family, LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 12-16 lines being covered. These may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	5 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines(moved during this period and only in operation for approximately 2 months)
Polish Legation	3 lines(third installed in April 1959)
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	5 lines.

3. **Planning for the Future**

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 24 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system effected for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 24 will be the maximum number of lines which can be properly handled and handled securely by the personnel currently available for LIFEAT.

4. **Performance of Agents**

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. The personnel from the AYCALL group were terminated during this period and compartmentation has been employed in the re-assignment of tasks among LIFEAT chain. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval has been procured from Headquarters for an approach.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959 to spend $159,590.00. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1960 is contained in the attached Field Project Outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 7

PROJECT OUTLINE

PROJECT: LIFEAT

PART I

1. **Area of Operations**

This project is run from the Mexico City Station. It is concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. **Purpose**

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet and Satellite plans, activities and connections with other Communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose is in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico, Priority A, Objective One.

3. **Background**

Project LIFEAT was initially approved on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT Project was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has been expanded since that time to where the present coverage averages 18 lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by KUBARK staff and contract employees with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past eight years Project LIFEAT has produced more than 55,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence-gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet and Satellite Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. **References**

a. HMM-A-10198, 31 May 1958, Renewal Request for FY 1959

b. HMM-W-6820, 24 Sept. 1958, Approval of Renewal Request for FY 1959.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico,

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military personnel and their activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To collect information on prominent Mexico Communists and pro-Communists and their activities.

f. To collect information on prominent Communists, other than Mexicans, active in Mexico and to identify them and their associates.

g. To collect information on exile groups active in Mexico.

h. To collect information on targets of opportunity in Mexico.

6. Targets

For objectives "a" through "d" -

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and commercial office telephone conversations.

b. Selected Satellite office and home phones.

For objective "e" -

c. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior Communists or pro-Communists.

For objective "f" -

d. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

For objective "g"

e. Telephone conversations emanating from the residences and/or offices of selected targets, i.e., LIERODE, in Mexico.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

For objective "h" -

f. Telephone conversations which can be monitored of targets of opportunity, e.g., BOMORNING.

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN

Asst. Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITMUS, LIVERY, LIERODE, BOMORNING and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

8. Coordination

a. Information produced by LIFEAT is closely coordinated with other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational coordination is required with any other area but they are kept informed of any information produced by LIFEAT which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LINOG, which supports David M. WILSTED, who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in coordination with Project LIFEAT. AW/+

c. Project BESMOOTH which supports Woodrow D CABBOT, the [illegible] [illegible] from the [illegible] [illegible] is effected in CO. coordination with Project LIFEAT

9. Personnel

a. Staff Agents;

Ralph B.#RAFANELLI - under unofficial commercial cover(201-176295)

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

1. David M. *WILSTED(201-009195) - principal outside case officer
[illegible] Project handled under Project [illegible]
2. Alice M. *CAILLETEAU(201-119967) - clerical work C-47041
3. Olivia N. *GLADMON(201-117751) - processes tapes and does clerical work C-46?46
4. Carol K. *ZINSMEISTER(201-117968) - processes major portion of LIFEAT take. C-49572
5. Wallace L. *KAWOHL(201-033959) - basehouse operator CC-3977
(aka LIMITATION)
6. Leona C.*GANDARA(201-) - LIFEAT clipping C-6157
[illegible]
~~7. Woodrow D. *GABBOT(201-14465) - processor for LITMUS take~~

In Project BESMEETHAM [illegible]

c. Field Agents:

*LIFEUD-1 formerly LIMEWATER(201-183704) OA 17 Oct. 1950 CC-739

*LIFEUD-2 formerly LIMEWATER-1(201-117970) OA 14 Aug. 1951 CC-1412

*LIFEUD-3 formerly LIMEWATER-2(201-117971) OA 14 Dec. 1953 CC-7452

*LIFEUD-4 formerly LIMITATION-3(201-117743) OA 1 Oct. 1953 CC-6970

*LIFEUD-5 formerly LIQUATION(201-117744) OA 16 Dec. 1953 CC-9476

*LIFEUD-6 formerly LILACE(201-117978) OA 28 Sept. 1954 C-50465

*LIFEUD-7 formerly LIMESTONE-4(201-117980) OA 21 Oct. 1954 C-31459

*LIFEUD-8 formerly LIPSTICK-13(201-119521) OA 31 Mar. 1955 C-33182

*LIFEUD-9 formerly LIMESTONE-8(201-117984) OA 27 Apr. 1956 C-45672

*LIFEUD-10 formerly LIMESTONE-9(201-114085) OA 13 Sept. 1956 C-50464

*LIFEUD-11 formerly LIQUATION-2(201-113595) OA 21 Aug. 1956 C-50455

*LIFEUD-12 formerly LIPSTICK-35(201-113596) OA 6 Aug. 1956 C-50157

*LIFEUD-13 formerly LIPSTICK-37(201-115833) OA 13 Sept. 1956 C-50150

*LIFEUD-14 formerly LIQUATION-1(201-117972) OA 26 Sept. 1956 C-38015

*LIFEUD-15 formerly LIQUATION-3(201-126315) OA 19 Jan. 1957 C-54096

*LIFEUD-16 formerly LIMEWATER-6(201-222786) OA 2 July 1958. C-70322

d. personnel dropped from the project;

Following indigenous personnel were terminated for security reasons during FY 1959;

LIMESTONE-1
LIMESTONE-2
LIMESTONE-3
LIMESTONE-5
LIMESTONE-7
LIMESTONE-10.

Frances M. MENZIE resigned during FY 1959.
Janet N DELACCUR is not now active but her clearance is being kept open.
Daniel K. BROMUND returned PCS to Headquarters during this period.
Louise J MARINO was transferred to LIEMPTY Project in February 1959.

10. Operational Clearances

Please see 9.

11. Cover

~~Woodrow D. GABBOT enjoys fictional cover as Researcher for a PBPRIME Research Council.~~ [illegible] per C.O.

Other cover remains the same as that submitted in HMM-A-7063 except for David M. WILSTED who is engaged in insurance business since he has procured his "Inmigrado" status.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Daily contact and communications between the Case Officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this Project is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and case officers follow pre-arranged signals for meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, pre-arranged meetings are held at night. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by agents except in the case of LIVERY where agents are too old to drive. One of the indigenous agents is used to contact LIVERY base. Entrance to bases on foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project and with agents is kept to a minimum and code is used for phone conversations between Case Officers and agents.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been arranged.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication appear to be suitable for the Project and function adequately from a security viewpoint. Locations and times of meetings are changed frequently to prevent discovery.

13. Control and Motivation

Control and motivation seem to be based on two factors primarily; ideological and monetary. A third controlling factor would be fear of reprisal from local police should discovery occur.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed probable that a great deal of replacement equipment will be required by the Project during FY 1960 since much of the current equipment installed and working has been in use for the length of the Project and since this equipment is no longer being manufactured, replacement parts will be unobtainable soon and new units will be required.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1531
Page 13

PROJECT OUTLINE

PART II

PROJECT: LIFEAT

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1960. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries;

1. Staff and Contract Personnel

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-9	
Salary	$5985.00
Quarters	2304.00
~~Woodrow D. GABBOT~~	
~~Salary~~	~~9890.00**~~
~~**(Since this subject's contract has not been received, this figure is based on statement he is GS-13 and minimum figure taken)~~	
~~Quarters~~	~~1728.00~~
Translator(LIMERICK) GS-12 not yet named(This is established in hopes that the Project will be able to live-monitor portion of LIMERICK traffic)	
Salary	8330.00
Quarters	2400.00
Transportation	1000.00
HHE move	1500.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - salary	5400.00
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - salary	2000.00
Olivia N. GIADMON - piecework	4200.00
Wallace L. KAWOHL - salary	1728.00
Leona C. GANDARA - salary	900.00
TOTAL	$47,365.00

~~$ 35,777.00~~

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 14

2.	Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
	LIFEUD-1	$5764.61	
	LIFEUD-2	2498.00	
	LIFEUD-3	1633.00	
	LIFEUD-1's helper	144.12	
	LIFEUD-4	1921.54	
	LIFEUD-5	3650.92	
	LIFEUD-6	3000.00	
	LIFEUD-7	2113.69	
	LIFEUD-8	1921.54	
	LIFEUD-9	1633.31	
	LIFEUD-10 no salary		
	LIFEUD-11 no salary		
	LIFEUD-12 no salary		
	LIFEUD-13 no salary		
	LIFEUD-14	3650.92	
	LIFEUD-15	768.61	
	LIFEUD-16	960.77	

(Due to continued increases in cost of living, it is expected than an over-all raise of 10% will be made during FY 1960 to the agents above listed. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should devaluation of the peso occur during FY 1960) $3300.00

Christmas bonus (In accordance with local custom this amounts to one-month's pay for each agent) and gifts where necessary $3,000.00

TOTAL $35,961.03

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Main Base	$1969.55	
LIVERY Relay Base	585.00	
ANNEX IV	3000.00	
ANNEX VI	2260.00	
ANNEX VII	2000.00	
ANNEX VIII	3375.00	
Proposed basehouse	3500.00	
TOTAL		$16,689.55

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment
HMM-A-12936
KAPOK-1631
Page 15

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	$2500.00	
New equipment, i.e., reels, recorders	3000.00	
TOTAL		$5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies(paper,rolls,etc.)2000.00

2. Transportation

RAFANELLI QP car	600.00
ZI SMEISTER mileage	400.00
LIFEUD-7 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-5 car rent	290.00
LIFEUD-8 car rent	675.00
LIFEUD-14 car rent	290.00
TOTAL	2930.00

3. Other operational expenses(to cover loss of deposits, fatalities, serious emergencies, separation payments, medical payments, emergency moving bills, renovation of basehouses and expenses involved in covering targets of opportunity) 25,000.00

TOTAL	29,930.00
GRAND TOTAL	$135,445.~~00~~

11 615
$122,527

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

CS COPY

50-6-3-1/

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

039 RAY/JLS

DATE : 19 MAY 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 3

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 20 0930Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 18853

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3899
(WARE ACTING)

CRYPTONYM NUMBER 518 ASSIGNED LIFEAT INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL THROUGH/16 AS FOLLOWS: 1. LIMEWATER; 2. LIMEWATER-1; 3. LIMEWATER-~~2~~5; 4. LIMITATION-3; 5. LIQUATION; 6. LILACE; 7. LIMESTONE-4; 8. LIPSTICK-18; 9. LIMESTONE-8; 10. LIMESTONE-9; 11. LIQUATION-2; 12. LIPSTICK-35; 13. LIPSTICK-37; 14. LIQUATION-1; 15. LIQUATION-3; 16. LIMEWATER-6.

END OF MESSAGE

File Lifeat/Dev Plans

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-7649
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE 13 MAY 1959
SUBJECT - LIFEAT Project Renewal		RE "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED - See below.		

REFERENCE(S)

HDGM-6820, 24 September 1958

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1959. It is requested that the Station's request for the Project renewal be submitted to Headquarters prior to the expiration date.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

11 May 1959

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
- 1 - RI

Scaletti

WH/III/Mexico/E. I. SCALETTI:mpn

13 May 59

FORM 10-57 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-6820
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/1
FROM : Chief, WHD		DATE 24 SEP 1958
SUBJECT : Operational/LIFEAT Project Renewal		RE "473" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED : None		

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMA-10198, 31 May 1958
b. HMMW-6555, 3 July 1958
c. MEXI-2031, 22 July 1958

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 9 September 1958 for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of $159,590.

2. KUTUBE/OPS recommended that the Station make an increased effort to reduce the amount of paper work for the case officer to allow him sufficient time to go beyond the surveillance-investigative phase of handling the many operational leads and be in a position for more agent recruitment efforts. KUTUBE suggested that several of the lines which are of marginal value be deactivated, temporarily at least, to assist in this effort.

3. The project review forwarded with HMMA-10198 was submitted for approval as prepared in the field with the exception of Part II which had to be retyped in view of the number of changes and additions required. The only changes made in the Project review - LIFEAT section was the deletion of several examples of reports originating from several LIFEAT sources. These deletions (such as the last five examples of reports on Soviet Commercial Activities) were made because the reports did not originate with LIFEAT eventhough they did concern the Subject being discussed. Part I of the Project Outline excerpts submitted by the field was also submitted for approval--the only change made was the omission of the field's request for a change in paragraph 6 of the Project Outline on Objectives. Headquarters did not think subparagraph "f" should be deleted.

4. Attached for our information and records is a complete copy of the Renewal Request. It is requested that you review the memorandum, "WH Division's Comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal", and the new Part II, paying particular attention to the personnel included therein. This request is being made in view of the conflicting information Headquarters received from the Station Case Officer who was on TDY in Headquarters (DIR 31900-16 July 1958) and from the field (MEXI-2031) in reply to HMMW-6555.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

19 September 1958

Attachments: Even pages (KAPOK)
u/s/c: Odd pages (KAPOK)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City (w/a)
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom.
1 - RI

Scaletti
WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI:ngs

50-6-32/1

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
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2		5	
3		6	

022 CR/WS/ws

DATE : 22 JULY 1958

22

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, S/C 2

JUL 24 07 34 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19357

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2031

LIFEAT

REF: HMMW 6555

1. PARA 1. ONLY LIEDDY TO BE USED.

2. PARA 2. SUBJECTS IDENTICAL. NO PLANS TO USE.

3. PARA 3. LIMESTONE 10 NOT USED. HUSBANDS SERVICES TERMINATED 15 JULY 58. LIPSTICK 37 NO RECORD EMPLOYMENT AT STATION. LIMESTONE 9 WITTING BUT NEVER USED PER STATION RECORDS.

4. PARA 4. NEW LICOOL PROJECT BEING WRITTEN. DO NOT INCLUDE WITH LIFEAT.

5. PARA 5. SUBJS OF MEXI 1816 (IN 44759) FIRED 15 JULY. PLAN TO REPLACE SO PLEASE ALLOW FOR REPLACEMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ SECRET

24 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LIMERICK

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, SR from Chief, WH/III dated 2 July 1958

According to a telephone call from Herb Manell of SR/10 on 23 July 1958 SR Division believes that information produced by Project LIFEAT on the RIS and the Soviets is most valuable. He stated that this project is the chief source of information other than physical surveillance.

The only recommendation that SR Division would make is that the field be more selective in the reporting that is transmitted to Headquarters. (This recommendation has already been passed to the field)

John B. Brady
C/WH/Mexico

~~SECRET~~

17 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT : LITMUS Phase of LIFEAT Project

REFERENCE : WH/III Memorandum dated 2 July 1958

1. Due to a period of dormancy, the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project has furnished a relatively small amount of reporting, during the past year, concerning BEDOX officials and their activities in Mexico. While small in quantity, the information furnished has been of considerable operational value because of the nature of the operation and the fact that it serves as a major source of data on the BEDOX target. The LITMUS operation has furnished accurate travel data, information on the function and scope of activity engaged in by the BEDOX personalities we are interested in and has helped us determine the number of contacts the BEDOX installation maintains with the local citizenry in the course of its activities. In the last case, the LITMUS operation has linked a local citizen, long suspected of Soviet Bloc intelligence activity, with one known and one suspected BEDOX intelligence officer serving under diplomatic cover in Mexico. This local citizen is now the subject of an extensive effort to prove his Soviet Bloc intelligence role and to determine the extent of his activity. Finally, the LITMUS operation has begun to furnish valuable operational data on a BEDOX personality who has recently arrived to assume a consular post. This particular BEDOX official was recommended to the field as a target of interest because of his past intelligence background. We feel confident that the LITMUS operation will aid considerably in our effort to monitor the activities of this individual.

2. Now that the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT operation has, once again, begun to function, we believe that the information obtained therefrom will show a steady increase in operational value during the coming year.

PETER K. HEIDMANN
Chief, SR/P

~~SECRET~~

16 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH/III, subject as above, dated 2 July 1958

Before its suspension in January 1958, the LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT provided biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City which EE/C found useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets. If the LIVERY phase of the project is resumed, it is anticipated that it would continue to provide similarly useful information. For this reason EE/C is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO DIBBLE
Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

~~SECRET~~

14-00000

554 MJ/SW/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG : C. ZTHRUNG
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 16 JULY 1958

554

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

16 10 30z
CABLE SEC

	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, TSS 4, S/C 2

OUT 50935
OUT 50935

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 31906
31906

REF HMMW 6555

NO NEED REPLY PARAS ONE, TWO, THREE, FIVE REF. DISCUSSED WITH SECHEN. LICOOL NOT INCLUDED LIFEAT RENEWAL REQUEST. RE PARA FOUR REF HQS DOES NOT THINK LICOOL FALLS UNDER OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, ETC MKCHARITY PROJ NOR IS IT AN OP WHICH SHOULD BE FUNDED BY KURIOT. THEREFORE SINCE STATION WISHES WITHDRAW LICOOL FROM LIFEAT REQUEST NEW PROJ SOONEST SO LICOOL EXPENSES CAN BE COVERED BY APPROVED PROJ.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat/1

J. C. King
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
~~SECRET~~

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch
CRYPTONYM : LIFEAT
DIVISION : Western Hemisphere
STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER
Name: J. R. Brady
Room: 1211, Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 16 July 1958

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT Project be renewed for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959 for a total of ~~$159,589.76.~~ 159,590 156,055 /MF

2. Attached is a Project Review of LIFEAT which was prepared by the field, a memorandum giving WH Division comments on the LIFEAT Project Renewal, and revisions to those sections of the Field Project Outline Part I which have changed since last year when a new Project Outline was submitted. A new Part II containing a detailed breakdown of the estimated costs for FY 1959 is also attached.

ROBERT N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

J. C. KING, C/WHD

Attachments:
- WH Division Comments on LIFEAT Project Renewal
- Project Review - LIFEAT
- Project Outline Part I (Excerpts)
- Project Outline Part II
- Folder with past Renewals
- Form 680 (in quad)
- Envelope with true names

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WH Division Comments on LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. At the end of January 1958, telephone linemen discovered our tap on the LIVERY installation leading into one of our base houses. As a result of this all LIFEAT operations were suspended as of 31 January and 1 February 1958 pending the outcome of what appeared to be an involved investigation by the Mexican Telephone Company. The LIMEWATER's disclosed that the telephone company was not investigating the situation and the operation was secure. The first line from the LIMERICK group was put in again on 17 March 1958. During the same month coverage of one American Communist was also re-instated. As of the end of April, the Station had coverage on the following lines: 3 LIMERICK, 1 LITHOSPHERE, 1 LITMUS, 1 American Communist, 1 Target of Opportunity, and 1 Mexican Soviet Contact. Since the partial re-instatement of LIFEAT coverage there has been no indication that suspicion of the activity exists on the part of the Mexican Telephone Company or security services. In order to provide more secure LIFEAT coverage, a new system of installation of technical surveillance is now in effect. This system prohibits the opposition from detecting any LIFEAT lines with a voltage meter.

2. The following new personnel have been included in this Project renewal request:

a. LIENDY (Leona C. GANDARA - ps), a U. S. citizen and wife of a Staff Agent, was issued CSA on 24 June 1958 as a LIFEAT processor. The field is preparing a contract for her. (C-61557)

b. LIMENU-1 (Janet N. DELACOUR - ps), a U. S. citizen, was issued an Operational Approval on 31 January 1958 for use as a LIFEAT processor. She is motivated by patriotic loyalty. Financial remuneration will provide additional control. The field has been requested to prepare a formal contract for her. (C-64393)

c. LIMEWATER-6 is an employee of the Mexican Telephone Company and is LIMEWATER's assistant. His motivation at this time is believed to be financial. A POA was granted LIMEWATER-6 on 14 May 1958. An Operational Approval has been requested. (C-70322)

d. LIQUATION-4, wife of LIQUATION-1, occupies a basehouse with her husband. She received an OA on 2 October 1957. She will receive no remuneration.

3. LIMESTONE-9, LIMESTONE-10, LIQUATION-2, LIPSTICK-35, LIPSTICK-37 and LIMITATION-7 are still active under Project LIFEAT. They receive no remuneration. Therefore, their names do not appear on the list of LIFEAT agents on the attached Part II of the Project Outline.

~~SECRET~~

4. LIMITATION-5 (C-24845) and LIMITATION-6 (C-39418) who were included under Project LIFEAT when it was last renewed, have been withdrawn from this project and were included under the LIPSTICK Project renewal which was approved on 3 December 1957.

5. The LICOOL phase has been removed from Project LIFEAT since these two technical operations are completely compartmented. The funding for LICOOL and its facilities will be covered by another project.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transshipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

HMM-3085 Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidente, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3404 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Calco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contacts reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on dindividuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9656, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMESA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

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b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

~~HMM-3074, Czech Concern over Possible Expulsion from Mexico.~~
HMM 32[illegible] [illegible] of Czech [illegible] Commercial Legation
and [illegible] Exposition

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMM-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMM-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

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HMM-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

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LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LAURICLE interest.

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CI/CS matters constitute a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources. A few representative samples of this type of information are the following:

HMMA-9121, Suspicious Soviet Contact
HMMA-9135 - Sergio KIRZEY Rassvetaef
HMMA-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCHAYFOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samual MAGIDIN Magidin, has confirmed the continuing decline of the local Jewish Communist movement. It has also provided the Station with information on those former members who continue to meet at irregular intervals on an informal basis.

Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the produce of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

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Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT Project. However, since LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be achieved, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication of the coverage can be derived when it is realized that some 15,000 pages of raw text are the direct result of the operation from which the statistics cited above were derived. Except for a period from 1 February - 11 April 1958 LIFEAT has been in daily operation with some 18 to 23 lines being covered. Generally, these may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy -	7 lines
Czech Legation -	2 lines
Polish Legation -	2 lines
American Communists -	5 lines
Remainder -	7 lines

Attachment to HMMA-10158
MXOI-1401

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 28 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 28 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

In general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good and secure during the past year. It is hoped that within the coming year the remainder of the LICALL group will be securely and permanently removed from the Project and replaced by well-compartmented personnel. In view of the high degree of security necessary for the personnel involved in this operation, it is planned to screen very carefully any possible candidates before they are approached for use in this operation after prior approval for an approach has been secured from Headquarters.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached amendment to the field outline which was submitted with HMMA-5708.

5. Expenditures during Period under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958, to expend $156,647. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1959 is contained in the attached field project outline Part II.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINE
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 5 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~[illegible]~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SACHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all ~~KAPOK~~ LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LIEMUE, LIVERY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

Attachment to HMMA-10198
KapOk-1401

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LITMUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMMA-10198 KAPOK-1631

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

(1) Staff and Contract Personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)		
Salary	$5985.00	
Quarters	2100.00	
Daniel K. BROMURT, GS-12		
Salary	8810.00	
Quarters	2100.00	
Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00	
Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).		
Salary	8000.00	
Quarters	2100.00	
Transportation	1000.00	
HHE move	1500.00	
Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)	4000.00	
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~	~~3000.00~~	Dele
Leona C. GANDARA	4000.00	
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary	5400.00	
Francis M. MENZIE - Salary	2504.00	
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary	2425.00	
Olivia N. GLARMON - Piece work	4200.00	
Louise J. MACHIMO - Salary	1850.00	
(Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)	56,375	56,375
TOTAL	~~60014.00~~	~~60014.00~~

(2)

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

Field Agent	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1922.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	1729.38	17,[illegible]
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	766.61	
LILACS ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY. 3,300.00

Christmas bonus and presents 3,000.00
(One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)

Salary total ~~42,302.38~~
42,305.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Basehouse	1729.38
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITMUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00

Total ~~21,743.38~~
21,745.00

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00

d. Miscellaneous

(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts)	2000.00	
(2) Transportation		
LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00	
RAFANELLI QP car expense	500.00	
KIRSMEISTER mi'eage	350.00	
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00	
LIMITATION car rent	300.00	
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00	
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00	
(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity)	25,000.00	
Total	30,130 ~~30,039.00~~	30,130 ~~30,039.00~~
GRAND TOTAL	~~$145,864.76~~ 156,055	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMW-6555

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/1

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED: Cable Reply, Submit Agent Termination Reports where appropriate.

RE 43 - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-10198

P R I O R I T Y

It is requested that you reply by cable to the following questions so that the request for renewal of the LIFEAT Project can be submitted.

1. Approval to insert the following persons at the salaries indicated. Please correct salaries listed below if they are wrong.

LIEDDY - $4,000
LIMENU/1 - $4,000
Nadine M. CHAROUSEK - $3,640

2. The following have been cleared for use under LIFEAT since the last Project renewal. Since they were not mentioned in your request for renewal, have they been activated under Project LIFEAT and should they be included in our request for renewal? Are any funds required to cover their use?

LIQUATION/4
Subject of HMMW-5906

3. The following agents were included under the LIFEAT Project renewal of last year. Since none of them receive pay their names did not appear on Part II of the Project Outline attached to reference. Therefore, Headquarters does not know whether they are still active under the Project. In our request for renewal we must indicate the names of all agents who have been dropped from the project during the past project year and the present use being made of each agent. Please indicate those agents who are no longer under Project LIFEAT and what use is being made of each. If they are not active, please submit agent service records on them. If they are being used for other work please submit new PRQ II's and requests to amend their Operational Approvals. Unless advised to the contrary, Headquarters will assume the following are still active under Project LIFEAT:

LIMESTONE-9
LIMESTONE-10
LIQUATION-2
LIPSTICK-35
LIPSTICK-37
LIMITATION-7

4. The covering dispatch to your request for LIFEAT Project renewal stated that LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD had been removed from LIFEAT. Since MULFORD is covered by Project MKCHARITY, Headquarters assumes you intend to carry out LICOOL operations under Project MKCHARITY. In view of the fact Project MKCHARITY is a KURIOT Project which supports KURIOT Staff Agents Harvey C. MULFORD and Alice N. HADZELLI and provides for technical equipment and technical services, Headquarters does not believe LICOOL belongs under MKCHARITY. If LICOOL were included under MKCHARITY, the latter project would have to be amended to provide for such operational activity and to provide funds for base houses, base house-keepers, and processors of LICOOL take.

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMW-6555

PRIORITY

We believe LICOOL is best placed under LIFEAT, where it has been included in the past. The only alternative would be a new project to cover LICOOL operations. Therefore, it is requested that you comment by cable on the above by indicating a new Project Outline will be forthcoming, or requesting us to include LICOOL in our LIFEAT Project Renewal. If the latter is the case, please indicate the number of LICOOL base houses, rent per year for each, names and salary of any LICOOL base housekeepers and processors not already included in your request for LIFEAT Project Renewal request, and any additional expenses which should be included. Also indicate how many LICOOL operations are active at the present in addition to the one proposed in MEXI-1577, dated 30 June 1958.

5. With reference to MEXI-1816 (20 June 1958), Headquarters plans to leave LIMESTONE's 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 in the LIFEAT Project when it is submitted for renewal. We will indicate that LIMESTONE's 1, 2 and 7 are not active under the Project but funds for continued payments to them are included because of security reasons emanating from their past use and knowledge acquired under Project LIFEAT. If it is decided to terminate any or all of them the money can be used for that purpose.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

3 July 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
- 1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/E.T.SC[illegible]:ngs

FORM 10-57 3a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS [illegible]	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

~~SECRET~~

2 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1958 - 30 June 1959.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LCMAYFLWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

R. N. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mpm

This will [illegible] ready [illegible] made when
comments on CI [illegible]
it is sent to [illegible]
for review

~~SECRET~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSI 43-48

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-10198
[redacted] 1401
50-6-32/1

TO : Chief, WH Division
DATE: 21 May 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
0
SPECIFIC— LIFEAT Project Renewal

Reference: HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957

ACTION REQUESTED: Renewal of Project LIFEAT for FY 1959

1. There is attached a Review of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. In accordance with the suggestion made in reference, Part I of the Project Outline has been revised only in those sections where there have been personnal changes of the operation has been otherwise altered in a basic aspect.

3. Part II is submitted in its entirety. LICOOL and the provision for Harvey C. MULFORD have been removed from this section, thereby cutting the budget from the sum requested for FY 1958.

4. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be renewed for FY 1959 for the amount requested.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Encl. (Odd pages herewith
Even pages USC)

EPS/GFB/bct
15 May 1958

Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
DES ~~BFD~~
~~FI~~
ARD

Remove from Project DMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 30 Fold: 2

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

50-6-32/1

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

14-00000

~~[illegible]~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10196
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT REVIEW - LIFEAT

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy -

a. Soviet Commercial Activities:

During the past year reports submitted from screening the traffic of the two established Soviet Commercial Offices in Mexico have provided a great amount of detail concerning Soviet efforts to sell in the Latin American market, both heavy industrial merchandise and movies and literature. Knowledge of their methods of transshipping and attempts at concealment of point of origin of products has been gleaned from this take. As a result of this knowledge, reports on the firms with whom they are doing business have been procured and provided for background information. Following are a list of the reports submitted as a result of intelligence procured from this source:

HMM-3053 Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3165, Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico
HMM-3286 - Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico, December 1957
~~HMM-3253 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Michoacana del Occidento, S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3264 - Soviet Commercial Contacts in Mexico - Servicio Agricola, S.A.~~
~~HMM-3139 - Anilinas y Productos Quimicos S. de R.L.~~
~~HMM-3404 - Imports into Mexico from Soviet Union~~
~~HMM-A-9519 - American Cyanid Co., Calco Chemical Division~~

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities:

This project has provided coverage and details of some of the diplomatic activities of the Soviets in Mexico. It has served to show the relationships maintained, culturally, socially and diplomatically, between the Soviets and the members of the Satellite establishments in Mexico.

HMM-3215, Soviet Attendance at Yugoslav Reception
HMM-3351 - Reception at Soviet Embassy.
HMM-2992 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City
HMM-2849 - Diplomatic Activities of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City

c. Soviet Cultural Activities:

Information produced by LIFEAT has given details of Soviet activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, and related activities. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2870 - Soviet Embassy Reception for Mexican Musicians
HMM-2847 - Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy
HMM-3080, Cultural & Propaganda Activities of Soviet Embassy

~~[illegible]~~

CS COPY
50-6-52/1

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

d. Soviet Military Activities:

Monthly reports on the activities of Soviet military personnel, knowledge of which was obtained from LIFEAT, and their contacts in military circles in Mexico have proved to be of especial interest to ODYOKE service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials:

Through LIFEAT coverage a roster of Soviet personnel presently in Mexico has been maintained by Station Mexico. This has been the primary source of such information. LIFEAT has enabled the Station to determine in advance when departures can be expected for the Soviets, prior to their permanent departure, normally stock up on clothing and occasionally other items throught to be in short supply in the USSR.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts:

Contact reports of the Soviets are compiled and provided Headquarters as necessary. These reports are of considerable operation value in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in regular contact. Following are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2841 - MONTES y BRADLEY (fnu)
HMM-3199 - Narciso BASSOLS Contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials:

LIFEAT has provided the Station with the most productive source of information concerning the private and official lives of the Soviets assigned here. These reports have been submitted on individuals, e.g. HMM-A-9504, Aleksey N. CHERKASOV, and also under one cover, HMM-A-9856, January 1958 Report of Personnel Activities.

h. Goods and Services:

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions known to be providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a LAURICLE operation. Information of this type has also been of considerable value to the Station in the LIMESA operation.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy:

LIFEAT material which does not fall into any one category but which deals with the Soviets and their associates and related activities has been reported as necessary.

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the period under review is essentially the same as that from the Soviet Embassy. To avoid repetition, only a brief summary of the information submitted will be given here.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~ 50-6-32/1

a. Czech Personnel Reports:

HMM-3164, Activities of Zdenek KVITA and HMM-3238, Travel of Czech Legation personnel, are examples of the type of reports made from the personality and activity information acquired from LIFEAT coverage of this installation. HMM-3262, Cocktail Party at Czech Residence, is an example of the reports from this source on diplomatic activities of this installation.

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities:

Reports on a spot basis which were of interest included:

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HMM-3126 New Location of Czech Legation Commercial Office and Skoda Exposition.

Polish Legation

Information on this installation closely parallels that obtained on the Czech Legation and the Soviet installations. The largest amount of information concerning the Polish installation has been procured from LIFEAT. An example of reports from this source is HMM-3161, Leon KILARSKI, Polish Commercial Attache. Another is HMM-3130, Suspicious Contact of Edward RUDSKI, Josef Isaak GENSCHAFT.

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HMM-3176 - Travel of Pro-Communists

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HMM-A-9135 - Sergio KIREEV Rassvetaef
HMM-A-8552, Vladimir SOKOLOV; Col. Jesus de LEON Toral, 6 November 1957
LCMAYPOWL

Jewish Communist Activities:

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Conclusion:

The Mexico City Station believes that the produce of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of KUBARK assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has materially contributed to several priority objectives of the Station's Related Mission Directive.

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~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

Project Review

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring of approximately 28 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time and with the new system being used for LIFEAT lines, Station believes that 28 will be the maximum number of lines which can be handled properly and securely by the personnel presently assigned here for LIFEAT.

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~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

PROJECT OUTLINE
(Excerpts)

PROJECT LIFEAT

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was initially approved 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run almost continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has since expanded to an average of 23 telephone lines.

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and it is staffed by KUBARK personnel, both staff and contract, together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the time of its operation Project LIFEAT has produced more than 50,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has an interest and also has, at the direction of Headquarters, installed special taps on targets of opportunity.

4. References

HMM-A-7063, 5 June 1957 - Request for Renewal of Project
HMM-W-5708, 16 December 1957 - Approval of Project for FY 1958.

6. Objectives - ~~Omit "f"~~

7. Tasks

Case Officer - Edward P. SECHEN
Assistant Case Officer - Gene F. BRADDOCK

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT ~~KAPOK~~ staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the operational phases LIFEAT/LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE, LITMUS, LIVERY and American Communist Group in Mexico activities.

~~SECRET/KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

d. Coordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

f. Maintain supervision over basehouses and training of the personnel therein.

9. Personnel

The following are changes from FY 1958 for FY 1959:

Daniel K. BROMUND arrived at Station Mexico to assume duties as translator of LIFEAT/LITMUS material and relief translator on LIFEAT/LIMERICK.

14. Equipment and Support

It is considered essential that new equipment be provided for LIFEAT for FY 1959 in view of the fact that much of the equipment in current use has been steadily in operation since the inception of the project in 1951. Also, in view of expected expansion of the project and the possibilities of live monitoring, additional equipment in first-class condition will be necessary. A backlog of 10 new recorders and 300 reels along with repair parts is considered a minimum for efficient continuance of the project.

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMMA-10196 KAPOK-1401

LIFEAT PROJECT OUTLINE - PART II

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1959. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to the rise in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansion, LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries:

(1) Staff and Contract Personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7 (promotion to GS-9 in the mill)			
Salary	$5985.00		
Quarters	2100.00		
Daniel K. BROMUND, GS-12			
Salary	8810.00		
Quarters	2100.00		
Travel & TDY to border to renew tourist visa & to Washington, D.C. to pick up rentista papers.	400.00		
Translator (LIMERICK), GS-12 not yet named (This position has been indicated in view of the hope that the Project will be able to live-monitor at least a portion of LIMERICK traffic. There is a Staff Agent slot available under this project).			
Salary	8000.00		
Quarters	2100.00		
Transportation	1000.00		
HHE move	1500.00		
Janet N. DELACOUR (2.02/hr)	4000.00		
~~Nadine M. CHAROUSEK~~	~~3640.00~~	← delete	DM7
Leona C. GANDARA	4000.00		
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER - Salary	5400.00		
Francis M. MENZIE - Salary	2505.00		DM7
Alice N. CAILLETEAU - Salary	2425.00		
Olivia N. GLADMON - Piece work	4200.00		
Louise J. MACRINO - Salary (Will be included under LIPSTICK Project when it is renewed 1 September 1958)	1850.00		
TOTAL	~~63014.00~~ 56575.00	60014.00 56575.00	DM7

(2)

Field Agents	Presently	Possible Raise
LIMEWATER	5284.22	
LIMEWATER/1	2209.77	
LIMEWATER/2	1441.15	
LIMEWATER's helper	144.12	
LIMEWATER/6	960.77	

~~SECRET KAPOK~~

Attachment to HMM-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

Field Agent	**Presently**	**Possible Raise**
LIMESTONE/1	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/2	576.46	
LIMESTONE/3	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/4	1921.54	
LIMESTONE/5	768.61	
LIMESTONE/7	1441.15	
LIMESTONE/8	1441.15	
LIPSTICK/18	~~1729.38~~ 1732.00	
LIMITATION	1729.38	
LIMITATION/3	1921.54	
LIQUATION	3650.92	
LIQUATION/1	3650.92	
LIQUATION/3	768.61	
LILACE ($2.58 per hr.)	3,000.00	

(Due to recent increases in the cost of living, it is expected that an over-all raise of 10% will be made to agents during FY 1959. In April 1958 a new import tax of 40-60% was imposed by the government with the resultant increase in commodities in general use. Adjustments will be made in peso amounts should the devaluation of the peso occur during this FY.	3,300.00
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance with local custom. Also special gifts in some cases.)	3,000.00
Salary total	~~42,302.38~~ 42,305.00

b. Basehouse rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK Basehouse	17~~29.38~~ 30.00
ANNEX IV	3050.00
LIFEAT Repair Base	1540.00
ANNEX II	1452.00
ANNEX III	1360.00
ANNEX V	3060.00
LITMUS Basehouse	1452.00
LIVERY Basehouse (replacement for old blown base)	2100.00
LITHOSPHERE Basehouse	2000.00
LIVERY Relay Base	2000.00
Proposed basehouse (German Embassy coverage)	2000.00
Total	~~21,743.38~~ 21,745 -

50-6-32/1

14-00000

[illegible]

Attachment to [illegible]-A-10198
KAPOK-1401

c. **Equipment**		
Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2500.00	
New equipment, i.e. recorders, reels	3000.00	
Total		5,500.00
d. **Miscellaneous**		
(1) Supplies (paper, rolls, wire, tubes, tape, plans, parts)	2000.00	
(2) Transportation		
LIMESTONE/3 car rent	600.00	
RAFANELLI QP car expense	580.00	
ZINSMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LIMESTONE/4 car rent	400.00	
LIMITATION car rent	300.00	
LIQUATION/1 car rent	300.00	
LIMESTONE/7 car rent	600.00	
(3) Other operational expenses (to cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills, and to cover targets of opportunity)	25,000.00	
Total	30130.00 ~~30,030.00~~	30130.00 ~~30,030.00~~
GRAND TOTAL	~~$145,864.96~~ $156,055.00	

changes made per discussion with [illegible]

[illegible] 50-6-32/1

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]
50-6-32/1

CLASS. SECRET

DATE 18 APR 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - LIFEAT Renewal

Project LIFEAT expires on 30 June 1958. It is requested that the Station's request for project renewal be pouched so that it reaches Headquarters prior to 1 June 1958.

R M Dahlgren
J. C. KING
C/WHD

COPY

14 April 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- ✓1 - FI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

R M Dahlgren
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officers)

JB [illegible]
(Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, C/WHD

[illegible], C/WH/III

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

14-00000

~~SECRET~~

3 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to authorize the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine E. CHARUHSEK for the period 1 January 1958 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project). Funds now available in Project LIFEAT are sufficient to cover payment to CHARUHSEK.

2. CHARUHSEK will serve as a processor of LIFEAT material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-6245) on 12 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

3. CHARUHSEK has above average motivation to do the work required of her. Motivation is a prime consideration in work of this type. CHARUHSEK will listen to LIFEAT tapes (in English until her Spanish language ability permits work on Spanish tapes). She will type summaries of the material on these tapes. The handling of the tapes and summaries will be between CHARUHSEK and her father-in-law, LIMEWATER (C-739). Her cover will be that of housewife.

R. S. DAHLGREN,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - WH/III/Memo chrono
- 1 - WH/III/Mexico chrono
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:jck

~~SECRET~~

19 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include the payment of $1820 compensation to Nadine M. CHAROUSEK for the period 1 January 1957 through 30 June 1958 (the expiration date of the project).

2. CHAROUSEK will serve as a processor of LIFEAT material. She received Provisional Operational Approval (C-66244) on 13 December 1957. A contract check list to provide a payment of $1.75 an hour compensation has been prepared for Contract Personnel Division.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
VI - Subject

~~SECRET~~

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5708
50-6-32/1

[redacted] #589

SECRET [redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Project Renewal and Amendment

Reference: HMMA-7063

1. Project LIFEAT was renewed on 30 October 1957 for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958 for a total of $130,154 for FY 1958. The Station will note that Headquarters rewrote the Project Outline and Project Review which were submitted in HMMA 7063. This was done to facilitate subsequent renewals of the complex LIFEAT Project. As regards the Project Outline, if no major changes occur during the next project year, the Station will only have to submit a Part II to the Project Outline, and any changes which may have affected Part I, principally those concerning personnel. The rewritten Project Review should be used by the Station as a format for next year's Review. By following these procedures, it is believed that we can avoid the re-writing and retyping of the entire Project and make it simpler for the Field Case Officer to prepare the renewal request.

2. Project LIFEAT Amendment was approved on 5 December 1957 for a total of $26,493 for fiscal year 1958, thus raising the total amount authorized for the present project year to $156,647. This Amendment authorized the establishing of a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND for cover purposes, against which a Letter of Credit will be obtained so that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico. (See HMMW-5691 for details on this Letter of Credit).

3. The Amendment also requested authority to incorporate Roland K. WINGSNESS as an additional Staff Agent in the Project. A total of $6,493 for the remainder of the project year was requested to cover WINGSNESS' expenses and this amount was broken down as follows:

Salary ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 1956 estimated at	300

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

AB
AB X
IN
PS
RX
DES | HFD
FI
ACD

Remove from Project KDMANGO
C3 Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 13-175/78
Box: 32 Fold: 2

SECRET [redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

RECC[illegible]Y

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

HMM-L-5708
Page Two

Travel (PC3 Air to Mexico for family)	$ 500
Household Effects, Movement	800

This additional obligation for Project LIFEAT was approved with the authorization to add another competent staff agent; however, Roland E. WINGSHES [illegible] 22 was not approved pending completion of the necessary action to waive existing personnel management restrictions on transferring employees from KUCHAI to KUDOVE and until suitable cover has been arranged by Cover Division. This problem has not yet been settled but you will be notified as soon as a definite decision has been reached regarding the transfer of WINGSHES to KUDOVE and subsequently to Mexico City on PCS.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
Project LIFEAT Outline and Project Review, 1/2 of pages herewith and 1/2 of pages, u/s/c

10 December 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/1/att. herewith and w/1/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

CZehrung
WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:mjn

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

[redacted]

C. [illegible]
WHD
2555
9 DECEMBER 1957

MEXICO CITY

DIR-48520
OUT-71383
[illegible]

MEXI

REF: MEXI 724 (IN 43718)

1. ~~[illegible] FUNDS AUTHORIZED THESE RENEWALS~~ BROKEN DOWN:

A. LI[illegible]: $52,318 FY 58 AND $7,350 FY 59

B. LI[illegible]STICK: $82,417 FY 58 AND $16,483 FY 59

C. LIF[illegible]T: $156.647 FY 58

2. DISPATCHES FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE.

LATEST PROJ RENEWALS APPROVED

LIFEAT/A

J. C. KING, C/WHD

R. W. [illegible], C/WH/III

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD 594
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 DECEMBER 1957

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : W 5
INFO : FI/CPS, CE 4, SR 4, CP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 10 19 46 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

71170
OUT 71170

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 48374

RE: MEXI 0718 (IN 43260)*

1. LIFEAT AMENDMENT APPROVED 5 DEC FOR BROMUND RENTISTA COVER. Now CONVERTING STAFF AGENT AND MAKING FINAL COVER ARRANGEMENTS. ESTIMATE DEPARTURE HQS 18 DEC BY CAR. LDP

2. REGRET IMPOSSIBLE SEND GABBOTT TDY OR PCS PRIOR 1 FEB DUE USUAL DELAY MEXI ENTRY NON-U.S. CITIZEN. SIMILAR TO MOOLMAN CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IF GABBOTT'S PCS CAN BE EXPEDITED OR TDY IN MEANTIME.

on

EE/P/MR. SZCZEPANSKI By Phone LDP

WH/PERSONNEL PC Bowers
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. King
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~ 3-6017

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chief of Operations, DD/P

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT (Amendment)

1. The attached project, originating in WH Division, is designed to determine Sino/Soviet/Satellite plans, activities, and connections with other Communist elements through independent audio-surveillance operations in Mexico. It is presented for your approval of two amendments: the first, to permit the utilization of Roland K. WINGSNESS (p) as an additional Staff Agent in the project, and the second, to establish for cover purposes a $20,000 U. S. bank account for Staff Agent Daniel K. BROMUND (p) in order that he may obtain Rentista status in Mexico.

2. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $26,493 from the DD/P-WH Division budget for fiscal year 1958. Sufficient funds are available in the WH Division budget. If approved, these two amendments will raise the total amount authorized for the present project year, 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958, to $156,647. Project LIFEAT was renewed by the DDCI on 30 October 1957 in the amount of $130,154.

3. Attached is the LIFEAT Project Outline, which sets forth the important factors involved in the operation; a WH Division memorandum, dated 31 October 1957, which explains the proposal for securing Rentista status for BROMUND; and a WH Division memorandum, dated 13 November 1957, which requests authority to incorporate WINGSNESS into the project as a Staff Agent.

4. CCB/NC comments that according to Finance Division, establishing a bank account for BROMUND is the only means of satisfying the requirements of the Mexican government. The Letter of Credit must be irrevocable and allow a stated withdrawal per period (as in this case, per quarter) in order that the full amount cannot be liquidated before the expiration of the Rentista. CCB/NC recommends approval in this connection. In addition CCB/NC recommends approval of the proposed use of WINGSNESS, provided that his cover, which has not been determined as yet, be coordinated with CCB/NC sufficiently in advance to allow CCB/NC to state any objections deemed necessary and to take effective action toward establishing sound cover.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

5. I recommend approval of these two amendments, subject to the conditions as stated by CCB/HC in paragraph four, above.

/s/ W. Lloyd George *
W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

Concur: (Signed) [illegible] COP-DD/P   3 DEC 1957 Date

Approved: Signed C. P. CABELL DDCI   5 DEC 1957 Date

Attachments: Project Outline LIFEAT
Memorandum, 31 October 1957
Memorandum, 13 November 1957

Staff Coordination:

For C/FI/OPS	s/R. Bryant
For C/CI/OA	s/J. Burton
C/CCB/HC	s/J. Southard
For C/CI	s/H. Brown

Responsible Officers:
Hdqts. - Louis D. Puckett
Field - Charles Anderson

* Amendment approved to extent that a competent additional staff agent may be added to the project and the Letter of Credit underwritten. However the addition of Wingness per se is not approved until the necessary personnel management restriction currently in effect have been complied with.

/s/ L.G.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Project Renewal

1. LIFEAT Project was renewed for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. It is requested that this Project be amended to include Roland K. WINOSNESS as a Staff Agent.

2. WINOSNESS is a Staff Employee attached to ORR. He recently completed a four month TDY in Mexico City where he performed his work in a highly satisfactory manner and the Chief of Station, Mexico City, has specifically requested his PCS assignment under Project LIFEAT. Approval will be requested of Chief of Operations to transfer WINOSNESS to the DDP from DDI as soon as this Project Amendment has been approved. A Staff Agent slot is already available under Project LIFEAT which can be filled by WINOSNESS. As soon as WINOSNESS becomes a DDP employee, WHD plans to give him intensified language training and to send him to Mexico after the first of the year.

3. Although Daniel K. BROMUND was included in the LIFEAT Project Renewal as a Russian translator, the volume of material produced under LIFEAT in the Russian language is increasing at such a rate that the services of two Russian translators are required. WINOSNESS also will be used as an assistant Case Officer, will administer at least two base houses, will do regular line inspections and make technical repairs at the listening posts, and will be required to prepare finished operational and intelligence reports based on his own and other LIFEAT agents' raw reports. WINOSNESS is well qualified to perform all these tasks.

4. Authority is requested to obligate an additional $6,493 for Project LIFEAT for the last half of the present project year. A breakdown of this amount is as follows:

WINOSNESS Salary: ($7,785 per year)	$3,893
Allowances: (Quarters up to $2,000)	1,000
Other (Educational-in accordance with R-20-610 dated 9 February 56 estimated at-)	300
Travel: PCS Air to Mexico for family	500
Household Effects, Movement	800
TOTAL	$6,493

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

File Lifeat

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. Puckett
Room 2111 Barton Hall
Ext. 2555
Date 13 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Project Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

DIVISION Western Hemisphere

STATION Mexico City

It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include Roland E. WINOSNESS as a Staff Agent under this project. The additional cost to the project for the remainder of the project year will be $6,493. The attached memorandum sets forth details of this amendment.

ROBERT M. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES APPLE, WH/FI

COLLINS ALMON, WH/STAFF/CHIEF

DATE

Attachments
Memoranda (4)
Form No. 680 (4)
Envelope w/True Name Card

SECRET

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIFEAT (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 July 1957 TO 30 June 1958 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $______ AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

______ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ______ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1958	FISCAL YEAR
COMPENSATION	$ 3,593	$
ALLOWANCES	1,300	
TRAVEL	1,300	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES		
OTHER:		
TOTAL	$ 6,193	$

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☒ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ______ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ______ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

______ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ______ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. (INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED)

☐ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION.
☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
L. D. Puckett	8535		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 38-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

~~SECRET~~

(3)

14-00000

004 HM/JM/ATP

DATE : 01 NOV 57

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 2 06 5[illegible] '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI, S/C 2

IN 29930

TO DIR **INFO** **CITE** MEXI 0521

REQUEST REPLY MEXI 739 (IN 24781).*

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMENDMENT RESEARCH REPORT ON LIFEAT.

FILE TITLE Proj LIFEAT - Development & Plans

INITIALS

DATE PROC

50-6-32/1

ENCLOSURE

DATE OF DOC 1 Nov 57 ☒

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

AREA DIVISION Western Hemisphere

STATION Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name Louis D. [illegible]ckett
Room 2112 [illegible] 311
Ext. 2555 or 3162
Date 31 October 1957

1. It is requested that the LIFEAT project be amended to include authorization to open a bank account of $20,000 for Daniel K. BROMUND (Staff Agent). Project LIFEAT was approved for renewal for the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.

2. Subsequent to the renewal of Project LIFEAT, it was determined that the cover appropriate for Daniel K. BROMUND would be that of a Rentista. In order to obtain Rentista status from the Mexican Government, it is necessary to show documents which prove that the applicant has an income of approximately $350 per month for a period of five years. On approval of this amendment, it is planned to open an account for Daniel K. BROMUND for the amount of $20,000 against which the bank will issue him a Letter of Credit which will permit him to draw against this account at the rate of $1,000 quarterly. This Letter of Credit will then be used to obtain Rentista status for BROMUND. This Letter of Credit will be held by the Station and will be passed to BROMUND for use once every three months. BROMUND will use this Letter of Credit, withdrawing his $1,000 quarterly, and will immediately deposit this money and the Letter of Credit with the Finance Officer at the Station. These deposits will be accounted for in the Station's accountings.

3. To protect the United States Government's interest, the necessary Declarations of Trust and/or Assignment of Interest as determined by the Finance Division will be executed and filed with the Monetary Branch, Finance Division.

ROBERT H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

CHARLES A[illegible]LE, WH/FI

COLLINS ALMON, WH/Staff/Chief

DATE

Attachments
1. Form 680 (quad)
2. Envelope w/true name

14-00000

DESENSITIZED
per CSM 43-43

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMMW-5390~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
CLA

50-6-32

AN
AB X
~~IF~~
~~PS~~
~~RI~~
DES NFD
~~FI~~
ARD

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative/LIFEAT
SPECIFIC - Procurement of Recorders

Reference: HMMA-8143 (KAPOK 1106), 2 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: Clarification of request for recorders.

1. Paragraph four, e, of reference contains a request for ten used EKOTAPE recorders. However, it is not clear whether this request is in addition to or in place of the request contained in MEXI 918, dated 9 August 1957. The recorders requested in MEXI 918 were forwarded to the Station under cargo numbers 20369 and 20370 on 16 and 17 September 1957 (see DIR 35369 and DIR 35748), and probably arrived at the Station after the referenced dispatch was written.

2. There are no used EKOTAPE recorders available at Headquarters for shipment to the Station. However, KURIOT has advised the Desk that should any used recorders become available at Headquarters or at other field stations, they will make every effort to send them to Mexico City. As the Station probably knows, EKOTAPE recorders are no longer manufactured.

3. KURIOT requested that the Station be informed that KURIOT appreciates the technical report contained in the reference. They will investigate further the technical problems experienced by the Station; the Station will be advised of any significant developments. KURIOT considers that six months use from the Revere heads, under LIFEAT operating conditions, is quite good.

4. In view of the unavailability of used EKOTAPE recorders and the recent shipment of ten new REVERE recorders, Headquarters will take no further action on the referenced request unless requested to do so by the Station.

COPY

Remove from Project KDMANGO
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 30 Fold: 4

RECORD COPY

J. C. King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

HMM-W-5390

16 October 1957

Distribution:
  3 - Mexico City
  1 - WH/Mailroom
  1 - WH/Support
  1 - WH/Logistics
  1 - TSS/ASD
  1 - WH/III/Chrono
  ✓1 - RI
  1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

WH/Support
50-6-32/1
WH/Logistics
TSS/ASD Mr. Bartley
for R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere

STATION: Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

Name: [illegible]

Room: 2112 [illegible] Hall

Ext: [illegible]

Date: 22 Jul 1957

1. The attached project outline is presented for renewal for the period 1 Jul 1957 through 30 June 1958. The project outline is accompanied by a review of LIFEAT activities during the past year.

2. In support of the renewal of Project LIFEAT there are attached memoranda prepared by CI/OPS/WH, EE/P and EE/C.

3. A brief historical resume of Project LIFEAT may be found in Section three of the project outline.

F. [illegible], C/WH/III

G. [illegible], WH/FI

C. [illegible], WH/Staff/Chief

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

DATE

Attachments:
- Review of LIFEAT Project
- Revised LIFEAT PPO
- Form 680 in quad.
- Memoranda from CI/OPS/WH, EE/P and EE/C
- LIFEAT Project Approvals
- LICOOL Project Approvals
- Envelope containing true names of case officers and agents.

4

REVIEW OF PROJECT LIFEAT TO ACCOMPANY REQUEST FOR RENEWAL

1. Product of the Project

The Soviet Embassy

a. Soviet Commercial Activities

Reports submitted during the past year have conveyed a substantial amount of detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy in Mexico, and to a lesser extent, in adjacent areas. This information has reflected the types of products the Soviets are selling and purchasing in Mexico, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, procedures used for arranging sales and purchases and the manner of affecting shipments. This information has been screened from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commercial traffic and appears to be accurate and detailed. Within the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased considerably and remains the Station's primary source for information on Soviet commercial activities. Pertinent examples of this type of information may be found in:

HMMA-2476, CS-3/[illegible] File, dated 1 March 1957 "Tentative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee"

HMMA-1973, CS-[illegible] File, dated 15 October 1956 "Mexican Exports to the USSR"

HMMA-1760, CS-[illegible] File, dated 19 October 1956, "Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the U. S."

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Project LIFEAT coverage of Soviet diplomatic activities appears to have been quite thorough and enlightening during the past year. Reports submitted on these activities have indicated some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. LIFEAT operations have also established some facts concerning the relations among the Soviets, Poles and Czechoslovakians in Mexico City. Some indication has been received on the relations between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type provide some evidence as to when the Soviets seem to be engaged in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican

Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate other Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in later traffic. Briefly, the Soviets do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The reports have shown an improvement in Soviet relations with the Yugoslavs, which were practically non-existent for several years in Mexico City. The reports show further that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent business and social interchanges. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-2327, dated 15 January 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

HMM-2395, dated 6 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

HMM-2465, dated 27 February 1957, "Diplomatic Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

c. Soviet Cultural Activities

Information produced by LIFEAT reflects in detail Soviet cultural activities in connection with publications, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. Examples of such reports are:

HMM-2322, dated 18 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, November 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

HMM-2377, dated 30 January 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

HMM-2460, dated 27 February 1957, "Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."
CS-3/[illegible] RI

HMM-2326, dated 16 January 1957, "Visit of Soviet Artists to Mexico."

d. Soviet Military Activities

Monthly reports are prepared from LIFEAT information on contacts between Soviet and Mexican military personnel. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of particular interest to the U.S. service attaches in Mexico.

e. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have been reported in almost every instance during the past five years through LIFEAT coverage. Frequently the Station has determined forthcoming departures long before they took place by careful study and interpretation of LIFEAT materials indicating Soviet contacts with local clothiers and other merchants selling luxury items - it is the habit of Soviets, prior to departure from Mexico, to stock up on items which are not available in the USSR. This type of coverage is of particular interest to ODENVY.

f. Soviet Embassy Contacts

Monthly reports of contacts by members of the Soviet diplomatic corps are compiled and submitted to Headquarters. These reports are of considerable value in planning agent operations against the Soviets. They are also of operational assistance in identifying local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets maintain regular contact. The following reports are examples of this type of coverage:

HMM-2376, dated 30 January 1957, "Contacts
25-5 34,772 of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City,
[illegible] December 1956."

HMM-2459, dated 27 February 1957, "Contacts
[illegible] of Soviet Embassy, Mexico City,
[illegible] January 1957."

g. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

LIFEAT has been a very productive source for collecting personality information on Soviets. Such data as Soviet contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc., are of value in determining which officials may be susceptible to recruitment and/or defection. A case in point would be the present Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori [illegible]. A recent study of his background and habits indicated that his wife might be vulnerable to recruitment because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. A sample of the personality report series may be found in [illegible]-6001, dated 1[illegible] May 1957, subject: "Boris Pavlovich K[illegible]".

h. Goods and Services Provided to the Soviet Embassy

Periodic reports of the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy have been of considerable value in developing and mounting a [illegible] operation. This type of information is valuable in determining the identity of individuals having access to the Soviet Embassy who can later be recruited by the Station as controlled agents. [illegible]-2[illegible]2, dated 27 February 1957, subject: "Goods and Services Used by the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956 - January 1957", is an example of the Station's reporting of this type of operational information.

i. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-2375, dated 30 January 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, December 1956."

HMM-2448, dated 27 February 1957, "Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, January 1957."

The Czech Legation

The information obtained on the Czech Legation during the past year is basically the same as the information obtained on the Soviet Embassy; consequently, to avoid repetition in this review, only the highlights of Czech Legation coverage are mentioned.

a. Data Pertaining to Czech Personnel

The LIFEAT collection effort in this connection has been productive. Reports have reflected personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members and information suitable for use in planning defection approaches.

The following reports are cited as examples of this type of information:

HMM-1896, dated 28 September 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-1959, dated 17 October 1956, "Czech Legation Personnel."

HMM-2330, dated 18 January 1957, "Czech Legation Personnel."

b. Spot Reports on Czech Legation Activities

Spot reports are submitted periodically on matters of interest which pertain to the Czech Legation. Examples of these reports are:

HMM-1779, dated 10 September 1956, "Proposed Czech-Mexican Barter Transaction."
CS-104650
[illegible]

HMM-1814, dated 19 September 1956, "Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives."

HMM-1577, dated 9 October 1956, "Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia."
CS-107787
[illegible]

HMM-1987, dated 24 October 1956, "Czech Delegates to the XX International Congress of Geology."

Polish Legation

As with the Czech Legation, information pertaining to the Polish Legation parrallels closely the type of information reported about the Soviet Embassy. By far the largest amount of information obtained on the Polish Legation during the past year has resulted from LIFEAT coverage. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded to Headquarters. The following examples of spot reports were forwarded for Headquarters' dissemination:

HMM-1744, dated 29 August 1956, "Polish Legation Reception Commemorating 11th Anniversary of Day of Liberation."
CS-103442
[illegible]

HMM-1748, dated 31 August 1956, "Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to the Eighth International Radiology Congress."

HMM-2631, dated 20 February 1957, "Polish
Legation Contacts with Carlos
Augusto LEON (Venezuelan Communist)."

HMM-2532, dated 29 March 1957, "Release of
Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo."

HMMA-5941, dated 9 January 1957, "Julius
KATZ-SUCHY."

Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

A significant amount of information was received from LIFEAT during the past year concerning the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Party front organizations. The latter included information on the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, the Mexican Peace Movement, the Society of Friends of China and various art fronts. This information has been of value in supplementing agent coverage of these organizations. The following reports are examples of this type of information:

HMM-1657, dated 18 July 1956, "Narciso BASSOLS."

HMM-2285, dated 29 November 1956, "Xavier
GUERRERO Saucedo and Clara Porset
de GUERRERO."

American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages initiated through LIFEAT during the past year was directed against American Communists in Mexico. Most of these targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production was processed in part by ODENVY. A total of 342 reels of information were recorded on three separate cases. A fourth case, LCMAYFO-L, was mounted at the suggestion of ODENVY just 15½ hours after the Station received the request from Headquarters. The Station has received three commendations from Headquarters on the LIFEAT coverage of this case and Edward P. [illegible] received a personal commendation from the DCI for his work on this operation. Over 90 reels of valuable information have been produced since the beginning of this operation on 9 February 1957.

Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT coverage provided the means for the Station to assess reports from another source concerning the hardening of the Mexican Government's attitude toward foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets provided reliable information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario [illegible] Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI, Jacobo [illegible]ITZ Zender and [illegible] [illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained through other Station sources. LIFEAT also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons who sought to help those imprisoned. For example, LIFEAT established that the Venezuelan Communist leader, [illegible] [illegible] Morales, was the person holding the passport of Joaquin [illegible] at the time of his arrest; this fact, among others, makes [illegible] appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. The below listed reports contain information of this type:

H[illegible]-A-6240, dated 6 March 1957

[illegible]-A-6242, dated 6 March 1957

[illegible]-1769, para four, dated 12 September 1956, is cited as containing an apparently reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-U. S. articles and opinions.

LA[illegible] Information

LIFEAT has contributed materially to several matters having LA[illegible]ICLE interest.

Counter Intelligence Information

CI/CE matters constitue a major portion of the Mexico City Station's priority objectives. Project LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. A few representative samples of this type of information are listed below:

H[illegible]-1958, dated 9 October 1956, and [illegible]-2286, dated 2 January 1957 describe contacts between Narciso BA[illegible]LS, leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor N. G[illegible]V, his Soviet case officer.

[illegible]-7246
RI

[illegible]-2420, dated 8 February 1957, sets forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

[illegible]-2270, dated 19 December 1956, sets forth contacts between Nikolay R[illegible]IZOV, Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus MAZO [illegible], Mexican Naval officer.

HMMA-4163, dated 23 April 1956, and HMMA-2276, dated 20 December 1956, describe a lengthy series of contacts between "Brana" HAILE, an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. KAZANTSEV, Soviet intelligence officer.

Checks on Double Agents

Several of the Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT while in contact with the Soviet Embassy, thereby enabling the Station to verify portions of their reports and hence providing means for establishing the veracity of the agents' reports to the Station. Among those monitored during the past year were LIBELKA, LIL[illegible], LI[illegible] and LISTOCK-1.

Jewish Communist Activities

LIFEAT coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Aaron Jose PRZYSWA Margulos, has provided information on the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PRZYSWA in Communist matters.

Coverage of the Jewish Communist leader, Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It also produced the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, a member of the Jewish Communist group, and the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent.

Further, LIFEAT has established that the Liga Popular Israelita, a Jewish Communist front organization, is almost defunct and quite inactive.

Hidden Microphone Operation

One LI[illegible] type operation is presently active. It is directed against the residence of the Soviet Counselor of Embassy and has caused a great deal of concern with the technical problems of installing the equipment and recording conversations properly in order that acceptable production of operational data might be obtained. A TSS technician is presently at the Station correcting these deficiencies; and, recent cable reports have provided valuable information which tends to confirm previous tentative conclusions that the Soviet Counselor of Embassy is a suitable target for a concentrated defection approach. The Station is currently making the necessary plans to approach the target, having already received Headquarters' approval.

Conclusion

The Mexico City Station and the Headquarters Mexico Desk agree that the product of the LIFEAT Project measured against the expenditure of Agency assets in terms of personnel, time, security risks and funds well justifies its renewal. The information produced by this operation has contributed materially and substantially to several priority objectives of the Mexico City Station's Related Mission Directive.

2. Progress of the Operation

Definite progress has been made in reporting on the objectives of the LIFEAT project; however, all LIFEAT objectives are of a continuing nature and are not designed to be fully achieved. For this reason, no statistics can be cited as to the percentage of coverage on each objective. A general indication can be derived of the scope of the project by realizing that approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from LIFEAT during the past year. An average of 23 simultaneous coverages on a 24 hour per day basis has been maintained during this review period. Generally, these coverages may be broken down as follows:

Soviet Embassy	8 lines
Czech Legation	2 lines
Polish Legation	2 lines
American Communists	3 lines
Remainder	8 lines

3. Planning for the Future

During the coming year Station capabilities will be expanded to permit monitoring approximately 30 lines. Basic coverage of Soviet, Czech and Polish activities will be continued to the maximum extent possible and assets and capabilities will be maintained for exploiting important targets of opportunity. At the present time the Station believes that 30 lines are about the maximum load the technical agents assigned to LIFEAT can properly handle and protect. The Station is currently preparing plans for submission to Headquarters which call for the establishment of a similar but separate and compartmented LIFEAT-type operation. Such a project would have new agents not previously associated with or knowledgeable about LIFEAT.

4. Performance of Agents

The Station has reported that in general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good during the past year. However, some of the agents connected with the group based on the family of the former head agent James [illegible] (deceased) have not been performing in a completely satisfactory manner. These agents are gradually being replaced by new and fully compartmented agents. The Station continues to face recruitment problems, however, since the LIFEAT employment qualifications are quite rigid. The basic qualifications are:

a. Absolute discretion

b. Willingness to cover a base 24 hours daily for long periods of time.

c. Willingness to obey complex orders for long periods of time.

d. Willingness to live in a situation of constant danger.

Additional comments concerning the production, security and cover of individual agents will be found in the attached field project outline.

5. Expenditures During Period Under Review

Approval was granted for the period under review, 1 July 1956 - 30 June 1957, to expend $113,931. The total amount of funds obligated for Project LIFEAT during FY 1957 was $99,167. The proposed LIFEAT budget for FY 1958 is contained in the attached field project outline.

6. Status of Commitments

There are no commitments other than those provided for in the field project outline and the individual contracts of several LIFEAT personnel.

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

PART I

1. Area of Operations

This project will be run from the Mexico City Station. It will be concerned with targets located in Mexico City.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to determine Sino-Soviet plans, activities and connections with other communist elements through the use of technical surveillance. This purpose appears to be in consonance with the Related Mission Directive for Mexico (dated 7 May 1957), Priority A, Objective One.

3. Background

Project LIFEAT was approved initially on 3 October 1950. Actual operations began on 18 January 1951 and have run continuously since that time. The LIFEAT operation was begun with the installation of one telephone tap and has expanded since that time to an average daily monitoring of 23 telephone lines and from one to four hidden microphone installations (the microphone operations were originally under a separate project—LICOOL).

Project LIFEAT is a unilateral operation. It is completely independent from any liaison arrangement and is staffed by Agency staff and contract employees together with a substantial number of local indigenous controlled agents.

During the past six years Project LIFEAT has produced more than 40,000 pages of operational and intelligence information in direct support of the Mexico City Station's objectives specifically and has contributed materially to the intelligence gathering activities connected with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, Project LIFEAT has been of considerable value and assistance in monitoring the activities of Americans residing in Mexico City in which ODENVY has major interest.

4. References

a. HMMA-4503, 9 May 1956 (Station's request for renewal of LIFEAT Project.)

b. HMMW-3710, 19 November 1956 (Headquarters' notification to the Station of the renewal of the LIFEAT Project.)

5. Objectives

a. To identify Soviet and Satellite intelligence personnel and to collect information on the nature and extent of their clandestine intelligence and propaganda activities in Mexico.

b. To collect information on Soviet and Satellite commercial, diplomatic, cultural and military activities in Mexico.

c. To collect biographic information on Soviet and Satellite officials.

d. To collect information on the movements, assignments and positions of Soviet and Satellite personnel.

e. To identify and collect information on prominent Mexican Communist Party (PCM) officials.

f. To collect information on the plans and activities of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

g. To collect information on the activities of prominent Jewish Communists residing in Mexico.

h. To collect information on the activities of American Communists and other targets of opportunity living in Mexico.

6. Targets

For Objectives "a" - "d":

a. Selected Soviet Embassy and Commercial Office telephone conversations.

b. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Soviet Officials.

c. Conversations emanating from the residences of selected Soviet Officials (hidden microphone installations).

d. Selected Czech Legation, Czech Commercial Office and Polish Legation telephone conversations.

e. Conversations emanating from the New Polish Legation (hidden microphone installations).

For Objectives "e" and "f":

14-00000

f. Selected telephone conversations originating within the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) headquarters.

g. Telephone conversations from the residences of senior PCM and other Communist officials' residences.

For Objective "g":

h. Telephone conversations from the residences of selected Jewish Communists.

For Objective "h":

i. Telephone conversations from the residences of known American Communists.

j. Telephone conversations, and other conversations which can be monitored by technical means, of targets of opportunity.

7. Tasks

Senior Case Officer - Thomas G. URQUHART
Assistant Case Officer for LIMERICK phase - Arthur S. STOUGH

a. Supervise the operational and administrative activities of all LIFEAT staff, contract and indigenous personnel.

b. Maintain awareness and provide direction in all operational matters pertaining to the management of the LIFEAT Project.

c. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIMERICK, LITHOSPHERE and LITHOGRAPHY phases of the LIFEAT Project.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIMERICK with other Station operations.

e. Maintain LIFEAT capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

Case Officer - Matthew S. BINKLEY

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LICOOL phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LICOOL phase.

c. Maintain LICOOL capabilities for mounting operations against targets of opportunity.

d. Insure that all operational and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the [illegible] personnel involved and, where appropriate, other Station personnel.

Case Officer - Harvey P. [illegible]

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LIVERY phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LIVERY phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LIVERY personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

Case Officer - (To be assigned later)

a. Provide guidance and day-to-day supervision of the LITMUS phase of the LIFEAT Project.

b. Conduct the training of all personnel assigned to the LITMUS phase.

c. Insure that all operations and intelligence information receives appropriate handling by the LITMUS personnel involved and where appropriate by Station personnel.

d. Co-ordinate information received from LIVERY with other Station operations.

The tasks of all other personnel assigned to the LIFEAT Project are stated or implied in Sections 9 and 11, below.

8. Co-ordination

a. Information produced by the LIFEAT Project is closely co-ordinated with all other operations at the Mexico City Station. No operational co-ordination is required with any other area, but they are kept informed of any information produced by the Project, which may be of interest to them.

b. Project LIROC, which supports David W. [illegible], who is the principal outside LIFEAT Case Officer, is effected in co-ordination with Project LIFEAT.

c. LIFEAT Project is co-ordinated with Project [illegible] under which [illegible] and [illegible]-1, who perform work for Project LIFEAT, are carried.

d. In specific instances this project is co-ordinated with O NAVY representatives and activities in Mexico.

9. Personnel

The following persons will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958.

a. Staff Agents:

(1) Ralph F. RAFAEL[illegible], who is under unofficial commercial cover, acts as assistant Case Officer.

(2) Daniel K. BRA[illegible], formerly a Staff Employee with SR Division, will be a Staff Agent with the Mexican Station to do translation of LI[illegible] material. He was granted a Security Approval on 23 February 1951. Until his arrival the Station is utilizing the Services of Rowland K. WINGENESS on a TDY basis.

b. Contract Agents/Employees:

(1) David M. WILSTED. With the death of James O. ATCALL (p) in March 1956, WILSTED has become the principal outside Case Officer in the LIFEAT Project, and also assists with the processing of some of the LIFEAT material. He is supported by and is the only agent under Project LINOO which was approved on 24 May 1957. The purpose of the LINOO Project, is to establish WILSTED as a long-term deep cover asset in Mexico City. WILSTED received an Operational Approval on 2 November 1951.

(2) Alice N. CAIL[illegible] does ZOMAR processing for LIFEAT material. She received a covert security approval on 28 May 1956.

(3) Olivia M. GLA[illegible] (LI[illegible]), is used to process LIFEAT tapes and prepare ZOMAR abstracts. She received an Operational Approval on 30 July 1956.

(4) Frances M. HENZIE does clerical work for Project LIFEAT. She received a covert security approval on 5 August 1955.

(5) Carol K. ZI[illegible]ISTER (LICALLA-1) processes a major part of the LIERICK material. She received an Operational Approval on 3 June 1955.

(6) Louise J. MACRINO (LI[illegible]) will process LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 6 September 1955. A covert security approval is being requested.

c. Field Agents:

(1) LILACS, David M. [illegible]'s wife, assists in translating and preparing reports from LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 28 September 1954.

(2) LIMESTONE-1 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 11 September 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(3) LIMESTONE-2 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 25 November 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 December 1953.

(4) LIMESTONE-3 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 29 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(5) LIMESTONE-4 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 October 1954 and has an oral contract effective 1 November 1954.

(6) LIMESTONE-5 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 21 March 1955.

(7) LIMESTONE-7, wife of the late James O. AYCALL, has been used as a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1956.

(8) LIMESTONE-8 is an assistant base house operator and processor of tapes. She received an Operational Approval on 27 April 1956.

(9) LIMESTONE-9 received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(10) LIMESTONE-10, wife of LIMESTONE-3, received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(11) LI[illegible] is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company. He provides the basic information necessary for running the Project. He received an Operational Approval on 17 October 1950 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1950.

(12) [illegible]-1 is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation. He received an Operational Approval on 14 August 1951 and has an oral contract effective 1 October 1953.

(13) [illegible]-2, works with and has duties similar to his cousin, [illegible]-1. He received an Operational Approval on 11 December 1953 and has an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(14) LIMITATION is a base house operator. He received Operational Approval on 3 April 1951 and 30 September 1952 and is under an oral agreement effective 1 May 1951.

(15) LIMITATION-3, LIMITATION's father, is an assistant base house keeper and processor of LIFEAT material. He received an Operational Approval on 1 October 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 November 1953.

(16) LIMITATION-5 is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 15 February 1954 and on 20 August 1954. He is under an oral agreement effective 1 March 1954.

(17) LIMITATION-6 assists LIMITATION-5, her husband, with the base house. She received an Operational Approval on 3 January 1956.

(18) LIMITATION-7 is an assistant base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 13 August 1956.

(19) LIPSTICK-18 is a base house operator. He received Operational Approvals on 31 March 1955 and 25 October 1955 and is under an oral agreement effective November 1954.

(20) LIPSTICK-35 is an assistant base house operator and is the wife of LIPSTICK-18. She received an Operational Approval on 6 August 1956.

(21) LIPSTICK 37, a relative of LIPSTICK-18, is an assistant base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 13 September 1956.

(22) LIQUATION has been a base house operator and may retire during the coming project year. He received an Operational Approval on 16 December 1953 and is under an oral contract effective 1 January 1954.

(23) LIQUATION-1, LIQUATION's brother, is a base house operator. He received an Operational Approval on 26 September 1955.

(24) LIQUATION-2, wife of LIQUATION, is a base house operator. She received an Operational Approval on 21 August 1956.

(25) LI[illegible]-3 is an assistant base house operator and processor of LIFEAT material. She received an Operational Approval on 19 January 1957.

(26) Unwitting assistant to LI[illegible] for routine office work.

LIPRIFORM and LIPRIFORM-1, who handle Czech languages tapes for the LIFEAT Project, are included under the LI[illegible] Project since the translation of the material and application of it to Czech operations are considered LI[illegible] functions. LIPRIFORM received an Operational Approval on 3 July 1951 and his wife, LIPRIFORM-1, received one on 5 May 1952.

ODENVY's local office processes certain taps from targets of primary interest to them.

There are a total of 41 persons who work full and part time on the LIFEAT Project. It is expected that two more processors and one additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

d. Personnel Dropped from the Project:

The following Staff Agents returned to Headquarters on PCS during the last project year: Lewis D. NICKLAS, Chester D. POLLICOVE, and Norman F. WANGEROW.

LIPSTICK 13 left Mexico City.

10. Operational Clearances

See item 9.

11. Cover

(1) Ralph B. RAFANELLI: Fully documented employee of LIFINGER, who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

(2) Daniel K. BROWNEL: The Station is in the process of arranging LI[illegible]'s cover.

(3) David M. WILSTED: Partner in small family-run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

(4) Alice H. CAULETEAD: Housewife

(5) Olivia N. GLADDEN: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

(6) Frances N. MENZIE: Housewife

(7) Carol K. ZINSMEISTER: Housewife

(8) Louise J. MACHADO: Housewife, wife of LIPSTICK-19

(9) LILACK: Housewife

(10) LIMESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have an income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

(11) LIMESTONE-2: Brother of LIMESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

(12) LIMESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

(13) LIMESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

(14) LIMESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIMESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

(15) LIMESTONE-7: Widow of James O. AYCALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

(16) LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

(17) LIMESTONE-9: Housewife

(18) LIMESTONE-10: Housewife

(19) LIMEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

(20) LIMEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(21) LIMEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

(22) LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the LIMIT Base.

(23) LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

(24) LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm.

(25) LIMITATION-6: Wife of LIMITATION-5. She handles most of the routine work LIMITATION-5 has done for the Station in the past.

(26) LIMITATION-7: Housewife

(27) LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

(28) LIPSTICK-35: Housewife

(29) LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

(30) LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

12. Contact and Communications

a. Contact and communications between the case officer and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner. Various patterns have been established by which the agents and the case officers follow prearranged signals for the meetings. When heavy or bulky material is to be passed, the meetings are always held at nights. All movement in and out of bases by the Case Officers and Principal Agents is done in cars ostensibly owned by the base agents, except in the case of LIVERY, where the agents are too old to drive. One of the local agents is usually used to contact the LIVERY base. Entrance to the bases by foot is made only in great emergencies.

b. Telephonic contact concerning the Project is kept to a minimum and a code system of digits and cryptonyms has been devised for use by the agents and case officers for phone conversations.

c. Alternate and emergency signals have been worked out.

d. In general these systems of contact and communication have been in practice for over six years and appear to have been suitable to the work. In detail, locations and times of meetings have been changed frequently.

13. Control and Motivation

The indigenous agents on this project are motivated by the following factors:

a. The LI[illegible]ATER group: Motivated by high salaries and LI[illegible], himself, by pro-PBPRIME feelings. One of his sons is at present studying there. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

b. The LI[illegible] group: Motivated by family loyalty, good salaries and pro-PBPRIME outlook. They are further controlled by fear of police action.

c. The LIMITATION group: Motivated by pro-PBPRIME sentiments, LIMITATION being a PBPRIME citizen and LIMITATION-1 having resided there for many years.

d. The LIPSTICK group: Motivated by family loyalties, good salaries and personal loyalty to LI[illegible].

e. The LIQUATION group: Motivated by family loyalty and good salary. LIQUATION, himself, is anti-Communist. Control is ideological and monetary.

14. Equipment and Support

It is believed that the supply of equipment for LIFEAT currently at the Station is sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT

PART II

16. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U. S. dollars per year. LIFEAT costs will be higher than in the past because of rises in the cost of living (especially increased rents) and intended expansion.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Ralph B. RAFANELLI, GS-7				
	Salary	$4,525.00		
	Quarters	2,000.00		
			6,525.00	
Daniel K. Bremond ~~Unnamed~~ LIMERICK processor(GS-12)				
	Salary	7,570.00		
	Quarters	2,200.00		
	PCS Travel	2,000.00		
			11,770.00	
~~Unnamed LIDCE translator~~				
Included under New Project Besmooth	~~Salary~~	~~6,500.00~~		
	~~Quarters~~	~~2,000.00~~		
	~~PCS Travel~~	~~2,000.00~~		
			~~10,500.00~~	
Carol K. ZIMMEISTER	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00	
Frances M. MENZIE	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00	
Alice H. CAILLETEAU	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00	
Olivia H. GLADMON	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00	
Louise J. MACRIDO	Salary	3,360.00	3,360.00	~~46,364.00~~ 35,864.00

2. Field agents

	Presently		
LIMEWATER	5280.00	✓	
LIMEWATER-1	2208.00		
LIMEWATER-2	1440.00	✓	
LIMESTONE-1	1440.00		
LIMESTONE-2	576.00		
LIMESTONE-3	2208.00		
LIMESTONE-4	2208.00		
LIMESTONE-5	768.00	✓	
LIMESTONE-7	1538.00	✓	
LIMESTONE-8	1728.00	✓	
LIMITATION	2112.00		
LIMITATION-3	1920.00	✓	
LIMITATION-5(not hired yet)			
LIQUATION	3840.00	✓	
LIQUATION-1	3840.00	✓	
LIQUATION-3	768.00	✓	
LI[illegible]TICK-18	1728.00	✓	
LILACE (£2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00	✓	
LIMEWATER assistant	144.00		
Possible raises	2000.00		
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00		41,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LIMERICK base house	2050.00	
LITHUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LITHOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
LCMAYFOWL base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIPHAT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2800.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	
		21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	5,000.00	5,000.00

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts)	2,000.00	2,000.00
2. Transportation		
LIMERICK car rent	300.00	
Carol K. ZINGMEISTER mileage	350.00	
LITMUS base car rental	700.00	
LIVERY base car rental	700.00	
LITHOGRAPH base car rental	400.00	
(MV 2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	
		4,590.00
3. Other Operational Expenses (To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity)		20,000.00
Grand Total		~~140,654.00~~ 130,154.00

17. Special Problems and Commitments

None not reflected in the Project Outline

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-43

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7370

[redacted] #1012

Mr. Dahlgren

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— LIFEAT/Operational

SPECIFIC— Operations report for June 1957

MICROFILMED
JAN 25 1962
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

REF: HMM-A-7141

The following report is keyed to the headings required in FN 52-670 sec 3c2.

a. Processing of information: No change. The LCMAYFOWL phase of the operation was live monitored all day and during the early evening hours. A large number of ZOHAR abstract sheets, made out by Olivia Gladmon and Alice Gailleteau, were forwarded to Headquarters. Gladmon was also used on the processing of the Maurice HALPERIN target. During June the new system of making numerous carbon copies of the traffic was further developed and hence more copies were made available for clipping and putting into "P" (201) files. Routine reporting on monthly developments, particularly pertaining to the LIMERICK phase, was continued on the same basis as in the past.

15964

b. Exploitation of leads: Leads connected with the visit of the alleged Communist agent Jacobo UCHNIK, from Argentina were followed through the Maurice HALPERIN line and were coordinated with other activities on the case. From LIFEAT coverage it was also ascertained that LCMAYFOWL was in contact with Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, RIS case officer stationed at the Soviet Embassy. This knowledge, obtained by voice recognition of KOLOMYAKOV in a single contact with the LCMAYFOWL target, resulted in the mounting of a physical surveillance of the LCMAYFOWL target which confirmed the existence of the contact and enable the station to derive further information of importance. In a third instance, LIFEAT contact between a Mexican Army officer and an RIS officer enabled the station to make plans to cover a meeting between them scheduled for 3 July 1957. Finally, coverage of LIMERICK targets commercial lines enabled the station to direct various investigations which resulted in the identification of several commercial contacts of that establishment.

c. Liaison: Not applicable.

d. Security: Security on the project remained without substantial change. Nothing further has developed from the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. On the other hand, the activities of the local telephone company, which is now more solvent than in many years because of a new financial setup, continued to cause problems and temporary suspensions of work. LITMUS was not run during the entire month and the Maurice HALPERIN phase was suspended after about a week's operation owing to the presence of telephone crews in the same block as the base house as well as at other points along the LITMUS segment of the net. It was observed

Remove from Project KDABACUS
CS Classification: 50-6-32/1
JOB # 73-1735/77
Box: 36 Fold: 4

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

50-6-32/1

[redacted]

that the telephone crew had the habit of putting a high ladder up to the roof of any house upon which they wished to work, whereas in the past it had been their custom to ring the doorbell, ask permission to go to the roof and do so through the house where they wished to work. This new custom brought about the need to study emergency procedures and redraw them. A limited experiment was made on one line with some success. This experiment consisted of leaving the hot stub of one line on the base roof as usual, but instead of leading it directly into the operations room, as previously, it was attached loosely to a lead-in made of softer wire of the type used for interior installations. In the moment of need, the base operator had merely to haul on the soft lead, which therewith parted from the outside wire. Upon reaching the roof, therefore, the telephone men found only a stub ending in random fashion. This emergency method is considered better than none but is satisfactory for no more than one line at a time. It is the further disadvantage in that the outside wire stub is "hot" and could be checked by the telephone crew who, as they have done in the past on a few occasions, might call the target on that hot stub to see where he was located. In general, the station continues to recommend that when telephone crews are working near a base or along its net, crosses should be pulled and the operation suspended till the crews have left the neighborhood. An exception was made in the Halperin case because it was hoped the line would shed light on LCMAYFOWL.

e. Technical: No technical problems were encountered in June 1957.

f. Personnel and Administrative: No problems of a personnel or administrative nature were noted.

g. Miscellaneous: LIFEAT Annex IV was rented early in June and is being readied for use on three to five targets during July. LIMERICK Annex II is still out of service owing to the absence of LICATION and the continuance of work in the zone by the telephone company. LIVERY is out of service owing to the retirement of LIMESTONES 1 and 2 from active duty on account of the alleged blackmail plot of April 1957. LIMERICK Annex III is out of service and will not be recommissioned. One of its LIMERICK target lines was changed over to LIMERICK main base on 28 June. The other two lines from Annex III should be installed at LIMERICK main base during July.

During June 1957 the following lines were monitored part or full time:

7 - LIMERICK office lines out of 8 existing. Two were suspended for some two weeks because of the telephone company activity in their zone.
2 - LITHOSPHERE lines
1 - LCMAYFOWL line
1 - Maurice HALPERIN line (for about a week only)

During June the following cables, HMMs and informational HMMAs were based entirely or in part on LIFEAT:

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

50-6-32/1

MEXI 487
MEXI 498
MEXI 507
MEXI 523
MEXI 525
MEXI 528
MEXI 554
MEXI 563
MEXI 564
MEXI 565
MEXI 578
MEXI 579
MEXI 580
MEXI 581
MEXI 589
MEXI 592
MEXI 595
MEXI 601
MEXI 610
MEXI 618
MEXI 626
MEXI 625
MEXI 627
MEXI 628
MEXI 629
MEXI 634
MEXI 636
MEXI 657
MEXI 659
MEXI 662
HMM-2697
HMM-2698
HMM-2699
HMM-2700
HMM-2713
HMM-2719
HMM-2732
HMM-2734
HMM-2735
HMM-2736
HMM-2745
HMM-2746
HMM-2747
HMM-2757
HMM-2761
HMMA-7102
HMMA-7147
HMMA-7196
HMMA-7204
HMMA-7207
HMMA-7232
HMMA-7237
HMMA-7259
HMMA-7267
HMMA-7281
HMMA-7290
HMMA-7300

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

TGU/ewf
11 July 1957

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/3 Mexico

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia from Chief, WH, subject as above, dated 3 July 1957

The LIVERY phase of Project LIFEAT continues to provide considerable biographic data on the members of the Czech Legation in Mexico City, which EE/Czechoslovakia finds most useful in the evaluation of these individuals as possible targets for recruitment, either in Mexico City or upon their assignment to another overseas post. For this reason EE/Czechoslovakia is interested in seeing Project LIFEAT renewed.

PHILO DIBBLE
AC/EE/C

~~SECRET~~

9 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

SUBJECT: Project LIFEAT/LITMUS

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 3 July 1957 concerning the renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 through 30 June 1958. The LITMUS portion of this project is of primary interest to the Polish Branch, and as part of the increasing priority of KUBARK interest in Poland and Polish targets, it is strongly recommended that the project be continued.

2. This reaffirmation of our interest in LITMUS is based on the coverage it afforded up to December 1956 at which time the case officer/monitor handling LITMUS departed Mexico. This coverage was mainly of operational value in providing the following types of information:

(a) indications of Legation plans to move which lead to the station's investigating the possibilities of installing microphones in strategic places which would have immeasurably improved our knowledge of Polish activities in Mexbo.

(b) Legation security practices which are useful in predicting or interpreting changes elsewhere.

(c) Repatriation effort which has been of interest in itself and is of potential value in determining what part of this effort is connected with the PIS activity in Mexico.

(d) Travel and other information concerning the TDY presence in Mexico of important PIS personalities which assists in the world wide coverage of these individuals.

(e) Some information about the PIS representatives assigned to the Legation.

(f) Confirmatory information concerning some basic aspects of developmental activities such as LIMETRIC.

(g) Biographic and personality information in varying degrees of completeness about each of the individuals

~~SECRET~~

assigned to the Legation and some indication as to their activities and contacts. This data is most useful in assisting in the assessment and selection of these individuals as potential recruitment targets.

(h) Positive intelligence concerning commercial, cultural/propaganda, and diplomatic activities of the Legation personnel. The fact that the disseminations have been relatively few, is due to the usual limitations inherent in this type of audio operation.

3. The method of reporting information from LITMUS (separate reports on Legation officials and on the various subjects of interest) has been extremely well done and most useful to EE/P in assessing any specific personality, or an operational situation. It is hoped that with this basic information from LITMUS now available in each case, the station will be able to put the operational leads to use. Our recommendation for the continuance of LITMUS is based on the assumption that KUBARK operations in Mexico against the Poles will now be aimed primarily at the clarification of the status of the PIS in Mexico, the recruitment of Polish officials within the Legation, and answering the basic question of what the Poles are doing in Mexico. It is believed that LITMUS is essential to the support of this effort.

4. As an example of our interest in Mexico and LITMUS, it is pointed out that a Satellite case officer from the EE Division is currently preparing to depart for Mexico. It is also planned that a Polish speaking contract agent, experienced in Polish operations including monitoring audio efforts, will be sent to Mexico in the near future to work on LITMUS and to assist this case officer.

PETER K. HEIMANN
Chief, EE/P

~~SECRET~~

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/CPS

ATTENTION : Mr. Robert Brown

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LCMAYFOWL phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Poland

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIDRUG phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

WH/III/Mexico/LDPuckett:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

3 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT : Project LIFEAT

1. The WH/Mexico Desk is now in the process of requesting the annual renewal of Project LIFEAT for the period 1 July 1957 - 30 June 1958.

2. During the past year a considerable amount of operational and intelligence information from the LIVERY phase of this project has been forwarded to your office. In view of the pending project renewal, it would be appreciated if you would forward to the WH/Mexico Desk at your earliest convenience a memorandum evaluating this project with regard to your area and sphere of interest.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

~~SECRET~~

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/III/Mexico

NO.

DATE 26 June 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Mexico/LSulc	7 JUN 1957		
2. C/WH/Mexico		1957	
3. C/WH/III	1 July	1	
4.			
5. WH/Staff/Chief	1 JUL	1	
6.			
7. C/WHD	1 JUL	1	
8.			
9.			
10. FI/OPS - Projects Branch ATTN: Miss Emma Paxson	2 JUL 1957	5 JUL 1957	
11. WH-Mexico			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attachment being held by your office.

PROJECT ACTION
RECEIVED
FI/OPS/Projects Branch
2 July, 1957

10 & 11 returned per conversation with Mr. Pept (?) Since this is not to be effective until August we will have to await project renewal

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended, effective 15 August 1957, to permit Daniel K. BROMUND (ps) to replace Lewis D. NICKLAS (ps).

2. BROMUND will monitor LIFEAT coverage and will process the resultant reels. He will be employed in translation and the preparation of reports based on this translation. He will also be employed in analysis of LIFEAT production and the preparation of special reports written on his analysis.

for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVED: ______________________
Chief, FI/OPS

Attachment:
1 Envelope containing true names

SECRET

VIA AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO [illegible]-7053
[redacted]986

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 5 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Project Plan - LIFEAT

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

1. The attached Project Plan for LIFEAT is submitted for Headquarters approval and renewal.

2. It will be noted that the attached plan calls for an expansion in coverage and additional personnel.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

4 June 1957
TGU/gfb

Cryptonyms - and in some cases real (target) names - have been used in the attached because of the difficulties in writing a pouch with numerous identities.
W.C.

Attachments:

1. Herewith left portion odd-numbered pages
2. UNDER SEPARATE COVER left portion even-numbered pages
3. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion odd-numbered pages
4. UNDER SEPARATE COVER right portion even-numbered pages

Distribution:

3 - HQS(w/5 sets atts)

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Remove from Project KDMANFO
CS Classification: 51 6-32/1
JOB # 73-175/78
Box: 22 Fold: 2

RECORD COPY

[redacted]
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

50-6-32/1

Att HMMA 7063

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

CRYPTONYM: LIFEAT FIELD CASE OFFICERS Thomas S. URQUHART

Matthew S. DINGLEY

Harvey P. [illegible]

Not present

STATION Mexico City CHIEF OF STATION

Willard C. CURTIS

1. The attached Field Project Outline is submitted for approval for the Fiscal Year 1958. In accordance with Field Instruction No. 236-1, 7(d), (dated 23 October 1953), the following information is submitted.

Product of the basic project

During the current fiscal year production from LIFEAT has been quite voluminous. The Soviet phase alone has accounted for some 6,000 pages of summary text and constitutes somewhat less than half the coverage yielded by the total project. The following general categories of information have been developed through LIFEAT and are cited below with a few examples of production(see references to specific reports and dispatches in the following paragraphs).

2. The Soviet Embassy

Information on the Soviet Embassy derived from LIFEAT has been voluminous and extensive reports have been furnished on the following matters:

a. Soviet Commercial Activities.

Reports such as HMM-2498, 8 March 1957; HMM-2054, 6 November 1956; and HMM-1975, 19 October 1956 have conveyed a substantial amount of month-to-month detail concerning Soviet economic and commercial policy and actions in Mexico and to a lesser extent in adjacent areas. This information reflects the types of products the Soviets are selling or purchasing in the area, the names of their intermediaries, details on prices, manner of arranging deals, and manner of effecting shipments. This information was screened out and briefed from extensive and prolonged coverage of Soviet Embassy commercial traffic and appears to be fully authentic as well as rich in detail. Reference is also made to HMM-2476, 1 March 1957(Tentative Deal for Ecuadorian Coffee); HMM-1973, 18 October 1956(Mexican Exports to the USSR); and HMM-1760, 18 October 1956(Sale of Soviet Ferrous Metal in the US) as examples of specific spot reports based on information derived from the same source. During the past year traffic concerning the Soviet commercial office in Mexico has increased a great deal and remains this Station's primary source on all such matters.

RECORD COPY

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

50-6-32/1

b. Soviet Diplomatic Activities

Reference is made to HMM-2327, HMM-2395 and HMM-2465 as examples of the type of monthly reports now being submitted relative to the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Embassy. These reports, based almost entirely on LIFEAT, indicate some relationships the Soviets are developing with the Mexican Government, with other Latin American governments, and with other foreign diplomatic representatives. They also shed some light on the relations between the Soviets, Poles and Czechs in Mexico City; and even on the relationships between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Reports of this type show when the Soviets seem to be engages in a drive to establish contacts in various departments of the Mexican Government and when they appear to be conducting a drive to cultivate Latin American diplomats. The reactions of both the Mexicans and the Latin Americans to these advances are often shown in the corresponding traffic. The Soviets, in general, do not seem to get a very good reception from the Latin Americans, but on the other hand, LIFEAT shows that they are well received by the diplomatic representatives of India and Indonesia. The diplomatic reports have also shown an improvement of relations with the Yugoslavs(which were non-existent for several years here). The traffic and reports further show that the Soviets, Poles and Czechs have frequent interchange and other join in days of sport or other entertainment.

c. Cultural and Propaganda Activities

HMM-2329, HMM-2377 and HMM-2460 are cited as examples of the monthly summaries of Soviet cultural activities based on LIFEAT materials. They reflect in detail Soviet activities in connection with publication, cultural institutes, travel of Mexicans to the USSR for cultural purposes, visits of Soviet cultural figures to Mexico and data concerning how their local arrangements are made. HMM-2326 is cited as an example of a separate report on the visit of some Soviet musicians to Mexico.

d. Contacts of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2376 and HMM-2459 are examples of monthly summaries of contacts of the Soviet Embassy. These are of value in planning agent operations against the Soviets since they list various contacts known to be maintained by them. This type of report also lists the local and foreign Communists with whom the Soviets are in contact each month, together with a description of the nature of the contact when known.

e. Miscellaneous Activities of the Soviet Embassy

LIFEAT material relating to the Soviet Embassy, which does not fit into any general category, is set forth each month in a series of reports on miscellaneous activities. These reports include such random information

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as banking transactions, landscaping activities, evidences of internal construction, etc. Examples of this type of report are HMM-2375 and HMM-2446.

f. Military Activities of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2391 and HMM-2450 are examples of monthly reports of Soviet contacts with Mexican military circles and are derived almost entirely from LIFEAT. They reflect the identities of the local military figures with whom the Soviets maintain contact and in most cases contain at least some data on the reasons for the contact. These reports are of considerable interest to American service attaches in Mexico.

g. Goods and Services of the Soviet Embassy

HMM-2452 is an example of periodic reporting on the persons and institutions providing goods and services to the Soviet Embassy. These reports have been of particular interest in developing the LIMESA project and resulted in the making of a contact in the cleaning business through which this Station obtained entry for one of its agents into the Embassy. (Cf HMM-A-6872).

h. Personality Reports on Soviet Officials

HMMA-6651 is a sample of a series of personality reports on Soviet officers prepared mainly from LIFEAT materials. LIFEAT reflects varying amounts of information on the Soviets. Some are frequently heard and much data accumulated on their contacts, marital situations, official duties, etc. These data have been used on occasion for studying possible defection pitches and will probably be used more in the future. In the case of the current Soviet Naval Attache, Grigori NIKIFOROVS, his habits were studied mainly through LIFEAT and note was made that his wife might be vulnerable because she was having amorous relations with one of her husband's subordinates. (MEXI 524; MEXI 495; MEXI 447).

i. Movements of Soviet Officials

The arrivals and departures of Soviet officials have more often been ascertained through LIFEAT than through any other source. The Station has been able to advise of movements out of Mexico through LIFEAT in almost every case where such travel took place in the past five(5) years. Frequently the Station has received notice of movement long before it took place by studying contacts of the Soviets with local clothiers, etc. since it has been the Soviet custom to stock up on clothing and various luxuries prior to leaving Mexico. The arrivals of many Soviets have been learned of only through LIFEAT, even in a number of cases when the Soviets travelled

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through the U.S. MEXI-853, 4 March 1957, is an example of this type of coverage. Notice of this arrival first appeared in the traffic on 26 February 1957. HMMA-6842 is referred to as an example of this Station's coverage of unusual Soviet "courier" travel, in part based on LIFEAT.

2. Various Spot Reports

HMM-2081, describing the Soviet Embassy reception of 7 November 1956, is cited as an example of numerous spot reports on Soviet Embassy activites on which information was obtained mainly or entirely through LIFEAT. These reports are also put out to cover the travel of Soviets in the country of Mexico(MEXI-907, travel of Pavel IATSKOV, Soviet Consul, to Nuevo Laredo on 11 March 1957).

3. Czech Legation

LIFEAT has provided considerable information on the Czech Legation during the past year. The information thus obtained is roughly parallel to that obtained on the Soviet Embassy, and periodic general summaries have been forwarded in HMM-1605, HMM-1632, HMM-1693, HMM-1997, HMM-1747, HMM-2349 and others.

a. Personnel data

Personnel data on staff members of the Czech Legation have been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1896, HMM-1959, HMM-2330 and others. This data has been of use not only in reflecting personality data, official functions and domestic matters pertaining to Czech staff members but also in planning defection approaches.

b. Spot Reports

From time to time spot reports on matters of especial interest in connection with the Czech Legation have been forwarded, among which reference is made to the following entirely or partially based on LIFEAT:

HMM-1779, Proposed Barter Transaction;
HMM-1814, Travel of Czech Commercial Representatives;
HMM-1935, Vera Marie PLASILOVA;
HMM-1977, Travel of Enrique CASTRO Garcia; and
HMM-1987, Czech Delegation to Geological Congress.

c. LIFEAT Coverage

During most of the year LIFEAT coverage of the Czech Legation was confined to the two phones in the main Legation building but early in 1957 one of the two lines of the Commercial Office was crossed and very high production received. It is projected that this basic coverage will be continued to the extent circumstances permit.

4. Polish Legation

By far the greatest amount of information derived on the Polish

Legation in the past year, as well as every year since 1951, has been through LIFEAT. As in the cases of the Soviets and Czechs, this information is generally forwarded in periodic general summaries, of which HMM-1547, HMM-1610, HMM-1619, HMM-1667, HMM-1767, HMM-2018 and HMM-2173 are cited as examples. Biographic information on Polish staff members has been forwarded in such reports as HMM-1886, HMM-1800 and HMM-1929.

The following reports are cited as examples of spot reports on items believed to be of especial interest relating to the Polish Legation:

HMM-1744, Polish Legation Reception
HMM-1748, Polish Legation Contacts with Polish Delegates to Radiological Congress
HMM-2431, Polish Legation Contacts with Carlos Augusto LEON (Venezuelan Communist)
HMM-2532, Release of Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo and
HMMA5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY.

5. Combined Reports

HMM-1789, entitled "Soviet Bloc Economic Penetration in Mexico" is an example of a report of a general nature based on LIFEAT coverage of Poles, Czechs and Soviets.

6. Counter-intelligence matters

Counter-intelligence matters constitute the major CI portions of this of this Station's related Mission Directive and LIFEAT has contributed more leads and general information on the Soviet aspect of this subject than all other Station sources combined. The following reports are cited as examples of many of this type of reports and information developed in this category:

a. HMM-1958, HMM-2286, describing contacts between Narciso BASSOLS, leading Mexican pro-Communist, and Viktor I. [illegible]LOTOV, his Soviet case officer who appears in LIFEAT under the name of "LOPEZ."

b. HMM-2218, HMM-2262 and HMM-1336, dealing with the contacts between the leading Venezuelan Communist, Carlos Augusto LEON and his Soviet case officer, Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV. A comparison of readings from LIFEAT/LIERICK with LIFEAT coverage on the Venezuelan Communist Party Officer Eduardo MACHADO Morales indicates that LEON is probably the intermediary between the Soviets and the Venezuelan exiles.

c. HMM-2420, setting forth arrangements for clandestine contact between Colonel Jesus de LEON Toral, of the Mexican General Staff College, with his Soviet case officer.

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d. HMM-A-4463, HMM-2232, HMM-2276, setting forth a lengthy series of contacts between "Franz" WILE, an Ethiopian student in Mexico, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV, Soviet intelligence officer.

e. HMM-A-6744, which sets forth the history of the contacts between Heracio SANDOVAL, ODENVY agent, and Boris P. KOLOMYAKOV.

f. HMM-2270, setting forth contacts between Nikolay [illegible], Soviet intelligence officer, and Jesus MAZO Mejucro, Mexican naval officer.

g. HMM-A-5416 and HMM-A-4216, which deal with the possible contacts of a Mexican parachutist named Edward Albert [illegible] with the Soviet Embassy and which possibly has some importance to counter-intelligence within the U.S.

h. HMM-A-5941, Juliusz KATZ-SUCHY (Polish Intelligence Matter), setting forth this subject's activities and contacts while in Mexico. This report was largely based on LIFEAT.

and i. Many others.

7. Double Agent Checking

During the past year, as in previous years, a number of this Station's double agents have been monitored through LIFEAT in contact with the Soviet Embassy, thus enabling the Station to verify certain portions of their reports and hence leading to a better chance to evaluate the agents. Among those heard in the past year were LIBEL R, LIBEL R's son, LIEMONADE, LIRACE and LINSTOCK-1. In each case LIFEAT tended to confirm the Station's good opinion of the agent. On the other hand, several recent contacts former Station agent LIVESTOCK-3 and the Soviets indicate that LIVESTOCK-3 may be "playing" with the Soviets or endeavoring to do so.

8. LAURICLE

Reference is made to HMM-A-5923 (HMM-OM-843) which sets forth data on Soviet LAURICLE matters, derived mainly from LIFEAT. Personality data on LAURICLE figures, especially in the Polish and Czech establishments, has been accumulated and studied as a major Station objective.

9. Intentions and Activities of the Mexican Government

During the early part of 1957 LIFEAT enabled the Station to assess reports it was receiving from another source concerning the changing and hardening of the Mexican government's attitude towards foreign Communists. LIFEAT coverage of various individual targets gave solid information on the arrests of the foreign Communists Mario SOSA Navarro, Joaquin ORDOQUI,

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Jacobo HURWITZ Zender and Chone [illegible] and tended to confirm data on the same matters obtained from Station agent [illegible]-2. LIFEAT also added details which were not available to other Station sources, such as the names of the persons sought to help those imprisoned. For example, it was learned that the Venezuelan Communist leader Eduardo MACHADO Morales was the person who was holding the passport of Joaquin ORDOQUI at the time of his arrest, which fact, among others, makes MACHADO appear to be one of the most important foreign Communists in Mexico. Reference is made to the following reports which contain information of this general type: HMMA-6240 and HMMA-6242.

HMM-1769(p. 4) is cited as containing a seemingly reliable report to the effect that in 1956 the Mexican president told the editor of one of Mexico's leading newspapers that he should play down or omit anti-US articles and opinions.

10. Information on the Mexican Communist Party and Communist Fronts

During the past year considerable day to day detail was received from LIFEAT concerning the Mexican Communist Party and its fronts. The latter included the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos(the intellectual author of which was covered in LIFEAT) and the Mexican Peace Movement, Society of Friends of China and various art fronts(through coverage of an officer of those movements.) This information was of value in supplementing agent coverage of those organizations and occasionally provided information unknown to the agents. (Cf HMM-1657 and HMM-2285)

11. American Communists in Mexico

One of the most extensive and productive coverages through LIFEAT in the past year was directed against American communists in Mexico. In this period several American targets were covered at the request of ODENVY and the production processed in part by them and in part by this Station. ODENVY assumed the task of reporting most of the information on these subjects but provided the station with carbon copies of their summaries of the pertinent reels and of the reports based thereon. The subjects thus covered for ODENVY were as follows, with a listing of the number of reels passed on each:

a. Noah SEBORER, possible American espionage agent for the Soviets (23 reels)
b. Frederich Vanderbilt FIELD, American Communist, and his wife, Anita Boyer FIELD(254 reels)
c. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist agent(55 reels.)

12. Of particular importance in the coverage by LIFEAT was the Alfred Kaufmann STERN // and Martha Dodd STERN case which was of particular interest not only to KUBARK but

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also to ODENVY. This case was a part of the Jack SOBLE espionage case; and LIFEAT coverage of the STERNs has been outstandingly excellent. In fact, the Station has had three(3) commendations from Headquarters on the LIFEAT coverage of this case and Edward P. [illegible] had a personal commendation from ASCHAM on his work(LIFEAT) on the case. Over ninety(90) reels have been produced by LIFEAT on the STERNs between 9 February and 27 May 1957. Another interesting facet of this coverage is that on 8 February (at 1630 hours) 1957 a cable from Headquarters asked that the Station attempt to institute LIFEAT coverage on the STERNs. At 1000 hours on 9 February 1957 LIFEAT coverage had been completed and was producing.

13. Miscellaneous Coverages

During the past year the following individual targets have been covered for periods of time varying from one month to a full year:

a. Aaron Jose PSZYSWA Margules, Jewish Communist leader. The coverage reflected the decline of the Jewish Communist movement and the relative inactivity of PSZYSWA and was suspended.

b. Noah SEBORER, American Communist. He and his wife work for a travel agency and their traffic has reflected many details concerning the movements of Americans in and out of Mexico, many of them Communists.

c. Samuel MAGIDIN Magidin, Jewish Communist leader. This coverage confirmed the decline of the local Jewish Communist movement and the final liquidation of its headquarters. It reflected the names of the few active members who continue to meet informally. It was of especial value in covering the arrest of Chone SHEINBAUM, member of the Jewish Communist group, and in covering the deportation of Jacobo HURWITZ Zender, known Communist agent. From this coverage details were learned concerning the names of the lawyers used by the defendants, together with a considerable view of the methods and secondary contacts.

d. Alfred K. (and Martha Dodd) STERN(see para 12), which was probably the most outstanding technical surveillance operation ever mounted by this Station and which is still continuing.

e. Eduardo MACHADO Morales, Venezuelan Communist. This coverage conveyed a host of details on the machinations and activities of the Venezuelan Communists in Mexico and to a lesser degree provided information on their contacts with the Soviets and Mexican Communists.

f. Xavier GUERRERO. This coverage contained considerable detail on the Communist party, Society of Friends of China, Peace Front and other organizations of which GUERRERO was a member. It also contained details of great interest on various Latin American Communists and Americans with whom the GUERREROs were in contact. Information derived from this line

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was used in inducing the Mexican Government to deport Mario SOSA Navarro and thus provided the Station with the means to test one of its more potent sources as well as check the accuracy of his progress reports.

g. Narciso BASSOLS. BASSOLS is a leading collaborator of the Soviets in Mexico. Coverage of his traffic showed him in contact with his Soviet case officer and gave details of interest on Mexican political matters and one important Communist front, the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos, of which BASSOLS was the intellectual author though not a member.

h. Asa ZATZ Dolinski, American Communist mentioned above.

i. Headquarters of the Liga Popular Israelita, Jewish Communist front. This coverage reflected that the Liga was almost defunct.

j. Fernando Alberto MILIA, Argentine Naval Attache, who was covered briefly in connection with the proposed defection of a Soviet official with whom he was in contact.

14. Microphone Phase

LIFEAT Project also includes the LICOOL phase. Reference is made to [illegible] 006 which describes a current LICOOL installation directed against a Soviet official.

15. Summary

In summary, LIFEAT constitutes one of Mexico City Station's chief assets; and it is the belief of COS Mexico that this operation (which is wholly KUBARK's and has no liaison or other service involved) is by far the best operation of its kind KUBARK has in the world.

a. Accomplishments

On a general average over the past year LIFEAT has consisted of twenty-two (22) to twenty-three (23) simultaneous coverages, each of 24 hours per day. The targets covered have included major coverage of all those which rank highest in the Station's PRD (Soviets, Poles and Czechs) as well as a large number of selected targets of opportunity. Approximately 15,000 pages of summary text have been obtained from the project. This information, though fragmentary at times and at times difficult to understand, is nevertheless documentary in nature. In detail, average coverage of the targets at the Station has been as follows:

Soviets	8 Lines	American Communists	3 lines
Czechs	2 lines	Remainder	8 lines.
Poles	2 lines		

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b. Planning for the Future

Current planning calls for the continuation of about 24 lines of coverage with bases and personnel being assembled to permit an increase to about 30 lines, local circumstances permitting. Basic coverage will be continued to the fullest extent possible on the Soviets, Poles and Czechs, which coverage of individual and targets of opportunity will be shifted so as to produce the greatest possible amounts of important information. At present it is believed that 30 lines is about the maximum the technical agents on this one operation can mount and protect properly. In order to get more coverage, the Station will likely establish (if Headquarters approves) a separate, independent LIFEAT-type operation, with new principals.

c. Performance of Agents

While in general the performance of the LIFEAT agents has been good in the past year, some of those connected with the group based on the family of former head agent James O. AYCALL have not been acting in a satisfactory manner. These are gradually being weeded out and new, more effective and fully compartmented base operators are being substituted for them. The Station's problem in this connection is difficult since it is hard to recruit persons who combine the following qualifications necessary for base house operations:

i) absolute discretion;
ii) willingness to cover the base 24 hours daily, year after year;
iii) suitable cover;
iiii) willingness to obey complex orders to the letter year after year;
and iiiii) willingness to live in a situation of constant potential danger.

d. Status of Approved Commitments

LIFEAT Project (as approved in HMM-W-3740) contains most of the elements which will be necessary in Fiscal 1958. The main difference that will be noted in the attached Field Project Outline is that costs will be higher and one more base house will be added to the current list.

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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM LIFEAT FIELD CASE OFFICERS Thomas J. URQUHART

1. Area of Operations Mexico City, Mexico

Matthew S. D[illegible]

Harvey P. DE[illegible]HOLZ

(Open)

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. CURTIS

2. Purpose

To mount various types of technical surveillance operations, mainly telephonic, against the Soviet, Czech and Polish diplomatic missions in Mexico; against important contacts of those installations; and against leading Mexican and non-Mexican Communists and Communist sympathizers.

3. Background

This project was first approved 3 October 1950 and has been extended each year thereafter. Actual operations began 18 January 1951 and have been continuous, with small breaks for security or other operational reasons from that date. The project was last approved in HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956.

LIFEAT has been run since its inception without liaison and no plans now exist to change this arrangement.

Over the past 6 years and 3 months LIFEAT has expanded from coverage of one(1) line to coverage of an average of about twenty-four(24) lines, each being covered 24 hours per day. In all, over 40,000 pages of documentary information on prime station targets has thus been obtained from this operation.

4. Reference

HMM-W-3740, 19 November 1956, contains the last renewal of this project.

a. This project has been one of the outstanding KUBARK operations in the world. Certain elements at Headquarters recognize this. Chief, SR/CE states to this Station during his visit in January 1957 that this was the only "LIFEAT-type" operation which was wholly KUBARK's and he said it was

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the best such operation. From knowledge COS Mexico has, it is known that (unless something has developed very recently) LIFEAT is the best operation of its kind which KUBARK has.

b. Headquarters has stated:

i. In DIR-03198 of 18 Feb. 1957, "HQS commends Station prompt and effective coverage and handling this case";

ii. In DIR-09958 of 29 March 1957, "Good work";

iii. In DIR-11936 of 12 April 1957, "ODENVY and we(HQS) are most gratified by iniative and success your coverage".

All of these referred to LIFEAT coverages.

c. The Director has personally commended the Station officer for his work in one line's coverage in this operation; and has orally stated to COS, Mexico that this is an excellent operation.

5. Objectives

To carry out this Station's obligations in conformity with its Related Mission Directive, through technical surveillance operations. The product from this operation is coordinated with other Station operations, with especial attention to Soviet, Polish and Czech activities.

6. Targets

Primary targets covered in this operation are:

Soviet Embassy and residences of Soviet officials;
Czech Legation;
Polish Legation; and
Alfred Kaufmann (and Martha Dodd) STERN.

Secondary targets are:

Soviet, Polish and Czech agents;
Mexican and foreign Communists; and
American Communists.

7. Tasks

a. To maintain and operate existing project facilities and establishments;

b. To augment similar coverage when need or opportunity arises;

c. To recruit, train and administer such agents as the project requires;

d. To issue such reports as are deemed necessary, based on material acquired from the project;

e. To coordinate information obtained from the project with other Station operations;

and f. To provide [illegible] with operational information and reports on experience obtained from the project.

8. Coordination

LIFEAT information is very closely coordinated with all other operations at this Station but does not require operational coordination with any other area. However, when the project yields information of interest to other areas, these areas are informed.

9. Personnel

It is intended that the following personnel will participate in the LIFEAT Project during Fiscal Year 1958:

a. Case Officers

Case Officer: Thomas G. UNQUHART*
Case Officer for LICOOL phase: Matthew S. DINGLEY*
Case Officer, Czech Legation phase: Harvey F. DEMMHOLZ*
Case Officer, Polish Legation phase: to be named*
General asst. Case Officer: David H. WILSTED(U.S. citizen) - technical - contract agent(has own commercial firm which furnished his cover)
General Asst. Case Officer: Ralph FAFANELLI(U.S. citizen) - commercial
General Asst. Case Officer: Arthur S. STOUGH* /unofficial cover/

* Denotes Diplomatic cover

b. Operations agents

✓ 1. LIMEWATER. Field Agent, Operational Clearance 739, dated 17 October 1950. He is an employee of Telefonos de Mexico, local telephone company, who provides the basic information necessary for running the project.

✓ 2. LIMEWATER-1. Field agent. Operational clearance 1412, 14 Aug. 1951. He is charged with aspects of the technical portion of the operation.

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3. LI[illegible]-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7452, 11 Dec. 1953. This agent works with LI[illegible]-1 and has similar duties.

4. LIMESTONE-1. Field agent, Operational Clearance 6799, 11 Sept. 1953. Base house operator.

5. LIMESTONE-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7347, dated 25 Nov. 1953. Asst. base house operator.

6. LIMESTONE-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7585, 28 Dec. 1953. Base house operator.

7. LIMESTONE-4. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-31989, 21 Oct. 1954. Base house operator.

8. LIMESTONE-5. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-32742, 21 March 1955. Asst. base house operator.

9. LIMESTONE-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance in HMM-W-3265, 13 July 1956.

10. LIMESTONE-8. Field agent. Operational clearance in DIR-09743, 1 May 1956. Asst. base operator and processor of tapes.

11. LIMESTONE-9. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50464, 24 Sept. 1956

12. LIMESTONE-10. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50758, 24 Sept. 1956.

14. LIMITATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance 6970, 1 Oct. 1953. Asst. base operator and processor.

13. LIMITATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 5977, 30 Sept. 1952. Base operator.

15. LIMITATION-7. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50457, 13 Aug. 1956. Asst. base operator.

16. LIMITATION-5 and LIMITATION-6. Field agents. Operational clearance in HMM-W-2800, 13 Jan. 1956, and HMM-W-1333, 19 Mar. 1954. To be used as base operator.

17. LIQUATION. Field agent. Operational Clearance 7496, 16 Dec. 1953. Has been base operator but may retire. However, he should be kept on the rolls until a definite decision is made.

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18. LIQUATION-1. Field agent. Operational Clearance forwarded in HMM-W-2252, 5 Oct. 1955. Base operator.

19. LIQUATION-2. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50455, 21 August 1956. Base operator.

20. LIQUATION-3. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-54096, 19 January 1957. Asst. base operator and processor.

21. LIPSTICK-18. Field agent. Operational ~~Clearance C-33182~~, dated 31 March 1955. Base operator.

22. LIPSTICK-35. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50157, 6 August 1956. Asst. base operator.

23. LIPSTICK-37. Field agent. Operational Clearance C-50750, 13 Sept. 1956. Asst. base operator.

c. Processors of recorded tapes

24. Carol K. ZIMMEISTER, contract agent. Operational Clearance C-29842, 1 July 1954. Processes major portion of Soviet target material.

25. LILACE. Field agent. Clearance contained in HMM-W-1742, 15 Oct. 1954. General processing.

26. Alice M. CAILLETEAU. Contract employee. Cleared in HMM-W-3051, 20 April 1956. ZOHAR processing.

27. Frances M. MENZIE. Contract agent. Cleared in HMM-W-2763, 28 December 1955. General processing.

28. Olivia GLAHSON. Contract agent. Clearance by virtue of contract dated 1 January 1957. General processing and ZOHAR processing.

29. Unwitting assistant to LIENATER for routine office work.

(NOTE: LIERIFORM and LIERIFORM-1, who handle Czech language tapes, are included in the LIDOGTROT Project. In addition to the above processors, assistant Case Officers STOUGH and WILSTED also engage in processing. ODENVY's local office processes certain tapes from targets of primary interest to them. LIMESTONE-8 and LIQUATION-3 alternate assistant base operator duties with those of processing.)

Total personnel, part or full time on Project: 37.

NOTE: It is also expected that two(2) more processors; and one(1) additional technician will be added during Fiscal Year 1958.

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10. Operational Clearances

Cf Item 9.

11. Cover

a. Cover for the case officers noted in 9a, diplomatic or commercial (unofficial) see 9 a.

b. Set forth below is a discussion of the cover of the non-diplomatic personnel in the operation.

1. David N. WILSTED: Partner in small famil -run machinery business. His Mexican documentation is complete and legitimate.

2. Ralph RAFANELLI: Fully documented employee of LIFIRER, who has in the past provided similar cover for undercover agents.

3. LIMEWATER: His natural cover is of employee of the local telephone company, which he has been for a number of years.

4. LIMEWATER-1: Enjoys natural cover as a telephone company employee.

5. LIMEWATER-2: Enjoys natural cover as telephone employee.

6. LIMESTONE-1: She is an elderly person and hence can logically have income from family estate. Does not attract attention.

7. LIMESTONE-2: Brother of LIMESTONE-1 and resides with her. Is elderly and can pass as a poor relative and retainer.

8. LIMESTONE-3: Has been engaged in obtaining small government contracts and moves in and out of various government offices. Unfortunately his cover is not really good and steps must be taken to improve it if he is to remain in our employ.

9. LIMESTONE-4: Elderly woman who has had large business enterprises in the past and who does not need to explain her source of income for this reason.

10. LIMESTONE-5: Father-in-law of LIMESTONE-3 and ostensibly dependent on him.

11. LIMESTONE-7: Widow of James O. McCALL, who was widely regarded as a man of means. Hence she ostensibly lives on his estate. This woman has a tendency to live beyond her means, however, and is a cause for anxiety.

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12. LIMESTONE-8: Relative of LIMESTONE-4. They reside together. This agent is a widow and ostensibly lives on an inheritance.

13. LIMESTONE-9: Housewife.

14. LIMESTONE-10: Housewife.

15. LIMESTONE-11: Housewife.

16. LIMITATION: He is an architect and follows an almost full time career in that business while his relatives manage the LIFEAT base.

17. LIMITATION-3: Very elderly retired person who formerly had a large business and whose income therefore is not open to question.

18. LIMITATION-7: Housewife.

19. LIMITATION-5: Accountant with a large firm. His wife (LIMITATION-6) handles most of the routine work he has done for the Station in the past.

20. LIQUATION: Businessman with office in the city. He spends a good deal of time on selling machinery while LIQUATION-2 and LIQUATION-3 mind the base.

21. LIQUATION-1: Has been out of town working on a contract. Previously was a student and had adequate cover for part-time work. When he returns to LIFEAT his cover will be similar to that of LIQUATION.

22. LIQUATION-2: Housewife.

23. LIQUATION-3: Elderly widow who resides part time with her children, hence not likely to arouse suspicion.

24. LIPSTICK-18: This agent's cover, that of plumber and electrician, is not satisfactory. It appears, however, that he may be put into another type of operation sometime this year.

25. LIPSTICK-35: Housewife.

26. LIPSTICK-37: Dependent relative of LIPSTICK-18.

27. Carol K. ZEISMEISTER: Housewife.

28. LILACE: Housewife

29. Alice N. CAILLETEAU: Housewife

Page 17
Attachment to HMMA-7063
[redacted]986
5 June 1957

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted]

30. Frances H. [illegible]: Housewife.

31. Olivia A. [illegible]: Retired woman residing with daughter and known to have independent income from retirement from former job.

12. Contact and Communication

Contact and communication between the case officers and the agents and undercover personnel in this operation is maintained in a clandestine manner in generally the same form as in previous years. Reference is made to HMMA-4503, 9 May 1956, for a general description of this system, which appears to have been successful.

13. Control and Motivation

Reference is made to HMMA-4503 under this heading.

14. Equipment and Other Support

It is believed that supplied of equipment for LIFEAT currently at the Station are sufficient to carry the operation through the calendar year 1957, but it is possible that simultaneous breakdown of quantities of the older equipment, dating from 1951 and in constant use since then, would necessitate the placing of separate orders for replacements.

15. Coordination

LIFEAT is coordinated with all other projects at this Station.

16. Timetable

LIFEAT has been in almost constant operation since its inception in January 1951 and it is planned to continue it indefinitely.

17. Estimated Costs

The following costs are estimated for FY 1958. All figures are in U.S. dollars per year. It will be noted that owing to rises in the cost of living and especially to much higher rents and to intended expansions, L[illegible] costs will be higher than in the past.

a. Salaries

1. Staff and Contract personnel:

Ralph G. RAFANELLI, GS-7			
	Salary	4,525.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
			6,525.00
David M. WILSTED			
	Salary	6,400.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	Educ.All.	500.00	
			9,100.00
Unnamed LI[illegible] processor(GS-12)			
[illegible]	Salary	7,570.00	
	Quarters	2,200.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			11,770.00
Unnamed LI[illegible] translator			
	Salary	6,500.00	
	Quarters	2,000.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			10,500.00
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER	Salary	5,400.00	5,400.00
Frances L. MENZIE	Salary	2,504.00	2,504.00
Alice H. CAILLETEAU	Salary	2,425.00	2,425.00
Olivia H. GLADMON	Salary	3,880.00	3,880.00
Harvey C. HULWARD			
	Salary	10,320.00	
	Quarters	2,300.00	
	PCS Travel	2,000.00	
			14,620.00
			66,724.00

[redacted]

2. Field agents	Presently	Possible raise
LIEWATER	5200.00	
LIEWATER-1	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIEWATER-2	1440.00	(at 1500, up 250)
LIESTONE-1	1440.00	
LIESTONE-2	576.00	
LIESTONE-3	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIESTONE-4	2208.00	(at 2300, up 300)
LIESTONE-5	768.00	
LIESTONE-7	1536.00	
LIESTONE-8	1728.00	(at 1800, up 300)
LIMITATION	2112.00	(at 2200, up 400)
LIMITATION-3	1920.00	(at 2000, up 550)
LIMITATION-5(not hired yet)		
LIQUATION	3840.00	(at 4000, up 1100)
LIQUATION-1	3840.00(new deal)	
LIQUATION-3	768.00	
LIPSTICK-13	1728.00	(at 1800, up 200)
LILACE ($2.02 per hour, 120 hrs. per month)	2504.00	
LIEWATER assistant	144.00	
Christmas bonus and presents (One month salary to each agent, in accordance local custom. Also special gifts in some cases)	3000.00	39,250.00

b. Base house rentals, utilities and expenses

LILYRIC base house	2050.00	
LITMUS base house	2000.00	
LIVERY base house	2000.00	
LITHOSPHERE base house	2000.00	
LIMAYPOLE base house	1800.00	
Proposed base house	2900.00	
LIFEAT base shop	2000.00	
Proposed base house	2700.00	
Proposed base house	2600.00	
LICOOL-6 base	600.00	
Proposed LICOOL base	600.00	21,450.00

c. Equipment

Local purchase of emergency and special equipment	2,000.00	
New car - LIMITED	3,500.00	
		5,500.00

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Miscellaneous

1. Supplies (paper rolls, wire, tubes, tape, pens, parts)	2,000.00	2,000.00
2. Transportation		
LIERICK car rent	300.00	
David H. [illegible] Auto expense	340.00	
7 Carol K. [illegible] mileage	350.00	
LI[illegible]US base car rental	700.00	
LIV[illegible]Y base car rental	700.00	
LI[illegible]OSPHERE base car rental	400.00	
(I.V 2047)	1440.00	
Proposed base car rental	700.00	4,930.00

3. Other Operational Expenses

(To cover loss of deposits on rents, fatalities and other serious emergencies, separation payments, medical expenses, emergency moving bills; and to cover targets of opportunity)	20,000.00
Grand Total	159,854.00

Page 21
Attachment to H[illegible]-7063
[redacted]936
5 June 1957

[redacted]

52-6-32/1

SECRET

1 February 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/CPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Amendment to Project LIFEAT

1. It is requested that Project LIFEAT be amended to include the purchase of a LIFEAT/LIMERICK basehouse in the amount of $20,000. The lease on the present LIFEAT/LIMERICK base expires in April.

2. The LIFEAT/LIMERICK base is the principal base of operations covering Mexico City's number one priority targets. The location of this base must be moved since the lease on the present base cannot be renewed. Furthermore, a decision has been reached whereby new operational techniques will be initiated which will necessitate round-the-clock operations in the base by station cleared personnel in order to satisfactorily cover the targets. This will undoubtedly necessitate the acquisition of a more securely controlled base of operations. The station does not believe such a base can be acquired other than by purchasing the property indicated. However, every effort will be made to lease this property providing leasing arrangements can be made to meet the security requirements of the operation.

3. At present additional funds are not needed in the LIFEAT Project to cover the purchase of a new basehouse. Should more funds be needed before the project expires, they will be requested at a later date.

J. C. KING
CWH

APPROVED: ______________________
CHIEF, FI/CPS

JOSEPH R. GROVES

APPROVED: ______________________
D/ DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-32/4
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 3

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3		7	
4		8	

843

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, EUR 8, SB 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

OTTA

ANAL RID DESK WH/1 ABSTRACT INDEX

S E C R E T 151600Z CITE OTTAWA 4139

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

15 FEB 67 01388

REF A MEXICO CITY 0121 (IN 88248)

B MEXICO CITY 9919 (IN 77928)

LOCAL LNERGO REP PASSED REF INFO RE LOWRY TO SMABOVE 13 FEB 67.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LIFEAT

50-6-32/4
15 FEB 67

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO 50-6-74

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-74

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☑

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 41

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SECRET

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DISSEM BY AV

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/IC 2, EUR 8, SB 8, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

MEXI

AN	RI	WH/1
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX ✓	

S E C R E T 272155Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0121

DIRECTOR INFO OTTAWA [redacted]

REDCOAT (IN 79922)

REF: MEXICO CITY 9919 (PLS RELAY TO OTTAWA).

MICROFILMED APR 14 1967 DOC. MICRO SER.

AN	RI	33246
PS	DEST	WH/1
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

1. PER LIFEAT DON LOWRY AGAIN CALLED LEONOV 19 JAN IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS FROM CANADA. LOWRY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTACT ESCARTIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY, BUT LEONOV SAID HE COULD NOT HELP HIM AND THAT HE SHOULD KEEP TRYING.

CIT CANADA? In contact w/ Sov Emb Mexico City

2. LOCAL LNERGO HAS RECORD OF ONE DONALD ROBERT LOWRY, BORN 26 NOV 1914 OR 1915 IN WALKERVILLE OR WINDSOR, ONTARIO. LOCAL LNERGO IS NOTIFYING THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA TO SEE IF LOWRY STILL ON WANTED LIST.

in contact with Soviet Embassy Mexico City

3. STATION HAS LIONION PHOTO OF MAN WHO VISITED CUBAN EMBASSY ON 9 JAN AND SHOWS SOME RESEMBLANCE TO VERY OLD LNERGO PHOTO OF DONALD ROBERT LOWRY. CAN POUCH PRINTS IF OTTAWA STATION WISHES.

4. SUBSTANCE OF THE ABOVE AND INFO IN REF MAY BE PASSED TO SMABOVES, DISGUISING SOURCE. REQUEST OTTAWA STATION COORDINATE ANY ACTION WITH LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MICROFILMED ~~MAR 7 1967~~ DOC. MICRO. SER.

50-6-74

~~50-6-74~~

27 JAN 67

INDEX: ☒ YES ☐ NO 3

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-32/4

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 29

15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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January 21

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB 8, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS

MEX IN 77928

SECRET 132130Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9

MICROFILMED
FEB 21 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

13 JAN 67

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

ACT X INDEX X WH

1. LIFEAT REPORTS THAT MAN GIVING HIS NAME AS DON [illegible] Lowry [illegible] LOWRY (PHONETIC), EVIDENTLY AMERICAN, WAS IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE LEONOV 201-132139 ON 9 JAN AND ALSO WITH CUBAN CULTURAL ATTACHE RICARDO ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ SAME DAY. LOWRY SAID HE HAD NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE EXPERIENCE AND HAD ALSO BEEN RADIO AND TELEVISION ANNOUNCER. ESCARTIN FERNANDEZ HAD AGREED TO SEND HIS LETTER AND WRITING SAMPLES TO CUBA IN NEXT POUCH AND TOLD HIM CHANCES WERE MAYBE TWENTY PERCENT, EVIDENTLY OF HIS GETTING A JOB THERE. LOWRY HAS TO WAIT AROUND MEXICO FOR TWO WEEKS, APPARENTLY UNTIL HE HEARS FROM CUBA.

2. LEONOV WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT SAID HE WOULD INTRODUCE LOWRY TO SOVIET CONSUL ON 10 JAN. CONVERSATION INDICATES THAT LOWRY HAD FIRST ASKED LEONOV ABOUT A JOB AND LEONOV HAD SUGGESTED HE TRY THE CUBAN EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST CABLED HEADQUARTERS TRACES. INFORMING LOCAL LNERGO.

LIFEAT/Reco

SECRET

BT

SECRET

No HQS TRACES

50-6-32/4
13 JAN 67

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief of Station, Port au Prince [illegible]

SUBJECT: LIMUD/LIFEAT Disposition of Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: DIRECTOR 68776, 23 January 1967
Action required. As determined by Headquarters.

1. As requested in reference, Station Port au Prince is pouching to Headquarters all of the LIMUD/LIFEAT cards currently on file at the Station. Please return to Station copies of those cards containing sufficient information to be of value to Station.

2. Station is in agreement with Headquarters that a hard copy of the tapes should be sent directly from Station Mexico City to Headquarters in order that Headquarters may expedite the processing of the material. However, Station suggests that in order to reduce the overall processing time and eliminate what could be duplication of effort, only Headquarters receive a copy of the tapes. Then Headquarters, when processing the original tapes, could retape those Creole portions and send a composite tape to the Station for translation.

3. Station currently has a backlog of the LIMUD/LIFEAT tapes. Please advise whether these tapes also should be sent to Headquarters for processing.

4. Headquarters comments and suggestions are welcome.

Francis D Kirkpatrick
Matthew H. ONUS

Distribution:
2-Chief, WH
1-Mexico City

[illegible] by DIR 72017

[illegible] 8 [illegible] 1967

DEFERRED

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HTPA-1973

DATE: 26 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/LIFEAT/Transmittal of Traffic of Subject of 201-735575 and LICLOVE-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached as A are copies of traffic covering the Subject of 201-735575 for the period 1, 2, 4, and 7 June 1966. This traffic was provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

2. Attached as B are copies of traffic covering LICLOVE-2 for the period 30 May - 12 June 1966. This traffic was also provided Station Mexico by LIFEAT.

3. Attachments are being forwarded KAPOK and under separate cover.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
A & B a/s KAPOK u/s/c

Distribution:
✓3 - DCWH/C w/atts u/s/c
1 - C/WHD w/o atts
4 - FILES

LIFEAT
CB
DEFERRED
50-6-32/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29211

DATE
16 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/4

2F

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, [illegible]
~~Chief,~~ WD

HMM

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Port-au-Prince

SUBJECT
LIFEAT/[illegible]-1
Translation of Creole Portions of LIFEAT Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
- A. HMMA-28440, 8 March 1966
- B. HMMA-28489, 14 March 1966
- C. HMMA-28534, 22 March 1966
- D. HMMA-28594, 29 March 1966
- E. HMMA-28701, 11 April 1966
- F. HMMA-28761, 25 April 1966
- G. HMMA-28834, 3 May 1966

MICROFILMED
JUN 2[illegible] 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Action: FYI

1. Attached for addressees information are translations of the Creole language portions of the LIFEAT tapes forwarded in references. The translations were done by [illegible]-1. Conversations which have no operational or intelligence value have not been included.

2. In 29 GF 22 3.2 the journal Combatant cannot be identified by the station. Can Headquarters identify the journal?

3. The Judy in 29 GF 98 17.5 is probably Judith [illegible], the Costa Rican communist friend of the [illegible].

4. 29 [illegible] 101 [illegible] is a very interesting conversation. Evidently Pierre [illegible] has just returned from Miami and San Juan, Puerto Rico where he went to meet his mother. Don Jon CIBLAS is Fritz CIN[illegible] who is believed to have forged a signature while illegally ordering a new Haitian postage stamp issue. [illegible] planned to keep the stamps and sell them at a profit to stamp dealers. According to a PEP (Haitian CP) clandestine journal, an Edmond [illegible] was a Haitian delegate to the Tri-continental conference in Havana in January 1966. However this name was probably a pseudonym. Per Consulate files, Edmond [illegible], DPOB 3 December 1915, Cayes, Haiti traveled to and from the U.S. in June 1966. The Cuban approach to [illegible] in San Juan is the first direct confirmation of Cuban exile activity directed at Haiti in Puerto Rico. Gerard [illegible], [illegible]

(a) T

CS COPY

5[illegible] - [illegible] - 34/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
~~H[illegible]-1877~~

DATE
~~14 June 1966~~

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-4-121

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | SECRET | HTPA-1859

[illegible] [illegible]

19 June 1934 Gonaives, Haiti is a Haitian lawyer/economist/labor leader. [illegible]-1 knows him as an active intelligent leftist labor lawyer. Subject of HTPA-1715, a station contact, reported that on 29 October 1965, LATORTUE spoke before a symposium on Haiti in San Juan. LATORTUE called for the overthrow of the socio-economic structure of Haiti including the "money-grabbing" bourgeoisie. Past source reporting reveals LATORTUE as a very capable, energetic intellectual with a genuine gift of leadership. He received a Haitian law degree, studied economics in Paris for six years and received a U.S. Government grant to attend a Harvard seminar on marketing in 1962. While in Haiti he appeared to be pro-American. At the San Juan symposium LATORTUE declared that every Haitian would resist U.S. intervention in Haiti and condemned the U.S. State Department for meddling in Haitian exile affairs. MANIGAT is probably Leslie Fr MANIGAT (201-297822) DPOB 16 August 1930, Port-au-Prince, now a resident of [illegible]. Though MANIGAT is a known leftist, this is the first indication from within CP circles of his close ties with the Communist parties. It would appear from the information and implications in the telephone conversation that both LATORTUE and MANIGAT have ties with the Communist parties but that they are not bound by party discipline or dogmatism.

[illegible]

5. The "zero" (ph) mentioned in 29 CP 128 2.0 is unknown to station. Can addressees recognize the name as a clinic or hospital in Mexico or in the Soviet bloc? The zero is pronounced z e r o (Merriam-Webster pronounciation keys).

6. The [illegible] of 29 CP 137 18.5 is probably Joseph MARRON of HTPA 1791, 24 Feb 1966.

7. The DUVAL in 29 CP 139 8.7 is probably Guy DUVAL, DPOB 28 August 1935, Miragoane who accompanied Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES from Mexico City to Moscow in August 1964. Station notes that some mail for the GPCs is being received by the [illegible].

JOSEPH C. [illegible]

Attachment:
Translation of Tapes

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City w/orig. att.
2-C/WHD w/1cy att.

SECRET

Attachment to HTPA-185

MICROFILMED
JUN 24 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

4

29 GP 82 3.2

This conversation is about "The Comedians", a book written about Haiti by Graham Greene. Gerard and Suzie are talking to Pierre Lelong. Pierre says the book was the novel of the month of February in the U.S. Book is about Duvalier. Gerard has heard that foreigners are making money on Haitian heads by writing such stories but he has also heard that Greene was in contact with a person who really gave him full information. Pierre says there was a review of the book in L'Edition and he has saved it. Gerard asks Pierre if he has the latest edition of the newspaper Combatant. Pierre has it and promises to return it.

29 GP 85 3.0

Suzie calls Gerard PIERRE CHARLES. Roger has left Suzie a note. Gerard failed to go where he had planned. Gerard called Dorce but Dorce wasn't there. He went to the Embassy for 15-20 minutes but he couldn't find him. (Conversation probably about Aldi Castor's visa.) Gerard asks how everything came out. The wife of the Chief of Police came over to fix the thing about the little girl. The police never suspected anybody and they don't think anybody like that had it. Suzie says Claudette finally found her passport. Claudette went to a (convent?) and someone stole her handbag which contained her passport, money and license to work. Everything was returned the next day with a check for $500. Claudette had to return the $500.

29 GP 85 9.0

Suzie with Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if he saw a number on the front or back of something (papers)? No. There is nothing written by hand. Gerard received three copies and they are looking for two more.

29 GP 98 17.5

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie asks Gerard if Aldi has come by. Suzie says she is going back to the Embassy. Gerard has changed everything and the man will come by around 2:00 to pick him up. Judy called to ask when she should come.

29 GP 103 4.9

Pierre Lelong calling Suzie Pierre-Charles. Suzie asks Pierre when he returned. He just arrived, but without his mother. Suzie asks Pierre how Lillian and her friends were. They were fine. Tonton CINEAS had been arrested and had been shot. Also, something is supposed to start in Haiti. Tonton CINEAS was in touch with someone named Maitre Edomond PIERRE. Clemerd CHARLES was also involved

att 1 to HTPA 1857   SECRET   CS COPY   50-6-32/4 in the affair. $[illegible],000 was involved. The person that gave him the news was a friend of Clemard CHARLES. A newspaper in N.Y. named El Tiempo has written about an invasion of Haiti. El Tiempo reported that someone named Vixama was involved. Pierre was in a store in San Juan, Puerto Rico buying some cloth when a Cuban girl approached him and asked him if he was Haitian. The girl was accompanied by a Cuban man and they asked Pierre questions about Haitian history. They asked Pierre if he knew anything about Duvalier. Pierre explained he was opposed to Duvalier. The Cubans said there were people in San Juan planning to "catch" Duvalier. Pierre implies that the Cuban man lives in Mexico. Gerard PIERRE CHARLES takes the phone. Gerard tells Pierre that someone named Silvie is on the border. Gerard asks Pierre if he has brought the merchandise. Yes. Pierre went to the post office to pick up a package and they were going to open the package to inspect it but Pierre told the clerk it was not necessary to inspect it. The post office clerk said the declared value was too high, and he had to open it. When he opened it he found it was a handwritten manuscript so the clerk asked no more questions. Everything went alright. Pierre mentions that during his trip overseas (San Juan) he met Gerard LATORTUE. Gerard asks Pierre what LATORTUE's financial status was. Pierre thinks LATORTUE is working at the University of Mayaguez. Pierre says there are a lot of Haitians in Puerto Rico that are interested in doing something (against Duvalier?) but most are without families. They are petty bourgeois or engineers working in San Juan. The bourgeois Haitians now have stores in Puerto Rico. Gerard asks Pierre if LATORTUE mentioned anything about his uncle Francois LATORTUE. No, he did not. LATORTUE might come to Mexico soon on a tourist visa. He has to go through some routine to get the visa. Gerard tells Pierre that Francois LATORTUE is up to his neck in politics in Haiti. LATORTUE said that the leftist party was really mistreating MANIGAT and LATORTUE didn't like it. Everytime MANIGAT opens his mouth something happens. The leftist parties likened MANIGAT to Castro. Like Castro, MANIGAT talked too much and did too many things. MANIGAT showed his card too much and that is why they are mistreating him. It was the Communist party that put MANIGAT where he is, just as the CP put Castro where he is. LATORTUE has written an article to counter what has happened to MANIGAT. Gerard says he knew MANIGAT 10 years ago in Haiti. LATORTUE has written an article condemning American intentions of landing in Haiti. LATORTUE x is Professor of Economics at the University of Mayaguez. LATORTUE is trying to leave Puerto Rico and go somewhere else where he can find better work.

29 GP 105 25.7

Gerard is talking to Suzie about a title of property. She cannot find it. She asks about Daniel.

29 GP 106 2.7

Gerard calls Pierre LELONG and asks Pierre to drop by tonight. Has Pierre found 2 packages of papers? One contains papers for Suzie's course and the other is a package of white blank paper for mimeographing.

29 GP 107 20.2

Suzie calls Gerard. Suzie is near the "guy's" house. She wants some money to get a large roll of paper and wants to write a check for the people that are going to send "those things" this afternoon. Gerard asks if she received any news. Yes. Gerard asks Suzie to buy some flash bulbs for his camera.

29 GP 118 3.0

Suzie with Benoit. Benoit excuses himself for not coming. He will come by tomorrow night about 8:00 p.m. when he gets out of school. Has Suzie received any news from Gerard? No. Suzie asks about Pierre Louis. Pierre Louis is doing alright.

29 GP 118 11.2

Suzie calls Vincent. Long time no see. Vincent kids Suzie about her travels, vacation, new house, and car. She asks about Angelica. Benoit is coming over tomorrow. Angelica's brother came in for a vacation. Vincent asks Suzie if there is any other news. No. Still the same as in February from the newspaper Ralliement. The same story. Vincent says that he has no news about Haiti but he got a letter from the family saying that the economic situation is very rough. Vincent asks about Aldi. He scored 9.10 on an exam. Suzie asks Vincent if he has seen CINEAS (ph) (sounds like somebody at the Mexican University). Vincent says everybody at the University is against him.

29 GP 128 2.0

Gerard is talking to an uidentified person. Gerard explains to the person that before he travels "they" will give him a test which will show if he has TB or not. If the test is positive, they will give him medecine to stop or cure it. The unidentified person is afraid and Gerard tries to tell him that it is not serious because if it were, "they" would have given him special treatment in the "zero". The unidentified person says that he has just come out of school and has had pneumonia.

29 GP 128 10.0

Gerard with Suzie. MARRON wants to know what time he should arrive because he is doing something very important. He should come around 2:00.

29 CP 129 12.7

Suzie with Sonya. Susie and Sonya are going to the theater. They mention Maggie who told them that they shouldn't go; they won't understand anything.

29 CP 137 18.5

M calls [illegible] and asks M to come right away.

29 GP 139 8.7

Pierre LELONG calls Suzie. Suzie has friends with her now. She asks if there is a letter. He said there is an open letter. When Pierre came in he found all the letters opened on the table. There is a letter from DUVAL. They must be yesterday's letters.

29 GP 140 16.2

Suzie ~~x~~ with Claudette LELONG. Suzie thanks Claudette for the gift and the translation. There had been a lecture at the University given by someone who spoke only French. The person came Tuesday night and left this morning. How does Suzie feel after all that translating? She is O.K.; its her field. She is moving today. Claudette tells her Gerard is going to be suprised when he comes back. Suzie tells Claudette that she will tell Pierrot to tell his friend in Miami that her brother Aldi is coming up soon.

29 GP 146 7.0

Suzie calls Bernard. They talk about Suzie's new house. She is a big bourgeoise now. She asks for Sonya's address.

22 GP 5 9.5

(Ti Ben is a nickname for Benoit.) Ti Ben with Suzie. B couldn't come because he was~~x~~ busy working but by Saturday he will try to have everything ready. She will call him and let him know. Suzie asks B if they are already on strike. B says medical school hasn't started yet. B proposed a plan for a strike but three of them didn't like the idea. They decided to wait and see what happens. Suzie asks B if he has news from Haiti. He heard some troops had landed in Haiti. Suzie asks what kind of rumors he had heard. B: "Duvalier has burned half of Cap Haitien. A Haitian told him that". Suzie has heard that there was a landing in Haiti and Duvalier killed 15,000 people. One Thursday a newspaper El ? announced a landing in Haiti. The newspaper Veridades announced that there had been a wave of repression in Haiti. Some American boats and airplanes were surrounding Haiti. The Haitian government protested to the Americans but the Americans said that it was just a routine check/protection of the islands. Suzie says that Monrod PHILLIPE was shot because of the CINEAS affair. Suzie asks B if he has heard from the Haitian Embassy. No. B's philosophy course had been suspended.

END

From 2050, 7 June (Tuesday) to 0700, 8 June 1966

2.0 Out to 25-20-00. Sergio (Martinez Barroso) with Cecilia, who answers. Has lost the address. It is Dante, behind the Hotel Tecali. Dante #23.

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 2200, 7 June.

2.7 Out to 03. No rings.

From 0700 to 2100, 8 June (Wednesday) 1966

After 0915, 8 June

2.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with Juanita, who answers. The men aren't going to come to lunch. About what to fix lunch....

After 1115, 8 June

3.2 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 1146, 8 June.

After 1345, 8 June

3.5 Out to 03. Time is 1419, 8 June.

3.7 In. Sra. Olga (v) with maid, who answers. They (she and another woman) are coming home for lunch now...about lunch...

4.0 Out to 17-30-59. MI asks WO, who answers, for Jose Mora. Who is calling? A friend from Cuba.

Jose Mora takes phone. MI has a letter for JM from Carlos Mora. Could he come by tonight to pick it up at Cuban Embassy? ALL RIGHT, but if he can't come by tonight, please leave it with "portero" and MO will pick it up tomorrow. Fine. How is Carlos (Mora)? MO did not see him. He (Carlos) only left the letter there at MI's office.

4.5 Out to 24-99-72. Hangs up.

4.7 Out to 35-40-00. MI asks WO, who answers Aeronaves de Mexico, for 4 reservations for tomorrow's flight to Los Mochis. There is no flight tomorrow. There is one day after tomorrow. They fly Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, at 0945. They have to change planes in Culiacan, flight 125. The return flight leaves Los Mochis at 1335 on Tuesdays Thursdays and Saturdays. Then, they will reserve the tickets for day after tomorrow with return flight on Saturday.

WO checks and says the four are confirmed on flight 1009 to Culiacan and they have requested confirmation from there on. Call back tomorrow. Jose Civeira, Hugo del Pino, Enrique Lanza and Sergio Martinez are the ones going. Phone 25-04-14, his office phone. His home phone 31-01-06.

After 1500, 8 June

7.0 Out to 09, twice. No rings complete. Olga Martinez Barroso asks for operator 134.

WO takes phone. Re Habana call of Civeira. Still no circuit to Habana. They are out of order.

50-6-52-4

7.5 In. MO asks Olga (v), who answers, for Sr. Civeira.
Civeira takes phone. Blasin (?ph) called. Wanted to talk to C. Fine. They have to go by Aeronaves de Mexico before 1300 for tickets to Los Mochis. There is a flight leaving every day. Martinez Barroso called ~~and~~ there is no flight until day after tomorrow.
MI takes phone. There is no direct flight to Los Mochis. In any case they have to go to pay for tickets. Have to go before 1330. MI will go by so MO and MI can go by for tickets.

8.0 In. MO with maid, who answers...wrong number.

8.2 In. MO with maid, who answers. Asks if this is house of Ambassador. Yes, it is house of Sr. Martinez. MO then says it is wrong number. Maid thinks Martinez B. is Amb.

8.5 In. MO with Juana, who answers, for Enriqueta.
Maid comes to phone. About MO's work...maids...MO and (Sra.) went downstairs at 1500. Maid just got back. Sra. went on to the Embassy. About visiting Enriquita this Sunday. MI is not sure if she will be off on Sunday....MO's Mrs. is having guests on Saturday evening...

Reel off at RT 10.2, 2100, 8 June 1966

1966

From 2100, 2 June (Thursday) to 0650, 3 June 1966

From 0650, 3 June (Friday) to 0730, 4 June 1966

After 0900, 3 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, her mother (maid), who answers. Both are maid types...about why she has not called...will see one another tomorrow.

2.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about fixing the fish....rice.

After 1240, 3 June

3.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers, about lunch....They will be home around 1330 or 1400. Set table in dining room - for four people.

4.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. They are leaving now so she can start frying the fish.

After 1435, 3 June
After 1930, 3 June

5.0 In. No answer.

After 2120, 3 June

5.2 Out to 03. Time is 2253, 3 June.

From 0730, 4 June (Saturday) to 0955, 5 June 1966

After 0950, 4 June

5.5 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Is everything all right? Yes. Has Juanita left (for my off)? Not yet.

After 1200, 4 June

5.7 In. Sra. with maid, who answers. Has Juanita left? No. Peal some potatoes to fry them...

After 1445, 4 June

6.0 In. MO with Sra., Olga, who answers. MO is her husband. MO is going home now. MO had to come to the Embassy with some things because he got the interview (appt) today. He is coming now.

After 1640, 4 June

6.2 Out to 14-13-26. MI asks MO, who answers at Cuban Embassy, if ????Rubio??? left. About 30 minutes ago. MO is Jerrin.

After 1900, 4 June

6.5 In, 4 times. No answer, complete. WO with maid, who answers.

6.5 contd.
Maid types...WO called a while ago, but got no answer. WI has been here....Is WI going home tomorrow? Yes. WO can't go because she doesn't have money...WI will lend her money....WO is going to quit her job. WI is not happy either....WI is Enriqueta. WO will see if she can go tomorrow....

After 2130, 4 June

11.0 In. WO with Enriqueta, who answers. WO is waiting for her. She has been ringing the bell...about going home...WO is on the corner of Melchor Ocampo right now...WI just awakened....

From 0855 to 1915, 5 June (Sunday) 1966

11.2 In. MO with Juanita (maid), who answers. Asks if ....? (Sra.) is there. Will see. Check to see (if she or he) is asleep.
Juanita takes phone. Yes, someone is asleep because (he or she) had guard duty. All right.

12.0 In. MO with Juanita, who answers. Asks if Sergio is up. No, went to sleep very late. Does MO want to talk to the Sra? No, just tell him when he awakens that they are waiting for him at the Embassy.

12.2 Out to 14-~~21~~13-26. Sergio with MO, who answers. Did MO call? Yes. They wanted to know if he was up. Sergio will be at the Embassy in 30 minutes. About sending a car for him if there is a car there - in 30 minutes. There is no one there now (with a car), but will send one if one arrives.

13.0 Out to 14-13-26. Sergio asks Nico, who answers, for Lasa (ph).
MO takes phone. Hasn't no one gone by (a car)? No one is there. Sergio will go there now.

13.2 In. Lanza (or Lasa) with Olga, who answers. Has Sergio left? Yes. He waited for a while for Hugo to come for him in car. Sergio has no~~t~~ car. But he has left now...Sergio spent all night at Embassy on guard duty.

13.7 Out to 14-13-26. Olga with Nico, who answers. Has Sergio left? He just left.

After 1230, 5 June
After 1530, 5 June

14.0 In. No answer.

Reel off at RT 14.2, 1925, 5 June 1966

60F

From 0810, 1 June (Wednesday) to 0645, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

After 1100, 1 June

2.0 In. WO with WI, who answers. WO needs some pamphlets for schoolwork. She has wrong number. This is house of Amb.

2.2 In. WO with WI, who answers. (Maid types...WI is WO's mother.) Why didn't WO call her yesterday, was woried about her....abot what WO has done....will come by to see her in a little bit.

After 1230, 1 June

2.5 Out to 03. Time is 1250, 1 June.

After 1500, 1 June

3.0 Out to 14-13-26. Dials without dial ~~ing~~ tone.
Out to 14-13-26. Olga (inside) with WO, who answers at Cuban Embassy. Olga has to do an errand and will be in a little late. Remember to get ready to go "there." Olga will go, but later on. Is Olga better? A little better...grippe. Olga is at home now.

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1519, 1 June.

After 1635, 1 June

After 2120, 1 June

3.2 Out to 03. Time is 2251, 1 June.

Reel off at RT 3.2, 0645, 2 June 1966

14-00000

JUN 6

From 0645 to 2100, 2 June (Thursday) 1966

2.0 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 0737, 2 June.

After 0900, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Dials without dial tone.

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1042, 2 June.

After 1210, 2 June

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 1303, 2 June.

2.5 Out to 17-89-76. WI (maid) with WO, who answers. Want Sr. Torres to go by check a stove - Manuel Todos Santos. He has not come by (although they phoned previously). Manuel Todos los Santos 7-79A.

After 1410, 2 June

2.7 In. WO with Kata (maid), who answers. How is everything? Fine. Has child had lunch? Yes. Juanita is with child - upstairs. Had a good lunch....WO is child's mother.

After 1610, 2 June

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 1638, 2 June.

After 1830, 2 June

3.2 In. WO with WI (maid), who answers. Greetings. (WO is WI's daughter.) How did things go? Fine. Will they go home this weekend? WO can't. Doesn't have money. WI got her money. Is Sra. going to pay her every 2 weeks? Thinks so. How much did she pay her? $200. Sra. told Juanita that she didn't want WI to go to WO's house. Got very angry the other day and made a scene at the Embassy with WO's Sra., that it looked like she was trying to steel her maid. Made a scene in front of everyone. That is why she doesn't want WI to go to WO's house (WO works for a woman of Cuban Embassy too). WO went with the Sra. to Sears. They (people where she works) went out last night. WO was afraid. They were throwing stones from the other house. Sra. said that these were the Americans who are angry with the Cubans. That there may even be war if they continue this way (maids interpretation of U.S.-Cuba relations). WO says neither Sr. nor Sra. were there last night. WI says that she and her husband (that is couple for whom she works) have to be on gaurd duty tonight and won't be home until very late. Also they are not coming to have dinner.

Sra. where WO works paid her for 15 days yesterday, but WO prefers she pay her whole month. Will tell her.

3.2 contd.

WO thinks she won't stay long with Sra. They expect more and more of her. They went to Sears today and walked all the way. She (Sra.) won't pay for a cab. This time el Señor took them (there), but after that and other times, never pays for a cab. A lot of walking and WO's feet are swollen from so much walking. Then, WO is not bad off there. She is alone there (doesn't work with another person), not so much work...Will see about this.

WO will phone WI on Saturday. WI only goes out in the mornings. And not always...Juanita sometimes goes for chicken and tortillas...

Reel off at RT 5.0, 2100, 2 June 1966

LIFEAT

HMM-09776 TDCS-314/09444-65	Travel to Mexico of Family of Emilio Cordero Michel Dominican Exile
HMM-10084 CS-311/01530-66	El Siglo XXI, Publishing House to be Directed by Arnoldo Orfila Reynal
MEXI ~~7066~~ IN-01912 -80616 CS-311/05859	Dissatisfaction of PVP with Max Pastor Parra Leader of the JSC (Communist Youth) Costa Rica

HMM. K196

5 JUN 1966

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Coverage of Dominican Embassy, Mexico City

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Attached for Addressees' information and retention are copies of the transcripts of the LIFEAT coverage of the Dominican Embassy in Mexico City, reels 21 through 34 for the period 2 to 9 May 1966.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo, w/atts
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50-6-32/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28943

DATE
10 May 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-3

1900

attachment ·40
HMMA-28843

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
2 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T21-
1045-1730 hrs.-

00- - Entrada.- 1045 hrs.- (conversación iniciada)- HD GUZMAN con HF hacen planes para verse pero GUZMAN dejó ayer el chqfer que tenia y CARLOS no puede salir solo porque tiene licencia de la Republica y que le digas " al amigo que estamos como un clavo arriba de la carretera con la punta para arriba y que no hay que apurarse por la otra cuestión y que le des un abrazo y ya sabes que estamos aquí por si no nos volvemos a ver o a hablar". HF que está bien.- 12-

12- - Bloqueado.- 24-

24- Entrada.- 1048 hrs.- HF pregunta que requisitos hay para sacar visa a Santo Domingo o ir a trabajar por dos meses allá. MARINA pregunta si tienen algún contrato para trabajar. HF que si que es de una oficina de contadores para ir a hacer unas auditorias en Santo Domingo y algunas poblaciones del interior y que la oficina esta acreditada y es la Hans & Hana. MARINA dice que hace falta una carta bancaria y otra de la oficina donde trabaja. certificado de conducta de la policia, tres fotografias y llenar un formulario y si es urgente pagar el cable para su contestación rapida ya que si es por oficio tarda de 20 a 25 dias y urgente son 5 o 6 dias. y que cabe aclarar si van a trabajar para el Gobierno entonces es distinto. HF que despues que pase a verla le dirá como están las cosas.- 59-

attach to HMMA-28843

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50-6-32/

59- Salida.- MARINA reclama los sobres que no le han llegado. HF BERMUDEZ dice que hoy mismo pasa a dejarlos.- 74-

74- -Bloqueado.- ruidos.- 86-

86- Entrada.- HF por datos para visa para ir a Santo Domingo como turista. MARINA le proporciona los datos.- 108-

108- Salida.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- MARINA saluda al señor INCLAN y pregunta si hay alguna valija para la embajada. Este dice que no hay nada.- 118-

118- Salida al 03 por la hora.-1103 hrs.- 121-

121- Salida.- 1108 hrs.- MARINA por MIGNON. HF dice que no está.- 127-

127- Salida al 13-21-92.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ SAVIÑON. HF dice que anda por la sub-dirección. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamaré mas tarde porque ahora sale a la calle - 136-

136- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Embajador, de parte del señor GRULLON de la Republica Dominicana. TAPIA dice que el embajador no está y que el puede atenderlo. Despues HF GRULLON CORDERO saluda a TAPIA y dice que ayer llegó y queria avisarle a MARCIO si es que estaba lista la pelicula de nosotros o sea CAÑA BRAVA para hacer las pruebas. TAPIA dice que MARCIO tiene mas de 15 dias en Santo Domingo. GRULLON que ésta tarde a las seis van a tener la exhibición de la pelicula para que

(hoja dos) ...

... la vean. TAPIA aclara que MARCIO tiene mes y medio en Santo Domingo. GRULLON creia que la semana pasada se habia venido para acá. TAPIA que no que sigue allá y que hay como diez o doce compañeros dominicanos a las conferencias que hay y tiene compromisos con cenas, reuniones, etc. y que veran la forma de reunirse pronto. Despues HD MAZO (?) saluda a FRANK GRULLON CORDERO. Este dice que le manda saludos VICTOR y que anoche llegué. MAZO dice que hoy recibió una carta de FELLO y le dice que tu venias para acá y que iba a tratar en Gobernación lo de la visa. GRULLON dice que ya se la dieron y ya les avisó por cable y que hoy van a tener la exhibición de la - pelicula en el Condominio de los Productores de la avenida División del Norte a las seis de la tarde. MAZO tratará de estar allí pues conoce el lugar. GRULLON que trate de llevar a todos los que pueda pues es una pelicula "muy nuestra" y si algo se ofrece estoy en el Hotel Reforma. HD es el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO y dice que tambien el lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-12-92. GRULLON que está bien.- 183-

183- Entrada.- 1208 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a TERE y pregunta por MARINA. Esta dice que acaba de salir y le avisa que ya está viviendo de nuevo en los apartamentos Carmen pues antes vivió dos años allí. MIGNON conoce a la dueña de los apartamentos o sea doña CARMEN y lo mejor que tiene TERE es que tiene su - tranquilidad de espiritu y no es espectadora de nada y además eres muy inteligente para llevar bien las cosas. TERE da las gracias y dice que presisamente por eso lo hizo. MIGNON pide diga a MARINA a su regreso que le llamó y que desea a TERE que resuelva sus problemas de sus hijos y se vuelva a casar y cambia de tema y dice que ella se va a fín de mes para la patria. TERE

(hoja tres) ...

...le dá gusto saber que se vá y cree que ya todo está en calma. MIGNON cree que le pueda tocar alguna bala. TERE que nada de eso pues ella hace poco regresó y encontró aquello muy distinto. MIGNON pregunta cual es la impresión que TERE traé de allá. Esta dice que " .. bueno.. pues JUAN BOSH.. tiene la mayoría". MIGNON que entonces nada hay que hablar " y como tu sabes que JUAN y yó somos como dos hermanos, tu puedes tener la absoluta seguridad y eso no te lo digo por hablar, porque a mí no me gusta hablar mucho; que si algo puedo hacer por tí, lo haré". TERE le da las gracias. MIGNON agrega " y con toda justicia porque te lo mereces". TERE sigue dando las gracias y ella bién sabe como MIGNON se lleva con los amigos dominicanos. MIGNON sigue ofreciendo su ayuda y comenta: " ..Pues.. JUAN lo primero que me va a decir.. mira vieja - porque asi me dice "vieja"-- y sientate aquí y dí lo que tu quieres", asi lo que yo pueda hacer por tí TERE basta y sobra que sea madre y tengas dos hijos para que yo te ayude con todo mi corazón. TERE que gracias y gracias.. gracias.- 217-

217- Bloqueado.- 224-

224- Salida.- 1215 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ pide envien un agente de seguros de la AMA para que vean su auto y llenar los requisitos o bien pasar a su domicilio que es Herodoto 30-102 y con teléfono 45-98-23. MF toma nota y ofrece enviar al agente. - 254-

254- Entrada.- 1234 hrs.- MF por el Corl.JORGE MORENO. TAPIA dice que no está. MF es SONIA -pero antes dijo que era MIROSLAVA- y pregunta como está. TAPIA dice que bien pero la otra noche ...

(hoja cuatro)

... ella no se quiso dormir con él. SONIA dice que como quería "que me acostara contigo si allí estaba mi hijo, y ademas estabas muy borracho y traias una pistola que hasta de balazos le querias dar al perro.. y hasta me pusiste bien espantada y dige ..hay. en la madre.." TAPIA si recuerda algo de eso y tuvo que decirle a un chofer de taxi en la calle que se llevara su auto a su casa porque "yo ya no podia manejar". SONIA dice que " vi que estabas muy encabronado y no sabia que hacer" y que se acaba de cambiar de casa y su nuevo teléfono es 43-29-67 y que le avise lo mismo al Corl.MORENO y que alguno de ellos le preste $500.00 para acabar de cambiarse a su departamento nuevo. TAPIA está sin un centavo y están en espera de que llegue "la paga".- 324-

324- Entrada.- 1240 hrs.- MF de la agencia de viajes Ultra-Mar Express para datos o requisitos de visa. TAPIA proporciona los datos.- 355-

355- Salidas ocupadas y sin contestación.- 405-

405- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- HF con su amor TERESITA para disculparse que ayer no le pudo hablar pues anduvo por la Universidad. TERE por estar esperando su llamada no salió del hotel. HF se apellida CARDOSO y dice que anduvo con ANGEL y con LEONEL y que despues del futbol se fueron a casa de LEONEL y pregunta si tiene dinero que le preste. TERE dice que no le han pagado. CARDOSO necesita dinero para comprarse zapatos y quiere que TERE aunque sea consiga dinero prestado. TERE tratará de ver si consigue porque ella tambien quiere comprarse zapatos.- CARDOSO si consigue el dinero pide le llame antes de las cinco y media al 17-81-00.- 479-

(hoja cinco)

479- Salida.- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a papeleria. MF dice que llame mas tarde porque la señora salió a comer.- 499-

499- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. MF dice qu salió a comer y no tarda y ella lo llamará en cuanto llegue. GUZMAN que sea antes de las dos porque los pasaportes que dijo ENRIQUEZ que iba a enviar no han llegado y los está esperando para sus visas de cortesia tal como lo trataron en la mañana. MF va a investigar eso y despues le avisará.- 516-

516- Entrada.- 1325 hrs.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERE para saber si se ven mas tarde y se ponen a "cotorrear" sobre vestido y deudas que tienen.- 569-

569- Salida al 24-51-29.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA con MIGNON para avisar que ya está el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ en las oficinas pero si le quiere llamar a su casa es el 45-98-23 y que hay otro el de su recamara pero no recuerda bien que número es, y que le llegaron dos cartas y una es para el Patronato de las Actividades de Alta Especialización Docente del Instituto - Politecnico Nacional y otra de Santo Domingo que cree que es de NELSON ANTONIO ARCINIEGA dice que es para ella. MIGNON ofrece pasar o llamarle mañana a FERNANDEZ y recoger esas cartas.- 616

616- Salida.- (Instituto de Cardiología)- MARINA pregunta el teléfono de Nutrición. MF que es el 19-57-00.- 631-

631- Salida al 19-57-00.- 1349 hrs.- (Nutrición)- MARINA pregunta por el Dr. GARCIA PATRONI. MF dice que espere un momento. MARINA espera y despues cuelga.- 684- (hoja seis)

684- Entrada sin contestación.- 692-

692- Entrada.- MF por YADIRA.- ya salió.- 695-

695- Entrada.- 1602 hrs.- sin contestación.- 750-

750- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1720 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. MF dice que regresa en una hora. GUZMAN le volverá a llamar.- 767-

767- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1725 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHEKER. MF dice que es la ext.808 pero no contesta. GUZMAN pide se le diga que le llamó.- 810-

810- Entrada.- 1728 hrs.- TERE pregunta que quieren con ella. GUZMAN dice que fué don RENE quien lo llamó y quiere saber si recogió el sobre que le dió YADIRA. TERE lo tiene en el cuarto y que despues le iban a decir con quien habia que mandarlo. TERE pregunta si la monja llegó. TERE no sabe pues ella acabad de llegar. GUZMAN que entonces mañana van a mandar ese sobre con TAPIA y que está lacrado. TERE dice que tiene un sello de la COPREDAL. GUZMAN que asi es.- 855-

855- Entrada.- 1730 hrs.- MF saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta que van a tomar "la fria". GUZMAN está aquí trabajando y que por eso llamó a YADIRA para recoger un sobre, pero ya se solucionó. MF si le da tiempo lo espera para tomar un café.- 890-

- -

. - . (..7.-12- 2 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
2 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T22-
1755-1824 hrs.-

00- Salida al 18-07-00.- 1755 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. SCHEKER.- sin contestación.- 18-

18- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1810 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ. HF dice que espere un momento. Despues ENRIQUEZ se disculpa con "el doctor" GUZMAN porque resulta que la camioneta del banco chocó y alli iban las personas que le entregarian los pasaportes. GUZMAN dice que de eso queria avisar pues llegaron a verlo a las dos y cinco con los pasaportes y ya se les dio la visa por un año con entrada y salida y asi que ya no hay problema y no se les cobró ningún centavo y cambiando de tema sobre el asunto que le consultó en la mañana, ENRIQUEZ que lo tiene pendiente pero uno de los que comisionó para eso se enfermó pero mañana sin falta se lo informa y ya recuerda que es sobre los datos de CORTINA PORTILLA (del Lic.EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO de quien piden datos confidenciales para el gobierno dominicano). GUZMAN que si y que tiene entendido que uno de los hermanos de CORTINA es director de la Financiera. ENRIQUEZ va a pedir mayores datos y mañana se los informará. GUZMAN cambia de tema y pregunta si fué a ver al Dr.SCHEKER. ENRIQUEZ dice que no, pero que le consiguió la cita con SANCHEZ MIRELES (del ISSTE) y no se lo pudo comunicar porque tuvo que atender a la delegación belga y todo el dia estuvo con ellos. GUZMAN que entonces mañana le llamará.- 44- (hoja uno)

44- Salida sin contestación.- varias veces.- y ocupado.-75-

75- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1824 hrs.- (Seguros)- GUZMAN pide comunicarse a Papeleria, preguntar por LUCHITA GAMAS. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues MF dice que nadie contesta y si quiere lo ~~puedo~~ dar recado. GUZMAN que le diga que le llame a la embajada.- 122-

122- Entrada.- LUCHITA con su amor GUZMAN para disculparse que a la una salió a comer y hace rato ya iba de salida y que ahora que lo vea le dirá como hacerle para le llame sin problemas. GUZMAN pasará por ella a las siete "y adios chula".-134-

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. - . (..2.-L2-2 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 26-77-85.
3 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T23-
0910-1125 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 04-

04- Salida al 39-68-50.- 0910 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ, pero le informan que no está.- 11-

11- Salida.- HORTENSIA con su otro amor RAFAEL para reprocharle que ayer la dejó esperando. RAFAEL no pudo y se citan para el lunes a la misma hora y mismo lugar.- 23-

23- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0944 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por HERNANDEZ. Despues GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si ya tiene las cosas del Coronel. Este dice que no que hasta mañana pasará a dejarlos. GUZMAN que pase hoy por la franquicia de los cigarrillos.- 42-

42- -Bocina descolgada y salida ocupada.- 55-

55- Entrada.- 1030 hrs.- Coronel FERNANDEZ saluda a MARINA y pide diga a don RENE que no podrá llegar a la embajada porque sigue enfermo. Despues GUZMAN dice que se cuido por el mal tiempo y que si algo se ofrece le mandará avisar y ademas hay una invitación de la Presidencia de la Republica para la toma o jura de la bandera el dia 5 en el socalo de la ciudad.- 80-

(hoja uno)

80- Salida al 12-25-78.- 1036 hrs.- (Oficina Internacional del Trabajo)- CARMITA de parte de GUZMAN pide hablar con el Director o Sub-Director. MF dice que espere un momento. Despues GUZMAN saluda a GERALDO DE MELLO EBOLI Director General y dice que acaban de recibir un oficio de la Cancilleria de Santo Domingo para solicitar la inscripción del señor PEDRO MOTA MORILLO que es Director General de Servicios de Empleos y Registro de Desocupados del Ministerio del Trabajo y que figura como candidato del país al curso regional de los servicios de empleos en el Perú para el mes de Agosto y quiere saber si hay que mandar algún oficio o nota. EBOLI que solo una nota confirmando ésta conversación teléfonica y que por vuelta de correo notifique a Santo Domingo que es indispensable que el gobierno me mande los formularios específicos. GUZMAN dice ya tenerlos en la mano y se los podrá proporcionar. EBOLI que está bien y que el mientras mandará un cable a Ginebra notificando este ingreso para continuar con los formularios en la selección de candidatos. GUZMAN que gracias.- 129-

129- Salida.- (Air France)- GUZMAN pregunta el vuelo 700 que ruta tiene. HF que es el 702 y sale México-N.Y.-París- Nima y sale martes, jueves, viernes, sabados y domingos y hasta el 31 de mayo es el 702 pero despues cambia al 700 sin llegar a Nima.- - 142-

142- Entrada.- 1051 hrs.- HF secretario de la Embajada de Corea pregunta por GUZMAN para agradecerle su cooperación para asistir a la ceremonia de las credenciales de la Embajada de Corea y quiere saber cuando es la toma de posesión Presidencial. GUZMAN dice que las elecciones son el primero de Junio, pero no se ..

(hoja dos)

... sabe que día es la toma de posesión. HF que quiere saber la fecha para poder mandar una delegación de su país a esa toma. GUZMAN ofrece comunicarselo a su tiempo. HF que gracias. - 168-

168- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1053 hrs.- y bocina descolgada.- - 175-

175- Salida al 09.- 1056 hrs.- sin contestación.- 182- MARINA desea se le informe sobre unas llamadas que hicieron a Santo Domingo despues de 29 de abril. HF que llame al 18-82-20.- 187-

187- Salida al 18-82-20.- 1058 hrs.- sin contestación.- 196- MARINA desea saber el importe de llamadas de larga distancia a Santo Domingo a partir del 29 de abril pasado. HF dice que necesitan que ellos den las fechas y lugares a donde llamaron. -209-

209- Salida.- HD pregunta el teléfono de la Canada Dry. HF que es el 17-31-27.- 221-

221- Entrada.- 1102 hrs.- HF de una agencia de viajes pide datos para visa a pasaporte mexicano. TURC le proporciona los requisitos.- 247-

247- Salida al 43-37-50.- 1105 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta sobre el asunto o pedido para el Coronel FERNANDEZ. HF dice que todavia no hacen la nota y que mande a su chofer a las cinco a recoger el pedido en las oficinas de Diagonal San Antonio en el 2do.piso. GUZMAN que está bien y en todo caso mandará al hijo del coronel. - 267-

(hoja tres)

4983

7- Salida ocupada.- 274-

274- Salida al 19-56-10.- 1111 hrs.- sin contestación.- ocupada. - 300- (Instituto de Cardiología)- GUZMAN pregunta por el Dr. PEGUERO de Consulta Externa. HF dice que espere un momento. -346- HD GRULLON saluda a PEGUERO y pregunta como se siente. Este dice que ya un poco mejor. PEGUERO que hay que hacer planes para ir mañana a Zacahuisco y que se ponga de acuerdo con GUZMAN que tiene auto, y pregunta si le ha llegado algo para él. GRULLON que solo una correspondencia de credito educativo y tambien para el Dr. EDUARDO ALVAREZ porque cree que es dinero. PEGUERO que si es asi se lo recoja y se lo lleve. Despues PEGUERO saluda a TAPIA. Esta pregunta con quien comentó lo de la otra noche que anduvieron " con las viejas". PEGUERO dice que con nadie. TAPIA dice que ayer le llamó la mujer "esa" (SONIA) y que hay que organizarse para verla mañana "pues creo que todavia está borracha".- risas.- Quedan de verse mañana a las siete y media en casa de PEGUERO y que irá tambien PATRONI. Despues GRULLON le informa que tambien hay un sobre de la Dirección de Bellas Artes y de Educación para pedir datos de sus becas para su credito educativo y que está firmado por el Vice-Ministro de Educación RAFAEL GONZALEZ TIRADO. PEGUERO se entera y pide se la lleve para ver ese asunto y llenar el cuestionario.-419-

419- - Bloqueado.- 423-

423- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1121 hrs.- CARMITA con HECTOR RENDON (el maricón) para saber si se ven hoy por la tarde. HECTOR dice que esta trabajando por las tardes. CARMITA quiere ir a la Villa a dejarle unas cosas que le llegaron a SALVADOR (RENDON) - 440-

(hoja cuatro)

440- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- HF de la AMCOSAD pregunta por TAPIA. CARMITA dice que espere. Despues HF cobrador de AMCOSAD para saber si puede pasar a dejar sus recibos. TAPIA dice que está muy flojo de dinero y le pagará los tres juntos en cuanto llegue su cheque. HF que el reglamento es que si se acumulan tres recibos se le dará de baja. TAPIA dice que se los lleve juntos. HF que es dificil localizarlo ni por teléfono. TAPIA que antes de venir le llame para preparar su dinero.- 465-

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
3 mayo 66
L2-M2-T24-
1218-1344 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación fuera y bloqueado.- 15-

15- Salida al 35-56-08.- 1218 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor de Gobernación)- GUZMAN pregunta por la Licenciada MONTERO para saludarla y avisarle que ayer le mandó unas notas. MONTERO dice que espere un momento. Despues HF dice que sobre sus peticiones de visa de ANTONIO JORGE GARCIA se está localizando y creo que para mañana esté lista y de los otros tres ya están haciendo los oficios y mañana mismo pueden pasar por ellos. GUZMAN que por favor y que sobre todo el del sobrino del agregado militar. HF EMILIANO SANCHEZ FEON dice que está bien.- 41-

41- Salida sin contestación.- 60-

60- Entrada.- 1246 hrs.- HF hija de la señora ALVAREZ pregunta por FRANK TAPIA para saludarlo y explicar que el paquete que le mandan a su hermana es una trampa para cazar tigres. TAPIA que entonces el va a informar a Relaciones porque el no va a poder pedir una exoneración de fuero diplomatico en un bulto que contiene una cosa simple ya que pueden creer que estoy metiendo contrabando y si fuera ropa o alguna cosa de comer lo haría, pero en ese caso se tienen que pagar cerca de mil dolares de impuesto por una simple trampa para caceria. HF que entonces de todos modos gracias.- 83- (hoja uno)

4901

83- Entrada sin contestación.- 87-

87- Entrada.- 1305 hrs.- HF pregunta por TERESITA PEÑA. TAPIA dice que espere.- cortan.- 98-

98- Salida al ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~.- (Centro de Capacitación)- TERE PEÑA pregunta por el maestro TENORIO.- cortan.- 112-

112- Salida sin contestación.- 117-

117- Salida al 12-04-40.- 1310 hrs.- MARTHA pregunta el precio de los cubiertos que vio el anuncio en Novedades. HF que salió a comer el personal y es mejor que llame mas tarde porque ella no sabe.- 124-

124- Entrada.- 1311 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN, CHUYITA dice que no está y que si deja recado.- 131-

131- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida al 14-10-02.- 1321 hrs.- MARINA saluda a LULY y pregunta como han estado .. bla.. bla..- asuntos familiares. - y falta de sirvientas.- 210-

210- Salida al 19-13-89.- 1328 hrs.- ocupado.- 213- MARINA pregunta por la señora MUÑOZ PEÑA para saludarla. Esta dice que no le pegaron y que sigue sintiendose enferma. MARINA dice que mañana pueden pasar por ella para llevarla a Cardiologia y le den una revisada.- bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 241- (hoja dos

241- Entrada.- 1330 hrs.- HF de la Agregaduria Militar de la Embajada de Venezuela, quiere saber si el Agregado Militar de la Dominicana va a ir a la Asociación de Agregado Militares. MARINA dice que no están los militares y que mañana le podrá informar. HF que resulta que estan en reunión los agregados y lo están esperando. MARINA va a tratar de localizarlo para darlo su recado.- HF que ella está en el 14-36-20.- 261-

261- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1333 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el Coronel MARCO JORGE MORENO. HF EDELINA dice que no está. HD es TITO PEÑA y dice que llamaron de la Asociación de - Agregados Militares y que los estan esperando o que llame al 14-36-20. ADEVILA que está bien.-286-

286- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1334 hrs.- 290-

290- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1337 hrs.- (Suits Emperador)- CARMITA pregunta por el señor DEL OLMO de la oficina de Turismo. HF dice que espere un momento, despues le dice que no está.- 307-

307- Entrada.- 1338 hrs.- HF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que no está. HF LIBONEY (?) pregunta entonces por TAPIA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues LIBONEY saluda a TAPIA y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bien. LIBONEY dice que va a mandar a su esposa a Puerto Rico a que la operen allí porque así se siente con mas tranquilidad y aquí tiene muchos problemas y quiere arreglar los documentos sacando - pasaporte dominicano. TAPIA dice que no hay problema y que el tiene que hacer un permiso para que su esposa salga o sacando un acta notarial.- TAPIA no sabe muy bien como está eso pero ...

(hoja tres)

... es mejor que se legalice bien o saque un pasaporte mexicano de la niña porque sino despues van a descubrir el truco de que cuando llegó o donde está la visa de la niña, etc. y hay que aclarar que ella nació en México. LIBONEY que está bien y pregunta si TAPIA sale de vacaciones. TAPIA dice que no podrá salir. LIBONEY si algo se le ofrece le llamará a la embajada. - 353-

353- Entrada.- 1342 hrs.- HF con su amor YADIRA para avisarle que se podrán ver hasta mas tarde porque tiene mucho trabajo. - 372-

372- Salida ocupada.- 381-

381- Salida al 11-84-20.- 1344 hrs.- YADIRA pregunta por TAPIA primero y despues por la señora AIDA. HF dice que espere un momento.- YADIRA espera y cuelga.- 410-

410- Salida ocupada.- 414-

414- Entrada sin contestación.- 419-

419- Entrada.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por TERE PEÑA. HORTENSIA dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TERE que lo espere un momento en unos 10 o 12 minutos para poner unas cosas al escritorio de TAPIA y de GUZMAN.- 437-

437- Entrada.- HF por FRANK. FIALLO dice que no está. HF Es NATACHA SANCHEZ DE TAPIA (esposa de FRANK TAPIA) y saluda a RENE y se despiden familiarmente.- 455- (hoja 4- L2-3 may.66)

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 23-77-95.

3 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T25-

1724-1730 hrs.-

00- Salida al 45-98-23.- 1724 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a la niña AURORA y pregunta por su papá el Coronel MAURICIO FERNANDEZ. Esta dice que está en el baño. Despues doña JOSEFA (esposa de FERNANDEZ) dice que espere un momento. Luego GUZMAN pregunta a "CHIFU" FERNANDEZ como se siente. Este dice que bien. GUZMAN pregunta si puede mandar a su hijo CARLOS por las cosas o GUZMAN mismo va por ellas. FERNANDEZ que mejor vaya el porque CARLOS no está. GUZMAN que está bien.- 24-

24- Salida.- GUZMAN pregunta por la señorita. MF dice que le llame al otro teléfono.- 30-

30- Salida al 43-58-77.- 1730 hrs.- (Importadora Mercantil - Mexican)- GUZMAN pregunta si ya tiene listo el pedido del coronel FERNANDEZ. MF dice que en cinco minutos estará listo. GUZMAN mandará a su chofer con una tarjeta a recoger todo. MF que está bien y que es Diagonal San Antonio 1116-segundo piso. -47-

47- Entrada sin contestación.- 51-

- - - - - (1x- L2- 3 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-35.-
4 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T23-
0930-1032 hrs.-

51- Salidas ocupadas.- 60-

60- Salida al 22-62-29.- 0930 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a HERNANDEZ si mañana se van o puede pasar hoy a la embajada. ~~XXXXXX~~ HERNANDEZ podrá pasar a verlo mas tarde a su cuarto del hotel. GUZMAN dice que ya no está en el hotel sino en un departamento de la calle Petén #347-5. HERNANDEZ pasará mañana entre diez a once a verlo.-86-

86- Entrada.- 0933 hrs.- HF por el horario de atención de parte de la Volkswagen de México. GUZMAN que de diez a dos de lunes a viernes solamente.- 90-

90- Salida al 35-51-37.- 0940 hrs.- GUZMAN desean comprar 100 ejemplares de la Cartilla Diplomática escrita por LEONARDO - ENRIQUEZ. HT dice que se le pasará el pedido a la persona que se encarga de los pedidos. -113-

113- Entrada.- 0946 hrs.-HF reclama el pago de renta de las - oficinas donde está la Embajada y se debe el mes de abril y el mes que cursa. GUZMAN no sabe de eso y es mejor llamar el jueves porque hoy casi ni vendrán las empleadas.- 127-

127- (hoja dos)

5001

127- Salida al 10-08-17.- 1000 hrs.- CARMITA pregunta por MIGUEL HERNANDEZ. MF que ha de ser MIGUEL GONZALEZ pero no está. CARMITA dice que hay un encargo que entregarlo y que se comunique a la embajada. MF que está bien.- 152-

152- Entrada.- 1013 hrs.- MF por GUZMAN para avisar que la persona encargada de surtir las cartillas diplomáticas no contesta su teléfono y tratará de estarle llamando para surtir su pedido.- 163-

163- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- Dr. CABRERA saluda a GUZMAN y pregunta por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que no está. CABRERA quedó de llamar hoy con TAPIA para el asunto de una carta que le iba a hacer. GUZMAN dirá a TAPIA sobre su asunto. CABRERA dice que pasará como a la una a la embajada.- 172-

172- Entrada.- MF pregunta la dirección del Consulado. MARINA que es Durango 217 esquina con Valladolid.- 177-

177- Entrada.- MIGUEL GONZALEZ se reporta y pregunta por CARMITA. Esta dice que ella le llamó para avisarle que tiene una carta y un litro de ron que le quiere entregar. MIGUEL pasará a la embajada.- 187-

187- Salida al [illegible]-65-70.- 1032 hrs.- YADIRA con su amiga VICTORIA para saber en que paró la novela de la sirvienta.. bla.. bla..- - Y despues comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hace y que llueve mucho " al carajo".- bla.. bla..- YADIRA recibió carta de su mamá que está en Santo Domingo y que se siente enferma de la presión.- se despiden.- 244-

(hoja tres)

244- Salida ocupada.- 253-

253- Entrada.-HF con MARINA para saber si ha llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no y comentan lo de una pelicula de DOLORES DEL RIO. - 269-

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(..4.- L2- 4 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
4 mayo 66.
LS-MR-726-
1115-1236 hrs.-

00- - Bloqueado.- 06-

06- Salida al 15-50-40.- 1115 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD pide comunicarse a reparaciones. MF dice que está ocupada la linea y que si espera. MD que está bien.- Despues cuelga.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 1125 hrs.- MF con MARTHA para saludarla y comentar sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y quedan de verse mas tarde.-94-

94- Entrada.-1130 hrs.- MF por el Coronel JORGE MORENO. MARTHA dice que no ha llegado.- 97-

97- Entrada.- MF por el Coronel JORGE. MARTHA dice que no ha llegado y solo está FERNANDEZ.- 102-

102- Salida al 15-50-40.- 1133 hrs.- (Viana y Cia)- MD otra vez por el departamento de ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Reparaciones. MF dice que espere un momento.- despues cuelga.- 146-

146- Salida al 15-50-40.- 1137 hrs.- (Viana)- MD quiere reportar que el refrigerador que compró tiene el foco fundido.- MF dice que espere un momento.- cuelgan.- 199-

(hoja uno)

199- Salida.- 1143 hrs.- (Viana)- HO dice tener tres horas queriendo tratar el asunto de su refrigerador y nadie le hace caso. MF que ella pasa la comunicación al departamento pero nadie contesta.- despues cuelga.- 247-

247- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupada.- 319-

319- Entrada.- 1153 hrs.- MF con MARINA para saber si ha llegado o llamado MARCOS. Esta dice que no, y comentan sobre el mal tiempo que hay en la ciudad y que dicen que en Santo Domingo está nevando, pero no lo creen. -quedan de llamarse mas tarde. - 344-

344- Salida al 12-16-39.- 1157 hrs.- (Petrolizadora)- CARMITA pregunta por HECTOR [illegible]. HO dice que espere un momento. - Despues CARMITA con HECTOR (el de la voz de maricón) para saber que hay de su hermano SALVADOR (novio de CARMITA). Este dice que ha tratado de localizarlo y no lo ha visto y va a ver si el viernes se reunen.- 393-

393- Entrada.- 1201 hrs.- HF Ing. PUGIBET pregunta por el Coronel MORENO. MARINA dice que no ha venido y si gusta dejar recado en caso que venga. PUGIBET que le diga que lo llame a al teléfono 13-09-25 o 13-65-15 y que le diga que estará de seis a ocho de la noche y para mayor dato le diga que es el cuñado del Coronel [illegible]. MARINA que está bien.- 419-

419- Entrada.- HO por el Corl. MORENO. MARINA cree que ya no regrese hoy.- 424-

(hoja dos)

424- Entrada.- Dr. CABRERA pregunta por el Cónsul TAPIA. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues TAPIA informa que ya le dijo a TERE le haga la carta, y puede pasar por ella a eso de la una y media. CABRERA que está bien.- 443-

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444- Entrada.- HF por el Corl.JORGE. MARINA dice que no ha llegado.- 447-

447- Salida.- (Despacho Lomeli)- MARINA desea saber sobre los departamentos que se rentan casi frente a la Embajada Dominicana. HF dice que ya se rentaron.- 460-

460- Salida ocupada.- y sin contestación.-515-

515- Entrada.- HF ALVAREZ se reporta. MARINA dice que le llegó una carta de crédito educativo pero dinero no le ha llegado. ALVAREZ tiene desde febrero que no recibe dinero, y que mejor la carta se la abra porque no puede ir a recogerla. MARINA la abre y da lectura de su contenido de la cual piden rinda una declaración sobre sus ingresos de postgraduado y en que hospitales está haciendo sus servicios, con fines de renovar contrato de becado. Y que esas cartas llegaron igual para LEGUERO, PEÑA MELO, YUBERES y GARCIA PATRONI. ALVAREZ que gracias.- 576-

576- Salida ocupada.- 592-

592- Salida.- (Embajada de Haití)- MARINA confirma la asistencia de RENE FIALLO para visitar al Embajador de ese país hoy en la tarde a la reunión invitada. HF que está bien.- 605-

([illegible])

605- Salida ocupada.- 622-

622- Salida.- 122xxhrs.- (Servicio Internacional)- MARINA pregunta si hay algún mensaje o cable para la embajada. HF que no hay ninguno y que llame al 19-09-06.- 650-

650- Salida al 19-09-06.- MARINA pregunta si hay algún cable para la embajada.-HF dice que no hay nada.- 678-

678- Salida.- 1234 hrs.- (Carteros Zona uno)- MARINA pregunta por INCLAN para saber si hay alguna valija para la embajada. HF dice que no hay nada.- 699-

699- Salida al 49-12-92.- 1236 hrs.- MARINA pregunta por el coronel MORENO. HF dice que no está. MARINA pide le diga a su papá (de HF [illegible])... - (SE TERMINA LA GRABACION POR ROTURA DE LA CINTA MAGNETICA)-- 730----

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

12-SE-T27-

1259-1329 hrs.-

00- Salida sin contestación.- 05-

05- Salida al 39-66-50.- 1259 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ para pedirle el dinero de la renta. ARMANDO se lo lleva el viernes porque hoy no tengo dinero.-31-

31- Entrada.- MP con MARINA para saber si habló MARCOS. MARINA dice que no vino porque tiene el auto descompuesto y que despues llamó a su casa y dijo que no estaba. MP espera a MARINA a las dos para ir a comer juntas.- 42-

42- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1306 hrs.- 45-

45- 1313 hrs. Entrada.- MP por el Coronel [illegible]. YADIRA dice que no vino hoy. MP que entonces con JOHN FRANK TAPIA. YADIRA dice que espere. Despues MP MARTA comenta con TAPIA que MARCOS es un bandido como todo dominicano pues lo está esperando que pase por ella para llevar unos papeles a Gobernación. TAPIA dice que lo puede llamar a su casa al 49-12-92. MARTA dice que ya lo tiene y que no solo le urge su asunto sino la visa de MARTINA RICUR que tiene mas de un mes que no sale. TAPIA que si pidió la visa como MARTA entonces no va a salir nunca. - risas. MARTA termina conque le llamará a MARCOS a su casa.- 69-

(hoja uno)

5008

69- Entrada.- MF equivocado.- 74-

74- Entrada.- MF por GUZMAN. HORTENSIA dice que ya salió y tal vez regrese mas tarde. MF que le diga que llamó la señorita GAMAS (CHELITO GAMAS amor de GUZMAN)-.79-

79- Entrada.- 1320 hrs.- RENE FIALLO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que ya salió y que regresa al rato. FIALLO que entonces con TERESITA. Despues FIALLO pregunta a TERE si terminó el texto del mensaje cifrado que hicieron anoche con LEONTE. TERE se lo entregó ya a GUZMAN. FIALLO que vea si no se ha enviado, porque tambien dejó en el escritorio de GUZMAN... CORTAN. -- fuera.- 95-

95- Entrada.- FIALLO continua con TERE y pide vea si GUZMAN comparó el texto corregido en la parte final del cable y que se refiere a una constancia conjuntamente presentada por varios países tales como Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Panamá, Venezuela y Dominicana; porque yo no sé si al corregir puse todos los países. TERE va a revisar eso porque ella no recuerda haber visto eso..- SE CORTA.- 114-

1326 hrs.

114- Entrada.- FIALLO continuá con TERE e insiste que vea esa copia corregida en el escritorio de GUZMAN y vea si hay otros papeles en que hicieron algunas correcciones porque temo que haya omitido alguna cosa en el cable y que tambien tenga bajo su custodia hasta que llegue GUZMAN y en caso que no llegue los meta en alguna de las gabetas del escritorio. TERE que está bien. -Despues FIALLO dice a TAPIA que bajando las escaleras me saltó un pensamiento desagradable pero que no tuvo tiempo de

(hoja dos) ...

... regresar para advertir que GUZMAN tuviera cuidado de dejar el mensaje en clave que dejé sobre su escritorio, ya que TAPIA recordará cuando en dias pasados se le llamó de Cuernavaca para que proporcionara la clave del descifrador, entonces debió GUZMAN tener cuidado de ese trabajo en la inteligencia de que TAPIA tambien se diera cuenta de ese trabajo, para no prestarse a malas interpretaciones. TAPIA dice que " yo lo tengo a usted en un concepto demasiado elevado para dejarse andar con niñerias y cualquier cosa que suceda, quiero que sepa que jamas yo preguntaré porque fué, ni tendré porque pensar mal de usted", o sea que para mi es usted uno de los hombres que he conocido y usted lo sabe en muchas ocasiones en su presencia y en su ausencia. RENE dice que dado a las circunstancias de sus ausencias quiere tener en TAPIA un amigo. TAPIA rie y dice que el puede depositar toda la confianza que guste y que el trabajará junto y de acuerdo y que no soy el tipo que anda con niñerias y esas cosas. RENE lo sabe y agradece sus conceptos.- 165-

165- Entrada.- 1329 hrs.- RF con YADIRA para hacer planes a salir a comer hoy o cenar por la noche entre las amigas de - siempre o bien mañana que no trabajan por ser día festivo.-203-

203- Entrada.- EMILIO CORDERO dice a TERE que GUZMAN le pidió le dijera que el cable que lo ayudó en la mañana a pasar y si a las dos no ha llegado GUZMAN por él, que entonces lo mande con HORTENSIA a Gobernación que es en donde están ahorita. TERE que don RENE le dijo que revisara ese cable si estaba completo de los paises en una corrección y que RENE ordenó dejara ese cable en una gabeta del escritorio de mismo RENE, asi que es mejor que GUZMAN le llame para ver que hacer.- 228-

(hoja tres)

228- Entrada.- MT con TERE para citarse en casa de ella por la tarde.- 242-

242- Salida al 03 por la Hora.- 1343 hrs.- 244-

244- Entrada.- GUZMAN pregunta novedades. HORTENSIA que le devolvieron el pasaporte que le dió y las franquicias las tuvo que llevar a Relaciones y hasta el viernes se las devuelven. - Despues GUZMAN con TERE. Esta dice que lo que le dió GUZMAN a copiar no es para cifrarlo, porque don [illegible] llamó y le dijo si ya lo había pasado y que revisara si estaban completos los países y que si GUZMAN no estaba que los dejara en una gaveta. GUZMAN está de acuerdo y el pasará más tarde.- 268-

268- Salida.- [illegible] con MT para saludarla y decirle que ayer por la tarde le estuvo llamando para invitarla a salir. MT dice que no salió y que el teléfono para nada llamó... bla.. bl...- - y planes para mañana que es día festivo y que no trabajan.-331-

331- Entrada.- MT por YADIRA para saber si van a salir por la tarde. YADIRA acepta. MT se llama VICTORIA.- 354-

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. - . (..4.-L2- 4 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

4 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T28-

1825-1924 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- 1825 hrs.- sin contestación.-HF pregunta por su "papi", pero se equivocó.- 06-

06- Salida ocupada y bocina descolgada.- 20-

20- Salida al 19-02-09.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta a donde tiene que hablar para hacer algunas aclraciones sobre la llegada de cables internacionales. HF dice que llame al 19-09-06.- 36-

36- Salida al 19-02-06.- 1844 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere saber si hay algún cable procedente de Santo Domingo. HF que llame al 19-09-06.- 41-

41- Salida al 19-09-06.- GUZMAN quiere saber si ha llegado algún cable de Santo Domingo. HF dice que no ha llegado nada pero en tanto lo tengan se lo enviarán a la embbajada. GUZMAN que en todo caso a la suite Emperador. HF que está bien.- 53-

53- Entrada.- 1924 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES pregunta a su amor GUZMAN si se van a ver. Este dice que todavia tiene mucho trabajo y pregunta si se acordó del asunto de aquel señor. CHELO que si pero que es conocido por otros lados de la Financiera pero alli nadie lo conoce, pero ella tiene una tarjeta de un despacho que se dedica a investigar personas. GUZMAN dice que uno de los

(hoja uno) ...

... hermanos trabaja en la Financiera. ~~[illegible]~~ LUCHITA que ahora que lo vea le entregará esa tarjeta. GUZMAN le llamará a su casa despues de las seis y media.- Y no tengo para cuando salir ya que me tienen como esclavo. - 71-

71- Entradas sin contestación.- 88-

88- Salidas sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 107-

~~107-~~ ~~Salida~~ - - - - - (..2.- 12- 4 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
5 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T28-
1139-1236 hrs.-

107- Salida.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que va a estar en la embajada hoy. HERNANDEZ le mandará su pedido y pregunta si el tiene la cuenta del Coronel FERNANDEZ. GUZMAN no está seguro pero son como mil ciento ochenta. HERNANDEZ tratará de pasar cuanto antes a verlo.- GUZMAN lo espera antes de las once.- 122-

123- Entradas sin contestación.- 141-

141- Salida.- (Suite Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MF dice que acaba de salir.- 154-

154- Entrada.- MF RENE FIALLO dice estar llamando desde hace rato y nadie contesta. GUZMAN dice que el contestaba pero nadie lo hacia fuere y que el lo llamo al Hotel para avisarle que se recibió un cable confirmando lo de la fecha que se mando en el otro cable, y es junio. RENE dice que se alegra y que pasará al rato a la embajada para ver eso sobre lo que ayer se estuvo escuchando y la razón a las reservas finales y ademas dando cuenta por si hay alguna presión de parte de ellos "allá con los paises interesados" ya que seria algun error lamentable o un mal entendido de compañeros. GUZMAN que está bien.- FIALLO ademas comenta que anoche lo llamó MARIA JOSEFA la esposa de FERNANDEZ CAMINERO

(hoja tres) ...

..y le dijo que habia extrañado su ausencia y que ofreció mandarle un cable y tambien ofrecio acompañarla hoy y para ese caso aunque sea se van en un taxi para ayudarla. GUZMAN que está bien.- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1139 hrs.- LD.- MF pregunta por el Lic. ~~XXXXXX~~ MARCIO VELOZ MAGIOLO. RENE FIALLO dice que no está en México ni regresará al país. MF pregunta entonces por la señora DE VELOZ. RENE que tambien se fué a Santo Domingo. MF pregunta quien se quedó en su lugar. RENE dice " tienen el gusto de hablar con el que se encargó de la Embajada y soy RENE FIALLO ENcargado de Negocios y Ministro Plenipontenciario".. MF dice que le habla MARUJA FEXEIRO DE LLAVONA de padres gallegos y dominicana de nacimiento y hace un mes y medio mandó a la ciudad de México porque ella vive en Torreón, Coahuila;dos pasaportes de sus hijos para renovarlos y son a nombre de MARIA ISABEL y JOSE ANTONIO LLAVONA FEIXEIRO y resulta que son menos de 4y3 años y ellos quieren ir a Santo Domingo y quiere tener la seguridad de que están en la embajada porque los mandó con un español VICENTE VIDARRETA - es VILLARDEL y ademas ella quiere ir a Santo Domingo porque ella es española de nacimiento no dominicana y tiene que renovar sus documentos que se vencen el 6 de julio y sus hijos si son dominicanos con domicilio en calle Abelardo Rodriguez Urdaneta #11 en Santo Domingo muy cerca de donde viven los padres de MARCIO VELOZ. RENE ofrece investigar eso y se lo informará despues. MARUJA dice que ella vive en la Avenida Mayrán #580 Colonia Jardín en Torreón o el teléfono de su esposo que es dueño del café Colón y se llama JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ - español-, con telefono 2-74-75. RENE que está bien y que va a hacer lo posible por resolver su problema. -- 356-

(hoja cuatro)

356- Salida.- (Apartamentos Carmen)- GUZMAN pide el departamento 28 con la señora TERESITA PEÑA. MF dice que salió.- 372-

372- Salida al 02.- LD.- 1225 hrs.- GUZMAN quiere hacer una llamada a Torreón con cargo al 2-74-75 con la señora MARUJA FEIXEIRO DE LLAVONA o su esposo JOSE MANUEL LLAVONA FERNANDEZ. MF toma nota y dice que espere un momento.- Despues GUZMAN informa a la señora MARUJA que los pasaportes que dice que mandó con un señor ya le fueron visados hace dos días y todos sus trámites quedaron arreglados. MARUJA dice que la señora esposa de MARCIO VELOZ es hermana de una cuñada que ella tiene y por eso se valió de enviar los pasaportes a visar. GUZMAN dice que ya quedaron autorizados sus visas y una persona los recogió y los llevó tal vez para Torreón. MARUJA que está bien y que gracias.- (lineas cruzadas)- Y MARUJA reconoce a LEONTE como hermano de JOSE y de JAIME y que ella es muy amiga de doña JOSEFA mamá de LEONTE.. bla.. bla..- Despues se ponen a platicar sobre las amistades y la familia que ambos son - conocidos.- 448-

448- Entrada.- MF Lic. ARRIETA por el Corl.MARCOS JORGE. GUZMAN dice que fué a la ceremonia del zocalo a una jura de bandera del Ejercito Mexicano y no vendrá.- 455-

455- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1236 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta "por su señorita Coronel y etc.. TAPIA". MF pregunta de parte de quien. GUZMAN que " de la embajada de Nigeria". Despues GUZMAN saluda a TAPIA y dice que le quizo llevar sus mariachis para sus mañanitas. TAPIA ríe. GUZMAN la felicita en su día. TAPIA da las gracias. GUZMAN dice que acaba de recibir un cable y que ..

(hoja cinco)

.. dice: "Embajador de México, a TAPIA, recibe felicitaciones cumpleaños, abrazos para todos, firma MANUEL LARA Y BOLIVAR". TAPIA se entera y da las gracias, y dice que su esposa y su familia fueron a las piramides de Teotihuacan; cambia de tema y pregunta que lió traia RENE con el cable cifrado. GUZMAN dice que nada y que era otro cable grande y ya quedó todo arreglado, y que " ese hombre es mas bruto que el gobernador", cambia de tema y dice que hay que mandarle un regalo a esa muchacha. TAPIA pregunta por el papelito que le dio de unos cubanos residentes norteamericanos y que hay que ver en Gobernación ese asunto pues son tres cubanos que le trajo MARICH. GUZMAN no tiene ese papel pero lo va a buscar y a la vez pregunta si recuerda que se renovaron dos pasaportes de dos niños hijos de unos españoles que viven en Torreón. TAPIA que si que se lo dió a una vieja española fea. GUZMAN que está bien y saludos.- TAPIA antes de colgar comenta " que el viejo me llamó para pedirme disculpas sobre que no me habia enterado del cable cifrado que habian hecho entre "el viejo" y GUZMAN, y que me pusiera inmediatamente al habla contigo y que estaba molesto porque yo estaba pensando que me habian pasado por arriba, y que no lo tomara asi y que el me daba plena confianza, etc." - risas.- GUZMAN comenta que asi es mejor para que se de cuenta que no quiere nada " entre bastidores".- risas.- TAPIA comenta " que está loco ese viejo". GUZMAN rie y dice que hasta pronto.- 531-

531- Salida.- (Aeronaves)- GUZMAN pregunta por la hora de llegada del vuelo 411 procedente de Miami. HF que a las 16:00 hrs.- 539-

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T29-
0851-1046 hrs.-

00- Entrada sin contestación.- 07-

07- Salida al 22-68-29.- 0851 hrs.- (Exclusivas Bennet)- GUZMAN pregunta por HERNANDEZ para pedirle que no vaya a venir hoy a la embajada sino hasta mañana y que se traiga las muestras. Y lo de la vajilla. HERNANDEZ que estará a las diez o diez y media.- 18-

18- Salida ocupada.- 23-

23- Salida al 21-36-70.- 0915 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor MACAÑA y si van a verse hoy. Este dice que hasta el lunes para que pienses lo que te dije. HORTENSIA dice " estás pedo y si no quieres venir entonces mañana si, y no te hagas payaso". - bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 45-

45- Salida al 17-51-27.- 0916 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por OSCAR RODRIGUEZ de la Cañada Dry, pero alli no trabaja nadie con ese nombre.- 53-

53- Salida ocupada.- 59- equivocada.- y ocupado.- y sin contestación.-103-

(hoja uno)

103- Salida al 13-74-92.- 0925 hrs.- HORTENSIA pregunta por su amor ZARRATE para saber si se pueden ver. Este dice que mientra siga actuando como niña y siga creyendo en los Santos Reyes no volverá a salir con ella y que ya es una mujer que debe de hacer las cosas por si misma. HORTENSIA se enoja y le dice hasta luego. - 126-

126- Salida sin contestación.- 136-

136- Salida al 33-01-80.- 0931 hrs.- HC pide a MF MARIA ELENA que anote en su libreta que voy a ir a la Embajada Americana, luego a la Dominicana y despues de la Procuraduria. MARIA que está bien.- 143-

143- Entrada.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que tiene un trabajo que terminar antes del dia 25 porque se quiere ir para el dia 23 "allá". MARINA se alegra. MIGNON invita a MARINA y a TERE PEÑA a comer hoy un mangú de platanos.. - Ambas aceptan.- 166-

166- Salida al 25-59-12.- 1011 hrs.- ocupado.- y bocina descolgada.-180- (Papeleria Cosmos)- MARINA pregunta por el señor VIDAL para avisarle que hace tres dias tiene el dinero de la renta del cuarto. VIDAL mandará recogerlo con su recibo.- 204-

204- Salida.-(Información)- MARINA por el número de Agua Electropura. LF que es el 33-13-00.-- 209-

209- Salida al 33-13-00.- 1017 hrs.- equivocado.- con Electrolux.- despues dicen que es 46-29-30.- Y luego MARINA hace pedido de agua electropura.- 1020 hrs.- 245-

(hoja dos)

245- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HF pregunta si hay alguna correspondencia para JOSE PEREZ. MARINA dice que no hay nada.- 258-

258- Entrada.- 1033 hrs.- HF desea informes para visa, pues habla de los Establecimientos Nosie y x tambien saber los requisitos para poder legalizar una carta poder para pedir el traspaso de maquinas en la Republica Dominicana. MARINA que primero ir a Gobernación y a Relaciones Exteriores y ya legalizados por esas dependencias puede pasar a la embajada bajo conocimiento de algún notario y que cuesta la legalización la cantidad de cinco dolares. HF que gracias.- 272-

272- Entrada.- 1040 hrs.- HF pregunta por el Corl.JORGE. TERE dice que no está. Despues GARCIA saluda a LORETE GUZMAN y pide le diga que lo llame al 11-90-43 con ANDRES GARCIA.- 283-

283- Entrada.- 1046 hrs.- CRISTINA saluda a MARINA y pregunta si ha llegado esa gente. Esta dice que no y que anoche llamó y no contestaba el teléfono y que hay que esperar hoy a ver que hay. CRISTINA dice que hoy va a la recepción de la embajada de Etiopía y que vea si en gobernación ya le dieron el permiso de residencia. MARINA pide le llame mas tarde entonces.- 310-

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. - . (..3.-L2- 6 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.

6 mayo 66.

L2-M2-T30-

1058-1208 hrs.-

00- Entrada.-1058 hrs.- MF de parte del señor GEORGE KATKINGSON del diario Los Angeles Times que solicitó una visa para ir a Santo Domingo y que es de nacionalidad norteamericana y que ya tuvo una visa de periodista y la quiere renovar. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues MF GEORGE dice que el consiguió antes una visa que le dieron en San Juan de Puerto Rico para la Dominicana y que ahora quiere volver para el asunto de llevar la notas periodisticas de las elecciones de su país y se quiere evitar tener que ir a San Juan a renovar. MARINA que hay que hacer todos los trámites de nuevo aquí, ya que son otras reglas y es mejor que deje el número de su teléfono para llamarlo cuando llegue el Cónsul. GEORGE dice que es 35-89-69 y que es GEORGE NATANSON y está radicado ~~xadixa~~ en México para los asuntos de su periodico en Centro America.- 56-

56- Entrada.- 1104 hrs.- LUCHITA GAMES con GUZMAN su amor y saber si se ven hoy. Este dice que si y pregunta por el número de la agencia que le ofreció darle. LUCHITA a la tarde que se vean se lo dará porque no lo traé consigo. GUZMAN le llamará a las cuatro y media.- 68-

68- -Bocina descolgada.- 83-

83- Salida.-(Embajada de Corea)- MARINA dice que hay una correspondencia que llegó de Santo Domingo para esa embajada y no hay ..
(hoja uno)

... con quien enviarla y de ser posible pasen a recogerla. MARINA aclara que proviene del Ministerio de Relaciones de Santo Domingo. HF que está bien y que gracias.- 93-

93- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1115 hrs.- (Ceremonial)- MARINA pregunta por FLORES TEJADA. HF dice que salió a la calle. MARINA pide se le diga que el señor GUZMAN desea tener una conferencia con él, con fines de tratar un asunto de su - Gobierno y que se le señale una cita. HF que está bien.-104-

104- Salida.- sin contestación.- 110-

110 Entrada.- 1117 hrs.- HF informa que de León,GTO, llaman al Corl.MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Despues HF ANDRES saluda a MARCOS y pregunta si recibió su telegrama de felicitación por el santo de MARCOS. Este dice que si y que gracias. ANDRES que ha estado haciendo gestiones ante la Ferretera el Bajió para el prestamo de unos 200 y que será una letra de cambio a seis meses de pago con intereses. MARCOS le llamará mas tarde para darle la respuesta. ANDRES tiene una comida que [illegible] le da al Obispo para congraciarse. MARCOS le llamará tarde como a las siete. ANDRES que a su despacho o sea el 3-17-02 y alli espera su llamado. MARCOS que está bien.- 134=

134- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1124 hrs.- YADIRA saluda a TAPIA y dice que si va a venir a la embajada. FRANK TAPIA pregunta que necesita. YADIRA que sobre unos documentos y una visa que pide el corresponsal del diario Los Angeles Times o sea NATANSON que quiere ir a Santo Domingo y que la vez pasada se la dieron en Puerto Rico. TAPIA dice que entonces se vaya a Puerto Rico a sacarla, despues dice que pasa al rato.- 149- (hoja dos)

149- Salida al 19-55-93.- 1125 hrs.- YADIRA por DEL OLMO, pero todavia no llega.- 154-

154- Salida ocupada.-y sin contestación.- 168-

168- Entrada.- 1123 hrs.- MA ADELINA ELIAS DE MORENO con su esposo el Coronel MARCOS JORGE MORENO para avisar que va al salón y que despues pase por ella. MARCOS que está bien y que solo sacó reintegro en la Loteria.- 180-

180- Salida al 35-56-08.- 1133 hrs.- (Oficialia Mayor).- HORTENSIA pregunta por la señorita MONTERO. Despues GUZMAN saluda a la Licenciada MONTERO. Esta dice que sus dos oficios pendientes de firma desde el miercoles no los tienen sino hasta hoy mas tarde y de los otros dos están pendientes de que se despache. GUZMAN que está bien y explica que hay tres medicos dominicanos que vinieron a México con visa por tres meses y sus pasaportes son oficiales con visa diplomática y se vencen el dia 8 y que Relaciones explica que hay que llamarles o solicitar el cambio por oficio. MONTERO que asi es y que despues le mando los oficios para que se despachen luego.- 201-

201- Salida al 13-21-92.- 1139 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el Lic. ENRIQUEZ para saludarlo. Este dice que estuvo un poco enfermo y con mucho trabajo, y que ya logró informes "sobre esa persona y que el último puesto que todavia tiene es en una compañia fraccionadora de terrenos y mas bien es al amparo de su hermano JUAN CORTINA PORTILLO, quien es la cabeza del grupo, y que he ocupado otros puestos siempre bajo la celula de su hermano JUAN y que "él" (EUSTAQUIO CORTINA PORTILLO) es una buena persona..

(hoja tres)

...completamente honorable y digna de todo crédito" y que el ultimo dato como antes lo dijo está como Presidente de una compañia de terrenos fraccionados, pero la persona que le dió ese dato dijo que eso era hacé seis meses y hasta la fecha no se ha logrado comprobar. GUZMAN pregunta si logró investigar de que filiación politica o social es mas o menos. ENRIQUEZ sabe que es igual que todos sus hermanos o sea de un grupo completamente catolico practicante y siempre ha estado en un circulo de hombres catolicos formados hace tiempo por un grupo de hombres que estuvieron o éstudiaron con el padre jesuita RAMON SILVA o RAMON MARTINEZ SILVA. GUZMAN toma nota y dice que no lo agradece mucho porque sus datos son valiosos. ENRIQUEZ que nada tiene que agradecer " doctor" si sus datos son en cierto punto cortos. GUZMAN que no y que verán que dia se reunen con las esposas a cenar juntos. ENRIQUEZ que está bien y que anoche estuvo platicando con el Dr. ROCHAC y dice que los conoce. GUZMAN dice que el Dr. ROCHAC es intimo amigo de mi padre y es una bella persona. ENRIQUEZ dice que salió hoy fuera y no sabe cuando podrá regresar a Santo Domingo hasta " que lo llamen". - 236-

236- Entrada.- 1143 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARCIA para saber si "está el señor". MARCIA que si que está platicando con don RENE. CRISTINA que va a esperar y al rato lo llamará porque lo quiero "coger a como dé lugar".- 248-

248- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.-MF quiere preguntar si para ir a Haití y Antillas Holandesas se tiene que sacar visa con la Dominicana. MARCIA dice que no es necesario porque no tienen que tocar Dominicana para llegar a esos otros paises.- MF platica que ..
(hoja cuatro)

.. ella tiene familiares en Santo Domingo trabajando en la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana y en caso de poder ir a ese país podría gestionar su visa allá mismo. MARINA que le ayuda en mucho pero de todos modos tiene que hacer las gestiones desde la embajada de aquí.- 292-

292- Entrada.- 1150 hrs.- CRISTINA con MARINA y pregunta por MARCOS (JORGE MORENO). Este dice que espere un momento. Despues CRISTINA dice que sabe que hace mal en llamarle pero para ella es suficiente estar esperando tanto y lo que le hizo el miercoles está muy mal ya que ella desde el 21 de abril está tratando de hablarle por ultima vez sin tener que molestarlo más. MARCOS guarda silencio. CRISTINA que solo le quiere saber su opinión para un viaje a Santo Domingo que ella quiere hacer y que no habia salido antes porque su hija está enferma. MARCOS dice que aquí no se puede hablar para nada. CRISTINA que ya se que te molesta hablar con-migo pero será la ultima vez que lo hago pero yo quiero saber tú consejo para ir a Santo Domingo y lo demas está por demas hablar y quedamos como amigos y total. Y que ya con los desaires que me haces ya es suficiente. MARCOS que no es momento para hablar y menos aquí y que el lunes nos vemos y no puedo seguir hablando porque hay mucha gente. CRISTINA que entonces nos vemos el lunes "enfrente donde ~~xxxx~~ siempre". MARCOS que está bien.- 328-

328- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- y siguen salidas equivocadas.- 427-

427- Salida al 19-55-90.- 1206 hrs.-(Hotel Emperador)- YADIRA por su amor DEL OLMO, pero no ha llegado y pide le diga que "su esposa lo llamó".- 433- (hoja cinco)

433- Entrada.- 1208 hrs. HORTENSIA pide a MARINA informa a GUZMAN que está en el zocalo, pero que estuvo en Gobernación y que todavia no estaban los oficios, y que si quiere que regrese a Gobernación. MARINA despues de informar dice que se venga mejor para la embajada pero rápido.- 449-

449- Salida sin contestación.- y equivocada.- 474-

474- Entrada.- HF por el Coronel MORENO. GUZMAN dice que ya salió. HF que es el Ing. IUGIBET.- 484-

484- Salida.- equivocada.- 490-

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(..6.-L2- 6 may.66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T31-
1354-1402 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- HF para cobrar la renta del local que ocupa la embajada. MOLINA dice que hay un cheque por un mes y es por la cantidad de $1,200.00. HF pasará a recogerlo.- 07-

07- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Noruega, para saber quien es el encargado de Negocios. MARINA dice que es RENE FIALLO. HF que es para una invitación que le enviarán.- 13-

13- Salida al 03 por la hora.- 1341 hrs.- 16-

16- Salida sin contestación y ocupado.- y equivocado.-31- - al 03 por la hora.- 1353 hrs.- 34-

34- Entrada.- HF de la Embajada de Dinamarca quiere saber si todavia es Ministro de Relaciones en Dominicana el Dr. CARLOS FEDERICO PEREZ Y PEREZ. GUZMAN dice que si. HF que es para enviar una correspondencia y tambien saber el nombre del Vice-Ministro. GUZMAN que es el Dr. MANUEL GUERRERO POUS porque el anterior Lic. RAMON MENCIA LISTER es representante ahora en las NNUU. HF que tambien el Jefe del Protocolo lo es todavia FRANCISCO JOSE [illegible] RINCON. GUZMAN dice que si. HF que gracias.- 47-

47- -Salida.-(Ceremonial)- GUZMAN por FLORES TEJADA. HF que llame despues de las cinco porque ya salió al aeropuerto.- 54-

54- Entrada.- ~~133xxxxx~~.- HF ANGEL por YADIRA. MARINA dice que salió la suegra y esposa de FRANK TAPIA. ANGEL que está bien. (es el esposo de YADIRA y se llama ANGEL DEL ~~xxxx~~ OLMO y trabaja en el servicio de turismo del Hotel Emperador)- 60-

60- Entrada.- MF con MARINA para comentar que su hija está enferma y que hace rato estuvo hablando con MARCOS JORGE MORENO y que le dijo que tenia que hablar con ella el lunes.(MF es CRISTINA amante del Corl.MORENO)- Y que a la noche van a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopiá.- 107-

107- Entrada.- Corl. MAURICIO FERNANDEZ pregunta por LEONTE para saber si puede firmar el giro al portador. Este dice que si. - 118-

118- Salida.- equivocada.- 123- y sin-contestación.- y ocupada. - 146-

146- Entrada.-HF dice ser pasante de Medicina y quiere irse a la Dominicana en calidad de interno en algún hospital. MARINA que solo hay que cubrir los requisitos de visa y se le podrá aceptar. HF dice que termina sus estudios a fín de año y tiene tiempo de ir tramitando sus asuntos. MARINA que está bien.-165-

165- Salida equivocada.- 172- y salida al 03 por la hora.- 1350hs - 175-

175- Entrada.-1354 hrs.- HF con TERESITA PENA para saber a donde vá mas tarde. Esta dice que iba a ir con CRISTINA a la recepción de la Embajada de Etiopía pero antes van con MARINA a casa de

(hoja dos) ...

.. MIGNON en un carro. HF que está bien. TERE dice que vino el doctor CABRERA - dominicano- quien se va para la patria y anda vendiendo el auto en mil dolares y que vale como 30 mil, y que es un Ford. HF se interesa y pregunta a donde hablar con CABRERA. TERE que al 19-56-52 y 19-56-53, y que sale mañana a Pachuca y el domingo se va a Miami para despues a Santo Domingo.- 216-

216- Salida.- HORTENSIA pregunta por ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ.- - equivocado.- 226-

226- Salida sin contestación.- 240-

240- Salida al 21-36-70.- 1402 hrs.- HORTENSIA por el señor MAGAÑA para avisarle que "le habló aquel y que quiere verla con el niño". MAGAÑA que entonces lo dejan para el lunes. HORTENSIA le dice: " está pedo y quiere verte hoy", MAGAÑA que primero arregla tus asuntos personales y despues nos vemos y despues le corta.- 270-

270- Salida equivocada.- y sin contestación.- 288-

288- Entrada sin contestación.- 310-

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EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-55.
6 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T32-
1736-1900 hrs.-

00- Salida al 10-55-90.- 1736 hrs.- (Hotel Emperador)- GUZMAN pregunta por don RENE FIALLO. MF MERCEDES FERNANDEZ DE FIALLO dice que salió para la embajada Suiza y que despues iba a pasar a las oficinas. GUZMAN vino porque se lo dijo y va a tener que esperarlo. MERCEDES porque se va a entrevistar con el embajador suizo. GUZMAN lo va a esperar de todos modos y si no viene mas tarde entonces mañana vendrá.- 22-

22- Entrada.- HF ROLAND DALLAS de la Agencia de Noticias Reuter de Londres, quiere saber si hay una reunión de productores de azucar en México y si la Dominicana está representada. GUZMAN no sabe y pregunta cuando comienza esa reunión. ROLAND que tiene informes de Londres que debe de comenzar hoy y que participan Perú, Brasil, Dominicana, Colombia y México. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. Despues dice que si le quiere llamar mañana a las once porque yo soy un empleado de la embajada y no sé de eso. ROLAND que gracias.- 44-

44- Salida.- RENE pide el apartamento 201 con el señor TAPIA. - HF dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que tienen aquí una dificultad en un cable cifrado que estámos trabajando y resulta que el sello de la embajada no está en el escritorio de doña MARINA y que GUZMAN le dice que el se lo dió a RENE para un visado de cortesia en la mañana y de modo que no ...
(Hoja uno)

.. está el sello y necesitan mandar esos cables hoy mismo. TAPIA tarda en llegar unos diez minutos. RENE que está bien.63-

63- Salida al 18-52-86.- 1830 hrs.- ocupado y sin contestación.- - 87-

87- Salida al 14-02-86.- 1835 hrs.- RENE por TAPIA.- equivocado. - 94-

94- Salida al 14-02-76.- 1835 hrs.- RENE pregunta por FRANK TAPIA. ID' dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice a TAPIA que no hay necesidad que se venga. TAPIA que el no sabe de ese asunto de descifrar y que yo tenia la cable pero es en mensajes de llegada, mas no para salidas y eso a lo pudo... risas. RENE que entonces va a dejar a GUZMAN que haga todo y que ya encontraron el sello de la embajada que MARINA dejó en el escritorio mio y ya se lo he dicho que yo no la quiero acusar de que las cosas se le olvidan y todavia asegura de no hacer las cosas. TAPIA que si y que asi se pasa el tiempo olvidandosele las cosas. Y que hoy en la mañana decia que estaban perdidos unos cheques que al final los encontrarón. RENE que es una pobre mujer que está perdiendo la memoria y se despiden.- 130-

130- Entrada.- 1845 hrs.- MARINA pregunta a GUZMAN si se le quedó en su auto un broche de ella. GUZMAN lo recogió y lo tiene guardado.- 140-

140- Entrada.- 1847 hrs.- TERESITA PEÑA con GUZMAN para saber que se ofrece. GUZMAN que es por el sello que no aparecia.- Pero ya lo encontraron y acaba de llegar otro cable cifrado y "el viejo ya se fué a la recepción de Haiti".- 158- (hoja dos)

135- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1850 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por el señor FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones. Se dice que ya no vino por la tarde a trabajar pero ella dirá que le llamó si es que llega o hasta mañana.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1900 hrs.- CHELITO GAINES con su amor GUZMAN y saber a que horas se ven. GUZMAN que dentro de media hora allí en su casa. CHELITO la espera en la puerta de la casa.-181-

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. - . (..3.- L2- 6 mayo.66)-

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-65.
7 mayo 66.
L2-M2-T33-
1046-1454 hrs.-

00- Entrada.- sin contestación.- 03-

03- Entrada.- HF CHELITO GAMES saluda a su amor GUZMAN y pregunta que hace. Este dice que trabajando. CHELITO dice que se " va a quedar seco de tanto trabajar". GUZMAN que si " y si tú no me cuidas peor". CHELITO si lo quiere atender y se verán hoy. GUZMAN le llamará mas tarde a las doce a su oficina.- 08-

08- Entrada.- CRISTINA con GUZMAN y con TERESITA PEÑA para comentar que su hija IRMITA está un poco enferma y que citó a MARINA para mañana en casa y comer juntas.. bla.. bla..- sin importancia.- 38-

38- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1046 hrs.- (Carteros Zona Uno)- GUZMAN pregunta por IBULAS para saber si ha llegado alguna - valija o correspondencia para la embajada. Este dice que no y que le llame mas tarde.- 45-

45- Entrada.- HF por CARMITA CASTILLO de parte de SALVADOR - RENDON. GUZMAN dice que los sabados no trabaja .- 49-

50- Entrada.- 1056 hrs.- SONIA por JORGE MORENO o por TAPIA. GUZMAN dice que hasta el lunes estarán porque hoy no vienen.-
- 53- (hpja uno)

55- Salida al 18-29-93.- 1100 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a FLORES TEJADA del Ceremonial de Relaciones y dice que le llama porque el Encargado de Negocios RENE FIALLO acaba de recibir un cable de nuestro gobierno y de que tiene que comunicarle ciertas cosas al Canciller CARRILLO FLORES y para ello solicita una audiencia . FLORES dice que el Ministro salió de viaje a los Estados Unidos o sea por Nueva York y Washington, pero en cuanto regrese se le solicitará la entrevista o si es urgente se podrá gestionar con el Primer Sub-Secretario. GUZMAN que como es una cosa directa con el Canciller entonces van a esperar por les semana si es que no tarda mucho en regresar, y que el lunes le avisará. FLORES que está bien.- 74-

74- Salidas ocupadas.- 110-

110- Salida al 12-04-93.- 1150 hrs.- GUZMAN pregunta por INCLAN para saber si llegó siempre valija. Este dice que no. GUZMAN a la vez pregunta los requisitos que se necesitan para enviar valija de aquí de México a la Dominicana. INCLAN no sabe ya que son cosas diferentes al servicio de correo y para ello es mejor preguntar a Comunicaciones. GUZMAN que gracias.- 127-

127- Salida ocupada.- 136-

136- Salida al 19-89-04.- 1158 hrs.- (Oficina de Personal de Comunicaciones)- RENE FIALLO desea saber a quien hay que dirigirse para los trámites de envió de una valija por via aerea para el gobierno Dominicano. MF que debo de llamar al 18-06-60 ext.271 que es el Departamento de Transportes.- 159-

(hoja dos)

159- Salida sin contestación.-178-

178- Salida al 21-70-51.- 1200 hrs.- (Jefatura de Correos)- FIALLO pide informes sobre como y donde depositar una valija diplomática para Dominicana. MF que en las oficinas centrales de las calles de Tacuba y Ruiz de Alarcón.- 194-

194- Salida sin contestación.- y ocupadas.- 220-

220- Entrada.- 1210 hrs.- MF de la Administración Central de Correos avisa a GUZMAN que les llegó una valija diplomática y como es sabado tiene que pasar a recogerla mas temprano y que es de parte de INCLAN y estarán hasta las dos de la tarde. GUZMAN que gracias.- 227-

227- Entrada.- 1211 hrs.- CIELITO GAMES con su amor GUZMAN para comentar que llegó valija, y que GUZMAN va a ir a retirarla del correo y le llamará despues para verse mas tarde.-235-

235- Salida al ~~24~~- 23-41-54.- 1232 hrs.- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por el departamento que se renta en las calles de Lerma esquina con Tiber o sea atrás del Hotel Maria Isabel. MF con acento de norteamericana le informa y que renta $4,500.00 al mes.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES quiere uno mas barato para dos personas.- 268-

268- Salida sin contestación.-275-

275- Salida.- ~~XXXXXXXX~~ MERCEDES por un departamento que rentan y que ella necesita por tres meses.- MF ofrece los que tiene en Rhin 29 (Apartamentos Carmen donde habita TERESITA PEÑA) y otros mas en Petrarca y Newton, Polanco.- 321- (hoja tres)

321- Salida ocupada.- 327-

327- Entrada.- 1250 hrs.- MF por GUZMAN. MERCEDES DE FIALLO dice que salió a recoger una valija y regresa mas tarde o bien hasta el lunes. MF es CHELITO GAMES y dice que llama de Seguros Progreso y que es sobre un cobro de un seguro (?).(Efectivamente CHELITO que es amor de GUZMAN trabaja en Seguro Progreso de la calle de Madero 69)- 344-

344- Salida al 14-83-89.- 1254 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pide informes sobre el apartamento de Herodoto 30. HF dice que lo puede pasar a ver a la hora que guste.-371-

372- Salida.- MERCEDES por informes de un departamento pero ya está rentado.- 379-

379- Entrada.- sin contestación fuera.- 383-

383- Salida sin contestación.- 390-

390- Salida al 13-70-44.- 1301 hrs.- (Cine Mundial)- GUZMAN pregunta por RAMON CARVAJAL para saludarlo y ponerse de acuerdo en caso que llame la NENA para hacer planes y salir de paseo mañana. RAMON está de acuerdo.- 411-

411- Salida al 45-72-69.- ~~xx~~- 1302 hrs.- MB MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta por el departamento que rentan amueblado.- 427-

427- Salida al 11-25-10.- MERCEDES por informes del departamento amueblado que rentan en la calle Venecia 34, Colonia Juarez.-
- 438-   (hoja cuatro)-

458- Entrada.- 1310 hrs.- CHULITO GAMES pregunta a GUZMAN si se van a ver porque ella ya sale del trabajo y se va para su casa. GUZMAN entonces le llamará mas tarde a su casa porque tiene mucho trabajo y qué sobre el dinero del cobrador lo xxxuàt resuelve el lunes pero hoy de todos modos se han de ver.- 481-

481- Salida sin contestación.- 512-

512- Salida al 46-23-24.- 1331 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO se interesa por los apartamentos de la calle de Lerma MF que los puede pasar a ver con el velador JOSE./- 525-

525- Salida al 46-41-07.- 1333 hrs.- MERCEDES por datos del departamento de rentan en la calle de Pachuca. MF le corta.- 542-

542- Salida al 20-99-05.- 145xxxxx.- MERCEDES pregunta por la señora CEBRIAN para saber lo del departamento que se renta y que a ella la recomienda la Agencia (?). MF dice que la señora no está y que tarda en regresar.- 563-

563- Salida al 20-99-05.- 1454 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO con la señora CEBRIAN para saber sobre el departamento que renta y que es por tres meses porque no tiene la seguridad de continuar ya que pasando las elecciones de su país tal vez salgan del país o tal vez nó. Y quedan de llamarse el lunes para ponerse de acuerdo en que si lo rentan o no por el tiempo antes mencionado. - 708-

708- -Salida.-(Suits Emperador)- RENE FIALLO pide a MF le mande un taxi a la embajada.- 750-

(hoja cinco)

750- Salida.-(Emperador)- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si mandaron el taxi. MF que si y que tarda cinco minutos en llegar.- 766-

766- Entrada sin contestación.- 812-

- -

. - . (..6.-L2- 7 mayo 66)

EMBAJADA DOMINICANA.- 28-77-85.
9 mayo 66.
~~Z8k~~- L2-M2-T34-
0904-1212 hrs.-

00- Entradas sin contestación.- 16-

16- Salida al 22-66-29.- 0904 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a HERNANDEZ y dice que el sabado lo estuvo esperando y quiere verlo hoy. HERNANDEZ lo espera por la tarde en su casa. GUZMAN que está bien porque necesito eso hoy. (HERNANDEZ es de la distribuidora Benot quien les vende vinos, cigarrillos, etc. de importación).
- 25-

25- Entrada.- 0910 hrs.- HD MARCOS JORGE MORENO se reporta. GUZMAN dice que espere un momento. Despues HD saluda a MORENO y pregunta si no lo recuerda que es su viejo amigo de Santo Domingo y que tu estabas de Comandante de la Guardia en Palacio. MORENO lo recuerda y pregunta si es MINELLA. HD dice que si y que llegó ayer a dar un paseo y a saludar a los amigos y como no conocia esto a eso vino, y vino con su esposa y están en el Hotel Oxford en la calle Mariscal 67 y que vino a conseguir las visas de Guatemala. MORENO va al rato a llegar a la embajada. Despues otro HD saluda a MORENO y le dice "vagabundo" - risas. Y que se vino manejando desde Guatemala pero ahora que está en la ciudad de México no se atreve a meterse a las calles por el tráfico enorme. MORENO pide lo esperen un rato pues no tarda en llegar. HD dice que en Santo Domingo le mandaron un libro de PEREZ FERREIRA que se titula "Guerra o Patria" y lo dejó en ...
(hoja uno)

... Guatemala, pero en la pagina 128 te mencionan y dice sobre una forma brillante de las actuaciónes de MORENO o sea que dice: " el Coronel MARCO ANTONIO JORGE MORENO fué relevado de la - Victoria despues de haber derrotado a mas de cinco mil presos politicos y que eso le costo que lo sacaran de allí", asi que quiere decir que tu nombre está para la historia ya porque figuras en un libro. MORENO se alegra de saber eso y dice que al rato se verán. HD vino con GALLARDA con su esposa e hijos y despues irán a buscar a BRUNO para verse todos juntos.- 77-

77- Entrada.- 0959 hrs.- HF de parte de HORTENSIA pregunta por MARINA para avisarle que está enferma y que se tuvo que ir al Seguro y que llegará mas tarde. GUZMAN que está bien.- 85-

85- Entrada.- 1001 hrs.- LD.- HF en INGLES pregunta por RENE FIALLO. MARINA en mismo INGLES informa que no está y que llega en una hora, o que llame al Hotel Emperador.- 110-

110- Entrada.- 1012 hrs.- HF por JOSE FRANK TAPIA el Cónsul. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues HF ARNEDOS pregunta si le manda eso. TAPIA que si que lo espera. ARNEDOS se lo manda en un sobre y pregunta como está la familia. TAPIA que bie tódos y pide qúe la carta que le va a mandar se la haga llegar lo mas pronto posible porque es urgente.- ARNEDOS si debe de suspender por algo el viaje se lo avisará, porque va a hablra con DENIS para ver si ella tambien va y que le manda a la persona para que le arreglo el pasaporte y la visa. TAPIA que está bien.- 126-

126- Entrada.- 1015 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si les han llamado. Dona MARINA que a don RENE le llamaron de Estados

(hoja dos) ...

... Unidos que les dijo que estaba en una junta y que llamaran mas tarde. MERCEDES que si llama le diga que ya sale para el Congreso a buscarlo. MARINA que está bien.- 134-

134- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1019 hrs.- YADIRA dice a MARIA que por la tarde se ven para comer juntas.- 142-

142- Entrada.- 1021 hrs.- HF por la dirección de la Embajada. GUZMAN se la proporciona.- 145-

145- Salida al 46-65-70.- 1024 hrs.- MARINA pregunta de parte de MARINA como amaneció el niño. HF dice que ya bien y que ella va a esperar a su hombre que llegue hoy.- 158-

158- Salidas sin contestación.- 174-

174- Entrada.- 1049 hrs.- CRISTINA con CARMITA y con MARINA para saludarse y preguntar como sigue la hija de MARINA o sea LILIANA. MARINA dice que ya mejor. CRISTINA está esperando porque MARCOS JORGE la cito a las dies y media en la puesta de Palacio de Hierro de Durango, y estará llamando para saber si llega a la embajada. MARINA que está bien.- 193-

193- Entrada.- 1108 hrs.- HF por el agregado de Prensa. YADIRA dice que llame al 24-31-29 (xxxxxx -- es con la MIGNON)- 204-

204- Entrada.- 1110 hrs.- MERCEDES DE FIALLO pregunta si llegó su esposo RENE. GUZMAN y despues MARINA dice que la están esperando. Despues MERCEDES reclama a RENE que la hiso ir a buscarlo. RENE le dice " mi vida perdoname, y me tuvo que venir". MERCEDES
(hoja tres) ...

... fué al banco a hacer el deposito. RENE que está bien y que el está en espera de una llamada de Estados Unidos, pero no dejaron dicho de que ciudad era, pero si es de Estados Unidos lo primero que he pensado es en ABRIL, pero tiene que estar esperando de nuevo la llamada. MERCEDES que no ha de ser nada grave de lo contrario te hubieran dejado recado.- 240-

240- Entrada.- 1119 hrs.- CRISTINA pregunta por MARINA para saber si llegó a la embajada MARCOS JORGE MORENO. Esta dice que vino por un rato pero va a salir de nuevo porque anda con los agregados militares del Salvador y otros que lo vinieron a buscar. CRISTINA creia que lo estaba huyendo y pregunta si anda uniformado. MARINA dice que no. CRISTINA que entonces si regresa le diga que el miercoles tratará de hablar con el, porque yo no puedo estarlo esperando mas hoy.- 260-

260- Entrada.- 1127 hrs.- CRISTINA ahora con TERESITA para decirle que MARCOS la tuvo esperando casi una hora y que ahora tendrá que esperar otro dia para ver cuando se digna verla.. bla. - bla..- Y quedan de verse mañana.- 346- bloqueado.-352-

352- Salidas sin contestación y ocupadas.- 373-

373- Salida.- Coronel FERNANDEZ reclama a la empresa Tele-Rex que del televisor que compraron está en malas condiciones y necesita que lo vayan a ver a su domicilio de Herodoto 30-102 y que lo vendió JUAN VALDEZ. -MF toma el reporte.- 402-

402- Salida al 45-45-86.- 1140 hrs.- ocupado.-y sin contestación. -418- equivocado.-427- FERNANDEZ con su hija y despues con su

(hoja cuatro) ...

... esposa JOSEFA NUÑEZ y pide que llame a la agencia en que compraron la televisión para que de los datos de factura y démas. Y que mañana va a tener que hacer mas cena porque invitó a unos amigos militares y a MARCOS.- 454-

454- Salida al 37-03-16.- 1143 hrs.- HD por MANUEL. HF dice que no está. HD que le diga que no le quieren pegar en la - embajada porque la maquina no está aquí. HF dice que se espere y que ahora van a reclamar.-496-

496- Entrada.- 1145 hrs.- CRISTINA avisa a MARINA que ya va de salida y tiene que estar a una misa y que despues hacen planes para mañana.- 515-

515- Entrada.- 1147 hrs.- MF MERCEDES LERO pregunta por GUZMAN. MARINA dice que espere un momento. Despues MERCEDES pregunta si ya llegó la visa del Dr. (?). GUZMAN que van a esperar que se la manden de Relaciones. MF MERCEDES que son tres visas y que una de ellas es de su mamá. Despues MD TERESITA dice que llame despues para mientras llegan esas visas.- 354-

554- Entrada.- 1155 hrs.- MIGNON saluda a MARINA y dice que acaba de recibir una carta del xx señor ese de Santo Domingo preguntandole por su visa. MARINA va a ver eso y pregunta si se va siempre el 23 para que aproveche la toma de posesión. MIGNON se quiere ir antes y quien sabe si espete para la fecha de la toma de posesión. Despues MIGNON informa a GUZMAN que acaba de recibir una carta de FEDERICO que quiere saber sobre sus visas. GUZMAN que ya salió el chofer por ellas a Gobernación. MIGNON se quiere ir para el dia 18 y quiere llevarse la visa para FEDERICO. GUZMAN le arregla el asunto el miercoles.- 597-

597- Entrada sin contestación.- fuera.- y salida sin contestación.- y ocupado.- 635-

635- Salida.- (Ceremonial)- TERESA pregunta el número de teléfono donde se celebró la conferencia de desnuclearización. HP dice que es el 26-25-60.- 659-

659- -Bocina descolgada.- 667-

667- Salida al 26-25-60.- 1205 hrs.- (COPREDAL)- TERESA pide comunicarse con alguna persona del archivo, pues RENE FIALLO desea solicitar unos documentos sobre las ultimas declaraciones del COPREDAL. HP dice que espere un momento. Despues RENE dice que es el delegado de la Dominicana ante la COPREDAL y necesita con urgencia de las dos ultimas sesiones que no fueron repartidas por falta de tiempo o sea con el acta final que suman tres y sus mociones conjuntas que se sometió a la mesa en el momento de cerrar y que fueron los paises actuantes Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Perú, Panamá, Dominicana y Venezuela. HP toma y ofrece mandar esos documentos a mas tardar mañana. RENE que en todo caso si a las dos no le llegan puede pasar por ellos porque tiene que hacer su comunicación oficial ante su gobierno.- 738-

738- Salida al ~~46x09x73xax1212xhrs.~~- CARMITA pide comunicarse a la oficina de Turismo del Hotel Emperador, pero no hay nadie. - 757-

757- Salida al 46-09-73.- 1212 hrs.- GUZMAN saluda a MARTIN y pregunta que hay de nuevo. Este dice que nada que en el trabajo fecundo y creador. GUZMAN pregunta si ya sabe que llegó un nuevo

(hoja seis) ...

14-00000

... Jefe de Misión. MARTIN no lo sabía y pregunta si entonces ya renunció a su cargo MARCIO VELOZ. GUZMAN que no que este nuevo que viene llega como Encargado de Negocios, y cambia de tema y dice que está en éstos momentos escribiendo una carta para ROBERTO ZUÑIGA y compañía que es la agencia aduanal y que en su nombre va JOSE FRANCISCO TAPIA para hacer esas gestiones de la franquicia diplomatica de libre importación del automovil en forma ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ temporal según acuerdo de la oficina de Registro Federal de Automoviles. MARTIN está de acuerdo y el mismo puede darle contestación a esa solicitud. GUZMAN que es conveniente hacer el endoso de la factura y demás documentación..... - SE TERMINA EL ROLLO.- 835-

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. - . (..7.-L2- 9 mayo 66)

50-6-32/4

14-00000

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DCWHD/C

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMROD/LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: Pass to Thomas G. URQUHART

Forwarded herewith is verbatim conversation between Judith FERETTO and Adelina ZENDEJAS on 20 November 1965. (Source: LIFEAT)

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As stated - Herewith

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- 2 - DCWHD/C w/att (h/w)
- 1 - C/WHD w/o/att
- 3 - Files

50-6-32/4

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 27885	15 December 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	HQS FILE NUMBER 201 - 020481

99 FEB No. 13 20 Nov 65

JUDY: Mujer, ya te arreglaron el teléfono?

AZ: Ya

JUDY: Te he llamado.

AZ: Sí, lo tuve muy mal, se mojaron los cables, porque los acomodadores de los teléfonos vinieron y lo plantaron y yo les dije que todavía no estaba puesto y dijeron no importa, ahora voy a tener que pagar la nueva instalación.

JUDY: Y eso no va por cuenta de ellos?

AZ: No. Y como le haces cómo le haces si no te quedas sin teléfono.

JUDY: Ah sí hay cosas que no puede uno ni pelearlas.
Cómo llegó tu mamá, quería en primer lugar saber eso.

AZ: Pues llegó muy cansada con la altura luego pues le dió gripa y luego pues la impresión, si a uno le produce impresión un viaje así, imagínate para ella que a su edad va a consumar el sueño de su vida y a ver de bulto todo lo que se imaginaba

JUDY: Pues fíjate que el otro día te quise decir, pero como estabas tan ocupada con..te acuerdas? allá en el Instituto que había recibido carta de Carlos y habla de tí por supuesto y me pone además..te voy a leer donde dice: Recibí también carta de ADELINA donde me dice cosas muy bonitas tuyas. Bueno me encanta que hayas conocido a (no entiendo nombre) me dices cuando viene...(Judita termina de leer y dice:, el muchacho se fuè sin avisarme desgraciadamente, yo quería mandarle una botella de Tequila y se fue;(pero está internado desde 2 días antes de que mi mamá llegara a Roma,- AZ habla)..JUDY: El muchacho? AZ: No, Carlos. JUDY: Ah sí el habla aquí de eso, que le traerá óptimos resultados.

Roco Saenz [illegible] had been [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] & travel [illegible] [illegible] Italy [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 1st [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

AZ: Llegando a Roma lo internaron y estará hasta hoy en el hospital.

JUDY: Depende mucho de las enfermeras nos pregunta (se ríen) (continúa leyendo la carta)..."tardaste mucho en escribirme, te espero la próxima vez en Trieste, un abrazo para tí, un abrazo para Adelina, dile que a pesar de mi buena voluntad no he encontrado a su madre.

— Contreras?

AZ: No la pudo encontrar porque se puso muy malo en Trieste; exactamente los días que mi mamá estaba en Roma él ya estaba en camino a Ferreri, porque le escribió a Carlitos y le dijo lo mismo y le dijo que me buscara y el maldito muchacho si no me encuentra en El Día no me lo dice, por cierto que le pregunté por su mamá y me dijo: "bueno, vive en Cuautla más tranquila, tú sabes.."

JUDY: Esta carta es del 30 y el muchacho salió el 30 y me dice: pasado mañana ingreso al hospital. Le voy a contestar esta semana-

AZ: Le voy a escribir yo también, él quisiera que todos los días le escribieran.

(cont..

cc # 12 HMMA-27835 (15 Dec 65) CS COPY 50-6-32/4 (cont...

JUDY: De pasada le mandaré un traguito de Tequila como recuerde de este hermoso país.

AZ: Tú sabes que no puede tomar nada, por eso lo encerraron

JUDY: No, lo encerraron por lo de su pierna.

AZ: Pero por eso, no puede tomar nada, Carlitos me dijo eso, que no se había querido internar y lo había estado alarga y alarga porque iba a tener una dieta tremenda entre ella ni gota de alcohol ni gota de vino, dice: "y tú ya sabes cómo es mi papá".

JUDY: qué otra cosa te iba a decir...mira, de lo de Carlos Pellicer que hablamos para digo tan a la carrera...

AZ: (interrumpe) yo hablé con él

JUDY: Sí él me dijo. te enteraste bien de todo domo fué (AZ la interrumpe y dice: Sí la leí.) Judy continúa: Ah leíste la carta..

aZ: Después me dijo, no hay nada que hacer, yo le hable al otro día. me dijo: mira vino el secretario del señor con su montón de excusas y me hizo un montón de halagos, se estuvo más de media hora conmigo y ante eso me ha desarmado completamente.

JUDY: Sí, pero sí se puede publicar la carta.

AZ: Pero en dónde, en El Día no la publicam.

JUD.: No la publican? Yo la mande a todos los lugares que pude, me entiendes? fuera.

AZ: No, ni de chiste, yo le dije: mira, yo podría hacer un comentario y me contestón: lo entiendo, además creo que no se puede hacer, así me dijo ese día.

JUDY: Yo estuve con él, en la casa.

AZ: (interrumpe) me dijo que había hablado a "Política" a ver si acaso pero a cualquier revista o periódico que la publique, le quitan el papel, así tranquilamente, yo compré "Siempre" pensando que ya saliera algo y ni una palabra, ni Sucesos fíjate tú.

JUDY: Ah, antes de que se me olvide, qué hay en lo de MADRAZO Angelina

AZ: Bueno mira él ya no aguantó, porque los intereses creados en el PRIson superiores a la buena intención de él.

JUDY: Espérate un segundito.,,, Ya perdona.

AZ: Bueno, entonces, él pues en verdad trataba de hacer un partido y.. de purificarlo vamos.. y los intereses creados más la propaganda en contra de él, pagada por esos intereses no le permitió realizar lo que él quería.

JUDY: Verdad que es un hombre muy honrado?

AZ: El es honrado, muy muy honrado, un poco desbocado como buen Tabasqueño, un poco arbitrario, porque él en su vida ha ido así a brincos y ha superado las cosas, pero pues las mañas de todo esto y además intereses personales terribles, en Chihuahua, en Sinaloa, en donde el latifundismo de los nuevos ricos de los nue-

(cont..

vos Porfiristas, pues no se deja ganar para nada y luego cuando no hay en realidad un movimiento popular desde la base, organizado donde no hay una militancia verdadera ningún partido e incluyo al (JUDY la interrumpe diciendo "claro, claro" y no se escucha el nombre del partido) qué puedes tu hacer, si yo a veces pienso que cómo López Mateos no aventó todo al diablo se fue a la Derecha completamente.

JUDY: Tú sabes que está muy enfermo.

AZ: López Mateos?

JUDY: Sí, porque yo tengo de cliente a la señora Alvarez Amézquita, que son muy amigos, bueno y un día de estos me estuvo dando las quejas de cómo está de mal el doctor, entre otras cosas, dice que está bueno, una cosa tremenda, que no quiere hacer caso y que se está matando, bueno y que va a ir con el Lic. López Mateos, van a Chile no? entonces yo misma le dije: pues si nadie tiene influencia sobre él porque usted no le habla como amiga del Lic. López Mateos que le hable a él, porque tiene una diabetes y no hace ningún caso, está malísimo, tiene una úlcera, toma tragos, en fin matándose no? pero entonces me contesta ella, pero si López Mateos está igual o peor, porque un día de estos casi se les muere de un dolor de cabeza, casi casi se les muere, me dice: pero ya usted sabe lo que es la cosa de la política y del poder y eso, dice: él estaba feliz esperando el nombramiento este, porque no pueden estar sin esas cosas.. me lo dijo ayer.

AZ: Yo me imagino que algo tenía porque..

JUDY: Interrumpe.. me lo dijo como cosa seria, que se les quiso morir..

AZ: Yo tengo una carta de él, contestando el telegrama del día de su santo y ..(JUDY interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento)..
AZ continúa: me puso una carta pero además le he tenido algunas cosas, sobre todo con esto de la Olimpiada y he estado llamando y entonces me pareció tan extraño que inclusive la secretaria de Humberto aparecía como enferma y el ayudante que por última vez tomó el teléfono me dijo: A. maestra, si es usted, le voy a dar el teléfono de San Jerónimo pero no diga usted que yo dije que la señora está enferma, me entiende usted?... Y yo pensé algo le ha de pasar, quizá allí se la ha arrebatado la gentetante a Adolfo que ha preferido encerrarse en su casa y hacerse todo y ya Humberto ya está allá, trasladado parte de su oficina y está trabajando allí. Luego le hablé a la Sra. Greger y me dijo: mire, el Lic. Romero está muy ocupado porque el señor tiene muchas cosas, pero yo no le pregunté porque ya sé cómo Patricia, pero sí me dió risa porque dije que estará enfermo, porque eso de que se encierre en su casa es muy extraño, por eso algo debe saber.
Yo quise hablar con Eva y le hablé a Amelia su hermana que es mi conducto porque aunque ya no es Presidenta todavía tiene una ola de gente allí y me dijo: vamos a hacer una cosa, espera a que pase el 15 de noviembre y que termine toda la preparación del viaje de Aldolfo (corr. Adolfo) y ya hacemos una cita para que la veas aquí mejor. Ahora que no sabía si Eva acompañaría a Adolfo y también eso me hizo pensar qué cosa será, porque los dos van uno por un

(cont..

lido y otro por otro cuando tienen trabajo, pero si ya Eva va a acompañarlo es que él está enfermo.

JUDY: No pues yo sse sé, que estuvo seriamente mal.

AZ: Tiene diabetes emocional, se le sube la azucar por horas y se le baja por horas. Yo lo había visto bastante bien y de repente se ha desaparecido, yo creía que estaba trabajando en la intervencion, en esto, en lo de Chile, pero mira las gentes que se ponen graves graves durar mucho.

AZ: Se murió Ana Mayeb, tenía anemia hemolítica. Del páncreas, no hay nada que hacer, además le dio bronconeumonía y se fué volando. Murió el martes 9, tú llegaste un día antes del acto verdad? bueno, entonces yo era la que iba a hablar, yo tenía 39 de calentura, ese día me viste muy mal.

JUDY: No hablamos por teléfono el día que tú estabas preparando el discurso. Entonces fué cuando quería yo hablar contigo de todas estas cosas, excepto de lo del Lic. López Mateos.

AZ: Era ese el día, había muerto un día antes. Había tenido tanto lío y tanta cosa, me había emberrinchinado porque me habían nombrado y no puedo dar conferencias, no tengo tiempo para preparar y así me dá mucho coraje ir a hacer porquerías y más en el caso de la Unión Soviética, entonces lo había escrito pero lo tenía que resumir porque eran muchas hojas y no tenía más del tiempo preciso para terminar, revisar y corregir y luego pues otras veces yo puedo hablar, pero ahora que tengo este ruidito en el oído, tú no sabes qué desesperación porque me pongo nerviosísima, luego tenía calentura, total al entrar al acto me dijeron murió Ana Mayeb.

JUDY: Yó hace mucho no la veía, porque yo donde solía encontrarme con ella era allá, ya tú sabes, con esta amiga que vive en la Av. Veracruz. Esa noche cenó allí con nosotros, pues todavía estaba Pere aquí.

AZ: Bueno pues ella fue la primera que me dijo que era un caso muy difícil en que en otra situación se podría hacer algo, pero que cómo íbamos nosotros a pedir cosas.

JUDY: Ah bueno, de esto te quería hablar también, de lo que me contó Carlos Pellicer, tú lo debes saber bien, de la gestión de un grupo de hombres de lo más destacado de México, de personalidades en todos los campos, de la gente muy honrada, etc. y pusieron en manos de Carlos Pellicer una petición al "barbón" no para que le libere ni nada de eso no? sino para que se sepa de ella y las razones, es una cosa muy respetuosa, me dijo Carlos y perfectamente humana. Entonces Carlos debió haber ido en representación del grupo a depositar en manos de...

AZ: No le van a contestar nada.

JUDY: No, no no, ir personalmente a la isla, me entiendes?

AZ: Pues no le van a hacer caso.

JUDY: Y resulta que entonces él se queja con mucha razón porque aquí estaba Luisa cuando eso, y estaba furiosa porque hagan cosas así. Entonces se fue aquí, donde una es su amiga o amigo, que es el

(cont..

embajador, porque son muy amigos, y le dijo y le pidió el visado y la negaron el visado. Francamente Adelina, eso da vergüenza.

AZ: Pues no me extraña.

JUDY: Y me dijo, están haciendo un Gobierno democrático o qué.

AZ: Bueno, eso no lo entienden.

JUDY: No, no Adelina no, ya esas líneas no se pueden tener a estas alturas.

AZ: Bueno, pues mira, ese día del entierro, yo hablé con una gente de allá, que fue porque esta mujer ayudó mucho en toda la represión y eso, fue al entierro, entonces yo fui en la mañana a las 8:30 y me estuve allí hasta las 10:30 en que me fui a mi trabajo ... (JUDY la interrumpe y le pide que espere un momento) AZ continúa: y le dije: yo no voy a ir al sepelio pero volveré al salir del trabajo, y efectivamente en la noche con todo y la calentura me fui pero andaba muy mal, la tarde estaba horrible. Estuve hablando con esa gente que ha estado allí en mayo de este año y me dijo que el "[illegible]" negaba todo y que allí había [illegible] todo, para absolutamente todo.

JUDY: Sí, el asunto no es que sea o no

AZ: (interrumpe) y grita que se está quemando pues se le derramó el té.

AZ: Te voy a decir que para mí es una cosa muy grave, porque esto debe haber creado una situación para los [illegible] terrible, desde que el papá fué a verla, que no lo dejaron hablar más que 10 minutos...

JUDY: (interrumpe) bueno mira nadie está pidiendo que la liberen, es una cosa de un respetuoso de los valores muy grandes de México que respetan a ese Gobierno y que yo creo que si a gentes que son como son se les ha dado visa...

AZ: Ya no se les da visa a nadie.

JUDY: Bueno, pero aquí hay gente que ha ido y ha vuelto y sigue allí y es [illegible], para esos sí hay visados y que no hay visado para un individuo que ha defendido todo el tiempo este gobierno que lo respeta como se debe, que se dirige en nombre e que va en representación de la gente más limpia de México, que no le están diciendo al DR. CA[illegible]O pónganla y le rogamos que haga esto o lo otro, me entiendes? porqué no le dan un visado que vaya personalmente y le diga tenemos [illegible] aquí [illegible], no se las podemos decir y se fue y ya, eso es lo que hacen Adelina eso lo hacen en todos los países del mundo sin excepción, entonces esto sí da una vergüenza y lo que ayuda aquí es a aumentar a que este grupo de gentes tenga que empezar con justa razon a hablar mal de este gobierno.

AZ: Bueno yo creo que Carlos ya no será más Presidente del Instituto

JUDY: El está invitado además para presidir el jurado de algo, que hay allí, un concurso, en la Casa de las Américas, entonces lo que cont..)

quería yo Adelina, es que tú le escribieras a tu papá.

AZ: Yo no puedo escribir, porque yo tengo que mandar la carta abierta, yo escribo con un gran cuidado, mira, lo operaron, tú sabes cómo es su estado? yo no, al fin supe de qué lo habían operado, porque una amiga mía que me ha mandado pedir medicinas y que me mandó los dos últimos libros de mi papá, fue la que me lo dijo, entonces yo metí una carta para la hija, le pregunto de los niños, de mi papá y le digo que estoy muy angustiada porque no sé de qué lo habrán operado, que me tiene muy intranquila la operación de mi papá, le platico cosas totalmente familiares, entonces esta persona me contestó diciéndome: a su papá lo operaron de hemorroides y ya está mejor, cosa que me dió gusto porque yo inmediatamente l mandé el "Herrolé" que es lo que yo temo y que me escapé de la tercera operación. No he recibido contestación, no sé nada, pero yo por intuición comencé a no escribir más de cosas permitidas, eso lo envié por correo, pero lo que yo llevo allí, a la Embajada, le digo al embajador aquí está la carta y el me dice: no Angelina no faltaba más, y le repito: léala, yo no me voy contenta si usted no la lee.

JUDY: Y porqué tú no hablas con él

AZ: No, porque entonces va a resultar lo siguiente: que no vuelvo a entrar a la Embajada, porque yo sé de una gente que hizo eso y no la dejan entrar.

JUDY: Entonces yo no quiero ir allí, ni que haya otra revolución, con toda honradez te lo digo, porque eso no es lo que uno quiere, así como lo oyes se lo suelto al primero que encuentre.

AZ: Yo voy a decir una cosa, las otras revoluciones están consolidadas y aceptadas.

JUDY: No y no, no se trata de estar dejando entrar al enemigo ni mucho menos, ni se les está irrespetando. O respetan las medidas democráticas o que no hagan revoluciones.

AZ: Pues no te puedo decir muchas cosas por teléfono, ya sé.

JUDY: Luisa estaba indignada, me dijo: esto da vergüenza, lástima que estuvo aquí nuestro papá días antes, si él hubiera estado aquí él hubiera hablado, si hubiera ido a plantear esta cosa como dá vergüenza.

AZ: Pues sí, no lo ve nadie, mis hermanas la vieron en julio, los dos días que estuvieron, dicen que está muy avejentado muy [illegible] a ellas les dijo que no sabía nada, entonces la otra persona, que es una persona que a mí me merece todo crédito, me dijo, bueno la cosa es que el cuñado y la [illegible] han dicho [illegible] que no.

JUDY: Pero ellos están presos o qué?

AZ: Sí, Joaquín estuvo muy enfermo, lo dejaron ir a la casa que le han desmantelado a la señora, ella está totalmente aislada, pero estaba con su mujer y con su hijo en cuanto se mejoró lo volvieron a encerrar.

JUDY: Pues eso era lo que quería yo hablar contigo, porque realmente cont..)

pues... ah, y ya la retacharon a [illegible].

AZ: absolutamente. Ya la retacharon.

JUDY: Mira, un día de estos el ex-marido de ella, andaba yo con unos amigos en la Comercial Mexicana y andaba él allí como sonámbulo hecho un viejito, ya no tiene ni pelo, pero qué barbaridad.

AZ: Yo lo vía él hace días y le pregunté por ella, porque siempre le pregunto y me dijo: ella... Yo le dije que la había visto en enero, que iba con los niños, así y allá, [illegible] que está allá. Entonces me dijo: sí vino dejó los niños y se regresa, pero me lo dijo así con una cosa de amargura terrible y entonces le dije y se va a quedar definitivamente? no, me dijo, regresa en tres días y creo que no volverá, entonces después alguien me dijo que seguro no le volverían a dar la visa.

JUDY: Pues qué barbaridad, que tenga la gente así que hablar, con la razón en la mano.

AZ: Quien sabe, yo ahora no adelanto juicios, yo no sé qué haría.

JUDY: No, mira por grave que sea, nadie se está metiendo a ver la gravedad o no gravedad.

AZ: Que al canoso lo llevaron a Checoeslovaquia, custodiado a carearlo etc etc, lo llevaron a París a carearlo y la investigación ha sido poco...

JUDY: Eso yo no lo discuto, ni discuto culpabilidad o no, justicia o no nadie se está metiendo en eso, es una cosa sumamente respetuosa la petición.

AZ: Bueno, te voy a decir a qué grado están las cosas de extremas, yo junto medicinas porque sé que hay casos de gastroenterolo la que no pueden tratar, la gente se les muere.

JUDY: Yo estoy horrorizada por lo de mi [illegible] que la acaban de operar de cáncer en Praga la trasladaron para allá.

AZ: No, no tengas eso.

JUDY: No Adelina, si ese cáncer está maligno, está pésimo,

AZ: Bueno pues medicinas sí puedes mandar.

AZ: Eso no se cura con medicinas Adelina sino con tratamiento.

JUDY: Los grandes especialistas no están ya allí y la experiencia es la experiencia. Está al cuidado de una de las mejores especialistas de allá, que la ve cada mes, imagínate.

AZ: Pues, yo mando medicinas y siempre llevo la caja, en eso he sido muy changa siempre, cuando el portero me dice: voy a avisarle al embajador, le digo: aquí está la caja, le dice que es de parte mía y que puedo revisar todito. Ahora cuando se abre la puerta y va a avisarle al embajador, entro y saco y todo lo extiendo, y le digo ahora ud lo empaqueta como quiera. A mí no me han vuelto a invitar a nada, yo sé que tienen recepciones muy cerradas a mi no me han invitado a nada, a nada.

(cont..

JUDY: Sí, ya se, aunque para uno es mejor.

AZ: A nada, siempre yo invito a los agregados culturales, a los [illegible]. Antes siempre iban, ahora no van. Creo que esta actitud les va a hacer perder al Instituto Mexicano-Cubano.

JUDY: Como no van a perder, pues no te digo la calidad de gentes, pregúntale a Carlos cuando regrese de Tabasco que te diga la lista más o menos de la gente, creo que serán 40 o algo así. Gentes escogidísimas.

AZ: Y ya te digo, de mi papá, directamente bueno ni su hija, ni la mamá, nadie de ellos me escribe, yo sé a través de esta persona y te digo, quiero que consiga usted esto que me imagino son parte de cuota para ellos, cómo se los podemos pagar. Inclusive yo le dije bueno mire si hay ocasión con algún diplomático, y se lo pidió que fuera con diplomático, mínimas 4 botellas de ron, que son las que pueden salir de allá y ojalá me llegaran para Navidad, salen en 90. pesos mexicanos así de que son como [illegible] dls. cada una. Y yo he estado ajustando a lo que se pueden enviar porque yo no estoy ahora en condiciones de enviar 500 pesos de regalos como antes lo hacía con tantos sacrificios porque JUDITH, me ha quedado una deuda de la casa de 20 mil pesos que yo tengo que salir en el año que entra y yo me jubilo, yo voy a tener una casa muy cómoda, muy agusto para trabajar, claro que hasta donde yo pueda sostener el coche, mientras me dan gasolina y chofer, el día que no, lo agarro lo vendo y me acabó, yo no puedo manejar con este oído lo intenté hace poco y me dí una mareada tan horrible que a las tres cuadras le dije al chofer, mire tome el volante, yo no puedo.

JUDY: Bueno, vamos a ver cuándo nos vemos de todas maneras Adelina.

AZ: Sí yo te tengo tu regalo

JUDY: Tenemos que hablar de verdad y vernos, tú me avisas porque ya sales en vacaciones.

AZ/ Cuáles vacaciones? Tengo vacaciones sólo en la escuela, pero nada más, lo que puedo hacer es fugarme del Instituto una tarde para que nos veamos, porque de otra manera no nos podremos ver y aquí hay todavía tanto polvo que no me atrevo a invitarte a comer.

JUDY: Ya tengo aquí a una muchacha, y por cierto ya te dejo porque le tengo que estar diciendo, es nueva, muy buena me está saliendo, voy a descansar un poco porque ya no aguantaba, 3 años y medio de estar como bestia de carga.

AZ: Yo prefiero pagar para que me trabajen, después a qué hora me pongo a hacer las cosas. Salgo a las 8 de la mañana regreso a las 3, como y con esto del oído son las 2 de la mañana y yo no me he dormido, amanezco aturdida.

JUDY: Bueno, me le da un abrazo a su mamá, dígale que pregunté por ella.

HMMA-27555

cont..)

AZ: Sí ya sabe que eres tú, nos vemos adiós.

JUDY: Adiós.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG : DAVID [illegible]/hdp
UNIT : WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 23 September 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-776046

3, SECRET

DE. XY XXXXX[illegible]
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

1		5	
2		6	
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TO : ROME MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65 18

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WE 8

INFO: VR , FILE 8 RID COPY, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC [illegible]

SIG CEN

TO ROME INFO MEXI CITE DIR

45331

PER OIRW-24382 PARA 7, PLS ADVISE WHETHER YOU CONCUR DISCONTINUING LI[illegible] COVERAGE CARLO COCCIOLI (201-776046) WHILE CONTINUING WATCHLIST HIS TRAVEL OUTSIDE MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WE/EXT

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/1 Mr. Fisher (telecoord)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/4

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GROUP 1
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Enrique SEMO Caley

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached for Headquarters' information and retention are copies of the LIFEAT coverage on Subject, reel #269 through reel #272 for the period 2 through 14 July 1965 and reel #1 through reel #16 for the period 31 July through 16 August 1965.

2. This coverage was temporarily discontinued from 15 through 30 July because of technical difficulties with the instrument in the Semo home.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated in paragraph 1

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

File: [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26,933	19 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-745927

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, EED

INFO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: DMLET/LIFEAT/Operational
Transmittal of LIFEAT Tapes and Transcripts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith for translation of the Yugoslav portions are the following LIFEAT tapes: 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14. Also forwarded are the following Spanish transcripts: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14.

2. Because of the DMSAUCE/1 flap, the Spanish transcripts of the LIFEAT tapes will continue thru the end of this week (10 April), after that there will be no transcribing done in the field.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - EED w/att h/w
X - WHD w/o/att
2 - Files

File
LIFEAT Prod.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25814	8 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-8-2/9

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State

EVALUATING AGENCY

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
12 March 63

DATE OF DISTRIB.	February 1963	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/538,352
CHIEF COUNTRY	Yugoslavia/Mexico	FIELD NUMBER	HMMA-21443

PLEASE RETURN EVALUATION BY WAY OF IRR/CS - ROOM [illegible]

SUBJECT Yugoslav Commercial Activities in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within __ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
☐ 1. *Major*
☒ 2. MODERATE
☐ 3. LITTLE
☐ 4. NO
} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY.
☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY.
☒ 3. MODERATELY.
☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY.

C ACCURACY.
☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE.
☒ 2. CREDIBLE.
☐ 3. *Doubtful.*
☐ 4. *False.*
☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
☒ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION.
☐ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION.
☐ 3. *Sufficiently known.*
☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS.
☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information.*
☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication.*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
☐ 1. *More detail.*
☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary.*
☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach.*
☐ 4. *Better organization.*
☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT.)
☒ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
☒ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY.

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

We would appreciate your comments evaluating this report.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

As a status report, document is of moderate value. Generally negative progress of Yugo attempts to establish a commericial foothold in Mexico not in itself of great interest to this office, at this time, but would increase in interest in direct relation to information on decision of Belgrade to grant a loan to Mexican govt.

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) P. Adler	COMPONENT INR/RSB/EA	PHONE x 3803
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED. Mar 1	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Mar 6	

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(COLLECTOR/E UAT RECLASSIFY ACCORDING T ATA ED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY State Department
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	27 January 1961	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/463,061	Lifect 10 Apr. 61
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5400	

Subject Mexican Technicians Going to Work in Cuba

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~priority~~ standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☒ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☒ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☒ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☒ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☒ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- ☐ 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

This report would have been of greater value if it had included some comment on the political orientation of the technicians (if any) and whether they were being sent by the Mexican Government or were hired on a purely personal basis.

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) Lawrence S. Eagleburger	COMPONENT State/INR/RAR/MAB	PHONE 182-2097
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED March 17, 1961	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED March 22, 1961.	

10-59 EDITION

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(20)

LIEFAT
Translation

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR/EVA[illegible]TC[illegible] RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO [illegible]A[illegible]ED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 2 November 1960
DISSEM. NUMBER CS-3,454,933 KAI
L. Bright
L. Frit
Lumsd
Chief Country Mexico/Nicaragua
FIELD NUMBER HMM-5264
20[illegible]

Subject Nicaraguan Revolutionary Activities in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☑ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☑ 3. MODERATELY
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☑ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☑ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- ☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- ☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- ☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- ☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

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- ☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR
NAME (Please print) RT Morrison
COMPONENT INR/RAR-P
PHONE 3327
DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Nov 15 '60
DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Nov. 16/60

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,903
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245

Subject: Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
☐ 1. *Major*
☑ 2. MODERATE
☐ 3. LITTLE
☐ 4. NO
} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
☑ 3. MODERATELY
☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
☑ 2. CREDIBLE
☐ 3. *Doubtful*
☐ 4. *False*
☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
☑ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
☐ 1. *More detail*
☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
☐ 4. *Better organization*
☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
☐ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
☐ 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
☐ 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐ 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
☐ 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
☐ 2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
☐ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (*Please print*) RT Morrison	COMPONENT INR/RAR-?	PHONE 3327
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Nov 18 '60	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED Nov 18 '60	

10-59

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

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CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY OSI

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB. 26 September 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER CS 3/451,014	Lifeat
Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union	FIELD NUMBER HMM 5159	18 June 61

Subject **Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes**

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXXX standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)
- 1. *Major*
- 2. MODERATE
- A3 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- 3. MODERATELY
- B4 4. NEGLIGIBLY

ACCURACY.
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- C2 2. CREDIBLE
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- D3 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- E7 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
- F1 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- 2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- 4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- 2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- 3. PARTIALLY BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

(IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
- 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON
- H2 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Coordinated with LSD/SI - C. W. DeLong

EVALUATOR NAME (Please print) WALLACE W. HOWARD [illegible] P. Clark	COMPONENT OSI/NED	PHONE 3955
DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	

(20)

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5

FORM 5-60 39

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CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY United States Information Agency

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	1 November 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/454,903	[illegible]
Chief Country	Mexico/Cuba	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5245	22 [illegible]

Subject Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

A SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF: (IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.)

X 1. *Major*
2. MODERATE
3. LITTLE
4. NO

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:

1. SIGNIFICANTLY
X 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
3. MODERATELY
4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:

1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
X 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.

1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:

1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
X 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:

X 1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:

1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)

1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information on Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America is of major and continuing importance to this office, which must evaluate the nature, scope, and extent of those activities in order to combat them.

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) Flora M. Roth	COMPONENT Office of Research and Analysis, USIA	PHONE 182-5475
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED November 8, 1960	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED November 14, 1960	

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FORM 5-60 39 PRIOR EDITION MAY BE USED. (20)

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(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA ADDED BELOW)

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CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State.

EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	3 October 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/L51,671	[illegible]
Chief Country	Mexico/Poland	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5186	4 [illegible]-60

Subject Projected Arrival in Mexico of Polish Travel Officials

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within (30) days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is ~~xxxxx~~ standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. *Major*
[✓ 2. MODERATE]
3. LITTLE
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
[✓ 3. MODERATELY]
4. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
[✓ 2. CREDIBLE]
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
[✓ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION]
[✓ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION]
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
[✓ 1. *More detail*]
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation, or better explanation of source, or both*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

OUR COLLECTION NEEDS

F OTHER REPORTING MEETS:
1. OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
2. OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
3. MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
4. FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

G (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

H (IF SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU, OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT:)
1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination?

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information of this nature is of value to RAR, for it provides new data and/or corroboration of information from other sources on Latin American – Bloc contacts. RAR has continuing interest in receipt of reports of this nature.

57

EVALUATOR

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT INR/RAR-[illegible]	PHONE [illegible]7
DATE REQUEST RECEIVED [illegible]	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED [illegible]	

3

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Production

CONFIDENTIAL
(COLLECTOR EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO . A ADDED BELOW)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR Rec in OR 5?1-60
EVALUATING AGENCY

DATE OF DISTRIB.	26 September 1960	DISSEM. NUMBER	CS-3/451,014	Lifeat
Chief Country	Mexico/Soviet Union	FIELD NUMBER	HMM-5159	31 Oct 60

Subject Mexican Government Purchase of Soviet Radioisotopes

Due 27 October 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is XXXXX/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:
- 1. *Major*
- [✓ 2. MODERATE]
- 3. LITTLE
- 4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- [✓ 3. MODERATELY]
- 4. NEGLIGIBLY

ACCURACY:
- 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- [✓ 2. CREDIBLE]
- 3. *Doubtful*
- 4. *False*
- 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE 8.

RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION:
- 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- 3. *Sufficiently known*
- 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- 1. *More detail*
- 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- 4. *Better organization*
- 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- 6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
- 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

FOR COLLECTION NEEDS:

THE REPORTING MEETS:
- OUR IMPORTANT NEEDS.
- OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- MOST OF OUR MINIMUM NEEDS.
- FEW OR NONE OF OUR NEEDS.

(IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT MEETS IT:
- FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
- *partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- NEGLIGIBLY

SUBJECT IS IMPORTANT TO YOU. OTHER REPORTING DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM NEEDS, AND YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT SOON.
- OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

It is impossible to tell if the USSR prices to Mexico are in line with world prices or not. According to a 1957 Soviet price list, potassium is 3 rubles per millicurie, iodine is 8 to 13 rubles per millicurie and gold is 1 to 3 rubles per millicurie depending upon the form of the carrier. According to the report the average price is $0.15 per millicurie. The quantities of each isotope however, are not given.

Radio isotope prices have changed in the US markedly over the past few years. For example, the price for gold 198 has changed from 20 cents per millicurie prior to May 1959 to 6 cents per millicurie after May 1959. Unless more detailed information is obtained, the information has only moderate value to us.

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
WILLARD S. SMITH	ORR/[illegible]	x3942

DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED

14-00000

Rec'd. 10 Jun '60

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATE ADDED ON FRONT) 17 JUN 1960

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER	
CS-3/439,064	1 June 1960	HMM-4913	Lifeat (3)

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union Due 7 July 1960 19 July 60

Subject New Policy of Soviet Commercial Office in Mexico

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. *Major*
X 2. MODERATE
3. LITTLE
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
X 2. MODERATELY
3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
X 2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION
1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
X 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
1. *More detail.*
2. *Less detail; more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
6. (STATED IN COMMENTS)
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Part of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY. REQUIREMENT CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH (OTHER SOURCES) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. FULLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
X 3. LITTLE
4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
X 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
EVALUATOR Robert Naper	ORR/S/TF/SP	5036
DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

(COLLECTOR/EVALUAT[illegible] RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA [illegible]ED ON FRONT) 29 JU[illegible]

[illegible] 22, 19[illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY CRR
EVALUATING AGENCY

[illegible]

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/439,528	8 June 1960	HMM-4963

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union

Due 15 July 1960

17 July 60

Subject Disagreement between Mexican Businessman and Soviet Commercial Officer over Money Owed for Tractors Purchased by the Mexican Government

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. *Major*
2. MODERATE
[✓ 3. LITTLE]
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
[✓ 2. MODERATELY]
3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
[✓ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE]
2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
[✓ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION]
2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better explanation of source, or both.*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED.
2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
[✓ 3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.]
4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. FULLY
[✓ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY]
3. LITTLE
4. NONE

K (IF IN G YOU [illegible]CKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAV[illegible] [illegible]ED NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) Robert Naper	COMPONENT ORR/S/TF/SP	PHONE 8036
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED 11 July 1960	

FORM 10-58 39 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

2(3) CONFIDENTIAL [illegible] Rec in ORR

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO DATA [illegible]ED ON FRONT) 96 [illegible]

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR

EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER
CS-3/434,304	18 April 1960	H[illegible]-4858

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union Due 17 May 1960

Subject Soviet Plan to Sell Newsprint to Mexican Government Agency

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
1. *Major*
2. MODERATE
[✓ 3. LITTLE]
4. NO

IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT.

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
1. SIGNIFICANTLY
[✓ 2. MODERATELY]
3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY:
1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
2. CREDIBLE
3. *Doubtful*
4. *False*
[✓ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.]

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
3. *Sufficiently known*
[✓ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS]
5. *Conflicts with previous information*
6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
1. *More detail*
2. *Less detail, more summary*
3. *Less fragmentary approach*
4. *Better organization*
5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both*
6. (STATED IN COMMENT)
7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT CAN BE CLOSED
2. *Partially. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
3. PARTIALLY, BUT NEED CONTINUES.
4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
1. FULLY
2. SUBSTANTIALLY
3. LITTLE
[✓ 4. NONE]

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
[✓ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.]

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print)	COMPONENT	PHONE
	Eugene Erro	ORR I/MS	4285
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED	
		26 May 60	

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Operational/LAURICLE	2. RI FILE NO. 50 6 32/4
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-15007
	4. DATE 18 May 1960
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFER[illegible] SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN T[illegible] CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-175906

18 May 1960

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO ➡

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL file LIFEAT Proc

(COLLECTOR/EVALUATOR: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO D/ ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY ORR Rec'd 4 March
EVALUATING AGENCY

DISSEM. NUMBER: CS-3/428,266
DATE OF DISTRIB.:
FIELD NUMBER: HMM-4761

Chief Country: Mexico / Soviet Union
Subject: Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton
Due 25 March 1960

EVALUATOR: Please complete this valuation within ___ days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority/standard. Indicate choices by "x." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one x in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further NOTES on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- ☐ 1. *Major*
- ☒ 2. MODERATE
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NO

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT:

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. SIGNIFICANTLY
- ☒ 2. MODERATELY
- ☐ 3. NEGLIGIBLY

C ACCURACY.
- ☐ 1. SUBSTANTIALLY TRUE
- ☒ 2. CREDIBLE
- ☐ 3. *Doubtful*
- ☐ 4. *False*
- ☐ 5. CANNOT BE JUDGED. SEE D.

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION.
- ☐ 1. USEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION
- ☒ 2. USEFUL FOR NEW INFORMATION
- ☐ 3. *Sufficiently known*
- ☐ 4. AT PRESENT WE LACK OTHER INFORMATION TO JUDGE ACCURACY OR USEFULNESS
- ☐ 5. *Conflicts with previous information*
- ☐ 6. *Appears to be fabrication*

E USEFULNESS WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATER WITH:
- ☐ 1. *More detail*
- ☐ 2. *Less detail, more summary*
- ☐ 3. *Less fragmentary approach*
- ☐ 4. *Better organization*
- ☐ 5. *Better observation or better exploitation of source, or both.*
- ☐ 6. (STATED IN COMMENTS)
- ☒ 7. NO DEFECT AFFECTING USEFULNESS.

REQUIREMENTS

F (ONLY IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED.) REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY. REQUIREMENT MAY BE CLOSED
- ☐ 2. *Partial. Portion of requirement may be closed.*
- ☐ 3. PARTIAL. BUT NEED CONTINUES.
- ☐ 4. NEGLIGIBLY

G DEGREE TO WHICH CITED (NON-CS) REPORTING PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- ☐ 1. FULLY
- ☐ 2. SUBSTANTIALLY
- ☐ 3. LITTLE
- ☐ 4. NONE

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- ☐ 1. WE WILL PRESENT A REQUIREMENT WITHIN 30 DAYS.
- ☐ 2. OUR NEED DOES NOT WARRANT A REQUIREMENT FOR CS REPORTING.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

EVALUATOR
NAME (Please print): POPE, FLETCHER, Jr.
COMPONENT: CRR/M/AG
PHONE: x3552
REQUEST RECEIVED: 15 Mar. 1960
DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED: 29 Mar. 1960

FORM OBSOLETE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Swisher file LIFEAT Prov

(COLLECTOR/EVAL OF: RECLASSIFY ACCORDING TO PA ADDED ON FRONT)

CIA REQUEST FOR EVALUATION BY Department of State
EVALUATING AGENCY

SYSTEM NUMBER	DATE OF DISTRIB.	FIELD NUMBER	
S-3/423,266	19 February 1960	HMM-4761	Lifeat 5 Mar 60

Chief Country Mexico/Soviet Union

Subject Soviet Negotiations for Mexican Cotton

EVALUATOR: Please complete this evaluation within 60 days of receipt of request. Need for completion within this time is priority standard. Indicate choices by "X." If item marked is printed in italics, please explain under "Evaluator's Comments." Normally, put one X in each appropriate section. Otherwise, please cover each of these aspects in your comments. For further notes on use of this form, see reverse.

SUBJECT OF THIS REPORT IS OF:

A
- 1. Major
- ✓ 2. Moderate
- 3. Little
- 4. No

} IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO OUR NEEDS.

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT.

B CONTRIBUTES TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT:
- 1. Significantly
- X 2. Moderately
- 3. Negligibly

C APPEARS:
- ✓ 1. Substantially true
- 2. Credible
- 3. Doubtful
- 4. False
- 5. Cannot be judged - see D

D RELATION TO OTHER INFORMATION
- ✓ 1. Useful for confirmation
- 2. Useful for new information
- 3. Sufficiently known
- 4. Of possible use with other information to judge accuracy or usefulness
- 5. Conflicts with previous information
- 6. Appears to be fabrication

E COMPARED TO OTHER [illegible]
- 1. More detail
- 2. Less detail, more summary
- 3. Less fragmentary approach
- 4. Better organization
- 5. Better presentation or better explanation of source or both
- 6. [illegible] comment
- ✓ 7. No [illegible] differences

REQUIREMENTS

F CHECK IF YOUR REQUIREMENT IS CITED & REPORT SATISFIES IT:
- 1. Fully. Requirement can be closed
- 2. Partially. Portion of requirement can be closed
- 3. Partially. But needs continuing
- 4. Negligibly

G REPORT TO [illegible] PROVIDES ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT:
- 1. Fully
- 2. Substantially
- 3. Little
- 4. None

H (IF IN G YOU CHECKED "LITTLE" OR "NONE," AND IF YOU HAVE FILED NO REQUIREMENT.)
- 1. We will present a requirement within 30 days
- 2. Our need does not warrant a requirement for CS reporting.

COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Is this information of sufficient use or value to warrant dissemination? Please comment.

EVALUATOR'S COMMENTS AND FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

Information of this commercial [illegible] is often difficult to [illegible]. Although the general subject of this [illegible] was [illegible], the more complete [illegible] information [illegible] the extent and [illegible] of possible Soviet [illegible].

Information of similar type [illegible] would be valuable. [illegible] Are other [illegible] purchases of cotton pending?

Ø6

EVALUATOR	NAME (Please print) Donald P. Swisher	COMPONENT [illegible] RPRIE	PHONE [illegible]
	DATE REQUEST RECEIVED Feb 24, 1960	DATE EVALUATION FORWARDED March 4, 1960	

LIFEAT PRODUCTION

15 December 1959

CS 3/421,516

HMMA-4567

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

15 February 1960

What specific aspects of this report are of use? Of value? Please indicate and comment.

Information on the type of machinery offered or sold to Mexico or to Latin America is available from overt sources.

Information on prices is interesting and useful. Price quotations would be more helpful if specifications as well as serial numbers were available. Information indicating whether Soviet prices conform to or vary from world market prices.

Information on goods that the Soviets are interested in buying is of some importance, although this is generally available from overt sources.

SECRET

See HMMW 8486, 11 Feb 1960, LAURICLE, filed C/WHD's office.

This dispatch was written by FI/D in reply to HMMA 14362, 20 Jan 1960 and should be reviewed before LIFEAT or LIFHIT are submitted for renewal.

IMPORTANT

LIFEAT/[illegible] prod
LIFKIT/ops

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14372
KAPOK-1737

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO: Chief, KUDOVE:
Attn: Division D

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 20 January 1960

SUBJECT: Projects LIFEAT and LIENIT

RE: "AS 3" (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 5

REFERENCE(S):
HMM-A-13934, 16 Oct. 1959
HMM-A-13828, 2 Oct. 1959

1. During the recent TDY visit to this Station of David M. FREDLUND(p) of KUTUBE D, the interrelationship between the conversations recorded under Project LIFEAT which bear on Soviet Communication and the regular provision of the hard copy of Soviet official diplomatic communications obtained by the LIENIT activity were discussed. The Station indicated that frequently LIFEAT obtained conversations which referred directly to specific messages: by content; by seeking clarification of garbled or missing groups; by officials who are to or have signed the message in question; and on one or two occasions the messages (admittedly not sensitive) were dictated to secretaries over the telephone.

2. Examples of the above conversations were forwarded to Headquarters in reference dispatches. The conversations with FREDLUND resulted in the suggestion that KUTUBE D should regularly receive the LIFEAT material when it relates to Soviet messages. Also that KUTUBE D in forwarding this type of LIFEAT material to ODINCH would record that the drop copies of the Soviet messages are normally forwarded to ODINCH (source LIENIT) and that if there is any value to ODINCH in tying the two sources together for further processing by ODINCH, the Station would cross-reference the forwarding dispatch numbers. This Station would appreciate receiving, at an early date, any Headquarters comments.

3. This Station is willing to continue to exploit LIFEAT material for LAURICLE purposes should this be judged of value by Headquarters. At the present time Willard C. CURTIS is personally handling this phase of LIFEAT reporting.

4. KUTUBE D should note that at the present time the LIENIT source is providing Soviet, Japanese, Czech and Polish drop copies to the Station. The traffic is over one-month old upon receipt and is in Station's hands only for a few hours. The source is capable however of obtaining traffic from all sources filing officially in Mexico City and the Station can do this without increasing the operational risk.

5. The Mexico City Station would appreciate any comments or guidance on either this phase of LIFEAT reporting or of LIENIT which KUTUBE D could give.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

18 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS(1 - Chief, KUDOVE:
Attn: Division D)

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14393
KAPOK-1739

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-8-11

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

22 January 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Communications

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D

REFERENCE(S):
A. HMM-A-14372;
B. HMM-A-14383

SOURCE: LIFEAT

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet traffic for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters. (SOURCE: LIEMIT)

2. On 27 November 1959 the following conversation took place:

> "Anatoliy Alekseyevich PAVLENKOV tells Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV that he just spoke with New York. PAVLENKOV says that BEGLOV(ph) called. PAVLENKOV says that Moscow wants to know how many luncheons and dinners there were yesterday. PAVLENKOV says he counted 3 luncheons and one dinner. PAVLENKOV says that a cable should be sent saying that on the 26th the bankers gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN and that MIKOYAN gave a dinner for the officials of the Government. Another thing Moscow wants to know what word was left out in KOLOKOLNIKOV's cable which was about KOLOKOLNIKOV's account at Poza Rica. In BELTRAN's speech there apparently was one word left out by the operators. KOLOKOLNIKOV will look at the text and see what it is. PAVLENKOV will come over and then they will send the cable. KOLOKOLNIKOV then suggests that they call BEGLOV in New York and give him this information. KOLOKOLNIKOV will do that.

> "KOLOKOLNIKOV tells WO(woman outside) to write down what he tells her. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her that yesterday the Ministry of Industry and Trade, SALINAS, and the President of the Banco Exterior, ZEVADA, gave a luncheon for MIKOYAN at the Hotel Ambassador. In the evening A.I. MIKOYAN gave a dinner for officials of the Mexican Government. KOLOKOLNIKOV adds that the speech that ROLDAN(should be ROLDAN instead of BELTRAN) made the works "to show" were left out. KOLOKOLNIKOV tells her to send this to Moscow. KOLOKOLNIKOV will call tomorrow and let WO know when he will return. KOLOKOLNIKOV has to get his visa from the American Embassy."

words?

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-64

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMM-A-14392
KAPOK-1738

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-8-11

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 January 1960

SUBJECT: Soviet Communications

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Call to Attention of KUTUBE/D

REFERENCE(S):
A. HMM-A-13934
B. HMM-A-14372

SOURCE: LIFEAT/LIMERICK

1. The following is a quotation of a conversation held on 2 December 1959:

> A man outside called the Soviet Embassy, introduced himself as Yevgeniy N. VOYEVODIN and asked Yelena Ivanovna FILIPOVA, secretary of the Commercial Office, if he could still send a cable off(that late) on that date. FILIPOVA promised to try to get the cable off. VOYEVODIN then said he wished the cable sent to: RAZNOEKSPORT, Moscow, 9019, 9021 and then dictated:
>
> > "Exposition will close on 15th of December. To deliver the souvenirs is too late.
> >
> > VOYEVODIN."

2. It is requested that this pouch be routed via KUTUBE/D.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

FILED IN

SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-A-14374
KAPOK-1760

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-8-11

TO Chief, WHD

INFO

DATE 22 January 1960

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT Soviet Communications

ACTION REQUIRED Please route this dispatch via KUTUBE/D

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)
A. HMMA-A-14372;
B. HMMA-A-14333.

1. Under reference B photographs of hard copies of Soviet Embassy traffic (Source: LIMIT) for November 1959 were forwarded to Headquarters.

2. On 28 November 1959 Vladimir KOLOKOLNIKOV spoke with Ivan Ivanovich (possibly [illegible]) in New York. KOLOKOLNIKOV said he wished a cable sent to Moscow concerning the departure of Anastas I. MIKOYAN (Soviet Vice Premier who had been visiting Mexico, 18-26 November 1959). KOLOKOLNIKOV said he himself would fly out "on Monday." A woman took the telephone and KOLOKOLNIKOV dictated the following:

> "Today at 0900 local time the First Deputy Minister of the Council of Ministers USSR, A.I. MIKOYAN, and his escorting party flew out of the Capital of Mexico on the Il-18 for the Fatherland. MIKOYAN was seen off at the airport by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Manuel TELLO; the Minister of Foreign Trade, Raul SALINAS; Minister of Education, TORRES Bodet; and officials of the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet Ambassador to Mexico also saw A.I. MIKOYAN off, V.I. BAZYKIN, and workers of the Soviet Embassy. Before the flight out A. I. MIKOYAN made a short speech in which he thanked the President of Mexico, LOPEZ Mateos, members of the Mexican Government, the whole Mexican people for the warm reception which was shown him and his escorting party in their country."

3. KOLOKOLNIKOV then dictated another cable. This cable was the message that MIKOYAN sent from aboard his plane to the President of Mexico thanking him for the reception that he received in Mexico. (NOTE: The translator "slipped" and did not transcribe this cable verbatim.)

Willard C. CURTIS

20 January 1960

Distribution:

3 - WHD

14-00000

SECRET

From: Mexico, Mexico City Report No: HMM-1831 Local File No:

No. of Pages: 1 No. of Enclosures: 1(for Station files only)

Report Made By: Thomas G. URQUHART Approved By: Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Hqs(1 for KUWRAP) Orally to:
2 - Files(1 w/att)

Source Cryptonym: A. LIKAYAK-2 References: HMM-1765, 12 Sep. 1956, p.9
B. LIFEAT/LIMERICK

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G. (Garzun)

Source obtained the information contained in the attached report from his sister, who is a journalist, and from a copy of the magazine on which subject is employed. He also obtained information from an address investigation on subject. Owing to the type of information developed on ROMERO, she is being included in this Station's series of LCIMPROVE subjects.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-59
FEB 1948

COPY

50-6-32/4

SECURITY INFORMATION

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO: HMM-1331

SUBJECT: Alicia ROMERO G.(Garzun)

DATE OF INFO: May - August 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 12 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 19 Sept. 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source A: Mexican business with contacts in journalistic circles B-2 (paras 1, 3, 4 and 5)
Source B: Source with access to Soviet official circles in Mexico B-doc (para 2)

The following information has been developed on Alicia ROMERO a suspicious contact of Grigori NIKIPORETS, Soviet Naval Attache, Mexico
201-160641

Av. Coyoacan 624-2,

1. An investigation of Avenida Coyoacan 624-2, the residence given as that of subject, showed it to be occupied by Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO. Her husband is related to Captain Antonio HARO Oliva, husband of Nadia HARO Oliva, who is an actress in a show called "The Four Colonels."
201-220883

2. It has been ascertained that on 7 May 1956 a man described as Major HARO Oliva, a movie producer, was in contact with Yuri PAPOROV, Soviet Cultural and intelligence officer. Mexico
201-082455

publication, Mexico

3. Alicia ROMERO G. has been identified as in charge of the photographic department of a magazine named ARRAZ, published at Avenida Juarez 20-22 in Mexico City.

COMMENT: A copy of this magazine is being retained in Station files.

The director of the magazine is Jorge HARO Cabrera, husband of Maria Eugenia Romero de HARO (noted above) and he resides at Avenida Coyoacan 624-2. He pays 750 pesos per month rent.

4. Alicia ROMERO G. is the sister-in-law of Jorge HARO Cabrera. She is the daughter of Maria de la Luz(widow) de ROMERO. Alicia ROMERO reportedly is the mistress of various politicians. She claims her home to be at Av. Coyoacan 624-2. Alicia ROMERO is reported to be pro-Communist and to be a member of the PRI. She is to be supported by that party in the forthcoming elections for the post of Federal Deputy.

COMMENT: Her connections with politics and politicians explain some of the report noted in the reference.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.
APR 1953

50-6-32/14

(20)

RI/AIS

YURIY ZR PAPOROV. 201-82455 CIT: USSR SOVIET CULTURAL AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. Δ MEXICO ASCERTAINED THAT ON 7 MAY 56 SUBJ WAS IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR HARO OLIVA, A MOVIE PRODUCER DOI SEPT. 1956

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

John M. Whitten:js
CWH/3
5613
28 June 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 LOGS | 6

: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 50937

50937

LIFEAT

REF MEXI 5162 (IN 68160)*

REF MISTAKENLY SLUGGED TYPIC. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE TAPES BEEN TRANSCRIBED? IF NOT TRANSCRIBED, CAN MEXI DO IT? IF TRANSCRIBED, ERASE TAPES. IF NOT AND MEXI CANNOT HANDLE, POUCH TO DIR. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Mexi queried Hqs as to its desire have pouched tapes LIFEAT ESLARD-1 coverage for period resided Hotel Maria Angelos.

WH/COPS ____________

W. Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

file LIFEAT Ops

N. Judkins

ORIG : N. JUDKINS:dd
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 5940
DATE : 22 APRIL 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

25 APR 63 18 58z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, ~~FI, TSD~~ 5, S/C

DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 35066

REF: MEXI 4201 (IN 19807)*

1. HQS APPROVES LOAN OF ONE STERILE SPARE B-10 DIAL PULSE RECORDER TO DURKIN.

2. HQS URGES CLOSE SUPPORT TREASURY/NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS. MEXI MAY PROVIDE DURKIN WITH OCCASIONAL LIFEAT COVERAGE PROVIDED NO LIFEAT TAKE GIVEN TO MEXICANS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *William J. Durkin, Treasury rep assigned to Mexico investigating narcotics traffic, approached Station re dial recorder for phone tap on Mexican target.

TSD BRUCE LA ROSE (BY PHONE)
CI/OPS FRANK HUGHES F.W. Hughes
~~WH/COPS~~
CI/R&A/TC

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

1 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT: Recruitment of a Retired CIA or Military Officer for Contract Status in Mexico

1. Mexico City needs a replacement in September or October 1963 to work on a technical operation. The Station does not want a staff employee, but a Contract Agent.

2. The Contract Agent would need the following requirements:

a. Must be retired, and move permanently to Mexico under cover of a retired U. S. citizen, with the appropriate guaranteed income required under Mexican law. ($320 for husband and wife per mo.)

b. Must have technical training which would enable him to work on a technical operation, possibly involving the care and upkeep of recorders, etc.

c. Must have a working knowledge of Spanish, or the ability to acquire this fluency prior to arrival in Mexico.

d. It will be necessary for the employee to work with people, make early and late meetings, and to spend a good deal of time driving around town. Therefore, the candidate must drive a car and be physically fit to work long hours.

3. It is requested that information on any candidates be furnished WH/3/MEXICO or C/WH/3 for consideration.

John M. Whitten
C/WH/3

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - h IFEAT/SUPPORT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMA 20305, 3 December 1962

1. Reference problem was discussed by KURIOT with David N. WILSTED, during the latter's TDY at Headquarters in early December 1962.

2. KURIOT recommends the following solution and has furnished the attached material for delivery to WILSTED for his use:

a. The terminal identification system consists of two fluids. Vial "A" is collodion in which is mixed a small amount of phenolphthalein and is intended to be used by the person who originally connects the wires. Generously daubed on the end of the screw, this solution dries almost immediately in a water repellent, invisible coating.

b. The second vial "B" contains household ammonia. If the dauber in this bottle is drawn down the row of terminals in the connection box, the tip of any screw which was previously treated with the phenolphthalein will immediately turn a dark red color and then will vanish after a minute. The ammonia can be reapplied and this reaction will repeat itself a couple of times before more phenolphthalein has to be reapplied.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
1 box with two vials of liquid (U/S/C)

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City w/att (USC)

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED
7 January 63

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-11200

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
30-6-32/3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	Bustos	rlr	5940

ROUTING	INITIAL
1 - Chrono	
1 - TSD/AOB/Mr. McBee	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/PI~~	
C/WH/3	
~~DESTROY~~	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
TSD/AOB		Mr. McBee (draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	7 JAN 1963	J. C. King

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W   Attn: Willard NAUMAN

INFO.
Chief, WH;   Chief, KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
GYROSE/ Jose Ordoqui

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith are the following items pertaining to Subject:

a. LIFEAT references;

b. Salient reports from other agent sources;

c. References to close contacts of Subject;

d. Exemplars of various types of Mexican police agent reporting;

e. Roughed-out drafts of police agent reporting. These have been viewed and tentatively approved by COS, Mexico. Copies have been retained at the Station.

2. Station Mexico is submitting separately its proposals on the technical and operational aspects of this operation.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/att
1 - C/WH w/o att
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2 - Files

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
2[illegible] Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
28 Dec. 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20425

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUBIOT

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Security

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See below.

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to request Headquarters' assistance in a problem involving clandestine markings for terminals in a telephone cable cross box.

2. Specifically, it is desired to have the capability of recognizing which cable terminals in a box are being used for telephone tapping without having any markings apparent to unauthorized persons. This system is needed for use in the event that taps must be disconnected quickly under the threat of a possible security problem.

3. The tap connections are made by LIFEAT telephone company personnel and the terminals could be marked by them at the time the tap is made. The connections sometimes have to be removed by another person who is not familiar with the connections.

4. It is felt that a quick drying, transparent glue or lacquer that would fluoresce brightly under UV illumination would be appropriate. A material that could be removed later by wiping or chipping it away would be desirable but this characteristic is not vital.

5. The system must be usable in open shade, although some additional shade might be had by partially closing the doors of the box, and the light source must be portable and if possible have the appearance of an ordinary flashlight. The light source can be brought within two inches of the terminals.

50-6-32/3

(Continued)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DATE TYPED
3 Dec. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20305

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-20305

6. This sytem is needed as soon as possible for use during December 1962 and January 1963. Therefore, Headquarters' early assistance or recommendation would be greatly appreciated.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/KURIOT
1 - C/WHD
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
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☐ CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Progress Report for October 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AN
A9
IN
PS
BX
DES
FI

Ref: A. HMMA-20156
B. MEXI 2384

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet During the reporting period, LIFEAT coverage of Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV provided an important and valuable check confirming the reporting of a number of KUBARK controlled double agents targeted against this Soviet officer. Also, coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, although not considered vital, does complete Station coverage of the Soviet target and does provide daily information on the activities and contacts of the Bulletin Office personnel.

(2) LIFEAT/Polish LIFEAT continued to provide vital information concerning the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation with coverage of both individuals and their daily activities.

(3) LIFEAT/Yugoslav Besides the usual coverage of day-to-day activities of the official installation, LIFEAT leads have indicated the possibility of a successful recruitment of a Mexican employee of that installation. LIFEAT information will become even more valuable for continuing assessment of the potential agent and forming of a plan for approach to the Mexican in question.

(4) LIFEAT/Communist Party Coverage in this area gave Station its first information concerning the second arrest of LINLUCK, as well as providing some information on important persons in the Mexican Communist movement.

(Continued)

Remove from Project:
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

RECORD COPY

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET/~~[redacted]

DATE TYPED 28 Nov. 1962	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-20261	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/3	

(5) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT provides continuing coverage of the daily activities and contacts of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo. Although most of the leads gathered will depend on future exploitation, one contact with an ODYOKE official was noted by LIFEAT (see reference b).

(6) LIFEAT/Cuban Of late, much of the emphasis of the LIFEAT operation has been directed toward support of Station operations in this area. Coverage included monitoring of the activities of AMSTET-1 for the interested Case Officer. This information provided daily leads for the Case Officer in his contacts with AMSTET-1. LIFEAT also covered three lines in support of the AMSTRUT operation. Of this support the interested Case Officer has noted LIFEAT provided very valuable coverage of the important AMSTRUT operation during October. The coverage gave valuable operational leads and resolved what would otherwise have been areas of uncertainty or groundless suspicion. This allowed the case officers to move with more certainty in developing the operation than would otherwise have been prudently possible. It is noted that LIFEAT's continuing coverage is proving to be most helpful.

(7) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continued to provide information of interest to ODENVY. Travel and contacts of the ACCM are particularly worthwhile.

(8) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT continued its coverage of former Station asset LIVESTOCK-2. This was in keeping with Station's policy of making periodic checks of the activities of former, potentially dangerous agents.

It should be noted that it is the Station's opinion that LIFEAT's excellent overall service, plus its ability to provide unilateral coverage of targets of opportunity on short notice (sometimes on as little as two hours notice), make LIFEAT a dependable daily contributor to the fulfilling of the Station's mission.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report.

C. LIAISON

During the month of October the two playback recorders used by the ODENVY processor broke down. These were repaired by the LIFEAT technician, David M. WILSTED. ODENVY continued to process take from the LIFEAT/American Communists in Mexico lines.

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. LIFEAT meeting sites continue to be changed periodically. The fourteen regular and six alternate sites used for daily contact between the Station Case Officer and WILSTED and Wayne C. DRABAND are considered adequate. Numerous meeting sites are used for contacts between WILSTED/DRABAND and the basehouse keepers.

E. TECHNICAL

Audio and dial tape recorders ordered by the Station in support of the LIFEAT operation began to arrive at the end of October. These were placed in immediate service. It is noted that the automatic tape stop on the new model Revere audio recorder has thus far proven to be of no use to the operatio

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/~~[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20261

and on occasion has caused some minor problems. It is believed that these problems are temporary and will be eliminated when WILSTED has time to by-pass this cut off switch.

The new Annex VI (see reference A) was placed in full operation on 23 October and presently provides coverage of four target lines.

F. COVERAGE

During the month of October 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 25 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. and 5. Polish Embassy (two lines)
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (five lines)
11, 12, and 13 BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
14. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
15. Peter WATKINS
16. AMSTET-1
17, and 18. AMSTRUT operation
19. Psychiatrist attending AMSTRUT-2
20. Carlos ILLESCAS
21. Suspected PCM safehouse
22. LIVESTOCK-2
23. Albert (Margaret) MALTZ
24. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
25. Noah SEBORER

G. PERSONNEL

LIEMBRACE-8 was reintroduced to LIFEAT in order that he may brush up on its daily operation. LIEMBRACE-8 will temporarily replace David M. WILSTED as LIFEAT technician during the latter's home leave December 1962 and January 1963.

Steps were initiated to amend the clearance of LIEMPTY-19 for work as a part time LIFEAT processor/translator.

2. During the reporting period, LIFEAT operation provided a total of 62 reels of raw take from ACGM lines to local ODENVY for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 53a	USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/~~[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. THREE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	✓
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ARD

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: ~~Chief of Station, Mexico City~~

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Progress Report for September 1962

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19843

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSFHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. EXPLOITATION OF LEADS

(1) LIFEAT/Soviet In this reporting period LIFEAT provided vital information and live-monitoring support during the installation phase of a successful Station technical operation targeted against Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, Soviet Military Attache in Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/Cuban This coverage provided valuable operational support during the period leading up to the recruitment of AMSTRUT-2 giving timely advance information of AMSTRUT-2's arrival in Mexico, as well as his day to day activities and contacts. Following AMSTRUT-2's recruitment, LIFEAT gave an excellent account of AMSTRUT-2's activities for those periods he was not under the control of his case officers. This was invaluable proof of his full cooperation with KUBARK and added a safety factor for the case officers making the recruitment and initial handling which would not have been otherwise available.

(3) LIFEAT/Polish and LIFEAT Yugoslav These coverages continue to provide excellent information of the daily activities of the Satellite officials assigned to Mexico. The LIFEAT support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues as noted in reference.

(4) LIFEAT/Exile LIFEAT coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo provides information and operational leads which, though valuable now, would be invaluable if ODYOKE's policy toward AREVALO becomes sufficiently defined to fully exploit all the information provided by LIFEAT.

(Continued)

RECORD COPY

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-175/77
Box: 2 Fold: 6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 8 Nov. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [redacted]1887
HMMA-20156

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~[redacted]

(5) LIFEAT/American Communists LIFEAT continues to provide information of interest to ODENVY (who initially requested this coverage and processes this take.) Local ODENVY has noted recently that the information concerning travel of American leftists to Mexico and their contacts while here are particularly worth while.

(6) LIFEAT/Miscellaneous LIFEAT coverage was reinstituted on LIVESTOCK-2 in Station periodic check on the activities of this former agent.

B. PROCESSING OF TAKE

No change from previous report (see reference).

C. LIAISON

No change from previous report (see reference).

D. SECURITY

There have been no known adverse security incidents effecting the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The "coyote" incident noted in reference, paragraph 1. D. is now settled and should pose no further difficulty to this operation.

E. TECHNICAL

No change from previous report (see reference).

F. COVERAGE

During the month of September 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment.
5. Individual considered for cut out in BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation
6. and 7. Polish Embassy (two lines)
8., 9., and 10. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
11. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
12. Peter WATKINS
13. LIVESTOCK-2
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)
16. AMSTRUT Operation

G. PERSONNEL

LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 obtained a basehouse on 29 September which will take the place of the old Annex VI (closed when LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-11 were terminated due to their pending divorce). It has been decided to retain the same annex designation, i. e., Annex VI, since the area of coverage is the same as that provided by the old basehouse.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-20156 [redacted]-1887

2. During the month of September 1962. LIFEAT operation provided a total of 54 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based wholly or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
~~3~~ - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

~~SECRET~~

Memo outgoing

5 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Hayn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

~~SECRET~~

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a) Calero 39 - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) Juanacatlan 179 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) Atlixco 47 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) Tenansingo - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) Aristoteles 80 - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 520 (name of person unknown)

f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING

PROCESSED	ACTION
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, Task Force W Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
CHROSE/AMSTRUT - Transmittal of LIFEAT Coverage

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Attention Martin O. HIBBERT

Attached in accordance with conversations with Martin O. HIBBERT, are LIFEAT transcriptions in the AMSTRUT-2 case for 11-26 and 28-30 September and 1 October 1962.

Willard C. CURTIS

CS in 19-6-56/3 → LIFEAT OPS

Attachment:
52 pages

Distribution:
2 - TFW w/o att. CS file
3 - WHD w/o att.
1 - JMWAVE w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
X-TFW/REG

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 October 1962	9 October 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19988

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, EE

INFO
Chief, WH; COB, Monterrey

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
BEDOX/LIFEAT

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
DIR-38331, 26 September 1962

Attached herewith find a copy of MNTY 0600 requested by Headquarters in reference.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att; 1 - COB, Mnty w/o att
1 - EE w/att
3 - Files

50-6-32/3

DATE TYPED 26 Sept. 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 28 Sept. 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-19882	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 50-6-32/3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

14-00000

TO [illegible] INFO

MNTY 0600
NUMBER

LIRING 1 SAID UNKNOWN [illegible], DESCRIBED AS DOCTOR, BLOND [illegible] HAIR, TALL, AGE APPROX 25, IN TORREON 2 AUGUST 1 DAY ONLY. CONTACTED JOSE LUNA ORTIZ, YOUTH [illegible] OF COAHUILA STATE COMMITTEE PCM. PURPOSE OF VISIT WAS CONTACT HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

~~S E C R E T~~
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

INCOMING

07/1542Z

Att HMMA-19887

50-6-32/3

Where is

Aug 61 - June 62

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

PROCESSING		
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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

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TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: O LIFEAT Progress Report for August 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref : A) HMMA 19641
B) HMMA 19129

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1).

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET With the departure of Vladimir G. NOVIKOV during the month of August 1962, it was decided that LIFEAT should pick up coverage of his replacement Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV. The continued coverage of Aleksandr G. SIDOROV, which includes extensive periods of live-monitoring and special processing of the take, is considered essential to those Station assets involved in the attempt to place the technical surveillance noted in last month's report (see reference A). Coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office continues to provide interesting personality data on Soviet officials assigned to Mexico.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage in support of the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation continues to be vital to that operation. Additional coverage for this operation has been undertaken, leads from which will probably determine future direction of the operation as well as aid KUBARK in controlling the operation.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In this area LIFEAT provided the information that a cousin of a recently assigned KUBARK deep cover agent, Victor W. OBOLD (ps) will be travelling to Mexico in the near future. This cousin is a long-time Communist Party official and a chance meeting with him could have destroyed OBOLD's carefully prepared cover. Due to LIFEAT advanced warning, proper security safeguards have been arranged. LIFEAT has also provided travel information on Yugoslav officials from the United States which was of great interest to ODENVY.

(Continued)

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 20 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-19843
[redacted] 1942

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JFK # [illegible]
Box: 74 Fold: 6

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage in this area has been most rewarding in providing leads to the contacts of Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, former Guatemalan President. Spanish Republican Exiles were covered for approximately one-half month in August, at which time it was decided that the coverage no longer provided sufficient leads and information to justify continued LIFEAT effort.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) This coverage is at the request of the local office of ODENVY and the processing of take in this area is done by that office. One of the most interesting items provided from this coverage was the fact that the American Communists Albert MALTZ and Margaret Larkin MALTZ had separated and that Albert MALTZ would probably reside in the U.S. with Margaret remaining in Mexico. Concerning the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, the local office of ODENVY wrote on 23 August 1962: "This office feels that the coverage mentioned is quite valuable and many useful leads are obtained from this coverage, particularly with regard to travel in and out of Mexico of American Communists who are in contact with individuals on whom coverage is maintained".

B. Processing of Take

No change from that noted in reference A.

C. Liaison

No change from that noted in reference A.

D. Security

During the early part of August 1962 a group of "coyotes" was uncovered in the telephone company in Mexico City and a number of arrests were made. This group had organized a unit including linemen, centralmen, installation crew, warehousemen, and workers in the office responsible for providing service to new clients. It was the purpose of the "coyote" group to provide service, for a price, to those individuals whose requests for installations had been turned down by the telephone company due to limited availability of cables and contacts. (Note: The company generally keeps a certain number of "spare pairs" in each cable for its own use in providing special service, company phones, and for rerouting during repairs to other cables. It was these spare pairs and contacts which the "coyotes" used to provide illegal phone service.) This telephone company within the telephone company would also collect monthly fees from their "subscribers". When the story came out, the telephone company had special police stationed in each central and spot checks made of linemen and crews to prevent recurrence. It was therefore necessary for the LIFEAT linemen to refrain from any clandestine activity for a period of almost four weeks so as not to be accidentally picked up as a member of the "coyote" group. LIFEUD-1 has reported that the situation is now back to normal with the special police details and special checkups terminated. No compromise of the LIFEAT operation resulted from the above incident.

E. Technical

In addition to re-supplying LIFEAT with audio recorders (as reported in reference A), the Station has ordered ten new dial tape recorders for the project. Funds for this purpose were included in the latest Project Renewal Request (forwarded by reference B).

F. Coverage

During the month of August 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 15 target

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
	~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	HMMA-19843 [redacted] 1942

lines. The coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Svyatoslav F. KUZNETSOV
3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK's place of employment (and place of contact with BEKNAVE)
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7., 8., and 9. Yugoslav Embassy (three lines)
10. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
11. Peter WATKINS
12. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
13. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Charles SMOLIKOFF (aka SMALL)

G. Personnel

The basehouse operators for LIFEAT Annex VI, LIFEUD-5 and LIFEUD-1, after a long period of family disagreements, have mutually decided on a divorce. Both are being terminated by KUBARK since their usefulness as basehouse keepers for the project will end with their divorce. The agents have agreed to the termination and it will be accomplished on a friendly basis. (Agent Service Records will be forwarded). Therefore, it has been necessary to close Annex VI and terminate coverage of the lines provided by that basehouse. LIFEUD-24 and LIFEUD-26 have been recruited to replace the terminated couple and are presently looking for a suitable basehouse which could fully replace the old Annex VI. (Note: POA was granted for LIFEUD-24 on 28 June 1962 and OA was requested. Also, OA was requested for LIFEUD-26 on 30 August 1962.)

During the absence of Woodrow B. GABBOT (ps), the processor of the Polish language portions of the Polish Embassy take, a replacement in the person of contact agent BETUMBLE was provided by Headquarters. He performed well with no known security hazard to himself or LIFEAT. BETUMBLE departed Mexico City on 17 September 1962. Until GABBOT's return Polish portions of this take are being translated by the Station Satellite Case Officer.

2.A. During the month of August 1962, the LIFEAT operation provided a total of 45 reels of raw take from the ACGM lines to the local ODENVY office for their processing. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. The following reports were based in whole or in part on positive intelligence which is provided as a by-product of the LIFEAT operation:

HMM-6605
HMM-6626
HMM-6663
HMM-6667
HMM-6670

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
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	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief, SR Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Operational/Transmittal of LIFEAT Report

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19741, 4 September 1962
Action: Per Paragraph Two.

1. Transmitted herewith in attachment is a LIFEAT report of 10 September 1962, of a second telephone call from Moscow to Vladilan Ivanovich SAMOKHIN, Head of the Soviet Information Bulletin Office in Mexico City.

2. Headquarters is requested to advise if it has interest in receiving any further such reports.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above.

Distribution:
2 - WH w/att
1 - SR w/att
3 - Files

lifeat ops

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 18 Sept. 1962	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-19826	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-	

CLASSIFICATION
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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Progress Report for July 1962

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

A. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/SOVIET LIFEAT coverage in this area was concentrated on known RIS officers: Vladimir G. NOVIKOV and Aleksandr G. SIDOROV. The most rewarding lead from this coverage during July was that SIDOROV would be absent with his entire family from his apartment for nearly two months, and more importantly, that no one would be continuously watching the apartment during that time. Based on this information, the Station has been able to make the necessary preparations for establishing technical surveillance of this apartment. LIFEAT coverage of the Soviet Bulletin Office, in addition to the above coverages, has provided information on the daily activities of individual Soviet officials assigned to Mexico, including collection of travel and biographical data.

(2) LIFEAT/POLISH LIFEAT coverage has been vital to the BEKNAVE/BECHICK operation. LIFEAT has even provided live-monitoring of an international call to BECHICK from a former admirer. Also in the Polish area, LIFEAT provided names of Polish Embassy contacts who were invited to Polish national holiday celebrations at the Polish Embassy, as well as information concerning the impending arrival of the new Polish Ambassador.

(3) LIFEAT/YUGOSLAV In the Station's increased operations against this target, basic biographical, personnel assignment, and personnel daily activity information is essential. LIFEAT has been providing just this type information since coverage commenced in May.

(continued)

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # 72-473/17
Box: 38 Fold: 6

DATE TYPED
21 August 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19641 [redacted]-1922

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-32/3

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

(4) LIFEAT/EXILE LIFEAT coverage of exile and revolutionary groups has been concentrated on coverage of Central American and Spanish Republican groups and individuals. Coverage of Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo, former President of Guatemala, has provided the Station with valuable information concerning his contacts and future plans. Further, LIFEAT covered LIGIRD-1's contact with AREVALO and later revealed AREVALO's conviction that the Station asset, LIGIRD-1, is involved in a plot to assassinate AREVALO. Coverage of Spanish Republicans displayed the internal dissensions aroused by the plans of a small group of the Mexico-based exiles to assassinate certain prominent persons with plastic bombs, and ultimately told of the departure from Mexico to Cuba of two individuals implicated in the plot.

(5) LIFEAT/American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) Targets covered in this category are in answer to a long standing requirement laid on by ODENVY and approved by Headquarters. In the past ODENVY has noted the coverage as valuable and worthwhile to them. As in the past reliable information was provided on the activities, travel, and contacts of the ACGM.

B. Processing of the Take

LIFEAT processors continue to process all take for the LIFEAT operation except for the three ACGM lines which are processed by the local ODENVY office.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No security incidents directly affecting the operation or future of LIFEAT were noted during July 1962. The assignment of special telephone company crews to make a survey of spare telephone lines available for use of new subscribers may cause problems when these crews uncover a "spare" line used in a LIFEAT coverage. However, since these crews have no authority (or desire) to trace down the lines to their ultimate destination, normal LIFEAT security practices should negate this danger. A second development which could cause future problems is the possible assignment of a LIENVOY technician to check telephone centrals to see exactly who else may be carrying on LIENVOY type work. As of this date LIFEAT personnel, who have been provided with the true name of this individual, have never heard of him working in any central in Mexico City. As of this moment it appears this will not develop into a threat to LIFEAT operations.

E. Technical

New recorders provided in May to LIFEAT are now in operation and appear superior to previous models used. It is planned, with the approval of Project LIFEAT for FY 1963, to completely re-equip LIFEAT with new recorders and possibly dial tape recorders.

F. Coverage

During the month of July 1962, LIFEAT covered a total of 16 target lines. Specifically, the coverage by target was as follows:

1. Soviet Bulletin Office
2. Vladimir G. NOVIKOV

3. Aleksandr G. SIDOROV
4. BECHICK
5. and 6. Polish Embassy (two lines)
7. and 8. Yugoslav Embassy (two lines)
9. Juan Jose AREVALO Bermejo
10. Peter WATKINS
11. Juan Simeon VIDARTE Franco Romero
12. Dr. Eugenio ARAUZ
13. LINEB-1 (one line covered for this double agent operation)
14. Albert MALTZ
15. Noah SEBORER
16. Charles SMOLIKOFF

G. Personnel

Clearance was received on LIFEUD-24 and he will commence work shortly to fill the gap left with the resignation of Olivia N. GLADMON (ps). (See project renewal forwarded HMMA-19129.) A deep-cover agent, OBOLD, was made available to process completely the take from the Yugoslav lines. He is working out well with no evident security danger to either himself or LIFEAT.

2. A. Since submission of the last Project LIFEAT Renewal Request and Project Review, 72 reels of LIFEAT on the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) have been passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, a number of memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based in whole or in part on LIFEAT provided material.

B. Despite the fact that LIFEAT is used primarily to support Station operations, some positive intelligence is gathered as a by product of the operation. The following reports were forwarded to Headquarters based on LIFEAT material:

HMM-6421
HMM-6452
HMM-6479
HMM-6499
HMM-6565

3. The Station has applied the RYBAT control to this dispatch to ensure the Desk's control of the information contained herein.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

21 August 1962

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

[illegible] 3435

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-17815 [redacted] 1920
TO INFO	Chief, WH Division	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 22 September 1961
SUBJECT	LIFEAT Report for April, May, June, July, and August 1961	RE: "43-5" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information	
REFERENCES		

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE with related lines continued to provide valuable information for use in support of Station operations. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut on 19 May for security reasons. The following leads were provided: As a result of a LIFEAT provided lead, the Station was able to develop an operation in cooperation with the Mexican Government whereby Mario CHAVEZ, Guatemalan who is representative of the Castroite Bohemia, was placed under Mexican surveillance and ultimately arrested. LIFEAT also provided a check on the activities of LITANGO-1. Further, provision of travel information to and from Cuba by Nicaraguan and Guatemalan exiles was of continuing importance.

(2) LIFEAT was employed as a check of the activities of former KUBARK agents LIVESTOCK-2 and LIVESTOCK-3. This coverage has contributed measurably to Station security.

(3) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided vital coverage of the LITMUS official installation during the DECORN recruitment operation. Also of value were the leads pointing to two suspected LITMUS Intelligence Service agents. Other Station assets are now investigating these leads.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGM) continues to provide excellent coverage of the activities, travel, and contacts of the American Communists living in Mexico. This information is of primary importance to ODENVY.

b. Processing of Material

LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No adverse incidents were noted during the reporting period. However, coverage of the LIERODE official installation was cut when LIENVOY technicians began regular checks of those lines.

e. Technical

No change.

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Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

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50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period varied greatly due to the moving of two basehouses. However, the number covered averaged 12, with the breakdown as follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	2
LITMUS, and related lines	3
American Communists	3
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	2

g. Personnel

The assistant outside case officer, Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps), will depart Mexico City for a new assignment within the next month. David M. WILSTED (ps) will undertake complete outside work for LIFEAT for a temporary period while a locally obtained replacement for RAFANELLI is being cleared and trained.

2a. During the reporting period information from 236 LIFEAT reels on coverage of the American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to the local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5570
5573
5575
5587
5588
5590
5592
5613
HMM-5625
5627
5630
5639
5641
5642
5643
5647
HMM-5652
5655
5659
5660
5717
5742
5743
5836

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 September 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

[illegible]

50-6-32/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16838
[redacted] 1881

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO
INFO
: Chief, WH Division

FROM
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
14 April 1961

SUBJECT
LIFEAT Report for March 1961

RE 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
Information Only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V. paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIERODE, with related lines, continued to receive emphasis from the LIFEAT operation during the reporting period. The appropriate Case Officer considers the check of penetration agents LITAMIL-3, LITAINT-7, and LITALUS-3 through LIFEAT to be of utmost value in controlling these agents and checking their activities. In addition, LIFEAT provided extremely valuable information in the defection of Jose PARDO Llada, giving leads for both FI and PP exploitation. Aid was also given in providing a check of the AMIRON AWOLS in Mexico. In a related occurance, LIFEAT provided information that indicates the Cuban Embassy in Mexico is being used as a Guatemalan Communist communication channel to exiles in Cuba. LIFEAT also provided daily information on travellers to Cuba.

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information for use in the BECORN operation. It is also of continuing importance as a daily check on the activities of the LITMUS personnel in Mexico.

(3) During the recent Latin American "Peace Conference", LIFEAT provided information on the delegates to the Conference, especially the U.S. delegates, as well as the activities of the Conference.

(4) LIFEAT coverage of Noah SEBORER provided advance information on the travel to the United States of Anna SEBORER and Maria and Enos WICHER. The actual departure and return of these American Communists was also confirmed through LIFEAT.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: ____ Fold: ____

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d. Security

No adverse occurances were noted during the reporting period.

e. Technical

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

No change.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the month of March 1961 was 12. The breakdown follows:

LIERODE, and related lines	4
LITMUS, and related lines	4
American Communists	1
Local Communists	2
Targets of Opportunity	1

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from twenty-nine LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY. In addition, numerous memos were prepared by the Station for passing to local ODACID and ODENVY based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables, and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material:

HMM-5497
HMM-5505
HMM-5507
HMM-5511 (MEXI-7492)
HMM-5532 (MEXI-7577)
HMM-5533 (MEXI-7580)
HMM-5534 (MEXI-7585)
HMM-5536
HMM-5541
HMM-5545 (MEXI-7639)
HMM-5549
HMM-5550 (MEXI-7681)
HMM-5552
HMM-5560
HMM-5563

MEXI-7494
MEXI-7502
MEXI-7561
MEXI-7564
MEXI-7600
MEXI-7613
MEXI-7615
MEXI-7626
MEXI-7677

HMMA-16555
HMMA-16564
HMMA-16565
HMMA-16600
HMMA-16607
HMMA-16608
HMMA-16625
HMMA-16627
HMMA-16633
HMMA-16639
HMMA-16664
HMMA-16665
HMMA-16687
HMMA-16710
HMMA-16725
HMMA-16728
HMMA-16735
HMMA-16738
HMMA-16740
HMMA-16747
HMMA-16771

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

12 April 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Automobile License Check

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 ? 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

HMMA 16477, 15 February 1961

The results of Headquarters investigation revealed that the automobile noted at home of Refund -1 mentioned in reference is registered to one Lewis *CIMINO, 2711 Chesley Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. Headquarters traces on CIMINO were negative. auto noted at home 201-183704

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 21 March 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 23 MAR 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9610

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3 ✓

ROUTING | INITIALS
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/Mexico
RI | BR
RI TY
WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT
WH/3/Mexico	C.Cudney	ngw	AC/WH/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	22 1961	J. C. KING

552

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [illegible]A-16767
[redacted]978

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 29 March 1961

RE "43.3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT e LIFEAT Report for February 1961

ACTION REQUIRED Information only

REFERENCES [illegible]A-16605

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHP-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LI[illegible] continued to be an essential check on the activities and veracity of the penetration agents LITALUS-3, LITALUS-4, LITAINT-7, and LITAMIL-3. It also provided daily information on the activities of the Cuban official installation as well as coverage of long-distance calls received by that installation from Havana, Cuba. In relation to the A[illegible] AMOLS in Mexico, LIFEAT was able to help confirm that none of the AMOLS contacted the Cuban Embassy. LIFEAT also picked up the return from Cuba of Oscar RODRIGUEZ Moruna (person who desired employment as a Cuban G-2 agent).

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS continued to provide the interested Case Officer with daily information on the activities of the officials of the LITMUS installation in Mexico City.

(3) LIFEAT, through coverage of Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, was able to provide information on preparation activities of the recent Latin American Peace Conference held in Mexico City. This line also provided information of GUERRERO's contacts with other Communists, particularly Francis W. and Libby Campbell PARK, Canadian Communists now residing in Mexico.

(4) Coverage of Noah and Anna SEBORER revealed the plans of Anna SEBORER to travel to the U.S., and gave precise itinerary and flight schedule for this travel. LIFEAT was also able to provide the plans and travel schedule on Enos and Maria WICHER's travel to California. This information is of interest to ODENVY and was passed locally to that office.

AN [illegible]
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NSD~~
~~FI~~
[illegible]

b. Processing of Material

No change.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

Contractual arrangements for a new basehouse, Annex VIII, have been all but completed. It is believed that this move will once again enable full secure use of the experienced basehouse keepers who were involved in the security question noted in paragraph 1 (a)(d) of Reference. In order to further improve LIFEAT's coverage and security, the Station is also considering a move of Annex I if a suitable new site can be located. Headquarters will be advised of any progress made in this respect.

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]/77
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

e. Technical

No change.

50-6-32/3

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

f. Coverage

The total number of LIFEAT lines varied from eight to eleven during the reporting period. The normal breakdown is as follows:

LIFRODE and related lines.	4
LITMUS and related lines.	3
American Communists.	1
Targets of Opportunity	3
Total	11

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from 28 LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information. Memos to ODACID and ODENVY were also based on LIFEAT provided material.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMMA-16535
16534
16533
16503
16500
16498
16495
16478
16456
16455
16440
16404
16397
16394
16390

HMM-5507
5505
5503 (via MEXI-7462)
5497
5475
5480 (via MEXI-7381)
5462
5465
5452
5443
5446

MEXI-7241
7248
7335
7345

Millard C. Curtis
Millard C. CURTIS

28 March 1961

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: [redacted] [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

TO: Chief, WH Division

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 8 March 1961

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Report Covering August, September, October, November, December 1960, and January 1961

(CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

REFERENCES:

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d)(1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

(1) LIFEAT/LIFRODE, with related lines, provided overall coverage of the local Cuban and exile activities, and was considered extremely valuable in support of Station operations in the Cuban area. LIFEAT coverage of the Cuban Embassy enabled the appropriate Case Officer to check the veracity and activities of the penetrations of that installation; particularly LITAMIL-3, LITALUS-3, and LITAINT-5. It was also invaluable in the debriefing of LICOOZE-1. LIFEAT material was the basis of an effective KUBARK inspired press release concerning derogatory activities of Cuban Embassy personnel.

LIFEAT leads were of special value in two "one-time" operations. The first of these was the ability of LIFEAT to provide advance information on a meeting arranged between Mario ROJAS Villa (aka James Bradford STEWART) and a Cuban Embassy official. As a result of the lead time given by LIFEAT, the Station was able to provide surveillance of the meeting and arrange for the detention of ROJAS. Ultimately, ROJAS (a fugitive from ODENVY) was returned to ODYOKE jurisdiction through Station action. In a second case LIFEAT provided follow-up information which, when provided to ODURGE, lead to the apprehension of Thomas Howard GRIGGS (aka Carl JOHNSON). He, too, had attempted to arrange a meeting with Cuban officials in Mexico, and was under warrant for abduction in Chicago, Illinois.

AN [illegible]
IAB X
IN
PS
EX
DES Nro
FI
DAP

LIFEAT information was heavily drawn upon in the case of Guillermo HERNANDEZ Vega, possible Castro agent, who was suspected of penetrating the AMIRON program. Through LIFEAT the Station was able to monitor HERNANDEZ's attempts to contact various Mexican and Cuban officials and to arrange for his return to MADD before any such contacts were made.

(2) LIFEAT/LITMUS continued to provide daily information on the official Polish installation in Mexico City which is described by the interested Case Officer as "invaluable and unique." During this reporting period, major contribution has been in providing the leads which determined that a local cafe is a front for much Polish intelligence activity in the area. It has been further indicated that this cafe is the Headquarters for a suspected Polish operation directed against the ODACID installation (previously fully reported to KUCLUB, KUBIOT, and KUTUBE/D in HMMA-15514, HMMA-15995, and HMMA-16222. The telephone of this cafe has been added to the LIFEAT coverage with resulting increase of Station knowledge of Polish Intelligence activity.

Also of major interest was the LIFEAT support of a Station audio operation against the Polish Embassy in Mexico City. In this, LIFEAT provided the information on delivery date of a KUBARK "bugged" piece of equipment ordered by the Polish Embassy. As a result of the lead time provided, the Station was able to promptly initiate base house procurement and other support for this operation.

Remove from Project HD in H1160
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 75-77/71
Box: 56 Fold: 6

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

50-6

As a continuing asset, LIFEAT provided daily notice of the activities and movements of Polish officials. In one case LIFEAT provided advance information concerning travel plans of one Jan KRZYWICKI, a person on the Polish Watch List.

(3) During the reporting period LIFEAT added to the security of the Station in checking on present and past agent assets. Of particular note was the coverage of the activities of LIFIRE, LIVESTOCK-1, and LIVESTOCK-2.

(4) Until terminated for security reasons (see SECURITY, below), LIFEAT coverage of the U.A.R. Embassy provided independent check of the activities of the members of that installation. Of note were the LIFEAT revealed meetings between Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano, former Mexican President Lazaro CARDENAS and the previous U.A.R. Ambassador Anouar HATEM. This coverage also provided information concerning the visit of an Algerian rebel delegation to Mexico.

(5) LIFEAT provided coverage of the local Communists, the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM), and lately on two important Canadian Communists living in Mexico. In its coverage of local Communists LIFEAT provided coverage of Carmen BRUFAU Civit (admitted former Soviet agent), Xavier GUERRERO Saucedo and his wife, Clara Porcet de GUERRERO, and Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos. LIFEAT provided leads indicated the place of employment of BRUFAU, as well as much of her daily routine, thereby allowing the Station to initiate physical surveillance of her. LIFEAT coverage of CAMPOS, of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program, revealed his insincerity in cooperating with KUBARK, and as a result efforts toward his full recruitment were terminated with minimum danger to Station assets. Recently, at Headquarters request, LIFEAT reinitiated its coverage of the GUERREROS. This coverage has already provided information of the continuing contact between the GUERREROS and Frank and Libby PARK, Canadian Communist "inmigrantes" to Mexico and members of the Labor Progressive Party (Canadian CP). The Station hopes to mount a more comprehensive coverage of the PARKS as a result of the LIFEAT lead. In the LIFEAT coverage of the ACGM, of particular interest was the advance travel plans of Albert MALTZ, Noah and Anna SEBORER (as well as the travels of their sons Carl and Robert SEBORER), Maria and Enos WICHER, and Grace and Sam NOVICK. Daily activities of the ACGM are provided through LIFEAT to the local office of ODENVY.

(6) The LIFEAT complex provided the security check of the private office telephones of the Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station, as well as checks of the home telephones of certain of the Station officers (as reported in HMMA-16465). Since this service is unique and of value to Station security, it will be utilized periodically to guard against hostile audio surveillance.

b. Processing of Material

There has been no change in the processing of the internally produced LIFEAT take. LIFEAT processors continue to process the take from the LIENVOY/LIMERICK coverage.

c. Liaison

In November 1960, the local office of ODENVY requested that coverage of Albert MALTZ be re-initiated. This was done for a short period. However, due to the start of telephone company cable work in the area of basehouse Annex IV, coverage had to be terminated. Technical surveillance will be resumed when cable work has been completed.

d. Security

Operations at basehouse Annex VIII had to be discontinued on 10 October 1960 when the telephone company's installation crews moved into the area of that basehouse and actually approached the annex to investigate the number of lines entering the house. The crew was put off until the next day with the standard, and normal for Mexico City, excuse that the "Senor" was not at home and they could not enter without his permission. By the time the crew returned on the following day, the basehouse had been completely cleared of all equipment, the lines cut back to the roof-line and their ends treated with acid to give them an aged appearance. The crew was allowed to enter the basehouse to check (and ultimately remove) the extra lines, with the admonition that it was about time they cleaned up that mess on the "Senor's" roof. Operations will be resumed when a suitable new basehouse site has been located and equipment installed. There have been no security repercussions since the removal of the extra lines by the telephone company.

The only other security note was in relation to Annex IV and was covered in LIAISON section above.

f. Coverage

The number of lines covered by LIFEAT during the reporting period has ranged from 9 to 15, but has averaged 12. The normal breakdown of the LIFEAT coverage is as follows:

LIERODE and related lines............3
LITMUS and related lines............3
American Communists.................1
Local Communists....................2
Targets of Opportunity..............3

It is hoped that once the telephone company has completed its present city-wide cable and installation work, at least in the areas of the basehouses, LIFEAT will be able to increase its coverage to 15 or 18 lines. The targets for this 3 to 6 line increase are already noted by the Station.

g. Personnel

No change since last report. Headquarters is reminded that the second tour of Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps) will end in June 1961. It is requested that a qualified replacement be provided from Headquarters.

2. a. During the reporting period, information from one hundred thirty LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico was passed to the local office of ODENVY for its information.

b. The following reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the reporting period:

HMM-5095 (via MEXI-6008)
5098
5100
5101
5133
5137
5144 (via MEXI-6171)
5154
5159
5168
5172
5174 (via MEXI-6346)
5180 (via MEXI-6359)

HMM-5186
5187
5193
5207
5214
5226
5235
5245
5247
5261
5264
5268
5277

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16605
[redacted] 1967

HMMW-5289
5297
5299
5309
5310
5319
5321
5329
5330
5332
5333
5338
5339
5342
5343
5347
5348
5354
5356 (via MEXI-6937)
5362
5372 (via MEXI-6979
5375
5376

HMMW-5378
5379
5380
5381
5382
5383
5384
5386
5387
5392
5393
5398
5400
5406
5407
5408
5409
5410
5413 (via MEXI-7187)
5418
5426 (via MEXI-7187)
5428
5437 (via MEXI-7212)

HMMA-15431
15467
15472
15480
15481
15499
15537
15552
15571
15580
15655
15657
15695
15696
15697
15701
15722
15734
15762
15765
15778
15792
15799
15814
15877
15895
15917

15936
15971
16037
16051
16052
16078
16103
16111
16114
16147
16179
16185
16214
16234
16235
16255
16270
16304
16306
16320
16328
16330
16342
16370

MEXI-6000
6048
6062
6114
6371
6429
6433
6437

MEXI-6511
6561
6587
7052
7055
7078
7096
7119

FORM 10-57 53a (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~
[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~S E C R E T~~ [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16605 [redacted] 1967

In addition to the above, approximately 30 memos based on LIFEAT procured information were passed to local ODACID, and 20 memos were passed to local ODENVY.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

3 March 1961

Distribution:
  3 - Headquarters
  2 - Files

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-16477
TO : Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 15 February 1961
SUBJECT Automobile License Check		RE "43-3" (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED - See below.		
REFERENCE(S)		

1. It is requested that a prompt check of the following license plate be made and the results forwarded to Mexico City Station:

Maryland 1960 plate
CE 5574
1960 Grey Ford

2. This automobile was observed in front of the home of LIFEUD-1 on 9 February 1961. The driver, an English speaking man, was accompanied by a woman of latin features. The man entered LIFEUD-1's home at about 1030 on the above date.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

CS COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACTION FINISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Carmen BRUFAU Civit

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: [illegible]-9065, 1 September 1960

The interested Headquarters component has expressed a desire to review the LIFEAT take to date on Subject. Please forward copies to Headquarters and send copies of future take on a monthly basis.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED: 16 December 1960

DATE DISPATCHED: [illegible] DEC [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9314

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-32/3 ✓

✓1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexi/Chrono

BR

WH/3M

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexi	John G. Heyn	bj C/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. KING

FORM 5 60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

076

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~[illegible]~~

DATE : 8 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2, ADDP/A

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 9 0814Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40047

DIR INFO SALV CITE MEXI 6594

REFS: A. DIR 09836 (OUT 55644)

B. DIR 09975 (OUT 55756)

C. DIR 09835 (OUT 55643)

1. MEXI PLANS MOUNT LIFEAT COVERAGE SALV EMB AND LIENVOY COVERAGE "EDITORIAL POPULAR" (MIGUEL ANGEL VAZQUEZ E. SALV COMMIE LEADER) SOONEST.

2. LIMUD NOW COVERING "EDITORIAL POPULAR" AND CARLOS BARRIENTOS MORAN SALV STUDENT AND MEMBER FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO SANDINO (FRS). PLAN LIMUD COVERAGE MAURICIO DE AL SELVA SALV COMMIE MEXI.

3. MEXI HAS NO PENETRATIONS OR LEFTISTS FOR TASK BUT PLAN SEND LIMASK CENTRAL AMERICA INCLUDING SALV SHORTLY. LIMASK "COVER" THAT OF EDITOR "VOZ DE AMERICA LIBRE". PLANS WILL BE SET FORTH

LIFEAT

~~[illegible]~~

SEPARATE CABLE.

4. NO INFO RE NEW SALV REGIME FROM MEXI SOURCE THUS FAR. ON 6 NOVEMBER LIOOZE-1 REPORTED NO INFO SALV SITUATION. HE WILL QUERY PORTUONDO CUBAN AND RE ABOVE WHEN OPPORTUNE.

5. MEXI REQUESTS HQS AND SALV APPROVAL SHYROCK TDY SALV FEW DAYS ORDER FAMILIARIZE SELF BACKGROUND EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES COUP AND CONSEQUENTLY BETTER EVALUATE INFO RECEIVED MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STATIONS CONDUCT FULLEST POSSIBLE COVERAGE OF INCOMING MAIL FROM EL SALVADOR AND CABLE PRIORITY SALIENT INTEL ON SITUATION THERE.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ORIG: CHARLES W. ANDERSON
UNIT: WH/FI
EXT: 3995 648
DATE: 3 NOVEMBER 1960

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 5

INFO: CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	MEXI	4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE		
☐	DEFERRED	3 23 01Z 60
☐	ROUTINE	CABLE SEC
☒	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT88628
88628

TO MEXI PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 09820
09820

1. DESIRE MOUNT LIFEAT OR LIENVOY COVERAGE SALVADORAN EMBASSY SOONEST AND CABLE PRIORITY PERTINENT INFO POLITICAL SITUATION SALVADOR.

2. CAN STATION SUGGEST COVERAGE ANY OTHER TARGETS WHICH MAY PRODUCE ON THIS VITAL MATTER?

END OF MESSAGE

LIFEAT OPS

CWHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3/MEXICO
COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DATE : 17 SEP 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2 (MR HEYN WH NOTIFIED 1855 17 SEP 60)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/CI, C/CI/RA, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FE 4, D/OC 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 17 2214Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 14365

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 6348

file
LIFEAT/OPS

RYBAT

REF A DIR 00992 (Out 70506) *

B DIR 01226 (Out 70522) **

1. STATION TAKING FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. MKCHARITY[1]-PREPARING MOVE SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT TO SAFE AREA. MULFORD[2] TO SPEND MORE TIME IN LIFINGER[3] COVER OFFICE. STEHLIK[4] INSTRUCTED STAY AWAY ~~FROM~~ MKCHARITY[1] BASE. LIMAT[5] OPERATION INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. DUE PHILIP L. ALPHER[10] KNOWLEDGE MKCHARITY[1] CONSIDER THIS OP COULD BE MOST SERIOUSLY AFFECTED.

B. LIMESA[6]/LIMUST[7]-PLAN MOVE ALL TECH GEAR FROM UNIT 11 AND SUSPEND UNIT 15 LICALLA ACTIVITIES.

C. LIFEAT[8]-REVISING AND REVIEWING LP CUTOFF AND EVACUATION

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 14365 MEXI 6348

PLANS. DUE COMPARTMENTATION AND BELIEVED LIMITED ALPHER 10 KNOWLEDGE THIS OP, DO NOT CONSIDER COMPROMISE LIKELY.

D. LIENVOY 9 -NO DEFINITIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN NOW DUE LIAISON NATURE OP.

2. HQS REQUESTED PROVIDE CONTINUING ADVICE LATEST APPRAISALS 10 ALPHER'S AND OTHER ARRESTED TECHS KNOWLEDGE ABOVE AND ALL OTHER STATION OPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments:

* Headquarters informed the field stations that LCHARVEST(11) audio operation against NCNA in Havana was compromised.

** Stated that all security precautions should be taken since it was possible that all audio perations could be affected.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15595
[redacted] 1445

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 31 August 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report

(CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFERENCE(S):

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) LIFEAT/LIERODE provided information which assisted in the press exploitation of the story of Gladys Izquierdo Martinez de DELGADO, wife of the recently deported (with the help of LIFEAT provided material) Cuban agent Francisco DELGADO Garcia. LIERODE coverage was also the origin of the lead which gave access to Cuban agent Elpi CASANOVA.

2) LIFEAT coverage was reactivated 18 July on LIVESTOCK-2 as a Station security operation to check the activities of the potentially dangerous former agent.

3) LIFEAT also continued to provide the only independent means of checking the veracity of Jose Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

4) LIFEAT coverage of the American Communist Noah SEBORER provided the itinerary of SEBORER's trip, which commenced 17 August, to Havana, New York, Moscow, and Tel Aviv.

b. Processing of Material

The LIFEAT complex continues to process the take from the LIENVOY Soviet coverage.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

No change.

e. Technical

No change.

AN [illegible]
AB
IB
PS
SX
DES | NFD
FI
[illegible]RD

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # [illegible]
Box: [illegible] Fold: 6

f. Coverage

LITMUS and related lines	4 (two initiated in July)
LIERODE and related lines	4
American Communists	1
U.A.R. Embassy	1
Targets of Opportunity	2
Total	12

RECORD COPY

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-15595
[redacted] 1445

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO

INFO

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT

RE "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

PAGE TWO

REFERENCE(S)

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) returned from home leave and resumed duties as outside Case Officer for Project LIFEAT on 23 July.

2 a. During the month of July 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office for processing from the LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, information dispatches, cables, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of July 1960:

HMM-5032 (via MEXI-5835)
HMM-5045
HMM-5047
HMM-5065

HMMA-15275
HMMA-15277
HMMA-15307
HMMA-15309
HMMA-15328
HMMA-15402
HMMA-15408

MEXI-5835
MEXI-5941
MEXI-5943

c. Four (4) memoranda were passed to ODACID and two (2) to ODENVY during the month which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

29 August 1960

Distribution:
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2 - Files

50-6-32/3

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-15394
[redacted]1535

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-32/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 27 July 1960

SUBJECT: O - LIFEAT Monthly Report, June 1960

ACTION REQUIRED: - None. For your information.

REFERENCE(S):

RE "433" - CHECK "X" ONE:
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK

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1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, Paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT/LIMERICK continued to provide advance information on arrivals, departures, work assignments, and contacts of the Soviet officials in Mexico City. In this area LIFEAT provided the following: advance travel information on the return of First Secretaries Yevgeniy BOCHKOV and Yuriy ALEKSANDROV from consultations in the USSR, advance information on the arrival in Mexico of the Georgian Ballet on 1 June and its subsequent departure for Cuba on 20 June accompanied by Assistant Cultural Officer Aleksandr BROVKIN, and advance information on the assignment and arrival of new Consular Officer Serafim V. DUNIN. LIFEAT leads provided on the continuing attempts of the Soviets to rent apartments are being checked by the Station surveillance team.

LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the Cuban Embassy staff, particularly providing exploitable coverage of Cuban intelligence activities. Of major importance during the month of June was the acquisition of leads on the activities of Cuban "tourist" Francisco DELGADO Garcia. As a result of these leads, passed to the Mexican government in disguised form, DELGADO was arrested on the night of 7 July and thereafter deported. LIFEAT information also enabled the responsible Case Officer to alert agent LIMASK to threats made by DELGADO to have LIMASK arrested. The LIERODE related coverage of the telephone of Santiago GARCES Arroyo has enabled the Station to maintain a check on the activities of AMSHAD-1, including his possible role as middle-man in a "frozen pesos for sugar" deal reported in MEXI-5794.

LIFEAT/LITMUS provided information on the activities of the Polish Legation during June, particularly noting the travel plans of Polish Intelligence Officer Thadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIFEAT coverage of a member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) is used in checking the veracity of Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos who is of interest to the Station's Communist Party Penetration Program.

LIFEAT also agreed to support Project LIENVOY in the processing of the Soviet take when LIENVOY picked up coverage of the Soviet lines LIFEAT was forced to relinquish on 22 June 1960 (See SECURITY below). LIFEAT, though short of processors, agreed to the processing when it was learned that LIENVOY would be unable to process the added coverage it had undertaken.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # [illegible]
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b. Processing of Material

Due to the desire of COS that ZINSMEISTER continue to process the take it obtains from the Soviet lines, LIFEAT processor Carol ZINSMEISTER (ps) will undertake the processing of the take of these lines

FORM 53
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CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~[redacted]

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which LIENVOY now provides. This is exactly the work previously done by ZINSMEISTER and the only difference is that tapes are made at a different location. However, this does require close coordination within the Station of these two operations.

A problem which has arisen with the withdrawal of the Soviet coverage from LIFEAT responsibility (see SECURITY below) and the "outage" experienced earlier in June on two of the most productive Soviet lines, is the extreme drop in the production of positive intelligence from LIFEAT coverage. It is hoped that with more intensive exploitation of the coverage still available, plus exploitation of new lines being installed by LIFEAT, that the production of positive intelligence will again measure up to that previously provided by LIFEAT.

c. Liaison

No change other than the closer inter-office liaison with Project LIENVOY due to the above noted LIFEAT processing of LIENVOY take and the increased reel and finished product exchange this entails.

d. Security

On 21 June 1960 LITENSOR suggested to COS that LIENVOY begin operations against the Soviet and Satellite targets in Mexico City. In order not to indicate that the unilateral LIFEAT operation was providing this coverage, it was necessary for COS to agree to this suggestion. So as not to jeapordize LIFEAT operations and personnel, LIFEAT coverage was suspended on the Soviet Embassy and Polish Legation, and the applicable "crosses" were pulled and cleaned. This was accomplished by 1030 on 22 June 1960. Coverage continued on the home of Aleksandr BEKIER, Polish Conselor of Legation, since no security problem seemed to be raised by continued coverage of this line.

e. Technical

The arrival in early June of a portion of the replacement parts requested for LIFEAT use has enabled LIFEAT personnel to perform much needed repair and maintenance work on the aging LIFEAT equipment.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (All pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LITMUS	3 lines (2 pulled 22 June for security reasons)
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
U.A.R. Embassy	1 line (Initiated 7 June)
Target of Opportunity	1 line

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of June 1960, eleven (11) processed reels from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local office of ODENVY as well as seventeen (17) reels from ODENVY's processing. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-15394 [redacted] 1805

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of June 1960:

HMM-4983 (via MEXI-5665)
HMM-4990 (via MEXI-5686)
HMM-5014

HMMA-15088
HMMA-15116
HMMA-15129
HMMA-15134
HMMA-15135
HMMA-15144
HMMA-15168
HMMA-15175
HMMA-15180
HMMA-15196
HMMA-15203
HMMA-15232
HMMA-15239
HMMA-15246
HMMA-15266

MEXI-5710
MEXI-5745
MEXI-5771
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5794
MEXI-5799
MEXI-5818

c. Eight (8) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of June 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired material.

Willard C. CURTIS

25 July 1960

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14-00000

DISPATCH

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

HMMA-15400
RYBAT-1625

TO : Chief, WH Division

50-6-75

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

27 July 1960

SUBJECT - Monthly Activities Report on LIENVOY

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None. For your information.

REFERENCE(S)

REF: HMMA-15170, RYBAT-1402

On the evening of 18 June COS met with LITENSOR at the home of LIELEGANT (see MEXI-5761). Among other subjects discussed, LITENSOR urgently suggested that COS arrange coverage of the Soviet/Satellite installations. Since this coverage is obviously one of great interest to KUBARK, COS was left with no alternative but to enthusiastically accept LITENSOR's suggestion. LIELEGANT was equally enthusiastic about the suggestion and requested COS to furnish a list of target lines as soon as possible. On 21 June Malcolm Q. EDELAND passed to LIENVOY/2 a list of 4 Soviet, 2 Polish, 2 Czech and 2 Yugoslav lines. The Polish, the Czech, Yugoslav and 1 Soviet line were placed within two days. Meanwhile all LIFEAT Soviet/Satellite lines were removed. After due consideration it was decided to advise LIENVOY/2 that we would prefer to drop the 2 Polish lines and at least one Yugoslav line and use all remaining available lines (LIENVOY can handle a maximum of 30 lines, always keeping two spares) to cover a total of five Soviet lines and keeping the two Czech lines already in operation. This was agreed to but the four additional Soviet lines could not be placed immediately due to the temporary absence from the city of LIENVOY/3 whose aid was needed to fulfill this assignment.

The eventuality of a request from high Mexican officials for LIENVOY coverage of Soviet/Satellite with its attendant affect upon LIFEAT had been foreseen by the Station for sometime. On at least two previous occasions when a hint was made to COS by lesser officials than LITENSOR, COS was able to dissuade these officials on the basis of lack of qualified personnel for processing, transcribing, and exploiting the take that would come from taps against Soviet/Satellite installations. However, on the above occasion when LITENSOR even went so far as to suggest that the translations could be handled by language experts at Headquarters COS was in no position to argue this point with LITENSOR. The actual implementation of the change over of Soviet/Satellite coverage from LIFEAT to LIENVOY (LIFEAT went back on Polish Legation in late June) was accomplished smoothly, with no flaps and the Station does not envision any problems, certainly, in the immediate future.

The processing and transcribing is being handled in exactly the same fashion as before i.e., LIENVOY is doing the taps only, LIFEAT personnel are processing the tapes from LIENVOY. As far as the Mexicans are concerned, the tapes are being forwarded to Headquarters for processing with the transcriptions being sent back to the Station for our information. The Station has promised LIENVOY/2 and LIELEGANT a monthly summary of any interesting highlights that appear in these transcriptions.

file

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FORM 53

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

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Between the dates 9 to 14 June during the visit of DORTICOS, LIENVOY covered 10 of the 20 lines of the Del Prado Hotel where the DORTICOS party was staying. This coverage was for 24 hours daily and the LIENVOY personnel monitored all calls coming to and going from the DORTICOS suite (see MEXI-5731). This service was requested by the Station the day before DORTICOS arrival in Mexico City and was readily agreed to and immediately put into affect thru the efforts of LIENVOY/2. Considerable information of interest and value was obtained from this operation as well as quantities of operational data.

Also, during the month of June LIENVOY/9 was dispatched to Cuba on a special assignment per HMMW-5765. LIENVOY/9 successfully accomplished his mission, returning on 6 July. The results from this mission will be forwarded to Headquarters in a separate dispatch.

1. There follows the third monthly activities report on LIENVOY covering the month of June 1960:

A. Exploitation of Material Obtained

During the month of June a total of 29 lines were in operation against the following targets:

1. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas del Rio
2. Sam Brooks
3. Gral. Lazaro Cardenas Del Rio
4. Lic. Alonso Aguilar Monteverde
5. CTAL
6. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
7. Russian Embassy
8. Leopoldo Arenal Bastar
9. David Alfaro Siqueiros
10. Problemas Agricolas y Industriales
11. Vicente Lombardo Toledano
12. Czech Embassy
13. Joaquin Basanta Lopez
14. Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo
15. D. F. S.
16. D. F. S.
17. Jorge L. Tamayo
18. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
19. Francisco Galindo Ochoa
20. Amalia Solorzano de Cardenas
21. Dr. Lauro Ortega
22. Manuel Sousa Hermida
23. Lic. Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero
24. Czech Embassy
25. Prensa Latina
26. Embajada Cubana
27. Czech Embassy
28. Yugoslav Embassy
29. Armando Lopez Betancourt

Plus 10 lines - Hotel Del Prado - DORTICOS suite 9-14 June (see MEXI-5731)

B. Processing of Material

With the closing of Unit C (see HMMA-15200) the two processors retained under the project, LIENVOY/6 and LIENVOY/7 were transferred to the Intercept Center where they are now responsible for doing the full transcription of the tapes covering lines of interest to KUBARK.

C. Liaison

During the month of June COS was in contact with LIELEGANT on the average of four times each week. As stated in paragraph one above, COS met with LITENSOR on 18 June.

D. Security

It is believed that the security of the project has been improved with the closing of Unit C and the elimination of all Unit C personnel with the exception of LIENVOY/6 and 7 who were transferred to the Intercept Site. During the absence of Arnold F. AREHART, Malcolm Q. EDELAND was in direct contact with LIENVOY/2 and took advantage of this contact to repeatedly stress the necessity for tight security of this operation as well as personal security of the various LIENVOYs. For operational efficiency, contact once a week will be maintained between LIENVOY/2 and EDELAND.

E. Technical

Early in June AREHART returned to Headquarters to convert to Staff Agent and pick up his family to return Pcs Mexico City. He and his family arrived 24 June. AREHART reported on his return that some of the equipment was in need of attention but that there were no technical problems during his absence.

F. Personnel

With the elimination of Unit C the following personnel were terminated during the month of June:

LITABLE/2
LITABLE/3
LITABLE/4
LIENVOY/13

G. Production

The following fifty-seven (57) reports, cables and information dispatches were based wholly or in part on LIENVOY during the month of June 1960.

HMMA-15084
HMMA-15093
HMMA-15094
HMMA-15095
HMMA-15103
HMMA-15107
HMMA-15142
HMMA-15147
HMMA-15170
HMMA-15172
HMMA-15200
HMMA-15201
HMMA-15217
HMMA-15249

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-15400 RYBAT-1425

HMMA-15260
HMMA-15262

MEXI-5682
MEXI-5688
MEXI-5689
MEXI-5698
MEXI-5703
MEXI-5717
MEXI-5731
MEXI-5732
MEXI-5736
MEXI-5746
MEXI-5754
MEXI-5761
MEXI-5762
MEXI-5763
MEXI-5764
MEXI-5779
MEXI-5786
MEXI-5788
MEXI-5803
MEXI-5813

HMM-4974
HMM-4989
HMM-4991 (MEXI-5705)
HMM-4992
HMM-4993
HMM-4997
HMM-4998 (MEXI-5719)
HMM-4999 (MEXI-5720)
HMM-5001
HMM-5014
HMM-5016
HMM-5018
HMM-5019 (MEXI-5797)
HMM-5022
HMM-5023
HMM-5025

Willard C. CURTIS

26 July 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

Secret [illegible]/Ops

2(3)

Attachment to: HMMA-15325

Subject: Douglas J. NISLEY's (p) Report for June 1960

13 July 1960

1. During June the LIENVOY project put taps on the telephones of the Czech and Yugoslav Embassies. Anticipating a possible LIENVOY tap on the Polish Legation, the LIFEAT project removed its tap on this installation lest it be discovered by LIENVOY. The Station now receives Czech and Yugoslav reels every day from LIENVOY. The LIFEAT tap on Aleksander BEKIER's line continues, a tap on Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ has just begun to produce, and a tap on the Polish Commercial Office is under consideration. Eventually, when the Station is confident that the LIENVOY project will not tap the Polish Legation lines, the LIFEAT project will be able to reinstitute its coverage of this target.

2. A daily flow of photographs is coming from Richard Z. SPATHAR (p) in the LIHABIT/2 installations. The Station now has possession of the LITABBY/2 basehouse, but for various reasons it will not be useable for a while, and consideration is being given again to using LITABBY/1 as a base for photographic surveillance of the Polish Legation. No photographic site is available, or under consideration, for the Yugoslav Embassy.

3. As of 30 June, then, the situation is as follows:

a. Czech Embassy: Daily photographic and telephone coverage, augmented by a considerable quantity of information from LIPIRE air passenger manifests, visa requests submitted to the U.S. Embassy, and LIMAT mail intercepts.

b. Polish Legation: No photographic coverage. Telephone coverage limited to the taps on the BEKIER and ADAMOWICZ lines. Relatively slight information from visa requests, since there are fewer Poles than Czechs in Mexico City, and also because the Poles are apparently unable to take home leave. Little information from LIPIRE air passenger manifests, for the same reasons. Rather more information from LIMAT.

c. Yugoslav Embassy: Telephone but no photographic coverage. Very little information from visa requests or from LIPIRE. LIMAT is a good source of information, but mostly on commercial topics.

d. Other EE Targets: No information worth mentioning, because of the lack of any other diplomatic installations. LIPIRE submits occasional reports on the arrival and departure of individual EE satellite personalities.

Secret

4. Processing the source material listed above absorbs a large part of NISLEY's time. LIBRIFORM handles the translation of the Czech material, and BESMOOTH of the Polish material. There is no translator for the Yugoslav mail and telephone intercepts. NISLEY listens to the Spanish conversations on the Yugoslav reels, and attempts an occasional translation of the more interesting bits of Serbo-Croat correspondence with the aid of the dictionary kindly supplied by Headquarters. NISLEY meets BESMOOTH every day to pick up the Polish translations. LIBRIFORM and SPATHAR are still being met daily by Harvey P. DENENHOLZ (P); after his PCS departure in July this will become NISLEY's responsibility, as will the handling of LIMITATIONs 4 and 5, LIFEBLOOD, LINILE and LIBALSA.

5. Beside the daily scanning of source material, one of the month's more important activities was the updating of the table of organization of the Czech Embassy. This has now been completed. Photographs of departed Czech personnel were forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15081, 15106, and 15120. Of the sixty Czechs (including wives, but not children) known to be stationed in Mexico City, photographs are lacking for twenty. SPATHAR has photographed about the same number of unidentified people repeatedly entering the Czech Embassy; copies of these photos are being given to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, and it is expected that one by one these people will be followed home and identified.

6. The Polish table of organization had already been determined, with the possible exception of one newcomer to the Polish Commercial Office who has not yet been completely identified, and there were no changes during the month. It is believed that most of the Yugoslavs have been identified.

7. The process of accumulating information on Czech personnel has not yet gone far enough for the Station to pick one or two likely targets for concentrated attention. A newcomer, positively identified as a Czech Intelligence officer, arrived on 30 June and will naturally receive all possible coverage. The Station received a proposal from Headquarters for special attention to be paid to Jaroslav VALENTA, the Commercial Attache; unfortunately, VALENTA had just departed on home leave, so action is being deferred until his return in August.

8. Among the Poles, concentrated attention is being paid to Aleksander BEKIER and Stanislaw ADAMOWICZ by means of telephone taps. The newly arrived Polish Intelligence officer will, if technically possible, receive the same coverage as soon as his permanent address is determined, although this will probably mean dropping the BEKIER line. Physical surveillance was run on Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI and Henryk POTASZ during the month, the former being

an identified and the latter a suspected intelligence officer; in both cases the surveillance was dropped after the subject showed signs of becoming tail conscious. The ZIOLKOWSKI surveillance lasted several days and revealed a number of possible IS contacts which are now being followed up. The POTASZ surveillance was blown practically immediately.

9. File studies have now been completed and Target Personality Data Forms executed on all Poles except the custodial personnel, Henryk POTASZ (whose form is in the process of completion), and the three newcomers about whom little is yet known. As a result of this activity, Roman CZYZYCKI and Mieczyslaw WLODAREK have tentatively been selected as worthy of closer concentration, the former on a long-term basis and the latter on a short-term basis. CZYZYCKI is interesting because he is ambitious and apparently not intellectually committed to the regime, he is the close assistant of Aleksander BEKIER and hence has access to information of value, his entire family is with him, and he is young enough to be able to make a new life for himself if flight should become necessary. Attempts are now being made to develop a contact to him through one of his many acquaintances in the Mexican press.

10. WLODAREK is interesting mainly because he is Minister, and because he seems to be dissatisfied with his prospects. HMMA-15177 of 17 June transmitted information about a possible avenue of approach to him. Information received more recently disclosed that the doctor, who had been tentatively spotted as a means of access to Mrs. WLODAREK, is indeed anti-Communist but is also on unfriendly terms with Mrs. WLODAREK. ODACID personnel, who had been asked to cultivate WLODAREK at diplomatic functions, have reported that WLODAREK has not attended any at which they have been present. No likelihood is now foreseen of any means of contact to WLODAREK, and indications are that his recall may take place some time this summer.

11. An attempt early in June to recruit a source close to Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI failed when it was discovered that the individual did not have the access she had been believed to have. Details were sent to Headquarters in HMMA-15116 of 8 June.

12. Information on a possible source of operational intelligence on Czech personnel was obtained from LIKAYAK/2 and forwarded to Headquarters in HMMA-15082 of 3 June and HMMA-15199 of 22 June. The mail intercept on the Czech accommodation address has begun to function, but so far has produced nothing of value.

13. MEXI-5633 of 6 June and HMMA-15195 of 17 June transmitted information from and about BEFUNNY obtained from LIFEBLOOD.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~/[redacted]
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.	HMMA-15319 [redacted]1503
TO	: Chief, WH Division
INFO	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	50-6-32/3
FROM	: Chief of Station, Mexico City
DATE	13 July 1960
SUBJECT	0 - LIFEAT Monthly Report, May 1960
ACTION REQUIRED	- For your information.
REFERENCE(S):	

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

gck

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
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☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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AGP

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

During the month of May 1960, Project LIFEAT continued to provide excellent coverage of the activities of the official Soviet and Cuban installations in Mexico City, the Station's top priority targets. The following are specific, though necessarily selective, contributions made by LIFEAT through provision of exploitable leads and support to Mexico City Station.

1) The most outstanding single contribution of the LIMERICK phase of Project LIFEAT during the period of this monthly review was the providing of information to the responsible Case Officer which confirmed the validity of agent LITARDY-1. This double agent turned himself into ODENVY, and thus to KUBARK, during the latter part of the review period. LIFEAT/ LIMERICK provided data on the activities and Soviet contacts of LITARDY-1, thus enabling the case officer to adequately plan productive use of this new asset.

2) LIMERICK continued to provide Project LIMESA with support in the form of information on goods and services provided to the Soviets from the local economy. Of special interest was information on specific apartments which the Soviets were considering renting. LIMERICK also continued to provide valuable information on Soviet commercial activities which has been reported separately.

3) Also provided was information of a CE nature concerning specific assignments of personnel within the Soviet Embassy, advance travel plans of Soviet officials, and arrivals, departures, and addresses of Embassy staff members. The following are examples of this category of information:

a) Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN arrived 11 May 1960 and is probably the Intelligence Officer replacement for Yevgeniy LAPSHEV. The address of SHUBIN was also provided by LIFEAT.

b) Aleksandr BROVKIN was assigned duties as Assistant Cultural Officer to replace Vladimir NOVIKOV during the latter's home leave.

c) Valentin BAKULIN was appointed Soviet Film Officer in charge of distribution of Soviet films, including propaganda films.

d) Advance notice was given of the 20 May arrival of the Soviet delegation to the International Cotton Conference held in Mexico City, and noted that the delegation would be composed of Dmitriy MAITOV, Boris FIRSOV, Abdulla SULTANKHODZKAYEV, and Vladilyena TERESHCHINA.

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CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-177/71 [redacted]
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3) Advance information was provided on the following travel: Soviet Ambassador BAZYKIN to leave 21 June 1960 for home leave in the USSR; planned departure of Vladimir NOVIKOV, Cultural Officer, for home leave in the USSR and return to Mexico; departure for home leave 31 May 1960 of known RIS officer Colonel Dmitriy KUZNETSOV; that thirteen Soviet officials are returning to the USSR during the months of July and August 1960 with no indication that these are to be replaced (Five of these are known RIS officers; Yuriy CHELPANOV, Pavel KOVALEV, Yevgeniy LAPSHEV, Vladimir MAKOVKIN, and Grigori YEFREMOV).

4) Due to advance information provided through LIFEAT/LITMUS, the Station was able to cover a clandestine meeting of Alexandr BEKIER, Polish Counselor of Legation in Mexico, and provide identification of BEKIER's contact. Through coordination with MKCHARITY and the Station's KURIOT representative, both audio and photo surveillance of the meeting were arranged.

5) LIFEAT/LIERODE significantly supported the Station's efforts in the Cuban operations field by providing leads that lead to and assisted in the recruitment of agent LITALUS-3, a penetration of the Cuban Embassy who is to be handled by LITALUS-1. LIERODE is also utilized as a continuing check on the activities of the newly recruited agent.

6) The Station's CE priority has been supported through coverage of the phone used by PCM members Juan Luis CAMPOS Villalobos and Mario PEREZ Marin. This coverage has provided information of value concerning addresses, phone numbers, and contacts of other PCM members. It has also been employed as a cross-check of statements made by CAMPOS to Howard O. MOSCHIANO.

7) LIFEAT provided information on travel planned and accomplished by associates of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM) particularly that of Maria WICHER to Moscow, the return of Albert MALTZ to Mexico, and the planned travel of Noah SEBORER to Moscow in August.

b. Processing of Material

During the month of May 1960, the quantity of raw information processed was noticeably reduced, and thus the amount of positive intelligence derived was also reduced, due to the "outage" on certain of the most productive LIFEAT lines. Principally involved were the Soviet lines, including one week break on an Embassy line, three weeks on the Soviet Motion Picture Office line, and one week on the Soviet Commercial Office line. These "outages" were primarily due to the telephone company pulling the LIFEAT crosses, or the target telephone being out of order.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

No security problems arose that were not readily solved by the personnel concerned, nor did these jeopardize the operation.

e. Technical

The only technical problems encountered were those falling within the province of the telephone company, as noted in 1. b above, or the normal malfunctions encountered in the aging LIFEAT equipment. These last were repaired as rapidly as possible with the aid of the replacement parts recently forwarded by Headquarters. No major "outages" were due to LIFEAT originated technical problems.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines (outages as noted in 1. b above)
LITMUS	3 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines

g. Personnel

David M. WILSTED (ps) departed Mexico City on 21 May 1960 for home leave and Headquarters consultation of approximately two months duration. His duties as outside Case Officer and principal technician have been undertaken by Ralph B. RAFANELLI (ps) and LIFEUD-8.

2. a. During the month of May 1960, information from twenty-three LIFEAT reels on coverage of American Communists in Mexico were passed to the local ODENVY office for its information. During the period 10 May through 16 June LIFEAT processed this take as the ODENVY processor was on home leave. Twenty-six reels of LIENVOY coverage of Sam Brooks were also passed to the local ODENVY office under the guise of LIFEAT material.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during May 1960:

HMM-4921
HMM-4924
HMM-4943
HMM-4953 (via MEXI-5610)
HMM-4963
HMM-4964
HMM-4966
HMM-4967
HMM-4971
HMM-4972
HMM-4975 (via MEXI-5640)
HMM-4979 (via MEXI-5643)

HMMA-14942
HMMA-14950
HMMA-14956
HMMA-14969
HMMA-14991
HMMA-15004
HMMA-15040
HMMA-15049
HMMA-15055
HMMA-15053

MEXI-5662
MEXI-5615
MEXI-5593
MEXI-5586
MEXI-5575
MEXI-5566
MEXI-5521

c. Seven (7) memoranda were passed to ODACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of May 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ATE : 30 JUN 60

O : DIRECTOR

ROM : MEXICO CITY

CTION : C/WH 7

NFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2*

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

JUL 1 2139Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 19430

5813

DIR CITE MEXI 5813

RYBAT LIENVOY

REF DIR 35367 (OUT 89228)**

1. RE PARA 4, LIENVOY WILL COVER FIVE SOVIET AND TWO CZECH LINES WITH TAPES PROCESSED BY ZINSMEISTER AND LIBRIFORM. LIENVOY MONITORS WILL EXTRACT FROM SPANISH FOR RESUMEN WHAT IS CONSIDERED OF INTEREST LITENSOR. LIELEGANT TOLD WE WILL INFORM HIM OF PERTINENT INFO OBTAINED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS PROCESSING) OF SOVIET AND CZECH TEXT FOR PASSING LITENSOR. LIFEAT WILL COVER POLISH AND OTHER CURRENT TARGETS. FOR SECURITY REASONS CZECH LINES HAVE NOT BEEN COVERED BY LIFEAT FOR PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. RE PARA 5; (A) NO CURRENT PROBLEM RE EXPLOITATION LEADS SINCE LIELEGANT HAS EVINCED NO INTEREST THIS MATTER. (B) PERSONNEL UNIT C TERMINATED AND BASE CLOSED. VIEW LIENVOY LACK LANGUAGE AND EXPLOITATION CAPABILITY AND OUR ABILITY CONTROL WHAT IS PASSED (OSTENSIBLY FROM HQS), STATION SEES NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WILL POUCH DETAILS JUNE LIENVOY MONTHLY ACTIVITIES REPORT.

3. THIS DEVELOPMENT FORESEEN BY STATION SINCE LIENVOY BEGAN; NO INTENTION CUT DOWN ON LIFEAT (INDEPENDENT) OPS AND HAVE SUFFICIENT WORK FOR BOTH.

END OF MESSAGE

Lifeat/98

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

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NFO :

PAGE 2

IN 19430 MEXI 5813

IO INFO CITE

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT JMNET CABLES.

**CONCERNED PHONE TAPS AND LITENSOR OFFER RE OVERTHROW CASTRO.

~~SECRET~~

410

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 24 JUN 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 6 (MR HEYN, WH DIV NOTIFIED 1910 24 JUN)

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2

JUN 24 2226Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 16468

5786

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 5786

RYBAT LIENVOY LIFEAT JMNET

REF DIR 36367 (out 89228)*

1. RE PARA 6 REF, STATION HAS TAKEN ADEQUATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. LEFEAT COVERAGE CUT PRIOR LIENVOY ACTION. LIMERICK AND LITMUS COVERAGE TERMINATED 22 JUNE 1020 HOURS.

2. WILL REPORT SOONEST ON FUTURE HANDLING THESE PORTIONS LEFEAT AND LIVENVOY.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *SUGGESTED LIFEAT COVERAGE BE CUT ON LINES TO BE COVERED BY LIENVOY.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

8 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT: LIFEAT

1. During my recent visit to Mexico I had a good chance to go over many of the ins-and-outs of this project with the Case Officer and with other officers in the Station. At Station staff meeting I stated that reporting on CI material derived from the project was inadequate and COS appeared to go along with this view. The concensus I got from the Case Officers was that the SR Case Officer is not sufficiently alert to the need for reporting on the CI aspects of the matter and is limiting himself to strictly servicing SR Division matters. Various Case Officers cited instances to me of conversations pointing to new clandestine relationships or containing previously known clandestine relationships in the Soviet field which have not been reported. Owing to a lack of time, I was unable to examine the records myself, but I am inclined to accept those statements as true.

2. The Case Officer gave me a general run-down of the situation of the agents on this project and it appears that everything is running very well. He told me that in his new project outline, which will be up in a week or two, he is including some raises to some of the agents. He told me that on his last round of pay raises he had some difficulty here at headquarters. If any difficulty seems forthcoming this time, I should like to have the matter brought to my attention because, as you know, I feel very strongly on this matter and fought the same battles with headquarters for at least five years.

3. In speaking with the Case Officers on the Cuban side, as well as on the CI, it was apparent that LIFEAT remains probably the biggest single source of information available to the Mexico City Station and that every effort should be made to continue its smooth functioning. If this means a couple of hundred pesos increase to each agent semi-annually or annually, it does not seem to be too much of a strain and I do not see why we should have any trouble. When I compare the salaries of the base operators and processers on this project, especially considering the illegal position they are in, with those of relatively unproductive agents elsewhere in Mexico and in many other Stations, I cannot help but feel that we are buying a great deal for our money in this project.

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

cc: CI/OPS/WH (Mr. Brown)

~~SECRET~~

6 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

~~SECRET~~

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

Rene - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
Jose - does exchange connections.

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

a) Calero 39 - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) Juanacatlan 179 - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) Atlixco 47 - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) Tenanzingo - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) Aristoteles 30 -UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) Suderman & Horacio - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) Cuautla 131 - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

~~SECRET~~
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:
RID/

NOTE: In the absence of comments or indication of action taken, this cover sheet will be destroyed when the document is filed.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.				
2.				
3. AC/WH/3		27/5/60		7
4. MEXICO/Hqs			31 V	[illegible]
5. Burton				[illegible]
6. Hughes				[illegible]
7. Reports		1 June	1 June 1 June	mv
8. Br 4				ew
9. WH/FI		3 June	6 June	[illegible]
10. Tania C/OPS/WH			7 June 60	[illegible]
11.			9 JUN 1960	
12. FI/D/Bray		13 Jun	13 Jun	CS
13. SR/[illegible] 1701		15 JUN 1960	16 JUN 1960	eB
14.				
15.				
16. Remove from Project [illegible] CS Classification: [illegible] 33/3 JOB # [illegible]				
17. Box: [illegible] Fold:				
18. CH/[illegible]				
19.				
20. ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]L				

COMMENTS

DESENSITIZED
per CSM 43-43

[redacted]

Copy [illegible]

RECORD COPY

#4 [illegible]

4 to 9 & 10: This is the first expanded Monthly Report since my visit to [illegible] Station. The inclusion of this section on Exploited Leads marks a signal improvement over former monthly reports.

~~[illegible]~~

nice

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[illegible] material
[illegible] be handcarried
[illegible]
[illegible] mail

file

2(3)

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE	~~ABSTRACT~~		FILE NUMBER
	~~INDEX~~		[illegible]

DATE MICROFILMED	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER
	[illegible]	[illegible]MA-14991

FORM 4-58 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

~~SECRET~~

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14991
[redacted]-1773

TO : Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
20 May 1960

SUBJECT - LIFEAT Monthly Report, April 1960

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RE "X" (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, section V, paragraph 2 (d) (1):

a. Exploitation of Leads

1) The LIMERICK phase of the LIFEAT operation is able continuously to provide the interested case officers with background personality information on the members of the Soviet Embassy staff, as well as travel information on Soviet officials and diplomatic couriers. During the month of April 1960, this type of information was exploited for the following:

a) Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, First Secretary, will be the replacement for Vladimir Georgiyevich NOVIKOV as Cultural Officer when the latter leaves for the USSR on 29 May 1960. He will also act as the Soviet Ambassador's executive secretary during the home leave of Vladimir Ivanovich CHERNYSHEV. CHERNYSHEV departed for leave on 17 April.

b) Nikolai ZHOUGANOV was the replacement for Anatoliy Konstantinovich YEMELYANOV, Commercial Office employee who works "upstairs" in the Chancellery rather than in the Commercial Office. This indicated that ZHOUGANOV may be a code clerk.

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c) Confirmation that four aliens are employed in the Chancery as teachers, one of whom teaches English.

d) Indications of increased contact between the Soviet and Cuban officials as noted in the travel of Soviet officers to Havana and conversations between the Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Ambassador indicating an announcement of importance was to be made on 8 May, possibly concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USSR.

e) Through the review of past LIFEAT traffic and the direct statements of the Soviet Embassy personnel in discussions of "duty rosters", it has been determined that a reduction in the Embassy staff is in progress. Future LIFEAT information should disclose whether this reduction is of a permanent or temporary nature.

f) Advance travel notice on Soviets such as CHERNYSHEV, NOVIKOV, Semeon FEDOROV, and couriers Vladimir BYKOV and Valentin KUZNETSOV.

LIFEAT/LIMERICK also revealed a serious rift which has developed between the Soviet Commercial Office and one of its primary commercial contacts, Mony DESWAAN, over the latter's failure to pay the Soviets for two shipments of Russian farm tractors for which DESWAAN has received payment from the Mexican Government, the ultimate purchaser. LIFEAT indicates DESWAAN has made himself unavailable to the Soviets since two of his checks have "bounced" for lacks of funds. LIFEAT further noted that the Soviets are concerned over reports that DESWAAN is planning an early summer trip to Europe with his entire family.

LIMERICK provided valuable support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation by furnishing detailed information on the DeSwaan and Esteve Brothers commercial dealings with the Soviets. It was also employed as a security device after the conclusion of the above operation.

Leads were provided on two properties of interest to the Soviets, Calle Mazatlan #208 and Calle Chilpancingo #13, which were a valuable contribution to the LIMESA Project.

II) LIFEAT/LITMUS was the source of information on the arrival in and departure from Mexico City of Polish officials Jozef WINEWICZ, former Polish Ambassador to Washington, and Boleslaw JELEN.

III) LIFEAT/LIERODE continued to provide excellent operational leads concerning Cuban and exile operations. Of particular note was the ability of Station Mexico to warn an ODACID officer of a possible "walk-in" provocation attempt by an agent of the Cuban Embassy. LIERODE also provided information on four American citizens who entered Mexico on their way to Honduras to join an anti-Somoza revolutionary attempt.

b. Processing of Material

Although the LIFEAT project must be considered primarily a Station support project, an effort to further exploit LIFEAT for positive intelligence has been made by assigning the assistant case officer the task of coordinating the efforts of the appropriate area case officers and the Station reports officer in matters concerning LIFEAT produced information. Although this system has been tested only during the month of April, it is hoped that it will prove of value in increasing the positive intelligence take from LIFEAT provided material.

No change was made in the manner of processing the raw LIFEAT reels during the month of April.

c. Liaison

As in the past, the only liaison connected with Project LIFEAT is in passing reels from coverage of the American Communists in Mexico to ODENVY for their processing. No other liaison is considered necessary or desireable.

d. Security

LIFEAT/LIVERY continued to remain out of operation due to the extensive telephone company installation and renovation work being carried on in the vicinity of the LIVERY basehouse. No definite date can be given for the completion of the telephone company work.

e. Technical

No change.

f. Coverage

LIMERICK	5 lines	
LITMUS	2 lines	
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines	(one terminated 27 April due to lack of value.)
American Communists	1 line	
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines	(one installed 1 April, and one installed 25 April.)

g. Personnel

No change.

2. a. During the month of April 1960, twenty-two (22) reels were passed to the local ODENVY office from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of American Communist Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material until 12 April at which time LIENVOY coverage of BROOKS was discontinued.

b. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during the month of April 1960:

HMM-4855
HMM-4857
HMM-4858
HMM-4876
HMM-4877
HMM-4879
HMM-4891
HMM-4892
HMM-4893
HMM-4895
HMM-4904 (via MEXI-5485)
HMM-4907 (via MEXI-5490)
HMM-4918 (via MEXI-5507)
HMM-4919 (via MEXI-5508)

HMMA-14762
HMMA-14843
HMMA-14855
HMMA-14885
HMMA-14892

MEXI-5373
MEXI-5424
MEXI-5435
MEXI-5441
MEXI-5451
MEXI-5453
MEXI-5463
MEXI-5467
MEXI-5494
MEXI-5496

c. Eleven (11) memoranda were passed to CDACID and ten (10) to ODENVY during the month of April 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 May 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14856
[redacted]1764

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-6-32/3

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
20 April 1960

SUBJECT
O - LIFEAT Monthly Report - March 1960

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with CSHB-F 52-6-1, Section V, paragraph 2 (d) (l):

a. Exploitation of Leads.

LIMERICK continues to be extremely useful in providing background information on Soviet personalities for the SR case officer as well as movement reports on these personalities which are of interest to the local ODACID chief. The LIMERICK phase of LIFEAT also provided support to the Station's AEIMPULSE operation.

LITMUS provided information concerning the impending transfer of Polish Consul Tadeusz ZIOLKOWSKI.

LIERODE has provided important information enabling the Station to follow closely the defection of LITAG-1 as well as the ensuing reaction in the target establishment, and was employed as a security device and information media in the preparations for the defection of LITAINT-1.

LIFEAT provided excellent leads on Nicaraguan exile activities while also providing an independent check on agent LITANGO-1.

LIFEAT was employed for protective security in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2 until 18 March, at which time it was decided that LIVESTOCK-2 no longer posed a threat to the Station's security.

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b. Processing of Material

No changes have been made in the processing of either LIFEAT reels or LIFEAT derived intelligence.

c. Liaison

No change.

d. Security

LIVERY remained out of operation due to the extensive telephone company renovation work being carried on in the vacinity of the LIVERY basehouse.

e. Technical

No change.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # 73-125/77
Box: 30 Fold: 2

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

50-6-32/3

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | ~~SECRET~~/[redacted] | HMMA-14856 [redacted] 1764

f. **Coverage**

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line
Targets of Opportunity	3 lines (two of these lines terminated mid-March, and one terminate 3 March.)

g. **Personnel**

No change.

2. a) During March 1960, twenty-seven (27) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS continued to be passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

b) The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA-14618
HMMA-14624
HMMA-14672
HMMA-14677
HMMA-14683
HMMA-14700
HMMA-14711
HMMA-14718
HMMA-14719
HMMA-14731

HMM-4803
HMM-4836
HMM-4843
HMM-4849

MEXI-5267
MEXI-5275
MEXI-5283
MEXI-5287
MEXI-5296
MEXI-5332
MEXI-5353
MEXI-5361
MEXI-5367

Twenty-one (21) memoranda were passed to ODACID and one (1) to ODENVY during the month of March 1960 which were based on LIFEAT acquired information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

19 April 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-14688
[redacted] 1756

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
INFO

Chief, WH Division

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE
16 March 1960

SUBJECT

LIFEAT Monthly Report - February 1960

ACTION REQUIRED

Information only.

REFERENCE(S)

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

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1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3 (c) (2):

a. Processing of information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

b. Exploitation of leads

LIMERICK provided the identitites of several contacts of RIS officer, Alexander PRIKHODKO. This coverage also revealed the possible sale of property located near the Soviet Embassy to the Soviets. LIMERICK further provided coverage of the activities of suspect RIS agent, Gabriel UKAEGBU. LIMERICK also provided support for the AEIMPULSE operation.

LIFEAT continued to be employed as a protective security aid in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has provided an independent check on agent LITANGO-1, and coverage of Cuban intelligence operations. LIERODE also provided a lead on Santiago GARCES Arroyo, who is to establish a Cuban secret service.

c. Liaison

No change

d. Security

LIVERY continued to be out of operation due to telephone company renovation work in the vicinity of the LIVERY base house.

e. Technical

No new developments.

f. Personnel and Administration

Jeremy L. NIARCOS (p) reported to Mexico City Station to replace Gene F. BRADDOCK (p) as assistant case officer in the LIFEAT operation.

Remove from Project CDIMANGE
CS Classification: 50-6-33/2
JOB # 75-175/77
Box: 2 Fold: 2

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14688 [redacted]1756

g. During February 1960, the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	5 lines
American Communists	1 line (coverage was resumed on 23 February)
Targets of Opportunity	1 line

2. During February 1960, seven (7) reels were passed to ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist residing in Mexico City, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches, and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during the month of February 1960:

HMMA	MEXI	HMM
14448	5076	4761
14457	5079	4762
14458	5086	4768
14468	5088	4771
14504	5094	4790
14511	5155	
14512	5158	
14514	5160	
14517	5213	
14571	5221	

Twenty-three memoranda were passed to ODACID and six to ODENVY during February 1960 which were based on LIFEAT produced information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

15 March 1960

Distribution:
✓3 - WHD
2 - Files

50-6-32/7

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [redacted]-1751

TO Chief, WHD

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50-6-32/3

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE 2 March 1960

DESENSITIZED per CSH 43-43

SUBJECT C Operational
LIFEAT Monthly Report - January 1960

ACTION REQUIRED Information only

REFERENCE(S) HMMA-14403, 22 January 1960

RE: "X" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670 paragraph 3(c)(2):

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIFEAT continues to be utilized as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIVERY provided several useful leads for the Case Officer.

LITMUS provided information enabling the Station to identify a safehouse presently used by the Polish IS.

LIERODE continues to be a major source of information regarding exile activities.

LIMERICK material provided information on Soviet communications which was forwarded to HQS for KUTUBE D processing.

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

LIVERY lines were suspended due to the activity of telephone company personnel involved in the installation of new cables in the area contiguous to the LIVERY basehouse. No other security problems were encountered.

E. Technical

No new developments.

F. Personnel and Administration

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During the month of January 1960 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines(off for security reasons for a part of the month)
LIERODE and related lines	? lines(one discontinued during this period)
American Communists	1 line(off on 13 January)

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Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: [illegible]
JOB # 13-175/77
Box: 2 Fold: 3

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

CS COPY

50-6-32/3

Eleven reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in addition to which reels from LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were also passed to ODENVY for processing as being LIFEAT material.

2. The following reports, dispatches, cables and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT material during January 1960:

MEXI-4898 MEXI-4912 MEXI-4913 MEXI-4915 MEXI-4917
MEXI-4919 MEXI-4926 MEXI-4938 MEXI-4939 MEXI-4941
MEXI-4954 MEXI-4960 MEXI-4990 MEXI-5004 MEXI-5021
MEXI-5028 MEXI-5031
HMMA-14355 HMMA-14372 HMMA-14392 HMMA-14393 HMMA-14394
HMMA-14403 HMMA-14411 HMMA-14415 HMMA-14417 HMMA-14421
HMMA-14317 HMMA-14418 HMMA-14422 HMMA-14425 HMMA-14433
HMMA-14436 HMMA-14444 HMMA-14448
HMM-4703 HMM-4704 HMM-4706 HMM-4707 HMM-4710
HMM-4711 HMM-4712 HMM-4718 HMM-4724 HMM-4726
HMM-4729 HMM-4737 HMM-4742

During the month of January 1960, nineteen memoranda were passed to ODACID, five to ODENVY and two each to ODIBEX, ODUNIT and ODOATH attaches which were based on LIFEAT information.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

26 February 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

5-6-32/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMM-A-14303
[redacted]-1741

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 50-6-32/3

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-43

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

DATE: 22 January 1960

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Monthly Report - December 1959

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only

RE: "43" - CHECK "X" ONE:
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): HMM A-14253, 15 Dec. 1959

1. The following report is submitted in accordance with FN 52-670, paragraph 3(c)(2):

A. Processing of Information

No changes have been made in the manner of processing LIFEAT material.

B. Exploitation of Leads

LIMERICK provided information for Station action and also through live-monitoring gave protection to personnel involved in the activity with the LUNIK.

LIFEAT is still being used as a protective security measure in connection with the dismissal of LIVESTOCK-2.

LIERODE has revealed the identities of Cuban agents on the outside, i.e., in an unofficial position.

LIVERY provided the CO with information used in the KACHTIK Operation. (HMM-A-14317, RYBAT-1300, 13 Jan. 1960.)

C. Liaison

No change.

D. Security

No problems encountered which have not been readily resolved by the personnel involved.

E. Technical

Nothing new to report.

F. Personnel and Administrative

No change.

G. Miscellaneous

During December 1959 the following lines were in operation:

LIMERICK	5 lines
LITMUS	2 lines
LIVERY	2 lines
LIERODE and related lines	6 lines
Targets of Opportunity	2 lines
American Communists	1 line

AN X
AB X
TN
PS
BX
ES NPD
FI
RD

Remove from Project: ODRANGE
CS Classification: 50-6-32/3
JOB # 73-125/77
Box: 32 Fold: 6

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~/[redacted]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO 1

50-6-32/3

2. During December 1959 thirty-one(31) reels were given ODENVY from LIFEAT coverage of American Communists in Mexico. Reels from the LIENVOY coverage of Sam BROOKS, American Communist, were passed to ODENVY as LIFEAT material for their processing.

3. The following reports, cables, information dispatches and memoranda were based wholly or in part on LIFEAT during December 1959:

HMM-A-14191
HMM-4667
HMM-4678
MEXI-4734
MEXI-4792
MEXI-4844
HMM-4672
HMM-4649
MEXI-4735
MEXI-4814
HMM-4691
HMM-4640
MEXI-4773
MEXI-4831
HMM-4712
MEXI-4789
MEXI-4842

Fifteen memoranda were passed to ODACID and five to ODENVY during December 1959 which were based on LIFEAT provided information.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

20 Jan. 1960

Distribution:

3 - HQS

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: [redacted] Vol I
Development + Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO
ROOM: 5C 54

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
24 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/21/78		[illegible]	

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SECRET

3-62 OP-61 (3-76)

(7-13)

E

RETIRED

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LDDEGHAN Vol I
Development + Plans

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Jan 1965 - 2 Oct 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
24 MAY 78		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/21/78		[illegible]	Kark

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

3-62 OP-61 (3-70)

RETIRED

(7-13)

Project Renewal Requests

for
LIONION

1 of 4

(7-13)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

TO : (Station/Base)
MEXICO CITY

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	122/1

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDAFGHAN Development & Plans

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☒	RETAIN IP/ARD	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)
~~[illegible]~~:

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
MEXI

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION

☐	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

VERIFIED

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Palmer, #630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE
1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER
50 06 122/1

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
MFG 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG (SC OR RID SECTION CHIEF)

COMPONENT - RID/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/01

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The KDAFGHAN Project was officially terminated on 22 September 1972. The reason for termination was VWBLANKET contamination.

Edward K. LAUBOCKER

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

E2, IMPDET
CL BY: 055272

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-19157

DATE
2 OCT 1972

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Perry Smith	md (27 Sept 72)	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/FI	27 Sept 72	
WH/Plans		

AN
AB
IN
PS
BX
DES | RFD
FI

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-69
(40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

20 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Project KDAFGHAN

1. Project KDAFGHAN, approved for FY 72 and FY 73 in the amount of $11,950 each year, covered Mexico City Station's observation post targetted against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico. OP operators KDAFGHAN-1 and his dependent mother KDAFGHAN-2, Cuban exiles resident in Mexico since 1960, were the only human assets in the project.

2. As a result of the JMYAK damage assessment and other security considerations it was decided that the project should be terminated and the agents resettled in another country. DIRECTOR 285255 amended the project for FY 72 to a total of $20,950 to provide for the termination and resettlement of the agents. The agents were terminated in August 72 and are now being resettled in Spain. DIRECTOR 300167 concurred in terminating the project as of 31 August 72.

3. In view of the developments in paragraph 2, above, WH/FI recommends approval of this termination request.

Robert D. Wiecha
C/WH/FI

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: KDAFGHAN

1 of 4

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI/FC	CA
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere	
AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico	
RENEWAL FY 19	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: John Davis	DATE: 25 Aug 72
XX TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: 3E04 · BUILDING: Hqs · TEL. EXT.	RED: 9424 · BLACK: 6924

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray	29 Aug 72	29 Aug 72		X
C/WH/COG	✓ Lawrence Sternfield Orville Battle	30 AUG 1972	31/8/72		X
C/WH/B&F	John T. Boeck J Boeck	31 AUG. 72	1 Sept 72		
C/WH/SS	✓ Richard B. Wright		1 Sept 72		
C/WH/FI	Robert D. Wiecha RWiecha	Sept 21		✓	
C/WH/Plans	John H. Wilson John H. Wilson	21 SEP 1972			✓

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
		$	19	$
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD		22/9/7

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

SECRET

25 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Project KDAFGHAN Termination

1. A request for termination action is contained in paragraph four, herein.

2. Project KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation, and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations. The KDAFGHAN project encompasses two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962.

3. While this project may be of some value to the FBI (FBI compares KDAFGHAN photographs with the photographs of known leaders of extremist groups in the U.S. as well as with photographs of persons who are subjects of identification orders prepared on badly wanted fugitives in the U.S.), it is of little value, as presently constituted, to Mexico City Station. There are other means of obtaining photographs of PCS and TDY Cuban personnel.

4. In early 1972 the Station mounted a thorough CI review of all Cuban operations in an attempt to improve their overall security. Although KDAFGHAN-1 passed the SGSWIRL with no apparent deception, his Cuban exile status, the long period of time he has been operating his OP site in close proximity to the Cuban Embassy, and the potential (perhaps immediate) danger presented by his and KDAFGHAN-2's Cuban relatives made

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 055272
WN-SISM

SECRET

it clear that the agents should be terminated. In view of the aforementioned, as well as security considerations in the JMYAK case, WH/1 requests approval to terminate this project effective 31 July 1972. In order to meet termination commitments, project KDAFGHAN was amended on 30 June 1972 by DIRECTOR 285255 in the amount of $9,000, increasing the project's authorization from $11,950 to $20,950 for FY 1972. KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2 were terminated on 1 August 1972. There were no security incidents during the termination.

John C. Murray
C/WH/1
/for

Murray:md

1972

TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FILE IN CS FILE NO ________

FILE VR DDO, DDP, C/FI, D/SECUR, C/EUR, OGC

"Eyes Only"

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 285255

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPAT PLUMYAK

REF: MEXICO CITY 20301 (IN 649510)

1. IN ORDER PROVIDE FOR COSTS OF AGENT TERMINATIONS FOLLOWING PROJECTS ARE AMENDED FOR FY 72:

A.	KDTUCK	$8,451	(NEW TOTAL $ 48,451)
B.	KDULSTER	10,500	(NEW TOTAL 20,350)
C.	KDADORN	7,136	(NEW TOTAL 22,856)
D.	KDAFGHAN	9,000	(NEW TOTAL 20,850)
E.	KDFACTOR	9,844	(NEW TOTAL 28,844)
F.	KDACROBAT	7,728	(NEW TOTAL 44,187)
G.	KDVAULT	6,296	(NEW TOTAL 15,420)
H.	KDCALVERT	80,950	(NEW TOTAL 160,950)
I.	KDLADDER	1,040	(NEW TOTAL 17,552)
J.	KDABSCOND	3,150	(NEW TOTAL 24,785)
K.	KDADAGE	21,354	(NEW TOTAL 72,921)

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 28525

PAGE 2

L. KDRAIL 2,400 (NEW TOTAL 10,400)

M. KDPACIFY 1,800 (NEW TOTAL 7,800)

N. KDSALEM 8,800 (NEW TOTAL 31,200)

2. FILE: 50-6-128/1, 50-6-89/1, 50-6-90/1, 50-6-122/1, 50-6-74/1, 50-6-114/1, 50-6-58/1, 50-6-72/1, 50-6-131/1, 50-125-27/1, 50-6-144/1, 50-6-126/1, 50-6-110/1, 50-6-38/1. EX-2 APDIR WH-[illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

WH/SS

WH/B&F

C/MPS/BG

C/WH/C.P.

DDP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

T. Shackley
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project KDAFGHAN Renewal FY 1972 and FY 1973

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The Project KDAFGHAN Renewal for the period 1 July 1971 to 30 June 1973 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 29 June 1971 in the amount of $11,950 for FY 1972 and $11,950 for FY 1973.

Roger W. Bicego
Roger W. BICEGO

AB
FI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-18507

DATE
2 JUL 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

Internal Dist:
1 - RI
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/John Davis/kk/30 June 71			6955

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH 1	30-6-71	John C. Murray for

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM: KDAFGHAN

TYPE OF ACTION		FI	CI	CA
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL			
	AMENDMENT NO.			
X	RENEWAL FY 1973			
	EXTENSION			
	TERMINATION			

DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division

FIELD STATION: Mexico City

BRANCH: WH/1

DESK: WH/1

CASE OFFICER: John Davis John Davis

DATE: 16 June 71

ROOM NO.: 3 E 04

BUILDING: Hqs

TEL. EXT.: RED 9354 BLACK 6955

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WH/1	John C. Murray John C. Murray	16/6/71	16/6/71		
C/WH/COG	Lawrence Sternfield	17 June 71			✓
C/WH/B&F	for L. O. Healy	17 Jun 71	6-17-71		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		6-23-71		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		6/25/71		
C/WH/Plans	John R. Cassidy J Cassidy	28 JUN 1971	28 JUN 1971		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 71	30 June 73	$ 23,900	1972 1973	$11,950 $11,950

APPROVING AUTHORITY: C/WHD for

SIGNATURE:

DATE: 29 JUN 1971

FORM 5-69 848 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

KDAFGHAN - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1972 Cost: $11,950. FY 1973 Cost: $11,950.

KDAFGHAN Project Finance History

	APPROVED	OBLIGATED
FY 1970	$11,165	$11,165
FY 1971	$11,094	$11,094

Purpose

KDAFGHAN is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The objectives of the project are to furnish photographic coverage of the Cuban installation during daylight hours, to assist the Station in compiling dossiers on officials of the installation and to fulfill various requirements in support of other Station Cuban operations.

Description

The KDAFGHAN Project continues to encompass two assets, KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2, who have been associated with the project since 1962. Both agents continue to furnish information on a timely basis on the personalities and activities of the Cuban target. A description of the individual assets is set forth below:

a. KDAFGHAN-1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the KDAFGHAN Project since 1962. KDAFGHAN-1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing and mounting is processed by KDAFGHAN-1.

b. KDAFGHAN-2 (201-305604): KDAFGHAN-2 is the mother of KDAFGHAN-1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. KDAFGHAN-2 acts as KDAFGHAN-1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the basehouse.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Changes

The only major change during the project year was the installation of a TV monitor/robot camera combination during October 1970, the month designated as "Cuban month." This added coverage contributed to the compilation of target studies on several Cuban officials. These studies will be used as a starting point for future operations, namely the recruitment/defection of these officials.

Accomplishments

1. The main value of the production of the KDAFGHAN Project has been in establishing the pattern of various Cuban Embassy employees. The monitoring has also revealed which automobiles the various employees usually drive. Photographic coverage of the visitors to the main gate of the Cuban Embassy and logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel have proved very useful in identifying new Cuban PCS employees in Mexico. Normally the Station has been able to match movements of new and old employees during the initial period when duties and contacts were being turned over to the new employees and so identify their duties. KDAFGHAN has provided current photographs of TDY and transiting Cuban officials and Headquarters has often provided positive identifications of these persons. Norberto Hernandez, a DGI headquarters officer visiting Mexico, was identified in this way.

2. The Station utilizes KDAFGHAN photographic coverage and logs to verify the visits of Station assets to the Cuban Embassy.

3. KDAFGHAN also provides coverage of what appears to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy main gate. In the case of Americans who arrive in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate number, car description, and sterile copies of photographs are given to the FBI for identification. A significant result of the KDAFGHAN operation included a photographic of a specific individual - an old FBI target - who had been seen visiting the Cuban installation.

4. KDAFGHAN also provided useful coverage for the KDACOUSTIC-3 operation, an operation aimed at the recruitment or defection of a DGI officer. This coverage enabled the Station to determine KDACOUSTIC-3's movements, an important factor in timing the calls and visits of our access agents. This use of the operation should prove extremely valuable during the coming year since a more aggressive recruitment program against the Cuban target is planned.

Problems and Security

No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. Gerald D. FAHLANGER continues to be the Case Officer and handler of KDAFGHAN-1. FAHLANGER has met and could continue to meet KDAFGHAN-2 in an emergency. The alternate Case Officer is Terence D. SISTONE who meets KDAFGHAN-1 when FAHLANGER is not available. Both Case Officers are known to the assets in alias, and both meet KDAFGHAN-1 in a safehouse. During February 1971 the safehouse was changed in compliance with normal operational security. Meetings are generally held once a week. More frequent contact can be made by telephone. In an emergency, anyone can call KDAFGHAN-1 at his home and say they are a friend of "Pepe Simon." KDAFGHAN-1 will reply "I haven't seen him since last Christmas." KDAFGHAN-1 speaks English.

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

The Station is constantly examining the possibility of an audio installation at the main gate of the Cuban Embassy. A successful audio device would serve, in most cases, to identify the individuals who are photographed by KDAFGHAN-1 since they normally identify themselves to the gate house attendant. There are a few Station assets who have occasional access to the gate house, and it is conceivable that one of them could place a quick plant device, provided security conditions are favorable. The Station currently has under consideration a recruitment effort against a lower level employee of the Cuban Embassy who would be of tremendous help in such an operation.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for FY 1972 in the amount of $11,950 and FY 1973 in the amount of $11,950.

2. Source of Funds: Project KDAFGHAN is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's Operating Program in the amount of $10,844 for FY 1972 and $10,844 for FY 1973. The additional Funds required are to be absorbed from within the WH Division allocation.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current, and next fiscal years:

	FY 1971 Obligations (Estimated)	FY 1972 Request	FY 1973 Projection	FY 1974 Projection
KDAFGHAN-1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 5,088*	$ 5,088	$ 5,088
KDAFGHAN-2 Salary	1,920	2,112*	2,112	2,112
Christmas Bonus	560	600*	600*	600
KDAFGHAN Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
KDAFGHAN Safehouse (for Station meetings with KDAFGHAN-1)	864	1,200	1,200	1,200
Utilities for Safehouse and Basehouse	500	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (film, paper, chemicals, stationary)	1,250	1,250	1,250	1,250
TOTALS	$11,094	$11,950	$11,950	$11,950

*Increases reflect the "cost-of-living" granted effective 1 January 1971.

4. Foreign Currency: There are no special requirements for foreign currency.

5. Commitments: Upon termination, the agents will be paid a termination bonus not to exceed three month's salary.

6. Funding: Case officers pay the assets directly. The funds are accounted for with end receipts obtained from the assets. KDAFGHAN-1 has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accountability: All funds are accounted for by receipts and/or certifications as required by Agency regulations.

Annexes:

None.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project LIONION Renewal FY 1971

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Project LIONION Renewal for FY 1971 was approved by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division on 26 June 1970 in the amount of $11,094. A copy of the Renewal is being forwarded by split transmission.

Douglas F. TASSELL

Attachments:
- A) Left Side h/w
- B) Center u/s/c via split transmission
- C) Right Side u/s/c via split transmission

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w & u/s/c via split transmission

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-17977	1 JUL 1970 30 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

AN NS
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DES ~~NFD~~
~~FI~~
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Scott Holloway	nh	6924

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		John C. Murray

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MFG. 11-68

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION	PROJECT CRYPTONYM LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X	F I/C ☐ CA ☐
NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division	
AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
X RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH One	DESK
EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Fred Kravcov	DATE 24 June 70
TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E04	BUILDING Hqs — TEL. EXT. RED 9041 BLACK 6954

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Charles M. Bounds	24 June	24 June		
AC/WH/B&F	Wyatt B. Thompson	6/24	6/25		
C/WH/SS	Richard B. Wright		6-25-70		✓
C/WH/FI	Richard S. Welch		26/6/70		
C/WH/Plans	Robert B. Moore Robert B. Moore	26 JUN 1970	6/26		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

(Type in Organizational Element and Name Below Only When Concurrence Obtained by Originating Element.)

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL FUNDS AUTHORIZATION
1 July 1970	30 June 1971	$ 11,094	1970	$ 11,094
			19	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	J.Hrvtn	26 JUN 1970

FORM 5-69 648 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(5)

LIONION - Mexico City, Mexico - FI/CI Support Project Targetted Against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. FY 1971 Cost $11,094.

	Approved	Obligated
1966	$10,718	$ 9,142
1967	11,328	11,590
1968	11,466	9,726
1969	11,258	10,803
1970	11,994	10,844 (Estimated)

Purpose:

The LIONION Project provides the Mexico City Station with fixed, selective photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. It is designed to provide information in support of Priority A, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the current Operating Directive, that is, the Cuban target present in Mexico and the support rendered by Cubans in Mexico to exile and other leftist groups in Mexico.

Description:

1. The LIONION Project currently encompasses two agents, LIONION/1 and LIONION/2, a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound, and a safehouse for meetings with Station Case Officers. The two agents furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrance to the Cuban Embassy. In addition, on a spot basis, photographic coverage and visual surveillance of the Cuban Consulate entrance is possible. The agents also act as dispatchers for the unilateral LIEMBRACE surveillance team when the LIEMBRACE team is being used against Cuban target individuals. A description of the individual assets is set forth below.

2. LIONION/1 (201-288248): A Cuban lawyer in exile in Mexico who left Cuba in 1960. He has been the principal agent of the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/1's cover is that of a translator and would-be writer. Family holdings in

Tampa, Florida, inherited from his deceased father also provide financial backstopping. LIONION/1 received his "immigrado" (permanent immigrant) status in 1965 and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. All photographic coverage of the main Embassy gate through final printing, cropping, and mounting is processed by LIONION/1. LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 maintain a log which indicates when a photograph was taken, and pertinent identifying data. License numbers of cars used by various Cuban Embassy personnel are recorded as well as license numbers of cars of unidentified persons visiting the Cuban Embassy.

3. LIONION/2 (201-305604): Mother of LIONION/1. Her cover is that of a dependent mother. As with LIONION/1, she has "immigrado" status and has been associated with the LIONION Project since 1962. LIONION/2 acts as LIONION/1's assistant and fill-in whenever he is away from the LIONION basehouse.

Changes:

During the project year, the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance was discontinued. Little or no use was being made of the product from this camera. One reason for limited use was that there was no real way to readily fix the time--or the day-- a particular photo was taken. There were no other significant changes in the project during FY 1970.

Accomplishments:

1. The LIONION production for FY 1970 consisted almost entirely of photographic coverage of visitors to the Cuban Embassy main entrance and of logs of the movement of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors. This proved very useful in identifying new Cuban Embassy PCS employees in Mexico. The monitoring also revealed which cars the various employees usually drove.

2. LIONION also took photographs of what appeared to be American visitors to the Cuban Embassy front gate. In the case of Americans who arrived in automobiles bearing U.S. license plates, the license plate numbers, car descriptions, and sterile copies of photographs were given to LNERGO for identification.

3. The Station also used the LIONION photographic coverage and log to check on the reports of Mexican and other JKLANCE assets who claimed to have visited the Cuban Embassy. In the case of some assets, LIONION/1 was given a photograph of the agent and told to be particularly alert at certain times of certain days to confirm the agent's entry and exit. This proved particularly useful in checking AVDIME/1's story of contact with the Cubans. It also confirmed LIRELIC/1's visit to the Cuban Embassy at an early stage in Station recontact with LIRELIC/1.

Problems:

1. No agent control or operational problems have been reported. Neither were there any security problems encountered during the period. LIONION/1 was met in a safehouse on an average of once per week by Andrew E. PELLEMENT, in alias. Following PELLEMENT's departure in late May, Gerald D. FAHLANGER took over the responsibility for the LIONION Project. FAHLANGER, in alias, meets LIONION/1 approximately once per week. In January 1970, the Station had LIONION/1 change the safehouse used for meetings with Station officers. He signed a one-year lease on the new apartment, in alias. LIONION/1 uses the apartment on weekends and evenings to lend credence to the cover story he used in renting; i.e., that he lives out-of-town and maintains this small apartment in Mexico City for use during his frequent visits.

2. Station visits to the LIONION basehouse were limited to three during the reporting period. These were made during non-daylight hours. LIONION/1 picked up the Station officer away from the LIONION basehouse area and drove the officer to the basehouse in LIONION/1's own car. The basehouse has a driveway off the street entrance-way which facilitates entry during non-daylight hours.

3. During the Project Year, the pulse camera and the electronic equipment used with the LISAMPAN operations were removed from the basehouse, thus reducing the amount of compromising equipment in the basehouse.

Coordination:

The Ambassador is aware of our efforts against the Cuban target in general. He has not been specifically briefed on this operation.

Future Plans:

1. The Station is re-examining the various points of view which the LIONION basehouse provides of the Cuban Embassy complex in order to determine what steps can be taken to improve the usefulness of the LIONION product. For instance, from the window in the room where the pulse camera previously was installed, an excellent view can be had of the Cuban Embassy garden and the walkways between the three Cuban Embassy buildings--as well as the Consulate. The Station plans to have LIONION/1, on a spot-check basis, observe the garden area. In this way, the Station hopes to update its information on the location of the various officers' offices, the general pattern of movement and activity, etc. This area will also be observed during the night to see if it can be determined which areas are being used for living quarters or offices.

2. It is also planned to assess LIONION/1's ability to observe and draw appropriate conclusions from his observations, and to write these up for the Station.

3. Depending on the need for Consulate coverage, the installation of closed circuit TV coverage of the Consulate entrance is being considered.

4. The Station is being queried as to emergency contact arrangements with LIONION/1.

Costs:

1. General: This renewal request is for the period 1 July 1970 through 30 June 1971 (FY 1971), in the amount of $11,094.

2. Source of Funds: Project LIONION is included in the Western Hemisphere Division's FY 1971 Operating Program in the amount of $10,000.

3. Project Budget: The following is a cost breakdown for the preceding, current and next fiscal years:

	FY 1970 Estimated Obligations	FY 1971 Request	FY 1972 Projection
LIONION/1 Salary	$ 4,800	$ 4,800	$ 4,800
LIONION/2 Salary	1,920	1,920	1,920
Christmas Bonuses	560	560	560
LIONION Basehouse Rent (Observation Post)	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse (for meeting with case officers)	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Miscellaneous Expenses (Film, paper, chemicals, etc.)	1,000	1,250	1,000
TOTALS	$10,844	$11,094	$10,844

4. Foreign Currency: There is no need for foreign currency which the Station cannot provide. There are no non-JKLANCE funds involved in this project.

5. Commitments: LIONION/1 and LIONION/2 receive, in addition to their regular salary, the equivalent of one month's salary as a Christmas bonus. LIONION/1 is reimbursed for operational expenses related to the project. In the event of termination, each agent will receive thirty days actual notice.

6. Funding: All funds are passed by the case officers during the safehouse meetings with LIONION/1 who receipts for the funds on the spot. The amount of funds used under this project are not enough to arouse the suspicion of LIONION/1 by the authorities should he be apprehended. He has sufficient private income to cover the JKLANCE funds he receives.

7. Accounting: All funds are accounted and certified for in accordance with JKLANCE regulations.

8. Annexes: None.

CMBOUNDS
WH/1/R
IT: 6924/9424
DATE: 8 September 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, TSD-6, FI-2

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CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO MEXICO CITY

LIONION

REF: MEXICO CITY 1132 (IN 19170)*

1. IN ORDER ASSIST HEADQUARTERS EVALUATION LIONION PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE WOULD APPRECIATE STATION ADVICE FOLLOWING:

A. IF NO VISITORS ENTERING LIRING MAIN GATE, DOES LIONION/1 AUTOMATICALLY SHIFT AND COVER LIRING CONSULATE EVEN THOUGH CONSULATE BEING COVERED BY PULSE CAMERA?

B. IF INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTS ENTER MAIN GATE AND THEN PROCEEDS TO CONSULATE, DOES LIONION/1 FOLLOW AND PHOTO ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE?

C. WHAT IS STATION'S ESTIMATE OF PERCENTAGE OF LIONION/1 COVERAGE OF INDIVIDUALS ENTERING AND DEPARTING CONSULATE? FROM PAST CORRESPONDENCE HEADQUARTERS HAS GAINED IMPRESSION LIONION/1 COVERS CONSULATE AS EFFECTIVELY AS PULSE CAMERA.

D. IS LIONION/1 STILL LOCATED SAME BASEHOUSE AS PULSE CAMERA?

mw

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WH/1	

50-6-122/1

08 Sep 69

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CONF: RECEIVED
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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR 36226

TO

2. FILE: 50-6-122/1.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Station advised presently obtains many pictures of LIRING Consulate visitors since most first time visitors try enter through main gate which primary LIONION photo target.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

CI/SO

Chelo M. Sturdi
pr AC/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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WH 8

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INFO:

FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6,

#203

S E C R E T 072247Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1132 MEXI

7 Aug 69 IN 16170

DIRECTOR

LIONION

1. IN ATTEMPT ELIMINATE MARGINAL OPS, STATION INTENDS TERMINATE LIONION-1 PULSE CAMERA COVERAGE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER UNLESS HQS INDICATES IT CONSIDERS PRODUCT OF SUFFICIENT VALUE TO WARRANT RETENTION. STATION PRESENTLY OBTAINS MANY PICTURES OF LIRING CONSULATE VISITORS SINCE MOST FIRST-TIME LIRING VISITORS TRY ENTER THROUGH MAIN GATE WHICH PRIMARY TARGET LIONION PHOTO COVERAGE. ALSO MANY CONSULATE VISITORS LATER PHOTOGRAPHED AT AIRPORT. IT NOT POSSIBLE HAVE LIONION-1 COVER BOTH ENTRANCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, BUT HE ABLE MOVE EQUIPMENT TO COVER CONSULATE IF NEED ARISES.

2. FILE 50-6-122/3.

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-37024, 25 April 1969

Project LIONION has been renewed for FY 1970 in the amount of $11,994, as forwarded by the Station.

Norris W. DAMICONE

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-17364

DATE
8 July 1969

11 JUL 1969

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

RI - 1
CHRONO - 1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/A1	Malone	cms	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC WH/1	8 Jul 69	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG. 11-66
(40)

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PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM
LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION		X FI/CI	CA	OTHER
	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division		
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City		
X	RENEWAL FY 1970	BRANCH One	DESK	
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER Al Malone	DATE 16 June 69	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 3E04	BUILDING Hqs.	TEL. EXT. RED 1973 BLACK 4167

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
AC/WH/1	Ernest J. Tsikerdanos Ernest J. Tsikerdanos	16/6/69	17/6/69	✓	
C/WH/B&F	Elliotte C. Want	6/17	6/17		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson GR Thompson	18 JUN 1969			
AC/WH/FI	David L. Smock David L. Smock	21 June 69		✓	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	23 JUN 1969	20 Jun		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 July 69	30 June 70	$ 11.994	1970	$11,994
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	JHnh	5 JUL 1969

FORM 12-64 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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16 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : LIONION Project Renewal Request

1. Approval is requested of the LIONION Project for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 (FY 1970) for $11,994. Funds are available.

2. Project LIONION is a support project which provides the Mexico City Station with fixed photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The surveillance is conducted by two indigenous agents located in a basehouse directly across from the Cuban compound. At times the principal agent also acts as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team. Information is radioed to the team concerning the departure of Cuban officials, thus allowing the team to remain a more discreet distance from the target.

3. As reflected in the attached Project Renewal, an audio device planted in the gatehouse of the compound could be monitored at the LIONION basehouse, aiding greatly in identifying visitors. Since the time the Station submitted the renewal, however, this device ceased to function along with the rest of the LISAMPAN devices. This installation was monitored through carrier current from the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse, also situated in front of the compound. Since the connection between the two basehouses was by carrier current only, and since the agents in each basehouse are unaware of the other's activity, a possible compromise of the LISAMPAN/LISASH activity should not affect LIONION security.

4. Although the LIONION Project does not produce disseminable positive intelligence, it is considered by the Station as essential to its Cuban operations. The 4,100 or more selective individual photographs produced annually,

coupled with the visual observations, were effective in providing timely operational information. In addition, over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film is produced annually, recording the image of each visitor to the Consulate. The years of experience of the principal agent have given him intimate knowledge of the target personalities. He often brings matters to the immediate attention of the Station without having been levied the specific requirement to do so. As a result, the Station is aided greatly in keeping abreast of the day to day activities of the Cuban compound.

5. In recent months, the LIONION Project was useful to the Station in checking out statements made by ESMARROW-1.

6. In March 1969, the Project provided photos of three U.S. citizens who visited the Cuban Embassy and were suspected of being draft dodgers. The photos were passed to the FBI within three hours of the request for information.

7. Other than the loss of the audio device in gatehouse, there have been no changes. The operation continues to run smoothly.

8. Approval is recommended.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM
SUBJECT Operational/LIONION LIONION Project Renewal for FY 1970		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Renewal of Project

Reference : HMMW-17154, 11 April 1969

1. Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970 for a total of $11,994.

2. Information concerning the performance of LIONION-1 and the project operations during the second and third quarters of FY 1969 has been elaborated, and a separate LIONION Progress Report for this period will not be prepared. The Station will submit a regular progress report to cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1969 in July 1969.

For Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. Renewal, right side; h/w
2. Renewal, left side, u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/att - 2 copies)

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 37024	DATE 25 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

SECRET

LIONICH PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

Project LIONICH

Station Mexico City

Field Case Officer Andrew E. PELLEMENT

Chief of Station Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

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S/c att: 1
HMMA- 37024

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LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Objectives

1. Project LIONION, a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, has the following specific objectives:

a. To furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installation.

b. To operate as a listening post in support of technical operations against this target to complement the photographic coverage.

c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.

d. To assist the Station in compiling information for individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.

e. To fulfill various requirements in support of other Station PBRUMEN operations.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the over-all objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes

Oliver D. CIMOCH assumed administrative and operational responsibility for Project LIONION in December 1967 and continued this responsibility until his departure in December 1968. Pending arrival of CIMOCH's replacement, the Project was handled by Station Officer Gerald D. FAHLANGER and Station WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY. On 28 February 1969, LIONION-1 was introduced to Andrew E. PELLEMENT, who assumed Project responsibility effective that date.

C. Intelligence Production

As an operational support project, Project LIONION does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. Quantitatively, during CY 1968, the Project provided over 4,000 selective individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering the target installation and over 8,000 feet of pulse camera film. There has

[illegible] TRANSMISSION
NO [illegible] DISSEMINATION

been no formal audio product from Project LIONION since July 1968 when the transcription of the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic was terminated. As reported extensively in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, the Station has been unable to activate LISAMPAN/BAKER since 16 January 1969. A qualitative analysis of the LIONION product is discussed in paragraph D below. The Station is unable to evaluate the worth of the pulse camera operation since the bulk film, undeveloped, is pouched directly to Headquarters. The cost of this portion of the operation is minimal, however, since it is limited to the cost of the film and development at Headquarters. The camera works automatically and requires only minimal maintenance.

D. Effectiveness

1. Project LIONION is considered by Station Mexico City as essential to its PBRUMEN operations. It has consistently proven highly effective and responsive to Station requirements of both long and short range nature. LIONION-1, the Project's only full time agent, continues to furnish on a timely basis, information on the personalities and activities of the target personnel. LIONION-2 continues to backstop LIONION-1 and substitute for him when he is away from his post. At the age of 70, she is not able to man the LIONION base full time, and her sight is failing. She is able to photograph visitors, however, and live monitor the LISAMPAN/DOG traffic. LIONION-2's role as a backstop to LIONION-1 insures continuous coverage of the target during daylight hours, five days a week. LIONION-1's more than six years of experience working on the same target continue to produce an increasingly complete and accurate identification of the staff and visitors to LIRING. These years of experience have developed an agent knowledgeable of WOFIRM operational and security requirements who will often bring to the Station's attention those matters which he feels are of immediate interest without having special requirements levied upon him and without waiting for the next regularly scheduled meeting with his Station contact. He has on numerous occasions notified the Station of the presence of suspect PBRUMEN security types. He has also frequently passed along operational leads of use to the Station in other aspects of its PBRUMEN operations.

2. The addition of LISAMPAN/DOG to the LIONION basehouse has noticeably increased LIONION-1's ability to identify new visitors to the target and at times, determine the nature of their business. The LISAMPAN/DOG product was channeled to the LIONION basehouse by carrier current from LISAMPAN/LISASH on 10 April 1968. Since its primary value is as an aid to LIONION-1 in identifying LIRING visitors, its product has not been recorded

or transcribed since July 1968. LIONION-1 live monitors the traffic from his basehouse. LISAMPAN-1 who mans the LISASH base has been told nothing of the LIONION base and LIONION-1 was offered no explanation concerning the manner in which LISAMPAN/DOG production is channeled to him. Thus a possible compromise of the LISASH basehouse, linked directly to LIRING, would not compromise the LIONION basehouse which has no direct link with the target.

3. Project LIONION was of direct assistance to the Station on two separate occasions in recent months:

a. As a result of information received on a priority basis (the same day as requested) from LIONION-1, the Station was able to verify certain statements made by ESMARROW-1 concerning the location of LIRING officials at specific times. LIONION-1 reported the times at which these officials came in and out of the LIRING compound and provided a description of the clothes they were wearing at the time. LIONION-1's information raised the possibility that ESMARROW-1 might at least have been confused in his reporting of the times at which he met LIRING personnel, etc.

b. In March 1969, LIONION-1 was able to provide pictures of three WOLADY males, who, although unidentified, fitted the general description and time frame furnished by LNERGO. The latter suspected that two or three WOLADY draft dodgers might visit LIRING to arrange travel to PBRUMEN. The Station was able to furnish LNERGO with pictures of the three together with a report of their arrival and departure from LIRING within three hours of its request for information. Additional information was promptly forwarded to LNERGO as it became available from LIONION-1.

4. During the past year, LIONION-1 acted as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team on a number of occasions. By utilizing his vantage point in the area of the target, he is able to radio information to the LIEMBRACE team on the arrival and departure of LIRING officials thus allowing the team to remain at a distance from the target unseen by possible counter-surveillance from the target. The Station plans to use LIONION-1 in this role more extensively in the coming year whenever surveillance of LIRING personnel entails the team's presence near the LIRING compound. Such utilization of LIONION-1 should lessen the risk of exposure of the team to the PBRUMEN IS.

5. LIONION-1, himself, continues to provide the consistently high level of productivity that has characterized his work in past years. As mentioned above his response to priority requirements continues to be most gratifying. He is prompt in submitting both operational and administrative reports to the Station. He is ready, at a moments notice, to change personal plans when a need for his services arises. After five years without a substantial vacation, LIONION-1 plans a three week trip from 4 - 25 May to Europe (Italy, Greece, France) and the U.S.A. He originally requested five weeks to make this trip for which he has long saved his money, but quite willingly shortened the trip to three weeks at the Station's request and added that he would postpone the entire trip if the Station thought his services were more needed at home. In order to help defray the cost of making a second trip to Europe to complete his original itinerary, the Station will give LIONION-1 a gift of $250 on 1 May 1969 and will tell him that consideration will be given in 1970 to providing an equal amount, but no decision can be made on that second gift until mid-1970.

E. Problems

1. LISAMPAN/BAKER: As reported in HMMA 36553, 19 February 1969, LISAMPAN/BAKER was turned off for security reasons on 16 January 1969 at 1345 hours. All subsequent attempts to reactivate it have been unsuccessful. Headquarters was requested to review all available Station information on this to decide whether BAKER's abrupt end was the result of a compromise or whether it was somehow connected with the installation of TELEX equipment at LIRING.

2. LISAMPAN/DOG: The LISAMPAN/DOG/METRAP installation is generally working well. There have been numerous occasions when due to unknown circumstances the audio reception has either been bad or non-existent. Walter W. CORNBURY and PELLEMENT visited the LISAMPAN/LISASH basehouse and found no problem with the monitoring equipment there. The trouble may have resided with the central office of the LIRISK company and was probably not the result of technical counter-surveillance of LIRING. As of 3 April 1969, LISAMPAN/DOG was working properly and automatically.

3. There have been no significant personnel, security, morale or administrative problems since the last project renewal.

F. Liaison

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

[illegible] BY SPECIAL PERMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

G. Interagency Coordination

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training and location to provide the photographic and technical coverage cited above. In addition, the Station will continue to make use of LIONION-1 as a dispatcher in surveillances of LIRING personnel.

2. In order to check the LISAMPAN/DOG take for items of possible value to other Station operations, LISAMPAN/1 will be instructed to record the DOG traffic for the three week period while LIONION-1 is on vacation. These tapes will be given to Richard C. HABOUSH for an analysis of their operational worth and technical quality. HABOUSH will transcribe them if the contents warrant.

I. Costs

1. For the past project year, 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $16,250. It is approved for $16,632.

2. For the renewal period of 1 July 1969 through 30 June 1970, it is requested that $11,894 be approved. Estimated figures for FY 1971 are provided below together with the breakdown for FY's 1969 and 1970. The major addition to the FY 1971 figures is a possible raise for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2. These figures are broken down as follows:

	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971
Salaries:			
LIONION-1	$ 4,704	$ 4,800	$ 5,200
LIONION-2	1,860	1,920	2,000
Xmas bonuses	550	560	610
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	1,200	1,200	1,200
LIONION Safehouse	864	864	864
Utilities for both	500	500	500
Operational Expenses:			
Film	700	1,000	1,000
Paper	400	450	450
Chemicals	250	300	300

[illegible]

NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

Miscellaneous:			
Operational	50	150	350
Special gift to LIONION-1	250	250	
Total	$11,328	$11,994	$12,474

3. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1 covering expenses chargeable to his revolving fund. His accounting has been most satisfactory in all respects, and such accountings will be continued during the ensuing project year.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Processing and Exploitation of Photographic Coverage of LIRING by the AMOT Organization.

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968

1. The following comments are for the information and assistance of those officers who are in the process of determining the future of the LIONION operation:

a. The AMOTs have received and reviewed a number of the prints from the LIONION operation and report that it is a time-consuming and largely unproductive effort.

b. The practical results of such a review, i.e., the identification of the greatest number of visitors to LIRING, can be realized best through the widest circulation of the prints among the AMOT staffers, contacts, and informants. This practice would result in wide knowledge of the existence of the operation, and in the expenditure of many man-hours which, it appears, could be more productively spent in other pursuits.

c. The AMOT organization currently does not have either the qualified personnel or available space and equipment to process the film as suggested in paragraph three of reference. Until they move into new quarters, in, hopefully, mid-1968, the single AMOT photographer will be working in very tight quarters.

2. It would appear from JMWAVE's experience with AMOT exploitation of the LIONION operation, that further activity in this connection at JMWAVE would be unwarranted.

James N. Ahamanos
James N. AHAMANOS

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD
2 - COS/Mexico City
2 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 Feb 1968	FEB 13 1968

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21267

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
LIONION Renewal of Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33595, 5 December 1967

Project LIONION has been renewed for the period of 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for the sum of $16,632. This figure includes $5,374 for FY 68 and $11,258 for FY 69.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

Cuban co

50-6-122/1

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declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW 16131

DATE
5 FEB 1968
1 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/3

RI

CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	2 Feb	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-68

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION/Processing and Exploitation of Impulse Camera Film by AMOTS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 33841, 17 January 1968

Headquarters concurs in the proposal made in reference that the LIONION impulse camera film be processed and reviewed by the AMOTS.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
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50-6-122/1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 16106	DATE 1 FEB 1968 29 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

RI

CHRONO

AN PW [illegible]
WH 1
[illegible] INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Daly	bb	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG	30 Jan 68	[illegible] Williamson

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	29 Jan 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

CRYPTONYM
[illegible]

TYPE OF ACTION		FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION Western Hemisphere Division
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1968-69	BRANCH One
		DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER [illegible]
		DATE 10 Jan 68
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. [illegible]
		BUILDING
		TEL. EXT. RED 0041 BLACK [illegible]

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO
C/WHD	[illegible]				
C/WH/[illegible]	Elliot C. [illegible]	1/19	1/18		
C/WH/SS	George R. Thom[illegible]		22 Jan 68		✓
C/WH/CI	Thomas Polgar		21 Jan 68		
WH/EXO	Donald C. [illegible]	[illegible]	27/1		

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATES IN	DATES OUT	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 68	30 June 69	$ 15,632	1968	$ [illegible]
			1969	$ 11,[illegible]

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	[illegible] JAN 1968

FORM 12-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

SECRET

10 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January 1968 through 30 June 1969 for $16,632 including $5,374 for FY 1968 and $11,258 for FY 1969. WH Division programmed $11,800 for this activity for FY 1969 and funds are available. Funds requested for this renewal are slightly less than the previous year due to a reduction in support costs.

2. This project provides Station Mexico City with photographic and physical surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. In addition, the project principal agent is able to observe and record the patterns of activity and personal associations of various Cuban personnel and visitors to the Embassy and Consulate. This effort has been of assistance in planning recruitment attempts against target personnel. The principal agent also performs ad hoc functions for the Station such as dispatching the surveillance team against selected Cuban personnel and renting and maintaining a safehouse. This project naturally does not produce positive intelligence.

3. Plans for the forthcoming period include using the project basehouse and the two project agents as LP operators in the expansion of an existing technical operation targeted against the Cuban Embassy. There is also a possibility that the photo coverage of the Cuban Consulate entrance will cease shortly as this coverage has not proved particularly useful. It is not anticipated that these changes will substantially affect the cost of the project.

4. It should be noted that the $4,800 operational loan made to LIONION-2 in February 1966 has been completely repaid. The security of this project is considered satisfactory.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

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14-00000

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Station Mexico City

Field Case Officer
Cornelius L. PEUVION

Chief of Station Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Renewal of the LIONION Project is requested for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258--$5,374 for FY 1968 and $5,884 for FY 1969.

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

S/C ATT. # 2 to HMMA-33595

H/W ATT. # 1 to HMMA-33595

PROJECT LIONION RENEWAL REQUEST

A. Objectives:

1. Project LIONION is a long-term support project designed to provide fixed photographic, technical, and physical surveillance of the PBRUMEN Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. The specific objectives are:

    a. To furnish photographic coverage during the daylight hours of the main entrances to the target installations.

    b. To maintain in readiness a listening post to support technical operations against the targets.

    c. To radio dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the targets.

    d. To provide for a mechanism which can fulfill various miscellaneous PBRUMEN support requirements.

2. The above-cited objectives are in agreement with the overall objectives of Station Mexico City.

B. Changes:

In late January 1967 the operational and administrative responsibilities for Project LIONION were transferred from Howard A. TRECKLER to Cornelius L. PEUVION. No agent handling, control, or administrative problems were encountered during the past year.

C. Intelligence Production:

As noted in Section A above, Project LIONION is an operational support project and does not produce disseminable positive intelligence. During the past year this project did provide over 5000 individual photographs of persons and/or vehicles entering or leaving the target installations, as well as approximately 8000 feet of pulse camera film. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the installations, which LIONION-1 provides in daily logs, has been incorporated into Station files and on occasion made available to other stations or LNHARP agencies, i.e., LNERGO. LIONION has been particularly useful in spotting new employees whose photos are then passed to LITAMIL-7 for identification.

D. Effectiveness:

1. Project LIONION is considered by the Station to be highly effective and essential. In addition to providing the valuable photographic coverage cited above, LIONION-1 continues to provide interesting observations on the personalities and activities of the personnel working in the targets. LIONION-1 reporting is being incorporated into the recruitment operations targeted against LIRING-2 and LIRING-16.

2. In early July LIONION-1 obtained and furnished a new safe apartment which is being used for sensitive or lengthly meetings with LIRESORT-1 as well as LIONION-1. The safe site has been stocked with a sufficient supply of food so as to allow two persons to live there for at least three days in the event the Station ever needs a cooling-off site for an agent or defector.

3. Throughout the past project year LIONION-1 continued to function effectively as the radio dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE Surveillance Team. Much of this effort was expended in estimating the movement/habit pattern of LIRING-2, a prerequisite for his pending recruitment.

E. Problems:

1. On 27 June LIONION-1 was hospitalized for emergency surgery to treat a perforated ulcer. Since LIONION-2's presence was required at the hospital during the operation and also throughout the postoperative convalescence period, photographic coverage was suspended until 10 July.

2. Other than a temporary postoperative morale slump on the part of LIONION-1, there have been no significant personnel, security, or administrative problems.

F. Liaison:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable to Project LIONION.

H. Plans:

1. The Station plans to continue to exploit LIONION-1's experience, training, and location to provide the photographic coverage cited above. In addition, the Station plans to make more extensive use of the operational log books and personality observations provided by LIONION-1 in support of an intensive physical penetration program.

2. During the ensuing period, the Station plans to utilize LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 as LP operators for a portion of the LISAMPAN technical penetration operation. It is anticipated that this additional task will not be levied on LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 until after 1 January 1968.

I. Costs:

1. For the past project year, 1 January through 31 December 1967, it is estimated that the total project cost will be about $9,000. It is approved for $11,666.

2. For the renewal period of 1 January through 31 December 1968, it is requested that $11,258 be approved. This is broken down as follows:

	FY 1968	FY 1969	Total
Salaries: (Including Xmas bonus)			
LIONION-1	$ 2,208	$ 2,576	$ 4,784
LIONION-2	900	1,050	1,950
Rents:			
LIONION Basehouse	450	450	900
LIONION Safehouse	264	264	528
Utilities	150	150	300
Supplies:			
Film	600	600	1,200
Paper	312	304	616
Chemicals	150	150	300
Miscellaneous	90	90	180
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250	250	500
Total	$ 5,374	$ 5,884	$11,258

3. It should be noted that the operational loan made to LIONION-2 to enable her to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico (see Cost Section of previous project renewal request) has been completely repaid. The loan, which was placed in an escrow-type account, was withdrawn in monthly increments by LIONION-1 and incorporated into his revolving fund. A detailed accounting was prepared each month by LIONION-1, a practice which will be continued during the ensuing project year.

J. Technical Annex:

Project LIONION continues to receive excellent technical support from the local WOACRE representative, Walter W. CORNBURY.

K. Other:

While LIONION-2's failing eyesight precludes her filling in for LIONION-1 over any extended period of time, she has continued to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT LIONION

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See Below

1. Prior to submitting the LIONION project for renewal 1 January 1968, Headquarters requests the Mexico City station comment on the desireability of continuing the photography of persons entering and leaving the PBRUMEN Consulate. As the station is aware this film is no longer reviewed at JMWAVE and there are no present plans to resume this practice since in the past it proved unproductive and costly. The film has never been reviewed on a regular basis at Headquarters and has been referred to only once for identification purposes during the past year. At present the film as received at Headquarters is developed (negatives only) and placed into storage.

2. Headquarters realizes this coverage is potentially valuable and undoubtedly this film contains photographs of assorted revolutionaries and others of CI/FI interest; but the value lies in the ability to identify the persons being photographed and until we have this capability - and personnel to sort out and follow-up the leads - there seems

(Continued..)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
2 - COS, JMWAVE

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-16029	15 December 67
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/Daly		sl	

RI
CHRONO

ABSTRACT

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	15 Dec 67	Carl J. Williamson

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	15 Dec	W.J. Kaufman

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-16029

little justification in continuing this coverage.

3. It would be appreciated if along with the station's recommendations an estimate of the cost of this particular portion of the LIONION activity could be included.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

50-6-122/1

FORM 0-64 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION
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PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

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SECRET [redacted]

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIONION Project Renewal Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DESENSITIZED per DOI 70-12

Reference: HMMW-15195, 24 January 1967

Attached is the Station's renewal request for Project LIONION. The Project should be submitted for renewal for the period 1 January through 31 December 1968 for a total of $11,258.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
  A. Renewal Request, right side (h/w)
  B. Renewal Request, left side (u/s/c) ATT'd 15 DEC 67 RIDER

Distribution:
  Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 2 copies each)

2 ATT

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 33595

DATE
5 December 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN LIONION - Approval of Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : HMMA-30793, 7 December 1966

Project LIONION was renewed as submitted in reference on 23 January 1967 in the amount of $11,666.00 for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15195

GROUP 1
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DATE
30 JAN 1967
24 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	J. Stewart	pem	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RI
Chrono

CROSS
RID
WH
ABSTRACT X
INDEX

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1/25	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X FI CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere Division	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
X	RENEWAL FY 1967-68	BRANCH: One	DESK
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: Jack Stewart	DATE: 4 Jan '67
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 332 · BUILDING Ames · TEL. EXT.	RED. / BLACK 3654

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISIONS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	In DATE	Out	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	5 Jan 67		
C/WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C/WH/SS	George R. Thompson	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	[illegible]	[illegible]/67	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marcelius	20 JAN	[illegible]/67	

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	AMT THIS ACTION	FY	REVISED TOTAL
1 Jan 1967	31 Dec 1967	$ 11,666.00	1967	$ 5,574.00
			1968	$ 6,092.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
C/WHD	William V. Broe	23 JAN 1967

FORM 2-66 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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4 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION
(Photographic/Technical Coverage
of Cuban Embassy in Mexico)

ACTION REQUIRED: Approvals Requested Paragraphs One
and Four

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1967 at an annual expenditure of $11,666.00, including $5,574.00 for FY 1967 and $6,092.00 for FY 1968. WH Division programmed $12,000.00 for this activity for FY 1967 and funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $668.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small monthly raise for the Principal Agent and a new provision for miscellaneous operational expenditures.

2. Although this two-man Project does not produce positive intelligence, it contributes substantially and directly to the coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico, producing photographs in bulk of personnel and visitors as well as information on patterns of activity and personal associations, and supporting recruitment attempts. It is contemplated that the Project will afford support to the extensive technical penetration of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN) currently scheduled for installation in mid-January 1967. One of these penetrations is scheduled for the Embassy gatehouse where visitors would normally identify themselves upon entering. Information from the gatehouse is to be transmitted securely to the LIONION basehouse as well as to the LISAMPAN listening post. By collating this and other LISAMPAN information with the photography, it is hoped to be able to identify photographically many of the visitors to the Embassy.

3. The physical security of the photo-basehouse has been improved and the overall security of the Project is considered to be satisfactory.

4. It will be noted that in February 1966 the Station assisted LIONION-2, a Cuban citizen, to qualify for Mexican immigrant status with a loan of $4,800.00, which was reduced to $2,640.00 as of 31 December 1966 at a repayment rate of $240.00 per month. This loan is being protected by an appropriate Memorandum of Trust. Approval is requested to continue this arrangement until LIONION-2's immigration status is settled, estimated to occur by 30 November 1967.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET [redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NIR
NO INDEXING REQUIRED

DESENSITIZED
per DOI 20-17

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Transmittal of LIONION Project Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Attached herewith and under separate cover for addressee are an original and five copies of the LIONION Project Renewal request.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIONION Project Renewal
Left hand side herewith
Right hand side under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-30793	DATE Dec. 7 ~~November~~ 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/8

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET/KAPOK

REQUEST FOR PROJECT RENEWAL

Project LIONION

Field Case Officer
Howard A. TRECKLER

Station Mexico City

Chief of Station Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible]
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L.Side ATT. #1 to HMMA-30793

R. Side ATT. #2 to HMMA-30793

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives:

There have been no changes in the objectives of the LIONION Project as set forth in the renewal request of last year.

B. Changes:

Howard A. TRECKLER has assumed the duties of Case Officer for LIONION since the departure of Lawrence F. BARKER in August 1966. TRECKLER is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jose" or "Joe". TRECKLER meets with LIONION-1 at least once each week and sees LIONION-2 only if he visits the LIONION basehouse. With the departure of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE (P) in August 1966, Walter W. CORNBURY (P) assumed the duties of technical consultant for the project. CORNBURY is known to LIONION-1 and 2 as "Jack". LIONION-1 is being given a pay increase of $8.00 (U.S.) per month effective 1 January 1967. There are no other changes contemplated for the coming year.

C. Intelligence Production:

The intelligence production is the same as that reported in the renewal request for last year. It is difficult to estimate the intelligence value in numbers of reports as there are so few positive reports made from this type of production on the photographic end of the project. But this photographic coverage is of inestimable operational intelligence value in coverage of the PBRUMEN target. Should the LISAMPAN operation become active, part of LIONION's time will be used in support of that operation.

D. Effectiveness:

The Station's estimate of the value of this project has not changed from that expressed in the renewal request of last year. LIONION has further established his importance to the Station's operational activities by demonstrating his ability to spot surveillance targets at LIRING from only a physical description provided by the Case Officer. If the planned LISAMPAN activity gets underway, LIONION observations and insight into activities of LIRING will be increased greatly.

The apartment spotted by LIONION-1 and obtained by the Station across from LIRING that was mentioned in last year's renewal request is scheduled to be utilized in the LISAMPAN operation. The location of LIONION-1 across from the target and his background knowledge built up over the years are invaluable assets to the Station's coverage of the primary target of the Related Mission Directive.

E. Problems:

There were no major problems during the past year. One security problem involved the claimed spotting of some of the photographic equipment from the street by David M. WILSTED (P). A thorough check of the basehouse by LIONION-1 and the Case Officer failed to reveal any such equipment as being visible from the street. However, additional security measures were taken by darkening the background in the room behind the equipment through hanging of heavier drapes on the window, drapes on the wall, and putting up a portable screen behind the equipment. This also serves as a security check against the prying eyes of the household servant as LIONION-1 can now open the door fully to the room when the servant pages him and she cannot see the equipment. The other problem is the obtaining of inmigrado status for LIONION-2. This involves the depositing of funds to a bank account and is discussed under paragraph I.

F. Liaison:

There is no liaison involved in the project.

G. Interagency Coordination:

Not applicable.

H. Plans:

It is planned to have LIONION-1 keep special logs on the activities of selected targets in LIRING as he has done over the past year. With the case officer handling LIONION-1 directly on a weekly basis, it is planned to continue picking his brains for additional details on the LIRING target. Hopefully LIONION-1 and 2 will be utilized for assistance in covering the proposed take from the LISAMPAN operation.

I. Costs:

For Calendar Year 1966:

1. In the period 1 January through 30 June 1966, $4,500.00 was expended. The projected expenditure for July 1966 through 31 December 1966 is $5,000.00. This total project year expenditure is approximately $1,000.00 under that approved by Headquarters. However, this amount is probably due to having drawn film and other supplies from overall Station support without their having been charged off against the Project

2. For the period 1 January 1967 through 31 December 1967

Expenditures for	FY 1967	FY 1968
Salaries:		
LIONION-1	$2,210.00	$2,578.00
LIONION-2	900.00	1,050.00
Rents:		
LIONION Basehouse	600.00	600.00
LIONION Safehouse	264.00	264.00
Utilities	150.00	150.00
Supplies:		
Film	600.00	600.00
Paper	360.00	360.00
Chemicals	150.00	150.00
Miscellaneous	90.00	90.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenditures	250.00	250.00
TOTAL	$5,574.00	$6,092.00

The total for FY 1967 is $11,666.00. Approval of this amount is requested. Note that the salary figures include the salary raise for LIONION-1 and the usual one month pay Christmas bonus for LIONION-1 and 2. An additional provision has been made for miscellaneous operational expenditures as there may be a recurrence of same as in the past project year for which no provision was made. Provision is being made for charging of funds for supplies to the LIONION Project which was not done last year in order that more accurate bookkeeping may be followed.

In addition, the Station has had to make a loan to LIONION-2 for gaining status to qualify for inmigrado status in Mexico. This loan is held in a savings account in a Mexican bank to prove to the Mexican authorities that LIONION-2 can support herself. Funds are withdrawn from this account monthly, sometimes with interest, and deposited to a checking account where LIONION-1 withdraws the funds and they are applied to the revolving account for financing the operation. The initial balance deposited to the account in February 1966 was $4,800.00. Withdrawals have been made at the rate of $240.00 per month and as of 30 October 1966, the total account had been reduced by $1,680.00, leaving a balance in the account of $3,120.00 which should carry the account through November 1967. A separate dispatch follows with the Memorandum of Trust and necessary details on the account. Approval is requested for continuance of this account in order that LIONION-2 may obtain her inmigrado status.

J. Other:

LIONION-2 continues to perform in an excellent manner in support of LIONION-1.

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT RENEWAL REQUEST

CRYPTONYM LIONION

FIELD CASE OFFICER Lawrence F. Barker
Lawrence F. BARKER

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

The attached Project is presented for renewal.

CS COPY

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

SECRET/KAPOK

50-6-122/1

L. SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-27754 R. SIDE OF ATT. #1 to HMMA-27754

A. Current Objectives. The original objectives of the project have not changed but have been added to in the last year. The project is functioning well as a technical (primarily photographic) surveillance operation against the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City. It is designed to:

1. Furnish photographic coverage during daylight hours of the two entrances of the target installation.
2. Dispatch physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target.
3. Keep in readiness a listening post (LP) for the monitoring and recording of technical penetrations of the target.
4. Assist the Station in building up individual dossiers on officials of the target installation.
5. Monitor Station activities involving direct contact with the target, and furnish an observation post (OP) for other Station assets.

Objectives 4 and 5 are additions to those objectives set forth in the original project outline.

B. Changes. There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated in the coming year. It is being proposed in separate correspondence that some of the work load now on LIONION-1 be shifted to Headquarters, specifically the development of film.

LIONION-1's pay was increased 40 dollars a month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production. The operation has produced thousands of excellent photographs, many of which are shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target installation has been incorporated into many Station files (primarily personality files -- individual dossiers). No precise statistics are available on this production. It has been very heavy. Station JMWAVE should perhaps be called upon for an independent evaluation of LIONION production it has received .

D. Effectiveness. The project is considered both highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to excellent photographic coverage provided by the LIONION agents, the Station has found in LIONION-1 a first class asset for other operational duties. The LIONION basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the LIRHYME recruitment (and harassment) operation. C/O Wallace B. ROWTON sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks, observing the movement pattern of LIRHYME-1. LIONION-1 manned one of three radios used by the Station when LIRHYME was invited to appear for confrontation outside the Embassy. Without the LIONION base and the expert knowledge of LIONION-1 of target personnel and activities, such an operation as LIRHYME could not have been mounted. It might be noted that this operation was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico by Headquarters. It is expected that additional similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by the LIONION operation.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining -- by sharp observation and quick, intelligent, secure action -- an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target Embassy. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems. The problem of cover for LIONION-1 worked out well during the year to the point where it ceased being a problem. By living his cover as a translator he was enabled to build in strong self protection when called upon to do some translations for the office of the President of Mexico. Toward the end of the year, LIONION-1 received the coveted status of "inmigrado" which confers a great deal of immunity from harrassment by Mexican authorities.

The only problem now besetting the project is LIONION-1's excessive work load. As indicated above, an attempt is being made to alleviate this load.

F. Liaison. The operation has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's connection with the Mexican Presidency is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination. Not applicable.

H. Plans. It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational log books during the coming year rather than settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the LIONION base. LIONION-1 can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. LIONION-1 will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations as in LIRHYME. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar 1966, the period for which project is being requested.

I. Costs.,

1. For calendar 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965 $7,218.20 had been expended. At this rate some $9,200.00 will be expended in the concluding project year.

2. For the next period (calendar 1966):

Monthly costs

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
	Miscellaneous	15.00
	Monthly total	$ 874.00

Allowing for customary year-end bonuses of one month's salary for both agents, the figures for FY 1966 and FY 1967 would be $5,244.00 and $5,754.00 respectively, or a total for the calendar year 1966 of $10,998. Approval of this amount is requested.

J. Other. LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continues to perform in a splendid manner as assistant to LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION 3X
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/Renewal Request for Project LIONION

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW 14073, 1 November 1965

Attached by split transmission is a renewal request for the LIONION Project.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Left Side - Herewith
Right Side - Under separate cover

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
2 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
[illegible]

CS COPY

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA 27754	29 November 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK 3X	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
PBRUMEN/LIONION - Transmittal of Approved Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: HMMA-27754, 29 November 1965.

ACTION: FYI

Project LIONION was approved on 22 January 1966 in the amount of $10,998.00 for the period 1 January 1966 through 31 December 1966. The foregoing amount is broken down into $5,244.00 for Fiscal Year 1966 and $5,754.00 for Fiscal Year 1967.

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

LIONION
Stew
50-6-122/1

25 January 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14301	DATE [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/1

RI
CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Mexico	J. Stewart	sav	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/1		J.H.V.Fisher

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIONION

TYPE OF ACTION	X	FI/CI		CA		OTHER

	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City
X	RENEWAL FY 1966	BRANCH: 1 DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: J. Stewart DATE: 1 Jan 66
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO.: GH-43 BUILDING: Hdqs TEL. EXT.: RED 9325 BLACK 4506

CONCURRENCIES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (and signature)	DATE	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
C/WH/1	W. J. Kaufman	11 Jan 66	
WH/B&F	Robert D. Carter	11 Jan 66	
WH/SS	W.E. Brooks	[illegible]	
C/WH/FI	Thomas Polgar	19/1/66	
WH/EXO	Donald C. Marelius	22/1/66	

CONCURRENCIES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

		DATE	COPY NO.	MEMO ATTACHED YES	MEMO ATTACHED NO	MEMO ATTACHED DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMOUNT OF ACTION	FY	TOTAL AMOUNT
1 Jan 66	31 Dec 66	$ 10,998.00	1966	$ 5,244.00
			1967	$ 5,754.00

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
Chief, WHD	William V. Broe	22/1/66

FORM 6-65 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Renewal of Project LIONION (photographic/ technical coverage of Cuban Embassy in Mexico)

1. Approval is requested to renew Project LIONION for the period 1 January through 31 December 1966 at an annual expenditure of $10,998.00, including $5,244.00 for FY 1966 and $5,754.00 for FY 1967. WH Division programmed $10,750.00 for this activity for FY 1966. Funds are available. The Project cost has been increased by $520.00 over the previous year, occasioned by a small raise for the Principal Agent.

2. The Project has contributed substantially and directly to coverage of the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico and is considered highly successful and essential by Station Mexico City. It has produced a large quantity of excellent photographs of target personnel and visitors and has furnished valuable data on their patterns of activity and personal associations. It has also rendered valuable support to Station recruitment attempts against Cuban Embassy personnel and maintains an ever ready facility for support of any technical penetrations of this target accomplished by other Station activities. The Project has had no security or administrative problems. The Station has submitted regular progress reports.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

LIONION PROJECT RENEWAL

A. Current Objectives: This Project is a technical, currently primarily photographic, surveillance operation against the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City. Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances; furnishing a control point for dispatching physical surveillance teams against persons associated with the target; and furnishing a listening post (LP) in readiness to monitor and record technical audio penetrations of the target. Two new objectives added during the Project year include assisting Station Mexico City to build up individual dossiers on target officials; and affording an observation post for Station activities involving direct contact with the target. These new objectives are in consonance with Priority A, Objective 1 of the current Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City.

B. Changes: There have been no changes in personnel and none are contemplated during the coming year. Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film exposed under this Project. LIONION-1's pay was increased $40 per month effective 15 March 1965.

C. Intelligence Production: The Project is not designed to produce disseminable information. It produced thousands of excellent photographs during the year which were shared with Headquarters and Station JMWAVE. Information on the comings and goings of target personnel and visitors to the target have been incorporated into many Station files, principally the dossier files. No precise statistics are available, but at least 100 exposures are made daily during target working hours.

D. Effectiveness: The Project is considered highly successful and essential by the Station. In addition to the excellent photographic coverage provided, LIONION-1, the Principal Agent, has developed into a first-class asset for other operational duties. The Project Basehouse was essential to mounting and monitoring the Station's attempt at recruitment and subsequent harassment of a sensitive target employee. The Case Officer in charge of the attempt sat with LIONION-1 for several weeks observing the movement pattern of the target employee. LIONION-1 manned one of the radio dispatch posts used to control the physical surveillance of the target employee while near the Basehouse.

Without the Basehouse and LIONION-1's expert knowledge of the target personnel and activities, such an operation could not have been mounted. The operation itself was an attempt to satisfy the top priority requirement laid on Station Mexico City by Headquarters. It is expected that future similar operations will depend to a large extent on the facilities provided by this Project.

Another very effective performance by LIONION-1 was his obtaining, by sharp observation and quick, intelligent and secure action, an apartment in a building directly across the street from the target. The Station had been seeking an apartment in this building for many years.

E. Problems: The only problem currently besetting the Project is the excessive work load on the Principal Agent. To alleviate this, Headquarters is assuming the task of developing some of the film produced by the Project.

Cover for LIONION-1 has ceased to be a problem. He has received his permanent immigrant status and now has a good deal of immunity from harassment from Mexican immigration authorities. He was able to get his translator cover backstopped directly out of the Office of the President of Mexico and thus has a strong protective security factor built into it.

F. Liaison: The Project has no liaison connection. LIONION-1's cover backstop with the Office of the President of Mexico is non-operational.

G. Interagency Coordination: Not applicable.

H. Plans: It is planned to make better use of LIONION-1's observations and operational logbooks during the coming year rather than to settle for his excellent photographs alone. It has been found that he can often supply valuable additional information because of his "feel" for those persons who are under constant observation from the Basehouse. He can read significance into activity which might go unnoticed or be misinterpreted by observers with less experience. He will also be called upon for assistance in future recruitment operations similar to the case mentioned in paragraph D above. Several such operations are being contemplated for calendar year 1966, the period for which the Project renewal is being requested.

I. Costs: For calendar year 1965:

In the period 1 January through 31 October 1965, $7,218.20 has been expended. At this rate, some $9,200.00 will be expended by the end of the calendar year 1965.

Monthly costs:

Salaries:	LIONION-1	$ 360.00
	LIONION-2	150.00
Rents:	LIONION Basehouse	100.00
	LIONION Safehouse	44.00
	Utilities	25.00
Supplies:	Film	95.00
	Paper	60.00
	Chemicals	25.00
Miscellaneous Operational Expenses:		15.00
	Monthly Total:	$ 874.00

One-time costs:

It is customary in Mexico to give a year-end bonus amounting to one month's salary:

LIONION-1	$ 360.00
LIONION-2	150.00
Total:	$ 510.00

3. Calendar Year Total

Fixed monthly expenses	$ 10,488.00
One-time expenses	510.00
Total	10,998.00

4. Fiscal Year Breakdown

Fiscal Year 1966	$ 5,244.00
Fiscal Year 1967	5,754.00
	10,998.00

J. Other: LIONION-2, although not specifically mentioned above, continued to render excellent support as an assistant to LIONION-1.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Project Approval FBRUMEN/LIONION/Plans

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 25110, 6 January 1965

1. Project LIONION, as submitted in reference, has been approved by Headquarters for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965. The two agents have been redesignated LIONION-1 (201-288248) and LIONION-2 (201-305604).

2. In order to assist Headquarters evaluation of the LIONION Project, we request that periodic progress reports on LIONION include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

50-6-122/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW 13406 CS COPY	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-123/1

RI
Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	DM
RID/MIS	LH
[illegible]	
~~RID~~	
1044/1	
~~DESTROY~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	R. Scutt:jah		4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER
C/WHD		DESMOND FITZGERALD

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LICHICK

TYPE OF ACTION			
XX	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION: Western Hemisphere	
	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION: Mexico City	
	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH: WH/1	DESK: Mexico
	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER: R. Leutt	
	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. [illegible]	BUILDING: Hqs.

EXTENSION: [illegible]

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/1	H. J. Kaufman by A. G. Spera	28 Jan	✓			
WH/DMF	Robert Carter	1 Feb 65				
C/WH/SS	W. E. Brooks	2/3				
C/WH/RO	H. Littell	2/4				
WH/PCA	Gerard Droller Droller	2/16/65				
WH/EXO	Samuel Halpern L	19 Feb 65				

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
1 January 1965	31 December 196[illegible]	$ 10,478	196[illegible]	$ [illegible]
			196[illegible]	$ [illegible]

APPROVING AUTHORITY: Chief, WH Division

SIGNATURE: SHalpern

DATE: 19 Feb 65

FORM 6-60 848 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(5)

16 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/EXO

SUBJECT : LIONION Project

1. LIONION is a new project which is submitted in the amount of $10,478. This is a photographic surveillance operation targetted against the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Two agents are involved; LIONION-1, a young Cuban lawyer in exile, and LIONION-2, his mother. The agents act as observers and photographers. LIONION-1 is also used as a dispatcher for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, from which he is compartmented, to cover individuals associated with this target. These agents were previously used in connection with the unilateral telephone tap operation against the Cuban Embassy. The current photographic operation began in the latter part of 1962, and was previously funded under Cuban FI funds. The operation has provided valuable data for the identification of Cuban Embassy personnel and visitors, and on their patterns of action and personal associations.

2. The security of this operation, particularly the agent's cover for status and the communications arrangements, appear reasonably sound. Both agents know that they are working for AIS, and LIONION-1 was successfully FLUTTERED in October 1963. However, LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, who are penetrations of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of this activity, as they are used to help identify individuals photographed.

3. Approval for the LIONION Project is recommended. It is requested that, in order to assist Headquarters' evaluation, project reporting include details of CI/CE data furnished, and examples of leads developed from such information.

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/POA

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Approval of Project LICHION

1. Approval is requested of the attached LICHION Project Outline, and authorization of an annual expenditure, effective 1 January 1965, of $10,478 (FY 65-$5,004; FY 66-$5,474). Funds are available for this project.

2. Mexico Station agents LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9, penetrations in place of the Cuban Embassy, are aware of the existence of the LICHION photographic activity. This knowledge on the part of these two assets is essential to the exploitation of the photographic take.

3. WH/1 recommends approval of the LICHION Project.

A. G. Spera
W. J. Kaufman
Chief
WH/1

Attachment:

Project Outline

SECRET/KAPOK

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CH[illegible] [illegible] OF ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

2. RETURN THIS DOC
RM GA-50, ON C[illegible]/VOLUME: KDAFGHAN VOL. I.

3. IF YOU FORW SUPPORT
INDIVIDUAL 50-6-122/2

VE DATES: 25 SEPT 64 – 14 MAR 72

FORM 179 [illegible]IAL UNIT/LOCATION: LAD/DDO

ROOM: 3C34

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
26 MAY 78	5/26/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
5 July 78		D. HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
21 JUL 1978		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/20/78		HARDWAY	Hardway
12/12/78		Bark	Bark

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

PROJECT KDAFGHAN VOLUME I SECTION SUPPORT N [illegible] 122/2

LE

older 2

RETIRED FILE DESENSITIZED

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO RID/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

TO : (Station/Base)
MEXICO CITY

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12

ITEM 3—ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS

ITEM 6—ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8—USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES

ITEM 10—ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11—A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE	2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER: COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT	50	6	122/2

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDAFGHAN Support

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
☐ OPEN FILE
☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
☒ RETAIN IP/ARD
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
[illegible]

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
50

9. FILES ACTION
☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☒ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
Gloria Farmer #630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY
Charles M. Conner

EFFECTIVE DATE
1 March 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER
50 06 122/2

ORM -63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG 12-65

SECRET

39 1—CS COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE OF CRYPTONYM CHANGE - 20/04/71

KDAFGAN

FORMER CRYPTONYM - LIONION

CRYPTONYM CHANGE AUTHORIZED BY - ARMSTRONG
(RO OR RID SECTION CHIEF)

COMPONENT - FIO/AN

CABLE OR DOCUMENT REFERENCE (FROM ITEM 10 OF FORM 812) - HMMS-7138

N-O-T-I-C-E

THIS IS AN RID NOTICE OF A CHANGE IN FILE TITLE CRYPTONYM CAUSED BY COMPROMISE. IT IS TO BE PLACED IN THE FILE INDICATED AND TO REMAIN THEREIN AS A PERMANENT OFFICIAL CS RECORD.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE IN - 050-006-122/02

14-00000

ıBLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 10-1

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KDAFGHAN/SUP

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ # ___

ACTION UNIT: TSD-EOO

INFO: FILE, VR IP/AN, WH8, DDP, FI

ACTION NO.

6 - KDAFGHAN

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19236

560483

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 559398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

S E C R E T

TO	Chief, MHSPICE	XX
INFO.	Chief, WH Division; Chief, WOACRE	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	
SUBJECT	AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR ~~Replacement of Telephoto Lenses~~	

Reference: MEXICO CITY 15654

1. Two of the Station photographic operations, KDFACTOR and KDAFGHAN, have been using the [illegible] and [illegible] Balscope and [illegible] camera combination for approximately twelve years. These two operations provide valuable photographic coverage of two important targets and new equipment is required to improve the photographic quality and increase the capability for longer coverage during the day when light conditions are poor.

2. The Balscope in the KDAFGHAN-1 OP has a 15 X eyepiece and is located in a very small room. A full length true telephoto lens of 1000 mm will not fit into the space without taking out a concrete wall partition. Therefore a compact catadioptric lens is required for the project.

3. The Balscope in the KDFACTOR-2 OP should also be replaced by the same type of lens system mentioned in paragraph 2. The Balscope now in use is operated from the top of a table where KDFACTOR-2 must also stand to take pictures over a high wall in the foreground. The system must be removed from the table when not in use and stored in a locked foot locker. For these reasons the lens and camera should be light and compact to facilitate their use and storage.

4. As can be seen from paragraphs two and three a light weight compact lens system is desired for both projects and the Station

-continued

Distribution:
2 - C/MHSPICE
2 - C/WHD
2 - C/WOACRE 2 cc. to TSD/PEG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-42,502	DATE 13 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-18

So anxious to replace the old units. The operators are starting to climb the walls after these many years of peering through the Falscope. A verbal request had been processed to [illegible] to obtain two 1000 mm catadioptric optical systems with [illegible] [illegible] cameras. Please advise when these units can be obtained and the costing procedures. [illegible] has started the action on at least one of these systems through [illegible].

Charles F. [illegible]

2531

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WOACRE

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief, MKSPICE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN
Renewal of Passports for KDAFGHAN-1 and KDAFGHAN-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-17955, 11 June 1970

The WOACRE-issued Cuban passports for Subjects have expired. It is requested that new passports be prepared for them. According to KDAFGHAN-1, the new passports should carry the same numbers as the old passports. The passports, and current photographs of Subjects, are being forwarded under separate cover. It is requested that the old passports be returned.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
As stated u/s/c

Distribution:
✓Orig. & 1 - Chief, WOACRE (w/att. u/s/c)
1 - Chief, WHD (w/o/att)
1 - Chief, MKSPICE (w/o/att)

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 41480	7 January 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-305604~~ ~~FFN: P-7,097~~

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BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 15 PER ________ #

C- KDAFGHAN/Support

ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR Logs 4

④

ACTION NO 125

SECRET 091856Z NOV 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18173

9 Nov IN 465586

DIRECTOR

ADMIN LOGS KDAFGHAN

1. REQUEST OBTAIN AND POUCH TO STATION ON PRIORITY BASIS FOR KDAFGHAN ONE EACH: APRON, CLOTH, F/U/W PAKONOMY PRINT DRYER MODEL 13-S.N.-5932. MFR: PAKO CORPORATION, MINNEAPOLIS 40, MINN.

2. REQN 559-19-72 APPLIES. GP-1

SECRET

Dirtech has answered

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT
TSDE-00

INFO FILE, VR IP/AN WH 8 DDP FI ⑥

ACTION NO.
—

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24

S E C R E T 211720Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18014 (ROSTEDT ACTING)

DIRTECH INFO DIRECTOR, PANTECH

AQUATIC/KDAFGHAN

2 OCT 71 451868

1. KDAFGHAN-1 HAS FOR YEARS USED BALSCOPE LENS WITH 20 X EYEPIECE FOR ID PHOTOGRAPHY OF VISITORS AND EMPLOYEES ENTERING KDACOUSTIC. TO IMPROVE QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHY AND INCREASE CAPABILITY DURING EVENING HOURS WHEN LIGHTING POOR STATION PREFERS A PHOTOGRAPHICALLY CORRECTED 1000 MM TELEPHOTE LENS FOR PROJECT. PLS ADVISE AVAILABILITY OF ABOVE LENS FROM WOACRE STOCK. IF PROJECT TO BE CHARGED FOR LENS NOTIFY STATION.

2. MKSPICE DOES NOT HAVE THIS TYPE LENS IN STOCK. GP-1.

S E C R E T

pls file in
KDAFGHAN - Support 7/26

~~Davis~~

SECRET

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BY: ______ AT: ______

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______

ACTION UNIT C/TSD 3

INFO FILE, VR C/[illegible], C/WH 8, DDP, C/FI 2

ACTION NO. 133

S E C R E T 222053Z OCT 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4653

22 Oct 70 IN 191057

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

m

RYBAT AQUATIC

REF: DIRTECH 0131 (IN 189977)

1. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF EQUIPMENT USED IN PROJECTS (ONE EACH OF ITEMS LISTED):

A. LILYRIC:

TELESCOPE, BALSCOPE BAUSCH AND LOMB.;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA W/O LENS;

CAMERA, PENTAX MDL H3V;

B. LICALLA:

TELESCOPE, S-E, BAUSCH AND LOMB., BALSCOPE;

CAMERA, SP, 35 MM, EXAKTA, WO/LENS;

C. LIONION:

BINOCULARS, 10Z50, TASCO, JAP MDL;

TELESCOPE, BAUSCH AND LOMB BALSCOPE SR.;

CAMERA, PENTAX 35 MM;

DRIER, PHOTO PAKONOMY MDL 13.;

ENLARGER, LEITZ WETZLER FOCOMAT IC;

MOTOROLA HANDIE-TALKIE FM RADIOPHONE;

C ______

D ______ Wheeler

SECRET

FILE: LIONION/Sup

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4653 SECRET

MOTOROLA RADIOPHONE;

CAMERA, RETINA;

LENS, RETINA 50MM;

LENS, RETINA 35MM;

LENS, RETNA 80MM.

2. FILE: ~~TPA/AEWXWM~~ 50-6-32/2. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Document Receipt for LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW - 17955, 11 June 1970

Forwarded under separate cover is the document receipt for the LIONION passports.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

Attachment:
document receipt (u/s/c) 7 July 1970

1 att.

Distribution:
✓Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD (w/att, u/s/c)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 39115	DATE 26 June 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-122/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City	MICROFILM

SUBJECT PBRUMEN LIONION TECHS/Request for Renewal of PBRUMEN Passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Renew passports and return

Reference : HMMW - 13,672, 3 June 1965

1. Forwarded under separate cover in true name pouch are the WOACRE PBRUMEN passports for LIONION-1 and LIONION-2, issued by Reference. These passports have expired, and the Station understands that they can be renewed for another period. Due to the sensitivity of the LIONION operation, Subjects cannot obtain regular PBRUMEN documentation locally, and must have them in order to leave Mexico and return.

2. It is requested that WOACRE revalidate the passports and return them to the Station for re-issuance to Subjects.

for/John A. PROBERT

7 May 70

Distribution:
Orig. and 2 - Chief, WHD w/att. USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 38843	DATE 27 April 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-122/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: LIONION/Impulse Camera Film

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

References:
A. HMMA-33841, 17 January 1968
B. UFGT-21267, 12 February 1968
C. UFGT-21342, 22 February 1968

1. In view of references A and B and the small cost involved in operating the impulse camera Headquarters will continue to process this film.

2. Request JMWAVE pouch the film cited in reference C to Headquarters for processing.

Ronald L. PERRODIN

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-16194

DATE: 1 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/2

RI

CHRONO

ABSTRACT
INDEX
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	[illegible]	rc	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG	3/5/68	Paul E Oberst

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	1 Mar 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

AUDIT Report

[illegible]-8100787

November 1963, and we recommended that the matter be investigated. The current audit disclosed that little or no action has been taken on this matter.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Station determine whether FREAPANE owes WOFIRM for 1963 [illegible] company profits, and notify FREAPANE of the results of the investigation.

Safehouse Rent in Excess of Lease Not Adequately Documented

[illegible] The most recent lease for the LIONION safehouse (MEXI-82) was dated in 1962 and provides for monthly rental payments of MN 650. Since then, the rental payments have been increased to MN 1,450 per month, but the lease has not been changed because, in accordance with local custom, the landlord is reluctant to enter into a new lease due to the costs involved and the income tax implications.

Recommendation: We recommend that a memorandum for the record showing the revised rent be prepared and approved by the Chief of Station or other designated Station official.

Revision of Education Allowance Requires Adjustment of Amounts Paid

Education allowances for Mexico City were revised for some grades during the current school year; however, the Station did not retroactively adjust the allowances already paid, as required by section [illegible] of the Standardized Regulations.

Recommendation: We recommend that education allowances paid for the current school year be recomputed and adjusted to the revised allowances.

Proceeds of Property Sale Not Recorded in Finance Records

14. In our review of property transactions, we noted two instances (Vouchers [illegible] and [illegible]) where accountability was dropped because, according to the property vouchers, the property

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City
Attn: Walter W. CORNBURY
Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, WOACRE

AQUATIC/LIONION
Technical Information

Reference: HMMA 31767 dated 11 April 1967

1. LIONION 1 photographic results continue to be satisfactory for all concerned. It is therefore advisable that no changes in procedure be made at this time.

2. It is apparent that LIONION 1 relayed the incorrect developing formula for the pulse camera film. Perhaps this error is due to his inactivity in processing such film for over a year. Since the conception of this operation all pulse camera film has been developed in Microdol X. On the other hand, Tri X film used in the LIONION 2 operation (Pentax camera and Balscope) has traditionally been developed in Acufine.

3. All pulse camera film is processed at Headquarters by an automatic Huston system. Time and temperature information which the lab uses would be of little value to your development procedure. The results of your recent test indicate that it should be satisfactory for an occasional check on the equipment.

4. The difference between Plus X Negative and Plus X Pan film is worth only one half "f" stop, which should cause no problem if you decide to use the latter.

Albert J. LASCOFF

Distribution:
2 - COS/Mexico City
1 - COS/Panama City

50-6-122/3

LIONION
Support

Group 1 - Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

HMMS 5358

25 April 1967

SECRET

TSD/POB RWH ery 2378

1 - TSD/Reg
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - TSD/TOPS
2 - POB files

WH/1 25 Apr Mr. Stewart by phone x6955
WH/2 " Mr. Hidalgo " x5421
TSD/TOPS " Mr. Rosing in draft

TSD/COP

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

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4		9	
5		10	

ORIG: Polly Pike/cmo
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 4 April 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ # ____
CONF: WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, LOGS 4, TSD 6

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 5 1901Z CITE DIRECTOR 89630

TO MEXICO CITY

LIONION

File Support

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 0912 (IN 34374)*

PX PAN-417 FILM ASA 125 CAN BE USED BY CLOSING DOWN CAMERA LENS ONE HALF F-STOP SMALLER OPENING. ALTERATION TO HQS PROCESSING NOT NECESSARY. REQN 559-59-67 WILL FURNISH ASA 80, PXN-417 WHICH IS A NON-STOCKED FILM. FYI, STOCK NUMBER 6750-H03-0513 IS FOR PX PAN-417 ASA 125. DO NOT RE-ORDER PXN-417 FILM BY THIS STOCK NUMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: LIONION Pulse Camera has been using PXN-417 film ASA 80, but supply just received is PX Pan 417 ASA 125.

50-6-122

Telecoord:
TSD/POB, Dick Thayer
OL/SD/CCDB, Catherine Van Gombos
WH/1 ____
COORDINATING OFFICERS

File Lionion support

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

R.L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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25/1

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR TSD6, AOGS4,

S E C R E T 311750Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0912

DIRECTOR

LIONION TECHS

REF A MEXICO CITY 0681 (IN 21472)

31 MAR 67 IN 34374

B RQN NO 559-59-67

LIONION PULSE CAMERA HAS BEEN USING PXN-417 FILM ASA84. SUPPLY JUST RECEIVED IS PX PAN 417 ASA 125. IF LATTER USED WITH SAME SETTING IN LIONION CAN HQS COMPENSATE IN DEVELOPMENT? IF NOT PLEASE MONITOR REF (B) AND EXPEDITE SHIPMENT OF PROPER FILM.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOACRE Attn: Geoffrey K. BLOXALD

INFO.
Chief, WH; COS, Panama City (Clement L. BROCK)

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/LIONION Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: See paragraph 5.

1. The LIONION Pulse Camera has been working for well over a year with no major technical problem. A few months ago the 100 foot film magazine had to be repaired because the supply spindles had tightened and put an excessive strain on the motor.

2. More recently, the battery supply had dropped to about 22.5 volts or so causing erratic operation. The sensor relay between the VLS-2 and the camera suffered the most because of chattering and consequently arcing between the points.

3. To prevent failures of this type in the future, Raymond L. BARCENAS is making a small battery charger at a nominal cost that can be floated across the batteries keeping them fully charged. We are doing it this way rather than ordering a DC power supply because it is less expensive than a commercial model and will not be bothered by house current interruptions or fluctuations. If however, WOACRE/PB foresees any problems by doing it this way, please inform us.

4. On a recent visit to LIONION and a check of the equipment, it was found that the lens of his FOCOMAT 1C enlarger has a fungus like smudge between the elements. We cannot detect any degradation in print quality but would like to have a new one in case this is a fungus and it gets worse.

5. In summation it is requested that WOACRE/PB provide the following to Mexico City, charge 7135-2403.

a. Sensor Relay believed to be a Potter-Bromfield 5A5089 but please check;

b. Comments on the power supply;

c. Lens for a Leitz FOCOMAT 1C.

See HMMS-5277 [illegible]

Distribution:
~~2~~ - WOACRE
1 - WH
1 - Panama

CS COPY

for Willard C. CURTIS

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31294

DATE
7 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-122/2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/LIONION -- Transmittal of 35mm Pulse Camera

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-3960

1. The attachment contains the defective 35mm Pulse Camera previously reported in referenced cable. Very little additional information can be supplied, concerning this mechanical failure, other than that reported in the reference. This particular camera was installed on 16 June 1965 and operated normally from that date until the afternoon of 28 June, at which time it began to continually blow fuses. Hugh T. FRANCOTTE entered the LIONION photographic basehouse that night, and when it was found that the problem could not be corrected on the scene, the camera was removed and taken to MKCHARITY for further troubleshooting. It was finally discovered that the shutter motor was malfunctioning and partially burned-out. Joseph M. RESCIGNO stated that since there was a definite "short" in the motor, this would cause the camera fuses to constantly blow.

2. Also included in the attachment are two (2), one hundred foot capacity, film magazines. Both of these magazines are faulty, causing the film to jam. They were both in use with the previous Pulse Camera which became inoperative during late May and was forwarded to KURIOT Headquarters for repair. FRANCOTTE had two (2) new magazines in stock, and they were issued to LIONION/1 for use with the camera presently being returned for repair or replacement.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Camera
Film magazines

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-18

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT, w/atts
1 - WH, w/o atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26520	1 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-18

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: COS, Mexico City ATTN: Hugh T. FRANCOTTE
and ATTN: Lawrence F. BARTER

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT: AQUATIC
Passports for LIONION -1 and 2. Case 5670, 5670-A

PRIORITY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paras 2, 3

REF: HMMA-26017, 4 May 1965

1. New passports were issued for LIONION -1 and for LIONION -2 in accordance with your request. These documents as well as the 2 old passports are being sent to you in true name pouch.

2. The documents have a validity period of 5 years from date of issue; however, please return them to KURIOT after the passports have served their purpose. Please sign one copy of the document receipt form accompanying the documents.

3. When the LIONIONS -1 and 2 have received their immigration papers, please try to send the original documents to KURIOT for a brief examination. If they cannot be sent, KURIOT would like to have color-annotated photocopies of them.

LEON T. CISSEL

ATTACHMENT: 1 envl.
1. Documents, U/S/C/T/N/P

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
19 - 137 - 415	HMMW-13,672 PRIORITY	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
27 May 1965	SECRET	50 - 6 - 122/2

ORIGINATING

OFFICE - OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT
TSD/AB/4 Wesley Parcells vcs	3284

1 - TSD/REG
2 - WH/1
1 - Case 5670
1 - Case 5670-A
1 - AP/4 Files
1 - AB/4 Chrono
1 - RID/AN

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		Mr. Spera, by Phone X-4507

AN/M ~~FI~~ ~~RE~~ DESK WH/1
ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/TSD/OA		ROBERT BUSSEY

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

1/ SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CD

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION TSD6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TSD TIME 1330 BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 7, FI, WH/C8

S E C R E T 291651Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3960

29 [illegible] IN 01364

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

PBPULSE CAMERA BEGAN CONTINUALLY BLOWING FUSES AFTERNOON 28 JUNE. FRANCOTTE PERFORMED BASIC CHECKS THAT NIGHT AND REMOVED CAMERA FOR FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING MKCHARITY. TROUBLE BELIEVED TO BE CENTERED AROUND DEFECTIVE SHUTTER MOTOR. MOTOR CHECKED MKCHARITY AND FOUND PARTIALLY BURNED OUT. REPAIRS CANNOT BE MADE MEXI. REQUEST REPLACEMENT CAMERA SOONEST. MALFUNCTIONING UNIT TO BE POUCHED HQS 1 JULY. TEMPORARY PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED LIONION BASE HOUSE MORNING 29 JUNE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 29

26/25 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	FI
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
TSD 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT. TIME BY

INFO.
FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7

SECRET 171815Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3829

17 JUN 65 IN 92775

AQUATIC PBRUMEN LIONION

REF TN 593898, 8 JUNE 1965.

PULSE CAMERA CABLES FORWARDED VIA REF, RECD 16 JUNE. CAMERA INSTALLED AND TESTED SAME NIGHT AND IS OPERATING SATISFACTORILY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KURIOT

INFO.: Chief, WH Division
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/PBRUMEN/Issuance of LIONION Passports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

2P

References: (A) MEXI 3234, 28 April 1965
(B) DIR 06231, 1 May 1965

1. Attached (USC) are the expired genuine PBRUMEN passports of LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 together with two photographs and five signature specimens of each agent.

2. It is requested that new PBRUMEN passports be prepared by KURIOT and pouched to the Station as soon as possible.

3. The assumption of reference B that passports obtained at the PBRUMEN Embassy in Mexico City are actually issued in the PBRUMEN Capitol City is correct.

4. The old passports should be returned to the Station as the Mexican immigration visas appearing of pages 11 and 19 of the LIONION-1 and LIONION-2 passports, respectively, must be in the possession of the Subjects until they are granted their final immigration documents.

Remove from Project: DAFGHAN
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB #: 75-443/77
Box: 24 Fold: 2

continued

Attachment:
As stated - (USC)

Distribution
✓ 2 - C/KURIOT w/att (USC)
1 - C/WHD w/o/att - to WH/1
1 - COS, JMWAVE w/o/att - Out Pouch
3 - Files

[illegible]		[illegible]
		ABSTRACT
		[illegible]
[illegible]	✓	[illegible]
[illegible]	✓	[illegible]
	✓	[illegible] 4
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
12/10/?D		MARGUERITE

TSD/18
Case No.
5670-A

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 11 May 65

CS COPY

No att for Hqs.

50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-50-137-415	HMMA-26017	4 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-122/2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-26017

5. The Station is investigating through LICRAFT-1 the passport issuing service in the Miami area, as mentioned in reference cables, and will forward details in separate correspondence. Examples of Miami-issued passports will be made available for Headquarters perusal.

6. The Station wishes to express its appreciation to KURIOT for prompt action in response to reference A.

Lawrence F. Barker
for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 50-6-122/2
X-REF TO FILE NO. D-19-137-415
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☒ SIG. T. C. King

FROM C/TSD/AA/4
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
TSD 6

INFO
VR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, WH 7, C/OPS, FI, [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 9 1973
MICROFILMED

C/WH/1

29 APR 65 IN 54659

SECRET 290023Z

CDIR WAVE CITE MEXI 3234

28

PAQUATIC TYPIC LIONION

1. PBRUMEN ORDINARY PASSPORTS FOR LIONIONS 1 AND 2 HAVE EXPIRED. SUBJS CANNOT TRAVEL FROM MEXI BECAUSE MEXI GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ISSUE REENTRY PERMIT IN EXPIRED PASSPORT, PBPRIME GOVT WILL NOT ISSUE VISA IN ABSENCE MEXI REENTRY PERMIT. MEXI GOVT STANDS PAT EXPLAINING, RIGHTLY, THAT PBRUMEN EMB WILL ISSUE NEW PASSPORT TO ANY PBRUMEN CITIZEN REGARDLESS OF POLITICIAL LEARNINGS HENCE LIONIONS MUST GET NEW PASSPORTS.

2. FOR REASONS OPERATIONAL SECURITY LIONIONS CANNOT VISIT EMB FOR NEW PASSPORTS SINCE THEY KNOWN BY SIGHT TO EMB PERSONNEL AS MEXICAN NEIGHBORS. THIS SITUATION RESULTED IN COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE CXO ESCORTED "BLACK" BORDER CORSSINGS BY LIONIONS LAST YEAR WHEN THEY VISITED RELATIVES IN PBPRIME.

3. CAN HQS OR JMWAVE ISSUE NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS FOR BOTH AGENTS? PLS CABLE PROCEEDURE. MEXI PREPARED POUCH OLD PASSPORTS AND SPARE PHOTOS. LIONIONS WISH TRAVEL SOON.

4. FYI JMWAVE: LICRAFT-1 RECENTLY PURCHASED TWO EXCELLENT NEW PBRUMEN PASSPORTS IN JMWAVE AREA FOR HIS SONS, AT COST 75 DOLLARS

50-6-122/2
29 Apr 65

SECRET

	TRAVEL PROGRAM
	ABSTRACT
	[illegible]
	[illegible] FOR FILMING
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
	[illegible]
WORD	[illegible]

TSD/IB

D19-137-415

Remove from Project KDAFGHAN
CS Classification: 50-6-122/2
JOB # 73-442/79
Box: 24 Fold: 2

FORM 1-64 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

14-00000

RID/AN [illegible] SECRET

EACH. IF HAVE [illegible] THIS BUSINESS, BELIEVE STA CAN GET THEM FROM LICRAFT.

SECRET

CFN

PLEASE [illegible] 4001 RF ACTION INDICATORS

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief, KURIOT Attn: Peter T. SWINEHART

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: AQUATIC/Operational -- Availability of the Nikon Television System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of Hugh T. FRANCOTTE's departure from Headquarters, KURIOT had recently begun an extensive evaluation of the Nikon closed circuit television system. If this particular system is now considered "operational", FRANCOTTE wishes to be so advised, as there may be a possible application for it in support of an operation at the Mexico City Station. Lawrence F. BARKER was recently briefed by FRANCOTTE on the Nikon system, and is now interested in obtaining additional facts concerning it. BARKER, who is responsible for the LIONION Project, foresees a possibility for its use in the LIONION photographic basehouse.

2. It was thought that perhaps the system could be further "operationally tested" at this basehouse, and at the same time, the Station could examine the possibility of a permanent installation. Presently, LIONION/1 is utilizing a Balscope and Pentax camera for obtaining photographic coverage of the entrance to the PBRUMEN Embassy. Provided the television camera could be equipped with a telephoto lens of about the same focal length as the combination of the Balscope and 20X eyepiece, this system might be a suitable substitute for the equipment now in service.

3. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be advised if the Nikon television system is available, and Headquarters thoughts concerning the testing of it at the LIONION basehouse.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - KURIOT
1 - WH

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-122/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO: [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-25981

DATE: 29 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-122/1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Sprague/ozy
UNIT : TSD/AOB
EXT : 2373
DATE : 15 Sept 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

85

15 SEP 64 R 39z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TSD 6
INFO : WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

Bustos

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 52651

AQUATIC LIONION

REF MEXI 0982 (IN 79741)*

1. PULSE CAMERAS BEING MODIFIED AND RECONDITIONED BY CONTRACTOR TO CORRECT FAULTS SURFACED DURING LIONION OP. ~~MINIMUM TIME OF~~ AVAILABILITY FIRST CAMERA THREE WEEKS PROVIDING NO UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES OCCUR.

2. IF PRESENT CAMERA INOPERABLE SUGGEST RETURN TO ROBOT AND ~~[illegible]~~ VLS-2 OR K-100 WITH BURST BRACKET AND VLS-2 FOR INTERIM OPERATIONAL COVERAGE.

3. A SECOND CAMERA WILL BE SENT MEXI AS SOON AS RECONDITIONING COMPLETED FOR USE STANDBY.

- END OF MESSAGE -

TSD/COMMENT: *LIONION pulse camera malfunctioning. Request Hq forward replacement.

Lionion
Lippy 2

WH/1/Mexico Miss Bustos by phone x4523

TSD/FB Mr. Ericlson in draft

SEYMOUR RUSSELL
C/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RoBussey
ROBERT BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component)
WH/1

TO :
IP/AN

TO : (Station/Base)
Mexico City

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
WHD

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST; ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
050	006	074/2

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
☐ OPEN FILE ☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE ☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
☒ RETAIN ☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)
HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
050

9. FILES ACTION
☒ HOLD IN CS FILES ☐ RESTRICTED ☒ UNRESTRICTED ☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER ☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.
#630

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE
23 July 1973

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

50	06	74/2

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

38 1—CS COPY

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ______

ACTION UNIT TSD-EOO

FILE, VR [illegible] WH8, DDP, EI

ACTION NO [illegible] WH8(b) #147 VR

S E C R E T 141955Z MAR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19236

560463

DIRTECH INFO PANTECH, DIRECTOR

AQUATIC KDAFGHAN KDFACTOR

REF A. HMMA-41502

B. PANTECH 18798 (IN 55-9398)

1. PLS PROCURE TWO 1000 MM CATADIOPTRIC LENSES WITH CAMERAS AS REQUESTED REF A.

2. FOR PANTECH: NOT NECESSARY PROCURE SPOTMATICS UNLESS ADVISED DIFFERENTLY BY DIRTECH. GP-1.

S E C R E T

630 WH(Almen) 20 Nov. TSD 11/m

File
KDAFGHAN
and
KDFACTOR
Support [illegible]

YEP - WH/LOG maintain high [illegible]

While

Does this mean WH/LOG handling?

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 15

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

C29

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR. TSD 6

ACTION CHANGE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 19236 (STATION & NUMBER)

IN 560963-A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : TSD (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : TSD 3121 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : WH 6252 (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

PW

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
KDFACTOR Project Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Project KDFACTOR was amended 10 December 1971 for $4,260 for FY 1971 to cover the termination bonuses for KDFACTOR-1 and KDFACTOR-7. The Project amendment also provides funds of $19,000 for FY 1972 and $20,000 for FY 1973.

2. One of the provisos of the Project amendment is that the Station furnish Headquarters an updated security review of this operation with particular attention of the knowledgeability of terminated agents and their families. The Station should also address itself to the contingency that the present sites or personnel will be blown and investigate alternate means of continuing the KDFACTOR coverage. Please forward the security review to arrive at Headquarters no later than 15 March 1972.

Leslie D. CLEBANOFF

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Dist:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-18773

DATE
23 DEC 1971
typed 21 Dec 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

1 - WH/1
1 - IP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/FI/CI	EH Hernandez	dm	4167

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	21-12-71	John C. Murray

EVIOUS EDITION.

(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Turnover of LIEMPTY Project

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None. For your information.

REFERENCE : HMMA-39,679, 28 October 1970

1. Primary responsibility for the operational and administrative handling of the LIEMPTY Project was transferred, effective 1 December 1970, within the Station from the REDTOP to the Operational Support Section. This transfer was made as part of our effort to consolidate basic support functions in the Operational Support Section, and to relieve the REDTOP Section of activities which do not contribute directly to the pursuit of priority recruitment targets. However, the REDTOP Section will continue to be the principal consumer of the LIEMPTY product as received from the LILYRIC and LICALLA photo surveillance points. It will also be the main provider of guidance and requests for special LILYRIC/LICALLA coverage.

2. The previous REDTOP Case Officer (Bruce H. FERNALD) introduced the new Case Officer, Howard T. BAGAUS, to LIEMPTY-9, -13, and -14 in early December. LIMOUSINE, owner of the LILYRIC property, will continue to be handled by Timothy M. ARCHBOLD of the REDTOP Section.

Howard J. Archable

Howard J. ARCHABLE

DISTRIBUTION:
~~2~~ - C/WHD
1 - C/SBD

cc to SB/C/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-39,832	9 December 1970
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/1 2

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: 24 PER #

ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

767

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE VR. LOGS-4

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1		6	
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4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 112130Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0915 11 JUL 69 IN 00900

m

DIRECTOR

ADMIN/LOGS/LIEMPTY

REFERENCES: A. DIRECTOR 19485

B. BOOK DISPATCH 6678

C. HMMTA-9673

1. KEYED TO REFERENCE B.

A. RAMBLER AMERICAN SEDAN

B. 1969

C. SERIAL AK-17560

D. MV-2947

E. 3258.25 USD PURCHAS PLUS 97.75 USD MEXICAN TAX; TOTAL 3356.00 USD.

G. REGISTERED AS GERENDE PERSONAL VEHICLE. RECORDED ON FINANCE VOUCHER 00038 DTD 9 JULY 1969

2. DISPOSAL MV - 2606 REPORTED REFERENCE C.

SECRET

LIEMPTY 202

50-6-74

SECRET

ORIG: Damon Watters/sah
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 10 July 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7 SECRET 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH-8 FILE, VR, LOGS-4

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 10 22 02 2 JUL 69
(elite) (reference number) (pica)
CITE DIRECTOR 19485
IL9 [redacted]

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 83554

REQUEST STATION ADVISE STATUS MV-2947 AND DISPOSITION MV-2606. INFO NEEDED SOONEST FOR COMPILING NEW BUDGET ESTIMATES.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WH/1 Ernest J. Tichborn

DISTRIBUTION:

OL/SD/FSB/VS

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

50-6-74

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ORIG: H. Peverill/jt
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 13 March 1969

	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		6	
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY _____ PER _____ # _____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , RI/AN, LOGS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 13 23 11 MAR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 83554

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 9438 (IN-11845)*

AN
AB X

1. STATION AUTHORIZED DISPOSE MV-2606 PER FR 45-31(3) AND REPLACE LOCALLY WITH 1969 RAMBLER, COST NOT TO EXCEED $4000.00. MV-2947 APPLIES TO NEW VEHICLE.

2. ADVISE DESCRIPTION MV-2947 AND DISPOSAL ACTION MV-2606 WHEN ACCOMPLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BD-6678.

3. FILE: 50-6-74/2

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Reference requested approval to replace locally a 1963 Rambler which has reached 78,000 miles and is in need of repairs.

WH/B&F

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DISTRIBUTION:
OL/SD/FSB/VS

CS COPY

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

13 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 76 PER ______

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______

X-REF TO FILE NO ______

FILE RID ☐ RET TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR, RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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5		10	

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438 Mexi

DIRECTOR

11 Mar 69 IN 11843

AN
AF X
IW
I
Dt
WH/1

LIEMPTY LOGS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 72,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 35,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

ES COPY

SECRET

11 Mar 69
50-6-74/2

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, LOGS 4, MPS/BG

959

S E C R E T 112210Z MAR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 9438

DIRECTOR

11 MAR 69 IN 11643

LIEMPTY LOGS

1. REQUEST APPROVAL REPLACE MV-2606, USED BY RAYMON H. GERENDE AS LIEMPTY PRINCIPAL AGENT. REPLACEMENT REQUESTED ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

J. VEHICLE NEARLY SIX YEARS OLD AND HAD 78,000 MILES AS OF 1 MARCH 1969.

B. IN NEXT SIX MONTHS VEHICLE WILL NEED REPAIRS TO ENGINE, BRAKES, STEERING AND BODY, ESTIMATED COST OF WHICH EXCEEDS 50 PER CENT OF CURRENT CASH VALUE OF CAR, WHICH ESTIMATED AT 1000 DOLLARS.

2. PLAN REPLACE MV-2606 WITH EQUIVALENT VEHICLE, COST NOT TO EXCEED 4000 DOLLARS. BELIEVE LOW-PRICED AMERICAN BRAND SEDAN SUCH AS RAMBLER AMERICAN WILL FIT OPERATIONAL, SECURITY, AND COVER REQUIREMENTS. NECESSARY MONHDCAVAILABLE IN PROJECT AS STATION PROJECTS FY69 LIEMPTY OBLIGATIONS AT 38,000 DOLLARS AGAINST PROJECT APPROVAL OF 43,320 DOLLARS FOR FY69.

3. IF APPROVED, PLS INCREASE FIELD PROCUREMENT ALLOTMENT.

4. FILE: 50-6-74/2.

S E C R E T

SECRET

HMMA 35208, 8 August 1968

LIEMPTY/6 terminated amicably and resettled by his son-in-law - was content with termination bonus of $4,736. Following termination, effective 31 May 1968, the LIMITED base house went out of existence - station did not retain apartment since coverage from LILYRIC is completely satisfactory. LILYRIC personnel have done such good work that station now has better coverage than ever and at less cost.

ORIG: Nancy Perkins/rc
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 19 Apr 68

MESSAGE FORM
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(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 19 22 22 Z
CITE DIRECTOR (reference number) 93000

TO MEXICO CITY

File LIEMPTY Support

REF: MEXICO CITY 5263 (IN 93773)*

1. LIEMPTY PROJECT STILL BEING PROCESSED. IF APPROVED AS SUBMITTED, WILL ~~CONTAIN~~ APPROVE TOTAL OF $42,185 FOR FISCAL 68. STATION SHOWS $31,071 OBLIGATED AS OF 31 MARCH, LEAVING BALANCE OF $11,114. ON BASIS PAST EXPENDITURES, CAN PROJECT ROUTINE DISBURSEMENT OF ABOUT $10,000 DURING APRIL, MAY AND JUNE, WHICH WOULD INDICATE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS TO PAY $4,736 BONUS, BARRING UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY YOUR UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS CAN BE LIQUIDATED SO AS TO COVER IT.

2. RATHER THAN RETRIEVE PROJECT BEFORE APPROVAL IN ORDER TO AMEND IT, SUGGEST YOU TERMINATE LIEMPTY/6 AND CLOSE LIMITED (IN MAY), AND PAY BONUS 1 JULY FROM FY 69 FUNDS [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Wish terminate LIEMPTY/6 and pay bonus. Will project funds cover this?

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/B&F

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OA, CI/OPS/BG 2

S E C R E T 181745Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY [illegible] Mexi

18 APR 68 IN 53773

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY

1. STATION PLANS TERMINATE LIEMPTY-6 AND CLOSE LIMITED BASE HOUSE EFFECTIVE 31 MAY 68. LIMITED COVERAGE NO LONGER COMPLETELY RELIABLE OR THOROUGH DUE ADVANCING AGE AND FAILING HEALTH LIEMPTY-6. LILYRIC BASE HOUSE WILLING AND ABLE INCREASE WORKING HOURS TO PROVIDE FULL SIX DAY COVERAGE. LICALLA TO CONTINUE UNCHANGED. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SALARY INCREASES PLANNED FOR LILYRIC AND LICALLA PERSONNEL, ESTIMATE ANNUAL SAVINGS OF 4000 DOLLARS THRU LIMITED TERMINATION.

2. REQUEST APPROVAL PAY LIEMPTY-6 TERMINATION BONUS OF 59,200 PESOS (4736 DOLLARS) BASED ON STANDARD MEXICAN FORMULA OF THREE MONTHS SALARY PLUS ONE MONTH FOR EACH FULL YEAR OF SERVICE (THIRTEEN YEARS), AT CURRENT SALARY RATE 3700 PESOS.

3. PLS ADVISE STATUS LIEMPTY PROJECT RENEWAL ACTION AND INFORM STATION TOTAL FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR FY 68. NEED INFO TO DETERMINE IF SUFFICIENT FUNDS AVAILABLE TO COVER LIEMPTY-6 TERMINATION BONUS.

S E C R E T

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ABSTRACT X		INDEX

18 April 68
50-6-74/2

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO Chief, WH

INFO Chief, SB

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are authentic copies of Memoranda of Oral Commitments reflecting salary increases for the following LIEMPTY agents:

a. LIEMPTY-9 : Salary increased from 4,000 pesos to 4,500 pesos per month.

b. LIEMPTY-14 : Salary increased from 1,800 pesos to 1,900 pesos per month.

c. LIEMPTY-26 : Initial salary set at 700 pesos per month.

d. LIEMPTY-27 : Salary increased from 1,500 pesos to 1,800 pesos per month.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
MOCs (4)

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/atts.
2 - C/SB, w/atts.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34573	2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/2

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TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, SB

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-15952, 27 November 1967

1. Headquarters' confusion regarding the various LIEMPTY properties is understandable, although each change in location was duly reported as it occurred, and at various times project renewal requests, progress reports, and other correspondence has pinpointed the locations of the base houses involved. The confusion undoubtedly stems from the unfortunate fact that LIMITED and LILYRIC in effect exchanged approximate locations in 1966 without changing cryptonyms. Up to this point, LIMITED had been in a building owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE fronting for WOFIRM). LILYRIC had been renting an apartment in a building in which WOFIRM had no financial interest. In 1965, however, LIMOUSINE bought the property containing the building in which LIMITED had been located, razed the building, and built a new building in which an apartment was rented to the Station (the rent, however, was to be returned to the Station for three years as partial payment on the loan which the Station had given LIMOUSINE so that he could buy the building). For various operational reasons it was decided to put the LILYRIC personnel into the new building, instead of the LIMITED crew. LIMITED was therefore moved into the building which LILYRIC had occupied. At this point, of course, new cryptonyms should probably have been assigned in order to avoid the confusion which has evidently developed. (This was not, however, simply a switch of personnel - each base house retained its organizational integrity, which is undoubtedly why crypts were not changed). As far as LICALLA is concerned, the confusion

........continued

Distribution:
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Attachment:
Identity Sheet (under separate cover)

18 Jan 68

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-33814

DATE
8 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

probably stems from the fact that, while its location has not changed, it is located within the LIMUST building, which is owned by WOFIRM (with LIMOUSINE acting as "front") and which is administered within the LIMESA project. As stated, however, all of this has been carefully documented for Headquarters. The LIMOUSINE purchase of the old LIMITED building generated considerable correspondence (see particularly MEXI 2159 and DIR 77745 of January 1965). HMMA-28322 and HMMA-30403 spelled out the reasons for switching LILYRIC and LIMITED, and the completion of the move was reported in HMMA-30687. Finally, sketches and plans of the LILYRIC and LIMITED houses in their new locations were forwarded with HMMA-31303, dated 7 February 1967. As far as LICALLA is concerned, its location and status was never open to question, and its location in the LIMUST complex is regularly mentioned in LIMESA progress renewal requests. The Station understands that a memo describing the locations of the various base houses was attached to the most recent LIMESA project renewal request when it was submitted to the staffs by WH/1.

2. Personnel within the base houses is also well-documented (most of the LIEMPTY progress reports have identified each agent in each house), and the personnel have never been switched from house to house. Perhaps the best rundown of these personnel is Raymond H. GERENDE's security review, forwarded with HMMA-31164, 24 January 1967.

3. Station Real Property reports are also, with one exception (MEXI-41), up-to-date and they reflect current conditions. MEXI-03 does, of course, include LICALLA. Nevertheless, the Station asked for $1800 for rent and utilities for the following reasons: first of all, utilities are an unrecoverable expense no matter who owns the apartment. Secondly, the rent, even though returned to the Station because WOFIRM owns the building, must physically be paid by the occupant of LICALLA. He, in turn, is reimbursed by the Station via GERENDE. LIMOUSINE eventually returns the money, at which time it is credited to expense. This could, of course, be handled differently, but the Station has always found it convenient to finance in this manner, largely because finances with LIMOUSINE are handled on a semi-annual basis. The reimbursement, therefore, often comes many months after the payment.

4. The Station neglected to cancel MEXI-41, which should be done as it refers to LILYRIC in its old location, before the move in 1966. LILYRIC is now MEXI-132, and is in the building owned by LIMOUSINE. Rent payments are, as originally intended, being used to help liquidate LIMOUSINE's debt, and, as instructed in HMMS-4814, 15 June 1966, the Station is crediting this money to miscellaneous receipts. There can be, therefore, no question of the need to include money for LILYRIC rent and utilities in the LIEMPTY project. LILYRIC rent is, and has been since the apartment was occupied in October 1966, 3,000 pesos per month, which amounts to $2,880 per year ($3,200 has been requested in order to include utilities). Headquarters is correct in stating that the agreed-upon figure for the rent in this new building was 2,300 pesos per month. Station files indicate that the reason for the increase (and this apparently was not reported to Headquarters) was that the bank which holds the major part of LIMOUSINE's loan had determined that 3,000 pesos was a fair price for the apartment. The Station had, of course, no choice but to go along with this.

5. The Station has no record of MEXI-02, but it is likely that this is the old LIMITED apartment, which was indeed purchased by WOFIRM (via LIMOUSINE) in 1955. But since that building was later purchased and razed by LIMOUSINE, the old LIMITED apartment ceased to exist. The LIMITED base house was subsequently transferred to the building which had previously housed LILYRIC (but not to the same apartment), and LIMITED is

now carried, in its current location, as MEXI-113. As was the case with old LILYRIC, the rent money is not returned to the Station; WOFIRM has no financial interest in the building. Thus it is evident that the LIEMPTY project renewal, which used to say "LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to Station miscellaneous receipts" should now carry the footnote "LICALLA rent is returned to the Station and credited to expense; LILYRIC rent is, and will be through September 1969, returned to the Station by LIMOUSINE and credited to miscellaneous receipts as partial payment on Station loan to LIMOUSINE."

6. Finally, the LIEMPTY darkroom is the room where the films taken by LICALLA, LILYRIC, LIMITED, and LIENTRAP are developed, printed, and (on request) enlarged by LIEMPTY-4. This darkroom is located in GERENDE's apartment, and he is paid 1,000 pesos per month for maintenance of the darkroom in recognition of the fact that one room in his living quarters has been turned into a darkroom, and his electric and water bills are substantially higher than they would normally be without a darkroom on the premises. GERENDE is building a house which he expects to occupy in February 1968. His plans for the house specifically include a LIEMPTY darkroom, and he will continue to be paid 1,000 pesos per month for this. To cover this payment in the new house, MEXI-137 has been written and will be forwarded to Headquarters shortly.

7. In answer to paragraph 5 of reference, it is hoped that the following summary will end the confusion:

a. LICALLA

(1) MEXI-03
(2) Address under separate cover (Identity-1). [illegible]
(3) LICALLA has been in operation at its present location since 1956, originally as a rented property. In September 1957 the building in which LICALLA is located (which consists of four units, collectively known as LIMUST) was purchased by the Station, with LIMOUSINE acting as a front.
(4) Actual cost is nothing, since property is owned by WOFIRM. The original purchase price for the four units was $40,000.00 with an additional $20,000.00 spent on renovation. Rent is paid for cover purposes at the annual rate of $1,248.00
(5) Cost of utilities is estimated at $552.00 annually.
(6) Since June 1957, LIEMPTY-9 (originally LIPSTICK-39) has operated the LICALLA base house. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LICALLA.

b. LIMITED

(1) MEXI-113
(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 2)
(3) LIMITED has been in its current location since December 1964, and it is a rented property. At its previous location, the LIMITED base had been in operation from 1953 until September 1964.
(4) Annual rent is $1,440.00
(5) Annual cost of utilities is estimated at $560.00.
(6) LIEMPTY-6 (originally LIPSTICK-14) has operated the LIMITED base house (in both locations) since 1955. No other LIEMPTY agents are associated with LIMITED.

c. LILYRIC

(1) MEXI-132

(2) Address under separate cover (Identity 3)

(3) LILYRIC has been in its present location since October 1966, when the new building was completed and ready for occupancy. It is a rented property, although for three years beginning 1 October 1966 the rent is to be returned to the Station as partial payment on a loan to LIMOUSINE. This loan was made to permit LIMOUSINE to purchase the property and construct the building in which LILYRIC is located. This property had previously belonged to WOFIRM and had contained the building in which LIMITED had been located. LILYRIC was previously (November 1956 to September 1966) located in a rented property (the same building, but not the same apartment, in which LIMITED is now located).

(4) Annual rent is $2,880.00.

(5) Estimated annual cost of utilities is $320.00.

(6) LIEMPTY-13 (originally LIJERSEY-2) has operated the LILYRIC base house (in both locations) since LILYRIC was established in 1956. He is supported by his wife (LIEMPTY-14), and his son (LIEMPTY-27). Another son, LIEMPTY-26, has also worked in LILYRIC. (Because LIEMPTY-13 has a full-time job, LIEMPTY-14 does most of the photographic work, assisted by LIEMPTY-27. LIEMPTY-13 does some of this work, and makes all meetings with GERENDE.)

d. LIEMPTY photo lab.

(1) MEXI-137

(2) Address (as of February 1968) under separate cover (Identity 4).

(3) Actually, no property as such is involved here. The Chief of Station authorized payment to GERENDE for the use of a room in his quarters as a darkroom in 1964, after GERENDE was moved out of a base house in which he lived (rent-free) and maintained the dark room.

(4) and (5) Annual cost is $960.00, including utilities.

(6) The occupant is GERENDE, although the photo processing is normally done by LIEMPTY-4.

8. It is hoped that the above will shed some light on the problem; the Station will be glad to answer any further questions Headquarters may have.

FOR/Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

HMMA-33814, 9 January 1968

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity (1)	Benjamin Hill 15
Identity (2)	Pedro Antonio de los Santos 104, apt. 17
Identity (3)	Gelati 2 (as this is a corner house it is also known as Pedro Antonio de los Santos 100), Penthouse
Identity (4)	Calle Bezares, Colonia Molino de Bezares, Mexico 10, D.F.

S/c ATT #1 HMMA 33814

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

SECRET

FI LIEMPTY Support

DISPATCH SECRET

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Admin/Finance - Station Accounting for December 1967.

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 3.

REFERENCE : A. HMMT-8387
B. Book Dispatch 0279

1. Attached is a copy of the subject accounting. The original was forwarded to the Office of Finance by reference A.

2. As requested in reference B, there are no FY-1966 unliquidated obligations. FYI: FY-1967 unliquidated obligations are as follows:

SUPPORT	$1,764.05
LIHALO	232.15
LIP	169.45
LILISP-X	2,023.50

In reporting upon receipt of [illegible] refunds for safehouse rent collections for the period January thru June 1967, Projects LIMESA and LIEMPTY will be credited in like amounts.

3. It is requested that FY-68 advices of suballotments for all Station's activities be forwarded as soon as available and that "Notifications of Project Approval Action" for Projects LICONGA and [illegible] be amended to increase FY-68 funds available in the field as follows:

LICONGA - to $9,700 (for quarters, operational travel, rental of safehouse, and miscellaneous operational expenses).
[illegible] - to $20,000 see HMMA-33489.

Attachment:
As Stated Above.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att.

HMMT-8583

12 January 1968

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief of Station, Mexico City		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Properties

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The presence of so many new desk personnel at headquarters - people who are unfamiliar with station history - means that we must turn to you with questions oftener than you might wish. Our present question concerns property involved in LIEMPTY. (We are submitting the project as received from the field, but do not understand the background very well.)

2. HMMA-11257 of 16 January 1959, a project renewal, said that "approximately one year ago the LICALLA base was purchased by KUBARK through LIMOUSINE", and we have not found any cables or dispatches which would show a change in that status. Does MEXI 03 LIMUST/LIMESA (see Real Property Report of August 1967) include LICALLA? If so, and if we own LICALLA, why does it cost us $1800 a year for rent and utilities? (Up until the submission dated 1963 the project renewal used to say "LIMITED and LICALLA rents are returned to station by LIMOUSINE and credited to station miscellaneous receipts" but after that time this sentence was eliminated.)

(Continued..)

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-15952	27 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/2

RI
CHRONO

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sl	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

3. LIMITED is a different problem complicated by the fact that we are no longer sure what the name refers to. Originally we bought LIMITED and then sold it in January 1965 to LIMOUSINE who put up a new building on the lot and saved an apartment for our use. LIMOUSINE now owns the new building, but "MEXI 02, LIMITED Safehouse" is shown on the Real Property Report as "purchased" by WOFIRM in 1955 - should this not be corrected? A further complication is that HMMA -31164, GERENDE's January 1967 security review, speaks of LILYRIC in its present new location, inhabited by LIEMPTY/13, /14 and /27. Has the old LIMITED been re-christened LILYRIC because of its new inhabitants? When was it completed and are we still withholding rent from LIMOUSINE in settlement of his payment to us for the property. The REAL Property Report shows LILYRIC, MEXI 41, as having been leased in 1958 and costing $1030 to maintain ($856 rent, $44 reparis, and $130 utilities). It also shows MEXI 132 LIMEPTY, LIMOUSINE, LILYRIC as having been rented in October 1966 for $2880 a year (which is more than the 2,300 monthly rent for the flat in his new building which LIMOUSINE agreed that we would withhold for a period of two years after completion in partial settlement of his purchase of the LIMITED property.) (HMMA 25310, 3 February 1965.)

4. What does the LIEMPTY darkroom consist of?

5. We are, as you can see, confused. Would you be kind enough to send us a brief summary of each of the four LIEMPTY properties.

a. name and property (MEXI) number

b. address (under separate cover)

c. date purchased, sold, rented, etc.

d. Basic cost (original cost if purchased, annual cost if rented)

e. cost of utilities

f. occupants

6. If rental money which we pay out for cover reasons is subsequently returned to us, should it be included in a project?

H. B

Theresa H. BACHARDY

File LIEMPTY/[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
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DATE: [illegible]

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BY________PER________#________

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INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: HMMA 33059*

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES PLEASE LEAVE [illegible] TRUCK UNDER LIEMPTY AND DO NOT INCLUDE IN [illegible] RENEWAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Plan transfer [illegible] truck to Project [illegible].

Not sent. Msg. carried by Langda (P) on 17 Oct.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMBRACE/LIEMPTY - Transfer of Responsibility for the LIENTRAP Vehicle

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

References : MEXICO CITY-2600
MEXICO CITY-2654

1. In July 1967 the responsibility for the LIEMPTY Project passed from the Station Support Section to the REDTOP Section, where it more reasonably belongs. However, the LIENTRAP segment of the LIEMPTY Project has little to do with REDTOP activities and more rightly belongs in the Support Section. The Station, therefore, decided to transfer the LIENTRAP vehicle, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 to the LIEMBRACE Project with LIEMBRACE-3 to be the Principal Agent. This decision was based on both security and operational efficiency considerations. The formal change of command was made on 10 August 1967 in a meeting between GERENDE, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMBRACE-3.

2. Certain members of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team were already knowledgeable of the existence of the LIENTRAP vehicle and its operators from past operations and also from the old LIPSTICK Project. Conversely, LIEMPTY-10 was knowledgeable of the existence of the surveillance team and knew some of the members of the team (LIEMBRACE-4 is the step-son of LIEMPTY-10). By placing the vehicle under the command of LIEMBRACE-3, there was no breakdown of compartmentation.

continued...

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

16 Oct 67: Oral message sent back to station via Al Reynolds to the effect that we feel it impolitic to present a surveil ance poject in the neighborhood of $62,000, so please keep the truck under LIEMPTY for admin. purposes (and use it anyway you want.) C/WH/1 did not want to send a written message on this. NP

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 50-6-74

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 33059

GROUP 1

DATE: 12 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-72/1

3. On the other hand, the LIENTRAP vehicle was the most vulnerable part of the LIEMPTY complex and a roll-up of the truck could lead to Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and from GERENDE to the sensitive LIEMPTY photo basehouses. Thus, by attaching the LIENTRAP vehicle to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team we have actually improved the security of the LIEMPTY Project somewhat.

4. On the operational efficiency side, the benefits which will accrue from having the truck tied-in with the surveillance team for use in dispatching are obvious. In many areas of the city, such as around the market areas and third class hotels, an ostensibly empty truck attracts much less attention than a person on foot or even a passenger car. The ability to dispatch a target and at the same time take photographs of the target and any companions has its operational advantages. Hopefully, in some of the target-of-opportunity coverages now provided by the surveillance team, it will be possible to take photographs of the person with whom the PBSTEAL officer meets. Certainly, if the team takes an unidentified subject home after a target-of-opportunity discovery, by allowing the team leader to place the photo truck on the home we will speed-up the receipt of photographs.

5. LIEMBRACE-3 was told that LIEMPTY-10 and 11 have certain accomodation addresses which they must check on a routine basis and that any assistance given the LIEMBRACE team should not interfere with this task. It was stressed to LIEMBRACE-3 that under no circumstances should team members transport or otherwise assist in the servicing of the accomodation addresses. LIEMBRACE-3 was briefed on the normal activity of the LIENTRAP truck in providing photographic coverage of addresses in which the Station has an interest. As for handling the use of the truck, the following caveats were laid upon LIEMBRACE-3:

a. LIEMBRACE-3 should discuss the normal activities of LIENTRAP only with LIEMBRACE-1, the assistant team leader.

b. The truck is not to be used in active mobile surveillance without the approval of the Station.

c. The truck will be used for dispatching purposes only in those areas in which passenger vehicle and/or foot dispatching are not feasible.

d. LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will not be used for active surveillance nor will they be introduced to team members who do not presently know their true identities.

6. Operationally, the efficacy of the use of the LIENTRAP truck in coordination with the LIEMBRACE team has been proven in the coverage and surveillance of a letter-drop on Mexico City. Please see references for details of this operation, which could not have been accomplished in a secure manner without the truck assisting the team. No problems have been noted as a result of the change in command structure for the LIENTRAP truck.

7. Financially, one possible problem is evident in the new arrangement. Headquarters has limited the costs of the LIEMBRACE Project to US$ 50,000 per year and it will not be possible for the Project to remain within this figure with the LIENTRAP vehicle and personnel included therein. The Station does not see this as a great problem because the Operational Program includes the cost of those assets in the LIEMPTY Project and the transfer will merely mean a decrease in LIEMPTY equal to the increase in LIEMBRACE.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

[illegible] Support

14. As approved by Headquarters, the present LIENTRAP vehicle will be replaced by a new Ford "Econoline" truck in the near future. Before the old LIENTRAP vehicle is sold, it will be used to cover residences of the FJSTEAL/NYXIS opposition who are living in Mexico City.

HMMA - 32068
23 May 67

" The LIENTRAP vehicle has been replaced." HMMA 33455, 8 Nov 67, Project Renewal

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIMOUSINE/LIEMPTY/LILYRIC - Occupants of Building at Gelati #2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

References : A. HMMW-15157, 18 January 1967
B. HMMA-31303, 7 February 1967

1. Station wishes to correct somewhat the information provided in Reference B. Because of changing of plans and an error on Raymond H. GERENDE's part, the number of floors of the building located at Gelati #2 was given incorrectly in Reference B. The plans forwarded as attachments to Reference B were correct. The description in the dispatch should be corrected to show a ground-floor, three floors with two apartments each and a penthouse.

2. The occupants of the building, all of whom were checked and approved by the Station before leasing are:

Ground Floor Business - A beauty salon is located on this floor which is operated by Nelly Infante de Garcia. Her lease was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 31 May 1969. She pays $152.00 US per month rent.

Second Floor - Apartment 1 - Dr. Hector MUNOZ Franco. His lease was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 31 August 1967. He pays $128.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 2 - Alicia MADRIGAL Osorio rented this apartment on 1 November 1966 and she plans to vacate at the end of April 1967. She pays $84.00 US per month.

continued...

Distribution:
③ - Chief/WHD

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31837	18 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-74/1

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMA-31[illegible]

Third Floor - Apartment 3 - This apartment is rented by the Eighth Electoral District for use as an area office. The contract was signed on 1 February 1967 and is valid until 31 July 1968. The rent paid on this apartment is $112.00 US per month.

Apartment 4 - Edmundo [illegible]. His contract was signed on 1 December 1966 and is valid until 30 November 1968 with a rent of $80.00 US per month.

Fourth Floor - Apartment 5 - Wilfreid and Edith ASCHENBRENNER. Under the terms of their lease, which was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967, they pay $96.00 US per month rent.

Apartment 6 - This apartment is rented by Richard P. MAPES who pays $72.00 US per month. His contract was signed on 1 October 1966 and is valid until 30 September 1967.

Penthouse - The penthouse is leased by Andres GOYENECHEA O. who pays $240.00 US per month rent. His contract was signed on 1 September 1966 and is valid until 30 August 1967.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: S.L.Yaxley/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 7 April 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ # ______

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/1

INFO: FILE , VR . LOGS 4,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 7 22 29 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90635

TO

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 0996 (IN-38335)*

PURCHASE OF MV-2823 FOR $3440.91 AUTHORIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Station requested approval to increase amount of Ford Econoline from $3200.00 to $3440.91.

Nancy [illegible]

WH/1 Nancy Perkins
WH/B&F David W [illegible]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

#52

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION WH8 ~~☐~~ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 060035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0996

6 Apr 67 [illegible] 3 8 3 3 5

DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 88210

B DIRECTOR 46928

REQUEST AUTHORIZED AMOUNT FOR MV-2823 BE INCREASED FROM $3200.00 TO $3440.91 WHICH NEW PRICE OF FORD ECONOLINE NOW GOING INT~~M~~O ~~CT~~PRODUCTION AFTER 6 MONTHS LAPSE. NEW PRICE INCLUDES MANDATORY SAFETY EQUIPMENT INCLUDING FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SEAT BELTS AND WINDSHIELD WASHER NOT PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED BY MEXICAN LAW AND RADIO WHICH NECESSARY TO COVER TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT TO BE INSTALLED BY WOFACT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Status of LIEMPTY-5

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMW-15270, 23 February 1967

1. LIEMPTY-5 is the wife of LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the photography base used in processing the pictorial take received from the various units within the LIEMPTY complex. As such, she sometimes assists LIEMPTY-4 in the photo processing work. She is carried as a part-time basehousekeeper because she must remain at home as added security when photographs are being processed and/or being held until the scheduled meeting between LIEMPTY-4 and Raymond H. GERENDE takes place and the photographs passed for onward transmittal to the Station.

2. The Station regrets that LIEMPTY-5 was not included in the last Project Renewal Request, but the oversight probably resulted because LIEMPTY-5 does not receive a salary at the present time. The Station wishes to keep her present Memorandum of Oral Commitments, which calls for an hourly salary, in effect in case her services as a salaried asset are needed in the future.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - Chief/WHD

LIEMPTY Support
50 6 74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-31515	6 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-150615

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG: A. C. Kumro/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 26 October 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE LOGS 4

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 26 18 31Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 46928

TO MEXICO CITY

LOGS LIEMPTY

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)*
B. DIRECTOR 45720**
C. MEXICO CITY 8962 (IN-25013)***

MV-2823 APPLIES. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3200.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: *Requested authority replace MV-2279 with panel truck at maximum cost of $3200.
**Approved disposal of MV-2279 and authorized replacement if project funds available.
***Provide MV number. Approximately $10,000. available.

WH/1 C. Bustos (telecon)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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B1 7

ACTION WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR LOGS 4

S E C R E T 251500Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8962

DIRECTOR

25 Oct 68 IN 25013

REF: DIRECTOR 45720

PLEASE PROVIDE MV NUMBER FOR NEW TRUCK. APPROXIMATELY TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

Support

Bustos

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

ORIG: R. L. King/sly
UNIT: WH/Logistics
EXT: 6282
DATE: 21 October 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

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DISSEM BY 52 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, LOGS 4, MPS/BG 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 21 20 42 Z

CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 45720

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: MEXICO CITY 8920 (IN-22107)

APPROVAL GRANTED SELL MV--2279, CAN REPLACE IMMEDIATELY ONLY IF CURRENT PROJECT FUNDS CAN ABSORB COST, WHICH HDQS. DOUBTS. OTHERWISE MUST INCLUDE COST IN NEXT PROJ APPROVAL AND PURCHASE AFTER 1 DECEMBER. ALSO ASSUME THAT FY-67 PROGRAMMED AMOUNT OF $45,000 CAN ABSORB COST OF NEW TRUCK. SEE HMMS-4969. PLS COMPLY WITH BOOK DISPATCH 5373, DATED 7 MARCH 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested disposal and replacement of MV-2279.

WH/1, C. Bustos (telecon) by

WH/B&F, Mr. Connor (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. L. KING
C/WH/LOG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 38

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, [illegible]

S E C R E T 210017Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8920

DIRECTOR

1. REQUEST AUTHORITY TO REPLACE MV-2279 LIEMPTY TVA SLOT NUMBER 2 WITH FORD ECONOLINE PANEL TRUCK. MAXIMUM COST $3200.00.

21 OCT 66 IN 22107

2. MV-2279 PURCHASED 1959. ODOMETER READING 4900 MILES. EXCESSIVE OIL USE INDICATES NEED FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL OR REPLACEMENT OF ENGINE. TRUCK SINCE USED AGAINST MANY TARGETS. CONTINUED USE HAZARDOUS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

6 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CCS

FROM : WH Division

SUBJECT : Project Funding Plan/Project LIEMPTY (FI)

A. Identification of Activity

1. Project cryptonym: LIEMPTY

2. Approved for: 1 December 1965 - 30 Nobember 1966:
$41,500
FY 1966 - $25,520
FY 1967 - $15,980

3. Proposed successive fiscal year budget: Same

4. Brief statement of project aims, character and structure:

The purpose of this project is to provide support for mobile (1 truck) and stationary (3 base houses) photographic surveillance; one base house is also used as a dispatching base for a physical surveillance team. This project covers one Mexican Contract Agent who serves as Principal Agent for the eight Mexican field agents under the Project.

B. Funding History

1. The Contract Agent receives his salary directly from the Mexico City Station Case Officer ($540/month). He also receives money from the Station which he uses to pay the field agents their salaries (total of $1.700/month) and operational expenses. Receipts are received.

2. Funds have always been handled in this manner.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12 TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION LOGS-4 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, SOD-6, WH/C-8

S E C R E T 161803Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7641 IN 39026 16 June 66

LOGISTICS INFO DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02750 [illegible]

JBECHO

PLEASE SHIP 240 ROLLS OF STOCK NUMBER 6750-292-9666 FILM TRI-X 35MM, 36 EXP ROLLS ON REF IURADIAL FLIGHT. $158.60 NEEDED FOR UNEXPECTED HIGH DEMAND FOR LIEMPTY PROJECT. CITE REQUISITION NUMBER 539-73 66 FAN 6135-2990.

S E C R E T

SI

SECRET

o.K.

[illegible]

LIEMPTY Bgt

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

ASSIGN TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH/C ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH8 CI S3 S4 -

S E C R E T 282130Z

PRIORITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6403 28 FEB 65 IN 64419

REF WAVE 9343 (IN 63107)

RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT GENEVA. ADVISE IF NECESSARY TO MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

6400 9343 GENEVE

BT

SECRET

ETA 1 MAR

LIEMPTY // LCFLUTTER

[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three authentic copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

MOC of — LIEMPTY-6 carded and filed in 201-082444 and made [illegible]
" " ——> LIEMPTY-9 " ——> 201-136454 " " " " [illegible]
" " ——> LIEMPTY-10 " ——> 201-121190 " " " " [illegible]
MOC of ——> LIEMPTY-11 " ——> 201-119960 and made [illegible]

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
(3) - Chief WH Division
Atts herewith

Atts detached in RID/AN given Slash number and filed in 201's as indicated above.

CROSS REFERENCE TO
P-2464
P-2488
P-2453
P24-73

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28138

DATE
50-6-74/2
25 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Commitments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are three copies of subject memoranda covering the following agents used within Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

[illegible]

LIEMPTY-9	201-136454	[illegible]
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960	[illegible]
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567	[illegible]

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
3 MOC ea. h/w

filed in individual 201 files

CS COPY

50-6-74/2

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26232	DATE 1 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/2

MESSAGE FORM 15

ORIG : C. Bostos - Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 10 March 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-5762

28 SECRET

R1

ROUTING			
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[illegible] 65 22 39 z
ROUTINE
SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO OL 4, BPA, VR, FILE

TO
MEXI

INFO:

CITE DIR 91437

LIEMPTY LIMOUSINE

REF: MEXI 2732 (IN 19326)*

APPROVAL GRANTED DELAY INTTIAL PAYMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Limousine wishes delay initial payment for limitdd property for 90 days.

WH/Log J. Wisniewski

TELCCORD OL/RECD Bill Cabanis, DC/RECD/OL

TeCOORD DC/LOG, GEORGE MELLON

Liempty [illegible]

5
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Raford W. Herbert
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 14

SS S E C R E T

ORIG : Joseph F. McMahon
UNIT : WH/Logistics ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7282 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 4 December 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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4 Dec 64 21 14z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO OL 4, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 68656

REF: A. DIR 66008
B. MEXI 1798 (IN 34773)*

REQUEST FOR $500 INCREASE FOR MV 2676 PER REF B APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Requested increase from $3000 to $3500.

C/WH/1 by Spera

Telecon:
OL/PD, Mr. Gauvreau

5
4
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RAFORD W. HERBERT
AC/WH DIVISION

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : John T. Martin
UNIT : WH/Logistics
EXT : 7282
DATE : 23 November 1964

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
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23 Nov 64 19 45 z

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: OL 4 VR FILE

Busses

TO MEXI INFO: CITE DIR 66008

REF MEXI 1667 (IN26899)*

DISPOSAL OF MV 2284 AUTHORIZED AND LOCAL PROCUREMENT REPLACEMENT VEHICLE COST NOT TO EXCEED $3000 APPROVED. MV2676 APPLIES. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH/COMMENT: Request authority dispose of MV2284 and replace with new compact cost not to exceed $3000;

DC/WH/1

Telecon:
OL/TD/VSB, Maj. Fred
OL/PD. Mr. Gauvreau

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WH DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOSEPH F. MCMAHON
CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 13

32 SECRET

☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM Mexico City

ACTION OL 4

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO.

VR. FILE WH 7

SECRET 1923002

DIR CITE MEXI 1667 (EASBY ACTING)

CP

20 Nov 64 IN 26899

JBECHO

1. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION DISPOSE MV 2284 WITH 75,000 MILES. COST NEEDED REPAIRS AND OVERHAUL EXCEED 30 PERCENT LOCAL MARKET VALUE.

2. WISH REPLACE WITH NEW COMPACT 8 CYLINDER FORD WITH STANDARD EQUIPMENT FOR USE OLIVER C. SCANTLING. DUE SCANTLING BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH LOCAL FORD CAN GET 15 PERCENT DISCOUNT AND GOOD TRADE IN ALLOWANCE MV 2284 WHICH ALSO FORD. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3,000. DUE ALTITUDE, TRAFFIC CONDITIONS, NATURE SCANTLING ASSIGNMENTS, 8 CYLINDER VEHICLE NEEDED.

3. SUFFICIENT FY 1965 FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

47 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OL 4, RF, VR

SECRET 240224Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6642

24 Oct 63 IN 46326

LIEMPTY

1. REQ AUTHORITY DISPOSE MV 2286 CHEVROLET 1958. MILAGE 65,000. NEEDS EXTENSIVE REPAIR DUE AGE AND USE.

2. REQUEST AUTHORITY REPLACE WITH LOCAL PURCHASE RAMBLER CLASSIC 4 DOOR AT $US 3,050. STANDARD FACTORY INSTALLED EQUIPMENT INCLUDES RADIO, WHITE WALL TIRES, CIGARETTE LIGHTER, CLOCK.

3. ABOVE ASSIGNED RAYMOND H. GERENDE. FUNDS AVAILABLE PROJECT LIEMPTY THIS PURCHASE.

SECRET

Liempty Support

Funding

[illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Memoranda of Oral Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For your information

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject memoranda covering the following agents employed under Project LIEMPTY and reflecting recent salary adjustments:

LIEMPTY - 4	201-117967
LIEMPTY - 6	201-082444
LIEMPTY - 8	201-121189
LIEMPTY - 9	201-136454
LIEMPTY - 10	201-121190
LIEMPTY - 11	201-119960
LIEMPTY - 14	201-167567

Cover and KUBARK job assignments of above agents remain as previously reported.

for Willard C. CURTIS

50-6-74/2

Attachments:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - WH w/3 cpy ea att.
2 - Files

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE TYPED
11 Jan 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
15 Jan 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-20491

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/2

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Encl -7

[illegible] [illegible]

DISPATCH

TO : Chief, [illegible]

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY [illegible]

Cancel MV Authority

[illegible] February 1961

HMMA-1667, 15 December 1960

Project LIEMPTY does [illegible] requested that Headquarters cancel this MV authority.

[illegible]

9 February 1961

Distribution:
  2 - [illegible]
  3 - Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-16426

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
8 February 1961

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Memoranda of Oral Commitments

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
None, for Hqs. info only

REFERENCE(S)

Attached for Headquarters files are copies of recently revised Memoranda of Oral Commitments on several LIEMPTY agents:

LIEMPTY-4	201-117967
LIEMPTY-6	201-82444 201- (No Station record of 201 number)
LIEMPTY-8	201-121189
LIEMPTY-9	201-136454
LIEMPTY-11	201-119960
LIEMPTY-13	201-119961
LIEMPTY-14	201-167567

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

3 February 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/3 cys ea of 7 atts
2 - Files

50-6-74/2

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH

SUBJECT
Field Procurement of MV-2320 - Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
HMMS-1241, dated 5 Feb. 1960

1. Reference dispatch gives authorization to procure one 2-4 door, used sedan for Project LIEMPTY, MV-2320. Authorization was valid until 3 May 1960.

2. Headquarters has no record of procurement of this vehicle. If this sedan has been purchased please comply with paragraph 2 of reference and return signed Declaration of Trust.

3. If the purchase has not been made at this date please advise Headquarters if the Station still intends to secure the sedan and give justification for an extension of authority to purchase.

END OF DISPATCH

3 - Mexi

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 Dec. 1960	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-1667

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

Distribution:
1 - WH/LOG
1 - WH/REG
1 - CL/SD/VS

ORIGINATING			
OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/LOG	P. G. PIKE	nd	4591

COORDINATING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3		
Tele coord: CL/SD/VS	9 Dec. 60	with J. Herman

RELEASING		
OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH/SUPPORT		Paul E. Arneson

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED.

DISPATCH

OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS; BUDGET AND FISCAL BRANCH, FI/SG

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ______ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/3/Mexico (OPERATING DIVISION AND COUNTRY)

SECTION 1. BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED FUNDS *(To be completed from data in project outline)*

THE TOTAL FUNDS BEING REQUESTED FOR ABOVE PROJECT, AMOUNTING TO $ ______ , ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

BREAKDOWN AND TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR		
	1961	1962	
COMPENSATION	$ 23,000	$ 15,000	$
ALLOWANCES			
TRAVEL	1,500	1,000	
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,900	4,100	
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	1,500	1,000	
OTHER:			
TOTALS	$ 31,900	$ 21,100	$

SECTION 2. ADMINISTRATIVE *(To be completed by project officer)*

INDICATE ANY DETAILS THAT WILL ASSIST FINANCE DIVISION IN MAKING ADVANCES, DISBURSEMENTS AND ACCOUNTINGS

A. TYPE OF PROJECT *(Check one)*

☒ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

B. METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

C. FUNDS WILL BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY *(Check one)*

1	X	REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS *(FHB 30-1500-1 or FHB 30-1500-4)*
2		RECEIPTS ONLY *(R 230-200)*
3		OTHER *(Explain)*:

SECTION 3. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS *(To be completed by operating division budget officer)*

I CERTIFY THAT, TO MEET THE ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED IN SECTION 1:

A. -- FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE DIVISION'S BUDGET FOR THE FY 1961 .

B. -- FUNDS HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR THE FY 1961 .

SIGNATURE OF OPERATING DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER	DATE

SECTION 4. AUTHORIZATION *(To be completed by Projects Branch, FI/OPS)*

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 Dec 1960 TO 30 Nov 1961 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 53,000 , AS BROKEN DOWN IN SECTION 1.

SIGNATURE FOR PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/OPS	DATE

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond G. GERENDE
Oliver G. SCANTLING
Louisa G. MACRIDE

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
C.L.Zehring	2535		

14-00000

013

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 22 SEP 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : WH 4, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 23 0210Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 16961

6375

DIR CITE MEXI 6375

ACUATIC

1. POUCH SOONEST TWO ENLARGER BULBS FOR MODEL 57100 EXACT 35 ANDREAS VEIGEL STUTTGARD-BAD CANNSTATT. MACHINE WILL TAKE PHILIPS 125 V 100 W P28 TYP 6257 C/05 SOCKEL UNTEN WITH SOCKET MARKING A C32. NONE AVAILABLE MEXI.

2. FOR LIEMPTY BASE WHICH PROCESSES ALL LIMMERICK OP PHOTOS. ADDRESS CUINTON N. OUSLER FOR PROPER DELIVERY.

END OF MESSAGE

Liempty

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: ____________ (APPROVAL OF PROJECT); ____________ (ACCOUNT NO.); ____________ (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM [illegible] TO [illegible] IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 54910.00 AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

____________ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ____________ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR	FISCAL YEAR
	1962	[illegible]
COMPENSATION	$ 32600	$ 26120
ALLOWANCES	1260	900
TRAVEL	2225	1225
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	1000	5000
OTHER: [illegible]	5000	2200
TOTAL [illegible]	$ 42475	$ 36425

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one): ☑ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- ☑ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (ASR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CPR 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ~~[illegible]~~ WH DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 196[illegible] CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

____________ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ____________ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

- ☑ PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE
- ☐ PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
- ☐ RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION
- ☐ APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

[illegible] H. [illegible]
[illegible] G. [illegible]
[illegible] 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, [illegible] 2, 3, [illegible] 5, 6, [illegible], 34
[illegible] J. [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] D. [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
[illegible]	2[illegible]		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

SECRET

9 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Purchase of One Automobile and Increase of LIEMPTY TVA by One

1. According to the Project Renewal Request for LIEMPTY from the Mexico City Station, they plan to increase the LIEMPTY surveillance team during the coming year by two agents. To maintain the efficiency of an enlarged team, they will require one additional automobile.

2. It is requested that the TVA for LIEMPTY be increased by one automobile and that the Station be authorized to purchase locally this automobile for use under the LIEMPTY Project.

J.C. King
C/WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

file

LIEMPTY/Support

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; ________ (ACCOUNT NO.) ; WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 December 1958 TO 30 November 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,300.00, AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

________ FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH ________ DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 37,710.00	$ 23,320.00
ALLOWANCES	1,5[illegible]0.00	1,9[illegible]0.00
TRAVEL	4,750.00	1,[illegible]50.00
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,250.00	3,750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	———
TOTAL	$ 65,500.00	$ 29,800.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one) ☐ REGULAR ☐ SUBSIDY ☐ PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
- ☐ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (APR 30-10)
- ☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
- ☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ________ DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ________ CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

________ DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER ________ DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐	PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐	APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐	PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐	OTHER (Explain):
☐	RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨	

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. [illegible]orende (ps)
Oliver G. Scantling (ps)

LIEMPTY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John [illegible] Brady	2555		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 53-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

14-00000

File
[illegible]
Support

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT Lienvoy	2. SENIOR STAFF	
	4. AREA	
	A. DIVISION	WHD
3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)	B. BRANCH	III
A. NEW TVA	C. DESK	Mexico
✓ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA		

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door [illegible]		4	5
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER (List below)			
(1)				
(2)	[illegible]		1	1
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		5	6

6. REVIEWED BY			7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY		
SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE

8. APPROVED		9. AUTHORIZED	
BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE	BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE

FORM NO. 1 NOV 58 1116 TEST

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-36)

316 RLF/SW/ [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 31 JUL 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 1 2057Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 48642

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 4204

RE HMMS 761

HMMS 737

REQUEST MV AUTHORITY FOR LOCAL PURCHASE NOT EXCEED $3500 OF FOURTH LIEMPTY CAR AUTHORIZED BY REF B. WILL BE USED BY LIJERSEY SURVEILLANCE TEAM.

END OF MESSAGE

file LIEMPTY/[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

501/SC/CG/CG/

ORIG : JAMES S. BURWELL
UNIT : WH LOGISTICS
EXT : 4591
DATE : 3 APRIL 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	APR 3 19 43 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT89600

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 20062

RE: A. MEXI 3593 (IN 37255)
B. MEXI 3630 (IN 39968)*

1. REF A APPROVED. COST NOT TO EXCEED $3500. MV 2283 APPLIES.

2. AUTHORITY GRANTED REPLACE REF B VEHICLES NOT TO EXCEED $3000 EACH. MV 2284 MV 2285 AND MV 2286 APPLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S [illegible], 2147 AND 2148.

Tele Coord
OL/SD - S. DePyssler

JAB file
Property/Support

Paul E. Arneson
PAUL E. ARNESON
C WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

Robert N. Dahlgren
C WH BR III
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

James S. Burwell
JAMES S. BURWELL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 470/DMCL/CG/SSS Pp
2 APR 59

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 5

INFO DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 3 0338Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 39968

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3630

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMA 11257

B. HMMA 11368

C. HMMS 637 PARA 4

1. REQUEST CABLE AUTHORITY REPLACE MV'S 2041, 2147 AND 2148 FOR SECURITY REASONS IMPLIED REFS A AND B.

2. HQS AWARE EFFORTS INCREASE SECURITY AND COMPARTMENTATION SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. ABOVE 1952 MODEL VEHCILES HAVE BEEN USED ON MANY INVESTIGATIONS BY SEVERAL DIFFERENT AGENTS. CONSIDER IMPERATIVE INCREASE LIEMPTY SECURITY BY IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] LIEMPTY/Sup

S-E-C-R-E-T-

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

618/cc/cg/ca/

ORIG : R. M. HERMAN
UNIT : SUPPLY
EXT : 2550
DATE : 17 FEBRUARY 1959

619

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 17 21 47 '59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : CL 3

INFO : WH 4, DD/S, SSA, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT73536

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 13232

LIEMPTY/JBECHO

APPROVE MEXI 3318(IN 20248) FOR PANEL TRUCK. MV 2279 APPLIES

END OF MESSAGE

C/S Comments: Requested replace MV 2138 ~~on~~ by trade-in plus $2000.

Support Log

LIEMPTY

Telecon Coord - J. Burwell
WH/LOG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

For CHIEF, SUPPLY DIVISION
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R. M. Herman
VEHICLE SECTION
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

141 WCJ/LSB/LSB/

DATE : 13 FEBRUARY 1959

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : DD/S, SSA, OL 3, S/C 2

[illegible] COPY

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 14 10 21 33

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20248

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 3310

LIEMPTY

RE: A. HMMW 7257

B. HMMA 12095 PARA 10 D

C. HMMT 669

CAN REPLACE LIENTRAP (MV-2138) ON TRADE-IN PLUS $2,000.

PLEASE CABLE AUTHORIZATION.

END OF MESSAGE

LIEMPTY/Bug

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

SECRET
(When Filled In)

File
Br. 3

FI OPERATIONAL AUTHORIZATION

TO : FINANCE DIVISION

THROUGH: FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH, FI/ADMIN/BF

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY (APPROVAL OF PROJECT) ; 9/3570-83-164 (ACCOUNT NO.) WH/III/Mexico (COUNTRY, AREA DIVISION)

SECTION 1. TO BE COMPLETED BY PROJECTS BRANCH

THE ABOVE PROJECT HAS BEEN APPROVED FROM 1 December 1958 TO 30 November 1959 IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 95,[illegible]0.00 , AS BROKEN DOWN BELOW.

FI/PLANS/PROJECTS BRANCH

3 Apr 59
DATE

SECTION 2. TO BE COMPLETED BY CASE OFFICER

BREAKDOWN OF REQUESTED TOTAL	FISCAL YEAR 1959	FISCAL YEAR 1960
COMPENSATION	$ 32,710.00	$ 23,500.00
ALLOWANCES	1,870.00	1,400.00
TRAVEL	4,750.00	1,250.00
OPERATIONAL EXPENSES	5,250.00	3,750.00
OTHER:	21,000.00	———
TOTAL	$ 65,580.00	$ 29,900.00

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

TYPE OF PROJECT (Check one)	☒ REGULAR	☐	SUBSIDY	☐	PROPRIETARY

METHOD BY WHICH PAYMENTS ARE TO BE MADE

FUNDS TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY: (Check one)
☒ REGULAR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTINGS (AFR 30-10)
☐ RECEIPTS ONLY (CFR 9.4)
☐ OTHER (Explain):

SECTION 3. TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE WH DIVISION BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1959 CONTAINS SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

Moore
DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

26 NOV 1958
DATE

SECTION 4. OTHER APPROVALS

FINANCE DIVISION MUST HAVE, IN ADDITION TO FI PROJECT APPROVAL, SPECIFIC WRITTEN APPROVAL ON CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPENDITURES BEFORE FUNDS CAN BE ADVANCED. INDICATE BELOW ANY APPROVALS IN THIS CATEGORY THAT HAVE BEEN SECURED:

☐	PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE	☐	APPROVAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN WHEN REQUIRED
☐	PURCHASE OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT	☐	OTHER (Explain):
☐	RENTALS IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY REGULATION	▨	

SECTION 5. ADDITIONAL CRYPTONYMS, PSEUDONYMS, ETC.

Raymond H. Gerendo (ps)
Oliver G. Scantling (ps)

LIEMPTY - 3,-4,-5,-6,-7,-8,-9,-10,-11,-12,-13,-14,-15,-16,-17

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF OR DESIGNEE	DATE
John D. Brady	2565		

FORM NO. 680 REPLACES FORM 59-104
1 JUN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(3)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA- 11710

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-25/3
50-6-74/2

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 10 December 1958

SUBJECT: Operational/LIEMPTY Station File Breakdown

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for Headquarters information only

RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): (A) HMMW-6958, 31 October 1958, Paragraph one.
(B) HMMA-11257,

In reply to the request contained in reference (A), listed below is the Station's file breakdown for the LIEMPTY Project:

50-6-74/1 - Plans & Developments
/2 - Support
/3 - Operations (General)
/3A - Operations (GERENDE Contact Reports)
/3B - Operations (SCANTLING Contact Reports)
/4 - Production

50-6-74/5 - LIMITED Administration
/5A - LIMITED Operations
/5B - LIMITED Logs

50-6-74/6 - LILYRIC Administration
/6A - LILYRIC Operations
/6B - LILYRIC Logs

50-6-74/7 - LICALLA Administration
/7A - LICALLA Operations
/7B - LICALLA Logs

50-6-74/8 - LIENTRAP Administration
/8A - LIENTRAP Operations
/8B - LIENTRAP Logs

50-6-74/9 - LIJERSEY Administration
/9A - LIJERSEY Operations

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

WCC:anc
5 December 1958

Distribution:

3 - Hqs

2 - Files

FORM 53 — USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects Branch

CRYPTONYM : LIEMPTY

DIVISION : Western Hemisphere

STATION : Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

NAME: John H. Prady
ROOM: 2112 Barton Hall
EXT.: 2555
DATE: 24 November 1958

1. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project be approved for the period 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959 for a total of $95,380.00.

2. WH/Personnel has been requested to locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-ELAC slot formerly under the LIFETICK Project. This slot will be transferred to the LIEMPTY Project and will be filled by a person who will be responsible for the directions of the physical surveillance team under this project.

R. W. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date

Attachments:
FPO (in quad)
Form 680 (in quad)
Table of Vehicular Allowance
Justification for Purchase of Automobiles
Envelope with true names

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMW-6930

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 50-6-21/2

DATE:

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO :

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : Operational/LIJERSEY Agents Not Included under Project LIEMPTY

ACTION REQUIRED : Agent Service Records

REFERENCES: HMMA-11257

RI — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

The following LIJERSEY Agents have active Operational Approvals but were not included under Project LIEMPTY. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters whether these agents were ever recruited and whether the Station wishes to have their Operational Approvals remain active. Please submit Agent Service Records on these agents where appropriate.

LIJERSEY-14	(201-200231)
LIJERSEY-15	(201-209991)
LIJERSEY-16	(201-209153)
LIJERSEY-17	(201-208615)
LIJERSEY-19	(201-207439)
LIJERSEY-20	(201-215073)

OLIVER G. GALBOND

28 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
- 6 - Subject files
- 1 - RI

WH/3/Mexico/E.I.SCALETTI mgs Scaletti

CS COPY

50-6-21/2

BASIC FILE COPY
DO NOT REMOVE

50-6-21/2

FORM 10-57 53

USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

24 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.

2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIEMTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photographic surveillances.

3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorized for Oliver C. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.

4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the [illegible] and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 2041. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIEMTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE

1. PROJECT: LIEMPTY

2. SENIOR STAFF:

3. TYPE OF ACTION *(Check one)*
☒ A. NEW TVA
☐ B. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA

4. AREA
A. DIVISION: WHD
B. BRANCH: III
C. DESK: Mexico

5. REQUESTED ACTION

ITEM	TYPE	TOTAL ON HAND	TOTAL PRESENT TVA	TOTAL PROPOSED TVA
A.	SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passenger American or foreign		0	4
B.	STATION WAGON			
C.	OTHER *(List below)*			
(1)	Truck, panel, American or foreign mfg.		0	1
(2)				
(3)				
(4)				
(5)				
D.	TOTALS		0	5

6. REVIEWED BY

SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER	DIVISION	DATE

7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY

SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN.	DIVISION	DATE

8. APPROVED

BY DIRECTION OF DDP	DATE

9. AUTHORIZED

BY DIRECTION OF DD/S	DATE

FORM 9-57 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(20-38)

14-00000

28 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Staff Agent ~~to fill~~ BAP-8100 Slot in Mexico City

1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a Staff Agent to fill the BAP-8100, IO (FI), GS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOWER(ps).

2. This Agent must be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, especially in physical surveillance techniques. It would be helpful if the candidate also has area knowledge. He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets.

3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing these functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to other tasks.

R. H. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/CZehrung:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FROM: (Headquarters component) WH	SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION
TO :	
TO : (Station/Base)	FROM: (Division)

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE

ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE: ☐ SUBJECT ☒ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
50	6	74/02

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

KDFACTOR

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

	OPEN FILE		CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
X	AMEND FILE TITLE		REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

	RETAIN		DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

FORMERLY LIEMPTY

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

HMM

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)

50

9. FILES ACTION

	HOLD IN CS FILES		RESTRICTED		UNRESTRICTED		PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER		CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

050	006	074/02

FORM 12-63 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MFG. 2-64

SECRET

38

1-CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CASE FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION				DATE 24 October 1958
FROM: (Requester Name) Charlotte Zehrung	COMPONENT WH	BUILDING Barton	ROOM NO. 2120	TELEPHONE 2758

1. CASE TITLE

LIEMPTY/ Support

4. ACTION REQUESTED

X	OPEN FILE AS INDICATED.
	AMEND FILE AS INDICATED.
	CLOSE FILE
X	RESTRICT FILE TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
X	PERMANENT CHARGEOUT TO (DESK). WH/III/Mexico
	PREPARE FILE FOLDERS AND SEND TO REQUESTER.

2. COUNTRY AND NUMBER	3. CATEGORY AND NUMBER
50 (Mexico)	6 Operational

5. COMMENTS: (Include brief description of file or project)

Photo and physical surveillance coverage and support for station.

RECORD COPY

6. FOR RI USE ONLY

1. PROJECT STATUS
2. FIELD STATION(S)
3. HDQRS. COMPONENT(S)

7. ENDORSEMENT	8. APPROVAL
THIS REQUEST SATISFIES RECORDS REQUIREMENTS. C L Zehrung RI/ANALYSIS	REQUEST APPROVED [illegible] FOR CHIEF, RI
EFFECTIVE DATE 29 Oct Dec 1958	RI CASE TITLE NUMBER 50 6 712 N.S.

FORM NO. 812 1 DEC 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

Attachment "3"

HMMA- 31303 - 7 February 1967


piedra
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posta


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
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FACHADA

esc 1:50


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AL COLECTOR

ORIENTE

CORTE


reg
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col
B.A.P.
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escalera
garage
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R·4
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added in an economy
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LBANAL DE TUBO DE CONCRETO DE 15 cms ø CON 2% min. de pendiente

23

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3s SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

: DIRECTOR
: EL SALVADOR
ON: WH 8
: DDP, WH/SA 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, VR

FCB INT SS S3

S E C R E T 282140Z

DIR CITE SALV 5229 28 Aug 64 IN 62861
WH DIV CUBA CUBANDEF
[redacted]

* Provide details of approach made to [redacted] Target By [redacted] (Liaison) asset

REF DIR 44137

1. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PARA 3 REF, [redacted] (Liaison) ops Summary (Liaison) asset Target (Liaison's) [redacted] (Liaison) asset (Liaison) [redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT Target [redacted] HAD REFUSED TO SERVE AS INFORMANT FOR GOES ON SECURITY GROUNDS; CITED CASE OF STUDENT WHOSE REPUTATION RUINED IN UNIV A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO AFTER BEING COMPROMISED AS POLICE AGENT. Target [redacted] THEN RAISED POSSIBILITY OF WORKING FOR U.S. [redacted], PROBABLY BECAUSE IT WELL KNOWN AROUND UNIVERSITY THAT (Liaison) asset [redacted] ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH (USIA) [redacted] CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND ONCE GIVEN (U.S.) [redacted] SCHOLARSHIP.

2. AT MEETING WITH Station asset [redacted] ON 27 AUG, CI officer [redacted] TOLD HIM THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO LET THE DUST SETTLE ON THE RUSSIAN PROFESSORS FLAP BEFORE FOLLOWING UP PITCH TO Target [redacted], AND TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION THIS CASE UNTIL ADVISED. Station asset [redacted] DID NOT QUESTION THIS RATIONALE AND PROMISED TO COMPLY.

3. PLS IDENTIFY WH DW [redacted] REP MENTIONED PARA 2 REF.

S E C R E T

SECRET

FBI

29 Dec. 67 Miami
Re: MDC
Confidential

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM 15

MICROFILMED DEC 1 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: AKULE/MHSPAWN/AMMOP
Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: JMWAVE 0180

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to report the comments of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA) Congress. AMMOP-1 said that the precise date of the Congress is yet to be set though it is still scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will have a copy of the formal agenda by the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While AMMOP-1 is not a member of the committee preparing the agenda, he said that he is being kept generally informed of developments and that once the agenda is prepared he should be in a position to influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope to make his influence felt. AMMOP-1 also said that he has been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban case will be prominent in the agenda.

2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end.

Roger E. Marchbank
Roger E. MARCHBANK

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

19-300-10

CS COPY

DEC 1 1967

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-767219	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-29068	DATE 1 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-300-10

FBI

20 Oct. 67 Miami
Re: ADC
Confidential

FBI

30 Aug. 67
Miami
Re: MDC no class.

5 June 67 Miami
Re: MDC
Confidential

14-00000

C/WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chiefs, All WH Stations and Bases

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Christian Democracy in Latin America

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.

The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and is transmitted to all WH Division Stations and Bases as a review of the current status of Christian Democracy in Latin America and an updating of Headquarters' view on the movement. We believe the subject matter merits close and careful study by all Station operations and reports officers whose comments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published in the 3 March issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review, and will thus be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence community. However, the WOGEAR study could not include much of the "Conclusions" section since it was interpretative and had operational overtones. Thus we've decided to send the full text herein in book dispatch form.

1. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress. Christian Democracy's advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus frequent manifestations of anti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these concepts had an emotional appeal. This political charisma, coupled with a commitment to basic social reform and opposition to Communism, and presented within an ideological framework stressing the dignity of the human person, comprised a package of considerable attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the student and middle class elements. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of organizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups -- which

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
BOOK DISPATCH 5961

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
WH/CA

TYPIST
Joseph DiStefano gb (8 March 1967)

EXT.
5006

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1		(in draft)
WH/2		(in draft)
WH/3		(in draft)
WH/4		(in draft)
WH/5		(in draft)
WH/6		(in draft)
WH/7		(in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		William V. Broe

DISPATCH

represent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.

I - CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.

a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.

c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.

3. Parties of Moderate Potential. Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgement of potential, there are not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil and Guatemala -- that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

a. The Dominican PRSC stands as a prime example of CD irresponsibility from the time Caonabo Javier took over Party leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in April 1965. It has collaborated with the entire spectrum of Marxist-lining parties, and moderation of its extreme militancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has developed a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily from the university ranks, and is buttressed by the strongest CLASC affiliate (CASC) in the Hemisphere.

b. The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a miniscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. If the Panama CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and attracts militants from the predominantly negro and mestizo population, it could become a force of some importance.

c. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three key states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the presidential and parliamentary elections of late 1966. Expanded political activity will probably be permitted after the seating of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political parties will be limited. It appears likely that the PDC will have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the legislative life of the country. If the PDC joins with a party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PDC message and mystique sets the tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Christian Democracy in Brazil.

d. The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This nascent group has good strength in the youth and student movement and growth potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de Leon appears honest and intelligent but he has little organizational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged by a group of militant "Young Turks" on the left. With more vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly.

4. Parties of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia

(Remo di Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bridesmaids to the handful of parties that really count.

II - PARTY YOUTH WINGS

5. CD Strength in Universities Ahead of Party Strength. As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants are drawn from the ranks of student appendages active in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much more significant than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the Party polled 3.1 percent of the vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), while its University youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 election. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of the Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966. These comparitive figures suggest some conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below.

6. Radicalization of Youth Wings. Several CD leaders, most notably Frei and Caldera, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups of every political stripe assume positions to the left of their parties is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assumed by Marxist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University is allied with the Communist students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Some observers believe that the CD youth problem has been exaggerated and that the "hot heads" will mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is partially true, we would take issue with this relaxed view. The raw material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed -- and among the youth the cry has assumed din proportions. The natural mellowing process will no longer produce the same magic.

8. Need for Training. Some believe that the only way of arresting the CD youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lies in massive and intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national political training institutes, ORMEU and various student training

courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers share identical biases with the students with the result that misconceptions are reinforced and no new horizons are opened up. Frei and Caldera have asked the German Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field, but the Germans, while recognizing the serious need, have thus far declined to increase their commitment. To accomplish anything significant, the Germans believe a massive program must be launched (which would tax their current resources), and they wonder whether the CD youth situation has been permitted to drift too long to salvage.

III - THE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

9. CLASC Poses Serious Danger for CD Movement. A KUMONK study points out that "Organized labor could contribute substantially to the development of well-organized CD political parties in the hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for CD extremists to cause harm to the movement." Few would argue that how the CD movement fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant measure on the posture assumed and progress achieved by CLASC. More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it -- and in this regard CLASC is challenged only by the party youth and student wings. As an organized labor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesino arm); its only impact and sole raison d'etre up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they achieve the responsibility of government.

10. CLASC Has Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its "Christian" label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any member party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the CD parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting an example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does not discourage the belief that it is the chosen labor instrument of the Christian Democratic movement, although this label has never been formally bestowed.

11. Closer Ties Between CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely. It appears likely that a more organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing. A Seminar was held in Montevideo from 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratic Formation Institute -- IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties. The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political movement and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal representation of ODCA in both the Christian labor organization and CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coordinating Committee was formed -- the Comite Relacionador Y Coordinador De Organizaciones Laborales Y Funcionales De Los Partidos Democrata Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CD parties

to request ODCA approval of the creation of this Coordinating Committee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemispheric labor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership appears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would have emerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ODCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.

12. Negative CLASC Influence on Party Youth Wings. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated. It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor movement. This initiative appears to have made greatest progress in Central America.

IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA

13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin American CD parties formed their regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:

President : Rafael Caldera, Venezuela

Vice President : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru

Vice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala

Secretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic) but on balance has been less strident in its criticism than several of its member parties (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of Caldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit much closer attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply sanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to little more than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based more on revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful to qualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) and on negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and the oligarchies), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agreement on just what they want.

14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support from the Latin American parties and organizations against these criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans

continue to tolerate and thus abet the irresponsibility of the Latin CD parties because there are no standards at all. ODCA leader Caldera appears to recognize the need for at least some basic ideological common ground among ODCA-member parties. But no signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are not at all sanguine that even modest progress will be made in this regard in the foreseeable future. Reporting on the Congress of the World Christian Democratic Union (WCDU) held in Lima in April 1966 indicates clearly that the Latin American parties will not submit without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the European financial backers of the CD movement or by ODCA) that aims at imposing standards and controls that will impinge on their complete freedom of action.

15. Formation of Central American Regional Grouping. The Central American CD parties met in El Salvador in July 1966 to establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Democrata Cristiana de CentroAmerica (UDCCA). This action does not appear to reflect any element of pique with ODCA (the relations of COPEI and Rafael Caldera with the Central American parties appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to establish a smaller and more cohesive unit that can better address itself to the problems common to the area and, to a lesser extent, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is comprised of five parties (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras.

V - EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). The European CD parties were first to establish a regional organization, the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (NEI) in 1947. The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin American parties maintained their closest ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in Europe, particularly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin America. The NEI became progressively less significant and in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization was revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature.

17. European Financial Support to the CD Parties. The two CD organizations which have contributed most heavily to the support of the Latin American CD parties and related organizations are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 1967. It was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS at the rate of $160,000 per year commencing in 1966.

a. The IIS. The Institute for International Solidarity, headed until recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the new Director is Adolf Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Like its

Social Democratic counterpart (the Friedrich Ebert Foundation), the bulk of IIS's operating budget comes from the German Government. IIS maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports several CD activities directly. But it also contributes more than fifty percent of the FIS budget.

S. The FIS -- The International Solidarity Fund was formally created on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of financial support efforts on the part of the European CD parties and other CD-oriented groups in Latin America. The name was later changed to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC and other organizations. The FIS operates as an arm of the ECDU, with headquarters in Rome. Its most important leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS, a German national and close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer), Mariano Rumor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael (Secretary General of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions -- CISC).

18. Difference in Function of IIS and FIS. From the start of its activities, the Germans and Italians have contributed almost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for example, Vanistendael contributed only $15,000 from the CISC International Solidarity Fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for organizational support to the Latin American CD parties. While the IIS is the rich partner in the IIS-FIS tandem and could easily fund the Latin American parties directly, the FIS channel is preferred by the Germans and has two major advantages: First, since FIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (but not contributions) from all the European parties, the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively. Thus a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the German government. Second, it is easier to obfuscate the magnitude of European organizational support to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America if it is channeled through a multi-party organization. The Germans have limited IIS funding to less controversial areas -- support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training institutes. (See Attachment A for a detailed flow chart.)

CONCLUSIONS

19. CD's Challenge Communist Domination of the University. It was noted in Para. 5 above that almost without exception CD strength in the university greatly exceeds the voting strength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist/Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwhelmingly dominant throughout the hemisphere. Few would take issue with the conclusion that the vast majority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational message (the word "inspirational" more accurately characterizes the CD movement than does "ideological") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats -- the vote has shifted from one movement with a message to another. It would appear that the Christian Democrats are the only political group capable of challenging the Communists' hemispheric domination of the campus.

20. CD Strength in University No Indicator of CD Party Strength or Potential. From the foregoing, however, it does not follow that the growth of CD strength in the university presages a corresponding increase in CD party strength. While voting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these patterns are not a reliable barometer of either organized party strength or future potential. In no country of Latin America is the voting strength of the CD's or the Communists nearly as strong among the population at large as it is on the campus. One reason is that the university population of Latin America is less than 2 percent of the total population. The CD campus leader almost invariably graduates from student politics to more direct party involvement when he leaves the university -- even if the party has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the non-university youth (lacking the pseudo-intellectual pretensions and the self-bestowed elite label of the university-trained) are much less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because it has emotional or inspirational appeal.

21. CD Failure to Transform Affinity of Lower Classes Into Votes. The inadequately educated and the lower social classes in Latin America are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury he believes he cannot afford. Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class movement. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino appeal. By and large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder.

22. Individual Party Fortunes Appear Unaffected by CD Progress Elsewhere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movement throughout the hemisphere. This has not happened. There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either assisted or hindered in their development by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chilean victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEI leader Rafael Caldera has broadcast a variation on this theme that several European CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEI must emerge victorious in the 1968 election if the CD movement is to maintain its momentum, for an ideologically based movement cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would reject the view -- based on election results in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that individual party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. What appears to emerge from these elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of middle echelon cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the "socially disinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and considerations. International events (with rare exception) count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties even less.

23. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contributing positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact, remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.

24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by-country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question is: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.

RUTHERFORD J. LYNER

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EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION

Eichholz Academy

Political Leadership Academy

Student Institute

Institute for International Solidarity (IIS)
DIRECTOR
Adolf Herkenrath

WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)

European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU)

Christian Democratic Organization of Latin America (ODCA)

Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC)

International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UIJDC)

International Solidarity Foundation (FIS)
PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report

Christian Democracy in Latin America

Secret
№ 1100

3 March 1967
No. 0279/67A

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.

No such trend has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.

The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.

Current Balance Sheet

The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.

In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weakening Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.

The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.

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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA


○ Country with active Christian Democratic Party
○ Country with weak Christian Democratic Party
○ Country without Christian Democratic Party
MEXICO
CUBA
HAITI
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
BRITISH HONDURAS
HONDURAS
GUATEMALA
EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
COSTA RICA
PANAMA
VENEZUELA
GUYANA
SURINAM
FRENCH GUIANA
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
PERU
BRAZIL
BOLIVIA
PARAGUAY
URUGUAY
CHILE
ARGENTINA

EDUARDO FREI
President of Chile,
Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.

RAFAEL CALDERA
Venezuelan presidential aspirant and
number-two Latin American Christian Democrat

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Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.

In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame - educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.

Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.

The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.

The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.

The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote in

1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.

The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.

The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).

Party Youth Wings

As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.

Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.

The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.

Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.

The Labor Arm

A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.

In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC and the CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.

The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.

The Role of ODCA

In its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.

In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.

Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.

European Role and Influence

Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.

Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent European

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GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

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International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UIJDC)

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PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff

SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT

Support To:
Political Training Institutes

Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

Organizational Support To:
Political Parties

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CDs attempt to coordinate international CD activity through an organization they called the New International Team (NEI). This organization never achieved any significance because European influence in Latin America had already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American parties had been maintaining individual relations with the various European groups. These ties were strictly on vague ideological grounds and for financial reasons.

The two heaviest European contributors to the Latin American parties are the Institute for International Solidarity (IIS) and the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to $1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently reported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS.

The IIS, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several permanent representatives in Latin America and supports youth and student groups, political training institutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leadership of Dr. Johannes Schauff, operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU), successor to the NEI. Since its creation in 1964, Germans and Italians have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel for organizational support to the Latin American parties. It has assumed this responsibility because it is composed of representatives of all the European parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the European CDs collectively. Furthermore, a Latin American government or party in competition with the local CDs cannot formally protest its funding activities to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic movement in the past two and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less extensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comparable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes.

Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have any major effect on the fortunes of another. What appears to emerge from CD gains or losses in recent elections is rather solid evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on the basis of their own leadership abilities, organizational talents, and approach to local issues. International events count for little, and the influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties for even less. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

7 FEB 1967 Miami
RE : MDC
SECRET

25 Nov. 1966 New Jersey
RE: IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ CONFIDENTIAL

31 Oct. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC CONFIDENTIAL

30 SEPT. 1966 NEW JERSEY
IGNACIO VALLADARES RODRIGUEZ
CONFIDENTIAL

29 Aug. 1966 Miami, Fla.
RE: MDC SECRET

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

FROM JMWAVE	REPORT NO. UFG-8473	COVER SHEET XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Henry J. SLOMAN	DATE OF REPORT 8 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED RID DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER John C. TARBELL/vkl	PROJECT	CS DISSEMINATION 61
APPROVING OFFICER Philip G. ELMARD	SOURCE CRYPT AMOT-245	TCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
4 - Hqs	State
1 - DCS	FBI
2 - Santo Domingo HDC	I&NS
2 - Santiago de los Caballeros	Customs
2 - Caracas HVC	Border Patrol
2 - Guatemala City HGG	USCG

MICROFILMED
AUG 18 1966

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ; paras. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para 8 and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the document; para. 9: DD-1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD-1902, 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892; para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, 14 July, from Laureano BATISTA.

AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there is no record of contact since that time.

RID: Index FR 201-265279

Name: BATISTA Falla, Laureano
Sex : M
DPOB: 1 May 1935, Havana, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Elected organization secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC at congress 25-27 Feb 66. Trip to DR on behalf of MDC, June 66. 22

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

19-300-10

FORM 1467 7-64

CS COPY

(20)

SECRET

Page two of Cover Sheet UFG-8473

Name: BAZAN, Arnaldo
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in DR. Connection with MDC base. Formerly with La Salle College of Camaguey, Cuba.

Name: HERNANDEZ Rojo, Angel ([illegible])
Nickname: Baby, El Baby
Sex : M
DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba,
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second in command of military dept of MDC.

Name: BARBEITE Freyre, Placido A.
Sex : M
DPOB: 19 Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre in Miami. Chf of military dept of MDC.

Name: PALACIOS San Juan, Armando
Sex : M
DPOB: ?
Cit : Cuban
Occ or Status: Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico.

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE. A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT. 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT C Activities of the MDC; Possibility of Reactivating a Base in the Dominican Republic, Condition of Boats, Possible Alliances With Other Emigre Organizations

DATE OF REPORT 8 August 1966

NO PAGES 4

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 29 May to late July 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ United States, Miami ~~(10 June to 3 August 1966)~~

UFG-8473

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE:

A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. This group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. Summary: Laureano Batista Falla, leader of the Movimiento Democrata Christiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement), returned to Miami in late June 1966x from the Dominican Republic, where he allegedly obtained pledges of support for his anti-Castro undertakings from the Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, pending xxxxxxxx the aproval of President Balaguer. However, the military department of the MDC recently issued a document in which it voiced its discouragement, primarily [illegible] lack of funds. Xx Although representatives of the MDC have discussed the signing of agreements with representatives of the Students' Revolutionary Directorate (DRE), and the Cuban Representacion in Exile, (RECE), no alliances have yet been formed.

leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano returned to Miami from the

with rep

(DRE) and the Cuban Representation

alliances have been made.

2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National Executive Committee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned to Miami on 26 June. On 29 June he met with other leaders of the MDC to inform them of the results of his trip.

3. Batista said that during ~~thxxxxx~~ discussions held with General Juan N. Folch Perez, Chief of the Air Force of the Dominican Republic, he had requested ~~xxatixxxwithxthexMDC~~ that Folch cooperate with the MDC by allowing the MDC to maintain ~~Fxixxtxxxxxz~~-Base Luna, located at Estero Balsa, near the town of Pepillo ~~Xxxx~~ Salcedo (N 19-43, W 71-45). ③ ~~According xxx to~~ Batista, Folch ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ indicated his willingness to cooperate offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

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E /	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	OCR	FBI /2
SO #	USIA ( )	I&NS ( )					

FI	1	WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1
RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1
RE	3	WHC/CA	1		
CICS	1				
MO	1	CI/OPS/WH	2	WH/PACY(CINCSO)	1

LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 1, DO/H 1,

Liaison *

CS

COORD. RELEASE.

a. The use of five islets facing Santiago de los Caballeros City for a military base. (sic.).

b. Authorization for MDC personnel to move ~~into~~ in and out of the Dominican Republic in a clandestine manner.

c. Transportation of MDC war materiel from Miami aboard Dominican Air Force planes.

4. Batista ~~said~~ that he had visited Base Luna and on several occasions ~~had~~ talked with Arnaldo Bazan, a Cuban xkpxiixaxxix residing in Santiago de los Caballeros, who is the recipient of $ 3500. per month xkixk xxxxixxxixyxthxxMD sent by the MDC to the Dominican Republic for the maintenance of Base Luna. Bazan, xxxxxxxxixBatistatax who had arranged Batista's meeting with Folch, was described by xxxtixxxxixkxxxixkx Batista as having ~~of~~ formerly been with the La Salle College of Camaguey. Batista claimed that the ~~procurement~~ chief of Santiago de los Caballeros had made arrangements for thexhxxxxxx the of a house to be occupied by the MDC members who are in charge of Base Luna.

...ve had made arrange-
ments for the house which is occupied by the MDC members who are in charge of Base Luna?

5. Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including sending MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans ~~in order~~ that the necessary money ~~can~~ could be obtained.

6. Although Barbeite agreed with Batista regarding the need for preparation of operational plans and an estimate of the cost, xXxixpixxxxixgxthxxx he basically wxxxxxxxxxxs Batixtx opposed Batista's advocation of initiating immediate action. He felt that it was inadvisable to attempt the implementation of the plans until Balaguer's reaction is known. Hernandez' views coincided with those of Barbeite. Nxxxixixxxtxxthxxxxxkixx xxxxxxxhxxxxyxtkxxxxixxfxthxxxx The meeting ended without a solution to the disagreement.

...g ended without a
solution to the disagreement.

7. At the meeting Batista reported that dissension xithixx exists bxtxxxxxixx within the MDC in Puerto Rico, particularly between Armando Palacios xxxxXxx San Juan and Humberto Perez Xxxxxxx Herrera, president and military chief respectively. [redacted] Palacios ~~feels~~ claims that Perez does not report to the president on military plans and activities. However, Barbeite defended Perez' action with the argument that Xxxxxixxxxixxtxxxxxtxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxly military matters do not really fall xxxxxxthx within the scope of responsibilities of the president.

president.

8. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a document dated 29 May. This document included the following points:

a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds. The sum mentioned is $10,000.[5]

b. No change in United States policy ~~regarding action against Cuba from the U.S.~~ [illegible] is anticipated. A base of operations outside of the United States is considered to be so vitally important that the military department would be willing to operate an illegal base if the resources were made available.

c. The condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no sea transportation. The boats are described as follows:

(1) The CADELLO I is docked across from Brito's Boat Yard at Stock Island, Florida.[6] The boat is in need of repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the installation of electronic navigational equipment would be required to put it in operational condition. Current docking and routine maintenance costs are not being paid. Efforts to make commercial use of this boat have not been successful. This boat is considered ideal for activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present circumstances the expense which this boat represents is not justifiable. It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not established within four months.

(2) The KYA-ORA[7] which was donated to the MDC by a member of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta's Boat Yard in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.

(3) The LANCHA AZUL[8] is in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will proceed as money becomes available.

d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students' Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an "agreement in principle" to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment.

9. In July Jorge Mas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representacion Cubana en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated that some members of MDC ~~will~~ be offered full-time employment preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July no formal agreement had been reached.

10. Hernandez, who feels that Ramon Font Saumell[9] is incapable of formulating military strategy, favors the formation of a pact between the MDC and RECE ~~xgax~~ which would exclude Font from participating in the preparation of plans for military operations. Hernandez also said that he plans to attempt the reorganization of the military department of the MDC in order to replace Barbeite in a less important position than that which he currently occupies.

department of the MDC in order

from his present position to an unimportant position in the department.

11. In early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez[10] expressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite agreed to inform Valladares when an operation is to be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoilless rifle, a 50-caliber machine gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21.

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UFG-8473

1. Source Comment. At the time of his departure, Batista told the executive committee that he was going directly to Caracas, Venezuela. It was not until after his return that it was learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later explained that while he was in Puerto Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts."

Field Comment. Presumably he was referring to an interview with President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista had earlier said had been arranged by his cousin. (Cf. [illegible]

3. Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported to have been in charge of Dominican ~~xidxtox~~ Armed Forces aid in a ~~x@~~ caching operation for Cuban exiles in the Monte Cristi area. See TDCS-314/01722-66. ~~In TDCSDB-315/00790-66~~. Another source reported ~~that~~ in September 1964 approximately 30 Cuban exiles were taking training at a camp near Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46). See ~~[illegible]~~ TDCSDB-315/00794-66 for more information.

4. The location of the house was not given.

5. Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the tone was too strong. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source reported that the document was being prepared, and that $75,000 would be requested. (Cf. UFG-8327) CS-DB-3[illegible]/01[illegible]-66).

Field Comments.

6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat. The boat yard referred to is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica.

7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.

8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. (Cf. ~~UFG-8327)~~ CS DB-315/01727-66). Besides the CADELLO I, the MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the PUNCHIN CHIA (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO II.

9. Font is chief of military operations of Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (Cf. UFG 8423) CSDB-315/02202-66).

10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which he gave to the MDC. He offered to supply weapons to the MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs (Brigade 2506).

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FBI

29 June 66 New York
Re: MOC Secret

7 June 66 Florida
Re: MOC Secret

SECRET

XX

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, WHD
ADMIN/TYPIC
Station Files on Cuban Counterrevolutionary and Exile Organizations

REFERENCE: UFGT-16343, 31 May 1966

1. We are returning Volume VII of the MDC file which you sent with the reference for Headquarters to review as a sample of a group of 80 files which are no longer useful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvement, considering the need for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision until IDENTITY, a KUBARK employee who is retiring soon but is now engaged in writing historical studies, can visit the Station to survey those files with others.

2. IDENTITY plans to visit JMWAVE for several days about the end of July to size up and review certain records for writing a history of the Station. Therefore, we would like the 80 background files to be left intact for his visit. Afterwards a decision will be made on their retirement or other disposition.

3. If space for storing the files is critical we will authorize forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your holding them temporarily to assist with the historical research cited above.

Claude F. GOTTFRIED

Attachment:
1. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, h/w

Distribution:
3-COS/JMWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2

UFGS-8398

SECRET

1-WH/RMO, w/att.1
1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1
1-WH/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
1-Historical Staff

WH/RMO NOEL C. WILSON/pap

C/WH/C/CA/PP STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO UFGS-8398

IDENTITY - Paul Loeb

SECRET

FBI

Miami, Fla.
3 June '64
Re: MDC Confidential

14-00000

YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED File M.D.C

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3	MO	7	2
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, CI/OA, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, WH 8

ACTION

RE LIMA CONF 25-26 APRIL,

21 APR 65 [illegible]58

S E C R E T 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0321

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A. WAVE 0031 (IN 89790)*

B. DIR 75895

AMMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 APRIL ON PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 0321 0031 75895 AMMOP-1 MIAMI 0200 HRS 21 PERUVIAN 65

BT

SECRET

5

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ACTION WH/C8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE VR, C/LOA, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WH8,

ACTION

21 APR 66 00953

S E C R E T 210017Z

LIMA INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0322

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0321 (IN 00958)

IDEN: ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY

FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

S E C R E T

CFN 0322 0321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC

BT

SECRET

14-00000

M 27

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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4		8	

UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 151831Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0194 15 APR 65 IN 57580

DYVOUR AMMOP

1. AMCRIB-1 (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA RODRIGUEZ, NIECE OF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, WHO TRAVELED THROUGH JMWAVE AREA. DE LA MAZA HAND CARRIED LETTER TO AMCRIB-1 DATED 4 APRIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, PRSC SECY OF INTL AFFAIRS, WHICH REQUESTED AMCRIB-1 ARRANGE FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO BE USED FOR PRSC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN DOMREP. LETTER WAS ACCOMPANIED WITH $1400 FOR PURCHASE AND SHIPMENT COSTS OF CARS.

2. AMCRIB-1 TELEPHONED ROSARIO EVENING 11 APRIL TO CONFIRM LETTER AND AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCURING CARS. ROSARIO INFORMED AMCRIB-1 THAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE NOMINATION AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEMBLY ON 17 APRIL AND STATED HE WOULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUNNING MATE. ROSARIO ALSO INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME ELECTORAL SUPPORT FROM UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF APJ MEMBERS.

S E C R E T

57

CFN: 0194 AMCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO JMWAVE AMCRIP-1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA PRSC -1 PRSC DOMREP $1400 -1 11 -1 PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA API

PT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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15 SECRET

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1	RP—	5	FI
2		6	CA
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4		8	

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C 8, SOD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 151742Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0195

15 APR 66 IN 97588

DYVOUR AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0194 (IN 97582)

IDEN: JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE, SECRETARY OF MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO OF CUBA.

S E C R E T

CFN: 0195 0194 JESUS ANGULO CLEMENTE MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO CUBA

SEC 268

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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FROM JM WAVE

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/ICZ, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

SECRET 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167 14 [illegible] 5625

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (IN 94245)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

SECRET

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO: [illegible]

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

GROUP 1

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM JMWAVE

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI/IC2, CI/ON, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4

S E C R E T 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 Apr 6[illegible] 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96635

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

S E C R E T

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
File MDC [illegible]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PP	5	RR
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3	CA	7	FI-TC
4	[illegible]		

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
WH/2 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WHE, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/O 4

S E C R E T 141654Z

14 APR [illegible] 56625

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0132 (IN 94245)*

AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND WILL DEPART 0245 HOURS 14 APRIL FOR LIMA. HE INSTRUCTED MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DEBRIEFING ON RETURN.

S E C R E T

*RE PRETRIP BRIEFING FOR ATTENDANCE WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMO

CFN: 0167 0132 AMCRIB-1 0245 14 LIMA

BT

SECRET

40

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14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WHB, CI/ICG, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEOP, CA/O 4

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2		6	4
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4	HD	8	D

DATE TIME BY

S E C R E T 141654Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0168

14 Apr 65 96626

TYPIC AMMOP

REF: WAVE 0167 (IN 96675

IDEN: JULIO MONCAGATTA

S E C R E T

CFN: 0168 0167 JULIO MONCAGATTA **SECRET**

BT

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief of Station, Santiago

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMMOP/Operational
AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Organizations

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR : FYI

REF: WAVE 9754

1. As indicated in reference, the AMMOP organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the AMMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/1, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are forwarded under separate cover.

3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was replayed by FUSEE and was the basis for an article in a Santiago newspaper by Identity C.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
A. Identities - u/sc
B. Cys of Ltrs - u/sc

Distribution:
3 - WH/C w/atts
2 - COS, Santiago w/atts — [illegible]
2 - C/WH - w/atts

*Please furnish HQS File Number

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-24893

DATE
APR 4 1966
31 March 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
*

SECRET

To WH/C
U/sc att #A to
UFGA-24893

IDENTITIES: A. Christian Democratic Party
B. Alfredo Lorca
C. Jorge Roman

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

[illegible] 93

CS COPY

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible] RIVERSIDE STATION, [illegible], FLA [illegible]

Marzo 15 de 1966

Estimado demócratacristiano:

Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronunciado por Castro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el pasado 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoblemente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocución, a expresar mi opinión con relación a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligado, porque el hecho de ser demócratacristiano cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un día se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revolución en libertad y que lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al comprobar que las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los paredones de fusilamientos por héroes como Porfirio Ramirez, Presidente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Humberto Sorí Marín, Comandante del Ejército Rebelde y autor de la primera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para expresar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obligado, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en múltiples oportunidades, colaboración y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos, alegando unas veces desconocimiento y otras imputándonos incomprensión con el "proceso revolucionario" que se está llevando a cabo en Cuba, no queremos que en esta oportunidad en que son los compañeros chilenos los que necesitan de nuestra solidaridad, vayamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida a respaldar públicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo de Chile en la actitud cívica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas expresadas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales transcribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he creido que Frei es un representante de la burguesía chilena, que su gobierno es un gobierno de la burguesía. Jamás he creido que Frei vaya a hacer ninguna revolución".... posteriormente, al referirse a los sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Salvador donde murieron varias personas dijo: "Frei es un reaccionario Frei ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de mano firme, sinó un individuo cobarde, que abusa del poder,......

SECRET

1/2

Frei ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un politiquero vulgar que para justificar su sanguinario gesto, trata de culpar a la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascara. Frei demuestra al pueblo de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolución es la que va a hacer, qué tipo de gobierno es el que va a llevar adelante. Es decir, no una revolución sin sangre, sinó una política de sangre sin revolución; sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de Frei, sangre sin revolución, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre sin revolución, esa es la política de la Alianza para el Progreso".

Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle al paso a Castro y a la camarilla que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e instar y pedir mayor colaboración con los patriotas que hoy ofrendan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la continuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, sino tambien ponerle fin a todos estos incidentes bochorhosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo públicamente ante el mundo a un Presidente, a un Partido y a un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que él esta haciendo en Cuba, sí está realizando una revolución en libertad, sí ha defendido en todo momento el sano nacionalismo, sí se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los oligarcas y explotadores.

Para terminar, sólo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad que une a todos los demócratacristianos, exprese públicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolución en libertad, así como su respaldo a la actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno en los actuales momentos.

Pendiente de su atención y respuesta y dejando constancia de mi mayor consideración, quedo suyo

Cordialmente,

Ernesto Rodriguez
Sec. de Relaciones Internacionales del
MDC de Cuba

SECRET

JUVENTUD DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANA DE CUBA.
1732 N.E. 7th St.
MIAMI, FLA. U.S.A.

Miami, Marzo 17 de 1966

Estimado compañero:

La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol José Martí que dice:"ver en silencio un crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del daño que Castro quiere hacerle a la Revolución en Libertad, que está realizando el Presidente Eduardo Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile.

Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado muchas de las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ataques públicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificándo al Presidente de "representante de la burguesía chilena", "reaccionario" "mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardián de sus intereses en Chile".....etc. Hemos querido comunicarte, no sólo los ataques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han dado a Castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el Diputado Demócrata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a continuación transcribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso digno de análisis. Hace pocos dias atrás, según expresaron diputados que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Presidente. Agregó que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habría hecho lo mismo que Frei.

Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocado la epidermis de la Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera.

Yo estuve en Cuba -añadió Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subió al poder. En esa ocasión le pregunté al ver a tantos hombres armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y él me contestó, con ese modo tan tropical: "chico, armas para qué cuando se tiene al pueblo".

Sin embargo, -añadió Lorca- en los siete años que Fidel tiene al pueblo detrás de él, anda mas armado que un militar en plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los

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radicales, el Sr. Ibáñez, el Sr. Alessandri, el propio Sr. Frei, han recorrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo como los que utiliza Castro.

No se puede decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un mentiroso y un déspota como Fidel Castro afirma - añadió Lorca- . En cambio él está resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni se le conoce domicilio fijo porque los hijos de los muertos en el paredón le buscan. Además -puntualizó Lorca- vale la pena destacar que nadie se ha ido de Chile. En cambio, es público y notorio que más de 300 000 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y me atrevo a pensar que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irse de Cuba, se quedaría solo con sus barbas y su hermano Raúl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no está. Dicen que se cayó de un avión.

Finalmente, Lorca recordó el caso del que fuera Presidente de los tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorí Marín."Es un hombre íntegro, puro y extremadamente justo", decía Castro de él. "Estoy seguro que núnca condenaría a quien no mereciera la pena de muerte". No obstante una mañana amaneció de mal genio y el Sr. Sorí Marín se convirtió en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, íntegro y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.C. Alfredo Lorca, señalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, ratifican una vez más lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus dirigentes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demócratacristiana de América y que hoy, con más fuerza y moral que núnca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que expongas públicamente tu respaldo a la Revolución en Libertad que viene realizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Chile así como tu colaboración a la lucha que mantiene el pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo existente en nuestra Patria.

Consciente de que nuestra solicitud será escuchada por tí, y seguros de que nos darás a conocer la atención que has de prestarle, quedo a tu entera disposición

Jesús Angulo
Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 31		
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.	26 SECRET		
X-REF TO FILE NO.		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED	
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	1 PP-	5 MO
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FROM JMWAVE		3 CA	7 D
		4 CA	8
ACTION WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT	TIME BY
INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC2			

S E C R E T 042230Z

File m. r.c. [illegible] Christian

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE WAVE 0031 (INGHURST ACTING)

TYPIC AMMOP

REF A DIR 75895 *

B WAVE 9034 (IN 51776)

4APR[illegible] 89790

1. AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.

2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN B. IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY.

3. AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELEGATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY.

4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-10 OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB-1.

S E C R E T

* WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS SCHEDULED LIMA 4-14 MARCH.

CFN 0031 75895 9034 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRIB-1 B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 201-749991 AMMOP C AMCRIB-10 B AMCRIB-1

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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26 SECRET

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3	CA	7	S
4	RR	8	[illegible]

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CA2, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT, CI/OA, CI/IC2

ACTION

S E C R E T 042230Z

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 INGHURST ACTING

4 APR 66 IN 89798

TYPIC AMMOP

REF WAVE 0031 (IN 87790)

IDEN A. UIJDC

IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.

IDEN C. JOSE M. ILLAN

S E C R E T

CFN 0032 0031 A UIJDC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN C JOSE M ILLAN

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BT

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

JMWAVE

Henry J. SLOMAN
Sylvia B. MONESTIER

REPORTS OFFICER
John C. TARBELL/vkl

APPROVING OFFICER
Philip G. ELMARD

REPORT NO.
UFG-7960

DATE OF REPORT
15 February 1966

PROJECT

SOURCE CRYPT
AMOT-245

☐ COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
☐ CS DISSEMINATION
☐ TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

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4 - Hqs 1 - DCS 2 - Caracas 2 - Lima 2 - Santiago 2 - Bogota	1 - JMBAR	State FBI I&NS Customs USCG

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

TYPIC

SOURCE: AMOT-245 in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2 was received from AMCRIB-10, orally, on 14 February.

RID: No Index

Group 1: Excluded from
Automatic Downgrading
and Declassification

[illegible] RI COPY DC

19-300-10

CS COPY

(20)

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
7-64

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. [illegible]

SUBJECT C Christian Democratic Movement to Hold Congress in Miami, 24 to 27 February 1966

DATE OF REPORT 15 February 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Early February 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. United States, Miami (7 to 14 February 1966)

UFG-7960

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961.

1. The Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC, Christian Democratic Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February 1966.[1] Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress.[2]

2. The MDC is preparing to hold elections for positions on the executive committee.

Field Comments:

1. The Eighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico and Mexico attended. (Cf. CSDB-312/00790-65)

2. Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

DATE : 7 MAY 60
TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : IWOG 2
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMD, CA/PRO, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/RQM 6, FI/D, WH 10, DD/I, AD/CI, OS 2, S/C 2.

MAY 7 2154Z 60
ROUTINE
IN 36643
TDCS-3/436,741

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 4513

INTEL 05, 08

SUPDATA SOURCE [HANS ARTURO BODEWIG 7 LEUENBERGER] WHO GAVE INFO TO HAVA STATION REPR REF HAVA 4414 (IN 33466)* FILED 062225Z REPORT CLASS SECRET HKH-2283 (ALSO RCVD 2783) CUBA SUBJ SETTING OFF OF BOMBS BY JUVENTUD ACCION CUBANA ANTICOMUNISTA DOI 30 APR - 3 MAY 60 PADA CUBA HABANA 5 MAY 60 APR 2 SOURCE CUBAN WHO CLAIMS CONTACTS IN JACA (F)

C/S COMMENT: *A report regarding Cuban youth plans for sabotage on 30 April.

IWOG COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

C/WH	2	WH/4	2	OS/SSD/BAUMAN	1
WH/REG	2	WH/FI	1		
WH/EXEC	1				
WH/RE	1				
WH/PW	1				

TDCS PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY

BASED ON:
HKH 2783
NO PROJECT

LIAISON: *

RELEASING IWO:
Charles J Beckman
CHARLES J. BECKMAN

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
8 MAY 1960
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S-E-C-R-E-T

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ACTION WH/C 8

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FILE VR, CS/FE, DCI, D/DCI, DCI(Goodwin), DDP, ADDP, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, SOD6, COS2, EUR8, S/AP, DCD, DO/H3

7 Oct [illegible] 11550

S E C R E T [illegible]542Z CITE JMWAVE 3413

DIRECTOR

BELLA NAPOLI

TYPIC

1. EVENING 5 OCTOBER ORLANDO BOSCH GIVEN THREE YEAR SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY NAPLES COURT WHEN FOUND GUILTY OF TRANSPORTING EXPLOSIVES WITHOUT LICENSE IN APRIL 66. TWO COMPANIONS TO BE TRIED SEPARATELY.

2. EVENING 5 OCTOBER AMOT REPORTED THAT AMTAUP-2 HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY JORGE CUITERREZ ULLA, CHIEF OF PROPAGANDA OF MIRR, TO ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCE 6 OCTOBER. AMTAUP-2 ALSO REPORTED THAT AT TRIAL JORGE VEGA, BOSCH DEFENSE ATTORNEY, HAD MADE STATEMENT TO COURT TO EFFECT THAT BOSCH SHOULD NOT BE CONVICTED BECAUSE HE WAS TRYING TO FREE HOMELAND FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION AND IN DOING SO WAS NOT ACTING ANY MORE ILLEGALLY THAN WAS WOFACT, WHICH WAS CONDUCTING "SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY" FROM A BASE LOCATED AT THE "CAYO GORDO" SECTION OF NAPLES.

3. "CAYO GORDO" UNDOUBTEDLY IS GARBLE FOR GORDON PASS AREA OF NAPLES AT WHICH BERTHING SITE FOR JMWAVE MARK I SWIFT

SECRET

[illegible] WHERE IT LOCATED. HOWEVER, RIGGER HAS [illegible] SEPTEMBER WHEN REMOVED FOR OPS UPT AND REPAIRS. WAS SCHEDULED RETURN TO BERTH CIRCA 1 OCTOBER BUT THIS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF HURRICANE INEZ. RIGGER NOW AT TARPON PROPERTIES BERTH, KEY LARGO, WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO NAPLES SITE. AS HQS AWARE LATTER SITE ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR TERMINATION OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 66.

4. UPON RECEIPT AMOT INFO JMWAVE CONTACTED AND BRIEFED AGENTS SERVING AS CUSTODIANS AT NAPLES SITES. TO DATE THEY HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY QUERIES. OFFICIALS OF COVER CORPORATION, 29 (GULFLANT,) WHICH OWNS RIGGER AND RENTS BERTHING SITE WERE ALERTED AND BRIEFED 6 OCTOBER.

5. MORNING 6 OCTOBER AMTAUP-2 2 REPORTED PRESS CONFERENCE NOT HEARD BY HIM BUT THAT GUTIERREZ STATED HE HAD PHONED UPI, AP, MIAMI HERALD TO GIVE THEM PRESS RELEASE INCLUDING VEGA CLAIM RE [illegible] ACTIVITIES NAPLES AREA.

6. AS OF 1100 HRS 6 OCTOBER STATION HAD NOT SEEN ANY MENTION IN PRESS OF ALLEGED VEGA STATEMENTS. MIAMI HERALD AND MIAMI NEWS COVERAGE OF [illegible] TRAIL DID NOT MENTION [illegible] REVIEWING NAPLES PRESS COVERAGE OF TRIAL.

SECRET

1/N

7. AT GUTIERREZ REQUEST AMTAUP-2 TAPED STATEMENT FOR RADIO PROGRAM. REVIEW OF STATEMENT BY AMOT SHOWS THAT WOFACT NOT MENTIONED.

8. ALTHO NO FIRM EVIDENCE TO DATE ANTICIPATE THAT MIRR MAY SEEK PUBLICIZE FURTHER "REVELATIOONS" RE JMWAVE ACTIVITY, NOTABLY RE COMBINED OPS FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL. INFO FROM AMOT AND OTHER CONTACTS IN EXILE COMMUNITY INDICATES FELIPE RIVERO AND HIS ANC GROUP ALSO TALKING OF "EXPOSING" WOFACT ACTIVITIES. STATED AIM OF BOTH GROUPS IS TO SHOW "TWO-FACED" ATTITUDE OF U.S. GOVT WHICH STOPS ANTI-COMMUNIST EXILE FIGHTERS FROM USING U.S. AS BASE FOR ACTION AGAINST CASTRO CUBA BUT ALLOWS WOFACT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITY. FURTHER AIMS ARE TO SHOW EXILE COMMUNITY THAT MIRR AND ANC ARE "ACTIVIST" GROUPS AS COMPARED WITH OTHER EXILE ORGS AND TO RIDICULE AND TRY INTIMIDATE THOSE CUBANS WHO WORK FOR JMWAVE.

9. STATION EVALUATES INCIDENT AS HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPS OR GENERAL STATION SECURITY. STATION HAS DIRECTED INCREASED STATE OF VIGILANCE AT ALL COMBINED OPS SITES BUT DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY BASIC CHANGES IN COVER

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] SECRET

[illegible] SECURITY PROCEDURES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVEL OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL PLUS EFFECTIVE MASKING OF SENSITIVE DATA RE COMBINED OPS.

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BT

NW SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ROUTING

1	4
2 PA/PROP	5
3	6

DATE : 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1830 27 MAY)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

MAY 27 2216Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

PRITY DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYROSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN
ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY".
ARTICLE FLATLY
STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH
[illegible] GOV MUNOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES
JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE
UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD
LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS
WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-
GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN
MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD,
ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF
A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO
MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA".
IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED
CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT
AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR (ISOLATION) TRAINING HAS
ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

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SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S[2] STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1[3] AND PASSOVOY[4] ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ARTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

536

DATE : 24 OCT 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : LONDON

ACTION : IW 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, ~~CA/E~~, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/ INT 6, FI/D, BELL 5, WH 16, WE 7, DD/I(A), DD/I(L), AD/CI, OS, S/C 2.

MRP

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

OCT 24 2131Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 11257

TDCS -3/490,978

DIR INFO CARA CITE LOND 8769
1
ANDRE ACTING

INTEL DYVOUR
2 01
SUPDATA SOURCE (SMOTH)

TIME FILED 1310Z

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL OEL-30,995 CUBA

SUBJ STATEMENTS OF MANOLO RAY

DOI OCTOBER 1961

PADA ENGLAND LONDON 24 OCTOBER 1961
24

SOURCE (OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE) FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

WH/REG	5	WH/4/PM	2	WE/R	1				TDCS PRECEDENCE
WH/RE	1	WH/PACY	2	WE/6/R	2				
WH/FI	2	WH/1/V	1						
WH/PW	1	OS/SSD	1					XX	ROUTINE
WH/4	2	WE/P	4						PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
EJM Delaney
E.J.M.DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
24 OCTOBER 2244 Z 61

BASED ON: OEL-30,995
(HP/SMOTH) 01
LIAISON-C

File
PA/PRP ✓

SECRET

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3/12

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978

SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 11257

DATE OF INFO. OCTOBER 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-30,995

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS". 24

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA, INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO, HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET . NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

INS TREASURY REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1/P/V

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING. (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD DE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PROCESSED	ACTION	ACTION PLISHED
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Debriefing Report - Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCES: (A) WAVE 2733, dated 15 August 1963
(B) MEXI 5507, dated 26 July 1963

MICROFILMED [illegible]

Transmitted herewith, FYI, is a debriefing report on Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre. Subject arrived in the U.S., via Mexico in late August, 1963. The debriefing contains information re the MRR roll up in May, 1963. Attachment "A" contains a list of subject's friends that are currently employed in power plants in Cuba. Attachment "B" is a debriefing report on Angel BENCOMO who Sanchez believes was responsible for the MRR roll up.

END OF DISPATCH

ATTACHMENTS:
Debriefing Reports, 1 cy ea. herewith

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN
RI/MIS
NIP/15
~~RI/Files~~

INDEX - X

Distribution:
3-C/SAS, w/atts/h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Encl 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
4 Oct. 63

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 11 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-11653

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-132-5-96/3

14-00000

5P

3 September 1963

DEBRIEFING REPORT : Santiago *SANCHEZ de la Torre - aka "Jose Antonio"

DATE & PLACE : Safehouse #182, 29-30 August (0900 - 1300 hrs)

CASE OFFICER : Clarence E. SMERYAGE

1. Subject began to work against the CASTRO regime with the MRP in 1960. At that time he was employed in the Santa Clara power plant as a technician. His job was controlling the amount of electric current that was distributed. (Attachment "A" contains a list of Subject's friends currently employed in power plants in Cuba). On 17 April 1961 Subject made contact with a KUBARK infiltration team and began to assist the team. Team consisted of Segundo 04 *BORGES, "Pepe" 04 *GONZALES and *AMARGO/1. Case Officer Comment: AMARGO/1 has confirmed the fact that Subject worked with his team in Cuba. Subject permitted the team to install their RS-1 set in his house located at #219 Carretera de Camajuani in the City of Santa Clara. He also safehoused the team on occasion and permitted them to hold meetings at his house. After the failure of Playa Giron the team reorganized the MRR in Las Villas Province, selecting Subject to be the Civil Coordinator of the movement in that province. Enrique 04 *ORTEGA was selected as the Military Coordinator. On 21 July 1961, while 04 ORTEGA and Subject were in Havana for discussions with MRR leaders *AMHOOK/1 and Juan *FALCON 04 the KUBARK infiltration team and many other members of the MRR in Las Villas, including Subject's wife, were arrested. (Discussions were about actions to take place 26 July 1961).

2. 04 Maria *RODRIGUEZ Posa, from Santa Clara, age 50/55 yrs, called 04 ORTEGA in Havana and told him not to return to Santa Clara as many people had been arrested. 04 ORTEGA passed the 04 information to Subject but as subject thought it applied only to ORTEGA 04 he returned to Santa Clara late at night on 22 July. He went to his home and on 23 July proceeded to work at the power plant. Maria RODRIGUEZ Posa 04 intercepted him on his way home for lunch and told him that the G-2 was at his home and that they also were going to the power plant to arrest him. Subject also learned that there was surveillance on his home on the night of 22 July 1961, but the person watching the house had gotten drunk and did not see subject when he returned from Havana. From that moment until entering an Embassy on 6 September 1962, subject lived "black".

3. Subject proceeded to the outskirts of Santa Clara where a friend, Efrain *WAREN, resided. His friend told him to go to Havana. While driving to Havana Subject met another person who informed him that the G-2 had a roadblock on the highway at Colon, Matanzas, and that all cars were being searched. On 24 July 1961, Subject went to a beach called "GANUZA" located on the north coast of Las Villas near Corralillo. Subject's sister has a home at "Ganuza" so he left his car there and proceeded to Havana with some friends of his sister. Later the G-2 confiscated his auto. (It is interesting to note that the G-2, after confiscating subject's auto at the beach, believed that Subject had departed from Cuba. Subject thereafter communicated with his wife by sending her letters in jail via Miami where they were postmarked).

~~[illegible]~~
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Att #6 UFGA-11653

CS COPY

~~[illegible]~~

10/BR

4. On 25 July 1961 Subject went to the house of an MRR leader, FNU JIMENEZ in Havana. When Subject approached JIMENEZ house he noticed a "blind move as if someone was watching" so he did not go in. He walked two blocks to a bus stop. From the bus stop he could observe the house and he noticed that a car departed at a "high rate of speed". Later that day Subject made contact with ORTEGA at the house of Mario *IRIVE in Fontanar, Havana. (IRIVE still lives in Havana). ORTEGA told Subject of the MRR plans for the following day (26 July). ORTEGA said that the movement was "going ahead with their plans" even though they were aware of JIMENEZ' arrest. Subject resided for approximately one week at the home of Jose *MELGAREJO in Veradero. MELGAREJO continues to work for the GOC at this time. He is the Deputy Chief of "Asphalt Consolidated" for the entire country. (In April 1962 Subject's wife escaped from the Womens' Prison at Guanajay, Pinar del Rio. She also was safehoused at MALGAREJO's house). Subject claims that MALGAREJO is a "good man" who also has a home located at Avenida de los OCUJES #221 in Santa Catalina (outskirts of Havana). MALGAREJO's wife and sons reside with him. Subject spent approximately one month in the above house (Aug.-Sept. 61).

5. From October 1961 Subject resided with Ester *CRUZ, a person he had known for 10 years. While living with CRUZ he changed his appearance - lost much weight, dyed and curled his hair, obtained contact lenses. (C/O Comment: Ester CRUZ was arrested approximately 9 May 1962 during the "roll up" of the MRR. She is in jail at this time). In November 1961, Subject met Joso Luis *ARANGO from Camaguey. ARANGO was at that time military coordinator for the MRR and used the name "Angelito". FNU *REYES Aka LUCAS, who was the MRR Coordinator of Las Villas introduced Subject to ARANGO. REYES is from Yaguajay, Las Villas. Subject met REYES through Oscar *MADRUGA Aka "Anibel" whom he had known since 1959. ARANGO encouraged Subject to begin working for the MRR again. An ID card in alias from a medical laboratory was obtained for Subject. He then obtained a briefcase and began selling medical supplies. MADRUGA's cousin, Jose *FERNANDEZ, owned the laboratory "*ROMBERG LABORATORY". FERNANDEZ worked for AMBRONC/5. After AMBRONC/5 was captured two actual MRR members met FERNANDEZ and requested that he continue to work. FERNANDEZ did not know the men and denied that he worked for the movement).

6. In late November, 1961 Subject moved into a "guest house" where several other MRR members resided. House is called "*House of Maria de la *GALLEGA" and is located on "J" Street between 21st and 23rd Streets, Vedado. Subject met "Fernando", the Security Chief of the MRR at the guest house. Fernando continues to work in the underground. He also met Oscar MADRUGA there. He met Roberto *SANCHEZ who also continues to work in the underground. MADRUGA had gone to the hills of Las Villas but returned to Havana. Another MRR man residing there was Roberto *FERNANDEZ. Arturo *MUGARRA and #AMSALON/1 visited the house on occasion. Subject was once picked up at the house by AMSALON/1. During this period FNU REYES, Aka Lucas, was arrested and Subject began to work with MUGARRA. In December 1961 ARANGO took asylum. There was much conflict in the MRR during this period between AMHOOK/1 and AMBRONC/5. (Subject has many letters pertaining to this conflict but they were left in Mexico. AMBIDDY/1 is having someone pick up the letters. Case Officer will attempt to obtain these letters and review them. Subject claims he did not hand carry them to the U.S., as he thought our officials would seize them).

421BR

04 04

7. In January 1962, Arturo MUGARRA and Roberto SANCHEZ were preparing to depart from Cuba. When AMJAVA/4 and AMBRONC/5 arrived in Havana they changed their minds. (C/O Comment: A woman named Emilia del *MAS was 04 living with MUGARRA 04 This girl later came to the USA via the Brazilian Embassy) 04 MUGARRA's group consisted of Roberto 04 *SANCHEZ, Angel *CANETE, 04 04 Eddy *GALENO who "is bad, likes money, women, etc"., and subject. 04 GALENO called Subject here in Miami on 28 August and wants to talk with him).

04

8. MUGARRA informed AMBRONC/5 that he had doubts about Juan F *BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly", as he had asked too many questions re what AMBRONC/5 had brought to Cuba. AMBRONC/5 decided to call a "false meeting" of the chiefs of the movement to test BUSTAMENTE but "someone objected to this". In February 1962, a meeting of the leaders of the MRR took place and AMBRONC/5 reorganized the movement. 04 Subject met AMBRONC/5 only twice - once in February 1962 at the house 04 of Angel CANETE and another time in March, 1962 when the assassination of Juan *MARINELLO failed. The Operation failed as the automobile to be used in the assassination attempt was stolen on the day of the proposed Operation. The driver of the car was to be Orlando *CRUZ, brother of Ester CRUZ. The MRR suspected Orlando CRUZ after this incident as he is a person who "likes money" and the theft was"quite a coincidence". (Orlando CRUZ is presently in Miami. He called Subject on 28 August and wants to see him). AMBRONC/5 informed the group in March to suspend all operations until he returned from a 04 trip he was taking to the USA with 04 MUGARRA and Jose *RODRIGUEZ Pecheco 04 AMBRONC/5 placed 04 Angel *CANATE in charge of the radio sets. CANATE was 04 selected to be the only person in direct contact with the RADOP in place of Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" 04 MUGARRA gave subject two radio sets; one was placed in the apartment of a sister-in-law of subject located 08 08 at *23rd and I Sts., Vedado, Apt. #11. The other set was located at *A 08 Street between 3rd and 5th Sts., Vedado, the home of Carlos *CADENAS. 04 The only persons who knew the locations of the sets were the Radop, Juan 04 FALCON, the MRR Chief and Angel CANATE. 04 During AMBRONC/5's trip to the USA in April, 1962, Juan BUSTAMENTE, Aka "Roly" discovered where the radios were hidden. Subject had contact with FALCON and CANATE during April.

04 04 04

04 9. On 2 May 1962 AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA returned from the USA. Enrique *CEPERO and MUGARRA's 04 common-law-wife waited for them in the Blue Studebaker Lark. AMBRONC/5 and MUGARRA were late in arriving, however, and the group had departed from the area. 04

10. Subject later discovered that the G-2 had captured a "large radio" in the apartment of a radio technician named *TROVADIUS. TROVADIUS, when captured, fired at the G-2 and was himself wounded in the shoulder. Later TROVADIUS reported that he had seen Juan FALCON in prison and that FALCON had said "people in the G-2 had told me that no one would be wounded or killed".

01

11. The Radop *(AMBUMP/1) informed subject on Wednesday (9 May 1962) to take the radio set out of the house. Rumors were already circulating that the Radop and FALCON were captured. Owners of the house where the radio was cached had moved to Santa Clara for Mothers' Day. As Subject was in contact with Congo PECHECO during this time he did not attempt to pick-up the radio until Thursday (10 May) at 0700 hrs. Subject entered the apartment building (12 stories high) by the rear. Upon arrival he discovered that the glass doors on the terrace were opened (apartment was located on the eleventh floor). These windows are seldom opened.

51/BS

Subject entered the building with his briefcase containing a pistol. He noticed two men "loitering in the lobby". He took the elevator to the 9th floor, departed, and walked to the eleventh floor. Subject was wearing soft shoes. He walked quietly to the apartment and heard a voice say "don't talk so loud as no one will come in:. Subject then proceeded to the next apartment occupied by a friend of the movement. The friend said she had heard noises since the preceding night in the apartment. Subject then took the stairs to the 9th floor and entered the elevator. He got off on the ground floor and proceded to the house on Carlos 08 Tercero Ave. where the other radio was cached (Owner's name is CABANES) 04. Upon arrival at the house he discovered that the woman who owned the house was outside in her housecoat talking to a stranger. Subject then departed from the area, called a friend of CABANES 04 who went to the house. The friend was arrested, held a week and released. Subject then tried to pass this information to Arturo 04 MUGARRA but MUGARRA had disappeared. He later discovered that MUGARRA knew that the radios were discovered and that TROVADIUS had been shot. 04

12. On 9 May 04 Juan FALCON, 04 the radio operator (AMJUMP/1) 01, Pepe 04 *GUTIERREZ, Aka 04 Peluza, Estar CRUZ and Jose 04 *SEOANE were arrested. When subject heard of these developments he hid in the Guanabo area. During this period 9th to 28th of May, he saw 04 MUGARRA approximately eight times. He later heard that the G-2 had taken over a house in Guanabo; located 3 blocks from where he was hiding. Subject heard that the G-2 had taken a "blond thin man there". (Possibly AMBRONC/5). G-2 remained at the house for four days.

13. Subject then departed from Guanabo for a few days. When he returned in June 1962 he met Sylvia LNU; the person who resided at the house where the "blond thin man named CARLOS" was taken". Sylvia and subject met in the water in front of their houses. Sylvia is the wife of a BATISTA Naval Captain who lives in Miami. She has two "little girls". Sylvia said that "CARLOS" used to live at her house and after being captured he was returned there with the G-2. The G-2 was searching for a "plastic case and envelopes" (pads and crystals). Sylvia told subject that she had seen the envelope and that when Enrique CEPERO's family informed her that he was captured she hid everything in the house that could incriminate "Carlos" under the dog house in the back yard". "Carlos" talked as if he had been drugged when he returned to the house with the G-2. They searched the entire house bringing "Carlos" back and forth several times for four days. Sylvia was forced to open the door whenever anyone arrived and the caller was arrested. Sylvia was interrogated and the house was under surveillance for approximately a month. A friend of Sylvia's from outside Cuba visited her during this period and was arrested and held for a week. Sylvia said the items she buried looked like "pads and maps wrapped in plastic". Although she claimed the material was turned over to the MRR subject has doubts that this was done.

14. During September 1962 Subject and his wife entered the Uruguayan Embassy to remain in asylum until 19 June 1963 when they arrived in Mexico City via Safe Conduct.

15. Attachment "B" is a report on Angel BENCOMO who subject believes was responsible for the MRR "roll-up".

Clarence E. SMERYAGE

SECRET

ATTACHMENT "A"

***TALLAPIEDRA** - (Power Plant)

1. Ing. Manolito *FERNANDEZ - Superintendente
2. Ing. Luis F. de *LEON - Superintendente Auxiliar
   (Bomb Thrower)
3.

* * *

REGLA - (Power Plant)

1. Delfin *RODRIGUEZ - Operator Control Room
2. Ing. *ROSS - Superintendent

* * *

DESPACHO NARANJITO - (Sub-Station)

1. Jaime *GUIU

* * *

OFICINA PRINCIPAL DE DESPACHO

1. Carlos *MANUEL Pena - Auxiliar of Superintendent
   (May be throw a bomb)- He can give good information.

* * *

DESPACHO SANTA CLARA (Santa Clara Dispatching Office)

1. Pedro *LUCAS Galvez (Jefe Despacho) - Dispatch Chief
2. Agustin *GARCIA Cabalet - Despachador - (Dispatcher)

* * *

Vladimir S. *KLITTING.

MICROFILMED
10 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

Att. "A" # UFGA-11653

19-300-11

11P

ATTACHMENT "B"

Debriefing of Santiago SANCHEZ de la Torre

SUBJECT: Angel *BENCOMO (BENCOMO reportedly was responsible for the MRR roll-up per SANCHEZ - See MEXI-5507)

1. Angel BENCOMO is approximately 19 years old, has brown skin, short, stocky, approximately 150 lbs. BENCOMO was formerly a miliciaman in Camaguey and a friend of Arturo *MUGARRA 04 BENCOMO entered the MRR via Eddy *GALENO 04 during March 1962, when he was employed by the Abras Publicas in Camaguey. BENCOMO had trouble with his superiors, quit the militia, etc 04 GELENO brought BENCOMO to Havana where BENCOMO began working in resistance with Jose 04 RODRIGUEZ Pecheco and Santiago SANCHEZ. (BENCOMO did not meet Arturo 04 MUGARRA in Havana). SANCHEZ "tested BENCOMO" and he appeared to be OK i.e., disciplined, quiet, etc. SANCHEZ then began using BENCOMO to pick-up radios, minox cameras, etc. This activity took place between March and May 1962.

2. Arturo MUGARRA was arrested in May 1962 in a cafeteria in Havana where he went to dispose of an automobile. GALENO was to 04 meet MUGARRA at the cafeteria. MUGARRA and his brother arrived at the cafeteria, turned the car (Cadillac) over to the prospective buyer and sat down. A mechanic drove the car to test it and returned with two G-2 cars. Although GALENO was present and was questioned he was not arrested. 04

3. From May to September 1962, SANCHEZ saw BENCOMO often. In September SANCHEZ went into an Embassy but "heard that BENCOMO was arrested and held until November". In January 1963 SANCHEZ heard from BENCOMO via SANCHEZ' sister. BENCOMO wrote a letter (which SANCHEZ still has) saying that he was working for the MRR in the streets. BENCOMO said he did not want to seek asylum but was 04 considering going to the house of Luis *PERALES in Oriente (PERALES formerly was operating in the hills of Yayuajay but went to Havana to hide out in Jan.-Feb. 1962). In February 1963, SANCHEZ received another letter from his sister saying that BENCOMO was a G-2 man. BENCOMO identified himself as a G-2 man to 04 PERALES in December 1962, 04 and asked PERALES to cooperate with him 04 PERALES told SANCHEZ' sister of BENCOMO's proposition in January 1963. Since that time PERALES has disappeared. 04

c no.3

Att "B" to UFGA-11193

19-300-11

13/BR

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Burke, William P. Jr.
01775

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1947 - 1962
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CS Files
ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY: NONE

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:20 27 DEC 78		Chuck Berk	Chuck Berk
2:45 27 Dec		DANN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BURKE WILLIAM P
01775
TERMINATED

STANDARD FORM 56
Revised November 1959
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER L-1, FPM 56-103

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954

1. FULL NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle) Burke William P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) October 22, 1900

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

(a) ☐ SEPARATED
(b) ☒ RETIRED
(c) ☐ DIED
WAS EMPLOYEE AT TIME OF DEATH, AN APPLICANT FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(d) ☐ 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS
(e) ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING S. F. 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a) ☐ CURRENT S. F. 54 ATTACHED
(b) ☒ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY
(c) ☐ A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN FREE LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT S. F. 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL S. F. 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF S. F. 56. IF NO CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT S. F. 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR) October 27, 1962	6. ANNUAL COMPENSATION RATE (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5. 17,925.00 PER ANNUM	7. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

8. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS OFFICIAL RECORDS, AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5. (SIGN ORIGINAL ONLY)

(Personal signature of authorized agency official)

1 7 DEC 1962
(Date)

B. DeFelice
(Type name of authorized agency official)

Insurance Officer - Alternate
(Title)

Central Intelligence Agency
(Name of agency)

2430 E St., N. W., Washington 25, D. C.
(Mailing address of agency)

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3 — FILE COPY

31 OCT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 001775	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BURKE WILLIAM P JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 27 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3242 2221 4000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION U.S. FIELD NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION NEW ORLEANS, LA.		
11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT	12. POSITION NUMBER 0195	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 17925
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 22 00	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 03H0000	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-2-62

1150 Use Previous Edition

Bar 10/31/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

PSC: 31 OCT 62

OCT

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 001775	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BURKE WILLIAM P JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (OPTIONAL	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO [illegible] DA 31 YR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3242 222 4000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE IO CONTACT	12. POSITION NUMBER 0155	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION CC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.21	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 17325
18. REMARKS			

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 4-62 Use Previous Edition (4-61)

Executive Registry
62-[illegible]

2 3 OCT 1962

Mr. William P. Barke
6300 Saint Charles Avenue
New Orleans 18, Louisiana

Dear Mr. Barke:

As you bring to a close eighteen years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed much to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend warmest wishes in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JOHN A. McCONE

John A. McCone
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DC/EAB/SO
1 - D/Pers
1 - C/BSD
1 - OPF
1 - BCB Retirement
1 - BCB Reader

Originator: /S/ Harry W. Little, Jr.
Director of Personnel
22 OCT 1962

Concur: SIGNED
DC/EAB/SO
19 OCT 1962

OP/BSD/RSagament (18 October 1962)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR ST	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	001775	82500	V	15 0	$15810	15 8	$17925

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

'1' FILE

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE: 2 October 1962

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (Last) BURKE,	(First) William	(Middle) Patrick, Jr.	POSITION TITLE: Chief, New Orleans Field Office
PRESENT GRADE: GS-15	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDI/OO		STATION: New Orleans

BE AWARDED: Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD

☒ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☐ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit for his outstanding service to the Central Intelligence Agency. As Chief of the New Orleans Field Office since its inception in 1947, Mr. Burke labored unceasingly in developing programs which have produced important information on a continuing basis. In his role as Agency representative, he has been successful in establishing relationships which have furthered the mission of the Agency and enhanced its reputation in the area. In his role as office chief, he has provided leadership of the highest order to his associates, and leaves behind him a legacy of achievement in keeping with the best traditions of service to the United States.

(Recommendation approved by DD/I on 14 September 1962)

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

APPROVED

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

Deputy DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

5 OCT 1962

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD: HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.

SIGNATURE /Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER: ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-62 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 September 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 1775 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BURKE, William P., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: ~~VOLUNTARY~~ RETIREMENT (optional)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 7 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3242-2221-4000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/OO
Contact Division
U.S. Field
New Orleans Office
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: New Orleans, La.
11. POSITION TITLE: IC Contact ~~Intelligence~~ Officer, ~~Chief~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: K 0195
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.21
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15-8
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~$15,810~~ 17,925
18. REMARKS:

cc Payroll; Security

Subject is re-employable.

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: E. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO
DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 62
18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. LAROCQUE, JR. Acting Assistant Director, OO
DATE SIGNED: 30 Oct 1962

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: US
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGRITY CODE:
24. HOOTRS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 32 YR. 08
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 3 EH,00,0,0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVER 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. OCCUPATIONAL CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-1-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: H. F. Heggen By— 31 Oct 62
DATE APPROVED

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

OCT 31 2 03 PM '62

[illegible]

[illegible]

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

[illegible] Ave.,
[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
- Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
- Office, Major Staff, etc.
  - Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
    - Branch
      - Section
        - Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-500-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 15 Jul 1944

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 01775						
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Burke, William Patrick, Jr.			3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1900	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Sep 1947	
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 1	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1937		8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE NA	
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Rejected	10. LAST MED. RPT. Oct 1957	QUAL. FOR US Field	EVAL. FOR Annual	
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE 9 Jul 1947		13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None		14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1925-42 Self-Employed, New Orleans, La - Lawyer
1942-45 Military Service, US Marine Corps, Major - Division Legal Officer
1945-47 Administered Financial Matters Concerning Family Estate

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1915-19 Loyola Univ, New Orleans, La - AB Arts & Sciences
1920-23 Harvard Law School - LLB
1923-24 Trinity College, Cambridge, England - English Literature Research
1924-25 Tulane Univ., New Orleans, La - LLB

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1954 CIA Orientation
1959 Mgmt for Contact Div

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	I.O.	0132.21	P-7		OO/Contact/Contr/Actg R Mgr IAC	New Orleans
Sep 1948	"	0132.21	P-8		CO/Contact Br/Reg Mgr N. O.	"
Mar 1952	"	0132.21	15	OO	OO/ContactDiv/Ch, N.O. Off	"
Jul 1960	LWOP					"
Sep 1960	I.O.-Contact	0132.21	15	OC	DO/ContactDiv/Ch, New Orleans Off	"

20. DATE REVIEWED	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY 25 Sep 1962 OP/POD/QAB/hms	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 2 Dec 1957

FORM NO. 1200 (PART I) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART I) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. 1 FEB 57

SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
01775	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
BURKE, William Patrick, Jr.	Oct 1900

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Letter of Appreciation 1948 from AD/Operations prior to leaving Agency for having created an effective field office in less than a year, excellent relations with clients and local Armed Forces Representatives and high morale of office.

Commendation 1954 from DD/P for thorough and expeditious contribution made by DDI Personnel to urgent need for intelligence about Guatemala.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
25 Sep 1962	OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET

MAY 1962

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief, New Orleans Field Office continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. He is extremely conservative by nature and finds it difficult to act without the most careful consideration of all factors involved. While this approach might be a handicap in some areas it tends to be an asset in New Orleans. In spite of this tendency he willingly and efficiently devotes all his time and energy to the solution of a problem in an emergency. He represents the Agency well and maintains the highest respect in his community.

E M Ashcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

Dup

SECRET

MAY 1962

0 2 MAY 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

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EMAshcraft
E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

21 June 61

Memo for File - William P. Burke

Subject: Longevity Step Increase

In reviewing this file under the Security reinvestigation program, it was noted that the 3rd LSI (as GS-15) was proposed to be made effective on 18 Sept 60, but that the effective date had been changed by Payroll to show 16 Oct 60. Reason for the change is presumed to be due to LWOP. Form 560 shows 225 hours of LWOP during the waiting period. If those figures are correct, then there was no "excess" LWOP, since the law provides that a maximum of 240 hours of LWOP is creditable toward completion of the waiting period in the case of LSI's.

I called this case to the attention of Joe Tracy, C/Payroll, who will review LWOP records and, if required, issue a memorandum to correct the effective date of the last LSI.

Gene C. Stevens

SECRET

7 JUL 1961

30 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

E. M. Ashcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey
George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

3 JUL 1961

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

3 [illegible] 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office in a thoroughly competent and efficient manner. Mr. Burke is a conservative who sometimes finds it difficult without most careful and protracted consideration of all factors involved to adjust to changes in methods and objectives particularly those peculiar to clandestine support. While his conservatism added to his meticulous legalistic approach might be something less than desirable in certain areas it is a definite asset in New Orleans. When called upon in emergency he willingly and efficiently devotes his entire time and energy to the solution of the problem regardless of personal inconvenience. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area and readily maintains respect in the community.

MAshcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey

3 JUL 1961

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

SECRET

1960

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR
GS 15	9	$15,550	09	21	58	GS 15	Z	$15,810	10	26	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP 2 4 6

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION ☐ P.S.I. ☒ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS Employee has served an aggregate of 10 years in present, equivalent, or higher grade and at the top of present grade since 9-19-48. This is the third longevity step increase.

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. **SECRET** OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

	V to V		V to UV	**SECRET** (When Filled In)	**REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION**
	UV to V		UV to UV		

Date Prepared: Mo 9 Da 14 Yr 60

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo Da Yr)	4. Vet. Pref. (None 0, 5 Pt 1, 10 Pt 2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS EOD (Mo Da Yr)
101775	[illegible]RKE WILLIAM P JR	10 22 03	1	M 1	03 18 47

7. SCD (Mo Da Yr)	8. CSC Retmt (Yes 1, No 2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affid. (Mo Da Yr)	11. FEGLI (Yes 1, No 2) Code	12. LCD (Mo Da Yr)	13. (Yes 1, No 2) Code
07 15 44	1	50 USCA 403 J			03 13 47	2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI - OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

16. Dept.-Field (Dept, USfld, Frgn) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	25. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$15550	OC	09 19 48	XX XX XX	1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo Da Yr)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LWOP	570	9 ~~12~~ 7 60	Regular		

7

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	2531		75033

33. Dept.-Field (Dept, USfld, Frgn) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	42. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	43. Appropriation Number
	$		09 19 48	09 15 60	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): E. M. ASHCRAFT, Chief, Contact Division, OO

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Ann L. Budresky

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Geo. G. Carey
GEORGE G. CAREY
Assistant Director for Operations

Date Approved: 15 SEP 1960

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	9-16-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	D V Mulcahy	9/16/60

Remarks:

CK per M. Derosier 9-16-60

☐ Continued On Reverse Side

FORM NO. 1152 8-59 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (4)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BLT: 7 SEPT 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-LCD Mo	Da	Yr
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10	22	00		1	M 1	09	15	47

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code
07	15	44		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	18	47		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09	19	48	XX	XX	XX	1242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
RETURN TO DUTY FROM LEAVE WITHOUT PAY	50	09	07	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	4	INTELL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09	19	48	09	18	60	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED
9-22-60

DT

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

	V to V		V to UV	REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	DATE PREPARED Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 60
	UV to V		UV to UV		

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
1775	BURKE, William P., Jr.	Mo 10 Da 22 Yr 00	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	M	Mo Da Yr

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13.
Mo Da Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code		Mo Da Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	Mo Da Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

7

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/OO Contact Division New Orleans Office		New Orleans, La.	

16. Dept.- Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. - Usfld. - Frgn. XX Code 4	Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)	195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
15-~~7~~ 9	15550 $ ~~14,450~~	OC	Mo Da Yr 09 9 48	Mo Da Yr	0242-2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY*	1	Mo Da Yr ~~EOB~~ 7 19 60	Regular	96	

~~NTE 19 Aug 60~~
(THRU COB 10 Sept 60)

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	3036		75033

33. Dept.- Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept. - Usfld. - Frgn. Code				

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
—	$ ——		Mo Da Yr	Mo Da Yr	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) E. M. Ashcraft, Chief, Contact Division	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) GEORGE G. CAREY Assistant Director for Operations	Date Approved 1 Jun 60
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Ann L. Budresky 2271		

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved B.		

Remarks *Personal reasons. It is requested that Mr. Burke be granted 25 days of leave without pay commencing 18 July and ending ~~19 August 1960~~.

To take a trip — 10 Sept 60 per

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 6-53 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 26 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
101775	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	10	22	00		1	M	1	09	18	47	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Yes-1 No-2 / Code
07	15	44		1	50 USCA 403 J						09 18 47	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE		NEW ORLEANS, LA.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC			0242 2221

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
LEAVE WITHOUT PAY (THRU COB 10 SEPT 1960)	61	BOB 07 29 60	REGULAR	70	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO CONTACT DIVISION NEW ORLEANS OFFICE	2531	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	75033

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	4	INTEL OFF (CON) (CH)	0195	GS	0132.21

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 9	$ 15550	OC	09 19 48	XX XX XX	1242 2221

44. Remarks

POSTED

9-30-60 WR

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150 9/29/60

SECRET

(4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OC	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	25 31	GS-15 9	$14,450	$15,550

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

18 MAY 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Operations

SUBJECT: William P. Burke, Memorandum of Performance

1. William P. Burke, Chief of the New Orleans Field Office, continues to manage his office most efficiently and to demonstrate thorough knowledge of his area. His inherent conservatism and somewhat legalistic approach tend to make it difficult for him to accept change and methods peculiar to clandestine support without most careful consideration of all the factors involved.

2. Mr. Burke represents the Agency well in his area. His conservatism is to a degree an asset in New Orleans; it could conceivably be a handicap elsewhere.

EMAshcraft

E. M. ASHCRAFT
Chief, Contact Division

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

George G. Carey 20 MAY 1960

George G. Carey
Assistant Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 24 Feb. 1960
52
PROT. 0-60

TO : **Chief, OO/CD**
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Revocation of Cryptographic Clearance - **William P. Burke**

1. The cryptographic clearance held by Subject has been revoked under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Revocation is effective 9 Feb 60.

2. Subject is not authorized to have continued custody of, access to, or otherwise gain further knowledge of staff cryptographic material or information. Subject has been informed of this revocation, has been debriefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Debriefing Statement acknowledging continuing responsibility for the protection of all cryptographic information obtained during the tenure of his cryptographic clearance.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - OO/CD
1 - Security Office (Debriefing Statement Attached)
1 - Personnel Office (Wing 1-H Curie Hall)
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-53 1597b

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 101775

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/CD/New Orleans

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Sept 58 - Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of a domestic field office.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining cooperation of non-governmental sources in his area.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and carrying out effective intelligence collection.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	3

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 12 12 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He is able to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which makes him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods particularly when understanding support of the clandestine services is required. His conservatism is, to an extent, an asset in his area; it could be undesirable in some other assigments.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 100	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject is located in New Orleans.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 23 April 59	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CD/OO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. Ashcraft EMAshcraft

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 28 APR 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD/O	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George G. Carey George G. Carey

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT 7	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			NO.	DA.	YR.				NO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEARS IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 Sep 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
E. M. ASHCRAFT	24 Feb. '59	EMAshcraft

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR 56 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
101775	BURKE, WILLIAM P.	DDI/CONT	V-40	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	5	13,970	09	16	51	GS 15	X & Y	14,210 14,450	09	21	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING,
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE HAS SERVED AN AGGREGATE OF 10 YEAR IN PRESENT, EQUIVALENT, OR HIGHER GRADE AND AT THE TOP OF PRESENT GRADE SINCE 16 SEP 51. THIS IS THE FIRST AND SECOND LONGEVITY STEP INCREASES.

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

1958

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It ~~is recommended~~ that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/00	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/Contact/New Orleans	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CII)		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 9 September 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9/9/57 - 9/8/58	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject not available in Washington area.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 12 Sept 58 ~~27 August 1958~~	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR E. M. ASHCRAFT	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATA

9-[illegible]-58

[illegible] /58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 18 Sept 58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL GEORGE G. CAREY	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD/O

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Need to
list docs
Bates

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 19 9 55 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	RATING NUMBER 3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject possesses complete integrity and thorough knowledge of his area. He has the ability to assess the potential of sources and to obtain their full cooperation. He is inclined toward a legalistic approach which renders him somewhat less than receptive to new ideas and methods, particularly where understanding support of the clandestine services is required. This conservatism is to a degree an asset in the area and the duties to which he is assigned but could be undesirable in some other assigments.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/00	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/Contact/New Orleans	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Contact) (CH)		
7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 9 Sept. 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9/9/57 - 9/8/58	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 17 Sept. 58 ~~27 August 1958~~	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR E. M. ASHCRAFT	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CD/OO

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 18 Sept '58	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL GEORGE G. CAREY	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AD/O

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

92

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject will leave New Orleans only for an overseas post. He will not do so for duty in Washington. In view of the fact that his intelligence experience is entirely in the field of domestic collection, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas assignment. He is eminently qualified to continue in his present assignment.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No training or experience planned or required except periodic meeting of Contact Division Field Chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G.4. above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
101 775	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (*Last-First-Middle*) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)		
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
BURKE, William P.	October	22	1900

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
	April	9	1957	☑ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A.	Reading (40)
1.	I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2.	I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3.	I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4.	I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5.	I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B.	Writing (41)
1.	I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2.	I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3.	I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4.	I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5.	I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C.	Pronunciation (42)
1.	MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2.	WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3.	MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4.	MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5.	I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 Apr 57	SIGNATURE William P. Burke
(46)	(47)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BURKE WILLIAM P JR	101775	GS-15-5	$12,690	$13,970

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: 8 Sep 58

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): BURKE William Patrick Jr.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
6300 St. Charles Ave.,
New Orleans 18, La.

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
6300 St. Charles Ave.,
New Orleans 18, La.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Twinbrook 7-2485

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Louisiana

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: BURKE Mrs Frances Kittredge

2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 6300 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans 18, La.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: none

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Twinbrook 7-2485

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: none

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: none

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
none

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS:
Never separated, divorced nor marriage annulled

BURKE WILLIAM P JR   01775

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: 63-545

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.

COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

TELEPHONE EXT.: 2271

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE, SPINDLE, OR MUTILATE

RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

INSTRUCTIONS

THIS FORM MUST BE RETURNED WHETHER YOU HAVE HAD OVERSEAS SERVICE OR NOT.

PLEASE READ CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON ACCOMPANYING CARD, THEN FILL OUT THIS FORM AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.

DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 29-31	WHERE SERVICE WAS PERFORMED	PCS - 1 TDY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 32	DATES FROM MO. 33-34	DATES FROM YR 35-36	DATES TO MO. 37-38	DATES TO YR 39-40	SERVICE AS CIVILIAN - 1 MILITARY - 2 (ENTER NO.) 41	RESPONSIBLE U.S. GOV'T. DEPT. OR AGENCY	DO NOT WRITE IN COLUMN 42-44
310	Territory of Hawaii	1	05	45	10	45	2	US Marine Corps	540

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS NEEDED CHECK HERE ☐ AND ASK YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL CARDS

SECRET

FORM 1451

Housewife

unemployed, last two employers)
Not employed. Once employed by Town & Country., N.O.La.

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
not employed

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b 4-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

1958 doc

Per'l HISTORY STATEMENT w/atts

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
Sep 1942 - Dec 1945

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
U S Marine Corps

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U. S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
CIA, New Orleans Field Office, Sept 1947 to date.

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
None
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Dividends on stocks, capital gains, interest, rents and an annuity.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

1. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS:

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Whitney National Bank Hibernia National Bank	New Orleans, La. " " "
National American Bank National Bank of Commerce	" " " " " "

2. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 2 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS: - - -

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
- - -

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Loyola University of the South	Phil	Eng	1915	1919	AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School	Law		1920	1923	LLB	1923	?
Cambridge Univ., England	Eng	--	1923	1924	none	--	?
Tulane University Law School	Law		1924	1925	LLB	1925	?

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	
none				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
Headquarters US Marine Corps	Military Law	Oct 1944	Feb 1945	about [illegible]

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
—

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cambridge, Eng.	General only	1923-4	X		X	

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

I attended Trinity College, Cambridge, for about nine months.

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING
None					

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
20 ?	none	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)
None

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH
Golf, Fishing, Tennis, Badminton, Bridge, Piano. Proficiency - Fair.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK
None

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.
None

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN
Member of the Bar of Louisiana. Also licensed to practise before Federal Courts

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue): 1926

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue): 1958

SECRET

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

None

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

None

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

None except public speaking incident to legal practise.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

None.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Sep 1947 to Date
2. GRADE: GS 15
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Office of Operations/ Contact Division/ H.O.
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 10 (inc. 3 WAEs)
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, New Orleans Field Office.
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

Supervision and direction of professional and clerical employees. Carrying out policy and operational directives issued by headquarters. Maintaining liaison with other governmental agencies. Collecting and reporting positive foreign intelligence information. Appropriate duties incidental to the above.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII	CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS		
1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1 x	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Mrs Frances K Burke	wife	1906		x	US	6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans 18, La.
Patricia W Burke	daughter	1937		x	US	" " " "

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

14-00000

201
Doc 1947
Doc

Doc date,
26 May 1947

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Standard Form 57 - June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046.

4257

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question [illegible] completely. Typewrite or print. If you are applying for a specific Civil Service examination, read the announcement carefully and follow its directions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION No.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for:

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for:

4. XX XX XX (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William Patrick Burke, Jr.

5. Street and number or R. D. number.
6300 St. Charles Ave.

City or post office (including postal zone), and State.
New Orleans, La.

ANNOUNCEMENT No.

6. Legal or voting residence (State): Louisiana
7. Office phone No.: UP 1447
Home phone: UP 1447

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): New Orleans, La.

9. Date of birth (month, day, year): 22 Oct. 1900
10. Age last birthday: 46
11. ☒ Male ☐ Female
12. ☒ Married ☐ Single
13. Height without shoes 6'1½" feet inches
Weight: 202 pounds

SELECTION No.

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade:
Major USMCR (inactive duty) 15 Aug. 1945

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor.
☐ Nonappor.

Material
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Entered register:

Notations:

App. review:

Approved:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFER-ENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disab.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short-term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?		X
anywhere in the United States?		X
outside the United States?		X

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:
New Orleans, La.

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept: $ 8000.00 per year.
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify: ☒ Occasionally ☐ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment: (Month, year)
From: To present time

Exact title of your present position:
See appendix "A".

Salary or earnings:
Starting $ per
Present $ per

Place of employment (city and State):

Description of your work:

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person). If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment and division:

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.):

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for desiring to change employment:

16—47790-3

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

17. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.—In order to make [illegible] the training and experience that have [illegible] in the Armed Services [illegible] had no special or technical schools while in the service, write in Item (a) "No attendance at service schools" and indicate in Item (c) all [illegible] in duty assignment, showing dates of such assignment.

(a) First Special Service School attended:

See appendix "B"

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(b) What were you taught in First [illegible] Service School?

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School).

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

(e) Second Special Service School attended:

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(f) What were you taught in Second Special Service School?

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization.

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of:

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(b) Give name and location of last high school attended:

Jesuits High School, New Orleans, La.

(c) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:

English, History.

(a) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended		Years Completed		Degrees Conferred		Semester Hours Credit
		From—	To—	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Loyola University, N.O. La	A & S	1915	1919	x		AB	1919	?
Harvard Law School, Cambridge	Law	1920	1923	x		LLB	1923	?
Tulane University, N.O. La	Law	1924	1925	x		LLB	1925	?

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Philosophy, Eng. Science	?	Law and English Litt. Spent year (1923-1924) at Trinity Coll. Cambridge Univ. England in Eng. Litt. research.	

(e) Other training such as vocational, business, Army courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or in service training in a Federal agency:

Judge Advocate General of Navy;
USMC Institute

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended		Years Completed	
	From—	To—	Day	Night
Military Justice	1944	1945	x	
Post-Exchange Actg.	"	"	x	

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair
French			x			x			

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

School and private lessons

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g. business, education, [illegible]).

England, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, etc. Study and recreation.

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 40 shorthand

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State:

First license or certificate (year). Lawyer; Louisiana

Latest license or certificate (year): Continuous.

22. Give any other significant information you wish to include in your application such as (a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested) (b) your patents or inventions (c) public speaking and public relations experience (d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

Practising lawyer in New Orleans for about fifteen years; member New Orleans and Louisiana State Bar Associations.

RECEIVED
JUN 7 8 51 AM '47

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. James Gilly, Jr.	V.P. Whitney National Bank, N.O.La	Banker
2. Judge W. T. Westerfield	Court of Appeals, New Court House Bldg., N. O. La.	Judge
3. Fred N. Ogden	American Bank Bldg. N. O. La.	Broker.

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No Not employed.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now, or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and state what retirement act and whether retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? (If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.)	X	
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?	X	
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?	Inactive Reserve.	
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis, with full military pay and allowances?	X.	

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service	Date of separation or separations
8 Sept. 1942	Inactive duty 19 Dec. 1945
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	**Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)**
USMCR	013458 Major USMCR

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER, PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		X
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19....

Signature .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	
	35. Defective distant vision, corrected by glasses		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80).

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 26 May 1947.

Signature of applicant ....
(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe.")

16—

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "A"

HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT.

(Sec. 21 in Form [illegible]; Sec. 16 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

The following is a complete account of my business and professional activities since my return to New Orleans, from England, in the fall of 1924.

I had obtained a law degree from Harvard in 1923, but, as the law of Louisiana differs in many important respects from the Common Law, I entered Tulane University Law School, in October 1924, to study Louisiana Civil Code subjects. In the afternoons I worked as a researcher for the law firm of Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps and Dunbar, (now Phelps, Dunbar, Marks and Claverie) [illegible] United Fruit Co. Bldg., New Orleans, La.

In July 1925 I received the degree of LLB from Tulane, passed the Louisiana Bar examinations, and entered practise as an associate of the firm named above. My salary was, as I recall it, $100.00 per month, plus 75% of the fees on the business which I originated. Such fees were negligible. My work consisted in research on matters assigned by members of the firm, and the handling of minor matters of litigation.

Among the clients of the Spencer firm was the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co., a small bank which had been organized a few years previously. In 1928 the bank decided to open a Trust Department, and offered me the job of organizing and running it, at a salary of $[illegible] per year. I accepted, organized the department and operated it successfully until 1931. My work consisted in soliciting wills, trusts and custodianship accounts, investing the funds of beneficiaries, administering estates and handling receiverships.

In 1931 the discount department of the New Orleans Bank & Trust Co. got into difficulties, and, for the protection of the depositors, the entire bank was taken over by the Interstate Trust & Banking Co., of New Orleans. No loss was suffered by any of the customers of the Trust Department. I became Assistant Trust Officer of the Interstate Bank, and could have remained there indefinitely, but I disliked the environment and the policies of the management, and I could see very little prospect for advancement, so I resigned when the trust accounts had been transferred.

In the fall of 1931 I organized a corporation which was to erect a moving-letter on Canal St., similar to the one on the Times Building in New York. Revenues were to be derived from the sale of advertising which was to be interspersed among news dispatches. It proved impossible, however, to sell sufficient contracts to make the operation profitable, and I liquidated the corporation in the early part of 1932.

Two of my classmates at Tulane, Eberhard P. Deutsch and R. Emmett Kerrigan had been practising law together since graduation, and were becoming quite successful. They asked me to join them, and, in the summer of 1932, I became a member of the firm of Deutsch & Kerrigan & Burke. For the next five years we engaged in the general civil practise of law in all City, State and Federal Courts. Among others, we represented the [illegible] Engineering Co., the Item Co., Ltd., publisher of one of the local daily papers, the Standard Dredging Co., and a number of insurance companies, and local corporations and individuals.

My work covered the whole field of civil corporate and individual practice: the preparation of pleadings, interviewing witnesses, conducting litigation, writing briefs, arguing cases in the instant and appellate courts, examining titles, administering estates, handling taxation matters, etc. My income averaged approximately $7000.00 per annum.

I resigned from the firm in 1937 and continued practise, as an individual, with offices in the Canal Bank Building, until I entered military service in 1942. My income during that period varied between five and eight thousand dollars.

I was on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps from September 1942 to December 1945. While I was overseas my mother died, leaving a considerable estate. I was named executor in her will, and, after my return, I spent several months in administering the estate, transferring the securities and working out some rather complicated taxation matters.

I had decided, while in service, that I did not want to return to active law practice. The clients I had had before the war were being adequately served by other attorneys, and it would have meant starting all over again from scratch. I did not want to do that, so I began looking for a business in which I could invest capital and my services. Naturally, I have found quite a few, but none, as yet, which meets my requirements.

I am a member of the Board of Directors of the following corporations: The National Service & Appraisal Co., of Chicago, Ill., which is in the credit reporting business; the Cahill Realty Co., of St. Louis, Mo., a family real estate company; The Equitable Real Estate Co., Ltd., of New Orleans; and Miracle Services, Inc., a company which some of my associates and I organized recently to operate "Launderettes" in this territory.

I have been active in Civic matters, acting as team captain in drives of the Community Chest, and have taken part in drives by the Red Cross, The Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the Cancer Society, etc. I am a member of the Board of the Children's Bureau, a Chest agency, and a member of its finance committee.

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

MILITARY SERVICE.

(Sec. 16 in Form 2105; Sec. 17 in USCSC Std. Form 57)

In the spring of 1942 the war came pretty close to New Orleans. There were submarines in the Gulf, tankers were being torpedoed as they left the river, and the hospitals were filled with horribly burned seamen. I was anxious to do what I could, but I felt that at my age there was little hope of taking an active part. I became an Air Raid warden, and helped sell some War Bonds, and I thought that was about all I would be able to do.

Then the Marine Corps came out with an announcement that commissions were open in Aviation Intelligence to men up to 45 years of age. I saw the Recruiting Officer, and he recommended me for such a commission. Nothing happened for some time, so when I was next in Washington on business I went to Marine Corps Headquarters and looked p upColonel Welford, whom I had know in New Orleans.

He ascertained that Aviation Intelligence was filled up, but stated that he would be glad to have me in the Recruiting Division, and that I might transfer to Aviation Intelligence later on. I was delighted to get into the Marine Corps, and accepted a commission as Captain on 8 September 1942.

After an indoctrination course at Quantico, Va., I was ordered to San Antonio, Tex., as assistant recruiting officer. I remained there for three months, devoting most of my time to the Student Officer procurement program in the various Texas colleges.

In December, 1942, the Marine Corps, which had, prior to that time, been an exclusively volunteer organization, was placed under the Selective Service System, and Marine Corps Headquarters decided to follow the lead of the Navy and appoint a Marine officer as liaison to each state Selective Service Headquarters. I was one of those appointed, and was ordered to Raleigh, N.C. on 12 January 1943.

The post at Raleigh was one of some importance because of the large Marine Corps bases at New River, Cherry Point and Edenton, at which over one hundred thousand Marines were in training, and at which construction and maintenance programs involving several hundred millions of dollars were in operation. It was my duty to supervise the induction of all North Carolina selectees who were assigned to the Marine Corps through the Selective Service System, and to represent the various Marine Corps installations in their dealings and disputes with local draft boards concerning the deferment of about five thousand civilian employees.

In addition, I took an active part in the administration of the Selective Service Headquarters in Raleigh and throughout the state, interviewing registrants, their employers and dependents, advising local and appeal boards, setting up replacement schedules for various industries and passing on the merits of about eleven thousand appeals.

The work was interesting and productive, and living in Raleigh was certainly "good duty", but I had never lost my desire for overseas duty and made two attempts to transfer to Aviation, both of which were unsuccessful. Then, in September 1944 I heard that Marine Divisions overseas were badly in need of Legal Officers, and I immediately applied for transfer. I was ordered to Headquarters for indoctrination, and, after a tour of duty in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, I was sent to Camp Lejeune in February 1945 for further training. In April 1945 I sailed from San Francisco, and in May I joined the Fourth Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Maui, as Division Legal Officer. I continued in that post until the war ended and I procured a transfer to the inactive list.

A Marine Division consists of approximately [illegible] men. The Division Legal Officer is directly responsible to the Commanding General for the administration of military justice throughout the command, and supervises the work and findings of all General, Summary and Deck Courts, as well as those of all Boards of Investigation and Courts of Inquiry. He advises the Commanding General on the action to be taken as Convening Authority or Immediate Superior in Command. In addition he advises the Commanding General and Chief of Staff on all legal matters arising out of contact with natives, with civilian and military authorities and with the owners of training areas

WILLIAM P. BURKE

APPENDIX "B"

used by the troops. Moreover, he acts as Legal Assistance Officer to the Division, which involved, during my term of office, the giving of legal advice and service to about eight hundred individuals.

I returned to the United States on 25 October 1945, and completed my terminal leave on 19 December 1945.

During my term of service my superiors rendered reports on my fitness each ninety days. All of these reports were favorable, and many of them contained commendations. I was promoted to Major in August 1945, to rank from May 1943, and I hold a permanent commission as Major in the Reserve. My file number is 013458.

Rec'd: 6 Jan 1957

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 22 Oct 1900	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Contact) (Ch)

7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 9 September 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9/9/56 - 9/8/57

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 31 Oct 57	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR E. M. Ashcraft	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY GW DATE 11-1-57
Posted Pos. Control
Reviewed by PCD Rett 11/4/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 31 Oct 1957	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING George G. Carey	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 12 3 36 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area	RATING NUMBER 3

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Complete integrity; knowledge of area, familiarity with source potentials and attitudes, ability to obtain close cooperation of non-governmental sources at high level; loyalty to staff. Somewhat inclined to take legalistic approach to relationships with other elements of CIA and other IAC local representatives, with consequent loss of flexibility.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) BURKE (First) William (Middle) P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Contact)
7. GRADE GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 9 September 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 9/9/56 - 9/8/57
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one) ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 31 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR EMAshcraft E. M. Ashcraft
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 31 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George G. Carey George G. Carey
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

80

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is willing to leave the New Orleans area for an overseas tour, but not for duty in Washington. Since his background has been entirely in the general collection field, and since he has no substantive training, it is difficult to conceive of such an overseas position. He is eminently suited to continue in his present assignment.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G(4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted] William P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/55 - 9/8/56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject is stationed in Louisiana.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 7 Nov 56
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: E M Ashcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE 11-13-56
Posted Pos. Contr.
Reviewed by [illegible] 11/15

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 8
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

NOV 13 2 23 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Management of domestic field office.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Obtaining the effective support of non-governmental sources and contacts in his area.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis of assigned area for intelligence potential.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Liaison with Federal and local agencies and officials in his area.	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 The planning and carrying out of effective intelligence collection.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Support of other elements of CIA in his area.	RATING NUMBER 3

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

The ability to obtain high degree of cooperation from important industrial and educational sources in his area; ability to plan and direct the operations of his office with efficiency and exceptionally high standards; complete integrity. This integrity, coupled with a somewhat legalistic approach to many problems, tends to make him somewhat inflexible in his approach to the sometimes unusual requirements of Intelligence, particularly when they concern clandestine matters.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BURKE William P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 Oct 1900
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OC
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Operations/Contact/New Orleans Office
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Contact)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 9 September 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 9/9/55 - 9/8/56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 7 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: EMAshcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Contact Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 8 [illegible] 1956
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Assistant Director for Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 2

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

70

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He has indicated his unwillingness to leave the New Orleans area, he is eminently fitted to continue in his present job and, with the possible exception of logistics, it is difficult to conceive of another area in CIA to which he would readily adapt.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
23 ... 70
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

No further training or experience planned or considered necessary, with the exception of periodic meetings of the CD/OO field chiefs.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

See Section G (4) above.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15 RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	WLR	OCT 18 1955
Reviewed by F.D	GC	10/20/55

annual 9-9-56 next report due

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON RATED.

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BURKE, William P., Jr.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 22 Oct 1900	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION ✓ OC
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 9 September 1947	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Operations	7. DIVISION Contact		8. BRANCH New Orleans Office
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION: New Orleans, Louisiana			11. GRADE GS-15
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 9 September 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) ✓ 9/9/54 - 9/8/55			

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, New Orleans Office GS-0132.21-15	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 19 September 1948

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

The active management of a major domestic field office. This includes: (1) the supervision and direction of the professional and clerical personnel of that office; (2) within the broad directives of the Contact Division, the assessment of the intelligence capability of his assigned area, the conduct of methodical exploitation of the intelligence sources within his area, and the maintenance of close and affective relationship with Contact Division Headquarters for the purpose of directing local exploitation along the lines of current requirements and priorities; (3) the effective support of all elements of the Agency, required within his area; and (4) the maintenance of all Federal, State and local liaisons necessary to the accomplishment of his mission.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ *has* ☑ *has not been shown to the individual rated.*

THIS DATE 5 October 55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) EMAshcraft E. M. ASHCRAFT

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 6 Oct 55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) George G. Carey GEORGE G. CAREY

FORM NO. 45
1 JAN 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at each statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have a definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 2 05 PH '55
MAIL ROOM

5

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN, WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.												X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.									X					
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.							X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24 EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25 ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X													
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.							X							
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.										X				
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Complete integrity, high standards of behavior and accomplishment, the ability to induce cooperation at a high level, experience in domestic collection.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Somewhat inflexibly high moral and ethical standards.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 2 05 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Integrity and general competence.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, beyond periodic visits to Division headquarters.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

See B above.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

None applicable. He is capable of greater responsibilities in certain areas

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET

ISSUED IN LIEU OF FORM 50

NATURE OF ACTION CHANGE IN OCCUPATIONAL CODE AND/OR TITLE.

EFFECTIVE DATE 31 MARCH 1955

POSITION TITLE	NEW CODE	NAME	POSITION NUMBER
IO-CONTACT-CH	GS-0132.21	BURKE WILLIAM P JR	K 195 10177

POSTED
MAY 16 1955
SGB

APPROVED HARRISON G. REYNOLDS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

Pay adj
3/15/55

SECRET

WILLIAM P. BURKE
Post Office Box 1016
New Orleans, La.

6 December 1954

Mr. C. F. Camp
Chief, Personnel Procurement
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Camp:

I am today in receipt of your letter of 1 December 1954 concerning Mr. Clapp's visit and Mr. McBride.

I was not in New Orleans at the time when Mr. Clapp was here and accordingly did not have the pleasure of seeing him.

I am sorry that Mr. Clapp did not succeed in making contact with Mr. McBride. If I happen to learn of a more recent address of Mr. McBride, I shall pass the information on to you.

Very truly yours,

William P. Burke

WPB/gn

SECRET

DD/P - 1-1931-b

SEP 16 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Commendation of DD/I Personnel

1. For the past several months my office has had an urgent and a continuing need for intelligence about Guatemala -- for intelligence in such variety that at one time or another almost every DD/I component contributed.

2. Each of them -- offices as well as individuals within the DD/I area -- responded with a highly impressive alacrity and completeness. Their contributions were thorough in their coverage and fast in their preparation.

3. It is difficult to cite the work of particular individuals and components of DD/I, because much inconspicuous but essential labor must never have come to my attention. Risking the chance that such work might unfairly go unrecognized, I nevertheless believe that the work of the following individuals and units deserves special recognition:

John M. Armstrong, Milton R. Brown, Archie C. Bush and David L. Campa, OCI.

Miss Dorothy A. Brandao, William P. Burke, Hunter C. Leake and Lloyd A. Ray, New Orleans field office, OO/C.

William Buchanan, Kansas City field office, OO/C.

Miss Betty Didcoct and David F. Haley, Geography Division, ORR.

Norman E. Greenawalt, Charles D. Stockton, Milton S. Venezky and Robert J. Voskuil, Cartography Division, ORR.

Zygmund Lenchert, Richard V. Shamp and John E. Wilson, Photo Intelligence Division, ORR.

Harry A. McCrea and David R. McLean, OO/C.

Lawrence Snitzer, New York field office, OO/C.

SECRET

Office of Research and Reports which put its major resources at our disposal. ORR's geographic research area freely gave us the time of trained cartographers and interpreters. Without their skills, and the endless hours they applied those skills for us, our operations would have been most difficult. ORR's economic research area contributed less only because we asked for less; economic intelligence was not as vital as geographic intelligence to this operation. In addition, the major economic contribution was recognized and commended in my 7 June 1954 memorandum to you.

Foreign Broadcast Information Division which monitored Guatemalan and related broadcasts with more than its usual care, and, among other special activities, arranged a direct wire service so that our field headquarters unit received the monitored broadcasts immediately. The entire division turned to its task with such unity that singling out for commendation the work of any of its people is impossible.

Foreign Documents Division which gave us translations quickly and in the priority needed. Its service was the more remarkable for its lack of a Western Hemisphere unit. Initiative, flexibility, and willingness were substituted for this organizational lack.

Contact Division which provided a wide variety of services we requested, and on its own initiative proposed other useful services. It re-doubled collection of Central American intelligence information by its net-work of domestic field stations, it carefully watched the southern ports of entry into the United States on a 24-hour day basis, it provided us with commercial news clipping services and the texts of news broadcasts, and it located, surveilled and in many cases interviewed Guatemalans within the United States in whom we were interested.

CIA Library, especially its Book Branch. All components, however contributed. Its clipping service was reliable, alert, and keen to render maximum service. The Information Section promptly handled numerous spot requests and gave resourceful assistance well beyond the confines of its routine duties. The Book Branch surveyed periodical and scholarly literature meticulously, and thus uncovered much information useful to a psychological campaign.

Graphics Register whose Photo Branch and Film Branch both gave services much beyond the normal course of duty, and showed ingenuity in locating and preparing special materials.

Richard Helms

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SEP 28 1954
BY DATE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Offices

1. NAME (Last) BURKE,	(First) William	(Middle) P., Jr.	2. GRADE GS-15	3. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer (Chief) CD-OO
4. OFFICE DDI/OO	STAFF OR DIVISION Contact	BRANCH New Orleans	☐ DEPT'L. ☒ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 9/9/53 To 9/8/54

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

General and detailed supervision, direction and support of the activities of personnel attached to the New Orleans Office, with a view to insuring the highest standard of professional and clerical performance and the most complete coverage of the area within this office's jurisdiction. Interpretation and implementation of policies originated by higher echelons. Maintenance of liaison with field installations of other IAC agencies for the purpose of effecting coordination of domestic intelligence collection. Collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence information from domestic nongovernmental sources. Provision of support to other components of CIA.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

In the type of work in which I am presently engaged.

10.

31 August 1954
DATE

WPBurke Jr
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

He performs these duties conscientiously and efficiently.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 28 10 55 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

By the maintenance of his office and official relationships in an area of peculiar traditional independence and integrity, on a firm and high level.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR HIS IMPROVEMENT?

To continuing his present efforts to reach a broader understanding of the whole intelligence problem, both within CIA and in the IAC complex. To a more tolerant approach to support problems.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is capable of greater responsibilities now.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None, other than periodic visits to OO/C headquarters.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

24 Sept. 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

27 Sept '54
DATE

George G. Carey
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

BURKE, William P. Jr.

OFFICE: OO	DIVISION: Contact
BRANCH:	SECTION: New Orleans Off.

I. FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Central Intelligence Agency	New Orleans, La.	✓	9	1947	5	[illegible]	51	27	3	4
Total Civilian Service										

SCD – 13 [illegible]

OK

[illegible]

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
U S Marine Corps (Reserve)	8	9	1942	31	10	1945	26	1	1
Total Military Service							[illegible]	1	1

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 Dec 1951.
DATE

W. P. Burke Jr.
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
23	5	7

14-00000

1. Agency and organizational designation: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OO [redacted]act—New Orleans Office

2. Pay roll period: [redacted]

3. Block No: 4238

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name: Mr. William P. Burkes Jr

6. Grade and salary: G-15 $10,750.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks:

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
EFFECTIVE 24 OCT. 1951
SALARY ADJUSTED TO $ 11,800.00

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase. ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating is good or better than good and service and conduct requirements certified: (b) (Signature of Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
9/26/51	3/19/50	$10,750.00	$11,000.00		10/12/51

20. LWOP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods:)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP [illegible] Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

10/1/51 g

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN POSITION SLOTTING AND OR CHANGE IN POSITION DESIGNATION

NO CHANGE IN GRADE IS INVOLVED

DATE OF T O APPROVAL 6 FEB 1952
EFF DATE OF POSITION SLOTTING 24 MARCH 52

OO CONTACT DIVISION

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
BURKE WILLIAM P IO CHIEF	GS 132 15	K195
RAY LLOYD ANTHONY INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K196
LEAKE HUNTER C II INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K19601
BRANDAO DOROTHY A ADM ASSISTANT	GS 301 7	K197
LATNO JOAN MGT INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 7	K198
NAGEL GERTRUDE G SECRETARY STENO	GS 318 5	K199
DUFFY GLADYS E SECRETARY STENO	GS 318 5	K19901
ANDERSON MAY HELEN CLERK STENOGRAPHER	GS 312 4	K200

HOUSTON OFFICE

NAME & TITLE	PERSONS GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
RISCHE ERNEST A IO CHIEF	GS 132 15	K201
HAYNES BEN P INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 14	K202
IVES GEORGE O INTEL OFFICER	GS 132 13	K203

CONFIDENTIAL

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Public Law 513, approved May 13, 1950, 81st Congress (2nd Session), is quoted verbatim herewith:

"AN ACT

"To enhance further the security of the United States by preventing disclosures of information concerning the cryptographic systems and the communications intelligence activities of the United States.

"BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED. That whoever shall knowingly and willfully communicate, furnish, transmit, or otherwise make available to an unauthorized person, or publish, or use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government or (2) concerning the design, construction, use maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government, or (4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

"Sec 2. (a) The term 'classified information' as used herein shall be construed to mean information which, at the time of a violation under this Act, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution

"(b) The terms 'code' cipher', and 'cryptographic system' as used herein shall be construed to include in their meanings, in additions to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications.

"(c) The term 'foreign government' as used herein shall be construed to include in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States.

"(d) The term 'communication intelligence' as used herein shall be construed to mean all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

"(e) The term 'unauthorized person' as used herein shall be construed to mean any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in section 1 of this Act, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States.

"Sec. 3. Nothing in this Act shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regulary constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof."

I, William P. BURKE, do hereby certify that I have read, and thoroughly understand, Public Law 513, quoted above.

Signed: Wm P Burke

Date : 6 Nov. 1950

Witness : Jean M. Latona

Position: Communicator, N.C.

Date : 6 November 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER 8-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MM (gk) 130

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. 01773	10/22/1900		4/11/50

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Periodic Step Increase *	3/19/50	CIA Admin. Inst. 20-8 Dated 12/9/49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
GS-15 $10500.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10750.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL	
		X		Bu.#Y-192

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES — NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2103900 TO: 529-303	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Louisiana

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

*Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48

Efficiency Rating: Excellent
Approved 3/20/49

Conduct Report: Satisfactory
Dated 3/6/50

VAP 4/11/50

Andrew E. Van Esso
ANDREW E. VAN ESSO
Chief, Administrative Staff
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/50 based on performance during period from 3/22/49 to 3/19/50

William E. Burke, Jr. (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer GS-15 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE ✓ if adequate – if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

____ (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
____ (2) Mechanical skill.
____ (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
____ (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
✓ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
____ (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
____ (7) Accuracy of operations.
____ (8) Accuracy of final results.
✓ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
____ (11) Industry.
____ (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
✓ (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? Yes (Yes or no))
____ (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
____ (16) Cooperativeness.
____ (17) Initiative.
____ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
____ (20) Physical fitness for the work.

+ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
____ (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
____ (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
____ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
____ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
____ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
____ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
____ (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
____ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
____ (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

____ (A) ____
____ (B) ____
____ (C) ____

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

Adjective Rating
Rating official E
Reviewing official E

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) Chief Contact Div. (Title) 16 March 1950 (Date)

Reviewed by [illegible] (Signature of reviewing official) AD/OO (Title) 20 Mar 1950 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3/20/50 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66177-6

PERIODIC PAY INCREASE REPORT

TO: Mrs. Firmin Contact

THIS DATE: 3/2/1950

In order to determine whether the employee named below is eligible for a periodic pay increase it is necessary that his (or her) immediate supervisor execute the following "Conduct Report" and obtain the signature of the highest supervisor having knowledge of the employee's conduct.

CONDUCT REPORT

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: William P. Burke

POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE: Intell. Off. GS-15

☒ This employee's conduct has been satisfactory.

☐ This employee's conduct has been unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

Last equivalent salary increase 9/19/48
Eff. Rating - E - 8/20/49
Effec. Date 9/19/50
2105908
529-388

F. McClellan

SIGNATURE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Lyman Kirkpatrick

DATE: 6 March 195

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

FORM NO. 37-105
OCT 1949

RETURN TO: PERSONNEL DIVISION
ATT: TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH

1949

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 PART
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1949

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R054.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PM (sm) 130

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST) Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 10-28-49

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Conversion-Class. Act of 1949	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10-30-49	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Letter - DCI - 10-28-49

FROM		TO
Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager GS-15 (Intelligence Officer)
P-8 $10,305.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	GS-15 $10,500.00 per annum
Operations Contact New Orleans Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

R. F. McClellan
Acting Chief, Personnel Division
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT			WWII	WWI	OTHER
		DISAB	WIFE	WIDOW			
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S. A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. CF-182 mm 11/10/49

17. SEX	18. RACE	19. APPROPRIATION	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2105900 TO: 329-303	Yes		Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

Standard Form No. 51
August 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.

✓

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (X) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL ( )

As of 3/19/49 based on performance during period from 9/19/48 to 3/19/49

William P. Burke, Jr. (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer, P-8 (Title of position, service, and grade)

OO, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE V if adequate − if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☐ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
...... (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
+ (7) Accuracy of operations.
+ (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
......(10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
......(11) Industry.
......(12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
......(13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
......(14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
+ (16) Cooperativeness.
+ (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
......(20) Physical fitness for the work.
...... *(21) Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... *(22) Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... *(23) Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ *(24) Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ *(25) Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
...... *(26) Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
+ *(27) Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
...... *(28) Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... *(29) Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ *(30) Ability to make decisions.*
+ *(31) Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form	Adjective Rating		Adjective Rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and check marks or better on all other elements rated	Excellent	Rating official..	E
Check marks or better on all elements rated, and plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Very Good		
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance overcompensated by outstanding performance	Good	Reviewing official..	E
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and all weak performance not overcompensated by outstanding performance	Fair		
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory		

Rated by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of rating official) Chief, Contact Br. (Title) 23 March 1949 (Date)

Reviewed by .... (Signature of reviewing official) Dep AD/OO (Title) 24 March 1949 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 3-28-49 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)
ST

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—26177-4

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME BURKE, WILLIAM P.	NATURE OF ACTION E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION Regional Manager	GRADE P-3
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Field	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 11 September 1947

RECOMMENDATIONS:

28 December 1948
DATE

John R. Tietjen
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1948

RESTRICTED

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

NAME William P. Burke, Jr.	CLASSIFICATION — INITIAL [illegible] — DATE 9-21-48 VICE ☐ IA ☐ VV ☐ NEW ✓ Bu. # F-192 12-4-47
NATURE OF ACTION Transfer + Promotion	QUALIFICATION & REVIEW — INITIAL GCI — DATE 9-21-48
EFFECTIVE DATE 19 September 1948 ~~Immediately~~	2195-0 5 29-308 Scha-45 Lee 9-23-48
FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS LAST WORKING DAY:	APPROVED: 15 1948 SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR)
FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:	15 Sept '48 SIGNATURE (EXECUTIVE FOR A&M) Kelly 15 Sept '48 SIGNATURE (CHIEF, PERSONNEL BRANCH)

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Asst. Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-7	Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-8
GRADE AND SALARY	P-7, ~~$8179.50~~ 8509.50 p.a.	P-8, $10,305.00 p.a.
OFFICE	Operations	Operations
BRANCH	Contact	Contact Br
DIVISION	Control	New Orleans Office
SECTION	Southern I.A.O.	—
OFFICIAL STATION	New Orleans, Louisiana	New Orleans, Louisiana
DEPT. OR FIELD	Field	Field 130

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ George Carey ORGE G. CAREY Assistan Director for Operations	DATE 15 Sept, 1948.

FORM NO. 37-3
OCT 1946

RESTRICTED

(1514)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1948

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R066.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] (cs) 130

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-FIRST-MIDDLE INITIAL-LAST) Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/22/1900	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 9/17/1948

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Transfer & Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 9/19/1948	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-45

FROM		TO
Asst. Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)	8. POSITION TITLE	Regional Manager P-8 (Intelligence Officer)
P-7 $8509.50 per annum Bu.#V800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	P-8 $10,305.00 per annum
Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Operations Contact Branch New Orleans Office
New Orleans, Louisiana	11. HEADQUARTERS	New Orleans, Louisiana
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

DOG - 09/19/48
CSED - 09/15/47
LCD - 09/18/47

NSP 9/24/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Chief, Personnel Branch
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu.#V-192
12/4/47

17. SEX M	18. RACE W	19. APPROPRIATION FROM 2195900 TO 529-308	20. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	22. LEGAL RESIDENCE Louisiana

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1948 783384

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 **CONFIDENTIAL**

Executive Registry
0-1835

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Executive for Administration and Management DATE: SEP 15 1948

FROM : Assistant Director for Operations 3

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. William Patrick Burko, Jr.

1. It is requested that the attached recommendation for promotion of Mr. William P. Burke, Jr. from P-7 to P-8 be approved even though Mr. Burke has not served the required time in-grade as established in Paragraph 4c of Administrative Instruction No. 20-1. This recommendation is based upon the fact he has served in his present capacity as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, for approximately one year and his performance of duty has been outstanding.

2. Mr. Burke entered on duty as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office, OO/C, on 9 September 1947 in which capacity he is still serving. The position of Chief, New Orleans Office, has been allocated as a P-8.

3. Subsequent to assuming his duties as Acting Chief of the New Orleans Office, Mr. Burke displayed great initiative and unusual ability in planning his organization and without any loss of time, placed it on a highly productive basis. Mr. Burke has not overlooked any possible sources of intelligence within his area, and is submitting extremely valuable reports, particularly those that pertain to Latin America. In addition, Mr. Burke's office has produced comprehensive reports on the intelligence potentialities of Houston, Texas and Tulsa, Oklahoma, convincing this office that field offices in both localities will be justified.

4. Mr. Burke's accomplishments as Acting Chief, New Orleans Office have been outstanding. Due to his unusual leadership the morale of his office personnel has been maintained at a high level, despite heavy working conditions.

5. Mr. Burke received an A.B. degree from Loyola University, New Orleans, in 1919 and LLB degrees from Harvard Law School and Tulane University in 1923 and 1925 respectively. In addition, he spent one year of study at Cambridge University, England. Upon graduation from law school, he became affiliated with various prominent law firms in New Orleans, and in 1937 established his own firm which he operated on a successful level until his entry into the military service during World War II.

6. Mr. Burke has an outstanding military record, having served approximately three years in the U. S. Marine Corps during World War II, and being honorably released from duty with the rank

CONFIDENTIAL

of Major. During his tour of duty with the U. S. Marine Corps, he served in the capacity of liaison officer with Selective Service and later, as legal officer with the Fourth Marine Division in the Pacific.

7. By reason of his civilian and military experience and wide acquaintanceship in New Orleans, Mr. Burke is exceptionally well qualified for his present assignment and is performing his duties in an outstanding manner. In view of his superior accomplishments and contributions to the successful operation of the Contact Branch, it is strongly recommended that Mr. Burke's promotion to the grade of P-8 be approved.

George G. Carey

GEORGE G. CAREY

19 May 1948

Mr. William P. Burke
P. O. Box 1016
New Orleans, 6, Louisiana

Dear Bill:

Prior to leaving CIA, I want to record my sincere appreciation of the fine job done by you in New Orleans.

Your achievement is all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that you started in your city singlehanded and with little guidance or precedence. Within the space of less than a year, you have created an effective field office which is now making a significant contribution to national intelligence.

Inspections reveal that your relations with the local Armed Forces representatives as well as with your clients are excellent. Noted also is the high morale in your office.

Please accept my congratulations for this splendid record and accept my gratitude for your loyal support.

With best wishes for your continued success,

Very sincerely,

EDWIN L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Director for Operations

ELS:rn

cc: Personnel Files ✓
Chief, OO/C

Standard Form No. 51, Rev.
Approved Dec. 1943
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 458

Form approved
Budget Bureau No. 50-R012.
Approval expires Mar. 30, 1945.

REPORT OF EFFICIENCY RATING

ADMINISTRATIVE-UNOFFICIAL ( )
OFFICIAL:
REGULAR (✓) SPECIAL ( )
PROBATIONAL or TRIAL PERIOD ( )

As of 3/31/48 based on performance during period from 9/9/47 to 3/31/48

William F. Burke (Name of employee) Intelligence Officer P-7 (Title of position, service, and grade)

Operations, Contact (Organization—Indicate bureau, division, section, unit, field station)

ON LINES BELOW MARK EMPLOYEE V if adequate – if weak + if outstanding	1. Study the instructions in the Rating Official's Guide, C. S. C. Form No. 3823A. 2. Underline the elements which are especially important in the position. 3. Rate only on elements pertinent to the position. a. Do not rate on elements in *italics* except for employees in administrative, supervisory, or planning positions. b. Rate administrative, supervisory, and planning functions on elements in *italics*.	CHECK ONE: Administrative, supervisory, or planning ☑ All others ☐

...... (1) Maintenance of equipment, tools, instruments.
...... (2) Mechanical skill.
...... (3) Skill in the application of techniques and procedures.
...... (4) Presentability of work (appropriateness of arrangement and appearance of work).
+ (5) Attention to broad phases of assignments.
...... (6) Attention to pertinent detail.
...... (7) Accuracy of operations.
...... (8) Accuracy of final results.
+ (9) Accuracy of judgments or decisions.
+ (10) Effectiveness in presenting ideas or facts.
...... (11) Industry.
...... (12) Rate of progress on or completion of assignments.
...... (13) Amount of acceptable work produced. (Is mark based on production records? .... (Yes or no))
...... (14) Ability to organize his work.
+ (15) Effectiveness in meeting and dealing with others.
...... (16) Cooperativeness.
...... (17) Initiative.
+ (18) Resourcefulness.
+ (19) Dependability.
...... (20) Physical fitness for the work.
+ (21) *Effectiveness in planning broad programs.*
...... (22) *Effectiveness in adapting the work program to broader or related programs.*
...... (23) *Effectiveness in devising procedures.*
+ (24) *Effectiveness in laying out work and establishing standards of performance for subordinates.*
+ (25) *Effectiveness in directing, reviewing, and checking the work of subordinates.*
+ (26) *Effectiveness in instructing, training, and developing subordinates in the work.*
+ (27) *Effectiveness in promoting high working morale.*
+ (28) *Effectiveness in determining space, personnel, and equipment needs.*
...... (29) *Effectiveness in setting and obtaining adherence to time limits and deadlines.*
+ (30) *Ability to make decisions.*
...... (31) *Effectiveness in delegating clearly defined authority to act.*

STATE ANY OTHER ELEMENTS CONSIDERED

...... (A) ....
...... (B) ....
...... (C) ....

STANDARD
Deviations must be explained on reverse side of this form

STANDARD	Adjective rating
Plus marks on all underlined elements, and no minus marks	Excellent
Plus marks on at least half of the underlined elements, and no minus marks	Very good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and any minus marks overcompensated by plus marks	Good
Check marks or better on a majority of underlined elements, and minus marks not overcompensated by plus marks	Fair
Minus marks on at least half of the underlined elements	Unsatisfactory

	Adjective rating
Rating official	E
Reviewing official	E

Rated by .... (Signature of rating official) Chief F/D (Title) .... (Date)

Reviewed by Lyman Kirkpatrick (Signature of reviewing official) Deputy Chief Contact Br. (Title) 14 April 48 (Date)

Rating approved by efficiency rating committee 5/3 (Date) Report to employee E (Adjective rating)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—28177-8

16856

Assistant Director for Operations 9 October 1947

Executive Director

Identification for Contact Specialists

1. Attached are:

a. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 104, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. William P. Burke, Jr., Chief of the New Orleans office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

b. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 105, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Jay B. L. Reeves, Chief of the Pittsburgh office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

c. Three original letters of introduction dated 9 October 1947, signed by the Director of Central Intelligence, registration number 106, copy 1 - 3, to be issued to Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds, Chief of the Boston office of your Contact Branch, and copies 4 and 5 for record purposes.

d. Sample of letter of introduction to be used in connection with above letters, to be written and signed in each case by the field office chief concerned.

2. The Assistant Director for Operations may request additional similar letters when new field offices of the Contact Branch are established and when field office chiefs are changed.

3. Instructions relative to accounting for the registered letters signed by the Director will be issued to you direct from the Central Records Division of the Services Branch, A&M.

4. The Chief, Personnel Branch, A&M, will place a notation with the personnel records of each field office chief to whom these letters are issued, and will be responsible that these individuals are not reassigned or separated until these registered letters have been accounted for and withdrawn for destruction.

5. The Assistant Director for Operations and the Executive for Inspection and Security will cause such inspections to be made of the use of these means of identification as will insure maintenance of adequate security in connection therewith.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. T. SHANNON
~~Acting Executive Director~~ ExcDir A&M.

4 Enclosures
1. Ltr from DCI re William P. Burke (copies 1-5)
2. Ltr from DCI re J L. Reeves (copies 1-5)
3. Ltr from DCI re B on G. Reynolds (copies 1-5)
4. Sample ltr of intr[illegible]tion to be used by chiefs of [illegible] offices

cc: Chief, Pers Br.
cc: Chief, Svcs Br (for C.R.)
cc: Exec for I&S

14-00000

To CC
Mr. Malley

AK

12 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Personnel Branch
Executive for A & M

SUBJECT: Detail of William P. Burke, Jr.

REFERENCE: 37-3, "Personnel Action Request," dated 10 July 1947

It is hereby requested that your records be marked to show that Mr. Burke has been designated Acting Manager of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is not intended to recruit anyone against the P-8 Manager position.

Hayden Channing
HAYDEN CHANNING
Executive Officer
Contact Branch

AFFIDAVIT

STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(DEPT. OR ESTAB.)

(BUREAU OR OFFICE)

WASHINGTON, D. C.
(PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT)

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR., DO HEREBY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I AM NOT ENGAGED IN ANY STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT I WILL NOT SO ENGAGE WHILE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; THAT I AM NOT A MEMBER OF AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES THAT ASSERTS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT I WILL NOT WHILE A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BECOME A MEMBER OF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION.

Wm P Burke Jr
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR APPOINTEE)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 11th ~~10th~~ ~~9th~~ DAY OF September, 19 47 AT Washington. STATE OF D. C.

Elizabeth Morrison
Appointment Clerk

Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943

FORM NO. 57-24
SEP 1946

(1590)

Standard Form No. 61a
Approved January 28, 1941
U. S. Civil Service Commission
C. S. C. Dept. Cir. No. 409

OATH OF OFFICE, AFFIDAVIT, AND DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (Department or Establishment) .... (Bureau or Division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of Employment)

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I, WILLIAM P. BURKE, JR.

Do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT

Do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence; and that during such time as I am an employee of the Federal Government, I will not advocate nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.

C. DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

Do further certify that (1) I have not paid or offered or promised to pay any money or other thing of value to any person, firm, or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment; (2) I will inform myself of and observe the provisions of the Civil Service law and rules and Executive orders concerning political activity, political assessments, etc., as quoted on the attached Information for Appointee, and [strike out either (3) or (4)]

(3) the answers given by me in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this sheet are true and correct;

~~(4) the answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19...., filed with the above-named department or establishment, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date, except for the following (if necessary, use additional sheet; if no exceptions write "none"; if (4) is executed, the reverse of this sheet need not be used):~~

Wm P Burke Jr
(Signature of Appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this ~~10th~~ 11th day of September A. D., 19 47

at Washington (City), D. C. (State)

[SEAL] Chapter 145, Title II, Sec. 206
Act of June 26, 1943

Elizabeth Morrison
(Signature of Officer)

Appointment Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown

16—32804-2

11 September 1947 (Date of Entrance on Duty) Asst. Regional Manager, P-7, $5179.50 (Position to which appointed) 22 Oct 1900 (Date of Birth)

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form, if required, is to be completed before entrance on duty. Every question must be answered. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancelation of application or dismissal after appointment. False personation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. Present Address 6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15 La.
(Street and Number) (City and State)

2. Who should be notified in case of emergency? Mrs Wm P. Burke wife
(Name) (Relationship)
6300 St. Charles Ave New Orleans La
(Street and Number) (City and State)

3. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (either by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? Yes or No? NO If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

Name	Post-office address (Give street number, if any)	(1) Bureau and (2) Temporary or not, and (3) Department or office in which employed	Relationship	Married or single	Age
		1.			
		2.			
		3.			
		1.			
		2.			
		3.			
		1.			
		2.			
		3.			

4. Place of birth New Orleans La
(Town) (State or Country)

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	Yes	No
5. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
6. If foreign born, have you furnished proof of naturalization or citizenship to (1) the U. S. Civil Service Commission?		X
(2) this agency in connection with this appointment?		X
7. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, has there been any change in the status of your citizenship, or of the persons through whom you gained your citizenship?		X
8. (a) Do you hold any position or office under the United States or any State, Territory, County, or Municipality? If so, state the place, position, and salary under Item 12.	X	
(b) Are you willing to resign such position or office if it becomes necessary to do so in order to hold the Federal position?	X	
9. Do you receive any pension or other benefit for military or naval service or an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any Retirement Act? If so, give details under Item 12 stating whether you were retired for age, length of service, or disability; amount of retirement pay and under what retirement act, and rank, if retired from military or naval service.		X
10. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been discharged for misconduct or unsatisfactory service, or forced to resign from any position? If so, give under Item 12 where employed, name and address of employer and the reason for discharge in each case.		X
11. Since you filed application resulting in this appointment, have you been arrested, or summoned into any civil or military court as a defendant, or indicted for or convicted of any offense (felony or misdemeanor)? If so, for each case give under Item 12 (1) the date, (2) the name and location of the court, (3) the nature of the offense or violation, and (4) the penalty, if any, imposed, or other disposition.		X

12. Space for detailed answers to other questions.

ITEM NO.	Write in left column numbers of items to which detailed answers apply
8	U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Inactive duty status.

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable civil-service rules, the War Service Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, purchase of office, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, promise to observe provisions regarding political activity, and particularly for the following:

(1) **Identity** of appointee with the applicant whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) **Age.**—If discrepancy exists between the date of birth and that on application and if definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment.

(3) **Citizenship.**—The responsibility for obser[illegible] provisions of appropriation acts prohibiting or restricting the employment of [illegible] lies with the appointing officer. The Civil Service Commission indicates on applications showing foreign birth that citizenship has been verified. The appointing officer should verify citizenship if the list of eligibles or the letter of authority from the Commission makes the appointment subject to proof of citizenship, or if the application shows foreign birth but does not indicate on its face that citizenship has been proved. If the answer to question 4 of this form shows foreign birth and the application shows birth in the United States, the case should be referred to the Civil Service Commission.

(4) **Members of Family.**—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of the family in the classified service, no other member of such family is eligible for appointment in that service. Minors do not establish a different family merely by living at an address different from that of the parents. Doubtful cases involving more than two members of a family, including all pertinent evidence, should be referred to the Civil Service Commission or its duly authorized representatives for decision. Under War Service Regulations, the members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments for one year or less.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53304-1

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1946

FORM APPROVED
BUDGET BUREAU NO. 50-R066

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GRO...

MI(gw)

130

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - FIRST - MIDDLE INITIAL - LAST): Mr. William P. Burke, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10/22/1900
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 9 September 1947

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9/9/1947
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-20

	FROM	TO
8 POSITION TITLE		Assistant Regional Manager P-7 (Intelligence Officer)
9 SERVICE GRADE, SALARY		P-7 $3179.50 per annum
10 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		Operations Contact Control Southern I.A.O.
11 HEADQUARTERS		New Orleans, Louisiana
12 FIELD OR DEP'TL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

No-Strike Affidavit has been properly executed.

This appointment is made subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

Pay adj
7/1/48

WILLIAM J. KELLY
Acting Chief, Personnel Branch

14 SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW	WWII	WWI	OTHER
	X				X		

16 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL
	X		

Bu.#F-~~21.04~~ 200.
3/2/47

17 SEX: M
18 RACE: W
19 APPROPRIATION: 2185900.001
FROM: 528-143
TO
20 SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 11 September 1947
22 LEGAL RESIDENCE: Louisiana

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1947 - 722549

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Investigation Report

Date: 28 August 1947

Number: 32458

Subject: [illegible], William J., Jr.

To: Chief, Personnel Branch

1. Investigation directed by: [illegible]

2. Sources of information:

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED, THOUGH SUBJECT TO THE RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED

UNLESS THE APPLICANT ENTERS UPON DUTY WITHIN ~~[illegible]~~ 60 DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE, THIS APPROVAL BECOMES INVALID.

By

Security Officer
ERMAL P. GEISS ✓

jm

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

(17)

E

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

5/11

NAME:
William P. Burke, Jr.

NATURE OF ACTION:
~~New~~ Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE:
9 ~~23~~ September 1947

FOR SEPARATIONS, TRANSFERS OUT, AND RESIGNATIONS
LAST WORKING DAY:

FOR RESIGNATIONS FROM FEDERAL SERVICE ONLY
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

BUDGET	INITIAL	DATE
~~21 85-900 5-28-104~~		8-8-47 9-2-47
2165900.001 5-28-143	EK	

CLASSIFICATION	INITIAL	DATE
		8-6-47

VICE		
IA	✓	Aa # F-21.04 3/2/47
VV		
NEW		

EMPLOYMENT	INITIAL	DATE
		7/28/47

Schedule a-20

8-11-47

CHIEF, PERSONNEL DIV	INITIAL	DATE
		8/5/47

8-11-47

	FROM	TO
TITLE		asst ~~Acting~~ Regional Manager (Intelligence Officer) P-7
GRADE AND SALARY		P-7 @ $179.50
OFFICE		Operations
BRANCH		Contact
DIVISION		Control
SECTION		~~W.I.A.O.~~ Southern I.A.O.
OFFICIAL STATION		New Orleans, La. ~~Washington, D. C.~~
DEPT. OR FIELD		Field

REMARKS: * According to travel regulations. Secreg. 7/21

Forms 38-1, 57, copy of Priority Request letters attached.

No Control

Approved for appointment in grade P-7 at entrance salary of $8179.50 subject to security clearance.

FOR THE DCI:

Walter C. Ford
WALTER C. FORD
Captain, USN
Executive Director

advised branch 8-29
branch O.K. 8-29

130

RECOMMENDED: OFFICE CHIEF, BRANCH CHIEF, OR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER	DATE
For Hq. Chairman	7.10.47

FORM NO 37-3
OCT 1946

(1514)

WILLIAM P. BURKS
6300 St. Charles Avenue, New Orleans 15, La.

6 July 47 11 July 47

CONTACT: Invited to Washington for interview & introductory course

5 1/4 days	$6.00		31.50
		Fr: New Orleans, La. to D.C. & return	92.35
Taxi from station to hotel & return			.40
			$124.25

10 JULY 1947

JAMES H. DUNN, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATION & SERVICES

DONALD V. MULCAHY, CHIEF
PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT SECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

9 July 1947

MEMORANDUM: Executive for Inspections and Security

SUBJECT: William Patrick Burke, Jr.

In compliance with CIG Directive 15 and with authority from the Projects Review Committee, this branch will open an Inter Agency Office in New Orleans, Louisiana as soon as the necessary personnel may be processed for employment. This Southeastern area of the United States represents a fertile field for the operations of the Contact Branch and it is deemed advisable to open a New Orleans office at the earliest possible date.

Mr. William Patrick Burke, a native of New Orleans, a graduate of Harvard and Tulane University Law Schools and a former Major in the U. S. Marine Corps is under consideration for employment as the Acting Regional Manager for this office. In order that his employment may be effected in the shortest possible time, it is respectfully requested that a priority security investigation be granted on this individual. It is realized that the total number of allowable priority investigations is very limited, but in the instant case, the circumstances are such that the compliance with this request will measurably aid in the accomplishment of the mission of this branch.

John F. Blake
Assistant Executive Officer
Contact Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ASSIGNMENT DESCRIPTION FORM

(This form fully completed (see note * at bottom of sheet) in duplicate must accompany request for admission of candidate to Assessment or Training Classes)

Request for:
(a) Assessment XXXX
(b) Training

Candidate's name in full: WILLIAM PATRICK BURKE, Jr.

Cover name if necessary: Date: July 7, 1947

Age 46 Sex M Marital Status: Married Branch: Contact Desk: Field

Specific station to which candidate is going: New Orleans, La.

For consultation call:

George B. McManus	2311	2210 E. St.	103
Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate	Phone Extension	Bldg	Room No.

Has Security Check been completed?

Type of Cover:
(Military; Govt. Official; Professional; Business; etc.)

Title of projected assignment: (a) Contact Specialist (b) Acting Regional Manager

Civil Service classification and salary level of projected position: P-7 @ 8179.50

What will be the specific duties of the candidate? (A detailed and concrete description is essential; a general job title is not satisfactory.): Will organize and run the New Orleans Inter-agency office in the initial stages Has to establish and maintain contact with the top executives of American business, industrial and educational institutions. Must be able to sell CIG to them, gain their confidence and establish a discreet channel throug which all foreign intelligence available to those organizations can flow to his office.

What are the promotional opportunities in the projected position? Good

What will be the administrative or supervisory responsibilities of the candidate? (If none, write "none".) May eventually have to direct the activities of one P-6 and one CAF-7.

Will the candidate work alone or with other people? With others.

If the latter, how many and what will be the candidate's actual working relationship to them, e.g., closely cooperative or relatively independent? The two mentioned above. Close cooperation.

Will the candidate be working directly under a supervising officer? No

If not, how will his work be directed and reviewed? By Washington

What will be the living and working conditions under which the candidate is expected to operate?

---

* For reasons of security, details such as student's true name or specific mission may be omitted in the case of undercover personnel, if so desired by the Desk.

FORM NO. 51-1 (Edition of [illegible] 1946
OCT 1946 may be used)

SECRET
(over)

SECRET

What special qualifications do you wish the candidate tested for? Sense of security as he must live a normal life in his own home town while conducting a discreet operation. Ability to discriminate between valuable intelligence information and worthless. Ability to arrange facts cogently on paper. Tact and discretion.

What period and type of training is considered necessary for the candidate before placement in the field? About three weeks in Head Office and then Inter-Agency Offices.

What special skills or knowledge related to the job does the candidate possess?

Loyola University, New Orleans, AB, 1919, Harvard Law School, LLB, 1923, Legal banking, business and Marine Corps experience.

Indicate knowledge of foreign languages:
("Slight", "Fair", "Good")

	Read	Speak	Write
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			

The following information is required only in the case of candidates scheduled for training:

Previous background in intelligence work:

Foreign residence and foreign education

Occupational history: (job descriptions and dates only)

Signed: For George R. [illegible]

Branch Officer Sponsoring Candidate

SECRET

(over)

(2491)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Director, CIG

THROUGH: Chief, Personnel Division

Subject: Assessment of William Patrick Burke~~, Jr.~~

Reference: Procedures Governing Payment of Per Diem and Travel, Approved Under Project 00-5.

In accordance with the above referenced procedures, it is hereby requested that approval be granted for payment of per diem and travel for the purpose of bringing Mr. Burke to Washington for assessment.

Mr. Burke was recently interviewed in New Orleans by Chief, Control Division, and Chief, Field Division, of the Contact Branch of this Office and is recommended as being well qualified for the Regional Managership of the New Orleans Interagency Office. It is considered that, in view of the importance of the proposed position to the accomplishment of the Contact Branch mission, no final decision as to his employment should be made without the benefit of assessment.

This office is anxious to activate the New Orleans Interagency Office as soon as possible and requests your approval in order that an early date for Mr. Burke's visit to Washington may be made.

E. L. Sibert
E. L. SIBERT
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
Assistant Director for Operations

24 June
Approved
Actg. Ex. Dir.

CONFIDENTIAL

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:
Thomas B. CASASIN

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10:10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

[illegible] B CASASIN

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION/DOCUMENTS FROM CASASIN'S (P) PERSONNEL FOLDER FOR PERIOD 1955-1962. (IN MID 1962 CASASIN WENT OVERSEAS.)

casasin

1. SERIAL NO. ?62	[redacted]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART		EOD: 7 [illegible] 195[illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] [redacted]		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] 192[illegible]	5. CONTINUOUS SERV. COMP. DATE 20 Nov 1949
MARITAL STATUS Married	DEPENDENTS (Includ. spouse) 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1923 1950 1953	US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	NA
CAREER STAFF STATUS ✓	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS	LAST MED. APT. QUAL. FOR Jul 1962 PCS C/S	EVAL. FOR PCS C/S
CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT #1 / RELEASE MIL. SER. CAT #2 / TOTAL DEFERRED (CAT #3) / RETIRED
ASSESSMENT DATE None		13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APT. TEST DATE None	

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer

1949 Guido Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper

1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

NON-CIA EDUCATION

942 Trinity College, Conn - French

40-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French

1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible](1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese

1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, High; W, Inter(Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957

Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50	[redacted]	1954	[redacted]	1960	[illegible]
1950	[redacted]	1954	[redacted]	1962	Mid-Officer's Inst
1950	[redacted]	1954	[redacted]	1962	French
1950	[redacted]	1954	[redacted]		
		1960	Cland Serv Review		

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE - OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	11	DI	DDP/SR/FE Area	Tokyo
[illegible] 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SR/[illegible] Area	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

DATE REV. 0 Apr 19[illegible]	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]	22. ITEMS 1-16 REVIEWED AND VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

EMPL. SERIAL NO. [illegible]		
[redacted]		DATE OF BIRTH Jan 192?

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

[redacted]

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUT [illegible] QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [illegible], 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection with Soviet Defectors.

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of the defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

Appreciation 1961 from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED 20 Apr 1964	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY mih

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

CASASIN

A. FULL NAME Mr. Mrs. Miss (Use No Initials) [redacted] (First, Middle, Last)

Telephone: Office: NOT APPLICABLE Ext.

Home: HO-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No., City, State, Country)

B. NICKNAME [redacted] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where? By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City, State, Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS

FORM NO.

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ________ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ________

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ________
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________
Date Date

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

____

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

---

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN BENJAMIN [redacted]
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE-18-MD-USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND, USA
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO-BALTIMORE

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [redacted] PULASKI HWY, BALTIMORE, MD, USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 TO 1919 BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION
Date Date

COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE MARGUERITE [redacted]
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS [redacted] MILFORD AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DRÔME, FRANCE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO, MD, USA
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL
73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI ADRIEN [redacted] AGE 23
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS [redacted] SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME ______ AGE ______
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY [redacted] RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)
CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE, FRANCE
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)
CITIZENSHIP ITA ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES AR
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE [redacted] RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PS #63 / MC DONOGH SCH. ADDRESS BALTIMORE, MD, USA / PIKESVILLE, MD, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL. ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE

COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA (City, State, Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

Country	Service	Rank	Dates of Service
USA	ARMY	1/LT	FEB 1943-OCT 1948

Last Station	Serial No.	Type of Discharge
GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN	0-937200	HONORABLE

REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 48 TO 30 SEP 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, U. (St. & No., City, State, Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR + WRITER

REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY.

FROM 1 APR 48 TO 15 AUG 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY.

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA
TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, News Agency SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH
YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.
REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY
ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 309-POSTMASTER-SAN FRANCISCO USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING
TITLE OF JOB CHIEF CENSORSHIP SUB-STA. SALARY $ 331 PER MONTH
YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment
REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY
ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL {FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA / PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CAL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY)

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA
TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ ARMY PER SGT.
YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.
REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1946

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD.
ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
St. & No. City State Country
KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR F.T. CLAYDON
TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 20 PER WEEK
YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES
REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS. ADD.	AIS-PRESIDIO/	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY,	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY,	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND,	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1351 K ST. NW [illegible]	WASH.	D.C.
		RES. ADD.	705 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R. H. KUNZMAN	BUS. ADD.	U.P. BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/AF	WASHINGTON	D.C.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.	"	"	"
3.	MR. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	D.C.
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE MIDDLEBROOK	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	11 ARNOLDALE	WETHERSFIELD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY GAS	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	323 E. 24TH	BALTIMORE,	MD.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. MR. FRANK DUCHARME	BUS. ADD.	TRAVELERS INS.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.	26 LILLEY	W. HARTFORD	CONN.
2. MR. JAMES KNOX	BUS. ADD.	G. FOX CO.	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	
3. MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN	BUS. ADD.	ALBERT STEIGER	HARTFORD,	CONN.
	RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

1. NAME LEE'S INC ADDRESS 2421 EASTERN AV, BALTIMORE, MD.
2. NAME MONTGOMERY WARD ADDRESS [illegible] AV. OAKLAND 16, CAL.
3. NAME ADDRESS

St. & No. City State

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

		St. No. City State Country
FROM 1933	TO 1937	[redacted] PRESSMAN ST- BALTIMORE-MD - USA
FROM 1937	TO 1939	[redacted] HARVARD AV- MONTREAL-QUE-CANADA
FROM 1939	TO 1942	[redacted] MOUNTAIN ST- MONTREAL-QUE-CANADA
FROM 1942	TO 1942	[redacted] LILLEY RD- W. HARTFORD-CONN- USA
FROM 1942	TO 1942	MILITARY SERVICE
FROM 1948	TO PRESENT	[redacted] ST. PAUL ST- BALTIMORE, MD, USA
FROM	TO	
FROM	TO	

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

		City or Section	Country	Purpose
A. FROM JUN 1937	TO SEP 1937	PARIS	FRANCE	VISIT
FROM JUL 1939	TO JUL 1939	NIAGARA PENINSULA	CANADA	VISIT
FROM SEP 1937	TO JUL 1942	MONTREAL	CANADA	RESIDENCE

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN EUROPE WAR SERVICE
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM SEP 1946 TO OCT 1945 TOKYO, SENDAI JAPAN MIL OCCUPATION
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________
City or Section Country Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

✓ 1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE)
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 - JAN 1948

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N WASHINGTON DC USA
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 - PRESENT

3. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

4. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

5. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

6. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

7. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ______ SPEAK ______ READ ______ WRITE ______

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BADMINTON - FAIR.
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. [redacted] RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS [redacted] ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE MD USA
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA DATE 25 NOV 1948
City and State

Henriette C. Driscoll
Witness

[redacted]
Signature of Applicant
CASASIN

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. - I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19. - I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12. - I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A. DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Casasin

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 6 Jan. 1955 rwc

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. [redacted] Cwasin
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum 8560		GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5		DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

POSTED
JAN 17 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

r/s

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. [redacted] Casarin

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.B. 16 Jan 1955

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI ~~SD-EF~~

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3400-20
TO: 5-3400-55-015

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Ill.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

POSTED

my 1/20/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

uty Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313738

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997876

...pational designation	2. Pay roll	3. Sheet No. 5-3400-20	4. Slip No.
...name (and ... number when appropriate) [redacted] Cassen	6. Grade and salary GS-13 $8360.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
...se normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks $ 8,990 SALARY ADJUSTED TO: EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955 PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE	11. Appropriation(s) SR 7	12. Prepared by NZ 9 Nov 54	13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date Jan 55	15. Date last equivalent increase 5 Jul 53	16. Old salary rate $8360.00	17. New salary rate $8560.00	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

...OP date (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP ...llowing periods)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

...ess LWOP Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

...ORM NO. 1126d—Revised
...d by Comp. Gen., U. S.
General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. [redacted] Casasin	20 Jan. 1924		26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)

REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED: 21 OCT 1956

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

Robert D. Lovelace

Robert D. Lovelace

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION

FROM: 7-3400-55-015

TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED

STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY

FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD

R.A. Skeels (Gus), FI/CMO

DATE: 2 Oct 56

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PE	11 OCT 1956
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	FEB:	10-9
E.		

REMARKS:

POSTED

11 OCT 1956

PE

F. APPROVED BY

Robert A. Stuart per FE Dar, jr 9 Oct '56

SECRET

14

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	[redacted]	DDP/SR	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

8. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS 4 7-4/0 4305

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

G.M.STEWART

J.H.
TMK 1/25

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Casasin	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,835

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME Casasin	3 ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4 FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	[redacted]	DDP/SR 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
BELIC, GEORGE	15 Jan 1958	George N Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	[redacted] Castren	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	Castren [redacted]	DDP/SR 10	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58	GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS
4 742

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 8/5/59
HF 7/31/59

G.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 560

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Cavasin
[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 02 YR. 60

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☒ | CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1234 1000 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
SR 6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER BR CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 12990

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	60300	SR	75013		1	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR.:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT):
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES): 1
HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE:
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS dg 10-2-60

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-21)

GE 10/18/60

134-1000-10

3040
80
3120

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	[redacted]	60 300 V 7	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
006102	[redacted]	DDP/SR 7	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION ☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-58 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

BAB: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 08 04 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3234 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
SR/6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER BR CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13510
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 01 20 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1B00091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

POSTED
8-20-62
JJ

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : [redacted] Cassin

1. Cover arrangements ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/or~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~xxxxxxx~~ to deny ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~xxxxx~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

Paul P. [illegible]
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

580

SECRET

(4-13-40)

57

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 · FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Casasin
MR. [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Dec 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55
B. APPROVED: 18 Jan. 1955

7. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13		Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.		GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5		DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE 2 Jan. 55

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 M.Z.

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. M.Z.

See memo

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert [illegible] W Muenster

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: R. Ledford
Title: DD/P Admin.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SR:FI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3400-20
TO: 5-3400-55-015

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 52 REMARKS

Effective date per [illegible] 1-11-55 [illegible]

Conc. by Osborne 1-11-55 [illegible] 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	M.Z.	4 Jan
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	5 Jan 55
E.		

REMARKS.

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: DEC 21 1954

F. APPROVED BY [illegible]
1-5-55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] [redacted]	DATE OF BIRTH Unk	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 15 July 1958	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-55)

(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
[redacted] Casasin		57-41

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or~~ ~~death~~ incurred on 3 December 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B. [illegible]

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	Mo 09	Da 12	Yr 60	
		V to V		V to UV
XX		UV to V		UV to UV

1. Serial No. 006102	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] [illegible]	3. Date of Birth Mo 01 Da 20 Yr 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP SR FAR EAST AREA TOKYO STATION SOVIET BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fron.- Code 3	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER BR CH	18. Position No. 189	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 14 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 1 Da 16 Yr 55	25. PSI Due Mo 7 Da 8 Yr 61	26. Appropriation Number 1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Voucher	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo 10 Da 02 Yr 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fron.- Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER - BR CH	35. Position No. 50 D-15	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 14 4	39. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL A. Busby

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Russell Gage	9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	hg	10-10-60	E.		
C. Classification	hg		F. Approved By	F. Sullivan	10-1[illegible]

Remarks: Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

Recorded by
CSPD
10-5-
w/o file

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI[illegible]) SECRET (4)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 306102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Casasin				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 5 4 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION			
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFF CLR DR CH		12. POSITION NUMBER ...5	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 13510		

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 4-62 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

16-Aug-62 (When Filled In)

XxF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1952

1. ~~SERIAL NUMBER~~ 006102 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Casasin

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Resignation	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 05 DAY 04 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 1000 1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/SR
SR/6
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (Br Ch)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LD, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 06	17. SALARY OR RATE $ ~~13250~~ 570 pa 13510 ✓

18. REMARKS

Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

Recorded by
CSPD
Dill

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL A. Busby ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 7/24/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HEOTAS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
45	10	60300	SR	15013		1	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
				1,60,00,9,1					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION Afy 8-15-62	46. O.P. APPROVAL Emmett F Higgins	DATE APPROVED 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 62 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(Date)

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE - 4 August 62	DATE SIGNED 23 July 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE: Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force.* The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*) CASASIN
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH
20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
None CIA	49	11	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. CASASIN

1 August 51
(DATE)

[redacted]
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this _____ day of _____ 1952 at _____
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE
5 8 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

CASASIN.

[redacted]

[redacted]

WITNESS:

Lorene E. Norbeck

Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 9 August 1957

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 55-104
1 FEB. [illegible] WHICH IS [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

4011

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 -
[redacted] CASASIN - ①

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of [redacted] to GS-15. ① ①

2. Mr. [redacted] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

①

3. The very facts of Mr. [redacted]'s youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [redacted] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

Charles Katek

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

	INFORMATION ADDRESSEE
Chief, SR	Chief, FE
Chief of Station, Tokyo	

SUBJECT	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE ⑦ Promotion of [redacted]	[illegible]	FJTT-1950 DATE [illegible]

REFERENCE(S)

FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

[redacted] - 1
Baker - 2
Maury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line ⑦ with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0601 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed ⑦ that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted]'s promotion, which both he and [redacted] ④ felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. ③ [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss ⑦ [redacted]'s promotion with [redacted]. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending ⑦ [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0601 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

④
[redacted]

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

[illegible] ROUTING
Pers/S/Pers
✓ Pers

☐ CONTINUED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible]

Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
[redacted] CASASIA

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

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st reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted]'s qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

[redacted]

Edward MARFLIUS [redacted]

[redacted]

Part [illegible] of previous document

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/[illegible]

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 — [redacted] CASASIN — ①

Chief of Sta

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

REFERENCE: [illegible]-11531 ([illegible]) dated [illegible]

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of [redacted] to GS-15. ① ①

2. Mr. [redacted] was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 19 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency. ①

3. The very facts of Mr. [redacted]'s youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. That careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. [redacted] deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level. ①

[illegible]
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

SECRET

C O P Y

FJTT-1950

TO: Chief, SR

25 November 1958

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of [redacted] CASASIN ①

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on ① [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury [redacted] promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended. ①

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted] ① promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress. ①

WILLIAM E. NELSON

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: CASASIN [redacted] Recommendation for Promotion

① = CASASIN

①

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

①

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, ① [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In ① the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

①

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without ① his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

CASASIN'S

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

1 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of CASASIN [redacted] Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of [redacted] prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin. CIA officer

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended CASASIN'S [redacted]'s promotion in December 1953. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. [redacted]. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. [redacted] has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: *Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.*

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: *Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors [illegible] the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.*

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED.

BY DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P9S
Reviewed By PCD 12/1/55

CASASIN

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY [redacted]	1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION (1) FI, (2) FP
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) USSR Base, Tokyo		SR 809
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 February - 30 September 1955		

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
   1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
   2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
   3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
   4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
   1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
   2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Carleton B. Swift	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) W. Lloyd George
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. Nov. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Phyllis M. Lanburn

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 22
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an ai[illegible] describing the individual. Your desc[illegible]on is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meanin[illegible] relation to a particular job or assign[illegible]t. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS		CATEGORIES													
		NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	SAMPLES			X											
B. PRACTICAL.											X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.														X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.												X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.													X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.															X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.														X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X		
11. CALM.														X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.															X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.													X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.														X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.														X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.														X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.													X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														X	

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 11 07 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating: skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. CHASAN GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward M [illegible]	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisors*)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET Potential

(when filled in)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. C95951N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Japan Station (REDWOOD)
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- ☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- ☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- ☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- ☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- ☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 15 November 1956

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marelius

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY R DATE 19 JAN 1957
Posted Pos. Cr
Reviewed 1-22-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 21 November 1956

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: W. Lloyd George

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 13 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Deputy to Branch Chief	5	Supervising	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Conducts Foreign Liaison	6	Prepares correspondence and reports	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Prepares and manages projects	4	Handles admin routine	4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:
Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION	
Six	OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL .

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather more than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

JAN 3 11 13 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. C 95RS/N GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station REDCCD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 23 Oct 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Lloyd GEORGE	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE CCS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 16 Oct 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL
OCT 30 11 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business fits him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Stevens.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. CASASIN GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station REDWOOD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.
Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field).

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 16 Oct 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward Marchi	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
7 NOV 1957
Posted Pers. Card ___
Reviewed by PCD OJ 11/12

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 23 OCT 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Lloyd GEORGE Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and Manages Projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Developes and handles Agents	RATING NUMBER 5

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

FITN. 3 REPORT (Part II) POTEN. .L

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. ASASIA GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER O THS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

OF PERSONNEL
MAIL FROM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE [illegible]
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR 8.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

OA5151N

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion	
☐ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

x	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		14 JUL 1958
Reviewed by PCD		7/24/58

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA ESTABLISHED AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE WITH [illegible] WISHES IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS REPORTS AS REALISTIC AND MEANINGFUL AS POSSIBLE

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5/6

INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH [illegible] SECRET Performance (4)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 18 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY.
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

6/16/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A CADASIN GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1959	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45

SECRET

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

APR 22 11 19 AM '59 MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

20 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2305
OSPD

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Sta/SR	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT				
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☒	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE	

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59-24 June 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 23 June 1960

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [redacted]/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 June 1960		Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	COS, Tokyo	John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

SEC
1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded by
CSPD

Ni ? Casasin **FITNESS REPORT** [redacted]

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To July 1960-October 61	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

'61 MAIL ROOM

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] b/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET

JUN 1962

61c1

6 August 1962

[redacted]

CASASIN

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

Casasin

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

[redacted]

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

Casasin

[redacted]

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

[redacted]

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
... Division

CONCUR: ______________________
EDWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
O.P. FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 C 15 AUG 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL & UNRELATED TIME PERIOD MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 AUG 78		DAN HARDWAY	Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

NEW YORK TIMES
14 JUNE 1976

W. Harvey, C.I.A. Aide, Dead; Linked to Anti-Castro Plotting

William K. Harvey, reportedly the head of a special Central Intelligence Agency group set up in the 1960's to plan the removal of foreign leaders by means including assasination, died of a heart attack last Wednesday in an Indianapolis hospital.

Mr. Harvey, who was 60 years old, was said to have been in charge of the agency's efforts against Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba. He was among 10 agents whose identities were disclosed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after an investigation in 1975 of alleged assassination plots by the United States.

William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, had argued that disclosure of the names of agents would put them in jeopardy of retaliation by "irrational groups."

Mr. Harvey testified before the Senate committee that he had been told by superiors that the Castor assasination plot had been aproved at the highest levels of the government, and that he had discussed the efforts with his immediate superior, Richard Helms, who later became director of the agency.

Mr. Harvey moved to Indianapolis in 1969 after retiring from the agency, where he had worked for 22 years. He worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1940 to 1947.

At the time of his death, Mr. Harvey was law editor for Bobbs-Merrill Publishing Company.

He was buried Saturday at South Cemetery in Danville, just west of Indianapolis. He is survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter, Sally, and a son, James D. Harvey.

68-134

13 FEB 1968

Mr. William King Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

I am sorry that due to a busy schedule and my absence for several days during the Christmas holidays I didn't have an opportunity to see you prior to your retirement at the end of the year.

Red White has told me of his visit with you, and I am particularly appreciative of your expression of continued loyalty to the Agency and your offer to be of assistance should an appropriate occasion arise.

I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

OP/BSD/RB/MJRoper:jsc
Rewritten:ExDir:sbo
Distribution:
0 - Adse
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
~~1~~ - OPF
1 - RB

(Concurred in by C/EAB/OS on 8 Jan 68)

NOTE: Covert correspondence

Mr. William King Harvey
23 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015

Dear Bill:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your more than twenty-six years of service to your country. The success with which you have met them should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
- O - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - C/EAB/CS
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OPP
- 1 - RB
- 1 - RB Reader

/s/ [illegible] D. [illegible]
[illegible]

Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

Concur: [illegible] **
C/EAB/CS

OP/BSD/RB/[illegible]Roper:jsc (26 December 1967)

**NOTE: Covert correspondence.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 December 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 051164

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, William K.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible]
Retirement - CIA Retirement System
(Voluntary) AND DISABILITY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 31 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 8136-1186

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sec. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
Development Complement

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 18 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 27055

18 REMARKS
Mr. Harvey is not recommended for the Agency Reserve List.

Coord w/ Mike Ripper, R.B. by telecon 12/29/67.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 13 YR. 16

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: CBJ CCDD.

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34 SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-9-68 m.w.

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 28 Dec 1967

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

13 DEC

Executive Registry
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - William K. Harvey

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. William K. Harvey, GS-18, Operations Officer, European Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 30 December 1967.

3. Mr. Harvey has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 52 years old with over 26 years of Federal Service. This service includes over 20 years with the Agency of which more than 9 years were in qualifying service overseas. The CIA Retirement Board has recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse this recommendation.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. William K. Harvey under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

[illegible]

/s/ Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

[illegible]

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

[illegible]

/s/ Richard Helms — 15 DEC 1967

Director of Central Intelligence — Date

SECRET

[illegible]

Distribution:
0 - Return to D/Pers
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - RB Soft file (w/hold)
1 - RB Reader

.C 13 3 25 PM '67

OP/FSD/RE/MJRoper:tlh (7 December 1967)
Retyped: OP/FSD/BDeFelice:jas (11 December 1967)

DEC 16 10 18 AM '67

14-00000

Personal Information

[redacted]

7:25 - [illegible]
not in

7 18

25,890

Op. officer

Conv. 2-25-67

EOD. 30 Sept. 47

2:25 - checking

10 -
12. not in
12.45 not in
1.15 not in
1.30 not in
2.00 not in

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	04/09 05/06	01	1361186	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
01	199200		REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
41	35014		F/TAX 1
53	1102		INS WEAPA
54	1000		INS FEGLI
57	750		INS UALIC
61	1374		0820 HOSP 2
75	12948		AGY RET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											99	147012	

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.
147012

FORM 8-63 1315

SECRET

(10-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 25 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7130-~~1207~~ 1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
~~FOREIGN FIELD~~ Dev. Conf.
~~SOUTHERN REGION~~
~~ROME STATION~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (UNASSIGNED)~~
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C ~~ROME, ITALY~~
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~CHIEF OF STATION~~ Ops Officer
12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0000~~ 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: ~~0136.05~~ 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18-1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 25,890
18. REMARKS:

Clhu

cc payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, C/P/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Russ Lang
DATE SIGNED: 2/28/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 35
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODINGS: NUMERIC 99997 ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 13 YR. 16
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-15-67 mw
46. OP APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 2 Mar 67

FORM 1152 3-66 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 24 | YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	XXX	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7136-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
~~CS/CS~~ DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: 1st Secretary
OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 01 [illegible]
18-1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~24,224~~ 24770
$ 25,890

18. REMARKS From: ~~DDP/EUR/FF/COS, ROME~~
Subject departed the Station 21 March 1966.

Other.

cc security

Security [illegible] SR/SS 3/15/67
[illegible] 3/16/67

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, E/E/Personnel
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 2/23/67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA. YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA. YR
[illegible]	[illegible]	44997	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	09 13 16		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA. YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-15-67
46. O P APPROVAL: R [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Rome

Director of Personnel

WOLLOGAGS - - Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

Action: As indicated
REF: Book Dispatch 5096 & OIRS - 7586

1. You have been found to be qualified as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System and have been so designated effective 21 November 1965.

2. Although such designation under present statutes is viewed favorably by most persons, the regulation governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interests. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefore must be received in Headquarters within 60 days of the date of this dispatch or acceptance of designation will be assumed. Any questions that you may have in connection with your designation that cannot be answered by referring to Book Dispatch 5096 should be forwarded to Headquarters.

3. We believe that the benefits of the Organization Retirement System are superior to the benefits of the Civil Service Retirement System. However, there are a few situations in which an employee at the time of retirement may have so many years of service (almost 37) that he would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system. Because of this, the policy decision has been made that a participant in the Organization system who would receive a higher annuity under the Civil Service system may, not later than one year prior to his retirement, apply to be removed from our system and transferred to the Civil Service system. Thus, you should not anticipate this contingency as a factor in deciding whether you regard your designation as a participant adverse to your best interests.

21 DEC 1965

/s/ Richard B. Ega[illegible] 15 DEC 1965

RICHARD B. E[illegible]Y

OIRS - 7779

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 November 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 21 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / XXX CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1267

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WE
ROME STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY

11 POSITION TITLE:
FIRST SECRETARY
CHIEF OF STATION

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0262

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
FSR		01 2	24,284
GS	0136.05	18 1	$ 25,382

18 REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

1 cc to OP/BSD/RB
1 cc to CCS
1 cc to Finance through CCS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Philip C. B[illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 18 NOV 1965
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 28
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 50630 ALPHABETIC WE
22 STATION CODE: 36533
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOG/TRS CODE: 3
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 09 DA. 13 YR. 16
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO 05 DA. 17 YR. 59
27 DATE OF LEI: MO 05 DA. 17 YR 59
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE 2
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR TEM PROV TMP / CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0- WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-29-65
46 OP APPROVAL: [illegible] for D/Pers
DATE APPROVED: 18 Nov 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 MARCH 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 30 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CC CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3136-6300-1014
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
ROME STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE: 1st Secretary
CHIEF OF STATION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0262
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP		17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR		02	0	15,900
GS ~~(00)~~	0136.01	18	1	20,000

18. REMARKS
5TFS
FROM: DDP ~~TASK FORCE~~ W/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/0662. Tran) 1

APPOINTMENT MEMO TO DCI SENT ON 27 MARCH 1963.

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/SS 4/3/63

259 SENT TO MEDICS ON 15 MARCH 1963. to 6/2

REQUEST ALL NECESSARY CLEARANCES BE GRANTED PRIOR TO 1 JUNE 1963.

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY. CSPD Routing
06/27/63

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: THOMAS M. FISHER, C/WE/PT
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: McLean
DATE SIGNED: 24 June 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	6213	10E	31533		3	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXP RES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RES/ PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6/27/63
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B. L. Bond for D. Lew
DATE APPROVED: 26 June 63

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.
8-62

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

CO/P [illegible]

12 JUN 1963

Executive Registry
63-4946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey
Chief of Station, Rome, Italy

1. This is to make a matter of written record the appointment of Mr. Harvey as Chief of Station, Rome, Italy, effective on or about 30 June 1963. Mr. Harvey will replace Mr. Francis I. G. Coleman, who is scheduled to attend the next session of the National War College. Verbal approval was given by you and by the Director.

2. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

William D O'Ryan
WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
Chief
Western Europe Division

Attachment
Biographic Profile (Part I)

CONCUR:

Deputy Director (Plans) — 13 JUN 1963 (Date)

APPROVED:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence — 22 June '63 (Date)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

22 May 1963

Mr. William K. Harvey

Dear Bill,

I wish to express my real appreciation for the time you have devoted to Agent Panel affairs. Your operational experience and personal knowledge of many of the individual staff agents and career agents have provided a sound basis for your contributions to Panel decisions concerning their promotions and reassignments. I look forward to the time, after your overseas assignment, when we may have the pleasure of your service in a similar capacity.

Sincerely,

W. Lloyd George

W. Lloyd George
Chairman, CS Agent Panel

Bill, may I add in
my own hand and words
real appreciation for your
wisdom, objectivity and help

Lloyd

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 8 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132 - 1000 - 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
Task Force W
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - CH ~~Chief~~ Special Coord
12. POSITION NUMBER: BA-662
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS 15
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 02-0 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $14900 $ 18500 ✓
18. REMARKS: ~~PRA for the duration of Task Force W~~ from FI staff tray 4

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: for Louis Armstrong
DATE SIGNED: 8/27/62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Richard D Vanderen
DATE SIGNED: 8/28/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61100 ALPHABETIC TF10
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MOTORIST CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 09 DA. 31 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LE: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - NO WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearney 08/25/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B. J. Snel for OP Pers
DATE APPROVED: 29 Aug 62

SECRET

Pre-1959 personnel
actions

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 061164

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 19 Jan 1941

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HARVEY, William King	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sep 1915	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 29 Sep 1947
6. MARITAL STATUS Remarried	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) ▷ NO. 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH ? ? ?	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE ?
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS ▷ MEMBERSHIP ?	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. May 1967	QUAL. FOR Current Duties EVAL. FOR Annual Exec
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS ▷ NONE X	SERVICE GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1931-33	Danville Gazette, Indiana - Reporter & Printer
1934-35	Indiana Univ, Bloomington - Publicity Writer (athletics)(PT)
1937-40	Self-employed, Maysville, Kentucky - Attorney-at-Law
1940-47	Dept of Justice, FBI, DC/NYC/Pittsburgh, Pa - Special Agent & Supervisor/

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1933-37	Indiana Univ, Bloomington - LLB (with Distinction) Law, Psych, Philos, Journalism

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): German - R,High; W,P,S,U,Inter; Interpret - Oct 1961

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1963 Italian

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1947	Intel Of	P-6		OSO/FBS/Ch, Inf'TUSSRDiv	Hq
May 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/FBS/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Dec 1948	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DOPC/DCh, ForeignBr	"
Mar 1949	" "	P-7		OSO/COPS/DCh, Ops for CE	"
Oct 1949	" "	GS15		OSO/Ch, Stf-C&ACh, Stf-D	"
Feb 1951	Chief Stf E	16		OSO/Ch, Staff E	"
Dec 1951	I O	16		OSO/Ch, Plans Staff	"
Dec 1952	Ops Of	16		DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Bonn
Nov 1953	I O	16	FI	DDP/EE/GerMis/BOB/COB	Berlin
Dec 1954	Area Ops Of 0136.01	16	FI	" " " " " "	"
Jan 1956	" " " 0136.01	17	DI	DDP/EE/GerSta/BOB/COB	"
May 1959	Chief of Base 0136.01	18	DI	" " " " " "	"
	Sep 1959 return to Hq				
Oct 1959	Ops Of 0136.01	18	DI	DDP/Ch, FI/D	Hq
Jun 1962	" " 0136.01	18	D	DDP/Ch, Task Force W	"
Jun 1963	Chief of Sta 0136.01	18	D	DDP/WE/Rome Sta/COS	Rome
Jun 1965	" " " 0136.05	18	D	" " " " "	"
Feb 1967	Ops Of 0136.01	18	D	DDP/EUR/Dev Comp	Hq
Dec 1967	Retirement (voluntary - CIARDS)				

20. DATE REVIEWED 22 Sep 1971	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY obs	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE ▷ No

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Harvey William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 15 JUN 1965	RATING LETTER O

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in Italy with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Employee at Field Station	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 3 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HARVEY William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian		8. CURRENT STATION Rome	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

28 OCT 1965

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K Harvey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE 21 October 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE THKaram Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

what date?

Colored photograph removed this date and forwarded with Biographic Profile to Mr. McCone via Mr. Henry Oosthoek, WH/Pers. Mr. Oosthoek cleared with Mr. Gene Stevens, Chief, T&R Branch, POD/OP, the removal of picture.

V. Graham, OP/POD/CAB
5E-2508 HQS
Ext. 7771


HARVEY WILLIAM K
JANUARY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SF: 9 JAN 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 061108	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 12 31 67	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8135 1100 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 9997	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 18 1	17 SALARY OR RATE 27055

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 Employ Code 18	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 09 13 16	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE CE0000	32 Correction Cancellation Data (TYPE MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 2 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D. ECHOLS

POSTED

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SECRET

PLW

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	44 997	CF	GS 18 1	$25,890	$27,055

SECRET
(When Filled In)

E.T. 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. CCE 02 25 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V; CF TO V; V TO CF; CF TO CF X	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7136 1186 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 25890

18. REMARKS
OTHER
WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
56	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRE MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 16 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 02 24 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7136 1186 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE FIRST SECRETARY OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 01 2 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 24770 25890

18. REMARKS
OTHER
ROME, ITALY

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44337	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE 1	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 08 13 16	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	NO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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3-17-67

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630	CF	GS 18 1	$25,382	$25,890

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	061164	50 630	CF	GS 18 1	$24,500	$25,382

JGD: 19 NOV 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OD/pers

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ODF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 21 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6136 1267 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY		
11. POSITION TITLE FIRST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0262	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16. GRADE AND STEP 01 2 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 24284 25382

18. REMARKS

ROME, ITALY
EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 28	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50630 ALPHABETIC WE	22. STATION CODE 36533	23. INTEGREE CODE 1	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 09 13 16	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 05 17 59	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA YR. 05 17 59
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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11-26-65

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 06/16/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 061144	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION SERIES CODE ADJUSTMENT		4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 07 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6 FUNDS	V TO V CF TO V	X	V TO CF CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO CHARGEABLE 5136 1267 0000	8 CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE DIVISION		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY			
11 POSITION TITLE CHIEF OF STATION		12 POSITION NUMBER 0262	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS LB etc) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.05	16 GRADE AND STEP 18	17 SALARY OR RATE		

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6 21 65

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4 51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 28 JUNE 63

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 061164	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HARVEY WILLIAM K

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 30 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3136 6300 1014	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE ROME STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE 1ST SECRETARY CHIEF OF STATION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0262	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 02 0 18 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 15300 20000

WASH., D.C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	62630	WE	36533	1	3	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RES/ TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOL

POSTED
07/02/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

28 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1958, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HARVEY WILLIAM K	261184	81100	CF	18 1	$18500	18 1	$20000

PSC: 12 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061164
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR): 06 08 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP TASK FORCE W
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SP ASST TO COORD / OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0662
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR / GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 02 0 / 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14900 / 18500
18. REMARKS: THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/08/62 TO SHOW THE INTEGRATED TITLE, CLASSIFICATION, GRADE, STEP, & SALARY WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY OMITTED.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs. Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
57	10	61100	TFW	75013	1	1	09 13 16		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32 MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				37	06 08 62			

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROJ, TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

09/18/62

BAB 9/12/62

FORM 8-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-31)

(When Filled In)

DATE: 31 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HARVEY WILLIAM K
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): [illegible] 09 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V X | CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3102 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: TASK FORCE W
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0062
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 18 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18500
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 01100 | ALPHABETIC TFW
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): [illegible] 12 18
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE | CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO DA. YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR PROV | RES TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES | HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/5/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition 8/31/62 SECRET (4-61)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	HARVEY WILLIAM K	561164	41 09	GS-18 1	$17,500	$18,500

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 18 AUGUST 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
561164	HARVEY WILLIAM K	09	13	15		0	M 1	09	29	47		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.
12	09	40		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	29

12. LCD Yr.	13 [illegible] Yes-1 No-2	Code
47		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DOP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05	17	59	XX	XX	XX	0127 1003 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
CONVERSION TO PERMANENT SUPERGRADE RANK *		07	27	60	REGULAR	QM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DOP FI STAFF DIVISION D OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4109	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	SP ASST TO COORD OPS OFFICER CHIEF	0872	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
02 18 1	$ 14900 18500	D	05	17	59	XX	XX	XX	1123 1003 1000

44. Remarks

* THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON 27 JULY 1960 APPROVED YOUR PERMANENT GRADE AS GS-18.

2.29.60 WL

E.D.ECHOLS

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

Pre 1960
Personnel actions

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 061164

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HARVEY William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 27 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

28 OCT 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

My rating of the performance of this officer remains the same as the description of his performance which is contained in his fitness report for period ending 31 March 1965.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE William K. Harvey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. Harvey is currently at his overseas post.	
DATE 27 September 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, WE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluations given Mr. Harvey on duties No. 2, 3 and 4. I believe duty No. 2 could have been rated "outstanding" rather than "strong," with justification. I also think, however, that duty No. 1, involving the overall administration and management of the Station and its personnel, should more appropriately be rated "proficient," or perhaps "strong."

DATE 21 October 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE THKaram Thomas H. Karamessines

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Harvey William K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 13 Sept 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-18	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italian	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and the Base in Milan.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises CA Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

15 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey has continued to manage the Agency's activities in ~~Italy~~ with the same enthusiasm and drive which characterized the description of his approach to the Station Chief role in his past Fitness Report.

In his efforts to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-Satellite targets Mr. Harvey has devoted considerable energy to acquiring the basic information needed for this task. This has been well reported and the responsibilities for carrying out this shift in operational approach have been precisely delegated. It is still early to assess the results operationally but the reorientation has been well organized. As an early indication of the trend this is taking, several successful technical operations have been established which are well on target.

To accomplish the objectives of the CA responsibilities of the Rome Station Mr. Harvey has acquired the most competent officers with this highly specialized skill and has staunchly supported their efforts to prosecute this program which remains extensive. He has considerably improved the Station relationship with Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, by devoting greater effort to this necessary phase of the Station Chief's role and the Ambassador, during a recent trip to Washington, made special mention of the degree of confidence he had in the Station's reporting and in the extent to which it has kept him properly informed.

During the period under review Mr. Harvey acquired a Deputy Station Chief - for whose arrival he had waited more than 6 months. He has delegated general management of the Station's activities to this officer, who has applied himself diligently to this task and the results have been promising. Mr. Harvey has been receptive to headquarters guidance, is extremely prompt and thorough in replying to his correspondence.

(cont'd)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Employee at Field Station

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 2 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan W D O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 3 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADDP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas H. Karamessines THKaramessines

SECRET

William K. Harvey

Fitness Report for Period 1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

Section C (cont'd)

Some administrative details, such as the reports on the performance of officers whose evaluation he was reluctant to make, Mr. Harvey has had a tendency to postpone despite repeated efforts to provoke him into timely response.

I have rated Mr. Harvey's overall performance outstanding in recognition of his superior supervisory ability, his unusual skill in expressing his views and his determination to accomplish his basic objectives regardless of the obstacles which he encounters. The Rome Station is complex, is engaged in some highly sensitive operations which must be guided with a strong hand and by an officer with a degree of professionalism which Mr. Harvey is well able to supply as a result of his extensive operational experience.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
061164

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Harvey	(First) William	(Middle) K.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1916	3. SEX N	4. GRADE 18	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief of Station, Rome			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/Italy		8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Station, Rome	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles Station relationship with Ambassador and Embassy and Station Bases.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises correspondence with headquarters on entire complex Station program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises CA Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Engaged in reorientation of Station FI program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

12 AUG 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 11 11 19 AM '64

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Harvey's management of the Agency's program in Italy has to date been characterized by the forcefulness and drive which have gained for him in previous assignments a reputation for dynamism. He has undertaken to reorient the Rome Station's FI program toward Soviet-satellite targets and any delay in this reorientation has been due fully to our inability for administrative reasons to supply the personnel he desires on the time schedule which he would prefer.

Although not by inclination oriented toward the objectives of CA, he has preserved and guided the most complex CA program in Western Europe with understanding and skill. To accomplish this it has been necessary for Mr. Harvey to learn the intricasies of an extremely complex local political situation. This he has set about to do with confidence. His accumulated experience in earlier assignments has equipped Mr. Harvey with a self-assurance and confidence which I have rarely seen equalled in any other officer. The continuance of ideal relationships with the key Embassy officials in Rome has been somewhat handicapped by the sudden death of the principal officer in the Embassy who was knowledgeable of our program and the impossibility of bringing into knowledge of our activity the next lower level echelon of Embassy officials for reasons beyond Mr. Harvey's control. This handicap has been overcome over the past year and Mr. Harvey is currently supervising extremely sensitive political operations and contacts to the satisfaction of the Ambassador and his headquarters.

He delegates responsibilities skillfully to those officers under his command who are best qualified and by his own outstanding performance, which is always at its best under heavy stress, he earns an intense loyalty from these personnel. He demonstrates cost-consciousness and outstanding supervisory ability.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 27/2/65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Report will be shown to employee upon return from overseas.	
DATE 28 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William D. O'Ryan

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 17 AUG 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Plans	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard Helms

SECRET

SECRET

6 1164

18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Mr. William K. Harvey

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1962 to 15 January 1963 during which Mr. Harvey was Chief, Task Force W.

2. As a senior officer in the Clandestine Services, Mr. Harvey has behind him a long record of professional accomplishment achieved during tours in Washington as well as seven years in Berlin. He is thoroughly grounded in the tradecraft of clandestine activities, and has brought to each and every assignment an intelligent, thorough, and uncommonly conscientious approach. His qualities of leadership are attested to by the loyalty and devotion of those colleagues who have worked under his direction. If anything, there has tended to grow up within the Clandestine Services a coterie of officers who have come to regard themselves as "Harvey men", a development which Mr. Harvey himself has not encouraged but which demonstrates the strong emphasis on first-class tradecraft which he has insisted upon in each assignment.

3. As Chief, Task Force W, Mr. Harvey had the task of organizing and developing a large operational team devoted to the acquisition of intelligence and the handling of special operations directed at Cuba. He was obliged to work within a complicated bureaucratic framework, a fact which made the clearing of actions a laborious and time-consuming exercise. Under his direction, the Task Force grew substantially in size and in professional competence with the result that when the Cuban crisis arrived in October intelligence assets were in place to make a significant contribution to the overall intelligence picture. Mr. Harvey devoted considerable ingenuity, long hours of personal time, and great energy to this enterprise, and, although certain aspects of the intra-governmental coordination of the operations had rough sledding, his net achievement was the establishment of an effective, going concern with momentum which carries on to the present.

4. Mr. Harvey, after a strong performance as Chief, TFW, has been assigned as Chief of Station, Rome, and is now preparing himself to take over at that post in the coming months.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director (Plans)

Read 23/4/63

29 APR 1963

Reviewing Official:
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET

OCT 1962

OD/Pers

15 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: William K. Harvey - Memorandum in lieu of fitness report for period 30 March 1960 - 10 May 1962

1. It is difficult to prepare a fitness report on this outstanding officer, largely because forms do not lend themselves to measuring his many unique characteristics. His strengths are in professional knowledge and competence in the operational field, in a toughness of mind and firmness of attitude, while the latter in past years have moved him into positions that were sometimes stronger than superior officers, with a responsibility for adjustments necessary in matters of policy in relation to Agency position in the community, were able to handle easily, his own closeness to policy positions of the Agency within the U.S. community in the last two years has found him with a real ability to handle policy matters and to adjust to necessities, without losing his firmness and his independence of thought.

2. He is sometimes accounted to be less than outgiving of information about operational matters in which he is engaged, yet it should be remembered that this characteristic has been part and parcel of a sound operational attitude in his career. He has a wide knowledge of personalities within the officer corps of the DD/P and is for the most part a good selector of officers to accomplish necessary tasks. He handles people well. He has a tremendous energy and is a loyal officer both to his superiors and to the purposes of the Clandestine Services of CIA.

3. He is one of the few distinctly outstanding officers in the DD/P.

W. Lloyd George

W. LLOYD GEORGE
Chief
Foreign Intelligence

8 September 1960

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

The following statement relates to the performance of William K. Harvey, GS 18, Chief of FI, Division D.

This officer has held a series of responsible positions in DD/P and its predecessor clandestine intelligence organization for well over ten years. He excels in the field of clandestine operations in general and especially so in that phase of clandestine staff and operational activities concerned with the procurement, handling and exploitation of highly sensitive and critical intelligence and operational materials.

His performance generally over the recent years has proved him to be one of the outstanding officers of the DD/P organization. He has demonstrated clearly superior performance both in staff responsibility at Headquarters and as Chief of Base in a very important field station where he was directly engaged in supervising and carrying on operations successfully against targets of the highest priority.

In the period under review, June 1959 to March 1960, he took over and directed functioning of one of DD/Ps most sensitive components charged with achievement by special means against targets of the highest importance. This included carrying on negotiations and liaison with other components of CIA and other Agencies and Departments of the U. S. Government concerned with his special field. His performance of this responsibility in many respects has been outstanding. He has continued to demonstrate his fitness to handle a wide range of positions of major responsibility within the clandestine service.

Among his outstanding characteristics are: thorough understanding of his profession and ability to make this clear to persons of high level whose knowledge of the Clandestine Services is general. He is firm, tenacious, and on occasions strongly aggressive in pursuit of his point of view. While this may sometimes make for difficulty on the part of those in higher echelons who wish to dispose of a complicated problem easily and quickly, this officer's persistence in carefully presenting his arguments and in holding to them until their fact and logic prevail or until policy factors override, makes him a highly valuable asset to CIA.

Rater W. Lloyd George
W. Lloyd George
C/FI

Reviewer Richard Helms
Richard Helms
COPS

SECRET

010

14 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
November 1957 - January 1959

1. Subject's abilities and performance are too generally known to require detailed comment. One of the very senior officers in KUDOVE he has been chief of what is probably the largest and most productive overseas Base of KUBARK for approximately seven years. During this period Subject has been personally responsible for a number of operational successes, some of which have been of national importance. Possessed of driving energy, determination and initiative, he has few equals in professional experience and competence. Throughout his administration of the Base he has established and maintained exceedingly high standards of accomplishment, discipline and endeavor. Subject's judgement, on occasion, is impulsive and proposals of the Base have been, from time to time, advanced and defended with greater vehemence and more exhaustively than the occasion, objectively speaking, required. Subject's basic self-discipline, good sense and loyalty, however, have prevented any such incidents, which are in large measure manifestations of the highly charged atmosphere and insistent operational pressures of Berlin, from developing into serious friction with the German Station or Washington headquarters.

2. It has been a pleasure to serve with this officer and, during his assignment, he has consistently rendered dedicated and effective service of the very highest order.

John A. Bross

CONCUR:

CHIEF, EE DIVISION

RYBAT
SECRET

14-00000

Harvey, W. K. EE —

Chief of Base 6548-[illegible]

Berlin

18 June 1959

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION: Chief, Records and Services Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - William K. Harvey
January 1959 - June 1959

I have nothing to add to the memorandum dated 14 January 1959. Subject continues to render an outstanding performance.

John A. Bross

I certify that I have seen
this Fitness Report

William K. Harvey

CONCUR:

James Critchfield
Chief, Eastern European Division

SECRE.

Pre 1959 Fitness Reports

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*Last-First-Middle*)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Son-James	68-0535

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 7 March 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Harvey, William	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Self	CLAIM NUMBER 68-0533

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 July 1964.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 3 January 1968	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE R. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Harvey, William K.	Daughter-Sally	68-0534

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 August 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 January 1968	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-55 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

Items Indicated by a Star are to be Completed by the Payee.

1. (Agency)

TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT VOUCHER

2. D.O. VOUCHER NO.

3. BU. VO. NO.

6. D.O. PAID BY

*4. PAYEE'S COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS

William K. Harvey
28 West Irving Street
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

*5. TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

A. Number	B. Dated
6-69348	2/23/66
6-69348A	5/13/66

*7. EMPLOYEE NUMBER (State Only): 253900

*8. TRAVEL ADVANCE STATUS

A. Old Balance	$ -0-
B. Applied This Voucher	$ -0-
C. New Balance	$ -0-

9. OFFICIAL STATION (State Only): Rome to Dept.

*10. STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT FURNISHED TRANSPORTATION

A. GTR or Trans. No.	B. Valuation	C. Carrier*	D. Class	E. Point to Point Travel (1) from	(2) to
LI 302,207	$1302.90	SS Constitution	1st	Naples	New York
IO 359,316	271.35	AF TWA	Economy	Munich	Washington

*11. PAYEE CERTIFICATE: *I hereby certify that this voucher and attachments are correct and just in all respects, and that payment or credit has not been received.***

A. Date: March 17 1967

B. Signature: William K. Harvey

12. PAYMENT CALCULATION

*A. Amount Claimed (See Item 19.) $ 649.61

B. Differences, if any $

C. Amount Allowed (Verified correct to Approp. ________) $

D. Applied to Advance (See Item 8B.) $

E. Net to Payee $

13. ADMINISTRATIVE APPROVAL: Recommended for approval.

A. Date

B. Signature

Name:

Title

*14. PREVIOUS PAYMENTS: The next previous Vo. paid under same travel auth. was:

A. D.O. Vou. No.	B. Paid (mo. & yr.)	C. D.O. Name and Symbol

15. CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT: *Pursuant to authority vested in me, I certify this voucher is correct and proper for payment:*

A. Date

B. Authorized Certifying Officer's Signature

Name:

Title:

16. METHOD OF PAYMENT (For Paying Office Use Only)

A. Cash or Dep. Check Amt.	B. Exchange Rate	C. U.S. $ Equivalent	*D. Date

E. Treasury or Depository Check No. and Name of Depository

*F. Payment Received

(Payee's Signature)

17. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION

A. Fund	B. Allotment	C. Oblig. (T/A) No	D. Organization (State Only) USIA: Activity/Sub-Activity	E. Function (State Only)	F. Object	G. Paying Office (State Only)	H. Paying Date (State Only)	I. Amount

*Item 10C - If carrier was foreign ship registry, attach certificate of readiness.

**FRAUDULENT CLAIM - Falsification of any item in an expense account works a forfeiture of the claim (28 U.S.C. 2514) and may result in a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both (18 U.S.C.).

FORM FS-286
6-65

FORM FS-268 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, and transportation expenses for persons and things for which reimbursement is claimed, or effect [illegible] weights, measures and attach [illegible] receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Concurrent travel
Wife
Daughter, Sally, Age 7
Separate travel
Son, James, born December 1947

Lire 625/$1 DM 4/$1

Dates 19 66 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
			FORWARDED			
Mr. Harvey, Wife, and Daughter						
Mar.21	0700	LV. Rome via private auto				
	1130	AR. Naples				
		163 miles at 12¢				19.56
		Autostrada tolls L.1750				2.80
		Required fees for auto (Ford)				
		at dock				
		Preparation of car L.1500				
		Auto check-in fee L.1000				
		L.2500				4.00
		Baggage transport Rome				
		to Naples L.3500				5.60
		Baggage transfer charges				
		for hold baggage L.9350				14.96
	2300	LV. Naples	3/4	6	11.25	
Mar.22 thru30		At sea	9	6	135.00	
Mar.31		At sea	1	2	5.00	
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					151.25	46.92

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1960 O—753-220—(1280)

FORM FS-285 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

#18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary, or transportation expenses for persons and things [illegible] hich reimbursement is claimed; as effects, show weights measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 66 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	 Other (G)
			FORWARDED		151.25	46.92
April 1	0800	AR. New York				
	1200	LV. New York via personal auto				
	1830	AR. Washington				
		269 miles at 12¢				32.28
		Tolls				4.55
		Dock charge for release of car				2.50
		Baggage transfer charge				
		at New York pier	1	16.00	40.00	15.00
		Railway express charges for				
		shipment of 337 lbs. of				
		baggage from New York to				
		Washington				23.40
Travel	of son	James				
June 2		LV. Munich via AF				
		AR. Paris				
June 5	1200	LV. Paris via TWA 803				
	1500	AR. New York				
#19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					191.25	124.65

GPO : 1962 O - 655734

14-00000

FORM FS-285 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18. CLAIM (Show complete itinerary for transportation expenses for persons and things for which reimbursement is claimed; on effects, show weight, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 1966 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
			FORWARDED		191.25	124.65
June 5	1630	LV. New York via TW 203				
	1807	AR. Washington Nat'l Airport				
		Air travel from Munich is				
		less expensive than $302.90				
		economy air FARE from Rome				
		to Washington				
		Airport tax in Munich DM500				1.25
		Direct scheduling from Munich				
		via air				
June 2	0740	LV. Munich via LH 161				
	0830	AR. Frankfurt				
	1215	LV. Frankfurt via PA 107				
	1745	AR. Washington				
		Per diem ½ @ 16.00 less 35%			5.20	
		Shipment of air freight from				
		Munich to Washington (85lbs.)				67.10
		Deferred home leave travel for				
		Mr. Harvey, James and Sally				
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to item 12A. on face of voucher)					196.45	193.00

FORM FS-288 (THIS SIDE MAY BE USED AS A SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET) Page 2

*18 CLAIM (Show complete itinerary [illegible] transportation expenses for persons and things for which reimbursement is claimed, on effects, show weights, measures and attach all receipts.)

REMARKS (Names and Ages of Dependents, explanation for use of foreign registry ship, rates of exchange, etc.)

Dates 19 (A)	Local Time (B)	Itinerary and Description (C)	Per Diem Days (D)	Daily Rate (E)	Amount Per Diem (F)	Amount Other (G)
				FORWARDED	196.45	193.00
June 28	0900	LV. Washington via personal auto	3/4	16.00	30.00	
June 29	1500	AR. Indianapolis	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 @ 12¢				70.08
July 22	0900	LV. Indianapolis via personal	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		auto				
July 23	1500	AR. Washington	3/4	16.00	30.00	
		Mileage 584 miles @ 12¢				70.08
		Cost by auto is less than				
		cost by rail with scheduling				
		as follows:				
June 28	1900	LV. Washington via rail				
June 29	1205	AR. Indianapolis				
July 22	1505	LV. Indianapolis via rail				
July 23	0915	AR. Washington				
		Per diem 2 x $16.00 x 2.5 $80.00				
	RT 1st class rail (Family Plan) 169.40					
	RT Sleeping accomodations (Bedroom, plus roomette is least expensive) 76.96					
	$326.36					
*19. COLUMN TOTALS (Sum of which forwarded to Item 12A. on face of voucher)					316.45	333.16

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO. 6-DIGITS	3. NAME MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS
<● 2	●	●

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR ●	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR ●	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<● 3	● 061164	● HAR	● BF71	4	3	3	3	3	2	61

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO	DA	YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	
● 10	02	61	● 09	13	15	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<● 5	●	●	●	●							

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO DA YR	
●								●	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	
<● 4	●	●	ENTER UNDER "TYPE" - A - ADDITION TO RECORD C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				
●	●					●				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
061164	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
HARVEY, WILLIAM K	7	13	15

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
German				☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

CODED
NOV 19
DATE

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

[✓ 2.] I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER. -- [illegible]

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 10/2/61	SIGNATURE William K Harvey
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
0 61164	HARVEY	WILLIAM	K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	3				03	21	66	ITALY	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
IN 80062	22 March 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☒	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION	DATE 3/29/66		SIGNATURE Jackie E. Persinger
☒	C & T DIVISION			

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

16-3525

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

Office of the Director General

G.P.O. BOX NO. 510BB.,
MELBOURNE

24. May, 1966.

My dear Admiral

My Liaison Officer in Rome has told me of the tremendous assistance and co-operation that he and his section received at all times from Mr. W.K. Harvey.

I understand that Mr. Harvey has now returned to Washington and I would like to say how much I appreciate all that he has done to assist the work of my officers in Rome.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(C.C.F. SPRY)

The Honorable W.F. Raborn,
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E [illegible] Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24	25-26
061164	HARVEY, WILLIAM K.	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	ARRIVAL				DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				01	08	66	ITALY	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	DEPARTURE				RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
X	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN 26160

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 4 Jan. 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	X REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ C & L DIVISION ☒ C & T DIVISION	DATE 13 Jan. 1966	SIGNATURE Beverly Y C

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
61164	Harvey	William	K	50

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	CMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	06	30	63				Italy	365

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	CMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☒	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: Rome 9550 IN 70227

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD:

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☒ FINANCE DIVISION		DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

130470 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5		6-23		24-25
[illegible]	[illegible]			34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		39-41
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		
		04			05				801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FISCAL DIVISION ☐ FINANCE DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE

FORM 1451a
8-58

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

130471 FEB 961

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23	24-25
[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]	34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	[illegible]	10 ~~[illegible]~~	[illegible]	[illegible]	11 ~~[illegible]~~	0[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

/	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
[illegible]	

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE
☐	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 6-58 1451a SECRET (4-10)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL O/D - [illegible] T + R
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) HARVEY (First) William (Middle) KING

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 68 W. IRVING St. Chevy Chase, Md

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE Berlin	DATE OF MARRIAGE 3/2/54
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
CLARA GRACE, Nee Follick	Above		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
JAMES.	Same	M	12
sally		F	18 Mo.
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
SARA K. HARVEY	1615 Northwood Drive Indianapolis, Ind	[illegible] 2579	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? Mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Wife - Above	RELATIONSHIP
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER OL 4-5178
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS: HAMILTON NATIONAL BANK & BANK OF SILVER SPRING

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS
1 JAN 57 EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

self & wife Jointly

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	11/4	William K Harvey

CONFIDENTIAL

OD/Pers

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TUTORIAL TRAINING REPORT

03/11/63 - 06/17/63

Student	: William K. Harvey	Office	: WH
Year of Birth	: 1915	Service Designation	: D
Grade	: 18	No. of Students	: 1
EOD Date	: 09/47	Instructor	: Mrs. M. Lutyk

This is to certify that William K. Harvey received 92 hours of tutorial training in ITALIAN language.

Beginner : X

Non-beginner : ____

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Bengt C. Herder

BENGT C. HERDER
Chief Instructor

10/21/63
Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

Pre 1961 Personnel material

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 28 November 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Harvey, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH:

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6765

Room 3E 30

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL - Executive

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQDS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES AT HEADQUARTES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 24 MAY 1967

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:
JOHN E. FRALLIC
PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 31 January 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WH

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☒ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HOQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

ROOM NO. & BUILDING

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

Qualified for Current Duties

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

31 January 1966

DATE: 31 January 1966

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Peter J. Gaughan

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST	17 March 1965
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	HARVEY, William K.
3. POSITION TITLE	COS
4. GRADE	GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	WE DIVISION
6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.	7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	10 March 1965
STATION	Rome
TDY OR PCS	PCS
TYPE OF COVER	Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	2
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
MARGE OROSTEPHAN, WE/PT

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404
EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S
PCS

JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 3 22 65

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 17 March 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of HARVEY, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE: COS

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE DIVISION

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 7157

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

Dependents:

Wife: Clara G.

Dau : Sally J., 10 Aug 58

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 10 March 1965

STATION: Rome

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: Integree

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 2

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

MARGE GRISTEPHAN, SS/PT

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 E 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

259 forwarded at request of Joe Cline.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED O S
PCS
JOE W. CLINE

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

3 22 65

SECRET

(26)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

e/D

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May 1963

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) William K. Harvey	3. POSITION TITLE Chief of Station	4. GRADE GS-18
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH WE Division	6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.	

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 1 July 1963
STATION: Rome
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 3
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION *(One block must be checked)*

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
MARGE GROSTEPHAN

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404
EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

Request evaluation for above PCS.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Excluded from automatic [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 May 1963

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Dependents of William K. Harvey

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief of Station

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: WE Division

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5356

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: o/a 1 July 1963

STATION: Rome

TDY OR PCS: PCS

TYPE OF COVER: Integree

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: 3

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED: 0

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Marge Grostephan

MARGE GROSTEPHAN

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4 B 4404

EXT.: 7157

10. COMMENTS

89's on file in medical office - per telephone conversation 16 May 63

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible] ASSIGNMENT

DATE: JUN 1963

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

[illegible]

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 January 1962

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

3. POSITION TITLE: Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI/Division D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8471

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

☒ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 28 January 1962
STATION: Panama City, Panama
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: Official State Department
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: NONE
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 - L Building
EXT.: 4464

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[illegible]

DATE: [illegible] 1962

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 October 1960

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Harvey, William K.

3. POSITION TITLE: Division Chief

4. GRADE: GS-18

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI Staff, Division D

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 8471

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD: 28 October 1960
STATION: Germany and Switzerland
TDY OR PCS: TDY
TYPE OF COVER: State Integree
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: none
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: G.A. Kennedy, Jr.
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1505 L
EXT.: 4464

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Subject departed on another TDY prior to evaluation. However is Qualified for proposed TDY.

DATE: 2 NOV 1960

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I. REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY C.A. KENNEDY, FI/D ADMIN

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): HARVEY, William K.

2. DATE: 9 April 1960

3. TO POSITION:

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FI/Division D

5. GRADE: GS-18

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☒ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas TDY
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES
AND PROPOSED TDY O/S ASSIGNMENT

14 JUN 1960

Roland

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) HARVEY (First) William (Middle) K.
2. DATE Sept 1957
3. TO POSITION Germany
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/EE/
5. GRADE GS-16

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☒ Overseas PCS

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☒ Overseas PCS
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)
Second tour.

CI 10

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Please notify Corinne L. Hassell, x3041, of results.

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED PCS O/S ASSIGNMENT OCT 9 1957

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Harvey, William King #1

DATE: 8/21/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY FI

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☒ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Non-arduous O.K. for TDY
O/S where medical
facilities are
available.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32 NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-37, WHICH MAY BE USED. (26)

OSO

REPOR[illegible] PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS [illegible] DUTY

31 Jan 51 194

Harvey, William K. WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1 Overseas

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:

Approved for TDY. To report to Medical after TDY

JOHN R. TIETJEN, M.D.

FORM NO. 37-32
DEC 1948

14-00000

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME HARVEY, WILLIAM K.	NATURE OF ACTION E.O.D.
TITLE OF POSITION Intelligence Officer	GRADE P-7
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Departmental	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position. 10 May 1948

RECOMMENDATIONS:

2 February 1949
DATE

John R. Tietjen
SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 38-57
NOV 1945

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

15 December 194 8

Harvey, William C'O WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR

#1

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED: None

Capt., MC

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1947

(1053)

7.ll

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR DUTY

10 [illegible] 194

[illegible] WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL

EXAMINATION ON THIS DATE AND FOUND QUALIFIED FOR
[illegible] Overseas

☒ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (FOR ARMY EM ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED:
None

John R. Tietjen

JOHN R. TIETJEN, CAPT MC

FORM NO. 37-32
JAN 1947

[illegible]

Standard Form 57—June 1946
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 50-R046

INSTRUCTIONS.—Answer every question below clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. If you are applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination read the examination announcement carefully and follow its instructions. Mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

1. Name of examination, or kind of position applied for.

2. Optional subject (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for:
C.I.O.

4. Mr. Mrs. Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
William King Harvey

5. Street and number or R. D. number
2627 39th Street N.W.

City or post office (including postal zone) and State
Washington, D. C.

6. Legal or voting residence (State) 7. Office phone No. Home phone.
Kentucky OR 2914

8. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S. name city and country).
Danville, Indiana

9. Date of birth (month, day, year) 10. Age last birthday. 11. ☒ Male ☐ Female
9/13/15 31

12. ☒ Married ☐ Single 13. Height without shoes 5 feet 11 inches Weight: 185 pounds

14. Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
If now employed by the Federal Government, give present grade and date of last change in grade

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Approved ☐ Disapproved	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered register
Notations		App. Review: Approved

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 points (tent.)	
			☐ 10 points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Discl.	
			☐ Being investigated	
INITIALS AND DATE				

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column	YES	NO
15. (a) Would you accept short term appointment, if offered, for— 1 to 3 months?		X
3 to 6 months?		X
6 to 12 months?		X
(b) Would you accept appointment, if offered— in Washington, D. C.?	X	
anywhere in the United States?	X	
outside the United States?	X	

15. (c) If you will accept appointment in certain locations ONLY, give acceptable locations:

(d) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept per year. CAF 13 P 6
You will not be considered for positions paying less.

(e) If you are willing to travel, specify ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly

16. EXPERIENCE.—You are requested to furnish all information asked for below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to determine your qualifications for the position for which you are applying. In the spaces provided below describe EVERY position you have held. Use a separate block for EACH position. You may also include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Start with your PRESENT position and work back, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Explain clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position. Describe your experience in the Armed Services in question 17 (Military Experience).
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 4 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (Month, year) From. To present time

Exact title of your present position:

Salary or earnings. Starting, $ per Present, $ per

Place of employment (city and State).

Description of your work:

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division.

Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, mfr. of locks, etc.)

Number and kind of employees supervised by you:

Name and title of immediate supervisor:

Reason for desiring to change employment:

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16—47330-3

18 CONTINUED

Dates of employment (month, year) From 12/9/40 To 8/22/47
Place of employment (city and State) Washington, D. C. N.Y., N.Y., Pittsburgh, Pa.,
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: FBI - Dept. of Justice
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of ...): Law Enforcement-counter Intelligence
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: various
Name and title of immediate supervisor: D. N. Ladd
Reason for leaving: voluntary
Exact title of your position: Special Agent & Supervisor
Salary or earnings: Starting $3200 per annum Final $7000 per annum
Description of your work: Supervision of Counter-Intelligence operation

Dates of employment (month, year) From 9/37 To 12/40
Place of employment (city and State) Maysville, Ky
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Self
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of ...): Practice of Law
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor: None
Reason for leaving: Voluntary
Exact title of your position: Attorney-at-law
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work: General Practice of Law

Dates of employment (month, year) From 6/31 To 9/33
Place of employment (city and State) Dansville, Indiana
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division: Danville Gazette Danville, Indiana
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of ...): Newspaper
Number and kind of employees supervised by you: None
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Alvin Hall, Editor
Reason for leaving: Voluntary
Exact title of your position: Reporter & Printer
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work: General Newspaper Publishing business

Dates of employment (month, year) From To
Place of employment (city and State)
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person) If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division:
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of ...):
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Name and title of immediate supervisor:
Reason for leaving:
Exact title of your position:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ per Final $ per
Description of your work:

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING: In order to make the [illegible] If you [illegible] special or technical schools while in the service, write in item (a) "No attending [illegible] schools" and indicate in item (c) all important [illegible] duty assignment, showing dates of such assignments.

(a) First Special Service School attended: NONE

(b) What were you taught in first Special Service School?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(c) Duty assignment or rating after this training (give all important changes in duty assignment whether or not you attended a Service School):

(d) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

(e) Second special Service School attended:

(f) What were you taught in Second special Service School?

Location:

Dates attended (months, years):

From: To:

Rating received at end of this training:

(g) Duty assignment after this training:

(h) What did you do during this duty assignment?

Dates of duty assignment (months, years):

From: To:

List on a separate sheet of paper any additional experience, training, service, or special duty assignments during military service or hospitalization

18. EDUCATION.—Circle highest grade completed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Mark (x) the appropriate box to indicate satisfactory completion of

☐ Elementary School ☐ Junior High School ☒ Senior High School

(a) Give name and location of last high school attended: Wiley High School Terre Haute, Indiana

(b) Subjects studied in high school which apply to position desired:

(c) Name and Location of College or University	Major	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night	Degrees Conferred Title	Degrees Conferred Date	Semester Hours Credit
Indiana University Bloomington, Indiana	LAW	1933	1937	6		LLB	9/37	180

(d) List Your Chief Undergraduate College Subjects	Semester Hours	List Your Chief Graduate College Subjects	Semester Hours
Journalism	20	Law	95
Phil & Psych	20		

(e) Other training, such as vocational, business, study courses given through the Armed Forces Institute (show name and location of school), or "in service training" in a Federal agency:

Subjects Studied	Dates Attended From—	Dates Attended To—	Years Completed Day	Years Completed Night

19. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair
German			x						

(a) How was your knowledge of foreign languages acquired?

Study

(b) If you have traveled or resided in any foreign countries, indicate (1) names of countries (2) dates and length of time spent there and (3) reason or purpose (e. g., business, education, recreation)

20. List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as operation of short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices:

Approximate number of words per minute in typing 50 shorthand

21. Are you now or have you ever been a licensed or certified member of any trade or profession, such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)

☒ Yes ☐ No Give kind of license and State Attorney

First license or certificate (year) '37 at Law - Ind. & Ky

Latest license or certificate (year) '47

22. Give any other information not covered elsewhere in your application such as:
(a) your more important publications (do NOT submit copies unless requested)
(b) your patents or inventions
(c) public speaking and public relations experience
(d) membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.

23. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. B. F. Small	Sycamore Bldg-Terre Haute, Indiana	Atty
2. E. L. Zeigler	Cochran Bldg., Maysville, Ky.	Atty
3. A. M. Thurston	C.I.O.- Washington, D. C.	

24. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States?	X	
26. Do you advocate or have you ever advocated, or are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X
27. Within the past 12 months, have you habitually used intoxicating beverages to excess?		X
28. Since your 16th birthday, have you ever been convicted, or fined, or imprisoned, or placed on probation, or have you ever been ordered to deposit bail for the violation of any law, police regulation or ordinance (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed)? If your answer is "Yes" list all such cases under Item 38 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken.		X
29. Have you ever been discharged or forced to resign for misconduct or unsatisfactory service from any position? If your answer is "Yes" give in Item 38 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.		X
30. Do you receive an annuity from the U. S. or D. C. Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 38 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating if retired from military or naval service.		X
31. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? If your answer is "Yes" give details in Item 38.		X
32. Does the U. S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 6 months? If your answer is "Yes" show in Item 38 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address, (3) relationship, (4) department or agency by whom employed, and (5) kind of appointment.		X
33. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
34. Have you ever had tuberculosis? If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 38.		X

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
35. Have you any physical defect or disability whatsoever? If your answer is "Yes" give complete details in Item 38.		X
36. (a) Were you ever in the United States Military or Naval Service during time of War?		X
(b) Is the word "honorable" or the word "satisfactory" used in your discharge or separation papers to show the type of your discharge or separation?		
(c) Was service performed on an active full time basis, with full military pay and allowances?		

(d)

Date of entry or entries into service:	Date of separation or separations:
Branch of service (Army, Navy, M. C., C. G., etc.)	Serial No. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation.)

IF YOUR ANSWERS TO THIS QUESTION (No. 36) INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VETERAN PREFERENCE, SUCH PREFERENCE WILL BE CREDITED IN THE EXAMINATION. IF APPOINTED, YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER PRIOR TO ENTRY ON DUTY, OFFICIAL EVIDENCE OF SEPARATION FROM YOUR LATEST PERIOD OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES DURING TIME OF WAR. DO NOT SUBMIT PROOF OF DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION WITH THIS APPLICATION.

Indicate "Yes" or "No" answer by placing X in proper column.	YES	NO
37. (a) If you served in the U. S. Military or Naval Service during peacetime ONLY, did you participate in a campaign or expedition and receive a campaign badge or service ribbon?		
(b) Are you a disabled veteran?		X
(c) Are you the unmarried widow of a veteran?		X
(d) Are you the wife of a veteran who has service-connected disability?		X

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 37 (a), (b), (c), OR (d) IS "YES" AND YOU WISH TO CLAIM VETERAN PREFERENCE, ATTACH TO THIS APPLICATION VETERAN PREFERENCE CLAIM (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FORM 14) TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PROOF SPECIFIED THEREIN.

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 36 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19....

Agency .... Title ....

38. Space for detailed answers to other questions (indicate item numbers to which answers apply).

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS APPLICATION IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW (U. S. CODE, TITLE 18, SECTION 80)

I certify that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date ....

Signature of applicant ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name, as "Mary L. Doe.")

GPO 16—17253-1

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS COMPLETELY. IF QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY WRITE "NOT APPLICABLE". WRITE "UNKNOWN" ONLY IF YOU DO NOT KNOW THE ANSWER AND CANNOT OBTAIN THE ANSWER FROM PERSONAL RECORDS. USE A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER FOR EXTRA DETAILS ON ANY QUESTION OR QUESTIONS FOR WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT ROOM. ATTACH TWO RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PICTURES TO THIS FORM. DATE TAKEN WRITTEN ON THE BACK OF EACH. TYPE, PRINT OR WRITE CAREFULLY; ILLEGIBLE OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL NOT RECEIVE CONSIDERATION

HAVE YOU READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS? YES ☒ NO ☐

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

NAME MR. ☒ MISS ☐ MRS. ☐ FIRST: William MIDDLE: King LAST: Harvey TELEPHONE: OR 2914

PRESENT ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: 2627 39th Street N.W. CITY: Washington, STATE: D. C. COUNTRY: U.S.A.

LEGAL RESIDENCE STREET AND NUMBER: Maysville CITY: Kentucky STATE: COUNTRY: U.S.A.

NICKNAMES: None

OTHER NAMES THAT YOU HAVE USED: None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? None

HOW LONG? None

IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (WHERE, WHEN AND BY WHAT AUTHORITY): None

DATE OF BIRTH: 9/13/15

PLACE OF BIRTH CITY: Danville, STATE: Indiana COUNTRY: U.S.A.

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: US

ACQUIRED BY: BIRTH ☒ MARRIAGE ☐ NATURALIZATION ☐

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NUMBER: DATE ISSUED: NAME OF COURT:

LOCATION OF COURT CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

PREVIOUS CITIZENSHIP: None DATE HELD FROM: TO:

OTHER CITIZENSHIPS (GIVE PARTICULARS): None

STEPS TAKEN TO CHANGE PRESENT NATIONALITY (GIVE PARTICULARS): None

LAST U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER: None DATE: - PLACE OF ISSUE: -

ALL OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS YOU HAVE HAD (GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES): None

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: None

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN THIS COUNTRY: - PORT OF ENTRY: - PASSPORT OF COUNTRY: -

LAST U.S. VISA NUMBER: - TYPE: - DATE: - PLACE OF ISSUE: -

SECTION 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	EYES	HAIR
31	M	5'	185	Green	Blonde

COMPLEXION: Fair

SCARS: Triangular scar rt. cheek

BUILD: Medium stocky

OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: mustache

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1946



SECTION 3. MARITAL STATUS

MARRIED ☒ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ SINGLE ☐ DIVORCED ☐ — DATE OF SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: - PLACE: -

REASON FOR SEPARATION OR DIVORCE: -

NOTE: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND AND GIVE DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

NAME OF WIFE OR HUSBAND: FIRST Elizabeth Howe MIDDLE (FOR WIFE, MAIDEN) McIntire LAST Harvey — DATE OF MARRIAGE: 4/4/34

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Bloomington, Indiana — (HIS OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE: STREET AND NUMBER / CITY / STATE Flemingsburg, Kentucky COUNTRY U.S.A.

LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐ — DATE OF DECEASE: - CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER 2627 39th Street N.W. CITY Washington, D. C. STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 2/3/16 — PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY Flemingsburg, STATE Kentucky COUNTRY U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY STATE - COUNTRY -

OCCUPATION: Housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: War Department - MDW - 1942-'44

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER Pentagon Bldg CITY Washington D. C. STATE COUNTRY USA

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE: FROM: - TO: - BRANCH OF SERVICE: - COUNTRY: -

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): See above, War Dept., MDW - Washington, D. C. 1942-1944

SECTION 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (INCLUDE PARTIAL DEPENDENTS)

NAME RELATIONSHIP NONE AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER NONE CITY STATE COUNTRY

NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY

SECTION 5. PARENTS

NOTE: FOR STEPFATHER, STEPMOTHER AND/OR GUARDIAN, GIVE THE SAME INFORMATION AS REQUIRED BELOW ON SEPARATE SHEET

NAME OF FATHER: FIRST Drennan MIDDLE R. (only) LAST Harvey — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: 7/25/16 — CAUSE: Spinal Meningitis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER S. Tennessee St. CITY Danville, STATE Indiana COUNTRY U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1888 — PLACE OF BIRTH: Danville CITY Indiana STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY STATE - COUNTRY

OCCUPATION: Attorney — LAST EMPLOYER: Self

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER Danville CITY Indiana STATE COUNTRY U.S.A.

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED)

SECTION 5. PARENTS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2)

DATE OF MILITARY SERVICE: FROM: None TO: - BRANCH OR SERVICE: - COUNTRY: -

OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

NAME OF MOTHER: Sara — FIRST: Jewel — MAIDEN: King — LAST: Harvey — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: - CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 607½ South Center Street — CITY: Terre Haute, — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

DATE OF BIRTH: 1890 — PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: Danville — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY: STATE: - COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: Professor — LAST EMPLOYER: Indiana State Teachers College

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: Terre Haute, — STATE: Indiana — COUNTRY: U.S.A.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN (GIVE DETAILS): None

SECTION 6. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (INCLUDING HALF-, STEP-, AND ADOPTED BROTHERS AND SISTERS)

NAME: FIRST: None MIDDLE: LAST:

PRESENT ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

NAME: FIRST: None MIDDLE: LAST:

PRESENT ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

NAME: FIRST: MIDDLE: LAST:

PRESENT ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE: COUNTRY:

SECTION 7. PARENTS-IN-LAW

NAME OF FATHER-IN-LAW: FIRST: James — MIDDLE: Marvin — LAST: McIntire, Sr. — LIVING ☒ DECEASED ☐

DATE OF DECEASE: - CAUSE: -

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 480 Mt. Carmel Avenue — CITY: Flemingsburg, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 1880 — PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: Fleming County, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: usa

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY: STATE: - COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: Attorney — LAST EMPLOYER: Self

NAME OF MOTHER-IN-LAW: FIRST: Nannie — MAIDEN: Ross — LAST: McIntire — LIVING ☐ DECEASED ☒

DATE OF DECEASE: 1942 — CAUSE: Arteris-scleroscis

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: STREET AND NUMBER: 480 Mt. Carmel Avenue — CITY: Flemingsburg, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

DATE OF BIRTH: 1886 — PLACE OF BIRTH: CITY: Fleming County, — STATE: Kentucky — COUNTRY: USA

CITIZENSHIP: USA — DATE ACQUIRED: Birth — WHERE ACQUIRED: CITY: STATE: - COUNTRY:

OCCUPATION: Housewife — LAST EMPLOYER: ———

SECTION 8. RELATIVES

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO LIVE ABROAD, ARE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A FOREIGN POWER, ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ARE MARRIED TO NON-CITIZENS.

NAME: NONE
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NAME: NONE
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION: NONE

NAME:
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY:
REASON FOR LISTING UNDER THIS QUESTION:

NOTE: INDICATE BELOW THE RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, IN MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE (UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN)

NAME: Dwight Harvey
RELATIONSHIP: Cousin
AGE: 45 approx.
CITIZENSHIP: USA-Birth
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY: Not known to me as present
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN): Colonel - U.S. Army

NAME:
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

NAME:
RELATIONSHIP:
AGE:
CITIZENSHIP:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE COUNTRY:
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN):

SECTION 9. EDUCATION

SCHOOL: Public Schools
ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY: Danville, Indiana
Terre Haute, Indiana USA
DATES ATTENDED FROM: 1921 TO: 1928
DEGREE: 8 yrs. Elementary Credit

SCHOOL: Wiley High School
ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY: Terre Haute, Indiana USA
DATES ATTENDED FROM: 1928 TO: 1931
DEGREE: H.S. Diploma

COLLEGE: Indiana University
ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY: Bloomington Indiana USA
DATES ATTENDED FROM: 1933 TO: 1937
DEGREE: LLB with Distinction (2 yrs. credit)

COLLEGE: -
ADDRESS CITY STATE COUNTRY: - -
DATES ATTENDED FROM: - TO: -
DEGREE: -

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE S[illegible]US [illegible]NTINUED TO PAGE 5)

SECTION 10. SELECTIVE SERVICE STATUS

CLASSIFICATION II-A- IV-A	ORDER NUMBER 1194	APPROXIMATE INDUCTION DATE None	BOARD NUMBER K 113

ADDRESS OF BOARD STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE
Maysville, Mason County, Kentucky USA

IF DEFERRED, STATE REASON
Yes, 1940-1947 Special Agent- FBI- US Dept of Justice

SECTION 11. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE - UNITED STATES OR FOREIGN

COUNTRY USA	SERVICE FBI-US D of J	SERVICE DATES	FROM: 12/9/40	TO: 8/22/47

GRADE Special Agent	SERIAL NUMBER ————	TYPE OF DISCHARGE Voluntary Resignation

LAST STATION Washington, D. C.	COMMANDING OFFICER ————

REMARKS:

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (USE ADDITIONAL SHEET IF NECESSARY)

NOTE: INCLUDE BELOW PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESS AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE LAST 5 POSITIONS AND COVER AT LEAST 15 YEARS.

EMPLOYER: R. H. King Construction Co.
JOB TITLE: Laborer
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: Danville, Indiana
KIND OF BUSINESS: Bridge Construction
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Construction Worker
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: R. H. King
DATES COVERED FROM: 5/26 TO: 9/26
SALARY: $10 PER: week
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Return to school

EMPLOYER: Danville Gazette
JOB TITLE: Reporter & Printer
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: Danville Indiana
KIND OF BUSINESS: Newspaper
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Editoral and Mechanical Work
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Alvin Hall, Editor
DATES COVERED FROM: 1931 TO: 1933
SALARY: $10-$15 PER: week
REASONS FOR LEAVING: To Enter University

EMPLOYER: Indiana University
JOB TITLE: Publicity Writer
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: Bloomington Indiana
KIND OF BUSINESS: See above
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Writing Athletic Publicity
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: Various
DATES COVERED FROM: Partime 1934 TO: 1935
SALARY: $10-(Approx) PER: week
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Voluntary Resignation

EMPLOYER: Self
JOB TITLE: Attorney-at-law
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER CITY STATE: 210 Covert Street Maysville Ky.
KIND OF BUSINESS: Practice of Law

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 6)

SECTION 12. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5)

YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: General Legal Practice
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: None
DATES COVERED FROM: 1937 TO: 1940
SALARY: $1500-$2200 PER: year
REASONS FOR LEAVING: To enter FBI

EMPLOYER: Federal Bureau of Investigation
JOB TITLE: Special Agent & Supervisor
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: Department of Justice Bldg. CITY: Washington, STATE: D. C.
KIND OF BUSINESS: Law Enforcement and counter intelligence
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY: Counter-Intelligence
NAME OF SUPERVISOR: J. Edgar Hoover
DATES COVERED FROM: 12/9/40 TO: 8/22/47
SALARY: $3200-$7000 PER: Annum
REASONS FOR LEAVING: Voluntary Resignation

EMPLOYER:
JOB TITLE:
ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER: CITY: STATE:
KIND OF BUSINESS:
YOUR DUTIES AND SPECIALITY:
NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATES COVERED FROM: TO:
SALARY: PER:
REASONS FOR LEAVING:

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW GIVE DETAILS CONCERNING ANY POSITION FROM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED OR WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LEFT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE NOT ENTIRELY FAVORABLE.

DETAILS: Absolutely None

SECTION 13. CHARACTER REFERENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
D. F. Newell	Jersey Ridge Rd.	Maysville,	Ky.
B. F. Small, Atty	Sycamore Bldg.	Terre Haute	Indiana
J. H. Finch, Sr.	Bank of Maysville	Maysville,	Ky.
Harry Stewart	Chief of Police PD	Maysville,	Ky.
E. L. Zeigler, Atty	Cochran Bldg.	Maysville,	KY

SECTION 14. SOCIAL ACQUAINTENCES-FIVE IN THE UNITED STATES (GIVE BUSINESS ADDRESS WHERE POSSIBLE)

NAME	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE
A. H. Thurston	% C.I.G.	Washington,	D. C.
Matthew McGuire	U.S. District Court	Washington,	D. C.
J. A. Bennet, Lt. Col.	Andrews Field,		Maryland
L. Whitson	Room 1734 Dept. of Justice	Washington,	D. C.

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 7)

SECTION 15. NEIGHBORS-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES (AT YOUR LAST NORMAL ADDRESS)

NAME Richard Frear	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2627 39th St. N.W.	CITY Washington,	STATE D. C.
NAME H John Holzberg	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2629 39th St. N.W.	CITY Washington,	STATE D. C.
NAME Richard Gallaher	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2629 39th St. N.W.	CITY Washington,	STATE D. C.

SECTION 16. MISCELLANEOUS

DID YOU EVER HAVE OR DO YOU NOW HAVE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? YES ☐ NO ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES" EXPLAIN BELOW:

DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? In Moderation

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENCE, AND DISPOSITION OF CASE.

NO

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? YES ☐ NO ☒
IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

SECTION 17. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES ☒ NO ☐ IF ANSWER IS "NO", STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME.

NAMES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Peoples Bank of Fleming County, Flemingsburg, Kentucky
State National Bank, Maysville, Kentucky (Acct recently closed)

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN BANKRUPTCY? YES ☐ NO ☒ IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE PARTICULARS:

SECTION 18. CREDIT REFERENCES-THREE IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME Peoples Bank of Fleming County	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Flemingsburg,	CITY Kentucky	STATE
NAME State National Bank	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Maysville,	CITY Kentucky	STATE
NAME J. Garfinckel & Co.	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Washington, D. C.	CITY	STATE

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS

FROM: 3/1942	TO: Date	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2627 39th St. N.W.	CITY Washington,	STATE D. C.	COUNTRY
FROM: 2/1942	TO: 3/1942	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Gracen Court, Center Avenue	CITY Pittsburgh,	STATE Pa.	COUNTRY
FROM: 1/41	TO: 2/1942	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 40-71 Elbertson Street	CITY Elmhurst, L.I.	STATE N.Y.C.	COUNTRY N.Y.

(CONTINUED TO PAGE 8)

SECTION 19. RESIDENCES FOR PAST 15 YEARS (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7)

FROM: 9/1937	TO: 12/1940	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible]	CITY Maysville,	STATE Ky.	COUNTRY USA
FROM: 1933	TO: 1937	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER Various	CITY Bloomington,	STATE Ind.	COUNTRY USA
FROM: 1931	TO: 1933	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER E. Main	CITY Danville	STATE Ind.	COUNTRY USA
FROM: 1928	TO: 1931	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER [illegible] S. Center St.	CITY Terre Haute,	STATE Ind.	COUNTRY USA
FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY

SECTION 20. RESIDENCES OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NONE EXCEPT VISIT CANADA

FROM: (MO. AND YR.)	TO: (MO. AND YR.)	CITY OR SECTION	COUNTRY	PURPOSE
9/40	9/40	Canada	(S.Ste. Marie)	Fish.

SECTION 21. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: IN SPACE BELOW LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ALL KINDS TO WHICH YOU HAVE BELONGED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND LABOR UNIONS. INCLUDE ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR A BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OF WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OR TO WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN SUPPORT.

NAME	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE	COUNTRY
Sigma Chi		Bloomington,	Indiana	USA
Phi Delta Phi		"	"	"
Order of Coif		"	"	"
Rotary International		Maysville	Ky.	USA
Natl. Rifle Association		Various		
Boy Scouts of America		Various		
FBI Recreation Association		Washington, D. C.		

SECTION 22. LANGUAGES-FOREIGN (STATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT", "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	READ	WRITE
German		Slight	

SECTION 23. GENERAL QUALIFICAT[illegible]

INDICATE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OR TRAINING YOU HAVE. ALSO, SET FORTH ANY QUALIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION.

Specialist in counter Intolligence , operations, analysis, and evaluation -

SECTION 24. SPORTS AND HOBBIES

Fishing, hunting, firearms

SECTION 25. EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE

NAME Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey	RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS STREET AND NUMBER 2527 39th Street N.W.	CITY Washington, D. C.	STATE	COUNTRY	TELEPHONE OR 2914

SECTION 26. INFORMATION AND FINAL COMMENTS

NOTE: YOU ARE INFORMED THAT CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED, AND YOU ARE INVITED TO MAKE ANY CHANGES (OR ADDITIONS) IN YOUR STATEMENTS THAT YOU MAY THINK ADVISABLE.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION, IF SO, DESCRIBE, IF NOT, ANSWER, "NO".

NONE

SECTION 27. CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY INTENTIONAL MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR MY IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL.

SIGNED AT ______________ City ______________ State

DATE ______________

______________ Witness

______________ Signature of Applicant

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elisabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Nannie Rose McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elisabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Dronan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Hannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addressee: Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elizabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Nannie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elizabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

SECRET

27 August 1947

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ON WILLIAM KING HARVEY

PERSONAL: Birth: September 13, 1915 Place: Danville, Indiana
Leg Res: Maysville, Kentucky

PARENTAGE: Father: Drenan R. Harvey
Birth: 1888 Place: Danville, Indiana
Mother: Sara Jewel King Harvey
Birth: 1890 Place: Danville, Indiana

RELATIVES ABROAD: None

EDUCATION: Wiley High School, Terre Haute, Indiana
Dates: 1928 to 1931
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937 LLB degree

EXPERIENCE: Danville Gazette - Newspaper, Danville, Indiana
Dates: 1931 to 1933
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana
Dates: 1933 to 1937
Practice of Law, Maysville, Kentucky
Dates: 1937 to 1940
F.B.I., Special Agent
Dates: 1940 to August 22, 1947

MILITARY: None

TRAVEL: Visited Canada for one month in September 1940 on vacation.

MARITAL STATUS: Married to: Elisabeth Howe McIntire Harvey
Birth: February 3, 1916 Place: Flemingsburg, Kentucky
Dependents: None besides wife
Father-in-law: James Marvin McIntire, Sr.
Birth: 1880 Place: Fleming County, Ky.
Mother-in-law: Mamie Ross McIntire - now deceased
Birth: 1886 Place: Fleming County, Ky.

Washington address and telephone number:

2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

Emergency Addresses: Mrs. Elisabeth M. Harvey
2627 - 39th St., N. W.
Washington, D. C. Tel: ORdway 2914

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE

Investigation Report

Date: October 8, 1947

Number: 32814

Subject: HARVEY, William King

To: CPD (2)

1. Investigation directed by: RHC

2. Sources of information: OSO

3. Remarks

4. Recommendation:

SECURITY APPROVAL RECOMMENDED. THOUGH SUBJECT
RECEIPT OF DEROGATORY INFORMATION AT SOME
RE DATE. INTERVIEW WAIVED.
LESS THE APPLICANT ENTERS UPON DUTY WITHIN
DAYS FROM ABOVE DATE. THIS APPROVAL BECOMES
INVALID.

Branch notified of
this appvl. Copy (orig.) sent to
[illegible] 9 Oct. 1947.

By RHC/fm
Security Officer
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

CC: Mr. Judson H. Lightsey

CONFIDENTIAL

CONF

FORM NO. 38-101
DEC 1946

(1794)

MEMORANDUM

Re: William King Harvey

A complete and thorough investigation has been conducted on this employee and he was found suitable for employment in this agency.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, Communications DATE: 8 August 1952
Acting
FROM : Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: HARVEY, William King
32814

In reply to your memorandum this is to advise that subject meets the current requirements for cryptographic clearance and is approved for such duties as of this date.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. Geiss

SECRET

Personal + 3rd Agency Material

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~[illegible]~~ FRONT NATIONALE
(NATIONAL FRONT)
LOOSE DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10:30 19 SEPT 78		PHOEBE ORR	Phoebe C. Orr

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM DATED 20 DECEMBER 1948
(FRONT NATIONALE FRANCE)

THIRD AGENCY

S E C R E T

LONDON

9 August 1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-21

COUNTRY France
SUBJECT Resistance and Labor organization in Normandy; Civilian Attitudes.

ORIGINAL REPORT NO SV-139
DATE OF REPORT 24 July 1944
EVALUATION B-2

CONFIRMATION
SUPPLEMENT
CORRECTION

SOURCE OSS - 3rd Army
SUB SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION Undated
PLACE OF ORIGIN France

NUMBER OF PAGES 2
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AL

1. The Conseil de la Resistance in Cherbourg is composed of three main groups: the O.C.M., Liberation and the Front National:

The Chief of the Conseil de la Resistance, M. Greslin, is an O.C.M. leader and his organization holds the majority of seats in the Conseil. The O.C.M. is generally composed of merchants, landowners and notables who, prior to the armistice, were Rightists or extreme-Rightists.

Liberation, which claims to have been the most active and efficient movement in the Department, is led by and generally composed of Socialists and C.G.T. men. In fact all the Resistance Socialists and Union men are members of Liberation.

As in the rest of France, the Front National is here the Communist Party's resistance organization. It is not as influential here as it is reported to be in other regions.

2. The right hand man to M. Greslin is M. Bocher (Beauchet), who seems to be as well the most prominent labor leader of the department. Bocher is at the same time secretary of the Regional Socialist Federation, secretary of the Merchant Sailor's Union, secretary of the Union des Syndicats, representative of the I.T.F. and head of the local Liberation movement. He is a very efficient man and seems to be respected and esteemed even by his political adversaries.

3. The enthusiasm in favor of the Allies described in the newspapers should not be overestimated. The Norman did not like the Germans and is glad that they have been thrown out. But a very

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 26-780 BOX 160

AID	ONI	G-2	STATE	TREAS.	OWI	FEA	ANS	NC	FCC	JCA		

320487

SECRET

great number of people here are suspicious of Resistance because of the presence of Communists and Socialists. Moreover, they are very reserved towards foreigners as a rule, and they are not sure of what the Allies intend to do. They are also puzzled about the currency which has been introduced. On the part of Labor, there is a sincere enthusiasm for the victories of the democracies somewhat tempered by the way local problems are handled by military authorities. For example, the ~~Army or the Navy~~ have hired dozens of workers to repair the Cherbourg harbor, but ~~they have done it~~ without consulting the unions. (They have Thus) given work to ~~a lot of~~ former Todt workers, more or less reliable, while skilled workers who were in Resistance Movement are left unemployed. Instances of this kind are frequent.

SECRET

[illegible]

[redacted]

Report No. T-459

Report from [illegible]

[illegible]

Distribution: [illegible]

Information Date: 7-10 December 194[illegible]
Report Date: 18 December 194[illegible]
Dissemination Date: 2 January 194[illegible]
Value: B-2
Source: [illegible]

File [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible] is in full [illegible] [illegible] The [illegible] of [illegible] political [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible] place [illegible] [illegible] both the [illegible] are [illegible] [illegible] difficult to estimate [illegible] [illegible] to be about equal [illegible]

[illegible] according to [illegible] has [illegible] of [illegible] He pointed out [illegible] [illegible] in 1939, of [illegible] were Socialists [illegible]; he stated that if elections were held [illegible] the Socialists [illegible]

[illegible] that the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and that since the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] political [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] to replace the [illegible] [illegible] He states [illegible] will [illegible] be accomplished, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] organization and [illegible]

[illegible] in private conversation, and [illegible] Socialist [illegible] in a speech before the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] people [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] or the [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] without [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

6. [illegible]

7. [illegible]

8. [illegible]

9. [illegible]

10. [illegible]

11. [illegible]

that the CGT [illegible] not maintaining a sufficiently independent and oppositional attitude.

12. Regarding relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, [illegible] Soldani, member of the [illegible] Fédéral of the party for the Var and member of the MLN, expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the MLN now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the socialists of the MLN with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great rejuvenated Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on this subject, [illegible] took explosive exception to an insinuation by [illegible], member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the MLN were simply a group of arrivistes who were trying to take advantage of the situation to seize political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voted its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and approved also a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to [illegible], secretary of the Toulon section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the Var. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. [illegible], president [illegible] member of the [illegible], related that the Communists have gained many new followers in the Var since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims this is due to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy and also from their young, vigorous leaders as compared with the Socialists [illegible] leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. [illegible] asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter – as he put it – place party interests above the national interests.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasons [illegible] as follows: the elections were scheduled before the [illegible] of the [illegible] by the Allies and [illegible] population [illegible] that [illegible] the country [illegible]. [illegible] the Allies [illegible] recognized the de Gaulle Government the pressing need for [illegible] no longer exists. Besides, it would not be fair [illegible] three million prisoners and deportees [illegible] to the polls. According to [illegible], however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing [illegible] strength which they [illegible] in the various departments.

[illegible]

mental and local liberation committees. [illegible], M. [illegible] indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was not in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. (Aragon may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the [illegible] as well as for the [illegible].) Etienne Allegre, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both [illegible] and [illegible] criticized the [illegible] of the Var, M. [illegible], for not being [illegible] enough in his handling of the details of the department, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. [illegible] praised [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the sous-prefecture at Toulon and that he has not broken away from the old habits of the plodding permanent fonctionnaire.

19. [illegible] described Admiral [illegible], [illegible] of Toulon, as a [illegible] of the old tradition – along with the great majority of high naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegre, the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 1[illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of [illegible].

21. Mouvement Republicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about [illegible] months ago. The officers are: [illegible], president; M. [illegible], secretary; M. [illegible], treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of formation; [illegible] hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. [illegible] claims a membership in the Toulon section of [illegible] but this appears to be an exaggeration. [illegible] stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le [illegible], published in Marseille, has a local circulation of [illegible]. This Toulon edition was started [illegible].

22. The Union Feminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) is the women's adjunct of the MRP at Toulon. [illegible] is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote. [illegible] series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 December 1944 has been organized by the UFCS.

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are [illegible] as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from one brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. [illegible] and [illegible], of the PS, is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the PCF and the PS in the Var [illegible] after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the Department of the Gard. On the other hand, Arrighi, of the PCF, points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the PS, because they see in this an attempt

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] of the [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible]. However, [illegible] [redacted] are still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] at length [illegible] of the [illegible] not Communists [illegible] the positions of responsibility in [illegible] or held by Communists.

25. [illegible] according to [illegible], representative of the [illegible] in the [illegible] members of the [illegible] October 194[illegible], [illegible] members in 19[illegible]. [illegible] one of the most urgent [illegible] before the [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] of salaries. [illegible] workers are too highly paid [illegible] compared to the salaries of [illegible] skilled workers in other trades. This [illegible] created by the Germans who paid very well in order to [illegible] labor in certain high [illegible]. For example, workers in the building trades [illegible] getting up to 30 francs per hour, while skilled ajusteurs on [illegible] earn only 12 francs per hour. [illegible] points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the high levels established by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore the [illegible] is faced with the delicate task of working at the [illegible] time for the [illegible] to a certain extent [illegible] some salaries and the raising of others.

[illegible] and Military [illegible]

26. [illegible] Colonel [illegible] Derrat, [illegible] headquarters [illegible] about 7 km [illegible] of [illegible], at the [illegible] a [illegible] private estate formerly occupied by the [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible].

27. [illegible] commanding [illegible] four [illegible] of the [illegible] of the 15th Military Region [illegible], Hautes Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes [illegible] by Regional Commissioner [illegible] placed under the command of [illegible] official, [illegible] under the [illegible] of the 15th Military Region, [illegible] collaborationists and black marketeers [illegible] political prisoners [illegible]

28. [illegible] that he [illegible] and [illegible] in spite of circumstances, [illegible] inspection tour of the quarters, however, [illegible] the military [illegible] of the Colonel [illegible].

29. [illegible] that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the

29 [illegible] stated [illegible] blanc -- elements of [illegible] been reported [illegible] but as [illegible] elements [illegible] circulating in [illegible] in Toulon to [illegible]. Thus [illegible] do 27 [illegible] for all [illegible]

30 [illegible], who was formerly [illegible] chief of the [illegible] Intelligence, [illegible] still a member of the [illegible], claims [illegible] for the [illegible] in [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] were [illegible] civilians [illegible] their spare time to [illegible].

31. [illegible] According to [illegible] Colonel [illegible], [illegible] of the [illegible] in the [illegible] at [illegible] command of Colonel [illegible] complete [illegible], and is prepar[illegible] shortly for the front to join the [illegible]. In Toulon, [illegible] formed on [illegible] one of the [illegible]

[illegible] Relations

32 [illegible] sailors stationed in [illegible] report [illegible] principally [illegible]. The feeling [illegible] general among [illegible] at Toulon [illegible] the French would [illegible] possible

33 [illegible] their side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful [illegible] bombing of Toulon, which [illegible] long [illegible] food [illegible] the civilian population [illegible], about [illegible], veterans of the last war [illegible] requisitioned for [illegible] were sold at [illegible]

34 [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible] diplomatic representation [illegible] the possibility of [illegible] a new French [illegible], the [illegible] Government.

35. [illegible] also [illegible] people [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] In that connection, he stated that [illegible] no confidence [illegible] the [illegible] regime.

[illegible] Situation

36. [illegible] [illegible] suffered heavily from [illegible] the [illegible] but [illegible] as [illegible] in the center of town [illegible] the [illegible] Bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 36,[illegible] houses [illegible] entirely destroyed 1,[illegible] damaged [illegible] since it is [illegible] difficult to obtain building [illegible] houses which [illegible] partially [illegible] of the [illegible] people [illegible] living [illegible] friends and relatives [illegible] from the [illegible] normal population of [illegible] of [illegible] it has risen to [illegible]

37. [illegible] of building material [illegible]

8,[illegible] tiles [illegible] for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of [illegible]
5,[illegible] tons of [illegible]
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,[illegible] square [illegible] of window panes.

[illegible] roofing [illegible]

38. [illegible] conditions in [illegible] being [illegible] children, [illegible] to [illegible] children of [illegible] 6 [illegible] 1,5[illegible] [illegible] distributed [illegible]

39. [illegible] fact [illegible] of [illegible] there [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible] 100 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] however, people [illegible] to [illegible] the food [illegible] with the [illegible] place.

41. [illegible] supply are [illegible]. The streets [illegible] editorial [illegible]

- - - - - - - - - -

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]	Secretary	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] ([illegible])
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] Sports, [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] et [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible], jardins [illegible] [illegible] des [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible] Nationale
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible]	Union [illegible] Femmes [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] de la [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	([illegible])
[illegible]	[illegible] [illegible] et [illegible]	[illegible]

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Report from France

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Notes on Toulon

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[illegible] Oct [illegible]

Notes on Toulon

1. [illegible] is in full political [illegible], with [illegible] toward the elections [illegible] for next [illegible]. The Communists and Socialists are the [illegible] of the [illegible] political parties, and their strength must be [illegible] divided. The Christian Democrats (Mouvement Republicain Populaire) are lagging [illegible] place [illegible] the Radical-Socialists [illegible] very [illegible]. As for the [illegible] organizations, both the [illegible] (Mouvement de Liberation Nationale) and [illegible] (Front National) are [illegible] strong [illegible] in the public eye. It is difficult to estimate the extent of their popular following [illegible] their leaders [illegible] unwilling to [illegible] any figures [illegible] but both appear to be about equal in strength to the [illegible] Communists.

2. Socialist Party. According to Mr. [illegible], [illegible] of the Toulon [illegible], the Socialist Party has [illegible] registered members in Toulon (as compared with [illegible]) [illegible] in the department of the Var (as compared with [illegible] before the war). He pointed out that the Var was traditionally a Socialist stronghold: in 1939, of [illegible] conseillers generaux, [illegible] were Socialists and [illegible] Communists; he stated that if elections were held [illegible], the Socialists [illegible] case [illegible].

3. [illegible] feels that the political situation is confused by the existence of the [illegible] and the [illegible], and that since the work of the resistance is over, these groups should disappear and give way to the political parties. He maintains that the leaders of the [illegible] are motivated by [illegible] of personal interest, their object being to replace the old [illegible] and the old leaders. He states that [illegible] of the Socialist Party with the [illegible] will not be accomplished, and that individual Communists joined the [illegible] simply to [illegible] the [illegible] elements in that organization and [illegible] the influence of the [illegible].

4. [illegible] Mr. [illegible], in private conversation, and [illegible], Socialist [illegible] of Marseille, in a speech before the Congress of the Socialist Federation of the Var at Toulon, [illegible] September 1944, stressed the need for holding [illegible] elections in [illegible]. They pointed out that present [illegible] of [illegible] Liberation [illegible] were not representative of the will of the people [illegible] reflect public opinion. [illegible] said [illegible] proof of popular [illegible] before he could [illegible] considered [illegible]. [illegible] the Comité de Libération [illegible] constituted [illegible] people. [illegible] the [illegible] (almost always a [illegible]), [illegible].

5. [illegible] feels it possible that the [illegible] may [illegible] pressure on the government to [illegible]. [illegible] a [illegible] of the elections [illegible] order in France [illegible] although he does

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not be taken the attention here would seem [illegible] to the [illegible] affairs in [illegible] of [illegible] because of the practically unanimous popular support of General De Gaulle.

6. The Socialists [illegible] a certain [illegible] of the women's vote. They feel that the women are likely to be strongly influenced by the clergy when they go to the polls. Despite this fact, however, the Socialists want the elections to be held next February.

7. The Socialist party was [illegible] on the [illegible] throughout the [illegible] of Toulon, with a [illegible] display of posters and propaganda material, and huge paintings of Leon Blum and Jean Jaures. The Toulon edition of Le Provencal, the Socialist paper published at Marseille, [illegible] the daily [illegible] Le Petit Varois [illegible] a small knot of [illegible]. Frequent meetings of the Toulon Section and of local sub-sections are held.

8. Congress of the Socialist Federation of the Var: The first Socialist Congress of the Department of the Var was held Sunday, [illegible] December, at Toulon, [illegible] the chairmanship of [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] of the party and Mayor of [illegible]. About 300 delegates and [illegible] attended the small hall, each party section in the Department being represented by [illegible] delegates. The meeting lasted all day, with a break for lunch. It was conducted in a serious, business-like manner.

9. The longest debate centered on the question of the activities in the Front National of [illegible], [illegible] of the Socialist deputies of the Var. The Congress unanimously adopted a motion presented by the Bureau Federal whereby [illegible] would be permitted to continue in the Front National on the condition that all his public propaganda appearances were devoted exclusively to the interests of the Socialist Party. As an example of the impossible position in which he was placing himself and the Socialist Party by taking an active part in the leadership of the [illegible], the question of the trade unions was raised; the [illegible] is in favor of the [illegible] unions, the Socialist Party is opposed. [illegible] refused to accept the conditions imposed on him by the Congress, and resigned from the party. At that the Congress unanimously voted a resolution rejecting his resignation and excluding him from the party.

10. There was also lengthy debate on the question of collaboration with the Communist Party, [illegible] though a motion in favor of opening discussions [illegible] the departmental level with a view toward achieving unity between the two parties was killed. However, a motion was finally voted unanimously approving the continuation of discussions on the [illegible] national level [illegible] of the working class, and expressing the desire of the Socialists for harmonious relations with the Communists. The [illegible] to be anti-Communist but expected, in return, that the Communists would not be anti-Socialist.

11. During the debate, there was sharp criticism of the conditions forced against the Socialists in the [illegible] and the local Comite de Liberation by the Communists through the [illegible]. It was [illegible]

that the CGT was not maintaining a sufficiently independent and apolitical attitude.

12. In discussing relations of the Socialist Party with resistance groups, M. Soldani, member of the Bureau Federal of the party for the Var and member of the MLN, expressed his deep regret over the fact that fusion between the Socialist Party and the MLN now seems impossible. He said he had hoped this fusion of the socialists of the MLN with the best elements of the Socialist Party would constitute a great regenerated Socialist Party of the future. During the debate on the subject he took vigorous, almost explosive exception to an insinuation by [illegible], member of the Bureau Directeur of the party, that the leaders of the MLN were simply a group of arrivistes who were trying to take advantage of the situation to gain political power.

13. As for foreign policy, the Congress expressed itself as opposed to the hegemony of any one great power, whether it be Britain, the United States or Russia, and in favor of a system of collective security, with all the democratic nations of the world equally represented in an international association of nations. This association should have its own army, credit, transport, etc. in order to be able to guarantee the peace. Regarding the treatment of Germany, the Congress voiced its opposition to any dismemberment of the country, but approved a long occupation with a severe allied control of all German industry and commerce and a long-range program for the reeducation of German youth.

14. Communist Party. According to M. [illegible], secretary of the Toulon section of the Socialist Party, the Communists claim to have 4,000 registered members in the Var. Communist leaders interviewed declined to quote any figures.

15. M. Pothier, prominent Communist member of MLN, maintains that the Communists have gained many new followers in the Var since the war, at the expense of the Socialists. He claims that this results to a large extent from the Communists' nationalist policy and also from their young, vigorous leaders, as compared with the Socialists who still have the same leaders representing the old regime. He stated that the policy of the Communist Party would remain nationalist in the future; that it would be difficult to return to a revolutionary program.

16. Pothier asserted that the Communists get along better with the Christian Democrats than with the Socialists, since the latter - as he put it - place party interests above the national interest.

17. The Communists are opposed to the holding of elections next February. Their reasoning, ostensibly, is as follows: the elections were scheduled before the recognition of the Provisional Government by the Allies as a means of holding a popular referendum and thus showing the Allies that De Gaulle and the country [illegible] him. Now that the Allies have recognized the De Gaulle government, the pressing need for immediate elections no longer exists. Besides, it would be only fair to wait for the return of the three million prisoners and deportees before proceeding to the polls. According to M. [illegible] of MLN, however, the real reason the Communists are opposed to the elections is their fear of losing some of the strength which they now hold on the various depart-

[illegible]

mental and local liberation committees. Incidentally, M. [illegible] himself indicated his personal opposition to the holding of elections at the present time, since the women's vote constituted an experiment and he was not in favor of conducting such experiments while France was still at war. ([illegible] may well feel that to hold elections now would mean a loss of strength for the MLN as well as for the Communists.) Etienne Allegre, Communist municipal delegate, stated flatly that he believed the elections would be postponed, although the party is making its plans so as to have everything in readiness in case the elections are held in February.

18. Both Allegre and Pothier criticized the prefect of the Var, M. [illegible], for not being vigorous enough in his handling of the affairs of the department, particularly the procurement of adequate food supplies. Pothier praised [illegible] for his personal courage and for his active participation in resistance activities but pointed out that he was formerly secretary of the sous-prefecture at Toulon and that he had not broken away from the old habits of the plodding government fonctionnaire.

19. Pothier described Admiral Lambert, Prefet Maritime of Toulon, as a reactionary of the old tradition - along with the great majority of higher naval officers at the Toulon naval base.

20. According to Allegre, the Toulon edition of Rouge-Midi, the Communist paper published in Marseille, has a daily circulation of 1[illegible],000 and a Sunday circulation of 15,000.

21. Mouvement Republicain Populaire: The Toulon section of the MRP was formed about one month ago. The officers are: M. Labrosse, president; M. Jouzian, attorney, secretary; M. Cornier, worker at the Naval Arsenal, treasurer. A departmental federation of the MRP is in the process of organization; Labrosse hopes to have it organized before the end of the year. Labrosse claims a membership in the Toulon section of 1,000 - but this appears to be an exaggeration. Labrosse stated that the Toulon edition of the Christian Democrat newspaper, Le Meridional, published at Marseille, has a local circulation of 2,000. This Toulon edition was started two weeks ago.

22. The Union Feminine Civique et Sociale (UFCS) is the women's adjunct of the MRP at Toulon. As in Paris, the MRP in Toulon is making serious efforts to capture the women's vote. A series of three free weekly political lectures, starting 13 December 1944 has been organized by the UFCS.

23. Radical-Socialist Party: It is universally stated that the Radical-Socialists are practically absent as a political force in the Var. No party headquarters has been established in Toulon, and aside from the brief newspaper announcement, no sign of any Radical-Socialist activity was discovered.

24. MLN and PS. Pothier, of the PS, is optimistic over the possibility of fusion between the MLN and the PS in the Var echelon after the agreement just reached between the two groups in the department of the Gard. On the other hand, [illegible], of the MLN, points out that many members of his organization are hesitant about uniting with the PS, because they see in this an attempt

on the part of the FN to absorb the MLN. However, he states that discussions are still continuing between the two groups. [illegible] asserts that although many members of the FN are not Communists, all the positions of responsibility in that organization are held by Communists.

25. CGT. According to M. Bessone, representative of the CGT on the CDL, there were [illegible] registered members of the CGT in the Var on 1 December 1944, as compared with 24,907 members in 1937. Bessone considers one of the most urgent problems before the CGT in the Var to be that of the stabilization of salaries. Some workers are too highly paid (this in comparison to the salaries of equally skilled workers in other trades). This state of affairs was created by the Germans who paid very well in order to attract labor to certain high-priority jobs. For example, workers in the building trades are getting up to 3[illegible] francs per hour, while skilled ajusteurs and tourneurs earn only 12 francs per hour. Bessone points out that it is not possible to raise all salaries to the highest levels established by the Germans, since this would cause an inflationary trend. Therefore, the CGT was faced with the delicate task of working at the same time for the reduction -- to a certain extent -- of some salaries and the raising of others.

Police and Military Units

26. [illegible] Republicaines de Securite and Gardes [illegible]. The Forces Republicaines de Securite have a total strength of 3[illegible] officers and men in the Var, under the command of Lt. Colonel (FFI) Barrat. Their headquarters are at Ollioules, about 7 km. west of Toulon, at the Chateau [illegible], a requisitioned private estate formerly occupied by the Vichyite GMR (Groupes Mobiles de Reserve).

27. The two companies under Barrat form part of the FRS of the 15th Military Region (Vaucluse, Hautes Alpes, Basses Alpes, Alpes Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var) and are [illegible] by Regional Commissioner [illegible] and placed under the command of General [illegible]. The FRS are an official, paid militia, working under the prefect in each department of the 15th Military Region, with the principal task of combatting traitors, collaborationists and black marketeers and of maintaining order. In the Var, the FRS has the additional task of guarding the [illegible] political prisoners at the camp of [illegible]. Members of the FRS in the Var are all former FFI. The men are paid 2,055 francs monthly; officers and noncommissioned officers receive regular army pay.

28. Barrat stated that he is sadly in need of arms and equipment for his men. There are rifles for only [illegible] percent of his 3[illegible] men, and their total arms consist of [illegible] German [illegible] and two light machine guns. Barrat pointed out that it would mean a great deal for the discipline of his men if they could all be properly armed and equipped. He hastened to add that in spite of circumstances, discipline was good. An inspection tour of the quarters, however, revealed a rather mediocre discipline; the men lacked the military smartness and bearing of trained soldiers. German prisoners working on the premises were more prompt than the members of the FRS to come to attention and salute at the approach of Lt. Colonel Barrat.

29. Barrat stated that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the

29. [illegible] stated that he had sent detachments out on expeditions against the [illegible] blanc -- elements of which had been reported in various localities in [illegible] -- but so far without success. The [illegible] was not in radio contact with these elements anywhere in the [illegible]. [illegible] also has men circulating in civilian clothes in Toulon to help stamp out the black market. Thus far, the [illegible] made 250 arrests in [illegible], for all offenses.

30. [illegible], who was formerly departmental chief of the Milices Patriotiques, and who is still a member of the departmental committee of the Gardes Civiques Républicaines (ex-Milices Patriotiques), claims the credit for the [illegible] in the Var [illegible]. Barral stated two [illegible] of the [illegible] were the men on [illegible] of the [illegible] but that the former were unpaid civilians devoting only their spare time to this task.

31. F.T.P. According to it, Colonel [illegible], all the remaining FTP of the Var are grouped in the [illegible] at [illegible], under the command of Colonel (FTP) Salvatori. This unit consists of about 1,000 men, and is preparing to leave shortly for the front to join the 1er French Army. In Toulon, former FTP members have formed an Amicale des FTP. According to one of the members, the Amicale has a total membership of [illegible].

Franco-American Relations

32. American sailors stationed in Toulon report a number of cafe fights and arguments between themselves and Frenchmen, principally over women. The feeling is fairly general among American sailors at Toulon that the French would overcharge an American at every opportunity possible.

33. On their side, the French are, to a greater or lesser degree, resentful over the American bombing of Toulon, which destroyed a large part of the city; over American treatment of German P/W's; and over the fact that American food supplies for the civilian population have not arrived in greater quantities. [illegible] (a Corsican, about 55, veteran of the last war and maquisard for over two years during this one) complained bitterly that American soldiers had sold cigarettes, rations and soap at high black market prices and had not given anything away, contrary to what was expected of them. Cigarettes were sold at 50 to 100 francs a pack; soap at 50 francs a cake.

34. [illegible], Communist member of the [illegible] and director of La Liberté du Var, stated that there existed a general feeling that America had, with [illegible] to Vichy, continued relations with the Vichy Government even after its recall; that Washington was not pleased with the de Gaulle government and would have preferred Giraud or a counterpart to de Gaulle; that a report was circulating in [illegible] circles to the effect that three days before the liberation of Paris, American diplomatic representatives had penetrated into the city and had discussed with Vichy officials the possibility of setting up a new French government replacing the De Gaulle Government.

35. [illegible] also stated that most people were no doubt glad that the Allies had [illegible] to [illegible] the decision of the Government to disband the Forces Civiles [illegible]. In that connection, he stated that the CGR and the FRS [illegible] a great necessity, since the people had no confidence in the police — most of the same men who had served the Vichy regime.

Economic Situation

36. Housing Destruction. Toulon has suffered heavily from Allied bombing. The port area was particularly hard hit, but a good deal of destruction was caused in the center of town as well. According to the municipal bureau of Reconstruction, of a total of 16,[illegible] houses in Toulon, 993 were entirely destroyed, 1,3[illegible] more than 50 percent destroyed and 2,9[illegible] more suffered damage. Since it is extremely difficult to obtain building materials to make repairs, houses which were only partially damaged are deteriorating rapidly from the effects of the weather. Many people made homeless are temporarily living with friends and relatives, in makeshift quarters; a large number have not yet returned to Toulon from the interior, where they had sought refuge during the bombings. Toulon's normal population of 160,000 had dropped to [illegible] at the end of August; it had risen to [illegible] at the end of October, and is now around 110,000.

37. The municipal Service de la Reconstruction estimates needs of building materials for repairs as follows:

8,[illegible] tons of tile shingles for roofing
3,[illegible] tons of bricks
5,[illegible] tons of plaster
1,[illegible] tons of cement
1,[illegible] tons of lime
200,000 square meters of window panes.

Temporary roofing repairs are being made with wood planks.

38. Food. Food conditions in Toulon are bad, the most serious shortages being milk for children, and fats and oils. There is only enough milk to permit distribution to infants up to 9 months. According to Dr. [illegible], in order to provide milk for the 1,077 children of 9-18 months, 600 cans of condensed milk would be required daily. Another 900 cans daily would be needed for the 1,500 children 18 months - 3 years of age. [illegible] stressed the urgency of this problem. Dr. [illegible] recommends that if American milk is shipped to Toulon, it be given directly to the municipality for distribution, instead of to the Red Cross. (He claims that on previous occasions when American milk was distributed through the French Red Cross, much of it found its way into the black market and never reached the children for whom it was intended.)

39. Despite the fact that the Var is an important producer of olive oil, there is a serious shortage of this product on the market. According to Allegre, municipal [illegible] in charge of Ravitaillement, whatever stocks of olive oil do exist in the region are blocked by the Ministere du Ravitaillement for distribution throughout France. This is a source of discontent among the people

However, [illegible] distribution of [illegible] with the [illegible]. It is expected that [illegible] will improve by the end of the year. At present, olive oil sells [illegible] francs per litre on the black market, but [illegible] when available, it sold for [illegible] francs [illegible] supply.

40. The bread ration of [illegible] grams daily is generally considered satisfactory and the meat ration of about [illegible] grams weekly is felt to be a considerable improvement over the 90 grams monthly received during the occupation. However, people seemed to expect a more immediate and greater improvement in the food situation with the coming of the Allies than has actually taken place.

41. **Public Services:** Electricity, gas and water supply are normal. The streets are partially lighted at night. Trolley services are functioning in Toulon and its suburbs. There is one [illegible] train daily to Marseille, and one [illegible] daily with connections with the Marseille-Paris train.

* * *

ANNEX

[illegible]

		[illegible] Movement
Frank Arnal	President	[illegible]
Amiges	Vice President	[illegible]
Rigon	Vice President	[illegible]
[illegible]drin	Secretary	Communist
Bertolini		Communist
[illegible]		Socialist
[illegible]		[illegible] (Franc-Tireur)
[illegible]		Franc [illegible]
[illegible]		Catholiques
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
Legion, Fr.		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		Comité de [illegible] de [illegible]
		[illegible]
Mme. [illegible]		Union des Femmes Françaises

[illegible]

	Responsibility	Party or Resistance Movement
[illegible]	Président de Délégation (Chef) Police	FN
[illegible]	Finances	FN (Chrétien Démocrate)
[illegible]	Reconstruction, Urbanisme	FN
[illegible]	Instruction publique, Beaux Arts, Sports, Théâtre	FN
[illegible]	Oeuvres de guerre et familles	FN
[illegible]	Radio, [illegible]	FN
[illegible]	Travaux d'entretien des bâtiments communaux, voiries, jardins publics, contrôle des travaux neufs	FN (Communist)
[illegible]	Ravitaillement	Communist Party
[illegible]	Service propreté, affaires militaires, Défense passive, quais, port et [illegible]	CS
[illegible]	Réquisitions, sinistrés et Réfugiés	Socialist
[illegible]	Etat-civil, contributions, octroi	Socialist
[illegible]	Personnel, régie des trams	CGT
[illegible]	Cimetières, pompes funèbres, abattoirs	CGT
[illegible]	Services publics concédés	CGT
Mme. [illegible]	[illegible]	Mouvement Unifié de la Libération Nationale
Mme. [illegible]	[illegible], Maison, Marché	Union des Femmes Françaises
[illegible]	Jeunesse, Sports	Fédération de la Jeunesse Patriotique
[illegible]	Hygiène, Laboratoire	Loge Maçonnique
Mme. [illegible]	Contentieux	(Indépendante)
[illegible]	Service des Eaux, Nettoiement, Assainissement, Usine d'incinération et Colonies	(Indépendant)

9 452

K 6

Toulouse 12 Septiembre 1945.

INFLUENCIA DE LOS COMUNISTAS EN TOULOUSE

Los comunistas influyen totalmente en el "FRONT NATIONAL" y su diario "LE PATRIOTE", de Toulouse.

Asimismo en el COMITE FRANCE-ESPAGNE, cuyo Presidente Jean CASSOU, a pesar de no pertenecer al Partido Comunista, se deja maniobrar por el.

Igualmente en el Comite FRANCE-U.R.S.S.

- - - - - -

SECRET

Report No. : F-6937
Date of Report : 28 April 1946
Information : Current

FRENCH: POLITICAL

Reported Replacement of "Front National" by a New Paper

The following report is from a member of the staff of "Front National" and is a close friend of Thorez. This information was disclosed directly to a well-tried source, who has extensive contacts in French press circles:

1. It appears improbable that "Front National" will continue to be published after the elections, because of the breaking down of this political formation, which is of no further interest - except perhaps a marginal one - to the Communist Party. However, until now, Thorez has been opposed to its disappearance.

2. At present the leaders of the CP are planning to replace it by a more effective organ, and are studying three possible solutions:

(a) A newspaper which might be called "Ce Matin", and which would be supplementary to "Ce Soir" which would be responsible for its publication. The directors of "Ce Soir", which is a successful paper, are opposed to this idea, because they do not see the necessity for placing an additional load on the budget.

(b) A paper exclusively for women and which would treat all questions interesting to women: the home, the factory, food, the child, clothing, education, etc. But it is wondered if women have not adopted the habit of reading their husbands' paper, and would not be reluctant to indulge in the expense of an extra paper.

(c) An evening paper which would sell for 3 fr., and which would be similar to "Le Monde" in form, and would be the leftist opposite number of that paper. This paper would be destined particularly for the elite, and would stress cultural matters, accurate documentation, etc. The difficulty lies in assembling a first rate editorial staff to handle the political, economic, financial and artistic departments of such a paper.

3. It appears likely that a decision will be reached before the end of May.

SECRET

Distribution: 3 May 1946
Embassy/Paris
LO
MA

Washington
Amzon
Bern

SSU/SD PARIS

Hampshire/Bramley II

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

REF. MAPS	CARD NO. F65

Code Name ✓ Other Code Names

Name FRONT NATIONAL (PARA)

Pre-D-Day D-Day

Address (i) (ii)

Hides (i) (ii) (iii)

Proof of Identity

Description: Height Weight Build Colour of Eyes

Distinguishing Peculiarites

Zones of Operations Z N

~~Sub~~-Organisors GOLBERT represents the MOVEMENT CONSEIL DE LA RESISTANCE

W/T Operator

Experience

Remarks Resistance movement supposed to be run by the Communists strongest in the North but has some following in Z S.

1219

14-00000

From: Marseille
Report No: MM-633
Local File No:

No. of Pages: 8
No. of Enclosures:

Report Made By: H. R. SHERIDAN HRS
Approved By:

Distribution:
By copy to: 0
Orally to: 0

C. F.D.I [illegible]

Source Cryptonym: HOMOHEDRAL
References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Although this report is based principally on information received from HOMOHEDRAL, the chief facts have been confirmed by HOMESTRETCH and HOMOGENE. Much of the information, especially the excerpts from CADI reports, was taken from the original CADI documents which HOMOHEDRAL lifted from the CADI files. (One of HOMOHEDRAL's sub-agents got the char-woman who cleans the CADI offices to lift a few reports each night for a period of a week.) The Italian immigrant sent by this station to the CADI office is Ettore GUIDETTI.

Copies to:
Pari-2
Wash-2
Mars-1

Classification **SECRET**

FORM NO. 51-60
FEB 1947

REGISTRY COPY

29-4-11-2

Subject: Comite D'Action et de Defense des Immigres

Report No: WFM-233

Date of Information: See below

Place Acquired: Marseille

Date Acquired: 28 April 1949

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 29 April 1949

Source: HOMOHEDRAL

1. The Comite d'Action et de Defense des Immigres (CADI) was organized at Paris in November 1944 and operated overtly until ordered dissolved as a subversive group by a decree of the Ministry of the Interior in December 1948.

2. The principal organisations which joined to form CADI are as follows:

Parti Communiste Francais
Confederation Generale du Travail
Conseil National de la Resistence
Front National
Union des Femmes Francaises
Union des Patriotes Sovietiques
Comite Italien de la Liberation
Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive
Union National de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
Aide a la Patrie Polonais
Front National Armenien
Italia Libera
Front National Roumain
Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France
Union Nationale Espagnole en France
Federation des Espagnols Residant en France

3. As the name CADI implies, the organisation was formed to aid foreign immigrants in France. It was not ostensibly founded as a political organisation, nor was it ostensibly designed to support any particular political party. Its apparent purpose was rather to give social and legal aid to any and all immigrants in France. Its social program was quite simple and was largely devoted to the distribution of food, clothing, shelter, and money to needy immigrants. Its legal program was two-fold: first, it offered legal assistance to the individual immigrants through its lawyers; and secondly, it sponsored a series of measures in the Chamber of Deputies which were designed to benefit the status of all immigrants.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-88
FEB 1949

REGISTRY COPY

39-4-11-2

SECRET

4. The measures which CADI sponsored were officially known as the "resolutions pour la promulgation d'un Statut Juridique des Immigres", and demanded the following benefits for the immigrants:

a. That "Cartes de residence privileges" be granted to all immigrants, without exception, after three years residence in France.

b. That immigrants be allowed to choose their place and type of employment.

c. That immigrants be granted all the social benefits to which a French citizen is entitled.

d. That expulsion from France be made dependent on a court order, rather than on a decree of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. CADI sponsored the above measures for all immigrants. For those certain immigrants who had volunteered for service in an Allied army, or had taken part in the Resistance, or had been deported to Germany, CADI made the following demands:

a. That naturalization be granted by judges of the peace upon simple proof of the immigrant's claim to be in one of the above categories, and that all other naturalization requirements be waived.

b. That all invalids, deportees, and widows of men of this category be entitled to the same social benefits as French citizens of similar classification.

c. That the term "Mort pour la France" be added to the titles of the deceased of all immigrants of this category. 5

6. For those immigrants of the above category (para 6) who preferred to maintain their original citizenship, CADI demanded:

a. That they be allowed to choose their place and kind of work and that they be permitted to change their profession whenever they so desired.

b. That they receive all social benefits granted to French citizens.

c. That all "administrative measures resulting from their antifascist activity before and during the War be annulled." (Field comment: This is a direct translation from the French and refers to any legal actions taken against immigrants who, as Communists, refused to obey the orders of the French government between September 1939 and the German attack on Russia.)

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WFM 533

7. CADI was largely successful in realising its demands, for the Statute of Immigrants which was passed by the Consultative Assembly (the Statute was composed of the ordonnance of 24 March 1945, the ordonnance of 2 November 1949, the ordonnance of 19 October 1945, the ordonnance of 15 October 1945, and the decree of 25 December 1945) gave to immigrants an equality of rights approximate to those enjoyed by a French citizen. The most active supporter of the CADI measures in the Consultative Assembly in 1945 was Madeleine BRAUN, prominent Communist and one of the leaders of the Front National. The Communist Party and the CGT also heavily backed these measures.

8. Paragraphs 4 through 6 represent CADI's original program; it was overt, it was designed to benefit all immigrants, and it was supposedly non-political. To implement its program, CADI established branch offices throughout France in the cities which had large numbers of immigrants. These branch offices were known as Centres d'Action de Defense des Immigres. CADI also took the lead in organising the annual National Congress of Immigrants (Congres National des Immigres), the first one of which was held in Paris on 23 January 1946. M. ABERACHA, representative of the Ministry of Industrial Production presided. In 1949, CADI again sponsored the congress, now called the International Congress of Immigrants in France (Congres International des Immigres en France), which took place in Paris 15 February to 17 February. Some 15,000 delegates, representing 3 million immigrants of all nationalities, attended. Justin GODARD, president of CADI, made the principal speech. Louis SAILLANT, secretary-general of the CGT and president of the CNR, was a member of the sponsoring committee and sat on the speakers' platform. The sponsors' committee for the 1947 Congress which was also held at Paris in February, consisted of Justin GODARD, Louis SAILLANT, Jacques DUCLOS, Albert BAYET (delegate of the Ligue des Droits de L'Homme), PINEAU (director of the Union de Jeunesse Republicaine de France), Madeleine BRAUN, and Joseph NORDMANN (lawyer for the Lettres Francaises in the KRAVCHENKO TRIAL).

9. Although the ostensible and apparent purpose and activities of CADI were those outlined in paragraphs 3 to 6; its true purpose and its clandestine activities were quite different. CADI was not the non-political organisation that it professed to be, but was in fact a tightly controlled Communist organisation. To be sure, the legislative measures it supported benefited all immigrants, but they were designed primarily to help Communist immigrants. Similarly, CADI's program of aid to immigrants was restricted solely to Communist or pro-Communist immigrants. The true purpose of CADI was to aid Communist and

29-4-11-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

pro-Communist immigrants to enter France; to aid them in establishing themselves in France; to place them in industries, mining, and agriculture; to organize them into faithful followers of the Communist Party; and finally to control them.

10. In order to realise its true purpose, CADI embarked on a clandestine program which may be divided into three major parts: the supplying of certain necessary identification papers, to illegal Communist immigrants, the placing of these immigrants in certain jobs, and the organising of these particular immigrants, along with all the foreign laborers in France, into submissive groups which would follow the orders of the CGT and the Communist Party.

11. Evidence of this first activity is found in the CADI office in Marseille. This office is currently operating a program whereby any avowed Communist immigrant coming to the office is furnished a "carte de travailleur etranger", and given a job in industry or agriculture, and, for the sum of 5,000 francs, is furnished with a naturalisation decree.

12. (Field Comment:

Having heard from two sources that CADI was operating such a program, this station sent on 10 March 1949 one of source's sub-agents, an Italian immigrant who had entered France clandestinely, to the Marseille CADI, at 8 Place de la Prefecture, to ascertain if these reports were true. At CADI our sub-agent was received by George LINIVER. Our sub-agent then presented himself as an Italian immigrant who entered France clandestinely and asked that he be given a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER asked our sub-agent who had sent him to CADI, to which the sub-agent replied, "I am a Communist." LINIVER asked to see the sub-agent's Party card, and the latter showed it to him. LINIVER then asked the sub-agent if he had a job in France, to which the sub-agent replied in the negative. LINIVER told the sub-agent to return in two weeks at which time he would give him an "autorisation de sejour", and in three weeks, he would provide him with a "carte de travailleur etranger". LINIVER also promised to give our sub-agent an agricultural job in Sete (Herault). Finally, LINIVER told our sub-agent that for 8,000 francs he would provide him with naturalisation papers. Our sub-agent replied that he wanted such papers, but that he would first have to acquire the money. The interview ended with both men raising their fists in the Communist salute.

13. From questioning our sub-agent, it appears that the papers CADI furnishes are genuine papers which they obtain through the conivance of certain individuals in the Marseille Prefecture.

The sub-agent's sister unfortunately died in Paris on [illegible] March. The sub-agent then left immediately for Paris and has not yet returned. Upon his return to Marseille, this station will send him back to CADI to claim his "carte de sejour" and "carte de travailleur etranger". We will also give him 5,000 francs with which to acquire his naturalisation papers and we will direct him to accept the proferred job in Sete.)

14. Additional evidence that CADI is engaged in supplying these papers is found in the fact that on the 24,28, and 29 of January 1949 four foreigners presented themselves at the office of the "Confederation Generale des Internes et Deportes Politiques de la Resistance et des Victimes de l'Oppression Nazie et du Racisme" where, thinking they were at the CADI office, they asked that they be given "cartes de sejour". These men were:

✓MILLER, Robert - born in Baden, Germany
✓JACOBSOHN, Carl - born in Hamburg, Germany
✓GEORGES, Morice - born in Seekelyncmakely, Hungary
✓LASZLO, Alexandre - born in Marsvakely, Hungary

These four had entered France clandestinely and each had been told before leaving his own country to apply to CADI for his French papers.

15. The following excerpts from CADI reports indicate CADI's activity in placing immigrants in industries and in agriculture.

a. "The Poles sent by CADI into the iron and coal mines number 60,000. In addition CADI has placed 80,000 Polish agricultural workers in France." (Field comment: From a report by LOUKA, delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France.)

b. "In the large chemical and metallurgical factories of Marseille one-third of the employees are immigrants. In the Acieries du Nord, 340 workers are foreigners; the Cotel Plant, 485 workers are immigrants. CADI has placed many of these men and will continue to place as many again." (Field comment: From a report of Guido ZAMIS, CADI secretary in Marseille.)

c. "There are 3,800 foreigners in the coal mines at Carmaux-les-Mines. CADI has placed 80% of these men." (Field comment: From a report of the CADI representative for the TARN department.)

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16. The following excerpts from CADI documents indicate CADI's activity in organising the immigrant laborers into submissive groups ready to follow CADI-CGT-Communist orders:

a. "It is necessary that CADI take the lead in organising these foreign laborers in strong and democratic unions. We must protect them from their capitalist oppressors and we must aid them in their struggle against their employers. In CADI and in the CGT, the immigrant finds his strength." (Field comment: From a report by Louis PETIT, one of the organisers and national leaders of CADI.)

b. "It is through CADI that the immigrant masses are able to mobolise for the tasks which lie before the whole country. It is CADI which must educate the immigrants in the ways of true democracy and it is for CADI to lead them in their struggle." (Field comment: From a report of LAROCHE, secretary-general of CADI.)

c. "Before the war, the countries from which these immigrants came were under the control of Fascist and reactionary regimes. The immigrants left their homes without hope of returning. Now things have changed; the countries from which they came are today true democracies and they now have the problem of helping those of their former citizens who are now living outside their borders. It is CADI who, working with these democratic governments, is attempting to obtain the rights of liberty and democracy for these immigrants now in France." (Field comment: From a letter written by Louis PETIT.)

d. "We are proud to be from a region where the majority are immigrants, the immigrants who organised the great strike of 100,000 workers during the occupation under the leadership of Auguste LECOEUR. In those times, all orders were executed clandestinely, and we will execute them today with the same enthusiasm. CADI must lead the way." (Field comment: From a speech by the CADI secretary in the Pas-de-Calais.)

e. "The control of the recruiting of immigrant workers must be done in a rigorous manner by CADI and the French workers. unions. We must prevent the immigrant worker from becoming a tool in the hands of the capitalists." (Field comment: From a speech by GIOVETTI, (fnu), delegate of Italia Libera.)

17. Further evidence of CADI's activity in organising the immigrant workers is found in CADI files. Report after report from various CADI delegates throughout France list by

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nationality the number of immigrants in their areas, and in addition many of the reports note the number of these immigrants who are under CADI control. These reports are all similar, and it is sufficient to quote from one: "More than 50% of the miners in the Loire basin are immigrants; of these, the following percentages adher to CADI: 95% of the Poles, all the Yugoslavs, 80% of the Portuguese, 60% of the Italians, and 75% of the Hungarians." (Field comment: From a report by CADI secretary from the Loire.)

18. Although supposedly dissolved by Ministerial decree in December 1948, CADI continues to operate clandestinely throughout France. Its present national president is Justin GODARD, former minister; FRYDMAN, (fnu), a member of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive, is vice-president; LAROCHE, (fnu), is secretary-general. National Headquarters are located at 102 rue de l'Universite, Paris. The principal organisations supporting CADI today are those listed in paragraph 8, except for those of these organisations which have ceased to exist.

19. CADI functions in conjunction with these organisations and in addition it has its own delegates scattered throughout France in the industrial and mining regions. Among the CADI delegates are the following:

HORCADO - delegate of the Federation des Espagnols Resident en France
LOUKA - delegate of the Conseil National Polonais en France
GIOVETTI - delegate of Italia Libre
KOVACS, Muranyi - secretary-general of the Union Democratique des Hongrois en France
PANAS - member of the Front National Hellenique
MELIK - member of the Front National Armenien
VINCIGUERRA - president of the Union des Voluntaires Etrangers
SORU - delegate of the Front National Rouman
CONTI, Mme. Germaine - secretary of the CADI in Paris
ZELENY - delegate of the Union Nationale de la Colonie Tcheco-Slovaque en France
GUERRIERO - member of the Federation des Immigres Portugais
HOLLAND - delegate of CADI on Eastern France
FRYDMAN - vice-president of CADI; delegate of the Comite d'Unite de la Defense Juive.
PETIT, Louis - one of the organisers and responsibles of CADI

29-4-11-2

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

(Field comment: It is realised that some of the organizations of which these men are listed as delegates have been dissolved, notably Italia Libra and the Front National Armenien. However, the names of the individuals and their affiliations are shown exactly as they appeared on CADI documents.)

20. CADI is well-financed. Its principal financial support comes from the Communist Party and the CGT. (Field comment: CADI documents acknowledge unspecified contributions from these organisations. One of source's informants, the chief of the Foreigners' Section of the Marseille Prefecture, has stated that he knows the Marseille CADI has an undetermined quantity of rubles, presumably received from the Communist Party.)

21. In Marseille, the CADI office was established by Guido ZANIS and George LINIVER in March 1946. It was originally located on the Blvd. du Muy, but in September 1947 it transferred to 3 Marche des Capucins. In February 1948 it moved to 97 rue Longue des Capucins and then, after it was ordered dissolved, it continued to function clandestinely at 2 Place de la Prefecture, where it remains today. ZANIS remains the director of the Local CADI, assisted by LINIVER.

29-4-11-2

WFM-339
5 Aug. 1948

SECRET

Subject: [illegible]
Report No: [illegible]
Date of Information: 5 August 1949
Place Acquired: Wien
Date Acquired: 6 August 1949
Evaluation: B-3
Date of Report: 8 August 1949
Source: [illegible]

1. The Chief of the [illegible] in the [illegible]

2. Actually the [illegible] is composed of two [illegible]

3. A certain [illegible] with the [illegible] among these is [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

③

Classification SECRET

REGISTRY COPY 29-4-5-236

Form No. 51-99

WFM-3

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET 37-4-5-206

BEST OBTAINABLE
FROM [illegible] SUBMITTED

22 November 1948

From: Paris
Report No.: [illegible]-1195
Local File No:

No. [illegible]
No. of Enclosures: 1 rpt

Report Made by: Kenneth L. [illegible]
Approved by: [illegible] L. Ackerman

Distribution
By copy to: Wash - 2
[illegible] - [illegible]
[illegible] - 1
Orally to

Source Cryptonym: [illegible]
References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments

Attached is a report entitled "Further Arrests and Restrictive Measures by the French Surete to Halt Rumanian CP Activity."

SDB-[illegible]

Classification SECRET

REGISTRY CO.

[illegible] Further Arrests and
Restrictive Measures
by the French Surete
re [illegible] Rumanian CP Activity
Place Acquired France, Paris

Evaluation [illegible]

Source [illegible] 1

[illegible] -4150
Date of Information 15 - 17 Nov 1948
[illegible] 18 Nov 1948
[illegible] 12 Nov [illegible]

1. [illegible] following persons, all of whom have been particularly active in connection with Rumanian Communist Party affairs, especially within the Paris legation, were arrested by the French Surete on 15 November:

Ilie [illegible], a cobbler, and member of the Front National Roumain (Field Comment: [illegible] has previously been reported by source as a rich man, though cobbler by profession. He has property at [illegible] (Seine et Oise). At Paris, he lives at [illegible] rue Anjou. He is a frequent visitor and telephone caller at the Rumanian Embassy.)

[illegible], member of the Front National Roumain

Marta-[illegible], Legation employee (

Jeannine [illegible], a French citizen and noted Communist.

In addition to the above and belonging to the same category is [illegible], who was arrested on 17 November.

2. The apartments of the foregoing were searched, but apparently nothing of importance was found. Subsequently, the five incarcerated persons were released.

3. The Association des Roumains Amis de la France (Front National) was dissolved by order of the Surete, which has also forbidden the publication of the newspaper "La Roumanie Libre."

(2)

SECRET
REGISTRY

FORM NO
FEB 1948

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

[illegible]MA-0295

[illegible]

[illegible] 2[illegible] April 1949
Attn: [illegible] Benson
Chief of Station, Marseille

[illegible] Prominent Communist in Cannes
Dr. [illegible]ICARD

Ref: [illegible]

[illegible]

1. Subject is a prominent Communist in Cannes and is currently one of the leading members of the "Combattants de la Liberte" in that city. He was one of the organizers of the "Front National" in the Alpes-Maritimes.

2. In 1945 he was elected mayor of Cannes (which also made him mayor of La Bocca, a quarter of Cannes). He ran for re-election as mayor in October 1947, but was defeated.

3. In 1945 he was also elected as a Conseiller General in the canton of Cannes, but was defeated when running for re-election to this office on March 20-2[illegible], 1949.

4. In 1947, he was elected as a Conseiller Municipal in Cannes and currently holds this office.

5. Subject is married and has one daughter, aged 20. His address is Chalet [illegible], Cannes (on the road to Antibes).

H. R. Sheridan
H. R. SHERIDAN

(3)

Copies to
Wash-2
Mars-1

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CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTRY COPY

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. WFPA-9526

SECRET CONTROL
U.S.A. OFFICIALS ONLY
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 26 March 1951

TO Chief, FDW

FROM Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Transmittal
SPECIFIC- List of Alleged Communist dominated organizations

1. Attached is a copy of a list given to Leon H. S[illegible]man recently by Jack West, Legal Attache. The attachment was originally given to West by Keith Angell, Security Office, ECA-OSR, Paris. Mr. Angell advised that he had received this list from a source in the Prefecture of Police, Paris, and that it is based upon information in Prefecture files and investigation by that agency.

2. It will be noted that this list is apparently of quite recent date in that these international organizations recently expelled from France (IFDW, WFDY, WFTU) are noted as "dissolved".

3. Mr. West also transmitted a copy of this list to Mr. William Crawford in the Embassy here.

Gustav Peterson

FDW - 3 (3 copies 5 pg att)
Files - WFPA - 1
Comm - 1 (1 att)

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[redacted]

29-4-13-727

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

[illegible] 7526

[illegible] COMMUNISTES

Parti Communiste Français, 44 rue le Peletier; 120 rue Lafayette.

Amicale des Anciens de la Mer Noire, 23 rue Fremicourt (15eme).

Amicale des Veuves de Guerre, 30 rue Rene Boulanger (10eme) Bot. 21.31.

Amicale des Volontaires de l'Espagne Republicaine, 46 rue du Fg Montmartre,
(9eme) - Prov. 02.49

Amicale Nationale des Elus Municipaux communistes de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge
(9eme) Tru. 78.31

Amicale Nationale des Elus Republicains de France, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Amis de la Commune, 37 rue du Louvre (2eme)

Amis de la Nature, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) - Tru. 49.88

Amies de la Paix: 37 rue Jouvenet (16eme) - Jas. 86.04

Amities Franco-polonaises 9 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 01.85.

Association des Travailleurs Scientifiques, 37 rue Geoffroy St-Hilaire (5eme)

Association d'Etudes et d'Informations municipales, 1 rue de Maubeuge (9eme)
Tru. 78.31

Association Nationale des Anciens F.F.I. - F.T.P.F. et de leurs Amis,
17 boulevard des Italiens (2eme) - Ric. 46.27

Association Nationale des Cheminots Anciens Combattants, 9 rue Lauten-court,
Mar. 04.97

Association Nationale des Familles de Fusilles, 10 rue Leroux (16eme) Kle. 71.80

Association Nationale des Rapatries d'Indochine, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme)
Tru. 09.85

Association des Veuves Orphelins Ascendants Victimes des deux Guerres,
3 rue de Tilsitt (8eme)

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants, 46 Fg Montmartre (9eme)
Pro. 02.49

Centre de Diffusion du Livre et de la Presse (C.D.L.P.), 142 Boulevard Diderot
(12eme) Dor. 41.39 - 4[illegible].05 - [illegible]

Centre Laique de Formation du Personnel d'Encadrement des Oeuvres pour l'Enfance,
8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme) - Bot [illegible].50

Combattants de la Paix et de la Liberte, 8 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 35.87

Comite Francais de Defense des Immigres, 15 Fg Montmartre ([illegible]eme) Prov. 8[illegible].78

Comite Francais de la Jeunesse Democratique, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme)
Tru. 00.88

Confederation Generale de l'Agriculture, 11 bis, rue Scribe (9eme) Ope. 52.99

Comite National des Ecrivains, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) Anj. 05.79

Comite National des Journalistes, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme)

Comite National des Pharmaciens, 13 rue Ballu (9eme)

Confederation Nationale des Locataires, 23 rue Arthur Rozier (19eme) Nord. [illegible]2.51

Confederation Generale du Commerce et de l'Industrie, 169 rue du Temple
(3eme) - Tur. 52.15

Confederation Generale Unifiee de l'Artisanat, 10 rue des Filles du Calvaire
(3eme) - Tur. 53.29

Conseil National de la Resistance, 1 rue Vernet (8eme) - Ely [illegible].

Cooperative de Production et de Diffusion du Film, 31 rue de Chabrol (9eme)
Pro. 07.05

Editeurs Francais Reunis, 33 rue St-Andre des Arts (6eme) - Ode. 73.24

Editions de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) - Seg. 12.91

Editions Sociales, 64 Bld Auguste Blanqui (13eme) - Gob. 45.41

Federation des Chorales et Groupes Artistiques de la Jeunesse, 9 rue Humblot
(15eme) - Seg. 15.01

Federation des Locataires, 32 bis, Bld Richard Lenoir (11eme)
Roq. 9[illegible],20

Federation Francaise des Cines-Clubs, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme)
Anj. 9 .54

[illegible] PA- 7526

Federation Musicale Populaire, 2 rue de l'Elysee (8eme) - Anj. 91.54

Federation Nationale des Deportes Internes et Resistants Patriotes,
10 rue Leroux (16eme) - Kle. 71.50, 59.10, 87.52.

Federation Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre, 46 rue Copernic
(16eme) - Pop. 43.92

Federation Nationale des Deportes du Travail, 5 rue du Fg Poissonniere (10eme)
Prov. 15.01

Federation Nationale des Directeurs de Colonies de Vacances,
29 rue St-Merri (4eme)

Federation Nationale de Lutte Anti-Tuberculeuse, 2 av. Mathurin Moreau (19eme)
Bot. 56.65

Federation Nationale des Prisonniers de Guerre, 62 rue Chaussee d'Antin (9eme)
Tri. 43.23

Federation Nationale des Sinistres, Mairie de Noisy le Sec, Nord. 96.59

Federation Sportive et Gymnique du Travail, 19 rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 49.88

France - Espagne, 4 Cite Ponthiers (9eme) Tri. 05.26

France - Roumanie, 16 rue Vezelay (8eme) Lab. 26.88

France - Tchecoslovaquie, 18 rue Bonaparte (6eme) - Ode. 20.20

France - U.R.S.S., 29 rue d'Anjou (8eme), Anj. 19.54

France - Vietnam, 40 rue d'Argout (8eme), Lou. 08.20

Front National, 10, rue St-Georges (9eme) Tru. 40.84

Ligue Francaise de l'Enseignement, 3 rue Recamier (6eme) Lit. 88.71

Mouvement des Intellectuels Francais pour la Defense de la Paix,
3 rue des Pyramides (1er) Ope. 39.02

Mouvement National Judiciaire, Palais de Justice, Bd du Palais (4eme)

Plein Air Jeunes, 9 rue Humblot (15eme) Seg. 11.01

Radio - Liberte, 5 rue Lamartine (9eme) Tru. 71.82

Secours Populaire Francais, 11 Bd Montmartre (2eme) Cent. 27.70

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[illegible] - 75126

Travail et Culture, 5 rue des Beaux-Arts - Paris (6) Dan. 09.09

Tourisme et Travail, 58 rue d'Hauteville (9). Pro. 90-48 et 39.19

Union de la Jeunesse Republicaine de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 10.44

Union des Architectes Francais, 14 Rue du Cherche-Midi (6)

Union des Artistes Modernes, Club Mallet-Stevens, Rue Mallet-Stevens

Union des Arts Plastiques, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8) Anj 91.54

Union des Camps et Palais de la Jeunesse, 9 Rue Humblot (15)
Segur 11.01

Union des Chirurgiens Dentistes Francais, 22 Rue Emile Menier (16)

Union des Femmes Francaises, 12 Bis rue d'Astorg (8). Anj. 38.66

Union des Ingenieurs et Techniciens Francais, 2 Rue de l'Elysee (8)

Union des Jeunes Filles de France, 9 Rue Humblot (15). Seg. 11.70

Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et l'Entr'Aide, 14 Rue de Paradis

Union des Medecins Francais, 2 Rue de Sese (8). Opera 74.40

Union des Vaillants & Vaillantes, 5 Bd Montmartre (9). Cen. 75.61

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants, 20 R. de la Chaussee d'Antin

Union Francaise des Auberges de la Jeunesse, 140 Bd Haussmann (8)

Union Francaise Universitaire, 19 rue de Jussieu (5). Por. 13.38

Union Nle des Etudiants de France, 15 rue Soufflot (5) Dant. 71.40

Union Nle des Intellectuels, 2 Rue de l'Elysee. Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Spectacles, 2 Rue de l'Elysee, Anj. 91.54

Union Nle des Vieux Travailleurs, 8 av. Mathurin Moreau (19)
Nord. 17.23.

724

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

1 PA - 7526

[illegible]

[illegible]

Bureau du Congres Mondial des Partisans de la Paix, 2 rue de l'Elysee
Anj. 18.20

Bureau de Liaison des Intellectuels pour la Defense de la Paix, (Issu du Congres de Wroclaw), 2 rue de l'Elysee, Anj. [illegible]

Federation Democratique Internationale des Femmes, 37 rue Jouvenet (16)
Jasmin 85.04 (Dissolved)

Federation Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers Politiques, 10 rue Leroux (16)
Kle. 71.50

Federation Internationale des Juristes Democrates, chez Me. Joe Nordmann,
12 Quai Bourbon (4) Dant. 72.45

Federation Mondiale de la Jeunesse Democratique, 21 rue de Chateaudun (9)
Tru. 16.95 (Dissolved)

Federation Syndicale Mondiale, 1 rue Vernet (8), Ely. 30.50 (Dissolved)

111P

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

WFMA-0186

6 October 1948

TO: Chief, FBW Communist Activities

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Paris,

FROM: Chief of Station, Marseille

SUBJECT: Organisation of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area

Dukes - Book P-3

INTEL

The following is a survey of the organisation and membership of the French Communist Party in the Marseille Area:

Departmental Federation: headquarters, 18 Allees Leon Gambetta

Federal Secretary: Denis BIZOT

Federal Secretariat: of French CP, Marseille area:

Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI

Federal Bureau:

Denis BIZOT - in charge of political section
Pierre DOIZE
Josette REIBAUT
Marius COLOMBANI
Lucien MOLINO - 19 Blvd. Bordillat
Jean CRISTOFOL
Pierre EMMANUELLI - in charge of Press-Propaganda
Ludovic TROUIN - in charge of organisation
Pascal POSADO
Henri BERTINI
Rene LALLEMAND
Yvonne ESTACHY
Paul COURTIEU
Jean CLAVERIE (alias POLLUX) - in charge of recruiting and interior police. A particularly dangerous person.

Federal Committee

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RECORD COPY

[illegible] Committee:

Francois [illegible]
Lucien [illegible]
Joseph ALB[illegible]
Alix A[illegible]
[illegible]
Calisto [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Jean Char[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

CI [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

- 3 -

Foreigners in the French Communist Party number about 7,000, and are divided as follows:

Italians	1,[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
([illegible]	2,[illegible]	(of which 200 are [illegible])
[illegible]	600	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

REPRODUCTION FROM

[illegible]

5

[illegible]ATIONS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Union des Femmes Françaises, Marseille area

Headquarters: 41 Cours Lieutaud

Departmental Office:

Secretary: Simone [illegible]
Members: Catherine [illegible]
(4,000) Jeanne [illegible]

Union de la Jeunesse Républicaine de France, Marseille area

Headquarters: 83 Rue de Rome

Fed. Sec'ty.: Lucien [illegible]

Secretary: RIGAUD

About 1,100 members

Union des Jeunes Filles de France Marseille area

Secretariat: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Headquarters: [illegible]

President: [illegible]

Vice President: [illegible]

Sec'y. Gen'l: [illegible]

Treasurer: [illegible]

Propaganda: [illegible]

[illegible]: Paul [illegible]

(cont'd.)

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Honorary Members of the Committee:

CALLAS (Ex chief of FTP in the Bouches-du-Rhone)
CAPORALI (Cmdt)
CLAUDIE (Cmdt)
GILETTE (Lt. Col.)
GRANVILLE (Colonel)
MORVAN (Cmdt)
PELLETIER (Colonel)
PETRE (Colonel)
POZZO DI BORGO (Cmdt)
SIMON (Colonel)
SENATORE (Cmdt)

Membership: 3,800, of which 3,000 are members of CP,
300 are CP sympathisers and 200 non-sympathisers

Org[illegible] CP

Secours Populaire Francais, [illegible]

Headquarters: 5 rue Villeneuve
Secretary: OLIVI
Fed. Officers: DEVIL
CHERI
MANETTI
ROIG
BOSCHESCHI
ARNOUX
CATALA

Vaillants et Vaillantes

Fed. Commissaire: Charles LECA
Fed. Director: Paul ESTEVE
This movement is directed at youths of less than 18 yrs.

Université Nouvelle

Members: Casimir JOUSSERON, Prof. at University of Aix
Georges MOUNIER, Writor
Francis HALBWACHS, Fellow at University of Aix
This movement is directed at university groups.

Amies de la Paix

President: Perrine 8008

(2)

SECRET

22-4-5-233

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

EFMA-186

Association France-Roumanie

Committee Members:

CERMOLACE
CLERISSY
COHEN
FROLY
GLOCASTY
HAINICLE
LION
MONTROGNON
Dr. PETIT
RUYSSEN
ROOLIAND
SACHTER
SEBAN
THERAN
TOSTET

Association France-URSS

Headquarters: 68 rue Montgrand

Association Nationale des Fusilles et Massacres

Sec'y. General: Mme. GEORGES
Legal Counselor: Mlle. JUIFFRA

Association des Volontaires pour l'Espagne Republicaine

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques

[illegible] ARAC, P

Association Republicaine des Anciens Combattants marseille area

Headquarters: 4 rue St. Jacques
President: Adrien MOUTON
Secretariat: SENATORE and J. MOUTET
Treasurer: J. CLERC
This organization is made up of 60 sections

Union Francaise des Anciens Combattants

President: RIEU-ROY
Vice-Pres: DUPUY
Sec'y-Gen: GUERINI
Treasurer: BRISSEC

Officiers de Reserve Republicains

Headquarters: 20 Blvd. Paul Peytral
Honorary Presidents: GRANIER and PETRE
Secretary: BAUD
Asst. Sec'y: PAC
Treasurer: OLOT

⑤

SECRET

Front National

Headquarters: 18 Allees Leon Gambetta

Groupement National des Refractaires et Maquisards

Headquarters: 41 and 43 rue Grignan
Dept. Sec'y: FROLY

Milices Patriotiques

President: RIPERT
(RIPERT was in command of a CRS unit which was dissolved after the events of December 1947, and is now chief of a Communist shock troop group.)

Federation Nationale des Deportés et Internés Patriotes

Headquarters: 54 La Canebiere
President: Colonel PETRE
Vice-Pres: Abbe COGNAC

[illegible]

Italia Libera

Headquarters: 55 rue d'Alger
President: Mario MAGLIOCCO
Secretary: Aurelio BERTINO

Front National Armenien, [illegible]

Headquarters: 67 rue Longue des Capucines
President: SAATDJIAN
Secretary: HATORIKIAN

PC Espagnol

Departmental Director: Fausto JIMENEZ

VARIOUS OTHER COMMUNIST-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

②

MUR
Union Republicaine et Resistante pour l'Union Francaise
Benjamins et Benjamines
Pionniers et Pionnieres
Federation Nationale des Sinistres
Association des Veuves de Guerre
Comités d'Entreprises
Comité de Vigilance
Comité de Defense de la Republique
Bureau Annexe Sud des Vietnamiens, An affiliation of the Delegation Generale des Vietnamiens de France

SECRET

UFMA-186

IMPORTANT COMMUNIST CENTERS

Marseille
Arles
Aubagne
La Ciotat
Martigues
Miramas
Port de Bouc
Marignane
Gardanne
St. Louis du Rhone
St. Chamas

In case of Communist insurrection, it would be necessary to count on 12 to 15 thousand "die-hards", and 20 to 25 thousand who would be apt to side with the Communists.

RESULTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1946

Votes case	404,231
Communist votes	157,452 (38.9% of total)

RESULTS OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1947

Number of mayoralities to be elected	117
Number of Communists defeated	26 (22%)
Number of Communists elected	17 (14.5%)

POLITICAL MAJORITIES IN MUNICIPALITIES

Prior to 1947 - 19 municipalities Communist controlled (16.2%)
After 1947 - 12 municipalities Communist controlled (10.3%)
Municipal elected jobs held by Communist:
1945 - 498　　1947 - 408

③

SECRET

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— WFMA-186

COMMUNIST PARTY SECTION ADDRESSES IN MARSEILLE

1er Arrondissement: headquarters, 6[illegible] rue de Lorette
Political sec'y., Louis CALISTI

2eme Arrondissement: Headquarters, 20 rue St. Saens
Political sec'y., Leon MERINO

3eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 31 rue Guerin

4eme Arrondissement: headquarters, rue Mourel, Maison du Peuple

5eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 100 Bard Baille

6eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 109 Blvd. Vauban, Maison du Peuple

7eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 191 rue d'Endoume

8eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Chemin du Rouet
Political sec'y., PELLEGRINI

9eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 12 route de Cassis

10eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Bor Port, 69 Ave. Delessert

11eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 162 Route Nationale, St. Marcel

12 emeArrondissement: headquarters, St Barnabe, 18 Chemin de St. Julien

13eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 92 Ave. de St. Just

14eme Arrondissement: headquarters, Bard de Pons, Bon Secours

15eme Arrondissement: headquarters, 10 Route de Lyon

16eme Arrondissement: Estaque Gare, Bordure du chemin de fer

Section de Saint Louis: Political secretary, BERT

Section de la Belle de Mai: headquarters, 31 rue Guerin

Section St. Lazare: headquarters, 3 Place de Strasbourg

Section Marine: headquarters, 25 Blvd. des Dousnes

Section Plaine: headquarters, 39 Place Jean Jaures

②

APERTURE [illegible]

SECRET

29-4-5-233

NAMES AND LOCATIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY CELLS IN MARSEILLE

Name	**Location**
Cheminots	Gare St. Charles
APAL	Vieux Marseille
Abattoirs	
Air France	Marignane
Albert BOS	Sebastopol
Alexandre BLANC	Sorgues
AUDIAS	PTT, rue Honnorat
"	La Madrague
BACCI	Trousat
BARBUSSE	Quartier Lodi
CASATINI	Bar du Telephone, 20 rue de Lyon, ARENC
CHAINAND	Estaque Bar du Littoral
COLLOMB	3 Marche des Capucins
DEVERGER	Porte d'Aix, 3 Place de Strasbourg
DI RUSTO	Bar Moderne, Avenue d'Arenc
Des Douanes	Bar Robert, 40 rue Emile Zola
Eveche	60 rue de Lorette
Entreprise Paoli	Rue Kleber
Excelsior	Blvd. Pons
FIFI TURIN	12 Chemin de Cassis, Ste. Marguerite
FLEURY	3 Marche des Capucins
Hopital de la Timone	(under leadership of SEASSEAU)
Jean PEREZ	60 rue de Lorette
IVALDI	Bar des Amis, 9 rue Pautrier
Jean THINQUET	Bar de la Veranda, rue des Grands Carmes
LAPPORGE	Bar Amer Picon, 3 Blvd. National
Louis PORTA	3 Place de Strasbourg
MANTAUZIER	60 rue de Lorette
Paul LANGEVIN	2 rue Moisson
Securite Sociale	3 rue Moutet
Vieux Marseille	60 rue de Lorette

SECRET

WFMA-186

COMMUNISTS HOLDING ELECTED OFFICES IN BOUCHES-DU-RHONE

Deputies

Francois BILLOUX, Marseille
Paul CERMOLACE, Marseille
Jean CRISTOFOL, Marseille
Lucien LAMBERT, Marseille
Adrien MOUTON, Arles
Raymonde NEDELEC, Marseille

Counselors of the Republic

Marcelle BOUVET (alias DUMONT, Mireille)
Charles COSTES
Leon DAVID

Members of the General Council

Jean BARAILLER
Marcel BADUIN
Denis BIZOT
Pierre EMMANUELLI
Edmond GARCIN
Louis GAZAGNAIRE
Rene GAUTHIER
Martin GONTIER
Jean LAERO
Clement MILLE
Raymonde NEDELEC
Josette REYBAUT
Jean SENATORE
Ludovic TROUIN

F. D. Noyes
F. D. NOYES

(2)

SECRET

29-4-5-257

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, BORIS D.
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

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28 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

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TARASOFF, BORIS D. 019477

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled in)

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Tekm,
11-3070

27 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Chief, Transactions & Records Branch, Control Division, Office of Personnel**

SUBJECT : Custody of Honor and Merit Award presented to Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

Because of security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the subject's Honor Award and related papers listed below:

Certificate of Merit

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the Awardee may obtain his award by calling the Executive Secretary.

Ellin B Glenn

Ellin B. Glenn
Executive Secretary
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
Original - Subject's OPF (No. 019477)
1 - C/WH Support Staff
1 - HMAB Case File

S-E-C-R-E-T

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY | Ad. 70

5 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

THROUGH : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Certificate of Merit

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3[illegible]. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you will not be available for such a ceremony.

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

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1 - C/WH
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
1 - Sec't, HMAB
1 - Recorder, HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 November 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER	019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	[illegible] [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 11 DAY 30 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	1135 0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	P.L. 88-643 Sect. 235c
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0489
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	12 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 16,084

18. REMARKS

Not Recommended for [illegible] Service List

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED	4 Nov 70
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Carl J. Taylor	DATE SIGNED	4 Nov 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HDQTRS. CODE	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	11 [illegible] [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	[illegible]
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV PROV./TEMP) CODE	
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED 1—YES) / HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	11-5-70 lu
46. OP APPROVAL	Dow H. [illegible]
DATE APPROVED	11.05/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasof~~f~~, Boris	Self	70-0502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 2 Jan 69-5 Oct 69.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
14 January 1970	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasoff, Boris	Wife-Anna	68-0264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 22 June 1967.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
25 September 1967	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4-21-35)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VIS

DATE PREPARED: 25 AUGUST 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 10 | YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8135 0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489 HXXX

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 11685

18. REMARKS:

FROM: SAME/0418 [redacted]

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 25 August

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
37	10	5620	WH	45075		3	11 [illegible]	

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O P APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 6 Sep 67

(4)

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : [redacted]
Request for Early Home Leave

1. In accordance with HR 20-30b(3), it is requested that approval be granted for [redacted] [redacted] to begin home leave short of tour.

2. [redacted] has been [redacted] in Mexico City since 5 June 1963. He last returned from home leave on 13 January 1966 but because his wife's parents are in very poor health, the Station has requested on his behalf that the date of his home leave be advanced to 23 September 1967.

3. The Station and [redacted] are aware of the requirements to extend his next tour in Mexico City by the number of days his present tour will be reduced.

4. [redacted], a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, will reach mandatory retirement age in November 1968. At that time he will be converted to contract employee status in order that the Division may retain his unique skills. (There is a continuing requirement for [redacted]' services as the Station's Russian and Spanish translator which could not be met as effectively by the utilization of other personnel.)

5. If this request is approved, please coordinate on the attached cable to Mexico City.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

Tarasoff/Pires D.

SUBJECT: [redacted]S, Request for Early Home Leave

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment:
Bio Profile

CONCUR:

A DDP/OP — 3 Aug 1967 Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel — 3 Aug 67 Date

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OP-865

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: ppm
Patricia P. MacDougall
WH/Personnel 3D5309

EXTENSION: 6815

NO.

DATE: 1 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/Personnel			
2. C/WH/1 3B4403			
3. SB/Pers 5B4804			
4. C/WH/SS 3D3102			
5. C/WHD 3D3107	2 AUG 1967		
6. Mr. Collins CSPS/AP GG10		3 Aug. '67	Dmc
7.			
8. [redacted]			
9.			
10. DDP/OP 3C29	3 AUG 1967	3 Aug	
11.			
12. D/Pers 5E56			
13. WH/Pers 3D5309			
14. C/WHD 3D3107			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Call Linda
x 4516

Hand Carry

Subject has had 24 months continuous service in Mexico since 6 September 1960.

CCS has no objection.

6 to 10. This is in accord with the agreement you reached discussing this with Chief, WH.

6 to 10 & 12.
Recommend approval.
Douglas M. Collins

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH PERSONNEL
EXT: 6815
DATE: 1 AUGUST 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1
2
3
4
5
6

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER ______

CONF: WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, C/OPSER, D/OP, C/CCS3, C/CSPS

(date and time filed)

SECRET

3 22 33Z

CITE DIRECTOR 25166

TO MEXICO CITY
RYBAT/
REFS: A. HMMW-7717
B. FR 20-145 (3)
C. HMMT-7964

1. DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL APPROVES REF A REQUEST FOR HOME LEAVE SHORT OF TOUR. NEXT TOUR WILL BE EXTENDED BY NUMBER DAYS PRESENT TOUR SHORTENED.

2. HQS HAS DECIDED NOT TO GRANT EXCEPTION RETURNING FEINGLASS TO CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT ~~EE~~ SYSTEM BUT INSTEAD PLANS HIS USE AS A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FOLLOWING RETIREMENT UNDER AGENCY SYSTEM IN NOVEMBER 1968. (SEE ED-5495 RE EMPLOYMENT OF ANNUITANTS)

3. WILL ADVISE RE TDY REPLACEMENT AND EXACT TIMING.

Mr. Conner (SB) x6412 will fill TDYer.

//END OF MESSAGE//

TS/PERS ______
DDP/OP ______
C/CSPS ______
C/WH/1 ______
C/WH PERS ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

GEORGE R. THOMPSON
C/WH/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

XX 13

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 MARCH 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ XX CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7135-0990
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH I
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER 13
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0418
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~11306~~ 11685
18. REMARKS:

FROM: SAME/0400

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman
Chief, WH Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 29 March

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: Apr 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	5762	WH	45075		3	11 02 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: C4-11
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Don H.
DATE APPROVED: Apr 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

XXB

651

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 18 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7135-0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. | DA. | YR.

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO | DA | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA. | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE;
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-B64N

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 30 NC 19

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

XXB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 APRIL 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH APR | DAY 11 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ X ~~CF TO CF~~

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5135 0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
97 DDP/WH
BRANCH 3
G MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0400

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 1

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,250

18 REMARKS

FROM: GS-11.3/$9,240

TO BE EFFECTIVE 11 APRIL 1965

Recorded by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 4/9/65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible] Collins

DATE SIGNED: 9 Apr 65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	51700	WH	45075		3	11 02 08	4 11 65	4 11 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 04/09/65

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Ragan - IbK

DATE APPROVED: 9 APR 1965

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Tarasoff, Boris D	Self	62-016

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on [illegible] 1961. Virus infection

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
5 SEP 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 MAY 1963

GG

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

06/05/63

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT Career

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 05 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135-5700-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 400

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $8575

18. REMARKS:

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIV.

1 COPY TO SECURITY

C - 22/57 ✓

Recorded by CSPD

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 5/14/63

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Dan Collins

DATE SIGNED: 21 May 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13	20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10	21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC [illegible]700 / ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE: 45075
23. [illegible] CODE:	24. [illegible] CODE: 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE: [illegible]
27. DATE OF LEI: [illegible]	28. NTE EXP RES: MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:	30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 2 = FICA, 3 = NONE; CODE: 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECUR. REQ. NO.: 000000
34. SEX: M 1	35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE: 06 [illegible]	37. LONG. COMP. DATE: [illegible] 26 56
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE C	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE:	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: —
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1 (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 6	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO); CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) —; CODE —; NO. TAX EXEMP. —; STATE CODE —

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 6/05/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 27 May 63

(4)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 May 1963

CSF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, BORIS D. ✓ 06/04/62

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] YEAR [illegible]

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V | ☐ V TO CF | ☐ CF TO V | ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8575 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: SAME

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIVISION

Received by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 5/14/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: For Myron Smith

DATE SIGNED: 21 May 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC ~~[illegible]~~ ALPHABETIC ~~[illegible]~~

22. STATION CODE: ~~[illegible]~~

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VOTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 62 YR. 03

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE: [illegible]

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 06/03/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Charles W. Clayor

DATE APPROVED: 28 May 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________________ (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular
Part Time
Temporary
Temporary - Part Time
Summer
Detail Out
Detail In
WAE
Consultant
Military

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
Office, Major Staff, etc.
Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
Branch
Section
Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 018477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): TARASOFF BORIS D
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 06 04 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1890 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:
11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 OCTOBER 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, BORIS D.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT ~~[illegible]~~

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 26 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: I O Foreign Div

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~8310~~ 8,575

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDI/FDD/USSR BR/MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT./WASH. D.C.

CONCURRENCE

Chief, WH/Career Service

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P. C. Bowers
P. C. BOWERS WH/PERS OFCR
DATE SIGNED: 10/31/62

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul C Wilson
DATE SIGNED: 5 Nov 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 3
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 4997 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 02 YR. 08
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sec Cmt FDD 11/21/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 11/23/62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 April 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11	02	08	1	M 1	02	20	56		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
06	02	51	1	50 USCA 403 J					02	20	56

13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	OD	06	14	59	06	12	60	0243-1010-0000 5/4300/20/001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	5	1	60	Regular	01	

25

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch Materials & Industry Section	2720	Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	IO (Foreign Doc)	1146	GS	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 01	$7,030	OD	5	1	60	10	24	61	0243-1010-0000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Myron Shpur, Ext. 4876

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Bagnall
J.J. BAGNALL
Chief, Foreign Documents Division

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

W/c file 4/26

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

5 June 1959

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, Boris D.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 11 Da. 02 Yr. 08
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS-EOD: Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 56
7. SCD: Mo. Da. Yr.
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No.-2): Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. Da. Yr.
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Leo (Yes-1, No-2): Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDI/Office of Operations
Foreign Documents Division
USSR Branch
Materials & Industry Section

Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - , USfld - , Frgn -): Code 2
17. Position Title: IO (Foreign Doc)
18. Position No.: 1147
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0132.48
21. Grade & Step: 09 03
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 6285
23. SD: OD
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 5 Da. 17 Yr. 57
25. PSI Due: Mo. 5 Da. 15 Yr. 60
26. Appropriation Number: 9-4300-20-001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Promotion
Code:
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 6 Da. 14 Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code:
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDI/Office of Operations
Foreign Documents Division
USSR Branch
Materials & Industry Section

Code:
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - , USfld - , Frgn -): Code 2
34. Position Title: IO (Foreign Doc)
35. Position No.: 1146
36. Serv.: GS-
37. Occup. Series: 0132.48
38. Grade & Step: 10 01
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 6505
40. SD: OD
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 6 Da. 14 Yr. 59
42. PSI Due: Mo. 6 Da. 17 Yr. 60
43. Appropriation Number: 9-4300-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Myron Shpur, Ext. 576

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):
J. J. BAGNALL
Chief, Foreign Documents Division

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19[illegible] - FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.— One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 2 May 57
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Promotion B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED asap B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04-X	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Docs. Officer - K653.04
GS-0132.48-7, $4660.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.48-9, $5440.00 p.a.
DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Talbot Bielefeldt Chief, USSR Branch	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature:
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Myron Shpur, ext. 576	Title: J.J. BAGNALL, Chief, Foreign Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM TO: 7-4301-20	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	gw	5/7/57
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

16—57320-4

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1954 – FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 Sep 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Foreign Documents Off. - K777.99(Cl	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Documents Off. - K653.04-7
GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.48-7, $4525.00 per annum
~~DDI-Office of Operations~~ ~~Foreign Documents Division~~ ~~USSR Branch~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Present incumbent (James Whalen) will be resigning cob 28 September.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Talbot Bielefeldt Chief, USSR Branch	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Benjamin B. Cain BENJAMIN B. CAIN Title: Acting Chief, Foreign Documents Divisio
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) Myron Shpur, Ext. 576	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-OD

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 7-4301-20	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JWC	10/2/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

[illegible]

F. APPROVED BY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER 31

CONFIDENTIAL

VOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff	2 Nov. 1908		25 June 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment and Change of Service Designation
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP
7 Sept. 56
~~1956~~

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Assistant - BVP - 8141	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Foreign Docs. Officer - N777.99(OL)
GS-0301.28-7, $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.46-7, $4525.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJOINTLY Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Action has been coordinated with Career Service Boards concerned.
Two copies forwarded to Office of Security.
Loss Notice attached.
Concur for PB Jointly : RB Ledford 8/29/56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Talbot Bielefeldt
Chief, USSR Branch

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Myron Shpur, Ext. 576

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J J Bagnall
Title: J. J. BAGNALL, Chief, For. Docs. Div.

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

From: SD-D
To: SD-OD

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-2306-23
TO: 9-4301-20

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
[illegible]

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JJ	[illegible]	8-16-56
C. CLASSIFICATION			no F.I. Report — only move rptd & Project.
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Robert L. Stricklin for 9/7/56

10—67330-4

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
Promulgated by the
U. S. Civil Service Commission
January 19— Federal Personnel
Manual Chapter

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri
2. DATE OF BIRTH: Nov. 2, 1908
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 Aug. 1955

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 Feb. 56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	INTEL ASST ~~Intel-Analyst~~ (Gen) BVP-~~[illegible]~~01 6141
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	~~GS-0132.36-07~~ $4525 GS-1.28-7
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P FI Staff Division D Project [redacted] PB Jointly Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Request Expedite Clearance for PB Jointly Action Coordinated with "D" and DI CS Pools.
RGS

B. REQUESTED BY: Frank B. Rowlett
FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/SPD

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Harriet Conner X3020
~~[illegible]~~

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD:D

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 6-2306-23
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JQB	22 Aug
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: R. H. Stricklin — RG Tofford 8/19/55

16—67320-8

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW 6/12/55

2. PLACE Berkeley, Calif.

3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION ☐ Yes ☒ No

4. INTERVIEWER JFWinter

5. REFERRED BY Busby/FR

6. NAME (Last name first, in caps) TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

7. PERMANENT ADDRESS 16315 Bevil Way, San Leandro, Calif. TELEPHONE FR 60718

8. BUSINESS ADDRESS TELEPHONE

9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS TELEPHONE

10. DATE OF BIRTH 11/2/03

11. PLACE OF BIRTH EKATERINOSAV, Russia

12. CITIZENSHIP ☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (List Country) ______

ACQUIRED BY: ☐ Birth ☒ Naturalization (Date) ______

13. ☐ Single ☐ Married ☐ Widow(er) ☐ Divorced

14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding Wife)

15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (REG. 10-9)

None

16. EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, THESIS TITLE, GRADE AVERAGE OR CLASS STANDING, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, ETC.)

Russian University, New York, N.Y. 1924-26. General Course.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (EMPLOYERS, POSITIONS, DUTIES, SALARIES, REASONS FOR LEAVING)

1/52 to present: YWCA, Oakland, Calif. Building Eng. $305. mo.

12/45-10/51: American National Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio. Building Maintenance man. $265 mo

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (BRANCH, SERIAL NO., STATIONS, TRAINING DUTIES, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES, RANK HELD, RESERVE STATUS, CURRENT PROFICIENCY AND INTEREST). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

USArmy. T/4. 2/41-11/45. Honorable Discharge. 20248233. Was Special Agt. in Germany and was used as interpreter between US and Soviet forces for short while.

FORM NO. 37-117
OCT 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

(4.11)

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (AREAS, TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE, HOW ACQUIRED, ETC.)

Ger., WW II

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (GIVE TESTS WHEN SKILL WARRANTS AND RATE BELOW)

Language	Native Fluency	Fluent but Foreign	Adequate for Translator	Adequate for Research	Adequate for Travel	Limited	Acquired By
Russian		r,s,w,u					Study and home
German					r,s,w,u		Residence
French					r,s,w,u		Study

21. SALARY REQUESTED GS 7

22. POOL INTEREST ☐ Yes ☐ No

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION
Washington, D.C. ☒ Yes ☐ No
Anywhere in U.S. ☒ Yes ☐ No
Overseas ☒ Yes ☐ No

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☒ PHS ☒ App. 1 ☒ Med. ☒ Sec. Agree. ☐ Affid. Required

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (APPEARANCE, MANNERS, PERSONALITY, MATURITY, MOTIVATION, FLEXIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE, EMOTIONAL STABILITY, QUALIFICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK, CAREER PLANNING, OVER-ALL IMPRESSION, PERTINENT UNFAVORABLE FACTORS)

PROFESSIONAL

There's nothing outstanding about Tarasoff - just an average joe trying to make a living and without the ambition, energy, perspicacity to make use of a saleable article: knowledge of Russian. Physically he's sort of soft, tends to be overweight - he's about 5'8" tall, and about 190 in weight. His personality is on the negative side, his manner dull.

Tarasoff was greatly interested in the possibility of working for the US Government. He wants that security. And he has about reached the end of the line salary wise as a maintenance man or building superintendent. Tarasoff is willing to work in D.C. but insists on a GS 7 because he has to support a wife and two children. He does not mind the sedentary aspects of Project Detail - I doubt if he'd be interested in anything that wasn't sedentary. He also liked the the other aspects of Detail and I would think from talking with him that he would be quite able to handle a job on Detail. He can translate - reads with a great deal of ease. His PHS I notice indicated he's interested only in o/s - this is not what he told me; he is interested in US also but he will go o/s if necessary.
I recommend Tarasoff for a GS 7 on Project Detail.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR

~~Pusey/Project Detail~~

28. SERIAL NUMBER(S)

29. TESTS

30.

JRWinter
Signature of Interviewer

7/4/55
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 019477

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 2 Jun 1951

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted]

3. SEX M

4. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908

5. SECURITY COMP. DATE 20 Feb 1956

6. MARITAL STATUS Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) NO. 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1923 1965 1949

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) 1936 Russia Spouse: NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Feb 1959 OTHER STATUS

10. LAST MED. RPT. Mar 1963 QUAL. FOR PCS C/S EVAL. FOR PCS O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1956

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1936-40 J. F. Sullivan, General Contractor, Bronx, NY - Supervisor of Crews
1941-45 Military Service, US Army, CIC, T/4 - Special Agent
1945-51 American National Red Cross, Cleveland Ohio - Building Maintenance
1951 Aero-Tech, Oakland, Calif - Shop Maintenance (2 mos)
1952-56 YMCA, Oakland, Calif - Building Engineer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION Born and lived in Russia until 1920, in Istanbul 1920-23
1924-26 Russian Univ of New York, NYC - Russian English, History
1927 Cooper Union Art School, NYC - Fine Arts (10 mos)
1944-5 MITC, Camp Ritchie, Md - CIC (2 mos); 1945 Univ of Pa - German Lang
1950-51 Cooper School of Art, Cleveland, Ohio - Commercial Art
1953-54 Oakland Art Institute Oakland Calif - Advertising Art

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Russian - R,W,P,S,U Native; Transl & Interpr - Apr 1957
Ukranian - R,W,S,U Inter; P High - Apr 1957 - Interpr
White Russian(Byelo) - R,W,S,U Inter; P High; Interpr - Apr 1957
1962-3 Spanish

(Continued on next page)

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1956 English Usage Review
1957 Intel Orient
1957 Basic Country Surv-USSR for FDD
1958 Non-clerical Basic Typing
1959 Writing Workshop

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Feb 1956	Intel Asst	0301.28	7	D	DDP/FIStf/DivD/PBJOINTLY	Hq
Jun 1956	" "	0132.48	7	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br	"
Sep 1956	For Docs Off	0132.48	7	OD	" " " "	"
May 1957	" " "	0132.48	9	OD	" " " "	"
Jun 1959	I.O.(For Doc)	0132.48	10	OD	OO/FDD/USSR Br/Mater&IndusSec	"
May 1960	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	" " " " " " "	"
Nov 1962	" " "	0132.48	11	OD	DDP/WH/CS/CS Dev Comp)	"
Jun 1963	Ops Off (SA)	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-3	Mexico City
Apr 1965	" " "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-1	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED 10 Nov 1969

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms /hc

22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 14 Jun 1960

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 56 PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

PERS. SERIAL NO.
019477

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
[redacted] Tarasoff, Boris

DATE OF BIRTH
2 Nov 1908

17. Foreign Language Abilities - Continued:
Bulgarian - R,W Inter (Apr 1959) P,S,U Slight; T None - Apr 1959
Slovak - R,U High; P Native; W,S,T None - Apr 1957
Polish - R (Inter) P,S,U Slight; W,T None - Jun 1959
Czech - R Inter (Feb 1960)
Serb-Croat(Serb) - R Inter (May 1959)
French - R Inter; W,P,S,U,T None - Disclaims proficiency Feb 1967

DATE REVIEWED
10 Nov 1969

PROFILE REVIEWED BY
hms/hc

FORM 1200-1a
3-67

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 19477	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)	
NAME (Last-First-Middle) TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri		DATE OF BIRTH Nov 1908

26. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS


TARASOFF Boris
FEBRUARY 1961

Color Photo Inserted Behind
Biograhpic Profile in
TRUE NAME


TARASOFF Boris
FEBRUARY 1961

27. DATE REVIEWED 10 May 1960	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/QAB/hms

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

57

PROFILE

RET
(W... ...led In)

BI...PHIC PROFILE (...RT 2)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 019477		
NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Tarasoff, Boris D.		DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1968

23. PHOTOGRAPH


[redacted]

24. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

25. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

26. DATE REVIEWED 10 Nov 1969	27. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/hc

FORM 2-68 1200 (PART 2) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019177

SECTION A Tarasoff Boris **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 SC FILE	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

FEB 25 1 45 PM '69

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal inter-relationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 Jan 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 41 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul L. Dillion /s/

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Nov 193[illegible]	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See Instructions - Section C)*				
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 29 February 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 24 [illegible]	

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 29	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE 16 February 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston Scott

SECRET

SECRET

C-2532 (Biladeau)
5 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Transactions and Records Branch
Office of Personnel

ATTENTION: Mary Coriden

SUBJECT: Boris D. TARASOFF — 1
Anna TARASOFF

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named subjects.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny subjects' current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

THOMAS K. STRANGE
Deputy Chief, CCS/NC

cc: ID/SO

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

DT

BBG: 30 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Tarasoff Boris D [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (MANDATORY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 11 30 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1135 0990 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 235 B

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0489

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 16084

18. REMARKS:

T-P-111

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1. LAST NAME: TARASOFF
FIRST NAME: Boris
INITIAL(S): D

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty
F/T
P/T
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ________ Annual Leave Bal. ________

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years
Months
Days
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION: 11/30/70 RETIREMENT

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE
(HOURS)

	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	360	900
6. Current leave year accrual through 11/28 19 70	184	92
7. Total	544	992
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	168	0
10 Balance	376	#992

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hrs + 2 holidays

12. Salary rate(s) $16,084.00

13 Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 12/1/70 to 2/03/71 1700 (Hours)

24. Certified correct by
[illegible] (Signature) 1/5/71 (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE
(DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ________
15 Current balance as of ________ 19__ ________
16 12-month accrual rate ________
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ________
18 Monthly accrual date ________
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20 Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ________ to ________
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr. ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	0	
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on 4/5/70	0	
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ________		

REMARKS
SCD: 6/2/51

#Unused Sick Leave——992hrs ——"U.S.C. Ch 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

[redacted]

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
019477	[redacted]	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 12	4	$14,727	04/07/68	GS 12	5	$15,173	04/05/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 7-1 1970

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Dow H [illegible]

FORM 7-56 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$15,611

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 3	$11,685	$12,225

1011

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME			3. ORGANIZATION		4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS	
019477	[redacted]			51 620		CF		
6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI / ADJ.
GS 12	3	$12,225	04/09/67	GS 12	4	$12,607	04/07/68	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 7 Feb 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SE: 12 SEPT. 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] Berco D [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 09 10 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 459	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11685

18. REMARKS

18 Sep 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA 33. SECURITY REQ NO. 34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAP RES PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET MAH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EIT: 13 APR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] D [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 09 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF		7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH I MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11685

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
OF-4b

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA. YR.
32	10	51620	WH	45075		3	11 02 08		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - CIA; 3 - FICA; 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT; 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR; RESV; PROV; TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ECHOLS

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C 4/7/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

cwp/!

Serial No.	Name			
019477	[redacted]	51 673 CF		

Old Salary Rate				New Salary Rate				Type Action		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PA	LI	ADJ
GS 12	2	$11,306	04/10/66	GS 12	3	$11,685	04/09/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED ON
OF-40

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 Feb 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 560E 3-65 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Tassell D. Boris D. [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 12 13 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF X
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 0920 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS: EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ Code | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Hdqtrs. Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) CODE: 2 | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible] [redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 2	$10,987	$11,306

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[illegible] [redacted]	019477	51 620	CF	GS 12 1	$10,250 ✓	$10,619 ✓

Bcl

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[illegible] [redacted]	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,619	04/11/65	GS 12	2	$10,987	04/10/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

8 APR

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLC: 9 APR 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 013477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 11 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ · CF TO V ☒ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0400	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
PK OF-4b
14 APR 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51700 · ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 04 11 65	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 04 11 65
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE · MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR · RESV PROV · TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE · 0 - WAIVER · 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO TAX EXEMP · STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
04/13/65 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5.165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

WH.

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	[redacted]	64 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62	GS 11	4	$ 8,840	10/27/63			

POSTED ON
-4b

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY Joseph B. Gay

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE [illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

WH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted]	019477	51 700	CF	GS 11 4	$ 8,840	$ 9,250

✓ TED
-40
5 JAN 1964

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 5 JUNE 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

0AB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 06 DA. 05 YR. 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3135 5700 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
JUN 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Emplee. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
13	10	64700	WH	45075		3	11 02 08	05 01 60	10 28 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1				00000	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	39. HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	06 02 51	02 20 56	C	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	43. CODE	43. NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	44. CODE	44. NO. TAX EXEMP.	44. STATE CODE
1	6		0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/11/63

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JGD 28 AUG 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 04 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4235 1990 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE I O FOREIGN DOC	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.62	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8575

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 06/04/63 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM # 13 SERVICE DESIGNATION WHICH READ, D TO READ, OD.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1BD0091	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

C.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
09/25/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 28 AUG 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 5 JUNE 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 019477
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): TARASOFF BORIS D
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 06 | 04 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235 1890 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: I O FOREIGN DOC
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.62
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8575
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 11 | 02 | 08
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 3 - FICA; 5 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1BD0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR | RESV | PROV | TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES; 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/06/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

5 JUN 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ABM: 26 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 019477	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) TARASOFF BORIS D

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 11 26 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ; V TO CF ; CF TO V ; CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3235 1990 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE I O FOREIGN DOC	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION OD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.62	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8575

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 64997	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 11 02 08	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE; MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. ; 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (NO. DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES); HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO); CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/6/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

11/26/62 Abm

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-31)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1964 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	019477	86100	V	11 2	$ 7820	11 2	$ 8310

2-13-1010

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
019477	TARASOFF BORIS D	86 100 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-11	2	$ 8,310	10/29/61	S-11	3	$ 8,575	10/28/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS JMK AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE: 10/24/62

E O ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
19477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD 22 23 ✓	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	1	$ 7,560	05/21/60	11	2	$ 7,820	10/29/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OD	TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	27 20	GS-11 1	$ 7,030	$ 7,560

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BWS: 29 APR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11	02	08		1	M 1	02	20	56	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
06	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						02	20	56	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	10 FOREIGN DOC	1146	GS	0132.48

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
10 1	$ 6505	00	06	14	59	06	12	60	9 4300 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION	30	05	01	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI 00 FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECTION	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	10 (FOREIGN DOC)	1146	GS	0132.48

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 1	$ 7030	00	05	01	60	10	29	61	0243 1010 0000

44. Remarks

POSTED
19 MAY

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

15-3-60

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 12 JUNE 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo. / Da. / Yr.
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	11	02	08		1	M 1	02 / 20 / 56

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
06	02	51		1.	50 USCA 403 J						02	20	56		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OFFICE OF OPERATIONS FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title							18. Position No.		19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
	2	10 FOREIGN DOC							1147		GS	0132.48	
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number				
09 3	$ 6285	00							9 4300 20 001				

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06	14	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDI OO FDD USSR BRANCH MATERIALS & INDUSTRY SECT.	2720	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title					35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	10 FOREIGN DOC					1146	GS	0132.48
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. / Da. / Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. / Da. / Yr.	43. Appropriation Number				
10 1	$ 6505	00	06 / 14 / 59	06 / 12 / 60	9 4300 20 001				

44. Remarks

FO[illegible]
16 JUN 1959

SECRET

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

a E 6/15/57

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD -25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA	YR.
GS 9	2	$ 6,135	05	18	58	GS 9	3	$ 6,285	05	17	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD.

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

MAY 11 11 50 AM '59
PAYROLL BRANCH

S.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	OD	0653.04	1147	02/24/59

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. 25	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD 24	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440				GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
TALBOT BIELEFELDT	1 April 1958	T Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET **PERSONNEL FOLDER** (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,440				GS 9	2	$ 5,575	05	18	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET **PERSONNEL FOLDER** (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
TARASOFF BORIS D	119477	GS-09-2	$ 5,575	$ 6,135

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R., FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 17 May 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION 30
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 May 1957
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04
GS-0132.48-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-9 $5440.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/CO Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT	
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OD

15. SEX: M 1
16. APPROPRIATION
W FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13
TO: Same
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

POSTED
27 MAY 1957
GW

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OF

717 -#123157

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. [illegible]	5. ALLOTMENT
119477	TARASOFF BORIS D	DDI/FDD -25	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
7	1	$ 4,525	02	20	56	7	2	$ 4,660	02	24	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Talbot Bielefeldt	7 Jan 57	T. Bielefeldt

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

are

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF 119477	2 Nov 1908		3 October 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT 56	7 Oct 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
K-777.99	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Documents Off. K-653.04-7
GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232940	DDI/Office of Operations Foreign Documents Division USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD-CD

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
1 M W	FROM: 7-4301-20 750-13 TO: Same	Yes		STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 ECD 02/20/56

POSTED
OCT 5 1956

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

ITRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 13 Sep 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): 57 Reassignment (Change of Service Designation)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9 Sep 1956

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Asst. BVP-0141	8. POSITION TITLE	Foreign Docs. Off. K-777.99
GS-0301.28-7	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.48-7 $4525.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff Division D, Project FB Jointly Office of the Chief Branch 2, Section B	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 232040	DDI/OO FDD USSR Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

From: SD/D
To : SD/OD

15. SEX: M W

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 7-2306-23 750-13
TO: 7-4301-20

1

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

4 EOD 02/20/56

LOGGED
SEP 20 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Director of Personnel

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1956-378847

773 9/14/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC

F.C. 14 Dec. 1955
C.-1235 tat

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. BORIS D. TARASOFF	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov. 19[illegible]	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 20 Feb. 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 20 Feb. 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Asst. BVP-S141
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS- 301.28-7 $4525.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff Division D Project PBJOINTLY Office of the Chief Branch 2 Section B
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:D ECC

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: W 6-2396.23	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 20 Feb. 1956	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

20. REMARKS:

Subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.
Subject to the satisfactory completion of a medical examination.

RC-93

DOG: 2/20/56
CSFOD: 2/20/56
LCD: 2/20/56
SCD: 6/02/51

PSI Due: 2/24/57

POSTED
2/24

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

~~Director of Personnel~~

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 - 355[illegible]

[illegible] 2/20/56

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019477

SECTION A Tarasoff Boris GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov. 08	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br.1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January - 15 July 1970.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

14 AUG 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform his assigned tasks in superior fashion. Not only is he a skilled transcriber/translator, he is also able to put his experience and knowledge into words in preparing character analyses which have been of great value to the Station's operational program. Although his work load is often quite heavy, he can always be counted on to complete his assignments promptly and he willingly puts in the extra time frequently needed.

His team spirit and dedication are shown by the fact that on several occasions, in spite of advancing age and recent illness, he spent long hours in base houses on live-monitoring assignments. He will be greatly missed when he retires in the near future.

As previously noted, this officer does not handle operational funds or have supervisory responsibilities. He has had no cover problems, nor has he required any unusual administrative support, other than that which is to be expected in connection with his forthcoming retirement.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 19 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donald F. Vogel /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above ratings and comments. I am not able to add any meaningful comments due to the highly specialized nature of Subject's duties.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A [illegible] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br.1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January thru 31 December 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language materials into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 1-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his assigned duties in a superior fashion. Illness put him out of action for some time, but otherwise the Station received the fine performance which has come to be routine with him. This officer's experience and dedication make it possible for him to work effectively with an absolute minimum of supervision. He responds instinctively to items of operational significance, and his experience and knowledge make it possible for him to write penetrating analyses of target personalities, and interrelationships among these persons, based solely on what he hears.

This officer has also been called upon to transcribe material from audio operations, in addition to the telephone material which is his normal assignment. He has also handled this well, although his advancing age and less acute hearing make this task much more difficult for him.

While not called upon to use Spanish normally, he has sufficient fluency to handle material in Spanish when required.

This officer uses his time well and takes good care of the equipment assigned to him. He does not handle operational funds nor does he have any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
20 January 1970	[redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
12 months	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Donald F. Vogel /s/	Ops Officer

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I can add nothing substantive to the above report since I have little opportunity to deal at first hand with Subject's output. The rating officer is both meticulous and fair and I have full confidence in his evaluation of Subject.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 January 1970	Chief, Ops Officer	Paul V. Harwood /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

Tarasoff Boris N

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 1908
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1969
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language product into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to consistently perform at the excellent level which has characterized his work in this Station for several years. His high level of personal dedication and professional competence have become standard.

FEB 25 1 46 PM '69

From his daily work he has an intimate knowledge of and insight into the personalities of individual Soviets and the personal interrelationships existing between members of the local Soviet colony. The character analyses which he prepares are excellent and an invaluable aid to our Soviet program.

He has had no professional, administrative, or personal problems during the reporting period.

His knowledge of Spanish continues to improve and aids him considerably in his work.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 Jan 60	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 41 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul L. Dillion /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with the ratings given in Section B and in the narrative evaluation of this officer's performance in Section C. He continues to perform his duties in a superior fashion.

DATE 28 Jan 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 019477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [redacted].
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
XX	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1968
12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 January 1967 - 1 January 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Transcription of English language conversations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

22 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

SECTION C

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer continues to perform his duties in the excellent manner that we have come to expect during the 4 1/2 years that he has served in the Station. His work is an indispensable part of the Station's program.

He has had no professional, administrative or personal problems during the reporting period.

He continues to study Spanish in which he shows satisfactory improvement.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

SECTION D

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	/s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
29		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Ops Officer	Paul Dillon

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in the ratings given this officer and in the narrative evaluation of his performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 February 1966	Chief of Station	Winston Scott

SECRET

C19477 [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
C19477
[redacted]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff Boris
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-12
5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH-1
8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XX CAREER
☐ RESERVE
☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
XX ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 28 February 1967
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone tap product into English transcript.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets based on the above.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Translation of Russian letters into English.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translation of Spanish language telephone product into English and transcription of English conversations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

27 MAR 1967

14 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

[redacted] continues to show a high degree of competence in his primary responsibility, which is translating and transcribing Russian telephone conversations. He works quickly and accurately and has a fine feeling for the subleties of the Russian language. His character analyses of Soviets have been of great assistance in the Station's operational planning. He continues to maintain his deep cover status well and presents no problem of either an administrative or a personal nature. His wife continues to assist him with his work, and together they make an excellent team.

Subject is very cost conscious in his operational duties.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 3 Feb 67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 3 Feb 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Cynitha Hausmann

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with the rating officer's evaluation. The Station is fortunate that [redacted] intends to remain permanently in Mexico where he makes an invaluable contribution to the SB Section's program and presents no difficulties whatsoever.

DATE 3 Feb 67	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Paul L. Dillon

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
019477

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
Tarasoff, Boris D.
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 08
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-12
5. SD: D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 16 August 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian telephone and audio products into English transcript	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Processing transcribed telephone materials into a format which allows for immediate analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of personality and assessment reports on individual Soviets on the basis of the above material	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
3 / OF-4b
4-9-66

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

7 JUN 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 15 2 02 PM '66
JUN 24 4 26 PM '66

There has been no change in the excellent performance of [illegible] officer and his wife, a contract employee, who assists him in all facets of his work.

There have been no problems of either a professional or personal nature during the reporting period.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 June 1966	[redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
9 1/2		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 June 1966	Chief/SR/Mex.	Paul J. Dillon /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 June 1966	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

SECRET

12 AUG

FITNESS REPORT (CONTINUED)

Jardeff, David

[redacted]

Subject has not been in a supervisory position and his present assignment outside on unofficial cover working as a loner gives no indication as to his supervisory ability. It is believed Subject probably serves best as an independent analyst without supervisory responsibilities.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
017477
~~264216~~

SECTION A Tarasoff, Boris — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT /WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 Sep 1964 - 15 Aug 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Preparation of characterization-assessment personality reports on the Soviet complement.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Processing of transcribed telephone materials into format facilitating immedicte analysis and handling by the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

25 APR 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has continued to demonstrate a very high level of interest and competence in his work. Beyond the relatively technical aspect of producing transcriptions, which he accomplishes with timeliness, accuracy and thoroughness, he strives to provide the Station and Headquarters with an insight in depth on the local Soviet complement. He does this capably, particularly when one understands the limitations of his technical access. His wife, a contract employee, assists him in the preparation of the technical product. However, her over-all contribution goes beyond this, since Subject and his wife work together in effort to distill the meaning of their product in terms of personality assessment. They are uniquely well adjusted to their deep cover circumstances, are of little burden administratively to the Station, and are presently interested in continuing their assignment in Mexico City indefinitely.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 February 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] [redacted] /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 26	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 22 Dec 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herbert Manell /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Chief of Station, Mexico City concurs in this Fitness Report as submitted by [redacted]'s supervisor for the period reported.

[redacted]

DATE 12 April 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston M. Scott /s/

SECRET

14-00000

38

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Tarasoff Boris A. [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov 1908

3. SEX: M

4. GRADE: [illegible]

5. SD: D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP WH 3

8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): [illegible] June - 30 November 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian language telephone and audio product into English transcript.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

21 NOV 1963

FORM 45 4-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

The relatively limited period of Subject's assignment to the Station, coupled with the normal complications attendant to a staffer's conversion to the DDP and to a deep cover status on a first assignment abroad, compels the supervisor to make a tentative assessment only at this time. However, from all indications to date it would appear that Subject and his family are acclimating themselves very well to the environmental, cover and work situation. Subject is interested in his work, applies himself conscientiously and is prompt in completing his assignments whether the work load for a day is light, or is heavy and requires unpaid overtime concentration. The translation product is presently exact and conforms to the Station's standards for such work. As Subject becomes more familiar with specific Station requirements, through experience and with closer supervision than afforded to date, he will be able to make a more imaginative contribution to his work, an effort that he has already begun.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 October 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 October 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 15 NOV [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/[illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Spanish Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing
(900 hours, full time)

09/24/62 - 02/15/63

Student	: Boris D. Tarasoff	Office	: WH
Year of Birth	: 1908	Service Designation:	D
Grade	: 11	No. of Students	: 4
EOD Date	: 02/56	Instructor:	Mrs. L. Edwards

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHOD

This is a 20-week, full-time course. The general aim of the course is to enable the student to use the spoken language with moderate facility and accuracy in a large number of everyday situations while providing a basis for further learning of the language either by actual use in the area or by further formal study. The major objectives of the course are to develop an ability; 1) to distinguish and produce the sounds of the language; 2) to use a large variety of basic sentences and expressions in the spoken language and apply them by re-combination to new situations; 3) to comprehend spoken Spanish in a variety of current everyday situations; 4) to develop the skills and techniques needed to read Spanish texts with minimum use of the dictionary; 5) to write the language in basic form, including letters, telegrams, short composition, etc.

The entire working day, 5 days a week, is devoted exclusively to language study. Four to five hours daily (a maximum of 25 hours a week) are devoted to guided drill and conversation practice with native speakers. The balance of the day is devoted to language laboratory drill and preparation of assigned material. Three days at mid-term and the final week of the course are spent in a special language-house in which Spanish is spoken exclusively.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. The number of students receiving each adjectival rating on overall course performance is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Incomplete	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
1		2*	1

Mr. Tarasoff's application and interest throughout the course was unstinting. Progress in all course objectives was modest but steady. In future study particular attention should be given to pronunciation and structure.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: LAWRENCE C. [illegible] 11 Jun 63
Chief Instructor Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

29 OCT 1962
Seen by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 019477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD OD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT CO/FDD/USSR Branch		8. CURRENT STATION Hq.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 21 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct 61 - 20 Sept 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reads Russian-language newspapers, periodicals and books to find information of intelligence value on Soviet heavy and construction machinery industries	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Evaluates materials found in published sources for processing through internal reports or through contract translations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Extracts and translates items for internal reports	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Compiles Quarterly Scheduled report, Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Scans Russian-language newspapers, periodicals, and books and selects items of interest to the entire Industry and Materials Section of USSR Branch, FDD	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

24 [illegible] '62

During his rating period, as during his entire tour of duty in FDD, Mr. Tarasoff has demonstrated himself to be a mature highly-capable intelligence officer. His professional ability and personality contributed greatly to the smooth operation of his section.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 20 Sept 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1 yr, 10 mos.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 19 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry and Materials Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE EDWIN R. STRAKNA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with this rating. Mr. Tarasoff has common sense and intelligence sense. He appreciates the significance of information, for intelligence purposes, both in the fields for which he is responsible and in other fields as well.

His ability to scan rapidly a great volume of Russian-language material, and extract or note items of value, will be sorely missed.

DATE 24 ~~19~~ Sept 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T. Bielefeldt TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
19477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff, Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc.)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From 1 Oct 60-31 Sep 61 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reads Soviet newspapers, journals, and books for information on Soviet heavy machine building, industrial organizations, on subjects covered by other section members.	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Compiles quarterly scheduled report Commodity Output of USSR Union Republics	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Judges value of information in Soviet publications, and selects such information for publication in scheduled reports or for contract translation.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Performs special assignments for other CIA components, such as interpreting from tapes and writing reverse translations.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Writes and compiles articles for scheduled reports.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL NOV 3 9 28 AM '61 MANPOWER

Serious-minded, hard-working, well-informed. Has profound knowledge of the USSR, its people, and its institutions. Innately an intelligence officer, he has the ability to discern news of intelligence value where others see nothing. Maintains an image of the world, the USSR, the US and the CIA in his mind, and seldom makes incorrect prediction or estimate regarding World or Soviet affairs.

His intellectual maturity of the Russian language makes him adaptable to a large variety of assignments. Is characterised by resolutnes, steadfastness, and ability to resist pressure or propaganda.

His work in the section has been excellent throughout, and he covers subject fields equivalent to the work of 3 people in 1955. He works very well as part of a team.

His qualifications are an asset both for work in FDD and for assignments involving personal contacts and utilizing spoken Russian.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 25 October 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Is at present on detached duty. Will be dhown copy on his return.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 25 October 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry & Materials Section	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edwin R. Strakna

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This supervisor tends to rate a little high in his over-all evaluations; Mr. Tarasoff's performance is not*outstanding in every respect; however, he is a superior employee, and has an unusual amount of native common sense and intelligence insight.

*literally

DATE 25 October 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T Bielefeldt Talbot Bielefeldt

SECRET

31 OCT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Seen by OD/CSB

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	19477

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE CS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION CD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (For. Doc)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT CO/FDD/WSR Branch

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Oct 59-30 Sep 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for information on a wide range of industrial subjects for use in his own and others' reports	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes intelligence information reports on chemical, metallurgical, construction, and power machinery	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Handles special projects, oral and written, as required	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

His native Russian language facility is of tremendous assistance to the section and
the agency. His rapid scanning of Soviet documents for his own projects turns up
valuable bits of information on other subjects, which he is always careful to refer
to the proper persons. He is always ready to assist with language problems and if
he ~~doesn't~~ know the answer he exhausts all possible means to find it. He is called
on for special branch or division projects involving reverse translation, and he has
held a number of TDY assignments requiring spoken Russian. The morsels of intelligence
gleaned for his own reports from the masses of material which he scans are briefly and
tersely stated. Is a systematic worker, keeps good files, and avoids duplication.
Plans and organizes his activities carefully so that he always manages to complete a
project well ahead of the target date. Has constant informal contact with all his
consumers and goes to any length to give them what they want, provided that their
request is reasonable and justifiable. If they ask for something which he knows is
of no value or which has been duplicated elsewhere, he has no difficulty in persuading
them to cancel the requirement, since they have learned that they can trust his work
and his genuine desire to help. It is not hard to discern that he sometimes gets
bored with the monotony of his work, but an occasional tour of TDY is generally
sufficient to revive his enthusiasm for another year at his desk. Has an uneven
temperament, sometimes gloomy and sometimes bantering, but only rarely does this
affect his working relationships.

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MAIL ROOM

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 52	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Employee on TDY

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 25 Oct 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Materials and Industry Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 28 October 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Talbot Bielefeldt Bielefeldt

SECRET

Seen by OD/CSR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 [illegible] 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
19,477

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Tarasoff, Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Documents)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 Oct 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 20 Nov 58-30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for intelligence information on a wide range of industrial subjects	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes reports based on the above material	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does special scanning, translation, and research jobs as required	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Shows skill and good judgment in extracting data on a wide range of technical subjects from Soviet documents, which he scans with great rapidity. His written reports based on this material present good intelligence information. However, they suffer slightly from small inaccuracies in syntax and grammar, and there are occasional passages where the meaning is vague or the logical connection between facts has not been made clear. This type of passage may be further complicated by his lack of native familiarity with the precise English idiom and his tendency sometimes to use the wrong connective. However, any such failings in the use of English are entirely offset by his superior knowledge of Russian. His promptness in submitting reports and in completing other assignments is exceptional. Maintains close relations with consumers and goes out of his way to fill all their requirements to the letter. His greatest asset to the section, branch, and division is his native Russian fluency and his knowledge of the USSR. He not only serves as consultant and authority on ~~XX~~ the Russian language for the section and branch, but takes on extra jobs as translator or interpreter as required by the division or the agency. His natural intelligence has enabled him to do on-the-spot or rush jobs in fields in which he has had no background. He continues to learn and to retain his knowledge. During a period when his well-deserved promotion was blocked because of the lack of a slot, a situation which was unfortunate but the fault of no one in his office, he became a bit rebellious and reluctant to take on extra duties which he otherwise would have accepted. He feels, and rightly so, that he is capable of more challenging and perhaps more interesting assignments which require the use of spoken Russian. Every opportunity has been given him to find such a permanent assignment, and he has just been on extended TDY involving such activities.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 29 Oct 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 3 yrs, 4 mo	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify)

DATE 28 Oct 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Industry and Materials ~~XXXXXX~~ Section, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

x I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 29 October 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE T. Bielefeldt TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF, Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION CD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OC/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (Foreign Doc)		
7. GRADE GS-09	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 December 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 20 Nov 58	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Sec. USSR Br. Chief, Materials & Industry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

DATE
11-26-58
12 1/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 29 Nov 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the space below up to six of the most important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 21 9 00 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Scans Soviet documents for intelligence material on a wide range of technical fields	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintains technical files	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes technical reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Serves as language consultant	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job. Works hard. Reads Russian rapidly and looks out for material of interest to others as he scans. Is adaptable and flexible and handles several different technical fields with equal facility. Can tackle almost any subject without previous experience and turn out a good job. His native knowledge of Russian is of considerable benefit to the whole section. Selects the salient points from masses of useless or repetitive material with intelligent judgment, and compiles reports which are pointed and concise. His only deficiency of any consequence is the slight awkwardness and occasional lack of clarity in his written English style. His English has improved considerably during the past two years, but sometimes the failure to use the most precise term or the right connective complicates for the reader a conception which is perfectly clear to the writer.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Not necessarily better suited, but a position requiring the use of native Russian speaking ability would also be suitable.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) TARASOFF	(First) Boris	(Middle) D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1908	3. SEX M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION OD					

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: 00/FDD/USSR Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO (Foreign Doc)
7. GRADE: GS-09
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 December 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)*: 21 November 1957 - 20 November 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
20 Nov 58	Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch	Sec. USSR Br. Chief, Materials & Industry

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
20 Nov 1958	Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION.

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 454 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
28

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL Should have been promoted months ago, but has been prevented by lack of a slot. His inherent intelligence should enable him to learn rapidly any new fields, processes, or policies required. He is patient in dealing with people, and goes out of his way to help those who come to him for assistance. He has the ability to carry responsibility without worrying about it.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
[illegible]
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is anxious to have a tour of duty overseas, and since he has not been able to advance in his present job because of conditions beyond his control, his efforts to find such a position have not been discouraged.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

After a single tour of overseas duty, which he will not accept unless his wife can accompany him without losing her CIA status, he would like to settle down permanently in the U.S.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section 'A' below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): TARASOFF Boris D.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 November 1908
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/USSR Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer
7. GRADE: GS-9
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN CL. OR "D", A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 13 Nov 57
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	Ju	13 NOV
Reviewed by DUP	Pelt	11/19/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 15 Nov 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Talbot Bielefeldt T. Bielefeldt
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I)
1 NOV 55
REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC [illegible] this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rate[illegible] the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

[illegible]CTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes Soviet documents and selects intelligence information	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Compiles intelligence reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Serves as consultant on linguistic matters	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present jo

Minor difficulties with English usage do not prevent him from turning out reports which are concise and to the point. Ideas are in general clearly formulated, although there are occasional instances of inexactness of expression. Because of his native facility in the Russian language, on the other hand, he is frequently consulted on all levels throughout the branch on matters involving interpretation of the foreign text. He is not an eager beaver, and because of his language fluency can accomplish as much as others in less time and with less effort. Probably works at full capacity only under pressure, and for this reason some of his best contributions have been on special projects with target dates, several of which have covered material outside his field of responsibility. His disposition is generally patient, stable, and unruffled.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

Although present performance is entirely satisfactory, he is not in a position here to utilize fully his Russian language speaking facility.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 13 12 10 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) TARASOFF (First) Boris (Middle) D.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 November 1908
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/USSR Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer
7. GRADE: GS-9
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 11 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 November 1956 - 20 November 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
13 Nov 57	Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	Chief, Industrial Sec USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
15 Nov 57	Alfred Bielefeldt Bielefeldt	Chief, USSR Branch

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MA[illegible], ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AN[illegible]
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE
BY
Posted Pos. Control
11/19/57

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

16

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
[illegible]
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Because of his innate capacity I would judge that after initial adjustments, and with application, he will always be able to meet the requirements [illegible] situation. His day to day activities will not always give evidence of this versatility, and it may sometimes come as a surprise.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

He is now getting teaching experience by teaching one class in Basic Russian and another in Russian Conversation.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Because of his age, he would like to have a tour of overseas service within the next two or three years, before he settles down here to a permanent assignment.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS: HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	/	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.
FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit
this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordi-
nate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his
strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except
under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing
any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of
Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

GENERAL

SECTION A.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-OD
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 Dec 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 56 - 20 Nov 56	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☒ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

CERTIFICATION

SECTION B.

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ~~☐ HAS NOT~~ BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: ~~Supervisor temporarily in another office.~~

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 4 Dec 56	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E/ Deutsch Rosamund E. Deutsch	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY gw DATE 12-11-56
Posted Pos. Control 402
Reviewed by PUD 12/19

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 10 Dec 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T. Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION C.

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 11 10 12 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 extracts information from Soviet documents	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 compiles technical intelligence reports	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 maintains files of machine models and plants	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

I feel that Mr. T. has not yet been on the job long enough to demonstrate his maximum capacities. Although he came with no background in his specialized field, he has shown considerable facility in acquiring technical information and building up his technical vocabulary. He has a good eye for intelligence. Although he has not native English fluency, his reports are pointed, concise, and, except for occasional minor points of grammar, very well expressed indeed. Owing to his persistence and application, he was rated second highest in a class in English usage. Soon after his EOD, the analyst whom Mr. T. was assisting was transferred, leaving him with full responsibility for covering a field which was still very new to him. He has done an exceedingly good job under the most unpropitious circumstances. He needs to develop fuller utilization of varied research methods, but this will be easier as he becomes more familiar with the materials and problems with which he has to deal. His native Russian fluency is a decided asset. He is calm, cooperative, and easy to work with.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

His native Russian fluency might be better utilized in some other type of position, although his performance on his present job is entirely satisfactory.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) TARASOFF Boris D.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 2 Nov 1908	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-OD
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OO/FDD/USSR Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Foreign Documents Officer		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 11 Dec 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) June 1956 - 20 Nov 56	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☒ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 4 Dec 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Rosamund E. Deutsch Rosamund E Deutsch	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Industrial Section, USSR Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO

A. THIS DATE 10 Dec 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Talbot Bielefeldt T Bielefeldt	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, USSR Branch

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	0	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify) For the reasons stated on the Performance Report, I feel it is not possible to make a fair estimate of his supervisory potential at this time.

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR

4 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 10 12 AM '56
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

I feel ~~xx~~ very definitely that Mr. Tarasoff's overall potential~~s~~ are greater than he has had an opportunity to show thus far. This will doubtless be reflected in his next evaluation.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Since Mr. T. has been on duty such a short time, present plans are simply to give him further training in his present job and to allow him to develop to his maximum capacity there. He will soon be enrolled in the I.O.C.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

His native Russian fluency should be taken into account.

REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS: I do not think he so nearly average in all respects as indicated in Sec. I, below. I do not know him well enough to disagree with most of the ratings, but I would rate him "4" on items 7, 15 and 29, at least. Quiet, unobtrusive, modest, cooperative. Have seen few indications of initiative, but such not to be expected while he is learning a new job; no reason to assume incapable of initiative. T.Bielefeldt

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

Se.N9 655

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : CSPS
CCS/NOC
Office of Security
CI Staff

SUBJECT : Summary of Agency Employment -
Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff. [redacted]

1. Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, a Translator/Transcriber with the Agency since February 1956, will retire effective 30 November 1970. Your approval is requested for him to use the attached employment history.

2. For your information, we have been advised by the Mexico City Station that once Mr. Tarasoff has retired to Guadalajara, Mexico, except for establishing new social relationships, he will probably not be asked to go into any detail about his past cover jobs that would require anyone to call upon these firms for backstopping confirmation. In the event he should become involved in any post-retirement activities that might require checking into his past, Mr. Tarasoff will contact Headquarters for instructions.

Richard B. Wright
Chief, WH Support

Attachment:
Employment Resume

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Summary of Agency Employment - Mr. Boris D. Tarasoff, [redacted]

CONCUR:

Carl F. Taylor
C/CSPS — 4 Nov 70 Date

C/CCS — 6 Nov 70 Date

Carpenter for
Director of Security — 10 Nov 70 Date

for Fred E Hubbard
C/CI Staff — 18 Nov 70 Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by USJPRS Bureau/Standards, Dept of Commerce Wash, D.C. ~~I joined~~ USJPRS on Western Avenue in ~~Washington, D.C., which is a company under contract to the Dept. of State, the Dept. of Defense and on occasion to the Dept. of the Interior (fish hatcheries division)~~. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for scientific subjects. Also, I was [illegible] ~~hired~~ by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA XXXXXXXX and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously. ~~I was also connected by mail with a Linguistics Studies firm, Room 212, 419 Boylston St., Boston 16, Mass. Frequently some of my friends from USJPRS would send me some special articles for translation. I would charge the above organizations in accordance with the time spent in translating. This amounted to roughly $10,000.00 a year.~~

H MMT-10577

1956-1959: I worked for various establishments in Washington, D.C., as a translator from Russian into English, such as the Library of Congress, and various other translating firms, which abound in Washington, with a salary varying in accordance with the output of translated material, from $500.00 to 1,000.00 per month.

1959-1963: I was employed by USJPRS Bureau of Standards, Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D.C. I worked as an analyst and translator, at home most of the time, translating and analyzing articles from newspapers and technical magazines. I was paid $8.00 for 1,000 words for ordinary material, $10.00 for technical and $12.00 for the scientific subjects. Also, I was utilized by the Dept. of State to be an interpreter for two Soviet delegations at $25.00 per diem plus expenses. I spent five weeks with each of them.

1963-1970: After leaving USJPRS I came to Mexico with my wife and children to avoid the weather extremes of the USA and to look into possibilities of profitable investments that could aid me financially after my retirement. My income during this period came from annuities and the moneys lent to my brother-in-law in Cleveland, Ohio, who is a successful real estate man and the owner of an amusement machines business (Cadillac Music Co.) in which I had invested some money previously.

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): [illegible] [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): 1908

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: [illegible]

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

X [redacted]

DATE

14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-[illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

3 JUN 1965

Tarasoff. Boris D.

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : **Retirement Planning**

1. The established policy of the Agency favors early retirement of its employees who, as you know, are normally expected to retire when they become eligible for a full annuity. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and planning, and you should therefore know that you will be eligible for retirement, according to our records, during **November, 1970.**

2. Planning ahead can bring about, with each passing year, definite progress toward your retirement goals. The Agency is anxious to assist you in planning for your retirement. It is even more important, as an employee, that you begin now to plan for this occasion.

3. You deserve to know as much as possible about the general subject of retirement and more specifically about the retirement policy itself, your annuity, life and health insurance protection, opportunities for other employment, Social Security benefits, and educational materials available on the subject. The Agency feels that this type of information and advisory service should be made available to you at least five years prior to the date of your eligibility.

4. You are requested to call the Executive Secretary of the Board, Mr. Howard G. Phillips, on extension 6872 to arrange an appropriate time to discuss any plans you may have and benefits available to you upon retirement.

/s/ Howard G. Phillips

Lawrence R. Houston
Chairman
Agency Retirement Board

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) [redacted]	DATE (from item S-1) 15 Oct '64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Herbert Manell	DATE (from item S-2) 22 Oct 1964
DATE RECEIVED A[redacted]	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT-4961	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 1908	2. SERVICE DESIGN D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Intell Officer GS-11	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico D.F. Mexico	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 5 June 1963	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 5-6 Dec. 1965	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 13 Dec 1965	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 Jan. 1966

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Wife - 43
Son - 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

There are no health or other personal circumstances perventing a return to post or assignment to another foreign post. However two factors, of operational and personal nature, should be considered: Subject and family have already initiated and are in the process of completing the relatively complicated procedure of legalizing their continued residency in Mexico as "rentistas" (retired persons). Secondly, Subject's son's secondary school education is being completed in Mexico. Transfer to another foreign post could negatively affect the completion of his secondary schooling.

9. (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

1. Translation and transcription of Soviet technical product.

2. Preparation of characterization and assessment studies on the local Soviet complement.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

If returned to post for a second tour, continuation of Spanish language instruction.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

N.A.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[2] EXTEND TOUR 18 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ~~30 November 1966~~ (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Spain 2ND CHOICE Uruguay 3RD CHOICE Buenos Aires

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION (Please note that planned departure is Dec 65, due to factor that son finishes his school year on 30 Nov 65.)

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

The Station recommends and urges that Headquarters approve Subject's return to Station. His performance meets every Station requirement. For Subject's work, continuity is essential to obtain maximum effective product.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that FEINGLASS' tour of duty in Mexico City be extended until December 1965 as requested in section 6 B, and that he return for a second tour of duty following home leave.

DATE ______ TITLE C/WH/PERS SIGNATURE ROBERT D. CASHMAN

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:
Approved extension to end of 1965 followed by home leave and second tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMMS-3905 DATED: 22 Dec 1964
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

Dwight M. Collins/gf

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Dwight M. Collins (SIGNATURE) DATE: 22 Dec 1964

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C. Bustos
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 17 Feb 64

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12.62

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

17 FEB 64 20 04z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH-8
INFO : CCS-3, OP-2, CI/OA, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 01920

REF: MEXI 8219 (IN 19281)*

HDQS HAS POLICE STATEMENT OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR [redacted] HAS NOTARIZED STATEMENT FROM BANK ATTESTING ANNUAL DEPOSITS $5,500. SINCE BANK WOULD NOT INCLUDE IN LETTER MORE THAN ACTUAL DEPOSITS, HDQS OBTAINED NOTARIZED LETTER FROM COVER DIVISION NOTIONAL FIRM STATING FEINGLASS HAS YEARLY INCOME $6,000 FROM VARIOUS INVESTMENT SOURCES HANDLED BY THEM. HDQS PLANNING MAIL THESE THREE DOCS TO MEXI CONSULATE ASKING THEM AUTHENTICATE DOCUMENTS AND MAIL TO PO BOX WASHINGTON WHICH USED BY DYVOUR. UPON RECEIPT HDQS WILL POUCH MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Requested what action Hdqs taking to get bank statement for FEINGLASS to facilitate his processing a rentista petition.

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

CCG/NC Baladeau (by phone)
WH/PERS ~~Baladeau~~ RENEHAN (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Tiscall Brid [redacted]

15 JUN 1963
~~26~~

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted] ________

[illegible] have been [illegible] to you while [illegible] and obligations [illegible]

2. [illegible] Staff Agent Personnel [illegible] $8575.00 [illegible] GS 11^3 ________, respectively [illegible] allowances and [illegible] variations [illegible]

(a) [illegible] your cover [illegible] the gross [illegible] from this organization [illegible] except as [illegible] you as a Staff Agent [illegible] is to be remitted [illegible] period [illegible] specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20 [illegible] or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated [illegible] For your information [illegible] payments due you [illegible] Federal income taxes [illegible] added to the income taxes withheld [illegible] withholdings normally made from [illegible] this organization [illegible] you will be [illegible] with HB 20 66 [illegible] procedures to be followed [illegible] for [illegible] taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization [illegible] due you an amount equal [illegible] your gross salary [illegible] Fund This amount [illegible] this organization [illegible] you will be [illegible] satisfactory [illegible]

d) [illegible] allowance will [illegible]

[illegible] your position [illegible] Security For [illegible] such contr[illegible] contributions for [illegible] and [illegible] may be con[illegible] such case a[illegible] you receive as a result of your participation in such program[illegible] be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information, currently this premium pay is ten per cent of your base salary [illegible] additional taxable compensation to you and [illegible] payable for that period of time you are assigned under nonofficial cover.

3. [illegible] You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organizational issuances.

4. [illegible] You will be entitled to travel, transportation [illegible] in accordance with the regulations of this organization [illegible] integrated personnel will be [illegible] cover organizations [illegible]

5. [illegible] You hereby agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of **two years** from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, [illegible] expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED [redacted]

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Personnel Officer

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: See # [illegible] and [illegible] for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]
DIVISION: [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] 1963

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[illegible]
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT:
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3135-5700-1000
3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff employee 20 Feb 1956 - Present CS-11
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: [illegible]
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: [illegible]
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): [illegible]
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D.C.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 5109 [illegible]th St., N.W., Wash., D.C.
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 40
Son, 14
Dau, 17
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO
RELATIONSHIP:
Brother
Wife

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): N.A.
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: Enl.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: CS-11³ $8575
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ---
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING:

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS w/family $3,000
32. POST: ---
33. OTHER: Allowances applicable to staff agent under non-official cover.
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ---

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, U.S., 40, 5 May 1923
Son, U.S., 14, 20 Mar 1949
Dau, U.S., 17, 22 Dec 1945

[illegible] Agent Panel
3 June 63
[illegible] Collins
Secretary, [illegible] Agent Panel

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER:
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]
DIVISION: WH/3
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 6024,6211
DATE: 16 May 1963

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All benefits applicable to Staff Agent
Non-official cover premium pay.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☒ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
N.A. ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION Indefinite ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE 31 May 1963

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) ---

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION
Per Agency regulation ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)
FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Translator - Russian, Spanish

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

20 Feb 56 - Sep 1962 - FDD/USSR Branch/ Hqs
Sep 62 - Present - Full time Spanish Language Training

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☒ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Russian	X			X			X		
Spanish		X			X			X	
All Slavic languages intermediate on Agency exams									

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
Russia

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

USSR, Turkey, All Western Europe in war, 6 mos Mexico

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING.

See staff employee official file

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTER [illegible]

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Tarasoff, Boris Dimitri

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Nov. 1908

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
CIA	56	02	20				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U. S. ARMY	1941	2	3	1945	Oct	20	Honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

20 Feb. 1956
(DATE)

Boris D. Tarasoff
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 20th day of Feb. (MONTH) 195 5 at Washington, D. C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 4 yrs, 8 mo, 18 days

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	56	02	20
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	4	08	18
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	51	06	02

verified
4/29/57

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) *(Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7)*			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—66459-1

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	(Last) TARASOFF	(First) BORIS	(Middle) DIMITRI	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 079-05-9624

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED 5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) 5109 - 45 St. N.W., Wash. D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE as above	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE as above

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Cleveland, Ohio	DATE OF MARRIAGE
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE na	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED na	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
na

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Anna	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 5109 - 45 St., N.W. Wash D.C.	TELEPHONE NO. 363-1944	

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Barbara	as above	f	22 Dec 45
Raymond		m	20 Mar 49

NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) TARASOFF, DIMITRI	ADDRESS deceased	TELEPHONE NO.
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) TARASOFF, [illegible]	ADDRESS deceased	TELEPHONE NO.

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Mrs. E.C. CONELLA

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) CONELLA, HENRY Mrs	RELATIONSHIP SISTER-IN-LAW
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 31599 GATESMILLS BLVD, PEPPERPIKE, OHIO	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

LIST NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST COMPANY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BORIS D. + ANNA TARASOFF

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

in our own possession

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

[illegible] [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] Blvd [illegible], Ohio

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington D.C.	29 May 1963	Boris D Tarasoff

CONFIDENTIAL

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAR 15 1956 (DATE) I have attended the Induction Course specified by Regulation 25-110.

BORIS DIMITRI TARASOFF
(NAME) - Please print

☐ CLERICAL ☐ STENOGRAPHIC ☑ OTHER

OFFICE DDP / FI

GS- 7 (Grade)

FORM NO. 487 REPLACES FORM 31-121
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(61)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Boris Dimitri Tarasoff, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

20 Feb. 1956 (Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 20th day of Feb., A. D. 1956;

at Washington, D. C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) WESLEY HALL 426, 21st STR. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH NOV. 2 1905.

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) EKATERINOSLAV RUSSIA

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY ANNA TARASOFF

(B) RELATIONSHIP WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 16315 BEVIL WAY, SAN LEANDRO CALIF.

(D) TELEPHONE NO. BR 6-0172

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
	HAVE YOU RECEIVED OR DO YOU EXPECT TO RECEIVE A LUMP SUM [illegible] FROM FEDERAL OR D.C. GOVERNMENT SERVICE?
	☐ YES ☐ NO
	HAS LEAVE [illegible] BY SUCH PAYMENT EXPIRED?
	☐ YES ☐ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee*.—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age*.—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship*.—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family*.—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55100-8

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                                                       GS -12   D    nH    AA0810500310
019477  [redacted]                                     SCHD-GR  SD   ORG      AA-ITEM
EMP#                 NAME

                                                             EC004ZUZI845    VF061ZUXXX45
   AE0100014936    AB0020200023    VR00G99HAF23 ---------- TA04G99HAU26
   EC00G99HRK45    VJ06G99HBK45    PH206SYXJK51    FL005SYKAA40
   TC00G99HAK54    PM004SAUXA56    BQ2740504457    BQ301       60
   BK5070000467    BQ2110111459    BQ5455555357    BC5733433257
   BQ361       59  BQ5111111459    ZM5 XXXXXX69
   BQ6033433257    ZYP169690000
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"Retired Nov 1979
"Not Recd for Reserve"

71 [illegible] (F)

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

1 FEB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

119477

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Return to QAB 1A04 Curie

THIS DATE: 19[illegible], 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

DATE 25 OCT 1957

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, BORIS DIMITRI

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.	3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E. Washington, D.C.
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER LUdlow 4-1380	5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S. Tarasoff, Anna	2. RELATIONSHIP wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 2819 - Gainsville Str. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER LUdlow 4-1380	6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER EXecutive 3 - 6115	7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION 8491

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)	(Last)
	Anna		Adamoviez	Tarasoff

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE 10 March 1945	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country) Cleveland, Ohio

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 13610 - Benwood Ave., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO	8. DATE OF DEATH	9. CAUSE OF DEATH

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE [illegible] OCT 1957

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 2819 - Gainsville Str., S.E., Washington, D.C.

11. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 1923	12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY	14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country) U.S.A.	16. DATE ACQUIRED At birth	17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

18. OCCUPATION Temporary clerical position	19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers) CIA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 2430 - E Street, Washington, D.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
~~3 Feb 1941 — 20 Oct 1945~~

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
~~Army~~

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
~~U.S.A.~~

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Anacostia National Bank	2844 - Alabama Ave, S.E., Washington, D.C

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

I had been adjudged bankrupt by the U.S. District Court of New York on 29 Oct 1940 in the case of Orel Delicateesen, 1456 Lexington Ave. N.Y.C.

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)* U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER *(Specify)*: Naturalized

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		BACHELOR'S DEGREE
	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
X	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS		MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Russian University of N.Y., N.Y.C.	General		1924	1926			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
Cooper Union Art School in New York City	Fine Arts	1927	1927	10
Cooper School of Art in Cleveland, Ohio	Commercial Art	1950	1951	21

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
MITC Camp Richie, Md	CIC Course	1944	1945	2
University of Penn. Philad. Pa.	German Language, CIC	April	1945	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

Advanced CIC Course, Oberursel, Germany, in July 1945

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE". INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Russia (Ukraine)	General	1908 - 1920	Native			
Turkey (Istambul area)	General	1920 - 1923	Yes			
Germany (U.S.Zone)	General	May 1945 -Oct 1945				U.S. Army

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE
Russia - I am a native of that country
Turkey - I lived there as a stateless person for 3 years
Germany - I was with the U.S. Army of Occupation

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) 30
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Badminton - fair, Soccer - Fair, Photography - good, Philately - good, Oil-painting - good, Reading - good.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK My training and experience with the CIC would indicate the type of work for which I am best qualified.

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Public Speaking and public relations experience on the Executive Board of Greater Alameda County C.I.O. Council

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Chairman of the Circle of Youth "Russian Culture", New York, N.Y. 1937 - 1940
The National CIC Association, 1956 - present

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 2 Mar 1956 to 27 Jun 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FI/CI/ICD
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Research, analysis, and translation of materials in the Russian Language, including extensive work with microfilmed materials.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 27 Jun 1956 - 9 Sep 1956
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Reading newspapers and periodicals, abstracting information of intelligence value and compiling it into reports.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): 9 Sep 1956 - present
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OO/FDD/BU
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Foreign Documents Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Abstraction of intelligence information from Soviet newspapers and periodicals and compiling it into reports.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF ... APR 22 1 52 PM '57

SECTION XIII — **CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS**

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sisters, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Anna Tarasoff	wife	1923		x	USA	2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E., Washington, D.C.
Barbara Tarasoff	duaghter	1945		x	USA	same as above
Raymond Tarasoff	son	1949	x		USA	same as above

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

EOD Date: 20 Feb 1956

Places of residence:

18 Feb 1956 - 7 Jul 1956	Wesley Hall, 1426 21st Str., Washington, N.W., D.C.
7 Jul 1956 - 1 Dec 1956	3605 - Minnesota Ave. S.E., Washington, D.C.
1 Dec 1956 - Present	2819 - Gainsville Str. S.E., Washington, D.C.

DATE COMPLETED 10 April 1957	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Boris D. Tarasoff

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

June 12, 1955
Date

1. I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures.

2. I agree to honor the requests of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to my application for employment or rendition of services whether it be accepted or rejected.

3. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in the Central Intelligence Agency, unless specifically authorized by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. I agree not to disclose processing procedures I have observed in the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application for employment to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Boris D. Tarasoff
Signature

Witness

FORM NO. 270
1 OCT 54

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

[illegible]

14-00000

15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALL PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 28 May 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Request for Security Clearance dated 28 May 1963

CASE NO. : 104887

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT Saradeth, Pierre D.
[redacted]

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-11, by DDP/WH/3, in the capacity of

Operations Officer at Mexico City, Mexico.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

WAOsborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-40)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 14 December 1955

Your Reference: C-1235 DDP FI

Case Number: 104887

TO: Chief, Records & Services Division
Personnel Office

FROM: Chief/Security Division
Personnel

SUBJECT: TARASOFF, Boris Dimitri

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of EOD procedures.

EB McNamara advised 12/16/55
~~Tat~~
will call

[illegible]

Ermal P. Geiss
Ermal P. Geiss
MJ

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(5)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

ILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: OCONNELL, JAMES
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 PM 12SEP78		PAT ORR	
2 [illegible] SEP 1978		ORR	

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OCONNELL, JAMES P.
TERMINATED 84

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OPF

6-29

28 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Intelligence Medal of Merit for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Intelligence Medal of Merit has been approved for Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

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DD/M&S 3362 OPF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

73-4966

DATE 10 August 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO. 009784	NAME (Last-First-Middle) O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	BIRTHYEAR 1917	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT D-M&S/OS	SD SS	SCHEDULE GS	GRADE 16	STATION

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1965 - June 1973

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his especially meritorious service with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 21 years. Mr. O'Connell's broad knowledge of Agency security activities and his unusual executive talent are factors that have been instrumental in his making a truly significant contribution to the mission of this Agency. Throughout his career, Mr. O'Connell, an unusually dedicated officer, has consistently displayed a high degree of professionalism, reflecting great credit on him and the United States Government.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by A-DD/M&S on 16 July 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

27 AUG 1973

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ John F. [illegible]

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD John F. Blake

SIGNATURE (Signed on Original)

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER R. Austin, Jr.

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(4)

OFF

SECTION A

003764 O'CONNELL, James P[illegible]

Security 7041

1333 Elsinore Ave, McLean, Virginia 22[illegible]

U.S.

Intelligence Medal of Merit

June 1973

Virginia

Wife

SECTION B

20. FULL NAME

24. FULL NAME

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED

26. LOCATION

27. INCLUSIVE DATES

28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED

SECTION C

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE

Deputy Director for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location)

Office of Security, Headquarters

36. Executive direction and supervision of all Office of Security activities in the areas of physical, technical, and overseas security for the Agency. This additional [illegible] included the supervision and guidance to area Security Officers assigned to other Agency components throughout the world. This position re[illegible] providing advice [illegible] to [illegible]

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED

September 19[illegible] - June 1973

40. FULL NAME

42. GRADE

44. FULL NAME

OPP

SECTION [illegible]

Award for [illegible] Act or an Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? [illegible] was outstanding, and if it was more [illegible] expected. [illegible]

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character [illegible] for which recommended. Give complete [illegible] of administrative, technical, or [illegible] and responsibilities [illegible] Include dates of assignment and results [illegible] the individual [illegible] If appropriate, [illegible] results of achievement, [illegible] or performance. Include reference to [illegible] Letters of Commendation, or other documents [illegible] on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified copies.

Mr. James P. O'Connell has responsibility for providing executive direc[illegible] and guidance to a highly sensitive and complex area of Agency security. This [illegible] physical, technical and overseas security ar[illegible] since August 1968. Previ[illegible] this he served in the positions of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, As[illegible] Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support and as Chief, Regional [illegible] Officer for the Far East. All of these positions required not only a broad [illegible]edge of Agency and security activities but also an unusual executive ability, which [illegible] O'Connell's case has been consistently rated as "Strong" to "Outstanding." [illegible] evidence of his many contributions and dedication to the Agency and Office [illegible] are the many kudos he has received to date. He received commendations in 19[illegible] in 1959, in 1961, 1965, 1969; letters of appreciation in 1969, 1971, and 1973. [illegible] space and the sensitivity of many of these recognitions do not permit a full and co[illegible] analysis, they are indicative of the caliber of professionalism and dedication [illegible] has been expected of him.

In summation, Mr. O'Connell has demonstrated, particularly after assum[illegible] executive responsibilities in this Office, an unusual and selfless dedication and profes[illegible] that has [illegible] a hallmark of his service to this Agency and the country. [illegible] record to date [illegible] difficult to emulate and is a distinct credit to the Office and [illegible]ency.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR [illegible] AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES [illegible] HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE [illegible]

1. [illegible]

2.

3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY Charles W. Kane	48. [illegible] OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Deputy [illegible] of Security	49. DATE [illegible] JUL 1973

SECTION E [illegible]

50. HEAD OF Security CAREER SERVICE (Career Service of nominee)	[illegible]	[illegible] JUL 1973
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	[illegible] Services	
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	[illegible] Management & Services	[illegible] 73

CIF

36. Duties and Responsibilities. (Continued)

senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters with senior advisor status to the Director of Security. The incumbent also formulated, recommended and implemented security policies, procedures and measures to protect the security integrity of Agency activities.

[illegible] 201

4 September 1973

Mr. James P. O'Connell
1333 Elsinore Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. O'Connell:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

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Originator:
Director of Personnel

OP/RAD/ROB/PJS/lks

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 JUN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - **Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr.**

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Grade : **GS-16** Position : **Security Officer**
Career Service : **Security**
Office/Division : **Office of Security**
Date Requested for Retirement : **29 June 1973**
Age at that Date : **56**
Years of Creditable Service : **27**
Years of Agency Service : **21**
Years of Qualifying Service : **5**

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

/s/ Harry B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Deputy Director for Management and Services

Date

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OP/RAD/ROB/DEChickering:bew/3257 (29 June 1973)

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

NAME: James P. O'Connell
ADDRESS: 1333 Elsinore Avenue, McLean, Virginia
HOME TELEPHONE: 356-9666

Central Intelligence Agency December 1951 - June 1973

Employment consisted of:

Executive direction, supervision and acted as principal advisor on physical, technical and overseas security matters. This entailed global responsibilities in providing security support for all Agency activities and operations.

Formulated and recommended security policies and procedures on an Agency-wide basis along with providing advice and guidance to senior Agency officials on a broad range of security matters.

Executive supervision of Agency investigative and operational intelligence support, some of which are unique to foreign intelligence operations. This required providing guidance and direction to such activities and ensuring the investigative efforts or supportive functions adequately fulfilled the needs of Agency-wide security.

Principal senior security liaison contact with other U.S. Government agencies and departments engaged in security and counterintelligence efforts.

Senior Security Officer responsible for providing overall personnel, physical, and technical security protection for Agency intelligence operations, facilities, and personnel in the Far East area.

Senior Investigator responsible for planning and reviewing investigative efforts in the tri-state area of Washington, D.C. and in the support of foreign intelligence operations. This included support to the Agency's employment and personnel security program and required liaison with Federal, state, and local officials who could assist in such activities.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., JR. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM)CANCELLATION N.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 29 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271-0500-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DD/M&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): OS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16/7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000 ✓
18. REMARKS:

Subject's last working day is 29 June 1973.

cc/CSB - info
cc/payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley, C/A&TS/PB
DATE SIGNED: 6/21/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17 ✓
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE 0
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: BJ, 00, 0, 0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: BB 6-28-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 21 June '73

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

03 JUL 1973

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 June 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 24 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3271 0500 [illegible]
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect.203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY. CODE:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MOOTRS CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: BB
46. O.P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 6/?/73
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
SECRET
(4)
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

OP-1 1-71

20 JUN 1973

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

73-0574

7 February 1973

73-2641

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 22101

Dear Mr. Schlesinger

Please convey to Mr. Howard J. Osburn, your Director of Security, my sincere appreciation for the excellent briefing which was recently provided for me by personnel of the Office of Security. The briefing and technical demonstrations accompanying it were both personally informative and professionally rewarding.

A special note of thanks is due to Mr. Ermal Geiss, Deputy Director of Security, Mr. James O'Connell, Deputy Director for Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security, and Mr. Edward F. Sayle, Chief, Special Activities Operations Branch. Their considerate attention, sincere interest, and cooperative spirit were deeply appreciated.

Sincerely

William A. Temple
WILLIAM A. TEMPLE
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

CONFIDENTIAL

1 MAR [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: James P. O'Connell

SUBJECT : Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony

1. In a memorandum to the Deputy Director for Support, the Director of Central Intelligence expressed his thanks and appreciation to all who participated in making the Frank G. Wisner Memorial Service a dignified and tasteful ceremony. The Deputy Director for Support also expressed appreciation and thanks.

2. I wish to add my appreciation also for your contribution in making the ceremony an outstanding success.

3. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in both your Administrative and Official Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 [illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 01 | YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: .X | V TO V | | V TO CF | CF TO V | | CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271-0500

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Office of the Deputy Director

R
37

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Security Officer

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0450

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16/5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ [illegible]

18 REMARKS:

From: DDS/OS/Executive Staff/CC #0701

CC:Parrell

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley

DATE SIGNED: 19 July 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16240 | ALPHABETIC SEC

22 STATION CODE: 750B

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 | DA. 19 | YR. 17

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-1-68
MW

46 OP APPROVAL: R L Brown

DATE APPROVED: 26 JUL 1968

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITI

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 69-4658

15 OCT 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Committee on the Security of Headquarters Building in a series of twelve meetings between May and August 1969 conducted a detailed study and analysis of each facet of security of the Headquarters Building. I know that considerable time and effort were given to preparation of the detailed briefings, supplemental studies and reports, contributions to the formal report and implementation of the recommended corrective measures. I am appreciative of the efforts and contribution made by your staff to this important piece of business. Although I am sure that many of your staff have worked on this project, my attention has been drawn particularly to these officers:

Buckley, Robert
Carrico, H. Clifton
Elliott, Robert N.
Farrell, Francis M.
Fennessey, Robert E.
Geiss, Ermal P.
Good, Charles B.
Green, James P.
Griffin, Robert B.
Hayes, Robert J.
Herlihy, John F.
Kane, Edward J.
King, Joseph F.
Mantoni, Rudolfo
McCord, James W., Jr.
McGinn, John B.
O'Connell, James P.
Parr, Laurence
Petit, Alan F.
Sullivan, Arthur H.
Todd, Orin H.

2. I would appreciate it if you would pass this commendation on to the individuals concerned. Copies of this commendation have been forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in the Official Personnel File of each of the above officers.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

O'CONNELL. James P.

69-T30311

[illegible]

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John W. Coffey

I want to express my appreciation to you personally and through you to Howard Osborn and the other of your associates who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President on Friday. The arrangements were flawless; the security first-class without being intrusive. I am well aware of the amount of work and planning which went into the successful outcome. I particularly want to commend the good sense and judgment which prevailed throughout. It is easy to push people around. It is difficult to take proper precautions and at the same time make everyone feel as though it were his or her party. Thank you very much. Well done!

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Acting Executive Director

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DDS

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 January 19[illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'Connell, J[illegible] P. JR

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 | DAY 15 | YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7771-0103

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): 50 USC 403J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
Security Policy & Executive Staff
Office of the Chief

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: Security Officer

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0701

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~3~~ 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $21,415 22035

18 REMARKS:

The present incumbent, Mr. Edward J. Kane, will be reassigned, effective 29 January 1967.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt
Ernest L. Hardt
Chief, PersPr/A&TS/OS

DATE SIGNED: 20 Jan 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
33	10	16180	SEC	7503		1	02 19 15		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CS, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
				[illegible]	1			

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-26-67 [illegible]

46 O P APPROVAL: [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 23 Jan 67

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

APPLICATION FOR SERVICE CREDIT PROCESSED

THROUGH REGULAR CHANNELS PER CENTRAL

COVER.

DATE: 15 February 1966

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr. 25 February 1966

THROUGH : Head of GS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett Echols

GROUP 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 OCTOBER 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J.P. Jr.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and transfer to vouchered funds. (CORRECTION)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 26 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 0271-0300

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP. DIR. ~~&~~ INVESTIGATIONS + ~~AND~~ OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0522

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,[illegible]

18 REMARKS: Corrects effective date of previous action which read 08-15-65. to [illegible]-26-65

Date 7 OCT 1965
Security [illegible] has been granted for [illegible] request
[illegible]
Chief, Personnel Security Division

cc

15A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

15B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/[illegible]/A&TS

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SEC	[illegible]		1	02 1917	

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 DATE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16; MO. DA. YR. [illegible]

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. PROV. TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10/13/65

46 CP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 10/14/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 August 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 15 YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271-0300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP ~~DD~~ INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER (S C)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,045

18. REMARKS:

Telephonic Concurrence, Jay Newman, DDP/FE Personnel, 13 August 1965.

Date: 18 AUG 1965
Security Approval has been granted the use contemplated by this request
Steven T. Kuhn
A/Chief, Personnel Security Division

1cc Cl. Br.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest L. Hardt
Ernest L. Hardt, Chief/[illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 18 Aug 65

F
11

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16395 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 2005
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From FE B 9/27/65 [illegible]
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible] for [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 27 Sept 65

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
6-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 19

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 18 YEAR 1965

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6137-1600 ~~5271-0301~~

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
~~DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY~~
~~INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION~~
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF~~
Rejected
DDP FE Foreign Field
FE JAO OKINAWA STATION
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
SECURITY UNIT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ~~WASHINGTON, D. C.~~ Okinawa Island, US POSS

11 POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER (15)

12 POSITION NUMBER: ~~0411~~ 4171

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): CS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~2~~ 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~19,590~~ 20,245

18. REMARKS

I certify that this promotion is absolutely necessary in accordance with Action memorandum A-436, dated January 23, 1965.

SS Career Service

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: for Ernest L. Hardt, Chief, PersBr/

DATE SIGNED: 15 June 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE
20 EMPLOY CODE
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 HOURS CODE: 3
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-12-65 WR

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 12 July 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'Connell, J[illegible] P. JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 13 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS				
	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3137-7000-3361
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO-Okinawa Station
Administrative Section
Security Unit
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Okinawa Island, US POSS
11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~GS-15~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4171
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,[illegible]
18. REMARKS:

From DDP/FE/Undetermined

1 - Security
1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Lee Austin, CFE/Pers
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: H. E. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 56400 ALPHABETIC FE
22. STATION CODE: 15513
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. VOUCHERS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 2 DA. 19 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

[illegible]

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Lee Concurrence FE 9-7-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 9-11-62

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL, ~~James~~ P. Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 27 | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2137-7000-3361
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO~~- Atsugi Base~~ *
~~Administrative Section~~
~~Security Unit~~
Unassigned

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Unstationed
~~Atsugi, Japan~~

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~88-15~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000 ~~3169~~
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LD, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~3~~ 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: ~~14,360~~ 14,055

18. REMARKS

From: DDS/OS/DD Invest-Oper Sup/SS Div/OC/0370

259's submitted to Medical Staff
Subject to depart o/a 8 June 1962
Any questions inquire FE/PE/JAO-KOR x5271 H.E. Eissner
*For slotting purposes only until slots transferred to Okinawa. Subject to be physically located at Okinawa

1cc - Finance Div.
1cc Security

Security 6/1/62
MH 6/4/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: R. L. Staten ACFE/Pers
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. [illegible] CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
20	10	000 56 ~~[illegible]~~	FE	99999		3	02 19 17	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE) CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA:
EOD DATA
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PTS, 2 = 10 PTS):
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.:
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES) HEALTH INS. CODE:
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)):
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS:
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO); NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE:

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: See Career Sec
05-31-62

46. C.P. APPROVAL: MTJ
M L Abele

DATE APPROVED: 5-31-62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

28 July 1960

1. Serial No.: [illegible]
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): [illegible] J F JR
3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code: [illegible]
5. Sex: [illegible]
6. CS EOD Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code: [illegible]
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA [illegible]
10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.:
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code:
12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code: [illegible]

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
Code: 31[illegible]
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: [illegible]
16. Dept. - Field: Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code: 2
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: [illegible]
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: [illegible]
21. Grade & Step: 15 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $13,730 ~~12770~~
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible]
26. Appropriation Number: 2271 1030

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 60
28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.: [illegible] 60
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
Sec. Sup. Div., Office of the Chief
Code: 3119
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D.C.
Station Code:
33. Dept. - Field: Dept - USfld - Frgn - D Code: 2
34. Position Title: Security Officer
35. Position No.: 370
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.01
38. Grade & Step: 15-1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 13,730.00 pa
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.:
42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.:
43. Appropriation Number: 1271-1030-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Pos. Control		4 1960	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(4)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

24 X February 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M 1	12	17	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code
11	07	45	1	50 USCA 403 J					12	17	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
4	INVESTIGATOR	0187	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06 28 59	12 25 60	0271 2051 0000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT*	07	3 16 60	Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS Office of Security DD Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Office of the Chief		Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
D 2	Investigator	436.83	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15-1	$ 12,770.00 pa	SS	6 28 59	12 25 60	0271-1030

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
~~J. Marlene Reimers, Ext. 2063~~

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	D Mulcahy	

Remarks "This request for PRA is to permit the utilization of this employee's unusual background and qualification in a Headquarters assignment for a period of approximately 2 years."
H. E. Steele
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

Grade is maximum [illegible] position No. 436 and no [illegible] is contemplated [illegible] (4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

PRA

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.: 50734
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL J P JR
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 02 Da. 19 Yr. 17
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51
7. SCD: Mo. 11 Da. 07 Yr. 45
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Appt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
12. LCD: Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE

Code: 3.25

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.

Station Code: 75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -): Code 3
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: 0107
19. Serv.: CS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 15 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 12770
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59
25. PSI Due: Mo. 12 Da. 25 Yr. 60
26. Appropriation Number: 9 7100 30 041

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Transfer
VOUCHERED FUNDS

Code:

28. Eff. Date: Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: R

Code / 30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

B 11

31. Organizational Designations:

Code:

32. Location Of Official Station:

Station Code:

33. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -): Code 4
34. Position Title:
35. Position No.:
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step:
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
42. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 0271-2051-0000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): H. E. Steele, Ch., Pers. Br., A&TS/OS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Delphia Nutter Ext. 2064
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		21 DEC	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

REQUEST CHANGES BE MADE BY SECURITY ONLY

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: Mo 6 Da 25 Yr 59
V to V | X V to UV | UV to V | UV to UV
1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, James P.
3. Date of Birth: Mo 2 Da 19 Yr 17
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code:
5. Sex: Male
CS - LOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code:
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code:

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

9

14. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
Security Support Division
Support Branch, Office of the Chief

Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept.-Field (Dept - Usfld - Frgn -): D Code 2
17. Position Title: Investigator
18. Position No.: 311
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 14-3
22. Salary Or Rate: $11,835.00 pa
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade: Mo 11 Da 20 Yr 55
25. PSI Due: Mo 05 Da 15 Yr 60
26. Appropriation Number: 9-7100-[illegible]-003

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: PROMOTION
Transfer to C Funds
Code: 07
28. Eff. Date: Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

11

31. Organizational Designations:
DDS Office of Security
DD Invest & Operational Support
San Francisco Field Office

Code: 3125
32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.
Station Code: 750/3
33. Dept.-Field (Dept - Usfld - Frgn -): U Code 3
34. Position Title: Investigator
35. Position No.: 187
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.22
38. Grade & Step: 15-1
39. Salary Or Rate: $12,770.00 pa
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59
42. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 25 Yr 66
43. Appropriation Number: 9-7100-30-041

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): H. F. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	25 JUN 1959	
B. Pos. Control		27 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F.		26 June 59

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Personnel Security Division

Remarks
Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds. W-4 D-4A Forms attached.
[illegible]

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE BY SECURITY ONLY

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI
SECRET
(4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. JAMES Patrick O'CONNELL JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb '17

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6-23-55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: [illegible]
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator	T311-13 ~~[illegible]~~	Investigator T311
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-13	~~$8560.00 pa~~ 9205	GS-1810.22-14 ~~9600.00 pa~~ 10,320.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security ~~DDA-Security Office~~ DD/Invest + Operational Support ~~Special Security Division~~ Security Support Div. ~~District Field Office~~ Support Branch Off. of Chief		DD/S Office of Security DD/Invest. & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch, Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): E. W. Schmidt

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): H. E. Steele Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: C. M. [illegible]
Title: Executive Officer/OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			K		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: ~~[illegible]~~
TO: 5-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Va

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	D.H.	6/23/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION	FA	[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: [illegible] for [illegible] 11/18/55

16—[illegible]

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED
VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Patrick MR. JAMES P. O"CONNELL Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb '17	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible]/18/55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 5 JUN 1955

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T323	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator [illegible]11-13
GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $85[illegible].00 pa
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch/ Off of Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM UNVouchered Funds. W-4 Form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., ASTC, SO

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Jane Giesler Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. E. Steele
Title: Ch, Personnel Branch, ASTC, SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-SE

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-7130-30
TO: 5-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Date: 20 MAY 1955
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	5-24-55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
H C [illegible] for [illegible] 6/1/55

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 195- -FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): [illegible] JAMES Patrick [illegible], Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible] '17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 11/8/54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: [illegible] 1954

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T-25
GS-1810.22-13 $[illegible]0.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-[illegible] $8[illegible].00 pa
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Cover Support/Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District [illegible] Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Transfer [illegible] Vouchered Funds to [illegible] Vouchered Funds. [illegible] form attached.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [illegible] Ste[illegible], [illegible], Pers. [illegible], [illegible], SO
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: R. E. Stuh
Title: [illegible], [illegible], SO

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD-[illegible]

15 SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-[illegible]03-20
TO: 5-[illegible]

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): YES
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21 STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
Concurred by [illegible] 17 Nov 1954. Rec'd 3 Dec '54
Effective date [illegible] 5 Dec '54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	12/2[illegible]/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

10—67329-2

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible] Rick [illegible], JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] 1917	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST [illegible]
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) [illegible]		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 25 apr 54	

FROM—		TO—
Investigator ([illegible]) T311	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13 $[illegible].00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.[illegible]-13 $[illegible].00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp[illegible] Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE DUE 2 May 1954

TO SALARY $ 8560.00

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, [illegible]	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: [illegible]
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) [illegible] Ext. [illegible]	Title: Chief, Admin & Training [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: [illegible]-103-20 TO: [illegible]-103-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:	

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	21 apr 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950 – FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V O U C H E R E D

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES P. Fisher O'CONNELL, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 2/19/17
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 12/1/53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 20 DEC 53
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T311
~~GS-1810-13 $8300.00 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8300.00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office ~~Special Security Division~~ ~~Operations Branch~~ Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper.Support/Sp.Inquiry Section
~~Washington, D. C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*):

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, AS/TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): F. F. Cyrus, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: for Chief, A&R & Tng Staff
SA

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CS-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-7103-20
TO: 4-7103-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		12/1
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		12/7/53
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Schmidt 12/15/53

SECRET

10-67329-8

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. JAMES P. O'CONNELL, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 10/14/52

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
PROMOTION

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 9 Nov 52

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(Gen) T126.04
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 pa.
Inspection & Security Office Special Security Div. Operations Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100
FROM: 7103-00
TO: Sch. A 116

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	29 Oct 52
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY 11-3-52

PERSONNEL TION REQUEST

GISTER NUMBER

NAME O'CONNELL, James P.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 12 [illegible] 50
NATURE OF ACTION REASSIGNMENT	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator(Gen) T127.10	Investigator(Gen) T126.04-12
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa	Same
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	Same
DIVISION	Special Security Division	Same
BRANCH AND SECTION	Admin Pool - Operations Staff	Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Same
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

RECOMMENDED:

5 September 1952
DATE

EWSchmidt
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHI OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 28 Sept 52 C Taylor

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE — SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.		DATE APPROVED
NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

DATE — SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: [illegible]

ALLOTMENT: 21-3-52

CSC AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
30	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE — SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE — SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
9-[illegible]-52	

FORM NO. 37-5
NOV 1949

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

ROSTER NO.

NAME O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE MAR 31 1952
NATURE OF ACTION New Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	7-C	Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 $7040.00 pa
OFFICE	5 March 52	Inspection & Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH AND SECTION		Admin Pool Operations Staff
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐ 1810

REMARKS:

C#1915

Transfer leave from UV Funds.

Slot #7 JM

Concur for the chief of I & S Staff - W. A. Osborne Mar 5, 1952

RECOMMENDED:

13 February 1952
(DATE)

C. F. HENEY C F Heney
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. ...)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
6893		2-28-51

NEW VICE L A REAL

DATE 3/6/52 SIGNATURE Eugene P. Wilson

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2 / 239
ALLOTMENT: 710
C. S. C. AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE 3/6/52 SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE SIGNATURE JMR

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 3-10-52 SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF D Mulcahey

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mrs. Ginn 1313 L Bldg

TO : Personnel, Room ~~[illegible] "L" Building~~

DATE: 10 January 1952

FROM : Special Security Division

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr. - Administrative

1. Due to the nature of the assignment of this employee at this time, there is no objection in mentioning our Agency in connection with transferring the necessary papers and leave record from the former Agency.

2. It is requested that this be done by Personnel as soon as possible.

Ervin W. Schmidt

ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
Assistant to the Chief
Special Security Division

CONFIDENTIAL

To: CFD, Payroll Section

I hereby authorize and direct CFD Payroll Section to mail [illegible] future payroll checks to my bank to be credited to my checking account.

Name of Depositor JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.
Account No. S 8545
Name of Bank NATIONAL SAVINGS + TRUST Co.
Address of Bank NEW YORK AVE + 15 ST N.W.

James P. O'Connell Jr.
Signature of Employee

CONFIDENTIAL

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: James P. O'Connell Jr

Date: Dec. 17, 1951

14-00000

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO.: [illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): O'CONNELL, James Patrick, Jr.

Sex: M | Date of birth: 19 Feb 1917

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENTS (Exclude spouse): 2

Date: [illegible] 1951

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS: ☒

MEMBERSHIP: Dec 1954

Sep 1967 | Prop TDY

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: ☒

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-41 US Gypsum Co, Jersey City, NJ - [illegible] Clerk
1941-43; 1946-47 James P. O'Connell [illegible] Co, NYC - Foreman, Of[illegible]
1943-44 Manufacturers Machine & Tool [illegible], NYC - Warehouse Supervisor
1944-46 Military Service, US Navy, [illegible]
1947-51 Dept of Justice, FBI, DC - Special Agent

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1935-39 St John's Univ, Brooklyn, NY - [illegible]
1945 Navy [illegible], [illegible] Univ - [illegible] Code & Cipher (4 mos)
1947 FBI Academy, Quantico, Va - [illegible] (3 mo)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1952 Spec Sec Trng
1952 Nat'l Intel Orient
1954 Staff Crypto
1955 Basic Mgt
1962 Ops Support
1962 Spec Sec [illegible]
1962 [illegible] to [illegible]
1962 [illegible]
1962 Sec Off Fld Crs
1962 [illegible]
1966 [illegible]
1966 [illegible]

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE EOD [illegible] /(Continued on next page)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE			GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & [illegible]	STATION
Dec 1951	Investigator (Gen)		1810.00	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
Nov 1952	"	"	1810.00	13		[illegible]/Ops[illegible]/Ch [illegible]	"
Mar 1953	"	"	1810.00	13		[illegible]/Dep Ch, [illegible] Br	"
Oct 1953	"	"	1810.00	13	SS	[illegible]/Ops[illegible]/Ch, Spec[illegible]	"
Mar 1954	Investigator		1810.22	13	SS	[illegible]/Ch, Ops Support Br	"
Oct 1954	"		1810.22	13	SS	OS/SSD/Ch, District Fld O[illegible]	DC Field
Dec 1954	"		1810.22	13	SS	OS/SSD/Ch, Support Br	Hq
Nov 1955	"		1810.22	14	SS	" " " " "	"
Jun 1959	"		1810.22	15	SS	OS/Dep Ch, Security Sp[illegible]	"
Apr 1960	"		1810.22	15	SS	OS/Chief, Security Su[illegible]	"
Jul 1962	Security Off		1810.01	15	SS	[illegible]/FE	[illegible]
Sep 1962	"	"	1810.01	15	SS	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Apr-Jun 1965 Acting [illegible]							
Jul 1965	Security Off		[illegible]	[illegible]	SS	DDP/FE/JAO/Security Unit	"
Sep 1965	"	"	1810.01	16	SS	OS/[illegible]	Hq
Jan 1967	"	"	1810.01	16	[illegible]	OS/Ch, Security Policy & [illegible]	"
Aug 1968	"	"	1810.01	16	SS	CS/[illegible]/Deputy Director	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 1 Jun 1973

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]/cal | E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010026

22. [illegible] VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: [illegible]

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET 104 — PROFILE

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I - Continued)

EMPL. SERIAL NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible]	[illegible], Jr	[illegible]

[illegible] - Continued:

1967 [illegible] Lecture
1967 [illegible] Sem in [illegible]
1969 [illegible] on [illegible] Ops/Brookings



[illegible] J P JR
1917
790101 4 JULY 69
6.73

DATE REVIEWED	PROFILE REVIEWED BY	
1 Jun 1973	[illegible] cal	E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010026

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE / SERIAL NO. [illegible]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], James Parrish, Jr.	

23.

PHOTO JULY 67

26. Additional Information - Continued:

Appreciation [illegible] from DCI to CS personnel who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President to the Agency 7 Mar [illegible].

Appreciation 1971 from D/CS for Subject's contribution in making the Frank G. Wisner Dedication Ceremony a success.

Appreciation 1973 from Brigadier General Temple, USAF to the DCI for the excellent briefing provided by the Office of Security.

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1954 from C/SR for contribution to successful management of the FEFILTER Project; concurrence by the Dir of Security.

Commendation 1959 from Dir of Security for many years of outstanding performance in Operational Support, upon his assignment as Deputy Chief, SSD.

Commendation 1960 from Chief of Ops for imaginative handling of many aspects of Project [illegible].

Commendation 1961 from Director, Security USIA, for assistance rendered the USIA.

Commendation [illegible] from COS for performance of assigned duties in a superior manner while serving in the capacity of Acting D/COS.

[illegible] made by CS personnel in conducting a [illegible] Headquarters Building.

(Continued above)

27. DATE REVIEWED 1 Jun 1973	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY ermm/ cal

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET /05

PROFILE E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010025

SECRET
EYES ONLY

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

SECRET
EYES ONLY

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

24 April 1972

James P. O'Connell
Date

CONCURRENCE:

28 April 1972

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official
Date

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
0097

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 02/19/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16 SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/PTOS/ODD	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 4 MAY 1972 15	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

SECRET

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 29 April 71
James P. O'Connell
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 30 APR 1971
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7984- SEC-SS

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

22 MAY 1969 CK

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ~~DDS~~ [illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S 68-2461

2 9 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

20 MAY 1968
04

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

15 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

COVER CONTROL OF RETIREMENT PROCESSING

FILE

Retirement Operations Branch
Office of Personnel

DATE 7 June [illegible]

RETIREE [illegible]

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

On the basis of a review of the records of the Central Cover Staff, the following action is to be taken on processing retirement documentation for the person named above.

TYPE RETIREMENT		CIVIL SERVICE		CIARDS	DATE	

COVER		OVERT ROUTINE		COVERT (OFFICIAL COVER) LOCK-UP		COVERT (NOC) SPECIAL	RETENTION OF AWARDS		YES		NO

CORRESPONDENCE		OVERT		COVERT		THRU CCS

FINANCES

ANNUITY PAYMENTS SHOULD BE		U.S. GOV'T. CHECK			OTHER (Payment instructions follow)	
TAX DOCUMENTATION SHOULD BE		CIA		CSC		OTHER (MEMO FOLLOWS)
REQUEST TRANSFER OF FUNDS FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION		YES		NO		INTERNAL TRANSFER

INSURANCE

FEGLI		OVERT		COVERT		MAINTAIN RECORDS INTERNALLY ONLY

TYPE OF HOSPITALIZATION CARD:

AUTHORIZATION TO CONVERT INSURANCE		YES		CONVERSION MUST BE APPROVED BY CCS

RESERVE

MEMBER OF CIVILIAN RESERVE		YES		NO		OVERT		COVERT

REMARKS

CHIEF, COVER SUPPORT BRANCH, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY OFFICE OF SECURITY

______________________ NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS TO ABOVE.

OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FORM 4-73 3429 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-5-13)

7 - OFF. PERS.. FILE ROOM

SECRET

31 March 1959
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/or, have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 11 November 1951, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~[illegible]~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block ~~[illegible]~~ telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy", Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

4. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 30 March 1959, Mr. R. A. Leigh, 1608 L Building, Ext. 4571.

Paul P.
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division

SECRET

14-00000



SECRET
(When Filled In)

RCS: 5 JULY 73

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 06 DA. 29 YR. 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3271 0500 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEP DIR PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18. REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 19 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: OBJ0000
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVER 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
BB
7-9-73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DMS: 21 JUNE 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 24 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 3271 0500 0001
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDM&S/OFFICE OF SECURITY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 16	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1. CSC 2. CIA 3. FICA 5. NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0. NONE 1. 5 PT 2. 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RSRV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0. WAIVER 1. YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0. NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1. NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2. BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3. BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1. YES 2. NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-27-73

DMS

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

b15

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 7	$36,000

DD/PTOS Jenn/13

A37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 200	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$34,623	07/12/70	GS 16	7	$35,612	07/09/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE [illegible]

☒ NO EXCESS LWOPO 0

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS DJB

H.E.FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 200	V	GS 16 6	$34,623

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 240	V	GS 16 6	$32,819

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 240	V	GS 16 5	$30,087

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 [illegible] 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 24[illegible]	[illegible]	GS 16 5	$28,364

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009764	16 130	V	GS 16 4	$23,079	$25,118

EXEC SF STAFF

A 37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009764	OCONNELL J P JR	16 130	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	25,118 ~~23,079~~	07/17/66	GS 16	5	25,879 ~~$23,778~~	07/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE Howard J
DATE 7/17/68

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP
☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS
AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2/37

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CS [illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009[illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible] S.C.A.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 0[illegible] DA [illegible] YR 7[illegible]

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: [illegible] 0.00 [illegible]

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/SECURITY

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1.1[illegible].01

16. GRADE AND STEP: [illegible]

17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI — MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES — MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction / Cancellation Data — TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECUR. REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0 NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE — MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR. RESV PROV TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI — HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 WAIVER 1-YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE — 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-[illegible]-72 [illegible]

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 11-71 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

A-37

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 240	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$30,087	07/14/68	GS 16	6	$30,972	07/12/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Howard J Osborn

DATE 5/7/70

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS mjs

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

14-00000

FLW: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 008734
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 01 YR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

X	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3271 0500 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0459
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 25879
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16240 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 02 DA 19 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVER 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-9-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	15 375 V	GS 16 3	$2[illegible],24[illegible]	$20,975

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	15 130 V	GS 15 4	$22,085	$23,079

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BJT: 27 JAN 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 15 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X — V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7271 0103 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
SECURITY POLICY & EXECUTIVE STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0701
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 22085
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16130 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 02 DA 19 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 5-64 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

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11F

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	45 400 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI		
GS 15	4	$18,170	06/23/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	06/20/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

4
776

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	16 375	V	GS 16 3	$20,975	$21,415

A40

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	16 375 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI		ADJ.
GS 16	3	~~$20,975~~ 21,415	07/08/65	GS 16	4	~~$21,415~~ 22055	07/17/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS , AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NCM. 14 OCT 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CAF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009794
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 26 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐ X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0522
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:
~~THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150~~ TO CHANGE THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ, 08/15/65, TO READ, 09/26/65.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
53	10	16375	SEC	75013		1	2 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 16; MO DA YR 08 15 65
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY GEO NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE:
37. LONG COMP. DATE:
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RES / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 6 5

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJM: 8X 13 8 8UG 65

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) OCONNELL J P JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 08 15 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF		7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6271 0300 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY DEP DIR INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0522	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 16375	ALPHABETIC SEC	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 02 19 17	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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POSTED 7/65
10/6

FORM 11 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

378, 12 JUL 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009784	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 07 18 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	6137 1600 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO - OKINAWA STATION ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION SECURITY UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS

11. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 4171	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1810.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA. YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR)
22	10	45400	FE	75513		3	02 19 17	07 08 65	07 08 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA. YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA. YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

2/19/65 lin

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	45 400	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	56 400 CF 16	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$15,525	06/24/62	GS 15	4	$16,005	06/23/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

4
770
6/18/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 August 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 330 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LA 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS: EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
OCONNELL J P JR	009784	56400	CF	15 3	$14330	15 3	$15525

14-00000

ABM: 13 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 13 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☒

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3137 7000 3361

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP FE
FE JAO OKINAWA STATION
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
SECURITY UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OKINAWA ISLAND, US POSS

11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 4171

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 14380

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. Employ. Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 56400 ALPHABETIC FE

22. STATION CODE: 75513

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA. YR.): 02 19 17

26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)

27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR.)

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA. YR.)

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)

36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)

37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR.)

38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV PROV TEMP) CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/13/62

09/24/62 25

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-31)

Serial No.	Name	Cost Center Number	LWOP Hours
009784	OCONNELL J P JR	~~24 435~~ V	

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 15	2	$19,055	12/25/60	GS 15	3	$19,380	06/24/62		

8. Remarks and Authentication

to V 1/4/63

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ABM: 25 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
009784	OCONNELL J P JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05 27 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V	X	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	2137 7000 3361	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE	UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
SECURITY OFFICER	0000	SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	1810.01	15 2	19055

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
20	10	56000	FE	99999		3	02 19 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

OSTED

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	[illegible]		

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 15	1	$13,730	06	28	[illegible]	GS 15	2	$14,055	[illegible]	25	[illegible]

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-60 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 5 AUG 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M	1	12	17	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	07	45		1	50 USCA 403 J						12	17	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0436.83	GS	1810.22

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 1030

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	08	07	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SEC. SUP. DIV., OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	SECURITY OFFICER	0370	GS	1810.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 13730	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	1271 1030 1000

44. Remarks

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SS	OCONNELL J P JR	109784	31 19	GS-15 1	$12,770	$13,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 1 MAR 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	02	19	17		1	M 1	12	17	51	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.
11	07	45		1	50 USCA 403 J						12 17 51

13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Ltd Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	3125	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title			18. Position No.			19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series			
	4	INVESTIGATOR			0187			GS	1810.22			
21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number			
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 2051 0000			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	03	06	60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3119	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title			35. Position No.			36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	INVESTIGATOR			0436.83			GS	1810.22
38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	SS	06	28	59	12	25	60	0271 1030

44. Remarks

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 22 DEC 1959

1. Serial No.: 109784
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): OCONNELL J P JR
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 02 | Da. 19 | Yr. 17
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 12 | Da. 17 | Yr. 51
7. SCD: Mo. 11 | Da. 07 | Yr. 45
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. | Da. | Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
12. EOD: Mo. 12 | Da. 17 | Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Eco (Yes-1, No-2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE
Code: 3125
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 3
17. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
18. Position No.: 0187
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 1810.22
21. Grade & Step: 15 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 12770
23. SD: SS
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 06 | Da. 28 | Yr. 59
25. PSI Due: Mo. 12 | Da. 25 | Yr. 60
26. Appropriation Number: 9 7100 30 041

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
Code: 01
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 12 | Da. 27 | Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE
Code: 3125
32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 4
34. Position Title: INVESTIGATOR
35. Position No.: 0187
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1810.22
38. Grade & Step: 15 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 12770
40. SD: SS
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 06 | Da. 28 | Yr. 59
42. PSI Due: Mo. 12 | Da. 25 | Yr. 60
43. Appropriation Number: 0271 2051 0000
44. Remarks:

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:26 JUNE 59

1. Serial No. 509784	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) OCONNELL J P JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 02 Da. 19 Yr. 17	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51		
7. SCD Mo. 11 Da. 07 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo. 12 Da. 17 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT DIV SUPPORT BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	17. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	18. Position No. 0311	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 1810.22
21. Grade & Step 14 3	22. Salary Or Rate $11835	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 003			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	Code 07	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY DD INVEST & OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE	Code 3125	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	34. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	35. Position No. 01[illegible]	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 1810.22
38. Grade & Step 15 1	39. Salary Or Rate $12770	40. SD SS	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59 42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 28 Yr. 60
43. Appropriation Number 9 7100 30 041			

44. Remarks

FO[illegible]ED

[illegible]. STEWART

(4)

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
H. E. Steele	10 Oct, 1958	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,595	05	19	57	GS 14	3	$11,835	11	16	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. M. STEWART

10 JUN 59

PAYROLL

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR 56 560b

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
		-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5.	MENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20		

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ✓ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS ✓

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
109784	OCONNELL J P JR	DDS/SEC	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	11	20	55	14	2	$10,535	05	19	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Hi Eastland Steele	5 April 1957	H. E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
		6-8103-20	

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)	6. Grade and salary
O'Connell, James P., Jr.	GS-13 - $9205.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)	12. Prepared by
Security - 8	MG - 10/4/55

13. Audited by

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

( ) ( )

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

dab

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr. [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 18 Nov 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 20 Nov 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311
GS-1810.22-13 $9420.00 Per Annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 Per Annu
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest and Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Office of Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL	
				SD/SS

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-7103-20
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

H. G. [illegible]

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION
Director of Personnel

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 - 380600

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PA)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Rec. 20 May 1955 rwb

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 June 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.D. 5 June 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-323	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-311-13
GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security DD/Invest & Operational Support Security Support Division Support Branch Off of Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SR

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7130-30 TO: 5-7103-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
DATED 1[illegible] MAR. 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: $9265

POSTED
14 JUN 1955

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1950—[illegible]

TJ 6/13/55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 17 Nov. 1954

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 3 Dec. 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE B.O.B. 5 Dec. 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator T-311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T-323
GS-1810.22-13 $3560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $3560.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division District Field Office
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-82

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-7103-20 TO: 5-7130-30	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

FO ED
12 6 5

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director [illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954

14-00000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 O-23374

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Pay roll No. 10/54 4-[illegible]-20

4. [illegible]

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) O'CONNELL, JAMES P. Jr.

6. Grade and salary GS 13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	[illegible]	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous period											
8. New period											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) SECURITY 8

12. Prepared by reh/3/10/54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
9SEP54	9SEP52	$8360.00	$8560.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate space covering LWOP during following periods) Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ [illegible] status of [illegible] period.

☐ LWOP [illegible] during period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950 General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

neo

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	19 Feb 1917		23 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	25 Apr 1954	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T311	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T311
GS-1810-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-13 $8360.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper Support Sp Inq Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 4-7103-20 TO Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 9 Dec. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Dec. 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T126	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen) T311
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection & Security Office Project Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Oper. Support/Sp. Inquiry Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

verified

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL. ☐ CD-[illegible]

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

12/10/53

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Inspection & Security Office

Page 2 of 7 Pages

VOUCHERED

Used in lieu of SF-52 &/or or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary; (a) Change in Title (b) Change of Position No. (c) Reassignment within Division without series Code change All Class series are the same on the From and To sides.

Eff. Date: 2/15/53

T/O App.: 1/14/53

NAME	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.	ACTION	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.
Interrogation Research Branch	(cont'd.)					Interrogation Res.Branch	
Greenwood, Austin E.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-11	T95.06	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-11	T95.07-11
Wuerth, Howard J.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.03	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96-9
Kuhn, Steven L.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.01-9
O'Connor, James P.	Interrog.Sp.	GS-9	T96.04	b,c	Interrog.Sp.	GS-301-9	T96.02-9
Bittorf, Walter F.	Polygraph Tech.	GS-11	T222	b	Polygraph Tech.	GS-1671-11	T278
SSD Office of the Chief						SSD Office of the Chief	
Gromek, Helen	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.04	b,c	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T284
Special Referral Branch						Special Referral Branch	
Livingstone, John A.	Inv.CE	GS-11	T108.01	a,b,c	Inv.Gen.	GS-1810-11	T286.02-11
Sprouse, James M.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T108.04	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T108.01-9
Hoatson, Chester R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.02
Collins, Wallace C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T128.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T108.04
Lach, Stanley	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109.02	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109
Stembridge, Sidney D.	Inv. CE	GS-9	T109	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T109.01
Cox, Thomas A.	Inv. CE	GS-7	T109.01	a,b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T109.02-7
Lunsden, Dorothy S.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T110	b	Secy. Steno.	GS-318-5	T287-5
Ryan, Mary P.	Clerk Steno.	GS-[illegible]	T52	b,c	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-~~X~~ 4	T111-[illegible]
Banks, Isabelle	Clerk typing	GS-3	T141.01	b,c	Clerk typing	GS-301-3	T141-3
Operations Branch, Project Section					Operations Br.	Project Section	
O'Connell, James P.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T126.04	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T126
Kroppy, Joseph F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.07	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T127.01
Hamby, Louis L.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T127.08	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T127.03-11
Carver, Carol J.	Secy.Steno.	GS-5	T130.01	b,a	Secy.Steno.	GS-318-5	T130
Brodeur, Ruth C.	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131.03	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-4	T131
Delmar, Margaret J.	Clerk Steno.	GS03	T131.07	b,a	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-3	T131.01-3
Benini, Tulia Anne	Clerk Steno.	GS-4	T131	b,a	Clerk Steno	GS-312-4	T131.02
Covert Security Branch						Covert Security ~~Branch~~ Sect	
Olson, Edwin C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.03	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T289-12
Carter, Albert T.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T127.05	b,a	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T290

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

App.by: EWSchmidt
Staff or Div. Chief

App. by:
Class & Wage Div.

App. by:
Personnel Div.

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PRESCRIBED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. '17
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 7 Nov. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 9 Nov. 52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen.) T126.04-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.)T126.04
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-13 $8360.00 per annum
Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: 11X2100
FROM:
TO: 7103-00
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

H. C. CL[illegible]

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1P

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-810794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb. '17	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 30 Sept '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 12 Oct. '52	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen.) T127.10	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen.) T126.06-12
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12
Inspection and Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool-Operations Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Operations Staff
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEP'T'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 11X2100 TO: 7103-00	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Va.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cancelled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9-30-52

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952-810794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Security Information

INSPECTION & SECURITY OFFICE

CODE "T"

SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION

NAME	TITLE	GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
OPERATIONS STAFF CONTINUED			
FERRALL, Francis I.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T128-9
MOONEY, James J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-7	T128.01-7
DIEDRICH, Robert C.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.02
BELT, Charles	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T128.03
KOHN, Patricia	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T129-5
BLACK, Dorothy M.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130
VASS, Carol J.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.01
NICKLAU, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.02
PIRRONE, Marie	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.03-4
ST.IVANYI, Elaine	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-4	T130.04-4
BAIWIR, Frances E.P.	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T130.05
GROMEK, Helen	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131
OLDHAM, Katherine B.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.01
MASCIOCCHI, Norma	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.02
CHECHILE, Rose Mary	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.03
BRIGHTMAN, Joan Lois	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.04
LEITH, Elizabeth A.	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.05
ADMINISTRARIVE POOL			
OPERATIONS STAFF			
GREENER, William E., Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T126.05-11
CARROLL, Thomas M.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.08
PARR, Laurence G.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T127.09-11
O'CONNELL, James P.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T127.10
LAFFERTY. LaVerne	Clerk Stenographer	GS-312-4	T131.07

h- Cl. - ? March 1952
ACD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James Patrick O'Connell, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: # 2
4. DATE: 31 March 1952

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 31 Mar. 1952
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sch. - A - 6.116 (3)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator General GS — 12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS — 12 1810 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Inspection & Security Office Special Security Division Admin. Pool Operations Staff
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
				Da. #6393 23 Feb. 1951

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2123900 TO: 7103
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 31 March 1952
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Va.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

(7)

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of three months.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

Chief Personnel Division 09
ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

FD+AR
26 MAR

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'CONNELL, James P. ~~Patrick~~, Jr.

DATE: 13 February 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: RESIGNATION

EFFECTIVE DATE: COB ~~X~~ 30 March 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Investigator General	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040.00 pa	
OFFICE	Inspection & Security Office	
DIVISION	Special Security Division	
BRANCH	SSD Pool Admin Pool	
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. F. HENEY C F Heney	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER D Mulcahy 3-16-52	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Please transfer leave to "V" funds.

2 27

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 16—63300-1

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: O'CONNELL, James ~~Patrick~~ P., Jr.

DATE: 5 December 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 December 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator General
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-12 - $7040.00 p.a.
OFFICE		Inspection and Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH		SSD Pool Admin Pool
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS: G. C. Ball 9534

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: C. J. KING, Administrative Officer

EXECUTIVE:

CLASSIFICATION: Gilbert 12/14/51

PERSONNEL OFFICER: D. Mulcahy

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS: YES ☑ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON: 17 December 1951

SECURITY CLEARED ON: 10 December 1951

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED: NA

ENTERED ON DUTY: 17 December 1951

DOG 11/04/50
EOD 12/17/51
ACD 12/17/51

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY Rmw DATE 2 DEC 1954
Robert J. Hayes
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

1810

REMARKS:

Slot No. 6
1 PHS attached. Security has retained the necessary papers for processing.

Recruitment Request No. 1862

Posted JM 12 Jan
Spw 5/3/54

REQUEST CONTACTS BE MADE
BY SECURITY ONLY

COPY IN PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
EYES ONLY

24 April 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1971 to 31 March 1972. The rating period covers the third full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security.

2. The directorate which Mr. O'Connell supervises is geographically widely separated in the Headquarters area. This separation adds complexities to the task of supervising the directorate and coordinating the activities of three Divisions, operating over a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities. During the reporting period, one of the Divisions of Mr. O'Connell's directorate took on an important, added responsibility--the security of automatic data processing. This function covers the complexity of maintaining security in a rapidly expanding activity replete with serious security problems because of the severe compaction of information resulting from rapid advances and acceptability of technology in the field of data handling. The achievements of the Physical Security Division, the Technical Division, and the Overseas Security Support Division require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid contradictions detrimental to a unified security policy.

3. In spite of the difficulty of supervising divisions remotely located from his office, Mr. O'Connell has applied and achieved effective supervision. The Divisions moved forward in an

SECRET
EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

innovative manner and have been effective in discharging their responsibilities.

4. Mr. O'Connell also spearheads the security program which furnishes Security Officers to overseas stations and domestic operations as necessary. Mr. O'Connell has taken a personal interest in this activity and has been of considerable assistance to the Office of Security Career Board in the assignment of Security careerists to those positions.

5. During the last Fitness Report, the description of Mr. O'Connell's performance was raised from "Strong" to "Outstanding." He has continued his performance in such a manner as to warrant an OUTSTANDING rating.

6. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell   24 April 1972
James P. O'Connell   Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn   28 April 1972
Howard J. Osborn   Date
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 02/19/17
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-16
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Security Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PTOS/ODD
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D.C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1972
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1971 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

MAY 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report -16
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This is a narrative Fitness Report which covers the period from 1 April 1970 through 31 March 1971.

2. During this entire period, Mr. O'Connell has served as the Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security. The rating period covers his second full year in that position. The Directorate which Mr. O'Connell heads has gained added importance and increased attention during the year. It encompasses an area of activity which is vitally important to the Office of Security and the Agency as a whole. Mr. O'Connell has given considerable attention to efforts which decrease our vulnerability at the hands of foreign opposition as well as from domestic efforts resulting from national unrest. Mr. O'Connell has shown improvement in the over-all coordination of his responsibilities throughout the current rating period. He supervises his people in an effective manner and anticipates problems so as to simplify their solutions.

3. During the previous rating period, Mr. O'Connell's performance was considered to be STRONG with several outstanding features. During the year, I consider that there has been sufficient addition to the outstanding areas of his performance to raise his over-all rating to OUTSTANDING.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5 MAY 1971

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell — 27 April 71
Date

CONCURRENCE:

Howard J. Osborn — 30 APR 1971
Director of Security — Date
Reviewing Official

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1969 through 31 March 1970.

2. The rating period covers the first full year that Mr. O'Connell has served as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security at the GS-16 level.

3. The year encompassed in the rating period has seen myriad complex and varied additional responsibilities develop within Mr. O'Connell's Directorate. Specifically, he has supervised the activation and implementation of the Overseas Security Support Division, a new component within the Office and an extremely important one. He has supervised the first full year of implementation of the Interagency Training Center at Hedgeneck, Maryland, which falls within the purview of the Chief, Technical Division. Finally, he has been a participant in an overall survey of the security of the Headquarters Building and has supervised the Chief, Physical Security Division in developing and applying new physical security techniques and realistic principles of physical security. Mr. O'Connell is a capable and efficient supervisor. He is a veteran in the Office of Security and has a knowledge of all of the various ramifications of the Agency's total security mission.

GROUP 1 [illegible]

1 [illegible] 1970

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. Mr. O'Connell is poised and expresses himself very well, both in oral and written form. I evaluate Mr. O'Connell's performance over the past year as STRONG with several outstanding features. I have confidence in his judgment and ability and consider him a valuable career asset of this Office. His has been a difficult task in that as well as assuming new and additional functions, he has been burdened with the supervision of one Division Chief who has proven to be extremely difficult to handle over the years. In fairness to Mr. O'Connell, I should add that no one in this Office has been particularly effective in supervising this individual who is now slated for early retirement. I believe that with this individual's departure Mr. O'Connell should be able to achieve a more coherent integration of his Directorate's functions in the interest of further efficiency and effectiveness.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

15 MAY 1970
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

CONCUR:

Howard J Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Reviewing Official

29 APR 1970
Date

EYES ONLY
SECRET

✓

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: BROOKINGS INSTITUTE

COURSE : CONF. FOR FED. EX. ON BUSINESS OPS.

COURSE DATES : 18 - 23 MAY 1969

GRADE (IF GIVEN) :

EXTERNAL TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 024745

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

James P. O'Connell 5/26/69
SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED

Request No. 024745

Date 3 June 1969

EYES ONLY
SECRET

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
Mr. James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security for
Physical, Technical and Overseas Security

OC 7784- SEC-SS

1. This Fitness Report covers the period from 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969.

2. Mr. O'Connell was appointed Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security in August 1968 and this Rating covers his performance during this period as well as his performance as Executive Officer from 1 April 1968 to 1 August 1968.

3. Mr. O'Connell, as Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security, is responsible for the supervision of three large and complex divisions of this Office. In addition, he is responsible for providing policy and technical guidance to our Area Security Officers assigned to other components of the Agency and in the field. Upon assuming his duties in August 1968, Mr. O'Connell was quick to grasp the general scope and nature of these varied and complex activities. He is an alert and intelligent supervisor and he recommended and put into effect several significant personnel and organizational changes within his Directorate which have resulted in significant improvement in the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate. Recently, he was instrumental in creating a new Overseas Security Support Division made necessary by the dissolution of this Office's regional security staff in Frankfurt, West Germany. He is an astute manager and an

OC

[illegible]

effective supervisor. He brings to the performance of his duties broad knowledge and experience of security procedures and practices. He has been most effective in keeping a close rein on budgetary obligations within his Directorate.

4. Mr. O'Connell is personable and articulate and is able to express himself well in both written and oral form. His career is marked by steady advancement and consistently high level performances. He possesses all of the requisite qualities of a senior Security executive. However, I feel that he has not as yet applied all of these qualities to their maximum potential in his performance as DD/PTOS. Mr. O'Connell has one Division Chief who is extraordinarily capable and effective in producing results. Conversely, however, he presents one of the most difficult supervisory problems in the Office because of certain personal characteristics. I don't feel, and I believe that Mr. O'Connell would agree with me, that he has yet gotten on top of this individual as well as he should. I am convinced, however, that he is fully aware of the problem and is working hard to achieve the proper supervisory balance. I rate his performance, on balance, as STRONG with many outstanding features. I have complete confidence in Mr. O'Connell's ability, judgment and excellent potential. He is a valued career asset to this Office and the Agency.

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this Fitness Report.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

29 APR 1969
Date

CONCUR:

for Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

16 May 1969
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ~~DDS~~ CS/HATS/FD

EYES ONLY
SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S 68-2461

2 9 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Narrative Fitness Report
James P. O'Connell
Chief, Executive Staff

1. Mr. O'Connell has served as Chief, Executive Staff of this Office from 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968, the rating period covered by this Fitness Report.

2. Mr. O'Connell has been most effective in the administration and direction of the complex and varied activities encompassed in the functions in the Executive Staff of this Office. He has been effective in directing the staff in the formulation and implementation of basic security policies and procedures. In addition, he has performed diligently in continuing review of the considerable volume of paper that transits the Office of the Director of Security. He has been meticulous in ensuring that staff work and correspondence leaving this office is up to the highest standards and has been very effective in arranging priority action in meeting short deadlines. As the initial professional recipient of the majority of correspondence received by this Office for action, he has been very effective in applying his knowledge of the basic organization of the Office to the assignment of action with appropriate coordination.

3. Mr. O'Connell is a personable and articulate senior executive who writes particularly well. He has had extensive experience as a Security careerist, both in Headquarters and overseas, and his career has been marked by rather rapid advancement and a record of fine performances in positions of increasing responsibility. I have no reservations about rating his performance in this position over the past year as OUTSTANDING.

MAY 1968

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY
SECRET

4. In searching for an area where Mr. O'Connell might strive for further improvement, I am hard put to find any in the light of his consistently high performance record. I do believe, however, that Mr. O'Connell has lost or appears to have lost some of his enthusiasm and eager initiative which marked his performance for the first six months in this position. It is possible that this is due to the fact that the problems we encounter today require more measured and considered judgment as opposed to enthusiasm and initiative. Nonetheless I would like to see Mr. O'Connell strive for a better balance in these essential performance characteristics

5. Mr. O'Connell has seen this report.

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SEEN BY:

James P. O'Connell

James P. O'Connell

2 9 APR 1968
Date

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Support
Reviewing Official

15 May 1968
Date

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/S

069784-Jew

EYES ONLY
SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM : Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT : Completion of External Training

26 SEP 1967

This is to advise you that James O'Connell training request # 020602 attended the following external training program :

COURSE : Exec. Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE : 7-8 September 1967

GRADE : None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

__ Grade Report
__ Certificate of Completion
__ Roster of Participants
X Training Report by Student
__ Training Report by Institution
__ None
__ Other: ______________

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training
ATTN : Registrar/TR
THROUGH: Training Officer

FROM : James P. O'Connell
OFFICE: Office of Security
DATE : 12 September 1967

1. FACILITY ATTENDED
Civil Service Commission
1900 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

2. DATES OF TRAINING
7 - 8 September 1967

3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM
Executive Seminar in Automatic Data Processing

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES
A broad orientation of the ADP field both in and out of government.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM (*Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.*)

I found the seminar extremely informative and worthwhile from the standpoint of examining the historical progression of the ADP from several points of view. All the speakers were highly qualified in their particular field and their presentations were well prepared. All were exceptionally apt in fielding questions.

Mr. Bert Engelhardt, Associate Director, ADP Management Center, CSC, was a gracious host and handled his role as moderator in a truly professional manner. He has an engaging, friendly personality and is effectively articulate. If I were to single out any weakness it would be Mr. Engelhardt's lecture. He spoke on the Systems Analyst. In his presentation he seemed not to take into consideration the professional level of the group and devoted an inordinate amount of time on basic managerial precepts. This seemed to have an irritating effect on the participants who by virtue of their positions had considerable experience in the management field.

Overall I would say, notwithstanding the above observation, it is an interesting and effective program.

6. ATTACHED ARE	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES		YES	X	NO
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION		YES	X	NO

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

James P. O'Connell
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

FORM 4-63 1049 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.   SECRET   (36-45)

SECRET

009784
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16 GR
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1

18 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : James P. O'Connell
Fitness Report

1. This memorandum will supplement the information contained in Mr. Victor R. White's memorandum of 10 April 1967, since Mr. O'Connell was reassigned to the position of Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff on 9 January 1967.

2. This then covers the period from 9 January 1967 to 31 March 1967. During this period, Mr. O'Connell quickly justified the selection for this key position in the Office of Security and has already begun to demonstrate his executive talents in this position.

3. Although the period for which he is being rated in this position is too short to be characterized definitively or finally, I would say that his progress thus far justifies an unqualified rating of "Outstanding".

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

27 [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Outstanding Fitness Report)

The attached Fitness Report reflects an Outstanding performance. Mr. O'Connell is a senior executive in the Office of Security who has recently been assigned to an important Staff Chief function. In view of Mr. O'Connell's career progress, no special recognition for this outstanding performance is considered necessary at this time.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Attachment

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

10 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

This is an annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 9 January 1967. Mr. O'Connell was reassigned from Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS) to Chief, Security Policy and Executive Staff, and the Director of Security will add comments for the remainder of the rating period ending 31 March 1967.

As Assistant to the DDS(IOS), Mr. O'Connell applied exceptional executive talent in sharing with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs in the Office of Security. It is felt that Mr. O'Connell made an outstanding contribution to the management of IOS at a time of the heaviest work pressures in our history. Mr. O'Connell has a calm, clinical approach to work problems, and his solutions to these problems reflect the soundness of his judgment and the breadth of his experience. He expresses himself clearly and concisely in both writing and speech. As Assistant DDS(IOS), he demonstrated sound management concepts and acute cost consciousness. His strength as a supervisor is reflected in the universal respect he enjoys among all subordinates.

I regard Mr. O'Connell's performance as ADDS(IOS) as "Outstanding."

Victor R. White

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell

10 April 1967
Date

Reviewing Official Comments:

Howard J. Osborn

4/16/67
Date

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

* See memo.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 009784

GENERAL

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 02/19/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/IOS/Off. of DD		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
25 April 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
16 August 1965 - 31 March 1966

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

SECTION B

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See attached Memorandum	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

22 APR 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

18 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This is an Annual Fitness Report on the above employee for the period ending 31 March 1966. Mr. O'Connell is currently assigned as Assistant Deputy Director of Security (IOS), a position he assumed in September 1965. He was promoted to GS-16 at the time he assumed these responsibilities on the basis of a long period of distinguished service that was culminated in his assignment as Regional Security Officer for the Far East.

2. As my Assistant, Mr. O'Connell shares with me the responsibility for the direction of the investigative and operational support programs of the Office of Security. He brings to this position a wealth of experience, sound management concepts, and the ability to meet and solve complex administrative problems. I have implicit confidence in his judgment, and he enjoys the full respect of all of his associates. Mr. O'Connell has made an outstanding contribution to the management and direction of IOS at a time when our work load is the highest in history. He is susceptible to innovation and has a keen appreciation of cost factors in meeting his managerial responsibilities. He has a unique ability to put work problems in the proper focus, does his job without fanfare, and maintains extremely high standards of work accomplishment.

3. Mr. O'Connell's performance fully justifies his promotion to the supergrade level and, in the relatively short time he has been in his current assignment, his overall performance is considered unusually strong with many outstanding aspects.

Victor R. White
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SECRET

Excluded from automatic [illegible]

SECRET

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

18 April 1966

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell

18 April 1966
Date

Reviewing Official:

Howard J Osborn

19 April 1966
Date

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) **DATES:** 8-13 May 1966

Student : James P. O'Connell, Jr. **Office** : OS

Year of Birth: 1917 **Service ~~Designation~~** SS

Grade : 16 **No. of Students** : 33

EOD Date : December 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

7 JUN 1966
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) OCONNELL JAMES P. JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ACTING DCOS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE OKINAWA		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 65 - 15 June 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Memo in lieu of Fitness Report (See Section C)	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

The period of this report is less than 90 days from the [illegible] subject's annual report.

A Memo in Lieu of Fitness Report was prepared on subject for the period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965 and all comments in that memo remain in effect.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUL 14 10 19 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE JAMES P OCONNELL JR. /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES D. ANDREWS/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Comments of reviewing officer of last report remain in effect.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

8 April 1965

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell
Period 12 September 1964 - 31 March 1965

[redacted], chief of the Regional KUSODA Support Staff for nearly three years, is 48 years old and a career employee with more than 13 years service. Although this has been his first overseas tour, he and his family are well adjusted to foreign assignment, and he is apparently able and willing to serve in any position offered.

As the senior KUSODA officer in the Far East, he directs the activities of six officers on his own staff as well as supervises and provides guidance to all other KUSODA officers assigned in the Far East; in addition he monitors the performance of three other KUSODA officers attached to this Station. In this supervisory role, he has an excellent insight into the abilities of his staff and definitely holds the respect of his subordinates.

As the senior KUSODA officer he is my principle adviser on many KUSODA matters. His judgment is mature, his evaluations usually sound. He is dependable and I believe his loyalty to our service and his superiors is above question.

He operates his staff well, is cost conscious and requires an absolute minimum of supervision from Station command.

He maintains excellent liaison relationships with other island services.

[redacted] will continue to develop and can assume positions of greater responsibility.

I rate this officer as Strong--on the high side.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

READ: /s/ James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
X	CAREER	☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*		X	ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL *(Specify):*		☐	SPECIAL *(Specify):*	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. May 65			12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)* 12 Sept 64 - 31 March 65		

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 2 MAY 1965	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 30 2 08 PM '65
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 8 April 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 April 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James D. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attachment

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

O'CONNELL, James P.

Comments of Reviewing Official:

I agree with the rating officer's comments. Mr. O'Connell has been a credit to the Okinawa Station and to his parent Career Service.

Signature of Reviewing Official: W E Colby

William E. Colby Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
009784

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) O'Connell (First) James P. (Middle)
2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-15
5. SD 88
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [redacted] DDP/FE/JKO
8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 64 - 11 Sept 64

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the ~~manner in which employee~~ performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 — RATING LETTER

Memo in lieu of Fitness Report attached

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 — RATING LETTER

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 — RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER S

30 SEP 1964

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 1 9 08 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 Sep 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James P. O'Connell

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 11 Sep 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Alan Warfield

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer. Though I am not in a position to deal directly with Mr. O'Connell, I am aware of responsibilities and fully appreciative of excellent support rendered to the COS, Okinawa and to Area FE Stations of the Security Staff at Okinawa.

DATE 25 SEP 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting Chief, Far East Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert J. Myers

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted]
Period 1 April 1964 - 1 September 1964

A full fitness report was prepared by me on this officer on 15 April and therefore this memorandum, being prepared in connection with my transfer, will merely supplement the previous report.

During the past five months I have had further evidence to substantiate the statements made concerning [redacted]s maturity and dependability. He has been my chief counselor in a recent reappraisal of standards of behavior from a security standpoint. His opinions and advice are always carefully thought through, devoid of fear induced over caution, and realistic.

[redacted] continues to be a good supervisor. He knows his people, their capabilities and limitations. They respect him for his leadership.

In liaison with other security activities [redacted] has established excellent relationships which have frequently proven their value. He has considerable talent for liaison which should be kept in mind in selecting his next assignment.

[redacted]

[redacted]

/s/ Alan Warfield

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009734

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT RSS /		8. CURRENT STATION Okinawa	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify): Memo in lieu of FR		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 31 March 63 - 31 March 64

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

27 MAY 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

11 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administration and Training Staff

SUBJECT : Fitness Report of James O'Connell

I concur in the attached evaluation of Mr. James O'Connell's performance for the period 31 March 1963 to 31 March 1964. In addition, I wish to add that Mr. O'Connell has accomplished his fine performance with a minimum of supervision and direction from this Office which is responsible for support to the Overseas Security Officers.

E. M. WINTERS
Deputy Director of Security (PPS)

Attachment:
Fitness Report

[illegible]

27 MAY 1964

SECRET

15 April 1964

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted] James O'Connell, GS-16

Period 31 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

James O'Connell
[redacted] is Chief, Regional Security Staff, FE. As such he has performed a fine job in meeting the requirements of FE Stations for security services and in gaining acceptance for the security program. The requirements have been considerably accelerated during past months due to the unsettled conditions in the FE Area. Also support to Headquarters projects has been added to the security office. Perhaps too frequently a job which falls to the station and which cannot be properly identified with one component falls to the Regional Security Staff. O'Connell [redacted] while keeping his eye on his primary responsibilities has been most helpful and cooperative in handling secondary duties.

He is a mature officer, seasoned by experience and training. He is calm and poised in crisis situations. His dependability and personality are genuine assets to the Station.

O'Connell
[redacted] is a good supervisor who promotes team work among his people, who is opposed to waste, and has demonstrated his interest in efficiency and economy.

O'Connell
[redacted] makes a sincere effort to separate the Regional Security office from the Station Security office, however, this is difficult if not impossible to do. Perhaps the Station is as much to blame as the overlapping of the various security functions. Surely it is understandable that the Chief of Station wants the best advice he can get on a security matter of concern to him and will turn to the senior officer available. This is an especially tempting recourse with such a fine officer as [redacted] close at hand.
O'Connell

He has responded well to the call for economy and although he has little latitude in this respect he has instituted some restrictions that will result in savings. He writes lucidly and succinctly.

I am pleased that he is to be at this Station for another year.

[redacted]

MAY 31 3 22 PM '64

s/ Alan D Wingfield

READ: [redacted]

27 MAY 1964

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SEP 1962

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'Connell James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 February 17	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/IOS/CSD/CC

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	~~DENIED~~

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 62	11. REPORTING PERIOD From March 61 - To 27 Nov ~~March~~ 62	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
DEN

10 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'CONNELL is completing eleven years of Agency service. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University and his experience qualifications include four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief of the Security Support Division. During this period the accomplishments of the Division reflected a high caliber of leadership. Mr. O'CONNELL has displayed outstanding executive ability and a broad understanding of the investigative, support, and security problems inherent in the job. Mr. O'CONNELL applies his abilities well and obtains a high level of work productivity and quality. He has considerable capacity for further development and is currently assigned as Chief, Regional Security Support Staff, FE.

It is felt that Mr. O'CONNELL's present assignment will add to the breadth of his experience and coupled with his proven talents for administration will insure the development of his potential for greater responsibility at the executive level.

Victor R. White

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

Reviewing Official:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Noted By Employee:
(Mr. O'Connell is on PCS assignment and not available. A copy of this Fitness Report will be furnished him.)
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE
SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Security Officer Field Course #12

during the period 14 May *to* 25 May 1962

William A. Kotapish
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James P. O'Connell

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Physical Security Training Course #8

during the period 23 April *to* 11 May 1962

William Kotapish

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Introduction to Intelligence No. 50
40 hours, full-time 19 - 23 March 1962 45 students

Student : O'Connell, James P., Jr. Grade: GS-15 Year of Birth: 1917

EOD Date : December 1951 Office : Security

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

Introduction to Intelligence has four objectives: (1) to instruct the student in the basic concepts of intelligence and the role of national intelligence within the Government; (2) to describe the intelligence community: its members, their duties, and their relationship to CIA; (3) to define and describe the functions of CIA and identify the components performing them; and (4) to explain the processes and means by which CIA fulfills its responsibilities for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence.

Lectures given by Orientation Faculty members and guest speakers take up about half the time; seminar and review exercises, about one fourth; and study periods and training films, the remaining quarter. An Intelligence Products Exhibit, representing all the Offices of the DD/I, puts on display the products of those Offices and by visual aids demonstrates the activities of each Office.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged on the basis of a 40 item multiple choice test on course content given the last day of the course. On the basis of this test each student is given an adjectival rating. The number of students in this class receiving each adjectival rating is shown below. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent
0	22	23*

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief, Orientation Faculty 23 March '62
Date

S E C R E T

TRAINING REPORT

Counterintelligence Familiarization Course No. 30
80 hours full-time 29 January - 9 February 1962

Students: 17

Student: **O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.**

Year of Birth: **1917**

EOD Date: **December 1951** Grade: **GS-15** Office: **OS/Ops. Support Div.**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - COMMENT AND METHODS

This course, designed for the staff employee who requires a basic knowledge of counterintelligence doctrine and methodology, aims to increase his understanding of this activity by (a) acquainting him with current counterintelligence concepts and objectives and the organization and functions of counterintelligence targets, (b) familiarizing him with skills and techniques employed in detecting, investigating, and operating against targets, and (c) showing him how to report, record, and disseminate counterintelligence information.

The student is instructed through the media of lectures, directed reading, tours, training films, examinations, class exercises, and discussions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The overall adjectival rating and comments below are derived from a review of the student's performance in class discussions, three written problems, and two objective tests. The written problems involve name tracing, an examination of a counterintelligence interrogation and the dissemination of information about an individual of counterintelligence interest.

OVERALL ADJECTIVAL RATING

EXCELLENT

COMMENTS

Mr. O'Connell contributed significantly to class discussions. His performance throughout the course demonstrated a sound comprehension of the instruction. His handling of the problem situations was thoroughly professional.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: M. E. O'Brien
Chief Instructor

27 Feb. 1962
Date

S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Support No. 50
120 hours, full-time, Phase I   2 - 20 April 62   8 Students
80 hours, full-time, Phase II   23 April - 4 May 62   10 Students

Student : O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.   Year of Birth: 1917

EOD Date: December 1951   Grade: GS-15   Office : OS

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Operations Support Course emphasizes the role of support personnel in clandestine activities and their responsibility in originating material of a support nature at headquarters and in the field. The Course objectives are to provide the student with (1) an appreciation of the interrelationship between operating functions and support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations and problems pertinent to the necessary support of operational activities.

a. Phase I covers instruction on organization, functions and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services; basic principles of clandestine activity accompanied by practical exercises; project and agent management; familiarization with defensive and offensive audio surveillance.

About fifty per cent of Phase I consists of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about thirty-five per cent is devoted to field exercises, practical written assignments, practice problems, and observing films as training aids in basic tradecraft. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

b. Phase II includes name checks, records procedures, foreign travel, finance and property accounting, dispatch, pouch, cable and message-writing procedures. For this phase, problems have been developed to represent situations as they normally occur at a Class B Station.

About thirty-five per cent of Phase II is composed of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about fifty per cent is devoted to practice problems and practical written assignments. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The adjectival ratings on this student for each major area of this course are the result of an evaluation of his work on his individual projects, on the other exercises, and on the final examination. Comparative judgment takes into account students in preceding classes as well as the present one. The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received. The rating the student receives represents the student's performance in the course with no allowance made for difference in age, education, experience and so forth.

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME O'CONNELL, James P. Jr.

MAJOR CATEGORIES

PHASE I	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Tradecraft - Recognition of elementary principles.	0	2	6
2. Casing - Written observation of an assigned site.	0	2	6
3. Personal Meeting Plan - Written paper emphasizing techniques of effecting clandestine meeting.	0	5	3
4. Personal Meeting - Carrying out student's plan.	0	4	4
5. Contact Report - Written report of clandestine personal meeting.	0	2	6
6. Operational Support Procedures - General knowledge of Clandestine Services Organization and Functions; Agent and Project Management.	0	2	6
PHASE II			
1. Originating Headquarters and Field Dispatches. Indexing Requirements. Field Pouch Manifest.	0	2	8
2. Preparation of Headquarters and Field Cables. Writing and Indexing Messages. Use of Message Writing Techniques.	0	7	3
3. Type II Property Accounting - Fundamentals and Execution of Records.	0	1	9
4. Foreign Travel - Currency Conversion and Completion of Travel Voucher.	0	4	6
5. Familiarization with Class B Accounting and Preparation of Records.	0	0	10
6. Clandestine Services Headquarters and Field Support Procedures.	1	4	5

COMMENTS

Student cancelled per Office of Security, 6 April 1962.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

18 May 1962
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

3 AUG 1961

28 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM: Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

Mr. O'Connell is completing ten years of Agency service and his experience qualification includes four years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from St. John's University.

This evaluation covers Mr. O'Connell's first year assignment as Chief of the Security Support Division. It is felt that the outstanding accomplishments of this Division during this period are in large measure attributable to Mr. O'Connell's managerial skill. During this time the Security Support Division, without additional personnel, has increased its production substantially and in the area of operational support has handled many unique and diverse assignments.

Mr. O'Connell has a keen and analytical intellect and a broad understanding of the investigative and security problems inherent in his job. He applies these qualities with his talent for administration to make for an overall outstanding performance.

Mr. O'Connell has the capacity for further development and his future training should be directed to senior management courses to insure the full development of this potential.

Victor R White
Victor R. White

Reviewing Official:

R L Bannerman
R. L. Bannerman
Acting Director of Security

Noted by Employee:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET

16 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.
(Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes an evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Deputy Chief, Security Support Division and as Chief, Security Support Division.

2. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of a sustained performance of outstanding proportions Mr. O'CONNELL was promoted on 4 May 1959 to the position of Deputy Chief, Security Support Division, and on 4 April 1960 to the position of Chief, Security Support Division.

3. During the rating period Mr. O'CONNELL's performance amply justified and confirmed the previous assessments of his potential executive caliber. He has demonstrated in his recent assignments highly advanced administrative ability and judgment of an excellence considerably more than that required in the discharge of his increased responsibilities.

4. He has continued to display a marked dedication to the welfare of his office and the Agency. His approach to the discharge of responsibilities within his purview has been progressive and sound in all respects. His contribution has been invaluable.

5. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's overall performance and his demonstrated talents and gifts of personality continue to constitute him as being qualified for a future of increasingly important service.

David E. Hanlon

David E. Hanlon
Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred Hall

Fred H. Hall
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

23 [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] SS/CSB
CFH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 February 1917	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator	7. OFF DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT CS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL *(Specify)*

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD *From* 12/17/57 *To* 3/31/59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER *(Specify)*	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

4 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
(Fitness Report)

1. This report constitutes a continuing evaluation of Mr. O'CONNELL's performance as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division.

2. Mr. O'CONNELL's performance in terms of productivity and quality has been outstanding in every respect. His responsibilities have been most exacting and demanding, not only because of the administrative requirements involved, but also because of the urgent and unprecedented nature of the problems he is called upon to handle. Many of these problems have had Agency-wide implications and have been of interest to high Agency officials. He has met the challenges presented to him in a superb fashion and in a manner reflecting credit upon himself and the Security Office. In addition to this statement of evaluation, it should be noted that Mr. O'CONNELL, upon the recent completion of his assignment as Chief, Support Branch, SSD, and his promotion to Deputy Chief, SSD, received a commendation from the Director of Security commending him for his over-all splendid performance with particular reference to his handling of an ultra sensitive matter of interest to the highest authorities of the Agency.

3. In terms of potential, Mr. O'CONNELL's performance, his impressive physical appearance and personality, coupled with his proven powers of judgment and administration, in the opinion of the rater constitute him as being of potential executive caliber.

David E. Hanlon
David E. Hanlon
Acting Assistant Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Fred H. Hall
Fred H. Hall
Acting Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

NOTED BY EMPLOYEE:

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb. 1917	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 17 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 December 1956 - 17 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☑ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☑ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS ~~AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.~~
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR FRED H. HALL	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec.(I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Action Processed EL DATE 19 DEC 1957
[illegible] WHD 12/23/57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Dep. Dir. of Security(I & S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE, CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 56

SECRET

Performance

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 13 2 33 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:
  - *ORAL BRIEFING*
  - *GIVING LECTURES*
  - *CONDUCTING SEMINARS*
  - *WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS*
  - *CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON*
  - *TYPING*
  - *TAKING DICTATION*
  - *SUPERVISING*
  - *HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*
  - *DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*
  - *ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*
  - *MANAGES FILES*
  - *OPERATES RADIO*
  - *COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*
  - *WRITES REGULATIONS*
  - *PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*
  - *CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
  - *PREPARES SUMMARIES*
  - *TRANSLATES GERMAN*
  - *DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
  - *KEEPS BOOKS*
  - *DRIVES TRUCK*
  - *MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
  - *EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*
- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SUPERVISES	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 RECOGNIZES AND SOLVES INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 PREPARES CORRESPONENCE	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'CONNELL is an excellently trained and widely experienced investigator who has demonstrated the ability to coordinate and supervise the unique and diverse investigative and security ~~xx~~ problems inherent in the work of the Agency. He willingly discharges his responsibilities and cheerfully accepts the necessity to meet these responsibilities at all hours of the night, on weekends, holidays, etc. He is a dedicated Career employee and has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb. 1917	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 17 December 1952	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 17 December 1956 - 17 December 1952	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] H. HALL	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Ass't Dep. Dir. of Sec.(I & S)

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 25 November 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Dep. Dir. of Security(I & S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential (4)

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

69 MONTHS

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

The fine performance which Mr. O'CONNELL has given over a period of years in several different assignments indicates a good potential for development and advancement.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'CONNELL is obtaining fine developmental experience in the varied responsibilities of his position as Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division. No specific, formal training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'CONNELL would prefer not to go overseas on a PCS assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes his responsibility to serve wherever the requirements of the Agency may dictate.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 17 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- ☑ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- ☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- ☑ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- ☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- ☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 27 November 56
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Fred H. Hall
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pers. Cont.	[illegible]	21 DEC 1956
Reviewed by	[illegible]	12/[illegible]

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: [illegible] Cunningham
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1. - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY, HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2. - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE: ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4. - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5. - A FINE PERFORMANCE, CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6. - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 55 OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH
ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

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MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SUPERVISING	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 COMPREHENSION OF INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. O'Connell is a versatile, intelligent employee who always promptly accepts and discharges his responsibilities willingly. He is an experienced, able investigator and a capable supervisor. He has no significant weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: CS/Sec. Sup. Div., Support Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 17 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16 December 1955 - 16 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 27 November 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Fred H. Hall
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Security Support Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 30 Nov 56
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING: Robert H. Cunningham
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Dep. Dir. of Security (I&S)

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

DATE
21 DEC

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☑ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

57

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 12 3 09 PM 56
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. O'Connell's potential is excellent. He is intelligent, interested in his work and is a career minded employee.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. O'Connell has already capably handled several different positions in the Security Office, both at Headquarters and in the domestic field office organization and has completed several training courses. No specific training is planned at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

As a matter of personal choice, Mr. O'Connell would prefer to remain in a domestic assignment at this time. However, as a Career employee, he recognizes and accepts his responsibility to serve wherever his services are required.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

CODED

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns,
directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weak-
nesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under
your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report
is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, through-
out the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibili-
ties by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

DATE
DEC 20
Posted Pos. C[illegible] whl
11/1 12-22-55

A 17 Dec 56 next report due

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'CONNELL, James ? P. Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 Feb. 1917
3. SEX: Male
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: SD-SE ✓
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 17 December 1951
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security
7. DIVISION: Security Support
8. BRANCH: Support
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 17 December 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 5 November 1954 to 15 December 1955 ✓

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, Support Branch, Security Support Division 1810.22
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 14 December 1954
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

From 5 November 1954 through 13 December 1954, Mr. O'Connell was Assistant Special Agent in Charge of a Security Support Division field office where he supervised a large number of clerical and professional employees engaged in investigating individuals and/or organizations to be employed or used by the Agency and in conducting investigations in support of various Agency activities. From 14 December 1954 to date, Mr. O'Connell has been Chief of the Support Branch, Security Support Division, where he has supervised the activities of clerical and professional employees engaged in directing the very complex and highly important Operational Support and Cover Support activities.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated indi-
vidual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I be-
lieve that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evi-
denced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness.
If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum noti-
fying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 8 December 55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor)

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT. (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 14 Dec 55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

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(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

Dec 28 [illegible]

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descri[illegible] each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer dis[illegible] if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.												X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.												X		
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.											X			
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.												X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

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(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. O'Connell is an experienced and highly skilled investigator and investigative supervisor. He obtains and maintains the respect of his subordinates, associates and supervisors. He willingly accepts and discharges responsibilities.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None.

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

No.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ Dec 28 [illegible] '95

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None, at this time.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

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(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

10

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisor to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted EMC 11/29/54
Re[illegible] 12/3/54

A Next due date 17 Dec 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): O'Connell James P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 Feb 1927
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: SD-SE
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 17 December 1951
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DD/Security
7. DIVISION: Special Security
8. BRANCH: Operations Br.
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-13
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 22 November 1954
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 12-16-53 to 11-5-54

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, Operational Support/Special Inquiry Desk
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: October 1953
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

He has been responsible at the supervisory level for supervising all investigative cases of an operational support or special inquiry nature. In this field he has worked in major and delicate areas of Agency activity directing matters of utmost sensitivity and import to the Agency. The normal demands of the matters referred to him require expert, skilled, sensitive investigative activity which can only be accomplished when supervised with outstanding judgment and overall knowledge. He has also served as Deputy Chief of the Operations Branch, handling at the administrative level normal and involved matters arising in Branch level operations. He has also served as Assistant to the Deputy Chief, Special Security Division, where his duties were in the major field of coordination.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 12 November 1954
SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): David E Hanlon DAVID E HANLON

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 12 November 1954
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority): Robert A. Cunningham

FORM NO. 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 54

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(4)

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(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 3 12 PM '74
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.													X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.														X
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.													X	
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.														X
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
11. CALM.														X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.													X	
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.													X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.														X
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.													X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.													X	
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.														X
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.													X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.														X
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.														X

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.													X	
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.													X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".													X	
29. TOUGH MINDED.													X	
30. OBSERVANT.													X	
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.													X	
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.													X	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.													X	
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.													X	
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.													X	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.													X	
45. VERSATILE.														X
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.													X	
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.													X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.														X
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

An highly outstanding versatility in Division operations at the administrative, supervisory, and operational levels. He has a highly developed ability to handle with firm, deliberate, and excellent judgment matters of great urgency and import. He also possesses a highly developed skill in handling personnel, analyzing performances, and recommending adjustments and reassigments.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

NA

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NOV 22 3 12 PM '54
MAIL ROOM

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS [illegible] OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

NA

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES [illegible]

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Training in the Agency Management Program.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

NA

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
16 November 1953
Rec'd Pos. Control 11 June 58

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) O'CONNELL, James P., Jr.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE PUD Investigator (Gen.)	
4. OFFICE Security	STAFF OR DIVISION Special Security Div.	BRANCH Operations Br.	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 17 Dec 52 To 16 Dec 53	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor		IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

During the first period of this report from December 1952 to May 1953, I served as Chief, Project Unit. This involved the direction of six supervisors and five clerical employees. This Unit concerned itself with the handling of covert clearances on personnel being utilized in the larger Agency projects. In addition, I was designated the Security Office representative of the Projects Administrative Planning Staff which required my making spot decisions regarding security aspects of the projects under discussion. From May 1953 until October 1953, I was designated Deputy Chief, Operations Branch. This assignment carried with it administrative and supervisory duties as delegated by the Chief, Operations. I also assumed the duties of the Chief in his absence. This involved the supervision of the Covert Records Section and the six desk components of the Operations

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.
26 March 1954
DATE

James P. O'Connell Jr.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. O'Connell's performance is described as outstanding. It is pertinent also to note that Mr. O'Connell's performance has been characterized by a splendid motivation flowing from an obvious disposition on his part to place the interest of the Agency and Division above personal considerations.

SECRET

(Over) (4)

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He has demonstrated that he possesses to an extremely high degree the ability to analyze and evaluate problems often times on an emergency basis and to recommend courses of action or to act on the basis of very sound judgment. He has also demonstrated an advanced ability in the field of administration at all levels (continued below - Item 20)

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

By familiarising himself as far as possible with problems in the Divisional administrative and policy making fields with a view to analyzing for his own knowledge high level approaches and solutions.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. O'Connell has the present potential of handling greater responsibilities. This ability should constantly develop in degree to the point where his future potential would be increased.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell's abilities are such that it may be observed that at this point his assignments may be regarded in terms of his abilities being utilized where most needed.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Agency training and rotation in the field of management and, generally, training which will provide Mr. O'Connell with more specific and detailed knowledge of the administration and problems of other components of the Agency.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

14 May 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 May 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

with which he has been concerned. His approach in this respect is from a general overall standpoint with considerations and actions taken which indicate his ability to consider problems in terms of their general implications to the Division rather than to his specific operation. More specifically, his performance has been noteworthy because it demonstrates a comprehensive knowledge of security problems and the administration of the Security Office. Constantly he is called upon to represent the Division and SO in negotations and conference with representatives of other components of the Agency regarding specific operational problems. He has handled such assignments with a high degree of tact and good judgment demonstrating a definite public relations ability.

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Section 7 (Cont.)

Branch. Since October 1953, I have served as Chief of the OS/SI Desk. I am charged with the direction of five case supervisors and five clerical employees. The unit handles all requests for operational support assistance emanating from other components of the Agency. This includes the setting up and servicing of covert letter drops; supervision of all escort and courier missions, and the scheduling of appropriate type surveillances. The unit also supervises cases and projects that are by their nature extremely sensitive.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY DATE
3 May 54

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) O'CONNELL, (First) James (Middle) P., Jr.
2. GRADE GS-12
3. POSITION TITLE Investigator (Gen.)
4. OFFICE I&S
STAFF OR DIVISION SSD
BRANCH Ops.
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 11-17-51 To 11-17-52
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated.

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As unit chief of the Project Desk, I am charged with supervision of the processing of security clearances for covert personnel to be utilized on the larger projects of the Agency. This involves the directing of seven case supervisors and five clerical employees. These supervisors are engaged in the scheduling of field investigations, making security appraisals and ultimately issuing a security determination for the covert personnel concerned. As an adjunct to this I also supervise necessary operational support to projects as requested. My position further requires that from time to time I represent the Division in conferences with operational units in regard to pertinent security aspects of covert projects.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Agent's Basic Training Course	Washington, D.C.	3 Weeks	1/7/52 to 1/25/52
CIA Orientation Course	Washington, D.C.	4 Days	11/18/52 to 11/21/52

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Security.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10. 3/13/53 James P. O'Connell Jr.
DATE SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 13 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. O'Connell has shown his ability in the position of Desk Chief to organize his work and supervise personnel on his "Desk" in such a way as to operate the Desk at maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Mr. O'Connell handles himself in a most impressive and effective way in dealing with other personnel of the Agency in problems relating to security factors in major projects of the Agency. Established deadlines have always been met by Mr. O'Connell and his judgment in rendering decisions has been most adequate.

(Over) (4)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. O'Connell's ability to organize his work and supervise others and make proper decisions are items in his performance that are considered outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. O'Connell's services are excellent in all respects.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Greater responsibilities could immediately be assigned to Mr. O'Connell if a suitable vacancy existed in the Division.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. O'Connell is well suited for his present position. It is felt that at this time his service in his present position is of most benefit to Mr. O'Connell and the Agency.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

No rotation is recommended at this time. The Division is planning a training program for Headquarters agents which Mr. O'Connell will attend.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. Services have been satisfactory.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

6 April

DATE

Edward [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

1 April 53

DATE

Fred Hall

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

aq

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SECRET

✓

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type): 00 9784

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'CONNELL JAMES P.

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): FEB 19, 1917

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 104 03 8105

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: 00 9784

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James P. O'Connell

DATE: 12 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

BENEFITS & COUNSELING
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 15 2 52 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968.)
176-101

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 2/19/17	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 104 03 8105
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code) LANGLEY VIRGINIA	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) Jim P O'Connell

DATE 9 Feb 1973

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): O'CONNELL, James P.

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Feb. 19, 1917

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 104 03 8105

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: CIA

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code): Washington, D. C. 20505

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED AN "ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE"? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one. (See Instructions for Employees on page 4.)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James P. O'Connell

DATE: 20 March 1970

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
APRIL 1968
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-102

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME (Last) O'Connell	(First) James	(Middle) P., Jr.	SEX M	YEAR OF BIRTH 1917
GRADE GS-[illegible]	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr) Dec. 1951	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION [illegible]		

EDUCATION (Level attained and major subjects)
B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING
P.E.T.I.N.
F.L.A.T.B.

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible] 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Phase)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1962	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	4 April	15 April 1955	
SUPERVISION			
Int. Intell. Orient.	18 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM CIS

TRAINING RECORD

NAME (Last) O'CONNELL, James P.	(First)	(Middle) (2)	SERIAL NO.	SECRET (when filled in)
GRADE	EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr)	ASSIGNMENT		MISCELLANEOUS (Date)

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)

SCHOOL

DEGREE AND DAT

MAJOR

MINOR

	DATE TESTED	SCORE
P.E.T.N.		
F.L.A.T.B.		
WRITING		
TYPING		
[illegible]		

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

[illegible] TRAINING RECORD

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. O. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE		REMARKS
	ENTERED	COMPLETED	
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
Writing Workshop (OTR)	13 Feb.	8 Mar. 1962	(DD/S Special)
SPECIAL AGENTS #7	8 Jan.	25 Jan. 1962	
SOFC #12	14 May	25 May 1962	
PHYSICAL SECURITY Co. #8	23 April	11 May 1962	
OS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES			
Sr. Mgtment. Seminar	8 May	13 May 66	ISO
Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

NAME (Last) O'Connell	(First) James	(Middle) [illegible]	SEX X M	YEAR OF BIRTH 1927
GRADE [illegible]	E.O.D. DATE (Mo. Da. Yr) Dec. 1951	OFFICE, STAFF, DIVISION [illegible]		SD

EDUCATION (Level attained and major subjects)

B. S. Economics Degree

TESTING	
F.E.T.A.	
F.L.A.T.B.	

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)	19 Mar.	[illegible] 1962	(1st two weeks only)
OPERATIONS SUPPORT ([illegible] Class)	2 Apr.	20 Apr. 1952	
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION (or equivalent)			
CI OPERATIONS			
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES			
MANAGEMENT	4 April	15 April 1955	
SUPERVISION			
[illegible] Intell. Orient.	18 Nov.	21 Nov. 1952	

SECRET

FORM 513

TRAINING RECORD

(45)

NAME (Last) (First) O'CONNELL, James P.	(Middle) (2)	SERIAL NO.	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	SECRET (When Filled In)
GRADE	EOD DATE (Mo-Da-Yr)	ASSIGNMENT		MIDCAREERIST (date)	

EDUCATION (level attained and major subjects)		DATE TESTED	SCORE
SCHOOL	F-E-T-B		
	F-L-A-T-B		
DEGREE AND DATE	WRITING		
MAJOR	TYPING		
MINOR	SHORTHAND		

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION (or equivalent)			
OPERATIONS SUPPORT			
OPERATIONS FAMILIARIZATION			
CI FAMILIARIZATION			
MANAGEMENT			
WRITING WORKSHOP			
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW			
Staff Crypto		1954	

FORM 513 11-61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

TRAINING RECORD

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE ENTERED	DATE COMPLETED	REMARKS
SPECIAL AGENTS COURSE			
S. O. FIELD COURSE			
PHYSICAL SECURITY			
Special Security Training		1962	
Protect Intel Against Espionage & Theft		1966	
ADP Lecture		1967	

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY INFORMATION

LANGUAGE	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U	TEST DATE	R	W	P	S	U

SECRET

SECRET (When Filled In)

COURSE	DATE		REMARKS
	ENTERED	COMPLETED	
CI Familiarization	29 Jan.	9 Feb. 1962	
PHOTOGRAPHY (TSS)			
LOCK PICKING (TSS)			
Am. Abroad (Okinawa)	13 Dec.	14 Dec. 1961	
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Exec. Seminar in ADP	7 Sept	8 Sept 67	CSC
Conf. for Federal Execs on Busi. Ops	18 May	23 May 69	Brookings

SECRET

SECRET

13 March 1967

As per Directive dated, 17 February 1967, the following Office of Security personnel attended a two hour ADP lecture given by the Office of Computer Services in the Main Auditorium on 9 March 1967:

- ANDERSON, Theodore M.
- BICKINGS, Betsy Ann
- BIELSKI, Christine A.
- BRECHBIEL, Beulah
- BRIDGETT, Thomas L., Jr.
- BRINSON, Mabel H.
- BUCCI, Frederick F.
- BUCKLEY, Richard F.
- BURNS, Donal J.
- BUTLER, Paul J.
- BYNAKER, Marian K.
- CALLAHAN, James W., Jr.
- CANTY, William J.
- CAPONE, Michaelann
- CARPENTIER, Patrick L.
- CARROLL, Kenneth F.
- CARROLL, Patricia Jean
- CASEBOLT, Maxine
- CLAYTON, H. Kenneth
- COLLINS, Wallace C.
- COULTRY, Jean C.
- CULLEN, Daniel A.
- CULLINAN, Peggy T.
- CURTIS, Dorothy V.
- DALY, John T.
- DALY, Thomas J.
- DAVIS, Georganne Francis
- DEEGAN, Helen
- DEPOY, Flossie Louise
- DETERS, Bernadette
- DE VAUGHN, Lindal Gail
- DIXON, Shirley M.
- EIGENBRODE, Pauline S.
- FARGO, Edward I.
- FARR, James R.
- FLOYD, Lewis
- FOOTE, Phyllis N.
- FULLERTON, Stanley
- GARDINER, John F.
- GEISS, Ermal P.
- GOODRICH, Kenneth S., Jr.
- GREEN, James P.
- HALL, Delphian H.
- HAMBY, Louis L.
- HARDT, Ernest L.
- HARRINGTON, John T., Jr.
- HASTY, Bunia V.
- HASTY, Rufus B.
- HAUGHERY, William M.
- HICKS, Eartha'
- HILLIER, Floyd W.
- JUSELL, Ralph H.
- KELLAM, Sandra E.
- KELLEHER, William V.
- KING, Joseph F.
- KUBISKEY, Rollis A.
- LAMM, Frances
- LATTANZE, Richard F.
- LIGHT, Judith Marie
- LOCKMAN, Louis Lee

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

LONG, Joan Patricia
LUIBL, Dolores M.
LYON, N. Harris
MAHONEY, Frank M.
MAKINSON, Rae
MANTONI, R. J.
McGREW, William M.
McLEOD, Loretta B.
McMAHON, Francis J.
MELKERSON, Carroll A.
MORGAN, Patsy
MORRISSEY, Raymond
MULLANE, Jeremiah J.,
MURPHY, Joseph E.
MURTEN, Russell E.
NEWMAN, William M.
NOE, T. P.
NOFFSINGER, Martha
O'CONNELL, James P.
O'REILLY, Edward T.
PAINTER, Alana A.
PALMER, Harold L.
PAYNE, Leonard H., Jr.
PETIT, Alan F.
PILLAR, Raymond
PITTMAN, Elizabeth G.
RAINES, John W.
RECTOR, Harry C.
REIMER, Charles F.
ROMAGNOLI, Julius S.
ROMIG, Clyde E.
RUBINO, Dominic J.
SANDELS, John M.
SAVELSBERG, Lillian
SCANLAN, Frank J.
SCHWEGMANN, George C.
SNELSON, Frances Arlene
STEGMAIER, John E.
STEPHAN, James M.
SULLIVAN, Edmond A.
SWIFT, Gerald J.
TACKETT, Charles L.
TAVENNER, Patricia A.
THOMAS, Henry E., III
TUGGLE, Holcombe T.
VASALY, L. W.
VASS, Frances Jean
VERY, Patricia L.
WALLS, William M.
WELSH, Vera D.
WETRICH, Thomas D.
WIENCKOWSKI, Louis
WRIGHT, Richard H.

Robert E Leidenheimer

Robert E. Leidenheimer
Chief, Training Branch, A&TS/OS

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(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James P. O'Connell
Signature

18 August 1965
Date

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1965

James P. O'Connell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Commendation for [redacted]

Ernest.dem Berkaw

1. When [redacted] was moved to Saigon/O'Connell on rather short notice, I named [redacted] as Acting D/COS. He served in this capacity from early April until his departure on 16 June 1965.

2. Within a matter of days he was performing the assigned duties in a superior manner. He most certainly demonstrated sound judgment, dependability and mature tolerance. The latter is an essential for the daily problems unique to any post type service.

3. As to his executive or leadership qualities I believe I can save several paragraphs by stating simply that within a week of assuming his new assignment I left on a 6-day TDY and within 30 days departed south for over 3 weeks and in each case departed with absolute assurance the Station was in good hands, and it was.

4. I would appreciate it if this document could be passed to Chief, KUSODA and if appropriate a copy placed in his personal file.

/s/ James D. Andrews, COS

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(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) O'Connell (First) James (Middle) P.

2. XXXXXXXXXX HOME LEAVE POINT

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Arlington, Virginia

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Home Leave Point
c/o John J. Deane, 426 N. Casey Key, Osprey, Florida (Father-in-law)

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Brooklyn, New York	DATE OF MARRIAGE 24 May 1941
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Virginia P. O'Connell	826 Whispering La., Falls Church, Va.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	SEX	AGE
Maureen P. O'Connell		F	23
Virginia D. O'Connell		F	19
James P. O'Connell	SAME	M	17
John D. O'Connell		M	11
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State)	TELEPHONE	
Deceased			

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: John J. O'Connell
RELATIONSHIP: Brother
ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): #2 Old Hills Lane, Port Washington, New York
TELEPHONE: PO5 3312

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS:

Change in Home Leave
Point APPROVED:
[illegible]
[illegible] Personnel
13 Apr 65

[illegible] 15 [illegible]

SIGNED AT: Okinawa, R.I.
DATE: 30 March 1965
SIGNATURE: [illegible]

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-78
1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) James P. O'Connell, Jr.	DATE (from item S-1) 26 Oct 64	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James Andrews	DATE (from item S-2) 26 Oct 64
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: FE/P/JKO 10 Nov 64	DISPATCH NUMBER: TW 376517	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Feb 1917	2. SERVICE DESIGN SS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE C/~~Regional~~ Security Support Staff, GS-15	4. STATION OR BASE Okinawa	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER ODIBEX

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 26 Jul 62	6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 15 Jun 65	6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 Aug 65	6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 15 Aug 65

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU: 4 Dependents

Wife - 48 yrs. Son - 17 yrs.
Daughter- 22 yrs. Son - 11 yrs.

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

None.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*). (*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

SEE ATTACHED SHEET.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Management courses.

(4)

SECRET

FORM 6-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I would prefer to be assigned to a position that would allow me to use my past experience in investigative or operational support activities.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE).

[1] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE Investigations Division 2ND CHOICE Operations Support Div. 3RD CHOICE Field Office

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station concurs in Subject's preferences. He would be eminently qualified for an assignment, for example, as chief, investigations division. Although a good supervisor, it is recommended that the training he requests in the field of management be approved; despite his grade, the organization's mid-career program would probably be more effective than some external programs.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division defers to the SS Career Service for determination of Subject's next assignment.

DATE 13 Nov. 64 TITLE CFE/PERS SIGNATURE Robert L. Staten

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

Chief, Investigations Division in accordance with request in Sec. 11b (above)

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. FGOS - 4659 DATED: 13 Jan 1965

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Robert E. O'Brien (SIGNATURE) DATE: 13 January 1965

Robert E. O'Brien

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR:

As Senior Security Officer in the Far East, I have the following responsibilities and duties:

1. The overall security responsibility for all stations and bases within the cognizance of the area division.
2. Administers and supervises the Regional Staff whose mission includes conducting Security Audits of all FE stations and bases; administering polygraph examinations, audio countermeasure inspections, physical and technical security matters and air ops security support.
3. Monitors the performance of Career Security Officers assigned to individual stations from the standpoint of effectiveness and productivity.
4. Security Officer to the Senior War Planner, Honolulu.
5. COMINT Security Officer for all FE installations.
6. Security and alternate Control Officer for the clearance system governing special projects in the Far East of the Office of Special Activities.
7. Furnishes security advice and guidance to the Chief of Station, Okinawa as requested.
8. Maintains a regional liaison capability with other U.S. Government agencies in the FE area.
9. Performs sensitive security inquiries as directed by Headquarters.

60 9784
[illegible]
[illegible] 65.
65-15

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell ①
Period July 62 - May 62

1. In accordance with FR 20-9 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. ① [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

3. In addition to carrying out his Regional responsibilities, ① [redacted] has been very helpful to Okinawa Station. He has established excellent rapport with the military and has ably assisted the Station in several delicate problems. In approaching any problem [redacted] is objective, tactful, and exercises good judgment. ①

4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

Ernest F. Saylor
ERNEST F. SAYLOR
COS, Okinawa

READ: [redacted] ①
James P O'Connell

2 0 JUN 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENT HEREWITH TO FCOT-6937
dtd 22 May 1963

James P. O'Connell, Service Designation--SS, Security Officer, DDP/FE/JKO
for period 24 July 1962 - 22 May 1963, GS-15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] James P. O'Connell

1. In accordance with FR 20-9 b (2) this memorandum is written in lieu of submission of Form 45.

2. [redacted] has been attached to Okinawa Station since 24 July 1962. As Chief, Regional KUSODA Staff, Okinawa, he has the responsibility of providing KUSODA support to all FE and SEA Stations. Although as Chief of Station, Okinawa I do not have supervisory responsibility over the Regional KUSODA Program, I am pleased to state that in my opinion he has carried out his work in a commendable manner.

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4. It would be a pleasure to serve with him at any time.

/S/ George E. Meloon, COS

READ:

/S/ James P. O'Connell

Reviewer Comments: Subject has placed emphasis on his required responsibility as contrasted to Okinawa security problems. This emphasis plus his personality and professional reputation has enabled a definite contribution to the Regional Far East security function, in spite of the fact that there is an inherent tendency to bypass Okinawa on security matters since it is not in the command channel to all FE Stations.

/S/ Raymond F. Drummond
CFE/Support

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1963

3 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Administrative & Training Staff

SUBJECT : O'CONNELL, James P.
Personal Matter (Last Will and Testament)

On June 28, 1962, Mr. O'Connell communicated with the undersigned and asked that the following information be properly recorded:

> He advised that on 28 June 1962, both he and his spouse had executed Last Wills and Testaments. He is maintaining in his possession a copy of the mutual Wills. The originals are in the custody of Joseph Keating, Esq., 150 Little Falls Road, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. Keating is the Attorney who drew up the Testaments.

David E. Hanlon

David E. Hanlon
Executive Officer

file
7/6
EB

TKR

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(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) O'CONNELL	(First) JAMES	(Middle) P.	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 104-03-8105

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE FALLS CHURCH, VA.

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE BROOKLYN NEW YORK	DATE OF MARRIAGE MAY 24 ~~APRIL 4~~ 1941
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S).

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 826 WHISPERING LANE	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAMES OF CHILDREN MAUREEN VIRGINIA D. JAMES P. JOHN D.	ADDRESS FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA	SEX F F M M	DATE OF BIRTH 22 APR 42 26 FEB 46 17 AUG 47 4 JAN 54
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
MOTHER AND BROTHER

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME ([✓ Mr.], Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-~~Middle~~) O'CONNELL, JOHN	RELATIONSHIP BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON NY	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER PO
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)	YES	✓
	NO	
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES	✓
	NO	
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	✓
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 5 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

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(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

NATIONAL SAVINGS AND TRUST CO.
15 + PENN. AVE N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.
VIRGINIA P + JAMES P. O'CONNELL JR.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	20 April 1967	James P. O'Connell

CONFIDENTIAL

1 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD(IOS)

SUBJECT : James O'Connell
Ervan Kuhnke

1. I am pleased to forward the attached letter from the Director, Office of Security, USIA commending Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke for assistance rendered the United States Information Agency.

2. Please bring this correspondence to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Kuhnke with my personal thanks for their good work.

3. After it has served its purpose, this correspondence should be forwarded to A&TS for filing in appropriate Administrative and Personnel files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 3 - Addressee
1 - Commendation File
1 - Chrono

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1961

Dear Shef,

I would like to take this opportunity to belatedly express the sincere appreciation of both my office and the Broadcasting Service of this Agency for the assistance rendered by employees of your staff, Mr. James O'Connell and Mr. Ervon Kuhnke in September and December of last year. This assistance consisted of picking up tape recordings prepared by Radio Moscow in the possession of Mr. Paul Frederick Dauer, 1923 De La Vina Street, Santa Barbara, California and delivering them to my office for the information of our Broadcasting Service. In addition to this service, Mr. Kuhnke of your staff readily volunteered to see that these tapes were returned to Mr. Dauer and this latter service was performed last month.

The excellent spirit of liaison co-operation evidenced by your staff is most gratifying to me and it is hoped that I might be of service in some similar matter in the future.

Sincerely,

Paul J. McNichol, Director
Office of Security

Colonel Sheffield Edwards
Director, Office of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

SECRET

DD/P 4-432

27 FEB 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

SUBJECT : PROJECT HARPSTAR

1. With the successful launching of Project "HARPSTAR" I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for the efficient support given FE Division in this matter.

2. I wish especially to compliment Mr. James P. O'Connell of your staff for his imaginative handling of the many aspects of this complicated operation.

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

4 May 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James P. O'Connell

THROUGH : Deputy Director (IOS)

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. Upon your reassignment from Chief, Operational Support Branch to Deputy Chief, SSD, I wish to forward my personal commendation for your many years of outstanding performance in operational support. You have displayed not only an unusual aptitude in the security handling of support, but have evidenced a highly professional intelligence approach to the many problems given you. As example, I cite a recent case where through certain assets of this office, you arranged for and directed the spotting, recruitment, briefing, cover and cut-out arrangements for an agent engaged in a very sensitive operation of interest to the highest authorities in the Agency, and conducted it on an "Eyes Only" basis.

2. In this operation, as in many others, you have exercised imagination with both judgment and discretion; all of which has brought great credit to this office, the Deputy Director (IOS), your Division, and, of course, yourself.

3. I congratulate you and am confident of your continued success in the office and in the Office of Security Career Service.

4. I am arranging to file copies of this letter in your Personnel and Administrative files.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DD(IOS)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: James O'Connell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 17 December 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
James O'Connell Jr.
Date: 10 Jan 1956

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) O'CONNELL	(First) James	(Middle) F.	AGE 37	GRADE 13	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE 21	CAREER DESIGNATION CD-SE
STAFF OR DIVISION SSD	BRANCH Operations		POSITION TITLE Investigator General, Desk Chief			
NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 10	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 0		NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 0		NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 32	

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☐ YES B ☒ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Germany	Frankfurt	Security Officer
2ND	Netherlands	The Hague	" "
3RD	Switzerland	Zurich	" "

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B" STATE CONDITIONS; IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

Wish to have family reside with me.

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

I do not wish an assignment which would interfere with childrens' education or health.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

wife - 37 yrs	son - 7 yrs
daughter - 12 yrs	son - 8 mos.
daughter - 8 yrs	

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE. (4)

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (*old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.*) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None.

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Security Officer in any agency component.

REMARKS

DATE 2 Sept. 54

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECTION II (*To be completed by employee's supervisor*)

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE

3 months

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

3 months

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT*

Mr. O'Connell is presently supervising an all important Desk in the administrative Division and in connection with his overall versatility in the field, his ~~abilityxx~~ availability is limited by the fact that he would have to assist in training a replacement. His preference is logically stated with the further comment that his ability is so advanced that he would qualify as a top ranking Security Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR 9/3/54

APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

COPY

Chief, Special Security Division 26 April 1954

Director of Security

Commendation for Messrs. James P. O'Connell, Jr. and William J. Cotter

1. The attached memorandum from the Chief, SR, dated 23 April, commending the services of Messrs. James P. O'Connell and William J. Cotter of the Special Security Division is forwarded to you with great pleasure.

2. Please bring this to the attention of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter and extend to them my personal commendation and thanks for the excellent services which the subject memorandum reflects. Copies of these commendations are to be included in the Security and Personnel files of Messrs. O'Connell and Cotter.

Sheffield Edwards

COPY

COPY

20 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Commendation of Security Office Personnel

1. It is with pleasure that I wish to pass to your Special Security Division a personal commendation of two officers who have assisted materially in the establishment and continued successful management of the AEFILTER project.

2. Confronted with a sudden requirement to deploy several security officers to a new activity here in the United States, Mr. James P. O'Connell, Jr., contributed materially to the project in the coordination of several neighborhood checks, re-assignment of several Security Office personnel, the preparation of two safe houses on short notice, and the reception of sensitive alien personnel under the strictest security precautions. Mr. O'Connell has put in many hours on this project, well beyond his normal routine, and several times at great personal inconvenience.

3. I wish, at the same time, to commend specifically the security officer who went under the operational alias of [redacted] [redacted]. This officer supervised five other highly qualified and experienced officers in the preparation of elaborate house-breaking safeguards for the first safe house acquired under Project AEFILTER. [redacted] Carter did his job not only thoroughly but quite cheerfully, despite actual personal hardship.

William J. Carter

4. It is all too seldom that the Divisions get around to giving credit where it is due, even in the domestic activities of DD/P. In these two cases, however, I feel that this commendation is the least token that can be proffered to two devoted and skilled civil servants.

5. I suggest that copies of this memorandum be included in the personnel files of both Mr. O'Connell and [redacted] Carter

DANA B. DURAND
CSR

COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service *for leave purposes* and retention credits *for reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): O'CONNELL, JAMES P. JR.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 FEB 1917

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	41	3	3	51	11	30	SPECIAL AGENT
CIA	51	12	17	52	12	21	

SCD 11/7/45
12/9/57

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. NAVY	44	10	4	46	2	15	HON.

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

______________________ (DATE)

James P. O'Connell Jr.
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
4	8	28
1	—	5
1	4	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE 7 - 1 - 15

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

16—63489-1

[illegible] that

JAMES P. O'CONNELL

[illegible] the

[illegible]

8 January 1952 25 January 1952

C. F. Heney

28 January 1952

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James P. O'Connell, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 December 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

James P. O'Connell Jr.
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 17th day of Dec., A. D. 1951,

at Wash. D.C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

Robert J. Hayes
(Signature of officer)

Appt Clerk
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—63160-8

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
3212 SOUTH 9 ST. ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
FEB 19 1917

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*)
ELMHURST NEW YORK

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY
VIRGINIA P. O'CONNELL

(B) RELATIONSHIP
WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
3212 SO. 9 ST.
ARLINGTON VIRGINIA

(D) TELEPHONE NO.
JA2-3622

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE (*Check one*)
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*	X	
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55180-2

14-00000

SECRET
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

DMB

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444), "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	02/19/17	SS	16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Brookings Institution - Seminar on	Public and Business Policy	17 May	18 May 1972	
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY [illegible] MAY [illegible]

(4-51)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI	TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS	
1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX	PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS		
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE 4/5/73	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

[illegible]

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Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
009784	O'CONNELL, J. P., Jr.	19 Feb 1917	SS.	GS-16

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

3

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE 30 April 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	2/19/17	SS

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Brookings Institute	Federal Executive Seminar	May 1969		1 week
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-60 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

7 0 OCT Enf

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

MAY 6 10 54 AM '70

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
13 April 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (*Last-First-Middle*)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb. 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (*City, State, Country*)	YEARS ATTENDED (*From-To*)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (*Specify*)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (*Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried*) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (*Last*) (*First*) (*Middle*) (*Maiden*)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, State, Country*)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

(8-5[illegible])

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1 Japan, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Laos, Rangoon, Philippines		2 Oct. 1967	[illegible]				TDY
2	none	to 6 Nov. 1967					TDY

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 April 1968	James P. O'Connell

SECRET

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

65-16
55

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
009784	O'CONNELL, James P.	19 Feb 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

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(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			MAY 1	11 00 AM '69			
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP: FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2 March 1969	James P. O'Connell

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 009784	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) OCONNELL J P JR	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 02/19/17	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP GS -16-04
6. SD SS	7. POSITION TITLE SECURITY OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SEC	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	59/04/04	59/04/18
~~VOLCANO ISLANDS~~ OKINAWA, RYUKU IS.	PCS 45	62/07/25	65/06/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: [illegible]
4 AUG 67

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	ST JOHNS UNIV NY	39

FORM
1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) NONE
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER-SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

BASKETBALL - GOOD
PIANO-ORGAN - ABOVE AVERAGE
CARPENTRY - GOOD

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NONE

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NONE

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NONE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII	**MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify) NONE	2. BRANCH OR CORPS	3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM - TO -
4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)	5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)	6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS NONE

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1. NONE			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.			☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year): SEPT 65 - JAN 67
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEAD QUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: OFFICE OF SECURITY
4. TITLE OF JOB: ASSIST DEP DIR SECURITY, INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 16
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE DDS/IOS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES, SUPERVISED OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND THE PROCESSING OF COVERT INVESTIGATIONS AND CLEARANCES. THIS INVOLVED THE SUPERVISION OF THREE DIVISION CHIEFS, ONE STAFF CHIEF AND EIGHT SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE ALL OF WHOM WERE AT THE GS 15 LEVEL. REPRESENTED THE OFFICE AT INTRA AND INTER AGENCY MEETINGS ON MATTER CONCERNING OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND INVESTIGATIONS. FUNCTIONED AS THE DDS/IOS IN HIS ABSENCE.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year): JULY 1962 - JUNE 65
2. LOCATION (Country, City): OKINAWA, RYUKU ISLANDS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE DIVISION
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF FE REGIONAL SECURITY STAFF
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE FAR EAST. FUNCTIONED WITH A STAFF COMPOSED OF AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES TEAM, 3 POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS AND TWO GENERALISTS. SCHEDULED SECURITY AUDITS WHICH WERE PERIODICALLY WERE CONDUCTED AT ALL FE STATIONS AND BASES AND UPON REQUEST AT SOD AND DDS+T INSTALLATIONS. WAS AVAILABLE TO PERSONALLY HANDLE SENSITIVE SECURITY MATTERS AT THE REQUEST OF HEADQUARTERS AND CHIEFS OF STATIONS. RESPONDED TO ALL REQUESTS FOR POLYGRAPH COVERAGE, PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TECHNICAL NEEDS SUCH AS AUDIO COUNTERMEASURES AND ALARM SYSTEMS. WORKED IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMSEC IN INSPECTING COMMO FACILITIES IN THE AREA. MADE RECOMMENDATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH THE FE ENGINEERS FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND INNOVATIONS TO IMPROVE SECURITY. MAINTAINED LIAISON WITH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COUNTERPARTS. WAS SECURITY ADVISOR TO SR WAR PLANS OFFICER, HAWAII.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year): JUNE 1959 - JUNE 62
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEAD QUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDS/IOS
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF, OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIVISION
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ADMINISTERED ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES AND OTHER AGENCY COMPONENTS. THIS CONSISTED OF ACCEPTING REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYZING THE BEST METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING THEM THROUGH THE O/S FACILITIES. SUPERVISED HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL WHO GAVE THESE ASSIGNMENTS TO THE DOMESTIC FIELD OFFICES. THE NATURE OF REQUESTS RANGED FROM SIMPLE TYPE SUPPORT SUCH AS A LETTER DROP TO THE COMPLEX HANDLING OF A HIGH LEVEL DEFECTOR WHICH INVOLVED ESCORTS, SAFE HOUSE FACILITIES, SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES ETC.

PERSONALLY HANDLED SENSITIVE CASES FOR DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

SECTION VIII AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): NOV 55 - JUNE 59
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEADQUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: SECURITY SUPPT. DIV./OS
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 14
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

THIS WAS BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ASSIGNMENT THE SUPPORT BRANCH BECAUSE OF IT'S EXPANSION OF ASSIGNMENTS WAS ELEVATED TO DIVISION STATUS.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): DEC 54 - NOV 55
2. LOCATION (Country, City): WASHINGTON, D.C.
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE SPECIAL SECURITY DIV./OS
4. TITLE OF JOB: ASSIST. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS13-GS 14
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSISTED THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE IN ADMINISTERING THE DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE. THIS ENTAILED THE SUPERVISION OF FIFTY INVESTIGATIVE AGENTS WHO CONDUCTED INVESIGATIONS ON AGENCY APPLICANTS, INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE OF INTEREST OF THE AGENCY IN EITHER AN OVERT OR COVERT MANNER. WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS CONDUCTED BY DFO IN THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. ALSO HAD SUPERVISORY COGNIZANCE OVER THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT ASSIGNMENTS GIVEN THE DFO.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): JULY 52 - DEC 54
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEADQUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: SPECIAL SECURITY DIV/OS
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF PROJECT DESK
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS 13
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

RESPONSIBLE FOR SEVEN SUPERVISORS WHO PROCESSED COVERT CLEARANCE ACTIONS ON INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TO BE EMPLOYED WITH OR ASSOCIATED WITH THE AGENCY. REPRESENTED OS AT INTRA AGENCY COMMITTEE MONITORING PROPRIETARY PROJECTS. GAVE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE ON SECURITY PROBLEMS INVOLVING OPERATIONAL PROJECTS. DELIVERED LECTURES ON SECURITY MATTERS FOR OTR.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — **MARITAL STATUS**

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY NO CHANGE

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3 DATE OF BIRTH

4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6 PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9 DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
JAMES P JR	SON	8/17/47	U.S	1893 ELSINORE AVE McLEAN, VIRGINIA
JOHN D	SON	1/4/54	U.S.	" "

SECTION XI — **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
SOCIETY OF FORMER FBI AGENTS (WASHINGTON D.C.)	WASHINGTON, D.C.	1952	DATE

DATE: 31 March 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James P. O'Connell

SECRET

O CONNELL JAMES P 662 OS 665

(1) (2) (3) (4)

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF GRANTING OR OF REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

THE ABOVE-NAMED INDIVIDUAL (ITEM 1) HAS BEEN GRANTED A CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE (OR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE HELD BY THIS INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN REVOKED) UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF HR 92-4. THE CLEARANCE (ITEM 2) OR REVOCATION (ITEM 4), IS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE MONTH AND YEAR SHOWN ABOVE. SUBJECT HAS BEEN BRIEFED OR DEBRIEFED, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATTERS AND HAS SIGNED A BRIEFING/DEBRIEFING STATEMENT, AS APPROPRIATE, ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. UPON REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE SUBJECT IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO HAVE CONTINUED CUSTODY OF, ACCESS TO, OR OTHERWISE GAIN FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF STAFF CRYPTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL OR INFORMATION.

WHEN EMPLOYEE NO LONGER REQUIRES THE CLEARANCE IN ORDER TO PERFORM HIS HER ASSIGNED DUTIES, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY STAFF, OC, BE NOTIFIED THAT THE CLEARANCE MAY BE REVOKED.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 - EMPLOYEE'S COMPONENT (ITEM 3)
1 - OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

Jean Paul DeBlois

CHIEF, DOCTRINES BRANCH, OC-S

FORM 12-63 1597b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Return to CAB 1604 Curie

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DEC

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

109734

THIS DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
O'CONNELL JAMES PATRICK JR.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
826 WHISPERING LANE
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
SAME AS 2.

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CLEARBROOK 6-1891

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
VIRGINIA

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
O'CONNELL VIRGINIA

2. RELATIONSHIP
WIFE

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH VIRGINIA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country) - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
HOUSEWIFE

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CL6-1891

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
ANNA C. O'CONNELL (MOTHER) 2 OLD HILLS LANE, PORT WASHINGTON N.Y.

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) VIRGINIA (Middle) P. (Maiden) DEANE (Last) O'CONNELL

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
BROOKLYN, N.Y.

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
1815 MADISON PLACE, BROOKLYN N.Y.

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
826 WHISPERING LANE FALLS CHURCH, VA.

11. DATE OF BIRTH
18 JAN 1917

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
NEW YORK N.Y.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
BIRTH

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

18. OCCUPATION
HOUSEWIFE

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
HARRY WINSTON (1947)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
5TH AVE N.Y.C.

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b REPLACES FORM 275
1 SEP 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

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(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
NATIONAL SAVINGS + TRUST CO.	15 ST + NEW YORK AVE, N.W.
	WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)	2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☐ NO	4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) DEC 1951 - MAY 1952
2. GRADE 12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUPERVISED THE ACTION REQUIRED TO INITIATE INVESTIGATIVE ACTION FOR ULTIMATE CLEARANCE DETERMINATION ON COVERT EMPLOYEES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAY 1952 - MAY 1953
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF, PROJECT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES BASICALLY SAME AS PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT ONLY ON THIS DESK PERSONNEL INVOLVED WERE ASSOCIATED WITH LARGE PROJECTS AND NOT ONLY WERE INDIVIDUAL CLEARANCES HANDLED BUT THE OVERALL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE PROJECTS WERE EXAMINED

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAY 1953 - MARCH 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 40
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DEP. CHF. OPERATIONS BRANCH
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUBORDINATE TO CHF. OPERATIONS AND PERFORMED HIS FUNCTIONS IN HIS ABSENCE. ALSO REGULARLY HANDLED DELEGATED DUTIES FOR HIM. INVOLVED SUPERVISION OF FIVE CLEARANCE & ONE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESKS.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MARCH 1954 - OCT 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SSD/OPERATIONS BRANCH
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 10
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CHIEF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DESK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES SUPERVISED ALL REQUESTS FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MADE TO THE OFFICE OF SECURITY. THIS INCLUDED CASES INVOLVING TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, SURVEILLANCES, CUSTODIAL DETAILS, ETC. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT TO HANDLE ITS REORGANIZATION

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) OCT 1954 - DEC 1954
2. GRADE 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT ASSIST SPEC. AGT IN CHGE. DISTRICT FIELD OFFICE INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION/OS
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 50
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES ASSISTED SAC IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FIELD OFFICE. THIS INCLUDED SUPERVISING THE SCHEDULING OF CASES TO THE AGENTS, GIVING THEM GUIDANCE IN INVESTIGATING THE CASES REVIEWING COMPLETED INQUIRIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII	CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS		
1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷		2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷	

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
MAUREEN	DAUGHTER	1942		✓	U.S.	[illegible] La
DIANE	"	1946		✓	"	Falls Church, VA
JAMES	SON	1947	✓		"	"
JOHN DEANE	"	1954	✓		"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

FORMER ADDRESS
1317 SOUTH BUCHANAN ST. ARLINGTON, VA.
(1952-55)

SECTION 7

5. DEC. 1954 TO PRESENT CHIEF, SUPPORT BRANCH
20 EMPLOYEES GRADE 14
ADMINISTER 3 UNITS THAT HANDLE (A) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT MATTERS OF A GENERAL NATURE (B) SPECIAL SUPPORT PROJECTS INCLUDING DOMESTIC MAIL DROPS (C) CASES INVOLVING SECURITY/COVER ASPECTS INCLUDING COVERT SITE SURVEYS, ADJUDICATION OF ~~[illegible]~~ REQUESTS FOR BUILDING BADGES TO COVERT EMPLOYEES. AS CHIEF OF THIS BRANCH I'M CALLED UPON FROM TIME TO TIME, TO REPRESENT OS AT INTER + INTRA AGENCY CONFERENCES, GIVE LECTURES REGARDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS + POTENTIAL OF OS IN SUPPORT FIELD AND PERSONALLY HANDLE HIGHLY SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS.

DATE COMPLETED 12 April 1957	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James P. O'Connell Jr

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office
Ext.
Home JA2-3622

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ JAMES (First) PATRICK (Middle) O'CONNELL JR (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 3212 SOUTH 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON, (City) VIRGINIA, (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME JIM WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 2/19/17 PLACE OF BIRTH ELMHURST (City) NEW (State) YORK (Country)



IP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE?

I CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

(State) (Country)

REVIOUS NATIONALITY? NA (Yes or No) (Country)

AT DATES: NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

NA

TEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? NA ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA (Number) NA (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX MALE HEIGHT 6'3" WEIGHT 210 LBS

EYES BLUE HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION FAIR SCARS NONE

BUILD LARGE OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE VIRGINIA (First) PATRICIA (Middle) DEHNE (Maiden) O'CONNELL (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE NEW YORK, NY. 5/24/41

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 1815 MADISON PLACE (St. and Number) BKLYN (City) NY. (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3212 So. 9 ST. (St. and Number) ARLINGTON (City), VIRGINIA (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1/18/17 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN (City), NEW YORK (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER DEANE FLYING SCHOOL

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS FLOYD BENNETT (St. and Number) AIRFIELD (City), BKLYN (State), NY. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

10 62443 1

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME MAUREEN RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 9
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 2212 So. 4 ST. ARLINGTON, VA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME DIANE RELATIONSHIP DAUGHTER AGE 5
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME JAMES RELATIONSHIP SON AGE 4
CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS SAME AS ABOVE (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JAMES PATRICK O'CONNELL (First) (Middle) (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED DEC. DATE OF DECEASE 10/12/51 CAUSE HEART AILMENT
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 88 33 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 5/12/80 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN, NEW YORK (City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA
CITIZENSHIP NA WHEN ACQUIRED? NA WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)
OCCUPATION TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING LAST EMPLOYER OWN BUSINESS
EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 69 GUERNSEY ST. BKLYN, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA
COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ANNE JENKINS O'CONNELL (First) (Middle)? (Last)
LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA
PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 88 33 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATE OF BIRTH 3/19/91 PLACE OF BIRTH CORONA, NEW YORK
CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)
IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER NA

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME JOHN J. O'CONNELL (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE 26
   PRESENT ADDRESS 1133 ST. JAMES AVE, ELMHURST, N.Y. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME JOHN J. DEANE (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box # 4 B [illegible] [illegible] FLORIDA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 6/24/90 PLACE OF BIRTH BROOKLYN, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? N.Y. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION RETIRED LAST EMPLOYER [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME KATHRYN (First) LANTRY (Middle) DEANE (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box # 4-B Route 1 Niceville Florida (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/19/97 PLACE OF BIRTH New York City, N.Y.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? NA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA
3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA
   CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR INVESTIGATIVE

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? 2040.00
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY ✓

FREQUENTLY ______, CONSTANTLY ______

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C ✓

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ______, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES NO

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

PREFER EASTERN STATES

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ST. BARTHOLOMEW ADDRESS ELMHURST (City) N.Y (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1/23 TO 1/31 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL XAVIER H.S. ADDRESS 30 W. 16 ST. (City) NEW YRK (State) N.Y. (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1/31 TO 1/35 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY ADDRESS BRKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ECONOMICS YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 1/35 TO 1/39 DEGREE B.S. in ECO.

COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______ (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY ______ YEARS COMPLETED ______

DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS
ENGLISH

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ______

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U.S.A (Country) NAVY (Service) ENSIGN (Rank) 11/2/44 3/11/46 (Date of Service)

ARMED GUARD CENTER N.Y. (Last Station) 409547 (Serial Number) ~~IN[illegible]~~ RESERVE (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 256 ADDRESS JACKSON HEIGHTS, N.Y.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON USNR

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NONE

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 3/2/47 TO 11/30/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS 12

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ADDRESS WASHINGTON (St. and Number) D.C. (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS INVESTIGATIVE NAME OF SUPERVISOR R. B. Hood

TITLE OF JOB SPECIAL AGENT SALARY $7040.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES INVESTIGATE MATTERS OF CRIMINAL NATURE, THOSE PERTAINING TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY, CONDUCT BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS ON PROSPECTIVE & PRESENT EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT.

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO SEEK A POSITION WITH GREATER ADVANCEMENT POSSIBILITIES

FROM 3/15/46 TO 3/1/47 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO.

ADDRESS 69 GUERNSEY ST (St. and Number) BROOKLYN (City) NEW YORK (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING & WAREHOUSING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J.P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB OFFICE MGR. SALARY $3900.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES OPERATED BUSINESS CONSISTING OF 12 TRUCKS AND WAREHOUSE. MANAGED ALL PHASES, SUCH AS MAINTENANCE, BILLING, DISPATCHING, IN ABSENCE OF MY FATHER WHO WAS IN SEMI-RETIREMENT DUE TO ILLNESS

REASONS FOR LEAVING FATHER RETIRED

FROM 3/2/43 TO 11/1/44 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY MANUFACTURERS MACHINE & TOOL CO.

ADDRESS 11 LAFAYETTE ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS PRECISION PARTS NAME OF SUPERVISOR WILLIAM GELSTON

TITLE OF JOB WAREHOUSE SUPERVISOR SALARY $3380.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF LARGE WAREHOUSE IN WHICH WERE STORED FINISHED & SEMI-FINISHED PARTS OF THE NORDEN BOMBSIGHT AND OTHER NAVAL ORDNANCE MATERIAL

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ENTER NAVAL SERVICE

FROM 9/41 TO 3/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY JAMES P. O'CONNELL TRUCKING CO

ADDRESS 64 GUERNSEY ST. BROOKLYN N.Y. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS TRUCKING NAME OF SUPERVISOR J.P. O'CONNELL SR.

TITLE OF JOB FOREMAN SALARY $2080.00 PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES SUPERVISED LOADING & UNLOADING OF TRUCKS TO & FROM RAILROAD YARDS TO THE WAREHOUSE.

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO OBTAIN A DEFENSE JOB

FROM 3/40 TO 9/41 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. GYPSUM COMPANY

ADDRESS 63 HENDERSON ST. JERSEY CITY N.J. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS BUILDING MATERIALS NAME OF SUPERVISOR D. ALLEN

TITLE OF JOB PRICE CLERK SALARY $[illegible] PER ANNUM

YOUR DUTIES PRICED MATERIALS FOR THE EASTERN SALES DISTRICT AND HANDLED ORDERS AND CORRESPONDENCE FOR SALES [illegible]

REASONS FOR LEAVING FOR ADVANCEMENT

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Fair

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Baseball — Fair

Basketball — Fair

[illegible] Fair

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION? AS INVESTIGATIVE SUPERVISOR AT MY LAST PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT I WAS DESIGNATED ASSISTANT FIELD SUPERVISOR AND AS SUCH WAS REQUIRED ON OCCASION TO ADMINISTER THE WORK OF SEVERAL TO 100 MEN. THIS INCLUDED THE ASSIGNING OF WORK, SUPERVISING CASES SUBMITTING EFFICIENCY RATINGS ON EMPLOYEES AND BEING GENERALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THEIR ACTIVITIES

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 45 SHORTHAND

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR)

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

NA

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES IN THE U. S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES – NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

4. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

5. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S. (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

2. Mr. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. [illegible] BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible]

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [illegible] IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS [illegible]

(OVER)

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: No

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.
1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] Washington, D.C. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS Phila, Pa (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 6/50 TO Present [illegible] Virginia (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 2/48 TO 2/50 3609 So. 25 St. " " (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1/47 TO 2/48 [illegible] St. Phila. Pa (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 3/46 TO 1/47 [illegible] Ave. Elmhurst, N.Y. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 10/44 TO 3/46 Box [illegible] (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 6/43 TO 10/44 [illegible] 31 St. Brooklyn N.Y. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 1/41 TO 6/43 U.S. Marine [illegible] " " (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 2/23 TO 1/41 [illegible] St. [illegible] Ave. Elmhurst N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM NA TO NA NA (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM .... TO .... (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

2. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NA

3. .... (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

4. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. N/A (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? MODERATION

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

FBI - FEB 1947

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Virginia F. O'Connell RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 3212 So. 7 St. Arlington Virginia (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Arlington Virginia (City and State) DATE 2/4/57

William Cotts (Witness)

James P. O'Connell Jr. (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

SEC. 15 EMPLOYMENT

9/39 TO 3/40 SEVERAL PART TIME JOBS DOING
BOOKKEEPING + SALES WORK

5/39 TO 9/39 GARDEN CITY BEACH CLUB
ATLANTIC BEACH, LONG ISLAND NY
ASSISTANT MGR. 150.00 A MO.
REASON FOR LEAVING: SEASONAL WORK

1/39 TO 5/39 ABRAHAM + STRAUSS INC.
BROOKLYN NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT STORE
CREDIT DEPARTMENT - INTERVIEWER
INTERMITTENT EMPLOYMENT DEPENDING
UPON STORES NEED FOR HELP.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 6 September 1962

PROT 2-230

TO : **Director of Security**
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - **James P. O'Connell**

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 8 June 1962.
HR 90-4

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by **Director of Security**, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Jean Paul DeBlois
JEAN PAUL DeBLOIS
Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
- 1 - **Director of Security**
- 1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
- 1 - Personnel Office
- 1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

(9)

14-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY APPROVAL

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Date: 10 December 1951

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

Your Reference:

FROM: ~~[illegible]~~
Chief, Special Security Division

Case Number: 66483

SUBJECT: O'CONNELL, James P.

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is an applicant for a position in I&S.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

Jes

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

(5)

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 AUG 1974 RK

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TARASOFF, ANNA
OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: C/LAD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 June		DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

SECRET

26 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (P), Terminated Contract Employee

1. During period 8 April 1957 through 8 September 1953, subject served as an Agency Staff Employee. During this period, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

2. During period 15 July 1964 through 19 October 1970, subject served as a part-time contract employee on a prearranged regular scheduled tour of duty. With respect to this period of service:

(a) Period 15 July 1964 through 7 September 1967 is creditable for purposes of Civil Service Retirement. Since subject was covered by Social Security during this period, Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld.

(b) During period 8 September 1967 through 19 October 1970, subject was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System.

3. Action Required:

(a) Office of Finance: Please post the above information to subject's retirement records.

(b) DDP/WH/Contracts: For your information.

/s/ [illegible]
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig - O/F/C&TD
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - CPD subject file
1 - CPD chrono

SECRET

[illegible]

11 MAR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Civil Service Retirement Credit

1. It is requested that information be provided as to the creditable service for the Civil Service Retirement program for the following individuals.

Kurt B. CANEPA
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
Ralph M. SAMOSKA
Jesse D. WITCHARD

2. Although the named individuals are no longer employed by the Organization, the creditable service can be of particular significance to each.

3. Your early attention to the request will be appreciated.

for William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Following are the total number of hours for each year worked by Sandra B. CAZAZZUS under contract. The information was provided this office by Payroll.

Period of Service			Actual Hours
From	To		Worked
15 Jul 64	Dec	1964	551 hours
Jan 65	Dec	1965	789
Jan 66	Dec 66	1966	1091
Jan 67	Dec 67	1967	1092
Jan 68	Dec	1968	1486
Jan 69	Dec	1969	1414
Jan 70	19 Oct	1970	1217

Dow:

This gal had two contracts. The first one included a leave benefit. This first K ended and was immediated replaced by a 2nd K, which included Civil Service Retirement.

From the number of hours worked I feel we can make a determination that ~~she~~ during the full period she worked ~~[illegible]~~ in a part-time basis on a prearranged reg. sch. tour of duty. If you concur, I will write a std. type memo to O/Finance.

Subject is now terminated, but in WH field with her husband. Bill Kenehan has a dispatch in asking that Hqtrs. verify her total K service.

Paul.
23 Mar 71

ok – DK

SECRET

Contract Service — Sandra B. CAZAZO (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
8 Apr 57 – 8 Sep 63	CIA Staff Employee service		
15 Jul 64	Contract Employee with Social Security. No LPAs or PSIs.	$2.59 p.h.	
14 Aug 64	Pay increase	2.72	
10 Oct 65	Pay increase Authorized future LPAs.	2.62	
3 Jul 66	LPI	2.90	
7 Sep 67	Contract terminated	2.90	
8 Sep 67	Contract Employee with ~~Social~~ Civil Service Retirement and LPAs. No PSIs.	2.90	
8 Oct 67	LPI	3.03	
14 Jul 68	LPI	3.12	GS-05/5
13 Jul 69	LPI	3.37	GS-05/5
28 Dec 69	LPI	3.57	GS-05/5
19 Oct 70	Contract terminated	3.57	"

NOTE: On 24 Mar 1971, subject's official Staff Employee file was reviewed. It reflected; (a) staff employee service from 8 Apr 57 to 8 Sep 63; (b) during entire period was a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System; (c) she was on LWOP during period 12 Jun-8 Sep 63; and her SF-144 dated 8 Apr 57 reflect no prior Federal Service.

1. LAST NAME: TARASOFF [illegible]
FIRST NAME: ANKA
INITIAL(S): A

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty: 9/8/67
F T:
P T: X
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d)
on ________ Annual Leave Bal ________

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years: Months: Days:
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
Contract terminated 10/19/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)

	ANNUAL	SICK
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	275	256
6. Current leave year accrual through 10/17 19 70	89	56
7. Total	364	312
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9. Total leave taken	0	0
10. Balance	364	312

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360hrs 2 holidays
12. Salary rate(s) $3.57 p/h
13. Lump sum leave dates
From 0800 10/17 to 1700 12/22/70 0 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by:
(Signature)
Auth cert. officer
(Title)
(Date)
(Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes NONE
15. Current balance as of ________ 19__
16. 12-month accrual rate
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months
18. Monthly accrual date
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date
20. Date basic service period completed

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ________ to ________
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 8/14/64	0	0
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates)		

REMARKS
SCD
7/15/64

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 013175
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CAZAZZUS SANDRA B

PREPARED:02/.3/7.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (1BCHL01)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 1? DA ? YR. 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CONTRACT-TYPE A (S)

6. FUNDS ▶ | ☐ V TO V | ☒ V TO CF |
| ☐ CF TO V | ☐ CF TO CF |

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1135-0970
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNCLASSIFIED

11. POSITION TITLE: TRANSLATOR
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (PART TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1045.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 3.78 LEI: 071564 DOG: 071564

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      23   SEX: F       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 00
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 071564  FED SERVICE COMP:
                                          HOSPITILIZATION: F    PLAN:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC
FEGLI: YES               PREV. GOVT SERV: 5         SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: H             A/L INC: 3                 S/L INC: 3
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 090357 EXPIRATION DATE: 09077_ DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 07.564
REFERRING OFFICER: WH ADMIN          REFR ORG: WH         PHONE: 4-60
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:           STATE:
TRAVEL: NNN      OPS EXPNSE: N          HOUSING: N            POST/EQUAL: N
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: N        OFFSET CLAUSE: N      STD GOVT: N
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N     EDUCATION: N
STEP INCRS: N    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N     SEPARATION: N

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

Form 11503 7-66 MFG. 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DUPLICATE

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL *THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE*	DATE 25 January 1971

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (*Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym*) CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1
LOCAL ADDRESS Mexico City, Mexico	PERMANENT ADDRESS Cleveland, Ohio
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Mexico City, Mexico	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Contract Employee, Type B

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
15 July 1964	8 September 1970	7 September 1971	19 October 1970

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Retirement of husband.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (*Add or delete as applicable*)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE			
LOGISTICS			
xxxxxx			
Security			

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (*Signature*) W.S. Renehan, C/WH/Contracts	DATE

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(*OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE*)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD			OS #131 751 13 July 64	CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (*Signature*) DATE

REVIEWED:

REMARKS (*Please initial*)

Duplicate - advance copy to OF/C&TD/CEAS 30 October 1970.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE
C/WH/1		

FORM 3-67 1689 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS AS CONTRACT

OCT 67 - DEC 67	$609.07
JAN - DEC 68	4549.34
JAN - DEC 69	4935.06
JAN - OCT 70	4335.49

$14428.89 ÷ 3 = $4809.63

HIGH 3 AVERAGE

1½% x 4809.63 x 5 = $360.70
1¾% x 4809.63 x 5 = 420.85
2% x 4809.63 x 2.5 = 240.48
$1022.03 ANNUITY

HIGH 3 BASED ON LAST 3 YEARS AS STAFF

JUN 62 - JUN 63	$5545	GS 6/4
JUN 61 - JUN 62	5160	6/3
JAN 61 - JUN 61	2497	6/2
JUN 60 - DEC 60	2255	5/2

$15457 ÷ 3 = $5152.33

HIGHER ANNUITY

1½% x $5152.33 x 5 = $386.45
1¾% x $5152.33 x 5 = 450.85
2% x $5152.33 x 2.5 = 257.63
$1094.93 ANNUITY

CHZ 2245 (P) TARASOFF 8 FEB

1. She is not eligible for retirement annuity until she's 62 yrs old - on 5 May 1985.

STAFF (CSR) Apr 57 - Jun 63 Sept 63
→ CONTRACT (SS) Jul. 64 - Sept 67
" (CSR) Sept 67 - Oct 70

per [illegible] NO Refund of Retirement deductions has been made, either from Staff or Contract employment.

Form 2802

Resignation effective 7 Sept 1963 } ~~$1781.83~~

57-63	CS Deductions while a Staffer	$1781.83
67-70	" " " Contract	961.24
	TOTAL	$2743.07

Sept $2.90
8 Oct 67 $3.03
14 Jul 3.12

Stone

Sept 67 $6.09 Dec 67
68 $4549.34
69 4935.06
Oct 70 4335.49

Oct 70
Apr 57
13 yrs 6 MONTHS

5152.33
3)15457.00
15
3 6
15 10
15

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, W H Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT ADMIN/CONTRACTS - Termination Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Sandra B. CAZAZZUS' contract was terminated effective 19 October 1970. Since her husband is retiring, she will no longer be available for employment.

2. Submitted herewith is a signed contract termination and termination secrecy oath.

Zachary T. Abarta
Zachary T. ABARTA

Attachments:

Contract termination - - - Orig & 1 h/w
Termination secrecy oath - Orig & 1 h/w

Distribution:

Orig & 2 - Chief, WH Division w/att.

Rec'd 30 OCT 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT 10,578	DATE 22 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 OCT 1970

SECRET

ug OS/ID

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 16 day of October 1970.

Sandra B. Cazazzus (SEAL)
Signature Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Witnessed by me this 16 day of October 1970,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

SIGNATURE

SECRET

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

You are hereby notified that your services under a contract with the United States Government, effective 8 September 1967, are to be terminated at the convenience of the United States Government pursuant to paragraph 4 of said contract, and that the 30 days' notice required by the contract begins 19 September 1970 .

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph 4 of said contract which read as follows:

> "_____. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the United States Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations."

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By________________
Field Contracting Officer

Acknowledged:

Sandra B. Cazazzus

Witness:

Grace H. Tremblant

Reviewed:

____
Contract Approving Officer

HMMT-1125 78

Rec'd orig
30 Oct 70
orig routed with
term. sheet (1489)

SECRET

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE
12 Oct 70

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR NOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)* CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. (P)			SEX Female		DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 23
MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1945, 49	NATIONALITY U.S.A		LAST MEDICAL EXAM Unknown
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL Type B, 13 July 1964			JOB TITLE Transcriber		COMPONENT DDP/WH/1
CONTRACT CATEGORY Type B	EFFECTIVE DATE 15 July 64	EXPIRATION DATE 7 Sep 71	SALARY $3.67	GRADE EQUIVALENT GS-5/6	PROJECT OR FAN # SUPPORT

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		X
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	X	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X	
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X	
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School Graduate

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1944-45	Cleveland Trust Company	Cleveland, Ohio	Bookkeeper	
1955-56	American Trust Company	San Leandro, California	Commercial Bookkeeper	

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Apr 57-Jun 63	Clerk-Typist	Staff	Hqs		EOD as Resign. as	GS-4 GS-6
Jul 64-present	Transcriber	B	Mexico City	SUPPORT	$3.67	GS-5/6

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV); KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

Performed her secretarial/transcribing duties outside the Station.

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

Satisfactory.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

Satisfactory

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

No problem.

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

None

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

SECRET

	...ING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

Bill Montgomery
CCS/CTS
6697
12 October 1970

...LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 35 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

...NF: CCS 2 INFO FILE, VR, WH8, OCC2, OS3, OP3

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 13 OCT 70 21 17z CITE DIRECTOR 077157

MEXICO CITY

JBCENT/ADMIN

1. PLEASE ADVISE DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS AND SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS THAT THE FLAT RATE TAX HAS INCREASED TO 18.4 PER CENT EFFECTIVE WITH PAY PERIOD ENDING 20 SEPTEMBER 1970.

2. STATION SHOULD START WITHHOLDING TAX AT HIGHER RATE IMMEDIATELY. DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: ________ WH/F

________ WH/CON

WH/F/NCC

C/WH/SS

C/CCS/CTS

14 00

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

Miss Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

Dear Miss CAZAZZUS

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 8 Sept. 1967, as amended, which expires 8 Sept. 1970.

Effective 8 Sept. 1970, said contract, as amended, is extended for one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By

Contracting Officer

Accepted:

Sandra B. Cazazzus

Witness:

Timothy M.

Approved:

Concur:

DDR 6 OCT 1970

Date :

REVIEWED:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract Provisions

Reference: HMMT-9892

1. Reference indicated Sandra B. CAZAZZUS is a Contract Employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day as well as a varying number of hours in order to meet operational deadlines.

Reference asked that the contract for CAZAZZUS be amended to provide reimbursement of six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967.

2. The request is answered by the Station's explanation--unless and until there has been established in advance a regular tour of duty, an individual is not eligible for leave or holiday pay (see FHB 20-1 and FR 20-13).

In the event the basic criteria is met (FHB 20-1), the effective date could not be retroactive.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMS-6559

DATE

[illegible] 1969

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/1
1-WH/Contracts
1-WH/Registry

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/Contracts VSRenehan:md (17 Sept 69) EXT 4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S NAME

C/WH/1

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

C/WH/SS George R. Thompson

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Anna A. Tarasoff

FROM: RID/D&P/INCOMING
GB-12

EXTENSION x7737

NO [illegible] 9892

DATE 10 SEP 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Chief/WH/Reg.	11 SEP 1969		
2.			
3. CWH/SS			
4.			
5. WH/contract	13 Sept 69	13 Sept	
6. C/WH/1			
7.			
8. WH/Contracts			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

?

Your comments please. Subject's contract already provides for sick and annual leave effective 15 July 64, and she is considered a part-time contract employee on a regularly scheduled tour of duty. Subject's contract does not provide for overtime and holiday time. Her contract would have to be amended to include this provision.

6-8 Pls advise that under terms of contract cannot approve Para 3 request.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (C/E) (132830) - Contract Entitlements

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. Book Dispatch - 6496
B. Book Dispatch - 6144

1. Subject is a contract employee who is required to perform her duties during various hours of the day (including a varying number of hours) in order to meet operational deadlines.

2. Even though CAZAZZUS' contract allows her annual and sick leave benefits, she has not been reimbursed for any leave during the period 8 September 1967 to the present. In addition, the Station has not reimbursed her for any holidays, WOLADY or local, while other contract employees whose contracts call for a regularly scheduled tour of duty, have received compensation.

3. Since subject has worked an average of 30 hours per week, with Headquarters concurrence, it is recommended that she be reimbursed six hours per day when in a leave status and for paid holidays retroactively to 8 September 1967, the effective date of her present contract.

for/John A. KAUBERT

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT - 9892	3 September 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
[illegible] B [illegible]
~~[illegible]~~

1. Effective 8 September 1969 the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 8 September 1967 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

RB/DA
5 Sept 69

SECRET

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension

It is requested that the contract for the following named individual(s) be amended to extend the term as indicated.

Tarasoff, Anna C.
CAZAZZUS, Sandra B. Through 7 September 1970

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

DATE:

CTC No. ____________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for ____________

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction has been ☐ will ☐ will not ☐ be forwarded. The Station/Base will be ☐ has been ☐ advised of this assessment.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
seventeen and three-tenths (17.3) per cent	14 December [illegible]

2. This is a new assessment ☐ a revised assessment ☐.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

CONTACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Chief, C.P.D.

APPROVED:

____

Executive Secretary, Covert Tax Board

DISTRIBUTION: Orig & 1 - Addressee: 1 Copy CPD: 1 Copy Area Division: 2 Copies CCS

FORM 9-69 2643 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(1-4-21)

3 - CPD

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WOGAME

Douglas J. FEINGLASS (p)
ADM/JBCENT - Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (p) - Revision of Tax Assessment Rate

REFERENCE: Letter of Tax Instruction, HMMS-5711, 14 Dec 1967

1. Please advise FEINGLASS that his flat rate percentage tax assessment has been revised by the Tax Staff from thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent, established by reference, to twenty and eight-tenths (20.8) per cent, effective 29 June 1969, T/Y 1969. This revision is necessary as his income and tax position have changed to such a degree as to make the previous tax assessment rate unrealistic. A computation of the revised tax rate is attached.

2. This assessment revision is incorporated by reference as an amendment to FEINGLASS' Letter of Tax Instruction.

3. From the information submitted to the Tax Staff, it appears that FEINGLASS' daughter qualifies as a dependent. The new tax computations are based on five exemptions. Also, FEINGLASS should list five exemptions on his 1969 tax return.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Attachment: As Noted

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - C/CPD (wo/att)
1 - OF/C&TD/CPB (wo/att)
1 - C/WH/1 (wo/att)
1 - WH/Contracts

HMMS-6524

11 August 1969

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

NOTE FOR FILE:

CAZAZZUS' husband's (FEINGLASS) retirement date extended to Nov. 70.

25 JUN 1969

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Annual Fitness Report - Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached are copies of an Annual Fitness Report on Sandra B. CAZAZZUS.

2. CAZAZZUS and her husband make a good and efficient team on the duties assigned to them.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

orig routed to:
WH/CXO, 11 Feb 69
DC/WHD 11 Feb 69
WH/1 ?
WH/contracts 18 Feb 69
CPD 19 FEB 1969

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH Division w/att.
1 - C/SB Division w/o att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-9523

DATE
29 January 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS		
DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Francis J. COIGNE Francis Coigne	
DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis	

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 1923	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contract Employee	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form roady for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT
DATE 28 January 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Sandra B. CA[illegible]US (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) Paul L. Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969	Chief of Station	Winston M. Scott (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal.)

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOMOLD

INFO.
Chief, WH Division Contacts

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/TRAINING
Language Training

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

As of 1 March 1968 the below listed personnel were receiving voluntary Spanish language training paid for by the organization or LNGOLD:

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
Francis J. COIGNE
Humphrey K. FEADSHIP
Douglas J. FEINGLASS
Henry N. LANGDON
Keith R. LEVENDERIS
Wanda G. PANKPINTO
Clarice F. PARDECK
Cora B. RAUSKIND
Joseph F. TRECANTI

and the wives of Walter W. CORNBURY and Gerald D. FAHLANGER.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - Chief, WOMOLD
2 - Chief, WH Division

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-8919

DATE
9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 1923	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Sandra B. Cazazzus

DATE

14 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 5 1968

CONT [illegible] DIV.

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

Approved BoB 50-RO 385

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

Statistical Stub (SF 176-T)

To be completed only by employees who checked either box "A" or box "C" on the election form. The purpose of this stub is to furnish statistics on the initial registration under the liberalized life insurance program.

1. Which box did you check?	Box A	☐	1
	Box C	☐	2
2. Did you have regular insurance under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program on January 1, 1968?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
3. Your sex?	Male	☐	1
	Female	☐	2
4. Are you now married?	Yes	☐	1
	No	☐	2
born?			

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Sandra B. CAZZAZUS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please forward a completed form 89 on Sandra B. CAZZAZUS for review by the Medical Staff.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-5798

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATING

OFFICE — OFFICER — TYPIST	EXT.
WH/Personnel/PPMacDougall/lvr *6 Feb.68	681

COORDINATING

1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/1

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/Pers		
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		George R. Thompson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CAZAZZUS Sandra B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 1923	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contract Employee	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract employee				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1968 thru 31 December 196

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
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S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This employee continues to assist and compliment her husband, a Staff Agent, in an unusually efficient team. She pre-edits transcribed materials and puts usable material into a form ready for filing, thus saving analytical and clerical time in the Station. Her knowledge of Russian and Spanish, analytical ability, overall efficiency and interest in her work all contribute to a fine performance.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 January 1969	Sandra B. CAZAZZUS (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969		(signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) Paul L. Dillon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer concurs with this report. Subject and her husband continue to form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 January 1969	Chief of Station	(signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal.) Winston M. Scott

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym) Francis J. COIGNE Francis J. Coigne
DATE 28 January 1969	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym) Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WOGAME

SUBJECT
AIR/JECENT - FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMT-8732, 15 December 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is the name and address of the notional organization for FEINGLASS to use on his tax return. Also forwarded under separate cover is a brief outline of the nature of the notional.

2. As previously discussed in a Headquarters tax briefing, this notional would not issue any tax documentation and was not to be used for any purpose other than their tax return. This return was to be kept in a safe place, since the return would indicate a different cover than what they are using in Mexico.

3. In the event FEINGLASS ever indicates that the use of the notional is necessary for purposes other than the tax return, this requirement should be cleared by Headquarters prior to actual use.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/SCA)
1 - WH/Contracts (wo/att)

Attachment (USC)

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 16 FEB. 68	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sancra B. CAZAZZ[illegible] Sandra B. Cazazzus

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 16 Feb 1968	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym) **Francis J. COIGNE** Francis J. Coigne
DATE 16 Feb 1968	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym) **Willard C. CURTIS** Willard C. Curtis

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CAZA[illegible] Sandra B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 May 23	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Contract Employee	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE
	TEMPORARY		
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		
XX	SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
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P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into workable format for Station analysis and filing.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject continues to complement her husband as a part of an efficient team. Her expeditious processing of transcript materials (so that they come to the Station ready for filing) saves the Station a great deal of work and time. Her language and analytical abilities are utilized to pre-edit material and cut out the superflous. She continues to show interest in her work at which she is very efficient.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 Feb 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 29	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 Feb 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Francis J. COIGNE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs in this Report. This employee and her husband form an efficient and valuable team.

DATE 16 Feb 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ballpoint pen to make legible copies.

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil
Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
June 1967

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

New Carrier's Control No. 11252435

Old Carrier's Control No.

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Tarasoff, Anna A.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR

3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? YES ☐ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE)

5. SEX MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. ☒

Covered on husb's policy

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN.
2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Norma Sue Carpenter for
Anna A. Tarasoff
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT)

12-28-67
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 12-28-67

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 12-31-67

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

Contract Emp.
9-8-67
WH

5132830

2809-109

Triplicate—For Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

DATE 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Anna A. Tarasoff has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 8 September 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/WH.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS, Contract

Action Required: As Noted

References : A. BD-6144
B. MEXICO CITY 2718

1. In view of Reference B and inasmuch as Sandra B. CAZAZZUS was in the Headquarters area, a new contract was prepared granting her the benefits of Reference A. The contract was signed by CAZAZZUS and has been forwarded for related processing.

2. Attached is a copy of the contract effective 8 September 1967 for CAZAZZUS. She elected FEGLI but declined the health insurance as she is included under her husband's policy. CAZAZZUS was thoroughly briefed on the provisions of the contract as well as the provisions of her previous contract.

STATION ACTION:

As CAZAZZUS is payrolled by the Station, related deductions for the new benefits (Civil Service Retirement and FEGLI) are to be made by the Station. Social Security deductions will, of course, cease as there is no cover requirement for mandatory Social Security coverage.

3. During the briefing, CAZAZZUS inquired about the use of sick leave. She was informed sick leave can be used in the same manner and per the same regulations as when she was formerly a

(continued)

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2-COS, Mexico City, w/att, h/w

HMMS - 5679

SECRET

WH/Contracts/WSRenehan: gms (17 Nov 67) 4460

1-WH/Contracts w/att
1-WH/1 w/att
1-WH/Reg wo/att

C/WH/1

staffer. The point involved was whether she had been granted sick leave during her "maternity leave" in 1965. She was advised that possibly she did receive payment covering the period which her accrued sick leave represented; and, possibly at that time she had only a minimal balance accrued.

STATION ACTION:

It is suggested the Station review her leave/pay account for the above cited period and advise her of the details involved.

Should the records reflect she had a balance but was not provided the leave, a pay adjustment may be made up to the balance at that time with an appropriate reduction of her current sick leave balance. NOTE: She was advised she could not have sick leave accrued since that time applied retroactively.

It is further suggested the Station Admin or Finance Officer conduct the briefing due to the necessity for the briefer to have a rather technical knowledge of leave.

Hugh E. WESTBY

8 Sep 67

Miss Sandra B. Cazazzus

Dear Miss Cazazzus:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a contract employee under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 15 July 1964, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

SECRET

4. This agreement is effective as of 8 September [illegible] and shall continue thereafter for two (2) years unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Sandra B. Cazazzus

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]/[illegible] - [illegible]/CAZARES - Tax Handling

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The [illegible] Tax Committee has approved a flat rate assessment of [illegible]/CAZARES's Federal tax obligation, beginning with tax year 1967. Attached is the letter of tax instruction which [illegible] should review. The original must be signed and returned to Headquarters.

VICTOR D. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
1 - WH/Contracts (w/att)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]-5711	6 December 1967 14 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Letter of Tax Instruction for FEINGLASS/CAZAZZUS

1. Based on discussions held with tax representatives of the Organization, an assessment of your Organizational income has been approved to satisfy your Federal tax obligation.

2. The assessment computation is based on an estimate of your taxable compensation from the Organization and your estimate of other income from outside sources. The assessment computation results in a percentage of your salary being withheld each pay period to completely satisfy your tax obligation. For tax year 1967 thirteen and nine-tenths (13.9) per cent will be withheld, effective 28 August 1967. The computation is attached.

3. In computing your assessment rate, you have been granted a basic tax credit of $250.00. This credit is not guaranteed, but is granted to give reasonable assurance that you will not pay a higher tax than you would under ordinary reporting procedures.

4. Future changes in your income or tax status may justify a revision of the assessment rate. In this event this agreement would be amended accordingly.

5. It is important that you file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue that is consistent with your cover status. Care and accuracy in preparing this return are necessary. Any tax liability resulting from the tax computation on this return will be satisfied by your own funds. A certified true copy of this tax return must be forwarded to us upon your submission of the original to Internal Revenue. Provided below are specific criteria to assist you in the preparation of the tax return:

A. You will be provided with the name of a notional organization to be used on your 1967 tax return. The only income you will report will be income shown on your (FEINGLASS) earning statement. You will not report your wife's income or tax withholding nor will you report any withholding that was made from your salary.

B. The income that is shown (using the notional as a source) will be reported on the Form 2555 (Statement to Support Exemption of Income Earned Abroad) and will be exempted from tax, due to your residence overseas. You will base your exemption on physical presence abroad. For tax year 1967 you will report your income as being earned prior to hom leave and therefore fully excludable because the qualifying period, which ended on the date you left Mexico for home leave, included an eighteen-month period abroad.

C. Other income must also be reported on this tax return, including interest from the Credit Union, which will be indicated without identifying the Credit Union by name.

6. You may request an advance of funds for payment of foreign income or related (income) taxes assessed against income received from or guaranteed by the Organization. Accounting for these funds will be made in the form of copies of the receipted tax bills (or other acceptable tax documents) which will be forwarded to the home office for approval and write-off of expense.

7. Please acknowledged the original of this letter and return to Headquarters, attention: Covert Tax Committee.

8. We appreciate your cooperation in arranging these details.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Acknowledged:

____

Date__________________________

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHE[CK] CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Pinchon		
2			
3		11/17 2:30	
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Kaufman reviewed and declined to coordinate, feeling that time was no longer appropriate for this message.

file as is

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. — DATE

J. Fisher

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

FORM 7-66 12 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1. MESSA[illegible] ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGH PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN THE ADDRESS LINE.
2. SEND [illegible] NAL AND YELLOW COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. [illegible] SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE [illegible] OUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED [illegible] TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE. INCLUDING S[illegible] .. END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE [illegible] ROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 September 1967

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 34619

IN DISCUSSING REF WITH FEINGLASS PLEASE EXPRESS OUR SYMPATHY DEATH OF CAZAZZUS MOTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref advised CAZAZZUS can take physical on return Mexico.

C/WH/1 ______________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 8

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1 SS

FROM

ACTION WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SB8, CCS3, CSPS, OP2, D/MS2

8 Sep 67 IN 47516

S E C R E T 072355Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2718

DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

1. SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS DEPARTING SEP WITH MINOR SON FOR MOTHER'S FUNERAL IN CLEVELAND, OHIO. SHE UNABLE COMPLETE PHYSICAL HERE, PLANS DO SO AT HQS.

2. ALSO INCOMPLETE IS CONTRACT REVIEW FOR NEW BENEFITS PER BOOK DISPATCH 6144. STATION SUGGESTS THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED AT HQS DURING FEINGLASS CONSULTATION 31 OCT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

A Contract

9/8/67

Anna Tarasoff.

Physical as dependent
will be taken at Hqs. 7375
259 out 9/8/67

Mr. Fisher will
have Subject DIR
Designate & will contact 9/1 WH
when she & husband
arrive in Hqs 9/8/67

PP

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES (13)

ORIG: PPMacDougall/lvr
UNIT: WH/Personnel
EXT: 6815
DATE: 18 August 1967

S E C R E T

FILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: C/WH 6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR C/CCS 3, C/[illegible] [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 29114

18 22 00Z

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 2499 (IN 34006)
B. HMMS-5433

1. TDY HQS INCLUDED IN FEINGLASS TRAVEL ORDER. SHOULD PLAN ARRIVE HQS 31 OCTOBER 1967.

2. FAMILY SHOULD TAKE PHYSICALS IN FIELD AND FORWARD RESULTS. FEINGLASS WILL TAKE PHYSICAL WHILE HQS.

3. REF B POUCHED 16 AUGUST ANNOUNCES ARRIVAL TDY REPLACEMENT 18 SEPTEMBER 1967.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref A requested home leave beginning ~~18~~ 23 Sept. with TDY Hqs. to discuss 1968 retirement.

Ref B gave info on TDY replacement for FEINGLASS.

C/WH/1

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Edward K. O'Malley
EDWARD K. O'MALLEY
AC/WH/PERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 18

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

7

ACTION D/ASS 2

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE VR WH 8 CCS 3 IPS OP2

SECRET 261615Z CITE MEXICO 1893

26 Jun 67 IN 98383

DIRECTOR

HBDRAW

REF: MEXICO CITY 1888 (IN 97294)

CAZAZZUS ILLNESS DIAGNOSED AS FLOATING KIDNEY. RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL 24 JUNE 1967. NO OPERATION PLANNED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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4		8	

[redacted] 28

ACTION D/MS 2 ☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CCS 3, OP 2

SECRET 240020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1888 24 Jun 67 IN 97294

DIRECTOR

HBDRAW

SANDRA B. CAZAZZUS ADMITTED TO AMERICAN BRITISH COWDRAY HOSPITAL 22 JUNE 1967 WITH SEVERE ABDOMINAL PAIN. PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSED AS KIDNEY DISORDER. WILL ADVISE FURTHER.

SECRET SECRET

BT

June 26

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 132830

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX F	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
XX INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
XX SPECIAL (Specify): Contract Employee

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966-31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Selecting and processing transcripts in Spanish and English into a workable format for Station analysis and filing	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling administrative matters for her husband and herself.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is the first time a fitness report has been prepared on CAZAZZUS herself, although previous fitness reports on her husband, Douglas J. FEINGLASS, have mentioned ~~her~~ valuable contribution. She and FEINGLASS continue to work as an excellent team. CAZAZZUS works conscientiously and quickly and saves the Station a great deal of time in the routine processing of paper and tapes. Her interest in the subject matter and her analytical ability enable her to weed out superfluous material and assist FEINGLASS in his translations and analyses.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

BY SUPERVISOR

2.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's evaluation of CAZAZZUS. She compliments her husband perfectly

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7
SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 8 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Sandra B. Cazazzus Sandra B. CAZAZZUS

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 7 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (In pseudonym) Jonathan L. WEENING
DATE 28 Feb 67	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (In pseudonym) Francis J. COIGNE Francis J. Coigne

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

Miss Anna A. Tarasoff

Dear **Miss Tarasoff**:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **22 August 1966**, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**3**. Taxes. As an employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on taxable income paid to you under paragraph **one (1)** above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 -- Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible]	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

[illegible]

[illegible]

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

SECRET

Anna A. Tarasoff

4 June 1966

MISS [redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 July 1966, as amended, which expires 14 July 1966.

Effective 15 July 1966, said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

[redacted]

WITNESS: Irving G. Chonsky

APPROVED:

WH CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Office of Finance

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Finance-Salary Increase-Sandra B. C'ZAZZUS, Employee Number 132830

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information only.

REFFRENCE: HPMS-4512, dated 6 January 1966

Furnished herewith is acopy of acontract amendment for Sandra B. CAZAZZUS covering the legislative salary increase as of 10 October 1965. The amendment was not prepared in time for CAZAZZUS to sign it before going on home leave and consequently had to await her return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As Stated Above

Distribution:
2 - Office of Finance, w/att
1 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-6164

DATE
17 January 1966

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

[redacted]

Anna H
Čarcoff

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 10 October 1965, said contract is amended by includi therein provision for compensation increase of the Federal Emplo Salary Act of 1965, in conformance with policies and procedures of th Organization. Said contract is amended also to include the fol sentence in paragraph one, entitled "Compensation":

"Compensation will be increased based on legislative pay increases."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in ful force and effect.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME

BY Willard C. Curtis

ACCEPTED:

100 SIGNED

WITNESS:

Irving A. Oronsky

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Office of Finance

Salary Increase - Sandra [illegible] CAZAZZUS, Employee Number [illegible]

The Office of Finance has not received a contract amendment for the 10 October 1965 salary increase which the Station has paid Subject as reflected on Station T/489-66. Therefore, in the absence of a contract amendment, it would appear that CAZAZZUS is being overpaid. Please advise.

SHIRLEY K. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - COS/Mexico City

[illegible] - 4512 6 January 1966

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C&TD/APB/CEAS/E.Landry/rkm 2294

2 - WH Division
3 - C&TD/APB/CEAS
1 - RI/DP
1 - OF/Registry
✗ - CPD

WH/BF

WH/SS

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, OF 2, CCS 3

SECRET 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

REF: DIR 62414

8 DEC 65 IN 10658

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ADMIN FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH S.A. DOUGLAS J. FEINCLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

SECRET [illegible]

tax records requested [illegible]

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

Dec 23

SECRET

ANNA H. TARASOFF
[redacted]

Dear Miss [redacted]

Reference is made to your present contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 14 August 1964, said contract is amended by including therein provision for compensation increase of the Government Employees Salary Reform Act of 1964, in conformance with the policies and procedures of this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

O/E

New rate $ ~~2.42~~ 2.72 P/hour

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

/s/ Joseph B. Ragan
Special Contracting Officer

DISPATCH

C/WH/SS

CPD

C/BD 465 9 Fax Info

CCS - Mar 19 - Hignet 5270.

DISPATCH

Chief, [illegible]

FROM

Chief of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT

Effective Date for [illegible] – [illegible]

REFERENCE: A. [illegible]
B. [illegible]

The effective date of [illegible] Contract [illegible] July [illegible].

Station [illegible] for [illegible].

[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - [illegible]

Orig rec'd & fwd - 17 Aug 64
WH/B&F
CPD-5 E69
CFD/CEAS-2276.t

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible] August 196[illegible]

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 48769 A DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Anna Tarasoff

Anna Tarasoff
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Herbert Manell
Herbert Manell

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 48769 B DATE 29 July 1964

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Sandra B. Cazazzus

Sandra B. CAZAZZUS
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:
Gerald F. GESTETNER

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONTRACT TYPE B SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 15 July 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 13 July 1964

CASE NO. : 131751

TO : WH/PERS

SUBJECT : TARASOFF, Anna A.

1. This is to inform you of Security Approval of the Subject person for Contract Type B employment as specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-53.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days to contract with Subject within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

3. This office is to be advised when a Contract is signed by Subject and when the Contract is terminated.

4. As a part of this contracting process:

☐ A polygraph interview must be arranged by your office.

☒ A polygraph interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne

CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1992a

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(9-40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

TO:		CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
	X	Personnel Security Division/Office of Security

DATE: 13 July 1964

FROM: WH/PERS
GH-4408

SUBJECT: (True name) Tarasoff, Anna

PROJECT: Station Support

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.: 131751

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
X	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL Type B		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Mexico City, Mexico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband, a Staff Agent, in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIEMRICK product.

Subject resigned from staff employee status on 8 September 1963.

She has been with her husband in Mexico during interim period

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED		GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
W.S. Renehan	6577	W.E. Brooks

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief, SR Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATIVE/[illegible]
WAE Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-9691

1. Transmitted under separate cover attachment are three copies of a signed field contract completed on the Subject of reference.

2. Her principal responsibility will be to assist her husband Douglas J. FEINGLASS (P) in the transcribing and processing of the Station's LIENVOY/LIERICK product. The part-time employment of Subject will permit FEINGLASS to devote considerably more effort and concentration on the preparation of assessment studies on the [illegible] complement.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD. C. CURTIS

Orig 4 / 4 att - 17 July 64
C/WH/SS
WH/DTF
CPD 5869
CFD/REAS 6465

Attachment:
As stated above (USC)

Distribution:
2 - WHD, w/att
1 - SRD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: GROUP 1 / Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-4648

DATE: 12 June 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

15 Jul

Mrs. Anna A. ~~Tasiroff~~ Tarasoff

Dear Mrs. Thasroff:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you, as a Contract Employee, for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $2.53 per hour. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by the United States Government.

2. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(c) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(d) The Government will withhold from the compensation due you under this agreement social security deductions in conformance with the basic social security legislation, as amended, and the procedures of this Organization. For reasons of security, all inquiries concerning your relationship to the social security system shall be made directly to this Organization, and in no event may any such problem be presented by you or on your behalf to any representative of the governmental unit responsible for implementing the social security program.

3. Execution of Documents. If in the performance of services under this contract you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has, in fact, been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

4. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

5. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

6. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

7. Term. This contract is effective as of [illegible], and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Winston M. Scott
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Anna A. Tasaroff
Anna A. Tasaroff

WITNESS: [illegible]

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:

Special Contracting Officer

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SR 7, VR

S E C R E T 0200157

2 Jul 63 IN 95704

DIR CITE MEXI 9601

REDCOAT

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF: HMMS-2052, 11 JUNE 1963

1. PER DISCUSSIONS WITH WALLACE A. DEMOLAT, STATION WISHES EMPLOY WIFE OF DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS ASAP TO ASSUME PART OF LATTER'S LIENVOY TRANSLATION AND TRANSCRIPTION DUTIES. WOULD FREE HIM TO CONCENTRATE MORE ON PREPARATION ASSESSMENTS-CHARACTERIZATIONS OF SOV COMPLEMENT.

2. REQUEST HQS INITIATE CLEARANCE. FORWARDING FIELD CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE REF.

S E C R E T

Recd July 9
a.m.
July 13
Clearance granted
Cable

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico XX

Chief, WHD

Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

Please inform Subject that her resignation from staff employee status has been processed and made effective as of 8 September 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 Mexico City

HMMS-3145 23 September 1963

SECRET

WH/PERS W.S.Renehan ecm 7555

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/PERS

C/WH/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. The wife of Douglas J. FEINGLASS has asked that she be considered for employment in a contractual capacity. She was advised that biographic information would be forwarded and that whether or not her services were used would be up to the Station.

2. Subject has previously submitted her resignation from staff status and was processed out effective 7 June and placed on 90 days LWOP. In the event there is a requirement for her services within the 90 day period, she may be hired in a contract capacity without further clearances. Her contract should contain provision for Civil Service coverage; other benefits would be in accord with her contractual status as outlined in FHB 20-1000-1. At the time the contract is forwarded Headquarters, a functional description of her duties should also be forwarded.

3. Subject is scheduled to leave with her two children by train in 16 June. She and the children will enter on tourist cards. They have also applied for regular passports.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Biographic Profile, USC

Distribution:
3 Mexico City, w/att. USC

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMM-S-2980	11 June 1963 14 JUN 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Pers	W.S.R[illegible]	blr	7535

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/[illegible]	14 JUN 1963	

RELEASING

SECRET/RYBAT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

HMM-S-2980

DOB: 5 May 1923

POB: Cleveland, Ohio

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE: 1942

CHILDREN: Daughter - Barbara, 21 Dec 1945
[illegible], 20 Mar 1949

EXPERIENCE:	1944 - 1945	Cleveland Trust Co., Cleveland, Ohio Commercial Bookeeper
	1955 - 1956	American Trust Co., San Leandro, Calif. Commercial Bookeeper
	8 Apr 1957	EOD KUBARK, Clerk, GS-4
	14 Jul 1957	PBJointly, Clerk
	9 Mar 1958	KUDESK, Intell Clerk
	2 Nov 1958	Promotion, GS-5
	8 Jan 1961	Promotion, GS-6
	7 Jun 1963	LWOP for 90 days at end of which time resignation will be effected.

FITNESS REPORT: 30 June 1961 - 30 June 1962, Overall Rating "A"
(Transliterates Russian Material "P")

TRAINING: Basic Supervisors, 2-13 May 1960

TEST: Russian, Reading "E"

SECRET/RYBAT

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT 7 June 1963
DATE

TO: W.S.Renehan, WH/Pers

FROM: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff

SUBJECT: Receipt of Advance of Funds for Transportation from Washington, D. C. to Mexico City

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$525.00 in conjunction with Subject. It is understood that this advance is for ~~[illegible]~~ lowest first class rail travel Washington to Mexico City, Mexico and related costs, and anticipated per diem for three days for myself and two dependent children. Accounting for the advance will be submitted to the Mexico City Station.

Anna Tarasoff
Anna Tarasoff
SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

Please return ________ signed copy(ies) of this receipt

7 June 1963
DATE RECEIVED

To ________________________

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 30-60
1 AUG 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(33)

SECRET

7 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

SUBJECT: Mrs. Anna Tarasoff, Contract
Employee Clearance

1. It is requested that clearance be granted for the employment of Mrs. Anna Tarasoff as a Contract Employee, Type A or B at the Mexico City, Mexico Station to provide clerical services.

2. Mrs. Tarasoff is presently a GS-6, staff employee. She is being reassigned to the CS Development Complement and placed on a 90 day LWOP status effective COB 7 June in order to join her husband.

3. In the event the Mexico Station can use her services she would be employed in a contractual capacity and her resignation from staff employee status would be effected the day prior to the effective date of contract.

4. In the event additional information is desired, please contact Mr. William Renehan, extension 7555.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 June 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 015935
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): TARASOFF, ANNA
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LWOP AND REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 6 DAY 7 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 327-1770-1000
8. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP CI STAFF
CI DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELL CLERK
12. POSITION NUMBER: 01 3971
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0313.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 6 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5,545.

hourly rate
2.67
2.54

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP CI STAFF/SPECIAL INVESTIGATION GROUP/PROJECTS BR/INTELL CLK/WASH., D.C/0151

Employee's last working day 7 June 1963.

LWOP (HHB 20-1 Para. 10 a.) Leave of absence to accompany husband to new station - not to exceed 90 days.

cc to security and finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CI STAFF — DATE SIGNED: 5 Jun 63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: — DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGRATION CODE
24. POSITION CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI — MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES — MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAREER/CAREER-PROV/TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — CODE — 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.P. APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED

(4)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

PUBLIC SCHOOLS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WOODROW WILSON HIGH SCHOOL

PUPIL'S PERMANENT RECORD

LAST NAME OF PUPIL: TARASOFF
FIRST NAME: BARBARA
MIDDLE NAME:
PARENT OR GUARDIAN: Boris Dmitri Tarasoff
OCCUPATION: Analyst - U.S.Government (Translator (jun))
RESIDENCE: 5109 - 45th Street, N.W.
TEL. EM 2-6990
RESIDENCE:
TEL.
PLACE OF BIRTH: Ohio
DATE OF BIRTH: 12.22.45
SEX:

DATE OF ENTRY: 9.6.61 FROM: Kramer Jr.
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO:
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM:
DATE OF WITHDRAWAL TO:
DATE OF RE-ENTRY FROM:

NINTH GRADE

SUBJECT	GRADE	UNIT
English	A	1
Anc. & Med. History	A	1
9th Algebra 1 & 2	[illegible]	2
French		
Gen. Math		
Latin 1 & 2	A	2
Typing		
Gen. Science		
Biology	A	1

UNOFFICIAL

TEST RECORD

UNOFFICIAL

YEAR BEG. 9.6.61 SECTION 112-2 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 2H	ALQ	A	A	1
Mod. History				
Pl. + Solid Geom.	AHG	C	B	1
French 1H	GLF	A	A	1
Latin 3H	CKS	A	A	1
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Biology				
Chem. H	AHL	B	B	1
US History	SS"		A	1
Physical Ed. 10-b	CCR DW	B	B	½
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment	A	A
Days Present	91½	81
Days Abs. Ex.	1	1½
Days Abs. Unex.	-	-
Times Tardy	-	-

YEAR BEG. 9.5.62 SECTION 112-3 RCS

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English 3H	LRG	A		
U.S. History				
French 2H	UHF	A		
Latin 4H	SWA	A		
Spanish				
German 1P	RAM	A		
Physics R	JE	A		
Physical Ed. 9	CSR	A		
Military Science				

UNOFFICIAL

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment	A	
Days Present	90½	
Days Abs. Ex.	2½	
Days Abs. Unex.	0	
Times Tardy	2	

YEAR BEG. SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Government				
French				
Latin				
Spanish				
Chemistry				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

YEAR BEG. SECTION

SUBJECT	TEACHER	SEM.	FINAL	UNIT
English				
Physical Ed.				
Military Science				

	SEM. I	SEM. II
Deportment		
Days Present		
Days Abs. Ex.		
Days Abs. Unex.		
Times Tardy		

Son - Raymond

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: VITALE, GUY
OP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONNEL MATTERS OUTSIDE TIME FRAME

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
3:30 25 AUG 78		GAETON ~~[illegible]~~ FONZI	
26 AUG 1978 0950		HARDWAY/FONZI	

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VITALE, GUY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 28 | YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X | V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

CMC

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (S)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18 REMARKS:

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.E. - dmw 3/3/69

Intel Asst occupying Intel Analyst slot

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

[illegible] (D) SA/ESPS [illegible]/69

15A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb '69

15B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTERS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 2 DA. 16 YR. 17

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0 BJ coco.

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO.

34 SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 3—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE

46 O P APPROVAL: [illegible] Lowden

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 Feb 69

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT - CIA & DISABILITY SYS.

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐

GHO

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST (S)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1685

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26

16 GRADE AND STEP: 08 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 8984

18. REMARKS

Last working day is 28 February 1969.

1152 telecoord. w/Paul Seidel, R.B. - dmw 3/3/69

INTEL ASST occupying INTEL ANALYST SLOT

1 - Finance
~~1 - Security~~

SA/CSPS 20 Feb 69

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 6 DA. 16 YR. 17
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—CSCH 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0.BJ.00.0.0.
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV PROV, TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-69 JE

46 O P APPROVAL: K. Lowden

DATE APPROVED

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

JLB: 10 MAR 69

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003620	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) VITALE GUY		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 28 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V CF TO V V TO CF CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1685	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0301.28	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 8984

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET

28 FEB 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Guy Vitale

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 28 February 1969 and your annuity will commence as of 1 March 1969. The annuity is payable on the first day of the month following that for which it accrued. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last calendar year if that amount is more than 30 days.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OP Files
1 - Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP BSD ROB/PJSeidel:jef (27 February 969)

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, GUY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee Guy Vitale	Date Signed 28 Feb. '69
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 1730 "H" St. N.W. Wash. D.C.	Correspondence ☐ Overt ☒ Covert

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
18 February 1969

FILE NUMBER
11326

EMPLOYEE NUMBER
003620

ID CARD NUMBER

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN:
Chief Support Staff

REF:
Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT
VITALE, Guy

OFFICIAL COVER
☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)

A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS
EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______

B. CONTINUING AS OF COB

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ______ W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD

☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)

DATE (as of COB)
FROM EOD

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

COVER HISTORY:
Oct 49 - Jan 57 Hqs/Overt
Jan 57 - Mar 60 Greece/DAC
Mar 60 - Present Hqs/DAC

SUBJECT IS TO INDICATE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR ENTIRE PERIOD, BUT IS NOT TO REVEAL SPECIFIC PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF COVER ASSIGNMENTS.

FORWARDING ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: UNKNOWN

RF/kas

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

(13-20-43)

FORM 8-68 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SDF: 20 FEB 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003620	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) VITALE, GUY				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 23 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH				10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE				12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES			16. GRADE AND STEP 08	17. SALARY OR RATE
18. REMARKS					

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE CODE 2 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
22 69
je

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 FEBRUARY 1969

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 23 YEAR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 9235 - 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP:
17. SALARY OR RATE: $
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE:
20. EMPLOY CODE:
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 2—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 13 FEB 69

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

OP-1
1-66.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

69-1750

Executive Registry
69-2024

17 APR 1969

Mr. Guy Vitale
1730 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Vitale:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-six years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Sgd Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ____________________
Director of Personnel

Concur: SIGNED 2 APR 1969
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jef (1 April 1969)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement
Guy Vitale

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Guy Vitale, GS-08, Intelligence Analyst, Western Hemisphere Division, Clandestine Services, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 28 February 1959.

3. Mr. Vitale has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 51 years old with over 28 years of Federal service. This service includes over 21 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Services Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. Guy Vitale under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 December 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 28 | YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235-1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
Miami Operations Branch
PM Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: INTELL. Source ASST. (D)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1506

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (07)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.23

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 7553

18 REMARKS:

From WH/C/MOB,PM Sec.,#1142

P.R.A. per HR 20-21c(3) NTE December 1967.

Recorded By
CSPD

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 20 Dec 65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: W. J. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 21 DEC 1965

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51570 | ALPHABETIC WH

22 STATION CODE: 25015

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 | DA. 16 | YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. 12 | DA. 27 | YR. 67

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 83

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-23-65 H

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 12-23-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Guy Vitale** **20 October 1965**

THROUGH : Head of **D** Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees ~~in the~~ Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees".

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 20 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Task Force W
FI/CI Branch

2
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0683

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (09)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $6500 ✓

18. REMARKS: Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

Recorded by
CSPD
Awe

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 14 Dec 62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 1/7/63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61300 ALPHABETIC TFW

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 16 YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: ✓ MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPEC. R. REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES CODE 15 01 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 01-3-63

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 December

1. SERIAL NUMBER	003620
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	VITALE, Guy
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	3232-1000-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP Task Force W FI/CI Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0683
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS (09)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	08 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE	$6500

18. REMARKS

Promotion recommendation attached. Fitness Report submitted previously.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/TFW/Pers.
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO. DA. YR.
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI — MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES — MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — CODE — 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 .62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 March 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (NMI)

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 18 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235-1400-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
Branch 4
FI/CI Sec.

3
B

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INTELL. ASST. (Intelligence Asst) (P)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (PA)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28

16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $5685

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/EE/CS/Dev.Compl., D.C.

Security [illegible] 3/6/62 CONCURRENCE: Frank Driscoll (per phone)
EE/Personnel Officer

3/16/62

1 copy to Security

19. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES DURHAM, WH/4/Pers.Officer

DATE SIGNED:

18a. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: W. Brumbaugh

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. MOOTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECUR. REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOC. SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. J. Kearney 03/2/62

46. O.P. APPROVAL: W. Brumbaugh

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 June 1960

1. Serial No. 503620	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) VITALE GUY	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 16 Yr. 17	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 09 Da. 13 Yr. 49	7. SCD Mo. 10 Da. 24 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 13 Yr. 49
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 2			

25

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	Code 5231	15. Location Of Official Station ATHENS, GREECE	Station Code 29501
16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 5	17. Position Title INTELL ASST	18. Position No. 1809	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0301.28	21. Grade & Step 07 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 4980	23. SD DS
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 09 Da. 06 Yr. 59	25. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 04 Yr. 60	26. Appropriation Number 0139 9350 3018	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 17	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 12 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 25	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	Code 5268	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	34. Position Title	35. Position No. 661200	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD D
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0320 1998	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) 6 7 60

C/EE/Personnel

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)

Annell M. Weiland X3884

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature Of	Date
A. Career Board		6/15/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		14 JUN 1960	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	6-13-60	

Remarks In-casual

FCS RETURNEE

No. 1152

(4)

Pre 1960 Requests for
Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 03620

SCD: 24 Oct 1942

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, Guy (nmn)	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1917	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS Single	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 0	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Apr 1960	QUAL. FOR Dept Duties	EVAL. FOR O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE x	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Book Room Attendant

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Reds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	GS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/EE/CS/CSDevComp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 25 Jan 1965	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc	22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 5-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 03620	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE, Guy (nmn)	DATE OF BIRTH Oct 1917

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, EE Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to EE Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED 25 Jan 1965	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: 24 Oct 1942

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: 003620

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): VITALE, Guy (nmn)

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 16 Oct 1917

5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE: 13 Sep 1949

6. MARITAL STATUS: Single

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 0 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH:

8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE:

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954 OTHER STATUS:

10. LAST MED. RPT.: Apr 1960 QUAL. FOR: Dept Duties EVAL. FOR: O/S Returnee

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE x SERVICE: GRADE: ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3 RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1939-41 Various jobs for short periods of time; also unemployed during part of this time.
1942-46 Military Service, US Army, Sgt
1946-49 Library of Congress, DC - Clk; Libr Asst

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1937-38 Kents Hill Jr College, Maine
1948-50 George Washington, DC - Poli Sci
1957 American Mission Sch, Athens, Greece - Greek (3 mos)

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested): None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1962 Rcds Off Crs

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Sep 1949	Messenger	0302.01	CPC 3		C&D/Admin/Mail&CourierSect	Hq
Sep 1950	File Clerk	0305.01	GS-3		R&E/Map/Proc&RefBr	"
Jul 1951	" "	0305.01	4		RR/Geo/Map Library Br	"
Nov 1952	" "	0305.01	4		ORR/Ch,GeoRes/MapLibrary/ProcBr	"
Sep 1956	" "	0305.01	5	IR	" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1956	Clerk	0301.26	5	DS	DDP/SE/OpsDiv/Rpts,Index&Biog	Athens
Oct 1957	"	0301.26	6	DS	" " " " " " "	"
Aug 1958	Intel Asst	0301.28	6	DS	DDP/SE/OpsStf/RI Section	"
Sep 1959	" "	0301.26	7	DS	" " " " " "	"
Jun 1960	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/EE/CS/CSDevComp	Hq
Mar 1962	" "	0301.26	7	D	DDP/WH/Br-4/FI/CI Sec	"
Jan 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	8	D	DDP/TFW/FI/CI Br	"
May 1965	" "	0136.01	8	D	DDP/WH/C/Miami Ops Br	"
Dec 1965	Intel Asst	0301.28	8	D	" " " " " "	"
May 1968	Intel Anal	0132.35	8	D	DDP/WH/C	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 6 Feb 1969

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
03620	

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
VITALE, Guy (nmn)	16 Oct 1917

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Commendation 1960 from Ch, EE Logistics for services rendered while on a temporary assignment to EE Division Logistics Office.

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
6 Feb 1969	hc

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Vitale, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. July 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 AUG 1968	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 7/18/68
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 9
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 18 July
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR:
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Alva King
Alva King

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE: 13 July 1968
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/COG/OS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Thos. J. Barrett

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 5 26 PM '67

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 Aug '67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Gerry Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Section Chief, PM Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest Chiocca Ernest Chiocca

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE 28 AUG 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/COG/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET

11 May 1960
File K-4849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : VITALE, Guy, nmi

1. Cover arrangements are in process, and/// have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 1 April 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked /////////to deny ////////// Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. //

Paul P. Stewart
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-58 1580a

(4-13-40)

5-17-60
GR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ALB: 10 MAR 69

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT VOLUNTARY UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 02 28 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9235 0620 0000
8. ~~CSC OR~~ OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/COG
OPERATIONS BRANCH
WH SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1685
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.26
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8984
18. REMARKS:

---

1. LAST NAME: VITALE FIRST NAME: GUY INITIAL(S):
2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty: 9-13-49 F/T: X P/T:
Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act: Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ________ Annual Leave Bal. ________
3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years: 26 Months: 4 Days: 4
☐ More than 15 years
4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION: 2-28-69 RETIREMENT CIARDS

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1-11- 19 69	274	1655
6. Current leave year accrual through 3-08- 19 69	24	12
7. Total	298	1667
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	4	0
10. Balance	294	1667

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 274 hrs
12. Salary rate(s) $8984.
13. Lump sum leave dates: from 0830 3-3-69 to 4-18-69 1030 (Hours)
26. Certified correct by: Pat McG[illegible] (Signature) 4/17/69 (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) 143-2595 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ________
15. Current balance as of ________ 19 ___ ________
16. 12-month accrual rate ________
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ________
18. Monthly accrual date ________
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20. Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr. ________ to ________
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr. ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated	0	0
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on 1-14-68	0	0

25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates): ________

REMARKS
SCD 10-24-42

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 9 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 300	V	GS 08 6	$ 8,614	$ 8,984

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

5/10/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER 00362	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) VITALE GUY		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 05 DA. 04 YR. 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 8235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION WH SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE INTEL ANALYST	12. POSITION NUMBER 1465	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.35	16. GRADE AND STEP 08	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5/17/68

C/WH/COG

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 08	5	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 8368	01/16/66	GS 08	6	$ ~~[illegible]~~ 8614	01/14/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 17 Nov 67

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS NM

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500	V	GS 08 5	$ 7,781	$ 8,008

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
V TA					

4 2 1

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	51 500 V	GS 08 4	$ 7,290	$ 7,553

G-33

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	51 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	4	$ 7,553	01/19/64	GS 08	5	$ 7,791	01/16/66			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS GT AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 23 Nov 65

JAN 2[illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65 (4-51)

PJH: 29 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 DA. 28 YR. 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 1162 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
WH/C
MIAMI OPERATIONS BR/PM SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1506
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 7553
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 51500 ALPHABETIC WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 16 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 12 DA. 27 YR 67
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 83
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.
38. CAREER. CATEGORY: CAN PROV RESV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/29/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 003620	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) VITALE GUY				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 31 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR PM SEC			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12 POSITION NUMBER 1142	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 08	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18. REMARKS

POSTED
6-10-65 ttt

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
1-63 MFG 1-63 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

-2-111

1 Serial No	2 Name			3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours	
003620	VITALE GUY			37F 49 300 V					
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI / ADJ
GS 08	3	$ 6810	01/20/63	GS 08	4	$ 7020	01/19/64		

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY JLL
SALARY CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Charles W. DATE: 3 Dec 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (451)

DEC 13 4 18 PM '63

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	49 300	V	GS 08 3	$ 6,500	$ 6,810

BAB: 18 JAN 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP TASK FORCE W
FI/CI BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0683
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6500
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61300 | ALPHABETIC TFW
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 16 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 63
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 63
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAN PROV RESV TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
02/21/63

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

23 JAN 1963 Bab

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
VITALE GUY	003620	61000	V	07 4	$ 5850	07 4	$ 6095

232-1200

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
003620	VITALE GUY	61 000 V 2A	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	GS 07	4	$ 5,850	09/02/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
03620	VITALE GUY	DDP/FE UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH. Date	6. NEW SALARY RATE Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	7. TYPE ACTION PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09/04/60	07	3	$ 5,685	09/03/61	X		

8. Remarks and Authentication

2-040

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9/26/61

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

L. I

ABM: 20 MAR 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 003620
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): VITALE GUY
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 03 DA. 18 YR. 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1400 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 4
FI CI SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE ASST
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0685
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0301.28
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5685
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	64450	WH	75013		1	10 16 17		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
503620	VITALE GUY	DDP/FE C	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA.	YR.
GS 07	1	$ 5,355	09	06	59	GS 07	2	$ 5,520	09	04	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS 2 . 000

14. AUTHENTICATION

4LF 7/23/60

E.D.ECHOLS

EC

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4)

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	VITALE GUY	503620	52 88	GS-07 1	$ 4,990	$ 5,355

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE:10 JUNE 1960

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
503620	VITALE GUY	10	16	17		1	M 1	09	13	49		

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
10	24	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	13	49		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP EE ATHENS STATION OPERATIONS STAFF RECORDS INTEGRATION SECTION	5231	ATHENS, GREECE	29501

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	INTELL ASST	1809	GS	0301.28

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DS	09	06	59	09	04	60	0139 9350 3018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	67	06	12	60	REGULAR	25	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT EE DIVISION	5288	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	1	INTELL ASST	061260	GS	0301.28

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	D	09	06	59	09	04	60	0320 1998

44. Remarks
CASUAL (PCS RETURNEE)

POSTED
16 JUN 1960
60

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

6/16/60

SECRET

(4)

Pre 1960 Notifications
of Personnel Action

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Vitale, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Asst.	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
July 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 67 - 30 June 68

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis and Research of clandestine service documents for information pertinent to the criteria of the CUIS/LA Subversive machine program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists personnel with machine name traces and other operational support assistance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Preparation of biographic input sheets for machine processing into the Cuban IS program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer insures compliance with CS Records directives including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 9 AUG 1968	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 6 1968

Mr. Vitale since he was assigned to me initially on a part-time basis and later as a full time assistant has performed adequately as an input analyst in addition to his proficient work as a Records Officer and General support assistant. The quality of his input has been good and his production has helped considerably in cutting down the size of the input backlog. Mr. Vitale also continues to perform the Records Officers function for the branch with a sound knowledge of general records procedures. His attitude and attendance record continue to reflect a willingness to assist the branch in whatever way necessary. In addition Mr. Vitale's valuable background knowledge on a former vital portion of the branch's effort continues to be utilized to a considerable extent. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office.

Mr. Vitale is presently within 2 years of retirement or 4 years, if he does not receive an overseas assignment. He has told the career panel, he would accept an overseas assignment to either Vietnam or Laos. In view of his experience with paramilitary operations, it is felt this would be a more fitting assignment for him than the present one, even though he has been performing quite satisfactorily.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 7/18/68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 18 July	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Alva King Alva King

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the evaluation of this employee as presented above.

DATE 13 July 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/COG/OS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thos. J. [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION C/Continued NARRATIVE COMMENTS

For approximately four months during 1967, Mr. Vitale worked with me in providing Headquarters' support to JMWAVE in its conduct of special operations into PBRUMEN. In such a role, Mr. Vitale's knowledge of the history, mechanics, requirements and PBRUMEN personnel of these operations was invaluable in (1) the preparation of operational proposals for the 303 Committee, (2) the provision of timely operational information periodically requested by the front offices of both WH/COG and WHD, and (3) the briefing of WOFIRM personnel newly assigned to JMWAVE to assist in these operations. While under my supervision, Mr. Vitale was a conscientious, loyal, cooperative employee who readily and willingly performed all tasks assigned to him in an exceptional manner. He always expressed his willingness to work as many hours as necessary to finish the task at hand. He has a very pleasant personality, gets along well with his fellow workers and exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in the use of government equipment and materials. The rating letter "S" most accurately reflects the level of performance of Mr. Vitale during the period he was under my supervision.

Robert J. Weatherwax

Robert J. Weatherwax

Fil Control

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell Asst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION Washington	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 July 1966 - 30 June 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for the Branch's paramilitary program.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and in the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and in processing operational clearances.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Assists in conduct of input to Cuban I.S. Machine Records Program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 31 AUG 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

AUG 31 9 26 AM '67

Mr. Vitale continues to perform his duties as an operational support assistant capably. His background knowledge of Cuban paramilitary operations has provided the Branch with very useful continuity. His ability and experience in locating material and in handling records for headquarters support to WH/COG Special Operations contribute substantially to the Branch's operational support effort. Mr. Vitale carries out his assigned duties in a willing, loyal and highly dependable manner. He recently has been given an additional assignment on the CUIS Machine Input Program which he is handling in a highly efficient manner. He gets along well with his colleagues and contributes to the smooth running of the office. He does not have supervisory responsibilities, but does show concern for efficient and economical use of government property.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 Aug '67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Section Chief, PM Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest T. Chiocca Ernest Chiocca

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As noted in the last Fitness Report, I concur generally in the supervisor's ratings of Mr. Vitale's performance as listed; but I must again note that these are duties which could be performed by a more junior clerical type and that Mr. Vitale should not be considered as performing GS-8 level Intelligence Assistant work at a Proficient rating. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, not qualified for such a role and his official position title should be changed to prevent any misunderstanding as to the somewhat unique nature of his value to the Agency.

DATE 28 AUG 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/COG/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Analyst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XXXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 1965 - 30 June 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains project and agent 201 files for an extensive paramilitary program.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Locates and maintains material for use in briefings and the conduct of liaison with other government agencies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Aids in conducting name traces and processing clearances.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 As Branch Records Officer, insures compliance with CS records directives, including authorization for destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 29 JUL 1966	RATING LETTER P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 26 4 07 PM '66

Mr. Vitale's principal qualification is his background knowledge of the operational history of Cuban paramilitary operations. This has afforded the branch considerable continuity. He is a very willing worker who gets along well with fellow employees. His knowledge of and experience in handling records and locating material makes him valuable in headquarters support of WH/Cuba paramilitary case officers - a task he performs in a loyal and dependable manner.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 July 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bryan Mills

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had opportunity to observe subject's performance closely for nine months and while I generally concur in his supervisor's ratings of the duties as listed, it should be noted that these same duties could be performed equally well by a more junior Intel Clerk or Intel Assistant and, therefore, the overall rating as a GS-8 Intel Assistant does not accurately reflect his capability. In my opinion it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for subject to perform competitively with other Intel Assistants at a GS-8 level, and I recommend his position title be changed to Ops Support Assistant, a role in which he performs capably.

DATE 25 July 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert A. Ortman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE, Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION Washington D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 July 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 July 64 - 30 June 65

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

22 JUL 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUL 23 12 00 PM '65

Mr. Vitale's longevity on the project makes his services increasingly valuable. This is particular true, in briefing and orienting new officers. He continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project where many of his colleagues have transferred primarily because of the many demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. Although Mr. Vitale has no supervisory responsibilities and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity. Because Mr. Vitale's job and performance have remained almost exactly the same as during the previous year, this fitness report is also very similar.

Ca

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 13 July 65

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 46 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 13 Jul 1965

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/C/MO/PM

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Calvin Hicks
Calvin Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing official does not use the same rating scale as the supervisor; therefore, would rate subject one letter lower in the first three duties and P in the overall performance. Subject is conscientious, pleasant and has an excellent "stay-on-the-job" approach.

DATE: **20 July 1965**

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: **C/WH/C/MO**

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: **Walter T. Cini**

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
49300 [illegible]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct 17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-08	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances; traces and maintains agent 201 files.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

14 AUG 1964

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Vitale continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office on a most complex project. His longevity on the project, coupled with his continued objectivity, makes his services increasingly valuable. This is in contrast to many of his colleagues who have transferred because of the many extreme demands and frustrations caused by this extraordinary project. Mr. Vitale continues to be a most loyal, cooperative and willing worker, getting along well with all hands. His maturity and many years of experience in his field, in addition to his great general knowledge, make him a most valued employee when compared to colleagues of similar rank. It is because of this that I have again rated Mr. Vitale very high. In addition, and fully realizing his limited potential as a senior operations officer, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE July 23, 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 34 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/SA/MOB/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Undersigned concurs in the ratings of the specific duties and performance in current position of Mr. Vitale. Mr. Vitale has been concerned with the Cuban effort for several years and his personal knowledge of past events is extremely helpful.

DATE 28 July 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/SA/MOB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Colonel Arthur A. Maloney

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

81

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
003620

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct. 1917	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-8	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances. Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS records, directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

9 AUG 1963

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 9 8 40 AM '63
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to do an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources.

During the past year subject has continued to be a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker on a project that due to its nature is more frustrating, and demands more with less apparent return than most projects. As on his previous fitness report, I have rated him very high, primarily due to the fact that ~~he's mature~~ his maturity and many years experience with the Agency have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS 7-9 level. Consequently, although he has made GS-8 within the past year, I feel he is still undergraded and should be promoted to GS-9 at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE June 13, 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22 mths.	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 12 June 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/SAS/MOB/FM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Calvin W. Hicks

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While not wishing to detract from the value of subject's duties or from the manner in which he performs them, I do have strong doubts as to whether the nature of his duties warrant promotion to GS-9 even if they were performed in an outstanding manner. During the next year additional duties of a more demanding nature will be placed on subject and I will want to weigh his performance under those circumstances before recommending promotion.

DATE 6/13/63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/SAS/MOB/FM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Charles W. Matt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 003620

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) VITALE (First) Guy (Middle)		2. DATE OF BIRTH 16 Oct. 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intell. Asst.		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TFW/FI Br.		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Sept. 1961 to 30 June 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processes name traces and clearances - Traces and maintains agent 201 files.	S/O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts research for preparation of reports and plans.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains office files on a complex project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares cable or dispatch replies to name trace requests.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer - Insures compliance with CS Records, Directives and authorizes destruction of CS documents.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an exceptional job in assisting his office in the formulation of reports and plans by his research and ability to quickly make name traces and ferret out information from the various agency sources concerned.

He at all times has been a most cooperative, loyal and willing worker with good security habits. Although, he does not have the ambition or drive to get to the top of the ladder that many younger officers may have (not everybody can or wants to be Chief, but can still be one of the best indians in the business), his great store of general knowledge and many years of agency experience have made him of much more immediate value than most of his colleagues in the GS-7-9 level, and it is because of this that he has received such a high rating. Consequently, it is recommended that Mr. Vitale be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest opportunity.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE Aug 21, 1962	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 MONTHS	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 21 August 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR TFW/PM/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C.W. HICKS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 August 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/TFW/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE C.W. MATT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] by
CSPD

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Oct, [illegible]	3. SEX	4. GRADE [illegible]
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible] WH/4

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 31 AUG 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 [illegible]	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Research Work Required in the Preparation of Reports.	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assistant to C/O (leg man)	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Maintenance of Office Files	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Safehouse Keeper	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Intel Ass't.	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):		▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

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SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is very versatile and can be utilized effectively on an assignment involving heterogeneous duties. His ability to function as an agent handler is extremely commendable. Subject is able to communicate equally well with "high or low level agents." He further demonstrated his usefulness in the preparation of research papers and the maintenance of files. Supervisor feels that Subject's productivity and effectiveness is dependent on whether he is in a position that he personally likes (It should be noted that Subject is 44 yrs old).

Subject has demonstrated that he can assume greater responsibilities. (During the period covered he travelled to Puerto Rico and New Orleans on assignments not under control of the Supervisor)..

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 28 Feb. 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Guy Vitale

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION ~~Employee at Hqs~~

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 12 FEB 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/O	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas G. Clines THOMAS G. CLINES

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☑ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
Subject was assigned activities for which reviewing official was responsible for a period of two months.

DATE 13 Feb. 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [illegible] Off. [illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Glenn J. Farnsworth GLENN J. FARNSWORTH

SECRET

7 Dec 1960

FITNESS REPORT

[illegible]

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) VITALE Guy	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intelligence Assistant		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT EE/Germany (casual)

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 May 60 - 15 Nov 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Process name traces	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Process POA's.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
3

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES				X			
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES				X			
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT				X			
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER *(Specify):*	▨	▨			X		

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

DEC 6 11 32 AM '60

Mr. Vitale was assigned to the S&T Section of the German Branch on a casual basis from 1 May to 15 November 1960. His duties consisted entirely of processing name traces and POA's. Although he had little experience in this type of work, he performed his duties in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. He was always polite to his fellow employees and did his best to contribute to the smooth operation of the section.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 1/2	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Already reassigned prior to preparation of this fitness report.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 21 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/EE/G/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herbert W. Natzke Herbert W. Natzke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE 23 Nov 60	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/EE/Germany	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William J. Graver William J Graver

SECRET

Section 3. **Comments of Reviewing Official:**

This employee had no qualifications for assignment in the German desk or German operational field. He was carried in the German Branch in a casual status while an assignment suitable to his talents was being located. The fitness report for the period of his duty with the German Branch is accordingly only a record of the fact that he loyally and diligently carried out assigned tasks to the best of his ability.

William J. Graver
Chief, EE/Germany

Pre 1960 Fitness Reports

SECRET

2 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Personnel

SUBJECT : Commendation - Mr. Guy Vitale

1. The Eastern European Division Logistics Office wishes to commend Mr. Guy Vitale for the manner in which he conducted himself while on temporary assignment in this office. Rather than sit idle awaiting a new assignment, Mr. Vitale volunteered his services and was given various logistical general services jobs and duties which he carried out with enthusiasm and effort rarely seen in a person in his status. We found him as an enthusiastic-willing worker who gave selflessly of his time and showed a strong devotion to duty.

2. A copy of this commendation should be made a part of the employee's permanent 201 file.

S. DANILUCK
Chief, EE Logistics

SECRET

Pre 1960 7RQ &
certifications for insurance
and retirement

wH/1/mo

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO 083620	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) VITALE GUY	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 10/16/17	5. SCHEDULE GRADE STEP GS -08-05
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE INTELLIGENCE ASST	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT AH	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
GREECE	PCS-52	57/01/01	60/01/24
Vieques Island, Puerto Rico	TDY-10 days	61/4/01	61/04/10

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 10 JUL 67
INITIALS: APS

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J
May 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 7 JUL ENTD

(4-51)

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III

EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS City, State, Country	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.							
2							
3.							
4							

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2.				
3				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 American Mission School, Athens, Greece	Greek Language	57/2	57/4	3 mo.
2				
3.				
4				
5				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2				
3.				
4				
5				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**	
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)		
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)		
3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U. S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME.	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 June '67	Guy Vitale

Pre 1960 - PHS, CLEARANCE
request &
appl. forms

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE May 1970

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel file:
Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: Sources and methods

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9.8.78	10:10	Betsy WOLF	Betsy Wolf

322007

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G. 006102

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DEB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 April 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last–First–Middle): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 | DAY 14 | YEAR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION, FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: $31,554

18. REMARKS:
24065

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: William C. Dooley, C/E/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 8 Aug

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 9 Aug 72

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC — ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS. CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE [illegible]	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX	35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-9-72 MW

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Dow H. Lutticker

DATE APPROVED: 9 AUG 1972

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

10 AUG 1972

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

VYB

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 JULY 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], Alfred [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]
EXTENSION OF PRA ~~NTE 24 FEB 1971~~

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 20 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF	

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 27,463

18. REMARKS:
cc: PAYROLL

NTE 24 Feb 1971

* PRA Per HR 20-17 e(1)(b)

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E Pers
DATE SIGNED: 7/13/70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 14 July 1970

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 446.20 ALPHABETIC EUR
22. STATION CODE: 3-[illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 07 DA. 20 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 02 DA. 24 YR. 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—DRGH 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-23-70 mw
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 7-23-70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

XXB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 FEB 1969

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, [illegible] [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 1 year

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 25 YEAR 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9136 1231

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (Ind)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 ~~5~~ 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 23,734 — $ ~~23,075~~

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers

DATE SIGNED: 2/26/69

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 3-4-69

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 41 [illegible] ALPHABETIC EUR

22 STATION CODE: 24065

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24 HQDTRS. CODE: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 02 DA. 24 YR. 70

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: S 2

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—URGH 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-7-69 mw

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 3/7/69

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

KKS

DATE PREPARED
24 February 1967

1. SERIAL NUMBER
006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
Williamson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED
MONTH 02 | DAY 26 | YEAR 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ | V TO V | | V TO CF
| CF TO V | XX | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE
7136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

A
19

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE
OPS OFFICER (14)

12. POSITION NUMBER
0668

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP
15-6

17. SALARY OR RATE
$ 20,585

18. REMARKS
X PRA-per HR ~~-21c (2)~~ 21-17D(B) for ~~duration~~ of present tour.

Slotting for new T/O.

D m Ell

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman, C/E/Personnel

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED
2 MAR 1967

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
32	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	24665		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
03 25 69	82						

EOD DATA

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV, PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
3-3-67
DW

46. O P APPROVAL
Dow H. Pitelle

DATE APPROVED
[illegible]

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

P 55

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XYB

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 March 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, Jacques
[redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 10 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6136-1231

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WE
FOREIGN FIELD
PARIS STATION
INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $19,415

18. REMARKS:

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 28
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 50600 ALPHABETIC WE
22. STATION CODE: 24045
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. [illegible] DA. [illegible] YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 02 DA. 03 YR. 63
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 DA. 31 YR. 65
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE): CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV, TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0—WAIVER 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 04-01-[illegible]

46. O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 31 MAR 1966 LK

Don H. Lutichen

DATE APPROVED: 31 Mar 66

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OP-2
3-66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

		DATE PREPARED 10 FEBRUARY 1964
1 SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] Richardier, Jacques	
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH [illegible] DAY 15 YEAR 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CC CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4136-6250-1012	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WE PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS [illegible]	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 17,210		

7
6

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP WE/PARIS STATION/0886.

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-21c (2) FOR DURATION OF TOUR.

NTE ~~November 1967~~
03/14/66

CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT	DATE SIGNED 6 Mar 64	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER [illegible] Collins	DATE SIGNED 10 Mar 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 31	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50600	ALPHABETIC WE	22. STATION CODE 54015	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS. CODE 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 [illegible] 24
26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28 NTE EXPIRES 03 14 66 ~~11 30 67~~	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 182	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37 LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION [illegible] 3/19/64	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 17 Mar 64

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 AUGUST 1963

XXB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH / DAY / YEAR

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	CC	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136-6250-1012

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
PARIS STATION
EXTERNAL OPS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: ~~0887~~ 0886

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16,005

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD/WE AREA/FRANCE/PARIS/0240

PRAed IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-580, PARA 4 (b). 10/22/63

COPIES SENT TO FINANCE AND SECURITY.

RODOC COORD
cm

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: GEORGE MOGANNAM, AC/WE/PT

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Lou Collins

DATE SIGNED: 15 Oct. 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 50 660	ALPHABETIC WE	22. STATION CODE 24065	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 6 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.								
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. 10 12 65	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 4 84	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX								
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.								
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.
STATE CODE								

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Rearney 10/22/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 15 Oct 63

(41)

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 January 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]402

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] [illegible], Jacques

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 | DAY 03 | YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR - FOREIGN FIELD
Western European Area
France
Paris

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 16005

18. REMARKS:
From same slot.

PRA in accordance with HR 20-21c(3) for a period not to exceed 2 years.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A. Busby
ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: D. M. Collins

DATE SIGNED: 24 Jan 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60600 | ALPHABETIC SR

22. STATION CODE: 20165

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HQTRS CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 | DA. 30 | YR. 34

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 02 | DA. 03 | YR. 63

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 02 | DA. 03 | YR. 63

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 80

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE | CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: MMO 8 FEB 1963

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible] B. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED:

(4)

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

X·B

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Jacques
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment (Career)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 05 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	x	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3034 4008 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Western European Area
France
Paris
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Paris, France
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer D
12. POSITION NUMBER: 240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS 14
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 06
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13[illegible] 510 pa

18. REMARKS

~~[illegible] 16 July 62;~~ Last day at Headquarters will be 31 July 1962 Departing U. S. around ~~XXXXXXXXX~~. end of August 1962.

259's submitted.

Copy furnished Office of Security.

c 7/54

WE concurrence on the telephone 11 July by Roland Dulin, Acting DC/WE
Dm Collins

Recorded CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Dm Collins
DATE SIGNED: 24 July '62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5[illegible] ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 24665
23. [illegible] CODE:
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 20 YR. 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 01 DA. 16 YR. 55
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 01 DA. 05 YR. 61
28. NTE EXP RES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 – CSC, 3 – FICA, 5 – NONE; CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 26102
34. SEX: M
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 – NONE, 1 – 5 PT., 2 – 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 03 DA. 07 YR. 44
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 11 DA. 20 YR. 49
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 – YES, 2 – NO; CODE 2
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 – WAIVER, 1 – YES); HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOC. SECURITY NO.: 042-20-5339
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1 (0 – NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 – NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 – BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 – BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 – YES, 2 – NO); CODE 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0 –
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 – YES, 2 – NO) 5; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP. –; STATE CODE –
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 8-15-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B Kagan
DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET (4)

[illegible]

[redacted]

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject:

My last statements concerning the performance of should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16-Aug-62

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXF

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): RICHARDSON / JACQUES Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Resignation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 04 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3234 1300 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
SR/6
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (Br Ch)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0050
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~13,355~~ 570 13516

18. REMARKS

Copy furnished Vouchered Payroll.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ANDREW L. BUSSY, C/SR/PERSONNEL

DATE SIGNED

19A. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 7/23/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. STATION CODE NO.: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STAT. ON CODE: 13
23. INTEGRATION CODE
24. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 01 20 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPEC. REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 2 = FICA 3 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1 RR 009.1
32. CORRECTION / CANCELLATION DATA: CODE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECUR. FY. REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. W.I. SERV. CRED. IT: 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE: 2 = NEITHER 3 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERV. OF LESS THAN 12 MOS. 3 = BREAK IN SERV. OF MORE THAN 12 MOS.
42. CLEARANCE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Jul 2 15 62

46. C.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 7/24/62

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
8-61

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE 4 August 1962 (Date) FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

To accept private employment.

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE -	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 August 62.	23 July 62	Augustus G. Richardson

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, Zone, State)

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a - The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains only to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 - "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary - Part Time		

Item 9 - "Organizational Designations" should show all levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

Major Component (Director, Deputy Director, etc.)
 Office, Major Staff, etc.
  Division or Staff (subordinate to first line)
   Branch
    Section
     Unit

Item 11 - "Position Title" should reflect the standard abbreviated title given in the most current edition of the Position Control Register or reported on Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization.

Item 18b - Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, the gaining Career Service should approve and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING - The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel through the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of the Comptroller, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

DAT: 16 AUG 62

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]6122	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. [illegible] 04 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFF [illegible] BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]5	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]35[illegible]

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-81)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 09 Da 12 Yr 60				XX	V to V UV to V	V to UV UV to UV
1. Serial No. 006102	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Jacques G Richardson RICHARDSON, JACQUES	3. Date of Birth Mo 01 Da 20 Yr 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M		6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No -2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP SR FAR EAST AREA TOKYO STATION SOVIET BRANCH	Code	15. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - Code 3	17. Position Title OPS OFFICER BR CH	18. Position No. 189	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 14 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 1 Da 11 Yr 55	25. PSI Due Mo 7 Da 2 Yr 61	26. Appropriation Number 1134 7000 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER OF FUNDS to Vouchers	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo 10 Da 02 Yr 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept - Usfld- Frgn - Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER - BR CH	35. Position No. 50 D-15	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 14 4	39. Salary Or Rate $ 12,990	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 1234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
ANDREW L. RUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL A. Rusby

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
E. C. JOHNSON X4407

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Russell Grace	9/16/60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		10-15-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security.

CSPD
10 5 60

w/o file

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDIT.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Richardson Jacques G.	~~ ~~	59-41

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 3 December 1958

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
28 AUG 1959	B. DeFelice

NOTICF OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 9-58 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON, Jacques G.	DATE OF BIRTH Unk	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 58-201

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, ~~or death~~ incurred on 4 Feb 1958.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 15 July 1958	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

(4-21-35)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR JACQUES G. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Dec 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 5 Jan. '55
B. APPROVED: 16 Jan 1955
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—	TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) BC-171-13	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 p.a.	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR/5	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.	Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary) 4 Jan 55

PLEASE TRANSFER FROM VOUCHERED TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS. $560.00 M.J.

Memo stating why fitness report not necessary. M.J.

C/FCMO

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Robert W. Muenster

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: DD/P Admin.

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:FI

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-3400-20
TO: 5-3400-55-015
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Effective date per [illegible] 1-11-55

Conc by Osborne 1-11-55

[illegible] 1-11-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	MJ	4 Jan
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		5 Jan 55
E.		
F. APPROVED BY	Rolfe W. Allen 1-5-55	

REMARKS:

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: DEC 21 1954

SECRET

10—57820-2

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Jacques G. Richardson AGE: 31 DATE: 13 Dec 1954

STATION Washington, D.C.
AND DUTIES: Area Ops Off. DD/P UNIT: SR
(Br. Ch.)

PRIMARY CAREER
DESIGNATION: SD:FI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-13

PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14

PRESENT T/O SLOT BC-171
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

PROPOSED T/O SLOT BCF-189
NUMBER AND GRADE: GS-15

CIA TRAINING:
SOC - 9 Jan - 3 Feb 1950
Ops Course - 20 Feb - 17 Mar 1950
Adv. Ops Course 27 Mar - 21 Apr 1950
CE Course 4 Jan - 22 Jan 1954
Audio-Surveillance 29 Nov - 1 Dec 1954 - Flaps & Seals 2 & 3 Dec 1954

EDUCATION:
University of Michigan, 1945 - BA
Georgetown University - 1951 to 1952

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese & French - Fluent
Mandarian, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese & German - Fair

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
Feb 1943 to Aug 1946 - US Army
Sept 1946 to Mar 1948 - Civil Intell. USA
Apr 1948 to Oct 1948 - Civil Intell. 1st Lt. (over)

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
APT - 7-18-50 - Intell Asst. GS-7 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO - 10-1-50 - Intell Officer, GS-9 - OPC/FE/FE-3, Japan
PRO & REAS - 4-29-51 - Intell Officer, GS-11 - OPC/FE/FE-3
PRO - 1-20-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/FE/FE-3
REAS - 2-17-52 - Ops Officer - GS-12 - OPC/EE/EE-4, Great Russian Sec., Wash, D.C.
REAS - 12-7-52 - Intell Officer(Dep.Ch.) GS-12 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
PRO - 7-5-53 - Intell Officer (Dep. Ch) -GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5 O/C
REAS - 2-28-54 - Area Ops Off. (Br. Ch.) GS-13 - DDP/SR - SR-5

RECOMMENDED BY:

Chief, SR/Admin

CONCURRENCES:

Chief, SR

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS)

Publications "Press Censorship in Japan" Army Info Digest Nov 1949 to Numerous news items, 2 editorials while editor, graduate term papers on Yugoslavia, China, Korea & Afghanistan.

OF_E OF PERSONNEL
DEC 28 2 39 PM '54
MAIL ROOM

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 [redacted]
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST:
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb 1954
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	DEPUTY CHIEF (FO) ~~Intell Officer (Dep Chief)~~ FC-190-13		Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch.) FC-171-13
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00		GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	~~DDP/SR~~ SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief		DDP/SR SR-5
11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Washington, D.C.~~		Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Charles H. Dixson

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Charles H. Dixson
Title: SR Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	SEAL

CD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-3400-20
TO: 4-3400-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	RW	2/16
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Roy W. [illegible] 7/14/54

10—52

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Jacques D. Richardson	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 30 ~~Mar.~~ May 1953
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 5 July 53	

FROM—		TO—
Deputy Chief I.O. BC-190-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Deputy Chief I.O. BC-190-13
GS-132-12 $7040.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00
DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

BC-190

LT Bel
DDP/ADMIN 25 June 53

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: JUN 24 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
~~Chief~~ Charles H. Dixson

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Doris B. Powell
Title: FI/CMO.

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 3748

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				FI

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	1 July
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
7/1/53

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

16—67829-8

REGISTER NO.

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Feb.

NATURE OF ACTION: Reassignment

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-12 $7040	GS-12 $7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-4 Great Russian Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: ~~S.617~~

(3. 480) JK

132

~~#~~ 510

KJR

RECOMMENDED: 5 Jan. 52
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
9845		1/17/52
NEW	VICE	L. A. ✓	REAL

DATE 2/5/52 SIGNATURE W P Gilbert

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS 2723900
APPROPRIATION:
ALLOTMENT: 2011
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 6 x 16 (d)

DATE SIGNATURE 2-15-52 | SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE | SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—02400-1

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO:

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 20 Jan. 52

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Operations Officer	Operations Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 ~~$5400.00~~ 5940	GS-12 ~~$6400.00~~ 7040
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: S-617

132

9930

RECOMMENDED:

30 Oct. 51
(DATE)

Exo/FE
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
9845		1/17/52

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE	SIGNATURE
1/17/52	

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2 1 2 3700

ALLOTMENT:

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: 2017 Sch A 6.116 (i)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1-18-52	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
JAN 1 1952	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62480-1

PERSONNE .CTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 381

NAME: RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 April 51

NATURE OF ACTION: Transfer
Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer GS-9	Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	GS-11, $5400 p/a
OFFICE	OPC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH AND SECTION	FE-3 Japan Sec.	FE-3
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 178 In grade since ~~14 Feb 51~~ 1 Oct 50

S-14

#3729

RECOMMENDED:

14 March 1951
(DATE)

George A. Kidd
RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division
(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: 30 Mar. 51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
2992	3032	6-2-49

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE 3/31/51 SIGNATURE Gilbert
EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 841-101
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch a 6.11 6 (A)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
5-1-51	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS
SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 27 Apr
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF Charles W Cleaver

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62152-1

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NUMBER 2938

NAME RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Feb 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-9, $4600 p/a
OFFICE		OPC
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH AND SECTION		FE-3, Japan Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

132

S-6 FE-39 JBEDICT

4998

Transfer leave for vouchered funds.

Please move Holland, Anthony from S-6 to S-7, FE-3, Japan, Washington Hdqrs.

Concur for Chief Inspection and Security
Ernest P[illegible] 1/19/51
Ch Pers. Security Br.
1/25/51

RECOMMENDED:

9 January 1951
DATE

for RICHARD G. STILWELL, Chief, FE Division
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
23 Jan '51

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.		DATE APPROVED
2977	3051		6-2-49
NEW	VICE	I.A. ✓	REAL

DATE 1/17/51
SIGNATURE Austin J. Thomas

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2113900
ALLOTMENT: 541-101
CSC AUTHORITY: Sch A 6.11 b(1)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
2-21-51	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

GPO 850 50-278

SECRET

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Richardson, Jacques G ~~Dallas L. Caunter~~, understand that by virtue of my duties in the C I A I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the C/A, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the C/A.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the C/A is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations _____," and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 21st day of November 1949.

x Dallas L. Caunter ~~(Seal)~~

Sworn to before me this 21st day of November 1949.

at Washington, D.C.

Joseph S. R

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

EOD: 7 [illegible] 19[illegible]

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.: [illegible]

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3. AGE: [illegible]

4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jan [illegible]

5. SERVICE COMP. DATE: 29 Nov 1949

U.S. NATURALIZATION DATE(S): [illegible]

MARITAL STATUS: Married

YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 3 1923 1950 [illegible]

CAREER STAFF STATUS: MEMBERSHIP Jul 1954

OTHER STATUS:

LAST WHO APPT. QUAL. FOR: Jul 1962 PCS O/S

EVAL. FOR: PCS O/S

CURRENT RESERVE STATUS: NONE X

SERVICE:

GRADE:

ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA DATE:

RELEASE MIL. SER. DATE:

TO BE RETIRED DEFERRED DATE:

12. ASSESSMENT DATE: None

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE: None

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE: None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer

1949 Guide Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper

1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French

1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French

1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible](1947); Oriental Civilization, Japanese

1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, High W, Inter(Feb 1962) Trans & Interp Aug 1957

Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962), R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50	UTCA	[illegible]	CI Ops	1960	[illegible]'s Cont
1950	Intel Orient	[illegible]	Audio Surv Tech	1961	[illegible]
1950	Ops	[illegible]	Ops Audio Surv [illegible]	1962	French
1950	Ops Famil	[illegible]	Flaps & Seals		
		1960	Cland Serv Review		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECT. DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1949	I.O.	0132.06	7		OPC/[illegible]/[illegible]	HQ
Oct 1950	" "	0132.06	9		OPC/[illegible]	"
Apr 1951	" "	0132.06	11		OPC/[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	12		" " " " "	"
Jul 1953	" "	0136.01	13		DDP/SR/[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Feb 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	13	FI	DDP/SR/Ch, FE Br	"
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	FI	DDP/SR/FE Area	Tokyo
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	14	D	DDP/SR/WE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" "	0135.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	"

20. DATE REV.: 20 Apr 19[illegible]

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: [illegible]

22. ITEMS 1-19 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 1200 (4) 8-57

SECRET

PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] PROFILE (PART 2)

PERS. SERIAL NO.

NAME [redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH
[illegible] 192[illegible]

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION REPORTS FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS

[redacted]

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [illegible] 1955 from Director, FBI and the DCI for service in connection [illegible]

Commendation 1955 from CIA Defector Coordinator for cooperation and competence in the handling of two defectors.

Commendation 1955 from the DCI for high degree of personal competence and devotion to [illegible].

Letter of Appreciation 1960 for suggestion which proposed revisions of Form 1050.

[illegible] from Commandant, USAF Command and Staff College for fine lecture.

27. DATE REVIEWED
20 Apr 1964

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
mh

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 57

SECRET

PROFILE (4)

006102

20 Jan 1924

Married

Jul 1954 | Jul 1962

None | None

1942-46 Military Service, US Army, 2nd Lt. - Civil Censorship, Military, Japanese Translator & Instructor, [illegible] College
1949 Guide Publishing Co, Baltimore, Md - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 Baltimore Housing Authority, Md - Administrative Officer

1941 Trinity College, Conn - French
1940-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French
1945 Univ of Michigan, Army Language School - [illegible], Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)	French - R, P, S, U, [illegible] W, Inter([illegible] 1960), Trans & Interp Aug 1957 Japanese - P, S, U, Inter(Mar 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

15. SPONSORED TRAINING

1949-50	[illegible]	1951	OC Ops	1961	[illegible] Exec
1950	Intel Orient	1954	Audio Surv Mgmt	1962	French
1950	Ops	1954	Oper Audio Surv Equip		
1950	Ops Famil	1954	Photo & Scale		
		1960	Cland Serv Review		

16. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE EOD [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & OFFICE TITLE	LOCATION
Nov 1949	I.O.	0132.03	7		OPC/Ops [illegible]	[illegible]
Oct 1950	" "	0132.03	9		OPC/FE-5	"
Apr 1951	" "	0132.03	11		OPC/D Ch, FE [illegible]	"
Jan 1952	Ops Off	0136.01	12		" " " " "	"
Jul 1953	" "	0136.01	13		[illegible]/Ch, FE/[illegible]	"
Feb 1954	Area Ops Off	0136.01	13	[illegible]	/[illegible]/Ch, [illegible]	Tokyo
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.01	14	[illegible]	/[illegible]/FE Area	[illegible]
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	/SR/Ch, Br 3	[illegible]
Aug 1962	(Resignation from SE Status)					
Aug 1962	(Excepted Appt to SA Status)					
Sep 1962	Ops Off	0136.01	14	D	SR/WE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	SR/WE Area	"
Oct 1963	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/External Ops	"
Mar 1964	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	WE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	Ops Off	0136.01	15	D	EUR/FF/CentReg. ParisSta	"

DATE REVISED 20 Apr 196[illegible]

FORM 1200 [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[illegible]102

SECTION A

GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)		2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	3. SEX [illegible]	4. GRADE [illegible] 5. SD [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT EUR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
CAREER RESERVE TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
ANNUAL REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
[illegible]

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
[illegible] 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 [illegible] employment as a [illegible] of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and [illegible] the overall cost of the [illegible]	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to [illegible] and spot leads on eventual access and support [illegible] against the local [illegible] and [illegible]	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses [illegible] with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an [illegible] government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good business sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the [illegible] and [illegible] fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local [illegible] officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of [illegible] citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of [illegible] personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't--

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 June 1971	/s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in [illegible]-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 May 1971	[illegible]	

SECRET

[illegible] REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continues to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the Station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local [illegible] and [illegible] targets.

Section B (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. However, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "[illegible]" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 193[illegible]	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-1[illegible]	5. SD [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION Berlin	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR	
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE	
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):			
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970			

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate [illegible] publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local [illegible] target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local [illegible] targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER -
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be described, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial [illegible] target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several [illegible]ers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major [illegible] target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other [illegible] representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and [illegible] targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible] employer.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
	Handling Officer	/s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL /s/

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 May 1970	[illegible]	/s/

Section F 3 continued

from the Organization. His continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his personal contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional drive to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 3 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

SECRET

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037391

FITNESS REPORT

[redacted]

SECTION A

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 25 [illegible]	3. SEX [illegible]	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]/EE		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)			SPECIAL (Specify)	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1963			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) [illegible] 1962 - 31 March 1963	

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 14 July 63	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET

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SECRET

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 May 1963	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6½ months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 May 1963	Ops Officer	/s/ James [illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 May 1963	CPS Officer	/s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

[redacted]

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's CE/SID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

13 September 1960
(Date)
File No. K-1328

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jacques G. RICHARDSON

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective 12 September 1960, it is requested that your records be properly blocked to deny Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. Operating component must take necessary action to block telephone locator by submitting the Personnel Information Card, "Office File Copy," Form No. 642, to Machine Records Division, Office of the Comptroller, Room 107 Curie Hall, Attention: Miss Wenkenbach.

Paul P.
HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS
Operating Division - SR

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

27

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MJP: 10 AUG 72

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OLE

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 14 YR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3130 1231 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0868

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: 31554

18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hdqtrs Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 30 YR 24

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR

27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC / 2 - CIA / 3 - FICA / 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: DAHNFOG

32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE / 1 - 5 PT / 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR

37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO DA YR

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER / 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES / 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

H B FISHER

POSTED
8-11-72 m

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SECRET

WEB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	44 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 15	7	$29,099	01/26/69	GS 15	R	$29,907	01/23/72		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE George K

DATE 20 Dec 71

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions **PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION** (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORG.,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques.	006102	44 735	CF	GS 15 7	$30,701

SECRET

BEG: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCB

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA- NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 02 | 25 | 71

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / CF TO CF ☐

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1136 1231 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0668

13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: 29039

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 Employ. Code: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44620 ALPHABETIC EUR

22 STATION CODE: 24065

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 [illegible] Code: 3

25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 | 20 | 24

26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):

27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR): 02 | 24 | 73

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 82

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE — CODE:

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE / MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):

37 LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):

38 CAREER CATEGORY

39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 0 WAIVED, 1 YES — HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED — 1 YES, 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED — 1 YES, 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-2-71 Bun

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SECRET

ARS

GROUP 1
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(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$29,099

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BBG: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 20 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15-7	17. SALARY OR RATE 27463
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44620	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 24065	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR 02 24 71	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 32	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 5-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	CODE 0-WAIVER 1-YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R.S. WATTLES

POSTED
5718.20

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SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1
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(4-51)

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 15 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 7	$25,909

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Richardson Jacques	006102	44 620	CF	GS 15 7	$27,463

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$20,585	$21,469

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson Jacques [redacted]	006102	44 600	CF	GS 15 6	$21,469	$23,075

EVR

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006102	Richardson Jacques [redacted]	44 600	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
S 15	6	$23,075	01/29/67	GS 15	7	$23,734	01/26/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 11 Dec 68

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Dow H Lutscher

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EJH: 8 MAR 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible], Jacques [redacted]		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 26 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 20585

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
[illegible]
10 Mar 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	44600	EUR	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
02 25 69	82						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. SERVICE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
3-3-67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$19,415	$19,978

---

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	5	$19,978	01/31/65	GS 15	6	$20,585	01/29/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

[illegible] JAN 1967

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 11 Jan 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E Mfg. 3-65

(4-51)

RZF: 7 APR 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible], Miguel [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 10 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 19415

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	01 31 65

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	82	2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

WE

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006102	[redacted] Richardson, Jacques	50 600 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	4	$18,170	02/03/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	01/31/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY BK

25 JAN 1965

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

L1

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 5	$18,740 ✓	$19,415 ✓

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949. AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

MHC: 8 13 MAR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacqueline [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR): 03 15 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V X CF TO CF ☐

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136 6250 1012

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WE
PARIS STATION
INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0885

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 17210

18. REMARKS:

[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	50600	WE	24065		3	01 20 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
03 14 66	82						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) / HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FOSTED
03/23/64 DK

E. D. ECHOLS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 MAR 1964 Jd

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51) (When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1960, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	006102	50 600	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

POSTED CF-4b
8 JAN 1964

MHC:1128 OCT 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 13 YR. 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF ☒
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4136 6250 1012
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WE
PARIS STATION
EXTERNAL OPS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0886
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 16005
18. REMARKS:

POSTED CF-4b
5-?-63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 50600 ALPHABETIC WE
22. STATION CODE: 24065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA. 20 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 10 DA 12 YR 65
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE: 84
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES. PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

14-00000

(P)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AUPD 08/17/63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) Richardson Jacques [redacted]				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 01 63	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4136 6250 1012	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
	CF TO V	X CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIV			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER			12 POSITION NUMBER 0240	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 15	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

Form 1150B 1-63 MFG. 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

19 AUG 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

EAB: 1 FEB 63

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 000102 ~~037367~~	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 03 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V · V TO CF · CF TO V · X CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3134 4008 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SR FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA FRANCE PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0240	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE 16005		

18. REMARKS

Jan 23 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	60600	SR	24065		3	01 20 24	02 03 63	02 03 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE · CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE · MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
	80						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP · CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE · CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES · HEALTH INS CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMP. · STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E.D. ECHOLS

POSTED
FEB 27 1963 bus

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

1/14 11 FEB 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

AUTOMATED PSI RECORD ADJUSTMENT

SERIAL NO.	LEI YR MO DA	PSI DUE DATE YR MO DA	ORGANIZATION CODE OFFICE	DIVISION	CURRENT GRADE	STEP
	62 07 08	64 07 05	DDP/	SR	GS-14	6

PROJECTED GRADE	STEP	NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAX. 20 CHARACTERS
GS-14	7	Richardson, Alfred [redacted]

FUND V/CF	SCHED.	CURRENT SALARY (OR HOURLY RATE)	PROJECTED SAL. (OR HOURLY RATE)	ID CODE
CF	GS	$14,970	$15,865	C

REMARKS

Subject received a PSI 07/08/62 to GS-14-6 so will not be due another until 07/05/64.

(2/27/62)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND
DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS.
EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
Richardson, Alfred [redacted]	006162 ~~[illegible]~~	40600	CF	14 6	313510	14 6	=14970

14-00000

PSC: 20 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [redacted]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): Richardson, Jacques [redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 05 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF: X (CF TO V)
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3134 4008 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP SR
WESTERN EUROPEAN AREA
FRANCE
PARIS
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0240
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 13510
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
[illegible]
Jlw 20 Aug 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. Employ. Code: 10.
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 60600 ALPHABETIC SR
22. STATION CODE: 24065
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 01 20 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.): 01 16 55
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.): 01 08 61
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE: 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.:
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 06102
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT) CODE: 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 03 07 44
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 11 20 43
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR PROV / RESV TEMP) CODE: C
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES): 1; HEALTH INS. CODE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 042205339
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) CODE: 1
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO): ; CODE: 0; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS: 0
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO): ; CODE: ; NO TAX EXEMP.: ; STATE CODE:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-21-6

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

Bec 8-20-62

14-00000

DAB: 16 AUG 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 04 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3234 1000 1000
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR SR/6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 13510

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 45	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE 1BD0091	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REC. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA. YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV. PROV. / TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8 20 62

E.D. ECHOLS

LLG 8/16/62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

234-1010-10

3040
80
3120

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
006102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	60 300 V 7	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 14	5	$13,250	01/08/61	GS 14	6	$13,510	07/08/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
006102	RICHARDSON, JACQUES D.	DDP/SR 7	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS-14	4	$12990	07	12	59	GS-14	5	$13250	01	08	61

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☒ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

ARF: 30 SEPT 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) RICHARDSON JACQUES

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 02 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1234 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SR SR 6 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER BR CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0050	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 12990

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 16	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 60300	ALPHABETIC SR	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA. YR. 01 20 24	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.								

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX							

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES
HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.						

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D. ECHOLS 10 22 60

L I

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

GE 10/18/60

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-310030

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible]	6. Grade and salary GS-14 $10,320		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:	11. Appropriation(s) SR 9	12. Prepared by pcs 3 May 56 13. Audited by

☑ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 15Jul56	15. Date last equivalent increase 16Jan55	16. Old salary rate $10,320	17. New salary rate $10,535	18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~ SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

4 SEP 1956

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	48 40	GS-14 4	$12,075	$12,990

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 506102	2. NAME RICHARDSON JACQUES	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN. DDP/SR 10	4. FUNDS UV	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	3	$11,835	01	12	58

7. NEW SALARY RATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	4	$12,075	07	12	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

4 742

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

DWP 5/5/59
HLF 7/31/59

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
RICHARDSON JACQUES	506102	GS-14-3	$10,750	$11,835

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	DDP/SR 8	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
BELIC, GEORGE	15 Jan 1958	George N Belic

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
506102	RICHARDSON JACQUES	DDP/SR	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
			LAST EFFECTIVE DATE						EFFECTIVE DATE		
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	07	15	56	14	3	$10,750	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. JACQUES S. RICHARDSON	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 26 Sept. '56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 21 Oct

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,535.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL (D)

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

RE-SLOTTING FOR NEW APPROVED T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
Robert D. Lovelace
Robert D. Lovelace

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Phyllis M. Landrum Ext. 4407

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX
M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3400-55-015
TO: 7-3400-55-015

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

R.A. Skeels (ENVS), FE/CMO
2 Oct 56

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PE	11
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	FEB	10-9
E.		

REMARKS:

POSTED
11 OCT 1956
PE

F. APPROVED BY
Robert H. [illegible] per [illegible] 9 Oct '56

SECRET

14-00000

Agency and organizational designations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 957876

1. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
RICHARDSON, Jacques D.

2. Pay roll

3. Block No.
5-3400-20

4. Slip No.

6. Grade and salary
GS-13 $8360.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:
$ 8990
SALARY ADJUSTED TO:
EFFECTIVE 13 MAR. 1955
PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

11. Appropriation(s)
SR 7

12. Prepared by
BZ 9 Nov 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date
2 Jan 55

15. Date last equivalent increase
5 Jul 53

16. Old salary rate
$8360.00

17. New salary rate
$8560.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s).

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

rvs

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. JACQUES G. RICHARDSON
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jun 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 19 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION (AMENDMENT)*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.D. 16 Jun 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 $8560.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | 5-PT. ☒ | 10-POINT: DISAB. | OTHER
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | | REAL.

SD- DT
~~SD-~~

15. SEX: M 16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: ~~5-3400-55-015~~
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

*This action amends Item #9, on the "from" side, on Notification dated 11 Jan. 1955, to show the correct salary, previously shown as $8360.00 per annum.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

my 1/20/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-313758

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 6 Jan. 1955 rvs

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JACQUES O. RICHARDSON	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 11 Jan. 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 16 Jan 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops Officer (Br. Ch) BC-171-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BCF-189-14
GS-0136.01-13 ~~$8360.00~~ per annum 8060	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $9600.00 per annum
DDP/SR SR/5	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Far East Area Japan Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3400-20 TO: 5-3400-55-015	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Subject to approved medical clearance prior to being sent overseas.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

[illegible]
JAN 17 1955

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) **Mr. Jacques G. Richardson**	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 24	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 28 Feb. 54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief (IO) BC 190-13	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer(Br. Ch) BC171-13
GS-132-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
SR-5 (Far East Branch) Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR SR-5
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-3400-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

3/19/54

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Qf 4/7/54

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 24
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 3 July 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 July 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sch. A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-12	8. POSITION TITLE	Deputy Chief I. O. BC-190-13
GS-132-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-13 $8360.00 per annum
DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SR Division SR-5 Far East Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: 11X2100
FROM: 3400-20
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

LAJ 7-3-53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 (PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER ... FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.——ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jun 24	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 5510	4. DATE 16 Feb 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 17 Feb 52	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Operations Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer
GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 p. a.
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC EE EE-4 Great Russian Section
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X				

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL	
		X		DL-9845 1/17/52

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2123900 TO 2011	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mo.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(S.LEO)

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

D. V. KULCANT
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Nothing

Aug 28 52

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14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (5 PARTS)
[illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION(RR)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Jacques C. Richardson	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. 9930	4. DATE 18 Jan. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 20 Jan. 52	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer GS-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Operations Officer GS-12
GS-11-132 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-12-132 $7040.00 per annum
OPC FE FE-3	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu. 9845
1/17/52

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 2123900 TO 2017	yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Maryland

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(517)

R W Mulcahy

C. V. MULCAHY
Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Jacques G. Richardson	20 Jan. 1924	#5729	23 April 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Transfer and Promotion	29 April 1951	Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer, GS-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-11
GS-9-132 · $4600.00 per. annum. Bu.#2974	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-132 $5400.00 per. annum.
OPC FE FE-3 Japan Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL X	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X					

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
		X		Bu.#2996 CSC#3032 6/2/49

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101	Yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

(778)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE

5 / 4 0

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE AND IDENTIFICATION

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-889285

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12

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

F.C. 1/19/51
(ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Jacques G. Richardson
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: 14938
4. DATE: 19 Feb. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 Feb. 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(h)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer, GS-9
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-9-132-$4600.00 per annum.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OPC FE FE-3, Japan Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X		X			

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu.#2974
CSC#3051
6/2/49

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 841-101
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 19 Feb. 1951
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Trial period has been completed.

H. C. Clinkscale

H. C. CLINKSCALE
~~Personnel Division~~ 09

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	DATE 9 January 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation	EFFECTIVE DATE Cob 18 Feb 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Officer V	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-9, $4600 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	FE	
BRANCH	FE-3 Japan Section	
OFFICIAL STATION	Tokyo, Japan	

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR for RICHARD G. STILWELL Chief, FE Division	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

S-49 FE-39 JBEDICT

Transfer leave ~~from~~ to unvouchered funds.

-Not due US for travel costs

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

GPO 83-300337

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME Jacques G. Richardson		DATE 7 September 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion		EFFECTIVE DATE 1 October 1950
	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	Intelligence ~~Assistant~~ Officer ✓
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-7 $3825 p/a	GS-9 $4600 p/a
OFFICE	OIC	OPC
DIVISION	FE	FE
BRANCH	FE 3	FE 3
OFFICIAL STATION	Japan	Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Richard G. Stilwell RICHARD G. STILWELL [illegible], FE	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-757 9/13/50	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ________

ENTERED ON DUTY ________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS: Employee EOD with CIA 30 Nov 49 as GS-7 130

Charged to FE-11, JBEDICT, Position No. ~~X~~ 49, Japan

BRD

44

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

GPO 050 50-284

SECRET

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

DATE: 18 July 1950

TO: OPC

BUILDING: "K"

ROOM: 1044

FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER

EOD DATE: 18 July 1950

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: RICHARDSON, Jacques

POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Assistant

GRADE: GS-7

SALARY: $3825.00 per annum

PAYROLL: unvouchered funds

DUTY STATION: Japan

DATE SECURITY CLEARED: 10 June 1949

DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED: 18 July 1950

DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED: 18 July 1950

DATE FINGERPRINTED: 18 July 1950

DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY: 18 July 1950

DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Not Applicable

DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED: 18 July 1950

EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS:
Mrs. Harriette D. Richardson (Wife)
6601 Old Bladensburg Road,
Silver Spring, Maryland Tele: SL 3953

EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS: Same as above

REMARKS:

POSTED

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER
ROBERT S. RATTLES

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME RICHARDSON, JAQUES G. ~~[illegible] (Pseudo)~~	DATE 15 July 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation	EFFECTIVE DATE COB 17 July 1950

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Intelligence Assistant	
GRADE AND SALARY	GS 7, $3825 p/a	
OFFICE	OPC	
DIVISION	Operations	
BRANCH	FED	
OFFICIAL STATION	~~Unassigned~~ Tokyo, Japan	

	APPROVAL	
QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RICHARD G. STILWELL Acting Chief, FE	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER Robert S. Wattles	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject to be entered on duty on unvouchered funds in his true name of Jacques G. Richardson. The effective date of his true name appointment is 18 July 1950.

Frederick [illegible] Richards
Authorized Certifying Officer

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME KICHARDSON, JAQUES G. ~~[illegible]~~

DATE 7 November 1949

NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE 20 November 1949

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Intelligence Officer GS-7
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-7, $3825.00
OFFICE		OPC Ops Staff
BRANCH		FID Area III
DIVISION		SO-II-JBEDICT
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 21 November 1949

SECURITY CLEARED ON 10 June 1949

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 21 November 1949

ENTERED ON DUTY 20 November 1949.

DCG-07/05/53
CSECD - 11/10/49
NOR 11/26/49

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Pseudonym acknowledged 21 November 1949 JSR

... VERIFIED
BY AH DATE 1-13-55

Frederick W. ...
Authorized Custodian ...

FORM NO. 37-1 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE NOT TO BE USED.
AUG 1949

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Richardson, Jeffrey [redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D	

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Off

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/EUR

8. CURRENT STATION: Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	*Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.*
M–Marginal	*Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.*
P–Proficient	*Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.*
S–Strong	*Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.*
O–Outstanding	*Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.*

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary --con't--

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT and D.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 June 1971	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Handling Officer	/s/ Francis S. Sherry

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 May 1971	DCOS	/s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Richardson J.

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA): [redacted]

DATE (from item S-1): 17 Oct 69

NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true): Murat Natirboff

DATE (from item S-2):

DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 12 December 1969

DISPATCH NUMBER: OFPT-15240

DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 I 1924

2. SERVICE DESIGN: CS

3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE: S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15

4. STATION OR BASE: Paris

5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER:

6A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD: 5 Sep 1967

6B. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: Please see 11B

6C. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ: Summer 1970

6D. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE: o/a 1 October, 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

2: (at that time) 42 and 17

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

I would like very much to use my fluent French in my next assignment, as well as make use of my extensive exposure to science and technology -- both operations and and the larger world of the scientist and the engineer in today's evolving societies and economies. I would most especially hope to use my long experience in non-official cover activities and the managerial exposure accumulated thereby.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).* *(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)*

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter range similar local activity during a period marked largely by an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited, and modified a non-official cover in order to mask our operational activity, and integrated these into the broader ranging overall activities of a major field Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity of viable professional/commercial cover organizations. The tasks included many business and production aspects as well as management of the firm's /unwitting/ personnel in the field and from the home office.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, upon their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance of targets, and in recruitment.
- As my original non-official cover became modified as a result of mergers, I was able to develop, alone, continuing cover to serve our needs of operational access as well as those of 'status' cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED: INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

(a) the senior-most management course offered through the Organization;
(b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole;
(c) at least audit the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in a French-speaking technically advanced locale.
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover non-official or official) in an area where I can combine my experience and linguistic ability.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers, or (b) JCTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.
Fifth choice: to work on the Intelligence side of the house.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ______ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ______ (DATE)

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE Staff Training 2ND CHOICE Personnel 3RD CHOICE Intelligence

2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE Brussels 2ND CHOICE Geneva 3RD CHOICE Ottawa

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION; with different responsibilities

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends that Subject return PCS to Headquarters at the end of his current tour. We would welcome a replacement who is capable of functioning in the same general cover context, but any such individual must also be able to spot and thoroughly access agent candidates. He should also handle a number of agents in the same field. We are, in short, seeking an officer who will aggressively exploit his cover.

---- continued----

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

No decision has been made concerning next assignment

DATE 24 Aug 70 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______
CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

Field Reassignment Questionnaire (continued)

12. develop new operational leads on his own initiative, and at the same time be prepared to take over and run assets related to his own cover employment.

CAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Richardson, Jacques
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD	
20 Jan 1924	M	GS-15	D	

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Off
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/EUR/F
8. CURRENT STATION: Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHMARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local MHMARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

29 JUN 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1

(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHHARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHHARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHHARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHHARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHHARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current WOLADY part-time employer.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Handling Officer Chief, SR II	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Francis Sherry /s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE 19 May 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

Richardson, Jacques

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 October 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 20 OC	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OCT 9 1 35 PM '69

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 June 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 5 June 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Murat Natirboff

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3. COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the KCC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-99925.

DATE 23 JUNE 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David kE. Murphy

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

Richardson, Siegfried

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D'
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)						ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - ~~31 March~~ 30 September 196

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WOLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 24 Oct. 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 28 Oct. 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Murat Natirboff
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL See attached.		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief ofStation	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the managerial demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as many leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must end because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

Richardson Eugene

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HBFAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

31 AUG 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

Subject is cost conscience.

HQRS. NOTE: Subject has no supervisory responsibilities.

Seth T. Crawford
Chief, E/F

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
	Employee is on h/l. Report will be shown to him upon his return.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/French		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
3 June 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could rang ... g on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe actio
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfacto ... or excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are b
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

List up to six of the most important specifi ... Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY ... in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences where targeted Soviet S&T personnel are expected	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts, develops and assesses Soviet S&T personalities at international conferences.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participates as an inside spotter, manager and key team member in recruitment operations against Soviet S&T personnel	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Spots, develops and assesses Soviet, third national and PBPRIME agent candidates in HBFAIRY	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an outstanding job in creating a [illegible] mechanism which enables direct access to an important target group. This job was performed [illegible]fully, securely, intelligently and imaginatively. Subject is an experienced, highly capable senior professional officer in every sense of the term. He is a thoroughly organized self-disciplined person who can operate effectively outside a normal Station complex. He has the supple mind required to learn highly technical cover tasks and perform these in a skilled manner. He organizes the performance of these cover duties in such a manner as to extract the most operational mileage. Subject has spotted, assessed, developed, and in special cases recruited. He is extremely articulate, and an excellent writer. Despite his deep cover status, he submits timely finished operational and information reports. His management, administration, and record keeping of both his cover and operational duties is excellent.

Although Subject has had long experience in supervisory capacities, his present singleton cover status does not require supervisory duties.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 May 1966	SIGNATURE /[redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 May 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	/s/Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 4 May 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
Richardson, Jacques
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DDP/WE/French

8. CURRENT STATION
Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUWOLF or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON
BK OF-4b
6 JUL 1965

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O *

30 JUN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
[illegible] 56 PM '65

SECTION C. **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addition he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical targets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible (continued)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 June 1965	/s/ [redacted]

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 June 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ James M. Flint

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's performance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and, as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

Reviewing Officer

2 June 1965 Chief, External Operations Section /s/ Robert E. Owen

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 June 65	DC/WE	Edward Ryan Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C continued SECRET [redacted]

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information. Otherwise, he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctillious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

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*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF. DIV. BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development and assessment of technical personalities of interest to Station's internal (domestic) programs.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	O

POSTED ON
OF-45

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

26 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

JUN 25 11 28 AM '64

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Eighteen	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Richardson, Jacques **FITNESS REPORT** [redacted]

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037367 010112

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
16 JUL 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

15 JUL 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

SECTION C

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

SECTION D

BY EMPLOYEE

1\.

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] /s/

BY SUPERVISOR

2\.

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

3\.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet.

DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

Richardson, Jacques
[redacted]

SECRET

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

SECRET

SECRET

JUN 1962

6161

6 August 1962

[redacted]

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report Richardson, Eugene

Subject: [redacted]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

Quentin C. Johnson
QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

CONCUR: Howard J. Osborn
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

DEC 1961

Recorded by CSPD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Richardson, Jacques

NIS GT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME [redacted] (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To July 1960-October 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF ... 1961
20 AH '61
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. [redacted]as a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] b/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE QUENTIN C. JOHNSON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4520

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacque
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
11. REPORTING PERIOD From: 1 Apr 59-~~61~~ 24 June 62

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
							X
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	▨	▨					
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

(4)

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 June 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Jacque Richardson/s/ on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 23 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Adam Brindle(P) signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON, Jacques	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

JUN 22 11 19 AM '59
RI/MAIL ROOM

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SK 8

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON JACQUES
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE, TOKYO, JAPAN
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 27 May 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William E. Nelson
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE:

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		1 JUL
Reviewed by PCD		7/24/58

[illegible] UNDER CRITERIA [illegible] AND IN COMPLIANCE [illegible]

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 27 May 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: John E. Baker
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1. - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2. - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3. - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4. - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5. - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6. - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

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Performance (4)

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(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 26 2 18 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN		6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer	
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John E. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential

(4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

OF PERSONNEL
JAN 26 2 18 PM '50
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

14 57 PERS.

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section A below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station [illegible]
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Completed at Headquarters; subject not available (Copy sent to field.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marchi
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY Ju DATE 7 NOV 1957
Posted for C[illegible], [illegible]
Reviewed by [illegible] GJ 11/[illegible]

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. ☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE: 23 Oct 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE Lloyd George
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and Manages Projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Developes and handles Agents	RATING NUMBER 5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

GENERAL

SECTION E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDWOOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

CERTIFICATION

SECTION F.

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Lloyd GEORGE
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: COS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

SECTION G.

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note the rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note your rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

DATE
NOV 1957

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR

15

PERSONNEL
OCT 30 1 50 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Japan Station (REDWOOD)
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 15 November 1956
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward [illegible]
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Coded F...
1957
1-22-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 21 November 195
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: W Lloyd George
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 19 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and manages projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles admin routine	RATING NUMBER 4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY: Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* **RICHARDSON JACQUES**	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION **DI**
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Edward Maelius	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. Lloyd George	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ~~Chief of Operations~~

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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Potential

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(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With res[illegible] below, he tends to support subordinates from his own ener[illegible] rather [illegible] than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 3 11 15 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to [illegible] the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

CODED
BY
DATE 29 NOV 1955
Posted Pos. Control P&S
Reviewed by POD [illegible] 12/7/55

FIELD REPORT

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED.

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY: Jacques Richardson
1. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
2. SEX: M
3. SERVICE DESIGNATION: (1) FI, (2) PP
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): USSR Base, Tokyo
SR 534
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 30 September 1955
7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 17 February - 30 September 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo 0136.01
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 17 February 1955
3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (*List in order of frequency*)

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
   1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
   2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
   3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
   4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other KUBARK elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representatives of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
   1. Consult with or advise other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
   2. Make available to other KUBARK and non-KUBARK units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES
1. NAME OF RATER (True): Carleton B. Swift
2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): W Lloyd George
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.: Nov. 1955
5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES: Phyllis M. Landrum

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply to some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale of each major category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

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(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														X
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												X		
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.													X	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.												X		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												X		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 22 11 07 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES,

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CY 7 DATE 8/1/54

R.P. 8/18/54

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) Richardson (First) Jacques (Middle) G.
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Area Ops. Officer CD-FI
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION SR
BRANCH SR/5
☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment ☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor ☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.

Sorry—corrected list:

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10. 3 July 1954
DATE

Jacques G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

(Over) (4)

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MAY 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

FI\Training

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE: 29 July 54

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

DATE: 21 July '54

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CU

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON	(First) Jacques	(Middle) D G.	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Emp. Intell.Off. (Chief) CD FI
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR 5 FE Br.	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-53 To 7-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment ☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor ☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorized personnel at Hq and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions, etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organization and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS). The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10.

22 October 1953
DATE

Jacques G. Richardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the Branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

JPH

(Over)

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953
DATE

J a Parrott
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953
DATE

Dana B Durand
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

9

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON,	(First) Jacques	(Middle) G.	2. GRADE GS-12	3. POSITION TITLE I.O. (Dep. Chief)	
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR-5 Far East	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.
Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl's.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.
7 February 1953
DATE

JRichardson
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that Service and this Agency.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953
DATE

George G Kisevalter
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

March 30 1953
DATE

Dana B Durand
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

WARNING—Do not fill out this form until you have read all instructions.

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM

STANDARD FORM NO. 2808 JUNE 1966
U S Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 831-1 2808-104

A. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DESIGNATOR

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month)	(Day)	(Year)	3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
RICHARDSON	Jacques	Gabriel	Jan	20	1924	042 20 5339

4. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY OR LAST EMPLOYED, INCLUDING BUREAU OR DIVISION

5. CLAIM NUMBER IF RETIRED
CSA—

I, the employee or former employee identified above, canceling any and all previous designations of beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any lump-sum benefit which may become payable under the Civil Service Retirement Act after my death. I understand that this designation of beneficiary will not affect the rights of any survivors who may qualify for annuity benefits after my death, and that this designation will remain in full force and effect unless or until canceled by me in writing.

B. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES

TYPE OR PRINT FIRST NAME, MIDDLE INITIAL, AND LAST NAME OF EACH BENEFICIARY	TYPE OR PRINT ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) OF EACH BENEFICIARY	RELATIONSHIP	SHARE TO BE PAID TO EACH BENEFICIARY (See Example)
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	Dau	One half

DUPLICATE

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries who may die before a lump-sum benefit becomes payable shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. If none of the beneficiaries are alive when the lump-sum benefit becomes payable, this designation shall be void.

January 12, 1972
DATE OF THIS DESIGNATION (MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR)

(SIGNATURE OF DESIGNATOR—DO NOT PRINT)

C. WITNESSES (A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary)

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, CERTIFY THAT THIS INSTRUMENT WAS SIGNED IN OUR PRESENCE.

Richard M Butler	13219 Allerton Ave	Rockville, Md.
(SIGNATURE OF WITNESS—DO NOT PRINT)	(NUMBER AND STREET)	(CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE)
(SIGNATURE OF WITNESS—DO NOT PRINT)	(NUMBER AND STREET)	(CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE)

PRINT OR TYPE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) TO INSURE RETURN OF COPY

Jacques G. Richardson
c/O Mrs T. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22134

(Reserved for Receiving Stamp of U. S. Civil Service Commission)

MAR 2 10 43 AM '72
PERSONAL AFFAIRS

THIS DUPLICATE WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU

Standard Form No. 1152
Form prescribed by
Comptroller General, U. S.
October 23, 1950
(Gen. Reg. No. 104, Supp. No. 1)

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

UNPAID COMPENSATION OF DECEASED CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EMPLOYEE:

NAME— (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)
RICHARDSON	Jacques	Gabriel	Jan 20 1924

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division)

I, the employee identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any UNPAID COMPENSATION *due and payable under existing law after my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary relates solely to Unpaid Compensation as defined in section 2 of the act of August 3, 1950, Public Law 636, and in nowise will affect the disposition of any benefit which may become payable under the Retirement Act applicable to my Government service. I further understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, unless or until canceled by me in writing, so long as I am continuously employed in the above department or agency.*

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES:

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary
Pamela A. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half
Michelle D. Richardson	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	Dau	One half

I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that, if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any deceased beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change any designation of beneficiary at any time in the manner and form prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States, and without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

January 12 1972
(Date of execution—month, day, year)

(Signature of employee)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE:

(Signature of witness)

1329 Wentworth Ave.
(Number and street)

[illegible] Ill.
(City, zone number, and State)

(Signature of witness)

(Number and street)

(City, zone number, and State)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYEE

Jacques G. Richardson
c/o Mrs [illegible]. G. Driscoll
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria VA 22314

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING DATA OF EMPLOYING AGENCY

[illegible] FEB [illegible] 2 [illegible]

[illegible]
(Indicate date and by whom received)

DELIVER BOTH COPIES TO THE PROPER OFFICER OF YOUR AGENCY—DUPLICATE WILL BE NOTED AND RETURNED

14—65919-1

DUPLICATE

Standard Form No. 54
January 1968
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 990-1
54-106

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT
Read instructions on back of duplicate before filling in this form

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INSURED:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year)

PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW TO SHOW WHETHER YOU ARE:

☐—AN EMPLOYEE ☐—RETIRED, OR AN APPLICANT FOR RETIREMENT ☐—RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION BENEFITS OR AN APPLICANT FOR SUCH BENEFITS

IF YOU ARE RETIRED OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION GIVE YOUR "CSA," "CSI," "A," or "X" NUMBER

(CSA, CSI, A, or X number)

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (If retired, former department or agency):

(Department or agency) (Bureau) (Division) (Location—City, State, and ZIP Code)

I, the individual identified above, canceling any and all previous Designations of Beneficiary under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program heretofore made by me, do now designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries named below to receive any amount of LIFE INSURANCE and ACCIDENTAL DEATH INSURANCE due and payable at my death. I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary will remain in full force and effect, with respect to any amount payable, unless or until canceled by me in writing, or until such time as it is automatically canceled (see regulation "f" on reverse side of duplicate copy).

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES (SEE EXAMPLES OF DESIGNATIONS):

Type or print first name, middle initial, and last name of each beneficiary	Type or print address (including ZIP Code) of each beneficiary	Relationship	Share to be paid to each beneficiary

For each type of insurance (regular and optional): (1) I hereby direct, unless otherwise indicated above, that if more than one beneficiary is named, the share of any beneficiary who may predecease me shall be distributed equally among the surviving beneficiaries, or entirely to the survivor. (2) I understand that this Designation of Beneficiary shall be void if none of the designated beneficiaries is living at the time of my death.

I hereby specifically reserve the right to cancel or change this Designation of Beneficiary at any time without knowledge or consent of the beneficiary.

(Date of execution—month, day, year) (Signature of insured)

WITNESSES TO SIGNATURE (*A witness is ineligible to receive payment as a beneficiary*):

Richard [illegible] (Signature of witness) 13219 [illegible] (Number and street) Rockville, Md. (City, State, and ZIP Code)

(Signature of witness) (Number and street) (City, State, and ZIP Code)

PRINT OR TYPE NAME AND ADDRESS (including ZIP Code) OF INSURED

THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RECEIVING AGENCY

[illegible]

(Indicate date and by whom received)

SEE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE COPY FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON WHERE TO FILE THESE FORMS.
DO NOT FILE WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE.

DUPLICATE

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, European Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Paris		MICROFILM

SUBJECT ADMIN/Personnel
[redacted] - Change of Beneficiary Forms 4A

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Richardson, Jacques

Forwarded herewith and under separate cover are change of beneficiary forms completed b[redacted] Since [redacted] will be at Headquarters during home leave towards the end of February, it is suggested that he be contacted during his TDY if additional information is required.

Carolyn A. Tanzola
Carolyn A. TANZÓLA

Attachments:
1. Flight & Accident Plan, h/w [illegible]
2. SF-2808, U/S/C via TNP
3. SF-54, U/S/C via TNP
4. SF-1152, U/S/C via TNP

CABLE BOARD
24 FEB [illegible]

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att #1-h/w; #2,3,4-usc-tnp

Dick

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 [illegible]	OFPT-17469	10 February 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

52 74-57

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) Richardson [redacted] (middle)

[redacted]

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 20 Jan 1924

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) Richardson, Jacques [redacted]

DATE 1 March 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 19 3 45 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-122

6 52 56 74-57

SECRET

31 July 1962
Date

THIS IS TO C[illegible] THE [illegible] ARE OF THE PROVISIONS OF REGULATION [illegible] FEBRUARY 1959 CONCERNING THE PERSONAL CO[illegible] EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS.

[redacted]
Signature

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY 33 PER ______ # ______

ACTION UNIT C/EUR 2

INFO FILE, VR C/WOCHD 2 C/CCS 2 D/OP D/SECUR 4

ACTION NO 071

JPB

S E C R E T 011654Z JUN 72 CITE PARIS 28959 (RILANDER ACTING)

1 JUN IN 625469

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. APPRECIATE REF ACTION WHICH WILL HELP AVOID ANY SECURITY PROBLEM FOR CASASIN. RE PARA TWO REF THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT UNCAIRD WILL QUERY FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER DIRECTLY. UNCAIRD CONDUCTS NO APPLICANT INVESTIGATIONS ITSELF. SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR AMERICAN APPLICANTS IS U.S. GOVT, NOT UNCAIRD, REQUIREMENT. THEREFORE, BELIEVE UNNECESSARY TO TAKE ANY FURTHER ACTION TO BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. ONLY REQUIREMENT NOW IS FOR ROUTING REPORT FROM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION INDICATING FAVORABLE SECURITY DETERMINATION FOR [redacted] Richardson, Jacques

2. NO FILE. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Richardson [illegible]

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA): [redacted]

DATE (from item S-2): 3 Feb. 1969

NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true): David Murphy

DATE (from item S-2): 3 Feb. 1969

DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 20 February 1969

DISPATCH NUMBER: TM-798947

DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 I 1924

2. SERVICE DESIGN: CS

3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE: S&T project manager, Area Ops Off, GS 15

4. STATION OR BASE: Paris

5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER: LPCVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD: 5 Sep 1967

6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: Please see 11B

6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ: Summer 1970

6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE: o/a 15 August 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3: (at that time) 42, 19 and 16

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My younger daughter should graduate from high school in Europe in June, 1970. Because she should not be transferred at that critical scholastic juncture, I would like to remain in the field another nine months to see her through her senior year.

In my next assignment, I would like to use my fluent French from time to time, if possible.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

- I planned, established and operated a long-range S&T spotting-assessment activity against sensitive targets, and a shorter-range similar local activity in an adverse political climate.
- I planned, developed and exploited an adapted non-official cover to mask the operational activity, integrated into the further-ranging overall activities of a major Station.
- I managed the non-official cover activity as a viable professional/commercial activity, including many business and production aspects, as well as the local handling of the firm's [unwitting] personnel.
- I assisted other Stations and Bases, at their request, in spotting-assessment activities, in local search and surveillance activities, and in recruitment.
- As part of my original non-official cover withered because of a corporate merger, I developed independently continuing cover to serve operational access needs as well as those of status cover.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I would like to take (a) the seniormost management course offered by or through the Organization as well as (b) a review course of activities within the CS and the Organization as a whole. In addition, I would also like to (c) audit, at least, the S&T course, if that is still being offered.

If (a) is possible through a civil school away from Headquarters, I would have no objection to the displacement involved.

(4)

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

First choice: to manage a large-scale non-official cover project in another French-speaking, technically advanced area (such as metropolitan Geneva or Brussels).
Second choice: chief of station or base (cover official or non-official) in an appropriate area.
Third choice: to be assigned to Staff training, preferably training (a) senior unit or project managers or (b) JOTs.
Fourth choice: to be assigned to Staff personnel work -- above the Division level -- where new personnel are screened, tested and evaluated, then assigned.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 *(for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice)* IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

[1] EXTEND TOUR nine MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO o/a 15 June 1970 (DATE)

[4] BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

[3] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, with different responsibilities.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

We are anxious to have this employee remain in his present assignment until 1970. You will note his first choice in para 11-A, to manage a large scale non-official cover project. It is possible we will have such a requirement here by 1970, but cannot yet be definite. If this develops positively, we will discuss with the employee.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

EUR Division recommends that [redacted] request for an extension of his current tour until June 1970 be approved.

DATE 3/11/69 TITLE C/E/PERS SIGNATURE Willford C. Taylor

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ~~ASSIGNMENT~~: Extended to June 1970

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. OFPS-11268 DATED: 11 July 69

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: Charles B. [illegible] (SIGNATURE) DATE: 7/16/69

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FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true): [redacted]

DATE (from item 5.1): 9 Dec 1963

NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true): James Flint

DATE (from item 5.2): 27 Dec 1963

NAME OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924

2. GRADE: GS-15

3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE: Operations Officer, GS-15

7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR: 10 September 1962

4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known):

5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE: Paris

7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD: September 1965

6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR: None

7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (*see special note on Transmittal Form*):

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational exploitation.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same ~~x~~capacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking ~~on~~ several journeymen case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms propmer, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (*refer to catalog of courses, if available*):

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

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9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION , after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:
1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:
1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS? INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs. A. B 2-20-64

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER 6 February 1964 DATE	SIGNATURE G K Mogannam G.K. Mogannam (Ed)

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. OFPS-7995 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. Collins	20. SIGNATURE
21. TITLE Secretary, CS Agent Panel	22. DATE 26 February 1964

23. COMMENTS

Approved extension of present tour to September 1965, followed by home leave, and then second tour.

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CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-10.2 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract

CASE OFFICER: Ruth W. Paul X6356

DIVISION: SR

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info call EV Johnson X5953

DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT: NA

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3234-4008-1000

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ VV

4. SLOT NO.: 240

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:
James M. Kennicott (P)
John F. Reynolds John R.
Williams, John F. Martin (A)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee since 1949

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): SI

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): [redacted]

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 38

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO
NA

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY / 28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 6) including premium pay
$13,570

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	X	X
NO		

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations

33. OTHER

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 19 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized

44. OTHER: As authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*

CASE OFFICER: Ruth Paul X6356

DIVISION: SR

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info

DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS call Ev Johnson X5923

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*

☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: ____ DAYS ____ MONTHS ____ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

FI and CA

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outsideFrance when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant ~~XXXXX~~ editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Russian	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE | TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERAT | DATE | TYPED NAM

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo (FJTT-1950, attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 17 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

Charles Katek
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addr

OFFICIAL CLASSIFICATION DISPATCH

TO
Chief, SR

INFORMATION ADDRESSEE
Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/ADMINISTRATIVE
Promotion of [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
FJTT-1950

DATE

REFERENCE(S)
FJTW-11531 (RYBAT), dated 11 October 1957
ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2

Richardson - 1
Baker - 2
Maury - 3
Nelson - 4

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on [redacted] under cover of FJTT-0601 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as [redacted] was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assured that in doing so he would also discuss with [redacted] [redacted]s promotion, which both he and [redacted] felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. [redacted] was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss [redacted]'s promotion with [redacted]. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending [redacted] for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0601 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

[redacted]

20 November 1958

Distribution:
2 - Chief, SR
2 - Chief, FE

Pers/S/Pers
✓ Pers

☐ CONTINUED

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 53 TEST
1 SEP 56

(40)

SECRET

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO : Chief of Station

FROM : Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: [redacted] - Recommendation for Promotion
Jacques RICHARDSON

1. [redacted] has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of [redacted] as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. [redacted] operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organization as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, [redacted] has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, [redacted] has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider [redacted] to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. [redacted] is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the

SECRET

best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relations but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

4. In sum, [redacted] qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

Edward MARELIUS [redacted]

9 December 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CSB

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-15 - Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 8 October 1958

1. The SR Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo ([illegible], attached) recommend the promotion of Jacques G. Richardson to GS-15.

2. Mr. Richardson was last promoted 16 January 1955. On 19 February 1955 he arrived in Tokyo to serve as the senior SR officer in the FE field area, his present assignment. In this position he has continued to display qualities of leadership, initiative, imagination and thoroughness which resulted in his rapid rise in the Agency.

3. The very facts of Mr. Richardson's youth in relation to his responsibilities and the fact that promotion to his present level has been rapid, caused the Division and the Chief of Station, Tokyo to hold until this time a recommendation for his promotion which was submitted in June 1957. Most careful consideration has convinced us that not only is Mr. Richardson deserving of the recommended promotion, but his elevation to the higher grade will be in the best interest of the Career Service and meet definite Division requirements for a senior officer at the GS-15 level.

CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 - Addee

C O P Y

FJTT-1950

25 November 1958

TO: Chief, SR

FROM: Chief of Station, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Promotion of Jacques G. RICHARDSON

REFERENCE: FJTW-11531 (RYBAT) dated 11 Oct 1957

1. In line with paragraph 2 of Reference, after a period of six months we submitted an additional promotion fitness report on RICHARDSON under cover of FJTT-0801 dated 28 May 1958. Inasmuch as Baker was then at Headquarters on TDY, we requested that he review this fitness report and assumed that in doing so he would also discuss with Maury RICHARDSON's promotion, which both he and Nelson felt was to be strongly recommended.

2. Baker was, however, not shown this fitness report at Headquarters, nor did he have the opportunity to discuss RICHARDSON's promotion with Maury. In reviewing our records we are now concerned at the possibility of some administrative slip-up and would appreciate a word of advice as to how this promotion action is proceeding. We would like to reiterate that we now have not the slightest hesitation in recommending RICHARDSON for promotion and find that the fitness report submitted with FJTT-0801 still reflects our current high appreciation of his abilities and progress.

WILLIAM E. NELSON

COPY
Attachment to
FJTA-19609

MEMORANDUM No. 360 18 June 1957

TO: Chief of Station

FROM: Chief, Soviet Branch

SUBJECT: Jacques RICHARDSON - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Jacques Richardson has been under my supervision as Deputy and Case Officer for approximately fifteen months. Based on the knowledge of Richardson as an individual gained during this period and upon his actual performance, I recommend that he be entered for consideration on the SR Division GS-14 to GS-15 promotion list at this time - June 1957. The slot and job which he now occupies, Chief, Soviet Branch, is, of course, adequate to accommodate such a promotion.

2. Richardson's operational performance has been outstanding and notably versatile during this period. He has engaged primarily in liaison and has been personally effective in terms of results achieved almost daily, in terms of reports, operational data, and joint enterprise; while, overall, he has established enduring professional relationships from which the organisation as a whole should benefit for some time to come. In addition, owing in large part to unique personal talents, linguistic and otherwise, Richardson has handled a number of unilateral cases most effectively. In the office, too, as well as in face-to-face operational situations, Richardson has been outstanding. He has a flair for and a facility with the written word as evidenced by the amount of general and particular correspondence which he has initiated, and he knows the organizational "drill" intimately and from way back. Thus, I feel that he is qualified for the recommended promotion by ability and experience in both the internal and external aspects of the profession.

3. Relative to the more personal characteristics involved in the term managerial ability, judgments are necessarily more subjective but here, too, I consider Richardson to be qualified in maturity, in judgment, and in experience. He would most certainly be a supervisor who could perform all the chores or handle all the situations which he would be calling upon subordinates to take care of, in itself, the beginning of any good supervisory relationship. In actual fact, he has had considerable experience in this regard already and the principal shortcoming I have noticed is a tendency to "carry" others by an extension of his own industry. Richardson is not without his difficulties in the area of personal relationships. He is a purist at times and manifestly impatient in certain human situations where a shrug of the shoulders would be the best reply. These characteristics do not always make for the best personal relationships but are frequently obviated by intellect and above all are correctable and are being corrected.

5. In sum, Richardson's qualifications, broad experience and proven abilities dominate his age, the only factor militating against a promotion at this time. It is therefore my sincere recommendation that a promotion recommendation be forwarded to Headquarters for consideration in the current mid-year lists.

EDWARD MARELIUS

1 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT : Nominations for Promotion to GS-15

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 14 May 1958 from
Secretary, CS Career Service Board

1. After reviewing GS-14 employees assigned to the SR Division, I wish to again recommend the promotion of Jacques Richardson, Chief, Soviet Branch, Tokyo to GS-15. I concur also in the attached recommendation for the promotion of Paul Haines prepared by the Chief of Base, Berlin.

2. The Chief of Station, Tokyo and I recommended Mr. Richardson's promotion in December 1958. This earlier recommendation presented the personal qualities of Mr. Richardson. I wish simply to point out at this time that since early 1954, Mr. Richardson has more than fully discharged responsibilities at the GS-15 level. I believe that it is definitely time to elevate him to the level at which he has been performing more than satisfactorily for over 5½ years.

Charles Katek
CHARLES KATEK
Acting Chief, SR Division

Distribution:
Orig & 6 Addressee w/att

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R3

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1924

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
None CIA	49	11	28				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
United States Army	43	Feb	15	48	Oct	27	Yes; honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TOTAL YEARS	TOTAL MONTHS	TOTAL DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

1 August 57
(DATE)

Jacques G. Richardson
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

______

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
5	8	12

12. TOTAL SERVICE: 5 8 12

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

16—66480-2

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Lorene E. Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Jacques G. Richardson
(Employee)
Jacques G. Richardson

Date: 9 August 1957

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 55-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 56

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

12C [illegible] 14C0
12-1

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON (First) Jacques (Middle) G.
2. THIS DATE 28 Dec 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☒ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☒ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA
☒ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED
☒ AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
GEHA - Health		✓			
Fed. Emp. Ins.		✓			

J Richardson
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:
CPB: RWSloan
SIGNATURE
I&CB:
SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

These forms were returned to me 17 Feb 55 in envelope. The forms have not been signed by the Insurance office indicating that individual did not report to that office. RWS

Per phone info from insurance office 21 Feb 55 P/R deductions are to start eff. 26 Feb 55 RWS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorr ation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB fil

(4)

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

14-00000

1-3688

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G2-AP

3 DEC 1954

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Director of Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: Deputy Director of Plans

- Jacques G. Richardson

1. I have received a letter from Major General Boniface Campbell, Commanding General, Army Intelligence Center, expressing appreciation for a presentation by Mr. [redacted] at Fort Holabird in October 1954. Mr. [redacted] also arranged for presentations by two other speakers at the Army Intelligence Center. A copy of General Campbell's letter is attached.

2. The remarks contained in this letter are a source of real satisfaction to me, and I take this opportunity to add my appreciation to that expressed by General Campbell.

Arthur G. Trudeau

ARTHUR G. T
Major Gen
A. C. of S

1 Incl
Cy ltr fr Gen
Campbell dtd
12 Nov 54

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1948)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 48, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA (Department or agency) OPC (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, Jacques Gabriel Richardson, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated ____________, 19____, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Jacques Gabriel Richardson
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13th day of July, A. D. 1950,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

Frank G. [illegible]
(Signature of officer)

[SEAL]

____
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—55100-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*: 8601 Old Bladensburg Rd Silver Spring Md.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*: Baltimore, Md.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON

(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 8601 Old Bladensburg Rd-SS-Md.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: SL-3783

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—[illegible]

ESPIONAGE

1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting national defense.—That (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defence, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section 6 of this title; or (b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or (d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal, book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years and may,

in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $10,000. (Sec. 1, Title I, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 217), as amended by sec. 1, act 28 March 1940 (54 Stat. 79; 50 U.S.C. 31)).

2. Unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense.—(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and (b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years. (Sec. 2, act 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 218; 50 U.S.C. 32)).

I have read and understand the provisions of the above.

[redacted]

Witness:

Joseph S. Riff
21 November 1949

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1947)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA	OPC	WASHINGTON, D. C.
(Department or agency)	(Bureau or division)	(Place of employment)

I, [redacted], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. SF-57, dated 1 October, 19 48, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

[redacted]

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of November, A. D. 19 49,

at Washington, (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Chief [illegible]
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*)

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: HARRIETTE D. [redacted]

(B) RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 7[illegible] S. LOYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA, VA.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: TE 8506

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(*Check one*)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO	10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS — ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?				NONE
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*				
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*				
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*				
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*				

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—53309-1

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(When Filled In)

1604 Curie

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

50.6102 QAB

THIS DATE: 7 August 1957 NOV

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
Box 888 APO 500
San Francisco, California

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
722 South Royal Street
Alexandria, Virginia

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Tokyo 2636-3928

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: DRISCOLL, Theodore Gotzian

2. RELATIONSHIP: Father-in-law

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 722 South Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Council of State Governments, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C.

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TEmple 6-8506

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: EXecutive 3-6715

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mr Henri A Richardson (Brother), 3039 Macomb Street NW, Washington, D.C. (EM-3-6093)

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS:

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last):

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE:

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country):

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country):

CODED
18 DEC 1957

7. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH:

9. CAUSE OF DEATH:

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased):

11. DATE OF BIRTH:

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country):

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY:

14. PLACE OF ENTRY:

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country):

16. DATE ACQUIRED:

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country):

18. OCCUPATION:

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers):

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444b 4-57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To - by month and year)

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Mme Henry Bit (pronounced Bee)	2. RELATIONSHIP Mother's aunt	3. AGE 65?
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES 27, avenue Edith Cavell, Nice, Alpes Maritimes, France		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country) France	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT About 3 times a year, by mail	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT May 1957
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) M. Felix Breton	2. RELATIONSHIP Mother's 2d cousin	3. AGE 70?
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES 13, rue Greneta, Paris III^e, France		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country) France	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT Once a year, by mail	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT Christmas, 1956
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

I have met each of the above relatives only once in my life.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

Annual dividends on modest investments in stocks, credit union, and cooperative.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Clarendon Trust Company,	Arlington 10, Virhinia

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
USA

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	XX	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Graduate School, Georgetown University	Int'l	Rel'ns	Jun 51	May 52	N o	n e	24 hours

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Am an experienced intelligence briefer.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

Member, British Interplanetary Society, London.
Associate member, American Astronautical Association, New York.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Nov 1949 - Oct 1951
2. GRADE: 7 - 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OPC/FE/3 - Desk intelligence officer
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: One to three
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Soviet desk officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Prepared, conjointly with OSO/FDS/FE, operational plans against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Oct 1951 - Dec 1953
2. GRADE: 12- 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR/5; deputy chief, then chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: up to 23
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Branch deputy chief, then Branch chief
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervised and directed SR plans and projects targeted against Soviet Far East.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Jan 1954 - Dec 1954
2. GRADE: 13
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR/COPS/DR - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 18
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief of special defector reception project
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Direct and supervise the reception, debriefing, intelligence exploitation, resettlement and legalization of two high level Soviet intelligence officers granted political asylum in the USA.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Feb 1955 - Mar 1956
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR - NA/SR Base, Tokyo - Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 22
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief of Base
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Direct and supervise field plans and projects based in Japan and Okinawa, targeted against Soviet Far Eastern targets.

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): Mar 1956 - Jun 1957
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SR - Tokyo Station Soviet Branch Deputy Chief
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Deputy chief of branch
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Assist Branch Chief in development and management of all Japan and Okinawa-based operations against USSR and Soviet Embassy, Tokyo.

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 2

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 3

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Harriette D. Richardson	Wife	1928		X	USA	Same as mine
Pamela A. Richardson	Daughter	1950		X	"	"
Michelle D. Richardson	"	1953		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED: 7 August 1956

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

37833

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: NOT Ext. APPLICABLE

Home: 40-7983

PRESENT ADDRESS 2908, ST. PAUL ST (St. & No.) - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST (St. & No.) - BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME JACK WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

Where? By Whose Authority

C. DATE OF BIRTH 20 JAN 1924 PLACE OF BIRTH BALTIMORE (City), MD (State), USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE?

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # NOT APPLICABLE ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS

FORM NO. 30-1
APR 1949

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? N/A

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 24 SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9½" WEIGHT 140

EYES BROWN HAIR BROWN COMPLEXION DARK SCARS FOREHEAD

BUILD SLENDER OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES NONE

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ________ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR SEPARATION, DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ________

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ________
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________
Date Date

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ________

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ St. & No. City State Country

---

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME JOHN (First) BENJAMIN (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 2906 ST. PAUL ST., BALTIMORE-18-MD-USA (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 21 NOV 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH CENTREVILLE, MARYLAND, USA (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? ______ City State Country

OCCUPATION AUTO DEALER LAST EMPLOYER EAST END AUTO CO- BALTIMORE

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 6505 PULASKI HWY, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. City State Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1915 (Date) TO 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY AVIATION

COUNTRY USA, GT. BRITAIN DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

XX

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME ADRIENNE (First) MARGUERITE (Middle) BIT (Last) RICHARDSON

LIVING OR DECEASED DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE 5 DEC 1947 CAUSE CANCER

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 3103 MILFORD AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 14 AUG 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH ROMANS, DRÔME, FRANCE

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? 1921 (?) WHERE? BALTO, MD, USA (City State Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOV. 1919 - NEW YORK

OCCUPATION MILLINERY BUYER LAST EMPLOYER EMPORIUM WORLD MILL'Y CO.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS UNKNOWN, CHICAGO, ILL, USA (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NONE TO ______ BRANCH OF SERVICE ______

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

NONE

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

DL 73452

1. FULL NAME HENRI ADRIEN RICHARDSON (First / Middle / Last) AGE 23

PRESENT ADDRESS 5724 SIMMONS AV, BALTIMORE, MD, USA - USA (St. & No. / City / State / Country / Citizenship)

2. FULL NAME ______ (First / Middle / Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country / Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME ______ (First / Middle / Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country / Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME ______ (First / Middle / Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country / Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME ______ (First / Middle / Last) AGE ______

PRESENT ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country / Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE (First / Middle / Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED ______ DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ______ (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______ (City / State / Country)

OCCUPATION ______ LAST EMPLOYER ______

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME NOT APPLICABLE
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ________ DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ________ PLACE OF BIRTH ________

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ WHEN ACQUIRED? ________ WHERE? ________
City State Country

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME HENRY BIT RELATIONSHIP GREAT-UNCLE AGE 65(?)

CITIZENSHIP FRENCH ADDRESS 27 RUE EDITH CAVELL, NICE, FRANCE
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME CHARLES GRANDGERARD RELATIONSHIP SECOND COUSIN AGE 55(?)

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS % OTIS ELEVATORS, BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11 RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME CMDR. ROBT LEE CLARK RELATIONSHIP COUSIN AGE 30

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS N.O.B., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

SEC. 12. EDUCATION DS #63

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL McDONOGH SCH ADDRESS PIKESVILLE, MD, USA (BALTIMORE, MD, USA) City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1930-34-37 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL LOYOLA HIGH, MONTREAL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1940 GRADUATE? YES

COLLEGE SIR GEO WILLIAMS COLL, ADDRESS MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1940-1942 DEGREE NONE

COLLEGE U OF MICHIGAN. ADDRESS ANN ARBOR, MICH, USA City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1945 (see P13) DEGREE B.A.

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

USA ARMY 1/LT FEB 1943-OCT 1945
Country Service Rank Dates of Service

GHQ FEC-TOKYO, JAPAN 0-937200 HONORABLE
Last Station Serial No Type of Discharge

REMARKS: WHILE ENLISTED, SERIAL WAS 31316266

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 5-A ADDRESS HARTFORD, CONN.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

SEC. 14. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

FROM 15 AUG 45 TO 30 SEP 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR KURT SPAULDING

(MILITARY) TITLE OF JOB LIAISON OFFICER SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; REPORTS COORDINATOR & WRITER

REASONS FOR LEAVING RETURN TO USA FOR SEPARATION FROM ARMY.

FROM 1 APR 45 TO 15 AUG 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT / ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 500 POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR VINCENT MERCOLA

TITLE OF JOB DEPUTY CHIEF, NEWS AGENCY SALARY $ 251 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Asst chief of principal Allied press censorship bureau in Japan.

REASONS FOR LEAVING CENSORSHIP SECTION ELIMINATED

FROM 1 NOV 46 TO 31 MAR 48

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY

ADDRESS CCD-GHQ-FEC APO 309-POSTMASTER-SAN FRANCISCO, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL CENSORSHIP NAME OF SUPERVISOR ROBT. SPAULDING

TITLE OF JOB CHIEF, CENSORSHIP SUB-STA SALARY $ 221 PER MONTH

YOUR DUTIES Operated field censorship surveillance detachment

REASONS FOR LEAVING TRANSFERRED TO HQ IN TOKYO

FROM 15 MAR 46 TO 15 AUG 46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY DEPT/ARMY

ADDRESS ARMY LANGUAGE SCHOOL (FT. SNELLING, MINN, USA / PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CAL, USA
St. & No. City State Country

(MILITARY) KIND OF BUSINESS CIVIL AFFAIRS TNG NAME OF SUPERVISOR YUTAKA MUNAKATA

TITLE OF JOB RESEARCH EDITOR SALARY $ ARMY PER SGT.

YOUR DUTIES REVISED ARMY MANUALS, PREPARED CIVIL AFFAIRS COURSES.

REASONS FOR LEAVING COMMISSIONED; TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN

FROM NOV 1941 TO JUL 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY T. EATON CO, LTD,

ADDRESS ST. CATHERINE ST, MONTREAL, QUE, CANADA
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS DEPT. STORE NAME OF SUPERVISOR E.T. CRAYDON

TITLE OF JOB PHOTOGRAPHIC SALESMAN SALARY $ 30 PER WEEK

YOUR DUTIES SOLD CAMERAS AND PHOTO SUPPLIES

REASONS FOR LEAVING WAS PART-TIME JOB ACCEPTED WHILE IN COLLEGE

8

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	CAPT. GORDON WALLACE	BUS ADD.	AIS-PRESIDIO	MONTEREY	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	2160 COOLEY.	PALO ALTO	CAL.
2.	MR. GEORGE MOORE	BUS. ADD.	U/CALIFORNIA	BERKELEY.	CAL.
		RES. ADD.	571 NORTH,	OAKLAND.	CAL.
3.	MR. JOHN CHEATHAM	BUS. ADD.	117 E. PATRICK	FREDERICK,	MD.
		RES. ADD.	101 E. CHURCH	FREDERICK,	MD.
4.	MR. T. G. DRISCOLL	BUS. ADD.	1151 K ST. NW	WASH.	DC.
		RES. ADD.	705 S. ROYAL	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
5.	MR. R. H. KUNZMAN	BUS ADD.	U.P. BUREAU	DES MOINES	IOWA
		RES. ADD.		UNK	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	MR. GEORGE FINNEY	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/AF	WASHINGTON	DC.
		RES. ADD.	2310 VALLEY DR.	ALEXANDRIA	VA.
2.	DR. MORRIS CRANE	BUS. ADD.	BALTIMORE AV	PHILADELPHIA	PA.
		RES. ADD.			
3.	MS. BRADFORD COOLIDGE	BUS. ADD.	DEPT/STATE	WASHINGTON	DC
		RES. ADD.			
4.	MISS FLORENCE [illegible]	BUS. ADD.		NONE	
		RES. ADD.	71 ARNOLDALE	W. HARTFORD,	CONN.
5.	MR. ANTHONY SAZ	BUS. ADD.		UNK	
		RES. ADD.	303 E. 21TH	BALTIMORE,	MD.

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. MR. FRANK DUCHARME BUS. ADD. TRAVELERS' INS. HARTFORD, CONN.
RES. ADD. 26 LILLEY W. HARTFORD, CONN.
2. MR. JAMES KNOX BUS. ADD. G. FOX CO. HARTFORD, CONN.
RES. ADD. UNK
3. MRS. LOUIS FRANKLIN BUS. ADD. ALBERT STEIGER HARTFORD, CONN.
RES. ADD. UNK

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS BALTIMORE NATIONAL BANK, HIGHLANDTOWN BRANCH, BALTIMORE, MD.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.
1. NAME LEE'S INC ADDRESS 3421 EASTERN AV, BALTIMORE, MD.
St. & No. City State
2. NAME MONTGOMERY WARD ADDRESS 2401 AV OAKLAND 16, CAL.
St. & No. City State
3. NAME ADDRESS
St. & No. City State

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 1933 TO 1937 3110 PRESSTMAN ST BALTIMORE - MD - USA
FROM 1937 TO 1939 4561 HARVARD AV - MONTREAL - QUE - CANADA
FROM 1939 TO 1942 1461 MOUNTAIN ST - MONTREAL - QUE - CANADA
FROM 1942 TO 1942 26 LILLEY RD - W. HARTFORD - CONN - USA
FROM 1942 TO 1942 MILITARY SERVICE
FROM 1948 TO PRESENT 2905 ST. PAUL ST - BALTIMORE, MD, USA
FROM TO
FROM TO
St. No. City State Country

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM JUN 1927 TO SEP 1927 PARIS FRANCE VISIT
FROM JUL 1924 TO JUL 1924 NIAGARA PENINSULA CANADA VISIT
FROM SEP 1937 TO JUL 1942 MONTREAL CANADA RESIDENCE
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM OCT 1944 TO JAN 1945 NORTHERN EUROPE (City or Section) WAR SERVICE (Country) (Purpose)

FROM SEP 1946 TO OCT 1948 TOKYO, SENDAI (City or Section) JAPAN (Country) MIL. OCCUPATION (Purpose)

FROM ______ TO ______ (City or Section) (Country) (Purpose)

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: UNKNOWN

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? NONE GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ______

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ______

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

✓ 1. AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (MEMBER AT LARGE) (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: NOV 1945 - JAN 1948

2. RESERVE OFFICERS ASS'N (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) WASHINGTON (City) DC (State) USA (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: OCT 1948 - PRESENT

3. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

4. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

5. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

6. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

7. ______ (Name and Chapter) (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE JAPANESE SPEAK FLUENT READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FLUENT READ FLUENT WRITE FLUENT

LANGUAGE ________ SPEAK ________ READ ________ WRITE ________

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

SWIMMING, SKIING, HORSEMANSHIP, FOOTBALL - GOOD.
BASEBALL, ICE HOCKEY, LACROSSE, VOLLEYBALL, BADMINTON - FAIR,
PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCESSES - STRONG AMATEUR INTEREST.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

HAVE AN ABILITY TO WRITE, EITHER REPORTORIAL OR EDITORIAL, WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR RESEARCH OR SPECIAL REPORTS WRITING.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

NONE OTHER THAN DEPT OF ARMY FOR COMMISSION AS OFFICER.

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAMES OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV, WAR DEPT, + FBI CONDUCTED LOYALTY CHECK SOMETIME BETWEEN FEB 1947 AND JUN 1947.

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ______

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? OCCASIONAL WINES AND LIQUOR

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME JOHN B. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS 2908 ST. PAUL ST, BALTIMORE MD USA
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA (City and State) DATE 25 NOV 1948

Henriette C. Driscoll (Witness) Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. - I HAVE NEVER HELD A FULL-TIME CIVILIAN JOB, SINCE I ENTERED THE ARMY DIRECTLY FROM COLLEGE.

19. - I HAVE NEVER BOUGHT ANYTHING ON CREDIT. THEREFORE, I HAVE LISTED THREE CONCERNS WITH WHICH I HAVE TRANSACTED NORMAL BUSINESS.

12. - I ACQUIRED SUFFICIENT CREDITS FROM THE ARMY JAPANESE SCHOOL AT THE U OF MICHIGAN TO RECEIVE A B.A DEGREE, IN ABSENTIA, WHILE STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

FROM SEP 1942 TO DEC 1942 I COMPLETED ONE SEMESTER AT TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONN.

Jacques G. Richardson

Note: information contained herein is supplemental.

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ____ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ JACQUES (First) GABRIEL (Middle) RICHARDSON (Last)

Telephone: Office: VE-4810 Ext. 13 Home: ____

PRESENT ADDRESS ____ St. & No. ____ City ____ State ____ Country

PERMANENT ADDRESS ____ St. & No. ____ City ____ State ____ Country

B. NICKNAME ____ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ____

____ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ____

HOW LONG? ____ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ____

____ Where? ____ By What Authority

C. DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____ City ____ State ____ Country

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ____ Country BY BIRTH? ____ BY MARRIAGE? ____

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # ____ ISSUED ____ Date BY ____ Court

AT ____ City ____ State ____ Country

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ____ Yes or No ____ Country

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ____ TO ____ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ____ Country

GIVE PARTICULARS ____

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ____ GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ________

PORT OF ENTRY? ________ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ________

LAST U.S. VISA ________ Number ________ Type ________ Place of Issue ________ Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE ________ SEX ________ HEIGHT ________ WEIGHT ________

EYES ________ HAIR ________ COMPLEXION ________ SCARS ________

BUILD ________ OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ________

X SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ________ MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED ________ WIDOWED ________

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ________

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE — INCLUDE ANNULMENTS — USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE HARRIETTE McCLURE DRISCOLL RICHARDSON (First / Middle / Maiden / Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ALEXANDRIA, VA; 25 JUN 1949

~~HIS (OR~~ HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 705 S. ROYAL ST., ALEXANDRIA VA. (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE RD., ESSEX, MD. (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 19 JUN 28 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. (City / State / Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City / State / Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS — (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM — (Date) TO — (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE —

COUNTRY — DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ________

OCCUPATION ________ LAST EMPLOYER ________

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ________ TO ________ BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

____

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME ________ AGE ________
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME ________ AGE ________
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME ________ AGE ________
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME ________ AGE ________
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME ________ AGE ________
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS ________
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

× SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME THEODORE GOTZIAN DRISCOLL
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 14 OCT 92 PLACE OF BIRTH ST. PAUL, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

____

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? —
City State Country

OCCUPATION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR LAST EMPLOYER COUNCIL OF STATE GOVTS., 1737 "K" ST, NW, WASH DC.

X SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME HARRIETTE (First) BELL (Middle) CASWELL DRISCOLL (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 705 S. ROYAL ST, ALEXANDRIA, VA (St. & No. City State Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 13 APR 00 PLACE OF BIRTH MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP — WHEN ACQUIRED? — WHERE? — (City State Country)

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER —

X SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State Country)
2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State Country)
3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State Country)

X SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME NONE, other than mine RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________
2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________
3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. & No. City State)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ________

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: ______

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? ______ IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? ______

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: ______

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

×SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME MRS. J. G. RICHARDSON RELATIONSHIP WIFE

ADDRESS 1619 DOOLITTLE ROAD, ESSEX, MD.
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

X SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Baltimore, Maryland (City and State) DATE Oct 18 49

Sylvia F. Chaillou (Witness)

Jacques G. Richardson (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

14. Since August 29, 1949, I have been employed as Administrative Assistant to the Director of Planning, Housing Authority of Baltimore City, at the salary range of $3,100 - $3,900.

14-00000

MILITARY RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

RICHARDSON, JACQUES G.	0 937 200	1ST LT	INF	ORC
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE *	27 OCT 48	SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON		
2908 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET, BALTIMORE 18, MARYLAND	20 JAN 24	BALTIMORE, MARYLAND		
SEE 9	BROWN	BROWN	5'10"	145	0

X X X STUDENT, COLLEGE X-02

MILITARY HISTORY

X 5 A HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 1625 RICKENBACKER ROAD, ESSEX 21, MARYLAND

27 JUN 46 (PRESS) CENSORSHIP OFFICER 9335

NONE

WW II VICTORY MEDAL; OCCUPATION, JAPAN

NONE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE LANGUAGE SCHOOL, FT SNELLING, MINN.	12 SEP 46	JAPAN	25 SEP 46
RR 1-1	9 OCT 48	USA	23 OCT 48

0 2 19 2 1 12 8 1 5

INSURANCE NOTICE

X X 31 OCT 48 30 NOV 48. 6.50 X

*SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
LAPEL BUTTON ISSUED

Jacques G. Richardson

ALVIN R BARNETT
CAPT USAF

Army of the United States

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that

JACQUES G. RICHARDSON 0 937 200 1ST LT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

honorably served in active Federal Service in the Army of the United States from

27 JUN 46 *to* 27 OCT 48

Given at SEPARATION CENTER, FORT LAWTON, WASHINGTON

on the 27 *day of* OCTOBER *19*48

Thomas B Hammond
THOMAS B HAMMOND
MAJOR AGD



ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION

HONORABLE DISCHARGE



Army of the United States

Honorable Discharge

This is to certify that

Army of the United States

is hereby Honorably Discharged from the military service of the United States of America.

This certificate is awarded as a testimonial of Honest and Faithful Service to this country.

Given at

Date

copy copy

STANDARD FORM 57--NOV. 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOY NT

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent del in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admi n card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR
CIG

2 OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)
As required.

4 DATE OF THIS APPLICATION

5 ~~Mr.~~ (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER
1620 Rickenbacker Road, Mars Est.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE
Essex 21, Maryland

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State)
Maryland

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE

(B) HOME PHONE

9 DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)
January 20,1924

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country)
Baltimore, Maryland

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 10 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 145 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE
Second Lt.,16 July 1946

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR.
☐ NON-APPOR.

MATERIAL
☐ SUBMITTED
☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15 (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,750 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

WAR DEPARTMENT

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

15. CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Nov.1941 TO: Jul 1942

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Salesman*

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 25 PER Wk
FINAL $ 30 PER Wk

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Fred T. Clayton

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): T.Eaton Co. Ltd.,Montreal

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Retail Department Store

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: Return to USA

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Salesman of all types photographic materials and equipment;demonstrator, all types black-and-white and color motion picture equipment.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: Oct. 1940 TO: Jun 1941

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Photographic technician*

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 20 PER Wk
FINAL $ 25 PER Wk

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Montreal, Quebec

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Harry Jacoby

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Jacoby,Photographers Crescent St,Montreal

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Portrait photographers

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: Desire of more interesting work.

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Darkroom apprentice, copier, equipment maintenance.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO:

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

*Please Note: The t[illegible]ositions listed were part-time [illegible]bs only, while the applicant was a college student. I have never applied for, nor held, a full-time civilian position.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFIED GRADE (if Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)	NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU	REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 59) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
Jan.45	Dec.45	Ann Arbor, Michigan AIJLC, U.of Michigan	Japanese language, customs, sociology, how-and why of Japan's history and economic aggression. Written Japanese. (Continued)

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 [✓ 12]

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:

☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

High School of Montreal

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

English, French, physics, history.

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Sir Geo Williams College	Fren	Sep 40	May 42	2				66
Trinity College, Conn.	Fren	Sep 42	Dec 42	½				12
U. Michigan, Ann Arbor	Jap	Jan 45	Dec 45	1		B.	Feb 47	45

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
French	15		
English	12		
Japanese	24		

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT
USAFI	Journalism	Apr 47	Pres		

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTNG EXC.	UNDERSTNG GOOD	UNDERSTNG FAIR
Japanese		x		x				x	
French	x			x			x		

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR):

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

France: 3 mos, 1927; 3 mos. 1944
Canada: 5 yrs, 1937-1942 Japan 1 yr

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

All cine equipt; teletypes; short-wave-receivers & transmitters.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Public relations as interpreter in ETO and Japan. Censor and review-editor of Japanese press, radio and motion-picture fields.

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Col Kai E. Rasmussen	(Washington 25 DC) Diplomatic Sec, [illegible] Dept, GS	Mil Attache
2. Mr. Yutaka Munakata	Presidio of Monterey, Academic Sec, MISLS, Calif.	Instructor
3. Lt. L.B. McNeill	1928 McKinley Ave, Honolulu, T.H.	CIC

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF, OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*	X	
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
15 Feb 1943	Present
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army	31216266; 0-927200

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*	—	X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
33	Hernia, inguinal - repairable.		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT ....

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—63040-1

JACQUES GABRIEL RICHARDSON

17. MILITARY TRAINING (continued)

Rating received at end of this training: Tec 4
Duty assignment or rating after this training: Assignment to MISLS.
Dates of duty assignment: Jan 1946 to Aug. 1946

Second Special Service School attended: MISLS, Fort Snelling, Minn.
Location: Fort Snelling, 11, Minnesota
Dates Attended: Jan 1946 To: Aug. 1946
Rating received at end of this training: Second Lieutenant
What were you taught in Second Special Service School? Order of battle, military terms of the Japanese armed forces.
Civil affairs, military administration of occupied areas, propaganda writing.
Duty assignment after this training: Student; translator: instructor.
What did you do during this duty assignment? Translated newspaper articles, ordinances, SCAP directives, etc. flown from Japan. Made instructor's guides for civil affairs courses.

SECRET

Date: 13 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division/Office of Security

SUBJECT : Richardson [illegible] [redacted] (P): Your Number 37833

1. In compliance with paragraph four (4) of your latest memorandum, subject as above, clearance to cover the following proposed change in Subject's status and/or use is hereby requested:

Ops Officer	Position Title	Ops Officer
GS-15	Grade	GS-15
DDP/SR Foreign Field Western European Area Paris, France	Orgn Designation	DDP/WE Paris Station External Ops Station
Paris, France	Headquarters	Paris, France

2. Changes other than specified above:

3. The proposed effective date of this change is: 13 October 1963.

Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Date 18 OCT 1963
Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When filled in)

DATE: 31 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Staff Agents Branch

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT : [illegible] [redacted] #37833

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 24 July 1962 in which a covert security clearance was requested to permit Subject's use as a Staff Agent, GS-14, by DDP/SR in the capacity of Operations Officer at Paris, France.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

4. This clearance becomes invalid in the event that Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne

SECRET
(When filled in)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT - (Appendix I)

Listed below are names of organizations identified by the Attorney General under his responsibility pursuant to Executive Order 9835, dated 21 March 1947, to list the names of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which he, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Each applicant must review the following list of organizations for certification purposes, and signature on the last page.

Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
The American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Croatian Congress
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy, successor to American League Against War and Fascism and predecessor of American Peace Mobilization
American Patriots, Inc.
American Peace Mobilization.
American Polish Labor Council
American Russian Institute of San Francisco
American Slav Congress
American Youth Congress
American Youth for Democracy
Armenian Progressive League of America
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
Black Dragon Society
California Labor School, Inc., 216 Market Street, San Francisco, California
Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent, also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women
Central Japanese Association (Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
The Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance (Deutsche-Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
The Citizens Protective League
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations and branches.

The Columbians
Communist Party, U.S.A., formerly Communist Political Association, and its affiliates and committees, including:
    Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City)
    Committee to Aid the Fighting South
    Dennis Defense Committee
    Labor Research Association, Inc.
    Southern Negro Youth Congress
    United May Day Committee
    United Negro and Allied Veterans of America
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Dante Alighieri Society
Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U.S.A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America)
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
Friends of the Soviet Union and its successor American Council on Soviet Relations, both predecessors of the National Council of American Soviet Friendship
George Washington Carver School, New York City
German-American Bund (Amerikadeutscher Volksbund)
The German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufsgemeinschaft)
Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki Gimusha Kai, Zaibei Nihonjin, Heiyaku Gimusha Kai, and Zaibei Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association)
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society - a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoko Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, including People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)

Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Peoples Committee
Jikyoku Iin Kai (Current Affairs Association)
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of
  Japanese Ancestry who have returned to America after
  studying in Japan)
Ku Klux Klan
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League
  (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship
  (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
League of American Writers
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)
Macedonian-American People's League
Mario Morgantini Circle
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends
  Group or Southern California War Veterans)
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
Northwest Japanese Association
Ohio School of Social Sciences
The Peace Movement of Ethiopia
Peoples Educational Association (Incorporated under
  name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.), also
  known as Peoples Educational Center, Peoples University,
  People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Proletarian Party of America
Protestant War Veterans of the U.S., Inc.
Revolutionary Workers League
Sakura Kai (Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association -
  composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War)
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Shinto Temples

Silver Shirt Legion of America
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Suiko Sha (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Book Shop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
Young Communist League

I certify that I have read the names of the above-listed organizations, and that I am not, nor have I been, a member of; that I have not contributed to, received literature from, or attended meetings of any organization listed, except as indicated and explained below:

(Organization) (Dates of Membership)

Remarks:

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C. (City and State)

DATE 11 January 1949

Kenneth W. Doyle (Witness)

Jacques L. Richardson (Signature)

I.D.2. (Address)

FORM NO. 38-1A
AUG 1948

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXX

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Deputy Personnel Officer
Date: 10 June 1949

From : Chief of Inspection and Security
Number: 37833

Subject: **RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel**

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Your memorandum dated 14 March 1949 stated Subject is an applicant for OPC.

AC 17 July 53

ERNAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Branch notified 14 June cd

XXXXXXXXXXXX

SECRET

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HIDALGO, B.A.
CP FILE

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: PERSONAL MATERIAL & SENSITIVE OPS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
9-6-78	9/9/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Personal - Post agency
activity

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED
26 FEBRUARY 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630 ✓	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, BA[illegible]S N. JR. ✓		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT (DISABILITY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT DISABILITY SYSTEM		4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 28 YEAR 70	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6 FUNDS ▶	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 0235 0620
		8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel) [illegible] 243 [illegible] 2.31	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION		10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12 POSITION NUMBER 1318	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D.
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17 SALARY OR RATE $15,173 ✓

18 REMARKS
[illegible] 27 Feb 70

SUBJECT HAS SIGNED WAIVER FOR SICK AND excess ANNUAL LEAVE ACCUMULATING AFTER 28 FEBRUARY 1970.

Not Recommend in Agency Reserve Program due to Health
[illegible] for [illegible]
[illegible] 27 Feb 70
WH/PERS

1 - FINANCE

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL HENRY L. BERTHOLD, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 26 Feb 70	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 27 Feb 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 45	20 EMPLOY CODE 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOTERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO 05 DA 27 YR 19	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 MTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-ORGN 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA ▶		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVER 1-YES HEALTH INS CODE			40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS		44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 03-04-70 MR		46 C.P. APPROVAL			DATE APPROVED 3/4/70			

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

EMPLOYEE NOTICE OF RESIGNATION

I RESIGN EFFECTIVE ______________________ FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON
(Date)

MAR 2 [illegible] '70

MY LAST WORKING DAY WILL BE—	DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING SALARY CHECKS AND BONDS, TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Zip Code)

403 Shires Creek Rd.
Rockville, Maryland 20851

INSTRUCTIONS

Items 1 thru 7 and Items 9 thru 18a — The initiating office should fill in each of the referenced items. Items 3 thru 7 and 9 thru 18 require information which pertains *only* to the action requested, and NOT to the current status of the employee unless specific items remain unchanged.

Item 5 — "Category of Employment" should show one of the following entries:

Regular	Summer	WAE
Part Time	Detail Out	Consultant
Temporary	Detail In	Military
Temporary-Part Time		

Item 9 — "Organizational Designations" should show *all* levels of organization pertinent to identifying the location of the position:

FIRST LINE
- Major Component *(Director, Deputy Director, etc.)*
  - Office, Major Staff, etc.
- Foreign Field or U.S. Field *(if pertinent)*
  - Division or Staff *(subordinate to first line)*
    - Branch
      - Section
        - Unit

Items 11 and 15 — "Position Title" and "Occupational Series" should be the standard abbreviated title and corresponding occupational series in Handbook of Official Occupational Titles and Codes for the duties actually to be performed by the employee. If different from the title and series of the position occupied as shown on the most current edition of the Position Control Register or Form 261, Staffing Complement Change Authorization, explain under Item 18—Remarks.

Item 18b — Signature should be that of the official authorized to approve for the Career Service to which the employee belongs. If more than one Career Service is involved, *the gaining Career Service should approve* and the other Career Service should concur in Item 18, Remarks.

ROUTING— The original only of this form will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel *through* the appropriate Career Service official(s). In the case of requests specified in HB 20-800-1, which require advance approval of or notification to the Office of Security or the Office of Finance, one copy only will be sent to the Office(s) concerned.

SECRET

MEDICAL

25 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.

SUBJECT : Exceptional Service Emblem

1. Your request for consideration to receive the Exceptional Service Emblem has been reviewed by this office to determine your eligibility for the award. With considerable regret, I must concur in the assessment that the injuries you suffered in the line of duty do not fall under the special criteria governing award of the Exceptional Service Emblem. Hazardous duties, in the meaning of the governing regulation, relate to duties performed in areas in which internal strife, civil disturbances or hostile action by armed forces or persons unfriendly to the United States were present at the time the injury was incurred, or, relate to duties performed in an assignment defined as hazardous due to unusual geographic or other natural conditions.

2. You may be sure that this decision has been based upon thoughtful deliberation. Please accept my personal thanks for a job well done under difficult conditions.

Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - C/WH/Pers
1 - OPF/Hidalgo
1 - D/Pers
2 - BSD/HMAB

S E C R E T

24 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Balmes N. Hidalgo

VIA : WH/RMO

SUBJECT : Records Officer Appointment

1. In accordance with a request received from your component, you are hereby appointed a Records Officer in the Clandestine Services. Your functions are described, in summary, in CSI 70-1, Para. 4.d. You have also participated in a training course in which these functions were reviewed in some detail.

2. The essence of your appointment is that you now occupy a position of trust in which you are expected to draw on your knowledge and experience to exercise responsible and sound judgment in building and maintaining a professionally useful records system in the Clandestine Services. You are, at the same time, expected to train and guide others within your component in these respects.

3. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder.

EAMarelius

EDWARD A. MARELIUS
DDP Records Management Officer

cc: Personnel File of Addressee

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S E C R E T

SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL

1968

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(38-107)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 August 1966

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, B[redacted] N., JR.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 14 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235-0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HQTRS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE | 39 FEGLI (CODE, 0—WAIVED, 1—YES) HEALTH INSURANCE, HEALTH INS CODE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA, CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-16-66

46 O P APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 26 Jul 1966

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
3-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 DECEMBER 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, BALMES N.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH DEC DAY 19 YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 - 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DOP/WH
BRANCH 2
PANAMA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (GS-12)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1318
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10,987
18. REMARKS:

FROM: WH/C/MIAMI OPS BR/FI SECTION/5235 - 1162/1145/WASHINGTON, D. C.

Recorded by
CSPD
&J

1 - FINANCE

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED: 13 Dec 65
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROUTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
57	11	5730	WH	2573					

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO, DA, YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 12/15/65

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE

X VOUCHERED
UNVOUCHERED

NAME (Last, First, Middle): HIDALGO B. N. Jr

SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

OFFICE (and division): DDP/WH

ORIGINAL
X CORRECTION

LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE: 02-11-52

THIS DATE: 12-13-65

SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel):

FORM 11-58 171a

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 [illegible] 1964

1 SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]7030

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], [redacted] [illegible], Jr.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: [illegible]

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 1 YEAR 64

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

6 FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]235-1162

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Operations Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0[illegible]7

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)

17 SALARY OR RATE: $10,250

18 REMARKS:
From: DDP/SAS/CS/S Pos.[illegible] Reg 43G

Security [illegible] 10/28/64
CCy 11/2/64

Recorded by
CSPD
CL

[illegible]

[illegible] of Security

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [illegible], C/[illegible]/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 10/29/64

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: A. B[illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 10-30-64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 49150 ALPHABETIC SAS
22 STATION CODE: 75623
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOOTBS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 27 YR 19
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: LAB RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sup Dir[illegible] (2)
[illegible] 11/2/64

46 O.P. APPROVAL: A. B[illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 10-30-64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXF

DATE PREPARED	9 April 196[illegible]		
1. SERIAL NUMBER 027[illegible]3[illegible]	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]IDALGO, B. N. Jr.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT ([illegible])	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 04 DAY 26 YEAR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4232-1000-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP Special Affairs Staff CS/CS Development Complement	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER ~~XXXX~~ [illegible]	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 (1)	17. SALARY OR RATE $9980.

43
F

Recorded by
CSPD
[illegible]

18. REMARKS * 0 [illegible]

~~[illegible]~~.

*For ~~medical reasons. Not to exceed one year.~~

For duration of period that the individual is on sick leave; not to exceed one year.
[illegible] for CSCS

3/5/9

1 cy Payroll;
1 cy Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Orrill C. Dawson ORRILL C. DAWSON, [illegible]	9 April 64		13 Apr 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
13	10	49497	SAS	75013		1	05 [illegible] 19	12 22 63	12 24 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
			1					00060	[illegible]

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0-WAIVED 1-YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
[illegible]		[illegible] [illegible] 40	[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]		2	1			-

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE
1		4		C	0			-	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
[illegible] 4/27/64		13 Apr 64

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 April 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 021630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] Hidalgo B. [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 23 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0031
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9980
18. REMARKS:

Recorded by
CSD
[illegible]

1 cy Security
1 cy Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Orville C. Dawson
ORVILLE C. DAWSON, WH/SA/Pers.
DATE SIGNED: 9 April 64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS CODE: 2
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 5 DA 27 YR 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: [illegible]
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 4/27/64
46. C.O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
HIDALGO, BALMES N.	[illegible] self	60-264

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 30 May 1963. Broken left foot.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 | DAY 28 | YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3132-2001-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section

3A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0732
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (4)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8840
18. REMARKS:

P - 359

Recorded by CSPD

1 cy Security

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Louis W. Armstrong LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Pers.	DATE SIGNED 18 Apr 63	19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER D McCollin	DATE SIGNED 11-4-63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61770 ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 99499	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VETERANS CODE 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH 05 | 27 | 19	26. DATE OF GRADE [illegible] | 17 | 58	27. DATE OF LEI 9 | [illegible] | 62
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSR 2 = FICA 3 = NONE CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECT. INCUMBENCY AT OR DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO. 27630	34. SEX M	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE [illegible] 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE 07 | [illegible]	37. LONG. COMP. DATE [illegible] | 7 | 5[illegible]	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAREER PROV./TEMP CODE 2	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. X		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. CLEARANCE CODE 8	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE 1 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT. STATE CODE					

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: W. Kearney 4/22/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Bagnell

DATE APPROVED: 19 Apr 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XAF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): HIDALGO, [redacted] N., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 27 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3232-1000-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
FI/CI Branch

2
A

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0682

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 8840

18. REMARKS

Recorded by
CSPD

1 cy Security

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG, C/SAS/Eops.

DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

24.: 1

25.: 05 27 19

FOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

44. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 19 Apr 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

RZR: 25 APR 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 27 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0682	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 8840

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition
11-62

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 December 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 22 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4132-2001-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Special Affairs Staff
U. S. Field
Forward Operations Station - JMWAVE
CI Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (D)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0731

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS (D)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 (1)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 9475

18. REMARKS

RECEIVED BY
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ORVILLE C. DAWSON, C/SAS/Pers.

DATE SIGNED: 12/11/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 12-16-63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22

20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 1C

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 49730 ALPHABETIC SAS

22. STATION CODE: 99930

26. DATE OF GRADE: 12 22 63

27. DATE OF LEI: 12 22 63

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

44. C.P. APPROVAL: Kagan

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: C27630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [illegible], Alla [illegible], Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 20 | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP
Task Force W
FI-CI Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0792
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $9?40

2
A

18. REMARKS
From: DDP/WE/PI [illegible] Tray 1

Recorded By
CSPD

CONCURRENCE: [illegible]
(Phillip C. [illegible], WE/Pers.Off.

11/20

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Louis W. Armstrong [illegible], C/FI/[illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 6 Nov 62
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 61300 | ALPHABETIC TFW
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MOTORS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 5 | DA. 27 | YR. 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC | 3 - FICA | 5 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE | 1 - 5 PT. | 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV | PROV/TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED | 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE | 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE | 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) | 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T.P. Kearney 11/19/62
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [illegible]
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ø No.
HIDALGO, BALMES H. JR.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 1 DAY 12 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2235 1000 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
SECTION A
PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: BR-641

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $8,080

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/4/FI-CI/#681

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: P. C. Bowers
P. C. BOWERS C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: R. K. Reedy

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. MONTHS
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.: 05 27 19
26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT 2 = 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED 1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1/16/62

46. C.P. APPROVAL: R. K. Reedy

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(41)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 August 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER	027630
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	HIDALGO, B. H., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT (And Transfer to Vouchered Funds)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 09 · DAY 20 · YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V · ☐ V TO CF · ☒ CF TO V · ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2635-5000-8021
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Div. Branch 4 PI-CI Sec.
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER (D)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0681
12A. PCB CONTROL NO.	
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS (12)
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	11 (3)
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 8,080

3

18. REMARKS

From: DDP/WH, Br. 4, #0626

RS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Herbert V. Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL, Ch/WH/4/Pers. HVJ

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: DK Reedy

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODE NO. NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	60452	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: T. Kearney 08/1/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: DK Reedy

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, BALMES N., JR.	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. Da. Yr.	
7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code

2 |

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS/OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	Code	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	17. Position Title INSTRUCTOR OPERATIONS	18. Position No. 1014	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1711.50

21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 59	25. PSI Due Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 61	26. Appropriation Number 0175-2533

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 17	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 26 Yr. 60	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

3A

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 4	Code 417	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code 1	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. BA-626	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 11 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7270	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 0135 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P. C. BOWERS WH/PERSONNEL OFFICER	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Elmer R. Wingrove 17 June 60 ELMER R. WINGROVE PERSONNEL OFFICER
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ex.) JOHN WASHINKO X8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		6-21-60	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		6-23-60	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		6-23-60

Remarks

6/21/60

6/24/60

6-22-60

2 copies to Security. 1 Loss Notice.

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 5 Da 20 Yr 59	V. to V	XX V to UV	UV to V	UV to UV	
1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	3. Date of Birth Mo 5 Da 27 Yr 19	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

3

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field	Dept-Usfld-Frgn- D	Code	17. Position Title Area Ops Officer	18. Position No. 0486	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.01					
21. Grade & Step 11 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7,030	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 17 Yr 58	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 20 Yr 59	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment + Transfer to Confidential funds	05	Mo 06 Da 14 Yr 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

2

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/OTR Operations School Covert Training	1172	Washington, D. C.	75063

33. Dept.-Field	Dept-Usfld-Frgn- D	Code 3	34. Position Title Instructor Operations	35. Position No. 1014	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 1711.50					
38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7,030	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number 9-7500-30-018

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Mr. Glen Moorhouse, C/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Mr. Elmer R. Wingrove, x-3078

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Elmer R. Wingrove MATTHEW BAIRD Director of Training

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		June 59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		11 JUN 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	C. Powell	11 JUN 1959

Remarks

One copy forwarded to UNVOUCHERED Payroll. Two copies forwarded to Security.

Recorded by
CSPD

WH/FCR

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI

SECRET

Security Approval [illegible] Pers. SD/OS 6/17/59

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[redacted]

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	DATE OF BIRTH	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER
HIDALGO, Balmes	Unk	58-112

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 1 Oct 57.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BCD REPRESENTATIVE
24 Sept 58	

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM NO. 1076
1 SEP 56

14-21

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

E-2266

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

2 Mar 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo	Da	Yr	
127622	MR. BALMES N. HIDALGO, Jr.	5	27	19		1	M	2	17	58	
7. SCD Mo	Da	Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo	Da	Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo / Da / Yr
7	16	46		1	50 USCA 403 J	3	13	58		1	~~2~~

13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

3/17/58

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field: Dept - Ufld - Frgn - / Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv. / 20. Occup. Series
21. Grade & Step / 22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr; 25. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
$			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Excepted Appointment	13	3 / 17 / 58	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/WH Branch III Central America Section	4613	Washington, D.C.	

33. Dept.- Field: Dept - Ufld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept - x		Area Ops Officer	# BA-486-11	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo	Da	Yr	42. PSI Due Mo	Da	Yr	43. Appropriation Number
11-1	$ 6390	D	3	17	58	9	20	59	8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P.C. BOWERS WH Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext)
JOHN WASHINKO X 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		3/17/58	D. Placement		3/14/58
B. Pos. Control		3/17/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert [illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] MAR 1958

Remarks
Subject is presently engaged as a Contract Employee with the WH Division.
# For slotting purposes Only.

Approved for DDP purposes
SSA

FORM 1152a
5-57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER 9

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 May 1919
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 July 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment; promotion, separation, etc.*): Excepted Appointment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
		8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I. O. (FI) BAF-277
		9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11, $6390.00 p.a. OK
		10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Panama City, Panama
		11. HEADQUARTERS	
	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject is presently a contract employee with Project HYPOTHESIS.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): C/WH
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): P. C. Bowers, x3692
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD:D 9/26

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 6-3525-56-051	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Ofz	3 Aug 55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	7-20	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Robert A. Stone, Jr. 7/28

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 027630	CODE 16 Jul 1976			
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Nov 1919	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 18 Feb 1952	
6. MARITAL STATUS Remarried	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclude employee) NO. 2	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1914 1892	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA Puerto Rico NA	
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP Mar 1961	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. APPT. Jul 1967	QUAL. FOR Dept Only	EVAL. FOR TDY O/S
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 / TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 / RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1958	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT
1940-43 Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45 Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47 Francis H. Leggett Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49 Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50 Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51 American Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951-52 Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION High School Graduate
1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U None (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING
1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng, Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt
1966 Undetermined Entry (Cert)

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS					Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala					
Jun 1959	Instructor (Ops)	1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE
					" " " " " " "	"
Dec 1963	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CS/CS Dev Comp	Hq
Apr 1964	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/SAS/CI Staff/Ops	"
Nov 1964	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH/C/Miami Ops Br	"
May 1965	" "	0136.01	12	D		"
Dec 1965	" "	0136.01	12	D	DDP/WH-2/Panama	

20. DATE REVIEWED 22 Jun 19[illegible]	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]/obs	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 9 Feb 1960

FORM 6-67 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET PROFILE (c)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 027630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, B. N., Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1968 from TSD/AP/CAS for the postal intercept exemplars which are invaluable to that office.

27. DATE REVIEWED 23 Jun 1969	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/obs

FORM NO. 1 FEB 57 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1003 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Hidalgo Balmes N.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION HQS	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 - 31 December 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Panama Desk Case Officer for Panama City Station FI operations. Prepares cables and dispatches to Panama City and other Stations and internal Headquarters correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts required coordination with other offices within the agency.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises and/or maintains files and regulates indexing relating to his cases.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Hidalgo is a man of unusual background even in our unusual organization. This background undoubtedly affords him qualifications for our work, but nevertheless, on the professional level he suffers from disadvantages as well--overcoming some but not others. He is not well-educated in a formal sense, and in our world of words is not adequately equipped to prepare finished written correspondence. He has difficulty in organizing his work systematically, thus at times, giving an impression that the preparation has not been thorough--which might not really have been true.

On the other hand, Mr. Hidalgo has the advantage of native fluency in Spanish and an obvious understanding of the Latin thinking process and culture. He is broadly experienced in operations, not only as a case officer but as an actual agent himself, having served four years as a Bureau penetration of the CPUSA. He is operationally imaginative and unquestionably possesses the ingenuity and courage to translate ideas into action. In this respect, however, his efforts must be channeled and selectivity exercised. On the Panama Desk this officer provides the valuable service of operational history and continuity; he served six years in the Station and has been on the desk for three.

Continued

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 9 Jan 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 January 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/2/P	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Thomas Doolittle
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is an experienced and well qualified operations officer, and it is indeed unfortunate that there are medical problems which do not allow him to be assigned overseas. Since Mr. Hidalgo cannot be assigned overseas, I too endorse his desire to be assigned to OTR or to another assignment of his choice.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 JAN 1969	C/WH/2	Edwin M. Terrell Edwin M. Terrell

SECRET

SECTION C Continued

Hidalgo, Balmes N.

Mr. Hidalgo is a gregarious uncomplicated person, generally pleasant, and generous in his instincts--but not entirely without his quixotic side--and one whose natural Latin emotionality has been intensified by a life of experiences outside the norm, e.g. years as a CP penetration, air crashes, war wounds, etc.

This officer is aware that his intellectual background and medical debilities are obstructions to his advance. Understandably, he has developed outside interests, apparently as compensation. Expectedly, his attitudes at times so reflect.

In sum, Mr. Hidalgo serves a satisfactory function on the Panama Desk and no doubt could continue to perform so indefinitely, but in view of his limitations in a desk-bound situation and the medical restrictions, both of which will continue to inhibit his advance in his present component, this supervisor endorses Mr. Hidalgo's desire to be considered for transfer to another component, namely OTR (specifically covert training), where his attributes would likely come more directly into play. He has the operational experience, competency in a foreign language, an outgoing personality, and experience in lecturing and teaching.* Finally, regardless of the shortcomings reflected in this evaluation, the grading officer finds much to admire in Mr. Hidalgo personally.

*Should a suitable opening in that field be unavailable, it is felt there would be merit also in considering Mr. Hidalgo's other stated interests, i.e., the technical interrogation section of the Office of Security or OO Contacts Division.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/2		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) [illegible] 12-66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for all FI/CI Projects for the Desk	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Initiates, prepares and coordinates all operational communications to the field on FI/CI matters	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares project renewals, studies and papers on FI/CI matters	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translates Spanish language material for the Branch	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates FI/CI matters for the Desk with other Hqs components	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Occasionally handles visiting indigenous assets	RATING LETTER S

31 MAR 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Comment by Mr. Tsikerdanos, previous supervisor: 1 51 Fil '67

Mr. Hidalgo is a very capable case officer who is more suited to a field position. He is adept at handling indigenous personnel and has a keen operational mind. He is good at grasping operational leads but is not a capable writer. He has trouble expressing himself on paper. His Spanish language capability is a decided asset to the Branch. A longstanding illness has limited his effectiveness at the Desk. He is cost conscious and has no supervisory responsibilities.

Comments by Present Supervisor:

I concur in the above estimate of Mr. Hidalgo's operational capabilities. During the months (Oct 1966 - March 1967) I have worked with Mr. Hidalgo I have not found his health to be a factor in his performance of his duties.

Ken Knaus

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 March 67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Rafael C. Hidalgo

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 MAR 1967 9 MAR 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Formerly C/WH/2/P Present C/WH/2/P	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ernest J. Tsikerdanos Ken Knaus

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo's health caused him to be absent from his duties several times during the first part of 1966 but these absences were for a limited period. From my observation, his health has not presented a serious problem to the performance of his duties.

Several times during the absence of Mr. Tsikerdanos in the year 1966 Mr. Hidalgo was the acting desk officer. His performance was most satisfactory, and his supervision of the other desk employees, albeit for a limited period, was fully satisfactory.

DATE MAR 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/2	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edwin M. Terrell

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes A., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE C.S Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
X	CAREER	☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		X	ANNUAL	X REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		☐	SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 16 [illegible] - 30 November 1965		

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his ~~own unique experience in the Communist Party.~~	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

4 JAN 1966

FORM 4-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Susan L. Darling Susan L. Darling

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with [illegible] exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and, under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter T. Cini Cini

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 27630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 16 Jul 1946

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible], [illegible], Jr.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH May 1919	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 17 Mar 1958

6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Excluding Employee)	NO. 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1927 1945 1950	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA Puerto Rico NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Pending	10. LAST MED. RPT. Sep 1962	QUAL. FOR Dept Only	EVAL. FOR TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE Feb 1958	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1940-43	Military Service, US Army, Cpl - Infantry
1944-45	Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, Jersey City, NJ - Inspector
1945-47	Francis H. Leggitt Co (Food Wholesaler), NYC - Correspondence Clerk
1946-49	Dept of Justice, FBI, NYC - Contract Agent on a Penetration Project
1948-50	Colonial Trust Co (Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1950-51	American Trust Co(Bank), NYC - Collections Clerk
1951	Dept of Defense, New York QM Procurement Agency, NYC - Inspector

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1945-46 New York University - Foreign Trade, Business Law

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Portuguese - R Interm; W, P, S, U Zero (Oct 1959); T None - May 1958
Spanish - R High; W Interm; P, S, U Native (Nov 1959); Translate, Interpret - May 1958

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1958 Comm Party Org & Ops
1958 CI Famil
1958 Info Rptng,Rpts&Rqmts
1958 Operations
1958 Intel Orient
1959 Picks & Locks
1959 Audio Surveil Mgmt

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
	Feb 1952 - Mar 1958, Contract Employee for DDP/WH/Project HYPOTHESIS					Panama
Mar 1958	Area Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-III/Central America	Hq
	Jan - Feb 1959, TDY Mexico and Guatemala					
Jun 1959	Instructor(Ops)	1711.50	11	D	OTR/Ops School/Covert Trng	Hq
Jun 1960	Ops Off	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4	"
Aug 1961	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH-4/FI-CI Sec	"
Jan 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/WH/Plans & Ops Stf/Sec A	"
Apr 1963	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/SAS/US Fld/Forward Ops Sta	JMWAVE

20. DATE REVIEWED 24 Oct 1963	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/[illegible]/hms/rwh	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 9 Feb 1960

FORM 6-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO. 27630	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.	DATE OF BIRTH May 1919

23.



24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/POD/QAB

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1050 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. [illegible] FEB 57 SECRET PROFILE (8)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, BALMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH P&O SEC A.		8. CURRENT STATION	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 18 Sept 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 September 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/PO/A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE CLARK W. SIMMONS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE 13 September 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE VERNET L. GRESHAM

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO Balmes N., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH, Br. 4, D.C.	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS
☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☐ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From Oct60 To 30Sep61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Hqs. C.O. for 3 major CI/FI Projects-at one time comprising 301 Agents. Originates operational traffic, Support traffic and maintains records and files.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responsible for spotting, interviewing and recruiting of Cuban students in the U. S. for return to Cuba for operational purposes.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Hqs. C.O. for 8 unilateral independent Agents, including originating operational and Support traffic, and maintaining proper records and files.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Interviewing, briefing and debriefing Spanish only speaking Agents and contacts for all operational Sections of the Branch.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled-In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Hidalgo has done a fine job during the reporting period, while assigned to the CI Section of the Branch when it was in its most active period of buildup and operations. The manner in which he accepted any assignment is unusual and he was often working under pressure. During the period, he was on several temporary duty trips in connection with operational activities, which he completed very well.

He has a talent for getting along with and understanding Latin Americans, and with his fluent Spanish language capability, he has performed in a commendable manner. While Mr. Hidalgo has never shunned responsibility, his assignment did not entail the delegation of extensive responsibility. It is the feeling of the Rating Officer that he should be given the opportunity for greater responsibility, and training, which will qualify him for a supervisory role. After that, he should be qualified in all respects for promotion to GS-12.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject hospitalized.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 20 March 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR D/Chief, WH/4/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert W. Andrews Robert W. Andrews

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 March 1962	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/4/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Clark W. Simmons CLARK W. SIMMONS

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DA. 14 September 1966
TO: (Check) ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) ☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION WH	SUBJECT Hidalgo, Balmes N., Jr.
ATTN: Mr. Hannah	
REF: Form 1322 dated 9 September 1966	FILE NO. 9927
OFFICIAL COVER DISCONTINUED Joint Operations Group	ID CARD NO. 1140 (Returned)
	EMPLOYEE NO.

☒ **Unblock Records:** *(OP Memo 20-800-11)*

Effective EOD.

☒ **Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category.** *(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)*

☒ **Return All Official Documentation To CCS.**

HIDALGO B N JR

HIDALGO B N JR

1-PSD/OS

~CRET

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 9 April 1964

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT, SAS

ESTABLISHED FOR: HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.

ATTN: Mr. Dawson

FILE NO.: K-7412

REF: Request for Cover, 9 April 1964

ID CARD NO.: NA

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

X bX CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(RB 20-800-7)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(RB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

S MEMO MUST REMAIN
P OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
OD/sll CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 23 April 1963

TO: (Circle) [✓ ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION]

☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT SAS

ESTABLISHED FOR: HIDALGO, Balmes N., Jr.

ATTN: Mr. Durham

FILE NO.: K-7412

REF: Verbal request for cover

ID CARD. NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3. (HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

CD/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS. 1-PSD/OS. 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

15

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE
9 March 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT - WH Div

SUBJECT
HIDALGO, BALMES N. JR.

ATTN:
WH/SS 1405 Barton Hall

REF:
Your request of 1322 dated: undated

FILE NO.
K-7412

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED
US Army Element, Joint Operations Group

ID CARD NO.
832

☒ UNBLOCK RECORDS:
(OP memo 20-800-11)

EFFECTIVE 27 October 1960

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ RETURN ALL MILITARY DOCUMENTATION.

☐ REMARKS:

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN
ON TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

39165

Robert E. Young
EDF
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCG

DISTRIBUTION: 1-SS/DS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-WRD COMPT

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

7 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr., Contract Employee

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective **immediately**, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) (XXXXXXXXX) to (deny) (XXXXXXXXXXX) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer. **Subject is to be converted to Staff Employee status within the next few days.**

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of **7 March 1958.**

Edward J. Barton
for JOSEPH K. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: PSD/CS
EN

SECRET

93—

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT:

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP		NEW SALARY
HIDALGO, B. N., JR.	027[illegible]30	51 350	V	12	5	$16,034

---

1 LAST NAME FIRST NAME INITIAL(S)
HIDALGO, B. N. JR.

2 APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty F.T P.T
Subject to Sec 203(d) 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec 203(d)
on ________ Annual Leave Bal ________

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years Months Days
☐ More than 15 years

4 DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RET AND DIS SYSTEM EFF 2/28/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	ANNUAL	SICK
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	46	8
6. Current leave year accrual through 2/21 19 70	24	12
7 Total	70	20
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9 Total leave taken	4	20
10. Balance	66	-0-

11 Total hours paid in lump sum 66 hrs
12 Salary rate(s) $15,173.00
13 Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 3/02/70 to 3/11/70 1030 (Hours)

26 Certified correct by (Signature) 3/13/70 (Date)
for Chief Payroll (Title) 143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)
14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ________
15 Current balance as of ________ 19 ____
16 12 month accrual rate ________
17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ________
18 Monthly accrual date ________
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20 Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ________ to ________
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough	AWOL or Suspension
	(Hours)	
23 During leave year in which separated		
24 During step-increase waiting period which began on 12/15/68		

25 During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ________

REMARKS
SCD 7/16/46

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

3-31-70

70-1271

70-1556

3 1 MAR 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

As you bring to a close more than twenty years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - C/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: ______________________
Director of Personnel

* Concur: ______________________
C/EAB/OS

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (5 March 1970)

8 SEP 1970

Mr. Balmes N. Hidalgo, Jr.
403 Silver Rock Road
Rockville, Maryland 20851

Dear Mr. Hidalgo:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
Questionnaire
Return Envelope

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EFAB/MLShobe:dag (31 Aug 70)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BSJ: 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

G&F

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HIDALGO, B R JR
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 02 [illegible] 70
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 0435 [illegible] 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 2
PANAMA SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER: 1312
13 SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 5
17 SALARY OR RATE: 15173

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 45
20 Employ Code: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22 STATION CODE
23 INTEGREE CODE
24 Hdqtrs Code
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 27 YR 1[illegible]
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27 DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE | CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE: E0000
32 Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R. C. WATTLES

POSTED
03-05-70 jbc

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

BSJ, 4 MAR 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO D N JR			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT-DISABILITY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 28 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR		
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V ☐ V TO CF CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 0235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY P.L. 88-643 SECT. 231		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION			
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1310	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 15173	
18. REMARKS				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (8-51)

PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY U.S.A.

PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 202 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED OCTOBER 1962

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 390	V	GS 12 5	$15,173

2

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME			3. ORGANIZATION		4. FUNDS		5. LWOP HOURS	
027630	HIDALGO B N JR			51 390		V			
6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 12	4	$13,392	12/18/66	GS 12	5	$13,798	12/15/68		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Eu Terrell

DATE 10 October 68

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☒ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDIT

FORM 7-62 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

JC

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 215 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,607	$13,392

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 4	$12,064	$12,607

C/W #2 G 30

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	51 390 V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 12	3	$11,685	12/19/65	GS 12	4	$12,064	12/18/66			77.33

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE Oct 12 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE [illegible] 14 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	[illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	[illegible] 2643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 2	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED OF YOUR RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS ACTION TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF HR 20-50. SUCH APPEAL MUST BE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACTION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH | 26 DATE OF GRADE | 27 DATE OF LEI

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

027630

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO H N JR	027630	51 350	V	GS 12 3	$11,355	$11,685

G 33

[illegible]	Name	[illegible]	LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO H N JR	51 500 V	

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	[illegible]	Grade	Step	Salary	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	ADJ
GS 12	2	$10,907 xxxxxxx	12/20/64	GS 12	3	$11,355 xxxxxx	12/1 /65			

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE E. D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

JH: 17 DEC 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 12 19 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 0620 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 2 PANAMA SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1318	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 11355

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Headqrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	
37	10	51350	WH	75013		1	05 27 19			
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX			
35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO					
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA							

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	51 500	V	GS 12 2	$10,605	$10,987

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR			
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 31 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6 FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION WH C MIAMI OPS BR FI SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.			
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1145	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D		
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B (4-63) Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

3CF

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	49 997 43F	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$10,250	12/22/63	GS 12	2	$10,605	12/20/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

OFC PAYROLL BRAN.
DEC 22 11 06 AM '64

L1

MHC: 2 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1 SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR		
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR) 11 02 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 1162 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 0887	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 10250

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 37	20 Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 49150	ALPHABETIC SAS	22 STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs. Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA. YR) 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	NO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA. YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR REGS PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: DEV COMP 2

E.O.ECHOLS

POSTED
11/02/64 JK

FORM 11 62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

R7P: 23 APR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027530	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CAREER PROVISIONAL EXCEPTED APPT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 | 2[illegible] | 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V		V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J					

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 2227	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) CS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 9980

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. Employ Code 12	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 42227	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 25013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 | 27 | [illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 12 | 22 | 63	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 12 | 22 | 63

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO 00000
34. SEX M							

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR 07 | 1[illegible] | 46	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR 03 | 17 | 59	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR REG PROV TEMP	CODE P	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 1	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO								

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 1	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE 3	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE 0	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4.29.64 WA

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

26 APR 1964

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

STR: 28 APR 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Hidalgo, B.H. Jr
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 04 DA 25 YR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4132 2001 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SAS
US FIELD
FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE
CI SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: JMWAVE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0731
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9380
18. REMARKS:

FILED ON
29 Apr 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 27 YR 19
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC / 2 - FICA / 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1800031
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE / 1 5 PT / 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER / 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE / 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE / 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) / 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES / 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

CODED
4-29-64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

28 APR 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SAS

61

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Hidalgo, B. H. Jr.	027630	49 730	CF	GS 12 1	$ 9,475	$ 9,980

POSTED ON
OF-4b
8 [illegible] 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 20 DEC 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027526	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Hidalgo B. R. Jr.	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 12 22 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF U. S. FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS. OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0731	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 1
17. SALARY OR RATE 9475		

18. REMARKS

30 Dec 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	49730	SAS	33340		2	05 27 19	12 22 63	12 22 63

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 FICA, 3 NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 WAIVER, 1 YES)	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 YES, 2 NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

12/27/63 K

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 DEC 1963

7/C

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLG: 25 APRIL 63

OAB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] Harge [illegible]	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER PROVISIONAL	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 04 28 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / X V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3132 2001 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF U. S. FIELD FORWARD OPERATIONS STATION-JMWAVE CI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION JMWAVE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0732	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE 8840		

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
6 MAY 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 13	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61730	ALPHABETIC SAS	22. STATION CODE 99939	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 03 17 58
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 09 16 62	28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE 1	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO 27630	34. SEX M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) 0	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 07 16 46	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) 03 17 58	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE P	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) 1	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) 1	42. LEAVE CAT CODE 8	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE 0	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS 0	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
15/05/63 WK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 25 APR 1963

(14-81)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZR: 25 APR 63

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	HIDALGO D N JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	04 27 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	3232 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/SPECIAL AFFAIRS STAFF FI/CI BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0592
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	11 4
17. SALARY OR RATE	8840
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. Employ Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Headqrs Code	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	05 27 1[illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
28. NTE EXPIRES	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE; CODE)	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	1ED0031
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	
36. SERV COMP. DATE	
37. LONG COMP DATE	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. / RESV / PROV. / TEMP; CODE)	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 WAIVER, 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
05/01 3 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ABM: 20 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 20 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS X V TO V CF TO V V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3232 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TASK FORCE "W" FI-CI BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0682	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 8840

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 61300	ALPHABETIC TFW	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 05 27 19	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV. TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12/11/62 K

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-81)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	027630	64075	V	11 4	$ 8340	11 4	$ 8840

235-1000

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
027630	HIDALGO B N JR	64 075 V /	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 11	3	$ 8,080	03/19/61 ✓	GS 11	4	$ 8,340	09/16/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS JMG AUDITED BY

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

AES: 17 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 027630	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIDALGO B N JR		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 01 17 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2235 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH PLANS & OPERATIONS STAFF SECTION A		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0641	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 11 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 8080
18. REMARKS			

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	64075	WH	75013		1	05 27 19		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 3 FICA 5 NONE / CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE: 0 - NONE 5 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 MIL SERV CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXE 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

1/18/62 JM

Form 1150 861 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARE: 18 AUG 1961

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 027630
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HIDALGO B N JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 20 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2635 5000 8021
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP WH
BRANCH 4
FI CI SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0681
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 8060
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC): 64450 WH
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MAJOR CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 05 27 19
26. DATE OF GRADE:
27. DATE OF LEI:
28. NTE EXPIRES:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE:
36. SERV COMP DATE:
37. LONG COMP DATE:
38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LED:
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE:
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

08/29/61 WK

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
527630	HIDALGO B N JR	DDP/WH 3A UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 11	2	$ 7,820	09/20/59	11	3	$ 8,030	03/19/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E. D. ECHOLS wK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

43

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/21/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 827630	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HICALGO R N JR				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 03 DA 17 YR 61	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4232 1990 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SAS			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION		
11 POSITION TITLE			12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES		16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE	
18 REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150S 1-63
Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(6 51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	HIDALGO B N JR	527630	46 17	GS-11 2	$ 7,270	$ 7,820

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

AES: 24 JUNE 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
527630	HIDALGO B N JR	05 27 19	1	M 1	03 17 58

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidavit (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13.	Code
07 16 46	1	50 USCA 403 J			03 17 58	Yes - 1, No - 2	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	1172	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. Field (Dept - 1, USIld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
3	INSTRUCTOR OPERS	1014	GS	1711.50

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 58	09 20 59	9 7500 30 018

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	57	06 26 60	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 4	4617	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. Field (Dept - 1, USIld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
1	OPS OFFICER	0626	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 7270	D	03 17 58	03 19 61	0135 1000 1000

44. Remarks

[illegible]

06-22-60 WK

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
527630	HIDALGO B H JR	DDS/TRNG 21	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 11	1	$ 7,030	03	17	58	GS 11	2	$ 7,270	09	20	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS U 75C.

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

RLx 9/28/59
MC 10/6/59

C. H. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE · AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560a

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

JEC:12 JUNE 59

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 527630	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO B N JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CSC/EOD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58
7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403	10. Appt. Affidav Mo. Da. Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo 03 Da 17 Yr. 58
13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 1?1 CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	Code 4613	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 2	17. Position Title AREA OPS OF	18. Position No. 0486	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 11 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 7030	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo 03 Da 17 Yr 58	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 20 Yr 59	26. Appropriation Number 8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	Code 05	28. Eff. Date Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OTR OPERATIONS SCHOOL COVERT TRAINING	Code 1172	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5 Code 3	34. Position Title INSTRUCTOR OPERS	35. Position No. 1914	36. Serv GS	37. Occup. Series 1711.50

38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7030	40. SD D	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 09 Da. 20 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 7500 20 018

44. Remarks

POSTED
CP

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
HIDALGO B N JR	127630	GS-11-1	$ 6,390	$ 7,030

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 16 MAY 58

1. Serial No. 127630	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR. HIDALGO B N JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 05 Da. 27 Yr. 19	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 1 5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58
7. SCD Mo. 07 Da. 16 Yr. 46	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1 9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo 03 Da. 13 Yr. 58	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1 12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr 58	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14 Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
16 Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19 Serv. 20. Occup. Series
21 Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate $	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. / 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. / 26. Appropriation Number

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CORRECTION*	Code 1[illegible]	28. Eff. Date Mo. 03 Da. 17 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01
				30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	Code 4613	32 Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title AREA OPS OF	35. Position No 0436	36 Serv. GS 37 Occup. Series 0136.01
38. Grade & Step 11 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6390	40. SD 0	41. Date Of Grade Mo [illegible] Da. 17 Yr. 58 / 42. PSI Due Mo 03 Da. 20 Yr. 59 / 43. Appropriation Number 9 35[illegible] 25

44. Remarks

*THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF 1150 EFF 17 MAR 58, ITEM #2, THE NAME, WHICH READ BALMES N. HIDALGO TO READ BALMES N. HIDALGO, JR.

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL 17 MAR 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)		3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
127630	BALMES N. HIDALGO HIDALGO BALMES N		05	27	19		1	M	1	03	17	58
7. SCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 / Code	12 LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes-1 No.-2	Code	
07 16 46	1	50 USCA 403 J	03	13	58	1	03	17	58		2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title			18. Position No.	19 Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
21. Grade & Step	22 Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24 Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number			
	$							

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT	13	03 17 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32 Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH III CENTRAL AMERICA SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title		35. Position No.	36 Serv.	37 Occup. Series
	2	AREA OPS OF		0486	GS	0136.01
38. Grade & Step	39 Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number	
11 1	$ 6390	0	03 17 58	09 20 59	8 3500 20	

44. Remarks

POSTED
7 MAY 1958

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

FITNESS RPTS
1966 - 1969

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes T., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 [illegible] 1919	3. SEX	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/C		8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 15 March - 31 October 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Headquarters desk officer responsible for the support of Miami Station CI/CE activities and operations.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Advisor to various components of the WH and WE Divisions on Cuban operations with specific reference to the Cuban Security Intelligence Service, organization, modus operandi and personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Briefing representatives of foreign liaison services and selected agents visiting in Washington on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services and his own unique experience in the Communist Party.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Translator/interpreter: Served as consultant to WH Division on Cuban Spanish.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

4 JAN 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo is an able intelligence officer, devoted to his profession and selfless in his desire to be of service to the Government. Although he has suffered ill health in recent years, he was insistent that he be among the first to be sent to the Dominican Republic when the crisis occurred.

An intense person, Mr. Hidalgo is industrious, works well under pressure and sets high standards for his performance. Because he is intent on getting things done, he is occasionally hasty in judgment and in written presentation of the results of his research and conclusions. He is perceptive, quickly accepts suggestions and offers counter-proposals with cogent argument. Mr. Hidalgo was not in a supervisory capacity. He was cost conscious; always endeavoring to be conservative where possible.

He is an effective and cooperative member of an office, ready to assume responsibility and to help his colleagues. Thanks to his unique experience on the Cuban target, he has wide knowledge of the Cuban problem and is, in fact, an expert on the Cuban Security and Intelligence Services.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/C/MO/FI-CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Susan L. Darling

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's assessment of Mr. Hidalgo with [redacted] exception to the statement that Subject works well under pressure. He is indeed an intense person and, under great pressure, his involvement affects his performance; and even more important, it has a very bad effect on his health. With this consideration noted, the undersigned thinks very highly of Mr. Hidalgo and would be pleased to be associated with him again.

DATE 9 December 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/C/MO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Walter T. Cini

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, Balmes N.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SAS	8. CURRENT STATION Washington		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 9 April 1964--15 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Participated (with other WH/SA/CI officers) in the handling and debriefing of a defected intelligence officer housed in the Headquarters area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Served as Headquarters desk case officer for several counterintelligence operations--prepared cables, dispatches, and memoranda pertaining to these operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assisted in translations and preparation of operational documents in Spanish (s/w messages, cover letters, owvl messages, etc.).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Served as case officer for a counterintelligence operation (the agent was located in New York City) which included the debriefing, assessing, training, and dispatching of the agent to a denied area (Cuba).	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

29 MAR 1965

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo's fluent knowledge of Cuban Spanish, his previous experience in DD/P Cuban operations, and his broad knowledge of Cuba (people, geography, customs, etc.) made him a particularly useful and versatile operations officer during his assignment in the WH/SA counterintelligence operations section. As indicated in Section B (specific duties) he performed a wide variety of duties.

Mr. Hidalgo approached and performed his assignments with enthusiasm, keeness, dedication, and promptness. He displayed a particular talent for conducting debriefings, and it was in this type activity that he performed best. He also writes well which added to his debriefing capability as well as to his performance as a Headquarters desk operations officer in writing cables, dispatches, memoranda, etc. Mr. Hidalgo is cost conscious and effective in the use of space, equipment and funds. He does not hold a supervisory position.

Mr. Hidalgo performed most of his duties with a minimum of supervision. In a few instances, however, he had a tendency (in his eagerness and desire to get the job done well) to become impatient with the slow and deliberate pace of progress which is sometimes necessary in operational activities. In these few instances, Mr. Hidalgo's work required supervision by a senior operations officer.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 23 mar 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 11 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 March 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR WH/SA/CI/COPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard Tansing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Hidalgo is a sound operations officer with native fluency in Spanish. His impatience is with administrative delays rather than with operational problems which he understands fully and handles well. He has had problems with his health but these largely have been overcome and in the past 9 months have not impeded his operational usefulness. As of the date of this fitness report, he appears fully capable of handling any CI or FI operation assigned to him.

DATE 23 III 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C WH/SA CI (WH/C/SP)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold F. Swenson

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

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FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 027630

SECTION A — GENERAL

Hidalgo, E. J. Jr.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX Male	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):			XX	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 6 May 1963 to 5 September 1963

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 To effect security screenings of PBRUMEN refugees arriving in the JMWAVE area from PBRUMEN in joint collaboration with ODENVY representatives.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 To interrogate PBRUMEN security suspects, surfaced by the above screenings and other means, in conjunction with representatives of the KUJUMP interrogation center [redacted] DC	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 To supervise the interrogation efforts of three KUJUMP interrogators connected with the JMWAVE/KUJUMP KUDESK debriefing program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 To prepare and present to his immediate supervisor completed interrogation reports.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 POSTED ON	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 27 SEP 1963	S

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SEP 26 2 07 PM '63
MAIL ROOM

The person being rated is a conscientious devoted [illegible] who has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to get along with his co-workers and other ODYOKE representatives with whom he is collaborating. He receives his assignments cheerfully and with enthusiasm and approaches all of his tasks with great zeal. He devotes an inordinate amount of his own personal time to his duties in an effort to achieve perfection and sets very high standards for his own performance The person being rated speaks native Spanish and is able to accomplish all of his interrogations in Spanish. This ability is a great asset to him in his work and redounds in benefits to the KUDESK effort of the Station.

The person being rated is an accomplished interrogator and thus receives very little guidance in his work. His ability to trap security suspects in contradictions is unique and is paying dividends in the WAVE KUDESK field of endeavor. He has shown mature judgment in the handling of complex security cases, balance in appraising the interrogation results and in recommending disposal action, and proficiency in the preparation of his interrogation reports. He is currently supervising the interrogation activities of three KUJUMP interrogators [redacted] and has shown an ability in establishing personal rapport with these interrogators and proficiency in drecting their activities. It is recommended from the standpoint of his career development that after the completion of his current assignment, the person being rated be moved into an assignment involving the handling of agents in the KUDESK field of effort.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4 months	At time preparation this report employee was on TDY Hqs and leave. Will be shown him upon return.	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
4 September 1963	Chief, CI Branch, JMWAVE	/s/ Neil T. PICKWORTH (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is a hard working, dedicated, productive intelligence officer who has completely mastered those basic tools of the trade which are needed in CI activities. Subject has and uses native Spanish language fluency. Subject's performance during the period covered by this fitness report warrants an overall evaluation of "Strong." As a result, it is believed that Subject is a well-qualified journeyman who has earned a promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject is strongly recommended for promotion to the grade of GS-12. Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer. Subject's activities come to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 September 1963	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SEP
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FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
027630

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) HIDALGO, BALMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH P&O SEC A.	8. CURRENT STATION		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 October 1962

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
17 Jan 62 - 30 Sep 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for initiation and development of WH Division durable assets program.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Collate and maintain files on espionage laws of LA countries.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Served as interpreter and translator for Division LA contacts.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinated with Branch 1 of WHD on FI and CI matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Gives lectures as guest instructor to students attending School of International Communism.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Hidalgo joined WH/PO/A in November 1961 and took up those responsibilities listed above. However, Mr. Hidalgo's performance of duties was interrupted on two occasions by serious illness, 9-27 March and 15 April-31 May 1962. He was twice hospitalized. From 25 June-9 August 1962, Mr. Hidalgo was on TDY for WH/3 as escort officer for Latin American trainees. Although beset by health and other personal problems, Mr. Hidalgo seized upon each new assignment with his customary energy. He proved particularly adept in working as interpreter and escort officer for Latin American trainees, and demonstrated high interest and proven competence in counterintelligence work. His excellent memory and quick perception were distinct assets in these undertakings.

It is recommended, however, that Mr. Hidalgo's next assignment not carry responsibility for submission of finished papers or staff studies, but be one entailing duties commensurate with his ability to work effectively with indigenous personnel and to pursue CI leads through records investigation.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
18 Sept 62	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 September 1962	C/WH/PO/A	Clark Simmons CLARK H. SIMMONS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have had insufficient personal contact with Subject to make any meaningful comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 September 1962	C/WH/OPS	VERNE L. GRESHAM

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance). N/A
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employers' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
✓	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions). Medical Disability
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed Feb 27, 1970
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 403 Silver Rock Rd Rockville Md 20851	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

IR c/o Veronica Hidalgo
x6646

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): HIDALGO JrBalmes Nieves

DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): May 27 1919

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 123 05 9966

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: Employee Serial Number 27630

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE: 13 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 20 3 30 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED MARCH [illegible]
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A8

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, BALMES HIDALGO JR., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

17 Mar 58 (Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 13 th day of March A. D. 1958,

at Washington, (City) D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Appointment Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
% 4615 [illegible] NW - Wash 16, D. C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*) Havana Cuba

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY Louise Hidalgo
(B) RELATIONSHIP wife
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
(D) TELEPHONE NO.

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MAR-RIED	SIN-GLE
		1 2 3			
		1 2 3			
		1 2 3			

(*Check one*)

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	✓	
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	No	✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case, (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		✓
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT:		✓
(1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		✓

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
			U. S. [illegible]
			☑ ☐
			HAS LEAVE [illegible]?
			☑ ☐

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, and members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

1C

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QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information, however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
027630	Hidalgo, Balmes N. Jr.	05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City State Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From To)	GRADUATE
La Salle Academy	NYC NY	1938-1940	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. NY University	Comm Law	IMP-EXP	1943-45	NO		
UNIV of MD	Fire engineering		1968	No Credit Course		
2. Mont Jr College	Real Estate Procedures		1968	No Credit Course		

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
Suburban Hospital	Emergency Room procedures	~~XXXXXXXX~~ 1968		3(?)

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. Non-Com leadership school		1947		?
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)
HIDALGO	Veronica	Waylonis	Waylonis

3. DATE OF BIRTH 23 May 14	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City State Country) DuBois, Pa, USA
5. OCCUPATION Admin Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER CIA

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
US	N/A	Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	1945 NYC NY	US	Arlington, Va
2. ☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria Va
ADD	Mother	1892 SPAIN	US	Rockville Md

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SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK (X)) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Havana Cuba	Language, customs, people	1919-25		X			X
Rep of Panama	" " "	1952-58		X	X		X
El Salvador, Mexico	" " "	various		X	X		X
Guatemala, Puerto Rico	" " "	various		X	X		X
Hawaii	" "			X	X		X

Dec 20 1963

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Extremely capable in First Aid (advanced) and teaching of same. Firefighting procedures. Elementary knoledge of Real Estate Procedures.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION: N/A
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS: N/A
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: N/A

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

NONE

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION: N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT: N/A
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED: N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT	AGENCY-SPONSORED
Non-Com leadership school	same	????		

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
American Red Cross	Silver Spring Md	1964	present
1. Rockville Fire Dept and OTHERS	(presently Rockville, Md)	1958	present
International Rescue & 1st Aid Assoc	worldwide	1956(?)	present
2. Montgomery Board of Realtors (ASSOCIATE member)(Permanency pending)		1958	present
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

I am a bit hazy on the dates.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 Dec 63	

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SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Area and people/Lan.	1919-1924	Family	X		X	X
Panama	Area and people/Lan	1952-58	XXXX	X	X	X	X
Dom Rep	Area and People/Lan	1965			X		X
Salvador&Guat	" " " "	1961-2-3			X		X

SECTION VI & Mexi TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

Quite proficient in photography - Safety and Fire engineering - First Aid including the Instruction of First Aid& Hospital Coppsman duties. SOME Real Estate knowledge.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION See age.
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG NONE
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE N/A
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK N/A
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION N/A
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☒ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT N/AX
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED N/A

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
Non-Com leadership school	Infantry	1943	RES N/A AGENCY SPONSORED N/A

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. Rockville Fire Dept & others	Rockville Md & others	1958	present
2. Red Cross as Emeregncy transport and First Aid Instructor as well as Md Corpsman		1964	"
Associate member Mont Realtors		1968	"
3. Int Assoc Rescue & First Aid		1964	"

SECTION X REMARKS

Re Section IV: Both daughters now married.
Re Section III: This is second marraige.
Re Real Estate training: This still in active stage. Plans are to supplement my work and eventually change to it on full time basis.

DATE 25 Nov 68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

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QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 027630	NAME (Last-First-Middle) Hidalgo, Balmes N.	DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
La Salle Acedemy	NYCity NY	1938-40	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	New York Universtity	Comm Law	Import-Export procedures	1943/45	NO		
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
University of Md. College of Engineering	Fire Service extension	Jan 66	Aug66	8

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Montgomery Junior College Rockville Md Campus	Real Estate procedures	Oct 1968		1
2	Suburban Hospital Bethesda, Md	Emergency Medical Aid/ Maryland State Corpsman	Jan-May 1968		5

ALSO FIRST AID INSTRUCTORS course of more than 40 Hours.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: Married

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) HIDALGO (First) Veronica (Middle) W. (Maiden) (WAYLONIS)

3. DATE OF BIRTH May 29 1914	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) DuBois, Pa., USA
5. OCCUPATION Admin Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER C.I.A.

7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) N/A	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED Birth

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Feb 23/50	US	Alexandria Va
2.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE	Daughter	NYC NY - Jan 6/45	US	Arlington Va

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QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 027530	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO B N JR	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 05/27/19	5. SCHEDULE GRADE/STEP GS -12-04
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH	9. LOCATION (Country-City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
~~[illegible]~~ PANAMA	PCS-VV	52/05/12	57/12/30
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	59/01/29	59/02/08
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	60/02/01	61/03/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	61/04/19	61/06/19
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY-CC	63/12/01	63/12/18
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	PCS-CC	~~60~~/04/01	~~60~~/05/01
		63/04/01	64/04/01
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	TDY-CC	65/7/11 [illegible] TWO WEEKS	~~65/7/11~~ [illegible] 15

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED 25 APR 1968
DATE: INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		
NONE	Two YEARS - Commercial Law Import Export Procedure	NYU	1943-45

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SECTION III	EDUCATION (Cont'd)			
HIGH SCHOOL				
LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS City State Country	YEARS ATTENDED From-To	GRADUATE	
La Salle Academy	NYC NY	1938-40	☒ YES	☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM. / QTR. HRS. Specify
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM TO			
1	NYU - NYC NY	Commer. LAW	Export laws	Sept 43 to ? 45	No		???
2							
3							
4							

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1	Full Ops course		During 1958		9
2	Management Course		1966	One Week	
3					
4					
5					

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(When Filled In)

SECTION VII	MILITARY SERVICE		
CURRENT DRAFT STATUS			
1 ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO		2 SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION ???	
3 LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS N/A		4 IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON N/A	
MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)			
1 MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify) Army	2 BRANCH OR CORPS Infantry	3 DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM Oct 1940	TO Sept 1943
4 STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify) Federalized National Guard	5 RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation, if past service) Cpl.		6 SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER 20249765

7 CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☒ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Infantryman; Crypographic section; driver.

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
None
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1 CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2 DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3 EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4 CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (Give the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6 IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	Language-Area knowledge	1919-1924	——	X			
Panama	" " "	1952-58		X			X
Puerto Rico	" " "	various			X		X
Guatemala	" " "	various			X		X
El Salvador	" " "	various			X		X
Mexico	" " "	various			X		X
Dom Rep	" Limited area knowledge	1965					X
Germany	" " "	1963					X
Scotland	" " "	1963					X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
40		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

Various

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

First Aid Instructor. Very active currently.
Fire Fighting and safety practices. University of Maryland. Active cutrently.
Sky Diving - 10 jumps during 1962 - None since.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

First Aid Instructor - National Red Cross - 1963

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue) 1963

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (~~Single~~ ~~Married~~ ~~Widowed~~ ~~Separated~~ ~~Divorced~~ ~~Annulled~~ [✓ Remarried]) SPECIFY: MARRIED

2. NAME OF SPOUSE Last: HIDALGO First: Veronica Middle: Maiden: WAYLONIS

3. DATE OF BIRTH May 23 1914	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) DuBois, Pa., USA.
5. OCCUPATION Administrative Asst	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER CIA

7. CITIZENSHIP US	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) None	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED N/A

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Frances R. Hidalgo	daughter	Feb 23 1950 NYC NY	US	Alexandria, Va
Balmes N. Hidalgo Sr.	father	Dec 15 1890 Puerto Rico	US	NYC NY
Rose Hidalgo	mother	Jan 12 1892 Spain	US	NYC NY

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
American Red Cross Civil Defense team	Montgomery Cty, Md.	1964	present
Franconia Volunteer Fire Department	Franconia, Va	1958	1963
Rockville Volunteer Fire Department	Rockville, Md.	1964	present
International Rescue and First Aid Association		1967	present

DATE 9 Feb 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]
2. I.D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible]
4. COMPONENT [illegible]
5. GRADE [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE [illegible]
8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD / SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A / M	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE
DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD				
A-M	E-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
25. CHECK NO.
DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
SECRET
(10-43) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]
2. I.D NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) [illegible]
4. COMPONENT [illegible]
5. GRADE [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE [illegible]
8. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33) [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD / SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A / M	NOT AWARDABLE

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE
DATE

15. TYPE OF AWARD				
A-M	E-I-N	C	R-W-S	D-V

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD $ [illegible]
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
SIGNATURE
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
DATE
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.
23. FORWARD CHECK TO
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT
25. CHECK NO.
DATE

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
SECRET
(10-43) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 127 630	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I–GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR	May	27	1912

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Spanish 720	May	9	1958	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II–LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

[✓ 1.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

[✓ 1.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

[✓ 1.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

[✓ 1.] I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

[✓ 1.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

~~2.~~ I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3.] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 May 1958	SIGNATURE
(46) C	(47) A

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
127630

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
Hidalgo, Balmes Nieves JR

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
May	27	1919

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
Portuguese 630

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
May	9	1958

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

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[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND. B

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

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BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

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2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

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DATE SIGNED 9 May 1958	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
[illegible]

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 17 April 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 18658 DDP/SAS

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN :

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves, Jr.

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. **This is a conversion case.**

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 10-63 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(5)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 22 April 1963

YOUR REFERENCE: Memorandum of 19 April 1963

CASE NO. : #65077

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted] Hedaiye R.K. Jr.

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, OS-11, by DDP/SAS in the capacity of Operations Officer under Project JMWAVE.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS
JMA

FORM 10-54 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-40)

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 10 March 1958

YOUR REFERENCE:

CASE NO. : 65077

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : HIDALGO, Balmes Nieves

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

   ☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

   ☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

   ☒ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

   ☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

   ☒ This clearance is issued in advance of receipt of a SF-377. Subject will be assigned to the WH Division.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W M Knott
W. M. Knott
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Name:	Balmes N. HIDALGO, Jr.
Grade:	GS-11
Service Designation:	DI
Date and Place of Birth:	27 May 1919 Havana, Cuba
Marital Status:	Married
Education and Career Outside the Agency:	1945-46 New York University - No degree (2 yrs) Nov 45-Dec 49 FBI, Eastern part of United States - Undercover Agent
Languages:	Spanish - Fluent Portuguese & French - Fair
Military Duty:	27 Mar 39-27 Sep 1943 New York National Guard (Federalized Oct 40) U.S. Army
CIA Experience:	18 Feb 52 Ex Appt., Contract Employee, GS-9, DDP/WH/ HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama 1 Feb 56 Promotion, Contract Employee, GS-11, DDP/WH, HYPOTHESIS, Panama City, Panama
CIA Training:	Covert training

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(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
	HIDALGO JR	BALMES	NIEVES

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED D, C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: D.C.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE BELZONI MISS. USA	DATE OF MARRIAGE 9 APR 1943
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE -	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED —	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
—

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
LOUISE HIDALGO			
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**AGE**
LUZ MARIA		F	13
FRANCES REBECCA		F	9
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
BALMES N HIDALGO			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NUMBER**	
ROSE HIDALGO			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
WIFE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr. Mrs. Miss) (Last-First-Middle) HIDALGO, LOUISE	RELATIONSHIP WIFE
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
GREENWICH SAVINGS BANK

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

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(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED? SALNES N. HIDALGO JR +/or Luise Hidalgo

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DO NOT NOTIFY OTHER PERSONS IN ITEM 3 OF EMERGENCY UNLESS WIFE IS NOT AVAILABLE.

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE Balmes G. Hidalgo

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force.* The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): HIDALGO JR, BALMES NIEVES

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 27 MAY 1919

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service*).

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
US ARMY DEPT OF DEFENSE QUARTERMASTER Corp	51	1	12	Present			

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
US ARMY INF.	1939	MAR	27	43	SEPT	21	Honorable

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☑ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(DATE)

Balmes N. Hidalgo
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 13th day of Mar (MONTH) 1958 at Washington, D.C. (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

Betty A. Bussard

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
7	2	6
4	5	25

12. TOTAL SERVICE 11 8 1

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*).

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	58	3	17
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	11	8	1
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	46	7	16

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 12*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SF-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—66453-1

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "N.A." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES

Sec. I. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

1. FULL NAME Mr. [illegible] Flores [illegible] Other N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS 10 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

PERMANENT ADDRESS 10 Avenue D New York City 9, New York USA

NICKNAME [illegible] WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? [illegible]

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THEM?

Answer: See Attached sheet marked Section I

How long? 2 years IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

N/A N/A

DATE OF BIRTH 27 [illegible] 1929 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Cuba

PRESENT CITIZENSHIP American BY BIRTH [illegible]

NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE No. N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

N/A

HAVE YOU MADE APPLICATION [illegible] No [illegible] N/A

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A [illegible] No

[illegible] N/A

[illegible]

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[illegible] FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE N/A CAUSE N/A

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS Box 662 Leland Mississippi USA

DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1879 PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible], Mississippi, USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY N/A

CITIZENSHIP American WHEN ACQUIRED Birth WHERE [illegible], Miss., USA

OCCUPATION Retired EMPLOYER [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See Attached Sheet Marked Sec. [illegible]

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

[illegible]

14-00000

A. ACTIVE U.S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

USA Army Infantry Cpl. 1/6/1943

Camp Hale, Colorado 202/9786 Honorable

REMARKS: Could not pass physical to return overseas

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER N/A ADDRESS N/A

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N/A

[illegible] N/A

B. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.) (See attached also)

From 14 Jan 1951 To Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE GS-7

EMPLOYER (Firm or Agency) [illegible]

ADDRESS 111 East [illegible] St., New York [illegible], USA

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB [illegible]

[illegible]

From [illegible] 1950 To [illegible] 1951 N/A

[illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED [illegible] HAVE YOU [illegible] DESIRE TO EXPLAIN ANY DETAILS

[illegible]

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] N/A

[illegible] N/A [illegible] N/A

GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN THIS APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS [illegible]
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

N/A

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN

[illegible]

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY [illegible]

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] Brooklyn [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible]

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS. (Give [illegible]

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. Unknown
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. Unknown
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible] N.Y.
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible]

[illegible] Bus. Add. Unknown
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. Unknown
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible] Bus. Add. [illegible]
Res. Add. [illegible] N.Y.

[illegible]

[illegible] National City Bank [illegible]

RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

From [illegible] to Present [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

From [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible]

From

From

From

From

CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

See Attached sheet (Sec. [illegible] 17 [illegible])

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible]

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: [illegible]

[illegible] MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES? [illegible]

DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU USED INTOXICANTS? Yes [illegible]

EXTENT: [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED [illegible] (IF SO, GIVE DETAILS BELOW) [illegible]

[illegible] WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] YOU INDICATE BELOW THE NAME [illegible]
[illegible] INVESTIGATION
[illegible] 1954

[illegible]

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP Wife
ADDRESS [illegible] New York [illegible]

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

In 1964, [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] FBI [illegible]
FBI [illegible] were notified.

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

[illegible] Ohio [illegible] 1971

[illegible] Jr. [illegible]

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

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Section 10:

May be reached at or through Mariano Nieves Hidalgo at 1411 Paris St. San Juan, Puerto Rico	Mariano	Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Jorge	Nieves Hidalgo	Uncle	Puerto Rico
	Rina	Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	Nieves Hidalgo	Aunt (by marriage to [illegible] Nieves Hidalgo)	Puerto Rico
	Joseph	Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	Gilbert	Nieves Hidalgo	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible] Hidalgo	Cousin	[illegible] Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible] Hidalgo	Cousin	[illegible] Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	Cousin	Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	Cousin	[illegible] Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	Cousin	[illegible] Puerto Rico
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
City [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Ohio	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Ohio	
[illegible]	[illegible]	Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	Villa	[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]	Villa	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	Villa	[illegible]	

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

In 1946, October, I was approached by certain [illegible] members of the Communist Party [illegible] Party. Finally in November of 1946, I arranged an interview with Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

These happenings all took place in New York City, New York.

The FBI asked me if I would be willing to join the Communist Party and report all activities regularly. I thought the matter over and upon the next visit of the Party members I allowed myself to be recruited into the Communist Party. I rose in the Party ranks to become Section Press Director, among other responsibilities held.

[illegible] friends, associates and relatives. [illegible] by wife [illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible] in early 1949, [illegible] Communist Party [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? ______ (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) XXX Mr. XXX Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo, Jr. (Last)

Telephone:
Office NA
Ext. NA
Home NA

PRESENT ADDRESS House number 60, 94th St. East, Panama, Republic of Panama (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME "Barney" "Bal" WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? See remarks

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? See remarks

HOW LONG? See remarks IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

No (Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 27 May 1919 PLACE OF BIRTH Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U. S. (Country) BY BIRTH? NA BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT See remarks (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

NA

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? March 1924

PORT OF ENTRY? NYC, NY ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? U. S.

LAST U. S. VISA None (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 38 SEX Male HEIGHT 5' 9½" WEIGHT 145

EYES Brown HAIR Dark Brown COMPLEXION Dark SCARS Appendix and under chin

BUILD slight OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Mole, Upper left lip.

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE MARRIED X DIVORCED WIDOWED

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Annie (First) Louise (Middle) Beier (Maiden) Hidalgo (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Belzoni, Mississippi - 9 April 1943

XXX(XX HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Rt. 2, Box 76, (St. and Number) Belzoni, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15 May 1927 PLACE OF BIRTH Morgan City, (City) Mississippi, (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION File Clerk LAST EMPLOYER Classified

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Classified (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Luz Maria Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 12

CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Frances Rebecca Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 7

CITIZENSHIP U. S. ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (also dependent) (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Balmes (First) Nieves (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH December 1890 PLACE OF BIRTH Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY 1923 (March) NYC, NY

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Puerto Rico (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Do not remember

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS None (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Frances (First) Rosario (Middle) Hidalgo (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH Oviedo, Spain

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Marriage 1917 WHERE? Havana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY March 1924, NYC, NY, USA

OCCUPATION Retired LAST EMPLOYER Leonid De Lesoinskis

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS 48 St. NYC, NY (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

NA

1. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Henry (First) B. (Middle) Peler (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue, Leland, Mississippi, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1895 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? USA (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Laborer LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Erma (First) Rebecca (Middle) Peior (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 210 California Avenue (St. and Number), Leland (City), Mississippi (State), USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH USA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? U.S.A. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

See remarks

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NONE

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR See covering dispatch reference

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $5390.00 P/A
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes

FREQUENTLY ...., CONSTANTLY X

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES X, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL St. Thomas Apostle ADDRESS NYC (City) NY (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL La Salle Academy ADDRESS 2nd St. and 2nd Avenue NYC, NY USA (City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1936-1940 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE NY University ADDRESS Washington Square, NYC, NY, USA (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Foreign Trade and Business Law YEARS COMPLETED Two (Night School)

DATES ATTENDED 1944-1945 DEGREE No

COLLEGE .... ADDRESS .... (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY .... YEARS COMPLETED ....

DATES ATTENDED .... DEGREE ....

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS ....

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U. S. (Country) Army (Service) Cpl. (Rank) 1940-1943 (Dates of Service)

Camp Hale, Colorado (Last Station) 202 49766 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER Do not remember ADDRESS

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NA.

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM Feb. 1952 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-11

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY See covering dispatch reference

ADDRESS See covering dispatch reference (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR See covering dispatch

TITLE OF JOB See covering dispatch SALARY $ 6390.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES See covering dispatch reference

REASONS FOR LEAVING

FROM January 1951 TO February 1952 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-7

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY NY QM Procurement Agency

ADDRESS 111 East 16th Street NYC, NY, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS U. S. Govt. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Inspector SALARY $3825.00 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Inspecting material being purchased by U. S. Govt. specifically the U. S. Army.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To obtain present position.

FROM July 1950 TO January 1951 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY American Trust Company

ADDRESS Wall Street, New York City, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work

REASONS FOR LEAVING Left for higher paying work

FROM January 1948 TO May 1950 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Colonial Trust Company

ADDRESS 6th Avenue and 45th Street, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Banking NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Collections clerk SALARY $50.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export banking clerical work.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Promised promotion failed to materialize.

FROM August 1945 TO September 1947 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Francis H. Leggett Inc.

ADDRESS 28th Street and 12th Avenue, NYC, NY, USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Wholesale Grocery house. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Do not remember

TITLE OF JOB Correspondence clerk SALARY $ 57.00 PER week

YOUR DUTIES Export correspondence clerical duties.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Dissatisfied with type of work.

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK Fluent READ Fluent WRITE Fluent
LANGUAGE Portuguese SPEAK Slight READ Fair WRITE Slight
LANGUAGE SPEAK READ WRITE

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Judo - Have attained "yellow belt" rank
Photography - Very good degree of proficiency
Bowling - Fair degree of proficiency
Philately - Fair degree of proficiency
Fishing (no comment)

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Yes, See covering dispatch reference.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

All photographic devices.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 30 SHORTHAND 0

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC.

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE No.

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ______ LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ______

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

NA

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

Yes. I must wear glasses continually.

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Edward Lee Anderson	BUS. ADD.	See Dispatch	reference.	
		RES. ADD.			
2.	Willard Galbraith	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
3.	Homer Neal	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
4.	Andres Rivera	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			
5.	Joseph Sancho	BUS. ADD.	" "	"	
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
4.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
5.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

See remarks

			Street and Number	City	State
1.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
2.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			
3.		BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.			

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Greenwich Savings Bank. 36th St. and Broadway and 6th Avenue. NYC, NY.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME None ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
April 1952	Present	Panama Republic of Panama
1949	1952	20 Ave. D, NYC, NY, USA
1944	1948	200 West 82nd St., NYC, NY, USA

SEC. 23 RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM	TO	(City or section)	(Country)	(Purpose)
A. 1919	1924	Havana, Cuba	Country of birth	
1942	1943	Pacific area	US Army	
1952	Present	Republic of Panama		Work

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. None (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. ....
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Numbe.) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

5. ....
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

6. ....
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

7. ....
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ....

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NO (See remarks)

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Beer with meals.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

Department of Defense

Present Organization

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Federal Bureau of Investigation - 1946

This Organisation - 1952

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Annie Louise Hidalgo RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Same as applicant (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Ft. Amador, Canal Zone (City and State) DATE 19 July 1957

(Witness)

Balmes C. Hidalgo (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

Section 1A - While an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigations from 1946 to 1949 I used the name of Bernard Harris to members of the Communist Party of the United States. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 1D - I became an American citizen at birth through the citizenship of my father. This information is already on file in this organization.

Section 3B - My wife is employed by this organization.

Section 10 - I have many relatives in Spain and Cuba but do not correspond with them and so do not know names, addresses or present status.

Section 18 - All persons mentioned in this section are employees of this organization.

Sections 19
and 20 - Not having lived in the USA for over five years I have lost all contact with old friends, neighbors, etc. I do not know their addresses, status, etc., at this time.

Section 25 - My past connections with any subversive groups and the reasons for such connections is already on file in the files of this organization.

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE July 1971

CRABANAC, Terence S.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HUNT, E. HOWARD (CONTRACT

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 January 1965 – 3 Dec 1970

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: O/P

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2/28/78	2/28/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway
3/15/78	3/15/78	DAN HARDWAY	Dan Hardway

TS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

Contract Service — Terence S Crahinac (P)

Date	Action	Comp	GS Equivalent
4 July 65	Former Staff Employee Hired as a Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPIs and PSIs.	$19,550	GS-15/7
10 Oct 65	LPI	20,595	GS-15/7
3 July 66	LPI	21,192	GS-15/7
17 Sept 66	Contract Terminated	21,192	GS-15/7

Converted to Staff Employee Status

14-00000

SECRET

8 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Engagement of E. Howard Hunt as Independent Contractor Under Memorandum of Oral Contract

1. Effective 2 November 1970, subject was retained under oral contract to write a citation concerning an employee of CIA for a fee of $250.00. The completed citation was delivered to and accepted by CIA on 23 November 1970.

2. Subject is a former CIA Staff Employee who retired effective 30 April 1970.

3. Subject is to be paid his fee of $250.00 under Fin Account Number 1176-0041. At Mr. Hunt's request, payment is to be made in the form of two sterile checks, one in the amount of $200.00 payable to the Public Service Aid Society, and the second in the amount of $50.00 payable to the Educational Aid Fund. Please forward both checks to Mr. Ben DeFelice, 5E-67 Headquarters.

4. No other commitments have been made to subject.

Approving Officer
Office of Personnel

APPROVED:

/s/ [illegible]

Chief, Contract Personnel Division

8 DEC 1970

Date

The

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

1 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] Terence S. CRABANAC

[redacted] on instructions of the Deputy Director for Plans, and with approvals from the DCI and the DDCI, was converted to contract employment and assigned to Spain for a special undertaking in behalf of the DD/P. He left for Spain in July 1965 and returned to the U. S. in June 1966 having completed his assignment successfully. If an evaluative comment is needed to cover his work during this period of time he should be rated as "strong".

Thomas H. Karamessines
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Orig & 1 - Director of Personnel
via C/EUR
1 - ADD/P

SECRET

3 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TRB

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service for [redacted] [illegible]

1. The following is a record of subject's contract service with the Agency:

Date	Action	Compensation
4 July 1965	Contract Employee	$19,880 per annum
10 October 1965	Salary Increase	$20,595 per annum
3 July 1966	Salary Increase	$21,192 per annum
17 September 1966	Contract Terminated	$21,192 per annum

2. All of above service is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - CPD

SECRET

SECRET

26 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Paul R. Wilson

SUBJECT : Verification of Contract Service
[redacted] CRACANAC, Louis S.

In order to establish the salary, LCD and to compute the SCD for both leave and retirement purposes, it is necessary to verify the contract service and salary of [redacted], DOB 9 October 1918, who claims employment with this Agency in a contract status from 4 July 1965 to 17 September 1966.

Lowell P. Moore
Lowell P. Moore
Deputy Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

This is to advise that effective 17 September 1966 I will resign from employment with the United States Government as provided in the contractual agreement effective 4 July 1965. It is understood that my status as a Staff Employee will be effective 18 September 1966, the day following my resignation as a Contract Employee.

Terence S. GRABANAC

APPROVED:

b1

European Contract Approving Officer

Date

APPROVED:
/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

~~REVIEWED:~~
~~/s/ Dow H. Luetscher.~~
~~Special Contracting Officer~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

The ADDP requested the writer to personally bring CRABANAC's file to him for review this date. I was informed by Mr. Karamessines that Subject has now returned to headquarters for reassignment and will not be returning to Madrid, as his duties have been fulfilled there.

When the DDP decides CRABANAC's next assignment, ADDP will inform us of such and action desired. CRABANAC's travel accounting was given to C/E/B&F for preparation and processing of the voucher for Subject's return travel.

Charles J. Francis

Charles J. Francis
AC/E/SS

CFrancis/cls: 14 Jul 66

SECRET

8 NOV 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT: Request for Exception to Provision of FR 45-10b — Terence S. CRABANAC (P)

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph 4 for the approval of the Deputy Director for Support.

2. Terence S. CRABANAC (P) is a Contract Employee assigned to the Madrid area in Spain in a sensitive assignment since his conversion from a Staff Employee on 4 July 1965. CRABANAC was a GS-15, step 7 ($19,880.00 per annum) and he is being paid at the same rate in his present contract status. His contract provides that he will be entitled to a living quarters allowance in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel.

3. The basic living quarters allowance for Class II officers in Madrid is $2,900 per annum. The house which CRABANAC has located, with a one year lease from 15 November 1965 to 14 November 1966, has an annual rent of $6,600.00 excluding utilities. Therefore, for rent alone, he will be $1,960.00 per year over the 160 percent maximum allowed under the provisions of FR 45-10b. On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent over the quarters allowance, he would be out of pocket $2,395.00.

4. Due to the operational sensitivity of CRABANAC's assignment, his request for relief on his housing costs was handled by Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP. On 15 September 1965, Mr. Karamessines, ADDP, approved his being reimbursed on a 75/25 percent basis for the excess allowable costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance. This authorization was included in a letter to CRABANAC from Mr. Karamessines. It is requested that the Deputy Director

for Support authorize the 75/25 percent sharing of the excess allowable costs up to 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

/S/

Edward Ryan
Acting Chief
Western Europe Division

Recommendation in paragraph 4
is authorized:

Charles H. Davis
for Deputy Director for Support

9 NOV 1965
Date

DDP/WE/SS:DavisB.Powell/aj/6189 (8Nov65)

Distribution:
Orig. - C/WE
2 - SSA-DD/S
1 - C/WE/SS
1 - WE/LO
1 - WE/PT
1 - WE/BP
1 - WE/S

SECRET

Chief, Western Europe Division - 18 October 1965

ATT : Support Staff

Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

Duty Status Reports-Terence S. CRABANAC, Employee Number 179080

Reference : FHB 20-1000-1, paragraph 5.

1. To date there is no record of receipt of Forms 764, Duty Status Reports, for Terence S. CRABANAC since his EOD 4 July 1965. These reports are required in order to maintain his leave account in accordance with the terms of paragraph 6(e) of his contract and to preclude action to withhold pay in accordance with requirements of the referenced handbook.

2. It is requested that this office be advised as to the reason for the delay in the submission of these Duty Status Reports.

LUCILE P. TWOGOOD
Chief,
Contract Employees Accounts Section
Agent Payroll Branch

TO: Compensation and Tax Division
Office of Finance

ATTENTION: Lucile F. Twogood

FROM: Chief of Support, WE Division

Per conversation with Mr. Thomas Karamessines, ADDP, there will be no Duty Status Reports (Form 764) submitted on Terence S. CRABANAC. This should be used as the authority to continue his pay without these reports.

Davis B. Powell
Chief of Support
WE Division

5 NOV 1965

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

October 18, 1965

Dear Howard,

Your insurance representative has passed along some information concerning reimbursement to you by means of deposits to your bank account. So that you will understand the reason and the source of deposits which show up on your bank statement, here is the run-down for the present:

Amount of Deposit	Approx Date of Deposit	Reason for Payment
$ 5.00	Sep 9	Settlement of claim for son Howard (settlement sheet enclosed)
$216.06	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: You..........$ 47.68 Lisa.......... 112.88 Kevan......... 24.50 Howard........ 31.00 $ 216.06 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$505.75	Oct 7	Settlement of following claims: Lisa..........$ 112.49 Kevan......... 63.75 Kevan......... 189.74 Lisa.......... 139.77 $ 505.75 (Four settlement sheets are enclosed.)
$ 60.00	To be made Nov 4	Refund of advance premium payments made on your life insurance policy which you cancelled.

I am also forwarding herewith some bills and receipts which your insurance representative has returned with appropriate notations on each. I believe you will want to retain these for possible future use.

Sincerely,

John

4 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division,
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : Terence S. CRABANAC (P), Contract Employee
Request for Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that Subject's contract, which was effective 4 July 1965, be amended with respect to living quarters allowances so as to authorize reimbursement for 75% of the excess allowable costs up to, but not in excess of, 60% of the standardized quarters allowance.

2. The proposal for this 75%/25% sharing basis, in lieu of the standard 50%/50% basis, has been reviewed and approved by Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines.

Davis B. Powell

Davis B. Powell
Chief, WE Support Staff

SECRET

15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines

SUBJECT : Madrid Housing

1. The following is a listing of the GS-13 and above staff employees and their quarters costs as of April 1965:

Grade & No. of Dependents	Allowance	Cost	Cost to Individual
(COS)GS-16 (3)	$2,900	$4,236	All cost paid
GS-15 (1)	2,900	3,132	$116
GS-15 (0)	2,000	1,800	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	2,796	0
GS-14 (5)	2,900	3,840	450
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,280	140
GS-13 (3)	2,000	2,472	236
GS-13 (5)	2,000	2,544	272

2. Mr. Hunt's quarters allowance is $2,900. Using the same formula as applied to the other staff employees at the Station, the following would be the figures:

$2,900 + 60% ($1,740) = $4,640

On a 50/50 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $870 if his costs were $4,640.

On a 75/25 percent sharing basis of the 60 percent, he would be out-of-pocket $435, if his costs were $4,640.

3. I would recommend he be authorized the 75/25 percent sharing basis of the allowable excess costs up to, but not to exceed, 60 percent above his quarters allowance.

Davis B. Powell

Davis B. Powell
Chief
WE Support

4640
-435
4205

SECRET

SECRET

3 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : General - Terrence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
Specific - Paragraph Entitled "Offset"

REFERENCE : A. OGC Opinion 65-2476a, dated 12 August 1965

B. Our Memo, dated 8 July 1965, Same Subject

1. This office herein recommends an ammendment to CRABANAC's Supplement dated 4 July 1965, to delete paragraph 7. entitled "Offset."

2. This office acknowledges the OGC opinion, Reference A, which determined CRABANAC may retain without Agency salary offset any future royalties earned as a result of his literary efforts based on the fact cover does not include role of a writer.

3. As Subject's cover "activities" have been officially clarified as being only a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer for which the Agency will be making all entitlement payments and actually he will receive no funds from any cover, this paragraph, which is misleading, has no meaning in Subject's contract and it is hereby recommended that it be deleted from CRABANAC's Supplement.

4. Further, in future cases when a cover is so light that Subject will not be receiving funds from cover it is reccommended that no "Offset" paragraph be included in Supplements or Contracts.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Attachment
Ref. A and B

no action taken on
this memo.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

OGC 65-2476a

12 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Terence S. CRABANAC - Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. You have requested the opinion of this Office in regard to the retention of future royalties which might be earned by Terence S. CRABANAC as a result of his literary efforts. We believe that he is entitled to retain such royalties without an offset against his Agency salary.

2. We have been advised by Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support, that CRABANAC's cover does not include the role of a writer; CRABANAC's cover for status will only be a light one of a retired Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, paragraph 7 of his contract dated 4 July 1965 may remain as written. Royalties from the fictional works that he writes as a profitable hobby will not be emoluments received from or through his "cover activities."

Norman D. Block

NORMAN D. BLOCK
Office of General Counsel

cc: Chief, Covert Claims Branch
Mr. Gene Stevens, WE/Support

3 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Norman Block

SUBJECT : Terence S. Crabanac -- Retention of Royalties by a Contract Employee

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation of 26 July 1965 between yourself and Rogers C. Brooks of this Office wherein background information relating to the assignment of Terence S. Crabanac was discussed.

2. Subject will apparently develop a cover as a writer, a field wherein he has an already demonstrated talent based upon several publications. The objective of the cover is to provide a basis of attribution for some of his income. At the time of the preparation of Mr. Crabanac's contract, the specific detail of his cover was unknown.

3. Request your opinion in regard to the retention of possible royalties earned by Crabanac as a result of his literary efforts or whether such income should be properly offset.

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

Attachments.

OP/CPD: RCBrooks/cw: 2 August 1965

Distribution:
Orig & 1 -- Addressee
2 -- CPD

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFI[illegible]ION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WE/Support	15 July	[illegible]
2			
3	WE/BT - Stevens		
4	Re Seeing Mr. Coleman		
5	concerning P.O. Box		
6		[illegible] 9778	

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY 9235
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Assume you wish to add this to
your file. As previously stated
there is no reason for him to
have a Transportation allowance.
If you are in touch with Coleman,
pls have him see me. I want
him to get a postoffice box –
over

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/WE/3	14 July

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

(40)

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 O—587282

from Security to which he
can send his financial
accounts. This will reduce
contact with station.

WE [illegible]
CRABANAC

SECRET

8 July 1965

FINANCIAL BRIEFING REPORT

DATE : 7 July 1965 **STATUS**: Contract Employee

SUBJECT : Terence CRABANAC **COVER** : Non-Official - Writer

DESTINATION: Madrid Spain

DEPENDENTS : Wife and four children
14 12 11 and 21 mos.

Subject was advised that this briefing was being held to review with him the official financial business and personal aspects created as a result of his assignment. He was told that a report of the briefing would be prepared and that a copy would be forwarded to the KUBARK office responsible for his administration.

Subject is proceeding abroad as a retired OD CID officer who is now pursuing a career as a writer.

Subject had read his Contract. The persons present at the briefing were Subject and wife Division Budget and Fiscal Officer, payroll representative, and the undersigned Certifying Officer.

The payroll representative briefed Subject regarding his compensation, Headquarters payrolled allowances, tax withholding and deductions. proposed Foreign Duty Data Sheet was used and an official copy will be sent to the office administering Subject upon receipt of a notification Subject has arrived in place. The Tax Committee representative had briefed Subject as to the procedure by which he will fulfill his Federal tax reporting requirements - see below Section III entitled "Taxes." All questions raised by Subject during the briefing were answered to his apparent satisfaction. There were two points which were to be reviewed further by WE, they were:

a. Review of Supplement relative to quarters allowance being payrolled and non-accountable.

[illegible]
[illegible] T.A.

b. Determination of authorization and amount of a Transportation Allowance.

Plans call for Subject to establish through Monetary Division an operational bank account. This fund will serve his operational needs while in Madrid as he is to have no (or limited) contact with the Station. Highpoints of the briefing are discussed below:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

I. Funding and Accounting

A. Headquarters

(1) Will payroll Subject's compensation (and allowances) authorized deductions. . (~~Specify allowances as applicable~~)

(2) Will advance PCS travel funds and audit accounting which is to be submitted by Subject when accounting complete.

(3) Will advance funds and receive accountings for operational fund. His first accounting will be upon moving into permanent quarters, and initially quarterly thereafter, unless activity warrants more frequent accounting period.

B. Station

Will provide only emergency support as needed.

C. Cover

(1) Subject has no ligitimate cover from which through agreement with KUBARK he would receive payments.

(2) Paragraph 7 entitled OFFSET is in question with contracting office as to what is intended as Subject's only income from cover activities appear to be income from his writings. Subject is under impression income from writings not to be refundable.

No problem. Subj will have no cover income from writing. In event he should at some future time receive cover income from other source, it would be offset.

II. Terms of Contract and Additional Items

(11) Allowances -

Subject was informed that allowances were subject to fluctuation as a result of Standardized or KUBARK regulations changes.

(11a.) Subject was advised to notify Headquarters of changes in his family status as such changes would effect allowances being payrolled where rates are determined by Subject's family status.

(12) Receipts

Subject was advised that a receipt is required where practicable or a certification in lieu of receipt should be submitted for all reimburseable expenses in the amount of $15.00 or more.

(20) Travel

Subject was briefed in general regarding reimburseable incidental expenses and travel entitlements in regard to his proposed itinerary. Among the points covered were the following:

A. Per Diem rates applicable to Subject's proposed itinerary

B. Excess baggage provisions when economy/tourist flights are used

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downgrading and
declassification

C. Use of less than first class air travel accomodations

D. Use of American airlines

(30) Effects Shipment
Subject was briefed in general regarding his KUBARK authorizations as follows:

A. The combined shipping and storage of household effects is limited to 13,500 pounds net for Subject.
B. Full shipment is authorized.
C. Subject was advised the total of the amount of the effects stored and shipped shall not exceed the limitations for shipment and storage set forth as 13,500 pounds net.

(31) Unaccompanied Baggage
300 pounds net per traveller which may be used as follows: When entire journey is by surface transportation the 300 pound authorization is to be shipped by surface transportation, or can be included with household effects shipments.

(33) FOREIGN CUSTOM DUTIES
As Subject is under non-official cover he may be required to pay foreign import duty so this regulatory authorization was discussed.

(43) Transportation Allowance
Subject will be taking his personal car and reported he will be authorized a Transportation Allowance not yet determined by Division. The Allowance is to be paid monthly by Headquarters.

(51) Temporary Lodging Allowance
Subject was advised he would be entitled to this allowance and he was briefed as to its provisions as outlined in the Standardized Regulations.

(53) Permanent Personal Quarters
Subject was advised that his quarters would be administered in accordance with FR 45-10b, and then the provisions of this Regulation were explained to him. However, Division B&F Officer intends to review this point for possible contract amendment in providing a quarters allowance at maximum Standardized rate and to be non-accountable.

(60) Leave

(61a) Subject was informed of his leave balances as of 3 July 1965: A/L 374 hours and S/L 633 hours.

(63) Leave Benefits
Subject was informed of accruals, use, and carry-over for annual (360 hours) and sick leave while overseas. Also, he was informed Headquarters forwards leave balances to the field annually.

(71) Insurance
Subject was informed that costs incurred for insurance protection of baggage, effects, car and their shipment are considered personal and are not reimburseable by KUBARK.

(74) Education and Educational Travel Allowances
These regulatory provisions were discussed as the ages of Subject's children indicate his elligibility. All official employees are required to send children to U. S. Military school, Subject's allowances will be equal to that authorized for other WE non-official personnel in area.

(81) Operational Expenses
Subject was briefed in general terms regarding advances, control, safekeeping, accounting, receipts, and other supporting authoritative documentation.

(82) Operational Entertainment
A thorough briefing was given Subject regarding this topic in accordance with current regulations.

(84) Other Operational Considerations
An operational bank account is being opened through the Monetary Division to house an operational advance - amount yet undetermined. Subject was advised not to co-mingle personal funds with operational funds. Subject will submit his first accounting upon occupying permanent quarters and initially quarterly thereafter. From this account TLA and Educational allowance payments will be made and reported.

III. Taxes
Subject was advised he should file overtly only. Subject's W-2 is to be forwarded by pouch and his tax return is to be returned by pouch for mailing to U. S.

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downgrading and
declassification

IV. Banking Arrangements

A. Subject has provided Headquarters with his bank account for use as his stateside allottee.

B. An operational bank account is to be established.

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - CCB
1 - C&L
1 - Registry
1 - Payroll
1 - WE/Division

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declassification

SECRET

8 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division, O/P

SUBJECT : general - Terence S. CRABANAC - Supplement
specific - Paragraph Entitled "OFFSET"

1. This office has a question as to the intent of including paragraph (7.) entitled "OFFSET" as appears in the Contract for Terence S. CRABANAC. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

> 7. OFFSET
> Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

2. Subject reportedly is proceeding abroad under the cover of a retired Foreign Service Officer and in pursuit of his ambitions as a writer. Subject will receive all his contractual benefits through the Agency, there is no cover company, so therefore the only apparent emoluments to be received from or through his cover activities would be earnings received from articles, stories, or books written by him. Please inform this office if its interpretation is correct. If not, we would appreciate your interpretation and reasoning relative to the statement "Emoluments received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U.S. Government."

WILLIAM R. CAULFIELD
Chief, Covert Claims Branch

JUL 11 [illegible]

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Mr. Terence S. Crabanac

Dear Mr. Crabanac: :

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties you will be compensated in an amount calculated at the rate of $19,880 per annum. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments, within-grade promotions and, if applicable, a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in an approved manner. Taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance, a transfer allowance and a home service transfer allowance.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives. All accrued but unused leave credited to your former account as an appointed employee of this organization will be transferred to the leave account established for you hereunder.

(d) As a Government employee under contract converted from staff status without a break in service, it is required that you continue to make contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Such contributions (presently six and one/half per cent (6-1/2%)) will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $19,880 per annum.

(e) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Contract Employees of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

7. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions.

8. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognise and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

11. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

12. Term. This contract is effective as of 4 July 1965, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon sixty (60) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY DHL
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/S/

WITNESS:

/S/

APPROVED:

/S/

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	CASE OFFICER Gene Stevens	DIVISION SE/PI
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 7157	DATE 24 June 1965

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HR 20-620-1, HR 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All Benefits Normally Applicable To Staff Personnel Except FEGLI.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☒ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

BY ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 4 July 1965

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 60 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATIO ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, PI, PP, other)

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Intel Officer

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): ☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
24 June 65			

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use HR 20-33 and HH 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Gene Stevens
DIVISION: W [illegible] T
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 7157
DATE: 2 June 1965

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Terence S. CRABANAC

2A. PROJECT

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Madrid, Spain

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 6136-1347

3A. FUNDS ☐ V ☒ VV

4. SLOT NO.

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: 23-501

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) Staff Employee November 1949 - July 1965
Terminal Salary GS-15 step 7, $1[illegible],[illegible]0 per annum

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Type A Granted 23 June 65

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 46

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): Oct. 9, 1918

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Largo, Florida

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Bethesda, Maryland

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - 45
Dau - 14
Dau - 12
Son - 11
Son - 21 Mos.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: -----

24. RANK OR GRADE: --------

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $19,880 per annum

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: none

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

COVER		CIA	
☐	YES	☒	YES
☐	NO	☐	NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: yes

32. POST: yes

33. OTHER: Cost-of-living, Education, TLA

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife - U. S. - 45 - April 1, 1920
Dau - U. S. - 14 - March 9, 1951
Dau - U. S. - 12 - November 27, 1952
Son - U.S. - 11 - March 22, 1954
Son - U.S. - 21 mos. - September 1, 1963

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: yes, when authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: yes, when authorized

44. OTHER

6 January 1965

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Benefits & Services Division

SUBJECT : Cause of Illness - E. Howard Hunt

1. Having been requested to give an opinion regarding the origins of the duodenal ulcer for which I was hospitalized October 12-15, 1964, I believe it to have resulted from three years of work frustration and professional dissatisfactions occasioned by (a) Agency failure to assign me to an appropriate post abroad following my participation in Project JMATE, and (b) the passive, non-challenging nature of the domestic work I was given.

2. I should point out that before joining Project JMATE in May, 1960, I requested in writing, and was granted by responsible senior officials, commitment to return me to an appropriate assignment abroad upon the termination of JMATE. Despite continuing verbal assurances in the ensuing three years I was not sent abroad. Instead, I was retained in domestic duties which I felt were inconsistent with the heavier responsibilities discharged by me during a long and active operational career abroad.

3. The T/O position I have been occupying - Chief of Covert Action for DO Division - is the equivalent of my 1953-54 assignment as Chief of Covert Action for SE Division. Organisationally I am where I was 11-12 years ago, but with a smaller staff and many fewer responsibilities.

4. To me this represented a professional dead-end, without hope of promotion or foreign assignment, a situation which preoccupied my mind and in due course found physical reflection in duodenal hemorrhage.

5. For the record, the foregoing information is not volunteered, but provided in response to an official request.

HOWARD HUNT

SECRET

7 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. Howard Hunt

SUBJECT : B&C Claim

1. Returned herewith is CA-1 (in duplicate) and CA-2 (in duplicate) which you completed in connection with your recent illness.

2. The Benefits and Services Division has requested the following information:

a. Statement of medical history - Form 89 attached for this purpose.

b. Full statement from physician, or physicians, including nature of illness, treatment, prognosis and statement as to what he thinks may be the cause.

c. Statement from you, describing in full, what you think the contributing cause may be.

Virginia C. Lynch
DD/Personnel

Attachments - A/S

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP		DATE
TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION	ESTABLISHED FOR
	☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	
ATTN:		FILE NO.
REF:		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED		EMPLOYEE NO.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ Block Records:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective ______________________.

☐ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☐ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☐ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

☐ Remarks:

☐ Cover History

James H. Franklin

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

MEMORANDUM FOR ATTACHMENT TO GA-2 Filed by E. Howard Hunt

My first knowledge of Mr. Hunt's illness was on the morning of 12 October when his office informed me that he became ill and was taken to the hospital with a "bleeding ulcer". He has been on sick leave since that date.

Thos. P. Schreyer
Executive Officer

14-00000

C. W. WILCOX II, M.D.
DIRECTOR

[illegible]
DEPARTMENT OF RADIOLOGY
DRS. CROOVER, [illegible] AND [illegible]

PATIENT [illegible] AGE [illegible] DATE [illegible]
PHYSICIAN [illegible]
EXAMINATION [illegible]

Upper [illegible] study [illegible] shows [illegible] to have [illegible] The stomach empties satisfactorily.

[illegible], M.D.

LTA/sv

CHART COPY

CASASIN, Thomas B.

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Personnel File: Thomas B. CASASIN (J. Richardson)

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
[illegible] 8	[illegible] 7/8	[illegible]	[illegible]

1R

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 0037033
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS [illegible]
PREPARED:08/23/74

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (033MH71)
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 06 DA. 26 YR. 74
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER ASSOCIATE (F)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		CF TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 4136-4292
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION
UNSAVANT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPERATIONS OFFICER
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): [illegible]
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 36000 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112049 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible] REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 7503
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STATUS: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: [illegible] TRAN EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE : [illegible] DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y SID GOVT: Y
[illegible]: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
[illegible]: N [illegible] TAX RELIEF: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

ALL ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS B

PREPARED:08/11/72

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INITIAL ENTRY

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 15 YR 72

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3136-1231

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 0

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 33260 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:       24   SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV    NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:           FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                  HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                PREV. GOVT SERV: 4      SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A              A/L IND: 6              S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS          REFR ORG: EUR       PHONE: 6913
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y      FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI       OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4     DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y     PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N     OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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downgrading and
declassification

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER CC[illegible]7623	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS E		PREPARED: 10/15/73
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 10 14 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER ASSOCIATE (S)	
6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4136-424
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION UNSAVANT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17. SALARY OR RATE DOG: 020363 $ 36000 LEI: 052672

18. REMARKS ---------- STATUS INFORMATION ----------

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 112047 FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PERM. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L INC: 6 S/L INC: 4

---------- CONTRACT INFORMATION ----------

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS REFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 7503

---------- ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES ----------

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: Y DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 0057[illegible]

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN, THOMAS [illegible]

PREPARED: 0[illegible]73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 07 | 01 | 73

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER ASSOCIATE (S)

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X | CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 4150-[illegible]

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
*DDO DIRECTORATE
EUROPEAN DIVISION
*CRSAVANT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: 34971 EOD: 0[illegible] LEI: 0[illegible]

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
AGE AT EOD:      24  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: DIV     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 112049  FED SERVICE COMP: 0507[illegible]
TYP  APPOINTMENT: CIA REG                  HOSPITALIZATION: F    PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                 PREV. GOVT SERV: 4          SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A               A/L CAT: 6                  S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: [illegible] DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REPORTING OFFICER: EUR [illegible]          [illegible]            PHONE: 7503
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y      FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI       OP. EXPENSE: Y         HOUSING: [illegible]         POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4     DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y    MED SERV: Y
OVERSEAS PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : N        CLEARANCE COMP: N   EDUCATION:
STEP BONUS: N     FIT TAX CHILD: N       OTHER ALLOWNS : N   SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK [illegible] REFLECT CHANGES [illegible]

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(4-5)

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 003783	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 01/19/73
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 12 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO O ☐ O TO V ☒ O TO O	7. FAN AND FISCA 3131-4252	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE $ 34971	DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872	

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: DIV     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:*112045  FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D              HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES               PREV. GOVT SERV: 4       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L INC: 8               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NOCAD PERS       REFR ORG: NOCA     PHONE: 5050
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y    FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:         STATE:
TRAVEL: OHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y        HOUSING: A          POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4   DIFFERENTIAL: Y      OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : N      ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N   OTH TAX ENTL: N      OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 0037833	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PALP/REC:01/15/73

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 01 DA 07 YR 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NCA 3131-4292	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE ACA-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17 SALARY OR RATE DOG: 020363 $* 34971 DLI: 052872

18 REMARKS — — — — — — — — STATUS INFORMATION — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4

— — — — — — — — — — CONTRACT INFORMATION — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NCCAL PERS REFR ORG: NCCA PHONE: 5050

— — — — — — — ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES — — — — — — — — — — —

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

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8 72 MFG 9 72

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B	PREPARED: 11/03/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 11 DA. 01 YR. 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO C	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		C TO V	X	C TO C	3131-4292	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17. SALARY OR RATE DOG: 020363 $ 33260 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITALIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 3 S/L IND: 4

- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

EOD DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: NCAD PERS REFR ORG: NOCA PHONE: 5050

- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
L GIDL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : N ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 0037833
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS B
PREPARED:09/29/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 09 DA. 20 YR. 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO σ
		σ TO V	X	σ TO σ

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: *3131-4292
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
*DDP DIRECTORATE
*NON-OFFICIAL COVER ACT DIV

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 0
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 33260 DOG: 020363 LEI: 052872

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      24   SEX: M        MARITAL ST: DIV     NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP:              FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                    HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES                PREV. GOVT SERV: 4        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A              A/L IND: 8                S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER:*NOCAD PERS       REFR ORG:*NOCA      PHONE:*5050
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y    FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4   DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N   OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:
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78-02869R
Box A

/437 SECRET FRP: . . . .

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-11 INFO: FILE, RF, (13/P)

78 0582111 PAGE 001
TOT: 190843Z APR 78 WASHINGT 208255

SECRET
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 190843Z WASHINGTON 208255
TO: PARIS.

FROM: E/F/S INFO E/D/PERS, E/D/HF, OP/CPD, CCS/CSB, OED/NOC

SUBJECT: ADMIN BCHAWK WOGAME - THOMAS B. CASASIN (P)

1. ACCORDING TO MOC ON THOMAS B. CASASIN, RTACTION OBLIGATION TO REIMBURSE CASASIN FOR COST OF SHIPPING UP TO ONE THOUSAND (1000) POUNDS OF HHE FROM FRANCE TO WODUAL, EXPIRED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1977. ALL OTHER COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING EXTENSION OF CASASIN'S SERVICES UNDER MOC, EXPIRED 31 DEC 77 ALSO.

2. FYI: UNSAVANT PROJECT FOR CASASIN WAS TERMINATED AT END OF FY 76 REPEAT FY 76. PROJECT FILE BEING CLOSED AS ALL ASPECTS OF THIS CASE TERMIN ATD.

3. FILE: 029-006-252/2; 201-0933259. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: E/F/S (SANDY DELONG X9487 14 APR 78); COORD: C/E/D/PERS (DUTER), E/D/BF (YOW), OP/CPD (BROOKS), CCS/CSB (FOR INFO), OED/NOC (FOR INFO); REL: C/E/F (HORNSTEIN). CL BY 061308.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

DATE 2[illegible] 1975

TO: OFFICE OF FINANCE

VIA: CHIEF, EUR AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

FROM: CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER, PARIS

SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT OF [illegible]/2 ([illegible]) as ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (Independent Contractor) (Contract Employee)

1. TERM AND ACTIVITY CHARGE - Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Activity [illegible], effective 1 July 1975 ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ until ~~XX~~ obligation is ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ completed but not to exceed 31 December 1977. CMK

2. SECURITY APPROVAL - The appropriate security approval for subject's use has been obtained. Type (former Career Associate) dated ______.

3. CITIZENSHIP - Subject (is) (is not) a WODUAL Citizen.

4. COMPENSATION - Subject will be paid nothing per ______ in ______ currency. Describe any other compensation in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, loans, currency conversions or other ______.

5. TAXES - Explain method of collection when appropriate FLAT RATE.
(N/A, FR 20-18d applies, to be determined by Headquarters)

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE - Quarters Allowance N/A per ______.

Subsistence Allowance ______ per ______.

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES - N/A

a. Travel expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed. Fixed Payment ______.
Regular Accountings ______. Allowance of ______ per ______.

b. Other operational expenses (will) (will not) be reimbursed.
Type Expense ______; Method of Accounting ______.
Type Expense ______; Method of Accounting ______.
Type Expense ______; Method of Accounting ______.

8. OTHER COMMITMENTS - *Describe BEHERALD will reimburse CASASEN for costs of shipment of up to 1000 (one thousand) pounds of [illegible] at the conclusion of cover employment from Paris, France to [illegible]. (Scheduled for 31 May 1977)

9. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS - (Not promised Subject but may have to be met) *Describe ______
/a

NO COMMITMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE BEEN MADE TO SUBJECT.

SIGNED: Edward [illegible]
Case Officer

REVIEWED: ______
Special Contracting Officer
1/3/76

APPROVED: ______
Field Contracting Officer

*Certain special benefits or commitments require prior Headquarters approval i.e., leave, retirement, death, disability, missing in action, resettlement, escrow accounts, citizenship assistance, emergency assistance, bonus payments, and other unusual items.

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Headquarters
1 - Station Finance
1 - Subject File

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14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Pers/SP	23 FEB 1976	hy
2			
3	AD/Pers 1976	25 FE	1976
4	C/CPD		
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Recommend AD/Pers approval (albeit retroactively) of the attached request from the Chief, EUR Division to extend the MOC for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an independent contractor without compensation beginning 1 July 1975. The only benefit payable under the MOC will be a taxable payment for the shipment in 1977 of 1,000 lbs., of personal effects from Paris to the United States.

Subject, now age 52, retired under CIARDS 28 June 1974 as a GS-15 (Step 10) career associate. On 24 June 1974, D/Pers approved a request to engage him as an independent contractor for a one-year period beginning 1 July 1974 at an annual fee of $8,000.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/CPD, 5 E 67, Hqtrs 7841	23 Feb 76

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FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions ☆ GPO 1974 O - (40)

SECRET

76-0561

76-376

29 JAN 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Request for Extension of the Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P), Retired Annuitant, under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Action Requested: Your approval is requested to extend the services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P) under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977. The only compensation to CASASIN would be money equivalent to shipment costs for a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States. Since CASASIN is an Independent Contractor, the amount of money given CASASIN will be considered taxable income for tax year 1977.

2. Basic Data and Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. Twelve years of this period were spent as a Staff Employee, seven of which were at Headquarters and five years, 1955-1960, were spent in Tokyo. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under nonofficial cover as a Staff Agent. In 1972 he was converted to Career Associate status to coincide with his cover employment with UNESCO, a position he attained on his own initiative. CASASIN retired as a GS-15, Step 10, on 30 June 1974 and with proper Headquarters approvals was utilized by Paris Station as an Independent Contractor, effective 1 July 1974. His compensation was in accordance with the 90 percent provision of HR 20-13 a(1) (c) (1).

3. Staff Position: Due to his growing employment involvement at UNESCO, CASASIN requested, and the Paris Station agreed, not to renew his written Independent Contract, due for renewal 1 July 1975. However, since CASASIN is willing to meet informally

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 057567

SECRET

with the Station, the Station requests a Memorandum of Oral Commitment to be effective for the period CASASIN remains in UNESCO's employ, which is expected to terminate in 1977. CASASIN's experience as an Operations Officer and, specifically, experience and operational contacts derived through his present employment position in Paris are sufficiently valued by the Paris Station to request the continuation of CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

4. Recommendation: Your approval is requested to continue CASASIN's services under a Memorandum of Oral Commitment for the period 1 July 1975 to 31 December 1977 with total compensation being money equivalent to the cost of shipping a maximum of 1,000 pounds of personal effects from Paris, France, to the United States.

William W. Wells
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

Deputy Director for Operations — Date: 17 Feb 1976

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date: 25 FEB

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel — Date

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : Career Management Group,
Contract Personnel Branch

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN (P)
Termination of contract

This is to advise you that Thomas B. CASASIN'S (P) contract expired 30 June 1975. It is requested that CASASIN'S contract be terminated effective that date.

Gerald K. Hughes, Jr.
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

APPROVED:
/s/ [illegible] W. Sandman
Special Contracting Officer

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 027164

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
~~Mr. Jacques C. Richardson~~
Casasin, Thomas B.

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-15 Equiv. Position : Career Associate
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Europe Division
Date Requested for Retirement : 28 June 1974
Age at that Date : 50
Years of Creditable Service : 30
Years of Agency Service : 24
Years of Qualifying Service : 19

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommended that the request be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

B. DeFelice
Director of Personnel

4. The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved:

/s/ Harold L. Brownman

Deputy Director for Management and Services

[illegible]
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

3595 (4-74)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 026653

Distribution:
- 0 - Return to Director of Personnel
- 2 - DD/M&S
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - Applicant
- 1 - OPF
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OP/RAD/ROB/WFMadigan:cam/3257 (27 June 1974)

SECRET

CERTIFICATION BY THOMAS B. CASASIN CAREER ASSOCIATE, AS TO EXPENDITURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ALLOWANCE

I certify that the Administrative Allowance payments made to me in accordance with the provisions of the Addendum to the Agency contract dated 5 August 1972 and any amendments and extensions thereto have, to the best of my knowledge and belief, been used substantially for the purpose for which provided and have not accrued to my personal advantage or enrichment.

[illegible]	SIGNED
Date	Thomas B. Casasin

E2IMPDET.
CL by: 063837

OUTG NG MESSAGE

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12 - 1

PAGE OF PAGES

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF 162304Z DIRECTOR 696231

CONF: EUR 4 INFO: FILE CMG/NOC 3 EMP/MS CCS 2

OP

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TO: PARIS.Y

WODEEP ADMIN Y

REFS: A. PARIS 56954 | IN 578647 |

B. OFAT-1377, 29 MAY 74 Y

NEED TO KNOW DATE WHEN CASASIN WILL CONCLUDE UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. SECTION I (C) NOC STATUS REPORT FORWARDED REF B STATES HE ON THREE-YEAR EXTENSION CONTRACT WITH UNCAIRD TO END JUNE 1977. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.A

C/EUR/PERS Stephen C. Ertz

CMG/NOC GEORGE MARLING (PHONE)

E/NOC E Sullivan

E/BF P. Yew

DATE: 16 MAY 75
ORIG: BARBARA GENTILE
UNIT: E/F/S
EXT: 9487

C/E/SS — RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/F — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT
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OP 2. OF 2, CMG/MS

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2		5	
3		6	

T 011629 EIA530 PAGE 01-01 IN 578647
TOR:131043Z MAY 75 PARI 56954

SECRET 131003Z MAY 75 STAFF

CITE PARIS 56954

TO: DIRECTOR,

WODEEP ADMIN

1. THOMAS B. CASASIN HAS GIVEN NOTICE THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO RENEW HIS CONTRACT WHICH TERMINATES 30 JUNE 1975. HE CITES HIS GROWING INVOLVEMENT AT UNCAIRD AS THE REASON.

2. HE HAS AGREED TO FUTURE MEETINGS WITH STATION OFFICERS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION HE ASKS ONLY THAT HIS ENTITLEMENT FOR SHIPMENT OF HEE TO THE U.S. BE KEP OPEN UNTILHE CONCLUDES HIS UNCAIRD EMPLOYMENT. STATION WILL WRITE A MOC COVERING THIS CONTINGENCY. PLEASE ADVISE YOUR CONCURRENCE.
E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 20 May 1975

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-three and seven-tenths (23.7) per cent	1 May 1975	

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

GEORGE S. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

22 MAY 1975
Date

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SECRET

FORM 11-73 2643 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(1-4-21)
E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

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SECRET

DATE: 13 December 1974

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twelve and nine-tenths (12.9)	1 December 1974	1975

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

[illegible]
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Rogers C. Brooke
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

26 DEC 1974
Date

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OFAT-1492
6 Aug 74

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 128609	2. NAME (last, first, middle) CASASIN, Thomas B. (P)	3. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jun 24	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Associate - Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	9. CURRENT STATION Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH	X	REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-)
1 January 74-30 June 74

13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM IN LIEU.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 3-73 45N

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2. IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Thomas B. CASASIN

PERIOD COVERED: January - June 1974

Although I have been the Station case officer for Subject only since January 1974, I have been acquainted with his performance for the Station for the past 5 1/2 years through my assignment in the French Branch at Headquarters and, for the past 2 1/2 years, as the Station officer responsible for UNCAIRD operations. I have always considered CASASIN to be a highly skilled, experienced senior case officer thoroughly devoted to the work of BKHERALD. He is becoming increasingly effective in his present cover position at UNCAIRD, operating against both Soviet and PRC targets, and I am delighted that he has agreed to continue his cooperation with the Station as a field agent following his retirement from BKHERALD effective 30 June 1974. CASASIN can look back with pride over his years of service with BKHERALD but he can also look forward to additional years of highly useful, productive work for Paris Station.

CASASIN's attitude can best be summed up by a comment on my first operational meeting with him following his official retirement. He instinctively went immediately to a discussion of operations, not of retirement. I am confident that CASASIN will continue to be a highly motivated, effective asset of Paris Station, and I wish him well.

John H. Kenney
Operations Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

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SECTION D

The attached Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report should be read in conjunction with the NOC Status Report on Subject for the period ending 31 March 1974; these reports overlap somewhat in the period covered. As has been indicated by both Russell N. SKOGSBERG, who prepared Section I, and George T. HEMSLEY, who prepared Section III of the NOC Status Report, Subject is an impressive officer who has developed superb cover for himself but who has been only reasonably effective in identifying, developing and turning over useful access agents to the Station. While endorsing the general thrust of the Memorandum in Lieu of a Fitness Report, the undersigned also feels that Subject should bring a sharper focus to bear on developing in-depth relationships with those persons who have the potential of becoming quality access agents to priority targets. Subject meets and knows many people in his milieu, including Soviets; he reports in considerable volume on these contacts. We encourage him to concentrate on a few of these contacts and to plumb them to their depths. The undersigned joins SKOGSBERG in wishing Subject well and in paying recognition to his motivation and his attitude.

Subject's Specific Duties remained essentially as described in his previous Fitness Report (for the period 1 January - 31 December 1973). I would rate him on these Specific Duties as he was previously rated.

/s/ Oleg Selsky

Operations Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8.

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT including Section D.	DATE 6 Aug 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (*in pseudonym*) Thomas B. CASASIN
2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.		
DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (*in pseudonym*) Edwin E. [illegible] for Russell N. SKOGSBERG	
DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (*in pseudonym*) Edward J. HEROSIAN Edward J. Herosian	

FORM 3-73 45A OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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E 2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

(04-47)

SECRET

DATE: 23 July 1974

CTC NO. 110

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax Assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Eighteen and seven-tenths (18.7)	23 June 1974	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

25 JUL 1974
Date

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T 431289 EIA505 PAGE 01-01 IN 365718

TOR:201235Z SEP 74 PARI 51247

S E C R E T 201107Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 51247 (HEMSLEY ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

ADMIN PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 599151

EDWIN E. HAURONIC WITNESSED SIGNING OF CASASIN'S CONTRACT. E2 IMPDET.

luth

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CMG/CP

SUBJECT : Inclusion of HHE shipment in contract for Independent Contractor, Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. It is requested that the new contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P) include shipment of HHE for him and his dependents and POV as well as storage of household effects.

2. CASASIN retired from the Agency 28 June 1974, and by regulation is entitled to movement of HHE up to one year. An extension of an additional six months can be requested, but beyond that CASASIN would not be covered.

3. EUR has been granted approval to hire CASASIN under a Paris Station project. His cover job contract has been approved until May 1977, at which time he plans to return to the United States.

4. Therefore, EUR recommends his contract include the benefits of shipment of HHE, POV, and storage of goods to his place of legal residence upon the successful completion of his services.

George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

CONCUR:

CMG/CP
for

19 JUL 1974
Date

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

CONFIDENTIAL

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CCS/CSB GH-43 Hqs.	EXTENSION 5029	NO. CSB 74-254	DATE 27 June 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. OP/CPD 5E-69 Hqs.				This individual is being retained as an independent contractor after retirement. Geo. P.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

CSB 74-254

26 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT: Mr. Jacques G. Richardson

1. This is to advise you that Mr. Richardson will be placed under the covert annuity plan administered by the Cover and Commercial Staff effective upon his retirement in June 1974. He has also been placed under the Combined Group Investments (C.G.I.) plan for hospitalization insurance.

2. All future correspondence with Mr. Richardson will be handled through the Cover and Commercial Staff.

GEORGE S. POWELL
Chief
Cover Support Branch
Cover & Commercial Staff

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063851

SECRET

Jacques
Richardson

Sal. 36000

90% 32400

Annuit 22-24 K.

8000 is
within 90% rule

Age 50

Thomas B. CASASIN GS-15^{10}

22,332 annuity per annum

36,000	current salary GS-15^{10}
3600	less 10%
32,400	
22 332	less annuity
10,068	

Annuity figure from Bill Madigan, RDB,
27 Jan 74
CMcL

SECRET

[illegible]/C 74-3322

26 JUN 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Request for Approval to Utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : DD/P 6-1818, 2 May 1966

1. Action Requested: The European Division requests approval to utilize Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor subject to the terms regarding employment of annuitants as set forth in the reference. CASASIN has just opted for retirement under the Agency Retirement Program effective 28 June 1974.

2. Basic Data or Background: CASASIN, born 20 January 1924, has been employed by the Agency since 1949. He held several positions in Headquarters and from February 1955 until October 1960 served in Tokyo. Until his departure for Paris he served as a Branch Chief in the then SR Division. In 1962 CASASIN was assigned to Paris under non-official cover as a Staff Agent to work on the Soviet target. He remained a Staff Agent until his conversion to Career Associate status in 1972.

3. Staff Position: In 1972, with Paris Station approval, CASASIN on his own initiative obtained an editorial position with IDENTITY. This cover job affords him the unique opportunity to establish and maintain contact and access to a variety of target personalities. Despite a heavy cover load, he has been able to make useful operational contributions

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055747

SECRET

to the overall Station effort against the Soviet Bloc and more recently, the PRC target. His current appointment with IDENTITY has recently been extended until 31 May 1977. We would like to continue to utilize CASASIN's professional talents and his natural sustained access to priority targets in IDENTITY. CASASIN will retire at the GS-15 step 10 level. In accordance with Agency regulations CASASIN's proposed gross annual contract salary of $8,000 plus his annuity will not exceed ninety percent of his salary at the time of retirement.

4. Recommendation: It is requested that approval be granted to employ Thomas B. CASASIN (P) as an Independent Contractor.

A Roosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

CONCUR:

William E Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

27 July 1974
Date

APPROVED:

Wm Janney
Director of Personnel

27 June 74
Date

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

CONFIDENTIAL

7 AUG 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CMG/CP

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

This is to inform you that Career Associate Thomas B. CASASIN (P) retired from the Agency on 28 June 1974. His contract is terminated effective as of that date.

George W. Owens
George W. Owens
Chief, Personnel Section
European Division

Distribution:
Original &① - Adse.

APPROVED:
/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Special Contracting [illegible]

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 033769

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 28 April 1974, to offset dollar appreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,741 for the figure $14,981.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

APPROVED:

for Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL by: 063837

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For **Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN**

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Mr. Casasin

Effective the day following your departure from **Paris, France** for home leave, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowances" of your current Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) is hereby (further) amended:

1) By substituting the figure **$6,877** for the figure **$13,741**; and

2) By extending the period covered through the day prior to your PCS return to **Paris, France** following home leave.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 14 November 1973

CTC NO. 210

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION : Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Tax assessment for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. A flat rate percentage covert tax assessment of this individual's gross taxable Agency entitlements has been approved as indicated below. An acknowledged Letter of Tax Instruction ______________ forwarded. The ____________________________ advised of this assessment. This rate is to be applied to the individual's gross taxable earnings.

Assessment Rate (Percentage)	Effective Date	Tax Year
Twenty-eight and seven-tenths (28.7)	9 December 1973	1974

2. This is a revised assessment.

3. Other payroll factors pertinent to this tax assessment action are as follows:

GEORGE S. POWELL
Executive Secretary
Covert Tax Board

CONTRACT APPROVAL:

/s/ Charles W. Sandman
Chief, Contract Personnel Division

16 NOV 1973
Date

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP: 112330Z

DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 465807

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TO: PARIS.

ADMIN FINANCE WODEEP

1. REQUEST THOMAS B. CASASIN FORWARD HQS ASAP COPIES OF HIS COVER PAY STATEMENTS FOR FEB & MARCH 73.

2. LATEST COVER PAY STATEMENTS INDICATE INCREASE ALLOWANCE OF $260.67 PER MONTH MADE IN FEB OR MARCH 73. COVER PAY OFFSET 1 FEB 73 THRU 15 SEPT 73 WAS $12,631.28. ANALYSIS BASED ON COVER PAY STATEMENTS IN HAND HQS FOR APRIL, MAY & JUNE 73 EXTENDED THRU 15 SEPT 73 INDICATES OFFSET SHOULD HAVE BEEN $14,307.57, WHICH RESULTS IN REFUND DUE FROM CASASIN OF $1,676.29. NET PAY DUE NOW $787.87 PER PAY PERIOD. ALL NET PAY DUE CASASIN WILL BE WITHHELD UNTIL REFUND DUE - $1,676.29 IS LIQUIDATED.

3. IF PROPOSED METHOD OF REFUND REPAYMENT CITED PARA 2 ABOVE UNACCEPTABLE TO CASASIN, PLEASE ADVISE. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 11 OCT 73
ORIG: J. A. PAVLICK
UNIT: E/BF
EXT: 86657

OF/C&TD/D. LAURLEY/TELECOORD

C/E/SS RELEASING OFFICER — C/E/F COORDINATING OFFICERS — E/BF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN

1. Effective 1 July 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $14,981 for the figure $13,494.

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Kenneth C. Rushworth
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

for Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CL by: 026715

SECRET

27 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : EUR/Contract Personnel

SUBJECT : Changes in Financial Analysis Number
Personal Services of Thomas B. CASASIN (P)
OBJECT CLASS: ____________________

It is requested that the cost of personal services for subject Career Agent be changed, effective the pay period beginning 1 July 1973 from Financial Analysis Number 3131-4292 to 4136-4292 (UNSAVANT)

EUR DIVISION BUDGET OFFICER

APPROVED:
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]D TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (In pseudonym) Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Reginald M. GUNION Reginald M. Gunion
DATE 31 January 73	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Joseph H. Rilander Joseph H. RILANDER

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE CS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 28 February 1973	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 February - 31 December 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains direct long-term contact with CKPOLAR personnel and exploits these contacts for operational objectives.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, subject began a new job in an upper-level, executive capacity with an international organization. He obtained this job without BKHERALD assistance and the salary offsets approximately 60% of the total cost of this activity. This cover job was possible because of subject's extensive, solid background in scientific journalism and his French fluency. His cover is impeccable because he is capable of a first class, professional performance on this job and he was selected for the job solely on his professional qualifications in competition with other highly-qualified persons.

A solid cover situation is useful only to the extent that it serves as a base for BKHERALD activities. Despite a full time job and unwitting superiors and co-workers, Subject has done a full time job for BKHERALD. He has maintained an intensive dialogue with one Soviet official, frequent contact with others, and he is developing additional Soviet contacts in his cover organization. He has also established initial contacts with Chinese officials and has laid the foundation, through the cover organization, to develop and maintain direct and long-term contact with certain of these targets. He has been effective and ingenious in devising direct access to this difficult target and to others having access.

Subject devotes about 50% of his operational effort to the Soviet and Chinese targets. His operational reporting reflects these priorities and it is timely,

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		/s/ Joseph I. Saltsman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

During the period under review, this NOC moved into a highly sensitive but potentially very valuable new cover situation, in which he has infinitely greater access to Soviet and Chinese targets. The NOC is also superbly equipped to handle this new position, by virtue of previous experience, linguistic competence and substantive knowledge of the field of endeavor. He should, in our judgment, do a first-class job, both for the cover employer, and for the Organization as well.

With respect to the specific duties set forth in the first section of this report, this reviewer would not have rated specific duty number two at the "O"

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		/s/ Hugh R. Montgomery

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

complete and literate. Despite his relative isolation as a NOC, he is well aware of priority objectives, concentrates his efforts in these areas and does not waste time on operationally marginal activities.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKHERALD personnel but his cover job provides supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

SECTION D (cont'd) REVIEWING OFFICIAL

level; in point of fact, it would, in the writer's opinion, merit a solid "S", but no more. Recognizing that such ratings are perforce subjective, and that the rating officer has a closer, almost daily experience factor, nonetheless, the reviewer simply does not believe that the written record of the NOC's accomplishments on the specific targets will support an "O" rating at this time. Even accepting the limitations which the cover situation imposes upon the NOC, he has still not performed in a manner which would correspond to the literal definition of "O".

Other than this divergency, the reviewer shares the laudatory comments set forth in the narrative on this NOC. He is all the things the rater has stated and more: highly intelligent, versatile, linguistically extremely well qualified, and professionally experienced in his cover role. He has begun very well to utilize this new cover position on the Organization's behalf, and it is quite accurate to note that the NOC landed this particular plum (in terms of competition for the cover vacancy) solely on the basis of his own demonstrated talents in the cover context.

In sum, this is an experienced, effective NOC, whose new cover affords him an expanded natural access to a host of the Station's primary targets; he has begun to exploit this access in a sound, logical fashion, and the period ahead should further document the utility of his key situation to our operational programs. In fairness to all concerned, it is simply too early in this new position to attempt a definitive judgment of the depth of access which can be derived from it.

Comments by Chief, EUR France:

Although concurring with an overall rating of "S", I consider the "O" ratings for specific duties numbers one and two to be somewhat high and I recommend an "S" for both. Casasin certainly has maintained his cover and we anticipate he will be able to preserve it in his new job. He has just begun to initiate contacts with Soviet personnel of operational interest and it remains to be seen how effectively Casasin can exploit this situation.

Frederick A. Allner, Jr.

Frederick A. Allner, Jr.
C/E/F

ATTACHMENT - FITNESS REPORT - Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

NOCAD/MB REVIEWING OFFICER COMMENTS:

Whether Specific Duty No. 1 is rated "O" (as by the Station rater and reviewer) or "S" (as by the EUR Division reviewer), the fact remains that CASASIN is melding his overt life and operational activity against a primary Station target with a degree of success not often achieved by Agency officers.

CASASIN's response to requirements based in NOCAD administrative and managerial responsibilities has been prompt and efficient; in this additional specific duty we rate his performance "Strong".

In view of his initiative and competence in a demanding and sensitive NOC assignment, NOCAD agrees with CASASIN's overall performance rating of "Strong".

/s/ Charles J. Beckman
Charles J. Beckman
Chief, NOCAD/Management Branch

10 APR 1973
Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Administrative Allowance Committee

SUBJECT : Fixed Allowance Amendment for

~~Career Associate, Thomas B. CASASIN~~

1. Effective 14 February 1973, to offset dollar depreciation, the fixed allowance for Subject is revised by substituting the figure $13,694 for the figure $12,234. (   )

2. All other provisions of the current Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

Allowance Committee

SECRET

E2IMPDET
CLby 026715

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Official Personnel File

SUBJECT : Richardson, Jacques F.
CASASIN, T. B.

1. Studies in Intelligence is the Agency's quarterly professional journal. It publishes a wide variety of unique material—historical, analytical, technical, etc.—on all aspects of intelligence both as a profession and as a function of national security and foreign policy. Employees whose writings are accepted for publication make a valuable contribution to the Agency's work which ought to be reflected in their official files.

2. Accordingly, the Board of Editors wishes to record the fact that Studies in Intelligence has published the following material submitted by Mr. Richardson:

Article: "What to Do with Defectors" - Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1961)

Letter to the Editor - Vol. IX, No. 4 (Fall 1965)

Hugh T. Cunningham
HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Chairman, Board of Editors
Studies in Intelligence

Distribution:
0 - Subject's Official File
1 - NOCAD/Pers

[illegible]

Thomas B. Casasin

Date	Action	Compensation	Grade
15 MAY 72	Career Agent	33,260	GS-15/
7 JAN 73	LPI	34,971	GS-15

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Career Agent, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 7 September 1972, paragraph (A) entitled "Fixed Allowance" of your Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972, is amended by substituting the figure $12,234 for the figure $11,769 to reflect your total HHE storage cost.

All other provisions of your Allowance Committee Addendum remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SIG...

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

18 DEC

____
Allowance Committee

Note: CASASIN was converted from Staff Agent to Career Agent status, effective 15 May 1972. The conversion does not affect any provisions of his Allowance Committee Addendum dated 18 April 1972.

E2IMPDET
CLby 027015

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Thomas B. Casasin	DATE (from item 5-1) 26 Sept 73	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) David E. Murphy	DATE (from item 5-2) 3 Oct 73
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 20 Oct 73	DISPATCH NUMBER: OPAT4785	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	2. SERVICE DESIGN CS	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION; TITLE AND GRADE ACC, Car Assoc, GS15	4. STATION OR BASE Paris	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER UNCAI.D
6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 10 Sep 62 3 Apr 72	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE o/a 15 May 1974	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ o/a 25 May 1974	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE same	

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

1 daughter, aged 20 (already actually back at her university)

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My two-year contract with UNCAIRD ends officially 14 May 1974; it is, theoretically, renewable.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR *(see special note on transmittal form).*
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Have continued my spotting and assessment functions, mainly of MKHAR.H and TAPPLE individuals on a selected basis but of third and fourth nationals as well. Have concentrated on two particular MKHASH targets, while assuming new cover responsibilities and managing a fairly large-scale, authentic cover property in the field of mass communication. Have also responded to Station investigative needs in fields other than my own, and have maintained a continuing relationship with a high-level, well placed MKHA[illegible] political-technical management personality. Have also developed a minor, yet well-placed [illegible] personality in the field of technical innovation and management.

Have arranged to travel to various venues of technical and scientific meetings for appropriate coverages of personalities or substance, as the case required.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

I believe that there is none indicated at the present time, especially in view of the time and schedule demanded by my cover functions.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I think that in view of the difficulty of obtaining, through legitimate means, the kind of cover assignment I have at the present time, I should stay where I am.

Having said that, Headquarters may wish to give consideration to my moving to a position analogous to the one I have in another organization which is comparable in access and movement to what we know to be the case in UNCAIRD.

I would like, at any rate, to be able to continue to use the French language operationally.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

2 EXTEND TOUR 6 to 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Oct 74 - Apr 75 (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE [illegible] 2ND CHOICE [illegible] 3RD CHOICE [illegible]

3 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION; INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIAL REGION.
1ST CHOICE Geneva 2ND CHOICE Brussels 3RD CHOICE Black Africa

1 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Station recommends approval of extension. If CASASIN retains present, excellent cover with international organization, it is a natural for coverage of primary targets.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Hqs approves home leave in April 1974 and new tour.

DATE 13 April 74 TITLE Personnel Off SIGNATURE Marjorie Galey

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:
Home leave in April 1974 followed by a new tour.

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. [illegible] DATED: 13 Feb 197[illegible]

CABLE NO. ____ DATED: ____

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ____ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ____

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OFAT-1110
19 Feb 74

FITNESS REPORT	NOTE: Supervisor or Reviewing Official may assign a higher classification if CONFIDENTIAL is not adequate for the report when completed.

SECTION A. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 128609	2. NAME (last, first, middle) CASASIN, Thomas B.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-15	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Associate	8. OFF. DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	9. CURRENT STATION Paris

10. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		CAREER PROVISIONAL		RESERVE
	CONTRACT		SPECIAL		TEMPORARY

11. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		21-MONTH		30-MONTH		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From-to-) 1 Jan 73-31 Dec 73	13. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 28 February 1974

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Exploits his natural access to Soviet personnel for operational needs.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Exploits his wide range of contacts inside and outside his cover organization for operational purposes.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Makes imaginative use of cover position to meet Chinese officials at international conferences.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

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CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report, Subject has settled into his new cover job as an upper-level executive in an international organization. This salary offsets approximately 40% of the cost of maintaining this NOC in Paris. His cover is, however, excellent for other than financial reasons: Subject's experience and skills are such that he is admirably qualified to perform the job and is doing outstanding work in the eyes of his peers and supervisors, all of whom are unwitting. More importantly, it places him in a situation where he has normal, daily contact with numerous Soviet officials and by skillful use of his cover job he concocts logical reasons for contacting Chinese officials to whom he does not have natural access. In addition to direct contact to target individuals, Subject uses his position to spot and assess co-workers having access to Station targets.

The area of Subject's performance most in need of strengthening is follow-up development of operational targets. His cover situation is somewhat unique for an NOC in that it puts him in daily contact with his priority target group: Soviet officials and other potential agents having direct access to Soviet officials. This access is not fully exploited. He should make a concerted effort to expand social and/or business contacts with the four or five Soviet officials who work in close proximity to him and to seek out and assess eight or ten third

//continued//

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 Feb 74	/s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Operations Officer	/s/ Oleg N. Selsky for Joe Irl Saltsman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the supervisor's letter ratings and with the substance of his narrative comments. Put as simply as possible, Subject has done an outstanding job in establishing superb access cover; it now remains for him and the Station to exploit it operationally. On the basis of his ability during the reporting period to establish meaningful relationships with target Soviets or to spot and assess leads to potential agents who can, Subject's retention is this assignment would not be justified in terms of costs. The 40% rebate does make this effort entirely defensible, however, but Subject should understand that we expect more concrete results now that his cover position has been solidified.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
12 Feb 74	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ John W. Berg

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C - Narrative Comments (continued)

country nationals who work in the same offices as these Soviet officials. The objective is more first hand reporting by Subject on Soviet officials and assessment reports on several of his co-workers who can be selected and recruited (based on his assessment reports) by other case officers to serve as access agents to Soviet officials.

Despite long service as an NOC, Subject's knowledge of and responsiveness to Organization priorities and requirements has not weakened. He concentrates on priority targets and his operational reporting is complete, on target and highly literate.

As is normal in an NOC position, Subject has no supervisory duties over Organization personnel although his cover job does include supervisory responsibilities. Subject is meticulous in his presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest. There are no administrative problems related to this project.

CONFIDENTIAL

FITNESS REPORT - FIELD TRANSMITTAL

20 Jan 74

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel.

SECTION A, items 2, 3, 7, and 8

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 (*Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature"*)

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 15 II 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym) Thomas B. Casasin Thomas B. CASASIN

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS.

DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym) Reginald M. GUNION for
DATE 12 Feb 74	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (in pseudonym) George T. HEMSLEY

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CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(04-47)

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : [redacted] CASASIN, T B.

Contact C/CPD prior to servicing any request for verification of Agency service.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

NOTE: Subject converted from Staff Agent status to Career Agent status effective 15 May 1972; this should be placed in his terminated Staff Agent file.

SECRET

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP

This is to advise that Thomas B. CASASIN (P) has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 15 May 1972. The contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/EUR.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Former Staffer (Stf Agnt)

SECRET
GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/F		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 March 1972	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 71 - 31 March 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintenance of effective NOC status and functioning as a WOMACE officer in this situation.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains direct contact with MHHARSH personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides spotting reports on wide range of contacts and follows up with additional meetings when individual is of special interest to Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to Station requirement for information on individuals or organizations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Operational reporting.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 10 APR 1972	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds must be commented on if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period covered by this report subject's job with a scientific publication was terminated for economy reasons. He has now, by his own efforts and with no BKTRUST help, obtained a similar position (as of mid-March the contract has not been signed but it is almost certain that he has the job) with an international organization. The job is at a professional level with a salary that will offset approximately 40% of the total cost of this activity. His French fluency and background in scientific journalism were instrumental in obtaining this job. Subject's operational security is good and all indications are that his cover security is superb.

Despite a full time cover job, and completely unwitting employer, subject has maintained a high output for BKTRUST. He has maintained frequent and meaningful contact with two MHHARSH nationals in Paris and with an MHHARSH couple in another European city. The flow of spotting reports is equal in number and quality to those produced when his cover work was less demanding. One person spotted and assessed by subject was successfully recruited by an "inside" case officer. Subject's cover situation precludes the possibility of his recruiting.

/continued/

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 March 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Joe IRL Saltzman

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet.

DATE 27 March 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE (continued)

It has been noted in past fitness reports that subject was weak in long-range, operational development of a target. The ease and probable success of an extended development is a function of the personalities involved. During this reporting period subject has conducted a sustained development of an MHHARSHER despite their different ages and divergent personalities thus demonstrating improvement in this area.

It some times appears that subject's reporting could be more precise and more closely attundd to BKTRUST objectives. This is probably the result of time limitations,and the NOC officer's knowledge of BKTRUST needs is lessened by his relative isolation.

As is normal in a NOC situation, subject has no supervisory duties with BKTRUST personnel. His cover job provided supervisory responsibility. Subject is meticulous in presentation of financial accountings and his operational expenses are modest.

SECRET

Section 3 - Comments by Reviewing Official

The career of this NOC officer has reached a crucial juncture; if, as we currently anticipate, he succeeds in landing the position for which he appears to have the inside track, he will gain access to an institution and its employees which could prove to be invaluable. His new function will permit the widest possible access to a variety of targets, and with careful guidance, his utility as a spotter and assessor should improve very substantially.

The report notes that this officer has conducted a lengthy dialogue with an MHHARSH target; it is quite accurate that our NOC has handled himself well in a situation where disparity in age and background renders the relationship somewhat incongruous. Nonetheless, accuracy requires that we record that the NOC's interlocutor has obviously not maintained this ongoing relationship solely for altruistic motives, and has, in point of fact, on one occasion suggested that the NOC might wish to "help" him in the preparation of restricted distribution reports on the local situation, even though the particular topic was in itself totally innocuous. For these reasons we continue to monitor this relationship with great care, particularly since we simply cannot assess its longer range viability and the direction it is likely to take.

In sum, the NOC has done the best he could under somewhat trying circumstances, exacerbated by the severe economic problems of his erstwhile employer, which led to the NOC's being separated from that position at the end of last year. Through his own efforts, the NOC learned of the vacancy for which he has applied, and by assiduous and discriminating manipulation of his extensive connections on the local scene, has managed to maneuver himself into becoming the leading candidate for the post. If he is accepted for this position, his value to the Organization will unquestionably increase by a quantum leap, and we are consequently optimistic concerning his future ability to make an impressive contribution to Organizational goals on the local scene.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 13-1

S E C R E T

ORIG: Tom Roberts
UNIT: 9235
EXT: E/F/X
DATE: 1 June 1972

M
3

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 43 PER _______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: EUR 5 INFO: FILE VR. NOP CCS 2 NOCAA 2 CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 01 Jun 72 23 10z CITE DIRECTOR 274972

TO PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: DIRECTOR 271979

1. HQ INSTRUCTED CASASIN THAT IF UNCAIRD RAISES WITH HIM QUESTION OF FRC "NO RECORD" RESPONSE TO UNCAIRD QUERY RE HIS FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD REFER UNCAIRD TO IDEN. CASASIN SHOULD SAY HE CONSULTED IDEN ON RECENT VISIT RE HIS ACCRUED SERVICE CREDITS WITH VIEW TO WITHDRAWING THEIR CASH VALUE SINCE HE DOES NOT INTEND REENTER U.S. GOVT SERVICE. CASASIN SHOULD SAY IDEN CHECKED AND ACKNOWLEDGED CASASIN'S PREVIOUS SERVICE AND CAN VERIFY SAME TO UNCAIRD. ADVISE HDQ IF CASSASIN USES ABOVE AND IDEN WILL BE ALERTED.

2. [illegible]

3. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ________
NOC/CS ________
CCS/CSB ________

J Keith Reid
C/EUR/SS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

TOM ROBERTS
E/F/X
5295
26 MAY 1972

SECRET

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed)

SECRET

26 MAY 72 23 03Z

CITE DIRECTOR 271978

7/499

PARIS

RYBAT ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP WOGAME

REF: PARIS 27951 (IN 597183)

1. UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION CASASIN HAS BEEN CANCELLED.

2. ALSO TAKING MEASURES BACKSTOP PRIOR EMPLOYMENT. BUT REGRET IT NOT POSSIBLE BACKSTOP WITH FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES FRC ITS RESPONSE WILL BE "NO RECORD."

3. IF UNCAIRD QUERIES SKOGSBERG DELEGATION RE FRC RESPONSE, PRESUME SKOGSBERG CAN ARRANGE REPLY THAT "FRC IN ERROR" BECAUSE CSC INVESTIGATION CONSISTENT CASASIN'S CURRICULUM VITAE.

4. NO FILE.

END OF MESSAGE

E/COV ED WILT (IN DRAFT)

OS/OSD/SAB LARRY MILLS (TELECORD)

NOC/CS BILL BROWN (TELECORD)

CCS/

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG: ROBERT JARMAN V/
UNIT: C/E/S
DATE: 5 APRIL 1972

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16-2

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ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☒ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: EUR6 | INFO | FILE, VR, NOIAD3, OP2, CCS2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

[illegible] 72 [illegible]

TO PARIS

252752

ADMIN TOPSY WODEEP

1. FOLLOWING IS STATUS REPORT ON TALKS WITH CASASIN RE CONVERSION TO CAREER AGENT:

A. PROCESSING FOR CONVERSION DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH CASASIN AND HE AGREEABLE TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT, WHICH NOW IN PROCESS. CONTRACT WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED.

B. IN ORDER CONVERT CASASIN TO CAREER AGENT IT NECESSARY ~~TO~~ ALLOW HIM RETAIN PORTION OF COVER SALARY IN LIEU OF 10% LOSS OF STAFF STATUS PAY AND TO MOVE HIM FROM GS-15/8 TO 15/10 LEVEL. ABOVE WILL BE SPELLED OUT FULLY IN CONTRACT.

C. CASASIN WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO ~~[illegible]~~ WODEEP UPON DATE OF HIS ACCEPTANCE BY UNCAIRD.

2. SHOULD CASASIN NOT BE ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, HQS RECOMMENDATION, SUBJECT TO STATION CONCURRENCE, WOULD BE FOR CASASIN TO REMAIN PARIS AS STAFF AGENT FOR RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD TO COMPLETE CURRENT OPS ASSIGNMENTS. FOLLOWING THIS PERIOD CASASIN WOULD BE [illegible] ~~RETURNED HQS FOR REASSIGNMENT~~. REQUEST STATION COMMENT.

-CONT-

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: ROBERT JARMAN
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 252758

3. IF CASASIN ACCEPTED BY UNCAIRD, WOFCCP ~~[illegible]~~RA WOULD LIKE CASASIN TDY HQS AREA FOR ADDITIONAL TWO OR THREE DAYS TRAINING. CASASIN PLANS RETURN WOCORK FOR DAUGHTER'S GRADUATION FIRST WEEK JUNE. THIS WOULD ~~[illegible]~~ PRESENT BEST OPPORTUNITY COVER-WISE FOR CASASIN TDY HQS AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

E/F/X
E/PERS
E/COV
NOCAD/CADRE J. KINSCHI (TELECOORD)
DC/NOCAD
C/E/SS J Keith Reid
C/E/F

J Keith Reid
E/COPS SS

5
4
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1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

Attachment #1

Item 44. Operational Expenses

Reimbursement for payment of fringe benefit programs of cover organization (including retirement, health, and life insurance) when it is determined by the Agency that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security.

Attachment #2

Item 50. Offset of Income

In accordance with HN 20-129(2b), CASASIN will initially be permitted to retain $1449 of his cover income without offset. Upon successful completion of three years service under this contract, the offset will be further reduced by $551, which totals $2000.

[illegible] PROFILE (PART [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible]				
[illegible] B. (P)		Jan 1921	20 Nov 1949	
Married	7 [illegible] 1923 1950 [illegible]			
	Jul 1954		Jul 1962	FCS C/S	FCS C/S
X				
None	None	None		

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1943-48 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt. - Civil Censorship Officer, Japanese Translator & Instructor, Liaison Officer
1949 [illegible] Publishing Co, [illegible] - County Editor of weekly paper
1949 [illegible] Housing Authority, [illegible] - Administrative Officer

1942 Trinity College, Conn - French
[illegible]-42 Sir George Williams College, Montreal, Canada - French
1945 Univ of Michigan, [illegible] - [illegible](1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52 Georgetown Univ Graduate School - International Relations

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R, P, S, U, [illegible]; W, Inter(Feb 1962), Trans & Interp Aug 1957
Japanese - R, S, U, Inter([illegible] 1962); R, W, Elem; Trans & Interp Aug 1957

18. AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

		[illegible]	[illegible] Ops	1962	Intel [illegible]
1949-50	UTCA	[illegible]	[illegible] Surv Mgmt	1962	Tech Writer's Inst
1950	Intel Orient	1954	Oper Audio Surv Equip	1962	French
1950	Ops	1954	Flaps & Seals		
1950	Ops Famil	1960	Cland Serv Review		

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE [illegible] (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE	OCCUPAT. CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (if any)	LOCATION
Nov 19[illegible]	I.O.	0132.[illegible]	7		[illegible] Sec/[illegible]LICT	HQ
Oct 1950	" "	0132.[illegible]	9		[illegible]	"
[illegible]	" "	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
[illegible]	Ops Off	[illegible]	[illegible]		" " " "	"
[illegible]	" "	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible] Ch, FE Br	"
Feb [illegible]	Area Ops Off	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Jan 1955	" " "	0136.[illegible]	11	DI	[illegible] Area	Cairo
Oct 1960	Ops Off	0136.[illegible]	11	D	[illegible]/Ch, Br 6	HQ
Sep 1962	" "	0136.01	11	D	DDP/[illegible]/NE Area	Paris
Feb 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	" " " "	"
Oct 1963	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/NE/Internal Ops	"
Mar 1964	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/NE/Internal Ops	"
Feb 1967	" "	0136.01	15	D	DDP/EUR/FF/CenReg	"

20. DATE [illegible] 20 Apr 19[illegible]
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY rah
22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE No

FORM 1200 [illegible] SECRET PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

DATE 29 MAY 72

TO : James Jones | 4B-11 | Hqs

FROM: Office of Medical Services

SUBJ: Interim Medical Disposition

This is to advise that the medical processing of Jacques VOLTAINE is incomplete awaiting receipt of supplemental medical information or completion of corrective medical action. Final medical disposition will be issued when this matter is resolved.

Glenn [illegible]

FORM 7-68 2997 CONFIDENTIAL (4-26)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: (See HR 20-33 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Robert F. Jarman

DIVISION: EUR/F

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 9269

DATE: 27 March 1972

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE — Thomas B. CASASIN

2A. PROJECT: NOCAD/~~Cadre~~

2B. PERMANENT STATION: ~~Paris~~

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 2131-0115

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V. ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.) — Bio attached

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): In process

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 48

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Alexandria, Va.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Paris, France

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☒ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE: Daughter - 18

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: No

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED AS AN OFFICER CHECK ONE. ☐ RETIRED REGULAR ☐ RETIRED RESERVIST

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: 1st Lt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT TO BE OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: GS-15/10 $33,260

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: NA

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): UNESCO

30. FEDERAL TAXES
☐ GOV'T TAX DOCUMENTATION - BY AGENCY
☐ TAX DOCUMENTATION BY ESTABLISHED COVER
☒ AGENCY TAX COMMITTEE CASE

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO U S CITIZENS AND RESIDENT ALIENS)

31. QUARTERS: Yes

32. POST: Yes

33. OTHER: all standard allowances

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): To be determined

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

DAUGHTER - USA - 18 - 5 September 1953

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER: See Att. #1

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: Robert E. Jarman

DIVISION: EUR/F

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 9269

DATE: 27 March 1972

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-44, HR 20-41, HR 20-7, HR 20-53, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

All normal benefits for career agent. Reimbursement for foreign taxes.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): XX PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED X CULTURAL X EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☐ TOTAL ☒ PARTIAL ☐ NONE See Att. #2

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION Indef. ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 90

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION

Operations Officer

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting, assessment and recruitment of potential operational assets for the Paris Station.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been associated with CIA for over 20 years as an operations officer.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE X POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
French	XX			XX			XXX		
Japanese		XX			XX			XX	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Japan, Canada, France

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Guide Publishing Company, Baltimore, Md. - County Editor - 1949
Baltimore Housing Authority, Md. - Admin Officer - 1949

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Authorize advance shipment of HHE presently stored in Paris to U.S.A. for combining with present HHE in U.S. storage.

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
March 27, 1972	Frederick A. Culner, J	2 [illegible] 1972	

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an Independent Contractor to render professional services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Fee. For professional services rendered hereunder, you will be paid a fee calculated at the rate of $8,000 per annum. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Taxes. As an Independent Contractor, monies paid you under paragraph one (1) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Board or this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you and your dependents to and from your permanent post of assignment and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable organization policies and procedures. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and when authorized for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. Upon your satisfactory completion of services hereunder, you will be authorized transportation expenses for you, your dependents and your household and personal effects to your recorded permanent place of legal residence in the United States. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred herewith are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations or your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Execution of Documents. If, during your utilization hereunder, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

SECRET

7. Status. Your legal status under this agreement is that of an Independent Contractor. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as implying the creation of an employee-employer relationship.

8. Requirements. Requirements levied upon you by this organization hereunder are a part of this contract provided they are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or negotiated benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Secrecy. By virtue of personal knowledge acquired during this and any previous association, you will become privy to employees, associates, plans, programs, methods and the like of this organization, in particular, and the U. S. Intelligence Community, in general. As a direct consequence of this knowledge, you agree to keep forever secret all classified information so obtained; to refrain from presenting a paper, writing for publication; making a speech through any media or forum, or other public statement on the subject of intelligence, factual or fictional, without prior authorization by the Government. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the U. S. and other applicable laws and regulations.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 July 1974, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated upon fifteen (15) days' actual notice by either party hereto. Termination or expiration of this agreement will not release you from the provisions of paragraph ten (10) above and any secrecy oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /S/ Charles W. Sandman
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Cassin
Thomas B. Casasin

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

RCB/ JH
28 June 74

SECRET

15 May 72

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction of terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, and subject to the provisions set forth in paragraph four (4) below, you are guaranteed payment of a basic salary of $33,260 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-15/10. In addition, you are herein authorized legislative salary adjustments and a post differential in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Your Federal Tax liability, benefits, retirement and the like shall be based upon said basic salary.

4. Disposition of Cover Emoluments.

(a) Earned Cover Income.

(1) Earned cover income is herein defined as income (including benefits in kind) received by you from your cover activities, which income does not have as its source the Government (this organization) or for which reimbursement from the Government has not nor will be sought by the cover activity.

(2) Earned cover income in an amount initially computed at the rate of $1449 per annum may be retained by you in addition to your basic contractual salary for the first three consecutive years of successful service hereunder; thereafter, at the rate of $2000 per annum.

(3) Earned cover income in excess of that set out in subparagraph two (2) above will be offset and thereby reduce your basic contractual salary by a like amount.

(4) You will initially report to this organization, upon assumption of cover status and thereafter on an annual basis, your rate of cover compensation. Any changes during the year will also be reported. This organization will pay your basic contractual salary (initially $33,260) until such time as reports indicate cover income in excess of that set out in sub-paragraph two (2) above. You will thereafter be paid at your full rate of compensation less anticipated earned cover income based on the last report. Adjustments, if any, will be made following receipt of the yearend report. Failure to timely submit reports may result in a delay or suspension of contractual payments due you hereunder.

(b) Other Cover Emoluments. With the exception of earned cover income, emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such times and in such a manner as the Government may prescribe.

5. Taxes. (a) As an employee of the Government, you must satisfy your Federal tax liability on the taxable income paid to you under paragraph three (3) above. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational and security considerations, the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on said income. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference.

(b) You will not be required to bear the expense of foreign taxes on income paid or guaranteed you by the Government under paragraph three (3) above. You will be reimbursed for such foreign taxes paid by you, consistent with your cover.

6. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with regulations of this organization applicable to its appointed personnel. In the event you are furnished quarters by your cover facility or the Government you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost-of-living allowances in conformance with applicable regulations of this organization including, but not limited to, a post allowance or, if applicable, an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance and a separation allowance.

7. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You will also be authorized shipment of household effects, presently stored in Paris, France, for combination with such household effects as are presently in storage within continental United States. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

8. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including but not limited to payment of fringe benefit program costs, of your cover organization (including retirement, health and life insurance) when it is determined by this organization that membership therein is necessary for cover and/or security, also entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

9. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you ~~hereunder shall~~ entitle the Government or your cover facility to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

10. Benefits. (a) By virtue of your employment relationship with the Government hereunder, you are entitled to coverage under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to sick, annual, and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government-appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government or cover officials. All accrued but unused leave credited to your account under previous employment with the United States Government will be transferred to the leave account established for you under this agreement.

(c) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act.

(d) Your participation in the Retirement and Disability System of this Organization is preserved by virtue of your transfer without a break in service from a position of employment wherein qualification for such status was achieved. Contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted from the basic compensation due you hereunder.

(e) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Act. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(f) You are herein authorized continued coverage under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act unless you have previously executed a written waiver of said coverage. This organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(g) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee in the line of duty while abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Contract Employee permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations, and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(h) You will be entitled to claim reimbursement for loss of personal property pursuant to applicable Government regulations.

11. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with governmental instructions.

12. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

13. Secrecy. (a) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all classified information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws of the United States and other applicable laws and regulations.

(b) In the event you marry or remarry during the term of this contract, you agree to advise this organization at least one hundred twenty (120) days in advance of such contemplated marriage, or otherwise as soon as known, and to furnish such personal history data on your prospective spouse as may be required by this organization. You understand and agree that should this organization determine that your marriage would limit or otherwise impair your usefulness to the Government, this contract may be terminated.

14. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

15. Reassignments. During your period of service under this agreement, it may be necessary for this organization to terminate an assignment for reasons beyond your control. In such event, you will be given every consideration for other assignments appropriate to Career Agents.

16. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government. Specifically, you herein acknowledge that this organization makes no commitment, either express or implied, that appointed employment status will be offered you at the conclusion of or during your period of contractual service.

17. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 Mar. 1972 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto,

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

SECRET

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ [illegible]

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Thomas B. Casasin
Thomas B. Casasin

WITNESS:

Matthew [illegible]

APPROVED:

____

RCB/dhc
4/5/72

14-00000

Copy

SECRET
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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B		PREPARED: 05/11/72
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION INITIAL ENTRY	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 05 15 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 5136-1231	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE EUROPEAN DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 0	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 33260 DOG: 02036 LEI: 05267

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 24 SEX: M MARITAL ST: DIV NO. DEPENDENTS: 01
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: FED SERVICE COMP: 030744
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES PREV. GOVT SERV: 4 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 6 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 051572 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 051572
REFERRING OFFICER: EUR PERS RLFR ORG: EUR PHONE: 6913
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: N ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: N OTH TAX EXIL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

fb

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG 2 72 Use Previous Edition

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GROUP 1
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(4-51)

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BBQ: 01 JUN 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

J

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 008102	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1973		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 02 23 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V	☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD FRENCH AREA PARIS STATION PARIS ANNEX		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0663	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 29099	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1
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SECRET
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EOD: 17 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 008102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEBRUARY 1971
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 20 YR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1136 1231 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
FRENCH AREA
PARIS STATION
PARIS ANNEX
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0688
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 27463
18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1
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(4-51)

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10 MAR 69

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

B

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION EXTENSION OF PRA NTE: 24 FEB. 1970	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 02 25 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	9136 1231 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP EUR FOREIGN FIELD CENTRAL REGION PARIS STATION ANNEX, PARIS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0668	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 23734

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006102
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CASASIN THOMAS B
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 02 26 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · CF TO CF ☒
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 7135 1231 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
CENTRAL REGION
PARIS STATION
ANNEX, PARIS

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: PARIS, FRANCE
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0663
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20585
18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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declassification

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14-00000

17 APR 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006102	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CASASIN THOMAS B		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 10 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS V TO V ☐ CF TO V	V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 8136 1231 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY SECTION 203 P.L. 88-643
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WE FOREIGN FIELD PARIS STATION INTERNAL OPERATIONS SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION PARIS, FRANCE		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0885	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 19415

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1
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wc

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO
SUPPLEMENT TO STAFF AGENT PERSONNEL ACTION
FOR THOMAS B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Reference is made to your Staff Agent Supplement, effective 5 August 1962.

Effective 27 September 1965, all reference to income is deleted from that supplement and the following provision is substituted:

Taxes. **As an appointed employee of the Government you must satisfy your Federal income tax liability on taxable income paid to you. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income tax liability on income directly received as a result of your Federal employment. Such determinations and procedures constitute an integral part of your Staff Agent administration.**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________

Personnel Officer

Copy pouched to field
TMA Y52637
1 Mar 66
[illegible]

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, EUROPEAN Division		
INFO.		
FROM Chief of Station, PARIS		
SUBJECT O ADMIN PERS TOPSY WODEEP — Thomas E. CASASIN		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

file
Bio Sect

REF: PARIS 27?ol, 27 April 1972

As reported in reference, CASASIN begins his UNCAIRD job on 5 June 1972. Forwarded USC are a Curriculum, Vitae which he prepared for UNCAIRD and a completed form required for an LNLUTE security clearance.

Reginald M. Gunion
Reginald M. GUNION

Attachment:
1. As stated, USC

c/s att'd by TP/ND 15 May 72

Distribution:
2 ~~3~~ - C/EUR w/att USC
1 - DCC/RCG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-95019	DATE MAY 8 1972 4 May 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER [illegible]

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION — ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ÉDUCATION, LA SCIENCE ET LA CULTURE

CURRICULUM VITAE

Please complete this form in English or French. It is in your own interest that your answers are complete, accurate, and clearly presented. They should be typed or printed on the form; only if additional space is required for certain items should separate sheets of the same size be used, with clear reference to relevant numbers.

Veuillez remplir ce formulaire en anglais ou en français. Il est de votre propre intérêt que vos réponses soient complètes, précises et claires. Elles doivent être tapées à la machine ou libellées très lisiblement; autant que possible, n'employez que cette formule pour donner les renseignements demandés; en cas d'absolue nécessité, utilisez des feuilles supplémentaires de même format, avec indication précise du paragraphe.

1. Family name (Surname) - *Nom de famille*	First names - *Prénoms*	Maiden name - *Nom de jeune fille*
RICHARDSON	Jacques Gabriel	

2. Permanent address - *Domicile permanent*	Telephone
5 villa Madrid, 92 Neuilly, France	722 99-90
3. Mailing address - *Adresse postale* (If different from above) (*Si elle diffère de la précédente*)	Telephone

4. A) Date of birth - *Date de naissance*			B) Country and place of birth - *Pays et lieu de naissance*	C) Sex - *Sexe*	D) Marital status - *État civil*
day / *jour*	month / *mois*	year / *année*			
20	I	1924	USA, Baltimore, Maryland	M	Divorced

5. A) Citizenship at birth *Nationalité à la naissance*	B) Present citizenship (since) *Nationalité actuelle (depuis)*
USA	USA

C) Have you taken any official steps towards changing your present nationality? *Avez-vous entrepris des démarches officielles aux fins de changer votre nationalité actuelle?*

No

6. Give the following information about persons fully dependent upon you for financial support. *Donnez les renseignements suivants sur les personnes qui sont, financièrement, entièrement à votre charge.*

Name of dependant *Nom de la personne à charge*	Date of birth *Date de naissance*	Relationship *Degré de parenté*	Name of dependant *Nom de la personne à charge*	Date of birth *Date de naissance*	Relationship *Degré de parenté*
Pamela A. Richardson	19 IX 5[illegible]	Daughter			
Michelle Richardson	5 IX 5[illegible]	Daughter			

7. List any of your relatives employed by the United Nations or its Specialized Agencies. *Donnez les noms de ceux de vos parents qui sont employés par les Nations Unies ou une des Institutions spécialisées.*

Name - *Nom*	Relationship *Degré de parenté*	Name of international organization *Nom de l'organisation internationale*

8. Would you object to serving in any regions of the world? If so, indicate which. *Auriez-vous des objections à travailler dans certaines parties du monde? Dans l'affirmative, indiquez lesquelles*

No

9. Would you accept employment for [illegible] *Accepteriez-vous un emploi d'une durée de [illegible]*

Up to 6 months *moins de 6 mois*	No
6 months to 1 year *6 mois à un an*	No
more than 1 year *plus d'un an*	Yes

10. How much notice would you require to report for work? *Dans quel délai pourriez-vous entrer en fonctions?*

One month

11. If employed, you will be required to pass a medical examination. Have you any disabilities which might limit your prospective field of work or preclude your undertaking any necessary travel by air? *En cas d'engagement un examen médical est nécessaire. Avez-vous une infirmité quelconque susceptible de restreindre vos activités professionnelles ou de vous interdire tout voyage par avion que vous pourriez être appelé à effectuer?*

No

12. For what type of work or for which specific post do you wish to be considered? - *Quel genre d'emploi ou quel poste précis vous intéresse?*

Scientific-technical publications

13. EDUCATION - ETUDES - List in chronological order the educational establishments you have attended from the age of 14, including in service training courses having lead to the granting of diplomas

Enumérez, en suivant l'ordre chronologique, les établissements d'enseignement que vous avez fréquentés depuis l'âge de 14 ans. Mentionnez également les stages de perfectionnement ayant abouti à l'obtention d'un diplôme.

Name, place and country Nom, adresse et pays	Years attended / Années d'études From - de	 To - à	Degrees, diplomas, etc. (in original language) and main subjects Diplômes, titres (titre original) et matières principales	Date obtained Date d'obtention
A) Secondary, Technical, Professional, etc. Secondaire, Technique, Apprentissage etc.				
High School of Montreal, Canada		Jun 40	Diploma	1940
b) Colleges or equivalent Universités ou équivalent				
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor USA		Feb 42	BA	1942
Georgetown University, Washington USA	1951-2		None	
Rensselaer Polytechnic, Troy, NY USA (Technical Writers Institute)		Jun 62	Certificate	1962

14. List professional societies to which you belong and your activities in public or international affairs.

Enumérez les associations professionnelles dont vous êtes membre; vos activités publiques et internationales

International Council for the Advancement of Science [illegible], Founding Member; British Interplanetary Society, Fellow; Society of Technical Publishers and Writers, Senior Member; International Science Writers Association, Member; The Glaciological Society, Member; Association des Journalistes Scientifiques, Membre Associé; and others

15. List, but do not attach, your significant publications. Include publisher and date and place of publication.

Enumérez, sans les joindre, tous travaux importants que vous avez publiés. Indiquez le nom de l'éditeur, le lieu et la date de publication.

Numerous articles, Science and Technology, Space/Aeronautics, Electro-Technology, 1963-9; numerous articles, Science Journal, 1969-70; numerous articles, book reviews, Atomes and La Recherche, 1969-present; numerous articles, Innovation and Search, 1969-present; Journal of Medical Engineering & Electronics, 1969; numerous articles in Nature 'News and Views,' 1970-present; articles in Purchasing and Heating Industry, 1963-9; editorial work for Unesco Impact, 1970; planned June 1971 issue on chemistry of Unesco Courier; article on American oceanology in Sciences & Avenir, August 1970, and others

16. LANGUAGES
LANGUES

A) Mother tongue :
Langue maternelle : English

B) Other languages
Autres langues

	Ability to - Aptitude à Speak / Parler Excellent Excellente	 Good Bonne	 Fair Passable	 Slight Faible	 Write / Rédiger Excellent Excellente	 Good Bonne	 Fair Passable	 Slight Faible	 Read / Lire Excellent Excellente	 Good Bonne	 Fair Passable	 Slight Faible	 Understand / Comprendre Excellent Excellente	 Good Bonne	 Fair Passable	 Slight Faible
French	☒		☐	☐	☒		☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐
Japanese	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
Spanish	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
Italian	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐

C) In which languages are you able to teach ? *Dans quelles langues pouvez-vous enseigner ?*

English and French

17. CLERICAL SKILLS - STÉNO-DACTYLOGRAPHIE

Indicate speeds in words per minute, after verification on non-commercial texts.
Indiquez les vitesses en mots-minute après vérification des vitesses sur textes non-commerciaux.

Languages - Langues		Shorthand Sténo	Typing Dactylo
English	anglais		
French	français		
Spanish	espagnol		
(Other - autre)			

18. MECHANICAL SKILLS - MÉCANOGRAPHIE

List any special skills you possess and office machines you can use
Enumérez vos compétences techniques et les machines de bureau que vous avez appris à manier.

Can use all office equipment, including some IBM and ICL computers (2, 2.5, and 3d generations)

14-00000

19. EMPLOYMENT RECORD.
ANTÉCÉDENTS PROFESSIONNELS

Starting with your present position list in reverse order every employment during at least the past ten years.

Énumérez, en commençant par le plus récent, tous les emplois que vous avez exercés au cours des dix dernières années au moins.

A. PRESENT POSITION - POSTE ACTUEL

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: October 1 1970 To: Present
De : A : Ce jour

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting : 78,000F Present : 85,150F
De début : Actuel :

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
Directeur Adjoint, Paris

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Société d'Editions Scientifiques; Science-Information

Type of work
Genre d'activité Scientific publishers, consultants

Name and title of your immediate supervisor M. Cheukiewicz,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct Président

Reason for wishing to leave - Pourquoi desirez-vous changer d'emploi?
Would like to have my week-ends free

Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates.

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales ; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

Directeur-adjoint of firm publishing monthly scientific magazine and providing scientific and technical consulting services; deputy to president, helping him manage two enterprises specializing in the processing of specialized information and the talent which handles it.

Directly responsible for sales, sales promotion, advertising, and public relations functions; supervise accountancy and purchasing functions, and relations with other publishers.

Handle the inception of all foreign relations, and deal directly with international organizations (OECD, Unesco, et

B. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: January 1 1969 To: Present (concurr'
De : A :

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting $5,000 plus comm. Final $9,000 plus comm.
De début : A la fin :

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
European Director — Paris

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Technology Communication, Inc

Type of work
Genre d'activité Managing overseas publishing co.

Name and title of your immediate supervisor F. Park,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct Executive Director

Reason for leaving
Cause de départ Would prefer to remain as consultant.

Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates.

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales ; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

Responsible from the outset for creating editorial and promotional resources and services outside North America, mainly in Europe, of new firm specializing in continuing education for technical management. This includes the publishing and editing (based in New York) of three periodicals: Innovation, Search, and a monthly newsletter. All are concerned with the art of management in a continually changing social environment.

Find authors; write my own article material; work with firms and individuals as well as government units desiring ther

C. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From: February 1968 To: June 1969
De : A :

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting $19,500 + profits Final $21,000 + prof
De début : A la fin :

Exact title of your position and place of work
Titre exact de votre poste et lieux d'activité
Chief Correspondent, Europe

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Conover-Mast Publications, Inc

Type of work
Genre d'activité Applied technology periodical press

Name and title of your immediate supervisor H. Conover,
Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct President

Reason for leaving
Cause de départ Tired of routine; wanted new challenges

Description of your duties (underline the main points); include number and type of subordinates.

Décrivez vos fonctions, en soulignant les principales ; indiquez également le nombre et les fonctions des personnes sous vos ordres.

As head of correspondents, planned, directed and supervised work assignments of a dozen correspondents reporting to the overseas editorial bureau of a major trade press organization, which during this period was merged by purchase with the Cahners Publishing Company

D. PREVIOUS POSITION - POSTE ANTÉRIEUR

Dates of employment - Durée d'emploi
From / De: May 1962 To / A: February 1968

Annual salary - Traitement annuel
Starting / De début: $10,000 + profits Final / A la fin: $19,000 + profits

Exact title of your position and place of work / Titre exact de votre poste et lieu d'activité (London, Paris)
European Editorial Representative

Name of employer - Nom de l'employeur
Conover-Mast Publications, Inc

Type of work / Genre d'activité: Specialized periodical press

Name and title of your immediate supervisor / Nom et titre de votre supérieur direct: L. Hagerty, Exec Vice Pres (deceased)

Reason for leaving / Cause de départ: Promotion

Description of your duties (describe the main points) [illegible] and type of work done
Décrivez vos fonctions [illegible] les principales, indiquez également [illegible]

Established, planned, directed and managed activities of overseas editorial bureau of medium-sized publishing firm specializing in the applied sciences, industrial management methods and technology, and marketing methods magazines.

E. If applicable, give here a brief resumé of employment(s) held before those covered above.
Si vous le jugez utile, résumez ici vos divers emplois antérieurs.

1960-2	Free-lance technical editor, various publishing houses, New York
1960-2	Supervising Technical Editor, Scientific Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army
1955-60	Supervising Foreign Affairs Specialist, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, at Tokyo, Japan
1950-4	Regional Editor, International Press Section, US Information Agency
1949	Reporter, then associate editor, weekly newspaper chain, Baltimore

20. REFERENCES: List three persons not related to you by blood or marriage, who are familiar with your character and qualifications. Do not repeat names listed in item 19.

RÉFÉRENCES : Indiquez trois personnes (parents et alliés exclus) pouvant donner sur vous des renseignements d'ordre moral et professionnel. Ne répétez pas de noms déjà cités dans la case 19.

Name - Nom	Full address - Adresse complète	Profession
Prof AIGRAIN Pierre	DGRST, Ministère de la Recherche Industrielle et Scientifique, Paris	Civil Servant
Mr VICHNEY Nicholas	Science Editor, LE MONDE, rue des Italiens Paris	Journalist
Prof THUILLIER Pierre	University of Paris, Nanterre Campus, Paris	Educator

21. Have you any objection to our making enquiries of your present employer?
Voyez-vous quelque inconvénient à ce que nous prenions des renseignements auprès de votre employeur actuel? ☐ yes / oui ☒ no / non

22. State briefly any other relevant facts. Include information regarding any residence or travel outside the country of which you are a citizen.
Donnez brièvement tout autre renseignement utile à votre candidature. Donnez également des précisions sur toute période de résidence ou voyages hors du pays dont vous êtes ressortissant.

Foreign residence: Canada 1937-42; UK, France, Belgium, Germany, 1944-5 (military service); Japan, 1946-8 (military service), 1955-60; France, 1962-present

23. I certify that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are true and complete. I understand that wilful misrepresentation renders me liable to dismissal, if employed.

Je certifie que les réponses que j'ai faites aux questions ci-dessus sont complètes et exactes. Je reconnais qu'en donnant sciemment une indication inexacte, je me rendrais passible de renvoi immédiat, au cas où je serais engagé.

Signature

Date November 30, 1971

N.B.

You may be requested to supply documentary evidence in support of the above statements. Do not, however, send any such evidence unless asked to do so by Unesco.

Receipt of this form is not ordinarily acknowledged but your application will be carefully examined and Unesco will, if need be, get into touch with you.

Applications for employment are not normally retained by Unesco for more than two years after receipt.

Il pourra vous être demandé de fournir des pièces justificatives à l'appui des déclarations faites ci-dessus. Ces pièces ne devront être envoyées qu'à la demande expresse de l'Unesco.

Il n'est pas coutume d'accuser réception de ce formulaire, votre demande sera néanmoins examinée attentivement et, le cas échéant, l'Unesco se mettra en rapport avec vous.

En règle générale, l'Unesco ne conserve pas les demandes d'emploi plus de deux ans après réception.

[illegible]

IDENTIFICATION AND PERSONNEL DATA
FOR EMPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN

INSTRUCTIONS.—Prepare in quadruplicate. All sections must be completed. Write "None" when applicable. Type or print answers. If space not adequate for complete answers continue under item 23, and attach a supplemental sheet to this form if necessary. All addresses must show street number, street, city, and State.

1. NAME (Last, first, middle)
RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

2. OTHER NAMES USED (Maiden name, names by former marriages, former names changed legally or otherwise, aliases, nicknames, etc. Specify which, and show dates used)

5. DESCRIPTION (Check one) ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR EYES	COLOR HAIR
178 cm	72 kg	Brown	Black

6. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)
☐ SINGLE
☐ MARRIED
☐ SEPARATED
☒ DIVORCED
☐ WIDOW(ER)

7. BIRTH DATE

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
20	Jan	24

3. PRESENT ADDRESS AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE THERE
5 villa Madrid
92 Neuilly, France
3 years

8. BIRTHPLACE (City, county, State, and country)
Baltimore, Maryland

4. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE (Go back 15 years. Continue under item 23 on other side if necessary.)

FROM	TO	NUMBER AND STREET	CITY	STATE
June 1969	Present	5 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1962	June 1969	9 villa Madrid	92 Neuilly	France
Sept 1960	Aug 1962	312 Lamond Place	Alexandria Va 22314	
[illegible] 1958	June [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Tokyo, Japan	
Feb 1955	June 19[illegible]	2-chome [illegible] Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, Japan		

9. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
INDICATE WHETHER:

(A) BY BIRTH ☐	(C) NATURALIZATION ☐
(B) DERIVATIVE ☐	PETITION NO.
DATE	DATE
CERTIFICATE NO	CERTIFICATE NO
PLACE	PLACE

10. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
042 20 5339

11. MILITARY SERVICE (Past or present)

SERIAL NO.	BRANCH	FROM (Yr.)	TO (Yr.)	TYPE OF DISCH.
31316265	Army	1943	1946	Hon
0 937200	Army	1946	1948	Hon

12. EDUCATION (All schools above elementary)

NAME OF SCHOOL	ADDRESS	FROM (Year)	TO (Year)	DEGREES
High School of Montreal	University St, Montreal		1940	Dipl
University of Michigan	Ann Arbor		1947-X	BA
Georgetown University	Washington DC	1951	1952	---
Rensselaer Polytechnic	Troy NY.		1962	Certif

S/C att. 2 to OFPA-98019

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[illegible]

15. EMPLOYMENT (List ALL employment dates starting with your present employment. Show ALL dates and addresses when unemployed. Give name under which employed if different from name now used.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER (Firm or agency)	TYPE OF WORK	ADDRESS	REASON FOR LEAVING
1970	Present	Sté d'Editions Scient Mr H. Chodkiewicz	Publishing	Paris France	To accept Unesco appt
1960	Present	Technology Communic'n Mr F. P. Park	Publishing	New York NY	ditto
1962	1969	Conover-Mast Public'ns Mr H. Conover, Jr	Publishing	New York NY	To join Technology Comm'n
1960	1962	Army Office of Ch of Staff; Col H. P. Garrity	R&D reports	Washington DC	To re-enter priv industry
1955	1960	Tokyo QM Center Col J. H. Stewart	Industrial surveys	Tokyo Japan	Contract expiration
1950	1954	USIA (IPS) Mr Hundy	Govt info services	Washington DC	To accept o'seas asgmt
1949	1949	Housing Authority, Baltimore; Mr Kilburn	Public housing authority	Baltimore Md	To accept better job
1948	1949	Guide Publications Inc Dr Kobre	Publishing	Baltimore Md	To accept better job

16. FOREIGN COUNTRIES VISITED (SINCE 1930) (Exclusive of military service)

COUNTRY	DATE LEFT USA	DATE RETURNED USA	PURPOSE
Western Europe	1944	1945	Military service
Japan	1946	1948	ditto
Japan-Korea	1950	1953	USIA activities
Japan	1955	1960	Civil service
Western Europe	1960	1960	Tourism
France, western Europe	1962	1972	Business, tourism

15. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U.S.A., OR ANY COMMUNIST OR FASCIST ORGANIZATION?

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

16. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY FOREIGN OR DOMESTIC ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH IS TOTALITARIAN, FASCIST, COMMUNIST, OR SUBVERSIVE, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED OR SHOWS A POLICY ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?

No

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

17. IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 15 OR 16 ABOVE IS "YES", STATE THE NAMES OF ALL SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, MOVEMENTS, GROUPS, OR COMBINATIONS OF PERSONS, DATES OF MEMBERSHIP, AND OFFICES HELD. IN QUESTION 21 OR ON A SEPARATE SHEET TO BE ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART OF THIS FORM, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON YOUR ACTIVITIES THEREIN AND MAKE ANY EXPLANATION YOU DESIRE REGARDING YOUR MEMBERSHIP OR ACTIVITIES.

NAME	ADDRESS	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD

18. MEMBERSHIP IN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (*List all organizations in which you are now a member or have been a member, except those which show religious or political affiliations.*)

NAME	ADDRESS	TYPE	FROM	TO	OFFICE HELD
British Interplanetary Soc	London	Professional	1955	present	Fellow
Soc of Tech Communication	Washington	"	1968	present	Sen Member
Intl Science Writers Assn	London	"	1965	present	Member
American Club	Paris	Social	1962	present	Member

19. RELATIVES (*Parents, spouse, divorced spouse, children, brothers, and sisters, living or dead. Name of spouse should include maiden name and any other names by previous marriage. If person is dead, so state under "address" and enter other information as of time of death.*)

RELATION	NAME IN FULL	YEAR OF BIRTH	ADDRESS	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Daughter	Pamela A. Richardson	1950	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA
Daughter	Michelle D. Richardson	1953	5 villa Madrid 92 Neuilly France	USA	USA

20. REFERENCES (Name three persons not relatives or employers who are well acquainted with you)

NAME	ADDRESS	YEARS KNOWN
[illegible], Jr	[illegible] Road [illegible]	6
[illegible] P. Freedman	420 East 23 Street (6C) New York NY 10010	29
Col Gordon Wallace	[illegible] Moreland Circle Prescott AZ 86301	29

21. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, TAKEN INTO CUSTODY, HELD FOR INVESTIGATION OR QUESTIONING, OR CHARGED BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY? *(You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)*

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

22. WHILE IN THE MILITARY SERVICE WERE YOU EVER ARRESTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A TRIAL BY DECK COURT OR BY SUMMARY, SPECIAL OR GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL?

(ANSWER "YES" OR "NO")

IF YOUR ANSWER TO 21 OR 22 IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS IN ITEM 23, SHOWING FOR EACH INCIDENT: (1) DATE, (2) CHARGE, (3) PLACE, (4) LAW ENFORCING AUTHORITY OR TYPE OF COURT OR COURT-MARTIAL, AND (5) ACTION TAKEN.

23. SPACE FOR CONTINUING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS *(Show item numbers to which answers apply. Attach a separate sheet if there is not enough space here.)*

CERTIFICATION

NOTE: *The original copy must be signed by the person named in item 1 on this form.*

I certify that the above information is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 1 1972
(DATE)

SIGNATURE (Sign original only)

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(When Filled In)

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FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A — **GENERAL**

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CASASIN, Thomas B.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 24
3. SEX: N
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Off
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/EUR
8. CURRENT STATION: Paris

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1971
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971

SECTION B — **PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Gained full-time employment as a senior executive of a foreign scientific publication for the purpose of further developing access to Station targets and appreciably lowering the overall cost of the operations in which he is involved.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to gain access to MHHARSH personnel and spot leads on eventual access and support-type assets directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and assesses MHHARSH officials with whom he has made contact as well as access prospects to the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reports on the above activities.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject managed to gain full-time employment as a senior executive of an HBSPRITE government subsidized scientific publication at a time of economic slowdown when jobs were not easy to get. He did this without help from Headquarters or the Station. Such an achievement is a tribute to Subject's fluency in French, his ability to write, his general scientific know-how and his good buisness sense. Over half of his salary therefore is now paid by this company. In converting to full-time employment, a major adjustment, Subject's contribution to the Station operations in the MHHARSH and TPFAST fields against which he is targetted temporarily decreased somewhat. Subject continued, however, to maintain contact with three local MHHARSH officials and initiated contact with three others. He also continued to search for new leads to personalities in the priority areas assigned to him. Subject has the capability to call on local scientists or technicians of just about any nationality with the possible exception of TPFAST citizens. He has used this near-unique potential well.

Subject has had occasional difficulty switching from "professional" or intellectual subjects in his development of MHHARSH personalities or access prospects to more down-to-earth interests necessary —con't→

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT.

DATE 9 June 1971	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Handling Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Francis S. Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Station submitted comments on Subject officer recently in OFPT-16549 (8 April 1971), to which we should add that Subject has, largely on his own merits, acquired a solid and potentially highly useful cover employment. However, this new employment will demand a very substantial amount of time and energy from Subject, and the unanswerable question at the moment relates to his availability for Organizational tasks. We shall need additional time and careful working with this officer to determine the answer, since the fiscal outlay from the Organization to support his continued stay in Paris is still quite

DATE 24 May 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT

Section C (continued)

to the development of human relations. His forte is therefore more in the field of spotting and making operational contacts than in that of more than short-range operational development. Subject's operational situation makes it impossible for him to attempt recruitments. Thus, his very real achievements are not by essence of the spectacular variety.

Subject's reporting has been satisfactory and continue to be copious. He could, however, further improve the selectivity of the leads provided the Station and make more of an effort to "digest" the information contained in his reports.

Although Subject has, at present, no supervisory function, he has repeatedly requested such a responsibility. He is careful with operational expenses and has exercised good security.

During the period under review, additional efforts have been made to make full use of Subject's potential and integrate him further in the work of the station component with which he works. He is a particularly valuable asset for the Station programs directed against the local MHHARSH and TPFAST targets.

Section D (continued)

substantial. In a word, is it worth it? We do not yet know, although our initial impressions are favorable.

On the fitness report itself, this rater would have preferred an "S" rating for specific duty number one; Subject may ultimately deserve an "O", but it does not seem warranted at the present time. Moreover, I believe the overall rating would more properly have been in the higher range of the "P" category, rather than "S", but it is of course a subjective judgment of the rating officer, who is more intimately and directly involved with Subject on a frequent basis.

In sum, the cover is superb, and only time will reveal to what extent the cover requirements permit a full measure on behalf of the Organization. We are following this aspect closely and will be commenting upon it subsequently as we gain experience and knowledge.

FITNESS REPORT

SECRET

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE [illegible]	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Established and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Uses his cover to develop leads on eventual access or support type assets to be used by the Station against the local MHMARSH target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to various Station requirements including investigative work.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Initiates contact with selected local MHMARSH targets and undertakes to develop sufficient rapport with them to provide operational assessments.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	-
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

The comments of the rating officer are limited to the period from October 1969 to March 1970 during which he worked with Subject. The previous rating officer has added his comments to allow coverage of the total indicated period from April 1969 to March 1970. During this period Subject was integrated in a new team assigned to the local S&T and Commercial MHMARSH target. Subject's recent activity has been very productive indeed. Subject used the excellent potential given to him by his cover to skillfully spot and assess access agent candidates. As Subject's operational situation in Paris precludes making recruitment, the most promising of these candidates was placed in contact with a Station officer during social events Subject organized. At the same time, Subject continued his efforts to develop personal relationship with several MHMARSHers. The beginning of personal, as opposed to purely professional, relations with a major MHMARSH target enabled him to obtain insight into the target's beliefs and personality which was the best the Station had to date. Subject also managed to establish contact with two other MHMARSH representatives of interest. This, in one case, required almost six months to accomplish via a combination of patience, skill and determination. Subject is an experienced officer. He is cost conscious and practices good security. The Station has no other asset with the necessary scientific and editorial know-how, fluent French and local knowledge to replace Subject. In view of this and the recent progress made by Subject in response to very specific requirements and his willingness to try to establish personal and, hopefully, social relations with access prospects and MHMARSH targets, the Station recently recommended that he be extended in Paris. At the same time, the Station recommended that Subject's cover be reinforced by full-time employment with Subject's current [illegible] part-time employer.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR [illegible] Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Francis Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

As previous Station correspondence and fitness reports will reflect, this officer has been the subject of varying evaluations and projections in recent years. In fairness to him, however, it is equally true that an officer under non-official cover reflects, in the level and quality of his performance, the amount and type of guidance, direction and push he receives from the responsible inside case officer. Making allowances for these variables, this officer's past record has not been impressive; however, it is also correct to note that he has improved substantially during the latter part of the period under review, and that if the Station can work out some fiscal arrangement which will reduce the heavy financial input

DATE [illegible] May 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [illegible]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh Montgomery

Section D3 continued

from the Organization, his continued presence at this Station definitely appears to be warranted for a sufficient period to reach more definite conclusions concerning the level of sustained performance over a somewhat longer period than that reflected by this report.

On balance, we are pleased that this officer has responded so well to greater case officer direction and that he has undertaken somewhat more aggressive efforts to expand his range of contacts in immediate proximity to the primary Station targets. This officer does bring many talents to bear on his operational activity: he has absolutely fluent French, a solid and exploitable cover, and a vast range of contacts in the local community. Nonetheless, it will require additional time to explore these contacts in depth, select those which appear to be operationally viable, and pursue them actively either to the point of recruitment by another officer or elimination from further development, for whatever reason.

In sum, in spite of the recognized and commendable improvement in this officer's performance during the period under review, the reviewer submits that the letter grade for specific duties 2 and 4 would more properly have been a "P", and that the overall rating, at this point, would more accurately be set at a level between "P" and "S", probably closer to the former than the latter.

This reviewing comment has been read by the officers who prepared the Fitness Report.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 October 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During this reporting period subject had very markedly increased the tempo of his activities and contacts. Many agent prospects have been screened and contacts were established with people of interest to several elements of the Station. Subject is particularly thorough and outstanding on specific investigations where he utilized cover in a skillful and imaginative way. He has improved in terms of people development but in this respect he is still best with people in a professionally related context rather than a contrived social context. As mentioned in the previous report subject's cover assignment does not allow him to make recruitments. Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness and does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 11 June 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 5 June 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I do not concur in this rating. I would have given the employee STRONG in the performance of his cover responsibilities, that is to say in the manner in which he has created and expanded his cover. I would have restricted myself to PROFICIENT, however, in assessing his exploitation of that cover for operational purposes. For a fuller treatment of this staff agent's performance, suggest that reference be made to the NOC Status Report, submitted 26 May 1969, via OFPA-89925.

DATE 23 JUNE 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 00G102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D!
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XXXX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Station targets.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet WOLADY and third national of operational interest in the S&T community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responds to Station ad-hoc requirements on the local internal target.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops potential agent prospects in the S&T community to the point where they can be recommended as Station agent candidates.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since the last reporting period Subject's efforts were directed by the Station toward the spotting, developing and assessing WOLADY S&T agent candidates in terms of recruitment and inclusion in the Station's S&T spotting network.

Subject has done thorough and at times imaginative spade work in this field despite the fact that the mission was not as successful as anticipated. Recent progress however would indicate that the next reporting period would be more productive.

Subject continues to respond to ad-hoc specific assignments in an exemplary manner.

Because of the nature of his cover assignment Subject is not authorized to make recruitments.

Subject has a high degree of cost consciousness. He does not exercise any supervisory responsibilities under his cover assignment.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 24 Oct. 1968
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 24 Oct. 1968
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Ops Officer
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Murat Natirboff

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached.

DATE:
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief ofStation
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ David E. Murphy

SECRET

3. It is difficult to place in the proper perspective the contribution of this senior staff agent to Paris Station operations. On the one hand, Subject has established superb cover in the scientific and technical field which should have afforded him virtually unlimited access to persons of interest to us, both Soviet and potential access agents. In evaluating the manner in which the employee set up and managed this cover, I would tend to agree with his comments to the fitness report on the [illegible] demands on him although these comments are somewhat overdrawn.

The principal difficulty has been the time it has taken to relate the cover potential to the specific operational requirements of the Station. We have not received from CASASIN as [illegible] leads and assessment reports to persons of operational interest in the S&T field as we think he could have produced. It may be that the earlier listing of the project (viewed as a regional undertaking) contributed to this.

Recently we have noted significant improvement in that we have received responses to requests we have made for assessment and development of potential access agents within a cover context. We hope, therefore, that this last year of CASASIN's stay will be the most productive ever. It is unfortunate that the cover must and because of the cover company's decisions over which we had no control.

/s/ David E. Murphy

ADDENDUM, Form 45 (Fitness Report), for period March 67-March 68.

Section D

As the individual being rated, I would like to add some remarks to those prepared by the rating officer.

The assignment I have includes managerial responsibilities which (a) are essential to the continued existence and security of the cover mechanism as a vehicle for operational exploitation, and (b) are not necessarily visible to those "on the inside."

In the case of (a), I must engage in a constant orchestration of the cover and the facilities it offers. This means maintaining a managerial equilibrium to insure that cover work will not become, of itself, so demanding that it negates the cover's utility to the CS. In effect, the top officers and middle managers of the cover corporation [who are not cleared and witting] have to be satisfied that their demands are met (or cannot be), or else manipulated in order to neutralize or reject their demands. After all, the cover position is to them a legitimate, normal, workaday post in their firm. What work is done at their bidding, it follows, must be accomplished according to the high standards of thoroughness and accuracy which they have set.

In the case of (b) -- which derives from (a) -- and can prove to be so demanding that the needs of the CS could no longer be served, the incumbent is required to manage a span of human contacts at several levels in order to preserve his cover position and enhance its value to the CS. This means planning, directing and managing the work of multinational, multicultural teams of technical correspondents, as well as meetings and negotiations to improve the [cover firm's] relations with similarly widespread individuals at the levels of editor-in-chief, publisher, corporate vice-president, president, and chairman of the board. These levels are scattered not only through industry, but have their analogs as well in government, higher education, and professional societies.

Having previously managed both a CS base and the principal denied-areas operating component of a major field Station, I can report quite honestly that my present managerial responsibilities exceed the former -- despite the apparent lack of "supervisory responsibilities" in my present position.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN, Thomas B. (SA)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/France	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			XXX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):			☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishes and maintains a legitimate S&T publishing representation for the purpose of developing natural access to Soviet S&T personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops cover pretexts to meet, assess, and recommend as agent candidates WOLADY and Third Nationals in the HEPAIRY S&T community.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Contacts and develops local Soviet Bloc personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops cover pretexts to attend selected scientific conferences.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Responds to local Station adhoc operational requirements.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to maintain a secure effective cover mechanism. In this reporting period the whole thrust and objectives of this cover facility have been changed from pursuit of targets designated by Headquarters at international conferences to pursuit of the local Soviet presence. This has caused a major readjustment and Subject is now beginning to produce the type of leads that help the Station achieve its local operational objectives.

Subject continues to show a well organised methodical approach to his cover and operational tasks.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/[illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I rarely see the written product of this employee's efforts and know little of his work except as I am informed of it by his supervisor in the Station. I have the impression, however, that the employee is responding to his supervisor's guidance and is not by any means simply drifting along paths indicated by his cover work, which can be a temptation when an employee has, as is true in this case, rather limited contact with his colleagues who work under official cover on the same target. I thus concur in the evaluation on the basis of limited knowledge.

DATE 9 August 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Robert E. Owen

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006102

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/French	8. CURRENT STATION Paris		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1964 - 2 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Contact, cultivation and assessment of, and collection of biographic and operational intelligence on Soviet scientific and technical targets, and on other Soviets and other nationalities to whom he has access through his cover.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessment of potential operational assets to be used against the targets specified under Specific Duty No. 1.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Execution of operational assignments as directed by Hqs and field stations concerned, whether of a KUTUBE, KUWOLF or KUDESK nature.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation or acquisition of cover firm written material as operational information to increase his access and flexibility in furtherance of Specific Duties Nos. 1 through 3.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Planning, directing and managing overseas bureau of cover firm, with emphasis on exploitation of the cover to meet operational requirements.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

During the reporting period this employee as a staff agent has continued the solidification of his cover and the expansion of his operational activity within his cover to a point where he represents as deeply buried a staff officer as can be found in anyone with his past organizational background. From the point of view of the host country authorities he appears to be completely legitimate. From the more important point of view of his targets, he also apparently has been accepted, and not through a lack of opportunity for scrutiny, for what he claims to be. He thus represents for KUBARK an asset who has not only solid status and access cover, but also the demonstrated capability for exploiting his cover for specific and aggressive operational undertakings.

As has been stated in past fitness reports, his present capability directly and openly to approach operational targets through the vehicle of his cover is the result of his own efforts, in which he has devoted a tremendous amount of work not only to establish and enhance the foundations of the cover, which requires a considerable amount of work for the cover company, but to devise and exploit ways and means by which the cover activity may be applied directly to operational tasks and programs. In addition to operational activity in his country of assignment, he has also been used in Hqs-directed activity in other countries, usually involving direct contact with target individuals, and in addition he has contributed greatly to the acquisition of operational information for the use of Hqs components in their overall approach to Soviet scientific and technical targets.

It would be difficult to fault this employee with respect to energy, professional skills, and mental capacity. He is a keen student of his operational environment and very skillful in analyzing the possibilities it offers for application toward operational objectives. He shows considerable resourcefulness in devising logical and credible

(continued)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 June 1965	/s/ Thomas B. Casasin

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 June 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ James M. Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since the Reviewing Officer in the field has not indicated his views on this Fitness Report, I would like to make a comment of my own. Without wishing to detract from anything the Supervisor has said about Subject's performance, I feel obliged to note that the ratings given him in this report are higher than those given, for example, to any Branch Chief in this Division, and, as such, are inconsistent with the grading pattern of the Division as a whole.

2 June 1965 Chief, External Ops /s/ Robert E. Owen Reviewing Officer

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
24 June 65	DC/WE	Edward Ryan

SECRET

approaches to operational problems and personalities, and expends considerable effort in maintaining a level of specialized knowledge sufficient to backstop his cover and to ensure the maximum exploitation of his contacts with target organizations and individuals. His command of spoken, written, and technical French is excellent.

From the point of view of supervision, this employee in his present position requires guidance only insofar as to identify specific targets and for him to protect himself in situations where he does not have, by virtue of his not having access to official files, specialized information~~. Otherwise~~, he requires no supervision other than the periodic provision of policy and operational directives.

This employee has always been conscious and punctillious in his preparation of operational and administrative reports, including financial accountings, and his reporting in general, despite the burdens imposed by the necessity for minimizing the risks inherent in the lack of access to classified storage, leaves nothing to be desired.

Other than the funds for operational activities, this employee currently has no responsibility for the programming and use of personnel, space, equipment, and funds.

With respect to dedication to his job, this employee has practically speaking single-handedly built his present cover/operational position despite a number of negative factors inherent to his situation such as relative isolation, meager opportunity for contact with his professional group, and expensive area of assignment, and an exposed cover situation where the necessity for living cover is compounded by the necessity of avoiding mistakes which might jeopardize cover. His dedication to and enthusiasm for accepting the challenge ofthis assignment, and his willingness to continue on in it, deserve particular mention, particularly since he would perhaps justifiably feel that his present assignment may leave him outside the mainstream of competitive organization progression.

This employee's health and family situations leave nothing to be desired, as his proven mobility in the execution of operational assignments attests.

It should further be noted that with respect to the problem endemic to deep-cover assignments of allocation of time between cover work and operational activity, this employee comes very close to the happy norm of making cover work complement operational work, and making operational work contribute where possible to the enhancement of cover.

While this employee's assignment to date has essentially been a one-man show, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to expanding the operational complex which he has created in order to capitalize on his experience, the work he has put in to date, and his own management capabilities.

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*(Section B) - No special recognition of Subject's "Outstanding" overall performance is being requested at this time.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 006102

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CASASIN Thomas B.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE/France		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 May 1964	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Finding, cultivating unwittingly and assessing new target personalities among Soviet scientists, engineers and other technical specialists.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Continuing the assessment and unwitting development of established targets in the same category.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Development of similar leads on target personalities from other denied areas; making recruitments outside base country.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Development and assessment of technical personalities of interest to Station's internal (domestic) programs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Managing and directing cover company's foreign bureau and its assets to strengthen own cover and diversify access for KUTUBE, KUWOLF and KUDESK purposes.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Researching, writing and editing own and others' material published by cover company to strengthen cover and diversify access for KUDOVE operational purposes.	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee combines the relatively rare combination of a senior and broadly experienced intelligence officer under working cover providing both long-term status in his country of residence (and in Europe in general) and access for a variety of operational functions, including spotting, assessing, contact with Soviet bloc nationals of specific interest, investigative measures, assessment in depth of ostensibly cover-company hired persons, and attendance at a broad range of national and international specialized meetings. Development of the capability operationally to exploit his cover has been the achievement of the employee himself. In so doing he has at the same time achieved genuine acceptance by his cover company associates (most of whom are unwitting) and his colleagues in his cover profession and related professions.

In undertaking operational tasks this employee has consistently shown initiative imagination, security consciousness, and application of both operational and substantive background to the problem at hand. He has put a conscious effort into improving his already excellent command of the French language, and his grasp of a variety of specialized scientific and technical fields has been achieved basically as a result of his own efforts.

His management of operational reporting, finances, and the administrative problems connected with his cover status has been exemplary.

It should be noted that during the reporting period, this employee has not had the benefit at all times of specific pinpointed operational direction. As of the end of the reporting period, Headquarters assumed control of his activities against specific Soviet targets on a Europe-wide basis.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Thomas B. CASASIN

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Eighteen	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 25 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert E. Owen

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) Thomas H. CASSIN	DATE (from item 5.1) 9 Dec 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Jaron Flint	DATE (from item 5.2) 27 Dec 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:			DATE

DO NOT COMPLETE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Jan 1924	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE Operations Officer, GS-15	7A. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD OR CURRENT TOUR 10 September 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Paris	7B. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD September 1965
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR Rome			7C. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Staff agent assigned to a major overseas station, exploiting the cover provided by a major firm of technical periodical publishers. I take my instructions from a section chief within the station, and report in writing on the progress of my cover development and its operational application.

For operational reasons, I develop and assess operational leads in the FI, CI and CA areas, principally against denied area targets. I also handle local investigations and such cases as the station determines will fit into my cover, or which I can otherwise handle in alias. I travel to other field stations to handle such tasks as they request or Hq directs. I handle all cover tasks as they appear.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like to continue to serve essentially in the same capacity as described above, although I would like eventually to add more supervisory and managerial functions to my responsibilities. I would like to expand the operating base provided by the cover organization by taking on several journeyman case officers to work with me against both denied area and host country targets, and to make the cover facility and the access it provides of more versatile use to both the station and to KUDOVE as a whole.

My second choice would be to return to Hq, and use the knowledge and experience I have gained in my present job to (1) select staff personnel who will be placed in non-official cover, (2) select the cover mechanisms proper, (3) train our personnel for the proper discharge of their total responsibilities while serving under such cover.

9. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

The completion of work toward a master's or doctor's degree in the physical or life sciences, or in the management/administration of the sciences and their personnel.

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SECRET

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SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION, after a one-year extension of my present tour

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE OTR 2ND. CHOICE Cover Group 3RD. CHOICE Office/Personnel

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE Geneva 2ND. CHOICE Brussels 3RD. CHOICE New Zealand/Canada

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 25

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife, will be 37 in 1965; two daughters, 15 and 12 in 1965

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Next post should have high school facilities teaching in French or in English.

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Chief, External concurs in subject's wish for one year extension and return for second tour after home leave in the fall of 1965. However, subject's wish as expressed in 9.A. of having case officers working under him is not feasible at this time.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Recommend Home Leave and return for another tour.

SR Concurs.

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER DATE 6 February 1964	SIGNATURE G K Nogannam (SCD) G.K.Nogannam

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT	18. REFERENCE DISPATCH NO. OFPS-7775 CABLE NO.
19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Dwight M. Collinsjff	20. SIGNATURE /S/
21. TITLE Secy, CS Career Panel	22. DATE 26 Feb 64

23. COMMENTS Approved extension of present tour to Sep 1965, home leave and second tour.

SECRET

14-00000

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

CASASIN

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
037367

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR		8. CURRENT STATION Paris	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 10 September 1962 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Establishment and maintenance of cover as a genuine working member of his profession.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Spotting and assessing persons of operational interest to Paris Station and to other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Investigating of organizations and phenomena of operational interest to the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Collection of positive and operational information using his cover for entree.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

See attached sheet.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6½ months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Reception Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ James Flint

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See attached sheet

DATE 20 May 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL OPS Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Edward Ryan

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

The assignment of this employee to the field under non-official cover was designed to compensate for the loss of an employee in an official cover slot which was cut from the Station's ODACID allotment of personnel positions.

During the reporting period this employee has accomplished with success the convincing establishment of his cover in a complex milieu, and has been accepted as legitimate by his professional colleagues, the persons whom he meets under cover, and the French authorities. It should be noted that his ability to assume his cover has been largely the result of his own efforts over a period of years to acquire and maintain a familiarity with the general scientific field.

During the reporting period he has developed a wide circle of contacts in the scientific and journalistic fields and applies a long background in a variety of assignments in KUDOVE to the determination and assessment of operational potential among these contacts. At the same time his cover organization, in which only four persons are witting of his actual status, has shown itself to be more than satisfied with his performance of his cover duties.

This employee requires a minimum of detailed operational supervision; it is necessary in specific cases only to indicate the operational or informational objectives.

From the point of view of administrative support, his attention to detail and meticulousness reduce the problems of his support by the Station to a minimum.

This employee uses the French language continuously, and his facility is such as to permit him to handle himself excellently in a broad range of complex technical subjects. He has in addition undertaken specialized French language training to develop this capability further. His operational reporting is excellent both with regard to clarity and pertinence.

In the immediate future he will be assigned case work, for the most part in fields where it will complement, and be complemented by, his independent operational activities and cover work.

6 August 1962

Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report

Subject: [redacted]
[illegible]

My last statements concerning the performance of [redacted] should be extended to cover the remainder of his service as Chief of SR/6. He departed headquarters for a field assignment 31 July 1962.

QUENTIN C. JOHNSON
Chief of Operations and Plans
SR Division

signed
HOWARD J. OSBORN

CONCUR:
HOWARD J. OSBORN
Chief, SR Division

Recorded by
[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Branch Chief	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OC/SR/6	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To July 1960-October 61

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises large functional branch of thirty-seven staff and fifteen contract personnel.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with various components of the Agency and with other agencies.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for operations support, including initiation of new support activities.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares and presents briefings.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises preparation of, and sometimes personally prepares, special studies both on own initiative and on request.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of SR Division records on Soviet defectors, supports exploitation of defectors and participates in their resettlement.	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

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SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM '61

Mr. [redacted] has a good knowledge of Soviet matters and generally is very well informed. He continually demonstrates much initiative and a high degree of productivity. He is stimulating to his associates, businesslike and delegates work easily. He appears very self-confident and he is dynamic.

Mr. [redacted] supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 9 November 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Twelve	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 9 November 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR SR/Chief of Plans and Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE QUENTIN E. JOHNSON Q. E. Johnson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 21 NOV 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN M. MAURY

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SECRET

F377-0370

[illegible] FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 9-1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 9-2)
[redacted]	9/15/59	John Baker	

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW: Andrew L. Busby

DATE: 6/30/60

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1924

2. GRADE: GS-14

3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer

4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known): DI

5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE: Tokyo, Japan

6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR:

7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: 15 June 1960

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Chief of Major External Geographic Branch (USSR-European Satellites) of large overseas station (Tokyo). As such, am responsible to Station Deputy for Operations.

Direct, manage, supervise and train 25 persons, including operations and project personnel under non-official cover, under State, Army, and Air Force cover. Personnel are divided functionally within FI, PP, and CI sections.

Initiate and launch new FI, PP and CI operations using best available independent assets as well as assets available through foreign (Japanese) liaison. Manage and exploit perennial operations; observe progress or deterioration of activities to insure that marginal and non-productive activities are terminated. Am case officer on my own operations, too.

Maintain liaison with other US agencies. Provide operational support to other Far East stations needing specialized aid as USSR-East European operations emerge and develop.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

I would like a challenging assignment overseas, again, as my first preference: I am especially interested in developing across-the-board FI-PP-CI programs "from scratch," with particular reference to building up long-term FI-CI programs and assets. I am not unduly particular as to area, but of course would prefer an area in which English or French is the lingua franca.

My next choice would be to go to an area whose language I do not know — but could learn — and which meets the requirements of the challenge stated in the first paragraph, above.

My next choice would be to return to Japan, where I could use my Japanese knowledge.

My next choice would be an assignment to a special training course at the national intelligence level.

My last choice would be reassignment directly to Headquarters.

* * * * *

I would especially enjoy an assignment in which I can combine on-the-job training of other personnel with the direction and management of their operational programs.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Clandestine Services Review
State Senior Officers' Course
Appropriate additional language training
Outside advanced graduate work in international relations.

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT *(continued)*

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 *(for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice)* IN THE BOXES BELOW:

2 RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

3 BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION:

1ST CHOICE: Western Europe
2ND CHOICE: Eastern Europe, Africa, or Near East
3RD CHOICE: Latin America, Southeast Asia

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

10 weeks, including possible TDY

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 60

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife: Harriette, 32
Daughters: Pamela, 10; Michelle, 7

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

To be assigned as Chief, SR/6

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Andrew L. Busby	SIGNATURE:
TITLE: Chief, SR/Personnel	DATE: 30 June 1960

17. REMARKS *(additional comment)*

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Crearin

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Sta/SR

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☒	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From 1 Apr 59 To 24 June 60	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Soviet Branch, responsible for activities of 24 staff and 6 contract employees	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 5/6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for station SR planning, budgeting, and operating activities	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Representing the station at varied levels in all SR matters	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his "host" country; an excellent and proven degree of operational "know-how"; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty. He can be expected to continue his dynamic and imaginative pursuit of a most difficult target. It is my opinion that this officer has great potential and is ready for increased responsibilities which would involve the promotion for which he has been recommended. As for training, a good managerial course might help to bring into even sharper focus his many talents.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 23 June 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted] on transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (*Specify*):

DATE 23 June 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] signed on ~~[illegible]~~ transmittal

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS, Tokyo	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John Baker/s/ on transmittal

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

Vacacin

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 January 1924	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT SR, Tokyo, Japan	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD: 10 Apr 58 - 31 Mar 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs operational branch of some 17 persons	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case officer	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local intelligence and security services.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with U.S. military and civilian intelligence services	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the Station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 April 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE signed on transmittal

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William Nelson signed on transmittal

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 April 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/Tokyo Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker signed on transmittal

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FE, TOKYO, JAPAN	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William F. Nelson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED UNDER CRITERIA
ESTABLISHED AT THIS STATION AND IN CONSONANCE
WITH [illegible] STANDARDS IN ORDER TO MAKE FITNESS
REPORTS AS [illegible] AND MEANINGFUL AS POSSIBLE

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 May 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John F. Baker	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5/6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SP IC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only)*.

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 As branch chief directs and plans operations of denied area branch.	RATING NUMBER 5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison with other U.S. agencies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts operational liaison with local security services.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops and handles agents	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject is an exceedingly well-equipped operations officer. He is mature, intelligent, has a thorough background in operations in his area and the ability to grow in his job. His operational planning and execution is usually impeccable. He has the loyalty of his subordinates and the respect of his equals and supervisors. He is particularly effective in dealing in the liaison field where his good sense and disinterest in "fighting the problem" produces a maximum of cooperation and good will. If he has any minor fault as a supervisor, it is not in impatience with his subordinates, as reflected in previous evaluations, but in an occasional unwillingness to say no to them.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON JACQUES
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FS, TOKYO, JAPAN
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1957 - 9 April 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 27 May 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William E. Nelson
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE:

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 27 May 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: John E. Baker
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisors*)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NU OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN YOUR SUPERVISION
10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

His potential for advancement is excellent. He has the right blend of operational know-how and supervisory talent to undertake positions of wider scope than he now holds. Although his advancement has been rapid for his age, his maturity, poise and common sense almost completely eliminate age as a factor in his potential for a more senior job.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject deserves at sometime within the next year or two the opportunity to broaden his experience either by command of a small station or advancement to a more responsible job in a large one.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30 DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SR File

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON Jacques
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: Tokyo Station REDWOOD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Operations Officer
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Completed at Headquarters; subject not available

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 16 Oct 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Edward Marelius
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief SOV Branch Japan Station

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 23 OCT 57
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Lloyd GEORGE
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: COS, Tokyo

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SF IC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB.
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy to Branch Chief	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts Foreign Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares correspondence and reports and handles administrative routine	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares and Manages Projects	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Developes and handles Agents	RATING NUMBER 5

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has excellent natural equipment for employment in this organization in terms of his intelligence and natural apptitudes. Additionally, he brings a great deal of area knowledge and language ability to his present assignment. During the period covered by this report he has displayed great industry and devotion to duty in a variety of circumstances and achieved notable results in production and in the creation of both short and long-term assets for his unit. On the debit side I would say that he is somewhat too businesslike in many personal situations to the point of being almost humourless. This, however, is a quality which he does not permit to intrude upon the necessities of his operational work although it often shows in office relationships.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON Jacques	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station FEX:OCD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1956 to 30 September 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 23 OCT 57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Lloyd GEORGE Lloyd George	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE COS, Tokyo

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 16 Oct 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward Marelius	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief SOV Branch Japan

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Spec)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

15

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject is well suited for this business and the business for him. He should progress steadily to positions of great responsibility.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Normal refresher a/o preparatory training as required.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

No limiting factors or personal circumstances known to the rater

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	[illegible]	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR EDWARD MARELIUS	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. LLOYD GEORGE	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPE C DUTIES

DIRECTIONS.

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 **Deputy to Branch Chief**	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 **Supervising**	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 **Conducts Foreign Liaison**	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 **Prepares correspondence and reports**	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 **Prepares and manages projects**	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 **Handles admin routine**	RATING NUMBER 4

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject has really superb natural equipment for work in this Organization in terms of mental capacity, psychological bent and affinity for the things and people he comes against. He tops this off with industry and language ability among other natural aptitudes. On the debit side and measured against the best, he is a bit shy of humor and personal understanding in some situations, qualities which mitigate more against acceptability than job competence.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE.. BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Subject is an all around performer capable of a primary, in place of his present secondary, responsibility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) RICHARDSON JACQUES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Japan Station (REDWOOD)	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Operations Officer		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 October 1955 to 30 September 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 15 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR EDWARD MARELIUS	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE CHIEF, Soviet Branch

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 21 November 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL W. LLOYD GEORGE	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Operations

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (*truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds*) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (*First line supervisor*)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (*Second line supervisors*)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (*Executive level*)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (*Specify*)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NU OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN R YOUR SUPERVISION

Six

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has a high all around potential. With respect to supervision, below, he tends to support subordinates from his own energy rather more than to bring them along the hard way, and a normal tendency to avoid the categorical "no" - both tendencies easily correctable.

SECTION N. **FUTURE PLANS**

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Routine refresher training as appropriate.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

All normal. No limiting factors.

SECTION I. **DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL**

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5 STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. *The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and*
2. *A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.*

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Jacques Richardson	1. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1924	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION *(Current)* USSR Base, Tokyo		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 September 1955	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 17 February - 30 September 1955		

SECTION II *(To be completed by field supervisor)*

1. CURRENT POSITION Chief, USSR Base, Tokyo	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 19 February 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS *(List in order of frequency)*

A. As Chief of Operating Base:
1. Manage and direct all operations against target area, and monitor products.
2. Supervise system of development and exploitation of operational leads.
3. Supervise proper administration and support of operations, including finances.
4. Conduct or supervise effective liaison with other CIA elements, with other Government agencies abroad and, when appropriate, with representative of other governments.

B. As Senior SR Division Officer in Area:
1. Consult with or advise other CIA and non-CIA units on target area, government, and IS characteristics.
2. Make available to other CIA and non-CIA units area specialists, as required.

SECTION III *(To be completed at headquarters only)*

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER *(True)* Carleton B. Swift	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD *(True)* W. Lloyd George
3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 7 Nov. 1955	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Phyllis M. Landrum

DO COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTE USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP 54

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks: this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.												X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.														X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.													X	
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.												X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.													X	
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.													X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.														X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.													X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.													X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.												X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

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(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.														☒
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											☒			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".												☒		
29. TOUGH MINDED.												☒		
30. OBSERVANT.												☒		
31. CAPABLE.													☒	
32. CLEAR THINKING.														☒
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												☒		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												☒		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													☒	
36. DELIBERATE.													☒	
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												☒		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											☒			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													☒	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												☒		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.														☒
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													☒	
43. HAS DRIVE.												☒		
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												☒		
45. VERSATILE.													☒	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													☒	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											☒			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												☒		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													☒	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.												☒		

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Capable operations officer with broad understanding of Soviet problems.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT A NGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL ER CONSIDERATIONS:

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Richardson Jacques JJO.		2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Area Ops. Officer CO-FI	
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR/5	☐ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 18 July 1953 To 17 July 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

18 July 53 - 31 Jan 54

a. Manage and direct the activities of an overseas operating branch.
b. Assist the division chief of operations in the planning of new and continued oper'ns.
c. Assist the division chief in personnel programming in support of branch and field station activities.

1 Feb 54 - 17 Jul 54

a. Establish new domestic activities branch.
b. Develop and manage operational program of this branch, insuring (1) continuity of treatment by qualified personnel, (2) processing of intelligence requirements, and (3) expeditious movement of finished intelligence.
c. Multilateral liaison with other elements of CIA, the Government, and foreign IS.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
Counterespionage (OTR)	Washington	3 weeks	22 January 1954

(In addition to the duties indicated in §7 above, I also give a 3-hour lecture at the CE course (advanced phase) approximately every six weeks.)

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am primarily interested in a foreign assignment where I could apply the various espionage and CE techniques it has been my responsibility to manage and plan for in recent years.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
My work at headquarters has become somewhat narrowing in that I am losing language abilities and opportunity for direct contact with foreigners.

10.

9 July 1954
DATE

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Richardson is a superior officer in the performance of his duties. He is efficient, precise, and energetic, and brings considerable imagination and foresight to the operational problems confronting him. His concept of staff organization and responsibility is of a high caliber. In handling personnel, he is perceptive and serious, and his judgment and motivation are of the highest quality.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

This officer has been outstanding as a staff officer. He is unusually talented in his balancing of jurisdictional equities. This ability reflects a broad competence, however, and should not be construed so as to limit his future duties.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

This officer's devotion to his duties and professional convictions sometimes inclines him toward inflexible declarations of position. This fault, a minor one in officers of considerable potential, will be corrected by increased responsibility and experience.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

This officer is prepared for promotion and for increased responsibilities in command or staff duties.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Richardson is presently well placed. See below.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Tradecraft training and a field assignment. Both are planned in the next six months.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 July 54
DATE

Peer de Silva
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

21 July '54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): RICHARDSON [illegible] D
2. GRADE: GS-15
3. POSITION TITLE: Sup. Intell. Off. (Chief)
4. OFFICE: DDP — STAFF OR DIVISION: SR — BRANCH: SR 5 PS Br. — ☐ DEPT'L. ☒ FIELD — IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From [illegible]-13-53 To 7-14-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☒ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST ... MAJOR DUTIES.

a. Supervise and manage a foreign geographic branch; this includes a total of 51 authorised personnel at Hq and in the field stations. b. Direct and coordinate all project development. c. Detect and explore potential operational leads. d. Coordinate intra-division activities with appropriate branches, inter-division activities with appropriate divisions, senior staffs, and elements outside DD/P and CIA. e. Determine the suitability of new personnel, continued employment and rotation of incumbent personnel, and make available incumbent personnel on loan basis to other divisions etc. f. Apportion the operational and administrative workloads within the branch sections and desks, and their personnel. g. Adapt changing field situations and problems to the organisation and operation of the branch, making the branch best serve the needs of the field stations. h. Review continuously all requirements imposed on the branch, and transmit them clearly to the field.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None (I was overseas part of the time covered by this report).			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? I am principally interested in the building and successful operation of American intelligence abroad, both in theory and in practice.

REMARKS (QUALIFICATIONS, APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS): The only remark I can make here is the one I stated in the previous report: the administrative responsibilities of a branch chief do not enable him to be a purely operational individual. If it were possible to carry less of an administrative load, I would enjoy devoting all of my time to the refinement of the intelligence process and its techniques in my area of concern.

10.

22 October 1953

DATE | SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

During this period Mr. Richardson was promoted from Deputy Branch Chief to Branch Chief, in recognition of his extremely good performance. Not enough time has elapsed to be able to evaluate him fully on all aspects of his new position. However, his handling of the Branch has been unusually good from a management point of view and there is every reason to believe that in the planning and direction of operational activities the same high standard will prevail.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

He is a good organizer and a good leader. He is methodical and thorough in his planning and supervision of substantive activities, while at the same time he maintains close and sympathetic relations with his subordinates. His knowledge of them and of their personalities and problems is outstanding.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

He should continue to develop his knowledge of operations and operational procedures.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He is well equipped to advance through increasing levels of responsibility.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Well placed at present.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Assignment to a field position in the not-too-distant future.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

26 October 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

26 October 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) RICHARDSON,	(First) Jacques	(Middle) G.	2. GRADE GS-12	3. POSITION TITLE I.O. (Dep. Chief)
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION SR	BRANCH SR-5 Far East	☒ DEPT'L ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 2-18-52 To 2-18-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.
Assist the Branch Chief in management of the Branch and its overseas stations (3); at present, I act as Branch Chief about 25%-30% of the year. Supervise the planning and preparation for approval of all basic plans, programs, and projects. This involves thorough discussion with each of seven (7) desk chiefs of the purposes and procedures for accomplishing any single mission under any given project, including target analysis (whether FI or PP), preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements, specific personnel needs, etc. Am responsible for working directly with the Division's Intelligence Branch for control of requirements, ops intelligence, and reports. Am responsible for maintaining liaison with appropriate staffs and other Divisions who must coordinate any action or document. Assist or direct, as required, specific mission planning at overseas stations on TDY. Supervise preparation of all periodic reports; interview candidate empl'

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
International Politics, 102	Graduate School Georgetown University, Washington.	4 months: 3 hours' credit	5 June 1952

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?
I am primarily interested in the conception, planning, and operational management of FI and PP activities, and ops policy and control.
IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).
This differs from my present assignment essentially in that a Branch Chief or his Deputy becomes so involved in administrative detail that he cannot always give his undivided attention to project management and agent handling problems. Otherwise, I feel that my background and experience qualify me for the functions I aspire to perform.

10.
7 February 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE. As Deputy Branch Chief, Mr. Richardson has performed his duties, taken as a whole, in a superior manner. His timely and efficient preparation of intelligence annexes, logistic and fiscal requirements and reports has been particularly outstanding. During three to four months of the past year, Mr. Richardson has acted as Branch Chief. The review of Branch operations under Mr. Richardson's direction, during the writer's absence, indicated his complete competence in supervising Branch activities. His supervision of the planning and preparation for approval of basic plans and projects of the seven (7) desk chiefs has been superior. Mr. Richardson also participated in the planning and dispatch of a difficult operational mission, acting in the capacity of Senior Case Officer. On this mission his liaison with representatives of one of the Military Services was conducted in a manner which enhanced cooperation between that S ice and this Agency.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Richardson's performance was noticeably outstanding with respect to his thorough knowledge of every activity of the Branch. He was in position to assume direction of Branch activities at any time. He also kept himself thoroughly briefed on Division policies and planning in order to give timely instruction and guidance to the Branch overseas stations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Richardson has a very thorough background in two (2) languages, French and Japanese. He would benefit substantially by learning the Russian language. He is meticulous with respect to his attention to details, sometimes to the point of concealing the broader picture from his view. It would be well for Mr. Richardson to direct his attention to the broad scope of Branch activities rather than to concentrate on its details.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to assume the duties of the chief SR Division representative at a field station. In order to assume this responsibility in the most efficient manner, it is recommended that Mr. Richardson serve a minimum period of time of approximately six (6) months as the assistant to the present chief of the field station.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Richardson could serve effectively in a staff function for either FI or PP activities. This does not mean, however, that his present duties are not better suited to his qualifications.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Mr. Richardson has already been recommended for overseas assignment in the Far East during the past year. He has area knowledge and command of the Japanese language, having served in Japan previously with the United States Army. His duties at Headquarters have been so pressing that his departure for overseas assignment is being delayed until an adequate replacement may be trained.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

March 31 1953
DATE

George Kisevalter
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

Mar 30 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

Jm

GS-15
WE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas B. CASASIN (SA)

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096, dated 12 August 1965

Recent correspondence on the above subject informed you that I had determined that you met the criteria specified in the applicable regulation for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System. On the basis of this determination and your recently executed election to remain in the System, your designation as a participant was made effective 10 April 1966.

Richard B. Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

lo E
15

28 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas B. CASASIN (SA)

THROUGH : Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT : Designation as a Participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch 5096 dated 12 August 1965

1. Based on a review of your record and the recommendations of the Head of your Career Service and of the Organization Retirement Board, I have determined that you meet the criteria for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System.

2. The regulation governing this retirement system provides that "Any participant who has completed fifteen years of service with the Organization and whose career at that time is adjudged by the Director of Personnel to be qualifying for the system may elect to remain a participant in the system for the duration of his employment by the Organization and such election shall not be subject to review or approval by the Director." Since you have already completed fifteen years of service with the Organization, your right to this election vests upon your designation as a participant and must be exercised immediately.

3. If you should elect not to remain a participant in the system, you will be continued under the Civil Service Retirement System. Once your election has been made, you do not have the privilege of changing it at some later date.

4. It is requested that you indicate your election by checking in the appropriate box and signing below. The original of this memorandum should be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Richard B. Egan

RICHARD B. EGAN

Exercise of option of participant with fifteen years of service:

☐ I elect to remain in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

☐ I elect NOT to remain a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System for the duration of my employment by the Organization.

Signature ____________________

Date ____________________

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO (1-6) [illegible]			2. ID NO. 8707
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE French	6. LANG. CODE (23-27) [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Feb. 14, 1962	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Feb. 14, 1962	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1924

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	
	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES

READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
H	I	H	H	H

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
	A
	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD

ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
A	I-H	R	V

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16 I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE	DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.	CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) 06102				2. ID NO. 0787
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION CA	5. LANGUAGE [illegible]		6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 370
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Nov. 5, 1962	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Aug. 6, 1962	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 30, 1926	

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	12. TEST SCORES				
☐ APPLY FOR AWARD	READING (24)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
☐ ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL	-	-	I	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	14. TYPE OF AWARD			
☐ A	ACHIEVEMENT (A)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
☐ M	MAINTENANCE (M)	HIGH (H)		
☒ NA				

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)
Award disapproved by CS Board

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ (40-45)
SIGNATURE
DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.
SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

French Basic Reading, Speaking, Writing--II
100 hours, part-time, 9 Apr 62 - 15 Jun 62 — 4 students

Student : Harriette D. Richardson (Dependent)
(wife of Jacques Richardson - SR) — Year of Birth: 1928

EOD Date: — Grade: — Office : —

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS - Instructor: W. Ray Rackley

This is the second phase in a three-phase basic sequence of 30 weeks, each phase lasting 10 weeks.

The general aim of this course is to provide a thorough grounding for the student who has previously had either a reading course in French or an insufficient introduction to the language. The major objectives of this phase of the course are to develop an ability: (1) to distinguish and pronounce satisfactorily all the sounds of the language; (2) to use effectively a modest stock of French sentences and expressions; (3) to comprehend normal-speed spoken French in a variety of everyday non-technical situations; (4) to begin to read and write basic French, applying the spoken vocabulary and grammatical material previously learned.

Classes are held 2 hours per day, 5 days a week, requiring a minimum of 10 hours of preparation per week. To receive the maximum benefit from this course each student should plan to devote at least two-thirds of the class preparation time doing drill in the language laboratory.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student progress is evaluated primarily on oral recitation in the form of drills and free conversation based on memorized material. In addition, several tests are given during the course. This student's rating is indicated by the asterisk.

Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Excellent	Incomplete
	3	1*	

Mrs. Richardson was definitely a superior student. Her pronunciation was excellent and she had a solid command of the structure of French. She was somewhat hesitant in new language situations, but she more than made up for this through diligent and profitable laboratory and home preparation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: /s/ W. RAY RACKLEY
Chief Instructor

26 July 1962
Date

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RS-4/

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY (Forward original and 2)	DATE
TO : Director of Training ATTN: Registrar THRU: Training Officer, SR Division	FROM: J. G. Richardson CSR 6 (DD/P) 5218 X-5098
1. INSTITUTION ATTENDED Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	2. DATES OF TRAINING 10-16 June 1962

3. DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM (Include list of courses and a copy of grades received)

Technical Writers' Institute; certificate awarded

Purpose: to provide a forum where technical writers from industry and government can meet to discuss and practice writing techniques under the supervision of experienced teachers. Many of the instructors have worked closely with industry as consultants on special writing problems and training courses for technical writing. All of them have published in the field of technical writing.

4. YOUR OPINION OF THE PROGRAM (Explain strengths and weaknesses)

This was an excellent combination of classroom presentations and writing laboratories. Almost all guest speakers had a useful message to deliver. The writing encouraged is of the tight-language, pure English variety, in the three categories of informative, directive, and persuasive writing. The schedule was full, although I believe it could have been fuller. The five 2-hour workshops should be expanded to three-hour sessions. The contact with representatives of industry was especially useful for cross-fertilization purposes.

5. EXPLAIN TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND WHETHER THEY WERE MET

Four our purposes, the training objectives were (a) to see that our writing techniques in the reporting field compare favorably with those in industry, (b) to meet and become known by persons throughout the nation in the technical writing field, and (c) to learn new techniques in the field of communicating technical, scientific and engineering concepts, processes, and general information. All three objectives were met. I recommend that officers from SR/Reports and SR/Requirements-Targets, as well as analysts from SR 6, be permitted the opportunity to attend this same institute in future years. It is well worth the effort.

6. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

18 JUN

J. G.

Jacques G. SIGNATURE Richardson

NOTE: The original will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder, 2 copies will be for OTR us

FORM 8-60 1049 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(36-49)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]				2. I.D. NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.		4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE French	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Dec. 1[illegible], 1960	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Aug. 6, 1961	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1924	

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	12. TEST SCORES				
APPLY FOR AWARD	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL	I	I	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)		14. TYPE OF AWARD			
	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
X	M				
	NA	M*	H		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. @ old scale, 1 yr. @ new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) [illegible]				2. I.D. NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.		4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE Japanese	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) [illegible]
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Dec. 1[illegible], 1960	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Aug. 6, 1961	9. GRADE 14	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1924	

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	12. TEST SCORES				
APPLY FOR AWARD	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL	-	-	I	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)		14. TYPE OF AWARD			
	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
XX	M				
	NA	M*	I	[illegible]	

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ [illegible] (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS
*3 yrs. Main. (2 yrs. @ old scale, 1 yr. @ new scale)

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGEMENT COURSE NO. 64

40 hours, part-time 18 students

Student: **Jacques Richardson** Year of birth: **1924**

EOD Date: **September 1956** Grade: **14** Office: **SR**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Management Course is designed to familiarize senior line and staff managers with both the theory and the practical problems of management in CIA. The underlying assumption of the course is that management development is a process of growth on the job. The course, however, enables the participants to examine their job activities in an environment where, guided by the instructors, they can critically examine their own actions, exchange ideas with managers from other components, and develop an understanding of the complex relationships that exist among the people, the pattern of organization, and the purposes of the Agency. The course approaches the problems of management in the Agency by discussing the formal and informal structures, concepts of leadership and communication, the problems of personnel management, and theories of planning and controlling. These subjects are related as closely as possible to the activities of the class members.

The content of the course is developed through lectures, case and group discussions, filmed presentations, and problem-solving exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief Instructor 20 February 1961
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Services Review No. 31
80 hours, full-time 28 November - 9 December 1960 43 students

Student: **Jacques G. Richardson** Year of birth: **1924**

EOD Date: **November 1949** Grade: **GS-14** Office: **DDP/SR/6**

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course aims to develop in the Clandestine Services officers, and others, recently returned from the field an up-to-date awareness of the role of CIA in the United States intelligence community, the relations of the DD/I area with the CS and the support available from the offices of the DD/S. Recently this course has been designated as an alternate prerequisite for CIA officers nominated for certain external training.

The course is presented by lectures given by CIA officials who are directly responsible for the missions, functions, programs, and services discussed. Each lecture is usually followed by a short question period. Approximately 10 per cent of the students' time is scheduled for reading pertinent up-to-date regulations and background summaries.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course. This student was conscientious and regular in attendance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Mayo S. Stuntz 21 December 1960
Chief Instructor Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME RICHARDSON, James O. Div. SR/5

SUBJECT Flaps & Seals - Basic Familiarization

DATES TRAINED FROM 2 TO 3 December 1954

EVALUATION:

Did good work. Appears to have a good understanding of the basic principles involved. His attitude inclass reflected his interest in the work.

Note: This course is only for familiarization. It does not qualify student to engage in the opening of mail.

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
- 1 - TLO ✓
- 1 - OTR/Registrar
- 1 - TSS/TD files

SECRET

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Jack Richardson **Div.** SR

SUBJECT Audio

DATES TRAINED **FROM** 29 Nov. 1954 **TO** 3 Dec. 1954

EVALUATION: Although lacking a background in electronics, Mr. Richardson was able to grasp the instructions given and correctly interpret it. I feel that Mr. Richardson would be able to correctly evaluate audio opportunities and to equip and direct such an operation with the exception of the telephone tap. Mr. Richardson is not qualified to perform maintenance on the equipment.

CS Moorfield
CARL S. MOOREFIELD

Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TD.

Distribution:
- 1 - TLO ✓
- 1 - OTR/Registrar
- 1 - TSS/TD files

SECRET

CSR/AD
T.A. Parrott
O. de Silva
J. Smith
April 15. 1954

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Counterespionage Course No. 20

RICHARDSON, Jacques G.		Male	4-22 January 1954
Name		Sex	Dates of Course
20 Jan. 1924	10 June 1949	GS-13	DD/P/SR-5 /E/
Date of Birth	EOD	Grade or Rank	Office

Chief of geographic branch.
Projected Assignment or Present Position

The Counterespionage Course is a specialized course of three weeks' duration designed to expose the student to CE principles and practices and to indoctrinate him therein. The course is conducted on a seminar, round-table basis. Emphasis is placed on student participation during staff and guest lectures. Ample time is allotted for reading the extensive material provided.

Each student is required, starting mid-way in the second week, to give a presentation before the class. This hour-long presentation is based on a problem assignment given the student by the staff. Exception is made where students have the field or headquarters experience in CE or a related field; such a student is permitted to give a one-hour lecture based on specific experience. The "canned" problems are selected to test students' ability to do CE research, collate, make logical analyses, and present ideas effectively to a seminar group.

This evaluation is based primarily on the student presentation, and to a lesser degree on participation in seminar discussions when conducted by the staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

RICHARDSON, Jacques G.

1. Mr. Richardson ranked first in a strong group. He applied himself effectively throughout the course. His seminar contributions aided materially. He drew freely on a sound operational background and was by all odds the top student.

2. Student Presentation: Mr. Richardson presented a case with which he was familiar from his own experience. It was a first-rate performance. The material was very well organized and crisply presented. So effective in fact, that Mr. Richardson will be called upon to give the same discussion in subsequent CE courses.

3. In my opinion Mr. Richardson is fully qualified to act as senior CE officer.

Chief Instructor, CE Course

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME RICHARDSON [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 2 May 1950

TRAINING COURSE Advanced Operations V

DIVISION OPC/FBD GRADE GS-7

TRAINING PERIOD 27 March - 21 April 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer.

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

			Possible Score	Achieved Score
FACTS	(1)	Comprehension of mission of OSO	(40)	30
	(2)	Comprehension of mission of OPC	(40)	30
	(3)	Comprehension of operational procedures	(25)	16
	(4)	Comprehension of operational policy	(25)	16
	(5)	USSR and Communism (clandestine aspects)	(20)	15
SKILLS	(6)	Evaluation of operational data	(30)	24
	(7)	Operational planning	(30)	24
	(8)	Operational mechanics	(30)	23
	(9)	Personality analysis	(30)	21
	(10)	Personality manipulation	(30)	16
		TOTAL	(300)	215

Overall adjectival rating . . . . Satisfactory (72%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

		Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	5
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4)	Industriousness	7
(5)	Practical intelligence	5
(6)	Astuteness	5
(7)	Adaptability	5
(8)	Effectiveness	5
(9)	Stability	5
(10)	Initiative	5
(11)	Imagination	5
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	4

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED: ____________________
CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED: ____________________
CHIEF, TRD

Dist: COS
COP
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Files

FORM NO. 51-38
JAN 1950

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

Richarson

STUDENT'S NAME [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 10 April 1950

TRAINING COURSE Operations

DIVISION OPC/FBD GRADE 7

TRAINING PERIOD 20 February - 17 March 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Ass't Pol. Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1) Comprehension of basic principles of clandestine operations	(40)	28
(2) Use of tradecraft (ability to apply principles of clandestine operations)	(50)	32
(3) Ability to evaluate operational data	(20)	15
(4) Ability to use operational data	(20)	14
(5) Planning	(30)	19
(6) Personality analysis	(20)	17
(7) Personality manipulation	(50)	42
(8) Adaptability to operational emergencies	(30)	21
(9) Attention to detail	(20)	14
(10) Organization and presentation of written operational material	(20)	16
TOTAL	(300)	218

Overall adjectival rating Satisfactory (73%)

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

	Rating
(1) Ability to get along and work with people	7
(2) Ability to grasp instructions	6
(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work	6
(4) Industriousness	5
(5) Practical intelligence	6
(6) Astuteness	5
(7) Adaptability	6
(8) Effectiveness	6
(9) Stability	6
(10) Initiative	5
(11) Imagination	6
(12) Ability to handle and direct people	7

3. COMMENTS. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. ______
Chief, STS

REVIEWED. ______
Chief, TRD

FORM NO. 51-[illegible]
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations, and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

Richardson

STUDENT'S NAME [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT 10 February 1950

TRAINING COURSE Staff Orientation V

DIVISION OPC/FBD GRADE GS-7

TRAINING PERIOD 9 January - 3 February 1950

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Assistant Political Warfare Officer

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Problems	Possible Score	Achieved Score
(1)	Reporting of Information	(30)	20
(2)	Message Writing	(5)	4
(3)	Interviews: Procurement of Information	(25)	14
(4)	Interviews: Personality Handling	(25)	16
(5)	Mapping and Sketching	(30)	26
(6)	Observation and Description	(30)	25
	Objective Tests		
(7)	Intelligence Tools and Objectives	(25)	18
(8)	Reporting Mechanics	(20)	15
(9)	CIA Security Regulations	(10)	9
(10)	USSR and Communism	(50)	31
	TOTAL	(250)	178

Overall adjectival rating .... Satisfactory

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, the higher indicating above average.

		Rating
(1)	Ability to get along and work with people	6
(2)	Ability to grasp instructions	5
(3)	Enthusiasm and interest in work	7
(4)	Industriousness	7
(5)	Practical intelligence	7
(6)	Astuteness	7
(7)	Adaptability	5
(8)	Effectiveness	7
(9)	Stability	8
(10)	Initiative	6
(11)	Imagination	0
(12)	Ability to handle and direct people	6

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths and weaknesses.)

CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. CHIEF, STS

REVIEWED. CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-67
JAN 1950

SECRET

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO ALLOWANCE COMMITTEE ADDENDUM
For Staff Agent, Thomas B. CASASIN

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

Effective 25 May 1970, your current Allowance Committee Addendum, as amended, is further amended by substituting the following for sub-paragraph (B) entitled "Other Allowance Entitlements":

> (B) One-Time Payment. You are herein authorized a one-time, non-taxable Agency payment of $235 in lieu of your entitlement to reimbursement for the round-trip educational travel of your daughter from Paris to Norton, Massachusetts, and return to Paris. Payment of this amount will be by deposit to your bank account. This payment and the fixed allowances as set out in sub-paragraph (A) above are in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations.

All other provisions of your Allowance Addendum, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

SECRET

SECRET

ADDENDUM TO STAFF AGENT SUPPLEMENT
For Thomas B. CASASIN, Effective 5 August 1962

Mr. Thomas B. Casasin

Dear Mr. Casasin:

The Agency Allowance Committee is authorized to modify the entitlements of a Staff Agent for cover, operational or security reasons. Based upon that authority, on 7 June 1966, the Committee made the following determinations which will apply to your Agency overseas assignment in Paris, France under non-official cover. These determinations supersede and modify any provisions of your present Staff Agent Supplement which conflict therewith:

(a) Fixed Allowance. Effective the day of your return to Paris you are herein authorized a non-accountable, non-taxable fixed allowance calculated at the rate of $7,580 for the following year, i.e., for a one year period. If required, advances may be granted by an Agency authorizing official. This fixed allowance is in lieu of your Agency overseas allowance entitlements except that upon your return to a domestic permanent post of assignment you will be entitled to a home service transfer allowance in conformance with applicable Agency regulations. Agency fixed allowances are also in lieu of entitlements to (1) reimbursement for the overseas operational use of your POV and common carriers in and around Paris and (2) storage of your HHE. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government or by your cover facility during the period covered by these fixed allowances.

(b) Exemption from Offset. During this one year period of your overseas assignment, you are herein authorized to retain, without offset, the housing and cost-of-living allowances of your cover facility.

(c) Requirement of Certification. You agree to certify, when requested, that payments made to you as set forth herein have been expended for the purpose for which made and have not accrued to your personal advantage or enrichment. You will repay any amount for which you cannot provide such a certification. You understand that you are not required to make financial accountings for amounts received under (a) above.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

APPROVED:

____
Allowance Committee

ACKNOWLEDGED:

____
Thomas B. Casasin

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For **Thomas B. Casasin** Effective 5 AUG [illegible]

Mr. **Thomas B. Casasin**

Dear Mr. **Casasin**.

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain rights and obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are **$13,510** and GS-**14 6**, respectively, and you are entitled to receive the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable thereto, however, certain procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your cover position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If, except as provided in paragraph 4 below, your cover emoluments ever exceed those due you as a Staff Agent the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Your Federal income taxes will be withheld and reported in conformance with HR 20-33 or any subsequent regulations or procedures promulgated by this organization. For your information, this organization shall withhold from the gross payments due you Federal income taxes in an amount which, when added to the income taxes withheld by your cover facility will equal the tax withholdings normally made from your gross taxable compensation with this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make tax remittances in conformance with HB 20-661-1. Also, that issuance together with R 30-720 covers the procedures to be followed in order to receive reimbursement for foreign income taxes imposed upon you.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one half per cent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) If permanent quarters are not furnished your quarters allowance will be granted at the maximum rate established for your post of assignment, family status and grade. No accounting for this allowance will be required.

If your position requires that you make contribution to the Social Security Fund, such contributions will be at your expense. However, involuntary contributions for cover facility programs such as insurance and retirement, may be considered items of expense to this organization, and in such case any monies you receive as a result of your participation in such programs must be returned to this organization. Whether participation in a particular cover facility program is involuntary will be determined by this organization.

2. Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay. You are hereby authorized Nonofficial Cover Premium Pay in conformance with applicable organizational issuances. For your information currently this premium pay is ten percent of your base salary, represents additional taxable compensation to you and is applicable for that period of time you are assigned under nonofficial cover.

3. Equalization Allowance. You are hereby authorized an equalization allowance in accordance with applicable organization issuances.

4. Travel Expenses. You will be entitled to travel, transportation and storage in conformance with the regulations of this organization. HR 20-2c provides that travel expenses of integrated personnel will be allowed in accordance with the regulations of their cover organizations or HR 22, whichever allows the greater amount.

5. Travel Penalties. You herein agree that your assignment abroad will be for a minimum of ______________ from the date of your arrival at your permanent post of duty, unless such assignment shall be sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience. Your violation of such agreement may result in regulatory travel penalties. HR 22-6 provides that if the agreement is violated during the first year of duty abroad, expenditures for travel and transportation to the post, including per diem while at headquarters and storage of effects, shall be reimbursed by the employee. If the agreement is violated after the first year of duty, but before the completion of the minimum tour agreed to above, return travel at Government expense shall not be allowed.

AGREED: ______________

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________
Personnel Officer

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] V. Paul [illegible]

DIVISION: SR

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-1000 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: For contract info

DATE: 9 July 1962

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Thomas B. CALASIG

2A. PROJECT: NA

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Paris, France

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3234-[illegible]-1000

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.: 2-0

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:
James H. Kamicott (P)
John F. Reynolds John R. Williams, John F. Martin (A)

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)*
Staff Employee since 1949

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE *(Type and date)*: SI

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY *(Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)*: Staff Agent

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 38

14. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, day, year)*: January 20, 1924

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*: Alexandria, Virginia

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)*: Alexandria, Virginia

17. MARITAL STATUS *(Check as appropriate)*: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS *(Not including individual)* RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Three - Wife, age 34
Daughter, age 8
Daughter, Age 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY. ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NA

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY *(Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)*:

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U. S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE:

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY / 28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Pay entitlements equating to GS-14 (step 5) including premium pay

29. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)*:

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	X	X
NO		

SECTION V ALLOWANCES *(NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)*

31. QUARTERS / 32. POST: In accordance with regulations

33. OTHER:

34. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)*:

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS: ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife, U. S. Citizen, age 34, DOB 13 June 1928
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 8, DOB 5 September 1953
Daughter, U. S. Citizen, age 11, DOB September 1950

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: As authorized

43. ENTERTAINMENT: As authorized

44. OTHER: As authorized

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGU[illegible] ☐ [illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*

CASE OFFICER [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION For [illegible] call [illegible]	DATE 9 July 1962

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)*

All Staff Employee benefits

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*	☐	PROPOSED	48. TYPE *(Check)*	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	☒	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☒	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☐	OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

RA ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)* ☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION						52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE
	DAYS		MONTHS		YEARS		☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*	55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION
	☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(CI, FI, PP, other)*

FI and CA

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Handling and supervision of field agents already recruited.
Spotting, assessment and development of agent candidates or projects.
Recruitment of agent candidates outside France when necessary.
Clandestine support of own and other station operations.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Photographic equipment salesman
Newspaper assistant XXXXX editor
Assistant to planning division of housing authority of a major city
Operations Officer for past 12 years

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE				
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE						
☐	COLLEGE *(No degree)*	☒	COLLEGE DEGREE	☐	POST GRADUATE	☐	MA	☐	PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
French		X			X			X	
Japanese		X				X		X	
Russian									X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Canada, Japan, Western Europe thru residence, study and travel

SECTION XV EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Newspaper assistant editor - $2,100
Assistant to planning division of housing authority $3,100

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	JOHN CLARK		[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 3 April 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): RICHARDSON, Jacques G. (Dependents)

3. POSITION TITLE: Staff Agent

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/EUR

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6913

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT Home leave & return to Station

ETD: October 1967
STATION: Paris, France
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Non-official
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: three
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 93) ATTACHED: 3

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: George W. Owens E/PERS

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 4-B-01

EXT.: 6913

10. COMMENTS

Medical statements from a private physician is attached.

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS
SPERRY PRESTON

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE: 89 21 74

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, European Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN

Staff Agent

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OFPS-10932

CASASIN's dependents took physical examinations at the American Hospital in Paris on 20 February. Since, because of his cover there could be no LNHARP connection, CASASIN's dependents made arrangements for their physicals as private citizens, on the pretense that they required statements that they were in good health in order to obtain insurance. Obviously, forms 88 were not prepared; the attached certificates of good health and freedom from contagious disease are all that is normally given to private individuals in France. We hope they suffice.

DENISE H. ZEHNGRAFF

Attachment - U/S/C via TNP
As Stated Above

Distribution:
3-Chief, Eur-Div w/att usc-tnp

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPT-13839

DATE
MAR 14 1968
11 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Paris

Chief, EUR
Administrative/Personnel/Medical
Dependents of Thomas B. CASASIN

The Office of Medical Services has advised that Thomas B. CASASIN's dependents did not take physical examinations prior to their PCS return to Paris. So that CASASIN's dependents may be fully covered under the Overseas Medical Program, it is essential that arrangements be made for their physicals to be taken in the field and the results forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible.

Daniel J. LHURIGAN

DISTRIBUTION:
3-COS, Paris

20 OCT 1967

OYPS- 10932

S E C R E T

1-E/REG
1-E/PERS
1-OMS
1-E/F

E/Pers GWOWENS mm 6913

OMS

C/E/F



14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 006102	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CASASIN THOMAS B (P)	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/24	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS-15-06
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WE	9. LOCATION (Country, City) PARIS, FRANCE	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	TDY-60	50/07/01	50/09/01
US PACIFIC POSSESSIONS	TDY-60	52/07/01	52/10/01
ASIA AREA	TDY-60	53/06/01	53/07/01
JAPAN	PCS-VV	55/02/17	60/06/24

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	LINGUISTICS, GENERAL	MICH UNIV.	45

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg. 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) RICHARDSON, (First) JACQUES (Middle) G. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 042-20-5339

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED: ESSEX, MARYLAND

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): ALEXANDRIA, VA.

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: ALEXANDRIA, VA.

HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: ALEXANDRIA, VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: ALEXANDRIA, VA. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 25 JUN 49

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE: — DATE OF DECREE: —

IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED: — DATE SPOUSE DIED: —

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S): —

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
HARRIETTE D.	312 LAMOND PL, ALEX, VA.	KI 9 1037	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
PAMELA A.	SAME	F	19 SEP 50
MICHELLE D.	"	F	5 SEP 53
NAME OF FATHER ~~(Or male guardian)~~	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
JOHN B. RICHARDSON	3948 WYMAN PKY, BALTO, MD	PE 5-5240	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
DECEASED			

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. NONE

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME ~~(Mr., Mrs., Miss)~~ (Last-First-Middle): THEODORE G. DRISCOLL RELATIONSHIP: MOTHER-IN-LAW

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 722 S. ROYAL ST., ALEX, VA. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: TE 6-8506

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: WHARTON-POTTER, N. FAIRFAX ST, ALEX., VA. BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: KI 9-4330

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ☐ YES ☑ NO
CONOVER-MAST PUBL'NS INC. 205 E. 42 ST., NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) ☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) ☐ YES ☑ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

CLARENDON TRUST CO., ARLINGTON 10, VA.
JACQUES G. RICHARDSON } JOINT
HARRIETTE D. RICHARDSON

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

WIFE HAS IN POSSESSION

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT Washington, D.C.	DATE 31 July 62	SIGNATURE Jacques G. Richardson

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATT:

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

NAME: RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel **DOB:** 20 January 1924

GRADE: GS-14 Date of Grade 16 January 1955

MARITAL STATUS: Married

DEPENDENTS: Wife
Daug - age 11
Daug - age 8

CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

EDUCATION:

1940-42	Sir George Williams College, Canada - French
1942	Trinity College, Conn. - French (½ year)
1945	Univ of Michigan - BA (1947), Oriental Civilization, Japanese
1951-52	Georgetown Univ. - International Relations

PRIOR ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

1940-41	Jacoby Photographers, Montreal, Canada - Photo Tech (part-time).
1941-42	T. Eaton Co., Ltd (dept store), Montreal, Canada - Salesman (part-time).
1943-48	Military Service, U. S. Army, 1st Lt.(1946-48, G-2 Japan).
1949	Guide Publishing Co., Baltimore, Md., County Editor of weekly newspaper (4 months).
1949	Housing Authority of Baltimore City, Md., - Planning Admin. officer (6 months).
1955-56	Seikei Univ., Tokyo, Japan - Current Affairs English Seminar Leader (part-time).

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:

French - Reading and Writing - Elementary; Speaking - Native (Oct 1960).
Japanese - Reading andSpeaking - Elementary; Writing - Intermediate.

MILITARY RESERVE STATUS: NONE

ORGANIZATIONAL TRAINING:

1950	Basic Intel
1950	Staff Orient
1950	Ops
1950	Adv Ops
1950	Intel Orient
1950	Ops Famil
1950	UTGA
1951	Documentation
1954	Counterespionage
1954	Audio Surv Mgmt
1954	Ops Audio Surv Eq
1954	Flaps and Seals
1960	Intel Rptg Tech
1960	Cland Serv Review
1961	Mgmt Course
1961	IBM Program. Orient. Course

RYBAT

SECRET

RYBAT SEPARATE COVER ATT:

BIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

RICHARDSON, Jacques Gabriel

ORGANIZATIONAL EMPLOYMENT:

Nov 1949	I.O., GS-7, OPC/OPS St/FBD Area III, Hqs
Oct 1950	I.O., GS-9, OPC/FE-3/Ch, Soviet Desk, Hqs
Apr 1951	I.O., GS-11, OPC/FE/Dep Ch, FE-3, Hqs
Jan 1952	Ops Off, GS-12, OSO/SR/Dep Ch, SR-5, Hqs
	June - Oct 1952, TDY Hawaii, Alaska & Pearl Harbor
	June - Jul 1953, TDY Japan and Korea
Jul 1953	I.O., GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, SR-5, Hqs
Jan 1954	Area Ops Off, GS-13, KUDOVE/SR/COPs/Ch, Spec Def Rec Proj, Hqs
Feb 1955	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/FE/Japan/Ch, USSR Base, Tokyo
	Oct - Nov 1955, TDY Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaya and Burma
Mar 1956	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Dep Ch, Sov Br, Tokyo
	Nov - Dec 1956, TDY Hong Kong and Australia
Oct 1957	Area Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Tokyo Sta/Ch, Ops Br, Tokyo
Oct 1960	Ops Off, GS-14, KUDOVE/SR/Ch, Branch 6, Hqs

PERSONNEL EVALUATION:

Fitness Report, 10 April 1958 - 31 March 1959 "Subject continues as one of the most capable, professional and hard working of the branch chiefs in the station. Working against a tough denied area problem, he demonstrates imagination, drive, excellent area background and knowledge, and a high degree of productivity. He definitely has the potential for an even more responsible position." Fitness Report, 1 April 1959 - 24 June 1960 "In most respects, this officer is one of the best I have known in this agency. He has a broad and deep knowledge of his target area, as well as of his 'host country'; an excellent and proven degree of operational 'know-how'; the ability to write and speak lucidly and effectively and with apparent ease; and a very high degree of motivation and devotion to duty." Fitness Report, July 1960 - October 1961 "Subject supervises a very large and key branch engaged in a wide variety of activities, a difficult job which he does well."

RYBAT

SECRET

SR/SS

1 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Group/Non-official Cover

VIA : SR/SS

SUBJECT : Cover requirements for Thomas B. CASASIN (P)

1. Information keyed to your format "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual" is transmitted herewith.

2. SR would like to have a durable, permanent cover established for Thomas B. CASASIN as quickly as possible. CASASIN is presently a staff employee in Headquarters. He will be available to develop and undertake cover preparations as soon as Cover Group has completed the necessary arrangements.

3. It will be convenient for CASASIN to discuss cover plans and preparations with you whenever you wish. Miss Ruth Paul (ext. 3839) will serve as Headquarters case officer and will be pleased to provide any supplementary information you may require.

John Gerry
Chief, SR/2

Attachment:
As stated in Para 1, 2 cy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6) 36102				2. ID NO. [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE Richardson, Jacques G.		4. OFFICE OR DIVISION SR	5. LANGUAGE Japanese	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 379
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Mar. 5, 1962	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Mar. 5, 1963	9. GRADE 15	10. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 20, 1924	

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST	
X	APPLY FOR AWARD
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL

12. TEST SCORES				
READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
-	-	-	I	I

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
	A
X	M
	NA

14. TYPE OF AWARD			
ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
M	I		

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-45)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-45)

TLO COPY

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Richardson, Jacques G.

Subject has been evaluated by OMS and found to be qualified for proposed assignment.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-103

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mary
E/Pers.

DATE: 3 October 1967

FROM : Registrar/OMS

SUBJECT: Dependents of Richardson, Jacques

No medical disposition. Dependents will be evaluated when physicals are received.

DONALD W. FARLEY
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

SECRET

13 September 1960
File No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, [illegible]

ATTENTION : Security Officer

SUBJECT : Jacques C. [illegible]
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Form 1322, dated 9 September 1960.

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group
___
___
has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. [illegible] for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

FORM 9-60 1554

SECRET

(9-11)

A. General Information

(1) Thomas B. CASASIN (P). Aliases: John F. Reynolds, John R. Williams, John F. Martin, Mr. Black, John J. Kennedy, Lt. Col. Williams, Mr. Robbins, John Raincy, Mr. Richards, Mr. Roberts. Cover development has not been previously requested.

(2) Staff employee, GS-14, Step 5; total compensation under cover should be publicly within range of current actual compensation.

(3) Employee: fully cleared; wife previously had CSA for contract work in Japan, not overtly affiliated with CIA (cover was Army). Spouse is aware of employee's status.

(4) Medical status OK

(5) Employee has had psychological assessment and technical interviews. Results presumably satisfactory.

(6) Current cover: industrial liaison officer, Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group. Previous cover (Nov 1954-Sep 1960): supervising foreign affairs specialist, Detachment 1, Army Property Disposal Sales Agency, APO 94, San Francisco. Earlier cover (Nov 1949-Nov 1954): editor, International Press Section, USIA, in Washington. All were backstopped.

(7) New cover can be assumed at any time.

(8) Proposed departure date overseas is roughly summer 1962, but is flexible.

(9) SR/Support and SR/COA funds will be available to support any operational expenses and financial commitments made to the cover organization.

B. Biographic Information

(1) DPOB: 20 January 1924, Baltimore, Maryland. Male, caucasian. Married, two children (girls, 8 and 11). Current address is 312 Lamond Place, Alexandria, Virginia. Previous address was 344-C 3 chome Harajuku, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo, Japan.

(2) Adult dependent to accompany is wife, who resides with employee, and on whom bio data is available in the Office of Security. Both minor daughters would accompany overseas.

(3) Education: BA, U of Michigan; graduate work in international relations at Georgetown University.

(4) Professional experience: part-time work during college years as apprentice and journeyman photo technician; part-time work as photo equipment salesman; newspaper assistant editor, about $2,100 per annum; assistant to chief, planning division of housing authority of major city, $3,100 per annum; employed since then by CIA, pay range of $3,800 to $13,250 per annum.

(5) Outside interests: photography, including own processing; writing, editing non-fiction and some fiction; gardening and do-it-yourself wood and metal working; interest in mechanics and electricity; interest in organization, management, and administrative planning; member, British Interplanetary Society; former associate member, American Astronautical Society; former member, Japan Rocket Society. Interested in sports cars and other high quality automobiles and trucks. Skiing, swimming, horseback riding, hiking, camping, alpinism.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: An exceedingly well-equipped operations officer, combining an excellent knowledge of the target area and of the base country with proven operational know-how and a mature, dynamic, self-confident personality. Has a great facility to express himself in writing and orally. Very effective in dealing with people on various levels, poised and businesslike.

(7) Financial status: almost wholly dependent upon job income. Outstanding debt is mortgage on house (about $20,500).

(8) Previous foreign residence: Canada, 5 years; Japan, 8 years. Tourism and official travel (including war service) for shorter periods to the UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, British North Borneo, Australia, and the Philippines.

(9) Speaks French and Japanese (tested in both).

C. Security Considerations

(1) Employed by CIA 12 years and two months. Security approval is TOP SECRET dated 10 June 1949.

(2) Employee will know specifically of CIA interest.

(3) Employee has had normal staff employee access to CIA buildings.

(4) Identification of CIA connection to others: a few close friends and neighbors are aware that employee has worked for CIA since spring 1961 on detailed basis from Pentagon. Employee has been exposed to foreign intelligence services, but always under alias, and in all cases but one for short, one-time purposes. Exception: the Japanese, who know employee as John Reynolds. Turned up once in a Japanese police report as a

SECRET

possible intelligence-connected person after having been accosted by a Japanese policeman in a CIA safehouse which had evidently been compromised without Station's knowledge. Government claimed no knowledge of employee's intelligence connections. Employee has one close acquaintance in proposed area of assignment who knows of employee's true connections. Acquaintance is former staffer, discreet, and who wants to protect his own reputation and status locally.

(6) There are no other known problems bearing on security.

(7) Employee has used overseas cover designations and Headquarters' "Army Scientific Liaison and Advisory Group" and USIA for cover backstopping for non-operational purposes.

(8) After the forthcoming tour, it is hoped that the employee will be able to continue in a non-official cover capacity, or convert to the most appropriate official cover dictated by operational and administrative planning needs.

(9) This is a request for permanent cover.

(10) Theodore G. Driscoll, 722 S. Royal Street, Alexandria, Virginia. Father-in-law of employee. He is not witting of Subject's CIA employment.

(11) Insurance: WAEPA and "Eisenhower" payroll-deducted insurance. Have personal policy with Massachusetts Mutual, taken out while under Army cover. Wife is beneficiary in all cases.

(12) No Selective Service or reserve status or responsibility.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Operation

FI-CA management of large group of agents earlier recruited by others for REDWOOD purposes, including termination of marginal assets.

Spotting, assessment, and reporting potential new recruits.

Recruitment of agent-candidates outside the country of assignment when necessary.

Clandestine support and communications of own and others' operations.

Other tasks set out by Station, within cover and time-available capability.

(2) Location

Paris, France. Alternates: Brussels, Belgium; Luxembourg; Geneva, Switzerland.

(3) Employee should be relatively free to travel on short trips to nearby countries of Western and Middle Europe. Times and intervals will probably be dictated by the Paris Station.

(4) Special groups the employee should be able to contact

Although it is not essential, it would be desirable if the employee's cover permitted him to initiate and maintain contacts in the scientific, technological, commercial and engineering fields.

(5) Income directly attributable to cover should be in the range of $10,000 per annum, with supplementary income attributable to commissions, retainers, piece work fees, personal resources, etc.

(6) Employee should be able to devote upward of 30 hours per week to operational duties.

(7) Communications channels desired

Communications will be (a) directly with Station; (b) indirectly with Station via dead-drop, S/W, accommodation addresses, cut-outs, or any combination of these, or (c) in unusual circumstances via Headquarters or third country points. It is not desired that the cover facility provide an operational communication channel.

(8) Cover Suggestions

Suitable covers might include: technical publication representative, correspondent, or editor; book or manuscript agent or publisher's representative; corporation, service, or management consultant's representative; prestige or representational agent for large firm, service, institute, or association. The cover vis-a-vis the target is less important than the status afforded by the cover to the eyes of the host government, i.e., a reason for being there.

DISPATCH

SECRET

OSMA-12,641

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO: Chief, WE
Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Madrid

DATE: 25 August 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, aka Luis TEDECHI

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: OIEN-18463, 29 May 1961

On receipt of reference, Madrid Station traces were run on the Subject with negative results. Traces were also requested of the QUANTUM service and on 21 August 1961 they informed us that they had no record of the Subject in their files. In this case the QUANTUM service also carried out traces in the QUOTA files for KUBARK.

ANTHONY B. FELDRAKE

24 August 1961

Distribution:
2 - Buenos Aires
2 - C/WE
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

~~201-6145~~
201-289247

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

ABM/mat

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OIRA-8890

TO: Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO: Chief, [illegible] Attn: Chief, [illegible]/[illegible]
Chief, WH

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-6145

FROM: Chief of Station, Rome

DATE: 13 July 1961

SUBJECT: Counter Espionage
Luis T[illegible] (Possibly Luis T[illegible])

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

OIRW-18463, 29 May 1961

File checks conducted on Subject through Police Liaison are negative.

FRANCIS K. [illegible]

Distribution:
2-Buenos Aires
✓1-[illegible]/4
1-WH

201-289247
~~201-61145~~

FORM 10-57 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

CS COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OSBA-1924
TO: Chief, WE (Attention KUDESK). INFO: Chief of Station, Madrid		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-6145
FROM: Chief of Base, Barcelona C.C.S.		DATE 13 June 1961
SUBJECT: Counter Espionage Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI		RE. "43-3" -- (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S): OIRW-18463

There are no base file or QUOTA traces on Subject in Barcelona.

Elaine B Friedwald
Elaine B. Friedwald

13 June 1961

Distribution:
- 3 - Headquarters
- 2 - Madrid
- 2 - Files

CS COPY

201-289247
~~201-6145~~

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chiefs of Station, Rome, Madrid; COB, Barcelona

INFO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT Counter Espionage
Luis TEDESCHI, possibly Luis TEDECHI

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
See paragraph 3

1. A source who has given highly reliable information in the past, and whom we have no reason to question, has stated that during 1943 one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by/or was actually working for the RIS. According to the source, he was known to have been active as a member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during early 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. The Buenos Aires Station has determined that a Luis TEDESCHI, born 2 February 1918, is listed in local police files as living at El Dorador 3150, telephone 58-3717. Further investigation is being conducted there. Unfortunately, Headquarters does not have the date and place of birth of Subject of paragraph 1. The source has indicated that Subject was probably born in Italy and may have been active in the Spanish Civil War 1936-39. This, of course, could explain his involvement in the Spanish Communist Party.

3. It is requested that Rome, Barcelona, and Madrid check Station and Base files for any traces of Subject. Liaison and police contacts may be approached for any information available in their files.

4. Please address replies in this matter "Attention KUDESK."

GERALD D. NUTTARD

Distribution:
2 - Rome
1 - Barcelona
1 - Madrid
1 - Buenos Aires

RECLASSIFIED
RI/
RI/Files

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 29 May 1961

DATE DISPATCHED 12 JUN 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OIRW-18463

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ~~201-6145~~ 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WE/X	John D. Walker	sjs	2528

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WE/4	31/5	[illegible]
C/WE/5	31/May	Thomas H. Thiele
C/CI/SID	1 Jun	Oscar H. Sells

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/X		John D. Walker

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/WE/P WE/4	
RI/WE/5 WE/X	
RI/FI	

FORM 6.60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

DRAFT

7 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/Project

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. This office is extremely interested in obtaining all available information on one Luis TEDESCHI, who was reported to be residing at Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina, in the early part of 1943, at which time he allegedly was of interest to the RIS. The attached document refers to a Luis TEDESCHI residing at this address in 1942 and to an individual by the name of TEDESCHI who had resided at Estados Unidos 6366 in 1942. Apparently the information as shown on the attached document was obtained through mail intercepts.

2. We would appreciate having you tell us if you know of any way we might locate the intercepts referred to and possibly any other intercepts directed to TEDESCHI while the U.S. Office of Censorship was in operation.

BIRCH D. O'NEAL
Chief, CI/SIG

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CI/SIG

CI/SIG/EAGEgerter:jm

DRAFT

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH

SUBJECT
Counter Intelligence/Luis TEDEDCHI (Correct spelling believed to be TEDESCHI)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See Paras. 3 and 4
HABA-9016 of 4 November 1960

1. Headquarters regrets that it has been unable to learn the date and place of birth of the Luis TEDESCHI who, according to a usually reliable source, was being considered for recruitment in 1943 by the RIS, or was actually working for the RIS. As stated in HABW-6515, our source reported that the address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

2. Collateral information on Luis TEDESCHI of Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, has been found in a 1942 document which appears to have been based on censorship reports. This document indicates that TEDESCHI's address, as given above, was a cover address for a UDE (Union Democratica Espanola) manifesto sent from Cuba. Also one TEDESCHI, Estados Unido 3366, Buenos Aires, was given as a cover address in a secret writing message. A copy of the pertinent portions of this document is attached.

3. It is hoped that a unilateral surveillance on the Luis TEDEDCHI living at El Domador 3150, Buenos Aires, if instituted as the station planned, will be fruitful. Headquarters will be extremely interested in any further information on this individual you may be able to develop, as it is possible that he may be linked with Communist and/or RIS activities in Cuba as well as being used locally by the RIS.

4. As KUDESK is currently handling this case, it is requested that the slug REDWOOD not be used.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee, with one attachment

1 - WH/2, no att.
1 - RID for 201-289247, 1 att. ✓
3 - CI/SIG, 1 att.

ROUT
RI/
RI/T
CI/SIG

DATE TYPED
6 February 1961

DATE DISPATCHED
10 FEB 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HABW-6669

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SIG	A.E.G. Egerter	jm	2621

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C.CI/SIG	7 Feb 61	Birch D. O'Neal
C.WH/2		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WH		Chief, WH/J. C. KING

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

[illegible] to #HABW-6669

[illegible]

S/4612

[illegible] SECRET

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 959, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

28th July to 14th August 1942 ; Spanish

c/34

OPINIONS AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : REPORTS COMPILED BY COMMUNISTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 550 - 3, 565 - 8 and 571, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and to their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falangist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

5860

TRI.10001/42, TRI.11003/42,
TRI.24567, and TRI.14201/42 cover groups of reports on the same subject.

S/4555 covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also SER.14567/42, SER.14974/42, SER.19252/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.13328/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPAÑOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 3566, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

Att to HABW-6669

201-[illegible]47

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

MICROFILMED
FEB 23 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HABA-9016

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-6145

TO Chief, WHD
INFO Chief, SRD

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

DATE
4 November 1960

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/IMPROVE
Luis *TEDEDCHI 201-6145

RE 433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
See Paragraph 2

REFERENCE(S)
HABW-6515

1. In view of the fact that Subject dispatch presented a possible lead to an RIS agent, it was decided to do a unilateral check on TEDEDCHI rather than refer the matter to liaison. As a result of investigations undertaken by BIPALA-1, the Station learned that:

Luis TEDEDCHI

Is listed in the Buenos Aires police files as living at El Domador 3150, with telephone number 58-3717, and has no record of police offences. This individual was born on 2 February 1918.

2. If possible, it is requested that Headquarters attempt to confirm the above date of birth with the source of reference. The Station plans to institute a unilateral surveillance on Subject, and will keep Headquarters informed of pertinent developments.

Carlton G. Recart
Carlton G. RECART

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD
1 - Chief, SRD
1 - Chrono
1 - File: 201-6145

BCHeighan/okb

Lee to WHD

INDEX F
Index-F
201-289247
~~[illegible]~~

CS COPY

End-1

FORM 10-57 (40) 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1 of 1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT General-Counter Espionage
Specific-Luis TEDESCHI*

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
See Para. 2

1. A source who has given extremely reliable information in the past, has stated that, during 1943, one Luis TEDESCHI was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS. TEDESCHI was known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by TEDESCHI during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2. Our source was unable to provide further information on TEDESCHI and Headquarters' files contain no pertinent identifiable information on him. It is requested that you check all available records including any appropriate local services for any information on TEDESCHI that may be available.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

MICROFILMED
JAN 6 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

(3)

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 Oct. '60	17 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HAB[illegible] - 6515

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~[illegible]~~
~~200-6-145~~ - 201-289247

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Distribution:
~~Buenos Aires - 2~~
WH/2 - 1
CI/SIG. - 2
~~RID for 200-6-145 - 1~~

ROUTING | INITIAL
RI/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CI/SI	AEGEgerter	jrm	2356

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C, CI/SIG	13 Oct 60	Birch D. O'Neal
	14 Oct	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH	12 Oct. '60	Chief, WH/J. C. KING J. C. King

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

5 October 1960

SUBJECT: Luis TEDESCHI

1. A Source, who has given extremely reliable information in the past, stated that, during 1943, Subject was either being considered for recruitment by the RIS or was actually working for the RIS.

2. Subject is known to have been an active member of the Spanish Communist Party. The address used by Subject during the early part of 1943 was Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires.

3. It is requested that Latin American, as well as Spanish and Portuguese stations be asked to check available local services for any possible traces on Subject.

#75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION ROUTING SHEET

TO Anne Egerter	BRANCH CI/SIG	ROOM & BLDG. 1408 J	PHONE 2621

REQUEST NO. 21	REQUEST DATE 12 Jan 61	SUBJECT Jedidchi

THESE REPRODUCTIONS ARE OF A PERMANENT QUALITY AND ANY INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENT, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, MAY BE INCLUDED IN A 201, SUBJECT OR PROJECT FILE. REMAINING MATERIAL MUST BE DESTROYED AS SOON AS THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE HAS BEEN SATISFIED. PR ①

FORM 1-57 1259 SECRET (40)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO

DATE RECEIVED IN S A.

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1.					
2.				[illegible]	[illegible] pending [illegible] receipt of further info.
3. Riner					
4. Olden					
5.					
6. Spain FBW		21/4	22 Apr.		
7.					
8.					
9. Leddy	2211			[illegible]	
10.					
11.					
12.					Index-file
13. FBI RLG	2212	26/4	28/4	[illegible]	
14.					
15.					

-53

MAR 25 194[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

MICROFILMED: 1P

SECRET

SERIES NO THH-344
FILE NO. 30-33

OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON, DC

REPORT MADE AT HABANA, CUBA

DATE 16 Mar 48

PERIOD COVERED 15 Jan-15 Mar 1948

MADE BY Clarence D. Lloyd

STATUS P

SUBJECT

GENERAL : Communist Matters

SPECIFIC : Spanish Communist Party

REFERENCE : THH-W-258, THH-377, THH-380

SOURCE : A - LA files; B-ALLCRATIC.

SYNOPSIS

Addresses used by Spanish Communist Party in 1943, as reported in Source A files, set forth. References in Source A files to persons who might be identical with some of those listed, or investigations of whom might lead to identification of individuals listed, in THH-W-258 also submitted as background material that is being used as a basis for investigations of Spanish Communist Party in Cuba.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADDENDUM:

To date no definite information has been received that would link any of the individuals reported herein to those named in reference THH-W-258. It is realized that this information is quite vague and is not conclusive in any way, but it is hoped that, by using it as a basis for our investigations, more concrete details regarding the Party's present activities in Cuba, as well as identification of individuals named in reference, can be obtained. Copies of this report are being furnished to our field stations in Mexico and Buenos Aires inasmuch as addresses used by the Party in 1943 include several in those countries.

REGISTRY COPY

EVALUATION : C-3

DISTRIBUTION : Wash (3)✓
Mexico (1)
Buenos Aires (1)
Files (2)
No other distr.

APPROVED BY Geo. M. Granville
wds

SECRET

Comm Contl—10-24-47—5,000

SECRET

Series No. TKM-344
16 March 1948

SUBJECT: Spanish Communist Party

1. Investigations are being conducted in attempts to identify individuals named in material concerning Spanish Communist Party transmitted to us in TKM-[illegible]-252. Review of Source A files has revealed only scattered information which is being used as a basis for the investigations and this preliminary data is set forth below:

2. In March 1947 Source A outlined in some detail the Spanish Communist reporting system in the Western Hemisphere. The addresses known to be used by the Party at that time were stated to be as follows:

a. Buenos Aires

José [illegible]
Costa Rica 4553
Buenos Aires

Emilio [illegible]
Calle Cordoba 2244
Tercero D
Buenos Aires

Juan [illegible]
Calle Alsina 1954
Buenos Aires

Roberto CANINI
Inclan 4235
Buenos Aires

Jaime [illegible]
Rivadavia 5704 (7° piso)
Buenos Aires

Luis [illegible]
Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires

Luis [illegible]
Estados Unidos 2369
Buenos Aires.

b. Mexico

Ana [illegible]
Calle Pino 52 Depto 9
Mexico, D.F.

A. SANCHEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio [illegible] GARCIA
Avenida Egidos 37
Mexico, D.F.

Antonio COLLANTES
Zaragosa 67, Apt. 27
Mexico, D.F.

E. RODRIGUEZ
Morales 77
Mexico, D.F.

SECRET 200-4-5-33

Series No. TKH-344
March 16, 1948

c. Cuba

Caridad DIAZ
Calle Nueva del Pilar 2
altos del café
Habana, Cuba

Manuel [illegible]
San Lázaro [illegible]368 altos
Habana, Cuba

Juan José [illegible]
Casa de la Cultura
Paseo del Prado 210 altos
Habana, Cuba

Cesareo FERNANDEZ
Luis Estevez y Farraga
Santos Suarez (bodega)
Habana, Cuba

Alexandro [illegible]
Calle Lawton, entre Tejar y Pocito
Habana, Cuba.

d. Jack STRONG
c/o W.L.P.
832 Broadway, 9th flr.
NewYork, New York

Benigno RODRIGUEZ
c/o Francisco Ganivet
51 Cleveland Square
London W. 2, England.

Dolores IBARRURI
Moscow, Russia.

3. Enclosure to TKH-[illegible]-258, report on expenses, cites payments to:

a. "Daughter of Eduardo" - $7 in Mar and Apr; $17 in May.

Source A reported that:

(1) On 21 Sep 45 one EDUARDO ORTEGA Y GASSET, a Spanish political exile, spoke at a meeting at the Casa de la Cultura, Cuban Communist front organization, lauding the success of a convention held 14-16 Sep 45 by the COMITE CONGRESIONAL PRO REPUBLICA ESPANOLA.

(2) On 1 Mar 46 EDUARDO [illegible], representing the Association of Cuban ex-combatants of the Spanish Republic, spoke at a demonstration in front of the Spanish Legation in Cuba held as a result of the execution of ten leftist underground workers in Spain.

b. "Son of Esteban" - $11 each month. From Source A it is learned that:

201-4-5-88

SECRET

Series No. T[illegible]-314
March 16, 1949

(1) [illegible] VEGA (nationality not given) was named Secretary General of the [illegible] HISPANO CUBANA PRO [illegible], Spanish Communist Group.

(2) RITA [illegible] (nationality not given) was the representative in Cuba of the [illegible] DE [illegible] of Spain.

c. "[illegible]" - 175 in Mar; 1 in Apr. There is only one reference which might vaguely be considered to have any bearing on this item.

(1) SANTIAGO [illegible] (aka Santiago [illegible]) a Spanish [illegible], arrived in Cuba in 1910. From that time until 1941 he lived in Santiago de Cuba when he came to Habana to assist Francisco (Pancho) GARCIA GONZALEZ in work "of an intelligence nature" for the Spanish Front group, Casa de la Cultura.

d. "JOAQUIN" - 179 in Mar; 130 in Apr. Source A reported:

(1) JOAQUIN [illegible] was acting in 1946 as first Vice President of COMITE HISPANO CUBANO PRO REPUBLICANO ESPANOLA in Ciego de Avila, Cuba.

(2) JOAQUIN LORENZO was a sailor on the vessel RIO NEUQUEN in 1942 and was acting as a courier to Habana for the Spanish Communist Party. This information, it was stated, was obtained from secret writings between one "PALACIOS" in Buenos Aires and one "GUILLERMO" in Habana.

Source B advises that according to official Cuban records, the vessel RIO NEUQUEN of Argentine Registry has arrived at Cuba only once since 1942. That was 13 April 1943. There is no record of the vessel having been here any time in 1942. The crew list of the RIO NEUQUEN does not carry the name of Joaquin LORENZO nor any name similar thereto.

e. "[illegible]" - a seaman, who usually makes trips to Cuba, and two comrades who are anti-com.
"PANCHO" - Summary Jan-Mar 47. "To PANCHO Jan-Feb $315.55.

(1) In March 1947 it was reported by source A that Francisco (PANCHO) GARCIA GONZALEZ (see 3c(1)) had traveled in 1942 and 1943 from Cuba to Portugal

SECRET

20-4-5-88

and returned; that he was an intelligence agent working for the Spanish Communists in Cuba and was in liaison contact with the Soviet Legation here. He was at that time reported to be utilizing the services of a courier named [illegible] between Cuba and France.

One JULIO [illegible], Cuban who fought with the Republican army in the Spanish war and was with the American merchant marine during World War II was reported as possibly the same. However, it was pointed out that this individual is supposed to be anti-communist. In March 1947 he was employed on a vessel (unnamed) between Philadelphia and Colombia but he also came to Habana often. There is no further report in Source A files concerning identification of this individual.

(2) See also 3d(2) above.

f. "Expenses for Documentation of [illegible] - $17.04 in May. [illegible]." Source A reports:

(1) FELICITA [illegible] (probably Cuban though nationality not given) attended the national PSP training school. Was president of Socialist Committee of the first district of Camagüey Cuba.

(2) LUIS ORTIZ (nationality not given) represented JUVENTUD SOCIALISTA UNIFICADA DE ESPAÑA in 1945 and was a member of the JUVENTUD SECCION of Casa de la Cultura.

g. "What They Send Us From Cuba On the Organization There". One of the family members is the daughter of a mourned member...Engineer [illegible] who died here"

(1) María GARCIA IZQUIERDO was elected in January 1945 Secretary of Feminine Section of the JUVENTUD COMBATIENTES ESPAÑOLA DE CUBA.

4. Others mentioned in reference TKH-W-258 - MARIA ANGELES, ANGELITA, CONCHITA, EULALIO, VICTOR, HUETA - cannot be identified in any way with persons named in Source A files.

[illegible] 4-5-55

5. In addition to the information outlined above, there have been gleaned some details regarding lesser Cuban Spanish Communist groups and individuals. These are not included herein since the meager information available on them--which dates back two-four years--or the mere submission of the names can serve little or no purpose at this time. In view of Mexico reports TMM-377 and TMM-336 concerning Carlos DIAZ FERNANDEZ no inquiry regarding him is being made here.

200-4-5-58

14-00000

MAR 15 1954

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OTTA-38

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WE ✓

DATE: 12 March 1954

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— INTEL

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col William Washington

REF: TRIE 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/TRUST for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
2 - Rome w/encl

INDEX

7

ENCL

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

77-7-12-265

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. OITA-38

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: ~~12 March 1954~~

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Acting Chief, Trieste Substation

INFO: Senior Rep., Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— [illegible]

SPECIFIC— Summary of Reports Submitted by Lt. Col. William Washington

REF: [illegible] 2175

Attached hereto is a summary of reports relative to possible disturbances in Trieste which was prepared by G2/TRUST for the meeting described in reference.

James B. Blevins

Enclosure: 1 G2 report

6 March 1954

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/encl
2 - Rome w/encl

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

CLASSIFICATION

COPY

77-7-12-265

Encl to 01TA-38
12 Mar 57

[illegible]

1. [illegible] Rept No. [illegible] dtd [illegible] Dec 53. Eval [illegible]

In late Jan 54 the action squads of the [illegible] will be reorganized on a new system [illegible] in any eventual demonstration [illegible] 54. [illegible] more than 6- [illegible] will come from the northern provinces of Italy particularly from the [illegible] and [illegible] areas. These youths will be trained to be commercial travelers and representatives. They will live in private homes. [illegible] direct contact with the [illegible] will be [illegible], who does not believe that the police are acquainted with his activities in the [illegible] incidents.

2. [illegible] (1) dtd 2 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] is presently [illegible] anti-allied propaganda [illegible] in Trieste. [illegible] is believed to have been [illegible] this new anti-allied propaganda by [illegible] office in [illegible], (presumably [illegible], one of [illegible]). The propaganda material will be collected in Italy by one of the group [illegible] to a friend of [illegible]. [illegible] are being made with ex-convictor [illegible], for the use of his warehouse in the [illegible] area, in which to store the material for distribution.

3. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 12 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]-3

The [illegible] is making plans to have thousands of leaflets printed for the 8th and 20th of [illegible]. The leaflets will be nationalistic in nature and will appeal to the population to [illegible] the two dates. The leaflets will be printed by the [illegible] Printing [illegible], Trieste, and are to be distributed throughout the streets of Trieste a few [illegible] before the two mentioned dates.

4. CIC Rept No. [illegible] dtd 15 Jan 54. Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], Salvatore, recently returned from [illegible], was [illegible] safe passage to [illegible] if necessary to evade police arrest. [illegible] was also promised financial assistance from a [illegible] businessman, whose identity is presently unknown. [illegible] has avowed to avenge the deaths of the six Trieste residents killed during the November riots. He has notified his group that they must strike a decisive blow on [illegible] by dynamiting the Yugoslav Delegation Building in Trieste and also the British and American Headquarters in Trieste. [illegible] is presently approaching Trieste merchants and businessmen in the hope of obtaining financial assistance for his ventures. It is known that a certain member of his group is in possession of arms and explosives intended to be used by [illegible].

1 to 01TP-38 [illegible]

77-7-1[illegible] 265

5. [illegible] (4) dtd 19 Jan. [illegible]

A group of [illegible] met on [illegible] Jan to discuss [illegible]. alvatore's trip to [illegible] on 16 Jan. [illegible] he would [illegible] were discussed for [illegible] demonstration on 23 [illegible]. It was decided to [illegible] in small bottles [illegible] quantities, as a [illegible] against the police. [illegible] of the "[illegible]" Hall in the [illegible] Theater building, [illegible] stored there. [illegible]: The dates of reports 4 and 5 do not coincide, although they apparently concern the same subject.

6. [illegible] (5) dtd 22 Jan. [illegible]

At a meeting of the [illegible] said that it was inadvisable to [illegible] demonstration now ([illegible]) but [illegible] school students to concentrate their efforts on 23 [illegible]. [illegible] promised that he would authorize such demonstrations on that day.

According to the source, [illegible] group composed of [illegible] members and those of other parties [illegible] is being formed under the [illegible]. This group, which is considered [illegible] group, consists of action squads of 20-25 persons and will eventually operate under one leader. The source also stated that this group is being formed with [illegible]'s knowledge, although he is trying to evade as much responsibility as possible.

The source also added that the following action squad leaders meet daily in [illegible] and [illegible] to discuss their program. They are quoted to have said that 23 [illegible] will be their day of revenge against the police.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], Pasquale
[illegible], Orazio
[illegible]
[illegible], Guido

7. [illegible] dtd 25 Jan. Eval F

The [illegible] intends to use violence in an attempt to intimidate all local Yugoslav merchants. A prominent member of the [illegible] is stated to have said that the future policy of the party is to be one of violence.

8. CIC [illegible] 5 C-2555 dtd 3 Feb. Eval B-3

[illegible], noted Italian nationalist, stated that to the best of his knowledge there were no plans on the part of Italian groups or parties [illegible]

Trieste to run a demonstrations on 2[illegible] Mar. [illegible] stated that certain groups would, no doubt, plan to place wreaths or flowers at the various spots where the [illegible] riot victims were [illegible]. [illegible] predicted that the ceremonies would [illegible] peaceful and probably only of [illegible] hours duration, unless the police attempted to interfere.

9. [illegible] dtd [illegible] Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], Carlo [illegible], [illegible] of the Trieste [illegible] are the members who [illegible] on [illegible] Mar. They are planning to have pre-[illegible] in the near future for distribution throughout the city. [illegible] has stated that the [illegible] would participate in future manifestations only in conjunction with the other Italian political parties in Trieste.

[illegible], Dario [illegible], Carlo [illegible], [illegible] in the Italian parliament, who were injured in the [illegible] in Trieste, have written to several Trieste friends stating that they intend to visit Trieste sometime in March. [illegible] stated that he will oppose their coming to Trieste because their appearance would [illegible].

10. [illegible] dtd 11 Mar, Eval [illegible]-3

[illegible], Salvatore, who is active in forming the "[illegible] Shirts" action squads, has requested permission to use the [illegible] in Trieste as a meeting place for the members of the squads. The [illegible] will discuss his request at their next meeting. It is believed that permission will be granted to [illegible].

11. [illegible] 6/32 (15) dtd 13 Mar, Eval [illegible]

In a conversation with Lt Col [illegible], the following information was supplied:

a. Leading members of the Committee for the Defense of Italianity in Trieste and Istria are discussing the possibility of patriotic processions to be organized in Trieste on 20 Mar.

b. No definite plans have been made as yet to stage demonstrations on that date, but the "Committee" is in favor of supporting student processions.

c. It was not excluded, during these discussions, that the presence of civilian police may be taken as a challenge and will turn eventual processions into disturbances.

d. [illegible] informed source that he [illegible] to leave Trieste on 16 Mar to avoid a repetition of the unfortunate [illegible] of last November.

12. [illegible] Feb. [illegible]

[illegible] stated that there is no danger of the [illegible] or other Italian [illegible] in a demonstration on 2[illegible]. [illegible] that it had been brought to his attention that [illegible], [illegible] to organize the criminal elements of [illegible] to prepare demonstrations on 2[illegible]. [illegible] advised the [illegible] that [illegible] was not a member of the [illegible] and to have nothing to do with him.

[illegible] also stated that another person who should be closely watched [illegible], [illegible]. He said that the [illegible] will have nothing to do with [illegible].

13. [illegible] 22 [illegible]

[illegible] (the [illegible]), an organization consisting of [illegible] members [illegible] activities, to [illegible] territory of Italy, to [illegible] and to [illegible] the [illegible] that occurred on [illegible].

This group was founded by [illegible], [illegible]. A certain [illegible], Francesco [illegible] a very active member with [illegible]. At present this group is discussing:

a. Disturbances on 2[illegible].
b. A hand grenade attack on the Yugoslav [illegible] Headquarters.

17-7-7[illegible] -265

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

Security Information

Secret Control
US Officials Only
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. STTA-3769

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief of Mission, Trieste

DATE: 5 February 1954

INFO: Senior Representative, Rome

SUBJECT: GENERAL— MSI/INTEL

SPECIFIC— MSI Activities and Plans for 20 March 1954

REF: TRIE 2069; STTA-3697, dated 14 January 1954

1. The following information was obtained from SSO/C/309(5), dated 22 January 1954, a report of the Trieste Security Office (British Field Security Service) made available by CEOPAL. Source is PILSEN (Evaluation is F). Date of information is 19 January 1954.

2. Riccardo GEFTER-WONDRICH presided at an MSI meeting held on Via Rismondo. Approximately thirty persons were present. GEFTER-WONDRICH told the students of "Giovane Italia" that it was inadvisable to demonstrate against the sentences imposed on students who participated in the November riots. Instead, he invited them to concentrate their efforts and attention on preparations for 20 March, promising that he would authorize student demonstrations on that date.

3. It is rumored that a new clandestine organization, composed of approximately 260 youths who are members of the MSI and other parties, is being formed under Bruno MARSETTI (TSO Comment: Bruno MARSETTI is possibly identical with Salvatore MARSETTI.) This organization consists of action squads of twenty to twenty-five men, each squad being under one leader. MARSETTI was expected to return from Rome during the weekend of 23-24 January with arms and funds for this organization. In the opinion of source, these arms and funds are supplied by prominent Masons in Rome and Milan. Source stated that the organization is being formed with the knowledge of GEFTER-WONDRICH, although the latter attempts to evade any responsibility therefor.

4. The action squad leaders meet daily in different locations to discuss progress. At the present time they have no headquarters. Their principal task appears to be the formation of plans for demonstrations on 20 March. They state that 20 March will be their day of revenge against police. The following persons are leaders of action squads:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOSCOLO
SANNA (fnu), brother of Duilio SANNA
Natale FERA

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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CLASSIFICATION

12-240

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STTA-3769
5 February 1954
page 2

5. The following data is from TSO/O/309(4), dated 19 January 1954. Source is PILSEN. Date of information is 18 January 1954. The following MSI members met in the Buffet Gallopin, in Piazza Goldoni:

Constantino DE MARCO
Aurelio D'ALESSIO
Pasquale BUONAIUTO
Orazio BOSCOLO (armed with pistol)
SANNA (fnu) (armed with pistol)
Natale ERA

Subjects discussed MARSETTI's trip to Rome. MARSETTI had left for Rome on 16 January, arriving on 18 January, and had telephoned Trieste that he would "bring back the goods." The meeting also discussed plans for demonstrations on 20 March. It was decided to use acid in small bottles in limited quantities against the police.

6. ✓ Dr. TEDESCHI (fnu), manager of the Ridotto in the Rossetti Theater, keeps MSI arms stored there.

Michael L. Rosemont
Michael L. Rosemont

30 January 1954

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2 - Rome

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SECRET CONTROL
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"SECURITY INFORMATION"

43-7-24-1170

WCL-28265
29 Aug 52

Date of Information July 1952. E/ 2272 242
0

Country: ITALY

Subject: The S.T.I.M. Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Remarks:

Source: Believed reliable, based on documentary evidence.

43-7-24-4/0

14-00000

I T A L Y

Economic

The S.[illegible] Machine Tool Factory, MILAN.

Location.

1. The firm, which designs machinery for construction in other factories, has its technical offices in Viale [illegible] 66 and its sales department in Via T. Prisco 3, MILAN.

Personalities.

2. The manager is (Dr.) GOSSE[illegible], a German and former manager of a German machine tool factory. He is assisted by Ing. [illegible]SCHI and by other technicians.

Production.

3. The firm designs and/or produces on a sub-contracting basis the following types of machines :-

Machine tools for the manufacture of micron bearing balls, steel bearing balls, cylindrical roller bearings, conical roller bearings, cages for ball bearings, external and internal rings for ball bearings, sewing needles, bicycle accessories, fount for typewriters, eccentric presses for hot and cold stamping, sandpapering machines, special grinders, oscillating grinders, selectors, rotary rolling mills, control instruments, pneumatic hammers, splining machines, rectifiers, presses, drilling machines, and polishing machines.

Patents.

4. With the exception of some very small items, the machines designed by the firm are not covered by patents.

Destination of Output.

5. The firm's products are sold on the home market.

E [illegible]

4[illegible]-7-24-1/70

14-00000

N.Y.-Si Op. 38

S/4612

NOT SECRET

FROM : No name, HAVANA, CUBA.

TO : SR. LUIS TEDESCHI, PICHINCHA 969, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINE.

6734

28th July to 14th August 1942 : Spanish

OPINION AND CONDITIONS IN SPAIN : REPORTS COMPILED BY COMMUNISTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH PASSENGERS FROM SPAIN.

This cover contains Reports Nos. 350 - 3, 355 - 8 and 371, compiled from interviews with persons who have recently left Spain, and describe the attitude of the Spanish people to the war and to their Government, the extent of German penetration in Spain and of Spanish aid to the Axis, the activities and standing of political parties of the Right and Left in Spain, and general living conditions in the country. This group of reports contains opinions of both Communist and Falangist sympathisers.

PREVIOUS RECORDS:

5560

TRI.10901/42, TRI.11663/42, TRI.24567, and TRI.14201/42 cover groups of reports on the same subject.

S/4555 covers a group of reports on the Spanish political scene, possibly from the same source as the above, which may be VICENTE URIBE, the Communist leader, whose headquarters are in CUBA. See also BER.14567/42, BER.14974/42, BER.19232/42.

Addressee, LUIS TEDESCHI, is shown by TRI.13328/42 to be a cover address for a U.D.E. (UNION DEMOCRATICA ESPANOLA) Manifesto sent from Cuba. He may also be the TEDESCHI, ESTADOS UNIDOS 8566, who is given as a cover address in the s.w message in TRI.14725/42 (secret).

REPORT No.350

Results of our first conversation with a young man from TORRELAVEGA, SANTANDER, about 28 years old. At the beginning of the war he was in the army in MOROCCO and spent the whole war in Franco's army. He comes from a family of small garage-owners. Neither he nor any of his family have belonged to any political party or syndicate although his sympathies have always been on the left.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE REGIME AND THE WAR. — He says that the immense majority of the Spanish people is against Franco and the Falange, workers, peasants, employees, bourgeois, big and small and a large proportian of the soldiers and the Requetes. He says that everyone hopes for the victory of the Allies. In it there is a blind trust, especially when the U.S. entered the war as the U.S. and England are the most powerful countries in the world, especially with the assistance of Russia. Only the Falangists desire and plan for the victory of Hitler, even though "there are many Falangists too who take a very black view of him". He says the majority of people sympathise with England. They have complete faith in the victory of the Democracies. There are supporters of the USSR, but the immense majority, according to our informant, do not like "communism" and prefer Democracy. He is obviously rather muddled by the Falangist propaganda against the U.S.S.R. He says that the entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war gave rise to happiness all over the world, although there had been a great deal of confusion before, through the "Treaty of Aid between Russia and Germany." But this confusion disappeared with German aggression against the U.S.S.R. He says that the German defeats on the Russian front raised morale and renewed everyone's confidence in victory. Hitler's admission in his speech of how much they had suffered in Russia in winter, and that they were on the edge of catastrophe, produced great joy among the people. He says that the entry of the U.S. into the war caused a very good impression, and increased people's confidence in victory although Pearl Harbour caused some demoralisation. He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, except the Falangists. Franco does not wish it himself, and desires neutrality but since those who command are Serrano Sunar and the Falangists, Franco has no choice but to do what Hitler orders him, and there is serious danger of war for Spain. He says that the Anglo-Soviet and the Soviet-American pact are known through the Falangist press which has spoken of them. They made a very good impression on the people. Asked if he knew that the said pact stipulated that after the victory nations would have freedom to decide their destinies without foreign interference, he says yes, the press published it. About the Second Front he says that everyone thinks of it, and is hoping for it to open if possible through Spain. That the day they disembark, all the people will rise. Asked what the people would do in case of a landing in France, he said that his opinion was that if that happened the Spanish people would rise, even though the invasion was not on their coasts. The agreement about the Second Front is also known. He says the people who are most fervent supporters of the Nazis are Serrano Suner, Primero de Rivera, and a certain Count whose name he does not know. He often says that he knows nothing of politics, because he only read the sports news in the papers and did not want to know anything about the Falange. He says that there are many preparations for war; they are making fortifications on the coasts of Galicia and placing a considerable amount of artillery there. He says that the political force of the Falange and the syndicates is "artificial"; everyone hates them. The people belong to the syndicate because they can't help it, but they do not pay their dues or take them seriously. Discontent has even reached the ranks of the Falange. Many clerks, students, and people who joined it thinking they "were going to steal the music" are now very discontented, and do not pay their dues, and when they are threatened with being expelled they say that is what they are waiting for, for the Falange to play at "fisticuffs". There are many officers in the army who are not in agreement with the Falange or the idea that Spain is to go to war. The most violent opposition comes from Queipo de Llano and Yague. No one knows where Queipo is going and Yague is thought to be in exile in the Prov. of Pontevedra. Both were cashiered, Queipo for protesting against food leaving for Germany and Yague because in a speech at Zaragoza, he said - "we do desire a great and free Spain, but without any Blue Shirts, Red Shirts, or prisoners."

All the sergeants say that they are very discontented, because they earn 5 pts. which keeps them very short and of the soldiers he says-"in a word they are hungry, many years in barracks, and then the danger that they might be sent to war". He says that they are well-uniformed, just as well as before the war. They have dismissed the 1941 Draft. He thinks that there was very little sympathy for the Division Azul and the people laughed at those who volunteered. 40% were forced to go, others went because they were hungry, and there were a few volunteers. He says that survivors came back in a state of panic, there was a lack of food and equipment, several of them mutilated themselves in order to escape from this inferno. All say that the Russians are very well-armed and fight with great courage.

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that his opinion is that a great deal of food is taken to Germany, although he can give no details, but if there is no food and olive oil in Spain where is it? He says that in Torrelavega the "Fabrica Continental" is working at high pressure, making tyre covers, while in Spain transport is held up for want of them.

THE CHURCH. — He says that it is not true that in the Church there are anti-German and Anti-Falangist groups. The supporters of the Regime are the Falange, the Germans and the Clergy, in that order. The Church wishes for the triumph of Germany, in spite of her anti-Catholic policy because they believe that in that case they will be able to preserve their position of influence. He says that English and Russian news can be heard although it is very difficult and is forbidden although there is no watch or inspection. He says that everybody is against the Falange and submissione to Germany, including the monarchists and the rich on whom the Falangists impose large fines for racketeering. Many of the monarchists, bourgeois etc. are on the side of England. Democracy is considered as a possible substitute for the Regime. A democratic Republic like there was before the war. A Regime of peace and work. Speaking of the solution of the present situation, he says that they want a regime of peace and not a revolution. Then he contradicts himself by saying that it will not be achieved by peaceful means. He says that this would be the best but that the deaths, the betrayals, the crimes must be avenged.

The people are very united and there are not the old differences between the parties of the Frente Popular. The policy of National Union is unknown, he has heard no one speak of it.

DETAILS OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE — He says that he thinks that secret organisations function, especially in Bilbao and he says particularly "It is a city of brave men". He says that notices painted on the walls are often seen there. He only remembers one "Less Franco, more white bread". Asked if the notices were signed by any party he says no, because it would give away the people who had done it. He says that he knows, because he was told, that in Bilbao there were illegal pamphlets and even a newspaper in circulation, but he does not know their content. He thinks that there must have been a clandestine press, but as he was never an idealist the people who did those things would not trust him, and as he is out of everything he does not know any details". He says he thinks that the people working in Bilbao are nationalists and communists, especially the latter. That a few months ago two Italian submarines, badly damaged by English planes, came into Santander. Two hundred persons were arrested for discussing this, and many people thought that the second front had already begun. He gives no more details. He says that Serrano Suner was the object of an attack in Madrid when he met Arrese, and when the latter tried to protect Suner he was seriously wounded and had to undergo a critical operation. Asked if he thought there was sabotage etc., he says no – the disorganisation of the train services is due to all the employees being new and not knowing their business.

GUERILLEROS -- He says that "El Carinoso" was working in Santander and "The Railwaymen" too; that "El Carinoso" came from Lierganes and had his headquarters in Santander. That he was recently killed through quarrels and imbroglios caused by his girlfriend who was from the J.C. and had another lover, and it was he who was arrested at the same time as El Carinoso. It was he who informed against them all. Many people love the Guerilleros, although there are many people who help them through fear, as for example a relation of his from whom they took his only pig, but in general the Guerilleros behave excellently. "El Carinoso" was once in Barcelona, where he went in a cab to get his teeth fixed. El Carinoso was not a politician but took to the mountains in order to avenge the death of his cousin who was assassinated by the Falange. That they often, like the guerilleros of Asturias, disguised themselves as Civil Guard, went down to the villages, and arrested the Falangists. But where there are most Guerilleros, and the most active, is in Asturias. Six months ago, about three hundred guerilleros were ready to embark on the coast in order to leave Spain. But there was a quarrel and a terrific fight between these guerilleros and the forces of authority, with many dead, and after that they retreated to the mountains. He says that the politicians who are most popular are Prieto and Azana. Some speeches of Prieto's have been circulated through Bilbao, but he does not know what they say. There is also in circulation an article, reproduced from an English paper, reprinted by an employee in the Real Comp. Asturiana, de Inz. Republicana. The article refers to the powers and resources of the Allies and their chances of victory. He says he does not know of any activity of the communists, that this is obviously the activity of other people who are not communists; that for example the man who reprinted the article and those who read it were all on the Republican Left, and if there is any communist activity it is so camouflaged that no one knows who is the author. He says that during the crossing they were detained by the English in Bermuda and in Baltimore by the Americans. That the English made a short examination, they did not interrogate them in front of everybody and left them the letters they carried. In Baltimore they were interrogated one by one and were asked about fortifications, food, if they sent it to Germany, etc. When our informant said he had been in Franco's army up to the war they asked him why he did not desert to the Republican army.

SOLIDARITY. — He says there is no organisation for solidarity, that this only exists between groups of friends who have a relation or acquaintance in prison. They are not allowed to visit the prisoners more than once a week. He says that the killing still goes on, and that in Vog, a few days before he left, a lieutenant of the Civil Guard was shot for having gone for a walk along "at his own risk".

REPORT No.351

MARIA RODRIGUEZ, about 29 years old. Comes from a comfortably-off peasant family in the Province of Orense. She is very sluggish and at every question repeats that she does not know and that women do not understand many things. She had only a little more than an hour to spare as she was busy in the evening and had to leave for the interior in the morning.

WAR — She says that she was surprised when she arrived in Havana as she thinks there is more enthusiasm in Spain than here and more confidence in an American victory. The peasants "like everyone else" would like the "American" to win, even those on the Right are sure the Germans will lose. She cannot explain the nature of Franco's assistance to Hitler, she says only that "as it was the Germans who won, Spain owes them more than it has". She cannot be explicit, either, about the dangers of war, but she says that Franco's soldiers, the young men in general, and as a concrete instance a brother of hers who served five years in Franco's army, says that they will go up into the mountain and shoot before going again to the war. About the Division Azul she knows only that when it was first formed a volunteer left from her district. He was an outlaw who had committed crimes and she says that he went through fear of the consequences. The people do not like the Blue Division. They were not asked for anything for the "volunteers".

FUTURE PROSPECTS — She insists that there is great confidence that it will soon change. So much so that a Republican who was hidden for years and afterwards discovered told her to tell her husband "Do not leave because things will soon change" The village has a hundred inhabitants, and she says that they all hope it will change; but from what we can gather this confidence is based entirely on an Allied victory. She says that if the English opened a second front in Spain the people would revolt, but she says she has heard no opinions on this point. The people speak without fear. She relates that the Falangists tried to take a pistol from her father and that he hid it. They threatened him, they took him in a car telling [illegible] him that they were going to knock his head off, but the old man remained firm, telling them to do what they liked. They did not do anything to him nor did they get the pistol. As an example of solidarity against the Falange the old man said he had sold the pistol to a man who was going to America. They told him to prove it, the old brought as witnesses two peasants who lived more than a league away, without having agreed on a story first, but being quite convinced that the peasants when they saw the Falangists, if only for the sake of contradicting them, would say that what he said was true. A little later they sent him a notice for a Falangist meeting and he refused to go. She does not know if the other peasants did.

ARMY — She knows that a short time ago they dismissed the 36 (1936) Draft. Her husband was on service in Orense and deserted and went to Cuba. Immediately the Captain of the Company and a lieutenant went to his house to make inquiries. His brother told them "In his circumstances I do not know what I would have done", and the captain and the lieutenant went away saying - "He is right".

PEASANTS. — As we have already said, she belongs to a family which is comfortably off, they have several labourers in their employ. She says that the day labourers, and the farmer are equally against the Government and the Germans. To illustrate the situation she says that the daily wage is 20 pts. without food, ~~and 5 with food. They all prefer the~~ 5 and food, because otherwise they have nothing to eat. The peasants are very discontented, and show it openly to the Falangist officials when they come to inspect the harvest and when they fix the prices, saying - "They have no right to do it, it is an abuse", but it appears that it goes no further then this. They have not requisitioned anything but they force them to sell to the official buyers who issue permits to authorised buyers. These individuals take the produce to large shops and amass reeal fortunes. A quintal of potatoes, they have to sell at 30 pts. and they are sold afterwards by the dealers at the standard rate of four or five ptas the kilo, that is to say at a 800% profit, to private people who require them. And if the peasants take their produce to the market they have to sell it at the standard rate to the dealers. No peasant takes any rye to the market, they prefer to run the risk of selling it to private people. This is the only way in which they can get other products. They have imposed a new tax; they have to pay 15 centimes for each vinestock. They have given up the "one-dish meal" and they are not forced to contribute to Auxilio Social. She says that the Government does not know what is going on in the country. They distribute the sulphate, not according to the number of vineyards, not even according to the number of inhabitants, so that her district which is wine country, gets less sulphate than the next one and produces very little wine, although it has more inhabitants. A kilo of sulphate is worth 39 ptas. - before it was worth 50 centimes. She says that they were taking a few things to America and they made them pay in Pielato, in Orense, and in Vigo, and if they had passed through more provinces they would have had to pay again.

REPORT No.352

Information volunteered by three Galician peasants, not members of political parties. They remained throughout the war in Franquist territory, although only one of them fought in the army. Very backward politically, anti-Franquist, and more anti-Falangist. With the exception of one who was in Asturias as a soldier, the others never left their village which is a hamlet in Galicia.

SPANISH ATTITUDE TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — The majority of the Spanish people with the exception of the very rich and the Falangists are against Franco and the Falange. They explain that Falangists see what is coming to them through the crimes they have committed, and they are the people who really wish for a German victory, with the object of saving their skins, and the money they have stolen from the people. In Spain, in general, no one wants the war, since they are exhausted, according to our informants, except for the Falangists. It is said that Franco is a partisan of neutrality, and daily visits the British Ambassador at his private residence and has interviews with him. In spite of this they say there is a danger of Spain being pushed into the war against her will, because in Spain the Germans are the masters. All the world believes that the Allies will be the victors except the Falange. Before the attack on Russia many people were demoralised by the German advances and began to "think them invincible". When Russia entered the war, enthusiasm and confidence in Hitler's defeat increased enormously, but that was especially when the Russian victories began.

They say: - I do not know what would have happeded to us but for Russia; the Nazis would be masters of the world. They also say that the Nazi army will not stand another winter of war, that they have suffered such losses that the next Russian winter offensive will defeat them although there is no talk of a Second Front. They are sure that the Democracies will win the war. They admire the resistance of the U.S.S.R. They say that Germany has already lost the war as a consequence of the losses suffered in Russia. The entrance of the U.S. into the war contributed to increase the already existing confidence in victory. They do not know of the Anglo-Soviet and Soviet-American agreements, nor the agreement about the second front. One of our informants asked us what "0 Hitler 1942"* meant and when we told him he said that they also said it in Spain, because in order to achieve it it was necessary to open a second front. They think that if there was a landing in France the people would rise. They also say that there are rumours that they land in Galicia and in this case the whole of Galicia would revolt to help the Allies. The same thing would happen in any part of Spain.

The "DIVISION AZUL" is hated by the majority of the people. They say that the majority have been forced to volunteer, and explain how the recruiting is done. Anyone who does not want to go and fight Communism, take a step forward. Some enlisted because of the desperate situation they were in. Some enlisted, too, bec because they were stalwart Falangists. When the recruits left the province a great many people went to see them off, calling them "sons of bitches" and insulting their mothers. When one contingent of "Volunteers" came back from the Russian front at Irun they had to leave the train because the people were stoning them. Many people came back maimed and with frostbite. They tell terrible stories about the Germans and the horrors of the war. They say the Russians are very brave and fight with great courage. That they have large supplies of ammunition, and that things on the Russian front are not like the papers said they were. They said that the food on the Russian front was very scarce and bad. It was sent to them from Spain and they suffered many hardships. They all wished to return to Spain as soon as possible; they repented of having enlisted.

*"Zero hour for Hitler in 1942".

HELP GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Now and then they send reinforcements to the Division Azul in groups of a thousand or one thousand five hundred. They say that in order to replace the casualties and tho those who return crippled. Even the Falangists themselves say - "the Russian front is a very serious matter". Those who are recruited to replace losses in Russia are recruited by force, by the process already mentioned. All airmen have to serve some months on the Eastern Front as "training". They say that lately they were training about 150 pilots to send them to Russia. The war factories are working at high pressure. The Germans are directing the erection of an aerodrome in the province of Lugo. In Galicia very few Germans are to be seen. Military instruction is obligatory for boys and youths in the "Frente de la Juventud". They also train youths from 15 onwards to serve in aviation. A friend of the informants told them that there passed daily through a city in the North fifty card loaded wit war material in the direction of the French frontier. German submarines refuel at Redondela and Vigo. He says that English aeroplanes often make reconnaissance flights over the harbours of Galicia. They describe Serrano Suner as the most subservient to the Nazis and in general to the Falangists who have crimes behind them or who have become rich through robbing the people.

Those who go to work in Germany are those workers who have nowork, or even if they have any live in the greatest poverty. They believe that by going to Germany they will be able to solve their economic situation and that of their families. The groups sent are not very large, according to our informants, at least in Galicia. This is understandable because the Germans prefer specialists. According to our informants, three workmen came back from Germany who say that in Germany the situation is terrible. They hardly eat, there is great poverty. They have the impression that Germany will not resist long in consequence of the situation there is in the country. They also say that a group of Spanish workmen were thrown out of the country because "they caused trouble".

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASSES — He does not know of any dissension in the army except the case of Yague and Queipo, and gives data which is already known. The soldiers in general are against the entry of Spain into the war....They live in very bad conditions, badly fed, badly clothed and ill-treated by the officers, especially by the recently recruited Falangists. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. They have demobilised the '39 draft. By their conversation we observe that the soldiers from the "national" and the "Red" zones receive different treatment. In Galicia there are many soldiers from Cataluna who have already spent several years in the army. They do not make it difficult for youths of military age to leave Spain; they cited their own cases. One of them is 18, the other 24 years old.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE FRANQUIST REGIME — They say that there is no resistance there at all, because no one can act, and passivity is the opinion and state of mind of the people. When we insist they say there have been various train smashes and some derailments which they think were due to sabotage as well as to the defective material. Everybody knows the British and Soviet war communiques and they are discussed in private conversation. Some people take them down in shorthand and later circulate them. He says that in Vigo there is a secret transmitting station, but it was discovered by the police and all those connected with it shot. They were said to belong to the republican Left ("Isquierda Republicana") and among those shot there was one doctor and other intellectuals. He does not know any more details. Women complain loudly in queues of the shortage of foodstuffs. He knows because the rumour went round there that Prieto made a speech in the White House before Roosevelt, and that Roosevelt embraced him saying that the Americas were behind the Spaniards. This speech too is circulating in clandestine copies, but he never could see one. He says that there is no organised political activity because this is impossible. He tells several jokes which are going the rounds, and quotes this one: - "Recently they made a film called "We Thieves are Honest Men". Beneath the announcement of this film in Vigo, someone wrote "The Caudillo's Own Words". He says the press give most space to the English War communiques and the U.S. war news bulletins.

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWARDS NATIONAL UNION. — Talking of Unity they say textually "There, there are no parties, there are only anti-franquists, and all the differences between sections of the Popular Front have disappeared.

Lister is known and has a following in Galicia. The politicians with most prestige are Prieto and Asana and Negrin, although Negrin is the most hated by the Falangists".

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He thinks of the Republic as the Regime to substitute for Fascism, but without a revolution, and he immediately adds that the Republic will come because when the Germans are at their weakest the whole people will revolt and avenge the crimes of the Falangists. The people's blood rises when they see those who assassinated their relations dressed up in blue shirts. The Falange consists only of professional assassins and robbers. Those who wear the shirt can be recognised by their faces. Those who joined the Falange at first now do not want to know anything about it, and do not want anyone to wear the shirt. There is friction between Requetes and Falangists. The people hate the Requetes less than the Falangists. They say that the schools teach only militarism and religion. There are many little boys who can hardly read, but who can speak of military operations with maps, artillery and aviation. A teacher who was dismissed and came back to his post, told our informants that the Ministry constantly sent them books of military tactics, so that they could teach them to the children. The summer camps for children consist of sending boys to camp and teaching them drill.

GENERAL SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE. — They spoke of the terrible poverty endured by t the people, and the high price of food; wages have hardly been raised in comparison with those paid under the Republic. The Committees of Supply get hold of agricultural products and only leave a small quantity per person for the whole year's supply. Already in their village the Falange had listed the crop although they had not yet requisitioned it, which they had already done in other parts of Galicia. Falangists speculate in foodstuffs, selling them at high prices and so get rich. He says that in Vigo a large quantity of rice went bad and had to be thrown into the sea because they would not sell it to the people at lower prices. The rationing is quite inadequate. They were a whole year without seeing olive oil. Naturally on the Black Market it could be bought at 50 pts and more. In a year they only had bread twice. A very small meal in a restaurant costs 16 pts. Two courses and dessert 25 pts. One of them was charged 75 pts. for eating and sleeping in a pension in Vigo one day. A pair of shoes costs 25 pts., a poor suit 500, a dozen eggs 18 or more pts. The people hate the Committees of Supply used by the Falangists to make themselves rich. They say that there is the greatest immorality in all official organisations and everyone steals.

In the prisons there are still many people. They treat the prisoners very badly. In the prison of Oviedo, which has a capacity for 600 there are more than 3.500 prisoners. There are batallions of forced labour (workers they call them); they grant some people conditional liberty but they send them to districts where they know no one and where they die of hunger.

Generally these three young men have great confidence in the victory over Hitler, and say Germany may break up this very year.

REPORT No.353

Information volunteered by an ex-Consular official of the Cuban Government in Spain, who arrived on the "Marques de Comillas" on the 25 th of July 1942. The subject is a person of quite good economic position. He is the sons of Spaniards and owns some properties in Asturias. He went as Consul to ——— after Franco's troops had taken possession of it. A man of moderate views, politically of the persuasion that was regnant there at the moment, he honestly believed, doubtless as a result of Falangist propaganda in America, that "Franquist Spain was a paradise". Later he had the opportunity of experiencing what Franquism represented, and still represents for Spain, and owing to his honourable behaviour as Consul he was often insulted and was even threatened with expulsion. He was closely connected with officials of the Fascist Regime and with Falangists in high positions. His term of office, to use his own expression, was more successful through his friends than owing to his position.

SITUATION OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME — 90% of the Spanish people are against the Franquist regime. He says that to assess accurately the solution desired by this ninety percent is very difficult. Some wish, specifically, for the restoration of the Republic, but he maintains that what everyone is longing for is a change in the Regime, something to relieve the really chaotic situation in which the Spanish people find themselves. (He did not know life under the Republic, and therefore when he talked with people they always underlined the enormous difference there was between that life and life under the present regime). The Falangist unity they boast of is a myth. Division in the Franquist Camp grows daily. The Falangists write lampoons in the streets and so do the Requetes, but their slogans are contradictory. The Falangists accuse the rest — of being curs and traitors to the doctrine of the Falange. For example, he talked to a Falangist lieutenant – the man came from Cuba to fight at Franco's side – in the cafe "El Gato Negro" in Madrid, a few days before embarking. He seemed to be ashamed of the present situation in Spain. He excused himself by repeating the Falangist tag that the Falange had been betrayed. (This must refer to the Monarchists, Requetes, and other reactionaries). The Falangists are aware of the present situation in Spain. Perhaps that is the reason why they are seeking a solution which will preserve their class privileges. In his own phrase – the Franquist regime hangs from a very thin thread, which must snap very soon. (Perhaps this is not only the view of our informant, but also of some military and civil leaders with whom he was closely connected). For this reason, he says, they have tried to give the impression of a change, taking advantage of the "Camara Corporativa", and, if it is true, with the restoration of a Falangist-Monarchy.

ON THE MONARCHY. — There is, he says, no public activity with this goal. There does not exist what we might call psychological receptivity for this measure; but undoubtedly negotiations in this direction are being carried on by high officials of the Franquist Regime. He was in Madrid on the 22 – 23 June 1942, at the time of the visit of Don Juan. His visit was not given any publicity, but there were widespread police precautions. The streets nearest to the palace were closed to the public and a strict watch was kept. There were also arrests of suspicious persons, those who had been in prison etc. But the press gave no sign. The presence of Don Juan was public property. The people seemed completely indifferent. The monarchists displayed no activity either. Perhaps, he added, they took precautionary measures with some people characterised by their adhesion to the Monarchy. His impression is that if the monarchy were restored in Spain it would be in alliance with the Falangists, but the people would still have the impression that the situation had changed. He maintained that there would be the semblance of a coup d'etat, apparently directed against the Falange, but Franco would remain head of the army. If so, things would, fundamentally, remain as they are; that is, the Spanish State would still be entirely subordinated to Hitler, and without changing the policy of "partiality" they now maintain, to one of "neutrality" in the war. They would take this step, in his opinion, only in the last resort, if faced with a second front in Europe, and on the approach of Hitler's defeat, which would, naturally have an immediate repercussion on the countries subject to the Nazis in Europe.

ON THE COMPLETE SUBSERVIENCY OF THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — In Spain the Falangists do not speak of their position of "Neutrality" in the war but of "partiality". This is their attempt to justify the help they give to the Axis. There are German submarine refuelling stations in Vigo, Redondela, and on the Galician coast. This is public property, but every now and then the press publishes a complete denial that Axis submarines refuel in Spain. These denials are very frequent but they do not give much proof. Those who can see tanker-launches carrying on this work laugh at these ridiculous denials. Also on more than one occasion German submarines have been repaired in Spanish dockyards. In Galicia it is quite impossible to get a pot of jam. All the production, which is enormous, goes to the Germans. There are places on the frontier, through which trains pass with produce for Hitler. There are fortifications and artillery on the coasts of Galicia, where the Germans are in command. There are also new aerodromes, some already finished and some under construction by German technicians. They fear an Allied invasion in Galicia. Hitler is assisted not only with food and primary materials, but also with men.

There is continuous propaganda for the sending of volunteers as workers to Germany. Unwilling contingents of soldiers have left for the Blue Division.

THE DIVISION AZUL was a Falangist manoeuvre to give political importance to some Falangist leaders. The manoeuvre turned out very badly. This Division is the most unpopular innovation of the Falange. Our informant talked with 11 survivors of the division, who had returned from the Russian front on account of their wounds. One of them was 18 when he left as a volunteer, without the consent of his family. He asked if he would return to the front again and he answered categorically "My eyes have been opened. I will never return". They all speak of the bad food they are given - mainly vitamin pills and pots of jam. They speak of the courage and fighting spirit of the Russian army, but above all of the contempt with which the Germans treated them. They regarded them as inferior beings and they also said that when they paid compliments to the German women, a Spanish custom, they answered them disdainfully as if they despised them. There were cases of self-mutilation in the ranks of the Blue Division. At any rate their panic was obvious, and they refused to return. Everybody speaks ill of the Division Azul.

Its commander Munos Grande, is the most despised of soldiers. Countless jokes about this division circulate in Spain. Our informant knows several, but cites the following as an example which came from the Club Benevente-Arniches etc. "El Gato Negro" in Madrid. Munoz Grande sent a telegram to the political address of the Blue Division at the front - this was the address; F.E.T. URSS M.G. The telegram arrived and no one could decipher it, but finally a soldier said - "This is quite clear", and read the following words - "We were all deceived. Serrano Suner is the only one responsible. Many thanks". ("Fuimos enganados todos. Unico repponsable S.Suner. Muchas gracias").

ON THE DANGER OF WAR FOR SPAIN AT HITLER'S SIDE. — His impression is that Spain wi will continue to assist Hitler as she is doing now but that she will not enter the war. Some of the Generals are in disagreement with the present policy - among them Varela, Aranda, Yague, Queipo etc. Among the soldiers the feeling against the Fascist Regime is very marked. They complain of bad food, treatment, clothes.... too much time spent on marches etc. Queipo, on his return from Italy was rude to Serrano Suner and struck him for which he was sent back to Italy. General Aranda spent a month at Gijon and talked to our informant. They had an interview. Our informant has a real admiration for Aranda, who, he says, is a gentleman. He says that Aranda appeared to be Leftist. Among his remarks he remembers the following words. "We Spaniards are robbers. We are, and we have been for some time. If you walk through the Castellana of Madrid you will see the sumptuous palaces owned by Wexler(?) and Primo de Rivera, etc. built wi with the blood of the Cuban people and the poor Spaniards who went to defend the Spanish colonies. The colonies were lost but the military leaders, whose duty it was to defend them, enriched themselves. Now it is the same thing over again. We made a revolution in order to bring progress to Spain but we have spilt blood in torrents uselessly. The result was not worth the expense of so much blood and so much repression".

In his conversation, although he said nothing against the Germans, he showed contempt for the Falangists who are enriching themselves; he showed particular fear of the treatment meted out to the soldiers in barracks. His impression is that it was a result of the seriousness of the situation through which the Franquist regime was passing and fear of what the outcome might be. He said nothing about the state of the war, and whether he was a partisan of England. In the conversation he had with the General it is possible that there was another aspect, which through discretion he did not repeat.

HUNGER SITUATION. — The situation has become noticeably worse during the last months. For several months already the rationing has been practically nil. The rich buy everything on the Black Market. Our informant, with his wife and five children spent from 9.600 to 10.000 a month on food alone. He says that during the year his expenditure on food - he does not drink nor smoke - was 120.000 pesetas. Of course he had a special clothes budget - 600 pesetas for a suit and 180 to 200 for a pair of shoes. When asked how the workers live who earn 10 to 15 pts. salary or perhaps less, he says very badly. They do not eat, and adds that besides they cannot earn more. If the workers and the people in general had a greater purchasing power, life would be impossible in Spain as they would also buy on the Black Market and no one would eat. Therefore the privileged classes can eat, and they can only do it if they have a fortune. They accuse the Falangist leaders and the Government of racketeering on the Black Market. Immense fortunes have been made in a night. "They go to bed poor and wake up millionaires" This is the only explanation of the fact that one is allowed two packets of tobacco at 0.90 per person per week, and in the Compania Arrenditaria de Tobacos, which is a state monopoly, one person can buy from 100 to 10,000 packets of the 0.90 at 7.50 a packet. He also relates the following instance. Petrol is scarce in Spain. A litre costs 15. pts. Cars frequently stop in the streets for lack of it. He cites a case which happened in the street of Gijon. A distinguished military personage had no petrol He saw a tank-convoy of Campsa pass and asked the chauffeur for a few litres, and when he refused, he ordered them to give it to him, as a superior officer. The chauffeur refused again, and in a panic explained that he could not do it because he was not carrying petrol but olive oil, without being able to explain which military leader or leaders it was destined for, although he knew it was to be sold as contraband.

SITUATION OF THE PRISONERS. — He cannot calculate the number of prisoners there are actually at the moment although he asserts that it is at any rate enormous. By reason of his position he has visited prisons and fortresses, and is terrified at the terrible treatment in the "Comisarias" Civil Guard barracks etc. On more than one occasion he says he has saved more than one Republican from certain death. The prison that he knows is the Coto at Gijon. It is at the moment completely full. The treatment is inhuman. They do not give the prisoners a cell number but allocate them only a square meter for sleeping, standing etc. That is to say that when a prisoner arrives he is given a metre of ground. Nor do they give them a mess. Lately they agreed to give them a peseta daily for maintenance. He does not understand why there are not more deaths, as with one peseta a day in the prison canteen one can only buy bread. They took the miners who were prisoners to camps so that they could work in the mines. They gave them 50 cts. day wages for bachelors and a peseta for a wife and 50 cts. for each child, to the married ones. They keep them working ten and twelve hours daily in the mine. The number of shootings has diminished. It is imputed to the fact that "almost all must have been tried".

THE CLERGY — He says that the clergy have never intervened in politics from the pulpit as much as they do now, sometimes inveighing against the Franquist Government, and at other times, naturally, defending the policy of the Falange. Numbers of the priests and monks continually expound their view on the political regime and the points on which they differ from it. As a characteristic example he relates that about two months ago in Gijon there was a house used provisionally as the Church of San Jose, which was destroyed during the war. A priest, professor at Salamanca, gave five lectures. In these lectures he spoke almost exclusively on political questions, and attacked the Franquist Government for their method of supply and distributing the foodstuffs among the people, saying that what was wanted was more rationing and less Franquist regulations. He also advocated the necessity of a pardon for all condemned people and other things that our informant does not remember. 500 people went to the first lecture, but the second one, when they heard what the subject was, was attended by literally all Gijon.

RECONSTRUCTION. — Reconstruction is only done as a matter of private enterprise by proprietors and churches. In Madrid, the Montana barracks, the prison, the workers districts, damaged by the bombardments, remain as they are. Nothing has been rebuilt. The Arguellos district has been partly rebuilt. Every owner has taken in hand his own property. The Franquist reconstruction policy is a myth. The people mock at it and make jokes, among them the following - In Gijon they erected a building marked "Reconstruction Office"; in the hallway there were two doors, one marked "for partial destruction" and the other "for total destruction". So a well-known Asturian who was visiting the office about his house which had been partially destroyed went into that department. Once inside, there were two more doors - "for those who have some resources, and for those who have not". He went through the first door, there was another room with two doors - "for those who are Falangists, and for those who are not". He went through the second door and found himself in the street.

FACTS ABOUT RESISTANCE. — In Spain acts of sabotage are carried out on the railways, factories, etc., although he cannot decide whether these are organised actions decreed by illegal organisations of Spanish Republicans or are spontaneous acts of workers who are enemies of the Falangist regime. He does not know any concrete instance of the activity of the workers organisations, C.P.S. etc., but when he was in Madrid on the 22nd and 23rd of last June, there was a film on called "We Thieves are Honest Men". There were thousands of lampoons done on that, some very clever and suggestive which were scattered throughout Madrid. According to our informant, one day the lampoons appeared printed in the same type lettering as the poster, with the following - "words of the Caudillo, from a recent speech". For this reason there were arrests and a number of beatings in Madrid. He also saw how the people had lost their fear. In the Gran Via in Madrid a man cried out that he was not only red but communist, and he could not endure this any more. Apparently the people told him to be silent but he did not take any notice. The R.A.F. bombardment of Cologne, which was known in Spain from the English broadcasts, was celebrated almost all over Spain by the people who stayed up much later than the usual time in the streets, drinking in bars, etc. He says that even the police took part as they are largely Anglophile.

GUERILLEROS — He says that there are many in Asturias; there is a state of war. There are Moors and the 'Tercio'. The guerilleros appear occasionally in the villages and avenge the deaths of anti-Fascists who have been murdered by the Falange. They take food and clothes. Once his car was stopped by a group of them in the street of Llanes. They were dressed as Falangists. When he showed his papers as Consul of Cuba and proved he was not the previous consul Pena, a known Falangist, they saluted him and said - "Long live the people of Cuba". He says that although they behaved correctly he was rather afraid. He knows that a short time ago the guerilleros of Campocaso had a fight with the Civil Guard and killed several people, among them some well known Falangists in the district. It appears that the Guerilleros are magnificently armed.

FUTURE PROSPECTS. — He believes firmly that Hitler will be defeated this year. He has great faith in the people of Spain and France, etc. Nazi-dominated Europe will arise, since this life cannot continues "even one winter more". He is confident that the U.S.S.R. will not be defeated; on the contrary the Soviet battlefronts will be the end of Hitlerism. He believes that England and the U.S., in opening a second front, will count on the help of peoples oppressed by the Nazis, in France or in Spain, and things will move rapidly. The Spanish people are waiting for the invasion of the Allies in order to take arms in the streets against their rulers. The Spaniards trust in the Allies and hope that the Second Front will not be long delayed. Soviet and English broadcasts are listened to; they follow the progress of the war. They hate the Germans and the Italians. Those who before supported Franco are now his enemies and partisans of the defeat of Hitler. The Spanish people hope to escape from this situation by the defeat of Hitler and trust in the Restoration of the Republic.

Cuba. — 28.7.42.

REPORT No.355

ANGEL MARTINEZ, 26 years old, is a student from Bilbao. He is not a consistent Fascist or anti-Fascist either, as his opinions are rather confused.

SPANISH [illegible] TOWARDS THE WAR. — He says that no one speaks of the war because they take the view that Spain will not enter it. All the world thinks that Germany will lose the war because her enemies are very strong. He says that nothing is said about the second front. About the Blue Division he says that the people are against those who went to Russia, chiefly because they think them mad. He talked to a friend of his who came back from Russia, who was thoroughly glad to be back. He said that our entire war was child's play compared with this one and the way the Russians fight. He says that some Leftists were in the Division through hunger, and some were Falangist adventurers, and in spite of its being said that all are volunteers it is obvious that many were forced into it. He says that in the Gibraltar demonstration, there were only four Falangists, "who do not know what war means".

In general he pretends to be slow and tries to get out of the questions with trifling answers. We think it is because he feels constrained by a Falangist who is with Him. He declares that he is against Serrano Suner, but he says he is quite favourable to Franco because he promulgates laws which favour the people and is a partisan of neutrality besides. When we give him examples, especially that of the Blue Divison, to show him what Franco's neutrality amounts to, he maintains that they are all volunteers. He says they are always speaking in favour both of Germany and the Allies, because Franco wishes to stand well with both sides. He says that when the state of "non-belligerence" was established the people were content because before that they were afraid of being involved in the war. This fear, he says , is not so strong now. When asked what he would do if he were in Spain and the Spanish people were involved in the war he answered - "I would go to the mountains or spend a bullet on the first officer who tried to force me". He says that many Spaniards would do the same if Spain were forced into the war, because it would be so terrible.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME TO HITLER. — He does not know the proporations of this assistance but he says that volunteers continue to leave for the front. In the same way he thinks that if the Germans did not take provisions from Spain all the needs of the country would be supplied. With this idea he complains against the Germans and against Serrano Suner above all. Falangists in uniform are now only seen in parades.

WORKERS FOR GERMANY — He says that a few months ago they sent a great quantity of workers to Germany. They were almost all Galicians, and very few from Bilbao. A little later they were returned because "they were being deceived", "getting into difficulties". When he was asked to be more precise he said that when they got to Germany they asked to be returned to Spain, and so they did with almost all of them.

TERROR — He says there are no persecutions or executions. When the execution of Larranaga was mentioned he said that the people had no knowledge of these crimes. About the refugees he says that the people talk of their returning to Spain when the war is over.

FRICTION — On this point, without being questioned, he says that the Requetes and Falangists cannot meet, because when the two parties were amalgamated the Requetes were pushed into the background, and that is the reason they prefer the monarchy. On this point he says that he has heard nothing about the restoration nor about the differences between certain leading factions in the army.

RESISTANCE. — At first he said that no one speaks about the war or any other problems because the people are afraid. But afterwards he said that people remember the Republic and how well they lived then. He does not report any example of resistance to the war. He says that the Nationalists have a lot of influence, but not so other parties, among them ours. Prieto has no influence either. In general it is obvious that he is ignorant of many things or does not dare to speak of them.

UNITY — All the anti-Fascists are united, but he gives no details.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — When the war ends with the victory of the Allies Franco will fall, and he thinks that the Republic will return. He thinks it will happen soon because the situation is unbearable, although "there is no need to think of Revolution" He says that if the Germans invaded Spain the people would rise. As we said, he is studying for his bachelors degree. His matriculation costs, including the price of books, about 500 pts; before it used to cost 200. He says that studying has become very difficult. He says that all students belong to the S.E.U. although it is not obligatory, but they are coerced, and they join in order to be in a good position.

ON CONDITIONS OF LIFE — He explains that in the rationing they allow a K. of potatoes per person a week, a quarter litre of olive oil, 200 gr. of vegetables etc. No one can live on that except those who have a lot of money; the rest go hungry. The workers, who are paid the same salary as before, cannot afford to deal on the Black Market and he says that there have been cases at Altos Hornos where workers have fallen dead from hunger at work. This causes discontent although it is not openly expressed. Now they have appointed wardens in the factories in Bilbao, and the workers receive larger rations. Here he is contradicting himself, because sometimes he says that these wardens were demanded by the workmen (which would be a demonstration of resistance) and sometimes he says that the directors asked for them. He says that in spite of everything he cannot understand why when food production is on the increase the workers are so badly fed. Later he says that they watch them closely and force them to work without ceasing. He relates (although we know no details) that the middle class does not feel the pinch like the workers.

POPULAR ORGANISATIONS. — They exist just as they did before. He cites the Club Andauchu which organises excursions. These organisations are not controlled by the Falange. Young people are as gay as before, and dance and go to the mountains.

ARMY — He refers above all the discontent of the families because their sons have to spend four years in the army. He says that they demonstrate their discontent and that they all want to be demobilised. But this open discontent is confined, he says later, to private conversation.

REPORT No.356.

Card

LUIS FERNANDEZ - a Mexican student, who has always lived in Gijon, Spain. His family is comfortably off and he is going to Mexico to join his father as he lived on what his father sent him in dollars and when this was forbidden he decided to leave Spain. He is an ardent Falangist. He is ignorant of all problems of the working and middle class. He only associated with people who were very well off, and especially with Falangist students. He is very cultured.

He says that he was in Gijon at the beginning of the war and remained there till now; as he was a Mexican he was molested by neither party.

HUNGER — He roundly asserts that there is no hunger, only a scarcity of certain articles. That with rationing "there is not enough for one mouthful" but that he never felt the want of food. That the olive oil ration is 1/8 of a litre every 15 days, and so on for all other commodities. That the rationing of bread (black bread, since white can only be got on the Black Market) is arranged in three categories, and for that there are three classes of cards - poor, middleclass, and rich. That the ration of the poor is larger, as they have less money for buying on the Black Market. That at Belmonte, Asturias, the rations are double what they are in Gijon. That rationing is different in each province, and even in different places in the same province. He says that no one is interested in politics, that everyone's daily preoccupation is food. He says that "it used to make him laugh to see well-to-do old people who in all their conversations spoke of nothing but the price of beans and bread etc." When he was asked for facts he says that it is obvious that the poor (by which he means the workers) who earn 10 or 12 pts. cannot buy anything contraband and live on their rations, which causes them to suffer somewhat from hunger and be very discontented. He says that the ~~fm~~ hunger is caused by the war and the blockade, because as soon as the Spanish war was over there was abundance of everything and free exchange, and as soon as the European war began there was scarcity and rationing. He also says at the same time that the cause of the scarcity is that the Government has bought thousands and thousands of tons of food in case the situation gets any worse. That this is good policy of the "Generalissimo's" and that the Falange is doing a lot of propaganda, saying that it is much better to keep the food now, when a lot is coming from Argentine and the U.S., than to eat it now and then if the situation gets worse, have nothing. That the people who are "good stuff" accept it, but most people protest and complain. He says that another cause of hunger are the Provisions Committees, which, like those of Gijon, are composed of bandits who sell as contraband the articles they are supposed to divide among the population.

ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR — He says that Spain will not enter the war, that this is the opinion of everybody. That all approve the foreign policy of the Government, which is very intelligent, as it knows how to maintain a balance in the situation and remain neutral. He says that the Spaniards are very favourable to Germany because they could have penetrated into Spain and taken Gibraltar, thus closing the Mediterranean to the English, but that it is "a German idea that one must be pleasant". After arguing a little with him I said that Germany might not have invaded Spain because she was not interested in dispersing her troops, considering that she needs them all for fighting against Russia. Later he confessed that all the Spaniards would fight against the Germans in case ~~they~~ invade Spain because the Spaniards are very fond of their independence, and would fight anyone who wished to enter Spain. The Spanish Government is a partisan of neutrality and the immense majority of the Falange think that Spain should send volunteers to Russia but "not enter the war" because they do not know that many thousands of Spaniards would be killed.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR. — He says that in Spain much petrol has been stored and that new tanks are under construction. He says that this too "is ~~the~~ being kept for the bad times", and in case anyone tries to invade Spain the '39, '40 and '42 drafts are mobilised. The '41 draft has been sent home. The '42 draft was called up with a three months' delay. They spend two years in military service. There is also a pre-military service for Youth Organisations. This is not obligatory but it is counted as time spent in the service and for that reason every one does it.

INVASION — He says that there are no Germans in Spain. He has seen none and so on. If there are any they are disguised as peasants. He is not certain that they are making fortifications in the north of Spain. Gijon is in fact defended by two ships, one of them a "sulta-tacos" and if there was an English invasion there "they would be the masters".

HELP TO THE NAZIS. — He says that it is not a fact there are more factories in the north of Spain which were not there before, and they do not work for the Germans. That the Germans say in their propaganda that they mean to suspend armament manufacture, because they have enough. That Germany is selling a quantity of war material to Turkey, which is a proof that they have no need of it, therefore armaments are not manufactured in Spain nor exported. But he takes the opposite view, that Spain receives material from Germany; there are frequent consignments, mostly tanks. What Spain does send, not, "as some say because the Germans take it", but because the Government gives it very willingly, is food. Every day many loaded open cars leave Spain and the people talk of it and are discontented, but those are only those who "think with their stomachs".

DESPATCH OF WORKERS. — He cannot be accurate about the quantity but many thousands have gone, all volunteers. He says it is quite natural for a man with no food or job to go there where they eat well and can send money home and because all the "poor" are like that. That is the reason they "go as volunteers and are glad to better their position".

DIVISION AZUL — 40,000 went, all volunteers, among them some quite well-known people and distinguished Falangists. The number of volunteers was so great that they had to close the lists and there are many thousands still waiting for their turn to go when they send reinforcements. In April 3,000 who had been relieved came home, that they were all very happy. He had many friends who had gone and others who were ready to leave Our informant asked them if they had had many losses but the legionaries said that this was a lie, they had had very few deaths. There had been many wounded, to the point that not one of them had not ~~been wounded at least once.~~ All those who come home have been wounded. They say that it is very cold but they stand it very well and are much congratulated by the Germans. They wear the German uniform and the red cap. They say they behaved marvellously in Russia and gave the Russians a beating. That the Russians are brave, that is why they attack them from behind, but that they do not know how to fight and do not have good officers, although they have an abundance of material. "They attack in mass formation and do not care about their losses, so that very few reach the trenches." That men of the division always fought in a numerical superiority of ten to one and caused the Russians many losses. They were congratuated by the Nazis and often appeared in the German war communiques. That on occasions they established a salient on a river and resisted for more than ten days, that as they fought they sang and sang and that many Spaniards had been decorated with the iron cross. Our informant thinks that they have more losses than they confess to (all those he spoke with were Falangist students), and that in the casualty lists published only the names of the most important are given. In Spain everynne admires the courage of the Legionaries and praises them twice as much as the Germans do. He insists that they are all volunteers, and says in his own words - "a few idealists and the rest, the immense majority, because they were in a bad position in Spain and could get not work or food. They went into the Div. Azul in order to earn a good living because they are paid at the German rate and a war bonus, plus an allowance and large indemnity in case of death". Besides, if they are brave they can desert, when they go on leave they have millions of pts. in their pockets and can "put on airs and pose as heroes in their uniforms and their iron crosses in Spain". He says that although the lists are closed, there are thousands who are ready to leave at a day's notice, and that he "knows several." They said they celebrated Christmas very happily in February as they sent them tobacco and food from Spain.

He says that in Spain there is a lot of talk about the war, although no one bothers about politics at all now, and only about food. There are all sorts of parties, partisans of the Allies and the Germans, and among his friends the people are mostly partisans of the Germans; he also thinks the majority of Spaniards are on the side of the Germans and among the 150 in his university hall only two were partisans of Democracy and they had fierce arguments in loud voices until the director came. The partisans of the Nazis maintained that anyone who wanted England to win was not a Spaniard because if the Democracies win Prieto will come back and all the Reds of the Republic, and there will be a government of Leftists and in this fashion they attack the defenders of England. The students say - "we are very fond of Germany, because she helps us to be free of communism and is now defending us against it." He says that this appeals to many people who also hate communism.

SECOND FRONT. — He says that no one believes it will be established. The Germans cannot invade England, nor can the English invade Europe. All Spaniards would unite to defend themselves from the English. They would do the same if the Germans invaded Spain.

ON THE WAR.— He said that the Spanish idea was that it would last five or six years and that when they were all exhausted there would be an armistice or negotiated peace. This is the opinion of the people on the Right and the Falangists; he does not know the views of the rest. Franco said in a speech - "If the Russians make a breach and arrive at Berlin, he will send two million men to fight communism". They do not attack the Republicans much, but blame the Russian agents and the Communists for all that is happening in Spain. He says that in Hendaye there are hundreds of aeroplanes and many fields full of tanks. The Germans have war material on the frontier in fantastic quantities. He thinks that it is in order to be in a position to assist either France or Spain if it were necessary.

FRICTION — He says that there are no disagreements between the Requetes, Falangists or Catholics; they are all united, and if there were any friction there are no scenes or quarrels because the "Generalissimo" would shoot them.

FRENTE DE LA JUVENTUD. — He says that it was a failure, that at the beginning many people were excited by the propaganda, then they got tired and practically the Youth Front does not exist.

STUDENTS. — ~~These are all thmx~~ very happy to be members of the S.E.U. because they avoid military service. The S.E.U. is obligatory. The~~x~~ only corps they have to belong to is the University Militia. In summer they go to camps where they have military instruction and are commanded by students who are officers with some officers from the Army.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE — There is none at all. In Spain there is a totalitarian Government favourable to the Germans. In totalitarian countries there are no protests or any resistance because anyone who resisted would be shot. There are discontented people but they are silent, they do not speak because they cannot. I have seen no inscription on the walls of Gijon, the only thing there are a few robbers, the so-called Guerilleros, who rob, kill and assassinate. Three months ago at the Puerto de Somiedo, they machine-gunned a bus with travellers in it and the Civil Guard retreated. They are assisted by the discontented peasants and their families. If they came to Franco, with their hands free of blood, he would pardon them".

TERROR — At the beginning they shot many people, especially to pay off personal scores. Now it is done through the tribunals. It is a fact that shooting continues, but only for those condemned to death.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — Perhaps the end of the war will solve all these problems, The Governments of Spain will impose peace, law and order as soon as the war is over.

RESTORATION OF THE MONARCHY. — All a lie; all respectable people support Franco and the disagreements there are between the parties do not constitute a problem.

DISAGREEMENTS IN THE ARMY — He says there are none. Quelpo was sent outside Spain diplomatically, as a drunkard and a rascal, as all the army is with Franco and Hitler, who have saved Spain and Europe from Communism.

RECONSTRUCTION — He says there is a lot being done in the way of reconstruction. In Gijon they have built hundreds of new houses and the town is very much changed. The people who have money are afraid it will lose its value, daily, and either build or use the money for business. 4.8.42.

REPORT No.357

JOSE PAGOS, a peasant, resident in Cuba for 11 years, returned to Spain in 1940. At that time he was a Franquist. He is very backward and extremely suspicious. At first he refused to speak, especially when he was told that he must talk to a journalist. He knows very little, since he lived in a small village in the district of Estrado and only left it to embark. He often says that he knows nothing, and can only give information about his village that is not political. Is a moderate anti-Falangist, and continues to defend Franco, of whom he has a high opinion, in many instances. The first thing he asserts is that in Spain there is not so much hunger as they say here. There is a scarcity caused by the war but it is just the same as it is everywhere, those with money eat and those without go hungry. It is not true that they requisition the peasants' crops, at least in the part of Spain he knows. He says that everyone says in Spain that they control the crops, and even if they force them to sell at the standard rate they leave the peasants enough to eat. It is obvious that everyone makes fun of the order and hides the produce "but it is not that they requisition them, but that the Government controls produce and they have to sell it at fixed rates." He says that he has a brother in the army and the soldiers are very well fed. The food is well prepared but rather scarce. In Estrada they get the two regulation loaves just as before the war, but in Coruna bread is scarcer in the barracks. What everybody wants is for the war to end, anyhow, what is wanted is peace and tranquillity. When asked about the second front he says everyone is hoping for the English to*come and give orders in his house but when the people are so anxious they want something to happen to change the situation and see if it improves". On further questioning he confesses that 90% of the population are against Franco - not on his own account but on account of the hunger and misery there is.

There is no repression. People are only executed legally, through the tribunals.

He says that no one wishes Spain to enter the war, and Franco, "if he could, wot would have been on the other side already, but as he has the Germans on the frontier he cannot do it". The rich and the monarchists are discontented, and there are many people who were deceived and do not like the present regime.

Asked whether the people support the Germans of the Allies, he says - some on each side. A little later he says everybody hates the Germans and is afraid of their encroachments except the Falangists.

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THE DIVISION AZUL, he says was voluntary, at least "the papers say so although I do not know". (His most frequent phrase is "the papers say so but nobody knows"). He asserts that there were many volunteers and one went from the municipal government of Estrada, his village; he was the assistant to a high official. He does not know anything about the survivors. He gives the address of a Cuban who arrived in the "Comillas" with an amputated foot, a volunteer in the Blue Division. (The father of the legionary, when questioned at the port, said he was lame through an accident). He confirms the stories about Queipo and Yague, In Vigo he heard the following story - The Governor of Burgos was imprisoned for black marketeering and a son of his, a lieutenant in the army, went to Madrid to see Serrano Suner, who refused to see him and told him to see his secretary; the lieutenant refused and was referred to the Aide-de-Camp. The Aide-de-Camp unfortunately asked him what he wanted and the Governor's son said - "I wanted to put two bullets in S. Suner, but as I can't I'll put them in you instead"; he shot him and left him dead.

In Vigo a bad meal cost him 20 pts. He does not know anything about it, but the people say the Germans take everything. When we ask his opinion about the scarcity of rice, olive oil, etc. he ends by saying that he thinks too that the Nazis take it.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He says that any regime will do as long as it is not this one. No blood to be spilt and "those in the wrong" to be pardoned. There are many people in the wrong who joined Franco, but have now repented. He says that those people fear the fall of Franco because there would be retribution, and many people would be killed, but if the Republic could come without bloodshed everyone would be delighted.

A cow is worth 3.000 pts. The Civil Guard turn a blind eye to the contraband sales of the peasants because it suits them.

REPORT No.358

Report from a youth of 17, a Cuban, born of Spanish parents, who was living in Santander for about ten years with his grandmother. He has no political convictions and in some respects is rather influenced by Nazis and reactionary propaganda. He is quite a wide-awake intelligent boy. He talks with no reservations and seems to be telling everything he knows.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TO THE WAR AGAINST HITLER. — He says that in Spain there are two parties, one which supports the Germans and wishes for their triumph and the other which sympathises and hopes for the victory of the Allies. In the first class S. Suner stands out, it includes all the Falange, some generals, and the middle class, government employees etc. The other class includes the majority of Requêtes, the rich whose money is in London, the workers, and all the poor in general. He says that in Spain it is only permitted to speak in favour of the Germans, and that the partisans of the Allies speak only/in ~~secret and~~ ~~among~~ trusted friends. With the passage of time, owing to the German campaign in Russia, which the Falangists said would end in a week, there is growing a loss of confidence in the German triumph, both among the partisans of the Allies, who were dispirited at the beginning of the Russian campaign, and among the supporters of Germany themselves. He says that in Spain, except for a couple of Falangist fools, no one wants the war, not even the army chiefs, much less the soldiers. He really thinks that if they gave the order to march, no one would protest, but he does not insist on what would definitely happen. The German defeats in Russia, which are considered very important in Spain, have greatly contributed to raise the morale of the enemies of the Falange, who are now resisting it openly. (He refers to the Requetes and in ~~gmmx~~ general to the partisans of England who are very numerous). The entry of the U.S. into the war was not considered very important, because German propaganda, which is very widespread, says that the submarines sank all the ships which campe to Europe and that there was very little use in producing a quantity of war material if it never reaches Europe. He adds that the people realised that the Germans were and assassinate. Three months ago at the Puerto de Somiedo, they machine-gunned a bus with travellers in it and the Civil Guard retreated. They are assisted by the discontented peasants and their families. If they came to Franco, with their hands free of blood, he would pardon them".

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During the winter they had lost millions of men and a great deal of material. It was terifying what went on there. He says that those who come back from Russia are forbidden to speak of what they see there and therefore it is impossible to get more details. However they tell their friends in confidence.

ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY THE FRANCO-FALANGIST REGIME TO HITLER. — The reinforcements they send to the Div. Asul grow less each time. No one wants to go because the stories of the survivors are gradually passed round. He adds that the Germans pay them very highly. They give them 3.000 pts. just for crossing the frontier. A few months ago a few left Santander to concentrate in San Sebastian. It is there that they train. While before, they made propaganda out of those who were going to Russia, and saw them off at the Station, now it is done secretly.

All foodstuffs are sent to Germany, that is why there is famine in Spain. "I wish you could see all the things they send. Imagine that one can't get olive oil, which used to be so abundant in Spain". They say that in Bilbao and in Reinosa (?) and other places the factories work for the Germans. According to him there are no German soldiers in Spain, only technicians. Germans in civilian clothes are particularly common. He added that the Germans spend millions on propaganda and there are many newspapers, reviews, pamphlets etc. which are distributed gratis. The people, as a result of so much propaganda, do not know what to think on some points. They say - "If what the Germans say of Russia is true that country is doomed to disappear; there is nothing but savagery there". He says that some German propaganda postcards show Roosevelt and Churchill dressed as prostitutes, and Stalin in the middle embracing them. The people do not like this kind of propaganda. As for the German infiltration into the country, he limits himself to saying that they are the masters in Spain. He gives no data. He says that the Falange is very much weakened, that only timeservers and those who do business, thanks to the positions they occupy in it, are its supporters. Whereas, when it began, everybody wished to be Falangists, now no one takes any notice, and some people are careful to conceal the fact that they are Falangists. They say that the Requetes appear very upset. They were the ones who fought hardest in the war and now the Falangists are taking advantage of the victory. He says they do not give positions to the Requetes, and when the Falangists control the syndicates they do not give them work either. There is a great deal of discontent among the Requetes, and they have already begun to speak openly against the Falangists and those whom they blame for the present situation in Spain. They accuse them of being robbers. He says that they have printed broadsheets about the Falange, which they scatter on the streets and stick on walls at night. He adds that the syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory, but if it were not so no one would belong. They oblige the young men to enter the "Frente [illegible] de la Juventud", although many are already losing their fear, and do not join, or, if they make them members against their will, do not pay the dues. Referring to the despatch of workers to Germany, he says the numbers were high because they offered them a good salary and food as weal, but he has the impression that they were deceived, like the members of the Div. Azul. He does not know any more details.

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RULING CLASS IN SPAIN. — In the army there is a group h headed by Yague and Queipo, who are opposed to Spain entering the war, and the Germans and Italians controlling Spain. He says that in conjunction with the Requetes and other individuals in the army, they were preparing a coup against Franco, and principally against S. Suner, who is the worst hated of all, but it was found out and no one knows what happened/to Yague and Queipo. General Espinosa de los Monteros also had something to do with it, but he does not know exactly what his part was. Referring to Yague, he says that he was dismissed from the Air Ministry when he made a speech in favour of releasing the prisoners. Queipo refused to allow the Italians to have any olive oil. The situation of the soldiers is very bad. They hardly eat at all, and are very badly clothed. It is pitiful to see them. They all wish to be demobilised as soon as possible. The '39 draft has been demobilised and he thinks the first reserve of the '40 draft as well. He thinks it is because they cannot keep them in barracks for want of food.

THE PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE TO THE WAR AND THE REGIME — According to our informant the state of mind of the people is one of extreme hostility towards the present state of affairs, although it is not obviously shown. The Reds are in hiding. He says that the only people who are openly fighting against the Falange and the Regime in power are the Requetes. That besides the pamphlets we have referred to above, there often appear on the walls, lampoons and posters against the Falange. He remembers one which said more or less - "Famine and Theft, that is the Falange". There appeared another very like it, but he does not know what it said because they rubbed it out at once. He says the Requetes also accused the Falangists of being cowardly assassins who are only useful for doing mass assassinations ("dar Paseos").

The people take a sympathetic view of these actions of the Requetes. In the queues people xxxxxxxxx speak against the Government and the Falange. There are many prisoners. When the "nationalists" first entered Santander they killed people in thousands. The Falangists held many "paseos". They went on killing, only less than at first. The prisoners died of their harsh treatment, many were tubercular. He does not know if they give them organised assistance. Probably relations and friends. He does not know of any activity of the party, or the J.S.U. The Reds are very carefully watched. The only ones who do anything are the Requetes. In general our informant does not know any of our organisations because he was very young when the war began. The only thing he says is "the Falangists are like those they used to call the F.A.I. They go to a house, steal, take a man, take him and shoot him, and then it is finished". We could not get any information about the Union Nacional, although he gives the impression that he does not know anything about it.

He has no ideas on the future prospects. He thinks that this depends on England; there is talk that the Requetes wish to set up a King who is not a Bourbon. He does not know anything/the restoration of Don Juan. The Falangists are enemies of the Monarchy and the people do not worry much about this problem. Referring to the attack on S. Suner; Espinosa de los Monteros, Ambassador in Berlin, had on one of his visits to Madrid, a violent quarrel with Suner and in consequence resigned. He reports that then he was appointed Captain General of the Sixth Region, Burgos, and on taking over the post he made a speech in which he attacked the Falange. He reports that as a consequence he was violently dismissed. A few days later a son of the general who is a lieutenant in the army, shot at S. Suner several times, he thinks in Madrid. Arrese was wounded in consequence. The press said nothing about it. They published a notice that the Secretary of the Party was undergoing an abdominal operation.

The Italian submarine which entered Santander was damaged in the Caribbean. A few miles from Santander, and in full view of everybody, it was attacked very near the coast by two English aeroplanes which all but sank it. He says it entered harbour, listing over on one side. The English aeroplanes were not able to finish the sinking because German pursuit planes forced them to retire. When asked where the (German) planes came from he said Irun. (He gives the impression that he does not know really where their base was).

30.7.42.

REPORT 371

A young Basque 24 or 25 years old. By profession a metal-worker. Up to the beginning of the war he was working with an uncle in Zaragoza. He remained in the battle zone throughout the whole war and was mobilised in Franco's army. Is a Basque nationalist, like almost all his family. Although a workman by profession he always worked with his relations, almost always as foreman, or at least as manager. He has no political point of view nor are his class feelings very developed. He has never belonged to any syndicate. After the war was over he worked in Bilbao in a wire factory where there were about a thousand workmen. He finally left work in order to devote himself to the Black Market because, according to him, it was impossible to live on what he was paid at the factory. He lived in Nationalist circles, they were the only ones with which he was connected. For this reason his report is rather incomplete, and in some cases lacks objectivity. He is rather reserved.

ATTITUDE OF THE SPANIARDS TOWARDS THE ANTI-HITLER WAR. — In the graphic words of the informant, 90% of Spaniards are partisans of England. The workers, peasants, petit-bourgeois, capitalists, and some of the clergy, (later he told us the majority of the Basque cures) are on the side of England, although in a passive way, and against Germany and the Falange.

The general opinion which is expressed in conversations between groups of friends, and lately also in the street, is that the defeat of Germany is inevitable, due, according to our informant, to the fact that the Allies have more economic resources and more primary materials. It is thought that the United States will be a very important factor in the realisation of victory. Also the defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front contribute to stressing this opinion.

In Spain everyone is tired of the war, and no one wishes Spain to take part in it. There people are in a real panic on this score. Our informant thinks that if Franco should decide to fight, in view of the terrorist nature of the Regime, the people would have to obey. Later in another conversation he said that there were people who, in that case, would hide in the mountains.

The defeats suffered by Germany on the Eastern front were well known there and contributed to increase the people's confidence. He says that they said there that, in spite of their resistance, it was obvious that the Russians were not sufficiently prepared to face a power like Germany.

The entry of the United States into the war was received with joy by the people who interpreted it as an event destined to shorten the war, of which they are all very tired over there.

The Ratification of the Anglo-Russian Pact and the American-Russian agreement is known there, although the range and content of the pact and the agreement were not known. He says that the Falangist press; only said that these nations had promised not to make a separate peace.

He does not know the agreement about the second front, although this subject is very often spoken of, with the idea that it would be the final blow to Germany. Over there they think that the opening of the Second Front will result in the rising of the French people, perhaps the Spanish people too. With this idea in mind the people often discuss possible landing places. It is thought that ~~this will take place in France, although~~ some say it might also happen in Spain. The opening of the second front would be received with joy by all.

The attitude of the people to the "Division Azul" is frankly hostile. It has no sympathy from the people, even from the very moment the recruiting was begun. He says that in the beginning a few volunteers gave their names, mainly Falangists who wished to earn merit in order to improve their position in Spain. Others went because their position in Spain was desperate and they thought it might improve if they left it. Some, who were in the army, found themselves in the position of not being able to refuse, because if they had they would have got into trouble. But they all went in the belief that they would see the war from a distance, and that they were really being sent as a symbolic deputation for the Moscow parade. He says the press made propaganda, asserting that the Spanish soldier could fight in all climates, as they had shown at Teruel. He says that when the names of the first casualties arrived, the people were glad and said "that will teach them to interfere in what does not concern them". The survivors came back disillusioned. They repent of having gone. The majority of them come back ill or crippled. He adds that the war in Russia is worse than the Press reports.it; the Spanish war was child's play compared with it. The Falangists are more reserved and make no public criticisms like the others but among their friends they also say that it was terrible. They went into action in fact just before the Russian counter-offensive began, and received the full brunt. They had many losses through bullets and the cold. Some of those who came back crippled have German iron crosses for which they get a pension, our informant does not know the amount, from the German government.

SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE FRANQUIST REGIME AND THE FALANGE TO HITLER. — Our informant does not know in what quantity they send reinforcements to the Blue Division. He thinks that there is some exaggeration on this point on the part of the Falangist Press which tries in this way to encourage enthusiasm among the young men. He knows that the place they report to and train is San Sebastian, and that from there they leave for the front. He thinks that they are still sending people, but they are only "reliefs" for those who come home. He adds that those who go to the Division Azul today, with very few exceptions, do it against their will. They get the majority of those who go from the barracks. He says that many workmen went to Germany on account of the lack of food and work. He does not know how many but he thinks a fair quantity. He says that the people take these things calmly generally, because they cannot do anything against them. He only heard that in Irun there had been some scene with the Blue Division or with the workers who were going to Germany but he gives no actual details, saying that it is dangerous to try and know too much.

In Spain the most fervent supporters of the Nazis are - Suner, Munos Grande, Moscardo and other generals, and especially the "idealist" Falangists, or those who committed injustices or profiteered and are afraid of "the tables being turned".

He says that the Falange is only the shadow of what it was during the war. That at the beginning many people joined it for safety's sake, but now it is a dead thing that no one takes any notice of. The same happened with the "Flechas", "Frente de la Juventud" etc. The syndicates have many members, because membership is obligatory in order to get work. The workers would not join them if they could help it. He says that all the directors are Falangist bureaucrats who take advantage of their position to steal all they can. He cites as an example the fact that employers are obliged to pay something as a contribution to the subsidy allocated to workmen with large families, but he says that the Falangists do not pay it to anybody, but spend it themselves. For these and other similar reasons there is a lot of discontent among the employers.

Our informant says that they are still sending large quantities of food to Germany, also iron and other materials. The people know that if there is famine in Spain it is because of the Germans and the "Black Marketeers"

Asked about the production of the metal factories in Bilbao, he says that they are working at pressure, but he does not know if it is war material. He knows that pig-iron is being sent to France, he imagines it is intended for Germany. Iron ore is also sent to France by sea.

FRICTION AMONG THE RULING CLASSES. — He knows that in the army there is a surge of feeling against the Falange, but he says that it has no outside repercussions. The only incident known there was the case of Yague and Quedpo de Llano. In general there is a great feeling against the Falange among the soldiers. The consequence is that they make life impossible for Falangists in the army.

He says that the majority of the Basque Priests are enemies of Germany, of the Falange and of Franco. They are very indignant about the executions of nationalist priests carried out by France. Even today there are many of them in prisons. He says that the priests devote voluntary masses to praying that Spain may not enter the war.

He says that other members of the clergy, although they are opposed to the Catholic persecutions in Germany and Poland, support Franco because they believe that only with his help can they preserve their positions.

He adds that the richest and most influential people there do not wish to hold official posts because they feel that there will be a change in Spain and they do not wish to have the responsibility of the crimes committed by others. Official posts are occupied by a series of bandits.

Hatred for the Falange is general in the majority of social classes. He says that even those who belonged to the Falange before, young students, employees or just rich people, do not wish to have anything to do with it now, and say that the Falange is going to the dogs.

He adds that in general everybody hopes that the triumph of England will cause a change of government in Spain and so they confine themselves to waiting although there is talk of a possible coup d'etat by the soldiers.

RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST ENTERING THE WAR AND AGAINST THE FRANQUIST REGIME — The people wish to see the situation change as soon as possible, but they believe that the solution must come from outside. According to our informant, there is no thought of fighting against the regime. He says that the workers in the factory in which he worked spoke openly against the regime but he does not know that there was any activity. (Given the character of the informant we may suppose that even if there was he would take pains to ignore it). From time to time the women rioted in the queues; at first they shut them up, now they say nothing. He asserts that every day the people speak more openly against the regime. The contribution to "Auxilio Social" was obligatory before but now no one pays. When the young ladies of "Auxilio Social" beg for subscriptions in the streets and ask the reason for refusal, some people answer - "because I do not wish to".

He says that when Franco was at Bilbao the people remained in their houses and he was received only by four "chats bottes" in the offices of the Falange. At the end of Franco's speech not a soul applauded. Then some Falangist young ladies said, half in tears, "what we must do is buy a machine gun and shoot them all".

Assistance to the prisoners, according to our informant is given by relations and friends. There is no organised assistance, but he proceeds to tell us that certainly there have been collections sometimes in the factory in favour of the prisoners, but "by groups of friends". He does not know of the activity of any organisation, as such. The nationalists, according to him (he is a nationalist) are the ones who have some organisation.

They distributed there a speech made by Aguirre in America. One of ~~the~~ Prieto's was also in circulation. He has no news of the other organisations although he admits that if they have any organisation they would not go and tell him about it.

When he is asked about the activity of the different organisations of which the Frente Popular is composed, and the attitude of the militant party members of these organisations, he asserts categorically that there the people are completely united, and there is now no talk of socialists, anarchists, communists, republicans etc. All treat each other as comrades, and help each other as far as they can. In Spain, according to our informant, there are only now enemies of Franco and the Falange, who maintain a strict unity among themselves; they discuss the progress of the war together, comment on the situation etc. He says that the people wish for unity, regret the disunion there was before in Spain and the quarrels between different parties and anti-fascist organisations.

He did not know of the shooting of Larra or Diegues. The execution of Larra impressed him very much and he said that in order to do what Larra had done one would need plenty of guts.

FUTURE PROSPECTS — He repeats again that they believe in Spain that the triumph of England will cause a change in the situation. (We must point out that for some time there have been currents in the Basque nationalism which have been seeking for a "solution" of their national problem with the assistance of England, transforming the "Pais Basque" into an English protectorate or Dominion or something like that, and even during the Spanish war there were individuals who thought that at the critical moment the Basques would receive help from the English)

Our informant told us at the beginning that there people spoke only in favour of England, but after considerable circumlocution he confessed that the workers also sympathised very much with the Soviet Union, although conversations in this direction were much more restrained. He added that the people were quite well informed about the course of events as they listen daily to the bulletins of Radio London, and some also listen to those of Radio Moscow.

The people in general are in favour of a solution on the basis of the Republic. Others are afraid that the fall of Franco will result in a revolution "worse than the other" and for this reason they are more hesitant. Those individuals are specially the rich. If they believed that the Republic would be established without bloodshed they would be in complete agreement with it.

In Spain they believe that Hitler may be defeated in 1942, especially if the Second Front is started. They also say that Russia is bearing the brunt of the fight.

Speculation about a monarchist restoration has neither delighted or depressed the people. The possibility does not arouse much interest.

The people, who, according to our informant, have most prestige in Euskadi (Basque national territory) are Aguirre and Prieto, especially the former.

As regards conditions of material life he assures us that they are terrible and that is the fundamental reason why all the people have turned against Franco. There is much talk of "no home without bread or a roof", but that does not improve the situation.

All business is controlled by the "Black Marketeers" of the Falange who, sheltered behind the Committees of Supply, requisition the crops from the peasants at the standard rate, and instead of selling them to the people at the standard rate they reduce rationing to almost nothing in order to compel the people to buy articles on the Black Market, at a price which will give them the profits. He says that these who have no money to buy things contraband (and they are the majority since salaries have hardly been increased at all in comparison with pre-war standards) die of hunger. He gives prices which correspond with those for other regions of Spain".

NOTE: the military and naval information contained in these reports has been extracted and supplied to the S.O.I. Trinidad, and the Military Adviser, Imperial Censorship, Trinidad, under the reference numbers S.E./S.O.I.1, and S.E./M.A.1 respectively.

T/9.9.42.
Copies to London, New York, Bermuda & Jamaica.

[illegible]

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TEDESCHI, LUIS	
201-0289247	379-001-002
SEX M	DBD-76473
	04 SEP 44
CIT ARGE	FBI
	P8

LETTER DROP
CONNECTED W/OR MENTIONED IN PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE
/INVOLVING SPAN COMMUNIST NETWORK, PRINCIPALLY
IN LATIN AMER/ SEE PALACIOS-NUNEZ CASE INDEX
FOR VOLUME /S/ AND PAGE /S/

DATE 15 OCT 74 09190912

201-289247

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

For Betty

Bob Tarr →

1943 addresses.
under same name

① Estados Unidos 2366
Buenos Aires

② Pichincha 969
Buenos Aires.

Collateral information -

On original no additional -

29 AUG 1975

See if field can furnish any additional
background info - (TC)

201-

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 05-979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO HEADQUARTERS, RI

DATE 9 December 1960

FROM Ann Egerter, CI/SIG, 1408 J

ACTION ✓ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.* (X2621)

SECTION I: *All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *Cryptonym or pseudonym will be entered in Headquarters.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
✓ NON-SENSITIVE

201 NO. 289247

SOURCE DOCUMENT HABW-6515-12 Oct 60

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): TEDESCHI, Luis

SEX ✓ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO: YES ☐ ✓ NO

BIRTH DATE: D ? M ? Y ?

COUNTRY OF BIRTH: ?

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH: ?

OTHER IDENTIFICATION: 1. CM 2. 5B 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE: Arg~~entina~~ 004

ACTION DESK: ~~CI/SIG~~ 731

2ND COUNTRY INTEREST: ~~WH/2~~

3RD COUNTRY INTEREST

COMMENTS: cit: ?

- c 1943 was an active member of the Spanish Communist Party.
- Address 1943: Pichincha 969, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
- Suspected Soviet agent Info rptd. 1943

CS Copy

201- 289247

PERMANENT CHARGE ✓ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ✓ NO

SIGNATURE Ann Egerter

FORM 10-57 831a SECRET RECORD COPY (38)

FBI doc.
27 Jan 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 41305

FBI doc.
1 Feb. 1972 (NY)
RE: Jim Beynon
Bufile: NY 100-175210
DBD 31051

FBI doc.
26 28:Dec. 1968 (Seatlle)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov
DBC 39101

FBI doc.
22 29 April 1963 (Detroit)
RE: The United States Festival Committee, Inc.
Bufile: 100-436225
DBA 39107

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1969 (NY)
RE: Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov, Galina Sergeyevna Orekhova
DBC-41307

FBI doc.
24 June 1966 (Wash.)
RE; Communist Party, United STates of America; International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBB 51452

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1974 (NY)
RE: World Peace Council
DBD 69841

FBI cable
11 Oct 1974 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
DBD 81515

FBI doc. 18
18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

14-00000

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DBD 81515

FBI doc. 18
18 Oct. 1974 (Chicago)
RE: World Peace Council
Bufile: 100-41972
DBD 82108

FBI doc.
20 Aug. 1975 (NY)

RE: International Conference of Solidarity with the Independence of Puerto Rico, Havana, Cuba, September, 1975
DBD 90674

FBI doc.
26 April 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Michele Allison Winter
Field office file: 100-21782
DBA 1530

FBI doc.
16 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, International Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 5593

FBI doc.
2 Feb. 1971 (NY)
RE: Communist Party, USA, INternational Relations
Bufile: 100-3-81
DBD 4464

Winter

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-97891	06 JUL 76	201-0289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

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FBI/DBD-97886	15 JUN 76	201-0289246			

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SECTION [illegible] TS#210307

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DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-91238	08 September 1975	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT
HELEN MARY WINTER

SOURCE INFORMATION

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DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/000-07429	1[illegible] Apr. 7[illegible]	201-289246			

DOC. SUBJECT

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SEC[illegible] TS# 207019

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SUBJECT OF 201 *(Last, First, Middle)* WINTER, HELEN MARY	201- 289246			

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FBI/000-07430	27 Apr. 75	201-289246			

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Also
DBD-87447 TS-207886 DRD'd
DBD-90319 TS-208391 Dd'd

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FBI/DBD-95432	03 MAR 76	201-0289246			

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
FBI/DBD-93305	13 February 1976	201-289246			

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(7-46)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

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DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-006887

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FBI/DBQ-80203

4. DATE 26 Sep 74

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

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SECTION BY ---TS-206249----------------

Cross reference
deleted from
Star

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WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

200-004-208/04
DPD-69841
28 FEB 74
FBI
P9

MBR U.S. DELEGATION TO WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES, MOSCOW, USSR, 25-31 OCT 73, SPONSORED BY WPC.

DATE 27 MAR 74

09086070

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

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WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	100-009-022
SEX M	DBD-90674
	20 AUG 75
	FBI
	P2

FROM THE POLITICAL COMMISSION OF THE CP-USA MBR DELEGATION U.S. SUPPORT COMM. FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CONF IN SOLIDARITY W/THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO

DATE 12 SEP 75 09327216

201-0289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

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WINTER, HELEN
201-0289246
SEX F

201-0850469
OBD-75231
31 MAY 74
FBI

SECY OF INTERNATL AFFAIRS CPUSA INQUIRES RE SONDRA SANDY PATRINOS IF SHE INTERESTED IN THE TRIP TO MONGOLIA

DATE 27 JUN 74 09136546

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

S E C R E T

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

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WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	100-004-123
SEX F	DBD-74602
	13 JUN 74
	FBI

MBR OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CPUSA.
MBR OF A DELEGATION FROM CP USA WHO VISITED MOSCOW TO ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION W/LEADERSHIP CPSU DURING PERIOD 4-10 MAY 74

DATE 23 JUL 74 09144083

201 - 0289246

S E C R E T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

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WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	200-004-208/04
SEX F	DBD-32108
	18 OCT 74
	FBI
	P2

DISCUSSED QUESTION OF CHIL AND USA GOVM INVOLVEMENT

DATE 22 NOV 74 09210285

201- 289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	201-0006887
SEX F	DBD-78208
	06 SEP 74
CIT USA	FBI

SCHEDULED TO DEPART FR NY 01 MAY 74 DESTINED FOR MOSCOW VIA AEROFLOT TOGETHER WITH FERN AND HENRY WINSTON /201-0006887/ AND JAMES JACKSON /201-0011793/

DATE 04 NOV 74 09199669

201- 289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-0289246	201-0133419
SEX F	DBD-81515
	10 OCT 74
	FBI

OBSERVED ENTERING PREMISES OF POLD UN MISSION NYC. MBRS OF CPUSA

DATE 24 OCT 74 09195351

201-289246

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

X-REF. SHEET   S-E-C-R-E-T   DATE 26/10/74

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0289246	DBD -80203	26 SEP 74	201-0006887

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T   E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

FILE IN 201-0289246

FBI document
10 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
18 July 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
15 May 1974 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
19 Nov. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
22 Aug. 1973 (NY)
Subject: Tour of Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics by Representatives of Central Committee, Communist Party, USA, July 13 - Aug. 12, 1973

FBI document
30 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
23 March 1973 (NY)
Subject: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

FBI document
10 January 1973 (NY)
Subject: Gus Hall, aka/ Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufiles: 61-8077 and 100-423449

FBI document
20 December 1972
Subject: Gus Hall, aka; Helen Mary Winter, aka
Bufile: 61-8077 and 100-0423499

FBI document
15 June 1972 (NY)
Subject: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
MET WITH JIM BEYNON, CANADA, NOV 71

100-004-124
DBD -31051
01 FEB 72
FBI

R 7202281340

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 289246

FORM 867 8-66 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LITERATURE COMMISSION VENEZUELA TO ATTENDED THE IV PARTY CONGRESS

200-004-324
DBD -04464
02 FEB 71
FBI

R 7102160350

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

200-004-324
DBD -05593
16 FEB 71
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
HAD DEPARTED USA 21 JAN 71 FOR VENEZUELA TO ATTEND THE IV PARTY CONGRESS AS DELEGATES OF CP USA

R 7103030740

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI Doc.
17 Sept. 1970 (Wash.)
RE;Communist Party, USA Contacts with Communist Parties of
Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru
(NOFORN, NO DISSEM ABROAD)
DBC-93754

FBI Doc.
14 May 1970 (Wash.)
RE: Contacts Between Communist Party, USA and Communist Party
of Venezuela
DBC 82704

FBI Doc.
24 June 198669 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile: 100-423449)
DBC 54933

FBI doc.
20 May 1969 (NY)
RE: Helen Winter
Bufile : 100-423449
DBC 52075

FBI&doc&

FBI doc.
10 Jan. 69 (NY)
RE: Carl Winter, Helen Winter
DBC 39844

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

```
WINTER, HELEN
201-289246                              201-760835
SEX F DOB ?                             DBC -41305
                                        27 JAN 69
CIT ?                                   FBI
OCC ?
HAD RETURNED FROM A TRIP AND ARRIVED FOR
WORK AT COMMUNIST PARTY, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA /CP, USA/ HEADQUARTERS ON JAN 27,
69

                                          R 6902051315
```

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

C1150

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246 201-752914
SEX F DOB ? DBC -41307
24 JAN 69
CIT ? FBI
OCC ? P4
SEC ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CP, USA.
MBR NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CP USA ON TRIP
7 DEC 68 TO CONNECTICUT W/HUSBAND CARL
WINTER /201-760835/, B. M. OREKHOV
/201-752914/ AND WIFE GALINA SERGEYEVNA

R 6902061627

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

C/SI

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN	
201-289246	201-752914
SEX M DOB ?	DBC -39101
	26 DEC 68
CIT USA	FBI

OCC ?
SECRETARY OF THE ORGANIZATION COMMISSION, CPUSA, ALSO A MBR OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CPUSA
IN CONTACT WITH BORIS M. OREKHOV, 201-752914

R 5901141020

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (Wash.)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
BUfile: (SC) 100-423449
DBB 77957

FBI doc.
8 Nov. 1960
RE: Helen Mary Winter
DBF 62099

FBI doc.
26 July 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 88376

FBI doc.
2 June 1967 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 81991

FBI doc.
D 23 May 1967 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: &E&&ad Field Office 100-17363
DBB 81995

FBI doc.
27 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78966

FBI doc.
18 April 1967 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 78724

FBI doc
18 Jan. 1967 (NY)

RE? Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77690

14-00000

KENT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-285246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?
< USA, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
COMMUNIST PARTY FUNCTIONARY WHO WORKS IN
NATIONAL OFFICE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

100-004-121
DBB -51452
24 JUN 66
FBI

R 6607180197

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN
201-289246
SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC CP OFFICIAL
< USA
ELECTED TO NATL COMM CPUSA DEC 59 IN
CHARGE OF CP SCHOOL IN MARXIST TRAINING
IN NEW YORK CITY, MAR 66.

201-762338
DBB -51958
20 JUN 66
FBI
P2

R 6607122280

FILE IN 201-289246

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI doc.
6 July 1966 (Seattle)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Field office file: SE 100-17363
DBB 77913

FBI doc
21 Jan. 1966 (NY)
RE; Helen Mary Winter

Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77914

FBI doc.
26 Oct. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77915
)

FBI doc.
30 July 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77916

FBI doc.
5 May 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77917

FBI doc.
12 Feb. 1965 (NY)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77918

FBI doc.
20 Nov. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77919

FBI doc.
20 August 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77920

FBI doc.
25 Feb. 1964 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77921

FBI doc.
17 May 1962 (Detroit)
RE: Comgress of Canadian Women, Information Concerning
DBA 10048

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

THE UNITED STATES FESTIVAL COMMITTEE, INCORPORATED (EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	200	004	236	01

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DBA -39107
4. DATE 22 APR 63
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-289246
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
DE T-2 ADVISED DURING SEPTEMBER, 1962, THAT ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1962, CARL AND HELEN WINTER HELD A BUFFET SUPPER OPENHOUSE AT THEIR RESIDENCE, 9556 BURNETT, DETROIT, IN HONOR OF THEIR DAUGHTER, MICHELE WINTER, UPON HER RETURN FROM THE EIGHTH WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL.
DE T-3 ADVISED ON MARCH 18, 1963, THAT CARL WINTER WAS THE STATE CHAIRMAN OF THE MDCP
DE T-1, ON MARCH 20, 1963, ADVISED THAT HELEN WINTER WAS CURRENT MEMBER OF THE YOUTH CLUB OF THE MDCP.
DE T-2 STATED THAT AT THE OPENHOUSE MICHELE WINTER GAVE A TALK AND TOLD OF VISITING SOCIALIST CITIES, SCHOOLS, FACTORIES, HOUSING, AND TRANSPORTATION. SHE TOLD OF VISITING LENINGRAD, VOLGAGRAD, MOSCOW, AND EAST GERMANY.
MICHELE EXHIBITED SOUVENIRS WHICH SHE BROUGHT BACK, AMONG THEM THE RED FLAG AND THE EAST GERMAN FLAG. MICHELE SAID SHE HAD MOST OF HER SOUVENIRS SENT BACK FROM THE COUNTRIES FROM WHERE SHE ACQUIRED THEM AND CARRIED HER LITERATURE IN THE BOTTOM OF HER BAG, WHICH HAD A SHOULDER STRAP. SHE SAID THIS WAY SHE HAD NO TROUBLE WITH CUSTOMS AND IMPORT AUTHORITIES IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-289246

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 96370

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77922

FBI doc.
21 June 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBF 81488

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
MICHELE ALLISON WINTER	2. RI FILE NO.	100	004	134
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. DBA -01530		4. DATE 26 APR 61	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
201-289246

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

WINTER, HELEN (201-289246)
SUBJ. WAS BORN 6/25/24. AT LOS ANGELES, CALIF., RESIDES AT 9556 BURNETTE, DETROIT. SUBJ.'S PARENTS ARE CARL AND HELEN WINTER, BOTH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE. CP, USA. INFORMANT ADVISED DURING 4/61, THAT SUBJ. IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CP. SUBJ. WAS REPORTED AS AN ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF "NEW HORIZONS". SUBJ. ATTENDED CLASSES IN MARXISM INSTRUCTED BY CP MEMBERS. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SET FORTH. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS CONTACTED DURING 4/61, COULD FURNISH NO ADDITIONAL SUBVERSIVE INFORMATION. SUBJ. IS A FRESHMAN AT WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY, DETROIT.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-289246

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI doc.
24 Jan. 1961 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter, nee Wagenknecht, et al.
DBF 67557

FBI doc.
6 Sept. 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-423449
DBB 77923

FBI doc.
3 June 1960 (Detroit)
RE: Helen Mary Winter
Bufile: 100-0423449
[illegible] DBB 77924

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

FROM: [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

1. ACTION: OPEN ☑ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

ROOM NO. [illegible]

PHONE [illegible]

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☑ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO. [illegible]

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [illegible] R [illegible]

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA

NAME VARIANT

10. TYPE	(Last) (First) (Middle)
[illegible]	[illegible]
H	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D [illegible] M [illegible] Y [illegible]

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible]

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible]

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible]

CODE [illegible]

15. CITIZENSHIP [illegible]

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE [illegible]

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)
[illegible] the National Committee, [illegible] Party, USA, Michigan [illegible]

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION [illegible]

22. ACTION DESK [illegible]

23. CODE [illegible]

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

Wife of Carl Winter, head of the Michigan District of the Communist Party, USA, [illegible] of N.Y. CO.

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-[illegible]

FORM 6-60 831 TEST OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249
Vol. II

INCLUSIVE DATES: ____

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ____

ROOM: ____

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ____

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec. 78	8 Dec. 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

FBI Doc.
29 Sept. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA-23746

SECRET

To: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

From: Deputy Director (Plans)

Subject: Semen [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, to our CSCI-3/772,735, dated 25 September 1962, and to your file number 105-93295.

2. Information from our representative in Paris indicates that one Joseph [illegible], born 10 May [illegible], [illegible], USSR, possibly a Soviet citizen, living at Le [illegible], France, and a Russian refugee, was listed by the French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to France from 15-30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed.

3. An official French liaison service reported on 9 November 1962, that Josef [illegible] (sic) had not attracted their attention. Our representative advises that this is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

CSCI 3/773,830

SR/CI/RED - L. Lyon 4 Dec 1962
Distribution:
Orig and 1 addressee
1 C/CI
1 CI/Liaison
1 CI/R&A
1 SR/CI/P/dl
~~1 RID (201-257249)~~
1 WE/3
1 CI/OG/SS
1 Comeback
1 SR/CI/RED

Based on OFPA-65186, 20 Nov 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-257249

FBI doc.
29 Nov. 1962 (PHiladelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 28575

FBI doc.
02 20 November 1962
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBA 28182

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-CESSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SR

INFO
Chief, WE
Chief, EE
Chief of Station, Vienna

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/ECIMPROVE
Jozef KOZAK [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None; for information only.

REFERENCES: A. OFPW-34223, 25 September 1962
B. OFPA-67615, 16 October 1962 (not sent Vienna.)

In their Memorandum No. D-5054 dated 9 November 1962, UNBOUND informed us that Subject had not attracted UNBOUND's attention. This is tantamount to a "no trace" reply.

Robert G. Lamprell
Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
2 - SR - [illegible]
2 - WE
2 - EE
2 - Vienna

201-289249
deferred

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
16 Nov 62

DATE DISPATCHED
20 Nov 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPA- 68186

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XXXXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris WTM

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Josef *KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None; FYI only.

REFERENCE: OFPW-34223 of 25 September 1962

1. According to Paris Station files:

Joseph KOSAK AKA KOZAK
DPOB: 10 May 1901, Szrdoriben, USSR
Possibly a Soviet citizen
ADDRESS: La Seine, France
Russian Refugee

was listed by French Ministry of Interior as potentially dangerous during the visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to France, 15 - 30 March 1960. Approximately two thousand other individuals were also listed (SOURCE: OFP-8178 of 27 April 1960, page 35).

2. Since Paris Station has terminated AEDOGMA/1, it will not be possible to obtain further information on Subject from him.

3. We are querying UNBOUND for information on Subject.

Robert G. Lamprell
Robert G. LAMPRELL

Distribution:
~~2~~ - SR
2 - WE
2 - EE

INDEX X

CS COPY

201-289249

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
10 Oct 62	OCT 15 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPA- 67615

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249 ✓

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Paris, COS, Vienna

INFO:

FROM: Chief SR, via Chief, WE and Chief, EE

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka Semen POHORILIW (201-289249) and Jozef KOZAK aka Osyp KOZAK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See below

1. Attached for your information is an FBI report on an interview with Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ, contact of Semen POHORILYJ and correspondent of Antin NYKYPORUK.

2. The FBI has requested any information available in our files or through KUBARK sources concerning KOZAK's current activities and contacts with the Soviets. The information on KOZAK in the last paragraph on page 3 and the top of page 4 of the attachment, is the latest information we have on KOZAK. This same information was received from Paris in OFPA-55817 of 7 December 1960 and gave KOZAK's address as 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

3. To Paris: We would appreciate any information available on KOZAK's current activities and contacts. You may query liaison.

4. To Vienna: The interview with DIDKOWSKYJ contains a statement that KOZAK left the camp in Salzburg for France with NYKYPORUK in 1948 or 1949. Other information indicates that KOZAK came to France in 1946 from Munich. We would appreciate your checking Station and liaison files for any information on KOZAK, including biographic data and the date of his departure for France (or Munich). Please send a copy of your reply to Paris.

for DMK

Doris M. Killgo

PKS

Paul K. Stockwood

201-289249

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Paris w/a
2 - Vienna w/a

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 10 Sept. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 25 SEP 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFPW-34223

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-28924

CLASSIFICATION: CS COPY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/RED	L. Lyon	tb	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/RED	13 Sept 62	Allegra Hall
SR/2	14 Sept 62	
EE/A	18 Sept	
CI/OPS/SS	20	J. Evans
WE/3		R. Ova

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 Sept	Robert E. Owen

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/ 1 - SR/CI/RED 1 - EE/A	
RID/ 2 - WE/3	
~~RID/~~	
~~RID/~~	
SR/C/Bd	5027
DESTROY	

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

CS COPY

DISPATCH

SECRET

25 SEP 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon [illegible], also known as
Semen [illegible]
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 12 July 1962, entitled as above, and to your file number [illegible].

2. The files of this Agency contain no additional information on Josef [illegible], also known as Osyp [illegible]. We are querying our sources abroad for any information available on [illegible] and his current activities and contacts with the Soviets. You will be advised of the results of our inquiries.

CSCI-3/772,723

SR/CI/RED/L.Lyon 13 September 1962

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/Al
1 - RID (201-289249)
1 - WE/3
1 - EE/A
1 - CI/OO/SS
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

Coord. with

CS COPY

201-289249
ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX
DATE 13 Sep 62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FBI doc.
24 Aug. 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiricon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 20582

ELB FBI64066

(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

1 cc w/ATT TO [illegible]/A
1 cc w/ATT TO [illegible]/3

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SR/CI/RED	5C45	[illegible]		
2. ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible]				[illegible]
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.	8 DEC 65	13 44		
17. RID/FI				

The report provides bio data on Krivenko + Burchart. The investigation indicates there is no point of contact between these persons and Pokarelin —

See DBA-23746, 11-10-62 for some info

9 DEC 65 10 41

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST	ABSTRACT	
	INDEX	X

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-289248

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
3 Aug 62

DOCUMENT NUMBER
EAVA 30210

FORM 12-59 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO	EAVA-30210
TO	Chief of Station, Paris
INFO	Chief, SR; Chief, EE; Chief, WE
HEADQUARTERS FILE NO	201-289249 29-6-106/3
FROM	Chief of Station, Austria
DATE	3 August 1962
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1 Semen POHORILIY -
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information.

RE: "43" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

A. EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961 201-289249
B. EASA-5566, 24 November 1961 201-289249

In accordance with a recent request from ODENVY, we queried our liaison in regard to Subject and his contacts in Austria. A copy of their reply, which has been passed directly to ODENVY in Bern, is attached for your information.

Christine R. Kerbe

ATTACHMENT: h/w
Liaison Reply dated 24 July 1962 (in German)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris w/Att.
2 - Chief, EE w/o Att.
1 - Chief, SR w/Att.
1 - Chief, WE w/o Att.

31 July 1962

CS COPY

1 encl. H/W

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

ATTACHMENT TO EAVA-30210

Subject

Betr.: POHORILYI Semen Spiridow,
BURCHART Vera,
Dr. KRIWENKO Gregor

Bezug: Do. Anfrage

Reply to Questions.

Dr. Gregor KRIWENKO (Arzt, 3.12.1900 in Kiew/UdSSR geb., seit 1955 durch Einbürgerung österr. StA., Kremsmünster 60, Oberösterr., wh.) war seinerzeit in der Ukraine als Arzt tätig und kam im Jahre 1943 mit seiner Gattin Maria geb. Kurotschina und seinen beiden Kindern als Flüchtling nach Österreich. Von 1943 bis 1945 war er als Arzt im Krankenhaus Ried i. I., später im Allgemeinen Krankenhaus in Linz und dann bis 1952 als Flüchtlingsarzt im ehemaligen Flüchtlingslager Ried i. I. angestellt. Seit 1952 geht er keiner geregelten Arbeit mehr nach. Als Befürsorgter übt er noch fallweise stillschweigend geduldet die Heilpraxis aus. Im übrigen betätigt er sich als Organist und Chordirigent in der griechisch-orthod. Kirche in Salzburg. Seine Gattin, die seinerzeit in der Ukraine angeblich Sängerin war, ist gleichfalls musikalisch tätig. Der Sohn Dr. KRIWENKOS studiert Sprachen, die Tochter ist kränklich und steht in keinem Arbeitsverhältnis. Ein Bruder Dr. KRIWENKOS ist angeblich noch in der UdSSR als Arzt angestellt.

Dr. KRIWENKO lebt mit seiner Familie in sehr bescheidenen Verhältnissen, ist sehr religiös eingestellt und als Antikommunist bekannt. Die ganze Familie genießt einen guten Ruf.

Veronika (Vera) BURCHART geb. Chermilewski (17.2.1901 in BAR/Ukraine geb., seit 1957 durch Einbürgerung österr.StA., Untereitzing 32, Bez. Ried i.I./Oberösterr., wh.) kam mit ihrem Gatten Wilhelm BURCHART (26.4.1887 in Jedenier/Ukr. geb.)

3 aug 62 SECRET CS COPY

201-28924

encl #1 TO EAVA 30210

gleichfalls im Jahre 1943 als Flüchtling von der Ukraine nach Österreich. Wilhelm BURCHART war in der Ukraine Fabriksdirektor. 1961 verstarb er in Ried i.I. Veronika BURCHART erhält eine Rente. Sie tritt in keiner Weise nachteilig in Erscheinung.

Die bisherigen Erhebungen erbrachten keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, daß die Vorgenannten Verbindung zu dem in Philadelphia lebenden Semen Spiridow POHORILYI haben. Sollten die weiteren Erhebungen in dieser Hinsicht Positives erbringen, wird der do. Stelle davon Mitteilung gemacht werden.

24.7.1962

SECRET

FBI doc.
12 July 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: (E) 105-93295
DBA 13988

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM
Chief SR, via Chief WE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: None, FYI

Attached for your information is a copy of an ODENVY report dated 20 April 1962, on an interview with Subject on 13 April 1962.

Doris M. Killgo

PKB
Mortimer F. Bingham

Distribution:
3 COS Paris w/att

201-289249

DATE TYPED
16 May 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
25 MAY 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-33472

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289249

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	CKS
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
SR/CI/RED	
~~DESTROY~~	

1 - RID
1 - SR/CI/RED
2 - WE/3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/CI/RED	LLyon	aes	6991

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/CI/RED	16/5	
C/SR/2		
FI/SPOG	22 May	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WE/3	24 May	Robert E. Owen

FORM 9-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

[illegible] 62

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - Russia

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 5 February 1962 regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-93295 (E).

2. An interview of Subject by your Bureau, under the conditions outlined in the reference, would not adversely affect any of this Agency's sources or operations. We would appreciate any information you may obtain from Subject on his contacts and associates abroad.

CSCI-3/769,591

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:aoh - 23 February 1962

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SR/CI/P/dl
1 - SR/CI/RED
1 - Comeback
1 - RI/Files (201-289249

Reference: DBA-396, 5 February 1962

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

FBI doc.
20 April 1962 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBA 7408

FBI doc.
5 Feb. 1962 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295 (E)

SECRET

19 JAN 1962

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILEW
and Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ also known as DIALKAWSKY (fnu)
Internal Security - Russia

81-631 - type [illegible]

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subjects and to your file number 105-93295.

2. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on Andrij DIDKOWSKYJ of 731 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. We have not checked our sources abroad and will not do so unless this action is specifically requested by you.

3. A sensitive Austrian source provided the following information on Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ on 31 October 1961:

> "Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950."

4. Additional information from the same sensitive source, in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947, reveals that

> "Semen PHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 178 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features."

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

A copy of the photograph is attached for your information. The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

CSCI-3/769,019

Attachment - As stated

SR/CI/RED/LLyon:afo - 15 January 1962

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
- 1 - C/CI, w/o att.
- 1 - CI/LSN, w/o att.
- 1 - CI/R&A, w/o att.
- 1 - SR/CI/P/dl, w/o att.
- 1 - SR/CI/RED, w/o att.
- 1 - EE/A, w/o att.
- 1 - Comeback, w/o att.
- 1 - RI/Files, w/o att. (201-289249)

Reference - DBF-96946, 21 December 1961

Based on EASA-05566, 24 November 1961

14-00000

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST Nº 100092

DATE OF REQUEST 5 Jan 62

REQUEST FROM

NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER L. Lyon

OFFICE DESIGNATOR SR/CI/RED

ROOM, BUILDING 1501 J

EXTENSION 8251

14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO

15. TYPE OF REQUEST

X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

___ ADDITIONAL DATA

___ OTHER

16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT

X ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

___ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

___ OTHER

17. INFORMATION REQUIRED All information

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER) DIDKOWSKYJ , Andrij

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC. DIALNAWSKY

3. BIRTH DATE 30 Nov 1890,

4. BIRTH PLACE Didkowitsche, Ukraine

5. CITIZENSHIP U.S. in 1958

6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Retired - lives at 631 North 7th St. Philadelphia Pa.

7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION Laborer

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
1904 to 1920 resided in Russia. 1920 to 1943 " in Poland 1943 to 1951 Salzburg, Austria 1951 to Sept. 1958 - Philadelphia		

10. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
	6'1"	170	Brown	Black-grey	White	

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME) Wira Sergel, born 1897 in the Ukraine. Resides at Kostppol, Ukraine.

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-58 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

14-00000

SECRET

L. Lyon

11 January 1962
DATE

M: FI/D

file

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~XXXXXXX~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

TE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

N THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION ICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

IEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO GER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S ILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

FI/D

DATE

M:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-289249
Vol. I

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
8 Dec. 78	8 Dec. 78	Betsy Wolf	Betsy Wolf

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

201-2892

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

23 Jan 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on [illegible] (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation:

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened:
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☒ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Grace Lassiter (name) IA (title) SE/X/AF (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed (initials) 30 JAN 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201- 289249 Vol I & II

201 to files

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

FBI doc
21 Dec61 (Wash)
Re- Semen Spiridon Pohorily
Bufile- 105-93295
DBF -96946

FBI doc.
30 Nov. 1961 (Buffalo)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF-95895

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EASA-5566

TO: Chief of Station, Austria

INFO: C/EE, C/SR, C/WE, COS/Paris, CAPOG, COS/Germany

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-289249
2y-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 24 November 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDICTA-1
Semen POHORILIW

RE "433" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Vienna, please make appropriate number of prints from attached negative.

REFERENCES:

a. EGMA-10664, 23 May 1961
b. EAVA-20253, 19 July 1961 (not to Germany or Paris)
c. EASA-5195, 7 August 1961 "
d. EAVA-23594, 4 October 1961 "

1. References b., c. and d. contain Vienna's instructions to Salzburg regarding identifying Subject; our initial reply stating there was no information in [illegible] files; and Vienna's permission to run unilateral police traces through GREYFIGY-1, respectively.

2. GREYFIGY-1's initial report (received on 31 October 1961) states that

Semen POHORILYI - born 2 February 1910 in Czerkassy/Kiev, married, teacher, Ukrainian citizen, resided at the refugee camp in Siezenheim, Salzburg, from 13 July 1950 to 23 August 1950. Prior to 13 July 1950 he lived at the Hellbrunn refugee camp in Salzburg. According to police records Subject left Salzburg for the United States on 23 August 1950.

3. Additional information in the form of a photographic copy of the official police registration card and a negative of an identification photograph of Subject, both dated 7 November 1947 reveals that

Semen POHORILYJ - born 2 February 1910 in Przemysl, is a Polish citizen, married, teacher, 176 cm tall, gray eyes, blond hair, oval face, no prominent or identifying features.

The date on the registration card presumably indicates the date on which Subject was first officially registered by the Salzburg police.

4. We are returning to Vienna the photograph sent us under reference b. for their retention. We have also attached the identification negative noted in the preceding paragraph. Would Vienna please make prints for SR and Paris and attach them to their copies of this dispatch.

MAXWELL E. UTTERIDGE

Attachments: H/W

Distribution:
2 - Vienna w/photo & negative
2 - EE w/o Att.
2 - SR w/photo
~~2~~ - WE w/o Att. - 1 c destroyed
2 - Paris w/photo
2 - CAPOG w/o Att.
2 - COS/G " "

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

☐ CONTINUED

201-289249





att to EASA 5566
To: Chief SR
from Chief, ab Base, Salzburg

201-289249
24 Nov 61

14-00000

FBI doc.
24 Oct. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF-92203

FBI doc.
18 Oct. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295

DBF 92487

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ also known as Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to previous correspondence from this office regarding the Subject and to your file number 105-93295.

2. An official French liaison source reported in early September 1961 that Antin NYCZPORUK received a letter with the return address: (fnu) DIALHAWSKY, 63/N. 7 SA. (sic) Philadelphia 23, Pa. The address was also received from an official U.S. source as 13/N 7 SA. but this is believed to be a typographical error. It has not been possible to verify the address as the envelope was not photographed but was passed routinely from the post office to NYCZPORUK. The letter was not tested for secret writing.

3. The files of this Agency contain no identifiable information on DIALHAWSKY. It is possible the address should be 631 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, which is the one used by POHORILIW. According to information from your Bureau, this is the home of Dymto WASYLASZUK, Secretary of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association and the residence may be used for meetings of that organization.

4. We would appreciate any information in your files on DIALHAWSKY.

CSCI-3/767,673

SR/CI/RED:LLyons:CH - 11 Oct 61

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/liaison
1 - SR/CI/P/DL
1 - RI/files (201-289249)
1 - Comeback
1 - SR/CI/RED

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EAVA-28594

TO: Chief of Base, Salzburg

INFO: Chief, EE; Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief of Station, Austria

DATE: 4 October 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA-1
Semen POHORILIW

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

EASA-5495 dated 7 August 1961

1. The IRO files, we understand, have been moved to Germany (International Tracing Service) or are in the process of moving. This makes such a check inadvisable, if not impossible.

2. A GREPPIGY-1 check would not be objectionable even though he, in turn, makes a police check.

MATTHEW H. CHUBB

2 October 1961

Distribution:
  2 - COB, Salzburg
  1 - Chief, EE
  1 - Chief, SR
  1 - 201-289249
  1 - Registry

[illegible]

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

201-289249

407
DATE : 27 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/IC 2

RE Filing (check one):
- No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
- RI file this copy as indicated ☒
- Branch copy filed as indicated ☐ 74-6-63/3

RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

ROUTING

1	SR/Rud	4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 27 1818Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 36157

DIR CITE PARI 7037

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 11938 (COUT 97023)*

ADDRESS GIVEN IN PARI 6667 (IN 26062) AS RECD FROM UNBOUND. BELIEVE HQS ASSUMPTION REF CORRECT. ADDRESS ALSO RECD FROM ODOPAL AS 13/N 7 SA BUT THIS BELIEVED TYPO ERROR. IMPOSSIBLE VERIFY AS UNBOUND DID NOT PHOTO ENVELOPE WHICH PASSED ROUTINELY FROM P.O. TO NYCZPORUK.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO TRACES DIALNAWSKY.

RI COPY

ROUTING [illegible]	
R[illegible]	JH
R[illegible]	
DESTROY	
RI/FI	

FORM 4-58 1389a

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

25 SEP 1961

(35)
Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EGMA-56218

TO: Chief, SR

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-289249
29-6-106/3
FP: CE-1643

FROM: Chief, Munich Operations Group

DATE: 21 September 1961

SUBJECT: CAMOG/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/Operations
Identification of Picture

RE "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: None

REFERENCE(S): EGMW-10664, 23 May 1961

Both AETRAPEZE and AEMERCURY-2 were shown the picture forwarded with the reference. Neither recognized the picture as being of anyone they had ever seen.

HADLEY B. ALLENSWORTH

APPROVED
for
HOWARD E. TAPHORN

Distribution:
- 2 - SR
- 1 - EE
- 2 - COS/G

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO 1

CS COPY

201-289249

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-289249

ORIG : LOUISE LYON
UNIT : SR/CI/RED 1534
EXT : 8251
DATE : 14 SEPTEMBER 1961

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

RI FILING (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

5 SEP 61 17 38 z

74-6-63/3

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

OUT97023

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 11988

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: PARI 6667 (IN 26002)*

1. NO HQS TRACES. ASSUME ADDRESS IS 631 NORTH SEVENTH STREET, PHILADELPHIA ALSO USED BY POHORILIM. ADVISE. ACCORDING ODENVY THIS HOME OF DYMTRO WASYLASZUK, SECRETARY UKRAINIAN WORKINGMENS ASSOCIATION AND MAY BE USED FOR MEETINGS THIS FRATERNAL ORG. HQS OPINION ADDRESS MAY ALSO BE USED BY UKRAINIAN MEMBERS UWA.

2. WILL ADVISE ODENVY WHEN CORRECT ADDRESS RECEIVED FROM PARI.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *Requested traces on DIALMAWSKY, Philadelphia, correspondent of Antin NYCZPORUK, Suspect RIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
ENFILE	

C/SR/2

William D. Kepuch
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/CI/RED
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-289249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 008
8 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, S/C 2, ~~SE 4~~

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
File this copy as indicated ☒
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐ 74-6-63/3
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☒
Signature:

ROUTING

1	SR1 Red	4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 9 0256Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 26002

DIR CITE PARI 6667

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)*

UNBOUND SURVEILLANCE ANTIN NYCZPORUK REVEALED RECEIPT LETTER WITH RETURN ADDRESS: DIALNAWSKY, 63/N.7 SA. PHILADELPHIA 23 PA. 63 N 7

REQUEST TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CABLE PRE-DATES CS FILES. COPY MAY BE SEEN IN SIGNAL CENTER ARCHIVES.

RI

Reply sent 15 Sep 61.
Out 97023 (~~Dir~~ 11988)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
21 Aug. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 86583

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EASA-5495

TO: Chief of Station, Austria

INFO: Chief, EE
Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO:
201-289249
29-6-1[illegible]/3

FROM: Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 7 August 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA-1
Semen P[illegible]RILIN

RE: [illegible] 43 3 — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Pls indicate what further action we may take.

REFERENCE(S): EAVA-28253, 19 July 1961

We passed on your request concerning Subject to the local chief of USFP. He checked his files and found no traces. He suggested that the old IRO files might have something. Checks of these files are normally done by a local investigator of USFP. We request permission to bury Subject's name in a short list of names which the local investigator would then be asked to check in the old IRO files. Also, please indicate whether we should try to check this out through [illegible]-1, who presumably would check with the Salzburg police.

Sladen E. Wilsong

Distribution:
2 - Vienna
2 - EE
2 - SR

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1.

201-289249

SECRET

2 August 1961

C-61-1144

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/2/CE
Attention: R. I. Perkins

SUBJECT: Photo Identification
Semen POHORILYJ

The photograph of Semen POHORILYJ was shown to Reino HAYHANEN,* who stated he did not recognize the subject. The photograph is attached.

J. M. Evans
J. M. EVANS
C/CI/OPS/SCVSAT

Enclosure:
Photograph

* on 31 July 1961

SECRET

610511



201-289249

FBI doc.
22 June 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 80925

FBI 6666

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: EAVA-23253

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO: 201-289249
29-5-106/3

TO: Chief of Base, Salzburg

INFO: Chief, SR
Chief, WE

FROM: Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 19 July 1961

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

RE '433 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S): EGBW-10664, dated 23 May 1961 201 - 289249

Chief of Base, Salzburg is requested to check USEP and any other appropriate files on Subject of reference (a copy of which is herewith attached for Salzburg). The principal object of this exercise is to determine whether the person shown in the attached photograph is identical with Subject. As a minimum please ascertain the addresses at which Subject lived in Salzburg from 1945 to 1950. Depending on what you find, we can then devise some unilateral method of confirming the identity of the attached photo.

Lee J. Farmer

18 July 1961

Attachments:
- A) Copy EGBW-10664, h/w
- B) Photo USC

Distribution:
- 2 - Salzburg, w/atts.
- ✓2 - SR, wo/atts.
- 2 - WE, wo/atts.
- 1 - Reg., wo/atts.
- 1 - File

LJF/ejn

201-289249

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Secret

COPY

LIAISON UNBOUND

CPFA 59215
13 June 1961

contact reports

UNBOUND 11and JENTONS - weekly meeting 9 June 1961

Antin NYCZYFORUK

4. Gave him poop on Antin NYCZYFORUK, It wastoo late in the AM to get hold of UNBOUND 27 oranyone who would be in on the working level and hesaid he would take it up with them in the afternoon and that we could then get together and discuss means of action.

Secret

14-00000

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the KEMPOTE TEST which we believed had been used when working on the POHORILIW letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the POHORILIW letter. This, of course, does not mean that the POHORILIW letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the KEMPOTE TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified KEMPOTE procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/765,739

Attachment: KEMPOTE TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/nfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A

[illegible] 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Source FOHRILL

201-289249

1. Representatives of the FBI Laboratory have been previously briefed on the KENFOUR TEST which we believed had been used when working on the FOHRILL letter and which established the presence of SW on the letter.

2. We have now been advised by a field representative that a modified version of this process was actually used and it is possible that the SW is detectable by this version of the test, but not by the regular test of which your Bureau has the details.

3. It should be noted that our work on known systems revealed two cases exhibiting the same type of fleeting detection as was noted on the FOHRILL letter. This, of course, does not mean that the FOHRILL letter is written in one of these systems, but merely that fleeting detections can occasionally be expected with this variation of the KENFOUR TEST.

4. Agency headquarters laboratory has not completed a comparison of the original and modified KENFOUR procedures so as to confirm the finding of our field laboratory that the modified test is more sensitive. It is being provided to your Bureau at this time, however, since it is a technique which has been used successfully in a current case.

CSCI-3/762,739

Attachment: KENFOUR TEST (Modified)

cc: TSD - Dr. Colin Reid (w/o attachment)

CI/Liaison/JARoman/mfr (2 June 61)
Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - TSD
1 - SR/Rita Perkins
1 - RI
1 - CI
1 - CI/R&A

SECRET

CS COPY

201-289249

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OPFA-58988

TO
Chief,WE
INFO Attention: Chief,SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-289129
29-6-106/3

FROM Chief of Station, Paris

DATE 2 JUN 1961

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED For Your Information

REFERENCES
OFPW 30647, 19 May 1961

1. AEDOGMA was shown the photograph attached to Reference and said he did not recognize the face.

2. AEDOGMA stated that he knew no one other than NYCZPORUK in contact with POHORILIW, when the subject was raised later, in another context.

WALLACE H. HAVEDON

1 June 1961
Distribution:
3-SR
2-WE

Crfm cc se [illegible]

fil 201

when VIEW + MOB reply - notify Bureau of results

USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS
51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29
WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

201-289249
CC 29-6-104/2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : RITA PERKINS
UNIT : SR/2/CS
EXT : 2080
DATE : 23 MAY 1961 1672

ROUTING			
1	SR/2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SR 6
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

RI Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RI Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature: [illegible]

29 MAY 61 22 54z

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 60803

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 42528

42528

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

RE: PARI 4365 (IN 34016)*

1. ODENVY HAS NO OBJECTION STA INFORMING UNBOUND POHORILIW CASE PROVIDING POHORILIW NOT IDEN BY NAME.

2. PLS FORWARD FOR HQS PASSAGE ODENVY ANY UNBOUND INFO PBPRIME ASPECTS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *POHORILIW US RESIDENT WHO SENT LETTER CONTAINING S/W TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK IN PARIS.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/	MK
RI/	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

SR/SI
CI/OG/SS
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWE/X
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

DISPATCH

SECRET

[illegible]-10684

TO: Chief, Munich Operations Base; COS, Vienna

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany; Chief of Station, Paris

201-289249
29-6-106/3

FROM: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA/1

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Show photograph to appropriate sources

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached is a photograph of Semen POHORILIW, which we would like shown, without name, to appropriate unilateral sources for possible identification.

2. FYI: POHORILIW's name appears as the sender of a letter containing secret writing to Antin MYCZYPORUK in Paris, France. The letter was sent in care of Dmytro GNYP, another Ukrainian resident of Paris. GNYP, in November 1960, asked AEDOGMA/1 to deliver the letter to MYCZYPORUK who was confined to a mental sanitarium near Paris. GNYP told AEDOGMA/1 that he (GNYP) and MYCZYPORUK had been involved with Vasiliy [illegible] (Soviet assigned to UNESCO and the case officer of the arrested emigre Grigoriy [illegible]), and therefore GNYP feared coming to the attention of the French police by delivering the letters to MYCZYPORUK. MKTOPAZ analysis revealed the presence of the s/w in the letter from POHORILIW, but failed in attempts to develop the s/w. [illegible] and Paris Station are now investigating this case; therefore, in your reply please send an information copy to Paris.

3. The following is biographic information on Semen POHORILIW.

   a. dob: 2 February 1910
   b. pob: Czerkasy, Ukraine
   c. parents: Spiridon and Alexandra nee IWCZENKO POHORILYJ
   d. education: seven years elementary school and one year teachers' school
   e. residence: USSR 1924 to 1943
      Poland 1943 and 1944
      Czechoslovakia 1944 and 1945
      Salzburg, Austria 1945 to July 1950
      United States July 1950 to present
   f. physical description: c. 1951, 5'10", 175 pounds, gray eyes and fair complexion.

23 MAY 1961

Attachment:
Photo herewith

Pamela D. Chalifoux
PAMELA D. CHALIFOUX

16 May 1961

Distribution:
2 - MOB, w/att.
2 - COS, Vienna, w/ATT
2 - COS, Paris
2 - COS, Germany

1 - SR/3
1 - EE/g
1 - WE/3
1 - EE/A
2 - SR/2/CE
~~1~~ - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Semen Spiridon POHORILYJ aka POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to memorandum from this office, CSCI-3/764,636 of 24 April 1961, and to your memorandum of 3 May 1961, file number 105-93295.

2. As reported in referenced CSCI memorandum, a letter purportedly from Subject was tested for secret writing. Secret writing was seen by one technician and its presence confirmed by another technician. However, the message had disappeared before a third technician could observe it. The technician who tested the letter has said that only one line of hand-printed secret writing was distinctly visible. There were traces of S/W on other parts of the letter but this was very indistinct. The cover letter was in longhand. The disappearance of the writing did not permit photography or recording of any part of the S/W message.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed: James R. Hunt, Jr.

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/765,321

Distribution:
Orig &1 - Addressee
2 - SR/2/CE
1 - CI/OG/SS
~~1~~ 201-289249
1 - C/CI
1 - SR/RISB/DL (dummy copy)
1 - CI/Liaison (dummy copy)
1 - CI/R&A (dummy copy)

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 19 May 1961

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM
Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT
REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: Show attached photo to AEDOGMA/1

Reference: OFPW-30103, 17 March 1961

1. In answer to our request of ODENVY to compare the handwriting of Semen POHORILIW with that attributed to him in the letter to Antin HYCZYPORUK, ODENVY has informed us that at this time they do not have sufficient specimens of POHORILIW's handwriting to reach any conclusion.

2. ODENVY has furnished us with the attached photograph of Semen POHORILIW. We suggest that this photograph, unidentified, be shown to AEDOGMA/1 for possible recognition. We are sending this photograph to MOB, also, for showing to appropriate sources.

MFZ
SHELBY K. LIPNOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Attachment: h/w
Photograph

Distribution:
3 - COS, Paris (w/att.)

CC [illegible] FILE IN 29-6-106/3

DATE TYPED
12 May 61

DATE DISPATCHED
19 MAY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPW-30647

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-289129
~~29-6-106/3~~

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE
~~1~~ 1 - 201-289129
1 - 29-6-106/3

Km
SR/2/CE

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	2080

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2	15/5/61	JOHN ~~GERRY~~
WE/3		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWE/3		

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

POKORI'IY, Semen Photo taken

AEDIPPER [illegible] shown c. 11 May 61 - [illegible] negative



FBI doc.
11 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 76343

FBI doc.
3 May 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj, aka
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75098

FBI doc.
21 April 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
Bufile: 105-93295
DBF 75201

[illegible]

[illegible] 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 28 February 1961 on Subject.

2. We plan to discuss with French liaison the receipt by Dmytro GNYP and Antin NYCZYPORUK of the letter containing secret writing from Subject, who will be identified to the French only as a resident of the United States. We believe such a discussion is desirable in view of its pertinence to the current investigation of the intelligence activities of Vasiliy MYAKUSHKO (member of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO from April 1957 to August 1960). If such a discussion would adversely affect your interest in POHORILIW, please advise us as soon as possible.

CSCI-3/765,058

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh 20 April 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
~~1~~ - 201-289249
1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

SECRET

CS COPY

14-00000

FILE No 201-284249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	S/C 2	4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 255
11 APR 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2, CI/OA

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature

APR 11 1329Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 34016

DIR CITE PARI 4355

IN34016

REDWOOD AEDOGMA UNBOUND

REF: DIR 33187 (OUT 91903)*

1. STA WISHED EXPLORE TELLING UNBOUND THAT GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD RECEIVED S/W MAIL FROM UNNAMED SOURCE IN PBPRIME. SINCE UNBOUND STILL INTERESTED MYAKUSHKO CONTACTS, MIGHT PROFITABLY PUT MAIL COVER ON G AND N

2. STA THEREFORE ASKED ODENVY REP OPINION WHETHER ODENVY HQS INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF ABOVE INFO RE G AND N GIVEN TO UNBOUND.

3. ODENVY REP STATES HE CABLED QUERY TO HIS HQS RE ABOVE.

RE REF:

A. "PBPRIME ANGLE REFERS TO INVESTIGATION OF POHORILIW WHICH IS ASPECT OF CASE MOST DIRECTLY TOUCHING ODYOKE INTEREST.

FORM 1389 Use Previous Editions

SECRET

FILE No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

RE Filing (check one).
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 34016 PARI 4365

B. MADE NO REF "LIVE LETTER DROP".

C. LOOSELY REFERRED TO KUBARK'S "PENETRATION OF CORRESPONDENCE CHANNEL". THIS INACCURATE AND MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN MEAN WE INTERCEPTED MORE THAN ONE LETTER IN POHORILIW-NYCZYPORUK CORRESPONDENCE. ODENVY REP AWARE OF SECOND LETTER (FROM USSR TO N WHICH NOT FOUND CONTAIN S/W) INTERCEPTED BY AEDOGMA, BUT DID NOT MENTION IN HIS CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ODENVY REQUESTED CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS.

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH PBPRIME ANGLE.

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP PBPRIME.

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RPerkins
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757 1565
DATE: 3 April 1961

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 4 APR 61 19 59z
X ROUTINE
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

SIG CEN

INITIALS

OUT91903

~~OUT 91903~~

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 33187

33187

REDWOOD AEDOGMA

RE DIR 26906 (OUT 77202) *
OFPW 30103

1. ODENVY ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION FOLL POINTS CONFUSION ARISING FROM ODENVY PARI REPORT MEETING WITH STA ON POHORILIN CASE:

A. WHAT MEANT BY WORD ANGLE IN STA QUERY WHETHER DISCUSSION CASE WITH UNBOUND WOULD INTERFERE WITH PBPRIME ANGLE;

B. STA ALLUSION LIVE LETTER DROP PBPRIME;

C. REF TO MORE THAN ONE LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME. (RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION NYCYPORUK).

SR/SI
CI/OG/SOV (Smith in draft)
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/X
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

25 APR 1961

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Semen POHORILIW - Internal Security R

FROM:

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins x 8757

NO. CSCI-3/764,636

DATE 29 March 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CSR/2/CE		29/3	
2. CSR/2		29/3 /61	
3.			
4. SR/RISB/DL	MAR 1961	30/3	
5. SR/COP/SI	MAR 1961	R 1961	
6.			
7. CI/OG/SOV		3	e
8. C/CI/OG		4 apr	✓
9. DC/CI	-4 APR 1961	10 APR 1961	
CI/Liaison	[illegible]	1961	
10. ~~C/CI/Sov~~		11	e
DC/CI	11 APR 1961	21 APR 1961	
11. RID/[redacted] AN		24 APR 1961	
12. ~~RID/MIS~~			
13. RI/FI			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

7 to 9A - In view of FBI investigation of Subject believe FBI should have this info. This is case on which I sent you memo re [illegible] S/W handling.

Evans

Let me see info on this.

enclosed 14 7.e.

ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX
DATE 24 APR 1961

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-476738

24 APR 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILIW 201-289249
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

a. Bureau report of 14 February 1961, made at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Subject as above;

b. Memorandum from Deputy Director (Plans), Subject as above, dated 9 January 1961, and numbered CSCI - 3/763,211;

c. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 16 November 1960;

d. CIA Teletype, Subject as above, dated 17 February 1961.

2. We would appreciate being informed whether or not you have had an opportunity to compare the hand writing of Semen POHORILIW and that of the letter bearing his name and address, which we sent to you with reference 1.b..

3. In a review of our files we note that the lack of elaboration in our earlier correspondence might cause your Bureau some difficulty. Our statement in reference 1.c. that the POHORILIW letter bore indications of secret writing was based on the findings of our technical staff. One of our technicians applied a test that permitted him to see writing which, although it was not legible, could be seen to be other than that of the overt text. This writing remained visible long enough for another technician

CS COPY

201-289249

to confirm its presence. There have been reports that our source is considered by the Soviets to be American controlled. Thus it was considered that, if this letter were a Soviet intelligence communication, it was likely the Soviets would consider the operation compromised when our source's possession of the letter was reported. For this reason, we decided it was best to forge a copy of the POHORILIW letter and make every attempt to develop any secret writing it contained. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so, and the original letter was destroyed in the process. As we reported in reference 1.d. on 8 or 9 January 1961 our source delivered to Antin HYCZYPORUK the forged copy of the POHORILIW letter. To date there has been no report of any reaction to HYCZYPORUK's receipt of the forgery.

CSCI-3/764,636

SR/2/CE/Rita Perkins:bbh   29 March 1961

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - C/CI
1 - RID/FI
1 - SR/RISB/DL
2 - SR/2/CE

14-00000

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T-

PROCESSING

ACTION	PRO-POSED	ACCOM-PLISHED
MARKED FOR INDEXING		
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	X	
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
ABSTRACT		
MICROFILM		

TO

Chief of Station, Paris

INFO

FROM

Chief, SR via Chief, WE

SUBJECT

REDWOOD/AEDOGMA - Semen POHORILIW

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: DIR 26906

1. CDENVY has informed us that neither the release of Antin NYCZYPORUK from the mental sanitarium nor his repatriation would affect their investigation of Semen POHORILIW.

2. CDURGE files contained following information on Subject: He was born 2 February 1910 at Czerkasy, Ukraine. His parents, now deceased, were Spiridon and Aleksandra nee IWCZENKO. Subject attended elementary school for seven years and teachers' school for one year. He resided in the USSR 1924 to 1943; in Poland, 1943 and 1944; in Czechoslovakia, 1944 and 1945; and in Salzburg, Austria, from March 1945 to July 1950. His last residence in Salzburg was at Camp Hellbrunn. In July 1950 he was granted a visa to the United States as a displaced person. At that time he stated his destination in the United States was the home of Pawlo KLYMENKO in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He entered the United States in September, 1960. In July 1951 he filed a Declaration of Intention to become a United States citizen. At that time he was residing at 933 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, and was employed as a polisher. His physical description in 1951 was 5'10", 175 pounds, blond hair, gray eyes and fair complexion.

[illegible]

3. According to CDENVY in January 1961 Subject was residing at 931 North 7th Street, Philadelphia, in a home owned by Dmytro WASYLASZUK and Paraska OLEKSIUK. WASYLASZUK is a member of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Workers Association.

SR/63

SHELBY K. LIPECOTT

MORTIMER F. BINGHAM

Distribution:
  3 - COS, Paris

DATE TYPED

13 March 61

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OFPW-30103

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

29-6-106/3
201-289249

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/2/CE	Rita Perkins	bbh	8757

2 - RI
2 - WE/3
2 - SR/2/CE

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CSR/2		JOHN GERRY
WE/3		
CI/OG/SOV		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWE/3		201-~~[illegible]~~ 289249

CS 19-29-6-106/3

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

COPY

FBI doc.
28 Feb. 1961 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj
DBF 69970

FBI doc.

749

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 21 ~~E~~ FEBRUARY 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO. 201-252249

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, ~~WE 4, S/C 2~~ RIFIS

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED 24 FEB 61 23 24z
☒ ROUTINE
~~SIG CEN~~
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
INITIALS

OUT 77202
OUT77202

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 26903
26903

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

RE: PARI 3664 (IN 46263)*

N/ ~~ODENVY SENT REF INFO AND ASKED IF RELEASE AND OR REPATRIATION NYCZYPORUK WOULD AFFECT POKORILIV CASE.~~ ODENVY INTERIM REPLY NON COMMITTAL BECAUSE DELAY THEIR INVESTIGATION. THUS RECOMMEND NO ACTION PARI THIS TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

* CS COMMENT: REF ASKED IF HQS DESIRED ANY PARI ACTION RE POSSIBLE REPATRIATION NYCZYPORUK.

RI COPY

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	MK
RI/TI	
RI/FI	

CI/OA/SU

SR/SI

WE/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CWE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

C/SR/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FORM 4-58 1389a

NO. ~~201-106163~~ 201-289249

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

G: RITA PERKINS 633
I: SR/2/CE
: 8757 633
E: 17 FEBRUARY 1961

: FBI

M: DIRECTOR

NF: SR 6

O: CI, CI/OPS, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value Destroy
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required
Signature:

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED 17 FEB 61 22 11z
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

~~SIG CEN~~

INITIALS

OUT 74849

INFO CITE DIR

FBI

SERGEI POHORILIN

REF: CSCI 3/763,811

1. LETTER DELIVERED NYCZYPORUK 8 OR 9 JAN. NYCZYPORUK READ LETTER IMMEDIATELY AND GAVE NO INDICATION HE SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. NYCZYPORUK TOLD OUR SOURCE DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED AND ALL HE NEEDS IS AN ASSURED DOMICILE IN PARIS TO BE RELEASED. ANOTHER SOURCE REPORTED GNYP AVERS NYCZYPORUK WILL REPATRIATE FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE.

3. WE DO NOT PLAN INTERVENE IN RELEASE AND/OR REPATRIATION OF NYCZYPORUK UNLESS IT AFFECTS YOUR INVESTIGATION POHORILIW. PLS ADVISE SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

ROUTING
RI/A MK
3B
RI

CI/OG/SOV/SAT J. C
SR/SI
WE/3
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CI J. Cowan
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FORM 1389 (35)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

X-Ref 99-6-[illegible]/3
201-[illegible]

DATE : 269
16 FEB 61 SR 12

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

RID Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
File this copy as indicated.
Branch copy filed as indicated.
None Required.
Signature:

ROUTING

1	SR 12	4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 16 1533Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 46263

DIR CITE PARI 3664

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA 1

REF DIR 15201 (out 50208)*

cit. ? / Dob. [illegible] 1916 Pob. - Ukraine / Ukr Emigre Paris, PSA

* Andy

1. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVERED LETTER 8-9 JANUARY. NYCZYPORUK OPENED AND READ IMMEDIATELY, GAVE NO INDICATION HE ~~D~~SAW ANYTHING WRONG.

2. N'S DOCTORS CONSIDER HIM COMPLETELY CURED. N TOLD DOGMA HE ONLY NEEDS ASSURED DOMICILE PARI FOR RELEASE. HOWEVER GNYP INFORMED BYDNIK THAT N WILL REPATRIATE WHEN RELEASED.

3. IN LIGHT POSSIBLE N REMOVAL, ANY ACTION DESIRED PARI?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED DETAILS RE THE DELIVERY OF A LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK WHICH DEFINETLY CONTAINED S/W.

subject ? (201-29[illegible]56)

cit. ? Dob 1915 [illegible]

Ukr Emigre Paris, PSA

contact of [illegible] Nyczyporuk contact ?

subject of 201-276.56

RI

POHORILIW SEMEN

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/[illegible]	MK
RI/[illegible]	✓
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

SECRET

FORM 1389c REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
14 Feb. 1961 (Philadelphia)
RE: Semen Spiridon Pohorilyj,aka
DBF 69574

FBI doc.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OPPA- 56927

TO
Chief, WE
INFO
Attention: Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
29-6-106/3

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris

DATE
8 FEB 1961

SUBJECT
REDWOOD LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA
Transmittal of UMWEAVE TRACES

INDEXING (CHECK "X" ONE)
☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For Your Information

REFERENCE(S)
DIR 15201, 7 December 1961

Transmitted herewith are the UMWEAVE traces for Dmitrio *CHYP and Antin *NYKYPORUK as requested in reference.

Leona N. Costerman

7 February 1961

Attached Herewith:
2 UMWEAVE traces

Distribution:
3-SR with 2 copies each attachment
2-WE with 1 copy each attachment

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

7 February 1961

Dmitrio *GNYP, born 13 October 1898 at WASNICZU, Hungary - child of Wassile and JAZWINSKA Paraska, Ukrainian refugee, has lived for about the past twenty years at 211 rue de Beroy, Paris 12eme.

He has been employed, since 1945, as night watchman for the "Societe de Transports de Vehicules Automobiles", 60 rue St. Ferdinand, Paris 17eme.

His monthly salary is about 60,000 old francs.

From his first marriage, he had two sons, Baseli (36 years old) who lives in Pdand and Lvilomir (34 years old) who lives in the USA.
[illegible]

From his second marriage with Martha MASLY, born 9 September 1903 in LWOW Poland, he had a third son Jean, born 22 May 1940 in Paris (12th arrondiesment) who chose a French nationality.

During the German occupation, GNYP who has been in France since 1925 went to work in Germany as a volunteer for the organization TODT. Returning to France in 1943 he worked until the Liberation as a chauffeur for the "Legion SPEER " at Enghien Les Bains.

In 1944, with the liberation, he was arrested and interned at Fresnes for collaboration, but this detention was not followed by condemnation.

In the milieux of Ukrainian refugees he is considered as an opportunist.

[illegible]
CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

SECRET

7 February 1961

Antin *NYKYPORUK, born the first of January 1912 in Karkow (Ukraine), bachelor, has most recently lived at 86 rue de Montreuil-arrived in France in 1950.

He first of all was a manual laborer, and then an electrician.

Bothered with mental troubles, he has been interned since 1954 in various psychiatric hospitals.

His last stay was in 1959 at Villejuif.

Since his departure, his activity and sources of income have not been known because his unemployment payment has been refused by the "Bureau de la Main d'Oeuvre".

His ordinary resident's card has lapsed since 16 August 1960 and he is ~~actually~~ at present violating the law for Foreigners.

It is a question of a violent individual when he has his mental crises.

On several occasions the police have intervened to control him before interment.

CONTINUED CONTROL
SECRET

SECRET

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Semen POHORILYJ
Internal Security - R

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 22 November 1960 on Subject.

2. There have been no new developments in France on this matter. Our source has been given a facsimile of the POHORILIW letter, but there has been no report on its delivery to Antin NYCZPORUK (see attachment).

3. We have received the following biographic information:

a. Dmytro GNYP was born on 13 October 1898 at Wasyczyn Rohatyn, Western Ukraine. He is married and the father of two sons, one of whom repatriated to the Ukraine in 1948 and the other of whom lives in France and is a member of the Ukrainian nationalist organization - Spilka Ukrainskoji Molodi (The Union of Ukrainian Youth in France). GNYP's education consists of four years of elementary schooling in the Ukraine. In 1918 he served as a non-commissioned officer in the Ukrainian Army in a formation called the Sitschowi Strilci. GNYP emigrated to France in 1925. He has been a member of two Ukrainian communist organizations in France; in 1927 he joined the Soyuz Ukrainskych Hromadian u Francji (Union of Ukrainian Citizens in France), and from 1945 to 1947 he was a member of the Batkivtschyna (Homeland). His address for the past two years has been 211 Rue de Bercy, Paris XIIeme.

CS COPY

copies filed in
29-6-106/3
201-277417

201-289249

b. Antin NYCZYPORUK (according to GHYP his true name is NYKYPORETZ) was born about 1910. He is married and had a wife and two children in Noginsk. Prior to 1944 he was a professor of Ukrainian and West European Literature at a pedagogical institute in Kiev. NYCZYPORUK left the USSR in 1944; from 1945 to 1948 he was in an International Refugee Organization camp in Salzburg, Austria; he has resided in France since 1948.

4. The following details on GHYP's and NYCZYPORUK's involvement with Soviet intelligence were obtained by our source from GHYP and other Ukrainian emigres in France. During the period 1958 to 1960 GHYP and Vasiliy MYAKUSHO, Third Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to UNESCO, frequently visited with each other at the Soviet Embassy and at GHYP's apartment on 211 Rue de Bercy. At the end of 1959 GHYP introduced NYCZYPORUK to MYAKUSHKO. MYAKUSHKO asked NYCZYPORUK to contribute literary articles to Soviet publications; it is not known whether NYCZYPORUK wrote any such articles. Early in 1960 NYCZYPORUK developed a persecution complex and was confined to a sanitarium for a short period. GHYP, fearing that NYCZYPORUK might expose the GHYP-MYAKUSHKO relationship, provided NYCZYPORUK with free board and lodging in his apartment and with spending money. MYAKUSHKO dropped NYCZYPORUK as soon as the latter's mental condition became obvious. In May 1960 the Soviet Embassy advised NYCZYPORUK to repatriate to the USSR as soon as possible, and offered to help locate his family in the USSR. (As you already know, in October 1960 the Soviets sent NYCZYPORUK a letter reporting his family was not in Noginsk. See attachment.)

5. There is a rumor in the Ukrainian emigre colony in Paris that NYCZYPORUK has been a Soviet agent since about 1949. This is based on his close relationship with Josef (aka Osyp) KOZAK since 1949. KOZAK moved to France from Munich in 1946. Until his expulsion in 1950 he was quite active in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals/Bandera (OUN/B) in France. He was ousted from the OUN/B because of his excessive curiosity about OUN/B members and their relatives in the USSR. Subsequently it was learned that KOZAK was in contact with the Soviet Embassy in France. KOZAK is presently residing at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret.

CSCI-3/763,211

Attachment - Copy of two letters

SR/2/CE/RPerkins:bbh 27 December 1960

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/Liaison
1 - CI/OG/SOV
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
1 - 29-6-106/3
1 - 201-289249
1 - 201-277417
1 - SR/2/CE

Based on: OFPA-55524
OFPA-55817

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. OFPA- 55817
TO Chief, WE Attention: Chief, SR INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 2[illegible]-6-10[illegible]/3
FROM Chief of Station, Paris		DATE 7 DEC [illegible]
SUBJECT [illegible] [illegible] A [illegible] Jozef (aka [illegible]) *KOZAK		RE [illegible] — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED For information		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)		

1. KOZAK, a friend of Antin *[illegible] (see O[illegible]PA-55524, 25 November 1960), is a West Ukrainian of about 50 years of age. He arrived in Paris just after World War II and was engaged as the A[illegible]/5 operative in France, since he had been involved in this activity in Munich until 1946. As an intelligent man, gymnasium graduate, and student of political economy at the University of Nancy, KOZAK was able to learn all A[illegible] secrets.

2. KOZAK came into contact with Antin [illegible] in 1949 and they became fast friends. Ivan *[illegible] is convinced that [illegible] was already then a Soviet agent and made contact with KOZAK on HIS instructions. When [illegible] and others noticed that KOZAK frequently made critical remarks about A[illegible] activity, displayed excessive curiosity about various A[illegible] members and their relations in the USSR, they became suspicious of him. He was removed from his job and strictly isolated from A[illegible] activity in 1950. Then the suspicions were borne out when it was learned that KOZAK had contact with the Soviet Embassy. He has subsequently maintained his contact with [illegible].

3. KOZAK is now living at 26 rue Gaston Jaillon, Vesines Chalette, Loiret, where there is a rather large Ukrainian colony.

Wallace N. HAVEDON

6 December 1960

Distribution:

- 3 - SR
- 2 - WE

FORM 53	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

705

94-6-106/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 5 DECEMBER 1960

TO: PARIS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SR 6

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, EE 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	0
2	2	5	3
3		6	

6 DEC 60 23 39Z

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT50208
OUT 50208

TO PARI INFO CITE DIR 15201

15201

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

RE: PARI 2579 (IN 49970)*

1. ODENVY REPORTS NO FILE INFO GNYP NYCZYPORUK AND POHORILIW. ODENVY INVESTIGATING POHORILIW AND REQUESTS ANY DETAILS WE CAN DEVELOP.

2. ONLY ACTION FOR PARI NOW REPORT DETAILS DELIVERY LETTER TO NYCZYPORUK AND UNWEAVE NAME TRACES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SINCE EGTA 15927 REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

WE/3
SR/COP/CE
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

C/SR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

498

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ~~PARIS~~

ACTION : SR 6

INFO : ~~TSD 4~~, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	2	4	
2	2	5	3
3		6	

DEC 2 1958Z 60
ACTION CHANGE

ROUTINE

IN 49970A PARI 2579

TO INFO CITE

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

CS COMMENT: ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM TSD TO SR BY DR REID TSD EXT 2922 IN COORDINATION WITH RITA PERKINS, SR DIV EXT 8757.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 349
30 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

Parkins
Rall

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

NOV 30 1750Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 49970

DIR CITE PARI 2579

LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. EGTA 15927

B. PARI 2453 (IN 45709)**

C. FRAN 7388 (IN 45202)

1. FACSIMILE PASSED TO DOGMA FOR DELIVERY ADDRESSEE.

2. SINCE REF A REPORTS SW DEFINITELY PRESENT PHILADELPHIA LETTER, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FURTHER PARI ACTION IF ANY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENTS: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**STATED NO FURTHER TESTING REQUIRED. REQUESTED POUCH ALL LETTERS PARI.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FBI doc.
22 Nov. 1960 (Wash.)
RE: Semen Pohoriliw
DBF 63039

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
EGTA 15927

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief of Station, Paris
Attn: James B. WINTERHALTER

INFO
Chief, EE   Chief, WE,   Chief, SR
Chief, KURIOT

FROM
Chief of Station, Germany

DATE
22 Nov 60

SUBJECT
AQUATIC / REDWOOD / Operational
Transmittal of SW examination Report

ACTION REQUIRED

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCES

A. OFPA 55220, 4 Nov 60
B. EGTA 15911, 8 Nov 60
C. PARI 2329, 10 Nov 60
D. DIR 11442, 15 Nov 60
E. OFPA 55359, 16 Nov 60
F. PARI 2426, 18 Nov 60

Transmitted herewith as KAPOK attachment number one is a report on the laboratory work done on letters mentioned in the references above.

Elmer E. Hukeed

Elmer E. HUKEED

Attachment: 1
KAPOK Report

Approved: Joseph Q. Klemack
Joseph Q. KLEMACK

Distribution:
3 - Chief of Station, Paris, w/att
~~1 - Chief~~, SR, w/att
1 - Chief, WE, w/att
1 - Chief, EE, wo/att
2 - Chief, KURIOT, w/att

COPY

FORM 10-57 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Attachment to EGTA-15927
dated 22 November 1960

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

REFS: (1) OFPA-55220, 4 November 1960
(2) EGTA-15911, 8 November 1960
(3) FRAN 7328

1. The purpose of this report is summarize the laboratory work done on two letters transmitted to us originally as attachments to Reference #1. For identification purposes in this report we shall refer to the letter postmarked in Philadelphia as Letter #1 and the one postmarked in the USSR as Letter #2.

2. In order to facilitate a better understanding of the results some interpretative data on the tests performed is included.

3. Because of the requirement that the letters be left in good condition to permit their delivery to the addressee, the initial examination consisted of the customary visual and U.V. inspection (including long wave and short wave), and the so-called KEMPOTE test. This latter test has only recently been introduced and constitutes the most formidable test known to us against SW. It was by means of this test that the presence of SW in Letter #1 became apparent. In the application of this test a portion of the SW is actually physically lifted from the item being tested and subsequently through a process involving both chemical and physical reactions, the SW is made visible. The degree of visibility varies from completely negative results to completely legible ones. According to the technician who performed this test the results obtained with Letter #1 were not quite legible, but definite enough to permit checking to establish that they were not due to the visible ink of the letter. The time interval during which this particular detection is observable lasts but a few minutes which the technician used to verify that he was detecting SW and not visible text. By the time he called in his two colleagues the reaction had progressed to the point that only one of these technicians was able to observe the SW. Thus the operator and one other technician saw the SW.

4. At this point the letters were returned to Paris with Reference #2 which reported "definite traces of SW" in Letter #1.

5. Before giving an account of the work done during the second phase of the investigation (i.e., after the letters were returned to the laboratory for development) it should be pointed out that the KEMPOTE test, though an extremely effective test for the detection of SW, does not identify the system involved. Complete development of the secret message under these circumstances would have been almost impossible. The only alternative available to the chemist, and the one he followed in this particular case, is to proceed with a series of chemical tests applied directly to the document under investigation. These tests are applied in sequence, one after the other, each requiring for its execution that a portion of the page be sacrificed. It is therefore important that those tests affording the greatest probability of developing the SW be applied first; thus if and when, a test is found capable of developing the ink, the remainder of the page (i.e., the portion not affected by previous chemical applications) is treated with it.

S E C R E T
K A P O K

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

Page 2 of Attachment to
[illegible]-15927 dated
22 November 1960

SUBJECT: Report on Testing of Letters for SW

[illegible]

6. In testing Letter #1, the chemist chose to apply first those tests known to be effective in developing known RIS inks. (There are, however, RIS inks for which we have no known developer). After such tests were exhausted without yielding any detection the chemist proceeded with the application of other tests. In all a total of 30 different chemical tests were applied. No additional ones were used because no more area was left on the letter to apply them.

7. None of these tests yielded even a trace of SW. These results appear to contradict the report initially sent with Reference #2. They should not be so interpreted. We still believe that Letter #1 contains SW, our failure to develop it notwithstanding.

8. As previously reported, Letter #2 was not treated, for reasons given in Reference #3. A facsimile of Letter #1 was made before undertaking its chemical treatment. The facsimile was check by a competent linguist and authentication specialist and found satisfactory.

9. FYI: Any information concerning the KENFOLD test, including its existence, is considered extremely sensitive and should be so treated.

Elmer E. Hukeed

Elmer E. HUKEED

DESENSITIZED
per CSN [illegible]

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO : Chief of Station, PARIS

INFO : Chief, KURIOT; Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR

FROM : Chief of Station, GERMANY

SUBJECT : /AQUATIC/LCIMPROVE/AEDOGMA
Transmittal of Letters

ACTION REQUIRED

29-6-106/3

DATE 20 November 1960

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

A.	DIR 11442	D.	OFPA-55369	G.	PARI 2330
B.	FRAN 7364	E.	PARI 2426	H.	EGTA-15911
C.	FRAN 7388	F.	PARI 2329	I.	OFPA-55220

Enclosed herewith as Attachment #1 is an envelope containing the two letters of reference "I". A full report on the examination of these letters will follow.

Elmer E. Hukeed
Elmer E. HUKEED

ATTACHMENT:
1 - Envelope Containing
Two Letters

APPROVED: Joseph Q. Klemack
Joseph Q. KLEMACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - COS, Paris, w/attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
~~1~~ - Chief, SR, w/o attachment

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FORM 10-57 (40) 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 339
19 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4*

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2

ce

ROUTING

1	L	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

NOV 19 2226Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 45202

PRITY PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7365

REF A. PARI 2426 (IN 44558) **

B. OFPA 55359

C. EGTA 15911

1. ALL ATTEMPTS DEVELOP SW UNSUCCESSFUL ON PHILDELPHIA POSTMARKED LETTER. FACSIMILE MADE.

2. LETTER POSTMARKED USSR NOT TREATED AS NO TRACE SW FOUND PER REF C. ALSO WOULD INVOLVE REPRODUCING LETTER HEAD. ADVISE IF DESIRE FURTHER SW TESTING.

3. WILL RETURN FACSIMILE PHILDELPHIA ORIGINAL USSR NEXT POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR AQUATIC USED.

**REFERENCE RYBAT.

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

273

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

ROUTING

1	1	4	
2	3	5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : FRANKFURT

ACTION : TSD 4

INFO : EE 4, SR 4, WE 4, S/C 2, CI, CI/OPS, FI

CE

NOV 18 1844Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 44579

OPIM PARI INFO DIR CITE FRAN 7364

AQUATIC REDWOOD

RE OFPA 55369

LETTERS WILL BE DESTROYED IN DEVELOPMENT. WITHHOLDING ACTION PENDING YOUR ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

SINGLE COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

266

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 18 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/TSD 2 (TSD ISSUED TEMPO COPY AT 1345 18 NOV 60)

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/SR 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ce

ROUTING			
1	2	4	L
2	3	5	
3	[illegible]	6	

NOV 18 1821Z 60

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 44558

OPIM FRAN INFO OPIM DIR CITE PARI 2426

SENSITIZED

RYB[illegible] AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

Perkins

REF A. FRAN 7364*

B. DIR 11442 (OUT 92118)

1. REQUEST MKTOPAZ ATTEMPT MAKE FACSMILE OF OVERT TEXT OF LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE. PROCEED DEVELOP ORIGINAL EVEN IF FACSIMILE NOT POSSIBLE OR NOT FULLY SATISFACTORY. CABLE ALL RESULTS OPIM BEFORE POUCHING FACSIMILE.

2. DIR: AGREE COMMENTS REF B. IF NO SW, BELIEVE GOOD CHANCE REASONABLE FACSIMILE WILL PASS CURSORY INSPECTION ADDRESSEE AND PROTECT AEDOGMA. IF SW PRESENT WILL HOLD OFF DELIVERY PENDING HQS ADVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIAT AS OF 1400 18 NOV 60.

6

SINGLE unit

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

OFPA- 55369

COS, Germany MKTOPAZ
Chief, SR
Chief, WE
Chief, EE

29-6-106/3

16 NOV 1960

Chief of Station, Paris

AQUATIC REDWOOD Operational

XX

See Below

A. DIR 11442, 15 November 1960
B. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960

Forwarded herewith are reference B letters for development as per reference A. It is requested that every effort be made to expedite this matter and to have letters back to Paris by return pouch if possible. Please cable progress.

Wallace H. Havedon

15 November 1960

Attached herewith:
2 letters as attached in reference B
Distribution:
2-C/MKTOPAZ Germany
2-C/SR
2-C/WE
2-C/EE

502

ORIG: RITA PERKINS
UNIT: SR/2/CE
EXT: 8757
DATE: 15 NOVEMBER 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	2	4	6
2	2	5	
3		6	

TO: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SR 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 4, WE 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	15 14 16z 60
X	ROUTINE	CABLE SEC
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 92770
OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

SEMEN POBORILIW

1. USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE IN PARIS, FRANCE, REPORTED EARLY NOV 60 THAT DMYTRO GNYP ASKED SOURCE TO DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, WAS NYKYPRZUK AND NYKPORETS, WHO CONFINED MENTAL SANITARIUM NEAR PARIS. GNYP TOLD SOURCE MADE REQUEST BECAUSE BOTH GNYP AND NYCZYPORUK HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH VASILIY MYAKUSHKO, RIS OFFICER WITH UNESCO, WHO WAS CASE OFFICER GRIGORIY DEMYDCZUK UKRAINIAN EMIGRE ARRESTED BY FRENCH AUG 60, SEE YOUR MEMO 12 SEP 60.

2. OUR FIELD OFFICE EXAMINED LETTERS AND FOUND ONE LETTER FROM NOGINSK USSR ADVISING NYCZYPORUK HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK, NO EVIDENCE SECRET WRITING. OTHER LETTER FROM SEMEN POBORILIW OF 613 N 7TH ST. PHILADELPHIA 25 BORE INDICATIONS SECRET WRITING. IF SOURCE ABLE RETAIN LETTER FIELD OFFICE WILL REPRODUCE AND ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP SECRET WRITING.

CONTINUED

5/L 631

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

Page 2

DIR
OUT 92770

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR

3. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION IN OUR FILES ON SEMEN POHORILIW AND ANTIN NYCZYPORUK. DMYTRO GNYP REPORTED IN 1958 MEMBER UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX PARISH COUNCIL IN PARIS. OUR SOURCE MET NYCZYPORUK IN REFUGEE CAMP CA 1945, AND CHARACTERIZES HIM AS BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRAINIAN LITERATURE. SOURCE HEARD RUMORS NYCZYPORUK NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT RECEIVED MONEY FROM SOVIET EMBASSY PARIS, ALSO HAD AGREED MYAKUSHKO ORDER TO RETURN TO USSR ON CONDITION SOVIETS LOCATE HIS FAMILY IN NOGINSK.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING ABOVE PERSONS.

END OF MESSAGE

SR/COP/CE
WE/3
CI/OG/SOV/SAT - draft S.MILER
CI/LG
TSD - by phone Dr. REID
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CI J. Roman
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

RITA PERKINS
SR/2/CE 706
8757
DATE: 14 November 1960

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

O: PARIS FRANKFURT

ROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SR 4

NFO: COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE:
☐ DEFERRED — 23 05z
☒ ROUTINE — CABLE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT92118
92118

O PRTY PARI FRAN — DESENSITIZED — INFO — CITE DIR 11442
11442

RYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REFS: A. PARI 2329 (IN 402964)*
B. PARI 2330 (IN 402966)

HQS OPINION PRIME CONCERN DETERMINING WHETHER IDEN 1 REF B INVOLVED RIS. RECOMMEND MKTOPAZ DEVELOP IF THEY CAN, IF NOT PLS STATE DEGREE CERTAINTY PRESENCE SW. DEPENDING RESULTS, INCLINED BUY TIME WITH REF A PARA 4C, ALTHOUGH ~~XXX [illegible]~~ BELIEVE RIS WILL CONSIDER OP COMPROMISED WHEN AND IF REPORTED LETTERS WERE IN AEDOGMA/1 POSSESSION. WILL ALERT ODENVY HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *STATED (EGTA 15911) LETTER IN WHICH MKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 TO IDEN 2 IN CARE OF IDEN 3.

CI/OPS

SINGLE COPY

SR/COP/CE
WE/3
TSD
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

CSR/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

421

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	B
2	3/2	5	
3		6	

NOV 10 2132Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40966

DESENSITIZED

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2333

KYBAT IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF PARI 2329 (IN 40964)

IDEN 1: PROF SEMEN POHORILIW 613 N. 7TH ST PHILADELPHIA 25

IDEN 2: ANTIN NYCZYPORUK, AKA NYKYPRCZUK AKA NYKYPORETS

IDEN 3: DMYTRO GNYP 211 RUE DE BERCY PARI XII

NO STA TRACES FOR ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

51/6 631

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

419

DATE : 10 NOV 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : C/SR 4

INFO : COP, C/CI, C/CI/OPS, C/FI, C/TSD 2, C/EE 2, C/WE 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	2	4	
2	3/2	5	
3	C	6	

NOV 10 2131Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 40964

DIR INFO FRAN FROB CITE PARI 2329

~~RYBAT~~ IMMEDIATE HANDLING

REDWOOD AQUATIC LCIMPROVE AEDOGMA

REF A. OFPA 55228 not [illegible]

B. EGTA 15911 not [illegible]

1. REF B LETTER IN WHICH NKTOPAZ SUSPECTS SW CONTENT POSTMARKED

Semen Pohorilliw Andrii Nyczyporuk

PHILADELPHIA 6 SEPT FROM IDEN 1 TO IDEN 2 CARE OF IDEN 3. OVERT

Dmytro Mnyp

CONTENT IN UKRANIAN APPARENTLY INNOCUOUS.

Nyczyporuk

2. FYI: IDEN 2 BRILLIANT BUT MENTALLY UNBALANCED PROFESSOR UKRANIAN LITERATURE. AEDOGMA/1 MET IN REFUGEE CAMPS CA 1945. FREQUENTLY HEARD RUMORS HE NEVER HELD REGULAR JOB BUT HAD MONEY ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED BY SOV EMB. IN PARI PUT IN CONTACT WITH VISILIY

Mnyp Nyczyporuk

MYAKUSHKO BY IDEN 3. IN MAY, IDEN 2 ADVISED BY MYAKUSHKO REPATRIATE

Nyczyporuk

USSR IMMEDIATELY. IDEN 2 AGREED ON CONDITION SOV EMB LOCATE HIS

SECRET

FAMILY IN NOGINSK, USSR. OTHER REF B LETTER FROM NOGINSK GORSOVET

nyzyfiruk

ADVISING IDEN 2 HIS WIFE AND DAUGHTER NOT IN NOGINSK.

nyczyfiruk

3. IDEN 2 CURRENTLY IN UNKNOWN MENTAL SANATORIUM NEAR PARI.

UJNYP nyzyfiruk

IDEN 3 RELUCTANT PERSONALLY DELIVER TWO LETTERS TO IDEN 2 SINCE BOTH

RIS offcr

HAD HAD CONTACT WITH NYAKUSHKO, WHO DISAPPEARED AFTER DEMYDCZUK ARREST, REQUESTED AEDOGMA/1 TO VISIT IDEN 3, LEARN ADDRESS SANATORIUM, THEN DELIVER. AEDOGMA/1 CAN DELAY AS LONG AS NECESSARY UNDER PRETEXT LETTERS ALREADY OLD, HE BUSY SETTLING IN NEW APARTMENT.

4. STA SEES FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

A. AEDOGMA/1 DELIVER LETTERS NOW, TRUST RIS NOT LEARN HE COVERTLY OPENED.

INFORM?

B. DEVELOP FOR SW AT HQS OR FRAN, THEN HAVE AEDOGMA/1 INFER

Po Horiliw nyzypiruk

IDENS 1 AND 2 HE HAD NO TIME MAKE TRIP TO SANATORIUM, SIMPLY DROPPED IN MAIL BOX. RIS THEN MIGHT ASSUME UNBOUND INTERCEPTED BECAUSE OF KNOWN INTEREST IN NYAKUSHKO CONTACTS.

C. POSSIBLY REPRODUCE LETTER WITH OR WITHOUT SW.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PRIORITY

DISPA. SYMBOL AND NO
EGTA-15911

TO : Chief of Station, PARIS Attn: James B. WINTERHALTER

INFO : Chief, EE; Chief, WE; Chief, SR; Chief, KURIOT

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

FROM : Chief of Station, GERMANY

DATE
8 November 1960

SUBJECT : AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational
Examination of Letters for Secret Writing

RE. "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

OFPA-55220 dated 4 November 1960

1. The letters transmitted with the above reference have been covertly tested for the presence of secret writing.

2. The letter postmarked from USSR revealed no evidence of secret writing. The letter postmarked Philadelphia had definite traces of secret writing, however, because of the nature of the requirements no attempt was made to develop or identify the secret writing.

3. The letters are herewith returned, sealed, for integration in the mails for sending to the addressee.

Jacob R. OVERBURY

Attachment:

1 - Envelope
Containing Letters

APPROVED: Treaster
for Joseph Q. KLEMACK

DISTRIBUTION:

3 - Chief of Station, PARIS, w/attachment
1 - Chief, EE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, WE, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, SR, w/o attachment
1 - Chief, KURIOT, w/o attachment

201-289249

FORM 10-57 (40) 53b USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
priority

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OFPA- 55220

TO Chief MKTOPAZ Germany
INFO Chief, WE and Chief, SR

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
None

FROM Chief of Station, Paris

DATE

SUBJECT General: AQUATIC/REDWOOD/Operational
Specific: Testing letters for possible secret writing

RE "433" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED See below

REFERENCE(S)

1. KURIOT/Paris requests that the attached letters be examined for secret writing. These letters have been opened by a REDWOOD agent and photographed by the Paris Station. It is possible that these letters contain SW and SW traps.

2. MKTOPAZ technicians should keep in mind that these letters have to be ~~[illegible]~~ returned in the 9 ~~[illegible]~~ November pouch, as these letters have to be integrated in the mail system and sent to the addressee without his knowledge that these letters have been tampered with, on the eleventh or twelfth November. If the work cannot possibly be done the letters should be sealed and returned untested.

James B. Winterhalter

4 November 1960

Attached Herewith:
2-letters for Frankfurt only
Distribution:
3-Germany
2-SR
2-WE
3960 TSD

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.



Сочи. Домик Н. А. Островского

Куда France/ Франция
Poris XII
211 rue de Bergy
Кому M-r Спур Dmytro
Pon. Nykyporuk Antin

Адрес отправителя СССР
г. Ногинск Московской обл.
Горисполком иск 823

23 Sept 60

Encl #2 to OFPA 55524

201-277417

Р. С. Ф. С. Р.
ИСПОЛНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
НОГИНСКОГО ГОРОДСКОГО СОВЕТА ДЕПУТАТОВ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ
Адрес: г. Ногинск, улица III Интернационала, дом 57, тел. 2-20

исх-825 «8» сентября 1960

Исполком Ногинского городского Совета депутатов трудящихся сообщает, что НЕКИПОРЕЦ Агриппина Семеновна в городе Ногинске не проживает.

ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬ ИСПОЛКОМА ГОРСОВЕТА

/В.ПЛЕШЕВ/



S. Po.
631 N. 7th St
phila. 23, pa.
U. S. A.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
SEP 6
530PM
1960 CC

VIA AIR MAIL

Mr Gnyp Dmytro
(Pour Antin)
211, Rue de Bersy
Paris XIIe

FRANCE.

F

[illegible].IX.60

Дорогий Антоне!

Занепокоїв ти мене своїм станом. Що сталося, що ти знову попав на той чортячий курорт? Чи знову щось помітили у тому ділі, чи ти з кимсь посварився, чи що воно там сталося?

Зрозуміло річ, що нема що питати як там є у тому будинку. А все ж, як ти себе, будучи здоровою людиною, почуваєш, як там харчують, поводяться; які є можливості та надії на вихід з чортополоху? В якому стані є тепер твоє здоров'я? Хто та як може тобі помогти?

В цей лист укладаю тобі один зелений на покриття витрат.

Ода знову мене нога дуже турбує. Хоч уже є трохи краще, але рани, що були появилися, ще не погоїлися. Операцій уже багато мав, але біди цілком ніяк не можу позбутися. Як буде далі.

Наталці моїй. Літо тут цього року для Філадельфії було добре, холоднувато .. [illegible] [illegible] раз [illegible] 40-50 років. Вже й осінь надійшла. Тут вона холодна не буває. Холодними є [illegible] та морі, т.з. [illegible] моїй.

Як будеш мати можливість напиши пару слів.

З найкращими [illegible] [illegible] моїй Сем



encl #2 to OFPAJ3524

201-277417

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MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OG/SOV/SAT

From: SR/2/CE/Rita L. Perkins

Subject: Outline Communication re POHORILIW Case

1. OFPA 55220, 4 November 1960
   Request to MKTOPAZ to analyze letters

2. EGTA 15911, 8 November 1960
   MKTOPAZ reply that POHORILIW letter bore definite traces of S/w.

3. PARI 2339, 10 November 1960
   PARI STA informed Hqs of AEDOGMA/1 receipt of letters, relay to MKTOPAZ, latter's reply, and asked for guidance

4. OUT 92770, 16 November 1960
   INFO PARI 2339 relayed to FBI; long delay in informing FBI because cable came in on Thurs evening and not given to c/o until 14 Nov. Dr. REED consulted 14 Nov re the wording "definite traces" and advised could not elaborate until MKTOPAZ report came in.

5. OUT 92118, 14 November 1960 To Pari
   Stated HQS opinion prime concern was to determine if POHORILIW involved RIS and directed PARI to return letters to MKTOPAZ and that the latter attempt to develop the S/W.

6. OFPA 55369, 16 November 1960
   PARI returned letters to MKTOPAZ per para 5 above.

8. 7. PARI 2426, 18 November 1960
   Refed 6 above; directed MKTOPAZ to make foreged copy of POHORILIW letter and then attempt develop S/W

7. 8. FRAN 7364, 18 November 1960
   MKTOPAZ reminds PARI letters will be destroyed in development attempts Holding action till Pari advises.

9. FRAN 7388, 19 Nobember 1960
   MKTOPAZ reports efforts to develop S/W failed.

10. EGTA 15915, 20 November 1960
    MKTOPAZ returned letters to PARI; full report on examination will follow.

11. EGTA 15927, 22 November 1960
    MKTOPAZ report in full. My copy does not indicate date arrived in HQS, but believe c. 1 December; at this time in telephone communication with DR. REED who advised S/W detection made by new sensitive method, that FBI lab aware of this method, and he would be responsible for relaying this info to FBI.

12. DBF 63039, 22 November 1960
Made reference to our teletype; said had no info persons involved; investigating POHORILIW, desired any further info we cld develop.

13. PARI 2579, 30 November 1960
Letters given to AEDOGMA/1 to deliver to NYKZYPORUK; and since POHORILIW letter bore definite S/W trace asked for further guidance

14. OUT 50208, 6 December 1960
Relayed para 12 ODENVY reply; and advised only PARI action for time to report delivery letters to NYCZYPORUK and UNWEAVE traces.

15. OFPA 55817, 7 December 1960
Relayed additional info on NYCZYPORUK - his relationship with Jozef KOZAK.

16. OFPA 55524, December 1960
Transmitted to HQS facsimiles of letters involved, and bio on GNYP and NYCZYPORUK.

17. CSCI 3/763,211, 9 January 1961
relayed info and letters cited para 15 and 16 to FBI

18. PARI 3664, 16 February 1961
Informed HQS letters delivered to NYCZYPORUK 8 or 9 January 61; and that N evidenced no reaction when opened letters; N said considered cured by Doctors and only needs assured domicile to be released; aldo GNYP rumor that N intends to repatriate when released. PARI Sta aksed for guidance.

19. OUT 74849, 17 February 1961
relayed para 18 to FBI and asked if any action PARI would abet their investigation POHORILIW.

20. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned interim reply to Perkins 20 or 21 February that FBI investigation delayed by incorrect address; unfortunately para 3 cable gave address as 613 N 7th whereas letter stated 631 N 7th, cf. para 16 and 17.

21. Mrs. ROMAN telephoned Perkins 27 February 1961 and reported FBI did not have report on S/w aspects. Perkins called Dr. REED and was told that this info had been passed to William Magee, Chief of FBI lab about 1 December 1960 and that Dr. REED in speaking to Mr. Magee had cited our teletype OUT 92770 and the name POHORILIW; further he would call Mr. Magee and remind him of same.

22. I believe Mr. Magee and Dr. REED spoke on the matter 28 February (I was absent from office on 28 Feb and 1 Mar) but I spoke to Dr. Reed on 2 March 1961 and he assured me now remembered matter.

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2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT				VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA
10 TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

Address 615 - N. 9th St. Philadelphia 37, Pennsylvania.

Possibly involved in [illegible] 60

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30. IDN-

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Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel [illegible], Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS✓(in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a 'Blanket' request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (D.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #7-574, ID & [illegible], who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 13 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 25 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

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CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Subconclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2. Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing remarks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

Bruce L. Solie

Attachment:
Summary

BLS:ko

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- C. Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For His Defection in 1964?
- D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His Claimed KGB Career?
- E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit to Western Intelligence?
- F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched by the KGB?

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G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO

A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He Claimed

C. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed

D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not Credible

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V. Annex

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers

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I. INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.

This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

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but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.

There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provide new positive information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.

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II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

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interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately 08 875 KGB officers, 08 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and 08 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.

(3)BR

In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.

The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.

Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

TO : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491

IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been debriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE

The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:

1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;
2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.

The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:

Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.

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Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.

Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.

Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test three:

Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.

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Was SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.

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Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.

To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.

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To the best of your knowledge, was PENKOVSKIY exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy? Yes.

Was there any misleading information in the notes you brought out from the Soviet Union? No.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.

Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.

Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative of deception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph tests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to run the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin exhaustion.

Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following relevant questions were asked on test four:

Did you join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.

Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.

Were you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you only a Captain at this time? Yes.

Were you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March 1953 to May 1955? Yes.

In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.

From January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the Chief of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.

From January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department? Yes.

Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, at the time of the Stalingrad operation against Benson, Mule and Stroud? Yes.

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The following relevant questions were asked on test five:

Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.

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Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.

Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.

Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.

In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.

Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.

Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.

The following relevant questions were asked on test six:

Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.

Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.

Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.

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IRD # 6[illegible]
Page 5

To [illegible] knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHEREPANOV papers? No.

Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.

Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.

Did you personally make an approach to KEYSERS 06 at the Moscow Airport? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:

Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.

Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.

Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.

Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.

Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.

Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.

The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:

While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.

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Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact with [illegible] on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.

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Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.

Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer to defect to the Americans? No.

Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no indications of deception.

CONCLUSION

Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions asked.

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III. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.

It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964?

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence?

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions?

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?

A. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?

A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, associates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other associates of his father and mother.

Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of

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little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad.

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.

Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate.

The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily substantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement concerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization" (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature. An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

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Operational Memo # N-2

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967:

I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine.

My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a student.

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.

In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

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1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.

In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941 I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.

In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in July-August we returned in Moscow.

In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in Leningrad.

All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).

In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3).

In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the international relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.

In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, documents and a uniform).

In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, received a flat in 1947 (St. Mira - former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was dealing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.

Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950 I finished the institute and received a diploma.

I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district).

When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.

In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the reception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation)). SHUBNIAKOV and GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I was said to come next day and began to work.

When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV, was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.

I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943. In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.

In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the 2 section - GUSKOV.

In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion - a senior case officer.

In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.

In August 1956 my father died.

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the 1 section - KOVSHUK).

My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hospitals. In 1960 I was thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of 2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia (counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for "cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.

When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place - the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go to work in eastern Germany.

In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964.

During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-KGB at St. Kiselni.

Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of disarmament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.

B. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?

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B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concerning the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.

It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning

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his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.

Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:

Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section,
First Department, SCD

Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December
1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh
Department, SCD

January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of
Section, First Section, First Department,
SCD

January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section,
Seventh Department, SCD

July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh
Department, SCD

(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief." The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.

It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.

One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.

During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.

C. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962 AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.

On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.

NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.

The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.

If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.

A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.

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NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through 06 David MARK whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.

The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.

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NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)

Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO

Operational Memo # N-4

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich

The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:

What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.

It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.

Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.

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declassification

When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.

In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.

It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.

And now in spite of everything I do not regret.

D. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the information furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964.

In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive determination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to willful deception.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.

Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.

NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.

The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.

E. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.

NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.

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NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.

There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.

Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

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limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately 08 [2,000] KGB officers and [several 08 hundred] KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of 08 [2,000] CIA employees and 08 [several hundred] agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.

Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts

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can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.

NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.

In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.

Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.

A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.

The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.

Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA 06, 08 employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963. NOSENKO identified 06 Herbert HOWARD as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that 06 HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, 06 HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of 06 HOWARD was great enough so that his contract with 29 USIA was not renewed.

If indeed 06 HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by 06 HOWARD; while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if 06 HOWARD was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using 06 HOWARD as intermediary.

NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true

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name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouad Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.

Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, [redacted] information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the British

Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termination by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the microphones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.

If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system on which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 - [illegible] January 1962.

A few general comments in regard to the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section. As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO [illegible] American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.

NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.

Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.

A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).

NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.

It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.

As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive

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intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.

F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY" IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
[illegible]

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.

NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to 06 James STORSBERG. (This was a lie and an interview with 06 STORSBERG with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited 06 LUNT (Horace LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met LUNT.)
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(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund 06 STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met 06 STEVENS and only had seen 06 STEVENS once at a distance.)

(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.

(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)

(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

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he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)

In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to [Johan PREISFREUND]. 06

(b) Both furnished information in regard to a [military code clerk case (James STORSBERG)]. 08, 06

(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

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Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)

(d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(e) Both furnished information in regard to

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[Edmund STEVENS] and [Isaac Henry SHAPIRO]

The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.

The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence

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that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.

The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early 1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.

It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.

NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.

GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an

American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German 08 sounding" name.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH, 06 who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador 06, 08 BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH according to 06 NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD.

(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of 06 James STORSBERG who was actually the subject of a recruitment approach in 1961.

There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that 06 Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. 06 Johan PREISFREUND was used in the 06 STORSBERG operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about 06 PREISFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use 06 PREISFREUND in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use 06 PREISFREUND as an agent.

NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the 06 James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the reporting by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the James 06 STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the 06 James STORSBERG case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG 06 has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by James 06

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STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by 06 STORSBERG himself.

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of 06 Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

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agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department.

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving [BARRETT] 06 in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on [BARRETT] 06 was later given to the First Department and that [BARRETT] 06 was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. [BARRETT] 06, following his return

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to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the 06 [Robert BARRETT] case. It should be noted that 06 [Robert BARRETT] could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow."

(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.

NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.

The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.

The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly [John GARLAND] 06 and the train manifest lists [John GARLAND] 06 and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of [John GARLAND] 06 but claims no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.

NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.

A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."

In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.

It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counteract the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.

Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelligence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even considered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and 06 Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an

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example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.

G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION OR MISSIONS?

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G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.

It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to

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be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.

The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)

The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.

Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:

a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.

c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.

It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.

The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that

NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.

Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.

The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.

H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION?

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H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.

The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.

It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.

The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

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necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.

Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.

It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.

The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.

IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

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COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.

With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.

Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination
of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"

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PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO
AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF
"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)

"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

> "NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who

enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted] Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him."

"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?"

"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:

A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.

B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.

C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.

D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.

E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)

F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.

G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance."

"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."

"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made."

"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself."

"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."

"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable."

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."

A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAIMED

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A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

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1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.

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It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.

The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.

Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

okrenov Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence (on agents), then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Serov Ivan and Ivashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.

~~or [illegible]~~

2. Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1951-1952.

3. Bogdanovskiy - a deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.

4. Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

5. Chikin - in 1950's a colonel, worked in the department of foreign af. irs of the ministry of defence.

6. Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950's worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

7. Demchenko Petr - an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.

8. Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.

9. Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency "Novos".

10. Bulganin Lev N. - in 1950's worked in GRU.

11. Ioliyev - an officer of GRU in 1950's. (or Iyevlev).

12. Keloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.

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13. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations, in 1951 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (knows

14. Kapalkin - a general, in 1940s was a deputy of chief the Military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kapalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife - a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko - Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkin Victor - in 1940s studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.

15. Kabalinov Vladimir - a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

16. Khabarov - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

17. Khaytov S.S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

18. Kon'kov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.

19. Kozlovskiy - in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.

20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1950s)

21. Orekhov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a japanese language.

23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.

24. Shalin - a general, in 1940s was a chief of the Military diplomatic academy; later was a chief of GRU.

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25. Shapeshnikov Igor' - a general, works in GRU; his father was a marshal USSR.

26. Mel'nikov Sergey - a chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.

27. Namgaladze - a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea, 1950-52

28. Sergeyev - an engineer-[illegible]colonel, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).

29. Guslovich - in 1950-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.

30. Grishchunov - an officer of GRU, worked in the USA, last years in India, from where was recalled.

31. Tishkin (or-ov) - a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy intelligence of the ministry of military navy.

32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - works in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.

33. Voronkov Al'bert - an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.

34. Vorontsov Michael - a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-51) ~~[illegible] a doctor of Pacific fleet, works in port Leningrad, as an archives agent of~~ KGB.

35. Yershov - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.

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The 15 of March, 1951 was signed an order about my appointment as an interpreter of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district., where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pivan' went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).



The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in bay Postovaya, here were also Political directory of 7 Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases. The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhildorbat. The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I., a chief of staff - vice-admiral Kasatonov. 6001128

The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Mel'nikov Sergey K., his deputies - captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy

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(agents department), captain of 1 rank Khaytov-Simon S. (information department), captain of 1 rank Kontkov (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).

I was working in the information department. Officers Kabalinov, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant-Verzunkov Albert; major Ershov, captains Orekhov, Rodionov, Pogodin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also sergeants and privates.

In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.

In June-July 1952 a personnel department of the chief directory of navy intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district-former Prussia).

Soviet is a little sity-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.



Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there were a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).

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Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.

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The commander-in-chief of 4 Fleet was admiral Golovko A.G. The chief of my navy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Ryzgantsev. There were officers: Vinogradov, Bulakh, Demchenko and others with sergeants and privates.

Before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transferred from east Germany in Soviet. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another task - a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). - an absolutely monkey business.

In the end of December I took a leave reasoning it with my illness, but having in mind a transference in another place.

In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of KGB (former MVD).

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B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED

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B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.

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in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.

The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.

The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.

The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that

NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.

The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953.

STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).

There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in this issue.

NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist.

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD AS HE CLAIMED

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C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.

This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

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to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.

The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.

The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.

NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American correspondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.

From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related by him.

NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period.

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his assigned functions, but makes no allowance for the uncertain personal status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.

NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.

Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "VOLODINA" and "RANETA" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.

The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER A SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF, THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION

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D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI 06 in June 1956, contact with 06 Sir Allen LANE and 06 Arthur BIRSE in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of 06 Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the recruitment of 06 George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

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06 William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of 06 David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of 06 Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of 06 Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.

06, 06, 06 Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and 06 David TAYLOR were 08 British citizens and the other above-named individuals were 08 United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.

In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against 06 Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. 06 MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.

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NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer, then considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.

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The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including [William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE]. 06, 06, 06, 06, 06 It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and [William TARASKA] 06 were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

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was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.

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NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the [Patrick PRESSMAN] and [Gerald SEVERN] cases; and, the listing of the [Sofia SHATTAUER] case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

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The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether [Gisella HARRIS] was necessarily a Seventh Department case.

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This question seems quite superfluous since [redacted] was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.

On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

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although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counterintelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.

NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.

NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including businessmen, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.

The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen 06 [John SHUBIN] in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since 06 [John SHUBIN] did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no

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assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.

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E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)

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E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)

It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.

The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.

Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.

It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.

According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.

According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.

The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.

In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.

According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.

According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:

(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.

(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.

As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.

Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.

Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.

According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.

Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.

The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.

ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.

ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.

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ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the

First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.

Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.

Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relate it to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.

NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.

It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant.

This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has consciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the affair derive from honest confusion.

Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous interviews leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.

Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).

It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.

In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.

It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.

As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.

NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the

First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.

It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.

In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning this claim.

The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.

In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

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Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems adequate.

The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details concerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that responsibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for reporting on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.

NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.

GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.

It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

The following comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

06

The first case, James STORSBERG, is covered on pages 166 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB effort against STORSBERG. 06

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made to 06 STORSBERG. NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach to 06 STORSBERG.

An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to 06 STORSBERG since 06 STORSBERG dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the

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approach occurred at the "end of 1960."

NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the STORSBERG case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to STORSBERG but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to James KEYSERS (June [illegible], 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against KEYSERS.

When recently reinterviewed, STORSBERG continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.

Joseph MORONE another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by STORSBERG that MORONE was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of MORONE clearly indicates that the events STORSBERG describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.

The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to STORSBERG occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to STORSBERG it is believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning a successful operation against a military code clerk 08 in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to STORSBERG 06 and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.

Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against James KEYSERS 06. As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way reflect against NOSENKO. KEYSERS 06 did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the airport, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to KEYSERS 06.

There are certain statements relative to the KEYSERS 06 case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.

(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard KEYSERS 06 as the replacement for STORSBERG 06. In fact, KEYSERS 06 actually was being trained by STORSBERG 06 as a substitute, not a replacement, even though his primary assignment

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was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that KEYSERS either was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that STORSBERG was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to KEYSERS. The observations of NOSENKO are of interest since KEYSERS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS was to be the eventual replacement of STORSBERG.

(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, KEYSERS acknowledged to his supervisors (Colonel URBAN) his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).

Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of Colonel 06 URBAN reflects that 06 KEYSERS was not informed by 06 URBAN of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."

(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he /NOSENKO/ asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones 06 (KEYSERS failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."

While the official record shows that KEYSERS 06 did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to Colonel 06 URBAN in the office of 06 Colonel URBAN, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before 06 KEYSERS left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that 06 KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach 06 KEYSERS at the airport. In view of the short time between KEYSERS report of receipt 06 of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the 06 KEYSERS matter therefore is considered completely credible.

Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to 06 Matthew ZUJUS, who succeeded 06 James STORSBERG having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for 06 ZUJUS, according to NOSENKO.

The previous summary states (page 183) that 06 ZUJUS, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.

The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph 06 MORONE in 1960, not 06 ZUJUS in 1962.

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Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met 06 MORONE at American House. In a recent interview, 06 MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of 06 MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with 06 ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of 06 ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.

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It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about 06 [ZUJUS] or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of 06 [ZUJUS]. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding 06 [ZUJUS] the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. 06 [ZUJUS], who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about 06 [ZUJUS] after 1 January 1962.

Pages 165 - 169 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to 06 [Paul JENNER]. Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that 06 [Paul JENNER], who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as 06 [JENNER] to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with 06 [JENNER] as a part of a future operation against 06 [JENNER] in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with [JENNER]. 06

NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of [JENNER]. 06

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and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.

06 JENNER after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to 06 JENNER they both said that they might see 06 JENNER in Moscow. About three months later 06 JENNER reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave 06 JENNER a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised 06 JENNER not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter 06 JENNER at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.

Insofar as is known, 06 JENNER has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.

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During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards 06 Paul JENNER. He still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with 06 JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that 06 JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the 08 31 March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.

The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as 06 JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to 06 JENNER, struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to 06 JENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some other person entirely.

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It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as 06 JENNER. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and 06 JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with JENNER, 06 this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the 06 John GARLAND case. 06 GARLAND was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to 06 GARLAND other than to identify him as a code clerk.

GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of 06 GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that

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the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment.

It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no doubt that the (fnu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOSENKO may prove quite useful.

As regards the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND 06 matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case (GARLAND) 06 that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against 06 GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-06 GARLAND matter.

The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists 06 John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. 06 GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as 06 GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.

Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not

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matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-06 GARLAND trip.

The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of 06 GARLAND, he would have been aware of it.

NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.

As with the 06 JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the 06 GARLAND-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of

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this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the JENNER case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.

Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the JENNER case nor those in the GARLAND case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.

Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.

According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as MORONE and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She

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successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.

The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the 06 MORONE case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the 06 MORONE trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the MORONE 06 case.

NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. 06 MORONE and 06 BEGGS departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the 06 MORONE case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

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KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.

The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOSENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.

Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that 06 [MORONE] when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning 06 [MORONE] (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that 06 [MORONE] had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of 06 [MORONE] with "IVANOVA's friends."

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NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has furnished information on a developing operation against Marine guard GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered of using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, MORONE and a Marine guard, possibly GARCIA, had been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary also states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENKO,

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knew of no black market involvement of 06 MORONE with CECCHI. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the 06 Maurice ZWANG case below.

The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that 06 MORONE met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.

A review of official records indicates that 06 MORONE did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.

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A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective: 08, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06

(a) 06 Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against 06 ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on 06 ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of 06 ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although 06 ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination 06 ZWANG reacted when he

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responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.

Second, NOSENKO had not reported that 06 ZWANG was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of 06 ZWANG were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of 06 ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.

(b) 06 John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identified TAYLOR 06 as 08 a State Department code clerk and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of 06 TAYLOR with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit 06 TAYLOR before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might

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endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to James STORSBERG who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.

The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG 06 was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR, 06 the operation against 06 STORSBERG was underway before 06 TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR 06 since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.

(c) 06 Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified 06 Frank DAY as 08 a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about 06 DAY and no operational measures were taken against 06 DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, 06 DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, 08, 06 Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons

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at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.

According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on DAY 06 and 06 BROWN but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.

(d) 06 Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve 06, 08 Robert DWELLY, a code clerk in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion 06 DWELLY was a homosexual.

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There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where 06 [DWELLY] was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.

06 [DWELLY] has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed 06 [DWELLY] as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about [DWELLY] 06 as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.

(e) 06 [Joseph GAFFEY] - NOSENKO has identified 06 [Joseph GAFFEY] as a 08 [code clerk]. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure 06 [GAFFEY] into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.

By way of comment, the previous summary stated that 06 [GAFFEY] arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that 06 [Fred KADERA] had reported that 06 [GAFFEY] had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the American

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House. It was further noted that 06 GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.

As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:

(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.

(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by 06 GAFFEY during interview, 06 GAFFEY also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to 06 GAFFEY, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May

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1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh Department.

The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from microphone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.

A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side handwritten notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active microphones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was characterized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.

During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.

According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical coverage. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.

Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN 06, 06, 06 and Sipe BURTIN 06. The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBIN 06 and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of SMITH 06. NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN 06, 06, 06 and Sipe BURTIN 06 were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.

NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as

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Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that LUBIN is 06 George LUBIN and that 06,06 Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN are correct names, with 06,08 Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. 06 SMITH, at this time, has still not been identified.

In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.

According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.

According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV

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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.

By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.

In the previous summary (pages 240 - 246), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.

As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.

(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.

(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene 03 MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that 03 MAHONEY reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of 03 MAHONEY and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.

(c) 03 Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.

(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

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that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.

It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence.

As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation against 06 STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit 06 KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability," it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dispensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.

As to the 06 STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from 06 MORONE, that it had to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence

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of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the 06 STORSBERG operation had been completed.

As to the 06 KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to 06 KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that 06 KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.

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F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter.

NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.

According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals.

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A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.

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In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews

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has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of 06 JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where 06 JOHNSON stayed. They met 06 JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.

In regard to the 06 William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against 06 JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against 06 JONES and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the 06 JONES case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.

In regard to the 06 Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the 06 BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.

In regard to the 06 Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why 06 BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom 06 BRAUNS met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

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the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that 06 BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that 06 BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made 06 BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since 06 BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that 06 BRAUNS listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. 06 BRAUNS had a

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* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.

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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.

NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO. On the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.

The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:

(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)

(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)

(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.

The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.

As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.

It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of [Edward McGOWAN]. 06 NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with [a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,] 08,24,14-1 and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.

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Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclusion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explanation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed information concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961.

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:

(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.

(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:

(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.

(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.

(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.

G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964

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G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and 06 Herbert HOWARD who actually was a 29 USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.

The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows.

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(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.

(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Department since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.

(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.

According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD] 06 case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually

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learned of the name when the First Section, First Department, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of 06 [HOWARD].

In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and 06 [Herbert HOWARD] were the only successful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.

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ANNEX

The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex "B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex "A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers."

Attachments:
  Annex A
  Annex B
  Annex C

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ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

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ANNEX B

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT

Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of 49 08 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49 08 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.

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To comment specifically on each of the 08 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 08 40 of the 08 49 cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps 08 four cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all 08 49 of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.

Without citing in detail any of the 08 49 cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:

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(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as well as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.

Certain of the 08 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.

It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 08 49 cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however, that the

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explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the 49 cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.

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ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

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ANNEX C

THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,

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during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.

Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958 - 1960.

Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.

During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.

Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material. However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information," or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.

The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive information" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full consideration. These areas are:

(a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American personnel in the United States Embassy during 1958 - 1960, nor is there any information suggesting the KGB had an American source or American agent in the Embassy during that period of time.

(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU officer who had been an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under

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[Department of State cover] assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.

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In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 - 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.

In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically

CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.

The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.

If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.

The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that the latest information in the papers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.

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06 LANE, Allen - IV, D, 1, 2

LANGELLE, Russell - III, F, 3; IV, E, 8

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06 LUBIN, George - IV, E, 49, 50

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06 MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53

06 MALIA, Martin - IV, D, 2

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06 MARK, David - III, C, 4

06 MATLAW, Ralph - IV, D, 5

06 MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2

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06 MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 13

06 PECHTER, Bernard - IV, D, 5, 6

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POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-7

06 PREISFREUND, Johan - III, F, 5, 11, 12

06 PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5, 7

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06 RUFE, John - IV, D, 5, 6

06 SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - III, F, 10

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(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

[redacted]

06 SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - III, F, 6

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06 SHUBIN, John - IV, D, 11

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06 SMITH, John Discoe - III, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50

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06 STEVENS, Edmund - III, F, 4, 6

06 STORSBERG, James - III, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56

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06 [(WILBY, William Stanley)] - IV, D, 2

WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, C, 4-7

ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)

06 [(ZUJUS, Matthew)] - IV, E, 26-28

06 [(ZWANG, Maurice)] - IV, E, 40-42

TOP SECRET

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP SECRET

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. [redacted] quoted [redacted] to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

a sensitive source

a KGB officer

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive source [redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted] this source, NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter.

a sensitive source According to [redacted], FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] [redacted] Soviet intelligence service,

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad'. "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source [redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [redacted] a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

A sensitive source

Comment: [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent[redacted] identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted]. a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, a sensitive source [redacted] identified an [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, [redacted] have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source [redacted] reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted]. Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KGB officers It appeared quite certain to [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One KGB officer [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

a sensitive source

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

[redacted]

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Top Secret

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. [redacted] A KGB officer expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] a KGB officer [redacted] said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred [redacted] to above.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

([redacted])

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in a response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether [redacted] the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

24 February 1964

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

[redacted]

February-March 1964

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source:

[redacted]: A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6 March [illegible] [redacted]

According to a sensitive [redacted] source, [redacted] (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964
According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source

[redacted] "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said by [redacted] by a sensitive source to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] Another sensitive source identified MEDVEDEV,

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source:
[redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

[redacted]

[redacted]

December 1964

a [redacted] source

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to [redacted] source the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far
source

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] Source later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.)

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]: It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [redacted] the KGB officer on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] the KGB officer attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified [redacted] the KGB officer. NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted]: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. a sensitive source [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966
Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. [redacted] said Source that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's
Comment: [redacted] allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

[redacted]

[redacted]

March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
[redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted], was an important boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom [redacted] talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

Source

Source

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

Source

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in KU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

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The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

February 1967

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The Bona Fides of NOSENKO

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TOP SECRET

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I. INTRODUCTION

This review presents the facts and observations which bear on the bona fides of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

The highlights of NOSENKO's biography, as he has given it to CIA, are as follows: He was born 30 October 1927, the first son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After graduating in 1951 from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where he specialized in international law and the English language, NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intelligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eastern) Fleet and then as a senior translator and political officer at an intelligence unit of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953, immediately following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a junior case officer in the KGB. He was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from 1953 to mid-1955. During this period he was initially responsible for operational activity surrounding American journalists in Moscow and later for operations against U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy. When transferred to the newly organized Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1955, NOSENKO had as his targets visitors to the Soviet Union from the United States and the countries of the British Commonwealth. Having handled a number of successful tourist operations, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the section responsible for operations against American, British, and Canadian nationals. Eighteen months later NOSENKO returned to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January 1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and personally supervised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence target at the time, and against American code clerks, collectively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets. At the ~~end of~~ December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its First Deputy Chief.

From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three years following his defection in February 1964, is a definitive study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information, required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investigation, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his reports, constitutes a large part of the evidence. This review also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, collations with materials from other sources, and opinions by specialists of various kinds. These factual elements are presented without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed.

This review is presented in the following format:

Part II:	A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent debriefings and interrogations.
Part III:	A discussion of the operational circumstances of NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandestine contact with American Intelligence and later for defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the defection.
Part IV:	The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them.
Part V:	The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the KGB, the operations with which he was associated, his travels abroad, the awards and promotions which he received, and other Soviet sources' statements on these points.
Part VI:	NOSENKO's production, especially in counterintelligence matters not discussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized.
Part VII:	Specialists' assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him; by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA case officers who handled him; and by the CIA polygraph operator who tested him.
Part VIII:	Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about the bona fides of NOSENKO.
Part IX:	The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for certain other sources.

There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following:

- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 1961.

sensitive source

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

sensitive source

[redacted]

- Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

[redacted]

[redacted]

source

- [redacted] former [redacted] agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, [redacted]

All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January 1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSENKO's bona fides.

II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. Introduction

From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)

The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Disarmament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Service Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get together for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information, but simply wanted to tell him some things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet delegation to the arms talks.

At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of 1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Although NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and professional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intelligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, nevertheless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA.

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* Another Soviet source, [redacted] has also reported that the KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer; although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a number of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier in the day, that CIA would want more information than the two items which he originally offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later.

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962, always in the same safehouse. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being concerned with the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.

NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within the limits imposed by personal security considerations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA interest had been outlined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA, via an address he was given, when he came to the West again.

C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)

NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later session of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accommodation address announcing his presence. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, varying in length from one and a half to six hours.

D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to the Soviet Union.* Exfiltration plans were then implemented, and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still further: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant tip).

During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were also notified of the CIA plan at this time.

In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a polygraph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a routine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

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* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this cable.

"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.

Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved himself willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.

After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous reports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interrogation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief.

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

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* See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph tests.

NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."

In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his character and personality.

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 1~~4~~3 August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's personal and professional background.

There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English.

III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva

NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962, he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German services.

The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with [redacted] of the [redacted] publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

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*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.

**[redacted] was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with [redacted] and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of [redacted])

According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties." A [redacted] official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.

At his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO described the same incident, in the context of reporting a possible KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: "I decided to try to take this English girl to bed. And this had nothing to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurka [Yuriy GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva] said to me: 'Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have people even in British counterintelligence.'" NOSENKO described the incident as follows:

> "After I had been here a week or two there was a reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me, and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYMBAL) was there. He said to me: 'Yura, it looks to me like you are going to bed with that girl.' I answered: 'What do you mean, Mikhail Stepanovich? She just interests me.' I had already decided to try to get her in bed...But, listen further. After this she used to go to the Disarmament Conferences. Well, to make it short, I asked this girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, not English, and works in an office here. We agreed to meet at a restaurant. I asked my friends which restaurant here is the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restaurant and sat there all evening--all alone. There were just the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is called 'Day and Night' in Russian, 'Jour et Nuit.' We sat there and then she asked me where we could meet again. A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I called again. Again she was out. I called a third time. She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence officer and that I was interested in her for this reason. This, honestly, wasn't so. I had only one thing in mind. She was quite a woman...But the English girl felt that she was being developed. I met three times with her. Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them [her superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently signifying that they terminated the relationship] at once. She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were walking on the quay and I said to her: 'How about going up to your place?' she answered: 'I can't.' 'Why?' I said, 'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.' She answered: 'Is it possible for me to come to you?' I said: 'You can't come to my place. There would be a knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.' So all I could do was have her next to the parapet. But the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I fee sorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Because they--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly, as a human being, I am concerned that they might fire her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one thing."

The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurred at about the same time that NOSENKO established contact with CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove him to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days after NOSENKO approached MARK) [redacted] the permanent representative o[redacted] in Geneva, told his host at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girls from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had come to the [redacted] consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls had told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40, who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by [redacted]. According to the girls, [redacted] said, the two Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americans and had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. The name which [redacted] gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these Soviets "sounded like TISENKOV." From their descriptions, the two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KISLOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night of drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repaying this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate cause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.

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*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.

B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

1. TDY in 1962

When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first time on 10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs "expert" with the Delegation to the disarmament talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO was asked to explain precisely why he had been sent out to Geneva. He replied as follows: "Right now, I came to provide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation... There is a special [KGB] department for delegations, a special one, recently created. And the chief of this department is simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate. He is both chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate so that there will be a person who can be held responsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the directorate [O.M. GRIBANOV] hated to sign all sorts of recommendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or wherever he may be. This happened more than once, and he was summoned before the [CPSU] Central Committee. Therefore, he decided to create a new position. The person holding it is simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning exits [from the USSR]. This was in order to avoid being called on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this department and who signed off...

"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations. Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not a single delegation... With me it happened as follows: I was not planning to go. They told me: 'You are going.' I said: 'I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?' 'No, you are going,' was the reply. 'And what did the chief order?' I asked. The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV when he spoke of the "chief".] said: 'GROMYKO is going this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer, not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department chief.' Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was called in to my chief, my immediate chief, who is concerned with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And I have been here since 10 March."

Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that in addition to his security officer functions in Geneva, he had a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer, NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that SHAKHOV might be an American agent. NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.

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*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had previously served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States, [redacted] SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never had been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad when he was suspected of being an American agent, NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad. "There was no proof, only suspicions," and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states: "GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who supervised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

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attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963. The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that SHAKHOV's face is familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow; and [redacted] identified him as an "employee of the KGB." [redacted], however, [redacted] said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a 'pure diplomat'" and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not engaged in any Soviet intelligence activity at that time.

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*For further particulars on [redacted] see Part VI.D.6.

[redacted]

this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers: A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a [redacted] double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."

NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

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* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a.)

Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.

Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Rezident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.

Question: What about the report?

NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

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*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.

> out measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.] GOLUBEV, formerly of the Fourteenth [Counterintelligence] Department, was in the Soviet Delegation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details. When the officers in the United States decided to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a report on him which said he was liking life in the U.S.--American products, money. He was pictured as not good and, in addition, he was not wanting to work as an agent.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an interpreter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who, the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received his agreement. I had also talked about this with [M.V.] KHLOBUSTOV and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chief of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and [A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, "What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRIBANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, knew anything about it.

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*GOLUBEV was also identified by [redacted] sensitive source as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. According to [redacted] he was one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no record in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO

1. Introduction

NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoyable career in the KGB.

2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give details on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more. He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No...

Case Officer: As you have said, I am an intelligence officer as are you. And I think that we will understand one another.

NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent basis.

Case Officer: Of course.

NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long-term relationship. Understand me. I am now the chief of a section. Before my departure [from Moscow] a decision was being reached--and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a department. Do you understand what this is?

Case Officer: Why are you telling me this?

NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two cases, to receive money for this, and that's all. Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps I will give you something. God knows. But I don't want to do this now. I don't want to and I am not prepared within myself for this... I am giving two interesting cases. The most interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the two most interesting ones. In the first of them ["ANDREY"**], I took no part. In the second [BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.

Case Officer: I want you to understand that these two matters that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to play like children. You know perfectly well that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course I want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business.

NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I know, I will tell. Of course, you yourself understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this.

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*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in Part VI.D.6

When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO had been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal past and his professional career. In this statement he described his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB and generally the functions and operating techniques of the various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk. NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agreement involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the fact that he had already given considerably more:

NOSENKO: I have told you enough for this day, and I will tell you only these two cases which I wanted to tell you, and it is enough for this day.

Case Officer: How do you imagine that this is enough? You know that we work much the same way.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Case Officer: You know what interests us, of course.

NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things. Let's meet one another [again].

Case Officer: Good. But let me say this: What you tell me is your business. I am not going to try to bring any pressure at all...There is no argument about it. I am not going to say: 'Please see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is completely impossible. That's it. No more on that subject.

NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.

Case Officer: All right. Agreed.

NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will come back here in a month or not...I personally don't want to, either, because my wife will be moaning at home. But I am afraid they will make me come, because I know the delegation. I know the circumstances. They may make me come. In that case we can meet.

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*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.

Case Officer: You know that I would not bring any pressure. That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.

Case Officer: That's all right.

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time to think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.

Case Officer: But you knew that when you came. Why did you come to us? Why to the American rezidentura [CIA Station] and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't refuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases.

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent record of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you something. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."

or of the degree of this cooperation was never raised again. At the very start of the second meeting, on 11 June, he said: "I am tortured all the time by a single thought. Everything now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move by your people and it will be the end of me." Although he sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO expressed his primary personal concern as being his own security vis-a-vis the KGB.

b. Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider defection except in circumstances where his personal security would be endangered. His devotion to his wife and children and the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this refusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on another occasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even on a permanent KGB assignment and accompanied by his family.) Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done.

c. Motivation

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money, NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210, and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NOSENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly repeated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his operational funds. The case officer remarked that there must be something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not, in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is premature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams and our industry is at the point of collapse because this reorganization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. And how much does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80. And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

now raising the prices for butter? You know, you feel this internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off on the wrong track. Also, look at the serious situation in Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR. It is very serious. In Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere there they have had floods. These rains are also very serious. It means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here]. Do you understand what is wrong? Faith in the future is being lost. Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me. God knows."

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particular request when NOSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I can't see them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this system. I can see what is being done and what is not being done. Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, 'How much is it possible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my people. How often can you say that things will be good; how often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you understand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Poland, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well, that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand? It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment? I do not believe in what is being done. I do not believe in this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He had a dacha and a state-owned automobile. I have my own Volga [automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We always had a lot of money, especially during the war. A salary of 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000. There was much money. She is a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her possessions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money. Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not money, but this great, great resentment."

14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequities existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people. NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to emphasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had "always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He explained that it was not the technical progress of the United States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of living of the American people. It was rather the openness and directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in Geneva.

Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situation in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total statement on motivation during the 1962 meetings.

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immediate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few opportunities, if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.

Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately, the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA Headquarters.

During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintelligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and recruiting other Soviets.

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Although his impending defection was mentioned, his reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the meantime, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for discussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time. The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NOSENKO confirmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time I will be sick within. And I know that a certain period of time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely unmercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. This is the most basic and most difficult spot of all. And I know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a strong liking for children--not only for my own, but for all children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 February was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not mentioned for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Arriving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been ordered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

> "This decision was made by me, not now, at the moment I write this request, but several years ago. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing more than the average Soviet citizen about the policy of the Soviet government, about the direction which this government has chosen to take, and about the law and order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that

live in this country and work for the welfare of this government."

4. The Letter of July 1964

The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA and later defecting to the United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "everything put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter "to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper.

> "1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the period in the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better.
>
> "2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people,

important specialists in the field of medicine, were brought to such a condition that they condemned themselves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were simply forced to give the evidence which was needed by the investigators. The secret letters on the cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGB about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to look at everything more critically. Already I no longer had faith in all those ideas which for years had been pressed into my head.

"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts to convince them that a new era would arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party was always going to concern itself with the welfare of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all means in this struggle, even microphones (they listened to the conversations of BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and others). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course.

"4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages.

"5. I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV, VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.

"6. The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

"7. The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government.

"8. Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)

"9. My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'unbelievably difficult life' flew immediately out of my head. And that which I met with in my work, the sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others--think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

"10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.

"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.

"12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the leadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel.

"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my delays at work and also when I would be delayed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children.

"14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?

"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in financial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth.

"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I understood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad.

"17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents.

"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV, and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB.

"19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"

D. NOSENKO's Activities in Geneva

1. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pretend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that I am not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come at all, and no one will say a word to me." CIA made no attempt to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the CIA safehouse.

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation.[*] To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of checking on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members, P. F. SHAKHOV,[**] but by the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he received any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him. Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in Geneva.

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

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[*] I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delegation in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO contacted CIA.

[**] SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part III.3.1.

GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands.)

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAVRICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relationship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: 'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to be doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I didn't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with O. M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, by virtue of TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his leaving the impression with GRIBANOV that NOSENKO (who was still in Geneva) had agreed to this action.

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* TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias "ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since 1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief Directorate.

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL, NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Residency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next section), and sometimes the two ate alone. During the 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL on a daily basis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964, once when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for one or two days and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lausanne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSKIY was to pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV, specifically with regard to a night in early June - when NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds, which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962 when NOSENKO squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of income. NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in any event he constituted no threat.

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* MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in order to have operational meetings with agents.

** Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's career in the KGB including his service in the United States.

*** In October 1966 NOSENKO named all the Soviets living at the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.

**** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in Part VI.D.6.

*****See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.

In 1964 NOSENKO confirmed that he had spent much time with KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big, big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Residency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOSENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours, and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his departure, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endangering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went on until past midnight. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have no other demands for his attention except for the visits to the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

E. Timing of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in place until the middle of February. During the week that followed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports indicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs.

At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:

- The desire to get information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access to this information;
- The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**
- The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;
- The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:

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* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the conference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.

** GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several [redacted] sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's defection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.

26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.

28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.

30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.

31 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers**, which he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.

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* From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is no evidence that he visited Switzerland.

** See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.

[redacted]

1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place in the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States.* His case officers confirmed that this was correct.

3 February 1964: NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.

4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

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* [redacted]

** See Part III.F.

authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.

NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central Intelligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.

F. The Recall Telegram

On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964 NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Legal Residency during the day and again in the evening. (He had met with CIA from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSENKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO learned that the coded telegram described above had arrived from Moscow ordering him to return immediately to Moscow to participate in the KGB conference on tourism.

[redacted]

Special intelligence indicates, however, that no cable traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February, the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at 1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was no traffic on 4 February; and the next message passed was a routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)

On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recalled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording.

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

G. Soviet Official Reactions

The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.

9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.

A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to

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* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.

Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.)

13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent." As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

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* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.*

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* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any previous Soviet defection.

Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)



Subject (circa 1963)



Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)

TOP SECRET



Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)



Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)



Subject (February 1964)



Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)

I. Repercussions Within the KGB

1. [redacted] sensitive source

sensitive source

According to [redacted], it was the "unanimous opinion" of the KGB leadership and of KGB officers [redacted] that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several years to come." As a direct result, [redacted], new regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of many officers abroad -- [redacted] -- known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO.*

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in July 1964, [redacted] said that 15 KGB officers had already been fired. Among them were GRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies

sensitive source

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* [redacted]

** See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV.

including one General BANNIK.* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's personal friend and protege, [redacted] stated it had been decided that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans and was therefore ultimately responsible. [redacted] reported further [redacted] that GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGB and the Communist Party immediately after the defection, adding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a summary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which contained enough "compromising material" to prevent such a trip under normal conditions.** [redacted] reported having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security at a military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."*** Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN, Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.****

sensitive source

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* [redacted]

** According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who supported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved. Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had been approved by GRIBANOV.

*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate.

**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly socially and we have often caroused together unofficially... He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together." Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked specifically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially, most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said, was the only other person present on these three occasions; all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow restaurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although [redacted] indicated that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

2. [redacted] source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSENKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to [redacted] One of his handlers informed [redacted] that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.

3. [redacted] source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. [redacted] also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to [redacted] that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK , said [redacted], who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G.KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)

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* MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

4. KGB Handlers of Agents

A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's handling of [redacted], the subject of a lead received from NOSENKO and [redacted] double agent.* [redacted] on 31 March 1964, was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible surveillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family. At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that [redacted] was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and told him that this decision had been made about two months earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection). At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to [redacted] that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO probably could not identify [redacted] as a KGB agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what we [the KGB] are doing in Canada."

Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the defection, JOHNSON said.**

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* See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the [redacted]

** See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.

IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE

A. Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own statements to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a summary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.

B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defection furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the principal source on this topic. He volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These various accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's birth to his alleged entry into the KGB. The first column in the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before and during that interrogation. Most of the information given in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's questioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his statements to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circumstances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
- 4	"I was born in Nikolayev, my father worked as a senior mechanic at a plant and took evening courses. Then he graduated from the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute."	Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934.	Born 1927 in Nikolayev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Institute. Father from simple peasant background, while mother's parents were nobility. (May)	"I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Republic of Soviet Russia."	Born 1927 in Nikolayev, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO and Tamara Georgievna NOSENKO.
		In 1934, at age six, entered the "zero" (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, in Nikolayev.	Entered the "zero" class in Nikolayev in September 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May)	"In September 1934, in Nikolayev, I entered the 'zero' class. My father was already in Leningrad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard."	
- 8	"My father was sent to Leningrad, to the Sudomekh plant, a small plant in Leningrad. He was at the plant for half a year and then became director. This was 1936-1937. Then he was sent to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad as Chief Engineer. He was there less than a year."	Moved to Leningrad in 1935, where father was first appointed chief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several addresses and attended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder NOSENKO was chief engineer of "several enterprises" in Leningrad during	Moved to Leningrad, probably in spring of 1935. Attended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38. (May)	"Shortly thereafter he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my studies, I travelled to Leningrad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the First Class until September 1935 as there were no 'zero' classes in the Leningrad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938."	Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938.

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	1935-1937; became director of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.]			
"In 1938 my father was assigned to Moscow as Deputy Peoples' Commissar. I was only a little boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples' Commissar, later Minister, of the Shipbuilding Industry and remained such until his death in 1956."	NOSENKO's father was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow and NOSENKO entered 10-year school located on Ulitsa Bol'shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press reported that I.I. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar in 1940.]	In 1938 the elder NOSENKO was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol'shaya Polyanka. He completed the Fourth Class in 1938-1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May)	"In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he began to work in the Peoples' Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end of the summer."	
	Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585. Went to Sochi with parents for vacation and was there when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day.	NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Polyanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vacation to Sochi, where the family stayed at a "rest home" of the Council Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while there	"In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the next day."	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		and returned to Moscow the next day by train. (May)		
	Enrolled in Moscow Special Naval School, but studies did not begin in Moscow because of the war and immediate plans to evacuate the school. In September 1941 NOSENKO spent one week digging trenches with a group from the school, and on 10 October he travelled with the rest of the school to Kuybyshev. There he began his studies in the Seventh Class.	Enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev, attended the 1941-42 school year in Kuybyshev. (May)	"In October 1941 my mother and I were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where I completed the Seventh Class in June 1942." [Note: NOSENKO here added a year to his life which he had not mentioned earlier. To accommodate this change he subtracted a year from the time he spent at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. See below.]	**Went to Chelyabinsk from Moscow in 1941, after the start of the war.**
"I studied first in a school of the Navy. There I sailed aboard boats and cutters." [No date given.]	In June 1942 completed the Seventh Class at the Moscow Special Naval School in Kuybyshev. Returned to Moscow in July with about three other boys from the school. Prevailed on father to allow transfer to "real military school" and enrolled in the Leningrad	In summer 1942 returned from Kuybyshev to Moscow on leave. While there somehow learned that Special Naval School to be moved from Kuybyshev to Achinsk, Siberia. Did not want to go so far away from home, so enrolled in Leningrad Naval Prep School, Baku. Spent	"I completed the Seventh Class in Chelyabinsk. In the beginning of the summer of 1942 I moved from Chelyabinsk to Gor'kiy and soon after this returned to Moscow. In Moscow I was accepted in the Special Naval School which in August 1942 was evacuated to Kuybyshev. There	**Was in Gor'kiy for a time in the summer of 1942.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Naval Preparatory School which had been evacuated from Leningrad to Baku. Spent summer vacation at home in Moscow with parents.	summer with parents in Moscow. (May)	I entered the Eighth Class."	
	After 3 1/2 months in Moscow, left by train for Baku with a group of about 30 other students in October. The trip lasted 14 days. Route not recalled. Arriving in Baku joined Prep School and spent about a month in "quarantine." Then assigned to the Ninth Training Company, in the Third Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. [Note: The Moscow-Rostov railroad line was cut by the Germans by this time. The only possible route at this time would have been a long and circuitous one via Tashkent]	Went to Baku by train in October. Trip took two weeks. Spent first four to six months in Baku in "quarantine," which was similar to American bootcamp. Enrolled in the First Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. (May)	[In Kuybyshev; see above entry.]	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took military oath. [Note: NOSENKO was 15 years old at this time, by law too young to take oath. This point stressed in April 1964 interrogations.]	Took military oath at end of "quarantine" period. Oath administered to make boys feel a part of service although too young. Oath taken between 15th and 16th birthdays, i.e., after October 1942 and before November 1943. NOSENKO certain he celebrated 15th birthday in Baku in 1942. (May)	[Studying in Kuybyshev. See above entries.]	
	Completed Third Course (Eighth Class) in June 1943. Took no vacation but spent summer working at the school in Baku. In September 1943 began new school year in the Second Course, equivalent to Ninth Class.	Completed First Course in June and spent summer of 1943 at school. Entered Second Course at the Naval Prep School in Baku in September 1943. (May)	[Completed Eighth Class in Kuybyshev.] "During the summer of 1943 I returned to Moscow on vacation. The Special Naval School was to be evacuated from Kuybyshev to Achinsk and therefore, not wanting to go to Achinsk, I enrolled in the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.	"I took the military oath in Baku. I was 15 years old at the time. This was in 1943." [No month given.]
	Along with 15 or 20 classmates, NOSENKO submitted a collective letter asking to be sent	Since 1942 NOSENKO had had an "obsession" about getting into the war. Students from	"While at the Naval Prep School in Baku, in October 1943, I joined the KOMSOMOL."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	to the front because they had heard that students at the Frunze Higher Naval School had gone. Request caused an uproar and investigations. Permission denied.	the Frunze Higher School had gone to the front in 1942 and some of the older boys at the Prep School went in early 1943. Fired up, NOSENKO and about eight others filed a petition to be allowed to fight. (May)		
	Joined KOMSOMOL.		[See above entry.]	
inning of 1944)	In January, together with classmate Yura RADCHENKO, NOSENKO went to the city military commissariat in Baku to inquire about joining a Marine detachment. They were turned down and thereupon ran away from the Naval Prep School. Travelling by boxcar, the two went to Stantsiya Lazarevskaya via Tbilisi and from there walked to Tuapse in search of the mili-	After receiving a scolding from school authorities for having submitted the petition, NOSENKO and several other boys began to plot to run away to the front. When the time came in early 1944 only one other boy, RADCHENKO, would accompany him. The two slipped out of school, made their way to the railway station, and found a freight train heading toward Tuapse. On arriving in Tuapse they were arrested almost immediately	"I studied in Baku only for half the school year because I ran away from school, home to Moscow, in the beginning of 1944!"	The story about going to or toward the front was a lie, NOSENKO said.

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		tary front. Arriving in Tuapse, they were arrested and were then returned to Baku under guard. In Baku, they managed to escape again before being returned to the Prep School. After hiding a few days at the home of a girlfriend, NOSENKO and RADCHENKO travelled to Moscow by train, using forged documentation obtained by a friend in the Naval Prep School. They were arrested at the Moscow Railroad Station by military police who had been alerted by authorities in Baku. NOSENKO's father bailed him out. [Note: Previous accounts varied widely. NOSENKO originally said he had participated in the battle for Novorossiysk with his entire class from the "Frunze Higher Naval School." This battle actually took place in September 1942. On a later occasion, NOSENKO	at the station, several days later they were returned to Baku where they managed to escape. They then travelled to Moscow using false documents and were arrested at the train station on arrival. (May)		

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June 1962	1965	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	said that he and RADCHENKO saw combat near Tuapse.]			
	Took Ninth Class exams after studying as an "external student" at the Gorniy Institute in Moscow. Passed these and through father's influence was transferred back to the Naval Prep School, which had just moved back to Leningrad from Baku. Travelled to Leningrad to join his class in September.	Did not want to return to Baku as ashamed to face classmates after failure to get to front. Remained at home and attended adult education courses at Gorniy Institute and had special tutors in math and Russian grammar. Finished Ninth Class in spring or summer and travelled in fall to Leningrad to rejoin class in Prep School. (May)	"In Moscow I finished the Ninth Class as an external student at Gorniy Institute and at the end of the summer of 1944... was enrolled in the Naval School in Leningrad and travelled there in the month of August."	
	Studies did not start at once. NOSENKO and others lived in Narva and worked in the woods.	Arriving in Leningrad NOSENKO was assigned to a group made up of stragglers and was sent to the forest near Leningrad to cut wood for the winter supply at the school. Conditions were terrible--the work was hard and the weather was cold, damp, and miserable. (May)		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Studies in Tenth Class of Naval Preparatory School commenced in November 1944.	About three or four days before the boys were to return to Leningrad a car was sent for NOSENKO. He returned to Leningrad to stay in the Hotel Astoria with his father who was visiting with a delegation. After this he went back to school, sometime in November. (May)		
	At the end of April 1945, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party by a jealous young officer and was hospitalized. In the ensuing investigation he protected the real culprit by pretending that he had shot himself accidentally while cleaning a gun. He never saw the officer again.	Sometime in February or March, a female acquaintance of an unknown Navy officer began to flirt with NOSENKO. The officer became angry, drew his gun and shot NOSENKO through the hand. The officer was apologetic, and NOSENKO promised not to report the incident. The wound grew worse, however, and NOSENKO was forced to enter the hospital. He told the doctor that he had accidentally shot himself with a souvenir gun. He was hospitalized for about three weeks. (May)	"In the beginning of 1945 I accidentally shot myself through the hand and spent about a month recuperating in the Navy hospital."	NOSENKO shot himself through the hand. This was absolutely accidental and was not an attempt to avoid military duty. [Note: NOSENKO made this statement in response to a direct question. The question was based on a report from [redacted] source [redacted] that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a "naval college in Leningrad in 1942."]

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
May-June 1944	"I finished the Naval School, then was in the Navy. I fought," (boyeval--presumably in World War II). "In 1945 I was demobilized."	While in the hospital, NOSENKO applied for release from military service. This was assisted by father's friends. After release from the hospital he did not want to return to school. He called his father and then spent a week with friends of the family in Leningrad before getting a room in a dormitory at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. Despite failure to return to the Naval Prep School, NOSENKO was credited with satisfactory completion of the school year (Tenth Class). In June he passed the exams for the Second Course at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum. He then went to the District Military Commissariat and was demobilized. He received his military reserve registration and a certificate of satisfactory completion of	In the hospital NOSENKO decided he could not return to school as he was ashamed of the type of girls he had been with the night of the accident and could not stand the thought of being made an example of by the school KOMSOMOL organization. He left the hospital in civilian clothes and stayed with a friend of his father. He obtained a statement that he had attended the Naval Prep School, which was just a report of his courses and an average of his marks up to that time. As the son of a minister it was then easy for him to enter the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum where, with special tutoring, he was able to complete the Tenth Class in the summer. (May)	"After this [hand shooting] incident I did not want to go back to the school and began to study at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad, in the Second Course, in order to complete the Tenth Class. In May or June 1945, with the help of the Director of the Tekhnikum, I received documentation certifying that I had completed the Second Course which made it possible for me to enter the Institute [of International Relations] and I returned to my parents in Moscow."	

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TE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
		ten year's schooling. [Note: A biographical statement was drawn up on the basis of NOSENKO's statements in January-February 1964 and approved by NOSENKO as correct in February 1964. This statement said that he completed his 10-year education at the Baku school in the spring of 1943 and thereby became eligible to enter a higher educational institution. From 1943 to 1945, the statement continued, NOSENKO attended the Frunze Higher Naval School (a counterpart of Annapolis). After three years there, he decided to leave the Navy, was demobilized and entered the Institute of International Relations. In October 1966, NOSENKO said he had lied about attending Frunze Academy.]			
ly 94	"After the war I went to study at the Institute of International Relations...In 1945 I was demobilized.	NOSENKO decided he did not want to study further at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum and returned to Moscow where he	NOSENKO decided he would like a career in the foreign service and returned to Moscow, where he passed the entrance	"In July 1945 I entered the Institute of International Relations."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	passed the entrance examinations for the Institute of International Relations (IIR). The exam consisted only of a composition, dictation, and an interview.	exams for the IIR. (May)		
	Travelled to Germany with his father who was leading a delegation. For the purpose of the trip only, NOSENKO was issued a uniform and documents showing him to be a senior lieutenant. When he returned to Moscow he continued to pass himself off as an officer who had seen combat in the war and eventually got into trouble at the institute because of this. Began studies in Faculty of International Law and English language in September.	Travelled to East Germany in August 1945 with father's delegation. Given temporary commission as senior lieutenant for the trip. Continued to wear uniform on return, even to classes at the institute. Entered institute on return from Germany and chose to specialize in English language and U.S. area studies for reasons he could not recall. (May)		

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
June 1946		Completed first year at Institute of International Relations.			
eptember 1946		Began second year at IIR.			
June 1947		Completed second year at IIR. Commissioned junior lieutenant in Reserves.	With help of temporary documents used for the trip to Germany, NOSENKO managed to exempt himself from compulsory military training during his first two years at IIR. When it was found that his claims of active duty were false, he was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the Reserves along with his classmates. (May)		In 1947 commissioned a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Did not undergo any military training. After completing second year at the Institute, began to do military translations to avoid military service.
eptember 1947		Began third year at IIR.	In third year at IIR NOSENKO began to specialize in International law. (May)		
Late 1947	[NOSENKO was talk- about his present wife.] "This is my second wife. I was married before... I cannot say that I	While studying at the IIR NOSENKO was dating Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, the daughter of a lieutenant general.	"I was a friend and companion of TELEGINA for some months before her father was arrested in connection with STALIN's campaign	"While I was studying at the Institute, at the end of 1947, I married Augustina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, who was born in 1929"	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
loved her a great deal...The war had just ended. I wanted peace. I wanted a quiet corner. I wanted someone to look after me...and so we became acquainted. We saw each other for about two weeks. Let's get married. I married her. That's all." [Note: NOSENKO did not date this marriage other than to imply it was right after the war; it is included here to place it in the context of later statements.]	TELEGIN was arrested by STALIN, and NOSENKO married Augustina soon afterwards, in about November 1947.	against associates of Marshall ZHUKOV. However, we never planned to marry. After the arrest, however, I decided to marry her in order to show my strength of character. I cannot remember the date of the marriage, which was my first. I think that it happened in 1947, but do not know what season or how long after the arrest of TELEGIN." (Interrogation Protocol Signed in February 1965.)		
18 "One Monday...at 10 o'clock [I came home early from work]. Suddenly I heard--I approached on tietoe--What is this? In my bed, who is lying with my wife? Her older brother. Well, I slammed the door, left, and did not go back. Never went back. That was all.	Broke off marriage after several months when he found his wife in flagrante delicto with her brother. The two were separated, but not divorced, at this time. [Note: As with other dates connected with the TELEGINA marriage, NOSENKO has been imprecise here: in	"One morning--I cannot remember the date or season, but it was in the first half of 1948--I came early and unexpected from my studies at the Institute of International Relations to the apartment of my wife's mother, where I sometimes met my wife, and surprised her in sexual inter-	"I lived with my first wife until 1949."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
Bye bye...Well, you can imagine my horror." [Note: Portions of the tape of this conversation are unreadable. It is clearly implied that this scene took place at NOSENKO's own home.]	April 1964 he said on another occasion that he found his wife with her brother sometime prior to June 1947.]	course with her brother. I walked out without comment. The next day I returned to our apartment where my wife and I continued to live together, although our relationship was strained. I stayed with her because she was pregnant at the time." (Protocol signed February 1965.)		
	Completed third year at IIR.			
"A child was born who might have been mine and who might not have been mine. God knows. There was still no child when I left. Well, I helped out. I sent money. That's all. But I didn't see either her or the child." [Note: NOSENKO provided no date for the above.]		Girl with hare lip and cleft palate born to TELEGINA. NOSENKO decided deformity was due to her incestuous relationship with her brother. Subsequently gave his wife a little money to help support the child, but never considered it his. Marriage cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the apartment. (May)		

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Began fourth year at IIR.			
	Completed fourth year at IIR.			
	Successfully defended his thesis on the subject of "Diplomatic Immunity."			
	Completed English language studies.	NOSENKO was through with courses at the Institute in January 1950 and had already defended his thesis on "Diplomatic Immunity." The last half-year at the Institute was relatively free because the students were given time to prepare for the state exams which were required for graduation. (May)		
	In March or April 1950 NOSENKO was interviewed by the assignments commission of the IIR and was tentatively assigned to the GRU. In May 1950 he went to the	Before taking his final state exams, NOSENKO went before the placement board. Here they talked about his possible assignments and although no definite decision was reached	"In the spring of 1950 before the beginning of the state examinations a personnel placement commission was created at the Institute and I declared to it my	The Placement Commission sent NOSENKO to the MGB where he was told he was not a suitable candidate. The reason was for "little things. I was drunk several times, only an average student, etc."

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	GRU Personnel Department for an interview with Colonel KALOSHIN on the instructions of the chief of the "secret unit" at the IIR.	it was suggested he go into the Navy. After this, but before the state exams, NOSENKO visited a special section of the Navy Ministry to give them special documents for a security check. Although it was not stated, NOSENKO believed he was slated for Navy Intelligence. (May)	wish to work in some sort of military organization. Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section gave me a telephone number and told me to call it. The number was K-6...and I realized that the MGB was interested in me since these numbers belonged to the MGB. I called the number and was told to come to the MGB... the conversation [at the MGB] concerned my biography and my knowledge of the English language.. Nothing was said about where it was intended for me to work....Later the chief of the Institute's special section told me my qualifications were not suitable for the MGB."	**NOSENKO said he did not mention this earlier because his interrogators would not have believed that the MGB first turned him down and they later accepted him in 1953.**

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	Took state exams for completion of the Institute. Passed three of them but flunked Marxism-Leninism. Advised GRU and was told to call back when he had his IIR diploma. He was allowed to take the Navy physical exam, which lasted three days.	After failing the state exam NOSENKO had someone in his father's office call the GRU to see what he should do. It turned out that the security check would take a long time and NOSENKO was told to check back after he had passed the exam. (May)	"During the summer of 1950, while the state exams were underway, I began to process for entry into the Navy GRU. My processing took place through Colonel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the GRU Personnel Department. Up until March 1951 I repeatedly visited the Ministry of the Navy... I filled out questionaires in duplicate, wrote two autobiographies and submitted copies of my diploma." [Note: NOSENKO in his 1966 autobiography did not mention having failed the exam in Marxism-Leninism.]	
"I finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950, after this I worked in the GRU of the Navy."	Passed exams on second try and received diploma of completion of IIR. Contacted Colonel KALOSHIN of GRU Personnel. Submitted	NOSENKO checked back with GRU Personnel after passing his exams. (May)	"I submitted copies of my diploma to GRU Personnel." [See above entry.] NOSENKO processing for GRU entry.	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	diploma, transcript of grades, and other necessary papers. [Note: Previously in 1964 NOSENKO stated that he graduated from the IIR, which at that time was a four-year course, in mid-1949 and "just loafed around" for a year. He later changed the completion date to late 1949 or early 1950. Then he changed this to say that he failed exams in 1949 and had been forced to wait an entire year before he could retake them in 1950. Finally he gave the version above.]			
"When they offered me [assignments in] Moscow, Leningrad and the Far East I took the Far East so that nobody could say that Yuriy NOSENKO took advan-	Entered on active duty with the Navy on 17-19 September 1950, when he received orders transferring him from a junior lieutenant in the Reserves to a junior	In the autumn of 1950 received orders transferring him from the Reserve to active duty. Offered a choice of duty posts, NOSENKO chose to go to the Far East "in order to prove he	[See above entries.] Still processing for GRU entry.	

TOP SECRET

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
tage of his father's position."	lieutenant on active duty. Received orders to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh Far East Fleet. [Note: In an earlier version, NOSENKO said he entered the GRU in 1949, having finished the Institute of International Relations the same year.]	was now ready to make a man of himself...in the country God forgot." (May)		
"I worked in the field of information in the Far East, in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan...in the field of information--radio intercept, etc. All your movements, when you moved vessels to Chemul'po, Korea, the Korean operation...we knew all the ships there because you talked on the air. You transmitted. We knew each division, its name, its number, everything...	On approximately 1 October 1950 NOSENKO left Moscow by train for the Far East. The trip to Bukhta Postovaya (near Sovetskaya Gavan), where his unit was stationed, took nine or ten days. Assigned to work in the Information Section under Captain Second Rank KHAYTOV. Duties included translations from American Naval literature and making summaries of American Navy OB in	Arriving at his duty station NOSENKO was assigned to the Information Section. He liked the work and did a good job despite the rigorous conditions. During his service here he received special mention as an outstanding officer. There were 300 to 350 intercept operators there. NOSENKO and other officers analyzed the take as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok. (May)	[See above entries] Still processing for GRU entry.	

June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
and we reported this to Moscow. I don't know what was done with this information after this. So, we were concerned with information."	Far East. There was a unit involved in radio intercept of American Naval targets in Korean area, but NOSENKO was not personally concerned with this work.			
	Promoted to the rank of lieutenant.	After about seven months in the Far East, NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant. This was April 1951. Normally one is promoted from junior lieutenant to lieutenant only after a year's service in grade. This can be reduced to six months in the Far East. (May)	"On 12 March 1951 two orders were issued by the Naval Ministry; one concerning my enlistment in the Navy and the other assigning me as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet (Military Unit 70176). The following day at KALOSHIN's instructions I reported to the Moscow City Military Commission where I was issued my passport and my voyenyy bilet. The Commission also issued me temporary duty orders and travel documents. On 16 or 17 March I left Moscow for my duty post. I arrived at Bukhta Postovaya at the end of March and	"I lied when I said I started in the GRU in 1950. It was really March 1951." [Note: No effort was made to obtain a reason for this lie or to question NOSENKO on its implications for his earlier statements about promotions, etc.] "I was on active duty in Sovetskaya Gavan--Bukhta Postovaya from 1951 to 1953."

DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
				began work in the Information Department of the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet.	
End of 1951		NOSENKO involved in apprentice work in the Agent-Intelligence Section at Bukhta Postovaya. This involved going out to sea on subchasers to pick up and drop off, and conducting meetings with agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin. NOSENKO did not actually meet agents, but was merely along to learn how they were picked up at sea.			
January-February 1952		Filed action by mail to divorce TELEGINA in Moscow court and published intention notice in a local Sovetskaya Gavan newspaper in January or February.	NOSENKO was planning to divorce his wife before he left Moscow but did not start proceedings because he was afraid she would bring charges against him in the KOMSOMOL. Sometime in late 1951 or early 1952 he published his notice		

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			of intent in a local newspaper and forwarded the necessary papers to Moscow. (May)		
April 1952		Left Bukhta Postovaya and returned to Moscow on leave. Arrived at the end of April and reported to KALOSHIN. Requested transfer from the Far East.	On 1 May 1952 NOSENKO's father was to observe his 50th birthday. NOSENKO's two-year tour in the Far East would not be up until October or November 1952, and he was not entitled to any leave until it was ended. However, his section chief was very understanding and arranged for him to leave in April so that he could be in Moscow for the birthday celebration. NOSENKO flew to Khabarovsk where he had a "two-day drunken orgy" with another Naval officer. He then continued on to Moscow in time for the May Day and birthday celebrations. The next day he reported to the Navy Ministry and was told to re-	"At the end of April 1952 I left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April."	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
"I worked in the ar East until 1952, hen suddenly I Fell ill. In the Far East. It was this way. Then I arrived in Moscow, I went to the doctor. They began to x-ray me. Clear lungs, absolutely. They examined me one day, two days, three days. Clear, absolutely clear. Then by accident, right under my collarbone, a small, small, little spot was found and it turned out to be on a blood vessel. It turned out to be at a very early stage. At that time they had just discovered streptomycin and I was confined at the Hertzen Sanitorium near Moscow. I was there for two months. I felt fine but they	NOSENKO was on leave during May and June 1952 and lived during this time at the home of his parents at No. 4 Ulitsa Gor'kogo in Moscow. He received one month leave for his 1951 service in the Far East and the other for his 1952 service there. [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having had tuberculosis during any interrogations or statements in 1964. According to his 1966 statements, he spent only one year, March 1951 to April 1952, in the Far East.]	turn at the end of his leave for reassignment. (May) NOSENKO was on leave during May and June. No decision had been reached with regard to whether he would return to Sovetskaya Gavan or not and he was "at the disposal" of the Naval Ministry during this period. After the leave, NOSENKO waited another month until his assignment was decided upon. (May) [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having been hospitalized in this period.]	"While on leave I became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in a sanitorium near Moscow." [Note: In another statement, written a week earlier, NOSENKO said that in Sovetskaya Gavan "drunkeness and the severe conditions had their effect on my health and led to an outbreak of tuberculosis in May 1952."]	NOSENKO confirmed that he was at the Herzen Sanitorium during this period and said that as a result of his illness he was "coughing up a half a glass of blood at a time." His treatment consisted of shots of streptomycin.

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DATE	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was carried on their books until 1957. It was nothing."				
Mid-1952	"They offered me the opportunity to study in the Military-Diplomatic Academy. I went and took a look at the courses they had to offer--Marxism, Philosophy, History, and so on. Well, what did I need this for? I already knew this. I said: 'No, I won't go.'"		During the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Navy espionage school, and to Germany, but turned all of them down for various reasons. He rejected the opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy because he had already had 96 per cent of the courses in the Institute. (May)		NOSENKO was offered an opportunity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but did not want to go. Besides, he failed the physical examinations for entrance when sugar was discovered in his faeces. NOSENKO drank too much.
July-August 1952	"After my illness and after the Far East I received orders to the Baltic. On the Baltic there is a city which was formerly	Following his regular leave NOSENKO was ordered by the Navy to proceed to Berlin and Rostok, but refused to go	NOSENKO received orders to Sovetsk and arrived there in late August or early September 1952. In Sovetsk NOSENKO was assigned a political	"During the month of July the Personnel Department of the GRU reached a decision concerning the place of my	NOSENKO was shown a map of Kaliningradskaya Oblast showing Primorsk to be where he said Sovetsk should be located. NOSENKO continued to

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
the German city of Pillau and is now called Primorsk." There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts." Suitable candidates were selected from among the crews of ships. They were then formed into groups of three men each and were trained in radio-operation, demolition, etc. After this the groups split up and their members went their separate ways. In case of war the groups were to be reformed and sent behind enemy lines on sabotage and intelligence missions. [Note: The former German city of Pillau is now called Baltiysk, not Primorsk; the latter is a small village nearby.]	when he learned that the Naval Intelligence Points (MRP's) in Germany were closing down and that his final assignment was not definite. He then took more leave (unauthorized) until about 29 July when he left for Baltiysk and reported for duty to the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth Baltic Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk, a small town near Baltiysk. There he prepared area training materials for and carried supplies to agents, but did not actually deal with or train them directly. [Note: Previously during the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO said that he had received training near Moscow and was then sent to Rostok and Sassnitz before	officer's job and helped train sailors for wartime agent missions. His main task was to prepare the training plan for the sailors, to instruct them in subjects such as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR," and generally to see to their needs. (May)	further assignment and I was ordered to the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth Baltic Fleet Intelligence Unit in Sovetsk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Sovetsk is located before you go out on the spit of land where Baltiysk (Pillau) stands. I arrived in Sovetsk in August 1952 and began to work in the Naval Intelligence Unit as a senior translator. Shortly before my arrival the Intelligence Point had been moved from Rostok, in Germany, to Sovetsk. [Note: It was clear from NOSENKO's earlier descriptions that the "Sovetsk" which NOSENKO described is, in fact, Primorsk, a small village on the coast. The only place called Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast	say that he was assigned to Sovetsk in the summer of 1952. He was asked why, as a son of a minister and as a patient under treatment for tuberculosis, he was not assigned to the Black Sea or somewhere else with a healthy climate. NOSENKO explained that there were no positions available "elsewhere."

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	going to Baltiysk/Sovetsk. He then said this was a lie and gave the version above. The reason for the lie, NOSENKO said, was that he knew we "wouldn't believe the truth"--that he had successfully refused the assignment to Germany.]		is about 40 kilometers inland, and NOSENKO himself had said in 1962 that he served in Primorsk.] [redacted]	
2 No date given for divorce.	In mid-August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow from the Baltic for 7 to 10 days to complete divorce proceedings he had initiated in the Far East. This was not counted as leave, but as official business. He then returned to Sovetsk.	"Sometime after my return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan, I carried through with my intention to divorce. My divorce was noted in my Officer's Booklet and nowhere else. I turned this document in to the KGB Personnel office when I began my KGB service and since then have had no record of the divorce. I continued to pay alimony to Augustina TELEGINA (one quarter of my salary) until I left the USSR in		

	June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
			1964. She kept the name NOSENKO even after she remarried." [Note: This is placed here for comparison with his 1964 statement.]*		
	[See next entry.]	NOSENKO did not like his work in Sovetsk [sic] and wanted to return to Moscow to arrange for a transfer. He asked for annual leave which the unit commander refused to give him as he had none due. NOSENKO thereupon went to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk and with his help obtained leave because of the elder NOSENKO's influential position. NOSENKO then returned to Moscow shortly before New Year's.	NOSENKO disliked his job as a political officer and was disdainful of the low educational level of those he was called upon to train, as well as of the "whole stupid" program. He remained in Sovetsk only until December 1952, when he obtained leave to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. (May)	"I remained in Sovetsk a short time and returned to Moscow at the end of the year [1952] with the aim of changing my place of work... While in Sovetsk I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service." [Note: See 1965 entry for the spring of 1951.]	
ry- 953	"In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from Primorsk]. This was '53, in the beginning.	"I arrived back in Moscow in December 1952, just before New Year's. I had vacation for the month of Janu-	In January NOSENKO and his parents went to visit the family of General KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov. NO-	"On 1 January 1953 my parents and I were guests at the dacha of KOBULOV who at that time was working in GUSIMZ in East Ber-	

6[illegible]: NOSENKO was divorced from TELEGINA during his leave before going to Sovetsk (May and June 1952).

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June 1962	-964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
in January. Well I came on leave to Moscow. I was there at my father's dacha, near Moscow. KOBULOV came to visit us at the dacha...a conversation started. He asked: 'What are you doing?' I answered: 'I am working in the GRU...I came home on leave.' KOBULOV asked: 'How do you like your work?' I said: 'Speaking frankly, I don't." 'Well,' he said, 'you better come work with us....Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' KOBULOV was First Deputy to BERIA and a great friend of my father's."	ary. At the end of January, at the end of my vacation I went back to GRU Personnel and saw KALOSHIN...I told him I did not like my job, all that typing, and he said: 'Well, wait a while. Look around.' I was at the disposal of the Personnel Department all of February. I had no work at all. And since I was not working, I did not get any pay for this month. During this vacation I was living with my father and mother on Gor'kiy Street."	SENKO and KOBULOV discussed NOSENKO's dissatisfaction with his Sovetsk assignment and KOBULOV suggested the possibility of NOSENKO getting into State Security work. (May)	lin with the WISMUTH company. This was the first time I met KOBULOV; I don't remember how the conversation came around to me, but I told KOBULOV about my work in the Naval GRU and my desire to change my place of work. He promised to find me a place in the MGB, but this promise was empty conversation."	
y- 53 ed	"After the New Year I went to this sanitorium, Kubinka, 75 or 78 kilometers from Moscow, and I was there January	"I met my [second] wife [Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA] for the first time at the Herzen "House of Rest," one of the	"From the end of January to the middle of March I was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow where I had been	

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June 1962	1964	1965	April 1966	October 1966
	and part of February. After that I was home." [Note: This statement was made on 8 April. As no attempt was made to reconcile it with the previous entry, made on 6 April, and because NOSENKO offered no explanation, both are included here.]	"Houses of Rest" of the Council of Ministers. I was resting there for several days. She was there too. It's about 65-70 kilometers from Moscow, not far from Kubinka. I was waiting for my status to be resolved...I didn't want to stay alone at the dacha [his father's]. She was studying philology in the third course at Moscow State University. She had been seriously ill with tuberculosis when she was 17 and still required treatments." (Interrogation, 12 February 1965) [Note: NOSENKO's explanation of his presence at the "House of Rest" was given in response to the specific question: "What were you doing there?"]*	during the summer of 1952. Here I became acquainted with my second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.	

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ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it. I tried Dyatkino and met her.

* See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were established in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku. There is no indication that any of

C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or "rest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtaining their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.* KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Nikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Committee (GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defection.**

NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second marriage. According to his passport, the eldest of these, Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954 and the other, Tamara, on 13 July 1958.*** NOSENKO in 1962 displayed to his CIA handlers a photograph of the two girls and their mother and made a particular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

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* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various apartments he occupied in Moscow. He said that, from the time of his marriage to TELEGINA until his departure for his first GRU post in the Far East, he lived in an apartment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment, he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through. Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the Far East in 1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow phone book; he said that this would have required a visit to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms, etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone anyway. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defection in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.

** The GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.

*** NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth as 1957. In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, however, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO, a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past, drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2. Venereal Disease

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956 involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treatment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time his wife was pregnant with their first child. The CIA psychologist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the following summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incident, which are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interrogation):

"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. She called him, and he spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow for a private doctor who treated such diseases, but could not find one. Some of his friends at the office suggested a central clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a communicable disease. He was forced to give the false document. He came back for treatment about three times and was ordered to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left a note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safehouse so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request for information got into the hands of the section which made the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However, the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and moved into the administrative room near the office to serve his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed. A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of official documents was placed in his record. This was also a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result in expulsion. He made the statement that he had been punished for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply for party membership; the incident was brought up repeatedly in Komsomol meetings and even in party meetings (after he was accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion commission.)"

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954. In 1954, he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source, NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute of International Affairs.

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried out by the newly-created Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned the rank of Senior Case Officer. I developed a pride in myself, (a feeling) that I can do things. You know how it is. When a person feels that he can, that he has some support, then he works much better. He has more initiative and so forth."

3. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it without much thought, mainly because all his friends were joining. When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953, he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents. According to NOSENKO, "Immediately after this incident the Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a "strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.

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* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruitment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that he had received an award for his participation in this operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted this and said that he never received any KGB award for the BURGI or any other operation.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time, the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to leave the organization with a clean record. He was not permitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however. NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows: "Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness, to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate for some 'public service' (obshchestvenniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year, NOSENKO "made good" by running errands and performing other such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year; full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the distinction of being the only employee of the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREISFREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the "little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL, NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters.

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* According to the Statutes (Ustav) of the Komsomol in effect in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965, NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

** See Part V.F.9.

***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a.

D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) include a reference to one of the daughters as his "double" and two other personal letters in his possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.

- A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**

- A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV, said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and was "famous for his character."

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's.) sensitive source

- [redacted] reported NOSENKO is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. [redacted] sensitive source [redacted] [redacted] from conversations with fellow officers [redacted] He has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.

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* FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.

sensitive source

- [redacted] said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent a short time, perhaps a year, in the Information Department at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO had been a "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," [redacted] continued, and he was discharged from the GRU. However, his father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) in Moscow.

- The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was "closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families, and homes" and that his "father who died several years ago was an important official in the Party and state organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters.

source

- [redacted] said she heard from her KGB friend V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She could not explain this connection other than to say that all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)

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INCLUSIVE DATES: (PART V)

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NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

A. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel (or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank of captain). An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department (from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955, and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Department (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958, Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in 1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR in connection with operations, inspections, and conferences. Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958; he was one of 70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order of the Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a medal for completing ten years of "irreproachable service."* Thus, according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel, and many honors.

NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, including some in which he had a personal role, either as a participant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which he learned through his professional and personal contacts. Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this part of the paper. All are included in Part VI. The text of the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided on the same topics.

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* NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got any awards at all in the KGB.

B. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a KGB staff officer. His statements on these two topics are presented under separate headings below.

1. Date of Entry

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry in the month of March 1953.* In summary, he has said the beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952 (statement of 6 April 1964), March 1953 with no day (statements of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or 17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953 (statement of 26 July 1965), and 2 April 1953 (statement of 17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on 27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952. His statements about the entry date are arranged in chronological order below.

9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): "In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow /from duty with the GRU in Primorsk/. This was 1953, in the beginning, in January. Well, I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying at my father's dacha there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I came to Moscow on leave and, while I was home near Moscow at my father's dacha, /General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV** dropped in on us. A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working in the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counterintelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I

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* Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and when he first learned of the KGB agent "ANDREY"; the lead to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962 (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY" case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.

** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did not return to a position of authority until a few days after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD Minister on 9 or 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining concern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2. for further references to KOBULOV.

consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents...in '53, in March, in March '53. STALIN had just died."*

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*STALIN died on 5 March 1953.

31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952," NOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from the GRU to the KGB. He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964, NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography. He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 period one year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was discussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then studied and approved an official statement on his biography (for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates, including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies, NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during the same month had a conversation with KGB personnel about getting a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of 1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU... Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe it was 5, I don't know.

Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Early September 1952?

NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the first few days was sitting in a room with KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615. Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined... 7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been reading cases, studying forms; I worked like that (during) December, January, February... No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death, after the reorganization. And at the end of March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**

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* This would place the entry date some time at the beginning of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S. military attaches in Moscow.

8 April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning continued:

Question: Which is the truth?

NOSENKO: After the death of STALIN, in March 1953. Why did I say it /the other dates/? You see, I finished the Institute in 1949. Then I defended my diploma, and then came the State exams. I passed all the exams except one - "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," the philosophy. And I had to take all the examinations over again. All of them. I took four, passed three, flunked one. Just the same, all four had to be taken over again. For that reason I graduated, or I received the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although officially I graduated in 1949. This is an unpleasant thing and I did not want to mention it. And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This was the only thing. And then, after I said it, I did not want to correct it. To twist around again. And the mistake I made was about my work in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but 1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV accepted me right away. STALIN was still not dead and I was already accepted. March 1953, about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray, near Baltiysk. I had worked in the Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to Moscow was to get out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB. It was 13 or 15 March 1953."

17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): "From August 1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April 1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Directorate of the MGB-KGB."

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In the middle of March /1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBULOV... I worked in the First Section, First /American/ Department from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had lied, he replied: "There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on to explain that because he was only an average student and because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

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* Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in 1951, a year later.

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950. Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought CIA would not have believed him if he reported that he was first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was questioned at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a result, he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no official forms. His various statements are presented in chronological order below.

9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great friend of my father. He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counterintelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents."

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* See Part V.B.1. for further references to KOBULOV.

8 April 1964: "It was February [1953]. KOBULOV was in February - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: 'O.K., George. I'll help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember exactly. Yes. It was in February. I saw him at the cottage... By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks... KOBULOV was in February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to come along to the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday. KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short TDY.* My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing. I told him 'nothing,' that I was at the disposal of the [GRU] Personnel Department. I said: 'I don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get no satisfaction from the work.' He said: 'Well, you should be utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel - them look you over?' I told him: 'All right.' He called, and he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went... [NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB building, his receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGB Personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that. He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.' That's all." NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel officer] would come down and take the papers from me. I went, brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by the personnel people once more. And at that time another officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to me, because I was told to go to talk to ROZHENKO [first name unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days - evidently he did not forget - I got a call. It was Bogdan Zakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five minutes. I waited there almost two hours. The assistant came out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very, very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember it as though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He said: 'Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich.' He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American

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* NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow.

Department... Then he asked /A. M./ GORBATENKO to come in. He was filling in for the Chief of the First Department... He took me to his office... Well, they decided to put me in the First /U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yevgeniy KOZLOV, the Chief of the Section. He came in and said: 'Well, hello, Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around.' He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."

15 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB questionnaire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several additional phone calls to the KGB personnel office and described his second visit there to talk to ROZHENKO: "At the end of February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Chief of Section, of the Personnel Section. So we had a talk. It was the same thing again. He said: 'Tell me about yourself.' But he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your /military/ district. So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with KOBULOV, saying that it took place at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov, where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953. NOSENKO continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February. They said it was State Security calling and that I was to report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my education, service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (biographic form). I filled these out at home. The next day I called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself. They said they would call me. I did nothing from January to March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO. The official order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or 15th of March 1953.

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document continued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the Ministry of Shipbuilding in March 1953. I had come from the sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work. In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would concern himself with the question of my entry into the KGB. The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow. In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

called me at home and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUBNYAKOV... SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appointing me a case officer in the First Section of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief of the First Department, Lieutenant Colonel GORBATENKO, and introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV said I would take over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/ TORMOZOV and suggested that I begin work the same day. I was accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD."

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

Depending upon which date he has given for entering the KGB, NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, working on American correspondents living in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Military Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the same section until being transferred in June 1955. His activities, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral information on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section are reviewed below.

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO was taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, according to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room 615. "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY.*

During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country and would not contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of the file] is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on these seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember." He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

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* NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY and with [Andrew J.] STEIGER... For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB.

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMOREs and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting, etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the U.S. Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as convenient to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: "My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow. He told CIA at that time that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information."

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10 to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his agentura down as follows:

Target	Agents
Eddie GILMORE	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's wife.
Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver.
Henry SHAPIRO	Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROs in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in Moscow.)
Harrison SALISBURY	Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SERGEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second, "VOLODINK," was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINK." When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK," whom he continued to handle in his work with military attaches.

c. Information from Other Sources

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow, his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by GOLITSYN) appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers.*

The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKLOV had earlier identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied, and it had been long assumed that WHITNEY too had reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspondent in Moscow.

GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's information was received. He served in Moscow for 12 years, from 1941 to 1953, and is married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each, in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife (see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism by other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet articles. When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles took on an anti-Soviet tone.

NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two American correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.2. under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the U.S. Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Military Attache work. This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American) Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my table (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

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* See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV Papers.

- 18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the First Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Military Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Military Attaches being the microphones in their offices.**

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside."

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identified Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV: NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed in the Embassy as well as on the security measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Military Attaches.

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* The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior attache, none were targetted against individual members of the attache office.

** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the biographic information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

b. NOSENKO's Targets

As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches stationed in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence. He has used this statement about his main task (identical with that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S. Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 until his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one reason he knows relatively little about the personal backgrounds of his various targets during this period--the emphasis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action against them, coupled with information from other sources, is discussed in the following paragraphs.

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*Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NOSENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURANOV. When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over later in the year to KHRENOV.

**This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in alphabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. Questioned about these officers in a different context, NOSENKO indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said he was responsible for work against the military attache office). VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was attached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible for this group.

(i) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA; the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NOSENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember. NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges. In August 1954 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released.

(ii) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKELSON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant information on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

(iii) RICHARDS

NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working against

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*NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.

RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.

According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him. (This incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her contacts with RICHARDS.)* RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the following section on FELCHLIN.

(iv) FELCHLIN

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.

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* See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN, to whom she also taught Russian.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted American attaches in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. McKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time.*

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.)

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* Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source. (NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.)

(v) BENSON

NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared *persona non grata*. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

(vi) STROUD

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared *persona non grata* along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.

CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared *persona non grata* on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was, in fact, a CIA cooptee.)

(vii) MULE

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germeny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape.* BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army.

CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.

(viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE, and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV, then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M. GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew with other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad. The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the persona non grata action.

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*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO. (See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)

According to information from other sources, the equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO shrugged, but offered no comment.

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*The [redacted] source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA in 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Military Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that he might have contributed information leading to the three Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being declared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.

(ix) CARDELLA

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him.

CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Embassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information concerning him is available.

(x) VAN LAETHEM

NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, he had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Moscow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.** He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S. Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be only a TDY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive nature of his business there. He was project officer for the entire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to review the operations including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above).

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* Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB, he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his position as Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor would presumably be available to NOSENKO.

** Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of "ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES. Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that it was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no access to such information.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

By his account NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department was created to operate with and against foreign travellers in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

NOSENKO has described his personal and direct participation in the section's activities as consisting of:

-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents targetted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.

-Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time.

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent participation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1957: A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated, was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to

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*These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.

**This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.

NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in general [without specific assignments]. I send them out to look on their own. I give them money and tell them to go out. 'Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. Look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are a couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to do anything desired, either active or passive, anything. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say: 'Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat']. After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives: 'What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a conversation begins: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out?..."

When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they could not be used further since they had become too well known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these two agents participated was during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been unable to tell where they lived in Moscow, their family situation, or other such details. He said that he never met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never met either of them alone, without the other being present.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least six Americans, not reported on by NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S. graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet institutions, and the last Charles W. THAYER, the well-known diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO or other sources took place during the period from April to November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of compromising information obtained in 1959.**

3. Other Soviet Agents

The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning."

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with questions about somebody or something." NOSENKO began to collect information on these individuals and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied: Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another, some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14. NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents, all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during 1955. These were:

-Larissa SOBOROVA: An Inturist interpreter and one of the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired) and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation against [redacted] in the summer of 1957.* NOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involvement with two other tourists, one American and the other British, during 1957-1959. NOSENKO mentioned at one point that he "even told Larissa about his last name."

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*See Part V.F.4

**See Part V.D.4.m.

- Vladimir MUROMTSEV: KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV," recruited in 1955. (NOSENKO has also said that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958.") MUROMTSEV was called into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an interpreter for Syrian students studying there. During this period, his file was held by the local KGB in Central Asia. Later he returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief Directorate.

- Nikolay ROGOV: KGB cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955. ROGOV had formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central office of *Inturist* which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the Soviet Union.

- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, an *Inturist* interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photograph on 6 February 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it; when he was given her name, however, he said that this was a Second Chief Directorate agent, on whom Boris BELITSKIY had reported to CIA.** NOSENKO's only other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He said: "So, for example, I had this SOBOROVA, then I had MUROMTSEV. I recruited him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAROVA. Well, anyway, during this short period, during 1955 until the end of '55, I had about eight people, all of them translators from *Inturist*." NOSENKO therefore said he handled SHULGINA and implied that he recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R. LEVINE, who arrived in the Soviet Union in July 1955. Although there is no evidence that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to recruit LEVINE in November 1955. She has travelled abroad twice, the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an interpreter at the Brussels Fair in the summer of 1958. As NOSENKO indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a close friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved, probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation, in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament. BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva in the spring of 1962.)

- Tamara KUNGAROVA: *Inturist* interpreter recruited in 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was transferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

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* [redacted] are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGB controlled BELITSKIY, a source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.).

Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise operation against an American professor, which did not reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two lived in England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO believed there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965.

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the Tourist Department. These included the following:

-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow. NOSENKO did not indicate how DMITRIYEV was used operationally or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British target.

-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally recruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic area and his previous handlers there notified the Center, suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital. NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Directorate which, NOSENKO believed, "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that."

-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about 1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist students from foreign countries. There she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her, but she was turned over to him by I.A. KONSTANTINOV, a Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language school of the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet officials and delegates from America, England,, and Greece, she also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with a small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,

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*NIELSEN was, in fact, in contact with CIA at the time (see Part VI.D.2.).

D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there. RYTOVA is married to a man who works in one of the military offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

-Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym "OKSANA." She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor, Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO. She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according to NOSENKO.

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. Nine of these operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of the remaining five operations which did not end with a recruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of these operations does not always agree with that from other sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as follows: 1955 - one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 - two; and 1959 - seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual compromise.

These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below in the approximate order in which the cases began. For each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of the results of CIA investigations. The description of the BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons indicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information: Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations with MALIA. After NOSENKO had arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a

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*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA having relations. With MALIA insisting on the lights being turned off, however, it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red photographic equipment, NOSENKO said) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious," and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, has visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. In 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and clandestinely brought to the West literature for publishing abroad. In December 1963 MALIA was the subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches." MALIA had been in periodic contact with CIA in recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have had no involvements with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union at any time. He made a similar statement to [redacted] in October 1963. MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information about him.

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)

NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962 and despite his stated fear for his own security and his determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a letter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one month's pay for this recruitment, but in 1966 he retracted this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his personal and professional life: It was with this successful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counter-intelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of the personal and general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO, it is discussed in detail here:

In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might some day work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NOSENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning BURGI. (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet BURGI at this point, however.

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was acquired, whether it was a KGB or Inturist vehicle, who the driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB, or other details.

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*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists until 1960--only "collections of materials."

In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) KASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand, the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students might become future specialists on Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. Before he left BURGI was briefed on these arrangements, which called for a first meeting in the New York Public Library. BURGI was given a recognition signal and a KGB cryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with him.

About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had arrived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURGI appeared and the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution in Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation. In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award was for his longevity of service.

Investigation Results: BURGI was first interviewed on 22 November 1957 concerning his recruitment by the KGB. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* In August 1965, NOSENKO denied meeting [illegible] in Moscow.

BURGI then continued to describe the remainder of his stay in Kiev (generally agreeing with NOSENKO's account).

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Approach to [redacted] (1957)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 to [redacted], [redacted] on the basis of [redacted]nterest in continuing his commercial activities in the USSR. Originally the responsible case officer had been A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and [redacted] was known to speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little." When asked why a German-speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case,' and that was all." After being rebuffed by [redacted] NOSENKO saw him several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon [redacted] return to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

Investigation Results: [redacted] was interviewed by CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.)

[redacted] continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West Germany and was recently reported to have negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact is [redacted]

d. [redacted]

[redacted]

e. Recruitment of (fnu) [redacted] **)

NOSENKO's Information: In 1957 or 1958 [redacted] visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV, made [redacted] acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. It had somehow been determined that [redacted] had a fondness for girls. NOSENKO therefore presented himself to him, using the name "SMIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told [redacted] that he could find women for him. A party was arranged, with a KGB agent as [redacted] date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and [redacted] had sexual relations with the female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and [redacted] saw one another the next day, [redacted] announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he want to sell on the black market. NOSENKO offered to arrange the sale and took [redacted] to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, NOSENKO asked [redacted] to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia station, [redacted] was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Tourist Department, under threat of imprisonment. (It was DUBAS who had had the photographs taken the previous evening.) There was no further contact with [redacted] after he left the USSR, however, because on his return to Oslo he published an article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them."

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*See Part V.D.8 for more discussion of this point.

**This incident is described more fully in Part III.A.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of the American Express Company in Salt Lake City, based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen. The Soviet told HARRIS that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with the Soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake City, but the case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

[redacted]

g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned to be the responsible case officer. During an earlier trip to the USSR, the KGB had learned, KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman. NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Kiev, where she was living in 1957 or 1958, in order to compromise KRAFT. Although his wife was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. NOSENKO was present at the time supervising the operation. Photographs were taken. Then militiamen broke into the room, finding KRAFT and the woman in the nude; a recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and after this his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally been the responsibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance, however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the deputy chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not considered to be sufficiently experienced and his English was not good.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, (fnu) PERELETOV. Using the name "Mr. SERGEYEV," NOSENKO alone recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

i. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a [redacted] subject*, [redacted] in a room of the Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after [redacted] had been compromised by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.). The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with [redacted] subsequently.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

j. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: By himself NOSENKO recruited [redacted] in the Nova Moskovskaya (now the Bucharest) Hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after [redacted] had been compromised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, his homosexual agents (see Part V.D.2.). [redacted] is a [redacted] citizen and his case was also turned over to TARABRIN.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

k. Recruitment of [redacted] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of [redacted]

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* NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them to me."

[redacted]

[redacted] whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLFOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.B.2.).

Investigation Results: [redacted]

1. Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: When Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959, NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, as part of their general assignment to become acquainted with homosexuals (see Part V.B.2.), accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had previously been the responsibility of A.A. VELITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of operational contact from Odessa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring this homosexual to Uzhgorod; he did not recall his name, but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

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* NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the [redacted] man, but had asked NOSENKO's section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, is not known to have participated in operations stemming from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.

[redacted]

m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not a homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development--in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and has described the occasion in detail. There had been much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they were forced to spend waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he "had to provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they were a big help" to him in this operation. The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions on KHRUSHCHEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOSENKO reported, however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. This recruitment was carried out by another component of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do with it.**)

Investigation Results: [redacted]

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* See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for additional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.

** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had ostensibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

n. Compromise of WILLERFORD

NOSENKO's Information: Frederick WILLERFORD was BARRETT's roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the local KGB organization for the city of Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, without knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising material had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO's department and the local KGB unit then made a joint request for operational approval to approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.

Investigation Results: [redacted]

Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's description of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage of its compromising photography of BARRETT and WILLERFORD, and information provided by the earlier defector, GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise during 1959 and 1960. According to information he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case officer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had photographs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no question about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular photographs but decided that an approach on their basis would be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these photographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda repercussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed publicly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences between this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition, whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.*

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* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, [redacted] told [redacted] that both the KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer specializing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU personnel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and [redacted] indicated that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"--was employed. When questioned on this subject [redacted] reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of one section of this committee) and to which the GRU [redacted] contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to disrupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence; and to recruit. [redacted] and that the GRU did not recruit any Americans at the Exhibition. [redacted]

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-1963)

As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959 personally took part in the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers after transferring to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two Embassy officials in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever handled as a reporting source, FRIPPEL [redacted] The accounts of this operation by NOSENKO and FRIPPEL differ in several details, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with no significant information. These two versions are presented separately below.

a. NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first mentioned FRIPPEL during the third meeting in Geneva in 1962 while discussing KGB successes in Moscow: "There was another agent [KGB cryptonym] 'ARTUR.' He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. But he also has the cryptonym 'ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express Company [main office in New York City]. A new department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything. He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means and launched into a long description of the methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.

NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:

- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.

- NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment to the following: "In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."

- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations.

- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line.*

- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment."

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

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* See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. Embassy Section.

CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something." In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or a deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Directorate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they must have two or three. They will have important agents or those in leading positions."

- NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were "satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.*

- NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned. he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of importance," and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.*

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* NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify intelligence affiliation.

- On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers** in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN, dated February 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV of the U.S. Embassy Section: "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... Ironically, one day as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHMEDOVA [the fact of] "ARTUR's" affiliation with American Intelligence."*** NOSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEREPANOV papers was FRIPPEL, but he said he "could not say" whether FRIPPEL had any affiliation with American Intelligence.

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* NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.

** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was under consideration for operational use in Moscow, and in this connection background inquiries about him were submitted to the FBI. [redacted]

While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly before his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent in several operations against French-speaking foreigners in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing FRIPPEL.

- [illegible] interrogation in [illegible] 1966 [illegible] referring to his [illegible] [illegible] contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO suggested for the first time that "If you had [illegible], you could have made it work in Moscow. You [illegible] sent him to my apartment. It was possible, even with tourists."*

b. FRIPPEL's Information

FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur," was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1959 to 3 January 1961. [redacted]

[redacted]

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* See Part III.C., which describes NOSENKO's emphatic refusal during the 1962 meetings to have any contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union. During the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that in 1962 he had "absolutely no idea" concerning the possibility of CIA using FRIPPEL as an intermediary for contact inside the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* FRIPPEL also had social contact with NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN (see Part V.E.3.d.). NOSENKO said they did not know one another. There is no indication that FRIPPEL was questioned on these contacts by NOSENKO and/or CHELNOKOV.

** In February 1965 NOSENKO denied that this meeting took place. Department of State records show that in November 1961 FRIPPEL applied for a new passport indicating that he intended to depart the United States in February 1962 aboard the "Olympia" for a cruise which would visit the Soviet Union.

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to request permission to board the vessel.

** In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having told FRIPPEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk.

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB and should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet Intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications of primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during interviews on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet Intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to information on KGB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives exclusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was Deputy Chief of the KGB Section" dealing with American tourists at that time. He said he knew of later developments because of his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from mid-1962 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's information, as given to CIA and the FBI, is that the KGB determined as early as 16 October 1959, when OSWALD made his first declaration of intent to remain in the USSR, that he was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" of him entirely. According to NOSENKO, the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD and made no attempt to recruit or even to debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Minsk or during his trip to Mexico shortly before killing the President.

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* For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper.

** Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.

a. Statements to the FBI

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

** OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the hospital. From his diary, the Warren Commission concluded he received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis about 4 January 1960, approximately the time he moved to Minsk.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was a poor shot from V.V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been told this while visiting Minsk.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. Statements to CIA

On the basis of the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the similar information which he had previously provided CIA, further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 27 July 1964. New and explanatory information received during these debriefings is presented below.

(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD

Until OSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated routinely by the KGB. When OSWALD made his request, this was reported immediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this moment that the KGB began to pay attention to him. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the materials and reports immediately available it was decided that something was not quite normal about OSWALD, and the KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSWALD's suicide attempt supported the Tourist Department's feeling that it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also reported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know him." Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country." The Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed their hands" of this matter.

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* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.

** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizenship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed.

There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S. Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a very little person and also it is felt that he is not normal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU was not informed of OSWALD's defection. Neither was any attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assessment of abnormality.

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD

The KGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to register marriage. In fact the KGB did not know that she was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and checks at her place of employment. The people where she lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine," an uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it considered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the United States, "because she would tell him and also she would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment of the type of person she was."

(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union. He replied: "The Soviet law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was easy in this case because OSWALD was already living and working in the Soviet Union. It would be more difficult, of course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet citizens."* Asked whether it is not unusually difficult for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO explained: "In this case it was easier because Marina was already married to a foreigner." NOSENKO was next asked what office or level of the Government or Party must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage to OSWALD. He described the procedure as follows: "They would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply to register their marriage. [There] they will be told that they will have to wait a week or two while they think it over to be sure they want to get married. During this period the necessary checks are conducted. The Regional Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call the Minsk KGB. The Minsk KGB said that it is all right for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection. But it is the law that allows them to be married. There are no formal approvals necessary."

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* NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable person.

Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected this statement to say that, while local authorities make the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought, the MInistry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP).

(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit to Mexico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew only that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come to the Soviet Union. The Mexico City Legal Residency of the KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting information; this was the first that the KGB First Chief Directorate had heard of OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad), thereupon phoned V.K. ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A.G. KOVALENKO to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given the background on OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-enter the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN to relay this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

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* By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had already written the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet mails, of his desire to return to the United States. The letter, dated 5 February 1961, was mailed from Minsk and was received by the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February. The OSWALDs were married on 30 April 1961.

(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the Assassination

When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "It is a very unfortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet Union." (NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the assassination, but only that the fact of OSWALD's "defection" placed the USSR under probably unfounded suspicion.) NOSENKO's immediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct. This is putting a false color to it. I am your friend. I am completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and against the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way. I say this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD] and that everything should have been said to him or that he should have been in any way worked on, in any was [by the KGB] --God forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President. To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and even sent several workers down there to investigate--not trusting official papers. Even without specific orders I had to make a complete investigation on my end of things because this is a serious matter when the head of a government is assassinated... If you want to know, it would be a greater advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any intelligence service there have been assassinations of one kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization, not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by the assassination--to think that this should happen in the twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful government in the world."

7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations

a. Information from NOSENKO

In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, which had theretofore concerned itself with operational activity against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief of the first of these new sections.

NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960. His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said, on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers in the department.*

On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department operations prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this subject on 25 February 1965):

> "Operations against tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were 'caught in the act' of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do

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* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor could he recall any examples of the material he included in it, what the paper said about CIA tourist operations, or what other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as an operational cover in this period. He did remember, however, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism.

not know any details concerning the operational activity which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing.*

"I know of no case in which an American tourist was definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during this period.

"I do not know of any such American tourists who were CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this period.

"In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections. Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating literature. Although various operational measures were taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage search) and the use of KGB agents, none of these tourists received real operational development."

b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as MI-6) on the subject of "legal-travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed at the meetings. This summary spelled out CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist operations, including agent-spotting techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A copy of the document as well, presumably, as other British documents relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE, who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of 1959.

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* One Robert Alan McGUIRE, a former staff employee of CIA, travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR. While in the Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals, American girls, and assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of these details, appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said McGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.

A second joint meeting on this same subject took place in Washington, D.C., from 20 to 23 April 1960, and BLAKE mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of the sessions.*

c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document

When he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought with him a top secret KGB document dealing with the use by American Intelligence of tourists for espionage inside the Soviet Union and with KGB countermeasures.** This study relied heavily upon the two documents supplied to the KGB by BLAKE, and although it purports to be a study of American tourist operations during 1960, it cites as examples many cases which occurred in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents detected by the KGB are named and their operational roles accurately described. (As noted above, NOSENKO said that McGUIRE/McGOWAN was the only American definitely determined to have intelligence connections prior to 1960.) Cited below are excerpts from the GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA records and investigations.

The document states: "McGOWAN, Edward, born 1935, passing himself off as a post-graduate student of Harvard University, in Moscow, after a thorough check [for surveillance] sent an espionage letter containing secret writing. Further investigation of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of time on Russian and Polish questions at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, which is a branch of CIA. He came to the USSR at the expense of ROCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who are financing the so-called 'Research' work on Russia."

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* This occurred at a time that NOSENKO claims to have been in the American Department. During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, when NOSENKO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was asked about BLAKE. He replied only that BLAKE had been "an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Directorate" and that he was not nearly as valuable as the Canadian Ambassador [redacted] or "the other Englishman" (VASSALL). At the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE after his defection, NOSENKO replied: "Who's BLAKE?" During the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO was first asked whether the KGB had received any significant information concerning the use of tourism as operational cover by CIA during 1960 and 1961, when he was in the American Department, and was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained documentary information on this subject from an agent source. He replied "no" to both questions.

** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In content it is similar to the general description of the document which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in 1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that it had been written in the Tourist Department.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

During his trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958, McGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. On 20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel in Moscow, McGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude SAMUALS, fellow Americans, and the three of them were photographed by a surveillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he was incompatible with his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having her replaced. His new guide was V.L. ARTEMOV, who assured that McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit.**

The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal interest towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of shipbuilding factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this 'pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing secret writing. The letter contained the coordinates of a dead-drop for an American agent."

SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and he believed that he was under complete KGB coverage while there. He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB observation equipment. On one occasion SIMARD was introduced to and went out to dinner with Svetlana N. IVANOVA, who attempted to cultivate him.*** The characterization of his activities in the GOLITSYN document is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned SIMARD.

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says: "An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingrad he was detained while he was photographing a military factory."

GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-mailing mission and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Between midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the mailings, but GRAY detected surveillance daily thereafter until he left Kiev and later in Yalta. He was approached on 17 November in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made similar overtures. GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial installations and was released after interrogation and confiscation of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY. [redacted]

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* NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as Inturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which included a CIA officer. On one occasion, when this officer returned unexpectedly to his hotel from the theater to which ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section of the Tourist Department.

*** NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, but has not described her earlier activities against tourists.

The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian at a college of Yale University, when in Odessa with a group of tourists--American students--separated himself from the group and travelled through the city alone. In a notebook which was lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the fact that he utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. In Moscow he selected routes which were used to check and disdiscover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is the chief interpreter of the State Department, servicing Soviet delegations in the USA."

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in the Correspondents Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.* FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did not recognize his name.

Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandestine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960.

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* KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON case to which NOSENKO provided the lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

[redacted]

8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)

NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union occurred in the fall of 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained on 8 April 1964, it is necessary for a security officer to accompany any such delegation, and the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting Second Chief Directorate officers for this purpose, telephoned K.A. DUBAS, Chief of the Tourist Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 50 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only staff security officer making this trip.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog. This time he accompanied a delegation of 11 or 12 boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; nobody in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any members of the delegation.

NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias in London with the use of the same name with the British subjects [redacted] and [redacted] (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO explained this situation as follows: "With [redacted] I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to. And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people [[redacted]] came back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question [redacted] especially as one who used to work in intelligence.. [redacted] would say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' So, of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [redacted]' That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

[redacted]

of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [redacted].' That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable."

[redacted]

E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department)

1. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962.* This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counterintelligence target in the Soviet Union," the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and recruitment.

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees; and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants, including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assimilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, and they read and tried to exploit materials from telephone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with each; annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964 trip to Geneva.

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* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed particular emphasis on his activities during the period January 1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special importance to U.S. Government security.

** See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been variously dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.

Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained on 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier operated against members of delegations and various other categories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January 1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot was eliminated.* With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned over all of his agents to another officer in the section named TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to TIMOFEYEV and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S. Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**

2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. This /the transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more important there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed /had proven/ myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And here, in the American Department, I must show /prove/ myself with new people." NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed misgivings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSENKO why he had been selected for this position or who had recommended him for it.

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* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section, however; as before, it continued to be responsible for operations against tourists from the United States, England, and Canada.

** FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in 1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied: "Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the section (these are discussed in detail below). NOSENKO said that he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section, V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that because former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no one in the section had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January 1960. Asked who had been LANGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO replied: "LANGELLE was handled by several people - by [A.S.] MALYUGIN, then after that by [V.A.] KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

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* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of work against the Americans has been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly at this time. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter, there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's designation of KOVSHUK as Chief of the First (U.S. Embassy) Section in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.c.2. concerning a recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American Department officer, without indicating his position. The only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; GOLITSYN said that at this time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN identified Vladimir PETROV as Chief of the "section concerned with the American Embassy of the American Department of the Second Directorate" in 1960. NOSENKO had identified PETROV as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department, which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union.

PIN. Yes. LANGELLE was before my time." Two months later, on 24 June 1964, NOSENKO stated: "In 1959 and possibly in 1958, Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy Chief."* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for the first time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been the case officer for LANGELLE. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKHVALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he was no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E. 3.f.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operations with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties himself. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but he did not do so. These are summarized below:

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said: "The Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN. He is an Armenian. His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A. ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September 1961 as a member of a trade delegation. NOSENKO immediately recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he did not know this person's last name, but that his first name and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. When shown the last name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but provided no further information concerning his true identity or earlier service in the American Department.

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the names of KGB officers who had received various awards for their service. He wrote: "The following got either the Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star, I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief Directorate."

18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the officers who had been assigned to the American Department for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through 1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could not provide accurate information as to which officers were assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

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* With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has furnished only one other item of information: he reported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959, the Israeli Section was transferred to this department after having been a component of the American Department.

allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could not describe their functions. On this basis NOSENKO was then asked to list the officers who had joined the section between 1956 and January 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked to name the officers who had left the section in the same period, he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.

3. Duties and Knowledgeability

a. Introduction

Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section. On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation protocol which he agreed contained a listing of his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:

> "During the entire period in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:
>
> -General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
>
> -Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
>
> -Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.
>
> -For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Military, Naval, and Air Attaches.
>
> -I maintained the file on American Embassy security.
>
> -I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.**

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*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising attache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions are discussed below.

**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the time the protocol was signed.

"During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR'.*

"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section

(1) Access

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to all information on the section's activities and was obliged to keep current on this information. On this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his discussions with section officers made it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to 1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in full):

> "1. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.
>
> "2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the State Department, the offices of the Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.

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*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and [redacted] [redacted] respectively, who are discussed in other parts of this paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents he handled in this period; they are discussed below.

"3. There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

(ii) Duties

On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the section, particularly his function of supervising activity against code clerks. The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

Answer: I don't know.

Q: What was the most important?

A: Everything was important.

Q: Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy Section?

A: GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY who worked with DEMKIN. Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.] KURILENKO, and BELOGLAZOV working with the Attaches.

Q: They were all in the First Section?

A: Yes.

Q: What were their responsibilities?

A: GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in America House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane of the Ambassador. He must think about watching the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy Attache, assistants, and Marines.

Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the word "supervisor"?

A: Personally to be at the head, to direct.

Q: So, in your responsibilities of supervising all the work against all the code clerks, this meant that you were the head of this work, that you were directing this work, that you were participating in discussions concerning this work, and in these discussions you were talking about what measures were necessary.

(Interrupting.) When necessary, because there are little questions which the case officer must decide himself. When it was necessary.

Q: And participating personally when necessary?

A: Yes.

Q: What sort of case officer questions were you answering?

A: All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if my authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's successor as Chief of the American Department, S.M.] FEDOSEYEV. Several times, not once, we were discussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, concerning measures, concerning future steps. When it was necessary.

Q: What other duties did you have as a supervisor?

A: I told you. When it was necessary I was going to agent meetings with case officers. When it was necessary. Or, besides, I met personally with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND] or [redacted] "PROKHOR" was working against STORSBERG, "SARDAR" against ZUJUS. I was working myself with them.

Q: You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

A: Yes.

Q: When did you find it necessary to go to an agent meeting with a case officer?

A: Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in America House]. Ella said that MORONE had looked at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypothetical] example....Okay, I am going with him, hearing Ella myself, [to learn] what happened, [whether] it is possible to make something or not.

Q: You met Ella and talked with her?

A: Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say, why and how we are going. When it was necessary to go.

Q: As a rule did you try to make it a practice to visit the agents of the section who were working against the American target?

A: Yes, I am telling you. There was such an agent, Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her. It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, you see, they don't like it when a new case officer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file,

[redacted]

it was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because you do not believe GRYAZNOV. No. But, you see, to hear from the source [emphasized], directly, what is going on, and how it is going on, to get a feeling. Because the source will tell the case officer, then the case officer will tell you. Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail, every intonation. But in some cases, it is necessary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on the agent, on the target, whether you will go or not go. It's very difficult, again, to say.

Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the section's agents?

A: No, I can't say.

Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?

A: I can't answer you.

Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in regard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s".*

A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh [Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had also his own yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of us had a conspirative apartment.

Q: And you took the "Ya.K." from...

A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh. And, by the way, when I was leaving the First [American] Department, I took this file again to the Seventh.

Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.

A: No, because the section had only--how many?-- [P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.] FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent was living. In the First Section there were three or four conspirative flats.

Q: But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was none?

A: Only "Ya.K.'s".

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*A "K.K." (konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apartment) is defined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned and maintained by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who is perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational purposes, he said.

Q: Who kept a record of these three?

A: The case officers.

Q: Where was your "Ya.K."?

A: Vorovskogo Street.

Q: And where was GRYAZNOV's?

A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.

Q: And KOSOLAPOV's?

A: Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region of Arbat Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. DEMKIN's I don't remember.

Q: And you didn't have any responsibility for supervising the activity that went on at these flats?

A: I don't understand.

Q: Was there some central control of the use of the "Ya.K.'s"?

A: What kind of control?

Q: Who would be using them, when they would be using them, under what conditions?

A: No. The case officer who was working with it decides how to use this flat or how not to use it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very often we were using rooms in hotels.

Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational activity to his "Ya.K."?

A: He would also meet with his agents, with his operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NOSENKO was meeting his agents or operational contacts in his own "Ya.K.".

Q: Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever use these "Ya.K.'s" without your knowing about it?

A: Of course. It's their own flat.

Q: But you're supervising their work?

A: Must I keep them like a little, little child? No, no. They don't have to report to me: "Today I go to meet my agent at my flat."

Q: They can use them whenever they like without checking with you as supervisor?

A: Of course, of course. They are meeting their own agents.

Q: You have no idea who they are meeting, or when they are meeting them?

A: When they are meeting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this." But usually they are going to meet maids or they don't have to report. There is nothing active and there is....The file is going on.

Q: What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?

A: You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, because he has a number of cars at his disposal.

Q: Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?

A: I can't say.

Q: Was it the most important function?

A: Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most important. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at another place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situation.

(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again. NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's absence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March 1965:

> "I do not remember any particularly important operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Section, nor any unusual things that happened during

these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK had which I handled in his absence was to report to the Chief of the First Department about all mail going out of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences because there was no necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom I remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV [KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"], whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I think. The only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that was different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was that I had to go every day to see the Chief of the Department.

c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations

(i) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five operations wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for recruitment/defection purposes. According to NOSENKO, none was successful. The five major cases are reviewed separately below, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad by NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When

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*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photograph as that of a veteran KGB officer with whom he was personally acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City; subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of 1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence activity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April 1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Translation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes the role of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with the KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.

NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks underway, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses, none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No foreign agents were being used in operations against coderoom personnel, and at the time NOSENKO had no agents of his own in America House, or in the Embassy, who could be used in these operations.

In January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV* was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office (Room 614). There all KGB files on American code clerks, as well as the files on agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe, accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a trip, he said, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

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*GOLITSYN first named GRYAZNOV as a case officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, on 31 December 1961. He said at that time that he had been personally acquainted with GRYAZNOV since 1945 and that, as of the spring of 1960, GRYAZNOV was "working only against code clerks of the American Embassy in Moscow." GRYAZNOV had travelled to the United States at some time in the past, GOLITSYN added. [redacted] On 5 June 1962 GOLITSYN told CIA that he had been a classmate of GRYAZNOV during 1945 and 1946 at the "SMERSH" counterintelligence school in Moscow; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialist in operations against American code clerks, saying that GRYAZNOV was "very experienced" and had had "some successes." As an example, he told of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 while he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in connection with his forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had complained to GRYAZNOV that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki at the time, and to CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying: "Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code clerk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who was about to be transferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the KGB had received information from this American code clerk and classified him as a "real agent." NOSENKO has not mentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) and has denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassy at this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN, who travelled with the Moiseyev Dance troup to the United States and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV. CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities by GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV in true name.

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read available files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (not American and not Soviet) for agent work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a [redacted] military officer, [redacted] (cryptonym "SARDAR"), and directed him against the America House. (After his first few visits, [redacted] was specifically targetted against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND, who figured in the case of the military code clerk James STORSBERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which most of the code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operations against code clerks was successful during the two years he spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and January 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. He stated that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful approaches had taken place during this latter period.

(ii) Approach to STORSBERG

From the start of his association with CIA, NOSENKO has emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency as Deputy Chief of Section, was the recruitment of an American military cryptographer. He has explained the special stress placed on this requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Department code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had broken certain U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read enciphered messages up to and including those classified "secret", there had been no such success with American military ciphers, which remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also has asserted repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any American code clerk, either State Department or military, during the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.*

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*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" case.

On the several operations against military code clerks which NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given to the case of James Harry STORSBERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said that, in line with GRIBANOV's instructions that he pay particular attention to code clerk operations, he devoted most of his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGB approach; he described in the first person his conversation with STORSBERG. During the 1964 to 1966 period, NOSENKO denied not only that he had personally participated in this way but also that he had ever claimed to have done; he continued to say, however, that he supervised the operation from beginning to end. According to NOSENKO, this operation got under way with the recruitment of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a Finn) some time in the first half of 1960. The specific aim in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising activities, which would then form the basis for the approach. The operation dragged on through 1960 and until the spring, summer, or autumn of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French businessman to continue the development of compromising information. PREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation. Several weeks later STORSBERG was approached, principally on the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid and the operation was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORSBERG had not reported the approach and said that the KGB would use this fact as an additional element of pressure should STORSBERG again be posted outside the United States. NOSENKO also knew that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation against an American stationed in Moscow. Contrary to NOSENKO's information, he said that this American had been approached--and recruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.

A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORSBERG operation: GOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Moscow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured. According to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has said that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, and HURLEY has reported no approach.

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have interviewed STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruitment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who also generally confirmed the information given by NOSENKO but did not know the outcome of the case). The results of these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and from other sources, are summarized in this order below.

January 1960:	STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was supplied by the interrogator and was accepted by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).
Early 1960:	PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This was consistent with earlier statements, and NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND a week or so after his recruitment. On 21 October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND first met "in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960." He subsequently stayed with the general date "mid-1960.")
Summer 1960:	PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.
Early 1961:	Compromising photographs of STORSBERG and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
About May 1961:	PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced. (NOSENKO dated this by saying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
June 1961:	Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October 1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half before STORSBERG left Moscow." Told that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in "June 1961, i.e., five months before STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has reported that the approach was in October 1961; see below.)

NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later in the October 1966 interrogations. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREISFREUND most recently, he said, in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and patronymic, Yuriy Ivanovich; on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate" there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO. On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specifically named GRYAZNOV as the case officer holding the operational file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, supervised the operation against STORSBERG.

(c) Information [illegible]

STORSBERG did not report this approach until he was interviewed by the FBI [illegible] [redacted]

STORSBERG was interviewed by the FBI on 14 and 18 September 1964 in connection with the [illegible] (He had not been identified on the basis of [illegible] information.) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

** Official records, indicate that MORONE was transferred from Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 1961. If these records are correct, STOPSBERG could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD on this night in October 1961.

[redacted]

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* This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFREUND involved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second lead, discussed below.

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, however, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth" the following day.

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and was, on this basis, recruited by KOVSHUK "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGB wanted him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.* PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORSBERG and Irina were intimate.

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND, telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him. PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions, but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. He first replied that it had been at America House and recalled that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;" it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREISFREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaintance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:

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* According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V. SUNTSOV.

"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me at all."

PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introducing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENKO wished and the three of them returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREISFREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this deduced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**

Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 meeting PREISFREUND said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and the beginning of his involvement with STORSBERG. "The job," he said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was the only operation in which he participated and that he had told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the KGB.

PREISFREUND was shown GOLITSYN's photograph and remarked: "Was he here [in Finland]? I don't know him." Shown the photograph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this person may have been among them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"

At the close of the 10 July 1965 meeting, PREISFREUND mentioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forthcoming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about what his response should be if the KGB accused him of confessing to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all. Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Soviet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July 1965.

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* NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

** PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961. [redacted]

liaison

*** An official [redacted] service has advised CIA that in discussions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate [redacted], a representative of that service was asked by CHEKALOV for whom PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the [redacted]

aison [redacted] service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent of American Intelligence.

(d) Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had served the KGB most recently as a counter-intelligence officer in Helsinki during 1960 and 1961, reported separately two possibly related leads to operations against American personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. One of these was a developmental operation against a military code clerk which the KGB felt was almost certain of success, the other a recruitment approach to an Embassy employee which GOLITSYN was told had been successful. GOLITSYN learned these two items of information from different KGB Second Chief Directorate officers at different times.

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December 1961, when he reported information he said he learned during conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Headquarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1960.* At that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in connection with his preparations for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Directorate counter-intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSYN that he, GRYAZNOV, had personally prepared an operation involving an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conversation with GRYAZNOV down to "April or May 1960" and quoted GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment is prepared and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a woman," but could provide no further details. During these same talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk in the office of the American Military Attache since the establishment of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department (in the 1940's).

GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February 1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes. According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruitment in Moscow of at least one American who "could have been a code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow, had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in the approach, which was made by KGB officers. During an interview by the FBI on 18 June 1962, GOLITSYN [redacted]

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* According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

This second lead, GOLITSYN said, stemmed from his conversations with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of the American Department,* while GOLITSYN was temporarily in Moscow during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the explanation: "You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months

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* GOLITSYN could mean either Pomoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel' (deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers show that KOVSHUK was Deputy Chief of the Department as late as 1959. NOSENKO said that, as a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from Deputy Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962. GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSHUK for about ten years and characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, KOVSHUK was handling KGB agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Washington phases of the "ANDREY" case (he was identified by Dayle SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see Part VI.D.7.c.). According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK took personal part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, in the approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM, State Department Officer Richard HARMSTONE, and code clerk James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers Russell LANGELLE and Richard JACOB.

**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his arrival in Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28 January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from 9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April 1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversations in the American Department and that he learned of the second lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow in January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change his story of the summer leave.

(e) Information from other Sources

Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the Embassy at any particular time. This military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to perform his functions for other reasons.

STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Additionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

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* Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "military code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of "military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY.

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* NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow, he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLITSYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STORSBERG, HURLEY, or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a military man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the operation against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This conflicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn 1961."

(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases

(a) Introduction

According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul Francis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB identification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department of State files.) The report by NOSENKO on KOSOLAPOV is contradicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the KGB defector GOLITSYN.

Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets, a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Nevertheless, travel records contradict NOSENKO's statement that KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the 24-hour journey.

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLAPOV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki TDY by KOSOLAPOV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November 1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on 16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY. Each part incorporates the information from all sources, including NOSENKO.

(b) False Identity for Travel

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 February 1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, born in Perm' on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from 31 March to 2 April 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960, and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965, Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii. on STORSBERG operation) identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB officer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow in the fall of 1964 to ask whether he knew anything about NOSENKO's defection. Shown KOLOSOV's photograph in October 1966, NOSENKO immediately identified him as KOSOLAPOV.

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* NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).

NOSENKO told the [redacted] Subsequently CIA prepared a protocol, which NOSENKO read and signed, corroborating its accuracy. This protocol reads:

> "I do not know about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that he accompanied a code clerk back to Moscow at that time.
>
> "I was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 to January 1962 and would have to know and approve any operational travel by KOSOLAPOV outside the USSR. In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to accompany Paul JENNER, I talked with him about it, and then approved after he wrote it, the cable to the Helsinki residentura (Legal Residency) informing them of his mission, and of course received his report after the trip.
>
> "Normally, I would know about and approve this trip in advance. If I were away at the time, normally I would have heard about the trip upon my return. However, I don't remember anything about this trip either before or after KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki. If there were further developments in this case, I certainly would have known about them."*

(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case)

NOSENKO first mentioned a TDY by KOSOLAPOV in an interview by the FBI. [redacted]

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* NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to Cuba in November 1960. He was told that CIA travel records show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow, and he stated that he would have.

** [redacted]

[redacted]

NOSENKO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on 15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a protocol was drawn up in question-and-answer form, incorporating NOSENKO's responses, and on 19 February 1965, NOSENKO signed the protocol, attesting to its accuracy. The following is taken from this signed statement:

Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read the file on JENNER?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Did you read reports on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes, I read materials on JENNER, everything which came into the section on JENNER and the other code clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?

NOSENKO: Yes. We had his *anketa* [visa application].

Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Before his arrival we had only the *anketa*, nothing more. He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and there was a date on this *anketa* which was the date he was due to cross the Finnish border--the middle of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First Department. We decided to create an active operation. We knew the date, and we thought he was to be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on the same train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was KOSOLAPOV.

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* The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as previously stated, this was not true in JENNER's case.

Question:	How old was JENNER at the time?
NOSENKO:	I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina, to Vyborg as part of this operation. I think her first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last name; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed on the train in Vyborg as if she had been visiting someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he even arrived in Moscow. We wrote a proposal to the Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this. We explained that we had usually only one year in which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA" met JENNER and spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that they were all speaking together at one time. She gave JENNER a telephone number.
Question:	A KGB telephone number?
NOSENKO:	Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't working in the code room but in the mail room. O.K., that was interesting too. We waited one or two months for the call to come, but nothing happened. When JENNER once went to the railroad station or airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet again. JENNER saw her but did not approach [her]. Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only later did we learn that he is a very quiet person. There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof. He was like a child.
Question:	How much time did you have between the time of the anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?
NOSENKO:	A month, plenty of time to prepare.
Question:	A month?
NOSENKO:	Well, approximately a month. The usual approval from the Central Committee was necessary so that KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.
Question:	Who wrote this?
NOSENKO:	I prepared the kharakteristika [official form] on KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel Office.
Question:	Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against JENNER?

NOSENKO: It was the idea of the group.

Question: Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be before he left--what he was to do?

NOSENKO: I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the day before KOSOLAPOV left.

Question: Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent?

NOSENKO: She had been working before 1960, but I don't know for how long.

Question: Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with other units, for example, with the [KGB] First Chief Directorate (FCD)?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming for two or three days.

Question: Did you approve this cable?

NOSENKO: I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed, KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department, FCD.

Question: What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

NOSENKO: I don't remember if he used his own name or another.

Question: What other correspondence was there?

NOSENKO: Correspondence?

Question: What other cables or letters were sent to or received from the Helsinki Rezidentura [Legal Residency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's trip?

NOSENKO: Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to discuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, to see what agents they had, or to study the situation, the possibilities. We wanted to use agents against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants, to use girls...

Question: With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

NOSENKO: He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident. He discussed this question with them and they said they would see about it, but we were told that the Residency has more important questions.

Question: What was more important than the work against code clerks?

NOSENKO: They didn't tell us.

Question: Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what was so important?

NOSENKO: Code clerks in Helsinki would be more important for them; this is the work of the FCD.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recognize him and make contact?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and with the help of the Residency, I think, they found out at the railroad station who was going on the train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the 15th.

Question: When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: When did he return?

NOSENKO: I don't know, don't remember.

Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

NOSENKO: About one week, not more than one week counting travel time.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: By train, both ways.

Question: Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with him?

NOSENKO: He was alone.

Question: How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the right train?

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the local KGB officers there meet her and place her on the correct train. They knew the date and would establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train before placing her aboard...

Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following additional statement not included in the protocol: "The agent was 'SOLISTKA.' She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZNOV briefed her for the mission... KOSOLAPOV wrote a report on his trip. Nothing unusual or interesting in it. 'SOLISTKA' also gave a report to GRYAZNOV, but there was nothing there, either."

NOSENKO was questioned on 20 October 1966 about his responsibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers, without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions and his answers were as follows:

Question: Did you supervise all code clerk operations in 1960 and 1961?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV your subordinates during this period?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in order to travel to Moscow on the train with American code clerks?

NOSENKO: I know of one.

Question: When was that? Which one?

NOSENKO: Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.

Question: Which code clerk?

NOSENKO: It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found that he worked with the mail. He came as a secretary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he worked on the mail.

Question: JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Do you know of any others?

NOSENKO: No. What do you mean?

Question: Only one?

NOSENKO: Only one--JENNER.

Question: Was the operation successful?

NOSENKO: No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting. It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki.

Question: When did it happen?

NOSENKO: First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March or April.

Question: Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV make other trips abroad?

NOSENKO: He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple [the YOUNGERs] and was in the United States at one of the General Assemblies. That's all. That was in the '50's. No others.

Question: Did KOSOLAPOV personally meet JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?

NOSENKO: Yes.

When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photograph for the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Question: Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17 [Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From '59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate.

Question: We have information that a Viktor--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV.

Question: Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean anything to you?

NOSENKO: I was telling you that there was trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: JENNER, the code clerk?

NOSENKO: He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as a code clerk. He was working with mail.

Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in Helsinki by train from Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: On the 31st of March 1960.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the train with him. Right?

NOSENKO: I was thinking and I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure '60 or '61. I was telling '60, but I'm not sure. Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.

SECRET

Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 March and 2 April 1960 (See Part V.E.3.c.iii)



Junalla Vainikkala

1	[illegible], Paul Francis	[illegible]	[illegible].07.23	U S A	U S A - Mosk. /V

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst.
E. Saukkonen

31 March 1960



Junalla Vainikkala

1	Ferdinand, Klaus Vilhelm	[illegible]	19.04.23	Tanskan	Tanska-Afganistan/V	
2	[illegible], Sofia	konttoristi	[illegible]	Kreikan	Tukholma-Mosk./V	[illegible]
3	Kolesov, Viktor	[illegible]	19.03.27	N:liitto	Hki. - Mosk.	Oopv./Mosk.
4	Suomen kansalaiset:			Kotipaikka:		
5	Korhonen, Jouko Aarne Antero ✓	työmies	26.11.24	Joensuu	Joensuu-Mosk. alue	Oopv.viis.
6	[illegible], Kirsti Hellin Irene ✓	kansl.apul.	24.07.23	Jyväskylä	Jyväskylä-Sotsi	(15pv.viis.)
7	[illegible], Tyyne Kyllikki ✓	rouva	03.04.21	"	"	"
8	[illegible], [illegible] Helena ✓ Vaik	"	23.07.22	Lahti		
9	[illegible], Aare Viljam ✓ Vaik	opettaja	12.07.28	"	Lahti-Zaporoje	(15pv.viis.)
10	Takala, Toivo Erkki ✓ Vaik	var.hoit.	27.03.22	"		
11	Utriainen, Erkki Olavi ✓ Vaik	kirv.mies	09.08.20	"		
12	[illegible], Otto Allan ✓	toimittaja	08.12.17	Helsinki		
13	[illegible], Antti ✓	liitt.siht.	12.04.28	"		
14	[illegible], Unto Mattias ✓	[illegible]	13.12.16	[illegible]	Hki. - Mosk.	(15pv.viis.)
15	Järvinen, Aarne Juhani ✓	varastomies	27.01.34	Toijala		
16	[illegible], Judith Josefina ✓	[illegible]	03.03.15	Helsinki		

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst.
E. Saukkonen

2 April 1960

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Question: It's 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and using this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Don't remember. Must be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April.

Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the official record on his travel. We have his photo here, which you just saw.

NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, with this picture of Paul JENNER, it was said that he must come; we knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or something of this kind.

Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's, or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.

NOSENKO: I cannot give you any details. All I have said, everything what I knew. If you need something on KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.

Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according to the same official sources, left Helsinki by train to go to Moscow on the 31st. Two days before.

NOSENKO: They were going in one train.

Question: They weren't even on the same train.

NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.

Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.

NOSENKO: (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one even carriage with Paul JENNER. Then...

Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?

NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was reading also the agent's report of the female agent who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her. That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading KOSOLAPOV's otchet [official account] about his [trip].

Question: That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they gave you a report to read concerning this. But it is a fact that official records show that the two men were not on the same train. They were two days apart.

NOSENKO: No (whispered).

Question: JENNER left on the 31st.

NOSENKO: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake of Finnish officials. I don't know, but he was on the same train and he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER. The same train, the same carriage.

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960 comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students."* The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, Yuli, who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

- Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that either of these two women was a KGB agent, but has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.)

- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief.[*]

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* KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

** NOSENKO has mentioned several times that GRYAZNOV's agent "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on."

- CIA travel records show that JENNER arrived in Helsinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and departed by train the following day. KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained there until 2 April 1960 when he too departed for Moscow by train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960 indicates that there was only one passenger aboard the daily train leaving Helsinki for Moscow on this date, Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archivist. The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV) and shows that no American citizens were aboard.

(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever took place, NOSENKO has said nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in November 1960, but GOLITSYN said such a trip occurred and related it to an incipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to Helsinki, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The telegram advised that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, who was being sent to Helsinki under an alias and under Vneshtorg cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow.

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came to Finland?

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.

Question: He came under cover?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg). But, of course, there may be some different dates. Maybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the end of 1960 or it can be the beginning of 1961. And he waiting for some days, a week or so.

Question: In Helsinki?

---

[*] A similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV with regard to GARLAND (see below).

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Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.iii)

Luettelo matkustajista, jotka Junalla (kulkuneuvo) *saapuivat Suomeen / lähtivät Suomesta* Vainikkalan (raja-asema) *kautta* / 196

	Suku- ja etunimet	Ammatti tai arvo	Syntymäaika	Kansalaisuus	Määränpää	Osoite Suomessa
1	Mouravieva, Nonna ✓	sos.min.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2	Parve, Ralf	kirjailija	1919	"	Eesti	"
3	Morosov, Alexandre	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S-F	Kauttakulku
4	Otchapovski, Alexandre	"	"	"	"	"
5	Gavrilova, Maria ✓	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6	Kolesnov, Viktor	virkailija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7	Amadjanov, Kamil	"	1922	"	"	-
8	Akulinine, Petr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9	Lair, Jean Baptiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
10	Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.33	USA:n	"	"
11	Brubhard, Henry Charles	tsto siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12	Rantalainen, Aatu Ilmari	kirvesmies	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmak. 2.H.85, Hki.
13	Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähk.asent	25.05.00	"	"	4.Linja,20.B.39, Hki.
14	Immonen, Heikki Juhani Finn ✓	lainop.kand	21.01.30	"	"	Kivaltorink.23.C, Hki.
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
21						
22						

Passintarkastaja:
V.t.ylikonst. E. Saukkonen
E. Saukkonen

SECRET

TOP SECRET

GOLITSYN: Yes. Maybe four days. Then we knew that the American Embassy took a ticket for him [the American target] for the train... And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket in the same compartment. And before the departure we knew exactly from the guide [conductor] of that train that it's the same person--[I'm not certain whether he was a] code clerk or not a code clerk*--but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I was at the railroad station at that time. I went to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**

Question: See them off?

GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV: "Who is this person? I suppose [he is an] American?" I suppose [believe] he said: "He's a fat man, a young fat man."

Question: The American?

GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KOSOLAPOV said] bespectacled.*** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were smiling and looked through the window before departure.

Question: In the compartment? The train compartment?

GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Directorate].****

Question: When was this?

GOLITSYN: It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961. And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

Question: Who was this? Do you remember?

GOLITSYN: I don't remember because he changed his name. I know him but I... And I asked him how is that case that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want to discuss it. That's why I came to the conclusion that this case was a success. Otherwise he would have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to recognize this person in pictures.

Question: You think that you could?

---

* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the American as a code clerk.

** GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

*** KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is, however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer remains unidentified.

GOLITSYN: Yes, probably. He reminds me a little of one of my friends.

Question: He looks a little like your friend?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Which one? KOSOLAPOV?

GOLITSYN: No, no. This American

The Finnish railroad manifest lists the passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. KOSOLAPOV was one of eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND was the only American. GARLAND, by his own statement, arrived in Helsinki on 14 November 1960; he was travelling to Moscow to assume the duties of supervisor of the State Department code room in the U.S. Embassy.

As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) on 11 November 1960 for help in locating GARLAND, an American who would arrive there on 14 November.

GARLAND was first interviewed by John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow in connection with the GOLITSYN lead on 17 June 1962. In this interview GARLAND denied having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having ever been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified 20 Americans employed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who were of interest to the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or agents, or because they fell into some other category of interest to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of these 20 persons. One of them was GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but nothing doing." NOSENKO was asked on 2 September 1964 to review this list for the purpose of supplying any additional information he might have concerning the individuals named. NOSENKO stated: "As with all code clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in order to gather enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any agents, and I didn't hear of any derogatory information. As far as I know, there was no operational approach and no recruitment." Although he could not recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND or not, NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said he thought that he must have read current materials concerning GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO also said that there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concerning him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information concerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably never seen, and was unable to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October 1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of the discussion on that date:

Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSOLAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?

Question: No. This was a trip to Helsinki.

NOSENKO: Oh. I don't know. Maybe after, after '61 maybe. I don't know--'62, '63, I don't know.

Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on the train, according to official records, on 16 November 1960, going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records concerning this train trip to see who was on the train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the name he used.

NOSENKO: Yes?

Question: We found there was one American on that train with KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul JENNER.

Question: You don't know this man's name?

NOSENKO: (silence)

Question: Well, we checked further and we found out that GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.

NOSENKO: When he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER? GOLITSYN was then out, yes?*

---

* GOLITSYN arrived in Helsinki in July 1960, over four months after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.

Question: GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November 1960. You understand what I'm telling you?

NOSENKO: Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAPOV must tell him about the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy.

Question: This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time of year--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A different time. It's the same year, but a different time.

NOSENKO: I know only about his trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: Well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section, is aboard this train with this American code clerk, one of your targets, in November 1960?

NOSENKO: I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about whom he was thinking also that he was a code clerk. Yes.

Question: KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with JENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

NOSENKO: He must. He was working as a case officer of counterintelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak with him.

Question: KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the train back to Moscow. But GOLITSYN was not in Helsinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

NOSENKO: With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.

Question: It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other code clerk was?

NOSENKO: No. There wasn't such a one.

Question: Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear the name GARLAND?

NOSENKO: Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't recruitment or something else...

(iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE

(a) Introduction

In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assistance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB), the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960. The woman accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became intimate with him in Warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February 1961, and there had sexual relations with him. The compromising scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed. This information on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon after the woman's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May 1961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August 1961.

NOSENKO gave a few details on the same case, without mentioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the MORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish female) who participated in the operation. NOSENKO, however, said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that regarding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported, as have other sources, that a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV--posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case with another by saying that a fifth KGB agent was directed against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of the original report on MORONE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA" (Vladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case reported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

(b) NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow in order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.

Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then gave an example: "Listen, the sergeants [enlisted men] who lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go to America, so where did they go to rest [on leave]? To Finland or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find women there, the rate of exchange is good, and so on. What do we do? We planted a female Polish agent [on an American] in Poland. Then she comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, and things developed. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a code clerk went to Warsaw. They were on leave for a week and a half. We knew when they would be going. I made an immediate phone call to Warsaw. 'Give me a woman,' I said. 'Get a good whore for me there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the eye particularly.' Well, they sent me such a girl. And I placed this Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the same compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk, wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, they went to bed together while the other American slept. I told the Poles in Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs. They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Moscow. We did not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush, I said. A half a year went by. I insisted that nothing further may be done any earlier. Then I said, 'All right, let's give him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow] and they met one another. I created the conditions: we created the conditions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet] girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to sleep with the girlfriend. The Pole left and he was with this Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are afraid of Russians. But [we gave him] a Pole and then transferred him to a Russian."

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: "I remember we were working on one of the members of the guard of the American Embassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days' relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [KGB officers attached to the Polish UB] to do everything possible--to get a pretty Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They sent her. [illegible] and [illegible] asked her, during the conversation [illegible] reached the ultimate in intimacy. [illegible] They said they were surprised [illegible] she had reported that this relationship [illegible]. You see, the Poles had not told [illegible] the film which they gave us had been cut [illegible]. I remember we called the Poles a few [illegible] names [illegible] friends! They were doing this under instructions [illegible] that they withhold things. ... At any rate [illegible] developed any further."

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* The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The facts, however, seem to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow. BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish girl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted him in Moscow; BEGGS has denied that he, himself, was contacted by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to Warsaw with MORONE.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO has also mentioned a prohibition on recruitment attempts during the 1959 Sokolniki exhibition because of the need to avoid incidents affecting U.S.-Soviet relationships. GOLITSYN told CIA of such a prohibition placed on the use of homosexual compromise material against a U.S. Embassy employee in 1960 because of the impending visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. As a result of the U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, this visit never took place, and U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated. Throughout the rest of 1960 and most of 1961 they remained very strained, and Soviet pressures and hard lines culminated in the Berlin crisis and wall-building in Berlin in August of 1961.

NOSENKO further reported to CIA that the KGB case officer working against MORONE was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read the file on MORONE and saw his visa photograph, but he never saw him in person and so could not provide a physical description. NOSENKO had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions.

NOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MORONE were:

- Svetlana IVANOVA , a maid or waitress at America House who reported to DEMKIN, the case officer responsible for Americans living there, on everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE, and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information on MORONE which was interesting or useful from this source.

- [redacted] an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] visited America House and met MORONE, but he did not report anything of value that NOSENKO remembered.

- One of two East German females imported for use against the inhabitants of America House. In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used for this purpose. The first of these was Hanna, blonde, documented as a West German travelling to Moscow. NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREISFREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. The other East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.*

- [redacted], an Italian [redacted] at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that [redacted] had said about MORONE.

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* CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO seem to apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v). In any event, the incident involving Lillian occurred after the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.

From one of these agents, or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, chief of the section. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was a U.S. Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel, where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and BEGGS and for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Technical Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw.* The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse during the trip. The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

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* CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on 15 November 1960 on a through flight from Moscow to Cuba. [redacted] NOSENKO returned from Cuba approximately 14 December 1960. When told this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the technician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film strips after his return.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment approach to MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE into the city, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE and no recruitment of him.

(c) Information from Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safehouse suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and revealing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE.

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on 16 February 1962:

Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark.

Question: When was he sent? Do you know?

GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that he will continue to work now in the First Chief Directorate. He transferred there from the Second...

Question: Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall of 1960?

GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich] PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate who works against the American Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he worked in the American Department. I know him and I met him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section, the Embassy Section...

Question: Well, in VOLODYA, I'm interested in a KGB case officer who would be working against American code clerks in the fall of 1960.

GOLITSYN: Yes he [PETROV] is the chief of this section. That is why. He is the Chief of this section where GRYAZNOV works. [GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Section.]

Question: And GRYAZNOV is under him?

GOLITSYN: Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not [now], and then there was the reorganization and he became a little "liquidated" [downgraded in position].

In an October 1962 interview, following his withdrawal from Moscow, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had several drinks and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE had denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a statement which was supported by a polygraph examination administered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE are inserted in a later paragraph containing information from MORONE's associates in Moscow.)

The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in general, with the exception that he has stated that the two travelled to Warsaw on 13 November 1960 and that, after meeting the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower bunk in their train compartment. They arrived in Warsaw on 14 November and returned the 20th. BEGGS had heard from MORONE that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

The U.S. military code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), who laid some groundwork for the KGB approach to STORSBERG in the fall of 1961. When interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

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* In February 1965 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concentrate on Jim [STORSBERG]. Jim was his target."

[redacted]

MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House have described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by [redacted] the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE has confirmed that, on at least one occasion, [redacted] arranged the introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. MORONE had relations with one of them in [redacted]'s apartment in the spring of 1961. MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy [redacted] identified by NOSENKO as an agent of KOSOLAPOV, but not mentioned by him in connection with the MORONE operation. (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from [redacted] One report states that [redacted] asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the State Department code room, a restricted area to which [redacted] had no access. A number of reports indicate that MORONE was sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but not mentioned by him in connection with MORONE. (MORONE denies having had relations with IVANOVA but said that he told his friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a number of women from various Western embassies in Moscow.)

(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS

(a) Introduction

NOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled [redacted] the "main agent" in the KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. [redacted] military officer posted to Moscow for training, was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department. While being interrogated in February 1965, NOSENKO said that [redacted] could vouch for his bona fides, and he suggested that CIA approach [redacted] for this purpose.*

ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. After initially confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According to NOSENKO, neither [redacted] nor any other source supplied significant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of KGB agents besides [redacted] who participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS. One is Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer of 1962 when, NOSENKO said, he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

The first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because I spotted this in some notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a Syrian who was from Damascus. [redacted], and he became acquainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had something in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance away... Here is his name. He wrote it out himself. It is [redacted], and he wrote out his own address

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[redacted]

** The KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this paper.

here [on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him to the meeting]. We did not work with him, and we retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here is his address. The street is [redacted].. I worked with him myself at the [illegible] of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV. I said goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.

Question: What did you do against ZUJUS?

NOSENKO: Nothing at all. He [redacted] was merely studying and devloping him. During the conversation [at American House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we specially had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal] Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable, calm person... Nothing disturbs him.

Question: Why didn't you turn [redacted] over to the First Chief Directorate?

NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a [redacted]. If we were to turn him over to anyone it would have been to the GRU. But we decided to hell with it and put the case into our Archives.

Question: Did [redacted] know ZUJUS when you recruited him?

NOSENKO: No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name. So we showed him photographs, and when he said that he had met ZUJUS, then we directed him to develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to anyone else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment of [redacted] whereby a CIA representative would approach [redacted] saying that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO told CIA that if CIA talked to [redacted] the latter would be able to vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.

Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: [redacted]...I took with me, even though I had transferred to the Seventh [Tourist] Department [in January 1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him from the First [American] Department; it would have taken some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [[redacted] meetings with ZUJUS."

When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 identified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the case officer working against him was GRYAZNOV. He said that his (NOSENKO's) agent [redacted] was working against ZUJUS, but that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning him, although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on ZUJUS. There was no information on ZUJUS from KGB microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS and did not recruit him.

NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and personally handled the main agent, [redacted] NOSENKO read all current reports on ZUJUS as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for the America House) and his superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough development by [redacted] in order to learn everything possible about him, and eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through [redacted] [redacted] was to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in March or April 1962, and a "friend" was to be introduced to ZUJUS at that time. This had not been accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.

Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact that although [redacted] and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days [redacted] was to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in safehouses). This was once every week or two, depending on [redacted] They would meet again the following day; [redacted] would report on which Americans were drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from foreign embassies in Moscow. Although [redacted] went to America House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest. The KGB learned something about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him about it.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House decided to interview the woman. She told him that she was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.*

The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS states [redacted]

ZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965. Asked whether he had met any nationals of Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, ZUJUS named among others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as doorman at America House when this person entered, and that the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about, but their conversation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he left after a short while and went to the bar. ZUJUS may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply no additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored this beverage. ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description.

ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of background information concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

FBI investigations indicate [redacted]

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* See also NOSENKO's account of the KGB using one of two East German women, who represented themselves as Austrians, at America House in an operation against MORONE.

(vi) Approach to KEYSERS

(a) Introduction

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force captain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. For a short period in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961 because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the following day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he defect. This was followed by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.

NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S. Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STORSBERG--See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but corrected this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO s account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Moscow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher clerk [STORSBERG].[a] We sensed at once [that he was a homosexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else. We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an operational car. It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late, late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But such things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know about you. You have been caught. It will go very badly for you back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your answer.' Well, as is customary, you had someone accompany him. The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON, a lieutenant colonel. What was his name?* He accompanied him to Finland and then returned by plane. Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away, wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) had reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:

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[a] Although KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replacement; Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been returned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So I said 'What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello, hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Attache, that 'they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did not know who he was or what he was, i.e., we knew that he came to replace the military code clerk, on whom we had spent much time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS.

After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG, NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visiting ballet troupe in which some of the male members were homosexuals. He met them in the America House and his behavior towards them was reported to the American Security Officer and at the same time our agent had reported him to us. We wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans had already decided to give him up. All we could do was to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned him that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure. He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the Military Attache's office. At the airport--I even went there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a few words to him to change his mind. He left his group for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed, that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ran back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able to get at him."

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* This officer's name is MASON.

** See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February 1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.

While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28 January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't be in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I told you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to the States with military guards. How come he is back in 1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there. It is impossible" He was asked whether he was sure of his facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the same man, but this must be an error in your document. He just cannot be in Moscow."

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February 1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so I wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Remember when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG, the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him? And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS. In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to KEYSERS."

"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters [with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKO stated on 17 April 1964. "When he was being taken to the airport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; why not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sure enough he stood there with these two officers and then he walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately approached him right there in the restaurant. "I don't remember what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said" 'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.' He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word he went into the waiting room and started talking rapidly with the officers."

When questioned on the KEYSERS approach in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new details except that, at the time of the approach, he understood KEYSERS had not reported the KGB letter to his superiors at the American Embassy; he said that there was no information to this effect from the microphones or telephone taps in the U.S. Embassy.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In Moscow prior to his removal and in subsequent debriefings, KEYSERS admitted homosexual tendencies and his involvement in three homosexual incidents during his tour in Moscow, all at America House; one of these was an approach to a Marine security guard in March 196[illegible], which was rebuffed, and the two others were homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe visiting Moscow in May 1961. He denied that he ever made any public display of his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner may have been asleep following [illegible] homosexual relations.

During a detailed debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961 KEYSERS related the incidents leading up to the approach made at [illegible] in [illegible] as he was leaving the Soviet Union. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Microphones were subsequently found in Colonel URBAN's office and in the office of the Minister Counsellor. NOSENKO has reported that both were being monitored on a simultaneous basis in 1961.

** This is not an accurate description of NOSENKO who was 34 years old at the time, is several inches taller, and is not rotund.

A memorandum sent by [illegible], the Embassy Security Officer, to Colonel URBAN, the Army Attache, on [illegible] indicates that KEYSERS' behavior had been a subject of concern for some months prior to his removal from Moscow:

[redacted]

In a report to U.S. Army authorities on the date of KEYSERS' removal, Colonel URBAN stated as follows:

[redacted]

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* See Part V.E.5.g., referring to Colonel [illegible]'s statement on security losses as a result of KGB microphones in this office.

[redacted]

[redacted]

NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO's leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. code clerks for which he was the supervisor; their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFEY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice ZWANG.

d. NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN

(i) Introduction

John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During his Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's ~~letter mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned~~ (zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.

The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's case officer responsibilities and the information he learned about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop.

(ii) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the Tourist Department to the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was interviewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for coverage of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was officially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and February 1965. He produced the information in the following paragraphs at that time.

When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, already had received some information on him, and this was given to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV when he visited the United States in 1959; from the way ABIDIAN had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA.* NOSENKO remarked that the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

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* One type was early-warning information, the other notification of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise, as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSKIY case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later assigned him the cryptonym "ARSEN," since this cryptonym had been used by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, KGB Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this unit had no information in addition to that already included in the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO said that he did not know and never obtained details about ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous foreign assignments, military service, or status as Foreign Service Reserve, Staff or Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO).**

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* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956, MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of 1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code clerks.

**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this publication is not available in the U.S. Embassy Section. He subsequently recalled that the Chief of the Section, KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on ABIDIAN.

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets.* As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent information in the surveillance reports.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reached not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability, NOSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE's succes~~sor, he might lead to another POPOV.** Therefore, no operational~~ plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify that:

- ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing approximately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by ABIDIAN.) The only item of operational interest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female employee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

- [redacted] KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. [redacted] never obtained significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing [redacted] as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy, but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962 that ABIDIAN had recruited [redacted] for an unspecified intelligence mission in France shortly before [redacted] left the Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section thereupon turned the case over to the KGB First Chief Directorate.*

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* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.

** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described by NOSENKO. The former, a "thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter mailings is described in greater detail below. NEPTUNE-80, a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry out surveillance long after the target has travelled a particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's trail.

- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

- All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

- Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the only two KGB agents or operational contacts who met ABIDIAN were Lyudmila GROMOKOVA and "KAMO" (KGB cryptonym, name not remembered by NOSENKO). GROMOKOVA, a language instructor for U.S. Embassy personnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Embassy Section officer N.A. GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He did not learn anything of operational significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.** "KAMO" was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ABIDIAN at the

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* [redacted] claimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order to extricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit him shortly before his departure from Moscow.

** NOSENKO first identified GROMOKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964. The list on which her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher, and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO during 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMOKOVA's photograph and failed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he again said she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable because she had a good education and was able to provide personality sketches on her students. He did not associate her with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in February 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. NOSENKO then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortly after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure. The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy personnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for the remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his contacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian language conversation but kept the topic limited to his past personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his trips on which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also reported that on 23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a letter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for forwarding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student. When ABIDIAN refused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVA tore up the letter.

Baku Restaurant. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken.[*]

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly with the office room number of each American employee. ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). A report from some agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office." NOSENKO did not know and said he was unable to determine whether ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation or conversation was heard from ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was there, and NOSENKO said that he did not remember any specific interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other microphones in the Embassy.[**]

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished. He said that he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development.

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made.[***] Such information, he stated, would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone;[****] even if the U.S. Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.

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[*] See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involving a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

[**] In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an inoperative microphone was discovered in 1964.

[***] ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years in Moscow. In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September 1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to New York City and Washington for briefings connected with the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

[****] When CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO added, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times whether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he knew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip or trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it would have been his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

- Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which provides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

- Notifying the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.

- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and other operational activity if desired.

- Receiving, reading, and filing all surveillance reports and reports of other operational activity carried out by local KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated further that even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return and that he did not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

NOSENKO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1960.* Thereupon NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave in October 1960. He said that he could not recall exactly the dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel time. NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more than five, days after his return from leave; he could not recall the date of his departure for Cuba[*]

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* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publications Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOSENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip, and that he remembered no other details.

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO could not name ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his close friends and professional contacts with foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names or nationalities of people whom ABIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN because there was nothing of interest in these conversations. NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts about ABIDIAN's relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.

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[*] NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 and therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from leave by 10 November at the earliest (five days before departure). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that, in this case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than 10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on 5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966, however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February 1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and truths were all a porridge." He told CIA again for the first time that his 1960 leave was taken in January of that year, immediately after joining the U.S. Embassy Section. Additional details on this January leave period are given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimed responsibility for operations against U.S. military attaches in 1960.

(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO reported KGB knowledge of one type of operational task performed by ABIDIAN in Moscow in addition to his recruitment of [redacted] (see above). This task, NOSENKO said, involved mailing at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB double agents.

According to NOSENKO on 11 June 1962, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN; he said that this was achieved through the use of metka: "Stop mailing letters from the Embassy, by Embassy employees. After LANGELLE you didn't mail letters for a year and a half, and then you began again. ABIDIAN mailed several.* ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy Security Officer. Listen, we have this cold /i.e. complete coverage of clandestine mailings/. We have a machine, and the machine finds the letters which are mailed. Without surveillance. The machine itself. This is a big, big secret. Here's how it works. They enter your room - you live in Moscow, work and even live in the Embassy. They /Soviet maids/ clean up the room and simply pour a powder or apply it with a rag /to your clothes/. A rag, even like a handkerchief. There is no smell. They put it in the pockets where you might put a letter. And there is a special little machine at a station in Moscow... All letters which are mailed in Moscow pass through this machine, under a fotoapparat /literally a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light-sensitive device/. We now have 12 /machines/ and hope to have 100 in Moscow. And all the letters pass through the apparatus and the machine itself selects the letter which was mailed by you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it... This is how it was with the letters that ABIDIAN mailed. We had them all because this machine gave them /to us/. I even would phone surveillance and say: 'He's out walking around. ABIDIAN is out walking around, checking, checking.' I would say: 'Drop him. But give me all the letters today.' The machine determines whether there is a special letter there."

Three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and final meeting with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he knew to whom these letters were addressed. NOSENKO replied: "To whom did ABIDIAN mail letters? First he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa. Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someone else. He mailed two or three letters. One letter was to the Baltic area. The same kind, that is we had planted this man on you. I think it was to Riga, to our double agent. And still, I think, two or three other letters, also to double agents.** But we didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed. There weren't any. I was concerned with ABIDIAN; therefore I know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic area because he was handled by the Second Section of the American Department, the 'Active Line' - penetration."*

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* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE was declared persona non grata in connection with the arrest of CIA agent POPOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed, one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960 (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until 1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension resulted from other considerations.

**In 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA, one to an agent in [redacted] on 1 April, the second to an agent in [redacted] on 2 July, and the third to a [redacted] agent on 1 September.

NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was detected mailing the letter to Odessa. While discussing personnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I heard that he was there in 1959... He is considered a specialist on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN sees all the letters mailed by Americans, even the American tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by use of metka. There are several types of metka with different colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel, another type on British Embassy personnel, and another type for tourists.** The same type is not always used against the same group. They are switched around. An example is in 1961 when ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a 'game' /igra - double agent operation/. The agent was 'ARKHANGELSKIY' /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ABIDIAN used to park his car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in the shop window, and he would check for surveillance. He was even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance men got in there ahead of him, but he didn't do anything. Then he walked by a post box on the street and was checking it. Two or three times he was followed by this post box but the surveillance never saw him mail a letter. Still the KGB would remove the contents of the letter box and send it in. On the second or third time SUMIN found the letter he mailed with metka. He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents. Of course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent since it was a 'game'."

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* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section of the American Department was concerned with the penetration of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-controlled agents for recruitment.

** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees. Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently negative with a single exception. One test, on one item of clothing, produced a sharply positive reaction. This article of clothing belonged to a third national diplomat who was a CIA operational support agent in Moscow; he was also the only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radioactive isotope tagging in connection with an operational task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA. There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing in subsequent tests.

Under interrogation in January 1965 NOSENKO described how metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents in the United States The following is taken from the protocol of these interrogations which NOSENKO signed as being accurate on 4 March 1965:

> "ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.
>
> "FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.
>
> "I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY'. He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them. as I was told by SUMIN. I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."*

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* In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Marion ALBAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. Thereafter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at all for the "first year or so" of his Moscow tour and that FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there. When ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy

(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. If ABIDIAN's recollection is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, apparently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.)

v) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB surveillance had observed a visit by ABIDIAN to a probable dead drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section/ in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caught in the PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate. /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the American Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, and that post was there for about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960, 1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there then /in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire time that surveillance was watching the Pushkin Street site/... At the beginning I came there two or three times. I came there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing anything /meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not submitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - 'nothing.' the next week passed - 'nothing'... I shall tell you why /I didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had occasions where there were many such places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded, but we had forgotten about that in the First /American/ Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department. I transferred in January 1962."

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier statements not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interrogations:

> - In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

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* Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servicing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around the corner and entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected dead drop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

- As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This is the case file which NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, or when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

- NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been discontinued by this time without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY. The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961, following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station, Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark. Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and then walked by it for a closer examination. Although it was not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 December 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later. The pair then returned to the Embassy.

These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations. It was pointed out that, by his own most recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to American citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been confirmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, much of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to this observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.

Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refused to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:

> "I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 December 1961. Therefore, I was told that:
>
> a. I could not have placed the surveillance report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already turned over the file to GRYAZNOV.
>
> b. I could not have received reports about the stationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's case officer, since I was already in the Seventh Department in January 1962.
>
> c. The three month period in which the surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two weeks after I left for Geneva.
>
> Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveillance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results or that it had been discontinued."

Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involvement with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly." On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols dealing with other subjects.

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concerning ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB surveillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop site (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961 as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at any time during this period.

On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In response, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an

American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the proposed site.

When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes,' and I cannot say 'no.'"

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported, however, that KOZLOV was on TDY in the United States from 15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December 1961, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard) time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.

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* The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initially contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to this address and the only ones connected with its use as a dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY returned and entered the building to check the precise dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.

e. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches

At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he assumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions, NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials from microphones in various Embassy offices. Later in this same session NOSENKO recalled--and told CIA for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against officers assigned to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogation was as follows:

Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions on what was expected of you in the Section?

NOSENKO: I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Question: What did KLYPIN say?

NOSENKO: That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I consider that you must also pay special attention to code clerks. We must study them and make an approach to one of them. It's necessary to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's office and I remember also that he raised the question: "O.K. He will supervise this kind of work, but maybe he can also take the military. All three attaches." Well, KLYPIN did not say yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn't know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, you see, KLYPIN said: "Let's try it a short period of time." It was that way. It was decided that I will supervise the code clerks and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I don't remember dates -- later I was not supervising the military attaches but concentrated only on code clerks.

Question: Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only code clerks?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: What do you mean you were supervising military attaches?

NOSENKO: What does it mean? If the case officers of the three attaches have any questions or any papers to report to the Chief of Section, they go to me, not to KOVSHUK. They were deciding all questions with me. This is what supervising the work on these three attaches means. They were deciding all questions with me. For example, the case officers who were working against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions, any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was such a division [of labor].

Question: Am I correct that by military attaches you mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Attaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.

Question: And enlisted personnel?

NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice.

Question: Roughly how long did you have the responsibilities for the attaches?

NOSENKO: (pause) I don't remember. Several months.

Question: By several, you mean...?

NOSENKO: Five or six.

Question: And why was this responsibility removed from you?

NOSENKO: I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see, besides this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which...

Question: What occupied most of your time?

NOSENKO: Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then something to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself...

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: What was most important?

NOSENKO: They were all important.

Question: Can you tell me where you were spending most of your time to cause the removal of your responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: No. I can't tell you.

Question: Who was given the responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: Just a moment. I think he was... I don't remember how, or what date, when there appeared in the First [American] Department a Deputy Chief of Department. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a little bit later.

Question: Who was this?

NOSENKO: ALESHIN.* And his job was such -- it was a new one -- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, not only Americans, but of other departments also, the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Coordination of the whole work against all military intelligence officers. And that's why, later, KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are the Deputy of the Chief." It was not only because of the lack of time. Also it wasn't convenient to the case officers. They were reporting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the same thing to him.

Question: Who were you supervising?

NOSENKO: ...GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLAZOV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines.**

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO changed his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section], after a month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. And then after two months I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on vacation after I came.* After two weeks I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either before or after the leave."** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force."

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* NOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Section officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordinating the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer."

** In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was responsible for the Naval Attache's office in January when NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him against this target.

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on all of them."

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* In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody of a file with case officer responsibilities. Therefore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches.

** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and 1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave immediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part of January and part of February" 1960; He had gone, he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother. He then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the truth in February [1965] when I said I was on leave before I went to Cuba [in November 1960]. I know this." (See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960 leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)

f. Knowledge of the Target

(i) Introduction

His position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and occupants of the Embassy offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB had identified as CIA officers. The information from NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.

(ii) Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derives both from his general supervisory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to NOSENKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, who shared the office and safe where this file was kept.

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself or others was done on the basis of this file during his two years in the section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements are given in the next paragraphs.

All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors* were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB employees ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic; the details or significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965.

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* The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas; the eighth, ninth, and tenth are.

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the information, he said, was interesting, important, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the agent sources of the KGB. In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.*

NOSENKO did not study the Embassy security procedures in detail and did not remember where the classified trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operationally, because the trash was always burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard accompanied by an officer.**

The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.****

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* There never has been such a sign; NOSENKO's responsibility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.

** A check with two former Embassy security officers indicates that there has never been such a regulation. The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "invariably does it alone." One of the security officers questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Soviets would think this to be the case, since whatever collateral information they have on it would point to the truth."

*** Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and participation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.

**** The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any of the technical details of this room.

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOGLAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, including the date, except that the charwoman was granted a cash award.

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2 September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence personnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect American Intelligence," the latter notation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were the CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a protocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the Embassy."

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and 1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The persons he so identified, together with his comments concerning them were:

-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident" in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB surveillance and of his letter mailing.* NOSENKO did not recall the names of KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in clandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's position in the Embassy, where he had been previously stationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union, where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything about his personal life, the names of close American friends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read the file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, "was reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--his previous position, attitude. Little, little details. I don't remember."*

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* MARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officer; see Part II.B.

-John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of State security officer in connection with Premier KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).

-George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in personal contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.

-Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a trip in the USSR.

Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer, but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact with BOWDEN.

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* See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer before MORELL arrived in Moscow.

** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy. NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February 1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN as FBI on later occasions also. See Part VI.D.7.c. on CHEREPANOV.

- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected of being a CIA officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any derogatory information concerning him.

- William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of microphones in the Embassy, discussing a report he had written, or dictating it, about his observations on a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said that he did not know the names of agents working against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained derogatory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO knew, there had been no operational approach to or recruitment of HORBALY.

Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in CIA. In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first arrived in Moscow he openly discussed the fact that he had come to the Embassy from CIA. While in Moscow he had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON, BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

During the time NOSENKO said he belonged to the American Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status as such was subsequently found to have been known to the KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page 374) reported having been asked by one of the two KGB officers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee; when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stanley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to the Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA officers were.

NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intelligence affiliation of any of these four persons:

- NOSENKO was shown a photograph of MAHONEY, whom he did not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's name, which he recognized as being that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. NOSENKO said that, other than this, he did not know anything about MAHONEY--his previous career, his knowledge of the Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he departed, where he lived, his activities there, or evidence that he was an intelligence officer. "It wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have known. But there was none." NOSENKO was told that MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KGB penetration of British intelligence [George BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no information from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that had there been such information available, he would have been a special target and would have been handled by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO added that he could not understand why this information about MAHONEY was not given to the section by the KGB First Chief Directorate.

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* Earlier NOSENKO had said the KGB classified HORBALY as a CIA cooptee.

- NOSENKO identified Paul GARBLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said that he could provide no other details on GARBLER. NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names of any agents working against GARBLER, that he knew of no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" concerning him.

- NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO's superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA, BROWN shared an office with HORBALY, whom NOSENKO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB microphone with good reception but insignificant production, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961, and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer.

CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a joint CIA/MI-6 project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS personnel by his true first name only.

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* See first footnote, Page 243.

** An operative microphone was found in this office in 1964. In discussing the microphones in the Embassy, NOSENKO said that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuous monitoring of the microphones in HORBALY's and BROWN's office so that this monitoring could be used on targets of higher priority. See also Part V.E.4.g.

MAHONEY arrived in Moscow on 4 October 1960 as the Assistant General Services Officer at the U.S. Embassy. His specific CIA mission there was to support the handling of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in America House. From the start of his tour he was active in his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In checking locations connected with the PENKOVSKIY case, MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on two occasions during November and December 1960, and he made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as well as of its related signal site on 21 January 1961. Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive KGB surveillance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN commented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to the barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on myself, it continues to be occasional and extremely discreet."

George BLAKE, the KGB penetration of MI-6, was arrested in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other materials on this project. On this basis, MAHONEY was relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn from Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR). On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, with the rank of Commander. In September 1961 his official biographic data was forwarded to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April 1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions in Washington on the question of tourist operations into the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access to information on the agenda and participants for these talks, admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed the minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his Soviet handlers. On this basis CIA presumed that GARBLER was identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He was definitely identified as such in an article carried in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya in October 1963. This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson," was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how "the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use of the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HAMAN named GARBLER as having been involved in this work. This article, which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of WENNERSTROM, described a number of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HAMAN or with anything which HAMAN describes.*

GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

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* See Page 394 for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.

g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy. These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and techniques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless microphones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic operations against this target dated mainly from the period when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NOSENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed.

(ii) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in detail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the microphones became operative, but presumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was occupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the importance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or two they [the microphones] will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of political intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery building is presented in the following portions of this paper.

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*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the microphones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this remark suggests either that there was an external power source for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of such matters.

**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be in place at the time of occupancy.

(a) NOSENKO's Sources

Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was obtained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962. NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of information on the microphones are presented in chronological order below.

"We are listening to everything the military attaches say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans from our workers in other departments, from the English Department, from the French Department....We are listening to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it will be the end of me....Only three people know that we are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directorate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you."

NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these reports were delivered to his office. He answered: "No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned with this function which is called the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this, everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... [They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but I was required to return the report within two days' time. So, I would read through the materials to see what was useful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would underline this [the significant items] with a pencil. No, [I was wrong]. The report first went to the Chief of department and then I underlined with a pencil what was necessary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."

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*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility in certain instances.

**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained from the microphone system, according to the damage report by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.

During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those microphones which are actively used in monitoring conversations in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what "listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question:	How did this list come into your hands? What caused you to write it?
NOSENKO:	I came to KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working well, this one badly, and so on.
Question:	What was the date of this? What year and month?
NOSENKO:	Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning of 1961.
Question:	At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 you and KOVSHUK met in KLYPIN's office?

NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is difficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting: To discuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these released positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV, Chief of the American Department's section for work against American tourists and delegates suspected of being connected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing further on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones came from this meeting.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and signed were returned to the Second [Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material from this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, depending on their interest. If there was something interesting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it and give it to GRIBANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] came by car with this material. She went to KLYPIN. Sometimes she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Directorate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the original transcripts to this female worker; they were usually in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate] GRYAZNOV."

(b) Number and Locations of Microphones

The information from NOSENKO on the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.

NOSENKO's Information

11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been assured that none of the information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office.... Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy [where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor.... And we are listening to all your military attaches there. All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Force Attache....We have four or five points [from which we are getting intercepts]. We hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attaches--that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man [William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."

12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had something there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itself, in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is [Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material."

14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that concerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nothing. [NOSENKO is evidently describing the military code room.]....There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there is nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the field of agriculture. Nothing interesting."

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Military Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Embassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting the list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960 or early 1961 meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPIN received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1964 that it was decided to release the microphone positions in the GLEYSTEEN office, the HORBALY-BROWN office, the State Department code room and the teletype office. This would leave a total of eight 'listening posts.")

14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were installed in the chancery building before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were placed in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and the placement of the microphones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls.

January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KGB agents employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because such devices are too easily found. For the same reason, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or in the apartments of such Embassy officers as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal."

Information from Other Sources

In 1956 a sensitive source holding a senior position in the KGB submitted a written report to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow with the cautionary remark: "Do not speak about this information in the rooms of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows: "Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the KGB, I strongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American direction-finding specialists* in Stalingrad during the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American intelligence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to work and experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it is impossible to find them, even with special-purpose instruments."

GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the existence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many more had been installed in the chancery prior to 1953. (GOLITSYN was debriefed in early 1962 and his information on this subject was disseminated within the U.S. Government approximately two weeks before NOSENKO's initial contact with CIA.) GOLITSYN said he had learned of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by chance he happened to see a particular document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, during one of his visits to the American Department in 1960** he heard and saw that a report or reports concerning the results of audio-surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced. While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American Department ordered all personnel present to search for these papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large number of reports with red stripes across their covers, indicating that they were the property of the Operational Technical Directorate. The only office in the U.S. Embassy that GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with this search was that of the Minister Counsellor.*

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*This is a reference to the arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and SFROLD and the seizure of sensitive electronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of this equipment was based on information obtained from microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b.(viii).

**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again consulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 (he has not been more specific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961.

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis of NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the chancery building for the presence of microphones in the spring of 1964. The results have been described in the damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on 7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were discovered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the east face of the Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed audio cable which ran along the east face of the Chancery to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At this point, these cables were spliced into a one hundred and one (101) pair cable along with two ten (10) pair cables.... A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten, twenty, and thirty pair cables to the various microphone installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively identified.** Two (2) microphones not physically located can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6J based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with the exception of those offices with doors entering onto balconies and when exterior building constructions were adjacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."

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*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy Section had received from the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate "in 1960 or 1961." This document, according to NOSENKO, was "one of the reports with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document. The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, however, and, in the end, the case was closed with the conclusion that the document had probably been burned inadvertently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up. In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in December 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN's erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this document and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961. The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not in Moscow at the time.

**Four more were subsequently located, for a total of 54.

The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--one in the Ambassador's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.S. Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones

NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone installations:

11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy [to make new installations]. In that respect your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we can't get into."

14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of course, are from the...[Note: one or two words on the tape are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks, particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The shayba [microphone], as we call them, is fading and only two or three people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [probably speaking of machine noise]. From this point [pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he was speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be completely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to [recruiting] code clerks at all costs."

31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room [office of the Agricultural Attaches], there is no acoustical [sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now currently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard from Minister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very

difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second Special Department] and they told me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape]....[After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing...in general [from all of the microphones]." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good reception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room "only always the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines only....Reception was good when conversation came through. I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room] in 1960 and 1961."

On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of December 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:

- -one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache;
- -three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache;
- -one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counsellor;
- -the microphone in the office of the Publications Procurement Officer;
- -the microphone in the Marine bar;
- -the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
- -the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
- -the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
- -the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
- -the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
- -the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air Attache;
- -the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval Attaches;
- -the microphone in the Navy administrative office;
- -the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which NOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 and

1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO has said no microphone was installed).* On-site recordings made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsellor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelligibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in the military and State Department code rooms in the office of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelligibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible production by the code room microphones would have been sharply reduced by the installation of acoustical rooms during 1962.

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*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S. Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959. HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the report was made in the office of the Security Officer.

(d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production

Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO's Statements

11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind of fitness report [kharakteristika]. Sometimes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dictated something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weaknesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find-out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them--always....They chatter sometimes. Some of the things they say are surprising [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus....What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment]? Well, they are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing there and everything....They talk about interesting things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once."

12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Service Attaches] "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have something there.' We know it at once. I personally telephone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the department to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work almost openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Confidential cables [in the clear]. We receive the clear text and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything because of interference [teletype machine noise]....We didn't get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the code clerk James] STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course,

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*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.

all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding."

14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK and the decision to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section requirements for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NOSENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from the rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural Attache. The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take, not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued: "KOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see, nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing of interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEV [English-language Section of Second Special Department] and say: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or three men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard. For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip.... But we heard nothing about agents."

Later on this occasion the following diagogue took place:

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing.

Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?

NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, FEDOSEYEV, and KOVSHUK considered that there was a room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for the meeting.

Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-room?

NOSENKO: First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had information that the Embassy had such a chamber made out of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEYSTEEN's office was working, I remember. Reception was good, but there was no secret information. I don't know [about reception from this mike in 1962].

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*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for the summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incident on 2 May 1960.

Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]?

NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell which room. I think he was speaking about the group...

Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office?

NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY.

Question: What about the code room and teletype office?

NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.

Question: What about the military [code] area?

NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant [William HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera.

Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable.

NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was interesting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the [CPSU] Central Committee. There were political questions, for example.

26 January 1965: The following is taken from an interrogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

a. From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB.

c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific Military Attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific results from any trip. I do not remember any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY [Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating interesting opinions of the Embassy concerning the political situation and this material was looked at by the information group and then they were preparing special reports for KHRUSHCHEV."

Evaluation by Others

Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the microphone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphone was found and his statements below relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*

> "James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was dating a foreign national, I believe a secretary in the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not available. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism.
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> "M/Sgt. Peter BINDER [manager of America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of his keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, drinking habits, and any other incident of importance that might occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office.
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> "In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual activities, and he admitted to me being a participant in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, located on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as to the details of the incident.
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> "I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administrative procedures necessary in removing the individuals from Station.

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*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the residents of America House, and he personally participated in approaches to the two code clerks named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS. The STORSBERG and KEYSERS cases are discussed in Part V.B.3.c.

> [Summing up] "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very definite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can make."

In its general introduction, the USIB damage report states: "Although there has been no observable indication that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment of the United States based upon information considered possibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

The following extract from the USIB damage report concerns the declining value of the production from the microphones in 1962 and 1963.*

> "The security practices and procedures appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams....In September 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated

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*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason was the natural decline in efficiency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security procedures.

outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices. There were many discussions in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in themselves considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and-- street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room was constructed in the attache section and has since been utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."

(iii) Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented below.

11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy, I wrote an entire report about it. SHELEPIN was still there then [as KGB Chairman. I proposed that] equipment be installed in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it?' At the time there was an improvement in mutual relations (between the Soviet Union and the United States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and before this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in Warsaw.* SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it? We now have good relations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want complications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it was already too late. ABIDIAN was going there all the time, the Security Officer. It was already too late because this can be done only while the building is being built. When the windows and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do it slowly. Don't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assistants... You must be very, very clever and very, very foxy... Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the building, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and won't have anything."

31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right (north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was SHELEPIN. He didn't go for this. Whether it was the flap with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it was something else or whether it was the international situation, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then, later, when the building was finished, and when you were finishing or putting up the addition yourself, at that point it was too late to put these things in. It was impossible to do it."

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* NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of 19 microphones in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965 that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been something else."

No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one-hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof area to the basement of the North Annex...[All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows:

> "1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The center conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was unconnected.
>
> "2. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill....The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.
>
> "3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate path of the other coaxial cables to the block of reinforced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was unterminated...".

The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables were carefully insulated."

The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths [of] the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas.... No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire....The location of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses. The possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The most likely use is as an antenna although the other possibilities have not been completely discarded.

"a. Antenna for collection effort directed against code room.

"b. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technique.

"c. An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone system.

"d. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation.

"e. Not in use."

(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure area"--of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal has been underway since October 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has some intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The interview went as follows:

NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works against the Embassy. I know.

Question: Do you know what it is?

NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they put things in, and they listen and they do something, and they...

Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too.

Question: And it is for listening in?

NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment.

Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly?

NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I don't really know.

Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining information?

NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So we find out whether you're listening in on some of our communications or something like this.

Question: To what extent would you in your [American] Department, in your [U.S. Embassy] Section, know about these technical aspects? Would you have to know it? Would you know the details of these things?

NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that the members of the [KGB] Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern themselves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn't concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Section.

Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. It was this system, he said, which had determined that the Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" transmissions from the Embassy. NOSENKO repeated that "not being a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the job, or any further details.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question:	When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKO:	1960, November and December 1960.
Question:	Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
NOSENKO:	No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

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* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but practically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place, they were lazy bums. They would go to a lesson once and then miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two." In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted against any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer before he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies.

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* CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately September 1961, when he left Moscow.

4. Overseas Assignments

a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethiopia (1960)

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma. O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character weaknesses.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows: "Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was studying in the Higher School of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956 he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to GRIBANOV: 'Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.' When the Personnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and happened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office himself. He said: 'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and then said that at that time they made an investigation of my previous residence. And they found out that while I was studying at the Institute [of International Affairs] and was living on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me; different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week. This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954. And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides these things that I just mentioned."

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.* NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a security officer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel to this country.

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* NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in 1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease. See Part IV.B.

He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa application had been submitted in true name and under a different cover: "In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKOLAYEV representing the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't go anywhere. Then when this question came up of my going to the States in 1960, I said: 'I'm not going. I've been going under the Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sports delegations. This has to be changed somehow at this point.' So we thought about it and finally somebody said: 'Look, how about this? Perhaps [you can use] this committee of RUDNEV's [GNTK].' So I said: 'Well, it's up to you. You decide.' By that time my passport was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an agreement yet. It was decided that this delegation would go to the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have used the NIKOLAYEV name for his trip to the United States. He replied: "Sure, I could have gone as NIKOLAYEV, but I just didn't want to. Because, look, it was known to us that the British and American Intelligence exchange information on people they suspect of being KGB, and that the British, of course, had probably watched me when I was in England [in 1957 and 1958] and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under the cover of Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It kind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. Also suspicious. So then I have to go to the States. And if I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go there and they'd say: 'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different cover now.' But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard the name. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under some other alias. He answered: "That's the way it was decided. I guess so as not to get all mixed up they decided to send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."**

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* This visa application was submitted approximately six months after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to Ethiopia.

** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO said that he had been forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV because this was the name he had used with British citizens [redacted] when they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he could not, he said, have shown up in England with another name as [redacted] upon their return from the USSR (see Part V.D.4.d.). This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name for the U.S. visa application, for NOSENKO had used the name SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part V.D.4.h.) and the name PETERSON when he recruited Professor Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part V.D.4.1.). NOSENKO was in contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during this period. NOSENKO and other sources have said that the KGB suspected that FRIPPEL was an American agent (see Part V.D.5.).

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

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Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.

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NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to go to Cuba. GRIBANOV's deputy [S.G.] BANNIKOV, said that a worker [KGB officer] should be sent. But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba. "Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?" Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]. Someone from the Central Committee said: "No, there is a directive that one of our workers must go nevertheless." And only two days remained before the departure of the delegation. Who could they send?

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* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

Question: The first person they come across.

NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was ready. And they decided: "Get going immediately." We flew through Amsterdam, through Geneva. We spent a night in Amsterdam and then made a short stop in Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a headwind and the pilots were evidently afraid that we wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out of its way and made a landing on the island of Barbados. This was not a Soviet plane, but KLM. We flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM. Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water and natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba we flew through Kingston, through Jamaica, and then to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we did not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and through Parararibo--Dutch Guiana--across the ocean, some island or another there, and from there again Lisbon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. But here the entire delegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1962. His story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure to Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining before the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said: "Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready. His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement continued: "So somebody said: 'How about a visa?' And KUZNETSOV says 'Never mind. The Cubans will give him an entry visa.' And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately and The Netherlands issued their visa also right away."

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went: "I was with the delegation. They go to a plant--I go with them to the plant. I was with them all the time. They went to different plants, to watch the production. They met with some representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and they would have many discussions about how to increase production." NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull. He explained that he would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was to be, and that he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Resident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA, who was touring the Satellite countries and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 November 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 December 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is no record that he travelled to Berlin.**

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* CIA obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport while he was passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

** It appears possible that his name was not removed from the original passenger manifest for the 15 December flight to Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went unnoticed.

d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a security "watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this way: "I think I first heard that I was going to Bulgaria, a week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the section having contact with the counterintelligence representatives of the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies in Moscow... He said: 'You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.' He asked, 'Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said: 'KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] must tell you.' But this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria. After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He repeated the same thing and after about one and a half weeks I flew to Sofia." The discussion continued as follows:

Question:	What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before you left? What briefings or discussions were held concerning what you were to do in Sofia?
NOSENKO:	I was told: "You are going for consultations. There are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with you." No one was speaking with me about my trip.
Question:	What discussions did you have with your department chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this trip?
NOSENKO:	Nothing. He told me: "You will go. You will see what they are doing. You will tell them how to work."
Question:	Did you have any meetings or discussions with the representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow before you left?
NOSENKO:	No.
Question:	What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his section about what you were going to do in Sofia?
NOSENKO:	YEGOROV said: "You will go. You will tell us what they are doing."
Question:	Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know anything about the size of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO:	No. Nothing.
Question:	Did you know the names of any of the officers of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO:	No.

Question: Did you know what any of their particular problems were?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was then introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours and told them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work." At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has provided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part. About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were scheduled to visit Bulgaria in the near future, and he came across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records and an immediate phone call was placed to Moscow, asking for traces.

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* NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarians in this instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and that he had been away from the work for a number of years.

A reply was received almost at once: "Yes. This is the same LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told CIA that the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not previously known of them.

NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows: "KOZLOV and the Chief of the American Department were very interested. KOZLOV said: 'George [NOSENKO], you must help them. They never recruited an American.' I said that I would do what I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. I asked them if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they had one who is an operational contact. O.K., I said, acquaint them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he had been there, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. Then we went to YEGOROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANOV thought that I, myself, wanted to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the phone. GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. 'What are you doing?' he said. 'You are not at home, you are abroad. You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if you were at home.' I said: 'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to do anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgarians were to ask me, I could not do it myself. YEGOROV became upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians were asking. 'What they ask, I will tell,' I said, 'but I am not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is caught. I can dictate the questions to be asked. But the approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one. The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the time element... The Chief of the American Department, KOVACHEV, and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was made at the end of April, I think."

NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the approach. I told them I would not leave. 'If you need my advice,' I said, 'come to me.' KOZLOV and I were sitting in his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. I said they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I told them that if he agreed, they should change the place right away. Take him some place nice to finish the conversation. That's what I suggested."

The outcome was not known to NOSENKO, for he said: "I didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see one. I took a neutral position. They said everything was O.K. The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief. I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1, 2, and 3 May. When I returned they said everything was O.K. and that he [LUNT] had left. I asked them what they had decided for the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference."

This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs somewhat from what he had said earlier, on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimed then that he personally participated in the recruitment of LUNT against GRIBANOV's wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. The Minister of Internal Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to help. An [American] professor arrived, a very prominent specialist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians] had never tried [to recruit] an American. 'Let's try,' I said. The Soviet advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American. GRIBANOV was in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.' Then he hung up. What could I do? The Bulgarians had already made all preparations... I was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the office of the advisor and they were waiting for me... I decided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I told them to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they began and I came there. He [NOSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was poor... I said: 'You are a pederast.' He also proved himself to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria]... 'Well, what will society think of you, those whose know you?' Well, what did this person decide? He agreed."

The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still in Geneva. He volunteered the following: "In Bulgaria in April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate in this, I went there, and I helped them there with the whole process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bulgarians with what to do and how. He was the professor of philology, LUNT."

NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the approach was made the day before he left on his May Day holiday. On 24 April 1964 he said: "I remember that it was at the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was the same LUNT. I went on a trip the 1st, 2nd, 3rd of May. That is the 30th of April, 1st and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away, given all the data, and they called back right away and said: 'Yes, this is the same LUNT who was in Moscow...' As soon as this was established, the next day the Bulgarians planted this homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got together and decided to meet with each other the same day or the next day. This was all done very rapidly."

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. He travelled on 9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once reported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to 28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to whom he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian civil police while walking on the street with LUNT. After leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, on 25 April 1961, LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning.

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962

In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Department. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job, however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the American Department for it. (In fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had once held the job, losing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.) NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation which his own promotion to this post would have created. NOSENKO described his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

> "The decision for me to return to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First [American-British-Canadian] Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN [who was retiring in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons... for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tourist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the U.S. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the next few days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when he returned to the Tourist Department in 1962.

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* These specific dates were arrived at under interrogation in February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); he said in February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred at the end of December and reported to his new position at the beginning of January (see below).

F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

1. Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department to become Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the date as 2 or 3 January 1962. He has also reported that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March 1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January 1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E. JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation** confirmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Department. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDIAN made only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the "facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any correlation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department, he had originated any new methods for operations against American tourists. He replied that during this period he had proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye toward the KGB attempting to recruit them.* This suggestion, NOSENKO said, had been accepted.

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* Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

** See Part V.F.4. for details on this operation.

In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked what new knowledge concerning the use of tourism for espionage purposes by foreign intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied that the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this period. NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new information nor had he heard of such an agent.**

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIBANOV, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department in July 1962, immediately after his return from Geneva. A year later he was made First Deputy Chief of the Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apart from saying he was V.D. CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962 to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tourist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically concerning these duties.

NOSENKO's first operational activity after transferring to the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN, and in the arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KOTEN. For a short time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his supervisory position in the Tourist Department NOSENKO also became involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases - JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962. Finally, NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB investigation of Lee Harvey OSWALD after President KENNEDY's assassination in November 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

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* NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see Part V.D.5.).

** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George BLAKE, a staff officer of MI-6, who confessed after his arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington during April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate the American and British programs for legal travel operations, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union. Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain portions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.

***KOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR by this tourist agency.

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962 to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962, soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOSENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for a conference on tourist travel with KGB representatives from the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17 December 1963 to assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO's Agents

When NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's comments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said: "FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in 1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow, but FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.* Whereas NOSENKO had normally met FRIPPEL in the company of CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to the two 1963 meetings.

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* The only other agent whom NOSENKO handled during this period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See Part V.F.6.).

b. Johan PREISFREUND:

After GOLITSYN's defection, NOSENKO said, the KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy Section to continue to handle PREISFREUND while serving in the Tourist Department, but as PREISFREUND spoke only Finnish and Russian, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962 and 1963, this agent was not used operationally.

c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV:

NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not been used in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section. It was, according to NOSENKO, the last time they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were sent by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENKO explained that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.

d. [redacted]

When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department, he was instructed by the American Department Chief, S.M. FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, to continue to handle [redacted] studying in Moscow. NOSENKO had personally recruited [redacted] and had used him in the development of U.S. military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1961, an operation which was still underway at the time of NOSENKO's transfer. NOSENKO continued to meet [redacted] during the first months of 1962, and he recalled that in February or March of that year he instructed [redacted] to attempt to arrange a social meeting with ZUJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NOSENKO turned [redacted] over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. [redacted] was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO believed he left at that time to return to Syria.

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* FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended to visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was no such meeting. See Part V.D.5.

e. **Marina RYTOVA:**

Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTANTINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations, and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964. He did not indicate that RYTOVA took part in any operations from January 1962 until she began work for the Central Committee.

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON

a. NOSENKO's Information:

NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1962. He did not name JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited /an American/. I cannot remember his name. He is from California, a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fat, and he turned out to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals. In particular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/ - I'm afraid that they are known to you and the English... Here is what happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: 'Write it yourself.' So he typed it on a typewriter. I said: 'No, I don't want it typed. Write it out longhand.'... He had a very reactionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups, churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the government horribly. He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the government is lousy and everything here is poor. I said to him: 'Write, damn it, that the best country /in the world/ is the Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. Write, write.' In general he did everything /I asked/ but then, right away, he ran to the Embassy and told everything. This was in January of this year /1962/. He told everything. I know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job. 'Tell me when he comes,' /I ordered/. I sat down. 'He has come,' /the surveillance team reported/. 'Where is he?' /I asked/. 'In his room,' /they said/. 'We'll wait,' /I replied/. They reported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: 'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him. I knew that he had told everything in the Embassy. /I said:/ 'How are you? How about our connection in the States? And our work in the States? What do you think about it?' I said to him: 'Will you work? Can you give us something important or not?' He answered: 'I have nothing.' I said: 'And if I make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?' 'No,' he said, 'I will do anything you want.' But I couldn't tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said: 'Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad person.' We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. 'Go home, damn you,' I said. 'But if you write one insulting article about Russia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called /the Embassy/: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was frightening me.' We know he called the Embassy. We heard everything."

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* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies.

NOSENKO's first reference to JOHNSON in 1964 was at a meeting on 2 February, when he produced a note bearing that name and the date 5 January 1962. "Here I have a name jotted down, Everett Wallace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was 5 January 1962, but what took place I have absolutely no recollection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or something like that. But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that "it was something like JOHNSON, JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a 'J'" and that he was a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing "just a coat, no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked whether the KGB First Chief Directorate would have any use for JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that they /the KGB/ decided something had to be done" to stop him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. At about the same time there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR - no recruitment was attempted, because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had determined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (F. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.*

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* In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received its first indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both these agents.

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken, but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office, and he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in accordance with KGB orders. NOSENKO discussed the situation with JOHNSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union." JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that, upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise, the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from five to eitht years for such relations. It used to be three to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this, JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate the Soviet Union in the future.

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this way. And not everything that is written this way gets into their hands. In this case there was a coincidence. There was something we could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably just say: 'All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid of him. Let's see that his trip is cut off.'"

While discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January 1965, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: This (the approach) took place in the summertime of '62 or '63.

Question: In your notes, you have the date 5 January 1962.

NOSENKO: No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember it was summer; I think it was '63.

course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first signal is very helpful. So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they will start watching him from the time the flight starts. Now, as soon as he crosses the border, he will be watched by the border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel. This is a very important business, because the main task in regard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists those persons who are of interest from the operational point of view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and, when the processing is almost finished, another person is added to the group. Nobody knows this person in the group... but he was added at the last minute. So this is an indication. This is what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion, of course... In such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or twice a year. You know, such a little Jewish fellow - an emigre from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The last time he came he told us: 'You know, I'm thinking about it all the time,' he says. So they asked him: 'Are you afraid? Why are you shaking?' He says, 'Well, I'm not afraid; I'm not shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His pseudonym is 'ANOD' and his last name is SVENCHANSKIY. Well, I'll give you all this later."

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KGB many open code messages such as those described above, and a number of these messages have been considered to have been of definite operational interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the president of "Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.

There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March 1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in contacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was determined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO replied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.) The recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that Inturist would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for blackmarketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement. NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, and his name was entered in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September and one towards the end of 1963.

b. Information from Other Sources:

CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born on 6 March 1909 in Theodosia, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on his father's papers in 1929. His earliest employers were the "All-Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until December 1942. During the Second World War, SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S. Army Air Force as "official translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews. From October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for refusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the Soviet Foreign Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and September 1963.

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* At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSENKO) was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to his U.S. Air Force service in Alaska, [redacted] of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close contacts with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been instrumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and possibly a Communist agent." [redacted] Identified as a Soviet agent by Elizabeth BENTLEY, KAZAKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by GOLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had connections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers (two of them reported on by NOSENKO).

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* The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried the story of GOLD's testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N. Aide linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported that GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week before.

An FBI report [redacted]64 [redacted]
SVENCHANSKIY [redacted]

7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

a. Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1964 whether he had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963 Almost at once, NOSENKO recognized this as the case of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY - see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated in the arrest and had never met KOTEN, he had supervised the case from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me."

NOSENKO said that KOTEN had long been a member of the American Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.** Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. Moreover, on the eve of KOTEN's 1963 trip, the Tourist Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTEN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important [redacted] agent of the KGB's [redacted] Legal Residency, and that KOTEN intended to visit them while in the USSR. NOSENKO said he did not know the name of this agent [redacted]

This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an "interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working actively for th[redacted] Legal Residency and had provided the KGB with "good, solid information" with "very valuable material for technical intelligence;" at the same time the agent had been asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citizen, but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's production had recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the agent declined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union and now he was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, but in addition, it was about this time that the agent came into contact with KOTEN NOSENKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN "used to go to some bookstore that sells Soviet literature and through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEN knows, he became acquainted with the agent, who also used to go to this store. After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

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* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SOKOLOW in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVENCHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOW.

** NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently sponsored such contacts.

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store in order to meet and "work on" the agent and that, having learned that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, about 17 kilometers from Sochi.., he had evidently received the assignment (to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on him." The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives, former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When they arrived at KOTEN's hotel, however, the hotel administrator told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow a meeting. KOTEN then took it upon himself to travel to Stantsiya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the relatives. In the course of this meeting KOTEN took photographs of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along. From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get documentary data" and it therefore decided to "try to get hold of KOTEN."

There had already been some indication during KOTEN's earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments, the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on myself because everybody got excited. Everybody said: 'Let's go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right now.'" By this time KOTEN had travelled to Tbilisi, and there a homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations in a public park. These were suitably documented, and he was then picked up by the local Militia. (In the absence of his superiors and fearing the possible repercussions, NOSENKO had insisted that the illegal acts take place in a public place, and that the KGB not participate in KOTEN's apprehension.) After questioning by the Militia, KOTEN was permitted to continue his itinerary to Kiev, where he was scheduled to stay for two days before leaving the USSR

Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate, which was growing increasingly concerned that the [redacted] agent of the [redacted] Residency would be apprehended by the FBI, wanted to get him out of the United States before this happened. To 'establish the true purpose" of KOTEN's presence in the USSR and whether he was an American agent, as well as to hold him until the [redacted] agent had arrived safely in the USSR (as NOSENKO told the FBI on 24 February 1964), it was requested that KOTEN be detained in the Soviet Union. The decision was made to arrest him at once on the basis of the compromising materials obtained in Tbilisi. Following the arrest by the Kiev Militia, KOTEN was turned over to the KGB for interrogation; the purpose, NOSENKO said, was to "break him," to secure the admission that he was an American Intelligence agent. At the same time [redacted] the [redacted] agent had failed to keep a number of scheduled meetings with his KGB case officer, and the Legal Residency feared that something had gone wrong. He did eventually appear, however, and NOSENKO has described the subsequent meetings as follows: "They asked him: 'Are you going to leave the States?' He said: 'Well, I don't know. I have to think about it some more.' So we said: 'No, you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole affair.' So he said: You know, I was thinking of leaving with my wife, but my wife does not want to leave.' To make a long story short, they spent three meetings trying to talk him into leaving, and he kept hesitating. He didn't seem to want to leave, so then they told him: Look, we are breaking off contact with you. If you decide to go, you know how to do it. You are to go from the United States to some place in Europe and go to the Soviet Embassy there. They will give us a signal and the visa will be issued to you. But as far as we're concerned, we're breaking contact with you.'"

After this, according to NOSENKO, the KGB released KOTEN when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.

b. Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN

At the time of his arrest KOTEN was an instructor of Russian at New York University, director of the Library for Intercultural Studies, and a regular contributor to the New World Review and the magazine Jewish Life. Both the Library for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated "Communist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American Activities; the New World Review has been cited as a propaganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that, despite his arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to return there in the future and that he "still loved the Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarianism of the Soviet Government."

Regarding the arrest, the New York Times on 29 August 1963 carried an article under the headline "U.S. Guide Missing

After Soviet Trip;" the article stated that "an American tour of the Soviet Union ended today (28 August) at Kiev with the apparent arrest of the New York guide identified as Bernard L. Koten of Afton Tours." A second article datelined 29 August, Moscow, reported that "an official of the Soviet Inturist travel organization said today that Bernard L. Koten... had been arrested on charges of homosexual activities with a Soviet citizen. He said that Mr. Koten... was arrested in Kiev Tuesday night (27 August) and was being held in Tiflis (Tbilisi)... where the alleged offense took place." A third Times article, filed in Moscow on 28 September 1963, stated that KOTEN, who had been arrested on 26 August, had been released on 28 September and was enroute to Vienna; the article also noted that "officials of Inturist reported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on the reasons and circumstances of his arrest."

Several of KOTEN's friends have also commented on his arrest:

- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espionage agent in the past, was reported by an FBI source [redacted]

- Eda GLASER, a "close associate of KOTEN" and the office manager of the Four Continents Book Store, a Soviet book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as "fantastic" and a "fabrication." [redacted]

- SVENCHANSKIY, who returned to the United States from Moscow while KOTEN was still being held, stated that the morals charge against him was true but he (SVENCHANSKIY) had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and that KOTEN would be released.

FBI sources reported that KOTEN later made the following remarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:

[redacted]

[illegible]. After his release, [illegible] told that he could return to the Soviet [illegible] In fact, he could have returned [illegible] if he wished to do so. The arrest by the [illegible] and the mistake had been corrected.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible]

8. Arrest of BARGHOORN

a. Information from NOSENKO

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963; he was questioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the American Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could serve as material for an arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other possibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches.

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*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, furnish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of other operational activity centering around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 October 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immunity and were released; a few days later they were declared persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV, who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was jailed. All have been identified as KGB officers [redacted]

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damaging materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocation was not to be mentioned).

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*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at "about 60."

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. While the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKO--were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the local KGB organization in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well as BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.*)

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

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*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN returned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on 31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on 30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31 October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA attended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*

After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The closed package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

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*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had been present on the day after the arrest. At this interrogation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN reported that the materials were not discussed at this particular interrogation.

The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed the date of the approach as 5 January 1962, the date contained in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSENKO used the name NIKOLAYEV (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had (homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?

NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately - one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (American Department), and now I remember that I moved to the Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis) after 1 January 1962.

b. Information from JOHNSON:

JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothesmen in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor' said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doctor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this statement and was taken to a man in a third room who identified himself as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power to dismiss the whole affair, provided JOHNSON would do him a favor. The favor turned out to be a signed commitment that he would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States."

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* NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends in Moscow.

In the afternoon of 8 January, JOHNSON called the Embassy to say that he had been recontacted by the Chief of Police, who reminded him of his pledge and showed him four pictures. JOHNSON said: "I don't know where they got them, but they were dillies." During the interviews by the FBI [redacted] 1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially the same story, continuing to deny that he had actually been compromised. In addition to letters to his parents, JOHNSON said he wrote to about 20 other people, mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he did not tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV and NOSENKO on 13 May 1965, JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "somewhere" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was that of a younger man whom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statement on 2 February 1964: "In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Horst BRAUNS came to the Soviet Union. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that time could not recall his name.* We tried to recruit him but did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningrad, and in 1942 he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served in the German Army, and after the war he changed his name and went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different - it is Russian - because he changed his name when he was in Germany."

NOSENKO went into the operation against BRAUNS in greater detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case. This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Leningrad. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, when the Germans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took him along and some other people, local people, and so he found himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he worked in West Germany and then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - I don't remember /which year/ - he came to the United States and settled down. Why we became interested in this fellow... /NOSENKO thought his name was something like 'BRUNKS' or 'BRONX'/ is because he came from Russia. So, according to Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor of your country. So there was something to talk to him about. Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section or some other section /of the KGB First Chief Directorate/ that the man is working in some very interesting company that makes computers or adding machines or some other instruments. But when I talked to him he already left the company. He wasn't working with this company any more.

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* BRAUNS did not arrive in Moscow until after NOSENKO had returned to the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1962, according to travel records.

"They called him to Inturist. They gave him a room in the Inturist /Hotel/. Then KRUPNOV transferred him from the Inturist to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started talking to him. Then he left him in his room and called us up - said that he needed help, that he can't do anything with the man. I thought that he would be able to handle him all by himself, so I said to KOVSHUK:* 'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere, so I guess I'd have to go help him.' I got there and I see that the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after all, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Germans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his consent, he agreed to help us.

"The next day he went to Leningrad. So I felt that this agreement wasn't very firm, reliable. So the next day KRUPNOV and I went to see CHELNOKOV /Chief of the Tourist Department/. And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite shaky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through? If we decide to do so, then we'll have to go to Leningrad. So KRUPNOV went and called the man, and the man refused to talk to him. So then I was told to go. So I went /to Leningrad/ and... I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room, and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared, he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work for us. So we finally decided: 'Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Goodbye.' And that was all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROOKS or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he could not name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS was in contact in Moscow.

b. Information from BRAUNS

Interviewed by the FBI [redacted]

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* NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has reported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. The SVENCHANSKIY Case

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO provided the lead to Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," on 26 January 1964 in the course of discussions of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists of possible operational interest. "Well, here's an example! One of our agents is the director of a small tourist agency," NOSENKO said, "He takes the tourist's application form which has a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for example. Further, on the fifth line, where it says 'nationality,' he can make a small pinprick. And at the end, where the stamp of the tourist agency is placed, he can make a checkmark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us... but why he/the tourist/ is suspected we don't know yet, of

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

b. Information from BARGHOORN

BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political education and political system. His itinerary took him to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 October, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA. His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational interest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attractive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available, but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared. Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely ill. He was assigned to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the hospital for four days. During this period his clothes, notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authorities.

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*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely recalled the girl on the plane but either did not know or had forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute decision.

Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARGHOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metropol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.

BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uniformed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name might have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and contained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison.

Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu) PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

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*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interrogations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected with the interrogations. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated throughout the entire series of interrogations and had signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of translation.

hn Andrew SHUBIN

ohn Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth
es which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
in Geneva. NOSENKO identified SHUBIN as a
of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker,
rofessor in New York City. According to
rsonally involved in SHUBIN's fourth trip
62 or 1963. SHUBIN had become known to
gent during his third visit to the Soviet

ofessor of economics at New York Univer-
eviously known to the FBI [redacted] The following paragraphs
ormation from NOSENKO and other sources on

ormation

been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third
t Union.* He said on 25 January 1964 that
cow some time during the period 1959 to
l 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the
t by SHUBIN but thought it occurred in
any event, prior to 1960 and while he was
tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
t Department. NOSENKO indicated on 26 June
LITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist
sible for SHUBIN, and since at another time
VELITSKIY transferred from the department
would appear that he was placing the date
trip as some time before the transfer.

rted that SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
during the third trip. He has offered
as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO
as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet
e;** on 2 February 1964 he explained the
illance as having been founded on the KGB's

ing for this trip, as variously given by
nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no
rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according
xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
BIN went to the USSR without valid docu-

IN's own admission about having gone to
, there is no other evidence of his travel
ion prior to 1961.

[redacted]

d. Information from Other Sources

The GRU defector in Canada, Igor GOUZENKO, supplied the lead which enabled the FBI [redacted]

SHUBIN, whose father was a native of Russia, was born in Los Angeles on 20 February 1915. [redacted] After receiving [redacted] the NOSENKO information of 1964, the FBI interviewed SHUBIN [redacted]

[redacted]

10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

a. Introduction

NOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January, 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV's name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive" subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leadership that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) contact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of communication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail the circumstances of their introduction at a social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a "military intelligence officer," and he implied that they regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way. NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States "during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his role as a confidential channel to the White House. After the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas there actually were such weapons there.

According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that "something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet activity in Cuba. On 4 September DOBRYNIN gave Robert Kennedy "an unusual personal message from KHRUSHCHEV for the President": KHRUSHCHEV pledged that he would not stir up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections. On the same day, the President stated publicly that the United States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union sent a harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning the (unintentional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 plane on 30 August; the note threatened "appropriate retaliatory measures" against U-2 bases should such incidents be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-2 flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not resume until 14 October. On 6 September DOBRYNIN again told SORENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing new" in Cuba and gave his assurances that all their steps "were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to...the United States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN informed Chester BOWLES (a Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba. Similar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day that the President was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the presence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GROMYKO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.

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*The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from Washington until two months afterward.

Also on 18 October, the FBI reported, [redacted] Two days later BOLSHAKOV told Washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KHRUSHCHEV and MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before his departure from Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact. CIA has no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the President, or even directly to the Attorney General, or that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York City, he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba. [redacted] There is no report of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP and BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department, and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the decision to impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision was announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peaceful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 October by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,** in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI. FEKLISOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received at the White House late that night in a secret letter from KHRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work." BOLSHAKOV replied that no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINGER had "anything special to say," he might contact A.I. ZINCHUK.*

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*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Unofficial US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY, identified by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KGB-controlled source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated at that time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.

**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOMIN, was the author of one of the documents among the CHEREPANOV papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis

NOSENKO has not indicated that BOLSHAKOV had an information-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one occasion he said that the KGB agent "SASHA"** was unable to furnish any information of value in this regard. He said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB] First Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV*** was not satisfied with the work of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information on this." NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" reported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, "he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was very tightly held information. There were just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they were sworn to keep it secret."

[redacted]

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*ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptee rather than a staff officer.

**For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.

***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation had been influenced by "information from our Cuban comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This information had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated, however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to the President was received at the White House on the night of 26 October 1962.

c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV's GRU affiliation and the fact that the KGB was in no way involved in this channel to the U.S. Government via Robert Kennedy. He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's name during a discussion of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet Intelligence officers. "Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also sits there," he said. "He is a colonel and a friend of mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding discussion, he introduced the name again: "Then there is this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United States." NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very interesting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." When his case officer thereupon turned to another topic, NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: "I know BOLSHAKOV very well. He is my old friend...I met him through Yuriy GUK...[who]was with him in the United States...and we are now very good friends. He calls me up and consults me for advice..." On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military intelligence officer; "yet for some reason they chose him" as a channel between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO added, "reported directly" to the Chief of the GRU concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy by an American journalist (unnamed) at a reception in the United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for a walk, and as they strolled "down an alley," there was a man sitting on a bench directly ahead of them. "The journalist said: 'Listen, George [BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the Chief of the Department of Justice?' BOLSHAKOV said: 'No. Of course, I have heard of him.' 'Would you like me to introduce you?' 'Of course,' BOLSHAKOV said, 'please do.' He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling that all this had been pre-arranged."

This contact "was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy... BOLSHAKOV was called in for this. As you know, the whole idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy from KHRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV....It happened to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOV who sought to have the meeting....Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first talk about ordinary things, and then the conversation turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy did not say: 'Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.' He would say: 'You know, some of these problems seem insolvable.' And BOLSHAKOV would say: 'And you know, at home they think this and that way...' without actually saying that this was coming from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without explanations. It was an exchange of views on important political questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought that it was a "case of mutual 'feelers' being sent out by both sides--exploring some given current political situation."

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, no one replaced him as a channel to the U.S. Government. Asked whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV's departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact like there was before. It was broken at the time BOLSHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a cooptee....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left. He passes no more messages."

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable interest in him [BOLSHAKOV], even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOLSHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A. TOON*--tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said.

NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in December 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presidency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that everything was left without an answer....My personal opinion was that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future." Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.** "As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion reflected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No suspicion at all."

NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be pleased....Not to make an agent or cooptee out of him, but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the basis of what BOLSHAKOV had told NOSENKO about Robert Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who "is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex," would do "everything necessary for the State." Before NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, the President was assassinated and the matter was dropped. NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an interest in it....I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Let's utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU use him?'" NOSENKO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are working on WALTON--that this is a Number One target as far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do anything we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU. As long as they are working on it, let them do it.'"

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*Neither KERST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was affiliated with CIA in any way.

**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed authority for the operation in Moscow from the GRU, as he had proposed, the KGB Legal Residency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Information from [redacted]

In addition to NOSENKO, one other Soviet source had identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. [redacted] reported that another member of the GRU Legal Residency [redacted] had "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was an American correspondent based in Washington. This journalist, [redacted] had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to cooperate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

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* FBI [redacted]

SECRET



СССР

КОМИТЕТ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

"15" декабря 1963 г.

11933

Командировочное удостоверение №

Выдано подполковнику
Носенко
Юрию Ивановичу

Командированному в УКГБ Горьковской области

Срок командировки "15" дней
по "30" декабря 1963 г.

Основание: распоряжение нач. Главного Управления

Действительно по предъявлении удостоверения личности № НК-2511

Начальник ______ Управления отдела
Комитета Государственной Безопасности при Совете Министров СССР

Front



ОТМЕТКИ О ПРЕБЫВАНИИ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ

Прибыл в г. Горький 16 декабря 1963
Прибыл в г. Шахунья 16/XII-1963
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался
[illegible] г. Шахунья [illegible]
[illegible]

Убыл из г. Шахунья 17/XII [illegible]
бесплатной квартирой не пользовался
[illegible] г. Шахунья [illegible]
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Убыл из г. Горький 17 декабря 1963 г.

ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ (ОТДЕЛА)
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

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ФИНО
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
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Ст. бухгалтер

Reverse

Temporary Duty Authorization
December 1963

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya Oblast'
Length of temporary assignment: 15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate of Department

Committee for State Security
under the Council of Ministers, USSR

Front

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES
OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye **Chief Militia**
Section, **Militia Major ____(illegible)**

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye **Chief Militia**
Section, Militia Major ____(Illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./____(illegible)

Reverse (endorsements only)

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards

1. Rank

NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his progress through the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. He has volunteered additional information on this subject himself. His various statements follow in chronological order.

11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive 2,500 [rubles per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major, plus pay for longevity. I receive more than 4000, i.e., 450-470-480 [rubles per month] in new money. This is enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive lieutenant colonel soon. I have already completed my time in grade. We have a system of time in grade. From major to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years... My time in grade was up in December, in December of last year [1961]."

23 January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the temporary duty authorization which he said he had been issued in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV.* This official KGB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, and authorized "Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organization in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and 30 December 1963." It bore official stamps of arrival and departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting exfiltration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case officers on the basis of statements he had made during the 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated that it was correct. The biography included the information that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic] to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly before leaving Moscow for Geneva.

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date when he became a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the senior lieutenant."

Question: That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB].

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*See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it.

NOSENKO: Well, I had the GRU service. That counts two years, as military service, of course. It was considered as a continuance of military service.

Question: So you got it when? At the end of 1953?

NOSENKO: At the end of '53 or beginning of '54. Then I got captain in 1956.

Question: When in 1956?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the scheduled time passes before they give it. So, '56--Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...

16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the date of his promotions within the KGB from the date of entry, NOSENKO stated: "I began in the GRU as a junior lieutenant. While in the GRU I became a lieutenant, and I entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but I don't know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became a major in 1959. I don't know the month. In October 1963 I was made a lieutenant colonel....Personnel called me on the telephone and said I had been promoted. Later I was told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office, but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations. You never see the attestation. It goes into your official file."

26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never officially been a major. He explained this situation as follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, he became eligible for the rank of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was not promoted because a senior KGB official held against him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover treatment for gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of major had he received his captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NOSENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an administrative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had instead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO therefore was a captain from September or October 1959 until October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted

directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In this manner it turned out that he never officially held the rank of major.*

10 August 1965: Under questioning by DERYABIN, NOSENKO repeated the chronology of his promotions given on 26 January 1965. He again explained that he was put up for captain in 1956, but this time said that the promotion had been blocked on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he thought the true story would not be believed.

17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote the following: "In March 1951, with the rank of junior lieutenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, I worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of the Fourth Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1958 I received the rank of senior lieutenant [in the KGB], in December 1959 the rank of captain, and at the end of 1963 I was recommended for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and the travel order which you know of, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.**

19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography, NOSENKO included the following statement: "in July 1956 I became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I received a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer and was given the rank of senior lieutenant. In August 1957 I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of 1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of captain.

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant colonel in 1964. I was only a captain." Asked why he had said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: "There was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my position, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."

To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while serving in the KGB: He became a senior lieutenant in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.) On the other hand, NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieutenant colonelcy.

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*At about this time, in early 1965, [redacted] NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to his senior KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV. [redacted] shortly after NOSENKO's defection, [redacted] reported having received information from fellow KGB officers which made it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel.

**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search in December 1963.

2. Awards and Decorations

Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings" in Geneva as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow.* During the first series of interrogations, NOSENKO on 6 April 1964 claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 for his performances while in the American Department.

The following discussion of the subject took place on 6 April 1964:

NOSENKO: Yes, I received a big gold medal.

Question: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Banner--the Red Star, I mean. In '63 I received the Order of Lenin. In '63.

Question: What for?

NOSENKO: GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long period in the Second Chief Directorate--[V.D.] CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one--many, many [received the Order of Lenin].**

Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant service?

NOSENKO: No. For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department, which is considered good.

Question: What is good? Were there recruitments? What recruitments?

NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh Department is not recruitments. The main task is countering the intelligence activities of the opposition.

Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department got the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: Yes.

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*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible.

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Directorate officer whom he knew to have received this award was V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who recruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D.5.b.). On the same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case officer whether he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part in the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO. He asked this in January 1964 in Geneva.

Question: CHELNOKOV and KOVALENKO?

NOSENKO: Yes. And CHURANOV got and I got and--who else? [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV got and [V.M.] KOVSHUK also got the Order, the second time. The first time he got it several years ago, and this was the second time.

Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star?

NOSENKO: Red Star I got--I don't know for what.

Question: But then one year later they gave you another one, because this [Order of the Red Star] wasn't enough?

NOSENKO: Because the awards are given out--now, wait one moment; up until 1961, if there were any awards for the Chekists [KGB personnel] it was very rare, and they were only awarded for a specific thing. Such as CHURANOV, for instance. He was rewarded for a specific deed [the recruitment of VASSALL]. But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it was the idea of the Party to encourage the workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his medals and GRIBANOV to declare his medals. They get together with their deputies and decide to whom they will give them. They don't say to whom--they say, for instance: 'One order to your department; you decide who should have it.' Like that. Then we would get together, I CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, and we decided [who would get one]. In our department, [V.I.] YAKOVLEV got a medal. Who else got a medal? In 1962, I got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the Second Section--he got the Order of the Red Star. We decided on these individuals. As far as we ourselves were concerned, that decision was made by GRIBANOV and his deputy.

Question: Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?

NOSENKO: Well, as I have already told you, there was this Italian fellow [redacted]. This was considered a good case because the First Department later--the Seventh Department was only involved at the time of the arrest--began meeting with him.

Question: So you got the Order [of the Red Banner] in 1962 because of your work in the Tourist Department?

NOSENKO: I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for the Seventh Department, but for my work in the First [American] Department in 1960, 1961.

Question: You think so?

NOSENKO: I think so.

Question: The Order just came, without any explanation?

NOSENKO: It was just done at the order of the Chairman.

Question: And the Order of Lenin was the same?

NOSENKO: The same. Well, the way it says, "For work well done for the organs of the KGB" there is no indication exactly what it is for.

NOSENKO admitted on 8 April 1964: "In 1964 [in Geneva] I told a lie about the Order of Lenin. Why? It was a boast." NOSENKO then explained what he said to be the true circumstances and gave the reason for which he was to have received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO stated, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would get the Order of Lenin: "He said: 'I am submitting your names for the Order of Lenin for creating the TsOPS [Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate], for this new thing you have tried to create in tourist work.' But December [1963] had gone by. I left [for Geneva] and nothing happened."*

NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate from whom he had received each of these. His reply was as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956 I received a commendation and one month's pay. SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded me this for the recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.] while I was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the Second Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman, and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of the Chairman of the KGB was circulated, and I and all case officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file that on a certain date you received the commendation from the Chairman of the KGB.

"From 1956 on, I received something almost every year, but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB anniversary or May Day or Army Day. In 1957 or 1958, I got something from GRIBANOV. Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me and a group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third and fourth floors [of the KGB Headquarters building]. PERFILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, made the presentation.

"In 1959 I received a commendation and one month's pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several recruitments, among them the professor from Tennessee [MERTENS], DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people. There were six in all; three Americans and three British. I can't remember the British names just now.*

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*NOSENKO later reverted to his original statement, which related the award to his efforts to "inspire" the work of the Tourist Department.

"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work in general. A lot of officers got this. In 1961 I received the Order of the Red Star. With a group of case officers I got this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate. KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me (made the presentation). Personnel makes a note in your official file, but you can take the medal and the little certificate that goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study room (office).**

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. I also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service. They counted this from October 1950, when I joined the GRU, and they were late by two years in giving it to me. This is not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the hall along with a certificate.* In 1963 I received a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. Also, GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to receive the Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to receive it for arousing [inspiring] the Seventh Department."

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* See Parts V.D.4.1.and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts V.D.4.i., j., and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruitment operations and NOSENKO's role in them. NOSENKO also said during interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965 that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the Order of the Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to the First Department at that time (January 1960). NOSENKO has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asked what KGB officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on 10 June 1964 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other high-ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the important role they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962. He recalled this because they were planning the presentation for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and was not made until the end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSHUK and G.I. GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply for achievements, for good results in work." NOSENKO told DERYABIN in August 1965 that the order accompanying his award had read: "For exceptional performance of mission." When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general.

NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never received any KGB award or decoration for his operational work. The only awards he received during his KGB career, he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award for satisfactory completion of ten years of service.

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*NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive questioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is usually given for ten years and to KGB men only....That was in 1962. I had ten years of service then." When it was pointed out that, according to his most recent statement, he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he did not understand why but that he was certain that he had been given the medal after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements that he joined the KGB in 1952.) The following day, 17 April 1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled, is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing the service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU in 1950 and therefore should have received the ten-year medal in 1960. Because of a mix-up in the KGB Personnel Department he did not receive it until 1962.

**NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.

H. NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV

1. Information from NOSENKO

a. Summary

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promotions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the role which GRIBANOV played in his, NOSENKO's, professional advancement within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the approach to code clerk James STORSBERG (Part V.E.3.c.), his 1962 account of the arrest and attempt to recruit CIA officer Russell LANGELLE (Part VI.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration for operational activity and that he had not received the promotions he claimed.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Directorate.

12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one another illegally and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to become Deputy Chief of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promoting young people, new people, who already have experience, good experience, who have made recruitments. I know two or three [of the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 recruitments, four or five of them were British and the rest Americans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the question of my advancement is right now under consideration... I will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the

fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything. I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, my highest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He sometimes bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is unpleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because, inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He sometimes calls me personally [to his office] and says: 'You come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.' I go with him. We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He comes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?' I know beforehand [that he will say this] and everything is ready at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall we drink!' [GRIBANOV says]. I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich, cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. 'I don't drink cognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka then,' [GRIBANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older brother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attitude toward me."

23 April 1964

Question: Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?

NOSENKO: I never went in the house. I have driven to it.

Question: Did he ever come to your house?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work? If so, how, under what circumstances?

NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.

Question: Who else was there?

NOSENKO: TARABRIN.

Question: What was the occasion?

NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight. I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked me how long it would take me to get dressed and come down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room. Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00 a.m., gave him some pills to help him.

Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?

NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two group operational discussions (about 15 people present) about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that was the first time I ever spoke to him.

Question: When did you first have any personal conversation with him?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1960].

Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?

NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA.

Question: Why you?

NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story. this is it, this is why he started favoring me. Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of [Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.] CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he remarked once: "You are not a gossiper..."

Question: How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell anyone?

NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.

Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?

NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one before that by [V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Department it was written by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then [S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Department, by [A.M.] GORBATENKO.

Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

NOSENKO: He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with promotions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel.

15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965): "Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [F.G.] SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the activities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,

it may have been several months after I began my KGB service that GRIBANOV first came to my attention. I don't know when I first saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meeting before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I would not necessarily remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who were friends of my father, and seeing GRIBANOV wouldn't have been particularly important to me. Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate on a cable that I had written and, if SHUBNYAKOV was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV, who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how many times I took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. I think it was in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing a spravka on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV. KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANOV at this time. The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the report on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such occasions, but he was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used the name Vera Ivanovna. After work, I went home to change my clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on I saw him more frequently. Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun to call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department, but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.' In 1959 I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the FRIPPEL case and, sometime between May and October 1959, took him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations."

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February): "GRIBANOV was never in my own office, my home, my parents home or my parent's dacha. My father never knew him. I was never in GRIBANOV's home or his dacha. I was never in any KGB operational apartment with GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents [redacted] [redacted] and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not own agents to GRIBANOV. 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GRIBANOV finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. This decision was made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANOV in accordance with the intention stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal discussions with GRIBANOV about this appointment at this time. In 1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's Deputy, F.D.] BOBKOV, and GRIBANOV decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. They did not discuss this with me beforehand and no order was issued about this appointment. I was simply told that from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the Department. At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, since KOROBOV did not come to the Seventh Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons for appointing me Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU. GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KHLOBUSTOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to my making this second trip."

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* See below for a more detailed version of this affair.

** When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets like the one you gave me once. [signed] GRIBANOV."

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23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social encounters with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. The following, which was not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case officer notes.

Question:	Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.
NOSENKO:	Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In 1963 I received a call from TARABRIN at home. Then GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't take his car because I didn't want to call the duty officer. I took a cab and went to the Praga. They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.
Question:	Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)?
NOSENKO:	I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.

3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing me ahead."

Question:	What sort of punishment?
NOSENKO:	Even firing.
Question:	Do you think any others would be punished, or even fired?
NOSENKO:	Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. Many others, too.

Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject. The following is a transcript of the discussion:

Question: You said you think GRIBANOV might be fired. Yet, there is nothing in the protocol you signed [see above] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?

NOSENKO: (no answer)

Question: (repeats)

NOSENKO: Don't know.

Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?

NOSENKO: Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Question: Why not?

NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.

Question: Well, what is your opinion?

NOSENKO: He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: But you had already gotten ahead before; you said he didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: Why would BOBKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization.

Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?

NOSENKO: Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the SCD.

Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for Geneva.

Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?

NOSENKO: Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, who talked to me.

Question: How about the First Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate?

NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.

Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?

NOSENKO: [S.I.] GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.

Question: You must be withholding something about your relationship with GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO: No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'

Question: But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.

NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.

Question: Why did he promote you?

NOSENKO GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six recruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having no success with Americans in the Embassy.

Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In '59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of operations which were reported to him.

Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you Deputy Chief of Department.

NOSENKO: (shrugs)

Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department Chief--because GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for this, especially those who are against GRIBANOV.

Question: Who?

NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh Department.

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* Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal disease (see Part IV.C.2.).

Question: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy Department Chiefs, too. Would the same happen if one of them defected?

NOSENKO: Well, if it was from the Second Department, for example, no, because GRIBANOV wasn't personally supervising it. It would be someone else's proposal. In my case it was his own initiative.

Question: Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as a result of GOLITSYN's defection?

NOSENKO: No, absolutely not.

2. Information from [redacted]

As indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB in the wake of NOSENKO's defection.* [redacted]

[redacted]

According to sensitive source, [redacted] 15 KGB officers had already been dismissed from the KGB because of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal friend and protege; and that, therefore, he should have been aware of NOSENKO's intention to defect.

According to sensitive source, [redacted] when NOSENKO was being considered for inclusion in the Soviet delegation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NOSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... [redacted] said he understood this summary contained considerable 'compromising' information regarding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. [redacted] Sensiti source stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Geneva.' [redacted] the general feeling among KGB personnel that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father."

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* In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in operational contact in Moscow has stated that GRIBANOV disappeared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October 1964.)

According to sensitive source, [redacted] GRIBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after NOSENKO's defection in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers, most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them close friends of GRIBANOV, had been fired subsequently. [redacted] prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Directorate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on his behalf. [redacted] rather than being fired, Major General "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's stead.*

[redacted] after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an extensive investigation of personnel in KGB Headquarters to find out which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TARABRIN, who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relationship was only casual and was limited to occasional official contacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were close friends socially and had attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended. Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

* [redacted] BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection. NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it or the 1962 trip.

** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see above). [redacted] at the time of his removal from the KGB, TARABRIN was the Chief of the British Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

I. Confirmation from Other Sources

1. Introduction

Since NOSENKO's defection several Soviet sources and defectors have provided information supporting NOSENKO's claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at certain times. [redacted] a Soviet scientist with suspected intelligence connections who was approached by CIA, Soviet case officers for an [redacted] double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also a NOSENKO lead), a Soviet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Directorate officer in the various positions he says he was. Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO's knowledge of particular pieces of information or confirming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted, the information from one source sometimes contradicts that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.

2. [redacted]

[redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection within the KGB (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV) [redacted] and by his statements concerning the probable effect that the defection would have on KGB operations. [redacted] reported at various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PENKOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN or GOLITSYN," that the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years," that it is the "unanimous opinion" of [redacted] [redacted] "NOSENKO could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe "for several years to come".

[redacted] has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.* [redacted] NOSENKO as a "chief" had access to details on KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy, and [redacted] the loss suffered by the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this information was available to him only because he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. [redacted] reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief" in the Second Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds

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* [redacted] however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961.

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of many KGB officers in the USSR and abroad (see Part III.I.) and to sensitive information on KGB organization, operations, and methods. This status [redacted] made available to NOSENKO a "30-page personnel [illegible] and a 200-page phone list from Moscow Headquarters of the KGB."*

[redacted] supported certain of the operational leads supplied by NOSENKO. [redacted] The agent was John RUPE, named by NOSENKO as a person recruited in Leningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; this information NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of the American Tourist Section of the Tourist Department. [redacted] Further examples of [redacted] supporting NOSENKO in this way are reviewed elsewhere in this paper [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV incident in Part VI.D.7.c).

[redacted]

[redacted] also offered specific although [illegible] confirmation of NOSENKO's claimed positions in the [illegible] [redacted] that from the very beginning of his employment by the KGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorate. [redacted] he once worked against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; later he was assigned to work against U.S. journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGB, he was assigned to the task of working against American and

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* NOSENKO has never mentioned these documents.

[redacted]

[redacted]

European tourists in Moscow. His last position, [redacted], was that of Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (tourists). [redacted] NOSENKO secured this relatively high position because of help he received from Lieutenant General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Directorate. [redacted] throughout NOSENKO's career GRIBANOV had always helped him and saw that he was promoted..."

With regard to NOSENKO's KGB rank, [redacted] "it appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB." [redacted] reported having learned from [redacted] KGB officer, [redacted] that NOSENKO was in fact only a captain.**

[redacted] was asked if he feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether he feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He [redacted] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he is convinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick' by the KGB."

3. [redacted] sensitive source

[redacted] said that "he had heard about NOSENKO from various persons in Moscow. He said he had never known NOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important boss in the KGB. He said he did not know what directorate or department NOSENKO had been in. [redacted] continued that when NOSENKO was a young man he was in the GRU Military Academy*** and then [was] sent to the Information Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,

[redacted]

** Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had progressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 26 January 1965, however, he said that because of administrative confusion and GRIBANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major and had moved directly from captain to lieutenant colonel in late 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was really only a captain (see Part V.G.1.).

*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intelligence school of the GRU. Although NOSENKO said he attended various naval-type schools before joining the GRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a formal intelligence course of any training establishment of the Soviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called the GRU Military Academy) because it offered too many political courses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.

perhaps a year. [redacted] NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and 'not very good.' He was to have been discharged from the GRU, however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [redacted] it was the opinion of the persons from whom he heard the information about NOSENKO that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. [redacted] the U.S. Embassy had found many of the microphones based on NOSENKO information."*

[redacted] confirmed operational information which NOSENKO has reported [redacted]. SHUBIN was the only GRU agent named by NOSENKO, who sourced his knowledge of SHUBIN to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said he was in the Tourist Department.**

4. [redacted]

[redacted]

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*As indicated in Part V.E.3.g., the final sentence is largely but not entirel correct.

**See Part V.F.8.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. [redacted]

[redacted] at the time of the defection, NOSENKO was rooming in Geneva with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the International Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told [redacted] that NOSENKO often left his quarters without saying where he was going, but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "Intelligence" and had some mission to accomplish.** [redacted] RESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told [redacted] that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO, held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of treason and was sentenced to death. [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.I.4.)

6. GAMKRELIDZE

NOSENKO's service in the American Department was confirmed in the fall of 1964 by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange**** and asked whether the Russian people had been told about it. GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not been told officially but knew it had taken place since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. As an example, he said that it was in this way that he had heard about the NOSENKO defection and its significance. Expanding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that the "grapevine" indicated that the defection "was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States."

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* See Part VI.D.7.c.

** NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA, NOSENKO replied: "He thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's no problem if I come back late." [redacted] reported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB as a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.

*** GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as well as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAMKRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer... since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he has met with their American counterparts." During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country."

**** The exchange of the KGB Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place in February 1962.

7. GOLITSYN

The defector GOLITSYN is the only source of information on NOSENKO's KGB career who claims to have been personally acquainted with him. GOLITSYN said that he met NOSENKO for the first time in 1953 when visiting the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate on business, and that he saw and spoke with NOSENKO on a number of occasions subsequently, most recently in 1959. This first-hand information from GOLITSYN, however, is not always consistent either internally or in comparison with that supplied by NOSENKO.

CIA has no record that GOLITSYN, prior to the publicity attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was shown NOSENKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo the Disarmament Conference. He failed to comment on it.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB; the CIA official stated to GOLITSYN that the information so closely overlapped his own reporting, including prominent mention of GOLITSYN's friends GUK, KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the possibility of disinformation was suspected, perhaps in relation to GOLITSYN's own defection. Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named. Among these names was (fnu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that GOLITSYN had reported only on one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO, who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that organization in 1961 for the MVD. GOLITSYN said that in general, lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this information, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior CIA officials because his request had not been granted.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" in Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

GOLITSYN on 11 February 1964 raised the possibility of his participation in efforts to "break" NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data to assist him in analyzing the KGB operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the photograph depicted NOSENKO. GOLITSYN said he knew this because he was personally acquainted with NOSENKO, having met him two or three times in the U.S. Embassy Section while there on KGB First Chief Directorate business in 1953. He had also seen NOSENKO occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959, and when GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO told him that he was in the Tourist Department. Finally, GOLITSYN said, he and NOSENKO knew one another through their mutual friendships with Yu. I. GUK, V.A. CHURANOV, and Ye.G. KASHCHEYEV.* According to GOLITSYN, NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958 and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during the first year of this period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section, until 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO may have had these same responsibilities or he may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents. He was definitely in the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a senior case officer there as of 1959.** GOLITSYN was certain that NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. This he said he knew because he had visited the U.S. Embassy Section on at least three occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about December 1960 (sic, actually January 1961).*** GOLITSYN said that he knew in detail who was in the section, and that he would have known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the Deputy Chief.****

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* NOSENKO, on the other hand, failed to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meeting him. After the defection, NOSENKO was asked what he knew of GOLITSYN. He immediately gave a detailed account of an incident which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief Directorate intelligence activities; as a result of this letter GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this time that he was personally acquainted with him, had seen him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV at his dacha in 1953 or 1954. GOLITSYN saw NOSENKO's reply to his question prior to making the above statement, and NOSENKO's claims of friendships with Yu.I. GUK and V.A. CHURANOV were included in the file GOLITSYN studied.

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

(Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)

** This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Department from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Department during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed 1956 operation against BURGI and his 1957 operations against [redacted] and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.

*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.

****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization.

8. [redacted]

[redacted], a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent, told U.S. authorities [redacted], that she did not think NOSENKO was a KGB officer. At the same time, however, [redacted] said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is from the transcript of her remarks:

Question: Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who defected in Geneva?

[redacted]: I didn't have any real information. I heard some gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his mother was always involved in some blackmarketing, that his father had great concern over the family. This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really know--it was just gossip.

Question: Would you say that this idle talk was among KGB people or--

[redacted]: You know, I didn't know many KGB people. It was only Mr. SVIRIN.*

Question: But he told you about this?

[redacted]: He didn't tell me, he told [redacted] husband], ah--you know, they like to think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one day. They always repeat it. Well, somebody committed suicide. The old defector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in the paper.

Question: But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? His mother is Jewish, his father was a general. What was his father in?

[redacted]: I really don't know.

Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this?

[redacted]: I really don't know. I never heard. I never knew that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: I beg your pardon?

[redacted]: He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

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* V.G. SVIRIN was said by [redacted] to have been a KGB officer under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's employment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit conducting operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained a friendly association with [redacted] and her husband to the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (see Part VI.D.7.b.).

Question: The fellow from Geneva?

[redacted] No. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: No? What was he?

[redacted]: He was a civilian, I think.

Question: You never heard anything about his family, his friends?

[redacted] No.

Question: But you say he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gossip on these things. It is never safe. So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gossip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard.

Question: And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and a general for a father, but nothing about him.

[redacted]: Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

Question: In the Embassy in Moscow?

[redacted] In Moscow, yes.

Question; But yet, he was not a KGB person?

[redacted] But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is connected [in some way with the KGB]. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and everybody else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves.

During a later debriefing by CIA, [redacted] clarified her sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he visited the [redacted]. The information that NOSENKO had compromised the KGB microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social visit [redacted]. On this occasion SVIRIN remarked to [redacted] that NOSENKO had done considerable damage to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S. authorities.

9. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON*

In an 1962 debriefing [redacted]

10. Case Officers for [redacted]

[redacted] double agent [redacted]

11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV

In October 1966, Yu.D. KOROLEV, who said he was a Soviet journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magazine Paris Match.*** The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on NOSENKO which KOROLEV handed Paris Match editors stated in part: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.; it was granted to him. That was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes."

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* The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discussed in detail in Part VI.D.3.c.

[redacted] NOSENKO provided information on [redacted] (see Part VI.D.5.c.).

*** See Part III.H. for more details concerning KOROLEV's offer to Paris Match.

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VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO

A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality

1. Graphological Analysis

Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during an early debriefing session were submitted on 25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting analysts, together with a number of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The graphologists were told only that the writer was a Russian male aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was an intelligence officer by profession. Their report, which was qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



[redacted]

2. Reports by Psychologist

a. Psychological Testing Results

A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.

[redacted]

"Emotional Balance and General Stability: NOSENKO appears to

[redacted]

"Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness: NOSENKO

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

"Relations and Loyalty to His Parents: It is apparent

[redacted]

[redacted]

"Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a

[redacted]

*Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been

[redacted]

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



[redacted]

c. Psychological Interrogation:

For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid outline. There were relatively few changes of story from previous versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below.

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* A comparison of information obtained during this series of interrogations with information given earlier and later by NOSENKO can be found in Part IV.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Report by Psychiatrist

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically and to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~



B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an observer and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organization and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954, supplemented by continuing study of later information from a variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authoritative comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the following section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSENKO's entry into the KGB (then MVD) and his Communist Party affiliation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interrogated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DERYABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counterintelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN transferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Department. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency responsible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.

[illegible]

DERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.

b. DERYABIN's Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's comments follow:

"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*

"Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).

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* See also Part V.B.

** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KGB, see Part V.B.

c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.

d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year.

"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.

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* See also Part IV.B.

e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.

g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.

i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride (which was 'clean'), and that after the marriage he had filled out another anketa in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

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* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.

"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54

"Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had previously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in 1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it is used to compute length of service and must be entered on various forms from time to time.

"Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates in 1953: Asked to describe what directorates existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for a few months only, the FCD became the SCD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or did not remember, perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there.

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* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952. See Part V.B.

"MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO.

"The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnogo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).*

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**

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* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.

"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements that were taken from agents.

"NOSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by applicants and new employees.

"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHENKO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which NOSENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel Department were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had received his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to recall the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the interviewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Headquarters for over ten years as a staff officer and particularly as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

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*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

TOP SECRET

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the Building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MVD) identity document (see below).

"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connection with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. Without the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions. Actually, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were temporarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have forgotten it completely.

"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he said firmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Directorate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelligence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NOSENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agricultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

"NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was removed because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Komsomol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary.

"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manner.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there.

"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Komsomol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.

"NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spetsproverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal ones in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file.

"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

a. Introduction

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and interrogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experience, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20 other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place, as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations, have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:

- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.

- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the knowledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.

- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.

- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).

- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reactions under varied degrees of stress and control.

The features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and consistently observed by all of the officers involved.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings and the debriefings prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably convincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hurried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided." NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us" and "made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigorous, temperamental and vital man." Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's manner caused doubts on the part of the FBI representatives who took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, however, when the cases NOSENKO had mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to recall related incidents or additional circumstances which did not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by questioning from different angles or in different contexts. The same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of questioning tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate his points; new stories did not emerge. In a period of nine months, NOSENKO was drained of information on his personal and professional experiences and knowledge. Never before had the CIA case officers encountered a defector who was totally debriefed.

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his inability to supply details and to forestall further questioning has been to claim poor memory. "Different people have different types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others: "I have told what I remember." The case officers who have handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excellent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not always recall most easily those events which had occurred most recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role; he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the dates on which many of them transferred from one component of the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently discribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962. Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which, like the "ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively distant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and activities of his own target John V. ABIDIAN or details of operations against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.

These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted the debriefings.

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation

(i) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present. These characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below.

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points:

- Talking about operations he supervised and about his personal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBANOV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a particular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KOSLOV called him about the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK").

- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO sometimes quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said," "he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g., his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERG).

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOORN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned "little by little" from several different sources, he presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the impression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his information by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before" when queried again on a particular case; detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MORONE case and his travel to Cuba).

- NOSENKO, with a few exceptions (notably the compromise of PENKOVSKIY and the ABIDIAN visit to the dead drop site), could not supply specific or approximate dates for operational activities during the period of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section. Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961," he refused to estimate the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the year or events in his personal life.

(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided questions and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would give full details "later," when systematic debriefing began. When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, he would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: "This morning we drink; tomorrow we work." Prior to 4 April 1964 he provided only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only after 4 April 1964 that he could be constrained to reply to detailed questioning on other matters.

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. He would dismiss the details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own "poor performance," preoccupation with other matters, inattention to duty, absence from the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to master details because he was a supervisor). Unable to name or talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, including those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO disparaged the quality of such agents ("they never reported anything of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational level and their inferior status as servants and employees as one reason none of them could give the KGB operationally useful information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous employment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that NOSENKO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisations led him into unacceptable statements or positions. To use his responses to the questioning on John V. ABIDIAN as an example: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get at it. (In fact, the car was held by Soviet customs for two weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of the country. (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; also, ABIDIAN arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his destination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register, he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it; when the interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAN." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earlier given extensive details about how the KGB had analyzed the precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he was initially asked about George BLAKE, the KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it "was not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was mentioned again, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the following lines of defense:

- "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain," -- or a shrug.

- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety of the facts, their importance and their "reality." It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not details.

- He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I have been working with 'SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR," did confirm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provocateur," nor would the KGB supply information on "live cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad.

- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully," it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genuine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.*

NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: "I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with regard to ABIDIAN's file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see." On 9 February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as soon as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, opened this file'." On 16 February he said: "Time will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times within one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

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* [redacted] was the only such source at the time.

NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right.

INTERROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positions you say you held in the KGB.

NOSENKO: That's what I'm saying. If you could check you would find that I was only in these two departments and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything more. I can't prove anything. Maybe the future will show.

INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO: I don't know. But from what I understand the checking has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?

NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?

NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be sure.

d. Additional Observations

(i) Inquisitiveness About CIA

NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case, and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisitiveness include the following:

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared it and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.

(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.

(e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150 or so he said he had provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.

C. Polygraph Testing

1. Test in April 1964

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a polygraph examination which the CIA handlers had told him was a routine part of his defector processing. He was informed on 3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a good night's rest and to refrain from alcoholic beverages. NOSENKO drank heavily on the night of 3 April, did not enter his bedroom until 0300 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at 0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subsequently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was seen to remove his hand from his lips hurriedly.*

Following a medical examination by a physician who noted that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was introduced to the CIA polygraph operator. An experienced interrogator, fluent in the Russian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted below.

"The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing; specifically, to insure that a polygraphic record of Subject's reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraphic deception indications his charts might reflect... This plan was followed throughout the polygraph interview...

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* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis of six types of tablets which had been taken from NOSENKO's personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and instrumental analysis including the use of X-ray: "Sample No. 4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece of paper with the name 'Phenomin' written in Russian. Microscopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-amphetamine is a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate deception responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothiazine (a tranquilizer) which is the active ingredient in 'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above examinations it was established that none of the items submitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sulfaguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240) could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and there is nothing in the formulation of the tablets to suggest

"Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this report.

"It is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

"According to the plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with [my] opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate American Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.

"Series #1:

Were you born in the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth? Yes. (Reaction)

Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No. (No reaction)

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Communist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)

Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No reaction)
(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use for blackmail purposes. However, Subject said he was not worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare of his children, he would not allow himself to be blackmailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No. (Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction)

"Series #2:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No. (No reaction)

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with Soviet Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)

Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet agents into American Intelligence about which you are aware? No. (Reaction)

Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intelligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction)

Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction)

*Series #3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of uncovering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No. (Reaction)

● Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find out more about the structure and methods of operation of American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatisfied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discrediting Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving misinformation about Soviet agents' penetration of American Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

*Series #4:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)

Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction)

Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

"Series #5:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction)

Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose name is unknown to you, among the American representatives in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes. (No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a specially developed KGB plan? No. (No reaction)

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Disinformation)? Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge, was FEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction)

"Series #6:

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction) (Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.)

Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. No. (No reaction)

Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph to you? No. (No reaction)

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medicine or pills? No. (Reaction)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction)

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. (No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction)

"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instructions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."

2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD

a. Introduction

CIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1966 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movements restricted, and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate.

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions and his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

b. Results

"Series No. 1

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?

   Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?

   Answer: No. (Reaction)

7. Other than what you told me, did you actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

   Answer: No. (No reaction)

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* See Part V.D.6. for details on OSWALD

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.

"Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

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*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator

24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?

Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered: 'Before and after.' When the question was repeated, he again answered: 'Before and after.' Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered 'Before and after,' and when he answered 'No."

25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction) notation. However, it is noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.; OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961.

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

"Series No. 3

16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material on OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

13. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

18c. Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?

Answer: No. (Reaction)

"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.

"On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

c. Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it."

VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is required in assessing sources of information relevant to the security of the United States.

One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known: Except where independent information is available, it is risky to say and impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the KGB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent information, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the reports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from the KGB agents who have confessed, and from the Western services which have investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, a base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment of a source reporting on the KGB, even one who principally covers a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) upon which there previously had been relatively little inside information. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from other sources, it would be arbitarily confining if an assumption were not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable to those of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessment of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information was studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides was thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part III. through Part VII. of this paper.

The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following:

- Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, knowledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

- If there are grounds for doubting the general accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the nature of the information he has provided, and for other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed below. The discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

B. Evaluation of Production

1. Introduction

What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not available long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous, and accurate information.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of completeness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven position and access to information? (In this, one judges the internal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it with information from other sources and from investigations.)

Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know anything harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harmful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still unexposed.)

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)

These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counterintelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NOSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually concerned with the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence consequence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

NOSENKO's counterintelligence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:

- their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;
- their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship;
- their operational activities inside and outside the USSR.

For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.F.) follows a format in which the evidence is summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.

2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been employed within that service. At the same time, current information on the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelligence and security services. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the service; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics.

Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's reports on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Furthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 reorganization and 1964 are acceptable in the light of available information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his bona fides.

NOSENKO's information on some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is an impressive achievement of memory. These identifications, however, must be evaluated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discussion must concern new identifications, for intelligence personalities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a repetition of their compromise. This discussion must be further restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, because the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent reporting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such information can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no loss to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this evaluation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.

NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.e., were identifiable by name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless as they were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who were not known or suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's information. Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.* Assuming that NOSENKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible,** it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claimed service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his bona fides.

NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate

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sensitive sources

* Of these 24, ten were identified by [redacted] as KGB [redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB officers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.

discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures (Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unable to contribute any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting on the subject since 1954. (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, co-ordination requirements, mechanization of records and tracing mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting is available in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous points. NOSENKO's tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist as the behavior of a pathological liar saving face in a tight psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Operational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant access to information) which NOSENKO has claimed for himself. He indicated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent operations and development cases increased as he rose from case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Tourist Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chief of the latter section in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961, and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. Simultaneously he established lasting contacts with his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from 1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americans

NOSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow showing that:

- Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeeding only in recruiting one contract employee who was in Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 development cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named 11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the exception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).

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* NOSENKO placed the recruitment date prior to his entry into the KGB in early 1953, but Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY") said he became a KGB agent in November or December 1953.

- Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspapermen. Another two were under development by the KGB during that period.

- The American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer.

- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGB in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Department during that period. Moreover, for the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also described 18 development cases and nine investigations in which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conversations with KGB associates: a U.S. intelligence officer having the KGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON), and two agents in Geneva (names not given and as yet not positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KGB agent status of Horace G. LUNT, an American professor, because he took part in LUNT's recruitment while on TDY in Sofia, and of the [redacted] Legal Residency agent [redacted] because of the connection between [redacted] and Bernard KOTEN, an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO described two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his knowledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no agent sources able to supply information concerning the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

(i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a comprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in the USSR.

Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:

- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.

- GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruitment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the presence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female secretary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evidence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tourists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forthcoming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of 1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the document had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.

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* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who nevertheless had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S. military intelligence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.

NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a personal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, contradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy Section during 1960-1961:*

NOSENKO	Collateral
U.S. Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the beginning of 1961. Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate or 1st [illegible] went to the scene.	CIA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231-235; this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.)
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct subordinate, made but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; NOSENKO would have known about if not approved other TDY's in these years when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.	Travel records show that KOSOLAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200).
Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER; as supervisor of all operations against code clerks at the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities.	Travel records show that JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on separate days. (Pages 186-200)
The KGB knew that the U.S. military code clerk James KEYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB.	KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this microphone was monitored on a continuous basis by KGB personnel.) (Pages 213-219)

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* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a personal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARGHOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, William WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial investigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or as a supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his personal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHELEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged associates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations have been identified.

(ii) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of his information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information at the time he reported on them; and

Third, the possibility of identifying them on the basis of the details provided or in combination with details received from other sources.

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In another category, NOSENKO's leads to 35 Americans under development (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their importance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with confidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following the criteria listed above, NOSENKO's statements on KGB operational interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruitments of 22 tourists (none with access to classified materials and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information); four correspondents (one said by NOSENKO to have become inactive and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information); the American Express Company representative in Moscow; a contract employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:

- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in 1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was currently supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost his access to classified information through retirement from the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).

- U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who with his wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953 (Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOHNSON discontinued her role in the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining knowledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKENBAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classified information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S. Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one agent had access to classified information as of the date when NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which uncovered JOHNSON.

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead constituted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document while in charge of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could provide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown disinterest in his proposal to obtain for the KGB a top secret document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable. Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly disregarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB seems to have avoided full exploitation of JOHNSON in the latter stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent factors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable by the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillment of its overall intelligence requirements.

NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, a U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NOSENKO's reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what may have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSYN believed the military code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had previously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible that the KGB recruited either STORSBERG or William HURLEY (who NOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KGB). If it is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach described by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN, the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of this case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG or HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--not the American services--by deflecting security investigations from a recruited agent of the KGB.

(iii) Importance or Usefulness

The American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security authorities to:

- Confirm previous information on the recruitments of 13 tourists and three correspondents;
- Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists, two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk, STORSBERG;
- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; and
- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH.*

One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD) in the past had been in a position to pass classified information to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals at the Moscow Embassy (ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had access to classified information. From the standpoint of protecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruiting ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. security authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's information on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and 33 investigations by the KGB--a total of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.

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* Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontacted after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, others who had broken contact with the KGB, some who were known

(iv) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable incompleteness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authoritative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's statement that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy employee working with the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the questionable exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupying the attention and facilities of American security authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold information on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine source, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possibility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services.

c. Operations Involving Other Westerners

(i) Introduction

As already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-American) operations stems from his association with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canadian, as well as American, tourists. Where he has commented on sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for completeness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security.

(ii) Discussion

Of the 90 third-national recruitment leads (Pages 474-502), 22 have not yet been positively identified. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point out that only two of them are potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code clerk in the West German Embassy in Moscow in 1961. Without knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of these cases.

Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the 30 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information, four denied being recruited by the KGB, including [redacted] (the only one of those interviewed holding a government position), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been questioned while in the USSR.

Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive information, in their respective governments:

- [redacted]: NOSENKO said in 1962 that the KGB was working on him when he was [redacted] in Moscow, but he did not know whether [redacted] was recruited or not. [redacted] In 1963 he told CIA of his contacts in Moscow with Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.

- [redacted]: French [redacted]

- [redacted] NOSENKO reported that [redacted], is either an agent or a "solid contact" of the KGB. [redacted] Indian [redacted]

- [redacted] NOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1957 to 1961, [redacted] there is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.

- Indonesian [redacted] in Moscow: In 1962 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the Indonesian [redacted] Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of [redacted] who had been the [redacted] that time. Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that of a semi-satellite of the Communist Bloc, and revelation of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the Soviet Union.

Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases [redacted] he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. [redacted] position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the [redacted] lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.

The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services nevertheless were well on their way to identifying the source of the Admiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALL) by 11 June 1962. When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is reason to believe that the identification would have been accomplished without this information. The lead was therefore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself admitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being targetted or investigated by the KGB, none held positions of significance, with the sole exception of the then member of the British Parliament, [redacted] whose personal life and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable success--to destroy through a campaign of scandal.

(iii) Remarks

On the basis of the above examination, NOSENKO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessment of his *bona fides*. As a possible negative factor in consideration of his *bona fides*, the insignificance of NOSENKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and contrary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--and he himself has commented--that such recruitments were of no particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he should be able to make such a statement without challenge. To date no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Operations against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, cannot be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. Except for those he said he was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. It would not be valid to argue that a source of one lead should have told him of others, or that he should have had more close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or against his *bona fides*.

4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

a. Discussion

In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at that time "four or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conversations were heard. They included the offices of the Minister Counselor, the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Attache, one (unidentified) "State Department employee," and the Agricultural Attache. He also referred to a non-productive microphone in the code room but did not count this as one of the points. NOSENKO did not supply details of the information which the KGB obtained from any of these microphones except to make general allusions to the importance of the materials from those in the offices of the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. He stressed that the existence of these microphones was the KGB's "biggest secret" and that only a very few people knew of them. In 1964 NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written list of the offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and 1961.

NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1964, to be generally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there was no production but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy could be explained by KGB technical failure to receive the intercepts after they left the point at which the sweepers tested; where NOSENKO reported materials were obtained (such as from the Air Attache's office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, it could be conjectured that the microphone died between early 1962 and the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO's reporting did not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had reported on one specific microphone, and another earlier (and probably compromised) source had also reported that the microphones were there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced back to the point where its wires left the building, would lead to the uncovering of all the other microphones, as in fact happened with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information after his defection. Questioned repeatedly for details of the operation or examples of the product of those microphones, he gave almost no operational details* and could supply only the same three generalized examples of their product which he had already given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code room microphone;

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* One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted connected to the microphone operation (with the exception of the North Wing planning, see below) was the loss of a document reporting the product from one of the microphones; GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 255). GOLITSYN said he was present during the search for this document and it was under these circumstances that he learned specifically that there was a microphone in the office of the Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this microphone was the most important in the Embassy.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the microphone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a previous defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).*

In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961. NOSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Similarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.

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* A comparison between NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source who is believed to have been compromised to the KGB after that message (but before 1962) reveals similarities which may not be coincidental.

- NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the American direction - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American Intelligence officers..."

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.

NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent reports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as the source.*

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability to provide specific technical details concerning electronic operations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them.

- Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the existence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its renovation for occupancy by Americans.)

- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGB's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.

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* Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the microphones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone operation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active.

b. Remarks

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particular responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of GOLITSYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962. Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to have been responsible for the operational planning for the north wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception.

5. The BELITSKIY Case

a. Introduction

NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for example, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the agent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at enticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed.

NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consistent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Geneva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official responsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Government, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hostile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with prepared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsibility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handling double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinformation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find" and recontact him.**

c. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had apparently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KISLOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOSENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his photo when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed doubts of BELITSKIY's bona fides, CIA was handling the operation as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final appraisal of the operation's potential.

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* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent (FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other operations against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1958-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KGB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to.this information except that the KGB briefed him about it.

6. KGB Investigations*

a. Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the GRU (Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSENKO's production. If what NOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of POPOV's compromise (which has also been reported by other sources) is not particularly important and has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected American intelligence connections (as with LANGELLE and WINTERS). If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate in his statements about the compromise of POPOV, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.

(ii) Discussion

The information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:

Cause	Date Implied	Source
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	NOSENKO**
KGB surveillance of WINTERS	21 January 1959	CHEREPANOV document
KGB intercept of WINTERS letter	21 January 1959	POPOV message of 18 September 1959***
KGB surveillance of U.S. Embassy officer	none	[redacted] sensitive source
KGB surveillance of LANGELLE	4 January 1959	GOLITSYN, from the KGB orientation paper on the POPOV case *****
KGB agent	prior to 23 November 1957	GOLITSYN******

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* Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575).

** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about whether the KGB applied metka to this letter.

***POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing this letter.

[redacted]

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

The only other evidence available is analytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not exposed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that year. These facts can be interpreted as follows:

- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets' knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources.

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's information that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957.

(Footnotes from preceeding page.)

*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circulation within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security practices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive information; other sources have indicated that orientation papers sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information.

******This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA.

(iii) Remarks

[redacted]

The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO's information on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. Only with resolution of the *bona fides* of NOSENKO can a judgment be made on this part of his production.

b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY*

(i) Introduction

Because his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN is an essential element in NOSENKO's story of his 1960-1961 career, because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in the PENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Pushkin Street site which ABIDIAN visited, NOSENKO's story of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY appears to bear directly on the question of NOSENKO's bona fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with the established facts.**

(ii) Discussion

[redacted] sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing. NOSENKO, [redacted] and the "official KGB report" attribute the compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting between Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December 1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961, and [redacted] did not give a date.

[redacted] gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the compromise dated from May 1962. [redacted] gave two different accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unrelated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first version in 1961, without citing the time of year; in the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November 1961. [redacted] Since

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* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.

**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Presumably this was the subject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, for it was covered in the Soviet press and in at least one "official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their differing situations within the Soviet services could partially explain the differing versions that these sources have given, some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. Therefore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent to the question of NOSENKO's bona fides.

[redacted]

DATE 4/12/94

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PENKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIAN having been sent to check on a possible signal from him about the dead drop.

sensitive source

[redacted] however, makes it clear that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe.* [redacted] went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by ABIDIAN. Thus where [redacted] erred by indicating one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1961, and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. [redacted] said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from the second visit, and because of it PENKOVSKIY was subsequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that no one living at that address knew PENKOVSKIY and he became a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.

[redacted]

The rest of the [redacted] story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance among all the versions which places the compromise on the American side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claimed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participation until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit was the end of 1960 or the very beginning of 1961, whereas in fact MAHONEY's visit was in January 1961. Despite the errors relating to loadings and unloadings of deaddrops at the Pushkin Street location after the second (ABIDIAN) visit there, this story from [redacted] establishes KGB knowledge of MAHONEY's casing of Pushkin Street.

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* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arrival in Moscow.

Greville WYNNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by the KGB also introduced elements contradicting the versions of NOSENKO, [redacted] and [redacted]. As indicated in discussion of NOSENKO's story of the [redacted] conversation with DULACKI (Pages 536-538), the KGB was convinced that PENKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend "ZEP" was an important allusion and they demanded that WYNNE explain it. WYNNE either had forgotten the name or had never known it, and he was unable to tell the KGB who "ZEP" was. The fact that the KGB had a recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before that conversation took place and must have then become aware of the conspiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKIY-WYNNE relationship by virtue of the cryptic nature of that conversation. The additional fact that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified officer of British Intelligence on the same day the "ZEP" conversation between WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY was monitored is evidence that both WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of espionage as of that day, if not earlier. Nor could those suspicions have been explained away by the fact that PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE had legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view of the content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt relationship which required secrecy or even caution in conversation.

The indication from [redacted] that the KGB was aware of MAHONEY's visit to the inside vestibule of the Pushkin Street site in January 1961 is not only missing from all other versions, but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story: he claimed to know everything the KGB knew about this American dead drop site, because of ABIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said that he thought an American tourist (not a U.S. Embassy officer) might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ABIDIAN.

(iii) Remarks

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSENKO was deliberately withholding from CIA information of vital importance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed position in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, like the "official report" of the KGB, does not show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of information on the subject of the timing of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSENKO was deliberately withholding information on this subject and lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is not a bona fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bona fides would be disproven.

c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOVSKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers. The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).

(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examination of one draft document--the operational plan against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points related to form:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor as approving authority, and the designation of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this discrepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been detected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in the CHEREPANOV package cited a KGB cryptonym for him, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSENKO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of metka and "Neptun-80" for two of these techniques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established KGB practice of inserting cryptonyms for such devices, these preparations are not only not described, but the blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing.

In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetically as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intelligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information concerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be summarized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contradictions:

- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka, "Neptun-80," hidden microphones, other audio-devices, and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an intelligence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS' scheduled departure and depending on further accumulation of materials on WINTERS and the prevailing political climate at the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruiting him.

If the WINTERS operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possible approaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record.

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and disregard for security considerations in preparation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft document.

(iii) The Summary on LANGELLE

A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPANOV's own handwriting, also is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV. The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. According to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that POPOV was an American agent..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollection of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference to the indication that the KGB knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHEREPANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/POPOV operation was investigated by the KGB. The latter position should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the compromise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the discovery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed unnecessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated independently), this document too appears to be a KGB fabrication.

The authenticity of another passage in the same document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the dead drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intelligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice as known from many sources:

- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills, both times to case a proposed dead drop site. Both sites involved staircases, but they were two different staircases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park. Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead drop on either occasion, KGB surveillance could not have seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect that he had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not there), the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put 24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until 7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this. CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not been designated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it might have been designated could conceivably not even be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded. REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person intended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of American Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop contemplated for him in the event that he might be recruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have suggested REPNIKOV as the intended recipient. Again, CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop was unassigned by CIA.

If this document were or purported to be the official version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is a handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person who intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indicates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and incomplete.

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption.

There is no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.

It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered.

C. Evaluation of Sourcing

1. Introduction

NOSENKO was able to provide logical and plausible sourcing for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional assignments. Among his foreign leads, those to which he had no plausible direct access have been variously sourced to hearsay from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from his friend CHURANOV) and involvement in peripheral activities (such as his TDY to the city of Vladimir after the [redacted] had been spotted as a homosexual during a visit there). Questionable sourcing by NOSENKO has occurred in his statements on his one double agent case, four American cases and three involving foreigners. They are reviewed below because they include the most important leads NOSENKO has provided.

2. Discussion

There are two KGB Second Chief Directorate operations involving Americans which NOSENKO has sourced inconsistently or falsely.

He demonstrated uncertainty in his knowledge of the facts of the "ANDREY" case (Pages 413-426) by making vague allusions to having heard of it in "bits and pieces" from a number of case officers involved in the case at different times; his first knowledge of it, he said, was due to his own employment in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, "although I worked there quite a bit later. But it was known." (In 1962 he repeatedly dated the recruitment as "1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, identified as "ANDREY", fixed his recruitment date around December 1953, and he did not leave Moscow until April 1954. Since SMITH was directly subordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible for the Embassy's code room, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army Attaches had a logical reason for knowing more than he claimed about the case, including the agent's name. MULE, who succeeded VAN LAETHEM as cryptographic security officer and SMITH's supervisor, was supposed to be one of NOSENKO's more active cases at this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these facts.

In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 468-469), the U.S. Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1956, NOSENKO's ignorance of the objective facts of the case led him into statements concerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. In 1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defection that these claims were exaggerations designed to make him look better than he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUK, and GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a sense he did play a role: he was assigned to a phone watch in support of surveillance during the final phase of the case. Once again it is clear that he did not know the dates of SMITH's assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) nor did he know that the operation he has described took place between 1 and 5 June 1956, and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956. This is a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section.

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NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. As a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational planning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising. In this instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing.

NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had originated with the First Chief Directorate. Six of these he claimed to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GUK, who was personally involved in most of these operations.* Of the other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chief Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in them. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmentary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians he named as sub-sources.

In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted himself: He first said he had learned about "SASHA" from SHALYAPIN, providing lengthy and involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first attributing it to others and later saying that he could not remember when and from whom he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead, he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in the KGB.

Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify another source from whom he had heard this detail).

Regarding NOSENKO's leads to other Westerners, the case of the [redacted] "illegal" in Canada--[redacted] the RCMP's [redacted]--is paradoxical as to sourcing. NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case unofficially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow. When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian case in 1963 when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted his initial statement and said that GUK somehow got in contact with him, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance. Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus implied by NOSENKO, GUK was able to tell him all the operational details concerning [redacted] except his name. This case has an odd aspect which NOSENKO failed to see: He said that this man had come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of paper, rather than entered in the man's passport, so that there would not be a permanent record of his travel to the USSR. This implies, and [redacted] confirmed, that he travelled under his true name to Moscow. [redacted] furthermore confirmed that he had gone as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coordination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SHUBIN case, when the GRU failed to coordinate with the KGB). Yet despite logical professional need-to-know on NOSENKO's part, he first made his own knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial as well.

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*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962, and only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.

NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case of [redacted] French [redacted] When pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian Embassy in 1958 or 1959 with GRIBANOV, and when GRIBANOV told him to take a glass of wine to [redacted] he understood somehow that [redacted] was an agent of GRIBANOV's.

His sourcing for the case of the French businessman, [redacted] (Page 484), is not unlike that of [redacted] He said he had known that there was a French businessman who was an agent. On one occasion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANOV came in and he asked who was calling. When he was told it was [redacted] then he knew somehow that this was GRIBANOV's agent.

3. Remarks

NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO entered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did.

NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coincidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to reconstruct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the "Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect such information for CIA. Because these were among the most important and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, especially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next meeting with CIA.

NOSENKO's sourcing for the [redacted] and [redacted] leads seems illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NOSENKO has given an inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of [redacted] (not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

1. Introduction

What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the discussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of lieutenant.

The discussion of each period in his career has two central topics: First, NOSENKO's own description of his positions, responsibilities, and access; and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, operational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and responsible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activities during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.

2. Naval GRU Service

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77) have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to do with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the military oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. (According to available collateral information, the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of "show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He claims to have deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by voluntarily doing military translations at the Institute. While at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least twice and this went on his record.

- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon completion of the Institute of International Relations later in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then MGB] because of his school record, drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employment, and a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.

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* There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the circumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or training, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes for his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan' in the Soviet Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, considered generally to be the least desirable of all naval assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father that he was a man. (The above was his account in 1966, in all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months' leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However, according to the 1966 account, his service there lasted only one year.)

- In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO's job was to extract information from American publications reporting naval developments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account of his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four or five trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and three to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role, he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learn how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any agents, nor did he know the identities or missions of any others. He also could not describe the ships he had travelled on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965, NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in Primorskiy Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, according to other accounts, because of having contracted tuberculosis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either in his parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis. He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time." (X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from tuberculosis.)

- At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was offered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategic intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but turned it down because he had already studied most of the course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; besides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet at Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sassnitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he successfully turned down an assignment to these points, then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, damp Baltic climate of a recent TB-sufferer appears unthinkable, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were no other positions available.")

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* In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Portland, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.

- He could not remember the name of the place he served near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training materials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at the beginning of 1953. He either had had one or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Moscow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1966 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk.

- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initiative and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East.

c. Remarks

The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all the details were to be considered, the story would become even more confused.

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

(1) If his story of his personal life is true [redacted], NOSENKO would, according to all available information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRU officer service is, or both.

(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contradictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recollection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the locations where he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced.

(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practically non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.

(4) The functions he claims to have fulfilled involved no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life or personal experience.

That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).

NOSENKO's description of his naval GRU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such formalities as medical examination, personnel interviews or questionnaires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953.

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3. Entry into the KGB

a. Eligibility

The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligibility for admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that, on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from several knowledgeable sources, the KGB has more stringent entry requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol record must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelligence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the officers responsible for signing their names to the approval--accepted a person whose record showed (as noted on pages 679-680 above) desertion from the armed forces, self-inflicted wound in wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, previous marriage to the daughter of a state criminal, a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism, and a prior rejection by the KGB itself. The only change since the earlier rejection had been, according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military service in the Naval GRU.

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had contracted tuberculosis, for which he was still under treatment at the time he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the availability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though already arrested.

b. Date of Entry

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of story (Pages 86-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he said that he had joined the KGB in February or March 1953. In 1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a biographic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account, NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two different reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in October 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations, he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced him to take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was "unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it from CIA. In the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

NOSENKO's change of story took place in 1964 while still in the relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he revised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explanation for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1964 either when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1962. DERYABIN has commented on the significance which the date of entry holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619) concerning the timing of his entry on duty with the KGB. As a result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present First Chief Directorate was designated the Second Chief Directorate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953, not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the locations and existence of various buildings and offices in the vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.

In June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meetings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been recruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB. He estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDREY" was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KGB officer, and later reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREY" was recruited in 1949-1950. When he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S. Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY" case. NOSENKO was unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the "ANDREY" case was before his time, when he said in 1964 that this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in early 1954.

c. Circumstances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Moscow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February 1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived at home and was at the "disposal of GRU personnel" during February and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to KOBULOV on the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days from the sanitorium. It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB.

In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out a questionnaire (anketa) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO described the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB personnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit inaccurate, of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NOSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and implied that there were no forms to fill out.

d. Remarks

According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he was ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the KGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and had been himself a KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU service, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB.

4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

a. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspondents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dismiss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence." NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956, when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.) Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work."

b. Work Against American Correspondents

NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited KGB agents at the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint" that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.

c. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In discussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO refused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department was established within the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful information; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control.* He has also used this explanation to support his claim that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this period.

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*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.

An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these explanations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this period deserves attention.

NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--sometimes inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe certain of their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts as:

- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Moscow in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons.

- William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD, as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103). He claimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (He said, for example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.") NOSENKO described FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember anything about FELCHLIN's background, presumably well documented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR in two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States, and he continued to be in liaison with one of them in Moscow. NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FELCHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assistant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air Force Attaches, in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip throughout Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March 1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train. NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the unusual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow; he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was expelled along with Air Force Major Walter McKINNEY, and the Soviets refused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassador's personal plane until Ambassador BOHLEN himself protested. Confronted by his lack of knowledge of the persona non grata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to know the details because this incident occurred after he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this was not true.

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* NOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the subject of training materials. This was the seizure of sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his role in developing plans for the successful operation in Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to give the entire story of the equipment seizure and the persona non grata action, he said that the operation was carried out after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew no more about it. When told that the operation took place at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache in 1953 or 1954; he was a target of another U.S. Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know that VAN LAETHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own target Walter MULE (see above). What NOSENKO additionally did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH (the subject of NOSENKO's "ANDREY" lead--see below) and a friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent. NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955, again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Moscow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on temporary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in Moscow involved the planned use of the electronic equipment which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow.)

d. Additional Reporting

His information on two other operations involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S. Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruitment took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had left the USSR by then as well; he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY's" recruitment date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed certainty that "ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964. In 1964, however, NOSENKO changed his story and said "ANDREY" was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1954-1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C. above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June 1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S. Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused, contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information, incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section, in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and activities of the others; and he lacked even the most important details on security affairs involving the majority of his eight alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost nothing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so unconvincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his first period of alleged service with the American-British-Canadian Section of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purposes of the following discussion, it is convenient to divide this period into two parts. The first of these covers the years from June 1955 to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer, handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing operational activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service from June 1958 to the beginning of 1960 as Deputy Chief of this section. Apart from his personal involvement in a number of recruitment operations in the latter period, it is this service which provides a basis for NOSENKO to claim awareness of all important arrests of spies and recruitments from among American tourists visiting the Soviet Union; it is also this service as Deputy Chief of Section which NOSENKO cites as a basis for his involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Soviet Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)

(i) General

According to NOSENKO's story, he was among the first case officers in the Tourist Department. He arrived there just as the Department was being formed and took part with other officers assigned in the acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in generally "getting things going." Several months later he participated in what he says was his first operation against an American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal and professional life. With it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to all accounts prior to October 1966, when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for operational performance because of the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last promotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years, before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was described by NOSENKO as follows: Sometime in 1957 he was involved in the attempted recruitment of the German businessman [redacted] (Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO personally spoke to him. NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibilities of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available who spoke German but [redacted] was known to speak "a little English," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of [redacted] Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian); NOSENKO has not explained how he came to be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving [redacted] with women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit him. [redacted] has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957 was really not an operation at all. He was assigned to accompany the British [redacted] and the latter's interpreter [redacted] on a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch [redacted] a suspected intelligence agent or officer. His presence was confirmed by [redacted] who recognized NOSENKO's photograph.

This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, sometimes verified, operational role during the three years preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Tourist Section.

The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI's compromise (20 June 1956) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer. The identities of the other two KGB participants in the Kiev recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI; the identity, role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting relate to matters of greater operational consequence:

- NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an operation against him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.

- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this operation. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application (which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow. BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLOV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

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* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the personnel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case officer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.

d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approximately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959, most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the exception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NOSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going." Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Because of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages 145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called "legal traveller" program in 1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now there is a firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. Moreover, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not know can be compared with information from other sources. These facts are reviewed below.

(i) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 he passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a three-day meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representatives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of "legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assessment, and communications support of internal assets.

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mentioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his importance to the KGB. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent of the Second (British) Department (of the Second Chief Directorate) who was not nearly as valuable as the [redacted] or the other Englishman" (VASSALL). By 1964 he could not recall any such agent of the British Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: 'Who's BLAKE?"

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference between CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important materials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had received documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information.

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence operational activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Although NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the document in detail and specifically did not mention that this particular document was in large part based, as subsequent analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(iii) Tourist Agents

NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.

The KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to a number of cases of American tourists who were found by the KGB to be engaged in intelligence collection or intelligence support activities. In addition to McGOWAN, the GOLITSYN document cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and FRANCIS, all of them CIA agents detected by the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never mentioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports of the section which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section, presumably included all of these cases.

f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper

NOSENKO was questioned at length on the review of Western tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV. He said he gathered the material for this study from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his findings with GRIBANOV, could not give any examples of the information which he included in the report (other than statistical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations (other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists travelling by automobile), and did not know what other American Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his research for this report and his own experience, NOSENKO said he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been developing slowly and that, at the time the report was written during the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use of tourism by the American services.

BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his participation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO said, he was the one who made the decision that OSWALD was "not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or "it was decided." NOSENKO's information on the handling of OSWALD in 1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against which it can be reliably measured. The results of the polygraph examination in October 1966, however, indicated that NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected with any aspect of the OSWALD case and that he had heard of OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The polygraph results also indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell U.S. authorities about it.

h. NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959)

(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in one operation shortly after being promoted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was "definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 1958, NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of [redacted] but did not become personally involved in the approach, which was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year, NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the two in a series of successful recruitment approaches to [redacted] [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted]. (In the case of [redacted], who as a commercial representative [redacted] in Moscow, was not the responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in operations against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual compromise.

(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment operations in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on specific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he himself was never their official case officer. They include "LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" and KOSHKIN. He has remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no personality information about them. He identified only VOLKOV and YEFREMOV as his own agents.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only once, immediately after his return). He gave a relatively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's patronym.

- He does not know the home address, general area of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details, or other basic information about either of them.

- He said that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either of them alone without the other's presence.

- He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's encounters with and development of one Dutch and five other Americans, independently known to CIA. Of the Americans, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.

- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and YEFREMOV first came into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise which led to NOSENKO's entry as a "police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations

During 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis of homosexual entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have now been identified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the exception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLSFORD (which did not result in approaches during NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSENKO took part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the only recruitments by the section during this year, NOSENKO said. He claimed repeatedly in 1962, 1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commendation from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the five homosexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the [redacted] case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the [redacted] case--see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on [redacted] homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When [redacted]ent to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent there to approach him, flying alone (as in the [redacted] case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered: "He was not considered capable," his English was "not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remember who wrote the request for permission to make the approach ("Maybe I did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or whether [redacted] was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad compromise and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case officer, PERELETOV, but said that he, NOSENKO, made the recruitment [redacted] said another man was present.

NOSENKO's account in general matches [redacted] statements on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepancies, as well as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at this time Deputy Section Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "DUBAS, I think." When asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had the materials on [redacted] could not do the job, he answered: "I don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the transfer of a KGB "agent or operational contact" (he did not remember which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written. He gave a physical description but had no other knowledge of this agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background nor KGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said, travelled alone; NOSENKO did not arrange to receive him in Uzhgorod because the local KGB took care of everything. NOSENKO met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also forgotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this operation, nor obtain permission to travel alone with the agent to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk, where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the airport to the city." [redacted] said they travelled by train.) Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this operation.

(iv) The Agent FRIPPEL

FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his career (with the exception of [redacted], Pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR," Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learning about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations visiting the United States. With a wealth of reporting assets in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there. When FRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency. FRIPPEL is identified by KGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was considered such by the KGB is confirmed by statements of a self-admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS in 1962.

NOSENKO said FRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: "I recruited him myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conversations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV "had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNOKOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.

NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when FRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIPPEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether he could accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to him, and as a Deputy Department Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL's house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it happened, he said: "Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because he was also involved in the recruitment."

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the American Department. Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own return to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his relationship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, probably in 1960.

FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer responsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could recall nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1962, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew what the newspaper editors he was escorting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself.

During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO volunteered: "If you had been clever you could have made me work inside the USSR; you could have contacted me through FRIPPEL..." NOSENKO was asked in October 1966 whether he had expected or hoped CIA would attempt to establish contact with him inside the USSR through FRIPPEL. He strongly denied this.

i. Remarks

NOSENKO claims to have participated directly or indirectly in every recruitment operation with American tourists in the years 1955-1959. His presence in KGB operations during this period has sometimes been confirmed, but not always did these cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--American, British, and Canadian--for which NOSENKO said his section was responsible:

Years	Name	Nationality	Status in USSR	Confirmed
1955	MALIA	American	Tourist	No
1956	BURGI	American	Tourist	Yes
1957	[redacted]	German	Commercial/Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourists (under investigation)	Yes
	[redacted]	Norwegian	Quasi-official visitor	No
1958	HARRIS	American	Tourist	Yes
	KRAFT	American	Tourist	No
1959	DREW	American	Tourist	Yes
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Tourist	No
	[redacted]	British	Resident	Yes
	MERTENS	American	Tourist	Yes
	BARRETT	American	Temporary Resident	No
	WILLERFORD	American	Temporary Resident	No
	FRIPPEL (to 1963)	American	Resident, later tourist	Yes

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations involving American (six) and British (three) tourists than any other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of other nationalities and having different status in the USSR. FRIPPEL and [redacted] were neither tourists nor (according to them and NOSENKO) used against tourists; [redacted] were from continental Europe; BARRETT and WILLERFORD worked in Moscow for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according to NOSENKO, his operational work was considerably more intensive in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than before, when as a senior case officer his administrative responsibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.

Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the American Tourist Section is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five others of different varieties--with corroboration by other sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged to that section as a senior officer. The doubts are strengthened by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment target which the KGB possessed at the time of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tourist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) because the regular case officer lacked operational experience. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds" of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in another context. His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.

- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a number of significant aspects in the [redacted] case, including staff planning and management of the operation, operational support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach to [redacted]

- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instructions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occupation and his entree into the American community in Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted to report on matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the American Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Although available information verifies the continuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence that he was not.

Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the operational activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an operation between 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having been the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other components, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be expected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few), has given confused accounts of their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their specific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no personality background data on any of them.

Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO was a case officer of the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA "legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and 1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. NOSENKO knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the utmost interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genuine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not describe how data on tourists was received, general and specific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads channeled.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO was not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Department are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.

6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)

a. Introduction

From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons:

- The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO's own statements the KGB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly affect American security. The section has the two-fold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and using information from all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this section provided him his access to most of the major counterintelligence information he has reported, including recruitments of foreign embassy officials and microphone operations against the U.S. Embassy. Most important, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for stating that there were no successful recruitments of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for this two-year period, or for a time both before and after. (This is the same point made by indirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew members of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSENKO has provided.)

- The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents a penetration of any government; none has access to classified information; most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs.

sensitive source

- NOSENKO's work against the U.S. Embassy is confirmed by [redacted] and less directly by other Soviet sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is denied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in the section during these years.)

b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960" or "at the beginning of 1960."

As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which NOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Department (see Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor but left the section before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became second-in-charge of the most important operational section of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary.

NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activities during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period. He has also said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone that there were no recruitments. I was there."

When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for the section's operations, to supervise in particular operational activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIN to concentrate his efforts on the supervision of operations against the most important American recruitment target, the code clerks at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these activities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed case officer responsibility for John ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security officer (identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer, but actually a CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating materials from the microphones concealed in various U.S. Embassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), the work of the officers responsible for operations against the American Armed Forces Attaches in Moscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO reported that he was personally responsible during this period for the operational activity against Naval and Marine officers in the Naval Attache's office.

d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of all the operations being conducted by the section during this two-year period; by his own statement, nothing was kept from him. There were in these two years a total of over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the entire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. In answer to a question, NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents, except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55). NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND, although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had done this. (Regardless of who the recruiter might have been, KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)

NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had personal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with some U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS, nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and frequent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in touch with WINTERS. He could not remember who else KOVSHUK knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Government as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.

Unlike KOVSHUK, ARTEMEV, KOSOLAPOV, BORODIN, BIRYUKOV, KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picked for the DREW, [redacted] and other approaches and the only reason why he, an English speaker, would have been specially selected to work on the German [redacted] who spoke "some English.")

DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approve and retain a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an individual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another. By contrast, NOSENKO first did not list these functions among his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSENKO did not understand the question when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers, they could use them when and how they liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure "meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and later took back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed floor plans and photographs of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the military code room, and the State Department communications room). NOSENKO said that all important Embassy offices were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors," or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restricted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section could identify the known and suspected American Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertheless, he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY, MORELL, and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For example, MORELL, whose overt CIA affiliation was officially announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK and the KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked leading questions and given hints) and did not identify MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whom he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at all on the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his personal situation and background. He could not explain why KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that "every officer thought he was."

g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two subordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of one another and used a single safe, which contained files on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them. NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally asserted that he had also read and studied all the files kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on individual cases, however, he retracted these statements and said that he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did not study any of them, but that in any event he read all the current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones, agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer concerned.

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*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well, GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960.

CIA has two types of information against which the reports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of the detailed debriefings of code clerks returning from Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State and the military services; it also includes the special debriefings and interrogations of the Department of State, the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activity which has become known from various sources. On this basis, CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section involving United States code clerks during the period NOSENKO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of information is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSYN who, from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscow and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's information thereby directly contradicts NOSENKO's statement that the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment operations from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identified. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirmation has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it, and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND presents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to establish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His information concerning KGB activities involving five of these Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSENKO's information on a number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is described in the tabulation of American case leads given on Pages 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain.

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*As discussed below, there are important differences in the accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the outcome of this operation.

(i) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENKO said, the most important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO "dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.

NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his own operations in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYN had passed this information on to the Americans following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or specify his involvement in any particular operational activity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN.

Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccessful recruitment attempt against an American military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, said that he personally conducted the recruitment confrontation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts were full of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice versa, descriptions of the American's reaction to the confrontation, and statements of NOSENKO's admiration for the American despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identified the Finn as PREISFREUND and the American as STORSBERG and described and referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general.

After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally confronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role was limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach was made; after first saying that he had never claimed any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting" himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. This admission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1962 statements had been played to him and he had successively said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in 1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and it was his most important case. Interrogated further concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October 1966, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late 1961 following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that, in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American Embassy employee, possibly a military man and possibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said, PREISFREUND could not be used for six months or so in other operations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspicious. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest in PREISFREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that he was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of GOLITSYN's visit to the American Department. Since defecting he has insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place in the late spring or early summer of 1961 and has described his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue, that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his return from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that he (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.

NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in only one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to the outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSENKO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN. There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961 (NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961, STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's statement that this approach had already been made in January 1961 when he learned of it.

GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case. GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that GRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a military code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code clerk) in the history of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Moscow at the time GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG and HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBERG operation was just under way at this time and was long and drawn-out.

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*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

(ii) The JENNER Case

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because of the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Helsinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NOSENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KGB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER. Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking him to call her. After JENNER's arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further.

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*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he necessarily would know if it had.

JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted by two Soviet students from Vyborg, a young man and a woman, on the Helsinki-Moscow train. He also reported having been given a telephone number by the girl and later reported having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary evidence, in the form of official Finnish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when the train left Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV, travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960, two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train with him. NOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSENKO earlier said that he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER and therefore could not have met and talked with him as NOSENKO had reported, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he insisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described them.

(iii) The GARLAND Case

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was stationed in Helsinki, probably in November--not March--1960, KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the Helsinki Legal Residency. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal Residency learned which train this American was to board and succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the same compartment with him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this American. Later, when another American Department officer visited Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAPOV's operation with the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer, GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second trip to Helsinki in November 1960, again under the KOLOSOV alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one of his travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page 198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily have been involved in the planning of such a second trip and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would have been known to him upon his return, and he would not have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and that NOSENKO left Moscow for Amsterdam, en route to Cuba, on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that there was no such trip.

(iv) The MORONE Case

Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was mentioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using third nationals to obtain access to American code clerks who were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens. According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early 1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS) planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female agent of the Polish UB be introduced to MORONE on the Moscow to Warsaw train for the purpose of obtaining compromising materials. KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she arrived, and briefed her on the operation. She was then placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compromise. Events went according to plan: MORONE met the girl and was intimate with her on the train, but when the technician reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. In a further attempt to acquire compromising material on MORONE, KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in a Moscow hotel room. Still, the KGB felt, there was not enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly compromising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citizen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said that he had handled the entire operation himself, including telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw and that several months later the female agent was brought to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful and MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave a different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover, the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping the best ones for themselves, and this is why she had to be brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February 1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in Warsaw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had given instructions that no actions were to be taken which might embarrass then existing good relations with the United States. When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONE arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of receiving the personal report of the technician to say that he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning from Cuba in December 1960.

CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequent involvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish source who had provided much sensitive and reliable information previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable amount of detail including the date of the operation (which NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya." It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was withdrawn from Moscow in May 1961.

In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has consistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KOSOLAPOV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussed it with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a UB official in Moscow to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and briefed her on her assignment. NOSENKO has not been asked and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from 12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAPOV is confirmed to have been in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation involving the American code clerk GARLAND (see above). It is also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a delegation going to Cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest concerning him. NOSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a maid at America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use to lure MORONE into a compromising situation (see above). NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall anything specific of interest or use that she reported concerning him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO said, was an East German girl sent to America House to pose as an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might have reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he was working against MORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN's tour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to question the girl.

Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in illegal currency speculation with the Egyptian agent and that on at least one occasion the Egyptian introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSENKO did not know that MORONE was also involved in illegal currency dealings with [redacted] whom NOSENKO has identified as KOSOLAPOV's agent and who, he said, was involved with and reporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know that IVANOVA once introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reported by a number of his co-residents at America House to have been intimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some of these same Americans reported also that MORONE was intimate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO; MORONE himself said he knew UMANETS "well." Finally, the incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place after NOSENKO claims to have been transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDIAN's successor, MONTGOMERY.

(v) The KEYSERS Case

The approach to KEYSERS is the only time during his service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to have had direct contact with an American stationed in Moscow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, that it was possible that STORSBERG--the only other possibility--may not have seen him on the night he was approached in the Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent American source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involved in operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself pointed out, however, that this contact was of very short duration, and that it was possible that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case: KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and described the officer who approached him as a man considerably older, shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKO was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been noted.

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS, without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORSBERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to identify him as STORSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under training in the military code room as a "back-up" cryptographer for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow was ZUJUS.

On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NOSENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG's replacement, as the target of this operation. On 2 February 1964 NOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement, and the approach had been made to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one American Embassy official he ever approached.)

In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB believed that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection letter and that there was no indication that he had from microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of the Military Attache, where a microphone was discovered in 1964. NOSENKO had earlier said that this particular microphone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB. (KEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems had also been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was unaware of these discussions.)

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made.

(vi) Other Code Clerk Cases

Frank DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code clerk and the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew of any interesting information about DAY, whether he knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NOSENKO answered "no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulnerabilities he might have had, and that no operational measures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricultural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY later reported that the two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip, that on one occasion they found four "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during this trip an "attractive and available Soviet female" was placed in their train compartment.

John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any background information the KGB might have had about him. He described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people. No compromising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid, however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that the maid told TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months afterward.

Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain compromising photographs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there was no further activity surrounding ZWANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him, and there was no vulnerability data concerning him. When ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian maid, elsewhere identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; ZWANG admitted visiting the maid's apartment several times but denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and [redacted] and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO. NOSENKO was unaware of this.

h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN

NOSENKO said that, as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was directly responsible, as case officer, for all coverage of the Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN. This was NOSENKO's only individual target responsibility, and no KGB officer shared it with him. NOSENKO said that he opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN before ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow in early 1960, and that he turned this file over officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section at the end of 1961. It was NOSENKO who wrote the KGB plan for operations against ABIDIAN in about October 1960. ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was considered by the KGB to be a CIA officer and, as LANGELLE's successor, was also considered to be the most important counterintelligence target in the Embassy. ABIDIAN was thus made a special target of surveillance from the day of his arrival in the USSR; this meant he was always under surveillance by several teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate. The intensive coverage of ABIDIAN included mail censorship, telephone taps, and agent reporting; it was instituted, NOSENKO said, "in the hope that he might lead the KGB to another POPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO continued, in three letter-mailings--all to agents already under KGB control. He was seen to enter a suspected dead drop site on Pushkin Street, the significance of which did not become known to the KGB until later, when it was learned that this site was to be used by PENKOVSKIY. In the hostile interrogations of early 1965, NOSENKO agreed that he was the single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything possible about ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO said he knew nothing about ABIDIAN's personal background, his education, his studies in France, his military service, his date of entry into the State Department, his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments with the State Department, or his status as a Foreign Service Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FSR, FSS, FSO). NOSENKO said he tried to learn these things, but the information was unavailable in the Second Chief Directorate or in KGB Central files, and although he requested information from the First Chief Directorate, nothing was received. The only information the KGB had on ABIDIAN, insofar as NOSENKO knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be a CIA officer.

NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this document was not available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register "from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but that it contained no information on ABIDIAN.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasons ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer was his behavior while serving as a Department of State Security Officer with KHRUSHCHEV's delegation when the latter visited the United States in

1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPOV, who he said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENKO's office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same delegation.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was located in the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and was unable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary was. He reported that some agent told the KGB that ABIDIAN had a sign on the door of his office which said "Security Officer." There was no such sign.

NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's apartment was located. He did not know its contents and said that the KGB was not interested in this. He did not know whether ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.

NOSENKO identified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy language teacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she was intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on her students based on classroom discussions. He never associated ABIDIAN with GROMAKOVA. When told that ABIDIAN had taken language lessons from her, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginning of his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of significance and there was no regular reporting from her on ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular, private Russian lessons from GROMAKOVA throughout his tour in Moscow and that they discussed in class his past personal life, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to see his fiancee.

NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN travelled out of the USSR two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that, as ABIDIAN's predecessor LANGELLE was known to have travelled outside the USSR for operational reasons in connection with the POPOV case, it would have been of interest to learn where ABIDIAN had gone, but the KGB had no way of finding this out. (Note in the previous paragraph that GROMAKOVA knew.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibility of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return to the USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photograph the passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union.

NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscow within the USSR and explained that, as case officer, he would necessarily have been aware of any such trip as he would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled to Soviet Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO said for the first time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted in October 1966 that he knew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.

NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.

NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knew so little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly" as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he said, was that he had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks and therefore had very little time left for ABIDIAN (see above concerning code clerks).

In 1962 NOSENKO correctly described all of the three clandestine letter mailings carried out by ABIDIAN in Moscow at CIA request (Pages 226-230). He also provided accurate information on CIA letter-mailings in general, pointing out that none at all were mailed for a year and a half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No letters were mailed from 22 February 1960 until 1 April 1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSENKO explained that the KGB completely controlled this activity through the use of metka, a thief powder applied to the clothing of foreigners in the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected by special machines through which all mail passes. Despite the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB double agents and would therefore have been detected anyway, it was metka, NOSENKO said, which in each case led to their initial identification. After his defection NOSENKO described how the metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing (and hence to the letters) by the agent FEDOROVICH, who began working as ABIDIAN's maid several months after ABIDIAN arrived in Moscow in March 1960. NOSENKO insisted under interrogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKO, had personally briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metka. From a CIA debriefing of ABIDIAN, however, it appears that FEDOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN's maid until some time in July 1961, whereas ABIDIAN mailed his first letter in Moscow on 1 April 1961 and his second letter on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, after FEDOROVICH began to work for him.

i. Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street in Mosocw is described in detail on Pages 231-235. In summary, NOSENKO reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveillance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building. Upon examination it was decided that this was a likely dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was assigned to watch it. After three months, since nothing suspicious had been noted, this post was removed. The true significance of the location did not become known to the KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENKO said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and was ABIDIAN's case officer when this event took place. He heard of it while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it happened, visited the site the following day with V. KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department of the KGB Surveillance Directorate), placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month and periodically thereafter until the post was removed. It was KOZLOV who told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary surveillance had been discontinued. NOSENKO did not tell CIA about this incident in 1962, he said, because he knew that the watch had been discontinued and that nothing suspicious had been noted; therefore, he thought the incident would not have been of interest to American Intelligence.

NOSENKO has stressed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance by at least two surveillance teams at all times and that, on the day he visited Pushkin Street, ABIDIAN was under continuous watch from the moment he left the Embassy. NOSENKO has been able to give a detailed description of ABIDIAN's movement to the dead drop site.

Despite the special surveillance coverage of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, he was unaware of any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the days immediately preceding his visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO said that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this period and that he was sure ABIDIAN had not eluded the surveillance at any time during it. According to CIA records, three days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to indications that the dead drop had been loaded, ABIDIAN left the U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spaso House at about nine o'clock in the evening; at about two o'clock the next morning he and GARBLER (CIA Chief of Station) went in ABIDIAN's car to check the telephone pole for the signal PENKOVSKIY was to leave as part of his signal that the drop had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street he drove his car to the apartment of Air Force Captain DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole from a window in the apartment and then walked by it on foot. NOSENKO identified GARBLER as a U.S. naval officer but not as a CIA employee (see above).

Asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street at the time he did, NOSENKO replied that in about 1960 an American tourist or delegation member had gone to this address. It was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected the site as a dead drop location, and that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In fact, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to what appeared to be a prearranged telephone signal from PENKOVSKIY signalling that he had loaded the dead drop there. It has been confirmed that PENKOVSKIY did not give this signal and, because of the circumstances and type of signal given, the possibility of coincidence has been ruled out. CIA has therefore concluded that the signal came from the KGB.

The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter through which he initially contacted CIA. There is no record that a "tourist or delegation member" visited this address. The only known visits by Americans to the building on Pushkin Street--the only ones having any connection with its use as a dead drop location--occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY entered the building and checked the specific location of the dead drop. MAHONEY is known to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer before arriving in Moscow and was the target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour. (NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or his CIA status.)

NOSENKO's date of "late 1960 or early 1961" is incorrect, almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO said he turned ABIDIAN's file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1961. ABIDIAN checked the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after returning to the Tourist Department in 1962." Because NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON, and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January 1962 (he reported it to the U.S. Embassy at once), it can be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have visited the dead drop site with KOZLOV (who in any event was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street had been discontinued after three months without anything suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March 1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the dead drop.)

NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing the contradictions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remember whether he had gone there at all.

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations

On 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service attaches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would come to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section. After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.

NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960.)

NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO replied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on [supervising] all of them."

NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent [redacted] which he has described in detail (see Page 488) took place after he was relieved of these functions.

k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages 279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria until about the middle of May. While there he discussed both general matters and particular cases with the Bulgarians, gave several lectures on operations against American installations and personnel as well as against tourists, and finally directed the successful homosexual operation against the American Professor LUNT.

Aside from being told that he would be advising the Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparation for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of responsibility, or problems of the American Department of the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy Section (see above discussion of his responsibilities for code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a "very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOV was Chief of the American Department until 1953 and then from June 1955 until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by NOSENKO, had recruited BURGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away from active operations in Moscow too long.

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties as an advisor on operations against the American Legation. On the other hand, he accidentally became involved in a homosexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting series he described in detail how he set the operation up and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, however, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at the time.)

NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service became aware of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUNT's name or heard it mentioned; he recognized the name as that of a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when earlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGB Second Chief Directorate confirmed that this was the same man. In statements made to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said he had had homosexual relations at least five different times with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter planned to sell on the blackmarket, was on one occasion stopped on the street with him by a Bulgarian civil policeman, and corresponded with him in the interim between his first visit and the one during which the approach took place. LUNT had written the Bulgarian homosexual that he was returning to Sofia before arriving on the second occasion.

The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY

NOSENKO said that in October 1960 he was assigned to accompany a delegation of automotive specialists on a visit to the United States but that when this trip was cancelled, he went on TDY to Cuba (Pages 274-278). After he had completed arrangements for his passport and had submitted his true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not then be accepted in the United States. At about the same time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSENKO explained, it was not considered necessary for a security officer to accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the last moment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job since he already had a valid passport and authorization to travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit countries and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this name in connection with travel abroad. (He travelled to England in 1957 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said, because he had used this name with British citizens [redacted] in the Soviet Union; as [redacted] was suspected of being an intelligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity. He applied for U.S. entry under true name, however, despite the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV name with Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO further explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this would be noticed when the American and British services exchanged notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, conflicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover NOSENKO used, again under true name, in Geneva in 1962.

NOSENKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because a security officer was required and he happened to have a passport and authorization to travel. The delegation left Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection with an operation against John GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban intelligence service was operating against Americans stationed in Havana, particularly intelligence officers, and described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation.

1. Personal Handling of Agents

When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourist operations with him: YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and language teacher at the U.S. Embassy who was turned over to him by U.S. Embassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and [redacted] who were used in code clerk operations. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are discussed below.

(i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV

NOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual agents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use them in any way, however, according to his account. The only contact of the two known to CIA was a meeting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1959, while in Moscow and a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFREMOV and VOLKOV; in 1961, shortly after an apparently chance meeting with them, BARRETT was recruited by the KGB on the basis of the materials obtained in 1959. NOSENKO described the compromise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961.

(ii) FRIPPEL

NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPPEL during the 1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) "kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer.

(iii) DMITRIYEV

DMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during the 1955-1960 period. DMITRIYEV was then employed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operations. NOSENKO did not describe any operational use of him in 1960 or 1961.

(iv) RYTOVA

RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which time she was employed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker, she reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB operations in Moscow in which she participated during his service there.

(v) LEVINA

LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported anything interesting and was never used directly in operations involving the Americans. She was fired from the Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1961.

(vi) Johan PREISFREUND

As described in Pages 173-181 and discussed above, PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against James STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said that this was the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer of 1965. PREISFREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was able to supply a considerable amount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's manner during these interviews, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the interviews were completed, there was no reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives.

(vii) [redacted]

[redacted] (KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSENKO in 1961. A Syrian [redacted] in Moscow, [redacted] was first targetted against America House in General, but was then used only in the development operation against ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code clerk in Moscow. [redacted] met and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first suggested that CIA attempt a "false flag" recruitment of [redacted] using his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose; he provided CIA with [redacted] in Damascus so that contact could be established. Later NOSENKO said that [redacted] like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA interviewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met [redacted], did not recall his name and denied that his relationship with [redacted] was as close as NOSENKO reported.

m. Transfer to the Tourist Department

Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard of GRIBANOV's decision to promote him to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire American Department. NOSENKO, however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUK wanted the job and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appointment would therefore place him in a difficult position and wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returning there. At CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department upon the retirement of the incumbent, BALDIN, in July 1962. To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did not discuss with him his reasons for wanting to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions. On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of questions which were reported to him." According to his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred from the American Department at the end of December 1961 and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about 3 January 1962.

KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this position, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been personally involved in many of the more significant American Department operations during the previous decade. These included the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one of NOSENKO's most important leads, according to NOSENKO); the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG, HARMSTONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer WINTERS; and the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with the POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for the job, NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself recruited HARRIS and five homosexual tourists who visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Furthermore, NOSENKO's performance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, as he admitted under interrogation, was "not good."

NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said at various times that this took place in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January. (On this basis, he said that the official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate, however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962, and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; he placed this on 15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of 15 December 1961.

D. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the appointment to and transfer from this position have been inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments were made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contradictory about his activities during this two-year period, shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how each succeeding version made all of his claims increasingly incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties, targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where collateral information has covered the few subjects on which he provided details, it has almost invariably contradicted him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts. The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so incomplete, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest without reservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief. All available evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below), combines to formulate this conclusion.

7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)

a. Introduction

NOSENKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB activities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encompassed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 285-287).

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIBANOV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling operations against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervisory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALD.

b. Absences from Moscow

During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent several weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tourist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moscow only three months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment abroad. NOSENKO said he had "no accomplishments" in this period.

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* This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.

In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife and mother. NOSENKO has estimated that six months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation in 1963. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in Geneva on 19 January 1964, a period of 18 months, NOSENKO was absent from KGB Headquarters for eight months. Thus in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSENKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time.

c. Personal Participation in Operations

NOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSON and the interrogation of BARGHOORN) were unusual in that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSENKO could name no other examples of such operations. In both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's presence. The third case, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homosexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely tied in with [redacted] sensitive source and related.

(1) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruitment, but a decision was made that he was not worth the effort as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City. (JOHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this decision was made, postal intercepts showed that JOHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHNSON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation "in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the actual date of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly because he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the approach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.*

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intecept. About the same time there were indications of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 January.

Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally determined JOHNSON's homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were "signs." NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV invited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting letters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this operation the day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as "Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police."

(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has described in detail the selection of BARGHOORN as a hostage for IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in New York City as a result of [redacted] the planning of the provocation, other KGB activities surrounding BARGHOORN which were not related to the provocation, BARGHOORN's arrest in Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation. Except for some variation in dates, NOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOORN's movements and of the sequence of events in the provocation-arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two ways similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operation in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOORN was able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.

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* How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.

BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the evening before about the "compromising materials" which had been planted on him. With this officer on this one occasion was his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by the Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO) present in the interrogation room at the time when BARGHOORN admitted that he had the compromising information in his possession at the time of arrest. NOSENKO did not know why his particular presence was needed or desired, but he complied despite the fact that he did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN as he knew BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating officer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOORN has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogation sessions, that this session covered only biographic and background matters, and that the compromising documents and his possession of them had been discussed the previous evening, right after his arrest.

In describing the planning of this provocation, NOSENKO told CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN came from GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY, but did not divulge to him that it would be based on provocation. This was on the day before the arrest. SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest and secured permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was out of Moscow at the time. Reliable sources show, however, that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMICHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31 October, the day of the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tourist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually settled in the United States, where he was a technician working at an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed his subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Moscow Hotel where KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and because NOSENKO felt the recruitment was "shaky," KRUPNOV was sent after him to consolidate the agreement. BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV however, so again NOSENKO went to help him. It was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was so frightened that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO thereupon decided to terminate the case, and BRAUNS was sent on his way.

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact, had spent almost a week in Moscow before the approach was made. During this time he spent his days with an Inturist tour and his evenings with an old girlfriend he had known before the war. She had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year, telling him of her unhappy marriage and impending divorce. BRAUNS had written her of his intention to visit the USSR, and she travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to spend this time with him.

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO, according to NOSENKO) who joined him and his original interrogator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Leningrad. This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKO who was sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV. BRAUNS was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph but explained that he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize anyone involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be confused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENKO said he supervised the homosexual provocation and arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the developments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-303); he was not in face-to-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR since the war, had numerous suspicious contacts there, and was considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI) in the Communist Party. Prior to his arrival in 1963, [redacted] Legal Residency reported that KOTEN was in contact with an important [redacted] agent in [redacted], that he was carrying the address of relatives of this agent with him on his trip, and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was considered that he might have the mission of investigating the [redacted] agent inside the USSR. [redacted] As it was suspected from earlier trips that KOTEN was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise him, arrest him, break him, and provide time for the [redacted] agent to make his escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the [redacted]

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agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA protested the arrest of one of its members, KOTEN was released.

KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. His homosexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour guide for the New York firm "Afton Tours," which is owned by SVENCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identifying data on the "important [redacted] agent" [redacted] This agent had been identified [redacted] a year before KOTEN's trip. [redacted]

The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homosexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide publicity in Western newspapers. (The U.S. Embassy was not notified officially until two days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extremely unusual step by the KGB, which can be assumed to manipulate Inturist for operational support purposes.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was released from prison. He was told that the incident was a mistake which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere he wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he could return anytime. [redacted] the [redacted] agent, has since repatriated to the Soviet Union.

d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO

When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, [redacted] and RYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his return, in the operation against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREISFREUND was considered compromised to American Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSENKO met him socially when PREISFREUND returned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the Chief of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with [redacted], who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS, the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw [redacted] before going to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Although she was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case officer until 1964, when he defected.

(i) FRIPPEL

Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and Part VIII.D.5.) returned several times to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although FRIPPEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met FRIPPEL in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIPPEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors touring the Soviet Union. FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview. When FRIPPEL said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later reported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the "reactions" of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when he was drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided no information of value during any of these meetings.

(ii) SVENCHANSKIY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been considered, NOSENKO said, "of definite operational interest." In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the responsible officer.

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.

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NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had contacts with AMTORG in New York, there was some suspicion that he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more precise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only that NOSKOV "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.

NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had at one time been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language book-store in Chicago. FBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Soviet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegations on file of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States during the war. The FBI has reported [redacted] one time been the confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espionage in the United States." (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa applications.)

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said, he was directly involved in the investigation of OSWALD's activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NOSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD" after his attempted suicide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.

f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation

Part VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in November 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

g. Remarks

Leaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to supervisory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his personal role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificial in some instances and implausible in others. NOSENKO's knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of the compromise in unique, and the outcome seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUNS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance in that operation, he has not done so and his statements contradict NOSENKO on the part the latter played. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who recognized NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources contradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV's presence in Moscow) of the BARGHOORN arrest, explained as a retaliation-hostage action for events in [redacted] NOSENKO's information on the Soviet arrest of the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed [redacted]. NOSENKO's earlier information [redacted] information on the background of the SVENCHANSKIY operation is fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from several, mainly overt, sources; his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSKIY was confined to the two times when the original handler was also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5. In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or that he was even a case officer.

E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. KGB Awards and Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the American or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions follow a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for his first promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951. NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first time that he did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the rank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank, so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was filling a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search,** which gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the "official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.

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* See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

** See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promotions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that he was a major.*

In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authorization for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the alleged reasons for this rise [redacted]; it was GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRIBANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO. The same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistake and only promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRIBANOV advised him to accept this rank and promised that when he had completed sufficient time in grade for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened, NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieutenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional reason to question his relationship with GRIBANOV.**

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against KGB regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV himself as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)

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* This change of story coincided closely in time with a change in the information reported by [redacted]. Shortly after NOSENKO's defection [redacted] had said that remarks by his KGB associates made it appear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel. [redacted] that NOSENKO was only a captain.

** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his school and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Komsomol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a superficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Komsomol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organization Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Komsomol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSENKO's account of his expulsion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is contradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of 25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced out at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions were made in his case.

c. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limitation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretaryship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Komsomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; see Pages 80-81).

The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).

3. Schooling

a. Introduction

There is relatively little reliable collateral information concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what he himself has reported, available information consists of overt press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with references to these other sources, is summarized below.

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attributable to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Leningrad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In contrast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO allegedly received his early training in naval matters is characterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood.

b. Discussion

In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 January 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school.

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in 1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of 1941. NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.*

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* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and that this was farther from home than he wished to go. The Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, but was shut down.

Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according to the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before running away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also given expansive and changing accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted implicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacation, and of his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false.

NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as an "external" student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1944. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from his April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young naval officer in 1945.) According to the account given under interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, respectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early" 1945; since the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad.

The earliest collateral information specifically concerning NOSENKO's educational background appears to relate to the general period described above. [redacted] the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two classes behind ARTAMONOV, and would have been at the school for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence of the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely known in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's self-inflicted wound and disappearance, which ARTAMONOV has not mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been there such a short time and not in ARTAMONOV's class. (NOSENKO claims not to have known ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.)

In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO has said that he entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of courses, events and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of his earlier schooling. He has given various dates for his graduation and has explained that he did so to cover up the fact that he failed his final examination in the subject of "Marxism-Leninism," of which he was ashamed. NOSENKO most recently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of the summer of 1950. [redacted]

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount of collateral information available, make it clear that much of his account of his education has been false. The reasons for this are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical explanation. The CIA psychologist who tested and questioned NOSENKO about his youth suggested that, under conditions of interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his need to save face. This view is an accurate description of NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and other aspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with regard to questioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling to tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately (judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister's activities) describing the years preceding it. It is not apparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of his travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or why he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there.*

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* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, or one lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis of available evidence.

F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations must be founded, as with any source, on factors which are often immeasureable, but fewer reservations need be attached to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These operational circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in much the same manner as were NOSENKO's production, sourcing, and biography for they are tangible pieces of evidence. In the next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals, which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man), Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-43 (for the operational circumstances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO found him to be of above-average intelligence, one of them saying that "his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intellectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He is capable of good memory and, as illustrated by his repeating certain facts in the same sequence, capable of what appears to be good memorization of details. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the exceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short period.

Parts VIII.D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal backgrounds. Here may be added other observations by the CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly, he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he has a "remarkable" disregard for the truth where it serves his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."

The gaps and errors in NOSENKO's testimony therefore do not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consistently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB and if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively," and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NOSENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] as a possible penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps and errors in his reporting.

3. Motivation

Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his motivation must remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explanation and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet this claim is open to question: The amount of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven him to treason, especially since there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might have helped him make up his loss. Furthermore, only two days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSENKO spent the CIA money in another drunken debauchery (with the same companion) and came back needing more. The discrepancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regime, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.

By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanation for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not defect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 statements: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed family life and children of whom he was fond, cast shame on his father's memory and his remaining relatives, and departed forever from his own country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently continued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explanation. No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, whenever his reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psychologist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has." The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."

4. Operational Circumstances

a. Presence in Geneva (1962)

1962

When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962, NOSENKO was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, having held this position for two months. He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strange for the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip abroad unconnected with his own work. His reasons for being in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one another: The Disarmament Conference was not expected to last more than "a few weeks," but NOSENKO did not begin his work against SHAKHOV (one of the main reasons for his being there) until six weeks after arrival; GRIBANOV played a role in his TDY, but NOSENKO later denied this; there were in 1962 "new rules" requiring a staff officer to accompany a Soviet delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not remember such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva in 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba in 1960 and England in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despite his claim to a record so bad that he was not cleared by the KGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one of those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964, as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this but said in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the TDY. He reported the 1964 TDY might, because of his new position, be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his superiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO said he had the assurance that as Deputy Department Chief (which he knew he was about to become) he would in the future come to the West at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could not explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowed out of the USSR as a "treat," would go abroad for a conference which could be expected to last many weeks, probably months. This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENKO would be needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB conference to plan the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about this time, and he stuck to this story even after admitting that the telegram recalling him for this Moscow conference was an invention (see below).

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimed that he had no reason and that it is normally forbidden (as other sources have confirmed).** When asked how and why he

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sensitive source

[redacted] cited GRIBANOV's personal authorization of NOSENKO's trip in the face of derogatory information as one cause of GRIBANOV's dismissal.

**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency in London more than once during his visits there in a similar capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in 1960.

did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First, his own confused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably have his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues in his proper surroundings. However, in 1964 he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. He showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as "security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

d. Timing of 1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact came only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).

TOP SECRET

e. Willingness to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwillingness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compromised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration. Before he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said: "Maybe I'll meet you again Monday" (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, when he did return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KHRUSHCHEV."

f. The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram [redacted] leaves only two possible interpretations:

- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interrogation in 1966.

- There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne out by Special Intelligence.) Thus, the invention was [redacted] not NOSENKO's but the KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; and NOSENKO made an error in later admitting that it was not.

g. Remarks

The operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that:

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964;

- He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security;

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA although having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale;

- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide continuing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication.

Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, and that the KGB guided NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings, NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: "I will have to think about that tonight," or "I will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't want to give you an answer to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, after having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB:

-He called for an urgent special meeting to correct something he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached in 1961. This seemed remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this case gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S. Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his customary indifference to names and dates, NOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so.

-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the part of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or planned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however, was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context and without any explanation, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked.

In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defection in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effect of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as a public figure, confirming that he had a family, and verifying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photographer passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defection had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence." There is no independent press in the USSR, no Soviet journalist is allowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposition to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions.

G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO

1. Introduction

The preceding portions of Part VIII. present an analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed consideration to information about him from [redacted] Soviets reporting to CIA and the FBI. Because their evidence generally runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examination of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported NOSENKO's intelligence background are [redacted] sensitive sources [redacted] and the defectors [redacted] and GOLITSYN. None except GOLITSYN claimed to know NOSENKO personally or to have worked with him, and NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying they had never met. Some of them, as well as CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.

2. Corroboration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career

The statements of [redacted] the sources confirm that NOSENKO was a KGB officer with access to sensitive information:

sensitive source

[redacted] - [redacted]

[redacted] said NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who approved NOSENKO's (1964) TDY to Geneva. [redacted] NOSENKO was a KGB "chief," with access to details on KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He also stated that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy microphones and KGB operations involving correspondents and tourists, was "more valuable [to American intelligence] than PENKOVSKIY." NOSENKO "could do tremendous harm to the KGB," [redacted] and moreover, the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" (i.e., until 1966). He described the repercussions in the KGB caused by NOSENKO's defection: new KGB regulations to increase security, the dismissal of many KGB officers including GRIBANOV and the recall of many others [redacted] Asked [redacted] whether NOSENKO could be a "trick," i.e., a KGB provocateur, [redacted] expressed the conviction that NOSENKO was not. [redacted]

[redacted] sensitive source

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he declined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards, [redacted] NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered

[redacted]

[redacted]

- According to [redacted] source NOSENKO was in "Intelligence." His defection brought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO's friend GUK, who had recommended the TDY to Geneva. In addition, [redacted] reported, immediately after the defection a representative of the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to speak to the Soviet Government employees there. [redacted] said that NOSENKO had been tried in absentia in Moscow for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and 342).

- GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO's name in 1962, and there is no record of his ever having mentioned NOSENKO prior to the Western press announcement of the defection in 1964, even though he had named people known to him in the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Shortly after defecting GOLITSYN said that he had visited this Department in 1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961.) After NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given a summary of NOSENKO's biography. Thereupon GOLITSYN reported that NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 1953 and last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN stated, NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S. military personnel and later either for others in the Moscow Embassy or for correspondents. As of 1959, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Department. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see Pages 343-344).

[redacted] Soviet source, [redacted] Source, indicated she had been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a "civilian"; he had nevertheless provided information on microphones in the U.S. Embassy and had caused "considerable damage." [redacted] also have corroborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of NOSENKO's background. [redacted]

3. **Remarks**

[redacted] Source, aside, the Soviet sources have certified that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or implied that he had access to information valuable to American Intelligence--the microphones in the U.S. Embassy being one item in common. [redacted]

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[redacted]. Most of them have described the serious repercussions of NOSENKO's defection. The possibilities with regard to the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:

> First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector whose previous positions in the KGB enabled him to divulge all important details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans.
>
> Second, they are misinformed. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, they may be valid sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control. For this to be true, it would have been necessary for the KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of KGB personnel (including GRIBANOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the operation. The KGB, at the same time, would have propagated within and outside of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer and would have supported this fabrication in various ways [redacted] the rumor spreadin about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).
>
> Third, they have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGB conspiracy to support the *bona fides* of NOSENKO, a KGB-controlled source.

These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.

H. Alternative Explanations

1. Introduction

Parts VIII.B. through VIII.F. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are three alternatives:

> First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.
>
> Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to save face.
>
> Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that "different people have different memories" and that his own is "funny," and this is supported by his forgetfulness and errors concerning events he is known independently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and [redacted] cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with names," because he has almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective memory is probably true of nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might not appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appreciation of or respect for an "objective truth." His reporting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore seem distorted. He might recount events according to his mood of the moment. Thus, for example, if real attachments to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath, there would be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall when he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue and contradictory in major ways; that his account of his personal and professional life and his rendition of the information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or recount how he did the things he did. Most important, it would dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony since nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypothesis, however, is unsupportable because of several factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a counterintelligence organization which is known to require attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while overcoming the black marks in his file: scandal, indiscipline, negative background factors, and bad Party record. NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was inattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise resulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is untenable, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage (itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to the degree which would explain his poor performance under CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his performance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psychopathic personality is that such a person could be induced to recall certain details with the help of discussion, questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded, he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment from the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEV in Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability to find a category of information about himself which he consistently remembered nor any that he consistently forgot. If what is important is his own direct experiences, for example, it is odd that he recalled the operations of others better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents and people involved in his own career; he could recount details of the PENKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies among tourists, such as McGOWAN, for which he was responsible; he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the 1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embassy employees which permitted him to recall some details of the STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough to help him recall some of the other details which were equally pertinent to him personally; and it is not selective memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them. If it is said that his parental family is important to him (hence his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details about his childhood. If drinking with important people is meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what season of the year or in what restaurant they took place.

Finally, with reference to the "selective memory" hypothesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers best and which he told most confidently that the majority of inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among numerous examples.

c. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply embellished and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all, admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often in ways which led him into more contradictions and further admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented his service in the American Department to make himself more interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough from his operations and from his handlers to think he could pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on a number of points:

-The validity of the information he has provided. To get such information he would have to be a KGB staff officer, must have worked in both the American and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must have been a fairly senior officer with broad responsibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes). To name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:

(a) NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable details from inside the case, including the names by which the CIA case officers identified themselves to the double agent;

(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost complete accuracy, that CIA ceased clandestine letter-mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;

(c) He identified several Americans recruited or approached by the KGB in operations in which he said he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry SHAPIRO;

(d) NOSENKO knew inside information on Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activities of John ABIDIAN, WINTERS mailing of a letter to POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers, etc; and

(e) He knew certain details of the story of Aleksandr CHEREPANOV which would not have been available outside the KGB staff.

Thus there would not be any great need nor much room for embellishment.

-The confirmations of others. He appeared before BARGHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive source's [redacted] subsources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual importance: that he was a Deputy Department Chief in the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY, and so on. A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that NOSENKO's defection was the greatest loss ever suffered [redacted] by Soviet Intelligence. [redacted] Two sources reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as a result of the defection, and these officers did indeed return to the Soviet Union.

Thus any embellishment must concern only minor details such as his rank, which he has already admitted.

d. Combination of Above

Another possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor performance was due to a combination of bad memory, psychopathologically selective memory, and embellishment. While this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments discussed under component parts above.

e. Insanity

It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insane and that this was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings in his story. However, NOSENKO thereafter handled senior KGB functions well enough to be promoted and to be permitted abroad in 1964; he has been examined periodically by a CIA psychologist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact over considerable periods of time and under varying degrees of stress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel; he has maintained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. None of the foregoing results in an indication of insanity and there are countless other arguments which would invalidate this hypothesis.

3. Second Alternative

It has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psychopath, is what he says he is, but that for psychological reasons and while under interrogation, he did not want to tell what he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on the inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements, the interrogator merely caused more inconsistencies or else received the false answers that NOSENKO did not know or did not remember the facts. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO recalled and repeated what he had previously said in the less inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed debriefings prior to 4 April 1964. This alternative explanation thus does not account for the factual contradictions in NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, etc. It also fails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank as lieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TDY travel authorization which shows him to be a lieutenant colonel, and about the telegram recalling him to KGB Headquarters in January 1964. [redacted] The suggestion that NOSENKO lied to save face consequently can be dismissed.

4. Third Alternative

The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, in which case his misrepresentation was done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are (even in theory) only two possibilities: He is merely exaggerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including his diplomatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet official protests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in Washington, Soviet officials' remarks in various areas of the world, and reports from [redacted] other sources on his KGB status and importance.

sensitive source and

There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrepresented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accommodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.* This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under detailed questioning: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's production (see Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NOSENKO in April 1964.

4. Remarks

The first alternative above has been rejected while the possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed against American Intelligence.

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* His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported by any such "show" appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation in the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; PREISFREUND is an unreliable witness; and [redacted] is not accessible to interview.

I. Summary of Conclusions

CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching a definitive conclusion about the bona fides of this man who says he is a KGB officer-defector collaborating with American Intelligence.

As this point-by-point analysis has demonstrated, there is no reason to accept any of NOSENKO's claims to a career as an officer in Soviet Intelligence, to authority concerning the range and degree of KGB operational successes in the USSR (particularly with U.S. officials and private citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding major security cases in that country, or to cooperation with American Intelligence.

It would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to verify that NOSENKO lied about a single segment of his career in the KGB. He cannot have been truthful in saying that he was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and a Deputy Chief in the Tourist Department of the same directorate from 1962 until his defection. Numerous indications make it doubtful that NOSENKO, as he contended, belonged to the naval GRU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and to the American Tourist Section in 1955-1959. He was unable to support his alleged staff officer status in the KGB, providing incomplete and inaccurate information on his sub-sources and on such topics as Headquarters staff procedures while making illogical statements on modus operandi. Neither a supervisor nor, probably, a case officer, it remains dubious but possible that he was a KGB principal agent whose speciality in the past was compromising Western homosexuals. Whatever the capacity in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGB ranks, holding the KGB titles, or with the KGB honors he has ascribed to himself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of his claims to being a genuine defector.

There is no question, however, that NOSENKO has had the benefit of inside information from the KGB. He has said so, other sources have said so, the Soviet Government's reactions to the defection implied as much, and his reports contain details which could have come only from the KGB. He was introduced into several operations, the first as early as 1958, in a position appearing "senior" to known KGB staff officers. He has provided data on organization, personnel, and methods complementing and supplementing that from others affiliated with the KGB. Purposefully misleading about himself, NOSENKO has also been deceitful in discussing the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perhaps POPOV, although here his reporting often correlates with that from several [redacted] Analysis shows that -- NOSENKO and others to the contrary -- CHEREPANOV was a KGB provocateur, PENKOVSKIY was detected at the latest in early 1961 not 1952, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlier than January 1959 because of a KGB agent rather than surveillance. NOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented himself but has practiced deception under KGB guidance. Appraisals of NOSENKO's performance under interrogation, his alleged motivation, and the operational circumstances support this view.

sitive sources

Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with CIA began in 1962.

CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.

Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of the foregoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who, [redacted] have corroborated the bona fides of NOSENKO.

IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER SOURCES

1. Introduction

sensitive sources

The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by two categories of Soviet Intelligence sources: (1), the defector GOLITSYN and (2) [redacted] These sources, all of whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.** If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the [redacted] sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.

In assessing whether and how [redacted] sensitive sources could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures,*** and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL, GRIBANOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.

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* Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services are eliminated from detailed consideration here because their connections with NOSENKO are less direct than the sources with service in the KGB and GRU. [redacted] has never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he reported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's defection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK and V.V. VAKRUSHEV. Source

** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between GOLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector.

***That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.

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- Another phase of the preparations would have been NOSENKO's actual and demonstrable participation in operations, seemingly as a KGB officer. Presumably this would be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, TRIPPEL, and W.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen NOSENKO in some such role.*

- The KGB presumably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of some or all of the operational plan; it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners, in meeting Western double agents, or before microphones in their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never heard of this man NOSENKO" or speculating close to the mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bona fides of NOSENKO [redacted] by the spreading of false rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling KGB officers from the posts in the West (ostensibly because they were known to NOSENKO), by announcing the wholesale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters activities), and by making general announcements within the KGB about the "loss" incurred by the defection [redacted] Furthermore, since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad example of defectors, such announcements might be expected to denigrate NOSENKO as a "bad character" with venereal disease, an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc., in his background. The KGB might also have taken pains to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.

sensitive sources

It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether the reports of [redacted] concerning NOSENKO were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation, or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KGB disinformation.

Their direct and indirect support of NOSENKO's bona fides, as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated in the next sections below, together with presentations and appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common with NOSENKO's. Certain reports by [redacted]

Source

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* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist Department operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical participation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his claimed role was uncheckable since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on which NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS would remember or recognize him.

source

[redacted] are also considered because they overlap NOSENKO's to some extent, although by saying he was a civilian, [redacted] contradicted his claim to KGB staff officer status. A number of general correlations between the NOSENKO case and the [redacted] sensiti sources operations are then reviewed. The final section of Part IX is a summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN, [redacted] [redacted] sensitive sources

source

C.

B. [illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible] At [illegible] 1962 and 1963 [illegible] On 19 [illegible] 1962 GOLITSYN was shown a list of names of Soviet delegates to the 1962 session of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. NOSENKO's name was on the list but GOLITSYN gave no indication that he recognized the name.

On 2[illegible] June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB. The CIA officer stated to GOLITSYN that [illegible] closely overlapped his own [illegible], including [illegible] GOLITSYN's friends [illegible], and [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible] was suggested, perhaps in [illegible] items from NOSENKO [illegible] GOLITSYN's own [illegible] Second Chief [illegible] with GOLITSYN [illegible] was shown him, [illegible] Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the [illegible] as [illegible] NOSENKO, and [illegible] had [illegible] reported [illegible]; CIA records, [illegible] one Aleksandr [illegible] in Japan when [illegible] NOSENKO, who [illegible] further [illegible] identified as KGB [illegible] these names, [illegible] that organization in 1961 for the [illegible]. GOLITSYN said [illegible] in general, [illegible] the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were [illegible] of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. It was not given to him.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" from Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

On 11 February 1964 GOLITSYN raised the possibility of his participation in interrogations of NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data on NOSENKO to assist him in analyzing the operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department at the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he identified it as a photograph of the man he knew. At this time he gave the information about NOSENKO which is summarized below.

The NOSENKO case has not been discussed with GOLITSYN since the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment.

2. Resume and Discussion of Information*

American Department - 1953

NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953** and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, perhaps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the correspondents to the KGB.

GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, GOLITSYN, was there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counterintelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and reorganized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITSYN was Deputy Chief of the Emigre Sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. GOLITSYN has not indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although certain activities of common interest with the latter would appear logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with correspondents, however, did not encompass his having official contacts with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligence Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO's description of the location of his claimed office in the American Department, and his description of the duties of the co-workers he said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such a representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account, then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office. GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KGB operations against American correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956 or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business in the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953 encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental. Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could have led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO was a member of the staff within the American Department.

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* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see Pages 343-344).

** Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953 has been given more often than others and is more consistent with the rest of NOSENKO's story.

***This is now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

American Department/Tourist Department - 1955-1960

NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section there in 1958.

GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSENKO remained in the American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as 1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew

NOSENKO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSYN did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to determine that he had. If his access to this information was indeed that remote (as GOLITSYN's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likewise be somewhat garbled. GOLITSYN was unable to explain the fact that NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department cases had been positively established through photo identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who met NOSENKO as early as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in the KGB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his thesis. At that time GOLITSYN spent just under two months in the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN's work did not involve him in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having "occasionally" met NOSENKO in 1959; although he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourist Department.

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*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO has made no reference to this unit having a formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department.

Information Not Available to GOLITSYN

The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO concerning his claims to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until many months after GOLITSYN made his statements, and they were based upon all collateral information known relating to each phase. None of the results of these interrogations was made available to GOLITSYN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in these departments.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's statements on NOSENKO:

- First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed. GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. Moreover, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer" (actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting information to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas NOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955) and in the Tourist Department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g., in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circumstances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been questioned further about them. Nevertheless, as indicated in the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, and probably as [illegible]

The following discussion considers GOLITSYN's information about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSENKO's denial about having been in contact with GOLITSYN.* Possible explanations for GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having misidentified NOSENKO's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYN could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons; and third, GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under KGB control. To examine each of these points separately:

- GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial by NOSENKO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence to refute GOLITSYN's statement that he and NOSENKO met in the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions in Part VIII.I. about NOSENKO's _bona fides_ do not rule out the possibility that he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the two departments in these years, although not in the capacities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSYN erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.

- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew

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* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN's defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact that it took place on 15 December 1961.

NOSENKO's positions in the KGB would add authenticity to his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962, to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, GOLITSYN's intention in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater credibility to his expressed opinion that NOSENKO was a KGB provocateur.

- GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under KGB control. This explanation would mean that GOLITSYN, although offering partial confirmation for NOSENKO's claims, directly attacked the bona fides of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. Acting under KGB instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against American officials and tourists in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an account of their relationship that was consistent with GOLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other, GOLITSYN explictly and NOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that it must be rejected from serious consideration.

The choice thus seems to lie between the first two explanations for GOLITSYN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one an understandable error of assumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals. In either case, GOLITSYN's testimony does not contribute to a determination of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB as of the years prior to 1960.

There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having met GOLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and - unprepared for GOLITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSENKO accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or different conclusion can be drawn about the bona fides of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explanation is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953 and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.

2. Resume of Information*

According to GOLITSYN, he personally met NOSENKO two or three times in 1953, while visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, a component of the internal security directorate, and again in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, NOSENKO was unable to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and he denied ever having seen him. GOLITSYN said that GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends of NOSENKO as well as of GOLITSYN. (NOSENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of these three KGB officers; he acknowledged, however, that his acquaintance with GUK had been merely casual until NOSENKO's three-month TDY to Geneva in 1962 which made them the best of friends.) From 1953 to 1957 or 1958 GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, then transferred to the Tourist Department, where he was a senior case officer in 1959. GOLITSYN stated unequivocally that NOSENKO was not a Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or in the American Department as of the time he (GOLITSYN) consulted with various officers there in April–June 1960 and January 1961.** GOLITSYN spoke there with officers whom NOSENKO claims as close colleagues, including KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV, and would doubtless have known if NOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in code clerk operations. In summary, GOLITSYN corroborated some of NOSENKO's alleged assignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate but not all of them, while NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying that the two men had never met.

3. Comments on GOLITSYN

From December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of the American Desk, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Directorate, KGB (then MGB), and for most of the period from January to March 1959 he was on TDY training assignments to the Second Chief Directorate. In the first job at least GOLITSYN presumably would have had regular dealings with the U.S. Embassy Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in contact with the Tourist Department, in which NOSENKO claimed to have been then serving. Despite this, and despite his proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB personnel, GOLITSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings during the years 1962 and 1963, nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him, although he had numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the names of CHURANOV, KASHCHEYEV, and GUK.

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* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in the section which follows below are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate, as described on Pages 343-344.

**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-55 or in 1960-1962.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

There would appear to be no reason why NOSENKO, if he had ever met GOLITSYN, should not have said so to American Intelligence representatives.* To have done so would have given NOSENKO concrete support for his claims of KGB staff service, which he knew to be in question. On the contrary, however, NOSENKO consistently denied any contact and manufactured a demonstrably false story to explain his own absence during GOLITSYN's admitted visit to the section in which NOSENKO claims to have served in January 1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)

On the other hand, GOLITSYN's claim must be measured against the background and circumstances of his statements. In the absence of any comments about or identification of NOSENKO by GOLITSYN prior to the public announcement of his defection from the KGB, and in view of the amount of information made available to him from NOSENKO materials prior to his making any statements about his alleged acquaintance with him, GOLITSYN's "identification" of NOSENKO as a KGB staff officer known to him personally cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated information.

The weight of independent evidence against NOSENKO's alleged service in those positions which GOLITSYN corroborated, combined with the conflict between GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's testimony about their personal acquaintanceship, makes it impossible to accept GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career.

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*It is not likely that he would forget it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and important to remaining KGB officers; even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring back memories of such recent and direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

Date of Information	Source	Information Reported by [redacted]
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately 16 years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine. [redacted]
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO.** [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.
10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)	[redacted]	"It appeared quite certain [redacted] [redacted] that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB."
19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)	[redacted]	[redacted]

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[redacted]

** [illegible] of Vladimir [illegible], identified by [redacted] as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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(Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)

(Reported to the FBI on 22 February 1964)

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

[redacted] was asked [redacted] whether he felt NOSENKO actually defected or whether he felt the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB. [redacted] [redacted] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the U.S. Embassy.

Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow [redacted] on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these." Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB, [redacted] attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

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[redacted]

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FROM:

CIA JOB NO. ________

BOX NO. Reel 46

FOLDER NO. 2A

~~10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)~~

[redacted]

~~10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)~~

[redacted]

~~10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 February)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

[redacted]

The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva* and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

[redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy C[redacted]s of Departments had these phone books.** [redacted] expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO

[redacted]

[redacted]

is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

(Reported to the FBI on 9 March 1964)

[redacted]

NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*

[redacted]

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~~21 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.

(Reported to the FBI on 27 March 1964)

[redacted]

There seems to be unanimous opinion among the [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm." NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting forth the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

20 May 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 21 May 1964)

[redacted]

The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. [redacted] feels quite sure that NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. It was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

Reported to CIA by the FBI on 11 June 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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* See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.

(Reported to the FBI on 22 June 1964)

[redacted]

The general consensus among [redacted] KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. [redacted] these comments cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but [redacted] no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable." NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Repercussions of NOSENKO's Defection

19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~[illegible] February 1964 (Ki- [illegible]~~

~~[illegible] February 1964 (Ro- [illegible]~~

~~[illegible] and [illegible] February 1964 ([illegible]orted to the F[illegible] on 2[illegible] February 1964)~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[illegible] KUROCHKIN, a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be [illegible] as "well known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted" with him.***

[redacted]

***[illegible]ENKO provided no information concerning KUROCHKIN [illegible]

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(Reported to FBI on 28 February 1964)

[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI on [illegible] March 196[illegible]

[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI on [illegible] March 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] the Depart[illegible] [illegible]tions

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20 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)

[redacted]

...orted to ... 9 June ...

2[illegible] March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 23 March 1964)

[redacted]

9 April 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 14 April 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

(Reported to the FBI on 5 May 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] on 15 [illegible]

[redacted]

Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

Reported [illegible] the FBI on 1[illegible] 1964)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(FBI Report [illegible] 29 July 1[illegible]

An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at

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[redacted]

the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.* It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. [redacted]

Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK[redacted] Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. [redacted] S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.[redacted]

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* See Pages 327-336 in which NOSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.

[redacted]

*** NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUBEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as long as he had known him.

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 January 1965)

[redacted]

It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.* [redacted]

[redacted]

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 8 February 1965)

[redacted]

GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection.** In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.

** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.

Early June 1965 (Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 June 1965)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career.* GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an important military plant and is now a "nothing."

(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 10 September 1965)

[redacted]

After the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were friends socially and that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accused on willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.***

[redacted]

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* NOSENKO said that it was BANNIKOV who authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and that to the best of his knowledge, GRIBANOV did not know that he (NOSENKO) was making this trip. Nevertheless, NOSENKO said that he thought that GRIBANOV might be fired from the KGB as a result of his defection because "he was responsible for pushing me ahead." NOSENKO said that BANNIKOV would not be punished because he had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).

** NOSENKO reported that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2," the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

*** NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV three times socially during his KGB career: on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO reported that he provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN at parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961. He could not recall any details of the 1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did, etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 party, which took place in October or November, in considerable detail [redacted]

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According to CIA records, the sequence of events leading up to NOSENKO's confrontation with the Soviets was as follows:

- On the morning of 11 February 1964 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the U.S. State Department requesting an immediate interview with NOSENKO, but no reply was given.

- In the early evening of 12 February NOSENKO arrived in the United States.

- On 13 February NOSENKO's agreement to meet the Soviets was obtained, and initial arrangements as to the timing and place of the confrontation were discussed with him and within the U.S. Government.

- Final arrangements were agreed upon during the morning of 14 February, the Soviets were then notified, and the confrontation took place late in the afternoon of the same day.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. [illegible]

a. [illegible]

(1) [illegible].

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

(i) Introduction

[redacted] and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although [redacted] report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, [redacted] subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. [redacted] story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI.

[redacted]

(ii) Discussion

[redacted]). [redacted] report of [redacted] 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. [redacted] statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.

[redacted]

[redacted] report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He said in [redacted] 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by [redacted] that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel.

[redacted]

In [redacted] 1963 [redacted] reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, [redacted] continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph): an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the material in a concealment area in his desk; the KGB also continued in surveillance of the dead drop site, observed PENKOVSKIY load the dead drop, and seized an American (JACOB) who came to unload it. PENKOVSKIY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense. This report is the only indication from a Soviet source that the KGB had surveilled the two visits to the Pushkin Street site made by U.S. Embassy officers; while [redacted] report stated that one American visited the site twice, in fact two different Americans visited the site once each, MAHONEY on 21 January 1961 and ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.

(iii) [redacted]

[redacted]

(iv) Remarks

The Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for communication to PENKOVSKIY, and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGB did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB. Moreover, the first visit to Pushkin Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact between PENKOVSKIY and Western Intelligence, either American or British. Thus, [redacted] report on Americans visiting there is only partially accurate, and the use of these "surveilled" visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY is unsupportable. In reporting incorrectly on this matter, [redacted] could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one unnamed, the other apparently [redacted] despite the conflict in reporting about his position) repeated erroneous information in his presence.

[redacted] nevertheless is the only source to reveal that the KGB was aware of the Pushkin Street dead drop as early as 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY went to the site. [redacted] therefore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSENKO by showing KGB awareness of a CIA officer having gone to the dead drop site 11 months before ABIDIAN's visit there, and even before PENKOVSKIY finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with Western intelligence services. It was the ABIDIAN visit, NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at Pushkin Street.

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(ii)

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D. [redacted]

1. Introduction

While in general terms corroborating NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, [redacted] has supplied some details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSENKO on his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as [redacted] has had several topics in common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANOV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with NOSENKO's information, the reports by [redacted] on the case of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are interlocking:

- [redacted] and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGB surveillance.

- CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's compromise.

[redacted] concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and this statement by [redacted]

- [redacted] learned some of his details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and [redacted] and NOSENKO have indicated that this compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.

Presented below are [redacted]s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by a review of the topics common to these two sources.

2. Statements on NOSENKO

When discussing NOSENKO for the first time, [redacted] said on [redacted] that they were not personally acquainted, but that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by [redacted] and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

[redacted]	NOSENKO
As a young man, NOSENKO attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) and then was in the GRU Information Department--in all, perhaps a year of service in the GRU.*	NOSENKO said his entire service in the GRU, in the years 1950-1953, consisted of duty in the Naval GRU, first in the Far East and then in the Baltic.**

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* Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years' duration.

**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU.

[redacted]	NOSENKO
A "very undisciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," NOSENKO was to have been discharged from the GRU.	NOSENKO's statements about himself during the 1950-1953 period appear to agree with the evaluation, but he has said nothing about facing discharge by the Naval GRU.
NOSENKO's father, "a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB.	His transfer from the Naval GRU to the KGB in 1953, NOSENKO said, was at the initiative of KGB General KOBULOV, a friend of his father; the elder NOSENKO was Minister of Shipbuilding.
NOSENKO was "an important boss" in the KGB (directorate or department unknown).	According to NOSENKO, his most recent KGB title prior to defecting was Deputy Chief, Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.

[redacted] stated that NOSENKO gave 'very, very good information" to the United States, having had "great access" to KGB information which included "all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc." The U.S. Embassy, [redacted] [redacted] continued, had found microphones on the basis of information that NOSENKO had provided.

3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

(i) Summary

One of the two ways in which [redacted] has corroborated NOSENKO on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a genuine source of American Intelligence was to cite information he had learned from [redacted] CHEREPANOV had formerly served in the KGB; CHEREPANOV gave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREPANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and executed. In every major respect, therefore [redacted] agrees with NOSENKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the U.S. Embassy, [redacted] replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in which [redacted] has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. Like NOSENKO ~~and one~~ of the CHEREPANOV documents, [redacted] had indicated that KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy officer brought about the compromise of POPOV.

(ii) Remarks

As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was a KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made [redacted]

[redacted] agreement with both CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise, however, appears to be based on [redacted] direct involvement, and does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

[redacted] dates on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY are at variance with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on the person with whom PENKOVSKIY was first seen by the KGB: [redacted] said this individual was the British businessman WYNNE, while NOSENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.

According to [redacted] PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYNNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYNNE, and the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance.* CIA records show that WYNNE met PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962. [redacted] report that PENKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1962 therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveillance of the WYNNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report coincide with the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KGB was sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversation they had had [redacted] 1961 (one year earlier than in the [redacted] version). NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not identified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December 1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participation of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB was detained, [redacted] reported that while PENKOVSKIY was at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an American in a lavatory. [redacted] did not date this event, but CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962. [redacted] added that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unloading the dead drop.**

PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him, [redacted] stated. [redacted] no other sub-sources were named.

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* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.

**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's arrest may have been more than a month before.

c. The Compromise of POPOV

(i) Introduction

Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, [redacted] is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV: [redacted] information agrees with that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, as well as that in the 18 September 1959 message from POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy official following the recall of POPOV in November 1958. [redacted] however, has not precisely dated the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959), has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the others have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to POPOV), and has not named the CIA officer involved ((George WINTERS)*). The evidence from [redacted] like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, and the POPOV message, conflicts with that from GOLITSYN whose statements on the compromise of POPOV are supported by analysis of events in 1957 and 1958 on which POPOV reported (see Pages 663-665).

(ii) Details

[redacted] reported [redacted] on the POPOV compromise. POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend [redacted] appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise; POPOV, said [redacted] had made a "very serious mistake" by using an accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** "In some fashion" this came to the attention of the Austrian police, [redacted] and it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet officer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually POPOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled to Moscow to explain the situation, and when he was unable to do so, the facts were turned over to the KGB for full-scale investiga- tion. [redacted] it not been for POPOV's correspondence with an Austrian woman, "they would never have caught him," and that POPOV was "arrested because of a connection with a girl;" also, [redacted] at the end of 1958 POPOV was recalled to Moscow "for something" [redacted] the KGB While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progress, routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow. This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park, going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium, and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding area. Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and "operated" against American Intelligence for a year and one-half.* Eventually, the KGB put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise the American official who was meeting POPOV. The KGB photographed a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested the official and showed him pictures of his meeting with POPOV and of POPOV un- loading the dead drop at the bridge. After the American refused to work for the KGB, he was released and declared persona non grata.**

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* In his first reference to POPOV's compromise [redacted] that POPOV made the mistake of providing information traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark was given [redacted] and since then [redacted] has not resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other one treated at length here.

** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.

*** [redacted] went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with information that included the identification of POPOV as a Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an admission to having had some correspondence with her concerning his search for operational leads; the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's operational difficulties. POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 November 1958 ostensibly for a week's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin.

[redacted] CIA questioned [redacted] on POPOV's compromise. He said at this time that he had heard POPOV was apprehended through a dead drop. POPOV "apparently was under suspicion there in Berlin, and when they (presumably the GRU) recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts would be, and they were told the following: 'KGB workers place American Embassy employees under surveillance.' They observed an American at the staircase... and they found a dead drop under the staircase. So they established coverage of the dead drop and observed POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He agreed to it..."***

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* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE was arrested the following October, he could not have been doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.

***As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possi- bilities for dead drops to be used in other operations. One of these was located in Lenin Hills, an area of Moscow not far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was situated beneath a staircase; [redacted] LANGELLE visited the area of the dead [redacted] drop site on 24 and 28 May 1958, but the dead drop was loaded by a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed on Pages 563- 564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operation- al activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for the REPNIKOV case.

(iii) Sub-sourcing by [redacted]

In [redacted] that he had learned these details about the compromise of POPOV from a conversation [redacted] who conducted some of the investigation of POPOV because at the time he was a [redacted] The same sub-source was cited by [redacted] information he supplied CIA in [redacted]

[redacted]

(iv) Remarks

[redacted] reported, inaccurately, that American Intelligence gave POPOV an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead drop was used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGB doubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case. Each of these incorrect items came to [redacted] since [redacted] participated in the investigation of POPOV, presumably he would have recognized them to be untrue. One explanation for the inaccuracies might be that [redacted] precisely what he had been told, but [redacted] deliberately misinformed him. There is, however, no evident reason why [redacted] would have done this. Another explanation might be that [redacted] misunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information to [redacted] garbled the details. This would mean that [redacted] was less than fully attentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gained notoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in a position comparable to POPOV's: in contact with [redacted] Intelligence. [redacted] None of these explanations seems entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.

[redacted] has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicion surrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Moscow in November 1958 in connection with his correspondence with [redacted] On one hand, in 1962 [redacted] indicated that the KGB surveillance of the U.S. Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation of POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. On the other hand, in [redacted] implied that as a result of the suspicion of POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POPOV's future contacts in Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's surveillance of U.S. Embassy employees.

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*However, in another version [redacted] said that as soon as the Illegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOV immediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between [redacted] statements has not been resolved.

d. SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and BOLSHAKOV

In three instances [redacted] 1964 NOSENKO confirmed reports made by [redacted] the identification of SHUBIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and the status of BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.*

SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but independent of NOSENKO and [redacted] there is no verification of his having more recently been an agent of the GRU. [redacted] FBI.

BOLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of [redacted] and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other source, nor has he been observed in meetings with GRU agents. Both [redacted] and NOSENKO spoke of BOLSHAKOV's having met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. NOSENKO added that, in initiating the contact, the Attorney General knew BOLSHAKOV to be a "military intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**

4. Comments on [redacted]

[redacted] confirmation that NOSENKO is a genuine KGB officer-defector is comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB would not necessarily bring [redacted] bona fides into question: much would depend upon [redacted] sub-sources, as yet unidentified.

[redacted] and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise of POPOV, a man [redacted], and both have authenticated [redacted] the validity of a CHEREPANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence. In addition, [redacted] and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, about the contact between BOLSHAKOV [redacted] and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and [redacted] Their information on BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed by KGB controlled sources.

With the exception of his details on POPOV, [redacted]s reporting on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually, by misinformation [redacted] received and innocently passed along. These items taken together, however, in the light [redacted] statements on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that [redacted] is controlled by the KGB.

[redacted]

*[redacted]

**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer, the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact, since [redacted] was the only source to have made this identification before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.

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F. [redacted]

1. Introduction

[redacted] counterintelligence production has been extremely limited. For the most part she has provided only superficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value. Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, certain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total performance. [redacted]'s reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his *bona fides* and affirming the importance of the information he has reported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV case emphasized the depth of his treason and the retribution of the KGB--themes which dominate the NOSENKO account [redacted] Her reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from NOSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of importance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSENKO's milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are (with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been identified as KGB officers only by NOSENKO.

2. NOSENKO's Background and Career

[redacted] has claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN (who she believed only "knew about" NOSENKO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN." She has reported fragments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KGB status. She initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said she was not sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only after several conversations about him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGB status. [redacted] sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KGB friend SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)

3. NOSENKO's Knowledge - Damage to the KGB

[redacted] has mentioned NOSENKO's disclosures to the Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy - her only reference to information he might have provided - on each occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO. She once attributed to SVIRIN the remark in October 1966 that NOSENKO had done considerable harm to the Soviet Union by revealing this information, thus (and specifically only in this context) underscoring the importance of NOSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this information as the most important he has provided.) The context in which she has discussed NOSENKO has been the general one of defectors from the Soviet Union: she has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviets attempt to convince all Soviet citizens that "anybody who defects will find his grave by the hand of KGB people" [redacted] with reference to NOSENKO, she once quoted SVIRIN as having said that NOSENKO, too, would one day be exterminated, thus clearly implying that NOSENKO was a genuine defector.

4. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting

a. The CHEREPANOV Case

[redacted]'s account of CHEREPANOV's disaffection, treason, arrest, and execution confirms in general outline and in emphasis that of NOSENKO. [redacted] claims direct knowledge of the case through her own and her husband's personal friendship with CHEREPANOV and his wife. [redacted] described her husband, in fact, as the only friend of CHEREPANOV who remained faithful enough after CHEREPANOV's downfall to call on CHEREPANOV's widow, whose address [redacted] knew. This direct knowledge is comparable to that of NOSENKO and [redacted] [redacted]

She introduced her account of the CHEREPANOV case, as in her discussions of NOSENKO, by references to the determination and effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending and executing those who were "running away"; she offered CHEREPANOV as an example of a Soviet traitor who had been caught and executed. Her account of the details, however, differs sharply from that of NOSENKO (and others). Her identification of CHEREPANOV as a classmate of her husband at the GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MDA) from 1956 to 1959 is unique among the sources who have reported on CHEREPANOV. For the period during which [redacted] said CHEREPANOV attended the MDA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements concerning CHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some unspecified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. [redacted] also stated, however, that after his graduation from the MDA in 1959, CHEREPANOV "finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, suggesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSENKO has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having collected KGB documents during his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section for later transmittal to the Americans, [redacted] has described his increasing bitterness from the date of his entering the MDA in 1956. She was not sure that he had been a KGB officer; she neither mentioned nor did her account allow for his assignment to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-1961 (as stated by by NOSENKO); and she described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."

During her second account of the CHEREPANOV affair, [redacted] sourced her information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that "In two days this man was arrested...In two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSENKO's account of a KGB investigation of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to CHEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, CHEREPANOV's flight, and a seven-day search for him before his arrest.

b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Closely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY's compromise, [redacted] placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. Her statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources). Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortunes of her husband which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest. [redacted] cited her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information, as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial and had been somehow associated with the investigation - thus confirming NOSENKO on SVIRIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY investigation.

c. Reports on KGB Personnel

[redacted] has named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could report any substance. Of her KGB handlers:

- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedorovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not referred to operations against this Embassy.

- Two KGB handlers were assigned to [redacted] in Leningrad - V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers of the Leningrad KGB and have not been identified by any other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad KGB officers named by NOSENKO.

- Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian correspondent in Moscow was Vladimir Ivanovich KOSTYRYA. Only NOSENKO has identified KOSTYRYA as the KGB officer who had been in the United States under the name Vladimir Viktorovich VLADIMIROV; NOSENKO considered this, as he said in 1965, his most important identification among KGB personnel. [redacted] KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under Inturist cover; [redacted] relationship with him was not related to her earlier Inturist work, however, but her connection with a foreign correspondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his return to Moscow.

Of the four other KGB officers on whom [redacted] has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO and only by NOSENKO:

- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is a ubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments [redacted] has confirmed).

- In connection with SVIRIN, [redacted] recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in derogatory terms, Valentin MUZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and subordinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by [redacted] as the KGB officer under Novosti cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of [redacted] NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.

5. Remarks

There is confusion in [redacted]'s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that, on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on NOSENKO, [redacted] was inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however, [redacted] has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKO by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Directorate personalities.

Note: Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREPANOV, there are many aspects of the [redacted] case which independently led CIA and other Western services to conclude that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects are as follows:

- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

- [redacted] description of her husband's recall from Stockholm and his punishment for having previously worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOVSKIY also identified nor the logic of the situation: Her husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was uncovered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief assignment in Stockholm may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [redacted] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [redacted] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)

- Nearly all of [redacted]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.

- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [redacted] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.

- There are oddities in her relationship with the Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.

G. General Correlations

1. Quality of [illegible]

a. Introduction

In examining the bona fides of an intelligence source, it is necessary to evaluate the quality of his leads to Soviet illegals and to Soviet agents. [illegible] NOSENKO's identifiable and original leads [illegible] in Part VIII.B., show that with one exception--the JOHNSON-MINTKENBAUGH complex--he did not identify current penetrations of the U.S. Government. Considering the conclusion [illegible] the bona fides of NOSENKO, the assumption can be made that the KGB found it feasible to sacrifice the JOHNSON-MINTKENBAUGH operation. The reasons may have lain in the circumstances that the operation was under threat of compromise because of various security factors, the agents posed difficult handling problems, MINTKENBAUGH had no current access, and JOHNSON had not been exploited for some time before the NOSENKO lead was received. The rest of NOSENKO's identifiable leads to recruited Americans involved agents who had been previously compromised, who were inactive, or who had already lost their access to classified information.

[redacted]

b. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

sensitive sources

TOP SECRET

sensitive sources....

sensitive sources

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CIA with [illegible] intelligence activi-ties inside the [illegible] GOLENIEWSKI and GOLITSYN in 19[illegible] operation of this kind. What information was available came mainly from the reports and [illegible] who became involved with the KGB during visits to the Soviet Union. [illegible] GOLENIEWSKI's detailed information on [illegible] counterintelligence [illegible] particularly surveillance techniques and his less detailed information on the organization and operations of the [illegible] Directorate were unique [illegible] in early 1961. This information was [illegible] by GOLITSYN following his defection at the end of 19[illegible] organizational [illegible] identified a sizeable number of internal [illegible] and provided leads to specific [illegible] activities.

[illegible] Western Intelligence [illegible] and agent sources with connections of varying [illegible] with KGB internal counterintelligence. The [illegible] the most important of these [illegible]

[redacted]

---

* A Polish [illegible] staff officer trained by [illegible] GOLENIEWSKI was also a KGB agent within the UB

[redacted]

Other techniques on which various sources have confirmed one another include the following:

[redacted] reported [redacted] that the surveillance equipment used by the KGB Surveillance Directorate includes special paint invisible to the naked eye but visible through use of a special device. It is used in conjunction with helicopters, closed circuit television at bridges, tunnels, etc. A similar technique was described by GOLENIEWSKI.

[redacted] - NOSENKO [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers have described a special chemical compound sensitive to dogs but not to humans (NEPTUNE 80) which is used in surveillance.*

[redacted] - [redacted] reported [redacted] that microphones and transmitters are installed in American automobiles in the Soviet Union by personnel of the KGB Surveillance Directorate. GOLENIEWSKI earlier provided many details on this technique.

[redacted] - [redacted] the KGB had developed a transmitter using paper-thin batteries so shaped that they can fit in the shoulder pads of a man's suit. They also can be concealed in the thick covers of menus. Thus concealed, they are used in Moscow by the KGB to listen to conversations between foreign diplomats, particularly at the Hotel Metropol and the Hotel National. Such miniaturized devices have also been described by GOLENIEWSKI, GOLITSYN, NOSENKO [redacted] [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV papers. [redacted] Inter alia, NOSENKO and the CHEREPANOV papers gave the KGB cryptonym as "[illegible]".

[redacted] - NOSENKO and [redacted] have reported the KGB technique of switching telephone calls intended for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to a KGB installation, where they are intercepted by a Soviet posing as an American.

Where the bulk of NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations was concerned with those of the Second Chief Directorate, this has been true with only two of the other sources named here. [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted], however, have also given details on specific KGB internal counterintelligence activities in addition to their statements on the compromise of CIA assets within the USSR (a topic of reporting by [redacted] and CHEREPANOV as well). The information from [redacted] and [redacted] is summarized below.

[redacted] - has been able to provide details of KGB Second Chief Directorate activity. He reported the KGB's discovery of an American employed at the Sokolniki Exhibition in Moscow in clandestine contact with an unidentified Soviet female. (This contact is not identified with any CIA operation at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke of the KGB's knowledge of an American Intelligence deaddrop under a bench in the area of the Agricultural Exhibition. He said that the KGB controlled all U.S. agent contacts in Moscow, including one with an old man in his 60's (NOSENKO reported on an individual who may be identical with this agent).

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* The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been verified.

[redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] claimed to have fulfilled functions which NOSENKO and others have described as standard procedure in operations against foreigners and Soviets inside the Soviet Union. [redacted] said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent targetted against the Nepalese Embassy in Moscow and later against the Canadian correspondent who employed her [redacted]

c. Remarks

As previously indicated, it was only after the defections of the genuine sources GOLITSYN and GOLENIEWSKI in 1961 that American Intelligence began to receive voluminous and mutually corroborative information from others on the activities of the KGB Second Chief and Surveillance Directorates. The timing of this information therefore appears to be significant in addition to the overlap of specific details. The fact that so many of these sources, even including [redacted] provided KGB Second Chief Directorate information may reflect a centralized KGB decision to emphasize or sacrifice it.

sensitive source(s)

H. Evaluation

The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KGB mission could carry damaging implications for the American Intelligence sources who have supported his bona fides. Unless their statements on NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinformation spread by the KGB within the Soviet services, these sources might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as promotors of their own personal interests or as parties to a KGB conspiracy.

Regarding GOLITSYN, the opinion of CIA is that he purposefully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explanation [redacted] for the remarks on NOSENKO by [redacted] however, there seem to be no personal interests which their support of NOSENKO's bona fides might have served. The choice thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine sources of American intelligence but unwitting channels of KGB misinformation and, on the other hand, one or more of them being in league with the KGB.

[redacted] The possibility that [redacted] are under KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO operation by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his, and general correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same time, the NOSENKO-[redacted] connections were shown for comparative purposes. [redacted] Here nothing was found that would eliminate [redacted] from consideration as possibly being KGB provocation agents.

[redacted] This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKO is under KGB control, has brought the bona fides of [redacted] into serious question. If NOSENKO is a dispatched agent of the KGB, these other sources seem also to be.

SECRET/[illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
FRQ Part I - Alfonso Dibildox Torres

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is FRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

SECRET/[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM : Chief, WH Division			MICROFILM
SUBJECT : LIENVOY-8			

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the General Staff of the Presidency. LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's sharing of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12027	23 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-118406
	ORIGINATING	

DDP 1-122

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Related Mission Directive for Mexico

1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.

2. Your approval is requested.

JCKing
J. C. King
Chief, WH Division

CONCUR:

[illegible]
Chief, DDP/PG

Lloyd George
Chief, FI

Chief, CA

Chief, CI

APPROVED:

Richard Helms
A/Deputy Director (Plans)

3 JUN 1961
Date Approved

24 January 1961
Distribution:
Orig & 2 - WHD
1 - PG
1 - CA
1 - CI
1 - SR
1 - FI/Plans
1 - FI/INT
1 - RI

3 COPY

RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.

B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.

C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.

D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence

Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 83 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.

It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.

II. OBJECTIVES

PRIORITY A

1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.

    a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.

    b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.

c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.

2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.

a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.

b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.

c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.

d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.

e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.

f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces.

g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers.

h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.

3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.

a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS.

b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM.

c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.

d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.

4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.

a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.

b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.

c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.

d. Continue to provide operational support for activities directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba.

e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.

PRIORITY B

1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico, and propagandize the dangers of Communism.

   a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.

   b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists.

   c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.

2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.

   a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry.

3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

   a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.

   b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.

   c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.

   d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic.

4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.

   a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.

   b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACP.

14-00000
104-10213-10202
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

AH

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

15 November 1974



0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26
CIT GERM
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH 29 OCTOBER.

POB GERM, BERLIN
OCC PHARMACIST
OCC CODE CHEM

201-0032671*
TYPE NAME T
OI CODES AA XX
RCD DATE 53

30 NOV 70
00833555

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISC for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

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Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: [illegible]
TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: [illegible]

NO.

DATE

TO: [illegible]	DATE [illegible]	DATE [illegible]	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS [illegible]
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
14.				
15.				

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6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



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(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	GRADE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ GRADE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

[illegible]	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 2377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL. BY: [illegible]

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE ET-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 73-23) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (Name)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2021
CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*
   - a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.
   - b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.
   - c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*
   - a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.
   - b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).
   - c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.
   - d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*
   - a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.
   - b. Military attaches.
   - c. Assistant military attaches.
   - d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

70-1-1
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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

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15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

SECRET

DOI 50-10

a

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

E-2 IMPDET

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;

- (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
- (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
- (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
- (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
- (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

- (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- (b) CARE employees;
- (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
- (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- (g) Officials of the Vatican State;
- (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- (k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

- (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
- (c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. ***Fulbright Grantees***

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

e. *Employees of U.S Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

for Germany [illegible]
[illegible] only

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

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NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S

FEB 28 4 50 PM '78

FROM: C/ISS 1D4124

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 28 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/SA/DO/O				1 to 3: attached is the response to OLC 78-0070/19, 23 Feb 1978. The attached regulations answer all of the questions posed. Please note the classification SECRET. We assume that HSCA Staff will review here.
2.				
3. OLC attn: Pat. Carpenter			31	
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
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10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				

10 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

OLC 78 0070/[illegible]

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

SECRET

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ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



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0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                    201-0032671*
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN    TYPE NAME T
CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST      OI CODES AA XX
REF AACD-12345, 29 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM       RCD DATE 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 OCTOBER.

                  30 NOV 70          00833555
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Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

7

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s)
4.				of 201-______________.
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date)
14.				retained at ____________ desk.
15.				

610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	GRADE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ GRADE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	[illegible]	[illegible]

FORM 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: [illegible]

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



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(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. __________
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

FORM 2021

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

?

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

✓

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

15 November 1974

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-____________

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

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Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action: after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.

On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. One was never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed while resisting arrest. The others ...were arrested, confessed, and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, while resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the small group that actually did the killing.)

There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters. Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty, many of the details came out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:

> The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L. Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the 69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near his capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the request of the assassins.
>
> The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
>
> As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened, talks continued between Dearbon, Barfield and leaders of the anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was established between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . was named Plato Cox.
>
> The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operated a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but was later allowed to leave the country.
>
> The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

> gun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators.
>
> Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961, invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a postponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators, who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity. This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.
>
> It can be reported on excellent authority that close associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing.
>
> Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic by US officials. . . . . . Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if Trujillo had never lived.

We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo. Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however, has a vague impression that one of them was.

The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Owen, who was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records, we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantly to the quite complete record that appears in the EMDEED operational files.

Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were assigned the cryptonym EMDEED. One segment of EMDEED was known as EMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Most of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant documents were not put into the EMDEED files but were kept in a private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us. We also have studied another particularly useful document. The Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in charge of the investigation of the Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz. The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa in November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power failed. The New York field office of the FBI held extensive interviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the assassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogations of the persons it apprehended.

From the records (the [illegible] operational files), we can trace the origins and the course of U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:

> The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel.
>
> The function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed Forces.
>
> The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert Barreras and Salvador Estrella. . . . . . They were joined by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the government because of his involvement in the

---

* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1966)

Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in Moca on the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.

The Political Group had a less distinct membership. It included Luis Amiama Tio, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomas Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support of General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . . . .

The over-all authority appears to have centered principally in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient prestige to command authority. . . . . .

The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going to drive to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the Palace would inform the others by personal message. . . . . .

The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza threatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In any event, the plan went into execution. . . . . . Each of them had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own sawed-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles. . . . . .

The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Immediately after the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to reach General Roman. . . . . .

The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of General Tomas Diaz, where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators were all hunted down very quickly, except for Amiama and Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until the danger had passed.

The FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM investigator, gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the assassination took place. One of the assassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions). All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. While in delirium he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan Tomas." The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived. The rest were caught and interrogated followingtorture. All confessed.

The confessions led to identification of persons who were in or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz. Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the Consulate was actually working, because neither of the men who might have known the identities were available for interrogation. Amiami Tio escaped and General Diaz was killed.

Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group were fairly widely known to persons not actually members of it, there appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political and the Action Groups--perhaps too much compartmentation. The assassination itself was well planned. General Diaz was in over-all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all of the work. He took three cars to a local garage and had the engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus several of his own. He and the other participants took the cars to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each night. Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassination was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.

General Roman, who was to take over the government after Trujillo's death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telephone General Roman but could not reach him. Diaz then took the car with Trujillo's body still in its trunk and drove to Roman's house. He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the trunk, where it was later found by the police.

What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately heard shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the alarm and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him. He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. Thus, General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Roman that

Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his move to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had been a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. He did not know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. He was reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. By the time Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late for him to act; Hector Trujillo and Johnny Abbes had already taken charge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering a take over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan nor any appreciable chances of succeeding.

The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took place against a background of international activity in opposition to the Trujillo regime, with both the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-cut stands. These are some of the highlights:

a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed pending receipt of arms from Venezuela. The plot was discovered and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the OAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of human rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrests in the Dominican Republic in January 1960. A committee of the

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OAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1960 that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.

b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government announced after capture of most of the assassins that the Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betancourt's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were continued.

As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation EMDEED/EMSLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people involved, especially since officers of the Department of State played a very prominent role.

Washington - Department of State

Roy R. Rubottom	Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Frank Devine	Special Assistant to Rubottom
John C. Hill	Special Assistant to Rubottom

Washington - CIA

J. C. King	Chief, WH Division
Ned Holman	Chief, Branch III, WH Division

Ciudad Trujillo - Department of State

Joseph S. Farland	Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is pertinent to note that King and Esterline attribute U.S. and CIA involvement

with the plotters in the Dominican Republic to Ambassador Farland. They describe him as a former FBI employee who considered himself quite a clandestine operator. Esterline, who later served under him in Panama, called him "a wild man who bugged the Agency to support a move to assassinate Trujillo." He had direct dealings with a number of the key plotters.

Henry Dearborn	Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August 1960 and Consul General thereafter. He used the code name DELTA in correspondence with the plotters.
John D. Barfield	Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 and a consular officer thereafter. CIA cryptonym: EMDAZE-1

Ciudad Trujillo - CIA

Lear Reed	Chief of Station until October 1960
Robert Owen	Chief of Station from 20 January until 4 June 1961. Code name used with the plotters: GALGO
Charles Cookson	Operations Officer
Isabel Cintron	Administrative Assistant

Key Dominican Plotters

Dr. Jordi Brossa	Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO
Juan Vicini	Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE
Luis Baquero	Code name: SOCRATES

S. Thomas Stocker	An American in the Dominican Republic with whom the station had had an earlier unhappy experience. The consulate preferred to have nothing to do with him, but the Dominican plotters brought him in as a cutout to the consulate. He took delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three carbines passed to Berry from the U.S. Consulate for use by the plotters. He held them for a few days and then gave them back when Berry insisted they be returned. Berry then passed them to one of the assassins.
Dr. Severo Cabral	Code names: HECTOR and PLUTARCO
Jose Francisco Tapia	
Aulio Brea	
Andres Freitas	Code name: ANDY
Luis Amiama Tio	
Jose Rene Roman	
Juan Tomas Diaz	Code name: CRISTOBAL
Donald Reid Cabral	Code name: CIBAO
Lorenzo D. Berry	"Wimpy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen who owned Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo. He was the main communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. The weapons furnished the plotters were actually passed to Berry.
Flerida Berry	Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citizen of Syrian extraction. She appears to have been even more active in the plot than her husband. It was she who had the contacts with the Dominicans involved.

Most communications between the Dominican plotters and the U.S. Consulate were by means of written notes. Mrs. Berry received the notes from or passed them to either the Consul General's secretary or the CIA Station's administrative assistant.

Two documents provide a useful point of departure, from an historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had been played by CIA prior to 1960.

16 November 1959

Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:

> ". . . within this group there is growing militant anti-American feeling based on the premise that the United States should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non-intervention. . . . . . This group is in possession of clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."

15 February 1960

A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:

> "The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations; however, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and with the Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled him on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to criticisms of and activities directed against the Dominican government by exiles and other American governments unfriendly to the Dominican regime."

10 March 1960

This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo, with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was no one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune inside would be placed in trust, to be administered by internationally-known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.

This proposition received high-level attention in Washington, including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the meeting.

22 March 1960

Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin with the arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy" who would tell Trujillo to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatum, the plan then outlined steps for transition to an operating representative government. The army would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these comments of his own to Rubottom:

> " . . . this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect United States assistance. . . . . .
>
> "Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement a definite constructive program to influence the course of events in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities of this type of approach. . . . . . "

30 March & 7 April 1960

The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S. civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On 7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving willingly:

> " . . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Batista."

9 April 1960

State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which the following is an extract:

> "Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invasions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . .
>
> "What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover . . . . . "

"FYI wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency planning purposes only and in no way indicates higher authority at present contemplates such action. . . . . . "

11 April 1960

Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:

> "Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders are known to me including names their selectees for top governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose secret discussions. . . . . .
>
> "Regardless of . . . seething unrest which exists, indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take-over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of following developments (which we summarize below):
>
> (1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.
>
> (2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.
>
> (3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."
>
> (4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.
>
> (5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."
>
> (6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it.

Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added:

> "One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist

> them; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could fully substantiate this cooperation. . . . . . "

9 May 1960

A memorandum addressed to Chief, WH Division, and signed by P.E. Oberst, Chief, WH/CA, reports steps taken or recommended for improving CIA's capabilities in the Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or Fidelistas. Among things recommended were: placement of a junior officer in the embassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a contingency PM plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."

A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows:

> "The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity.
>
> "Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support.

(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations. Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28 June 1960, it appears that he did not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated 13 June, but he never took the post.)

3 June 1960

Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the meeting includes this comment:

> "Farland then told me that the underground opposition are planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty well along and could be executed at any time."

Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)

The author is not identified nor is there any indication that the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or overt actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.

17 June 1960

Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, queried State through CIA channels, asking for confirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader, Dr. Jordi Brossa. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position as follows:

a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against the Trujillo government while it is in full control.

b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.

c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional government which controls a substantial section of the Dominican Republic.

20 June 1960

Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied in the affirmative.

28 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on, for planning purposes, was the period extending through the "incapacitation" of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.

Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . . . " Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the undergound to accomplish a revolt.

29 June 1960

Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.

Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking up arms at sea and for caching in nearby caves. He also described an airdrop site.

1 July 1960

A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.

> "It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same. . . . . . It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.
>
> "Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.

Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve 30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studying means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."

8 July 1960

Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:

> " . . . imperative learn from /Juan Vicini/ and/or /Dr. Jordi Brossa/ what plans and capabilities are to be employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo and what is needed in way of material support for implementation of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent of military participation in preparations. In spite of /Vicini/ apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that must have some plan and capability for action which will assure stable interim government after removal of Trujillo. . . . . . In your opinion are /Vicini/ and /Brossa/ members of same group or if not could the two groups be merged? . . . . . "

8 September 1960

The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September) proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.

18 October 1960

Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition. The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your verbal request on 13 October 1960 . . . " This is the memorandum to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.

29 December 1960

The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read, in part:

> "Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such . . . . . He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
>
> " . . . . . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . . . it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be."

(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.)

12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the

Special Group on this date:

> "Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the group being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project."

19 January 1961

Cable from headquarters:

> "For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable, authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal front of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms. . . . . . Above coordinated with State."

24 January 1961

Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED by members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:

> "It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval on 29 December 1960 of our Operational Proposal."

(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)

31 January 1961

"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State Department:

> "With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."

6 February 1961

Cable from headquarters:

> "1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would appreciate [dissidents'] reaction to offer of armed assistance to include [dissidents'] current plan . . .
>
> "2. Also request [Robert Owen's] initial assessment [dissidents'] capability carry out plan of action once limited armed assistance provided."

10 February 1961

The station cabled its reply:

> "No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.
>
> "Initial assessment is [Brossa and Vicini] could not carry out plan. But with access [Dr. Severo Cabral] he now approaching point when will better be able evaluate group potential for action. We some weeks away from being able make solid preliminary assessment.
>
> "Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small

size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right direction can be made if we all thrown out. Ammo could come later."

14 February 1961

At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:

> " . . . asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum in CIA files.)

15 February 1961

Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his memorandum record of the meeting follow:

> " . . . . . Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of arms, although he did say that it is desireable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities of arms from Army contacts . . . but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to have arms delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired.
>
> "Vicini said that the object of obtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materiels and methods . . . a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby

electronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. . . . . .

"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator."

4 March 1961

Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum of his meeting with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage and kill him with guns and grenades:

"Vicini idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view."

(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)

The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:

> " . . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost, believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . . "

5 March 1961

As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be assured as much as human fallibility permits. . . . . . "

7 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the field, in part:

> "Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, request station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned . . . . . Request type and quantity arms desired. . . . . . "

8 March 1961

Cable from the station:

> "Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and group plan try kill Trujillo by [intercepting his car] at point near [Wimpy's Supermarket]. Date not set and obviously depends on Trujillo travel . . . Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved."

8 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently additional details in order make plans timely assistance. Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that requested . . . . ."

13 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas): Freitas speaks for Amiama Tio group which includes military members . . . in six brigade Hqs and which have capability, at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta in control provisional govt. . . . . . Request following station action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Hqs places special emphasis on identifying military membership Amiama Tio group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess realistically chances successful takeover."

15 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked [a consulate employee] for small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.' By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and learned the dissident group must do EMSLEW [kill Trujillo] this month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths are apparently aware renewal plan . . . . . Wimpy asked for five 45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for same, . . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . . ten 64mm tank rockets. . . . ."

16 March 1961

Headquarters cabled its reply:

"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and will advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is Berry making request on own initiative or is he speaking for Dr. Severo Cabral? . . . . . "

17 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For issue to several /of the dissident group/ Consul General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges. If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try get from Marines.

"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion /to send in each pouch one small size high fire power weapon/ as Dearborn increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for /assassination/ decline result lack tangible or too slow action on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day more involved in /the operation/. Loss of one of key people thru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE/EMLEED activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend themselves against SIM."

18 March 1961

Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr. Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:

"His group [assassination] plan now this: Group knows identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment incognito and lightly guarded. Group apparently has someone in building who can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [assassination], possibly including mistress, in silence.

"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job. . . . . . Severo Cabral's final position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination].

"Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing risk chaos for period of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to get decisive agreement support before [assassination].

20 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms . . . Will deliver to the group's representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. Coordinated with State Department."

22 March 1961

The station replied, in part:

" . . . we realize permission does not now exist but Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then

> please continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms . . . or import arms by [other] means. Completely negative plea for arms, whatever delivery method, will end cooperation Severo Cabral and probably by [Wimpy and Mrs. Berry].*

25 March 1961

The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P (Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Owen's responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government. "If above clarifies Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly. In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing orders permit return for consultations."

(Comment: We do not know whether Owen replied to this cable or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did go to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot

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* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.

establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine guns.)

26 March 1961

Cable from the station:

"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which available consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . . . . ."

(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)

27 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be pouched] makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package; or whether split shipment preferable."

(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)

29 March 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. . . Advise. . . . . . Pouching . . . nine magazines . . . "

31 March 1961

The station replied:

"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Berry by the station's female administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of good will to Severo Cabral now. These items are not what he asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity. The security risk in his having these items is no greater than his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated and less secure cache or drop."

Headquarters cable to the station:

"/Passing the three carbines/ approved. Advise Hqs when passing of this equipment completed.

(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)

7 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines/ contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine magazines."

9 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"/The station's female administrative assistant/ passed /the three carbines/ to /Wimpy Berry/ April 7. No complications."

(Comment: The files do not contain an account of how the carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents. Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose use essentially same technique as that for /the three carbines/.

[The station's female administrative assistant] driving own car will go to local supermarket [Wimpy Berry's] for usual Saturday morning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assist from Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car trunk with groceries. [Station operations officer] will then accompany to administrative assistant's apartment, help take groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer, [Wimpy Berry] will arrive in personal car, pick up items from operations officer at partially concealed entrance to administrative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for his visit will be commercial delivery.")

7 April 1961

Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection."

(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a request for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station. This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was at headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made the plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval was never given the station to pass them to the plotters.)

12 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

> "Equipment for Severo Cabral [submachine guns] which subject of Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14 April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme of delivery proposed."

(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on the 9 April entry.)

13 April 1961

An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from Juan Vicini:

> "The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines], with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day or two. . . . . . With the small amount of equipment which they are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places and therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced and the time factor considerably extended accordingly. With the rest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) [the submachine guns] the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost time greatly reduced."

14 April 1961

Extract from a note from SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA

[Consul General Dearborn]:

"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."

17 April 1961

Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA [Dearborn]:

"The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras: CRISTOBAL [General Juan Tomas Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the photographic job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3 Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing is waiting for the heavy cameras."

17 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

" . . . . . most important [the submachine guns] not repeat not be passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery."

20 April 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry]. This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created by [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.

"Request station provide full info soonest: (a) Have [the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) Details on an alternate plan to deliver [submachine guns] which would involve ground caching."

(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sent just three days after the failure of the landing at the Bay of Pigs.)

20 April 1961

Note to DELTA [Dearborn] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:

"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."

20 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin."

(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall, writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the submachine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so, we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food containers, but not in connection with pouching.)

21 April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the station:

> "/Submachine guns/ should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to /Wimpy Berry/.

22 April 1961

The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April regarding disposition of the three carbines:

> " . . . . . /Wimpy Berry/ has given /the three carbines/ to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up . . . . . "

(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Thomas Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for 31 May.)

25 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Foll from Dearborn: 'I believe political consequence of not delivering [submachine guns] so serious I plan go Washington within next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"

26 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"[Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other members assassination effort but General Juan Tomas Diaz probably will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can get. De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible . . . . ."

30 April 1961

Cable from the station:

"Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info: . . . main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gauge shotguns with 120 rounds and some small arms. . . . . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal and few additional weapons could be important. . . . . . I replied I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S. controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study and assessment. . . . . . "

2 May 1961

Cable from the station:

" . . . . . suggest Hqs review decision not pass submachine guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the overthrow of the Trujillo regime."

2 May 1961

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

" . . . . . Since it appears that EMOTH group has committed itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . . . . . "

(Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated by Ray Herbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on it. It was forwarded to the DDCI for release. General Cabell attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div., unacted upon.")

4 May 1961

The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these would work or not.

5 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

> "Regret delay but release [of the submachine guns] awaits high level State Department decision."

8 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

> "State Department has disapproved passing [submachine guns].

16 May 1961

Cable from the station:

> "For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep . . . . "

(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible memorandum in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and concerns a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transmittal dispatch makes it clear that the author was Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant. This is our interpretation of what Miss Cintron was trying to say: Sometime during the second week of May, Wimpy Berry asked Thomas Stocker to return the three carbines Berry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at first refused but finally agreed. /Presumably Berry then passed them to Antonio de la Maza./ On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession, and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that Berry had been working with on behalf of the consulate. SOCRATES (Luis Baquero) arrived at the supermarket while Stocker was still with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if he had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was to do the job did not know each other's identities. While Mrs. Berry was talking with Baquero, the man to whom Berry had last given the weapons /presumably Antonio de la Maza/ arrived at the supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he had returned the carbines to Stocker. He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he always carried them.)

18 May 1961

There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:

> "General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." *

25 May 1961

The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with dissidents." The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention of the subject.

27 May 1961

The station cabled:

> "Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with Andreas Freitas. . . . . . Freitas made no request for arms which indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has.

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* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the dissidents.

His only statement on this subject was that group has arms but is somewhat concerned whether enough.

"He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic elements of which he member remains on brink final performance and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow Trujillo.

"I replied . . . speed with which assistance could be given would be increased considerably if we could have prior info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities involved and identity of proposed junta. . . . . . He replied participants were not prepared give their names until afterward and could not give time for reasons stated earlier. . . . . .

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize."

29 May 1961

Headquarters cabled the station:

"For Dearborn from State . . . . . We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. Thi last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. . . . . . You must request and receive further specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. . . . ."

(Comment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)

31 May 1961

Cable from the station:

"State from Dearborn . . . . . If attempt is made by U.S. friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from consulate. Stocker told me same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents I told him this impossible. . . . . ."

Cable from chief of station:

"Assume /the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn/ is final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based. This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover up tracks,' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn now. . . . . . If assassination tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of station, the operations officer, and the administrative assistant mandatory. . . . . ."

31 May 1961

Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours, Washington time:

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO NUMBER 1. APFR 2. SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C). SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KILLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO HAINA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 HOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 0600Z. [0200 Washington time]

(Comment: The station's follow-up operational cable identified the source of Critic No. 1 as Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry, who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn and Chief of Station Owen at the consulate. At about 0100 hours, Dominican time, Andres Freitas telephoned Dearborn "to ask cryptically whether we had the news." Freitas said he would add details when he had them.)

3 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:

> "The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediately move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Owen, and Case Officer Cookson. It was also decided that Administrative Assistant Isabel Cintron should not return to Trujillo. Accordingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station the afternoon of 2 June issuing appropriate instructions."

9 June 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject: "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:

> "The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room 7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson, Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion and Mr. Jameson.
>
> "Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms."

(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson referred is not in the EMDEED operational files. We did not find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake Esterline, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now remember. There is an unsigned memorandum in the EMDEED file dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject: "ODACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents." The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and record sheet attached to the memorandum shows it was originated by John Poulter, WH3/DR&H, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH (Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record sheet and returned the memorandum to Poulter. This suggests to us that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked Esterline to have a summary pulled together.

J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was directed to one of the State representatives. He feels that, if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of that fact in his record of the meeting.

A memorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.

The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination. Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery of U.S. involvement with them. The consulate cabled through CIA channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issue of the Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story

> " . . . based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry) provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used to kill Trujillo."

Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons from the U.S. consulate to them, became known to the Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its interrogations of the captured assassins. The following summary is drawn from the FBI's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.

Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled at the house of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid was the cousin of Donald Reid Cabral, one of the key political plotters, but appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid in being called as a physician learned the identities of the assassins, General Diaz said he could not allow Dr. Reid to go free. General Diaz forced Dr. Reid to furnish refuge in Reid's house for four of the assassins (General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, Salvador Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). The other assassins went their separate ways.

Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz and his three companions began to panic. (It might be noted here that the assassins were so sure that the coup would follow and they would all be national heroes that they had made absolutely know plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs. Reid in the presence of his companions. Pastoriza and Estrella were highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after a near-fight and a drawn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after a few hours. Diaz and de la Maza left later and were killed in a gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza and Estrella were captured, tortured, and confessed. The following are excerpts from the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz, the SIM investigator.

> ". . . after Pastoriza left General Juan Tomas Diaz composed a telegram addressed to President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, which said, 'We who have killed Trujillo urgently need your help in order to flee the country. Signed General Juan Tomas Diaz.'

Diaz requested Dr. Reid to take this telegram to 'Wimpy,' an American who owned a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo, and to tell 'Wimpy' to take the telegram immediately to the American Consul and to ask the Consul to code the telegram and send it through the proper channels to Betancourt.

"Reid refused to take the telegram on the basis that he had already implicated himself greately in the plot through no fault of his own and stated that he thought Diaz was trying to have him killed by asking him to take this telegram to 'Wimpy.' With that de la Maza became so incensed that he punched Reid and pushed him around and even went so far as to hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son. Reid then said that the plotters could kill the entire Reid family if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to 'Wimpy.'

"Estrella was asked to furnish what he knew concerning 'Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. Estrella related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maza and General Diaz. He was asked if 'Wimpy' knew the purpose for which these weapons were secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy' was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that 'Wimpy' works for the FBI, the State Department, or some other agency of the U.S. Government.

"Estrella was asked to explain how he knew 'Wimpy' was connected with the Americans and he replied that he had heard from the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intermediary between the American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella stated that 'Wimpy' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza and Luis Amiama Tio, and that 'Wimpy' had been the intermediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed their proposed coup with American authorities.

" . . . the source mentioned that during the interrogation of the conspirators who mentioned that United States officials were involved, they were all asked to identify the United States officials, but none of the conspirators were able to identify these officials by name and mentioned only that they were high functionaries of the United States Department of State. The only name of any American official which was disclosed during these interrogations was the name of American Consul Hill in connection with the telegram that General Diaz wanted to send to Betancourt.

"... the source noted that the telegram never reached Consul Hill because Diaz tore it up after the incident in Dr. Reid's house.

"(. . . the source commented that the interrogators themselves did not believe at this time that the U.S. Department of State was in any way involved with the plot. They thought the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement . . . was simply a method by which Amiama induced General Roman to give his approval to the plot. . . . . . it was the interrogators opinion at that time that if the North Americans had been involved in this plot, the plot would have been much better organized and the coup would have succeeded.)

" . . . by the latter part of June 1961, the investigation had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals involved in the plot, many of whom had been arrested and interrogated. The only ones not accounted for were Luis Amiama Tio and Antonio Imbert Barreras. As previously related, General Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieutenant Amado Garcia Guerrero were killed when resisting arrest. (At this point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Garcia, de la Maza, Amiama, and Imbert had been captured, and made to talk, it is certain that many many more prisoners would have been taken.)

"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who were brought before the courts were Tavares and General Roman. As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in connection with this plot was brought before any Dominican court. 'Wimpy,' the North American, was to have been brought before a court to be deported; however, Ramfis ordered that he was not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is aware, no action was taken against 'Wimpy.'"

"Wimpy" Berry, his wife, and their children were allowed to leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently visited Washington. While in Washington, Berry was given $2,000 for "expenses" by CIA. After amnesty was granted the plotters in December 1961, the Berrys returned to Santo Domingo and resumed operating their supermarket. They, especially Mrs. Berry, continued to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the governments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.

To recap:

a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles were never delivered.

b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled a suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon.

c. On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsquent request for submachine guns.

d. On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Headquarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines was released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female administrative assistant on 7 April 1961. Berry, at the request of the dissidents, gave the carbines to S. Thomas Stocker for temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly kept them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used in the shooting. Ortiz, the SIM investigator, told the FBI that the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.

e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April 1961, Chief of Station Robert Owen evidently prevailed upon headquarters to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the motivations of men such as Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral, Amiama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters it captured revealed that they were not greatly motivated by a desire to live in a free and democratic republic. Most of them were seeking vengeance or personal gain. General Roman, who was to have taken over and form an interim government, admitted that he had had no intention of permitting free elections. He had planned to establish himself as the new Dominican "strongman" replacing Trujillo. General Juan Tomas Diaz was bitter over having been publicly disgraced by Trujillo and then cashiered from the army. Antonio de la Maza also had a personal grudge. His brother, Octavio, had been killed by the Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying of Gerald Murphy in the Galindez case. Most of the others also had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.

AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1025
(201-16881)
(23-88/2-139) Local

Dahlgren

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 7 November 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Subject, dated 29 October 1957, calling the attention of Headquarters to the fact that his assignment in Habana terminates in June 1958 and setting out his wishes as to reassignment thereafter.

2. While Vaivada did not include it in his memorandum, in recent conversations with the case officer he has expressed considerable interest in the possibility of being assigned under unofficial cover to Spain, saying that both he and his wife would welcome such an assignment. The Subject has also said in those conversations that he would not take it amiss if an opportunity for reassignment outside of the Central America-Caribbean area were to become open to him at any time prior to June 1958.

3. In the opinion of the Station, Vaivada has done a very good job here, having been confronted with and overcome a number of difficult problems and situations during his tour of over three years in Habana. The Station is happy to recommend that his request for reassignment be given every consideration.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachments:
Memorandum of Reassignment (4 copies)

Distribution:
4 - Washington w/att.
2 - Files w/att.

4 November 1957

JRP/mfm

DESENSITIZED
Per CSN 43-28

201-168881

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

Havana, Cuba
29 October 1957

SUBJECT: Reassignment - Arthur G. Vaivada

TO : Headquarters Desk

THROUGH: Chief of Station, Havana, Cuba

1. While at Headquarters in the early part of May 1957, it was verbally agreed that I return to Cuba for about one year, security permitting.

2. While my operational work in Cuba from August 1954 until February 1957 was concentrated on communist targets in the University of Habana, it should be pointed out that my duties during that period also involved many contacts with subversive oppositionist elements. When governmental persecution increased during February 1957, two of my key agents were lost, one of them by governmental assassination, so that I was obliged to leave Cuba temporarily pending clarification of the security factors involved. During my three months' absence in PBPRIME the local situation deteriorated; and after my return my position was less favorable than it had been as a newcomer since I had lost assets but had retained the cumulative security hazards of three years of cultivation and recruitment efforts. The University was, and still is, closed. Our communist penetration efforts are continuously harrassed by official persecution of the target group.

3. Since by June 1958 I shall have spent four years in Cuba, I believe it appropriate to submit this letter at this time requesting that Headquarters begin to study the possibilities for reassignment about June 1958, or prior to that date if necessary. As to future assignments, I have no reservations or special requests. I am willing and prepared to travel to any area consistent with my qualifications. Generally speaking, and for obvious security reasons, I am interested in getting out of the Central America-Caribbean area if possible. It may be recalled that I was denied an Argentine visa in 1953, for purely technical reasons. This situation may be changed, and I would not be opposed to a tour in Argentina, Chile, or any of the South American republics. In this matter, the nature of the new project or assignment would take precedence with me over personal preferences as to particular area of assignment.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

Att to HKHA 4025
7 NOV 57

201-168881

14-00000

4. Regarding my cover status: I entered Cuba in 1954 under student cover (Pan American Foundation Scholarship), and as it became increasingly more difficult to maintain owing to student disturbances, I completed a course in the writing of free-lance fiction and am thrice published. This writing has been used as a realistic, stop-gap cover, even after I was provided with a notional business cover (Public Surveys Institute) by Headquarters. I understand that journalism is considered a weak and time-worn cover; yet if it is worked at, and financially managed through a PEPRIME checking account, it not only satisfies local SS probes but it does not have the inherent disadvantages involved in setting up a full-fledged business cover. I set this out as a possible suggestion to Headquarters, but have no insistence as to journalistic over business cover. The notional business cover provided me has proved satisfactory in a limited sense thus far, and even utilized as cover for action occasionally, but I would be uncertain about introducing it in a less "Americanized" country than Cuba.

Arthur G. Vaivada
Arthur G. Vaivada

201-168881

SECRET

25 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Charlie Danish

SUBJECT : Ross CROZIER

REFERENCE : SAS Memorandum Dated 14 May 1963

1. Referenced memorandum requested the Subject be provided with military cover while assigned in the Headquarters area for operational and credit purposes in the performance of his duties with SAS. It is understood that your office was reluctant to issue the Subject the necessary military cover because he was physically located in a DODS office which was under commercial cover.

2. As indicated verbally on 24 June 1963, SAS will move the Subject out of the DODS area on 26 June. SAS has also requested suitable office or apartment space through the Office of Logistics from which the Subject will operate in the future. Until this property is acquired, the Subject will perform his duties from his home. Consequently, it is requested that immediate attention be given to providing the Subject with the necessary military cover. Refer any questions to G. A. LADNER, Jr., SAS/Security, ext. 5909.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, SAS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Security

SAS/Security:GALadner:ftk - 25 June 1963

SECRET

201-168881

19 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff
Room 1-B-24 Headquarters Building

SUBJECT : Request for Domestic Cover
Mr. Ross Lester Crozier

REFERENCE : Form 1322, forwarded to your Office,
14 May 1963

1. It is requested that this Office be advised as to the disposition of our request dated 14 May 1963 for providing Mr. Ross Lester Crozier appropriate Domestic Cover.

2. Since security requirements prohibit Mr. Crozier from being located in the Headquarters Building, he has been provided an office in the DODS Area. Subject needs "Cover" as soon as possible, for credit purposes, employment, etc.

3. Your prompt attention to this matter would be appreicated.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

cc: DODS

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/J. ALBERT HOESER/kct (19 June 63)

Distribution:
Orig + 1 - Addressee
1 - DODS
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

REQUEST FOR DOMESTIC COVER LIST ENTRY OR CHANGE

SUBMIT THIS FORM IN TRIPLICATE. ENCLOSED IN SEALED ENVELOPE

TO : **Central Cover Staff**

THROUGH:

SUBJECT: **Mr. Ross Lester Crozier** (True Name)

DATE: **14 May 1963**

ENTRY

Inclusion of subject on the Domestic Cover List is requested for the reason noted below. When notified that cover has been established, subject will be specifically authorized and instructed to conceal his Agency affiliation.

CHANGE

Subject is currently included on the Domestic Cover List. For the reason noted below, it is requested that

☐ this employee be removed from the Domestic Cover List.

☐ the following change be made:

REASON

Request subject be provided Military Cover (Army) while assigned in Headquarters Area for operational and credit purposes in performance of his duties with SAS.

Note: Subject was formerly under commercial cover at JMWAVE prior to January 1963.

COVER (*Complete only for new entries*)

TYPE COVER IN USE		
IF NO COVER IN USE	TYPE SUGGESTED (*Specify whether official or non-official*)	
	JUSTIFICATION, IF NON-OFFICIAL COVER SUGGESTED	

APPROVED BY CENTRAL COVER DIVISION	REQUESTING OFFICIAL
SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE **ORVILLE C. DAWSON**
DATE	TITLE **Chief, SAS/Personnel**

201-168881

FORM 7-58 1322 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: CROZIER, Ross

AGE:
DOB: 20 June 1922

DATE: 8 April 1963

STATION HQS.
AND DUTIES:

DD/P UNIT:

PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: CAREER AGENT

PRESENT GRADE: GS-12
PROPOSED GRADE: NA
CIA TRAINING:

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
NA

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: NA
NA

EDUCATION:

Wife: Costa Rican citizen, DOB: 15 Mar 1913
Son : DOB: 4 Sept 1949 - U.S. Citizen
DAU : DOB: 24 June 1951 - U.S. Citizen

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Spanish (Fluent - writing/reading/speaking)

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Tech Sgt. (1940-1945: Intelligence NCO) & (April 46 - Apr 49)
Leading man labor, $12.36 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone;
(Jan. 1946 - April 1946).

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Contract and career agent since June 1949 - Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba; (Foreign Intelligence with some Psychological Warfare and Paramilitary) FI mission with Castro's forces in Sierr Maestra (April 58). Mexico City Jan 59 to May 1960; assigned to WH/4 PA-PROP from June 60 to Oct 61; Assigned PCS JMWAVE Oct 61 to Jan 1963. (Case Officer on student project involving propaganda and area intelligence collection & network operation; CO on press placement and press collection project).

RECOMMENDED BY:

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

201-168851

FORM NO. 965 1 MAR 57 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

X TDY	EOD	OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. SAS-473-63
PCS		
INVITATIONAL		

NAME Mr. Ross L. Crozier		SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	OFFICE PHONE 6576	GRADE Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

From Washington, D. C. to NYC for approximately three (3) days TDY and return.

MODE: Air tourist/ce
PURPOSE: Operational contacts

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN c/a	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
			MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)		
19 Mar 63	22 Mar 63	$ 16.00				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED		
NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY	
TRANSPORTATION REQUEST	
CASH OR OTHER	
DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION	
SHIPMENT	NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED	
EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED	
ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE	UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE
ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED	
X YES $100.00	ACCOUNTING DUE DATE
NO	

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
$100.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.
473-63

CHARGE COST CENTER NO.
3132-1000-1000

DATE	SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER

COORDINATION		
SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE VINCENT J. HEYMAN, Chief	COMPONENT SAS/Support
SIGNATURE	DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE DESMOND FITZGERALD, Chief	COMPONENT SAS
SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 8-59 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 8-62

SECRET

March '63
201-168881

(20-40)

14-00000

13 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Chief, Staff Agent Accounts Section

THROUGH : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Reassignment of Career Agent -
Harold R. NOEMAYR

This is to advise you that Career Agent Harold R. NOEMAYR was reassigned PCS from JMWAVE to the Washington, D. C. area on 21 January 1963.

Howard J. Heyman
HOWARD J. [illegible]
Chief, SAS/Support

DDP/SAS/Personnel/John H. Martin/kct (13 Mar 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CPD
1 - SAS/Pers

201-168851

X

INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☒ 201-261813
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
~~DESTROY~~ ☐ ~~SIG.~~

201-261813

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

46 SECRET

ROUTING			
1	SR/CI(A)	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SR 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, RI/AN, WH 7, RF 2

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

20 July 63

R I COPY

S E C R E T 200017Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5444

IN 83496

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

C/S COMMENT: *DID NOT DESIRE COLD STREET APPROACH TO BAKULIN

REF DIR 45798

1. SINCE REF STATION HAS TRIED ~~SPT~~ SPOT CANDIDATES FOR PLAUSIBLE ACCESS VALENTIN VASILYEVICH BAKULIN WHOSE OVERT ACTIVITY IS PRINCIPALLY THAT OF SUPPLYING PROPAGANDA FILMS TO INTERESTED LOCAL GROUPS.

2. SOURCE SEYMOUR D. TRINNICH, POSSIBLE ACCESS ASSET IS ARTURO CARRILLO ESPARZA DPOB 3 JULY 1940 MEXICO CITY. CARRILLO IS GRADUATE STUDENT UNAM FACULTY SCIENCES, COMPLETING DOCTORATE THEORETICAL PHYSICS, IS MEMBER OF COMMITTEE WHICH OPERATES CINE CLUB, APPEARS SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY RE FINANCING AND FILM PROCUREMENT. CLUB HAS GOTTEN FILMS IN PAST FROM SOVEMB. (REQUEST HQS TRACES AND INITIATION POA, HAVE NO LOCAL TRACES.)

3. REQUEST TRACES ALSO ON CARRILLO'S GIRL FRIEND CYNTHIA CHLEBICKI, U.S. NATIONAL, UNAM MASTER'S DEGREE STUDENT, GRADUATE OF UNIV ILLINOIS, HOME ADDRESS 11 EAST 151 ST, HARVEY, ILL. (NO MEXI TRACES.)

4. INDEX.

S E C R E T

R I COPY

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

FORM 4-63 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

RI COPY SECRET RI COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

REPORT COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

UFG-[illegible]

JMWAVE

23 [illegible] 1963

[illegible]KENNEDY[illegible]

[redacted]: [redacted]

[redacted] C/da[redacted]

[redacted]

agency staff employee

copy

[redacted]

ASSET

Source: Paras. 1-4: [redacted] from [redacted], former Panamanian Charge in Habana, [illegible] in Miami who was approached by [redacted] of the Inter-American Affairs Commission. [redacted] works with [redacted], Panam employee; and it is said that the [redacted] [illegible] have been quite successful in shipping medicines to Cuba including shipments to prisoners in Cuban jails.

ASSET ASSET

Paras. 5 and 6: [redacted] on or about 20 September. [redacted] obtained the information because it was addressed to [redacted] of Miami, who is related to [redacted] who is a very good friend of [redacted].

ASSET

Also attached under cover of this report are the following items of information of potential interest:

a. Bulletin No. 2 of the National Medical Association in the Frente Interna Anti-Comunista fr [redacted] ASSET It is not known how [redacted] received this information. It is believed that this information dates to about June or July 1962.

asset

Attachments: H/W
Misc. Medical Info.

1 - Headquarters [illegible] & atts. h/w
1 - 00/C
1 - File

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM

b. Copy of a letter signed by Cmdte Rene VALLEJO for the Executive Council of the National Institute of Surgery of the Ministry of Health, dated 6 June addressed to Regino BOTTI, President of JUCEPLAN requesting an approval for the expenditure of $20,000.00 for the purchase of raw color film from Czechoslovakia. This film to be used at the national Universities and in Cuban scientific institutions. Received from [redacted] ASSET about mid-July from an unidentified correspondent.

c. ASSET [redacted] debriefing of Antonio TOLEDO Zamora (A12 829 419) who was in the third year at the Medical School, University of Habana. Report dated 21 August.

d. Translation of a commentary by Virgilio FEAJO Nunez, leader of the Cuban medical class Habana on 18 August [redacted] ASSET 1962. It was submitted in translated form by on 26 August. Though this appears to be an interesting commentary there does not appear to be anything new or startling in the information.

e. Listing of medical and professional personnel in Habana CRYPT CRYPT which was received through the [redacted] diplomatic pouch. Pouch turned over to [redacted] for duplication. [redacted] ASSET provided translations. Envelope had return address Colegio Teresiano Calle 17 No. 1054 Vedado, Habana. Addressed to Eduardo ROCO, PO Box 1495. No WAVE traces ROCO. Source of this information is not known. It is believed that the names under this attachment should be indexed for the Field. No indication of meaning of A,C and B, but believe they stand for A- Anti-Communist, B- Neutral and C- Communist.

201-002237

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dr 3		16 SEP		RB	
Mr MacAuley WH/CUBA				MCQ	Verbal approval from Mr. Oden, CI/OA on 11 Sept. 1957 - Written request for OA amendment submitted to CI/OA same date. MCQ.
3. WH BB				mr Rastetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be number
A line should be drawn across she
Officer designations should be use
Each officer should initial (check
Action desired or action taken sho
Routing sheet should always be re
For officer designations see separa

Paul:

Please draft cable to station and coordinate with Dick Rastetter :

"Hqs. has no objection use subject to contact Amourette B. ~~Due present situation Amourette-A, suggest station use [illegible] discretion in contacting Amourette-10 if such is felt necessary to maintain latter's interest.~~ AGL ~~Suggest~~ contacts be kept @ minimum during "cooling off period" until replacement arrives.

Rastetter edited above 12 Sept MCQ

SECRET

FORM NO. JAN 1947 51-19

201-168891

14-00000

FROM: CABLE

ACTION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 48405
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Forwarded	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Dr 3		10 Sep			
Mr MacAuley WH/CUBA				MCQ	Verbal approval from Mr. Oden, CI/OA on 11 Sept. 1957 - Written request for OA amendment submitted to CI/OA same date MCQ.
3. WH BB				Mr Rastetter read this	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

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Rastetter edited above
12 Sept
MCQ

Each comment should be number
A line should be drawn across she
Officer designations should be use
Each officer should initial (check
Action desired or action taken she
Routing sheet should always be re
For officer designations see separa

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947

201-168881

116

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 116 BD/MK/BM
10 SEPT 1957

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

SEP 10 15 40Z 57
RECD CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

IN 48405

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 016

RE: HAVA 014 (IN 48222)*

RE PARA 3 REF REQUEST APPROVAL USE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS CONTACT AMOURETTE B, AMOURETTE 10 IF NECESSARY, AND OTHER KUCAGE ASSETS AT STATION DISCRETION PENDING REPLACEMENT GALLEGOS. WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS KUTUBE DUTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: STATION COULD PROVIDE CONTACT FOR AMOURETTE-B AND POSSIBLY A ON INTERIM BASIS.

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 10 SEPT 57	

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

10 SEP 57
201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2362

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

29 JUL 57 09 12

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational

SPECIFIC C Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

Action Required: For Subject's Information

Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was recently amended to read as follows:

> "Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1 (b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:
>
> '1 (b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5,135 per annum.'
>
> All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect."

COPY

17 July 1957

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

Charles E. Apple
for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-347

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T
DATE: 20 May 1949
FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica
SUBJECT: GENERAL- OPERATIONS
SPECIFIC- Request for Project Authorization

REFERENCE: TZP-W-411

1. Authorization is hereby requested for the project described below, which we plan to initiate on 1 June 1949. In view of the comment contained in paragraph 2 of referenced communication, we are assuming that commencement of this project on a simple exploratory basis has already been approved by headquarters. No further commitments, other than those described below, will be made.

A. Objectives

(1) Cutout services, as suggested by headquarters, in an effort to test Subject's abilities.

(2) As a basic and continuing assignment to permit and encourage development of Subject's best local contacts as well as in the hope of filling a long-felt need in our operational pattern, he will be assigned to the general topic of labor; specifically, communist penetration of local non-communist labor groups and theoretical developments which are of interest regardless of group designation.

(3) Subject appears to be genuinely interested and to possess an unusual appreciation for operational ways and means, which is seldom encountered. For this reason, none of his assignments will be exclusive, and he will be encouraged to follow up such leads and opportunities as arise in the course of his daily occupations regardless of any objective and target assignments.

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

2[illegible] May 1949 [illegible] 43-26
201-168881

DESENSITIZED

B. Targets

(1) Subject will commence by serving as cutout for Hugger, who has always held out great promise but never been properly developed or directed.

(2) In the labor field, the principal and only target at the moment is the only labor federation, the Rerum Novarum.

(3) Subject will represent our only contact among the student groups and certain allied "intellectual" societies. Any activity in this category showing promise may subsequently become an assigned target.

C. Cryptonym and Essential Data on Personnel

The designation "Hydropathic", heretofore applied to subject individual, is hereby discarded. He will hereafter be designated by San Jose Station Symbol No. 26. For essential data on personnel, see TZP-A-365, Part I and II.

D. Control and Contact

Judging by Subject's background data and his already demonstrated cooperative attitude, we do not feel that control and direction of his activities will be any problem. Contact, owing to the nature of this project, will be frequent and carried out in any convenient manner, generally in one or the other of our respective homes.

E. Cover

Subject had planned to and has established himself in Costa Rica for entirely personal reasons, prior to any contact with this office. He has a Costa Rican wife, attends the university, and lives a perfectly normal life which any assignments from us will not disrupt. Our only anticipated problem is that of routine contacts between Subject and the Chief of Station. That matter will be handled with care and discretion.

DESENSITIZED
PER [illegible] 43-23

F. Cost

Subject has agreed to serve for a salary equivalent to $50.00 per month, to be paid in colones. To offset this expense we plan to dispense with the services of Hucklebone who is presently receiving $400.00 per month.

DESENSITIZED

G. Timing and other Factors

Our preliminary interviews with Subject lead us to believe that he will be the interested and reliable American cutout for which this station has long felt a need. His greatest virtue in this respect appears to be an understanding of operational methods and an appreciation of relative values with respect to information. It is hoped to make this a permanent project, but our plans and our arrangements with Subject are considered to be probationary, dependent entirely upon his development and future usefulness.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

DESENSITIZED

20 May 1949
201-168 881

14-00000

TZPA 365/01

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR POUCH
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-365/ ~~Part II~~ /01

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 4 November 1948

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations.
SPECIFIC- Operational Data - HYDROPATHIC PART II

1. The subject of TZP-A-365 Part I is HYDROPATHIC.

2. Subject is best qualified to serve as a cutout in handling informants. He has had experience along these lines in cultivating and collecting information from the following individuals:

Government Oppositionists:

Dr. José PEZET
Lic. Angel VEGA Mendez
Eng. Luis A. CRUZ
Prof. Luis FARIAS

Government Supporters:

Lic. Demetrio MARTINEZ
Lic. Alberto ARISALLO
Lic. Generoso SILCOS

As a result of the recent meeting between Elmer C. MERCER and Grover J. WARING, Subject has been recruited for the specific task of acting as a cutout in handling HYDROCYST I, who can be handled more profitably if trasferred to the control of MERCER's station. Subject to Home Office approval, no definite commitments have been made in this case.

3. Subject has a working knowledge of the following subjects:

a. Protocol
b. Liaison methods pertaining to intelligence in Latin American countries and inter-departmental liaison within our own government.
c. Communications systems. Subject transmits and receives about 12 - 16 words per minute in Morse code.
d. The political structure of Latin American governments.

Index D X

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

e. Subversive potential and leading subversive personalities of most Latin American countries.
f. Subject is trained in the use of firearms, jungle warfare, and has studied and worked with maps and charts, and is acquainted with surveillance and evasion procedures.
g. His primary activity after his arrival in the new area may of itself be useful. However, it is doubtful if this man will be able to devote any large portion of his time to our work until such time as he is thoroughly oriented.

4. Subject is best qualified to procure information in Latin American countries, particularly Panama and Costa Rica.

MANNER OF OPERATION

5. After he has established himself, Subject is interested in traveling in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

6. He is willing to travel for us and subject to Home Office approval, it is planned to introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST who will, in turn, introduce HYDROPATHIC to HYDROCYST I and, if approved, to HYDROCYST II. For the sake of cover, this is to be done on the basis that HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC are lodge brothers. HYDROPATHIC will join that organization in order to build up the cover. (Paragraph 8, TZP-A-365 Part I).

7. The number of people that will work for Subject is undetermined. Tentatively we have in mind HYDROCYST I and HYDROCYST II and, if he recruits them, the subjects underlined in red in Paragraph 16 of TZP-A-365 Part I. It might be well to start collecting biographic data on the latter three individuals at this time.

8. Subject is employed by another agency, but that employment will be terminated in the near future.

9. Subject has been recruited on an Embassy Intelligence Officer basis. It is possible that he knows the ultimate destination of any information he may submit.

10. As presently planned, HYDROCYST and HYDROPATHIC will be acquainted with each other. The turnover could be effected without these agents meeting, but then it would be more difficult to build up the lodge cover story. It would even be possible for HYDROPATHIC to communicate with HYDROCYST since both have a knowledge of Morse Code. However, it is believed that future information from HYDROCYST I will not have its primary value in this area.

11. Subject will be briefed to communicate by letter-drop. Here again, a lodge connection might be used as this is the present system which HYDROCYST I employs in forwarding communications to HYDROCYST.

12. Subject will be briefed to report in writing and to require his sub-agents to do so wherever possible.

SECRET

13. Subject cannot be expected to devote any major portion of his time to our work until he has built up his cover and is oriented in his new surroundings. Although fluent in the language, he will probably encounter a good deal of new terminology.

14. Subject has entered into a tentative oral contract to perform services for us for a salary of $50.00 per month. This can be made into a written contract at any time.

15. Subject's tentative continuing project is outlined in paragraph 2 above.

16. Subject should be capable of initiating his own projects.

PAYMENT

17. Starting in February 1949, it will be necessary to pay subject $50.00 U.S. dollars per month as indicated in paragraph 14 above.

18. Subject has been told that if his services prove satisfactory, he can expect an increase in salary. No specific amount was discussed.

19. It is contemplated that this station may be required to pay certain travel expenses for Subject. If done, this will be charged against Project Development.

20. No cost of purchase of information is involved at this time.

21. Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable. He has had considerable experience in writing reports and has remarked that his two principal criticisms of intelligence reporting as he has observed it in this area is that the reporting is inclined to be sensational rather than factual and that most people have nothing to report other than that which the opposition is willing that they receive. He should have a fair concept of security. However, general security in this area is very lax and he may have subconscious bad habits.

22. In view of his background, Subject should only be good in semi-covert work.

23. If this man is kept under cover he might eventually effect a penetration of scholastic or parlor-pink circles. It is presumed that this would be on a low level.

24. This individual could easily be recruited for a full-time job with our organization. However, it is believed that more is to be gained by starting him off in this manner, perhaps giving him periodic schooling and gradually increasing his activities and responsibilities.

CS COPY

Grover J Waring
Grover J. Waring

Distribution: Wash - 2
Sanj - 1
Files - 1

SECRET ~~[illegible]ITIZED~~

201-168881

☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO

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S E C R E T 291900Z

*In the station's judgement, neither GOM nor VLT will wish to push this further.

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 4885

RYBAT

29 SEP 65 IN 62264

REF MEXI 4865 (IN 61382)* [1]

1. NIGHT 28 SEPTEMBER LIFTER-3 SAID VLT CALLED MEETING NATIONAL DIRECTORATE SEPT 21, AT WHICH LIMOLD-1 [2] PRESENT, AND TOLD GROUP PLANNED CALL PRESS CONFERENCE SEPT 23 TO MAKE EXPOSURE RE ODYOKE [3] INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

2. SEPT 25 VLT SPOKE BRIEFLY TO NUMBER OFFICIALS AT UOM ABOUT PRESS RELEASE AND SAID THAT TO GAIN MAXIMUM IMPACT HE ADDED CHARGE THAT L-1 [2] AND RACIEL HERNANDEZ WERE THREATENED. ON QUESTIONING BY L-8, [1] VLT SAID NO NEW ATTEMPTS MADE AGAINST PPS PEOPLE BUT BELIEVES SOME ODYOKE [3] AGENCY HAS POSSIBLY ONE MEMBER NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OR PROBABLY ONE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER WORKING FOR IT, BUT ADDED THIS TYPE OF THING DIFFICULT UNCOVER AND PROVE.

3. L-8 [1] HAS TALKED TO ADRIANA SEVERAL TIMES SINCE EXPOSURE AND SHE SAYS PPS HAS NO PROOF OF CHARGES, AND NO EVIDENCE, DOCUMENTARY OR OTHERWISE, WHICH NOT PUBLISHED IN PRESS. THERE STILL NO EVIDENCE L-1 [2] HAS REPORTED MOST RECENT APPROACH, AND NO EVIDENCE

SECRET

File
Lombardo I.
201-

201-161881

HERNANDEZ HAS REPORTED MORE THAN FIRST MEETING AND FIRST TELEPHONE CALL TO PPS.

4. L-8[1] HAS TALKED TO HERNANDEZ SEVERAL TIMES SINCE PRESS RELEASE, AND LATTER ANGRY WITH VLT WHO FAILED CONSULT HIM BEFORE PRESS CONFERENCE. HERNANDEZ SAID VLT HAD PROMISED MATTER WOULD BE DROPPED AND NO PUBLICITY WOULD BE GIVEN APPROACH. HERNANDEZ NOW FEARS ODYOKE[3] AGENCY WHICH APPROACHED HIM WILL HAVE HIM FIRED FROM HIS TWO JOBS, AND REALIZES PPS IN NO POSITION HELP HIM.

5. L-8[1] BELIEVES VLT MADE EXPOSURE THIS TIME IN EFFORT MAKE SOME FAVORABLE PROPAGANDA AT EXPENSE PBPRIME[4], KNOWING THAT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF LATTER HAVE BEEN "EXPOSED" IN NUMBER PLACES RECENTLY. ALSO, VLT VERY POSSIBLY TRYING OFFSET EXPECTED ADVERSE CRITICISM AS RESULT CHIHUAHUA INCIDENT 23 SEPT IN WHICH SOME UGOCM (PPS) PEOPLE INVOLVED. ACCORDING L-8[1], PPS AND VLT FEEL GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS CHARGES AND WILL NOT SERIOUSLY INVESTIGATE IF IN FACT ANY EFFORT MADE AT ALL. VLT PLANS SPEECH IN CONGRESS ON 5 OCT, AND ALTHOUGH ADRIANA SAID SPEECH WILL DEAL PRIMARILY WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS, L-8[1] FEELS CERTAIN VLT WILL DISCUSS ODYOKE[3] INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES MEXI.

6. PRESS MORNING 29 SEPT CARRIED ARTICLE ON INTERVIEW LUIS

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

ECHEVARRIA MINISTER OF GOBERNACION HAD 1D 61264

WITH NUMBER REPORTERS 28 SEPT. ECHEVARRIA SAID VLT GAVE HIM PAGE 3

DECLARATION 25 SEPT REGARDING SUPPOSED ACTS EXPIONAGE AND BRIBERY INVOLVING TWO OFFICIALS PPS. ECHEVARRIA SAID IN VIEW FACT ONE OF TWO PERSONS ACCUSED BY PPS IS FOREIGNER (TORELLI), GOBERNACION HAD INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION, BUT THAT FACTS PRESENTED BY PPS DO NOT CONSTITUTE EXPIONAGE, SINCE NEITHER PPS OFFICIAL INVOLVED IS PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR FUNCTIONARY. ADDED THAT IF FACTS CAN BE PROVEN IT MAY BE THAT THEY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THREATENING PHYSICAL HARM TO PPS OFFICIALS 5 AND THEIR FAMILIES 6.

6 7. BENADUM TALKED TO LITEMPO-1 28 SEPT RE VLT CHARGES. LITEMPO-1 APPEARED NOT AT ALL CONCERNED, SAID VLT HAS MAKE SOME KIND OF SPECTULAR CHARGES PERIODICALLY IN ORDER PROVE TO PPS RANK AND FILE HE HAS NOT JOINED PRI, AND INDICATED GOM PLANS DO NOTHING ABOUT CHARGES. BENADUM 5 PLANS MENTION TO LITEMPO-4 7 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY 8

8. LIJERSEY-5 TOLD GERENDE 9 28 SEPT HE HAD NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1 10 SINCE TURN OVER TO CASE OFFICER IN 1957. L-5 8 DOES NOT KNOW LIHOLD-1 2 AND BELIEVES LIJERSEY-1 10, IF QUESTIONED, WOULD DENY ANY INTEL CONNECTIONS AND NOT REVEAL NAMES OTHER KUBARK PEOPLE THEN KNOWN TO HIM.

SECRET

SECRET

8 2

VIEW ABOVE DO NOT PLAN HAVE L/5 SEE L/1.

SECRET

IN 62264

PAGE 4

CFN 4385 4865 28 LIFTER-8 VLT 21 LIMOLD-1 23 RE ODYOKE
25 VLT UOM L-1 RACIEL HERNANDEZ L-8 VLT NO NEW PPS ODYOKE L-8
ADRIANA PPS NO PROOF NO EVIDENCE NOT PUBLISHED NO EVIDENCE L-1
NO EVIDENCE HERNANDEZ PPS L-8 HERNANDEZ VLT HERNANDEZ VLT NO
PUBLICITY HERNANDEZ ODYOKE PPS NO POSITION L-8 VLT VLT CHIHUAHUA
23 UGOCM PPS L-8 PPS VLT GOM NOT INTERESTED PPS
NOT SERIOUSLY VLT 5 OCT ADRIANA L-8 VLT ODYOKE 29 LUIS ECHEVAPRIA
GOBERNACION 28 ECHEVARRIA VLT 25 SEPT PPS ECHEVARRIA PPS TORELLI
GOBERNACION PPS NOT CONSTITUTE PPS PPS BENADUM LITEMPO-1 28 RE
VLT LITEMPO-1 NOT AT VLT PPS NOT JOINED PRI GOM BENADUM LITEMPO-4
LIJERSEY-5 GERENDE 28 NOT SEEN LIJERSEY-1 1957 L-5 NOT KNOW
LIMOLD-1 LIJERSEY-1 NOT REVEAL KUBARK NOT PLAN L/5 L/1
B

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14-00000

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, P/AIL, CA2, CA/PROP, C/OPS, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 212205Z [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI 4830

REF A MEXI 4830 (IN 59248) *

B DIR 38518

1. NOTE STATE TELEGRAM 693 OF 24 SEPT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES MENTIONED IN APPARENT FOLLOW UP EL DIA ARTICLE REF B. FULL TEXT VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO PRESS CONFERENCE BEING POUCHED.

2. INDEX.

S E C R E T * RE MORNING PRESS CARRIED PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

CFN 4830 4830 38518 693 24 SEP REF B VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO BEING POUCHED.

BT

RI 201-168881

File Ross CROZIER

201-168881

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOFMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	10/27 - 11/23	13220011000	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
4*	961.92	REG SALARY
5*	1883.76	LSL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30*	62.52	RETMT
1*	1778.86	FED TAX 1
2*	1294.72-	FED TAX 2
69*	9.27	936HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change
9. Allowances

RESIGN. EFF. 11/25/63
HEREWITH PJ THRU 11/25/63 + 376 hrs T/L @ 5.01 PER HR

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

EFFECTIVE DATE DAY MO. Y	CO. DE	EFFECTIVE DATE DAY MO. Y	CO. DE	ADDL. COMP. P/P	P/P	O/T	S/D	SOL.

			FROM EMPLOYEE	than Normal Salary	
2845.68	555.93		2269.75	2269.75	TOTALS
			NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.	

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(20)

201-168881

4 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Ross L. Crozier

201-168881

1. Attached is the original of Form 1689, Clearance Sheet for Termination of Contract Personnel, for retention in your file. A copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security for their records.

2. Also attached is Mr. Crozier's letter of resignation. In accordance with the provision of his contract providing for a ninety day notice, the resignation becomes effective close of business 28 November 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

Attachments:
Form 1689 h/w
Letter of Resignation

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 Addressee w/att
1 - Comp Tax Accts Br
1 - CCS
1 - Outplacement Branch

201-168881

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

TO: (Check)	☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	DATE
	☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT	ESTABLISHED FOR
ATTN:		FILE NO.
REF:		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED		

☐ BLOCK RECORDS: (OPMEMO 20-800-11) [illegible] DATE: [illegible] November 1953

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________.

X b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3. (HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS: Cover History: 1953 - Jul 54 - NOC, [illegible]; Aug 54 - Feb 57 - NOC, overseas; May 57 - Sept 60 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 60 - Aug 61 - NOC, CONUS; Sept 61 - Jan 63 - NOC, CONUS; Jan 63 - Jul 63 - DAC, Hdqs.

Subject will use above information for backstopping and use for commercial use only. Should he ever have need to apply for a governmental position, he will contact this office and will ignore above information and use CIA from Nxx 1953 on.

Bldg address not known.

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

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FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

27 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Charles Danish

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract Personnel - Ross L. Crozier

1. Mr. Ross L. Crozier, a Career Agent assigned to Special Affairs Staff, has tendered his resignation from the Agency. In accordance with the terms of his contract, he gave 90 days notice making his termination effective close of business 28 November 1963.

2. Subject's employment history was established by Mr. Biladeau of the Central Cover Staff in conjunction with the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division. Mr. Crozier was advised that he should indicate employment by CIA from his EOD date (1 June 1949) through the above termination date when applying for a position with another Government Agency. If seeking employment with private business, however, he was to utilize the employment history provided him by the Outplacement Branch.

3. It is requested that Central Cover Staff's records be noted accordingly. Contract Personnel Division should be requested to refer all inquiries concerning Crozier's employment to the Outplacement Branch of the Personnel Operations Division, effective immediately. The Outplacement Branch will acknowledge Agency employment when the inquiry comes from a Government source, and will deny Agency affiliation to all other inquirers

Vincent J. Hayman

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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(When Filled In)

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, **Ross L. Crozier**, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

30 Aug. 63

201-168881

FORM 1-58 1379 SECRET (12)

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 30th day of August 1963.

Ross L. Crozier (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 30 th ~~Aug~~ day of Aug. 1963
at Wash DC

George A. Ladner
Signature

30 August 1963

Washington 25, D.C.

DIRECTOR,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D.C.

I hereby tender my resignation from the Central Intelligence Agency as a Career Agent. In accordance with the termination clause in my contract, request that all salary be continued for a period of 90 days from this date. I understand that my services are to be available to the Agency during the period of 90 days.

Ross L. Crozier

Ross L. Crozier

1607 S. 26th St
Arlington 6, Va.

201-168881

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

DATE

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym) Crozier, Ross L.	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Special Affairs Staff
LOCAL ADDRESS Apt. 8 1607 So 28th St Arlington Va	PERMANENT ADDRESS Same
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Washington D.C.	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 June 1957	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED original contract indefinite term	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES contract for indefinite term	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION 28 November 1963

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

RESIGNATION

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE		8/30/63	
LOGISTICS			
PERSONNEL		8/30/63	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (Signature) Charles Francis	DATE 30 Aug 63

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER DIVISION			already briefed No interview nec.	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 23 Sep '63
OFFICE OF SECURITY SSD				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE Aug 30, 1863

REMARKS (Please initial)

201-168881.

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT SAS/EOB	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER SAS/CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	DATE

FORM 6-60 1669

SECRET

(8)

Ross L. Crozier
Resume

Al: 12 July 1963

On qualifications - there just aren't any in the civilian or industrial category - The university work in Economic Sciences was real, not cover, but interrupted before I got the degree (5 years). However, I specialized in Economic Theory, which when considered that I studied in three Latin American Universities (Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba) does give me some qualification as a "Latin American Consultant".

The classification as "Research Analyst" is cover except for that part of which the "Latin American" background could be utilized.

Although I have had no business experience in an administrative or executive capacity, I am sure that I could qualify in that work, especially if it were in connection with Latin America or utilizing my Spanish language ability.

As you can see by the above, unfortunately there is no commercial "counterpart" for the type of work I have been doing for 15 years or more. My feeling is that we should consult the "local outplacement" man first, on the possibility that there is a local opportunity, but the opportunities in the Latin American field whill be greater.

(In addition to the above, I might add that I have performed best in "operations" work"- which involves planning, direction and coordination.)

R

201-168851

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY - Ross L. Crozier
331-12-9652

10 July 1963

Organization/Location	Dates	Title/Position
60th FA Bn., Ft. Bragg, N.C.	29 Aug 40-8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, C.Z. and IBT	9 Sep 41-6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46-18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
University of Costa Rica Economic & Social Sciences	15 May 49-15 July 53	Student/G.I. Bill
University of Costa Rica Department of Geology	1 Aug 52-1 Nov 52	Adm Asst/Photography
Studio Indiana (Photography) San Jose, Costa Rica	1 Nov 52-1 Jul 53	Owner/Mngr.
Commercial Photography - Guatemala City, Guatemala	1 Jan 54-1 May 54	Photographer/Indep.
Pan American Foundation, University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. Scholarship Grant to Cuba. (Director: Curt Wilgus)	1 Sep 54-1 Sep 56	Student/School of Economic Sciences, University of Havana.
Public Surveys Institute, 1511 Bryant St., Dallas, Texas In Havana: Feb 57 - Apr 58 In Mexico: June 58 - Apr 60	1 Feb 57-31 Aug 60	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Clarence A. DePew & Sons, 230 Park Ave., N.Y.C. Branch Office, Coral Gables, Fla.	1 Sep 60-1Sep 61	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc Bldg 25, Coral Reef Drive, Miami 56, Fla. Empl Id No. 59-0938096	1 Sep 61-15 Jan 63	Research Analyst & Latin American Consultant.
U.S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group 7753 The Pentagon, Wash 25, D.C. Tel. OXford 7-7510 (Code 11)	15 Jan 63-To date.	Latin American Consultant.

Employment History:

Organization	From	To	Title/Position
60th FA Bn, Ft. Bragg, NC	29 Aug 40	8 Sep 41	Survey Operator
USAF, Canal Zone-Burma IBT	9 Sep 41	6 Jul 45	Intelligence NCO
USAF, Canal Zone	18 Apr 46	18 Apr 49	Intelligence NCO
Central Intelligence Agency 1430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 49	1 June 57	Contract Agent
Central Intelligence Agency 1430 E Street, Washington 25, D.C.	1 June 57	To Present	Career Agent.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

PERSONAL INFORMATION

VOL. V of V

14-00000

429 SE/DJB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-52514

ROUTING

DATE 8 APRIL 1958

S E C R E T

429

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy ✓
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated 201-32723
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked
Signature:

APR 18 00 22:58 58
RECID CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 14180

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1364

SUBJ: 201-52514

1. RE VAIVADA COVER, ROBERT S BENJAMIN WILLING IN PRINCIPLE ASSIST IN PROCURING WORK PAPERS AND COVERING ANY FRIEND NAUMAN. AS HQS INFORMED, EXPECT BENJAMIN WILL BE SATISFIED NOMINAL SUM COMPENSATE ADDITIONAL EXPENSES.

2. BENJAMIN TOLD NOTHING EXCEPT WOULD APPRECIATE HIS MAKING PLACE FOR A FRIEND. NO COMMITMENT OR OBLIGATION OF ANY KIND.

3. LEAVE DECISION TO HQS. IN EVENT ANY INTEREST WOULD PERHAPS BE WISE HAVE VAIVADA COME MEET AND TALK WITH BENJAMIN. 201-32723

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

MICROFILMED
DOC MICRO SER

CS COPY

AN 72
AB X
~~FI~~
FS MR
RY 4
DESENSITIZED
~~FI~~

FI

10 April 58

201-162881 ~~201-032723~~

~~CO 80044~~

S E C R E T

B-201-52514

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[redacted]

FORM 2-58 1389 (35)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6430

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 11 JUN 1958

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. NOEMAYER

ROSS L. CROZIER

REFERENCE: HMMW-6420, June 1958 (50-6-67/1)

ACTION REQUESTED: None. For Your Information.

Forwarded herewith is a copy of Subject's PRQ, Part II. Subject's Covert Security Approval was amended on 3 June 1958 to permit Subject's use in Mexico.

COPY

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

4 June 1958

Attachment:
As described above. (AAPOK)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City (w/attachment)
- 1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o attachment)
- 1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono (w/o attachment)
- 1 - RI " "
- 1 - Subject " "

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mpm

AN	RR
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IN	
PS	
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DES	NFD

AN	RR
AB	
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PS	
BX	
DES	NFD
FI	

201-168881
X
HMMW 6430
11 JUN 58

COORDINATED BY PHONE:

S.O./MR. WEHKING

CS COPY

(Releasing officer)
for J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

201-168881
201-32723

-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-14169
TO : Chief, WH Division		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-32723
INFO		
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 27 November 1959
SUBJECT Operational/Harold P. NOEMAYR		RE: (CHECK ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Advise ETA of NOEMAYR's replacement so that NOEMAYR can make departure plans.		
REFERENCES: HMMA-13726, 11 September 1959		

1. The Station would appreciate any information which Headquarters can provide concerning an ETD for Harold R. NOEMAYR and his family and an ETA for NOEMAYR's replacement. NOEMAYR's tentative ETD of 1 January 1960 is only slightly more than one month away and he has visas to obtain in addition to other departure preparations.

2. NOEMAYR was instructed by the Station to proceed with the necessary correspondence with Mexican, Costa Rican, Cuban, and Panamanian authorities for the required police certificates for his wife since she is not a citizen of PBPRIME and is applying for an Immigrant Visa. He has already received the necessary documents from Costa Rica and Cuba and expects to obtain the Mexican certificate within the next two days. No reply from Panama has been received as yet although it should arrive shortly. As soon as the Panamanian clearance and that from Mexico is obtained, NOEMAYR will submit all papers to the local ODACID installation and request the necessary documentation for the travel of himself and his family. As Headquarters is aware, the Immigrant Visa for NOEMAYR's wife will be valid only so long as she travels within four months of the date issued.

3. An early reply to this dispatch would be appreciated.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

LJS/mvr

25 November 1959

Distribution:
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

CS COPY

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-048

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 17 JUN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold R. HOEMAYER

ROSS L. CROZIER

Action Requested: Please Notify Subject

Reference is made to Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

> "(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

AN
AB
FB
PS
BX
~~DES~~ NFD
PI

9 June 1958

WH/3/Mexico/[illegible]

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - RI

201-168881
17 JUN 58

CS COPY

(Releasing officer)
for J. C. KING, C/WHD

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)
[illegible], /III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TRSA-974

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 10 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Ross Lester CROZIER

Ref: TRSA-925 - 18-6-3-66

Attached herewith are the fingerprints and samples of handwriting of subject to be attached to the reference.

Eugene T. Rodday

Encl: 2

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
RI/FP

CS COPY

CS COPY

RI COPY

201-168881
X
x D
TRSA - 974
10 JUL 51
201-168881
~~18-6-3-66~~

2 Encl.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

ALIEN

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Name Xxxxxxx Crozier (Surname) Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Classification

(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT PLAINLY)

Nationality USA Color White Sex M Reference

RIGHT HAND

1. Thumb 2. Index finger 3. Middle finger 4. Ring finger 5. Little finger

LEFT HAND

6. Thumb 7. Index finger 8. Middle finger 9. Ring finger 10. Little finger



Impressions taken by: Eugene T. Perry
(Signature of official taking prints)

Date impressions taken July 2, 1951

Note amputations

Ross L. Crozier
xxxxxx's signature.

FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

Left hand

Left thumb Right thumb



FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

Right hand



PLEASE DO NOT FOLD THIS CARD

10-16306

Encl 1 to 7RSA 9-74

CS COPY

201-165881

This is a sample of my handwriting.

Este es un ensayo de mi letra.

Ross L. Crozier

[illegible]

CS COPY

Encl 2 to TRSA 974

201-168881

~~18-6-3-68~~

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-W-275

SECRET DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, San Jose

DATE: 21 December 1948

FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document is forwarded to your station for examination in connection with the development of Project Hydropathic. You are directed to forward this document to Panama City when it has served its purpose.

COPY

A. Rodriguez
A Rodriguez

Attach.

RP:jcr

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

	201-168	881
	X	
TRS W	275	
DATE	21 DEC 48	

R. A. MacMillan
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICER

HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OP:BA

FAY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
APR 1947

(709)

OFFICIAL - DISPATCH

VIA: ________
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ~~TRS-~~ 643

DESENSITIZED

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: MAY 25 1951

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

FROM : Chief of Station, San Jose

DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational
SPECIFIC- HUMANOID - HUMANIST

Gen. cps

REF: TRS-~~[illegible]~~-633

1. A review of the compromise of the technical surveillance and the part played in it by HUMANIST indicates that HUMANOID may have been compromised by the former's confession. While you indicate that HUMANIST did not know HUMANOID's name, and could not have given it to the police, it is quite probable that he may have told them that an American other than yourself took part in the operation.

2. It would be natural for HUMANIST to attempt to minimize the extent of his confession in his report to you, and he may possibly have given the police identifying data and a description of HUMANOID. Because of these factors, headquarters feels that HUMANOID should be isolated from all operations for a period of approximately six months, in order to avoid the possibility that the authorities may suspect him of taking part in intelligence activities. It is believed that this period of inactivity will protect HUMANOID and assist him in the preservation of his cover.

3. You are authorized to continue his salary for the period during which he will perform no work for you.

4. It is requested that you turn over all operations which HUMANOID is currently handling to another agent (or agents) as soon as practicable. If you are unable to do this, you may suspend the operations in which HUMANOID has been active, until such time as HUMANOID can again resume his work for us. You are also authorized to pay the agent (or agents) whose work is suspended during this period.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET CS COPY
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

DESENSITIZED

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

(288)

SECRET -2- DESENSITIZED

5. If the opportunity should present itself, it would be appreciated if you would question HU[illegible]AMIST as to the nature of the interrogation which he underwent at the hands of the police, with the object of finding out whether he told them at any time that there was a third individual involved in the technical surveillance.

Wm M Wheeler Jr
WM. M. [illegible] JR.
T J Flores
By T. J. Flores

TJF:jr

SECRET DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

201-168881

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3314

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 17 January 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HAVA 755

1. Discussions of the whole problem of VAIVADA's early TDY to Headquarters were held between the agent, the field case officer, and the Chief of Station on 13 and 14 January, as a result of which it became clear that, unless Headquarters has a compelling reason to the contrary, it would be advisable that the contemplated TDY be postponed until about the end of VAIVADA's current contract year, i.e., the period of July-August 1957.

2. A number of important personal problems dispose VIAVADA to accept the delay in acquiring staff status that would accrue from such a postponement. His wife is sufficiently ill at this time from a form of nervous colitis as to recommend that she not travel now. His children would have to lose a semester of their schooling since the current semester began on 7 January. Moreover as he and family have resided in tropical areas for a number of years, VAIVADA would have to make a rather large financial outlay to purchase needed winter clothing for himself and his family which does not seem justified for a period as short as two months. Owing to several routine but time-consuming inquiries being made by the local ODACID in connection with his wife's visa application, there is no guarantee that VAIVADA would be able to depart Cuba before February 1957.

3. On the operational side, in spite of the original Station request that VAIVADA's travel be expedited, advantages now of delaying his TDY outweigh the disadvantages, from the Station's point of view. Most important of these is that two promising sources currently under development by the Station, namely AMPHODARCH-6 and AMPHODARCH-10, were originally contacted by VAIVADA and he has since been the person working most closely with them. To substitute him with a relatively untrained cut-out at this point in their development is not desirable. On the basis of the original proposed timing of his trip the Station has however proceeded with firm plans to transfer handling of two other sources, AMPHODARCH-1 and AMBIVALENT-5, to a reliable PBPRIME cut-out. This plan can be initiated whether VAIVADA departs now or later, and provides the ideal opportunity to take two low-level sources off VAIVADA's hands thereby freeing the latter to undertake new

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

2/17

development of specific student Communist and Youth targets the Station has already lined up. Both these sources have passed through an initial period of training and have fully demonstrated their reliability and ability to continue to perform effectively via a cut-out. In handling a half-dozen sources, as VAIVADA has been doing, he reached the limits of reasonable span of control and has not had the time to give to such new developmental work which is his forte and upon which it would be most desirable to have him concentrate rather than upon the mere routine handling of relatively tested sources.

4. Delaying VAIVADA's TDY as proposed herein would place VAIVADA at Headquarters at or about the end of his current contract year, where he would be immediately available for personal consultation regarding his future assignment whether or not it is decided that he return to Habana or sent to a new post. In this connection the Station wishes parenthetically to point out its definite interest in having VAIVADA reassigned to Habana for at least one additional year if possible, and to note that VAIVADA has expressed a personal desire to that effect.

5. Regardless of the decision as to timing of his travel, VAIVADA is proceeding to change his residence. He will try to obtain a suitable house possessing a telephone, something he has lacked heretofore, thereby carrying through plans previously reported to Headquarters in paragraph 6 of HKH-A-3144.

6. Therefore, unless there exist truly urgent reasons for VAIVADA's travel to Headquarters prior to about July 1957, it is recommended that his trip be postponed until that time.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washington
2 - Files

16 January 1957

JRP/dnt

RECEIVED

201 - 168881
~~2917~~

4-00000

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2726

[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE 7 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Habana

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Administrative
SPECIFIC - Arthur G. VAIVADA - Contract Amendment

REF: HKH-W-1710, 28 May 1956.

Forwarded is the original of the Contract Amendment transmitted under reference dispatch, signed by Arthur G. Vaivada. One copy of this Amendment is being retained in Station files.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1-Amendment

Distribution:
3 Wash w/att.
2 Files w/att.

5 June 1956

JRP/rrd

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

201-168881

SECRET
(When Filled In)

28 Jan
30 Jan

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) CROZIER, ROSS L.

3. POSITION TITLE

4. GRADE

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH TFW/

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD	
STATION	
TDY OR PCS	
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	WH
NO. OF DEP.'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE L. Armstrong C/~~TFF~~ TFW/PER

ROOM NO. & BUILDING GH 5608 Hdqts.

EXT. 6577

10. COMMENTS

#26513
6 Mar. 63
201-168881

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

DATE 6 MAR 1963

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

S. H. Dunston

(26)

2-259. to PS 23 Jan 63

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF $500.00 (CASH) FROM Louis W. ARMSTRONG.
REPRESENTING AN ADVANCE AGAINST SALARY DUE FOR THE PAY PERIOD
1/20-2/16/63.

PAYEE: HAROLD R. NOEMAYR

/s/
Signature

15 FEB 63

File

201-168551

SECRET

14 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR, Career Agent - Request for Advance Against Earned Salary

REFERENCE : HR 30-410, dated 20 May 1955

1. Subject has recently transferred to Headquarters PCS from JMWAVE. He is presently arranging to move into new quarters on 1 March 1963 and is short of funds to effect this transaction.

2. It is therefore requested that HOEMAYR be advanced $500.00 against earned salary totalling approximately $895.00 due him for the pay period ending 16 February 1963.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief,
Special Affairs Staff/Support

cc: SAS/Pers

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-161881

SECRET

FI D TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPOR

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, Items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, Items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 15 January 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Harold R. NOEMAYR

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 15 January 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Robert K. TROUCHARD
DATE FEB 12 1963 [redacted]	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Andrew K Reuteman Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

201-168881

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SAS

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
GYROSE/FINAN - 1962 Covert Earning Statement - Harold R. NOEMAYR

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: UFGS-2585, dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded herewith is 1962 Covert Earning Statement for Harold R. NOEMAYR. Subject departed JMWAVE 16 January and arrived at Headquarters 21 January 1963.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Earning Statement,.H/W

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
29 Jan. 196

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 31 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-3987

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168551

SECRET 22 Jan 63

TRAVEL ORDER

TDY ~~PCS~~ X INVITATIONAL		OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. 174-335-63
NAME Harold R. [illegible] (P)		SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.
OFFICIAL STATION Miami, Florida	OFFICE PHONE [illegible]	GRADE Career Agent

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Miami, Fla. to Washington, D. C.

PURPOSE: PCS per DIR 05617
MODE: Air tourist/POT/CC

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN MAXIMUM	OTHER (See below)	CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
26 Jan 63	Arr. Hqrs	$ 1[illegible].00			.12	

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Authorized 3½ days travel time with full per diem for subject only. Travel and costs in excess of direct route chargeable to traveler.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED		
NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
~~Argentina de los Angeles Cordero~~	~~15/3/12~~	~~Wife~~
~~Jose Arnolfo~~	~~13~~	~~Son~~
~~Lillian Caridad~~	~~11~~	~~Dau~~

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS. AND MODE	LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL
$600.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.
335-63
CHARGE COST CENTER NO.
3132-2001-1000

DATE	SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER
	[illegible]

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
EDWARD J. PRESTON	C/TFW/SUPPORT
SIGNATURE	DATE

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE	COMPONENT
WILLIAM K. HARVEY	CHIEF/TFW
SIGNATURE	DATE

FORM 8-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 9-63

SECRET

22 Jan. 63 (20-40)
201-168881

1 /

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	ROLL	NUMBER	PAY PERIOD DATE	ALLOTMENT	STA. NO.
NOEMAYR HAROLD R	15	857575	01/20 - 2/16	13220011000	000

	EARNINGS	DESCRIPTION
04	801.60	REG SALARY
18*	324.77	OT - HOL

	DEDUCTIONS	DESCRIPTION
30	52.10	RETMT
42*	24.94	FED TAX 2
42*	58.46	FED TAX 2
42	116.20	FED TAX 2
69	6.18	624HOSP 9

LEGEND of ACTION CODES

1. Promotions
2. Periodic Step Increase
3. Field Allotment
4. Salary Differential
5. Leave Without Pay
6. Hospital, Insurance, Credit Union
7. Overpayment
8. Tax Deduction Change

Ret to Hq 1/21/63 Cover term 1/15/63
Due Refund of 138.54 for Civil offset
Accrual for P/P 1&2-1963 10808 plus 11360 Paid by Voucher 1/15/63
Prem. Pay Paid From 9/16/62 - 1/15/63

EMPLOYEE NAME:
NOEMAYR HAROLD R

SECRET

EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE	EFFECTIVE DATE	CODE	ADDL. COMP.		REFUNDS DUE FROM EMPLOYEE	* ASTERISK Denotes other than Normal Salary
1126.37	257.88	24.94-				893.43	893.43
						NET PAY	PD. at HDQTS.

TOTALS

Less 500.00 Advance
$393.43

FORM 11-58 1315 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(30)

201-165881

SECRET

18 JAN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : Qualification for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : (A) Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962. Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

(B) Memorandum to DD/S from Chief, Task Force W, dated 17 August 1962. Subject: Application of Housing Allowance and Premium Pay to Certain JMWAVE Contract Personnel

1. This is to certify that Harold R. NOEMAYR, a Career Agent, assigned PCS to the geographic area of JMWAVE and JMBAR, qualifies for premium payment according to the authorization contained in the referenced memorandums. This certification is based upon the following conditions of subject's employment during his PCS assignment.

(a) Subject's hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively.

(b) In order to satisfactorily discharge his duties, subject is required to perform substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty, and duty at night and on holidays.

(1) A substantial amount of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty means an average of at least six hours of such over-time duty a week.

(2) The irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty is a continual requirement, generally averaging more than once a week.

201-168881

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(d) Night and holiday duty will be performed from time to time.

(e) Subject is responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty.

2. The effective date for this premium payment will be the beginning of the first pay period following 4 September 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

______________________________ ______________
Director of Personnel Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Task Force W
GYROSE/Personnel
Premium Pay for Certain Contract Employees

1. Headquarters has, or is now in the process of, amending the contracts for the following personnel to provide for Premium Pay in lieu of overtime:

BLAIHAUSE, Russell J.
CONNER, Richard E.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Philip D.
HEARD, Bruce R.
LAURENKUS, Marvin A.
STARKWOOD, Kenneth A.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TARYDINA, Jacob C.
YERKES, Leonard W.
CADICK, Irving G.
MOEZAYS, Harold R.
DEVOCNO, Irving G.
SLOBAR, Henry J.

2. When Peter J. DIGERVERO is converted from a contract agent to a contract employee status, his contract will also provide Premium Pay.

3. It is requested that JMWAVE review the above list to determine its completeness as it pertains to headquarters type contracts and advise if there are any discrepancies and/or omissions.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

13 Nov. 1962 15 NOV 1962

UFGS - 2255

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TFW/Personnel James Durham esm 6576

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

C/TFW/Pers. Louis W. Armstrong

ORIG : JAMES DURHAM:amm
UNIT : TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT : 6576
DATE : 13 NOVEMBER 1962 1672

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE Nov 14 00 22 62 Yoemaye

SECRET

LOGS

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, OP 2, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT97865

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 48601

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 1148 (IN 15729)

ALL CONTRACTS NOW BEING AMENDED WITH EXCEPTION PETER J. DIGERVENO. WILL AUTHORIZE PREMIUM PAY DIGERVENO UPON CONVERSION CONTRACT EMPLOYEE STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Request advise.

201-168871

Howard J. Preston
HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT

Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL

RELEASING OFFICER 13 .11 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

13 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Premium Pay for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the following provision:

> "You are herein authorized Premium Pay in lieu of overtime in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

BLAIKHAUSE, Russell J.
DELLAROCCO, Peter V.
GLAVASCO, Phillip D.
BEARD, Bruce R.
STUART, Jennifer A.
TARTARILLO, John K.
TARYDINA, Jacob C.
CADICK, Irving G.
GOLMAYR, Harold R.
DEVUONO, Irving C.
SLOMAN, Henry J.
LAURENKUS, Marvin A.
STARKWOOD, Kenneth A.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel

Date

DDP/TFW/Personnel/JDurham/kct (5575)

201-168881

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/TFW
1 - TFW/Person

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

14-00000

23 Oct. 62
201-165881

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-552848

1. Agency and organizational designations: DDP/TFW

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): NOEMAYER, Harold R. (F) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $10,105

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: jlv 23 Oct 62

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 14Oct62

15. Date last equivalent increase: 16 Apr 61

16. Old salary rate: $10,105

17. New salary rate: $10,420

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication) Date:

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods). Period(s).

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b
6 GAO 8000 1126-308

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

DISPATCH

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Personnel
Assessment Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGT-1813, dtd 18 April 1962
B. UFGS-1711, dtd 17 August 1962

1. Attached is the material forwarded by Reference B on IRVIN C. CADICK, IRVING C. DEVUONO, and HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. Biographic information on the three individuals has been reviewed and, as far as is known, is correct. It is assumed that another assessment would not be required on CADICK and DEVUONO inasmuch as fitness reports were forwarded by Reference A. Assessments of NOEMAYR is attached.

END OF DISPATCH

Forms to Mr. Dwight Collins

15 OCT 1962

Enclosures: Biographic info h/w

Distribution
3 - Chief., TFW w/encls.

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
4 Oct 62	8 Oct '62

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT - 2956

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the provision: -> effective 1 September 1962

"You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICK, Irving G. (Career Agent)
DEVUONO, Irving C. (Career Agent)
HORVATH, Harold R. (Career Agent)
CLAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

DDP/TFW/Personnel:JEMARTIN:jtr (25 September 1962)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TFW/Personnel

Memo approved by C.P.D., Mr. Suetorlus, 1 Sep. 62.

201-168881

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ORIG : LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
UNIT : TFW/PERSONNEL
EXT : 6576
DATE : 12 SEPTEMBER 1962 1548

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

5-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

12 SEP 62 18 19z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, OP, S/C 2

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT75621.

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 35588

GYROSE

REF: WAVE 8436 (IN 19838)

1. POLICY TO APPLY STAFF HOUSING ALLOWANCE TO CERTAIN CONTRACT PERSONNEL APPROVED. NECESSARY CONTRACT AMENDMENTS BEING PREPARED HQS FOR HOEMAYER, CADICK, GLAVASCO, DEVUONO, [illegible] AND HEARD. NO RETROACTIVE PROVISIONS IN APPROVAL. WILL REQUEST 1 SEPT EFFECTIVE DATED. POLICY DOES NOT APPLY TO CONTRACT AGENTS. DIGERVENO AND SLOMAN IN LATTER CATEGORY.

2. HQS WILL PROCEED CHANGE DIGERVENO TO CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR SLOMAN WILL BE REQUESTED UPON RECEIPT WAVE RECOMMENDATION. BOTH NEW CONTRACTS TO INCLUDE HOUSING PROVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Pls advise.

HOWARD J. PRESTON
C/TFW/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

Louis W. Armstrong
LOUIS W. ARMSTRONG
C/TFW/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-165782

13-9

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-W-411

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief of Station, Panama City and San Jose

DATE: 21 December 1948

FROM : Acting Chief, Foreign Branch T

SUBJECT: GENERAL- O Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

REF: TZP-A-365, Parts I and II

1. The proposal that the Panama Station activate an agent project in conjunction with San Jose has been studied by this headquarters and elicits the following comment. It is felt that nothing can be gained from a cumbersome joint operation of this project that cannot be obtained from a simple agent project controlled exclusively by the San Jose Station. If San Jose wishes to avail itself of these two men as an independent project, that station is authorized to proceed with its preliminary planning for submission to this headquarters for final approval.

2. In the event San Jose decides to use Hydropathic, that station is directed to become more familiar with his capabilities before entering into a formal agreement re tasks and salary. His practical experience and educational background are not outstanding and the mere fact that he has had duty with the U. S. Army in an intelligence capacity in no sense automatically qualifies him for our work. It is suggested that the San Jose Station initiate its relations with Hydropathic by using him as a cutout in an endeavor to test his abilities. If his value is proved and his Costa Rican associations appear to be in a position to give him high-level intelligence information, then come to a formal agreement with regard to his future work in an intelligence gathering capacity. The San Jose Station is directed to give him no encouragement at this time with respect to a later full-time position with this organization.

3. In summary Hydrocyst is to sever his formal connection with Hydrocyst I and is to have no knowledge of Hydropathic with regard to the latter's work for Mercer. Details on the procedure to be followed in Hydropathic's relation with Hydrocyst I are the responsibility of the San Jose Station and are to be submitted to this headquarters for final approval before any formal commitments are made. The Panama Station is directed to forward to San Jose all the documents in its files that are considered pertinent to the development of this project.

AN	NHE
AB	✓
~~II~~	
~~IC~~	
~~IE~~	
~~DB~~	
~~FI~~	
RID/FIP	

RELEASING OFFICER

DESENSITIZED

COORDINATING OFFICER

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

21-Dec 48

201-168881

FORM NO. Per. CSIL 43-23
APR 1947

(700)

DESENSITIZED TZP W-411

4. Attachment to TZP-A-365, Part I, is being forwarded to San Jose in order to provide Mercer with a sample of Hydropathic's work. The San Jose Station is directed to return this document to Panama City when the content of the report has served its purpose.

A. Rodriguez
ARodriguez

PP:jcr

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

SECRET

RID/EDI
RECEIVED
FEB 4 3 19 PM '71

C. [illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER
OPERA

HARRY A. REAL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-168881

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-1905

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 16 OCT 56 15 38 z

FROM : Chief, WHD

RI COPY

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- Arthur O. VAIVADA; Proposal to Grant Staff Status

Reference: HKH-A-2577 201-32723

Action Required: Pouch Views on Proposal Contained Herein

1. Headquarters looks favorably upon referenced proposal to grant staff status to Arthur O. VAIVADA. It has been determined however that such status is virtually out of the question for subject so long as his wife remains an alien. It has been further determined that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time, most of which would have to be spent in the Headquarters area. There are certain other basic requirements such as a fair knowledge of English and an ability to pass routine citizenship exams. None is believed to pose any problem in this case however.

2. Headquarters recognizes that the proposed travel and related expenses might work certain hardships on VAIVADA and his family. In order to partially offset these, we are prepared to bring VAIVADA to Headquarters for TDY-training to coincide with his wife's stay in the U.S.

3. If the foregoing proposal meets with the approval of the Station, VAIVADA, and the latter's wife, Headquarters should be advised as to preferable dates for implementation of same. We would also like to have recommendations re: further training of VAIVADA at Headquarters. Any objections to the plan, as outlined above, should likewise be communicated to Headquarters at an early date.

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

9 October 1956

Distribution: 3 - Habana, 1 - RI/D&P,
1 - WH/III/Cuba, 1 - WH/Mailroom,

201-168881

WH/III/Cuba/JBholand:gp

RELEASING OFFICER
JCKing
J. C. KING, C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
J. BRADY, AC/WH/III

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

X

Chief, Task Force W

[illegible]/Personnel

Information about Career Agents

ACTION REQUIRED: As Indicated

Transmitted herewith are sets of forms concerning the biographic data and request for assessment in the cases of the three Career Agents stationed in JMWAVE, Irving G. CADICK, Irving C. DEVUONO and Harold R. NORMAYK. Please have these forms reviewed for accuracy in the biographic section and have the appropriate supervisor complete the assessment portion. Stanley R. ZAMKA should prepare the assessment for CADICK and DEVUONO and Robert K. TROUCHARD should prepare the one for NORMAYK. It is requested that these forms be returned to Headquarters as soon as possible.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Career Agent Forms, herewith

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE, w/encl. a/s

1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

17 August 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HYCS-171

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

201-168881

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TFW/Personnel	John Martin	asm	6575

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/Pers.		Louis V. Armstrong

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT GYROSE
Housing Allowance for Contract Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. JMWAVE has reviewed the status of contract personnel assigned to this station and has related the circumstances of their assignment to that of staff agents with respect to the application of the station housing allowance. Certain of these contract personnel are not indigenous to this area, have been transferred or assigned to JMWAVE from other areas on the same indefinite basis as staff agents, and suffer the same inconvenLnces and uncertainties as staff agents which were recognized in the Headquarters approved housing policy. The rationale for granting some degree of financial relief under these circumstances, in the form of a housing allowance, is considered equally applicable to these individuals. Based on JMWAVE initial survey of the status of contract personnel the station requests that Headquarters approve extension of the housing allowance to the following individuals:

HAROLD R. NOEMAYER
PETER J. DIGERVENO
HENRY J. SLOMAN
IRVING G. CADICK
PHILIP D. GLAVASCO
IRVING C. DEVUONO
ALICE P. JENRETTE

2. Upon approval JMWAVE will forward to Headquarters copies of the proposed amended contracts and will pay and administer the allowance in the same manner as is now applicable to staff agents.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3- Chief, TFW

Att USC

DATE TYPED
30 June 1962

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-2270

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168851

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman, CS Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Career Agents of TFW

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, Task Force W from Chairman, CS Agent Panel, dated 6 June 1962, Subject: Information About Career Agents

Per your request contained in reference memorandum the following information is supplied on career agents assigned to Task Force W:

a. NOEMAYR, Harold R., GS-12, $9,475 (JMWAVE)

b. CADICK, Irving O., GS-15, $13,750 (JMWAVE)

c. DEVUONO, Irving C., GS-13, $11,155 (JMWAVE)

William K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - Personnel
3 - Subject Files

201-168551

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Nopmap

PROJECT ACTION

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: LIEDGE

TYPE OF ACTION		X	
☐	NEW PROJECT APPROVAL	DIVISION WH	
☐	AMENDMENT NO.	FIELD STATION Mexico City	
☐	RENEWAL FY 196	BRANCH 3	DESK Mexico
☐	EXTENSION	CASE OFFICER John G. Heyn	
X	TERMINATION	ROOM NO. 1009	BUILDING Barton Hall — EXTENSION 2555/3162

CONCURRENCES OF DIVISION

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE
C/WH/3/Mexico	John G. Heyn					
C/WH/3	Ned P. Holman					
WH/BAF	Robert D. Carter					
WH/PO/A	Clarke W. Simmons					

CONCURRENCES OF OTHER COMPONENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENT	TYPED NAME (And signature)	DATE	COPY NO.	MEMORANDUM ATTACHED YES	NO	DATE

APPROVAL

PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	TOTAL AMOUNT	FY	AMOUNT
		$	196	$
			196	$

APPROVING AUTHORITY	SIGNATURE	DATE
J. C. King, Chief, WH Division		1 Jan. 62

SECRET

1. It is requested that the LIEDGE Project be terminated effective 1 January 1962. The present project will not expire until 30 April 1962.

2. Effective 1 January 1962 all expenses and obligations under this Project will be picked up by WH/4, allotment #2335-5452-1000. This has been coordinated with WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul.

3. Harold R. NOEMAYR (p), Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/4 anticipates an indefinite need for his services and his transfer has been cleared with Mr. Armstrong of the Agent Service Panel.

4. This Project was merely a support mechanism for NOEMAYR and did not provide positive or CE information. NOEMAYR has performed valuable services for KUBARK with WH Division since 1948.

5. There are no cover or security problems involved in this project termination action since this is only an administrative measure transferring NOEMAYR from Project LIEDGE to WH/4. The Office of Security and CCG have been notified by WH/3 of this action. WH/4 is notifying the Agent Service Panel.

Distribution:
1 - LIEDGE/Dev & Plans
1 - VMP
✓1 - WH/4/Juul
1 - NOEMAYR/201

SECRET

1 Jan. 62

14-00000

SECRET

21 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
4-E-60 Headquarters Building

ATTN : Chief, PSD, Clearance Branch
3-E-44 Headquarters Building

VIA : WH/4/Security

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold NOEMAYR to JMWAVE

1. This is to advise you that Harold M. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, was assigned PCS to JMWAVE, a domestic base on 20 October 1961. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA-Prop activities in support of Project JMATE.

2. Your concurrence in the assignment of NOEMAYR to JMWAVE is requested.

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCURRENCE:

____
Director of Security

Note: This information was supplied to SA Panel per memorandum dated 15 September 1961 to the Career Agent Panel.

DDP/WH/4/Personnel:JAHOESEE:jtr (21 December 1961)

201-168881

SECRET

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/SS
1 - WH/4/Exec
1 - C/WH/4/SS
1 - C/WH/4/Security
1 - SA Panel
1 - WH/4/Personnel

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SED, Office of Security

SUBJECT : S-8644
#215482

Effective 1 January 1962 the file on Subject will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-161881

SECRET

1 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Investigative Division
Attn: Chief, SED, Office of Security

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR
S-9546
#112569

1. Effective 1 January 1962, Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, will be transferred to WH/4/Personnel, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. He will be paid out of their funds. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - NOEMAYR 201/Clearances
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Cover Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR

1. Harold R. NOEMAYR, Career Agent, was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961. WH/3 is terminating the LIEDGE Project which has been supporting him.

2. Effective 1 January 1962, any questions concerning NOEMAYR should be directed to Mr. Juul, WH/4/Personnel, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - Subject - NOEMAYR 201/Cover
1 - Chrono

SECRET

201-168551

SECRET

30 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Effective 1 January 1962 Harold R. NOEMAYR is being transferred to WH/4/Personnel, Mr. Juul, 1905 Quarters Eye, ext. 8350. He was transferred PCS to WAVE on 20 October 1961.

2. The LIEDGE Project is being terminated and starting on 1 January 1962 he will be paid from allotment #2335-5452-1000.

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
✓1 - NOEMAYR/201 - Contract
1 - Outgoing memo chrono

SECRET

201-168881

Hoemayr

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
JMZIP ADMIN/FINANCE
Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE (Domestic PCS Move)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Ref: UFGT 910, dated 28 October 1961

1. Reimbursement for the temporary storage of effects applicable to a domestic PCS movement is authorized from the date of the employee's departure. The maximum storage period is sixty (60) days. Harold R. HOEMAYR and William D. WENMEAD were assigned PCS to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961. Therefore, the initial reimbursement date for storage of effects is 20 August 1961. Unfortunately charges prior to 20 August will have to be borne by the individuals since regulations do not permit storage of effects during periods when an employee is absent from his domestic post of assignment.

2. Paragraph two (2) of the reference requested advice regarding reimbursement for shipment of effects between domestic PCS points using the following instruments:

a. POA - Upon evidence of a proper weight certificate, reimbursement for the transportation of 543 pounds from Washington to Miami (1104 miles) is the product of the applicable commuted rate, i.e., $19.40 (999 pounds or less) multiplied by the net hundred weight transported which is 5.43, giving a total of $105.33.

b. Rental of Trailer - If a proper weight certificate was not obtained at the time the effects were hauled between domestic PCS points, three (3) estimates must be obtained as to the weight of the effects. Reimbursement will be at the commuted rate and this includes the trailer rent (receipt is submitted).

c. Employee Rents and Drives a Truck - The same formula as given in the rental of a trailer is applicable. A weight certificate (or three estimates) along with the rental receipt must be submitted. Reimbursement is at the commuted rate.

(Continued on Page 2)

DATE TYPED 6 Nov. 1961	DATE DISPATCHED 15 NOV 1961
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS - 681
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-168811

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, WHD

SUBJECT

PAGE 2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

3. Interpretation of the "Commuted Rate Table" citing examples was requested in paragraph three of the reference:

a. Shipment of 4,000 lbs. of HHE from Washington, D. C. to Miami (1,111 miles) — $12.00 rate is used. In this instance the mileage is more than 1100 miles (Column "A" of Table No. 3); therefore, any mileage in excess of 1100 miles up to and including 1150 miles, the rate in Column H ($12.00) is used for shipment of 4,000 lbs. and up.

b. Minimum rates—(1) Three hundred fifty pounds billed at 500 pounds: reimbursement at the applicable rate for shipment of 500 pounds is authorized. If billing is less than for 500 pounds, reimbursement is applicable thereto.

(2) Shipment of 850 pounds HHE from Rockville, Maryland, to Miami and billed for 1,000 pounds: reimbursement - since the net weight (850 lbs.) exceeds the number of pounds shown in Column E (774 lbs. - breakpoint in lbs. for 1150 miles), the applicable rate is that shown in Column D ($15.00 for 1150 miles), and the applicable rate is the minimum hundredweight of that Column (D), instead of the actual weight (850 lbs.) of the HHE transported.

(3) The 1,000 pound minimum weight allowance for shipment to or from Fishers Island, New York is for additional allowance only and does not apply to shipment of effects from Rockville, Maryland to Miami.

4. We hope that the above has helped to clarify the transportation and storage of HHE in connection with a domestic PCS movement.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COB, JMWAVE

DATE TYPED 6 Nov 1961	DATE DISPATCHED 15 NOV 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS - 681	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SECRET

TRAVEL ORD...

	TDY	
X	PCS	
	INVITATIONAL	

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH-A-1024-62

NAME: Harold R. NOEMAYER (P)

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

OFFICE PHONE

GRADE: Contract Employee

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Travel from Washington, D. C. to Miami for PCS.

Mode: None,

TRAVEL DURATION		PER DIEM ALLOWANCE			AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE	
BEGIN	END	DOMESTIC	FOREIGN		CENTS PER MI. NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	CENTS PER MI. AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
			MAXIMUM	OTHER *(See below)*		
20 Aug.	20 Aug. 61	$				

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Note: Subject picked up in the field from TDY status for PCS.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER
FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
SHIPMENT | NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANIED	UNACCOMPANIED
LBS. AND MODE	LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
YES | ACCOUNTING DUE DATE
NO

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL: None

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 2535-5000-8021

CHARGE COST CENTER NO. 7-1024

DATE: 1 Nov.

SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER: P. J. Maggi

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
R J Bilodeau	CCG	13 Nov

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Fred F. Cyrus

COMPONENT: C/WH/4/SS

SIGNATURE: Fred F. Cyrus

DATE: 6 Nov 196

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Raford W. Herbert

COMPONENT: DC/WHD

SIGNATURE: J C King

DATE: 11-7-61

FORM 540 8-60 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 9-60

SECRET

(58-40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	
ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ABSTRACT	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
JMATE/ADMIN - Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: As stated

Reference: HR 22-11e(1)

1. Please advise for what period reimbursement is allowable in each of the following instances of temporary storage of HHE which preceded the individual's actual PCS assignments to JMWAVE on 20 August 1961:

Harold R. NOEMAYR - In anticipation of being assigned PCS to JMWAVE NOEMAYR placed his HHE in temporary storage in Alexandria, Virginia on approximately 1 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 22 September 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning NOEMAYR PCS JMWAVE is unknown. The date of his PCS travel order is unknown.

William D. WENHEAD - In anticipation of being assigned PCS JMWAVE WENHEAD placed his HHE in transit storage in Washington, D. C. on 27 July 1961 from whence they were shipped to Miami on 24 August 1961. The date of the personnel action assigning WENHEAD PCS JMWAVE is unknown. His PCS travel order approval date is illegible.

2. Cases have arisen which are not specifically covered by regulation. Please advise what reimbursement is allowable under HR 22-11a(3)b and attachment 2 in each of the following circumstances:

A. Employee on PCS transfer from Washington, D. C. to Miami carried 543 pounds of effects in his POV. A proper weight certificate was obtained. There was no cost to employee.

B. Employee rents a trailer on which his HHE are hauled between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee was only for trailer rent.

C. Employee rents and drives a truck containing his HHE between domestic PCS points incident to his PCS transfer. Cost to employee is truck rental only.

Continued

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
25 Oct 61

DATE DISPATCHED
OCT 28 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-910

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168881

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

TO: Chief, WHD SUBJ: Transportation and Temporary Storage of HHE UFGT-910

3. A question has been raised on how to interpret the rate tables in attachment 2 to HR 22-11. For example, the mileage from Washington, D. C. to Miami, Florida is 1,111 miles. In shipping 4,000 pounds of effects between these points is the employee entitled to reimbursement at the rate of $11.70 or $12.00 per hundred weight? In addition, reimbursements where minimum weight allowances occur are not clear. We assume that in the case where 350 pounds is billed as 500 the employee is entitled to payment for 50 hundredweight at the applicable rate. However, in the case of a shipment from Rockville, Maryland to Miami where 850 pounds shipped is billed as 1,000 pounds what reimbursement is in order? HR 22-11, attachment 2, mentions a 1,000 pound minimum only in regard to Fishers Island, New York.

4. Your early reply will be appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2 ~~SUPPORT~~	5
3	6

396
DATE : 20 SEP 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

[illegible]

Pers Fin

SEP 20 1619Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 32174

DIR CITE WAVE 7985

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A DIR 87859 (out 87469)

B DIR 87791 (out 88844)

C WAVE 7658 (IN 17386) *

IN VIEW FACT MESSRS DEAN, CROZIER IN TEMPORARY QUARTERS W/O HHE AT TIME DESIGNATION PCS 20 AUGUST, REQUEST AUTHORITY TERMINATE PER DIEM ABOVE INDIVIDUALS ON DATE ARRIVAL HHE BUT NOT BEYOND 20 SEPTEMBER 1961.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *RE EXTENT PER DIEM REDUCTIONS.

subje / WAVE

file

[illegible]

as by [illegible]

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

15 September 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: Career Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Assignment of Harold R. Noemayer

Approval is requested for the PCS assignment of Noemayer to JMWAVE, a domestic base. Subject will be utilized as an Ops Officer in PA/Propaganda activities in support of Project JMATE. It is anticipated that Noemayer will receive a cover salary (offset) during the period of this assignment. Such offset would not exceed his net Agency compensation.

/S/ Raford W. Herbert

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/Ops
1 - C/WH/4
1 - WH/4/PA/Prop
✓1 - WH/4/Personnel

WH/4/Personnel:RFCILLS:jtr (15 September 1961)

201-161881

SECRET

1524

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : RICHARD F. GILLS:jtr
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 4031
DATE : 8 SEPTEMBER 1961

TO : JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: ~~BELL 10~~
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

11 SEP 61 15 43z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT95185

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 10966

JMZIP ADMIN

Ross L. Crozier

[redacted] WILL BE ASSIGNED WAVE PCS. IF NECESSARY RETURN HQS FOR PROCESSING HE SHOULD BE SCHEDULED WITH STAFFERS.

END OF MESSAGE

Indiv / WAVE PCS.

C/WH/4/SUPPORT
WH/4/PA-PROP
~~C/WH/SUPPORT~~

201-168881

For J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. K. DAVIS
C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

9-8

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

28 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. NOEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to discontinue that portion of the "Compensation" section which states "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment". It is requested that this discontinuance be effected C.O.B. 10 June 1961.

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED:

FRED F. CIRUS
Chief, WH/4/Support

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

File – Cy w/Att H Ftr. 7/21/61

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective close of business 10 June 1961, that portion of Paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" which pertains to the authorization of additional compensation in the amount of $80 per month is deleted in its entirety.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : JOHN H. MARTIN
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL
EXT : 8350
DATE : 6 JUNE 1961 1594

ROUTING 06-07

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ BELL
CONF : BELL 15
INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

JUN 6 1704Z 61

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 9792
OUT 9792

TO WAVE INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 0891
0891

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 6491 (IN 2592) *

PREMIUM PAY FOR SUBJ REF WILL BE DEPOSITED HIS BANK BETWEEN 23 - 27 JUNE IN AMOUNT $343.36 NET, COVERING PERIOD 8 JAN THRU 10 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * REQUESTED ADVISE MR. ROSS CROZIER RE PREMIUM PAY.

C/WH/4/FIN

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

579

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE : 1 JUN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 4, BELL S/C

ROUTING

1	SUPPORT	4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUN 1 2128Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2592

NOEMAYR

Branch did you put in for it?

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 6491

JMZIP ADMIN FINANCE

RE WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

ADVISED DATE PREMIUM PAY TO BE PAID MR ROSS CROZIER.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT:* REQUESTED CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

John — Maybe he wants to know which payday will bring the windfall? Herb

6 Jun 61: Per conversation with Joe Hudson, SAAS, he had recd. The Amendment to C's contract for Premium Pay and the check should be deposited in C's bank around (or between) 23-27 June — total is for 8343.36 kt.

John — the ans.)

Subj Wave

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract, case of Harold R. NOEMAYER

It is requested that the Contract for Subject, as amended, be further amended to reflect the following addition: "Compensation". "You will receive additional compensation, amounting to $80.00 per month, effective 8 January 1961, in lieu of payment of the regular overtime rates for irregular, unscheduled and frequent overtime, for the duration of this assignment."

HERBERT V. JUUL
Chief, WH/4/Personnel

APPROVED

Chief, WH/4/Support

SECRET

201-168581

X

SUPPORT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 322
2 MAY 61

Rlg

TO : BELL

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : ~~BELL 15~~

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH, BELL S/C

ROUTING			
1	PM	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 2 1433Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 1136

BELL CITE WAVE 5979

JMZIP

HAROLD R. NOEMAYR ARRIVING HQS 2 MAY ON EAL 648 FOR CONSULTATION. WILL CALL CHOADEN ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

Filing | Wave

201-161881

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

192
06-45

ORIG: ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
UNIT: DC/WH/4/SUPPORT
EXT: 8712
DATE: 6 APRIL 1961

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: JMBELL
CONF: BELL 15
INFO: COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

CJT 5112
5112

TO WAVE INFO CITE BELL 3963
3968

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: WAVE 5287 (IN 1907)*

PER REF REQUEST CONTRACT WILL BE AMENDED TO ADD $80 MONTHLY EFFECTIVE 8 JANUARY FOR DURATION THIS ASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Request Noemayer's contract be amended effective 8 January 1961 to provide for premium pay.

201-168881

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
CHIEF, WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
COORDINATING OFFICERS

E. Schmidt
ERVIN W. SCHMIDT
DC/WH/4/Support
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 866
06APR61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

Pers

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

6APR61 0112Z

ROUTINE

IN 1907

BELL CITE WAVE 5287

JMZIP ADMIN

REF A WAVE ~~4968~~ 4698 (IN 03324)*

B UFGS 0284

C UFGS 0285

1. IN REPLY PARA 3 REF B:

3A. YES

3B. YES

3C. WAVE HAS NO OTHER CONTRACT TYPES THIS GRADE RANGE

3D ~~3E.~~ YES

Ross L. CROZIER'S

2. [redacted] UNSCHEDULED, IRREGULAR DUTY FAR EXCEEDS MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS STATED REF C. HE HAS BEEN SO QUALIFIED SINCE BEFORE INCEPTION PREMIUM PAY ARRANGEMENT AND WILL SO CONTINUE THROUGH OPS CLIMAX SAME AS WAVE STAFF EMPLOYEES.

3. REQUEST HIS CONTRACT BE AMENDED EFFECTIVE 8 JAN 1961 TO PROVIDE FOR PREMIUM PAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: ~~MONEY, OIL ADDITIVE, AND LOADED CLAMS INFILTRATED VIA OP~~ ~~CAROL.~~ wrong ref Jm

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38055 B

DATE 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY ~~RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,~~ OP CONTACTS ONLY I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

Noemayer

(SIGNATURE) Roger T. Fox

Roger T. FOX
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Oliver H. [illegible]

SECRET

201-168551

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

No. SD 38055 A

DATE 3 April 1961

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Ross L. Crozier

Ross L. CROZIER
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Oliver H. Carlton

SECRET

201-168851

2 Personnel

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACTUAL PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
CROZIER, Ross (Premium Pay)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF WAVE 4698 (IN 4338) dated 21 March 1961.

1. The contract of Ross Crozier with amendments has been reviewed. It is noted that the terms set forth a rate of GS-12 as full compensation and no provision is indicated permitting additional pay. Overtime does not apply above GS-10 and premium pay has not to date been applied to contract types.

2. The approval of premium pay is based on CSC Regulations, Section 25.261 which permits such pay to full-time employees subjected to substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled overtime, night and holiday duty. Consequently certifications were received from supervisors at Headquarters attesting to those eligible and in the field all staffers were processed for this in GS-11 and above (not to exceed the top of a GS-15) on the knowledge of the various assignments subjecting our employees to these qualified conditions.

3. Since processing is an administrative exercise of effecting a personnel action to add to his salary and thereafter assure that he is taken off this entitlement as soon as he is no longer entitled to it, it is not intended to do this for short periods. Except in the initial cases effective 1 February 1961, this pay becomes effective the beginning of the first pay period after he enters this type duty and is taken off the end of the pay period when he is no longer subjected to such duty. On contract types, it is suggested, therefore, that overall aspects be considered such as:

a. Is his duty and salary similar to a staffer receiving this entitlement?

b. Is the period of time proposed for the duty 30 days or longer?

CONTINUED

External Distribution:
2 - Addressee

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
23 March 61

DATE DISPATCHED
29 MAR 61

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-168891

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Internal Distribution:
1 - WH/4/Support
1 - WH/4/Registry

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/4/Support	E.W.Schmidt	vlm	8712

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/4/PPS	3/27/61	
C/WH/4/PPX		
C/WH/4/CPS		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

c. Does suggesting application to this case indicate that this should be done on all other contract types in this grade area and

d. Does the current and proposed duty entitle him to this additional pay?

Upon review of this additional information, if you feel an equivalent compensation should be effected, the case will be considered for possible amendment for approval by the contract officer of our organization. Additional details concerning personnel entitlements are being forwarded under separate cover.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

22 March 61
201-168881

X

CONFIDENTIAL

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designations
D. /WH

2. Payroll period
3. Block No.
4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
NOEMAYER, HAROLD R. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary
$9,215

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 22 March 61

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
[illegible]pr61	18Oct59	$9,215	$9,475	Joseph B. Baye (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Part-d(th

✓ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126b—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954. General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — DISBURSING OFFICER'S COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

620

DATE : 21 MAR 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, BELL S/C

Memo Pers

Info: Finan

ROUTING

1		4	
2	SUPPORT	5	
3		6	

MAR 21 2004Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 4338

TO BELL INFO CITE WAVE 4698

JMZIP ADMIN

REQUEST MR ROSS CROZIER'S CONTRACT BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE PAYMENT FOR PROJECT PREMIUM ALLOWANCE. ADVISE WHEN PAYMENTS TO BEGIN.

END OF MESSAGE

John

Ans. by dispatch 3/23/61

ED

John —

Pls see me! (Mr Schmitt is preparing a reply)

Herb

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

463
DATE : 17 MAR 61

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BELL

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

FROM : WAVE

ACTION : TSD 2

#112569

WH/3/M

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ROUTINE

IN 3826

BELL CITE WAVE 4534

JMZIP AQUATIC

1. PLS REGISTER ALIAS ROGER T. FOX FOR PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. SUBJ KNOWN AS FOX TO OPS CONTACTS. DOCS BEING ISSUED IN NAME FOX.

END OF MESSAGE

File

201-168881

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

A-4

File

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957, as amended.

Effective 8 January 1961, and to continue for the duration of your current assignment, paragraph two (2) of subject contract, entitled "Compensation" is amended to authorize additional compensation in the amount of $80.00 per month in recognition and compensation of the irregular, unscheduled and frequent requirement of hours of duty over and above the regular and daily schedule.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /S/
Contracting Officer

SECRET 201-168871 X

SECRET

3 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract - Harold R. NORMAYR

It is requested that the contract for Career Agent Harold R. NORMAYR, as amended, effective 1 June 1957, be terminated upon close of business 30 September 1963. Subject was advised of this termination on 1 July 1963, and the 90 days actual notice required by para. 15 (a) of the contract expires on 30 September 1963.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

DDP/SAS/PERSONNEL/John H. Martin/kct (3 July 63)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - SAS/Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

201-168551

4-00000

Hoemeyer

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: [illegible]

TO: (Check)
☐ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT H SAS

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: [illegible]

ESTABLISHED FOR: [illegible]

FILE NO. [illegible]

ID CARD NO.

☐ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPNEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR _____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE ______________________.

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☒ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☒ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

201-168851

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR THE STUDENT FILE

11 February 1958

FROM: Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

This folder contains information on the 41 American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China. The information was prepared for FE-2 CE working purposes. The material has not been carded, ~~and the material~~ is non-record, and should be destroyed sometime before 1 January 1959.

Rufus A. Horn, Jr.

DISTRIBUTION:
1- for student file

CONFIDENTIAL

CS COPY

200-8-14

SECRET

22 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE-2 CE

SUBJECT: File-check Results of the American Students in China

1. Cursory file-checks have been conducted on the American students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China and the results are attached hereto.

2. The file-checks are by no means complete, for they were conducted only for the purpose of determining the subject's political doctrines.

Rufus A. Horn

Attachment: As stated above

Distribution:
1 - ~~Chief, FE-2 CE w/attachment~~ student file
1 - IO Div. w/attachment
~~2 - Originator w/attachment~~

SECRET

American Student in China

K

ALHANOTE, Louis **File Check Results**

[illegible]

Residence - Brooklyn, New York
Passport No. 618189 issued 3/5/57

Photo Attached

MS-CARD to all names: → One of 41 American Students that went from the Moscow Youth Festival to China late 1957 [redacted]

1. Louis Alhanote, in 1954, visited the Soviet and Polish United Nations Delegation, in New York City. As of 1950, the subject was a subscriber to the "Daily Worker". In August 1952, the subject was a signer of the Nominating Petition that was circulated in behalf of Communist leader Simon W. Gerson, Representative in Congress, Thirteenth Congressional District, New York City. In 1949, the subject made application for membership into the Young Progressives of America. In 1951, a play "Longitude 49" was put on by the New Playwrighters, Inc., at the Czechoslovak House, New York City, the subject was a participant in this play. The subject, in 1955, was a member of the Labor Youth League of New York City. (DFB-88463, 20 August 1957.)



(over)

ALHONOTE, Louis

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Louis Alhonote:

"Louis ALHONOTE, from Brooklyn, was mentally ill and had been told by a doctor that he was paranoic. Once in a meeting of the American group when one of the other members disagreed with him, he dashed a glass cup against the wall. On a second such occasion, he threw a glass cup at Jake ROSEN, which caused Rosen to have three stitches in his chin and five in his biceps.. This second incident was hushed up only with difficulty because the Chinese authorities learned of it when a doctor was called."

SECRET

American Student in China

AVEDISIAN, Sahag **File Check Results**

cit. USA Photo ATTACHED
Residence - Pawtucket, R.I.
Passport No. 472013 issued 4/24/57
~~[illegible] from the [illegible] Festival!~~
~~[illegible] 1957 [illegible]~~

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow).

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

3. 00-B-3093654 (FLEETWOOD folder) comes from Avedisian. It is almost worthless. (Rec'd from O.O. 3 Dec)

4. WFB-95178, 6 Dec 57, an report on Sahag Avedisan ([illegible]). He refused to answer most some of the FBI questions, said he was not a communist, and explained his going to Moscow largely chance.

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not well educated; not intelligent enough to form own opinions but at end of trip did stick up for the Communist system; not believed to have had much association with Communist movement before this trip." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

(over)

AVEDISIAN, Sahag

SECRET

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Sahay Avidisian said he was not a Communist and never had been, when questioned by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)



AVEDISIAN, Sahag

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

BELFRAGE, Sally D.O.B - 4 Oct. 1936 **File Check Results**

ex. USA , Photo Attached

Residence - London/New York, New York

Passport No. 9728 issued 1/20/56

~~[illegible] American Student [illegible] from Moscow Youth Festival to China in late 1957 [illegible]~~

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Sally M. Belfrage, born on 4 October 1936, is the daughter of Cedric Hinning Belfrage. Cedric was or is the editor of the publication, "National Guardian," with offices located at 17 Murray Street, New York City. He was reported to be a Communist Party member in England; served as a Soviet spy in 1942 or 1943, while he was attached to British Intelligence in New York City; he and his wife admitted being Communists in 1937 or 1938; he held a Communist Party membership card in Hollywood, California, in 1937 or 1938; he has been a close associate of Soviet agents and known Communists and Communist sympathizers in the United States and in Europe, since 1937; he has attended and spoken at numerous Communist Party front organization functions; he has made pro-Russian statements and disparaging remarks about the United States. (DFB-26627, 11 May 1953)

3. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British subject who was deported from the United States and now resides at 16 Talbot Square, London, England. (DFB-90733, 27 September 1957)

4. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88476.

(over)

SECRET

5. Sally Belfrage's father, Cedric Belfrage, is a British-born magazine writer who was deported from the United States in 1955, and is now writing from Communist China. Komsomol Pravda on 10 September 1957 reprinted part of an article by Belfrage from the magazine Chinese Youth. The article echoed the Peiping line by charging the United States with holding dozens of Chinese students and refusing them visas except for Formosa.



BELFRAGE, Sally

SECRET

American Student in China

BLOCK, Morris D.O.B - 30 MARCH, 1920
P.O.B. NEW YORK, NEW YORK

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A. PHOTO ATTACHED
Residence - New York
Passport No. 921617 issued 4/12/56

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. A report dated 29 October 1956, indicated that M. BLOCK, 1718 Grand Avenue, New York City, had indicated a desire to travel to Czechoslovakia. It was not known whether or not he had actually filed for a satellite visa. (DFB-73259, 19 November 1956, p. 4.)

3. Morris BLOCK, residing at 421 7th Avenue, New York, New York, was listed as a reference by Grigory Lvovich SCHIFRIN on his visa application in 1954. SCHIFRIN was reported to have been linked with narcotic and diamond smuggling in 1946. (FJYA-5693, 22 March 1954.)

4. Morris S. BLOCH of 421 Seventh Avenue, New York City had known Rachel BEILIN since 1935 according to a report dated 11 August 1953. Rachel BEILIN was believed to have formerly engaged in trafficking drugs in Shanghai and been involved in Russian espionage. As of August 1953, Rachel BEILIN was residing with her husband Alexander, at 1566 Macombs Road, Bronx, New York. (DFB-29039, 20 August 1953.)

5. Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920, New York, New York, was among those on a list of persons denied security clearances pursuant to Executive Order 10173 as amended, dated 12 October 1953.

6. It has been reported that a certain Morris BLOCK, born 30 March 1920 at New York, and his wife, Mollie BLOCK, aged 37, United States Nationals, arrived on 16 April 1949 at Southampton from New York en route to Gdynia in the Polish S. S. Batory. Their destination was believed to be Warsaw. According to a reliable informant, who travelled

SECRET

with them from New York, BLOCK and his wife endeavoured to get permission to hold a public meeting on board during the crossing, but when this was refused they contented themselves by holding a small meeting in the Tourist lounge on the morning of 9 April. In the course of this meeting both BLOCK and his wife spoke very disparagingly of the Atlantic Pact and from the tone of their remarks, the informant gained the impression that they were Communists. (WELA-2326, 9 May 1949 and OSDB-16157.)



MORRIS BLOCK
3-26-56

(over)

BLOCK, Morris

7. Morris Block invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

SECRET

American Student in China

BLOKSBERG, Harry D.O.B - 6 June 1937 OCC. - APPRENTICE tool maker File Check Results
CIT - USA.
Residence - Trenton, New Jersey Photo Attached
Passport No. 454479 issued 4/15/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Harry Irving Bloksberg, born 6 June 1937, resides in Newark, New Jersey and is employed as an apprentice tool maker. His parents, Gabriel and Bertha Bloksberg, were described as Communist Party members. The subject is a member of the Labor Youth League (LYL) which is a Communist organization. He attended Camp Midvale, which is owned and operated by the Metropolitan Recreation Association (MRA), on occasions during 1955. In 1956, the subject was named to a committee that was organized to make plans for the Communist MRA Youth Group. (DFB-86649, 16 July 1957.)

(over)

BLOKSBERG, Harry

SECRET

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Harry Bloksberg:

"Harry BLOKSBERG's father pleaded the 5th Amendment in 1954 and was subsequently thrown out of a hearing for causing a disturbance. Harry apparently took some pride in this, as he carried with him a clipping about the incident which he read to members of the group." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

[illegible]



(over)

BLOKSBERG, Harry

5. Harry Bloksberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when he was asked if he was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

American Student in China

H BRONSTEIN, Eugene
CIT - USA
Residence - New York   Photo Attached
Passport No. A-757784 issued 6/28/56

File Check Results

1. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; came to Moscow by himself; not believed to have had previous Communist affiliation; at end of trip appeared to be sympathetic toward the Communist movement." DFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

EUGENE BRONSTEIN
6/27/56

BRONSTEIN, Eugene

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr. **File Check Results**

CIT- U.S.A. Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles

Passport No. 43499 issued 5/8/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Peggy Suger would return to the U.S.S.R. for an estensive folk-singing tour. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Guy Carawan, Jr. was the sponsor of a program entitled "Call to National Student Conference for Academic Freedom of Equality and Peace, University of Wisconsin, April 25, 26, and 27, 1952". The subject and his wife, Noel attended camp festivals that were sponsored by the Jewish Young Fraternalists in 1954. The camp festivals were held on property that belongs to the International Workers Order. The subject attended an affair that was given by Peoples Songs in Los Angeles, on 18 February 1950. Peoples Songs is an organization that was organized and directed by the Los Angeles County Communist Party. On 8 November 1954, Peoples Artists, Inc. a Communist front organization, gave a farewell party for the subject. Guy Carawan signed a petition that was addressed to Chief Justice Vinson requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court consider the cases concerning the "Hollywood 10". (DFB-88500, 20 August 1957.)

4. Guy Carawan attended a party at the home of Bart and Edna Van der Schelling on the night of 28 August 1953. The persons in attendance were members of the American Communist group in Mexico City. Carawan was described as the son of wealthy parents who has been working at a Quaker encampment some place near Mexico City. Carawan has now decided to dedicate his life to "singing the folk songs of the common people". (DFB-88501, 20 August 1957.)

(over)

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.

SECRET


GUY HUGHES CARAWAN, Jr
4/17/56

SECRET

CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.

SECRET

8

American Student in China

CARAWAN, Noel Oliver ~~[illegible]~~
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 43500 issued 5/8/56

Photo Attached File Check Results

1. Subject's full name was reported to be Noel Oliver CARAWAN. (DFB-88814, 21 August 1957.)

2. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband Guy Hughes Carawan, Jr., see the report entitled "CARAWAN, Guy Hughes, Jr.".

U. Interviewing Journalist.



CARAWAN, Noel

SECRET

SECRET

9

FJZW - 2233/1
10 Mar. 58

American Student in China

D.O.B - 24 Sept. 1930

COHEN, Robert Carl, P.O.B - Philadelphia, PENN. **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A

Residence - Los Angeles

Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Robert Carl Cohen was born 24 September 1930, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1947, the subject was reported to be residing in Los Angeles, California. In 1946, the subject was assigned to the Walt Whitman Club of the American Youth for Democracy. The subject's father is Isadore Cohen. An Isadore Cohen, not otherwise identified, was in April 1951, a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party and the President of Lodge 251 of the International Workers Order. (DFB-89875, 12 September 1957.)

4. The IO Division, in a cable to Tokyo and Hong Kong, stated that Robert Cohen and Orville Schmidt were probably the most reliable members of the students that were visiting China. (DIR-35428, OUT-89863, 13 September 1957.)

CASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 200-8-14

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ABSTRACT		X	INDEX	

CS COPY

COHEN, Robert Carl

201 - 197821
10 Mar. 58

SECRET

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Robert Cohen:

"Robert COHEN was sending reports of the group's travels to NBC; O'Connell said that he planned to write NBC a letter telling them what a poor choice they had made. O'Connell described Cohen as intelligent but overbearing, and probably the most unpopular member of the group. He admitted that he had been a pimp in San Francisco, and was rather proud of the fact that in 1939 -- at the age of 9 -- he had been stoned while marching in a May Day parade. Steve Tyler told O'Connell that Cohen had been residing in Paris and that he known there as a "violent left-winger". O'Connell could not understand the fact that Cohen at some previous time had been in the Army in security work for the Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. Robert Cohen departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting to arrange to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. (Pari 0169, IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)



ROBERT CARL COHEN
11/1/55

COHEN, Robert Carl

201-197821

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT: COHEN, Robert Carl

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-197821

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. FIZW-2233

4. DATE 10 Mar 58

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED 8 - JUN 1965

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO. 201-197821

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Doc. removed and reprocessed for 201-197821 (COHEN, Robert Carl).

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

American Student in China

COLLINS, Judy
CIT-U.S.A.
Residence - San Francisco
Passport No. 270636 issued 1/9/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

3. Ron O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; didn't appear to be very familiar with Communism; associated with the pro-Communist element on the trip; very naive and not a good thinker; seemed very impressed by the trip and by the Communist system." DFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.



JUDITH COLLINS
1956

COLLINS, Judy

(over)

SECRET

American Student in China

DANIELS, Ben Photo Attached **File Check Results**
CIT - U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 518654 issued 6/12/57

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.



(over)

DANIELS, Ben

3. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Ben Daniels:

"Ben DANIELS, who exited China through Burma, took many photographs on the tour (see ALUSLO Hong Kong telegram to DNI, 11 October 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957)

4. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...at the end of the trip (he) was sticking up for the Communist system; physically weak and does not have a strong will power." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.

American Student in China

FIDERER, Jerry D.O.B - 4 April 1933
P.O.B - New York, New York File Check Results
CIT-U.S.A.
Residence - Brooklyn, New York
Passport No. 20123 issued 4/26/56 Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Macao Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is far left. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The meeting of the Young Progressives of America that was scheduled to meet on 5 March 1953, did not take place due to the fact that only a few people attended; of the few that attended was one Gerald L. Fiderer. (DFB-65050, 19 June 1956.)

4. Gerald Lionel Fiderer, who resided at Brooklyn, New York, was not inducted into the United States Army on 27 November 1956, because he had a schizophrenic personality. (DFB-75071, 26 December 1956.)

5. Gerald Lionel Fiderer was born 4 April 1933 at New York, New York. In 1953, he was reported to have had "recurring emotional difficulties". He has been registered and publicly known as the General Secretary of the Labor Youth League (LYL) Chapter at the University of Wisconsin since 1955, and has been present at all public meetings of the LYL Chapter that has been held in Madison since September 1955. He was also reported as being present at an organizing committee meeting. of the Young Progressives of America that was held in Madison in March' 1953. The subject, (apparently as of 1956), is the vice-president of the LYL at the University of Wisconsin, participated in a public debate on behalf of the LYL on 19 April 1956, in Madison, in which he defended Marxism, criticized the "War Economy" of the United States, claimed that the elections in East Germany "are free", and claimed that reports on the recent Communist Party Congress in the U.S.S.R. were distorted in the United States newspapers. (DFB-70056, 20 September 1956.)

FIDERER, Jerry

6. Gerald Lionel Federer was dropped from the rolls of the University of Wisconsin because of poor grades in his classes. The subject was in contact with Sigmund Eisenscher the State Chairman of the Communist Party in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The subject apparently returned to New York on 1 July 1956. (DFB-71805, 24 October 1956.)



(over)

FIDERER, Jerry

7. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jerry Fiderer:

"Jerry FIDERER, a chemist, is definitely a Marxist thinker, but possibly not a Communist Party member." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

SECRET

American Student in China

GOLDSTEIN, Ninel

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A.

Residence - Brooklyn, New York

Passport No. 69190 issued 5/23/56

Photo Attached

Ninel E. Goldstein visited the Tass News Agency, New York City on 20 March 1955. The subject resided at 2670 Colby Court, Brooklyn, New York. She allegedly belongs to a Communist Party Youth Group in New York City. Her father, Alfredo Henley, was identified as a Communist Party member; her stepmother, Lillian Henley, was employed at the Soviet Embassy in 1954; her aunt and uncle, Ruth and Harry Fisher, ~~was~~ were employed with the Tass News Agency, in New York City, and her uncle, Zol Tan Deak, was described as a recognized Communist. (DFB-88449, 15 August 1957.)



GOLDSTEIN, Ninel

SECRET

American Student in China

H **GOODMAN, Faye** — **File Check Results**

CIT-USA.
Residence - New York — Photo Attached
Passport No. 473652 issued 4/23/57

1. No pertinent information was available on the subject.

2. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; pro-Communist; appeared to come from a poor working family and indicated her parents believed Communism was the answer for the working class." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.



GOODMAN, Faye

SECRET

American Student in China

GRAB, Fred Photo Attached **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A.
Residence - Vienna (formerly) now Alexandria, Virginia
Passport No. 73458 issued 5/24/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88472.

3. Don O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; possibly a socialist; don't think he believed in Communism but did believe socialism would be the answer to all problems; ..." DFB-9714



GRAB, Fred

American Student in China

GRANT, Joanne
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 473761 issued 4/24/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The Peking CHINA YOUTH NEWS carried in its 5 October 1957, issue an article by Joanne Grant, giving her impression of her visit to China. She had the following to say in her article:

> "You can see the future through the Chinese people. You can obtain a firm conviction that China will continuously advance forward. As a western visitor, nothing impressed me more than the great power of this country. Every person in New China is very modest but has great pride; they are united, have self-respect, and respect each other. No one can overlook China's advance; it is to be regretted that many people do not have the opportunity to observe it personally. I like Shanghai very much, because from the way Shanghai has changed I can really understand New China. In the old Shanghai, except for the Chinese, everyone had special privileges. However, everything has changed greatly. I am of the opinion that from this, one can see the miracles which have begun in this great country."

3. **The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.**

4. Joanne Grant has written for "Rights," a pamphlet sponsored by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC). The subject was among those invited to the ECLC "Bill of Rights" dinner that was given on 15 December 1954. In October 1953, she contacted the American Committee For Protection of Foreign Born and in October 1956, the subject's name and address was in possession of the Socialist Workers Party. (DFB-92684, 23 October 1957)

5. National Guardian


GRANT, JOANNE A.

SECRET

American Student in China

GREENBERG, Sheila **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A.

Residence - New York Photo Attached

Passport No. 98843 issued 6/11/56

1. RI has a 201 file on the subject, however, there is no material in the file.

(over)



SHEILA GREENBERG
5/11/56

GREENBERG, Sheila

SECRET

2. Sheila Greenberg invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination when she was asked if she was a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, on 21 November 1957. (New York Times, 22 November 1957)

3. Alex O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; definitely pro-Communist." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

American Student in China

HAMILTON, Betty | **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A
Residence ~~- New~~ York
Passport No. 184522 issued 9/11/56 Photo Attached.

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender her passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-886031.

3. [illegible] O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "...; described as a liberal; sold on the Communist system during the trip; believed most of the things she heard; however, appeared that she would never actively work for ~~the~~ Communism in the U.S." DFB 97144, 23 January 1958.



HAMILTON, Betty

SECRET

American Student in China

HOCKMAN, Sam
CIT- U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 746706 issued 1/30/57

File Check Results

Photo Attached

1. Shelby TUCKER, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was the most effective anti-Communist in the group and that he had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

2. The FBI in answer to a file check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any indentifiable data of a subversive nature concerning Samuel E. Hockman of Trenton, New Jersey. (DFB-88829, 21 August 1957.)

3. S. Hockman was an assistant to the director of the Jewish Legion, of 21 Hyde Park Street, London, W. Z. The Jewish Legion was reported to be a subversive organization. (WEL-3908, 26 Feb 48.)

4. S. Hochman departed Pari Air France midnight 1 Dec. for Idlewild arriving morning 2 Dec. Concerned about procedure at Idlewild re passports. Attempting arrangements to be met by sufficient people to forestall a passport incident. Fears contempt Congress charge, says he will not plead fifth amendment but will refuse to give information on other China travelers. (Pari 0169, (IN 40350), 28 Nov '57)



SAMUEL EDWARD HOCHMAN
8/1/55

HOCKMAN, Sam

SECRET

American Student in China

H **HOLLISTER, David** **File Check Results**
CIT-USA
Residence - New York.
Passport No. 211858 issued 5/2/56 Photo AHAchGD

1. David Manship Hollister, residing in New York City, was rejected from military service on 18 September 1951, because of a schizoid personality. Records dated September 1951, indicated that the subject had received professional care for dementia praecox in 1950 and 1951, and that the subject had admitted heterosexual and homosexual experiences until about March 1951. In 1952, the subject was registered with the American Labor Party. The subject's mother, Ruth Manship Hollyster, reportedly was a member of the Los Angeles Communist Party. In 1947 and 1948, the subject was a member of the Harvard Youth for Democracy. The subject was also believed to be a secret member of the Communist Party in 1947. (DFB-86787, 18 July 1957.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.



HOLLISTER, David

SECRET

SECRET

American Student in China

H **HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius** **File Check Results**

CIT- U.S.A

~~Residence - Los Angeles~~

Passport No. 619885 issued 7/19/57

Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Dean Hoxsey who originally applied for permission to remain in the U.S.S.R. now states that he is eager to remain in China after his interview with the American expatriates WILLS and WHITE in Peking. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that WILLS was thinking of returning to the US and that WHITE was completely brainwashed. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. Dean Hoxsey was recruited into the Communist Party in May 1944, and was assigned to the East Los Angeles Communist Party Club. In August 1949, the subject advised a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Los Angeles, California, that he had been reared in a home which was one of Communist influence, as his father, Lowell Hoxsey, had for many years been a member of the Socialist Party and in the 1930's had joined the Communist Party. (DFB-88557, 21 August 1957.)

HOXSEY,
DEAN CORNELIUS
JULY, 1957

HOXSEY, Dean Cornelius

SECRET

American Student in China

HYMAN, Elaine File Check Results

CIT-USA

~~Residence - Brooklyn~~ Photo Attached

Passport No. 136094 issued 7/12/56

Elaine Hyman, of 1240 Union Street, Brooklyn, New York, was believed to be on the Teenage Labor Youth League State Board, in August 1953. In 1944, Fay Hyman and William Hyman, parents of the subject, were members of the Communist Party, Thomas Jefferson Group, 11th A. D., Kings County, Brooklyn, New York. William Hyman, father of the subject, was a delegate for the Communist Party, 11th A. D., to the United Labor and People's Conference for May Day, that was held in New York City, on 26 March 1949. (DFB-88471, 20 August 1957.)



HYMAN, Elaine

SECRET

American Student in China

A

KIDDER, Noel Arthur

File Check Results

CIT - U.S.A

Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 113046 issued 6/30/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Noel Arthur Kidder, during an interview with a representative of the Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army, in April 1956, stated that he would refuse to sign a Loyalty Oath if he were inducted into the armed services. Kidder attended functions that were sponsored by the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born in 1956. He attended meetings of the Los Angeles County Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1956 and 1957. He was elected Vice President of the Los Angeles County LYL in January 1957. He attended the California State LYL Conference that was held in February 1957. In December 1956 he was reported to have stated that a violent class struggle and a revolution were certain to occur. A subscription to the "Daily People's World" was maintained in the name of Kidder in November 1956. (DFB-81948, 24 April 57)

3. Noel Arthur Kidder is married to Susan Toya Pollock. (DFB-83271, 15 May 57)



KIDDER, Noel Arthur

American Student in China

KIDDER, Susan Pollock

File Check Results

CIT-U.S.A.

Photo Attached

Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 126723 issued 7/3/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Sue Pollock, of 1700 Abermarle Road, Brooklyn, N. Y., was mentioned as being one of Gustave Gilbert's contacts. (No further information was given as to who Gilbert was or what was meant by Sue being a contact). (DFB-14187, 13 Dec 51)

3. For derogatory information on the subject and her husband, Noel Arthur Kidder, see the report entitled "KIDDER Noel Arthur."



SUSAN POLLOCK KIDDER
6/13/56

KIDDER, Susan Pollock

SECRET

American Student in China

KUZNITZ, Elaine
CIT-U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 135646 issued 7/12/56

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Division)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a probable Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.



ELAINE KUSNITZ
6-21-56

KUZNITZ, Elaine

SECRET

American Student in China

LANDAU, Nina
CIT.-U.S.A.
Residence - New York
Passport No. 488104 issued 6/7/57

Photo Attached

File Check Results

As of October 1956, Nina Serrano Landau and her husband, Saul Landau, were students at the University of Wisconsin. Mr. and Mrs. Landau have been active in the Student Peace Center at the University of Wisconsin. This organization was registered at the University as being a social-action type of organization which was affiliated with the American Friends Service Committee. In its 1957 registration, the Student Peace Center listed Nina Landau as secretary. In 1955, Saul Landau attended two public meetings that were sponsored by the Labor Youth League at the University of Wisconsin. Saul Landau was identified as having visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., in March 1956. (DFB-88459, 20 August 1957.)



LANDAU, Nina

American Student in China

H

LANE, Dick Photo AttAchED **File Check Results**
CIT-USA
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 908260 issued 4/6/56

1. The SR Division briefed the subject prior to his attendance at the Moscow Festival. (DFB-89325, 30 August 1957.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. The following documents pertain to the subject, however, efforts to locate the documents have been unsuccessful: 201-193201, DFB-86248, and DFB-88603.



LANE, Dick

SECRET

American Student in China

MARCH, William James D.O.B - 8 May 1939 **File Check Results**
P.O.B - Chicago, Illinois
CIT - U.S.A.
Residence - Los Angeles
Passport No. 218671 Issued 10/8/56 Photo Attached

1. William James MARCH was born on 8 May 1939 in Chicago, Illinois. His parents are Herbert MARCH and Jane V. MARCH. The subject attended a meeting of the Labor Youth League (LYL) in 1955, as a prospective member. In February and March 1957, he attended a meeting of the Los Angeles County LYL, and was also in attendance at a California State LYL Conference. Subject's mother was a member of the Central Section, Moranda Smith Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party in October 1955. (DFB-88466, 20 Aug. 1957)

2. Information has been received that William James March left New York 8 June 1957, for Europe to attend the Youth Festival in Moscow during July and August, 1957. March's parents were listed as father Herbert MARCH, with aliases Herbert Fink and Harry Martin; and mother Jane V. March. (DFB-86667, 19 July 1957)

3. William James March was issued Los Angeles Series Passport #218671 on 10/8/56. In his application for this passport, the subject stated he intended to depart from the United States on 12/5/56 for a proposed length of stay abroad of two months in order to visit France, Italy and West Germany for the purpose of visiting relatives and seeing Italy. Subject answered "no" to questions "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" and "Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?" (DFB-87370, 27 July 1957)



WILLIAM J. MARCH
10-4-56

MARCH, William James

SECRET

American Student in China

MATTOX, Virginia Lee (Ginger)

C I I - U.S.A.

File Check Results

Residence - San Francisco

Photo Attached

Passport No. A-758615 issued 7/12/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. Virginia Lee Mattox was born on 10 October 1937, at Los Angeles, California. On the subject's application for a passport she stated that she was not a member of the Communist Party and she had never been member of the Party. (DFB-85650, 28 June 57)

4. In November 1955, Virginia Mattox attended a meeting of the California Labor Youth League (LYL) State Board meeting that was held in Los Angeles, California. In 1955, Ginger Mattox was the chairman of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Teen-Age Club of the San Francisco County LYL. On 16 April 1956, Virginia Mattox attended a lecture on the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that was given by William Schneiderman the Chairman of the 13th District Communist Party of the U. S. A. (DFB-82103, 26 April 1957)



MATTOX, Virginia Lee

American Student in China

McKENNA, (Rev.) Warren occ - Theologian

CIT - U.S.A

File Check Results

Residence - Boston
Passport No. 11791, issued 5/27/57

Photo Attached

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans (that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier) give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513, 10 Sept. 57, from Moscow)

3. The Reverend Warren H. McKENNA of St. John's Church, Roxbury, Mass., was identified as an active participant in a picket line sponsored by the Communist Party during the strike at the Bethlehem Steel Company, Boston, in Oct. 1947. (IFB-28536, 30 July 53)

4. The name of Rev. Warren H. McKENNA was among those on a list contained in an article entitled "Penalties for Thinking Alarm U. S. Liberals." in the Daily Worker for 30 Oct. 1949. This article set forth that since the eleven Communist leaders had been found guilty, a great number of American church leaders had spoken out against the verdict of guilty. (IFB-889, 19 Jan. 1950, page 126)

5. Subject reportedly accepted position as Assistant at a Church in Dalston, London, England and is expected to remain there two years. Informants advised that one Warren McKENNA, was a sponsor of the National Conference of American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, December 1954 and December 1955; name appeared on card at Pittsburgh Civil Rights Congress, February, 1956; subject attended the meeting of the Civil Liberties Committee of Massachusetts in May 1955; the subject's name appeared on the mailing list of the Southern Conference Educational Fund in August 1954. Informants reported no current activity on the part of the subject. (IFB-63999, 30 April 1956.)

McKENNA, Rev. Warren

6. One Warren McKENNA was on a list of delegates to the Second World Peace Congress that was held in Warsaw from 16 to 23 November 1950. (WDCA-890, 80-54896, 11 Jan. 1951)

7. A reliable informant in the Boston area furnished a copy of the first issue of a new publication entitled "Our Common Concern," dated October 1950, published by Workers of the Common Life, at Roxbury, Massachusetts. The editors and publishers of this publication are Reverend Warren H. McKENNA and Reverend Robert MUIR, both associated with the Massachusetts Action Committee for Peace. The instant issue of this publication features the Stockholm Peace Pledge and the address which Reverend Joseph FLETCHER of Cambridge, Massachusetts, gave at the Winter Stadium at Ostrava, Czechoslovakia, on 18 August 1950, this speech also favored the Stockholm Peace Pledge. (DFB-6285, 22 Nov. 1950)

8. The Boston Globe, a Boston newspaper, on 5 November 1948, carried an article entitled "Boston Group Plans Welcome for 'Red Dean'". This article furnished information that a group of prominent Bostonians had joined into a special "Committee of Welcome" for the Very Reverend Hewlett JOHNSON, British Dean of Canterbury Cathedral, who was to visit at Boston after being refused a visa to enter the country the previous year.

The article continues, "Known as the 'Red Dean,' Dr. HEWLETT will speak at Jordan Hall, Gainsborough St., November 16 at 8 p.m." The article quoted Reverend Warren H. McKENNA, the Minister of St. John's Episcopal Church, at Roxbury, Massachusetts, as saying, "Dean HEWLETT was refused a visa by the State Department in 1947, because his invitation came from the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. The State Department later recanted and permitted the visa." (DFB-14689, 5 Jan. 1952, enc. 2)

9. Reverend Warren McKENNA, a delegate to the 2nd World Peace Congress in Warsaw, Poland, in November 1950, testified that Irma C. OTTO attended that Congress, presumably a delegate from some other groups, and that he and Mrs. OTTO had the same committee participation, which he described as "the commission to define aggression." This same witness testified that upon their return from Warsaw, Poland, both he and Mrs. OTTO spoke at a meeting sponsored by the Minute Women for Peace.

As of April 1955, Irma C. OTTO resided at 140 Huron Ave., Cambridge, Mass. c/o Flo LUSCOMB who has been identified by informant as a "Concealed Communist". Subject appeared before the N. H. Commission Investigating

SECRET

Communism and Subversive Activities in N.H. and testified on 1/6/54 and 2/1/54 that she was not and had not been a member of the Communist Party. She refused to give further information on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination. Informant identified subject as a former member of the Mass. Minute Women for Peace. Another informant reported subject spoke as the New England Representative of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born at the National Legislative Conference of this organization that was held in Washington, D. C. on 27-28 March 1955. Another informant identified subject as being in attendance at a meeting of the Chicago Women for Peace that was held on 12/6/54. (IFB-55296, 29 July 1955)

10. See 16 Mar 57 memo to Chief, Contact Division, 7.0.0., from Boston Office, on the [illegible] letter on interviews with [illegible] & Faxon.

11. Interviews [illegible]

McKENNA,
WARREN HENRY
(OCT 1950)

MCKENNA, Rev. Warren

(over)

SECRET

-4-

12 Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American Youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about McKenna:

"Reverend Warren McKENNA, a 39-year-old Anglican minister, has spent the last year or so in London. He has a socialist viewpoint, but is neither a clear nor a fast thinker. O'Connell commented that he sometimes had too much to drink and may have said some things he otherwise might not have." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

McKENNA, Rev. Warren

SECRET

SECRET

30

American Student in China

H **MESCOLI, Sandra** Florence

File Check Results

C. IT - U.S.A.

Residence - Los Angeles

Photo ATTACHED

1. No Record in RI.

2. Mescoli, as of December, 1957, was traveling in Europe after attending the youth festival in Moscow and the trip to China. She attended Labor Youth League meetings in 1956 and 1957. She attended the May Day rally that was held in Los Angeles, California, on 1 May 1957. (OFB-96419, 3 January 1958, in RI 201-146407)

3. [illegible] O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... not too well informed on Communism but did support the Communist system." OFB-97144, 23 Jan 58.



MESCOLLI, Sandra

SECRET

32

American Student in China

MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry) **File Check Results**

C.I.T.-U.S.A Photo Attached

Residence - New York
Passport No. 922674 issued 4/13/56

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

2. Larry Moyer, a reported Communist Party member, attended a meeting on 6 January 1950, at the Independent Progressive Party (IPP) Headquarters at San Diego. The meeting was held by the members of the IPP Housing Committee for the purpose of making plans for their participation in the public Rent De-Control Meeting that was to be sponsored by the City of San Diego on 25 January 1950. (DFB-23641, 9 January 1953)

3. The regular meeting of the Communist Party Morgan Hull Club was held at the home of Eli Larry Moyer on the evening of 14 March 1948. (This meeting was probably held in San Diego, California.) Eli Larry Moyer, a Communist Party member was among the members of the Independent Progressive Party that maintained a picket line at the entrance to the Chamber of Commerce Auditorium, in September 1948, when the California Un-American Activities Committee Hearings were being held. (DFB-19758, 22 July 52)

(over)

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Larry Moyer:

"Larry MOYER, age 32, was reporting on the trip for United Press. O'Connell was Moyer's roommate in Moscow, and had learned of many of Moyer's past experiences before O'Connell had indicated where he stood politically. Moyer had been a pimp in Hawaii in 1941, working through the photograph shops where a serviceman could get his picture taken with a hula girl. He had also been afriend of Ada B. Jackson, whom O'Connell described as "a well-known pink in New York"; Moyer had known her through American Labor Party meetings there. O'Connell said that Moyer was crude, but by no means stupid." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

S. [illegible] SCHWALD.



MOYER, Larry (Eli Larry)

American Student in China

Nowacki H **NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve)** D.O.B - 7 Oct. 1932 **File Check Results**

CIT - U.S.A P.O.B - POLAND

Residence - Detroit

Passport No. 117018 issued 6/22/56

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was residing at Hamtramck, Michigan and was employed by the "Glos Ludowy" (People's Voice) a Communist-line Polish-English language weekly newspaper. She attended meetings sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951, and the Convention of the Progressive Party at Chicago in 1952. She attended local and national functions of the "Glos Ludowy" in 1952. She served as Recording Secretary of the Youth Committee to Elect Peace Candidates in 1952, and was campaign manager for Ben Kocel who was an active member of the Communist Party in 1951, and the Progressive Party candidate for Michigan State Senator in the November 1952 elections. The subject represented the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born at the "Glos Ludowy" National Press Conference in Cleveland, Ohio in 1952. She was a member of the Civil Liberties Committee at the University of Michigan in 1952, and the International Workers Order in 1950. The subject was elected to the temporary Executive Committee of the newly formed Youth Club, Communist Party, U. S. A. District 7, on 4 December 1956, and was described that date as a member of the East Side Section of the Communist Party, District 7. Subject was the Chairman of the meeting of the Youth Club, Communist Party, District 7, on 11 December 1956. The subject has or is also connected with the Michigan Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, Michigan Artists Bureau, Civil Liberties Committee, Michigan Youth Committee for Peace, Freedom of Press Association of Michigan, American Slav Congress, and the National Negro Labor Council. (DFB-79256, 14 March 1957)

3. Genevive Loraine Nowacki was born on 7 October 1932, in Poland and in 1956, she was residing in Detroit, Michigan with her father and

SECRET

mother. Genevive's mother Stella who was born in Poland and naturalized at Detroit, Michigan travelled to Poland in 1956, and returned to the United States in that same year. Stella was a member of the International Workers Order, Lodge No. 3503, and was in good standing. Stella was also reported to have attended many receptions with the representatives of the Polish Embassy. (DFB-67777, 13 August 1956)

4. Miss Lorraine Nowacki was the Campaign Manager for Ben Kocel, the candidate for membership in the State Legislative representation of Michigan. Lorraine and Ben obtained over 1,800 signatures within less than 5 hours under the Progressive Party's petition demanding that the City Council in Detroit extend the rent control. (DFB-27456, 15 June 53)

5. [illegible] [illegible]

DFB-95643, 14 Dec 57, contains info on Nowicki's Communist connections, with her visits to USSR and China. Nothing of use for our interest in Americans imprisoned in China



GENEVIEVE NOWACKI
May 1956

NOWICKI, Lorraine (Genevieve

SECRET

American Student in China

O'CONNELL, Dan (Daniel Myles) — **File Check Results**

CIT- U.S.A

Residence - Chicago, Illinois

Passport No. 594311 issued 6/25/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist and had also refused to surrender his passport at the Chinese frontier, but, succumbed to pressure in Peking. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957 from Moscow.)

3. Dan O'Connell was listed as the Publicity Director of the United States Youth Festival Committee, as of May 1957. (DFB-84120, 16 May 1957.)

4. American HK telegram No. 604, 7 Oct 57, says O'Connell says he is last member Youth Festival group departing Communist China.

(over)

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SECRET

5. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. O'Connell said he saw Father Wagner in prison in Shanghai; he did not provide the Consulate General with more information about Father Wagner than appeared in the press. He was quite cooperative with the Consulate General (he turned over his passport) and was most anti-Communist in public and private statements. He described the greater part of the American group which attended the October 1 celebrations in Peiping as being politically and morally corrupt, and stated that only three members of the group, including himself, made any effort to defend the U.S. against Chinese Communist critics. The shortness of O'Connell's stay in Hong Kong prevented spending much time with him, but he stated that he would be happy to answer further questions after he returns to Chicago. (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

6. O'Connell is a KUJUMP informant. (See 10 January 58 item from KUJUMP, filed in CIA-connected Americans jailed in China)

7. WFB-95135, 9 Dec. 57, is a report on Daniel Myles O'Connell. O'Connell said that John Rosen & Bob Williamson were the leaders of the American delegation, & that the Reverend Warren McKenna was the leader of the group that went to China, that he (O'Connell) & Steve Tyler were the only members of the China group that praised the U.S.

SECRET

American Student in China

H ROSEN, Jake

CIT - USA.

Residence - New York

Photo ATTACHED

File Check Results

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was instrumental in applying pressure to make the Americans, that did not give up their passports at the Chinese frontier, give their passports to the Chinese in Peking. Tucker also feels that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. On 15 November 1951, it was reported that Jack and Mildred Rosen, indicated to be members of the Chicago Branch of the Socialist Workers Party, resided at 1839 Touhy Avenue, Chicago. (DFB-16666, 24 March 1952)

4. In March 1948, it was reported that Jack Rosen, who was residing at 314 Harbor Road, Hunters Point Housing Project, San Francisco, and a part-time employee at Sonotone, Inc., 450 Sutter Street, San Francisco, and a student at Stanford University, was a member of the Theodore Dreiser Club of the Communist Party. At a meeting of the Professional Section functionaries on 19 March 1948, and in a discussion by those present on the responsibility of a Communist Party member in the event of war between the United States and Soviet Russia, Rosen, a member of the club, stated, "I would be drafted like any other individual and then do what I could." This same Jack Rosen was on a list of Communist Party members or reported sympathizers known to possess or who have been issued licenses for the operation of radiotelegraph, radiotelephone or amateur "ham" apparatus; who have received radio training; or who have been or now are employed in allied fields where their employment, talent, or knowledge could be utilized for clandestine radio communications. (DFB-5016, 14 August 1950)

(over)

5. Jacob Rosen was a member of "The Campus" and the "Marxist Discussion Club," both organizations are student groups at the City College of New York, where Rosen was in attendance as a student. (DFB-90299, 19 Sept 57)

6. The "New York Times" issue of 30 July 1957, contained an article by "Max Frankel," regarding the World Youth Festival then in session at Moscow, USSR, which stated in part - "Jacob Rosen, 636 West 174th Street, Manhattan, a junior at City College went without sleep to keep things moving. He carried the United States flag at yesterday's opening, dipping it in salute to Nikita S. Khrushchev and other Soviet dignitaries, at the Lenin Stadium."



JACOB ROSEN
5/11/56

ROSEN, Jake

7, Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Jake Rosen:

"Jake ROSEN, one of the organizers of the group is "solidly leftist". His father had been a labor leader in New York." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)



CHINA VISITOR APPLIES

Passport Seized, Youth Moves to Re-enter City College

One of the forty-two young Americans who ignored a State Department ban to travel in Communist China will seek to re-enter City College next semester.

The student, Jacob Rosen, returned to New York last week and his passport was seized by immigration officials. He said yesterday that he had taken a six-month leave of absence from City College to attend a youth festival in Moscow and to travel in Europe. Mr. Rosen, a 19-year-old junior, went to China following the festival and visited relatives in Israel before returning home.

Dr. Buell G. Gallagher, president of the college, said he expected Mr. Rosen to have "no difficulty" in being readmitted.

8. Interviews SCKUALD.

9. DFB-95661, 26 Nov 57, contains info on Rosen's Communist connections and visits to the USSR and China. He was the organizer of the group. He helped prepare the report that said Democracy & Freedom looked well (Moyer objected to this). Several members of the group condemned Rosen as a Communist or acting for the Russians (these individuals are Moyer, O'Connell, Tucker, Coppedge, & Mumford).

American Student in China

H **SCHMIDT, Orville** **File Check Results**

CIT-USA

Residence - Marion, South D.

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-88603.

SECRET

American Student in China

SCHWARTZ, Larry **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - Utica, Michigan

Passport No. 920030 issued 4/12/56. Photo Attached

The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)



LAWRENCE RUSSELL SCHWARTZ

3/27/56

Over

SECRET

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

2. Lawrence Schwartz, who recently arrived in Hong Kong, from his tour in Communist China, had the following to say about his observations of Communist China: "Communism is run by fanatics. What they are trying to do cannot be done. People cannot submit to long periods of regimentation. Regimentation is frightening. In the states I visited, it was entirely out of hand." (New York Times, 21 Nov. 57)

SCHWARTZ, Larry

SECRET

14-00000

Dr Lockard

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

UNCLASSIFIED

32
Action

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Info

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FE
IES
SCA
PPT
IRC

CIA

Control: 12435
Rec'd: November 21, 1957
8:30 p.m.

FROM: Hong Kong

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 865, November 21

SENT DEPARTMENT 865, REPEATED INFORMATION KOBE 2, YOKOHAMA 3.

Lawrence Schwartz, member Youth Festival group, aboard PRESIDENT CLEVELAND due Honolulu December 3. Presence Hong Kong unknown until after departure.

DRUMRIGHT

UMT/1

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SCHWARTZ, Lawrence

American Student in China

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret) File Check Results

CIT- U.S.A
Residence - Los Angeles, California Photo AttacheD
Passport No. 729373 issued 7/11/55

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that the subject and Guy CARAWAN would return to the U.S.S.R. for an extensive folk-singing tour. (State Department Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 September 1957, from Moscow.)

3. There is no pertinent file information concerning Margaret SEEBER however, the following information is furnished for your information.

Charles Louis SEEGER, Jr. and Ruth Crawford SEEGER, parents of subject reside at 7 West Kirke Street, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland.

A report dated May 1952 states that Charles SEEGER was a member of the Communist Party in approximately 1936 and 1937. Ruth Crawford SEEGER was reported to have been friendly or acquainted with serious individuals during the 1940's who were Communist Party members, some of whom were also identified as being involved in a Soviet espionage ring which operated in Washington, D. C. and New York during the early 1940's.

Charles SEEGER admitted Communist Party membership from 1936 to 1939 in a discussion group of the Communist Party. He stated that the group payed no dues and had no membership cards. He also admitted that he joined a similar Communist Party discussion group consisting of three people in the latter part of 1941 and early 1942. This group, according to SEEGER met very irregularly and he ceased association with the Communist Party about 1943. He denied membership in the Communist Party at the time he was interviewed in August 1953.

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret)

Margaret SEEGER's half brother Peter SEEGER is reported to have been a member of the Communist Party in 1945.

Peter SEEGER is reported to have been one of the organizers of People's Songs, Inc. in 1946. He served as editor, executive chairman, and national director prior to the dissolution of the company in 1949. People's Songs, Inc. was cited as a Communist front which was incorporated January 31, 1946, by the California Committee on Un-American Activities in its 1948 report.

Peter SEEGER is also reported to have been a member of the WEAVERS, a musical quartet who entertained at "Closed meetings" of Communist Party functionaries and have appeared before numerous pro-Communist and Communist-front groups. (ONHW-4402, 20 February 1956 from various FBI reports.)

Peggy Seeger [illegible] SCKWAL



MARGARET SEEGER
12/13/55

SEEGER, Peggy (Margaret)

SECRET

American Student in China

TUCKER, Shelby Jr. (James) **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - ~~Pass Christian, Miss.~~ Photo Attached

Passport No. 615485 issued 3/29/57

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was anti-Communist. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow, on 9 September 1957, and was interviewed in regards to his trip to China. (Interviewers name not given) The interviewer stated that he was convinced from his talk with Tucker, both before the festival and now, that he was a sincere and loyal if misguided American and that his refusal to give up his passport to the Chinese was not a trick. (State Dept. Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The FBI in answer to a file-check request, from the State Department regarding some of the individuals that attended the Moscow Youth Festival, replied that their records failed to disclose any identifiable data of a subversive nature concerning James T. Tucker, Jr. (DFB-88829, 21 August 57)

JAMES SH [redacted]

TUCKER, Shelby, Jr. (James)

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE
[illegible]/10-857
OIS

FROM : American Embassy LONDON — 808 DESP. NO.
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — October 8, 1957 DATE
REF : Embtel 1887

7
5/2

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION SCA-2	INFO	DEPT. RMR-2 EUR-5 OLI-8 FE-4 P/IT-2
	REC'D 10/9		OTHER CIA-12 USIA-10

SUBJECT: Embassy De-briefing of Shelby Tucker, American Student Who Visited Communist China

7

Mr. Shelby Tucker, an American student at Oxford University, visited Communist China in company with several other students at the conclusion of the Moscow Youth Festival. After his arrival in Peking he was requested by the Chinese Communist authorities to surrender his passport. Mr. Tucker refused to do this and as a result was deported from China into the Soviet Union. He returned to London on September 12 and during his discussions with the Embassy volunteered to prepare a statement of his impressions of Communist China based on his notes. This statement is transmitted as enclosure one.

Shortly after Mr. Tucker arrived in London he was approached by Life magazine for his story, which it is understood he sold to the editors for a sum of $500.00. A copy of this story, which was written by a Life staff writer based on Mr. Tucker's remarks is transmitted as enclosure two. The Embassy understands that Life magazine is not now planning to publish this story.

There is transmitted as enclosure three a copy of Mr. Tucker's affidavit regarding the use of his passport in Communist China. This affidavit has already been transmitted to the Department under separate cover in connection with Mr. Tucker's passport difficulties but is included here for the Department's convenience.

It was the impression of the de-briefing officers that Mr. Tucker was sincere in his desire to furnish information which might be of use to the United States Government. Unfortunately, however, Mr. Tucker seems to have very little background in Chinese affairs and his observations, both written and oral, appear to contain little significant political or economic information.

/Mr. Tucker

POL/~~F-RHFosterick~~
REPORTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION COPY
Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.
THE ABOVE INSTRUCTION APPLIES TO THE DEPARTMENT ONLY.

TUCKER, Shelby

Mr. Tucker took a number of photographs during his stay in China. One print of each will be forwarded to the Department under separate cover when they have been received by the Embassy.

For the Ambassador:

Rockwood H. Foster

Rockwood H. Foster
Second Secretary of Embassy

Approved:

Edwin W. Martin
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures:

1. Statement of impressions of Communist China
2. Life magazine story
3. Mr. Tucker's affidavit

cc: Taipei, Hong Kong

SECRET

38

American Student in China

H **TYLER, Patty (Patricia)** **File Check Results**

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - New York

Passport No. 1 issued 6/12/56

Photo ATTACHED

1. No Record RI.

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. See Steve Tyler.

4. Joe McConnell told O.O. that Mrs. Tyler interviewed Richmond & said he had recently had all of his teeth removed & didn't look well, & that he was too outspoken against the Chinese. (By phone 14 January 58)



PATRICIA GROLL TYLER
6/12/56

TYLER, Patty (Patricia)

SECRET

39

American Student in China

H **TYLER, Steve**

CIT-U.S.A

Residence - New York

Passport No. 17 issued 10/22/56

Photo Attached

File Check Results

1. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject was non-Communist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow.)

(over)



SECRET

TYLER, Steve

2. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about the Tylers:

"Steve and Patty TYLER (ref. Consulate General telegram to Department 560, repeated Moscow 8, Prague 1, of September 27, 1957) have been traveling in Europe for about a year and a half. Steve is 23. Neither are college graduates. O'Connell felt that Patty was the smarter of the two, but that both were quite sound in their thinking, and he was convinced of their anti-Communist sentiments. O'Connell said that both of Steve's parents had been in some sort of trouble for leftist or Communist activity in the U.S., and that Steve feared that this would unwarrantably be held against him in spite of his violent reaction against his upbringing. O'Connell said that he had never known a case where the views of father and son were father apart." (Foreign Service Dispatch Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

3. Stephen Tyler's father, Leonard, of 263 Parkside Ave, was a member of the Parkside Club, Communist Party, and in the Parkside Club, he was Press Director and member of the Executive Committee. Stephen's mother, Evelyn, was in April 1949 a member of the State Committee of the American Labor Party. (DFO-94348, 19 Nov 57)

SECRET

American Student in China

H WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson) D.O.B - 14 MAY 1938 File Check Results
P.O.B - CLEVELAND chio
CIT- USA
Residence - New York
Photo Attached
Passport No. 502806 issued 5/9/57

1. The IO Division's informants that attended the Moscow Festival were of the opinion that the subject was a Left Winger. (IO Div.)

2. On 11 Oct. 1955, Confidential Informant T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported he had received information that Robert WILLIAMSON, born 14 May 1938, a student from Cleveland, Ohio had arrived in Paris, France on 2 Sept. 1955 from Prague, Czechoslovakia. Informant said his information indicated this individual had been in Poland. He stated he was not sure, but in all probability this person was a member of a youth club that had met in Warsaw, Poland. (DFB-59303, 11 Jan. 1956, RI 200-4-25201-8) (possibly subject's father)

3. WILLIAMSON, Bob - Represented the Communist League of Great Britain at the UJRF Congress at Lyon in April 1948. (French press, RI 20-4-10-100y8)



ROBERT DAWSON WILLIAMSON
5/1/57

(over)

SECRET

WILLIAMSON, Bob (Robert Dawson)

4. Daniel M. O'Connell, a member of the American youth group which toured Communist China after attending the Moscow Youth Festival, arrived in Hong Kong on 6 October 1957. O'Connell provided the Consulate General, Hong Kong, with information on some of the other members of the group. He had the following to say about Williamson:

"Earl (I believe O'Connell called him Bob) WILLIAMSON's father was deported from the U.S. for Communist activities and is now in London. (See Consulate General despatch No. 199 of September 17, 1957)." (Foreign Service Dispatch, Hong Kong, number 289, 14 October 1957.)

5. Interviewed SEKWALD

6. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say about the subject: "... very pro-Communist; definitely familiar with Communism; argued very convincingly for the Communist system and appeared sincere in his beliefs." OFB-97144, 23 January 1958.

A

American Student in China

WILLIAMSON, Earl — **File Check Results**

@77-USA

Residence - Pleasant Hill, Calif. /London
Passport No. 577624 issued 6/10/57

Photo attached

1. The IO Division's informants, that attended the Moscow Festival, were of the opinion that the subject was of questionable character. (IO Div.)

2. Shelby Tucker, the American that went to China and refused to give the Chinese his passport, stated that the subject is a most dangerous leftist. (State Dept. Incoming Telegram No. 513 dated 10 Sept 57, from Moscow)

3. The following document pertains to the subject, however, efforts to locate the document have been unsuccessful: DFB-86248.

4. Interviewee [illegible]

5. Dan O'Connell, a member of the group, had the following to say [illegible] subject: "... very naive; definitely for the [illegible] up." DFB-97144, 23 Jan 1958.



EARL R. WILLIAMSON
4/10/57

WILLIAMSON, Earl

FBI doc
25 Nov. 57 (Boston)
Re: Richard James Medalie
Bufile - 100-426846
Boston Field Office - 100-32145

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENT

BLOCK, MORRIS

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: BARNES, WINIFRED C.
DOD FILE 08 97 44

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFI
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSC

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F-8-97-44

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Miami Office

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE : 28 February 1967

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: BARNES, Winfred Clark

FILE NO: 496 289 A-89744

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

- a. ☒ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.
- b. ☐ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in
- c. ☐ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Steven L Kuhn

STEVEN L. KUHN
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
State Passport Report

APPROVED

FORM 6-65 1124a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9-47)

CONFIDENTIAL

BARNES, Winfred Clark   11 January 1967
#496 289

On 4 January 1967 a passport file of Winfred Clark BARNES was reviewed at the Passport Office, Department of State. The following is a summary of the information contained therein:

Date of Birth: 1 May 1912 at Gatesville, Texas; verified by birth certificate

Father: Shaw Andrew BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 May 1882 at Kennedy, Texas; current residence not given.

Mother: Velma Elizabeth HARRIS; Date of Birth: 8 March 1888 at Thelma, Texas; current residence not given.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 January 1966, #G755310, for a period of four weeks to visit Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Peru, Columbia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil for the purpose of tourism.

Permanent address: 5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida

Mailing address: International Petroleum Company, Ltd
396 Alhambra Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

Occupation: Director

Spouse: Lois Enquist BARNES; Date of Birth: 8 Marcy 1915 at New Haven, Connecticut; current residence not given; Wed: 17 February 1945; no information on whether or not marriage has been terminated.

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida on 27 February 1961, #B10831, for a period of varying from one day to three weeks to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe, Barbados and Suriname for the purpose of business.

RENEWED: At Miami, Florida on 12 May 1964, for a period of ten days to visit Peru, Columbia, and other South American countries for the purpose of business

SUBJECT's first passport was issued at Washington, D. C. on 21 February 1957, #328617, for a period of indefinite time, to visit Bermuda, Bahamas, Haiti, Trinidad, Jamica, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

#496 289

and Guatemala for the purpose of business
RENEWED: At Havana, Cuba on 2 separate occasions:
13 February 1959 and 5 June 1959, for a period of approximately two on both renewal forms, countries to visit and purpose of visit not given.

EAG/mch

APPROVED

CONFIDENTIAL

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DATE 6 December 1966

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, **MIAMI FIELD OFFICE**

ATTENTION : **GLEICHAUF**

SUBJECT : Ad Hoc Clearance

REFERENCE :

A 89744 W

Re **WINFRED CLARK BARNES**, Security Division has granted ad hoc clearance thru "**SECRET**."

Security checks will be completed.

Virginia L. Thorne

VIRGINIA L. THORNE
Security Liaison Officer

SECURITY

cc:

VThorne:pat

SECURITY MESSAGE # 1150

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

Miami (Gleichauf)

16 NOV 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 November 1966

BIOGRAPHIC DATA A-89744 NO.

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME: BARNES, Winfred Clark

2. ALIASES: A# ~~136283~~ REVISED

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1 May 1912, Gatesville, Texas

4. SEX: M

5. CITIZENSHIP: US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No., and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	5350 Southwest 76th Street Miami, Florida

A# 136284

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
1964	1966	Esso Inter-America Inc. ✓	Coral Gables, Florida
1961	1964	International Petroleum Co.	Coral Gables, Florida
	1960	Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd	Coral Gables, Florida
	1959	Esso Standard Oil (Cuba Div)	
	1957	Esso Standard Oil, S.A.	Havana, Cuba
1927	1955	Humble Oil Company	

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
1925	1929	Pearsall High School Pearsall, Texas	
1930	1933	University of Texas Austin, Texas	
1955		University of Pittsburg (15 session)	

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

16 NOV 1966

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 180 USE PREVIOUS
8-63 EDITIONS
MFG. 4-63

(4-43)

A089744

INFRED LARK
MR. W. C. BARNES

5350 Southwest 76th Street
Miami, Florida

BUSINESS:

Subject is General Manager and in Cuba Division at:

S000049 - Esso Standard Oil SA, Havana, Cuba

Subject is now with:
DIRECTOR:
A136284 - Esso Inter-America Inc., Coral Gables, Florida

INACTIVE
DATE 14 AUG 1963
INITIALS BCS

ACTIVATED
DATE 12-13-66
INITIALS rl

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CF. 8-97-44 Control

1 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, **Miami Office**

SUBJECT: Executive Leadership Conferences on Public Affairs

1. On Friday, 28 April 1967, the business executives attending the Conferences for Business Executives on Federal Government Operations, conducted by The Brookings Institution, were briefed by ranking Agency officials.

2. I have attached for your information biographic information on the executives from your area who were present.

James R Murphy
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

Attachments: a/s

cc: Control w/atts

JRM:mg

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

A89744 winfred clark

WINFRED C. BARNES

Director
Esso Inter-America Inc.

Mr. Barnes attended the University of Texas.

He began his career with Humble Oil & Refining Company, where he held various marketing positions before serving in the U. S. Army from 1942 to 1946. He rejoined Humble as a District Sales Supervisor at Corpus Christi, Texas, and later held the positions of District Manager, Assistant Division Manager, and Marketing Manager in several of Humble's marketing areas. He transferred to Esso Standard Oil, S.A. in Havana as Marketing Manager in 1957, and was General Manager - Cuba Division at the time of the loss of that operation in 1960. Upon his relocation in Coral Gables, Florida in 1960, he became Eastern Region Manager for Esso Standard Oil, S.A. Limited. Mr. Barnes joined International Petroleum Company, Ltd. as Marketing Coordinator in 1961 and was elected a Director of that company in 1964. Today he is a Director of Esso Inter-America Inc., with responsibility for petroleum marketing, public relations, government relations, and operations in the Caribbean and Chile.

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00- B-3,168,138
SUBJECT	Attitude of Segundo Cevallos, Key Official of National Bank	DATE DISTR.	6 Oct 60
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 60 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Sep 60		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Sep 60 I talked to an old friend who was president of one of the US-owned tire companies recently intervened by the Castro regime. My friend stated that he had recently contacted Segundo Cevallos, one of the top officials of the National Bank, in connection with obtaining approval for some of the company's US technicians to take their furniture and appliances out of Cuba. Cevallos said, "I don't want those technicians to leave. We need them." At this, the rubber company official stated that it was too late and that the technicians had already gone.

2. Cevallos then made the statement that he was very much concerned about the flight of technicians of all kinds from Cuba. He said that the revolution had been fought to give Cuba a more highly developed industry, but that the technicians were leaving and industry was being seriously effected.

3. Cevallos then said, "Something is wrong. The revolution has gotten off the track somewhere." He then added, "I have got to talk to 'Che' about this."

4. Cevallos is a man of about 60-63 years, and has a very important position, in that he is in charge of granting foreign exchange. My friend said that Cevallos is a very pleasant individual but seems to be a theorist, a professorial type who obviously has had little or no business experience. He has a background as a writer and philosopher, and apparently is extremely naive as evidenced by his comment that he would talk to "Che" Guevara about how the revolution had gotten off the track.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC		[illegible]		

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY **Cuba**

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,168,139

SUBJECT **Anti-Castro Attitude of ICP Personnel**

DATE DISTR. 6 Oct 60

NO. PAGES **Two**

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. **Sep 60 and earlier**

PLACE & DATE ACQ. **Havana/Sep 60 and earlier**

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Sep 60 there appear to be some significant developments occurring among personnel of the staff of the Cuban Petroleum Institute. The Institute has commandeered a building of Esso Standard Oil SA for use as headquarters, and is currently engaged in mixing the personnel of all three intervened oil companies in the new headquarters.

2. The shuffling around of personnel has further lowered the morale of the petroleum industry employees, and I have been told that 95% are strongly in favor of the companies and against the Castro regime.

3. Since ICP established its new offices, indoctrination sessions of employees have been scheduled on a twice-a-week basis. The first session was held recently and was concerned with the "Colored Problem of the World". The gist of the remarks of the conference leader was that Cubans were of Spanish ethnic origin, and because of the close ties of Spaniards and the Moors for so many hundreds of years it had to be realized that all Cubans had colored blood, and should not make a distinction and should have no prejudices concerning people with colored blood.

4. The second indoctrination session was headed by an overt Communist from the Texas Company. He delivered the straight Party Line, anti-US, anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, "The Soviet Union is the great hope of the world for peace", and only Communist ideology will survive, etc.

5. He also stated that, "The Declaration of Havana of Fidel Castro will be our doctrine," and said that it was desired to obtain the signatures of the whole population of Cuba to show that everyone was behind this doctrine. He then said in response to a question regarding what would happen to those who did not sign, "You are either for us or against us."

6. At this, one of the office girls who had been a strong Fidelista got up and remarked that such comments reminded her of the Batista days, and she strongly disapproved of any pressure tactics.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

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7. One of the male office employees then stood and stated that he agreed heartily with her, and added that it was not the intent of the revolution to "get into this sort of business." He then asked, "Why are we getting all this Communist propaganda and why do we not hear anything about José Martí?" His comments were greeted with applause.

8. A third employee stood up and talked for 45 minutes. He really laid it on the line concerning the way the revolution had failed the people of Cuba, and had leaned far too much toward Communism. The conference leader did not interrupt and following the conclusion of the employee's remarks did not even answer. He merely said, "That is all", got up and walked out. However, the next scheduled indoctrination session was cancelled.

9. Although mixing the employees of the three companies was done deliberately to break up a feeling of trust among employees who knew each other, and to introduce a feeling of fear concerning strangers, there has been close cooperation on the technical level between employees of at least two refineries. For example, technicians at Esso and Shell recently collaborated in shutting down the refineries without real justification, allegedly because of Hurricane Donna. When the word got out that the refineries were shutting down, ICP officials rushed in and protested vigorously that there was no danger, and that the action should not be taken. The technicians then said, "Well, it is too late now," and they kept the refineries shut down for three full days. Both Shell and Esso technicians concerned enjoyed this minor act of sabotage hugely.

10. They also cooperated in dealying action when they were ordered to start the cat plant. LPG is needed badly, so the technicians decided to keep the unit shut down. ICP officials screamed that it was unnecessary and ordered them to start, but the technicians said that it was not practical because it was too difficult, and possibly dangerous, to stop and start the unit. They said that the shortage of catalysts made it impossible to figure on keeping the unit going, and so it was not the right thing to do to start it at all. Consequently they have been able to keep the cat units shut down completely since the storm.

11. One of the top Shell engineers who has participated in such actions is going to attempt to skip the country as a test, because many other technicians of the oil companies are desperate to flee Cuba and are trying to arrange ways and means to do so.

-end-

language - 547

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-A-3,168,137

SUBJECT Desire of Oil Industry Technicians to Flee Cuba/Effect on Production

DATE DISTR. 29 Sept 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Sep 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Sep 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. A real body-blow could be given the Castro regime if a few selected technicians in the oil refineries skipped the country. As an example, at the Esso refinery there are four technicians whose loss would have a very severe effect on the production of the refinery. These men are all young, extremely intelligent, well trained, and are completely loyal to the company. They have served immediately below the superintendent and the assistant superintendent. These four would be given immediate jobs in the US, because of their outstanding backgrounds, if they were able to get out of Cuba.

2. The top figure of the four is Leon Hequin Maya, who is a specialist in the Processing Department, one of the most important functions in the plant. This department's responsibilities deal with the physical processing of the product from crude to the finished material.

3. Hequin is 32 years old, married, no children, but expecting a child in Dec 60. He is a graduate of Auburn University, with a degree in chemical or mechanical engineering. He is a Cuban national, I believe of the Jewish faith. He is about 5'10", weighs about 160 lbs, has close cropped black hair, and is a very personable, intelligent young man. He is a very good leader, and was definitely one of the men on their way up in the company.

4. Hequin already has been branded a counterrevolutionary in an official Acta, and has been taken out of the plant and put into the office. Apparently the regime wanted to get him away from the production line for fear of possible sabotage, and also wanted to utilize his undoubted talent and knowledge of the industry in headquarters.

5. Hequin is extremely eager to get out of Cuba, but he does not have a police exit permit, and since he has been branded counterrevolutionary he is afraid he would not get his passport back if he presented it for a police permit.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OCT 1960

STATE		ARMY			NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

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6. Another outstanding young man is Eequin's assistant, Jose Ramon Alvarez, about 31. He is a graduate of Auburn University and is a top flight engineer. Since Alvarez is single, he says that he will wait until the others get out of Cuba. He also wants to hang back to be able to do some sabotage before he makes his departure. He believes that he will be able to get out on his own.

7. A third top flight mechanical engineer, who is extremely eager to leave Cuba, is Santiago Pardo Suarez del Villar. He is about 35, a graduate of the University of Havana. Pardo is head of Maintenance and Construction, and is an extremely intelligent and capable engineer. He is about 5'8", weighs about 170 lbs, and has dark black ahair and a moustache.

8. The fourth is Raul Capote Ortiz, a graduate of Louisiana State University with the degree in chemical engineering. Capote is one of the top technicians in the Processing Department. He is married, but I do not know if he has any children.

-end-

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,164,609

SUBJECT Operations of Refineries/Effect of Use of Soviet Crude Oil/Jet Fuel Production

DATE DISTR. 23 Aug 60

NO. PAGES Two

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 the three major refineries confiscated by the Castro regime are operating in fairly good shape. Their principal problem is that the Soviet crude being supplied is very light and they cannot run as much volume because gas pressure builds up. The Esso refinery, for example, has a capacity of 36 thousand bbls per day on heavy crude, but 26 thousand bbls per day is the best they have been able to do on the Soviet crude, and it has been running at a rate of only 20 thousand bbls per day since 20 Jul 60.

2. The Soviet crude available to date has been compatible with the refineries and will not damage them, but in addition to not being able to get as much volume, the refineries cannot get as much fuel oil because of light ends. This is true of all three major refineries.

3. The refineries were designed for 26 gravity crude which is fairly heavy. The Soviet crude is 33 gravity, and has caused an imbalance in that they are now producing more gasoline than is needed. As a consequence, Cuba is searching desperately for fuel oil. The USSR has said that it is not in a position to supply fuel oil and so Cuba has turned toward Mexico, even to the extent of attempting to arrange deals whereby they will trade gasoline for fuel oil.

4. The imbalance of gasoline is indicated by the fact that the Cabaiguán refinery was shut down recently because its gasoline storage was completely filled.

5. Cuba will reach a critical point about 1 Sep 60. The Esso refinery slowed down from 26 thousand bbls per day to 20 thousand bbls per day because it had only a 10-day supply of crude. The supply on hand was sufficient to last only until 14 Aug, but around 11 Aug the refinery was supposed to receive a shipment of 80 thousand barrels of crude. However, this is only enough to operate four days.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

19 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,164,652
SUBJECT	Shortage of Lubricating Oil/ Operating Supplies for Refineries/ Ship Bunkerage	DATE DISTR.	23 Aug 60
		NO. PAGES	Two
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Aug 60		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Havana/Aug 60		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. As of Aug 60 there is a shortage of lubricating oil in Cuba which will become critical in a fairly short time. Great efforts have been made by the Castro regime to obtain lubricating oil from US suppliers, and a vessel, the Mar Caribe, has visited a number of US ports attempting to obtain the oil. However, it has been refused everywhere and had to return to Cuba in ballast. As of 10 Aug 60 it is loading molasses for delivery to Boston, and will then proceed to Montreal in an attempt to obtain lubricating oil.

2. A former Esso employee, Frank García, left Cuba on 2 Aug 60 for Mexico to try to obtain lubricating oil. He is going to visit the Mobile blending plant, PEMEX, and several others.

3. A US national Robt. Wallace, Tulsa, Okla. recently employed by ICP to attempt to arrange for the purchase of necessary supplies and spare parts for the oil industry has been traveling throughout the SW part of the US, also attempting to arrange for lubricating oil, but with no success. This individual is such an unsavory character that it is not beyond the bounds of probability that he might "go south" with the funds entrusted to him, which are considerable.

4. There are 20 principal types of lubricating oil needed for the total economy, and the actual status of supply of each is not known. They may be completely out of some and have six months supply of others. However, the general story is that there is a "one month supply" of lubricating oil available.

5. Lubricants for power plants, transportation, and communications are the primary concern. They are in critically short supply in diesel lubricants for engines and heavy equipment, and turbine oil for power plants.

6. There is no lubricating oil manufactured on the island although the Castro regime is trying to set up a plant. However, this is a long range project and takes a lot of time and money.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,164,653

SUBJECT Friction in New Management of Esso Refinery

DATE DISTR. 23 Aug 60

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. On 1 Jul 60 the Castro regime intervened the Esso refinery in Cuba. The interventor appointed was Commander Olivio Pino, a career officer in the Cuban Navy. The number two man is (fnu) Guardia, about 35, a former marketing analyst in the office of the company. As of Aug 60 there is evidence of definite friction between Pino and Guardia.

2. Commander Pino is an intelligent, affable, and hospitable personality. He wears a business suit, and to the best of my knowledge has never worn a "barbudo" beard.

3. Guardia, on the other hand, is a real hard-core Communist, who feels that Pino is too soft and not revolutionary enough. Guardia wants to take a hard line toward the employees. He wants to cut salaries and "get things in line." Pino knows that such abrupt changes would result in a drastic drop in efficiency, and would alienate employees who are at least neutral at present.

4. There are indications that Pino recently told Guardia in effect to stay in the office and keep his mouth shut.

5. Pino is directly under Alfredo Gutiérrez of ICP, and both are friends and associates of Fidel Castro, not Raúl, or "Che" Guevara. If something happens to Fidel, both Pino and Gutiérrez would definitely be replaced quickly, because they are not the hard-boiled Party line type.

-end-

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 7 SEP 1960

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-A-3164654

SUBJECT Leonel de Paula Arias, Oil Industry Procurement Agent (Biographic)

DATE DISTR. 17 Aug 60

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Aug 60 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Havana/Aug 60 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, graduate engineer, an official on the staff of a large oil company.

Source has had years of experience in company operations outside the US and has been located in Cuba for many years. [Source is normally available for reinterrogation should this report generate additional requirements.]

1. In Aug 60 the Castro regime sent two representatives to the US to attempt to obtain replacement parts and machinery for the oil industry. One of these men is Julio Caunedo, on the staff of ICP, and the second is Leonel de Paula Arias, a former employee of Esso Standard Oil SA.

2. De Paula is about 28-29 years old, 6'1", 180 lbs. He has black curly hair and fair skin. He is married and I believe has one child. He is a Roman Catholic; and has never been considered as having any left-wing inclinations.

3. De Paul speaks excellent English, and I believe studied in the US. He has a degree in engineering and worked three years with the Esso refinery, mainly in maintenance and construction. As of Jul 60 he was section head of the Refining Department, Purchasing and Warehousing.

4. The choice of de Paula to go to the US to obtain necessary supplies is sound because he is the man which the company would have chosen to do such a job if required. He has a reputation of being a good hard worker, intelligent and dependable. He has a pleasant personality and handles himself very well.

5. De Paula was considered one of the better men of the plant and could be classed as a key technician because of his knowledge, background, and ability, and it would definitely hurt the Castro regime if he fled Cuba. However, the opportunities for employment in the oil industry in Latin America are not good because there is considerable prejudice against Cubans on the part of other countries in which there are refining operations.

-end-

6 SEP 1960

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC				

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOFORN NO DISSEM ABROAD LIMITED

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CROZIER, ROSS LESTER
C-25507

INCLUSIVE DATES: /

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/OA

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN
25507 (CROZIER)

PERSONAL INFORMATION IN

25507 (CROZIER)

C-82712 sister-in-law of Subject
C-82713 wife of Subject

These two cases are requests for CSA.

We are forwarding the original of this request to the Office of Security, but since the husband of one of the subject's is under such DEEP COVER, we are setting up files and cards on those attached.

Files set up per Mr. Brewer's instructions to me on 26 Apr 60.

pat

Copy for Husbands file C-25507 made

14-00000

S E C R E T

DATE: 15 April 1960
mc

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C# 25507
OS# 112569

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

ATTACHMENTS (if any): Copy of WHD memo and PRQ part II.

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 15 Apr 60	CASE NO. C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
✓	FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ original TO SECURITY OFFICE w/PRQ II		REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*		REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
	PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW		PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓	FILE Copy WHD memo w/PRQ II		NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
	TICKLE FOR:		OTHER

REMARKS:

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

12 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

1. It is requested that the CSA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH and later amended to cover his use in Mexico under Project LIEDGE, be further amended to cover his PCS to Headquarters. His activity in or around the Washington, D.C. area will also be covered under the LIEDGE Project.

2. Attached is a new PRQ, Part II to cover his activity in the United States. NOEMAYR will continue to live under cover and will probably be reassigned overseas after a two year tour at Headquarters.

3. CSA's are being requested under separate cover on his wife and sister-in-law who are also living with him.

J. C. King
Chief, WHD

Note: Additional thermofax copy sent to S.O. per request of Evan Highley 8 July 60

SECRET

SECRET

30 June 1959 par

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico - Larry Sulc

SUBJECT: Ross Lester CROZIER

1. Reference is made to your request to this office dated 17 April 1958.

2. The reply to your request is contained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security dated 29 June 1959.

Chief, CI/OA

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 30 June 59	CASE NO. C-25507

TO Processing Branch: TAKE ACTION INDICATED BELOW ON SUBJECT CASE
(Always check "Remarks" for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR POA: ☐ EXPEDITE S.O. INDICES ☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

SET UP FOR:
☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ STAFF TYPE "A" ☐ STAFF TYPE "B" ☐ PROP APP ☐ SP INQUIRY ☐ GOV'T N. CHK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
CHECK FOR S.O. ☐ INDICES ☐ FBI INDICES	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC DATA
✓ FORWARD copy of S.O. memo ~~ATTACHMENT~~ TO DIVISION (WH/Mexico)	REQUEST "GREEN LIST"
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICE	REQUEST RESULTS STAFF "D" DOSSIER REVIEW
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM *(See "Remarks" for Reason)*	REQUEST RESULTS TECH INTERROGATION FROM: ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	PREPARE MEMO RE "EXPIRED" POA
PREPARE INDEX CARD FOR NAME(S) LISTED BELOW	PREPARE —— COPIES OF ATTACHED FOR USE AS BELOW
✓ FILE Orig S.O. memo dtd 29 June 59	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL
TICKLE FOR:	✓ OTHER

REMARKS:

T - 30 July 59
(Supplementary S.O. memo)

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-58 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (21)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

29 JUN 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to a memorandum dated 17 April 1958 from WH Division through CI/OA requesting that the Covert Security Approval granted on 3 July 1957 be amended to permit Subject's utilization as a career agent in Mexico City under Project LIEDGE.

This will confirm the verbal Covert Security Approval granted to Mr. Larry Sulc, WH Division on 3 June 1958 for the use described above.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon
for Robert H. Cunningham

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

29 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMPHODARCH/2
C-25507

1. On 23 April 1958 Mr. Lou Hamby of the Office of Security called in connection with the above designated case, specifically regarding the contingencies upon which the CSA dated 3 July 1957 was granted.

2. Mr. Hamby advised that the investigation of Subject has been completed and he has been given an LCFLUTTER, both with favorable results.

3. In view of the foregoing the restrictions (contingencies) in the 3 July 1957 approval are now removed. WH Division has been notified.

4. Jim Burton, Project Branch CI/OA, was given the above information also. He advised FI/Projects in order that further action could be taken in connection with the Project renewal.

John B. Brewer
CI/OA

CI/OA/JBB:rc

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 14 May 1958	CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________	✓	OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Please prepare tickler for 5 June 1958.

James R. Burton
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

14 May 1958

RE: Project LIEOGE
C-25507

1. Miss Emily Brockenbrough, FI/Projects, telephoned the writer to report that FI intends to hold up final processing of the subject project until a determination is reached by the Office of Security concerning the request for a Covert Security Approval authorizing the agent's assignment in Mexico City.

2. The writer agreed to advise FI/Projects when CI/OA receives a report from the Office of Security.

FI/Projects advised
per above on
23 May 1958.
JPB

DATE: 14 May 1958 BY: James P. Burton

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

CI/OA PROJECT REVIEW FORM

Cryptonym....LIEDGE....Division....WH....Station..Mexico

Type of Project.Provide Mexico City Station with career agent to be used as C/O handling CP operations.

Case Officer..Louis Puckett....Room.2121 EH....Ext..2555.....

New Project...X.....;Renewal of.......year-old project..........;

Amendment...........;Extension for.......months; termination.......

Project approval period from...1 May 1958.....to....30 April 1959.....

Recommendations:

1. CI/OA recommends approval on condition the agent Harold R. NOEMAYR receives, from the Office of Security, a Covert Security Approval for his new assignment in Mexico City and the results of his LCFLUTTER are satisfactorily resolved. Also, on condition that should the Office of Security request a clearance and LCFLUTTER on this agent's wife, a clearance is issued and LCFLUTTER results are satisfactorily resolved.

2. A new request for CSA for Subject's use in Mexico City was submitted to the Office of Security on 24 April 1958. When the Office of Security issued Subject's last CSA on 3 July 1957, they recommended that Subject be afforded a polygraph as soon as possible. Subject was given an LCFLUTTER a few days ago and although Subject ran clean the polygraph operator began getting some reaction, or hits, regarding the Subject's wife. There is some derogatory information in the Office of Security on what is believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law.

3. The Office of Security has not reached a final decision regarding CSA and LCFLUTTER for Subject's wife. They have stated, however, that unless the wife can be cleared and LCFLUTTER results are clean, it is doubtful whether a new clearance would be issued for the career agent.

Date of Evaluation....29 April 1958.........

Maurice S. Brady
CI/OA Reviewing Officer

Chief, CI/OA

Distribution:
1 - FI/Projects
1 - CI/OA Project file
1 - C 25507 ✓

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 4/29/57	CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓	FORWARD orig ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
✓	FILE copy attach memo.		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________		OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

orig of WH/III memo forwarded to Security 24 April 1958.

(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112565

It is requested that the OSA granted Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHODARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. NOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LI[illegible] which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of NOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APR 23 3 27 PM '58

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (items 35 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Harold R. NOEMAYER (p) - (formerly Arthur G. VAIVADA)

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified. His transfer to and activity in Mexico will be covered by Project LIEDGE.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes **To whom?** Record over the past years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-658
MAY 1950

40. **With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?**

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. **What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?**

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. **For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?**

KUBARK

43. **Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.**

While in the US Army and U.S.A.F. from 1940 - 1945 and again from 1946 - 1949, Subject was concerned with intelligence.

44. **What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.**

None except through agents which he handles.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

It is anticipated Subject will be an outside case officer for the Mexico City Station, handling Communist and Marxist party operations. Subject will also act as a spotter and recruiter.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

Subject received intelligence training by the Army. He was given covert training by KUBARK from 5 October through 25 November 1953, and again from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. Additional training will be given him at Headquarters from 21 April through 23 May 1958.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

His principal function will be that of handling and spotting agents.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

As per his contract, Subject receives the regular salary of a GS-12, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No. See contract signed by Subject as a Career Agent.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

He has native fluency in Spanish. For this reason he might pass as a long-time resident and possibly even as a national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although he has obvious foreign physical characteristics.

51. **What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?**

Middle class

52. **What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?**

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. **Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.**

All noted excellent

54. **With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.**

None.

55. **What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?**

Subject can send and receive morse code.

56. **Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.**

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Case officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPROVAL REQUEST

DATE 11 April 1958

PROJECT

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT. : Mr. Rice 2613 I bldg
FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT :
C C-25507
NO. 112569

1. TYPE OF REQUEST

☐ POA ☐ OA ☒ CSA ☐ PROP. A. ☐ CSC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING

☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED
BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III/Mexico representatives in safehouse.

6. USE OF SUBJECT

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF

☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☐ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION

☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES

RI TRACES

GREEN LIST INITIATED ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS ☐ PRQ-PART I ☐ OTHER: memo

12. REMARKS

Thomas Carroll Jr.

INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 REPLACES FORM 58-60 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 JUN 58

SECRET

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 Apr 58	CASE NO. C-25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FOI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☑ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RI TRACES
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING	REQUEST FIELD TRACES
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY	REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM	FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES	REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
FILE	SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ________	✓ OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

Use: For briefing by CI/ICD and WH/III Mexico representatives in safehouse.

GWNoble
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 58

SECRET

(21)

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE: WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Louis D. Puckett, Ext. 2555, 3162

PROJECT : OCA, Mexico City Station Allotment No. 8-3570-83-599

REFERENCE : R 45-1025, 25 June 1956

Type of safehouse requested: Office

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. - Business area

Maximum Price Range: $50/week

Occupancy from: 21 April 1958 To: 23 May 1958

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) career agent and personnel from the CI Staff and WH/III/Mexico. The agent will live elsewhere, not in the safehouse. The agent is a U. S. citizen, 36 years old. Sensitive material will be in the safehouse during the day. None will be left overnight. A tape recorder for play back will be used there during the day and will be stored overnight.

Cover Arrangement: Subject is a U. S. citizen - his cover is that of employee of Public Surveys Institute, (a notional polling firm) in Dallas, Texas. During a recent operational trip he took photographs which have appeared in the New York Times and the New York Daily Mirror. He has in the past sold news stories and fiction. His family will live at Presidential Gardens Apartments, Alexandria, Virginia, during the agent's stay in the Washington area.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REFERENCE No 733
CHARGE TO ALLOTMENT No 8/3570-83-599

Funds are available:

AUTHORIZING OFFICER

SECRET
CI/OA

COMMENTS:

A meeting in Security office was held with the following present.

C. Rice – Security SSD
B. Pearson – Security SSD
C. Phelan – Polygraph group
M. Reynolds – WH Div
H. MacAuley – WH Div.
W. Odum – CI Staff

Purpose of the meeting to discuss polygraph program for Subject

S.O. will work out details for WH and Subject will probably be brought to Miami for the poly-

questions re Subject
1) I&R has a file on Subject
2) question re wife

DATE: 9 Dec 1957 BY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Attachment:
so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

MICROFILMED
DEC 6 1957

SECRET

NO. 388 REPLACES FORM 38-46 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
JUN 55

(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 11 July 57	CASE NO. C- 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
✓	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION 1 Cy [illegible] S. [illegible]		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM.		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
	FILE		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ______ DAYS UNTIL ____________	✓	OTHER *(See Remarks)*

REMARKS:

Send to Chief WH/III
(Eyes only)

____
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred Hall
for
Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

124

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE: 3 JUL 1957

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507 Crozier, Ross Lester
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHOMARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia CHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Geo H Hall
Robert H. Cunningham

This data is the property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Security Office.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

16 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 20 February 1957 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

SO memo 2 April 1957/par

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, CI/CA

DATE: 2 APR 1957

FROM : Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall
Fred H. Hall

SECRET

SECRET

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25507

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Cel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMPHODARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

to SO
3/18/57

SECRET

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND (OR) NAME CHECK

DATE: 28 February 1957

TO : Deputy Director of Security
ATT: Mr. Rice 2613 I

FROM : Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT : C: C-25507
NO. #112569

PROJECT:

PCSA requested by
15 March 1957.

1. TYPE OF REQUEST: PCSA &

☐	POA	☐	OA	☒	CSA	☐	PROP. A.	☐	CRC

2. METHOD OF HANDLING: ☐ EXPEDITE ☐ ROUTINE

3. INDICES RESULTS REQUESTED BY

4. FBI CHECK REQUESTED
BY (Date)

5. AREA OF SUBJECT'S ASSIGNMENT
(WH/III/Cuba)

6. USE OF SUBJECT
see remarks

7. INVESTIGATION NOT TO REVEAL INTEREST OF: ☐ U. S. GOVERNMENT ☐ CIA ☐ SEE REMARKS

8. COVER SUGGESTED FOR INVESTIGATION: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ OTHER:

9. RESULTS OF TRACES

FIELD TRACES
NDI

RI TRACES
NDI

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ-PART I ☒ OTHER: PHS

12. REMARKS

6. Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized a the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

Thomas Carroll, Jr.
lms INITIALS

FORM NO. 693 1 APR 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 27 Feb. 57	CASE NO. 25507

TO: Processing Section

PLEASE TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION ON THE CASE SET FORTH ABOVE.
(Always check "Remarks" below for limitations or details)

SET UP FOR:

POA WITH:

☐ EXPEDITE INDICES FOR ☐ EXPEDITE FBI CHECK FOR

SET UP FOR:

☐ OA ☐ CSA ☐ PCSA ☐ PROP APP ☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY ☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RI TRACES
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST OPERATIONAL & DIV. TRACES
	INVESTIGATION STILL OUTSTANDING		REQUEST FIELD TRACES
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II
✓	FORWARD ~~ATTACHMENT~~ TO SECURITY originals PHS ~~+ [illegible]~~ dtd: 27 Feb 57		REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFO
	NOTICE: ☐ 1ST ☐ 2ND ☐ 3RD & FINAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	PREPARE CANCELLATION FORM		FURNISH GREEN LIST INFORMATION
	SEND TO RI/ARCHIVES		REQUEST RESULTS OF TECH. INTERROGATION
~~✓~~	~~FILE carbon copies of PHS + 772~~ ~~dtd 27 Feb 57~~		SEND "QUERY" MEMO TO DIVISION
	EXTEND POA FOR ____ DAYS UNTIL ____		OTHER (See Remarks)

REMARKS:

~~Proc. Branch~~

~~[illegible]~~

BRM
(SIGNATURE)

FORM NO. 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 FEB 56

SECRET

(21)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL	DATE 26 February 1957 PROJECT

TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA	
SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME Ross Lester CORZIER	C-25507	
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Arthur G. VAIVADA		

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE *(Full details)*

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL 15 March
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*	☐	OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☒	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐	GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☒	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐	WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐	NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐	GOVERNMENT	☐	ACADEMIC
☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD	☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER Hugh [illegible] MacAuley	EXTENSION 2056 1021 Barton	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF W. Galbraith

(9)

SECRET

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss ~~Mr.~~ Mrs. Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

Telephone None
Office
Ext. None
Home

PRESENT ADDRESS 5th Street 655, (St. and Number) Havana (City) (Vedado) (State) Cuba (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) Costa Rica (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NA

HOW LONG? NA IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS NA

NA NA

C. DATE OF BIRTH (When) 20 June 1922 PLACE OF BIRTH DeKalb, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP US (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? NA

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. NA ISSUED NA (Date) BY NA (Court)

AT NA (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) NA (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? NA TO NA ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? NA (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NA

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NA GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? NA ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? NA

LAST U. S. VISA NA (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 34 SEX M HEIGHT 6'2" WEIGHT 175

EYES Blue HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Ruddy SCARS None

BUILD Slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES Nose broken-to left

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE No MARRIED Yes DIVORCED No WIDOWED No

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE 17 Dec. 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE San Jose, Costa Rica (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655 Vedado, Habana, Cuba (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 15/3/18 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? San Jose, C.R. (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA (Date) TO NA (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

NA

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME Ross Arnulfo Crozier RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 6½
CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Lillian Caridad Crozier RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP US ADDRESS 5th St., No. 655, Habana, Cuba
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE
CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Lester Earl Crozier
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Mar. 15 1900 PLACE OF BIRTH Palestine Illinois USA
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Truckdriver LAST EMPLOYER Self-employed

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM 1917 TO 1919 BRANCH OF SERVICE US Army
(Date) (Date)

Theatre: France-Belgium DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Elizabeth Lorene McKibben
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS RR No. 1 Tampico Illinois USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 1903 PLACE OF BIRTH La Moille, Illinois USA
(City) (State) (Country)

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? above
(City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Unknown (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM NA TO NA BRANCH OF SERVICE NA

COUNTRY NA DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

None

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME James (First) Earl (Middle) Crosier (Last) AGE 27
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME Irma (First) Lilly (Middle) Crosier (Last) AGE 32
   PRESENT ADDRESS RR No. 1 (St. and Number) Tampico, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME Blanche (First) Elaine (Middle) Crosier (Last) AGE 30
   PRESENT ADDRESS 1900 Canal St., (St. and Number) Rock Falls, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME Morris (First) Edwin (Middle) Crosier (Last) AGE 24
   PRESENT ADDRESS 804½ 1st Ave., (St. and Number) Sterling, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country) US (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME NA (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Alberto (First) (Middle) Cordero Loizia (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Dec. DATE OF DECEASE Oct. 26, '43 CAUSE Cerebral Hem.

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) (State) Costa Rica (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1894 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Musician LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Dora (First) (Middle) Cordero Calderon (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE NA CAUSE NA

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) Costa Rica (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Sept. 7, 1893 PLACE OF BIRTH San Jose, Costa Rica

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? Above (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Norma Cordero de Gregor RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 24

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Box 2655, (St. and Number) Cristobal, (City) C. Z. (State) (Country)

2. NAME Isabel Cordero de Naranjo RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 27

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS Plaza Viquez, (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) (State) Costa Rica (Country)

3. NAME Consuelo Cordero Calderon RELATIONSHIP sister-in-law AGE 29

CITIZENSHIP Costa Rican ADDRESS San Juan Tibas, (St. and Number) San Jose, (City) (State) Costa Rica (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT: NONE

1. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) NA (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

2. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) NA (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

3. NAME NA RELATIONSHIP NA AGE NA

CITIZENSHIP NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) NA (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) NA

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR NA

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ NA
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY Yes and also

FREQUENTLY when necessary., CONSTANTLY No

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. Yes

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES Yes, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES Yes

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:
Preference for Latin America and Spain

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL Elwood ADDRESS DeKalb, (City) Illinois, (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1926-1934 GRADUATE? Yes

HIGH SCHOOL DeKalb Township ADDRESS DeKalb, (City) Illinois (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1935-1939 GRADUATE? Yes

COLLEGE University of Costa Rica ADDRESS San Jose, (City) Costa Rica (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics Economic Theory YEARS COMPLETED four

DATES ATTENDED 1949-1953 DEGREE Not yet

COLLEGE Univ. of San Carlos ADDRESS Guatemala City, Guatemala (City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics YEARS COMPLETED studies interrupted.

DATES ATTENDED 1954 Jan-May 1 DEGREE No

University of Habana--one year, 1954-55, Habana, Cuba
CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS
Political Economy, Principles of Administration, Sociology, General Mathematics, Economic History, Psychology, Statistics, Financial Math, Economic Doctrines, Labor Law, Credit-Money & Banking, Public Treasury, ~~CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS~~ Prices, Public Administration, Advanced Algebra, Biodemographic Statistics, Accounting I, Theory of Occupation (Employment) and Labor Unions and Coops.

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Dates of Service)

Albrook Field, C. Z. (Last Station) 16001320 (Serial Number) Honorable (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS: None

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER None ADDRESS NA

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS None

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 1940 TO 1949 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USA, USAF

ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB NA SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Intelligence NCO—Assists in collection, evaluation, interpretation and distribution of information of enemy and counterintelligence activities and the safeguarding of military information.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and termination of WW II.

FROM Jan 45-Aprl 46 TO CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY United States Naval Air Station

ADDRESS Coco Solo, Canal Zone (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Supply Station NAME OF SUPERVISOR Unknown

TITLE OF JOB Leadingman Labor SALARY $ 12.88 PER day

YOUR DUTIES Loading and unloading naval supply ships with native labor maintaining existent stocks in order, handling salvage and/or destruction of equipment.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Resigned to re-enlist in the USAF

FROM April 18, 1946 Apr. 18, 1949 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) T/Sgt.

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY USAF

ADDRESS Albrook Field, Canal Zone
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence NCO SALARY $ NA PER NA

YOUR DUTIES Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command. Organize and maintain files, study and prepare timely political analysis of Caribbean and South American republics.

REASONS FOR LEAVING ETS and to study Political Economy at the University of Costa Rica.

FROM Apr. 18, 1949 TO Mar. 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Free-lance photography and student.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS part-time Photo. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Self-employed

TITLE OF JOB none SALARY $ Variable PER

YOUR DUTIES NA

REASONS FOR LEAVING Employed by following agency.....

FROM March 1953 TO June 1953 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) unknown

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government.

ADDRESS San Jose, Costa Rica
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR Dr. Cesar Dondoli

TITLE OF JOB Photographer SALARY $ part time PER

YOUR DUTIES Design and direct a photographic laboratory for technical work in geology, both for the Costa Rican Government and the University of Costa Rica.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Termination of work—a temporary position

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE	English	SPEAK	Fluent	READ	Fluent	WRITE	Fluent
LANGUAGE	Spanish	SPEAK	Fluent	READ	Fluent	WRITE	Fair
LANGUAGE		SPEAK		READ		WRITE	

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Fishing, fresh water and sea. Sailboating, Hunting, Archery. Football in HS and USAF. Track, HS and USAF; High jump, broad jump and Discus; National record in Guatemala 1954 in Discus. Pistol (Expert). Chess. Jungle lore. Photography—freelance and commercial.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Particular position, no. In general, my study and experience has been almost entirely in Latin American areas, in their universities and government. In military service, I would naturally qualify for a position in political-economic intelligence. In civil service, this must be convertible to one or more departments, of which I have no knowledge as to particular positions. [illegible], any position that entails political-economic analysis in Latin American areas.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

Some experience in radio; send and receive 15-20 wpm Morse International, key and blinker. Operated motion picture projectors—Simplex 35mm and about all 16mm makes. Photo reproduction equipment, including laboratory microphotography.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 40 SHORTHAND No

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. NO

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE NA

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) NA

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

(1) All written work in political-economy was classified.

(2) None

(3) None

(4) None

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

None

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

None

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. W/O Francis Williams
BUS. ADD. Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio
RES. ADD. 5846 Access Rd., Dayton Ohio

2. Howard Mck Couse
BUS. ADD. Prospect at Little Neck Rd., Box 245
RES. ADD. Centerport, LI, N. Y.

3. Donald Page
BUS. ADD. Elgin Watch Co., Elgin, Illinois
RES. ADD. 525 S. Edison Elgin Illinois

4. Col. C. J. Stattler
BUS. ADD. Pentagon Bldg.
RES. ADD. 4550 Conn. Ave., Washington 8, D. C.

5. Edward A, Marelius
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 3333 Toronto St., Falls Church, Va.

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Wilford A. Pyle
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 12119 S. Hastings Dr., Norwalk, Cal.

2. Tom Oakland
BUS. ADD. Hopewell Junction, New York
RES. ADD.

3. Milo Edwards
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. Box 63 Kingston Illinois

4. Joseph Perkovich
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 532 Grove St. DeKalb Illinois

5. Guy Shifflet
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. RFD No. 3 Staunton Va.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Helen Buchanan
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 5008 7th St., NW, Washington 11, D.C.

2. Maria Fama
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 5010 7th St., NW, Washington 11, D.C.

3. Others not recalled.
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME NA

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NY, BRANCH — Av. 23, No. 152, Havana, Cuba

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: NA

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S. All credit references are
1. NAME foreign since I have not lived in the US since 1940. ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME NA ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

				(St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM	Nov. 1955	TO	Present	Calle 5 No. 655 Vedado Habana, Cuba
FROM	Apr. 1955	TO	Nov. 1955	Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado Habana, Cuba
FROM	Nov. 1954	TO	Apr. 1955	Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado Habana, Cuba
FROM	Aug. 1954	TO	Nov. 1954	Calle 3, No. 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
FROM	May 1954	TO	Aug. 1954	San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
FROM	Jan. 1954	TO	May 1954	7th Ave. N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City.
FROM	Jul. 1953	TO	Jan. 1954	5008 7th St. NW, Washington 11, D. C.
FROM	Apr. 1949	TO	Jul. 1953	San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

(All prior residence was military service—back to [illegible].)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

				(City or section)	(Country)	(Purpose)
A. FROM	Aug 40	TO	Nov 41	Fort Bragg, N. C.		60th Field Art.
FROM	Dec 41	TO	Mar 44	Canal Zone, Panama		USAF
FROM	Nov 44	TO	June 45	India-Burma-China theatre.		USAF
FROM	Dec 45	TO	Apr 49	Albrook Field, C. Z.		USAF
FROM	Apr 49	TO	July 53	San Jose, Costa Rica		Student

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Club Universitario, Av 3ra, Miramar, Habana, Cuba (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1954-55 academic year

2. Club Nautico de [illegible] (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) Habana (State) Cuba (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: January 1956—current

3. NA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. ____
(Name NA and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______________________

5. ____
(Name NA and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______________________

6. ____
(Name and NA Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______________________

7. ____
(Name NA and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ______________________

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? NO

IF "YES," EXPLAIN: NA

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes **IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?** Social-moderate

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

None

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Investigation (Loyalty check for security) in USAF 1944.

Again for USAF in 1946.

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Argentina Crozier RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS Calle 5 No 655 Vedado, (St. and Number) Habana, Cuba (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Habana, Cuba (City and State) DATE 24 July 1956

(Witness) ROSS L. CROZIER (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

Section 15 (Cont)

From June 53 to Dec. 53

Student. University of____________, Washington, D. C.

Reasons for leaving: Termination of course.

From Jan 54 to May 54.

Student. University of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guat.

Reasons for leaving: political disturbances.

From Jul 54 to present.

Student. University of Habana, School of Economic Sciences.

Section 23 (Cont)

From Jan 54 to May 54.	Guatemala City, Guatemala.	Student
From July 54 to present.	Habana, Cuba	Student.

S/ Ross L. Crozier

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI/OA/JRBurton:re (27/12/56)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - FI/Training
1 - D/Training
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/R&A
2 - CI/OA

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Date: 13 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/R&A
CI/OPS

SUBJECT: **Request for Covert Training**
Project: AMPHODARCH (FI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Attached are separate comments sheets for each CI Division listed above. Any comments you may have after reviewing the attached request for training, which was submitted by WH/III/Cuba, should be recorded on the comment sheet provided.

2. When you have indicated your comments on the sheet provided, send this by hand to the next person on the routing sheet.

3. Your comments will be consolidated into a memorandum to the WH Division over the signature of the Chief, CI Staff. This memorandum will be prepared by CI/OA. When this consolidated memorandum omits or contradicts one of your comments, CI/OA will so inform you.

4. If you feel that this request should receive further coordination within CI Staff, simply add the person's name or symbol to the routing sheet and forward, by hand. Routing outside of CI Staff can only be made by CI/OA.

Thomas Carroll Jr.
THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

Attachments:

CI/R+A

Re: AMPHODARCH/Arthur G. VAIVADA

CI Staff notes that training for VAIVADA is scheduled to commence on the same date in the same city as the training scheduled for Colonel PEREZ and Lt. CASTANO of the Cuban BRAC. This situation seems inherently dangerous and unwarranted by the circumstances as known to CI Staff. Pending further justification CI Staff cannot concur in the training as requested, but would of course concur in the training for VAIVADA if the locale were shifted to another city such as New York.

(This is basically an operational or an operational security matter. CI/R&A/TRB therefore urges that CI/OPS/WH and CI/OA discuss the problem with the desk, and resolve it if possible. CI/R&A/TRB will of course defer to CI/OPS AND CI/OA in this matter.)

DATE: 14 Dec. 56

JMBenton

COMMENTS: /

CI/OPS

CI/OPS/WH does not concur with the CI/R & A recommendations as set forth for the following reasons:

1. The security compromise would only stem from the two BRAC officers identifying the VAIVADA affiliation and training on behalf of this Agency. This appears extremely remote as the desk advised there is no indication that the BRAC officers know VAIVADA either by name or sight.

2. While VAIVADA is being trained, his wife will be attending citizenship classes in D.C. preparing for her citizenship examination before returning to Cuba. Consequently, it would be a financial drain for VAIVADA to stay in New York City and his wife in D.C. In addition, certain per diem costs would be incurred by the Case Officer traveling to New York City to monitor some of the OTR training.

3. The desk will instruct OTR of this joint training aspect and as a precautionary measure, request that training sites, hours, etc. do not overlap.

DATE: 1 Dec 1976

Robert L. Brown

CI/OA

AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED FOR ARTHUR G. VAIUADA ON 19 JULY 1949; A NEW OPERATIONAL APPROVAL WAS ISSUED ON 22 JULY 1954. CI/OA CONCURS IN THE APPROVAL OF THE WH DIVISION TRAINING REQUEST DATED 4-DEC-1956.

DATE: 27 DEC. -56 BY: James R. Burton

SECRET

SECR

20 December 1956

TO : C/CI/OA

FROM : C/CI/ICD

SUBJECT: : Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA of 4 December 1956

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA has worked principally, and successfully so, on CP penetration operations since employment by the Agency. His current work involves the handling of a net of CP penetration agents and informants. ICD concurs in general with the projected training scheduled for subject but recommends that considerable emphasis specifically be placed on anti-CP penetration operations (i.e., principles and practices of penetration of the international Communist movement).

2. In addition, subject should also be given materials and briefings on Communism in his area of operations. It is suggested that he be given the following materials to study and discuss during the phase of training recommended above: "The Operational Pattern of International Communism in Latin America" (a paper prepared by CI/ICD) and "The Communist Movement of Cuba" (a paper prepared by Miss Anne Kendall). These materials may be borrowed either from CI/ICD/WH (Hein) or from WH/III/Cuba (Roland).

3. Should OTR contemplate presenting in any form any of the CP penetration case studies contained in FHB 52-865-4 ("The CP Penetration Program" - Issue No. 4) to subject during the training sessions, CI/ICD (Hein - extension 3919) should be consulted. Some of the material in FHB 52-865-4 directly concerns VAIVADA's previous operational work.

CI/ICD/GHein:gmh
(20 December 1956)

Distribution: Original & 1 - addressee
1 - Hein
1 - Chrono
1 - ICD/WH

SECRET

4 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief for Covert Training, OS/TR

FROM : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Request for Covert Training

Project: AMPHODARCH (FI)
Pseudonym: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Request initiated by WH/III/Cuba

2. Project Approval - Agent Clearance

   a. Project AMPHODARCH last approved for renewal on 5 October 1956.

   b. P/A VAIVADA has operational clearance dated 19 July 1949.

3. Agent Status

Contract (contemplate change to staff status in near future).

4. Agent Nationality

United States citizen (by birth).

5. Operations Officer

James B. Noland, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

Alternate Operations Officer

Hugh O. MacAuley, known to student by true name. Office: 1021 Barton Hall, Extension 2056.

6. Training Date

Training to commence on 14 January for period of approximately six weeks.

7. Biographic Information

Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl, in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he reenlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

Late in 1948 he had been recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 he became a CIA contract agent. It was originally planned that he be used in Panama, but he was assigned instead to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica. While there, he successfully handled a high-level penetration of the Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been under student cover and has worked for his B.A. degree at the University of Habana.

Subject is happily married and is the father of two children. He is fluent in Spanish and is well qualified to continue work in his area of operations as shown by his past performance. He is also very versatile and has a wide range of outside interests, including sports, photography, outdoor life, and many others.

8. Previous Training

VAIVADA previously received covert training at Headquarters during the period 5 October through 25 November 1953, under the training alias of "VICKS." The training was of a comprehensive nature.

9. Project Objective - Area of Assignment

Objective of Project AMPHODARCH is to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

10. Cover - Operational Duties

VAIVADA's present cover consists of being a graduate student at the University of Habana. Efforts are currently underway to obtain a new cover as representative in Habana of a well-known U.S. polling agency. Subject's duties are those of a P/A handling a rather large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban University-youth circles with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters. He reports directly to the Habana Station.

11. Training Cover

Consultation in connection with proposed new polling cover (see above) combined with vacation and acquisition of citizenship for wife (would explain time spent in Washington).

12. Availability for Training

Student will be available for training on a full-time basis.

13. Special Problems

No particular problems anticipated.

14. Subjects to be Covered

Refresher course in Clandestine Intelligence Operations.

15. Technical Training Requirements

Only those falling within prescribed Operations Course, if any.

16. Visits to Overt CIA Installations

None, past or present.

17. Special Attributes to be Evaluated

General suitability only. Subject's performance has been outstanding.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

13 Dec Approval [illegible]

Senior Staff Training Officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB **DATE:** 15 OCT 1954

FROM : Chief, Special Security Division

SUBJECT: C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your request dated 21 July 1954 for a recommendation as to whether an Operational Clearance should be granted to permit the Subject's use as an Agent in Costa Rica under unindicated cover.

2. The attached information is furnished as an aid in determining whether or not the Subject should be used in the requested capacity.

3. In view of the fact that Subject has resided outside the United States since, at least, 1945 no field investigation was scheduled in this case.

4. This memorandum pertains only to this proposed assignment. It is requested that this office be informed of your decision in this case. The attached material should be returned to the writer in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" when it has served its purpose.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

OCT 15 9 12 AM '54

Attachment:
NCD dtd 28 September 1954

This data is property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

File
OC already issued

SECRET

SECRET

FI/STC/SPB

15 OCT 1954

Chief, Special Security Division

C-25507
#112569

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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

Attachment:
MCD dtd 28 September 1954

SECRET

S E SECRET

COVERT NAME CHECK REPORT

OOC

DATE: 28 September 1954

SUBJECT: R. L. G. 112569 OC

In accordance with your request, a covert name check was conducted on Subject with results as indicated below:

AGENCY	RETURN	DATE
G-2	NR	8/28
ONI	NR	8/27
STATE (less Passport)	NR	8/24
FBI	NIO	8/27
CSC		
HCUA		
OSI		
PASSPORT	NA	9/21
I&N		

This data is property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned.

SECRET T

FORM NO. 38-66
JUL 1950

PASSPORT FILE CHECK

DATE CHECKED 21 September 1954

INITIALS AND CASE NUMBER: P. L. ~~G.~~ #112569

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH : 29 June 1922 in Dekalb, Illinois
(Photostatic copy of birth certificate appears in the file)

PASSPORTS RECEIVED

DATE ISSUED	COUNTRIES	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL	POSITION AND ORGANIZATION
27 September 1945 #14394	Clon, Panama	Personal Business	Student

Amended 19 November 1946 to show occupation as S/Sgt. United States Air Force in Panama.

Renewed and amended the above passport at Panama City, Panama 29 January 1949 under orders from the United States Air Force (T Sgt. AF16001300) authorizing him 10 days leave of absence with permission to visit Republic of Panama and San Juan, Costa Rica. Subject registered at San Juan Tibas, Costa Rica on 3 March 1949 where he was for the purpose of study under the GI Bill of Rights.

14 August 1950 #180FS119	San Jose, Costa Rica (passport included son, Ross A. _______, born Costa Rica 4 September 49		Student

Amended the above passport 9 October 1951 at San Jose to include minor child Lillian CARIDAD, born Costa Rica 24 June 1951.

Renewed the above passport at San Jose, Costa Rica 17 August 1953.

~~ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:~~

2 July 1954 #96FS11099	San Jose, Costa Rica	Leaving for United States for visit	Student

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Address: (1945) 612 West 7th Street, Sterling Illinois.

SPOUSE: Married 17 December 1945 to Argentina CORDERO at Cristobal, CZ, who was born on 15 March 1919, who is not an American citizen.

PARENTS: Lester Earl _______, born Palestine, Illinois 15 March 1900 and Elizabeth Loraine McKIBBEN, born La Moille, Illinois, both of whom currently reside at Tampico, Illinois.

Subject's file indicated that he resided in Dekalb, Illinois from birth until 1940. From 1945 to 1949 he resided in Panama, from 1949 to date he had resided in Costa Rica.

WITNESS: (1945) Rose PERKOVICH, not related, 1322 Pleasant Street, Dekalb, Illinois.

LFM:ph

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA as follows:

As requested in memorandum dated 19 July 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date JUL 22 1954

FI/STC/SPB
cr

FORM NO. 1 MAR 54 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED

SECRET

(8)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CLEARANCE REQUEST

DATE 21 July 1954

TO : Chief, Special Security Division, I&SO
FROM : Chief, Staff C/SPB

SUBJECT: NO.____C ~~30984~~ 25507

Called Jean Coultre this date & advised her to disregard this request. New O.C. granted 22 July 54 on basis of previous record!

1. Character of Case: OC XXX CSC____ PROJ.____
2. CIA indices check required in advance-------------------------Yes--No---X
3. Project name: XXX AMPHODARCH
4. Proposed country of assignment: Costa Rica
5. Contemplated type of contract or employment agreement (see C.F.R. 14.1)____
6. Scope and nature of use or activity: Agent
7. Subject's cover: Not cited.
8. Present whereabouts and occupation of Subject: SA
9. Suggested guide of I&S investigation: U.S. Govt.:____ Commercial____ Other: Credit checks.
10. Special coverage desired in investigation: Not cited.
11. Limitation, if any, on investigation: Not cited.
12. Subject aware of Agency interest-----------------------------Yes--No-X-
13. Subject aware of pending investigation-------------------------Yes--No-X-
14. Subject briefed on "cover" story to be used in investigation----Yes--No--X
15. Probable investigative contacts informed of "cover" story subject will use: Yes----No----. If not, state reason.
16. Return attached PRQ Part I----------57's-------Biog. Data-XXX-with results of your action.
17. Certification having been made by the Chief of the interested Division that operational files and documents contain no pertinent information of an investigative or security nature other than that furnished to Staff C/SPB, such information forwarded to your office----------------------Yes--X No---
18. Remarks: STC/SPB (has) ~~(has not)~~ been advised if Green List initiated

____
INITIALS

FORM NO. 59-60
FEB 1953

SECRET

86

(9)

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaivada (pseudonym)

REFERENCE : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954, Forwarding Part I, PRQ.

Previous OC obtained in No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, for project HUMANOID.

No record of this in SPC/SPB.

1. Forwarded herewith is Part II, PRQ, on Arthur G. Vaivada

2. Operational....Security....Clearance is requested in order to employ Arthur G. Vaivada as (indicate: US, ~~or indigenous~~; witting ~~or unwitting~~; form and value of emoluments; FI ~~or PP~~; and ~~oral or~~ written contract.)

To receive a salary of $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.
To replace RIKON in project AMPHODARCH.

Robert D. Gahagen
for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

SECRET

14 July, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

SUBJECT : OCR-________-B/WHD/Branch III, Forwarding Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier 7. C

1. Forwarded herewith is Part I, PRQ, on Ross L. Crozier

2. a. A Green List name check (Form 51-125) has been requested.

b. The Registry and WHD operational files have been checked and no information of investigative value or security interest was found on the subject.

c. Local Field Traces contain no derogatory information.

3. Part II, PRQ, is being forwarded under memorandum for STC/SPB OCR-________-A/WHD/Branch III, dated 14 July 1954

4. Additional comments (if any):

Robert D. Gahagan

for J. C. KING, Chief, WHD

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

TRS/PRQ/26

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Ross (First) Lester (Middle) Crozier (Last)

2. Name in native script Ross L. Crozier

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) Lester Ross Crozier

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) Not applicable

5. a. Date of birth 20 June 1922 b. Place of birth DeKalb, Illinois

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate U/S/ by birth

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S. and no subsequent nationalities

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner of house and lot at Colima de Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica.

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) Matriculated as Student of Economic Sciences at University of Costa Rica, third year, under G/I/ bill Right
Also practicing photography and planning to open small studio.

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)
Not applicable

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) Lester Earl Crozier, Elizabeth Lorene Crozier, Father and Mother.
M/sgt Francis WILLIAMS, Friend. Colonel C/J/ Stattler, friend.
F. Arthur Greger, friend.

18-6-3-60

TRS/PRQ/26

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Lester Earl Crozier, Trucking business, Sterling Illinois, born 1900 in Palestine Illinois, U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationalities.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Elizabth Lorene Crozier (Maiden name; McKibben) housewife, Sterling Illinois, 1903 at LaSalle, Illinois, U/S/ at birth with no subsequent nationality.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Argentina de Crozier (Argentina Cordero Calderon) born 1918 at San Jose Costa Rica, married at Cristobal Canal Zone on 17 Dec 1945; Costa Rican at birth with no subsequent nationality, presently resides at Colima Tibas San Jose, Costa Rica; no previous marriages.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Ross Arnulfo Crozier, male, born 4 sept 1949 at San Jose, C/R/ and registered as a U/S/ citizen with no subsequent nationality; residing at Colima de Tibas, San Jose.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Norris Edwin Crozier, Male, 1933 DeKalb, Ill., U/S/, Sterling, Ill.
James R. Crozier, Male, 1930 Malta, Ill. U/S/ Somewhere in Corea with U/S/ Army.
rma Lily Crozier, Female , 1924 Elgin, Ill. U.S. Sterling, Ill.
anche Elaine Crozier, Female, 1927 DeKalb Ill. U/S/. Sterling, Ill.

TRS/PRQ/ 26

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

James Earl Crozier, Corporal, U/S/ Army in Corea.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U/S/ Passport, Issued San José, Costa Rica, Aug 14, 1950, # 180 (FS) 119
Cedula de Residencia, 100-37712, issued 6 April 1949. San Jose Costa Rica indefinite with annual renewal.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Catholic , Roman, practiced occasionally.

21. Present and past political affiliations **: Not applicable.**

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited **: With U/S/ Army, departed US in Nov 1941 and covered Panama, Puerto Rico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, then departed US in Nov 1944 and covered Australia, India, Burma, China, Iraque, Iran, Egypt, Morocco, Bermuda. Dep US in Nov 1945 to Panama as civilian to work US Navy at Coco Solo, then Dep C/Z/ in April 1949 for enrollment at U of CR, San Jose Costa Rica.**

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Graduated Grammer School at Five-points District School, Sycamore, Ill. 1937
Graduated High school DeKalb Illinois by virtue of recognition of credits attained thr ugh AF educational work and graduated actually in 1949.
Currently attending University of Costa Rica, third year, Economic Sciences.

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language **English** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Good**

Language **Spanish** Speak **Good** Read **Good** Understand **Godd**

Language ______ Speak ______ Read ______ Understand ______

TRS/PRQ/26

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war: U/S/ Army 1940 - 1941, Artillery, Private, North Carolina, dischgd for entry in Air Forces. US Air Forces. 1941 - 1945, Intelligence Specialist, Panama, India-Burma theater. Dischgd termination of War. US Air Forces, 1946-1949, Technical Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, Political analysis, dischgd - exp term of service.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

None.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Photography.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Comensation from G/I/ bill of Rights:	$120.00
Approx earnings from Photography :	$ 40.00
Owner of house and lot valued at :	$ 3,500.00

No current bank deposits.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Summer vacation 1939-40 - Stapling machine op. -$50 week - California packing Corporation, DeKalb, Ill. Left for service with US army.
August 1940-45 - US Army and AF, Operations and Intelligence Specialist - Technical Sergeant, 135 dollars month, dckgd exp term of service. -
August 1945 - Oct 45 - Laboratory Technician - Sterling Silica Gel Corp - $60 weekly - left due to strike complications.
Jan 1946 - April 1946 - Stevedore and Labor foreman - US Navy Coco Solo, CZ. approx 65 dollars weekly - left for entrance US Air Forces.
April 1946-April 1949 -US Air Forces, Albrook Air Base, CZ. Tech Sergeant, Intelligence Specialist, dischgd due to exp term of service.

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. **None.**

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Argentina de Crozier, **Correspondents:**

Mrs Jeannie Williams
m/sgt Francis Williams
Hq 2nd Air Force
Barksdale Air Force Base.
Sra Miguel Aguila
Panama City, R de P.

32. List five character references.

Lt. Col. C/J/ STATTLER , Washington, D/C/
T/Sgt. Francis J. Wiliams, Hq 2nd AF, Barksdale AFB, La.
Major Paul H. Harrison, Howard Field, C/Z/
Lt. Col. William R. Forbes, Howard Field, C/Z/
Mr. Edward Marelius, Washington, D.C.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

Not applicable.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 29

Apparent age 30

Height 6' 1"

Eyes blue

Face - shape

Complexion ruddy

Sex Male

Posture erect - good

Weight 165

Teeth perfect

Hair brown

Scars Appendectomy, varicose viens right leg.

Build Slender

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

/PRQ/

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATH; in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project and PBSUCCESS.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes

To whom? Above record over the past four years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation
Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

FORM NO. 51-95B
MAY 1950

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949.
Has subsequently been check upon employment in other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject if cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist Party activities and Central American revolutionary matters.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 "ovember 1953.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Previously worked a Principal Agent handling various sub-agents.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $5060.00 annually, plus allowances.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers? Social drinker but very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.
All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Excellent work done in previous projects should ably qualify subject for use in project AMPHODARCH.

Case officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB **DATE:** 19 July 1954

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance for use of Arthur G. VAIVADA in Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to Operational Clearance No. C-25507, dated 28 April 1954, wherein the Subject was cleared for use in Project PBSUCCESS.

2. It is requested that Subject now be cleared for use in Project AMPHODARCH.

3. PRQ, Parts I & II have been submitted to your office, Green List Check No. 9467 was submitted to STD and this office was informed by phone on 16 July 1954 that no derogatory information on Subject was on record with STD.

for C. KING
C/WH

SECRET

DATE: 9 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Cancellation of ~~PO and~~ OC on
(NAME) Ross Lester CROZIER
Project PBSUCCESS

It is requested that ~~PO and~~ OC, # C-25507, dated 28 Apr 1954, and granted to (Name) Ross Lester CROZIER for purpose of utilization on project PBSUCCESS be cancelled.

F. P. HOLCOMB
Special Deputy, DD/P

Carbon returned to WH noting completion
~~action completed by STC/SPB~~

JUL 20 1954

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/SPB
Attention: Mr. Ogden

DATE: 25 May 1954

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Request for Amendment of OPC - BIRADIAL C-25507

1. This division has been advised by the Guatemala City station that BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is currently being used as cutout in the ESCROW project.

2. BIRADIAL, whose pseudonym is Anthony G. VAIVADA, holds OPC for PBSUCCESS.

3. In accordance with the recommendation contained in Para. 6 (b), Memorandum of the Chief, Plans, FI, dated 7 May 1954, subject: Project Renewal ESCROW, it is requested that the OPC for this agent be amended to authorize his additional use as stated in Para. 1 above

Robert D. Gahagen
for J. C. KING

Copy of 10C dated
28 Apr 54 was forwarded
to Col Dreyfling in
response to this memo.
L. Salerno aware of this
CWL 9 June 54

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When filled in)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of Arthur G. VAIVADA

as follows:

This clearance amends Subject's first name (Ps) from Anthony To Arthur.
Use however, remains as stated in clearance dated 28 April 1954.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date MAY 5 1954

FI/STC/SPB
TC/cr

SECRET

FORM NO. 59-47 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED
1 MAR 54
(9)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. C-25507

TO: Chief, WH

ARthuR
Operational Clearance is granted for the use of ~~[illegible]~~ G. VAIVADA

as follows:

As requested in memo of 27 April 1954 this clearance supersedes that of 19 July 1949 and permits Subject's use under Project PBSUCCESS. Further, this clearance is so amended to allow for Subject's additional duties as cutout under Project ESCROW.

As requested in memorandum dated 27 April 1954

This clearance is for the specific use set forth above, and is based upon an appraisal of information currently available to this office. It must be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that derogatory information, if any, has been considered and evaluated for the instant purpose only.

Date APR 28 1954

FI/SIC/SPB
TC/cr

SECRET

SECRET

27 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: STC/SPB

ATTENTION : Mr. Maurice Brady

SUBJECT : Clearance for Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps) - PBSUCCESS

Confirming conversation on 26 April 1954 between Mr. Brady and Mr. Salerno, PBSUCCESS, it is requested that Operational Clearance No. 68, dated 19 July 1949, granted to Subject under Project BIRADIAL, now be amended and brought up to date for Subject's use on Project PBSUCCESS. In addition, it is further requested that the clearance issued be so amended as to also reflect Subject's additional duties as cutout on Project ESCROW.

for J. C. KING
CWH

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: WH/III

NO.

DATE 12 April 1954

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. RASBERRY		12 Apr 54			
2. DOERFLINGER		20	20	D	
3. ESTERLINE		20 Apr 54		E	3. There is no conflicts of interest here. PSBUCCESS is the primary interest and ESCROW is supporting PBSUCCESS. EDC
4. DAHLGREN			20 Apr		
5. FI/STC/SPB	2607 L				
6. ATT: MR. BURTON	✓				
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10 1 NOV 53 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI/STC/SPB
ATT : Mr. Burton
FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 April 1954

SUBJECT: Use of Contract Agent Anthony G. VAIVADA (?) as Cut-Out in ESCROW Project

1. The Guatemala Station has advised Headquarters that subject contract agent, who holds Provisional Operational Clearance for PBSUCCESS, is currently also being used as cut-out in the ESCROW Project.

2. Pursuant to telephone conversation this date between Mr. Burton and the WH desk officer concerned, it is requested that above reference Provisional Operational Clearance be amended to authorize the use of VAIVADA in the ESCROW project as indicated in paragraph 1 above.

J C King
J. C. KING
C/WH

File

Hold for new request from WH Salinas for use in PBSUCCESS when a [illegible]

(This memo brought to attention of Mr. Burton & Mr. Brady - 26 Apr. 54)
CWH

SECRET

1. Mitchell Rosberg, WH Case Officer handling project ESCROW, was advised on this date that he should submit a request to STC/SPB to amend the operational clearance for agent BIRADIAL to provide for his use in project ESCROW. It should be noted that BIRADIAL is currently being used as a cut-out in this operation.

DATE: April 9, 1954 James R. Burton

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

9 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: STAFF C

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Ogden

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (pseudo)

It is requested that the proper clearance be granted for the use of subject, now on Project BIRADIAL, on Project SUCCESS. This will confirm telephone conversation between your office and WH/Personnel on 9 December 1953.

[illegible]
for J. C. KING
C/WH

Note: I talked to / 14 Dec.
Virginia Lynch on
this and per status
that she would hear [illegible]
Caroline [illegible] in touch w/ me
on this. I requested a PRQ II
& that I would know
what the score was. FHD 16 Dec.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECURITY INFORMATION

6 August 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: FILE

FROM: James R. Burton

SUBJECT: Project BIRADIAL

1. BIRADIAL (formerly HUMANOID) is the only agent involved in this operation at the present time. Additional agents are expected to be added at a later date.

2. The Case Officer reported that the agents other than BIRADIAL formerly used in the HUMANOID operation would be picked up by other operations in the Costa Rica area in the near future.

3. The Case Officer was instructed to report the change in BIRADIAL's cryptonym and use to SIC/SPB and also the changes for the other agents when their transfer to new projects has been accomplished.

4. SIC/SPB concurrence is subject to further review of operation after six months when Commo details will be known.

SECRET
SECURITY I

SECRET

Fill in ~~Humanist~~ Humanoid Folder

24 September 1951

36213

Chief, WHD

THRU: Chief, STC
STC/SPB

Project HUMANOID

1. From information made available to this office it appears that details concerning the exposure of the technical surveillance of Juan Bosch and subsequent arrests were not fully determined. It is believed probable that HUMANOID has been compromised with the Costa Rican authorities.

2. It is understood that, with the exception of the HUMANIST Project, HUMANOID is to continue inactive for an undetermined period. Any further contemplated use of HUMANOID should be coordinated with STC/SPB.

3. In view of his wife's and mother-in-law's Costa Rican background and apparent connections and associations with politically significant personalities, it is recommended HUMANOID discontinue using his home to reproduce material obtained in the HUMANIST Project.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : STC/OCO

DATE: 23 February 1951

FROM : Chief, FDT

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evaluation of this agent.

Wm. M. Wheeler Jr.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

SECRET

D

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

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1		6	
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5		10	

DISSEM BY 28 PER

ACTION
SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT OT TIME 2140Z BY B

INFO
FILE, VR, CS/DO, OT, C/CI, OPS FR, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 072354Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 JUL 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY ISOLATION INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 42001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE ISOLATION 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: ISOTROPIC SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. ISOLATION STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING.ALL TRAINEES COMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES: dR 728520

File 201 each.
rlc

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT ISO/ISOT JULY 63)
AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT ISO FEB 64) 741331
AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT ISO JAN 65) 753409
AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676
AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 3600063
AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334081
AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

SECRET

BE ASSIGNED.

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO WAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

SECRET

BT

S-E-C-R-E-T

ATTACHMENT #2

TRAINING REPORT

TEAM/GROUP: PBRUMEN II
(211 hours, full-time)

11 July - 13 August 1966
(Date)

Student: FRANK

COURSE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT

This course is designed to train indigenous personnel in paramilitary resistance activities and intelligence collection operations in denied areas. Approximately 70% of the student's time is devoted to practical work and field exercises and 30% to the theoretical aspects essential for a logical understanding and application of training covered during the course.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

* U - Unsatisfactory	Performance is so low in relation to requirements of the work as to be unequivocally below minimum standards.
W - Weak	Achieved minimum standards, but less than adequate (in terms of indigenous personnel participating in the program).
A - Adequate	Has achieved the basic level required. Satisfactory, characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	More than satisfactory. Has acquired a solid beginner's proficiency. This rating may be interpreted as representing "average" on our rating scale.
S - Strong	Exceptional proficiency, characterized by thoroughness, initiative, originality, and an exceptional student understanding and application of paramilitary resistance activities.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of other students doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

* Modification of the Office of Training standard rating scale at the specific request of JMWAVE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

FRANK

		HOURS	RATING
1.	MAP READING (ABILITY TO REPORT LOCATIONS USING GRID COORDINATES)	12	P
2.	NAUTICAL CHARTS	8	P
3.	WEAPONRY (U.S. & FOREIGN)	31	P
4.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT	-	-
5.	RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS	20	P
6.	AMBUSH TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	S
7.	RAID TACTICS AND OPERATIONS	24	P
8.	CACHING	20	P
9.	CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT LINES (E&E)	-	-
10.	OBSERVATION AND REPORTING TECHNIQUES	40	S
11.	LEADERSHIP TRAITS AND CAPABILITY	See Comments	
12.	OPERATIONAL PLANNING ABILITY	See Comments	
13.	SKETCHING	12	A
14.	SABOTAGE (SEE ATTACHED STB REPORT)	-	-
15.	TARGET PHOTOGRAPHY	-	-
16.	AIR RECEPTION ACTIVITIES	20	P

17. WEAPONS QUALIFICATION (TEST RESULTS ATTACHED)

Pistol	Non-Applicable
Rifle	Sharpshooter
SMG	Sharpshooter

OVERALL PERFORMANCE

RATING LETTER

P

Rating takes into account trainee's effectiveness, such as performance in operational skills, tactics, techniques, leadership, planning, teamwork, motivation and limitations.

The ratings above, and narrative comments hereunder, are derived from a synthesis of all evaluations submitted on each respective trainee by the instructor staff.

Overall performance ratings of all students in this class were as follows:

WEAK 0 ADEQUATE 0 PROFICIENT 6 STRONG 0 OUTSTANDING 0

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Over-all, FRANK was the most conscientious and hardest working student in his class. His serious attitude and fine performance warranted a highly proficient rating.

In preparation of plans, completion of written exercises, and execution of field problems, he demonstrated a high level of achievement.

During the Ambush Exercise, FRANK had a leadership role during which he adhered to a detailed plan, exerted good control over the team, and produced a very successful ambush operation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

PREPARED BY:

Jerome W. Greiner
JEROME W. GREINER
Project Officer

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

Joseph M Hudacek
JOSEPH M. HUDACEK
Chief Instructor

8/30/66
Date

FRANK - Frank was the hardest working student of the group. He consistently applied himself to all phases of the training with equal and great diligence. However, his practical work, which took him a great deal of time to perform, was always a little sloppy. When Frank crimped detonators or threw improvised grenades, he was very shaky. However, he did not seem at all nervous about working with other hazardous material. He asked many pertinent questions which contributed to the group's training and always answered test questions correctly and in detail. He was cooperative and reacted well to correction. Some supervision was required since the staff instructors were concerned about his nervousness with detonators. His overall performance was rated as proficient.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT:tw
UNIT : SAS/EOB ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6153 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 18 JUNE 1963 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, WE 4, S/C

19 JUN 63 15 57z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 48198

KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 44488 (IN 55801)

1. REQUEST SMITHAM ASK AMWHIP FOR DATE HE SENT LETTER TO "THOMPSON'S FRIEND" IN PBRUMEN. ALSO REMIND HIM TO SAVE COPY OF LETTER FOR THOMPSON. IF AMWHIP AGREEABLE, OFFER SEND COPY TO THOMPSON VIA "SECURE CHANNELS".

2. FYI, LETTER IS ACTIVATION EFFORT TO RELUCTANT DRAGON AGENT NOW PBRUMEN, WHO MET PARIS BY THOMPSON AND WALLACE A. GROWERY LAST SUMMER. AGENT IS GOOD FRIEND AMWHIP WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN ARRANGING CONTACT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/4/S. Munger SM
WE/5

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

18-14

COORDINATING OFFICERS

William Tyng
WILLIAM TYNG
AC/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-252234

SECRET

DATE 21 January 1963

PREPARATION OF OUTGOING SW MESSAGES

TO: Bill Wainwright (Field Units Use Pseudo) TFW/FI (Div. or Branch)

FROM: TSD/SWB (Field Units Use Pseudo)

Transmitted herewith is an Outgoing SW Message prepared for:

AMLASH/1 (Cryptonym of Agent)

Message No.: #1

This message is located:

On the side of the paper that has the penciled "X" mark.

It is suggested that the cover letter be placed:

On the reverse side and at right angles to the penciled "X" side.

Make sure the penciled "X" is removed before mailing

William J. Murphy
(Field Units sign in Pseudo)

Form 60-1 (OUT) SECRET

MSJ 1. QUERIDO AMIGO. TU MSJ 1 CLARO PERO NO INCLUISTE DIRECCION SEGURA DE REMITENTE COMO PROMETISTE A JAIME EN PARIS. NO TE PREOCUPES DEL REMITENTE DE ESTA CARTA YA QUE NO ES CUBANO Y SE TRAJO LA CARTA A CUBA DE DONDE LA ENVIO DE UNA MANERA SEGURA. NECESITAS ALGO O TE PUEDO SERVIR EN ALGO? AVISAME ACERCA TU PRESENTE POSICION Y POSIBILIDAD DE REGRESAR AL SERVICIO MILITAR. SI NO REGRESARAS CUALES SON TUS FUTUROS PLANES? TODAVIA ESTAS EN HOSPITAL FAJARDO? POR FAVOR DAME INFORMACION CON MAS AMPLIOS DETALLES INCLUYENDO CUANDO OCURRIO, DONDE, CUANTO Y COMO Y DE QUIEN FUE OBTENIDA INFORMACION ETC. POR EJEMPLO EN MSJ 1 EN INFORME SOBRE CAMPO ENTRENAMIENTO DE GUERRILLAS DEBIAS HABER DADO NOMBRE, LOCALIDAD DE LA FINCA, POR EJEMPLO TERMINO MUNICIPAL, CAMINO O CAMINOS DONDE ESTA SITUADA, DISTANCIA DEL CAMINO Y PUEBLO MAS CERCANO, DE QUIEN Y COMO SE OBTUVO ESTA INFORMACION. PUEDES VENIR A MEXICO PARA UNA REUNION EN LOS PROXIMOS MESES? SI NO, QUIZAS OTRO PAIS QUE TU DESEES? TAMBIEN SELECCIONA E INFORMA EN DETALLE SOBRE LOS TRES ESCONDITES DISCUTIDOS EN PARIS. DOS PARA CARTAS Y UNO PARA PAQUETES PEQUENOS. POR FAVOR INFORMAME SOBRE LO SIGUIENTE LO ANTES POSIBLE: TIENEN LOS SOVIETICOS SUS PROPIAS CLINICAS MEDICAS EN CUBA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR RECIENTES INFORMES QUE GRAN NUMERO DE SOVIETICOS SE HAN ENFERMADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS? QUE FUE LA ENFERMEDAD? DONDE FUERON HOSPITALIZADOS? CUANTAS PERSONAS ESTUVIERON ENFERMAS? ERAN CIVILES, MILITARES O AMBOS? DONDE OCURRIO EPIDEMIA? PUEDES CONFIRMAR LLEGADA DE ENVIOS DE CARNE MALA PROCEDENTE DE LA UNION SOVIETICA? SI ESTO ES VERDAD QUE CAUSO QUE SE ECHARA A PERDER? CUANTA CARNE MALA HABIA? SOBRE ESTO TAMBIEN HAY INFORMES QUE MUCHO GANADO EN CUBA ESTA INFECTADO EN PROPORCIONES EPIDEMICAS CON FIEBRE AFTOSA REQUIRIENDO SU DESTRUCCION. SI ES VERDAD, DAME DETALLES INCLUYENDO EL NUMERO DE GANADO INFECTADO, ORIGEN DE ENFERMEDAD, AREAS DONDE SE HAN REGISTRADO INFECCIONES, MEDIDAS TOMADAS PARA CONTROLAR ENFERMEDAD. SE ESTA CONTROLANDO

ENFERMEDAD EFECTIVAMENTE? HAY ALGUNA INDICACION QUE CARNE INFECTADA SE ESTA VENDIENDO AL PUBLICO? POR FAVOR RECUERDA CONTESTAR ESTA CARTA LO ANTES POSIBLE, INCLUYE CONTESTACIONES A TANTAS PREGUNTAS COMO SEA POSIBLE. MAS IMPORTANTE QUE ESTO ES TENER UNA DIRECCION A LA QUE PODAMOS ESCRIBIRTE Y DETALLES SOBRE ESCONDITES Y TUS FUTUROS PLANES. SI POR CUALQUIER RAZON NO DESEAS O NO PUEDES MANTENER CONTACTO REGULAR CONMIGO PARA AYUDAR EN NUESTROS ESFUERZOS PARA UNA LIBRE CUBA, O SI NO DESEAS TRABAJAR MAS CONMIGO, POR FAVOR AVISAME DE ESTO TAMBIEN Y YO CONSIDERARE NUESTRO ENLACE POR TERMINADO. ME GUSTARIA CONTINUAR TRABAJANDO CONTIGO PERO TENGO QUE RECORDARTE QUE SE REQUIERE REPORTAJE Y CORRESPONDENCIA FRECUENTE Y CONTINUA EN ORDEN DE OBTENER LA MAXIMA VENTAJA PARA LLEGAR A CUMPLIR NUESTROS OBJETIVOS MUTUOS. SALUDES Y UN ABRAZO DE TU AMIGO. JAIME. FIN.

PERSONAL INFORMATION
(3 documents)

Volume 3 of 5

14-00000

GROZDEA, Ion (Dr.) - 201-168880

RUMANIA has crypt. -ars/12

"Health Unions Federation" (qv) pres.; was elected to the RPR Standing Committee for the Defense of Peace accd. to "Scanteia".

Am; Leg. PressReview#1515
Brit. Leg. PressReview#2484
9 Dec., '52

CIA-P-99946

Sent to RID/AN

23 Dec. 70

✓	HKHW-1847	4 Sept. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHW-1905	16 Oct. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3115	3 Nov. 56	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3314	17 Jan. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3418	21 Feb. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-3583	2 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2282	27 May 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2362	23 July 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-2422	12 Sept. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHA-4025	8 Nov. 57	201-168881
✓	HKHW-5825	14 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-5826	16 Jan. 58	201-168881
✓	MEXI-1364	10 April 58	201-168881
✓	HMMW-6377	22 May 58	201-168881
	HAVA 16 (IN 48405)	10 Sept 57	" "

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-6377
201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 MAY 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Harold P. HOEMAYR (ps)

Reference: DIR 19152 dated 25 April 1958

Action Required: None.

Attached herewith for your information and records is a copy of the Letter of Cover Instructions signed by HOEMAYR on 16 May 1958.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COPY

19 May 1958

Attachment:
1, (4 pages)

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City (w/1/ATT)
- 1 - WH/Mailroom (w/o/ATT)
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono (w/o/ATT)
- 2 - RI (w/o/ATT)

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:ngs

AN	
AB	X
~~IN~~	
~~PS~~	
~~BX~~	
DES	NFD
~~FI~~	
~~RID/FIP~~	

	201	168	881
RESTRICT	X	[illegible]	
HMMW	6377		
DATE	24 MAY 58		

RID/EDI
[illegible]

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

CS COPY
(Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
SUB 1949

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5825

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

~~14 JAN 58 13 05~~

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Ross Lester CROZIER

REF: HMMW-5826 (KAPOK)

1. Personal data on Subject is forwarded for station's information in connection with the proposal contained in reference, which is being pouched separately.

2. Ross Lester CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois, the oldest of five children in a middle class family which now resides in Sterling, Illinois. In December 1945 he married Argentina de los Angeles CORDERO Calderon, a Costa Rican citizen, born in San Juan, C.R., on 15 March 1918. They have two children: Ross Arnulfo, 8; and Lillian Caridad, 6. Subject and his family currently reside in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject received primary and high school education in DeKalb and worked at odd jobs until 1940, when he entered the Armed Forces, serving first in the Army, then in the Air Corps. Between 1941 and 1945 he served as an Intelligence Specialist in the Panama Canal Zone and in the India-Burma Theater. Discharged at the end of the war, he worked briefly in Illinois, then returned to the Canal Zone at the end of 1945 and obtained civilian employment with the U.S. Navy. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force and again served as an Intelligence Specialist until the expiration of his term of service in April 1949, at which time he was discharged with the rank of Technical Sergeant.

4. Upon discharge he went from the Panama Canal Zone to Costa Rica, where his wife's family resides, and from April 1949 to March 1953 he worked as a free lance photographer in San Juan. During this period he resumed his studies attending Economics courses at the University of Costa Rica. He returned to the United States during the latter part of 1953, resided in Washington, then for a few months attended the University of San Carlos in Guatemala City, until May 1954. Shortly after he transferred to the School of Economic Sciences of the University of Havana which he attended until 1957. Subject financed the first few years of his advanced education under the V.A. program. During his stay in Havana, Subject began

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

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FE/WFD
RI
R→/FTP

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

CS COPY

201-168881

201-168-881
X
HMMW 5825
DATE 14 JAN 58

SECRET

RI COPY

working on polling studies for the Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas which employs him at present.

5. Subject is 6'1" tall, slender built, athletic (1954 Guatemala national record in discus, track, high and broad jump, etc); is a pistol expert; has some experience as a radio operator; is an accomplished photographer and has designed and directed a photographic laboratory in Costa Rica.

6. Subject speaks and reads Spanish fluently and except for his height and Anglo Saxon appearance could pass as a native of Latin American countries. Subject became a Catholic convert shortly after his marriage.

7. Subject's wife was educated at the Liceo de Senoritas in San Jose, C.R., and has travelled extensively. Her father was born in Cuba, attended the Spanish Military Academy and served in Spanish Morrocco. In 1933/34 he was involved in Cuban politics and was forced to take refuge in Costa Rica, where he resided until his death in 1939. Her mother, who resides with Subject's family, retains an interest in Costa Rican and Cuban political affairs but takes no active part in politics.

8. A copy of a 1948 photograph of Subject is attached. Further information is contained in reference, forwarded under separate pouch.

9. The information given above is based on a PRQ and a PHS compiled by Subject respectively in 1948 and 1956 and on observations made by KUBARK officers who have been acquainted with him.

R B Gomez
for J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

6 January 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - W"/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- 1 - RI
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

SECRET

RI COPY

COORDINATE WITH:

R B Gomez
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

WH/Carib

WH/Personnel

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

201-168881

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ~~AIR~~ (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-1847~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SEP 4 1956

TO : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/KUCAGE
SPECIFIC - Arthur C. VAIVADA

Regarding clearance to discuss PP activities with the Station —

Reference: HKH-A-2697, dated 9 August 1956 201-32723

Action Required: None

Headquarters feels that in the situation outlined in reference and within the limitations set forth in reference, no additional operational clearance for Subject is necessary.

COPY

S.K. Short for
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

28 August 1956

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- ✓ 1 - RI/D&P
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba
- 1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/III/Cuba/WKent:gp

201-168881

S.K. Short for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

W. CALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

~~201-168881~~
~~HKH-W-1847~~
~~DATE 4 SEPT 56~~
~~201-32723~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 4 JUN 57 13 33z

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
{ SPECIFIC 0 Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUKANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

2. Subject stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations and would welcome the opportunity of being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any Spanish-speaking Latin American country.

3. The foregoing discussion with Subject was informal and without commitment on either side. However, the Station is being alerted to the possibility that Subject may be requested to perform such approaches at such time when worthwhile recruitment in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise in other countries. Nevertheless, any such action originating at Headquarters or at any other Station, will of course be subject to Station Habana's consideration and approval beforehand, depending on his availability in reference to his work in Project AMPHODARCH, etc.

28 May 1957

CS COPY

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

~~201-168881~~
~~HKH-A 2282~~
~~4 JUN 57~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2282

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE 4 JUN 57 13 33 2

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC 0 Arthur G. VAIVADA

Action Requested: None

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, Subject was asked by one of the Staff members if he would be interested in, and available for, recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries. Since Subject has a fine record in CP penetration work (i.e., his outstanding job in handling HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica and his efforts in the CP penetration program in Cuba), it is believed that he would be an effective recruiter of possible CP defectors.

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28 May 1957

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - Habana
1 - RI
1 - WH/Mailroom
1-WH/Cuba/Chrono
1- Subject

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

201-168881

for John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

Hugh C. MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs
(Coordinating officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

CS COPY

201-168881
HKH-W 2282
4 JUN 57

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5826

201-32723

SECRET ~~KAPOK~~
CLASSIFICATION

DESENSITIZED KAPOK #599

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 16 JAN 1958

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Proposed assignment of Arthur C. VAIVADA (P)

REF: HMMW-5825

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

ACTION REQUIRED: Station comments and/or concurrence.

1. Subject is identified in reference which also gives his personal data and is forwarded in a separate pouch. Paragraph 4 of that dispatch outlines the cover activities of Subject for the period 1949 to the present, during which he has been actually employed by KUBARK, first as a contract agent then, since May 1957, as a career agent. He currently receives a salary approximately equivalent to that of a GS-11.

2. Subject's current, extended tour with the Havana station comes to an end in May 1958; due to his operational experience and performance with KUBARK in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Havana, Subject appears to be a good prospect as a replacement for Floyd POSTANY in CP operations.

3. Originally scheduled to be used by KUBARK in Panama, Subject was instead assigned to Costa Rica in 1949 under the HUMANOID project. While the operational files of this project have not yet been reviewed by this desk, entries in his personal file show that while in Costa Rica he handled a successful high level penetration of the local party. At the end of 1953, after a period of training at Headquarters, he was assigned to PBSUCCESS where he apparently also performed creditably. In July 1954 he was re-assigned to the Havana station as the principal agent of project AMTHUNDARCH which involves the recruitment and handling of CP penetrations in that country. The AMTHUNDARCH and Subject's personal files have been reviewed by this desk; together with the training and the assessments of the case officers for whom he has worked, the files show that Subject is eminently qualified as a recruiter and agent handler in CP operations. The records show that Subject possesses a great deal of integrity, resourcefulness and intelligence: he was highly rated both by Headquarters training officers and throughout his operational work in the field. He is particularly evaluated highly as to judgment and common sense.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET ~~KAPOK~~
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
AUG 1949

CS COPY

201-168881
VAIVADA

SECRET KAPOK
DESENSITIZED

HMMA-5826
201-32723
KAPOK #599
Page two

4. Should his assignment to Mexico Station be agreed upon, cover possibilities can be considered in the fields of photography and athletic training which are among Subject's specialties. He lists himself as a "pistol expert" and a clarification of this term will be requested if, in the Station's opinion, it may enlarge cover possibilities, perhaps under LIMERKY. Subject's wife is still a Costa Rican citizen at present, while his two children are U.S. citizens.

5. Station's comments on this proposed assignment and possible cover suggestions will be welcome.

J C King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

7 January 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - KAPOK/Chrono
- 1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/ASpera:jck

COORDINATE WITH:

WH/Carib
WH/Personnel

J C King
J. C. KING, C/WHD

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

DESENSITIZED

SECRET DESENSITIZED

201-168881

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

049 HH/MCB/Aib

DATE : 22 MAY 1958

(49

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

MAY 23 07 58z58

RECD CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 32413

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1608

RE: MEXI 1468 (IN 22383)

DIR 11212 (OUT 51534)

PLEASE ADVISE ETA HAROLD R NOEMAYR.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Public Surveys Institute
General Polling Service

Albert E. Johnson
Executive Director

532 Fidelity Union Life Building
1511 Bryan Street
Dallas, Texas
Riverside 1-3674

[redacted]

LETTER HEAD STATIONARY USED BY THE
NOTIONAL COVER FIRM BACKSTOPPING
Harold R. NOEMAYR

Received From CCS/NC
on 20 May 1958

[redacted]

201-168781

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Luetscher)

DATE: 19 May 1958

FROM : Operations Division, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Harold R. ROSMAYR (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed overseas assignment.

James R. Fearon
James R. Fearon
Administrative Officer

MS/JRF:clp

Distribution:
  Orig.- Addressee
    1 - WE/3 (Puckett)
    1 - MS

SECRET

201-168881

201-168881

SECRET

C-1243 (Biladeau)
13 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

ATTENTION : WH/III/Mexico/Puckett

SUBJECT : Cover Story for Harold R. NOEMAYR (P)

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the cover story prepared for Harold R. Noemayr.

2. You are requested to review the cover story, as well as Noemayr's contract, to insure that the cover arrangements satisfy the requirements involved. If the cover story meets with your approval, please sign the copy of this memorandum in the space provided and return it to this office.

3. The copy of the cover story should be forwarded to the appropriate Chief of Station for retention in his files where it can be reviewed by Noemayr whenever necessary.

JOHN G. SOUTHARD
CHIEF, CCB/NC

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Harold R. Noemayr (P)
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Noemayr:

Your Cover

1. Cover has been contrived for you with two notional organizations, Public Surveys Institute and Betwins Travel Folders.

2. Public Surveys Institute is a notional organization which is ostensibly engaged in conducting all types of polls to determine public reactions on matters of interest to its many clients. This organization is located at Suite 532 Fidelity Union Life Building, 1511 Bryan Street, Dallas, Texas, telephone: RIverside 1-3674. The Institute is directed by Albert E. Johnson, a fictitious individual.

3. The above address is in actuality that of a telephone answering service where all normal calls of inquiry are handled by unwitting personnel during the course of their regular duties. However, any call which requires special attention is referred to a cleared and witting individual who has contact with headquarters. This person is adequately prepared to acknowledge your relationship with your cover firm and also answer any inquiries concerning you or your cover organization.

4. In addition to the above arrangement, you also have a contract with another notional firm to submit photographs and reports which are to be utilized in the preparation of travel brochures. This firm is Betwins Travel Folders which is located at Room 2101, 50 East 42nd Street, New York, New York, Telephone: MUrray Hill 7-4473. Betwins is directed by Charles H. Betwin, a fictitious individual, and is engaged in the preparation of material for travel folders, brochures, package tours, etc.

5. The above address for Betwins is in actuality located in the office of a cleared attorney who is prepared to backstop both the cover firm and your association with Betwins Travel Folders. This person also has contact with headquarters.

6. You are engaged on a contract basis to provide photographs and reports relating to possible tours, places of interest, eating establishments, hotels, etc. This information is then edited by Betwins and sold to various clients who desire travel folders.

7. You also have legitimate cover in the form of your free lance photography and short story writing. The past publication of this work can be used as a supplement to your Betwin cover.

SECRET

8. Your cover story for having been engaged by the Public Surveys Institute is as follows:

> During a visit to the United States in May 1957, you became acquainted with Albert E. Johnson, the Director of Public Surveys Institute. Johnson indicated that he was interested in engaging the services of several people to organize and conduct polls in various Latin American areas.
>
> Since you were already located in Cuba and had a knowledge of the language and customs, he expressed an interest in employing you in Cuba. As you felt this type of work would not conflict with your photographic efforts, you accepted the position effective May 1, 1957, in order to have an extra source of income.
>
> Early in 1958, Johnson advised you that he had acquired several promising accounts who were interested in Mexico and he desired to transfer you to Mexico City since you had both experience and the necessary language qualification. You readily agreed to the transfer and planned to leave for Mexico during the latter part of May after a short vacation in the United States.

9. Your cover story for having been engaged by Betwins Travel Folders is as follows:

> While visiting in the United States during April 1958 prior to your departure for Mexico, you became acquainted with Charles H. Betwin through Albert Johnson in New York. Betwin had seen some of your published work and expressed an interest in engaging your services on a part-time basis in Mexico. Since it meant an additional source of income as well as an opportunity to utilize your photographic talents, you readily accepted his offer. You were to photograph various places which were of interest to Betwin's clients and also forward information relating to prices, possible package tours, historical points of interest, etc.

Documentation

10. Correspondence reflecting your progress or difficulties encountered should be carried on between you and your cover firms. Such correspondence should be at intervals which would make your association with your cover firms appear to be the normal relationship of employer and employee.

SECRET

Financial Arrangements

11. It is understood that there actually will be no disbursement of funds for salary or other purposes to you through your cover firm, and therefore, arrangements for salary payments are a matter of concern between you and your division case officer. However, precautions must be taken to insure that the arrangements made will not conflict with your cover story.

Taxes

12. Your income tax returns will be filed with the Internal Revenue Tax Unit stationed at headquarters in accordance with Agency FN 20-660-4.

Restrictions

13. Should you at any time feel the necessity for a modification of this cover arrangement, or supplementing the cover outside of the present arrangement, or if any problems arise affecting your cover, direct a routine communication to your cover firms outlining the need or situation and concurrently notify your case officer of the conditions so that he may check with headquarters. Subsequently, you will receive advice from your cover concerns as would be normal and also be provided with official compatible instructions from your case officer.

14. With regard to any persons desiring to apply for a position with either cover firm, you are instructed to state that to the best of your knowledge and belief, the firms are adequately staffed. However, in order the the matter may be treated casually, the inquirer may be told to submit his application to the New York or Texas address, which ever applies, where it will receive due consideration.

15. You understand that these cover facilities have been established through cleared cooperative individuals who are witting, but not actually a part of the Agency. These persons know that you are actually an employee of the Agency and, as such, an extremely high standard of conduct will be expected of you.

16. A copy of this cover story will be retained in the station files. You may refer to it when necessary.

____

DATE _______________________

SECRET

SECRET

I certify that I have read and understand the above Letter of Cover Instructions regarding my cover and agree to comply with it in every respect.

____

DATE________________________

Distribution:
Orig.
cc: WH/III/Mexico/Puckett - 2114 B.H.

SECRET

SECRET

12 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

VIA: FI/OPS (Miss Paxton)

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA
Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Subject's contract effective 1 June 1957 be amended to include under Paragraph 4, Allowances, that Subject be entitled to the Educational Allowance for his children, effective from the initial date of the contract.

2. The above provision was inadvertently omitted from Subject's contract by the Area Desk, and since the Station notified Subject he was entitled to this allowance, it would be appreciated if this matter be corrected and the contract amended accordingly. The error came to the attention of the Area Desk when Subject's claim for educational allowance dated 18 April 1958, was turned down by Finance Division because of the aforementioned omission from the contract.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Files

SECRET

201-168881

X

14-00000

025 ER/ER/cr!dm

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 29 APRIL 1958

25

APR 30 05 49 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : [✓ WH 5]

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

IN 22383

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1468

RE: DIR 19152 (OUT 70226)*

1. CONCUR PARAS 2 AND 3 REF.
2. RECOMMEND USE JEREMY A TOLKING.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT; * CONCERNED COVER SET UP BY HQS FOR THE TRAVEL OF NOEMAYR.

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

582 MM/DJB/PJB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 25 APRIL 1958

582

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 25 19 46Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 70226
OUT70

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19152

RE: A. DIR 16715 (OUT 64381)
B. MEXI 1446 (IN 20477)*
C. HMMW-5826

1. SUB REF C ASSIGNED NEW PSEUDO HAROLD R. NOEMAYR.

2. APPRECIATE REF B SUGGESTION. HOWEVER, HQS ARRANGING NOEMAYR BACKSTOPPED COVER AS REPRESENTATIVE NOTIONAL PUBLIC POLLING SERVICES FIRM IN DALLAS, WHICH NOEMAYR USED IN CUBA, AND PHOTOGRAPHER AND COLLECTOR OF TRAVEL DATA FOR NOTIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE FIRM IN NEW YORK WHICH SUPPLIES TRAVEL INFO FOR PACKAGE TOURS. ALSO, HE WILL CONTINUE SUBMIT ARTICLES TO BOYS LIFE MAGAZINE. BELIEVE ABOVE COVER WILL GIVE NOEMAYR GOOD FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY AND WILL ELIMINATE MEXI NEED ARRANGE LOCAL COVER.

3. NOEMAYR PLANS ETA MEXI END MAY AS TOURIST. WILL ARRANGE WORKING PAPERS THRU STATION RECOMMENDED MEXI LAW FIRM.

4. REQUEST MEXI CONCURRENCE PARAS 2, AND 3 ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH: CI/ICD/WH/MR. ANDERSON

COORDINATED BY PHONE WITH: CCB/NC/MR. BILADEAU

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for R. N. Dahlgren
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

NOEMAYR
201

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

14-00000

482/MM/CG/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

DATE : 24 APR 1958

482

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 25 03 37Z 5[illegible]
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

IN 20477

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1446

RE: DIR 16715 (OUT 64381 *)

1. MR JOSEPH RAVOTTO, DEPUTY PAO, WHO KNOWS BENJAMIN AS WELL AS ANY ONE IN EMBASSY STATES HE SOUND, RESPECTED NEWS PAPER MAN WITH GOOD MEXI SOCIAL AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS. OUR FILES, ODENVY AND BIOG SECTION EMB TRACES NEGATIVE.

2. STATION CONCURS JOURNALISTIC COVER.

3. IF HQS APPROVES STATION WILL HAVE TALK BENJAMIN IN ORDER FURNISH DETAILS RE REIMBURSEMENT, FLEXIBILITY, DURABILITY AND OTHER ASPECTS GOOD COVER. WOULD NOT MENTION ANY NAME OR TARGET.

4. IF BENJAMIN UNDER CONSIDERATION URGE VAIVADA BE PERMITTED MEET, EVALUATE AND AGREE COVER ACCEPTABLE. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * CONCERNED VAIVADA COVER.

[illegible]

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

24 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Commendation for Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, a Career Agent, is hereby commended for his outstanding performance and devotion to duty in carrying out the assignment described below.

2. During the period 12 - 26 March 1958, VAIVADA, by working his way into the mountain stronghold of the Cuban rebel forces and winning their friendship, procured timely and valuable intelligence and operational information. While on this assignment, he worked under conditions of personal risk and hardship.

3. This memorandum is written to be included as a permanent record in Subject's personal file.

J C King
J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168851

SECRET

17 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA : Chief, CI/OA

FROM : C/WHD

SUBJECT : Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps)
C-25507
#112569

It is requested that the CSA granted Harold R. HOEMAYR (ps), formerly called Arthur O. VAIVADA (ps), on 3 July 1957 for use in Cuba under Project AMPHORARCH, be amended to permit his use in Mexico City. HOEMAYR will be transferred PCS to Mexico City in May 1958 where he will be carried under Project LIRICE which is being prepared for submission to FI/Projects for approval. Attached is a new PRQ Part II which covers our proposed use of HOEMAYR in Mexico.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/CI/OA
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Mexico Chrono
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/CZehrung:jck

201-168881

SECRET

16 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Branch

SUBJECT : Journalistic Cover for Harold R. NOEMAYR (ps)

1. Attached are the pertinent data pertaining to Subject's background as required by CSI 240-6.

2. It is requested that approval be granted for Subject's use of journalistic cover and that CCB/HC undertake the necessary arrangements to facilitate Subject's affiliation with appropriate news media.

J. C. KING
CHIEF
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

Chief, Central Cover Branch

APPROVED:

Chief of Operations, DD/P

SECRET

201-168881

(5) Outside interests, hobbies, etc: Athletics in general, outdoor life, photography, writing, jungle lore and chess.

(6) Objective personality evaluation: Subject is an astute, experienced and highly competent career agent. He possesses an attitude and a personality which are quite suitable for prolonged existence as a deep-cover asset. His personality is well suited for the many agent handling and management responsibilities that he will have in Mexico City.

(7) Agent's personal financial status: Solvent. He depends entirely on his salary.

(8) Previous foreign residence: Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1940. Military service in the Far East from 1944-45.

(9) Area experience: Area experience as reflected in the foregoing information is extensive.

(10) Language qualifications: Subject has fluent Spanish and English.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of employment with CIA: June 1949 - present.

(2) Frequency of visits to CIA installations: Not applicable, since CIA contacts made in safehouses.

(3) Extent of knowledge of others of subject's CIA affiliation: His wife is aware that subject is engaged in intelligence activities, however, not necessarily for CIA. No other non-agency personnel are believed to be aware of subject's CIA status.

(4) Past intelligence connections: With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA as credit reference: None

(6) Future plans for agent: Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency contact: Mrs. Lester E. Crozier, mother
1745 S. 26th St.
Omaha, 5, Neb.

(8) Personal insurance held and beneficiaries: None, except as provided for in his contract. His wife is his beneficiary.

(9) Incidents involving security in NOEHAYR's past employment with this Agency:

While there is no reason to believe that NOEMAYR has been exposed or compromised during his years of operating in Costa Rica, Guatemala or Cuba for CIA, the following incidents involving his security are set forth for your information:

a. NOEMAYR was forced to leave Guatemala prior to his scheduled departure when a Costa Rican source informed us that she had heard from high-level party sources that a "U.S. agent, specialist in Communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala." This vague reference unfortunately coincided with subject's arrival in Guatemala.

b. In 1953 when subject was leaving Costa Rica, he made two cold approaches, one to a woman communist who was a leader in the Union de Mujeres. As subject left her home, the lady went immediately to Party headquarters and reported the incident. However, she was unable to describe NOEMAYR and so confused the approach story that it was useless to the Party and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident.

c. While in Cuba, NOEMAYR was working with a municipal committee youth communist who was a translator and did a story for NOEMAYR in Spanish. They met in each other's homes and NOEMAYR gave the Communist his business card (PSI). Sometime later, the Cuban military intelligence officer (SIM) picked up the Communist and searched his premises. Among other things, they found NOEMAYR's business card. When queried about this, the Communist simply told the officials he did translating for NOEMAYR. Nothing came of this incident and NOEMAYR could detect no surveillance of his person or his premises.

d. While the Cuban police will probably have NOEMAYR's name registered as having visited the Sierra Maestra region, the publication of his photographs and perhaps an article at a later date, should cover subject as a writer thereby minimizing any security hazard in this connection.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of operation: PI. Subject will be an outside case officer for several station operations directed at the Mexican Communist and Marxist parties.

(2) Location: Mexico City and Guadalajara.

(3) Degree of mobility desired: Subject will spend most of his time in Mexico City but he should be free to travel to Guadalajara and other towns in Mexico.

(4) Special groups to be contacted: While subject will be concerned principally with the local Communist party, it is not necessary for him to have personal access to any special group.

(5) Approximate annual income to be attributed to cover: $10,000 (including allowances).

(6) Hours which must be devoted to operational duties: Subject should be able to devote at least 80% of his time to operational activity. His proposed cover will allow him a maximum of flexibility in arranging his cover and operational activity.

(7) Physical security requirements: No problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications: Subject will utilize station communications facilities and will have regular contact with station personnel.

(9) Cover suggestions: In view of subject's previous journalistic experience, listed below, it is believed that it would be most appropriate for him to utilize cover connected with journalism. Probably the most advantageous arrangement would be for subject to become affiliated with one or two relatively small U.S. newspapers who do not currently have representatives in Mexico City. His contributions to such news media should be in the field of feature and human-interest stories, rather than of current events. His salary could, and probably should, be based on a stringer or piecemeal basis, rather than having a fixed income. Since subject is also a competent and experienced photographer, he could be expected to make photographic contributions to the newspapers or magazines he represents.

In addition to the above arrangements, it is suggested further that the notional cover (Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, Dallas, Texas) previously utilized by subject be continued. Subject maintains that he has developed a very sound and detailed cover based on this notional arrangement and that it would be very logical for him to use it in Mexico. Also, this additional cover arrangement would give subject another means of income together with added social flexibility and geographic mobility.

(10) Previous journalistic and writing experience:

HOFMAYR's formal journalistic training consists of a two-year correspondence course in fiction writing with the Palmer Institute of Authorship.

HOEMAYR has had three short stories published: "Old Saber Nose" in Boys Life, September 1956; "The Golden Discus," in

Boys Life, June 1958; and "Duelo a 300 Brazas," in Bohemia, a Havana magazine, on 9 September 1957. HOEMAYR has done quite a bit of photographic work. While working as a photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica, in 1952, he did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture. They were so pleased with his work that they hired him to set up their photographic laboratory in the Ministry. During this period he had some photographs published, mostly portrait work. Within the last month, HOEMAYR has had one photograph of Fidel CASTRO published under his by-line, in the New York Mirror and four similiar photographs have appeared in the New York Times. He expects that several more of his photographs on CASTRO and his revolutionaries will be published, if the news value of the movement continues.

HOEMAYR has several personal friends in the newspaper and journalistic fields. Among them are: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor of Boys Life; G. Gordon Dewey, Fiction Instructor, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood, California; CWO Francis Williams, technical writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio; Andrew St. George, freelance writer and photographer who also works for Time-Life; Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP; and Arthur Gregor, scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass (married to his wife's sister).

14-00000

SECRET

DRAFT

Date: 16 April 1958

To: Honor Award Board

Through :

From: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Name: CROZIER, Ross L.

Position: Career Agent

Grade: GS-11

Office assigned to : WH/III

Station: Habana, Cuba

Legal Residence : Washington, D.C.

Citizenship : American, by birth

If any of the above items......

Recommended award: Intelligence Star and Certificate of Merit

Postumous: No.

Name of next of kin: Argentina de los Angeles Cordaro de Crozier

Relationship : wife

Address: Washington, D.C.

If previous recommendation were submitted...... Not applicable

---

Were you ~~witness~~ an eyewitness to the act? No

~~Will name Not applicable~~

Personnel in immediate vicinity or.........

Not applicable

List any of the above persons.....

Not applicable

Condition under which act was persformed: 201-168881

Location: I. Sierra Maestra mountains, Cuba. 12-26 March 1958 Not applicable

~~Cuba~~ II San Jose, Costa Rica, 1-2 May 1953 0400 AM.

Prevailing geographic conditions and obsticles encountered:

The area in which Mr. Crozier undertook his mission is the Sierra Maestra mountains located in the Oriente Province, Cuba, where the Cuban rebel leader, Fidel Castro has been able to hide-out and ~~resist~~ survive the efforts of the Cuban Army to ~~exterminate~~ capture or kill him for over a year. The ~~xxxxxx~~ mountainous area is an extremely rough and wild terrain, primarily ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ thickly vegetated with jungle growth. It is sparsely populated, and the only means of ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ access are foot paths and mountain trails. The approaches to the area are heavily patrolled by Cuban Government troops who are on the alert to ~~stop~~ intercept all persons ~~trying~~ attempting to enter or leave the area.

Office, component, or station: ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ Station, Habana, Cuba

Inclusive dates for which recommended: 12-26 March ~~[illegible]~~ 1958

Assignment completed: Yes

Now in same or related assignment: No.

Achievement performed: x

I.

Towards the latter part of 1957, as a result of an increasing number of alarming reports concerning alleged Communist penetration and support of Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement operating in the Sierra Maestra mountains, the Western Hemisphere Division became aware of the urgent need to mount an operation to acquire first-hand and reliable information and data on the Cuban rebel forces. In early January 1958, Mr. Crozier volunteered to undertake the precarious mission to contact Fidel Castro in his mountain retreat in the Sierra Maestras. He arranged for his free

SECRET

passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 of July Movement which the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Mr. Crozier left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of a rebel guide who conducted him safely through the Cuban Army lines. During the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the ~~mountain hideout~~ of Castro's headquarters, Mr. Crozier was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks. On 26 March 1958, Mr. Crozier accompanied Fidel Castro and a force of ~~xxxxx~~ 200 men on a dawn attack on the town of ManzAnillo, where he broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in La Habana. Mr. Crozier successfully accomplished his mission by reporting considerable intelligence and operational ~~xxx~~ information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

These exploits ~~together with the achievement set forth below~~, clearly demonstrate ~~denotes~~ Mr. Crozier's adaptability in precarious situations, as well as a deep devotion to his work and to CIA.

II

On 1 May 1953, Mr. Crozier..........

(Copy attached report)

Leave space after Section II

14-00000

On 1 May 1953, MR. CROZIER was in charge of an attempt to physically penetrate the home of Manuel MORA Valverde, President of the Costa Rican Communist Party for the purpose of obtaining documents which could be used to prove the Communist Party's control over the Partido Progresista Independiente, a front which had been organized to participate in the 1953 elections. The sub-agent who was to actually perform the penetration failed to appear and realizing the urgency of the operation, CROZIER voluntarily + on his own initiative made the penetration. At the time ~~afxkkex~~ (0400) he entered the MORA house, the entire family was known to be sleeping in the rear part of the house. Working quietly and quickly under conditions of ~~considerable~~ GREAT personal risk, Mr. CROZIER succeeded in carrying away approximately 85 percent of the legal PPI documentation and other records as well as a large amount of Communist Party documents such as minutes to meetings, code words, etc. A few days later a high level Party penetration reported that the PPI may have been eliminated from the electoral scene due to the almost impossible task of reconstructing the legally required records. However, the PPI was ~~xkxkxx~~ able to reconstruct the records and registered by the deadline of 26 May. According to the Station, "this operation provided the station with~~x~~ a bulk of compromising documents, seriously hampered PPI activities because of missing records, almost eliminated them from the scene, spread distrust, suspicion, and confusion among the ~~p~~ Political Commission, and, because it was finally attributed to Figuerista ~~xixixex~~ elements, enraged the Communists against FIGUERES and destroyed any possibility of an agreement with or support for FIGUERES." (HRS-A-212). On 29 May a careful slection of the more compromising documents obtained by CROZIER's penetration was mailed to the head of the Legislative Commission investigating the Communist affiliations of the PPI. On ~~May~~ 5 June an additional batch of the documents were mailed. These papers were selected for their authenticity, i.e. carbon copies of letters previously sent to the Assembly by the PPI, in order to establish the validity of the documents. On 24 July 1953 the President of Costa Rica signed a bill outlawing the PPI. The participation of Mr. CROZIER in the campaign to prevent the PPI from becoming a legal party is considered to have been instrumental in its success.

increasing reports concerning communist influence and penetration As a result of the WHD's need to acquire first handed and reliable information and data on Fidel Castro and his rebel forces operating in the Sierra Maestra.

As a result of an increasing influx of alarming report concerning possible Communist ~~influence~~ penetration and support of Fidel CASTRO's ~~the~~ 26 July movement operating in the Sierra Maestra, WHD became aware of the need to mount an operation to acquire first handed and reli-ble information on the rebel forces.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER L. D. Puckett

DIVISION WH

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2555 or 3162

DATE 16 April 1958

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE — Harold R. NOEMAYR
2. PROJECT — LIEGE
3. ALLOTMENT NO.
4. SLOT NO.
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES — Arthur G. VAIVADA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO *(If yes, describe and include salary)* — Career Agent GS-12 $7,570.00
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE *(Type and date)* — GSA 3 July 1957(Amendment in process to include Mexico City)
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY *(Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)* — Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP — USA
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE — 35
14. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, day, year)* — 20 June 1922
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)* — Omaha, Nebraska
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE *(City and state or country)* — Alexandria, Virginia
17. MARITAL STATUS *(Check as appropriate)* ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS *(Not including individual)* RELATIONSHIP: — Three, wife and two children
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE — No
21. VETERAN — Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY *(Longevity, combat disability service disability non-combat)*
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE — Army - US Air Force
24. RANK OR GRADE — Tech Sgt
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY — $7,570.00 p/a
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL — None
29. COVER *(Breakdown, if any)* — Income derived from cover will be turned in to Station
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☑ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES *(NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)*

31. QUARTERS — 0.00 p/a
32. POST — None
33. OTHER — Temporary living allowance, if required, not to exceed additional $136.00
Educational (2 children) $504.0
34. T *(Breakdown, if any)* — None

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO — Panama, C.Z. to Mexico City
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☐ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO
40. DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife, Costa Rican citizen, born 15 March 1918

Son, [redacted], born 4 September 1949 - US citizen

Daughter, [redacted], born 24 June 1951 - US citizen

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
43. ENTERTAINMENT
44. OTHER — of travel in Mexico. Yes, as

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.	CASE OFFICER L. D. Puckett	DIVISION WHD
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2555 or 3162	DATE 16 April 1958

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)

Annual leave
Sick leave
Death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under Federal Employees Compensation Act.
Missing Persons Act.
Civil Service Retirement
Regular Staff Employees medical benefits for employee and dependents as stated in R-15-230
(Subject will meet requirements when completes covert medical on 21 April 1958)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☒ OTHER Notional

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS 2

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 May 1958

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days)

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATIO ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (PI, PP, other) FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Case officer for Communist Party operations in Mexico.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Contract and career agent since June 1949.
Intelligence assignments in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
GRADE SCHOOL — HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE — TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE — COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
COLLEGE No degree — COLLEGE DEGREE — POST GRADUATE — MA — PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
English	X			X			X		
Spanish	X			X			X		

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Extensive area knowledge of Central America and Caribbean areas. Has resided in Latin America since 1940.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

19 [redacted]
A
Jan 1946
Apr 1946

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

14-00000

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: S.O./Investigations and Support

SUBJECT : Mr. Charles Rico

SUBJECT : Harold E. [illegible] (p), formerly Arthur G. VAITAIA (p),
S.O. #112569, C-29537

1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation between Mr. Rico of S.O. and Mr. Sulc of WH/III/Mexico (x3162, x2555) concerning an LCFLUTTER examination of Subject. The time agreed upon for this examination was 0930 hours on 24 April 1958.

2. A conference will be held at 2011 I Building at 1500 hours 21 April between the desk case officer and Mr. Rico.

E. H. Dahlgren,
Chief, WH/III

WH/III/Mexico/ISulc:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mexico/Chrono
1-Subject

SECRET

201-168881

FILE NO. 201-32723

31 553

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 1 JULY 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one)
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ____
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated ____
RE Indexing (check one)
Marked ✓ None required ____
Signature Mary Therrien

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

JUL 1 21 10:30
RID CABLE SECT.

				INITIALS
PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT 95479
OUT95479

TO MEXI INFO HAVA CITE DIR 29303

201-

REQUEST HAROLD R. NOEMAYR REPORT TO HQS IMMEDIATELY FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO APPROX TWO WEEKS TDY CUBA TO REESTABLISH CONTACT FIDEL CASTRO. ABOVE MISSION RELATED TO KIDNAPPING OF U. S. CITIZENS. CALL MR. ROBERT REYNOLDS ON ARRIVAL. ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

WH/3

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
~~DESTROY~~	
RI/FI	

AN
~~AB~~
~~ZI~~
~~FS~~
~~EX~~
(FI)

~~201-32723~~

WH/3/MEXI

for R Gomez
J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
21 JUL 58
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FORM 2-58 1389

201-168881

(35)

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 15 April 1958, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph two (2) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> " In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12. "

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Arthur G. Vaivada
Arthur G. Vaivada

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

____

15 April 58

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

15 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH: FI/OPS/Projects
Attention: Miss Paxton

SUBJECT: Arthur G. Vaivada - Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada's contract, effective 1 June 1957, be amended by deleting the first sentence of Paragraph 2 (Compensation) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $7570 per annum, GS-12."

2. All other terms and conditions of the original contract remain in full force and effect.

J. C. King
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

11 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI/Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA - Request for Promotion

1. It is requested that Arthur G. Vaivada, a Career Agent, be promoted from GS-11 to grade GS-12 for his outstanding performance in carrying out a precarious mission in line with the objectives of Project AMPHODARCH, in which he is the Principal Agent.

2. In early January 1958, Vaivada volunteered to undertake a mission to contact Cuban rebel leader Fidel Castro Ruz in the Sierra Maestra mountains in south-eastern Cuba. He arranged for his free passage into the Sierras through contacts within the 26 July Movement which he and the Station developed earlier. After the necessary arrangements, Vaivada left La Habana on 5 April 1958 for Santiago de Cuba, from where he left for the Sierras under the escort of rebel guides. In the course of approximately twenty days' stay at the mountain hideout of Castro's headquarters, during which time he was exposed to many hardships and great personal risks, he accompanied Castro and a force of about 200 rebels on their dawn attack on the town of Manzanillo on 26 March 1958. At Manzanillo, Vaivada broke off contact with the Cuban rebels and returned to his base in Habana.

3. During his relatively short stay in the Sierra Maestra mountains, Vaivada was able to gather considerable intelligence and operational information of noteworthy value, together with an excellent photographic coverage of his trip.

4. This exploit is another achievement to be added to the impressive past performances of Arthur G. Vaivada, who has always shown a deep devotion to his work and to the Agency.

5. Vaivada was born on 20 June 1922, and has been with CIA since 1949. He has been a career agent since 1 June 1957, and was promoted to the grade of GS-11 on 1 June 1957. His tour of duty in Cuba was from August 1954 until 31 March 1958.

JC King

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

Journalistic Background - AGV 14 April 1958.

1) Employment with dates: None (Free lance)

2) Three short stories: "Old Saber Nose" pub BOYS LIFE, Sept 1956
"The Golden Discus" pub BOYS LIFE, June 56.
"Duelo a 300 Brezas" pub BOHEMIA, Havana, Sept 9, 1957.

3) Contributions - Photo: While working as photographer and setting up a small studio in San Jose, Costa Rica in 1952, I did some contract work for the Costa Rican Ministry of agriculture. They were pleased enough with the results to employ me for purpose of setting their photo laboratory within the ministry. During this time I also had some photos published - but cannot recall where and when - mostly portrait work.
Currently, I have had one photo (CASTRO Rev) come out in NY Mirror and about four come out in New York Times. About five more will be published if the news value of this movement holds up.

4) Connections - persons known: Francis Smith, Fiction Editor BOYS LIFE. (Correspondence only for about three years now.)
G. Gordon Dewey, Fiction Instruction, Palmer Institute of Authorship, Hollywood 28, California.
CWO Francis Williams, Technical Writer, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio.
Andrew St. George, Time-Life & Freelance writer and photographer.
Charles Schuman, staff writer and cameraman for UP, currently working out of Havana, Cuba.
Arthur Gregor, Scientific writer, MIT and Nuclear Metals, Inc., Boston, Mass. (Married to wife's sister).

Prepared by Vaivada Lindsey

SECRET

201-168881

14 April 1958.

5) Societies - Memberships: Completed a two year correspondence course in fiction writing - Palmer Institute of Authorship.

Member of the American Legion - Havana.

Assessment (sec)

a) Last assignment: Arrived Havana in August 1954 with a one-year scholarship at the University of Habana (Pan American Foundation, University of Florida at Gainesville). This cover adequately set up and well back stopped. I travelled to Gainesville, met the man (Curt Wilgus) on that end of the line and the only documentation necessary was a series of letters from the Foundation that indicated my efforts to obtain the scholarship and finally their grant. After arriving, however, and matriculating at the U of H, it became immeddately obvious that the nature of my target was such that my presence within the unisersity was more a handicap than an asset. After a few months at the university, I abandoned studies (it was becoming increasingly difficult anyway due to political disturbences) and turned to freelance photography and writing for my cover. For several months I had the photography on just enough of a paying basis that would satisfy any security surveillance.

Photography and writing was definitely superior to university as cover, since it then gave me the opportunity to work inconspicuously on penetrations within the university.

Concerning general security aspects of that assignment, there was that one incident with the threat to exposure coming out of the death of an amphodarch key agent and my proximity throughout the entire incident. However, there has never been any indication that I was exposed or compromised. The station in Cuba felt that if I could return and operate as free from surveillance as I did, that certainly Cuban security people did not have anything compromising on me.

b) Previous assignments: To the best of my knowledge, I have never been exposed or c ompromised during the years of operation in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Cuba. There was an incident which prompted an early departure from Guatemala for personal and operational security reasons - but again, there was never any further indication as to the validity of the warning. What occurred - the Costa Rican source MARY - apparently learned from high level party sources that "a US agent, specialist in communist matters, had departed San Jose for Guatemala" and of course, this vagary unfortunately coincided with my arrival at Guatemala. At any rate, I was doing very little at Guatemala and would have departed anyway in view of the deteriorating situation of June 1954.

SECRET

Naturally, there are many intangibles involved with operating over long periods (almost 4 years in Cuba) in one place, and then travelling back and forth between areas of previous assignment (Costa Rica), and last but not least, cultivating communists in all these places. The question becomes, How ~~through~~ thorough are these people? Does a Cuban CP character communicate with a Guatemalan or Costa Rican along lines of security, of movement of Americans in these areas, and actual approaches made ? Probably not, at their best, the administration is hapnazard. A typical example: Once, in 1953, when I was leaving Costa Rica, I made a couple of cold approaches - one was with woman communist, a leader in the Union de Mujeres Carmen Lyra. I walked away from her house - she evidently got a taxi right behind me - and she went straight to the headquarters and reported to Manuel Mora. But she couldn't describe me - had the story so confused (the approach story) as to render it useless to them, and absolutely nothing ever came of the incident. (By the same token, it would have been a different story in Cuba.)

Although, even in Cuba, there is not persistence or perseverance in investigations. I was working with a municipal committee youth communist - he is a translator and did a story for me in Spanish - and he was visiting my home (twice) while I went to his apartment about four times. I gave him my business card (Dallas Corporation) and some time later a SIM net picked him - searched his premises - and among other things, turned up my business card. He was queried on it and stated that he was simply translating for me. Now this boy is a known communist, although they could get nothing on him at this time - but such an incident/should have provoked at least a casual surveillance of me or my premises. Nothing came of this incident either - and the station down there would known.

Lastly, the mission up to the Sierra Maestra has security implications. Not so much concerning communism, but its reasonable to assume that Cuban security people will come up with my name as having been up there. However, with the pictures published, perhaps an article later, there should be enough cover as a writer to neutralize any hazard there.

Past employment (with us)

a) Company or foundation: Scholarship from Panamerican Foundation at University of Florida at Gainesville, from July 1954 to June 1955.

Then the notional cover set up last year (May 1957) was the Public Surveys Institute, General Polling Service, 532 Fidelity Union Life Bldg., 1511 Bryan street, Dallas, Texas. This arranged so that any mail or telephone to the above corporation would confirm my company connections and could even be used as a credit reference if necessary. This arrangement was quite satisfactory.

SECRET

b) The security aspects of the Dallas corporation were very good I believe. Since freelance writing at best is considered a weak cover, this corporation connection gave me a more solid standing with more serious creditors such as landlords, banks and the larger merchandizing houses. In addition to the above, this cover was utilized very conveniently in operational instances where a realistic approach story was needed. Communists were approached on the basis of a political polling - this could be narrowed right down to soliciting information on the communists party as a political party. Again, it was always nice to have a business card with adresses and telephone numbers that could be given as immediate reference to any type of security interrogation.

Estimate of Journalistic capability:

While my contributions in fiction have been principally juvenile, my writing training has come largely over a period of years at reportorial writing. Since I have some experience as a photographer also, it is convenient to relate the two, and possibly my best field would be feature and article writing. However, while on the mission with the Castro revolutionary movement, I associated with various members of the press and had no difficulty whatsoever in passing as one of them. Given an adequate period for familiarization, I feel that I could just about move into any press or writing slot that did not require a great deal of copy or tight dealines.

AGV

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

mr. Dahlgren

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-4306

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Field File No. 23-89/2-180

DESENSITIZED

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 10 April 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

INFO: Chief of Base, Santiago de Cuba

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/Arthur G. VAIVADA

SPECIFIC— Commendation for Successful Completion of Mission to Sierra Maestra

Action Required: At Headquarters' Discretion

1. The writer wishes to commend Station and Base personnel whose work contributed to the successful preparation, mounting, and execution of the clandestine operation that recently placed a KUBARK Career Agent, Arthur G. VAIVADA, in the Sierra Maestra headquarters of Dr. Fidel CASTRO Ruz for sixteen days in March 1958. This mission resulted in acquisition by KUBARK of considerable important and timely information regarding the CASTRO revolutionary movement that was being urgently requested by customer agencies. In the writer's opinion the operation was a team effort. Giving credit to the staff personnel will in no way detract from the praiseworthy performance of VAIVADA himself.

2. With regard to VAIVADA the personal courage and professional ability as an intelligence officer demonstrated on this mission were of the highest order and should be highly commended. Headquarters is aware, as is the Station, that VAIVADA is desirous of acquiring staff agent status with KUBARK. The writer believes that his desires in this respect should be given consideration as part of any action taken in recognition of VAIVADA's services in the subject operation.

3. Station and Base personnel directly concerned with laying on this operation, arranging for proper briefing and support of VAIVADA, and recovering him securely when he left the Sierra Maestras, were Humphrey I. EBERWEIN, James R. PALINGER, and Nelson L. RAYNOCK.

Sherwood P. Rochon

Sherwood P. Rochon

Distribution:
~~3~~ - Washington
1 - Santiago de Cuba
2 - Files

SPR/gwm

9 April 1958

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	✓
RI/AIS	✓
201-168881	
RI/Files	

10 April 58
201-168881 ✓

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A HKH-A-4306

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RS COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : L. D. PUCKETT
UNIT : WHD 656
EXT : 2555
DATE : 9 APRIL 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

VAIVADA COVER

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 24 [illegible]
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT64381

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 16715

MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)*

1. DISCUSSIONS WITH ARTHUR G. VAIVADA INDICATE JOURNALISTIC COVER SUITABLE FOR MEXI ASSIGNMENT. THIS BASED HIS PUBLISHED FICTIONAL AND NEWS STORIES DURING PAST FEW YEARS AND PUBLISHED NEWS PHOTOS TAKEN DURING RECENT VISIT FIDEL CASTRO CAMP.

2. HQS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING U.S. COVER ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, TO INSURE CONSIDERATION ALL POSSIBILITIES, REQUEST STATION OPINION USE ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN (REQUEST CURRENT TRACES), WHO KNOWN TO NAUMAN.

3. REQUEST STATION CONCURRENCE VAIVADA USE JOURNALISTIC COVER.

END OF MESSAGE.

C/S COMMENT: *VAIVARDA ACCEPTABLE, SUGGESTED ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION.

COORDINATION WITH:
WH/III/CARIBBEAN
DC/CI/ICD
CCB/NC Mr. LuHoskie by phone

For J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S-E-C-R-E-T

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

SECRET

8 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Training/Briefing of DDP Personnel

Specific: Briefing of Ross L. Crozier, who is scheduled to be the new undercover CP Officer for Station Mexico City.

1. In Havana, Cuba on 5 March 1958, I briefed Ross L. Crozier concerning:

a) his proposed new assignment in Mexico; and

b) Headquarters desire that he receive special briefings from CI/ICD prior to going to Mexico.

2. Crozier stated that he was very glad to receive the briefing because he had not had a clear picture of what the proposed assignment in Mexico involved. He was pleased to find out that it was a pure penetration assignment. He also responded enthusiastically to the idea of receiving Headquarters briefings prior to going to the Field. He stated that he would like to have a short leave in Costa Rica prior to receiving the Headquarters briefing.

3. On 2 April 1958 in Washington, D.C., the undersigned and Mr. E. L. Anderson, Chief, CI/ICD-WH, briefed Crozier further concerning the matter discussed above, reaffirming our keen interest in the assignment. Mr. Anderson pointed out to him that his (Crozier's) "partner" in Mexico City (the inside CP officer), was in Costa Rica

SECRET

201-168881

and that if securely feasible it would be a good idea for the two men to meet there. Mr. Crozier stated that he thought that it could be done readily and securely as he will contact the Embassy normally as an American citizen and he is well acquainted with COS, San Jose. One of the elements in our plan for intensification of the CPPP in Mexico is that these two very capable officers should get to know one another well in order to function smoothly and efficiently as a team.

4. Mr. Crosier stated that he plans to return to Washington, D.C., from his leave in Costa Rica during the approximate period 20-25 April 1958. Chief, CI/ICD-WH is handling arrangements for the briefing of Mr. Crozier.

Paul J. Burke
Deputy Chief, CI/ICD

cc: WH/Mexi

Activities of Fidel Castro's Rebel Forces in Cuba



The rebel leader's men set up a printing shop in upper Sierra Maestra in Oriente Province. They have three typewriters, a small press and mimeograph machine for pamphlets.



[illegible] L. Crater

Mule train carries tanks of oxygen and acetylene for welding bombs, grenades and armor

[illegible] 7, 1958

14-00000

8, 1958.

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Army Reports Widespread Clashes—Thirty Rebels Listed as Captured

Special to The New York Times.

HAVANA, April 7—Fighting between Government troops and rebels under the command of Fidel Castro has intensified in Oriente Province in the last forty-eight hours, official sources said today.

A Cuban Army communiqué said seven rebels under the command of Raul Castro, a younger brother of the rebel chief, were killed in a clash in northern Oriente Province. The communiqué said thirty of the insurgent band were captured and the others were scattered and cut off from the main body of rebels in the Sierra Maestra.

This was the first announcement by the army of the capture of any rebels. It is believed here that the army has been following a policy of taking no prisoners.

Army Reports Plane Downed

Army headquarters also reported that troops had shot down a C-46 plane carrying arms and ammunition to the rebels. The announcement said the plane crashed and burned, killing the pilot and crewmen. Some unburned arms were found in the wreckage, the army said.

[A rebel announcement said insurgent forces had burned a disabled plane Friday near Manzanillo after it had landed with reinforcements and arms for Señor Castro's men, The Associated Press reported. The announcement did not say where the plane had come from.]

Another clash between Government troops and rebels occurred Sunday at Dos Palmas near Santiago de Cuba. The army asserted that a number of rebels had been killed or wounded and that seven jeeps

Continued on Page 3, Column 5

Ross L. Crozier

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

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Special to The New York Times.

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Continued on Page 3, Column 5

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1958.

CONFLICT IN CUBA GAINS IN VIOLENCE

Continued From Page 1

and trucks, eleven rifles and some ammunition had been seized.

Skirmish in Majagua

Government forces also reported a skirmish in the Majagua district near San Luis, near Santiago de Cuba. The army said the troops killed two rebels and seized three jeeps and some arme and ammunition. One soldier was wounded.

Señor Castro declared "total war" on the Government of President Fulgencio Batista starting April 1. The rebel chief has said he would call a general revolutionary strike at the "opportune" moment. So far no strike has occurred.

President Batista told newsmen yesterday he was confident that his forces would defeat the rebels, but he conceded it could be a long struggle.

Meanwhile, rebel sources in Havana declared an announcement by army headquarters Saturday that a rebel band led by Señor Castro had been cut off from the Sierra Maestra was without foundation. These sources said that Señor Castro's officers had decided more than three months ago that he should not lead any guerrilla expeditions but should remain in his headquarters in the Sierra Maestra.

An official of the Consoli-ated Railway Company of Ca-aguey, which serves tha east-rn half of the island, also de-ied reports that the railroad's nployes had gone out on rike. The official said the ebels had burned so many rail-ay bridges in the eastern part f Camaguey Province that it as impossible to maintain ain service.

In Havana, the police an-ounced the arrest of eighteen ouths accused of terrorism and ttempts to provoke a general rike. Authorities said some of he youths were Communists nd others were members of the uthentic organization headed by former President Carlos Prios Socarras.

Michigan Students Freed

HAVANA, April 7 (UP)—Two University of Michigan student newspaper men arrested because they were suspected of making contact with Cuban rebels were released today in Santiago de Cuba.

James Elsman and Barton Hathwaite, who had been picked up at their hotel yesterday by army intelligence officers, were freed when Park Fields Wollam, United States consul in Santiago, intervened.

The two youths, correspondents of The Michigan Daily, a student publication, had arrived in Santiago from Havana a few hours before their arrest.

Miami Newsman Arrested

MIAMI, April 7 (UP)—Television station WCKT reported today that Ben Silver, one of its newsmen, missing in Cuba since Saturday, had been reported under arrest at Santiago de Cuba.

Gene Strul, news director of the station, said the United States Embassy had found after an investigation that Mr. Silver was "safe." The embassy said he would be released and returned to Havana tomorrow.

Ross L. Cramer

SECLUDED REBEL ARMS SHOP: In this enclosure in Cuba's Sierra Maestra, so remote that even mules cannot reach it, weapons are repaired for forces of Fidel Castro.

201-165351

SECRET

DD/P 3-8523

4 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DD/P

VIA : CCB/NC

SUBJECT. : Sale of News Photographs by Arthur G. VAIVADA (ps)

1. It is requested that Arthur G. VAIVADA be granted permission to sell news photographs of Fidel CASTROS' Cuban Revolutionary Group to an appropriate United States news agency.

2. VAIVADA is a Career Agent who has very recently returned from a PCS assignment in Cuba. At the direction of the Western Hemisphere Division, VAIVADA spent the last three weeks of his Cuba assignment in the Sierra Maestra camp of Fidel CASTRO for the purpose of collecting current intelligence information on CASTRO's activities. As a result of his notional cover as a representative of a U. S. public opinion polling service, VAIVADA was able to take numerous photographs of current news interest. This Division considers the sale of these photographs as an integral part of the cover backstopping necessary to protect the identity of VAIVADA's actual Sponsor (CIA) from three U. S. news media correspondents who were with VAIVADA during his visit with CASTRO. Also, the sale of these photographs would supplement a future news media cover for VAIVADA in his forthcoming PCS assignment in Mexico City.

3. All money resulting from the sale of these photographs will be retained by the Agency.

for R. Gomez
J. C. KING
CHIEF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

CONCUR:

Fred R. Youngblood
for CHIEF, CCB/NC

APPROVED:

for T M Karamessines
COPS
4 April 1958

SECRET

201-168881

14-00000

187 SE/LSB/435

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 31 MARCH 58

187

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

MAR 31 21 10:5?

REC'D CABLE SEC.

PRIORITY

IN 10494

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 235

1. VAIVADA ARRIVING HQS EVENING 31 MARCH. WILL CONTACT CHAPRON.

2. ADVISING AMB PER DIR 17288 (OUT 54133)*APRIL 1 UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY. RELEASED 311703Z.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * VIEW SENSITIVITY AND POSSIBILITY LEAK TO PRESS BY EMBASSY, HQS PERFER NO MENTION VAIVADA MISSION UNTIL ITS COMPLETION.

SECRET

301-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

330 MRL/LSB/118

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 27 MARCH 1958
330

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 27 22 18:50
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49228

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 232

RAYNOCK RECEIVED NOTE FROM VAIVADA 26 MAR. WILL LEAVE SIERRAS VIA MANZANILLO 28-31 MAR AND CALL RAYNOCK FROM THERE. COMMENT. REBEL ACTIVITY MANZANILLO AREA MAY DELAY CONTACT. 271630Z.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168851

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

057/ES/OT/M

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 10 MARCH 1958
57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAR 11 0658Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 41341

TO SACU INFO DIR CITE HAVA 189

ADVISE IMMEDIATELY WHEN YOU CAN CONFIRM VAIVADA HAS REACHED DESTINATION.-

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

706/JW/DB/GHS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 5 MARCH 1958

76

TO : HAVANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	Subject file	6	

MAR 5 23 00 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT51534

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR 11212

RE HAVA 179 (IN 38161)(NOT SENT MEXI) *
MEXI 1017 (IN 26340)(NOT SENT HAVA)

1. FOR HAVA: LEAVE APPROVED.

2. FOR MEXI: VAIVADA ETA MEXI IS 20 MAY.

END OF MESSAGE

*C/S COMMENT: VAIVADA REQUESTED 15-20 DAYS LEAVE COSTA RICA PRIOR ARRIVAL MEXI. PAPATE INTERVIEWED HIM 3 MARCH.

5 March 58
201-168881 ✓

WH/III/MEXICO
WH/Support
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.



Photos taken by Arthur G. Vaivada at Hqs. of Fidel CASTRO's forces in Sierra Maestra, March 1958.

For 201 file.

201-168551

14-00000



U.S.N



FILE NO. 201-168881

663 ER/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1958

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

BY F 663 (check one).
No CS Record value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated ✓
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one).
Marked ___ None required ✓
Signature:

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 27 [illegible] 03 20z
[illegible] CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 99340
OUT 99340

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 10195

RE DIR 06765 (OUT 91241) *

REQUEST REPLY

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

C/S COMMENT: *HQS DESIRED TO ASSIGN VAIVADA PCS TO MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTHS ORIENTATION AT HQS. QUERIED IF HE COULD COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET SCHEDULE.

[illegible]	
[illegible]	Z
[illegible]	
RI/Files	

27 Feb. 58

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-168881

14-00080

505 BC/JM/LR

Hugh O. Macauley

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

584 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible] 07:50

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

OUT92831
92831

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 07387

REF: A. DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)
B. DIR 4551 (OUT 86187)

1. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDED TO INCLUDE OBJECTIVES VAIVADA MISSION:

A. NAMES, BIOG AND BACKGROUND DATA AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENT TOP OFFICERS CASTRO STAFF.

B. STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT CASTRO ARMY.

C. EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION CASTRO FORCES.

D. EXTENT COORDINATION AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, PARTICULARLY PSP.

E. GATHER OPS DATA FOR PLANTING FUTURE LONGTERM POLITICAL ACTION AGENT WITHIN CASTRO MOVEMENT TO DETECT AND COUNTERACT COMMIE PENETRATION.

2. PROJECT ALLOTMENT INCREASED $1000. APPROX COST MISSION ESTIMATED AS FOLLOWS: TRANSFER VAIVADA FAMILY SANJ $200; TRAVEL VAIVADA $200; STORAGE HHE AND CAR $600; MISC EMERGENCY OPS EXPENSE $1000. VAIVADA TO CONVERT SINGLE STATUS ALLOWANCE AND RECEIVE SEPARATION ALLOWANCE WHILE ON MISSION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

201-165561

RELEASING OFFICER SECRET AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 10 FEBRUARY 1958

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 10 20 37Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE 2

DIR 07387
OUT 92531

TO INFO CITE DIR

3. VAIVADA TO USE COVER REF B. ~~[illegible]~~ HE IS NOT USE POLLING COVER FOR CURRENT OPERATION. POLLING COVER TO BE REVEALED ONLY IF QUESTIONED REGARDING PAST ~~[illegible]~~ ACTIVITY. STATION TO PROVIDE ESCAPE AND EVASION PLAN USE EVENT NEED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *HQS SUGGESTED BUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREE LANCE WRITER WITH GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS.

FI/OPS JC
COORDINATING OFFICERS

for C. KING, C/WH/
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

656 WCJ/DB/MCB

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : H. O. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 5 FEBRUARY 1958

656

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 5 23 18 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 91241
OUT 91241

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, S/C 2

TO HAVA INFO MEXI CITE DIR C6765

REF DIR 2147 (OUT 80587)*

1. HQS DESIRES ASSIGN VAIVADA PCS MEXI AS CP PENETRATION OPS CASE OFFICER UNDER UNOFFICIAL COVER AFTER COMPLETION CASTRO MISSION AND APPROX ONE MONTH ORIENTATION HQS.

2. MEXI REQUESTS VAIVADAS ARRIVAL MEXI ONE MAY FOR FURTHER ORIENTATION AND OVERLAP PRIOR DEPARTURE PREDECESSOR FLOYD H. POSTANY.

3. APPROVAL REQUESTED PAR 2 REF EXPECTED SHORTLY. ADVISE WHETHER HE CAN COMPLETE MISSION AND MEET ABOVE SCHEDULE

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DIR C2147 HQS AGREED VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER COULD BE ARRANGED.

Coordinated by phone with:
ED ANDERSON, CI/ICD
WH/III/MEXI

COORDINATING OFFICERS

5 Feb. 58
201-168881

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. H. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

010 ER/DB/WS/10

DATE : 3 FEBRUARY 1958

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

FEB 4 05 28 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 26340

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 1017

RE: DIR 02146 (OUT 80586*)

1. VAIVADA ACCEPTABLE.

2. SUGGEST ARRIVE MEXI ON 1 MAY FOR ORIENTATION PRIOR POSTANY DEPARTURE.

3. POUCHING SUGGESTIONS RE COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

S/C COMMENT: *REQUESTED COMMENTS RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY.

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: A-I-R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-1292

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-168-881)
ield File No. 23-88/2-147

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 30 January 1958

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/KUTUBE

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2528, 6 January 1958

In reply to the query made in the referenced dispatch, VAIVADA has no objection to taking the LCFLUTTER test in June or as soon as he returns to Headquarters, and the Station sees no problem of morale or other nature for VAIVADA in the delay.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3 - Washinton
2 - Files

24 January 1958

JRP/mfm

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

COPY

201-168881 microfilmed

657 WCJ/DB/MCB

65

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : R. REYNOLDS
UNIT : WH/III
EXT : 2056
DATE : 21 JANUARY 1958

ROUTING			
		4	
2		5	
3		6	

22 22 39 :58

[illegible] CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 86187

TO : HABANA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 04551

RE: HAVA-133 (IN-18923)*

HQS CONCURS BUT SUGGEST FUCH BE ADVISED VAIVADA IS FREELANCE WRITER WITH "GOOD ODYOKE CONTACTS".

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION.

21 Jan. 58
301-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

Robert N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

January 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

Arthur Vaivada

SUBJECT: Subject of our letter number 4025; Interest in Assignment in U. S.

Padinger Sagger

1. In recent conversations with both JRP and RDS, Subject has broached the prospect of a possible assignment within the U. S. following completion of his Habana assignment. He says he would not want his statements re reassignment which were recently forwarded to Headquarters to be interpreted to mean that he is not interested in a U. S. tour. He says that he has been giving much thought to his future career, as well as to the needs of his family. He points out that he personally has now spent approximately 16 years, excepting vacations and short training periods, living and working outside the U. S., that his two children have never lived there, and that both he and his wife are concerned that too much time will elapse before they can provide their children with a period in the U. S. during their formative years.

2. It is the opinion of both RDS and JRP that Subject is at a point in his career development where a tour at Headquarters would be extremely beneficial. The Station lacks knowledge concerning the specific Headquarters jobs to which a person of Subject's status might be assigned; but it is our understanding that OTR sometimes employs these persons as instructors. We believe that a tour with OTR would not only remedy in great measure deficiencies in Subject's background caused by lack of Headquarters experience, but would at the same time afford OTR excellent instructor material.

3. In view of Subject's own interest in such an assignment, and our estimate of the potential value to him and to the Organization that would accrue from it, we recommend that Headquarters arrange such an assignment if at all possible.

4. In view of the likelihood of Subject's transfer in the near future, a prompt decision is requested.

201-168881

361 MJ/JM/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 16 JANUARY 1958 [redacted]

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

JAN 16 21 33Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

IN 18923

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 133

RE: DIR ~~01247~~ 02147 *

1. EBERWEIN THROUGH CLOSE CONTACT LUIS BUCH, KEY FIGURE IN 26 JULY MOVEMENT, CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES FOR VAIVADA MISSION. VAIVADA THINKS CHANCES SUCCESS WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF CASTRO BELIEVES HE IS UNOFFICIAL U.S. OBSERVER. STATION CONCURS AND SUGGESTS BUCH BE DISCREETLY INFORMED ANYTHING CASTRO TELLS VAIVADA WILL FIND ITS WAY TO U.S. GOVT CHANNELS. LIGHT FREELANCE WRITER COVER WILL THEN BE ADEQUATE.

2. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL PROCEED THIS BASIS UNLESS EVENTS ORIENTE FORCE DELAY.

161445Z

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: * APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

201-168881

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : R. G. MACAULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 7 JANUARY 1958

545

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

JAN 8 19 47z58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HABANA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	

OUT00537

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 02147

REF: HAVA-119 (IN 13410)*

1. HQS AGREES VAIVADA WELL QUALIFIED TO UNDERTAKE MISSION PROVIDED MORE SUITABLE COVER CAN BE ARRANGED. BELIEVE HIS FORMER COVER AS FREE LANCE WRITER WOULD BE MORE ADEQUATE FOR CONTACTING CASTRO. PROPOSED COVER REF COULD BE USED ONLY EVENT CAPTURE BY AUTHORITIES. DESIRE HE LEAVE ON MISSION NOT LATER END FEB. MEANWHILE VAIVADA CAN ARRANGE INTERVIEW FAUSTINO PEREZ.

2. PROJECT AMPHODARCH AMENDMENT UNDER PROCESS TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND COVERAGE TRANSFER FAMILY COSTA RICA AND DISPOSITION HHE AND AUTO. HQS WILL ADVISE APPROVAL.

3. VAIVADA'S NEXT ASSIGNMENT UNDER STUDY AND EXPECT DECISION PRIOR END FEB.

4. FREAPANE PCS HAVA UNLIKELY BEFORE ONE APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED HQS COMMENTS ON ASSIGNING ARTHUR G. VAIVADA TO VISIT CASTRO.

301-168881

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2528

201-168-881

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

6 Jan 58 10 08

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/KUTUBE
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2380, 16 October 1957
HKH-A-3990, 24 October 1957

Action Required: As indicated in paragraph 1.

1. With reference to KUSODA's request that VAIVADA be given an LCFLUTTER test as soon as possible, we have taken the position that, inasmuch as he is to return to Headquarters in June, there is little point in incurring the added expense for a trip now. However, he should understand that his continued employment under his new contract is contingent upon satisfactory completion of such a test. This, of course is no different from the requirements made of any employee; there merely is a time lag in his case because of distance. KUSODA has agreed to the delay providing VAIVADA is so advised.

2. Although we do not expect any problem, if VAIVADA is disturbed over having something like this hanging fire, and you feel there is a real morale problem involved, we will go ahead with it now. Our action will be entirely dependent upon KOCHOA's evaluation of the degree of importance this has for VAIVADA.

COPY

18 December 1957

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 2 - RI
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - OS
- 1 - Chrono Carib.
- 1 - Subject.

Hugh O. MacAuley
WH/III/Caribbean/HOMacAuley/js

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

OS/IRD
(Coordinating officer)

Robert N. Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
HKHW 2528
DATE 6 JAN 58

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

14-00000

FILE NO. ~~[illegible]~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : A. G. SPERA
UNIT : WHD
EXT : 2555
DATE : 6 JANUARY 1968

ROUTING	
1	4
2 201-168881	5
3	6

JAN 8 14 47Z 58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, S/C 2, FI/OPS 2, CP 2

~~RE Filing (check one):~~
No CS Record Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Branch copy filed as indicated
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked / None required
Signature:

PRECEDENCE				
X	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT80586

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02146

~~[illegible]~~

HMMW 5825 AND HMMW 5826 ~~[illegible]~~ FORWARD BIO AND OPS DATA RE ARTHUR G. VAIVADA CAREER AGENT WITH EXCELLENT COMMUNIST OPS RECORD IN COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA AND HAVANA STATIONS SINCE 1949. BEING CONSIDERED AS REPLACEMENT FOR POSTANY. NOW IN HAVANA COULD TRANSFER MEXI ~~AROUND~~ APRIL TO JUNE 58. PLEASE CABLE COMMENTS UPON RECEIPT DISPATCHES.

END OF MESSAGE.

RI COPY

COORDINATE WITH:
WH/CARIB
WH/PERS

RECLASSIFIED
RI/AN 2
RI/
RI/Files

6 Jan. 58

201-168881

J C King
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

R N Dahlgren
R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

32

032 WCJ/BP/WCJ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 02 JANUARY 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, S/C 2

JAN 3 [illegible] 47Z58
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 13410

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 119

RE: DIR 00452 (OUT 76181) *

1. ARTHUR G VAIVADA BELIEVES CAN ARRANGE VISIT CASTRO THROUGH CASUAL CONTACT PROVINCIAL 26 JULY LEADER HE MET THROUGH AMOURETTE-9. COVER WOULD BE AS AMERICAN REP SURVEY CORP INTERESTED PENETRATING CENSORSHIP BARRIER TO LEARN EXTENT COMMIE PENETRATION OF MOVT. PROVINCIAL LEADER VOLUNTARILY ARRANGING VAIVADA INTERVIEW WITH FAUSTINO PEREZ (HKH 1535) HAVA NEXT TEN DAYS.

2. VIAVADA EAGER UNDERTAKE MISSION AND WELL QUALIFIED VIEW WARTIME TRAINING JUNGLE TECHNIQUES, KNOWLEDGE CUBA, LANGUAGE CAPABILITY AND CLANDESTINE EXPERIENCE. WOULD WANT SEND FAMILY COSTA RICA AND JOIN THEM AFTER COMPLETION TASK. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE FINDING NEW AMOURETTE-B CUT-OUT, BUT STATION CAN FIND TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT PENDING ARRIVAL FREAPANE.

3. VAIVADA WOULD NEED TWO-THREE WEEKS LAY ON CAREFUL ARRANGEMENTS AND PROBABLY COULD LEAVE FOR SIERRA END JAN. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS. RELEASED 022105Z.

201-168881

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * HQS ATTACHES SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE CASTRO MOVEMENT JUSTIFY COVERAGE FROM SEVERAL ANGLES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

VIA: A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3990

(201-168881)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 24 October 1957

FROM : Acting Chief of Station, wh Habana

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational

SPECIFIC—Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2380, dated 16 October 1957

1. The Subject has no objection to submitting to an LCFLUTTER test at the convenience of Headquarters. This could be easily arranged here in the event an LCFLUTTER team is passing, or could pass, through Habana; on the other hand, VAIVADA could just as easily go to any designated place in Florida in order to take this test. It is understood that LCFLUTTER teams from time to time visit that state.

2. The Station will take such measures as are feasible to cover the activities of Subject and his wife while in Habana.

3. While the matter was not referred to in the reference, Subject's projected one-year tour of duty will end in June, 1958, at which time it is VAIVADA's desire to leave Cuba for a reassignment in another area in his present line of operational work and under similar unofficial cover conditions. A detailed dispatch on this subject will shortly be transmitted to Headquarters; it is referred to here so that the Headquarters desk may be alerted to the need for considering what assignments would be open to VAIVADA during the Spring or Summer of 1958.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger

Distribution:
- ✓3 - Washington
- 2 - Files

23 October 1957

JRP/mfm

FORM NO. 51-28 A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

24 Oct. 57
201-168881 ✓

RI COPY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ [✓ SECRET]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
WH/Personnel

NO.

DATE 5 December 1956

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/Pers Ofcr	6 Dec	6	JCB
2. WH/Admin	5 Dec	5	HB
3. WH/Personnel	6 Dec	6	
4. DI/CSP, 2050 "L" BLDG	7 Dec 56	7 Dec 56	EWD
5. ~~Contract Pers Div Wing 2F, Curie Hall~~			
6. 2309 "L" CS/CSP Ctl B	10 DEC 1956		
7. Chairman [illegible] 1711-L	3 JAN 1957	9 Jan	Efp
8. 2309-L ~~CS/CSP Sec B~~			
9. ~~Chief FI/Ops~~ 1711 L			
10. WH Personnel	11 Jan	11	JCB
11. WH III/Cuba			
12. WH/Pers			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

7. For approval
~~[illegible] for proper routing & [illegible] signs.~~
~~Please call [illegible]~~
[illegible] X4641

7 & 10 & 11 - Chief FI Ops believes this man should be considered for Career Agent not Staff Agent Status. I have already discussed with Mr. Roland & therefore papers are returned herewith.

201-168881

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ [✓ SECRET] ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 June 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Dec 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED:	

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BAP- *
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project AMPHODARCH
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position BAF-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
J. KOFLANOVICH X-8242

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

File

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Arthur G. VAIVADA (Pseudo)	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 June 1922	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Dec 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Excepted Appointment (Staff Agent)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED:	

FROM—		TO—
	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) DAP- *
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $6390.00 p.a.
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WH Branch III Havana, Cuba Station Project [illegible]
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Havana, Cuba
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* A memorandum has been forwarded to the Director of Personnel requesting that position DAP-409, San Jose, Costa Rica, be transferred to Havana, Cuba and upgraded to GS-12.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
J. [illegible] X-[illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				[illegible]

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible] in Havana

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

201-168817

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: *SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.*

CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland
DIVISION: WH/III
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2971
DATE: 4 December 1956

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS *(See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)*

All benefits normally given to a CIA staff employee.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS *(Check)*: ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE *(Check)*: ☐ PROPRIETARY ☒ CULTURAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ TECHNICAL ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES *(If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)*
☐ TOTAL ☒ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS 2
52. EFFECTIVE DATE: Immediate
53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE *(Number of days)*: Thirty days
55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION *(FI, PP, other)*: FI Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Spotting and recruiting agents. Obtaining information as principal agent for comprehensive youth-student net, with emphasis on Communist and revolutionary matters.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Army and Air Force intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION *(Check Highest Level Attained)*
☒ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE *(No degree)* ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY *(Check Appropriate Degree Competency)*

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x				x		x		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Very good.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

1940 - 1945: T/Sgt USA, USAF; Intelligence NCO
Jan 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS *(Use other side if necessary)*

Performance of Subject has been outstanding. He has proved particularly adept at spotting and recruiting of agents and his work has been highly praised by the COS, Habana. FI/Plans/Projects has stated of Subject that he "has obviously been a valuable, deep cover

☒ [illegible]

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
	J K Galbraith		

6-8483
Al 6-72

13 November 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA From Contract to Staff Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a strong case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area ofunofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen, a situation which complicates his proposed conversion somewhat. She has expressed a desire to acquire U.S. citizenship, however, and it has been determined that this can be arranged within the next several months, barring unforeseen developments. She will be required to spend most of this period in the U.S. and is currently making plans to do so.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted staff status at grade GS-11, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet Security and other requirements. There is available in WH Division a staff position (BAF-409) to which VAIVADA can be assigned.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training in the near future.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to staff status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SECRET

20 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA; Staff Status

1. The undersigned discussed case this date with Mr. Myers (2709 "I"; telephone extension 2551-2552) and with Mr. Pennington (2044 "I") both of Security Division. Mr. Myers was shown the content of HKH-A-________(recommendation for staff status for VAIVADA) and apprised of the problem of Mrs. VAIVADA not being a U.S. citizen. Myers stated that, while cases like this were usually very difficult, he felt this particular one might be justified in view of VAIVADA's long and excellent record with the Agency and the relatively long time during which he has been married. Myers indicated that the procedure would be as follows:

> Presentation of a formal request for waiver on citizenship requirements for spouse and granting of staff status to Subject. The memorandum would be prepared for Personnel, would then go to Security, and subsequently, with recommendations of both, to Deputy Director, who would have the final decision in this case.

Myers was to discuss the matter further with other elements of Security and advise within the next several days as to what the next step should be.

it later developed that this would be extremely difficult; that it would be much more practicable to concentrate on

2. Considering the possibility that such a request might be turned down, the undersigned discussed with Pennington the procedures for acquisition of citizenship for Mrs. VAIVADA, and determined that this should be relatively simple. The requirements were: presence in the U.S. (vicinity of Washington) for approximately forty-five days with some additional time to acquire passport. So long as we have nothing that would make her inadmissable to the U.S., the basic requirements would be: ability to speak English and to pass a relatively simple test based on pamphlet which would be given to her for study. Security would presumably handle her case when she arrives in the States.

3. It has occurred to the undersigned that perhaps, if it is necessary for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire citizenship, VAIVADA himself could be brought to the Washington vicinity for training purposes in order to facilitate the visit of his wife, expenses, etc. This would at the same time afford an opportunity to provide VAIVADA with formal Headquarters or PBPRIME training ~~of which he has had none to date.~~

SECRET

J. B. NOLAND 201-168771

SECRET

24 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Proposed Staff Status for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577, 17 April 1956

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status, and presents a good case for such conversion. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949 with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is 34 years old and was promoted recently to the equivalent of a grade GS-10. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

2. Unfortunately Subject's spouse (since 1945) is a Costa Rican citizen. Preliminary investigation at Headquarters has revealed that Subject's conversion to staff status is virtually out of the question so long as his wife remains an alien. It has also been determined, however, that the wife can acquire U.S. citizenship within a span of 45 days if she so desires and is willing to come to the U.S. for that period of time. This would remove the major stumbling block to acquisition of staff status for VAIVADA.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that (a) VAIVADA's wife be encouraged to seek U.S. citizenship under the terms outlined above (b) VAIVADA be granted staff status, contingent upon his wife's first becoming a U.S. citizen, and providing he can meet all other requirements. C/WH/III has endorsed the recommendation for staff status and a suggestion by C/WH/Admin that BAF-409, a new position currently alloted to San Jose, be transferred to Habana to be filled by VAIVADA.

4. It is further recommended that WH Division consider bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training to coincide with his wife's stay (at Headquarters' convenience). This would facilitate acquisition of citizenship for the wife and at the same time afford VAIVADA a chance for additional Headquarters training. Subject previously received covert training at Headquarters from 5 October through 25 November 1953.

J.B. Noland

J. B. NOLAND, C/WH/III/Cuba

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

AIR

HKH-W-1866

17 SEP 1956

: Chief of Station, Habana

: Chief, WHD

- Administrative
- Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: HKH-W-1819, 17 August 1956

Attached for your information and retention in Station files is a copy of the latest contract extension for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - as above

12 September 1956

Distribution:
3 - Habana, w/att.
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
✓1 - WH/III/Cuba/Subject
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - RI/D&P

WH/III/Cuba/JBNolan:cmcc

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

201-168881

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HKH-W-2380~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

(201-168881)

TO Chief of Station, Habana

FROM Chief, WHD

DATE 16 OCT 57 11 07

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur C. VAIVADA

References: HHS-A- 1326 (not sent to Habana)
HHS-A, 3 September 1957

1. At the time the request was submitted to convert Subject from Contract Agent to Career Agent status, a provisional covert security clearance was granted for that purpose. KUSODA recently advised that a full covert security clearance had been granted for the use of Subject as Principal Agent, under-official cover, in Project AMH[illegible]CH, in accordance with the provisions set forth in the memorandum of the Chief, KUBARK, dated 14 February 1949, entitled "Security and Operational Clearances."

2. At the same time, KUSODA requested the following action to be taken:

a. That full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible be taken on Subject and his wife and her family; and,

b. That arrangements be made to have Subject affronted with a LCFLUTTER test as soon as feasible.

3. Headquarters has already initiated the action set forth in Para 2 (a) requesting full traces and investigation of Subject and his wife and her family in Panama City and San Jose. Todate only San Jose has replied with HRSA-2938, copy of which was sent to Habana. Station Habana is requested to take appropriate action to cover Subject's and his wife's activities during their residence in Habana, and inform Headquarters of the results.

4. With reference to KUSODA's request for a LCFLUTTER test on Subject, they have expressed their desire to have Subject tested in the field as soon as possible, or as soon as the appropriate arrangements can be made. KUSODA has indicated that they will be happy to assist in arranging this test.

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
K
HKHW 2380
DATE 16 OCT 57

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET

RI COPY

However, Headquarters would appreciate receiving the Station's views and comments on the matter as quickly as possible so that KUSODA may be advised and can make the necessary planning.

5. The station is reminded that subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of KUBARK. Your attention is also called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions KUBARK Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if the station should desire at a later date to change the status or use of Subject, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to Headquarters.

11 October 1957

J. C. King
J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
- 1 - Subject

Hugh O MacAuley
WH/III/Cuba/HOMacAULEY/js

RI COPY

for J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
(Authenticating officer)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL	DATE 11 September 1957 PROJECT
TO: ~~CI/Operational Approval and Support~~ Division	FROM: *(Division)* WH/BR-3/Cuba

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME	C-25507	
CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Arthur G. VAIVADA (Sp.)		
TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE Career agent		

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE *(Full details)*

It is requested that Subject's OA be amended to allow the Station to use him as a contact between the Case Officer and Project AMOURETTE-B, and other PP assets at the Station's discretion, on a temporary basis until a permanent PP staff agent can be assigned to these duties. This temporary assignement will not interfere with Subject's regular FI duties.

Basis of the request: HAVA-016 (IN48405)

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*	☒	OTHER: amendment of OA

SEP 12 54 PM '57

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐	GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☐	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐	WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐	NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐	GOVERNMENT	☐	ACADEMIC
☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
☐	RECORD	☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
		☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
		☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh C MacAuley Hugh D. MacAuley, WH/3/Cuba	2056	J. Brady, AC/WH/BR-3

201-168181

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

321 RLG/LB/RAC

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ATE , 26 AUGUST 57

321

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 26 20 47 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 42938

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 999

RE: DIR 31708 (OUT 82423)

ADDRESS IS CALLE 6 NUMBER 311 ALTOS, ENTRE 15Y17, VEDADO, HAVA, CUBA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

Subject. Arturo G. VAHIVADA -

Info passed to Cover Div.
1211 ALCOT Hall Wing B -
27 Aug 1957
Mcg

201-168181

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

648 WCJ/DB/WS

ORIG : HO MACAULEY 64

UNIT : WH/III/CUBA

EXT : 2056

DATE : 20 AUGUST 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

AUG 20 22 15 '57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVA

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT82423

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 31708

REQUEST VAIVADA'S HOME AND OR MAILING ADDRESS FOR COVER PURPOSE.

END OF MESSAGE

301-168881

C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. BRADY, AC/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III - Willard Galbraith, Chief 15 Jul 57

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 Feb 56 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:
so memo 3 Jul 57. ac

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957 wherein a covert security approval was requested to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent status for use as principal agent for Project AMPHOBARCH in Cuba under non-official cover. Reference is also made to our memorandum of 2 April 1957 in which a provisional covert security clearance was granted for the above use.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in the Director's Memorandum of 14 February 1949 entitled, "Security and Operational Clearances," a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. This clearance is contingent upon the following:

a. The receipt by this office of full overseas traces and such actual overseas investigation as is possible on Subject and on his wife and her family.

b. that Subject be afforded a polygraph interrogation as soon as possible and that the verbatum results be promptly furnished to this office. The Office of Security will be happy to assist in arranging this interrogation.

4. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

SECRET

SECRET

8 JUL 1957

6. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

SECRET

SECRET

3 JUL 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Concurrent with this memorandum a covert security clearance is being issued to enable the Subject's conversion from contract agent to career agent for use as principal agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba under non-official cover.

2. This is to advise that information has been received from a confidential source of the Office of Security concerning Argentina CORDERO Calderon and her sister, Counsuelo, who are believed to be the Subject's wife and sister-in-law respectively. According to a December 1944 report, the above individuals were described as Costa Rican citizens then in Panama under suspicion and members of the Russian Ballet team of Pedro and Lidia CHUPRINE. Argentina is known to speak and understand German. She was formerly married to Pedro MARZAL, reportedly a German national and formerly on both British and U. S. Proclaimed List. She is reliably reported to have made pro-German remarks and is pro-German in her sympathies. It was further reported that both of the above individuals have at times attempted to secure information from members of the American Armed Forces.

3. In view of the above information, it is requested that current overseas traces and investigation be conducted on the Subject as well as on his wife and sister-in-law, Counsuelo, and other members of his wife's immediate family and that the results thereof be furnished this office.

4. The covert security clearance which is being issued in this case is made contingent upon the faovrable results of the requested overseas traces and investigation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham

This data is the property of the Security Office and should be returned when it has served its purpose. Its existence or contents must not be disclosed except to CIA Staff Officers directly concerned. This material shall not be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the prior approval of the Security Office.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

KURIOT TRAINING OF HUSKANAW AND HUMANOID-3

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO. [illegible]

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. [illegible] 02964

DATE 25 June 57

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

EVALUATION

ANALYST [illegible]

DATE PROCESSED 28 [illegible]

DISSEMINATED IN

DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

KURIOT TRAINING FOR THE SUBJECT

FDI

201-168881

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ~~241~~ ~~22881~~

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

20 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (Ps.)

1. Subject's contract dated 1 August 1954 was amended to provide him with an additional compensation to cover quarters allowance for his family in Costa Rica from 21 February 1957, when he and his family were ordered to leave Habana for operational security reasons; and to cover the period Subject was on TDY for training purposes at Headquarters.

2. Subject returned to Habana with his wife on 14 May 1957, to resume his duties as Principal Agent of Project AMTHODARCH. His children joined him in Habana from Costa Rica on 21 May 1957.

3. It is requested that Subject's Habana allowances, as set forth in his contract dated 1 August 1954, and subsequently amended, be reinstated for the period 14 to 31 May 1957. His new contract converting him to Career Agent status was effective on 1 June 1957.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

201-168881

X

14-00000

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. HKH-A-3675
201-032723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 13 June 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, SPR Habana WH

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, 22 May 1957

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a Memo on Cover Status prepared by Subject as requested by Headquarters, outlining his estimate of the situation and including a draft statement for Headquarters' use in preparing the directive his cover firm will transmit to him.

2. Subject's Memo and outline appear adequate in the opinion of the Station; therefore Headquarters can proceed to prepare appropriate business letterheads and cards (described in paragraph 2 of the reference) and mail them to Subject.

James R. Palinger
James R. Palinger.

Attachment:
1 - Memo on Cover Status (single copy) U/S/C

Distribution:
3 - Washington w/att
2 - Files w/att

JRP/mfm

10 June 1957

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

201-168881

SECRET

La Habana, Cuba

June 10, 1957

Memo on Cover Status - Arthur G. Vaivada

1. Enclosed herewith is the outline of an idea in keeping with the nature of this notional cover plan of a temporary nature. Careful consideration has been given to a number of ideas, all of which were rejected because possible local conflicts. This idea is still general enough (and I hope convincing) to leave opportunity for changes and/or improvement at Headquarters. The idea, and the terminology, was gleaned from the pages of "Investment in Cuba", a July 1956 study published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

2. As I understand this cover arrangement, the PSI should mail me a directive somewhat along the lines of the enclosed information. This should "hold us" for a couple of months, with possibly some queries from me occasionally. Then when our operational picture requires investigation in some particular field, PSI can be notified through the Station to request a survey or poll in that field.

3. On the basis of the enclosed "directive" (plus stationary and allied materials) I can consult a local lawyer as to the registration of this "Agency" and then advise PSI as to the legal requirement.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

SECRET

1. Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas, has placed a US representative in Cuba for the purpose of conducting public surveys, by polling, which will provide the home office with the requisite data for periodic market analyses. These periodic reports will be made available upon subscription to US investment and/or distribution agencies, and will contain comprehensive studies of market potentials and limitations, including the role of government as affected by current political developments.

2. PSI of Dallas will first compile reports of broad scope, from which subscribers may select their fields of special interest and place thier orders accordingly. These initial reports will cover such factors as:

a) The three P's - Population and Purchasing Power.

b) Productive Opportunities.

c) Improved Distribution Patterns.

d) Factors Affecting Demand.

e) A Study of Marketing Areas.

f) General Estimate of the Economic Situation.

3. The PSI representative will not require an office installation or local employees during the initial studies, but will prepare these at his residence until special requests are forthcoming from subscribers. At that time, all materials and installations as well as employment will be of temporary contractual nature, entirely dependent upon the scope of the survey.

Arthur G. Vaivada

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SEC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3/FI
ATTN : Mr. James B. Noland

DATE: 10 June 1957

FROM : AC/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Training Report on Arthur G. VAIVADA, (P)
Training Alias: "VICKS"

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA was trained covertly by instructors of this office in Washington, D.C. from 25 March 1957 through 7 May 1957. The original Training Request form dated 4 December 1956 reveals the following information concerning his background, experience and proposed assignment:

> "VAIVADA is thirty-four years of age, married and a U.S. citizen by birth. He attended high school in De Kalb, Illinois and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U.S. Air Force. The trainee served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China/Burma theatre and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945. Following his discharge, VAIVADA worked for a short period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling Silica-Gel Corporation, Illinois and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to work as a stevedor and a labor foreman. He reenlisted in the U.S. Air Force in April 1946 and was honorably discharged in 1949. On 1 June 1949, VAIVADA became a contract agent for this Agency. He served in this capacity in Costa Rica, handling a high level penetration of the Communist Party until 1953. In July 1954, the trainee became principal agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He has been operating under a student cover, working for his A.B. degree at the University of Havana. It is planned that VAIVADA will return to Havana, Cuba under cover of a representative of a well known U.S. polling agency. He will perform the duties of principal agent, handling a large net of sub-agent informants in Cuban university youth circles to provide coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities among these groups."

2. The instructors who participated in VAIVADA's training indicate that his overall performance was above average. He is a highly intelligent, practical and realistic young man possessing excellent judgment and common sense. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. VAIVADA should continue to develop as a skilled and competent agent.

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SEC

3. For the purposes of the record, it should be noted that VAIVADA received prior Covert Training during October and November 1953. The present training was more in the nature of a refresher.

4. VAIVADA received instruction in the subjects set forth on the attached Training Evaluation Reports. In addition, certain supplementary reading, discussion material, case histories, books, films and "live" problems were also covered.

5. His training was conducted by Mr. Pisanko known as "Hank" and Mr. Toth known as "Frank." Their Training Evaluation Reports are attached.

A. F. Schermerhorn
AUGUSTUS F. SCHERMERHORN

Attachments: 2

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

NAME OF STUDENT (Pseudonym) VAIVADA, Arthur G.	DATE (Day, month, year) 9 May 1957
TRAINING ALIAS "VICKS"	PERIOD COVERED 25 March to 10 April 57 and 26 April to 7 May 1957

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR	An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT	An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY	Requirements met without distinction.
POOR	A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE	An extremely deficient performance.

TRAINING SUBJECTS	RATINGS				
	SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1. Security					
2. Cover		X			
3. Observation & Description		X			
4. Interviewing					
5. Interrogation			X		
6. Surveillance			X		
7. Telephones & Mikes (Theory)		X			
8. General CI Methods			X		
9. Contacting			X		
10. Intrafield Communications					
11. Recruiting of Agents					
12. Training of Agents					
13. Agent Management & Control					
14. Double Agent Management & Control					
15. Reporting			X		
16. CE Operations		X			
17. Communist Theory			X		
18. Soviet IS		X			
19. Psychological Warfare		X			
20. Political Warfare					
21. Economic Warfare					
22. Sabotage					
23. Counter-sabotage					
24. Resistance Force Activities					
25. Guerrilla Warfare					
26. Evasion & Escape					
27. Weapons					
28. Demolitions					
29. Special Devices (R&D)					
30. Air Reception					
31. Sea Reception					
32. Map Reading					
33.					
34.					
35.					

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns

FORM NO. 381 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
1 OCT 55

SECRET

(17-38) OVER

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

		RATINGS				
		ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1.	Security consciousness	X				
2.	Ability to work with and get along with others	X				
3.	Ability to follow instructions		X			
4.	Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5.	Initiative	X				
6.	Resourcefulness and independence of judgment	X				
7.	Tactfulness and sense of discretion		X			
8.	Cooperativeness	X				
9.	Sense of discipline		X			
10.	Imagination and creativeness	X				
11.	Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12.	Attention to necessary details	X				
13.	Observant and careful in the collection of facts	X				
14.	Political sophistication and awareness	X				
15.	Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16.	Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17.	Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.						
19.						
20.						

STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT

ABOVE AVERAGE ☒ AVERAGE ☐ BELOW AVERAGE ☐

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

VAIVADA is a reliable, stable individual possessing a quick, alert mind. He was mature, serious and purposeful in his approach to training. His interest and attention remained at a high level throughout the instruction. In general, VAIVADA has the background and the desire to perform in a professional manner. The trainee possesses the ability to apply himself completely. He recognizes his shortcomings and was completely amenable to constructive criticism. VAIVADA zealously tries to find solutions to pertinent questions and problems. He analyzes facts and details thoroughly. He wants to know his job and, in any given situation, tries to learn as much as possible.

During the training, VAIVADA showed no signs of restlessness with the more routine aspects of clandestine activity. He is practical minded, adept, serious, willing to "dig in and do the grubbing." The trainee learns quickly and shows excellent promise for progressive improvement within the field of covert work. He carries out instructions and assignments in an efficient manner. VAIVADA possesses a calm, tenacious attitude. It is felt that he will develop steadily as a skilled and competent operator. He should become an increasingly valuable asset to this organization. His overall performance was above average.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ HENRY J. PISANKO

SECRET

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TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT

DATE (Day, month, year): 26 April 1957

NAME OF STUDENT (Pseudonym): VAIVADA, Arthur G.

PERIOD COVERED: 11 April 1957 through 25 April 1957

TRAINING ALIAS: "VICKS"

RATING DEFINITIONS

SUPERIOR	An extremely outstanding performance.
EXCELLENT	An outstanding performance, above average.
SATISFACTORY	Requirements met without distinction.
POOR	A deficient performance, below average.
FAILURE	An extremely deficient performance.

	TRAINING SUBJECTS	RATINGS SUPERIOR	EXCELLENT	SATISFACTORY	POOR	FAILURE
1.	Security					
2.	Cover					
3.	Observation & Description					
4.	Interviewing		X			
5.	Interrogation		X			
6.	Surveillance					
7.	Telephones & Mikes (Theory)					
8.	General CI Methods					
9.	Contacting			X		
10.	Intrafield Communications			X		
11.	Recruiting of Agents		X			
12.	Training of Agents		X			
13.	Agent Management & Control		X			
14.	Double Agent Management & Control					
15.	Reporting					
16.	CE Operations					
17.	Communist Theory					
18.	Soviet IS					
19.	Psychological Warfare					
20.	Political Warfare					
21.	Economic Warfare					
22.	Sabotage					
23.	Counter-sabotage					
24.	Resistance Force Activities					
25.	Guerrilla Warfare					
26.	Evasion & Escape					
27.	Weapons					
28.	Demolitions					
29.	Special Devices (R&D)					
30.	Air Reception					
31.	Sea Reception					
32.	Map Reading					
33.						
34.						
35.						

The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally respo[illegible] for its [illegible] he may within his discretion [illegible] other members of his sta[illegible] the report should [illegible] be shown to the student whom it concerns.

FORM NO. 381 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
1 OCT 55

SECRET

(17-36) OVER

SECRET

STUDENT EVALUATION

		RATINGS				
		ABOVE AVERAGE	AVERAGE	BELOW AVERAGE		NOT OBSERVED
1.	Security consciousness	X				
2.	Ability to work with and get along with others					X
3.	Ability to follow instructions	X				
4.	Maturity of judgment and common sense	X				
5.	Initiative					X
6.	Resourcefulness and independence of judgment		X			
7.	Tactfulness and sense of discretion	X				
8.	Cooperativeness	X				
9.	Sense of discipline		X			
10.	Imagination and creativeness	X				
11.	Amenability to constructive criticism	X				
12.	Attention to necessary details		X			
13.	Observant and careful in the collection of facts		X			
14.	Political sophistication and awareness					X
15.	Interest and enthusiasm for proposed assignment	X				
16.	Motivation for clandestine activities	X				
17.	Ability to relate theory to practice	X				
18.						
19.						
20.						

STUDENT'S COMPARATIVE EVALUATION TO OTHERS TRAINED FOR IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR ASSIGNMENT	ABOVE AVERAGE X	AVERAGE ☐	BELOW AVERAGE ☐

INSTRUCTOR'S COMMENTS

Arthur G. VAIVADA impressed this instructor most favorably. The trainee is highly intelligent, practical and realistic. He possesses excellent judgment and common sense. VAIVADA is mature, well-balanced, resourceful and positive. He appears to be open-minded and objective, possessing a questioning mind and a strong sense of curiosity. VAIVADA approached training with a strong desire to add to his knowledge and to refine his own methods and techniques. He was highly receptive and amenable to constructive criticism. The trainee has a feeling for detail and is observant and careful in the collection of facts. It was necessary for VAIVADA to spend considerable time on administrative matters during the training. However, he completed all outside assignments punctually and completely.

VAIVADA's performance was excellent. He is above average in every aspect. His motivation is strong and his interest in clandestine activity as a profession appears to be genuine. If properly supervised, he should be a valuable asset to this organization. The trainee appears to be industrious, possessing initiative with leadership qualities.

INSTRUCTOR

/s/ FRANK A. TOTH

SECRET

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Project AMPHODARCH
WH
19 May 58

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1957.

Effective 1 June 1957, said contract is amended by adding after sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph four (4), entitled "Allowances," the following:

> "(c) You will be entitled to an educational allowance in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in applicable Government regulations."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

/s/

Field informed, HMMW-6448

201-168551

X

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S

AIR SECRET HKH-A-3640

201-032723

Chief, WHD 29 May 1957

Chief of Station, Habana

Operational

Arthur G. VAIVADA

Reference: HKH-W-2268, dated 22 May 1957

1. Subject and his wife arrived in Habana on 14 May 1957 and have taken permanent quarters here; their children rejoined them the following weekend.

2. As outlined in the reference, and after conversation with VAIVADA himself, the national polling cover arrangement set up for the approximate three-month trial period appears adequate. At present Subject and the case officer are engaged in working out a suitable area or areas for his polling activities and will shortly notify Headquarters of the results.

3. There is being forwarded as a separate cover attachment an administrative memorandum from Subject, informing Headquarters that he established a bank account in Miami, Flórida, and his wishes respecting amounts of his salary and allowances to be deposited there following 1 June 1957. Subject's initial opening deposit in the Miami bank account was in the amount of $20.00; the "copy of check with true name and present balance" mentioned in the attached memorandum is being retained in Station files. It is requested that the Station be notified by cable of the amount of total salary and allowances to be paid direct to Subject each month in the field after 1 June.

James R. Palinger

Attachment:
1 - Administrative memorandum (single copy under separate cover)
3 - Self addressed bank envelopes U/S/C
Distribution:
v3 - Washington W/att U/S/C
2 - Files W/O Att

28 May 1957

JRP/mfm

SECRET

COPY

201-165851

SECRET

XAAZ 16934

22 May 1957

TO: Colonel J. Caldwell King,
Chief, WH Division
Attention: WH/Cuba

FROM: Chief, CI/ICD LM by

SUBJECT: General: CP Penetration Program

Specific: Informal discussion with Ross Lester Crozier, 9 May 1957, re his interest in, and availability for recruitment approaches in various Latin American countries.

1. On 9 May 1957, Mr. Paul J. Burke, Deputy Chief, CI/ICD, held Subject discussion with Mr. Crozier, whom he met outside of official quarters through the cooperation of Mr. Hugh MacAuley, WH/Cuba.

2. Mr. Crozier has a fine record in CP penetration work. He did an outstanding job in handling the HUMANOID-3 operation in Costa Rica over an extended period, and he has worked hard in the CP penetration program in Cuba since his arrival there.

3. It is believed that he would be an effective recruiter in various countries in Latin America.

4. He stated that he was keenly interested in, and would like to engage in, such operations, and would welcome being asked to hit a well-chosen target in any (Spanish-speaking) Latin American country.

5. Mr. Crozier stated that he expects to return to Cuba shortly. If, after three months, there is no indication that his security has been adversely affected by the recent assassination of one of his agents, he expects to be there about a year.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

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6. It is recommended that WH Division give consideration to employing Mr. Crozier as a recruiter when worthwhile recruitment-in-place CP targets are developed, or otherwise arise, in various Latin American countries. It is again made clear for the record that the foregoing discussion was informal and without commitment on either side.

cc: WH/CP (L. Sloan)

[illegible]

SECRET

201-168881

1C

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2268

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 22 MAY 57 11 14z

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: HAVA-891, 25 April 1957
HAVA-911, 7 May 1957
DIR-16802, 10 May 1957

1. Attached for your retention is a copy of Subject's new contract converting his status from that of Contract Agent - CS-10 to Career Agent - CS-11, to become effective 1 June 1957. Also attached is a copy of an amendment to his current contract, providing for the payment of storage of his household effects in Habana and quarters allowances for his family in San Jose, Costa Rica, for the period Subject was absent from his post. Subject read and signed the originals of both the amendment and new contract while at Headquarters.

2. Before Subject departed for the field, he was interviewed three times by one of the Headquarters staffs concerning his cover, and arrangements were made to fulfill the station's requirement for his return. However, since the polling cover originally planned for Subject could not be arranged at this time, a "notional" polling cover, adequately backstopped by a business mailing address and telephone number (being submitted under separate cover as Identity-A) was arranged as the alternative. Since Subject is returning to his post on a test basis, Headquarters feels that this notional cover is better than a more permanent arrangement would be; at least until it is more certain that Subject's stay will be permanent, thus avoiding any possible embarrassment vis-a-vis the employer company in the event Subject is forced to leave the country shortly after arrival. Furthermore, this notional cover will allow Subject almost complete freedom to pursue his other activity with very little time and effort necessary to maintain his cover. Appropriate business letterheads and cards to implement Subject's cover will be pouched to the Station as soon as Subject is able to survey the area and notify Headquarters of the type of polling activity he plans to use. He was instructed to select a polling activity not

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

22 May 57

201-168881

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SECRET

RI COPY

HKH-W-2268
Page Two

presently covered by another agency, so as to minimize the possibility of instigating inquiries about his employer by the competitors in the area. Should Subject remain at his post, and it is hoped he will, the cover originally planned can be arranged later if Subject or the Station feels that the present cover is not adequate enough; or, on the other hand, he can continue to use the present arrangement.

3. With respect to the payment of his salary and allowances, Subject was instructed to open a bank account here before he returned to the field. Headquarters requests he submit the name of the bank and the amount of his salary and allowances (preferably in round figures) he wishes to be paid by the Station. The balance will be paid monthly to his bank by Headquarters. Headquarters requires that this arrangement be set up to simplify and expedite his payments in the event of any changes in salary or allowances. Subject said he would give the information to the Station for transmittal to Headquarters.

4. It is regretted that Subject's wife was not able to become naturalized at this time, since she entered this country on a temporary visitor's visa, and it would have taken too long to change her status to that of a permanent resident and become naturalized. Since the conversion of Subject's status to that of a Career Agent was not affected by his wife's citizenship, it was suggested to Subject that he plan to have his wife become a citizen when he returns to this country in two years upon becoming eligible for statutory home leave.

5. Subject still has an outstanding travel voucher being processed at Headquarters, and the Station will be notified as soon as it is completed. Subject has been paid in full for his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957.

16 May 1957

JCKing
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
Copy of Contract
Copy of Contract Amendment
Identity A under Sep. Cover Attach.

Distribution:
3 - Habana w/attach.
✓1 - RI w/o attach.
1 - WH/Mailroom w/o attach.
1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono w/o attach.
1 - Subject w/attach.

WH/III/Cuba/H.C.McAuley/fs

J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing Officer)

(Coordinating Officer)

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

RI COPY

Separate Cover Attachment to:
HKH-W-2268

IDENTITY A:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Building
1511 Bryon Street
Dallas, Texas

Telephone: RIverside 1-3674

Contact: Mr. Albert E. JOHESON

Distribution:
- 1 - Habana
- ✓ 1 - RI
- 1 - Cuba/Chrono

SECRET

RI COPY

201-158881

SECRET

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective 14 May 1957, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting in its entirety Paragraph 1(b) and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "1(b) Additional compensation calculated at the rate of $5135 per annum."

All other terms and conditions of the original contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

Date: 10 MAY 1957

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended. Effective 31 MAY 1957, said contract, as amended, is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. By virtue of your relationship with the United States Government in the performance of services under this agreement your legal status is that of a Government employee under contract. As such, you are entitled only to the rights, privileges and benefits stipulated herein. It is understood that you will act under cover suitable to disguise your relationship to the Government, but you will be subject to administrative and operational directions and control by the Government at all times.

2. Compensation. In full consideration for your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at the rate of $6390 per annum, GS-11. In addition, you will be entitled to within-grade promotions in a manner similar to the procedures prescribed for Government staff employees. In the event that the salary level of your indicated grade is altered by Federal legislation and adopted by the Government, the compensation authorized under this contract shall be altered accordingly. Payments will be made hereunder as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

3. Taxes. (a) In the event taxes are not withheld by your cover facility or in the event your cover facility withholds taxes on only part of the compensation due you hereunder, the Government, in view of security considerations involved, will withhold Federal income taxes from all or the remainder of taxable monies due you under this contract in an amount equivalent to the United States income tax withholding schedule based upon your taxable income under this agreement and _____ present exemption(s). Sums so withheld by the Government will be paid over to the Internal Revenue Service. No Form W-2 will be issued you by the Government and you will be instructed as to the method to be followed in making timely filing of returns, estimates and payments in order to preserve security.

(b) If for cover considerations your tax payments exceed your true tax liability under this agreement, the Government will make appropriate reimbursements in conformance with applicable policies and procedures.

4. Allowances. (a) You will be entitled to living quarters allowances in conformance with and at the rates prescribed in the Standardized Regulations, (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas).

(b) In addition to the above payments, you will be entitled to an equalization allowance calculated at the rate of $2180 per annum. This allowance is in lieu of any present or future standardized post allowance established for your present permanent post of duty overseas, but is subject to the entitlement provisions applicable to standardised post allowances. It is understood and agreed that this allowance is predicated upon the comparative cost of living between Washington, D. C., and your overseas post, your unofficial cover, family status and basic compensation. Consequently, this allowance may be unilaterally adjusted or discontinued by the Government whenever warranted by a change in any of these factors. No accounting will be required for this allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for the following travel and transportation expenses:

(a) For you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with standardized Government rates for the authorized official use of your private automobile.

(b) Upon the satisfactory completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you will be entitled to home leave travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas; provided, however, that you have fulfilled any other requirements relating to home leave which are applicable to Government staff employees.

(c) Upon the successful completion of your services under this agreement, for you, your dependents, your household effects and your private automobile from your permanent post of assignment overseas to your place of residence in the United States.

You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses includigg, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approvdd by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by the Government in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government staff employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government. All accrued but unused leave earned under your contract with the United States Government effective 1 August 1954, as amended, will be transferred to your leave account under this agreement in conformance with established crediting procedures.

(d) From the compensation paid you pursuant to this contract, there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. If the conditions of your cover warrant or require that you make contributions to the Social Security fund, such contributions shall be at your expense.

9. Cover. It is anticipated that you will undertake certain cover employment in the course of your performance under this agreement. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

10. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every six (6) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

11. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required b the Government to evidence this relationship.

12. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

13. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

14. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

15. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 JUN 1957, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government you will not be entitled to the travel expenses set forth in paragraph five (5)(c) supra. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur G. Valvada

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED:

____

10 [illegible] 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. On this date the undersigned had a final meeting with Subject, at which time Subject was given a copy of his new contract to read and to acknowledge by signature the original copy. Subject had no questions concerning this document.

2. Mr. Biladou of Cover Division, was also present during the first part of this meeting, to advise Subject of the correct address of the cover firm he was to use as reference:

Public Surveys Institute
532 Union Fidelity Life Bldg.,
1511 Bryan Street,
Dallas, Texas

Phone: Riverside-1-3674

Mr. Albert E. JOHNSON

3. The address will give Subject the necessary backstopping in the event of any inquiries that might arise in the field concerning his employment. Subject was asked to survey the field upon his arrival in Habana and submit his views on the best type of polling activity for him, so that the proper business letterheads could be printed and sent down to him. He was also promised that he will receive business cards. These items are to be pouched to him through Station channels.

4. Mr. Biladou also stated that he was preparing a memorandum concerning Subject's cover to be sent down to the station for Subject's acknowledgement and signature. This document will be coordinated with the Cuba Desk.

5. Subject was also paid his salary and allowances for the month of April 1957 in the amount of $ 639.72, for which he signed a receipt. 201-168881

Subject was also instructed to open a bank account in Miami, Fla., so the Finance Division will be in a position to make payment adjustments without delay. Subject was instructed to advise Hqs as to the amount of allotment to be paid him by the station - preferably in a round figure.

Mca

14-00000

039 BP/JM/EMW
Heinz O. MacAuley

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : H. O. MAC AULEY
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 10 MAY 1957 639

TO : HAVA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : FI/OPS 2, FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MAY 10 21 01 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT54239

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 16802

REF: HAVA-891 (IN 35508)
HAVA-911 (IN 40651)

VAIVADA ETA 15 MAY. POLLING COVER PROVIDED.

END OF MESSAGE

10 May 57
201-168881 ✓

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

378

SECRET

JM/BP/RAC

DATE : 7 MAY 57

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 7 22 10 57
RECD CABLE SECT

ROUTINE

IN 40651

TO : DIRECTOR

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, /SC 2

TO DIR INFO CITE HAVA 911

RE: HKHA 3583

CUTOUT AMANTELOPE BEGINS MONTHS LEAVE PBPRIME 24 MAY. DESIRABLE VAIVADA RETURN PRIOR THAT DATE. 071945Z.

END OF MESSAGE

pl

	201-168881		
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	

DATE 04 JUN 1957

7 May 57
201-168881

SECRET

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SCO (Mr. Lustecher)

DATE: 1 May 1957

FROM : Special Support Staff, Medical Staff

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (p)

Subject has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found qualified for proposed PCS overseas assignment.

Vincent J Ford

Vincent J. Ford
Administrative Officer

MS/VJF:elp

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - WH/3 (Noland)
1 - MS

SECRET

301-168881

SECRET

CUBA

30 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Vaivada

1. During the morning of 30 April Mr. Millard of Cover telephoned regarding Subject, citing IN 35508. Mr. Millard said that he would be meeting with Vaivada at 1600 hours today and proposed providing him with a temporary rather than permanent cover with the new cover company which was being contemplated for long-range development. Mr. Millard's reasoning was that he did not wish to place Vaivada under the new company with the chance that the trial period approved for the Station might cause Vaivada to be pulled out from that cover in short order. Mr. Millard said that the temporary cover he intended offering Vaivada would be adequate.

2. I concurred with the above proposal.

W. GALBRAITH
C/WH/III

SECRET

201-168881

FROM:

ACTION

CABLE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 35508
Date Received SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Received	Forwarded		
1. Admin		25 Apr	25 Apr	Pbw	
2. III				Mch	
3. Cuba/FI				MCa	UAIVADA -
4.					
5.					#2108
6.					30 April Mr. Millard and Mr. Billedon (cover) arranging notional Collins cover for V. until originally planned cover can be arranged - V in accord - Mr. B. making arrangements and will advise.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. Cable desk					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

25 April 57
201-168181 ✓

FORM NO. 51-19
JAN 1947

426

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

426 JM/JB/BJ
DATE : 24 APRIL 1957

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI/OPS 2, [✓ FI/RI 2], S/C 2

VAIVADA, Arthur E.

APR 25 02 42 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35508

TO DIR CITE HAVA 891

RE: DIR 13777 (OUT 98246)

1. STATION CONSIDERS VAIVADA CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT HAVA VERY DESIRABLE BUT DEPENDENT SECURE COVER ARRANGEMENT. SUGGEST HQS SET UP ADEQUATE COVER THEN HAVE VAIVADA COME HAVA TRIAL PERIOD TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUED ASSIGNMENT. RECOMMEND INDEPENDENT POLL TYPE COVER, ALREADY DISCUSSED.

2. STUDENT ACTIVITIES NOW MINIMAL OWING UNIVERSITY CLOSURE WITH NO PROBABLE OPENING PRIOR NEXT SCHOOL YEAR. HOWEVER FEEL VAIVADA, WITH FIRM COVER, COULD PERFORM VALUABLE SERVICE FOR STATION IN SUBVERSIVE AND COMMIE PENETRATIONS. 242000Z.

END OF MESSAGE

	201	168881	
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX	
DATE 04 1957			

25 april 57
201-168881 ✓

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

We

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J. [illegible] NOLAND
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2971
DATE : 22 APRIL 1957

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

APR 22 21 48 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA

VAIVADA, ARTHUR G.

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, OP 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT93246

TO HAVA INFO CITE DIR 13777

REF HAVA 824 (IN 14694)

HQS CONTEMPLATES RETURN VAIVADA CUBA EARLY MAY FOR TRIAL PERIOD SEVERAL MONTHS TO DETERMINE ADVISABILITY CONTINUING ASSIGNMENT THERE. CABLE STATION VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

See Hava - 871

22 April 57

	201	168881	
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	
DATE 04 JUN 1957			

201-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~

SECRET

18 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

1. Arthur G. VAIVADA, Contract Agent, GS-10, assigned to Project AMTHODARCH in Habana, Cuba, was ordered by the station to leave Cuba for reasons of operational security following the killing of an indigenous member (AMTHODARCH-1) of his agent net by the Cuban authorities. Subject departed from Habana on 18 February 1957, and arrived in San Jose, Costa Rica, on or about 21 February 1957. He discontinued his residence in Habana, stored his household effects, and set up new quarters in San Jose for his family. He will maintain these quarters until about 6 May 1957, when he will be reassigned to Habana or PCS to another area. Subject, himself, is currently receiving training at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that authorization be granted to pay Subject quarters allowance to enable him to maintain residence for his family in Costa Rica for the time necessary to complete his training at Headquarters and be reassigned to the field.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

WH/III/Cuba/HCMacAuley/fs

SECRET

201-168881

12 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Raymond Millard

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA: Cover Data

Attached, in accordance with the requirements of your division, are certain data concerning Arthur G. VAIVADA, a WH contract agent, for whom cover as a pollster is being sought.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- ✓1 - Cuba Chrono
- 1 - VAIVADA File

Attachment:
As mentioned above

WH/III/Cuba/Chrono/JENoland/fs

201-168881

SECRET

A. General Information on Agent

(1) Pseudonym and Previous Requests for Cover

Arthur G. VAIVADA. No previous request, although cover suggested herein has been under consideration for some time and has been discussed with representatives of Cover Division.

(2) Employment Status

Contract Agent, in process of conversion to career agent at GS-11; salary $6,390; quarters allowance $2,400; equalization allowance $2,120; and following benefits:

Retirement; sick and annual leave; home leave travel; Federal Employees Compensation and Missing Persons Acts.

(3) Clearance Status

Subject has regular Operational Approval and a Provisional Covert Security Approval pending receipt of full Covert Security Approval. No clearances on wife, who is only adult accompanying agent overseas.

(4) Medical Status

Check-up pending; believed to be in excellent physical condition, however.

(5) Assessment

As Contract Agent, has not been subjected to assessment.

(6) Current and Previous Covers

Cover since June 1949--Employment by Agency has been primarily that of University Student with part time photography work, and employment during one period with Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture, as supplementary. In all instances Subject has lived cover, thus acquiring no particular backstopping.

(7) Availability for Assumption New Cover

15 May 1957

SECRET

(8) Proposed Date of Departure for Overseas Post

Subject expects to return to overseas duty on or about 10 May 1957.

(9) Project Cryptonym

AMPHODARCH

B. Biographic Information on Agent

(1) Age, 34; Sex, Male; Religion, Catholic; Subject is married and has two small children.

(2) Wife— Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier—Born 15 March 1918, San Jose, Costa Rica; Married to Subject since 1945; Costa Rican citizen in process of obtaining U.S. citizenship. Additional biographic information available at country desk.

(3) Education

High School, DeKalb, Illinois
University—5 years undergraduate study at universities in San Jose, Costa Rica, Guatemala City, and Habana, Cuba.

(4) Past Employment

1940-1945	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force)
Jan. 1945-Apr. 46	Labor Foreman, U.S. Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone, Panama.
April 1946-Apr.49	Intelligence NCO (Technical Sergeant USAF) Chief of Section, Political Analysis, Caribbean Air Command.
1949 April 1959-Mar.53	Freelance photography and University studies, San Jose, Costa Rica.
Mar. 1953-June 53	Photographer Ministry of Agriculture, San Jose, Costa Rica.

(5) Outside Interests, Hobbies, etc.

Athletics (general), outdoor life, photography, jungle lore, chess.

(6) Personality Evaluation

Subject is both energetic and forceful and seems to dedicate himself wholeheartedly to any venture which he undertakes. At the same time, he has a pleasing personality, is versatile, and adapts easily to most situations. He presents a good appearance, has somewhat of a "soldier of fortune" background(much of which acquired while working for CIA), and is a good conversationalist. It should be pointed out that in spite of the "soldier of fortune" tag, Subject is essentially a stable individual and devoted to his family. His work to date and his relations with those in CIA with whom he has come in contact, have been excellent.

(7) Personal Financial Status

Solvent; Owns home.

(8) Previous Foreign Residence

Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Cuba since 1949 as indicated above. Military Service in Far East 1944-1945.

(9) Area Experience

Area experience,as reflected in foregoing information, is extensive.

(10) Language Qualifications

Subject is fluent in Spanish language, which is indigenous to area in which he is and will be operating.

C. Security Considerations

(1) Period of Employment with CIA

June 1949 to present

(2) Frequency of Visits to CIA Installations

Not applicable. No visits other than to safehouses.

(3) Extent Knowledge of CIA Affiliation

It must be presumed that wife is aware of intelligence nature of Subject's work, though not necessarily the CIA connection. No other non Agency personnel believed to be aware of CIA status.

(4) Past Intelligence Connections

With U.S. Army and Air Force as indicated above.

(5) Use of CIA Credit References

Not applicable

(6) Future plans for Agent

Contemplate continuation in non-official cover status upon completion of current assignment.

(7) Emergency Contact

In the process of being arranged.

(8) Agency-sponsored Insurance

No Agency-sponsored Insurance as of this writing. Extent of others not known, but believed adequate.

D. Operational Information

(1) Type of Information—Expected Duration of Assignment

FI; Duration of assignment indefinite, but at least two years. Operations from average to high. Sensitivity—no persons, other than Agency personnel and cover facility officials, will be made aware of CIA affiliation while under non-official cover.

(2) Location

Habana, Cuba

(3) Degree of Mobility Desired

Will spend most of time in capital (Habana). Should be free to travel al will throughout country, however.

(4) Special groups to be Contacted

From the operational standpoint, access to political circles is most desirable.

(5) Approximate Annual Income to Be Attributed to Cover Organization

$10,000 (including allowances)

(6) Hours Which Must Be Devoted to Operational Duties

Subject should be able to devote at least 50% of time to operational activity, although duties entailed in proposed cover will fit in very nicely with operational requirement.

(7) Physical Security Requirements

No particular problems anticipated in this respect.

(8) Communications

No special arrangements are required, as Subject will be in more or less regular contact with Station personnel.

(9) Cover Suggestions

A polling cover (employment as of representative of a large U.S. polling firm) has been suggested and seems highly appropriate in this case, as it would afford excellent mobility in addition to job backstopping. Mr. Ray Millard of Cover Division has been attempting for some time to arrange such a cover for Subject.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/111/Cuba/McAuley

FROM: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: CROZIER, Ross Lester

1. Your request dated 26 February 1956 for approval to use the Subject has been processed by the Office of Security.

2. The results of this action are transmitted herewith.

Attachment:

so memo 2 April 1957/par

Thomas Carroll, Jr.

Distribution:
1 Addressee
1 File

201-168881

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

475 ERB/RFL/JL

DATE : 05 APRIL 1957

475

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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APR 6 07 27 :57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : [✓ WH-5]

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRIORITY

IN 27923

TO PRITY DIR INFO: HAVA **CITE** SANJ 2531

RE: A. DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)
B. HAVA 866 (IN 27345)

1. DOSSIER HAS NOT ARRIVED. VAIVADA AND WIFE HAVE DECIDED SHE WILL JOIN HIM ZRMETAL NOW USING TOURIST VISA. CHILDREN WILL REMAIN SANJ WITH RELATIVES.

2. PARA 2 REF A STATES NO CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT WIFE.

3. SHE ARRIVING ZRMETAL EAL FLIGHT 534 MORNING 8 APRIL. REQUESTS VAIVADA MEET. HAVE ADVANCED HER NO FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE.

Hugh MacAuley
CL 6-2547

Hugh MacAuley was called to contact and notify Vaivada

201-168881

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

5 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Subject: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Naturalization of Subject's wife

1. Mr. Jerry MANSETT, Alien Affairs Officer, Office of Security, Room 2503, I Bldg., X-2141, stated that the following requirements and procedure are necessary to submit Subject's wife's application for naturalization:

a. Memorandum from C/WHD to the Director of Security, Attention: Alien Affairs Officer, requesting that the application for naturalization be expedited so that Subject's wife may accompany him overseas on or about______________

b. Application for Naturalization forms to be filled out in duplicate. They are NOT to be signed by the applicant.

c. 3 passport-size photographs.

d. 1 fingerprint card (Obtained at the Immigration Office in Room 313, Old Post Office Bldg., 12th and Penn. N.W.)

2. The above memo and documents are to be submitted to the Office of Security (OS). After a security check an appointment will be made for Subject's wife to appear for questionning and signing of application. Once this formality is done, the application is placed in the District Court for the final swearing in by the Judge (The swearings take place each 2nd Tuesday of the month).

3/ There will be a fee of $10.00.

4. VAIVADA can be one of the two witnesses required.

201-168881

234

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

434/ERD/RFL/CG

DATE : 04 APRIL 1957

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
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APR 5 03 30 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 27345

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO SANJ INFO: DIR CITE HAVA 866

RE: SANJ 2523 (IN 26196)

CONSULATE ADVISES DOSSIER MRS ANGELA ARGENTINA IRIS CORDERO Y CALDERONA DE CROZIER FORWARDED SANJ VIA POUCH 21 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

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014 WCJ/BP/WS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

DATE: 02 APRIL 1957

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

APR 3 05 26 57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 26196

TO DIR INFO: HAVA **CITE** SANJ 2523

REF SANJ 2495 (IN 18323)
HAVA 841 (IN 19663)

VISA FILE VAIVADA'S WIFE STILL NOT RECEIVED SANJ. LOCAL CONSUL CAN DO NOTHING PENDING RECEIPT FILE. CAN HQS ASSIST?

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

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SECRET

2 APR 1957

Chief, CI/OA

Acting Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

C-25507
#112569

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 February 1957, wherein a provisional covert security approval and a covert security approval were requested to enable the Subject's conversion to career agent status for use as Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH in Cuba, under non-official cover.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Field Regulation 10-215, a provisional covert security approval is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph #1, above.

3. It should be noted that the provisional covert security approval herein granted is based on limited investigative coverage and should not be in any way construed as a final security determination relative to a full covert security approval. Upon completion of additional investigation now pending, you will be appropriately advised as to our decision with regard to the issuance of a full covert security approval.

4. Subjects of provisional covert security approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

5. Your attention is called to the fact that a provisional covert security approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

6. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 60 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Fred H. Hall

201-168251

SECRET

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. [illegible]

ALLOTMENT ACCOUNT SYMBOL 7-[illegible]-011

NAME Arthur G. [illegible] (Ps)

OFFICE PHONE 2729

GRADE AND SALARY GS-10 $5915

TITLE Contract Agent

OFFICIAL STATION Havana, Cuba

YOU ARE HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS.

ITINERARY

Havana, Cuba to Washington, D. C. and return.

PURPOSE

TDY - Training for approximately 6 weeks.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS (INCLUDE APPROPRIATE JUSTIFICATION)

AUTHORIZED PER DIEM

COORDINATION, AS REQUIRED (TO BE EFFECTED BY ORIGINATING OFFICE)

☐ DD/P ☐ OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ☐ THEATER CLEARANCE (IF OBTAINABLE)

ADVANCE OF FUNDS IS AUTHORIZED.

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $ [illegible]

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT 22 March 1957

TERMINATING APPROXIMATELY 3 May 1957

MODE OF TRAVEL (SPECIFY) Common carrier and private auto.

ALLOWANCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED AUTOMOBILE AS FOLLOWS IF APPLICABLE

☐ (A) CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER

☐ (B) XXX ten CENTS PER MILE, AS BEING MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT

CERTIFICATION (BY PROCESSING BRANCH)

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY. SIGNED COPY ON FILE IN CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH. REVIEWED. NO CHANGE NECESSARY. AMENDED AS INDICATED.

SIGNATURE

☐ THE CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION INDICATED IS EFFECTED IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

☐ IN CONNECTION WITH CHANGE OF STATION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRANSPORT YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY, YOUR HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS, SUBJECT TO WEIGHT LIMITS, RESTRICTIONS AND PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH IN AGENCY REGULATIONS.

☐ TRAVEL TO FIRST POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ RETURN FROM POST OF DUTY ABROAD, INCLUDING EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTATION OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND AUTOMOBILE, IS AUTHORIZED.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITH EMPLOYEE.

☐ DEPENDENTS TO TRAVEL WITHIN 6 MOS. OF EMPLOYEE.

☐ TEMPORARY DUTY.

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO. 7-[illegible]-011

DATE 22 March 57

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER J. [illegible]

TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL C/WH J. C. KING

DATE 28 March 1957

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING TRAVEL

SECRET

FORM NO. 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 APR 56

(20-48)

SOURCE -OS

CONFIDENTIAL

28 MAR 1957

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

BIRTH: 20 June 1922, DeKalb, Illinois

ADDRESS:
Pres: 5th St. 655, Havana (Vedado) Cuba
Perm: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A.

MARITAL STATUS: Argentina de los Angeles Cordero de Crozier, b. 15/3/18, San Jose, Costa Rica, m. 17 Dec 1945, Cristobal, Canal Zone
Address: Same as subject

CHILDREN:
Ross Arnulfo Crozier, b.c. 1949: Add: same as subject
Lillian Caridad Crozier, b.c. 1951 Add: Same as subject

PARENTS:
Father: Lester Earl Crozier, b. 15 Mar 1900, Palestine, Ill.
Mother: Elizabeth Lorene McKibben, b. Sept 1903, La Moille, Ill.
Address: RR No. 1, Tampico, Ill.

BRO & SISTERS:
James Earl Crozier, b.c. 1929, Add: Tampico, Ill.
Irma Lilly Crozier, b.c. 1924, Add: RR.1, Tampico, Ill.
Blanche Elaine Crozier, b.c. 1926, Add: 1900 Canal St., Rock Falls, Illinois
Norris Edwin Crozier, b.c. 1932. Add: 804½ 1st Ave., Sterling, Illinois

IN LAWS:
Father: Alberto Cordero Loizia, b. 1894, San Jose, Costa Rica, Deceased
Mother: Dora Cordero Calderon, b. 7 Sept 1893, San Jose, Costa Rica, Add: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
Sister: Norma Cordero de Gregor b.c. 1932, Add: Box 2655, Cristobal, C.Z.
Isabel Cordero de Naranjo, b.c. 1929. Add: Plaza Viquez, San Jose, Costa Rica
Consuelo Cordero Calderon, b.c. 1927. Add: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica

Deadline 29 April 1957

EDUCATION:
1926-34: Elwood, DeKalb, Illinois
1935-39: DeKalb Township, DeKalb, Ill. (Grad)
1949-53: Univ. of Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: Univ. of San Carlos, Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Univ. of Habana, Habana, Cuba.-

RECHECK

MILITARY: 1940-49: U.S. Air Force T/Sgt. Serial 16001300

CONFIDENTIAL

Previously Checked Aug 195
Please bring that check up to date.

28 March 57
201-168881

O.W.H.

15 APR 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

28
~~18~~ MAR 1957

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: CROZIER, Ross Lester

EMPLOYMENT:
1940-45: U.S. Air Force
1945-46: U.S. Naval Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
1946-49: U.S. Air Force
1949-53: Free lance photography and student, San Jose, Costa Rica
3-6/53: Section of Geology, Ministry Agriculture, Costa Rican Government, San Jose, Costa Rica (Dr. Cesar Dondoli)

TRAVEL:
1949-53: San Jose, Costa Rica
Jan-May 1954: Guatemala City, Guatemala
1954-Pres: Habana, Cuba

RESIDENCES:
4-11/55: Calle 11 No. 1013 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
1954-55: Calle 16, No. 511 Vedado, Habana, Cuba
8-11/54: Calle 3, No 6A, Miramar, Habana, Cuba
5-8/54: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
1-5/54: 7th Ave., N. 9-04, Jocotanango, Guat. City
1953-54: 5008 7th St., NW., Wash. 11, D.C.
1949-53: San Juan Tibas, San Jose, Costa Rica
All prior residences was military service back to 1941

RECHECK

Previously Checked Aug 1954
Please bring this card [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

201-168881

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA

Training and contact procedure for Subject was discussed with Mr. Schermahorn (Room 201-T-30, X-2778) on this date:

a) The training of Subject will last six weeks from 25 March through 6 May 1957.

b) Subject will use the code name "Mr. Vicks" throughout the training.

c) Contact procedure: Subject will call "Jim" on JA-7-9117 at 1:40 PM on 25 March 1957 (Monday). He will identify himself as "Mr. Vicks." He will be given instructions as to the place and time of pick-up to be taken to safe house. Subject will have identification card to be presented to instructor upon arrival at safe house.

d) In the event Subject has to be contacted during training period (i.e. wife's naturalization matters, etc.) the desk will contact Mr. Schermahorn's office (X-2778) the day before so arrangements may be made. Training Division will not release the phone numbers of their safe houses.

e) Subject will be in training full time during the six weeks' period and will be given assignments for homework to be done at night and over some week ends.

Mca

H. O. MACAULEY
FI/OPS_-Cuban Desk

22 March 1957

SECRET

201-168881

186

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

186 HM/JB/BRB

DATE: 19 MARCH 1957

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO: FI/RI 2, S/C 2

MAR 19 15 59 z57

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 20033

TO: OPIM HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2506

RE: DIR 07482 (OUT 86223)

1. REF ARRIVED 18 MARCH.
2. VAIVADA ARRIVING HAVA PANAM 506 MARCH 19. MEET.
3. HAVE ADVANCED HIM $400. ACCOUNTING TO BE MADE HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

JM/BP/MR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : J. B. NOLAND
UNIT : WH/III/CUBA
EXT : 2056
DATE : 13 MARCH 1957

717

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	~~Subject~~	4	
2		5	
3		6	07 '57

TO : HABANA

REC'D CABLE SECT.

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

VAIVADA

OUT 5483

INFO : ~~CI,~~ CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO: HAVA INFO: SANJ ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

REFERENCE: HAVA 833

CITE DIR 07107

NO OBJECTION PARA TWO. SUGGEST LENGTH STAY HAVA MIGHT BE CUT AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES MINIMIZED.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RLG/BP/J 481

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3	[illegible]	6	[illegible] 57

DATE : 14 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 18323

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2495

REF: HAVA 833 (IN 17296)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

1. VISA FILE ON VAIVADA'S WIFE NOT YET RECEIVED HERE ALTHOUGH LOCAL CONSUL HAS MADE TWO OFFICIAL REQUESTS OF CONSULATE HAVA. VAIVADA DOES NOT WANT LEAVE WITHOUT HER AND WANTS HER ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP FOR OWN PROTECTION IN FUTURE. STATION UNABLE PRESSURE LOCAL CONSULATE UNTIL FILE RECEIVED HERE.

2. VIEW ABOVE NOT FEASIBLE FOR VAIVADA LEAVE ON 18 MARCH. STATION HOPES WIFES VISA CASE WILL BE SETTLED BY 24 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

Answered
15 March!

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OO HM/RFL/J

DATE : 18 MARCH 57 [illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 18 20 03:57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 19663

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

TO PRITY SANJ INFO DIR CITE HAVA 841

RE: DIR 07482 (OUT 86223)

1. CONSULATE ADVISES VAIVADA AS WIFE'S DOSSIER AIR POUCHED SANJ VIA WASH 8 MARCH. SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED BY NOW.

2. REQUEST SANJ ADVISE FLIGHT AND TIME ARRIVAL VAIVADA HAVA.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

SECRET

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C68

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 11 [illegible] 57

068—ES/DB/WCJ
DATE : 10 MARCH 57

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : SAN JOSE
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 16366

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2491

RE: HAVA 826 (IN 15237)

1. VAIVADA ADVISES SO FAR HE KNOWS NO OTHER CONTACT KNOWS TELEPHONE NUMBER. HAS NEVER REVEALED NUMBER TO ANY ONE AND HAS NEVER WRITTEN IT.

2. RE GARAGE ADDRESS, ONLY KNOWS IT IS A "DIAMOND-T AGENCY GARAGE" LOCATED SOMEWHERE ON CALLE 20 DE OCTUBRE. SUGGESTS PR DUE BE REVIEWED FOR POSSIBLE PINPOINTING ADDRESS AND PHOTO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168871

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

8 March 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Office of Security

VIA: Chief, CI/CA

SUBJECT: Arthur G. VAIVADA (sp.)
C-25597

1. Reference is made to OS's verbal request of 7 March 1957, for additional information on Subject in connection with our request for a Provisional Covert Security Approval dated 26 February 1957.

2. Subject was born in De Kalb, Illinois, on 20 June 1922. He received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U. S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the U. S. Air Force. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-Burma theater and later in Panama. He was discharged from the service in 1945 with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, he worked for a brief period as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Panama Canal Zone to marry a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. For about four months he worked as a stevedore and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone and was discharged three years later, in 1949.

3. Late in 1948 he was recruited by the Agency, and on 1 June 1949 became a CIA contract agent. Since that date, he has served as a contract agent with continuing high level performance, first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba where he is utilized as Principal Agent of Project AMHODARCH. Subject has worked principally and successfully so, on Communist Party penetration operations since his engagement with CIA, and his current work involves the handling of a net of agents providing coverage of Communist, leftist, revolutionary and other political activities at the University of Habana, and the student-youth circles in general in Cuba.

4. Subject has always proven to be loyal and trustworthy. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status. He was promoted recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating.

201-168881

5. Subject's spouse, a Costa Rican citizen, has expressed desire to acquire U. S. citizenship, and has now made the necessary arrangements to accompany her husband to the U. S. for this purpose, when Subject returns for Covert training at Headquarters in the very near future.

6. Covert Security Approval, with an expedite Provisional Covert Security Approval, has been requested in connection with the recommendation to convert Subject from contract to staff status.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Cuba Chrono
1 - VAIVADA File

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

361/SE/DH/AFT
DATE : 07 MARCH 1957

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Mar 7 22 50 '57

TO : SAN JOSE
FROM : HAVANA
ACTION: WH 5
INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 15237

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ

CITE: HAVA 826

REQUEST SANJ CABLE VAIVADA REPLIES TO FOLLOWING: WHO AMONG HQS HAVA CONTACTS COULD ALSO KNOW TELEPHONE F-5019? GIVE DETAILED ADDRESS GARAGE WHERE JOAQUIN MARTINEZ VELASQUEZ, JS CONTACT, WORKS AND CAN BE REACHED.

END OF MESSAGE.

S E C R E T

201-168881

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

416 RLG/JM/BRB

DATE : 27 FEB 57 416

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

FEB 27 23 47 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 11647

TO DIR INFO: HAVA CITE SANJ 2474

REF DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)

1. VAIVADA PREFERS CAREER STATUS ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT CONCERNED FUTURE JOB SECURITY. WANTS WIFE ACQUIRE CITIZENSHIP AND HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED IMMIGRATION VISA WITH LOCAL CONSUL WHO HAS CABLED HAVA CONSULATE FOR DOSSIER ON WIFE.

2. WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM TO ZRMETAL BUT WILL LEAVE TWO CHILDREN HERE WITH WIFE'S FAMILY. TENTATIVE ETD 23 MARCH.

3. TIME ELEMENT IN OBTAINING WIFE'S VISA ONLY PROBLEM PRESENT TIME. HHHW 2092 NOT YET RECEIVED.

4. FOR HAVA. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION PAY VAIVADA SALARY FOR FEB. ADVISE AMOUNT DUE HIM. ALSO REQUEST YOU ATTEMPT EXPEDITE FORWARDING DOSSIER ON WIFE.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

454 JB/JM/MR 454

DATE : 27 FEB 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 28 [illegible] 45 57

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 11760

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: HAVA INFO: DIR CITE: SANJ 2476

RE: HAVA 811 (IN 49266)
DIR 03998 (OUT 79438)
SANJ 2474 (IN 11647)

OPERATIONAL MEMO DATED 26 FEBRUARY, PREPARED BY VAIVADA BEING POUCHED HAVA AS SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HRSA-2602.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

S-E-C-R-E-T

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL	DATE 26 February 1957 PROJECT
TO: CI/Operational Approval and Support Division	FROM: (Division) WH/III/CUBA

SUBJECT	CI/OA FILE NO.	SO FILE NO.
TRUE NAME CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Arthur G. VAIVADA	C-25507	

TYPE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE

USE OF AGENT OR EMPLOYEE (Full details)

Subject has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance. He is currently assigned to Cuba, where he is being utilized as the Principal Agent for Project AMPHODARCH. Project AMPHODARCH is an FI operation designed to provide information on political activities (including Communist) in university circles in Havana, Cuba. In view of his outstanding record and strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it has been recommended he be converted from contract to career agent status.

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL
☐	GOVERNMENT NAME CHECK	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)	☐	OTHER:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IS ATTACHED IN TWO COPIES	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	PRQ II IS ATTACHED, IF OBTAINABLE	☐	GREEN LIST CHECK HAS BEEN INITIATED

FIELD TRACES

☒	REVEAL NO INFORMATION OF VALUE	☐	WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN RECEIVED
☐	REVEAL INFORMATION AS ATTACHED	☐	NOT INITIATED. NOT EXPECTED TO POSSESS RELEVANT INFO.

SUGGESTED INVESTIGATIVE COVER

☐	GOVERNMENT	☐	ACADEMIC
☐	COMMERCIAL	☐	OTHER:

RI TRACES				DIVISION TRACES			
☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD	☒	RECORD (Not derogatory)	☐	NO RECORD

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON INVESTIGATION OR SPECIAL COVERAGE DESIRED

SUBJECT	IS	☒	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF CIA INTEREST
	IS	☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST
	IS	☐	AWARE	☐	UNAWARE OF IMPENDING INVESTIGATION
	HAS	☐	BEEN	☐	NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON A "COVER STORY"

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Hugh O. MacAuley	2056 1021 Barton	W. Galbraith 201-168851

FORM NO. 772
1 SEP 55

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

142
142 ED/GP/OBS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 23 04 47Z57
REC'D CABLE SECT

DATE : 23 FEBRUARY 1957

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE

IN 10068

TO HAVA INFO: DIR CITE SANJ 2471

RE: HAVA 803 (IN 48050)

22 FEB VAIVADA CONTACTED BURNETTE FOR WHO HE WORKED IN WSBURNT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

S E C R E T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

5

Mr. Arthur G. Vaivada

Dear Mr. Vaivada:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 August 1954, as amended.

Effective ______________________, said contract, as amended, is further amended by the addition of sub-paragraph (e) to paragraph three (3) entitled "Travel" which reads as follows:

> "(e) For temporary storage of your household effects while you are temporarily absent from your initial permanent post of duty hereunder."

Effective 19 February 1957, said contract is further amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

> "1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of certain information and services, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:
>
> (a) Compensation calculated at the rate of $5915 per annum; and
>
> (b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement at San Jose, effective upon your arrival thereat in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum. As this additional compensation is based upon quarters costs at said post, it is subject to unilateral adjustment by the Government whenever warranted by a change in the factors affecting its initial establishment. Quarters will not be furnished you by the Government nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

19 Feb 57
201-168771

SECRET

ORIG : J.B.NOLAND **611**

UNIT : WH/III/CUBA

EXT : 2056

DATE : 18 FEBRUARY 1957

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 18 20 29 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

TO : HAVANA INFO: SANJ

FROM : DIRECTOR

6

CONF : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE					
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT78042

TO HAVA INFO SANJ CITE DIR 03253

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA SHOULD CONTACT MR WILLIAM CLYONS IN SANJ. FYI FUTURE PLANS, VAIVADA TRAINING HQS COULD START 25 MARCH. INDICATE AT ONCE IF DESIRABLE

END OF MESSAGE

201-168881

D. C. MARELIUS, AC/WHD
for J.C.KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

W. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

188 RLG/JD/EMW

158

DATE : 18 FEB 57

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 18 16 40Z 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

REC'D CABLE SECT.
IN 48050

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SANJ INFO: DIR CITE: HAVA 803

REF HAVA 801 (IN 47267)

VAIVADA AND FAMILY ARRIVING SANJ 18 FEB. WILL CONTACT COS THEREAFTER.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-168881

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

301 HM/RFL/MR

DATE : 15 FEB 57

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 47267

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, CI/OA, FI/RI 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 801

RE: HAVA 799 (IN 46908)

1. PRESS 15 FEB IDENTIFIES MAN FOUND SHOT TO DEATH AS AMPHODARCH 1.

2. AGENT KNEW ARTHUR G VAIVADA TRUE NAME AND RESIDENCE. DUE THIS AND AS PRECAUTION STATION ADVANCING VAIVADA AND FAMILY FUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY TRAVEL THEIR HOME SANJ WHERE WILL STAY AT LEAST UNTIL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES RESTORED CUBA. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-168881

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA A I R (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HKH-W-2092

201-32723

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Station, Habana

DATE 8 FEB 57 15 00 z

FROM Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative
SPECIFIC Arthur G. VAIVADA

References: a. HKH-A-3314
b. HKH-W-1905
c. HKH-A-2577

Action Required: Notify Headquarters if Any Objection to Action Para. 3

1. Headquarters has no objection to the postponement of VAIVADA's training until the end of the current contract year (July-August 1957), and has cancelled immediate training arrangements accordingly. The Station should submit a new request several months prior to the desired new training dates.

2. There has been a change, meanwhile, in Headquarters thinking on the proposed conversion of VAIVADA to Staff status. Upon reviewing the case, the responsible Headquarters staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate and recommended that the requested personnel action be changed accordingly. The Staff pointed out that virtually all benefits which would accrue to VAIVADA under staff status are also obtainable as a career agent. These include Civil Service Retirement, Sick and Annual Leave, Home Leave Travel, Periodic Step Increases, and coverage under the Federal Employment Compensation and Missing Persons Acts. He would also be eligible for certain KUBARK insurance plans, subject to security and other special considerations. The one exception is that VAIVADA would remain on a contract basis, meaning that his job security would be somewhat less than that of staff personnel. His contract would be for an indefinite period, however, and his job security would closely approximate that of a staff agent.

3. In discussing VAIVADA's conversion, the reviewing staff also noted that VAIVADA would not necessarily be granted staff status, even though his wife were to become a U.S. citizen, and would definitely not qualify for same at this time. In view of this development and the generally favorable benefits accruing to a career agent, the Division has resubmitted its conversion request to provide for career rather than

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CLASSIFICATION

8 Feb. 57

RI COPY

~~201-32723~~

201-188881 ✓

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

staff status, at Grade GS-11. It is felt that the career status provides most, if not all, of the benefits sought for VAIVADA in HKH-A-2577. It will now be unnecessary, moreover, for Mrs. VAIVADA to acquire U.S. citizenship, although Headquarters stands ready to facilitate acquisition of same if the VAIVADAs so desire.

4. Should there be any objection, on the part of the Station or VAIVADA, to this latest proposal, Headquarters would appreciate an early indication to that effect, in order that other arrangements might be made. It would appear at this time, however, that the proposed career status is the most favorable that VAIVADA could expect.

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

5 February 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Habana
- 1 - RI
- 1 - WH/Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Cuba/Chrono
- 1 - Subject

JBNoland
WH/III/Cuba/JBNoland/jt

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, C/WHD
(Releasing Officer)

J. C. Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III
(Authenticating Officer)

RI COPY

201-168881
~~201-32723~~

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: James B. Noland
DIVISION: WH/III
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056, 2971
DATE: 30 January 1957

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Arthur C. VAIVALA
2. PROJECT: AMPRODARCH
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 3517-014
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA
6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary) (CTYE Subject first recruited in Panama as [illegible] in November 1948; transferred to Costa Rica in [illegible] Project Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL Project and PBSUCCESS.
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Operational Clearance - 19 July 1954
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 34
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 20 June 1922
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Sterling, Illinois
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Habana, Cuba
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP: Three dependents: wife and two children
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: World War II
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: USA and USAF
24. RANK OR GRADE: T/Sgt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $6,390.00 GS-11
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: $2,400.00 (non-taxable)
32. POST:
33. OTHER: Equalization Allowance - $2,620.00 (non-taxable)
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): NA

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☒ YES ☐ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Wife - Costa Rican (expects obtain U.S. citizenship in near future)
Born 15 March 1918 - 38 years of age. Married to Subject since 1945

Son - U.S. Citizen, 7 years of age.

Daughter - U.S. Citizen, 5 years of age.

20-167881 X

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: X
43. ENTERTAINMENT:
44. OTHER: Normal operational expenses of field

SECRET

30 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Request for Conversion of Arthur G. VAIVADA from Contract to Career Agent Status

REFERENCE : HKH-A-2577

1. Referenced dispatch from the field recommends the conversion of contract agent Arthur G. VAIVADA to staff status and presents a strong case for such conversion. Upon receiving a formal WHD request for such action, however, your Plans Staff suggested that career agent status would be more appropriate in this case, and further indicated that staff status for VAIVADA is virtually out of the question at this time. The request is being re-submitted, therefore, in revised form to provide for conversion to career rather than staff status.

2. VAIVADA has served CIA in a contract capacity since 1949, with a continuous high level of performance; first in Costa Rica, later in Guatemala and Cuba. He is currently assigned to Cuba and is expected to remain there indefinitely. VAIVADA is 34 years old and was promoted April 1956 recently to the equivalent of a GS-10 rating. His expressed career interests lie in continued employment by CIA, more especially in the area of unofficial cover assignments, for which he is highly suited.

3. In view of VAIVADA's outstanding record as a contract agent, his strong overall qualifications, and his expressed desire for a career with CIA, it is recommended that he be granted career agent status. A PHS and a new contract check list (in duplicate) are attached.

4. WH Division contemplates bringing VAIVADA to the U.S. for covert training during the latter part of 1957.

5. Approval for the conversion of VAIVADA from contract to career agent status, as indicated above, is hereby requested.

J. C. KING
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments
PHS (2)
Contract Check List (2)

Armstrong

7 Feb 57

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER James B. Noland	DIVISION WH/III
TELEPHONE EXTENSION 2971, 2036	DATE 30 January 1957

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-430 or successor regulations.)

FECA
Missing Persons
~~Retirement~~
CIA Sick and Annual Leave

Home Leave Travel
Periodic Step Increases

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☒ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION Infinite
DAYS MONTHS YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE
Immediate

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days)
Ninety Days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION
☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other)
FI Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED
Principal agent engaged in collection of positive intelligence and CE information.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE
Army and Air Force Intelligence. CIA Training. Other as indicated in Number 6, above.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)
☒ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	X				X		X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE
Very good.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA
1940-1945: T/Sgt. USA, USAF, Intelligence NCO.
Jan. 1945 - April 1946: Leading man labor, $12.88 per day, US Naval Air Station, Coco Solo, Canal Zone
April 1946 - April 1949: T/Sgt USAF, Intelligence NCO, Albrook Field, Canal Zone
April 1949 - Present: Contact agent.

X

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessa

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE
	N. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III	

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

204 FO/RFL/BRB

DATE : 15 JAN 57

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, S/C 2

JAN 15 1703Z 57

ROUTINE

IN 34563

TO DIR **INFO** **CITE** HAVA 755

REF: HAVA 745 (IN 32122)

REQUEST TRAINING BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. EXPLANATORY DISPATCH FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168881

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353

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

353/DEF/RFL/CG

DATE : 08 JANUARY 57

S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	[illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : HAVANA

IN 32122

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : FI/RI 2, CP 2, S/C 2

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: HAVA 745

RE: HKHW 1984

DUE DELAY FINAL PROCESSING WIFES VISA VAIVADA UNABLE DEPART HAVA PRIOR 16 JAN. WILL ADVISE ETA. GROWERY ACTING.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-168881

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH

ATTENTION: Chief, WH/III

SUBJECT: Covert Training Request for Arthur G. VAIVADA

REFERENCE: Project AMPHODARCH

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 4 December 1956 requesting covert training for Arthur G. VAIVADA.

2. The CI Staff approves the training request subject to the comments and recommendations set forth in the attached memorandum prepared by CI/ICD under date of 20 December 1956.

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment:
C/CI/ICD memo dtd 20 Dec. 56 - Subject; Comments and Recommendations on Proposed Covert Training of Arthur G. VAIVADA

SECRET

201-168881

Mrs. Argentina C. Crozier A-11 937 507

Admitted to the U S. as an immigrant: March 12, 1960

Type: O-1 Port: SNA (San Ontánio, Tex.)
Date of Birth: March 15, 1915

Received FOREIGN ADDRESS AND OCCUPATION INDEX CARD (Budget Bureau No. 43-R390) and Dept of Justice ID card Form No. 1-151 - thru my home address at Longmont Colorado about ~~March~~ 12 April 1960.
Index Card filled and mailed on 19 April 1960.

201-168881

RECIBO POR DINERO

22271 Universal

Nº 050

31 de January de 1951

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Seven hundred fifty and no/100 colones

por Services rendered, month of January

(₡ 750.00)

Ross L. Crozier

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-14

27-14

21-14

201-168881

RECIBO POR DINERO

258499 Universal

Nº 009

30 de April de 1953

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de Eight hundred colones 00/100

por Services rendered, 16-30 April

(₡ 800.00)

Ross L. Crozier

201-166851

BIOGRAPHICAL: Consuelo Felicia CORDERO Calderon

From	To	Place	Employment	Employer	Address
1 Jan 57	20 May 57	San Jose, C.R.	Manicurist Salon BORDALLO	Juan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
20 May	1 July 57	Havana, Cuba	Unemployed.		
2 July	13 April 58	San Jose, C.R.	Salon BORDALLO	Juan BORDALLO	62 entre Av 3 - 5
14 Apr 58	July 58	160 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
July 58	27 Dec 58	Mexico City	Salon Moderno	Esperanza HERRERA	Av Alvaro Obregon No 174
27 Dec 58	Mar 59	180 Main St. Quincy 69, Mass.	Unemployed.		
Mar 59	17 Mar 60	550 Riverside Dr. New York 27, N.Y.	Student at Wilfred Academy - 1657 Broadway 51st also employed at Glamour Cut, 353 E. 204 St., Bronx, N.Y. also employed at Ciro's Coffiure , Lexington Av 91st and 92nd. also employed at Jacques Beauty Salon, Inc. 160 West 55th Street, N.Y.		
21 Mar 60	to date	226 Burgess Ave Alexandria, Va.	Temporarily unemployed.		

Harold R. Noemayr

DATES WERE TAKEN FROM PASS PORT TRAVEL

201-168271

RECIBO POR DINERO

272271 Universal

Nº 069

30 de June de 1949

RECIBI de Cash

la suma de four hundred and no/100 colones

por services rendered, month of June

(₡ 400.00)

Ross L. Crozier

27-19-11
27-19-13
27-19-16
27-19-18
27-19-19
27-19-20
27-19-18

FILE IN 201- 168881

14-00000

ROSS L. CROZIER
Representative

Public Surveys Institute
General Polling Service
Riverside 1-3674

332 Fidelity Union Life Bldg.
1511 Bryan Street
Dallas, Texas

See Subject's Cover file
in Operations folder -

201-168 881

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: PLANS

FROM: WHD

SUBJECT: Project HUMANOID

Project HUMANOID is the most important single project of the San Jose Station, and the basis for all existing and contemplated OSO activities in the area. It is requested that the restrictions imposed upon project HUMANOID, as contained in TRS-W-635, copy attached, be lifted at this time, and the Chief of Station be authorized to direct the activities of HUMANOID into the following channels.

(a) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-3, the Station's penetration of the Vanguardia Popular, Costa Rican Communist Party, in order to utilize fully the agents potentialities. HUMANOID-3 is intelligent, has a wide knowledge of Communist activities, plans and personalities and is desirous of cooperating to the extent of his ability. After a thorough de-briefing of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, in order to acquaint him, HUMANOID-3 with the Station's specific interests and requirements, plus the subsequent close supervision which will be exercised by HUMANOID, and the continuing close supervision of HUMANOID-3 by HUMANOID, it is felt that the station will then be in a position to provide intensive and adequate coverage of the objectives assigned to it in the San Jose SOI.

(b) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-4, the Station's penetration of the Women's Fronts affiliated with the Vanguardia Popular. It is felt that the former cut-out HUCKLEBONE, who handled HUMANOID-4 until 1 June 1949, was somewhat inept in his operational dealings, which possibly may account for what seems to be a lack of productivity in the HUMANOID-4 project. HUMANOID-4 has an intimate relationship with active CP members in Costa Rica, both on a low and high level, and possesses a definite potential for both independent reporting, and for spotting a likely individual to be used as a parallel to the HUMANOID-3 project. HUMANOID, who will now handle HUMANOID-4, is capable of directing this agents efforts into the proper channels, and capitalizing fully on the talents possessed by the individual. It is felt that this is another instance whereby HUMANOID, by working closely and directly with the individual can make a substantial contribution to the efforts of the San Jose Station.

(c) Direct and close supervision of HUMANOID-1 and HUMANOID-2, the mail intercept operations presently covering the General Post Office in San Jose. The information that HUMANOID-1 has access to is important and is of documentary reliability. His position is important to the operational structure of the station. HUMANOID-2 is

SECRET

201-168881

a very satisfactory type of agent. He displays a certain amount of initiative in voluntarily performing tasks not specifically requested by the Chief of Station through the cut-out HUMANOID. HUMANOID-2 has demonstrated the qualities of willingness, discretion, and cooperation.

(d) As to the principal agent of Project HUMANOID, the following observations are submitted, which will indicate unmistakeably the value of this project, and its contribution to the successful activities of the San Jose Station.

Evaluation of services - As the principal agent and station cut-out, HUMANOID is charged with the direction and guidance of HUMANOID-1; HUMANOID-2; HUMANOID-3; HUMANOID-4. His handling of these agents is carried out in a professional and efficient manner, and his personal comments and corrections on their reports, based on his long acquaintance with local personalities and conditions, are of considerable value. His attitude remains enthusiastic and willing.

Evaluation of information - The information produced by the agents being handled by HUMANOID is of great value to the station. In addition to his own production, this agents operations are well suited to checking on information received from other sources.

COMMENTS - Despite the fact that HUMANOID has been working under certain operational restrictions for a number of months, his value to the station continues to be of major importance. In addition to the tangible and measureable information produced by and through him, HUMANOID has proved to be the single most valuable source of background and orientation data for the Chief of Station. His knowledge of the history of Costa Rican communist activities and personalities, and his grasp of the various revolutionary movements and figures has been freely shared with the Chief of Station. These "briefing meetings" represent an intangible contribution to the over-all performance of the Station. HUMANOID is eager to expand his operations and upon the removal of present operational restrictions it is believed that he can be given further responsibilities, particularly in the recruiting of additional sub-agents. The station is presently interested in accomplishing a parallel penetration of the Communist Party of Costa Rica, in expanding routine investigative coverage and in developing additional sources on political movements. It is believed that HUMANOID can insure the success of these new ventures.

COSTA RICA

1. HUMANOID

A. Identifying data:

(a) Nationality: U.S. citizen, born 22 June 1922
(b) Education: High school and attending college in Costa Rica.
(c) Occupation: Sergeant in U.S. Air Force during World War II, and an agent of the Panama Station until early 1949
(d) Marital status: Married
(e) Time devoted to our work: Approximately 40%
(f) How contacted: By Chief of Station

B. Humanoid is a cutout for projects Hugger, Humankind 1 and 3, and Humanist-2. See attachments.

2. Production:

(a) Description of info produced: Communist penetration of labor groups and student groups.

(b) Statistics on reports received and disseminated:
July thru December 3 received 3 dissemed

(c) Headquarters evaluation of info received: B-2

3. Cost of Project: $89.05 per month. ID shows following payments

July	$34.42	October	$58.39
August	34.42	November	51.63
September	34.42	December	51.63 ?

4. Administration by headquarters:

(a) Operational clearance granted.

(b) Allotment sheet up to date.

5. General Evaluation:

Humanoid is considered an excellent agent in all respects. His value is more than commensurate with his salary.

SECRET

201-168881

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym Arthur G. VAIVADA

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as HYDROPATHIC in November 1948 and transferred to Costa Rica in approved HUMANOID project. Subsequently was transferred to BIRADIAL project, PBSUCCESS and in 1954 to AMPHODARCH project (Cuba) with which he is currently identified.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? Yes To whom? Record over the past nine years shows that subject has easily been turned over to different projects and case officers.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject is motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, its remuneration and as loyal U. S. citizen.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-958
MAY 1950

201-168881

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Checked upon recruitment in Panama in 1949 and subsequently upon transfer to other projects.

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject is controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty because of American heritage, past Army and Agency service, and a desire for a career in intelligence work.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of the identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U. S. Army and Air Force Intelligence.

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject has furnished information received from sub-agents on Communist and revolutionary activities throughout the Central American-Caribbean area. Is now P/A in Cuban project with those primary objectives. Work to date has been outstanding. Has been particularly valuable in development and recruitment of new agents.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

Only those functions (Administrative-Operational) normally exercised by P/A.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U. S. Army Intelligence Training and Agency covert training from 5 October through 25 November 1953. Additional covert training at Headquarters planned for April-May 1957.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

From indigenous student—youth elements, with whom he maintains contact and who in turn have entree to Cuban Communist and revolutionary circles.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject is to receive $6,390 annually, plus allowances, with provisions for normal step increases, and promotion when justified.

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

Has native fluency in language and would at least pass as long-time resident and possibly even national of certain Central American-Caribbean countries, although has obviously foreign physical characteristics.

/PTG/

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?

Upper Middle Class

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Believed to be normal in all respects.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject can send and receive Morse Code.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Previously submitted.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

From Subject personally.

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Outstanding record led first to recommendation that subject be converted to staff status; following which it was determined that a career agent designation would be more appropriate in his case.

Case officer

SECRET

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH — ROSS L. CROZIER

Ross L. CROZIER was born on 20 June 1922 in De Kalb, Illinois and is the eldest of five children of a respectable middle-class family. His parents and his two brothers and two sisters now reside in Sterling, Illinois. Crozier received his primary and high school education in De Kalb and entered the U.S. Army in 1940, later transferring to the Army Air Corps. He served as an operations and intelligence specialist, first in the China-India-Burma Theatre and later in Panama. Crozier was discharged from the service in August 1945, leaving with the grade of Technical Sergeant. After his discharge, Crozier worked about three months as a laboratory technician in the Sterling (Illinois) Silica-Gel Corporation and then returned to the Canal Zone to marry Argentina CORDERO C., a Costa Rican girl in December 1945. He then worked about four months as a stevedore. and labor foreman in the Canal Zone. In April 1946 he re-enlisted in the Air Force in the Canal Zone, from which he was discharged three years later in 1949 at his previous grade of Technical Sergeant.

Crozier became an Agency contract agent on 1 June 1949. He was originally scheduled to be used in Panama but was assigned to the HUMANOID Project in Costa Rica instead. While there he successfully handled a high level penetration of the Costa Rican Communist Party. In 1953 he was sent to Headquarters for training, and in 1954 he was assigned to PBSUCCESS for a brief period. In July 1954 he signed a new contract in Washington whereby he became the new principal

201-168881

SECRET

agent of Project AMPHODARCH. He is under student cover and is actually working for his BA degree at the University of Habana, for which he has approximately 1 more year of academic work to complete.

?

Crozier has a healthy appearance and appears to be about ㉕ instead of 32 years of age. He is athletically inclined and has been, and is at present, interested in organizing and participating in intra-mural athletics. He is happily married and the father of two children. He possesses a great deal of integrity, honesty, intelligence, and resourcefulness. His chief hobby, aside from sports, is photography. He has made quite a study of picture-taking and has developed a portrait photo technique which he has found useful in his work and as an aid to obtaining extra spending money while going to school. The Chief of Habana Mission and WHD have a strong feeling that this man will perform his duties in a superior manner and will make AMPHODARCH a valuable and worthwhile project.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	RI FILE NO.
	DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / DATE
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM / DATE OF INFO. / EVALUATION
ANALYST MW / DATE PROCESSED 22 July 58	DISSEMINATED IN / DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

☐ CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	☐ TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJ

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER CF 25507

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-168881

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

D.

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(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

RE-PUNCH

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	04 APR 1960	ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RID/20	ROOM NO. 1014L	TELEPHONE 8514

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☐ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 168881 1.	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): CROZIER, ROSS LESTER

SEX 3. ☒ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8
☒ YES ☐ NO	21 DEC 22	USA	ILLINOIS	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
050	C50		

COMMENTS: CIT: USA

CS COPY

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☐ YES ☐ NO	☐ YES ☐ NO	Corina de Abreu

FORM NO. 831 1 OCT 58 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

14-00000

WH/3M

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RE-PUNCH

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: [illegible]

FROM: WH/3M

ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

ROOM NO.: [illegible]

TELEPHONE: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE ☐
NONSENSITIVE ☑

201 NO. [illegible] 1.

SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) ROZIER (First) [illegible] (Middle) (Title)

SEX 3. M ☑ F ☐

TYPE NAME 2. NAME VARIANT (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. YES ☐ NO ☐

BIRTH DATE 5. D M Y

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USA

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. ILLINOIS

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM

PSEUDONYM [illegible] HOLDER R.
[illegible] (F. RAE[illegible])

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX

ACTION DESK 11. WH/3M

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12. CI

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS:

CIT: USA

201-32723
Closed 3 May 57

VERIFIED

CS COPY PUNCHED
201-

PERMANENT CHARGE YES ☑ NO ☐

RESTRICTED FILE YES ☐ NO ☐

SIGNATURE

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions.

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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 3 May 1957	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	
FROM RI/CO Amelia Superfisky		ROOM NO. 2301 L	TELEPHONE 3127

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NONSENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 168881	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)	SEX 3.
CROZIER	Ross	L.		☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
☐ YES ☐ NO	D 0-0 M 0-0 Y 22	USA	Illinois	1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM
	Arthur G. VAIVADA

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
	~~WH/III/Cuba~~		

COMMENTS: WH/3C4

201- 168881

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
☐ YES ☐ NO	☒ YES ☐ NO	Amelia Superfisky

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

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PUNCHED

(38)

OZIER, Koss L. 201-16888

SECRET

Vol. I of V

OFFICIAL CS FILE

(Undated - Dec. 51)

FORM 3-68 1505B

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

3 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on CROZIER (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation: ________________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened: ________________
OI Code A2.

☐ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☒ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Roy Gilron (name) Ops Offcr (title) LA/M/FI (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201- 168881

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE

32-2 SB

CONF	ACP	TOO	TPE	BRO	DCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 302024Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 650063

CONF: EA/CO-4 INFO: FILE [illegible] EA-8 CA-10, OP/INT, [illegible]-4 C/OP-2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 13
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: LIMA, QUITO, GUAYAQUIL, SANTIAGO, BUENOS AIRES, MEXICO CITY

INFO PANTECH, DIRTECH, BANGTECH, TOKYTECH. Y

TAPPER/CO STARROYO TECHS Y

REF: DIRECTOR 618825 (BEING RELAYED MEXICO CITY) |*| Y

1. IN REFINEMENT OF REF REQUIREMENT QUERY WHETHER ADDRESSEES HAVE AN ASSET WHO IS ETHNIC CHINESE WITH LATIN AMERICA ORDINARY PASSPORT WHO COULD APPLY FOR A PRC TOURIST VISA. IF YES, PLEASE HAVE ASSET CONTACT PRC EMBASSY AND ASK IF THEY WOULD ISSUE TOURIST VISA AND HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE BEFORE ASSET COULD OBTAIN VISA. Y

2. WE ARE TRYING TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRC EMBASSY WILL ISSUE VISA FOR TOURIST PURPOSES TO SINGLETON TRAVELERS OF ETHNIC CHINESE ORIGIN WHO ARE NATIVE OR NATURALIZED LA CITIZENS WHO HAVE NO RELATIVES IN CHINA. Y

3. IF PER ABOVE AN APPROPRIATE ASSET CAN BE IDENTIFIED, WE B WOULD CONSIDER REQUESTING STATION CONCERNED TO LAUNCH HIM ON A SIMPLE OPS SUPPORT MISSION TO PRC: I.E., TO COLLECT INFO ON PRC DOCUMENTATION CONTROL BASED ON SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ASSET BEFORE LAUNCH. Y

DATE: 29 JANUARY 75
ORIG: JACK KOJIMOTO/YET
UNIT: CH/OCEA
EXT: 1730

	Init.
C/[illegible]/1	
DC/[illegible]/1	
C/[illegible]	
C	
[illegible]	
WH/1/[illegible]	

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

CL BY: 039306

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

COL	ACP	TOD	TPS	ADP	OCI		PAGE	OF PAGES
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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR — DATE-TIME GROUP — CITE — MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

DIRECTOR

65-0063

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

4. PLEASE ADVISE BY 14 FEBRUARY. E2, IMPDET.

*REQUEST ADDRESSEE STATIONS NOTIFY HQS IN ADVANCE OF ANY UPCOMING TRIPS TO THE PRC BY ITS OVERSEAS CHINESE ASSETS.

COORD: OTS/AB - THOMAS KLINE {DRAFT}
AC/LA/M - R. U. STONE {DRAFT}
DC/LA/NW - J. HENNESSY {DRAFT}
{FOR} C/LA/SB - P. KITTREDGE {DRAFT}
DCEA/CH
LA/TRS –

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHIEF, LA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY-

SENT FOR MICROFILMING

Date 13 Dec 70

Corrective Microfilming

TRSA 347 20 May 49 201-162221

SENT TO RID/AN
22 Dec 70

TZPW 411	8 Jan 49	201-168881
TRSW 275	27 Dec 48	" "
TRSA 925	11 May 51	" "
TRSW 643	28 May 51	" "
TRSA 974	10 July 51	" "
TZPA 365/01	4 Nov 48	" "

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

TPS-A- 698

DEC 7 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Acting Chief, WH

HUMANOID

REFS: a. TPS-A-1034
b. TPS-W-685

1. Headquarters files have just been admirably augmented through the receipt of reference a., which to say the least, sheds considerable, much-needed light on this operation. This was a most welcome clarification of many of our questions concerning HUMANOID.

2. Upon his return to Headquarters, Dennis E. COPELAND reported your desire to have HUMANOID sign a new contract. It is suggested in this regard that you furnish as soon as possible any provisions which you wish to recommend for inclusion in the contract. Such recommendations will of course be in conformity with Sec. 20-3 of the Regulations governing contract agents, not career agents. It would be most advantageous to submit such a contract for consideration simultaneously with a request for renewal of the operation at the end of February 1952.

3. Relative to your question in paragraph 2 of reference a., at the present time, TPS-W-685 is the current approved version of the extent of HUMANOID's operational activities. It is firmly believed that these restrictions will be removed when, in February 1952, this operation will be considered for renewal by the Staff which imposed the curtailment. It is urged that in your quarterly review for the period ending 31 December 1951 you give Headquarters the benefit of another specific detailed report. At that time, we will also submit a request for increased salary for HUMANOID.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

By J. C. Bonnet

ACWH

R. W. RASTETTER

JCB:cb
5 December 1951

SECRET

7 Dec. 51
201-168881

14-00000

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1084

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 19 November 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— HUMANOID Project

Ref: TRSW-685, TRSA-1056, WASH 14671

CS copy filed in 18-6-3-77

1. TRSW-685, which advises that the expiration date of this project has been determined to be 29 February 1952, was received several days after the forwarding of TRSA-1056, which recommended that subject be considered for career agent status. Although TRSA-1056 furnished certain of the data requested by headquarters, the following additional information, queries and comments are set forth with a view to facilitating a final evaluation of the project.

2. Pursuant to the approval contained in TRSW-655, dated June 29, 1951, HUMANOID has been and is currently acting as cutout for HUMANIST-2, as well as for HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3. It is therefore not clear whether paragraph 2.b. of TRSA-685 is to be interpreted as a new restriction on his activities which is to be placed into effect at this time. In other words, is headquarters' approval of the suggestions contained in TRSA-950 now withdrawn?

3. As discussed in TRSA-950, assistance was extended HUMANOID in setting up a photography and photocopy shop on the fringe of the downtown area. Funds formerly used for rental of a safehouse were applied instead as rental for his photo shop, with the purpose of providing a safe meeting place between HUMANOID and HUMANIST-2 and to provide a more accessible spot for the processing of HUMANKIND material. Early in July 1951, after two or three weeks experience with photostating HUMANKIND material at the studio demonstrated the unsuitability of the arrangement, HUMANOID resumed his photostatic work in his own home. The studio has continued to serve as a meeting place for HUMANIST-2. The following considerations entered into the decision to discontinue processing HUMANKIND-1 and 3 material at the photo studio: 1) The conspicuous nature of the equipment in a small shop; 2) the security risks caused by the presence in the studio of HUMANOID's local employee; and 3) the lack of any secure storage space for compromising material

201-168881

4. Since the dispatch of TRSA-1056, HUMANOID has been notified by his photographic assistant that the latter is resigning

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

COPY

TRSA 1084
DATE 19 NOV 51
18-6-3-77

to seek more remunerative employment at the end of this month. HUMANOID states that he is unable to devote sufficient time to the business to keep it going without an assistant and that it would be quite difficult to locate a competent workman at the salary level he can afford to pay. The above facts, plus unfavorable findings of a recent financial analysis of his business, have convinced HUMANOID to close the photograph shop at the end of November.

5. In connection with paragraph 2.d. of TRSW-685, which states that HUMANOID must discontinue using his home to reproduce the material obtained from HUMANKIND-1 and HUMANKIND-3, the following brief history of safehouse experience at this station is set forth. A review of the files and discussion with HUMANOID reveals that seven safehouses have been utilized to date:

a. An office room in the Panama Company building in San José from June, 1959, to November, 1949, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned when it was learned the room was called the "FBI office upstairs" by other residents of the building.

b. An apartment in Bella Vista from November, 1949, to January, 1950, used to process HUMANKIND material. Abandoned because landlord lived next door and used common entrance.

c. One-half of a house in San Pedro, which had private entrance. Abandoned because the notorious Frank MARSHALL was neighbor. MARSHALL is enemy of the Communist Party and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

d. An apartment in Parque Morazán. After two months this was abandoned as neighbors began making inquiries concerning infrequency of visits to the house.

e. Apartment in Barrio Luján, for four months. This was abandoned as many Party members lived nearby and knew HUMANIST-2 by sight.

f. A house near the Sabana airport for seven months, used to process HUMANKIND material. Frequent vacancy of the premises caused speculation by neighbors and landlord.

g. Photographic studio as discussed above. In addition to stated reasons for closing above safehouses, two house breakings were suffered, and it was frequently feared that the reproduction equipment might be stolen when it became apparent that persons were seldom in the houses.

6. In view of headquarters intention to terminate this project, it is not deemed advisable at this time to install HUMANOID in a new safehouse to process HUMANKIND material. Accordingly, headquarters advice is requested as to whether HUMANOID may continue using his house for the next few months, or whether this operation should be suspended immediately, inasmuch as no suitable alternate cutout has been located to date.

7. In reply to your request for comment on the salary increase for HUMANOID recommended by the former Chief of Station, please be advised that the writer concurs in the recommendation. As indicated in TRSA-1056 and TRSA-999, this agent has been living on a very close financial margin and has been aware of the recommended raise for some months. It is conceivable that he has taken the raise possibility into consideration in his personal financial arrangements. In any event, should headquarters decide to terminate subject, it is recommended that several months salary be authorized as a termination bonus in order that there will be no likelihood of security considerations arising from subject's possibly over-extended financial position. This bonus payment is believed justified by subject's long tenure of service.

8. With regard to paragraph 3 of TRSW-685, there have been no changes in subject's cover and current modes of contact and communication from those set out in TRSA-959. HUMANIST-2 makes a weekly door-slot drop at night at the photographic studio, and a live meeting takes place at the studio approximately three nights a month, with safety-danger signals being utilized. In addition, HUMANOID meets once or so a month with HUGGER, either at her home or at the studio. HUMANKIND contacts remain the same. My contacts with HUMANOID have taken place at his home, in a park, in a local pensión, at my home, and in coffee bars on a staggered schedule of about once a week.

9. With reference to WASH 14671, please be advised that absolutely no commitments have been made to subject, and, on the contrary, hints have been dropped to him of a possible curtailment of funds which might require discontinuing certain operations here. No difficulty is anticipated in terminating subject upon receipt of final instructions from headquarters.

10. With further reference to WASH 14671, your attention is respectfully invited to the following headquarters files which reflect opinions and evaluations of subject by other staff personnel:

TZPA-365 Part II	"Subject's superiors regard this man as highly dependable."
TZPA-365 Part I	"Subject's immediate superior is Lt. Col. Wm. R. FORBES, Director of Intelligence, CAIRC, who recommends subject highly."

TRSA-403 "Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments."

TRSA-588 "...services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent from both an information and security viewpoint."

TRSA-646 "...his integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended, and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities."

TRSA-860 "...the services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station."

TRSA-999 "...the services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable..... In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that he be considered for a raise in pay..."

TRSA-641 "...his experience and ability is such that he could probably be of use to the organization anywhere in Latin America."

11. The above file history, plus approximately three months observation and direction of HUMANOID served as the basis for my recommendation of career agent status.

12. At the risk of laboring the point, and solely on the basis of information available here, it appears that HUMANOID has provided valuable service in the past, that he is currently an important factor in the operational structure of this station, and that he possesses certain potential for future use by the organization. In this connection, it is noted that headquarters inquired some time ago (TRSW-641) whether subject would be interested in working for the organization in another country. Although it is realized your interest in this possibility may no longer exist, for your information HUMANOID has stated that he would go to any other Latin American country, in any capacity, on short notice.

13. The instant dispatch is respectfully submitted for your information and in response to your queries. It is to be emphasized that headquarters desires with regard to modifying or terminating this project will be followed implicitly.

201-168881

James K. Russo

~~18 6-3-71~~

Form No. 35-6
(Dec. 1947)

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
"SECURITY INFORMATION"

PAGE No.

To:	SAN JOSE	ROUTINE
From:	POLICY COORDINATION/ SPECIAL OPERATIONS	8 NOV 51
Confirmation:	WHD (1-2)	OUT 87290
Information:	IR (3-4), AD/SO (5), OPS (6), PLANS (7), S/C (8-9-10), DDP (11)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

WASH 14671

TO: SANJFG CITE: WASHFG

RE: TRSA-1056

MAKE NO COMMITMENTS RE FUTURE STATUS SUBJECT.AT PRESENT HAVE NO PLANS CONTACT HIM HERE.HQS FILES DO NOT REFLECT BASIS YOUR ENTHUSIASM SUBJECT'S USEFULNESS THIS AGENCY. HQS FAVORS CONTINUING PRESENT STATUS.

201-168881

V.L.GRESHAM
RELEASING OFFICER

JCB
ORIGINATING AND COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.W.RASTETER
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOD: 2351Z 8 NOV 51

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

2 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. RASTETTER AND MR. BONNET

FROM: Paul P. Paxton

SUBJECT: HUMANOID; Career Status

1. I do not feel that this man's position in the political and social life in Costa Rica lends itself to our need for a career agent in that area. His financial position negates his accessibility to high-level information, and our requirements for Costa Rica should not be satisfied through outright subsidization of an agent in order to place him in a position of influence. His wife's knowledge of his work for us is lamentable and her Costa Rican background with substantial local political ties should be sufficient reason to belay any further consideration on our part for increasing his knowledge of our operations. Admittedly, he has performed a satisfactory service for the San Jose station, but his efforts are not so vital that his termination, in the event he decides to sever connections with us because of his failure to achieve more prominent status, would be a permanent blow to our effectiveness there. With respect to his knowledge of future possibilities with us, we cannot be held responsible for unauthorized commitments that may have been made by the previous Chief of Station.

2. The current status of HUMANOID should be established in line with TRS - 685.

WH/PPP/ie
2 November 1951

SECRET

201- 168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1056

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 22 October 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Field Memo 218

1. Serious consideration has been given to the suitability of Humanoid for career agent status, and in this connection, it is to be noted subject is partially aware of the possibilities of career agent status by virtue of a discussion with the former Chief of Station.

2. It appears that Humanoid fills the requirements set out in reference memorandum, as follows:

a. Humanoid.

b. His existing cover is well established and believed to be durable. He has been attending the local university for over two years; he built and owns his own home in Costa Rica; he is married to a Costa Rican and has two children born here; and he has a going business in the form of a photographic shop which provides an excuse for additional income.

c. SOI objectives assigned to Humanoid include supervised direction of Communist Party penetration (Humanist-2); supervised direction of Postal Intercept Project (Humankind); direct provision of information emanating from local university and intellectual circles of which subject is a member. Also, subject formerly directed attempted penetration of the Communist Party women's "front" group (Hugger).

d. It has been noted that subject's efficiency and productivity have been hampered by financial considerations in the past. He has had unusually heavy medical bills, and the rising cost of living in Costa Rica has presented economic problems in view of his modest income. It is felt that subject has valuable potential for expanding his operations under the status of career agent. With the removal or partial removal of economic pressure, subject would be able to devote additional time to the exploitation of numerous personal contacts in labor, government, religious, and political circles. He is

201-168881

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FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

unusually adept at investigative technique, has the ability to balance risks involved against value of information to be obtained, and is thoroughly familiar with the geography and political trends in Costa Rica. To date, subject has confined his activities mostly to cutout and direction; however, it is believed that with additional freedom he could successfully engage in spotting, recruitment, general investigation, and independent reporting.

e. Subject has discussed his desire to send his wife and two children to his family in the United States late in October for a 60-day visit. He would then like to travel to the United States himself in late December for a brief visit with his parents in Illinois. This would be his first visit home in several years and would provide an excellent opportunity and cover for headquarters contact, either in Illinois or Washington, at which time formalities and necessary training could be accomplished. (NOTE: This planned trip of subject may temporarily interrupt contact with Humanist-2 and Humankind, as a suitable interim cutout has not yet been developed; but experience has shown that production from both sources practically dies out over the Christmas and New Year holidays in this country.

3. In connection with Paragraph e. above, it is to be noted that the travel plans of subject's wife have been complicated by advice from the Embassy Consular Section that the Immigration authorities at the port of entry into the United States may demand a $500.00 U.S. bond in substantiation of her intent to return to Costa Rica after the 60 days. This station is therefore considering advancing subject U.S. $500.00 in order to enable him to present the bond if it is demanded and to obviate the possibility of his spending several hundred dollars in travel money for his wife to a port of entry and return to Costa Rica if entry were denied. This money would not be used by subject for any other purpose and would be returned to station funds after successful entry of his wife into the United States.

4. In view of the fact that this Station has no basis for comparison with regard to possible salary figures which might be offered subject if career agent status is approved, no recommendation in this regard is being made. However, it is pointed out that subject has worked for the organization for almost four years, that his efficiency has been excellent, his grasp of intelligence requirements above average, his potential attractive, and that his present position in the operational structure of this Station is of major importance.

5. It is requested that this Station be advised if you are interested in considering subject for career agent status. If so, please advise whether contact will be had with subject while

he is in the United States. Also, will the government reimburse subject for travel expenditures for his trip. In view of the relatively short time remaining before his trip, it is requested that I be advised as soon as possible of pertinent details, such as length of time required for training, etc., in order that Humanoid may be briefed and in order that interim operational arrangements may be worked out.

6. It would be appreciated if a reply to the recommended salary increase of subject could be made available. (See TRSA-999 of July 1 and TRSA-1037 dated September 28, 1951.)

James K. Russo

18-6-3-74

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-1037

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 28 September 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Humanoid Project

1. In connection with a re-examination of the security factors of this Project, a pre-arranged visit to the home of Humanoid was made by the writer. As previously reported, subject has constructed a secret dark room under the floor of his house and processes the production from the Humankind Project in this work room. It is therefore necessary that certain compromising material is retained overnight by Humanoid, and, at present, this material is kept in a wooden desk with a cheap lock. Although Humanoid's personal security appears good at this time, the possibility of an unexpected house search or a pure case of housebreaking with theft as a motive cannot be overlooked, with resultant serious security considerations.

2. It is therefore requested that headquarters consider furnishing a small wall safe with a combination lock for installation in the above-mentioned dark room. It would be possible to sink the safe into the concrete wall, and even if complete concealment were not possible, the safety of the material would be greatly enhanced. Suitable safes are not available locally, but it is known that Remington Rand markets a small strong box with a combination lock (price about $20.00) which would be ideal.

3. I would appreciate receiving your opinion in this matter inasmuch as other measures must be taken in the event a safe cannot be made available.

4. Inasmuch as Humanoid is aware of the proposed salary raise recommended by the former Chief of Station in the Quarterly Report dated August 17, 1951, information as to the status of this recommendation is requested.

JKR
James K. Russo

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FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

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VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SPATCH NO. TRSA-935

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 31 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid

Ref: Memorandum given writer by Zachary T. Cady in Panama

1. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law, Sra. Dora Calderon de CORDERO, has no relationship with the family of former President Rafael Angel CALDERON Guardia. Humanoid advised that his mother-in-law was friendly with the CALDERON family years ago, but has had no contact with any of the family or the Calderonista Party since the revolution. This woman immigrated to Costa Rica as Dora INIKEN from Europe, and as it is customary for immigrants and illegitimate children to take upon themselves the name of the President, Dora INIKEN changed her name to CALDERON. Humanoid stated that she has no political connections whatsoever and is sympathetic to whatever administration is in power at the time. The information in the referenced memorandum was originally written by Humanoid three years ago and has no application to the present.

2. Regarding Humanoid's associates, Sr. and Sra. Miguel CORRALES, Humanoid stated that he has not seen CORRALES for over a year since CORRALES is in Guanacaste Province. It is true that CORRALES was a Figuerista during the revolution, but he is no longer sympathetic with FIGUERES.

3. Humanoid's intelligence activities are known to his wife, who has been of assistance to him in said activities on various occasions. However, Humanoid stated that his mother-in-law has no knowledge of these activities.

ETRoddy
Eugene T. Roddy

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31 July 51

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18-6-3-70

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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16 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. THARP:

SUBJECT: a. HUMANOID
b. Technical Surveillance in Costa Rica

HUMANOID is an American agent used as a cut-out in several San Jose operations. He was employed in the technical surveillance on the home of Juan Bosch, as one of the two monitors. He also handles the photography incident to the HUMANKIND project, which work he performs in his own quarters. (This may now be performed away from his home, but until very recently it was done at home.)

HUMANOID's PHS shows the following points which Dave Wright may be able to clarify:

(see TZP-A-365, Part I)

1. His wife is related, through her mother, to the family of CALDERON. This might be a connection with the "Calederonistas" who are alleged to be the group of Costa Ricans responsible for mysterious bombings early this year.

2. Subject's mother-in-law, who resides with him, is described as follows: "strongly inclined to Sr. Calderon GUARDIA and Leo CORTES during their respective regimes in Costa Rica, and she is now (Oct 1948) enthusiastic about the Junta Government of Jose FIGUERES. However, she takes no active part in politics."

3. Other friends and associates of his wife are: Sr. and Sra. Miguel Corrales (San Juan Tibas Costa Rica). Miguel Corrales was a radio operator and intelligence operative for Jose FIGUERES during the Costa Rican Civil War in the spring of 1948.

Jose FIGUERES and Juan BOSCH were the target personalities of the technical surveillance. FIGUERES made the statement that "one of his boys told him all about the surveillance."

From the above circumstances, it appears possible that HUMANOID's intelligence activities are probably known to either his wife, his mother-in-law, or his friend, CORRALES, and that one of the three could have been the source through which the surveillance was blown. Would you discuss this informally with Dave Wright, please?

J. C. BONNET

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201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DIS[illegible]CH NO. TRSA-972

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 9 July 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

KAPOK

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSA-925

Enclosed herewith is Part II - Operational Information - of the Personal Record Questionnaire for Project Humanoid.

Encl: 1 in dupl

Eugene T. Roddy

DESENSITIZED 7
per CSN 43-28

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

TRS /PRQ/ 26

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the case officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) Station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/13.

36. Cryptonym Humanoid

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?

Subject was first recruited in Panama as Hydropathic in November 1948 and transferred to San José as approved Humanoid project, July 1949.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? To whom?

Subject could be turned over quickly to any approved cutout, though at present he is himself acting as a cutout between Chief of Station and subagents.

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

Subject motivated by his interest in intelligence work, desire to advance in the organization as a career, and its remuneration.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

SECRET

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

Recruited and checked in Panama (see TZPA-365).

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

Subject can be controlled through dependence on salary, loyalty due to American heritage, past U.S. Army service, and desire for a career in this work--all are controlling factors, as well as his receipt of G.I. school benefits.

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

Subject is cognizant of identity of this organization.

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Subject previously in U.S. Army Intelligence (see Part I, PRQ 26, No. 25)

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Subject furnishes only information received as a cutout from subagents, Communist Party activities and Caribbean revolutionary matters.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

TRS /PRQ/ 26

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

None

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

U.S. Army Intelligence training.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information?

Subject acts as cutout for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, Humankind-3 and Hugger.

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities.

Subject receives $,000 per month (approved TRSW-627)

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

No.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

No.

DESENSITIZED

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.? Upper middle class.

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

Social drinker, very moderately. No gambling or mistresses.

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

All noted excellent.

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

None.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future?

Subject knows Morse code and can send and receive 16 words per minute at present, which rate can be quickly increased.

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

Photos forwarded with Part I. Handwriting and fingerprints being pouched separately.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

Subject submitted information personally.

DESENSITIZED
Per CSI 43-26

TRS/PRQ/ 26

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

None.

Case officer

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-23

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TRSA-999

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 31 March-1 July 1951.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	No change.
SALARY:	Subject was raised from 750 colones per month to 1,000 colones per month, effective 1 March 1951.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	Services of this agent continue to be extremely valuable as the principal cutout for three subagents. Subject also processes the information received, adding to it his own comments drawn from long personal acquaintance with local conditions. Subject maintains a good working relationship with subagents necessary for their continued trusted and unworried cooperation.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	The information procured by subject is valuable though very little is his own, but rather that of his subagents.
OTHER FACTORS:	Reference is made to TRSA950 and TRSW-655 wherein subject's operations, as planned by this station and approved by headquarters, were set out. These operations have continued as outlined without incident or danger to the security of this agent or this station.
COMMENTS:	Subject is devoting increasingly more time to the coverage of mail intercepts, their photostating, and enlarging coverage of same. The intelligence consciousness as well as the trust he has built up in Humanist-2 in reporting on top level Communist activities has taken time and has produced good results in effective coverage. In view of his importance to this station, his ability and his willingness to devote time to the work when needed, it is recommended that subject be considered for a raise in pay from 1,000 colones to 1,500. Subject is living frugally on his present salary and his G.I. subsistance. His wife has recently had another child which was followed by complications necessitating considerable hospital-

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TRSA-999

COMMENTS: (Con'd)

ization. This raise is recommended since it will enable subject to devote a sufficient amount of time to this work without being harried over expenses which force him to look for additional outside work. At the present exchange rate $1,500 amounts to $200 per month.

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AIR TRO-A- 605

JUN 29 1951

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational
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REF: TRC-A-730, TRO-W-613

1. A careful study has been made by the interested offices in headquarters of the referenced documents and other correspondence pertaining to the recent compromise of the technical surveillance. The course of action suggested and discussed by you under paragraph 2 of TRC-A-730 is concurred in by headquarters.

2. The recommendations contained in TRO-W-613, under paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 are hereby withdrawn.

3. Your headquarters has a continuing interest in this entire matter and would be pleased to receive any information as it is developed which would affect either adversely or otherwise the implementation of your suggested plan.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.
By T. J. Barrett

TJB:jr

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STC

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-950

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 7 June 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

KAPOK
DESENSITIZED

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations

SPECIFIC— Humanoid - Humanist

Ref: TRSW-643

1. Inquiry made of Humanist regarding the statements he made before the police during his interrogation reflects that he reportedly refused to testify before the police but made his deposition before the Procurador as to his part in the technical installation which implicated only the writer, and this only after he was told that Roddy had been identified. Humanist's testimony, as well as the line of questioning to which he was submitted, revealed the authorities' concern and their efforts to ascertain whether he had been engaged in or knew of any other similar installations on any other people. This he denied and maintained that the only installation was on Juan BOSCH. Humanist claims he made no mention of Humanoid, and he believes the police know nothing about him.

2. Humanist's claims also tally with the account of his confession as given writer by Manuel VENTURA, Presidential aide. Humanoid has been on the alert and has noted nothing of a suspicious nature which would indicate his activities being under observation or investigation. This matter of suspending his operations, as suggested by headquarters, was discussed by writer with Elmo R. Langtry during his recent visit in San José and the following suggestions are made for headquarters' consideration:

a. Humanoid at the present time is acting as cutout and chief agent for Humanist-2, Humankind-1, and Humankind-3. There is no other agent at the present time to whom these contacts can be given. It is believed that if these subagents are allowed a 6-months vacation, they will become practically worthless when picked up again and have to work for the money they have been receiving, aside from losing interim information and developments.

b. In an effort to establish a more secure, as well as a commercial, cover for Humanoid, this office has acceded to Humanoid's desire to set up a photography and photocopy shop in the downtown area, and has encouraged him in it by allowing funds paid for rental of a safehouse to be applied instead as rental for his photo shop. This provides Humanoid with a good cover in

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DESENSITIZED 7
per CSN 43-26

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a business which he is enthusiastic about and is a more natural place for Humanist-2 to make unobserved contacts. It also supplies Humanoid with a more accessible spot and efficient means to photostat mail intercepts and return them to the post office in time instead of commuting back and forth from his home in the suburbs of San José.

c. Therefore, it is suggested that Humanoid's semi-weekly contacts with Humanist-2, instead of being cancelled, be changed to a weekly letterdrop, and a live contact once a month to take care of salary payments and briefing. This letterdrop can be effected by Humanist-2 passing by the photo shop at night and dropping his messages through the slot in the door usually used for after-hours delivery of films to be developed. The film drop will be into a padlocked box, accessible only to Humanoid.

d. Regarding Humanoid's contacts with Humankind-1 and Humankind-3, these are conducted in a thoroughly safe manner. Mail extracted from postal channels by them is deposited in an envelope and placed in a post office box. It is checked daily by Humanoid, and if anything is there, it is removed, photostated, and returned by him the same day. If anyone is noticed hanging around the post office boxes, Humanoid does not go near the box and returns later when the way is clear.

e. Another factor has arisen since the last dispatch which has made this post office operation more secure in that the Director of the Post Office is now beholden to Humanoid. In a recent legal squabble noted in the press which was raised by a local Communist complaining about the government confiscating his mail from abroad, the government desired to prove that this mail was Communist propaganda which they had a right to confiscate, and the President therefore requested the Director of the Post Office to furnish samples to prove this point. With this "heat" on him, the Director made a frantic appeal to Humanoid, who was able to procure these samples for him, which satisfied the President, and for which the Director was truly grateful. Therefore, no trouble is expected from this intercept operation as long as the present personnel are being used, and ample warning will be given Humanoid in advance of any change in the present attitude.

3. Since it is believed that there is more to be lost than gained by dropping contact with these agents, the above modifications of these contacts are respectfully submitted for headquarters' consideration and decision.

Eugene T. Roddy
Eugene T. Roddy

[illegible]

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Chief, STB 21 May 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID Project

1. In accordance with conversations held between Chief, STC and FDT and with Mr. Johnston of your office, the following modifications and additional data concerning this project are set forth.

2. On 8 March 1951 a technical surveillance was installed on the residence of Juan BOSCH, a Caribbean revolutionary leader, utilizing the services of a telephone company employee, Marcos Aurelius Salazar, through HUMANIST. HUMANOID and HUMANIST carried on the monitoring in shifts, but at separated intervals. Shortly thereafter, it was noticed that some natives living nearby were unduly interested in the activities of the monitoring house, and, at the same time, mysterious bomb explosions were occurring in San Jose. HUMANIST learned that the police had received a report that unknown persons were spying on the airfield, which adjoined the monitoring post, and perhaps were manufacturing the bombs. The surveillance was discontinued and the equipment moved on 20 March.

3. It was deemed necessary to brief Salazar on a possible investigation and provide him with a suitable cover story. It is believed that Salazar became frightened, went to the police, and implicated HUMANIST, who was subsequently arrested. After three days, HUMANIST confessed and implicated the chief of station.

4. The chief of station, through his strong personal connections with the Vice President and other high officials, was able to convince the President this activity was not detrimental to the interests of Costa Rica and the whole affair was quashed. HUMANIST was released from jail and the chief of station continues to enjoy cordial and amicable relations with the Costa Rican officials concerned.

5. It is planned that the chief of station will be transferred in the near future, at which time HUMANIST will be terminated on the pretext that all operations are being discontinued. The only other current operation which HUMANIST knows anything about is HUMANIST-2, whom he was instrumental in recruiting in July 1949. He has had nothing to do with HUMANIST-2 since then and has never known who handles him or even if he is in contact with our station at the present time. It is believed that HUMANOID's true identity is unknown to him, and so far as he knows, HUMANOID was only helping on the one job, the technical surveillance.

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6. Although no evidence has been received from any source which would indicate HUMANOID has been compromised, the chief of station has been instructed, as a precautionary measure, to place HUMANOID on an inactive status for approximately six months. HUMANOID's salary will continue during this period, which is designed to permit further study and observation of all ramifications of this compromise as well as additional strengthening of HUMANOID's local cover. HUMANOID's responsibilities with regard to HUGGER, HUMANIST-2, and [illegible] will be transferred to another American cutout (possibly HUMBUG) or temporarily suspended, at the discretion of the station chief.

7. For discussion with the Chief, STC and Mr. Johnston, it is recommended that the HUMANOID project be approved as attached hereto, with the understanding that its reactivation will be dependent upon favorable results of the six-month period of observation.

WM. L. [illegible], JR.

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STC/OCO

SECRET

23 February 1951

Chief, FDT

HUMANOID

The following answers are keyed to your questionnaire dated 5 February 1951 concerning HUMANOID:

a. Subject is an active agent.

b. He is used substantially the same as when clearance was issued.

c. Subject has not been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated.

d. All information on subject's personal and operational security has been submitted.

e. The operation has been considered excellent. The only test of HUMANOID's security has been the test of evaluating his information, and the evaluation of his reliability by the Chief of Station.

f. There have been no operational or other changes in the status of this agent which have affected our evaluation of this agent.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

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301-168871

SECR

TRSA-860

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 October-31 December 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: No Change.

SALARY: $750 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services of this agent are extremely valuable to this station. Aside from cutout services in contacting subagents, he has been used on other miscellaneous investigations suitable to his capacity and has given freely of his time and effort

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information furnished continues to be of great value to this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No change.

COMMENTS: As previously reported subject's plans to transfer to Panama have changed, and he is staying in Costa Rica to finish his schooling. Due to subject's services and the time he devotes in performing them, as well as plans at this station for making greater demands on his time, it is planned to recommend that subject's salary be increased from $750 to $1,000 per month.

SECR

23 Feb. 51

201-161881

SECRET

CHIEF, STAFF "B" 19 February 1951

CHIEF, FDT

Project Outline---HUMANOID

1. To complete the attached field project outline, the following biographical information is submitted as required by paragraph 4:

> HUMANOID was born in 1922 in DeKalb, Illinois, USA, where he attended high school from which he graduated in 1940. Subject joined the United States Air Force in which he had five years' experience in general Air Force intelligence work. Subject is presently living in San Jose, Costa Rica, where he has been attending school.

2. This project dates from June 1949 in Costa Rica but subject was an agent of our Panama station for about six months prior to his departure for Costa Rica.

3. Subject's reliability is considered excellent and his operational services are also considered excellent. The value of this project, including the sub-agents, is considered to be of great value to our Costa Rican mission.

4. HUMANOID, in addition to being a principal agent, is employed as a cut-out for HUMANIST-2, HUGGER, and HUMANKIND. Attached are field project outlines for HUMANIST-2 and HUMANKIND, which includes HUMANKIND-1 and -3. Technically, HUMANIST-2, HUMANKIND-1 and -3 are sub-agents and therefore not required to have field project outlines submitted. The original development, however, of these agents was on an individual project basis, and the cut-out HUMANOID was later developed.

5. In lieu of a field project outline for HUGGER, the following is submitted:

> HUGGER is a Costa Rican by birth. She is private secretary in the main office of the United Fruit Company in San Jose, and is a secret agent of Guardia Civil of Costa Rica.
>
> HUGGER has the objective and task of developing contacts among Vanguardia Popular members, particularly in the women's front.
>
> While HUGGER's production is not great, it is valuable. Her pay is approximately $11.00 a month.

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6. Since the Chief of Station has only direct contact with HUMANOID and not with the sub-agents, the project is considered as one project, the HUMANOID Project. For accounting purposes, however, the sub-agents are being handled as individual agents although under the control of the cut-out HUMANOID.

7. HUMANOID's salary if $28.00 a month and operating expenses are about $66.00 a month.

WM. H. WHEELER, JR.

Ren

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TO: Chief, FDT

5 February 1951

FROM: STC/CCO J.E. Bonnet

SUBJECT: HUMANOID

1. STC records reflect that subject was approved for operational use under Operational Clearance # 68 dated 19 July 1949 XXXX

2. The clearance was based upon information available at that time. It is desired to maintain a continuing or periodic review of the security status of this person and the projects with which he has been or may be associated.

3. Your comments on the following points would be appreciated. In the event field correspondence is necessary to obtain this information please coordinate with STC/CCO.

a. Is subject still in an operational status? If not please indicate disposition.

b. Is subject being used in substantially the same manner as when clearance was issued? If not please explain.

c. Has subject been used in connection with projects other than originally contemplated?

d. Has any information been reported affecting subject's personal or operational security status?

e. Has the operation, including security tests of the agent, been satisfactory?

f. Has any information been developed in connection with this or other operations or have changes in existing conditions occurred which would affect your original evaluation of this agent?

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FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

PAGE No.

FROM:	SAN JOSE	ROUTINE
TO:	SPECIAL OPERATIONS	7 DEC 50
ACTION:	FDT (1-2-3)	IN 12657
INFORMATION:	ADSO (4-5) , STA (6), STB (7), STC (8), IID (9), S/C (10-11-12)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (I) 60A AR-380-5

SANJ 678

TO: WASHF CITE: SANJ

RE: TRSA 756

Did not leave [illegible]
Jan Hum[illegible]
[illegible]

HUMANOID PLANNING PERMANENT TRANSFER TO PANAMA 1 FEBRUARY REQUEST HQS CONSIDER APPROVAL OF HUMBUG BY 1 JANUARY 1951 TO PERMIT SUFFICIENT OVERLAP FOR ORIENTATION IN DUTIES AND CONTACTS.

201-168881

TOR: 1611Z 7 DEC 50

SECRET

COPY No. 1

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

SECRET

TRSA-745

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica

PERIOD: 1 July to 30 Sept 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: As set forth in TRSA-564.

SALARY: $750.per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: No change.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: No change.

OTHER FACTORS: Subject is contact personally by Station Chief.

COMMENT: Subject is contemplating moving to Panama approximately in April 1951, where he hopes to continue his schooling and work for this organization. He has had previous experience and contacts in Panama and can be highly recommended for similar work there. A substitution for subject has been considered and is being processed.

30 Sept. 50

201-168881

SECRET

SECRET

TRSA-646

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 April to 30 June 1950.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS: Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.

SALARY: $750 per month.

EVALUATION OF SERVICES: Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION: The information provided by the agents which subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.

OTHER FACTORS: No comment.

COMMENTS: No changes are contemplated in subject's status. He is contemplating a move to Argentina some time within the next two years and hopes to continue his present employment in that country, and if possible to make a career of this business in any capacity he can obtain. His integrity, discretion, and industry cannot be too highly commended and we feel that he is eminently suited for staff or cover employment in any capacity deemed commensurate with his intellectual and other abilities.

SECRET

30 June 50

201-168851

SECRET

AIR

TGS-A-468

21-4-50

Chief of Station, San Jose

Chief, Foreign Division T

Operational Matters
[illegible]

REF: TGS-A-364
TGS-A-457

1. A review of the financial records on [illegible] shows that salary and expenses in the amount of $804.09 were charged to this allotment during the first six months of the current fiscal year. This reflects a rate of disbursements slightly in excess of that anticipated in the annual allotment of $1500.

2. Ordinarily it would not be necessary to change the allotment at this time but the pay increase for [illegible], effective 1 April 1950, will definitely increase the total disbursements for the fiscal year to a figure in excess of the $1500.

3. In view of this situation the allotment for [illegible] for the 1949-1950 fiscal year is being increased by the sum of $900. The total allotment previously set at $1500 is therefore increased to $2400.

4. Taking this action at this time will obviate the necessity of making a last minute adjustment at the end of the fiscal year.

WM. M. WHEELER, JR.

BY W.L.DEAN

WLD:jr

21 April 50

201-168871

STB

WM. M. WHEELER

SECRET

SECRET

TRSA-586

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 January to 31 March 1950.
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	Objectives, tasks, and targets are set forth in detail in TRSA-564.
SALARY:	$500 per month during the quarter under consideration. $750 per month effective 1 April 1950.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been excellent, from both an information and a security standpoint.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	The information provided by the agents whom subject handles, a great part of which is owing to his own industry and devotion in their development, is easily the most valuable produced by this station.
OTHER FACTORS:	No comment.
COMMENTS:	No changes are contemplated in subject's status.

SECRET

31 March 50
201-168881

VIA: Air
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-564

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division T

DATE: 31 March 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operations Gen. Operational Matters - Costa Rica

SPECIFIC— Project Humanoid

Ref: TRSW-447

1. In accordance with verbal agreement made by the Chief of Station in Washington and formalized in referenced memorandum, the monthly salary paid to Humanoid will be increased from the present $500 to $750.00 effective 1 April 1950.

11432

2. A revised "Field Project Outline" applicable to Project Humanoid is submitted herewith, in accordance with GOI No. 2.

3. Possible existing confusion with regard to our charging of expenses of Project Humanoid and allied projects for which Humanoid supplies cutout services will be clarified in the near future as revised "Field Project Outlines" applicable to these latter projects are prepared and forwarded.

4. The attached "Field Project Outline" supercedes TRSA-347.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

Encl: 1

Project running over allotment by $150.00
Increase in Humanoid for [illegible] = 120.00
270.00

Increase allotm 300.00

IID COPY

31 March 50
201-168881
~~176-4-60~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

14-00000

TRS-A-506

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica PERIOD: 1 October to 31 December 1949.

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS	This agent provides cutout services in connection with the penetrations of Vanguardia Popular and also for the postal intercept project. In connection with the latter he does all of the technical reproduction work required. He also reports miscellaneous information which he obtains from his school and business contacts. Project dates from June 1949.
SALARY	$500 per month. Increased from $400 November 1949.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES	Services have been of considerable value to operations. The agents which he handles are the most productive of those now being used by this station, and his management of these informants has been good, from both an information and a security standpoint.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION	The information provided by the informants of the subject has been valuable operationally and is considered generally reliable.
OTHER FACTORS	Contacts with the subject are made directly. He is now attempting to obtain a secure place in which to meet HUMANIST-2. Other informants handled by this agent are HUGGER, HUMANKIND-1, and HUMANKIND-3.
COMMENTS	No changes are contemplated in the manner of handling this agent.

SECRET

201-168871

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRSA-468

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 1 November 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Project Humanoid
SPECIFIC- Amendment to Contract

1. Effective 1 November 1949 the salary of the individual designated as Humanoid was increased $100.00 to a total of $500 per month. This action was taken in consideration of excellent services, not in time, but in quality, in the management and direction of Projects Humankind, Humanist-2, and Hugger.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

~~REGISTRY COPY~~

14 Nov. 49
201-168881 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

X

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

SECRET KAPOK DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED
par CSN 43-26

TRS-A-449

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica	PERIOD: 1 July to 30 September 1949
OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:	(1) Cutout services. (2) Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups. (3) Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.
SALARY:	$400 per month.
EVALUATION OF SERVICES:	(1) As Humankind cutout: Subject has continued to handle this delicate and time-consuming assignment in a completely satisfactory manner. As Hugger cutout: Although Hugger still does not produce as we would like, it is not the fault of subject, who has devoted time and effort to his education and direction. (2) Rather than employment or investigation of prospective informants developed by subject with regard to these objectives, we have assigned subject the handling and direction of Humanist-2. We have every reason to believe that he will do this satisfactorily, and based on the high-level information which we receive through this source, subject will be able to proceed more intelligently to the coverage of the topics assigned. (3) Subject is proceeding slowly as directed by us, and attempting first of all to integrate the three projects with which he is charged.
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:	Directly, subject has yet provided little information. That stemming from his projects, however, is among the most useful and valuable which we obtain.
OTHER FACTORS:	None.
COMMENTS:	Subject is considered to be the most valuable employee we have at the present time from the point of view of actual present usefulness, as well as that of interest, industry, and comprehension of objectives.

SECRET KAPOK DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED 4 Oct. 49
per CSN 43-26 201-168881

14-00000

TTS-A-443

29 September 1949

Communist Organisers

REFERENCE: TTS-655, WASH 5590, TPS-W-377

Hugger

1. Every effort is being made to confirm with details - or deny - the information contained in TTS-655. The source of that report, as well as Hubbub, who is a personal friend of the original informant, have both been attempting for some time to extract more information from him. In addition, transfer of Humanist-2 to the management of Humanoid, which occurred this week, has provided us with an additional avenue of confirmation and Humanoid is making the matter his No. 1 priority job.

2. We expect to be able to cable our opinion of the truth or falsity of the original information within two weeks time, and if the story then appears to have some basis in fact, all our resources will be exploited for further details.

Original in Gen. Opera

CONFIDENTIAL

201-168881

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-429

~~KAPOK~~ DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 13 September 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Specific Operational Changes

REFERENCE: TRS-A-396, TRS-A-385

1. Certain rearrangements involving three current projects of this office are being made in order to produce greater effectiveness and security. The projects involved are Humanoid, Humanist and Humankind.

2. The owner of the separate office used by Humanoid to process the material received through Project Humankind has requested that the space be vacated by 15 September 1949. His reasons are purely business and have nothing to do with our operations. On that date, therefore, our effects will be moved to a new locale, which is incidentally more desirable from the point of view of convenience and security. The new "safe-house" will cost $400.00 per month, an increase of $275.00 over that paid for the former office, and is to be charged to Project Humankind effective 15 September 1949.

3. To offset this increased cost but principally to provide adequate exploitation of Humanist-2, that individual will be turned over to Humanoid for direct handling prior to 1 October 1949. Humanist-1, whose sole function has been to contact Humanist-2 and who has received a salary of $250.00 per month, will be eliminated on 1 October 1949. This arrangement has been carefully planned and discussed with all concerned and can be made without security risk. It will provide intelligent, American control of our potentially most valuable agent, and eliminate the present cumbersome communication and contact arrangement.

4. No change will be made in present symbol designations.

DESENSITIZED ~~CS COPY~~
per CSH 43-25

Elmer C. Mercer

~~KAPOK~~ DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

201-168771

CS copy filed in 18-6-8/63

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-403

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 9 August 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Operational Data, Project Humanoid

REFERENCE: TRS-A-347

The following operational data is forwarded in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 of September, 1947:

1. Humanoid.

2. Cutout services with a large amount of personal discretion permitted.

3. Subject is considered to be extremely reliable and intelligent, which, combined with his past experience, qualify him for a wide range of assignments.

4. San José, Costa Rica.

5. No.

6. He would, but at present is prevented from travelling by personal arrangements which it would be inconvenient for him to change.

7. All personnel are paid by us: Humankind-1, $100.00; Humankind-3, $100.00; Hugger, $100.00 (monthly).

8. No.

9. Yes.

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] 43-25

10. Yes. Subject is charged with principal direction of Project Humankind and Project Hugger. Aside from this, he is charged with investigation and recruiting of information personnel as suggested by himself in accordance with his opportunities, but only after consultation with us.

KAPOK
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

11. By direct contact in a "safe house".

12. Material emanating from Project Humankind through Subject is photographic. Material from Project Hugger and from Subject himself is written.

13. Approximately 40%.

14. Written. Copy was forwarded as TRS-A-364.

15. The subject matter with which Subject is concerned under the arrangements noted under No. 10 above is that of communist activity in student and labor groups.

16. He works only as directed by us, but frequently suggests matters for his own consideration.

17. Subject is paid in colones at the rate of $400 per month.

18. After six months employment, approximately December, 1949, we expect to raise his salary to $500 per month.

19. Contact expenses in connection with Projects Hugger and Humankind are paid subject, and average $200 per month. Maintenance expenses and rent in connection with the "safe house" where he does his work average $125.00 per month.

20. We would, were such a contingency to occur. To date it has not.

21. (a) Superior (b) Superior

22. Semi-covert because of his nationality.

23. (A) High level.

Elmer C. Mercer

Elmer C. Mercer

DESENSITIZED
per CSI 43-26

14-00000

SECRET

No. 68

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

TO: Chief, FBT (Att. Mrs. Geary)

Operational Clearance is hereby granted for the use of HUMANOID.

Limitations: As defined in TRS-A-376.

John C. Bonnet
JOHN C. BONNET
Acting Operational Clearance Officer
for Assistant Director, Special Operations

Date 7/19/49

Copy 1 of 2 copies.

201-168881

19 July 49

21 July

Field Notified

LC

W/Bh- 7509 out 8622 (see message file)

CIB notice attached.

SECRET

Operational Clearance Officer, OSO 14 July 1949

Chief, FBT

Humanoid

1. It is requested that provisional operational clearance be granted for the use of Humanoid.

2. It is further requested that a covert investigation be made on subject.

RG:pbs

JRJ-a-347

201-168551

SECRET TRS-A-376

OPERATIONAL REVIEW

CRYPTONYM: Humanoid

COUNTRY: Costa Rica **PERIOD:** 1 - 30 June 1949

OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

(1).- Cutout services.
(2).- Communist penetration of local labor organizations and/or student groups.
(3).- Discretionary reporting and operational pursuit of any and all intelligence information coming his way by reason of his normal daily activities.

SALARY: (₡) ₡400 per month. (approx $240 per qtr.)

EVALUATION OF SERVICES:

(1). As Humankind cutout: Subject has proven exceptionally successful in the face of some unusual difficulties. He has, however, developed the contacts necessary under this heading on a personal friendly basis to the point where all are lending their enthusiastic cooperation.

As Hugger cutout: For the first time in the history of his employment with us, Hugger is submitting well-organized reports and beginning to appreciate our needs. His progress is directly attributable to the time and effort devoted to direction by Humanoid.

(2). Subject has been fully occupied during the short period covered herein and has made no progress with respect to this assignment.

(3). Subject has cultivated three potential sources in fields of probable interest to us. After further local investigation of their possibilities, headquarters will be consulted.

EVALUATION OF INFORMATION:

Directly, subject has provided no information. That stemming from the projects he is now supervising, however, is accurate and always valuable.

OTHER FACTORS: None.

COMMENTS:

In the immediate future, subject's cutout activities should settle into more or less of a routine, releasing his energies for development of other assignments.

DESENSITIZED
per CSN 43-28

SECRET

DE[illegible]TIZED
EAPCK

30 June 49
201-168851

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRB-A-364

~~SECRET~~ KAPOK DESENSITIZED
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 13 June 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Humanoid

Reference: TRB-A-347

1. A copy of the contract signed by the individual principally concerned in subject project is attached. The signed original is retained in our files.

2. Pertinent operational data in accordance with Field Memorandum No. 6 dated 22 September 1947 will be forwarded when the operational routine has been established in more or less its final form and we are better able to judge the efficiency and value of the project.

Elmer C. Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

Encl:
Copy of contract

13 June 49
201-168881 ✓
201-168881

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

~~SECRET~~ KAPOK DESENSITIZED 7
CLASSIFICATION

TRS-A-369

22 June 1949

2. Informant Hugger, formerly reporting through subject, has been transferred to the control of Humanoid (see TRS-A-347)

Origin Huckleberry
cc - Hugger

DESENSITIZED
[illegible] CSI 43-23

201-168881

THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

USAF Personal History and security checks.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-251

SECRET - ~~RESPO~~[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch T

DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station, San José, Costa Rica

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic
Reference: TZP-A-365; TZP-W-411

1. This station intends to make the fullest possible use of Hydropathic, but it is not considered feasible to proceed with a formal request for project authorization until he has established himself in this area and we have made his acquaintance. Tentatively it is planned to use him in a cut-out capacity, meeting informants which we will provide, for an orientation period of indefinite duration. In this period it will be possible to evaluate Subject's capacity to play an integrated part in our operational set-up, and approval for our plans in this respect will then be requested.

2. Hydropathic will be contacted upon arrival and initial arrangements for his cut-out services forwarded to headquarters.

Elmer C Mercer
Elmer C. Mercer

23-23
cc - Panama City

DESENSITIZED
per CSI 43-23

CS COPY

SECRET - ~~RESPO~~[illegible] 7
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881
TRS A 251
DATE 5 JAN 49

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TRS-A-250

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station,
Panama City

DATE: 5 January 1949

FROM : Chief of Station,
San José

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- Project Hydropathic

Reference: TZP-A-365, Part I

The attached document, having served its purpose, is returned to your station.

Your cooperation in the matter is greatly appreciated.

23-23
1 Encl. - TZPA-365 11 Oct 48
cc - Washington ✓
Filed in Chronological order.

Elmer J. Mercer

REGISTRY COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

5 Jan. 49
201-168881 ✓

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. TZP-A-402

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Acting Chief, FBT

DATE: 31 December 1948.

FROM : Chief of Station, Panama City, Panama.

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operations
SPECIFIC- HYDROPATHIC

Ref: TZP-W-411

1. HYDROPATHIC is not a project (Memo to all Latin American Stations, dtd. 9 June 1947). It is a simple recruitment of an individual agent to be controlled exclusively by the San José Station. TZP-A-365 Part II suggested a manner in which he might establish contact with HYDROCYST I. Since HYDROCYST I is leaving Costa Rica temporarily, this is no longer a consideration.

2. All documents in our files have been forwarded to San José. This station has only contacted Subject twice and has told him nothing about our organization or any possibilities of any full time positions. If we can assist by arranging a contact between HYDROPATHIC and San José or in any other manner, we will be glad to do so. In the meantime, we will take no further action unless instructed to do so by the Home Office.

Grover J Waring
Grover J. Waring.

Distribution:

Wash (2) ✓
Sanj (1)
Files (1)

DESENSITIZED
PER CSN 43-28

201 - 168881	
TZ PA	402
DATE 31 DEC 48	

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
APR 1947

/12/ SECRET 23 FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: ODPD-D, VR, FILE, DORECORD, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, (25/P)

80 3951664 PAGE 001
TOT: 042052Z MAR 80 DIRECTOR 627924

S E C R E T
STAFF 042052Z DIRECTOR 627924
TO: PRIORITY MADRID.

WNINTEL ~~RYBAT~~ AKULE AMLASH

REF: MADRID 48679 3918232

1. DEPT OF STATE HAS SENT MESSAGE TO CONSULATE AUTHORIZING THE GRANTING OF VISAS TO AMLASH FAMILY, BUT HAS APPARENTLY ATTACHED A PROVISO - SO LONG AS CONSULAR OFFICER SATISFIED THAT THEY ARE BONA FIDE VISITORS AND NOT IMMIGRANTS.

2. OFFICER WHO DEBRIEFED AMLASH-1 IN MADRID ON 11 JANUARY IS EXPERIENCED AND SAVVY PROFESSIONAL. HE HAS BEEN INTERVIEWING REFUGEES FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND HAS CONSISTENTLY PROVIDED ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF REFUGEE INTENTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS. AMLASH-1 TOLD THE DEBRIEFER THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO VISIT THE US AND THAT HE WANTS AND INTENDS TO SETTLE IN SPAIN, WHERE HE CAN MORE READILY SET UP A MEDICAL PRACTICE AND BE LESS NEWSWORTHY THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEBRIEFER BELIEVES AMLASH-1 MEANT WHAT HE SAID.

2. FILE: 201-252234. RVW 4 MAR 00, DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.> ORIG: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER X-9011); AUTH: ADC/LA/OPS (PALMER); COORD: PCS/LGG/ID (CANTRELL); C/E/IB/S(STOVER); REL: C/E/IB (BERGER); CL BY 037029.

L.M.

LACU/EG

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY

04MAR80
201-252234

/12/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: C/LA-8 INFO: DDPD-D, VR, FILE, ~~DORECORD~~, DDO-4, C/CI-4, C/EPS/EG-2, C/EUR-6, C/LCG/ID, C/PCS, C/PCS/LCG, C/PCS/PGLO, DDO/DO, (32/P)

---

80 3620398 PAGE 001
TOT: 022211Z JAN 80 DIRECTOR 583488

S E C R E T
STAFF 022211Z DIRECTOR 583488
TO: IMMEDIATE MADRID.

WNINTEL AMLASH

1. LNERGO HAS ADVISED THAT AMLASH/1 (A/1)(IDEN A), CUBAN ASSET 1963-1965, ARRIVED MADRID 11 DEC 79 AND CONTACTED LNERGO SOURCE IN U.S. REQUESTING MEETING WITH KTACTION REPRESENTATIVE. ACCORDING LNERGO SOURCE A/1 HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY NUMERUUS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES SINCE ARRIVAL MADRID BUT HAS REFUSED GRANT INTERVIEW.

2. IDEN B TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED DEPART 7 JAN 80 FOR MADRID TO MEET AND DEBRIEF A/1 AND DETERMINE HIS FUTURE PLANS. LNERGO HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROVIDE BONA-FIDES AND CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS. WILL ADVISE WHEN RECEIVED.

3. PLS PROVIDE NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IDEN B CAN USE TO CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL MADRID. REQUEST REPLY IMMEDIATE.

4. FILE: 201-252234. CADL RVW 2 JAN 2000 DRV D9C.3. ALL SECRET.>
ORIG: SA/C/LAD (STURBITTS, X-9127, GREEN-3215); COORD: DC/LACO; DC/LA/OPS; C/EUR/IB; AUTH: DC/LA; C/LA; REL: DC/EUR/S THOMPSON. CL BY 12180.

Lacey

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

RECORD COPY

02 JAN 79
201-252234

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Acting Chief of Station, Djakarta

INFO

FROM
Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT
Visit of Identities

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : DBA-12821 (25 June 62)

1. OKENVY reports that they were advised by Identity A that his associate, Identity B would be visiting Djakarta in mid-July and that probably he (Identity A) would be summoned by General Jani in the near future to assist in procurement activities for the military.

2. Identity A expressed himself as being willing at the same time to serve ODYOKE without remuneration, on a confidential basis or otherwise, if his services can be of assistance.

3. Identity A has done some dickering with the local attache regarding aeronautical spare parts for which export permits have been difficult to obtain, claiming that he would have no difficulty in obtaining permits if the parts were purchased through his organization.

4. Identity A has also been in contact with another ODYOKE component since January 62 and therefore cannot be approached by KUBARK.

for John Mallery
CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Attachments:
Idens U.S.C. True Name Pouch

FORWARDED HEREWITH

Distribution:
2 — Djakarta

23 July 1962

RI File 201-41581

201-41591

DATE TYPED: 23 July 62

DATE DISPATCHED: 27 JUL 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: FHDW-5498

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: -41581

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

# FE/PIA 1 - RI ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	RBH
RID/?IS	
FE/PIA	
RID/FI	
FE/PIA/I	
DESTROY	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: FE/PIA/I
FILER: Dexter E. Kelpe.
TYPIST: jdk
EXT: 5503

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: CFE
DATE: 26/7/62
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Desmond FitzGerald

14-00000

SECRET

IDENTITIES U.S.C.
TRUE NAME POUCH Att. to
FNDW-5498

IDENTITY A	I Irving Davidson, Public Relations, 1412 K St., N.W.
IDENTITY B	Paul Pesik, formerly employed by the Indonesian Embassy, Washington.

FNDW-5498
23 July 1962
Encl. #1

SECRET

CS COPY

201-41581

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief of Station, Quito
Chief of Base, Guayaquil

INFO

FROM Chief, WH

SUBJECT Report of PBPRIME Citizen on Connections with Ecuadorean Government

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Please comment on Subject and his statements

other agency

1. The following paragraphs are quoted from an ODENVY report resulting from an interview with Identity. The addressees are requested to comment on the Subject's statements and to send to Headquarters information concerning the Subject's activities in Ecuador bearing on his statements.

A. On August 29, 1960, Identity was interviewed by ODENVY at his request. Identity related that he had just returned from a trip to Ecuador where he had been offered a job to represent that country as an agent in PBPRIME and he was seriously considering this offer. While in Ecuador, he had conferred with four individuals who he believed would run the new government which was to be sworn into office on August 31, 1960. These persons were identified as follows: Jaime Nebot Velasco, Minister of Development; Pedro J. Menendez Gilbert, Mayor of Guayaquil, Ecuador; Luis Noboa, an Ecuadorean businessman; and Enrique Ponce Luque, a Senator and partner of Noboa.

B. According to Identity, the new president of Ecuador, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, has been elected to that office for the fourth time and is an aged person. The above-listed individuals will control and operate the Government of Ecuador with the approval of Ibarra. As a result of his conferring with the above persons, Identity expressed the belief that Nebot will be the strong in the government. He described these individuals as patriotic with a sincere desire to better the plight of the common man in Ecuador. Identity stated that all of them are definitely pro-PBPRIME and Nebot said that all Identity has to do is tell him what PBPRIME

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

CONTINUED

Distribution:
2 - Quito
1 - Guayaquil

~~1 - RI (Subject)~~
1 - Registry

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	
RI/TY	
RI/FI	

DATE TYPED 5 Oct 1960

DATE DISPATCHED 6 OCT 1960

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HBQW-2393

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 01-41581

~~FILE HELD BY~~

CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1/E	HEMendenhall	sel	3847

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/1/E	5/4/60	ASWisniowski

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/1	5 OCT 1960	E. M. TERRELL

desires and the Ecuadorean Government will do its best to cooperate with PBPRIME.

C. Identity was also told that the Government of Ecuador has commenced negotiations with an electronics firm in Dallas, Texas, believed by Identity to be the Continental Electronics Company, for the construction of a 50,000 kilowatt radio station in Guayaquil. This station will be used to combat antigovernment propaganda beamed into Ecuador from Cuba. Nebot felt that PBPRIME could make use of this radio station. Identity told Nebot that he believed this could be arranged.

D. It is the opinion of Identity that this is a golden opportunity for PBPRIME to commence cooperation with a new government in a pro-PBPRIME country. He stated that the Ecuadorean Government would be most willing for KUBARK to utilize the above radio station; however, it would necessitate KUBARK's paying half of the expenses for its construction. Identity was advised that the information he had given ODENVY would be furnished to KUBARK pursuant to his request. He desired to be contacted within a period of ten days if KUBARK is interested in the information he had to offer. No further action concerning this matter will be undertaken by ODENVY.

2. ODENVY has previously reported at length on the Identity, a public relations counsel. Identity registered as a purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua on 15 April 1955; on 22 July 1958, he registered as an agent of the Israeli Military Industries, which was controlled by the government of Israel.

3. The Identity appears to be an international businessman with special interest in Latin American Countries. He has previously frequently contacted PBPRIME agencies on subjects he thought appropriate to bring to their attention. A cursory check of his 201 file revealed no derogatory information. Further information can be supplied if the field so requests.

END OF DISPATCH

CS copy

DISPATCH

FPMA-5545

TO Chief of Station, Manila

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-41581

FROM Chief, Far East Division

DATE OCT 16 [illegible]

SUBJECT I. IRVING DAVIDSON

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None

REFERENCE(S) FPMA-8470, 13 May 1958, Transmittal of MIRAVELIN Tap Transcripts

1. The information obtained in the name check of DAVIDSON reveals that Subject is an aggressive international businessman who would possibly participate in any business proposition for a commission; however, when negotiating with representatives of other countries, Subject usually protects himself by reporting the business proposition to a U.S. Government agency or official. The name check reveals that the relationship between Drew Pearson and MIRAVELIN may have resulted from Subject's personal contact with both men. The information re MIRAVELIN may have reached Pearson through Subject's office associates.

2. The following are the details of the check on Subject:

a. Subject, a U.S. citizen, born 19 January 1921, is married and maintains his residence and office in Washington, D.C. As reported by KUJUMP, 8 November 1955, Subject shared his office suite in the Wyatt Building with James Farriss, a former ODACID employee, and Jack Northam Anderson and Frederick G. Blumenthal, Washington representatives of PARADE magazine. Frederick G. Blumenthal is a former Drew Pearson leg-man while Anderson continues to work for Pearson.

b. An ODENVY report dated 6 November 1957, stated that Subject filed a registration statement, No. 886, 18 April 1955, with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, Department of Justice. Subject listed as his foreign principal President A. Somosa, Republic of Nicaragua. The nature and purpose of his representing the foreign principal was given as purchasing agent for various bureaus of the Republic of Nicaragua, including the military forces. He also stated that he dealt in general public relations and was self-employed. Another ODENVY report of 18 June 1957 stated that Subject listed his occupation as a Public Relations Counsel and Business Consultant in a report to a local credit bureau. The report indicated that Subject previously spent some time in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and is well acquainted with various business and government officials in the above-mentioned locations.

c. On several occasions in the past Subject volunteered information to various government agencies and offered his assistance to the U.S. Government. In an ODENVY report dated 15 September 1950, Subject advised that through a friend, Max Henriquez, who Subject claimed to be a representative for the Dominican Republic to the United Nations, Subject had become acquainted with Vincente Toledano, and was sufficiently close to him to obtain important information concerning activities of the Communist Party in Mexico. Subject offered his assistance to the U.S. Government in this matter. According to a KUJUMP report, submitted by the Office of International Trade, dated 1953, Subject furnished information regarding travel in 1950 between Mexico and the USSR and information on trans-shipments through Mexico.

201-41581

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 2

A Memorandum of 8 November 1955, reported that Subject had approached a KUBARK representative on 30 September 1955, at which time he requested guidance and possible financial assistance for a proposed business arrangement with Peter MIHALIDEC, former Yugoslav Assistant Military Attache in Washington, and now Chief of the Foreign Division of PUTNIK, a travel and tourist agency. The proposed business partnership was for the purpose of opening a PUTNIK travel agency in New York City. Subject had not been interested in participating in the travel and tourist agency in New York City but had suggested to the Yugoslavs that he would act as their public relations expert and publicize Yugoslavia's tourist attractions throughout the U.S. Subject stated he had initially contacted KUBARK for the purpose of obtaining financial backing in exchange for any information that he might be able to obtain through his contacts with the Yugoslavs. Subject was informed by KUBARK representative that KUBARK would neither give him financial assistance nor influence in any way his personal decision in the matter.

d. Also the files reflect that Subject has had contacts with other purchasing agents for foreign countries: In MANA 2217, 19 March 1957, Subject and Isaac Cohen, Israeli purchasing agent in New York, visited Nicaragua ostensibly to discuss the purchase of Israeli corvettes by the Nicaraguan Government. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, from a confidential source, stated one Sam Cummings, an international arms dealer, presently has a quantity of guns in bond in the "free trade zone", New York City, and Subject and James Farriss had been attempting to locate buyers for these guns. An ODENVY report dated 31 March 1958, stated that Abdul Rachman SURIOKUSUMO, Djakarta, Indonesia, connected with the Indonesian Police Force, had been in the U.S. in the early part of 1956 seeking arms for Indonesia. Due to U.S. regulations, he was unable to obtain arms. At this time Subject interested SURIOKUSUMO in purchasing arms from the Dominican Republic. According to source, Subject and SURIOKUSUMO made a trip to the Dominican Republic in June 1956 accompanied by a U.S. arms expert and Enrique Garcia, Jr. who had claimed to be a personal friend of Gen. Rafael L. Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and who is registered with the Foreign Agents Registration Section, listing his foreign principal as the Dominican Republic. It was reported in HMMA 0923, 6 August 1956, that Subject had written a letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua in which he stated the purpose of his recent trip and informed the Ambassador that "other reds" were attempting to undercut the arms price as quoted by the Dominican Republic. As reported in ODACID on 6 May 1958, Subject, as representative of the Government of Nicaragua, last year purchased 73 Staghound armored cars from Israel for the GON and also negotiated the subsequent sale of 30 of these vehicles to Cuba. Recently Subject approached U.S. officials in Nicaragua re disposal of 20 of these vehicles to the Guatamalan Government.

e. The only reference to MIRAVELIN reflected in this name check was a KUJUMP report dated 22 April 1957 which stated that a letter, found by a law enforcement officer in February 1957 among MIRAVELIN's personal effects, seemed to imply that a joint effort was being made by MIRAVELIN and the late Nicaraguan president SOMOZA to open a casino in Nicaragua. This letter dated 27 August 1956 was written on the letterhead of the Nicaraguan Government Agency, Suite 1224, Wyatt Building, Washington, D.C., I. Irving Davidson, U.S. representative, and stated: "Enclosed are Ex-Im bank particulars you asked for. Sam Waugh will cooperate with us 100%. Be sure that Pres. Somoza and only Pres. Somoza designates you 50% partner in the casino. You don't need any partner for the hotel end of the deal at all. You don't want one either. I am sure Pres. Somoza won't care about this. Don't hesitate to ask Somoza anything about anything. I already talked with him and told him that I hope that you would take over this project

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
	[illegible]	FPBW-5545

with your group and experience. I will then know that Nicaragua will have the nicest, best operated facility in the hemisphere. Give my best regards to Pres. Somoza when you see him. If you don't see him for any reason, you don't have a deal regardless what papers you see or whoever else you may meet. Somoza is a regular guy and our kind of people. He has also been helpful to our people on the other side. Your boy, Irv Davidson."

3. This information has not been cleared for passage to our liaison services.

for CHESTER D. DAINOLD

6 October 1958

Distribution:
- 3 - COS, Manila
- 1 - RI
- 1 - FE/PSH

.1 COPY

201-41881

FORM 10-57 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.
	[illegible]		3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	
PRO-POSED	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨	ABSTRACT
▨	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
Transmittal of Operational Plan for AMTRUNK VII

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Request Approval

References : A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Op Plan, 1 June 1963
B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Op Plan, 31 July 1963
C. UFGA-10533, Op Plan AMTRUNK V, 31 Aug 1963
D. UFGA-12725, Op Plan AMTRUNK VI, 27 Nov 1963
E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Op Plan, 18 December 1963

Transmitted for approval herewith is the operational plan for AMTRUNK VII. The AMTRUNK team is scheduled for infiltration on 7 February and for exfiltration on 17 February. A five-man team with Intermediate Craft will be infiltrated into northern Matanzas Province from which point the team leader, AMICE-14, and AMTRUNK-13 will proceed into Havana to accomplish the MHAPRON objectives of this operation. Approval is requested at the earliest possible time.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Op Plan (3 cys) - H/W

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DATE TYPED 22 Jan 64
	DATE DISPATCHED
	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13707
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-6-84/1

OPERATIONAL PLAN

RYBAT

DESENSITIZED

CRYPTONYM

AMTRUNK VII

2. REFERENCES

A. UFGA-9312, AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 1 June 1963

B. UFGA-10436, Amendment of AMTRUNK Operational Plan, 31 July 1963

C. UFGA-10933, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK V, 31 August 1963

D. UFGA-12725, Operational Plan - AMTRUNK VI, 27 November 1963

E. UFGA-13138, Amendment to AMTRUNK VI Operational Plan, 18 December 1963

3. BACKGROUND

Operation AMTRUNK III/IV which was mounted in August 1963 was successful in that the two principals of the team, AMICE-27 and AMICE-14, were able to contact and to recruit two principal agents and several other action agents to lay the groundwork for the MHAPRON objectives of the AMTRUNK operation. One of the two internal P/A's, AMTRUNK-9, was exfiltrated with the four-man AMTRUNK infiltration team for training and operational discussions in the JMWAVE area. In early September, AMTRUNK-9 was re-infiltrated into PBRUMEN in Operation AMTRUNK V, the same operation which exfiltrated AMFAUNAs -1, -3, -13 and -34. In late October AMICE-27 was separated from the clandestine part of the AMTRUNK operation. The original objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI, postponed from December 1963 to January 1964, were to revitalize and re-direct the efforts of the two internal P/A's toward their primary task, i.e. to spot and recruit among high level figures who are dissatisfied with the Castro regime. In late December, the scope of this mission was altered by the receipt of a commercial telegram in open code from AMTRUNK-9 indicating that he was in grave danger and wished to be exfiltrated. The twin objectives of Operation AMTRUNK VI then became: first, to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-9 and, this accomplished, for AMICE-14 to proceed to Havana for his task of re-channelling AMTRUNK-10's responsibilities. The exfiltration of AMTRUNK-9, who brought with him his entire family consisting of wife, brother-in-law, and three small children, was accomplished on 9 January 1964. The unexpected presence of AMTRUNK-9's family, coupled with reports of increased vigilance in the infiltration area, forced AMICE-14 to exfiltrate the same night without attempting to accomplish the second part of his mission.

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4. OBJECTIVES

A. To re-establish personal contact with AMTRUNK-10 and to secure his full cooperation in spotting dissidents within the higher levels of the military for the purpose of organizing a conspiracy against Fidel Castro.

B. To obtain from AMTRUNK-10 operational information on other MHAPRON recruitment targets.

C. To attempt the recruitment of FAR Captain and Cubana pilot Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a frequent personal pilot for Fidel and Raul Castro and an influential figure in civilian and military aviation.

D. Through the AMTRUNK ratline, to transport to Havana and cache a clandestine radio set for the future use of an infiltrated AMTRUNK radio operator. At the same time, to explore with AMTRUNK-10 and other internal contacts the possibility of safehousing and supporting a radio operator in Havana.

5. TASKS

A. The AMTRUNK Intermediate Craft will be towed by the KUBARK mother craft to the DRP at coordinates 221668, AMS Sheet 4085 IV (23° 14' 00" N and 80° 47' 00" W, H. O. 2624).

B. The AMTRUNK IC will then proceed to the vicinity of coordinates 133511, AMS 4085 III. At this point, AMICE-14 and/or AMTRUNK-7 will make contact with either Oscar DIAZ Jabiela-Garcia or his son Antonio DIAZ Torres in Casualidad (17654795, AMS 4085 III). These two individuals are knowledgable of the fact that the AMTRUNKs may return to the infiltration area although they do not know even the approximate date. Oscar DIAZ and his son Antonio are prepared to activate the ratline consisting of three different taxis, to move AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 into the Havana area. AMTRUNK-7 and -16, the team guides, and AMAGREE-1, the radio operator, will remain with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the infiltration area until the return of AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13.

C. Once in Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 intend to split up and seek refuge in different safehouses. They will maintain contact with each other, however.

D. AMICE-14's primary task vis-a-vis AMTRUNK-10 is to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10 and to obtain his full cooperation to work toward MHAPRON objectives. In addition, AMICE-14 will teach AMTRUNK-10 an OWVL system and leave a receiver with AMTRUNK-10. AMICE-14 also intends to give AMTRUNK-10 a review

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in the principles of secret writing.

E. Secondary tasks to be accomplished with AMTRUNK-10 are:

(1) To debrief him on his activities since AMICE-14 recruited him in August 1963.

(2) To collect operational information on other possible recruitment targets

(3) To explore the possibilities of accommodating and supporting an infiltrated radio operator.

F. AMTRUNK-13 will attempt the recruitment of Jose Alberto SEMIDEY Isalgue, a close friend of AMTRUNK-13's for 18 years and a first cousin of AMICE-14. The following is a short biographical sketch of SEMIDEY:

target sheet

Age 37-38 years old. Born in Matanzas, the son of Brig. Gen. Jose SEMIDEY, ex-Comptroller of the National Army and veteran of the Spanish-American War. SEMIDEY studied for one year at Purdue University, Indiana. He and AMTRUNK-13 graduated from the second class of ANACRA Pilot Training School in 1942. SEMIDEY flew for Expreso Aereo Inter-Americano and Cuba Aeropostal for about 11 years before he became Interventor or Administrator for the latter company after the Revolution. After Cuba Aeropostal was absorbed into Cubana, SEMIDEY held various positions of importance in Cubana. He also holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Air Force and reportedly has made reconnaissance flights and black flights carrying arms and/or agents to and from other Latin American countries. SEMIDEY has a close friendship with Victor PINA Cardoso, the Director of Civil Aviation, and is reportedly close to Raul CASTRO for whom he is a frequent personal pilot. Because of the close former friendship between AMTRUNK-13 and SEMIDEY and because of reports from AMICE-14's family which indicate that SEMIDEY has become disenchanted with the Castro regime, both AMTRUNK-13 and AMICE-14 consider SEMIDEY a prime candidate for recruitment.

G. If SEMIDEY should be out of the country on a flying trip at the time of infiltration, AMTRUNK-13 will attempt to set up contact with Commandante Rene de los SANTOS Ponce, who is reportedly stationed in Las Villas Province with a unit of "Lucha Contra Bandidos", an anti-counterrevolutionary force. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS are friends from boyhood and, for a period of 6 or 7 years, de los SANTOS worked as an apprentice plumber for AMTRUNK-13's

target sheet

father and lived in their home. AMTRUNK-13 and de los SANTOS also worked together in the 26th of July underground in Havana.

H. To return through the ratline to the infil/exfil area. Recognition signals will be established with AMTRUNK-7 and -16 and AMAGREE-1 who will be waiting with the IC in the mangroves in the vicinity of the lagoon at coordinates 129498, AMS 4085 III.

6. TIMETABLE

The scheduled date for the infiltration of the AMTRUNK team at the DRP is 0200 hours, 7 February 1964. The exfiltration of the five team members with the AMTRUNK IC and rendezvous with the mother craft at the DRP is 2355 hours, 17 February, with an alternate on 18 February. If exfiltration is not successful on either of these dates, the radio operator will be in contact with the base and contingent plans for exfiltration can be set up through this medium.

7. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

A. See references for biographical information on AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7.

B. AMTRUNK-13

AMTRUNK-13 is a 42-year-old Cuban citizen who has been a commercial airline pilot for most of his life. He is a high school graduate. In early 1959, AMTRUNK-13 was named Interventor of "Aerovias Q", one of the major Cuban airlines. He defected in December 1960 while still in that post. He is a native of Havana who was active in the 26th of July underground in that city from early 1957. While later in exile in the United States, AMTRUNK-13 made two clandestine flights into the Sierra Maestras during the war against Batista, the last bringing Provisional President Manuel URRUTIA Lleo from Venezuela for his first meeting with Fidel Castro in December 1958.

C. AMAGREE-1, Radio Operator

AMAGREE-1 is a 33-year-old Cuban citizen who has two college degrees, in education and in journalism. He is native to the province in which the infil/exfil area is located. Until his departure from Cuba in August 1961, AMAGREE-1 was a municipal official in Matanzas Province and was active in the propaganda section of the 30th of November Movement. AMAGREE-1 began his association with KUBARK in April 1963 as a radio operator trainee. As in the case of AMTRUNK-13, this is his first operational mission.

D. AMTRUNK-16, Guide

AMTRUNK-16 is a 41-year-old single Cuban citizen who, as a commercial fisherman, lived and worked in the infil/exfil area all of his life. He participated in Operation AMTRUNK VI in December 1963 and his up-to-date knowledge of the infil/exfil areafrom which he fled in late October 1963, proved invaluable on this mission. While he was still in Cuba, AMTRUNK-16 was a trusted contact for the AMTRUNKs on both Operation III/IV and V.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Primary.

RS-501 with special signal plan with continuous guard. channel. This equipment will remain with the AMTRUNK IC and will not be carried into Havana.

B. Alternates.

(1) OWVL

AMICE-14 will carry a RR-44 receiver with appropriate signal plan on the trip into Havana.

(2) AMICE-14, AMTRUNK-13 and AMAGREE-1 will all have in their possession a S/W system with indicators, materials and accommodation addresses in the JMWAVE area.

C. Case Officer Challenge

To be used to determine whether or not the radio operator, AMAGREE-1, is being controlled by a hostile force. C/O: "Diganos si los barcos de patrulla estan equipados con radar y armas pesadas". ("Tell us if the patrol boats are equipped with radar and heavy armament"). Radio Operator, if free from hostile control, will reply: "En Cuba no hay culebras venenosas". (In Cuba there are no poisonous snakes). Any other response to this question which the radio operator might give would indicate hostile control.

9. COVER

The entire infil/exfiltration using the IC will be black. During the trip to Havana, AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will devise their own cover stories to fit the individual situation, All five agents will be provided with false documentation.

10. **FINANCES**

The team will carry P5,500.00 of which P1,500.00 will remain with the personnel in the IC. AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-13 will each take P2,000.00 into Havana.

11. **CONTROL**

Control over the five members of the AMTRUNK team takes the form of providing or denying them the wherewithal, both financial and material, to engage in clandestine operations against the Castro regime.

12. **COMMITMENTS**

No commitments have been made to any member of the team other than a broad commitment to continue to pay their salaries in the event they are captured and to continue to provide support to their families for a reasonable period of time in the event of their death.

13. **SECURITY**

Both AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1 have been granted OA's. The other three team members, AMTRUNK-7, -13 and -16, have been granted POA's. All five have been LCFLUTTERed.

14. **TRAINING**

A. AMICE-14

The earlier training of AMICE-14 has been supplemented with three additional weeks of tradecraft training and he has since received review training in weapons firing, maritime, OWVL and S/W.

B. AMTRUNK-13

Prior to dispatch of Operation AMTRUNK VII, AMTRUNK-13 will have received the following training:

(1) Three weeks of tradecraft training

(2) One week of maritime training

(3) One week of survival training

(4) One week of PM training accenting map and compass and weapons firing

(5) Three half-day sessions in S/W

C. **AMAGREE-1**

AMAGREE-1 has received the same training as AMTRUNK-13 above plus basic radio operator training which included the use of medium speed communications gear. AMAGREE-1, prior to dispatch time, will have received training in a special signal plan with continuous guard channel.

D. **AMTRUNK-7**

Since AMTRUNK-7's primary function on the AMTRUNK team is as a coastal guide, his formal training has been necessarily limited. He has received extensive maritime and weapons training and three days of instruction in basic tradecraft principles.

E. **AMTRUNK-16**

This agent's function on the AMTRUNK team is similar to that of AMTRUNK-7. He will have received PM and maritime training prior to dispatch.

15. DAMAGE REPORT

See Attachment A

16. EQUIPMENT LIST

See Attachment B

SECRET RYBAT **ATTACHMENT A**

DESENSITIZED

DAMAGE REPORT

A. The damage report for AMICE-14 and AMTRUNK-7 remains the same as was transmitted in Attachment A to Reference D with the addition of Rudolph W. SOSPINE as "Jack".

B. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range
Survival Training Site

C. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred Folsom"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin",	training instructor
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey",	" "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry",	" "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry",	" "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted",	" "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete",	" "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack",	" "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Jim",	LCFLUTTER operator
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul",	" "

D. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-13:

AMICE-27 by true name
AMICE-14 by true name
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario Ramirez"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio Garcia"
AMTRUNK-7 as "Carlos Menendez"
AMTRUNK-8 as "Tomas Rodriguez"
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-16 as "Juan Gonzalez"
AMPAL-1 as "Joe"
AMSKILL-1 by training alias
AMSWING-2 by training alias
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

E. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMAGREE-1

Safehouse #174
Safehouse #216
Maritime training site
Survival training site
Firing range

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F. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe Webster"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Rudolph W. SOSPINE as	"Jack"	
Andrew S. PARMERS as	"Angel Martin"	, training instructor
Daniel V. GUSSOW as	"Bill"	, " "
Humphrey O. EDDERY as	"Ski"	, " "
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, " "
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Fletcher K. THENE as	"Harry"	, " "
Paul V. MENDECINO as	"Ted"	, " "
Wilfred R. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Floyd H. RUSANOWSKI as	"Jack"	, " "
Paul I. NAPOLILLI as	"Paul"	, LCFLUTTER operator

G. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMAGREE-1:

AMPANIC-14 as	"Enrique"	, training instructor
AMPAL-1 as	"Joe"	, " "
AMSKILL-1 by training alias		, training instructor
AMSWING-2 " " "		, " "
AMLABEL-1 as	"Terry"	,
AMTRUNK-7 as	"Carlos Menendez,	
AMTRUNK-8 as	"Tomas Rodriguez,	
AMTRUNK-9 as	"Jose Lopez"	
AMTRUNK-16 as	"Juan Gonzalez"	
AMSONIC-1 as	"Juan Sanchez"	
AMHINT-48 as	"Paco Gonzalez"	
AMLITAINT-1 by true name		
AMICE-14 " " "		
AMAKA-1 " " "		
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"		

H. Safehouses and Training Areas Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Safehouse #104
Safehouse #216
Maritime Training Site
Firing Range

I. KUBARK Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

Irving N. PEGGINS as	"Joe"	
Reuben A. HANNULA as	"Fred"	
Stuart V. KAPRIDNO as	"Dewey"	, training instructor
Alton T. PIRNACK as	"Larry"	, " "
Wilfred F. KNEAFSY as	"Pete"	, " "
Keith D. WINETT as	"Bill"	, LCFLUTTER operator

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT

J. Agent Personnel Exposed to AMTRUNK-16:

AMICE-14 by true first name and training alias
AMTRUNK-7 by true name
AMTRUNK-8 by true name
AMTRUNK-9 as "Jose Lopez"
AMTRUNK-13 as "Maximo"
AMAGREE-1 as "Mario"
AMAKA-1 as "Antonio"
AMLABEL-1 as "Terry"
Captain and Crew of "NEPTUNE"

SECRET RYBAT **ATTACHMENT B**

DESENSITIZED

EQUIPMENT LIST

Five-man infiltration team (2 infiltrees, 2 guides and radop)

A. Material to be Cached:

1 RT-48 Medium Speed Communications Gear

B. Personal Weapons and Equipment

1. 5 Belgian Browning 9 mm. Pistols
2. 2 M-3 SMGs
3. 2 FAL 7.62 Automatic Rifles
4. 200 Rounds 9 mm. Ammo
5. 400 Rounds 45 Cal Ammo
6. 300 Rounds 7.62 Ammo
7. 12 Magazines for 9 mm. Ammo
8. 10 Magazines for 45 Cal Ammo
9. 15 Magazines for 7.62 Ammo
10. 2 Sten Ammo Carriers
11. 2 BAR Ammo Carriers
12. 5 Pistol Belts
13. 5 Belt Holsters for 9 mm. Pistols
14. 5 Pr. Suspenders
15. 4 Canteens w/cup and cover
16. 1 Entrenching Tool
17. 1 Machete w/scabbard
18. 3 Trench or Bowie Knives w/scabbards
19. 1 Pr. Binoculars
20. 5 Silva Compasses

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

/BAT
DESENSITIZED

21. 5 UDT-type Watches

22. 5 Plastic Waterproof Flashlights

23. 5 Backpacks

24. 20 Waterproof Bags

25. 5 Swiss Pocket Knives

26. 5 Zippo Lighters

27. 2 Metascopes

28. 5 Penlights

29. 10 Plastic or Rubber End Caps for 45 Cal SMG Magazines

30. 6 Hand Grenades

C. Rations

1. 12 Black Concentrated Rations

2. 20 C-Rations (1 box = 3 meals)

3. Assorted Cans Fruit, Meat, Beans, etc.

4. Assorted Packages Rice, Dry Beans, Coffee, etc.

5. 100 Bouillon Cubes

6. 6 Packages Tropical Chocolate Bars

D. Medical Supplies

1. 1 Corpsman's First Aid Kit with Morphine Syrettes and Codeine (in metal container)

2. 5 Individual First Aid Kits

3. 100 Coricidin Pills

4. 100 APC Tablets

5. 100 Water Purification Tablets

6. 100 Vitamin Tablets

7. 100 Acromycin Tablets

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RYBAT

E. Clothing

1. 5 Sets Fatigue Uniforms, HBT Shirts and Trousers
2. 5 Fatigue Caps
3. 5 Civilian Sport Shirts
4. 5 Prs Civilian Trousers
5. 5 Pr. Civilian Shoes
6. 5 Pr. Jump Boots
7. 5 Leather Belts
8. 15 T-Shirts
9. 15 Pr. Undershorts
10. 15 Pr. Socks
11. 5 Pr. Light Gloves
12. 5 Sets Foul Weather Rubber Uniforms
13. 5 Berets
14. 5 Green Ponchos
15. 5 Pr. Insulated Underwear
16. 5 Field Jackets

F. Communications Gear

1. 1 RR-44 Receiver (for OWVL)
2. 1 RS-501 w/Signal Plan (continuous guard channel)

G. Secret Writing Materials

1. 3 Sets S/W Materials with Extra Carbons and Extra Vials of Developer Pills

H. Intermediate Craft

1. 16' 7" Boston Whaler, "Currituck" Model, Painted Dark Green, Outfitted with Wide-Angle Towing Rig

2. 2 75 hp Commercial Outboards w/Tool Kit
3. 7 Fiberglass Outboard Fuel Tanks, Capacity 13 Gal. Each
   6 Horizontal Tanks, Size 11¼ x 26½ x 12⅛"
   1 Vertical Tank, Size 13¼ x 26½ x 10⅛"
4. 5 Flotation Cushions
5. 2 Air Mattresses
6. Extra Propellers and Drive, Shear and Cotter Pins for both Commercial Outboards
7. 5 Black UDT-type Life Preservers
8. 1 Fire Extinguisher (for Gasoline Fires)
9. 1 12-lb. Anchor
10. 2 Hoses for Transferring Fuel from One Tank to Another (or 3 feet of 3/4 inch Plastic Tubing)
11. 2 Oars, Length 10 feet
12. 2 Wooden Push Poles, Length 12 feet, Diameter 2½"
13. 1 Plastic Bailing Bucket, 1 foot deep
14. 2 5-Gallon Plastic Jerrycans (for water)
15. 8 Extra Spark Plugs (4 for each Commercial Outboard)
16. 3 Rolls, Non-Shiny Plastic Tape
17. 50 ft. ½ inch Nylon Rope
18. 200 ft. Parachute Cord
19. 1 Small Hammer
20. 1 Pr. Pliers
21. 1 Screwdriver
22. 1 Spark Plug Wrench
23. 2 Upright Poles, 3½ feet in Length, w/Oarlocks

DESENSITIZED

24. 1 Ritchie Compass

25. 1 Sheet Camouflage Material, 20' x 10'

26. 1 RB 9.6

27. 1 HRT-7 Beacon

I. Maps

Maritime Charts

2 H.O. 1002

2 H.O. 2624

2 H.O. 0944

Series E723, 3-AMS, 1:50,000

2 ea. Sheets	4085 I	4085 IV
	4085 II	4085 III
	4084 I	4084 IV

J. Miscellaneous

1. Cleaning Gear for 9 mm Pistol, M-3 SMG and FAL including RIG Gun Grease

2. 200 ft. Parachute Cord

3. Box of Matches and Waterproof Containers for same

4. 12 Polyethylene Bags
   4--Large Enough to Contain FAL
   4--Large Enough to Contain Assembled M-3
   4 18" Size for Personal Documents, etc.

5. 2 Sheets Infra-Red Paper, 18" x 24"

6. 1 Dynalite

7. 14 Extra Flashlight Batteries

8. 4 Flashlight Bulbs

9. 8 Extra Penlight Batteries

DESENSITIZED

10. 4 Packs Lighter Flints
11. 4 Cans Lighter Fluid
12. 1 Set Parallel Rulers
13. 1 Set Dividers
14. 2 Protractors, Metal
15. 2 Pocket Rulers, Metal
16. 1 Flat Mill File
17. 1 Pocket Carborundum Stone
18. 1 One-Burner Gas Stove--Butane Gas or Similar Type--w/Extra Cylinders of Gas
19. 1 Cooking Pot (at least 8" in Diameter)
20. 5 Knife-Fork-Spoon Sets
21. 2 Messkits
22. Box of Insect Repellent, 48 Small Plastic Bottles
23. 6 Cans Spray Paint, Black
24. 1 Can Saddle Soap
25. 1 Package of Sponges
26. Toilet Paper
27. Hand Soap and Detergent
28. Paper Plates
29. Plastic Spoons
30. Assorted Fishhooks and Line
31. 8 Burlap Bags
32. Assorted Empty Cardboard Boxes

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/TSD/EB			EXTENSION	NO. DATE 24 June 1964
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/SA/MOB/PM GH4408 Hdqrs.				Bushnell 1.3 X phantom scopes are made in Japan - w/w distribution all have English marking
2. WH/SA/SO/NS				
3. WH/SA/EOB/Wainwright			W	
4. Dottie				
5.				To 2: I have [redacted] attached copy. This is for your attention.
6.				
7.				
8.				file [illegible] seems like a tech job tns. ⓦ
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

24 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

SUBJECT : Improved Sight for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE : a) Memo for the Rcd. dated 25 May 64, Subject: "FAL Silencer/Sights", from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. In accordance with reference a) the following material is provided:

   a) Three open rear sight hoods for the subject rifle.
   b) Three copies of instructions for installing the sight and zeroing the rifle.
   c) Three tool kits containing an adjustment screw driver and two files.
   d) 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler. (Boxes marked with red strip. These should be substituted for the rounds already delivered).

2. It must be understood that the limited time available would not permit more that cursory acceptance testing and the superiority of this sight over the standard unit has not been definitely established.

3. The scope and mount requested in reference a) proved to be an unfeasible development in the time available. A mount could not be devised which was interchangeable with any FAL without extensive modification to the weapon.

4. For additional information regarding this matter contact D. J. Hogan or D. R. Dunn on extension 3319.

WALTER L. ERHARDT
Chief
TSD/Engineering Branch

Attachments: As Stated

Distribution:
  1 - Addressee
  1 - TSD/SDB
  1 - C/TSD
  1 - EB-81J

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SNAP-ON SIGHT HOOD FOR

THE 7.62 BELGIUM (FAL) RIFLE

1. The sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight on the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) rifle. It is designed to raise the rear sight to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the underloaded ammunition and is an open sight for increased night sighting capability.

2. The sight hood is oriented with the three screws facing the muzzle end of the rifle (See attached drawings). Press down on the hood until the ball detent snaps into the peep hole

3. The slot for the existing rear sight is made tight so that the hood will fit firmly in place. If it fails to fit, file the existing rear sight as necessary. If the sight fits the slot but is difficult to snap on and off, or is too loose, adjust the ball detent by turning the center set screw on the sight hood.

4. The weapon must be zeroed on a known distance firing range to determine the sight settings and proper sight picture for standard and underloaded ammunition when using the hood. The only adjustments possible are those already on the rifle. (That is, elevation control using the graduated ramp and windage control by adjustment of the two locking screws at the base of the existing rear sight dovetail.)

NOTE: It is very important to hold the rifle the same way each time so that the relation of the eye to the rear sight remains constant. The user must determine his own zero for each rifle and hood combination and maximum effective range for each ammunition type.



FRONT VIEW



REAR VIEW

10 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: Memo for Rcd. dated 23 May 64, Subject FAL Silencers/ Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

1. On 2 June 1964, Mr. Donald R. Dunn, TSD/EB and the undersigned went to Isolation to test a modified sight and a telescopic sight developed for the 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle in answer to reference a). The tests were performed with the assistance of Mr. James Earb and Mr. Glen Winstead, Isolation.

2. The first tests were conducted with a Williams Peep sight modified to fit an aluminum block which was mounted in place of the standard FAL rear sight. The Williams sight has a larger diameter peep than the FAL sight and has a wider range of elevation settings as well as more positive control over both elevation and windage. The main purpose of the test was to establish a point of reference on the aluminum block to match the graduations on the Williams sight and allow the sight to be set visually for the desired range once the weapon was zeroed.

3. Firing commenced from 100 yards at a silhouette target using the hood of a jeep as a rest. Both underloaded and full load rounds were used. Light rain which gradually increased in intensity during the day served to complicate the procedure. The test results at ranges from 25 yds. to 130 yds. using the Williams sight are summarized in Attachment I. Exceedingly erratic results were obtained throughout the tests and one attempt to duplicate the 100 yd. zero resulted in a different setting later in the day.

4. A 2X scope of Japanese manufacture equipped with aluminum mounting rings front and rear to fit the rear gas port and rear sight mount respectively then tested. The scope was attached to the rifle with difficulty and attempts to zero it were frustrated by the inability to determine where the rifle was shooting. The mounting moved while attempting to adjust the elevation knob and it was determined that the mount could not be attached firmly enough to insure in retaining a proper zero. The test with the scope was aborted.

Lash-1 File

SECRET

3. It is recommended that the scope and mount be discarded as unfeasible. The Williams sight is acceptable although the number of clicks per revolution of the knob should be reduced. Further testing of the underloaded ammunition should be conducted to determine the reasons for the erratic performance.

DANIEL J. HOGAN

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MCB/PM (Col Hicks)
Attachment: As Stated

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

C/TSD/SDB

ATTACHMENT I

2 June 1964

Williams Peep Sight

At 25 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 60 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 4th line from top

At 50 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 clicks from bottom
Match ref. line to 5th line from top

At 75yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 80 to 110 clicks from bottom
Ammunition performance very erratic, wide variance on target

At 100 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 120 to 160 clicks
1st trial, 160 clicks, little variance
Match ref. line to 9th line from top
2nd trial 3 hrs. later, 120 clicks
Match ref. line to 7th line from top

At 150 yds., reduced loads
Raise sight 230 clicks (1 trial)
Match ref. line to 12.5 line from top

Could not mount telescopic sight properly. Began process of shooting in scope, found it moved.

At 100 yds., full loads
Raise sight 4 clicks from bottom

At 150 yds., full loads
Raise sight 8 clicks from bottom.

1. Intermittant rain throughout tests.
2. Cases with reduced loads were noted to be blackened at neck after firing. Suspected to be low pressures not causing sufficient case expansion to obtain proper seal. This can contribute to erratic performance. Recommend gas port be turned to off position to prevent action from opening and allowing gas leak. Also investigate soft annealing case necks.

SECRET

SECRET

Original in
Vital
Documents
file

T/N: Rolando CUBELA Secades

POSITION: Medical Doctor, Cmdte, Cuban Army
The Cardiovascular Department of Cmdte. Fajardo Hospital

LOCATION: Havana.

COMMO: S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon
agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Srta. Maria Dolores GOMEZ
Apartado 12318, Madrid, Espana

Mr. Humphrey R. Boncavil
P.O. Box 892
General Post Office,
New York 1, New York
(this address is to be used only for rapid commo)

In Nov 1963 Paris Station agreed to following address with Subject: Parents-in-law of UNSNAFU/9 Paris, France. (When letter is received, UNSNAFU/9 will deliver letter to the Station via UNSNAFU/5)
20 Rue De La Glaciere, Paris 13

Agent signs letters "Ramon"

ACC, Addresses, agent receiving:

Ernestina ACOSTA Gonzalez (Ene" Subjects former secretary)
#526, Apartment 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.
(top floor Apt, Tel: 303865)

Edf #526 Apto 8
Esquina Calle 25 y H.

(Emergency)
Virginia Secades (Subject's mother)
Calle 38 #122
Esquina Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Pepe" will contain S/W. Letters to the ACOSTA address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

SECRET

NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages out through the AMTRUNK/10 S/W system.

Emergency Commo: If contact cannot be made through above systems, Carlos TEPEDINO in N.Y.C. can probably arrange a means of contacting Subject.

C/O: Wainwright.

201-252234

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG: WILLIAMS/blc
UNIT: /IOS
EXT:
DATE: AUGUST 64

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-252234

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 AUG 64 15 19z

SIG CEN

TO : PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/SA 3 INFO DDP, VR

TO PARI INFO: CITE DIR 44511

SANITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMLASH UNSNAFU

REF: PARI 5922 (IN 57147)*

NO IDEN HQS TRACES CANTO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/COMMENT: *Ref XX RYBAT.

AMLASH-1 file

201-252234

WH/SA/EOB W. Wainwright (by phone)
WH/SA/INT Kitchens
WE/3 Roger Pierre (by phone)

Thomas F. Thiele
for WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

for Kitchens
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA

201-252234

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SECRET

AMLASH-1

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Test of Open Sight Hood for 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle

REFERENCE: A) Memo for Rcd. dated 25 May 1964, Subject: FAL Silencers/Sights, from C/WH/SA/MOB/PM
B) Memo for Rcd. dated 10 June 1964, Subject: Tests of Modified Sights for 7.62 Belgium (FAL) Rifle

1. On 15 and 16 June 1964, the undersigned and Mr. Bob Ricker, TSD/SDB went to Isolation to test an open sight hood for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle developed in answer to Ref. A. The Modified Williams peep sight developed previously in answer to Ref. A and reported on in Ref. B. proved unsatisfactory to the requester. The snap-on sight hood was then developed on a quick reaction basis to be simpler to install and easier to use than the Williams sight. In addition some improved underloaded 7.62mm NATO rounds having soft. annealed cases and cream of wheat filler were tested for performance. These were developed in hopes of correcting the erratic ammunition performance noted in Ref. B.

2. The open sight hood snaps over the existing rear sight of the FAL rifle, and in theory makes shooting in poor light or at night easier. It can be used with either standard factory loads or the underloaded ammunition in conjunction with the muzzle attachment silencer. The notch on the rear sight hood is "U" shaped and raised to compensate for the more curving trajectory of the low velocity ammunition. The hood is easily detached making the conventional peep sight available any time it is desired.

3. The attached data sheet summarizes the test results. It was found that some familiarization was necessary to get used to the open sight. Under ideal conditions the sight was as easy to use as the peep sight although it was more difficult to maintain uniform vertical grouping. The relationship between the eye and rear sight was found to be very critical. As the tests proceeded a change was noted in the point of impact vs. point of aim which was thought to be due to a change in sight picture on the part of the undersigned.

4. The improved ammunition was found to be quite consistant in performance. The use of cream of wheat filler to tamp the powder charge against the primer was an attempt to get more even ignition with correspondingly improved accuracy. The expended cartridge cases were checked periodically and no evidence was found of the soft annealed cases not expanding properly. During the tests the rifle and ammunition combination instilled a degree of confidence in the undersigned not present in the previous tests.

SECRET

[illegible]

5. Tests were conducted in the evening to determine the degree of usefulness of the sight in poor light. In this respect a 22 Caliber Hi-Standard pistol with folding shoulder stock and Bushnell 1.3X Phantom scope was tested in comparison. The scope was equipped with yellow filters to brighten the sight picture for low light level use. It was the opinion of both test personnel that the scope was superior to either the peep sight or open sight for as long as their was some illumination on the silhouette targets. Once the light failed the scope was completely useless although the undersigned could still discern targets with the naked eye out to 50 yds. All actual shooting was done with the open sight and some difficulty was experienced in hitting the targets at ranges of 100 yds. or more even at dusk. The closer targets could be easily hit up until it became too dark to see them at all. A large rain cloud moving from behind the firing position gradually obscured all available light. For the final shooting at 25 yds. occasional lightning flashes gave only a vague awareness of the target location. At no time during the night trials was there any muzzle flash visible from the under loaded ammunition and muzzle silencer combination. The gas port which was in the off position during the daylight trials was turned on at night but no flash was visible at the breech. A fine white cloud of cream of wheat powder was visible in front of the muzzle at almost full darkness but could not be seen more than 30 feet away.

6. Listener trials were conducted the following day to determine how far away an alert listener could discern the mechanical noise of the mechanism and that of the round being fired. Mr. Ricker walked away downwind at an angle of 90 degrees to the line of fire and stopped to listen every 25 paces. The undersigned fired single rounds, (hand actuating the mechanism) each time Mr. Ricker stopped. At 325 paces, or roughly 275 yds., Mr. Ricker reported he could still hear the mechanism being actuated, the round being fired, and the bullet striking a concrete pillar 200 yds. downrange. However, he stated that he might not have noticed the sound at that range had he not been listening for it specifically.

7. One of the major causes for concern at the start of the tests was that the cream of wheat filler might clog the silencer and render it ineffective. A total of 200 rounds were fired with the silencer in place and the noise level did seem to be higher at the finish of the second day. (Round numbers 180 to 200 were the ones expended during the previously mentioned listener trials). Inspection of the silencer at a later date revealed considerable cream of wheat residue in the screening. Sound level measurements made in the AMF sound lab showed that while the total noise level was no higher, the duration was relatively longer. This would make the silencer seem louder to near by observers but not increase the range at which it could be heard. However, from a standpoint of the ability for a listener to discriminate a silencer being fired from random noise, the longer duration gives him a better chance to recognize what he hears.

8. On 19 June 1964, the undersigned went to the warehouse at Franconia to try to fit the sight hood to other 7.65mm FAL rifles. It was suspected that the fit might be a problem when it would not fit over the rear sights of three FAL rifles at Isolation. Although it was later determined that the three rifles were of a different lot and may therefore have different tolerances on the rear sight casting, it was felt that further checking was necessary. Nine FAL rifles from the same lot as those obtained by WH/SA/MOB/PM were unpackaged and the sight hood tried on the rear sight. Of the nine, two were perfect fits and the other seven too thick for the hood to fit. This created a problem in that the sight hoods had to fit rifles which for operational reasons could not be measured before hand to determine the thickness of the rear sight blade. Providing adjustment in the slot of the sight hood would have complicated the fixture to the point where it could become operationally unsuitable. Therefore it was determined that the best solution was to provide several small files with the hoods. The peep sight on the rifles, a soft casting, was found to be quite easy to file. In most cases it would be necessary only to file several thousandths to obtain a proper fit. This procedure was explained to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM and he stated that it would be acceptable.

[illegible]

9. On 24 June 1964, three open sight hoods with accessories consisting of two files and a small screwdriver were turned over to C/WH/SA/MOB/PM. In addition, 400 rounds of improved underloaded ammunition with cream of wheat filler were provided as a replacement for the original 400 underloaded rounds.

10. On 29 June 1964, it was discovered that a scope was availabl for the 7.62mm Belgium (FAL) Rifle (Sniper Version) and in the Agency supply system. Steps are being taken to obtain a scope for evaluation. The results will be forwarded to C/WH/SA/MOB.

DANIEL J. HOGAN
TSD/EB

DDP/TSD/EB/DJH/EC

cc: C/TSD
C/WH/SA/MOB/PM

STANDARD VELOCITY AMMUNITION, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	SIGHT TYPE	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	6 1/4"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Peep	On	5 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Open Hood	24" high	4 [illegible]"	5
100 yds.	No. 2	Open Hood	26" high	4 [illegible]"	5

[illegible]ERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DAYLIGHT:

RANGE	RAMP SETTING	POINT OF IMPACT (RELATIVE TO POINT OF AIM)	EXTREME SPREAD	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	NO. OF ROUNDS
25 yds.	No. 2	3" high	1 3/4"	--	--	5
25 yds.	No. 6	3" low	2 3/4"	--	--	5
50 yds.	No. 6	On	5"	--	--	5
75 yds.	No. 6	4" left, 4" low	--	2"	7"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	6" left, 8" low	9"	--	--	10
100 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Diff. Shooter)	--	5"	13"	5
100 yds.	Full Elevation	8" left, 8" low	--	6"	8"	10
125 yds.	No 2	8" left, 18" low	--	9½"	11	5
125 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	10"	8 (2 missed target)
150 yds.	Full Elevation	On (Changed Sight Picture)	--	6"	18"	8 (2 missed target)
[illegible] yds.	Full Elevation	6" low (Changed Sight Picture)	--	8"	26"	10

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, DUSK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
200 yds.	10	6	15"	23"	Could see target more clearly through Peep sight but no rounds were fired.
[illegible] yds.	10	6	6"	6"	Could see target very clearly with 1.3X scope.

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, ALMOST FULL DARK, OPEN SIGHT HOOD:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	HORIZONTAL SPREAD	VERTICAL SPREAD	REMARKS
75 yds.	10	9	9"	9"	Peep sight useless
25 yds.	10	10	14"	25"	Could see targets out to 200 yds. with filtered scope at start of firing, could not see at all w/scope at finish.

UNDERLOADED AMMUNITION, OPEN SIGHT HOOD, FULL DARK:

RANGE	NO. OF ROUNDS	NO. OF HITS	REMARKS
25 yds.	10	5 (scattered)	Target in total darkness, rain cloud overhead, intermittant lightning flashes gave a vague awareness of target location.

LCP.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 21
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2 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	~~MOB~~	~~INT~~	5	~~SS~~ ~~SB~~
2		IOS	6	PERS AB
3			7	~~LOG~~ ~~CA~~
4	~~EUR~~	~~RPT~~	8	
		C/TIVE SI		SEC

FROM MADRID

ACTION WH/SA 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED TO: UNIT

INFO VR, FILE, DDP IWEL -CA CI/OPS CI/IC FI

S E C R E T 281046Z

DIR CITE MADR 2662 (GROVERY ACTING)

TYPIC AMLASH

REF DIR 73234

AMLASH/1
X-Cantillo

28DEC64IN49756

1. RE PARA 2 REF, CIS CONTACT IS LU[illegible] MANUEL CANTILLO TOIRAC, NEW SECOND SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY MADRID, WHO REPORTEDLY CONNECTED CUBAN SECURITY.

2. FYI AT STATION DIRECTION QUJAW 1 DEVELOPING CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH CANTILLO.

SECRET

Suarez de la Osa, Mario Silvestre

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/MHAPRON/AMTRUNK/Operational
AMTRUNK Progress Report for Period 1-30 November 1964

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
Action Required: FYI.

Key

1. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

A. Preparations were underway in early November to dispatch AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid in mid-November to cement the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19. These plans fell through when the Madrid Station notified Headquarters and WAVE that their workload would not allow sufficient case officer time to handle AMTRUNK-13 in Madrid at this time. WAVE agreed to postpone AMTRUNK-13's trip to Madrid several weeks until Madrid Station's workload abated somewhat.

B. The prospects of finalizing the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19 increased however with the receipt at WAVE of another open letter from AMTRUNK-19, this one mailed from Mexico City in mid-November. In AMTRUNK-19's first letter, mailed from Montreal in mid-October, he suggested using a friend in Mexico City as a cut-out to initiate a channel of communications between himself and AMTRUNK-13. In his second letter, AMTRUNK-19 stated that he had made the necessary arrangements with his friend in Mexico. Although WAVE, Headquarters and MEXI traces on AMTRUNK-19's friend, IDEN A, were fragmentary, Mexico Station stated that IDEN A was well-known to one of its PBRUMEN assets who vouched for IDEN A's loyalties. WAVE intends to send an innocuous letter to AMTRUNK-19 in AMTRUNK-13's handwriting to keep the channel with A-19 alive. AMTRUNK-19 appears eager to see AMTRUNK-13 again and has stated in both letters that he has considerable information to discuss in detail. It is well realized that this open letter channel is far from ideal but it is hoped that in early January 1965 AMTRUNK-13 can re-contact AMTRUNK-19 and provide him with a system of S/W.

Attachment: USC
IDEN Sheet

LASH-1 file

Distribution:
3 - Addressee,
w/att. USC

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
10 Dec 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-19045

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-84/3-1

as well as debrief him thoroughly and levy FI and MHAPRON requirements upon him.

C. In mid-November after the postponement of AMTRUNK-13's Madrid trip, preparations began to launch Operation AMTRUNK X in early December. This operation would attempt to re-organize the ratline to and from Havana and the AMTRUNK infil area for the future use of infiltrated MHAPRON recruiters and other agent assets as necessary. Secondary objectives are to bring into the infil area a cache of weapons and explosives for AMTRUNK-10/AMLASH-1 and to teach a system of S/W to one or more assets in the area. The team is to be composed of the same four individuals who participated in Operation AMTRUNK IX in October 1964: AMAGREE-1, Team Leader; AMAKA-1, Radio Operator; and AMTRUNK-16 and -20, Guides. It was decided to shelve the V-20 as the Intermediate Craft (IC) for this operation and substitute a 17' Johnson boat with twin 75 hp. outboard motors which could maneuver through shallower water and which could be more easily camouflaged. The basic reason for this decision was the fact that December through February are the low-water months in the AMTRUNK operational area. During this shallow water season, the heavier, wider V-20 can only be used in the deeper and more heavily-guarded infiltration canals.

D. Through the combined efforts of AMICE-14, the AMTRUNK P/A, and AMAGREE-1 and AMAKA-1, four radio operator candidates, to be trained for future use in PM operations, were recruited during the reporting period.

E. Recruiting for MHAPRON infiltration candidates continued during the reporting period. One prospective infiltree was recruited during the month of November and the case officer was active in assessing and debriefing two other candidates. It is hoped that by March 1965 one or more of these candidates will be trained and prepared for infiltration for clandestine MHAPRON recruiting. In large measure this will depend upon the success of Operation AMTRUNK X in re-organizing the ratline to and from Havana.

F. S/W Message No. 13 was sent to AMTRUNK-11 in response to his Message No. 15 in which he stated that both OWVL receivers were now in his possession. WAVE Message No. 13 to AMTRUNK-11 gave directions for the disposition of the OWVL receivers and the activation of OWVL contact with both AMTRUNK-11 and AMTRUNK-10.

2. **INTELLIGENCE REPORTING**

None

3. **OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES**

Salaries:	AMICE-14	$400.00
	AMAGREE-1	300.00
	AMAKA-1	250.00
	AMTRUNK-13	300.00
	AMTRUNK-16	225.00
	AMTRUNK-20	200.00
		$1,675.00
Mileage (AMICE-14 and AMAGREE-1):		$202.40
Household Expenses:		61.97
GRAND TOTAL		$1,939.37

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-19045

4. **PROJECTED PLANS**

Primary tasks to be accomplished are the mounting of Operation AMTRUNK X in early December, the dispatching of AMTRUNK-13 to Madrid to finalize the recruitment of AMTRUNK-19, and the staging of another contingent of MHAPRON recruiters for infiltration in March 1965.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT
TO UFGA-19045

IDEN Sheet

IDEN A — Dr. Francisco BORGES
M. Escobedo No. 692-16
Mexico 5, D. F.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 13

SECRET/RYBAT DESENSITIZED

ORIG : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC
EXT : 6153
DATE : 24/MARCH/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX 2
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1	TC —	5	CA-PA
2		6	C
3	FI	7	2
4	RR-OS	8	X

24 MAR 65 21 1:

TO : PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: OC/WHC 5 INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/WE 3, C/CI

TO PRITY PARI INFO CITE DIR

DESENSITIZED RYBAT PBRUMEN UNSNAFU AMLASH AMWHIP 95500

REF: PARI 9995 (IN 29053)*

1. DO NOT BELIEVE UNSNAFU/9 FIRING IN ITSELF A HAZARD TO AMLASH/1. HOWEVER, DO FEEL IT NECESSARY ATTEMPT DETERMINE BACKGROUND TO UNSNAFU/19 STATEMENT THAT U/9 WAS "DIRTY KUBARK AGENT", I.E. WAS THIS JUST HEATED UNCOMPLIMENTARY EPITHET OR WAS IT BASED ON DSE KNOWLEDGE MADE AVAILABLE TO U/19. IN EITHER CASE, BELIEVE IT MERITS RELAY TO AMLASH/1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING: WHEN AMWHIP/1 ARRIVES PARI IN NEAR FUTURE, ASK HIM ATTEMPT WITH GREAT CAUTION DETERMINE IMPLICATIONS U/19 ABOVE ACCUSATION. THEN HAVE HIM CALL HIS JEWELER FRIEND IN HAVANA, JOSE IGLESIAS, OSTENSIBLY ON BUSINESS MATTER AS COVER, AND RELAY PERTINENT DETAILS OF U/9 INCIDENT AS ROUTINE FRIENDLY GOSSIP. AMWHIP/1 SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM INSURING THAT MUTUAL FRIEND IGLESIAS WILL RELAY THE NEWS POSTHASTE TO AMLASH/1. BELIEVE THIS SECURE ENOUGH AND EMINENTLY FASTER AND MORE CERTAIN THAN S/W LETTER.

2. IF AMWHIP/1 FEELS THIS METHOD UNSAFE AT THIS TIME, for ANY REASON, ADVISE SOONEST.

3. PLS KEEP HQS CURRENT ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTER.

END OF MESSAGE

COMT.........

RELEASING OFFICER 24-20 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET/RYBAT DESENSITIZED

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 95584

*WH/C/Comment: UNSNAFU/19 fired in row with UNSNAFU/9. Requested guidance.

C/WH/C/FI

WE/5/C J. Wright (telecon)

WE/3 R. Piere (telecon)

WH/C/CH/PA - C. [illegible]

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ORIG : R. H. WEBSTER/dl
UNIT : DC/WH/C/FI
EXT : 6153
DATE : 25/JUNE/1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1	FI		SP
2			CA-AA
3	FE	7	C
4	RR	8	D

OS 26 Jun 65 13 09 Z

SIG CEN

TO : ROME
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : DC/WH/C-5 INFO VR FILE ADDP C/WE 3 C/CI-C/FI 2

TO ROME INFO CITE DIR 23142

DESENSITIZED
~~RYBAT~~ TYPIC AMLASH

REFS: A. DIR 22113
B. ROME 6642 (IN 98023)
C. ROME 6652 (IN 98586)

Mr. Hoke can't even brief properly on AMLASH-1 Doesn't know that much about him. Jane Roberts

1. BACKGROUND THIS CASE TOO EXTENSIVE TO RELAY. HOWEVER, PLAN HAVE JOSEPH LANGOSCH, WHO BEING ASSIGNED FRAN AS PBRUMEN ~~REGIONAL REP~~ CASE OFFICER, VISIT ROME TO BRIEF PRESLAND, PROBABLY IN AUGUST. S

2. NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE AMLASH COMPLEX PART OF DOUBLED OP BUT CERTAINLY AN INSECURE ONE. REF A WAS DESIGNED TO PRESENT CURRENT HQS THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS ON OPERATION.

3. INVOLVEMENT AMWHIP/2 RELATIVELY MARGINAL AS HE APPEARS BE barely S ON FRINGES OF MAIN GROUP ~~AND NOT~~ THOUGH PROBABLY PRIVY TO PLANS. HOWEVER, UNLESS ROME HAS SPECIFIC OPS PLANS INVOLVING HIM WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED NEAR FUTURE, SUGGEST CONTACT WITH HIM BE MINIMIZED UNTIL LANGOSCH CAN PROVIDE BACKGROUND.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
WE/4 S. Munger (by phone)

Amlash-1

C. Ryan
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

25-34

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

(5)

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ET

15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Merey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

SECRET

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has full confidence in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo, will provide the background information upon his return to New York.)

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular load seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tol~~l~~on. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tol~~l~~on is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advi~~c~~se or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

s. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez, assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB

File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op

C[illegible]TIAL

10 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

16

1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the effect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CO Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in President Duvalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Sam Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a Texas geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin America Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0830, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stuntz informed WH Division of the conflict and passed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Batu, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA Team to Yugoslavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Gomulka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Gomulka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlack, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagorski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. Maye Stuarts checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the DD/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

11. Wayne Nelson, DD/P Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that ACSI had called him earlier that day to assure him that ACSI had no direct interest in Charles and that it was acting as an intermediary at the request of General Delmar who had passed the lead to General Fitch. ACSI was concerned that due to the mix up in appointments to see Charles, charges might later be made that ACSI had interferred or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to Nelson what had happened and he later called back to state that ACSI was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. Matlack telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of ACSI was discussing the Charles case with DD/P to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over her own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for either the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominiently mentioned as a successor to Duvalier should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in Haitian affairs.

A. F. CZAJKOWSKI

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AFCzajkowski:acr

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301720Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428

MADR

DIRE~~CCT~~CTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 MAR IN 295724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO GUTIERREZ MENOYO, 201-269349 IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. no 201 WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA GUTIERREZ, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. DILE 201-269349. GP-1

S E C R E T

FI

30 Mar 71

SECRET

201-269349

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, EUR 6, FI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

ACTION NO. 751

SECRET 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963 WMIM

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUANTUM

5 Apr IN304300

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

1. BELIEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDRO M. DIAZ. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION ~~IN~~ EXILE. (DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

AN RI2
~~AB~~
IN
PS
BX
DES NPD
FI

CS COPY
SECRET

5 APR 71
201-269349

SECRET

For Subject's (201-269349) role in coordinated U. S. Army clandestine operation F/DC/15-63, please see 201-269895.

F: 201-269349

SECRET

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1971

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: NOEL SALAS SANTOS

FBI FILE NO: 105-7548 (MIAMI)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 6 MAY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (NEWARK)

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1971
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ANTONIO MATEU RODRIGUEZ
FBI FILE NO: 105-19301 (MIAMI)

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M COB ?

019-005-046
323 -2071470
15 JUL 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
NOTED IN REPORT ON STATUS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

R 7008191478

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

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ACTION NO. 251			

SECRET 051617Z APR 71 CITE WH/MIAMI 10963

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC QUANTUM

5APR IN304300

REF MADRID 13428 (IN 299724)

C

1. BELIEVE STATION ASSUMPTION CITED PARA 2 REF CORRECT.

2. AMOTS UNABLE IDENTIFY PEDRO M. DIAZ. STATION FILES CONTAIN CARD REFERENCE TO ONE PEDRO MANUEL DIAZ, CUBAN CITIZEN RESIDING 124 SW 18TH COURT, MIAMI, FLORIDA, WHO WAS MEMBER OF ISLE OF PINES ASSOCIATION IN EXILE. DOI: JAN 63). THIS MAY BE DIAZ OF REF IN VIEW OF FACT THAT ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AT ISLE OF PINES PRISON.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

SECRET

[illegible] Card

DoD Rpt No 5720-0009 71, 5 Feb 71

reportedly suffering from many years of malnutrition & in ill health.

G.M. & other ex-military were apparently ~~[illegible]~~ moved during end Dec 70 to El [illegible] Prison (allegedly maximum security prison in [illegible]) from Guanajay Prison in Havana province

SECRET

14-00000

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Albright

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MAR 31 12 15 AM '71

ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT WH8 FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 078

S E C R E T 301729Z MAR 71 CITE MADRID 13428

DIRE~~COT~~ CTOR INFO WH/MIAMI

30 Mar 71 IN 289724

TYPIC QUANTUM

1. QUANTUM-57 PROVIDED STATION WITH NOTE DATED 6 OCTOBER 70 FROM LAZARO GUTIERREZ MENOYO, IN CUBAN PRISON, TO ADDRESSEE WHOSE IDENTITY Q-57 CHOSE NOT REVEAL. WRITER'S FATHER, DR. ZABALETA GUTIERREZ, WHO STILL CUBA, ARRANGED FOR NOTE TO BE SMUGGLED OUT CUBA. MAIN PURPOSE OF NOTE WAS TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH REGULAR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL BETWEEN WRITER, VIA ADDRESSEE AND HIS FATHER, AND PEDRO M. DIAZ, 1251 NORTHWEST 30 STREET, MIAMI, FLORIDA.

2. ON BASIS ABOVE, GUTIERREZ APPEARS TO BE ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO (201-269349) ON WHOM FILE NO LONGER HELD AT STATION. PLEASE ADVISE IF ASSUMPTION CORRECT, INCLUDING TRACES ON DIAZ.

3. FILE 201-269349. GP-1

Requested CI traces 1 April 71.

SECRET

ACTION

SECRET

SECRET

FP

ALBRIGHT KEN
WH/C/OP
EXT. 7144

GB-547
3D38
TUBE DU3

NAME CHECK AND CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 2 April 71

RID CONTROL NO.: 00016 APR 571

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	3 Apr. 1971		Bo.
REQUESTER			5 June 71		K
RID/FILES	DT-[illegible]	GC52			
REQUESTER					
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-[illegible]	GA50			
RID/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003			

APR 2 01 AM '71

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS AND NOTES

Enter no. of references ordered ______

Cable request for traces.

Cubans only listed

C-2000 VDS

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: ✓ DIAZ,

GIVEN NAMES: Pedro M.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED:

201 NO. IF KNOWN:

AKA, ALIASES:

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*: One Lazaro Gutierrez Menoyo, in prison in Cuba, is attempting to establish regular letter commo channel to DIAZ.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
M	?	Cuba (?)	Cuba	1251 NW 30 Street, Miami, Fla

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

✓ ~~CARD~~ REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

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c. Forward to RID/Files.

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201 CONSOLIDATION: SEE CSI 70-20

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a. Completed Form 831

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DATE:

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER:

FORM

DIAZ, PEDRO /SGT./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT
MBR OF THE NATL POLICE AND OF THE SERVICI
OF INTELEGENCIA REGIMENTAL /SIR/ WHO HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN ORIENTE
PROV. CUBA.

019-007-001
HKSA-00050
04 JUN 56
SER 7
P1

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED IN A TEXT PREPARED BY SOC.
AS A MERCENARY AT THE PUNTA PRESIDENTE
BASE IN D. R. FOR SFNE.

019-300-003
DBA -96854
27 JAN 65
FP1
P4

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB 02 JUN 42
CUBA, MATANZAS PROV
CIT ?
OCC FISHERMAN
Δ USA, FLA, MIAMI
REF ISRM-13149, 27 SEP 63
AKA OF VERGARA DIAZ, HUMBERTO
SEP 63

201-735925.

1/p

*751

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200-4-173-414
IRA-2004

DIAZ, PEDRO

THE
CARD
FILED IN

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Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pers. info

127941

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
OF INTEREST TO SUBJECT OF 201-816431

201-815935
DBC -55476
23 JUN 69
P4

Yes

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

6907101034

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
AT MOSCOW STATE U
< USSR STUDYING IN USSR DURING 68-69 SCHOOL YR

200-006-226/03
EX -03327
05 DEC 68

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA, HABANA PROVINCE, SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS
SUBJ DESCRIBED AS NEO-COMMUNIST.

019-004-134
UFGA-04561
27 JUN 62
•201-314230
P2

DIAZ, PEDRO /DP./

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC GOVT OFFICIAL
DIV CHIEF OF THE MIN OF STATE DIV DE CONVENIOS, TRATADOS, CONVENCIONES Y REUNIONES'. SUBJ'S NAME APPEARS IN MEMO 85, DATED 02 OCT 56.

019-002-004
HKHA-03063
18 OCT 56
SER 174

24

127964
CORR CARD

6501252586

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

[illegible]

75-4-[illegible]
(HVC-6[illegible])

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL

75-6-4-522Y
HVC-1579
ENCL. 1
PG. 25

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel

[illegible]

75-4-134-17
HVC 937

DIAZ, PEDRO MELITON
DOB ?

201-2511[illegible]

CIT ?

@ OF DIAZ-LANDA, PEDRO MELITON, BORN 10 MAR 24
MATANZAS, CUBA. CIT CUBA
Δ EL SALVADOR
FORMER MEMBER OF BRAC
RECEIVED POLITICAL ASYLUM TO EL SALVADOR MAY 59

127989

DIAZ, Pedro Martinez — 4-4-5-491 (TABA-1611)

Martinez Diaz, Pedro

DIAZ, Pedro Maximo — [illegible]

DIAZ, Pedro Manuel — 75-4-11-[illegible] (HVCA-[illegible]) ([illegible] 2) ([illegible] 194)

DIAZ, PEDRO MANUEL — 75-6-4-572 HVCA-1983 ATTACH. PG. 476

127983

DIAZ, Pedro

201-53613
(TAB-A-1685)
~~(TS# 92809)~~
(Page 3)

THIS CARD FILED

127949

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE ROADS AND PUBLIC WORKS DEPT. OF VICTORIA DE LAS TUNAS, CUBA.

019-004-109
HKS -01067
20 MAY 57
SER 57
P4

C01252585

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
BUSINESSMAN. SPANIARD ACTIVE IN PROMOTING PEACE CONF. IN URUGUAY AUG 52.

200-004-278
TUN -01383
00 000 52
SER. 490

CORR. CARD
DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT CUBA
OCC POLICE AGENT
PLAIN CLOTHES NATL POLICE SGT ALLEGEDLY IN CHARGE OF THE DETAIL INVESTIGATIN ANTI BATISTA ACIVITIES. CHIEF OF BRAZ IN SANTIAGO MOD.

019-002-000
HKSA-00016
21 NOV 55
SER 14

DIAZ PEDRO
201-161423*

BORN 07-06-04 CUBA GUANTANAMO

RES. CUBA OCCUPATION

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

127937

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 05

CIT CUBA
OCC PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYEE

019 004-134
UFGA-06655 E01
15 NOV 62
P2

Δ CUBA, MATANZAS, COLISEO, URRITIA SECTION.
SUBJ IDENTIFIED AS COMMUNIST IN COLISEO, DOI APR 62.

127

DIAZ, PEDRO .

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

015-004-004
HCS -20189
00 JAN 53
CHILE
SER. 871

COMMIE EMPLOYED BY CHILEAN STATE RR.

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

073-124-003
HUMW-00253 E02
00 JUL 53
SER. 22

IN URUGUAY. PRES. OF ATENSO IN MONTEVIDEO.

DIAZ, Pedro

TN 21177
Guat 646

Guat - 30 Mar 50

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Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pres. info

127940

SE

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-006-008
[illegible]RA-01641
[illegible] DEC 52
SER. 1006

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro (Dr.)

73-6-2 [illegible]
([illegible]
TBIP-[illegible]
(p. 2)

[illegible] of value
[illegible] complete.

[illegible] of birth
[illegible] of birth
[illegible]nship
[illegible]

DIAZ, PEDRO

56-4-133
HZP-02140
4 JUN 57

ALIAS OF DE BELLO PEDRESCHI,
CARLOS GUILLERMO

CARD [illegible]
FILED

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Please complete:

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Citizenship:
Pert. info:

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB C 07

CIT CUBA
OCC ?

019-500
UFG -00889
11 APR 62
P3

MEMBER DEFENSE COMMITTEE LOCATED AT CORNER OF PRIMERA AVENIDA AND CALLE 29, VLRADERO, MATANZAS PROVINCE, CUBA

127944

0142915

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
COMMIE PARTY MEMBERS REFERENCES TO THE FOLLOWING: PEDRO ORTEGA DIAZ /1947/, PEDRO J. DIAZ /1950/, PEDRO P. DIAZ /1949/, PEDRO OLIVER DIAZ /1950/.

10[illegible]-[illegible]6-004
TABW-01697
00 NOV 50
SER. 202

CORR. CARD

127943

DIAZ, PEDRO

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
COMMIE PARTY ORGANIZER.

015-004-004
TCS -01307
00 000 51
CHILE
SER. 642

CORR. CARD

DIAZ, Pedro

aka Pico DIAZ xref

If this card is of value please complete

2

127951

DIAZ, Pedro

37-6-4-28
EET 28
(Encl 17
(Page

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Date of birth
Place of birth
Citizenship
Pert. info.

2

THIS CARD FILED IN

127948

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 18 JANUARY 1971

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE MUNEZ ALVAREZ

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN JUAN)

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION NO. 192

SECRET 191325Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIAMI 9322 19 DEC IN-22991

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

1. AMPALM-4 INFORMED STATION ON 11 DECEMBER THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY CARLOS (SARAGAT), WHO IMPORTANT ALPHA 66 SUB-CHIEF, WHO LEARNED OF IT FROM ANDRES (NAZARIO) SARGENT, LEADER OF ALPHA 66 THAT ALPHA 66 HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM ELOY (GUTIERREZ) MENOYO WRITTEN FROM A CUBAN JAIL. SARAGAT TOLD AMPALM-4 THAT HE WANTED HIM TO LOOK AT THE LETTER AND ADVISE SARAGAT ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. (APPARENTLY NAZARIO HAD ASKED SARAGAT FOR ADVISE.) AMPALM-4 EXPECTED TO SEE THE LETTER DURING WEEKEND 12-14 DECEMBER. HOWEVER, SARAGAT INFORMED AMPALM-4 THAT HE COULD NOT SHOW HIM THE LETTER AS ALPHA 66 HAD DECIDED TO LIMIT ITS READERSHIP.

201-
201-355380
201-269349

2. ACCORDING TO SARAGAT, THE LETTER APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY GUTIERREZ, ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY MORE THAN ONE PERSON PARTICIPATED IN THE EDITING. GUTIERREZ PRESENTED THREE POINTS FOR ALPHA 66'S

19-300-3

SECRET

file: 201-269349

14-00000

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

DISSEM BY ____ PER ____ #

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

DEC 23 10 29 AM '70
FORWARDED
RIDIAN

PAGE 2 WH/MIAMI 9820 SECRET

CONSIDERATION REGARDING POSSIBLE EVENTS IN CUBA. GUTIERREZ CONTINUED WITH OTHER POINTS CONCERNING THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER EXILE GROUPS IN THESE EVENTS. GUTIERREZ REQUESTED A RESPONSE TO HIS PLANS.

3. AMPALM-4 NOT ABLE LEARN MORE THAN INFORMATION PRESENTED PARAS 1 AND 2, ALTHOUGH HE STILL TRYING.

4. FILE: 19-300-3 AND 201-273453. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

201-269349

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

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3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONNECTED WITH THE 2ND FRONT ESCOMBREY AND MENTIONED IN THE DEBRIEFING OF SUBJ OF 201-354143

201-354143
UFAA-01387A01
16 OCT 69
P2

R 6910300820

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-033/03
UFAA-01136
25 JUL 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
ATT 2 P1 AND 2. FORMER FAR MAJOR, CURRENTLY IN JAIL IN CUBA SINCE AN INFILTRATION MISSION FR MIAMI IN 66.

R 6908040524

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCU~~MEN~~ MENT

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1968

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: RAFAEL RAMON NUGUET DEL VALAS

FBI FILE NO: 105-10798 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO All NAMES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-321168
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

WH/COG/FI

[redacted]

28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3 9

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, C/Ops, C/PA, FI

ANGLE 25
PS
ABSTRACT X INDEX X

S E C R E T 271807Z CITE JMWAVE 9958 WAVE

MICROFILMED DEC 4 7 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

27 OCT 67 IN 81447

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

NFG

TYPIC OSM

1. ON 26 OCT AMCONCERT/1 REPORTED HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL LEAD FROM TANYA SALAS DE GUITERREZ, WIFE ELOY (GUITERREZ) MENOYO (201-269349), FORMER HEAD SFNE (SECOND FRONT ESCAMBRAY, EXILE GROUP) WHO CAPTURED IN INFIL ATTEMPT CUBA APRIL 63 CLAIMS GLADYS (RODRIGUEZ) DE LA OBRA ARRIVED MADRID CIRCA 22 OCT ON IBERIA FLT FROM HABANA. RODRIGUEZ IS COUSIN RAMON (QUESADA) GOMEZ (201-321168) FORMER REBEL ARMY COMANDANTE WHO CAPTURED WITH MENOYO. AMCONCERT/1 SAYS QUESADA AND RODRIGUEZ CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH 13TH MARCH REVOLUTIONARY DIRECTORATE, INCLUDING THOSE WHO PRESENTLY HOLD GOVT AND ARMY POSITIONS.

SEX: F CIT: CUBA

SEX: F

18

2. NO JMWAVE TRACES RODRIGUEZ. FILE CHECK QUESADA SHOWS HE WAS 13TH MARCH MEMBER AND CLOSE FRIEND AMLASH/1 AND OTHER GOC OFFICIALS.

3. SUGGEST MADRID ATTEMPT LOCATE RODRIGUEZ AND DEBRIEF ON TARGETS OF INTEREST.

S E C R E T

SECRET

201-269349
27 Oct 1967

B-201-321168

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUEIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

019-006-122/03
UFGA-28030
20 JUL 67
P3

CIT ?
OCC PRISONER
SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ISLA DE PINOS
~~PRISON TO LA CABANA PRISON IN OCT 66.~~
~~FFN 19-120-30-71/4~~

R 6708031283

FILE IN 201-269349

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FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

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(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SNFE PLANS NEGOTIATE WITH GOC FOR EXCHANGE HERNANDEZ ARMAS /201-301755/ FOR SUBJ, FORMER HEAD SNFE AND NOW POLITICAL PRISONER CUBA.

201-300086
MEXI-09677
29 DEC 66
P1

R 6704210128

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELCY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-300086
MEXI-09163
08 NOV 66
P1

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
SUBJ IS FIRST ON JORGE ROBLEJO-LORIE 201-300086 PRISONER LIST IF NEGOTIATIONS FOR EXCHANGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FAIL. ROBLEJO ALTERNATE PLAN IS TO KIDNAP GUTIERREZ, WHO IS CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO, AND HOLD HIM FOR RANSOM OF 70 PRISONERS IN CUBA.

UFGNCS

R 6701121101

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISRM NO. 3703
DATE
201 NO.

NAME [redacted] GUTIERREZ Menoyo, Eloy
ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
PRESENT ADDRESS		OCCUPATION

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT
TRAVEL
ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

SUBJECT terminated w/o prejudice 4 May 66.

GP 3

~~GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In) CONFIDENTIAL

ISR LOG

FROM		SERVICE NO. SD 8831
INDEX	SECURITY	DATE
TO: / FROM:		DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
TO OO: / RESULTS	COVER	ISRM NO. / DATE
AREA DESK / OTHER		201-

COMMENTS

FORM 11-63 1797 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 MARCH 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ-MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-791330
USMA-20300A01
29 OCT 65
P12

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
TOP COMMANDER IN SEGUNDO FRENTE DE ESCAMBRAY AND ORGANIZATION AUTENTICA. NOW IN A G-2 PRISON SINCE TAKING PART IN SMALL INVASION IN MAY 65.

: WAS 065-002-010/03
058

R 6706021137

FILE IN 201-269349

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

FBI DOCUMENTS

DATE: 28 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO
FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (SAN ANTONIO)

DATE: 19 MAY 1965
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CUBAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S.
FBI FILE NO: 105-1998 (MIAMI)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-749653 - filed by Branch
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

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TIME
BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH/8 — FI

C S E C R E T 120126Z

MICROFILMED
MAY 9 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

12 FEB 65 IN 78972

DIR INFO MEXI CITE WAVE 8185

TYPIC AMSPICE

1. 8 FEB 65 WAVE RCVD TELEGRAM DTD 7 FEB FROM AMSPICE/1 URGENTLY REQUESTING CONTACT WITH WAVE C/O. WAVE FOUND AMSPICE/1 REQUEST RATHER ODD YET INTRIGUING PARTICULARLY VIEW FACT AMBLINK/1 HAD LAST CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 ON 6 FEB PRIOR DEPARTING MEXI FOR WAVE AREA.

2. NOT WISHING USE PHONE FOR REASONS SECURITY, WAVE DISPATCHED AMBLINK/1 MEXICO CITY 8 FEB ORDER DETERMINE NATURE AMSPICE/1 PROBLEM.

3. 9 FEB AMBLINK/1 PERSONALLY CONTACTED AMSPICE/1 AT HOME. SHE STATED HAD RCVD URGENT TELECON FROM IDEN'S WIFE WAVE AREA ASKING HER COME WAVE AREA HELP HER CARRY OUT CAMPAIGN OBTAIN PBRUMEN GOVT CLEMENCY FOR HUSBAND. AMSPICE/1 STATED SHE FULLY COMMITTED ASSIST IDEN AND WIFE SINCE THEY OLD FRIENDS AND THAT UNLESS WAVE CO HAD STRONG OBJECTIONS SHE PLANNED PROCEED WAVE AREA WITH CHILDREN. SHE IMPLIED WOULD NEED WAVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO MAKE TRIP.

4. AMBLINK/1 WAS INSTRUCTED BY WAVE INFORM AMSPICE/1 HIS SUPERIORS GREATLY DISPLEASED AT FRIVOLUOUS MANNER IN WHICH SHE BECKONS ASSISTANCE AND WHIMSICAL NATURE HER REQUEST. AMBLINK/1 FURTHER

over

B-201-749653

~~12 Feb 1965~~
201-269349
~~12 Feb 65~~

SECRET

INSTRUCTED AMSPICE/1 REFRAIN FROM SUCH TACTICS IN FUTURE.

5. WAVE NOT DESIROUS HAVE AMSPICE/1 CONTACT IDEN'S WIFE THIS TIME ORDER ATTEMPT SALVAGE AMSPICE OPERATION, IF POSSIBLE, FROM DAMAGES THAT WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY ACCRUE AS RESULT IDEN'S ARREST. AS STATED PARA 11W UFGA 16565 DTD 29 JUNE 64, AMSPICE/1, PRIOR HER INITIAL CONTACT WITH WAVE, CONFESSED HER CIS MISSION TO IDEN AND HER INTENTION DISCLOSE EVERYTHING TO ODYOKE AUTHORITIES. IDEN ALLEGEDLY COUNSELED HER DO LATTER. AS WILL BE RECALLED PART AMSPICE/1'S MISSION WAS PENETRATE IDEN AND HIS ORG.

6. WAVE OF BELIEVE E? IN SPITE FOREGOING THAT AMSPICE OP HAS FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE BEING SALVAGED. SINCE AMSPICE/1 IS CIS AGENT, WAVE DOES NOT FEEL IT LIKELY THAT CIS WILL HAVE SURFACED HER NAME DURING IDEN'S INTERROGATION AS IT NOT LOGICAL CIS WOULD DISCUSS THEIR AGENTS WITH ONE OF THEIR AGENTS' VICTIMS. IF A/1 NOT MENTIONED BY CIS, IT POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE SEEN FIT NOT BRING HER NAME UP. HOWEVER, SINCE IDEN'S CURRENT SITUATION IS ONE OF LIFE OR DEATH, IT VERY POSSIBLE IDEN MAY HAVE VOLUNTEERED FACT A/1 BETRAYED CIS ORDER GAIN ONE MORE POINT HIS FAVOR.

7. ORDER SAVE A/1 OP, WAVE HAS INSTRUCTED A/1 AS FOLLOWS:

A. SHE TO REFRAIN FROM MIXING IN IDEN AFFAIR.

B. IF CONFRONTED BY CIS WITH IDEN ADMISSION SHE TO DENY SHE TOLD IDEN HER MISSION AND SUGGEST HER HUSBAND MAY HAVE BEEN CULPRIT.

C. SHE ALSO TO CLAIM SHE DID NOT INFORM ODYOKE AUTHORITIES

AND WILL POINT TO HER INSOLVENCY, LOSS OF HER BUSINESS, HER PRESENCE MEXICO, AND VARIED ASSORTMENT PAWN TICKETS AND BILLS AS EVIDENCE SHE NOT WORKING FOR ODYOKE. SHE TO STATE THAT IF SHE WERE IN ODYOKE EMPLOY SHE WOULD BE LIVING IN LUXURY RATHER THAN POVERTY.

8. WAVE WILL CONTINUE CLOSE MONITORING OP IN HOPES A/1 CAN EXTRICATE SELF FROM CURRENT RATHER PRECARIOUS SITUATION.

SECRET

12 Feb. 1965
201-269349

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational
AMDELL-1 Information on Eloy *GUTIERREZ Menoyo

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI:

1. AMDELL-1 spoke with AMRAZZ-1 on two separate occasions and learned the following information with the dates and sources as indicated.

2. AMRAZZ-1 spoke on 31 January 1965 with Sergio (LNU) who had just reached Miami from the Dominican Republic. Sergio stated that GUTIERREZ had gone to Cuba with three other men on 20 December 1964, landing near Baracoa, Oriente. The only members in this first infiltration were those arrested. GUTIERREZ had promised to contact his base by radio on 31 December 1964, but no message was ever received. Plans called for another group of about seven men to infiltrate into Cuba at Baracoa on or before 20 January 1965. The group left the Dominican Republic on 20 January according to plan. Near the Cuban coast, they were pursued by three Cuban patrol boats and one airplane but managed to escape. The boat used in both infiltration attempts was called the "Betrand" which may mean a Bertram boat.

3. AMRAZZ-1 reported on 1 February that he had spoke on 31 January 1965 to Reynaldo ABREU in charge of GUTIERREZ' affairs in Miami who in turn had spoken to Celio VAZQUEZ, GUTIERREZ' main contact in the Dominican Republic by telephone on 30 January 1965. VAZQUEZ stated he could not come to Miami at that time as he was taking charge of dismantling the base there. He also needed about $10,000.00 to clear up back bills owed by the group. However, on 3 February 1965, AMDELL-1 reported AMRAZZ-1 had again spoken to Reynaldo ABREU who declared the members of GUTIERREZ' group in the Dominican Republic intended to go ahead with the plan to infiltrate Cuba. To his knowledge a leader had not been decided upon but ABREU believed the only person capable was Angel BAÑOS. (See paragraph 5 below for traces).

/ CONTINUED /

c/s copy filed 19-9-12

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201-269349

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE TYPED 10 Feb 65	DATE DISPATCHED FEB 15 1965
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 19,816	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-9-12-2	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA 19,816

4. Finally, on 31 January 1965, AMRAZZ-1 was invited to the home of "Pepe" (Jose) AGUIAR, secretary to Manolo RAY, to meet an Englishman whom AGUIAR privately described to AMRAZZ-1 as the head of British intelligence in the Caribbean just released four months ago from jail in Cuba. Later, after being introduced, the Englishman told AMRAZZ-1 the British Embassy in Havana had information that GUTIERREZ had been arrested on 4 January 1965. He did not state how he received this information or when and how he had come from Cuba. AMRAZZ-1 added he did not know how AGUIAR met this individual or where he was residing. AMRAZZ-1 described the Englishman thus: about 30 years old, 5' 10", medium build, 160 pounds, dark complexion, British accent, spoke little Spanish, wore sport shirt and pants.

5. WAVE files describe Angel Gilberto *BANOS Pantoja as a former U. S. citizen who fought in the Escambray, was a rebel army captain, arrived in the U. S. by boat along with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo in 1961. He is considered a possible DSE agent. Extensive traces are as follows:

a. WAVE files: AMOT report of 21 September 1963, BANOS reportedly stated II-Front had boats stolen from Varadero in action credited to II-Front and Alpha 66; 12 June 1961 "Miami Herald" reported Subject arrived in Key West with Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo and others. Detained by Immigration and Naturalization Service at McAllen, Texas, released, arrived Miami 11 June 1961; AMOT report of 11 December 1962 describes subject as II-Front member waiting on a Key for supplies necessary to go to Escambray mountains; AMOT report of 22 January 1963 describes subject as contact of Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, an ex-rebel army captain in Escambray during fight against Batista. Born Miami on 12 August 1943, lost citizenship for serving in Cuba under arms, came to U. S. with GUTIERREZ Menoyo and detained in McAllen, Texas; CSCI 3/775,277 of 12 March 1963 describes subject as confidant and courier for GUTIERREZ Menoyo; memorandum dated 22 January 1963 stated subject reportedly returned from 40-day trip inside Cuba as courier for II-Front; AMOT report of 11 April 1963 included Subject on list of those presented with prevention of departure notices by FBI; CSCI-3/772,476 describes subject as reportedly anti-United States, pro-Communist; AMCHEER-1 report and AMOT report of 16 June 1962 describe subject as having worked in G-2 offices at Rancho Boyeros Airport and being commander of a militia group there. Belonged to National Air Federation in 59/60. Reportedly had problems with Cuban authorities over theft of a jewelry store.

b. Headquarters traces: DBA 49631 of 28 August 1963; UFGA 11981 of 18 October 1963; DBA 55602 of 24 October 1963; OSMA 13,496 of 26 January 1962; 00-1512, February 1961; DBF 49905 of 17 May 1960; DBF 77248 of 18 May 1961; WAVE 3206 of 26 January 1961 and WAVE 3228 of 27 January 1961; CS-3/378,712, HKH-1754 of 24 November 1958; CO-A-3/180,639 of 7 March 1961 and CSCI-3/764,579 typed 22 March 1961; DBA-32298 of 18 January 1963; FBI-105-6243 of 15 April 1963; UFG-04958 of 14 April 1964; UFGA 07467 of 30 January 1963; WAVE 03604 of 23 January 1963; UFGA 05173 of 9 August 1962;

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

149653

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	2

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GUTIERREZ MENOYO, ELOY
201-269349
SEX M DOB ?

201-762117
UFGA-19792A01
15 FEB 65
P4

CIT ?
OCC ?
INFO RE CONNECTION WITH BLANCA ROSA MAURE (DE) CABRERA. WIFE OF SUBJ 201-762117.

R 6502191772

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 269.349 201-269349

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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S E C R E T 040052Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 79[illegible]

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7588 (68557) *

AB FI ~~DESK~~ ~~IS~~ ABSTRACT ~~INDEX~~

4 FEB 65 IN 73186

1. AMSCREAM-1[1] REPORTS KEY WEST JAMMED BY EXILES NIGHT 2 FEB TO WATCH HAVANA TV APPEARANCE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, DOMINGO ORTEGA, NOEL SALAS AND RAMON QUESADA. AMSCREAM-1[1], UPI'S MIKE ALONSO, AMOTS[2], AND AMSHADY-1[3] SUBSOURCES WHO WATCHED TV AT KEY WEST SAY PRISONERS LOOKED BETTER GROOMED AND DRESSED, MORE RELAXED THAN G-2 INTERROGATORS, SHOWING NO VISIBLE EVIDENCE TORTURE OR "BRAIN WASHING." ALONSO OBSERVED MENOYO LOOKED AND SOUNDED COLD AND CALCULATING, UNEMOTIONAL, IN CONTRAST WITH PREVIOUS CASTRO CAPTIVES SHOWN TV WHO SEEMED WEARY, TIRED, HOPELESS PRISONERS. AMSHADY-1[3] SAYS SOME PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE MENOYO WAS DRUGGED OR TORTURED, BUT PLAN SAY SO FOR PROP PURPOSES.

2. INFO RESULTING FROM MENOYO'S TV INTERROGATION BASICALLY SAME GIVEN BY MINFAR FROM PREVIOUS INTERROGATION (REPORTED PARA 3 REF). NEW ITEM WAS RAMON QUESADA'S TV STATEMENT THAT HE RECEIVED CIA TRAINING MAP READING AND ARMS HANDLING. ALSO NEW WAS MENOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES GIVE UP EFFORTS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG EXILES MENOYO DID NOT REVEAL ANYTHING NOT

201-269349

4 Feb 1965

SECRET

SECRET

IN 73186
P-2

PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY EXILES OR CASTRO REGIME. THIS FEELING REFLECTED MIKE ALONSO'S REPORT FOR UPI, AND IS THE INTERPRETATIVE LINE GENERALLY BEING FOLLOWED BY MIAMI PRESS AND RADIO. EMPHASIS CONTINUES ON ALLEGED ROLE DOMINICAN AND PUERTO RICAN GOVTS.

3. CANVASSING OF EXILE REACTIONS SHOW IMPACT MENOYO'S CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS HEAVIER AND MORE DOMORALIZING THAN MANOLO RAY'S FIASCO. PARTICULARLY UPSETTING WAS $\overset{E}{\text{MA}}$NOYO'S ADVICE TO EXILES THAT THEIR EFFORTS CAUSING UNNECESSARY BLOOD LETTING WITHOUT CHANCE SUCCESS BECAUSE PEOPLE INSIDE SUPPORT CASTRO. MENOYO'S UNEMOTIONAL DELIVERY AND WARNING TO EXILE ADVENTURERS THEIR FATE WILL BE WORSE THAN HIS BEING INTERPRETED AS EVIDENCE HE EITHER COWARD OR TRAITOR WHO KNEW WOULD NOT BE SHOT. $\overset{4}{\text{AMCORE}}$-2 REPORTS THAT EXILES UNABLE TO RECONCILE MENOYO'S ALLEGED BACKGROUND AS BRAVE GUERRILLA FIGHTER WITH LAST NIGHT TV PERFORMANCE AND FEEL ONLY EXPLANATION IS MENOYO WAS CASTRO AGENT ALL ALONG.

4. MOST EXILE LEADERS CONSIDER WORST DAMAGE FROM MENOYO EPISODE WAS UNDERLYING PROMOTION CASTRO GOVT AS POWERFUL REGIME AGAINST WHICH EXILES OR INSIDE RESISTANCE ELEMENTS CAN DO LITTLE. $\overset{4}{\text{AMCORE}}$-2 REPORTS SFNE PEOPLE ARE WISHING OUT LOUD FOR RAID BY ARTIME OR ORLANDO BOSCH TO COUNTER EFFECT MENOYO MUST HAVE HAD AMONG ANTI-CASTROISTS

SECRET

SECRET

IN 73126
P-3

4 5 (AS RCVD) 3

INSIDE CUBA. AMCORE-2, AMRAZONR-1, AND AMSHADY-1 AGREE THAT DEMORALIZING

EFFECT MENOYO TV PERFORMANCE WORST AMONG OPPONENTS CASTRO REGIME

INSIDE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

*Reports on JMWAVE area publicity concerning captured exile Gutierrez Menoyo.

INDEX. ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 269349 ✓
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ ~~RET. TO BRANCH~~ ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. Amt

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BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

AN ✓	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

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S E C R E T 040052Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7909 (INGHURST ACTING)

IN 73193

TYPIC PSYCH

REF A WAVE 7908 (73156)

B WAVE 7906 (IN 73176)

1. STATION BELIEVES MAIN DAMAGING IMPACT MENOYO CAPTURE AND TV APPEARANCE WILL BE ON MOTIVATION ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE CUBA. MAIN PSYCH TARGET WAS OBVIOUSLY CUBAN POPULATION AND TV SHOW WAS DESIGNED IMPRESS DOUBTING THOMASES AND ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS THAT REGIME INVINCIBLE AND ANY RESISTANCE USELESS. AS LATEST IN SERIES EXILE FAILURES MOUNT EFFECTIVE ACTION OPS AGAINST CASTRO, MENOYO CASE BOUND HAVE STRONG NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ANTI REGIME ELEMENTS INSIDE WHO WILL VIEW THIS AX ONE MORE INDICATION NO OUTSIDE HELP FORTHCOMING. BEST COUNTERACTION OF COURSE WOULD BE FEW SUCCESSFUL AND DRAMATIC RESISTANCE ACTS EITHER BY INSIDE GROUPS OR FROM OUTSIDE.

2. WHILE PROPAGANDA CANNOT CHANGE BASIC PSYCH ATMOSPHERE INSIDE HOEPFULLY CAN PARTIALLY COUNTER IMPACT MENOYO CASE BY RE-DIRECTING CUBAN AUDIENCE ATENTION TO LONG-TERM PROBLEMS CASTRO REGIME NOTING THAT CAPTURE FEW INDIVIDUALS CANNOT SAVE CASTRO FROM ULTIMATE

201-269349
4 Feb 1965

SECRET

SECRET IN 73193, pg. 2

INEVITABLE DOWNFALL. UNDERLYING THEMES WAVE PROP WILL BE RESISTANCE TO CASTRO INSIDE CUBA CONTINUALLY INCREASING, ECONOMIC SITUATION DETERIORATING, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE SLOWLY ISOLATING CASTRO, DOWNFALL INEVITABLE. FOLLOWING PARAS REPORT SPECIFIC PROP ACTIONS BEING CARRIED OUT.

3. FEB 3 AMCORE-2 RELEASING TO PRESS AND BROADCASTING OVER JMHOPE AMTHIGH LETTER FROM INSIDE INFORMANT REPORTING SUGAR CANE BURNING. RELEASE PICKED UP BY UPI AND AP 3 FEB. BROADCAST WILL ALSO POINT OUT MENOYO CASE ONE ISOLATED PROPAGANDA OPERATION BY CASTRO REGIME AND CANNOT CHANGE BASIC FACT FIGHT AGAINST CASTRO CONTINUES OVER WIDE FRONT: SABOTAGE, PRODUCTION SLOWDOWNS, ECONOMIC BLOCKADE, DISAFFECTION IN UPPER LEVELS REGIME, ETC., AND SUCH EVENTS AS MENOYO CAPTURE WILL ONLY INSPIRE AMCORE AND OTHER RESISTANCE ELEMENTS IN CUBA REDOUBLE EFFORTS SABOTAGE PRODUCTION WHICH ACHILLES HEEL CASTRO REGIME.

4. AMICE PROGRAMS WMIE (3 FEB) JMHOPE (5 FEB) AMTHIGH (6 FEB) EXPLOITING DECISION PANAMANIAN WORKERS NOT SERVICE SHIPS TRADING WITH CUBA AS SIGN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE CONTINUING, AND BLOCKADE TOGETHER WITH WORK SLOWDOWNS AND SABOTAGE BY WORKERS HITTING CASTRO MOST VULNERABLE SPOT.

SECRET

IN 73193 pg 3

SECRET

5. AMDOFF-1 AIRPORT STATEMENT PER REF B EXPECTED TAKE SOME PUBLICITY LIMELIGHT AWAY FROM MENOYO CASE AMDOFF-1 WILL ALSO APPEAR AMCORE-2 PROGRAM 3 FEB.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

201-264349

~~INDEX~~ ☐ ~~YES~~ ☒ ~~NO~~

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269349

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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84 **SECRET**

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FROM CARACAS

ACTION ~~WH 8~~ WH/SA

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UNIT WH

TIME 1802

BY DD

Jan 26 22 37 Z '65

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/SA 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

AN	NH	18	~~DESTROY~~
		FI	
ABSTRACT		X	~~INDEX~~

26 JAN 65 IN 67522

S E C R E T 262010Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE CARA 9635

IMMEDIATE ACTION

ON 26 JANUARY, DR. ARMANDO FLEITES, OF SEGUNDA FRENTE DE ESCAMBRAY, URGENTLY CALLED ON POL COUSELLOR EDWARD LONG (TWO WEEKS PRIOR VIA MUTUAL FRIENDS FLEITES HAD REQUESTED ONE WEEK VISITOR VISA "ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS" TO VISIT FAMILY IN WAVE AREA; BOWDLER IN PERSONAL LETTER TO LONG ADVISED THAT FLEITES HAD FORFEITED RIGHT TO SPECIAL TREATMENT AND WOULD HAVE TO APPLY FOR IMMIGRATION VISA). FLEITES, WHO ACCEPTS AS PROBABLY ACCURATE PRESS STORIES RE CAPTURE GUTIERREZ MENOYO, NOW CLAIMS THAT IN CAPACITY AS NUMBER TWO LEADER OF FRENTE, IT URGENTLY NECESSARY HE TRAVEL TO WAVE AREA TO SPEND ONE WEEK WITH HIS GROUP. STATES HE WOULD NOT EVEN WANT TO SEE HIS FAMILY, ADDING NOW WAS TIME FOR PBPRIME TO PROVE WHETHER "FRIEND OR ENEMY" OF CUBAN FREEDOM. ON OFFHAND CHANCE KUBARK MAY HAVE OPERATIONAL EQUITIES IN FRENTE, COUNSELLOR LONG ASKS STA CHECK WITH HEADQUARTERS. TENTATIVELY ADVISED HIM KUBARK NOT INVOLVED, BUT WOULD INQUIRE IN ANY CASE. SUGGEST HQS ADVISE BOWDLER AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER IN LIGHT ABOVE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES ODACID POSITION RE FLEITES ENTRY (AS STATED IN HIS LETTER TO LONG)

SECRET

201-269349

26 Jan 65

IN 67522
PAGE 2

RID/MIS
FEB '65

IN ANY MANNER CHANGED. IF NEGATIVE, LONG WILL ADVISE FLEITES ACCORDINGLY.

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CFN

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15 SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 5

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UNIT WH/SA

TIME 1335

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/SPG, WH 7

SECRET 261724Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE WAVE 7519

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7501 (IN 66863)

26 JAN 65 IN 67362

1. ACSI REPS MIAMI CONTACTED WAVE CIRCA 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND ASKED FOR EMERGENCY MEET 2200 HOURS 25 JAN IN ORDER COORDINATE PRIORITY OP WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN ACSI AND KUBARK HQS AM 26 JAN. WAVE AGREED MEET AS REQUESTED BY ACSI.

2. UPON INITIATION 2200 HOURS MEET ACSI REPS STATED SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPLETELY SINCE 1800 HOURS 25 JAN AND THEY NO LONGER HAD PRIORITY OPS PROPOSAL WORTH CONSIDERING. ACSI INDICATED HOWEVER THEY DID WANT BRIEF REUTEMAN AND EDWARD F. HUSEBY, WHO WAVE LIAISON TO ACSI, RE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THEIR OP. THIS BRIEFING REVEALED FOLLOWING:

A. MAY 64 MIAMI ACSI INHERITED FROM ACSI PUERTO RICO OP WHICH INVOLVED USE RAFAEL HUGUET DE VALLE (201-269895) AS POTENTIAL W/T OPERATOR AND SINGLETON INTEL COLLECTOR. CONCEPT IN THIS OP WAS HUGUET WOULD INFIL CUBA WITH SFNE LEADER ELOYO GUTIERREZ MENOYO BUT WOULD REPORT BY W/T TO ACSI ON OB ETC. GUTIERREZ MENOYO KNEW OF THIS ARRANGEMENT AND HAD GIVEN HUGUET PERMISSION MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ACSI. GUTIERREZ KNEW SPONSORING ORGANIZATION FOR THIS OP WAS ACSI. IT ACSI THESIS

201-269349

IN 67362 PAGE 2

THAT IN THIS OP THEY WORKING WITH INDIVIDUAL AGENT, I.E. HUGUET BUT THEY NOT SPONSORING GUTIERREZ OR SFNE.

B. GUTIERREZ INFILTRATED CUBA CIRCA 18 DEC 64. OP MOUNTED FROM BASE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BUT DETAILS UNKNOWN ACSI. IDENTITIES OF MEN INFILTRATING CUBA WITH GUTIERREZ NOT KNOWN ACSI.

C. HUGUET RECENTLY OBTAINED WORD FROM GUTIERREZ TO JOIN HIM IN CUBA. ACSI WANTED DISPATCH HUGUET SOONEST AND WANTED COORDINATED SUCH INFIL WITH WAVE. IMPLICATION BEING ACSI WAS GOING ASK FOR WAVE ASSISTANCE IN THIS OP. EXTENT OR NATURE THIS ASSISTANCE NOT IDENTIFIED.

D. ACSI LEARNED CIRCA 2000 HOURS 25 JAN OF HAVANA ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT GUTIERREZ APPREHENSION THUS ALL PLANS FOR HUGUET INFIL CANCELLED FOR TIME BEING. MIAMI ACSI NOT SURE WHAT FUTURE HOLDS FOR HUGUET BUT WOULD LIKE DISCUSS THIS WITH WAVE AT LATER DATE.

E. MIAMI ACSI MOST CONCERNED GUTIERREZ WOULD IDENTIFY ACSI TO GOC AS AGENCY SPONSORING HIS MISSION. IF THIS EXPLOITED IN PROP FIELD BY GOC THEY WANTED KUBARK KNOW ACSI DID NOT SPONSOR GUTIERREZ.

3. AFTER FURNISHING PARA 2 INFO ACSI ASKED IF WAVE WOULD GIVE THEM TRACES ON HUGUET AS THEY HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY TRACED HUGUET WITH WAVE. WE AGREED FURNISH TRACES WHILE CHIDING ACSI IN LOW KEY THAT THIS LATE DATE FOR RUNNING LOCAL TRACES.

SECRET

IN 67350 PAGE 3

4. MIAMI ACSI ASKED INFORMALLY WHAT WAVE THOUGHT OF THEIR OPS CONCEPT RE HUGUET AND GUTIERREZ. WE POINTED OUT THAT BASED FRAGMENTARY INFO AVAILABLE TO US WE FELT THEY HAD LIAISON AND NOT AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH HUGUET THUS IT HARD ENVISION HUGUET AS CONTROLLED ASSET. ADDITIONALLY IT POINTED OUT EXPERIENCE WITH WIDE VARIETY OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC EXILE GROUPS HAD CONVINCED REUTEMAN IT IMPOSSIBLE MAKE ACSI CONCEPT RE HUGUET WORK. THIS EXPRESSED AS REUTEMAN OPINION AND NOT AS KUBARK DOCTRINE.

5. TRACES RE HUGUET FOLLOW IN SEPARATE CABLE.

6. ASSUME HUGUET OP COORDINATED WITH KUBARK AT HQS LEVEL. IF NOT, PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-269341
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG 47726

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27 SECRET

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BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

30 JAN 65 IN 70252

AN / FI / DEST / ABSTRACT / INDEX

S E C R E T 292332Z

DIR INFO CARA CITE WAVE [illegible]

TYPIC

1. ON 28 JAN AMSHADY-1 WAS AT HOME ZENAIDA (MARRERRO) WIFE OF RENE (DECHARD) FORMER CUBAN CONSUL TO US, WHO ALTHOUGH AUTENTICA AND NOT BELONG SNFE IS CONSIDERED PERSONAL FRIEND MOST REVOLUTIONARIES WHILE AMSHADY-1 THERE AMAURY (FRAGINALS) ARRIVED AND SAID SENT WAVE AREA BY ARMANDO FLEITAS WHO STILL CARA AS NOT YET RECEIVED PASSPORT FOR US. FRAGINALS HAD SEVERAL MISSIONS ACCOMPLISH ACCORDING PART CONVERSATION AMSHADY-1 HEARD. FIRST, FLEITAS CONCERNED THAT INTERVIEW GUTIERREZ WIDOW GIVEN TO BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA WHO IN TURN GAVE SAME TO ONLY BATISTIANO COMMENTATORS. FRAGINALS TO ASSURE THIS NOT RECUR EVEN IF NECESSARY BEAT UP DE LA VEGA. FLEITAS ALSO AUTHORIZED FRAGINALS BEAT UP ANYONE CALLING GUTIERREZ COMMUNIST AS THAT LAST STRAW. ACCORDING FRAGINALS, FLEITAS PLANS REORGANIZE SNFE WAVE AREA AS DISPLEASED THEIR HANDLING GUTIERREZ INCIDENT. ALSO FLEITAS PLANS GO PBRUMEN SOON AS CAN SAY GOODBY TO WIFE AS OWES MORAL DEBT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS AND GUTIERREZ.

201-269349
30 Jan 1965

2. AMSHADY-1 ALSO HEARD FROM SAME SOURCE THAT PARENTS [illegible]

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

SECRET FORWARDED
RID/MIS

IN 70252
PAGE 2

FEB 17 8 39 AM '65

FEB 16 [illegible] 65

QUESADA, ONE OF THOSE CAPTURED, ARRESTED. ALSO SEVERAL ATTEMPTS CONTACT PARENTS GUTIERREZ BY PHONE UNSUCCESSFUL HENCE ASSUME THEY ALSO PRISONERS.

3. FRAGINALS SAID AFTER FLEITAS REANIMATED EXILES CARA FOLLOWING FIRST WAVE DEPRESSION UPON NEWS CAPTURE, THEY COLLECTED ABOUT $4000 CARA.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

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RS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 269349
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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49 SECRET GROUP 1

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/SA 8

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INFO VR. FILE, DDP, SR 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI, FI/SPG, OGC 2, CI, CI/PS, CI/IC 2, WH 7

SECRET 300142Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE WAVE 7712

TYPIC

REF WAVE 7648 (IN 69406) *

AN ✓	FI	
DEF	DESK	
ABSTRACT X 7	INDEX	

30 JAN 65 IN 7

1. AS REPORTED REF, AMLYRIC-1 TRIED CONTACT AURELIO NAZARIO SARGEN AS ONE OF FEW MEMBERS REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE SANE ENOUGH HELP REPAIR PROP LINES DAMAGED IN SFNE CONTENTION GUTIERREZ BETRAYED BY INTERNAL CONTACTS. BEFORE MAKING CONTACT HOWEVER AMLYRIC-1 ADVISED BY AMHIM-2 THAT AURELIO WAS AMONG THOSE AT 27 JAN PRESS CONFERENCE ARGUING IN FAVOR DELEGATION TO APPEAL POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ THROUGH SOV AMBASSADOR. AMLYRIC-1 THREW IN SPONGE AT THIS POINT; SEES NO HOPE BRINGING ORDER OUT OF CURRENT CHAOTIC ACTIONS THIS HEADLESS EXILE GROUP. SFNE OFFICIAL AMAURY FRAGINALS WHO CAME FROM CARA LATE 27 JAN ALSO DISSATISFIED PUBLICITY HANDLING BUT MOSTLY ON SUCH MATTERS AS EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH MRS GUTIERREZ BEING GIVEN TO WELL KNOWN BATISTIANO BENJAMIN DE LA VEGA.

2. 28 JAN DIARIO LAS AMERICAS REPORTS LETTER BEING SENT UN SECGEN ENCLOSING PETITION POW STATUS FOR GUTIERREZ SIGNED BY "NUMEROUS" EXILE ORGANIZATIONS (TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NOT INCLUDING WAVE GROUPS). ACCORDING WMET NEWS BROADCAST CUBAN EXILES MEXI CALLING FOR EXECUTION

SECRET
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201-269349
30 Jan 1965

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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SECRET

SECRET PAGE 2

RID 70281

ALL COMMUNIST PRISONERS HELD LA IF GUTIERREZ GETS DEATH SENTENCE.

FEB 17 8 39 AM '65

3. AMATEUR ANALYSTS AMONG LOCAL EXILES KNOWINGLY POINT OUT EXPENSIVE LATE MODEL ARMS CARRIED BY GUTIERREZ AND APPARENT "GREEN LIGHT" FROM U.S. AND DOMREP AUTHORITIES AS EVIDENCE HE SPONSORED BY KUBARK, BUT LEFTIST BROADCASTER MAX LESNICK REFUTED THIS POSSIBILITY ON RADIO REPLICA (WMIE) 28 JAN.

4. MOST TALK OF GUTIERREZ NOW LIMITED TO GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS HAVING DIRECT INTEREST OR INVOLVEMENT. SOME DISINTERESTED PARTIES OPINE HE MAY BE DEAD ALREADY. OTHERS LOSING INTEREST BECAUSE RECENT REPORTS LACK DETAIL. THREE CAPTAINS WAVE VESSELS EXPRESSED SORROW FOR GUTIERREZ PLIGHT BUT RELIEF THAT HE NO LONGER IN POSITION ENDANGER KUBARK MARITIME OPS.

5. GUTIERREZ ISSUE DIMINISHING IN IMPORTANCE ON LOCAL SCENE. THERE PRESENTLY NO REPORTED REACTIONS ON ARREST FROM CUBA VIA TELEPHONE CALLS TO EXILES THIS AREA, THUS IT DIFFICULT JUDGE WHAT IMPACT THIS ARREST HAS HAD ON OPS CLIMATE CUBA.

6. PLA RESTRICT PROP COVERAGE ON GUTIERREZ ARREST TO STRAIGHT NEWS REPORTING FOR NEXT FEW DAYS, I.E. WILL PUBLICIZE D.R. DENIAL THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THIS OP, ETC.

SECRET + 28 JAN CONFUSION STILL REIGNS AMONG EXILES ON NEARLY ALL ASPECTS ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO CASE.

SECRET

SECRET

064 JY MT

3 AUG 64 VE CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION : WE 8

INFO : FE 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, VR

ADDED: CI/IC 2, VR

Jfk-Gibson

S E C R E T 01 02135Z

4 Aug 64 IN 40821

DIR CITE PARI 5567 BINGHAM ACTING

LCHARVEST

1. VERGES MAGAZINE REVOLUTION COMBINED ISSUES NO'S 10-11 APPEARED ON PARIS NEWSSTANDS 30 JULY. STA BUYING UP COPIES FOR STUFFER PSYCH OP. WILL ADVISE.

2. FYI BULLETIN INSIDE FRONT COVER STATES:

FOLLOWING GRAVE ACCUSATIONS CONVEYED BY COMRADES IN NEW YORK, LONDON AND ACCRA AND CONFIRMED ON INQUIRY, REVOLUTION INFORMS ITS READERS THAT RICHARD GIBSON WHO MISUSED HIS OFFICE AS FORMER SECRETARY OF "FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE" IN ORDER PENETRATE RANKS OF INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT MUST NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED COLLABORATOR OF THIS REVIEW. NO EDITION OF REVIEW MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DOINGS.

3. DURING OUR OWN PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF APPROACHING GIBSON FOR WTRK JERVAY (ASO Rec'd JERVAY) ASKED LOCAL ODENVY IF HE WAS THEIR AGENT AND WAS TOLD NO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

040-006-138/03
NBDA-10084
12 MAR 64

PAZR 1918303

CIT USA
OCC EDITOR
Δ FRANCE
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION OF REVOLUTION DISPATCH CONTAINS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SUBJ AND PADBAYON/1

1 918 303

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE **PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION**	PRQ NO. DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM QREBONY/1	2. PSEUDONYM Frederick T. Dominic

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

In response to Headquarters requests, London Station officer George H. KatZenbach contacted Subject in London in mid-January 1965 for the purpose of debriefing him on his experiences in the pro-ChiCom milieu in Africa and western Europe up to the time of his departure from the staff of Revolution in sping 1964. This was followed up by in-depth debriefing sessions carried out by Katzenbach in a PBSWING conference room on 17,18,19 and 23 February. On the basis of these talks it was decided to recruit Subject for a test assignment in Algiers during the summer of 1965 during which time he would attempt to build long-term access and cover for reporting on activities and personalities in the Afro-Asian community. KUDESK/ICG staffer Joseph S. Tiffany was dispatched to London TDY 1-7 June for this purpose. After recruitment end agreement to LCFLUTTER examination, Subject was introduced to his Paris-based Case Officer, Rufus F. RODIGAST, on 3 June.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Yes/ To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, TIFFANY or KATZENBACH.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

KATZENBACH - known to Subject as "Earl Wilson"

TIFFANY - " " " " "Robert 'Bob' Gustke"

RODIGAST - " " " " "Paul Weller"

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "an communist.")*

Subject's lack of funds and a job are of primary importance. His need for cash (evidenced to some extent by his attempt to peddle articles to China Quarterly, Encounter and Atlantic Monthly in the fall of '64) was critical. But of even greater significance is his desire to effect his long-range rehabilitation in order not to be stuck in the morass of the impecunious and "morally fraudulant" extreme left

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

for the rest of his life. Also important in Subject's motivation is the sense of adventure connected with "The Game", which is enhanced by his desire to deceive (to put one over on) those persons, such as Verges, who exploited and deceived him. Subj. evinces deep contempt for these professional revolutionaries and what he refers to, with feeling, as their "moral fraud".

Control exists quite strongly in the area of Subject's material welfare and need for rehabilitation.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subj. explained to his wife that "Wilson" (Katzenbach), who telephoned his home was an American publisher's representative. Subj. and Rodigast will use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelance journalist, author. sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

KUBARK

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subj. applied for association with KUBARK in 1950 and again in 1960; his enemies have tried to discredit him by calling him a KUBARK agent, but there is good evidence that this rumor campaign has not hurt him among his friends, even his friends on the extreme left of the political spectrum. No known I. S. connection.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Basic security tradecraft briefings in London 1 - 7 June 1965;
SW training in Paris 14 June 1965.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

British. Subj. resided in London from June '64 to June '65. His wife is a British subject.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

In December 1963 Subj. was interviewed by a consulate officer in Paris for information on Lee Harvey Oswald, who reportedly had some contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Subj. was completely co-operative and the interviewer suggested follow-up, but the contact was dropped.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subj. elicits information from his broad circle of friends and acquaintances in the Afro-Asian/liberation movement areas.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian "Anti-imperialist" activity and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. It is possible that such contacts may lead to a possibility of employment or association with some organization in this field, but whether or not he will be instructed to accept will depend on the specific nature of the job and similar factors which cannot be anticipated now.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use is anticipated. No systematic CA exploitation is anticipated given the risk of compromise. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None.

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subj. has a contract for 1 June - September 1965 providing for salary of $500.00 per month, non-accountable expenses of $100.00 per month and per diem computed at the rate of $20 for days spent travelling to and from Algiers and $10 for period of residence in Algiers. (The $10 rate represents an oral amendment to the contract.) This is to be renegotiated o/a 1 September for extension to two years with 30-day termination clause.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject's skill as writer/editor may qualify him for CA work.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

See Section VIII. In addition it is set forth in the Letter of Agreement with Subject, that KUBARK will compensate Subject for any relocation of his family required by virtue of an approved change in place of employment.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

See Letter of Agreement. KUBARK recognizes its moral obligation to protect Subject against any adverse action which might result from activities engaged in by Subject at the request of KUBARK during his period of employment.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

London, Algiers, Paris Station files; JAGUAR, ODENVY traces and reports are also included in material available on Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

Reports have been received by various QKOPERA contract agents.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

No POA required under the terms of CSI 10-5.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is a rather cynical intellectual. He has a keen sense of what is in his best interest, however, and there is ~~xxx~~ every reason to believe that he considers a reliable and secure performance for KUBARK to be in his best interest. He showed a good sense of security in communications during his recruitment period. LCFLUTTER examination 13 June 1965 revealed no deception by Subject.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

While working for AFP in Paris (1958) Subject forged the signature of a personal enemy, Ollie Harrington, to a letter to the editor calculated to get Harrington in trouble with French authorities. Subject ahsamed of this action.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS; GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Liquor in moderatiion, no drugs. He is believed to have engaged in extra-marital sexual affairs, but in a discreet manner.

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

None known

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

All source, including extensive interview of Subject during the period January - June 1965

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Original method of contact was phone call to Subject's home (by Katzenbach) using ~~xix~~ the name Wilson. Subsequent RODIGAST contacts have been laid on at prior meetings and vary as to time and place. A~~x~~ signal is provided for (removal of glasses, which both wear) should either wish to prevent the meeting. A simple carbon-pad type, low level SW was used by Subject for sending emergency messages to a Paris drop. This has been replaced by an open code system to cover specific requirements, laid ~~xx~~ on at each meeting

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

LCFLUTTER examination of Subject o/a 13 June (no deception reported PALP 4056).

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
29 June 1965	Austin Goodrich (CI/ICG/Ops)

14-00000

EX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

ASSIFY TO FILE 201-306052

REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

43

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED AF/CD

FROM ALGIERS

ACTION AF7

☒ ~~RID~~ COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☒ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT AF TIME 0720 BY RFC

INFO FILE VR, WE 6, FE6, CA2, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, TSD6

AN Y	FI	CI/ICG
SS	DEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

29 Jun 65 IN 01015

S E C R E T 290825Z

IMMEDIATE PALP ~~DIR SITE~~ ALGI 6237

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY ZIEET

REF : PALP 4712*

LOCAL SECURITY EXPECTED BE GIVING SPECIAL ATTENTION ANYONE PREVIOUSLY CONNECTED BEN BELLA, COMMUNISTS (LOCAL HUMANITE REP FORCED DEPART YESTERDAY). HAVE NO ENTRY INFO EXCEPT BELIEVE LIKELY BE EASIER FROM TUNISIA. SUGGEST YOU CHECK ALGI EMB PARI ON VISA POLICY. FROM HERE ASSUME IF IT NOT EXPIRED CAN BE USED WITHOUT REVALIDATION.**

S E C R E T

*APPARENTLY WRONG REF. POSSIBLY PALP 4172 (IN 08695) INTENDED

** STEBONY UNABLE ENTER ALGI.

201-306052

29 June 65

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,459

TO
Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF; Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK ~~AF~~; Chief, KUWCLP

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-

FROM
Chief of Station, London

DATE
28 June 1965

SUBJECT
STEBONY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report of STEBONY Surveillance

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Pursuant to the suggestion contained in DIR 04341, 23 April 1965, we asked JAGUAR to lay on such coverage as they could manage. After some weeks has passed, and JAGUAR had not moved in this direction, we repeated our request, pointing out that STEBONY/1 would soon be leaving. Short-handed and hampered by certain restrictions, JAGUAR moved in to do what they could, and their coverage was due to start almost at the same time as TIFFANY was to begin his meetings with S/1. We contacted JAGUAR and told them to lay off (much to our chagrin) for the time being. This they did, but then, without our being advised, they resumed their coverage. We don't know exactly how long they actually had him in their sights, but they have now given us a letter (text below) suggesting that he was watched on 5, 6 and 7 June. A JAGUAR officer advised us informally that S/1 "seemed to be out of town" for one or two days. (TIFFANY had mentioned that he might take S/1 to the country for a day, but we don't know whether in fact he did so.)

2. Here is JAGUAR's notes:

> "As explained in conversation on the 8th June, 1965, we have received a report on S/1's movements during the period 5th - 7th June, 1965. Nothing of interest was learnt about his movements on the 6th and 7th June, but you may be interested in the following information relating to the 5th June: -
>
> "S/1 left his home at 11.25 and travelled by taxi to the Haymarket where he entered the American Express offices. He obtained a ticket for an air passage to Brussels and a train journey to Basle, thence to Lausanne and Paris where he was due to arrive on the 10th June. He paid £20-29-1d for his ticket. He left the American Express at 12.30 and subsequently returned home at 13.20 hours.
>
> "He left home again at 14.05 and went to the Clarendon Court Hotel in Maida Vale. He came out of the building after five minutes and wandered around for twenty minutes before returning to the hotel. He stayed there until 18.45 when he left alone and returned home.

3. The JAGUAR officer also told me that S/1's contact at the Clarendon Court Hotel was not identified by the surveillant, who in fact did not know which room S/1 had visited. The contact, of course, was TIFFANY, registered as GUSTKE.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT
- 3-Chief, WE
- ~~2~~-Chief, AF
- 2-Chief, KUWCLP

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

30 JUN 1965

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF
Chief, WE;
Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, London.

X

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHEY/Launching the Good Ship STEBONY

REFERENCES: A. PALP 4056

B. PALP 4057

2 01

ACTION REQUESTED: Para 7, Para 8, Para 46.

SUMMARY

On 12 June 1965 STEBONY/1 met KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and for the next three days underwent debriefings, briefings, an LCFLUTTER examination, and training in preparation for his summer 1965 assignment to Algiers. At the conclusion of this period LCPIPIT felt that S/1: had absorbed sufficiently the guidance given him, had responded satisfactorily to Case Officer control, was apparently clear of hostile direction, and was motivated to perform creditably throughout his three-month trial employment.

ATTACHMENTS U.S.C.:

A. Idens.
B. RODIGAST contact reports for 12,14&15 June meetings
C. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re Frantz Fanon Documentation Center, Milan.
D. RODIGAST report on STEBONY/1's comments re the British Guiana PPP office in London.
E. RODIGAST review of two published works by STEBONY/1
F. Cy of STEBONY/1 initial s/w letter to RODIGAST.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - C/KUWOLF w/atts. A,B,C,D,E,F u.s.c.
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1 - COS/London w/att. A u.s.c.
1 - C/WE w/atts. A,B,C,D u.s.c.

JUN 29 1965

OPIA 2555 25 June 1965

SECRET/KAPOK 201-306052

Personally, S/1 appeared to understand and to follow good security practices by and large, but he was concerned that his wife now suspected him of being "up to something" of which she did not approve. In short, his overall long-term security appeared weakest closest to home. Nevertheless, he appeared highly confident that previous denunciations to which he had been subjected would not "stick" and that he could rapidly reestablish himself among revolutionary circles.

His relationship to KUBARK over the longer period has apparently been of considerable interest to him, to the extent that he stated he would be interested in some sort of career status with KUBARK (with retirement benefits) and perhaps one day a "less covert" position. At this time in our relationship with S/1, however, LCPIPIT is concerned primarily with what to do with him on 1 September 1965. In fact, in view of the 19-20 June developments in Algiers and the possible postponement of most of the activities S/1 was to cover in efforts to reestablish himself as a legitimate propagandist for national liberation movements, KUBARK may find it not only feasible, but necessary, to revise S/1's initial KUBARK mission.

In the days and weeks to come we will be reporting S/1's progress as he relates his accomplishments and problems through S/W communications and in meetings with RODIGAST. We shall be submitting recommendations on S/1's longer term utility to KUBARK as we have more information upon which to make some judgments. We know that addressees will be subjecting the STEBONY operation to constant evaluation and analysis throughout the summer, and we will appreciate continued and coordinated guidance on how best to exploit the unique potential represented by this asset.

I. LCPIPIT SUPPORT FOR THE STEBONY OPERATION

1. On 3 June 1965 STEBONY/1 signed a letter of agreement with ODYOKE in London, in effect a contract with KUBARK. Upon signing the letter of agreement and agreeing to undergo an LCFLUTTER examination, S/1 was introduced to Rufus F. RODIGAST, a KUWOLF Career Agent based in Paris who had been designated S/1's outside case officer. RODIGAST is known to S/1 under the alias "Paul Weller." RODIGAST met at length with S/1 on 3, 5, and 6 June and made arrangements for S/1 to meet him in Paris 12 June and undergo further training, briefing, and security processing prior to embarking on a trial assignment of some 10 weeks.

2. On 12 June 1965 S/1 made contact with RODIGAST in Paris in accordance with instructions and was taken immediately to a safehouse for debriefing on his 8-11 June trip in West Europe and for training in the use of S/W system #64. RODIGAST's Contact Report on this meeting and his report of the debriefing are included in Attachment B (USC.). S/1 was passed $200.00 to make travel arrangements for his trip to North Africa. (See also PALP 4057).

3. On 13 June S/1 again met RODIGAST in accordance with instructions and was taken to his LCFLUTTER examination at an LCPIPIT safehouse. The results of this examination were forwarded in PALP 4056. In short, the outcome of the examination was considered satisfactory for the proposed operational use of S/1.

4. On 14 and 15 June RODIGAST again met with S/1 for further debriefings on the latter's contacts in Paris. RODIGAST then briefed him on KUTUBE requirements for MHPINCE and passed on the requirements and information forwarded in DIR 18107 and DIR 18675. RODIGAST's reports on these meetings are also included in Attachment B (USC). On 14 June S/1 was passed $500.00 as an advance on his per diem and travel expenses for his next meeting with RODIGAST. RODIGAST considers S/1 an apt student who learned the S/W system well in some two hours of instruction. Paris KURIOT Officer DONAHY noted some carelessness on S/1's part in the test messages, and this was subsequently brought to S/1's attention in the overall security briefing he received from RODIGAST.

5. The communications system established with S/1 consists of pre-arranged meeting sites and times, a one-way S/W system, and the use of the classified advertising section of the Algiers El Moudjahid (received daily in Paris) by S/1 to signal a postponement of meeting dates. The one-way system was chosen for this initial stage of the agent's operational relationship with KUBARK for reasons of security; given the operational climate in Algiers and the specific circles in which S/1 must move, and adding to the sudden political upheaval in Algeria, S/1 would not be in a position to receive incoming communications safely. As of 23 June S/1 had initiated S/W correspondence, his initial effort being clearly legible and the content operationally worthwhile. (See Attachment F).

6. The next RODIGAST contact with S/1 is scheduled for 15 July in Rome. (See OFIA 2538 for LCPIPIT's request for Rome Station support.) In view of the events that have just taken place in Algeria the meeting may well be concerned as much with rethinking S/1's operational objectives for the period following 16 July as with debriefings, briefings, and passage of funds. Even though latest indications are that Bandung II will proceed as scheduled, it is questionable whether the AAJA or the Afro-Asian Women's conference will be held in Algiers this summer. Moreover, there is no assurance at this writing that MHPINCE will not be either postponed, canceled, or moved elsewhere. Add to this the possibility that IDEN A might be on the scene profiting from the sudden rise in the political fortunes of his friends, and Algiers suddenly loses some of its appeal as an area in which to carry out a meaningful test of S/1's operational capabilities. The next three weeks will tell us much and perhaps allay many of our apprehensions.

7. Nevertheless, RODIGAST must be prepared to handle a number of eventualities in his 15 July meeting, not the least of these being a possible revision of S/1's mission. The following possible alternatives present themselves; we ask Headquarters to address its attention to them and to other developmental targets and to cable recommendations and guidance prior to 13 July:

A. S/1 to remain on site, continue his efforts to establish credentials and find a job in Algiers, or elsewhere, in the national liberation movement, and report on political developments in Algeria.

B. S/1 to travel to Dar es Salaam to look into the job offer made some time ago by Dennis PHOMBEAH.

C. S/1 to proceed to Brussels to continue development of IDEN B (see OFIA 2541).

D. S/1 to return to London to write up reports and operational proposals and polish up the translation of IDEN B's book.

E. S/1 to follow the MHPINCE caravan wherever it may lead (perhaps Sofia?) and continue to look for job leads (outside the Bloc).

8. The second RODIGAST meeting of the summer with S/1 is tentatively scheduled for the second week in August, site to be determined. Addressees will know that S/1's wife is expecting their third child o/a 11 August and that S/1 intends to be in London at that time if at all possible. Although he told RODIGAST he would forego a visit to London at that time if it were operationally necessary, he would find it difficult to justify his absence to his wife unless he were to have a truly plausible and urgent cover assignment. We must therefore anticipate in all likelihood that S/1 will be out of action for most of the second week of August. In any event, RODIGAST will probably be able to meet S/1 somewhere in Europe when S/1 returns to be with his wife and will at that time hope to be in a position to discuss with S/1 the best employment of his talents for the balance of the three-month contract period and to pursue with him his longer range utilization as well. Headquarters views, then, are needed both with respect to the weeks immediately following the 15 July meeting referred to in the previous paragraph as well as with respect to the post-August period.

9. Administratively, LCPIPIT has so far funded S/1 to the extent of $700.00 and has initiated action to have his salary and nonaccountable operational advance deposited to his Swiss bank account. These payments are being made in advance because of S/1's initially pressing financial needs. It is our understanding that the 1 July and 1 August 1965 deposits of $600.00 to S/1's Swiss bank account will be effected securely and on time through KDMAD/1 (see DIR 20944 and DIR 21703). Action was also taken to clarify the question of S/1's per diem. We have received his initial accountings for travel, per diem, and operational expenses for the period 8 - 12 June.

10. ON the basis of information available to LCPIPIT, S/1 has received the following payments from KUBARK since he was first contacted in London by George H. KATZENBACH in January of this year (we have no record at hand of the KUBARK funds passed S/1 by FAINMAN of [illegible]):

AMOUNT	DATE	COMMENT
$300.00	1/25/65 (o/a)	Ops payment per DIR 78506
400.00	2/23/65	Ops payment per ORLN 21869
400.00	April/65	Ops payment per DIR 98974
400.00	May/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341
100.00	6/2/65	Ops payment per DIR 04341 (signing bonus)
500.00	6/3/65	Ops salary advance for June/65
100.00	6/3/65	Nonaccountable ops advance for June/65
200.00	6/3/65	Travel and per diem advance
200.00	6/12/65	Travel Advance
500.00	6/14/65	Travel and per diem advance.

TOTAL: $3,100.00

11. Beginning with the Ops payment in May 1965, these payments have been T/A'd to Headquarters for charge to YGHITCH. In addition to his present salary of $500.00 per month and his $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance for operational expenses, S/1 is entitled to the following under the letter of agreement he signed 3 June 1965:

a) necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by ODYOKE.

b) operational expenses in excess of $100.00 monthly nonaccountable advance as are specifically authorized by ODYOKE.

c) compensation in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of S/1 and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by S/1 and ODYOKE.

d) per diem at the rate of $20.00 per day during periods of authorized travel (i.e.: during absence from London).

II. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

12. At this stage in KUBARK's relationship with STRBONY/1 it is well to note certain factors that must be taken into consideration as we seek to devise a longer-term operation centered on his capabilities and potential. For the sake of brevity, if not precision, we will discuss these factors under the following headings: Personal Assets, Motivation, Handling & Guidance, Security, Termination, and KUBARK Operational Requirements.

PERSONAL ASSETS:

13. STRBONY/1, as has been noted in OELA 42,750 "really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding... [of] African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly, he appears to be informed on certain Chicom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America." Combined with this knowledge and understanding is a long list of personal contacts in left-wing revolutionary circles and a reputation as an articulate and committed agitator for national liberation movements.

14. The Agent exudes an air of self-confidence and presents himself well and dynamically in interpersonal relationships. He has demonstrated talent as a working journalist, especially as a reporter. While we have limited information here upon which to base an evaluation of the accuracy and thoroughness of his reports, they have tended to be consistent on the whole and reveal the workings of a mind capable of storing away vast amounts of information and recalling it with minimal stimulation. S/1 seems to have good command of the French language and can get by in Italian and Spanish. He has had considerable experience in international travel, apparently accommodating well to various degrees of discomfort and hardship as the case may require. He is able to use cameras and tape recorders operationally, and he quickly learned s/w techniques.

15. Because of his coloring and facial characteristics S/1 can pass relatively unnoticed as a North African, Near Easterner, South Asian, or American Negro, inter alia. He gives the impression of being able to strike up casual friendships readily and easily.

MOTIVATION:

16. This is a sticky area open to considerable speculation at this point, though there are specific actions and statements on the part of S/1 indicating he has sought some professional relationship with KUBARK for several years. We understand, for example , that he tried to establish contact with ODYOKE while a student in Italy in 1951-52, that he appeared to be most cooperative when questioned by PBSWING Paris in relation to the assassination of President Kennedy, and that he took a calculated (?) risk by writing in directly to KUBARK in the summer of 1962 offering his services. In his contacts with KUBARKers since January of this year he has given every indication of being forthcoming and, apparently, sincerely interested in cooperating with us. One has the impression he was hoping to be recruited, and he certainly didn't play hard to get.

17. Now that he has signed a letter of agreement, undergone an LCFLUTTER, and been passed a considerable amount of KUBARK money he may consider himself already "on the team," though in effect he was told specifically at the outset that he had to prove himself over the next three months. He has intimated to BODICAST that he would like to parlay his present association with KUBARK into a long-term career relationship including retirement, insurance, etc. He has even alluded to an interest in working for BODICAST's "service" in a "less covert" capacity sometime in the future.

18. One basic question rests with all of us concerned: Why?

In his early talks with the London Station and again in his talks with BODIGAST and TIFFANY the Agent has indicated some degree of disenchantment with the organizations and personalities, if not the ideology, of the left-wing factions with which he had been so intimately involved. He has never goon so far as to renounce his birthright and citizenship, nor does he consider himself disloyal after several years of professional anti-PBPRIME activity. He intimates that he would someday like to return home, though he doubts he would be allowed to live down his past and start a new career in PBPRIME.

19. On the basis of information available to us we could not say that SMBONY/1 is or ever was an ideologically committed Marxist-Leninist. We might say that he has nurtured over the years a smouldering prejudice against the "in" group, both domestically and internationally. He has been an "out" most all of his life, and he has shown a strong attachment to the causes of the downtrodden Cubans, the colonially oppressed Africans, the organizationally subdued "young Turks" of orthodox communist and other leftist movements, etc. There is no question that in his sympathy for such causes he overstepped the bounds of reason and good sense, but it is doubtful that he actually committed any treasonable offense. One has the feeling that S/1 really sought to hedge his bets on the revolutionaries by putting out feelers to KUBARK.

20. There is a strong case for the argument that hard cash plays a significant role in motivating S/1 to cooperate with KUBARK at this point in time. All reports emphasize that he was not just broke, but deeply in debt, when he began talking to London Station. Subsequently he has been receiving what amounts to a salary at a rate somewhat in excess of average for a European journalish, let alone a professional small-time revolutionary. Since he has had no valid cover story for anything other than the first advance(s) from QKOPERA, we cannot be sure that he has let his wife, his in-laws, or his immediate circle of associates know the extent of his newly-acquired affluence. He is quite capable of thinking big operationally and has bluntly stated that it takes money to "move" in Algiers and that "poverty is no virtue in the 'Third World' ".

21. But S/1 does not appear to be an out and out mercenary. There must be other factors than money alone that would lead him to cooperate with KUBARK. It could well be that he is reacting philosophically to an outlook on life that let him down despite years of devoted cultivation. In the long debriefings he rarely, if ever, mentioned anyone who he felt had really accomplished anything as a professional left-wing revolutionary. There are indications that he regards his activities over recent years as somewhat unrewarding, though there is little indication that he didn't enjoy much of what he did or that he doesn't consider the cause of the national liberation movements a just and honorable cause. He may, simply, have reappraised the results of some years of revolutionary activity with a somewhat jaundiced eye and decided it was time for a change.

22. Certainly S/1 builds a convincing case about the reasons for his break with LIEN C, but it must also be noted that ideology is not among them. If anything, it would seem he was reacting to a breach of contract and perhaps wounded pride. The net result seemed to be a well of resentment against one individual, which resentment fermented into spite and determination to "get even." If this assumption is granted, then the letter he had published in ZREARTH and the manuscript he submitted to KMEMESIS are both explainable and explain much. It was his involvement with these publications that triggered KUBARK's operational interest in him, and we initiated contact at a period when he was, perhaps, basking in (what he probably considered) the success of his attack on LIEN A.

23. Looked at from still another angle, S/1's future prospects in January of this year (both in his professional and his personal life) were anything but bright for: he was jobless, in debt, to some extent cast off by the revolutionary movement, apparently felt homeless (as far as having something to which he could return in PBPRIME), and (from what scraps of information we can piece together) was not experiencing a mutually agreeable marital life. (He asserts he was unfaithful and that his wife knew it. We have learned from KAYZENBACH's talks with the SMOTHERS that she was unfaithful in her turn,

though we have no confirmation of this from S/1). In such a situation KUBARK was able to offer S/1 an opportunity to, in effect, begin anew, get out of a hole, rebuild his own self-esteem, and perhaps even build up some credit toward an eventual return to PBPRIME under conditions which he would find bearable.

24. It is interesting that in his long conversations with RODIGAST he should raise the question of his motivation as if to reassure ODYOKE that he was "on the level." He protested that we must not think that he had taken on this job just to "get out of a hole" for three months and explained that he wasn't really in a hole. He claimed that his debts to his brother-in-law were not a pressing matter at all. (However, during his LCFLUTTER examination we are told that the area in which he reacted most strongly was that concerning personal obligations, especially financial. We were probing to find out if he was indeed under some obligation, financial or otherwise, to certain of his revolutionary associates of the past two and a half years, and what ensued was an outpouring of all the small and not so small debts he owed virtually everyone he knew. Foremost among these was the debt of some £ 1,500 to his brother-in-law. Whether or not he feels pressed to repay is not as important as the fact that there seem to be times when it weighs heavily on his mind.)

25. Giving S/1 the last word, the following report from RODIGAST on his 14 June conversation with the Agent should be given careful consideration: "It was clear that he was telling me, without spelling it out in words, that he had made up his mind to cooperate with us because, or partly because, he had decided he wanted to be on our side. He even used expressions like 'our side'. I had the feeling that he did not want to say outright that he was changing his political orientation for fear that we would not believe him, but that in fact he might very well be doing so; I think there was something genuine in his protestation that he wasn't with us 'only for the money'."

HANDLING & GUIDANCE:

26. The least that can be said of S/1 in summarizing his relationship with his KUBARK contacts so far is that he is not docile and passive. He appears to be a self-starter with a sense of what is necessary to get an operation off the ground. From his account of his work for IDEN C it would appear that he can honestly claim a great deal of credit for putting the English edition into business.

27. To date S/1 has expressed no reluctance to undertake his current mission nor to consider other missions for KUBARK which might work a hardship on him or place his person or reputation in jeopardy. His responsiveness, in fact, encourages us to believe that he will accept assignments which permit him to move easily in those revolutionary left circles which are natural to him and which comprise, in effect, his natural target. He has, of course, made a case for working out of Paris, Rome, or Geneva rather than Algiers or Djakarta, but this was prior to his entering into a formal relationship with ODYOKE.

28. RODIGAST feels that he has been able to establish a good degree of working rapport with S/1 and perhaps even some degree of personal rapport. They have had some half-dozen meetings so far, including three working sessions in Paris. RODIGAST has stressed to him the vital importance of good security habits, not the least of which involves such personal behavior as will keep him out of compromising situations (in respect to his work for KUBARK).

29. S/1 has been on time for all his meetings with RODIGAST and has complied well with instructions; he submitted without hesitation to the LCFLUTTER and agreed to work with S/W (accepting the risks involved in disposal of the working materials). S/1 has not failed to remind RODIGAST of the probable cost of his upkeep and operational activities while in Algiers and has been assured that RODIGAST "fought for the $20.00 per diem

right on up the line." Needless to say, STEBONY/1 seemed most happy to know that RODIGAST was concerned for his welfare.

30, RODIGAST feels that he can manage S/1's self-assertion and dynamism, and LCPIPIT points to RODIGAST's record of handling "difficult" agents. RODIGAST's experience is reassuring in this connection, and we have no reservations about RODIGAST's ability to keep STEBONY/1 motivated in the months ahead.

31. A last word on the matter of handling: turn-over, So far S/1 has dealt with KATZENBACH, TIFFANY, and RODIGAST and has been forthcoming with all. There is no indication at this early stage that he has placed his relationship with KUBARK on a person-to-person plane nor are we sure he should be encouraged to do so. As representatives of ODYOKE the three persons mentioned above have apparently earned S/1's trust, and anyone introduced to him by one of them would probably be accepted with the same degree of confidence should the introduction of another case officer become necessary. In effect, then, we foresee no handling problem with S/1 as far as a change in case officers might be concerned. We would point out, though, that S/1 has been handled sympathetically and without hostility to date and that those who have dealt with him would strongly advise firm intelligent direction and against a provocative or heavy-handed approach to such a complex and self-centered personality.

SECURITY:

32. S/1's very background is enough to pose all the security problems one would want to contend with in any operation. At the same time it is that very background that makes him valuable to KUBARK. Therefore we can discount many logical apprehensions about his personal loyalty and motivation (discussed previously) and proceed to questions of operational security.

33. First of all, S/1 has been denounced as a KUBARK agent since the mid-1950's when, to the best of our knowledge, he wasn't actively involved in revolutionary activities. He traces this original denunciation to an incident in which he resorted to some rather unscrupulous practices (forgery and false denunciation) to get an erstwhile friend and CPUSA member (with whose wife he had become involved) discredited in France. (See Attachment to OELA 43,272). The upshot was that S/1 was considered by many who knew him in Paris to be a KUBARK agent who had informed on his communist "friend" to the French police. From that time to the present the KUBARK tag has stuck in certain circles, though STEBONY/1 feels those who really know him, and those important revolutionaries and communists whom he knows and who are his potential targets as a KUBARK agent, have largely discounted the possibility that this could be so. There is no denying the fact, however, that this denunciation is a handicap. It has been used fairly effectively by his last employer, IDEN A, to burn him in a number of places where he was probably previously unknown. Certainly the publication of the denunciation in IDEN C did not raise his stature in some quarters. LOND 7620 indicates S/1's enemies have little desire to let sleeping dogs lie.

34. Furthermore, IDEN A seems at this moment to hold as great a grudge against S/1 as S/1 holds against him, and IDEN A may still have better connections in the national liberation movement than S/1. This is especially so in view of the 19-20 June 1965 downfall of the Ben Bella regime in Algeria. IDEN A was not a Ben Bella man, and his fortunes declined sharply in inverse proportion to the rise of Ben Bella's. IDEN A's closest link to Algeria's power elite has long been Rabah Bitat, according to S/1. In the papers of 22 June we read that, in a "startling development," former Vice-President Mohammed Bitat flew into Algiers from exile in France and said he was ready to "assume his responsibilities." We presume that IDEN A will seek to move quickly to derive personal advantage from this sudden change in Algeria. As if operating in the Algerian security climate were not hazardous enough, S/1 may well have to contend with a vendetta mounted by IDEN A.

35. [illegible]/1's family situation presents some cause for concern, also. As noted in the discussion on motivation, he has been receiving funds since January with only QKOFFRA to give as a source. His wife, who is a conscientious leftist, is presently suspicious of his activities, he says, largely because he received a phone call from PBSWING London in January. He explained it was a PBPRIMER journalist passing through who wished to talk with him, to which she was supposed to have retorted: "Why should someone from PBPRIME be interested in you, and, moreover, why should you be interested in working for anything or anyone fm a PBPRIME?" S/1 told RODIGAST that the backstopping effort initiated by LOND 8004 did not fully dispel her skepticism. S/1's reaction to the FLUTTER examination on the question of "what his wife thinks" suggests that the matter is not laid to rest.

36. S/1 seems to be most concerned that his wife not find out he is working for ODYOKE, let alone KUBARK, and we presume he has reason to feel she would probably say or do something, whether deliberate or not, that would compromise him in his present situation. We do not know the history of S/1's marriage, but we have received indications from him that lead us to believe he could not count on her discretion and loyalty in all circumstances. His relationship with his wife, therefore, must be watched with some care to insure that it does not comprise an undue hazard or that she does not become vulnerable in some way to forces inimical to his effectiveness in his work for KUBARK.

37. Aside from speculation about possible repercussions in this area of their marital relationship, there remains the question of cover for some $3,180 passed S/1 by KUBARK in the past six months. His wife has been in the journalism business long enough to know that virtually unemployed journalists are not usually given travel and salary advances merely for the asking, especially when their press credentials are largely notional or the nominal sponsor has yet to go into publication. Thus, we have reason to believe she has some rather nagging doubts as to the legitimacy of S/1's present cover job. This is implicit in Paragraph 5 of the attachment of OELA 43,272.

38. On 15 June S/1 told RODIGAST his wife told him on the phone that a letter to him from IDEN D warned him to be careful "as things might be 'hot' for him in Algeria." IDEN D had apparently heard of S/1's forthcoming trip from contacts in New York and Paris, and S/1 surmises this means news of his summer's travels must be rather common knowledge by now.

39. At TIFFANY's request S/1 let IDEN E know he was in Paris, and S/1 says that latter "came rushing around" to see him. S/1's report on this contact was passed to the Paris Station 17 June by LCPIPIT. In the report is S/1's assessment that IDEN E would probably be willing to talk to RODIGAST's "service." We shall discuss this case further with Paris Station, but in the meantime it should be noted for the record that as long as S/1 is said by many to be a KUBARK agent, it would not be unreasonable to assume that IDEN E might connect an approach by an ODYOKE representative with his recent conversations with S/1. Therefore, the possibility of a flap here should not be ignored.

40. As far as S/1's contacts with KUBARK, he knows no one by true name and his case officer will continue to use an alias in all future contacts. At the same time, there is the ever-present danger that he may some day come to know RODIGAST's true name because of the number of acquaintances they have in common in Paris. It was largely for this reason that RODIGAST will avoid holding future operational meetings with S/1 in Paris. RODIGAST has already reportedthe rather unsettling experience of having S/1 tell him: "I think I've seen you someplace before." RODIGAST says this is quite possible. Were S/1 ever to stay in Paris for a considerable length of time the chances are Not remote that RODIGAST's identity would be compromised to S/1.

TERMINATION:

41. The question of termination is not academic at this time, for explicit in the letter of agreement which S/1 signed is his termination on 1 September 1965 unless specific conditions are met. It is doubtful that KUBARK will indeed terminate S/1 on that date unless such action is made imperative for reasons of security or of gross malfeasance on his part.

42. In the event of the termination of S/1 we foresee at this time no great cause for concern about possible repercussions against KUBARK personnel or installations. In addition to the use of aliases, RODICAST's meetings with him will be in third countries, and S/1 has not been passed classified information. He does keep in his possession materials for the use of S/W System #64. He received training in the use of these materials (and underwent his LCFLUTTER) in the apartment of two LCPIPIT contract personnel. This apartment, an LCPIPIT safehouse, was used only once previously for a clandestine meeting, and it will not be used again for at least two months.

43. Should it prove necessary to terminate S/1 the greatest danger which we can anticipate at this time grows out of his considerable skill as a writer and the possibility that this skill might be used to attack KUBARK or ODYOKE in some way, perhaps from the forum of the national liberation movement propaganda machinery which he has now forsaken. His knowledge of our operations and personnel has been kept to a minimum. Hence the danger of his pen speaking with great force or effectiveness is, we believe, not great and a problem which, though we must anticipate it, we believe to be remote.

[illegible] KUBARK OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:

44. All concerned would agree that a KUBARK agent who is unable to service KUBARK operational requirements would not be worth his keep. At the same time, it would be presumptious to expect that in a situation where the agent is being handled at arm's length and under such disadvantages in time and distance as in S/1's case, KUBARK's operational requirements could be regularly and, if necessary, speedily measured against the agent's capabilities and specific requirements levied on the agent.

45. So far in KUBARK's relationship with S/1 we have outlined a general target area for him, levied the requirement that he prove to KUBARK he can effectively penetrate that target area and operate in place, and levied subsidiary KUTUBE requirements for him to service as a by-product of his basic operational task. What we have assigned, in effect, is a short term operational mission upon which longer term operations might be based.

46. There is evidence in the reams of "testimony" KUBARK has taken from S/1 that he is a man who likes to operate, act, produce. There is also evidence that he, like any other human, consciously seeks approval and recognition of his work. The question to be posed is: Has KUBARK at this time, or will it have on 1 September 1965, an assignment for S/1 in which he can find satisfaction in producing a marketable product and find that approval and recognition which he requires? We must be more specific with him than to say: "Go out to Djakarta and see what you can dig up. We'll meet you again in two months for discussions." Rather, it would be well at this stage to review with the various area divisions those geographic areas in which S/1's talents could be fully exploited (Chile with FUSER?, Venezuela as an FALN penetration?, Djakarta as an AAJA staffer?, Ghana as a BAA writer?, Tanzania as a Government Radio editor?, etc., etc.) and to have a definite assignment for S/1 in hand at the moment we negotiate the extension of his contract.

47. Certainly the sudden change of leadership in Algeria can be expected to affect the national liberation movement and personalities in that movement who have drawn succor from the Ben Bella regime. As noted in the section on security, it is reasonable to assume that S/1 will be in a less

than fortuitous position if his efforts to reassert himself on the national liberation movement stage are to meet with brickbats from IDEN A from a front row seat. ALGI 6171 and PARI 1954 tend to support the estimate that S/1's friends in the Ministry of Information may now be gone, while IDEN A's Algerian friends may soon be in positions of power. While it is still too early to assume that such a situation will arise, it is not too soon to assess the possible damage this could do S/1 in the general target area so far assigned him and to watch closely for signs that he may truly be burned beyond operational usefulness to KUBARK. We would hope this should not come to pass, but we cannot ignore the possibility.

48. In the event, then, that the next two month's activities compromise S/1's credentials in the national liberation movement, where would we go from there? One suggestion would be a TDY to ZRMETAL where his brain might be picked for operational leads and KUTUBE, KUDESK, and KUWOLF information. He could also be urged to write out and edit a number of exposés on fraud, deception, and general double-dealing in the national revolution movement and in certain communist circles. He might find a job with IDEN B who may well need a new crutch if S/1's reports of his diminishing influence are to be given credence. In short, steps ought to be taken now to define the alternatives awaiting S/1 as of 1 September 1965.

Harvey G. FABERICH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-43,458

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, AF

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 25 June 1965

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY
6 STEBONY-Related BAIRN Items

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Attached are selected extracts from BAIRN reports. BAIRN is a very sensitive SMOTH operation, and the items should be treated accordingly.

2. Marc SCHLEIFFER (misspelled in BAIRN) is of interest. Pablo is Pable FERNANDEZ, Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy in London. Other items should be self-explanatory. On page 3 of the attachment, "integration", where underlined, should read "segregation."

3. As with these items, London will try to bring to Headquarters (and other addressees') attention STEBONY-related items that we notice. On the other hand, we do not require to be info'ed on all STEBONY traffic in the future. We would like to see copies of all of his intelligence reporting, whether for passage to the SMOOTHERS or not. On that topic, we would like to recommend that a liberal policy be followed in determining what of his stuff to pass to liaison here. We will be glad to review his reporting for passage, if there is doubt about whether to pass it. We would also like to see any materials relating to him that may have a bearing on London Station operations, relating principally to the U.K., or relating to any of our liaison services here, of course.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JUN 1965

201-306852
~~201-128663~~

CS COPY

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/[redacted]

☐ CONTINUED

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,458
25 June 1965

31 Mat 1965 17.10 hours: Mark SCHWEIFFER (or SCHWEISSER ph) calls Pablo, tells him he arrived in LONDON two hours ago. (Note : he speaks English with a U.S.A. accent) Pablo says he had been talking about Mark last Saturday with Richard GIBSON, who Mark had thought to be living in Switzerland. Pablo says Richard has lived in LONDON for a year. Mark is now married, his wife and two children are with him. Pablo says that Roberto Yepe and his wife Galina are also in LONDON at the Embassy. Mark is in a hotel near the British Museum. Will come to the Embassy at once. Farewells.

17.15 hours: Roberto Yepe calls Galina at home, tells her Mark is in LONDON. Both overjoyed. They arrange to meet. Yepe does not know yet what he is doing here or how long he will be staying.

18.30 hours: Present: Pablo and Mark SCHW[illegible]ER (pres.). Voices very indistinct.

Pablo and Mark appear to be talking about mutual acquaintances, who are mostly poets and authors. Pablo goes out.

Yepe comes in and greets the visitor; he says that his wife Galina would like to see Mark this evening. Yepe explains about his transfer from Glasgow to London; he then asks Mark when he is going to Nigeria (?Algeria). Mark appears to say that he will not be going until February next year, after he has been to the States; after that he would like to settle down in Africa, in Zanzibar, or in (?Tanzania) - he does not know.

Yepe asks where he can find Dennis PHOMBEAH: Mark says that he is in the Tanzanian High Commission at 43 Hertford St. and that Yepe can mention his name. Yepe goes out (pres. to telephone Dennis) and does not return.

10.00 hours: Richard GIBSON (ph, speaks English with U.S.A. accent) calls Pablo in some excitement to say that SCHWEIFFER (ph) "is arriving today". Pablo says he already knows, had seen him yesterday (see 31st May above) and had given him Richard's telephone number. Richard asks for Mark's address. Pablo checks with Yepe, who was taken by Mark SCHWEFFER to the latter's hotel, but does not remember the name or address. Richard remarks that he knows Mark's plan. He is on his way

/to . . . . .

1st June, Cont.

to Africa, is going to ALGIERS and wants to stay. Is going to Tanzania if he can. Had planned to leave LONDON today, but is staying over. Pablo replies, to see Richard and someone else. Richard thinks this is Dennis POMBEY (ph) to whom Mark had written from NEW YORK. Richard is ready to find accommodation for Mark and family while they are in LONDON, as Mark has little money. Richard is going out now until 16.00 hours when he will return to PRImrose 8775. Then he is due to go out again to the Tunisian Embassy. Asks Pablo to tell Mark that he (Richard) is going to Algeria, that he wants to see Mark, that there are possibly things that they can do together, that he or Mark could take the job offered by Dennis (POMBEY) in DAR-ES-SALAAM. Pablo says Mark is staying here to see Richard and presumably Dennis, then going to PARIS for five days, then on to Algeria. Richard says Mark can call him at home between 12.30 and 13.30 hours or after 16.00 hours.

Richard gives Pablo greetings from PETITA (or BETITA, ph) who says she is sending Richard and Pablo a new magazine called "Street" to be shared. She is working for the "Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee", Sue WRIGHT's (ph) group, and has "given up her job at the Nation". Pablo will send her some collaboration for the magazine. Farewells.

1 June (cont'd

13.55 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER (ph) calls Pablo (out). Then
asks for Yepe. Tells Yepe that they (Mark and family) had
slept late and are checking out of the hotel now. Confirms
with Yepe that the latter's wife Galina is at home. Is going
to telephone her. Yepe confirms Mark's having Galina's
number, then remarks that one of the two people Mark had
wanted to contact - GIBSON - had rung the Embassy. Mark
reminds Yepe of their having looked up together the telephone
numbers of the Tanzanian Mission. Mark has two numbers, one
GRO number and one FLA number (Note: the FLA number is
FLA 2327, home number of Dennis PHOMBEAH, Administrative
Attache. Mark had earlier said he had two people in LONDON
to contact, Richard GIBSON and Dennis.) He asks Yepe which ②
is the office number. Yepe checks then says it is GRO 8951.
Mark notes the Mission's address. Farewells.

1st June, Cont.

17.10 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER calls from the Embassy to Yepe's flat, speaks to Yepe's wife, Galina, says he, "Maria and the children" will spend the night with the Yepes. His wife and children are at present in Pablo's flat (Note: Both flats are in Park West).

17.30 hours: Mark SCHLEIFFER called at Embassy by Richard GIBSON, who suggests their sharing a flat in ALGIERS. Both need to brush up their French before "the others pour in" to ALGIERS. Mark agrees to go to Richard's flat, 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, to discuss various points. Mark mentions that his wife is an "Afro-American". Richard says that integration is much worse here than in the U.S.A.

2nd June

11.00 hours: Yepe calls the C.F.T.E., speaks to telex room, asks whether they can send a telex to Yepe's brother in Rumania. He explains that his (Yepe's) brother is Cuban Ambassador to Rumania and is due to go to Cuba today or tomorrow. He wants first to establish whether his brother is still in Rumania. If he is, Roberto wants the following message passed: "If you see Leo HUBERMAN in Cuba, please pass this message to him - 'If you come to LONDON, Dennis PHOMBEAH is anxious to see you'. (Signed) Roberto Yepe".

3 June

12.30 hours: Pablo calls Cuban Embassy (believed PARIS) (Obtained by direct dialling.) Speaks to Esther, then asks for Paco, who mentions that Guillermo has to return to Cuba, because his daughter has a cerebral haemorrhage. Pablo says he and Manuja are also "going to return". Paco asks "But they haven't called you?" Pablo replies "No". Gives no further explanation, but will write to Paco. Mentions that Mark SCHLEIFFER is coming to PARIS and will telephone Paco. Guillermo, Paco remarks, has already caught his plane to PRAGUE. Miriam is alone. Guillermo had been in touch with FRANQUI, and ROA had agreed to his going. This leaves the Commercial Attache.

SECRET

24 JUN 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Directory for Plans

SUBJECT: a Telephone Conversation Malcolm X - Carlos Moore and Sandy Bethune. (Afro-American Unity Group in Paris)

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a Xerox copy of a photostat of a transcript of a telephone conversation between Carlos Moore (and his friend Sandy Bethune) and the late Malcolm X, which took place 8 or 9 February 1965. SUGAR obtained this transcript on 4 June from the editor of the West Indian Gazette, (fnu) Manchanda. SUGAR believes that Manchanda got the photostat from the Ghana High Commission office in London. He further believes that the Afro-American unity group in Paris (among whom there is only one member with U. S. citizenship: the American Negro photographer, John Taylor) probably supplied the transcript to the Ghana officials as a means of building their credentials as a bona fide revolutionary organization, perhaps one entitled to receive financial support.

2. SUGAR gave the current (June 1965) address of Jamaican/Cuban Carlos Moore as: c/o Pedro Filipe, 168 Rue Grenelle, Paris 7e, France. SUGAR said that Filipe is a Cuban national.

10

CSCI-316/02636-65

INDEX	
[illegible]	[illegible]
ABSTRACT	

Attachment: 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CI/ICG-AGoodrich:lac
22 June 1965

SECRET

201-759145

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addresee
1 - C/CI
1 - CI/L
1 - CI/RA
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1 - CI/ICG/AMS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

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17 SECRET

GROUP 1 [illegible]

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1		5	
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FROM
LCPIPIT (PARIS)

ACTION
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT AF/OF TIME 0735 BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, WH 7, WE 6, OF, CI, ADDP, FE 6

AN	FI	
PS		
ABSTRACT		INDEX

S E C R E T 231117Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY BUEN CITE PALP 4115 CILIBERTI ACTING

ZIBET QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK QKFIND SGFLAG

23 Jun 65 IN 98790

REF A DIR 20944
B DIR 21708
C PALP 3983 (NOT SENT BUEN) (IN 83309)

1. REQUEST DIR RELAY BUEN SUBSTANCE REF C, ESPECIALLY DEADLINES FOR DEPOSITS IN SWISS ACCOUNT.

2. BUEN PLS ADVISE WHEN TRANSFERS EFFECTED.

3. NO INDEX

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

201-306052
23 June 65

file S[illegible], ops

21 Jun 65

Talked to Cy Goodrich this morning about STEBONY. He feels that he is on the level with us, that he is legitimately disenchanted with the far left, that he sees himself as a loyal American, that KATZENBACH was incorrect in saying that STEBONY would find it morally repugnant to act as a political action agent but would willingly serve as an FI collection asset (which doesn't make a whole lot of sense.) STEBONY was not in the least reluctant to take the LCFLUTTER; passed it apparently clean. The cover is admittedly a bit flimsey, but is supplemented by a connection with Tunisian L'Action for which he will do some layout work and writing. Cy believes that ~~he~~ ST understands perhaps better than he did the need for cover and attribution of income. Contract provides for $500 a month plus $100 non-accountable ops expenses plus $10 a day while in Algiers, plus $20 a day while in travel status, 1 June through 31 August, renewable for a two year period if mutually desirable and satisfactory, with 30 day termination clause. We have told [illegible] JAGUAR of our recruitment of STEBONY - Cy does not believe that they are in direct touch with him, but that they are in contact with friends of his, particularly one ?MARCHANT? or some such name. I asked Cy what STEBONY had been asked to do for us in Algiers, and he replied " to work himself into a position of access - to get information on factions and all developments in the conferences which have not been publicized." I asked if he had been given any requirements which dealt with strictly Algerian matters and he said No, that Rodigast had been told that we would send further requirements for the meeting tentatively scheduled with STEBONY in Rome or Tangier around 18 June.

I talked to Bob Wiley, who will draw up a list of requirements to send RODIGAST. Cy Goodrich and I agreed that I would open ops files on STEBONY, even though we have no project yet, and he will give me the contents of his soft file to include in it. He is also having the 201 file tidied up by RI and will have it charged to AF/1

NP

SECRET

Chief KUWOLF X

Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Brussels; Chief, WE

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
DTDORIC/Operational
STEBONY/QRPREY/Operational Contact with Iden A

201

1. For the Information of COS, Brussels: KUDESK and KUWOLF are jointly engaged in the operational exploitation of the peculiar talents and contacts of a newly-acquired asset, STEBONY/1 (Iden B). STEBONY/1 has had a rather turbulent career as a leftist revolutionary agitator and propagandist over the past several years during which time he came to know (and be known by) a number of significant personalities in the pro-Chinese factions of several European Communist Parties. Among these personalities is Iden A. STEBONY/1 has been denounced within these same circles as a KUBARK agent for some time, though until January of this year KUBARK was not in contact with him. It was only early June of this year that he actually signed a letter of agreement with an "ODYOKE Service". Currently STEBONY/1 is in Algeria seeking to re-establish himself in revolutionary circles as a prelude to a long-term penetration operation (at KUBARK's behest) targeted against the revolutionary cadres of Africa, Asia and Latin America which are apparently being given increasingly direct support by Peking.

2. One of STEBONY/1's bona fides in revolutionary circles is his acquaintance with Iden A who has told him that, personally, he does not share the doubts spread about STEBONY/1 because, as Iden A puts it, STEBONY/1's primary accuser not only charges he is a KUBARK agent but also an Iden A agent, which Iden A of course knew not to be the case. However, STEBONY/1 is actually in the process of seeking to ingratiate himself with Iden A and of winning his confidence to such an extent that their personal relationship might serve as STEBONY/1's credentials for some time to come. At present the relationship shows signs of being off to a good start. STEBONY/1 visited Iden A in Brussels on 9 June 1965 with the intention of getting himself accredited as a correspondent of Iden A's newspaper, Iden C. Iden A told him that, in fact, Iden C was sending Iden D to Algiers to cover the summers activities there. Iden A then added that Iden D would get in touch with STEBONY/1 in Algiers (c/o Iden E) so that STEBONY/1 could "introduce him around". STEBONY/1 considers this a fortuitous circumstance in that

Attachments: -continued-
Identity List usc
Book usc
Distribution:
3 - Chief, KUWOLF w/atts usc
✓2 - Chief, KUDESK w/att 1
2 - COS, Brussels w/att 1
2 - Chief, WE w/att 1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OFLA-2541 18 June 1965

JUN 22 1965

SECRET 200-126-19/3

he can exploit Iden D as a 'walking credential' in Algiers a unique way to suggest he himself is one of Iden A's 'boys'. It should be noted on the other hand that this situation provides Iden A a unique means of monitoring STEBONY/1's activities and contacts

3. Of priority interest at this moment, however is the fact that Iden A has expressed to STEBONY/1 his dissatisfaction with the progress to date in getting his book (Iden F) published in English Iden A claims that an Australian is supposed to be working on a translation but that he has heard nothing from him in over six months STEBONY/1 then told Iden A that he himself could do the translation job with the aid of friends but that he would have to spend some time with Iden A to work over fine points and to write together a new chapter updating the book In this way STEBONY/1 feels he could cement his personal relationship with Iden A

4. There are obviously operational and Station policy questions that should be considered in this context. First of all, our sole reporter on the STEBONY/1-Iden A relationship is STEBONY/1 himself Is he really seeking to set up a meaningful operational gambit to be exploited by KUBARK, or is he seeking to regain status among his former peers? We tend to believe the former on the basis of the results of STEBONY/1's LCFLUTTER examination and his long conversations with his deep cover case officer. Secondly, would the damage to the PBPRIME national interest inherent in the publication of Iden A's book in English outweigh the operational gain to be made by putting STEBONY/1 in Iden A's confidence. STEBONY/1 argues that, on the contrary, the publication of the book in English could hurt no one except possibly Iden A himself, because STEBONY/1 claims the book is a tiresome polemic against one small communist group by another small communist group. WOFIRM has no intention of recommending that KUBARK help get the book in print in any case for that would be Iden A's own problem Moreover, if STEBONY/1 did not undertake the translating job, the Australian would probably come through before too long anyway.

5. We are sure that addressees can see in this situation the seeds of a useful operational contact with Iden A who, according to various reports STEBONY/1 is receiving from other of his contacts in the pro-Chinese factions of the European Communist Parties, is starting to lose his grip on his own organization

6 In any event, unless advised to the contrary, we intend to encourage STEBONY/1 to continue developing his relationship with Iden A, especially as regards translation of the book. We are forwarding to Headquarters (usc) a copy of the book and request that the appropriate office in KUCAGE be approached immediately and asked to provide, on a priority basis, an English-language translation which we can pass to STEBONY/1 He could then rework this translation somewhat and involve his wife in the editing of it presenting the finished product to Iden A as a family effort Of particular importance from a critical point of view is that translations of quotations from non-francophone sources (Marx and Lenin for example) should be consistent with the 'official' English-language version of the quotations.

7 The time element involved is this: KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F BODIGAST will be meeting STEBONY/1 in Rome on or about 15 July. At that time he should have some firm word from KUBARK on the status of the translation effort In matter of fact of course, the ideal situation would be to have the translation in hand at that time though we cannot gauge from here whether that is within the realm of possibility In any case BODIGAST would have to have the translation definitely in hand the first week of August when he will be leaving Paris for his second one meeting with STEBONY/1

8. Paris/LCPIPIT would welcome advice and guidance from addressees on this venture and would be happy to clarify further any points which may have been raised in this dispatch but not fully answered

Harvey G. FABRICK

SECRET

Attachment to OFLA 2541
Under Separate Cover

Identity A - Jacques Grippa

Identity B - Richard T. Gibson, formerly of Fair Play for Cuba Committee and former editor of English edition Révolution Africaine

Identity C - La Voix du Peuple

Identity D - Arnold Hauwaert

Identity E - Georges Arnaud

Identity F - Marxisme-Léninisme ou Revisionnisme?

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO: AF
Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers CHIEF KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: STEBONY
O JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1 L/R

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 8101

1. Following is the full text of the JAGUAR letter, a part of which was transmitted under ref:

> "We have received the following two items of intelligence about S/1:
>
> 1. Some time in May this year, S/1 said that he would be going to Tunisia on 15th June to work on the staff of the paper "L'Action."
>
> 2. After his quarrel with Jacques VERGES in 1964, S/1 received £200 as "personal financial assistance" from Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese Communist faction in Belgium. Nils ANDERSSON also gave him financial help.
>
> Our sources were not able to say when the financial assistance was given to S/1 but presumably that from GRIPPA was made available some time between July and November last year."

2. S/1 reported to Station in May that he had had an offer of a job on L'Action, but there was no intention of his accepting it.

3. London has some doubts about whether S/1 in fact received this much money from GRIPPA. We suspect that he has told people this to enhance his stature as a "Chinese agent"; we still wonder, though, what funds he may have been covering this way, since we had not contacted him as of the time in question. Perhaps, as a result of ref, LCPIPIT may shed some light on this point.

George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-Chief, KUWOLF
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch

CS COPY

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
17 June 1965	2[illegible] JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,38[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Rome, Chief KUWOLF X

Chief, KUDESK; Chief, WE (Attention: WE/4)

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT **PRIORITY**

DTDORIC/Operational

QRPREY/STRBONY/1 Contact in Rome.

1. KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST is now the deep cover case officer for STRBONY/1 a newly-acquired potential penetration asset targeted on the pro-Chicom revolutionary movements of Africa Asia and Latin America. On or about 15 July 1965 STRBONY/1 will proceed from his current base of operations (Algiers) to meet with RODIGAST in Rome per Iden A

2. While in Rome STRBONY/1 plans to stay with Iden B Moreover Iden B's apartment may be used as a meeting site for RODIGAST and STRBONY/1 when Iden B is at work. In view of this we request Station and Headquarters traces (KUBARK and ODENVY only) on Iden B.

3. While in Rome RODIGAST will more than likely require Station support in the nature of pickup and pouching facilities for documents cash travel advances for STRBONY/1 (which are to be T/A'd to Headquarters, charge YUFITCH) and cable commo facilities should the need arise. RODIGAST is known to Rome Station Officer Lowell F ALSTON and perhaps others in the Station. RODIGAST is also known to and knows the witting personnel in PEBREGALE.

4. We would appreciate hearing from Rome Station at your earliest convenience concerning your capability to render the type of support noted above. RODIGAST would plan to make contact with the Station through PEBREGALE unless the Station should desire an alternate contact plan

Harvey G FABRIDGE

Attachments:
Identity List (See PALP 4070) TO: ROME + ~~[illegible]~~ DIR

Distribution:
3 - COS Rome
✓2 - Chief KUWOLF
2 - Chief, KUDESK
2 - Chief, WE

CS COPY

JUN 17 1965

201-306052

OPLA-2536 17 June 1965

GROUP 1
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S E C R E T 200-126-79/3

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file STEBONY/1

201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London R/F

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a copy of an item culled from a report of BAIRN (a sensitive SMOTHop) reflecting contact between Mrs. Sarah GIBSON and Pablo FERNANDEZ, the Cultural Officer at the Cuban Embassy. There is nothing particularly new or startling here, and it is forwarded for inclusion in the records.

2. Maruja is Pablo's wife; Sarah is, of course, the wife of Richard GIBSON.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

201-306052

1 att

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
16 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
17 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,353

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,353
16 June 1965

26th May, Cont.
16.40 hours: Mrs. Sarah GIBSON (ph), of the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, calls Cuban Embassy, explains to Margo that she wants Pablo to send, as previously discussed, some copies of "Revolucion Pueblo y Cultura" and "Lunes de Revolucion", either just on temporary loan, or if some copies can be spared, for retention by the Tunisian Embassy. The Press Secretary in the Tunisian Embassy is on the point of leaving to go back to TUNIS (going on 28th May) and before doing so, he very much wants to have a look at those papers. Margo promises to arrange this matter with Pablo, for delivery of copies to the Press Department, Tunisian Embassy, 29 Prince's Gate. Sarah GIBSON asks for delivery today if possible, if not, the following morning.

16.50 hours: Pablo calls Mrs GIBSON at KEN 4133 on Christian name terms, asks how her husband, Dick, and the children are, confirms that he will let her have some copies of "Ruega" (ph) given to him by a Cuban in LONDON, also "Pueblo y Cultura", but has no copies of "Revolucion". Confirms he will come to Sarah's house on Saturday afternoon (29th May) with Maruja and the children if it is fine, but he will come anyhow, as he wants to have a talk with Sarah. The GIBSON's home number is PRI 8776. Sarah remarks that the Tunisian Press Secretary is being sent back to Tunisia to take charge of a newspaper, and he has been most impressed by the Cuban layout in their publications. He needs the copies to give him ideas for his own work, and Sarah wants the influence to be Cuban.

Jeune Afrique?

att #1 to OELA-43353

CS COPY

201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, WE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, AF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK STEBONY
Processed STEBONY/1 De-Briefing Material

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies (one for KUDESK, one for LCPIPIT) of the processed material resulting from the initial series of debriefings of STEBONY/1. Again London Station is indebted to Roberta L. HORRELL for her superb work in preparing this excellent study.

2. We have made most of this material available to JAGUAR. The sections headed "Interest of Foreign Communist and Leftist Groups in the American Negro Problem," "The Robert Williams Case," "Black Nationalism," and "The American Negro" were not passed to JAGUAR.

3. We are retaining one copy of the entire study, which we are making available for review by ODENVY/London, who have expressed interest in this material. We trust that ODENVY Headquarters will be appropriately advised of the contents of these papers.

4. We see no reason for London Station to retain this copy in the files, and propose to destroy it unless Headquarters asks us to send it on to some other addressee. Similarly, we plan to destroy our copy of the rough transcript of the debriefing (previously forwarded under OELA 42,706, 9 March 1965) unless Headquarters would like us to send it on. In either case, let us know of your wishes regarding these items by, say, 15 July. In the absence of any instructions by that time, we will destroy them.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
- 3-Chief, WE w/o att
- 2-COS, Algiers, w/o att
- 2-Chief, AF w/o att

201-306052

CS COPY IN 200-124-156/4

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
15 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
17 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,329

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. RWM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

15 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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4		8	

FROM 2915 (LCPIPIT)

ACTION RI 7

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TYPED

UNIT AF TIME 1132 BY

INFO FILE, VR, ADDP, CI, [illegible], [illegible], CA 2, CA/O 4, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

AN	SI	
RS	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

S E C R E T 151532Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO BERN LOND CITE P[illegible] [illegible] 4053

ZIBET QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK QKFIND

REF A PALP 3983 (IN83509)

B BERN 5384 (IN83502)

IN [illegible]772 2

1. IN VIEW REF B, REQUEST HDQS EXPLORE WITH DIEARN CAPABILITY EFFECT SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER UNDER CONDITIONS SPECIFIED REF A. BRUSSELS MIGHT BE LOGICAL SOURCE IF CAPABILITY EXISTS.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

4 SUGGESTED EXTERNAL BANK TRANSFER.

201-306052

[illegible] 15 Jun 65

INDEX ☐ . NO ___ ~~CLASSI~~FIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42 201-3
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. ___
X-REF TO FILE NO. ___
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. ___

9 **SECRET** GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIB

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION WE 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, TSD 6, FE 6, RI/AN

S E C R E T 151530Z

DIR INFO ALGI LOND PARI CITE PALP 4056

KUDESK STEBONY CRPREY

15 JUN 65 IN 90665

REF A. LOND 7991 (IN 81357)

B. LOND 7995 (IN 81479)

C. DIR 15660

D. FRAN 5087 (IN 82159)

RI SR/I
PS [redacted]
ABSTRACT X

1. STEBONY/1 (S) MET RODIGAST (R) 12 JUNE PARI AS PLANNED AND PROCEEDED SAFEHOUSE WHERE R DEBRIEFED S AND TAUGHT HIM S/2 SYSTEM 64.

2. IN 13 JUNE LCFLUTTER S ANSWERED NEGATIVE TO FOLLOWING KEY QUESTIONS WITH NO INDICATION DECEPTION:

A. HAS ANYONE EVER APPROACHED YOU TO SERVE NON-PBPRIME IS?

B. HAVE YOU EVER SERVED ANY NON-PBPRIME IS IN ANY CAPACITY?

C. ARE YOU NOW A PAID AGENT OF ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT?

D. DOES YOUR WIFE KNOW YOU HAVE A CONNECTION WITH AN ODYOKE SERVICE?

E. HAVE YOU TOLD ANYONE ABOUT YOUR CONTACTS OR YOUR AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE WITH AN ODYOKE ORGANIZATION?

F. ARE YOU UNDER OBLIGATION TO ANYONE TO REPAY ANY DEBTS

SECRET

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201-306052

SECRET

IN 90665 Page 2

RID/MIS

Jun 21 4 11 PM '65

OR FAVORS? (PER LOND 8131) (IN 87361)

G. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE YOU A TARGET FOR BLACKMAIL? (PROBE TO SEE IF REVOLUTION ASSOCIATES HAVE ANY HANDLE)

H. HAS ANYONE EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL YOU?

I. HAVE YOU EVER ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL ANYONE?

J. HAVE YOU DELIBERATELY GIVEN US ANY FALSE OR FABRICATED INFO IN TALKS WE HAVE HAD WITH YOU?

3. 14 JUNE R BRIEFED S RE BANDUNG II MHMINCE AAJA, ETC, PASSED S ONE S/W SYSTEM 64 CARBON, ADVANCED 703 DOLLARS CASH TOWARD TRAVEL AND PER DIEM.

4. S ETA ALGI O/A 20 JUNE VIA SURFACE TRANSPORT FROM MOROCCO. S FUTURE CONTACTS WITH R SCHEDULED OUTSIDE ALGERIA. NO RPT NO STA CONTACT REQUESTED BUT WOULD APPRECIATE INFO HIS ALGI ACTIVITIES AS MAY BE ACQUIRED PASSIVELY BY STA STAFF PERSONNEL.

5. POUCHING COMPREHENSIVE WRAP-UP.

6. INDEX 201-306052.

* Suggested SW Carbon for STEBENY be obtained from Paritech.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,311

TO Chief, KUDESK

INFO Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-

FROM Chief of Station, London

DATE 11 June 1965

SUBJECT
STEBONY
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

Following is the text of a JAGUAR letter, dated 2 June:

"According to a secret and reliable source, STEBONY/1 has stated that he is working for the Belgian newspaper 'La Voix du Peuple'. He will be leaving London shortly for the Continent and will later be going to Algiers. He has told his friends that his job with 'La Voix du Peuple' turned up in time to save him and his family from 'starvation'."

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, KUWOLF
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-Chief, LCPIPIT

GROUP 1
[illegible] from automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible]

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PAGE NO. 1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-43,308

TO: Chief, KUDESK

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; (Attn: RODIGAST); Chief, AF; Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 10 June 1965

SUBJECT: KUDESK STEBONY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Officer's Comment on STEBONY/1 and Wife

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED:

REFERENCES:

1. In the course of an informal discussion on 8 June with the JAGUAR officer most familiar with the history of STEBONY/1 (and our relationship with him), the JAGUAR officer commented that he was frankly surprised at the volume of sexual activity of the African Communists and far-leftists. His first reference was to types such as Jeanne PYNOR, but he broadened the comment to include Rosalynde AINSLIE and others, and of course there were the recipients of these girls' affections as well - Africans (usually black) such as Kenyatta and Babu.

2. The JAGUAR officer then added that S/1's wife was also known to have shared her favors with other black men than S/1 - to such an extent, at any rate, that her promiscuity had come to JAGUAR's notice. (I mentioned that this must be some new news, since we had not heard of it before, but he indicated that this was old news, and apparently not of the type to be considered "derogatory.") The JAGUAR officer went on to say that S/1 himself has put in a certain amount of time in the beds of other white girls, and perhaps this is how he knows of the promiscuous propensities of some of them.

3. While S/1 has not particularly affected prudery in our talks, neither has he professed himself to be a great and universal lover.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 3-Chief, WE
- 2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
- 2-Chief, AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CS COPY

201-306052

FORM 1557 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 30

3 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AF/1/CI

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	[illegible]	5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 6, CI, ADDP, CA 4, CI/OPS, [illegible], CI/OA,

10 Jun 65 IN 87361

S E C R E T 101531Z

PALP INFO DIR ALGI CITE LOND 8101

STEBONY KUDESK KUWOLF JAGUAR

1. JAGUAR REPORT STATES "AFTER HIS QUARREL WITH VERGES IN 1964, STEBONY/1 RECEIVED 200 POUNDS AS 'PERSONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE' FROM JACQUES GRIPPA. NILS ANDERSSON ALSO GAVE HIM FINANCIAL HELP".

2. JAGUAR DO NOT KNOW WHEN GRIPPA FUNDS GIVEN TO S/1, BUT ASSUME BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1964.

3. IT POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, ULTIMATE SOURCE JAGUAR INFO IS S/1. MIGHT BE USEFUL, NONTHELESS, GET S/1 COMMENTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

201

SECRET

unsolicited, or did we ask for [illegible]?

2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/[redacted]

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris (Attention: COVERDALE)

INFO
Chief, WE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief, KUDESK;
Chief of Station, Madrid

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY/Operational
Data on Antonio LOPEZ Campille

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Ref: OFPA 79622, 19 May 1965 (not sent all addressees)

1. On 4 June STEBONY/1 provided the following information on the personality and living pattern of Subject which we hope will be helpful to COVERDALE in mounting an eventual recruitment approach.

a. Subject is smarting with desire for revenge against those who have cut him off from all meaningful political activity and probably from a source of income as well. (NOTE: Subject told S/1 that currently [illegible] is providing his PCE-ML with the equivalent of $1,000 per month.) He is particularly angry with [illegible], who owes him some money.

b. An intellectual, Subject has never been particularly effective in the area of practical organisational politics. He is rather weak in the sense that in a conflict situation he tends to pull back. In other words he is not aggressive by nature. At the same time, S/1 felt certain that Subject's indignation and desire for revenge were deeply seated in his emotions and he would not be able to rationalize away these feelings.

c. Subject is basically a friendly and courteous person.

d. Subject speaks French and Spanish but no English. His wife, described by S/1 as a stronger personality than Subject, does speak English. She teaches school.

e. Subject has mixed feelings towards CHIPPA, but uppermost is his desire to rehabilitate himself with the Belgian "gauleiter." It is thought that if someone telephoned Subject and made reference to "Jacques" or "a message from a friend in Belgium" Subject would most likely come out for a meeting.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

f. Subject has irregular working hours at the CNRS and it would be easy for him to leave the job for an hour or two without anyone becoming suspicious. He works on research projects and more or less sets his own hours.

g. Asked if he thought Subject would be in a position to provide much information on the PCE Pro-ChiCom dissident groups, S/1 said that he thought Subject was well-informed and, if willing, would be

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER COPY
OELA-43,294

DATE ~~201-109727~~
9 June 1965 201-306050

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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

able to provide a great deal of information despite his having been pushed aside from active and direct participation in recent months.

2. Based on the foregoing, the best ploy for getting at Subject might be a telephone call to his place of work with the caller using a cover pretext for meeting him alone and deferring all detailed questions to such a meeting on the grounds of not wanting to discuss these over the telephone. If this gets Subject out, then COVERDALE could apologise for the minor deception while explaining that it was required by reason of his not wanting to cause Subject embarassment or injury in the course of contacting him. Good hunting.

3. It may be possible for STEBCNY/1 to contact Subject during his visit to Paris 11 - 17 June. If COVERDALE would like to get a more current reading on Subject, please get in touch with Rufus F. RODIGAST, who will be meeting S/1 on 12 June.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris (Attn: COVERDALE)
3-Chief, WH
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Madrid
2-Chief, KUDESK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KURIOT; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Asian-African Journalists' Association Correspondence

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted as separate cover attachment are copies of correspondence from the AAJA to STEBONY/1. Among these materials is an original copy of one letter, which is forwarded for KURIOT's exemplar stockpile.

2. These materials were passed to TIFFANY by S/1.

3. London Station is not retaining copies of this material, nor do we anticipate passing any of it to JAGUAR.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
~~2~~-Chief, KUDESK w/att (USC)
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KURIOT w/att (USC)
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/o att

Excluded [illegible] downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
8 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,273

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
KAPOK

Asian-African Journalists' Association

(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. [illegible]

No.:

Djakarta, April 3rd 1964

Dear Colleague,

Warmest greetings!

As you are aware the Secretariat at its Second Meeting held in Gadok, Bogor (Indonesia), from November 30th to December 1st 1963, decided, inter-alia, to name April 24th, the opening day of the first Asian-African Journalists' Conference, "THE ASIAN-AFRICAN JOURNALISTS' DAY".

You will readily agree that the naming of April 24th, as Asian-African Journalists' Day, is of immense importance to us Afro-Asian journalists.

The Secretariat call on all its member organizations and members to observe this Day by celebration and meetings; press statements, articles and write-ups etc. in the various Afro-Asian newspapers and mass media generally.

This day will also mark the first anniversary of our Association and we earnestly call on you, dear members and colleagues, to mark this day as a historical event in the life of all Afro-Asian journalists particularly, and the Afro-Asian peoples generally.

We hope that you have by now received copies of the first issue of "the Afro-Asian Journalist". If you have not, please contact us and we will gladly let you have some (state how many).

We further call on you to continue sending us articles on the press-as well as on the struggle either for independence, or for the defence of your independence in your country-for publication in "the Afro-Asian Journalists".

We look forward to receiving material, newspapers etc. from you.

So as to inform all our member colleagues of your activities could you write us of or send us clippings of your activities on "the Asian-African Journalists' Day".

We look forward to hearing from you soon and wish you, in the Bandung spirit, all success and the further solidarity of our Association.

Yours fraternally,

LM/hif.-

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. [illegible] 62109 ext 777

ns.-

No.:

Djakarta, March 31st 1964.-

Statement on Cambodia

In response to an urgent appeal by the Cambodian Journalists, to journalists throughout the world, the AAJA calls on all its members to voice support for Cambodia's policy of peace and neutrality and to denounce the U.S. Imperialists, Thailand and South Vietnam, for their aggression against peaceful Cambodia.

We urge all our members to join their voices in demanding that the U.S. Government and all its allies agree readily to the proposal made by the Cambodian Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk for guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia; and to give valuable support to the just struggle of the Khmer people for developing their economy independently.

oooOOOooo

Enclosed a complete set of the daily bulletin that we ran for the duration of the Afro-Asian Film Festival III, which ended in great success, and which thoroughly exposed all those who refuse to recognise that our common enemy is imperialism headed by the U.S. The bulletin helped much to make the Communique possible.

We will be writing to you more fully,

comradely yours,

[illegible] Morrison.

With our compliments and best wishes !

PS Some Translations at the back

Secretariat
Asian — African Journalists' Association
Press House
Djakarta
Indonesia

Phone : 61749

[illegible]
[illegible]

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

cretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

mg

Registered.

No.: 110/KL/LK/64/P.

Djakarta, 11th. May 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor
"Revolution",
40 rue Francois 1er,
P A R I S.-

Dear Colleague,

Thank you ever so much for readdressing the letters of comrade Viriato da Cruz to him in Algiers. We are eagerly waiting for some response from him.

Your suggestions of sending us 100 copies of the English and a further 100 copies of the French editions is most welcome. We will gladly accept any subscription funds here in Indonesia and hold such funds until it can either be transmitted or used it by you here in Indonesia.

Your remarks about devoting some efforts to encouraging the progressive press for Afro-American in the USA were noted. We will be discussing the matter soon. (There is no objection in principle- indeed there can't be any at all). What is worrying us the prospects of getting information and articles regularly from any Afro-Americans progressive pressmen. Maybe you have some suggestions and ideas. Let us know, as we urgently feel the need to widen and strengthen unity, with our Afro-American brothers in the states. (We have dispatched 50 copies of the second issue of the AAJ to you).

We are just having some material typed and would let you them as soon as they are done. We would like you to assist (we can supply the articles) in popularising the convening of the next Bandung Conference (Heads of Afro-Asian States). Various forces are already working against such a conference and we have to forcefully put forward the suitability etc of a Second Bandung Conference.

Have you any suggestions etc.?

Our Deputy Secretary-General Joesoef who attended the Sixth session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council meeting in Algiers as an observer, had hoped to call on you in Paris, but unfortunately he was delayed somewhere else and could not thus meet you. However we hope that soon one of our colleagues will have the pleasure of meeting you and colleague Verges and discuss various common problems.

In the meantime, dear colleague, accept our warmest greetings.

Fraternally yours,

Joesoef
Deputy Secretary-General

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

Sekretariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No : 962/Sekr/63

Djakarta. 30th December, 1963

REGISTERED AND AIR MAIL

The Director,
"Revolution",
Metropole,10/11,
LAUSANNE,
Switzerland.

Dear Colleague,

Greetings! The Asian-African Journalists Association founded in April,1963 by 48 countries and Asian African Journalists Unions, took various far reaching decisions and resolutions.

Inter-Alia, it has decided to publish a monthly news bulletin; and to set up a Lumumba Academy, which will serve as a centre of information and reference.

The worthly magazine "Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, is of such a revolutionary content and import that we would like to receive two or three copies regularly monthly. In our turn we will send you copies (state how many), of our bulletin, the first issue which will be ready for dissemination mid January6- next month.

Is there a possibility of you also sending us back number issues of your magazine, as well as the special illustration-"Revolution"- for our office and for usage in the Lumumba Academy.

We are sending you, under seperate cover, some documents relating to the decisions and resolutions passed by the histroic conference; and hope that you will keep in close contact with us, as we are aware that we have much in common, in our struggle against the common enemy-imperialism, colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

Wishing you a prosperous New Year and further successes in your revolutionary work,

Yours fraternally,

Djawoto
SECRETARY GENERAL.

5c-6, 6
2, 3, 4-5,

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia - Afrika)

etariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

MR/AB

REGISTERED

No.:

Djakarta, March 13th 1964

Richard Gibson,
Editor-in-Chief,
REVOLUTION
Paris.

Dear Colleague,

We have received the various copies of REVOLUTION, which we heartily thank you for.

Your letter was ver encouraging, and we have noted the contents. We share your ideals, and are thoroughly convinced that our struggle against the forces of reaction will still further advance, and triumph.

We will bear in mind your request for articles etc., and will do all in our efforts to help.

REVOLUTION plays an important part in our revolutionary struggle against imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, and as such we would like to help in the further distribution of REVOLUTION. We are widely distributing it in Indonesia, and hope to do the same in South EastAsia as well. In addition, because of the foreign exchange problem, we will rather give you names of other interested persons outside Indonesia to whom you can send sample copies. Or we could do that if you so desire. Please let us know! A little note to the effect that we will distribute and wherever possible in South East collect articles for you, in REVOLUTION will be welcomed and facilitate matters.

We are printing initially 6.000 English copies of the 'the Afro-Asian Journalist',and hope to have an extra 4.000 in French ready soon.

We will dispatch 50 copies of 'the Afro-Asian Journalist' to you, under seperate number immediately -(one we will send airmail). If you would like more please do not hesitate to contact us.

Can you also send us some more French copies of REVOLUTION, if possible, as well as some posters.

Dear Colleague, our struggle is gaining momentum and the forces of reaction manifested in colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and manifestations are on the retreat. Our very close co-operation will further help in destroying colonialism and imperialism, which is the curse of all makind.

/We look .....

Asian-African Journalists' Association
(Persatuan Wartawan Asia-Afrika)

retariat : Press House — Djakarta
Telp. 61749

No.:

Djakarta, ______________ 19___

We look forward to hearing from you again. Greetings and warmest wishes to your Director Comrade Verges and all the other revolutionaries who are working together with you.

Fraternally yours

Djawoto
Secretary-General
A.A.J.A.

4-65 SUIU

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG. ______

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM
PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION
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ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WE
TIME 0946
BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA 2, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN

S E C R E T 071148Z

7 Jun 65 IN 84527

PRIORITY DIR INFO LOND CITE PALP 3990

AF/1 - C. BILLINGS will reply. JR

KUDESK STEBONY QKPREY

REF LOND 7991 (IN 81357) +

1. IN FINAL LOND MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST TIFFANY HE ASSUMED PER DIEM WOULD ACCRUE S ENTIRE ALGI STAY. S CLAIMED IMPOSSIBLE LIVE WITHOUT PER DIEM BECAUSE:

A. HIGH COST LIVING ALGI

B. MAINTAINING TWO HOUSEHOLDS

C. WIFE BEGINS MATERNITY LEAVE 1 JULY.

ANSAS	FI	CI/ICG
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

2. TIFFANY SUGGESTED TEN DOLLAR PER DIEM COMPROMISE AND S ACCEPTED. ESTIMATE TOTAL ADDITIONAL EXPENSE 450 DOLLARS.

3. CONSIDER THIS REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES AND REQUEST HQS APPROVAL BY COB 10 JUNE.

7 JUN 1965

4. S SUPPLIED FURTHER EVIDENCE GOOD FAITH 6 JUNE IN PASSING ADDRESS BOOK AND REVOLUTION AFRICAINE AND AADA CORRESPONDENCE FOR COPYING. LOND POUCHING.

SECRET

5. INDEX: 201-306052.

S E C R E T

+ RYBAT REF

201-306052

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TO
Chief of Station, Algiers

INFO.
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY/Operational
- Plans and Progress with STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 43,237

Forwarded herewith as Attachment is a report written by TIFFANY and RODIGAST covering their meeting with STEBONY/1 during the period 1-5 June. Though meetings will be held with S/1 on 6 and 7 June, it is not expected that these will produce any new information to alter the substance of Attachment. Info supplied by S/1 on a variety of personalities and activities will be handled by separate dispatch and info reports.

Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

201-306052

DATE TYPED 4 June 1965	DATE DISPATCHED
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-43,272
	HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

att - 1

TO: Chief,
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,272
4 June 1965

1. Cover Situation. S/1 was not successful in lining up any cover arrangement in the U.S. Around 28 May he received word from New York of a flat turn-down on his offer to serve as correspondent for Monthly Review. ~~Karo Schleiffer, who was on the spot got this job, and~~ MR's chief editor Leo Hubermann plans to attend 2nd Bandung himself. Locally, however, S/1 was able to line up the following sponsors (though none is in a position to pay much for his services they collectively provide him with sufficient reason for being in Algiers; he will let on that his travel costs were advanced him by his wealthy brother-in-law):

a. Cinnamon, a sort of British Ebony scheduled to bring out its first issue on 20 June.

b. West Indian Gazette, described in earlier correspondence, will provide S/1 with a letter of accreditation.

c. Institute of Race Relations. This politically neutral, academic outfit publishes a monthly newsletter. Connected with Chatham House, the Institute's secretary, Sheilla Paterson is a good friend of S/1. She has asked him to do a paper back book for the Institute on Africa. Again, though they could pay little for this effort it constitutes a highly respectable piece of cover.

During the last two months, S/1 has explained his income to his wife as coming from advances, expense money and articles for Encounter. This has not pleased her, as she dislikes both the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Laskey, but has at least satisfied her curiosity. To explain Katzenbach's telephone calls to his home (K. identified himself to S/1's wife ~~xxx~~ as"Mr. Wilson") S/1 had to improvise a purely notional affiliation with an American feature story syndication service called "Metropolitan Features". This will help explain some of his income to his wife, but will not be used with others.

2. The above skeletal cover will hopefully be reinforced in Algiers where S/1 will scour around for bits and pieces of work for his many contacts there. His visits to Grippa and Andersson on his way to Algiers will also help to fill out his ostensible sources of income, though S/1 has agreed not to overplay this angle. In other words, he will not pretend that these two have given him any funds, but if others want to make the assumption, so much the better.

3. On 1 and 2 June, Tiffany expounded at some length on the importance of S/1 trying to get an Opposition (Soviet, Cuban, Algerian or ChiCom) sponsor for any further cover, such as the researching of a book or establishment of an Afro-Asian news service for U.S. leftist periodicals and/or individuals. While we could easily set him up in this enterprise, we ~~do~~ not ~~want~~ to for the simple reason that this would at best only provide him with a superficial sort of access. What we want him to strive for is Opposition sponsorship that will lead him into one of the nerve centers of the national liberation movement in Algiers or Djakarta. (S/1 ruled out Cairo on the grounds that his wife is Jewish) S/1 accepted this reasoning and agreed to go for a position that holds out the prospect of long-range penetration in depth.

Att # 1 to OELA-43272

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4. Turnover to Rodigast. After getting S/1's unhesitating agreement to an LCFLUTTER examination and his signature on a Secrecy Agreement on 2 June, Tiffany introduced him to Rodigast, under the alias "Paul Weller" on the morning of 3 June. It was explained that Rodigast would serve as S/1 point of contact in the future. S/1 and Rodigast hit it off well from the outset, the latter's knowledge of Paris and Tangiers-based American beatniks and other intellectuals serving him well in the rapport-building process. Rodigast has laid on firm meeting arrangements for Paris and has discussed arrangements for meeting S/1 at least twice during the summer outside Algiers. Final agreement on a mid July meeting will be made in Paris to conform to a normal pattern by S/1 and arrangements which S/1 succeeds in developing in Lausanne and Paris. In the process of discussing communications Rodigast is also imparting instruction in good security practices on the part of S/1. Rodigast will instruct S/1 in the use of SW in Paris. Hopefully, Rodigast will be able to spend a day or two with S/1 in Paris, even though we want S/1 to get to Algiers as soon as possible.

5. Financial Arrangements. After discussing all possible alternatives, it was decided that the most secure arrangement would be to give S/1 an advance of the equivalent of $200 for his travel London-Brussels-Lausanne- Paris and per diem and ~~his~~ an advance of the equivalent of $600 for his June salary plus non-accountable expenses. These advances were made and signed for on 3 June. One important reason for the large cash advance was the fact that S/1 was completely broke, and he had to make some funds available to his wife to meet expenses and pay off a 65 pound Sterling debt to his brother-in-law before leaving on his trip. (S/1 will explain the funds as the last of the advances and payments for articles by Encounter and other publications.) For essentially the same reason (poverty) we agreed to make S/1's July and August salary payments in advance (to be paid into his Swiss bank account on the first of each month). We recognize that this procedure is

somewhat irregular, but we went ahead with it principally on the grounds that this was necessary to head off the security and morale problems posed by an irate wife.

6. In the course of his initial talk with S/1, Rodigast pursued the matter of the allegations made at various times in the past to the effect that S/1 is or was a "CIA agent" or "FBI agent". S/1 explained the situation as follows:

a. S/1 was a schoolmate of William Gardner Smith, and with Smith's encouragement came to Paris and worked with Smith on the English desk of Agence France Presse. S/1 took over the left bank apartment of Ollie Harrington, American Negro cartoonist and CPUSA member. S/1 had a falling-out with Harrington over the apartment (rent), and in what he describes as a moment of weakness he sought revenge by forging a letter with Harrington's signature which indicated support for the FLN (Algeriah nationalists); at that time the French were extremely sensitive to the subject, of course, and S/1's act was designed to hurt Harrington, and perhaps his friends as well. S/1 was found out, and questioned by the French police; his break with William Gardner Smith and that crowd dates from this moment. S/1 had been forced to write an apology to Harrington, confessing to the forgery.

b. S/1 believes that Jacques Vergès obtained the letter of apology (to Harrington) from Smith or from Ellen Wright (an American, white, widow of the Negro novelist Richard Wright; she continues to reside in Paris as a literary agent handling books of writers connected with Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir; S/1 says that she is a friend of Harrington). As for Harrington, S/1 believes he is now in Ghana or in East Germany; in East Germany he has American friends: a Negro singer Aubrey Pankey and his white wife Kay; she is an editor of the East German publishing house Seven Seas (which prints books in English), and is close to Shirley Graham Dubois.

c. The CPUSA knew of the Harrington forgery and according to S/1 told the Cubans about it, since the CPUSA hoped to discredit S/1 and put their own people in touch with the Cubans. S/1 told the Cubans a tall tale which he hopes they believed (among those he spoke to was Roa): he said that during the French drive against the FLN various people were writing letters in support of the Algerians and signing prominent names to them, and that the Harrington forgery was carried out in this spirit.

d. The hostility to S/1 from Ainslee and McGowan had as its origin their anger that Vergès had given S/1 a job that should have gone to an Englishman (or woman); they felt that Africa was a problem of the British CP; and so they spread the story about S/1.

e. Rodigast recalled that William Gardner Smith had once written a letter to the Paris Herald Tribune denying that a pro-Castro letter which appeared several days earlier signed W G Smith had been sent by him. At the time (perhaps 18 months ago) Smith told Rodigast, who questioned him on the matter, "Oh, that's an old story." Without indicating that he knew Smith, Rodigast raised the question of Smith's Herald Tribune letter to S/1, who said he had never seen it or heard of it before.

f. Rodigast gave S/1 the recent clipping from Le Monde which indicated that Patricia MacGowan's husband or lover Carlos Lansa had been arrested by the Algerians in connection with the investigation of the Delgado killing. Rodigast warned S/1 that we did not know whether a charge would be made, or indeed whether Lansa had already been released along with others arrested at the same time. Nevertheless S/1 thought the clipping would be useful to show to those not terribly familiar with the details, but who might be favorably influenced by a report showing that the people who denounced S/1 as a "CIA agent" had also sent Delgado to his death.

7. Questioned on his residence status vis a vis French and Swiss authorities, S/1 said:

a. He feels he can come and go to Switzerland without problems. When Revolution was closed down by the Swiss, S/1 was called in and notified that he had three months to leave the country because of the undesirable nature of his activities; the Swiss told Nils Anderssen informally that should S/1 change to a "desirable" activity he would be allowed to stay. Following his departure on what S/1 considered very polite terms (i.e., the three-month notice period), S/1 traveled regularly to Switzerland (once a month, on Revolution business), although he tries to arrive by means which expose him to minimal border checks (train rather than plane, and Trans Europe Express best of all) and while in Switzerland lives with friends rather than in a hotel to avoid having to fill out police cards. (S/1 was notified of his expulsion in September 1963 and left in December before the deadline. His most recent trips were in January-February 1965.)

b. S/1 was never arrested by the French, merely interrogated on the Harrington forgery charge. He has resided in Paris since that time. During the early stages of S/1's suit against Vergès for payment of back wages, Vergès' attorney said in open court that S/1 had been in France illegally (as he had no carte de sejour; he could not obtain one since Vergès never agreed to a work contract which would be required at the time of application for a carte de sejour). (In connection with the Vergès suit: S/1's French lawyer Pierre Schwarzenberg, has not pressed the charges; he is a Communist and an old friend of Vergès, and told S/1 he believed he could obtain a settlement through persuasion. S/1 has already paid Schwarzenberg's fee (the money was obtained from S/1's brother-in-law), and does not know whether he can whip up Schwarzenberg's enthusiasm. Should S/1 win a judgement for the some $5000 owed to him, he could force Vergès' bankruptcy (there is a printer in the same legal position who has not insisted on payment because he is reluctant to bring on bankruptcy). S/1 says that it is possible that if he engaged a first-class non-Communist attorney in France (who would have to be paid in advance) he might achieve this goal, but it is not certain that he could get the original fee back from Schwarzenberg.

8. For future contacts, Rodigast gave S/1 "an alias I am using: James Sunderland, c/o American Express, 11 rue Scribe, Paris 9, the "c/o American Express" being optional. Rodigast will also look into the possibility of emergency contact via want ads placed in Alger Republicain or Le Peuple (the latter is preferred by S/1), which Rodigast believes will be purchased and read daily by LCPIPIT during the summer anyway-- they arrive in Paris a day or two after publication. S/1 could advertise for a stenographer able to take perfect English shorthand, for example.

Rufus F. Rodigast
Rufus F. Rodigast

Joseph S. Tiffany
Joseph S. Tiffany

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
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TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief of Stations; Algiers; Paris/LCPIPIT; Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF (Attn: Noel D. KAMMERMAYER)

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY/KUDESK/QRPREY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: A LOND 7991
B DIR 15660

1. Forwarded under separate cover true name pouch as Attachment 1 is the original Letter of Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 3 June. Attachment 2 forwarded with this dispatch is a santized version of this contract.

2. Attachment 3 forwarded under separate cover true name pouch is a Secrecy Agreement signed by STEBONY/1 on 2 June.

3. Attachment 4 forwarded underseparate cover true name pouch is PRQ Part I, filled out by STEBONY/1 on 2 June. It should be noted that due to limitation of time this was prepared in great haste.

4. Attachment 5 is the top half of the signature specimen assigning a pseudonym to STEBONY/1. The bottom half of this document is forwarded as Attachment 6 under separate cover true name pouch.

Joseph S. Tiffany
Joseph S. TIFFANY

Attachments 1,3,4,& 6 (USC)
Attachments 2 & 5 Herewith

omatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/o att
2-COS, Algiers w/o att
2-Chief, AF w/att 2 h/w & 4 (USC)
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1, 3, 4 & 6 (USC) & 2 & 5 h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att

CS copy

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
4 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,237

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET-RYBAT

14-00000

SECRET

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

Mr. Richard T. Gibson

Dear Mr. Gibson:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

201

3. Operational Expenses. You will recieve $100.00 per month for necessary operational expenses on a non-accountable basis. Any operational expenses incurred beyond the amount must be specifically authorized by U. S. Covernemnt.

4. The U. S. Government will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and the U. S. Government.

5. The Organization, in recognition of a clear moral obligation will undertake to protect you against any adverse actions related to your activities and associations entered into at the request of the U. S. Government during the term of this agreement.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by U. S. Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under applicable laws and regulations.

7. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment hereto shall be binding on the U. S. Government.

8. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 June 1965 and shall continue thereafter for three months (to 1 September 1965). Extension to two years (to 1 June 1967) will be contingent upon the granting of full operational clearance and your performance during the summer 1965 assignment in North Africa and access acquired during that period. Furthermore, it is understood

   a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

   b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

By

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 2 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

LETTER OF AGREEMENT

STEBONY/1
Dear Mr. STEBONY/1

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, Hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $500.00 per month. Payments will be made in a secure manner acceptable to you. No taxes will be withheld from this amount. Escrow: A mutually agreed portion will be withheld in an escrow account for you for reasons of security as soon as this becomes a practical possibility.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the U. S. Government. You will be required to account for such expenses in a manner consistent with good security. Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel.

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a. That on or before 1 September 1965 it will be possible to renegotiate the terms of compensation of this contract for the period following that date;

b. That after 1 September 1965 this contract (and its extension) can be terminated by either party with 30 days notice.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath (Secrecy Agreement) you have signed.

United States Government

ACCEPTED: 3 June 1965

/s/ STEBONY/1

By ______________
Robert C. Gustke

OELA-43,237, 4 June 1965

SECRET

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Richard Gibson, understand that upon entering on duty I am undertaking a position of trust in the Organization responsible for intelligence relating to the security of our country. I understand that in the course of this association I will acquire information about the Organization and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Organization.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the espionage laws of our government and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of such laws, whether such disclosure be made while I am associated with the Organization or at any time thereafter.

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Organization not to disclose any classified information relating to the Organization without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it from information relating to the Organization, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Organization. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my association with the Organization, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or to other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my association with the Organization as during it.

4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Organization on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Organization, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or verbal or written utterance which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of government and Organization regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.

6. I understand that there are established procedures within the Organization permitting appeal at all times of any legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint and that to carry any such grievance or complaint which I may have outside the Organization will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3.

7. I further understand and agree that my association with the Organization is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with the Organization security requirements.

8. I will not undertake to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Organization, its activities, or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my association with the Organization without specific prior approval by the Organization.



Visas

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6110 75

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR YOU

- **TRAVEL IN DISTURBED AREAS**

  If you travel in disturbed areas, you should keep in touch with the nearest American diplomatic or consular office.

- **PROLONGED RESIDENCE ABROAD**

  If you make your home or reside for a prolonged period abroad, you should register at the nearest American consulate.

- **LOSS OF NATIONALITY**

  You may lose your United States nationality by being naturalized in, or by voting in the elections of a foreign state; by taking an oath or making a declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; by serving in the armed forces or accepting employment under the government of a foreign state. If you are a naturalized citizen of the United States, you may lose [illegible] by residing for 3 years in the country of your birth or former nationality, or by residing for [illegible] in any other foreign state or states. For [illegible] information consult the nearest American diplomatic or consular office.

- **VIOLATION OF [illegible]**

  If you use or [illegible] passport in violation of the conditions [illegible] contained in it you may lose the [illegible] States while you continue to reside [illegible] may be liable for prosecution (Section [illegible] U. S. Code).

- **LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF PASSPORT**

  If this passport is lost, stolen or destroyed, report full details immediately to the [illegible] Service, Department of State, Washington, D. C., or to the nearest American consulate. If in an outlying possession of the United States, report to the chief executive, and to the local police authorities. In loss or destruction cases, new passports are issued only after exhaustive investigation.

- **ALTERATION OR MUTILATION OF PASSPORT**

  This passport must not be altered or mutilated in any way. You must not alter any entry; make changes in your description, or [illegible] any other page of this passport. Alteration [illegible] it invalid. Only authorized officials of [illegible] or of foreign countries [illegible] writing, entry, or stamps on [illegible]

SECRET

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in connection with my official duties with the Organization remains the property of our government, and I will surrender, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Organization or upon separation from the Organization, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 2nd [redacted] day of June 1965.

Richard Gibson (SEAL)

Witness:

Robert [illegible] Approved:

Date

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

__/PRQ/__

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable" (NA)
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script NA

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) NA

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.) NONE

5. a. Date of birth 13 MAY 1931 b. Place of birth LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate NEGRO

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) U.S.

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) 30, STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT ROAD, LONDON, N.W.8 (tenant)

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) NA

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.) FREELANCE JOURNALIST

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.) NA

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) MRS. SADIE THOMAS (grandmother)
MR. CLARENCE GIBSON (father)

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

CLARENCE LOUIS GIBSON, CURRENT ADDRESS UNKNOWN IN PHILADELPHIA, PA. RETIRED MAILMAN. US. CITIZEN BORN IN U.S. BUT DATE AND PLACE UNKNOWN

14. Mother - same information as 13.

ALICE M. GIBSON (NÉE THOMAS)
DECEASED 1936 or 37 (?)

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

JOY MARJORIE GIBSON (NÉE KAYE), BORN HENDON, ENGLAND 12 July 1926, British, 30 STOCKLEIGH HALL, PRINCE ALBERT RD., LONDON, N.W.8
Married 24 MARCH 1956 in PARIS.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Dominique Elisabeth GIBSON, F. 29 Oct. 1956 en Paris, Nationality U.S.
Frederick William Gordon GIBSON, M. 5 March 1958 in Paris – U.S.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

None

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisnor of war

Entered U.S. Army in Trieste, Italy - Dec. 1952
Sent to Fort Dix, N.J. for basic training, later
transferred Fort Benning, Ga., then to 37th Engineer
Gp (Const), Gttingen, Germany as Public Information
NCO - discharged in Germany Dec. 1954

26. Present and past membership in organization (professional, social, political, etc.) FPCC - See #21

member NAACP, Urban League and American Society of African Culture

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Can operate camera, tape recorder

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Owe £1500 to my brother-in-law (Gordon Kaye)

Various lesser debts in Paris resulting from Revolution fiasco

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

cub reporter - Philadelphia Afro-American (newspaper)
Autumn 1950 - Spring 1951 - salary approx. $50 per week - left for
literary fellowship at "Yaddo", Saratoga Springs, N.Y.
1951-1952 - Rome - worked freelance for
Italian Films Export, film publicity outfit, and
Edmund Stevens, then Rome correspondent of Christian
Science Monitor

/PRQ/

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

EPISCOPAL — NOT PRACTICED

21. Present and past political affiliations

FOUNDING MEMBER, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE 1960 – 1962

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited (see attachment)

1951-52 ITALY John Hay Whitney Fellowship:
1954 – W. GERMANY – U.S. ARMY
1954-58 FRANCE – GI BILL at Sorbonne, then editor Agence France Presse 1960-61 Four or Five visits to Cuba for FPCC

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language French Speak good Read good Understand good
Language Italian Speak poor Read fair Understand fair
Language Spanish Speak poor Read fair Understand fair
German poor fair fair

29. (Continued)
Also assisted late Italian writer and film producer, Curzio MALAPARTE, on Italo-American film project. Salaries were all small and based on piecework. Drafted in US. Army in Dec. 1954.
1955-58 English editor at Agence France-Presse in Paris.—was discharged when "Ollie" HARRINGTON brought forgery charges against me. Salary 900 frs. per month
1959-61 CBS News, New York—newswriter—salary approx. $200 per week. Discharged because of involvement in Fair Play for Cuba, but was given CBS Fellowship at Columbia Grad. School (mainly African studies) for 60-61

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates. A MIRROR FOR MAGISTRATES (novel), London, 1958. Numerous articles in many periodicals, such as KENYON REVIEW, GIORNALE DITALIA, PERSPECTIVES U.S.A., MONTHLY REVIEW, THE NATION, REVOLUTION, BOHEMIA (Havana), REVOLUCION (Havana), etc.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.
Wife and children live with me.

~~See attached~~ Correspondents at home and abroad too numerous to list here but have been reported earlier.

32. List five character references.

NA

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 34

Posture stooped

Apparent age 36 or 37

Weight 165 lbs.

Height 5 ft 10 in

Teeth gap in front

Eyes black

Hair kinky black

Face - shape oval

Scars –

Complexion light

Build medium

Sex M

General appearance fairly neat, reasonably well dressed

Prominent features none

Other identifying features wear glasses

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

22. Travel (cont.)

1962 - ENGLAND, FRANCE, MOROCCO, ALGERIA
Departure from FPCC, no fixed objective abroad, Employed by Jacques VERGES and *Révolution Africaine* in Algiers, Nov. 1962

1963 - 64 SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM HOLLAND, ENGLAND - residence or trips involved with business of editing *Revolution*

1964 - ENGLAND - Stay with wife's family, seeking employment

1965 - JAN. + FEB. ITALY, SWITZERLAND, FRANCE, BELGIUM - trip financed by *Encounter* to research article

29. EMPLOYMENT (cont.)

1961-62 Acting Executive Secretary, Fair Play for Cuba Committee - salary ran from $150 to nothing per week. Left because of unwillingness to continue an unpleasant task.

1962-64 - Editor *Révolution Africaine* and later Editor of its English edition - salary 1000 (new) French frs. at first and later 1500 frs. per month - rupture based on financial collapse of publication and various disagreements with Verges, its publisher.

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 5 to OELA-43,237
4 June 1965

Signature Specimen London 2 June 1965

In the future I will use the following pseudonym and signature.

Frederick T. Dominie

Frederick T. Dominie

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 6 (USC) to
OELA-43,237, 4 June 1965

Richard T. Gibson

Richard Gibson

FBI doc.
24 May '65 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; AF; FE; LCPIPIT; Chief of Stations, Algiers; Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London RO

SUBJECT
O
KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

JAGUAR had made the following available to us, in response to our request for information on a continuing basis relating to STEBONY/1:

"In mid-May STEBONY/1 was still trying to arrange a visit to Algiers this summer - on the strength of help he has received from 'some comrades'.

"Robert WILLIAMS in Havana has given STEBONY/1 the impression that he may visit Algiers as a member of a Cuban delegation. Also, STEBONY/1 understands that William WORTHY, who has been in Hanoi, will be going to Algiers. STEBONY/1 expects to meet a number of his friends there and his main reason for wishing to make this trip is to discuss his problems, past and present, with these friends and other interested parties. He hopes to clear up doubts and uncertainties and, in this context, he has commented that one of the reasons for much of the hostility shown to him has been the reluctance of others to involve themselves in the differences which arose between himself and Jacques VERGES because the latter was clearly more influential and more important than STEBONY/1.

"STEBONY/1 had heard that VERGES was still insisting that STEBONY/1 was a KUBARK agent and that Nils ANDERSON and Jacques GRIPPA were 'ODYOKE double agents'. GRIPPA, who is leader of the pro-Chinese Communist group in Belgium, is planning to bring up-to-date his book 'Marxism-Leninism or Revisionism', published two years ago, by adding a new chapter. STEBONY/1 is looking into the possibility of its publication in the UK or PBPRIME and, in this context, he considers 'Monthly Review' to be the only possible medium although Leo HUBERMAN, one of the publication's editors, is not enthusiastic about the idea."

Kat
George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201- 306052

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
2-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers
2-COS, Paris

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
2 June 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
9 JUN 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,235

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM LONDON

ACTION C/WE3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT WE TIME 1534

INFO FILE VR, ADDP, C/CI

S E C R E T 021651Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO ALGI PARI PALP CITE LOND 7991

2 JUN 65 IN 81357

30

KAPOK STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY

2. ON 1 JUNE KATZENBACH INTRODUCED TIFFANY TO STEBONY/1 (S/1). ON 2 JUNE S/1 FILLED OUT PRQ PART ONE, SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT AND PSEUDO CARD, AGREED SIGN TWO YEAR CONTRACT 3 JUNE ON FOLLOWING TERMS:

A. COMPENSATION: FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS SALARY PLUS ONE HUNDRED NON ACCOUNTABLE EXPENSE ALLOWANCE PER MONTH.

B. TRAVEL COST PLUS AUTHORIZED MISCELLANEOUS OPS EXPENSES.

C. TERMINATION: TERM FIXED 1 JUNE THROUGH 31 AUGUST AT END OF WHICH IT POSSIBLE RENEGOTIATE SALARY IN LINE WITH S/1 ALGI PERFORMANCE AND DEGREE ACCESS HE HAS ACHIEVED FOR LONG TERM PENETRATION ASIAN AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. ALSO ON 1 SEPT THIRTY DAY CANCELLATION CLAUSE BECOMES OPERATIVE.

D. KUBARK AGREES PAY COST RESETTLEMENT S/1 FAMILY AT END ALGI SUMMER TOUR IF THIS REQUIRED BY S/1 JOB LOCATION.

E. QUESTION OF HOLDING PART S/1 COMPENSATION IN ESCROW TO BE DECIDED 3 JUNE. DUE OBLIGATION FAMILY MAINTENANCE, HOWEVER, IT UNLIKELY LARGE PORTION CAN BE WITHHELD DURING NEXT THREE MONTHS.

SECRET

3 JUN 1965

ANT ✓	~~PS~~	WE/BC/4
~~BS~~	~~[illegible]~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

201-306052

SECRET

IN 81357 PAGE 2

2. SINCE THIS CONTRACT IN LINE WITH TIFFANY TALKS WITH AF DIV PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS, WILL ASSUME APPROVAL UNLESS NOTIFIED OTHERWISE AND PRESENT CONTRACT FOR S/1 SIGNATURE 1000 HOURS 3 JUNE. IMMEDIATELY AFTER WILL INTRODUCE RODIGAST. S/1 PASSED EQUIV 100 DOLLARS SIGNING BONUS.

3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR S/1 IS DEPART LOND 8 JUNE SPEND ONE DAY TO VISIT GRIPPA AND OR RAINDORF BRUS; TO LAUSANNE BY RAIL 9 JUNE; TO PARI BY RAIL LATE 11 JUNE; TO TANGIER BY AIR 16 JUNE AND ON TO ALGI BY RAIL 17 OR 18 JUNE.

4. WE BELIEVE S/1 HAS ADEQUATE COVER FOR ALGI SUMMER, DETAILS BY POUCH.

5. ON BASIS TALKS WITH MARC SCHLEIFFER 1 JUNE S/1 SUGGESTED THAT HE TAKE TAPE RECORDER (OSTENSIBLY SUPPLIED BY BROTHER IN LAW) TO ALGI TO USE TOGETHER WITH S FOR RECORDING INTERVIEWS FOR PACIFICA FOUNDATION NEW JERSEY RADIO STATION WBAI. TIFFANY GAVE TENTATIVE TURNDOWN THIS IDEA, SINCE IT HIGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE REPORTER IN S/1 POSITION WOULD SPEND TIME MAKING TAPES FOR POSSIBLE (NOT CERTAIN) NOMINAL PAYTS BY WBAI. HOWEVER, THIS GIMMICK MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GET S/1 ACCESS FOR PRIVATE TALKS WITH TARGET PERSONALITIES. LEAVE TO ALGI AND HQS DISCRETION WHETHER

SECRET

TO AUTHORIZE TAPE RECORDER FOR S/1 WHICH RODIGAST COULD PROCURE AND TURN OVER S/1 PARI 13-16 JUNE.

6. FORWARDING PRQ ONE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT. WITH THIS AND S/1 AGREEMENT LCFLUTTER TRUST HQS CAN EXPEDITE APPROPRIATE SECURITY CLEARANCE S/1.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN

3 JUN 1959

14-00000

file R. Gibson

Telly

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

3 SECRET

☐ COPY ☐ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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2	1	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM LONDON

ACTION OS 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, EE 4, WE 6, CI/OA, CI, AF 6, CI/OPS,

S
E C R E T 271700Z

DIR INFO FRAN GMNY CITE LOND 7909

FJDUST LCFLUTTER KUDESK STEBONY

27 MAY 65 IN 77375

REF DIR 13891

DUE HIS NATIONALITY, WE DO NOT NEED SMOOTHERS OKAY TO FLUTTER STEBONY/1. HOWEVER, OUR GENERAL POLICY IS NOT TO FLUTTER HERE ANYONE WHO LIKELY REACT AND RAISE FUSS CAUSING SERIOUS POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT FOR US OR HMG. BECAUSE OF POINTS IN HIS HISTORY AND PERSONALITY, WE HAVE REASON TO DOUBT STEBONY/1 WILL COTTON TO FLUTTER, AND PREFER DEFER DECISION UNTIL TIFFANY BRIEFED AND HAS TALKED TO STEBONY/1. MAY THEN DECIDE, IF FLUTTER IN ORDER, CONDUCT IN EUROPE WHILE HE EN ROUTE ALGIERS.

SECRET
CFN

SECRET

201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.
Chief of Station, ~~LCPIPIT~~ (Paris)

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
STEBONY - Transmittal of Interview Tapes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. PALP 3904 (IN 75497)
B. OELA - 42,706
C. OELA - 42,410

1. Forwarded herewith as Enclosure are the tapes of KATZENBACH's interviews of STEBONY/1 requested in Reference A. Hopefully, this package will reach London in time for background use by Rodigast.

2. After Rodigast is finished with the tapes, please save one reel or send it back to Headquarters for retention, and destroy the other three.

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London w/att
1 - Paris w/o att

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELW - 22233	DATE 26 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

1 - RI
1 - CI/ICG
1 - WE/BC/U

AN PFI
ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG	A. Goodrich	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/BC/U		John K. Roberts

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	26 May	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, FE Attn: Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief of Station, London

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris 4P/45

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/KUDESK/STEBONY - "Revolution" Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: OELA-43,113 of 13 May 1965

Action: Please provide copy of subject list.

We note London Station's comment that the only copy of the "Revolution" mailing list, as provided by STEBONY, has been sent to Headquarters. We are not clear whether the STEBONY list was for the English-language edition of "Revolution" only, or for all subscribers. If possible, we should appreciate Headquarters' forwarding a list of "Revolution" subscribers and addresses in France.

Ann E. Ducote
Ann E. DUCOTE
EOJ

Distribution:
- 2 - Chief, FE
- 3 - Chief, WE
- 2 - COS, London

201-306052

MAY 21 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
CS COPY
OFPA - 79535

DATE
21 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Paris; Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK STKBONY LCHARVEST QRPREY
"Revolution" Address List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFPA 79410, 3 May 1965

London Station was able to make only a single copy of the list, and, due to its bulk and the length of time required to copy it, we have not retained a copy. We doubt that the entire list, which runs to several thousand names (mostly in the U.S.) would be useful to Paris Station, but Headquarters may be able to supply an extract of names to suit your need — or the whole thing, if you wish.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-COS, Paris
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, FE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
13 May 1965	14 MAY 1955

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,113

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

14-00000

BF

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

GROUP 1

☐ RI ☑ COPY ☐ BUM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED file STEBONY/1

FROM LONDON

ACTION WE 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, AF 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 121711Z

DIR INFO ALGI PAPI PALP CITE LOND 7620

12 MAY 65 IN 65581

KUDESK STEBONY

JAGUAR HAVE INFORMALLY ADVISED US OF NEW REPORT THAT "RUMORS HAVE RECENTLY REVIVED SAYING THAT STEBONY/1 IS CONNECTED WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY." STA REQUEST FOR ELABORATION, INDICATION OF AREA IN WHICH RUMOR CIRCULATING, ETC., MET WITH COMMENT THAT JAGUAR UNABLE TO SAY ANY MORE AT PRESENT, AND CANNOT "YET" LET US HAVE THIS COMMENT IN WRITING. WILL PURSUE AND ADVISE ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

201

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO. Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY
Cover Possibility for STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. During a recent meeting, STEBONY/1 called my attention to the book Political Africa, by honald SEGAL, published London 1961 by Stevens and Sons, Ltd. STEBONY/1 used the book to look up a brief bio squib on, as it happened, Patrick Duncan. He commented that the book, although out of date and far from objective (one of the collaborators was Rosalynde AINSLIE), was extremely useful to him.

2. I subsequently got a copy of the book, and find it useful. None-theless, it is far out of date. It would appear that there is a great need for an up-dated version, more comprehensive and more objective. STEBONY/1 might be the ideal person to work up such a book (he could even put some of his wife'r talents to work, in such a project), and, in turn, such a project could augment nicely his cover for, say, a year.

3. For Headquarters consideration then, the following suggestion: Contact Praeger (who published Political Africa in the U.S.) or another appropriate firm, and lay on a commission to compile such a compendium of facts, figures and faces on the African scene. Have them in turn commission STEBONY/1 to do the job, and provide him with enough of an advance to help cover his needs for a period of a year, say, starting after STEBONY/1's summer in Algiers. (Alternatively, of course, STEBONY/1 could be instructed to come to Praeger with such a proposal, which we could encourage Praeger to accept.) This could run concurrently with STEBONY/1's news-letter, if it materializes, and without any apparent conflict. It could also afford him additional cover for travel and interviews, as well as funds. And a useful reference tool could result.

4. This is just a suggestion, but we'd like to know what you think of it.

George H. KATZENBACH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE
2-Chief, KUDESK
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, FE
~~2~~-Chief, LCPIPIT
2-COS, Algiers - Out Pouch
2-COS, Paris

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
11 May 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
13 MAY 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,110

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201- 306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

201-306052

21/30 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM ALGIERS

ACTION CI

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE AF2, CA/02

11 May 65 IN 64377

SECRET 111100Z

LOND INFO DIR PARI PALP BRUS CITE ALGI 5878

LCHARVEST (PRTN GRBLD-BEING SVCD) QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: LOND 7141 (IN-46013)

RE PARA 8 REF. SOURCE IN ALGERIAN DIRECTORATE OF INFO SAYS [illegible] IS STILL HERE, ON PAYROLL OF DIRECTORATE ALTHOUGH NOT PRODUCING. CASE OFFICER SAYS SOURCE CAN PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFO [illegible] SUBJECT IF DIESIRED.

SECRET

CFN

AN ~~SAS~~

BS

ABSTRACT Y

AF/1/A

INDEX

SECRET

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

201 - 306052

INDEX. ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID. ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MES. 2 TOTAL COPIES 28

27 SECRET

GROUP 1

RI ☐ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
LCPIPIT (PARIS)

ACTION
~~WE 8~~ CI/IC 2

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE ADDP, AF 6, FE 6, CA/O 4, CA 2, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CCS 3, CI/OA, CA/PROP

E C R E 031055Z

DIR INFO LOND ALGI CITE PALP 3756

3 MAY 65 IN 57528

KUDESK STEBONY QRPREY

REFS A DIR 04341

B LOND 7341 (IN 55353)

C DIR 98974

1. RE PARA 2 REF A, RODIGAST (R) MOST INTERESTED THIS ASSIGNMENT. HE AVAILABLE FOR JUNE 1 INTRODUCTORY MEETING LOND. WILL POUCH SHORTLY OUR THOUGHTS RE COVER ACCOMMODATION, ADDRESS, ETC.

2. MEANWHILE LCPIPIT AND R AGREE WITH REF B PARA 4 POING CONCERNING S/1-R MEETING ALGI. ALTERNATIVELY SUGGEST CONSIDER TANGIERS TRAVEL TO WHICH R CAN COVER AS TRIP TO DEVELOP FEATURE ARTICLE ON AMERICAN EXPATRIATE LITERARY COMMUNITY WHICH CONGREGATES THERE. CASA ALSO A POSSIBILITY.

8 MAY 1965

3. HAS PRECISE TAPE DEBRIEFING MENTIONED REF C BEEN FORWARDED? PLEASE CABLE DISPATCH NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

AB/RB	~~RI~~	AF/2/A
~~FS~~		
ABSTRACT X		

201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

14-00000

DISP

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF; Chief, FE; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY KUDESK QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Records on STEBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Separate cover attachments to this dispatch are:

1 - A JAGUAR letter, forwarding
2 - A poor photocopy of STEBONY/1's passport, and
3 - A list of STEBONY/1's movements from 14 September 1962 to 7 October 1964, all derived from entries in the passport.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachments 1, 2 & 3:
(USC)

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WE w/att 1, 2 & 3 USC
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, AF w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, FE w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att 1 & 3 USC
2-COS, Paris, w/att 1 & 3 USC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-306052

306052
~~201-128663~~

CA|CF

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 3 MAY 65

1 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

DATE TYPED
27 April 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
28 APR 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,000

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 1 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30 Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London. N.W.8.

2. As requested, I am now enclosing for your perusal a photocopy of GIBSON's passport, number B.131994. I should be grateful if you would return this to me at your earliest convenience.

3. I am also enclosing for your easy reference a list of GIBSON's movements between 14th September 1962 and 7th October 1964 which has been compiled from his passport.

4. Apart from a visit to Paris for three weeks earlier this year, GIBSON and his wife, Joy Marjorie, have continued to live with their two children at the London address shown above. On his return from Paris on 14th February 1965, GIBSON was landed for three months as a visitor. In April he was reliably reported to be still apparently unemployed.

5. The above information, together with a copy of the list of GIBSON's movements, is being sent to ODENVY/LOND

SECRET

TO: Chief,
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment No. 3 to OELA-43,000
27 April 1965

Richard Thomas [illegible]

United States Passport No. [illegible]

Issued 25.1.61 (valid 3 years)
renewed in London (valid for further 2 years)

Born 13.5.31 in California

U.S. address struck through

Foreign address: c/o Mr. Sidney Kaye,
3 Langland Mansions,
Finchley Road, N.W.3.

Passport not valid for communist controlled parts of China, Korea, Vietnam, or for Albania or Cuba.

		Passport Page No.
14.9.62.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.10.62.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	5
23.10.62?	Arr. MOROCCO, Casablanca.	7
20.11.62.	Dep. MOROCCO, Oujda-Gare.	5
20.11.62.	Arr. ALGERIA, Zoudj-el-Beghal.	5
28.2.63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
6.3.63.	Arr. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	7
[illegible].63.	Dep. ALGERIA, Maison Blanche.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
21.4.63.	Dep. FRANCE, place illegible.	5
21.4.63.	Arr. U.K., Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	9
[illegible].4.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7.
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
[illegible].63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	7
[illegible].6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	9

14.6.63. ....

SECRET

		Passport Page. No.
4.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	9
5.6.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	9
[illegible].6.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Orly.	7
6.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
26.6.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Orly.	7
26.6.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
2.7.63.	Dep. U.K., Gatwick.	10
2.7.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
[illegible].63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
[illegible].63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
[illegible].63.	Arr. SWITZERLAND, Geneva, air.	7
[illegible].10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	5
1.10.63.	Arr. U.K., London Airport, visit up to 3 months.	10
3.10.63.	Dep. U.K., London Airport.	10
[illegible].10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Le Bourget.	10
27.10.63.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	8
[illegible].10.63.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
[illegible].10.63.	Arr. BELGIUM, ? Brussels.	7
[illegible].12.63.	WD/R Rubber Stamp.	11
10.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
23.1.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
23.1.64.	Arr. U.K. Folkestone, visit up to 3 months.	11
26.1.64.	Dep. U.K., Folkestone.	11
26.1.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	11
[illegible].2.64.	Dep. FRANCE, Vallorbe.	11
[illegible].2.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	11
[illegible].2.64.	Dep. BELGIUM, Brussels.	12

/17.3.64. ....

		Passport Page No.
17.3.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	11
1.4.64.	Dep. SWITZERLAND, Geneva-Cornavin.	12
27.5.64.	Arr. BELGIUM, Brussels.	8
30.5.64.	Arr. FRANCE, Gare du Nord.	8
7.10.64.	Arr. U.K., Dover, visit up to 3 months.	10

201-306052

TO: Chief, WE
FROM: Chief of St on,
London
Attachment No. 2 to
OELA-43,000, 27 April 1965



IMPORTANT

This passport is NOT VALID until signed BY THE BEARER on page two. Please fill in names and addresses below.

BEARER'S ADDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Name [illegible]

Address [illegible]

BEARER'S FOREIGN ADDRESS

[illegible] London [illegible]

IN CASE OF DEATH OR ACCIDENT NOTIFY

Name [illegible]

Address [illegible]

EXPIRATION AND RENEWAL

Unless limited to a shorter period, this passport expires three years from the date of issue shown on page two. It may be renewed for an additional period not exceeding five years from the date of issue shown on page two. The renewal fee is Five Dollars. This passport must be presented with the renewal application. Renewal is shown by a stamp placed in the passport on page [illegible]

NEW PASSPORT

When this passport expires and you require a new one, this passport should be presented with your application for the new passport.

[illegible] Important Information [illegible] Back Cover

The Secretary of State of The United States of America hereby requests all whom it may concern to permit the bearer to pass without delay or hindrance and to extend such courtesies aid and protection as would be extended to like citizens of foreign states travelling to the United States.



WARNING—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PROHIBITED.
ANY UNOFFICIAL CHANGE WILL RENDER THIS PASSPORT INVALID.

NAME RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON	
MAY 13, 1931	CALIFORNIA
5 FEET 10 INCHES	BLACK / BROWN
X X X	ISSUE DATE JAN. 23, 1951
X X X	PASSPORT RENEWED LONDON, ENGLAND. V. CONSUL. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Richard T. Gibson	

IMPORTANT: UNLESS OTHERWISE LIMITED
THIS PASSPORT EXPIRES THREE YEARS FROM ISSUE DATE.
IF RENEWED, IT EXPIRES FIVE YEARS FROM ISSUE DATE.

Photograph of bearer

ATTACHED
OF STATE

Richard T. Gibson



THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO OR IN COMMUNIST CONTROLLED PORTIONS OF

CHINA
KOREA
VIET-NAM

OR TO OR IN

ALBANIA

CUBA

"A person who travels to or in the listed countries or areas may be liable for prosecution under Section 1185, Title 8, U.S. Code and Section 1544, Title 18, U.S. Code."

4

Extensions, amendments, limitations and restrictions

5 OCT 1963
FRANCE

JUIL 1963

5



Visas

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER
TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS

Visas

SUISSE
E -6 SEP. 1963
Aéroport ... ève

SUISSE
E 26 AVR. 63
... Genève

SUISSE
E 28 FEV 63

ORLY A
9 MARS 1963
FRANCE

SURETE NATIONALE
VALLORBE. G
02 08 63
79 FRANCE

29 X. 1963

SUISSE
E 11 ...
AEROPORT ...



Visas

SURETÉ NATIONALE
VALLORBE G
10. 05. 63
73 FRANCE

BELGIQUE
27 MAI 1964
BRUXELLES · No 12

G
VALLORBE
05. 05. 63
FRANCE
73

SURETÉ NATIONALE
VALLORBE G
FRANCE

SURETÉ NAT
Gare du Nord
30. 05. 64
1 FRANCE

LE BOURGET
4 JUIN 1963
FRANCE

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(27)
24 SEP 1962

IMMIGRATION
(202)
EMBARKED
LONDON AIRPORT

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(111)
4 JUN 1963
LONDON AIRPORT

VISIT UP TO THREE MONTHS
IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(27)
21 APR 1963

IMMIGRATION
(126)
EMBARKED



LE BOURGET
OCT 1963
25 FRANCE

26JUN1963
LONDON AIRPORT

GATWICK (A)

29 AUG 1963

IMMIGRATION OFFICER

EMBARKED

-1 OCT
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
-7 OCT 1963
DOVER

VD [illegible] 8323
R 15-11-63

17 FEB 1964

23 JAN 1964

EMBARKED
JAN 1964

FRANCE
11
10 63

BELGIË
1964

16. 01. 64
73 FRANCE

13 01 64
FRANCE

14 12 63
FRANCE



Visas

GENÈVE-COINTRIN
S -1 AVR 1961
Frontière Suisse

BRUXELLES

12

Visas

13

14-00000

46

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

AF A
ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

23 Apr 65 23 19z

TO : LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C1/IC2

INFO: CI, WE6, CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, AF6, FE6, FI, DO 4, DO/H3, FI/INT2

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR CCS 3, CI/OA, VR, FILE 04341

RI

KUDESK, STEBONY, QKOPERA, QRPREY

REF: LOND ~~706 (IN 43053)~~ 7141 (IN 46013)

NP

COPY

1. ON BASIS KATZENBACH (K) DEBRIEFING STEBONY/1 BELIEVE S/1 KNOWLEDGEABILITY CONTACTS IN AREA WHERE CURRENT KUBARK ACCESS THIN SUFFICIENT WARRANT OPS FOLLOW THROUGH. STILL BELIEVE THAT ALGI DURING PERIOD MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST OFFERS BEST TESTING GROUND FOR PROBATIONARY ASSIGNMENT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER FOR EVENTUAL LONG RANGE PENETRATION PRO CHICOM GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL FRONTS.

2. FOR PALP: DESIRE RODIGAST (R) HANDLE S/1 DURING LATTERS VISIT ALGI AND PROBABLY AFTERWARDS, ~~IF S/1 SETTLES WEST EUROPE~~. WOULD HOPE THAT DURING PROBATIONARY PERIOD PARA 1 ABOVE, R COULD USE JOURNALIST COVER FOR SOME TRIPS ALGI TO COVER BANDUNG AND FESTIVAL. THIS SUPPLEMENTED WITH S/1 VISIT LOND OR PARI AND ONE WAY SW SHOULD INSURE CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE MONITORING S/1 CONTACTS, INFO AND DEVELOPMENT JOB PROSPECTS IN TARGET AREA. BELIEVE R CONTACT COULD BE KEPT ON SECURE ALIAS BASIS EVEN IN PARI ALONG LINES TPSHRIFT OP. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE.

201-306052

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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21 11 PM

TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

AND AVAILABILITY R FOR INTRODUCTION AT LOND MEETING WITH S/1 FIRST WEEK JUNE. IF AGREE ABOVE, SUGGEST ALSO PALP DEVELOP ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE PARI FOR S/1 CONTACT R IN FUTURE.

3. UPON RECEIPT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM R, REQUEST K MEET S/1 AND EXPLAIN FOLLOWING:

A. ODYOKE INTERESTED AND GRATEFUL HIS COOPERATION AND HOPEFUL RELATIONSHIP CAN MATURE.

B. AS EARNEST OUR CONTINUED INTEREST WE EXTENDING ONE HUNDRED DOLLAR WEEKLY RETAINER ADDITIONAL FOUR WEEKS. IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT KEY SUCH PAYT TO SPECIFIC NEEDS SUCH AS KIDS TUITION. THIS PAYT CAN BE MADE IN LUMP SUM ADVANCE.

C. PRETEND K WILL BE ABSENT LOND UNTIL LATE MAY.

D. PRESENT THINKING IS THAT MID JUNE TO MID AUGUST PERIOD ALGI, WITH AFRO ASIAN CHIEF OF STATE MEETING AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL PLUS PERHAPS ALSO AFRO ASIAN WOMENS AND JOURNALISTS CONFERENCES, COULD OFFER VALUABLE AND APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

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TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

FOR S/1 CLARIFY HIS REPORTING VALUE TO ODYOKE AND HOPEFULLY DEVELOP LONG RANGE ASSOCIATION OF INTEREST TO US.

E. AS PRELIMINARY STEP WE WANT HIM USE NEXT MONTH TO LINE UP VIABLE COVER VISIT ALGI THIS PERIOD. IN ADDITION ANY NOTIONAL OR REAL HELP FROM BROTHER IN LAW, S/1 XXX SHOULD TRY LINE UP FIRM AGREEMENTS WITH ONE OR MORE FAR LEFT PUBLICATIONS FOR ACCREDITATION TO COVER ALGI EVENTS. EXPLOITATION CONTACT WITH INDO EMBASSY MIGHT FACILITATE. (SEE PARAS 5 - 7 FOR GUIDANCE ON REF QUERIES.)

F. EXPRESS CURRENT INTENTION TO LINE UP DEFINITIVE MEETING WITH K COLLEAGUE 27 MAY TO HANDLE FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS. ARRANGE FOR S/1 CONTACT K 24 or 25 MAY FOR FIRM MEETING INSTRUCTIONS. FYI KUDESK STAFFER JOSEPH S TIFFANY PLANS TDY LOND 26 MAY FOR SHAKE DOWN OPS TALKS WITH S/1 PRIOR TURNING OVER TO R EARLY JUNE. THIS STEP CONSIDERED DESIRABLE IN ORDER SCREEN OUT K AND PBSWING FROM OPS FOLLOW THROUGH.

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ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 1176
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TO : LOND
FROM : DIRECTOR
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INFO :

TO LOND INFO : PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

4. BELIEVE NOW USEFUL BRIEF JAGUAR SMOTH OUR INTENTION DEVELOPING OPS RELATIONSHIP S/1. WE SHALL FORWARD SUMMARY ALL S/1 DEBRIEFING SHORTLY MOST OF WHICH CAN BE PASSED. IN VIEW POSSIBILITY S/1 WORKING WAY INTO SENSITIVE POSITION, PERHAPS IN DENIED OR SEMI DENIED AREA, TRUST JAGUAR/SMOTH WILL TREAT CASE AS SENSITIVE FROM OUTSET. REQUEST JAGUAR COOPERATION TO SHED LIGHT ON S/1 WIFE AS POTENTIAL SECURITY PROBLEM AND PROVIDE LIMITED SURVEILLANCE S/1 CONTACTS OVER NEXT MONTH. COULD THEY SECURE PHONE TAP ON S/1? TRUST IT WILL BE POSSIBLE ENLIST JAGUAR/SMOTH COOPERATION WITHOUT NECESSITY ACKNOWLEDGING EITHER TIFFANY OR RODIGAST (LATTER NON OFFICIAL COVER) TO THEM. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS ASSUMPTION INCORRECT.

5. RE PARA 1 REF PROPOSAL, SUGGEST K DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AS FUTURE POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER BELIEVE SECOND S/1 TRIP SUISSE AT THIS TIME WOULD LOOK SUSPICIOUS NOT LEAST TO NILS ANDERSON AND S/1 WIFE. MEANWHILE, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR S/1 TO ATTEMPT RAISE FUNDS FOR WEST INDIA GAZETTE FROM LOCAL SYMPATHIZERS AND MAKE ARTICLE CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLICATION.

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ORIG : A. Goodrich
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EXT : 1176
DATE : 22 April 1965

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TO : LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO:

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP, ALGI CITE DIR 04341

6. RE PARA 2 REF PROPOSAL S/1 SHOULD SHOP THIS AROUND AS AN IDEA BUT SHOULD NOT START ANYTHING YET AS EVERYONE KNOWS THAT EVEN MODEST EFFORT THIS TYPE IN PUBLISHING FIELD REQUIRES START CAPITAL OF WHICH S/1 CANNOT CURRENTLY EXPLAIN SOURCE.

7. RE PARA 3 REF, S/1 MIGHT WRITE A FEW LETTERS RECOMMENDING WILLIAMS BOOK TO PROSPECTIVE WESTERN PUBLISHERS.

8. PLEASE TA PAYT PARA 3 B ABOVE TO HQS YQHITCH ~~ALGERIA HQS FINAN ACCOUNT NUMBER 5138-1708~~.

AF/CCPS
AF/B&F
AF/1
DC/WE/BC J. Roberts (in draft)
CA/CF J. Murphy (in draft)
CA/PROP J. Culbertson (by phone)
CA/3 S. Braham ✓
CO/IO J. Downes (by phone)

Thomas F. Thiel
WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Lothar Metzl
C/CI/ICG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : CA/CF; CI/ICG

SUBJECT : Richard Gibson

1. Areas of Knowledgeability. A reading of the transcription of Gibson's taped debriefing clearly underlines KATZENBACH's assessment that Gibson possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of personalities and groups ranging from Zanzibar to the U.S. It is not always clear from the debriefing to what extent Gibson enjoys either a first-hand knowledge or even a friendly relationship with specific individuals or groups. What is clear is that Gibson moves in a milieu on which we presently have very little coverage; that he is already a member of this loosely defined society and thus can be presumed capable of developing new contacts or strengthening old ones by means of present and past associations.

It is difficult to categorize or devine what this milieu is. It is not the world of communist parties -- although it contains a preponderance of communists; and it does not seem to be a society which necessarily revolves about the Chinese. The primary common denominator covering most of the personalities involved in Gibson's reporting is some association with the revolutionary movement in Africa -- particularly Algeria. A secondary means of characterizing these contacts is a correlation with the radical French and Belgian left which lies outside such organized party structures as the PSU, PCF, BCP. (His main access to Chinese communists runs through Jacques GRIPPA in Belgium and Nils ANDERSSON in Switzerland with whom he claims to be on good terms at the present time.) Another common thread, almost as general, is association with Trotskyism, although the meaning or clarification of this political description is never spelled out. In general, Gibson displays a good and often personal knowledge of target areas which might be grouped as follows:

a. African exile revolutionary circles in France, Algeria and London, including the PAC, ANC, MPLA, MPA, and other less organized pockets.

b. European leftist sympathizers of the liberation movement in Africa.

c. Algerians or Algerian contacts in Europe who were associated with the war for independence.

d. Algerian personalities currently active or occupying official positions in Algiers.

e. The exile American Negro community.

f. Minor political writers and polemicists in exile leftist circles in Europe.

2. Access and Limitations on Access. There apparently has been circulated a charge that Gibson is a CIA agent. (This is reflected in his 201 as dating from his days with the FPCC.) In dealing with this question, however, KATZENBACH cites Gibson's own belief that he is still able to operate in the circles which would be of interest to us. It is, of course, difficult to tell from his debriefing the extent and seriousness of this charge against Gibson, insofar as it affects his bona fides. It does seem that in Gibson's milieu, gossip, personal attacks, muddled loyalties and an aura of conspiratorial confusion are everyday facts of life and that personal contact and effectiveness in building rapport would far outweigh such critical personal charges -- which, indeed, probably circulate about most people. At the present time, for reasons not entirely clear, Gibson feels that he would be unwelcome and restricted were he to visit Ghana, and, in fact, would not like to make such a trip. He has indicated, on the other hand, that he has friends in Algeria and believes he could probably get some kind of job there or at least find a receptive and generally friendly reception. He also appears to have some contact and standing with the Indonesian government, since he claims their London Embassy offered him employment. It is not known to what extent he might be able to parley such a contact into employment in Djakarta or some form of official association in Europe, although these questions could be explored further. The termination of his association with Revolution and Verges would not, according to his account of it, discredit him in the eyes of those who might have been partisans of the ideological line which this magazine purveyed. According to his account, Verges is not in good standing with the pro-Chinese like Grippa or even the Chinese, and that his (Gibson's) quarrel with Verges over unpaid salary is well known. While this may not be unbiased, it is apparently true that he has lodged a claim for payment against Verges, and thus is not in the position of having been expelled from Revolution for ideological deviation. As Gibson recounts it, it is Verges, not he, who is discredited.

3. Motivation and Readiness to Cooperate. The debriefing reflects between the lines what KATZENBACH judges in his covering dispatch to be a readiness to collect information for us knowing that we are an official agency and probably suspecting that we are KUBARK. His professed motivation is monetary, and frankly so, although a certain degree of fatigue with his past profession of ideological punditry is discernable. There are also a number of indications that Gibson would like to rehabilitate himself lest he be forced to make his living for an indefinite period of time in an environment that he finds both unpleasant and materially unrewarding. It is not possible, of course, to make an intelligent judgement from this debriefing on the firmness and consistency with which he

might undertake continuing assignments for us, but this is not an unusual area of uncertainty with a new agent and one which a probationary period should dispel. (It should be noted that in one instance, he volunteered a name as an operational lead -- i.e., as someone whom we might find it worthwhile to look up. He also provided what is apparently an accommodation address in Bogota for Chinese mailings.)

4. Long-Range Usefulness and Initial Targetting. Gibson's long-range usefulness, of course, would depend not only on his effectiveness and dependability, but on the opportunities which will emerge and take shape as a result of his initial activity. As a general proposition, he can be viewed as an intelligence collection asset targetted at radical independence movements, pro-Chinese personalities and organizations, and official personalities in newly emerged countries, primarily in Africa. Specifically, these targets would include:

a. PAC and ANC: Gibson claims to have friends in both.

b. FLN and Algerian government and publishing circles.

c. Afro-Asian Journalists Association, and by extension, other Afro-Asian groups, such as exist or promised in youth, labor, women, and so forth.

d. Pro-Chinese European parties, including the Belgian (he claims to have access to Grippa), the Marseilles faction and the Swiss activity of Nils Andersson.

e. By extension from these, although at present only a remote possibility, developing Chinese propaganda and intelligence instrumentalities.

In the short range, a current assignment for us should meet the following criteria:

a. lend itself to probationary exploitation;

b. not tie Gibson down indefinitely to one location or involve him in an identification with one faction, group or party that would limit his later flexibility;

c. permit him to respond to targets of opportunity as we may define them, both to have a maximum test of the range of his capability and access, and to probe for the best long-range use we can put him to;

d. enable him to build his bona fides and his contacts as we may direct.

The best likely assignment to fulfill these requirements is that of a journalist, preferably operating from Europe, capable of credible travel in Europe, Africa and even Asia, with some associations which will preserve his bona fides with target Afro-Asian groups. Assuming the development of adequate cover, he could then spend an initial period this spring and summer in Algeria to cover the Second Bandung Conference (29 June) and the World Youth Festival (28 July). (Other international conferences, including followup AAPSO meetings to the Ghana Congress in May, an Afro-Asian Journalists Conference or further PAJU meetings cannot be anticipated as targets at present either because of indefinite planning or because of unsuitable location. There is little doubt, however, that additional meetings will take place in Algiers and Africa bringing together interesting target personalities from Africa and Asia whom Gibson might attempt to report on.) In addition to his contribution in coverage of these meetings he might also attempt to develop his access and contact among the official Algerian community at least with the value of developing biographical and operational support data.

5. Proposed for Discussion. The following questions seem to present themselves for discussion at this time:

a. decision on the continuation of support to Gibson on a probationary period;

b. determination on targetting for initial probationary and possible long-range employment;

c. mechanics of establishing a project;

d. timetable for assignments.

James M. Murphy
CA/CF

Attachments:
LOND-7065 (re tentative cover arrangements)
Partial list of names cited in Gibson's debriefing
Selections from the initial processing of Gibson's debriefing

Distribution:
1 - AF/1 Mr. Baker
1 - CO/XD Mr. Downs
1 - CA/B3 Mr. Raymond; CA/PROP Mr. Culbertson
1 - CA/PEG
1 - WE/INT Mr. Landreth
1 - WE/BC/U Mr. Roberts (w/o att.)
1 - CI/ICG Mr. Goodrich
1 - CA/CF Mr. Murphy

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12 APR 65 IN 43053

DIR INFO PARI PALP BRUS ALGI CITE LOND 7065

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF DIR 98974

AN SD

PS

ABSTRACT X

AF 1 A

1. STEBONY/1 (S), STILL UNEMPLOYED, IS PLEASED WITH PROSPECT OF ACTIVE SUMMER IN ALGI. WHILE WE REPEATED WE NOT READY MAKE ANY COMMITMENT BEYOND CURRENT MONTH'S RETAINER, HE NOW MAKING PLANS TO CONTACT POTENTIAL SPONSORS FOR PROLONGED VISIT ALGI. BEST BET MAY BE CONTACT WITH MONTHLY REVIEW RPT MONTHLY REVIEW. FRANCES KELLY (UK CITIZEN) WHO NOW IN LONDON WAS SECRETARY TO MONTHLY REVIEW WHILE IN US. HUBERMAN, WHO RUNS MR RPT MR, DUE COME UK SOON ON TRIP. PABLO FERNANDEZ OF CUBAN EMB HAS ALREADY SUGGESTED KELLY CONTACT S, AND S WILL INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES GETTING MR RPT MR ACCREDITATION FOR ALGI. STA POINTED OUT THAT SEVERAL SMALL OSTENSIBLE BACKERS COULD EACH BE PAYING S, IN ABSENCE ONE LARGE AND WELL-KNOWN OUTFIT. S WILL BEGIN SERIOUS CANVASS POSSIBILITIES, KEEP STA INFORMED, AND WILL NOT COMMIT SELF WITHOUT OUR OKAY. S EVENTUAL MOVE TO ALGI NICELY COVERED IF MORE PEOPLE AWARE OF HIS GROWING DISSATISFACTION PRESENT STATUS.

13 APR 1965

2. LOND DISSEMING (ZRWAHOO) TWO ITEMS FROM MEETING. HQS

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201-306052

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] (35)

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RID/HIS

IN 43053 PAGE 2

Jun 25 3 53 PM '65

ADVISE WHAT SYSTEM YOU WISH FOLLOWED IN FUTURE ON SUCH ITEMS. SUGGEST ANY FOREIGN DISSEM CHANGE PARA. ADVISE ALSO ON PASSING SMOOTHERS. SUGGEST WE PASS AT OWN DISCRETION, ADVISING HQS IN EACH CASE.

3. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST, S MENTIONED THAT WILLIAM WORTHY RECENTLY ARRIVED DJAKARTA FROM CAMBODIA. INDONESIANS DID NOT KNOW HE COMING, UNTIL HE SENT TELEGRAM FROM CAMBODIA SAYING HE ARRIVING SOON. S AMAZED AT WORTHY'S ABILITY TRAVEL SO DISCREETLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE DID NOT APPEAR HAVE PASSPORT.

4. DID NOT DISCUSS DIR 88977 QUESTION, BUT S NOTED SCHLEIFER NOW IN NEW YORK. HQS MAY WISH REFINE QUESTIONS ON BASIS FORMER DEBRIEFINGS, OR WE CAN INCLUDE IN NEXT MEET. PLS ADVISE.

5. S FINANCIAL CONDITION DIRE. NEEDS 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS' TUITION. CURRENTLY LIVING OFF WIFE'S SMALL SALARY, BUT STILL HAVE TO PAY RENT AND TUITION. S CLOTHES OBVIOUSLY VERY SHABBY, HE SAID HE WEARING HIS LAST WHOLE PAIR OF PANTS. WILL NEED BUY SOME CLOTHES BEFORE HE GOES ANYWHERE. MAY WE GIVE HIM 150 POUNDS FOR KIDS TUITION IN ADDITION TO 400 DOLLARS AUTHORIZED?

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 34

48 | 60 SECRET

ORIG: A. Goodrich AJ
UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 5 April 1965

☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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Return to JC

TO: LOND
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/IC 2

INFO: VR, File, WE6, FE6, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF6
INFO: PARI PALP BRUS ALGI

AN SAS EI | AF | 1 | A
RS | [illegible]
ABSTRACT DATE DIR ~~INDEX~~

98974

TO LOND INFO:

LCHARVEST KUDESK QKOPERA QRPREY

REF: A. OELA 42750 (SENT HQS ONLY)

B. OELA 42410 (NOT SENT ALGI)

RICHARD GIBSON

1. ~~USKT~~ SUBJ REF B (IDEN TO ALGI) ASSIGNED CRYPTO STEBONY/1 WE PROCESSING SUMMARY REF DEBRIEFING TRANSCRIPTS WHICH WILL BE POUCHED ADDEES MID APRIL. TENTATIVE APPRAISAL IS THAT S/1 OFFERS PRIMARILY KUDESK KUTUBE POTENTIAL IN PROCHICOM NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRONT AREAS. PERHAPS SERIES CONFERENCES ALGI THIS SUMMER ~~XXXXX~~ BRINGING TOGETHER KEY TARGET FIGURES OFFERS BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR S/1 DEVELOP NATURAL COVER AND GAIN NATURAL ACCESS TO TARGET AREA.

2. PENDING FINAL DECISION AND SELECTION CASE OFFICER FOR FUTURE HANDLING REQUEST KATZENBACH CONTACT S/1, GIVE HIM RETAINER FEE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER WEEK FOR NEXT FOUR WEEKS TO INSURE HE DOES NOT TAKE ON FULL TIME JOB WHICH WOULD LIMIT OR PRECLUDE FUTURE OPS ACTIVITIES. DURING THIS PERIOD K (OSTENSIBLY ACTING ON BEHALF ODYOKE FRIEND WHO KEENLY INTERESTED IN INFO ON

C O P Y

201- 306052

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ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 5 April 1965

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TO : LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR

PRO CHICOM ACTIVITIES) SHOULD REQUEST S/1 SURVEY POSSIBILITIES JOBS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR ATTENDING SECOND AFRO ASIAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (AAJA) CONFERENCE (CAN S/1 DETERMINE EXACT DATES?), SECOND BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL IN ALGI. FOR EXAMPLE AS STRINGER FOR MONTHLY REVIEW AND/OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH AAJA. PERHAPS LETTER TO OLD FRIEND LIONEL MORRISON OF AAJA IN DJAKARTA MIGHT HELP. TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT INDONESIAN EMBASSY LOND MIGHT ALSO FACILITATE S/1 REENTRY TARGET AREA.

3. WITHOUT MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS BEYOND THE RETAINER SUGGES K PUT RELATIONSHIP WITH S/1 ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. SPECIFICALLY MEET OUTSIDE PBSWING, GET AWAY FROM NECESSITY K TELEPHONING S/1 HIS HOM AND PROVIDE S/1 WITH MEANS CONTACTING K FOR MEETING TO REPORT ON ANY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.

4. REQUEST WINTERROWD DISCOURAGE FAIRMAN FROM PUBLISHING S/1 ARTICLE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

END OF MESSAGE

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UNIT: CI/ICG
EXT: 5928
DATE: 5 April 1965

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ROUTING

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TO: LOND

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO LOND INFO CITE DIR

WE/BC John G. Roberts
CO/IO
AF/1
CA/CF J. MURPHY (by phone)
CA/PROP J. CULBERTSON (by phone)
CA/3 W. RAYMOND (by phone)
WE/3/INT. R. LANDRETH (by phone)

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LOTHAR METZL
C/CI/ICG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

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☐ NO INDEX
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SIG CEN

TO : ALGI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C1/IC2

INFO VR, file, WE6, FE6, CA2, ~~CA/PROP~~, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2, AF6

TO ALGI RE DIR 98974 INFO: CITE DIR 98975

IDEN: RICHARD T. GIBSON

N/R

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201-306052

W D Malley CSDO
for C/WE/INT

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▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, London R.I.

SUBJECT
O Richard Thomas GIBSON (201-306052), Memo of Understanding

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of a memorandum of understanding signed by GIBSON on 23 February 1965. The original is being retained in the Station.

2. Two receipts signed by GIBSON on 19 February and 23 February 1965, each in the sterling equivalent of $200, were forwarded to Headquarters with London's TA 5-190. We suggest that these receipts be obtained from Finance and incorporated in GIBSON's 201 dossier.

Kat

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w

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201-306052

DATE TYPED
25 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
26 MAR

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,807

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

1 ATT

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SECRET

To: Chief, WH
From: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-42,807
of 25 March 1965

I hereby acknowledge that I have voluntarily provided information to the United States Government, for which I received compensation. I have no further claim against the United States Government for this activity.

I further understand and agree that the entirety of this relationship is confidential and that nothing relating to it will be revealed by me to anyone.

Richard Gibson

Date: 23 February 1965

ATT #1 to
OELA 42807

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201-306052

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FROM: England, London

REPORT NO. OEL-40,731

REPORTS OFFICER: Leroy T. WADSWORTH

DATE 19 March 1965

NO. OF PAGES 2

REPORT APPROVED BY: Victor T. CRONEIGH

ATTACHMENTS

SOURCE: ~~[illegible]~~ JAGUAR

REFERENCE

COUNTRY: International

SUBJECT: Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

DATE OF INFO: 17 March 1965

SOURCE: Official British Service from "A reliable but very delicate source which must be given the utmost protection."

LONDON STATION COMMENT: Will Field Addressees please consider this report as for KUBARK BACKGROUND USE ONLY.

N.D.

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Plans for the Sale of "Afro-Asian Journalist" in Europe

201-306052

Richard GIBSON, the former editor of the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution", left London towards the end of January 1965 and returned in the second half of March, having visited Lausanne, Milan, Rome, Paris and Brussels. During his travels he met Nils ANDERSSON, who was formerly connected with "Revolution" in Lausanne and Jacques GRIPPA, the leader of the pro-Chinese dissident group of the Belgian Communist Party. Since his return to the U.K. he has made proposals to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association for these persons to receive copies of the Association's publication, "Afro-Asian Journalist". He has also suggested to the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association that copies of the publication should be sent to the following:-

i. Bulletin d'Information Marxiste-Leniniste,
11, rue du Landry,
Clichy,
France.

ii. The English Bookshop,
42, rue de Seine,
Paris 6e.

iii. Nuova Unita,
Piazza Cavour 2,
Milan.

iv. Marxtisch-Leninstisch-Centrum,
Postbus 1505,
Rotterdam.

2. It appears that GIBSON is trying to establish contacts in Europe with the object of expanding sales of the English and French editions of "Afro-Asian Journalist".

17th March, 1965.

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23 MAR 1965

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KAPOK
Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 42,706

1. Ref forwarded the tapes and a rough transcription of the debriefing session with Subject, which were held on February 17, 18, 19, 23, 1965.

2. In accordance with Headquarters' instructions, these meetings were kept on a don't-call-us-we'll-call-you basis - in fact GIBSON was given no means for calling us. Also in accordance with Headquarters' instructions, we did not pay GIBSON at a constant rate of over $100 per hour. The first ($300) payment to GIBSON was in fact more than we had originally intended to give him as a "binder", but in light of the imminence of his trip to Europe we advanced him that sum to help him to meet his expenses. This nicely coincided with our own time table, since the time he was gone - some three weeks - should have provided adequate time for the initial tape to be reviewed and for requirements to be prepared and pouched to the field. At any rate, the total sum given to GIBSON, for his time and a shot at his mailing list, was $700.

3. LCHARVEST may well feel that it has been done out of $700 in COA funds. The information obtained on ChiCom contacts of GIBSON, or on any ChiComs at all, was slight. GIBSON claims not to have had more than very little contact with them, and not to know too much about them. Unless there is hard info to the contrary, we are inclined to believe that GIBSON was telling pretty much the truth in this respect, as indeed seems to have been the case almost all of the time. While this is a bit of a disappointment, in a way, and seems to lessen the immediacy of LCHARVEST interest, it certainly does not appear to eliminate GIBSON's potential worth.

4. The London Station continues to feel that GIBSON has considerable potential as a source of positive intelligence on a wide range of targets - targets that appear to be only lightly covered otherwise, although we are not always able to judge this. A review of this debriefing can only cause one a certain amount of amazement at GIBSON's encyclopedic knowledge of many, many groups, personalities and parties of the far left, literally from America to Zanzibar. We leave it to Headquarters, of course, to evaluate

201-306052

Distribution:
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2-Chief, AF

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SECRET

DATE TYPED
15 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
18 MAR 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,750

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

his material; to the London Station, however, it appears to be not only rather massive but detailed as well. We do not doubt that he will be caught out from time to time on facts, and perhaps interpretations as well. But the totality of his information - and the whole performance was without notes - is astonishing.

5. Several points should be noted. First of all, a conscious effort was made to show GIBSON that his comments on the American scene were not being made a matter of record. (I took notes during our talk, and always stopped making notes when such a topic came up.) This is, as KULPA noted in OELW 1903 of 12 February 1965, an area of sensitivity with GIBSON. The only times that GIBSON really became emotional were when he talked about the American scene, his involvement, and the involvement of his close associates. And he kept reverting to the topic, and his involvement in it, throughout our conversations. We did not share KULPA's impression that GIBSON's dissatisfaction with the state of racial relations in America makes him generally anti-American. He does say that he would not like to be living in America for the coming year; but in the context of one who does not wish to be caught up in a period of growing violence, which GIBSON appears not to believe to be the solution to the problem. He states: "I can understand how they feel that way, I can recognize the problems, but I sure don't know what the solution to the problem is." His judgments on Negroes in the front of the racial struggle (Walter Bowe, Malcolm X, etc.) reflect not only an intimacy with the problem and a genuine concern, but also a generally reasonable and real understanding of many of the forces at work. GIBSON tends to condemn individuals - he spares no sympathy for the FBI, understandably - but he does not appear to condemn the United States as a whole, nor even the United States Government as a whole. At the same time, he makes no phoney protestations, either.

6. Regarding Cuba, GIBSON showed a similar emotional involvement (he acknowledges "my pro-Castro bias") but, withal, manages to give a more balances portrayal of the situation than many rabidly anti-Castro commentators. (Cuba, and Cuban matters, were also similarly low-keyed by me during our talks.)

7. Where GIBSON really comes into his own, and really astonishes with the breadth of his personal information and understanding, (and largely, it appears, without the same personal involvement and bias) is in African affairs (especially in left-wing fields), European Trotskyists and Communists and their general milieu, and Chinese-oriented international front organizations. Similarly he appears to be informed on certain ChiCom efforts at subversion and propaganda in Latin America.

8. Rather as if reading our thoughts, GIBSON offered to recruit himself. He didn't get too specific, and neither did we. But he did make it quite clear that he would be willing to collect information for us, knowing only that we were ODYOKE, probably suspecting that we were KUBARK, and probably equally doubting (because he knows the difference(that we were ODENVY. His motivations can be compiled from his own words. He has for some time been unable to find a suitable job here in London, He has economic pressures working on him - now exacerbated by the fact that his wife has caused her brother to withdraw some of the support that he had been providing. Venal? Opportunistic? Or someone who has a wife and two kids to support, and no job for the past eight months? GIBSON acknowledges that he has become somewhat bored with the "micro-biology" of chasing petty ideological differences, the kind that make factions of six members or less. At the same time, he acknowledges that he has to have a job, and that his access to and knowledge of these persons and groups are marketable commodities. His preference, he says, would be to have a nice quiet journalistic or public relations job here, but his efforts to find such a job have been fruitless. How, obviously, can one of his background and talents better employ them than as a collector and reporter of information? He says that he would like public relations or press work for the UN, perhaps, or an ODYOKE agency, but he is certain that he could never get the requisite security clearance. Still, obviously, he suspects that an "irregular" arm of ODYOKE, such as we, might be able to work something out.

9. How about his ideological motivation? We had hoped for some more concrete expression than we got, on this score, but what we have is not too bad. He states that he will not be "intellectually dishonest" to the point of becoming a "professional anti-Communist," by which he means a propagandist. At the same time, he agrees that he has no desire to be a professional revolutionary. Again we note that he is not blindly or unduly critical of ODYOKE. Granted, he criticizes many elements of ODYOKE policy and tends to defend some enemies of ODYOKE. A failure for him to do so would be sufficiently remarkable to make us totally suspicious of him. Note further his comment that he would have been perfectly willing to talk to us a year ago in Paris in the same fashion as he has here. This would sound rather suspicious and difficult to believe, were it not for the fact that he did show himself to be candid and cooperative in his Paris interview with a PBSWING officer.

10. How badly blown is GIBSON, then, if we are thinking of using him. After all, he has been publicly labelled a "CIA agent." Could he, then, work for KUBARK successfully? GIBSON himself is certainly a better judge of that than the London Station, and we feel that there are only two indices that can be used to judge the matter. The first and most immediate is GIBSON's own opinion, since he has lived with the problem, and has tested the idea in practice. He feels that he could still operate ("move" is his term) in most of the desirable areas successfully, provided he has adequate cover for being where he is and doing what he does. The second index would be for us to test his continuing access to targets of interest. It should not take too long to make such a test without putting anything into real jeopardy.

11. Cover for GIBSON, of course, would be a serious problem. He himself proposes the obvious answer: some kind of vaguely left journalistic tie-up. We should think that such cover could be arranged. And we propose to discuss a number of possibilities with Headquarters in due time.

12. Utilization and locale are most closely related, of course. From our vantage point here, it would appear that Algiers would be the most desirable home base for GIBSON. He could range out from there into Europe or the rest of Africa (the two best targets, apparently) and maintain a regular flow of information on Algerian affairs while "at home." He has spoken several times of the ease with which he is integrated into the Algerians environment, and he has a fairly well established base there from which to expand his operations. He has said that he would be willing to go there, or France, or most any other place where his children can continue their education in French. And Algiers appears to be, for the foreseeable future, a worthwhile target in its own right, as well as the site of a growing number of international front organization meetings, for which GIBSON would appear to have exceptionally fine credentials. As he says, he could go elsewhere in Africa, but Algiers is where he would fit best. We would be inclined to keep him, for the most part, away from the Cuban milieu (except, perhaps, incidentally) to avoid straining his reportorial objectivity. In the African, European, and international front areas, we suspect that careful checking would ensure such objectivity.

13. His utilization could best be considered on a straight information-collecting basis. To use him as a propaganda tool would be not only repugnant to him but destructive of his utility as well. Presumably he could be permitted to continue to write, not only for his overt employers (in a straight news fashion), but perhaps occasionally for leftist periodicals of his own choosing, in order to maintain his own cover. (This is, admittedly, seeing rather far into the future.) We do feel, however, that GIBSON could be an admirable and highly valuable collector of positive information on that whole spectrum of the left with which he is already so familiar.

14. GIBSON and security, to this point: GIBSON has met only myself, under alias, and under the impression that I was here temporarily. This idea was apparently made to stick, throughout our conversations. We would propose that, if GIBSON be recruited in fact, he be handled in alias and at a good, safe distance - more than arm's length. Until sufficient operational testing had been carried out, we would suggest that he not have a "resident case officer" anywhere - i.e., neither here nor in Algiers. Control of GIBSON is partly exercised by the documents we have received from him (receipts, memo of understanding) plus the voluminous taped comments. These, while not worthy of a court, are sufficient to do him considerable professional and personal damage - note particularly that his wife, according to him, would not approve of any of our contacts, and this appears to be quite meaningful to him. Financial control would be a continuing factor. And, perhaps to an unusually high degree, we feel that GIBSON would feel considerable gratitude to whoever (i.e., KUBARK) rescued him from his present and difficult position, "forgiving all", and providing him with a measure of respectability (at least in his own eyes) that he has henceforth been unable to achieve and maintain. In sum, we feel that a reasonably strong combination of control factors exist, and can be continued for as long as GIBSON would be properly handled.

15. We should also like to comment on the reliability of GIBSON's comments in the course of our meetings to date. We have found him to be thoroughly consistent in his comments and attitudes throughout. We found no indication of deliberate deception or serious attempts to mislead. He may have provided some erroneous materials, or he may have erroneously interpreted some events; but his comments and attitudes remained sufficiently consistent to lead us to believe that he was being reasonably honest all the way. He played down some items, no doubt, and played up others. In the course of a debriefing such as this was there seemed little or no point in pushing hard at such points - besides, his knowledge of the areas covered so far outdistanced mine that I could not have attempted to probe or pin him down on specifics. (Note also his tendency to make corrections in the debriefing questionnaire, as when the wrong name would appear for a political group in Switzerland.)

16. GIBSON's present status is that he is out of work, in debt, and without any prospects of reasonable employment in the near future. He is somewhat occupied with an article he is writing for Encounter; this will probably keep him from taking another job for the next few weeks. Beyond that, nothing is definite. If we would like to give him a try, then, some move should be made to formalize matters with him before he accepts some job that will put him out of the market.

17. Recognizing that there are risks involved, it nevertheless seems most undesirable to pass up what has the earmarks of being a highly useful asset. We request, therefore, that Headquarters review and consider the entirety of our knowledge of GIBSON to this point, and give us a reading on his potential worth, as viewed by LCHARVEST, AF Division, KUDESK/ICG and other interested parties. If, for reasons of which Headquarters is aware, and we are not, GIBSON is considered unacceptable as a KUTUBE asset, let us know. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a market for his talents and capabilities, we should move rather rapidly to pre-empt him. His present flexibility is not likely to last for long, and any plan to use him should take this into account. As WE/BC is aware, we are not in a position to put this into the form of a London Station project. This should not be the reason for neglecting what appears to be such a potentially rewarding asset for KUBARK, however.

18. We would appreciate a reply within a couple of weeks of Headquarters' receipt of this dispatch.

George H. KATZENBACH

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TO
~~Chief, WE~~

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK/LCHARVEST
Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are the tapes of the 17, 18, 19 and 23 February sessions with GIBSON. Also transmitted is a copy of the Station-prepared transcript of the tapes. The quality of the transcription varies: the first session is mostly summarized, the subsequent ones are almost verbatim. Roberta L. HORRELL did the transcripts, and I subsequently reviewed them, filling in comments, names, etc., that HORRELL had missed.

2. As rough as these transcripts are, a careful review of them is fairly revealing about GIBSON, and about his knowledge of the topics discussed. Further comment from this end will be contained in an operational dispatch. Right now we are anxious to get the present material into Headquarters' hands for further processing. This is about as far as we can take the material here, due to extreme time limitations. We are retaining a copy of the transcript, however, for further use and future reference.

Katz

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
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~~Attachment~~ files CI/ICG 20 Mar 65

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
9 March 1965

DATE DISPATCHED
15 MAR 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,706

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

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B

I was in Rome when there was sun.

I had left Rome when the snow arrived.

I had a reasonably cordial reception almost everywhere. I got some information. I didn't push too hard. Where I encountered a little bit of suspicion but not very serious, was in Brussels, and actually I think it was because Gaippu was so busy there. He said if I could have stayed on a few days, but I didn't have time or money ~~s~~ to hang around. But I can always go back and see him again.

I went from here to Zurich, to Lausanne. The only reason I went to Zurich was simply because Nils Andersson claimed that the Swiss had, you know we had been expelled from Switzerland with the magazine, and he said that they had told him that I was interdit de séjour, that is, can't come into the country.

But I have been in the country numerous times since then; ~~but~~ nevertheless I wanted to make certain. I know they know me in the Geneva airport. I went in the Zurich airport, and took the train there, (for Lausanne). And there I didn't stay in a hotel so that the local police would probably not know about it. They probably were aware, but they weren't going to bother, anyway. From Lausanne I went to Milan, Milan to Rome, Rome back to Lausanne to ~~[illegible]~~Andersson again, then Paris, and from Paris to Brussels and back here. Altogether it took three weeks. One could have taken much more time. Actually, it was more establishing of contact. I got some information for this thing I am writing for Encounter. In fact I got enough to do what I want to do. (I have to) first see what Lasky ~~He~~ wants.

I would like to follow up - - to go on to Algiers, to talk to some more people down there - apparently they have got a lot more information about Verges. Or so they told Andersson, of course useful if I'm going to play the money market. But for Algerian currency it was hard to find a buyer. The opposition has been the principal buyer of the new currency. // In other words ~~he daren't~~ Krieger and the people who were ~~go~~ out of the country when the change in currency came and who were short of ~~in~~ hard cash for their people going in and out, were buying this currency. And this has created a more favorable exchange rate. In any case, at that time the exchange rate was hardly favorable and you had to give a sell order 24 hours in advance for the bank to find someone to buy. And that was the thing. The money, he (Anderson) says that the exact sum in the bank he is not certain, in that account, He knows that Verges's figure was around ~~$75,000~~ 75,000. He thinks that was fairly accurate. That is, 75,000 dollars, in Algerian currency. The money was placed there between the end of July or August of 1962 and December of that year. In other words it was just after independence but during the period of struggle ~~between the~~ for power between the GPRA and the Tlemcen (pl) TLEMCEN ~~clandestine (?)~~ group. Where he got the money from ... As for the second $75,000, Verges said he had another account. He knows (Anderson knows) as he said before, nothing about this. And frankly he doesn't believe it existed.

However, he does think that Verges has received small amounts of money, where from he doesn't know. The Chinese line is ending. In fact, you can tell from looking at the magazine, the last editorial. He changes- The editorial is called Compagnon de Route, which means Fellow Traveler, This is just what he didn't want to ~~be~~ be called. And it ends up by saying in French- en a fait nous sommes des compagnons de route- - we're fellow travelers, we're for a united front of all the liberation movements with comprehension but without condescension. It's much more ~~understandable~~ modest, it's a playing down of their own role. In fact some of the articles ~~mentioned~~ inside the magazine of course are not in line with the editorial. The editorial doesn't have Verges's style, either.

((Who do you suppose wrote it?))

That is very difficult to say. It doesn't to my mind seem to be the style of ~~Chem~~ Kier either. I would suspect that it was written by ~~Cassard (?)~~ Kessel but for what purposes? ... Grippa's people told me, well, they considered this a favorable turn, that they were willing to accept Verges as a fellow traveler but as nothing more, and they told him that long ago. This is a power struggle. They told him that and what's more they're still not certain that they want to have anything to do with him. And apparently it's gotten to be the standard ~~xx~~ -- something that you ~~demand~~ need -- they demand that people who come to see Grippa now are - forced to say "we have nothing to do with Verges; if we had something to do with Verges, we make our self-

(Slaw on the Tide)

I would like to follow ~~up~~, ~~For~~ instance, I would ~~[illegible]~~ like to ~~go~~ have gone to Algiers.

~~Apparently~~

~~[illegible]~~ some people down there that I could talk to. Apparently they've got a ~~lot more information~~ about Verges and so on. ~~[illegible]~~ That's ~~what they told Anderson~~.

((Who told Andersson?))

Oh, some members of the Algerian Foreign Ministry who, I think, is ~~in~~ was traveling ~~Anderson he sees [illegible]~~ through Switzerland. He sees a lot of Algerians because he worked with them during the Algerian war, in various capacities. So he still sees them. He has kept on fairly good terms with them. ~~[illegible]~~

((You turned up some information in your talks with Andersson))

Yes, some. You mean about the source of (his) funds. He (Anderson) assures me that the money was not as I thought it was; ~~but~~ it was in the form of Algerian currency. I thought it was in stocks and bonds. My assumption that it was in stocks and bonds was based on his (Verges's) statements that he used to ~~say~~ make, whenever we would ask him for money he would say, "I must go to the bank to tell them to sell". Now apparently what this meant was that they were holding ~~the~~ Algerian currency. You could deposit money in Swiss banks, held (it is) ~~as~~ currency ~~in~~ of the deposit. If I deposit ~~I could hold in~~ pounds, they hold it in [illegible] ~~and~~ give a sell order. . this is criticism. You know, we ~~[illegible]~~ to do so, and we won't do this anymore."

A number of groups, apparently so. . You know, they have created the socalled Spanish Communist Party, (parenthesis, Marxist-Leninist, and this was one of the conditions. There are talks going on in France between the

1

~~Trichy~~ Clichy group and the Marseilles group and that was one of, ~~[illegible]~~ again, the conditions of the Marseilles people who were tied up with ~~----nard~~ Kien: and:, that Verges had nothing to do with them. On the other hand there are talks between ~~the Trichy~~ Clichy ~~group~~ and ~~a~~ young left- ~~wingers~~ students, they call themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. It's a very small group anyway. That again was a condition. They put out a magazine, a news letter, called Drapeau Rouge which had been mainly written— it's one single edition- mainly written by ~~Chou?~~ Kien. So obviously, the wind has turned very much against him(them). Verges has said, howver, ~~[illegible]~~ strange things too. To Maspero, not very long ~~[illegible]~~ ago at a cocktail party, he said, "I don't see why people reproach me for accepting the aid ~~from~~ of African friendsand comrades"- African comrades, no longer Chinese comrades. He also says that he admitted that they had made mistakes, that the magazine had been too sectarian, dogmatic.

2

((Verges said this to Maspero?))

Yes. Anderson told me that.

((When he says African, does he mean Black African or Arab?))

This is what we don't know. We have no idea who would waste that much money on him. First of all, who has the money, with which parties does he have connection? The UPC and the Cameroons, that split. The UPC and the Cameroons, a certain amount of money comes from Russia, other money coming from the Chinese, but very small amounts, because no one wants to pour money into this very divided organization. And he had contacts with one wing of it. I ~~[illegible]~~ can't see them giving him any money. The Salaba ? Salawa party - ~~Lagere and~~ ? in ? Niger, they also, according to Anderson, ?~~Mani~~ Mamani, who is one of their executive people, who is in Algiers, and who comes to Switzerland quite often, said that he no longer even bothers when he goes to Paris, to see Verges, that he sort of considered it worthless, (that he was) sort of an adventurer, an opportunist.

2

The thing that was for me a bit frustrating in all of this was that every once in a while — — — — this that and the other, ~~he~~ (Verges) has always had this equivoque, this doubt hanging over him. But no one has anything hard and fast about him. You can get- well in the past, what did he do. We know vaguely what he did, but nevertheless, what would you say that he did that would be really decisive and so on. It seems a his ambition, but his ambition seems to shift from one thing to the other. You don't know exactly what does he want. When he started this magazine, obviously he wanted to play a role in Algeria and Africa. Driven out of ② Africa, he still thinks he's going to get back to Algeria within a relatively brief period of time, six months to a year. And he kept saying to us, "Oh, yes, we'll be back, we'll be back." He's already prepared a list of people he's going to have thrown in jail, or shot, (laughing) or threaten with firing squads and so forth. That fell through (being back to Algeria). And now, of course, I suppose it must be extremely bitter to him to see Bitat, who had been ~~his~~ really, the closest, and ~~Zohardin~~ Zora DRIFF, (they had) been his closest associates inside of Algiers, with exception of Djamila Boubired, but she doesn't have any real weight, politically, ~~as~~ Bitat is back in Algiers, has made his peace with Ben Bella, and now represents, he's the General Manager for Volkswagen. (laughing)

Anderson's conversation with the Algerian (in Switzerland) about Verges was based just on Bitat. He said "Well, Bitat is going back. I suppose Verges will be following behind." He said (the Algerian), "No he won't. We have a file on him," what he's done. With money, in particular. Apparently they claimed that he had been dipping into the ~~pot~~ funds for years.

((This is the Algerian claim--)) Yes, that's what they told Anderson.

I think it's probably true. The funds of ~~the FLN~~ the Federation in France. You see he was, after all, a lawyer and then became the top lawyer of the FLN defense team in France, The legal defense team, and this meant that he had access to enormous sums of money. The ~~Alger~~ FLN-- obviously was an underground organization, even as well-structured a one as the Algierian one, in France, cannot demand very accurate bookkeeping. There were all sorts of very funny jokes about how this money was handled, (receipts) written on the corner of a newspaper for millions of old francs. . And so under those circumstances — Verges himself has told him some things about this.

As for his connection with Khider, Anderson thinks that Khider may have helped him (Verges) to get money ~~out~~ inside of Algeria, but he doesn't think that he got anything after he left and Khider left Algeria. In other words, he said as long as he was on the scene and formed part of this vague opposition to Ben Bella which Khider sought to at least unite on a few issues around himself , he may have received some money. But afterwards, he doesn't think he received any. He has no proof, of course. If he did receive money, it would have been small sums given to ~~Jamisa Buhares~~ Djamila Boubired as a token of friendship more than anything else. That may have explained her trip to Geneva, when she did bring some money.

That was in March or April, last year.

((What is the current financial relationship between Verges and Anderson?))

FOURTH SESSION

23 February 1965
(morning)

~~His connection with Khider. Anderson thinks he got no money after he left (Algiers).~~ ?.

~~If any came it would have been small sums given to Geneva as expression of friendship.~~

[illegible]
A and ~~V,~~ V maintains A owes him money because of a Swedish offset press bought

(2) originally for Revolution. He was very careless about money. At one point V asked A to buy a house. Evidently V thought he had enough money for anything. They bought press which turned out to be useless.

A. then took it. ~~Ex~~ A said he wanted it. Haggled over price. Then Verges went to Brussels to ~~buy~~ to sell the same press to Grippa, to play off Grippa and Anderson, because Grippa was also looking for an offset press. In fact, he did eventually buy an identical press, which is now installed in his place in Brussels. Anyway, Anderson did pay ~~paid~~ ~~bought~~ a certain amount. But The they didn't decide price definitely.

But A. paid a debt to a ~~printer,~~ (Gauguin) Swiss printer (which was) owed by Verges.

This (Gauguin) printer has sued for ~~XXXXX~~ 48,000 swiss francs. He has blocked Revolution's account at NMPP (Nouvelle Messagerie de Presse Parisienne) [illegible]. They had 7.50 francs in the account when he blocked it. They had a previous debt with a French printer.

Amount of money coming in from sales is very small. Verges has not contacted Gauguin to settle the matter. (Gauguin) Could put the magazine out of existence. He has ~~Has~~ only to demand money and if Verges don't find it in 48 hours Gauguin could force bankruptcy. But he wouldn't do that unless someone would guarantee he would get his 48,000. Creditors wait, hoping they will get something.

To Guarantee Gauguin that ~~for~~ amount of money (would be the) best way to put Rev. out of business. I could do it myself if I could get the money. I could get a similar judgment and force bankruptcy.

Actual legal composition of the company found by my lawyer: Nouvelles Editions Internationale

22 Aug 1963, Verges through a lawyer deposited papers of corporation for a Societé Anonyme RL at ~~16th~~ 6 bureau Paris. capital of 10,000 new francs ~~8~~8,000 held by Verges and 2000 by Maurice ~~Binet~~ ~~[illegible]~~ Sinet.

I thought there were at least five members there were but only two.

The money was actually deposited by a check through the lawyers guild.

There is 10,000 francs somewhere along the line. So Gauguin could get that much.

Company does exist but nobody is able to find it.

my current legal status- we are fighting for back wages. V ~~he~~ denies. He said we were paid too much. Then he said we then it goes before fact-finding agent. ~~says~~ they were "in ~~confidence~~" were incompetent – one look at the magazine disproved that. This continues to drag on. The lawyer in Paris is not energetic. Bro-in-law paid the lawyer 5oo francs. He probably thinks that is all he is going to get out of it. Question of paying Translations, etc. He shows lack of will power. He is an orthodox Communist. He is very honest. But hates scandal. So why push it? probably thinks "they are out of France", I don t think he has sold out of Revolution I can do it in 48 hrs. Lots of people want Rev out of business. ~~Question~~ (?)

Question is where does Verges get the small sums necessary to keep going. He's paying at least 5 people full-time, plus the ~~[illegible]~~ printer.

Delduecca printed No. 12. it is a high powered firm. what terms of agreement?

13th issue has gone back to offset press, the old printer. ~~I~~ I don't know why.

I should have spent more time in Paris. I dont want to overplay my hand. The last thing I should have done was ~~Recognize need~~ to question people systematically.

In Paris only important contact is Valdes, Spanish. Gave ~~me~~ some info on Spanish groups. Claims ~~they~~ Verges asked Cuba for money and got turned down. Cubans don't have much money.

(SINÉ)

It's a Great shock to these people to find that Chinese aren't putting in money. It is always someone else, like ~~Pinot.~~ Sinet —) [illegible]

Verges always indirect. doesn't want to ask anybody for money.

probably through Juan Arcocha, press & cultural attache, Paris, former sec~~torey~~retary of Carlos Franqui, editor of Revolucion, Havana. Arcocha is very anti-Communist, hipped on persecution of homosexuals. Not necessarily one himself. Very interesting.

I did not see Franqui. I don't know where he is.

I was getting enough info for personal needs. but didn't want to overdo it.

I do need a better story to travel around on.

Grippa generally was busy, lot of people around, obviously delegations, from where I don't know. there was a catastrophe, Something had happened. He is rather vague.

Sharp ~~Shock~~ clash between Grippa and ~~Verges~~ V came on question of money. After many months, ~~Verges~~ V went to Brussels, talk ended abruptly. V said: "~~He~~ Grippa went too far,' laid down political line, etc. I rejected." But this came only after an exchange over the source of funds. Grippa asked Verges where he was getting his money, and Verges got huffy.

mx

axSx Delegate general said Grippa didn't believe any of the stuff Verges said about me. Predisposed to oppose ~~Verges~~ → Verges.

(Verges will not confide to anyone - even Andersson - where the money comes from)

Verges and Algerian money. Hm Did he just say, just tell them, that he got the money from the Chinese? Did he get it from someone in Algeria but he is afraid of disclosing.

He wouldn't tell the Chinese at Bern the source of his funds.

(Q; Verges debts total $30,000?) D Now he must have cleared away at least the big debt with the original French printer. I said 30,000,000 francs or about $60,000. ~~Castel~~ Kessel confirmed that it was about that amount. ~~Castel~~ Kessel and I and my wife worked out the estimate. I don"t rembmber the breakdown.

Mainly Printing, photographs, paper, rent. We said between 30 and 40 million (old francs) promissory notes. and having them countersigned by Jerome Lindon publisher of L'Edition Minuit

I have to leave around noon. my little girl at home by herself.

⑤ Wife working in Tunisian Embassy, 14£ a week. She is (isn't) very happy there. Not much money, remember taxes.

Anderson: general background- he is Swedish, 32 years old, born in France of French mother and Swedish father. His parents settled in Lausanne when he was 6 months old. He was raised in Switz. had so little connection with Sweden that when finally had to go into Swedish army had to learn Swedish. Married to woman who is daughter of a prominent Conservative Swiss politician, may be a member of the ~~Federal~~ Parliament Council. Don't know his name. Husband does not see her parents. He chose Swedish nationality because most convenient, during Algerian war and didn't want to go into French army. Swiss nationality would cost both money and military service. Therefore took Swedish. In his youth he wasinvolved with literary and dramatic groups, still has keen interet in poetry and drama. He is connected with Theatre Populaire Romande .His press servée mainly for material for them. About all he prints. He is forbidden to print any political material but he can print or have printed Chinese literature, which is classified as philosophical. He can't print October. This - now printed by Gauguin in Montreux

He has never incorporated name la Cité - privately owned press and business, means personal risk.

He is distributor, mainly, for French books in Switz. has some substantial debts.

Most of his things are not political (now) but ~~has some~~ literary. Not essentially a political operation. Has two employes, a secretary and a Spanish boy who takes care of the press.

He for a time very much involved with the FL~~M~~N, how it happened don't know. He was one of their principal agents in Switz. Operated as far as Paris and Lyons. He rpresented ~~with~~ Swiss end of the support net work, to do tasks FL~~M~~N couldn't do themsevles. Carrying weapons, money, etc. He operated the Swiss ~~end~~ base. Much material was smuggled over Swiss border at Geneva. With Henri LeClerc?

Through connection with FL~~M~~N, A probably made first personal contact with Verges and with Maspero. He got into publishing from distributing through contacts with Maspero who was printing books. Algerians wanted these books to contènue coming out in French. They proposed that A print them. He took this to ~~G-ndin.~~ Gauguin who agreed to print, and that's how he became a publisher.

He had no trouble. Swiss police thought his life was in danger. ~~From~~ the JBS.

[illegible] 6

Is he solvent? Yes. But his wife works ~~is~~ as a school teacher. They have a car. They pay low rent. ~~B~~ All his operation is in one building - the [illegible]. Building of very mixed occupancy. His father and mother had flat in this building. The father and mother were decorators. Has office on upper ground floor and press on lower ground floor. His father dead. His mother remarried. Still a decorator.

Dont know just when A started this business. He began in decorating business paper hanging, etc. Then got into poetry, ~~xm~~ etc. had a little magazine. He had some money and bought the distributorship of these publications. From that he went into publishing, during Algerian war.

October- Anderson and group around him, established in 1964, summer, after fiasco of the Swiss Communist Party. Extremely small group. I doubt if they have more than 30 people. ① Operate mainly inside of the ~~P.C.P.~~ PdT official Communist party - Workers' Party. Aim to convince the peop'e inside of PdT rightness of Chinese ~~thinking~~ thesis and provide a rallying point for those expelled from the party. Print October in Italian, French & German

Octobre

I estimate 30 to 40 people involved. Swiss CP has all of 15 people. VEry weak organization. It might be discreetly financed by the Chinese. Though a little money handed over to Anderson A is obviously no longer really the center of it. He was the initiator. Fact he is not Swiss may have helped. I feel he was gradually pulling back from political involvement. Is under close surveillance by the Swiss police - has been warned what he can and can't do. People from Vevey even went up to Berne and asked for his expulsion. They got very little satisfaction.

There still are numbers of Spaniards who come in -- he has Chinese and Albanian literature in ~~[illegible]~~ Spanish.

Once they get out of Spain and can get this stuff they do go and look at it. MOR no longer exists - has been fused into new Spanish CP. They are just workers. Mundo Obrero Revolucionario produced on offset or mimeograph, principally by Tiafer (phon) Tagliaferro. in Anderson's office Catalan. The two leaders are out of it.

Three [illegible] groups: proletario, Chispa group is third. That has two people according to ~~Anderson~~ Valdes. The leaders of the other two groups were expelled from this Lenin-Stalin party.

Don't think he still has distribution of October officially. Penguin prints it, he stores it. That's political. This ban derived from the Revolution incident. Swiss authorities told us, We could stay in Switzerland if we wanted to but had to get out of all political activity.

Don't know ~~where~~ whether A still acts as a contact between various groups on the outside and the Chinese Embassy in Berne - couldn't tell. ~~I~~ I feel that he is much less active than he was. He was not well informed about Italian group, (Nuova Unita)

14-00000

& don't [illegible]

He is in contact with Grippa/ and with Maspero but very unhappy about The political line of Maspero's paper.

Andersson's wife: a silly woman -- self-dramatizes.

She went to Albania (anniv of Albanian rev.) and some other people from the October group. Went to reproach them for the aid they had given ~~Guiyard~~ Brilliard-Vervey. His wife does many things he can't do because he is a foreigner. She would act as his agent — did not go in her own right. He doesn't have much to do with Albanians. Her trip gave him a better impression. But she thought the Albanians were better informed about Europe and Marxist affairs party in Europe than the Chinese.

She at one time was a member of the central committee of the ~~French~~ Swiss Communist Party. ~~Maybe~~ Fact only had about 35 members. Practically anybody who joined The party was immediately on the Central Committee.

~~Among~~

① Andersson is ~~A~~ known as the man in Switzerland to see if you want to set up a base for any kind of a revolutionary movement. Maybe this is how he got in touch with Tupamaros.

There is a ~~Churiel~~ Curiel group very active — he had contacts with them. Rev Father Donde Dadsis? former worker priest, from Lyons, formerly with FLN now involved in Congolese, etc. rebel groups. Always gun-running — with missal in one hand, sub machine gun in other. Extraordinary priest. Had high protection in the Church, with Cardinal Gerlié (ph) of Lyons. who recently died. When priest was arrested, money to help from Cardinal.

Some left the Catholic church. I would say this Algerian generation provides the basis for the pro-Chinese element within the left-wing youth of France. The ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Party in a colonial situation and who were, from idealistic reasons, disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure on the part of the Communist Party.

Spanish, Italian, Portugese workers in Switz. Many are left-oriented and interested.

~~dxx~~ they are just workers.

~~Tifer~~ Tagliaferro, Catalan.

Marxist-Leninist Communist party made of the three groups- Mundo Obrero, Proletario, Chispa groups. Two members.

I can perfectly believe it.

cease any activities on behalf of Revolution which was felt as undesirable. Whether he is still a contact between groups on outside and Chinese Communists in Berne cannot say. He is much less active.

Much of this page appears on "left pg." in fuller transcription.

all these movements di[illegible]nishing in size and impor[illegible]ce----

He may be going to Brussels. He is in contact with Grippa. I don t know about it. He is unhappy with ~~Ma~~ political line of Maspero's publicatios

Brilliard

aid they had given ~~guillard~~.

Apparently that was ironed out. His wife does manythings that he can't do because he is a foreigner. She acts as his agent.

But he doesn't have much to do with Albanians, but her visit has somewhat raised the pretige of Albania in their eyes.

I think he would much rather deal with the Chinese.

He may have come in contact with the Spaniards through the Algerians.

the

He is known as ~~a~~ man in Switz to go to see if you want to set up a base for

ary movement

any kind of revolution Can give you advice,

put you in touch with the right bunch of people to sell you arms, if that's

what you want~~xxxxxxx~~. group sorts of things

There was a group called Curie~~ri~~, extremely activein all ~~s~~ Daney

~~Curiel group~~. ~~He~~ had contacts with them, with the Rev Father Donde, who is

a former

Catholic priest from Lyons, worker priestx, involved with the FLN,

very much on the left, now involved in various things, rebels, Congolese,

with missal in one hand and machine gun in the other. as a missionary priest,

always gun-running, but had very high protection in the church, ~~his~~

Were

ties with Cardinal Gesier of Lyons, who just died. He ~~Had~~ had ties with the

Algerians. whenever [illegible] the

Cardinal would be informed and

would

money be made available to take care of him.

from the

Many of people were Catholic, just Catholic, some left the church. The

Com Party didn't want anything to do with the Algerians.

Some are now in Algeria. Algerian gave basis for Chinese elements

in leftwing youth of France generation pro-

ones who saw the total ineffectiveness of the Com party in France

were disgusted with it and sought to make up for this failure

~~and sought to make up for this failure~~ of the Com party. I understand

among

now that there is great conflict ~~not with~~ new generation in youth movement,

in France. As far as Spaniards concerned, suspect it came about that way.

A's contacts with the Spaniards were extremely broad, many not even Marxists,

Spanish Social Democrats, some of them. Broad left spectrum. He published

a book about ______ Spanish Workers. Bitterly attacked by Kien

and Valdes. It wasn't Marxist at all.

has

A ~~.~~ fairly easy access to Chines Embassy. With Ambassador? No with a

man named Chu, think First Secretary. He apparently is the one delegated to deal

with Europeans, Communists and so on.

in Bern mission

Don't know whether A has contact with other Chinese. Some Chinese came

to him. Normally a question of publishing books. And a very modest type

of thing.

CURIEL ? MUST MEAN QUERIELLE

A has nothing to do with ~~NEAD~~ NCNA His contact is basically with the Embassy.

He told me had an incident with the Sov First Sec. at the Cuban Embassy last Jan. The Sov heard his name. said are you ~~Swiss~~ English? He said, no, I'm ~~Swiss~~ Swedish. You must be the Anderson. Sov. told him he couldn't get away with that sort of thing long. They had ways of stopping people like him. An emotional outburst. The Russian Tried later to leave better impression- I admire what you have been doing, etc.

A is known. to the Soviets.

He has been in contact with the Sawaba Party, with the Eritrean Liberation movement. That was slight. He is in touch with Curiel and company.

I'm not certain he is in complete approval of what Curiel group doing.

At one time Curiel group interested in something in the French West Indies. I understand that they were ~~trying~~ to send arms into Martinique and Guadeloupe - which arms one can get in Switzerland, and ship.

A was in contact with French West Indians. I don't know how far that went.

Here in London Curiel wanted to found a magazine last summer to be devoted to West Indies.

Two published here, ~~x~~ Flamingo and Daylight. Don't know whether Curiel has ~~xxxxx~~ anything to do with it. There is a new one, Magnet. And said to be another one on the way. I've seen Dabois (?) in Algeria and Lausanne, as a courier-guest, but I really don't know what Curiel is up to.

The Spaniards- I had no real knowledge onthat.

He is likely to keep up contacts with the Spaniards. Also has contact with the Portuguese -e.g. students in Lausanne. Knows what's going on.

~~Thexx~~ He is mixed up with Angola, was involved with the MPLA.

He was disappointed when the exaggerated claims of the MPLA were exposed: i.e. their claims that they had planes, arms on the inside, etc. But they couldn't document their claims for the OAU. Turned out a monstrous bluff. The UPA is a much more conservative organization; it did have a fighting force. And continued until quite recently to struggle. And that was when Viriato da Cruz and others switched from the MPLA.

Understand Dr. Neto still running around, [illegible] ~~has contacts~~ with the Chinese.

He probably is in Algiers now.

A. has contacts which consist of merely being there. Anyone who comes to Lausanne comes to see him.

A. kept in contact with Verges when Verges in Algiers. He had cultivated the Andersons. Anderson doesn't tell me everything about Verges' money. Mrs. A. went down there to visit Verges. A. had full power ~~to~~ ~~se~~ of attorney to sign for the Verges bank account in the Union des Banques Suisses in Lausanne. This account was started from ~~xxxxx~~ November 1962 until probably Jan 1964. Verges claimed that A had taken money. A. Anderson claimed the funds were down to 500 Swiss francs anyway.

Verges sent Kessel to close the account. Behind A's back, and when A found out he was furious. Verges claimed he also had a second account - in Geneva.

Anderson & Verges haven't seen each other since spring 1962.

SINÉ

In Oct of 62 before I went to Algiers, ~~[illegible]~~ when I came to Paris I saw Sinet who had ~~a~~ large amounts of Algerian curreency in his flat, it was indiscreet — several million of Algerian francs. the clost shelves were covered with bundles of Algerian currency.

I had met Sinet in New York when he came back from Cuba. He and his wife.

He came through FPCC office.

He asked me if I had time to help him change some of this money, which ~~ch~~ he claimed was given him by an Algerian friend~~s~~ who was going on a world tour, and had brought it from Algiers, but banks after independence did not want to change large amounts of Algerian money — would only take up to a certain amount. He was sending it by various people to airport, etc. small banks, to change a little at a time. At a one-for-one rate. This of course was part of the money that Verges got, I assume.

Verges had met ~~Finet~~ Sinet during the Algerian war, when and how I don-t know.
Sinet had been closely involved with the Algerians during the war. But
He was ~~xxxx~~ too conspicuous to do much in an open way. He may have
given money and such.
certainly helped in propaganda.
He knew Chandeli at the UN, and
His Algerian connections very good. He was in contact with Ben Bella.

The Erench govt would never allow ~~Finet~~ Sinet to go to see Ben Bella but did allow Sinet's wife to go. When Ben Bella was suddenly released, he said he had no proper clothes. It was she who took clothes to Ben Bella when he was released, and went to Cairo. Rabat

In 62 when I saw Sinet in Paris I was thinking of going to Algiers. I was vague about. He told me all about Verges and someone named Maurice Masquino (ph.) who then was editor of El Mujahid, weekly, official organ of the FLN.

It was actually throgh ~~Finet~~ Sinet that I really got the job with Verges.

I had heard of him (Verges) and he apparently had heard of me, but I had never known him before. Sinet had proposed that I meet him then — in October — but we couldn't, I don't know why. He had gone to Morocco or something.

This was at the time between the struggle between the ~~GRA~~ GPRA and the ~~Clemsen group~~ TLEMCEN group for power in Algeria. And I don't know where he was. Again, he played a role in the transfer of funds. They needed money for a large parade.
Verges carried the money ~~to~~ from Morocco for Khider ~~to~~ Algiers.

July - First meeting with Verges about 15 minutes. Talking about an English lang. edition then of Revolution Africaine

Ali Buzuren, was then business manager, later sec. of Algierian Embassy in Leopoldville.

First meeting (with Verges) was in November. 1962

Offices of Journal d'Alger had to be cleaned up. had been bombed. by OAS.

get staff, etc. ~~He~~ (V) in meantime ~~when~~ went to Paris, saw people connected with Maspero — Gerard Chaliand — to whom he proposed coming to Algiers as editor.
He was careful to make sure he had foreign editors not Algerian.

Revolution Africaine lasted 18 issues. I have the full file if you are interested.

why did Verges lost-post,

The political ~~section~~ bureau was breaking up. Bitat & Khider disagreed with Ben Bella.

Khider was seeking to use his post as secretary of the party to ensure he had some sort of hold

but his middle class background used very successfully against him by

Ben Bella. Since he came out of this milieu of small shop-keepers and grocers and there were scarcities it was easy to blame Khider every time there was something short.

Everyone knew of Khider's speculation with money. Turned out he had

$12,000,000 in Switzerland, probably much more elsewhere.

Verges was originally the head of the African Section of the Algerian

foreign ministry. After the Clemsen group came in. Due to his African contacts

He did not get along at all well with Khemisti who was then ~~was Ben Bella's~~ foreign minister.

He ~~then~~ at same time made contacts with Bitat and Khider, I'm certain, for money.

Ben Bella never gave approval, but other members of the political bureau did. And the money came from Khider - it was un-blocked by Khider, finally -

Fifty million francs in cash brought in to start magazine.

It went behind Ben Bella's back. Once it came out it was a fait accompli, and he didn't care.

Verges

He maintained later he didn't expect to hold out as long as he did.

Djamila Bouhired

His wife under Moslem law, was asked by Ben Bella if she would marry

him. She had ferocious animosity against Ben Bella, still has, I think.

So all this bad blood - frustrated desire - came into play. When Verges was asked to go to the Addis Ababa conference (he was not [illegible] in the Foreign Ministry) he smelled something fishy, and he begged off. Two or three days later he was called to party headquarters - it was already [illegible] - and they

told him ~~Was asked~~ to turn over everything to ~~a man named HARVEY~~ [illegible]. At 11 next morning,

That same evening he left by car, with Djamila Bouhired's niece, went to Morocco and then he went to Paris.

He has connections in Morocco. as high as the Palace, so I understand, but I don't know who.

Verges always cultivated a myth of big connections. But he does

circulate in worldly circles. Claims contacts in Pompidou's office. I never saw any benevolence from Pompidou's office, though.

So he went to Paris and then he came to Switzerlandm and obviously the money Sinet ~~had~~ had then he started to set up -- he had some money, obviously in France . . . and then he started transferring his funds from Algiers-from Lausanne - - transferred it on his person, on my person - no he never carried any money, but I carried some, and Kessel did too. Kessel claimed that he was actually stopped and searched and that he had this money in 500 franc bills in his hip pocket and they never looked in there. Any way, he did get the money in from Fracne. And he began publication of Revolution as a monthly in September of 1963. 6

((Had you known in advance what he was going to do?))

No. In fact, it was a question for a while, whether he would do it in Switzerland.

A wanted Verges to set up magazine in Switzerland. ~~Sinet~~ was very much against it. I'm certain Verges never intedned to go to Switzerland

~~Harvey~~ Hadj immediately spread story that Verges had stolen something like very upset when he heard that Verges was in Paris. He didn't like being connected with somebody who had stolen money. I called Verges and said he better get in touch with Andersson himself, better see him soon, because he would keep putting him off. The fact was that Andersson and I went to Paris. That's when we saw Verges. Verges placated him, said there was no truth in the charges. In fact, the charges were reduced. Harbi himself came to London. (The amount) went down, from 300 million to 200 million from 60 million to 50 million, and the whole thing was dropped. Buzerin, the business manager, was extremely indignant about the talk about misappropriation of funds and demanded an audit of the books. They found 6 million francs surplus. That was even more disturbing to them down there. ~~Habbi~~ Harbi is supposed to have said "this isn't swindling; this is an affair of state." Buzerin was then given his clean bill of health and he went off to be secretary (of Embassy) in the Congo, in Leopoldville. On his way back last Spring from Leopoldville -- he was no longer going to stay there; I think he is in Algeria now-- he and his wife stopped in Paris and saw Verges. He had been in contact with Verges and he was very much tied, family-wise, with this whole Bitat-Zohra Driff crowd.

Our transfer/was simply that here we had been working for Verges personally. The money, there -in Switzerland, had been his money and the Algerians never made any attempt to get in touch with us. None whatsoever. There was a letter to Andersson from Chalion, who remained with the Algerians. There was an attempted phone call from them down there- probably Chalion or someone with the magazine- which Andersson refused to accept. So we really were never before the choice. In other words, he proposed (the work); we were doing what he proposed. He was going to continue and the Algerians had no coherent story about the money and what was going on. At that time they weren't interested in the English edition. Later, when it continued, they did produce in Algiers one issue of an English edition, an imitation of ours, which was very badly done. That was the last. They never did any more. That was edited by Patricia Mcgowan Pinheiro, ~~(the wife of)~~ who was involved with a a half-Anglish, half-Portuguese leader from Mozambique who allegedly-- his group is extremely small-- He was kept going by the ~~Filemo~~ FRELIMO people from Mozambique because of the fact that they needed a European to represent the progressive European element (laughing) for when the day comes for takeover by Africans- well, Carlos (her husband) was waiting for the day when Carlos will be produced as a genuine Mozambiquan of European origin. She was also involved with the Portuguese. She wrote a book about Portugal

~~(under the name,)~~ a man by the name of Peter Fryer, published it in 1962. I can't remember the title. She speaks Portuguese. May be- apparently is connected with the Trotskyist group. ~~[illegible]~~

The Portuguese, from what I understand is going on — I would like to get back to Algiers to see what is going on — as in Great (ferment - spitting - the Eldorado business etc.)

Just part of the iceberg that stuck up above the water. She was close to the Algerians. She produced this one issue. Then that flopped. She had been asked by Verges to go with me to Lausanne to be the joint editor of the edition in English. She refused because she wanted to stay in Algiers, stay close to her Portuguese group. She didn't think very much of ~~[illegible]~~ me simply because she had set up the publication of the English edition ~~[illegible]~~ , (which) was supposed to have been done in London. And then suddenly behind their backs Verges arranges it Switzerland. The British Communist Party was very much upset about the whole thing. They had thought that they might be able to have something to do with it, that they might take it over. They had a woman who was working for us here, named Rosalind Ainslie, South African, a European woman from South Africa, who obviously — she works for East Germ ~~[illegible]~~ News ~~[illegible]~~ ? ? ? ~~[illegible]~~ Agency here now — would have been their agent. It was even going to be incorporated here under her name. Verges was going to be the junior and silent partner abroad. Obviously he wasn't going along with that. This was the summer of 63. At the time of the break with Algiers, she was working as our correspondent here; (she) was extremely upset. She was holding £1000 of Verges' money. She didn't know which way to go. Harbi came here and talked to her. The whole thing fell through. Finally she chose the Algerians and then they dumped her. And she was forced to repay the money to Verges that she owed.

And so we then stayed on in Switzerland. We were perfectly content to stay in Switzerland. Out of the . . .

Verges wanted to move to Paris. He had little justification for a move to Paris. He was absolutely delighted when the Swiss expelled us. They gave us three months to get out. It really wasn't any expulsion. We continued it (the magazine). The editor and publisher were out of the country. X Andersson had nothing to do with it. It was still being produced by ~~Gongim~~ Panquin, Only the English edition was banned. That was to prevent any further ublication (in Switzerland, presumably). That's why it had to be done

SECOND SESSION

18 February 1965

14-00000

(Tape starts a little late. G. had brought in bound volume of Revolution Africaine — all 18 issues — and we are discussing this when tape picks up.)

18 Feb 1965 10 to 11:30

It was essentially put together by Europeans, the magazine. The actual editor being Gerard Chalion ~~and she~~ which he got ~~it~~ from Maspero who now works for a professor ~~Bemelhart~~ Bettelheim. These are the entire issues that were put out by Verges. (all [illegible] ~~EX~~ We started 2 Feb. ~~The~~ His last issue, (was ~~Later~~ later than I thought) 18th May.

I have two copies of these. I'm trying to sell these to the University of California. (Just as the last issue of Revolution Africaine [illegible] sell at about $10 a copy) Don't know what I'll get for this, something between $25 and $50.00 for the full set. Verges doesn't even have this. There are three sets.

Andersson has one, I have two. I'm planning to keep one. Verges departed precipitously from Algiers - didn't even take a mailing list.

This I got together in Lausanne.

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~ I got them out of the binder.

Andersson had a file. ~~He distributed them.~~

I had to take Andersson with me to the binder to get them out. He kept one.

What I would like to talk to you about (is future work possibility.)

(I have the Atlantic Monthly article to do.)

~~They want autobiographic article.~~

~~I don't mind writing about Revolution.~~

CY: Does this page refer only to the Algiers phase?
Do the 18 issues refer only to French ed, only to ENG. ed., or to both?
What year (2 Feb) & 18 May ?

But what they want is a sort of autobiographical type of article. I don't mind writing about Revolution. Here's the problem. Once I write about-- it's all right for me to write about Revolution. Nobody will object about how far I go one way or the other. What I feel told you I could put in the public press generally, except for this about the other group, but in terms of Revolution itself there's no objection. However, if I have to go any further than that, that means that as far as I'm concerned most of these people will never touch me with a ten foot pole. (As it is,) What contacts I have, ~~I do~~ some are more delicate than others- - but I ~~feel~~ see that after this trip they could be built up again, after somehow finding some means of interviewing people relatively regularly. So what I want to ask you is, ~~10~~ one- what sort of ideas-if any, you ~~have~~ had in relation to me for future things; were you interested in my going, investigating anything further for you or are you satisfied with what little I know now. As I say, I don't think I know terribly much really, except incidental things which might corroborate what you know (from other sources.) Secondly, in terms of following up, if there's anything (in particular) For instance, I would suggest, the person to get the ~~this~~ Algerian (side of this story from) ~~thing from~~ would be Georges Arnault, the French writer who was in Algiers and (who worked there) on the first issue of Revolution Africaine, ~~and~~ after that never was any more. The split with Verges, who now works in the Ministry of Information and ~~who~~ remains fairly friendly (to me), on a personal basis and who could get me a good deal of information on the Algerian side, (if that's what you're interested in.)

Secondly there is again a possibility (through (Tate or Vincent) and the Atlantic Monthly,) that we might both try to cover the Second Bandung Conference.

((Through who?))

Tate (?), the European representative of the Atlantic Monthly, and we might cover the Second Bandung in Algiers together. That's in June if it is going to be held at all. # Soviet pressures and other pressures might cut it off -

If you're interested in other things, you know, now I have contacts

That's why I'd like to know/ ~~I don't know what-- really,~~ for instance - I've got a possibility - although it's a very slim one- just over across the street here. The Indonesian press office needs somebody. But I don't know whether--, These are little things. The people of the Pan African Congress- South Africa, the PAC, they came to see me to know if I could help them a little here in London, in setting up their offices and handling their press campaign. Of course they haven't real money,

((That wasn't so appealing on that ground))

No, that wasn't so appealing on that score. And then also, they don't have a policy. They're sort of wavering between a policy which means telling one thing to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and telling another to the Chinese in Peking, which any nationalist group has to do, obviously. It's extremely difficult to get any kind of a straight answer even inside the organization. And they are going through a period of reorganization, after some highly scandalous, not political offense, but just plain misappropriation of funds, the usual thing that happens in many, many African organizations, it's incredible (laughs). But I think the people here in London, at least on the surface, are somewhat more honest.

((Basically, you're not interested per se, in staying in the same milieu.))

No, no. But I'm not interested per se, ~~let's~~ say, in becoming a sort of professional anti-Communist. That isn't--

((Not either way- either a professional anti-Communist or a professional revolutionist-))

(laughs) No, no. No. The two careers. Frankly, I do have a feeling, you know I feel very bad about someone like Walter Bow; I know his problems. Only I don't know how the hell to solve them, and what interests me is to see-- again it is always a problem- what can the US government do - what will the people do now that they've got Walter Bow — — — —. To a certain extent I'm certain it was provocation, though Walter was game for anything, if you had gone to him and proposed to shoot the President, he would have said yes. Well, he would have thought about it anyway, and probably would have agreed. He would probably suggest that you'd ~~have to fight the~~ President and the Supreme Court along with it, you know. And he's not wild. He's a very sensible, moderate boy, except that he has such a it's not a chip on his shoulder, he's got half of the forest, a redwood on his shoulder. He comes from , the papers say he comes from Philadelphia; he doesn't, he comes from Camden, New Jersey. I remember when he was playing jazz as a kid. I first met him through this fellow in the Department of Agriculture

I told you about, ~~[illegible]~~ Haggard. He was a very good friend of his as well. Poor Tom he must be very nervous, down there in Agricultre, because he's known me personally, he's known Walter personally, they'll think he had some very strange friends.

Anyway, I'm certainly — you asked me for some information which I'm perfectly willing to give you. And if you had come along a long time ago and asked, in Paris, I probably would have given the same information. The point was that nobody seemed to want to know. I was talking to an American newsman-- I ~~was~~ wasn't running around peddling information, either- but I talked to people, sometimes saying just the opposite of what ~~J~~ Verges was saying. He never really protested too much about this. He pretended that what he was doing was fairly on the level but it was fairly obvious that it wasn't. Anyway, I — what I want to know, if possible, in a relatively short period of time... I've got to make up my mind what I'm going to do. I don't know how I'm going to do anything, in fact, ~~but~~ But I do not intend, even for economic reasons, to do something which I think is absolutely dishonest, in the sense of writing an article, ... (for example) if someone asked me to write an article about "Communist attractions for African students in France- in fact the Communist Party has very ~~little~~ few ~~attractions~~ for African students in France. It's just the opposite. The ~~A Bay~~ FEANF — — — —, the ~~organization~~ association for African students, is very resentful of what they consider — — — — and they would only love to be enticed and wooed. But ~~the~~ this American had ~~[illegible]~~ an idea which was based on some, on his own mythology actually, of beautiful French white girls, being sent to lure these simple-minded boys. In actual fact that's not true at all. I'm perfectly well aware that people have written articles which bear no relation to reality, they think, ~~of~~ what the hell, they want this sort of ~~thing~~ stuff, they pay for it. The Reader's Digest at one time was a regular market for that sort of thing.

~~[illegible]~~ (( ))

But what's the point. It isn't true and even though it might- it isn't even good propaganda, in the long run. ~~[illegible]~~ a titillation ~~[illegible]~~ value, especially the racial thing with sex thrown in- -

[Speaking of race and sex?]

~~A~~ ((What about your wife?))

Well, my wife, doesn't know - first of all, she knows of only once that I was seeing you, and she would highly disapprove of it. Not because my wife is a — has ever been a member of ~~any~~ anybody's ~~party, (including the~~ Communist party; it's just that she would feel that that would be a highly at all.

the Encounter thing. She doesn't really like it. I hate to ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ Revolution and all— I don't see any reason not to. She can accept that.

The fact is, the reason we have our financial problem, to a certain extent, is because her family ~~is~~ by no means poor/ but— My brother-in-law who has carried us for months, ~~has~~ to pay rent, right this week and she has practically told him we didn't want any money. So now, there I am, you know. This has caused— I respect, I know what her problem is- very often children that come from ~~very~~ lately wealthy homes— ~~and her family—~~

She comes from the poorest branch of her family, which is quite wealthy in this country. It's an Anglo-Jewish family, has a sort of monopoly on kosher food, prepared kosher food here, sort of like a Manischevitz operation— or racket. One of the relatives is — they're all in business. Her brother, one brother, is constantly having business ~~fam~~ failures. He's a very nice fellow, and all, but at one point he made phonographs, now the last thing, he made tape recorders, a little transistor tape recorder, but that's just flopped too. The other brother, is a chartered accountant. He has his own ~~firm~~ in the City, ~~which~~ He does quite well. He's married. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

As I say, She gets along very poorly with ~~them~~ him. And while I was away, unfortunately relations deteriorated to such a point that I ~~xxxxxxx~~ don't know quite how I'm going to— . .

She's happy that she's got this job in the press department of the Tunisian ~~Indonesian~~ Embassy. The only thing she's not happy about is the salary but she likes the job. — — — It's not serious. The ~~Indonesians~~ Tunisians spend most of the time telling her stories about ~~people~~ — — —

If I take a job— this thing in the Indonesian Embassy— the practically, in a state of war with Indonesia. Although my wife is English that doesn't give me an automatic right to stay in England, not that I'm terribly (eager) — — — to ~~be~~ stay in England. I would much rather be some place on the Continent. I would much rather, for instance.. take a job with some sort of a bureau — — Obviously that's out of the question. I could never get a security clearance, but I think a job with some sort of international organization— the UN, in Paris, Rome, or Geneva, which would be for me, information— I'd be quite happy at that. As for working for an American outfit, I can't see much possibility either, except this ~~ff~~ sort of free lance business, which could perhaps be extended. That I would certainly like, but ~~it~~ it's is precarious— when you have - kids, and then ~~my~~ what I feel ~~pretty solid commitments~~ ~~here~~ beyond question and then 3000 miles of water in between— makes it uncertain

((Let me see what I can find out. . soon as I can. . . now questions and answers. Who invited Verges to Algeria in 63))

He didn't go to Algeria in 63. He went to China. He was already in Algiers. He was in Algiers from the ~~xxxx~~ point of independence, that was in July of 62. And Verges arrived there ~~clandestinely, that is, B~~ with the clandestine group, that is, Ben Bella, Khider, Bitat, I suppose in October or November of 62. He was invited to China in March of 1963.

((How invited?))

The first time he went as the Director of Revolution Africaine and he ~~xxx~~ (went with) Djamila Bouhired, the heroine of the Algerian War, and ~~xxxxxxx~~ (managed) an enormous amount of publicity in the Chinese press ~~xxx~~ was given to her. ~~They~~ in fact ~~had xxxxxxx~~ there had been a book about her. She was well known for her part in the Algerian war ~~xxxxxx~~ and ~~in~~ this is how he got the interview with Mao, as he was an official Algerian representative, the Director of Publications sponsored by the Political Bureau of the FLN, and, I think it was, The Committee ~~of~~ (for) Foreign Relations, something like that, that handled the visit.

((When did he marry Djamila)) in process

Nobody knows. Nobody knows whether they are really married. ~~xxxx~~ This is again ~~xxxx~~ one of the things that he loves to keep a mystery. It is rumored, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ it has been said by a lot ~~xxxxxxx~~ of ~~x~~people that he has a ~~marvelous~~ muslim marriage. We know he was converted to Islam. During the war, the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ the Algerian War, he used ~~a~~ the code name of MANSOUR for his contacts ~~in~~ within the Front. After he came to Algeria, apparently he became a Moslem. and became J. M. Verges, Jacques Mansour Verges. Now he becomes Mansour Verges, then it becomes J. M. (referring to the magazine file)

((When he went to China. .))

Here he is back already. It must be about the ~~29th~~ 30th of March. It must be, because he and Djamila and my wife and I and our children left Algeria on the same plane for Paris when we left Algiers definitively, ~~xxx~~ he changing planes in Paris for Moscow, and I going a day or so later to Geneva., ~~not~~ and from Geneva, Lausanne.

(checking on name) he uses J. M. all the way through. ~~This was only at the~~ this is the last issue of his. There are sixteen issues here. ~~last when~~ He knew that he was under pressure and he tried to protect himself. He put ~~took~~ Djamila along with ~~him~~ — — — — and himself as a Comité de Direction — — — — [illegible] Number 1 and 2, to could protect him from the wrath of Ben Bella, but it didn't work.

((How long- we wont say when did they ~~they got~~ married- -))

It must have happened in the month right after independence. That's what I think. You see she had been held in prison, in France, she'd been sentenced to death and he had won her - well, he didn't win anything but he managed to keep her from being executed. In the course of this he became extremely close to her. Not only in sexual ~~life~~. And this is very strange, his sexual life. I don't know if he has one, in fact. He has a French wife and the French wife has a child, a boy about 12-14 years old and he still is ~~happily~~ apparently married to the French wife. By becoming a Moslem he could take a second wife.

((Did he live with her- with Djamila B[illegible]))

Never, really. In Algeria he had his own place and she lived with her family. When she comes to Paris she stays with him and actually they sleep in the same bed. (So, it's more than (platonic.) But I dont think that- - it's a sort of - a very curious relation ~~it seems to me~~. [illegible]

((If they were married, they were married when they went to China))

Yes. I don't know about how the Chinese ~~regarded~~ treated it. They never referred to her as his wife. But that is done very often. [illegible] He is very close to her family, her brothers. One is in Czechoslovakia, the other one was ~~the~~ in Leningrad, I think, going to school. And it was Verges who arranged for transfers of money. Her uncle is head of the family. Her father is a terrible alcoholic and skirt chaser who has no respect from his children. He and his wife ~~had a~~ divorced. The father came to Paris and Lausanne once and caused us a great deal of difficulty (laughing). Anyway, Verges has family connections there. This marriage, that ~~was~~ is supposed to have taken place, who saw it I don't know. Nobody knows. Even the father doesn't know. He said "Well, if she's married to him, why doesn't she say it. Why doesn't she tell even me."

He was never really accepted as a Moslem in Algiers. People thought, you know, you don"t take a man ~~[illegible]~~ — a man who is a Communist or even— an ex-Communist, of his kind, [illegible] he wasn't a member of the Communist Party, and convert him into a Moslem just like that. And yet there are certain characteristics of his behavior which are very strange to explain. One would say he did it for expediency, like going along with Ramadan, for instance, this is by no means pleasant, fasting- And even in Paris, ~~when~~ he would fast during ~~when it was~~ Ramadan. He used to drink ~~[illegible]~~ rather heavily, I'm told. He no longer touches any kind of alcohol. [illegible] And this he does all the time, whether there are Algerians around or not.

optics,

And his perspective toward ~~the~~ Algerians. He was always talking of going back to Algiers, going to shoot Gerard Chalion just because Chalion had double-crossed him with the staff. He thought, well, since I have these Europeans they won't be able to take over the magazine, ~~so quickly?~~ He's -very clever. He surrounds himself with people who are in a weaker position than he. Kiern, ~~Chem~~ in other words, a [illegible] little defense. — — — — have to be very strong willed. — — — — — ~~things that~~ took place in Algeria, other side, But Chalion made a deal with the Ben Bella people and kept the entire staff on.

((Revolution in Switzerland or Pa ris))

Once he saw that the old charges against him on account of the Algerian War would not be pressed that the French Government had forgotten all this, that the Ministry of Justice had no intention of prosecuting not only him, but Francis Jeanson celle [illegible] was sitting there. He was under sentence of death. And Jean — — — — , no one had ever bothered.

~~(Embassy. .)~~ ((

He claimed he had contact with somebody in Pompidou's office He had- well the only person who worked with the magazine was somebody in the Ministry of Finance who writes under the name of Jalet. He does the economic section. I forget his real name-- maybe Roget. He handled Common Market things. That's why his articles for Revolution always deal with the Common Market. Maybe he writes one paper for the Ministry and another for Revolution.

((How long did Vergès stay in Switzerland))

He never really stayed in Switzerland at all. He just came through there and stayed a few days, ~~there~~. And he was traveling on an Algerian diplomatic passport. He still has one. I don't know how he went to Japan, because he had been very reluctant to reply to the demand- ~~the~~ to request, for renewal of his ordinary French passport. It was quite possible to have dual nationality- French- Algiers. I don't know whether the Algerians (recognize) this. I think that he didn't have a normal Algierian passport, that he only had a diplomatic one, which should, I think, have been cancelled once he ceased to have any thing to do with the government. So he didn't want to travel on it. He wanted to come to London on several occasions but he didn't dare to try his Algerian passport. He could travel around much of Western Europe with his expired French passport. Most European passports are considered valid for five years after the date of expiration

You don't really need it anyway, just an identification — they will take an expired passport in Common Market countries, up to five years.

How he got to Japan I don't know. He may have finally applied for a French passport. I thought that he still wanted to maintain the fiction of his Algerian nationality, by not making any request for French passport. In Japan he was called the Delegate from ~~the Union~~ Reunion(?) and no mention was made of Revolution. There has never been, to the best of my knowledge and the knowledge of Andersson any mention in any Chinese publication whatsoever of Revolution, and they have mentioned all sorts of two-bit publications that they have financed lock, stock and barrel. And yet the Chinese did purchase it. I understand they do not purchase it any longer. And according to Andersson all direct ~~also had~~ contact between the Chinese group, Embassy and Verges in Paris had ceased.

((When))

As of last month.

((When they ceased purchasing))

According to Andersson. He says he has heard it from other people. He doesn't know from Chinese sources. He did tell the truth (was) in Berne, I had written a letter to the China Quarterly about the article by Fejto on Verges, refuting what Fejto said, asking what he thought of that. And he replied that they had no objection but they thought it was about time that somebody ended the fiction... that they thought Revolution was extremely embarrassing to them.

((How long did the English language edition stay with Andersson))

The English language edition was produced in Switzerland for the first year, the entire twelve issues. And was printed in Switzerland on the press of this Mr. ~~Gonguin~~ Garguin in Montreux. And Gonguin was introduced to Verges by Andersson. Andersson paid him and so forth. But Andersson didn't have any official connection with Revolution as of November I think, December, of 63. I went back and forth and Strelkoff, who did the layout and art work, went back and forth to Lausanne and saw Gonguin almost every month, once or twice a month, from Paris. But once I left Paris, the bank account was closed down - I mean, shortly thereafter, by ~~Gessoli~~ Kissel who came in behind Andersson's back and closed the account at the Union des Banques Suisses.

((That ended the Swiss production))

No, the Swiss production continued, but Andersson had nothing to do with it from that point. The twelve issues of that year were printed there.

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer, for the Algerian police, and that ~~she~~ she talks to ~~very opposite groups~~ [illegible] occasionally, and to ~~She talked~~ to Mamani of the Salawa ~~group~~ party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. ~~I don't know what she is going~~. She ~~wouldn't~~ didn't have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne. ~~You see, he was~~

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she ~~had to~~ wanted to be ~~all the time~~ [illegible] in Algiers. She wasn't ~~inter~~ interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

2 There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Aquino Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and a Goan who has lost his reason for being with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone ~~back~~ back! But ~~then~~ he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he ~~was~~ had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference [illegible] Nationaliste des Colonies Portuguese, which grouped together ~~the Frelimo~~ what later [illegible] came to be the Frelimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line countries There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine ~~and~~ [illegible] questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

2 ((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Macgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. ~~And~~ What was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people ~~really~~ without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonials students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

14-00000

((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did ~~[illegible]~~ Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he knew ~~[illegible]~~ her in the beginning, I imagine he met her ~~[illegible]~~ in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African, ~~the race~~ people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((So much for ~~[illegible]~~ those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was ~~[illegible]~~ the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but ~~he, one of the,~~ I'm told by Andersson, who ~~[illegible]~~ has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational ties. He is very close to the Pablo group. That's Michel Raptis. He's Pablo, ~~[illegible]~~ we could'nt havé overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely important role in the agrarian reform, in determining the type of agrarian reform that was going to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on the profit model, that is on a profit basis.

Harbi, ~~they~~ were all inside of this Bureau des Biens Vacants ~~de Bien~~ which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for ~~the~~ Monthly Review, ~~so I know~~ ~~all~~ about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before and just after Independence, ~~or rather~~ should have, considering what they had done. ~~But~~ they had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was ~~an~~ incredible.

That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — ——

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, they (the French) were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the ~~[illegible]~~ FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they fled and ~~they~~ left all ~~[illegible]~~ these farms. ~~[illegible]~~ It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you ~~have to~~ do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. ~~And then~~ This was ~~sort of~~ institutionalized later, ~~[illegible]~~ an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist system of agriculture. They

didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he began sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgan ?
who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more on an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's ~~also~~ all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if you are in a poor one? You don't split a profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich ones and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria. ~~and~~ Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 500 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great deception (disillusionment) of some of the Algerians not to be Yugoslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia under license.

((This is getting us a little bit far afield))

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group within the FLN, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

((When was he dropped)) ?

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgan it has become much more ______________ the word Socialism appears in Arabic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very ~~sort of~~ silly, it represents the very muddled mind that Usgan has. He is very much split between his religious (and political) inclinations. Usgan is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for natonalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

({Curious mix-up - - this religions and politics.}

(Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?))

No.

(Just an ethnic Jew))

Yes.

((Next on the list here is Robert Williams. Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.))

But ~~where was he now~~

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East. He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local Ku Klux Klan and discovered that the best way to deal with the Ku Klux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. ~~town-pants~~. Up until recently there's been sort of gentlemen's ~~general~~ agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. Williams of course, there is no doubt, was a great embarrassment to everybody, and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. He first came to ~~first thing of~~ national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had ~~boy~~ done something to a Negro woman and some local ~~the~~ jury had thrown it out. It came (Williams) said "well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." ~~[illegible]~~ But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the older, more ~~old leaders, the old~~ conservative Negro leaders very upset. ~~He was immediately,~~ People immediately came to his support, particularly the Trotskyites, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him ~~[illegible]~~ some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the North Carolina Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support, ~~[illegible]~~ with other Liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP Conference in New York in 1959 and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of of the Communist Party of the United States, which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and ~~the~~ Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person, on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national ~~xx~~ level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight, but ~~quick~~ We knew ~~that~~ what was coming in the summer of 61, ~~perhaps it was before. . no --~~ (1) obviously 61 was an embarrassment, for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than ~~an~~ embarrassment for Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, and who ~~xxxxxxx~~ told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." ~~They~~ Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They (the Negroes) didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. And then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence ~~xxxxxx~~ was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration ~~became~~ even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, there were reports in the European press. ~~The rumor went around~~ - Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in ~~thxxxx~~ this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia, Mississippi, case, they even have been killed. Williams, was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people, and get them out of jail."

He had arms, including ~~some~~ cal machine guns, which had been purchased in New York, and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people were out in the street in front of his house, when a car with a white couple, came down ~~this~~ The road. It was surrounded and the couple was ~~they were~~ told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. ~~Ixxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ This man came from a neighboring

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
town, claimed had lost their way. They said, "no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "Look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything ~~[illegible]~~ to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They [illegible] couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. ~~Edith~~ Minnie Mallory, ~~who~~ a Negro woman from New York who was there was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for ~~that~~ kidnapping, ~~[illegible]~~ and the case is on appeal now. Williams was spirited across the United States—I knew vaguely where he was, but he (was) kept very carefully by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada. From Canada he was flown by private plane ~~and by~~ [illegible] ([illegible]) Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any, ~~information~~ of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent ~~long~~ telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, ([illegible]) to get some kind of Federal intervention. ~~——~~ It was one of (the most sickening things that I ever saw, ~~those sickening things~~. ~~The~~ They wanted him out of the way. Even the ~~[illegible]~~ way they came to me later— two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that ~~[illegible]~~ point. His aunt died ~~and they~~ in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted poster for Williams, on the coffin and stood there— to see if he would come by. Really, they should have been thrown ~~outside~~ out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was— ~~[illegible]~~, the trouble is— the whole attitude. ~~attitude.~~ Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. (And he's turned into a world-wide figure ~~And now he has turned into a world—wide figure~~ because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not just (bother to try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now. ~~Unquestionably~~. I'm certainly [illegible] ~~and~~ everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. ~~Now~~, for every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred (others). I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

to
~~The twelve issues were~~ only 200 copies maximum, ~~[illegible]~~

It was still printed until No. 12, ~~the end of the year.~~ the end of that
first year. The twelfth issues were printed there. The twelfth issue was
It was never distributed.
only 200, or 366 copies maximum. I still have some. Those
are the ones I sold for $10.00 a book. The American libraries are desperate
to complete their sets. It was never distributed because Verges hadn't
paid Gonguin the money that he promised and I, while the copies were
arrangement of the financial busins, Federal Council
sitting there waiting for some ~~[illegible] financial arrangement~~ the Swiss finally
took action and seized them. Actually the seizure was more "platonic"
they
anything. I understand
but they just wanted to ~~[illegible]~~ said you can't send out Gonguin had
which of every issue,
50 copies, ~~of every issue, that~~ he had salted away. He knew he could sell
them. I think he could sell them in the States.
university libraries, you know,
American ~~libraries~~ are extremely - - political files. Revolution
(If
became a sort of -- it was, the American press. Revolution had a success,
it came from the American press, not the French press, or the British
press, the American press. It was really fortuitous but [illegible]
that you can't blame them - seeing this move to Paris, a new magazine
vaunted its
~~[illegible]~~ with a pro-Chinese line which really ~~was a~~ pro-Chinese line,
coming out at the same time as French recognition of China, So obviously
you write things about a new twentieth century Europe, Verges, the Chinese
(And that was what started it
top man in Europe, and this that and the other. We had three articles,
(one even
I believe, in the Christian Science Monitor, ~~[illegible]~~ of them had the
came in,
address in. Right ~~[illegible]~~ then the letters the subscriptions
All sorts of people wanted them.
came in. ~~[illegible]~~ A subscription agency in the United States
saw it, and and started taking orders from university libraries. ~~[illegible]~~
copies, I think.
~~[illegible]~~ The State Department took 20 ~~[illegible]~~. ~~[illegible]~~
There was
~~[illegible]~~ one airmail subscription for the Embassy ~~[illegible]~~ in Tokyo.
The Congress for Cultural Freedom had even more than that. They had a
list of every one of their correspondents, magazines, etc. Everyone got
one. So we were doing well. And he could have, actually, on the English
edition, whichhad a much lower cost than the others, he could have broken
even. He would never have made anything, (however).

But (with) his policy for the French edition, [illegible] printing and all,
he could never have balanced the budget without a hefty subsidy from
someone.

((Some colleagues on the editorial staff))

The ~~[illegible]~~ editorial staff was again a fiction. ~~There was no~~
(can
If you've been following Revolution since, You see each month, each
~~use issue this~~ [illegible]

16

~~because he want s to make sure that they have~~ grows larger. ~~Its~~ [illegible] mainly fictitious names, many of them. [illegible] don't even represent people.

He's got Carlos [illegible]. He's supposed to be from Spain. This was a name made up by ~~Mr. Chen~~ Klein to replace Valdes. Valdes was actually a person, who ~~is~~ is a Spanish scientist, a chemist, who works for the CNRS, the Centre Nationale de ~~Research~~ Scientifique, in Paris. He did write the articles on Spain under ~~Chen~~ Klein's supervision with strong ~~rewritint~~ rewriting. And his real name is Lopez. ~~M~~ I saw him. His first initial is S. Martin Valdes is not his real name. His address . . . [illegible]

~~Mxxxxxxxx~~ He ~~is the person who~~ he is now wandering about very much at odds, but he is still very well informed about the Spanish situation. I think that if approached in the proper fashion, ~~I~~ he might be ~~w~~ willing to talk.

((How old is he))

In his late thirties. I had no trouble talking with him. He is very bitter. ((Why)) He was expelled from the Proletario group which he had founded, or ~~and~~ more or less relegated. He isn't really made up for practical politics and he ~~xxx~~ . . . matter of pride, etc. but he keeps his hand in. He said he wanted to go see Grippa, but he didn't have much idea of doing anything. He is the one who told me about what was going on in the Spanish group. I could have gotten more. He had no idea that I was pumping him for information ~~Excpmxxxx~~ He seemed to be approachable, willing to talk about the Spanish ~~sitqtuion~~ situation. He can lecture for hours. He is the professorial type, not for the rough and tumble of ~~practical~~ clique-like politics. He was used by ~~Chen~~ Klein.

((What caused his rupture with group))

I ~~didn't get~~ don't know the exact story. He had group called Proletario. They put out a four-page news letter of the same name, ~~I~~ most of which was in theory written by Valdes. But was rewritten by ~~Chen, xxxx Chen~~ Klein. Klein was in contact with the members of the group and at one time Valdes and his wife were actually told that they were going to edit Revolution, a Spanish edition, ~~that~~ which was going to be publised in Europe. By the way the Spanish edition does exist, so I'm told, in Bogota. They have managed to get out a Spanish ~~I~~ edition - [illegible] Has nothing to do with Verges. It was brought out by the MOEC committee — Movimiento Obreros Estudiantes y Campesinos . . . a kind of Fidelista. ~~movement~~, a ~~and~~ which is quite pro-Chinese And is getting Chinese subsidy, I think. ~~I think. I RH~~ They had quite a scandal about misappropriation of funds. Apparently the Chinese were giving them ~~xxxxx~~ fifteen thousand, twenty-five thousand and twenty thousand, and ten thousand of it would arrive, and somewhere along the line ~~on the way to Europe~~ 8,000 or 10,000 on the way in Europe would disappear. One of the persons was expelled.

((What's relationship of Spanish edition to))
It has — (also some of the articles — --

Said to have copies in Brussels. I haven't seen. Brussels is used as a European headquarters for MOEC ~~Western Europe~~. People going through either to China or ~~toxxx~~ North Vietnam coming through there. ((Can they take stuff without any copyright problems?)) Oh, yes, at first Verges wanted them to be identical -- same as Revolution in France, but and they would say, well,-- they wanted the editorial work done in Paris, which he would finance, and they would finance all of the production side. But he was unable to pay ~~them~~ for even the editorial thing, so they said they would do all of it in Colombia.

He would finance and they would finance all of the production, but ~~theyxxwere~~ unable

They had a commercial printer, who was going to front for them in Bogota on the same format as the English edition, the old English edition; now the English and the French editions are exactly identical. The pocket format. I don't know what they've done. They didn't expect it to last very long- sort of a prestige operation.r Expected tjree tjree 3 or 4 issue to get out, before it would be seized, but that was enough for them. I think what they wanted to do was to establish themselves on an international plane, even nationally, as the leading left party

They've had a running battle with the Communist Party. They accuse the MOEC CP of having given the names of all their liaison people between the ~~tax~~ city and countryside - they are running ~~xcountrxex~~ - a guerrilla campaign in certain areas of the country which has become quite serious. And they do have organizational ties with the

* FALN of Venezuela. They are by no means a joke. / And they are having people trained in North Vietnam. They were supposed to. And in China.

They have some people in Algeria. They may even have persuaded

the Algerians to train some people. I don't know. But they were trying.

// Actual editorial policy of the magazine- selected by me.
When I was at magazine, I selected the articles as I chose.
In the English edition, with very few exceptions, almost everything was
Then there was a hiatus when no French edition. Then I was completely

on my own. While there was a French edition, all I had to do was pick out and
translate. Basically it was a translation. ~~Then there was~~
Verges strangely has very little concern about what goes into his magazine.
as it seems ((Who now in control))
He doesn't write and he doesn't even care terribly much.
Hanh Lan, former prof of philos. taught at ~~the Licee~~, has connections
~~then~~. His true name is a Licee in Paris,
with Trotskyist groups. Is now suspected by the group, the people in Clichy, who
make up the
French
Chinese group on the fringe of the Communist Party of being a Trotskyist

agent. Certainly is a person who has had extremely close ties and maintains
them with ~~Trotskyisax~~ Trotskyist groups, particularly the so-called Lambert- (Groupe Lambert)
(How old) Probably
~~He is~~ in late thirties. Married to French woman, from whom he was separated.

His route from Vietnam to Algeria. He never went to Algeria. He can't
French but can stay as long as wants- French Viet
leave France because has no French passport. Has been in Fr 12-15 years.
definitely
Came end of the forties or early fifties, in the forties, after the war.
his
He finished Lycee in France and went to Sorbonne, received doctorate.
apparently
philosophy, sociology. He is quite brilliant. He went into French Communist
I don't think he was in the CP in Vietnam, but he was connected to the Communist
party./ In France have organizational structure and also have ~~prominent~~ permanent
their permanent people.
people. Think he was one of the ~~latter~~. Was at one time to write a book
title- "Vietnam depuis Dienbienphu," published by Maspero.
on Vietnam, now being translated into English and will be pub in US
within month or so
by Monthly Review Press. This represents the most cogent ~~thought~~ soft line

that - one could put up for the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

This is the soft position. It is not the Chinese position. It's an equal

co-existence one where they don't talke about socialist revolution. They
don't even talk about taking power. but coalition, neutralization.
He wrote it '63. Has been updated with a new chapter. He does not still

remain within the Com party. Neither expelled nor did he leave but just became

inactive. He was a member of the economics commission of the party.

~~When~~ Verges ~~when he~~ was in the party, was a member of the colonial ~~xxxxxxx~~ commission

He has much less imagination than Verges, does not have the verve, certainly
none of more than anything else.
not the gambling instinct. He is a hack, is very cautious, wants to protect
[illegible]
his situation. For quite some time ~~he~~ has been going to see Maspero after

Maspero's
each issue of ~~his~~ mag comes out to say how good it is, etc, He thought
Revolution [illegible]
~~Maspero told Andersson.~~ Andersson told Maspero, ~~that~~ "he launched a terrible

campaign against you.

~~Complex person, numerous ties.~~

even proving his good faith by bringing manuscripts that were originally destined for Revolution. That Verges knew anything about that I seriously doubt . This went on to such an extent that Maspero told Andersson. Andersson said, "why he has launched a terrible campaign against you as a Trotksyite—" Maspero said he didn't believe it, so Andersson showed him a letter that ~~Chen~~ had written in which he demanded that he sever all ties with Maspero, and so on. with Trotskyists.

He is a complex person. He has numerous ties, ~~With~~
He printed two articles by the British Trotskyists about the British Communist Party, printed in Revolution, under the ~~pseudonym~~ name of Joshua Linton which turned out to be Thomas Kent written by one of the executive members of the British Trotsky Socialist Labor League, which is an incredible thing. Now he is really considered by many of these Chinese people to be a Trotskyist, or a Trotsky sympathiser. I don't know about it. He does have very curious ties. I don't what he present relationship is to the Vietnamese though he claimed that he had received a letter from Hanoi from a friend who was in a high position there who urged him not to do anything that could be considered anti-Soviet. This was some time before - in the spring./ And they said that really He should be returning home. But he has no intention of returning.

((Why))

He quite used to the life in the west. He's one of these fellows who particularly likes running around and having a girl . . says he's gathering information from — one day a girl said I'm not an encyclopedia, will you stop asking me all these questions?

((His relationship with the Chinese))

He has some contact with the ~~Chinese agencies~~ New China News Agency but it is a very slight contact, He was the one who finally in a state of panic went to the one of the ~~Chi Emb and~~ Chinese/news agency correspondents in Paris and told him of the financial plight of the magazine. And that's when the ~~man~~ mands from Chinese agency told him to prepare a budget. They Said they would see what they could do. He told ~~Castell~~ Kiesel and ~~Castell~~ put his foot down. He said that Verges . . .

((Who did he see))

* A Mr. Yan. They were at that time Yan and Yang. Yan a heavy set man, in his forties / the senior of the two, had contacts with various groups of political people. The Embassy aparently didnt want any direct contacts because the people in Marseilles and elsewhere used to go to Berne.
They had obviously first made contacts with the Chinese in Berne and then they continued them in Berne (after French established relations with Chinese) because obviously it wouldn't look very good to be....

* Possibly DP

~~contacts with groups.~~

[illegible]

(Shouldn't be too aggressive too soon, after established in France, that sort of thing?)

I don't know. After all, they have reasonably good relations with the French so I think probably the French will be disappointed that they haven't been able to get more concrete things out of ~~the Chinese~~ them, trade and so forth.

(The French don't want the Chinese to ~~B~~ -)

dabble in French politics too much. However, ~~everyone knows one of the things that - - Verges once said,~~ someone threatened- - No nothing to do with Verges, ~~it was~~ a friend of mine who works for ABC television in Paris, ~~[illegible]~~ Lou Chioffi, ~~and~~ talking to someone about Revolution in the French Foreign Ministry he said- ~~what do you think about this Chinese. He always thought there was something about this~~ - what do you think about this Chinese magazine put out ~~in~~ here? And he said- I don't know anything about it. Besides if we wanted to examine subsidies that go into the political publications in France we would certainly start with the Russians and Humanite and then go on with some of your American financed publications. (laughs) And that was the end of that!

That may have just been a sort of snide rejoinder. I think that they do ~~tend~~ intend to be discreet, that they were very happy about the situation there. I was in the Chinese Embassy only once. I was invited to a reception. I never saw so many people from ~~the~~ top brackets of government as at that reception. ~~Everybody~~ - - they had ~~the~~ Legion de'Honneur, ~~the~~ ~~[illegible]~~ the top structure ~~of~~

Everywhere you went [illegible] ~~they~~ ~~had~~ a Legion d'Honneur in ~~his~~ the button lapel. The top structure of the civil service were there - - - - - from all the important industries.

((What's ~~Chen~~ Kien's loyalty then))

~~Chen's~~ Kien's loyalty is ~~[illegible]~~ basically to himself. He's interested in Marxism, He's very academic minded. He really is a pedantic, academic person. And he's got a tremendous number of interests. He is a very hard worker when he works. It's he who writes and rewrites most of the magazine. He used to write most of the editorials. Verges does very little. He does not like to write. He doesn't like to be bothered with editorial things. He likes the promotional aspects of things. He likes to convene meetings every so often ~~and~~ to discuss things. But as for the actual running of things- though he did exercise a closer control over the French edition than he did over the English edition, he never- well once or twice he said put this in or don't put this in. He printed an article about Algeria which

(13)

was a veiled criticism, in the French issue, and he told me not to print that, for instance, in the English edition, his story being that he didn't want to embarrass the Chinese. He said that after all the Chinese were buying it ~~this~~ and this ~~magazine~~ wasn't their line ~~on~~ about Algeria and they might be asked embarrassing questionsby the Algerians — — — — ~~each~~ saying why do you distribute this magazine, ~~distributor~~ which has this sort of unfriendly article. ~~magazines which has this unfriendly article.~~

((You mean the Chinese were buying)

The Chinese at that time were buying 3000 copies of the English edition. — 300 c the French. They didn't seem to mind ~~about~~ the

300 French

In actual fact, the Chinese so far as I know never made any comment about the magazine, or its contents. None whatsoever.

((Is ~~Chee's~~ Kier's willingness to go to Maspero and knock Verges and go to Andersson and knock Maspero- is this inconsistent with his pedantic Marxism?)

For him a lot of it is academic. It's not related too much to life, except that he is a plotter, a born conspirer. He loves to have ten people around him and to tell them what to do, how to maneuver. Of course whatever he tells them generally turns out to be disastrous for them. For example, the so-called pro-Chinese students inside of the UEC, the Union des Etudiantes ~~Communiques~~ Comunistes at their congress last year-- ~~let's see they've got one coming up~~ he was the one behind who was telling them what to do, their tactics and strategy. They had a terrible catastrophe. (laughing) In fact the pro-Chinese students represent a negligible faction now inside ~~of~~ the Communist students, the largest faction being the Italian faction, which is actually financed by the Italian Communist Party. The Struggle has gone on for years between the French party and the Italian party and it continues there.

Then he had a group of youths who called themselves the Drapeau Rouge group. They put out again a four-page, like a newsletter, ~~for~~ which he promised to get money from Verges to subsidize. Verges had no money, as you know. One single issue came out.

Proletario, with Valdes, managed to keep on because Valdes had his own sources of income from the Spaniards who belonged to ~~it~~ [illegible] apparently. They kicked in quite a lot, a month, you know, to keep it going. It wasn't too expensive. The main thing is finding a printer who will print it clandestinely, in France. ~~Because all these things that have no~~ Under French law you're supposed to have a ~~Directeur Association~~ [illegible] ~~Gerant(?)~~ who is responsible for it and anything in a foreign language is exempt from the liberty of press, from freedom of press, in France. The only foreign languages that you can use are Basque and Breton and I think, the Alsatian dialect.

For a magazine addressed to the Spanish workers in France and in Western Europe, the problem was for them to find someone to print it, clandestinely. And they found someone I think with Siuet and Strelkoff.

(What about Strelkoff)

Let's go down the line. The next one ~~is~~ in order would be Castell: ~~Chastel (?)~~ is the nephew of Joseph ~~Casteli~~ of the French Academy.

(~~Castelli's~~ first name?)

Patrique

Patrick. He is the nephew of a very famous ~~m~~ man and he has worked, again, for Maspero. All these people worked for Maspero. Verges takes great pleasure in sort of taking people away from Maspero. He used to boast about the people that he had gotten away from Maspero. I suppose this — — —

fellow can't do anything for us, so why do you want to get him?

~~tantalizing~~ ~~xforxxx~~ but the idea that he might be able to undercut

or

Maspero ~~to~~ bring Maspero down ~~is~~ — he is extremely petty in this sense, ~~and once he~~ built up this grudge against Maspero, because he felt that

to buy, and then when he wanted

Maspero didn't support him 100% when he wanted ~~to buy, and they he wanted~~ to buy out Maspero, Maspero wasn't ~~interestedxxHexxxxxt~~ interested in

in a petty way,

combining forces. So from that point on he did everything possible ~~for~~

~~he did~~ can't do too much now,

~~pixxxxxx everything possible~~ to draw people away, ~~the~~ play down. He went to the Chinese and said Maspero was a Trotskist. The joke of the matter

and who are

was that all of the Trotskyists who had been in this organization, and

Kien Kien

I'm sure they are there, came through ~~Chen~~. It was ~~Chen~~ who had introduced

really

them to Maspero. And Maspero was the sort of person who couldn't care less whether the Trotskyites got in as long as there was some sort of free

the sort of

discussion. He's not a committed person anyway; he's a man who is ~~xxxx~~ ~~of~~ sentimentally on the left but outside of any party, and for whom this thing has become a fairly good business. Those magazines are by no means expensive. Only sell~~s~~ about 2000 copies per issue, which is all now that

sells

Revolution — it has come down a long way.

Anyway, ~~Chassel~~ ~~is~~ was one of Maspero's authors and he worked for

Algeria.

Liberation. He's been to Laos and to the French West Indies. He's a journalist. He's worked I ~~t~~think for France Observateur. — — —.

He's never been a member of the Communist Party. His main problem is trying to be ~~t~~ bigger one day than his uncle, whom he dislikes intensely but

though he claims

nevertheless finds very useful. His uncle is very tight with his money,

gets

but in any case he ~~gives~~ him credit — He says I am Kessel, and they aren't certain whether it's him or the nephew or son, so they give him credit.

He was the business manager. He knows damn little about business, but ~~he was~~. — Verges had a great deal of confidence in him and he knew a lot about money manipulation and so forth.

Verges tried to divide things up. On two occasions Verges asked ~~him~~ me to change some money. In one case he gave ~~him~~ me a brief case which contained $30,000 to cash, and asked ~~him~~ me to go to the bank and change it to French francs. I went into the bank and said I wanted to change some money. They didn't faint, nor ask any questions either. Then on the second occasion I think I changed only $2000. It was in cash, in hundred dollar bills. And the other one was in ten dollar bills. That was the problem, they had to count it all. They weren't at all pleased. Where he got the money from I don't know. ~~Theyxxxxx~~ It was in used American bills, old bills, ~~xxxx~~ wrappers on them had no identification. But he didn't want anyone else to know. He didn't want ~~2 Cassell~~ [illegible] to know I had changed it.

((You say ~~Cassell~~ was never in the French Communist Party))

No.

((Why not?)) (he is without)

I don't think ~~Cassell~~ Rossi ~~xx~~ is a person ~~de gauche~~ homme de gauche without even intellectual literary he likes to live well and the party's bureaucratic organization doesn't attract intellectuals~~xxxxx~~ very long. Many of them go through~~t~~ it but just that. They go in and out. In fact it's almost- it's very good reference if you've been in and out of the party. You've got so many people who have been in and out of the party that you can go almost anywhere and find sympathy and jobs and so on. ~~xxx~~ People at Expresse and so on are made up of people of that type.

((Does ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] write~~r~~?))

Yes. He has written one or two articles for Revolution, but very little. The only thing that he used to do was to re-write some of ~~Chen~~ Kien's things, the editorials in particular, after ~~Chen~~ Kien had worked on them, to put them into really good French. ~~Chen~~ Kien's French sometimes has a tendency to be very esoteric and baroque.

((No substantive editorial work))

No. He is definitely a lesser figure but he likes his position. He likes being the sort of front man. ~~In he~~ (Though with the financial troubles, he was the one who did suffer most. Because all the creditors got to him. Verges was hiding, didn't come into the office sometimes for days, or would come in only for a very short period of time, because he was afraid that people would want to serve summones and whatnot on him for debt. ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] was there. ~~Cassell~~ [illegible] was not a member of the company, [illegible] I thought he was.

By the way I don't know whether I got that correct, yesterday. That was the Bureau No. 6 where the- - this thing was - - not 16 22nd of August- - that was 63. When they set up the company.

(That's Bureau no. 6)

Now Sine.

Sinet is listed ~~as~~ with Strelkoff as Secretaire de la Redaction, which sounds like he had something to do with the editorial side of it but has nothing to do with that. He is of course the partner of Verges, at least on paper. Whether the ~~700~~ 2000 thousand francs in his name actually ~~xxxx~~ represent his money I doubt. I think it is probably all Verges' money. I think that Verges needed at least another person to go into the . . . He is the lay-out, ~~xxxx~~ make-up (man), [illegible] ~~When Verges went into~~ the layout, art work, cartoons, ((He handle photos, too??)) Well, yes, They ~~look~~ just send around to see where the can get them. But as they have no money now, it's just a matter of begging. They used to buy almost exclusively from Magnum.— that's why they had so many Cartier-Bresson. Magnum has ~~xxxxxx~~ beautiful photos, ~~but~~ ~~xx~~ except they are expensive. And then they couldn't pay them.

((Sinet is French))

His real name is Maurice Sinet. He is French. He is in his thirties. Married, rather unhappily; has one child, which his wife claims is not his. He's more of an anarchist. He was in the French Communist Party but for a very brief period, I gather. He is very virulent. Before Revolution came out he put out his own little magazine, a cartoon magazine called Sine Massacre which ~~was~~ (had) the most virulent cartoon; I've ever seen. ~~That~~ ~~picked~~ They depicted things like the clergy, or love — a very, very sick type of cartoon, which contrasted greatly from what made him famous, ~~Sine's cat.~~ the Sine cat. He made a fortune with his ~~cat~~ cats and he also had a tie-in with some ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ promotional things, ~~xxx~~ Key-chain and others — That's where of course he made a lot of money. He does a lot of commercial art work. He sells quite a bit here in England. He does work for British ad agencies.

((Why does a man this successful put this much effort into Revolution?))

Because he is-- again, the same sort of thing- he is an emotional Leftist, ~~very much~~ He is incapable of any real organizational (work)- - So is Verges. I think that no matter ~~xx~~ what sort of organization, he couldn't stay (with it) too long. He must be the big boss of it. He must be a grand ~~garcon~~ patron. Sinet is more , much more juvenile. He is forever throwing bottles of ~~ink~~ it, you know! [illegible] His financial success has been seriously endangered ~~by~~ - not from Revolution, but ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the business of Sinet Massacre because Mme. De Gaulle did not like what she considered blasphemous cartoons, and so he was arrested for Outrage ~~aux~~ publique, outrage a la ~~police~~ justice, outrage au chef d'état- - He got out of most of them but it cost a lot of money ~~[illegible]~~- it put this thing out of existence and Mme de Gaulle said she thinks he is a very nasty man.

((Does he get paid by Revolution or does he supply funds for Revolution))

No, he supposedly gets the same thing that ~~everyone~~ everyone else gets- [illegible] getting 1500 francs a month. Everyone allegedly gets or did receive 1500. He has an assistant because he can't devote much of his time to it. He's got to earn a living. He has a very expensive establishment. His mother and father, wife and child, [illegible] maintains two cars and has a three story- sort of duplex, bigger than an apartment. It is magnificent, on the Rue ~~Plichie~~ Clichy? in Paris. In order to maintain this he's got to find ways of earning ~~[illegible]~~ a living, mainly advertising work. He had worked for Express which paid him very well, but he broke with them on a political issue. He likes to eat well, drink well and run around after women and this is expensive. So a lot of the work, the donkey work, is done by Strelkoff, whose real name is Alexander Strelkoff.

(arrangements for [illegible])

The main thing to read in Verges are the editorials. That's the only thing ~~ginsberg~~ (?) cared about. The editorials are very-- towards the end for example, there's the ~~[illegible]~~ phrase - "it's better to have for the future a failure that is luminous, une chef lumineux, than success in confusion" whatever that means. This is Verges' line in many things. ~~[illegible]~~ They're (editorials) filled with phrases ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] - he wanted at one point to circle these ~~[illegible]~~ phrases with a crayon to show people that his line has always been the same.

GINZBERG? — is Pierre Villon (FCP CC real name) coincidence?

THIRD SESSION

19 February 1965

14-00000

Reel no. 2

((You have an acute memory for the last phrase of yesterday.))

I happen to be a journalist.

((You have a very retentive mind. You do very well about these things.))

As you get older you forget. Doesn't it frighten you sometimes when you can't think ~~i~~- of a name- - I'm really beginning to feel bad about . .x something ~~as~~ I can't remember- - I think my God, what's happening. .

[illegible] Strekkoff is Alexander Strelkoff. He is in his early thirties, son of Russian immigrant parents in France,

((Born in France?))

Born in France. Speaks Russian fluently. His parents were members of the Communist Party in Russia, / Bolshevik Party but with ~~Trotsk~~ Trotskyite tendencies. That's why they had to get out of Russia after the Revolution but he has no Trotskyist leanings at all. In fact because of his parents, he seems more or less to lean the other way, to be at least verbally, a violent Stalinist. He is married and has three (children), thee by one wife, has one illegitimate and several others. He is very active sexually. He is a very handsome fellow and has a great deal of success with girls. He earns his living as a graphic designer. He worked for Hachette doing ~~dusting~~ layouts for them, until the great Sinet Massacre scandal, when Mme. de Gaulle finally took umbrage at this. He and Sinet were the two cartoonists who put this out, ~~and~~

((Strelkoff can draw, as well))

[illegible] Yes. In those things I gave you you will see cartoons by Strekkoff. He is essentially an artist, a cartoonist, though no one ever printed his cartoons before he ran into Sinet because they were considered just too ~~disgusting~~ ~~too~~ disgusting for {publication}. He is really the acolyte, if you will, of Sinet. And any success, any money that he has come~~s~~ to him through Sinet. He is Sinet's man, and Sinet passes on work to him. They sort of pass around girls to each other and that sort of thing. He does, nevertheless, count for a certain amount in the magazine. He did count, because he was considered reasonably disinterested. That is, he wasn't concerned very much about money. He lives very poorly, with ~~his wife~~ his wife and children, and has made far more sacrifices than Sinet but he is a very loyal, I was going to say, a faithful retainer, of Sinet's. I think that would sum him up. His loyalty is to Sinet and not to Verges.

((What are his principal types of contact outside of—))

He doesn't have any contacts outside of— His contacts are mainly body to body with girls. In terms of politics, he didn't like the idea that perhaps ~~Chen~~ [illegible] was deeply involved with Trotskyism, that sort of thing, but that was just a small c~~alibre~~ count and (?), his scruples in this point. He wanted to keep it going. He was very ~~xxxxxxx~~ anti-Chinese in the sense that he didn't think that the magazine should accept any Chinese money if the Chinese were willing to give it, the reason for this being that he thinks that [illegible] should have a free hand in the arts, and so forth, jazz and all this, which of course he and Sinet are very much interested in.

((He's a literary liberal, then-))

Yes, in terms of the arts, he would be. He doesn't care much for abstract art, ~~but~~

((But he's not a party liner))

By no means. A former Communist, but he wasn't expelled. He also just withdrew.

((If his parents were emigres from Russia, I assume this would have been in the twenties, ~~or~~))

(They did) Yes, in the twenties, just before he was born. — because of their Trotskyist leaning. I suppose they were members of the Trotskyist faction * of the Soviet Communist party at that time.

((Do you know whether they were expelled or left voluntarily))

I don't know. I think they left voluntarily, but that's just supposition. I think he mentioned something about it. I think that they really ~~faixx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ fled ahead of the Soviet police, the Cheka- - he's Jewish, and maybe some of his relatives did end up in Soviet concentration camps. I think he still has some living relatives (in Russia) yes, because he was one of the chefs de chantier, construction foreman, in the final stages of the French ~~expeditionxxxxxxx~~ exposition in Moscow. That was in 61 or 62. He speaks Russian fluently. There ~~xx~~ he met some of his relatives.

((Has he made other trips to the Soviet Union))

I think he has made two trips. ~~but~~ One was with the French exposition, ~~and~~ he was there before and I think throughout the expodition, putting it up and so on. He is very competent ~~xx~~ as a designer, a little bit lazy — ~~but other than that~~ — he tries to get other people to do his work for him if he can, just as Sinet passes it on to him he tries to pass it on to others. Where money is concerned he is not terribly scrupulous but he's not money hungry. ([illegible]) His weakness is women. Very much so. He shocked the Anderssons. He used to come to Lausanne and he had so many girls

to meet(?)
~~xxxxxx~~ they couldn't keep up (with it).

((Did Sinet bring him to ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Revolution))

~~Hexxxx~~ Yes. He was delegated to do the work of the English edition. Sinet couldn't do it and this was before the French edition was started in France, so it was Strelkoff who did it. He came to Lausanne for a couple of days to do the layout~~x~~ and so on. Then he found someone in Lausanne, a Swiss graphic artist, ~~shex commercial artist~~, who then did the ~~main~~ major part of the work. Strelkoff came to oversee it.

That's about all there is about him. It's not very much, really. He's not very active politically. His life centers around females, jazz, night clubs. He would get drunk occasionally. He shares Sinet's tastes there - and women.

BABU

Now after Chen, Kien Vissel ~~Oswsell~~ and Sinet and Strelkoff, you have really reached the end of the immediate editorial staff~~x~~ as such. There was an editorial board which was a fiction. It had names of people like Babu on it. Babu saw Verges actually twice. He never contributed anything to the magazine except one interview which I did with him, taped in Geneva, when he was at the UN ~~office~~ Conference on Trade and Development.

((Babu's biographic details are well enough known but how did he come to get involved in Revolution in the first place.))

Dennis Phombeah

He was suggested by ~~Denis Pombere.~~ Dennis Phombeah ~~Denis Pombere is~~ now the delegate from Tanzania to the UN. ~~Pombehr is spelled with an h. Phombeahk.~~ Dennis Phombeah is a former student - he's a Tanzanian diplomat now, He is Tanganyikan by birth. He was the secretary of the Committee of African Organizations here in London for a number of years. This was a Ghana-subsidized attempt to group together and unify all of the various African national groups. He's married to a girl by the name of ~~Bidlewna~~ Ilena. She is a Jewish girl from London. Her parents also former leftists. But she is very much anti-Communist. Dennis has very close ties with the British Communist~~pmt~~ party. He was a member of their African student committee. They had a committee headed by a woman named Kay Beauchamp/Beecham (?) who was delegated the task of ~~to~~ sort of watch over the African students in London and they didn't have very much success. But Dennis was able to milk them, the Ghana Government, by getting a subsidy, plus he had direct ties with the Soviets. He was a graduate student at Moscow University under Professor Ivan ~~Potchkin~~ Potekhin (r.i.p.) ~~Potecki~~. He is now dead, as you know, he was the head of their African studies department. He was getting his doctorate. I think it was ~~it~~ in anthhopology, I don't know exactly. But he was one of the very few persons

getting a doctorate in Moscow while sitting in London, and his wife spent most of her time writing his thesis. He would tell her, "now read this book and tell me what it says" and then "work this into my general ~~thing~~ [illegible]".
He had very little time. He also had some connections with the Chinese and had been to Peking, when I don't know, and had been invited to go to Peking last summer. He managed to keep from getting there. I suppose he felt that if he went ... He did go to Moscow on several occasions, theoretically it was to see Prof. Pote~~skin~~ Kh'n. That was just before ~~Potekhin's~~ P's death.
The Zanzibar revolution is a year old, so it was before the Zanzibar Revolution ~~but was~~ early last year, ~~must have been January~~. I saw him last at Orly Airport when he ~~was I~~ - -
~~He~~ came through ~~I guess severl weeks~~ later on his way to Moscow. He took the Air France flight and he had an hour to kill in Paris, and I went out to the airport and saw him. He gave me ~~xxxxxxpictures~~ photos of Zanzibar.

((You had known he was coming))

Yes. They told me. This was for the magazine. Some of the photos that later appeared were the photos he brought. They were pretty bad photos. They were all one could get.

Then he took the Air France flight to Warsaw and Moscow. When he came back of course, although he was Tanganyikan, Babu knew him and had strong confidence in him and ~~he~~ appointed him adviser to the Zanzibar High Commission here in London. The Commissioner, who had been one of the Sultan's men, had left. There had been a Civil Servant by the name of Omar, Omar Zohran, who remained. He said he didn't want to lose his pension, this was his main concern, revolution or no revolution. He didn't know much about revolutions. In fact, he was very touching, because he asked us could we suggest books that he could read about revolutions. He was a time server. While he was quite useful as the First Secretary, nevertheless Babu couldn't trust him.
So Dennis Phombeah, was put in as a sort of watchdog.

When the Geneva Conference came up, Dennis was there ~~xxxxxxBabuxxx delegatex~~ as ~~Babu xxxxx~~, until Babu arrived, the chief delegate, from Zanzibar. In fact, he had everybody ~~xxxdelegatex~~ sitting in as delegates, I sat in as a delegate from Zanzibar for a few minutes without even knowing it. He said "sit down. I've got to go ~~went~~ out." ~~till I xxxxxx to go out.~~ There I was sitting there.
Somebody came up and took my photograph. I assumed that I was either being photographed by the CIA or by the State Department or the Soviet side ~~anx~~ or probably both.

((Did you ever see the product))

No. I assume it was for ~~xxxxxx~~ private consumption. There was an East German which I assume [illegible] ([illegible]

for press purposes. He wanted to take portraits of all the Africans. He got their names. He had a tremendous file there. (laughing) And he also had a wire-photo machine which worked right out of his studio. He did Phombeah and another African fellow while I was there.

Anyway, Phombeah was known to Verges. He may have met him when Verges was in the IUS (International Union of Students) in Prague. He was ~~the~~ a VicePresident. There are four vice presidents. Verges was one of them.

As I said, when we were in Algeria, we had this woman Rosalind Ainslie as our correspondent here. When there came the blow-up there was Phombeah- - he knew Rosalind Ainslie and was giving her political advice. In other words, he was much higher up in the hierarchy of the British Communist Party, although theoretically he is not a member of the party. That I don't know. He maintains he isn't. But she certainly accepted what he said to a great extent. But he was going ~~with~~ between everyone. So when she ceased to work for us he agreed to work, for £50 a month, but not to have his name used. He didn't want his name to appear in the magazine. He said "however, I'm certain that Babu — now this was before the revolution — I'm certain that Babu will be willing." He sent a ~~[illegible]~~ cable to him and got a reply which was favorable. Babu then turned up in Paris and London. He was at the Labor Party congress at Scarborough. On his way back to Africa from that congress he stopped in Paris and that was his meeting with Verges.

He told Verges ~~[illegible]~~ then: He said "we will be in power within six to eight weeks ~~after independence~~" after independence" And of course he was. And really that shocked Verges, ~~Verges~~ to see somebody who really knew what he ~~[illegible]~~ would do. Also Babu- - very strange in that he doesn't dress well at all. He looks very sloppy. ~~[illegible]~~

~~I saw him next~~. We both saw him next, ~~at~~ at the UN conference, the Geneva Conference. He came to Paris with the Omar character who ~~was~~ is still here. I saw he was presented to the Queen not too long ago. And his so-called Chef de Protocol, who just happened to be a boy who could speak French which was a convenience. He also came with an Italian girl by the name of Betti, Bettini? her last name, and I suspect, although I am not certain, that she is Laura Betti, who is a well-known Italian actress and the alleged mistress of Pierre Paolo Passali Pasolini, [illegible] the film director, He was the man who made Accatonia and just made the Gospel According to St. Matthew which got a big prize and all that. He is a homosexual and so it is a very strange sort of relationship. She was supposed to be a member of the

Phombeah Ainslie

Babu

Nenni Socialists. I don't know if she has gone with the PSIUP, ~~people~~ the new left split, or not. I tried to get more information about her in Rome but I couldn't just walk in and say "weren't you the girl I ~~found~~ found in bed with Babu". She speaks English well and she spent a considerable amount of time in Geneva with him and came to Paris with him.

(Sasu) Sales ~~Sallis?~~ ~~Sales?~~

He was also with Murray ~~Fells~~ (phon) an Australian who spent most of his time as a mutual funds salesman. x Murray was based in Geneva. I suspect that he also was supplying girls.

Murray was also in contact with and introduced Babu to a man by the name of Victor Herbert, who is an American Mutual Funds salesman. He used to be [illegible] with OIS, Overseas Investment Service, in Geneva, which is the biggest American overseas fund, run by a man by the name of Bernie ~~Canfa~~ Kornfeld ~~Cornbelt~~ (?). Exactly what this curious crowd was do'ng with Babu there in Geneva I don't know. Murray Sales then later told stories which were not quite true of a man who was going around the Hotel Intercontinental in Geneva knocking on doors saying ~~xxxx~~ "are you a Foreign Minister?" "Yes" " Well, I want to invest ~~$1~~ $50,000 in your country. Which country ~~xxxxxx~~ do you come from." Now Murray ~~Fell's~~ Sales' story is different. He told ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Melvin Lasky of Encounter that someone came and said, "I'm from the CIA. Here's a gold watch and I'll give you $50,000 if you'll work for us." ((Who are you)) Yes, who are you? ~~Exady~~ Exactly.

Despite some of the curious antics I heard of with Cubans, I can't believe anybody would get that way. And besides, Babu was very amused by the man who did come. And he didn't get a watch. He told me that he'd gotten a camera from the West Germans once. They said "don't recognize Ulbricht and we'll give you this lovely camera." Of course they had already made a deal with East Germany.

((What was Victor Herbert's role in all this?))

I suspect that they were trying to invest money, that was all. The thing which interests me about all of this is that Babu, despite the fact he is a revolutionary, and a very competent one, I think, he has other strings to his bow. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

One, he is very much interested in women. Two, he drinks heavily. Money, which is extremely scarce in Zanzibar like most places in the world, is of great interest to him. He also ~~xxxx~~ told us [illegible] that he had informed the Chinese that he was going to carry out the coup and the Chinese were opposed to it. They went ahead anyway. They thought it was an adventure. Then afterwards— [illegible] since you were able to do it, [illegible] ((Is that what he told you?))

Babu

Yes, that's what he told Vergesx and me. Actually, that wasn't for publication.

Phombeah brought in Babu. Babu had no real connection with the magazine except on these two occasions. He gave me an interview which was printed in the last issue - in both issues of Revolution, and that was all. Then he went off to Indonesia. That's history. The merger was ~~being~~ made between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and it was ~~partly~~ partially behind his back although he knew that it was going to go on and he was not at all opposed. He felt that it was a good thing. We found it difficult to understand why he felt it was a good thing, but he thought that in Tanganyika the chaos was so great and the lack of defined goals, the lack of ability, even ~~the~~ capacity to satisfy the growing needs of the masses there would be such that the Indian ~~community~~ community which had its hand on the ~~floor~~ small business, and also the big ~~time~~ fibre plantations and what-not were an especially vulnerable target group, that [Julius] Nyerere, despite all of his humanism and his Catholic religion wouldn't be able to put up much resistance. I think he was quite right. That's what happened. That is, Zanzibar ~~which~~ is taking over Tanganyika into Tanzania. There was a struggle between Babu and Hanga, but that seemed to calm down to a great extent. I think that's over now. I've heard different things. I don't know.

One of the things that this fellow Curtis Kate ~~Cabe~~ of the Atlantic monthly proposed to do - he has more proposals than he has dollars- unfortunately, is that we try to go to Zanzibar. No one has even done any (reporting) I probably could get in. No one really has written anything (of any particular note) about Zanzibar, since the revolution. Don't know whether that is possible or not.

((There was a great deal of noise at the time of the Zanzibar revolution about Babu's relationship with Kao Liang, the NCNA man.))

Well, yes, it's true he has worked for them. And after he informed them of what he was going to do, they — — — — —

that was about two or three days before the revolution. They had given him a small amount of money, but not much. . it wasn't their money - - the Zanzibar revolution, it was extremely confusing because he was out of the country at the time. He knew what must be done. But for instance, the bringing in of- - the fellow - - Okello which was an incredible thing to do. the former police corporal from Uganda. I have the feeling that he was by no means all powerful , that it was a coalition of forces, ~~The~~ revolution. It was popular in the sense that the overwhelming majority of the ~~[illegible]~~ island's population ~~was~~ were represented among ~~[illegible]~~ the revolutionaries who turned against the Arab and Indian populations.

which had long had a standing grudge against that and saw no way of doing away with, but obviously they weren't all as left as Babu. You had for instance Osman ~~Othman~~ Sharif, who may be made Ambassador to United States. The main reason he was made Ambassador [illegible] Zanzibar go keep him out of Tanganyika. He was going to be here in London, I think he was the High Commissioner in London, for a very short period of time. And then when the merger came, it was the Tanganyikan High Commissioner who represented the merged countries, with Omar Zoran still staying on as the Secretary, Dennis ~~then with~~ Phombeah going to ~~[illegible]~~ the UN where he had been, in Geneva at one point, now in New York, Sharif going to Washington

((And was recently recalled))

Yes. Sharif's position is extremely shaky, but they really disliked him greatly, but because he is the head of the Shirazi Community ~~Sharafi~~ they couldn't strike him down right away. What they wanted to do really was to put him in a position where he would finally be bought out. They figured that he would go over to the Western side. One day or the other he would jump. And that's the way of getting rid of him- without them having to do anything. That's one reason he was sent to Washington. They thought that after a while he would. .

((So much for Babu. Now on the Board))

Now we have the Mulana Bashani- - he is a Pakistani. Dennis Phombeah was unable to continue his work. He was unable really to do anything. He was just collecting £60 a month. The reason that he did absolutely nothing was that the actual work was done by a Pakistani named ~~Hamsa Alavi~~ Hamza Alavi a former secretary, Third Secretary or something, Of the Pakistan National Bank. He is a Marxist, I doubt that he is actually a member of the Pakistan Communist party. He comes from one of the Ismaili ~~Sect~~ Moslem Sects, and his family is extremely ~~weleth~~ wealthy and has holdings in a Tanganyika, a fibre plantation. He also has relatives in Zanzibar. When he was asked by Dennis Phombeah to go to Zanzibar to help straighten out their balance of payments problems, which he wanted to do, his family told him that if he did he'd never come back to them, since they had lost some money. He is a great friend of Ralph Milleband of LSE (London School of Economics) here. He is an academic. He has contacts with Trotskyist groups. His contacts with the British Communist party are not very good. He is very easy going, a rather soft personality. He is by no means 100% or even 50% pro-Chinese. In ~~[illegible]~~ particular because he doesn't approve of Chinese support for President Ayub Khan. This led to his replacement finally.

Hamza Alavi

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which had long had a standing grudge against that and saw no way of doing away with, but obviously they weren't all as left as Babu. You had for instance ~~Othman~~ Osman Sharif, who may be made Ambassador to United States. the main reason he was made Ambassador in United States was to exile him from Zanzibar go keep him out of Tanganyika. He was going to be here in London, I think he was the High Commissioner in London, for a very short period of time. And then when the merger came, it was the Tanganyikan High Commissioner who represented the merged countries, with Omar Zoran still staying on as the Secretary, ~~Then with~~ Dennis Phombeah going to ~~[illegible]~~ the UN where he had been, in Geneva at one point, now in New York, "Sharif going to Washington

((And was recently recalled))

Yes. Sharif's position is extremely shaky, but they really disliked him greatly, but because he is the head of the ~~[illegible]~~ Shirazi Community they couldn't strike him down right away. What they wanted to do really was to put him in a position where he would finally be bought out. They figured that he would go over to the Western side. One day or the other he would jump. And that's the way of getting rid of him- without them having to do anything. That's one reason he was sent to Washington. They thought that after a while he would. .

((So much for Babu. Now onthe Board))

Now we have ~~the~~ Ule Mulana Bashani- - he is a Pakistani. Dennis Phombeah was unable to continue his work. He was unable really to do anything. He was just collecting £60 a month. The reason that he did absolutely nothing was that the actual work was done by a Pakistani named ~~Hamsa Alavi.~~ Hamza Alavi a former secretary, Third Secretary or something, Of the Pakistan National Bank. He is a Marxist, I doubt that he is actually a member of the Pakistan Communist party. He comes from one of the Isma~~e~~li ~~Sect~~ Moslem Sects, and his family is extremely ~~welath~~ wealthy and has holdings in a Tanganyika, a fibre plantation. He also has relatives in Zanzibar. When he was asked by Dennis Phombeah to go to Zanzibar to help straighten out their balance of payments problems, which he wanted to do, his family told him that if he did he'd never come back to them, since they had lost some money. He is a great friends of Ralph Milleband of LSE (London School of Economics) here. He is an academic. He has contacts with Trotskyist groups. His contacts with the British Communist party are not very good. He is very easy going, a rather soft personality. He is by no means 100% or even 50% pro-Chinese. In ~~fxxti~~ particular because he doesn't approve of Chinese support for President Ayub Khan. This led to his replacement finally.

Hamza Alavi

~~[illegible]~~

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Kahn will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Kahn as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 years-old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

~~Sx~~ ((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues, of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslie. That would be May of 63, right up to spring of 64.

x ((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

Hamza

He ~~got~~ found manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. x But that was all. And it was sort of contre coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was ~~axxxxxxxx~~ an open forum, sort of rostrum for ~~the~~ debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted ~~it~~ to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, ~~xx~~ it particularly [illegible] ~~the state of his~~ because of ~~xhis~~ his feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up~~s~~, ~~between Pakistani~~ the ~~willing~~ growing friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship between Alavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife's family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. ~~Hxxxxx~~ The Socialist Register published last year ~~by~~ — an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups, for instance during the last election the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Ham~~s~~za worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies, to counter this; ~~and apparently~~ in fact they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

((How about Bashani))

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he ~~xxix~~ said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

((Do they get paid for this))

No.

Next is Hassan ~~Mayad~~ Riad. He is ~~F.~~ S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, (with headquarters in Dakar) UN economic adviser in Dakar. He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- ~~xxx~~ fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by ~~Victor Min~~ Edition de Minuit in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that ~~Chen~~ Kien, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a pseudonym ~~by him~~ and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research, stuff that he couldn't say in his official ~~publication~~ capacity. (~~Pseudonym~~ ~~Lajalle,~~ Like Jalet, yes.

Hassan Riad — [illegible]

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ~~ideoloi~~ ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

((Do you know him- How old is he))

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Part~~y~~ies, because there are [illegible] has really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated ~~,~~- in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~

Kept Communism, and ~~Marxism~~ ~~is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they are very useful people so ~~[illegible]~~ let's use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this ~~.~~".

2 ((Is he pro-anything in E~~y~~gypt))

Hassan [illegible]

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the flow of events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer ~~class~~ caste and he tries to show in his writings how the officer class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, and there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its functionaries — but still the problem of the masses remains.

((Does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?))

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly concerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~not here~~

Marcos Ferrer

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- that's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva ~~(or Semper)~~ SEMPER ~~Semper~~ of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer ~~(or Ferra)~~ to be a pseudonym.

Frene Ginwalla

~~Frenda~~ ~~Freddy~~ Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the Indian Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead~~s~~ until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in the her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I dont know~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open) . . She was accused, of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering ~~,~~ as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have ~~been~~ been to ingratiate herself. ~~I She works~~ She was here in London after she was expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 ~~a~~ for a deposit so ~~that~~ she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalind Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. ~~and~~ She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem ~~with any~~ for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

Gunmlea

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least ~~they~~ they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because ~~Indian - the Indians have holdings~~ the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal . Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the ~~Indians~~ Indians are thinking - ~~[illegible]~~ well— ~~(about to~~ ~~[illegible]~~ alas Africanization menaced them - ie ~~meant to the [illegible]~~ Indians. They the English used them as a sort of buffer, preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multi-racial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

The Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, and to the Colored people's congress, all of this in a so-called Congress Alliance. She had contacts with the Africans - the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her ~~as well~~. But she managed somehow to get back in, she was ill, she was in hospital ~~She was~~ hurt in an auto accident, and she had to have a very complicated bone operation . That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolution.

(On my list here we have Diallo)

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- ~~what's his name~~ -

Modewa Keida.

He is married to a French woman, a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ________________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

(In Mali)

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

over to next page

~~There's nothing very much. He just knew him.~~

~~This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.~~

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he (Verges) kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, ~~in~~ in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, ~~in~~ Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was ~~a friend of~~ Le Chinois ?

Phombeah

~~President of Mali,~~

Modibo ~~Bolewa~~ Keita. ~~xxxx~~ Married to a French woman. Leftist.
He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him
~~He offered to help. Put him~~ in contact with a man by the name of Mogotogo (?)

Title

who is Minister of Information, who is very very pro-Chinese, ~~in Mali.~~

~~And~~ When Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed welcome~~s~~ in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

((How did Verges and Diallo get together))

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

→ insert from page [illegible]

If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think ~~Odinga~~ the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

Diallo

I don't know very much about ~~Gama~~ Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to ~~Chen~~ Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going ~~that~~ he might go to Mali. ~~If Chen~~ Ken was going to be sent off to wherever, Viriato da Cruz of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia for the Afro-Asian ~~journals~~ Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Viriato da Cruz

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA. He is a poet, again, in the late thirties, married, has a child and is based more or less in Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China and this give him a sort of, gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more ~~so~~ ______ Dr. Neto, apparently more than ever now. And the Algerians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have [illegible] fighting forces — have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ~~logically~~ ideologically the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians ~~than~~ and to all of the hard revolutionary line people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant ~~missionaries.~~ missionary groups. ~~And~~ He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helped the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some talks and statements which the Chinese were pleased with.

The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt to his horror, I understand, that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he ~~assumed~~ presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics. He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions ~~that~~ in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that really he wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, he didn't have a passport, he had ~~all these~~ all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

Viriato da Cruz

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would ~~xxxxxxxx~~ look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events ~~xxxxxxx~~ threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN, of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, [illegible] a graphic artist, some of whose drawings ~~[illegible]~~ were printed in Revolution. They brought the things ~~to him~~. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic ~~blot~~ first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious~~s~~, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real ~~[illegible]~~ conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

FALN

((Do you know if he still has them))

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. ~~So~~ He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect verious tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything [illegible] first-hand [illegible] that they [illegible] split between a hard line, those who want to continue the ~~real~~ guerrilla struggle and the sabotage struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group [illegible] ~~that is~~ a little more pro-Chinese.

In any case these people did represent the FALN. There is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia Magowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslee to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

(~~[illegible]~~ (Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has beenkept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) you know, a [illegible] confidence [illegible] ~~to be~~ what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out

He represents nothing. He's a sort of hopeless person. She's a very dynamic woman. Verges claimed that she had become a police informer, for the Algerian police, and that ~~[illegible]~~ she talk~~ed~~s to ~~very opposite groups~~ [illegible] occasionally, ~~[illegible]~~ and to Mamani of the Salava ~~group~~ party in Algiers. But she no longer has anything to do with Revolution Africaine. ~~I don't know what she is going~~. She ~~wouldn't~~ ~~didn't~~ have anything to do with Verges after the moment that she refused to go to Lausanne. ~~You see, he was~~

((Why))

Why did she refuse to go? Well, she couldn't leave Carlos there by himself. God knows what would happen to him. Secondly, she ~~had to~~ wanted to be ~~all the time~~ In the swim in Algiers. She wasn't ~~[illegible]~~ interested in running a magazine in Switzerland, the magazine interest was secondary to her.

There was another Portuguese-speaking person in Algiers. That was a man by the name of Aquino Braganza. Braganza is a Goan and Goan who has lost his reason for being; with the end of the Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, he should have gone ~~[illegible]~~ back! But ~~[illegible]~~ he had been a Goan revolutionary with the Portuguese opposition. For years he ~~was~~ had been in Rabat hooked up to the, at that time it was the CONCP, Conference des Organisations Nationaliste des Colonies Portugaises, which grouped together ~~the Filemo~~ what later came to be the Frelimo and the MPLA. It was part of the hard line ~~countries~~ groupings. There was another one elsewhere which was soft line. Braganza was also sort of adviser to the magazine Revolution Africaine for ~~and~~ questions of India and so on. He stayed on and worked with Mohammed Harbi and came to London.

((Did he have anything to do with Patricia Macgowan))

Yes. They had been together in Rabat.

((Did he have anything to do with Carlos))

Yes. It's all the same crowd. But Carlos was waiting for destiny to call him and Braganza had already lost his chance. The Indians had got in. They'd liberated Goa, so what next, you know. Go back to India. He obviously wasn't going to go back. He was living too well, as it was. ~~And~~ what was he going to do in Goa, nobody knew him in Goa. He was a Goan educated in Portugal. One of these people ~~really~~ without a real national identity. He knew that he wasn't Portuguese and had this feeling of alienation from Portugal, which made him like most of the colonial students there-- the MPLA really started in Portugal- made him an oppositionist. He didn't have enough roots with the homeland. So he's just sort of floating around. His wife is a school teacher. He speaks excellent French. He was working for Revolution Africaine. I don't know if he still is. I'm certain he'll find something to do. He'll never go back to Goa.

((This points up the need for a continuing revolution, when the revolution is completed))

Yes. You don't have jobs unless you're in the government. And that's a problem, too. In his case, he never really did much, wasn't even a real revolutionary, just a bureaucrat in Rabat and other places.

((How did ~~the~~ Macgowan get involved with Verges))

That I don't know. I don't know how he ~~gatxinxeontactxwith~~ knew her in the beginning, ~~xxxxxx~~ I imagine he met her in Rabat. He used to go to Morocco quite often and had contact with all the African, [illegible] ~~the race~~ people there. I suspect that's where he met her.

((~~How~~ So much ~~xxxx~~ for those guys))

Now you've got Harbi. He was ~~xxxxx~~ the person who replaced Verges. He's out now, but ~~he, one of the,~~ I'm told by Andersson, who ~~xxxxx~~ has his ear to the ground in Algiers as well as in Switzerland, that Harbi is still in a very good position. He is one of the leading advisers to Ben Bella, represents the Left position. He's a Trotskyist, or a Trotskyist sympathiser without any formal organizational~~ly~~ ties. He is very close to the Pablo (group). That's Michel ~~Walter~~ Raptis. He's Pablo, ~~xxxx~~ ~~we~~ could'nt havé overlooked him, he's a feature of Algiers life. He played an extremely importat role in the agrarian reform, in (determining) the type of agrarian reform that was gong to be carried out. He came down on the Yugoslav model, that is collectives which are privately owned by the collectives and run on The profit model, that is on a profit basis.

Harbi (and Ducatel) ~~they~~ were all inside of this Bureau ~~de Bien~~ des Biens Vacants which then became the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. I once did an article for ~~the~~ Monthly Review, [illegible] ~~so I know~~ ~~all~~ about how it operated. What really happened was that the Europeans fled just before and just after Independence, ~~or rather~~ as [illegible] well they should have, considering what they had done. ~~But~~ they had expected a blood bath. The blood bath never took place. It was ~~an~~ incredible. That was one of the most incredible things to me in Algeria was that the Algerians didn't — — — — ——

Because the stories were horrifying. You know what happened. A month or so before, they (the French) were just shooting everybody on the street, trying to provoke them, and the discipline of the ~~XXX~~ FLN was incredible. Nobody would shoot back, no matter what they did. So they (The French [illegible]) fled and ~~they~~ left all ~~this~~ these farms. ~~xxxxx~~ [illegible] It was a question of ploughing and seeding. There is only a certain time of year that you ~~have~~ [illegible] to do this. This had to be organized and it was organized almost spontaneously locally. ~~And then~~ This was ~~sort of~~ institutionalized later, ~~afterwards~~ as an accomplished fact. They wanted some sort of a socialist didn't know how and the institutionalizing of it was really directed by these Trotskyists. There was Pablo, Harbi, a French lawyer named Matthieu from Grenoble who had been involved with the FLN, and he became sort of legal adviser of Biens Vacants, which was vaguely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture which was at that time under Omar Usgan who is now Minister of State, and Director of Revolution Africaine at present. He replaced Harbi.

Harbi is deeply resented by the army elements which are pro-~~Egy~~ Egyptian. However, the Army, despite its religious inclination, had its socialist bias and would like to see more centralization, more on an Egyptian model. In other words, they would like to see much more control from the center than this confused type of regional or local control. They feel that in the long run the business of the private collective ownership is going to cause trouble. It's ~~also~~ all right if it is a rich one, but what happens if you are in ~~it's~~ a poor one? You don't split a profit, you split a deficit. Obviously, according to the Yugoslav model, the state intervenes. The State taxes the rich ones and then distributes subsidies to the poor ones, but this a debate that is still going on in Algeria, ~~and~~ Curiously enough these Trotskyists have been in contact, very close contact, with the Yugoslavs. As you recall, the campaign, the so-called campagne de labeur, the ploughing, was made possible only by the delivery of 500 Yugoslav tractors which turned out to the great deception (disillusionment) of some of the Algerians not to be Yugoslav but to be American tractors put together in Yugoslavia under license.

((This is getting us a little bit far afield))

This is Harbi and this is the group. Harbi represents the leading spokesmen within the FLN of this sort of Trotskyist-leaning Left group, and his post is still very high, even though he is no longer Director.

((When was he dropped))

I think last summer. I'm not certain. With Usgan it has become much more ____________________ the word Socialism appears in Arábic because it is felt that Socialism in French doesn't have the same meaning as it has in Arabic. It's very ~~sort of~~ silly, ~~and~~ it represents the very muddled mind that Usgan has. He is very much split between his religious (and political) inclinations. ~~and~~ Usgan is a full member of the Communist party of Algeria but he left for natonalist reasons when they refused to support the rebellion, and joined the FLN. His wife is supposed to be fanatically religious and has made him more religious than he was.

((Curious mix-up- - this religion and politics.))

((Returning to our first subject, Strelkoff. Is he a practicing Jew?))

No.

((Just an ethnic Jew))

Yes.

((Next on the list here is Robert Williams. Whoever made this up calls him an American in Peking.))

But ~~where was he now~~

He's in Havana. He was in Peking recently and he may still be there, for that matter. He went on a second trip to the Far East, He was in one of the countries that had a celebration. I think he was in Hanoi, if I'm not mistaken. He was in Asia. He may still be there.

Robert Williams

Robert Williams is a Negro, former President of the Union County North Carolina branch of the NAACP, who had a hell of a battle on his hands against the local Ku Klux Klan and discovered that the best way to deal with the Ku Klux Klan was to shoot back at them. And it worked. They never had seen it, in that part of the south, anyway, the small towns of the South. ~~town pants~~. Up until recently there's been sort of a gentlemen's ~~general~~ agreement in the south that the Negro civil rights groups would go into the big cities, where they would be reasonably protected. But they had to leave the rural areas alone because they couln't expect much. Williams of course, was a there is no doubt, great embarrassment to everybody, and they were on his back. He got no sympathy from the NAACP leadership. He first came to national prominence after a case of obvious injustice where a white man had done something to a Negro woman and some local jury had thrown it out. He contended Williams said, "well if we can't get justice in the courts we'll have to take justice in our own hands." [illegible] But even the fact that Negroes would fight back got the ~~old leaders, the old~~ older, more conservative Negro leaders very upset. ~~He was immediately~~, People immediately came to his support, particularly the Trotskyites, not the Communists. The Trotskyites came in, and tried to take him over. They did give him some support. There had been a case before, another case, locally called the North Carolina Kissing Case. Two Negro boys, you may have heard of it, were sentenced to indefinite terms in prison for having kissed a six-year-old white girl. He was involved in that and again, it was the Trotskyites who came to his support with other liberal groups. In terms of organizational support it was the Trotskyites. I heard of him at the time I was in CBS and I thought that it was very understandable and sent him a message of support. I met him at the time of the NAACP Conference in New York in 1959 and when the FPCC was formed he was among the eight Negroes who were among the 30 founding members, to the great shock of

[illegible]

of the Communist Party of the United States, which did not particularly approve of seeing the two issues mixed, Cuba and Negroes.

Williams, very volatile, a very determined person, on a local level, has no ability whatsoever on a national level. He has become a symbol now to Negro youth in particular, as a Negro who is not an Uncle Tom, who will fight. We knew what was coming in the summer of 61, ~~perhaps it was before... no~~ (O)bviously it was an embarrassment, for the national executive of the NAACP, embarrassment for the Justice Department, and more than embarrassment for Terry Sanford, who was the Governor, and who told him, "I wish you were dead. Period." Finally, by one of these flukes of fate, there was a demonstration over a swimming pool. They (the Negroes) didn't want to integrate the pool. They just wanted to swim in it. But the local people said they didn't want to do that because they would have to change the water, and it would take too much time to change the water after Negroes swam in the water. So they had some demonstrations. Williams was almost murdered on one of these occasions. The demonstrations were getting pretty violent. Then King sent in some Freedom Riders who were going to show them how non-violence was going to work in this town. They decided to make an example. So Williams said, "I'm going to get out of this. I don't want anything to do with your non-violence. But you go ahead and I'll see what happens."

Well the non-violent demonstration ~~became~~ (even more violent. There were people shot. There were arrests. There was an English girl who now figures here in the British Trotskyist party, who was over there. People were coming from all over, there were reports in the European press. ~~The rumor went around~~ - Williams now had nothing to do with this. He was just sort of staying there saying well you see where non-violence gets you-- but there was a report that they were going to lynch the people who had been arrested. As often happens in this type of thing the Negroes and whites, outside whites who were involved, really came in for a hell of a beating, and as in the Philadelphia, Mississippi, case, they even have been killed. Williams was more or less a victim of the mob in the Negro community which said "we've got to do something. We've got to free these people and get them out of jail."

He had arms, including ~~some~~ machine guns, which had been purchased in New York and sent down there. They didn't use them because they got scared, but they had arms. The community was armed. The people were out in the street in front of his house, when a car with a white couple, came down the road. It was surrounded and the couple was told to get out. The crowd wanted to string them up right there. This man came from a neighboring

They [illegible] [illegible]

town, claimed had lost their way. They said, no you're a member of the Klan in this town." They wanted to kill him, or hold him as hostage. Williams said, "Bring these people in my house and you know I won't let them go." He called the Sheriff, and said, "Look, I have these people here and my people are very upset and I want you to know that I don't want anything ~~it~~ to happen to our people that you have in the jail." The Sheriff immediately called the National Guard, State Troopers and what not. They [illegible] couldn't hold out very long. Williams escaped. Julian Mayfield was there, a well known Negro writer who now lives in Ghana as a result of this. ~~Robin~~ Minnie Mallory, ~~who~~ a Negro woman from New York who was there was later arrested and convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison for ~~her~~ kidnapping, ~~[illegible]~~ and the case is on appeal now. Williams was spirited across the United States—I knew vaguely where he was, but he was kept very careful, by Cubans and by Negro groups in contact with the Cubans, to Canada. From Canada he was flown by private plane ~~and by~~ [illegible] Castro himself, to Havana, where he is now.

On two occasions the FBI came to me asking for information about Williams, and I damn sure wasn't going to give any ~~[illegible]~~ of what I knew. We had tried to get in touch with Bobby Kennedy himself. I had sent ~~[illegible]~~ telegrams. I even tried to get a telephone call in. Because I knew what was going to happen on this thing, [illegible] to get some kind of Federal intervention. ~~—~~ It was one of ~~those sickening things~~ the most sickening things that I ever saw. ~~[illegible]~~ They wanted him out of the way. Even the ~~[illegible]~~ way they came to me later— two of the agents came to the FPCC office in New York. They said, "We have 500 agents. We'll get him. He'll never get away." Well, he was away at that ~~[illegible]~~ point. His aunt died ~~and they~~ in New York around that time. They went to the funeral parlor where the body was and put a wanted ~~e~~ poster for Williams, on the coffin and stood there to see if he would come by. Really, they should have been thrown ~~[illegible]~~ out on their heads, frankly. If it hadn't been Negroes I'm certain they would never have done that sort of thing. The trouble was— ~~even that~~, the trouble is— the whole attitude. ~~attitude.~~ Anyhow, as it is, Williams is not a Communist, he's not a Trotskyite. He's a former Marine, who's just had enough. Really, you know. And now he has turned into a ~~world-wide figure~~ and he's turned into a world-wide figure because people like Bobby Kennedy and others could not ~~just~~ bother to try to see what could be done about it. It was no use, though. I mean, it's no use now. ~~[illegible]~~ I'm certainly [illegible] ~~and~~ everybody."

Well, that's too bad. Just like the case of these boys, Walter Bow, and so on. And they're not the only ones. ~~Now,~~ For every Walter Bow there must be at least a hundred [illegible]. I must say, I would no more want to live in the States now — you're going to really see something. I don't really

Verges wanted somebody from Pakistan on the board. He (Alavi) said "I'm certain that the Mulana Bashani Khan will agree".

((That would be Mulana Abdul Hamid Bashani))

That's right. He's sometimes called Khan as a title of respect. He's a 70 or 80 year-old man. He's called the Red Mullah, sort of like the Red Dean of Canterbury.

He's the leader of one of the East Pakistan parties. He had been to China and was quite pro-Chinese. He was more than willing. But he had absolutely no contact whatever with the magazine.

((Did he come in to replace Hamza Alavi))

Yes.

((How long did Hamza Alavi work with the magazine))

You would have to check the issues of the English edition. He was there until slightly before we dropped Rosalind Ainslee. That would be May of 63. right up to spring of 64.

((Did Hamza Alavi do anything actually)) ~~or did he just~~

He found manuscripts and so on. He actually did the work that Phombeah never did. But that was all. And it was sort of contre coeur with him because he did not agree with the thing. He had the idea that the magazine was an open forum, sort of rostrum for debate between all sorts of revolutionary movements. But when it became very obvious that Verges wanted to try, at that time, at least, to stay with the Chinese line, it particularly because of ~~the state of his~~ his feelings about the situation in Pakistan and he wasn't happy. Also on the question of India, he felt that the Chinese position vis-a-vis India wasn't just, and he didn't like the hook-up ~~between Pakistani~~ the ~~willing~~ growing friendship and actual solidarity between Pakistan and China.

((So he was through amicably. What is the present relationship between Alavi and Verges))

I doubt if he has any at all. He is very active here in London with Pakistani groups. He has money. His wife's family has money, his own family has. It wasn't a question of money for him.

((Has he continued to be active in AfroAsian things))

He's an academic. The Socialist Register published last year an article on Imperialism by him. He is active around the London School of Economics. He is known to the academic Left, friends with the boys who do Left Review and so on. His only practical work would be working with Pakistani groups, for instance during the last election the Tories ran in several constituencies Pakistani independent candidates in the hope of breaking the Labor vote, hoping that the Pakistanis would vote for these Pakistani independents. Hamza worked with the Labor Party in those constituencies, to counter this; ~~and apparently~~ in fact they were quite successful. He has very good connections inside the Labor Party. And he does not have very good ties at all with the Communist Party, though he is not by any means anti-Communist. He's a skeptic.

((How about Bashani))

He has never done anything. Never heard from him except once when he ~~mxkx~~ said we could put his name on the board. As far as I know there has never been any contact.

((Do they get paid for this))

No.

Next is Hassan ~~[illegible]~~ Riad. He is ~~R.~~ S. Amir. He is an official of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, (with headquarters in Dakar UN economic adviser in Dakar. He has a very high position inthat. He is Egyptian, a full member of the Egyptian Communist Party with very very pronounced Trotskyist views. That is, he feels, he has a theory about the role of bureaucracy in under-developed countries - the progressive and reactionary bureaucracy- ~~IXX~~ fits into general Trotskyist theories but applied there. He has done work on Egypt, state capitalism in Egypt. A book of his published recently by ~~Victor Min~~ Edition de Minuit in Paris, part of which appeared in Revolution. Some of it was so obviously Trotskyist that Kiu Chen, despite his somewhat partial agreement with parts of it felt that it was too obvious even to print in Revolution. He only comes through Paris occasionaly. His main interest in REvolution is getting his things printed. He is very interested in having his things published. He is very cynical about many of the African States. His article on Senegal appeared recently in Revolutian, in French, I think in No. 12. It was written under a pseudonym ~~by him~~ and based on the UN Economic Commission for Africa research , stuff that he couldn't say in his official ~~publication~~ capacity. (~~Pseudonym~~) ~~Lajalle,~~ Like Jalet, yes.

Hassan Riad – [illegible]

He is not overly pro-Chinese. He feels that the Chinese philosophical position isn't quite adequate, the ~~ideolol~~ ideological model isn't adequate for under undeveloped countries, certainly for Africa.

((Do you know him- How old is he))

Yes I know him. He is in his thirties. About 35. Married. He is Egyptian. He is anti-Nasser really. He feels that the Egyptian Communist Parties, because they are [illegible] has really abdicated any constructive role inside Egypt, even from the concentration camps where they were held putting out secret clandestine tracts supporting Nasser, which was the craziest thing I've ever heard. ~~Because~~ Now they've been liberated - in fact the old Communists are now being given very high organizational posts in the new Egyptian Party, ~~and~~ Communism and Marxism ~~is~~ are extraneous to Arab socialism but they are very useful people so ~~we~~ lets use them in there. And the group that are under Soviet influence are perfectly willing to go along with this".

Q ((Is he pro-anything in Egypt))

No, I think that he is sort of resigned to the [illegible] events of history. He analyzes what he considers state capitalist developments, the rise of a new bureaucratic middle class, the officer ~~class~~ caste and he tries to show in his writings how the officer caste class has crushed the old land-owning Wafdist ruling class which had its links with British and French financial interests, and has now consolidated itself in power, ~~and~~ there is a certain social mobility, but for them only. In other words, how limited it is and the officer caste certain of its functionaires —— but still the problem of the masses remains.

((does he concern himself very much with the state of Egypt?))

From an academic point of view only. He's more academic. He's not even particularly comerned wih revolution. If you want his address . . ~~and here~~

Marcos Ferrer

Now who do we have- Marcos Ferrer- that's Colombia. I don't know anything about it. It probably stands for Dr. Leiva ~~Semper~~ (~~or Semper~~) SEMPER of the MOEC IN Paris. He is a Colombian doctor, the representative in Paris of the MOEC. He is the one who conducted negotiations with Verges for a Spanish edition in Colombia. I assume Marcos Ferrer (~~or Ferre~~) to be a pseudonym.

Frene Ginwalla

~~Farida~~ ~~Freddy~~ Frene Ginwalla, next on the list, is a member of the India Congress for South Africa. She was a correspondent of Revolution in Dar es Salaam and she published a magazine called Spearhead until she was expelled from Tanganyika under a cloud and accused of being a Western spy. The accusations were not made openly. She was known to have contacts with the ~~Western~~ West German Embassy. She received West German money from the Carl Ebert Foundation and actually printed West German propaganda in the her magazine. She had gone to West Germany and done this so obviously that ~~I dont know~~ she couldn't have been very sophisticated about it because it was just too (open). . She was accused of having ~~told the Soviet Embassy of having~~ offered to carry information for the Soviet Embassy, volunteering as ~~a Communist~~ a South African Communist, to give them information, two-thirds of which turned out to be totally useless and false, which again might have ~~been~~ been to ingratiate herself. ~~I The works~~ She was here in London after she was expelled, I'm not certain of the exact dates. She was also known to have slept around with almost every Minister of the Tanganyikan government including Julius Nyerere. This is one of the reasons why there was so much hushhush about her, that she had obviously gotten a lot of information out of these fellows. She was very close to Oscar Kambona and she claimed that Oscar Kambona was going to get her back into the Foreign Ministry.

She was just Revolution's correspondent there. She did practically nothing. When she got out, she managed to keep her little office going. They didn't seize anything, and she turned over the mailing list of her Spearhead magazine to Revolution. Verges had paid her £1000 for a deposit so she could do some work but she really didn't do anything, but she, unlike Rosalynd Ainslie, turned over the unspent portion of that to Verges when she came to London. ~~and~~ She wasn't interested really in continuing her work with Revolution. Being Indian of course posed a problem ~~with any~~ for her with anything to do with the Chinese. She was very close to the Indian community, as anyone who looks through that mailing list will see we have lots of missionaries, Indian businesses, and so forth in East Africa, who were taking subscriptions to the magazine more or less out of friendship and solidarity with another Indian. They didn't care much whether she was a Communist or not.

Gumalla

She was supposed to have been the mistress of Dr. Dadu. At least ~~they~~ they say she slept with Dr. Dadu and they had a very close relationship to him. Dr. Dadu is the president of the Indian Congress for South Africa and a member of the Communist Party of South Africa, a very important member. Because ~~Indian~~ - ~~the Indians have holdings~~ community the Indian community has holdings up and down East Africa, Mozambique as well, their role in the liberation struggle is very equivocal . Obviously the Africans want to go ahead while the ~~Indians~~ Indians are thinking - [illegible] well — ~~[illegible]~~ also Africanization menaced them - the ~~meant to the [illegible]~~ Indians. They The English used them as a sort of buffer, preferred to bring an Indian clerk to East Africa rather than to train an African. That was a typical colonial maneuver but now it has put the Indians in a situation historically which is untenable, for a long period. You know people talk about multi-racial states but in East Africa it is a joke. It won't hold up. I don't think it will, anyway.

AThe Indian Congress of South Africa is related to the African National Congress, and so the Colored people's congress, all of this in a so-called Congress Alliance. She (Fatima [illegible]) had contacts with the African- the ANC people. the ANC people here in London. They were suspicious of her ~~as well~~. But she managed somehow to get back in. She was ill, she was in hospital ~~She was~~ hurt in an auto accident, and she had to have a very complicated bone operation . That put her out of action for some time. I don't know, but I heard that she is now back in Tanganyika. She may well be. She has quite a bit of money; her family has money. Of course the Indians do have money. She did very little for the magazine. She occasionally told me about people in the ANC who might do something for the magazine. But most of the people she told me abut were members of the South African Communist Party. That party has taken a pro-Moscow stand and most of its people don't want to do anything for Revolution, though we did have articles by Bryan Bunk (?) another South African Communist. That was before their party took their stand on the Sino-Soviet conflict. And there is a struggle going on right now inside of the ANC. That's a long complicated thing. That has nothing to do with Revolutin.

((On my list here we have Diallo))

Diallo is an adviser of the President of Mali- ~~what's his name~~ Modewa Keida.

He is married to a French woman, a Leftist, he knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him in contact with ________________ who is Minister of Information, who is very, very pro-Chinese.

((In Mali))

Yes. When Chou en Lai visited Mali, you recall, that he got quite committed. There were some gratuitous, open handed slaps

over to next page

~~There's nothing very much. He just knew him.~~

~~This is again one of Verges attempts to have a finger in another African country.~~

I didn't mention, with Phombeah, one of the reasons that he (Verges) kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga, ~~in~~ in Kenya. Phombeah at one time had hoped to be made the secretary of this new Lumumba Institute there, in Nairobi. Verges, odd as it may seem, had at one time, proposed himself as a sort of security adviser to Odinga. We felt that he continued to pay Dennis Phombeah for doing nothing mainly to keep a line of communication open to Odinga. He had met Odinga but got nowhere with him. In Algiers he was ~~a friend of~~ Le Chinois ?

Phombeah

insert

President of Mali,

Modibo ~~[illegible]~~ Keita. ~~xxxx~~ Married to a French woman. Leftist. He knows Verges through friendship and offered to help. He put him ~~He offered to help. Put him~~ in contact with a man by the name of Mogotogo (?)

Title

who is Minister of Information, and who is very very pro-Chinese, ~~in Mali.~~ ~~And~~ When Chou en Lai visited Mali you recall that he got quite a committed welcome~~s~~ in Mali. And there were some gratuitous open-handed slaps the Russians made. Didn't have to be made but were.

((How did Verges and Diallo get together))

I don't know. He had known him for a considerable time. There is nothing very much. This is again one of Verges's attempts to have a finger in another African country. One of the reasons that he kept Phombeah was Phombeah's connection with Odinga.

→ insert from page [illegible]

If in Algiers he was referred to as Le Chinois (as he was), I don't think ~~Odinga~~ the Kenyans would accept him.

This is a real problem. He says, "well, we colored people and so forth" and it is true that he is part - he's Eurasian, but it is very hard for Africans to accept that. They just put him down as Chinese.

Diallo

I don't know very much about ~~Gama~~ Demba Diallo. He played very little role in the Magazine except that he was a contact inside of Mali. He came to France early last year, the spring of last year (64), with his wife. He went to Vichy for his health and drank the waters for two or three weeks and he saw Verges. Verges had ideas, had mentioned to ~~Chen~~ Ken that if he couldn't keep the magazine going ~~that~~ he might go to Mali. ~~K Chen~~ Ken was going to be sent off to wherever (was) Viriato da Cruz of the Angolan Federation of Liberation, as adviser, and I was going to be sent to Indonesia ~~for~~ / the Afro-Asian ~~journal~~ Journalists. That was how he was going to take care of everybody.

(How about Castro Da Silva)

Viriato de Cruz

Castro Da Silva is the pseudonym used for Viriato da Cruz, formerly of the MPLA, and now of the UPA~~x~~. He is a poet, again, in the late thirties, married, has a child and is based more or less in Algiers. He has virtually no money at all. He has a small group which went into the UPA.

Holden Roberto, the head of the UPA is very suspicious of him. but nevertheless he needs him. He needs the Left. He has been to China ~~x~~ and this give him a sort of, ~~-~~ gives the Chinese a guarantee, but on the other hand the Chinese didn't even want to give Viriato money to transfer himself from Algiers to Brazzaville. And he was threatened by the MPLA people, who are of course Soviet-backed to the hilt, in fact more ~~so~~ Dr. Neto, apparently more than ever now. And the Algésians, Ben Bella, who had supported the MPLA up until the great fiasco when people discovered that they didn't have what they claimed to have— didn't have the fighting forces — have given their support to the UPA. Nevertheless, the MPLA people still remain and they are promising to reform and really carry out things. I think that ~~logically~~ ideologically the MPLA is much more congenial to the Algerians ~~than~~ and to all of the hard revolutionary line, people.

Holden Roberto is considered to be an American agent pure and simple and always has been. In actual fact, he received a lot of money through various Protestant missionary groups, American Protestant ~~missionaries.~~ missionry groups. ~~And~~ He himself is a Christian Protestant. These tie-ups have helpdd the Rightists to back him. He did go off to China, made some rather loud statements which the Chinese were pleased with. The Chinese haven't made any real decisive choice between the MPLA and the UPA. They're just waiting to see who is going to be able to produce.

((What about da Cruz? What is his function))

He has no function except to write articles about Angola, which he has done, one of which he signed with his own name. He has very little money and he hoped that Verges would be able to smooth the way with the Chinese, but alas! poor fellow, he learnt to his horror, I understand, that Verges was by no means the Chinese agent that he ~~assumed~~ presumed him to be. I understand that he has virtually retired from politics . He is a poet. And he'd much rather be a poet than anything else. He told me on several occasions ~~that~~ in Paris when he came to my house there for dinner that really he wished he could get out of the whole thing, but what was he going to do, ~~he~~ didn't have a passport, he had ~~also these~~ all these people sort of pushing him in into this. He didn't have any money. He didn't know what to do.

Viriato de Cruz

((He lives in Paris))

No, he lives in Algiers. He is still in Algiers to the best of my knowledge. He is one of the people in Algiers I would see. If I were to go to Algiers I would ~~xxxxhimx~~ look him up. He's not terribly dynamic but events ~~xxrxxxf~~ threw him up into a leading position and he sort of stuck there and doesn't know how to get out. The Chinese haven't given him the all-out support that he had hoped for

((Neither have they turned him down))

No.

((Amilcar Cabrera))

That was a name used, not a pseudonym, a false name. It doesn't represent anyone, it represents the FALN, of Venezuela in Europe. They have a bureau in France. I didn't really know them. I knew there were several people. One of them, a graphic artist, some of whose drawings ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ were printed in Revolution. They brought the things ~~to him~~. They are authentic. Because when Verges had a young French boy traveling through Latin America he went to Venezuela. They got him into the guerrillas. They got him all around. We had some very authentic first-hand reports. So whoever they are they are authentic. They were very, very cautious, probably suspicious of me because I was an American, so I never had any real ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ conversation with them.

((Do you known anything about who Verges's link to them was))

No.

((Do you know if he still has them))

I know this, that they asked him to remove the name Amilcar Cabrera and it has been removed, because it was identified with them. ~~So~~ He then put in a note in the twelfth French edition that in the future he would receive an article from the information department of the FALN. They'd be foolish not to send material, but they didn't want to be identified with the editorial policy of the magazine. This many reflect various tendencies inside of the FALN which I have read about. I don't know anything first-hand, that they split between a hard line, those who want to continue the guerrilla struggle and the sabotage struggle and those who want to look for possible negotiated solutions. One group, ~~that is~~ a little more pro-Chinese.

FALN

In any case these people did represent the FALN, there is no doubt about it. I didn't know any of them. They never had any dealings with me.

((Patricia Magowan))

I know very little about her. She did this book on Portugal. She was connected with the —— she has ties with the British Communist Party but also with British Trotskyists. She was the one who found Rosalind Ainslie to work here in London for the magazine. She is the mistress of a man named Carlos

(~~(Walk)~~ (Lanca?))

I'm not certain. That might be it. He is a European born in Mozambique, a Portuguese, who has been kept going by various African movements for years because he represents (laughing) ~~to be~~ what the French call an interlocateur, when they want to call him out obviously Neto does ~~xxxxx~~ have some American support as well or had some American support. His father did, I think.

((Do you know Michael Tabasa))

No, never heard of him.

((We come to Maspero))

Maspero

Maspero is just a third-generation French elite intellectual who has a little bit of money, runs a publishing house, and magazine, and who is extremely non-committed in his Left commitment. In other words he is a leftist but he is not a member of any party and is not really involved in active politics. His magazine more and more is taken over by Trotskyists at present. That was not always the case. He came really to the fore with the Algerian War. Considering the failure of the French Communist Party to do anything about ~~XXX~~ the Algerian question, it was intellectuals, the ~~the left~~ Intellectuals who were out of the party who responded, who made up the Jensen network, the support ~~network~~ for the ~~the~~ FLN underground in France, and who did the propaganda work and who gave the support. If ~~is~~ the FLN had French support it was among these people, not among the Communist party.

((Verges consistent efforts to))

Yes.

To wean ~~xxxx~~ away authors (from Maspero). Hassan Riab wrote for him. Chalion, whom he got for Revolution Africaine wrote for him and now is back again working for him, writing for him. [illegible] ~~Cassell~~ also. [illegible] ~~Chen~~ also. Almost everyone. Even I knew him because he published student material and he used ~~to things to~~ [illegible] in the States and I had correspondence and I used to send him material that we had.

((The competition between Verges and Maspero- was this a personal as opposed to ideological competition))

No it was personal. There is very little ideological about Verges.

Verges

Verges is an extremely ~~heady~~ [illegible], personal person. He is generous in many ways but ~~xx~~ even his generosity is [illegible] personally. ~~He is either for you.~~ ~~xx~~ He is a grand patron. He is extremely generous with money when he has it. He throws it around. You could never go anywhere with Verges that he doesn't ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ want to pay. When we traveled it was ~~most times~~ first class, ~~xxxxxxanythingxxxxx~~ on a plane. He ~~XX~~ has a deep-seated desire to be big, (he is a small man, he is short) to be talked about. He wants publicity. He wants to be known. He doesn't have any real commitments, I ~~don't~~ think, that are terribly deep. And I'm certain that if he were sure of money from the other side but nevertheless so that his name would stay big, I'll bet he'd. . . ~~He wants money not for himself but for prestige. After all Verges's father was the founder of the Communist Party-~~

money not for itself but for prestige. After all, Verges's father was the founder of the Communist party of Reunion, member of the French Assembly. His ~~Hm~~ brother is the head of the Communist party of ~~the Lille~~ [illegible] right now.

Verges

He grew up in this sort of French Left-wing upper class, which in France is the hereditary Left which goes all the way back to 1848 or before. Some families were extremely distinguished. ~~They really had~~ . And he is in that sort of group. ~~thing... xxxxxxxxxxxxfamilies~~ In France it is very much ~~xxx~~ respected, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ just as you might respect [illegible] ~~Flandeu~~ family. You know that a member of such and such a family obviously must be Left ~~but~~ because his grandfather and his greatgrandfather were.

((Maspero again))

Maspero fits just into that category.

((That same Leftist heritage))

That's right.

((Does he run his operation on a self-sustaining commercial basis))

More or less except that for instance he published a book on China recently, which the Chinese ~~subsidizers~~ and [illegible] subsidized. I suspect that he has received some aid from the Italian Communist party. The Italians look with great favor on him because of his openness, his critical approach, his Anti-Stalinism. Andersson says he got money from the Chinese for this book on China.

Verges has tried desperately to smear him with the Chinese as a Trotskyite but apparently the Chinese didn't give a damn.

((You said that the Trotskyists seem to be moving in on Maspero))

Yes.

((Would they be giving him any kind of financial aid))

I really doubt it. The Trotskyists generally are poor. ~~I don't think so~~. I think that what it is, is that he is really short of hands, short of manuscripts, short of people ~~xxxxxxxx~~ who can think and produce something. And here are these Trotskyist-leaning ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ intellectuals who don't have any outlet, so naturally.. It's just that he doesn't ~~have to~~ doesn't have any great sectarian feelings against them, so more and more tend to come in.

((Andre Belge))

Never heard of him.

(Neither have I. ~~xxxxx~~ Imokay in Nigeria)

Oh, Imokay is a student. He's no bureau man at all. He was a student at the university of ~~Enxxx~~ Ensuka. He distributed the magazine. ~~He never did anything~~ else.

He never did anything else. ~~Just a student, grddxttaxxjs~~ he has graduated now. I think he is working in the government somewhere.

((Did he get paid))

No- oh yes, he did, he got a commission on subscriptions. He got 30-some subscriptions from students at the university, in one week, as I recall, which was unheard of. Just a student, and just by sheer chance he handled the magazine.

((Mme. Michele Mestre))

Oh, My, Michele Mestre ~~ixxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Madame Mestre I don't know anything about. Michel Mestre is one of Maspero's people. I thought it was a man. I've never met him, don't know anything about him. I know there is a Michel Mestre who has written a number of books on the Congo for Maspero. Had nothing to do with Verges although Verges did put out feelers to get this person, man or woman, to work for Revolution. He wasn't successful. It was part of his general campaign of leaving Maspero with no authors at all.

((Rosalind Ainslie))

She's married. She works for the East German news agency ~~APN~~ ADN. She is obviously connected with the South African Communist party. She is a member of the Congress Alliance in South Africa and she is married to an Indian. She has ~~some~~ several children and she lives here in London. She comes from a wealthy family in South Africa, I imagine. She was found by Patricia Mcgowan Pinheiro to work for Revolution. That flopped after a short period. They didn't know which way to go, to stick with the Algerians or stick with Verges. The business of the magazine being pro-Chinese by no means was obvious, nor even clear in Verges's mind. The magazine wasn't pro-Chinese for an awful long time, ~~it wasn't a~~ question of being pro-Chinese. Certainly not when I was hired. It was Algerian, that was all.

Ainslie

((Americans attending subversive sabotage school in Prague))

I never heard of a subversive sabotage school in Prague. The Americans that I have known (who were) going through Prague have gone to Havana.

((Between Moscow and Havana en route))

Yes. I ~~dont~~ don't know anything about a subversive sabotage school. I don't doubt that there might be one. I imagine there's one in Washington too.

((I never heard of it. Either one))

(Laughs)

((Current addresses of some of these people))

Well, who do you want? ~~Chen~~ Kiem now, has no address. He sleeps around everywhere. He literally was sleeping on my floor at one point. If you had told me, I could have brought my book. I gave you people whom I contacted on my trip.

Hamsa [illegible] I can give you his- 74 ~~Hartford~~ [illegible] Road London NW 11

FALN- they have an office here in London. I don't have much.

Mammi, BP 35, Plateau [illegible] Saulière, 121 Rue Mouradidouch, Algiers. I have a bigger address book at home.

((You mentioned DuBois. Do you know very much about his group in Ghana)

Dr. DuBois had a number of people around him but he ~~is~~ was an elderly man; he was more interested in producing the African Encyclopoedia than anything else, which he did set up before his death. His wife is now one of the directors of Ghana television. She is a Ghana citizen, she has renounced her American citizenship. There are a number of people who are close to her or were close to Dr. DuBois such as Dr. Alpheus Hunton who is an American Negro who has written on Africa, and works for the enclycloposdia, The Ghana Institute. He was a member of the Communist party of the US. I think Shirley Graham may have been a member. Certainly Dr. DuBois became a member several years before his death. At the time of his death he was extremely pro-Chinese and was very unhappy. His wife, Shirley Graham DuBois, is very pro-Chinese. There is William Gardner Smith, an American Negro writer, who works for Ghana radio and who worked with me at the AgenceFrance Presse in Paris. Smith is close to Shirley Graham, or was. ~~Mayfield.~~ There is a girl by the name of ~~Maya~~ Miya Angelou, who was married, still married but separated, to form representative of the PAC in South Africa in Accra. He has been removed from his post for misappropriation of funds- ~~Musisi~~ Vu[illegible] Make. Those are the ones that I know of.

((Subsidiary question- Hammer and Steel))

The Hammer and Steel group in Boston is an alleged Chinese group that operates in Boston, (they are) former members of the US Communist party. After a period of inactivity it has suddenly become active and not more than a few days ago, while I was out of the country, without any effort on my behalf (i.e. my own part) they had my address here and I received two of their publications. Two recent publications, ~~here in London,~~ which were sent to my London address. So someone here, someplace, has sent them my new address. Very interesting that they should have it. We had an exchange ~~with the with~~ between them and Revolution, but I had not kept this up. They have just formed a so-called New England party of Labor which is supposed to be ~~the~~ the Chinese party, Marxist-Leninist party, and is opposed and they give the reasons for their opposition to the progressive labor group and to the POC, Provisional Organizing Committee for a new Marxist-Leninist party which was an old pro-Albanian group. Progressive Labor is of course a split ~~off~~ from the Communist party and split off because of the Cuban revolution and the civil rights question and so forth. POC has a large number of Negro and Puerto Rican members, almost the majority of them. PL has a number of Negro contacts and has been extremely active in the South but has made some serious mistakes. They had people in Monroe, North Carolina, after Williams. Taking Williams place they ~~had~~ sent a white man, which is a ridiculous thing to do. They didn't understand what ("Black [illegible]") nationalism means.

This new Hammer and Steel group, which has been a sort of group without a party, has now announced the formation of this New England Party of Labor which they hope will be the nucleus of a new Chinese Communist Party in the United States. But I don't know anything about them. (sic!!)

((Back to Switzerland))

(How long were you in Lausanne.))

From March, 1963, to ~~September of~~ December 63. Then I used to go back every month [illegible] magazine [illegible].

((What contact did you maintain there))

With Andersson.

((Did you have any American contacts))

No. What do you mean- with the American Embassy?

((Any Arab contacts))

No. Just the people that came in and out of Andersson's place. But I didn't . . Being an American I was very much aware of the fact that everybody was suspicious of me. So I made it a point not to bother.

((You talked about Drapeau Rouge. Is there any relationship with the John Llewellyn Davis Red Flag))

(laughing) Who is John Llewellyn Davis! That sounds like something out of- - - The Drapeau Rouge is a group of young, French students, university and licee students who had been connected with the youth group of the JSU which is the PSU, ~~the party~~ [roughly equivalent to] the Nenni Socialist Party in France. This was their youth group. They were dissatisfied with - - for instance, the Belgian section, ~~Arras~~. One of the boys had been in ~~Chen~~'s philosophy class in Licee had got in touch with ~~Chan~~ and he had given them advice and helped them to form this group, 64 or to continue ~~They continued~~ the group and it produced a news letter. He had promised them money. They put out one issue, and he never got any money. I heard that they were in contact with the Clichy group down [illegible] and were seeking some sort of recognition there, ~~and~~ among the things that they had promised they did a self-criticism admitting that they had done wrong to have accepted ~~Chea~~ Kiva's supervision and saying that they will never do this again.

((John Llewellyn ~~Davis~~ Davis, you say who the hell is he))

Yes.

((We talked about Pablo. Is this Michael Ra[illegible]))

He is a member of the Trotskyist IVth International - or was. He has been expelled ~~fee~~ for his heretical views, not that they all don't have heretical views, but his were extremely pro-Algerian. I think he has become an Algerian citizen. He is Belgian, I believe, or Dutch, but I think it is Belgian. He was arrested in Holland. He worked ~~for~~ with the FLN during the War, went to Algeria, was arrested in Holland, spent some time in jail, was released, went to Algiers with his wife and became very active in the Bureau de Biens Vacantes, ~~and then~~ later the Bureau of the Socialist Sector. His influence has been of an ideological nature and he has very close ties with the Yugoslavs, ~~and~~ despite his Trotskyism and he has now been expelled, he is also not at all persona non grata with the Soviets. He has a group called Pabloites.

'Pablo'

((How did he hit on Pablo))

This was his nom de guerre, I suppose.

He represented for a while a majority tendency in the international Trotskyist movement. ~~helped~~ being held by the American SWP Socialist Workers Party. Finally expelled. I don't know the ins and outs of the Trotskyists very much.

((When did you first run into him))

I had heard of him for years. The first time I saw him in the flesh was sitting in a cafe in Algiers. I never had anything to do with him. He used to hang out in a cafe which was right under the offices of Revolution Africaine, which was sort of a center for European Leftists and whatnot. It was called the Cafe Very (?) [illegible]

((Did he ever have anything to do with Revolution))

He made have had something to do with it later with Harbi but not under Verges.

((I meant in Europe, not Algiers.))

No, no, nothing.

((Do you know anything about the formerly dissident PDP of Montreux?, Th, Pro-Chinese Communist party of Switzerland)

They've got it wrong. There's only one pro-Chinese Communist party and that's the so-called Parti Comuniste Suisse, started in Vevey ~~Verve~~, not Monteaux, Vevey, [illegible] ~~Verve~~, Nestle's headquarters. Headed by Gerard Bulliard, a small businessman who has become a member of the PLP, ~~that~~ the Communist Party. He went ~~When~~ to Albania last year, last ~~summer~~, as a tourist, and sold the Albanians on the idea of supporting a breakaway Marxist-Leninist party. He came back to Switzerland and with five people formed this Swiss Communist Party, which grew to the awesome size of ~~they often size of~~ 35 people. Andersson was hostile at first, but when the Chinese took a more or less benevolent view on it in Berne, he went along, ~~and~~ He (Bulliard) may have received some money from the Chinese, I don't know. But we know that he received money from Albania. He became increasingly quarrelsome, he was very much worried about Andersson because Andersson was printing his newspaper, L'Etincelle (The Spark) on [illegible]. ~~He owned~~ this offset press in Lausanne. Anderson also was recruiting people for the group and he has more connections inside the Communist party, the PLP, than Bulliard ~~Guilliard~~ did, since Bulliard ~~he~~ had been only a recent member. ~~The~~ Lausanne group became larger than the Verve group. I don't know what happened after that. But ~~then~~, relations deteriorated rapidly and both the Albanians and the Chinese realized that they had made a drastic mistake. Bulliard then phoned the Albanians or ~~and~~ the Chinese in Berne and told them that if he didn't receive 3000 francs by a certain time of day that he would denounce Andersson to the police. Obviously, he didn't receive the 3000 francs and he went to the police about gun running and one thing and another - some of it [illegible] some real. Apparently they (police) knew more than Bulliard about Andersson ~~him~~. Then Bulliard ~~he~~ got a delegation and went to the Federal Council, to the Parliament in Berne, and ~~they~~ made an open public request ~~demand~~ that this foreign agent, this Swedish national, who had taken advantage of Swiss neutrality ~~hospitality~~, be expelled. The Federal Police came in. They banned Revolution and there was the gneral blowup. ~~They~~ didn't get very far, except that now it is suspected that Bulliard ~~he~~ is more or less subsidized by the Swiss police, that he is keeping ~~it~~ going and it ~~going and~~ his group, is down to about 15 people, according to Andersson. He obviously has a small amount of money which he is not getting from the Chinese. He later told Andersson, he proposed ~~that~~ Andersson retire definitely from politics, if he would ~~he would~~ be paid the sum of 5,200 Swiss francs. The reason for this was he wanted to keep the mimeograph machine that he (Andersson) had given him and he was deducting the price. I think he wanted 7,000 francs altogether for his exit from politics.

but he was willing to deduct the price of the mimeograph machine. He didn't receive that either. So he can't be considered very (important). At one point, to show you how silly he is, he was in contact with Kevin ? DELVIN ! Delman of Radio Free Europe, in Munich, asking him to organize a meeting for him there. This I found out ~~throu~~ through the Congress for Cultural Freddom people. With his copies of "Heinid(?) he has many ties, [illegible] with his furniture business and his wine business. He also sells wine.

((Relationship and persons involved in ~~of~~ Revolution with the New ~~[illegible]~~ Left~~ist~~ review in Great Britain)

They didn't particularly agree with the views of Revolution but they were sympathetic neverthess. They are ~~lef~~tists, some inside the Labor Party, people like ~~Balin~~ Thomas ~~Balig~~ Balogh, one of the economic advisers, they are very well connected here (Labour Party). They helped us here for a while. Hamsa Alavi had friends (among them). Dennis Phombeah also knew the editors, Perry Anderson, Roger Murray, who is now in Ghana, professor Hodgkins of the African Study Institute in Accra. There was no connection other than that, sympathetic cooperation. They were willing to help. Their views are quite different. They're not Communists. We weren't Communists either.

((They didn't buy space. You just swapped ads))

Yes. That's a normal arrangement between magazines. You exchange advertising.

((Movement for Colonial Freedom))

With Movement for Colonial Freedom ~~is~~ it was the same thing. We got very little real cooperation from ~~[illegible]~~ Movement for Colonial Freedom. We exchanged ads, they promised to accept subscriptions on our behalf but John Eber, who is the Secretary, was very much afraid that he might lose Algerian support, because Movement for Colonial Freedom ~~did~~ depends on getting support from all different African countries, Asian countries, etc. Therefore anything that might be anti-governmental in terms of Algeria he was very much afraid of. He is an ex-Communist. He told me - "What are you doing going around with Phombeah? He has been here with Harbi, the week before you ~~come~~ came with him. Which side are they on?" Phombeah walked in just as he ~~[illegible]~~ was saying this, and overheard it. He (Eber) was very embarrassed, but ~~he~~ he had to go on with it. Phombeah said, "I'm just helping all the brothers- -" (laughing) He was hopeless.

I have both children home now. This is mid-term, so the little boy is out.

My exact address: 30 Stockl~~ey~~eigh Hall an apartment house on Prince Albert Road, 21-31 engrance. 4th floor.

((Cannot give definitive answer for some time, would advise- play it reasonably safe, maintain access you have or could ~~x8~~ reestablish.))

My problem is short-range. I need money by next week. I have people who want me to write things. The things about Revolution, nobody particularly will care about. That's no embarrassment to anybody. Not even to the Chinese. Andersson said in fact they would be rather pleased with it, if somebody would finally get this off their backs, because they can't say anything at all. I'm committed to write the article for Encounter. There's a letter, [illegible] which is appearing in the current issue of the China Quarterly. The question is what to do with the Atlantic Monthly people.

I've got to arrange something quickly. I didn't expect the situation to crop up quite so quickly as this. It was relatively well taken care of when I left here, with my brother-in-law but my wife has gone and fixed up, loused up. ~~some~~ things with her brother which makes it extremely difficult. I can probably get some more money, but not very much more out of the Encounter people. They have already given me a large sum of money, more than they expected-, they expected Atlantic Monthly to come through and pick up part of it, which they never did. Now it is a question of exchange of letters. (Just one or two mis-steps and the whole thing ... So far as Revolution is concerned, I can continue this article, but I have the problem of getting money. That should be self-evident.

Anyway, I shall try to hold things off. I'm going to try to see if I can arrange something, as a temporary emergency measure, this afternoon. If I can and if I'm successful, then everything will be all right ~~for~~ till the end of next week.

((I can let you have $200 this afternoon.))

That would certainly be a great, (help) That would be very helpful. That would solve my needs-- Thirty-five pounds. How muchis £35, in dollars?

((Under $150.00)) ([illegible])

That's what, I need. That's what I actually need, immediately. If I take care of that I'm off the hook until next week. Now I've got to go and clear myself with Lasky of Encounter. You haven't been in touch with Lasky in any way, have you, with these Encounter people?

(No)

Well, somebody has. Some very strange- - you see the Congress for Cultural Freedom are sort of pushing in the background, and I know vaguely that they have the idea that maybe, that I might like to take a long-term ~~for long term,~~ job, with them in Paris. Personally I'm not terribly keen on some of the things the Congress for Cultural Freedom does. Some things are not too bad, besides the pay. But worse still, my wife would just about blow sky high over the Congress for Cultural Freedom, even though she knows Chi Quarterly and Encounter were subsidized by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Encounter is no longer. But there has been a lot of hankypank going on between them . Even the letter- I told you about the letter. They did everything possible to try to keep the editor of Chi Quarterly ~~to keep~~ from printing the letter, telling him all sorts of reasons, that it would blow my cover completely, and then the money that I got from Encounter, Lasky said well, maybe you won't write anything at all. I don't know, why They give me any money at all, send me off to write. .

((I don't know. You're talking mysteries to me))

As I say there are verious people who are hovering around and since I've been back, now here is the truth, he (Castro) hasn't bothered to really, to find out what I have.

((Couple of questions occur to me-- you mention the possibility of going to Paris to work for Congress for Cultural Freddom. . . Would you also be interested if things worked out, in going back to Algeria)

Oh, yes.

(To stay)

Sure. Certainly. All I need is a proper cover, ~~one that is not a~~ that's (yet) very hard. The suspicions of these groups are extremely slight. There was a fellow we haven't mentioned. You've probably heard about Dr. Robert Ramsey who was an American who was in Zanzibar. He's now locked up in jail in Algeria. He may be a Negro although I doubt it. I've never met him. I think that he's white, a liberal, member of the NAACP and all sorts of things. I forget what he's a doctor of, not M.D. He was sending out wild letters in favor of the Zanzibar revolution.

Then he claimed he was expelled from Kenya by sinister forces. He didn't have a US passport. He was here without a US passport. For a short time the British National Council for Civil Liberties gave him some support and the next thing I knew he was in Algeria. Now what is game is, and whether he is just a crackpot, God knows. Every revoltionary movement brings forth such a bunch of screwballs as one can only see inside a madhouse, you know.

((He's now in jail?))

Now in jail, in Algeria no charges against him. I understand the US EMbassy is trying to get him out (laughing). I don't know whether Dr. Ramsey was actually an agent of some kind, although he had too many confusions to be really a good agent. Yes, too confused. There was too much wrong. In any case, what I found was that people were generally (got very suspicious) if you had something to do and didn't live too lavishly, though Africans don't question too much on money. This business of feathering one's nest goes on all over Africa, apparently in Algeria now more than ever. Andersson said there are large transfers of money by Algerian francs into Switzerland (which are still being bought up by the opposition ~~even still~~ for their own purposes, One day.

Yes, Algeria would be fine-- provided I could find some reasonable - any kind of a newspaper assignment , a vaguely Left thing, better than anything else. but the more innocuous the better.

((You said once before, you fit well in Algeria, you didn't fit well in Black Africa))

I could move throughout Africa, but one has to start ~~chart~~ ones- thing. For instance, for me to go to Ghana would create, at this point, innumerable suspicions, but to go to Algeria where ~~when~~ I have people like Georges [illegible] Arnaud? ~~Arnaux~~ who is a very close personal friend, they would welcome me, and try to find something for me to do . . -- That would be easy to arrange. And from there I have South African friends ~~in the~~ with both PAC and ANC, I have very good contacts. Wherever they have offices I can move inside. But one has to have some reasonable sort of thing. On this trip I used some of the Afro-American journals, the magazine (Encounter) which was quite successful in some places. In fact Grippa said, "why don't I have this magazine. They send it to Verges and don't send it to me." Nevertheless with Grippa there was some suspicion. And I had the opinion-- I'm not paranoic and I don't like playing cops and robbers- or go for cloak and dagger stuff, but I had the opinion that somebody was watching me, was following me when I left there, which was one reason why I didn't see all the people I was going to see. I knew some Trotskyists there who (could) give me some stories about Grippa's organization - they're on the fringes of it, etc.- but I just didn't go to see them because I thought that Grippa might have someone watching to see where I was gong. He wouldn't like the connection with Trotskyites, anyway.

((I'll be away. . closed on Monday. Washington's birthday))

Oh, my God, is it?

((You'll have to buy a cherry pie this week end))

The kids know all about the cherry tree.

((Can you come on Tuesday))

Yes. But my coming in and out of this Embassy is not the best thing in the world. Right over there are the Indonesians, whom I know. Around the corner are the Cubans who know me very well. All it would take is one Cuban to see me walk in here.... I can always concoct a reason but . . I don't know how many people are watching. For one thing, ~~take~~ certainly the British Home Office, they've had me under surveillance ever since I've been here . There's no doubt about that. I got a tip on that from ~~Mark Kegel~~ Tim Ennals of the National Council of Civil Liberties. . .
British may be allies and all, but after all....

As far as my wife is concerned, she is by no means a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. She is not a Communist at all, never has been, but she would not like that in the slightest.
. . I can't get her to understand. .

Editorial signs

(( ))	query or comment by interviewer
( )	editorial insert
------- or - - -	omission
. . .	incomplete statement
--	dash

Taape No. 3 Gibson

((What do you think about that - Malcoam X))

I could have told you it was coming.

((Well, you did. You didn't single out Malcolm X))

it becomes make
Now comes the real thing. It's going to ~~affxxx~~ the Algerian struggle. You remember the Algerian struggle throughoutwas marked by clashes between the MNA and the FLN right up to and after the Independence. And this is what is going to happen now in the States, as far as I can see. But what I don't really like is -- there are so many small groups, uncontrollable
little
groups, kids, fifteen-year-old kids who are planning to shoot the President, and that sort of thing. You don't know how far it goes.
leading what, at this point.
So the idea of being a leader- leader of what? As to Black Ghettoes, there this thing-- I don't know (who responsible).

((Do you think that was Elijah))

I'm not at all certain. There are many, many, many people who would be glad to see Malcoam out of the way. For one thing, it does resolve a cettain problem and that -is, there was a clash, certainly it was going to come about between Williams's group and Boggs' men in Detroitx and Malcolm X, people who were more committed to an armed struggle. Malcolm's major contradiction was that he ~~xxixxx~~-- logically, what he was preaching
w
gould have led even to negotiations with Washington, to some kind of arrangement, or else to an armed struggle, an underground struggle. As soo n
as you on
have a vocal leader who is exposed and who is in the country, one hand he knew what was happening. He was very much aware of this proliferation of groups and activities, like the little business of Walter Bowe, which
~~really~~
~~was highly innocuous, in comparison~~

highly symbolic and almost innocuous, in comparison with some of the things His trips abroad, most of his btips abroad were in a way - he wanted to create unity by contacts with Williams and otherxx people, but here, in Europe and Cairo. One of the problems that he had was simply in getting
see
to Williams. He didn't want to go to Havana. He probably could have brought an extraordinary amount of pressure on the State Department to allow him to go as a journalist or something like that if he really wanted to. But
a
he didn't want to, because he didn't want to be exposed on political issue which might have cost him support. So where was he going to see Williams? Prague, perhaps, Moscow. But he didn't want to go to Eastern European countries either.

aims
((You said that one of his ~~things~~ might have been to negotiate with

Washington))

Exactly. At first the whole idea was that there was going to be a Black State. This was originally. But no one had any real. . . except for Elijah Muhammed's people -- I think that some of them did have. You saw the London Times article todayx? One of the things that disgusted him with the Elijah group was this talks with the American Nazi Party and with the Ku Klux Klan, particularly with the Klan, to buy a county, if you will, a county in Georgia, which the Ku Klux Klan was going to sell. They were going to see that all property in the country was turned over and this was going to be the nucleus of a Black State. He felt that the Muslims were seeking to perpetuate segregation for their purposes. He really was not a segregationist nor did he at the end believe in -- he wasn't a racist. This is whole thing, backing away from a religous point, from a racist poin trying to find some modus vivendi for a modified Black nationalism. But he wanted to talkx this over. Thisxisxhisx I don't know if he ever had any contacts with anyone beside New York City and State officials and police. He had rather good relations. He was extremely moderate in person and you could talk to him. I think this is what he really wanted or what would have come out of it. He just wanted the contact - to feel that there was somebody opposite him. To a lot of these people, thisx a lot of the stink could be taken out just bx by talking to them, not necessarily with publicity.

for benefit
((If he wasn't involved on the racial or theological grounds, what was))

Not a racist. For instance, it is said that the Muslims are anti-white and there is an anti-white elementx, and particularly xxd an anti-Semitic elementx, directed against Jewish shopkeepers. Obviously the Jewish shopkeepers, being exposed, being in the Ghetto, the resentment comes out against them. In New York it comes out against the Jewish element in the garment district. as many Negroes work in the garment district. It is unskilled, underpaid. and sweat shop type of thing. I must say that Malcolm sometimes played this tune himself. He knew it was facile, and also it pleased the Arabs. frxxxxx from whom he received considerable support.

((You mean the Cairo type Arabs?))

Yesx, the Nassertype. I don't know how much support he ever received financially, but I think they did receive support. And also the Black Muslimsx did receive support at certain times. It was no accident that he set xup a headquarters in exile in Cairo. He did go to Ghana and I know that in Ghana he was attacked by the orthodox Marxists. They are the first to launch an attack, for Black fascism or something. I feel that he was evolving, trying to get out of a box. His reaction was that of a Negro who

Grew ~~goes~~ up in a Ghetto, who becomes a criminal under pressures, he is intellignt he ix extremely intelligent. Not an intellectual but far more capable as an organizer say, than Williams. Williams is utterly hopeless. ~~And~~ He is not slow to catch ideas, but he has certain fixed ideas which have developed, certainly under pressure. Malcolm was moving and he as a figure could have done a lot too.

((Was this a maturing))

Yes, a maturing, a process of facing reality also. I suppose this is an explanation to a large extent of why there are so many children who are young kids, who are really involved in (the nationalist movement). They're facile, frustrated. They don't know what elsei They feel that the older organizations are i ncapable of doing anything for them. There is a class thing. They feel that there is sort of a Black bourgeoisie for whom there is now in general a possibility of integration, has sold them out, but they, but they who live in the Ghettoes, who go to the bad schools, who come out of poor homes and so forth, by the time they're sixteen, ~~they~~ their hope of, their the real hopes ~~of~~ integration, of being something in contemporary American society, is dead. It's this whole business, the motivation in schools, the good schools, the housing and the family even. If a child grsows up in a home where they don't have books- there is a great difference between a Jewish child in the Lower East Side, ~~and~~ no matter how poor that family, motivated by a ~~hmmm~~ long Jewish tradition, ~~mxxxxxNx~~ and a Negro child or, worse still, a Puerto Rican child, Middle Class ideals are beginning to sink down into the ~~Jewish~~ Negro community, but among Puerto Ricans there is an even greater gap, so I understand, ---------

Many of these Negro kids, they just feel this enormous wall around them, and one of the things that I am most aware of, even-- when I was a child, I grew up in Philadelphia. Many of my friends were white. We lived in a neighborhood in West Philadelphia which had Negro and white Irish, Italians, ~~Catholics~~, Jewish people, Italian, in proximity. Lived in the same block. That neighborhood now is solidly black. The school I went to was always mixed. Now most of these schools are black. There is more de facto segregati today, yhrough real estate, through housing, than there was 20 years ago.

((Is this intentional or is this because this was an area that was mixed and where a Negro could move in and so Negroes did.))

Yes. One of the problems is that around most American cities the city line marks the end of expansion for Negroes. They can't move into the suburbs. A middle class Negro who has money can move into the sububbs. And what areas they can move into are filled up . The whites flee out of the city,xX

((Washington would be the primary example of that))

Washington is that much more complicated because you are in the midst of the Southern States. Except that I notice, I have relatives that live around Washington. As a kid I used to go to Washington every summer. And going out towards Chevy Chase and Montgomery county, the Maryland side, there is a certain desegregation that has gone on. Obviously on the Virginia side it is the opposite. Also the Maryland counties to the South. That is a more segregated area. That is also the history-- the sort of slave line. in Maryland before the Civil War sort of went where Washington is now. across the State, to the South were they grow tobacco there was slavery, to the North there was no slavery. And there was a great deal of intermarriage- not intermarriage but racial intermixture. I have relatives who are to all intents and purposes white. When I was a child and went there in the summer, I really had no real awareness of race. It was a curious back~~ground~~ [illegible] of interracial mixture, that had gone on just before and after the Civil War. Now that has changed considerably., [illegible] That's in Montgomery county.

I brought the address book.

((It's extremely interesting to consider the racial problem at home but I would like to finish this up.))

Yes. What sort of addresses do you want.

NN

((The people we talked about))

Note names & addresses

This is Hassan Riad. ~~Amoui~~ Amin is his name, we ~~may have Ameer~~ S. AMIN. Boit postale . 3186 - Dakar, Senegal

M. Amiabel. was a Canadian, former Communist. He was setting up, he did set up a pro-Chinese group near Vancouver. Apparently there was considerable activity there. (6323 Marine Drive, Burnaby 3, B.C., Canada)

This is address of the Mulana. To the best of my knowledge Verges never heard from himx yet (Bhashani – c/o Janata Weekly, 16/20 Haba Roy Lane Dacca 1, E. Pak.)

~~Vosegra~~ BOSGRA Is a very interesting person, in Holland. He is a man who works with Andersson occasionally. He is not a Communist, is a vague Leftist with the ~~Christian Pacifists~~, the Pacifist Socialist Party, in Holland, which has gathered in a strange grouping of Leftists. He has contacts with the Angolans and Algerians. He goes to Algeria quite often. I have a feelin' he is somewhat connected with the ~~Giriut~~ Curiel people. (Vinkenstraat 13" Amsterdam (Angola Comite)

CHARTR [illegible] Montreal P.Q., Canada

Michel
Chartain xix, you know. He is secretary general of the Partie Socialiste de Quebec and is of course very much connected with the Cubans. And has had a great deal of contact with American Negro groupsx of the Left.

- GLN, Congo, in Brazzaville. It's so open, and so obvious, you know. They used to send things

CUELLAR - (Apartado Aéreo 13777, Zone 1 Bogota - or Ap. Aereo 15332 Bogota

In Colombia, Alfonso ~~Quoila~~- this address is where they receive
Not(?)
special materials. Things that they think will get by the censorship.
These things came from peking. They came to Revolution.

* The one great advantage of Revolution was if one watched it closely you could find i . . at one time, not any more, but certainly in the arly period, they weren't told by the Chinese to come there but they had seen Revolution on sale. (Orlando LINERO - Calle 56, No. 63-30, Barranquilla, Colombia)

17
Colonia Anahuac Mexico D.F.
Federico Emery, was a Mexican ~~settler~~ citizen, who had been in Peking and was supposed to be representing thex Mexican Marxist-Leninist group, the pro-Chinese group. (Tizoc # 19, Col. Anahuac, Mexico 17, D.F.)

Jurema Finamour, this poor Brazilian. who was involved in a most vague way. Verges put this person's name- I don't know whether it is a man or woman- think it's a woman- on the magazine, actually never received xxtyxn anything from her. I heard later that she was pro-Moscow, certainly not pro-Chinese. She's probably in jail now, after the coup down there.

~~iMmsxJsxmmmxPxymmx~~

M. { MxcJean ~~Fayon~~ FALLOT. This is the fellow who was Communist leader in the still Haute Loire, who is the only one who is still supposed to remain in contact.

Le Chambon sur Lignon, Haute Loire Everybody knows Mrs. Gunawardene . The Russians claim is parachuted everywhere. (P.O. Box 300, Dept 245, Peking)

Gregorio Goldenberg, in Peking, is Chilean. He works, think he works, inside of the Foreign Languages press. He is correspondent for El Mundo. of Havana. At one time he was correspondent for the Cuban radio. He was a very curious fellow. He wanted to set x up a Spanish edition of Revolution with Chinese money and offered to do this, when he came through Paris, hmix about a year ago. Verges managed to avoid ever giving him any answer on this. He actually offered to bring the money. for this.

Han Su-yin. Very interested in the magazine. She sent material from Cambodia and Verges does have some contacts in Cambodia, someone in the office of Norodom Sihanouk ~~Norda~~. A Frenchman, I think his name is Mayer. He was close to the chief of state.

Elpheus Hunter. W. A. ~~Hunter~~ Hunton. Anyone would know him in Accra.

(undoubtedly Charles Meyer, well-known figure in Phnom Penh

His group at the university of Ghent, which no longer exists, so ~~xx~~I'm told.

Masao KITAZAWA - 20 Muhammed Said Flat 81, Cairo
~~gawa~~, was the Japanese representative to the Afro-Aszian Solidarity Conference . He used to pass through Paris quite regularly. I don't think he is there any longer. Was much interested in the magazine. He used to use the ~~pxxyix~~ pseudonym of Walter Joh~~xxxx~~ sometimes.

Ab ~~Corina~~ Karina? was one of the leaders of the SWAPU ~~Swapo~~ of Southwest Africa.

used to send in articles. I knew him personally from New York.

has been going back and forth between Peking and also East Germany and West Germany. He's playing all sides. on this Southwest Africa thing.

Corengizi is the head of SWANU ~~Swanu~~, the other Southwest Africa group. (SWANU & SWAPU) ~~Thexs~~ They have a unity. . once there was a struggle between Karina ~~Corina~~ and Korengizi ~~Cochambina~~. Karina ~~C~~ was virtually eliminated. Karina ~~Corina~~ is an American agent, and so forth. The Last story that I heard about Karina ~~Corina~~ was that he was working for the Peace Corps in Bechuanaland. These are the stories that they circulated. Karina ~~Corina~~ has been unable to hold up his end of it. He is kind of sulking. And violence hasn't helpt him at all. Korengizi ~~Cochambina~~ has embarrassed people i over and over- - monomania but its ~~for his~~ worked.

Abdul Rahim KARIM (190a Finchley Rd., Lond NW3) special representative now, in London, for Verges. He is in Singapore. His article on Malaysia, against Malaysia, was greatly appareicated by the Indonesian government and a large number of copies of the issue of Revolution which contained it were bought up and i twas later reproduced. We received from Indonesian Embassies all around sub- ~~xxxxxxxxx~~. orders for that issue. Subscriptions came from the UN, their missions to the UN, perhaps here in London.

Julian Mayfield, Academy of Science, P.O. Box 2848, Accra. in Ghana doesn't use this address as often as he used to. because he is now editor of something called the African Review. It is a new magazine..

F. M. MOLL - Amstelkade 157, Amsterdam Phone 717032.
Now here's an interesting fellow- Mena, I aver quite figured him out. He is a Surinam ~~Pnnh Pnom~~ nationalist. in Amsterdam. He is close to almost all the Left parties. there. He pret4nds to be Marxist but claims that he is not involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute. ~~schism~~. He doesn't want anything to do with that. That is the reason he never wrote anything for the magazine. though I did see him. x

Carlos Moore. I have no address for him. He is an Afro-Cuban boy whom I first met in New York. He is in Paris and you might be able to reach him through Presence Africaine. He ~~supposedly~~ was writing a book about Cuba He was very much involved with Mobert Williams,with Malcolm X, he is extremely young but very active in ~~bady~~ --- . He is of Jamaican origin. There is a Jamaican minority in eastern Cuba, in Camaguey and Oriente Province. That's how you get names like Moore, etc. His father and brother live in New York, his mother is still in Cuba. He went back to Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and went to school there. He became very disillusioned. He left, claiming that there was racial discrimination and so forth in Cuba. Very, very anti —. He went to Cairo. He managed to get out, and he went on a Yugoslav ship, I think or a Greek ship, and got to Egypt. He had met some Angolans. ~~of~~ through the UPA who had been in Havana and they took care of him for a while until there was a split inside of the UPA, and the fellow who was there quit and went to Switzerland. He brought Moore out to Switzerland. Then Carlos wound up in Paris, where he still is, to best of my knowledge. He supposedly has written an article for Presence Africaine which is violently counter-revolutionary. He claims there is no revolution. His position, is relatively bizarre. . It's not terribly justified. But what I think is, that here is a case of Black Nationalism in the States being transported to Cuba. What he claims is that the only Cuban revolution that remains to be made that would be valid would be a black revolution. and that really the population of Cuba is overwhelmingly black, or of African descent, and that this has been a plot that has gone on for generations even now with Fidel Castro, particularly Dorticos, he claims, the white leadership has been able to perpetuate itself regardless of the political thing. This is his theme. He is interesting but extremely wild and emotional. I think it's a case where the intoxication of Harlem never went off. Anyway he might be worth talking to.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom people were going to try to get in touch with him but they weren't any too convinced that his thesis was correct. I don't think so. He claims of course that I am completely blinded by my pro-Castro sympathies.He claimed that Williams was very unhappy for racial reasons in Cuba. I thought that Williams was simply unhappy, He couldn't speak Spanish. He was under pressurex from the American Communists and Soveit Communists that didn't like him, the old Cuban Communists, which was one of the reasons for his whole-hearted turn towards Peking. That was the only way out. And he wanted to come back to the States.

The FBI was in no mood- we could probably have arranged xxxxxx something
werent that is that he was a fugitive,
if the Federal thing xxxxxx going to be held against him, that Rockefeller
most likely
wouldn't extradite him to New York. There were talks on this. A lawyer by
the name of Conrad Lynn had discussed this xxxxx, a Negro lawyer who was
a party called
connected with the Freedom Now Party, another Black Nationalist group,
but with basically a Trotskyite front. It was put up 99% by the SWP which was one of the reasons for its failure. This lawyer was well aware of Williams's desire to come back to the United States if he could stay out of the hands of a North Carolina lynch mob. The one talk I had with the FBI people convinced me that they were in no mood whatsoever, even though they realized what the situation was.

(Pan African Press - P.O. 8364 — Pinto, Private Box 8159, [illegible]

Pinto is a very curious fellow. Pinto is a man who is close to Kenyatta.
the P
In Kenya. who has or is involved with the Pan-African Press, who is not hooked up with Odinga, not openly in any case but who is sort of playing all sides, looking for hand-outs. I understand that he -received substantial ~~help~~ sums from Russia, so that he has shown more Muscovite color than any other.

J. 48 Balcombe, Lond NW7
William J. Pomeroy is the American who was captured with the Huks in the Philippines, you remember? He lives here in London, more or less retired from politics except that he writes. That's how he earns his living. But he depends more or less on the good graces of the British Labor Party the Left of that party and the British Communist Party to stay here. What he has to say about the failure of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines and the present Leftward turn in the Philippines apparently---
Progressive
There is an outfit called the Philippine Review which I think we (Revolution) gave publicity to- here it is- - the Progressive Review. It is connected with Pomeroy. They are about as Communist as they can get under the present
and an
law of the Philippines.They have hopes of what they call the Anti-Imperialist ground swell, in other words, an anti-American trend in the present government. They felt that the anti-Malaysia campaign might help, and the editor has been very much in contact with the Indonesians. He has been to Djakarta on several occasions recently. He is in contact with Pomeroy. Pomeroy's
of what he says
position is one inwhich he has to be very careful because the British Communists will dump him. His wife is Philippine.She can't get an American visa, so they have to live here. This makes him the captive of a certain part of the British Labor Left and the British CP. His book, The Forest, was published here and in the States by Communist publishing houses.It is an account of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines, at least his personal account, but he pointed out to me, that it is also an account of its failures. He has tried to keep out of the Sino-Soviet thing but I have

a feeling that if the situation in the Philippines changed both he and his wife would like to go back there. This is what he may be doing (working for) through his contacts with the Progressive Review. I don't knows how far they have contacts with the people inside the Philippinexx government but they claim to have.))

Shashikant P. Patel — 8 Modhav Kunj, Dixit Rd, Bombay 57. was an Indian from Bombay who wrote several articles among other things, . He is a business man and I imagine a rather successful business man. He is in on the fringe of the Indian Communist Party and now involved with the pro-Chinese wing of the party.

~~Madxgxkmadx~~ Modhav Kunj? - Dixit Rd Bombay 57

Strelkoff address — 151 Ave. Sufren, Paris 15, Phone 54F 54-36

Miss C.J. SNETHLAGE ~~Nem -lage~~ from Amsterdam is the head of the Cuba group. the com Cuba committee in Holland, She is very prominent in this Pacifist Socialist Party. She ~~is very~~ has been to Cuba, ~~but~~ despite her advanced age she is seventy-some, and very active. She

Torild SKARD, c/o GOMNAES, C 14 Studentbyen, Oslo, Norway ~~Sklaar~~ is a student leader in Norway. I think she is now a member of Parliament. She did a lot of publicity for the magazine.

Dr. Leiva Samper- MOEC representative in Paris He is a doctor, a cardiologist and seems to be quite a distinguished one. He is a heart surgeon. (129 Rue de Tolbiac, Paris 13e Phone POR 47-39 (hospital)

Schwartzenberg is my lawyer in Paris.
SINE — 35 Rue de Clichy - ph. TRI 73-32.

Manuela Sikes is a member of the Liberal Party (U.K.). She's a standing candidate for Ipswich, very pro-Cuban and pro-Algerian. She's got a lot of influence inside the party because of who she sleeps with. I don't know who it is, but I've heard an awful lot of stories.

Jose Venturelli, ~~Torrelli~~ / Calle E, #158 1-B, Vedado Havana Havana, is a Venezuelan artist and member of — — — supposedly very very interested in the magazine. He is a friend of Mxxxmx Martha Dodd, you may find on the cards the magazin was going to him c/o Martha Dodd at the Havana Libre hotel.

Martha Dodd had no direct contact with the magazine. She ~~xxxx~~ reportedly had taken quite a pro-Chinese position but to be so hopelessly compromised with the Czechs and Russians that she can't say too much except en cachet, to everybody she meets, especially young people. Whether this is her real attitude or not, I don't know. She might also be doing this to gain the confidence of people. There is no question that Venturelli is her very close friend.

Costas Veropolous (?) and is a student group leader from Greece, who edited a ~~M~~agazine in Greece called Africa Asia Latin America. It was a cut-down version of Revolution and represented for the Greek youth, the left wing of the ~~BC~~ EDA who were unsatisfied with the reformist tactics the Social democratic tactics of the EDA and EDAMx youth. He got in contact with the magazine he wanted matetial to reproduce in Greek. I suppose he did. I took one year of Greek and I know nothing of modern Greek, I could just about make out the title.

Pierre Vallieres(?) is a Canadian Communist who was setting up a thing called Revolution Quebequoise. He was dissatisfied with Chartain. He had been xxxx close to Chartain and he was going to be holier than Chartain. He worked for La Presse, which was on strike

Sydney NANASINGHE was a Ceylonese Trotskyist in member of the xxxxx committee of the ~~Lakisama Samaya~~ Lanka Sama Maja party before it split. the militant part of it split. He distributed I think 25 to 50 -- more likely 25 copies of Revolution, each issue. I understand that his group of the Trotskyists were more pro-Chinese than the pro-Chinese wing of the Ceylonese Communist party. He tried to get us to take their magazine in exchange.

That covers all of the real addresses that I have.

((At this point let's take stock of you. Is your kid back in school?))

Yes.

((You're not under pressure))

No. Thank the Lord, I've got that off the hook for a little while.

22 ((You have largely answered the question- What is the function of the Advisory Board of Revolution))

Nothing more unless it was to give prestigex to the enterprise. This is why it keeps growing larger and larger. First it started out as an editorial board, then he changed the title, to advisory board. then he calls it permanent collaborators. I don't know why. He claimed that under French law you had only exemption from seizure if you were really French - - now I do know what it was- - one issue of the magazine was seized in France. That was No. 7 which had Ho Chi Minh on the cover. It wasn't seized for Ho Chi Minh but because of an article on Reunion and the French West Indies. It was a platonic seizure, more in the way of a warning. The seizure order came down after the matazine had been distributed. There were virtually no copies picked up-. Undistributed and returned copies were seized but the money wasn't seized. That's about the nicest way you can seize a magazine. It was a warning. And he felt that an editorial board made xx up of foreigners didn't give him enough protection in France. That was the reason for changingx to permanent collaborators.

They certainly are quite active. For instance, the Colombian I mentioned-I still can't think of his name~~x~~-- but his daughter was put in an Albanian school. Poor girl, about eleven years old, and she didn't know a word of Albanian and most of the Albanians didn't know Spanish. She has managed to suffer through a year of it. ~~x~~ It is very interesting to talk to this little girl, now about 12, She was in Cuba, where you might think of the revolution as extremely informal lax in many ways easy-going. It's a libertarian type of revolution. Certainly it hasn't had the puritannical type of after-period that one finds in most revolutions, certainly ~~in and these the puritans~~ in China which proves a great obstacle for the Africans who go there. They are virtually unable to keep African students because of the fact that there is no sex. They used to let them go to HongKong and they would all come back with syphilis and gonorrhea to the great disgust of the Chinese. This girl, who seemed to ~~liak~~ like Cuba, in Albania was shocked by the degree of formality of relationships and for instqance she said that at the beaches -- in Cuba all the beaches were open, anybody can ~~xg~~ go to the beach. In Albania they have, as I suppose you find in many Communist countries, high officials, middle officials, low officials and then just plain working people. (and [illegible]). This to her was ~~x~~ (shocking). She wasn't aware of politics as such and that is what made talking to her so interesting.

((What do you think of Cuba nowadays?))

I know one thing, that the PS~~C~~P has virtually been defeated in every way, the old Communists. I was very much involved, obviously, the Cubans who were my friends ~~were~~ are not Communists. I suppose that one of the things that made the Cuban revolution attractive was that it wasn't doctrinaire. For Americans, college students, the young people, ~~it~~ after all of the years of disenchantment about revolution as such, the Cuban revolution looked like a romantic thing. It was extravagant. All these bearded fellows coming out of the mountains, and anyone who went to Cuba coulnd't help but feel the contagion.~~mf~~

((I think there was a sympathetic feeling within the States because it was not alien to our own revolutionary background, the idea of little men hiding behind trees shooting at the Redcoats.))

Right. Only they were shooting at Batista's troops who were armed by the United States. This is one of the things that many Americans are unable to realize, how deeply involved the US is with these military regimes. It has obviously been exploited from ~~their~~ an academic point of view, but from the popular imagination, we just don't think of it.

The Fidelista youth were not Marxist. They are more so today than they were before, but they have had this experience of dealing with the United States - - I have had a lot of argujments with them about it. - - - - - For instance when they came to the United States ini- - 28 March of 59, you remember, Felipe Pasos (?) came, Fidel went to Washington and he went to New York and it was extraordinarly badly handled. Christian Herter wouldn't see him at the State Department. He insisted on taking a hotel suite, rather than do that. Certainly it wasn't an official visit but a lot of people have gone to Washington xxx. . . Then it was a question of whether the Cubans wanted money or not. The Cubans claimed, . . . that they asked for $3,000,000 on short term credit, just a stop-gap and that this was turned down cold. until they ~~did~~ made some guarantees about American property. From that point on I think that their attitude towards the United States was one of expecting, looking for the worst. They were able to work out a few arrangements with xxfxx American companies concerning take-over. EAch time, they were vetoed by the State Department or someone else, who said don't go into this, because we want to have a solid front, no one should make an agreement with them otherwise.

It was provocation and counterprovocation. They would do something then there would be American xxxixx reaction, then a Cuban counterreaction until it was real escalation, diplomatically, to the point at which it fell completely into the hands of the Russians. That could have been short-circuited and prevented. They really are not happy where they are now. They want some independence, ~~of over~~ vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Ideologically they are not very happy with the Russians. They have managed though to maintain incredible independence, not signing the nuclear test ban agreement, they have never made any anti-Chinese statements at all, though Fidel came very close-- he did in one of the statments where Kruschev mentioned peaceful coexistence, and said that there had never been disagreement with the Russians over the missiles .xxxxxxxx In actual fact they were boiling. They were furious about the missile business. This left a bad taste in their mouths. The Escalante business, you know the ~~president~~ first attempt of the old x PS~~C~~P ~~was going~~ to to take over and create a faction which would displace the romantic revolutionaries, if you will. It failed but that didn't mean that Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and more capable technocrats inside the party didn't continue. They failed. Now Carlos Rafael who had the highest place of the old Communists is out as you know. And almost all of them went out at this point.

I am always struck by - Grippa said, for instance, of Guillermo Cabrera Infante, the Cuban Cultural Attache in Brussels, whom I know very well, that: "he's an anti-Communist". Which is true. He is a nationalist. That's all. And that's the one thing that keeps him there. But he and many of the people like CArlos Franqui and around Carlos Franqui and Haidee Santamaria. her husband, who is the Minister of Education, they are liberal, in their views about the arts, they are non-dogmatic, non-doctrinaire, Leftist if you will, but Leftist by situation and circumstance. They represent, if there is anyone in Washington who still has a sober mind about Cuba and who is not completely filled with venom ~~or~~ - and frustration- about Cuba, they would, I think, represent the real hope of reaching a modus vivendi in the future. They are the real heirs, I think, the people who will take over. I do not think the PS~~C~~P can do it. They have the mass support in the country behind them. It is always said, that If anything ever happens to Fidel and there is the slightest suspicion that it was done by a Communist, there wouldn't be a Communist left alive in the Island in about five hours. These were many people who felt that the Communists would have liked to do this. At one time it became almost a hysterical rumor spread around that the Communists wanted to kill Fidel.

The bitterness that I found against the old Communists was because they were compromised with Batista. Even now, this explains their pro-Chinese stand. But that can't go very far, either. Because they are not doctrinaire. The Chinese have been extremely flexible in dealing with Cuba - they can't offer them very much - and they can't push them, so they have been easy-going. - - - The handling of the October crisis between the Russians and the United States when they got ~~kxmx~~ together over the heads of the Cubans, was an insult. Being a small country and semi-colonial, it was a colony, it has an exaggerated sense of its national rights. This was, in terms of Cuba, not the world~~xxbmtxmfx&mbx~~, situation in general, ~~for the~~ perhaps. it was the only way to solve the October question, it seemed to be the only way, but in the terms of Cuba that was one of the grave mistakes of the Russians. The way the handled it. They didn't seem to soften the blow for the Cubans.

((They're very sensistive people.))

Right. And they've never forgotten it. They have nourished lots of hopes about DeGaulle and the possibility of trade with France. Trade is increasing, ~~hmk~~ they've tried desperately to get DEGaulle to visit Cuba which he wouldn't do. He would do lots of things against Washington, but there are certain limits (laughing), and that's one of them.

I know that's one of the things in back of their minds, in Paris. Every French delegation to Havana, even one just recently, I heard ~~that~~ about, Fidel went around sayings- why doesn't De Gaulle come and visit us.

xThere is a Gaullist group, France -Cuba (?) , not the Communist, but there is a Communist organization, There is also one inside of the government party concerned with Cuba and they have made recommendations for increasing trade. One of the things also encouraged is the increase of Spanish trade. Ironically one of the heroes of Cuba is Franco, because he continued trade and they say "You know, when we go to Madrid, there is never any trouble from the counter-revolutionaries. They behave themselves." I have a feeling that the Spanish attitude has some influence on the French. I would imagine that they hope that eventually this will be communicated to the West Germans.

Cuba certainly, I feel, if they did have ~~axshaisex~~ diversification of trade and an opening horizon -- because so many problems with the United States become emotional problems that no matter what the head of government or the State wants to do, you've got the problem of how to put it before the Congress and public opinnon, which has been so sensitized to it that this is the problem of American statesmanship that you don't have in any other places. De Gaulle for example, says "the people? I rule." but even he wouldn't go beyond a certain point.

~~Another thing~~, Algeria. Probably only DeGaulle cold have reached a settlement.x

((In two minutes, that's your prognosis for future ~~USxDub~~ US-Cuban relations.))

It depends very much on the United States. I think, I know, there are elements in Cuba who are more than willing. But they don't want to be pushed. The trouble is that when a Cuban talks to America, the next question is "when are you going to get rid of the Red regime," or something like that. That is the end of ~~dix~~ the dialogue. I would ~~imagxixtxhxx~~ imagine that it would have to be through talks. I understand - this is one thing thatthis ~~Cuban-~~ Carlos Moore, the Afro-Cuban boy who is extremely anti-revolutionary- he says he wants a real revolution. He worked in the Foreign Ministry at one time. What he ~~He~~ used to claim was that Dorticos and ~~paps~~ people around Dorticos are very very anxious for a rapprochement with the United States. That they would love to have contact. I certainly know that Dr. Roa, Foreign Minister, wanted somehow to have contacts, more direct contacts. He ~~has~~ had a problem too, that in public he couldn't say anything, and whenever he was in New York he was boxed in.x

((I don't want to start a debate but you say that the -- when are you going to get rid of the Red regime-- this is ~~the~~ a reflection of the sensitivity that you spoke about. ~~Isn't really~~ Similarly, isn't the Cuban population sensitized in such fashion as to come up with a comparably provocative and ~~and~~ dialogue-ending remark.))

It seems a little bit less. One of the problems is that of the Cuban immigration. There isn't in Cuba, to the best of my knowledge, a broad anti-Americanism. Always ~~in~~ even in Fidel's speeches, he makes a distinction between the American government and the American people. ~~Then~~ There is a very open nuance ?equivocation about the Cuban counter-revolutionaries. They may be counter-revolutionaries but they also happen to be uncles, cousins, nephews, and almost everybody has some one among them, from Fidel on down.

((The exiles in Miami and elsewhere))

That's right. They are relatives. Just as the treatment for instance of the people at the Bay of Pigs- which was extraordinary. In many countries they would have been -- in ~~our~~ [illegible] country, they would have taken them all out and shot them. There they weren't allowed to beat them; they said they "had been misled" and so forth. This ~~was not~~ ~~was for propaganda~~ ~~really~~ wasn't merely for propaganda, this was a feeling. I have seen it happen over and over again They might shoot someone. They did, they shot three people, a Batista sergeant and some others. It was an incredible gaffe ~~that~~ to include among these people an old Batista torturer. He was shot and no one much protested.

I have been told by people who have been there recently that you have only to say that you are an American to get a sympathetic audience around you immediately. People want to discuss with you, why did they do this, that. You see they can hear Miami. They listen -to the American radio all the time, and they listen to Radio SWAN. I heard Radio SWAN in Cuba. Radio SWAN ~~was~~ was a CIA radio operated off of SWan Island off of Nicaragua. [actually off of Honduras] an island which is claimed by Nicaragua [Hondurans] but in actual fact is possessed by the United States (laughing). The Nicaraguans have never been able to persuade us to leave. We just have some sailors on it. They built this enormous radio which broadcast to Cuba. It wasn't an official radio. It was called Radio SWAN. It was a CIA operation. It was so crude, it was really pathetic, the type of thing-- people are starving, that type of thing. Now this was directed at Cuba and when you have propaganda like that - ~~it~~ it is very little that can be confirmed. You say people are starving, and they are able to go out and buy something. There was a lot of racist material in there about Congolese troops stationed in Central Cuba. There were no Congolese troops. This short of attitude came out later. During the time of the Bay of Pigs operation ~~they~~

the press releases were incredible. This isn't going to be Machiavellian, my God you don't do it like that, you know. The best propaganda is the one that comes closest to the truth, that just slightly goes off, you don't have to push the point.

In any case, I do feel that there are an enormous number of people in Cuba and inside of the government, particularly among the old 26th of July ~~movement~~ people, who would be - - they don't want to make a capitulation to the United States. They want an independent government. They would like trade . They would like to get out of the dependence on the Soviet Union such as it is. They have managed to keep from being swallowed up by the Russians just by enormous effort on their part.

((~~You~~ Do you think that both sides have committed themselves so far that it is impossible to have any kind of rapprochement or normalization of relations without a feeling that one sidd or the other or both, had been forced to capitulate?))

I think at one point this was true, but ~~I should have made one point~~. ~~xx~~ I don't think it's true any more. To a certain extent in recent months there has been ~~has brought~~ a sort of cooling down in Cuban'-American relations, though there have been continued charges abut Venezuela, and it is certainly true ~~there~~ that the Cubans were encouraging the Venezuelan FALN. They certainly gave financial support not so much in the way of arms, I think, but money , and in a guerrilla campaign you get your arms anyway from the police and the army, from the army that's ~~surrounds~~ around you. That's the easiest way.

I have the feeling, nevertheless, that the Cubans are somewhat disappointed, disillusioned, about their ability to agitate these revolutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America, their ability to carry out any effective revolution, just as the Alliance ~~of~~ for Progress has proved to be a great disappointment to many people in Washington so has the Cuban open solidarity with other, almost any, revolutionary movement in Latin America, proved a disappointment.

On the other hand, the Cubans are not going to issue a statement saying that we will not export revolution. Certainly in the first yearsof the (Cuban) revolution, they ~~had become~~ did some extremely insane things, with expedition to Haiti, expedition to Santo Domingo, expedition to Panama, remember, and they had to send people in to Panama to get them to surrender, proved totally ineffective. The people in Santo Domingo were just slaughtered. In Haiti they were slaugtered also.

((Probably got them by Black magic in Haiti))

A messy situation. On the other hand, every once in a while Duvalier makes overtures. He's not beyond anything.

Well, if you want to get in touch with me again, you have only to give me a call. I don't imagine that anything much will happen. If I'm not there just say that Earl called, or something like that. But do avoid giving this address or telephone number. I imagine with my wife working now for the ~~Indonesians~~ Tunisians

((It would be someone else answering))

It would be ~~thexmaxdx~~ me. I dont think I'm quite going to set up shop down ~~at~~ with Leo Labedz ~~right away~~ & Company.

((Again, I do appreciate your cooperation))

No. Thank you.

MESSAGE FORM 32 RI

ORIG :	A. GOODRICH	
UNIT :	CI/IC/G	☐ INDEX 28 SECRET
EXT :	R-1176	☐ NO INDEX
DATE :	8 MARCH 1965	☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. Gibson's 201

ROUTING

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TO : LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO: WE 6, ADDP, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, AF 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE

8 Mar 65 21 07z

TO LOND INFO PARI PALP CITE DIR SIG CEN

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REFS: A. LOND 6396 *

B. OELA 42604

C. LOND 6360 *

90655

1. APPRECIATE ADDRESS LIST RECEIVED HQS 4 MARCH.

2. DO NOT WISH YOU ACKNOWLEDGE HAVING IT TO SMOOTHERS FOR TIME BEING.

3. REF C PARA 1: APPROVE YOUR PASSAGE SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT YOUR DEBRIEFING OF GIBSON INCLUDING DETAILS ON REVOLUTION ORGANIZATION AND HOW IT WORKS. HOWEVER, DO NOT PASS INTELLIGENCE OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

RI 16552

VR 14617

AF OPS	~~RI~~	AF 1/A
~~PS~~	~~DESC~~	
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~	

201-306052

CO/OPS ✓

AF/CI ✓

CA/3 W. Raymond (by phone)

for DCWE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

John G. Roberts
WE/BC/II
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

FORM 1389a

138

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306052 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG

2 · SECRET

GROUP 1

RI ☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY
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FROM
LONDON

ACTION
· FE 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE WE 6 ADDP CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2 AF 4 CA 2 CA/O 4

AN FI
DESP
ABSTRACT X INDEX

3 MAR 65 IN 14617

SECRET 031139Z

DIR INFO PARI PALP CITE LOND 6360

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 85977*

1. GIBSON DEBRIEFING COMPLETED 23 FEB. STA DOING ROUGH TRANSCRIPT TAPES AND PREPARING OPS DISPATCH, TO BE POUCHED NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. WHILE REF QUESTIONS NOT PUT TO G, HE DID MAKE COMMENTS ON SMITH AND GRAHAM, WHICH IN TRANSCRIPT. NO MENTION OF SHLEIFER. QUESTIONS CAN BE INCLUDED IN SUBSEQUENT MEET WITH GIBSON, HOWEVER. ASSUME ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL DERIVE FROM MATERIAL NOW IN HAND.

SECRET

CFN *QUESTIONS FOR DEBRIEFING

201-306052

3 MAR '65

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO.
Chief of Station, LCPIPIT;
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
LCHARVEST/KUDESK/MHSPAWN
Revolution Mailing List

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of the cards that constitute the mailing list for Revolution. These were borrowed from Richard GIBSON and copied in the station. GIBSON's wife, who compiled the cards and was responsible for distribution of Revolution (and to whom, therefore, they more properly belong) is not aware that GIBSON has "loaned" the cards out. They were returned to GIBSON's flat the same day he brought them in for copying.

2. We have not made any attempt to count them. There are several thousand. A few comments will be in order about some of the marks and notations that appear on the cards.

3. One general category is "Promotional". The first bunch of sheets - about twenty, it appears - are in this category. They are marked "Promotional" or "PR". These were sent out gratis either to induce publicity, or to encourage new subscribers, or to make friends happy. (Presumably, Robert WILLIAMS and several others are in this category).

4. Thereafter, the cards run in categories of one sort or another, with given countries generally lumped together. Those where the address was obviously stapled onto a card are some of those that were taken from Frene GINWALA's Spearhead mailing list. Some are marked "ex-Spearhead"; which means that the name came from the Spearhead list, and the person subsequently subscribed on his own, after a little promotional treatment.

5. The coded symbols, unfortunately, GIBSON could not explain, since this was his wife's territory, rather than his own. The first set of letters obviously refers to the country (e.g.,UK/). Other numbers and letters are not clear. The name that appears apart from the name of the subscriber usually indicates who arranged the subscription (this may be an agent, or something like a gift subscription). For instance, S. V. LEE is Sheldon LEE, who handles

AN SP
ABSTRACT
AF 1
CS COPY

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1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
25 Feb. 65

DATE DISPATCHED
2 MAR [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,604
201- 306052

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
~~[illegible]~~

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

some subscriptions. Expiration dates are obvious. "Private" merely means that someone ordered a subscription directly, himself, rather than through an agency.

6. Any further questions relating to the list can be included in any subsequent contacts with GIBSON, if they merit inclusion, and if it seems likely that he will know the answers.

7. We note that the list's accuracy cannot be guaranteed, especially after the time when the GIBSON's parted ways with Jacques VERGES.

8. At some time, the SMOOTHERs may ask us for this list. We would appreciate being advised as to whether Headquarters would like us to acknowledge having it.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-COS, LCPIPIT w/o att
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/o att
2-Chief, KUDESK w/o att
2-Chief, FE w/o att

MESSAGE FORM 31

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 18 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

SECRET

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☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

19 FEB 65 [illegible] 42z

TO : LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO WE 6, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, VR, FILE

TO LOND INFO: CITE DIR 86097

KUDESK LCHARVEST

RE: A. LOND 6129 (IN 81502)*

B. OELW - 21869

1. IN ADDITION QUESTION THIRTY-SIX REF B, WE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DESCRIPTION GIBSON'S CURRENT CUBAN CONTACTS AS BASIS FOR FOLLOW UP REQUIREMENTS. SPECIFICALLY HAS G BEEN IN TOUCH RECENTLY WITH ANY CUBAN OFFICIALS WHO SUPPLIED INFO ON CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION, STRUGGLE BETWEEN CASTRO AND OLD COMMUNISTS, STABILITY OF CUBAN REGIME, OR CUBAN SOVIET RELATIONS?

2. BELIEVE PROBING INTO HISTORY G RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT OUTSET SINCE THIS APPEARS TO BE AREA WHERE HE MOST SENSITIVE ABOUT GIVING POTENTIALLY SELF INCRIMINATING INFO AND FURTHERMORE OF MARGINAL VALUE.

END OF MESSAGE.

201-306052

*Lond query re rqmts on Gibson's Cuban contacts if any.

AN SB | FI | AF | 1 | A
ABSTRACT

WH/SA/EOB

WH/SA/CI R

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

John G. Roberts
C/WE/BC/U
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

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1176

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 9

13 SECRET

18 FEB 1965

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FROM LONDON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION WE 4

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TIME

BY

INFO VR, FILE, FE 6, FI, ADDP, DDP, WH/SA 8, FI/INT 2

RI COPY

SECRET 161247Z

16 Feb 65 IN 81502

DIR CITE LOND 6129

KUDESK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 84695

OELW 21369

NOTE NO RQMTS ON GIBSON'S CUBAN CONTACTS INCLUDED REFS. IS THIS OVERSIGHT, OR IS THERE REASON FOR NOT FOLLOWING THIS LINE? PLS ADVISE, INCLUDING RQMTS IF ANY.

SECRET

RI COPY

RI COPY

AN SR
DC
ABSTRACT

AF 1/A

201-306052

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] (35) (laughing) That's right. I think that going into that would tale a long time and I'm not that ~~-~~ it's also very hard to say, ~~taking contacts~~ and ~~a making your~~ contacts with the ~~Africans, with~~ the Chinese, you ~~say,~~ look, we need a car, for political work. ~~The~~ Chinese ~~say~~ turn up a car,

take ~~your~~ car. If the US embassy turned up a car, They would say take a car from the US Embassy. It doesn't make them any more American agents, It makes them Chinese agents. It's just a ~~ma-~~ matter of who can produce. Africa is full of poor people. Just as the Negro community in the United States is full of ~~[illegible]~~ poor people. Poor people don't have any sense of loyalty in the ordinary sense of the word. They have a sense of loyalty to their poverty, and colonial experience also mixed in ~~nationalism~~ nation-hood. The national sense is extremely weak. They see things in terms of Western ~~Nigeria~~, former colonial ~~power~~, that's all.

((Holden Roberto is down here. You ~~already~~ talked about ~~him~~ him. I know something ~~XXX~~ about him))

Roberto

You ought to know him better than I do. (laughing) I met him only once and that was in New York. I had a long discussion with him about ~~what~~ 1 to 3 in the morning, and he was terribly afraid that somebody would think he was a Communist. I tried to assure him I didn't think he was a Communist no matter what (laughing).

((Did he have anything to do with the magazine))

None, ~~No~~, because ~~the magazine,~~ while Verges was there in Algiers, and up until ~~[illegible]~~ Viriato da Cruz changed his position, the magazine ~~would follow~~ was following the MPLA and only changed about ~~with~~ when Viriato changed from the MPLA to the UPA.

Holden went to China and I suppose he gave the Chinese some guarantees but I don't know.

((Mario d'Andrade))

He is the active Secretary - I don't know his official title- of the MPLA and represents another tendency different from Dr. ~~[illegible]~~ Neto is the President. He had contacts with Revolution and with Viriato da Cruz. He sought to get Viriato to come back to the MPLA. He is a poet also. They are all poets. They are all former students in Portugal. The last time he came through Paris ~~he saw~~ . After Viriato published his article in Revolution, he asked for the right of reply which was granted by Verges but he never wrote the article. He could be said to be much more pro-Soviet than pro- ~~(Chinese)~~ if anything. I think that ~~Andrade~~ Neto

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, London
Attention: KATZENBACH

INFO Chief of Station, Paris
Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
DEBRIEFING OF RICHARD T. GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
RE: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. On 11 February KUBARK Staff Agent Errol S. KULPA, who had contact with GIBSON in 1963-64, listened to reference tape and made the following comments, which may be helpful to Katzenbach. KULPA felt that the GIBSON that he was hearing on the tape had indeed changed rather radically since the last time KULPA had any contact with him or the Revolution. KULPA remembers GIBSON as anti-white and probably (because of this racial orientation) anti-U.S. KULPA is therefore quite suspicious of GIBSON's motivations and advises that extreme precaution be taken in the handling of GIBSON.

2. KULPA's view of Gibson's motivations:

KULPA has strenuous doubts as to any idealogical motivation on the part of GIBSON. He recognizes the obvious monetary motivation and feels that this probably plays a large part in the man's being willing to talk to ODYOKE. Another very possible motivation is GIBSON's disaffection with VERGES. Parenthetically, KULPA added that in Algiers and probably in Paris, GIBSON was really nothing more than a name that VERGES wanted on the masthead. GIBSON's primary duties as "editor" were probably in the area of translation. In light of this KULPA feels that perhaps some legitimate information of value can be obtained in the area of the Revolution. Again, parenthetically, it might be noted that KULPA felt that GIBSON was not as "idealistic" as his wife. Where GIBSON might adhere to the aspects of Marxism-Leninism that called for revolutionary change (probably because of his dissatisfaction with a world in which the black man had to endure a certain amount of discrimination), he is not a strict doctrinaire in any of his beliefs. On the other hand, KULPA pointed out that GIBSON's wife (who by the way is a Central European by birth--not British) is idealistic in the sense that she feels her brand of leftism must be internally and idealogically consistent. (This is why she objected to GIBSON's writing for Encounter and why she probably would get upset if she knew exactly what type of game her husband was currently playing with ODYOKE.)

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	OELW - 21903	15 FEB 1965 12 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052 201 - 306052

ROUTING INITIAL
INGRI ~~(201-306~~052)
1 - AF/1
1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/3
1 - CO/IO
1 - WE/BC/Chrono
RID/FI
DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/ICG	A. GOODRICH	dab	5928

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AF/1	12 Feb 65	C. Baker (in draft)
CA/3	12 Feb 65	W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO	12 Feb 65	R. Brown (by phone)
WE/BC/U		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	12 Feb.	John F. Caswell

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	OELW - 21903

3. We are currently having reference tape transcribed and will forward the transcription to the field as soon as it is completed.

JST
JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

James L. Griffiths
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
1 - Paris
1 - LCPIPIT

MESSAGE FORM 33 N

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

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TO : LONDON INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

12 FEB 65 22 12z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2 INFO ADDP, WE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FE 6, FI, FI/INT 4, WH 7, VR, FILE

TO LOND INFO PARI, PALP CITE DIR 84695

LCHARVEST/KUDESK/QKOPERA

RE: A. OELW 21369

B. OELA 42410

15 FEB A.M.

FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS MAINLY DERIVED FROM REF B TAPE, FOR USE KATZENBACH DEBRIEFING GIBSON (G):

1. G SPEAKS ABOUT VERGES CONTACTS WITH FLN FEDERATION OF FRANCE AND FACT THAT $75,000 WAS FUNDED TO HIM THROUGH THE FEDERATION FOR REVOLUTION. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN G'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIANS IN FRANCE: LEADERSHIP, TIES WITH BEN BELLA, TIES WITH ERSTWHILE ALGERIAN OPPOSITION, TIES TO VERGES, SOURCE OF FUNDS, HOW MUCH SENT TO ALGERIA IN FORM OF REMITTANCES.

2. ENCOURAGE G TO TELL MORE ABOUT HIS WIFE, HIS WIFE'S CONNECTIONS WITH RABAH BITAT AND LATTER'S WIFE, HER POLITICAL IDEAS AND ANTECEDENTS.

3. "VERGES HAS DEBTS AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN $30,000". CAN G GIVE US A BREAKDOWN, ESTIMATE?

201-306052

AF 2 A

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] RI COPY [redacted] [redacted]

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R.I./HIS

MESSAGE FORM

3 52 PM 65

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : A. Goodrich
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 12 Feb 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 306052

JUN 20 10 11 AM 65

ROUTING
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TO : LONDON INFO: PARIS, LCPIPIT

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

- PAGE TWO -

TO LOND INFO: PARI, PALP CITE DIR 84695

4. WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE G TALK ABOUT HIS CONTACTS WITH ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR CHANDERLI IN GREATER DETAIL. WHAT FAVORS DID HE DO FOR CHANDERLI AND VICE-VERSA.

5. ANY INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION, PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES OF LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU BRUSSELS. ANY INDICATION THIS BUREAU INVOLVED IN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN ALGERIA?

6. INFORMATION ON RELATIONS OF VERGES WIFE WITH ALGERIANS BITAT AND KHIDER.

7. INFORMATION ON REVOLUTION BUREAUS ABROAD. HOW WERE STAFFS CHOSEN? WHAT ARE THEIR FUNCTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT?

END OF MESSAGE.

CA/B3 - W. Raymond (by phone)
CO/IO - R. Brown (by phone)
AF/1 - C. Baker (in draft)

John Caswell
DC/WE(BC)

C/WE/BC

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 3

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SECRET

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LONDON

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/SPG, FI/INT 2

SECRET 04/1802Z

4 FEB 65 IN 73844

ABSTRACT

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5957

KUDESK LCHARVEST QKOPERA

REF LOND 5867 (IN 71348) *

1. JAGUAR STATE (SHAME-FACEDLY) THEY NOW LEARN GIBSON DEPARTED LOND 25 JAN FOR ZURICH.

2. OBVIATES NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PASSAGE FUNDS PER REF, BUT WOULD STILL LIKE KNOW STATUS FAIRMAN/GIBSON RELATIONSHIP PRIOR 15 FEB.

SECRET

CFN

* CLARIFICATION INSRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN

201-306052?

✓ Richard Gibson's 201-
Thomas

201-306052
4 Feb 65

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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RI COPY RI COPY (35)

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT
KUDESK/LCHARVEST
~~Debriefing of Richard T. GIBSON - Transmittal of Requirements~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA - 42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Forwarded as enclosure are requirements for the debriefing of Subject. Together with the requirements is a KUDESK narrative on VERGES-ANDERSSON-Revolution complex for the background information of Katzenbach. Further background on Revolution can be found, if you have not already done so, in the following dispatches:

OELA - 39,346, 26 Sept '63
OELW - 20,852, 16 Dec '63
OELA - 40,208, 24 Feb '64
OELA - 40,542, 15 Apr '64
OELA - 41,545, 10 Sept '64
OEL - 30,251, 24 Sept '64

2. We have not yet had time to review the tape of your first session with Subject forwarded with Reference, nor do we expect to get a transcription completed in time to reach you by 15 February. The list of names attached to Reference indicate considerable knowledgeability on the part of Subject as well a tendency to pour out his knowledge in a sort of stream of consciousness style. We fear that, if given the opportunity, Subject will take the bit in his teeth and as much money as he can in his hot little hands and be off and running. To prevent this we would like to suggest that the debriefing be set up on a tightly organized, businesslike basis. It would probably be advisable to write up the terms in a Letter of Agreement contract for Subject's signature before getting started, making sure to include a paragraph in which ODYOKE's obligations and promises are limited to the terms specifically enumerated in the document. We think that any meaningful debriefing will take 3 - 5 days, and there is good reason to believe that Subject will have information of sufficient interest to justify this expenditure of Case Officer time. We do not foresee any long range operational relationship with Subject. While we look at the debriefing as basically a one-shot proposition there will probably be follow-up questions and, perhaps, specific action requests, requiring a later contact. Therefore, the communication channel to Subject should be left open on a "don't call us, we'll call you" basis.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE...

CROSS REFERENCE TO
1 Att
CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELW - 21869

DATE
3 February 1965
201- 306052
8 FEB 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201 - 306,052

1 - RI (201-306052)
1 - CI/I[illegible]l
1 - C/CO/IO w/encl
1 - CA/3 w/encl
1 - WE/BC

ROUTING / INITIALS
RID/A
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~~RID~~
RID/FI
DESTROY

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WE/BC/U	John G. Roberts	dab	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	3 Feb 65	Mr. Goodrich Coord in draft
C/CO/IO	2/3/65	Mr. ~~Boyd~~ Brown
~~[illegible]~~ OFC c/CO	[illegible]/65	[illegible]
C/CA/3	2/4/65	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	5 Feb. 65	John F. Caswell

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

3. In line with the need to put the debriefing on a businesslike (rather than a "flexible") basis, it might be a good idea to start by getting Subject to supply a personal history statement from the time of his first entry into leftist political movements to the present day. (This can be presented to Subject as a basis for us to formulate meaningful questions, not as any sort of personal "confession" on his part.) In addition to providing us with a check on his veracity, this will set the stage for a debriefing conducted on KUBARK's terms, not Subject's. It is important that it be made clear to Subject at the outset that we want facts, not speculation, commentary and analysis.

4. Please charge payments to Subject for the debriefing to Acct. Nr. 5137 - 1468 (Hqs. LCHARVEST OOA). Three hundred dollars for the initial 2½ hours talk with Subject is on the steep side. We are thinking in terms of $700 for five days debriefing with a bonus for a copy of the Revolution mailing list.

JST
JOSEPH S. TIFFANY

for James K. Griffith
STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - Lond w/2cc encl.

FEB [illegible]

Narrative

Nils ANDERSSON, Swedish-born resident of Switzerland, heads a printing and publishing establishment ("Editions la Cite") in Lausanne, said to have been set up in 1957 for the printing and distributing of Chinese literature. (This ties in with other information that the firm was established in Switzerland during the Algerian war in order to publish printed matter banned in France.) Since 1963 the firm had been responsible for the English-language edition of Revolution, but in 1964 the printing of the English-language edition was transferred to Paris where Revolution's main office is located. Swiss authorities had ordered ANDERSSON to cease publication of Revolution.

Revolution has had a complicated history. It is descended from African Revolution which first appeared in early 1963 in Algeria. Its editor, Jacques VERGES, is a former member of the French CP who broke with that party over the Algerian question. After VERGES, who briefly headed African Revolution, had a falling out with Algerian officials later in 1963 and left that country, he began a new publication in Switzerland using the facilities of the already established ANDERSSON firm. His new publication was called Revolution, sometimes known as Revolution — Asia, Latin America, Africa. (The Algerians continue to publish African Revolution, which has no known connection with Revolution.) Initially both the English and French editions of Revolution were handled by ANDERSSON's firm, but the publishing operations of the French edition were very soon moved to Paris. Later the printing, too, of the French edition was moved to Paris and only the English edition continued to be printed in Switzerland. VERGES and the main offices were located in Paris.*

1

Currently ANDERSSON is reported to publish Octobre, which is described as the organ of an organization in Switzerland called the "Centre Lenine." Both Octobre and the Centre Lenine are said to be controlled by ANDERSSON, but very little information is available about either. The Centre has been described as a propaganda arm of the Chinese Communists. There is some indication that they also have some connection with pro-Chinese dissident elements of the Spanish CP.

ANDERSSON's firm has also printed Mundo Obrero Revolucionario (MOR),

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* Although the English edition was printed in Switzerland, its editorial office was also in Paris, headed by Richard GIBSON, American negro. In late May and early June 1964 — when it was already apparent that Swiss authorities were going to close down the printing of Revolution in that country — GIBSON and Alexandre STRELKOFF went to The Netherlands seeking a firm there to print and distribute the English-language edition. It is not known why this effort was made instead of transferring the printing directly to Paris as was ultimately done.

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ATT #1 to CELW 21869

201-306052

the clandestine publication of a major pro-Chinese Spanish Communist group called the Partido Comunista Revolucionario. In view of recent reports that the MCR group may merge with one or more of the other dissident Spanish Communist groups and that a joint organ will be published, MCR may soon cease (or may already have ceased) publication. What role ANDERSSON may play in new publication efforts of the pro-Chinese Spanish dissidents is not known.

The clandestine leadership of the Partido Comunista Revolucionario has been located in Lausanne, Switzerland, with some representation also in Paris, but this group has apparently been receiving Chinese financial assistance through the GRIPPA party in Belgium. Another pro-Chinese Spanish group in Switzerland, the Oposicion Revolucionario Comunista located in Geneva, has been publishing La Chispa. The Chispa group has reportedly been receiving funds from the Chinese Embassy in Bern. Still another pro-Chinese Spanish group, the Agrupacion Comunista Proletario, has been publishing Proletario, apparently from Paris but with some representation also reported in Belgium. While the group has apparently had some contact with GRIPPA in Belgium, the Paris-based group at one time at least appeared to be sponsored or aided by VERGES. (GRIPPA has played an active role in trying to bring the different Spanish dissident groups to a merger.)

The relationship between GRIPPA and ANDERSSON, GRIPPA and VERGES, and VERGES and ANDERSSON is anything but clear. Some part of the confusion may result from GRIPPA's driving efforts to function as the director of Chinese political operations in Europe, and to try to bring the activities of others under his control.

a. GRIPPA was once reported to have said he had "lost confidence" in Revolution. Among his reported reasons was a belief that VERGES wanted to be designated absolute leader in Europe for the "revolutionary movement." Somewhat later GRIPPA was reported as saying that the Chinese were no longer subsidizing Revolution and that it was now being backed by Paris editor Francois MASPERO.

b. GRIPPA or his aides also appear to have been responsible for stories circulating among some pro-Chinese European dissidents that ANDERSSON had been written off by the Chinese as a "Trotskyite." GRIPPA has also been quoted as saying that the printing of MCR would be transferred from Lausanne to Belgium and to GRIPPA's own publishing facility. (This is not known to have taken place.)

c. There have been reports, unexplained, that there is bad blood between VERGES and ANDERSSON.

REQUIREMENTS

ANDERSSON

1. Life story, with particular coverage of the founding of his firm "Editions la Cite" in Switzerland. Dates, contacts, financing. Biographic data also on his wife.

2. Details on "Centre Lenine" and its publication Octobre. Why founded, by whom, how financed, present activities?

3. Details of relationship between ANDERSSON and the MOR group of dissident Spanish Communists. How were they put in contact with each other, how is MOR printing financed? Does ANDERSSON play any role vis-a-vis other Spanish dissident groups?

4. Methods and channels by which he has contact with the Chinese Communists?

5. Full details on the relationship between ANDERSSON and VERGES, past and present?

Revolution

6. How is "Revolution" financed? We should like to have the whole funding situation described: amount of support, from what sources, method of transmittals, payment of editorial and publication costs.

7. Life story of VERGES, with particular coverage of period 1962 to present. Who invited him to Algeria in 1963, why did he quarrel with the Algerians? Who directed him to ANDERSSON in Switzerland, why did Revolution's main office move to Paris? Did VERGES live in Switzerland in 1963. Where and for how long?

8. Why was the English-language edition continued with ANDERSSON's firm?

9. Biographic data on members of editorial staff.
   a. What is the magazine's policy toward the use of stringer correspondents?

10. Relationship of VERGES to pro-Chinese dissident Spanish factions, in particular the group publishing Proletario.

11. Any info on the mechanics of international distribution of Revolution. How are mailing lists compiled? Use of foreign distributors? (NOTE: We are keenly interested in procuring a copy of the mailing list.

12. Methods and channels by which VERGES has contact with the Chinese Communists or any others who currently provide him with backing.

13. With whom does VERGES associate most closely in Paris?

14. With which Algerians is VERGES in contact today. How and where is this contact maintained?

15. Discreet probing on STRELKOFF and his orientation and sponsorship is also indicated.

16. What are the functions of the advisory board of Revolution? Were members chosen by Verges? How do they communicate with VERGES?

17. What guidance if any do the financial sponsors of Revolution give the editorial staff? Do they supply packaged articles? Who decides what articles are to be used in the different language editions?

18. Complete review of GIBSON's relationship with Verges. When and where did they meet, under what circumstances? What briefing did Verges give GIBSON concerning the purposes, sponsorship and line of Revolution?

19. What exactly were the duties of GIBSON in Paris and Lausanne on Revolution?

20. Does "Revolution" grant reprint authorization? If so, do you know of any publications that have carried "Revolution" material?

21. What is the source of photographs used by the magazine?

GRIPPA

22. Explain his relationship to other pro-Chinese dissident factions in Western European CPs. Is he in contact with VERGES? With ANDERSSON? Details.

23. Why was GRIPPA not asked to assist in finding a new printer for the English edition of Revolution?

24. Has he ever made any financial contributions to VERGES or ANDERSSON?

FRONT GROUPS

25. All information available on Lionel Morrison, including biographic data, current status of Gibson-Morrison relationship.

26. All information available on the Afro-Asian Journalists Association, headquartered in Cairo. (Note, an AAJA conference is slated for March in Algiers).
    a. Identify any of the individuals (outside of Morrison) connected with it.
    b. Identify any AAJA contacts in Europe or Africa.

27. Any information on the structure, plans, finances or personalities of the Pan African Journalist's Union, headed by Kofi Baatsi, and headquartered in Accra.

28. Any knowledge of the International Organisation of Journalists, headquartered in Prague. Has GIBSON met any of its officials, or attended any of its meetings.

29. Any direct knowledge of the officers, employees, procedures etc. of Prensa Latina offices in Europe.

30. Any knowledge of the officers and operations of the NCNA offices in Europe and North Africa?

31. Any contact with representatives of, or any knowledge of the propaganda operations of the NFLSV (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam), which has an office in Algiers?

32. Knowledge of any officers or national leaders of the World Peace Council in Neth Africa or Europe?

Carribean

33. Any current or past contacts with Caribbean revolutionaries? Describe.

34. Info on the present status of the Mouvement de Liberation pour la Zone des Caraibes (MLZC), which has been mentioned by name in the Economist.

35. We are interested in the present stage of organization or disorganisation of the MLCZ (which has not been heard from for almost two years) and any other info available on the coordination of the anti-colonial struggle in the Caribbean; especially involvement of Cubans, Algerians, Soviets, Trotskyists, others. (See attached dispatch, OCOW-6712, for background on the MLCZ.)

36. Does Revolution receive Cuban assistance? Specifically what is the nature of the relationship with Revolution in Havana? Contact with Carlos FRANQUI?

Miscellaneous Leftist Groups

37. Describe relationship, and persons involved, of Revolution with the New Left Review and the Movement for Colonial Freedom in Great Britain. (These

groups have placed ads in the magazine. What did they pay for the space? How?

38. Any info on GIBSON contacts with members of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Switzerland (formerly dissident *PDT* of Montreux).

39. Did GIBSON or any other member of the Revolution staff ever have dealings with Michael RAPTIS (aka "Pablo") or any of his group? Describe in detail.

40. Any info on the Red Flag and that monthly's editor John Llewellyn DAVIS. Describe contacts between the DAVIS group and Revolution.

41. Any info on, contacts with, the Du Bois group in Ghana? Hammer and Steel in Boston?

Switzerland

42. What American contacts did GIBSON maintain in Lausanne and surroundings, particularly with young students in the area? Any Arab contacts?

43. Describe the Party mechanism to which you belong, if any, in Switzerland. Indentify the individuals involved, meeting places.

Personal Contacts

Biographic data, including current addresses and activities and the status of your relationship with the following individuals and/or groups would be appreciated:

44. Maurice SINE, cartoonist. His past and present role, first in Revolution Africaine and then Revolution. Others in Express crew (e.g. STRELKOV) who went to Algeria? Did all return to France?

45. Do you know any Americans attending the subversive/sabotage school in Prague? Any info on this institution and the indentities of participants would be much appreciated.

46. Rosalynde AINSLIE (London).

47. Mme. Michele MESTRE (Paris) Relationship to VERGES group.

48. F.K.I. DUOKHAI, Rev. bureau man in Nigeria.

49. Hamza ALAVI. Former editorial board who reportedly resigned his post. Circumstances of his resignation? Current position? Revolution Editorial Board Members:

50. BABU

51. Amilcar CABRERA

52. Demba DIALLO

53. Castro da SILVA

54. Martin VALDES

55. Hacen RIAD

56. Maulana Abdul Hamid BHASHANI

57. Marcos FERRER

58. Frene GINWALA, East African residing in London.

59. Carlos LANCA and Patricia McGowan PINHEIRO, reported to be Lanca's wife, in Algeria? Any other current Algerian contacts?

60. Muhamed HARBI, who replaced VERGES as editor of Revolution Africaine.

61. Robert WILLIAMS (American in Peking)

62. Muhamed KHIDER. Was his departure from Algeria related in any way to the depature of VERGES?

63. Sub Sahara Africans, particularly in Guinea, Mali and Ghana, with pro-ChiCom links or sympathies.

64. Holden ROBERTO (Angola)

65. Mario DeAndrade (Angola)

66. Michael TABATA (South Africa)

67. Francois MASPERO, Paris publisher of Partisan. How financed?

68. Andre BELGE. Any connection with Rev.?

69. Nguyen KIEN (or Lan Ngo MANH or Ngo Manh LAN).

Latin America

70. Background circumstances leading to the decision to publish Revolution in Spanish in Bogota.

71. Biographic info on Cesar PALACIOS P., described as editor of the Bogota edition.

72. Mario ARANGO, Director of the Bogota edition.

73. Is it intended to publish a Spanish edition of Revolution in other cities in Latin America? Are any other foreign editions planned?

74. Are articles translated into Spanish in Europe and then sent to Bogota, or is the translated work done in Bogota.

75. How and through whom is the Spanish language edition of Revolucion financed. Details.

76. Biographic info on Jerome FINAMOUR, bureau man in Brazil.

ChiCom Contacts

77. Did you have any contact with the New China News Agency? If so, explain the nature of the relationship and persons with whom you dealt.

78. In the course of your editorial activities did you meet any Chinese Communists? If so, please provide information on the individuals with whom you had contact.

79. Any info on contacts by VERGES and/or other Revolution staff members with NCNA representatives or ChiCom diplomats in Paris or Bern.

80. An account of GIBSON's time in Algiers when he worked on Revolution Africaine would be useful. Also, circumstances under which GIBSON went to Algiers and then to Switzerland to start English-language edition. With whose funds?

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-306-052
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☑ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. J Markey

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SECRET

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FROM London

ACTION WE-8

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BY

INFO VR. FILE, AddP, CI, CI/OPS, CA/O-4, CA-2, FE-6, FI, CI/IC-2

AN		FI		~~DESTROY~~
ABSTRACT			~~INDEX~~	

SECRET 01/1714Z

PALP INFO DIR PARI CITE LOND 58

1 FEB 65 IN 71348

SKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

1. REQUEST CLARIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN FAIRMAN RE PASSAGE MONEY TO GIBSON AS DISCUSSED WITH SOTHERN 25 JAN.

2. LOND BELIEVES GIBSON HAS NOT YET DEPARTED FOR EUROPEAN TRIP AND HOLD-UP MAY BE DUE NON-RECEIPT 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN. IF NOT INCONSISTENT YOUR LATEST INFO FROM FAIRMAN AND UNLESS HOS OBJECTS SUGGEST LOND CONTACT FAIRMAN AND AUTHORIZE PASSAGE FUNDS NOW RATHER THAN AS STATED DIR 72506.

SECRET

CFN

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201-306052
1 Feb 65

2 FEB 1965

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS RI COPY RI COPY (35)

DISPATCH

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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM
Chief of Station, London PRC

SUBJECT LCHARVEST/~~KUDESK~~/JAGUAR
JAGUAR report on GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,410, 26 January 1965

1. Transmitted herewith are copies of JAGUAR's latest report on Richard Thomas GIBSON, which they compiled for us on being informed of our current operational interest in him. We expect that further information will be forthcoming since, as previously noted, they have instituted additional coverage of GIBSON's activities.

2. JAGUAR refer us to their previous reporting on GIBSON, which has been contained in their reports on Revolution. These include OEL-36,105(29 August 1963); OELA-40,542(15 April 1964); OELA-41,545(10 September 1964); OEL-39,251(24 September 1964); OELA-4[illegible],788(20 October 1964).

3. JAGUAR also point out that the paper contains information received from a number of secret sources, and they request that we not give it any distribution beyond KUBARK without consulting them, unless, of course, we have the information from other sources. JAGUAR have made a copy available to ODENVY London.

4. JAGUAR also informed us orally that the persons they suspect to have played a most prominent role in the 1963 charges of GIBSON's CIA affiliation - the two persons referred to in para 3 of their paper - were Rosalynd AINSLIE and Patricia McGOWAN. JAGUAR gave us this information informally and off the record. It is interesting to note that, in Ref, GIBSON agreed that AINSLIE was one but made no mention of McGOWAN.

5. GIBSON spoke of the affair of JAGUAR's para 3 (a) at some length, giving a rather different interpretation, however. Paras 3 (b), (c), and (d) are rather more speculative.

6. JAGUAR also told us, informally, that some of their information on GIBSON, as contained herein, derives from some of his correspondence. The implication is not that JAGUAR has been reading GIBSON's mail, but that, by intercepts or penetrations, they have been reading the mail of some of the

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 27 Jan. 65	DATE DISPATCHED
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HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201-306052	

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persons to whom he has written - or, of course, mail of other persons, in which mention is made of GIBSON.

7. As a belated footnote to Ref, we learn that JAGUAR had previously identified the Swiss printer of Nils ANDERSON (see OELA-39,251, 24 September 1964).

8. JAGUAR informed us on 26 January that GIBSON had requested (prior to 23 January) a one-month extension of his residence permit, to enable him to make his proposed European trip and return to the U.K. The extension was granted without demur.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
JAGUAR report, herewith

Distribution:
- 3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
- 2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
- 1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
- 1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

SECRET

Richard Thomas GIBSON
Born: Los Angeles on 13.5.31
Address: 30, Stockleigh Hall,
Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8.

GIBSON has been connected with the pro-Chinese Communist publication "Revolution" and its predecessor, "African Revolution", at least since April, 1963. He made available the following information about himself as part of a publicity campaign planned for "African Revolution" in the first half of 1963:-

1951-52:	worked in Rome for the Mediterranean News Bureau of the "Christian Science Monitor";
1955-58:	editor with the English language service of "Agence France Presse" in Paris;
1958:	arrested by the French authorities because of his work for the Algerian National Liberation Front;
1959-60:	returned to the U.S.A. and employed by the C.B.S. News in New York until dismissed because of his pro-Cuban activities;
	awarded a C.B.S. fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University;
1960-September, 1962:	Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the U.S.A.

2. In 1963, GIBSON lived in Lausanne, where "African Revolution" and subsequently the English edition of "Revolution" were printed, but he paid frequent visits to "Revolution's" Paris office until the end of the year when "Revolution" was banned in Switzerland and he was refused permission to continue to live there. He then settled in Paris where, according to one report, he and his wife lived in "quite a luxurious flat". It would, however, be wrong to infer from this that GIBSON's means enabled him to enjoy high living standards, as another source subsequently reported that he had not paid any rent for the flat from May to October, 1964.

3. As far back as August, 1963, there were rumours in Communist circles in London that GIBSON was an American agent and that he had provided United States Intelligence with the names of certain unidentified United States negroes in accordance with a brief received from the Americans. Information from a well-placed source suggests that these rumours may have originated from the jealous reactions of two persons, connected with "Revolution", whose aspirations with the publication were cut short when GIBSON became Editor of the English edition. However, by mid-1964, VERGES, the Editorial Director of "Revolution", was claiming that complaints about GIBSON's activities had been received not only from London, but also from Cuba, American negroes in New York and a relative of GIBSON's who was working for the magazine "Spark" in Ghana. As a result, GIBSON was dismissed from the editorial staff of "Revolution". Charges made against him include the following:-

/ (a) ...

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(a) denouncing, in 1958, an unidentified negro, possibly a Communist, who was expelled from France;

(b) informing the publication's contacts in China that "Revolution" was disintegrating;

(c) providing "Newsweek" and the "New York Herald Tribune" with information in an attempt to discredit "Revolution";

(d) connections with the C.I.A.

Although GIBSON has denied the charges made against him, he realises that they have stuck and that it will be some years before he will be acceptable to any left wing organisation.

4. Having failed to find employment in Paris after leaving "Revolution" in July, 1964, GIBSON went to the United Kingdom on 7th October and was joined later by his British wife, Joy Marjorie, and his two children. He hoped to find work in London, but at the end of November, he was still without a job and dependent on his wife's family, who were paying the rent of his flat at 30, Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London, N.W.8. It is now known whether GIBSON has been able to find employment.

5. Nothing is known at present about GIBSON's contacts in the United Kingdom. Although during the time he worked for "Revolution" he was in touch with members of the pro-Chinese Communist splinter group in the United Kingdom - the Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - it is not known whether he has resumed contact. It has been reported that he still keeps in touch with the coloured South African journalist, Lionel MORRISON, who is employed by the Chinese-backed Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (A.A.J.A.) in Djakarta.

Comment: "Afro-Asian Journalist", no. 4, dated July, 1964, and published by the A.A.J.A.,
Para. 5: contains an article "Two Revolutionary Journals" by MORRISON, the journals being "Revolution" and "Spark".

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief, WE

INFO.

Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, FE; Chief, AF; Chief, WH; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT; COS, Brussels

FROM

Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK/LCHARVEST/REVOLUTION
Tape of Interview with Richard Thomas GIBSON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: LOND 5706, 21 January 1965

1. Attached is the tape of the interview with GIBSON, recorded in an Embassy office, using a Uher 4000 Report - 5 recorder, recording at a speed of 15/16 feet per minute. The interviewer used the alias of Earl Wilson. Gibson arrived at 1745 and departed at about 2030.

2. We are not attempting to summarize or analyze GIBSON's comments in this dispatch. The tape provides a much more revealing picture than our subjective comments could. A few notes, however, appear to be in order.

3. Speaking of his departure, GIBSON said he planned to leave London on 24 or 25 January. As of noon 24 January, at least, he was still in London because I saw him walking on St. John's Wood High Street. (A potential problem exists here: GIBSON and I live within a few blocks of one another and not infrequently ride the same bus line. This problem can only be met when it manifests itself.) JAGUAR, incidentally, has alerted its immigration contacts (prior to our meeting with GIBSON) and requested that his name be put on a watch list. They said that they would inform us if they learn that he has left the country. We have not yet heard that he has left.)

4. GIBSON was given money amounting to $300. Under the circumstances of his plans, as he expressed them, it seemed reasonable to do so, to ensure, at least partially, that he would come back to talk more. He was more than willing to take the money and raised the initial suggestion of $200 to $300 or $400. His obvious shift in his line regarding dollars (as opposed to pounds) is further indicative of his willingness to get what he could.

5. The considerable number of names mentioned by GIBSON makes the transcription of the notes a sizable chore, and in order to lessen this burden a listing has been compiled of almost all of the names, in the order in which they appear in the tape, with the exception of VERGES and the Free Play for Cuba Committee, CBS and a few others. The names appear only one time each on the list, although many of them crop up repeatedly in the tape.

201-306052

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
26 Jan. 65	27 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OELA-42,410.

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

201-306052

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Jatts.

A few of the phrases that do not appear too clearly on the tape are included on the list. Occasionally the names are written phonetically, indicated by (ph.).

6. GIBSON's offer of a photograph of VERGES was not accepted, on the assumption that KUBARK already has a photo. If this is not the case, let us know, and we will include that in our requirements for a subsequent meeting.

7. The Afro-Asian Journalists Association man is apparently Lionel MORRISON. He is also referred to as the "man from Djakarta". (See LOND 5575 of 12 January 1965.)

8. The reference to the Cultural Attache of the Cuban Embassy corroborates (rather, is corroborated by) the material referred to in para 4 of LOND 5337 (22 December 1965). We are not fully aware of the Cuban's political orientation, however,

9. In reviewing the tape, it will become apparent that the arrangements with GIBSON were left fairly flexible for the future. It would appear, from his responses, that a longer range relationship with him could, in fact, be established if, after thorough review of his materials, that seems necessary or desirable.

10. We will expect, in addition to the requirements that have been promised, that Headquarters will advise us on their desire to arrange for the one-shot approach previously suggested by Headquarters, or a different arrangement. We are unable to assess the validity or worth of all the comments he made. Our impression, however, is that he is reasonably knowledgeable of a number of fields of interest to us. We also suspect that in some areas his knowledge is quite superficial. His access to various areas of potential interest may be partially proved by his trip around Europe and should be a useful indication of how we may be interested in playing him. The possibility of his being a provocation has not been overlooked, of course, and we welcome Headquarters' comments on this score as well.

11. We would also appreciate further comments on various personalities, with whom we are not familiar - "Anderson" is the most obvious in this category.

12. Headquarters is requested to provide us with a transcription of this tape, as well as the promised requirements, prior to 15 February. ODENVY should also be provided with as much of the material as is of interest to them, and a copy of that material should be given to us to pass to the ODENVY office here. We are also obliged to pass to JAGUAR such elements of this material as is of legitimate concern to them. In this case, we would suggest that this be interpreted rather liberally and Headquarters-prepared copy be forwarded along with the other items listed above. (Note that JAGUAR has been quite cooperative while we have been approaching this case, and their recent run-down on GIBSON is being pouched almost simultaneously with this dispatch.)

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-List of names
2-Tape (WE only)

Gibson was not aware that the interview was being taped.

Distribution:
2 ~~3~~-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, FE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, WH w/att h/w
1-COS, Paris w/att h/w
1-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
1-COS, Brussels w/att h/w

Attachment to OELA-42,410
26 January 1965

List of names on tape, approximately in order of appearance:

PRJTO - "very silly man in Paris"
"next to Balmain"

"PR stunt"

"told by ANDERSON"

DELDUCCA (ph.)

to BABU

in POMPIDOU's office

Rabah BITAT

Zohra DRITT (ph.)

Revolution Africaine

Djamila BOUHIRED

Bill GRIFFITHS

French DST

articles for Encounter

Jerome LANDON (ph.)

Edition Lingui (very ph.)

Argument

Reunion Island

Hachete

Ngo Kanh LAN - Nguyen KIEN

Mr. SOONG

Fanonist - FANON

ODINGA of Kenya

Robert LEHMAN

Dennis POMBEYE of Tanzania Foreign Office

BABU and HANGA

Rosalynd AINSLIE

Sen RASHID (??ph.)

Jack WODDIS

Kay BEAUCHAMP (ph.)

POMBEYE (again)

CHANDRA (Algierian Ambassador to UN - ph.)

SARTRE saw Fidel

att #16
OELA-42410

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201-306052

Dienbienphu - Evian

OPRA

Ollie HARRINGTON (the comment "You take Harrington" means "You use Harrington's name.")

Pittsburgh *Courier*

Richard WRIGHT

William __________ SMITH - Ghana television

C. L. R. JAMES

George PADMORE

AFP

Miles STEWART

Tony BLOND (ph.)

Tony HAGEN

(Robert) WILLIAMS

Bayard RUSTIN

Emmet TILL

PATTERSON

ANDERSON (again)

(Jacques) GRIPPA

Veuvey

Bill WORTHY (ph.)

Monthly Review

??? SUBERMAN and Paul SWEAZEY (ph.)

Centre d'Etudes et Documentation de Marseilles

Amitie Franco-Chinoise

Clichy

BEAULIEU

TSHOMBE

ADOULA

Bob TABER

Cleanth BROOKS

Carlos FRANQUI

Leo LABEDZ

Ved MEHTA

Magnum

Week - published in Nottingham

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

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S E C R E T 211612Z

21 JAN 65 IN 64592

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5706

LCHARVEST KUDESK

REF DIR 78506

AF | 1 | A

ABSTRACT X

1. LOND OFFICER, POSING AS ODYOKE TDY FROM WASH, ARRANGED FOR GIBSON COME EMBASSY FOR INTERVIEW. G, WITHOUT ASKING QUESTIONS, CAME WILLINGLY FOR INTERVIEW, WHICH LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, MOSTLY SQUIRT TRANSMISSION WITH DIRECTIONAL PRODS FROM INTERVIEWER.

2. G VEHEMENTLY, REPEATEDLY AND APPARENTLY SINCERELY VOLUNTEERED HIS CONVICTION THAT NO CHICOM FUNDS, OTHER THAN 3000 SUBSCRIPTIONS, SUPPORTING REVOLUTION, ALTHOUGH VERGES HAS LONG HOPED ENTICE THEM TO DO SO. IN GENERAL TERMS, G COVERED HISTORY HIS INVOLVEMENT ANTI-COLONIALIST AFFAIRS SINCE 1958 - ALGERIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PARI, FPCC WORK IN NEW YORK, TRAVEL ALGIERS AND SUBSEQUENT VICISSITUDES WITH REVOLUTION.

201-306052

22 JAN 1965

3. G LEAVING NEXT FEW DAYS TO TRAVEL EUROPE, TO INTERVIEW VARIOUS LEFTISTS AND COMMIES (INCL GRIPPA) AS WELL AS NUMBER OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTION OF REVOLUTION. LATTER

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RID/MIS
JUN 4 3 PM '65

SECRET

JN 64592
PAGE 2

IN ORDER PRY FURTHER INTO VERGES' FINANCIAL CONDITION AND SOURCE OF REVOLUTION FINANCING, WHICH G BELIEVES HAS BEEN FROM ALGERIAN SOURCES VIA SUISSE. WILL TALK WITH "LITTLE MAN WHO DOES MANY THINGS FOR CHICOMS IN BERN" FNU ANDERSON, WHO ONE OF G'S BEST SOURCES ON VERGES RELATIONSHIP CHINESE BERN. WILL BE AWAY FROM LOND TILL ABOUT 15 FEB WHEN NEXT CONTACT SCHEDULED. STA GAVE G 300 DOLLARS TO HELP PAY COSTS OF TRIP, MAKE SURE HIS FUTURE COOPERATION. G SAYS HE EXPECTS RECEIVE 100 POUNDS FROM FAIRMAN 300 DOLLARS FROM ATLANTIC MONTHLY, WHICH WILL ALSO MAKE TRIP POSSIBLE. HAS AGREED PROVIDE MANUSCRIPTS AND, IF WAY CAN BE FOUND GET THEM OUT WITHOUT AROUSING WIFE'S SUSPICION, SEVERAL BOXES OF CARDS WHICH CONSTITUTE MAILING LIST.

4. DISPATCH WILL FOLLOW, PLUS TAPES (FOR DIR ONLY) OF MEETING.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

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RID: ABSTRACT · RFI · INDEX · DESTROY

S E C R E T 201543Z

LOND INFO DIR PALP CITE PARI 8742

KOBIRD LCHARVEST DIDCRIC QKOPERA KUDESK

RE A LOND 5652 (IN 61219)

B PALP 3073 (IN 60705)

1. PARI CONCURS REF A.

2. PALP INFORMS US GIBSON LETTER (REF B PARA 1) NOT BEING PUBLISHED. HOWEVER LETTER ITSELF PROMPTS FOLL STA QUESTIONS: (A) DOES GIBSON BELIEVE OWN DENIALS OF CHICOM SUPPORT "REVOLUTION"? IF SO HE LESS WELL INFORMED THAN WE HOPED. NOTE HE OFFERS NO EXPLANATION FOR MAGAZINE FINANCIAL RECOVERY, WHICH RECENT PRICE REVISIONS AND BI-MONTHLY ISSUE UTTERLY FAIL EXPLAIN. (B) IF GIBSON DELIBERATELY FALSIFYING QUESTION CHICOM SUPPORT, WHAT WERE HIS MOTIVES SINCE HE PRESUMABLY HOPED LETTER BE PUBLISHED?

3. OFPA 77970 (POUCHED HQS 18 JAN, LOND 20 JAN) PROVIDES BACKGROUND MATERIAL INCLUDING MEMO GIBSON CONVERSATION WITH GOSSETT, AMEMBASSY PARI.

4. INDEX 201-306052.

20 Jan 65 IN 63559

20 Jan 65

201-306052

14-00000

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, London

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WE

SUBJECT DTDORIC LCHARVEST KUDESK
Transmittal copy of Gibson Letter to KUBARK

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: DIR 78506

As stated in reference we forward herewith copy of Gibson's letter which the Station might consider using ultimately to establish bona fides if other means of establishing bona fides (such as phone call to Embassy) does not satisfy Gibson. London case officer in showing the letter to Gibson need not admit to or represent himself as a member of KUBARK, though Gibson might well make that assumption.

STEWART F. ROLNICK

2 - London
(w/att U.S.C.)
T.N.

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO
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OKLW-21828

DATE 21 JAN 1965
19 January 1965

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RID/[illegible]	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WE/BC(U)	John G. Roberts	jb	7220

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DCWE(BC)	17 Jan. '65	John G. Roberts JOHN F. CASWELL

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

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TO Chief, WE ATTN: Chief, FE		XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, London			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chiefof Station, Paris			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/UNBOUND - Identity A, formerly employed by Identity B

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: PARI 8052

NOTE: The following round-up and commentary on Iden A had been drafted before PALP 3017 of 6 January 1965 and later traffic presented the case in a somewhat different light. We forward the following anyway, as some of the background and suggestions still seem pertinent. Several questions raised below have now been resolved, notably the allegation of an Iden A/KUBARK link (explained by the ODENVY letter of 1 December 1964, not available when the following was written). Copies of recent PALP correspondence on Iden A, passed to us on 13 January 1965, are attached as Attachment 3, USC.

1. Upon receiving the memorandum cited in the reference, we requested further details from UNBOUND, stressing our interest in the report that CPUSA members had given IDEN C documents which showed IDEN A belonged to "the services of KUBARK". D/5986 of 30 December 1964, UNBOUND's answer to our query, merely reiterates that the UNBOUND source, a good one, based the report on a "communication of documents" by American Communists to IDEN C, which supposedly established that IDEN A belonged to KUBARK; UNBOUND states that the source is not in a position to identify the persons in question. UNBOUND's reply suggests the information might have come from an audio operation; we might mention here that IDEN A has appeared occasionally on UNPAY, but never in an informative way. A mail intercept might also be the source of UNBOUND's report, or it may have come from a third service (conceivably JAGUAR or SMOTH).

2. Our continuing preoccupation with the IDEN A question is three-fold: (a) his expulsion from IDEN B (and thus from acceptance by pro-Peiping groups) opens the door for his possible recruitment; (b) we would like to determine whether his ouster was engineered by personal enemies or whether he actually did work for an intelligence service, and which one; (c) as Peiping regards the USA as its primary target, the Chinese can be expected to continue propaganda attacks designed to create IDEN D tension and inflame the Afro/Asians

Attachments: 1. Excerpt from RFE research bulletin, 19 Nov 64, h/w
5/C attached in Ri/AN 2. Memorandum of Conversation, USC
3. Letters dated 4 and 6 Jan 65, USC
4. Identities, USC

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201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFPA - 77970	JAN 18 1965 15 January 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

against the U.S.A. While domestic effects of such propaganda are properly handled by ODENVY, the manipulation of IDEN Ds to further Chinese propaganda abroad becomes KUBARK's concern.

3. KUBARK's recruitment of IDEN A, or establishment of controlled access to him, could be extremely useful in countering attempts to undermine the USA with the Afro-Asians. IDEN A presumably still has a reasonably up-to-date idea of IDEN B plans in this regard, and he must know the names and locations of many persons involved. The most effective approach to IDEN A would probably be through an offer of money (his history indicates venality, and at present he appears to be in financial difficulties), and by stressing his chance to get even with IDEN C. The purity of IDEN A's Communism is open to question and should not impede recruitment; a more formidable obstacle to a successful operation is his possible connection with a foreign intelligence service. This could be a Western service but might also be the Soviets, for whom he would serve the dual purpose of causing trouble for the USA and at the same time reporting on the Chinese propaganda machine; it is a matter of record that the Soviets view IDEN B seriously. Whatever the basis for a KUBARK approach to IDEN A, it would require careful security planning, taking cognizance of his instability and his known attitude toward ODYOKE as an IDEN D.

4. "Revolution" has featured articles by three American Negroes, Richard GIBSON, Robert Franklyn WILLIAMS, and Malcolm X, all obviously intended to prejudice readers against the USA on ground of racial injustice. All three men are or have been involved with foreign Communists: GIBSON and WILLIAMS with the Chinese and the Cubans, notably, and Malcolm X with the Chinese and various African Communists (actual or crypto). The "New York Herald Tribune" of 4 January 1965 reported Malcolm's statement that he hopes to "internationalize" the American Negro problem, and that he claims to have influenced several African governments to make representations in the U.N. against the USA's treatment of its Negroes. This may be a foretaste of Chinese plans for foreign exploitation of this issue; Malcolm was interviewed by "Revolution" in Cairo, which has since proved its enthusiastic anti-Americanism.

5. OFP-14693 reports that Philip BART, a pro-Soviet official of the CPUSA, stated in December 1964 that the CPUSA has positive proof that four members of their Chinese faction are being paid by the Chinese Communists. (It is perhaps relevant to note here that the advent of "Revolution" was hailed by letters to the Editor from American leftists, including the FPCC; according to OFPA-37875, Vincent T. LEE of "All Worlds Publications" in New York City takes subscriptions for "Revolution"). It is hard to say where IDEN A enters into the clouded picture of American Communist partisanship in the Sino/Soviet rift, but in view of his shifting allegiances he may have divulged to pro-Soviet CPUSA members, or to the Soviets themselves, information on Chinese subversion in the USA. The October 1964 issue of "Hammer & Steel Newsletter" is cited by the Radio Free Europe research bulletin of November 1964 in the latter's review of pro-Chinese factions among Western Communist Parties; RFE research describes "Hammer & Steel" as a monthly produced in Boston by a small American faction. (Portions of the RFE research bulletin with its citations from "Hammer & Steel" are attached as Attachment 1). The marked paragraph from "Hammer & Steel" hits at the idea of white nations' inherent superiority; this is consistent with China's claim of a bond among the colored peoples of the world, which permits such effective anti-Soviet propaganda as the cover of "Revolution" for May 1964, which shows KHRUSHCHEV saying, "We, the whites...".

No. Ted was Strelkoff

6. IDEN C's denunciation of IDEN A may have been at least partially caused by suspicion he was trying to gain control of IDEN E; it will be recalled that very shortly before his ouster, IDEN A was in Holland negotiating for that type of printing equipment (HAGU 6137 and OCHA 28818). He is now living in London; he has presumably been obliged to find work there (unless he actually is on an intelligence payroll), and he may have landed with some leftist publishing outfit or even with the CPUK, which is sufficiently divided to afford room for his current views, whatever they may be. In addition to IDEN A's potential for reporting on Chinese propaganda efforts, his uses as a penetration of British or other European Communist publishing circles are obvious.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFPA 77970

7. UNBOUND reported that American Communists had allegedly given IDEN C documents showing IDEN A worked for KUBARK. One explanation of this allegation may lie in IDEN A's visit to the American Embassy, Paris, in late 1963, at the request of Mr. John G. GOSSETT, then Acting Consul General. GOSSETT was interested in any information he might have on possible connections between IDEN F, with which IDEN A had been connected, and President Kennedy's assassination. (A copy of GOSSETT's Memorandum of Conversation is attached under separate cover as Attachment 2; his appraisals of IDEN A and his reservations concerning his motives are interesting). IDEN A and GOSSETT had a far-ranging talk, including what may have been a tentative feeler by IDEN A for ODYOKE employment. It seems likely that IDEN A would have reported an American Embassy inquiry to his friends in IDEN F, and he may even have mentioned the possibility of future "work" for ODYOKE, which could have led to eventual allegations that he had been recruited by KUBARK. This is of course speculation, but IDEN A's flexible loyalties and liking for money are surely known to his colleagues, and, if he had already aroused antagonism among them, the Embassy visit would serve as a peg for sincere or expedient denunciation.

8. We can shed no light on the allegation that IDEN G is a KUBARKER (LOND 5337). Our only trace is OELA 39346, stating he is IDEN H. We are not clear as to the relationship between IDEN A, IDEN G, and IDEN I, also mentioned in OELA 39346, which states she "appears to be" IDEN A's wife. According to ODENVY Paris, however, IDEN A is married to IDEN J. OEL 39251 of September 1964 reported that IDEN A and his wife (unnamed) had successfully sued IDEN B for salary arrears; the fact that the wife was also employed recalls the IDEN I professional status, which might make her operationally significant whether or not she is married to IDEN A.

Ann E. Ducote

Ann E. DUCOTE
WH

Believe IDEN "G" does not exist, & that someone confused him with IDEN "A".

Iden "I"* is wife of IDEN "A"
She is British and not negro
Don't believe there is an IDEN "J"; again there must have been confusion, and her name is that given for IDEN "I"

14-00000

Att . to: OFFA - 77970, HW

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

November 19, 1964

United States

One of the most violent reactions came from the heartland of capitalism, from the small American faction which produces the monthly Hammer & Steel Newsletter in Boston. The October issue of the mimeographed bulletin vengefully gives a list of eight reasons why Khrushchev fell -- each one a vindictive crow of triumph, and many attacking not only Khrushchev but basic Soviet policies such as "the distortion of peaceful coexistence." Points 2, 3 and 8 will serve as illustrations:

2. His German policy -- Khrushchev sought to ingratiate himself with West Germany. He was obviously ready to sell out the German Democratic Republic...

3. The declining influence of the CPSU among the Socialist countries and the Communist Parties. The proposed Moscow gathering was shaping up as a conference of only those Party leaders ready to openly serve U.S. imperialist aggression against the national liberation struggles. For example, Asian supporters of Khrushchev could have gathered in a telephone booth.

8. The nuclear success of People's China. Khrushchev had maintained that nuclear power was the exclusive responsibility of revisionists and imperialists -- of white nations. Khrushchev's great power chauvinism was blown sky high in Sinkiang Province.

Although there is no evidence that the politically insignificant Hammer & Steel group enjoys any direct support from the Chinese (as the Russians alleged in their "Open Letter" of July 14, 1963), it has always offered its allegiance to Peking in the most extreme form. This is expressed again in the claim that "Khrushchev's failure to recognize the contradiction between the oppressed peoples and imperialism as the focal contradiction of our time resulted in blindness concerning the leading rôle of the Chinese Party."8 This is a claim that the Chinese themselves would not want to make, expecially at this juncture.

att #16
OFPA-77970

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ABSTRACT

INDEX

S E C R E T 151646Z

DIR INFO LOND PARI BRUS CITE PALP 3073 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DYDORIC QKOPERA LCHARVEST KUDESK

all - w/

REF A. DIR 76497 (IN58385)

B. LOND 5575 (ALSO PER BASTEAR)

15 JAN 65 IN 60705

1. AIRMAILING TO BASYUAR KATZENBACH LETTER WRITTEN TO ENCOUNTER BY GIBSON AT LASKY'S INVITATION RE FINANCIAL BACKING OF REVOLUTION. LASKY WILL NOT RPT NOT PUBLISH SINCE OBVIOUSLY WOULD BURN BRIDGES BETWEEN GIBSON AND OLD COLLEAGUES.

2. SABA LCPIPIT SUGGEST FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION:

A. KUBARKER UNDER ODACID POLITICAL OFFICER COVER GET ALL POSSIBLE INFO OUT OF GIBSON USING NECESSARY MINIMUM FINANCIAL INDUCEMENT. DEBRIEFING SHOULD START ASAP AND RELATIONSHIP SHOULD CONTINUE AS LONG AS FRUITFUL (LASKY FEELS GIBSON, AS "RACIAL REVOLUTIONIST, ENTHUSIAST AND OPPORTUNIST" WOULD RESPOND BADLY TO OPEN KUBARK PITCH);

B. MEANWHILE LASKY GIVE GIBSON 100 POUND GRANT TO TRAVEL AND PREPARE ARTICLES WHICH WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED UNTIL EVIDENT THAT GIBSON BURNED AMONG FORMER CONTACTS;

C. WHEN EVIDENT GIBSON BURNED AND FI POTENTIAL EXHAUSTED

SECRET

15 Jan 65

201-306052

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SECRET

IN-60705
PAGE 2 of 2

ENCOUNTER AND OTHER CONGRESS PUBLICATIONS WOULD TRY FOR MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA IMPACT GIBSON'S WRITINGS.

3. APPREC ADDRESSEES REACTIONS ABOVE. [redacted]

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

4. HQS KEENLY INTERESTED KUBARK DEBRIEFING SUBJ.

FEB 3 2 25 PM '65

FEB 3 11 03 PM '65

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : A. GOODRICH
UNIT : CI/ICG
EXT : 5928
DATE : 14 JAN 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

43 S-E-C-R-E-T

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FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: CI/IC 2

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FE 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, WE 6, FI/INT 2, [illegible]

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TO LOND INFO BRUS CITE DIR

77493

KUDESK LCHARVEST DTDORIC

RE LOND 5575 (IN 58385)*

FRIEND

DIR 76497**

WHILE APPRECIATE ANY INFO AVAILABLE JAGUAR, HQS HAS VOLUMINOUS FILE ON GIBSON WHICH ADEQUATE BASIS FOR LONDON STATION DIRECT CONTACT WITH GIBSON NOW TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY AND PRICE FOR ONE WEEK DEBRIEFING BY ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON CONTINENT. WISH CONTACT HIM NOW WHILE HE UNEMPLOYED AND ~~[illegible]~~ PROBABLY AVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

*CITED INFO FROM JAGUAR RE GIBSON.

**REQUESTED LOND STATION CONTACT GIBSON DETERMINE HIS AVAILABILITY FOR DEBRIEFING.

RI COPY

AN 5B FI
RS

AF 1/h

201-306052

John Caswell
DCWE(BC)

FE/CH W. E. SMITH
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WE/BC/C

RELEASING OFFICER

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XUDESK LCHARVEST DIDORIC

12 JAN 65 IN 5838

MICROFILMED FEB 10 1965 DOC. MICRO. SER.

AN | W | PS | 201 | FI | ABSTRACT | ~~INDEX~~ | ~~DESTROY~~

REF A. DIR 76457

B. BRUS 1858 (NOT SENT [illegible]

1. MATTER DISCUSSED BROAD TERMS WITH JAGUAR. EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT GIBSON OF CURRENT INTEREST TO US, WITH POSSIBLE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WHICH NOT YET RESOLVED. WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR READINGS CURRENT ACTIVITIES, ATTITUDES, ETC BY CHANCE THEY HAVE RECENTLY DIRECTED THAT FULLER INFO BE GATHERED ON SUBJECT, IN SUPPORT OF CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF INFO CURRENTLY IN HAND. WILL MAKE AVAILABLE ROUND-UP ON SUBJ WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. ITEMS CITED FROM MEMRORY BY JAGUAR REP: GIBSON DOES NOT YET HAVE JOB: NOT STAYING WITH KAYE (IN-LAW), BUT IN SEPARATE FLAT WITH WIFE AND KIDS; KAYE (BROTHER-IN-LAW) HAD BEEN SUBSIDIZING GIBSONS; GIBSON CORRESPONDING WITH (NEGRO) SOUTH AFRICAN ANC ACTIVITIST CURRENTLY IN INDONESIA WITH AFRO-ASIAN JOURNALISTS ORG, LIONEL MORRISON (201-725837); THERE OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY BAD BLOOD BETWEEN GIBSON AND JACQUES VERGES (VERGES WAS IN LONDON IN DECEMBER

SECRET

12 Jan. 65

B-201-725837

201-306052

SECRET

IN 58385 pg. 2

64; JAGUAR TRYING FIND OUT WHOM HE VISITED BUT THINK HE DID NOT SEE GIBSON); GIBSON HAS CONTACTED BBC IN SEARCH OF JOB AND AT LEAST ONE PERSON OF "PREVIOUS RECORD" AS LEFTIST; JAGUAR HAVE COPIES OF SEVERAL OF GIBSON'S LETTERS OVER PAST YEAR; JAGUAR VERY CURIOUS ABOUT WHERE GIBSON'S MONEY IN PAST CAME FROM, SINCE HE LIVED IN VERY ELEGANT STYLE IN PARIS.

3. LOND FEELS DECISION RE DIRECT APPROACH TO GIBSON SHOULD BE DEFERRED AT LEAST PENDING FUTHER ANALYSIS INFO DUE TO BE RECEIVED. TOLD JAGUAR WE KNOW GIBSON IN TOUCH MACFARQUHAR AND CAN ASK SMOTH PROVIDE FURTHER INFO THIS CHANNEL IF MACFARQUHAR NOT ALSO IN TOUCH JAGUAR, BUT PREFER KEEP QUERIES IN ONE PLACE. WILL DEFER QUERY OF SMOTH TILL THIS POINT RESOLVED.

4. VIEW FOREGOING, NO PRESENT NEED THESSIN LOND. WILL ADVISE IF SERVICES REQUIRED. APPRECIATE REF B.

5. ODENVY/LOND BEING KEPT INFORMED AND MOST COOPERATIVE.

6. FURTHER INFO FROM JAGUAR WILL BE FORWARDED SOONEST.

SECRET

CFN

FEB 3 1965

SECRET

FEB 4 11 08 PM '65

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London

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AF 7

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S E C R E T 061550Z

DIR INFO PALP PARI CITE LOND 5512 CAWOOD ACTING

10 Jan 65 IN 56408

ZIBET LCHARVEST OKOPERA

REF A. LOND 5337 (IN 47512)

B. PALP 3017 (IN 55241)

AN IS RI ABSTRACT INDEX DESTROY

1. WHILE LOND HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON TIE UP, SUGGEST DEFER DECISION TILL MORE INFO IN HAND. REF B DEVELOPMENT WOULD SEEM PROVIDE USEFUL MEANS GETTING MORE THOROUGH ASSESSMENT OF GIBSON (VIA SMOTH/MACFARQUHAR) AND IT WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW HOW HE GOT ONTO MACFARQUHAR.

2. VIEW MACFARQUHAR ASSOCIATION SMOTH AND CONTINUED JAGUAR INTEREST GIBSON AND REVOLUTION, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS' PERMISSION DISCUSS WITH SMOTH AND JAGUAR. WILL BE SEEING APPROPRIATE JAGUAR OFFICER 12 JAN AND WOULD LIKE DISCUSS AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

CDN 5512 5337 3017 DTLEAFAGE/GIBSON REF B GIBSON VIA SMOTH/ MACFARQUHAR MACFARQUHAR SMOTH JAGUAR HQS' 12 JAN

BT

8 Jan 65

201-306052

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

7 January 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON, Richard (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☒ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Robert W MAYHEW (name) Ops/Off (title) EUR/ROG (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KM (initials) 22 Jan (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET 23 Dec 1974
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on GIBSON (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☑ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______________ OI Code A2.

☐ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barbara Bush (name) IA (title) SS/CAG/PAB (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed EH (initials) 8 Jan 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-306052

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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(WHEN MATERIAL INSERTED)

BLACK TAPE 201 FILE

TO: IP/Files, GC-52
FROM: EUR /RMO, 4B4402 6771
(Rm. #) (Ext.)

TO BE OPENED BY Personnel of EUR/ROG ONLY!
(DON 5-50 Designation)

I certify that the enclosed 201 volume has been checked before sealing to ensure that the material is arranged in chronological order, duplicates have been removed, each Record Copy has been properly input to the DO Records System, and that all Record Copy material in this volume is classified to this file. Form 2021 to restrict this file is attached hereto.

(Signature of RMO)

VOL. V of VII enclosed.

Inclusive Dates of Enclosed Material (Multi-Vols. Only):
From 1 July 65 to Dec 68
(Date) (Date)

201- 306052

FORM 11-73 3299 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-20)

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

THIS VOLUME CLOSED AS OF

31 DECEMBER 1968

LIVER FUNCTION TESTS

On 24 October 1968, I saw Dr. Daly of the Bio-chemistry Laboratory of West London Hospital for liver function tests. My family doctor, Dr. Hodes, sent me to Daly as a private patient, as British practice is not to take these tests unless the patient's condition seems to be worsening. My doctor thought I showed no signs of a recurrence of hepatitis and the normal practice would have been, at most, for me to have been examined by the specialist at the hospital, who might then decide to ask for the tests.

Daly said that all required tests, except the B.S.P., would be done. He said he thought the B.S.P. unnecessary unless the others indicated negative factors. In which case, he said he would ask me to come in again for that test.

Daly will send me the results of the tests and his bill c/o American Express, Rome, within a week.

[illegible] HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE DOCUMENTS DIVISION OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOW-UP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH C/CA/CF.

201-306052

TM# 072369, 29 Oct 68

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
CRPHONE J	802799	12/01 12/31 1968	20	1242930	000

CD	EARNINGS NORMAL	EARNINGS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
C9	[illegible]000		REG SAL

NOTE:

THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS NORMAL	DEDUCTIONS OTHER	DESCRIPTION
73	8000-		LIQ PAYMT
80	89000		CPA EX CR
96	8000		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Changing tax code for the quarter and reducing tax to $80.00 per memo, dated JULY 1968.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 QRPHONE

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (20-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	NT/HRS	HD/HRS	RATE	O/T-NT AMT	H/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(20-51)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London JBM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. After considering several alternatives and given QRPHONE/1's lack of financial forward planning, LCPIPIT believes that it would be beneficial and advantageous for WOFIRM to offer to subsidize a portion of an overt life insurance program designed to give him both life insurance and a cash value toward retirement. We have discussed this with QRPHONE/1 and he has agreed to the desirability of such a program. He is willing to participate in such an arrangement and has undertaken to explore the possibilities available to him. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of several proposals which he has received from the local representative of a reputable WOLADY insurance firm.

2. LCPIPIT requests authority to subsidize up to 1/2 of the cost of a life insurance program for QRPHONE/1. (This WOFIRM portion not to exceed $50 per month.) From an administration standpoint this would merely take the form of an increased monthly payment and we would take the necessary steps to verify that the funds were indeed being devoted to their designated purpose.

AcL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
As stated above

DOC FORWARDED U/S/C
BY RID/SD 29 OCT 1968

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
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RYBAT CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1397

DATE
OCT 23 1968
22 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306[illegible]052

Attchmen to OEPA-1397

J. SPENCER LANGFORD, C.L.U.

REPRESENTING

MUTUAL LIFE OF NEW YORK

(MONY)

31 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE

LONDON, S.W.1

01-930 971[illegible]

13 September 1968

[redacted]

Dear [redacted]

The following will give you an idea of the protection, cash at 65, and retirement income you will get under three different plans on the basis we discussed on the phone. Let me know if you need any more information.

Premium -	$50/month	$ 75/month	$100/month
Plan Type			
Whole Life			
Death Benefit	23000	35000	47000
Cash at 65	21200	33100	44400
Life Income @ 65	133	207	278
Endowment at 65			
Death Benefit	17000	25000	33000
Cash at 65	25600	38100	50300
Life Income @ 65	160	239	315
Retirement Endowment @ 65			
Death Benefit	11000	17000	23000
Cash at 65	25300	39100	52900
Life Income @ 65	158	245	331

I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

1 - The retirement income figures are monthly income at 65 using the 10 year certain option

CS COPY

Note:

I would be willing to put up, or have deducted, part of such a scheme, say $25 a month.

201-306052

2 - Any figures concerning dividends are not guarantees nor estimates since dividends depend upon future experience and the annual action of the companies trustees

3 - All figures are in the US dollars and based on standard male issue at age 37.

Sincerely,

Spence

J Spencer Langford, C. L. U.

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 9 Oct 68

38

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

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BY 46 PER #

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 21 22 Z OCT 68 CITE DIRECTOR 40570

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON, ROME

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 7508 (IN 08511)

B. OEPW - 405, 8 Oct 68

1. DEFER PARA 2 REF A TO ROME (PER OIRW-27586, TELEPOUCHED ~~TODAY~~ 9 OCT).

2. REF B, POUCHED 8 OCT, REPORTS GENERALLY SANGUINE MEDICAL PROGNOSIS QRPHONE/1 HEALTH FOLLOWING HEPATITIS, PERMITS SHORT TRIPS TO CONTINENT PROVIDED HE WATCHES DIET CAREFULLY AND DOES NOT OVER TIRE, UNTIL CLINICAL AND CHEMICAL TESTS RECOMMENDED IN REF B PRONOUNCE HIM FULLY RECOVERED.

3. FILE 200-124-156/3.

END OF MESSAGE

EUR/1
EUR/BC/UK

Q/201

C/CA

D. Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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DISPATCH

.BAT CLASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET

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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

INFO.
Chief of Station, London

FROM
Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT
RYBAT/DTDORIC/QRPHONE
QRPHONE/1 Physical Condition

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OEPA-1312, 10 September 1968

1. On the basis of the documentation submitted under reference dispatch, the Medical Staff feels that QRPHONE/1 made a surprisingly fast recovery and seems well on the way to complete health. However, the hospital report (a quick translation of which into English is attached for your ready reference), dated as it is, still reflects some inconclusive levels in the results of the various chemical tests shown. Undoubtedly these have by now been lowered to completely safe levels, since QRPHONE/1 apparently felt well enough to travel to France, but the Medical Staff believes it would be advisable for QRPHONE/1 to undergo another series of liver function tests, to include the following:

a. SGOT
b. SGPT
c. Bilirubin (1) Direct
 (2) Indirect
 (3) Total
d. B.S.P. (Bromsulfophthalein)
e. Serum Proteins
 Albumin
 Globulin
 Total

We assume QRPHONE/1 has consulted his own physician on his return to the UK, but the Medical Staff has pointed out that clinical examination alone is not always sufficient to determine complete recovery from hepatitis.

(continued)

Attachment:
Hospital report

Distribution:
2 - Chief, LCPIPIT/London w/att
1 - COS, London w/o/att

CS COPY

8 OCT 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPW - 405

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE: 7 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION: RYBAT SECRET SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: ✓ 201-306052

1 - EUR/BC/UK
1 - RID - files ✓
2 - CA/CF

~~ANCMPI~~		
PS	~~TEST~~	
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Diane Chatelan Diane L. Chatelan gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
OMS/OD		Dr. Patrick Thurston E. Patrick, M.D.
EUR/BC/UK	7 OCT 1968	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA	8/10/68	Fred W. Valtin Fred W. Valtin

DISPATCH

2. In terms of our operational utilization of QRPHONE/1 at this time, while they reserve finite comment until all the returns (per above) are in, the Medical Staff did stress the paramount importance of proper rest and of not overtaxing the strength of the agent, coupled with his strict adherence to regular, warm, balanced meals in accordance with the dietary restrictions usually imposed, and complete absence of alcohol, in order to prevent a relapse. So long as these caveats are adhered to, however, there is no reason why he could not make some more short trips during the next few months, if necessary. However, since he also has an office to set up and we would like him to concentrate on the Kambona offer, perhaps it would be a good idea to keep those trips to a minimum for the time being.

3. The Medical Staff will be glad to review any further chemical tests per para. 1 above suggestions, or any others which his doctor may have already run.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London (PARFORTH Acting)

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Illness

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At their meeting on 4 September QRPHONE/1 submitted a report to RODIGAST on his hospitalization for hepatitis. Attached to his report is a copy of this medical record with results of blood and urine analyses written in Serbo-Croatian. We are forwarding a copy of the report under separate cover for evaluation by the Medical Staff. We are interested in having as thorough as possible an evaluation made of QRPHONE/1's illness in order that we may assure ourselves of his condition and the degree to which he ought to be active in the forthcoming months. We will appreciate it if Headquarters will pursue this matter with the Medical Staff and advise us of its findings and recommendations.

2. Also forwarded under separate cover is a memorandum prepared from RODIGAST's notes which elaborates upon QRPHONE/1's symptoms.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
1 - QRPHONE/1 Report & Medical Record
2 - Memorandum for the Record

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS/London w/o atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

DOC FORWARDED U/O S/C
BY RID 12 Sep 68

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201 — 306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1312

DATE
10 September 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: OEPA-1312

HEPATITIS BOUT

What I had thought was a touch of malaria and the extreme fatigue I felt when I returned to London in July proved in time to have been acute infectious hepatitis. The disease -- which takes two to three weeks to develop -- was probably contracted in Uganda. At least, I imagine so because my principal contact in Kampala insisted on taking me to a number of local restaurants of dubious cleanliness to sample Uganda delicacies.

Hepatitis was diagnosed by a doctor in Komiza, Vis, where my family had been holidaying since the beginning of July, and I was hospitalized in the isolation section of Split Hospital (there is no hospital on Vis) on the 7th of August.

My liver was swollen by one finger and blood and urine analysis indicated a fairly severe infection. Treatment consisted of terramycin and cortisone therapy, with massive doses of vitamins.

I was put on a fat-free diet, which I have been told to follow for at least six months. Naturally, no alcohol.

On 20 August, I was released from the hospital, mainly because I was pestering the doctors to let me go. I was told to have "absolute rest" for four to six weeks and to have another blood test within several weeks.

(Attached is the Yugoslav doctor's description of my case and treatment, with results of all blood and urine analyses. It is written ~~Croatian~~ in Serbo-Croatian.)

THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN ACQUIRED [illegible] SENSITIVE SOURCE. IT IS NOT TO BE ROUTED OUTSIDE [illegible] DIVISION OR STATION, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOWUP, WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH C/[illegible].

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#14/22a to OEPA 1312

201-306052

SEPARATE COV[illegible] ATTACHMENT 2 TO:
OEPA-1312

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

7 September 1968

SUBJECT: [redacted] Illness

1. The following information was obtained by [redacted] from [redacted]/1 at their meeting on 4 September 1968. It supplements the report which was submitted by [redacted]/1 which deals with his recent hospitalization for hepatitis.

2. Toward the end of his African trip [redacted]/1 had been feeling rather weak and nauseous, with no appetite. He was constipated, feverish and had gas pains. These symptoms persisted and after his return from Africa and on 6 August, while in Yugoslavia on vacation, [redacted]/1 suffered from acute gas pains and vomiting. He was taken from Vis, where he was vacationing, to Split where he was hospitalized. The address of this hospital is:

Opca Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel (Firule)
Split, Yugoslavia

His doctor was Dr. Juraj FILIPOVIC.

3. [redacted]/1's treatment was free inasmuch as he was able to show his British National Health Card and a reciprocity agreement exists between Britain and Yugoslavia.

4. [redacted]/1 states that at no time did he receive narcotics nor was he ever unconscious. During his stay in the hospital a young British youth (Derek WHITTAKER, age 19, from Shoreham-by-Sea, Surrey) was in his ward suffering from food poisioning.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

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2 s/c att to OEPA 1312

201-306052

(1)

att to OEPA-1312
10 Sept 68

Admitted to the section for infectious diseases 7. August, 1968

Observation: Malaria

Medical history: The patient had felt for about a week definite weakness, lack of appetite, an inclination to eructation and distress, a somewhat feverish temperature, heaviness under the right rib cage and in stomach.

Clinical observation under hair follicles showed: subicteric, afebrile, the liver + the epigastrium about 1 p.f., slight feeling accompanied by other regular findings.

Hepatitis tests showed damage of the liver parenchyma of an average nature, resembling infectious hepatitis.

Clinical course: Icterus progressed in the first 2 days, till corticostroide was introduced in the body, after which there began an improvement and the Icterus disappeared.

After 8 days the whitish-red disappeared from the urine, appetite was restored, abdomenal pains disappeared and after 13 days a control hepatogram was made / see findings /.

As it was necessary to continue

treatment of the disease, the patient asked to be discharged under medical supervision.

Diagnoses: Acute infectious hepatitis

Treatment: Only Serbo-Croatian words translated in this section. names of drugs are English

Discharged – 20 Aug 1968 as recovered

The patient needs to observe absolute quiet + stay at home, follow diet as instructed, under supervision of doctor and control of hepatogram for about 14 days.

He will continue with the recommended medicines [medicines not translated. Only Serbo-Croatian words

translated kroz /3 dana kroz 5 dana]
for days for 5 days]

and further depending on the condition of the patient /ULTer tbl/ while he takes dexason/

Translation penciled in on attachment, where meanings could be found.

SECRET

EPIKRIZA:

primljen na zarazni odjel 7.VIII.68 pod dg:
Observatio-Malaria:

Anamnestički:zadnj. oko tj. dva dana osjeća izvjesnu slabost, napetanu i nadutost, [illegible] eruktaciju, nevoljkost i subfebrilne temperature, te težinu pod desnim rebrenim lukom, i žuticu.
Kliničkim pregledom kod dolaska utvrdi se subikteričan, afebrilan, jetra opipljiva za oko 1 p.p., lagano osjetljiva uz uredan ostali nalaz.
Hepatalni testovi ukazuju na oštećenje jetrenog parenhima srednje jakog karaktera, odgovarajući slici infektivnog hepatitisa.
after admit
Klinički sindrom ikterus progredira u prvih par dana, dok se ne uvede u terapiju kortikosteroide, nakon čega očito dolazi do poboljšanja općeg stanja, te iščezavanja ikterusa.
Nakon 8 dana nestaje bilirubin iz mokraće, apetit uspostavljen,
abdo gastrointestinalne tegobe iščezavaju, te se nakon 15. dana napravi kontrolni hepatogram/vidi nalaz/.
Iako je bilo potrebno nastaviti liječenje u bolnici, bolesnik želi otpust, te se uz upute otpušta.

DIAGNOZA: HEPATITIS INFECTIOSA ACUTA   tablet or tablespoon

dragee

LIJEČEN: Beviplex drg-C vit tbl-Bilamid-cholin drag-Teria mycin caps-Dexason amp i tbl-Ulter tbl-Antipernicin amp+Bedoxin amp+Aneurin amp-Digestal tbl-Dijeta.
(diet)

OTPUŠTEN: 20.VIII.68.kao poboljšan.

Potrebno je nastaviti apsolutno mirovanje u kućnoj njezi,

dijetalnu ishranu po uputi, te kontrolu liječnika, te kontrolu hepatograma za oko 10-14 dana.

dragee   for

Od lijekova preporuča se nastaviti Beviplex drag 3x2-Bilamid-cholin drag 3x2-Tecomycin caps 4x1-Dexason tbl/4x1 kroz 3 dana, 3x1=2 dana, 2x1 kroz 3 dana, a dalje prema stanju bolesnika/ Ulter tbl/dok uzima dexason/-
days

Odjelni liječnik:
/dr.J.Filipović/

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OR STAFF, DISSEMINATED, RELAYED TO THE FIELD, OR FORM
THE BASIS FOR OPERATIONAL FOLLOWUP, WITHOUT PRIOR
COORDINATION WITH C/[illegible].

SECRET

SECRET

dir. ____

indir. ____

ukup. ____

Thymol ____

Kolesterin ukup. 16[illegible]

ester [illegible]

Cjel. bjelančevine [illegible]

Albumini [illegible]

Globulini [illegible]

Weltman ____

Sublimat test ____

Alkalna fosfataza: 5 K.j. - alkale (?) phosphate

SGOT=4o6 W.j.
SGPT=7oo W.j.
SE=12mm
L=4.1oo
DKS: eo 1, st 5, seg.31, Ly 56, mo 7
E=4,14o.ooo
Hb: 86%
I.B.=1,o
Fe=242 gamma %
Cu=15o " "

Gusta kap - drop of
blood smear
Razmaz krvi malarija ∅ - malaria

Urin: alb. -+
urobil. 1:32
bil. ++
sediment sahh. ∅ -
Sed: nešto L i sluzi - some L in service

sugar
ŠUK=93mg%

14.VIII
URIN: alb trag
sediment uroб. 1:4
bil. ∅ small types of fields
Sed: 3-4 L na sv. vid. polju

15.VIII

dir. 1,[illegible]

indir. [illegible]

ukup. [illegible]

Thymol 7

Kolesterin 2[illegible]

ester [illegible]

Cjel. bjelančevine [illegible]

Albumini [illegible]

Globulini [illegible]

Weltman ____

Sublimat test ____

SGOT: [illegible]
SGPT: [illegible]
[illegible]

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14-00000

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FILE VR, cl/dlsi, cl/EUR 4

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5		10	

~~AN~~	~~FI~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	rc/CF
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

S E C R E T 061556Z SEP 68 CITE LCPIPIT 5726 (PARFORTH ACTING) OALP

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE 6 SEP 68 IN 86805

1. QRPHONE/1 MET 4 SEPTEMBER IN BRUSSELS. HE NOW UP AND ABOUT FOLLOWING HOSPITALIZATION FOR HEPATITUS BUT MUST SEVERELY RESTRICT ACTIVITIES FOR AT LEAST NEXT MONTH. SOME ITEMS OF INTEREST OBTAINED WHICH BEING FORWARDED BY TM.

2. NEXT MEETING SET UP FOR DUBLIN 18 SEPTEMBER.

S E C R E T

BT

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET

C F

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QRPHONE 1	802799	08/01 08/31	20	1242930	000

1968

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	89000	2000	REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
73	9000-	2000-	LIQ PAYMT
80	89000	2000	CPA EX CR
96	9000	2000	FED TAX F

REMARKS:
Amendment for additional compensation and tax liability increased from $870.00 to $890.00 per month for free compensation at $800.00 per month, effective 1 July 1968. Actual amount of tax liability increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month, for the July 1968 pay period.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: QRPHONE - 1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

SECRET

CA/ooo

70

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	NT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-NT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
											00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

7-3

Richard

[illegible] Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO [illegible] NAL INC.
[illegible] 320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

Richard G[illegible]

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

NEGRO P[illegible]ESS INTERNAT[illegible]AL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-[illegible]
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

9-25

Richard Gibson

[illegible] hundred [illegible] $\frac{no}{100}$

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

Robert Gibson — Robert Gibson

PAYEZ A L'ORDRE DE
UNION DE BANQUES SUISSES

Robert Gibson

New York, N.Y.
1-8 1-8

OCT 14 68 608 5225

RECEIVED FOR [illegible] TRUST CO.
OF NEW YORK

3 SEP 1968

BY BARCLAYS BANK LTD.

P.&G.

1-30

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
[illegible] S. STATE ST. [illegible]
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

NOV 2 [illegible]

10-25 19[illegible]

2-77

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

Two Hundred [illegible] DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

001260 0710-0077 239022 0000000000

Richard Johnson

14-00000

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1172

$\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF

DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001172⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339[illegible]⑈ ⑈[illegible]⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1166

19 $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson

[illegible] DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001166⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339035⑈ ⑈[illegible]⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1155

50071

4-26 19[illegible] $\frac{2-77}{710}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200 00/00

Two Hundred & no/00 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001155⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 339036⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6326
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1145

2-77
710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible]

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001149⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 239026⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6326
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1144

439177

2-29 [illegible]

2-77
710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible] Gibs[illegible] $ [illegible]

[illegible] DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001144⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 239026⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

SECRET

Chief of Station, London/LCPIPIT

Stace
Gayle - file

Office of Finance

Increased Federal Income Tax Liability - QRPHONE-1, Employee No. 802799

In compliance with the recent Enactment of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Subject's tax liability has increased from $70.00 to $90.00 per month. This represents the additional Surtax charge and begins with the July 1968 pay period. Effective 1 December 1968 (1969 tax year) the tax liability will be reduced to $80.00 per month. The Station should effect the change and continue to T/A tax withholdings to Headquarters.

HARRIET C. VINCOLEER

Distribution:
3 - C/S, London/LCPIPIT

15 AUG 1968

OFPB-396   8 August 1968

SECRET

2 - CA/Staff
1 - EUR/Div.
3 - APB/CAAS
2 - OF/Registry

CMTD/APB/CAAS/THorsley:bj (8 August 1968)   8213

C/CA/EF

Q-201

C/EUR/SS   13 AUG 1968 [illegible]

Richard Gibson Reports
International news & features

Opća Bolnica
Zarazni Odjel
(Firule)
Split
Yugoslavia
13 August 1968.

Dear Mrs. Randall,

Unexpectedly, I found myself in this hospital in Split, Yugoslavia, on the 7th of August, confined to the isolation ward with a fairly rough case of infectious hepatitis, undoubtedly picked up in West Africa. (They tell me the incubation period is about 3 weeks.) In any case, I am hoping to be released from here in another 10 or 15 days at the most. The treatment is good and seems thorough. My biggest problem was originally linguistic. I still speak with the doctors, who know no English, in German or Italian, but my knowledge of Serbo-Croatian has increased steadily with the injections, blood testing and intravenous injections of glucosaline solution, etc.

The urgency behind this note is, through you, to inform the firm of my condition. I hope to return to London — without many, if any, days on the beach — as planned, but I am told that I should restrict my activities physically for another month. There are many things to do in Britain and on the Continent, but I regret not being able to undertake the conference assignment in September, at least, I do not think my strength will be sufficiently restored for that event. Anyway, we shall see...

Fortunately, my family is on Vis, an island 5 hours boatride from Split, and have not had their vacation completely ruined because of me. Since this is an isolation hospital for infectious diseases, no visitors are allowed and there is no temptation or urgency on my wife to make that lengthy crossing just to see me. For me, also, my holiday on the beach in the sun has simply turned into lying on my back in a hot room, but it could be worse and I hope to be up and about in the next week or two, at most. I feel certain that I will be able to meet all my minor commitments in London and elsewhere at the beginning of September but wanted to draw ~~the~~ firm's attention, as soon as possible, to my possible inability to handle another big assignment immediately.

Very sincerely yours,

Richard Gibson



R. Gibson, Opća Bolnica, Zarazni Odjel, (Firule), Split

BY AIR MAIL
PAR AVION

Mr. J. Henry Randall
Negro Press International
5708 South State Street
Chicago, Illinois 60621
U.S.A.

FBI doc.
6 Aug 68 (NY)
Re: The "Guardian," Formerly Known
as "National Guardian," Weekly
Guardian Associates, Inc.
Bufile: 100-357044
NY file: 100-93572

CF

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QRPHONE 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	74600		REG SAL

NOTE:

THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
80	74600		CPA EX CR
96	4600	7200	FED TAX F

REMARKS:

T/A 270 from London transferred taxes for the month of Dec., Jan., and Feb. in the amount of $210.00. $70.00 for each. payrolled was $46.00 each month, adjustment made herewith. Sub-object code changes for Accounting Only.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

QRPHONE/1

802799

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete

CA/Staff 000

(30-51)

SECRET

ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DATA								REFUND DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	ND/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	N/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600-	7200-00			

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

2

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 16 48 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95170

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS
CA/B&F LoHealy
DC/CA
EUR/BC/UK

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

Diane Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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COPY NO.

April 66

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 23 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

2. QRPHONE/1's employment by WOFIRM, which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, QRPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on a 30-day notice.

3. QRPHONE/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QRPHONE/1 a "tax-free" income of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967).
NOTE: The actual breakdown of QRPHONE/1's finances as carried on WOFIRM's books is $800 monthly salary and $70 per month tax supplement withheld at Headquarters to discharge QRPHONE/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee. This procedure was devised to honor the original "tax free" commitment made at the time of his recruitment and at the same time to fulfill the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources in which case WOFIRM will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFIRM financial obligations to QRPHONE/1. Since security considerations preclude processing of detailed accountings for miscellaneous operational expenses, and as an added inducement to QRPHONE/1 in connection with his obtaining certain confidential information of interest to WOFIRM, a small operational payment, as authorized by Chief, LCPIPIT will be made to QRPHONE/1 for each day during which he is required to be absent from his home on confidential business.
NOTE: Write-off of the funds passed to QRPHONE/1 is to be effected on the basis of the procedure approved by Chief, LCPIPIT and COS/London, a copy of which is attached. This procedure is authorized in view of the security considerations applicable to QRPHONE/1 and the need to limit the knowledge of this operation within WOMACE.

c. QRPHONE/1 is authorized to receive a non-accountable office allowance of $100 per month.

4. QRPHONE/1 will be compensated by WOFIRM in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFIRM. NOTE: This provision was included in QRPHONE/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QRPHONE/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. WOFIRM has arranged for a portion of QRPHONE/1's financial entitlements to be funded to him by QRPURE, which has also agreed to repatriate QRPHONE/1 to WOLADY. This has been done for operational reasons to enable QRPHONE/1 to qualify for foreign residence. Should QRPURE be obliged to honor this commitment, WOFIRM will guarantee this QRPURE commitment and will reimburse QRPURE for any costs incurred.

6. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QRPHONE/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expense category of approved Project QRPHONE.

7. QRPHONE/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

8. QRPHONE/1 is aware that he may be required, from time to time, to undertake an SGSWIRL.

9. QRPHONE/1 is aware of all provisions of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exceptions of paragraph 6, which describes an internal WOFIRM procedure; certain aspects of paragraph 3a--specifically that WOFIRM is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf; and certain aspects of paragraph 3b--specifically the procedure for write-off of funds since this is an internal WOFIRM procedure.

SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

April 25, 1968

O & 2 to CPJ - 26 apr 68
(1 for FO
1 for CCS)

SECRET RYBAT

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5	10

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 23 Apr 68

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 1641 Z CITE DIRECTOR 95140

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QRPREY QRPHONE

REF: OEPA 1003, 19 MARCH 68

MOC APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/PERS
CA/B&F Lo Healy
DC/CA
EUR/BC/UK

201

B Hugh Tovar
C/CA

Diane Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/SG

VIA: DC/CA

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. Forwarded herewith is the original revised MOC for QRPHONE/1, submitted by LCPIPIT under OEPA - 1003, dated 19 March 1968. The field requests notification of approval.

2. The MOC appears to cover adequately all points previously at issue; it is therefore requested that, subject to DC/CA approval and CA/PERS and CA/B&F concurrence, the attached outgoing cable to LCPIPIT signifying this approval be coordinated and released.

3. It is also requested that the MOC be further transmitted to the Office of Finance, via appropriate administrative procedures.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachments: 2
MOC for QRPHONE/1
Cable to field

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - CA/CF ✓

SECRET

201

Who said he is CIA agent:

1. Andersson said Hamza Alavi told Franz Fanon Institute in 1964 Gibson an Am. agent (Eb. rept. 18/2/66)

2. William Demby said he had recently been assured by Ignazio Silone Gibson was a CIA agent (Gibson had not seen Silone since 1952) (20/2/66 – Eb Rome rept.) (Demby said he had been accused of the same thing, by whom unspecified.)

3. "British" professor, China hand, told Franz Fanon Institute

Loose – Gibson
201

1069

BRITISH VISA GRANTED

On 10 April 68, I was finally granted a British visa, without restrictions, valid until 15 Feb. 1969. No questions were asked when I went to the Home Office to get the visa.

My Home Office file number is: G 110880.

From the Metropolitan Police, I received Aliens Registration Certificate E 662567, which lists me as correspondent for Negro Press International.

I was told by the police that I could apply within a year to have the registration requirement waivered because I am married to a British subject. Moreover, I am fsee to take any sort of employment or open a business without restrictions or having to request permission from the Ministry of Labour.

Tnd 07385 23/4/68

B.E.1

1070

HOME OFFICE

Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telegrams: Aliudep, London WC1
Telephone 01-405 4321
Telex 261867

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: 6 11 0180
Your reference:

10.4.68

Name	
Nationality U.S.C.	**Date of Birth** 17.5.31
Passport Particulars U.S. Passport no. issued on 1.12.65.	

This is to certify that the bearer of this letter, named above, does not require to obtain permission of the Ministry of Labour or of the Home Office before taking employment, either paid or unpaid, in Great Britain. (For work in Northern Ireland the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance for Northern Ireland should be consulted.) The bearer is free, so far as the Home Office is concerned, to set up in business, subject to any statutory laws and regulations governing the business or professional activities in which he/~~she~~ may be interested.

This letter should be retained for production to the Ministry of Labour or other authority if required.

for Under Secretary of State

TM# 072385/ 23/4/68

1071

INLAND REVENUE MONOLOGUE (required)

Until April of this year (1968), I lived mainly on assistance from my wife's family and occasional freelance journalism outside Britain. Also, I had some savings and investments in America and Switzerland to draw upon. My brother-in-law, Gordon Kaye, purchased a house at 32 Hartswood Road, Stamford Brook, London, W.12 for us — the price of the house being considered a loan to be repaid over the years as is possible. My children's school fees were paid by convenant by my brother-in-law, as well as a grant in convenant to my youngest daughter.

I was not a legal resident of the U.K. until 8 April 1968, and on that date I began officially my duties as Overseas Representative and Correspondent for Negro Press International of Chicago, with a salary of $300 per month.

TM# 072385, 23/4/68

1072

My brother-in-law asked me to send him from abroad the following letter, which I mailed on 16 April 68 from Rotterdam.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Jeffreys, Henry Rxx Rudolph & Marks
Lee House
Londonx Wall, E.C.2

Dear Sirs,

In response to the Inspector's request, I confirm that I have xxxx authorized my wife, Mrs. , to apply for Monique's income repayment for 1967. And I also confirm that she has no other incomex other than the XXXX Covenant for that year.

Yours faithfully,

TM# 072385, 23/4/68

DISPATCH

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SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Memorandum of Oral Commitment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. OEPW-160, dated 18 October 1967
B. OEPA-240, dated 21 September 1967

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment covering the WOFIRM relationship with QRPHONE/1. This revision reflects most of the suggestions made in Reference A.

2. As said in Reference B, QRPHONE/1 does not fall into the category of WOFIRM asset usually handled by LCPIPIT. This fact plus the very stringent security considerations which must apply to this operation dictate that certain procedure be followed in QRPHONE/1's case. Handling of this case has been facilitated by Headquarters' understanding and approval of the need for such care.

3. We request that this revised Memorandum of Oral Commitment be approved, and that we be so notified.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Memorandum

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

QRPHONE
301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-1003

DATE
19 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

1. QRPHONE/1 collaborates with WOFIRM as a Field Agent who provides certain services of a confidential nature. He has received a Provisional Operational Approval, dated 23 MAY 66. Financial aspects of his activity are charged to approved Project QRPHONE.

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a. Compensation so computed as to give QRPHONE/1 a "tax-free" income of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967).
NOTE: The actual breakdown of QRPHONE/1's finances as carried on WOFIRM's books is $800 monthly salary and $70 per month tax supplement withheld at Headquarters to discharge QRPHONE/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee. This procedure was devised to honor the original "tax free" commitment made at the time of his recruitment and at the same time to fulfill the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNFORT.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources in which case WOFIRM will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFIRM financial obligations to QRPHONE/1. Since security considerations preclude processing of detailed accountings for miscellaneous operational expenses, and as an added inducement to QRPHONE/1 in connection with his obtaining certain confidential information of interest to WOFIRM, a small operational payment, as authorized by Chief, LCPIPIT will be made to QRPHONE/1 for each day during which he is required to be absent from his home on confidential business.
NOTE: Write-off of the funds passed to QRPHONE/1 is to be effected on the basis of the procedure approved by Chief, LCPIPIT and COS/London, a copy of which is attached. This procedure is authorized in view of the security considerations applicable to QRPHONE/1 and the need to limit the knowledge of this operation within WOMACE.

c. QRPHONE/1 is authorized to receive a non-accountable office allowance of $100 per month.

SECRET

4. QRPHONE/1 will be compensated by WOFIRM in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFIRM. NOTE: This provision was included in QRPHONE/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MCC since it may be operationally desirable for QRPHONE/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. WOFIRM has arranged for a portion of QRPHONE/1's financial entitlements to be funded to him by QRPURE, which has also agreed to repatriate QRPHONE/1 to WOLADY. This has been done for operational reasons to enable QRPHONE/1 to qualify for foreign residence. Should QRPURE be obliged to honor this commitment, WOFIRM will guarantee this QRPURE commitment and will reimburse QRPURE for any costs incurred.

6. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QRPHONE/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expense category of approved Project QRPHONE.

7. QRPHONE/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

8. QRPHONE/1 is aware that he may be required, from time to time, to undertake an SGSWIRL.

9. QRPHONE/1 is aware of all provisions of the Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exceptions of paragraph 6, which describes an internal WOFIRM procedure; certain aspects of paragraph 3a--specifically that WOFIRM is paying LNFORT taxes in his behalf; and certain aspects of paragraph 3b--specifically the procedure for write-off of funds since this is an internal WOFIRM procedure.

SIGNED: Aaron C Laginestra
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

Maslott

Adrian B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

Date

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 FINANCES

1. This memorandum outlines a new procedure which is to be followed in the handling of the operational costs of field agent QRPHONE/1. This new procedure is being instituted in order to enhance the security and compartmentation of the handling of the administrative aspect of this project and parallels revisions in the handling of operational traffic. The new procedure which is discussed below is in accordance with accepted field procedures.

2. Currently QRPHONE/1 receives advances and accounts for these with detailed statements of expenses accompanied by true name receipts, etc. These accountings and the accompanying receipts have been maintained in the LCPIPIT files. This system is to be changed. Henceforth monies for operational expenses will be given to QRPHONE/1 by his handler (Career Agent Rufus P. RODIGAST) and will be carried on RODIGAST's accountings as operational expenses supported by receipts from QRPHONE/1 acknowledging receipt of the funds. This RODIGAST accounting and the QRPHONE/1 receipt will be used for write-off of the funds against approved project QRPHONE. No detailed accountings and no receipts carrying QRPHONE/1's true name are to be maintained in the LCPIPIT/Admin files.

3. It will be the responsibility of Chief, LCPIPIT and the project case officer to ensure that QRPHONE/1 is supplied with the funds necessary for the furtherance of the operation and to ensure that these amounts are carefully controlled to avoid overpayment. In discharging this responsibility the Chief, LCPIPIT may require [illegible] to itemize the various expenses to be covered by the payments.

APPROVED:

Chief, LCPIPIT — Date: 1/29/68

Chief of Station, London — Date: 8 Feb 68

SECRET

FBI doc
30 Jan. 68 (Wash.)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO.
Chief of Station, London; Chief of Base; Geneva; Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. GENEVA-2464
B. LCPIPIT-1711

1. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of QRPHONE/1's report on his expulsion from Switzerland. In it QRPHONE/1 concludes that the Swiss Border Police must have learned of his planned arrival through a phone tap on a call he made to Lausanne from Italy on the 18th of January.

2. Regarding QRPHONE/1's statement in paragraph two of his report concerning his having visited Switzerland many times since 1963, please see PALP-4738 of 1 October 1965.

3. QRPHONE/1 has been instructed not to pursue any further protests with the authorities (either Swiss or American) over this matter.

AcL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
2 - COS/Bern w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att ——— EUR/BC/UK, who given copy of attachment, will write to Swiss desk
1 - COB/Geneva w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
200-124-156/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-892

CS COPY

DATE
6 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

[illegible]

[illegible]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
OEPA-892

ARREST AND EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND

Brigue, 20 Jan. 1968.

The Milan-Geneva TEE reached the Swiss border at Brigue at about 1030. It was evident that the Border Police were expecting me -- the usual lone civilian inspector of passports was accompanied by a uniformed policeman. I was taken, with baggage, to the station immigration office. My wife went with me, but was apparently not covered by the ban on me. When the official in charge of the office phoned Lausanne and Berne, he was informed that I was to be expelled immediately and that they did not want to interrogate me.

Great effort was made by the official in charge of the office to be polite, especially when I made a rather vigorous protest at the expulsion, claiming that I had never been informed of the ban on my entry in Switzerland, said to date from 16 Dec. 1963, and that, in any case, I had visited Switzerland on numerous occasions since 1963 without interference. Moreover, I was a professional journalist accredited to the United Nations and was indeed on my way to Geneva to visit the U.N. Office there, I said. The official seemed somewhat baffled by this, because he had been informed I was en route to Lausanne, but I showed my tickets valid to Geneva. Nevertheless, with the greatest of apologies, I was escorted -- this time by a plainclothesman -- to a train back to Italy at 1130. My wife could have stayed in Switzerland but I asked her to return with me.

During my detention, my wife phoned Gilbert Etienne in Lausanne, informing him of the situation, the Associated Press office in Geneva (speaking to a Mr. Atkins) and the U.S. Press Attaché, Frederick ~~[illegible]~~ Steiner, in Berne. Actually, I had told her to phone as many wire services as possible, but she assumed I also wanted to get the Press Attaché to protest on my behalf. In any case, the shortness of time between trains prevented her from making more calls.

When given the attached formal notice of the travel ban by the Swiss official, I refused his request that I sign it and warned that the expulsion was a violation of Swiss agreements concerning the freedom of access to the U.N. Office in Geneva which I fully intended to protest formally and bring to world attention.

Later, from Verona, I spoke myself ~~[illegible]~~ with Gilbert Etienne, who was convinced -- quite correctly, I believe -- that his phone is tapped and that my arrival was ~~[illegible]~~ communicated to the Swiss Federal Police through a phone conversation I had with Etienne from

CS COPY

swiss explusion - 2 last

Milan on 18 Jan. (My train reservation was made in Milan, not London.) I also spoke with Atkins of AP in Geneva, who told me he had filed a story after my wife's call about an American Negro journalist being refused entry into Switzerland. He asked for more background on me, claiming that New York had expressed interest in developments. Atkins believed that I could get the ban lifted by protesting to the Swiss Press Attaché in London as a professional newsman. He said he believed Swiss authorities were rather jumpy about "suspicious" individuals entering the country since the large Biafran shipments of Nigerian currency to Zurich earlier in January. Whatever the real reason, although I do resent not being able to talk with Etienne -- I was counting on him to reestablish links with Nils Andersson in Albania and to give me a picture of the altered situation among pro-Chinese Communist parties in Western Europe since the latest split from Jacques Grippa's party in Belgium --, I think the expulsion is a most useful incident to prove that I am indeed a good revolutionary and I intend to exploit it as fully as possible, within reason. That is, no overt diatribes against "how the Man operates in Switzerland," say in the Los Angeles Herald Dispatch, but to inform as many people on the Left as possible of the incident and let them draw their own conclusions.

Michael Bakafa/Petros Defta, who was expecting me in Geneva for an interview on 22 Jan. was informed by a wire from Verona that force majeure prevented me from keeping the appointment and that I would be writing him when I returned to London.

VALAIS WALLIS

POLICE CANTONALE
KANTONSPOLIZEI

Poste 3900 Brig-Bhf. , le 20.1.1968.

An Herrn

GIBSON Richard Thomas

3900 Brig - Bahnhof

Référence : Notifikation einer Verfügung der Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft.

Objet :

Wir bringen Ihnen zur Kenntnis, dass Sie im Schweiz. Polizeianzeiger des Jahres 1963 unter Einreisesperre gültig ausgeschrieben sind. (Art. 33 667/1963)

Die Verfügung wurde durch die Eidg. Bundesanwaltschaft am 16.12.1963 getroffen.

Dauer: unbestimmte Zeit.

Von der Verfügung Kenntnis genommen: Zugestellt durch:

KANTONSPOLIZEI
Passkontrolle Brig

GIBSON Richard Thomas
des Clarence und der Alice
Thomas, geb. 13.5.1931
Los Angeles/Amerikaner.

SECRET

QRPHONE 1 802799 24 000 20

1967 EARNINGS

	TAX W/H	FICA W/H	ST. TAX W/H	TAX GROSS
(96)	67200			945280

SECRET

Paid Gross by Cover
No Covert Return Req.
Tax Committee
Flat Rate Tax W/H

SECRET

20 December 1967
(C-2929)
Murray

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/CF

SUBJECT: Accountings from QRPHONE/1

Enclosed in the attached sealed envelope are copies of accountings from QRPHONE/1.

Thomas K. Strange
Chief,
Central Cover Staff
Nonofficial Cover Branch

Attachments: One

201- 306052
Dec 67

~~201-306052~~

SECRET

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-0320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1050

8-3 1967 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 00

One Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001050⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈00000 10000⑈

THIS IS AN UNNUMBERED TRANSACTION

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-0320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

4181661067

PAID

SEP 1 8 1967

BARCLAYS BANK LIMITED (4)
ST. JOHN'S WOOD
40 WELLINGTON ROAD, ST. JOHN'S WOOD, LONDON, N.W.8
20 74-63

8-31 1967 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $100 00

One Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

R.A.B.

⑈001067⑈ ⑆0710⑉0877⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈00000 10000⑈

DISPATCH SECRET

XX

Chief of Station, **London for LCPIPIT**

Chief of Station, London

Chief, [illegible]

[illegible] Admin/ Funding
ORPHONE/1 Employment Agreement

REFERENCES: A. OELT-349, 21 Sept. 1967
B. OEPW-161 (PYDAT) (enroute)
C. LCPIPIT 0780 (IN 56628)

1. We appreciate LAGINESTRA's effort to combine and bring up to date all commitments made to ORPHONE/1 in a revised MOC, forwarded under REF A. We hope that the following comments, geared to the paragraphs as numbered in the MOC, will help to further streamline the product:

a. Para. 1:

Please see Reference B, PYDAT dispatch.

b. Para. 2:

As indicated in the REF A covering dispatch, ORPHONE/1's initial employment began 1 June 1965, rather than the 1 September 1965 date given in the draft MOC. Since the effective date of his relationship with WOFIRM will one day be the basis for an equitable terminal settlement, or might assume other administrative significance, we suggest that the paragraph be amended to reflect this: "ORPHONE/1's employment with WOFIRM which began 1 June 1965, was originally formalized by a Letter of Agreement for a period of three months, replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated 1 September 1965. Under this MOC, which remains in effect (as amended) since that date, ORPHONE/1's employment continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice."

(continued)

Distribution:
2 - COS, LCPIPIT
1 - COS, London

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW-160	26 OCT 1967 18 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/2

1 - CA/B&F
1 - CA/Personnel ✓
1 - C/CA/SG
1 - EUR/BC/UK
2 - CA/CF
1 - RID-Files

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Diane L. Chatelan	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CA/B&F		L. O. Healy
CA/PERS		
C/CA/SG DC/CA		Fred W. Valtin
EUR/BC/UK		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

c. Paragraph 5a:

From talking with RODIGAST, it would appear that the fine line of demarcation between ORPHONE/1's real "salary" and his "non-accountable [illegible]" is so vague to him (if indeed he was ever fully aware of it in our own bureaucratic terms) as to be virtually non-existent. It is equally confusing and often non-recognizable in other administrative paper-trails (see PART C). In terms of the tax situation, the $100 has already been adjudicated taxable and the $70 supplement has been computed as tax due on the $800 total. We suggest, therefore, in the interest of administrative simplicity, that we convert the total $800 to salary, and amend the MOC to reflect this.

d. Paragraph 5b:

A question came up concerning ORPHONE/1's per diem in connection with the three accountings which RODIGAST submitted for processing direct at Headquarters. Included were several operational lunches and dinners. ORPHONE/1 indicated he was leaving the computation of per diem due him up to Headquarters (we have allowed for 27 days @ $20 per day). Since regulations state that no one may receive double compensation for any reimbursable expenditure, and ORPHONE/1's per diem by definition is supposed to cover food, etc., we will have to deduct 15% for each meal specifically claimed by him in his detailed accounting (i.e., $3.00 per meal). This will be the subject of separate correspondence when the accountings are processed and we T/A the appropriate amount for credit to ORPHONE/1's account, but we raise it now as we are not certain as to LCPIPIT's intent or previous practice in this regard. The amount that ORPHONE/1 would be assessed is, of course, not very substantial, but if LCPIPIT feels ORPHONE/1 should receive greater financial assistance to further defray his personal as well as operational costs while in travel status, we suggest that this enabling paragraph be amended to permit greater flexibility in the establishment of the per diem amount. Now would be an appropriate time to amend the MOC to give Chief, LCPIPIT/London, the authority to set ORPHONE/1's per diem at ". . . $20 to $30 per day during periods of authorized travel, amount to be set in advance by Chief, LCPIPIT/London." Fifteen per cent will, of course, still need to be deducted from ORPHONE/1's accounting for every meal he correctly claims as an operational expense. As to travel which does not extend overnight, regulations only require that 35% be deducted from his per diem, rather than the 50% which, in effect, the $10.00 represents. We leave it up to you as to which provision you wish included in the final MOC, but in any event we suggest that it be incorporated in the body of the paragraph, rather than set apart as a quotation from another document.

2. We have no further comments concerning the remainder of the MOC.

3. If you concur with the above suggestions, please resubmit an amended MOC which would also reflect these additional changes. We are sorry not to have been able to meet LCPIPIT's 15 October requested deadline, but press of business related to ORPHONE/1's WOLADY mission intervened.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

SECRET
RYBAT

26 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CCS/NC

SUBJECT: QRPURE/QREBONY/1 Relationship

1. This will confirm our conversation of 18 September 1967, in which we discussed QREBONY/1's plan to visit QRPURE some time during the week of 25 September 1967, and you agreed to give QRPURE/2 prior warning of this visit. In accordance with the same conversation QREBONY/1 was briefed that his visit should be mainly a question of touching base with QRPURE, maybe a friendly luncheon with QRPURE/2 -- but that no substantive discussions affecting their ostensible relationship (i.e., amount of money, amount of QREBONY/1 production for QRPURE, etc.) were to take place. You were to brief QRPURE/2 along the same lines, and also to indicate to him that, contrary to our original thinking, we would now like to have QREBONY/1 given a by-line, whenever QRPURE/2 feels he can do so.

2. In addition to the above, we would appreciate it if you would take up with QRPURE/2 (and/or QRPURE/1, as appropriate) the possibility of increasing the amount of money funded to QREBONY/1 via QRPURE. As indicated to you, we would like to increase the current $100.00 monthly to $300.00 monthly, but would like your careful examination with QRPURE principal(s) that this amount is not excessive either in terms of their willingness to handle or in terms of QRPURE's ostensible ability to cover.

3. Please also mention to QRPURE/2 our desire to have QREBONY/1 open a small office in London, and our thought of perhaps including QRPURE (along with other publications) as a name on the door or on his letterhead. Would QRPURE/2 (or QRPURE/1) have any objections? Would he have any objections if any of the other names are of more radical publications? It would not be operationally feasible or desirable to let him know in advance which these would be, but since both

RYBAT
SECRET

Ebony
201-306052

QRPURE's have been briefed carefully as to QREBONY/1's radical aura, presumably they would have a good idea as to the kind of publications these might be.

4. For operational reasons, we would prefer that the arrangements indicated in paras 2 and 3 above not be broached until after QREBONY/1's departure from the United States, some time in mid-October. We will advise you of his departure so that you can make the necessary arrangements thereafter at your convenience.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee - Attn: J. Murray
2 - CA/CF ✓
Routed thru DC/CA

ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:G..
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct. 67

MESSAGE FORM
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5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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OCT 19 15 11Z

CITE DIRECTOR 44750

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

1. FOR SECURITY REASONS RELATING TO ITS ACTUAL DESCRIPTIVENESS, IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO CHANGE THE QREBONY CRYPT TO IDEN A. THIS NEW CRYPT WILL BE USED HENCEFORTH.

2. TO ASSIST IN EASIER COMMUNICATION IN AN AREA OF HIGH SENSITIVITY, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CRYPTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED: QRPEONY (IDEN B); AND QRPETTY (IDEN C).

3. IN FUTURE, PLS SEPARATE ALL QREBONY/1 PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE, EXCISE QREBONY/1 NAME, AND FORWARD BY RYBAT CHANNEL ONE COPY TO DTDORIC ~~[illegible]~~ AND ONE COPY TO KEYWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/DO - Ober (in draft)
EUR/BC/UK P.F. [illegible]
EUR/CA [illegible]

C/CA

Diane Chatelain
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

19 Oct 67

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CS Copy 201-306052

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ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN:gm
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 18 Oct. 67

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER ____ # ____

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CONF: C/CA/O 2 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , C/RI/SD C/CA 2 C/EUR 4

CABLE SEC [illegible] O.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

Oct 19 15 11Z

CITE DIRECTOR 44751

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: 44750

IDEN A - QRPHONE/1

IDEN B - ROBERT F. WILLIAMS - 201-108746

IDEN C - DANIEL WATTS - 201-248083

END OF MESSAGE

DC/CA ____

EUR/BC/UK

EUR/CA ✓

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Diane Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London (Support)

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Administrative
QREBONY/1 Employment Agreement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 was recruited by WOFACT on 3 June 1965. This recruitment was performed by an officer from WOMUSE/ICG since QREBONY/1 (then known as STEBONY/1) was viewed as a "double agent" penetration of pro-Chinese communist groups. QREBONY/1 has performed well in a difficult and dangerous environment. He is a clandestine agent operating against targets violently anti-WOLADY and of priority interest. The administration of QREBONY/1 requires special care since, by the very nature of his role, he is not typical of the average LCPIPIT asset.

2. QREBONY/1's initial employment was by Letter of Agreement for a period of three months. This Letter of Agreement expired 1 September 1965 and was replaced by a Memorandum of Oral Commitment dated the same day. This oral employment agreement remains in effect at this date--some two years later--, but has been amended to adjust compensation. Certain inaccuracies in the original MOC have also been corrected subsequent to its preparation. Given the sensitive nature of QREBONY/1's relationship with WOFACT it is sometimes difficult to adapt the operational realities of his situation to the administrative requirements of WOFACT. However, with great understanding at home and in the field, we have reached a very manageable situation.

3. In order to codify the entitlements and procedures applicable to QREBONY/1's employment the undersigned has prepared the attached revision of the MOC underwhich QREBONY/1 is employed. It is requested that HQS approve this revised MOC and notify LCPIPIT of approval by 15 October.

Attachment: HW
MOC

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/att HW
1 - COS/London (Support)

SEP 27 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPT - 240

DATE
21 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, c/CA2, c/EUR 4, c/CI

ACTION

S E C R E T 301632Z CITE LCPIPIT 1286

DIRECTOR INFO: LONDON

30 AUG 67 IN 42132

RYBAT DTDORIC QREBONY MHPROBE

1. BELIEVE QREBONY/1 SHOULD MEET WITH QRPURE IN ORDER DISCUSS HIS COVER AND ITS EVOLUTION AND IMPROVEMENT. IN LAST FEW WEEKS QREBONY/1 HAS NOTICED HIS ARTICLES STILL BEING USED BY QRPURE BUT WITHOUT HIS BYLINE. THIS MAY INDICATE SOME POLITICAL SENSITIVITY ON PART OF QRPURE, WHICH WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER THIS MAY NOT BE THE CASE AT ALL. THUS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS SHOULD BE FOR HQS TO DETERMINE STATE OF QRPURE MIND RE QREBONY/1. IF THIS POSITIVE, MEETING, WITH WOFACTER PRESENT, WOULD BE HELPFUL IN SOLIDIFYING RELATIONSHIP.

[redacted]

2. SHOULD SITUATION BE PROPITIOUS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS DISCUSS TWO ITEMS WITH QRPURE ON AN IN PRINCIPLE BASIS. FIRST, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE PAYMENTS FROM QRPURE TO QREBONY/1. QREBONY/1'S COVER HERE IS SUFFICIENTLY

Jack Murray will be in Friday. 1/9/67

SECRET

PAGE 2 LCPIPIT 1286 S E C R E T

WELL ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT, AND INDEED TO REQUIRE, AN ANNUAL SALARY FROM GRPURE OF AT LEAST $3-4,000, WHILE WE UNSURE OF GRPURE'S FEELINGS THIS SUBJECT IT OUR IMPRESSION HE MOST ACCOMMODATING AND WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INCREASE WOULD ENHANCE QREBONY/1'S COVER. SECONDLY, WE ARE DISCUSSING THE IDEA OF QREBONY/1'S ESTABLISHING A DINGY ONE-ROOM OFFICE FROM WHICH TO CONDUCT HIS AFFAIRS. THIS WOULD FACILITATE HIS OPERATIONS BY GETTING HIM OUT OF HIS HOUSE. IT WOULD ALSO BE A CONVENIENT GATHERING PLACE FOR HIS CONTACTS AND IF COST FACTOR CAN BE KEPT MINIMAL, ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH HIS COVER. WE DESIRE OBTAIN GRPURE REACTION TO IDEA OF QREBONY/1 HAVING OFFICE WITH GRPURE ON DOOR, EITHER ALONE OR IN TANDEM WITH QREBONY/1 REPORTS OR SOME OTHER TITLE. ALSO COULD GRPURE ACTUALLY PASS THE FUNDS FOR THE OFFICE IN THE FORM OF A MONTHLY CHECK OR SOME OTHER ARRANGEMENT? REALIZE THAT OFFICE PLUS SALARY RAISE TOGETHER REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN GRPURE INPUT TO QREBONY/1 AND WE NOT NOW IN POSITION TO ASSESS GRPURE WILLINGNESS DO SO.

NEVERTHELESS WE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS EXPLORING THIS WITH ORPURE IF POSSIBLE.

3. HQS SHOULD DISCUSS ABOVE QITH RODIGAST WHO IN POSITION EXPAND ON THIS SUBJECT.

SECRET

BT

14 September 1967

REVISED MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT

(Revised to include all changes and amendments operative as of 14 September 1967)

1. QREBONY/1 is employed by WOFACT as an independent contractor for certain services of a confidential nature. He has received an Operational Approval, dated . Financial aspects of his activity are charged to Project QREBONY.

2. QREBONY/1's employment under this agreement commenced 1 September 1965 and continues on a month-to-month basis. It can be terminated by either party on 30-day notice.

3. QREBONY/1 receives the following financial entitlements:

a. Compensation so computed as to give QREBONY/1 a "tax-free" figure of $800 per month (this figure effective 1 July 1967). NOTE: The actual breakdown of QREBONY/1's finances as carried on WOFACT books is $700 monthly salary; $100 non-accountable operational allowance; $70 tax supplement withheld at HQS to discharge QREBONY/1's WOLADY tax obligation. These taxes are remitted through the Covert Tax Committee.

b. Reimbursement for operational expenses and travel, unless these are reimbursed by other sources in which case WOFACT will offset such outside reimbursement against WOFACT financial obligations to QREBONY/1. Since security considerations generally preclude the detailed accounting for miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20 per day during periods of authorized travel. This per diem authorization was qualified by a personal ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965:

> "If subject is absent from his home station on authorized travel for part of one day and returns to his home station the night of the dame day (i.e. if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20 per day (i.e. $10)."

NOTE: QREBONY/1 has a revolving fund (advance) to assist in meeting operational and travel expenses.

4. QREBONY/1 will be compensated by WOFACT in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of himself and his family to a new residence if such relocation is considered desirable by him and WOFACT. NOTE: This provision was included in QREBONY/1's original Letter of Agreement and was retained in this MOC since it may be operationally desirable for QREBONY/1 to accept employment with a target organization based elsewhere.

5. LCPIPIT is authorized to approve purchase by QREBONY/1 of certain items of operational equipment which are to be non-accountable and which shall be charged against the operational expenses category of the budget attached to the FY 1968 project renewal.

6. QREBONY/1 signed a separate Secrecy Agreement (in true name) at the time of his original recruitment. He is aware that its provisions are still in effect.

7. QREBONY/1 is aware of all provisions of this Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the exception of paragraph 5, which describes an internal WOFACT procedure, and certain aspects of paragraph 3b, specifically that WOFACT is paying LNPORT taxes in his behalf. NOTE: He was promised tax-free compensation in his original recruitment and we have devised the current procedure to honor this commitment while fulfilling the requirement that all WOLADY citizens pay taxes on funds received from LNPORT.

SIGNED: ____________________
AARON C. LAGINESTRA
Case Officer

REVIEWED AND APPROVED:

____
ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
Chief, LCPIPIT

- - - - - -

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

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~~FROM~~ #1

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965-5422 sterile phone for this exercise

S E C R E T 251459Z CITE LCPIPIT 1268

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON 25 Aug 67 IN 39155

RYBAT DTDORIC MHPROBE QREBONY DIOVERTAX

REF DIRECTOR 29537

1. WILL CABLE ITINERARY REQUESTED REF AFTER RODIGAST MEETING WITH QREBONY/1 25 AUGUST.

2. APPRECIATE THAT WASHINGTON PROBABLY MOST CONVENIENT LOCATION FOR HQS MEETINGS WITH QREBONY/RODIGAST BUT BECAUSE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE PARAMOUNT REQUEST THAT SESSIONS TAKE PLACE ELSEWHERE, PREFERABLY NEW YORK CITY. HAVE SO INFORMED RODIGAST.

3. SECURITY RISKS ATTENDANT QREBONY MEETINGS WITH WOFACT IN U.S. ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. THUS REQUEST THAT QREBONY CONTACTS WITH WOFACT OFFICERS BE HELD ONLY WHEN ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED AND LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT AND PROBABLY INSECURE HAVE QREBONY/1 SET ASIDE BLOCK OF DAYS FOR MEETINGS ONCE HE ARRIVES IN U.S. AND THAT CONTACTS WITH QREBONY/1 WILL HAVE TO BE AD HOC INSTEAD OF AD SERIATIM. QREBONY/1 WILL DO HIS BEST ADHERE TO ITINERARY, HOWEVER

SECRET

WE FEEL IT ONLY REALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT HIS MOVEMENTS AND SCHEDULE WILL BE CONDITIONED BY DEVELOPMENTS FROM MOMENT HE STEPS OFF PLANE.

4. FOR SECURITY AND HANDLING REASONS IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR RODIGAST TO MEET AND BRIEF EACH WOFACTER IN ADVANCE WOFACTERS MEETING WITH QREBONY/1. NO TRUE NAMES OF WOFACTERS SHOULD BE USED AND SPECIAL CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN PROTECT RODIGAST, WHOSE TRUE NAME AND ADDRESS NOT KNOWN BY QREBONY/1.

5. RODIGAST ETA NEW YORK 10 SEPTEMBER. HE WILL PHONE VARASANO WHOM HE HAS MET MORNING 11 SEPTEMBER AT EITHER IDEN A OR IDEN B TO ARRANGE FOR MEETINGS WITH HQS OFFICERS. QREBONY/1 WILL BE TOLD ARRIVE NEW YORK 15 SEPTEMBER THUS GIVING FEW DAYS LEAD TIME FOR RODIGAST/HQS PREPARATIONS. REQUEST VARASANO, WHO WILL WISH DISCUSS RODIGAST PERSONAL AND DIOVERTAX OPERATIONAL MATTERS, ARRANGE FOR INTRODUCTION TO CONGREVE.

6. NO FURTHER REGULAR MEETING WITH EITHER QREBONY/1 OR RODIGAST BEING SCHEDULED ALTHOUGH PROVISIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEETING BEING LAID ON. ANY INFO FOR EMERGENCY PASSAGE TO

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 1268 SECRET SECRET

EITHER MUST REACH LCPIPIT BY COB 31 AUGUST.

SECRET SECRET

BT

We all agree.

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TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London aBm

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Basic Project Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LCPIPIT is revising the QREBONY Project files--which have been rather haphazardly maintained over the past year or so (much of this time the project was without a case officer). In our attempts to locate basic project documents we have been unable to find any copy of the provisions of the Operational Approval applicable to QREBONY/1. We do have a copy of the Provisional Approval granted 23 May 1966 forwarded with OFLW - 1591, 7 July 1966. Possibly the relevant document was destroyed during the reduction of files attendant upon the LCPIPIT move, or possibly it was inadvertantly not forwarded to LCPIPIT. At any rate we will appreciate being sent a copy.

2. We would also like to have a sterile version of the FY 68 Project Renewal as well as all other basic documents which ought to be available to LCPIPIT.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
1 - COS/London

AUG 30 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPT - 210	DATE 24 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London QBM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
O QREBONY/Jacques Verges

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

We are forwarding USC a copy of a letter sent QREBONY/1 by Jacques Verges' lawyer in which he makes a settlement offer on behalf of his client. QREBONY/1 will probably accept this, after a suitable waiting period, as it offers very telling and effective ammunition for use in his continuing battle to counter Verges' allegation that he was a WOFACT agent. It is our reading at this point that QREBONY/1 has been quite successful in this effort and that this settlement from Verges will be the final triumph in his campaign.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
Letter

DOC FORWARDED TO [illegible] BY RID/AN 5 SEP 1967

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3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
2 - C/Eur Div w/o att
1 - COS/London w/o att

201-386852
~~201-15[illegible]~~
AUG 30 1967

1 att a/s

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 499

DATE
24 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
28, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS - IX^e

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-19

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

AFF. GIB[illegible] C/ V[illegible]

Paris, le 24 Juillet 19[illegible]

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
London, W. 12
Grande Bretagne

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que le Conseil des Prudhommes par jugement rendu le 20 juillet 1967 a retenu sa compétence conformément au rapport du Conseiller rapporteur.

En tout état de cause, j'attends votre réponse à ma dernière lettre par laquelle je vous ai transmis les propositions de reglement à l'amiable faites par M. VERGES.

Je vous remercie de votre prochain courrier à ce sujet et,

./...

CS COPY

201-306052

S/C Att 1 to OEPA-499

~~201-186164~~

Vous prie de croire, Chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
25, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-10
OU 824 63-10

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 13 juillet 1967

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 - Grande Bretagne

AFF. GIBSON/ VERGES

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que Maître VERGES propose de vous régler en dinars algériens la moitié des sommes demandées, ce qui me semble intéressant pour vous, compte tenu de l'ensemble des circonstances de cette affaire, soit :

7.500 fr pour M. GIBSON d'une part, et
5.250 fr pour Mme GIBSON d'autre part
total : 12.7 0 fr

Je dois vous indiquer que cette proposition est un peu inespérée, car il est clair qu'en poursuivant la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES, vous gagnerez une certaine somme dont je ne puis fixer le montant, mais ne toucherez jamais rien.

En ce qui concerne la lettre dont M. GIBSON m'avait entretenu, mon Confrère ne me répond rien sur celle-ci. Je pense qu'il n'y a quand même pas lieu d'en faire une question de principe et que nous pourrions, dans le cadre d'un reçu, obtenir une phrase ~~[illegible]~~ sur ce qui a été dit à votre sujet.

En tout état de cause et si nous parvenions à un accord sur cette base, Me VERGES propose de tenir cette somme à votre disposition dès votre premier voyage en Algérie.

Je crois qu'il serait préférable que, d'une manière ou d'une autre, cette somme soit remise à une personne ayant votre confiance.

Si toutefois vous pensez que je dois tenter d'obtenir un peu plus, vous voudrez bien je vous prie me le faire savoir, mais j'insiste sur ce point qu'il est quelque fois préférable d'attraper une proposition à la balle, plutôt que de risquer de tout perdre.

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201-306052

...

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		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief of Station, London - for LCPIPIT	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Acting Chief WOVIEW		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/GREBONY LNERGO Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted, under separate cover, for your information only, is a copy of a LNERGO Report dated August 10, 1967. Please note paragraph 4 and bring to the attention of RODIGAST.

ISABELLE R. PRIAMI

Attachment: 1
LNERGO Report u/s/c

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, LCPIPIT w/att u/s/c
1 - COS, London w/att u/s/c

File in 201-306052
~~25~~ AUG 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-306052	OEPW - 117	18 August 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER CS Copy 200-124-156/3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

2 - RID files w/att
1 - E/BC/UK w/o/att
1 - CI/ICG w/o/att
2 - CA/CF w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	Ann J. Long	gm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/CA/CF	18 Aug 67	Diane L. Chatelan
CI/ICG		Dave Hornstein

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/CA		B. Hugh Tovar

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)
MPO. 1-66

DISPATCH

FBI doc
10 Aug 67
Re: Communist Party of Belgium
Bufile - illegible

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18 AUG 1967

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: 0 SUGAR's Trip to the United States

1. This is to advise the Bureau that this Agency plans to have SUGAR come to the United States during the month of September 1967. In addition to periodic consultation with Headquarters elements, the purpose of this trip will be to renew previous contacts, particularly among American Negro radical elements, primarily in order to develop information on possible Cuban (or other foreign) financial or other lines of support to these groups. He will be under instructions not to engage directly in any civil rights or other protest activities while in the United States.

2. We would appreciate the Bureau's concurrence in this activity. We would also welcome any Bureau requirements which the Agency would levy on SUGAR for servicing during his stay in the United States.

CSCI-316/03777-67

DDP/C/CA/CF/DCastelsara:jl (18 August 1967)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R&A
1 - CI/ICG
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1 - RI (201-306052)

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GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]

201-306052

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of KPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year,* I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

*Must be at least £1000 yearly.

Q/ 201 file

Tpi# 072269 15/8/67

FBI (X-ref)
10 Aug 67.

FBI doc
8 Aug. '67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Gibson
Bufile: (15) 105-93072

12 NYT. 16 JULY 67

NEGRO, IN PEKING, ACCUSES CUBANS

'Vicious Smear' of China in 'Forged' Letter Charged

Robert F. Williams, an American Negro who is now a black nationalist spokesman in Peking, has charged that the Cuban regime of Premier Fidel Castro has counterfeited a newsletter he puts out and used the bogus periodical for "a vicious smear attack" on Communist China.

In the May issue of the newsletter, The Crusader, which has arrived here, Mr. Williams asserted that the "forged" version "carries a metered postmark that is available only for Cuban Government bulk mailing." He charged that the newsletter was put out by "the Cuban G-2", which he said was heavily infiltrated by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Williams left his home in Monroe, N. C., in 1961 and went to Cuba, where he advocated a "freedom struggle" for Negroes in the United States. He left Cuba last year.

Another American Negro nationalist, Richard Gibson, in a current newsletter from London, describes Mr. Williams as "chairman-in-exile of the all-black Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in the United States." Sixteen persons, who were said to be members of the revolutionary movement, were arrested in Queens last month on charges of having plotted to murder moderate Negro civil rights leaders.

The Crusader that Mr. Williams contended was mailed from Havana last month, has a headline, "China Betrays The Cuban Revolution," and has Mr. Williams saying that he was "deceived by the soft lies and subtle flattery" of Chinese Communist leaders. It goes on to say that Mao Tse-tung was now "old and sick and can no longer control his arrogant, power-mad underlings who, although acting in his name, have abandoned the people's revolution."

Mr. Williams' current Peking newsletter asserted that "Afro-Americans should refuse to fight" in Vietnam. But it added that "those who are trapped into it" could "work among the troops to educate them to the true facts of life."

As advice to Negroes at home, the newsletter said:

"Revolutionaries must play it cool. Infiltrate the police and the master infiltrators, the C.I.A. We must learn to subvert him at his own expense while using his facilities to advance our cause of Black liberation."

On Monday, Workers World, a weekly here with a Trotskyist tendency, announced that it had obtained a statement from Mr. Williams denouncing the alleged murder plot here as a "frame-up."

"It is not my policy nor RAM's to kill condescending Uncle Toms," the statement said. "We are not an organization advocating pointless assassinations. We are dedicated freedom-fighters stressing armed self-defense. Our objective is to make America a just and decent place to live."

Q/1 201

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TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC QRFULLY QREBONY JAGUAR LEPAGEL
QREBONY's Group

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Refs: OEPA 256, 5 May 1967
OELA 4737, 10 May 1967

1. We now have JAGUAR's comments on the proposed "group" designed to allow QREBONY to expand his access by "representing" something - even if only a purely notional group. The letter from JAGUAR is attached.

2. We would observe that JAGUAR's comments are obviously made in a constructive vein. Similarly, JAGUAR seems to take a protective, almost proprietary interest in considerations affecting the QREBONY project. We naturally welcome this feeling on their part, since QREBONY continues to exist as a U.K.-based operation at their pleasure. And we think that JAGUAR's comments are sound, in substance. Their final comment also veils, to say the least, the understandable SMOKANGE reluctance to see yet another splinter group a-spawning, with the frightful political implications if a WOLADY spy were exposed while running a phoney "pro-Chinese" group in the U.K.! (It would probably be not too good in WOLADY, for that matter, but a government could fall here as a result.)

3. We have now had an opportunity to talk this over with CILIBERTI, LAGINESTRA and RODIGAST, and all are agreed that QREBONY's trial balloon will not be re-floated. We think no harm is done. If JAGUAR should come into possession of a copy of QREBONY's letter, and ask us about it, we will acknowledge that he wrote it to try out on a limited number of friends and aimed at his Swedish audience, preliminary to (he hopes) Rob WILLIAMS' arrival in Sweden. We are now merely replying to JAGUAR that we are grateful for their cogent comments, and that "the group" will not be activated unless there is a significant change in the QREBONY operational situation such as to require "the group" to be created, in which case we will again seek their concurrence.

Arthur T. JOSLVICK

Attachment: h/w
Letter - as stated
Distribution:

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO
2-C/WOVIEW, w/att
3-C/EUR, w/att
1-C/LCPIPIT, w/att.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-47,660

DATE
16 June 1967

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HQS FILE NUMBER
200-124-150

CC - [illegible]

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2. [illegible]

a) [illegible]

b) [illegible]

c) [illegible]

d) [illegible]

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TO

C/WOVIEW

INFO.

COS/London, C/WOMUSE, C/Eur Div

FROM

Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT CTDOPIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1's Relationship

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 is a particularly important one from both the production and security points of view. AMSQUAW/1 has been a prolific and reliable reporter, especially on items dealing with the International War Crimes Tribunal, and it will be highly desirable for her to continue to serve in this capacity in the forseeable future. It is recognized that AMSQUAW/1 is not a controlled agent and that her personal willingness to serve as a clandestine informant of QREBONY/1 is based upon a complex and inter-related series of reasons, both personal and ideological. QREBONY/1 helped her out of a tight situation in Africa and has befriended her since her arrival in London. For the last several months she has been living at his house. QREBONY/1 has a very agreeable personality and is a genuinely likeable person. At the same time, although she is not an ideological person, she shares his pro-Chinese ideological position and she has never questioned his explanation - that her reporting is for the Chinese. Lastly, we cannot and have not, overlooked the likelihood of a physical attraction between the two. In the last analysis it is impossible for us to state exactly what motivates her to act as a clandestine informant for QREBONY/1.

2. It is quite possible for the relationship between QREBONY/1 and AMSQUAW/1 to change at any time. Should their relationship take a turn for the worst it might possibly have adverse security implications for QREBONY/1. This subject has been discussed at length with QREBONY/1 and he agrees that great care must be taken. He is careful to use AMSQUAW/1 only in situations where it would be plausible for the Chinese to have an interest. Thus far this has been relatively easy, indeed at the Stockholm sessions of the Russell Tribunal the absence of any Chinese representatives served to confirm in AMSQUAW/1's mind that QREBONY/1 was the Chinese man on the scene. At this point no actual problem exists, but both LCPIPIT and QREBONY/1 are alert to the possibility that one could arise.

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW
2 - C/WOMUSE
2 - COS/London
2 - C/Eur Div

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OEPA - 281

DATE

1967

15 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CS Copy filed 201-294316

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TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
C/WOHUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1's Meeting with RNSLIVER

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith is a brief memo for the record summarizing a conversation between the undersigned and RNSLIVER in which the latter recounted his impressions of a meeting with QREBONY/1. Transmitted USC is a brief note from QREBONY/1 to RODIGAST covering the events of the same evening.

P.F. CILIBERTI

Attachments: H/W & USC
As stated memo H/W
Brief note USC

Distribution:
3 - C/WOVIEW w/atts H/W & USC
2 - C/WOHUSE w/atts H/W & USC
2 - COS/London w/atts H/W & USC
2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

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File in 201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 268

DATE
MAY 11 1967
10 May 1967

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CILIBERTI Conversation with RNSLIVER 26 April Concerning His Meeting with QREBONY/1

1. On 25 April BASTEAR told me that RNSLIVER was in London and was planning to meet with QREBONY/1. BASTEAR accordingly suggested that RNSLIVER be debriefed by the undersigned the following morning. Accordingly I met with RNSLIVER for about one hour, from which meeting the following highlights seem worth recording:

A. I told RNSLIVER that we (WOFACT) had been interested in QREBONY/1 at the time that he was writing for China Quarterly concerning his dispute with the editor of Revolution, Jacque Verges, but that we had lost tract of him of late. Now that we are in QREBONY/1's home town, RNSLIVER was told that we and Headquarters would be interested in any information on QREBONY/1 which could be reported as a result of such meetings as RNSLIVER had had with him.

B. RNSLIVER said that he had told Leo Labedz that he would like to meet Ibrahim to gain some understanding of what was going on in the African exiled community, particularly as it related to the Sino-Soviet split. Labedz said that he thought that RNSLIVER would do much better by talking to QREBONY/1 whom he, Labedz, said was one of the few people around from whom Labedz could learn anything.

C. RNSLIVER met QREBONY/1 at QREBONY/1's house. RNSLIVER did not have a complete roster of those who were there to participate in what RNSLIVER described as a "political bull session". He remembered only (in addition to himself and QREBONY/1) of Matthew Nkoana and a girl from Mexico City named Sucesos, who he said knew a great deal about guerrilla goings-on in Venezuela and whose address he said was Calzada, Tacuboya 103, Mexico 18. RNSLIVER said that Nkoana said practically nothing throughout the evening, apparently because he found RNSLIVER's presence odd and unnerving.

D. RNSLIVER was as impressed with QREBONY/1 as Labedz had predicted he would be. He described QREBONY/1 as remarkably knowledgeable concerning Chinese factions of Communist movements in Western Europe and Africa. He said that QREBONY/1 had described his recent trip to Nicosia and Cairo, had mentioned that he had visited Dar-es-Salaam, that he knew Jacques Grippa, and that he intended to visit Stockholm in connection with the Pussell Tribunal and a possible Stockholm visit by Robert Williams.

SECRET

CONTINUING BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to London from Stockholm on 10 July, I was again queried by British Immigration about my failure to register as a permanent resident. My excuse has always been that I did in fact go to the Home Office, but no action was ever taken because I rarely remained in the country more than a month. However, this tale is wearing thin and I fear that I may have much more serious trouble in the near future.

It would seem to me that the best solution might be to become the official London correspondent of KPI or any other outfit that might have me. I would need a letter to that effect and would require a notional salary of about $5,000 per year*, I believe, but even this might raise questions from the British Inland Revenue.

Some advice on this problem would be appreciated.

* Must be at least £1000 yearly.

9/ 201 file

Tpi# 072269 15/8/67

E. RNSLIVER was particularly impressed by QREBONY/1's library of radical books and pamphlets. RNSLIVER turned over to the undersigned for copying and return a recent issue of Williams' The Crusader, and a copy of QREBONY/1's own newsletter. These were received with feigned interest, although of course we had earlier received the same items from RODIGAST (already forwarded to Headquarters).

F. RNSLIVER did not recall meeting Mrs. QREBONY/1, and did not know how many children QREBONY/1 had. He described QREBONY/1's house as attractively middle class. He was aware of the fact that QREBONY/1 had gone to Kenyon College and praised QREBONY/1's writing skills. QREBONY/1 showed him a number of articles he had written which RNSLIVER said completely followed the Chinese Communist line. RNSLIVER was surprised that some of these articles had been printed in the United States in spite of their political orientation.

P.F. CILIBERTI

14-00000

att to OEPA-00268

Att

GRIFFITH VISIT

Conversation with Prof. William E. Griffith, London, 25/4/67.

Tadeusz Horko phoned my home to tell me that XXXXXX Griffith, who is spending a sabbatical year in Munich from MIT, wanted to see me. Later that evening, Leo Labedz and Griffith arrived. Stella Joyce of Amnesty International and Matthew Nkoana also arrived unexpectedly. It turned out that Lebedz and Joyce had often talked over XXXXXXX the phone, but had never met.

Griffith told me that he had recently visited East Africa. In Dar es Salaam, he had met David Sibeko and Ahmed G. Ebrahim of the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress). He said his distinct impression was that PAC was on a strong pro-Chinese course. Griffith said he had written to Nana Mahomo's old address in London in an effort to contact him, but had learned later that Mahomo was now at XXXXX Kirkland House, Harvard University. He said he looked forward to talking with Mahomo when he went briefly to the USA in May.

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S/C att to OEPA 268

350-124-15/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
C/WOMUSE, COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT 2061

SUBJECT
LTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

As HQS is aware, QREBONY/1 has been pursuing a legal action against Jacques Verges. He has now received a letter from his lawyer which seems to indicate that Verges is willing to make some sort of settlement--although he can only pay in Algerian dinars. QREBONY/1, of course, is willing to accept a settlement provided it includes some sort of apology from Verges. Armed with this apology QREBONY/1 could then dispose of any lingering doubts regarding his political reliability caused by Verges' accusations and would also have the ego gratification of forcing Verges to eat his own words.

FK 201-190164

ACL

AARON C. LAGNESTRA

S/C ATT'D BE [illegible]
Dated 12 MAY 1967

MICROFILMED
MAY 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: USC
As stated above USC

Distribution:
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2 - C/WOMUSE w/o atts
2 - COS/London w/o atts
2 - C/Eur Div w/o atts

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15/C

MAY 3 1967
201-306652

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 245	2 May 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Me Serge Schwartzenberg

Me Schwartzenberg
Avocat à la Cour
[illegible] Faub. Montmartre
PARIS-IXe [illegible]

PARIS, le 17 AVRIL 1967

18

Monsieur GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 (Grande Bretagne)

AFF. GIBSON C/Nouvelles Editions Internationales

Cher Monsieur,

Mon confrère adverse, Conseil de la Société Nouvelle des Editions Internationales, et de Monsieur VERGES, me fait savoir qu'il a eu une conversation avec Me VERGES qui lui a indiqué qu'il vit actuellement en Algérie et serait disposé à rechercher un règlement amiable des difficultés qui vous opposent.

Il m'a fait part qu'actuellement sa situation ne lui permet pas de payer en une autre monnaie que la monnaie algérienne, savoir le dinar.

Il y a là une question de principe. Pourriez-vous, je vous prie, me faire savoir si vous pourriez envisager une transaction aux termes de laquelle vous seriez réglé en dinars. J'ignore d'ailleurs dans quelles conditions l'exportation des capitaux d'Algérie est encore possible à ce jour.

Quoi qu'il en soit, peut-être seriez-vous intéressé par cette proposition.

Je n'ai pas encore discuté de chiffres avec mon confrère adverse puisqu'il s'agit là d'une question préjudicielle à toute discussion sur le fond de la somme due.

J'attends donc votre prochaine réponse et vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

MICROFILMED
MAY 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

I phoned Schwartzenberg and informed him I would agree
to a settlement, but the amount to be paid in any currency
would necessarily depend on the extent to which Jacques
Vergès apologized for his accusations against me in 1964.
I said I did not mind if Vergès attempted to lay the blame
for those accusations on a "misunderstanding" or on erroneous
or malicious misinformation given him by others.

[Copies sent to J. Griffin, R. Raindorf, Nils Andersson,
Gilbert Etienne (Lausanne).]

CS COPY

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATEMENT of EARNINGS and DEDUCTIONS

NAME	EMPLOYEE NO.	PAY PERIOD DATE	ROLL	COST CENTER	STA
QREBONY 1	802799	04/01 04/30	20	1240062	000

CD	EARNINGS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
09	74600	18400	REG SAL

NOTE:
THIS FORM IS ISSUED ONLY WHEN AN EMPLOYEE ENTERS ON DUTY OR THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE PAY ACCOUNT

CD	DEDUCTIONS		DESCRIPTION
	NORMAL	OTHER	
80	74600	18400	CPA EX CR
96	4600		FED TAX F

REMARKS:

Increase Normal Salary from $700 to $746 effective 1 December 1966.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER:

802799 QREBONY-1 CA/000

FORM 8-63 1314 Previous editions obsolete (30-51)

SECRET

								AMT DUE FROM EMPLOYEE			NET PAY		
PP	OT/HRS	HT/HRS	HD/HRS	RATE	O/T-HT AMT	H/D AMOUNT		CD	NORMAL	OTHER	CD	NORMAL	OTHER
								86	4600-		00		

REMARKS:

PAID AT HQS.

FORM 8-63 1315A

SECRET

(30-51)

CHANGING PLACES

DR Wilmot Rogers is one of two [illegible] staff members of the Carlisle Cumberland Journal who have [illegible] to the production side [illegible] (Carlisle) Ltd. — the [illegible].

Brothers have an expanding web-offset printing [illegible] and among [illegible] they handle is the new [illegible] comic JAG (U.K. Press Gazette, [illegible]).

Rogers, who is 37, is to become [illegible] controller after five years in [illegible] post. He started in journalism [illegible] News and later worked [illegible] Newspapers in the [illegible]. Before joining the Journal he was [illegible] for five years of the Cumberland [illegible] Cumberland Evening Star.

[illegible] appointment is that of chief photo-[illegible] Laurie Kemp as works manager [illegible]. He succeeds Charles Latimer [illegible] shortly to take up a post in the [illegible].

Rogers' successor is assistant editor [illegible] Atkins, a former Merchant Navy [illegible]

[illegible] TO SUNDAY MIRROR

[illegible] GARROTT, former features editor [illegible] Bristol Evening Post, is joining the [illegible] Mirror's features sub-editors after [illegible] as a features sub-editor with the [illegible] Mail.

[illegible] SHONE has joined the Flintshire [illegible] reporters at Mold after three [illegible] a reporter and sub-editor on The [illegible] Gazette and the Islington Gazette.

HE'LL EDIT QUARTERLY

[illegible] L. RANSLEY has been appointed [illegible] officer to the Muscular Dys-[illegible] Group of Great Britain and will [illegible] its quarterly Muscular Dystrophy [illegible]

FROM WWN INTO TV

[illegible] VACK, who joined Plymouth's [illegible] Morning News from the Redditch [illegible] last September, has moved to [illegible] Television as reporter and news-[illegible]. KATIE CRIEB is leaving WWN [illegible] Stafford Recorder. Two newcomers [illegible] are JON ADDISON and NEIL [illegible] from Auckland, New Zealand.

NEW DEVON EXECUTIVE

[illegible] NOON has been appointed assist-[illegible] of the South Devon Journal at [illegible]. He has worked with the [illegible] Express and Daily Mail and has [illegible] a magazine editor before moving [illegible].

[illegible] from 'Queen' [illegible] colour weekly

[illegible] ROBERTS, formerly with Queen [illegible] and London Evening Standard, [illegible] of Colour News Feature Weekly, [illegible] on April [illegible]. The magazine will be printed web-offset by the [illegible] Publishing Co. at [illegible] incorporates the old Londoner [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] meeting of the Newspaper Con-[illegible] Association — formed in [illegible] March 11 Press Gazette No. 115, will be held at the Midland Hotel, Manchester on April 22. Idea of the meeting is to bring together freelances from the north with those from the south who attended the inaugural meeting.



ALISTAIR COOKE HAS SAID IT 1,000 TIMES

ALISTAIR COOKE, home from the US to celebrate the thousandth BBC broadcast of his "Letter from America", was chief guest at a luncheon of the Association of Circulation Executives on March 27 in the Connaught Rooms, London.

Mr. Cooke gave an off-the-cuff, off-the-record talk which ranged from international affairs to golf and religion.

Chairman Bernard Aren welcomed continental members of Distripress, including Dr. G. Lesrig, Inter-Orbis, Milan; M. Vandevelde, Societe de Bibliotheque des Gares, Brussels; K. Olsen, Dansk Centralagentur, Copenhagen; Dr. Hans Merkom, Distripress Secretariat; David Money-Chappelle, Consultant to Distripress Committee.

PICTURED with Mr. Cooke, at microphone, are Mr. Aren and N. H. Nelms, managing director of Alfa Books.

Express O'Farrell gets racing post

MICHAEL O'FARRELL has been appointed racing correspondent of Dublin's Irish Times. He joined the newspaper's sports staff six years ago from the London office of the Daily Express.

JOHN CANDER has left the London advertisement staff of Eastern Counties Newspapers after three years as a media representative to join the Kensington and Chelsea Post's reporting staff.

SHE'S GROUP PRESS OFFICER

JUDITH TURNER has joined the Wedgwood Group as press officer, based in London, for Wedgwood, William Adams, Susie Cooper and Royal Tuscan.

PETER MUMMERY, formerly Time sales representative in Britain, is moving to South Africa to handle the US news magazine's advertising sales following the opening of a new office there. Another new office has opened in Amsterdam.

Hendon editor now group MD

GRANT MILLARD, at present editor and general manager, has been appointed managing director of the Hendon Times group, owned by Merritt & Hatcher.

He began with the London and Essex Guardian series at Walthamstow and moved to Hendon after three years with Mansfield's Chronicle-Advertiser.

NEGRO PRESS MOVE

RICHARD GIBSON has been appointed overseas representative and correspondent of Negro Press International, a news and feature service based in Chicago. He remains editor for Africa, Asia and Europe of the New York Afro-American monthly Liberator and international columnist to another US monthly, Independent.

ILIFFE TO MACLAREN

JOHN FENNER has been appointed advertisement manager of Maclaren's Modern Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. He was previously advertisement manager for Iliffe's Data Processing.

REPORTER FOR PR

RICHARD GUEST, deputy chief reporter of the Warley News Telephone, has joined Nicholas Mendes and Associates Ltd. — a Birmingham-based public relations company — as press service editor.

NEWS CONTACT DIRECTORY

New entries include:

USA EXHIBITION AT IEA
See under ELECTRONICS

J. & E. HALL LIMITED
See under REFRIGERATION

AVON RUBBER COMPANY
See under MOTORING

ROVER COMPANY LIMITED
See under MOTOR CAR MANUFACTURERS

OMAL GROUP LIMITED
See under BUSINESS EFFICIENCY

HOME BREWING AND WINE MAKING
See under HOME BREWING

CONSUMER COUNCIL
See under CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS

See Pages 30-41

TMF 114551, 17/5/68

R. Gib

201-306052

22 Apr 68

DISPATCH

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TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/Eur Div

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/QREBONY/1's Taxes

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QREBONY/1 told RODIGAST at their most recent meeting that he did not have to file an overt tax form for 1966 because his gross overt income for 1966 was less than $600. This will not be true for the 1967 tax year and he will have to file in the Spring of 1968. The operative sentence in the 1966 Tax Guide For US Citizens Abroad, US Treasury Dept IRS Pub No 54 states--"Every citizen of the United States, regardless of where he resides who is under 65 years of age and has a gross income of $600 or more during a tax year must file an income tax return."

2. For the record the undersigned who is as yet unfamiliar with all administrative details, would appreciate HQS confirmation of the above.

ACR
AARON C. LAGINESTRA

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2 - C/Eur Div

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201-306052
APR 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 228

DATE
22 April 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CA 2, EUR 8, C/I C 2, C/DA

S E C R E T 191034Z CITE LCPIPIT 0701

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REF: DIRECTOR 90256

ACTION 13 [illegible]

1. AGREED PARA 3 REF THAT RAISE NOT BE PASSED THRU QRPURE. ALSO AGREE JULY EFFECTIVE DATE. REQUEST HQS TAKE STEPS HAVE RAISE ADDED TO SALARY DEPOSITS MADE BY HQS TO QREBONY'S ACCOUNT.

2. WILL COMMENT ON PARA 4 REF WHEN PROMISED DISPATCH RECEIVED.

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Harrison =

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
C/WOVIEW

INFO.
COS/London, C/Eur Div, C/WOMUSE

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The USC memoranda sets forth a problem which QREBONY/1 recently encountered at London Airport and how it was solved with the assistance of London Station and JAGUAR.

2. As matters now stand, British Immigration will take no action against QREBONY/1 without checking with JAGUAR.

ACL

AARON C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
As stated above para 1 USC

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOVIEW w/att USC
- 2 - C/WOMUSE w/att USC
- 2 - COS/London w/o att
- 2 - C/Eur Div w/o att

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 1 MAY 1967

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APR 18 1967

15/c att

201-306057

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 211	17 April 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

TO: [illegible]

[illegible]'s [illegible] with Home Office [illegible] Roddy can tell him [illegible] what the Immigration people at the airport say. As long as he's properly documented (visa current and all that) they can't keep him out (unless, of course, they catch him in flagrante delicto. So as long as he keeps his nose relatively clean, he's okay. He doesn't need to worry until the Home Office comes to him; when that happens - IF it happens, and that is unlikely, the way the British law works - we will look into things further. Tell him that having a British wife makes him immune to most out-kicking activities - as long as his nose is clean.

In fact, it is all fixed with the Home Office. They will not take any action against him without checking with JAGUAR, and they, of course, will check with us. He should not be encouraged to be flippant or sassy with the Immigration people, but he doesn't need to panic, either. He should behave in a reasonably straightforward and natural way - so he should not be encouraged to think we have "fixed" things for him.

I also discussed again with JAG the question of having him taken off the watchlist. They are willing to do so, if we want, but their counsel still is that it is better for him to be watchlisted. There could probably be no better credential for him, if traveling with Ebrahim of Manchanda or Raimondo, or someone of that sort, than to get the business from the Customs or Immigration people. And, of course, he should, for our sake (security, and all that) be discouraged from carrying anything incriminating, and if he knows that he may be searched any time he comes or goes, that should help his discretion along.

Now, if, on the other hand, the airport harrassment really gets to be too much of a burden, maybe we will want to review the situation. On the basis of the two incidents to date, however, I vote for leaving him watchlisted.

Let me know if you see any problems, or if there are any unanswered questions.

(Oh, yes: consensus is that he should not apply for permanent residence permit. If he bothers about it, Roddy should point out that in applying for one he would have to give some info about his income, etc., which he doesn't have to do now. And, again, since his British wife is an ace in the hole, he doesn't have to volunteer that information; so he shouldn't.

FROM: J[illegible]ZEVICK

OEPA - 211
15 Apr 67

URGENT

BRITISH IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

Returning to the U.K. on 15/3/67, I was warned by British Immigration at London Airport that I was spending more time in Britain than outside the country. The Immigration Officer inspected my passport closely, counting the number of trips I had made since getting that passport, which had been issued by the U.S. Embassy in London, on 1 December 1965. However, no explanation was asked for concerning the travel. I explained that I had intended to resettle in Switzerland or France and was spending so much time in Britain only because my wife, who was British, had been helping to take care of her elderly parents in London. I was told nevertheless that I should go to the Home Office and apply for temporary residence in Britain.

Before doing so, I would need to know:

1) whether I should in fact do so;

2) how should I describe my work, if any, and source of income.

At present, upon investigation, the British would learn that I have no visible means of income, except for perhaps for my Reports and some freelance journalism, but nevertheless receive money regularly from a Swiss bank account.

If I told the Home Office, I was a freelance journalist, I imagine they would demand some sort of bank or other financial statements, which would probably be examined by British tax authorities for possible taxation. Even if I say I have no employment of any consequence and maintain myself on income from investments made in Switzerland and elsewhere, I might have to verify that statement and pay some sort of British taxes. Considering the positions of my brothers-in-law, I doubt if either could get away with claiming to fully or partially support my family, although my brother-in-law Gordon Kaye, who is a Chartered Accountant, has been deducting my children's school fees from his taxes by means of an educational trust fund, although he no longer pays anything towards the fees. I could say that I was the beneficiary of a tax-free U.S. fellowship, but this might prove more cumbersome and dangerous than necessary, in the present circumstances.

In any case, I need advice on this matter urgently, as I suspect I may soon have a visit from the Home Office if I do not go to them voluntarily.

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S/C att to OEPA-211

201-306052.



AFRO - ASIAN PEOPLES'
SOLITARITY ORGANISATION

VIII Council Session

NICOSIA - CYPRUS

201

Journalist Card No. 34

Name Richard Gibson

Country Englan

Organisation

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, London For LCPIPIT

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO
Chief of Station, London

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FROM
Chief, WOVIEW

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/QREBONY/Operational
QREBONY/1 Mentioned in Senate Hearings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 4.

1. Transmitted under separate cover is an excerpt from a recent Senate debriefing of a PBRUMEN defector, in which QREBONY/1's name was mentioned.

2. We do not believe that the testimony is particularly awkward for QREBONY/1, and while we had an opportunity to have this portion of the testimony stricken from the record, we elected not to do anything about it since it would have involved revealing WOFACT interest in QREBONY/1.

3. FYI, In order to avoid any concern on the part of QRPURE should this portion of the testimony ever hit the press, KAMMERMAYER mentioned the reference to QREBONY/1 in low key to QRPURE at a recent meeting. QRPURE exhibited no concern.

4. Please have RODIGAST brief QREBONY/1 concerning the testimony at an early opportunity.

JULIA R. CONGREVE

Attachment:
As stated above (u/s/c)

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1 - COS, London w/o att.

15/c ffl

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPW-46	DATE 13 APR 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

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1 - E/BC/UK w/o att.
1 - CI/IC w/att.
1 - WH/COG/CA/EW
1 - CCS/NC

AN | PS | CA/CF
ABSTRACT | ~~INDEX~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
CA/CF	Diane Chatelan	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC	4/4/67	D. Hout
for WH/COG/CA	4/12/67	J. Moughan
	RECEIVED	
APR 11	10 30 AM '67	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA		Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

S/c att to OEPW-46

Mr. Volta. I don't know, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know if they did in fact organize this conference in London, involving --

Mr. Volta. I think they did, but I never heard of it --

Mr. Sourwine. Involving the North Vietnamese. You heard nothing further?

Mr. Volta. No, sir.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, did you have any information about the presence in London of any other United States citizens who had attempted to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. No, sir. Not that I remember.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you have something to do with an individual who wanted to go to Cuba, to interview Castro?

Mr. Volta. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Tell us about this.

Mr. Volta. There was a newspaper man, a colored man.

Mr. Sourwine. A Negro?

Mr. Volta. Yes, a Negro. And he used to be, I think, president of Fair Play for Cuba here in the States, I think in New York. I don't know if this was in New York. And he visited the Embassy, trying to get a visa.

Mr. Sourwine. The Cuban Embassy in London?

Mr. Volta. Yes, the Cuban Embassy in London.

Mr. Sourwine. To get a visa to go to Cuba?

Mr. Volta. Yes. And then we sent this request to Cuba,

SECRET

S/C Att 1 to OEPW 46

201-306052

but we never had a reply. He wanted to have an interview with Castro for a magazine -- Playboy Magazine.

Q Playboy Magazine.

What did this Negro newspaper man do, do you know? Do you know where he worked?

Mr. Volta. As far as I know, he was editing a bulletin, newspaper bulletin, in London.

Mr. Sourwine. In London -- not in Paris?

Mr. Volta. I hardly can tell you exactly. But I know he was editing a news bulletin.

Mr. Sourwine. What kind of a news bulletin?

Mr. Volta. Well, a sheet of paper with news about different aspects.

Mr. Sourwine. Well, do you know whether this was really a news enterprise, or whether it was a propaganda enterprise?

Mr. Volta. I think it was a private news service, because his name was in the head.

Mr. Sourwine. What was that name?

Mr. Volta. I tried to remember his name.

Mr. Sourwine. Didn't you tell our man in Miami that it was Richard Gibson?

Mr. Volta. Right, that one, yes, sir. Richard Gibson.

Mr. Sourwine. Now, do you have any details about the alleged contract with Playboy Magazine for an interview with Fidel Castro?

SECRET

MR. [illegible]. [illegible].

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]

MR. [illegible]. [illegible].

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]?

MR. [illegible]. [illegible]. [illegible]
[illegible],
[illegible].

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 021318Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 2425

2 MAR 65 IN 65923

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

1. QREBONY RAW REPORTS RECEIVED 1 MARCH. APPRECIATE PROMPT FORWARDING.

2. SINCE WILL BE CONTINUING REVIEW OF CASE WITH JAGUAR IN NEXT FEW DAYS (THEY HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE OUR CONTINUED RUNNING OF HIM IN UK), WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE SUMMARY LATEST MEETING WITH QREBONY AND PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 2425 QREBONY RAW 1 JAGUAR UK QREBONY

BT



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1[illegible] FEB 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

201

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR's Involvement with American Radical Organizations

1. This memorandum requests your Agency's comments, on a priority basis, relative to improving the operational capabilities of SUGAR, a source of this Agency known to you, whose reporting on expatriate American leftist personalities we are forwarding on a continuing basis.

2. Despite our hopes and his efforts, SUGAR was unable to obtain an invitation to the Tri-Continental Conference recently held in Havana, which was a target for collection by this Agency. It is our belief that SUGAR's reputation of being pro-Chinese was responsible for his exclusion. In discussing this problem with important pro-Chinese communist personalities in Europe recently, the latter suggested that his ability to secure access to such meetings would be considerably enhanced if he could obtain a "grass-roots" base or connection in the United States which he could represent. In reporting this suggestion--which strikes us as valid--SUGAR speculated on the possibility that he might attempt to become the European "representative" of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), an American organization of which he knows little but which seems, from what he does know, to be consistent in its outlook with his ostensible political orientation.

3. In this connection, we would very much appreciate receiving any information you possess on RAM, its structure, personalities and membership. We would welcome particularly, any mailing list or address roster of this organization which might be passed on to SUGAR without compromise to security considerations.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. Most of all, we would welcome your comments on this general problem, given your Agency's broad knowledge of such organizations as RAM in this country. As a negro expatriate with pretended pro-Chicom sympathies, SUGAR has also cultivated a reputation for sympathy toward the admittedly vague and diverse manifestations of "black nationalism", and toward such personalities as Robert Williams who embody it. We would be most interested in receiving both your comments on this general movement of opinion in the United States, and your descriptions of the organizations associated with it which could enable us to provide information and guidance to SUGAR for developing an association which would increase his operational access and effectiveness.

CSCI-316/00844-66

CA/CF:JBMurphy:ajl (16 February 1966)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CI/LSN
1 - CI/R & A
1 - CI/IC
1 - RID (200-124-156/3)
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1 - CA/SEC
2 - CA/CF

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15 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. John Brewer

SUBJECT: Field Investigation of QREBONY; Qrebony Clearance (201-306052)

1. Pursuant to our conversation of 11 February in your office, this memorandum requests that the usual field background investigation not be undertaken in the clearance process instituted for QREBONY.

2. We make this request for limitation because of our strong belief that such an investigation would run an unacceptably high risk--approaching certainty--of causing serious damage to QREBONY's reputation and therefore his effectiveness with the targets against which he is directed as an informant. In the past, both here and abroad, QREBONY has made warm enemies, as well as friends, among dissident and leftist circles. He has particularly alienated both U.S. Communist and Trotskyist elements, apparently by his dealings with them while serving as Executive Director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the early 60's. His reputation for pro-Chicom sympathies--which is the basis of his present operational usefulness to us as a source--constitutes an additional grievance against him by such parties as the CPUSA and the CPGB which are pro-Moscow and anti-Peking. We know from independent sources as well as from his own testimony, that such hostility has taken the form of charges--completely false at the time--that he was an ODENVY or KUBARK agent. (Apparently a favored smear technique in such circles, this charge has been leveled in other cases with equal lack of justification.) These allegations against QREBONY' have not prevented him from winning the apparent confidence of many leftist target elements who, if they are aware of them at all, no doubt realise the prevalence of such backbiting and gossip and who have not been prevented from developing personal and confidential relations with him. Such charges, however, do represent a dormant vulnerability: they have made Subject something of a controversial figure in a millieu which rightly feels itself a target for intelligence collection and is extremely sensitive to the dangers of penetration.

SECRET

3. Against the background of this vulnerability, it must also be stressed that the sources to be contacted by such a field investigation would include many individuals whose suspicions of government interest--and hostility toward it--we could not reasonably expect to disarm. QREBONY's career in the United States in FPCC and similar groups put him in contact with a wide range of individuals who are not merely sophisticated but highly sensitive concerning any such inquiry. It is not possible to conceive of any method of approach which would not provoke their suspicions that a government connection with QREBONY was involved. (It is, moreover, hardly likely that cooperation could be expected of any of them, except in such cases where the individual sensed an opportunity to record damaging information.) In view of what we know about the rapid circulation of gossip among such individuals, and their great interest in, and suspicions of government interest, such an inquiry could be calculated with reasonable confidence to spell the end of any effectiveness QREBONY could offer this Agency.

4. While we realize fully that the aim of such an inquiry is to resolve unknowns in an individual's background and develop materials beyond those presently available, we note that QREBONY has been a subject of continuing interest to ODENVY for many years, and that, as a result, the basic politically derogatory associations in his past are a matter of record. As you know, a successful polygraph was performed on him indicating the absence of IS connection beyond such associations, and confirming (to the extent that it can be said to do so) his assertions of loyalty despite them.

5. In requesting clearance in this case, we are seeking to exploit QREBONY's ability to report information to us which he receives in the course of his contacts with national liberation leaders, pro-Chinese communists and similar personalities. Such information represents general political and biographical material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals. Requirements passed to him in this connection involve instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. It is anticipated that his usefulness will be increased by travel to those areas where his access to targets known to him permits firsthand reporting. It is also anticipated that he may be able to serve selected CA purposes by surfacing information available to him, when this does not prejudice his cover status.

His use is understood to be, and has been, limited and precludes revelation of classified information, either by operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, witting participation in the recruitment of other agents, or the passing of such requirements as would reveal a classified status of KUBARK knowledge or interest in any collection target.

James M. Murphy
C/CA/CF

Austin Goodrich
CI/IC

SECRET

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REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)*	DATE 10 February 1966
TO: ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security	FROM: James Murphy [illegible] 4 D 30 X7767
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Richard Thomas GIBSON	PROJECT QREBONY
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES QREBONY/1 Frederick T. Dominic (P)	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO. 201-306052 / SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

It was planned to use Subject in a test assignment at the Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference and the IX World Youth Festival, bothi in Algiers during summer 1965. When both of these events were cancelled, out test of Subject came to be based on his reporting capability relative to accessible contacts. His value confirmed in this way, we intend to help him expand his circle of contacts, using him as a penetration and informant on Afro-Asian national liberation and pro-Chicom elements in various countries.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION? See F below		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? CIA has not been explicitly identified, but subject doubtless suspects CIA interest.	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. Only extreme left-wing cover truly applicable. Very limited credit cover interest is conceivable but inadvisable in US.

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY
Possible long-range assignment to cover Communist targets in Algiers, Cairo or Djakarta makes case highly sensitive from the start.

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
X	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 169669

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Rome Frankfurt Algiers London Paris		
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 1-62 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

Gen List #169069

Richard Thomas GIBSON

8 February 1966

201- 306052

13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California

James Murphy
CA/CP
4 D 30
7767

U.S.

Freelance Journalist London, England

X

Journalist

X

Student John Hay Whitney Fellowship	Italy	1951 - 52
NCO U.S. Army	Germany, U.S.	52- 1954
Editor Revolution Africaine	Algiers	1962-64
Executive Secretary for Fair Play for Cuba Committee	New York	1961-62
Newswriter,XXX CBS News	New York	1959-61
English Editor Agence France Presse	Paris	1955-58
Freelance Italian Films Export & Christian Science	Rome	1950-52
Cub Reporter Philadelphia Afro-American	U.S.	1950-51

Emg Founding member of Fair Play for Cuba Committee; member NAACP, Urban League and American Society of X African Culture

5'10" 165 Black Kinky black Negro

Joy Marjorie Nee Kaye

Son - Frederick William Gordon Gibson DPOB 1958 Paris
Daughter Dominque Elizabeth Gibson DPOB 1956 Paris

FULL SEARCH

X 7468

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

CA/6

Chief, WE, Deputy Chief, WH/C; Chief, KUDESK

Chief of Station, Madrid
[illegible] GRPRIY, [illegible]/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of Background Reports on Subjects of Reference
: A. PALP 5275, 30 December 1965
B. MADR 6774, 12 January 1966

Attached herewith are copies of the reports prepared by AMTONE 2 concerning the Subjects of reference.

George D. SCORGONY

Attachments:
As stated above, herewith

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris (LCPIPIT), w/att, h/w
2 - C WE, w/o att
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automatic downgrading
and declassification

CA/KF

OSMA-20639

14 JAN 66

ALGUNAS OPINIONES SOBRE LA VIDA Y PERSONALIDAD DE:

ROBERT TABER
RICHARD GIBSON
ROBERT WILLIAMS
WILLIAM WORTHY

[redacted]

Robert Taber

(Los datos sobre la vida y curricula de estos señores anteriores a su visita a Cuba deberán encontrarse en otra parte.)

Bob es el mejor del grupo, casi el único que realmente vale. Hombre gran valor personal y un buen periodista, estuvo en la Sierra en 1957 y de nuevo en 1958, donde entrevistó y filmó una película para la CBS, de Fidel Castro y sus guerrilleros. Al triunfo de la Revolución, estuvo en Cuba de visita varias veces y fue luego uno de los fundadores del Fair Play Committee For Cuba. Aparentemente, perdió su puesto en CBS y se enajenó el amor de su esposa (de esto se quejaba a menudo en Cuba) por causa de la Revolución Cubana. Amigo personal de Raúl Roa y Gómez Wangüemert y también de Fidel Castro, según parecía en 1961. Con relaciones personales con Manuel Piñeiro (de quien se reía de sus ínfulas de policía) y Ramiro Valdés y Raúl Castro, aunque nunca pareció estimarlos mucho. Este sentimiento parecía recíproco. Gran enemistad hacia los miembros del PSP y enemistad de ellos hacia Taber, sobre todo de Aníbal Escalante y Joaquín Ordoqui y Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. Una de las tragedias en la vida de Bob Taber fue el darse cuenta de que se había malquistado con Fidel Castro por hacerle, personalmente y cada vez que lo veía, críticas periódicas. Fue entonces (a fines de 1960 y principios de 1961) que comenzaron verdaderamente sus problemas y que comprendió que no solamente había perdido el favor de sus amigos, sino que estaba en desgracia con sus enemigos. Fue esto, sin duda, lo que le hizo buscar la muerte en Playa Girón, mientras actuaba como corresponsal del periódico Revolución. Fue gravemente herido en un muslo y salvó la vida por pura suerte. Antes había renunciado a su pasaporte o había sostenido una polémica pública con periodistas o senadores norteamericanos, desde las páginas de "El Mundo", donde colaboraba. En Cuba por poco muere también, poco después, de una infección amebiásica contraída en Guatemala, en los días de la revolución contra Arbenz. A fines de 1961 salió de Cuba con un documento (ni siquiera pudieron darle un pasaporte cubano, el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores ya en manos totalmente de los comunistas) personal de identidad, tratando de ir a China como corresponsal, pero en Praga le negaron el permiso para visitar este país y la URSS. Pasó a Francia y luego a Londres —y de ahí regresó a USA vía Canadá.

Taber no es un comunista ni parece haberlo sido nunca. Es un romántico político y un hombre ingenuo, que creyó que la Revolución cubana, de alguna manera, encarnaba algo de los ideales de Jefferson y Lincoln, asombrosamente. Hoy sabe que nada hay que esperar del comunismo en general y de la Revolución Cubana en particular.

2. Robert Taber (continue)

En la actualidad mantiene lazos de amistad en Cuba con Carlos Franqui, Juan Arcocha y Gómez Wangüemert, ya que una de las características de Robert Taber es su sentido del agradecimiento. Es uno de los hombres que mejor conocen en USA la Revolución Cubana, sus motivaciones, sus verdaderas intenciones, sus intenciones enmascaradas, sus logros reales y falsos y sus verdaderos fracasos. Políticamente, por sus cartas, parece ser alguien que regresa a un socialismo ingenuo y primitivo, a lo Oven y Proudhon y aborrece el cinismo comunista de que el fin justifica los medios.

En Cuba, en 1961, realizó un acto de gran coraje intelectual, poco después del coraje físico en Playa Girón, al ser el único periodista (siendo extrahjero, además) que defendió el film "P.M.", que prohibieran Alfredo Guevara y el ICAIC y que originara la gran, primera purga de intelectuales de izquierda y fueran el pretexto para las llamadas Conversaciones de la Biblioteca Nacional y el famoso discurso de Fidel Castro a los intelectuales, tan citado dondequiera. El artículo de Taber fue aceptado por la dirección del periódico El Mundo, pero no fue publicado—aunque Fidel Castro conociera su contenido al ser leído públicamente en una de las sesiones de la Biblioteca. Este gesto apresuró su salidade Cuba y selló su suerte política.

Richard Gibson

Ultimamente residía en París con su esposa francesa. Era director de la edición en Inglés del mensuario "Revolution", publicado en Lausana por Jacques Vergés, antiguo director de "Revolution Africaine", argelino de madre china y amigo de Ben Bella, con quien disputó al probársele que recibía dinero de China Comunista para expresar los puntos de vistas chinos en el periódico argelino. "Revolution" era o es (ignoro si se publica todavía) financiado por China Roja. Gibson salió de su puesto en estas publicaciones, al ser acusado de ser un agente infiltrado de la CIA. En 1964 estuvo en Bruselas, ofreciendo una conferencia en la ULB (Universidad Libre), con motivo de una Exposición Latinoamericana, auspiciada por la facción pro-china de la Federación Comunista de Estudiantes de Bélgica (Federación de Bruselas) y pagada por el grupo de disidentes del PCB, Grippa, Reindorf, etc. Esa noche habló sobre la Revolución cubana y su visita a Cuba y en la presidencia del acto estaba el propio Jacques Grippa.

Richard Gibson estuvo en Cuba en 1960, invitado especialmente por el periódico Revolución y por el magazine Lunes de Revolución. Era entonces presidente del Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Fue invitado a sugerencias de Bob Taber por Pablo Armando Fernández, que viajó a Nueva York para invitar a un grupo de intelectuales negros norteamericanos a los festejos del 26 de julio de 1960. Junto con Richard Gibson viajaron a Cuba Robert Williams, Leroy Jones, Julian Mayfield, su esposa y un nutrido grupo de escritores y poetisas negras. Fue entonces que Williams conoció a Cuba. La presencia de Gibson fue mal acogida por el PSP y los núcleos intelectuales y políticos que en Cuba giraban en la órbita del Partido Comunista Cubano, ya que Gibson era acusado por el PC de USA de dejar fuera del Comité Pro Justo Trato a Cuba a prominentes figuras comunistas norteamericanas, mientras daba cabida en el mismo a trotzskyistas y gente de la Nueva Izquierda. Williams, por su parte, era considerado un agitador casi anarquista, por estos mismos círculos comunistas cubano-americanos.

Richard Gibson es hombre de un carácter turbio. Un buen periodista y no mal escritor, pero una persona más bien desagradable, dentro de un complejo no solamente político, sino también psicológico, alimentados por su problema racial. Es un intelectual fracasado y hombre poco franco, de una comunicabilidad torcida. La policía francesa le consideraba un agente al servicio de una potencia extranjera--China Roja.

Robert Williams

Robert Williams es considerado en Cuba como una calamidad que hay que soportar---al menos esa es la opiniión que se tiene de él en los círculos políticos y revolucionarios y oficiales. Conversé con él, brevemente, en La Habana, en agosto de 1965. Es hombre con quien no se puede hablar mucho, no solamente por su complicado acento del Deep Sputh, sino también por su incoherencia mental y verbal. Suele vérsele acompañado siempre de un traductor, por lo general un negro cubano. Su penúltimo traductor fue Carlos Moore, que hoy reside en París y que provocó una aguda polémica en los círculos cubanos y amigos de Cuba en Francia, al publicar en el periódico "Solidarité Africaine" un artículo que tomaba las tesis del intelectual negro cubano, Walterio Carbonell, sobre la pretendida discriminación racial que existe en los medios políticos y dirigentes cubanos. Este asunto tuvo repercusiones en Cuba y no solo trajo problemas al verdadero autor del artículo (Walterio Carbonell, hoy expulsado de la Unión de Escritores de Cuba), sino al propio Williams; quien más de una vez había expresado tal opinión en público y en privado. Las desventuras de Williams no comenzaron aquí, sino cuando insistió en su línea china revolucionaria mucho tiempo después que todos los medios políticos, oficiales, intelectuales y dirigentes de Cuba se habían re-orientado hacia Moscú. Williams complicó su situación con un viaje a China Roja y a su vuelta a Cuba se encuentra casi aislado y ya no suele ver a Fidel Castro, a Dorticós y a los otros dirigentes revolucionarios; con la facilidad con que solía hacerlo antes. Todavía conserva muchos de sus privilegios (el traductor perenne, la casa, la comida, la eduación de sus hijos y, creo, que la hora radial anti-americana), pero solamente porque su caso es muy conocido fuera de Cuba y en el Sur llegó a tener una cierta audiencia después de su fuga de Estados Unidos a Cuba y de haber dispuesto de una potente emisora (Radio Habana Cuba) para sus confusos mensajes de odio racial.

No me extrañaría que Robert Williams fuese declarado insano por un grupo de psiquíatras competente. En Cuba, la gente de la calle, lo tiene por tal. Ahora, en la Conferencia Tricontinental, estará asimilando su inestabilidad psíquica a la teoría de la revolución permanente --o a la lucha de la liberación de los pueblos de color.

William Worthy

Es el menos conocido de los cuatro y quizás el más peligroso, porque es el más estable emocionalmente, el más mediocre y más trabajador del grupo. Fue a Cuba en 1961, recomendado por Richard Gibson y el Fair Play Committee, pero también por su cuenta. Se hospedó en el Havana Riviera, no sin dificultades, pues sus puntos de vista, nada asimilables por los comunistas cubanos, fieles perritos de Moscú, le atrajeron el odio del PSP y una —ligera acusación— de posible agente del FBI infiltrado en el Movimiento Negro y en Cuba. Hablé poco con él y solamente recuerdo su extraño acento, tal vez de Chicago o simplemente algún defecto anatómico, su aspecto de metodista negro y los shorts de cuero de alpinista italiano que siempre usaba en el hotel. Luego se hizo famoso en Cuba y en Europa, cuando fue procesado por haber ido a Cuba y a China Comunista sin permiso válido. Worthy no es un fanático ni un comunista ni un oportunista, pero parecía en camino de convertirse en un abanderado de cualquier causa que le fuera afín. Entonces me pareció que esta causa sería el Movimiento Por Avance de la Gente de Color. Hoy podría ser la Revolución Negra o Latinoamericana —o, simplemente, mundial.

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT XX

Chief, KUWOLF

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REF: A. PALP 5033 (IN 96553)
B. OFLA 3128 (18 November 1965)

1. We have discussed the substance of the question raised in Ref B through the regular Headquarters channel with the ODENVY Rep here who has acted as a point of liaison for QREBONY material in the past. We passed on, also, the materials which you prepared for the ODENVY representative with whom you are in contact in Paris. We raised specifically the question of passing QREBONY's identity to the Paris ODENVY representative, which you mentioned in Ref B, stating that, so far as KUBARK is concerned, we had no objections. The ODENVY representative here, however, thought that this might serve to confuse somewhat the lines of coordination for QREBONY's information, for which ODENVY headquarters has sole responsibility. He therefore felt that we should continue the present arrangement by which, in effect, QREBONY's identity is held here at the point where his material within ODENVY originates. He appreciated, however, your initiative in filling in the Paris ODENVY representative on the targets which QREBONY can service, thus alerting him to possible leads he might look into. He suggests also that we be kept aware of your liaison with ODENVY in the field to guard against false confirmation or other possible duplication which could lead to confusion here in those quarters of ODENVY responsible for processing the QREBONY material.

2. With respect to Freedomways, discussed in Ref A, and Q's possible relationship with it, we will report separately.

Nowell D. KAMMERMAYER

Distribution:
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7 JAN 196

OFLW-1414

S-E-C-R-E-T 200-124-156/2

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CI/ICG

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SECRET 221745Z

PARI DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 5337 CAWOOD ACTING

ZIBET ~~LCHARVEST~~

REF PARI 8052 (N 39470) *

~~MOB~~ INT SS ES
IOS PERS AR
EOB RPTS LOG CA
~~CI~~ SI BF HH
SEC NS

22 DEC 64 IN 49512

1. UNBOUND HAS MADE AVAILABLE TO ODENVY SAME INFO AS CONTAINED REF. ODENVY LOND INSIST THEY HAVE NO OPS INTEREST GIBSON. SERIOUSLY DOUBT EITHER SMOTH OR JAGUAR HAVE ANY RELATIONSHIP GIBSON., SINCE WOULD BE GROSS (AND SOONER OR LATER APPARENT) CONTRAVENTION OUR AGREEMENTS RE USE ONE ANOTHER'S NATIONALS.

201

2. LOND PHONE DIRECTORY LISTS JEFFREYS ALFRED HENRY AND MARKS (CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS), 9 BASINGHALL ST., E.C.2. NO STA TRACES.

3. ODENVY FILES HERE REFLECT FURTHER INFO ON CHARGES GIBSON A KUBARKER, ALTHOUGH NOTHING TO INDICATE BASIS FOR SUCH CHARGES. (SEE ODENVY/WASH LETTER TO KUBARK INFO ODENVY/LOND AND PARI, 1 DEC64, CAPTIONED RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON.) CAN HQS SHED ANY LIGHT?

4. SINCE ARRIVAL LOND, GIBSON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CUBAN EMB

SECRET

AND MR. KENNETH TYNAN (LATTER IN CONNECTON JOB POSSIBILITY FOR GIBSON). (THIS INFO SENSITIVE, FROM SMOTH. HQS SEE OEL 39690 AND OEL 39490.)

5. SMOOTHERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WOULD LIKE SCUTTLE REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. REQUEST LOND BE ADVISED OF SCHEME OF DIR 63751. THEN, IF APPROPRIATE, SUGGEST WE DISCUSS WITH SMOTH/JAGUAR/LCBEFORE AS NECESSARY TO ENLIST THEIR COOPERATION. JAGUAR IN PARTICULAR MAY BE USEFUL IN PROVIDING CURRENT DATA ON GIBSON AND MAY BE ABLE GET SOMEONE CLOSE TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN OPS DATA IN SUPPORT ANY PLAN FOR OP AGAINST REVOLUTION REPEAT REVOLUTION. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

* UNBound INFo Re Richard GIBSON.

14-00000

RICHARD GIBSON

30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
London, N.W.8
Tel.: PRI 8778

Age: 34. Born: Los Angeles, Calif., U.S.A., 13 May 1931.

Married - wife English. Three children - ages 7, 9 and 5 mos.

Education: Primary schools, Philadelphia, Pa., U.S.A.
Central High School, Philadelphia, Pa.
Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio (read English lit.)
University of Rome (Italian lit., 1951-52)
Sorbonne, Paris (French studies, 1955)
Columbia University Graduate School, New York
(CBS Fellowship, 1960-61)

First entered journalism in 1950 as reporter-clerk for Philadelphia Afro-American, a Negro weekly.

In 1951-52, while attending the University of Rome, I worked as legman for Edmund Stevens, then chief of the Mediterranean News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor of Boston. I also did parttime work -- English-language public relations -- for Italian Films Export, a semi-governmental Italian agency for the export of Italian films to English-speaking countries.

1953-54: drafted into U.S. Army. Served as non-com in Trieste, West Germany and U.S.A.

1955-58: English-language editor, Agence France-Presse, the French national news agency in Paris. Also wrote for the Agence Intercontinentale, AFP's feature service.

1959-61: newswritten for Columbia Broadcasting System for radio and television in New York. Fired from this job because of my activities in founding the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in the U.S.A. to support the Cuban Revolution.

1961-62: Secretary-treasurer of the Institute for the Improvement of Inter-American Relations, Inc., chartered as an "educational foundation" under the laws of the State of New York. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee was a permanent committee of the Institute. As the chief paid officer of the organization, I directed a public relations campaign aimed at countering U.S. propaganda against Cuba. I published books, newsletters and placed advertizing on behalf of Cuba in the U.S. press.

1962-64: English-language editor of the international review Revolution. Was one of the founding editors of Revolution Africaine in Algiers and was later sent to Switzerland to edit a monthly in English. Directed all aspects of the editing, publishing and distribution of the magazine.

1965- : Publisher of Richard Gibson Reports, a regular news and features service, mainly for Afro-American newspapers.

201-306052

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 31

8 SECRET

ORIG : JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT : CA/CF ☐ INDEX
EXT : 7767 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 9 DEC 1965 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-306052

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

10 DEC 65 14 32z

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG CEN~~

CONF: CA/O 4 INFO: VR, FILE ☑ RID COPY, WE 8, WH/C 8, CA 2, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CCS 3

TO PALP INFO LOND

CITE DIR 64369

AN 22	FI	64369
~~RS~~	~~DEPT~~	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

10 DEC 1965

DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY

REFS: A. LOND 0723 (IN 00407)

B. DIR 61637

1. CONSULTATION WITH STATE CONTACT YIELDS FOLLOWING:

A. TRAVEL WITH U.S. PASSPORT FROM AREA OUTSIDE U.S. CONSIDERED TECHNICAL VIOLATION, NOT BASIS FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

B. EVIDENCE OF SUCH TRAVEL, E.G. CUBAN VISA STAMP, IS BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BY STATE DEPT AGAINST HOLDER OF PASSPORT. I.E. WHEN HE PRESENTS HIS PASSPORT FOR RENEWAL, EMBASSY WILL REFER TO DEPARTMENT FOR GUIDANCE. ~~[USUALLY RESULTING IN ISSUANCE OF NEW PASSPORT GOOD ONLY FOR ONE WAY TRAVEL HOME.]~~

C. DESPITE REF A REPORT FROM ODENVY THAT LOND PASSPORT FILE IS CLEAN, DEPARTMENT CONTACT HERE CANNOT ASSURE THAT LOND PASSPORT OFFICE PROCEDURES WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RENEW QREBONY PASSPORT ON REQUEST, WITHOUT REFERRAL ~~[illegible]~~ TO DEPT IF SUCH MADE, THERE MAY EXIST DEROG IN EBONY PASSPORT FILE HERE RESULTING IN INSTRUCTIONS TO LOND EMBASSY ISSUE LIMITED PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL HOME. CAN NOT CLARIFY FURTHER STATUS EBONY FILE HERE WITHOUT DIVULGING TRUE NAME.

Continued...

201-306052

14 Dec 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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3		7	
4		8	

DEC 14 8 56 AM '63

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 64369

2. IN ANY CASE WE ABLE PROTECT QREBONY THRU CLEARED STATE CONTACT. IF EBONYS REQUEST FOR RENEWAL IS REFERRED TO DEPARTMENT BECAUSE OF CUBAN TRAVEL OR SOME OTHER CAUSE, WE CAN HAVE DEPT INSTRUCT EMB ISSUE FULL RENEWAL ON BASIS THERE INSUFFICIENT LEGAL GROUNDS PROCEED OTHERWISE.

3. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN EBONY PASSPORT EXPIRES. IF IT HAS BEEN RENEWED RECENTLY, CUBAN VISA WILL PRESENT NO PROBLEM FOR LIFE OF DOCUMENT. EBONY SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT RENEW WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH HQS.

4. PLEASE ADVISE ALSO WHETHER EBONY HAS RECEIVED CUBAN VISA FOR TRAVEL, HOW ACQUIRED, AND WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HE PLANS FOR TRAVEL. APPRECIATE/ESTIMATED TRAVEL COSTS.
BREAKDOWN

END OF MESSAGE

CCS

CI/IC

WE/BC/U

CORD MEYER, JR.
C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JAMES M. MURPHY
CA/CF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF XX
Chiefs: KUDESK; KURIOT; CSB, FRANKFURT (PKTOPAZ for OVERSIGHT);
WE. Chiefs of Station: Germany; Paris (TECHS).

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT.
DTDORIC/Operational
QEBONY/Security of QEBONY/1 S/W Communications System

201

References:

A. OFIA 3044 (Not sent Chief, CSB, Frankfurt; COS, Germany; COS, Paris)

B. FRAN 9240

1. Forwarded herewith is a Memorandum for the record concerning Paris/LCPIPIT's investigation of the security of QEBONY/1's S/W communications system following an episode involving an 11 October 1965 message received from him by LCPIPIT.

2. We request Headquarters' guidance concerning this situation, with special reference to Paragraph 3 of the attached Memorandum, in order that we may take all appropriate steps to resolve the problem of maintaining secure communications with QEBONY/1, especially in view of the plans to send QEBONY/1 on an extended visit to Cuba commencing sometime in mid-December 1965.

Harvey C. FAEHRICH

Attachment:
Memorandum hw

Distribution:
1 - C,KUDESK w/att. hw
1 - C,KURIOT w/att. hw
1 - C, CSB,Frankfurt w/att. hw
1 - COS, Germany w/att. hw
1 - COS, Paris w/att. hw
1 - C,WE w/o att.
3 - C,KUWOLF

NOV 26 1965

OFIA 3152

24 November 1965

SECRET

200-124/156/2

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

FROM : Harvey G. FAHNRICH

SUBJECT : Security of QREBONY/1 S/W Communications System

REFERENCES : A. OFLA 3044
B. PALP 4385
C. FRAN 5087

1. In early June of this year KUWOLF developmental agent QREBONY/1 (formerly STEBONY/1) was trained by KUWOLF Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST in the use of the S/W system prescribed by MKTOPAZ per Reference C. QREBONY/1 took one carbon sheet of the system with him on a brief trip to North Africa and used it for four messages in the latter part of June. Concurrently, Paris Station TECHS, on LCPIPIT's behalf, requested in OFPT 10348 that MKTOPAZ prepare for QREBONY/1's use an S/W carbon pad which would alleviate the carbon concealment problem for the agent. The pad was received subsequently and passed to QREBONY/1 on 18 July 1965, at which time his original single carbon sheet was withdraw.

2. QREBONY/1 first used his new S/W pad for a message dated 22 July 1965, comments on which were transmitted to interested KUBARK Headquarters and Field components in Reference B. QREBONY/1 underwent a corrective briefing on the use of his pad on 4 August 1965, carbon No. 1 (rearmost of three in the back of his pad) was withdrawn since it bore an imprint of the 22 July message, and QREBONY/1 was authorized to use carbon No. 2 (middle of three) but only for "essential" messages. (a 24 July S/W message was also critiqued at the 4 August meeting--because the carbon impression was relatively weak.)

3. On the basis of LCPIPIT's instruction to refrain from using his S/W pad except for "essential" messages, QREBONY/1 did not employ it again until 11 October 1965. The nature of the message indeed met the criteria for use of the pad, but as in the 22 July letter the message was clearly legible without development. To quote Paris Station TECHS:

> "SW impressions were clearly visible under Ultraviolet Light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

On the basis of this report, QREBONY/1's previous performance in use of the pad, and the fact that the next point from which he was to use the pad would be Algiers, LCPIPIT determined that the risk of compromise outweighed the necessity of QREBONY/1 carrying this communications system with him and withdrew the S/W pad on 20 October 1965. LCPIPIT retains possession of the pad which contains the two remaining carbon sheets (No. 2 detached and inserted in the back of the pad, No. 3 still bound in the pad.) The 11 October message is clearly legible to the naked eye on carbon No. 2.

4. Of greater concern to LCPIPIT, however, were the following additional comments of Paris Station TECHS regarding the 11 October message:

> "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears. Plus, additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter.)"

5. In the 20 October meeting at which his S/W pad was withdrawn QREBONY/1 stated that he had written the 11 October message on a sheet of glass, perhaps with a pencil that was too soft. He conceded that there was some imprint on the carbon, but nothing which could be read on the actual message sheet. He said he wrote the message at 1100 hours when he was alone at his home and burned the remainder of the message stack immediately. He said he then put the message in an envelope immediately and sealed it gently under another sheet of paper to avoid rubbing it. He added that he then placed the proper postage on the envelope, placed it in his pocket, and mailed it two hours later at the closest mailbox to him home. QREBONY/1 asserted that he did not reopen the letter after sealing and was certain that his wife had not seen it.

6. Pursuant to LCPIPIT's exploration of this question with QREBONY/1 we sent an informal note to MKTOPAZ via a Paris Station Officer on 20 October 1965 requesting assistance in efforts to determine whether QREBONY/1's correspondence was indeed subject to tampering. MKTOPAZ prepared five "booby-trapped" envelopes for our use. Two of these were mailed to the LCPIPIT letter drop from two different cities on the continent, and the remaining three were passed to QREBONY/1 on 5 November for him to mail from his home.

7. The five "boody-trapped" envelopes were picked up at the LCPIPIT letter drop over a period of a week and were handcarried by a Paris Station Officer to Frankfurt on 18 November for processing by MKTOPAZ. Paris/LCPIPIT asked the opinion of MKTOPAZ on the following points:

a) Was there evidence of tampering with any of the five envelopes?
b) If so, which envelopes bore evidence of tampering?
c) Was it possible to determine from a study of the cachets whether such tampering occurred before or after the cachets were applied?
d) Did such tampering appear to be of a professional or of an amateur nature?
e) Any other MKTOPAZ observations which would help LCPIPIT determine the source of any tampering that may have taken place.

8. MKTOPAZ advised LCPIPIT on 19 November via FRAN 9240 that there was no evidence of tampering on the five booby-trapped letters."

2

Report Q REBONY/1: Security Aspects

OFLA-3146/1
30 Nov. 1965

In reply to the attached (Memo on Home Situation) Rodigast told QREBONY/1:

1. We can't do anything about his housing problem in view of non-permanent nature of our present arrangement.

2. Avoid formalizing periodical at this point; it should require no authorizations for publication as it is merely a news correspondent's report, mimeographed for convenience—not a magazine.

3. In order to control content, Q alone should have responsibility for putting out issues— can't delegate to wife and above all to other contacts.

CS COPY

201-306052

OFLA 3146/1

MTG:

HOME SITUATION

My wife was rather hostile to my news about my contacts with the Chinese comrades. She said she was sorry I couldn't work something out with Metropolitan Features. I hadn't done enough work for them because I was lazy, she said. She said if I weren't careful I'd be treated by the Chinese just as Nils? "What future was there in that? she asked. Anyway, she added, I didn't really give a damn about the Chinese.

[illegible]/1

She pointed out the situation was difficult for us. The landlord in London was trying to evict us and we had no idea where we were going. I had no substantial funds from the Chinese and was still living on the generosity of the Americans (Metropolitan), she said.

Moreover, she was tired of being a grass widow. I was keeping secrets from her, she had been certain for sometime, she said. She had had enough trouble with my "secrets" in the past, she said.

However, she liked the idea of [illegible] Reports, but was sorry about the "objectivity" and the 50 copies only limit. There was no reason, if I could get some help from the Chinese, that I couldn't make a success of the newsletter and really be independent, she said.

I emphasized to her that I had had contacted with the Chinese without Nils' knowledge and that she should on no account ever mention the matter with him. She said that showed how the Chinese treated people. Nobody was more honest than Nils, she added. What was happening to him now would happen to me one day, she said.

However, she was genuinely pleased with the newsletter and spent some time trying to collect material for the dummy I was preparing. She wrote..x herself a piece on xC.A.R.D. (I havex the feeling that a lot of her resentment would be dissipated if she would allowed to handle most of the business involved with the newsletter.)

The housing problem remains a serious one and we may have to move. A temporary furnished flat in London would cost us at least £25 to £30 a week today — at present, we pay £12-12-0 per week. We have given the case to a lawyer, but, because it is a furnished flat, we will probably have to get out sometime soon.

The other important question to be settled is that of a mailing address for the Report. Should I get a London mail drop and run the risks of running into the Home Office or should I get a lawyer and set the thing up legally, perhaps under my wife's (British subject) name? In that case, I could take a one-room office somewhere around Fleet St. and my wife could take care of the mail with an occasional office temporary secretary during my absence.

OFLA 3146/1

I suggest that the Report always be mailed out from the same address, London or whereever. My wife will be able to get sufficient copy from various people, such as Pomeroy and Jeanne Pynor [30-year old freelance journalist who specializes in African affairs, now married to a Kenya parasitologist studying in London, formerly worked for Dennis Phombeah]. For my purposes, if I can obtain press rates, I can wire copy to London from Havana or Dar es Salaam, thus giving tangible evidence of my activities as a bonafide newsman. It would be helpful if I could get an American Cable & Radio System Credit (Transferred Account) Card, such as I got from Revolucion in Havana for use at the U.N. in 1961.

Copy to Katzenbach

18 Nov 65

OFLA 3146/1

Subject: QREBONY/1 - Security at home

1. At his 17 November meeting with Rodigast QREBONY/1 (Q) was asked some questions concerning keep of files and correspondence. He keeps copies of all correspondence (except routine letters transmitting articles he has written, for example) in a file to which his wife has access. He maintains a minimum of questionable notes, and keeps his personal notebook (with addresses, expenses, etc.) in his coat pocket day and night.

2. His wife has two brothers. The one to whom Q owes money is Gordon, a chartered accountant, who during World War II was in British Military Intelligence. He visits the Q home to bring gifts from the wife's mother to the Q children, but has a cat-and-dog relationship with Q's wife; indeed, he will not stay for a meal because he can't stand talking to her, and the feeling is mutual. Q is certain she would never think of confiding in Gordon, for example to say: "Look at these awful letters Q has written!" Gordon is more likely to confide in Q himself. Gordon's politics are apparently solidly conservative. (His wife's other brother, less involved with them, works for Rank.)

3. Q mailed the three test letters as follows: one in the morning, the two following on successive afternoons, at the local box in the normal way. One of the three envelopes actually contained a note: a simple statement that "William" (Guillermo) had not defected but his brother had (Cabrera Infante), information acquired from a Cuban official (see separate contact reports).

4. Q wanted to get a lawyer's opinion on what regulations govern publishing a periodical in his country of residence (he is not of course officially a resident at all). Sensing additional costs and unnecessary formality, Rodigast suggested that he keep it on the basis of being a correspondent's reports, not a separate commercial press venture requiring eventual licenses or payment of business taxes, at least for the time being. Mailed first class, the material should require no permit from the mail authorities. A contact had suggested he might have difficulty with the locals (see report of Q's 15 November contact with WP).

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CL ,IFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

2 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
PARIS (LCPIPIT)

ACTION
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR CA 2 WE 8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 FI FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 171642Z
DIR CITE PALP 5033
DIDORIC QREBONY KUDESK
REF DIR 57747, PARA 3

17 Nov 65 IN 96553

201

1. PALP POUCHING DETAILS FIELD LIAISON WITH ODENVY/PARIS RE EXCHANGE INFO PERTAINING QREBONY PBPRIME CITIZEN CONTACTS. QREBONY/1 (Q) IDENTITY NOT DIVULGED LOCALLY.

2. AMONG INFO RECEIVED FROM ODENVY IS REPORT DATED 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK (FILE NO: BUFILE 100-434819) RE FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC (F). REQUEST HDQRS STUDY THIS DOCUMENT WITH PURPOSE ASSESSING FEASIBILITY HAVING Q ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH F IN ATTEMPT SECURE SPONSORSHIP/OUTLET HIS JOURNALISTIC VENTURES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE COVER RE PROJECTED TRIP HAVANA.

3. APPRECIATE Q-F LINK MAY BE INADVISABLE IN VIEW: A) F RELATIONSHIP CPUSA; B) Q'S CLAIM HE ON CPUSA BLACKLIST; C) SEEMING INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN INDIRECT ASSOCIATION CPUSA AND EFFORTS BUILD BONA FIDES AMONG PRO-PEKING ACTIVISTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

SECRET

IN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. ALSO APPRECIATE Q-F ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH ODENVY.

4. FOREGOING NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH Q OR RODIGAST AND WILL NOT BE RAISED WITH FORMER PENDING HDQS REPLY.

5. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN 5033 57747 PARA 3 PALP ODENVY/PARIS RE QREBONY PBPRIME REBONY/1 (Q) NOT DIVULGED INFO ODENVY 17 DEC 64 NEW YORK BUFILE 100-434819 RE FREEDOMWAYS INC (F) HDQS Q F RE HAVANA Q-F A) F CPUSA B) Q'S CPUSA C) CPUSA BONA FIDES PRO-PEKING Q-F ODENVY NOT YET Q RODIGAST NOT BE HDQS NO INDEX

T

SECRET

Chief, KUWOLF X

Chiefs, AF, WE, KUDESK, KURIOT; Chiefs of Station, LONDON,
BRUSSELS, ALGIERS.

Chief of Station, PARIS/LCPIPIT

DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY 20 October 1965 Contact with LCPIPIT

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A is Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST's Contact Report of his 20 October 1965 meeting with QREBONY/1.

2. Forwarded as Attachment B (USC) is the identity list for RODIGAST's Contact Report.

3. Forwarded herewith as Attachment C is the "Progress Report" submitted by QREBONY/1 to RODIGAST at the 20 October meeting. A careful review of the report's content did not justify KUTUBE dissemination of any of the material therein.

4. Copies of recent correspondence addressed to and sent by QREBONY/1 will be forwarded by nonaccountable manifest as appropriate.

5. Paragraph 5 of Attachment A refers to a security flap which has arisen in QREBONY/1's use of his S/W system. In a letter to LCPIPIT dated and postmarked 11 October and picked up by LCPIPIT 14 October, QREBONY/1 had prepared an S/W message. LCPIPIT received the following report from TECHS in Paris concerning this letter: "The envelope you sent has evidence of tampering. There was glue bleeding plus fiber tears, plus additional glue had been added to the upper flap (glue must have run and was sticking inside on the letter). S/W impressions were clearly visible under ultraviolet light (short wave and long wave) and also under a plain desk light."

Attachments: As stated.

Distribution:
2 - C,KUWOLF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,AF w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,WE w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - C,KUDESK w/Atts A,C hw; B use
1 - C,KURIOT w/Att. A hw
1 - COS, LONDON w/Atts. A,C, hw; B use
1 - COS,BRUSSELS w/Atts. A,C hw; B use
1 - COS, ALGIERS w/Atts. A, hw; B use

OCT 28 1965

CS copy filed in 200-124-156/3

File in 201-306052

OFPA 3044

26 October 1965

SECRET

~~200-124-156/3~~

6. Because of QEBONY/1's repeated carelessness in use of his S/W system and the obvious risk inherent in his seeking to use this system from Algeria, LCPIPIT withdrew the system from him at the 30 October meeting. His carbon sheet carried deep impressions that were easily readable by the naked eye. Also, we have, in cooperation with KUSODA/Paris, taken urgent action on an informal basis (to be followed up by dispatch) to have KUTOPAZ prepare a set of envelopes in order that we may run a series of tests on the possibility, as well as the source, of tampering with QEBONY/1's correspondence to us. A full report on this matter, including its resolution, will be forwarded appropriate addressees as soon as the investigation can be completed.

Harvey G. FAIRRICH

C

File in: 201-306052

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AF

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, KUWOLF;
Chief, LCPIPIT KUDESK

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY QRPREY JAGUAR
JAGUAR Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: A OELA 43,522, 2 July 1965
B OELA 43,802, 11 August 1965

1. The following is the text of a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1 and Marc SCHLEIFER. JAGUAR states that the information was received from a "most secret and delicate source which has been found reliable on previous occasions."

> "STEBONY/1 was in contact with Marc SCHLEIFER while the latter was staying in London with his family, en route for Algeria. SCHLEIFER had planned to leave London for Algiers via Paris on the 2nd June, but he deferred his departure in order to meet STEBONY/1. It seems that SCHLEIFER wanted, if possible, to visit Tanzania also. STEBONY/1 apparently was prepared to help SCHLEIFER and his family to find accommodation while they were in London because they had little money. He is also reported to have said that there was a possibility of his co-operating with SCHLEIFER in Africa.
>
> "According to our source, SCHLEIFER, while in London, arranged to contact the Tanzanian Mission, in connection with a job in Dar-es-Salaam which might be taken by either SCHLEIFER or STEBONY/1."

2. Ref A contains previous JAGUAR comments about STEBONY/1 and SCHLEIFER, of about the same period. While TIFFANY was in London (which puts it at the right time) STEBONY/1 was in touch with SCHLEIFER, and TIFFANY should be able to compare JAGUAR's comments with what STEBONY/1 said at the time. Ref B reflects a different contact between the two, from a different source.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK
3-Chief, WE
2-Chief, AF
2-Chief, KUWOLF
2-Chief, LCPIPIT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RS COPY

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-44,033

DATE
30 SEP 1965
29 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

RID

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-725,837

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ C1/ICG

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM

PARIS (LCAPIT)

ACTION

CA/04 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 4

30 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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UNIT		TIME		BY	

INFO

FILE VR, CA 2, ADDP, C1, WE 8, AF 7, FE 8, C1/IC 2, CA/PROP, C1/OA, FI, FI/INT

RMS-KM

C1/ICG

S E C R E T 271812Z

ALGI INFO DIR CITE PALP 4723

27 SEP 65 IN 60811

UNCRISP

DTDORIC QRPREY STEBONY KUDESK

REF ALGI 6529 (IN 58850)

1. RELUCTANT GIVE UP STEBONY/1 (S) FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. S TO BE ACCREDITED JOURNALIST TO CONFERENCE, WITH RENEWED PRESS AUTHORIZATION AND NEW VISA. AS GUEST NEW REGIME WITH NO CONNECTION TO OLD, LESS LIKELY TO BE DISTURBED. S TO REMAIN IN NORMAL CONFERENCE MILIEU THROUGHOUT.

B. EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IS ONLY ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS OR TROTSKYISTS ASSOCIATED WITH OLD REGIME HAVE BEEN TROUBLED, BUT NOT PRO-CHINESE. S IS PART OF MINORITY WHICH FOLLOWED CHINESE IN SUPPORTING NEW REGIME FROM FIRST DAY.

C. MOST OF S' OLD LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTACTS IN ALGI ARE GONE SO HE NOT LIKELY BE INVOLVED WITH THEM. EXCEPTION IS ARNAUD WHO SEEMS TO HAVE MADE PEACE WITH REGIME. S' OTHER CONTACTS WILL BE LIKE HIMSELF BE GUESTS OF NEW REGIME AND OF CONFERENCE. THEY WILL USUALLY BE PRO-CHINESE ELEMENTS SUCH AS AAJA BANDUNG CROWD.

D. WE CONTINUE HOLD TO ORIGINAL VIEW THAT S ATTENDANCE AT

201-306052

~~201-725837~~

27 Sept. 65

SECRET

SECRET

IN 60611

PAGE 2

CONFERENCE WOULD BE USEFUL TO BUILD UP HIS CONTACTS AND COVER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS. S WILL CONTINUALLY BE MOVING IN POTENTIALLY HOSTILE CIRCLES; THIS COULD BE TRUE OF TRIPS HAVANA, DARE, DJAK AT SOME TIME OR ANOTHER. IN VIEW OF NATURE OF OPERATION, THE RISK WOULD SEEM TO BE WORTH TAKING.

2. PALP UNABLE EVALUATE POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS VERGES REAPPEARANCE MIGHT PRESENT. AS OF 15 SEPT S NOT OVERLY APPREHENSIVE.

3. PALP REMAINS MOST INTERESTED DISCUSSING ABOVE WITH ALGI OFFICER PER PALP 4689 (IN 56988) AND PALP 4712. (IN 59208) PLS ADVISE.

SECRET

+ ALGI CONCLUDED IT UNWISE TRY HAVE STRONGLY OPERATE. IN ALGI

CFN 4723 6529 STEBONY 1 S S NO CONNECTION S MILIEU TROTSKYISTS NOT PRO-CHINESE S CHINESE S' ALGI ARNAUD S' PRO-CHINESE AAJA BANDUNG S S HAVANA DARE DJAK PALP VERGES 15 S NOT OVERLY PALP ALGI PER PALP 4689 PALP 4712 PLS

BT

AUG 19 74

HS

Sep 31 11 34 AM '65

RECEIVED RID/MIS

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-306052
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-726122
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM
PP 215 (CCP, PT)

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UNIT	TIME	BY

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AN, ~~[illegible]~~ FS ~~DEST~~ WH/C/FS
ABSTRACT X INDEX X

SECRET 221643Z

DIR INFO ~~MADR~~ LOND CITE PALP 4675
OSM DEV

22 SEP 65 IN 55673

IN 55673

UNCRISP TYPIC PBRUMEN STEBONY ~~QRPREY~~ KUDESK

ZZ PROCESSED
27 Sept. 65
P

REF: DIR 41939 ✓

1. IN 15 SEPT MEETING STEBONY/1 (S) TOLD RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ (F) NAMED AMBASSADOR LOND PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT REMARKS TO S AND 5 SEPT STORY LONDON "OBSERVER". (BAXENDALL EDITS "VIET REPORT" OF U.S. "EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM" AND HAS BEEN AN EDITOR OF "STUDIES ON THE LEFT.")

2. FIVE SEPT S (Stebony/1) CABLED F (Fernandez 201-726122) C/O FORNMIN HAVANA ASKING F (Fernandez) CONTINUED SUPPORT S (Stebony/1) EFFORTS RE FREE RIDE HAVANA AND ROBERT (IR USA 201-108746) WILLIAMS CONTACT.

3. S HAS KNOWN F AND WIFE SINCE 1963. F WIFE'S FAMILY HAS FURNITURE BUSINESS NEW YORK CITY AND F WORKED LAS AMERICAS BOOKSTORE AND PUBLISHING HOUSE.

4. S HAS MET WITH F IN NYC HAVANA PARI LOND OVER PAST FIVE YEARS. THOUGH CLOSE FRIENDS, S CLAIMS F WARY OF HIM BECAUSE OF S "PRO-CHINESE" ORIENTATION (BUT NOT BECAUSE OF OLD CHARGES S IS KUBARK AGENT.)

5. S CLAIMS F NONAMARXIST, NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN, NOT IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED, NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST. F "FRANK" WITH S THAT HE HAS BEEN ACCUSED IN CUBA OF HOMOSEXUALITY, BUT S SAYS F

20 Sept 65

B 201-726122

201-306052

SECRET

SECRET IN 55673 PAGE 3

ALSO SHOWS INTEREST IN WOMEN. F/S WIFE NOT PHYSICALLY ATTRACTIVE AND OTHER ACQUAINTANCES CLAIM HE MARRIED FOR MONEY.

6. S SAYS F DOES NOT APPEAR HAVE MUCH MONEY AND HAS MAINTAINED MODEST LOND APARTMENT.

7. F'S WIFE WORKS CUBAN EMBASSY. WIFE'S SISTER CAME LOND AT BIRTH F'S THIRD CHILD THREE MONTHS AGO. ON RETURNING HAVANA WITH F 31 AUG UNDERSTANDING WAS SHE TO CARE FOR INFANT SIX MONTHS SINCE F'S WIFE WORKED MORNINGS EMBASSY AND COULDNOT CARE FOR INFANT UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.

why didn't S/1 report this at the time? A

8. S SAYS F TOLD HIM MONTH AGO HE WANTED TRANSFER MADR OR HOPED OBTAIN FELLOWSHIP OR LEAVE ABSENCE PERMITTING STAY WESTERN EUROPE. DESCRIBES F AS POET OF BEATNIK BENT BUT NATIONALIST "LIKE ROA AND FRANQUI". X S CLAIMS F LOST NOTHING IN COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER CUBA.

OK News Check?

9. A. MANCHANDA,* PEKING-LEANING EDITOR VIRTUALLY BANKRUPT "WEST INDIAN GAZETTE" JUST RETURNED LOND FROM PEKING HAS PREVIOUSLY TOLD S THAT F SPOKE AT COMMUNIST RALLIES LOND AND TOOK PRO-MOSCOW LINE ON SINO-SOVIET ISSUES. S KNOWS NOTHING OF THIS AND QUESTIONS MANCHANDA ACCURACY. 22

10. APPARENTLY S NOT FOREWARNED F HASTY DEPARTURE.

11. S. VOLUNTEERED F WOULD "QUIT" ONLY UNDER TERRIFIC ATTACK AND

SECRET

SECRET

IN 55673 PAGE 3

PRESSURE FROM HOME OR IF SOVIET AMBASSADOR LOND TWISTED ARM (RODIGAST DID NOT SPECIFY REASON FOR DEBRIEFING.) LCPIPIT WILL TRY CLARIFY.

12. POUCHING FULL REPORT.

13. NO INDEX.

* HQS HIGHLY INTERESTED STEBONY-1 CUBAN CONTACTS

SECRET

CFN: 4675 41989 15 SEPT STEBONY/1 S RODIGAST PABLO FERNANDEZ F PER LEE BAXENDALL 1 SEPT S 5 SEPT LONDON OBSERVER BAXENDALL EDITS VIET U S VIETNAM SEPT S F C/O FORNMIN HAVANA F S RE HAVANA ROBERT WILLIAMS

S F 1960 F WIFE'S NEW YORK CITY F LAS AMERICAS S F NYC HAVANA S F S PRO-CHINESE NOT BECAUSE S KUBARK AGENT S F NON-MARXIST NOT EMOTIONALLY ANTI-AMERICAN NOT IDEOLOGICALLY NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR ANTI-COMMUNIST F FRANK S CUBA HOMOSEXUALITY S F F'S NOT PHYSICALLY S F NOT APPEAR F'S CUBAN F'S HAVANA F 31 AUG F'S NOT CARE S F WESTERN EUROPE FRANQUI S F NOTHING IN CUBA A MANCHANDA PEKING-LEANING WEST INDIAN GAZETTE PEKING S F PRO-MOSCOW SINO-SOVIET S NOTHING OF MANCHANDA S NOT FOREWARNED F S F SOVIET RODIGAST NOT SPECIFY LCPIPIT NO INDEX

BT

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

1 September 1965

TO: Director, DTEARN

VIA: Contract Approving Officer

FROM: Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: Engagement of STEBONY/1, as Independent Contractor

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract as a developmental agent for an as yet unwritten Project involving KUWOLF and KUDESK and coordinated through QRPREY. Subject's salary and expenses are to be charged against the BOLINABLE Field Allotment per DIR 36066. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 September 1965, and it shall continue thereafter on a month-to-month basis subject to termination by, and at the convenience of, ODYOKE without prior notice.

2. Security Approval. Per CSI 10-5, STEBONY/1 does not require a POA (cf: DIR 15660), and OA not being requested pending establishment definite STEBONY Project (cf: DIR 36066). LCPIPIT advised 2 June 1965 STEBONY/1 granted clearance for LCFLUTTER (cf: DIR 15660).

3. Citizenship. The subject is not a foreign national.

4. Compensation. The subject will be paid $600.00 per month. The subject will be advised that he must file a covert income tax return through KUBARK.

5. Operational Expenses.

(A) The subject will be reimbursed for operational travel, except as noted in para. 8 below.

(B) The subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses, except as noted in para. 8 below.

6. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the subject: "Since security conditions generally preclude the detailed accounting of miscellaneous travel expenses, per diem will be paid at the rate of $20.00 during periods of authorized travel." Per Personal Ruling of Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT dated 12 July 1965: "If subject is absent from his home station on authorized travel for part of one day

SECRET

and returns to his home station the night of that same day (i.e., if no hotel expense is involved in the sense of overnight accommodations), then he shall be entitled to draw 1/2 of his authorized per diem of $20.00 (i.e., $10.00)." Per diem under the above terms will be paid except as noted in para. 8 below.

7. Contingent Obligations. No additional commitments have been made to the subject under this oral contract. However, in the original Letter of Agreement signed by subject 3 June 1965 and which expired on 31 August 1965, paragraph 4 stipulated: "ODYOKE will compensate you in an amount mutually agreed upon for the relocation of you and your family to a new residence if such a relocation is considered desirable by you and ODYOKE." Under the circumstances ODYOKE may have to supplement such funds as subject may receive for relocation from a target organization, institution, or government in order to defray such relocation expenses as subject may personally incur.

8. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the subject. Moreover, in cases where travel and/or operational expenses and/or per diem are provided or furnished in money or in kind from other than ODYOKE sources, ODYOKE will offset such funds, goods, or services against the obligations assumed in the above oral commitments.

9. The substance of paras. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 8 (except as noted in the second sentence of para. 4) have been communicated to, and accepted by, the subject.

SIGNED ______________________
Richard D. SOTHERN
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

REVIEWED: ______________________
Contract Approving Officer

14-00000

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TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO Chief, of Station, Paris

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
0 STEBONY/STEBONY/1 Reporting

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
OFLA-2658

1. OFL-12 and OFL-13 were passed to the appropriate Headquarters desk for the evaluation requested in reference.

2. The results of the evaluations were that the reports based on STEBONY/1's elicitation contained "nothing more than chit-chat and opinion" with no new information that could be disseminated. As indicated in the last sentence of reference this result was not unanticipated by LCPIPIT.

3. In view of STEBONY/1's reportorial capabilities however, we hope that his continued efforts to elicit and report timely information will be vigorously maintained.

Raymond N. Endlein
RAYMOND N. ENDLEIN

EMERY T. RAMTHUN

Distribution:
 3 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
 1 - COS, Paris

201-306052
23 AUG 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1240	DATE 20 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-81

1 - RI
1 - WE/3
1 - CA/B3
1 - CA/INT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/INT	Karl W. Kalassay	ped	7486

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	26 8 10 22 LU 01	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		for L. J. McKinley

DW
CA/CF
ABSTRACT X INDEX

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT   X

Chief, KU-OLF

DTDORIC/QZPRSY/KUDESK/SPZHONY/1 - Transmittal of Background Materials

REF: OFLA-2613, 9 July 1965

1. Forwarded herewith is the following material compiled in response to your request in reference dispatch.

a. Copy of the final draft paper on the pro-Chinese dissident element in Belgium (SECRET NOFORN).

b. Copy of the "Applications for Membership" presented to the IV AAPSO Conference (UNCLASSIFIED - Possession by KUBARK is CONFIDENTIAL).

c. "The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement - A Status Report" (SECRET).

d. "Notes on Africa - #7 - The Fourth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference" (CONFIDENTIAL).

e. CS-3/559,256, 8 January 1964, AAPSO Mailing list (SECRET NOFORN).

f. Comments on Afro-Asian Journalists Association (SECRET and UNCLASSIFIED).

g. The Afro-Asian Journalist, No. 1, Vol. 2, January-February 1965.

h. Bibliography - AAPSO and Afro-Asian Liberation Movements (OUO).

Book Dispatch No. 4761, 21 January 1965, and its attachment, "Pro-Chinese Elements in the International Communist Movement," which LCPIPIT already has, would also be useful for this purpose.

2. It is likely that we shall be able to work up a more comprehensive bibliography than the one included above (h), and will forward the books as they become available.

Attachments: H/W
A-H, as listed above

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HOWELL D. KASSENMAYER

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2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT, w/atts., h/w

201-306052   OFLW-1234   19 AUG 1965

SECRET   200-126-79

1 - CI/ICG
1 - CA/CF
1 - RID/Files (for 200-126-79 file)
→ 1 - 201-306052

CA/CF   Robert Daniel   mcm   7767

CI/ICG   17 Aug 65   A. Goodrich (in draft)

14-00000

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TO
Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY JAGUAR
Info Requested from STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. JAGUAR, in acknowledging receipt of the processed STEBONY/1 material that we forwarded to them, have also asked for "further information about Francois MASPERO and Professor Nguyen KIEN. We should be most grateful for any further identifying particulars for both MASPERO and KIEN and with regard to the latter, we should particularly like to know his present position in connection with 'Africa, Asia, Latin America Revolution' and whether he still holds a teaching appointment in France."

2. JAGUAR's note was shown to RODIGAST in London on 12 August, just before RODIGAST met with STEBONY/1. LCPIPIT please provide anything that can be had for passage to JAGUAR.

3. As should be fairly apparent, I think, from reading the material we passed to JAGUAR, plus the fact that there has been no "Revolution" for lo! these many months, the status of anyone connected with the magazine is about as uncertain as the status of the magazine itself. Nonetheless, we will be happy to let JAGUAR know as much as we can.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
- 2-Chief, LCPIPIT
- 3-Chief, WE
- 2-Chief, KUDESK
- 2-Chief, KUWOLF

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-43,827	16 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

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CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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TO
Chief, LCPIPIT

INFO.
Chief, WE; KUWOLF; KUDESK; WH

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY SMOTH
BAIRN Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. BAIRN, a sensitive SMOTH operation, provides the following report relating to STEBONY/1 (date of info, 26 July 1965):

> "STEBONY/1 (previously in touch with Pablo FERNANDEZ while in London, en route with family to Algiers for the international conference postponed when Ben BELLA was overthrown) calls Pablo FERNANDEZ, tells him he (S/1) is just back from North Africa if the confernece is held in November. Says he has been unable to get any news of (Marc) SCHLEIFFER, and asks whether Pablo has heard of him. Pablo says he had a letter, brought by hand from SCHLEIFFER in Algeria, saying he (SCHLEIFFER) was going the next week to Cairo, and would write to Pablo from there. He has not yet written. S/1 says they had hunted for him high andlow in Algiers - he disappeared completely from the conference scene, and they thought that perhaps he had got mixed up in the (troubles between the new regime and Ben BELLA's faction), Pablo assures S/1 that SCHLEIFFER is all right. He knows this from a negro journalist, on "the Guardian" in the U.S.A. and coming from Pennsylvania, who covered the Algiers conference preparations. The journalist's name is, Larry HENRY or something similar. Pablo and S/1 agree to meet to-morrow (27th July), S/1 will call Pablo then to fix time and place. At 10.35 S/1 calls FERNANDEZ, arranges to call for him at the Embassy at 13.30 hours for them to lunch together."

2. This is for background information only.

Not To be Dissem outside U.S.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
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- ~~2~~-Chief, WE
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- 2-Chief, WH

#7

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA-43,802	11 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT
INFO	Chief of Station, Rome
FROM	Chief, KUWOLF
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY/Grace Elizabeth Anne Russo

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. OFLA-2538

B. DIR-27779

ODENVY traces on Subject have turned up general background data containing no derogatory information.

HOWELL D. HAMMERMAYER

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OFDW-1222

DATE: 9 AUG 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-306052

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- 1 - CA/CP
- →1 - RID/Files

3 ZFI

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CP	Mary C. Massey	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WE/4		John J. Sh

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/CA		Lewis J. Lapham

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SECRET 291003Z

29 Jul 65 IN 21357

AF FI

ABSTRACT X

DIR INFO PALP CITE LOND 8835

KUDESK GRFREY STEBONY

REF: PALP 4385 (IN 20682)

201-25837

1. LOND HAS LONG SUSPECTED LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR SOURCE. WHILE WISH PASS REF INFO, WOULD LIKE WAIT WEEK OR SO TO SEE IF WE GET SAME FROM THEM.

201

2. REQUEST PERMISSION PASS CAREFULLY SANITIZED VERSION REF INFO TO JAGUAR ABOUT AUG 10, UNLESS THEY PROVIDE SAME INFO IN MEANTIME.

3. FIRST SUBJ PARA 2 D REF IS AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT.

SECRET

CFN 8835 4385 LIONEL MORRISON A JAGUAR REF REF AUG 10 2 D AUSTRALIAN COMMIE WILFRED BURCHETT

BT

SECRET

29 July 65
201-306052

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO 201-306052

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FROM
LONDON

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23 JUL 65 IN 17638

SECRET 231422Z

PALP INFO DIR CITE LOND 8762

KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY

REF: LOND 8728 (IN 46730)

LATER JAGUAR NOTE STATES STEBONY/1, WHO NOW HAS U.K. VISITOR'S PERMIT FOR THREE MONTHS, STATED HIS INTENTION TO GO TO PARIS TO GATHER MATERIAL ABOUT FRENCH GOVT'S FOREIGN POLICY.

SECRET

CFN 8762 8728 JAGUAR STEBONY/1 U K PARIS FRENCH GOVT'S

BT

SECRET

CA/CF

23 JUL 1965

201-306052
23 July 65

CONFIDENTIAL

DBB 15

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 6 JUL 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Grace Elizabeth RUSSO

CIA Paris has requested that material on Grace Elizabeth RUSSO be made available. Subject was born 23 September 1925 in Boston, Massachusetts. She is presently employed by FAO, Rome, and resides at Via Annia Faustina 56, Rome. CIA Washington traces reveal no pertinent information on Miss Russo. It is therefore requested that a check be made of the Bureau's records.

In response to your request there are attached 5 reports which appear to relate to the subject of your inquiry.

see additional reports on subj: DBB-15788
DBB-15591
DBB-15592

CSCI-316/02909-65
[illegible] as of 29 July 1965

28 July 1965

This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division.

CS Copy

CONFIDENTIAL

201-306052
~~100-2-18~~

DBC 15788
FD-204
(5-7-54)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

O **Title:** GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Report of: Special Agent JOSEPH HOLIDAY

Date and Place: Albany, New York, July 16, 1957.

PROPERTY OF FBI
This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.
This is an FBI investigative report and makes no recommendation for clearance or disapproval.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This is in answer to your request for a check of FBI files.

DBD 15788

GRACE ELIZABETH ANNE RUSSO
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Albany, New York
July 16, 1957

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Professor JOHN K. GALBRAITH, Economics Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, presently vacationing at his summer residence, Newfane, Vermont, advised on July 12, 1957, that applicant has been his secretary and general assistant at Harvard University for the past four years. Professor GALBRAITH said he highly recommends the applicant as to character, reputation and loyalty. He further stated the applicant is a first-rate person, very superior, intelligent, and well qualified for the position she seeks. Professor GALBRAITH stated he is aware of the position the applicant seeks in view of the fact that he recommended her for this position.

Professor GALBRAITH was investigated in 1950 as "JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, also known as J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, KENNETH GALBRAITH, Consultant-Appointee, Commodities Division, Office of the Director, Office of Industry and Commerce, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., - LOYALTY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES" under the provisions of Executive Order 9835. On March 2, 1951, the Civil Service Commission advised that JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH resigned or otherwise separated from Federal service, prior to decision on loyalty.

DISPATCH

TO	Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief of Station, Brussels		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, KUWOLF		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	DTDORIC/QRPREY/STEBONY		

MARKED FOR INDEXING

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF. OFLA-2541, 22 June 1965

1. Subject to Brussels Station views, Headquarters believes that STEBONY's proposal in Reference is a good one and very consistent with our interests that he develop his access and acceptability within the circles of which Ref Iden A is a significant figure. We realize that the picture is a complicated one, and that Iden A of Ref may or may not yet prove to have the staying power of the successful political figure. At the same time, it does seem that he is the most outstanding leader of the anti-revisionists today, and as such merits our attention.

2. With regard to Reference para 4's concern about possible damage to our national interest by publication of the book in English, we tend to side with STEBONY in feeling that the support which such a publication might render to our enemies could not really be detected by the naked eye. Similarly, while agreeing with the sentiment that would critically scrutinize all proposals by new assets, we note that STEBONY is, indeed, supposed to be seeking to regain status among his former associates, and that Ref proposal does not, to our view, contain any hint which would suggest that in following out this line of action at our direction, he is motivated by any ulterior or concealed aim different from that which led us to impose the commission in the first place.

3. We are attempting to get a rough translation done on a priority basis. STEBONY, of course, should understand that such a translation will be unfinished, and should be carefully reviewed for the proper "feel," to rule out usage or interpretation which STEBONY, with his background, would never have inferred from the French text. Nonetheless, as the document has come to hand only on 2 July, and given the holiday weekend, the limitation on the number of translators available, the existence of other translation assignments, and, finally, the pouch transit time back to Rome, we regret that it will not be possible to get this product to RODIGAST for his 15 July meeting.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT
2 - COS, Brussels

CLAYTON P. NURNAD

GROUP 1
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201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLW-1152	15 JUL 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

CS COPY

1 - CI/IC
1 - WE/2/BL
1 - CA/CF
1 - 201-306052

DEST CA/CF
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	mcm	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/IC		Ralph Bergland (in draft)
WE/2/BL	12/7	Peake

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	13 JUL 1965	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
OELA-43,589

TO
Chief, KUDESK

INFO
Chief, WE; Chief, AF; Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, LCPIPIT;
Chief of Station, Algiers

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-306052 10 JUL 1965

FROM
Chief of Station, London

DATE
13 July 1965

SUBJECT
0 KUDESK QRPREY STEBONY
Old Letter from STEBONY/1

RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCE(S)

1. Cleaning out some old papers, I ran across a letter from STEBONY/1 (copies attached). The letter was seen by TIFFANY, RODIGAST, et al., during the busy week they all spent in London, and is sent along now to bring the record more or less up to date.

2. A batch of other materials, which arrived through our postal arrangement, were turned over to TIFFANY, and they are presumably now a part of Headquarters' records.

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Herewith

Distribution:
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-COS, Algiers w/att h/w

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1 att.

201-306052

FORM 10-57 53 (40)
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.
1

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Attachment to OELA-43,589
13 July 1965

Dear Katzenbach,

I'm pleased you have received at least one of my letters, but I still wonder if you got a large envelope containing three letters which had been held and return all at once. As one of the letters was rather detailed and dealt with matters of some importance, I'm rather disconcerted -- to say the least -- ~~that~~ to think that it may not have found its way to you. The envelope measured 8 by 5 inches and was light tan in color. A confirmation of its receipt would be appreciated.

Of course, I understood about the service, the newsletter, not being a definite thing. In any case, I am not looking for a sinecure, but for a good, deep cover and that seemed to be one. It also gave me something to offer contacts and would have strengthened my position considerably. At present, my cover is as light as the Emperor's new clothes.

Still no positive reply from any publication in the States, and the general silence from my American "friends" is not very encouraging. Here, the situation is much better, and if I can get to Algiers in good time, after visiting Grippa and Andersson and seeing some contacts in Paris, my position will be better, but I still see myself representing the West Indian Gazette or Cinnamon and/or the Institute of Race Relations. Mrs. Sheila Patterson, their editor, even suggested that I do a short paperback book for them, gathering together the conference documents with an analysis. All of this is better than nothing, but it definitely isn't much.

On the other hand, for the future, Noureddine Medjdoub, who has been Tunisian cultural attaché here, is returning to Tunis to take over the editorship of the Socialist Destour Party paper, L'Action. He has suggested that I write some features for him, after the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers and that I try to get to Tunis to discuss future projects with him while I am in North Africa. You well know what many Africans and Arabs think of Tunisia at present, so there may not be much that we can do with this arrangement.

This afternoon, I saw Dennis Phombeah at the Tanganian High Commission. Until three months ago, he was at the U.N. He claims that Vergès came to London last December and saw Babu about me and other matters, but that Babu was not convinced. He says he did not know that I was in London until recently -- this was our first meeting since the spring of 1964. Now, he proposes that he try to get the editorship of The Nationalist, the TANU paper in Dar es Salaam, for me. We will discuss the matter again at lunch next Monday. It would be a fixed post in Dar and I can't yet fathom why he is willing to suggest me for the job. He claims he has not been in touch with Vergès.

att 1 to OELA-43589 CS COPY STEBON411 201-306052

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, KUDESK		X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, WE		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT		MICROFILM
SUBJECT C DIDORIC/Operational ORPHEY/STKBONY/Request for Background Materials		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action requested: Paragraph 3.

1. Career Agent Rufus F. RODIGAST has been briefed by Paris/LCPIPIT on an ad hoc basis to date regarding information on the ~~Afro-Asian~~ national liberation movement of operational interest to his handling and guidance of STKBONY/1. As the STKBONY operation progresses, however, it is LCPIPIT's intention that those handling STKBONY/1 become more knowledgeable on the subject of the national liberation movement than STKBONY/1, himself, as a means to ensure the best possible operational guidance to the agent and to provide another element of agent control--superior knowledge.

RE/2 C/ICA-SG Cochrane

2. LCPIPIT's limited files include two basic documents: Attachment to OFLW 630, and Book Dispatch No. 4463. We also have selected disseminations and reports on Chinese Communist activities in Africa. What would be most useful, however, would be a collection of reports and analyses, whether overt or covert, discussing the following topics: a) Jacques GRIPPA and the pro-Chinese European Communist factions; b) the Afro-Asian Journalists Association (the Headquarters TPRANSACK c/o has had a file on this organization's founding); c) the individual national liberation movements and their leaders; d) operations of the national liberation movements, individually and collectively, out of such centers as Algiers (at least up to 19 June 1965), Dar es Salaam, Accra, Cairo, Djakarta, Havana, etc/.; e) national liberation movement relations with, and operations out of, the Bloc, both Moscow and Peking oriented; f) support and guidance of the national liberation movement by non-Bloc communist parties and selected fronts.

Don Logan

3. We recognize that much of the information on the above mentioned topics may not yet be collated, if indeed it is available; however, we should appreciate receiving from Headquarters such materials as you feel would best meet LCPIPIT's operational needs in working with STKBONY/1. Of special value would be a bibliography of overt writing on the subject, greatly alleviating the security problem and mere logistics of bringing RODIGAST and a large volume of classified reading together, in a secure environment, over an extended period.

Harvey G. Fahnrich
Harvey G. FAHNRICH

OS C.1

201-306652

Distribution:
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1 - C/KUWOLF
1 - C/WE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFIA 2613	DATE JUL 9 1965 9 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-126-79/3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, ~~KUDESK~~ AFRICA

INFO.
Chief, WE; Chief, ~~AF~~; Chief, LCPIPIT; Chief of Station, Algiers; Chief, KUWOLF

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
STEBONY JAGUAR
Report on STEBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted under separate cover is a JAGUAR report on STEBONY/1. While JAGUAR did not state what the DOI was, JAGUAR's letter was dated 15 June 1965.

2. ARNOUD, in JAGUAR's para 2 ii, should be ARNAUD.

3. The comments contained in the report are either consistent with what STEBONY/1 has told us or consistent with what STEBONY/1 is supposed to have been telling other people - sometimes both.

Kat

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
(USC)

Distribution:
4-Chief, KUDESK w/att USC
3-Chief, WE w/att USC
~~2~~-Chief, AF w/att USC
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att USC
2-COS, Algiers w/att USC
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att USC

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Dated 15 Jul 65

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201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-43,522

DATE
2 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Chief, KUDESK
FROM: Chief of Station, London
Separate Cover Attachment to
OELA-43,522, 2 July 1965

Richard Thomas GIBSON

2. The following further information has been received from a secret and reliable source:

i) GIBSON was to leave London on the 8th June en route to Algiers via Brussels, Lausanne and Paris, and he expects to arrive in Algiers about the 20th June.

ii) GIBSON has said that he will be in Algiers in his capacity as a journalist and that while there he may be contacted through Georges ARNOUD at the Directorate of Information or through an American, Marc SCHLEIFER, who is the representative in Algiers of the 2nd of May Movement. He has also said that he is anxious to meet some responsible members of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Secretariat in order to clear his name of the charges brought against him by VERGES.

iii) As a journalist GIBSON is hoping to be allowed to attend the Second Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Conference and he has made enquiries as to when it will be held.

iv) In commenting on an invitation which has been extended to Hodee EDWARDS to visit North Korea, possibly via Indonesia, GIBSON has said that he would very much like to visit Indonesia but that there is little chance of his doing so as the West Indian newspapers by which he might be employed would be unlikely to pay the cost of his fare.

15 Jul 65

SECRET CS COPY

201-306052

MESSAGE FORM
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DIANE CHATELAN
CA/CF
7767
6 APRIL 1967

SECRET

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SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 46 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☒ FILE RID

☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/2
X FILE 201-306052

CA/64 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , CA2, FI/AN, ENES, C/CI2, FI, FI/INT2, WH/COG8, CCS3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(elite) CA/PEG (place)
(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 6 23 25 Z CITE DIRECTOR 90256

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DTDORIC QREBONY

REFS: A. OEPA 90
B. OELA 43237
C. LCPIPIT 0619 (IN 38606)

1. CONCUR $ 100 PER MONTH PAY RAISE FOR QREBONY/1 RECOMMENDED REF A. WOULD PREFER EFFECTIVE DATE 1 JULY 67. ↑ TAX SUPPLEMENT WILL BE $70.

2. TO SATISFY ADMIN REQUIREMENTS, PLS PROVIDE AMENDMENT TO LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING REF B, REFLECTING THIS AND OTHER INTERMEDIATE RAISES GRANTED QREBONY/1 SINCE DATE REF B.

3. WOULD ALSO PREFER ABOVE RAISE BE GIVEN QREBONY/1 IN THE HAND RATHER THAN THRU ~~[illegible]~~ QRPURE, RESERVING LATTER CHANNEL FOR SPECIAL EXPENDITURES (SUCH AS TRAVEL COSTS) WHICH INVOLVE RELATIVELY LARGER SUMS OF MONEY AND FOR WHICH IT MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL USE QRPURE COVER FOR ATTRIBUTION. PLS ADVISE.

4. BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TIME SATISFY QREBONY/1 CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT FOR PERIODIC SGSWIRL. IN ADDITION ~~XX~~ OBVIOUS QUESTIONS, REQUEST HE BE SPECIFICALLY QUERIED ~~XXX~~

[illegible]

File in 201-306052

CS COPY FILED IN ~~100-124-157/2~~

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APR 13 0 33 PM '67

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 90256

PAGE TWO

RE (A) KNOWLEDGEABILITY HIS WIFE AND AMSQUAW/1 REGARDING HIS WOFACT AND OR LNFORT CONNECTIONS AND (B) HIS ESTIMATE THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCEPTANCES HIS PRO-CHICOM COVER AURA.

5. DISPATCH, ORIGINALLY PREPARED TO INCORPORATE ABOVE CONCURRENCE, FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B & F L H Shoemaker

E/BC/UK R.H. Webster

CI/ICG

CHIEF, CA

JAMES MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET

4 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - MOC Amendment

REFERENCE: OFLW - 1699, 1 November 1966

1. Effective 1 September 1966, the MOC of QREBONY/1 was amended to provide compensation of $746.00 per month.

2. Please see attached reference for the salary breakdown.

3. We regret that due to an administrative oversight, this memorandum was not submitted at an earlier date.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
Chief, CA Support Group

APPROVED:

CPD

Attachment:
OFLW - 1699

DDP/CA/Pers/JChaplin:nd (30 March 1967)

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ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7727
DATE: 24 MARCH 1967

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 22 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO CA/CF BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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INFO: FILE, VR, DA2, EUR3, CI/IC2, CI/OA

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CITE DIRECTOR 86838

LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

DYDORIC QREBONY QKOPERA

RE LCPIPIT 0519 (IN 24171)

AN ~~2~~	PT
~~BS~~	~~FT~~ CA/CF
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~

RE PARA TWO REF, PLS ADVISE DETAILS OF CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WINTERROWD AND SABA WERE MADE WITTING WOFACT'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN QREBONY/1.

END OF MESSAGE

C/CA/B3 - Mr. Fallow (telecord)
EUR/BC/UK - Mr. Webster (telecord)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

CA/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

D. Chatelan
DIANE L. CHATELAN
CA/CF 25 March 1967
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-306052

FBI doc.
23 Mar. 67 (Wash)
Re: Richard Thomas Gibson
no Bufile given

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
XX	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO
Chief, EUR; COS, London; Chief, WOMUSE

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/Institution Base

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

References: A. LCPIPIT-8161
B. DIRECTOR-66211, paragraph 3

At their 15 March meeting, QREBONY/1 and RODIGAST discussed QREBONY/1's running his own pro-Chicom group, at least as a paper organization to allow him to get close to target conferences and institutions as a bona fide delegate rather than bystander. QREBONY/1 feels that if not done right this could cause trouble, because of usual organizational rivalries. He is thinking of beginning by writing and circulating a statement in support of the statement on "Afro-American Liberation" which appeared in the 6 December Ad Hoc Bulletin (Marxist-Leninist) in Chicago. He would use a pseudonym to sign his statement, but would let all his friends know that the pseudonym was really himself, and he might use Manchanda's address. Perhaps Grippa would agree to circulate or print it. If this statement goes over, QREBONY/1 could escalate into a small organization. He will show RODIGAST a draft of his statement, but also will discuss it with Manchanda for "ideological purity".

P. P. CILIBERTI

Distribution
~~3-C/WOVIEW~~
2-C/WOMUSE
1-C/EUR
2-COS/London

MAR 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-164	20 March 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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TO
Chief, WOVIEW

INFO.
COS, London; Chief, EUR

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QREBONY/Salary Raise for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. At the time of his recruitment in June 1965, QREBONY/1 was told that his $600 monthly tax-free salary would be raised to $800 once he got a job in a target organization, which of course was the goal of his planned summer activity in Algiers.

2. Through no fault of his own, the Algiers assignment (and other possibilities, such as Djakarta) evaporated shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, WOFACT changed its signals and eventually decided to base QREBONY/1 in Europe targeted against individuals and groups in various countries.

3. From the beginning, QREBONY/1 has proved more than satisfactory as an agent. He has carried out assignments given to him with knowledge and tact and the proper spirit, has used his own initiative as much as our guidance, and has not violated our instructions. No one will argue that he hasn't proved to be better than we collectively thought he would be, and in terms of his own abilities—apart from targets which may or may not be accessible to him—he is getting better all the time.

4. Last year, about a year later than QREBONY/1 might have expected his salary to go up from $600 to $800, we raised it to $700. He was pleased, and he has not complained as much as he used to about a shortage of funds. (Presumably QREBONY/1 is responsive to the generally good treatment he has had, to the respect for him as an individual and the appreciation of his services; probably he is carried along as much by his own personal satisfaction in knowing he is meeting requirements and continually breaking new ground.)

5. Nevertheless, LCPIPIT believes the time has come to raise QREBONY/1's salary to the promised level. We can all agree that we are still getting his services cheap; QREBONY/1 receives no quarters, living allowance, or educational allowance for his children. His increased gratitude, the relief he will undoubtedly feel at being able to reduce his present financial worries, are more than worth the extra $100.

(continued)

Distribution:
3-C/WOVIEW
2-COS/London
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201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA-090

DATE
FEB 24 1967
21 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-126-156/~~X~~ 2

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-090

6. If Headquarters agrees, the money can be paid through QRPURE (whose monthly check will go up from $100 to $200 in this event). QRPURE could write to QREBONY/1 expressing his pleasure at the results of syndication of QREBONY/1's material, and announcing that the monthly fee will go up to $200; alternatively, QREBONY/1 could write to QRPURE saying he feels the sum should go up, and QRPURE would reply affirmatively.

P. F. CILIBERTI

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2 of 2

Monsieur et Madame GIBSON
30, Stockleigh Hall
Prince Albert Road
LONDON N.W.8 -(Grande Bretagne).

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Chers Madame et Monsieur,

Je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que j'ai fait citer la Société des NOUVELLES EDITIONS INTERNATIONALES pour l'audience du 13 avril prochain.

Or, je viens d'appendre que celle-ci est mise en faillite et que Monsieur PINTA, Syndic de faillite, a été nommé par jugement du Tribunal de Commerce.

Je ne vois pas, dans ces conditions, l'intérêt que vous avez à poursuivre le paiement de sommes qui vous sont dues par cette Société dont le passif dépasse de loin tout actif.

Voudriez-vous, je vous prie, me donner vos instructions définitives compte tenu de cette situation.

Je vous indique d'ailleurs que vous pouvez produire à la faillite entre les mains du syndic, mais que bien entendu celui-ci vous demandera un jugement pour pouvoir inscrire votre créance toute théorique contre la Société qui, comme je vous l'indique plus haut n'a que des dettes et aucun actif.

J'attends donc de vos nouvelles et vous prie de croire, chers Madame et Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

S. SCHWARTZENBERG,
Avocat à la Cour.

TM# 79462

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

Joy Gibson, fwded in
OEPA-0006, 26/1/67, filed
QREBONY/ops.

14-00000

DBB 71942, 25 January 1967   100-300-004

Abstracted from pages 38 and 37

q · At a meeting held on August 14, 1966, STANFORD mentioned that Rbbert Williams allegedly has $1,000,000 available for the use of RAM.

NY T-10 advised on September 26, 1966, that STANFORD prior to moving to Philadelphia on September 18, 1966, discussed RAM and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS with him. According to the source, STANFORD has alleged WILLIAMS has money available for RAM.

During the course of the conversation, STANFORD stated that the contact man between RAM in the US and R. Williams' is one Richard GIBSON in Paris, France. STANFORD stated that GIBSON passes on messages from WILLIAMS and will be the man contacted by whoever is designated as a courier to go to China to get the money.

Source also stated that he was told Richard GIBSON was living in the ~~CEX~~ Crystal Hotel (phonetic), Paris, France, and was working out of the La Royale Cafe (phonetic), Paris, France.

Gibson

SECRET

ODB-61450

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 105-93072

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BY LIAISON

Date: October 24, 1966

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: RICHARD GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source of this Bureau who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that during the Fall of 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist organization stated that one Richard Gibson was suspected of being a spy for the Central Intelligence Agency. According to this individual, Gibson recently had been in Milan, Italy, in the company of a female secretary from Paris, whose home is in New Rochelle, New York. At that time Gibson remarked his travel and activities were possible because he had married a wealthy English woman. Other things were said which aroused the suspicions of the Italian.

According to our source, the Italian pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist subsequently relayed his suspicions concerning Gibson to Rene Raindorf, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist). Raindorf reportedly thereafter met in Brussels, Belgium, with Gibson although he had indicated the Belgian pro-Chinese communists would look into the charges of the Italian Marxist-Leninist.

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201-306052

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 34

ORIG: JAMES M. MURPHY
UNIT: CA/CF
EXT: 7767
DATE: 31 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-124-156/3

SECRET

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CONF: CA/O 4 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE EUR 8, AF 7, CA 2, CCS 3, CI/OA, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

SECRET (CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER) 32195

1 17 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

REF: LCPIPIT 7388 (IN 83410)

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RE REF PARA 7: GHANA DESK REP MET QREBONY FOR ASSESSMENT WITH VIEW TOWARD H HIS POSSIBLE LATER USE AGAINST GHANA TARGET. DISCUSSION HODEE EDWARDS WAS GENERAL PROBING OF QREBONY RELATIONSHIP AND ESTIMATE ~~XXX~~ HER PERSONALITY. WHILE QREBONY MAY HAVE INFERRED POSSIBILITY RELATED OPERATION CAL ~~[illegible]~~ COMMISSION, WOFACT REP AVOIDED SUGGESTING SUCH WAS PLANNED MUCH LESS IMMINENT. IN FACT, DESK HAS NOT DEVELOPED SUCH DETAILED HQS PLANS FOR QREBONY OPERATION GHANA, GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES IN DEVELOPING SITUATION ON GROUND. WHEN AND IF CLEAR FOCUS SUCH OPERATION WORKED OUT AND AGREED WITH ACCRA STATION, WEST ~~[illegible]~~ AFRICAN TRIP WOULD PRESUMABLY BE FIRST STEP.

2. WHILE SUCH TRIP MENTIONED TO QREBONY AS PROBABLY USEFUL, EMPHASIZED TO QREBONY THAT VIETNAM IS TOP PRIORITY AT THIS TIME. STRONGLY FEEL HE SHOULD SIT TIGHT AND PLAY OUT THIS STRING WITHOUT PLANNING FOR EXTENSIVE AFRICA SWINGS, PARTICULARLY AFTER HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM ~~[illegible]~~ WOLADY TDY. WITH VIET TRIP AND RUSSELL FOUNDATION MORE IMMEDIATE HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS CLOSE TO HOME AT THIS TIME, SEE LITTLE VALUE AND UNNECESSARY RISKS IN OVEREXTENDING HIM IN WIDE AFRICA SWINGS OF LESS IMMEDIATE INTEREST. THIS EVEN MORE TRUE FOR EAST AFRICA GIVEN STATION VIEWS

RELEASING OFFICER

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 32195

TO

PER AJDA 1989 ON NEED FOR LONGER STAY, WITH ACCOMPANYING COVER AND CONTACT PROBLEMS, AND INDICATIONS OF PHOMBEAH HOSTILITY, NATURE AND EXTENT OF WHICH WE CANNOT IMMEDIATELY ASSESS. HQS VERY SATISFIED WITH QREBONY PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT SO FAR. WHILE UNDERSTAND HIS TEMPERMENTAL INCLINATION TO PRESS FOR ACTION ~~XX~~ ASSIGNMENTS INVOLVING TRAVEL, HE SHOULD BE ASSURED, IF NECESSARY, THAT SUCH DEMONSTRATION OF BEING CONSTANTLY USEFUL, ~~USE~~ NOT NEEDED AND ~~T~~ NOT ALWAYS IN BEST INTERESTS PROJECT DEVELOPMENT.

3. REF PARA 8: WILL BE POUCHING LONGER REPORTS ON QREBONY VISIT HERE WHICH DELAYED BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OTHER WORK. [illegible] RETURNED TO QREBONY ORIGINALS FINEMAN AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE HE LENT, BUT SENDING COPIES WE HAD MADE OF THESE AND REPORTS HE SUBMITTED ON WOLADY CONTACTS BY TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST 722028.

4. RE PARA 9 REF: YES. WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER THAT RAISE BE MADE AVAILABLE TO QREBONY BY TRANSFER FROM COVER FIRM, WHICH WE WILL EXPECT ARRANGE SOON (AWAITING CLEARANCE ON ONE ~~8~~ INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE CUT IN). CAN YOU MAKE DIRECT TRANSFER UNTIL THIS IS ~~X~~ SET UP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/COPS

AF/4/3. Foy (in draft)

JAMES M. MURPHY
CHIEF, CA/CF

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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25 Aug 66 83410

S E C R E T 251622Z CITE LCPIPIT 7388 (CILIBERTI ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE

DTDORIC QREBONY

1. RODIGAST (R) QREBONY/1 (Q) AS SCHEDULED 23 AUGUST. BALANCE ~~VOLADY~~ REPORTING BEING POUCHED AS WELL AS NEW RPORTS. Q PLANNING TRAVEL PARI BRUS-ROTTERDAM POSSIBLY FRANKFURT, VIENNA 2-12 SEPT. ROD WILL MEET Q ANTWERP 8 SEPT.

2. ROBERT WILLIAMS IN LETTER TO Q 25 JULY FROM PEKING SAID HOPES BE EUROPE LATER IN YEAR PROBABLY GOING SWEDEN TO MAKE SPEECH. ALSO ADVISED HE MAY TRY PUBLISH CRUSADE FROM PEKING AND ASKS Q'S HELP WITH DISTRIBUTION. ATTACKED HYPOCRITICAL RACIST CUBANS. (THIS INFO BEING DISSEMINATED).

SECRET

3. Q THINKS ENTRY NORTH VIETNAM MAY BE DIFFICULT AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION AND PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE NOT TO ENTERTAIN ELEMENTS OPENLY HOSTILE SOVIET UNION. LIONEL MORRISON SAYS WILLIAMS CAN'T GO HANOI AT PRESENT. RICHARD WARD TOLD FINEMAN ENTRY WOULD BE DIFFICULT. GRAY IN SAN FRANCISCO SAID HIS TOUR POSTPONED INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF MILITARY SITUATION.

4. AT KATZENBACH SUGGESTION Q MADE PRECISE APPOINTMENT NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS SAW AND DINH, LONDON 26 AUGUST WHICH KATZENBACH INFORMING JAGUAR TO ALLOW SURVEILLANCE.

5. RE DIR 26709, Q HOPES OBTAIN FURTHER INFO MOCK TRIAL FROM RALPH ROSENBAUM, US LEFTISTS CONNECTED RUSSELL FOUNDATION BUT WHO OPPOSED TO TROTSKYISTS. Q'S STRATEGY IS EXPOSURE FOUNDATION AS RIFE WITH CONFLICTS AND INFILTRATED BY TROTSKYISTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 7388 SECRET

6. POUCHING FULLER REPORT Q CONVERSATIONS SUTHERLAND NEW YORK WHICH Q TOLD KAMMERMAYER BY PHONE. SUTHERLAND INSISTED CARMICHAEL HAS NOT ACCEPTED RUSSELL INVITATION.

7. IF NOT SENT, PLEASE CABLE DETAILS HQS PLANS FOR Q OPERATION GHANA INVOLVING HODEE EDWARDS DISCUSSED WITH Q AT HQS. WOULD THIS BE IN FRAMEWORK Q VISIT WEST AFRICA AND APPROXIMATELY WHEN? WHERE DOES THIS PLACE EAST AFRICA TRIP, NOT MENTIONED TO Q BY HQS?

8. ASSUME HQS POUCHING ALL Q WOLADY REPORTING AS WELL CORRESPONDENCE. FOR EXAMPLE Q HAS NO COPY LETTERS FROM FINEMAN ON PARIS SITUATION WHICH SUBMITTED KAMMERMAYER.

9. CAN RAISE OF $100 IN Q TAKE-HOME AFTER TAXES BE MADE EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER? PLS CABLE WHEN BEGINNING DEPOSITS SO CAN NOTIFY Q.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

#106

Cable sent answering 9 in affirmative.

8 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT: Field Traces on QKEBONY/1 201-306052

This is to inform you that there were no additional traces on QKEBONY/1 from the Field Stations--Algiers, Rome, Paris, or London. Negative traces from Frankfurt Station.

Ann Jane Long
CA/CF

201 file

201-306052

SECRET RYBA

PROCESSING ACTION

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT POA for QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

None, information only

Attached herewith is the text of the Provisional Operational Approval on QREBONY/1. An Operational Approval is awaited pending receipt of final Agency traces which, we understand have not yet come in. Your attention is directed to paragraph 3 and to paragraph 5. The latter will be the subject of further correspondence in the future.

HOWELL D. KAMMERMAYER

Attachment:
POA h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT w/att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1591	DATE 17 JUL 1966
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

Distribution:
1 - RI w/o att.
2 - CA/CP w/o att.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CP	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	6 JUL 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

8. Not applicable. The Agent is not in the status of a tour of assignment but will be exploited in his current operational role as long as it is viable.

9. This request is not for interim cover.

10. No relative is witting for such emergency contact, nor is Benefits and Counseling Branch involvement applicable in this case.

11. None.

12. Agent has served in the U.S. Army, is not now eligible for induction.

13. Spouse is not witting and not clearable.

D. Operational Information

1. Type of Operation. FI. Duration is indefinite. Should be considered a penetration asset of a hostile propaganda establishment, rather than of an organized hostile intelligence service. No one, other than those indicated, are to be made witting.

2. Location: The Agent is to reside in London, with a possible alternative of Rome.

3. The Agent should be free to visit Cuba, all European countries, West Africa and E. Africa (particularly Tanzania) as well as North Vietnam and China. Impossible to anticipate the times or duration of such visits, which will, however, be at his (and our) control.

4. Special groups Agent should be able to contact: Not applicable.

5. Approximately $2,500 to $3,000.

6. Not applicable.

7. Communications channels desired: None.

8. Cover Suggestions: None not already expressed in previous documents prepared by CA Staff in identifying the cover mechanism and requesting DDP approval.

SECRET

II The arrangement between the cover firm and QREBONY/1 should be on the basis of a regular subvention to QREBONY/1 to act as a foreign stringer contributing feature-type material to the press service. An agreement having been ostensibly entered into by QREBONY/1 and the cover firm during the former's trip to the U.S. (expected around 20 July), a regular monthly check should be forwarded to QREBONY/1 by the cover firm, along with any correspondence it may see fit (suggestions for pieces to write, comments on pieces received etc.)

III The following steps are proposed to set this cover in motion:

A. At a meeting on 6 July, QREBONY/1 will be instructed to write a number of U.S. news media organizations stating that he expects to travel to the U.S. shortly, describing his news background and indicating he would be interested in developing some outlets for his writing. The cover organization is one of those addresses.

B. CIA's contact in the cover organization receives this letter and, pursuant to our direction, writes an answer stating 1) what his firm does, 2) that it would be very interested in handling QREBONY/1's product if it seems to fit the needs and 3) that it would be ready to reimburse some of QREBONY/1's expenses if he could come to Chicago to discuss the matter further.

C. QREBONY/1 does not meet the contact in the cover organization. He is briefed to offer the story, on his return, that he had entered into a regular arrangement with the cover firm to produce feature material usable by the cover firm (not specifying the frequency) in return for which he is to receive a monthly retainer.

D. Any letter QREBONY/1 may later wish to send to the cover firm should be given to us in copy preferably before it is sent.

E. Copies of any correspondence initiated by the cover firm should be made available to CIA and, particularly, to the Project Case Officer.

James M. Murphy
Chief, CA/CP

SECRET

SECRET

28 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

VIA: Chief, CCS/NC

SUBJECT: Request for Approval for Operational Use of U.S. Free-Lance Writer - QREBONY/1

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval pursuant to CSI 240-6, 10 January 1963, paragraph 6, governing operational involvement of personalities in the field of journalism. This request concerns cover support for QREBONY/1, an asset currently handled by CA Staff, and involves the cooperation of Russell R. DeBow, a Chicago city official and proprietor of the Negro Press International Inc. QREBONY/1 was granted a POA on 23 May 1966, and a full operational approval is pending. The project under which he is handled was approved by Acting ADDP on 14 June 1966. Mr. DeBow was granted a Covert Security Approval on 19 April 1966.

2. QREBONY/1 is an American Negro expatriate journalist and author presently residing in London. He is the author of one novel and numerous contributions to a wide variety of publication, such as the Kenyon Review, Monthly Review, The Nation, The Liberator and others. He worked as a reporter for the Philadelphia Afro American in 1950, for Agence France Presse in 1959, for CBS in 1960 and, in Europe, for the now defunct, pro-Chinese magazine Revolution. As a result of broad contacts and acceptance among radical, pro-Chinese and Negro militant circles, he has offered valuable access to important targets spanning four continents, and has demonstrated considerable skill in elicitation and exploitation of contacts for intelligence purposes in the process. The immediate and paramount operational objective for this agent is to gain direct access to hostile political targets in North Viet Nam and China. The outstanding requirement to be met in support of this objective, and of his continued effective exploitation generally, is the development of a backstopped and viable explanation for at least a portion of his income, which presently derives almost exclusively from clandestine CIA support. The proposal outlined below represents the conclusion of considerable research, including an interview with Mr. DeBow, to identify suitable cover arrangements which would make possible this explanation.

SECRET

201-306052

3. Mr. DeBow, a lawyer, is an Administrative Assistant to the Mayor of Chicago as well as a long time, if casual, contact of Domestic Contacts Service. His background includes assignment to the Intelligence Division of the Chicago police and cooperation with CIA in the course of a trip to Africa in 1961. Mr. DeBow also is part owner and in effective control of a very small feature syndicate in Chicago, the Negro Press International, Inc., which distributes rewritten news to Negro newspapers in the United States on a subscription basis.

4. On 20 June 1966, Mr. DeBow was approached by representatives of CA Staff and Central Cover Staff, acknowledging CIA connection, and interviewed with a view to determining the feasibility of using his service to backstop modest payments to QREBONY/1 for real or ostensible contributions of feature stories and reporting. (Since the contact was made to develop information pertinent to the present request for DDP approval, the interview was conducted on a hypothetical basis: QREBONY/1's identity was not revealed nor were any commitments entered into.) This conversation, despite its limitation, demonstrated clearly that such an arrangement involving Mr. DeBow and his firm would be practical from Mr. DeBow's point of view and well suited to the needs of the QREBONY Project. Mr. DeBow grasped the problem involved and suggested various means by which he could plausibly implement a cover arrangement should this be our decision. He was made aware of and understood the incongruity between his and QREBONY/1's ostensible political positions, and stated that this need offer no impediment to creation of the type of relationship which would be involved. The nature of Mr. DeBow's feature service and its modest size clearly enhance its usefulness and appropriateness for our objectives. Mr. DeBow, in conclusion, expressed his agreement in principle to participate in this cover support activity should CIA, on further review of its needs, decide to proceed with a request for his cooperation.

5. In the light of the very favorable response from Mr. DeBow and the determination, from reviewing the outlines of his operation, that it would be a uniquely appropriate backstopping for QREBONY/1, your approval is requested to recontact Mr. DeBow and establish with him suitable cover

arrangements for this purpose.

for CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff

RECOMMEND APPROVAL:

Chief, CCS/KC

APPROVED:

AA DDP

30 June '66

SECRET

27 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: QREBONY/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. The Memorandum of Oral Commitment with QREBONY is amended effective 15 June 1966 to provide indemnification in the amount of $10,000 in case of death, and payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of total incapacitation or disappearance.

2. It is anticipated that a trip planned for late summer or early fall will take QREBONY into VC controlled areas of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and China. Indemnification is intended to apply to death or disability resulting from air accident, act of war, or for disappearance.

3. Without being able to specify the possible circumstances, it is intended that such indemnification as outlined above be deemed to apply to loss of life or functions suffered by QREBONY as a direct result of his KUBARK relationship during the trip. Such indemnification, if made, must be presented to his widow by a cover mechanism which would hide KUBARK involvement.

Signed Thomas Mc Kinley

Thomas Mc Kinley
CA Staff Contract Approving Officer

CA/PERS/RHBELL:bg (24 Jun 66)

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- 1 - CA/Pers
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TO
Chief, KUWOLF

INFO.
Chief, KUDESK; Chief, EUR

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

RJS/8

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/Photo of QREBONY/1 and Contact

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover is a photograph of QREBONY/1 with one of his contacts.

Zaffaresi
Karen H. ZAFFARESI
(Dams)

Attachment usc
Photo usc

EBRAHIM, Gora

Distribution
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S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 13 JUN 1966

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201-306052

JUN 2 1966

1 & C ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFLA-3903

DATE
1 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
200-124-156/3

14-00000

SECRET

1-OFLA-3903

201-306052

DTDORIC/QRPREY/QREBONY

To: Chief, [illegible]WOLF

USC Att to OFLA-3903

Photo: Do not bend.



SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/CF - James Murphy	NUMBER 201 - [illegible]52
	SUBJECT QREBONY/1
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 10 February 1966 jab

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

(1) POA is granted to utilize Subject in an international context to exploit his contacts and/or associations with a wide variety of personalities and organizations (particularly Cuban and Chinese) engaged in "anti-imperialist" propaganda operations. Subject will be expected to renew his old relationships and expand his circle of contacts with Afro-Asian national liberation leaders, pro Chinese Communist, and similar personalities and to report general political and biographic material relative to the interests, activities and plans of such individuals and their organizations.

(2) Requirements passed to Subject will be confined, insofar as it is operationally feasible, to instructions for the refinement and completeness of the reporting he is capable of providing from his normal intercourse with source personalities. Disclosure of classified information will be held to a minimum, he will not be given operational assignments supporting or servicing other KUBARK operations, nor will he participate directly and/or wittingly in the spotting and/or recruitment of other agents.

(3) In addition to this background, certain of Subject's past statements and behavior are inconsistent with, and give rise to an uncertainty about, the nature and degree of his presently professed motivations and loyalties. It is impossible to resolve this uncertainty with the knowledge now available. At the present time, therefore, it is believed that his bona fides have not been established to an extent which would warrant handling him in any way than "at arms length".

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	23 May 1966

Continuation of PCA - 201 - 306052 - 23 May 1960

(4) This case has been discussed in detail on several occasions between representatives of CI/OA, CI/ICG, and CA/CE and there is agreement that it is primarily because of Subject's background and contacts that he is of interest and, therefore, it is believed, if he is handled with circumspection, the possible benefits to be derived justify the security risks involved in the use of Subject within the limits set forth above.

(5) Polygraph is recommended at least once a year.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

JOMUSE
QRPREY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, Richard Th [redacted] 201-306052

9 May 1966 poa os [redacted] James Murphy 7757

THERE IS A [redacted] /OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 11-56 443 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [redacted] ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A [redacted] CI [illegible] FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201 30 60 52

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

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TO Chief of Station, London (ATTN. KATZE[illegible])

INFO. Chief, KUWOLF

FROM Chief of Station, Paris (LCPIPIT)

SUBJECT DYDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/ REBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OELA 45254

1. At his 6 April meeting with RODIGAST, QREBONY/1 pointed out that his brother-in-law (the accountant) still thinks that QREBONY receives regular income from an American radio or news feature service, paid through Switzerland, and undeclared for tax reasons (QREBONY's and the American company's taxes).

2. RODIGAST thought that if the brother-in-law finds this story hard to believe he may guess that QREBONY is really working for KUBARK and may have passed this information on to the British. Thus he would be the source of the story relayed in reference.

3. At the same meeting, on another subject, RODIGAST asked QREBONY whether he had ever told anyone pointblank that he (QREBONY) is a Chicom agent. He said that he never had. RODIGAST broke in: "or the agent of any other country, including ODYOKE?" QREBONY said he had not.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Distribution:
2 - COS, London
~~1~~ 3 - C/KUWOLF
1 - C/WE

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201-306052
~~201-124-5673~~

APR 18 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OPLA-3731

DATE
15 April 1966

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HQS FILE NUMBER

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TO
Chief, KUWOLF NEC AJD

INFO
Chief, NE; COS, Cairo; COS, Dar-es-Salaam; Chief, AF
COS, London; Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; COS, Rome; CIR
CEL

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational
QRPREY/QREBONY/QREBONY/1's New Contact, Carole Piña

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. We are manifesting reports and correspondence concerning QREBONY/1's new contact, Carole Piña, an American, age 31, born in New York City (possibly Bronx County), whose father's last name was Appel or Appell. Her husband's name is Carlos Piña (Mexican), but she is separated from him and he is seeking a divorce. She holds US passport, No. D633873, issued 5 August 1963 in New York; it comes up for renewal in August (at which time she expects to be in Rome). She is afraid that her having traveled to Cuba in 1964 with a Progressive Labor delegation will hurt her chances of getting a renewal of her passport.

2. Subject had been having a series of political and amorous affairs during her stay in Dar, and was in serious trouble when Q met her. After rejecting Dennis Phombeah's advances, she was in serious danger of being declared a prohibited immigrant; Q befriended her, and he and Colman Ferrer of the Cuban Embassy (who had been having an affair with her) saw that she got out of Dar safely. Q was to meet her in Cairo (but in fact had no intention of doing so) and later caught up with her in Rome. She indicated a desire to work with Q (without quite knowing for whom she would be working--he hinted rather broadly to her that he was in cahoots with "our friends in the East," but it will be noted that in one of her letters there is this disarming phrase: she warns him about how to deal with certain persons and adds: "Be cool with them--do not show your true colors (whatever they are)").

3. Q seized on the opportunity of using subject as an unwitting informant and eventually agent on the same basis. She submitted to an interview on tape in a Rome hotel room which lasts about 2-1/4 hours, in which Q debriefs her on her knowledge of every Tanzanian, liberation movement, or Bloc personality with whom she had contact, and in view of her attractiveness and willingness she knew quite a few. (She had some amusing run-ins with ODYOKE personnel in Dar, which we shall edit out of the tape only for a fee.)

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF
2-C/KUDESK
2-COS/London
2-COS/Dar
2-COS/Rome
2-COS/Cairo
1-C/NE
1-C/WE
1-C/AF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAR 31 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3638	30 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-124-156/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLA-3638

4. Q feels that she is emotionally unstable--his firmness in dealing with her, his making it clear he was not out for her body, have made him a guardian and true friend. She seems to be a good political reporter, understanding her own (confused) political yearnings and where her various contacts stand; she also seems to have a good memory for details. Q says that her "anti-revisionism" is incipient anti-Communism. He could eventually recruit her as an ODYOKE witting agent, but that would take a lot of time and trouble; with much less effort he could effect a false-flag recruitment, and indeed, he has already done this on an informal basis by making it clear that he was collecting material for his Chicom friends. She would undertake further assignments for him. He actually asked her, "Suppose I asked you to go somewhere, would you go?" To which she replied, "If it's not cold." It is unlikely, however, that she would be able to return to Dar because of Phombeah's hostility. Wherever she goes, her main asset will be her physical attraction.

5. She could be debriefed further on any point raised in the tape interview. The ideal would be to have the questions by the time Q goes to Rome in the second half of April, but this does not seem to be a likely possibility.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

SECRET

202

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: OELA-45,254

TO: Chief, KUWOLF

INFO: Chief, WE; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, LCPIPIT

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 200-124-156/3 MAR 31 1966

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 30 March 1966

SUBJECT: DTDORIC QRPREY QREBONY
Relations with JAGUAR

RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED

REFERENCES

Ref: LOND 2425, 2 March 1966

1. A number of lengthly and fruitful discussions have been held with JAGUAR officers regarding our continued running of QREBONY in the U.K. Their comments on the quality of QREBONY's reporting have been reported from time to time. Similarly, we will not dwell here on the mechanical arrangements we have evolved (with SMOTH's agreement) to expedite the passage of information to JAGUAR, on the one hand, and avoid duplicate reporting (prinicpally by passing the same materials as CS dissems to SMOTH) on the other hand. Suffice it here to say that achieving both of these goals, without compromising QREBONY as a source throughout both JAGUAR and SMOTH (due largely to the wide range of areas he reports on), is a complex problem. We think we have reached a mutually satisfactory arrangement for achieving both aims.

2. What we are concerned with here, then, is JAGUAR's permission for us to run QREBONY from here, for the time being at least. The exact phrasing from JAGUAR's letter, agreeing to our request is: "With regard to the continued use of QREBONY by your service on a temporary basis while he remains in this country we have no objection to this provided we are kept fully informed of as much detail as possible."

3. JAGUAR pointed out that QREBONY operates in the same areas as some of JAGUAR's own agents, and this necessitates a fair amount of frankness regarding his activities in the U.K. We have made every effort to date to display to them that frankness. In return, JAGUAR has been cooperative, if not downright helpful. In one of our discussions, SMILL confidentially stated that one of their sources had quoted a sub-source as saying that QREBONY had admitted tohim that he is a KUBARK agent. We assured JAGUAR that QREBONY is under instructions not to reveal his KUBARK relationship, of course; that QREBONY is not supposed to be recruiting any sub-agents and has not done so; that the remark could well have been made in jest, in reference to the charges levelled against QREBONY three years ago (or longer). We told JAGUAR that it would obviously be advantageous for us to know to whom QREBONY is alleged to have made the statement, and we would be grateful if JAGUAR could tell us. We have repeated this request in writing, but with no reply to date. SMILL stated at the time that he had doubts about whether they could identify to us the person who had made the statement; he was sure that they could not go back to their agent for elaboration without showing an undue interest in QREBONY. We may yet hear who the person was. All this is repeated here merely to indicate how far JAGUAR will go to be helpful, and how far, to date, they will not go.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO
	SECRET	OELA-45,254

4. This, then, reflects the state of our relations with JAGUAR as it relates to QREBONY. We trust that this will be of value to Headquarters and LCPIPIT in planning QREBONY's future.

George H. KATZENBACH

Distribution:
    2-Chief, KUSOLF
    3-Chief, WE
    2-Chief, KUDESK
    2-Chief, LCPIPIT

SECRET

29 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT: Cover Arrangements for QREBONY/1

This memorandum contains information solicited by CCS to implement cover arrangements, already proposed by CA Staff and approved by DDP, involving Russell R. deBow of Chicago and CA Staff asset QREBONY/1. It is keyed to the headings set forth in the "Nonofficial Cover Request for Individual, Headquarters Edition."

A. General Information

1. QREBONY/1 (previously carried as STEBONY). No previous request has officially been forwarded for cover support.

2. Currently a Contract Agent. Currently compensated at the rate of $7,200 per year with a $1200 nonaccountable allowance.

3. Agent has not nor will be reviewed by the Agency's medical psychiatric assessment and evaluations Staff. He is already overseas and will remain there.

4. The Agent uses a complex of related cover stories, based primarily on exaggerated implications of fact: Namely, that his income derives from free-lance journalism and money available from his wife's family. Some quarters suspect or believe that he may possess funds from the CPR, but this has never been alleged by the Agent himself.

5. Agent is available now for cover.

6. Agent is overseas.

7. QREBONY Project.

B. Biographic Information

1. DPOB: 13 May 1931, Los Angeles, California; M; Negro; None; U.S.; No prior citizenship; Married; 3 children; 30 Stockleigh Hall, Prince Albert Road, London NW 8.

2. Adult and minor dependents are already in place and sharing the same residence. No readily available biographic information. He has 2 sons and one daughter, ranging in age from one to ten years.

SECRET

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declassification

QREBONY - 201 file

3. BA Kenyon College 1950; Foreign graduate study 1951-52.

4. Reporter, Philadelphia Afro American 1950; Miscellaneous: public relations--Italian Film Exports 1951; 1952-54 U.S. Army; 1957-58 Agence France Presse, Paris; 1960-61 CBS news, New York.

5. N.A.

6. Perceptive, aggressive but effective in personal relationships, literate.

7. Agent has fairly sizeable, but not pressing, debts to his in-laws. He lives modestly within his income from us.

8. Has resided only in U.S., Algiers, Paris and London, although he has travelled widely in other areas.

9. Fluent in French, competent in Italian and Spanish, and can read German.

C. Security Considerations

1. Agents has been receiving CA support for 13 months. POA granted 23 May 1966 with caution requiring care in view of the considerable derogatory information developed as a result of the Agent's past association with left-wing and radical organizations.

2. Agent is aware of U.S. intelligence interest, has not been explicitly apprised of CIA involvement but no doubt suspects it.

3. Agent has never entered any installations associated with CIA.

4. There is no U.S. identification of the Agent with CIA outside of Staff personnel. British intelligence (see paragraph 5 below). His wife (whose family resides in England) is unwitting.

5. The Agent is known in true name to the MI-5 and MI-6 of the United Kingdom.

6. None. It should be noted that the contemplated cover will not be a relationship which the Agent (any more than the cover) will proclaim or flaunt, given the fact that in his highly anti-American circle, such a connection would be regarded as unsavory. The purpose of the cover is to backstop the Agent's story that he receives income from hack journalism which he keeps separate from his "real" if unrewarding involvement with radical politics.

7. No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

QRFHONY
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-156/02
MALP-06112
30 MAR 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ RPTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT
BCAUSE MUST LEAVE APT 1 JUN AND MAKES
LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT
/ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGEOUS LEASE OR
PURCHASE/OR TEMPORARY.

R 6605110149

FILE IN 201- 306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUWOLF

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT RJS

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational Assessment of QREBONY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: OFLW-1494

1. Forwarded herewith is a 6-1/2 page answer by RODIGAST to the questions posed in reference. If any further clarification is required by Headquarters, please advise.

2. With regard to QREBONY/1's overt tax return, it has been determined that declarations must be filed by all citizens with over $600 income. If it turns out that QREBONY/1 cannot justify a $600 income from overt sources, and we think he cannot, he simply has no declaration to file and will be advised to so state to the Embassy.

Karen H. ZAFFARESI

Attachment h/w
As stated above

Distribution
3-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w

MAR 29 [illegible]

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OFLA-3627	29 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-306052

A. QRBONY/1 (Q) gives the convincing impression that he is at home in his new work. He responds well to suggestions and instructions, adds suggestions of his own for improving the plan-- an indication that he wishes to please. In the beginning he showed a tendency to raise minor objections involving personal material problems (e.g., inconvenience to family life of a long tdy) but less of this was remarked as he came to realize that requirements were to be reasonable and he was to be treated as a human being with his own problems.

He has stated that he would not continue his present involvement with target personalities and institutions if it were not that we wish him to, i.e., his own inclination would be to withdraw from the political fringe. Rodigast feels that this is consistent with his background, which was not a party career; in his youth he was willfully apolitical and hostile to the "movement"; later he was involved in opposing party people in his New York work; in Paris he didn't get along with his party friends (the affair of the forged letter) and of course broke with the magazine crowd there.

He seems to be genuinely committed to working against enemies of ODYOKE, ready to accept even deeper commitment; he has expressed no reservations as to what he will do. He doesn't object to reporting on old friends, fellow FBPRIMERS, et al. He raised no objection to FLUTTER, or using s/w techniques (which he took with him on a trip to what was then a very hostile area, where he had known enemies, and where there was a recent history of dealing roughly with outsiders). When orders conflict with personal desires (for example, when he planned to spend a weekend in a city he enjoys but was told he should proceed immediately to his next stopping place), he obeys without hesitation.

The foregoing is a collection of miscellaneous facts, but taken together they paint the portrait of a promising agent, both in terms of motivations and abilities.

B. Rodigast's knowledge of Q's attitude in the months prior to recruitment (June 1965) is limited. Rodigast has the impression Q had simply reached the end of his rope-- he had nowhere to go, he had earlier decided that he would like to work for or at least cooperate with ODYOKE (although earlier attempts to make contact met with no success). The humane treatment received at the hands of his recruiter, the subsequent sympathetic handling by his case officer, undoubtedly convinced him that he had not made a mistake.

The material factor is not to be underestimated. The demoralizing position of living on his wife and worse, on her family, must have lowered his resistance to any possible alternative. Rodigast simply doesn't know how Q might have responded to a reasonable offer from enemies of ODYOKE at that point. The prospect of immediate engagement at a decent wage may have been decisive.

Since that time, Rodigast feels Q's motivation has been reinforced and perhaps considerably altered: he has been asked to do obviously necessary tasks, and so he can feel he is needed by someone; he has been given reasonable instructions on how to accomplish them; he sees that others are concerned for his personal safety and material wellbeing. Rodigast has taken pains to avoid giving the impression that there was any confusion or error or difference of viewpoint in running the project (even at a time when there were plenty of all three); such problems were

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resolved before being taken up with Q, and thus he has a somewhat rosy view of the operation. The satisfaction of accomplishment (i.e., being able to produce useful answers to our questions) is surely a factor in his present attitude.

Though light-skinned, with a voice and accent which would be considered acceptable in any PBPRIME society, Q is extremely sensitive to the fact that he is a Negro. He has not said or suggested any such thing to Rodigast, but this is so obvious a factor in his correspondence (even discounting the extent to which the correspondence is part of his conscious cover) that it seems to Rodigast that it must be a factor in his life. On the other hand, Rodigast has known another Negro who was a close friend of Q (and now one of his major enemies, as a result of the Paris forged letter incident and contributing events) who was so sensitive about race that he makes Q in retrospect seem like an Uncle Tom.

Still, Rodigast does not believe Q could be handled by someone who is not genuinely a "nigger lover", i.e., who could not convey a convincing image of a person for whom a color difference was not a barrier (Q would surely detect the false "pal"). Q has mentioned anti-Negro prejudice as a reason for his refusal to cooperate with ODENVY officers who talked to him while he was in New York. In fact, Q deals with his present case officer as a possible if not a true friend; they share an interest and involvement in writing, English literature, living happily abroad, etc.; Rodigast has tried to read Dante in the original and Q has done so; Rodigast would like to write a novel and Q has published one; Rodigast doesn't know much about the post-logical positivists who interest Q but probably gives a convincing impression that he would like to know about them, and just might be capable of understanding them. What all the foregoing means is that in Q we have an accomplished person, and it is a useful tactic to treat him if not as a superior than at the very least as an equal.

There remains the possibility that opportunistic reasons are primary: Q joined the organization and stayed with us because he could not do as well in any other job, could in fact get no job (because of his background, his alien status abroad, etc). Rodigast does not exclude this, although he feels that whatever the original motivation, it has been strengthened and perhaps converted into something more worthy. But even if his primary motivation remains material, the history of the project over its first nine months suggest it is a viable one.

C. Q has lived in the underground for so many years without breaking that it is likely he will be able to continue to do so. He thinks fast, handles himself well in matters presenting security problems. He is not fully trained for clandestine activity. Rodigast's long meetings with him always include advice on one or more specific aspects of clandestine work, which when added yp may be taken to represent a short course, but that is all. The lack of training has led Q to do or say things which Rodigast would not have wished him to do or say, and whenever possible this has been brought to Q's attention, and he seems responsive to such instruction.

Rodigast would not recommend that Q be given a training course, but this would not preclude more formal sessions with Rodigast during which Rodigast could give more complete instruction on various phases of clandestine work.

Q gives the impression of not being easily moved. He has already survived violent attacks, questioning by legislative committees and police (including abroad), public denunciation; now that he has KUBARK as a friend he should resist at least as well as before. One negative trait is his need to take revenge for injury, and this tendency must be controlled; his instinct to be spiteful to an enemy could conflict with a longer-range plan.

It is to be hoped that the present situation regarding his wife (who believes him to be working for the arch foe of PBPRIME) will be possible to maintain. She doesn't like the situation much, but accepts it, and apparently hasn't betrayed his "confidence". If he is moved to another city which both Q and his wife would consider agreeable (Rome) she would probably be even happier and less likely to revolt, especially if a quarters allowance helped them get out of their present financial straits (they can pay rent and buy food but not save or repay debts— so his wife says he is doing an unpleasant thing without even being able to say they are better off than they were in Paris). If he were sent to a less agreeable place for six months or a year (say Dar) he would want to settle his wife in a desirable place (London but preferably Rome) for the children's schooling; here too her attitude would depend on their material position and on the possibility of his being able to visit on occasion (if he were in Dar, say, and she in Rome, he would return for visits— which would also be cover for his meetings with his case officer). Rodigast recommends that once in place, Q's basic wage be raised (as promised in June 1965) from $600 to $800, but that he also receive quarters and if possible an educational allowance.

D. Q says he is a local PBPRIMER. He now does act like one. Rodigast feels the evidence for his loyalty is at least as good as it is for most other PBPRIMERS he knows. Early in their relationship (probably mid-June 1965 in Paris) Q had said he had turned away from the revolutionary movement and toward his own country; even though there were opportunistic reasons for him to have done so, he is seemingly not anti-PBPRIME. His views on Negro problems in PBPRIME probably have not changed, but he never was a black nationalist, and has many friends, besides his wife, who are white). He might not agree with ODYOKE policy in Vietnam, Cuba, or elsewhere-- he obviously has not been questioned on his personal beliefs— but his dissent, if dissent there be, is not disloyalty, and in any case should not prevent him from executing KUBARK policy to the letter. Undoubtedly he has a leftist economic orientation, but there is no evidence that it is an orthodox Marxist one (or that it ever was).

He seems to like Rodigast; in any event they work well together. He has made no effort to develop a warm relationship with Rodigast, however, apparently feeling that this is not necessary, might not be appreciated, and would conflict with the compartmentalization so obviously kept in force by Rodigast (who hasn't told Q his true name, address, marital status, or any other personal fact which might lead to identifying him). Seemingly Q does not believe the name which Rodigast used at their introduction was a true name, for he didn't bother to remember it (the last name), and all this would tend to discourage the building up of a personal friendship.

It is probable that he respects rather than scorns KUBARK for its decent treatment of him. KUBARK through Rodigast has always kept its promises, Rodigast has never been a minute late for a meeting (Q has rarely been a minute or two late, and in recent meetings—presumably because he feels that Rodigast's never-failing appearance on the precise second of the meeting must mean that this is required KUBARK practice— he has been even more precise. Rodigast is always ready with a suggested solution to a security or other problem which will be faced by Q in carrying out a new assignment.

On the other hand, part of Q's satisfaction with KUBARK might derive from a feeling that KUBARK is a "soft touch". Rodigast does not recommend that anything be done to change Q's opinion (if he really does hold it); Rodigast feels that we are going to pay Q as much whether he likes us or doesn't, and for the same money we might as well make sure he likes us and will do his utmost for the organization rather than simply be a timeserver keeping up appearances. If given cause for resentment, his behavior is unpredictable, for he hasn't much to lose— reputation for loyalty, good name, etc. One solution would be to give him enough so that he would indeed stand to lose much.

Q appears to possess a realitsic, sane view of ODYOKE, what its people are like, what can and can't be done by it. As already indicated, he seems to be as loyal a PBPRIMER as other people who don't give much thought to the matter, certainly a lot more loyal than his background would lead one to expect. In any case, we have no recent evidence to contradict his statement that he considers himself to be a loyal PBPRIMER; it may just be true. If it isn't, this won't make any difference to the project as it is understood by Rodigast.

Q is unlikely to hold sympathetic feelings for ODENVY, having had what he described as an unfortunate experience or two with them. On the other hand, he is sophisticated enough to assume that his reporting on PBPRIMERS is of concern to ODENVY, and he must know that his own suggestion for tdy in PBPRIME to contact target institutions and old friends there would put him into ODENVY territory. He would probably accept any necessary collaboration without showing that he didn't like it.

E. Rodigast does not believe Q is at present working for another service, but it is difficult to know what would happen if another service approached him. Rodigast assumes he would report this to us, just as he reported in detail the overtures by two persons apparently working with the services of the country in which he resides. As part of the present operation involves the possibility that Q will in fact be approached by the opposition, and Q is aware of this, one assumes he is prepared to remain loyal to KUBARK; one would also assume he would recognize the heightened value of his services to us should he be approached by the other side and continue to remain loyal to us.

Q certainly would not agree to work for an opposition service for peanuts, but if offered a considerable sum of money (given that he just breaks even in his present arrangement with us, in the thinking of Q's wife), there is no telling what he would do. When recruited, Q was told he would get a raise once he got settled "in place" (to $800), and when this promise is kept he will have enough extra money to begin to pay debts and buy clothing, and thus have more concrete evidence of the material advantages of his present arrangement.

Rodigast would be very surprised if Q agreed to work for an opposition service not for financial reasons but through ideology.

Q likes to live well. He believes in wearing good clothes, staying in good hotels, being able to invite others out for food and drink. He says that in the revolutionary movement poverty is no virtue, but merely indicates lack of influence. He says that the most popular persons are those who can dispense money, alcohol, and women. This may well be true. It is certainly true that such a role would please Q immensely (that is, having a plush apartment in which he could entertain target personalities, satisfying KUBARK's requirements and his personal desires).

F. Q must be dealt with firmly, with continued serving of requirements and planned itineraries for trips. At the same time, it is obvious that he improvises well when left without instructions; he is versatile, and can create situations which will result in an intelligence product. Rodigast's method is to suggest reasonable plans and to be ready to show that they can be implemented, and how they can, anticipating objections.

While there is no evidence that if left alone Q would drift, dragging out an assignment to fill time, it is possible that he would. He has not written as many free-lance articles as Rodigast would have liked him to, because each requires thinking out a subject, gathering material, selecting a point of view and thinking of the public to which it would be addressed-- a lot of work for articles meant to serve mainly as cover, for publication in obscure organs, or perhaps merely to be used to convince editors that he was active. On the other hand, he produced the first issue of the newsletter in record time, following instructions to the letter (indeed, accepting what must at times seem like petty editorial changes made by Rodigast). Perhaps he produced the latter so efficiently because he saw in it added prestige, an opportunity to get his name back before the public in a respectable context.

Ideological motivation would not seem to be a level of control in his case. What is most important is his contentment with being (he hopes) a permanent part of a large organization, with a steady salary (he has never said this, of course); the power of ODYOKE is less important than its known reputation for keeping its promise to pay, something one doesn't find among the opposition groups known to Q, and he finds new examples of this daily.

Doubtless, his tendency to bear a grudge is a factor here-- Q is now in a position where he can thumb his nose at some of his enemies.

Rodigast feels that considerate dealing with Q, letting him know where he is going, what he can expect, not changing the rules abruptly or pulling a rug from under his feet, letting him see the possibility of small but certain increases in material benefits in the course of his career, compose the ideal formula for handling him. In the course of time, the ideological factor, which is perhaps marginal at this time, would probably be reinforced, could one way be a major factor. Q, meanwhile, must feel that the persons who deal with him are concerned with his material wellbeing and also of his physical safety, appreciating the risks in his work and understanding that not all assignments will bear fruit. Our relationship with Q could be destroyed very rapidly if we failed to pay him as promised, or wasted his time with make-work, or gave him confusing or contradictory instructions which suggested that KUBARK was not the all-powerful institution he may now think it is.

G. Very early in our relationship Q said that he would like to make a career in KUBARK, outside now, perhaps inside some day. He would work in PBPRIME or abroad. There was no indication then, and has been none since, that he regards the present relationship as a distasteful one to be terminated as soon as conditions permit.

He would like to settle in en expatriate's paradise, such as Paris or Rome, presumably involved in journalism and other writing. If he could do these things in connection with his work for us, so much the better.

H. Q is conscious of the need for security and handles himself well— as well as an amateur could in this context. But he is far more naive about techniques and especially the nuances of technique than Rodigast would have expected in one who had been involved in the revolutionary movement for so long. He often needs instruction on obvious points, and responds quite well to it, the exception being his clumsy handling of the s/w method-- he is an intellectual and not a technician, and Rodigast assumes that he (Rodigast) would not do much better if forced to use some technical system.

Q is quite observant. He will recall a personal remark made to him by Rodigast from one month to the next. His reports written some time after the event are thorough and apparently accurate.

He read A Spy and His Master by Christopher Felix, and has mentioned it a couple of times when a remark by Rodigast reminds him of something said in the book.

Rodigast doesn't think that even after training Q would be very good at throwing off surveillance (for example) as he seems too matter of fact to be sly, and perhaps slightly lazy about what might be gratuitous behavior (e.g., changing subway trains or taxis just on the assumption that someone might be following him). Rodigast's solution is not to depend on Q for such things, but to attempt to plan meeting and stage other operations so as to minimize the need for dependence on Q's skill in such areas. After patient briefing Q does understand the need for tradecraft efficiency, and as already noted he follows the advice.

I. At first Q qas quite concerned about money— he needed an advance for clothes, for travel, etc. His requests were really plaints, and he may have left the impression that he thinks of nothing but money. It was the complex of a poor boy who never had anyone he could turn to— despite a scholarship he had to leave a fine college after a brilliant freshman year. Once he received his advance and began receiving his money at the beginning rather than at the end of each month, and when he realized that he would receive complete and prompty reimbursement of expenses, he began to relax. Now he submits accountings without himself totalling the figures or keeping his own record (Rodigast knows this for he has seen Q's notes), so he must rely on us to tell him how much he claimed for (even Rodigast would never do that). He is, in sum, relaxed.

The same ease is to be noted in his substantive work; he submits his reports knowing he has done his best, and done well; he accepts compliments with a very slight nod. When Rodigast first met Q in a hotel room, Q had something of the hunted man. He still seems harried, slightly nervous at the moment of contact, but on the whole he is more sure of himself.

At the outset, Q would argue about assignments, suggesting alternatives, worrying about not having time to buy tickets, or enough money to pay for them. Now he accepts instructions without a murmur, even when they contradict a previous tentative plan. His excellent response to instructions may be his desire to please, his satisfaction with his job, or personal pride in accomplishment. Whatever the reason or reasons, the fact is that he does respond well.

14-00000

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Paris/LCPIPIT

INFO.

FROM Chief, KUWOLF

SUBJECT O Assessment of QREBONY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below

It would prove very useful to us--both as a contribution to the preparation of the Project Outline now in progress and as a backgrounder for possible discussions of QREBONY's operational utilization--if RODIGAST could provide us with an interpretive assessment of him based on the impressions and judgements he has been able to develop over the past months. We have some such initial assessments, of course, and can infer more from current reporting. However, we would like to get the benefit of RODIGAST's unique and direct contact, now that QREBONY has passed through a breaking-in phase and settled down in a regular relationship which, at its inception, is certainly a difficult one for most people to adjust to. We would suggest the following outline of topics for RODIGAST to follow:

A. Estimate of loyalty to ODYOKE and QREBONY's psychological adjustment--his comfortableness--in working for ODYOKE clandestinely: his attitude, as RODIGAST can infer it, toward targets hostile to ODYOKE: in short, his ideological motivation.

B. Estimate of his motivation generally: his personal reasons for association with KUBARK.

C. Psychological suitability and staying power in leading a "double life". Possible or actual strains on him by virtue of his wife's attitude. Qualms about the "morality" of his position or fears about being found out.

D. His own views of his patriotism or loyalty. His attitude toward RODIGAST, KUBARK, ODYOKE and ODENVY.

E. His susceptability to approach or control by an opposition service.

F. Methods of control to which he is mort, and least, responsive. What represents the effective lever of his control--internal ideological

Distribution:
2 - COS, Paris/LCPIPIT

continued

201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OFLW-1494

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DATE
17 MAR 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052

Distribution:
1 - RI (201-306052
2 - CA/CF

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CA/CF	James M. Murphy	ajl	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/ICG	15 March 1966	Goodrich (in draft)

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ABSTRACT X

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RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/CA	17 MAR 1966	Cord Meyer, Jr.

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DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OFLW-1494

motivation? financial need? resentments? a desire to identify himself with ODYOKE's power? or some combination of these?

G. His longer range plans, if any.

H. His security consciousness--i.e. his efficiency in tradecraft.

I. Any changes in his attitudes or personality which RODIGAST has detected over the period of their association.

HOWELL D. KAMSERMEYER

201-306052

DISPATCH | SECRET/[illegible]

TO: Chief of Station, London for LCPIPIT

INFO: Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, WOLIMR

SUBJECT: RYBAT/DTDORIC/PLQRPHONE/MHPROBE/STFLIMFLAM Training

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 294821

1. Being forwarded USC are copies of the QRPHONE/1 training report, the JBMINIMUM evaluation, contact reports of meetings with QRPHONE/1, a WOGEAR review of QRPHONE/1's book and some notes made by the STFLIMFLAM Headquarters officer, Harvey B. DAITCHMAN (IDEN), after his meetings with QRPHONE/1. These are for the information of both LCPIPIT and London Station and, taken together, should give you both the flavor of the variety of measures taken to assess the operational potential of QRPHONE/1.

2. During PAUPEROS' TDY at Headquarters we discussed the necessity of having QRPHONE/1 undergo an intensive seven day STFLIMFLAM training program to be conducted by DAITCHMAN. It is our opinion that in order for this training to be of maximum benefit, QRPHONE/1 and DAITCHMAN ought to be ensconced in a safehouse facility which provides security, comfort and an atmosphere conducive to learning. It is important that the training be conducted in a locale which will allow QRPHONE to give his full attention without being disturbed by his multitude of business and social contacts. Therefore, we recommend that LCPIPIT rent a cottage or beach house away from London for the duration of the training cycle. In discussing this with QRPHONE, he readily agreed and indicated that there would be no difficulty in getting away from his family for as long as we thought necessary. He

Attachments:
  A. As Stated (u/s/c)
  B. Iden Sheet (u/s/c)

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  1 - COS, London (w/att)

approval of DCI

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SENSITIVE [illegible] SOURCES

CA/B3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPW-1814	4 AUG 1972
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/[illegible]	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-156/1 ~~200-124-156/3~~

Distribution:
  1 - E/BC
  1 - E/CA
  1 - AC/CA/B3
  1 - CA/B3
  1 - CI/SO

CA/B3

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DDP/CA/B3/Ken Rosen:ckj		(31 July 1972)	7767

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/CA/B3	2 Aug 72	
E/BC	2 AUG 1972	
E/CA	2 Aug 72	
CI/SO	2 Aug 72	

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OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
ADC/CA	2 AUG [illegible]	Dino J. Pionzio

PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

simply would tell them and his business contacts that he was traveling on the continent. Please advise us of the dates which are determined to be convenient to PAUPEROS and QRPHONE/1. The Headquarters officer would prefer either the third or fourth week of September, and certainly not before.

3. As indicated in the reference we solicit comments from LCPIPIT and London Station on the results of our varied assessments of QRPHONE/1 and our decision to move ahead in the new operational directions described in OKPW-1661. We view the coming year as a trial one for these purposes and the Project Renewal has been submitted with that understanding clearly described.

4. Since QRPHONE/1 might refer to conversations he had with Andrew F. TELQUIST (P), PAUPEROS should know that TELQUIST used the alias "Bob" in all his meetings with QRPHONE/1.

Allan W. TEUTSCHMAN

200-124-156/1

~~200-124-156/3~~

17 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WOLIME

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1,
Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of WOMOLD From Chief,
WOLIME , dated 23 May 1972;
Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for [illegible] and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any thing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week — and then with only one written one and one that he received orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

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~~200-124-156/3~~

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he continued that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHOKE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When TELQUIST , during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHOKE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of TELQUIST He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHOKE. The three trips to New York by TELQUIST must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHOKE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recruitment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHOKE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHOKE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the paper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability — it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting — no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember — just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, FRONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because TELOUIST had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When FRONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading FRONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants FRONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which FRONE admitted he does consistently), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on FRONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York WOBONE). Concluding his admiration of FRONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of FRONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

full conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, FHOME is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were FHOME's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped FHOME and asked him for directions and FHOME gave them and just went about his business". FHOME's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in FHOME's report that FHOME even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed FHOME into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that FHOME may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading FHOME's report, was stunned to see that FHOME had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. FHOME had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that FHOME had done, the instructor's report concluded: "A first rate performance by FHOME, who's obviously been around — both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomats, as Mr. Smoot held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report [illegible]/[illegible]/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF WOYOLD

Chrono

SECRET/RYBAT

18 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. I met with QRPHONE/1 for much of the 12th of July and wearing two hats. We first went through the third phase of the training exercise in which I had been playing the role of an agent prospect whom he was to assess and recruit, and then later in the OTR safehouse I identified myself as the Headquarters officer responsible for his project. Incidentally, he did an excellent job in all three phases of the training exercise and did particularly well on the recruitment itself. QRPHONE/1 is clever, imaginative, has an excellent grasp of this aspect of tradecraft and handled himself particularly well in a complex and changing training scenario.

2. As the Headquarters staff officer responsible for his project, I described in detail the reasons for the long, serious look at his performance these last several months, the changing intelligence and operational requirements we face, and the careful scrutiny he had been given as we began to map out new directions for him, all of which ended with this advance four-week training program, testing, and evaluation and substantive briefings. He said he was a bit confused by the WOMUSE briefing of last week so I explained how that tied in with this evening's planned discussion on the China program.

3. We discussed his itinerary, personal plans and the pacing of the next several months, all of which were clarified to his satisfaction.

a. He will be debriefed on 24 July at 1000 hours at the OTR safesite in NYC following his return from the operational trip around the country.

b. I will meet him for the final operational briefing session at 1000 hours on 26 July in the same OTR safesite.

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c. He will depart New York the night of 26 July on the 8:00 p.m. TWA flight to London.

d. This will get him in London in time for a previously scheduled ops meeting with PAUPEROS on 27 July. He leaves on 1 August for a one-month vacation touring most of Europe with his family and spending one week in Malta.

4. Before the arrival of DAITCHMAN we discussed other operational matters as follows:

a. His friend in New York City, Richard Ward, (Apt. 11K, 372 Central Park West) recently returned from Hanoi and Paris with the manuscript of a new book written by Cambodian Prince Nordom Sihanouk titled "My War with CIA." Sihanouk gave the manuscript to Wilfred Burchett who gave it to a North Vietnamese friend to give to Ward. Ward was asked to find an American publisher and he, in turn, asked for QRPHONE/1's help. Burchett is an old friend of Ward's and stays at his apartment whenever he visits New York. The manuscript has already been given to a publisher in Europe. QRPHONE/1 asked if we would be interested in a copy. I told him to get one if he could do so without straining his cover.

b. His friend, Lyle Stuart, the publisher, has been trying to buy the American branch of the Oxford University Press, and apparently is about to consummate the deal. He offered QRPHONE a job as his European representative if the deal goes through.

c. Per TEUTSCHMAN' request I asked QRPHONE to give his instructor a copy of the long list of names and organizations given to him by Sibecho. Also per Ken's request, and in answer to my question, QRPHONE said he received the magazine published by the Turkish party in Collards Book Shop in London.

5. From 5:00 p.m. until a little after midnight on 13 July, DAITCHMAN of FE Division briefed QRPHONE/1 in substance on the STFLIMFLAM program, our interest in having QRPHONE/1 pursue such a role, and explained the great amount of dreary work that would be involved in learning the communist dialectic thoroughly if the whole venture were to be successful. I will make no effort to condense these seven hours

of ethereal discourse, but QRPHONE was fascinated, captivated by it and clearly interested in pursuing that long murky path to "enlightenment." /DAITCHMAN did an outstanding job in setting the stage, describing the target, and then explaining step by step how he and QRPHONE/1 and PAUPEROS would work together as the operation progressed. Regarding QRPHONE's upcoming trip in the U.S. /DAITCHMAN explained exactly how QRPHONE should act as he meets each of his friends and how he should develop his new-found "interest" in studying Marxist-Leninism as he meets with those various people. QRPHONE was very responsive, took notes, had ideas of his own, but more importantly was very appreciative of the tactical advice that /DAITCHMAN described. QRPHONE/1 will meet the following people over the next ten days.

a. Richard Ward in New York City.
b. Libel Bergman in Newark (on three different occasions)

c. Benjamin Blake, Milton Henry and a fellow named Boggs in Detroit (he's with NAR).

d. Don Wright, Herb Block, and Sidney Lens all in Chicago.

e. LPWEAKLY/1 and family in Chicago

f. Davida Fineman and Saul Landau in San Francisco.

g. The Martin Luther King Foundation in Atlanta.

6. All of the above were carefully chosen because of who they were, what organization or philosophy they represented, or their interest in the Chinese, and the extent to which the whole would knit together and form a viable base which QRPHONE can use as a springboard when he returns to London. /DAITCHMAN urged QRPHONE to join, or in some cases rejoin, Maoist study groups in London including the one conducted by Manchanda. The role that QRPHONE should play with these groups, as well as others in Europe who were singled out during various parts of the conversation, was also spelled out in detail. By the end of the evening QRPHONE had clearly in mind what it was all about, what he should do next and the purpose of our reconvening on the 24th and 26th to decide finally what it all amounts to.

7. I asked QRPHONE to call on the sterile line using the "Mr. Stanley" indicator on Monday afternoon, 21 July. This is simply to check in and let us know he is on the way and how things have come thus far. He calculated that he needed another $500.00 for the U.S. portion of his overall trip since LCPIPIT apparently had not anticipated this when he was given his original advance. I arranged through the good offices of in New York to get $500.00 to QRPHONE today.

8. QRPHONE asked if we had any intelligence requirements for him to pursue while he is in Malta. I said Ken would brief him on those requirements on the 24th of July if we had any. Incidentally, QRPHONE mentioned that Libol Bergman comes to New York City every Thursday and told QRPHONE that he could be reached on telephone number 265-2500. QRPHONE said if we cared to we might want to track that number and see where Bergman hangs out.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

31 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Contact with QRPHONE/1 in New York City

1. As arranged previously, I met with QRPHONE/1 at the WOMOLD safesite in New York City from 1000 hours to 1230 26 July. The meeting was intended to wrap up loose ends, convey our decision to pursue the STFLIMFLAM program (providing QRPHONE/1 himself was amenable), and to make clear that we expect measurable operational progress within the next year.

2. Although QRPHONE/1 had been debriefed on 24 July by other Headquarters officers regarding his trip around WOCORK, I asked him to review it again for my information so I could put it clearly in perspective as it related to our plans for him in the coming year. I'll not bother with the details here because such have already been written for the record elsewhere, but suffice it to say that QRPHONE/1 was both pleased and relieved at the reception he got from his old contacts because of the reflection these receptions had on his own bona fides. The allegations of his BKTRUST affiliation which had floated through Europe were never mentioned by his WOCORK contacts; on the contrary at least one of them urged QRPHONE/1 to return soon to WOCORK because this is where the action is. This same individual gave QRPHONE reading materials on the Communist dialectic and urged him to study them closely. This greatly impressed QRPHONE because it showed how accurate were the briefings given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer and demonstrated that we knew our tactics.

3. I then reviewed with QRPHONE/1 the reasons for our long close scrutiny of him and his performance these last several months followed by our selection of him for advance training, testing, and redirection in the strong hope we had that he would accept this new task because of its priority importance to our national collection requirements. I asked

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QRPHONE/1 his impressions of it all, his reaction to the STFLIMFLAM proposal, and whether he would accept its demanding obligations. QRPHONE said he certainly would and that he found it a real challenge to his intellect and his operational skills. The tedious study of the dialectic would not deter him. His only concern was how he should actually play it as he developed relationships with appropriate party members and, ultimately, the Chinese in SMORANGE. I pointed out he needn't concern himself with the last point because that would be part of the purpose of the ten-day training program in SMORANGE in September which would be given him by the Headquarters STFLIMFLAM officer. I said the training would require total emersion for ten days straight, probably in some secluded beach house on the coast where all involved could reside full time. He said this would present no problem cover-wise; he would simply tell his family he had gone to the continent. I said that PAUPEROS would be working out the details of this with him, probably after his return from vacation.

4. I said that given QRPHONE/1's past performance, his credentials with the radical left, and his apparent interest in vigorously pursuing the STFLIMFLAM program we expected to be able to measure in six to eight months the likelihood of his being able to achieve all the STFLIMFLAM objectives based upon the progress he would have made by then with his Chicom contacts. Should it appear that the STFLIMFLAM operation would not succeed we would be discussing alternative courses of action with him by the end of the year. He did say that of all the countries in Europe where his STFLIMFLAM and radical left potential is probably the best, Italy would be first and Denmark second.

5. I told QRPHONE/1 that his meeting with PAUPEROS had been moved to 31 July as he requested, reviewed his European vacation plans and his Malta trip and wished him the very best of luck. At this point QRPHONE/1 certainly seems willing and able aggressively to pursue our operational plans. We shall see.

Andrew F. TELQUIST

WOGEAR Review of African Liberation Movements

In general, the author has done a reasonably good job describing the historical development of the various African liberation movements, especially when one considers the complexity and number of splits and mergers that have occurred within and among the movements over the years. There are several glaring inaccuracies, however, in the author's conclusions about the current position and effectiveness of the several Portuguese African liberation movements.

Regarding Angola, the author characterizes the MPLA as an ideologically-oriented group (i.e., Soviet doctrine) that has failed to grasp and utilize to its advantage the tribal realities that exist in Angola. The author fails to acknowledge, however, that the MPLA has had some success, albeit limited, in building a movement that is national and multiracial in character rather than tribally oriented. Despite its urban intellectual leadership, the MPLA has had some success winning local support in rural eastern Angola.

By contrast, GRAE ranks a poor second. From inception, its primary base of support has been the large Angolan refugee population of Bakongo tribesmen who live in southwestern Zaire. Although the organization has won some support among Bakongo kinsmen across the border in northwestern Angola, it has failed to broaden its base because of its thinly disguised regional and tribal make-up. Moreover, Roberto's unwillingness to delegate authority or compromise have produced chronic disputes at the leadership level. The author's conclusion that GRAE is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the future of Angola is contradicted by the fact that the MPLA is by far the largest and most effective of the three nationalist groups opposing the Portuguese in Angola.

MOZAMBIQUE

The present FRELIMO leadership does not appear to be in the state of disarray in 1972 that the author believes it is. Although some differences undoubtedly persist, the present leaders seem to have closed ranks somewhat since the departure of Simango in late 1969. For the present, any internal squabbles that may exist are not noticeably affecting FRELIMO's fighting abilities inside Mozambique.

RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA

Reasonably straightforward and up to date. No serious deficiencies.

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

Notes on QRPHONE by Harvey B. DAITCHMAN

1. Revolutionary Image: Discussed briefly how it is obtained. Pointed out there is a pattern to it which is discernable among revolutionaries. It is usually issue oriented in the beginning, the war being one of the key issues, and it gradually evolves into a desire to engage in practical activities which usually expressed best on a continuing basis through work in an organization. Also connected with this process is the gradual development of a different "outlook." It is usually a mixture of idealism and Marxism-Leninism-socialism-Mao Tse-tung thought. Usually unstructured but developing.

It is possible in this stage to move from one group to another without any particular approbation being attached for this transience. This is particularly so if one starts way outside a M-L-ist group and moves inward towards it. Quite a different thing to start in a M-List group and go out.

Also in development of a new outlook one comes to study a variety of revolutionary literature. This can take one into different areas, anarchism, GW advocacy, revolutionary nihilism, socialism, Marxist-Lenism, etc. However, to get to latter it must be done logically.

2. Tightly Structured Op: Emphasis upon tight, controlled contacts which seek to accomplish a specific purpose--collection of info not necessarily one nor always one. Purpose is to lay ground work for future developments. Purpose to establish certain contacts which can be later used in either positive or negative fashion. Structured conversation is also essential. It too should seek to accomplish something, directed so as to be useful to future development of op: e.g., desire to have an explanation for an action to be undertaken later--so bring up in conversation with someone so that can use that conversation later as explanation for interest in a subject, knowledge of a subject, etc. It is checkable.

3. Study: Most important aspect in opening phases of op. Without correct study and without development (understanding) of "correct outlook" one will always be a dilettante to the, outside looking in, someone who is useful to them "under certain conditions," but not someone who is reliable, and not a dependable revolutionary. This is really the key, the ideological tool, it will open doors that cannot otherwise be entered.

4. Contacts: Those to be exploited now and those to be used in or for future time. In the beginning the contacts which are developed are to be used as a means of building his justification for having begun the serious study of Marx,

Lenin, and Mao. This must be discussed with people so that many are aware of it. These conversations will be later used when he explains how and why and when he became interested.

5. Diffuse Nature of Op: In beginning op has a diffuse nature. It is necessary to make many contacts. Some will be more useful than others, but all have potential for use in one circumstance or another. Since we have no way of knowing how or from whom the Chinese collect their intelligence, seek out, or otherwise spot budding revolutionaries we can assume that some one of his acquaintances will report his interest in Mao, etc. We can assume that through some of his activities Chinese will build up his dossier so that at a later date when we go directly to the Chinese for help they can look in their dossier and see that x number of months ago, etc., various things were reported. Etc.

6. Ops as a Process of Development: Permit no diversions or detours which might become permanent. This would include targets of opportunity, etc. Must always maintain correct operational line and cannot reach target by following various diversionary tributaries in the temporary interest of collecting marginal intelligence. Must be prepared to sacfrice diversionary tasks in pursuit of main goal or objective. If tangential things are folled up we then have a different op, and a new op line, must be cautious with this. Ops line serves as guide for whole op from beginning to end.

7. Tactics in Op: Must always be carefully thought out so as to insure forward development of op. Something must be seen emerging or useful, or having potential future value for development of op, otherwise it is pointless to undertake it. Tactics are details. Details are most important aspect in day to day running of op. They must be paid attention to, must be contributory, must be carried out in correct sequence, and we must keep in mind that at one or more points it is these details which will be subject of the scrutiny of the opposition. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DETAILS APPEAR LOGICAL TO THIS OPPOSITION, even if they may seem illogical to us at times. Our logic is not the same as communist logic.

8. Ops is Step by Step Process: Op should/or can be divided into steps, phases, stages, segments, whatever. Each phase should dovetail into the next. To some extent a general outline can be developed. Each of the major phases should be sub-divided into stages so that they can be dealt with step by step. For example: Three broad categories:

1st Phase: All initiatives are ours. We do all the work, lay ground for future stages. We have a flexible line which permits making maximum contacts to be correctly exploited. We give training. Also devise concrete activities for him to carry out.

2nd Phase: Chinese and others have shown interest. We will exploit this interest. After he has completed first phase we will begin to make structured contacts with the Chinese. In these contacts he will show that he has a grasp of the ideology, is interested in learning more, desires to study more intensively. Will use as negative examples: his book, Panthers, some aspects of Bergman's behavior, the unstructured and undisciplined nature of most revolutionary activists in U.S., particularly among the blacks, or whatever may seem appropriate at time contact is made. However, will seek their help to further his study and will indicate recognition of need to return to U.S. in order to undertake correct role in revolutionary struggle. At this stage we will have an idea of interest of Chinese. We will be able to determine whether we can expect progress or not. If they prove willing to help they will then be asked to guide his further study, to help him. Through this help they will be able to see the development which has taken place. We should get a good feeling of their willingness to guide him after a couple of meetings. If we are shut out then must make ops judgement from that point on--can always target against Soviets and use Chinese as negative example. If they are interested we will then lose some aspects of our initiative, but in essence the more initiative we lose to them, the more they try to direct him, the deeper he becomes involved with them, which is our objective--one of them. He must continue his study.

3rd Phase: Continue his study; continue his contacts all around, but by now should have significant contacts and can dispense with the more general "sparrow" approach. Once certain of their willingness to help we ask about a trip to Peking to study after which he wants to return to U.S. and take active role.

Recognize that this may be a sticking point. We don't want him here. However, this idea has to always be in the forefront as far as the Chinese are concerned otherwise they have little reason to be interested in him. This MUST appear to be his goal. We may be able to circumvent it later for one reason or another, or it might be useful to bring him back temporarily. This decision must be reserved for that time.

These stages and sub-stages must be further divided if we are to understand the operation correctly and are to carry it out correctly. Each action he is asked to undertake must be seen leading to something concrete in the next or another step. The whole op goes STEP BY STEP. We do not insert unrealistic objectives, or those which would be desirable but may be difficult. This is a waste of time. We only seek to do what is possible--possible is what can be turned into reality.

Emphasis must be made on "step by step" approach and must be maintained. Otherwise we can trip ourselves up by trying to accomplish something which is out of sequence FOR THEM. For example: He has read Marx and Lenin. We might say he's quite familiar with it. We could then say that he will read Mao and after that he will be able to pretend to be a Maoist. All of this is true. He could say it and act like he and others thought a Maoist should act. However, appearance and essence are not synonomous. It might appear to non-Maoists that our troop is a Maoist because he can talk as good a game as anyone else--or better than those who have not studied as much--but the essence of being a Maoist is not contained in such superficialities. Nor is the essence of being a Marxist-Leninist so contained. He cannot, for example, bloom or emerge as a Maoist and find acceptance with the Maoists. They know the process it takes to get there: "Several years of assiduous study can produce good results." (Some Chinese quote on studying Mao.)

9. **Their Weapon is Also Our Tool:** Once we understand correctly how they wield their weapon, the dialectical method, it can serve as our tool to pry our way into their camp. Through proper study and understanding we can develop and promote Q's superiority among his friends and acquaintances. To Marxists he will be much more acceptable and his intel product will probably be enhanced since they will talk on subjects they might not have touched upon in the past, he will be more trusted, and also he will have better recognition of key developments in Marxist world through better understanding of their reality.

10. Some activities which we might consider enroute.

a. Start His Own Study Group: Chinese would be very interested. Unlike most study groups with which I am familiar he would stress study of ideology--in correct way. However, to prevent them from profiting from such study they can be tied in knots for months dealing with a variety of ideological problems. There is no point in our developing for their use good revolutionaries. However, it would provide reason for frequent contact with Chinese in order for them to help him in the development of his group. Would probably lead him into contact with other interesting types. Might have it for "Americans only" abroad--to avoid problems with Brits: whatever:

b. Might Talk About Starting a One Man Institute for Studying African Revolution: could put out a four page broadsheet for peanuts. It would discuss various African problems. His book gives him good reason for such study. He might draw one or two people to him. Can use this too as basis for approach to Chinese. He will have come to recognize that he had not painted the true picture of national lib struggle in his book and through his broadsheet he seeks to rectify some his ideas.

c. He could seek to do another book on "The Dialectics of African Revolution." Here again the help of various communists, Marxist-Leninists, and particularly the Chinese in providing guidance (correct guidance) would give him frequent access and contact--providing the Chinese are willing to help.

d. Start a Broadsheet for American Revolutionaries Abroad: This would give him contct with a wide variety of radical U.S. types abroad. It would also have feed back into the American scene and in part fulfill his requirement to have an active role with U.S. revolutionary developments. Etc. Etc.

e. There are other activities which he might also undertake. The above are a few ideas of what we can do to "promote" QRPHONE. He can do a number of different things at the sametime since much of it overlaps and is hence compatible. However, each must be structured, carefully handled, with great attention to the details. STEP BY STEP.

Some Words of Caution: Our experience clearly indicates that it is incorrect to rely upon either the agent or the station to provide the impetus. This seems to be true for a number of reasons. Case officers change often, chiefs of ops, bases, or stations change--there is not much continuity. We are thinking of a long term operation which, as it grows, becomes very complex. It is not easily understood by someone who gets involved after it has been going for sometime. It is even more true of changes in station leadership whose attitude is largely developed on his subjective feelings from reading only cable traffic. The initiative, the operational ideas, etc. are best kept in Hqs. There is so much more information here to work with, people with whom one can talk, staffs, etc. Also most officers in the field simply do not have the time to sit down and plan in the kind of detail that is needed to continue and develop the op. It calls for solid knowledge of the communist reality in order to insure that no errors creep in those contacts he may make. It calls for someone to have the time to read, study, certain publications, articles, etc., and then to figure out whether or not a given publication or article can be used to make a useful contact, write a useful letter, etc. If so, how, and then go the field with the idea, and concrete directions about how it should be used. Case officers most likely won't be exposed to the same material and probably wouldn't have the planning time necessary, or the various resources of Hqs to do what needs to be done.

This is not to suggest that the field has nothing to say. However, if the understanding can be clearly made that this is in fact a joint operation, with Hqs having an opportunity for big input, with the understanding that the only thing which matters to all concerned is the correct development of the operation in the given concrete conditions and not either the Hqs or the field trying to establish some kind of supremacy of rights over the other--there is a good chance of success.

200-124-154/1
~~200-124-154/3~~

14-00000

Under Separate Cover Attachment B to OEPW-1814

IDEN - Andrew Ness

S/C ATT. 2 to OEPW-1814

CS COPY

200-124-156/1

~~200-124-156/3~~

Agent Profile - QRPHONE/1

QRPHONE/1 is an American citizen and a singleton agent who has been a recruited asset for some seven years. He has extensive contacts among leftist, radical, and communist movements in Europe and Africa and was able to sustain his relations with many such figures for operational purposes in spite of a formal disassociation some years ago. Originally a member himself of a radical pro-communist group, his disenchantment with internal personal and political dissension in an organization to which he had firmly committed himself led later to his acceptance of an operational relationship with the Agency. Although targeted after his recruitment at the plethora of new left and radical elements in Europe, essentially for intelligence collection purposes, QRPHONE/1 has recently been redirected toward the Chinese Communists with a view to ingratiating himself and seeking their guidance and support as he demonstrates an interest in more effectively acting on their behalf. Our ultimate objective is to precipitate invitations to Mainland China which will lead to successively higher echelons of contact within the Chinese Government.

To prepare QRPHONE/1 for this demanding task, extensive retraining, assessment and remotivation were recently accomplished and selective recontact was made by him with his more influential and pertinent communist contacts. Reactions to QRPHONE/1's alleged desire to more fully commit himself to the communist Chinese cause and the assistance rendered thus far by these communist contacts are encouraging indicators of the potential success of this agent to achieve our goal.

Although a complex man to manage operationally because of his own background and the mix of his ideological and professional motivations, QRPHONE/1's intelligence and personality are such as to well equip him to meet the challenge of the tests the Chinese are likely to throw his way. He is based in England, as is his case officer, and operational meetings are held in secure safe sites, sometimes on the continent.

QRPHONE/1 has produced numerous intelligence reports on communist and radical targets in addition to his covert action functions as a journalist and author. His long-term tenure with the Agency will be determined in part by the degree of success of his new Chicom directions.

201

1 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with QRPHONE/1

1. On 24 July 1972, Andy Ness (in alias as Andy), Frank Falko (in alias as Frank) and the undersigned (in alias as Ken) converged on the OTR safesite in New York City to meet with QRPHONE/1 in order to debrief him on his trip through WOCORK.

2. The discussion was started by having QRPHONE relate the details of his trip on a city by city basis describing the people he met and his reception by them. It should be noted here that several of the individuals that QRPHONE was to have seen were out of town or unavailable, however, QRPHONE will correspond with these individuals in order to maintain his relationship with them.

NEWARK

QRPHONE met with Leibel Bergman at his home and stayed overnight (14-15 July) as his guest. QRPHONE told Bergman that he had decided to make a full-time commitment to the study of Marxist-Leninist (M-L) doctrine in order to become more proficient in M-L theory and would like to join the RU to further this ambition. Bergman's reaction, according to QRPHONE, was enthusiastic. Bergman gave QRPHONE some M-L literature (which was the same as the literature Andy gave him several weeks ago to study) which he felt would be helpful. Bergman stated that if QRPHONE was really interested in becoming involved in the M-L movement he should return to WOCORK because that "was where all the inconsistencies were." Bergman invited QRPHONE to

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
approval of DCI
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

CLASSIFIED BY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

QRPHONE 201

take part in some M-L study groups but didn't say what exactly would be studied. The following are some general comments QRPHONE provided about Bergman. Bergman doesn't like Newark, he has been mugged several times and would like to go back to California; however, that is not possible at this time, so Bergman will instead move to New York City. Bergman is pleased with the current development of the RU. He said that the recent trip to China by several RU members was successful and that the trip had been pleasant for them. QRPHONE commented that it appears that Bergman does not have the same control of the RU that he formerly had, although he is regarded as the "guru" of the RU.

NEW YORK

QRPHONE said that Richard Ward is attempting to sell the English language rights of Prince Sihanouk's book My War With the CIA. Ward had been trying to get Lyle Stuart to purchase the rights but Stuart's antipathy toward Wilfred Burchett, "that old Communist" according to Stuart, was too great. Burchett apparently wrote the forward and Stuart doesn't want to publish anything with his name on it. QRPHONE, in our presence, called Stuart and convinced him to at least read the manuscript of the book before he turned it down. Ward has a South Vietnamese student living with him as a combination houseboy/companion. This student, whose name is David Truong, is the son of the South Vietnamese presidential candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran in the 1967 South Vietnames election on a peace platform and who is now in prison. QRPHONE said that this student has amassed a large collection of books on intelligence, that the books are expensive and that he doesn't have any idea where the money to buy the books came from. He also said he doesn't think Truong has immigration papers to stay in WOCORK legally. I asked if Truong was in any way involved with the recent attempt to hijack a plane to Hanoi. QRPHONE stated that Truong knew the hijackers and might have known something about the attempted hijacking because the hijackers had also stayed at Ward's apartment.

Ward is going to France soon for a vacation with a girlfriend he refused to identify because he feels his apartment and phones are bugged "by at least ten intelligence agencies." Before he goes on vacation he intends to stop in Paris and meet with DRV and PRG officials as well as with Wilfred Burchett. (Ward also met with Jane Fonda prior to her recent trip to the DRV). Ward will try to visit QRPHONE in London sometime in September before he returns home. Ward claimed that a "wealthy benefactor" gave him some $1000 to cover the cost of his vacation. Ward himself is broke and makes only about $60 per week salary.

DETROIT

QRPHONE was unable to see Milton Henry, leader of the New Republic of Africa, who was on vacation in Japan. He did manage to see FNU Boggs, who is apparently no longer involved with radical organizations but who is acting as a clearinghouse for black and white radicals. QRPHONE characterized Boggs as less doctrinaire and less dogmatic than he had been in the past. Boggs' feeling about the black radical movement is that it is in considerable disarray.

CHICAGO

QRPHONE saw LPWEAKLY/1 who told him that he was trying to get an invitation to visit China. LPWEAKLY/1 told QRPHONE that if he went he would see about taking him along. This was the first that QRPHONE knew about LPWEAKLY/1's plans. QRPHONE was unable to see either Sidney Lens or Hal Block because they were out of town. He did corroborate the fact that Block had recently been to China. QRPHONE spent some time with Don Wright, who was a member of the RU delegation to China. Wright is now a full-time RU official responsible for organizing RU cells in the Mid-West and seems committed to revolution although he doesn't speak in M-L terminology. Wright stated that one problem now facing the RU involves national exposure, i.e., getting minorities to become involved with the RU. This is a change from past RU philosophy which was that minority groups should form their own organizations separate from the RU. QRPHONE said Wright is very bitter toward the Black Panther movement and thinks that Eldridge Cleaver is "bad" and that Huey Newton and Bobby Seale are "corrupt".

SAN FRANCISCO

In San Francisco QRPHONE stayed with Davida Fineman. The mysterious M, who appeared in several of her letters to QRPHONE, is Martin Nichols, a Marxist scholar of note who translated into the English the entire Fundamentals of Political Economy. He was once a member of the RU.

Emotionally, Davida is not as depressed as she was several months ago, even though her brief exposure to the world of labor union organizing was a failure. Her comments about the RU were to condemn the Bruce Franklin group (Venceramos Organization) which she said is going to bring disaster to the whole RU because of its predilection for violence before the groundwork for revolution has been laid. Fineman feels that Robert Avakian, a high RU official, is less wild and erratic than in the past and has in fact become a good M-L.

QRPHONE saw Paul Richards, Hodee Edwards' son-in-law. Richards is a former CP member from the Mid-West, which he left because of the people. He feels that the Mid-West is a part of the country where the Government ought to test nuclear warheads. QRPHONE also met with Earl and Lee Rose. Earl was in the RU delegation to China where he must have caused some embarrassment to the delegation by his naivete. He attempted to meet African revolutionaries, particularly members of the MPLA, which he didn't realize were Moscow-oriented. Rose asked QRPHONE to write and send him material on the various African liberation movements. Lee Rose works for Bell Telephone Company although Earl, her husband, is unemployed.

ATLANTA

QRPHONE went to the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, formerly the Martin Luther King Foundation, where he met with Tom Porter, the head staffer of the organization. There was recently a split in the Center and the Executive Director, a Dr. Scott, was forced out of office. The office is still vacant and, according to Porter, will remain so for the immediate future. The reason for the continued vacancy is apparently to allow Coretta King and other members of the Board of Directors to maintain direct control. Porter is a former writer for Freedom Ways Magazine. QRPHONE said that Porter knew of him but didn't say exactly how. QRPHONE told Porter he would consider writing a brief on the Center for LPWEAKLY. QRPHONE said that the Center is going to establish a foreign affairs staff which will be headed by Jack O'Dell, an old CP member.

3. After QRPHONE's discourse on his trip, Andy discussed in broad terms what he could expect in the next year with regard to securing entre to the Chinese. QRPHONE was told that once he was proficient in M-L he would be expected to go out and test his knowledge with various individuals and organizations in order to gain access and become known to the Chinese. Andy emphasized it wouldn't be easy, that QRPHONE would have to be diligent and patient, but that in the end, if he was successful, the benefits would be many. QRPHONE accepted this.

Kenneth Rosen
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/KRosen:ckj (1 August 1972)

Distribution:
Orig. - routed to AC/CA/B3
1 - AC/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3

Phr 201

TSD/BAB MEMO # 275-72
20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rod Sweet, Chief CA-3

ATTENTION : Mr. Ken Rosen, Rm 3D18

SUBJECT : ORPHONE/1

1. Attached is the psychological assessment of ORPHONE/1. A preliminary verbal read-out was given on 7 July in which it was stated that Subject was an emotionally stable individual. We still support this statement, but a more in-depth analysis revealed there are certain aspects of his personality that are susceptible. These are discussed in the report. If any part of the report is unclear or requires further discussion, please contact us. Meanwhile, we would appreciate receiving follow-up information on Subject's performance in order to help us refine and improve our methods of assessment.

James M. Keehner
TSD/BAB

Attachment:
Report

Direct Psychological Assessment
of
ORPHONE/1

The psychological evaluation consisted of an extended interview and the JBMINIMUM test. His intelligence as measured by the JBMINIMUM is within the Bright Normal range by U.S. standards. The test scores were not as high as would be expected in comparison to his behavior and life style. The discrepancy could be due to the fact that he suffers from inferiority feelings and is working overtime to compensate. He gets considerable satisfaction and mileage out of his authorship; however, it takes a great deal of his energy in order to discipline himself enough to write a book. His talents are much more in the field of journalism. Mentally alert and very perceptive, he is aware of what is happening around him. These same traits would serve him well as an access agent. However, his reporting may reflect some distortions because his memory is not strong, and he tends to remember those events that are of interest to him. He naturally has good manual-manipulative skills, plus a practical bent that should enable him to easily and effectively learn and carry out tradecraft techniques.

Emotionally, Subject is fickle. "Out-of-sight - out of mind," describes the way he relates to others. The reason for this is that one of his primary needs is to be accepted and liked. Most of his life has been spent seeking acceptance, and because he is emotionally dependent he rapidly and intensely becomes involved. If separated from someone with whom he is involved, he has difficulty maintaining loyalty, and begins to look for another way to satisfy his needs.

An important fact which his case officer should remember is that he is not motivated by an ideology, but rather by the person who represents a particular ideology. His relationship with his case officer is of prime importance. To ensure his loyalty to the organization and consistent performance, he will need intense handling. The problem is that he may balk since he resists authority. He has the tendency to think that he knows it all, as witnessed by his never completing a degree.

Subject is not by nature a role player, and it would not be operationally advantageous to have him switch roles, for he cannot psychologically handle role playing over a period of time. He has worked hard to establish an identity for himself, and could not cope as effectively with a new one.

Conclusion:

Subject is a bright, extremely ambitious, and aggressive individual who appears to be motivated to work for the Agency by three needs: 1) a need to be accepted and liked; 2) a materialistic need; and 3) as a vehicle to be vindictive to former loyalties, i.e., the far left or radical movement in this country.

Though he is capable of switching loyalties, and his life history attests to this fact, it is very difficult to predict his future behavior since so much depends on his life circumstances. One statement that can be made is that, given his personality, it is very doubtful if he would return to his former allegiances. But if not personally involved with someone from this agency who can give him acceptance and support, he is likely to look elsewhere for his need satisfactions.

PAS Formula: 14(E+u+c Rc+c+ Uoo)L+

I HIGH (Digit Span) Low E

INTERNALIZER	EXTERNALIZER
Self Contained	Responsive, reactive
Inner Directed	Outer Directed
Physically Inactive, contemplative	Physically Active, relating
Values ideas, symbols	Practical, concrete, realistic

R HIGH Block Design LOW F

REGULATED	FLEXIBLE
Organized	Loose
Focused	Diffuse attention
Persistent	High imagination
Rote learning	Trial and error
Emotionally insulated	Spontaneous, expressive, sensitive
Memory good for procedures and routines	Memory good for feelings and impressions

A HIGH (Picture Arrangement) LOW U.

Role ADAPTIVE	Role UNIFORM
Versatile role player	Limited role player
Socially responsive and suggestible	Socially guarded and negativistic
Socially imitative	Often ignored
Reflects group behavior	Socially specialized or stereotyped
Overestimated	Often in conflict with group behavior
	Underestimated

OS 0257-72

SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff
ATTENTION: Mr. Jim Anthony

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1, Training Program "SHAW"

REFERENCE: Memo for Director of Training, From Chief, Covert Action Staff, dated 23 May 1972; Subject: "Covert Training for QRPHONE/1"

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York from 22 June to 14 July 1972. There were sixteen sessions for a total of eighty-seven training hours.

2. This was a happy reunion of trainee and instructor. Less than two years ago, PHONE was given three days of reports training (Please see Completion of Training Report dated 19 October 1970). Just as then, PHONE was totally engrossed in every training session from the moment of his arrival to the moment of his departure. Remembering that the instructor does not eat lunch, PHONE brought a sandwich with him daily and took this lunch while listening to the instructor. Thus, every minute of every day was made to count.

3. The only time lost was three hours for JBMINIMUM and on the several phone calls he had to make daily to check for calls to his cover office, then follow up with calls to those persons who had called his office and had left messages to be called back. At the most, these calls took half an hour. On some days, they took far less.

4. His cover organization work took up a considerable portion, everyday, of his free time with the result that he could not do any casing to speak of for subsequent preparation of commo plans for exercises. For example, told early on to prepare two dead drop commo plans, he was not able to come up with anything till the last week -- and then with only one written one and one that he reviewed orally. As a result he had to be given time during the training day to write reports of his countersurveillance exercises and one of his agent developmental exercises. After one such exercise, asked if he wished to take time out during the training day to write his report he said: "No, tonight I will make time to write it." And he did. And it was a good report.

5. On each Sunday, he went out of town to visit his aged Grandmother. He used the travel time to read tradecraft books (he read seven altogether).

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
by authority [illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

On Tuesday, July 4th, his publisher appointed him baby sitter for the publisher's teen age son and there went any hope of getting any casing done that day. At least one time, he mentioned that he did not go to bed till two that morning and as he had left the afternoon before, he had stated that he had meetings starting at four-thirty that afternoon. With all that, he nevertheless was fully alert and attentive every minute of every training session.

6. In his developmental recruitment series of exercises, his instructor played the role of operations officer -- and a real dumb-dumb he was. In such circumstances, PHONE had to do all the thinking, all the planning, all the casing for meeting sites, all the analyzing, all the preparing and pointing for the recruitment. It was pure joy to watch this man, after each meeting and again before the next one, go to work on the problem. He knew where he was, knew where he wanted to go, knew how to get there. When Mr. Rod Sweet, during the critique at the end of the series of exercises said: "He did a beautiful job," PHONE had earned that accolade all by himself. The instructor's only contribution had been in the teaching of the subject of Agent Acquisition.

7. At this point, the instructor wishes to execute a low bow in the direction of Mr. Sweet: He played his agent role excellently well and made the exercise a meaningful one for PHONE. The three trips to New York by Mr. Sweet must have been very taxing, particularly in view of his immediately upcoming TDY trip, but they were efforts well spent.

8. No man, of course, is perfect. Each has an Achilles heel, a weakness, or an all-too-human trait, at the very least. Our PHONE has his. He has a very quick mind. He knows it. And knowing it, he relies on it, counts on it. This, in turn, leads to a small failure in self-discipline. For example, told to write out his plan for the recruitment pitch, he came in with six words (maybe not that many) scratched on a 3 by 5 leaf torn out of his pocket notebook. He then proceeded, from these few words, to run off his plan without a single pause for an uh, hm, er, etc. It was as though he was reading a definition from a dictionary, so smoothly did his mind and thoughts run. He prepares everything in his mind, it appears, and does not like to write out that which he feels he should not have to write out. While it is great to have so facile a mind, a bit of discipline, to write out in full so important an act as a recuritment pitch, might one day save grief when an error would have been spotted had the entire plan been written out then looked over for possible flaws.

9. This small flaw, the instructor feels, accounts in considerable measure for PHONE's failure to bring in a written dead drop plan till the last days of the program. PHONE felt he could just as easily report orally. In fact, the other dead drop (he had been asked to do two) on which he reported orally, he discussed as though the peper was in front of him and he was reading from it. Nothing was missing -- area

description, access, hours of availability, the opposition, pros and cons as to suitability -- it was all there. He just didn't like to write out that upon which he could report orally.

10. In writing reports on the two counter-surveillance exercises, he dashed those off in jig time. No pause for thinking, no pause to look up at the ceiling or out the window. Just straight writing, including paragraphing. Mind and pen were as one. Same thing for his oral analysis before and after each meeting -- no pause to think, to review, to reconstruct, to remember -- just an IBM-type printout.

11. The instructor sets down this reluctance on our hero's part to write out certain things, not to downgrade him, but to alert desk and field officers that if they must have a certain report by a certain time, and they want it in writing, they must be firm. For example, after the second meeting in the developmental series, the instructor said: "I must have that report first thing in the morning. Do you want to take time out from this afternoon's training session to do it?" And, as already reported above, PHONE preferred to save the training time and he answered "I will make time to write it". In this case, time was of the essence because Mr. Sweet had to see the report before the next meeting. To sum up this item: When PHONE feels that an oral report is adequate he finds it a little difficult to bring himself to find time to make a written report. Told definitely that he must write a report and given a deadline, he meets the deadline and the report is everything it should be.

12. His reports on his recruitment meetings, Mr. Sweet said, were excellent. No jumping to conclusions, no padding, no misinterpretations, no omissions.

13. The surveillance team captain, reading PHONE's report on his actions during the countersurveillance exercises, marvelled at the completeness, total accuracy of description of the surveillants PHONE had made, including their ages (but always made each man an inch or two shorter than the actual height -- which PHONE admitted he does constantly), and the total recall of every move, every street crossing, every compass direction. (In the first countersurveillance exercise, sprung on PHONE without a moment's prior notice, he made one of his two surveillants. In the second one, with plenty of time to prepare, he made all three of them. These were two different teams from the New York Office of Security). Concluding his admiration of PHONE's reporting, the surveillance team captain said to the instructor: "You should be very proud of him".

14. In both exercises, the surveillance teams criticized the rapidity of PHONE's movements. He walks very rapidly from place to place, then spends time to browse in a book shop. Then off again at a high rate of speed to his next stop. They also criticized his looking both ways while crossing a one way street. They felt it made him appear

tail conscious. These are a typical New Yorker's habits. The instructor, also a New Yorker, is guilty of the identical actions. We are highly kinetic in our movements and as for looking both ways while crossing a one-way street, we follow the old Marine Corps adage: "There's always one S.O.B. that doesn't get the word". By sheerest coincidence, when the instructor was on his way to the safesite to deliver the surveillance team's report, he violated his own rule of looking both ways in crossing a one-way street and was bowled over by a hippie on a loaded bike -- going the wrong way. Only the large heavy film case the instructor was carrying kept him from being knocked flat.

15. Nevertheless, PHONE is now fully cognizant of the appearance that his actions create and will watch it in the future.

16. One last note on the counter-surveillance exercises: He chose his positions well and he camouflaged his actions beautifully. One example: The instructor called the surveillance team for a quick feedback on the first exercise and caught the men just as they returned to their office. They got on different phones for a three way conversation. They reported one incident as follows: "So rapid were PHONE's movements, that when he met a friend of his, he hardly paused to speak with him, just waved him off". The second surveillant: "No, it didn't look like that at all, to me. To me it looked like this Indian-looking person stopped PHONE and asked him for directions and PHONE gave them and just went about his business". PHONE's own report, which he wrote up before he learned about the two different interpretations of the incident: "--- where I stopped a foreign-looking man, apparently Indian in origin and asked him for the Museum which I knew perfectly well is on 55th Street. I turned around as he pointed south to 55th Street and spotted the same man in the grey suit, now holding his hat in his hand".

17. In the second exercise, there were two items of note: One, the team was surprised to note in PHONE's report that PHONE even had the name of the book that the surveillant picked up when he followed PHONE into a book store. Second, when the exercise was over, the team compared notes and decided that PHONE may have made two of them but could not possibly have made the third man. The team captain, on reading PHONE's report, was stunned to see that PHONE had indeed made the third man also, but good.

18. PHONE had an elicitation exercise (in addition to the developmental acquisition series) with Mr. Harry Webster, an instructor in the New York office. After relating the fine job that PHONE had done, Mr. Webster's report concluded: "A first rate performance by PHONE, who's obviously been around -- both coverwise and for real".

19. His choice of meeting places with his agent could not be faulted. For one, he chose an East Side restaurant (where diplomants, as Mr. Sweet held himself out to be, would properly be seen dining).

Yet it was far enough away from the United Nations building to lessen the chances that PHONE himself and his putative diplomat target would be spotted by friends or acquaintances. His choice for the next meeting was at an impressively named new restaurant near the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts on the West Side of town. This restaurant was located in the safesite complex. He was thus able very smoothly to invite his agent to the safesite from the restaurant for the recruiting pitch.

20. He did very well in executing two recognition meetings and two brush passes. He had no time to write his own commo exercises (as stated, he was able to write up only one dead drop commo plan) so he was given commo plans written up by another trainee. To give him variety, he was alternately the higher and the lower echelon, alternately accepted and made the hand-off.

21. In operational and intel reports, he did very well. He very successfully separated the operational from the intel info and the source comments from the positive intelligence.

22. Instructor's Observation: PHONE is a proud man, both as an individual and as an operator. While he was very discreet about it, very circumspect, he did, nevertheless, let the instructor know that he has, on occasion been handled with something less than pure genius. This, like the previous item, is noted not to down-grade PHONE, but to alert both desk and field officers that this man, being very sure, positive, definite and strong, hopes to be handled in a manner that would have those same words apply.

23. In sum: A very good man.

24. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in July 1973 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/SHAW. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Caleb L. Batten

CALEB L. BATTEN
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 10 March 1972

TO:	☒	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Ann Jane Long
CA/B3

SUBJECT: *(true name)* Richard Thomas Gibson

PROJECT: QRPHONE

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES: QRPHONE/1

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-306052

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SPECIFY)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B
☐	SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: International

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: See PRQ Part II, page 3, Section VI, 4 and 5.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM? ~~[illegible]~~ Identified but ~~subject doubtless~~ suspects CIA	X	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No FBI - All info from them has been received and reviewed.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY: See Memorandum dated 15 February 1966

5. PRQ STATUS

☒ PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED — Updated

☒ PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY — Updated

6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT previously sent

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*8. FIELD TRACES ** NA previously sent

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

9. CRS/ISG ** NA

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED
☐	SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES		10. FI/D **			☐	CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)
☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*LIST AREAS CHECKED — **IF NOT CHECKED - WHY? ☐ NOT APPLICABLE ☐ OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*

Comint no additional since last check 1966

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Roderick I. Sweet	1055	

FORM 3-71 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

201-306052

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AMENDMENT TO PRQ PART I

Name: Richard Thomas Gibson

DPOB: 13 May 1931 Los Angeles, California

Section II, 12

Present Residence: 32 Hartswood Road
Stanford Brook, London W. 12 (owner)

Section X

Monique Gibson Female Born 1966 U.K. U. S. Citizen

SECRET

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PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is __not__ to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

QRPHONE/1 formerly QREBONY/1

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

No change

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO __ANY__ RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM. See previous Part II

Yes To any Case Officer introduced to him by RODIGAST, or Aaron C. LAGINESTRA.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN. See Previous Part II

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA	known to Subject as	"Mike"
Louise R. CONGREVE	" " " "	"Louise Chapman"
XXXXX		
Isabelle R. PRIMMI	" " " "	"Ann"
Howell D. KAMMERMAYER	" " " "	"Jim"
Marie M. LUEBBERT	" " " "	"Pat"

FORM 11-60 1050a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4-20)

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")* See Previous PRQ Part II

This image of BKTRUST as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in QRPHONE/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of BKTRUST and of the importance of his contribution to the ~~XXXXX~~ BKTRUST EFFORT. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case,

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)* cool

QRPHONE/1 is dependent upon a BKTRUST salary and has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. QRPHONE/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Subject and RODIGAST use a journalist/literary agent cover in the unlikely event their clandestine meetings are compromised. Other officers will use cover of both being Americans in a foreign country.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Freelancexx jornalist, authera, and as a sympathetic leftist

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

BKTRUST

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

No change from previous PRQ Part II

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

See Previous PRQ Part II

Reporting Instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports 14-16 Oct. 197

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

No change

PRQ PART II

QRPHONE/1

SECTION II Motivation and Control

1. but every one of the wild anti-BKTRUST stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

Having accepted BKTRUST employment for a combination of reasons, it must be added that QRPHONE/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

QRPHONE/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. BKTRUST has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No Change

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

No Change

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will operate under free lance journalist cover and as a sympathetic leftist to develop contacts in the target milieu of Afro-Asian radical, pro-commie groups and solicit information from them on their activity, plans and views. Subject will also contact, assess recruit and possibly handle assets in these groups. In pursuit of operational objectives, he may be required to join a radical organization and/or travel to Bloc countries.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

No PM duties or use are anticipated. Selective CA exploitation within his cover situation - i.e. as a provacateur or means to surface anti-Soviet material from a "National Liberation" standpoint - will be continually possible.

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

None

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject has MOA providing for salary of $950.00 per month, (tax free), reimbursement for operational expenses and travel unless these are paid by other sources.

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ET.-

None known

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject speaks fluent but foreign-accented French. He has a functional speaking command of Spanish and Italian and can read German. Except for his language, he could pass as an Algerian.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRO PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Research, files,correspondence and assessment by previous case officers

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

None anticipated

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

SGSWIRL EXAMINATION OF SUBJECT on 21 September 1970 (no deception reported).

DATE 10 March 1972	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

7 MAR 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

1. A review in some depth of Project QRPHONE was conducted in January 1972 by DC/CA and me with Branch 3 personnel, with the participation of Richard Berkey (now of Branch 4, formerly QRPHONE Case Officer at LCPIPIT). Attached at Tab A are the questions which formed the basis for the review. A full record of the responses to these questions and the review discussion is not practical so I have attempted below to summarize the general conclusions which emerged. Attached at Tab B are two charts prepared by Branch 3 for the review plus a rough draft "CI Assessment" which they also prepared.

2. FI and CA/ Excluding FBI Sensitive Reports, QRPHONE dropped from 157 reports in FY 1968 to 6 reports in FY 1971. His FI reports have evidently not been used as a basis for CA activities since 1967. This situation is apparently due to a variety of factors: the character of the man himself, restrictions placed upon him, a changing political context which compounded targetting difficulties, the complications of his own security situation, and the method by which he was handled. It was agreed that QRPHONE does have inherent skills which should have an application to either FI or CA work. He is politically attuned; he writes well; he can handle contacts in several languages; he knows how to move internationally; he has an engaging social personality; he has an established (if controversial) reputation as a left-oriented journalist/writer with some scholastic credentials. The problem remains one of focussing his talents and determining the platform from which he should operate.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

3. Mobility. QRPHONE can be viewed as essentially possess mobility and has expressed a willingness to move. There are, however, qualifications on this. He has small children and an unwitting, anti-US, white, English wife, who would only be willing to leave her homeland if the overt job to which QRPHONE was going was clearly a step upward in his career.

4. Handling. The method by which QRPHONE has been handled, i.e. mainly through Rodigast (although there has been direct LCPIPIT contact recently), is unnessarily cumbersome and not suited to the close consultation needed to explore QRPHONE's future directions. Having been declared to the British Services the most secure place to meet QRPHONE is in the UK and he should be handled directly by an LCPIPIT officer.

5. Security. QRPHONE cannot escape the record of allegations that he is Agency-connected. What he can do, however, is face-up to these charges, challenge them and deny them. There may thus always be some element of suspicion attached to him, but, as time passes without definite proof of such a connection, its impact on his activities may be minimized and he may be able to engage in effective work inspite of it.

6. Sub-agents. It was felt that QRPHONE may possibly have a flair for recruiting and handling subagents. It was believed that this should be explored and that he should be given relevant training, based in New York. This would also provide the opportunity for Headquarters exploration with him of his future development.

7. Future Focus. What QRPHONE's own thoughts might be on his most natural course of development are not clear. He may have an inclination toward African Liberation Movements--the subject of his most recent major writing--but it could be questioned whether on this or on anti-fedayeen work, there is sufficient Agency interest to merit such focus. He has no significant base in the American black community (rather the contrary) which would make him of interest to others on this basis. His overt political orientation is described

as "radical," but it is an intellectual "radicalism," not revolutionary. Further, he is basically a theoretician not a personal activist by nature. He might be asked and might undertake an activist role—but it is felt that it would not sit naturally upon him and would probably not achieve whatever access might have been postulated. Within his theoretician, non-activist context it was nevertheless felt that the probably-to-be-expanded field of Chinese Communist activities in Europe provided the focus which might most usefully be explored. The expansion of Chinese Communist activities in Europe may come quite slowly but, in view of the probable shortage of assets in this field, it was a matter on which we should have some patience. It is also a field which could be explored without QRPHONE's needing to move. Whether he focusses on this field or another, however, QRPHONE needs to develop some job or organizational base which will make him interesting as a target himself to those we wish to focus him on. At the present time his cover does not provide a power or influence base and he is essentially completely dependent upon us.

8. CA Staff Termination/Redirection Responsibility. It was felt that in this process of redirection of QRPHONE, CA Staff should retain responsibility for QRPHONE. Even if a London-based assignment did not work out and it was decided to move QRPHONE to another area CA Staff should keep the project during the trial period and with this the responsibility for termination if the trial proved unsuccessful. If the trial was successful, on the other hand, then we would have discharged our responsibility for QRPHONE and could relinquish control.

9. Some time has passed since the above discussions took place. I am not aware of the extent to which there may already have been a follow-up to them. Needless to say, they have decided field implications in which LCPIPIT needs to be consulted, should they be pursued.

James E. Knott
Programs Officer
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - ADC/CA
1 - C/CA/B3
1 - CA/B3-Sweet
1 - CA/B4-Berkey
2 - CA/PO

SECRET

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1 **DATE:** 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE **STATUS:** Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has been said over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

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B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story . It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German. AND SPANISH

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However, the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

I disagree - I
Think we do know.
FD

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rod Sweet
CA/B3

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 5 January 1972

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DC/CA/B3		5 Jan	A
2.			
3. C/CA/B3		6 Jan	D
4. DC/CA/3		6 Jan	A
5. Rod Sw.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

- I'm all for the long-range objective cited: attached - An assessment of [illegible] by Andy Hern, re [illegible] potential to become a permanent dialectician, will be of value. A.

3-4
FYI - attached background info on QR Plan alternatives may be useful to you prior our 17 Jan. meeting this subject. DJ

- I have been proposed to re-direct [illegible] to [illegible] & then East Africa. - A.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

5 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's Operational Potential

1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer (Mr. Richard Berkey) and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/1's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).

2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with Mr. Andrew Ness, the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received Ness' reactions as follows:

A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.

B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.

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C. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicoms, QRPHONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicoms have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicoms, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRPHONE/1 is simply sympathetic, with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.

D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spotlight might be for QRPHONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicoms are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Ness feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRPHONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spotters" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.

E. The Chicoms will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targetting of the American revolution, hence QRPHONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicoms would see little or no use for QRPHONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa (just as we would assess and recruit a Thai for operations in Thailand, not in Nigeria).

F. Ness felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicoms would test the fiber of the man himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.

3. In answer to my question, Ness said he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, Ness could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.

Sweet

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RISweet:ckj (5 January 1972)

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
- 2 - CA/B3

28 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3

SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONE

REFERENCE: My Memorandum, "Review and Planning," dated 23 November 1971

1. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.

2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.

Fred W. Valtin
Acting Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-71-1369

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 6053

NO.

DATE: 17 DEC 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CA	17		
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. DC/CA		27/12	
6.			
7. C/CA/B3		27/12	DM
8. Rod			
9. DC/CA/3			
10. C/CA/3			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

FYI.

DM

7-8 — let's discuss

Hold for 1-5, 7 In discussing with China Ops last week, I asked them to take a joint look with us in terms of possible attractiveness to CPR if, as I assume, they become more aggressive in Europe. Want to talk about this one before my trip.

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17 DEC 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 29 November 1971

1. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks. Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.

2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold--namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that QRPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him in the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminating

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his services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposal arose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of proved capabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunity to become useful once more.

3. CI Type Review/QRPHONE Personal Security: Your memo makes out there have been frequent security reviews of QRPHONE's security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assessment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general summary of the alleged security breaches involving QRPHONE and their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and that assessments of his security status were made following each alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other leftist colleagues(who do not have any Agency association) by their rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational inefficiency.)

4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well. If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would want him permanently, only time and his own operational success could determine this. One hazards that if QRPHONE were able to make his way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station might come to regard him as a capital asset.

5. Substance: You noted that QRPHONE . . . "cannot just simply show up and start a leftist nuclei . . ." Why not? Others have. He is a well-known leftist in intellectual circles in Europe and has written many articles in praise of Mao. This should do for a start. As for what he might have to offer local leftists . . . money, energy and ideas will do. A great deal of money, of course, is unneeded, but some is. We can supply it. As for ideas and energy, he has both. Concerning the "built-in jealousy, animosity, etc." which such action would likely engender on the part of local rival leftists, this may or may not occur. But is this such a calamity if it should occur? Are not leftists usually fighting among themselves anyway? In any case, we have nothing to lose by trying to salvage this agent. What we have to lose by not trying is an agent asset of proved worth.

6. Credentials: You say in effect that QRPHONE has not been known as an activist but only as an intellectual. (Frankly, the distinction is not very important in my mind.) Be that as it may, he has written many articles on leftist subjects and has talked to innumerable leftists around Europe over the years. True, he has not been involved in such actions as street demonstrations, but we would not like him to be so personally involved in the future in any case. What we would want him to do is to write pamphlets, informally recruit associates to his group and provide a little money to the group as might be required for various undertakings. Aside from the organizing and funding, actually this is not very different from what he has been doing--except that it will be in one place for a change.

7. Book Dispatch Sale: You may be very correct in saying that shopping him around to European stations by book dispatch is a poor way to solicit useful tasks for QRPHONE. But again, I took my lead from C/EUR/CA who made a request along these lines. Certainly sending book dispatches wouldn't hurt any. If Spence is willing at some future time to visit various field stations and to attempt selling QRPHONE's services personally, we would be happy to have him do so. We, of course, don't know when he will be available to do so, and time is passing.

8. Concluding Comment: I really feel that we should relate to you in some detail the success which Andy Ness once had with the kind of undertaking which we have proposed for QRPHONE. It may interest you. On the other hand, it may be perfectly possible that the situation which Andy Ness once manipulated is not applicable to

the conditions which would confront QRPHONE in say Rome. But if we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumbent upon us to think of something else for him to do before we begin thinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that . . . "the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. . ." I agree. And to this end, we should like a couple of weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusions of ours about the current viability of this case and some future alternative course of action.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION: 7767

NO.

DATE: 17 December 1971

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CA/B3		12/17	D
2. DC/CA/3			
3. Don			D
4. Poo S.			
5. Jane			
6.			
7.			
8. Phone 201			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1-4.
Fred has always taken a big interest in this case, and so he will have to be brought into the planning. Rud is of course a good idea — and your analysis of past failures is excellent. Providing AF is for it, we should give it major consideration. Let us not, however, wholly discard the Rome play just yet.

---

4 to 3 -
Returned per your request

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17 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3

SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/1

1. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:

A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target. The British have asked that he not operate in London against African targets. His reputation among MHCHAOS target groups of interest to us in Paris and Stockholm has been so tarnished that he has not taken into their confidence significantly enough to be of value.

B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.

C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.

D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANCE agent.

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E. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.

F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)

G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.

2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.

A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.

B. From the point of view of MHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited in Tanzania. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.

C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled Tanzanian opposition politicians in London and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of President Nyere (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage in Dar es Salaam in the near future. Nyere and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.

D. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) to Nigeria or (2) to Ghana for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e. two or three more stringerships) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly by Lagos or Accra Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in Tanzania, the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning Tanzania would be calculatedly designed to support the Nyere government.

E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to Tanzania.

3. If you concur with the above, I will procede to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPIPIT.

Sweet

Roderick I. Sweet
Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

DDP/CA/B3/RSweet:ckj

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B3
2 - CA/B3

PROJECT QRPHONE

PART A. CHARTS REQUESTED

Chart I: For the period FY 1967 through FY 1971 provide the number of disseminated reports according to the subject field of the report. The headings would be: Fiscal Year, African Independance Movements, Anti-US Demonstrations, European Maoist Groups (etc., or whatever other subject fields you wish to set up).

Chart II: List the specific events or organizations against which covert action was in fact undertaken and give the number of QRPHONE reports which were submitted on such events/organizations.

PART B. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is the basic reason for this being a CA Staff project (other than history)? To provide multi-divisional tasking for FI purposes of general U.S. intelligence interest? To provide CA operational information for possible DDP use?

2. As regards FI reports, which have lately been described as being of only marginal interest, the main criticisms appear to be a lack of depth and detail. CA Staff's counter to this has been that QRPHONE goes as far as he can, and can go no further through elicitation. Have these depth/detail criticisms been valid? Is our defense valid, or could he reasonably be expected to elicit more depth and detail than he does?

3. If he can go no further through elicitation and we wish to keep him on the FI path, what is implied? That he develop and run agents himself? That he actually goes to work for an organization of intelligence interest to us? How realistic would either of these lines of pursuit be?

to Rod: this rough draft.

Draft.

CI Assessment

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xx xxx violently anti-French articles which were printed and counld have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportelly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: XXXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote him a long ~~lxtxxx~~ and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1. Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAl is pro- Cuban. end [redacted] Q/1 loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Bon Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Feb. ~~1969~~ 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributons to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine ~~EAN~~ Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. ~~This~~ ~~W~~ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI ~~picked~~ suspicion of Q/1 due to accusations against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

SECRET

QRPHONE REPORTING

	Cuban	AAPSO AAJA	African Liberation	War Crimes Tribunal	Anti-US	European Communism	FBI	FBI SR*	Total Dissems
FY67	3	5	13	27	12	24	22	-	106
FY68	1	3	24	32	27	27	43	30	187
FY69	1	-	12	-	17	10	2	43	85
FY70	-	-	13	-	-	9	-	9	31
FY71	1	-	1	-	1	3	-	31	37
	6	8	63	59	57	73	67	113	446

*Sensitive Reports

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 29 Nov 71

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/CA		29	✓
2.			
3. DC/CA		11/30	✓
4. C/CA			✓
5. Chief, CA/B-3		12/2	D
6. DC/CA/B3			A
7. Room 5			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

2-3 My real question is: Does this fellow really have it? Your comment in the 1st para under "credentials" seems to me about right. Who knows him personally besides Roddy?

He has it, but not (I think) for what has been proposed. Vernon & I as here and in the field know him well.
FV

Pls. read, return to me. We will discuss answers
Don

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

29 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3

SUBJECT: QRPHONE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONE Operations in Europe, Dated 24 November 1971

1. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.

2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.

a. Security: RODIGAST's and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him whether or not the Ollie Harrington incident had happened in Paris.

b. Location: Apart from the efficiency of the French police, there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's even going to Paris for a meeting, let alone being stationed there (e.g., protection of RODIGAST's identity, the Harrington incident, and the location there of the Wright clan). I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.

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A different cover for a move to Rome might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. Rome Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently??

c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (miniscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.

d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist??), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is Manchanda's insignificant group -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature -- which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.

[illegible]

In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost ($40,000??) to Rome, but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the "Andy Ness" operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.

e. Book Dispatch Sale: Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only three Stations really heavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall), and those three have former CI/ICG men who know QRPHONE well: Breckenridge, Hornstein and Friend. QRPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not through dispatch. I think, that the way to do it, if at all, is by Spence during a visit to these Stations.

f. "CI-Type" Review: A review of the file will show how often this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand Horvath asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.

3. Having gone around this problem several times in the past several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider QRPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt (as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course, entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least three area divisions.

4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.

Fred W. Valtin
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

24 November 1971

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

SUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe

1. Mr. Leo Horvath, EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either Rome or Paris for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group say, in Britain. He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in (France) (Italy) or whenever, as good Communists should.

2. Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which Mr. Andy Ness developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials--already strong--to the point where he might well become

Is this really still true?

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of focal interest to the PRC. This could lead to invitations to Peking (as it did in Ness's case) and possibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis the China target.

?

?

3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed to pose some doubts to Mr. Horvath. On the one hand, he did not feel that either Rome or Paris Stations had sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and support a tricky operation of this type which might have only marginal utility, in their view. As for Paris, the French police, being as efficient as they are, would probably come upon QRPHONE's "black net" in time, and could conceivably pose security problems for him. As an alternative, Mr. Horvath proposed that CA Staff write a general dispatch to all EUR Stations describing the asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see greater use made of QRPHONE's capabilities on the Continent. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment on the service that QRPHONE might provide them and suggest the means for accomplishing it. Mr. Horvath also asked that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the security review indicated no severe compromises of QRPHONE's cover or personal security, it would be a pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable contacts in the European leftist community.

I am not surprised and I am inclined to agree

I believe that the stations ought to be informed what [illegible] already

4. Accordingly, I agreed with Mr. Horvath's two recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would still like to raise the possibility of a black operation in Paris and Rome in that dispatch and to this, Mr. Horvath posed no objections.

Donald W. Muntz
Chief, Branch 3
Covert Action Staff

Addendum: Following the above conversation, Miss Jane Long has initiated a CI type of review of the Subject's security status.

I'm not opposed to another CI-type review but, frankly, am under the impression that this has been done quite exhaustively several prior times.

DDP/CA/B3/DMuntz:lb

Distribution:
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m

BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. OEPA-3285

B. LCPIPIT 20673 (IN 344001)

1. DATES OF QRPHONE/1 VISIT TO SWITZERLAND CHANGED. Q/1 WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA 27 JUNE TO 4 JULY.

2. FILE: 200-124-156/3, AND 201-306052.

GP-1

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INFO FILE, VR DDP ADDP dEUR dci/so

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BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON

27 MAY IN 344001

4

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: OEPA-3285

1. PER REF AND MASLOTT CONVERSATION WITH BACHMAN, QRPHONE/1 RECEIVED VISA TO VISIT SWITZERLAND 10-17 JUNE TO COVER EXHIBITION OF BLACK AMERICAN ART BEING HELD AT RATH MUSEUM IN GENEVA.

2. QRPHONE/1 INSTRUCTED LIMIT SELF TO JOURNALISTIC PURSUITS DURING SWISS STAY.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3 AND 201-306052.

GP-1

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201-306052

27 May 71

SECRET

4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targetting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?

5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?

6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense? ⓐ ⓑ

7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer? ⓒ

8. With a reportedly anti-US, white, British wife and 3 small children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?

9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency? French [illegible]

10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?

11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE's CIA status is known to MI-5, MI-6 and Scotland Yard. A French service penetration (UNDERBID/39) indicated

that Rodigast was under some suspicion. QRPHONE has been refused entrance at the border by the Swiss authorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of the groups and individuals he contacts on his travels he has a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyone doubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIA connection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a fact that probably the safest place for him to be contacted is London, in spite of whatever tradecraft he and Rodigast may practice? In spite of a rapport and background knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefits from with Rodigast, are these factors worth the extra handling complications? Doesn't this handling method essentially double the cost of the operation?

went 1 . [illegible] 71
+ [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair Play for Cuba?" the break with Verges? Does QRPHONE have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?

[illegible] office of
[illegible]
[illegible] fight over money

13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters the degree of interest in the Italian branch in having a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-Soviet propaganda ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit," what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom fringe groups?

14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE to become involved in depth with one of the groups he is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come under suspicion in case action against the group pointed to a leak?

15. If he could not take covert action himself through such a group to what extent are we now or potentially likely to become involved with covert action by other groups against:

- anti-Vietnam action
- African liberation movements
- New Left groups
- pro-Chicom groups
- Fedayeen groups

16. What are QRPHONE's real talents? Why hasn't he been able to do more about establishing himself on a more self-sustaining basis? Is it because of the targets we keep pushing him on? What is meant by these allusions to QRPHONE's "work discipline?" Do his talents possibly point toward some covert action use in a role where the CIA label is relatively less important?

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/R[redacted]

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MICROFILM

37

TO COS, London

INFO. C/LCPIPIT

FROM Chief, AF via Chief, EUR

MICROFILMED MAR 31 1971 DOC. MICRO

SUBJECT JAGUAR Reporting on African Expatriates in London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES:
a. OBLW-25,380 (26 Feb 70)
b. OELA-53,167 (24 Dec 70)
c. DIRECTOR 063010 (27 Aug 70)
d. OBPA 3090 (18 Jan 70)

1. For over a year ZIBET personnel have sought to stimulate more SMORANGE reporting on the activities of certain high level African expatriates in London. Up to now the results have been meager and discouraging, and in addition JAGUAR gained JKLANCE's agreement that QRPHONE/1 should desist from pursuing these London targets.

2. Perhaps stemming from the recent visit of SMOVID to Headquarters, however, we have just received an informative and useful report, prepared by JAGUAR, on Osumba Langi, the principal radical Kenyan expatriate in London, along with promises of other studies on targets mentioned during the Headquarters discussions. This is possibly a hopeful note for the future.

3. Prior to this development, JKLANCE had received only one report from JAGUAR in response to various appeals and the submission of requirements. That report, received in December 1970 was in response to Headquarters-supplied requirements forwarded the previous February (and resubmitted in August 1970), but contained very little positive information. Furthermore, the report's format and tone suggested that JAGUAR's reply was intended as a one-time affair. It certainly did not invite further questions nor indicate an intention to volunteer further details later.

4. In reviewing the correspondence on this matter, it was noted that the verbatim minutes of February 1970 Headquarters discussions with SMENCB and SMUMBRAGE contained a passage that may cast new light on JAGUAR's position. In response to ZIBET officers' queries about what JKLANCE could expect from JAGUAR (it previously having been made clear by the SMOTH officers that the target was JAGUAR's), the visiting SMOTH officers said of JAGUAR's position: "They have a quite serious

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[redacted]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO 200-124-156/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OBLW-26059

DATE Typed: 19 Mar 71 PHONE

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CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/[redacted]T

HQS FILE NUMBER 11-2-24

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OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/AF DC/EUR/BC	27/3/71	

(40)

DISPATCH

30 Mar 71

constitutional problem with their responsibilities to IDEN. The idea of passing out political information on exiles is repulsive to him." It should be noted for the record that JAGUAR itself has not given such an explanation to JKLANCE, but, knowing JAGUAR's bureaucratic position and its traditionally conservative role in the SMORANGE community, it may be that JAGUAR in fact is thus inhibited.

5. As to QRPHONE/1, SMOVID on 15 June 1970 followed up his March 1970 complaints to JADWIN about QRPHONE/1's contacts with expatriates in London. SMOVID expressed JAGUAR's concern about QRPHONE/1's security and its view that QRPHONE/1's information was of marginal value. SMOVID, emphasizing that he was expressing a view personally endorsed by SMUPSILON, outlined three possible options: withdraw QRPHONE/1 from the country; stop running and tasking QRPHONE/1 as an agent; or have JAGUAR take over the running of QRPHONE/1. (QRPHONE/1 subsequently was instructed to stop pursuing his SMORANGE targets.)

6. Thus JKLANCE is stymied. The question is whether there is anything that can be done to improve the situation. The one new factor in the equation that possibly could be used to reopen the discussion with a view to ameliorating the situation is the fact that there now is a different IDEN than when the February 1970 SMOTH explanation was offered. Even though JAGUAR has not specifically given that explanation, to JKLANCE, the Station, without reference to SMOTH's explanation presumably could elect to reopen the discussion in terms of a possible change of atmosphere since the change of IDEN. Such a discussion at least should give an indication of whether SMOTH's explanation is JAGUAR's (and JKLANCE's) major obstacle.

7. Were QRPHONE/1 permitted to resume his London contacts he could obtain some information of the type JKLANCE would like to get from JAGUAR. But, in view of the June 1970 SMUPSILON-approved SMOVID demarche to JADWIN, it might be unwise, for the moment at least, to sound out JAGUAR about reactivating QRPHONE/1. We would appreciate receiving London Station's views on this subject.

8. One final point that should be noted is that McGRILLEN, in forwarding the above-mentioned JAGUAR report on 24 December 1970, mentioned that visiting ZIBET officer Jeremy R. FREYMARK recently had discussed these JKLANCE requirements in London with SMOVID, SMENDIVE and SMEVICT and that it was McGRILLEN's understanding that "it was generally agreed to limit our requests in the future to selected targets on which there is evidence of coup plotting or subversion." McGRILLEN added that he looked forward to any followup questions based on the above criteria that Headquarters wanted the Station to submit to JAGUAR. FREYMARK's recollection of his talks with JAGUAR is at slight variance with McGRILLEN's account. FREYMARK recalls that he had agreed to limit JKLANCE's future requests to those cases in which JKLANCE had an active interest and where there was good reason to suspect a real threat to the stability of the African country against which the London-based African might be acting. Accordingly, there is attached a select list of individuals about whose contacts and activities JKLANCE would like to have updated information from JAGUAR. The type of information we desire is indicated by the illustrative questions and other data in support of our request. Whereas we would like to have unsolicited and regular reporting on these targets, we realize that JAGUAR is not equipped or prepared to accept such a continuing requirement. We believe that the attached list along with the paragraph five discussion pegged to a change of IDENS are good pegs for GIBSON or his designee in reopening the discussion with JAGUAR.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T/[redacted]	OELW-26059

9. London Station's report on the outcome of its discussions with JAGUAR is awaited with considerable interest.

RICHARD I. FELS

Attachment:
As stated above

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	S E C R E T/[redacted]	☐ CONTINUED	3

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ATTACHMENT TO DISPATCH NO. OLLA-26059

ZIBET would appreciate receiving from JAGUAR any current material on the activities and contacts of the following Africans who either reside in London or who visit there frequently. These targets have been selected according to the criteria outlined in paragraph 8 of the referenced dispatch.

__Ghana__

William BEDOE-ANSAH - Sensitive Headquarters' sources have indicated that John K. TETTEGAH is planning to return to West Africa. Since BEDOE-ANSAH is known to maintain contact with TETTEGAH and was in fact responsible for TETTEGAH's employment with a Japanese business firm in Cairo, we feel he may be involved in any new subversive moves undertaken by TETTEGAH.

Kojo BOTSIO - There has been some indication through sensitive sources that BOTSIO has recently been travelling in Africa and that he too may be involved in TETTEGAH's current activities.

(In addition we are still interested in the other targets mentioned in Reference C.)

__Nigeria__

L. BALOGUN - He is the purported author of the recently published Manifesto of Nigerian Young Revolutionaires Organization.

Alex CHINA - He is an Ibo resident in London who is not only a self-described Marxist but is also a regular contributor to __Advance__ the organ of the Marxist Nigerian Trade Union Confederation.

Sam IKOKU - Although IKOKU is the Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction of the Nigerian East Central State and is resident in Europe, we understand that he occasionally visits London. We would appreciate being alerted to these visits and receiving information on his London contacts.

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MAR 31 1971
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[illegible] OELW 26059

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T/R ~~Y B A T~~	OELW-26059

IDEN: The Home Secretary

[illegible]
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201- 306052

[redacted]

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/R ~~Y B A~~ T	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
RYBAT/DTDORIC/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/British Residence Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. QRPHONE/1 has received a letter from the Home Office which removes the previous restrictions on his stay in Britain. There is now no limit on the length of his stay in Britain and he does not need to report his address, etc., to the police. Further, he may now obtain employment in Great Britain without the need to obtain official permission.

2. For the record, we are forwarding under separate cover, a copy of the letter.

MICROFILMED
MAR 30 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: USC
Letter

S/C ATTD BY RID/~~AN~~ ANK
Dated 30 MAR 71

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - COS, London, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.

1ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D200-124-156/~~18~~ 2	OEPA-3221	18 March 1971
	CLASSIFICATION RYBAT SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

GRACIOUS, EUROPEAN-BORN LADY in mid-60s, of independent means, residing in Berkeley, seeks gentleman companion, scholar, writer, artist, with progressive political interests and desire to share tomorrow. NYR, Box 3511.

WOMAN, 50, Manhattan resident, 5'2" attractive, articulate, seeks male companion to share interests and experiences. Loves politics, music, time at home and cooking. NYR, Box 3507.

FEMALE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, 27, marooned in Ottawa seeks unattached, intelligent man, 25-35, who appreciates food, music, travel and the outdoors. PO Box 4445, Station E, Ottawa.

CREATIVE, petite woman, in search of sensitive mature unattached man 55-60, whose poignant longing is for more than just hello-goodby. NYR, Box 3501.

UNIVERSITY TEACHER, Denver area, 37, wishes to meet interesting and warm woman. All letters answered. NYR, Box 3495.

ATTRACTIVE, INTELLIGENT LADY, stable, responsive personality, sense of humor, seeks gentleman companion with similar attributes, prefers successful professional who enjoys home and country living. Minimum age, 45. NYR, Box 3494.

I AM 36, beautiful, intelligent, accomplished, strong, wise, modest. I have much love to give vital, expansive, solvent, rich adult male seeking mate. NYR, Box 3493.

SUCCESSFUL WRITER IN LATE FIFTIES, tall, attractive, amusing, seeks quasi-Platonic relationship with mature, sensitive woman interested in wearing rubber. Montreal area. NYR, Box 3500.

MODERN, IRONIC PENELOPE, tired of waiting for wandering Odysseus seeks eligible suitors who are tall, over 40, and who have intellect, imagination, and integrity. No need to fear, Odysseus, unless you are a male chauvinist pig and answer all advertisements placed by females. NYR, Box 3491.

REPUTEDLY CHARMING MAN, turning youthful 60, Southwestern Connecticut cliff dweller, writer-communicator of many interests, considering modest early retirement, seeks committed relationship with intelli-

BERKSHIRES: 1½ beautifully wooded acres, 175 foot paved road frontage, 500 feet brook frontage. PO Box 98, South Egremont, Mass. 01258.

WILL EXCHANGE 2 bedroom Manhattan apt. (E. 41st) and car for similar accommodations in London during May and June. NYR, Box 3488.

PUTNAM COUNTY, year-round rental, charming country cottage, two rooms, fireplace, all facilities. Sixty miles from NYC, suitable for single person or weekend couple. $125 per month plus utilities. (914) 225-8086 or write NYR, Box 3487.

RENT. Cliffside Cottage, Barbados. Sleeps four, secluded beach, maid service. Will meet arrival. $135. weekly. NYR, Box 3430.

LONDON, BARNES AREA, separate furnished flat in Edwardian house. Livingroom, bedroom, kitchen, bath, central heating, maid service, linens, dishwasher. Private garden faces common and lovely babbling brook. Near transport, shops and Thames. 20 minutes Hyde Park. $300 per month to June, $350. per month through September. Write Langdale, 21 Cedars Rd., London S.W. 13, England. Phone, London, 878-0963.

FRANCE: ROYAN. Furnished four bedroom house. Near beaches, Language Center. April-July. Sept.-July $145 month including all utilities. Johnson, 16 Rue des Orchidées, Paris (13e).

UNUSUAL LOFT, beautifully designed and furnished. Safe, quiet, convenient. Spacious, Sky-light. $300/month. (212) 962-1054.

COMMODIOUS VACATION HOME, secluded village location nr Manchester, Vt., May-Jun-Jul, $350/mo. Sheedy, 1 Schoolhse. La., Syosset, N.Y. 11791.

VILLA SALE/RENTAL. Completely modern. Classic style. Galilea Mallorca. Near Palma/Mediterranean. Fully equipped large pool grounds five bedrooms furnished. Ideal year round use/investment. Write illustrated brochure: 160 East 70 Street. New York, 10021.

VILLA RENTAL. Galilea Mallorca. Modernized 18th century stone house. Four bedrooms terraces pool. Write illustrated bro-

LONDON—light, airey four bedroom family home of American correspondent, large garden, all conveniences, completely furnished, close to Thames, Underground and bus, 25 minutes to Picadilly, from 23 July to 5 September for $600, all utilities included. Write Mrs. Joy Gibson, 32 Hartswood Road, London, W12 9NA or phone 01-749-0546.

PIERMONT, NEW YORK. June 1 to Oct. 1. [illegible] tastefully furnished house. Terraced garden. Every convenience. Overlooking Hudson. 15 miles from City. $1,500. (914) EL 9-0077.

MARTHA'S VINEYARD. 2 bedroom cottage. Oak Bluffs. Memorial Day to Labor Day. $1000 or by month. NYR, Box 3477 or (212) 254-7127 after 8 p.m.

MAINE rental (Mt. Desert Island): 3 bedroom furnished farmhouse on cove. Swimming, barns, separate study. Rent month or season. Call 413-584-1550.

EAST HAMPTON house available to share with teacher-writer couple. Private bedroom. Near beaches. Car needed. 691-7697, 790-4613, Wa 4-9465.

ETC.

RATIONALISTIC, non-occult astrology. Natal chart interpreted, $15. Give place, date exact time of birth. Sag/Aries, Box 51, RD 3, Hudson, NY 12534.

POETRY WANTED for cooperative poetry anthology. Include stamped return envelope. Idlewild Press, 1807 East Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, California 90021.

STAINED GLASS STUDIO authentically recreating small parts of 11th-16th century windows. Colorful, decorative. Herbs, animals, Medieval scenes. Available window hanging, shelf standing. We use technique, material of Medieval craft. Color catalog, 25c. Glass Masters, Box 272R, New York, N.Y. 10009.

COUNTERACT! If you were reluctant to support Friends of Art at your local museum, join ENEMIES OF ART. $1.00. ENEMIES OF ART, Box 5615, Milwaukee, Wis. 53211.

WILL BUY participation in Broadway or Off Broadway plays. Those running, past shows. Give full details. NYR, Box 3485.

HELP THE CAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION. The Providence Free School

SINGLES! — See PHOTOS of 4-10 ideal mates to select before dating! Advanced matching systems assure compatibility! All ages. Write for information and free questionnaire: YALE PHOTO-DATING® SERVICE INC., P.O. Box 509, Dept. E, New York, N.Y. 10028.

MEET YOUR IDEAL MATE (computerized matching). All ages. Write TEAM Project, 101 W. 30th St., Suite 531, NY 10001.

AUSTRALIA WANTS YOU!!! Government Assisted Passage 1971 Government Information and Forms Most Complete Information Available $1.00 Reports on Employment, Business, Taxes, Education, Teaching, Housing, Ranching, Maps, etc AUSTCO, Box 3623 NY, Long Beach, California 90803

WRITERS sell an editor before he reads your manuscript. Send for free booklet, catalogue. Writers Craft Systems, Box 181NYRA, Narberth, Pa. 19072.

I REQUIRE . . .

a "dating service" that

- ☐ has outgrown pop prattle about the "swinging scene" (ages 21 to 65)
- ☐ has the enlightened versatility to match flower children and Wall Street tycoons (although only sometimes with each other)
- ☐ has penetrated bigtown anonymity to dare deal only with its more cultivated, intelligent, literary community (48% through personal referrals)
- ☐ offers exclusive, expensive, exhaustive, individual processing by trained consultants

☐ A LOOK AT YOUR OUTSTANDING QUESTIONNAIRE

MIND MATES
Bureau for Interpersonal Relations
1 East 42nd St., New York, New York 10017
MU 2-3757

CLASSIFIED SECTION

Effective with May 6, 1971 issue.

40c per word—15 word minimum.

Six insertions: 39c per word
12 insertions: 38c per word
18 insertions: 37c per word
24 insertions: 35c per word

MICROFILMED
MAR 30 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

001

7P

HOME OFFICE
Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON W.C.1
Telex: 261867 *Telegrams:* *Alidep, London WC1*
Telephone: 01-405 4321

Please address any reply to
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE
and quote: P.E.O
Your reference:

- 9 MAR 1971

Sir/~~Madam~~

I am directed by the Secretary of State to inform you that he is now prepared to remove the restrictions on your stay in this country. The conditions attached to it have therefore been cancelled.

Cancellation of conditions means that you are now also exempt from the requirement to report changes of address and other particulars to the police.

There is now no necessity for you to obtain permission from a government Department to take employment in Great Britain. The Secretary of State would, moreover, have no objection if you wished to establish yourself in business or a profession, but it should be clearly understood that this does not relieve you of the obligation, in that event, to conform to any regulations governing the business or professional activities in which you may be interested.

This cancellation of your conditions does not extend to the Channel Islands which have their own laws relating to aliens. You should therefore consult the Immigration

SECRET

Authorities of the island concerned if at any time you contemplate going there to live.

This cancellation of conditions extends to Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man only as far as residence is concerned. If you are going to take work in either place, you will have to consult the Northern Ireland Ministry of Health and Social Services or the Employment Division, Government Office, Isle of Man.

Your passport and police registration certificate have been endorsed and are returned herewith. The endorsement in the registration certificate shows that you are now exempt from registration.

I am Sir/Madam
Your obedient Servant

Also enclosed:

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief, EUR; COS, London

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/QRPHONE - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached is an Agent Evaluation for QRPHONE/1 covering the period to 31 December 1970.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: H/W
Agent Evaluation

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Chief, WOLIME, w/att.
1 - Chief, EUR, w/o att.
1 - COS, London, w/o att.

file

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-156/3	OEPT-1289	JAN 21 1971 19 January 1971
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

AGENT EVALUATION

NAME: QRPHONE/1

DATE: 18 January 1971

PROJECT: QRPHONE

STATUS: Contract Agent (Under a Memorandum of Oral Agreement)

OVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: International correspondent for "Sunday supplement" type color magazine distributed by twenty major newspapers in the U.S. Also represents owner of this color magazine in other of his business ventures in Europe. This overt job was assumed in December 1970. Prior to that, Q/1 was the London representative of small U.S. news service. Q/1 does free lance journalism and is an occasional contributor to several magazines and newspapers.

COVERT JOB DESCRIPTION: Singleton agent targeted at the radical left, including Maoist, African liberation, and Palestinian groups. Q/1's access derives from his many contacts in these circles.

PERFORMANCE OF COVERT DUTIES: Q/1 continues to perform well and without posing problems for his handler. His personality is easy-going and his attitude positive. If his efforts are not always totally successful -- leaving us with tantalizing bits of information and many unanswered questions -- this is generally due to operational circumstances in which he was simply unable to elicit more information on a given subject.

PERFORMANCE OF OVERT DUTIES: Q/1 does a solid and workmanlike job as a journalist. He has acquitted himself well both as a representative of his cover firm and in his free lance activity. Occasional prompting on this subject produces added effort and in this connection the operation profits particularly from the energy and knowledge of the deep-cover agent handler who himself has faced similar cover demands over many years.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: QRPHONE/1's attitude is positive. (See below under Motivation.)

ATTITUDE TOWARD COVER EMPLOYER: Q/1's attitude is good. He has made an effort to discharge his part of the cover arrangement and to understand the weaknesses and problems which plagued his former cover organization. He is approaching his new cover arrangement with enthusiasm.

MOTIVATION IN ACCEPTING JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP: This is a subject on which a good deal has beensaid over the course of this operation. The following points can be made on the subject of Q/1's motivation:

A. His basic image of JKLANCE is positive.

B. This image of JKLANCE as a powerful, professional organization has been enhanced in Q/1's case by the circumstances of his agent relationship, which require very professional handling. Indeed Q/1 has probably come to hold a rather glamorous "storybook" image of JKLANCE and of the importance of his contribution to the JKLANCE effort. This is a very human trait and should not be exaggerated in his case, but every one of the wild anti-JKLANCE stories which he heard probably only serves to accentuate the feeling on his part of being a member of a very impressive outfit.

C. In his political evolution over the years, Q/1 has become active in at least two "causes". In both instances he saw these causes undermined by petty jealousy and factional struggles and in both cases he was personally harmed as a result. The product of this situation has been a certain disillusionment with "causes" and a cynical political outlook. (In other circumstances this might be called political maturity.) Q/1 now tends to view political trends as a detached observer rather than a participant.

D. Following on the foregoing thought is the fact that he is an American (and does not consider himself disloyal). Given his citizenship and his disinclination to feel "involved" in the currents of the radical left, he has been perfectly willing to accept employment by JKLANCE to report on those currents. He does not give any indication that he views this as "squealing" on his friends -- indeed the contrary seems to be the case.

E. On a more mundane level, it must be realized that Q/1 was recruited at a time when he was in serious financial straits. He was without a job and was living off the charity of his wife's family. JKLANCE has given him a job, paid him reasonably well and regularly, and has enabled him to be independent of his wife's family's charity.

F. Having accepted JKLANCE employment for a combination of the reasons set forth above, it must be added that Q/1 clearly likes his work. He enjoys dealing with international issues and political subjects. He enjoys the travel and the opportunity to exercise his language capability. In short, the rather sophisticated and cosmopolitan life which he has been able to live appeals to him.

G. In assessing the relative importance of these several factors which make up Q/1's motivation, the undersigned would stress that C and E were probably the immediate causes of his acceptance of recruitment while A and D were more underlying. B and F have arisen since recruitment and probably play an important role in his current motivation.

WIFE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JKLANCE: Q/1's wife is not witting of his JKLANCE affiliation. She was allowed to believe that he was working indirectly for the Chinese. She certainly is aware of the past JKLANCE accusations which have been leveled at Q/1, but as far as Q/1 can determine (and this is not a subject on which he can come right out and ask a direct question) she continues to accept the Chinese story. It should be added that Mrs. Q/1 is British and is the holder of some rather typical "left" anti-JKLANCE attitudes. It should also be noted that the relationship between the two is fraught with a variety of problems thereby adding to the complexity of the situation. Certainly the whole subject of Q/1's activities is one which Mrs. Q/1 views with misgivings and which is simply not discussed -- lest it lead to acrimony. Mention should also be made that Mrs. Q/1 seems to accept as legitimate the small amount of money received from Q/1's cover and to regard this as a genuine stringer relationship.

RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and responds well to Case Officer handling. He is a most willing asset requiring no special handling care -- other than the normal professionalism expected in the handling of a sensitive asset such as Q/1.

WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE: Q/1 is willing to accept guidance and criticism -- provided it is constructive. If anything, he may sometimes be too willing. His willingness occasionally exceeds his sense of security and it then falls to his handler to bear in mind security and/or operational considerations which may affect his pursuit of a given target. However, this should not be over dramatized.

RESPONSIVENESS: Q/1 is most responsive to requirements levied upon him. In this connection it should be recalled that his ability to respond fully is usually restricted by the nature of his relationship with his informants; i.e., since he is only eliciting the information from unwitting informants he is rarely able to press for all the desired details.

JKLANCE CONTROL: Q/1 is dependent upon a JKLANCE salary and he has signed recruitment documents and a security pledge. We hasten to add that Q/1 is not a handling problem and there has never been any instance in which either he or his handler has had occasion to allude to these control factors.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Q/1 has a good sense of personal security and his handler makes an effort to build upon this at every opportunity. As cited above, Q/1's enthusiasm sometimes leads to his failure to consider all aspects and implications of a given situation.

OTHER SECURITY AND COVER SITUATIONS: The past allegations of Q/1's affiliation with JKLANCE, many pre-dating his actual recruitment, add an extra dimension to Q/1's cover situation. We have no indication that any of these allegations are based on any proof, nor have they produced a significant reduction in his number of contacts.

ABILITY TO WORK WITHOUT SUPERVISION: Q/1 is a self-starter and can work well for extended periods without supervision.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS: Q/1 poses only a minimum administrative burden. He is not overly concerned about his administrative and financial position, allowances, payments, etc. He merely expects JKLANCE to do the fair thing by him. However, on the rare occasion when JKLANCE has failed to perform as he expected, he can be very upset.

REPORTING: Q/1 is a journalist by training. He is an effective reporter -- both in terms of ability to elicit and writing style.

PERSONAL ENERGY AND ENDURANCE: Q/1 is quite energetic and can continue his efforts on a sustained basis.

LANGUAGES: In addition to his (native) English, Q/1 can speak French, Italian and German.

WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL: Q/1 is quite willing to travel -- and even enjoys it!

AREA KNOWLEDGE: Q/1 is quite widely travelled in Europe and Africa and consequently has acquitted an extensive area knowledge.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ABILITY: Q/1's present operating context does not provide an adequate basis to evaluate these talents. It is assumed that he has a satisfactory competence in both these areas, however.

WEAKNESSES; PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL: Q/1 has no major weaknesses, either personal or professional which inhibit his operational use. The existence of his "reputation" as a JKLANCE asset -- which is believed by some and rejected by others of his contacts is a definite limitation on his employment.

CAREER POSSIBILITIES: Q/1 has mentioned to his handler that he hopes to be able to make a career of his relationship with JKLANCE. He enjoys the work and presumably the financial security. However, the combination of the security factors operative in this case and the unlikelihood of Q/1's continued access to targets of interest over a prolonged period argue against his being regarded as a career asset.

Aaron C Laginestra

AARON C. LAGINESTRA
FIELD CASE OFFICER

COMMENTS OF SUPERVISOR: This is another thoughtful evaluation of this agent, and reflects the views of the agent handler as well as of the Case Officer.

I doubt that we have really divined Q/1's motivations for working with JKLANCE, and this evaluation should be read as the best stab we can make at this enigmatic subject.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT
CHIEF, LCPIPIT

03 0145-70

SECRET

19 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

ATTENTION: Miss Diane Chatelan

SUBJECT: Completion of Training Report for QRPHONE/1 (P), Training Alias: PERSHING

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Director of Training dated 28 September 1970, Attention: Chief, Covert Training/CS/TR, Subject: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1, From: Deputy Chief, Covert Action Staff

1. QRPHONE/1 was trained covertly in New York on 14, 15, 16 October 1970. There were twelve hours of training in the three sessions.

2. In accordance with the reference training request and discussions between the instructor and the two Case Officers, QRPHONE/1 was given a concentrated dosage of reporting instruction with emphasis on spotting and assessment reports.

3. QRPHONE/1 is a professional writer, so there was no problem in the writing department. The need was for channelling the writing capabilities of this man who has been an Agent for five years, into our type of reporting and to end his "stream of consciousness" style of reporting, as one Case Officer put it.

4. QRPHONE/1 quite quickly got into the spirit of the training and by the end of the first session was obviously enjoying it and appreciating the opportunity to learn to write our way. He pointed out that his big problem is having to retain substantial amounts of information in his head for two or three weeks, then put it all down the night before he meets his Case Officer. From his conversation, it appeared that organizing a report had never occurred to him before and he several times said "no one ever told me about this", "this is the first I've learned of this, etc." These things were said in happiness at having discovered ways of improving his reporting and simultaneously making his reporting less of a chore and more of a joy.

If true, this is a sad re- flection on C/O's failure to train

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

5. In organizing a report exercise, he did extremely well. In exercises separating fact from inference, he did only fairly well, considering his background and compared to trainees with no where near his experience or education. He has a slight tendency toward jumping to conclusions and reading meanings into words. He realized this and from then on he overcame this weakness to a considerable degree. However, even on the last day, writing reports based on New York Times newspaper articles, he twice (out of five reports) substituted his own word for a word in the article for no valid reason and which new word in fact changed the meaning of the sentence, though only slightly.

6. This small weakness is not unique to QRPHONE/1. It is also true of other equally highly literate trainees, who, like QRPHONE/1, unconsciously substitute their own language for that which has been directly given to them, not realizing that they thereby sometimes change the meaning of that which they are reporting. Happily, QRPHONE/1 realized this during the exercises, recognized the changed meaning, and earnestly stated that he will watch it in the future.

7. In observation and description exercises, he did well after a rocky start. Here, he at first concentrated on individuals, almost completely ignoring the actions they were engaged in. He soon saw that he has a mental capacity to watch both at once and there was no problem thereafter.

8. He was excellent in his ability to separate hard facts and put those in the body of his reports while listing as comments those items which legitimately were comments and which had no place in the report itself.

9. For the final session, he had been asked to do assessment reports on two people. He was mortified when he came in on the last morning, happily handed in his five intel reports and suddenly realized that he had completely forgotten to do the other reports. However, in discussing spotting and assessment reports, it appears that he now understands them.

10. In an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the training, we would appreciate a detailed evaluation report in November 1971 from the field station. This report should indicate the extent to which the training has made the trainee a more useful and effective asset and should evaluate the performance in each area of tradecraft in which training was conducted; negative as well as positive comments are solicited. The field station's report should also include the trainee's own comments. Please ask the field station to slug the report WOMOLD/QRPHONE/1/PERSHING. Upon receipt of the report at Headquarters, please forward a copy to the undersigned.

Caleb L. Batten
Caleb L. Batten
DC/OS/ALT/TR

Originated by:
Aristides G. Lazarus

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) QRPHONE/1

FROM: CI/OA

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CA/CF 3-D-0002			✓
2. ATTN- GLORIA BENNETT			✓
3. TUBE EW-7			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

GLORIA -

I WILL CALL YOU ON THIS BY MID-AFTERNOON, BUT AM SENDING THIS ADVANCE COPY SO THAT YOU WILL HAVE THE BASIC INFO ~~[illegible]~~ IF DIANE CALLS BEFORE 1DO.

THE TRAINING MEMO WILL BE CARRIED ON TO THE DDP/TRAINING OFFICER THIS AFTERNOON.

CAL BATTEN, CHIEF, COVERT TRAINING WILL BE BRIEFED ORALLY (BY ME) AS TO CI/OA'S RESERVATIONS AS EXPRESSED IN THE STIPULATION ATTACHED TO THE POA AMENDMENT.

DICK RUPPNER

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THIS IS AN AMENDMENT TO THE POA AND NOT ~~AN~~ THE OA WHICH DIANE IS INTERESTED IN OBTAINING.

THE OA, ~~[illegible]~~ I BELIEVE, WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DISCUSSION BETWEEN DIANE AND CI/OA.

201-file

12OCT70

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET	DATE 12 October 1970	CASE NO. 201- 306052

SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
SET UP FOR OA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	ORSD	AREA:

USE

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
✓ AMEND ~~ISSUE~~ PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE. ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST RI TRACES	FILE
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	TICKLE
REQUEST FIELD TRACES	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

ADVANCE COPY

POA EXPIRED ____________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

CA/CF - D. L. CHATELAN

Subj's POA is amended herein, only to include the covert training outlined in paragraphs 2 and 3 of CA's 20 Sept 1970 memorandum for the Director of Training and with the stipulation that any information revealed to Subj during the training will not be of such a sensitive nature that its later revelation by the Subj to anyone, particularly anyone inimical to the US and/or the Agency, would represent a loss.

SIGNATURE

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

SENSITIVE

28 SEP 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/OS/TR

SUBJECT: Covert Training for QRPHONE/1

1. This is to confirm telephone conversation between Mr. Caleb L. Batton and Miss Diane L. Chatelan, Chief, Counter Front Branch, requesting covert training for subject contract agent.

2. We would like to have this training begin 14 October 1970, and can make the agent available full time for three days only. We are planning to have the training take place in New York City, and Mr. Lazarus has already indicated orally to Miss Chatelan that he will be available.

3. Our main objective is to provide QRPHONE/1 with a firm understanding of what is required for good intelligence reporting and also the skills needed for spotting and assessments. QRPHONE/1 has been an Agent for over five years and has absorbed a good deal of tradecraft in the process. He has not, however, had any formally organized training.

4. We would like to have QRPHONE/1's outside case officer (handler) present during this training.

5. Subject and his operational background represent a highly sensitive area and we would appreciate the selection of a training site with this in mind. Biographic background as needed by your instructor will be provided by Chief, CA/CF with whom all further arrangements for this training should be made.

FRED W. VALTIN
Deputy Chief
Covert Action Staff

CA-70-933

QRPHONE/1
306052

SECRET SENSITIVE

SECRET

DDP/CA/CF/DLChatelan:djr (25 September 1970)

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/TQRO
1 - DC/CA
1 - CA/CRU (Dummy)
2 - CA/CF

SECRET SENSITIVE

TO : ID/1 23 September 1970

FROM : Interrogation Research Division

SUBJECT: Richard Thomas GIBSON IRD# 54454
201-306052

BACKGROUND:

Subject is a 39-year-old, married, male U.S. citizen who has been utilized by this organization since 1966 as a covert action asset. He was granted a POA on 23 May 1966. His previous polygraph examination was on 13 June 1965.

PROCEDURE:

On 21 September 1970, Subject was interrogated and given a polygraph examination in a Commodore Hotel suite in New York City which was used as a covert site. Subject's interrogation and examination were conducted in the English language.

PURPOSE:

The examination was requested through Miss Diana Chatelin of the CA Staff. ADDP approval was granted for the examination. The examination was conducted in order to determine if Subject had revealed his covert relationship with this organization, whether or not Subject had been approached by any other intelligence organization seeking his cooperation, whether or not Subject was maintaining a secret relationship with any other organization, whether or not Subject was deliberately withholding any contacts which he has developed from this organization, and whether or not Subject is currently subject to blackmail or other direct forms of coercion.

201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

23 Sept 70

IRD# 54454
Page 2

CONCLUSION:

Subject's polygraph examination did not contain any indication of deception to any of the above listed specific areas of inquiry.

Lawrence J. Howe

Distribution:
Orig. - True, Coleman, Gaynor
1 - Coleman
1 - CI/OA
1 - File

OS/IRD:LJH:ydc

14-00000



WARNING—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PROHIBITED. ANY UNOFFICIAL CHANGE WILL RENDER THIS PASSPORT INVALID.

NAME: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

BIRTH DATE: MAY 13, 1931

BIRTHPLACE: CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.

HEIGHT: 5 FEET 10 INCHES

HAIR: BLACK

EYES: BLACK

WIFE: X X X

ISSUE DATE: NOV. 10, 1969

MINORS: X X X

EXPIRATION DATE: NOV. 9, 1974

Richard Gibson

SIGNATURE OF BEARER

IMPORTANT: THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE BEARER.

Richard Gibson

PHOTOGRAPH ATTACHED
FOREIGN SERVICE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[illegible]
NEW YORK, N. Y. 271
SEP 20 1970

201-306052



Visas

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT BEARER TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VISAS

EMBARK
-2 DEC 1969

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(200)
EMBARKED
12 NOV 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION
13 NOV 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than
11.2.70

Permitted to land on con[illegible] the holder d[illegible] United Kin[illegible]
15. [illegible] 70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(700)
-6 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(237)
EMBARKED
25 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

6

LUCHTHAVEN
12 XI 1969
BRUXELLES NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN
BRUSSEL - NATIONAAL
-2 XII 1969
AEROPORT
BRUXELLES - NATIONAL

LUCHTHAVEN
11 II 1970

[illegible]
NEDERLAND
-4 DEC 1969

31 DEC 1969
FRANCE

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer/later than
15.2.70

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(220)
EMBARKED
11 FEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(019)
31 DEC 1969
LONDON AIRPORT

7

-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than ONE MONTH

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (247) 26 FEB 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER 10 FEB 1970 LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS

٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than 15 2 71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER 1 SEP 1970

MAR 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER (310) 20 SEP 1970 LONDON A.

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
LONDON

Entry Visa No. 201
Type of Visa Tourist
Date 10 2 70
Good for One journeys
of One Month duration
from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for 3 Months from date of issue provided passport remains valid.

Fee received 500 Mms

B. El Tal
Consul General

UAR

9



-6 IV 1970

Visas

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later th...
ONE MONTH

(047)
EMBARKED
26 FEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
3 OFEB 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than
ONE MONTH

CAIRO AIRPORT PASSPORTS
٢٨ فبراير ١٩٧٠
RESIDENCE VISA / 18

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer / later than
15 2 71

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
CAIRO
1 SEP 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

3 MAR 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICE
(90)
EMBARKED
20 SEP 1970
LONDON A

8

THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
LONDON

Visas

Entry Visa No. 501
Type of Visa Tourist
Date 20 2 70
Good for One journeys of One Month duration from date of arrival. The validity of this Visa is for 3 Months from date of issue provided passport remains valid.
Fee received 500 mms

B. El
Consul General

UAR

9



Visa

The conditi a attached to the grant of leave to land is hereby varied so as to require departure from the United Kingdom not later than 15th Feb. 1971

for Under Secretary of State
Home Office.
Date 12 MAY 1970

The holder is hereby required to register at once with the police.

for Under Secretary of State
Home Office.
Date 25 MAR 1970

Cancelled

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(???)
EMBARKED
6 APR 1970

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than 15/2/71

JUN 1970

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(216)
EMBARKED
11 MAY 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

Permitted to land on condition that the holder does not remain in the United Kingdom longer than
15th February 1971

26 JUL 1970
Harwich Harbour

IMMIGRATION OFFICER
(752)
12 APR 1970
LONDON AIRPORT

10

GRATIS مجاناً

Visa

Valid for several journeys

سفارة المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية — لندن
Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom
of the Jordan — London
Consular Section القسم القنصلي

Ordinary Visa	تأشيرة عادي
Transit Visa	تأشيرة مرور
Serial No. 4-2	الرقم المتسلسل
Valid Till	صالح لغاية
Provided the passport is so long valid	ما دام الجواز معمولا به

Date ____ تاريخ

The Consul ____ القنصل

دخول

قنصل
CONSULAR
JORDAN EMBASSY · LONDON

11



Visa

٧،٢،١٩

12

Visa

السفارة اللبنانية في لندن

Ambassade du Liban à Londres

No. 1004 رقم

Visa Séjour سمة

موافقة خارجية رقم

Autorisation à E.i.o. du

Motifs اسباب الدخول

صالحة لغاية

Utilisable jusqu'au 24 Août 1970

N. de Voyages عدد السفرات

Londres, le 24 FEB 1970 لندن في

S. EL KHOURY

PERCU
Piastres Libanaises
1600
Monnaie Locale
£1.3.4

Visa holder must not take up Employment in Lebanon

لا يحق للحائز على هذه السمة العمل على الاراضي اللبنانية

AMBASSADE DU LIBAN * LONDRES *

13

SECRET/RYBAT

1

FBI info concerning Richard Gibson

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: + REF

DISSEM BY 35 PER CA # 1

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT C/CA 3

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO, C/CCS

ACTION NO. 95

SECRET 121600Z AUG 70 CITE LCPIPIT 3737 (THOHURST ACTING)

12 Aug 70 141393

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REF: DIRECTOR 057975

1. IN VIEW REF WE INCLINED ASK QRPHONE/1 MAKE OFT-POSTPONED VISIT TO U.S. IN SEPTEMBER AT WHICH TIME HE COULD FULFILL SGSWIRL REQUIREMENT AND ALSO MEET PERSONALLY WITH PRESIDENT OF LPWEAKLY TO FIRM UP DETAILS OF NEW + cover CIER. MID-EAST TRIP WOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER U.S. VISIT.

2. WILL DISCUSS WITH RODIGAST WEEK OF 17 AUG AND ADVISE RE DATES, DETAILS, ETC.

3. FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

SECRET

K will sec upon REQ.

Q-201

cc Q/Cover.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 9

SECRET

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1		5	
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ORIG: DIANE L. CHATELAN
UNIT: C/CA/CF
EXT: 1959
DATE: 27 February 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 48/03 PER CA # 1

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: C/CA3 INFO FILE, VR. DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/CI/SO,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 03 00 10Z MAR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

TO LCPIPIT INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE

REFS: A. LCPIPIT 9405 (IN 031696)

B. LCPIPIT 9348 (IN 029903)

~~1. IF YOU BELIEVE PROJECT CEILING FY 70 CAN BEAR COST, SEE NO PROBLEM REF A TRIP. NOTE HIS OPS EXPENSES AND OBLIGATIONS END JAN TOTAL $7,800. TO THIS MUST ADD $800 RECENT PAY AND TAX INCREASES, LEAVING ONLY SOME $2,500 ALL OPS TRAVEL REMAINDER FY 70 (UNLESS THIS SUM FURTHER OBLIGATED).~~

2. ~~[illegible]~~ VIEW REF B ACCESS POSSIBILITY, REQUEST TRIP BE DELAYED ADDITIONAL FEW WEEKS IN ORDER PERMIT Q/1 FOLLOW-UP ON ISSA CONTACT AND SERVICE RELATED DETAILED REQUIREMENTS (FORTHCOMING SOON) AFTER HIS EXTENDED ABSENCE MIDDLE EAST. SUGGEST HE BE GIVEN GREENLIGHT FOR TRIP MID-MAY, SUBJECT TO URGENT LEADS THAT MIGHT MEANWHILE EMERGE FROM ~~TRIP OR ISSA/~~ PHOMBEAH/STANDARD.

file: Q/201
CC: Q/Firanca
CC: Q/Kambona

2
3. RE PARA 2 REF A, AGREE SUBJECT TRIP NOT BE OPERATIONAL.

(continued)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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MESSAGE FORM
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4		8	

ISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

PER ______ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 013859

ER, REQUEST Q/1 ALLOCATE TIME FOR DEBRIEFINGS/ANALYSIS A/PHOMBEAH POSSIBILITIES BY ZIBET OFFICER WITH CONGREVE NEW. ALSO THERE STILL IS ~~[illegible]~~ STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR RL, WHICH CAN POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED SAME TIME. UNLESS YOU OBJECTIONS, SUGGEST Q/1 BE PREPARED SPEND WEEK IN NEW YORK HESE MEETINGS.

SINCE CONGREVE HAS MET Q/1 AND ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEMS VISE ABOVE, NO NEED RODIGAST PRESENCE UNLESS HE TAKING LEAVE SAME TIME.

FILE: 200-124-156/3. GP-1

END OF MESSAGE

CA/B&F

CI/OA

CI/SO

EUR/BC
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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DC/CA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.







14-00000

Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306052















Photos of office
at
35 Long Acre, W.C.2

201-306052









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

PHONE 201

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
COS, London; C/EUR

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
~~QRPHONE/Verges~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For the record we are forwarding, u/s/c, a copy of the letter to QRPHONE/1 from his Paris lawyer which outlines the status of QRPHONE/1's action against Jacques Verges. As Headquarters will recall this letter was used by QRPHONE/1 to good advantage in connection with his recent trip to Algiers. The letter says, in effect, that Verges has proposed a settlement of the matter and has agreed to pay this settlement in Algerian dinars. Needless to say, QRPHONE/1 has yet to receive payment. Nevertheless QRPHONE/1's purposes are well served by this attestation of Verges' expressed willingness to pay, with its implied admission of guilt!

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
QRPHONE/1 - Verges Letter

S/C ATT'D BY [illegible]D'SD
Dated 9 mar 70

Distribution:
(3) - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS, London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OEPA - 2425

DATE
26 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-306052
~~201-306-352~~
200-124-136/3

14-00000

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
99, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IX°
TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-10
SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

AFF. GIBSON C/VERGES -

Monsieur GIBSON
32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
LONDON W.12 -
(Grande Bretagne)

Cher Monsieur,

Je vous confirme l'entretien téléphonique que nous avons eu au sujet de votre affaire.

A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 xx il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même : salaire : 4.500 Fr -
préavis : 9.000 Fr -
congés payés : 1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-02425 CS COPY 201-306052

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous. je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 fr
préavis : 4.500 fr
congés payés: 1.500 fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

201-306052

S. SCHWARTZENBERG
AVOCAT A LA COUR
59, FAUBOURG MONTMARTRE
PARIS-IXe

TÉL. : TAITBOUT 63-19
OU 824 63-19

SUR RENDEZ-VOUS

PARIS, LE 19 DECEMBRE 1969

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Monsieur GIBSON
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A de nombreuses reprises, Maître VERGES a proposé de régler votre affaire et notamment le 1er juillet 1967 xx il a proposé - ce que j'ai accepté immédiatement - de vous régler ainsi qu'à votre femme , en dinars, lors de votre premier voyage en Algérie, une somme équivalente à la moitié de vos demandes respectives.

J'ai vu dans le cadre de nos pourparlers, la proposition manuscrite de Maître VERGES, dont les termes sont assez fidèlement reproduits ci-dessus.

A plusieurs reprises, Maître CAIN m'a confirmé l'accord de Maître VERGES pour régler sur ces bases ; toutefois ces derniers mois, il m'a fait savoir qu'il ne l'avait pas revu depuis un certain temps.

Pour vous permettre de discuter utilement avec Maître VERGES, si vous le rencontrez, je vous rappelle le montant des deux demandes :

1°) pour vous-même : salaire : 4.500 Fr -
préavis : 9.000 Fr -
congés payés : 1.500 Fr -

Il est demandé en outre un certificat de travail, des fiches de paye et la régularisation de votre situation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale.

Je pense que vous abandonnez ces trois derniers postes qui n'ont aucun intérêt pour vous, je crois.

2°) pour votre épouse : salaire : 4.500 Fr
préavis : 4.500 Fr
congés payés: 1.500 Fr .

Il est en outre demandé des fiches de paye et la régularisation à l'égard de la Sécurité Sociale. Ces deux derniers postes me semblent sans intérêt, comme pour vous-même.

Je pense donc que vous pourriez demander à Me VERGES de remplir les engagements qu'il a pris à votre égard, savoir paiement de la somme de 12.750 Fr français convertis en dinars.

Merci de me tenir au courant.

Veuillez, je vous prie, transmettre mes amitiés à votre épouse.

J'espère avoir le plaisir de votre visite lors de votre retour en Angleterre.

Je vous prie de croire, cher Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Rod: this rough draft.

CI Assessment ^ Draft.

1958 Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him. Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xx xix violently anti-French articles which were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.

2

30 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of Revolution, certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.

Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.

June 1967: XXXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of militant Marxism-Leninism).

March 1968: Stockholm. AFTONBLADET - Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefection American soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.

Note: Bjorn Kumm, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of Q/1's wrote him a long [illegible] and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.

Stockholm. TIDSIGNAL / Radical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.

Bo Hammar editor of TIDSIGNAl is pro- Cuban. and [illegible] Q/1's loyal to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.

May 1969: Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That Q/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.

Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overheard Cleaver accuse Don Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agent. This was at the Algerian Congress - Palestine Dec. 1969.

Feb. ~~1969~~ 1970 SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the Four persons listed as contributoms to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969. They were members of the British delegation representing the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. ~~This~~ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.)

8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned Q/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFANI ~~picked~~ suspicion of Q/1 due to accusations against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-009-054
OEP -00737
26 JAN 70
P3

CIT UK
OCC ?
JOURNALIST FOR LIBERATOR
< ALGERIA, ALGIERS ATTENDED CONGRESS OF
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES ALGIERS 26 -
28 DEC 69

080

R 7002111871

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: CHIEF, WOLIMS

INFO.: COS, LONDON; Chief, EUR Division

FROM: CHIEF, LCPIPIT

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/OPERATIONAL
Quarterly Operational Status Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: OEPW-7[illegible], dated 11 September 1969
OEPA-2325, dated 20 January 1970

Forwarded herewith are Quarterly Status Reports for the period ending 31 December 1969 for QREPITOME/QRMISSION, QRSTRIP, QRPADRE, and QRPHONE.

ADRIAN B. MASLOTT

Attachments: h/w
As stated (in duplicate)

Distribution:
- 3 - C/WOLIMS, w/atts (2 copies)
- 1 - COS, London, w/o atts.
- 1 - C/EUR, w/o atts

201-306052
200-124-156/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OEPA-2327

DATE: JAN 21 1970
21 January 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE : LCPIPIT (London)
AGENT'S CRYPT : QRPHONE/1
PERIOD COVERED : 1 October-31 December 1969
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

PROJECT : [illegible]
DATE OF POA/OA: [illegible] 1966
COSTS : [illegible] (Field Costs Only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: During the quarter an effort has been made to target QRPHONE/1 on the activities of the Palestinian liberation groups and their European supporters. A good start has been made in this effort. QRPHONE/1 undertook a "reconnaissance" of those European leftist groups active on this issue. (See OLPA - 2227) This in turn led to his being invited to attend the Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees which was held in Algiers in late December. (See LCPIPIT 7667).

In early November QRPHONE/1 made a brief visit to Paris to re-contact certain of his radical contacts there. (See OLPA - 2229) He likewise made a visit to The Netherlands in mid-December.

In October QRPHONE/1 made another extended visit to Italy in order to "take the temperature" of the radical left. The reporting from this visit was forwarded to Headquarters and Rome in OLPA - [illegible] and OLPA - 2175. This visit was deemed to have been useful by Rome Station which asked that another such visit be scheduled for February 1970.

A visit to Nairobi by QRPRANK in late December may offer an opportunity for an added assessment of her - something which has been sought for some time.

QRPHONE/1 continues his cultivation of various African personalities in London who are of operational interest. See OLPA - 2141 for a discussion of QRPHONE/1's relations with Dennis Phombeah and OLPA - 2197 for a discussion of his relations with Genevieve [illegible].

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY: [illegible] QRPHONE/1 by the Special Branch of Scotland Yard - sparked by his activity in connection with the Palestine issue - [illegible] security problems. The decision was taken to brief the leadership of the Special Branch in order to end the police [illegible] (harassment). See LONDON 8082, DIRECTOR 090343 and LONDON [illegible] for added details.

The suspension of activity by QRPURE has [illegible] for a new cover to be found for QRPHONE/1. Although the [illegible] story can continue to be used for one or two more months, a new cover arrangement must be sought with all deliberate speed. One suggestion in this was made in LONDON [illegible]. It is our understanding that Headquarters is pursuing [illegible] and possibly others. Meanwhile QRPHONE/1 has been instructed to project a "business as usual" image. He should be able to do so with no adverse effect on his cover.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access remains substantially unchanged - with a possible improvement in access to the Palestinian target due to his attendance at the Algiers meeting.

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4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ASSIGNMENTS; INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has approached all his assignments with energy and enthusiasm. He has fulfilled all [illegible] to the maximum degree feasible - given the limitations imposed [illegible] by the unwitting informant-type relationship [illegible]. Despite every effort by QRPHONE/1 to overcome this limitation - it must be recognized as a factor in this operation.

During the quarter QRPHONE/1 was the source of [illegible] reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR NEXT QUARTER: QRPHONE/1 will follow-up on his access to the Arab/Palestinian target. He will attempt to cultivate leaders in this cause - both European and Arab - with the objective of taking a trip to the Mid-East (Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut).

QRPHONE/1's postponed trip to the U.S. has been tentatively re-scheduled for April (in the next quarter).

QRPHONE/1 will re-visit Italy, per Rome Station's request, for another look at the activities and attitudes of the [illegible] left in Italy.

QRPHONE/1 will continue his development of African personalities of operational interest in London.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS [illegible] PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly (and other reports) remain valid insofar as LCPIPIT and RODIGAST are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER [illegible] REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very [illegible] personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, INCLUDING PROMOTION, [illegible]: A new method of funding the bulk of QRPHONE/1's salary to his Swiss bank has been approved and will be put into operation in January. This was necessitated by the problems of BIRNEE - which were cited in previous reports.

An increase in salary of $100 per month has been approved for QRPHONE/1. This will be effective 1 January and will be paid into an escrow-type arrangement in order that it not increase QRPHONE/1's standard of living.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1 is an excellent asset. He has performed well and effectively against his targets.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT: The initial effort to gain useful access to the Palestinian target seems to be progressing well. In subsequent quarters we will see whether or not this progress can be maintained.

The progress toward operationally useful contact with key Africans in London (Phombeah and Kambona) is painfully slow. In this - as in all other situations - the problem is mainly the nature of QRPHONE/1's access to his contacts (that of an unwitting informant). We feel that given this situation QRPHONE/1 is doing as well as might reasonably be expected.

OEPW - 858 was a much appreciated analysis of QRPHONE/1's recent reporting on the Italian target and explained why much of this has not been judged disseminable. Having reflected on this we realize that this is actually not surprising. It should be recalled that Rome Station specifically requested that QRPHONE/1 get away from rigid formal CS-type reporting and render more opinionated journalistic type reports. This type of reporting has been judged quite useful by Rome Station - but it is useful in an operational manner and for general appreciation of the situation. Thus it was not surprising that an analysis of this particular group of reports turned out as it did. Rome Station has orally noted to LCPIPIT that QRPHONE/1's visits will continue to be welcome and his reporting of definite use - even if this utility is outside the CS framework.

In general we feel that this operation is progressing well. In the past there may have been a tendancy on the part of certain "customers" to exaggerate QRPHONE/1's potential - with a consequent let-down when the realities of QRPHONE/1 the man and his access to targets was brought home. We now feel that this is behind us. Judged against the realities of his situation, his access and the nature of his targets, we think that QRPHONE/1 makes excellent progress against those targets assigned him.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

FBI (X-ref)
14 Jan '70

December 1969

Z1057683

Richard Gibson

→ **WARNING**—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PROHIBITED. ANY UNOFFICIAL CHANGE WILL RENDER THIS PASSPORT INVALID.

NAME RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON	
BIRTH DATE MAY 13, 1931	BIRTHPLACE CALIFORNIA, U.S.A.
HEIGHT 5 FEET 10 INCHES	HAIR BLACK EYES BLACK
WIFE X X X	ISSUE DATE NOV. 10, 1969
MINORS X X X	EXPIRATION DATE NOV. 9, 1974
	Richard Gibson SIGNATURE OF BEARER

→ **IMPORTANT:** THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED BY THE BEARER.

201-306052

SECRET

17 Dec 69

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division, OP

VIA: Chief, OPSER

SUBJECT: QRPHONE/1 - Amendment of Memorandum of Oral Commitment

1. It is requested that QRPHONE/1's Memorandum of Oral Commitment be amended to increase Subject's tax free income from $850.00 to $950.00 per month effective 1 January 1970.

2. This $100.00 a month increase will be set up in an interest bearing escrow account.

/s/

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

Concur: /s/ Rogers C. Brooks
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
- Orig. & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - Chief, OPSER
- 1 - CA/PERS
- 2 - CA/CF
- 1 - CA/CRU
- 1 - C/CA

CA-69-1163

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOLIME		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. COS, Paris; COS, London; C/EUR			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, LCPIPIT/London ap3m			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OEPA - 2223

ZR 201-306052

1. Reference reported QRPHONE/1's having lost his passport and having obtained a replacement at the U.S. Embassy in London.

2. On 17 November Air France returned the lost passport by mail. No explanation was offered regarding the delay in finding and returning the passport. Since QRPHONE/1 had already obtained a new passport, he returned the old one to the U.S. Embassy in London for cancellation.

ACL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

MICROFILMED
DEC 17 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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- 1 - COS, London
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201-306052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA - 2263	DATE DEC 10 1969 10 December 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201-306-052~~ 200-124-156/3

SECRET

24 November 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CA/BF

SUBJECT: Escrow Statements of Account

1. Forwarded herewith is the 30 September 1969 Statement of Account for the escrow accounts maintained by Project MHMUTUAL for your division.

2. If any of these statements do not relate to your division, please advise so that we may change our records.

3. Effective 1 May 1969 the interest rate was increased from four to five per cent per annum on interest bearing accounts.

Daphne H. Merriman

DAPHNE H. MERRIMAN (P)
OGC/MHMUTUAL

Attachments: a/s

201-306052

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ATLANTIC INVESTMENT CORPORATION
ESCROW ACCOUNT
Statement of Account
LARRY A. CUR

June 17, 1969 - September 30, 1969

Date	Receipts	Disburse-ments	Interest Payable*	Principal Balance	Account Balance
6/17/69	$ 3,200.00			$ 3,200.00	$ 3,200.00
6/30/69			$ 6.22	3,200.00	3,206.22
9/30/69			40.00	3,200.00	3,246.22

* 5% interest from day of deposit to day of withdrawal compounded annually on value date (6/17).

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11

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
COS, London; C/EUR; COS, Paris

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London a371L

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/Operational/MHPROBE
QRPHONE/Passport

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

2A 201-306052.

1. At their most recent meeting QRPHONE/1 reported to RODIGAST that he had lost his passport in Paris during his recent visit to France. The loss occurred on 8 November in the departure lounge at Orly Airport as QRPHONE/1 was waiting to board AF 822 for London (leaving at 1755 hours). QRPHONE/1 had shown his passport to the immigration officials when he entered the lounge. He then went to the duty free shop to purchase a bottle of Scotch and a carton of cigarettes for his wife (she smokes Galoises). He presumes that his passport slipped from his pocket during the process of producing his wallet to pay for these items. At any rate he did not discover the loss until the flight was airborne.

2. QRPHONE/1 had no difficulty re-entering Britain using his Home Office Certificate of Registration. He reported the loss to Air France immediately but as of his meeting with RODIGAST on 13 November it had not been located.

3. On 10 November QRPHONE/1 went to the U.S. Embassy in London and obtained a new passport (the number of this passport is IDENTITY - u/s/c).

4. We advised CHALEMSKY, of Paris Station, of this loss during his visit to LCPIPIT on 14 November.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Passport Number

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 9 Dec 69

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS, London w/o att
1 - COS, Paris w/att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 ATT

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA - 2223	21 November 1969 201-306052
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~201 306 052~~ ~~200-124-156/3~~

11P

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO: OEPA - 2223

MICROFILMED
DEC 9 - 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IDENTITY

Z 1057628

SECRET

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2223 CS COPY 201-306052
~~200-124-156/3~~

SECRET

7 NOV 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, CA Staff

SUBJECT: LCPIPIT Request for QRPHONE/1 Salary Increase

REFERENCE: OEPA - 2122

1. The following is a breakdown of QRPHONE/1's salary history:

Starting salary, June 1965	$600 per month
1 September 1966	$700 per month
1 July 1967	$800 per month

All of the above figures are tax free. In addition, as of 1 May 1969, Subject was given an additional $50 per month (also tax free) as our contribution toward some form of insurance against the future (endowment, lump sum cash value, or whatever the Field and he finally selected). This appears on the books as a salary increase. However, although to his ultimate advantage, it does result in a small decrease in take-home pay since Q/1 is also required to make a contribution to the payment of the premium.

2. In addition, Q/1's MOC also provides for $10,000 indemnification in case of death, or payment of $600 per month up to $10,000 to his wife in case of his total incapacitation or disappearance while employed by CIA. Allowance had originally been made for this provision when he seemed to have an excellent chance for travel to Peking; this year we included the provision as a general benefit, not tied to any particular type of hazardous travel alone. Finally, this year's amendment to his MOC also included a severance bonus of one month's salary for each year of satisfactory service. We placed $3,200 in a special escrow account to cover his previous four years' service, and are providing in our Project renewals for each year's required deposit to that escrow account. Please note, however, that this benefit has not yet been surfaced either to QRPHONE/1 or to RODIGAST, by decision of LCPIPIT (a decision which I believe was wise).

3. It is my feeling that the proposed salary increase of $250 tax free per month is way out of line. I believe that paragraph 3 of the reference, comparing Q/1 with a hypothetical GS-12 is a rather specious and unrealistic argument. Q/1, although an American, is an agent, and nothing more, and as you note in your penciled comment the question of quarters, allowances, and periodic step increases is not relevant. In addition, while I do not subscribe

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GROUP 1
[illegible]

Q|201

to some of the criticisms that have been leveled at his production, the fact remains that I have not seen any marked improvement during the past two years in the quality of the material he provides us. As time goes on and the realistic criteria of what is disseminable and what is not are applied more and more to his production, and this production in turn remains at its present level of superficiality, we will see less and less of it qualify for dissemination. Since he is an FI agent, this has considerable significance, although it of course does not present the full picture of his capabilities. His operational intelligence has been received with mixed evaluations; usually his initial coverage of a subject is very well received and often whets the appetite of the recipient for more; somehow, however, that "more" never seems to materialize -- they get more of exactly the same caliber, but little more in terms of depth of reporting. Perhaps the fault lies in ORPHONE/1, in which case we should realize early that what we have here is not a true FI agent, but a sort of "operational intelligence butterfly." Perhaps, on the other hand, the fault lies in RODIGAST's handling of the man, not in terms of the personal relationship which RODIGAST has been able to build up with him, but maybe even because of that relationship. I remember when I first talked with RODIGAST I quickly realized that he felt he knew more than Headquarters as to what was important for O/1 to cover and what was not; I am sorry I missed RODIGAST on his TDY here and when I was in London, and that his home leave has been postponed, for I had hoped to determine for myself whether RODIGAST still felt that way. Whatever the reason, I am by no means giving up on O/1, but will continue to try to narrow down his targets so that he will have a fair shake at showing what he can do when he is not allowed to cover the waterfront.

4. What the above paragraph is leading up to, is that I do not in all honesty feel that he has done anything to really deserve a promotion, except build longevity since the last one, and perhaps not follow up (actively) on that newspaper job offered to him (his preference, in any event). However, I do realize that a man must have an incentive, and would like to propose that we suggest to LCPIPIT that a more realistic increase might be in the neighborhood of $100 a month, and that the severance bonus mentioned in paragraph 2 above might now be surfaced both to RODIGAST and to O/1 as a new benefit.

5. Attached for your ready reference is a copy of the ORPHONE quarterly report for 1 April to 30 June 1969; this is the last one we have received.

DIANE L. CHATELAN
Chief, CA/CF

Attachment: as stated
Distribution:
1 - CA/CF
Orig. & 1 - DC/CA

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GIBSON, RICHARD
201-306052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-156/03
OEPA-02115
14 OCT 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
< UK, ENGLAND, LONDON
FORM ON EDITORIAL BOARD OF REVOLUTION
PRESENTLY IN ITALY

R 6911060376

FILE IN 201-306052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

QUARTERLY REPORT

STATION/BASE : LCPIPIT (London)
AGENT'S CRYPT : QRPHONE/1
PERIOD COVERED : 1 July-30 September 1969
CASE OFFICER TIME: 12 working days per month (average)

PROJECT : QRPHONE
DATE OF POA/OA: 23 May 1966
COSTS : ~~$4,334.14~~ 6,619.14 (Field Costs Only)

1. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING PERIOD: Pursuant to plans developed as a result of Marie R. LUEBBERT's TDY, QRPHONE/1 made a continuing effort to deepen his contacts with various African personalities connected with the "London group". Although some progress has been made with persons who seem of secondary importance, QRPHONE/1 still is unable to gain the confidence of the central characters such as Dennis Phombeah and Oscar Kambona.

QRPEONY's one week stay in the U.K. was a week of intense activity for QRPHONE/1 and saw his local "credentials" put to a most demanding test. QRPHONE/1 performed extremely well throughout the week. See OELA - 51297 for details.

QRPHONE/1 has been able to monitor the activity of Belgian Communist Rene Raindorf who is attempting to become a key figure in the Palestinian liberation movement. See OEPA - 2037, 2099 and 2123.

Following an overature from a U.S. newspaper QRPHONE/1 made a quick trip to New York to consult with Headquarters officers regarding the implications of this overature on his RVROCK status. See LCPIPIT 4222 and DIRECTOR 28728 for details.

Through two unwitting female informants QRPHONE/1 was able to obtain reporting on the Algiers Cultural Festival. See OELA - 51298.

QRPHONE/1 has continued his monitoring of the activity of various African liberation movement figures in London.

2. SPECIFIC MATTERS OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND COVER: QRPHONE/1's vacation in Italy with his family produced a marked improvement in his domestic situation - with its consequent impact upon the cover and security of the entire operation. This remains a matter of concern and one which will be carefully monitored.

QRPURE is now entering into a more meaningful overt correspondence with QRPHONE/1, including discussions of his participation in the new magazine. This will have a positive impact upon QRPHONE/1's cover as a representative of QRPURE.

A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is being sought to replace BIKNEE, which is no longer functioning due to unrelated problems encountered by the principal agent of that operation. For a review of the security implications of this matter (which are thought to be minimal) please see DIRECTOR 46178.

3. ESTIMATE OF AGENT'S CONTINUED DEGREE OF ACCESS TO TARGETS: QRPHONE/1's access to his various targets remains substantially unchanged.

4. EXTENT TO WHICH AGENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: QRPHONE/1 has approached all his assignments with enthusiasm and energy. He has fulfilled these assignments to the maximum

degree feasible - given his cover and the unwitting informant-type nature of his relationship with his many contacts. QRPHONE/1 makes every effort to overcome this limitation and in this regard a plentiful supply of background information greatly facilitates his elicitation of added details from his informants. However, this limitation is one which will always be with us in the case of QRPHONE/1 and it is one which can sometimes be particularly frustrating. During the past quarter QRPHONE/1 has been the source of 11 intelligence reports prepared by LCPIPIT/Reports.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LEVIED UPON AGENT FOR ENSUING PERIOD: QRPHONE/1 will make a trip to Italy in late September and early October in order to survey the situation within the Italian new left/radical sector. This trip is one which has been requested by Rome Station. (The trip will have been completed by the time this report is received by Headquarters.)

QRPHONE/1's contact with an official of the Eritrean Liberation Front led to a TDY by AF Division officer Geoffrey B. DRANSTON to brief LCPIPIT on the ELF and to discuss possible operational exploitation of this contact.

QRPHONE/1's trip to the United States has been deferred until spring 1970 by which time any possible repercussions from QRPEONY's return will be relatively unlikely.

An effort will be made to explore the operational possibilities posed by QRPHONE/1's existing (or potential) contacts within the Arab liberation movements. Headquarters views on this matter were requested in OEPA-2044.

A re-scheduling of QRPHONE/1's trip to Germany has been proposed and Headquarters and Bonn have been asked for guidance/requirements.

6. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENTS LEVIED INCLUDING MOTIVATION, PERSONAL SECURITY, ETC.: QRPHONE/1's response to assignments, like his performance, continues to be enthusiastic and energetic. The comments made in previous quarterly reporting regarding his security and motivation remain valid insofar as RODIGAST and LCPIPIT are able to judge.

7. AGENT'S PERSONAL RESPONSE TO CASE OFFICER HANDLING OR CRITIQUE OF HIS REPORTING TECHNIQUE: QRPHONE/1 has a very pleasant personality and relates easily to others. This is a positive factor in his elicitation of information from his many contacts and also makes dealing with him a pleasant and uncomplicated experience. QRPHONE/1 accepts case officer handling - including direction and criticism - well and in a constructive vein. The same holds true of critique of his reporting. Please see previous reporting on this subject for added details.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS, INCLUDING PROMOTIONS, TRAINING: A new means of funding QRPHONE/1's salary is now being devised. This has been the subject of several items of correspondence between Headquarters and LCPIPIT. We plan to consult with the SGFLAG representative in Bern on this matter.

QRPHONE/1 has had some purely overt problems with his Chicago bank (an apparent error in his statement, etc.) He is also being charged very high service charges for the performance of routine transfers. If he is not able to resolve his problems with this bank it may be necessary for him to change banks.

At LCPIPIT's insistance QRPHONE/1 has begun to invest a portion of his monthly salary in a reputable Mutual Fund of his choice. This modest investment program will enhance his financial security in the event of termination and/or a rainy day".

SECRET

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1514

PAID

APR 25 1969

4-11 1969 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001514⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1555

PAID

April 30, 1969 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Acct. of Richard Gibson -6288401 Harris Trust & Savgs Bank 200.00

MAY 2 1969

TWO HUNDRED AND NO/100-- DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001555⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
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CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1409

3-1 1969 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001409⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

1369

PAID

JAN 17 1969

1-6 1969 2-77/710

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Richard Gibson $200.00

Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS
2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001369⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

JAN 15 '69 000

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3 1-103 NEW YORK 1-103 3

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Richard Gibson

Richard Gibson

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FEB 25 '69

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APP.

Richard Gibson

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NEW YORK, N.Y.

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FEB CHICAGO

AP 22

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1316

11-29 1968 2-77/710

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Two Hundred & no/100 DOLLARS

American National Bank of Chicago
Chicago Illinois

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

⑈001316⑈ ⑆0710⑉0077⑆ 289086⑈ ⑈0000020000⑈

NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL INC.
5708 S. STATE 324-6320
CHICAGO, ILL. 60621

PAID

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14

6 1969 2-77/710

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Chicago Illinois 2-77

American National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago

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Richard Gibson

Richard Gibson

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CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, WOLIME	X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, EUR; Chief, LCPIPIT/London	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief of Station, London	MICROFILM
SUBJECT	QRPREY/QRPHONE/MHPROBE/JAGUAR	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As previously reported, we related to JAGUAR the incident in which Lionel Morrison is believed to have searched QRPHONE's papers while the latter was out of town. As you know, there have been some indications in the past which might be taken to suggest that Morrison was a JAGUAR contact - he works for the Daily Telegraph and seems to be in touch with David Floyd, and on one occasion provided QRPHONE with a report (on QRPEONY) which came almost simultaneously from JAGUAR. Clearly, this does not add up to much of a case, and we could hardly conceive that JAGUAR would be involved in the harrassment of QRPHONE. Even if there was no JAGUAR contact with Morrison, however, we felt it might be possible that JAGUAR could add to our understanding of this peculiar development from sources available to their own net. JAGUAR's reply is as follows (CORONET is the agreed crypt for QRPHONE):

> "With reference to your letter of 24th April 1969, we have been informed by a secret and delicate source that David M. SIBEKO, the newly appointed P.A.C. representative in London, has recently been told by Elias NTLOEDIBE, the P.A.C. representative in Nairobi, of the incident of MORRISON's search of CORONET's papers. According to Elias, MORRISON had written him a letter in an attempt to blackmail him. Elias told SIBEKO that what annoyed him was that MORRISON had sent photostat copies of Elias's own correspondence with CORONET.
>
> "Elias went on to say he was satisfied that MORRISON must have had covert access to CORONET's personal effects. Elias was surprised that CORONET had not replied to letters

/Continued/

Distribution:
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- 3 - C/EUR
- 1 - C/LCPIPIT/London

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-50928	DATE 26 June 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052

A substantial increase in QRPHONE/1's salary has been requested by LCPIPIT. We have further proposed that this increase be paid into an escrow-type account. See OEPA - 2122 for details.

9. GENERAL COMMENTS ON OVERALL AGENT PERFORMANCE: QRPHONE/1's overall performance has been superior.

10. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PROJECT: QRPHONE/1 continues to perform in a most effective manner.

AcL
Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OELA-50928

he had written to him about the A.N.C. and enclosing press cuttings. He has asked SIBEKO fo find out if CORONET got those letters, and to warn CORONET that MORRISON or someone acting for him has been stealing mail from his (CORONET's) house.

"Elias speculates that the spy, whoever he is, may be working for Black Power or Marxist/Leninists or The Telegraph or even M.I.5., and wants CORONET told of this.

"Elias has written to MORRISON telling him to go to hell and that he (Elias) and his friends will stand by SIBEKO.

"Elias has said that he held no brief for CORONET, but he notes that CORONET was introduced to the party by MORRISON and that in June 1968, MORRISON wrote an article in the Zambian Mail describing CORONET as a great Afro/American and a great revolutionary.

"According to Elias, CORONET was then living in London and he recalls that there was correspondence between CORONET and MORRISON at that time; and that CORONET used to supply MORRISON with pocket money. SIBEKO wonders when MORRISON began to work for CIA and infers that he and his friends should no longer be taken in by the 'coloureds.'

"In view of the delicacy of the source I should be grateful if the above information is not passed on to CORONET."

2. This reply does not of course answer all our questions, but it does seem to be in accord with what we know of the incident from QRPHONE. It seems reasonable to attribute Morrison's actions to factional fending with PAC - a crossfire in which QRPHONE happened to be caught.

NDK

Nowell D. KAMMERMAYER

201-306052

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: MPS/BG
OGC/MHMUTUAL

SUBJECT: MHMUTUAL Escrow Account for CRPHONE/1

1. It is requested that an MHMUTUAL interest-bearing escrow account be set up in an appropriate alias for agent CRPHONE/1. In accordance with an amendment to the agent's MOC concerning a severance bonus, the account is intended to accommodate annual payments of one month's salary for every completed year of satisfactory service. The initial deposit consists of $3,200, retroactively covering four years' service and computed at the rate of $800 per year. Additional deposits, in the amount of the agent's salary on the anniversary date of his contractual relationship (1 June), will be made annually to his account on or about that date.

2. Any additional questions that might arise may be taken up with Chief, CA/CF, ~~or with Miss Ann Jane Long~~.

B. HUGH TOVAR
Chief
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED ____________
MPS/BG
signed June 6

201-306052

CA-69-560

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

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INFO: FILE, VR, C/RI/SD, C/EUR 5, C/CI

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S E C R E T 201634Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2779

LOND

20 MAY 69 IN 62534

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

ASD

CA/PROP 01

ABSTRACT X

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: DIRECTOR 03219

1. LOCAL USIS HAS REPORTED THAT VISITING USIA OFFICIAL HAS INFORMED THAT QRPURE IS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT BUT APPEARED TOO SMALL TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT FULL TIME STRINGER ABROAD. ADVISED LNPURE NOT ENCOURAGE LANDY TO GO TO BAT FOR ARPHONE.

2. LANDY IN MEANTIME FOUND THAT QRPHONE OUT OF TOWN AND FREQUENTLY TRAVELS ABROAD. THIS HAS SET LOCAL USIA TO SPECULATING THAT QRPHONE MIGHT HAVE WANTED PRESS PASS TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES AS NEWSMAN ABROAD. LOCAL USIA HAS DETERMINED THAT MORNING STAR (CPGB) HAS PRESS PASSES, BUT THAT THEY NOT GIVEN TO BLOC JOURNALISTS.

3. LANDY WILL SIMPLY INFORM QRPHONE THAT SCOTLAND YARD TURNED DOWN APPLICATION AND THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. QRPHONE WILL DROP MATTER.

4. FILE: 201-306052.

SECRET

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20 May 1969

201-306052

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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C/FI 2

S E C R E T 081705Z MAY 69 CITE LONDON 2484 8 MAY 69 IN 53923

DIRECTOR INFO LCPIPIT

RYBAT QRPHONE MHPROBE

REF: LCPIPIT 2389 (IN 51831)

CACF

1. USIA CABLE DISCUSSED REF WAS UKNT MAY 7, NO. 3516, FOR ATTENTION IOS MCNICHOL.

2. FILE: 201-306052.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

8 May 69
201-306052

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM **United States Information Agency**

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

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IOS

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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071012Z MAY 69

02940

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO USIA WASHDC-~~802~~

STATE GRNC

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 3516

PF

file QRPHONE

USIAC

FOR IOS MCNICHOL. FOR GUIDANCE OF PRESIDENT OF AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL OF CHICAGO IS LEGITIMATE CLIENTEL. ALSO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS ANY INFORMATION OF RECENT ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD GIBSON, NPI REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHICH WOULD MAKE HIS CLAIM TO BE REPUTABLE PRESS REPRESENTATIVE SUSPECT. FYI SCOTLAND YARD HAS REFUSED ISSUE POLICE PASS TO GIBSON AND ASSOCIATION WISHES TO SUPPORT HIS REQUEST UNLESS HE HAS RECORD WHICH CLEARLY INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. WOULD APPRECIATE CABLED REPLY CONTAINING ESTIMATE WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO ASSOCIATION OFFICERS PURELY AS GUIDANCE. KING

EUR3
CA 3
CI
(17)

201- 300052

CONFIDENTIAL

JP

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

~~NO INDEXING~~ REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

MICROFIL
MAY 1
DOC. MICRO. SE

TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief of Station, Bern

INFO.: Chief of Station, London; Chief, EUR Division
Chief of Base, Geneva

FROM: Acting Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational
QRPHONE/Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. As addressees are aware QRPHONE/1 has officially been denied entry into Switzerland since 16 December 1963. This order was issued in connection with his employment with Identity A, which was then receiving money from the Chinese--in violation of Swiss neutrality. A similar order was also issued at that time for Identity B, who was the Editor of Identity A.

2. It is now some six years later and QRPHONE/1 (at least overtly) is employed as a legitimate journalist. He is not a member of any group which is proscribed by the Swiss authorities--although, of course, he maintains contact with a wide variety of leftist individuals in pursuit of his operational tasks. QRPHONE/1 has noted that Identity B has been allowed back into Switzerland--in connection with his defense of Arab terrorists and feels that if the Swiss are willing to do this for Identity B then they should also lift the ban on his entry into Switzerland. QRPHONE/1 obviously feels personally about this, and it may be that future operational benefit could be gained if QRPHONE/1 were again able to enter Switzerland.

3. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of a report written by QRPHONE/1 following his contact with the Swiss Embassy in London on this matter. We are also forwarding under separate cover a copy of the letter which he sent the Embassy in which he formally states his request that the entry ban be lifted.

/CONTINUED.../

Attachments: u/s/c
1-As Stated above
2-Identity Sheet

DOC FORWARDED [illegible] S/C
BY RID/SD 1 3 MAY 1969

Distribution:
2 - C/WOLIME w/atts
2 - COS/Bern w/atts
1 - COS/London w/o atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts
1-COB/Geneva w/atts

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MAY 8 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D 200-124-156/3	OEPA-1794	7 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T/R Y B A T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-306052

4. You will note that the Swiss Embassy suggested that QRPHONE/1 work through the U.S. Embassy on this matter. We have told QRPHONE/1 not to do this, but rather to deal directly with the Swiss. If he needs certification of his status as a working journalist we suggested that QRPHONE/1 obtain this from the appropriate professional organization (of which he is a member) in London.

5. We presume that the Swiss Embassy in London will be forwarding QRPHONE/1's letter to Bern. We will appreciate being advised of any Swiss action, or statements, on this case which may come to the attention of Bern Station. Any advice which Bern Station can offer regarding QRPHONE/1's pursuit of this matter will be welcome.

6. Of course Bern Station should continue to be guided by the contents of DIRECTOR-69543 in any dealings with the Swiss concerning QRPHONE/1.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT1 TO: 1960

OEPA-1794

3P

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SWISS ENTRY BAN PROBLEM

On 15 April 1969, I spoke with Charles Henry Bruggmann, First Secretary at the Swiss Embassy in London and who handles press affairs, by phone. I tried to arrange a personal meeting with Bruggman, who insisted on knowing the exact nature of my business with him. He claimed there was nothing he could do for me in London, except to forward a letter from me through channels to the proper authorities in Berne. (I later sent him ~~him~~ such a letter.) Bruggmann urged me to work through the U.S. State Department, which could take up the matter through the Embassy in Berne. If the U.S. Embassy would only vouch for me as a professional journalist, Bruggmann added, I would be almost certain to get the ban lifted.

Naturally, I have made no efforts to contact anyone at the Embassy in London, but perhaps something might be done to get the Embassy in Berne to acknowledge at least, when queried by the Swiss, that I am a bonafide journalist in the employ of a reputable U.S. news and features agency?

CS COPY

SOA #16
OEPA-1794

D 200-124-156/3

201-306052

1984

REGISTERED

17th April, 1969.

Mr. Charles Henry Bruggmann,
First Secretary,
Embassy of Switzerland,
77/81 Gloucester Place,
London, W.1.

Dear Sir,

Following our telephone conversation a few days ago, I am now writing formally to you to request that the ban on my entry into Switzerland be lifted. This ban, which dates from 1963, was never personally directed against me but against the publication for which I was then working as an Editor. That publication, 'African Revolution', no longer exists and I note that its former Algerian publisher, Me Jacques Verges now visits Switzerland frequently. In any case I am now in no way connected with him.

As you know, I am the overseas representative and correspondent, based in London, of Negro Press International, the major Negro news and features agency in the United States, which serves some 270 newspapers. This is a bona fide commercial journalistic enterprise and serves no political purpose. I personally am a member of the Foreign Press Association and the Association of American Correspondents in London and am accredited to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office here.

It is part of my duties to report on the activities of the United Nations and its agencies. I have been, for many years, accredited at United Nations Headquarters in New York and I was also an accredited correspondent at the founding conference in Geneva of UNCTAD. Many important meetings are scheduled to be held in Geneva during this year and I have been asked by my firm to cover these conferences. Therefore, I ask your consideration and cooperation in obtaining the removal of the ban on me in Switzerland which prevents me from fulfilling pressing professional duties.

I wish to make it most clear here that I am in no way connected with any political organization or bodies in Switzerland or elsewhere and am an established and well-known professional international journalist.

Sincerely Yours,

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT

1P

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 2 TO: OEPA-1794

IDENTITIES

MICROFILMED
MAY 13 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

A - Revolution Magazine

B - Jacques VERGES

CS COPY

SCA #2 to
OEPA - 1794
D 200-124-156/3

SECRET RYBAT

201-306052

14-00000

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6 MAY 69 IN 51831

S E C R E T 061128Z MAY 69 CITE LCPIPIT 2389
PALP

AT	FI	
PS		CA/2F
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

RYBAT DTDORIC QRPHONE MHPROBE

1. USIA REPS HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY JEROME LANDY, UK REPRESENTATIVE OF WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING AND PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION IN LONDON, CONCERNING YQPHONE. LANDY FORWARDED QRPHONE'S APPLICATION FOR A POLICE PASS TO SCOTLAND YARD (METROPOLITAN POLICE), WHICH TURNED IT DOWN, REFUSING TO GIVE A REASON. LANDY HAS CAPABILITY RAISE CONSIDERABLE FUSS ON QRPHONE BEHALF AND WANTS TO REPRESENT MEMBERS OF HIS ASSOCIATION AS BEST HE CAN. QRPHONE HAS PUT SOME PRESSURE ON HIM, CLAIMING TO BE LEGITIMATE REP OF QRPURE, ETC., RAISING QUESTION WHETHER TURN DOWN HAS SOME RACIST OVERTONE. SOMEWHAT CAUGHT IN MIDDLE, LANDY TURNED TO EMBASSY TO ASK WHAT IT CAN TELL HIM ABOUT QRPHONE TO HELP HIM JUDGE LATTERS JOURNALISTIC BONA FIDES. ACCORDING TO USIA OFFICER WHO INTERVIEWED HIM, LANDY IS ALSO HAVING QUIET INQUIRY INTO QRPURE MADE THROUGH HIS CHICAGO CONTACTS.

2. USIA QUERIED LOCAL LNER~~[illegible]~~ GO WHICH REPORTED IT HAD

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SECRET

6 May 69

201-306052

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 LCPIPIT 2389 S E C R E T

NOTHING SINCE 1962 AND FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA CONNECTION. IN ANSWER TO USIA QUESTION, STATION REPLIED THAT IT HAD COME ACROSS QRPHONE NAME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH REVOLUTION, EXPULSION FROM SWITZERLAND, ETC. TOLD USIA THAT IT SOUNDED TO US THAT JUDGMENT WHETHER TO GIVE OR WITHHOLD POLICE PASS IS POLICE DECISION, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO TELL LOCAL USIA WHICH WOULD ARGUE THAT LANDY SHOULD MAKE A CASE OUT OF IT. DID STATE THAT OUR RECOLLECTION FROM THE FILE WAS THAT QRPURE WAS A LEGITIMATE OUTFIT, BUT DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING FURTHER ABOUT IT THAN THAT.

3. IN ORDER TO PERMIT US CHANCE TO ALERT YOU, WE PERSUADED USIA DELAY ITS MESSAGE "WHILE WE CHECKED STATION FILES FOR ANY RELEVANT INFO." USIA CABLE WILL REPORT PROBLEM AND ASK GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ADVISE LANDY.

4. WILL FORWARD USIA MESSAGE NUMBER WHEN AVAILABLE. SUGGEST YOU ALERT QRPURE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRY (ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT, OF COURSE, BECOME AWARE OF IT).

5. QRPHONE OUT OF UK SINCE 24 APRIL, RETURNING 13 MAY. WILL BE TOLD NOT RPT NOT TO PRESS LANDY TO ESCALATE THIS MATTER INTO MAJOR ISSUE.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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INFO

FILE, VR.

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 LCPIPIT 2389 SECRET

6. FILE: 201-306052.

SECRET

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 2 / ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
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DISSEM BY 6 PER	☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH	
ACTION UNIT AF 7	INFO	FILE, VR 2/AA c/ic 2, EUR 6, CA 5, CA/PROP, FI 2
ACTION NO. 099		

S E C R E T 021205Z MAY 69 CITE PRETORIA 6916 PRET 2 MAY 69 IN 49487

OEL

DIRECTOR INFO LONDON

SECROWBAR

IP d/

1. SELEVER/17 PROVIDED FOLLOWING MEMO ON 2 MAY:

"SUBJECT: RICHARD GIBSON 201-306052

Δ U.K. LONDON
CIT: USA
OCC: Journalist

SUBJECT IS BELIEVED TO BE AN AFRO-AMERICAN JOURNALIST RESIDING IN LONDON. HE TAKES A KEEN INTEREST IN AFRICAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

IT HAS COME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT SUBJECT, WHO HAS OFTEN BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL EXPATRIATES, IS NOW SUSPECTED WIDELY OF BEING BOTH A (WOFIRM) AGENT AND A SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE CONTACT. THE TANZANIAN ASSISTANT HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON HAS APPARENTLY ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF THE SUSPICIONS AGAINST SUBJECT AND HAS PROMISED TO ALERT HIS GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO HAVING SUBJECT DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA IN AFRICA. ABOVE MERELY FYI."

AF PR
13 X
X
4
AF/2/SA

2. IN PASSING THE ABOVE, SELEVER/17 COMMENTED GIBSON PUTS OUT SOMETHING CALLED "THE GIBSON LETTER" ON ABOUT A WEEKLY BASIS AND SELEVER HAS FOUND THAT HIS INFO RE

MICROFILMED
MAY 19 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

SECRET

02 May 69
201-306052

MAY 6 3 20 PM '69
RECEIVED
RID/EDI

MAY 9 3 58 PM '69
RECEIVED
RID/EDI

PAGE 2 PRETORIA 6916 S E C R E T

PAC, ANC, ETC. IS FAIRLY ACCURATE. ALSO STATED HE NOT RPT NOT ONE OF SELEVER CONTACTS.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON GIBSON, WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE FOR PASSAGE TO SELEVER.

4. INDEX.

5. FILE: 72-2-2/3.

SECRET

as MANCHANDA, which are obviously known to the security authorities. Furthermore QRPHONE/1 himself might think it odd that he was being treated in that fashion and suspect that the Home Office was aware of his role which would not help your relationship with him. Alternatively (a) would obviously be a nuisance to say the least, so we felt that the obvious answer was (b) i.e. an extension of another year on present conditions."

3. We have attached QRPHONE/1's brief report of his visit to the Home Office to obtain this visa renewal.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

I think JAGWAR was absolutely right!

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1708

BRITISH VISA RENEWED

On 12 March, I got my British visa renewed until 15 February 1970. As in the past, my request seemed to cause some panic at the Home Office and I had to wait from 0930 until 1500 before finally obtaining the visa, albeit with apologies for the lengthy delay — normally it takes about an hour.

H/w att #1 to OEPA-1708

CS COPY

201-306052

SECRET

20 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jane Long, CA/CF, 3D0101

SUBJECT : Laboratory Tests, QRPHONE/1

REFERENCES : (1) OEPA-1662, 28 February 1969
(2) OEPW-405, 7 October 1968

Review of the laboratory studies from the initial dispatch and the one dated 28 February indicate a definite improvement of the liver function tests. It is our opinion that the individual has recovered from his hepatitis and should have no complications if he continues to follow his doctor's advice as to diet.

ROBERT A. INGRAM, M.D.
Operations Division
Office of Medical Services

Attachments:
Above references

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from
downgrading
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WOLIME	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, EUR Division Chief of Station, London		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, LCPIPIT/London QBM		MICROFILM
SUBJECT DTDORIC/Operational QRPHONE/Medical Report		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

QRPHONE/1's doctor has determined that his liver function has now returned to normal following his attack of hepatitis last Fall. We are forwarding under separate cover a copy of the report of clinical tests given QRPHONE/1.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachment: u/s/c
Report

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/SD 19 MAR 1969

Distribution:
✓3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

2' Mar. 69
cf. Dick

MAR 8 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1662	28 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-306052 ~~200-124-156/3~~

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 2oth, 1969.

To professional charges for biochemical investigations carried out on Jan 14th, 1969 :

£6. 6. 0.

With the compliments of Dr. Daly.

Dr. J. R. DALY

1 RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
01 - 546 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
01 - 748 3441

Jan. 20th, 1969.

Dear [ ]

Herewith your liver function tests, which now seem virtually as good as new.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

John Daly

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1662

I RIVERSIDE CLOSE
KINGSTON UPON THAMES
SURREY
KINgston 5828

Dept. of CHEMICAL PATHOLOGY
WEST LONDON HOSPITAL
HAMMERSMITH
LONDON, W.6
RIVerside 3441

Jan 20th, 1969.

Liver Function Tests, Jan. 14th, 1969.

Plasma	total bilirubin	less than 0.5	mg./100ml.
	alkaline phosphatase	3	K-A. units.
	alanine aminotransferase	9	i.u./l.
Serum	total protein	7.4	g./100ml.
	albumin	3.8	g./100ml.
	globulin	3.6	g./100ml.

Electrophoresis of serum protein showed a normal pattern.

Comment : All parameters of liver function tested appear to have returned to normal.

Chemical Pathologist.

NOTE:

This is sensitive information and must be cleared with E/AS/S prior to forwarding to HSCA.

(Gibson) OLC-78-1790/1

NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROC. POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, AF 1P

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Algiers

SUBJECT
Monthly Report/Errol S. KULPA

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Attached find contact and subject reports covering activities of KULPA during the month of January 1963. The two outstanding characteristics of this project remain a helter-skelter operational pattern and the usual difficulties in administration.

2. We can not really blame KULPA for the former. His forte is moving around and being able to convince. These two qualities are rare enough not to demand in too loud a voice for the third--serious concentration on a long range target. It is not that KULPA lacks the professionalism, rather it is the tempo of his personal and professional life that inclines him to speed rather than accuracy. As last month was marked by the stop and go of SCIMITAR/6, so this month was hampered by the upcoming Congo voyage. It is not that these ventures are unimportant, it simply remains difficult to judge KULPA's performance on events occuring outside our area of competence.

3. We can say nothing new or nothing untrue on the administrative aspects of the project. The cry is the same from all small stations--why must so much valuable time be spent on tiny administrative detail. In KULPA's case the matter is perhaps compounded by his transfer from Casablance but his complete file is living evidence of the imbalance of the outside staffer. In the regular four way breakdown, the file reflects almost no paper in Plans and Development, Production is not fat, Operations is fuller but transitory, Support is a swollen, blistering monster. We see no end to it. Our present agenda for the next KULPA meeting calls for a discussion of eleven separate administrative items. One more chestnut and we are finished. The KULPAS of the world take precise careful case officering with sufficient time prior and post the meeting to bring order from chaos. It is just this time that a small station lacks. So far, we are glad to state, KULPA seems to be worth the price paid.

David W. Lawton
DAVID W. LAWTON 3-6-25/4

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/AF (w/att h/w)

Attachments:
a.s.a (1 copy of each)

INDEX

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE TYPED
17 Feb 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB. 19 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
AAAA-554

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
3 - 6 - 25/4

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

SUBJECT :
TIME/DATE :
PLACE :

1. [illegible] out with E. the [illegible] very helpful for E's [illegible] to the spirit of [illegible] drinking, however. [illegible] putting off the [illegible]

2. [illegible] as our previous reports [illegible]

3. [illegible]

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUPPLIED

14-00000

no action on this bill is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] restrictions [illegible] [illegible]

3. [illegible] at least to [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] according to this, the [illegible], his [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] hand and at least part of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on this [illegible].

4. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in his [illegible] copies of his bill [illegible] [illegible].

5. The matter of his [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to forward a breakdown of his pay and [illegible] [illegible].

6. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on every copy of the silly thing [illegible] [illegible].

7. [illegible] the Government pay for [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] and this [illegible] [illegible]), [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] on Sunday 21 January at [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible]

Secret

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOLIME

INFO.
Chief of Station, London
Chief, EUR Division

FROM
Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT
DTDORIC/MHPROBE/Operational
QRPHONE/British Immigration Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 12 March 1969 QRPHONE/1 was granted an extension on his British visa valid until 15 February 1970.

2. Since QRPHONE/1's file at the Home Office indicates an interest on the part of JAGUAR in his case, JAGUAR was consulted prior to the issuance of the extension. (This is not unusual in the cases of persons such as QRPHONE/1 and does not necessarily imply an "agent" status. Of course WOFIRM is not mentioned at all in this file.) In coordination with London Station it was decided that a re-newal of QRPHONE/1's one-year visa was preferable to the granting of permanent resident status--which would normally have been the case. We quote from the appropriate memorandum from JAGUAR to London Station on this matter:

> "The choice was between:-
>
> a) an extension of two months
> b) an extension of one year i.e. a repeat of what was granted to him last year
> c) that his temporary residence should be made "unconditional" which would be the normal procedure if there were no special considerations.
>
> Our feeling was that for QRPHONE/1's cover purposes (c) would be undesirable; if his friends got to know of it they might think he was being treated over-generously in view of his contacts with leftwing revolutionaries such

/CONTINUED.../

Attachment: h/w
Report

Distribution:
3 - C/WOLIME w/att
1 - COS/London w/o att
1 - C/EUR w/o att

1 att

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OEPA-1708	2 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	201-306052

Secret

22 January 19[illegible]

CONTACT REPORT // PROJECT [illegible]

1. The record of KULPA'S dealings with Serge Michel and Roberto Holden appear to be as follows.
   a. Four (4) initial meetings with Michel on 17 and 18 Jan.
   b. Two (2) meetings with Holden on 19th and 20th Jan. It was evidently at these meetings that the trip to the Congo was arranged.

2. KULPA contacted Dunmore during the afternoon of [illegible] January, Saturday. Dunmore explained that he could not pass on the [illegible] of the plan discussed that day between KULPA and Holden. K. should call Dunmore at 0900 the following day, Sunday and discuss the matter with him.

3. Dunmore contacted Lawton that same evening and [illegible] between the two showed that it would be difficult to ask [illegible] on the minimum info Kulpa had give Dunmore over the phone. [illegible] wait for the next day's contact and to advise KULPA to hold off [illegible] with Holden. The latter was leaving for Tunis at 1[illegible]0 on Sunday.

4. KULPA telephoned Lawton at 1030 instead of 0900 [illegible] that his watch was wrong. He had quite obviously overslept. Lawton advised him to put Holden off and KULPA gave no indication of any difficulty in this respect. A meeting was set up for 1000 on Monday, [illegible] January.

5. It was at this meeting that it became apparent that KULPA had indeed committed himself and that Holden was making firm plans to have K. join him the following week in Leopoldville.

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

Secret

[illegible] REPORT 228, [illegible]   19 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts with Serge Michel

[illegible] Aletti Hotel, two meetings 17 Jan and two meetings 18 Jan

1. Michel is starting a new publication to be called ATLAS, much on the order of Pari-Match, which will be aimed at French-speaking North Africa, Middle East, and Algerians in France. An Algerian trained at Franc-Tireur in Paris will be editor (he was unnamed) and Michel will be the guiding genius. Color will be used for the cover and adds inside, the plates being made in West Germany. An Arabic edition will be issued later.

2. Michel plans to use three photographers for the magazine, fnu Lakhdar aka Djamal (trained in Czech), Djmal Tchanderli (if he consents to use a camera instead of a movie camera), and me. (Michel said he had to use Algerians even they were not "photographers", but that he needed me to back them up technically.) He has already taken twenty-some photos from me and has given me a long listof others he wants. He has promised to pay 1500 francs each to start, with raise in pay as the magazine progresses. I said my present work earns my living, and a question ofprestige was more important than pay for the moment. (Comment: I'm not sure how serious Michel is, nor if he has the authority to use me. At least he talks a good game, and he has taken some photos to show the editor for use in the first few issues.)

3. Before Michel offered employment on the magazine, he asked if I would be free to spend three or four weeks in Angola and the Congo with Roberto Holden to take "several thousand" photos which could be used for the next several years in a continuing campaign for the liberation of Angola, with me retaining selling rights in the negatives and the entire trip being paid by Holden. I said I was willing if I could arrange it with my employers. That was at noon 18 Jan. At six p.m. 18 January, Michel announced to me that Holden had agreed to sponsor a trip for me to Angola. As a first step, Holden wanted me present at 1000 Jan 19 to take photos of his interview with Ben Bella. I will be there.

4. Michel then said the Atlas once underway would not be his responsibility, just as he had loosed the reins of Al Shaab once it was started. Then he will publish an entire series of slick, one-time publications on the various phases of the Algerian government and its efforts, a photo book on Algeria, photo books on the various regions and problems of Algeria. Concurrently, he will be doing publications on Black African subjects, taking many, long swings through Africa to gather the information andphotos. He said, "You will be working more with me and traveling through Africa at that time than working on Atlas, which should have a good backlog of Algerian photos by then." He added, "Of course, I'll have to get permission to take you on these trips—maybe they'll want an African photographer instead."

5. After the Holden/Ben Bella interview today, I am to meet Holden and Michel to make further plans.

3

Secret

LISTRIK [illegible] REPORT #230, [illegible]

21 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts 1?-20 Jan

1. Serge Michel: Saw twice daily. He proceeded very rapidly re the proffered trip to Angola, including arrangements with Roberto Holden to pay for the trip. Only other interesting subject discussed was Atlas/ Al Chaab/ Afrique Revolution. He says [illegible] will be merged with Atlas [illegible] this year.

2. Josie Fanon: Met her twice with Serge Michel, XXXXXX same subject. She seems to be quite in the heart of Atlas, is very strong, treated as equal by Serge.

201-114045

3. Roberto Holden: Saw him twice, on 1?th and 20th. On 10th after Ben Bella interview, Josie Fanon presented me to him, and he mentioned that "Mr. Serge" had [illegible] liked of [illegible]. [illegible] for [illegible] to [illegible] publicity for Angola. The 20th with Michel & Fanon, before I could [illegible], Holden told me he was applying for my visa in Tunis that afternoon, and that he would send me my ticket to Leopoldville the day [illegible] returned to [illegible]. He is stopping at Continental, but [illegible] ticket would be [illegible] next [illegible] 27th. I explained that I was willing [illegible] I had told [illegible] the [illegible] country might not let me [illegible] things [illegible] in Alger. (Holden is going to Moscow in the very near future, according to Taleb Jamai who says Holden told him.)

4. Commandant Slimane: Saw him twice, once at [illegible] only on 10th and at my home night of 20th. Said he was going to C[illegible] for 10 days at maximum, would see me when he returned to give me his impressions. Said Algerians prepared do anything possible for Angolans.

5. Taleb Jamai: Saw him several times, including once at my home. Said never saw anything like the [illegible] of the [illegible] Congress by the FLN and Polit Bureau. [illegible] Irving [illegible], and his new assistant [illegible] is "stupid", are both CIA agents.

6. Mahjoub Ben [illegible] & [illegible] Ayeb, of UGTA: Had cocktails and dinner my home 20 h. Mahjoub declined talk about the Congress or anything faintly resembling politics.

4

Secret

[illegible] CARD REPRODUCTIONS

DISPATCH

S E C R E T/RYBAT

Chief, WOLIME XXX

COS, London; C/EUR'

Chief, LCPIPIT/London [illegible]

DTDORIC/Operational/[illegible]PROBE
QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

18

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

ACL

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C AUTD BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
③ - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS, London w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

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OSPA - 2115

14 October 1969

S E C R E T/RYBAT

200-124-156/3

14-00000

2R 201-725837 2R 201-301053 418 Lc
OEPA- 211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

1P

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

1.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

[illegible] 124-156/3

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON OEPA-

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

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2R 201-108746 3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

14-00000

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT COVER SHEET

FROM: England, London/LCPIPIT — OBP-737

23 January 70

JAN 26 1970

CASE OFFICER: Aaron C. LAGINESTRA Acl

REPORTS OFFICER: Norman C. BULSTRODE NCB

RELEASING OFFICER: Adrian R. MASLOTT ARM

080 [redacted] 7P

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - WOLINE, w/master
- 2 - LONDON (OK for SMOTH and JAGUAR, provided source description is changed to read "a fairly reliable source".)
- 2 - Algiers
- 2 - Paris
- 2 - Bonn
- 2 - Rabat
- 2 - Tunis
- 1 - Geneva
- 2 - Bern
- 1 - Amman
- 1 - Beirut
- 2 - Rome
- 2 - LCPIPIT

DTDORIC/QRPHONE

SUPDATA:

Subject: First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

Source: QRPHONE/1

Note: Request Headquarters verify and correct names. INDEX participants.

Congress documents gave several English translations for this Congress. We have chosen the one which we believe is the most accurate translation of the French.

File: 200-124-156/4

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

SECRET

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9-50

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

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S E C R E T

REPORT NO. CX OEP-737

DATE DISTR. 23 January 1970

COUNTRY International/Algeria

DOI 26 - 28 December 1969

SUBJECT First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers, 26 - 28 December 1969

ACQ (16 January 1970)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE Radical European who attended the Congress. His reporting has been generally reliable.

Summary: The First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees in Algiers was sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine. About 200 delegates, most of whom were Western European pro-Chinese militants, attended the event. In the proceedings of the Congress these militants sought to apply the Chinese theses of the "People's War" to the Palestinian struggle. The Congress firmly backed the notion that Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were one and the same body with Al Fatah acting as the vanguard body for bringing about unity among all Palestine commando/liberation organizations. A major decision of the Congress was the acceptance of a Palestinian proposal to create an information bureau in Algiers. The Algerians claimed that fifteen countries were represented. There was no list of delegates and the Algerian hosts went out of their way to assure anonymity among the participants. End Summary.

1. The Premier Congres International des Comites "Palestine" (First International Congress of Palestine Solidarity Committees) was held at the Club des Pins conference site ten miles outside of Algiers from 26 to 28 December 1969. It was attended largely by pro-Chinese militants from Western Europe. The total number of delegates was 188 -- 148 foreign, 20 Palestinian and 20 Algerian. The French delegation was the largest one present and the most divided into various factions.

ABSTRACT CARD REPRODUCTION

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NONE

The Congress was officially sponsored by the Algerian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine.

2. The participants, for the most part, espoused the Chinese theses regarding the "People's War" and applied these theses to the Palestinian struggle. While not directly criticising the Soviet policies in the Middle East, it was evident in the Congress documents that the European militants sought to do so. For example, they strongly condemned the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Middle East conflict. The main conclusions of the Congress were: an acceptance of the Al Fatah as being the only genuine Palestinian revolutionary organization, and a decision to create an information bureau in Algiers which will be run by Palestinians. The bureau will provide information on developments in the Palestinian revolution to all the Palestinian committees throughout the world and to all revolutionary movements which support the Palestinian people. In conjunction with these Palestine committees, the bureau will sponsor meetings, lectures, debates, film shows and an annual conference. (Source Comment: Abu el Hassen, a prominent leader of the Palestinian delegation, confided to one of the delegates after the Congress that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would probably sponsor a conference in Jordan sometime in 1970 or 1971.)

ALL CARDS "II" -- Δ ALGERIA, ALGIERS = ATTENDED CONGRESS OF PALESTINE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEES, ALGIERS, 26-28 DEC 69.

3. (Source Comment: In private conversations with some of the Algerian participant-observers, they were not altogether pleased with the Congress, feeling that its conclusions were excessively leftist. The chief spokesman for the Algerians was M'hamed FR ✓ Yazid, who is the Algerian representative on the United Nations Security Council.)

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ALGERIA ALGERIA, BLIDA
DIPLOMAT
~~ALGERIA~~

4. The delegates slept at the Zeralda Tourist Center located about eleven miles from the Club des Pins, and were bussed daily to the Congress site. The Algerian hosts saw to it that the delegates were kept busy and together. Strict security was maintained and the delegates had no chance to mingle with the Algerian people. There was no list of delegates and several of the participants used pseudonyms.

M
ALGERIA
LAWYER
Δ

5. The first session of the Congress on 26 December, which included the attendance of a large group of Algerians, was chaired by Larbi FV ✓ Bentoumi (Algerian). (Field Comment: TDCSDB 315/05408-69, dated 31 December 1969, described Bentoumi as the Algerian defense lawyer in the recent trial in Switzerland of the three Palestinian terrorists charged with attacking an El Al Boeing 707 in Zurich in February 1969.) Most of the first session was devoted to assigning the delegates to the commissions and in arranging the timing of the various speakers, such as Yasir FR ✓ Arafat, Al Fatah's official spokesman and chairman of the PLO. Upon the recommendation of a Palestinian representative, the Congress voted by a majority of 33 votes to create three commissions for the event. These were commonly known as follows: Political Commission, Information Commission and Organization Commission. (Source Comment: The Palestinians obviously had come to the Congress with only one immediate practical aim, i.e., to obtain left-wing acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian information bureau.)

M
C 28
PALESTINE
ENGINEER
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3

6. At the beginning of the second day of the Algiers Congress, 27 December, Bentoumi ceded the chair to Nabil FV ✓ Nasser of the PLO. For the rest of the Congress the Algerians played no active role, thus leaving the Palestinians with considerable freedom of action in the proceedings. The

Δ
PLO MEMBER

SEX M
DOB
CIT
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Palestinians took over the chairmanship of the three commissions and guided much of the work of these groups. A (Comrade) "Habaout" from Paris chaired the Information Commission; Abu El Hassen chaired the important Political Commission. (Field Comment: Source did not know the name of the Palestinian who chaired the Organization Commission.)

SEX M
DOB
CIT UK
OCC
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7. The most important Congress document was a political declaration which had been drafted in the Political Commission mainly by Abu El Hassen and Abhimanya H. Manchanda, a British citizen of Indian descent who is chairman of the pro-Chinese British-Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF). (Source Comment: Manchanda confided that he was not completely satisfied with the text of the document, but considered it worthwhile nonetheless because it came close to what he considered were general Chinese positions, although it did not condemn the Soviet Union by name. Abu El Hassen and other Palestinians congratulated Manchanda for his success in ramming through such a hard-line political document. Manchanda had in fact dominated the final plenary session of the Congress on 28 December which voted affirmatively on the declaration.) On one occasion during the discussions in the Political Commission, Yazid tried to persuade the Commission (whose revolutionary commitments he claimed to share) that it should go easier in its condemnations of the United Nations.

8. Delegations from the following countries were represented at the Congress:

a. Austria - Represented by an observer from the Moscow-line Communist Party of Austria

SEX M
DOB 22 DEC 18 BELGIUM
CIT BELGIUM
OCC
Δ

b. Belgium - a divided delegation headed mainly by Reno Raindorf but which included a few supporters of Jacques Grippa, a current political enemy of Raindorf.

SEX M
DOB 30 MAR 13 BELGIUM
CIT BELGIUM

c. Brazil - Represented by a youth named McGill who lives in London. SEX M CIT: BRAZIL

d. Great Britain (two rival delegations) - Delegation led by Manchanda as follows:

(1) Manchanda, representing the Solidarity Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Arab Peoples, and the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League

SEX F CIT: UK

(2) Diana Langford, of the Women's Equal Rights Campaign MEMBER OF

(3) Mike Krylitsias, of the SEX M
MEMBER Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League CIT. UK

(4) Mishek Chinamassa, of the MEMBER OF Zimbabwe Students Union in Europe (ZSUE). (Field Comment: An official British Service reported in August 1969 that Chinamassa was expelled by the executive committee of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) as president of the ZSUE.)

SEX M
CIT UK
DPOB. 13 MAY 31, USA

SEX M
CIT: UK

(5) Richard Gibson, journalist for "Liberator"

SEX F
CIT: UK

(6) Jane Williams, a school teacher OCC

from London who came as an observer

SEX M
CIT: UK

(7) Max Hunt, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union

F ✓ MEMBER

SEX M
CIT: UK
OCC: BOOK SHOP MANAGER ASSOCIATED WITH

(8) Matt L[illegible], manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 270 Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

F ✓

(9) David R. Shanks, from the Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh

MEMBER F ✓

SEX M
CIT. UK

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

F ✓ (1) Roger Young, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

F ✓ (2) Norman Temple, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

F ✓ (3) Abdullah Yasameo, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

F ✓ (4) Louis Eakes, of the Young Liberals MEMBER

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

F ✓ (6) (fnu) Hallier, of Agit-Prop (a PSC member) MEMBER

F ✓ (7) (fnu) Walker, who came as an observer

F ✓ (8) Bill Gunn, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC MEMBER

F ✓ (9) Dave Blundell, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London MEMBER

~~X M~~
UK
AFFILIATED WITH
~~MEMBER OF~~
PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

SEX M

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) Armanazi, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as "Aziz Yafi". Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

F F

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

OBSCURE CARD REPRODUCTION

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FRANCE
OCC
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f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger Fury, a leftist University lecturer; Jean-Pierre Vigier; [illegible] Kravine, brother of Alain Krivine; [illegible] Castro; and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

FR
FR
F
SEX M CIT: ALGERIA

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

F
3
FRANCE
ASSOCIATE OF ABDERREZAK BENHADJI

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

M
3
NETHERLANDS
F

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries. (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at Ulufbacken 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

M
3
SWEDEN
OCC JOURNALIST
Δ

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

F SEX M CIT: USA
(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

F SEX F CIT. USA
(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

F
AKA

DPOB 31 AUG 35 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA
(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

F ST
(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther party.

DPOB: 5 MAY 15 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA
(5) Lewis Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

OCC BOOKSELLER

F

11-J-43 USA, CALIF

USA

CC STUDENT

resides in San Francisco.

FR (201 [illegible])

(6) David Fineman, who resides in San Francisco.

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty" FNU. They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M

CIT: USA

OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

200-9-54

DISPATCH

S E C R E T/RYBAT

XXX

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: COS, London; C/EUR

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London [illegible]

SUBJECT: DTDORIC/Operational/[illegible]PROBE
QRPHONE/JAGUAR Reporting

18

Through London Station's liaison with JAGUAR we are sometimes able to monitor the reactions and attitudes of QRPHONE/1's enemies within radical circles in the U.K. We are forwarding, u/s/c, copies of two such recent JAGUAR reports. In this case they were particularly helpful in underlining the continuing need for attention to the cover backstopping of QRPHONE/1's sources of income.

Aaron C. LAGINESTRA

Attachments: u/s/c
stated above

S/C ATTD BY RID/SD
Dated 04 NOV 69

Distribution:
③ - C/WOLIME w/atts
1 - COS, London w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/o atts

1 ATT

CS COPY

	OEPA - 2115	14 October 1969
	S E C R E T/RYBAT	✓ 200-124-156/3

2R 201-725837 2R 201-301054 18 lc
OEPA-211

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON

1P

MORRISON says Richard GIBSON is gunning for him because he is too involved with GIBSON's wife Sara. MORRISON had had an affair with Sara when he was working for the "Afro-Asian Journalist" and was visiting London. GIBSON had found out, and told a member of the P.A.C. about it. He in turn told MORRISON, and he told Sara. She challenged her husband, and asked how he dare spread rumours about her. Once before she had walked out on him.

2. MORRISON said GIBSON was worried because he did not know exactly what information MORRISON has about him. There was a confrontation of the two at a meeting of the Race Relations Institute at which GIBSON refused to sit with MORRISON. MORRISON asked him on that occasion to report the matter to "his masters", implying that GIBSON was an agent provocateur.

3. MORRISON says Sara told him that they live far above their means but are never in debt, and she could not understand it. That is why she had started a nursery school, and no longer did any work for GIBSON. Previously she had taken part in a number of GIBSON's activities, for instance "the MANCHANDA attempt to break up the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign".

4. Once GIBSON went to the Foreign Press Association claiming that MORRISON had forged an application form and was not working for "Zambian Mail". MORRISON is now a weekly contributor to that paper but was not when he first applied to the F.P.A. MORRISON says that at present GIBSON and his wife are on holiday for two months in Italy.

2R 201-833039 A secret and reliable source states that. TARIQ ALI is certain that GIBSON is working for the Americans. He claims that the Chinese have documentary proof of this, and for that reason they removed him from the editorial board of "Revolution", the Paris magazine they were financing. GIBSON had then come to London.

2. TARIQ ALI says GIBSON is very wealthy but no-one knows where his money comes from. From time to time he hands out donations to sympathisers saying that they are "on behalf of the Chinese".

2R 201-108746
3. TARIQ ALI also has suspicions that Robert WILLIAMS, "who was thrown out of both Cuba and Peking" may be working for the C.I.A.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

[illegible] 174-156/3

Lionel MORRISON and Richard GIBSON OEPA-

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

S/C ATT. 1 to OEPA-2115. CS COPY 200-124-156/3

LISTENER REPORT #221, [illegible] 9 [illegible] Jan 63

Subj: PRESIDENT BEN BELLA'S VIEWS

PADA: Ben Bella's apartment, Villa Joly, 20-2200 Jan 8
N.B. BEN BELLA REQUESTED ANY OF THESE VIEWS BE KEPT PRIVATE.
1. The moment of crisis in Algeria is over, and relatively speaking a breathing spell is here. Opposition is nil, with the students and labor unions won over, the Federation disbanded, other opposition dispersed or too unorganized to be effective, and the people persuaded to give Ben Bella's government a lengthy and sincere support to overcome Algerian problems. For the first time since emerging from prison, Ben Bella is getting six or seven hours sleep per night. He is relaxed, calm, confident.

2. Algeria's greatest problem now is reconstruction of the economy, including housing, agricultrual reform, dams and irrigation, and some roads. In this respect, foreign aid is essential. He wishes that talks with the U.S. could start as soon as possible, and feels the best method to do this is to have an economic delegation visit Algeria to see on the spot the needs and special conditions. (He repeated several times that he wished the talks could start as soon as possible.) As for aid, he does not wish aid "which will help us eat better or have a higher standard of living" but rather aid "which will be of a developmental, constructional type" to permit the Algerian economy to help itself. In reply to the question whether he hoped more aid would come from the U.S. than from Russia, he said "I hope so, I hope so." (He gave the slight impression he felt the U.S. was much better equipped to aid.) The preliminary estimate of the government committee for the reconstruction of Algeria ~~[illegible]~~ is one hundred billion francs. This figure might go higher, but the final figure will be what Algeria will ask from France in additional help over the next two years. He stressed his appreciation for the American Ambassador, Mr. Porter, saying one of his most valuable qualities is that he actually loves the Algerian people, a trait extremely appreciated by him and the Algerian people.

3. The above help is in addition to the regular administrative budget and the operational budget. The administrative budget of 280 billion francs is a balanced budget, with receipts—especially because of the new taxes—expected without fail to equal expenditures. He mentioned several times that Algeria is too proud to ask anyone else to pay its administrative budget, i.e., pay its running expenses.

4. On the question of the economy, there will be a code established soon which will delimit the private and public sections of the economy. He was peeved that some people do not believe there will be a private section, and said "People will someday learn to take me at my word. If I didn't mean it, I didn't have to say it. And if I change my mind, I will say that too, and I will give the reasons. But, there will be aprivate section of economy, and we do want foreign private investment."

5. Land reform in Algeria is and will be an experiment never tried anywhere. There will be both collective and state farms—Ben Bella does not believe in giving land to individual peasants because cut-up plots are economically un-productive. And in any case, the question of communal lands has been a tribal custom in Algeria for thousands of years, which even the French could never wholly erase, and the new arrangements are but a slight change from this ancient custom. To butress this argument, he pointed to the fact that the peasants have

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[illegible]
[illegible]

already accepted with no difficulties the communal arrangement for the one million hectars of Biens Vacants (abandoned French lands) now being put into production. He contrasted this with the resistance of the Russian peasant "which caused the slaughter of millions of Russians from which Russian agriculture has not yet recovered". He feels even if production on these million hectares is lower than it was under French control, it is definitely worth it, since the profits won't go to one rich class which spends the money on the Riviera but will greatly boost the peasants' standard of living. In this respect, he was definitely not in agreement with Prof. Dumont's major criticisms of Algeria given on 8 January, and so told the professor in private.

6. With respect to Cuba, He was disappointed to return home to find that the missle bases did exist. His main hope in visiting Cuba—as he told President Kennedy quite frankly but correctly—was to help lower temperatures. He had advised President Kennedy not to invade, andhe had advised Castro to be more discreet in acceptance of arms. The end result was not disappointment, however, since "no man can be disappointed if a nuclear war has been avoided."

7. The U.S. reaction to the Yemen revolution disappointed him also, and he felt U.S. early actions were mistakes. It had appeared relations between Cairo and Washington were going to well prior to the Yemen crisis, andit had been a shame to ruin good relations. U.S. recognition of the Republic of Yemen however was highly welcome to him, and he feels this will do much to return U.S./Cairo relations to the previous high plane.

8. With respect to a United North Africa, he feels the time to act is now on a cultural and economic level. He feels identical textbooks, exchange of teachers, cultural exchanges, lowering of frontier custom and administrative barriers, etc. will start a movement which in the end will force constantly greater unity, even if the politicians don't really feel the time is ripe. He feels this is especially true in education and the exchange of economic advantages, such as procuring electricity from Oujda for Marnia or Tlemcen instead of from Oran.

9. "Upon his honor as a man" he swore he nor any Algerian had anything to do with the attempted assassination of Bourguiba. He also felt sure the two Youssefists in Algeria, who are good friends of his, had nothing to do with it. He felt his friendship with these two persons might have led to [illegible] suspicions that Algeria was involved. He said "that is not my way, and I have too many problems of my own to meddle in Tunisian affairs. It was a plot mounted andsupported in Tunisia itself."

10. Personal information gained: DOB 25 Dec 1916, Marnia, of parents born in Marrakech, Morocco, secondary studies at Tlemcen college, French army in France 1937-40, then demobilised, then French army 1943-45 in Italy where he received Military Medal and two others (highest medal possible, and he was first of three so decorated), then back to Algeria. In 1945 he was in 5th Moroccan regiment in Setif when 45,000 people were slaughtered, which marked his entry into politics. That action branded him for life, and he realised that force was the only answer to Algeria's cry for liberty. He does not hate the French in any way, however. That is in the past.

*** Both at the beginning and the end of the evening, Ben Bella remarked how each time we met, he was reminded of the "fine" times at Tlemcen and how much he appreci the help those broadcasts were to him. I delivered the tea set he had requested in D

Secret

LUSTRIMMER REPORT #222, K lpm 9 Jan 63

Subj: Americans/ Marc Schleifer/Richard Gibson/Afrique Revolution

PADA: Home of Jean Marie Boeglin (Jeanson Network), 7 January 63

1. Boeglin scheduled an informal discussion between himself, Schleifer, an exile leader from the Union of South Africa, and Yves Mathieu (phonetic) at the Boeglin/Mathieu apartment. I was invited to participate, and to translate for Schleifer who speaks no French. The South African didn't appear, but we were joined later in the evening by a French lawyer Maurice Lm who works in Biens Vacants and by Francois Lm, another Jeanson network character.

2. Boeglin has accepted me as being very leftist, "objective", and perhaps even communist—an impression I have matured with him. Thus, his acceptance of me as a like-minded person gave confidence to the others.

3. The evening was a discussion of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions. Schleifer was more or less the oracle, having been in Cuba twice, once for two months Dec 60/Jan 61 and recently for nine months. Personally, I felt Schleifer is so extremely left that he is a communist in everything except perhaps the card and the party membership. He is intelligent, reasons well, and is obviously well-read, being able to give quotes from books by title of the principal communist authors, especially Lenin. He is also fuzzy in that he seems to suspect U.S. positions as being propaganda positions and does not assume the same for Russian positions. At the same time, he gave me an impression of sincerity, quite a bit of criticism for Russia, and an obvious search for the truth. He didn't blink an eye when Mathieu assumed that we were all "Marxist, Socialist, and hoped for the eventual implantation of socialism even in the U.S." If he is not a communist, he is an extreme left fellow traveler.

4. The principal conclusions of the evening were that the Algerian revolution has proceeded along the path of socialism much faster than the Cuban revolution did, but that the Cuban revolution will reach true socialism before the Algerian revolution because of the limitating factor of the Evian agreements; the Cuban army was the spearhead of the revolutionary reforms in Cuba, but the Algerian army has not been due to the political crisis, a defect which is being corrected at the moment as plans are now being made for the Algerian army to assume the same position here; Russia and the U.S. after the Cuban brush have implicitly or explicitly made an agreement to keep out of Algeria in particular and Africa in general in favor of French and other European domination in order to keep from having a further stand-off as in Cuba; Russia is not ready for nor does it want further revolutions in Latin America or Africa—as opposed to Asia—since it is not ready to back such revolutions in the face of American or European opposition to the limit, and thus she can only lose face and the position of monopoly of communist leadership which she wishes to retain. Schleifer made one interesting statement that Morgan had been killed by Castro because he took funds from the CIA to finance a counter revolution.

I caused a flurry of dropped jaws during the evening, especially Mathieu—which was later forgiven because of my "known" objectivity—when I described the lower middle-class farm of my family with its 80 hectares, tractors, combine, etc., and declared communism couldn't work in such a wealthy atmosphere. Mathieu agreed that perhaps in the U.S. no more effective utilization and distribution of land could be envisaged.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Secret

5. Later I took Schleifer to his room, the home of Richard Gibson. He was due to leave for Morocco on 9 January, but stayed over to get an interview with Ben Bella which was to be arranged, or "guaranteed" as he put it, by Boeglin. From there he is to go to the States. I asked him what he was doing here, and he replied just traveling. Boeglin had told me he was a sociologist with a study grant, but Schleifer denied he was a sociologist, volunteering nothing about a grant. He told me Gibson was staying in Algiers to put out a new paper called "Afrique Revolution" which was to be a big, slick publication with many photos and a selling price which would enable it to replace Jeune Afrique throughout Africa. When I asked about financing, he said the Algerian government was financing it heavily. He suggested we meet again 8 January so he could present me to Gibson who was looking for a photographer, and suggested I could be that photographer at a nominal salary. I replied I would be interested more from the point of prestige and publication rather than salary since I was doing well in my present journalistic endeavor as far as salary went. I was kept from making the meeting, but I talked by phone with Gibson (who speaks French so badly he couldn't complete a sentence on the phone) and the meeting is to be set up on 10 January.

6. Boeglin requested Mathieu, who is a high official in the Biens Vacants section dealing with agriculture problems to set up a series of photos for me. Mathieu met me at the OG office 8 January and sent me on a visit to communal lands in Zeralda with an assistant, Mohamed Cherif Mosteghanemi (a real "pure" militant) on 9 January. Mathieu also presented me to the Director of the program, Mahjoub (phonetic) whom I had known since his days in the Ben Khedda cabinet. Mahjoub has given me carte blanche for a report in depth of the entire program, to be made over the next few weeks. At Zeralda, the regional monitor turned out to be an acquaintance from Tlemcen FLN office, and I was permitted to photograph any and everything I desired. To finish this report, I will be furnished with complete figures, etc., as well as further trips in the field, especially in the Constantine area.

/c

APERTURE CARD

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #223, Kulpa 9 Jan 63

Subj: Requested list of continual contacts, for which requirements are to be tailored.

1. President Ben Bella; seems to answer quite frankly whatever question I pose.

2. Commandant Sliman; slippery in questioning, but has evidenced desire to make recorded interview which will "shock" America on whatever subject I choose; Also has suggested a report on the army of the south with him as guide; has also agreed to explain army system to me; also has agreed to intercede with Boumedienne to permit me to photograph Angolan trainees.

3. Braham Bousar; has sewed up Gendarmerie and Army oil contracts for Shell and sees army leaders frequently, worked on budget with Boumediene; is married to sister of Minister of Finances Francis; step-daughter married to Bedjaoui of Ben Bella's office.

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou and brother of same name who works in Finance ministry; has suggested I arrange informal meeting with him and Ambassador Porter at my home.

5. Mohamed Madjad; former Director of Security, now at work in Ministry Foreign Affairs; to present me to his successor Yousseffi.

6. Jamal Kisri, Director of Tourism; good friend Security Director Yousseffi, Madjad, other important government members.

7. Jean Marie Boeglin, former Jeanson Network now assistant Ministry of Information.

8. Yves Mathieu & Mahjoub (promotie) of Siena Vacant.

9. WHAMY/4, now Algerian Radio.

10. Marc Schleifer/ Richard Gibson, American "leftists", connected with Afrique Revolution.

to find

11. Louis Aletti, Hotel Aletti; good friend of Chinese Ambassador, agrees/and produces generally any information I request of him. Knows most bloc people.

12. fnu Nahi (in spite of lack of firstname, we are quite good friends & exchange visits frequently), formerly with Shell, nowin Government office dealing with all Oil questions.

13. Mohamed Yazid, deputy; seems anxious deepen our old but rather light friendship.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

//

Secret

Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #231, Kulpa 30 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, Jan 25-29 Jan.

1. Serge Michel: Saw him Aletti hotel, his house, and three times my house. He says Yazid is de facto Minister of Information now, and will become Minister of Information over the next few weeks or month. Michel stayed with El Chaab long enough to get it on its feet, then moved on to plans for Atlas. When Atlas is established, he will move on again to books on Algeria and one-shot publications. He is going to the Congo in early April for a week to gather material for articles on Angola and the Congo. He is taking the line that Kennedy and Khruschev are "allies", with De Gaulle and Mao as enemies; thus Algeria should not support nor attack either one too much. He feels the Afrique Revolution is making political mistakes in this respect by attacking the United States (presumably with an article on Meredith & Mississippi) and can be termed the extreme left in Algeria. He feels Afrique Revolution will be taken over by Atlas staff in six months or less, and run on a less violent basis. Serge talked of his ancestors, saying they were all from Georgia, and that a translator was used when he talked with his grand parents who only spoke Georgian not Russian. He is an apatride with a Moroccan passport (which I saw but couldn't get the number) which contains his nationality as Moroccan, as opposed to other Moroccan passports for Algerians which have the nationality lined through. His father was apatride also, and Serge claims he feels more for Algeria than any other country. He arrived here the first time when he was 20 years old, and from that time lived with Algerian rebels. He is 41 years old now. He has three boys, about one year, four and six, all with Russian first names, and occupies a villa in Hydra. His wife speaks French with an accent, Russian I believe. His infant is very sick with athsma.

2. Richard Gibson & wife: Saw them in his office as result of his request for photos for Dave Watts in New York for the latter's "Liberator" publication, which is a slick, leftist publication with a format something like a cross between Newsweek and The New Yorker. I gave him fourphotos without my name, but he insisted on putting my name on the back for credit. He said Watts would pay me directly, since he had my address already. He also said I would probably get photo requests from London from a person whose name he didn't remember. This person and Watts are also correspondents for Afrique Revolution in their cities. Mrs. Gibson is white, and appeared to me to be jewess, probably from Brooklyn, judging from her accent. However, she could be foreign since the accent is difficult to place. Eduardo dos Santos was in the office, but wasn't very friendly. Gibson knew of my trip to Angola, probably from dos Santos via the Congo embassy in Tunis, and wanted some photos when I returned.

3. Jean Marie Boeglin: Boeglin phoned me, after having missed a luncheon with me last week. He has acted on my request to speak to Jacques Verges about using me when possible for Afrique Revolution. Verges is to meet me tomorrow to discuss photos. I am to bring one—violent action if possible—which is to be used as the first cover of Revolution, if it is a suitable photo. Boeglin will be there, and we are to meet today to plan the conversation with Verges to make sure I benefit.

4. Djmal Tchanderli: (brother of U.N. Chanderli, although name spelled differently). He came to my home with Michel. He is going to the Congo to film Angolans in March, and wanted my agreement not to film for my cover company while there. I finally agreed, extracting a promise from him that he would not take any photos, thus leaving me that monopoly in exchange for the film monopoly. He & Michel feel they are related, both families coming from Georgia, & Michel having an uncle named Tchanderli.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Secret

AF/Dud.

LUSTRIFER REPORT #231, Kulna 25 Jan 62

Subj: Contacts 21-24 January

1. Serge Michel: Saw him four times at Hotel Aletti, discussed mostly "Atlas". Asked me to prepare six color covers in advance, first one to illustrate ancient Corbusier plan for face-lifting of Algeria which is now planned by Algerian Government. Claims Afrique Revolution will be "absorbed" by Atlas (probably both under same editorship). Roberto Holden phoned Josie Fanon from Tunis, he will be in Rome Saturday, will send my ticket and visa for Congo from there. I am to leave soon as possible.

No 201 2. Louis Aletti, about sixty years, 220 pounds, 6'2", white hair, blue eyes, French, worked in States several years in 1920's, speaks English well, friend of most diplomats in city including Chinese, is accepted by Algerians as being anti-OAS in spirit. He claims the East German government has full recognition by the Algerians, cited Ben Bella's attendance at national holiday of East Germans, though Scharfenberg is only Charge d'Affaires. Gave me Chinese embassy address as 35 Rue Luciani, El Biar, phone [illegible]-48. Will have me to dine with East Germans whenever I wish.

3. Taib Jarai, Hotel Aletti & the city. Jarai had difficulty with reporters of Republique Algerienne and was in rage over "stupid communists". Again claimed Irving Brown was CIA agent in front of a French radio speakerine.

not ~~[illegible]~~

4. Dr. Hadj Hamou, Jamal Kisri, Braham Bouzar, at my home and at their homes. Nothing of interest conversed.

5. Fnu BOUZAR, police ~~xxxxxxx~~ officer, plus two of his friends, at Rora. Nothing of interest except the three of them very idealistic, insisting everyone must work to maximum for minimum pay in order build Algeria. Seems to be typical attitude among young Algerians.

No 201 6. Zerati, fnu police commissioner, Les Pecheries for lunch. Extremely pro-American, talked of all his OIS friends from Morocco at Ben Guerir while he worked in Marrakech. He should be contacted by someone under official cover as being "sent by his old OIS friends" or some such ploy. He can be developed.

No 201 7. Abdelkader Makery (phonetic), Secretary General of the Assembly, my home. Nothing of interest, but he is quite likeable and certainly of importance. Will see him again rather frequently.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

6

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Secret

LUSTRIKER REPORT #852, Pulpa   31 Jan 63

Subj: Contacts, 30 Jan— 31 Jan.

1. Jean Marie Boeglin: Saw him three times, his home, office of Revolution Africaine, and Brasserie du Berry, 30-31 January. He arranged meeting with Jacques Verges, Director of Revolution Afrique, having told Verges that I was "practically a militant" who would work well for the cause instead of the salary. He also offered me the "exclusive" job as photographer for the Information Bureau of Biens Vacants, with all expenses for trips etc paid for by the ministry, but with very little extra salary. I accepted, saying that was a good method to study the reforme agraire deeply for an article. Yves Mathieu will be my boss in that job. Boeglin then took me to the Opera where he has an office in capacity as Technical Director of the National Theatre. He requested me to furnish him with photos he could use for the Theatre posters and for the programs for the first production scheduled in mid-March. I agreed.

2. Jacques Verges: Saw him 1100 31 Jan in the office of Revolution Africaine, of which he is director. Madame Rabah Bitat is to be the editor in chief of this publication. Verges immediately offered me a job as a regular salaried photographer of Revolution or as a piece-meal photographer. I indicated I thought payment by the job was better, since my cover outfit is not "liberal" as I am. Regular salary for everyone on the paper, from the lowest secretary to Verges himself, as decided by Verges, is to be 100,000 francs per month. My job payments will amount to about thatmuch. I will take a trip once a week with Georges Arno (phonetic) to do photos on the feature article on Algeria for each week's publication. Verges also ordered six photos from me from my contact prints, and took one photo on the spot for the cover of the second issue due out 9 February. The cover of the firstissue of 2 February is to be a photo of Lumumba. Verges took me around to introduce me to the rest of the staff—all sullen characters who hardly said hello with the exception of Cinet, the ex-Express cartoonist—and showed me the physical layout. He ~~also~~ invited me to the opening cocktail party for Saturday night also. Boeglin later said he was quite impressed with my photo collection.

3. Serge Michel: Came to my home 31 Jan when I wasn't home, but I talked with him from Botras' house. Michel had with him "an FLN responsable" who wants to commission me to produce the photos for an FLN publication, slick style one-shot but presented as a "weekly", on Algerian women. We set up a meeting for Saturday morning to discuss it. We will take a trip into the Kabyle area to start these shots of women.

4. Djamal Tchanderli: Saw him down town, said he wanted to discuss something important with me, made date for tonight, but he didn't show. Will see him tomo:

5. Talked by phone with Tony Pell and Frank Kearns (directing CBS Paris since Kleiman is in New York since Christmas with rumored sick wife—he may be getting fired) in Paris. They are extremely interested in the Congo trip, approve it fully in spite of leaving radio uncovered here, want both radio broadcasts and actuality tapes. Also want me to shoot movies, and insist I make a deal with Tchanderli to permit me to shoot movies. Am to phone them tomorrow for latest word from New York on actual requirements and possible premium payments for Congo/Angolese movies.

13

6. Abdelkader Bel Hacene, two Deputies, at Hotel Aletti. Nothing of interest.

ABERTURE CARD REPRO

-C/NE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING 1P

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Paris

INFO
Chief, NE
Chief, WE

FROM
Chief of Station, New Delhi

SUBJECT
KOBIRD/LCHARVEST/PADBAYON
PADBAYON/1 Relationship with Jacques M. Verges

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action: FYI

RI: Index this dispatch to 201 file of Jacques M. Verges, French citizen, Director of pro-Chinese Communist magazine, "Revolution". Also index to 201 file of Richard Gibson, U.S. citizen, Editor-in-Chief of the English language edition of "Revolution".

201-179169

201-306 [illegible] 7153

1. Forwarded, herewith, as Attachment 1 to this dispatch is a copy of the letter cited in the reference from PADBAYON/1 to Jacques M. Verges. Attachment 2 is a copy of the reply written by Richard Gibson on behalf of Verges. Attachment 3 is a personality sketch of Verges prepared by PADBAYON/1.

2. Regarding Attachment 1, Tilak is a mutual friend who currently is studying in Canada. "Algerian Sister" refers to Jamila Bouhired. The remainder of the attachments are believed to be self-explanatory.

3. Headquarters asked (DIR 05476) if PADBAYON could furnish any information on Hamza Alavi of Pakistan who is on the Editorial Board of "Revolution". PADBAYON/1 had not previously heard of this individual.

Attachments
1,2,3 as stated

Edmund F. LAHSENE

Distribution:

2-COS, Paris w/att
2 - C/NE w/att
2 - C/WE w/att
2 - Files

INDEX H

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40-6-138/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	NPDA-10,084	12 March 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 40-6-138/3 201- (Verges) 201- (Gibson)

3

Jacques Verges 21 10 March 1964

Physical details

Verges is about 38 years old; about 5'5" tall and of medium build. He is fair colored, has a Chinese-looking face and wears spectacles. He has dark hair and dark eyes.

Parentage

Verges was born in Reunion Island which is a French Protectorate. His father is a citizen of that Island and his mother was from INdo-China. He has at least one older brother. The father was a Member of the French Parliament representing Reunion Island. Now the brother Paul Verges, is a Member of Parliament from that Island.

Marital Status

Verges was married about 1946 but was divorced in about 1959. He has one son from this marriage. It is now heard that he has married again in about 1963 to Jamilia Bouirhead, the famous Algerian prisoner who was sentenced to death but was given a reprieve. He defended her during her trial.

Personal Habits

Verges was a prominent student in Paris and was from the very beginning a very good debator. He is a charming conversationist and can keep any audience completely enraptured by his talk. He has been extremely popular with all groups and particular with females. He is very fond of eating well. He takes spicy food which would put even an Indian to shame. He drinks very little, works late hours, sleeps long in the mornings. He has an artistic temperament and good taste.

Career

In about 1950 Verges started working in the International Union of Students in Prague. There he was Secretary of I.U.S. and later also of International Students' Relief which was formed more or less in his time. He remained there till 1954. After this he returned to Paris and studied to get his law degree. From about 1955 to 1962 he worked as a lawyer in France. As a lawyer he rose to prominence immediately. He was elected to the first Secretaryship of the French Young Lawyers' Body, which is a post of academic distinction. From the very beginning Verges started taking political cases of those who were accused in the various French colonies of "sedition". He was adopted by the F.L.N. of Algeria as the Chief of the Legal Defence Bureau in Paris. He conducted several famous trials including that of Jamilla and at the same time carried on the campaign for Algerian independence in France and elsewhere. For

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ABSTRACT CARD REPRODUCTION

some time he was in trouble at the hands of the political groups opposed to Algerian independence. He was provided a guard outside his house and for a little while had even to leave France to live in Geneva because of fear for his life. Even in the legal defence that he conducted, the basis was entirely political. He was all this period subscribing to an extremist view which may be called ultra-revolutionary. For example, in his legal defence his theory was always to justify an act of killing by an accused on the ground that it was part of a war of independence.

Almost from the very beginning and in any case from 1951 Verges had serious difference with the French C.P. He considered them to be reformists and accused them of being cowardly in their support to the Algerian revolution. He was never a member thereof in this period and often worked against them.

In 1962 he shifted to Rabat as Political Adviser to the King. He was very friendly with a Senior Minister, "Ahmad", and his post in Rabat was brought about by the Minister. However, it appears he did not continue long in this post and was back in Paris in 1963. Now he is the Chief Editor of a political monthly journal called "Revolution". He is also reported to be the head of the China Lobby in Paris.

Acquaintance

The writer met Verges in 1951 when he visited Delhi. In 1955 the writer stayed with Verges in Paris twice and twince again in 1958. The last time the writer saw Verges was in Paris in 1961. (In 1951 Verges was in Delhi in connection with an I.U.S. meeting. In 1955 the writer was in Paris on his way to and from Prague in connection with I.U.S. matters. In 1958 he visited Paris going to and from Stockholm for the Youth Festival Preparatory Committee meeting. And in 1961 the writer was in Paris to attend an I.A.D.L. Commission on Algeria.) Verges has always been very friendly and cordial with the writer and openly discusses his problems, views, activities, etc.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. CELA-38,485
TO: Chief, WE		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 11-500.
FROM: Chief of Station, London		DATE 14 May 1963
SUBJECT: OLEWFAY/JAGUAR Charles GIBSON	201- b. 1931 California U.S.A. Cit U.S.A. in Lausanne, Switzerland	☒ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: Provide traces		

REFERENCES

1. JAGUAR have reported that a secret and delicate source has provided information about an American who is editing the English edition of a new publication, entitled "African Revolution". French editions of this paper are being published in Algiers under the title of "Revolution Africaine" and the English edition is being published in Lausanne, where the journal has established an office. The American editor is Charles GIBSON, who was born in California in 1931, and was until September 1962, the Executive Secretary of an organisation styled "The Fair Play for Cuba" Committee in the United States. GIBSON is said to have been previously employed by the CBS News in New York, who dismissed him for his pro-Cuban activities. He is also said to have worked for the F.L.N. in Paris and to have had a Fellowship in African Studies at Columbia University Graduate School at one time.

No 201

2. JAGUAR would appreciate any additional information that Headquarters could provide about this man's background and activities.

Lawrence L. Noldy
LAWRENCE L. NOLDY

Distribution:
4-Chief, WE

X-INDEX

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11-2-3

38

SECRET CONTROL/US OFFICIALS ONLY

REPORT NUMBER: OEL-30,251

FROM: ENGLAND, LONDON

DATE. 24 September 1964

NUMBER OF PAGES: 1

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:

REPORT MADE BY: LEROY T. WADSWORTH

REPORT APPROVED BY: VICTOR T. CRONBIGH

DISTRIBUTION BY COPY TO:
Washington 1
Paris (LCPIPIT) 1 OFL
Paris 1 OFP
Bern 1
Registry

INDEX

11-4-105

ORIGINATING ~~[illegible]~~ JAGUAR SECTION: E.1 REFERENCE OSLA-41,545 of 10 Sept 64.

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA AND COMMENTS:

JAGUAR Comment: "The attached report contains some futher information (see reference which was not sent Bern) about the difficulties experienced in recent months by "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

"Please do not give contents of this report any further distribution, other than to ODACID, WASHINGTON, without prior reference to us."

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D 200-4-305
D 29-4-105

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

11-4-105

SECRET

Att. to OEL-39,251
24 Sept 1964

RICHARD GIBSON
GT. U.K OCC PUBLISHING
[illegible] ENGLAND
WAS ED. "AF, LAT AM, ASIA REVO." SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE
O "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" ABLE TO PAY.

A secret source has provided the following information about "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and its French counterpart "Revolution" and about the differences between Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, and Richard GIBSON who was Editor until he was dismissed about two months ago.

2. On 13th August 1964, the Swiss Federal Council banned "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", which had hitherto been printed in Lausanne, and the Swiss authorities took possession of previous issues and subscription lists. GIBSON was however able to retain possession of one copy of the subscription list as well as distribution records and most of the unpublished manuscripts.

3. When GIBSON was removed from his position as Editor of the publication he and his wife were owed a substantial sum in arrears of salary. Jacques VERGES made no attempt to pay these arrears with the result that the GIBSONs took legal action and received judgement in their favour early in September for a sum in excess of £1,500. GIBSON expects that VERGES will be unable to pay this sum or to meet other debts and that he will be declared bankrupt. GIBSON hopes that it will then be possible for Nils ANDERSSON, the Swedish printer of the English edition, to take over both the English and French editions.

4. [illegible] <Because of his financial difficulties with "AF, Lat Am, Asia Revo" JACQUES VERGES has had to give up the tenancy of the Paris office of the publication at rue François 1er, and has moved to 52 rue Galande, Paris 5e. Richard Gibson expects he will be declared bankrupt.>

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.S. OCC PUBLISHING
ØA ENGLAND
SUBJ ED. "AF, LAT AM, ASIA REVO" SEPT 64 TOOK LEGAL ACTION + WON £1,500 DUE HIM IN PAST SALARY. SUBJ DOESN'T EXPECT J. VERGES WILL BE ABLE TO PAY.

0 "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

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NILS ANDERSON
Δ ENGLAND
OCC. PRINTER
SWEDISH PRINTER OF ENG EDITION OF "AF LAT AM ASIA REVO
RICHARD GIBSON HOPES SUBJ WILL TAKE OVER BOTH ENG + FR EDITIONS

22nd September 1964.

INDEX -X

SECRET
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GROUP 1
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declassification

SECRET

DISPATCH

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PROCESSING

PROC. ACTION	ACTION	ACTION MARKED
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XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
KEYWAY Psych
Jacque VERGES & Richard T. GIBSON Expelled from Switzerland

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELW - 20852 (9 December 1963)

1. LCBEFORE reported on 17 January 1964 that Subjects, both of whom are mentioned in reference dispatch concerning Révolution Africaine (GIBSON is a US citizen) and were working from that publication's Lausanne office, have left Switzerland at the request of the Swiss Government. According to LCBEFORE, VERGES departed Switzerland on 25 November 1963 for Latin America (possibly Brazil); and GIBSON departed on 15 December 1963.

Verges has [illegible] in Switz [illegible]

2. LCBEFORE believes that in part it can take credit for these expulsions in view of the fact that LCBEFORE-inspired publicity about Révolution Africaine has appeared in the Swiss press and that this publicity helped to draw the matter to the Swiss authorities' attention, thus prompting them to expel these two propagandists.

3. LCBEFORE also noted on 17 January 1964 that the November 1963 issue of Révolution Africaine lists Lausanne as a bureau (and Paris as the Main Office) whereas the October 1963 issue listed Lausanne as the Main Office and Paris as one of the bureaus.

Luke B. Tanchester
LUKE B. TANCHESTER

3 - C/WE

<Richard Gibson [illegible] working in the publication's office of Revolution Africaine Lausanne Switz. [illegible] depart Switz 15 Dec 63 at request of Swiss govt.>

11-2-24

<Jacques Verges 201-[illegible] were working in the publication's office of Revolution Africaine Lausanne Switz. At request of Swiss Govt and depart Switz on 25 Nov 63 for Latin America possibly Brazil.>

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY

DATE TYPED
22 Jan 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA - [redacted]
40613

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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ABSTRACT	
MICROFILMED	

TO
Chief, WE

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Pari
Chief of Station, Paris(LCPIPIT); Chief, KUDES

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
JAGUAR Paper on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-40,542(15 April 1964)

1. Reference forwarded a JAGUAR paper dealing with the well-known Communist magazine Revolution. Attached are (1) another JAGUAR note from SMOCK's office, and (2) the paper received with it. Please note JAGUAR's caveats on the use of the material.

2. SMIMPISH also remarked to me, on one recent occasion, that he had learned that Richard GIBSON had been expelled from the staff of Revolution (as is indicated here), but the reason that SMIMPISH gave was that GIBSON had been accused of working on behalf of "subversive" elements, which SMIMPISH implied to mean KUBARK. Maybe SMIMPISH was speculating on or misquoting this JAGUAR report. I haven't been able to go back to SMIMPISH on this, because he has subsequently gone on leave.

3. We (and JAGUAR) would appreciate any comments on this report.

George E. KATZENBACH

Attachment: herewith
1-Letter
2-Report

Distribution:
3-Chief, WE w/att h/w
2-C/KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-C/LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-C/KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS/Paris w/att h/w

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
10 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-41,545

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

att/2

SECRET

2P

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Reports received from a number of sources make it clear that "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has been in difficulties for several months and it appears that the last issue was No. 11 dated March 1964. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No. 7 of the French edition, "Revolution", dated March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000. Jacques VERGES, the publication's Director, tried to effect administrative economies in order to cope with the situation but according to VERGES, Richard GIBSON, the Editor, argued that the Chinese should be asked to pay the debts. Matters worsened when, again according to VERGES, GIBSON persuaded the Lausanne printer to write to Peking and ask the Chinese to settle the publication's debt to him. VERGES regarded GIBSON's activities as deliberately disruptive and designed to produce proof of China's support for the publication.

201-180164

2. Also, VERGES complained that GIBSON was working for Communist splinter groups in Europe to the detriment of the international Communist movement, and that he was dealing tactlessly with the magazine's agents and contributors. The situation was such that VERGES visited the U.K. in mid-July to discuss the position with BABU, a member of the Editorial Board. BABU, who is now Minister of State for Development Planning of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

201-378225

3. In July 1964 there were rumours that the English edition had gone bankrupt but these were denied by GIBSON who suggested that the English and French editions should be made quite separate, and that the former should be published in London. At about this time the split between VERGES and GIBSON became complete and the latter was removed from his position as Editor and from the Editorial Board, which issued the following "warning":-

> "Comrades from New York, London and Accra (Ghana) have raised up grave charges against Richard GIBSON. These charges have been confirmed and underlined by Richard GIBSON's present disruptive activities. Revolution's Editorial Board has decided to dismiss Richard GIBSON from all his responsibilities and expell him from the Editorial Board.
>
> "From now on, Richard GIBSON's activities can not in any way engage the responsibility of the review in all its editions.
>
> for the Editorial Board"

A similar statement was published in "Revolution" No. 10-11 dated July-August 1964.

<JACQUES VERGES (201-180164) DIRECTOR OF AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION, EXPELLED RICHARD GIBSON EDITOR, BECAUSE LATTER ARGUED THAT CHINESE/4. With GIBSON . . SHOULD BE ASKED TO PAY DEBTS OF PUBLICATION.>

CARD REPRODUCTION

SECRET

4. With GIBSON out of the way, VERGES and his supporters were hoping to resume publication of the English edition. GIBSON also seemed determined to carry on and it has been reported that as early as June 1964 he was enquiring into the possibility of publishing an English version in the Netherlands.

5. The only other change of significance which has occurred during 1964 has been the resignation from the Editorial Board of Hamza ALAVI who objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. Issue No. 11 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" shows that he was replaced by another Pakistani, the 78 year old Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI. BHASHANI, who lives in East Pakistan, is the leader of the National Awami Party.

201 ✓

✓

201-070343

1st September 1964.

FR
HAMZA ALAVI
CIT. PAKISTAN

RESIGNED FROM EDITORIAL BOARD OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" BECAUSE HE OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE

FR
<MAULANA ABDUL HAMID KHAN BHASHANI
(201-070343) LIVES EAST PAKISTAN + IS
LEADER OF NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY. ON
EDITORIAL BOARD OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA,
ASIA REVOLUTION" REPLACED HAMZA ALAVI
WHO OBJECTED TO ITS PRO-CHINESE ATTITUDE.>

FR
<RICHARD GIBSON (201-300052) EXPELLED FROM
STAFF OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA
REVOLUTION" JACQUES VERGES CLAIMED HIS
ATTEMPT TO HAVE CHINESE PAY PUB'S DEBT
DELIB DISRUPTIVE + DESIGNED TO PROVE
THAT HE WORKING FOR
CHINA'S SUPPORT, GROUPS
COM SPLINTER TO DETRIMENT OF
INTERNAT COM, + THAT HE DEALING
TACTLESSLY WITH PUB'S AGENTS +
CONTRIBUTORS.>

from London who came as an observer

SEX M F OCC

CIT: UK (7) Max Hunt, a teacher in London who came as an observer for the Schools' Action Union MEMBER

F

SEX M

CIT: UK (8) Matt L g a [illegible], manager of the Scottish Vanguard Bookshop at 27[illegible] Paisley Road, Glasgow, which is owned by the Scottish Workers Party

OCC: BOOK SHOP MANAGER ASSOCIATED WITH F

(9) David R. Shanks, from the MEMBER Scottish Workers Party who lives at 66 Dundee Street in Edinburgh

SEX M

CIT. UK

Delegation from the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) as follows:

F (1) Roger Young, treasurer of Friends of Palestine which is now affiliated with the PSC

F (2) Norman Temple, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

F (3) Abdullah Yasanee, of the Friends of Palestine MEMBER

SEX M

CIT: UK

OCC:

AFFILIATED WITH ~~MEMBER OF~~ PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

F (4) Louis Eakes, of the Young Liberals MEMBER

(5) an unidentified girl friend of Eakes

F (6) (fnu) Hallier of Agit-Prop MEMBER (a PSC member)

F (7) (fnu) Walker, who came as an observer

F MEMBER (8) Bill Gunn, of Reg Birch's Communist Party of Britain/Marxist-Leninist and of the PSC

F MEMBER (9) Dave Hlundell, of the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation (RSSF) in London

SEX M

(Source Comment: This delegation had been sent to Algiers by the London-based PLO representative, (fnu) F Armanazi, who is apparently the editor of the newspaper "Free Palestine". The newspaper, however, lists its editor as F "Aziz Yafi". Armanazi had supplied the airfare for this delegation because he did not want the PSC people to go to Algiers under the arrangements of Manchanda. All of the PSC people were young and no match for Manchanda who, in the final session of the Congress, was able to isolate them completely inasmuch as they opposed the recognition of Al Fatah and the establishment of the information bureau in Algiers.)

e. Italy - Represented by delegates from the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). They decided to be in an observer status, although they were entitled to be participants by the fact that they belong to a Palestinian Solidarity Committee in Italy. The only open political opposition to the overall political line of the Congress came from the Italians who passed out a statement at the final session deploring the importation of left-wing quarrels into the issue of Palestine.

CARD REPRODUCTION

M
3
FRANCE
OCC
Δ

f. France - The delegation was initially divided into factions but, on 27 December, a sort of truce was worked out and there was no overt trouble. Prominent members of the delegation were: Roger [illegible]ury, a leftist University lecturer, Jean-Pierre Vigier; (fnu) Kravine, brother of Alain Krivine; (fnu) Castroy and Marie-Claude Vignaud, the mistress of Abderrezak Benhadji (Algerian living in Paris).

FR
FR
F
SEX M CIT: ALGERIA

g. West Germany - The delegation was composed primarily of unidentified militants of the Socialist German Student League -- SDS. The group took a very left sectarian position and joined with the PSC from Britain in openly refusing to give full support to the Al Fatah. On the other hand the Germans played no role, speaking only briefly in the Political Commission.

F
3
FRANCE
ASSOCIATE OF ABDERREZAK BENHADJI

h. Spain

i. Switzerland

M
3
NETHERLANDS

F

j. The Netherlands - Represented as observers by Kees Wagtendonk and Bertus Hendriks who came from Amsterdam. (Source Comment: Wagtendonk said that he was still a member of the Pacifist Socialist Party; Hendriks described himself as a Marxist-Leninist.)

k. Scandinavia - Included Sweden, and perhaps two other Scandinavian countries (Source Comment: The small Scandinavian group, which came as observers, was guided during the proceedings by Samir Boutani who resides at Sluttbacken 31, Hagersten, Stockholm. He is an Arab journalist who claims to write for Lebanese and Syrian publications and who had attended the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal in Stockholm.)

M
3
SWEDEN
OCC JOURNALIST
Δ

l. Algeria

m. Palestine

n. United States - Delegation as follows:

F SEX M CIT: USA

(1) Herb Block, of the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party who led the delegation

F SEX F CIT. USA

(2) Mrs. Block, wife of Herb Block (Source Comment: The Blocks announced that they were attending the Congress under the pseudonym of "Douglas". Mrs. Block even went to the length of wearing a reddish wig and dark glasses. Neither Block played any significant role.)

F
AKA

DPOB 31 AUG 35 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(3) Eldridge Cleaver, Black Panther Party leader now residing in Algiers

F SF

(4) Don (LNU), a Negro from Chicago who accompanied the Blocks and who claimed to be a member of the Black Panther Party.

DPOB: 5 MAY 15 USA FR ( ) SEX M CIT: USA

(5) Lewis Bergman, a former member of the Communist Party of USA in Chicago who now

OCC BOOKSELLER

EX F
[illegible] 11 J[illegible] 43 USA, CALIF
IT USA
CC STUDENT

resides in San Francisco.

FN (201-[illegible])

(S) David FINEMAN, who resides in San Francisco.

(Source Comment: The US delegation was accompanied by two newsreel photographers from the West Coast, one who gave his name as "Hardesty" FN. They only attended the final session of the Congress and were primarily concerned with lobbying the PLO for facilities to go to Jordan to photograph guerrilla activities there.)

SEX M

CIT: USA

OCC: PHOTOGRAPHER

200-9-54

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WE

INFO: Chief, KUWOLF; COS, Paris; Chief, LCPIPIT, Chief, KUDESK

FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: KEYWAY
JAGUAR Paper on Revolution-Africa, Latin America, Asia

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REFERENCE: OELS 6746 (7 January 1964)

1. Reference authorized the Station to pass the 5 January 1964 issue of Propaganda Notes, Series B-40 (b) on Subject Chicom-financed publication to liaison.

2. We passed the KUBARK paper to SMOTH, LCBEFORE, and JAGUAR and requested comment.

3. JAGUAR's 3 April 1964 response, prepared by SMOCK, is attached. Please note the caveat in SMOCK's paragraph five; and that SMOCK indicates in paragraph four that the JAGUAR response is on behalf of LCBEFORE and SMOTH as well.

Luke B Tanchester

LUKE B. TANCHESTER

Attachment: herewith
1. SMOCK response
2. Note "Africa, LA, Asia Revolution"

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WE w/att.
1 - Chief, KUWOLF w/att.
1 - COS, Paris w/att.
1 - Chief, LCPIPIT w/att.
1 - Chief, KUDESK w/att.

INDEX

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 15 April 64

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OELA - 40,542

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SECRET 391295Z

DIR INFO ROME LOND CITE PALP 6112

IN 86048

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DYDORIC QREBONY QRPREY

REF PALP 6111 (IN 86062)

201-766056

21

1. QREBONY REPORTS HIS FAMILY SITUATION DIFFICULT BECAUSE MUST LEAVE APARTMENT 1 JUNE AND MAKES LOT OF DIFFERENCE WHETHER MOVE IS PERMANENT (ALLOWING LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE/OUS LEASE OR PURCHASE) OR TEMPORARY. IF STAYS LONDON WIFE CAN GET JOB, AND IS TRYING AT INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR FAMILY PLANNING, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TRAVEL NEAR EAST ETC. WIFE WOULD NOT MIND STAYING IN LONDON BUT WOULD LIKE ROME AS WELL. IN ANY CASE, DECISION NECESSARY. REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS.

2. Q WOULD LIKE HAVE WIFE IN ROME OFR AT LEAST 3-4 DAYS DURING HIS END-APRIL STAY THERE TO IMPROVE HER MORALE (COMPLAINS SHE NEVER GOES ANYWHERE) AND MAINLY TO MEET CAROLE PINA, ABOUT WHOM SHE HAS HEARD. MORE INVOLVED USE OF PINA WILL REQUIRE PUTTING TO REST WIFE'S JEALOUSY. PALP REQUESTS AUTHORIZATION TRAVEL NOT PER DIEM FOR Q WIFE TO ..CRET

201-124-156/2
30 march 66

SECRET

9P

AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION

Origin

The monthly publication "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is the successor to "African Revolution" which was the monthly English digest of the Algerian weekly "Revolution Africaine". "Revolution Africaine", which is published in French, first appeared in February 1963 with the declared aim of helping to build socialism in Africa. In order to increase its effectiveness it began to publish a monthly edition, "African Revolution", consisting largely of material selected from previous issues of "Revolution Africaine". The editorial office of "African Revolution" was established in Lausanne, Switzerland by March 1963 and the first issue appeared two months later.

2. When the first editor of "Revolution Africaine", Jacques Mansour-VERGES, was replaced by Mohamed HARBI in May 1963, he left Algiers and took control of "African Revolution" in Lausanne. After two issues had been published the connection between it and "Revolution Africaine" was severed and "African Revolution" became "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". In December 1963 the editorial board moved from Lausanne to Paris, and the publication now appears monthly in English and French, although the two editions are not identical. The former is printed in Switzerland and the latter, which carries the title "Revolution", is printed in Paris.

Editorial Policy of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution"

3. The Editorial "Europe too . . ." in issue No. 8 (December, 1963) urged the European working-class movement to take up the revolutionary struggle. Thus "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" made it clear that it intended its message to have a world-wide application. At first, however, it had directed its attention to the destruction of colonialism in Africa and the establishment of national independence and socialism, and had later acknowledged the logic of its arguments by changing its title to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

4. To begin with, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" did not give the impression that it was advocating any particular brand of socialism. The Editorial on "Ideology" in issue No. 3 acknowledged the existence of various types of socialism in Africa and recognised that they were based on the "profound logic of experience". In time, however, it became increasingly apparent that the publication was lending its support to the Marxist-Leninist theory of revolution, and the Chinese Communist interpretation of it. The principal article in issue No. 7 (November, 1963) which had the anodyne title "Third World? Which Third World?", was largely an exposition of the Chinese Communist attitude towards the national liberation movement, drawing material and inspiration from the Chinese Communist Party's document "A proposal concerning the general line of the International Communist Movement". (This was the letter, dated 14th June 1963, from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; it is a major document in the ideological dispute between the two parties.) The article contained the following quotation from the Chinese letter:

> "The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are centred in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-centres of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism."

/As if . . .

As if to emphasise the extent of Chinese influence in the publication's policies and at the same time to denigrate those Communist Parties which supported the Soviet line, the Editorial in issue No. 8 referred scornfully to "the proponents of the peaceful road to socialism" and the "treason of the revisionists", and proclaimed the end of the "isolation in which revolutionary Marxists have been held because of the revisionism of the leaderships of the Communist parties". Clearly, therefore, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" supports the Chinese Communist argument that it is most unlikely that socialism can be achieved by peaceful means.

5. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" has for the most part shunned theoretical discussion, although issue No. 9 (January, 1964) has a heavier ideological content than previous issues. It has made its appeal in extremely practical terms: its range of subjects has been wide and by no means confined to politics. Appendix A contains a list of the articles, and the names of their authors, which have appeared in issues 1 - 2 of "African Revolution" and issues 3 - 9 of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

Chinese Support and Influence

6. When VERGES was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "African Revolution" and these were in due course transferred to "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution". It is quite likely that this was a form of subsidy and, initially, when the publication sold for 5s. 0d., it was worth £750 a month. An article in "Newsweek" dated 9th March 1964 refers to a report that the Chinese Embassy in Berne provided the publication with £25,000 in 1963. In addition, each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that it has been stated that the Chinese are in a position to control to some extent what appears in "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" but no clear, reliable information is available to show how this is done. The publication has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU, a member of the Editorial Board who is now Minister for External Affairs and Trade in Zanzibar. He visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961 and went to China again in October 1963.

Cuban Support

7. A Spanish edition of the publication was envisaged as early as May 1963 and it has been reported that members of its staff have been in touch with Cuban diplomats in Europe with a view to the latter editing the proposed Spanish edition. There is however, no confirmation that it has yet been published in Spanish. It may be that this Cuban connection was of assistance in providing the pictures of the Cuban revolution which appeared in issue No. 3 (July, 1963).

Contact with the Communist Splinter Group in the U.K.

8. By the end of 1963, "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" had established contact with the Communist splinter group in the U.K. which is sympathetic to the Chinese line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Publications of this group - the British Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity - were advertised in issues No. 8 and 9. An article on "The Fight Against Revisionism" by Michael McCreery the leader of the group was published in issue No. 9.

-/Staff, Editorial . .

APERTURE CARD/REPRODUCTIONS

Staff, Editorial Office and Agencies

9. The following persons are listed in issue No. 9 as members of the Editorial Staff:-

Director	Jacques M. VERGES	
Editorial Board	Hamsa ALAVI	- Pakistan
	A.R. Mohamed BABU	- Zanzibar
	Amilcar CABRAL	- Venezuela
	Richard Thomas GIBSON	- U.S.A.
	Nguyen KIEN	- Vietnam (This is believed to be a pseudonym)
	Hassan RIAD	- U.A.R.
	Castro DE SILVA	- Angola

The same names are listed in issue No. 6 of "Revolution" as members of the editorial staff of that paper.

10. Secret sources have reported that the Business Manager of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is Nils ANDERSON, a Swede, and the Legal Adviser Bernard Arthur MARDER, a U.K. lawyer whose main task is to check proofs. Brief pen-pictures of some of the individuals prominently concerned with the production of the publication are given in Appendix B, from which it will be seen that, of the ten persons named in this paragraph and paragraph 9, at least three are Communists and two Communist sympathisers. Appendix C contains details of the Editorial Office and Agencies.

Publication and Circulation

11. "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" is published by Nouvelles Editions Internationales and is printed in Switzerland. The circulation of the English edition is believed to be about 20,000 while that of the French edition, which is printed in France, may be as much as 50,000. The English edition is given a world-wide distribution.

3rd April 1964.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

APPENDIX A

LIST OF ARTICLES WHICH HAVE APPEARED IN ISSUES
Nos.1 - 2 of "AFRICAN REVOLUTION" and ISSUES
Nos.3 - 9 of "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA
REVOLUTION"

"AFRICAN REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 1 (May 1963)

Liberate Our Brothers of South Africa	Ahmed Ben BELLA
Umkonto we Sizwe	Oliver TAMBO
For Revolutionary Unity	Bakary DJIBO
Blida, Year One	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
Yemen: A New Beginning	Ahmed DJIDJELLI
The New Strategy of Imperialism	A.R.
The Holy Alliance	Joaquin DIAZ
"Our Victory Depends on All the African Peoples"	Agostinho NETO
"Five Months of Independence in Angola"	Commandor BENEDITO
We Will Avenge Lumumba	Abdou ALFA
Hammer or Sickle?	Charles BETTELHEIM
War in South Vietnam	Ir. RAKJAT
The Slums of Nanterre	P.P.
Moscow, Peking and the Third World (documents)	.. ..
Guinea: Two Steps Forward?	Gerard CHALIAND
Mali's Road to Socialism	Gerard CHALIAND
Swaziland, Verwoerd and the British	.. ..
Larbi Ben M'Hidi	.. ..
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
London, Colonial Capital	Abdou ALFA
Abd-El-Krim Is Dead	M. VERGES
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (document)	.. ..
New Colonial War in Borneo	.. ..
An American in Algiers	Don STEFFEN
Cuba Si!	SINE
Negroes with Guns	Robert F. WILLIAMS
African Art	.. ..
Jazz: Renaissance or Decline	Philippe KOECHLIN
Jazz: The Avant Garde	Le Roi JONES
Sports and Racism in South Africa	Rosalynde AINSLIE

Volume 1 Number 2 (June 1963)

The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and M. J. VERGES
I. Interview with Mao Tse-tung	
II. The Army and the Party	
III. The Commune of the "Four Green Seasons"	
The Peoples Will Decide	.. ..
Africa in Question	Noureddine TIDAFI
The Working Class in Africa	
The Perspectives	A. SPANELA
The Stages	Anusse SALAH-BEY
Clarity in the Struggle	A.R.
Economic Planning in Tropical Africa	Charles BETTELHEIM
Modibo Keita Speaks	Gerard CHALIAND
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
The U.A.R.'s New Victory at Suez	Mansour EL RIFFI
The People Have Spoken	A.R.

/Algeria's . . .

Algeria's Workers Management Committees	Gerard CHALIAND
End of an Era. Borgeaud Leaves Algeria	J. MINCES and M. BEKKOUCHE
The U.A.M. and French "Presence"	Albert-Paul LENTIN
Algeria's Investment Code	Jacques CHARRIERE
The Kenya-Somali Crisis	Tony HUGHES
The Malagasy Rebellion	Aristide RATSIMBAZAFY
The Testament of Andrianampoinimerina	.. ..
The Virtues of the Truth	SEKOU TOURE
The War in "Portuguese" Guinea	[illegible]lcar CABRAL
Black Africa between the Two Wars	Jean [illegible]-CANALE
The Workers University in Conakry	Gerard CHALIAND
What Is Sanwi?	.. ..
Force and Violence in South Africa	Johannesburg Correspondent
Walter Sisulu, Underground Leader	Johannesburg Correspondent
South West Africa and the Nazis	.. ..
Agrarian Reform in Morocco (Part Two)	.. ..
Tsara: "Negritude? Dangerous Mystification"	.. ..
Towards an African Cinema	G.C.
Martinez: Painter of the Repression	G.C.
The Civilization of Benin	.. ..
Algeria: Sports and Independence	.. ..

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

Volume 1 Number 3 (July 1963)

The Cuban Revolution in Pictures	.. ..
Our New Name	.. ..
Ideology	.. ..
Ghana Builds Socialism	Jack WODDIS
National Revolution in Africa and Asia	Mehdi BEN BARKA
Modibo Keita: Lenin Peace Prize	.. ..
Africa and the Common Market	V. PILLAY
Morocco and the Common Market	Abdelaziz BELAL
The Dangers of Foreign Aid	Afena OSENDE
"I Accuse!"	Nelson MANDELA
The Poqo Affair	Johannesburg Correspondent
Algiers, Capital of Youth	.. ..
A School for Building the Future	Mohamed BEKKOUCHE
An Open Letter to President John F. Kennedy	.. ..
The Chinese Spring	Djamila BOUHIRED and J. M. VERGES
Spanish Students Fight Fascism	.. ..
Four Deserters from Mozambique	.. ..
For the Defence of Democratic Freedoms in Africa	.. ..
Sine Looks at the News	SINE
The Politics of Culture	Abdou ALFA
The Manding Epic: The Death of a Tyrant	.. ..
Young Artists of Southern Rhodesia	.. ..
Two Jazz Artists	Philippe KOECHLIN

Volume 1 Numbers 4-5 (August-September 1963)

The Afro-American Struggle	.. ..
Negro Nationalism and the Left	Harold CRUSE
Uncle Tom Goes to Africa	Julian MAYFIELD
You Can't Come Home Any More	William WORTHY

/Aiding . .

Aiding the Struggle in "Portuguese" Guinea	Abilio Monteiro DUARTE
The New Slave Trade	MAURIENNE
Aswan. Monument for the Future	Wilfrid BURCHETT
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu	General Vo Nguyen GIAP
Towards Victory in South Vietnam	.. ..
The F.N.L. of South Vietnam	Nguyen KIEN
Notes for a Biography of Fidel Castro	Carlos FRANQUI
"If Fidel Castro Were Elected President of the United States"	William WORTHY
African Nationalism and the Common Man	Julius NYERERE
The War of National Liberation of Irak' Kurdistan	Ismet Cheriff VANLY
Documents from Addis Ababa:	
Resolutions of the African Summit Conference	.. ..
Charter of the Organization of African Unity	.. ..
The Powers Behind Apartheid	C. FASULO
Education for African Servitude	Johannesburg Correspondent
Two South African Poets:	
Musisi Kunene	
Dennis Brutus	
Modern Poetry in Africa	Ken GEERING
Ibn Khaldun Today	Mouloud MAMMERI
The Magic Art of the Congo	.. ..
Sini-Kory	Keita FODEBA
A Jazz Great: John Coltrane	Le Roi JONES

Volume 1 Number 6 (October 1963)

The Freedom Struggle in South Africa	.. ..
An Introduction to African Economic Problems	Stephen KAZADO
Dr. DuBois is Dead	Julian MAYFIELD
My Last Message to the World	Dr. W.E.B. DUBOIS
State Capitalism in Egypt	Hassan RIAD
The O.A.S: "U.S. Ministry of Colonies"	Carleton BEALS
Why I Came to China at the Age of 72	Anna Louise STRONG
Socialist Planning in Cuba	Major Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA
Barbudos Si!	NUEZ
Techniques of the Guerrilla Fighter	Robert TABER
The Real Meaning of the Washington March	A.B. SPELLMAN
The Agrarian Situation in India	Dr. Sulekh C. GUPTA
Five Poems	Faiz Ahmad FAIZ
Will Handicrafts Survive?	Interview with Leonardo CREMONINI
White Critics, Black Musicians, New Music	Le Roi JONES
Appeal of the Executive Committee of Afro-Asian Writers	

Volume 1 Number 7 (November 1963)

Third World? Which Third World?	Pierre JALEE
The White Dictators of Southern Rhodesia	Fenner BROCKWAY, M.P.
"Malaysia" - the Neo-Colonialist Federation	Abdul RAHIM KARIM
The Agony of the Spanish Bourgeoisie	E. FERNANDEZ
A Day with Francisco Juliao	Dulce RODRIGUEZ
Venezuela: Empire of Oil and Iron	Carleton BEALS
Cuba at the United Nations	Interview with Dr. Carlos LECHUGA

/The . . .

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

The Preparation for November	Rabah BITAT
Verwoerd's Bantustan Bluff	Brian BUNTING
Illusion, Emulation and Integration	Wilmot Alfred FRAZER
Free Mae Mallory!	Clarence Seniors
Robert Williams Speaks from Peking	
Our Struggle in British Guiana	Dr. Cheddi JAGAN
Which Way for British Guiana?	Jeannette SCOTT
Crude Weapons that Helped Destroy an Army	Chou Chih-ching
New British Poets of the Left	Ken GEERING
Mr. Rockefeller's Museum of Primitive Art	Marion BROWN, Jr.
A Handful of Wheat	Prem CHAND

Volume 1 Number 8 (December 1963)

Europe.too!	.. ..
Spain - the Strikes and the Parties	Martin VALDES
The Crisis in Soviet Agriculture	A.H. EVANS
The Alliance for Plunder	Robert TABER
The End of the Mexican Revolution?	Carleton BEALS
Why We Went to Cuba	Phillip Abbott LUCE
The Road of Revolution in Peru	The C.C. of the M.I.R.
Cartoons from Cuba	CHAGO
The National Liberation Struggle in South West Africa	J. KOZONGUIZI
Underdeveloped Countries and the Problem of Peace	Andrew Gunder FRANK
The Kennedy Assassination	Fidel CASTRO
The Rights of Man in an Age of Abundance	James BOGGS
Repression and Torture in South Africa	Brian BUNTING
"Negroes" (filmed and staged in the U.S.A.)	Wilmot Alfred FRASER
The Failure of the "Peaceful Road" in Chile	Pedro ANDINO
U.S.A: The Shady Side of the Street	Thomas TOPOR
Protest Through Music in South Africa	Todd T. MATSHIKIZA
Ornette Revisited	Marion BROWN, Jr.

Volume 1 Number 9 (January 1964)

The Revolution in Africa	Editorial
The People's Victory in Zanzibar	J.M. VERGES
What Kind of Independence for Angola?	Viriato da CRUZ
The Class Struggle in Africa	.. ..
Must They Hang?	.. ..
The Fight Against Revisionism	Michael McCREERY
Panama: "Big Steal"	Carleton BEALS
Support the Panamanian People's Just Struggle	MAO Tse-tung
The Unfinished Revolution in the Philippines	William J. POMEROY
China: Where, How and Whither?	Keith BUCHANAN
What China Means by "Readjustment"	Anna Louise STRONG
The Meaning of Black Revolt in the U.S.A.	James BOGGS
Five Young Afro-American Poets	A.B. SPELLMAN Lorenzo THOMAS Sonia SANCHEZ Joe JOHNSON Le Roi JONES
Unchain My Soul	C. LINDSAY BARRETT
Don Cherry: Trumpet of the Year	Le Roi JONES

SECRET

APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUALS PROMINENTLY CONCERNED WITH THE PRODUCTION OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

In 201	Hamza ALAVI	- was born on 10th April 1921. He is a Pakistani resident in the U.K. and has strong Communist sympathies. Member of Editorial Board
In 201	Freddy Nils ANDERSON	- was born on 14th February 1933 at Lausanne. He is a Swede and the business manager of "Revolution". He has been a Communist for a number of years.
201-339225	Abdul Rahman Mohamed BABU	- was born on 22nd September 1924 at Zanzibar and is at present Minister for External Affairs and Trade in the Zanzibar Government. His sympathy towards Communism is well known. Member of Editorial Board
201-306052	Richard Thomas GIBSON 201-306052	- was born on 13th May 1931 in the U.S.A. He is the Editor-in-Chief of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" and works in the Editorial Office in Paris. An American negro, he was Executive Secretary of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" in the U.S.A. until September 1962.
In 201	Bernard Arthur MARDER	- was born on 25th September 1928 at Manchester. He is a Communist and has taken a close interest in African affairs. Reported to be Legal Adviser
201-180164	Jacques Camille Raymond VERGES 201-180164 alias Jacques Mansour VERGES	- was born on 5th March 1925 or 5th March 1929 at Oubone, Thailand. He was a member of the French Communist Party in 1951 and subsequently was employed by the I.U.S. as Secretary of its International Relief Organisation. More recently he was Defence Counsel in the trial of a number of members of the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). Director and key figure of the publication, "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

SECRET

APPENDIX C

EDITORIAL OFFICE AND AGENCIES OF "AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION" and "REVOLUTION"

The Editorial Office is at 40, rue François 1er, Paris 8e and there are the following agencies.-

Brasil - Jurema FINAMOUR, Avenida Viera Souto 86,
Ipanema, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara.

Britain - 4, Leigh Street, London, W.C.1
(Note - This is the business address of a Pakistani Communist, Tusaduq Ahmed)

China - A.M. KHEIR, 9 Tai Chi Chang, Peking;
distribution: Guozi Shudian, P.O. Box 399,
Peking (37)
(Note - KHEIR, a Sudanese Communist, is a member of the World Council of Peace and works for the China Peace Committee which is located at 9, Tai Chi Chang, Peking. Guozi Shudien is the official Chinese Government centre for the distribution of Chinese literature and propaganda)

Cuba - General Suarez entre Ayestaran y Calzada de
Rancho Boyeros, Havana.

Nigeria - F.E.I. ILOKHAI, 309, Awolowo Hall, University
of Nigeria, Nsukka.

Switzerland - Metropole, 10-11, Lausanne.
(Note - This is Nils ANDERSON's home and business address)

Tanganyika - Jweli MGOGO, P.O. Box 9221, Dar-es-Salaam.

U.S.A. - Room 603A, 1 Union Square, New York, N.Y.

Zanzibar - P.O. Box 1146, Zanzibar.

14-00000

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

TO
Chief, WH

INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief, AF;
OFP Chief of Station, Paris; Chief of Station, LCPIPIT

FROM
Chief of Station, London RIF

SUBJECT
O "Revolution, Africa, Latin America, Asia"

REF: (A) OELA-41,545 (10 September 1964) 11-4-35
(B) OEL-39,851 (24 September 1964)

Attached is a recent JAGUAR report dealing with Subject publication, and the comments of Richard GIBSON. In light of the continuing interest of the Addressee offices, this material is being made available on a strict KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY basis. JAGUAR has asked that the report's PEPRIME distribution (if any) be limited to ODACID only. Any distribution beyond that indicated above should first be cleared with JAGUAR.

INDEX -x

George H. KATZENBACH

Attachment:
Report, herewith

Distribution:
~~3~~-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w
2-COS, LCPIPIT w/att h/w

COPY

DATE TYPED
20 Oct. 64

DATE DISPATCHED

D 200-4-305
D 200-4-331

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 29-4-105
D 29-4-131

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-41,788

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
11-4-105

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT OF [illegible] A [illegible]
FORMER ED OF [illegible]
SAID [illegible]
CHICOMS [illegible]
FINANCE [illegible]
SAID ONLY IN
RESPECT THEY
HAD STANDING
ORDER 3,000
COPIES [illegible]

The following information was received in the first half of October 1964 from a source in close touch with Richard GIBSON, the former Editor of "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution".

2. GIBSON was aware that a number of people had thought that the Chinese Communists had provided some financial backing for "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", but this was true only to the extent that the Chinese had a standing order for 3,000 copies of each issue of the English edition. If the Chinese had given more general financial assistance VERGES, the publication's Director, would not have had to contend with the present financial difficulties and possible bankruptcy.

3. VERGES had had access to a relatively large sum of money which had been held in Switzerland from the time of the Algerian war of independence. When this had dried up VERGES had been unable to replenish it. Reports that VERGES had stolen this money were not true.

4. The publication owed 4[illegible],000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named KESSEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. In GIBSON's view too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

5. When "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution" was banned in Switzerland all except 100 copies of issue No. 12 were seized by the Swiss authorities. These 100 copies had already been sent to GIBSON.

6. The French edition "Revolution" has not appeared since August 1964.

16th October 1964.

Comment 1) Para. 4

Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

14-00000

"AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA REVOLUTION"

RICHARD GIBSON
CIT. U.S. [illegible] ENGLAND
FORMER ED OF L A A REV
SAID ALLEGED MONEY [illegible]
CHICOMS HELP
FINANCE [illegible]
SAID ONLY IN
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numerous refs

4. The publication owed 40,000 Swiss francs to a business-man, possibly Swiss, named KESSEL and 30,000 francs to the French printers. In GIBSON's view too much money had been spent on maintaining prestige offices at 40 rue François 1er, Paris.

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16th October 1964.

Comment i) Para. 4

Source could not provide any further particulars about KESSEL.

ii) Para. 4

Source did not say whether the sum owed to the French printers was in French or Swiss francs.

(JACQUES VERGES (FR.) [illegible] HAD ACCESS LARGE SUM MONEY HELD SWITZ. SINCE ALG. WAR AFTER [illegible] THIS GONE WAS UNABLE TO REPLENISH IT. REPORTS THAT [illegible] HAD STOLEN THIS MONEY UNTRUE.)

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11

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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ACTION		
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH
INFO
Chief, KUWOLF; Chief of Station, Pari (LCPIPIT);
Chief, AF; Chief, KUDESK; Chief of Station, Paris

FROM
Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT
LCBEFORE Draft of Round-up on Revolution

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: OELA-42,233, 5 January 1965

1. As noted in Ref, mention was made during one of LCBEFORE's bi-weekly meetings that I did not attend, of a "round-up in preparation". The apparent antecedent was Richard Thomas GIBSON, and I undertook to find out from LCBEFORE just what was what.

2. As it turns out, LCBEFORE was preparing a round-up of information on Revolution, rather than on GIBSON. In response to my somewhat agitated query (due to recent traffic relating to GIBSON, in particular), LCBEFORE rushed forth with the rough draft of their round-up, which is attached. They point out, however, that this draft is completely uncleared; it has not made the rounds of the responsible political departments and should not be regarded as a final product. In addition, it should be noted that it is intended, when completed, only for circulation within the SMOOTHER government - principally in overseas elements - and not for general publication.

3. LCBEFORE, after expressing the foregoing qualifications, invite any contributions that KUBARK would like to offer. The substance of the round-up seems to offer little room for controversy, although KUDESK/ICG may be able to contribute additional information. We also wonder whether the English-language edition has made any impact in the Western Hemisphere.

4. We assume that the appendix of personality data will be forwarded to us along with the final draft, or the final edition.

George E. [illegible]

Attachment: herewith

Distribution:
3-Chief, WH w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUWOLF w/att h/w
2-Chief, LCPIPIT w/att h/w
2-Chief, AF w/att h/w
2-Chief, KUDESK w/att h/w
2-COS, Paris w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS Cl. f

DATE TYPED
12 Jan. 65

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
OELA-42,304

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ARCHIVE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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DRAFT SECRET

RÉVOLUTION

1. During the past year Révolution and its English edition Africa Latin America Asia Revolution have undergone several important changes. For a time during the summer it was reported that the publication was in financial difficulties, but in the most recent French edition, No. 12, dated October/November it was announced that the magazine would continue on a new basis, with an enlarged Advisory Board, appearing every two months, not only in an English and a French edition but also in a coming Spanish edition to be published in Bogota for Latin America.

2. The changes which are being made do not in any way alter the pro-Chinese complexion of the magazine. Though the magazine now seems on a much firmer financial basis, there is as yet no evidence that the Chinese are directly subsidising it. They are however buying copies and taking advertisements. It has been reported that when Verges was in Peking in the early part of 1963, the Chinese agreed to take out 3,000 subscriptions to "Afric[illegible]" and these were in due course transferred Africa Latin America Asia Revolution. When the publication sold for five shillings, this was worth £750 a month. Each issue has contained at least one full page advertisement of Chinese Communist publications.

201-339226

3. <The publication reportedly has also had contact with the Chinese through Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, 201-337285 a member of the Advisory Board who is Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives in the Tanzanian Government.> Babu visited China in 1960, became the East African correspondent of the New China News Agency in 1961, and went to China again in October, 1963.

22

4. <By the end of 1963, Révolution had established contact with the Communist splinter-group in the UK, led by Michael McCreery, 201-757205> which is on the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet cold war.

/The ...

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

The French Edition

3. Entitled Revolution, this is now published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, 52, rue Galande - Paris 5°. The first issue of Revolution in September, [illegible] was published at 40, rue Francois 1er - Paris 8°, printed by "La Cite", Lausanne, Switzerland, but bound by Brigny, France. When in the spring, the Director, Jacques M. Verges, had run into financial difficulties, he found cheaper premises for his editorial office at 52, rue Galande - Paris 5° and with No.10/11 of July/August changed his printers to Offset-Presse. It seems that Revolution was in financial difficulties for several months. The trouble began, apparently, when the French authorities seized copies of issue No.7 of the French edition of March 1964 because of an article it contained on French overseas territories. Creditors became alarmed, fearing that the publication might be banned, and demanded settlement of their debts which were then estimated to exceed £10,000.

The Editorial Board 201-170164

Under the new arrangements Jacques M. Verges remains Editorial Director, with the following as Advisory Board ("Collaborateurs permanents"). New-comers to the Board since the last issue in July/August are marked with asterisks.

[illegible] & [illegible] to paragraph

In Advisory Board of Revolution "Collaboration" etc. [illegible]

Mohamed [illegible]	- Zanzibar
✓ Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani 201-700493	- Pakistan
✓ Amilcar Cabrera NC 201	- Venezuela
✓ Demba Diallo 201-756290	- Mali
✓ Nguyen Kien 201-511932	- Vietnam
✓ Hassan Riad NC 201	- UAR
✓ Castro da Silva Antonio 201-32793	- Angola
✓ Carlos Ferran NC 201	- Spain
✓ Marcos Ferrer NC 201	- Colombia
✓ Abdul R. Karim 201-22497	- Malaya

The first change on the original Advisory Board came with the inclusion in No.8 of Martin Valdes - Spain. The next change was in issue No.9 when Hamza Alavi - Pakistan - was replaced

/by ...

by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani also from Pakistan. It was reported that Hamza Alavi resigned because he objected to the publication's pro-Chinese attitude. An important further change came with the appearance of issue No.10/11 last July in which was prominently published a "Communique" announcing the dismissal from the Advisory Board of Richard Gibson - U.S.A. The Communique accused Richard Gibson, who is an American Negro, of having "used his former position as secretary to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" to infiltrate the International Revolutionary Movement". Some details of personalities are given at appendix.

[appendix to follow]

7. In Revolution No.12 it is claimed that the total issue of the new and enlarged bi-monthly magazine, including French English and Spanish editions, will be 50,000. However, since his dismissal, Richard Gibson has stated that, during his time on the magazine, while about 20,000 copies of the French edition were printed, the top sale of any issue was never more than 7,500 copies. In the case of the April No.8 issue, he says that the total sale in France was 3,000 copies. The prices of Revolution are given as: Africa: 2.5 dirham, 2.5 dinars, 150 C.F.A. Europe: 4.50 Francs. This represents a 15% increase in the price of the French edition. But this is accompanied by a lowering of the price by 35% in countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Those taking out annual subscriptions are informed that they are entitled on request not only to make use of Revolution's Documentation Centre on International Workers' Movement and the Struggle for National Liberation, but also to free copies of the magazine Pekin-Information. Those taking out a long-term subscription now will also be entitled to "publications in foreign languages from Peking".

8. A main feature of issue No.12 is a leading article by Jacques Verges entitled "Hiroshima, plus jamais!" Possibly by coincidence, this was published at the same time as the

/First ...

first Chinese nuclear device was exploded.

9. The Russian view of Revolution was made clear in Pravda on June 3 in an article attacking China, containing the following passage: "fractionist groups ... are also involved in the publication in several languages, with Peking's help, of a new "international" journal with the high-flown title of Revolution."

The English Edition

10. Now entitled Africa Latin America Asia Revolution, the English edition was originally published in Algiers with the title African Revolution. From the third issue onwards it was published in Lausanne as Africa Latin America Asia Revolution. In issue No.7 of November 1963, it was announced that the editorial offices were then located in Paris, with the offices of the French edition, but it continued to be printed in Switzerland. In August, 1964, the Swiss Government banned the "printing edition and the transit" through Switzerland of the English edition because they considered Africa Latin America Asia Revolution "an organ of propaganda of the Chinese Communists, designed for non-European countries, which does not limit itself to supporting the liberation struggle of the so-called colonial peoples but also propagates the political views of Red China".

11. The last English issue in the old series which has come to hand was No.11 of March. The first in the new series, No.1 Vol.II dated September/October is published in Paris by S.A.R.L. Nouvelles Editions Internationales, from the same address as the French Edition, 52, rue Galande - Paris 5e. This English edition, which was previously similar in format to Readers Digest, is now glossy and similar in format to the French edition. Most of the articles in it are re-printed from the French edition of Revolution.

The Editorial Board

12. As with the French edition, the Editorial Director remains Jacques M. Vergès, with the same Advisory Board except except

that ...

that Amilcar Caldera - Venezuela - is not included and there are two members not listed on the French Board - Rewi Alley - New Zealand - a member of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, and A.S.-Khaly of the Sudan.

13. Prices of this new edition are given as follows: Africa: 2 shillings; America: 75 cents; Europe: 5 shillings, 3.50 Francs.

Secret

CONTACT REPORT #12 25 January 1963.

TIME/PLACE : Safe House #2, 1000 Jan 25.

PRESENT : Kulpa, Tiptoft, Lawton.

1. Purpose of this meeting was to inform Kulpa that Headquarters had agreed to his trip to the Congo and to pass certain instructions re McInturff. K. said that he had not as yet received instructions from Holden and that the latter planned to be in Rome on Saturday. He would send the airline ticket from that city. K. also stated that Serge Michel had agreed that the first six covers on the new Afrique Revolutionaire (?) would be shot by K. K. hit us up for a light meter since he said that his present one was broken and since he had to take the pictures prior to his departure for the Congo which he anticipated would be either early or mid next week.

2. Another twist was that he had been contacted by Gibson, who informed him that a certain Dave Watts who runs a highly suspect sheet in New York City had written to Gibson asking him for photos. Gibson will purchase and forward several of K.'s negatives. Since all this is vague enough, Kulpa promised to get more facts.

3. The rest of the meeting was taken up by Tiptoft straightening out his accountings.

4. Next meeting. 1000 Tuesday 29 Jan.

5

Secret

REPRODUCTION IS BEST OBTAINABLE FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL, III

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFIC
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA.

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

[illegible]

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

[illegible] DULOKT

REFERENCES: A. [illegible]

B. MEXI 4884 (IN [illegible]), [illegible]

1. PER A, PARA 9-B, [illegible] HAS CONNECTIONS OF [illegible] CARDENAS [illegible] (201-243906) AND SUGGESTS [illegible] BE ASKED TO INTERROGATE CARDENAS ABOUT THESE CONNECTIONS. [illegible] DESCRIBES [illegible] PLAN IN 1963 AGAINST [illegible] SERGEYEVICH [illegible] (201-132139) IN WHICH AN ARTICLE WAS PLACED IN "[illegible] NOTICIAS" 31 MAY 1963 CITING CARDENAS AS CLANDESTINE CONTACT OF [illegible] FOR SMUGGLING ARMS TO GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES. SUGGEST [illegible] BE GIVEN ABOVE NEWS REFERENCE AS ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FOR [illegible] OF CARDENAS ABOUT HIS AND DULOKT-1'S PAST RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND INVOLVEMENT OF [illegible] WITH SOVIETS.

2. FILE: 200-124-182/3; 201-243906; 201-132139.

Leonov

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/SAO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-132139

14-00000

201-132157

201-132139

LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 10 de la Administración Postal Nal.

BOGOTA, D. E., VIERNES 25 DE JULIO DE 1969.

Dirección: Calle 14 número 4-24 Conmut. 423-100. Dpt. Via Avianca

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser víctima en Cali el conocido médico y ganadero Ernesto González Caicedo, ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecían sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como también los demás diarios de la capital, habían anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes basadas en informaciones oficiales que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas prosoviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Después del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña se produjo ahora en el Valle el del médico Ernesto González Caicedo por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas están exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así cronológicamente las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las áreas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la violencia en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San José de [illegible], similar al "simacotazo" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente después de la denuncia formulada hace pocos días por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periódicos más serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino mencionó editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los países q' serían más gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, además, que, pese a las divergencias ideológicas, la fauna comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoísta", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene denunciando.

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinión pública, que en poder del DAS, la Policía y el Ejército, reposan informaciones según las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "línea de Moscú", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor González, obedecen a móviles y tienen características similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios, Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC, como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar, creado por los comunistas prosoviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente célebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comité central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que había quedado reducido a las más precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriótica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada soviética, entregó en México la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, quien, por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminar con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario soviético que le dio el dinero a Pachón en México", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Ovechinnov y Victor Mednikov, todos ellos disfrazados de "periodistas", en una extraña correría que comprende justamente los países mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú y Bolivia.

Según "La Tribuna", de Lima, estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente después de su paso por aquí que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupa también en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros países de América Latina. Según el diario madrileño, las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosty son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a través de los cuales se desarrolla la más peligrosa actividad del comunismo soviético.

7 cable

COMMUNISTS PROMOTE VIOLENCE IN LATIN COUNTRIES

Source: La Republica, 25 July 1969

The kidnapping of which the noted doctor and rancher Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo was recently the victim in Cali has served to confirm, tragically, the existence of a vast communist plot to subvert the constitutional order and to plunge the country again into a wave of terrorism and violence which appeared to be buried forever.

In fact, this newspaper, like the other dailies in the capital, reported in its 12 and 18 July issues, on the basis of official statements, that the Department of Valle had been selected by the pro-Soviet communists as the scene of the continued wave of terrorist attacks and assaults and kidnappings recently begun in the Department of Antioquia.

Following the kidnapping of Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, the kidnapping of Doctor Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo has now occurred. The communist bandits are demanding the enormous sum of 4.5 million pesos in ransom. Thus the chronological stages in the new subversive plan are being carried out, beginning with the steps which are obviously designed to obtain the money necessary to finance the bandit gangs in the rural areas they have already selected.

This increase in violence in Colombia, to which must be added the recent gang attack in San Jose de Urama, similar to the incidents of past years, occurred immediately after the charges made a few days ago by the Buenos Aires daily La Prensa, one of the most serious and prestigous newspapers on this continent. On this occasion, the Argentine newspaper made editorial mention of Colombia as one of the countries which will be most seriously affected by the communist violence, along with Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

The facts indicate, moreover, that despite the ideological differences, the various "Maoist," "Castroist," and "Muskovite" categories of communist fauna are solidly united and pledged to the plan of terrorism and violence denounced in these charges.

We are in a position to inform the public that the DAS /Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security/, the police and the army have in hand information revealing that the Colombian Communist Party, a supporter of the "Moscow line," has issued instructions to all its affiliated organizations calling for immediate engagement in secret activity.

The same sources have stated that the kidnappings of Mister Norena and Doctor Gonzalez were similar in motivation and method to the kidnappings committed in past years by FARC /Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ bandits, resulting in the murder of the well-known businessmen Harold Eder and Oliverio Lara Borrero.

The FARC, as everyone knows, is a paramilitary organization established by the pro-Soviet communists and headed by "Tirofijo" (Dead-eye), of unsavory notoriety, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party supporting Moscow. Precisely in order to revitalize this organization, which had been reduced to the most precarious status thanks to the patriotic efforts of the armed forces, an official of the Soviet Embassy handed over the sum of 100,000 dollars to Colombian communist Feliciano Pachon Choconta in Mexico. Fortunately, he was found and captured when he was on the point of successfully completing his prophetic mission. On the subject of this notorious matter which had worldwide repercussions at the time, the Lima daily La Tribuna identified a Russian called Lenov in a series of recent reports, as "the Soviet official who gave Pachon the money in Mexico," and, on the basis of information obtained from Interpol; it added that Lenov is traveling with two other KGB agents, Alexander Operbunov and Victor Mednikov, all claiming to be "trade union leaders," on a fantastic tour which covers precisely the countries mentioned in the Buenos Aires La Prensa as the targets of the new communist plans for violence, that is to say, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.

According to the Lima daily, La Tribuna, these three Russians were recently in Colombia, and it was precisely after their stay here that the kidnappings and acts of violence referred to erupted.

Providing an abundance of detail, the major periodical Ya, published in Madrid, Spain, also analyzed the communist plot against Colombia and the other Latin American countries in a very recent issue. According to this Madrid daily, the headquarters of the Tass and Novosty news agencies are real "hotbeds of espionage and subversion" in which the most /illegible/ activity of the Soviet communists is carried out.

201-132139

EL TIEMPO

[illegible] 25 de
Postal Nacional

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA ◆ 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] la investigación por el secuestro del médico Ernesto González Caicedo.

Para [illegible] el [illegible] nombramiento de [illegible], fue comisionado el [illegible] Carlos Julio Trujillo [illegible] en Cali y se [illegible] cargo del negocio.

Juez [illegible]

También la Procuraduría comisionó al [illegible] el instructor Braulio Gutiérrez para que investigara penalmente al [illegible] penal municipal doctor Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez. Este funcionario, según lo informamos oportunamente, hizo [illegible] a don Enrique Gutiérrez Salazar, en un bar de la ciudad [illegible]. La investigación especial [illegible] el [illegible] de la parte civil, doctor Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos campesinos y agricultores ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, denuncia [illegible] "La Tronina", de Lima, el más [illegible] órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la Interpol.

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada anteriormente en días pasados por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño denuncia, igualmente, la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo [illegible] a escala internacional que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de tres agentes soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de sindicalistas" y que "uno de ellos, Lezov, es el mismo funcionario de la embajada soviética en [illegible] que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de $ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de este país".

Lezov ha estado en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operkinov y Victor Domnikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros como en el caso de Colombia, y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas prosoviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente", dice el diario limeño, mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc.

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado peruano Rubén Nevera, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24 (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares [illegible] informaron que este, [illegible] que había regresado sano y salvo, [illegible] crisis nerviosa [illegible].

No [illegible] empleados de la familia González [illegible] González Caicedo se encontraba en la residencia de su padre [illegible] desde tempranas horas de la madrugada y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones recogidas, González Caicedo recibió calmantes para controlar su estado de ánimo y superar la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más accesible a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y seria como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible] tan pronto se conoció la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López añadió: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y de [illegible] su seriedad y responsabilidad".

Sinembargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

No Hubo Intento de Secuestro en Tuluá

Cali, 23. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Quedó totalmente desvirtuado que en el caso de Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, se tratara de intentar un secuestro. Al respecto se reveló que se trata simplemente de un caso de extorsión cometido por un ex-agente del F-2 de la Policía Nacional, según lo informó un alto vocero de la institución armada.

Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fue agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta, acompañado de Plutarco Idárraga y José de Jesús Ochoa, exigió a Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero bajo las amenazas de ponerlo preso.

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idárraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres individuos se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

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201-132139

POLITICAL MOTIVES BEHIND COLOMBIAN KIDNAPPINGS

Source: El Tiempo, 25 July 1969

Day before yesterday the Lima daily La Tribuna, the most prestigous newspaper in Peru, charged on the basis of information obtained from Interpol that the reasons behind the kidnappings of rich ranchers and farmers which have occurred in Colombia recently are political.

Echoing the charges made in the editorial pages in recent days by the Buenos Aires newspaper La Prensa, the Lima daily also claimed that there is "a vast plan for communist subversion on an international scale affecting Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia equally."

In reporting the activities of three Soviet KGB agents in South America, this daily said that "they travel under the guise of trade union leaders," and that "one of them, Lenov, is the employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico who turned over to Colombian bandit Feliciano Pachon the sum of 100,000 US dollars for the subversive groups in that country."

Lenov is traveling in the company of the KGB agents Alexander Operkunov and Victor Dednikov. And no one is unaware of the fact that shortly after the visits of the "trade union officials" to various countries on this continent, there were outbreaks of acts of violence directed against the authorities, incidents terrorizing the population and kidnappings, as in the case of Colombia, or more specifically, Medellin and Cali.

"The plan of the communist sympathizers is designed to create a climate of uncertainty on the continent again," said the Lima daily, adding that all kinds of terrorist incidents, attacks, kidnappings, etc., are being used.

In the case of Colombia, these acts are designed, as high officials asserted at the beginning of this month, to facilitate obtaining economic resources for the reorganization of the FARC /Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/ guerrilla movement, which is currently in a state of complete collapse.

The recent attacks made in Medellin on the homes of the head of the DAS /Departmento Administrativo de Seguridad; Administrative Department of Security/, various well-known professional people and the premises of the newspaper El Diario, like the kidnapping of the Antioquia rancher Ruben Norena, are a part of the plan of the extremists pursuing the Moscow line.

* * *

Relative of Victim Comments on Press Coverage of Kidnapping

Cali, 24 July (By Cristian Martinez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia Lopez, one of the members of the family of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo, who has been most willing to talk to journalists praised the responsible and severe manner in which El Tiempo reported on the kidnapping of his brother-in-law.

Valencia Lopez, the brother of Alma Valencia de Gonzalez Caicedo, traveled from Popayan, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aurelio Iragorri Hormaza, as soon as the news of the kidnapping became known.

Valencia Lopez said: "We are grateful to El Tiempo for the way in which it presented the report about this matter, and stressed its severity and criminal nature."

However, he criticized some other reports published by other newspapers, which very nearly caused the failure of the negotiations for the rescue of Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo.

Tulua Incident Not a Kidnapping Attempt

Cali, 23 July (by Cristian Martinez Sarria). The report that the case involving Ignacio Ayala Mosquera was one of attempted kidnapping has been entirely discredited. In this connection it was revealed that all that occurred was an attempt at extortion committed by a former national police F-2 agent, according to a highly placed spokesman for that armed branch.

The incident occurred on Tuesday in Tulua, when Carlos Alberto Lozano, a former F-2 secret agent with a dishonorable discharge for bad conduct from that organization, accompanied by Phaller /name not clearly legible/ Idarraga and Jose de Jesus Ortega, demanded a large sum of money under threat of arrest from Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, who had previously been arrested several times for the illegal practice of medicine.

Police spokesmen added that Lozano and Idarraga were carrying photostats of police identification papers and cards which they had managed to obtain secretly. The three criminals are being held in Cali pending the pertinent investigation.

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additional (& Russian translation)

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, 4D30)

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LA REPUBLICA

EL DIARIO DE LOS HOMBRES DE TRABAJO

Tarifa Postal Reducida número 13 de la Administración Postal Nal.

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Conm. 433-160. Dist. "La Avianca"

Los Secuestros, Clave de Siniestro Plan Comunista

Denuncian Actividades en Colombia

El secuestro de que acaba de ser victima en Cali el conocido medico y ganadero Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo ha venido a confirmar trágicamente la existencia de una vasta conjura comunista para subvertir el orden constitucional y sumir de nuevo al país en una ola de terrorismo y violencia que parecian sepultados para siempre.

En efecto, este periódico así como tambien los demas diarios de la capital, habian anunciado en sus ediciones del 12 y del 18 de los corrientes basadas en informaciones oficiales que el Departamento del Valle había sido escogido por los comunistas pro soviéticos para continuar la ola de atracos, atentados terroristas y secuestros iniciados recientemente en el Departamento de Antioquia.

Despues del secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Ruben Noreña se produce ahora en el Valle el del medico Ernesto Gonzalez Caicedo por cuyo rescate los bandoleros comunistas estan exigiendo la crecida suma de cuatro y medio millones de pesos. Se vienen cumpliendo así cronológicamente las etapas del nuevo plan subversivo, comenzando por estos cuyos objetivos son obviamente los de conseguir los dineros necesarios para financiar las cuadrillas de bandoleros en las areas rurales ya escogidas.

Este incremento de la violencia en Colombia, al que hay que sumarle el reciente asalto en cuadrilla a San Jose de Urama similar al "simacotazo" de años pasados, se produce inmediatamente despues de la denuncia formulada hace pocos dias por el diario "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires, uno de los periodicos mas serios y prestigiosos del continente; en esa oportunidad, el rotativo argentino menciono editorialmente a Colombia como uno de los paises q' serian mas gravemente afectados por la violencia comunista, junto con Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador y Bolivia.

Los hechos indican, ademas, que, pese a las divergencias ideologicas, la fuerza comunista en sus diversas tendencias "maoista", "castrista" y "moscovita" está solidamente unida y comprometida en el plan de terrorismo y violencia que se viene denunciando.

Estamos en capacidad de informar a la opinion publica, que en poder del DAS, la Policia y el Ejercito, reposan informaciones segun las cuales el partido comunista colombiano, adicto a la "linea de Moscu", ha cursado instrucciones a todos sus afiliados para que se apresten a ingresar a la clandestinidad.

En las mismas fuentes se informó que los secuestros del señor Noreña y del doctor Gonzalez, obedecen a modelos y tienen caracteristicas similares a los perpetrados por bandoleros a las FARC en años pasados a resultas de los cuales fueron asesinados los conocidos hombres de negocios Harold Eder y Oliverio Lara Borrero.

Las FARC, como lo sabe todo el mundo, es un organismo paramilitar creado por los comunistas prosoviéticos y dirigido por el tristemente celebre "Tirofijo", quien es miembro del comite central del partido comunista adicto a Moscú. Precisamente para revitalizar a este organismo, que habia quedado reducido a las mas precarias condiciones, gracias a la patriotica labor de las Fuerzas Armadas, un funcionario de la embajada sovietica, entregó en Mexico la suma de cien mil dólares al comunista colombiano [illegible] Pachón Chocontá, quien por fortuna, fue descubierto y capturado cuando estaba a punto de culminár con éxito su fatídica misión.

En torno a este sonado asunto que en su época tubo resonancia mundial, el diario "La Tribuna", de Lima, identifica en una serie de crónicas recientes a un ruso de apellido Lenov como "el funcionario sovietico que le dio el dinero a Pachon en Mexico", y agrega basado en informaciones de la Interpol que Lenov viaja con otros agentes de la KGB, Alexander Oyerbunov y Victor Medmixer, todos ellos disfrazados de "sindicalistas", en una extraña correria que comprende justamente los paises mencionados por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires como enclaves del nuevo plan violento del comunismo, es decir, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru y Bolivia.

Segun "La Tribuna", de Lima, estos tres rusos estuvieron en Colombia recientemente, y es justamente despues de su paso por aqui que se están presentando los secuestros y actos violentos mencionados.

En abundancia de detalles, el importante periódico "Ya", editado en Madrid (España), se ocupo tambien en fecha muy reciente de la conjura comunista contra Colombia y otros paises de America Latina. Segun el diario madrileño las sedes de las agencias Tass y Novosti son verdaderos "nidos de espionaje y subversión" a traves de los cuales se desarrolla la mas peligrosa actividad del comunismo sovietico.

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EL TIEMPO

ilda Nº 25 de
ostal Nacional

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA ◆ 1969, VIERNES 25 DE JULIO

Un Investigador Especial Nombró la Procuraduría

La Procuraduría General de la Nación [illegible] que [illegible] por el secuestro del [illegible] Ernesto González Caicedo.

Para que [illegible] el [illegible] miento del [illegible], fue comisionado el [illegible] Carlos Julio Trujillo [illegible], que se halla en Cali y [illegible] del negocio.

Juez 11

También la Procuraduría comisionó al [illegible] el instructor Braulio Gutiérrez para que investigara penalmente al juez catorce penal municipal, doctor Eduardo Ramírez Jiménez. Este funcionario, como lo informamos oportunamente, halló [illegible] a don Enrique Gutiérrez Salazar en un bar de la ciudad, por lo que [illegible] la investigación especial [illegible] el [illegible] de las [illegible], doctor Santiago Romero Sánchez.

Secuestros en Colombia Tienen Fines Políticos

Nueva denuncia sobre el plan subversivo internacional hace el principal diario de Lima.

Que los secuestros de ricos ganaderos y agricultores ocurridos últimamente en Colombia obedecen a fines políticos, denunció ayer "La Prensa", de Lima, el más importante órgano informativo del Perú, basado en informaciones suministradas por la [illegible].

Haciendo eco a la denuncia formulada originalmente en días pasados por "La Prensa", de Buenos Aires, el diario limeño denuncia, nuevamente, la existencia "de un vasto plan subversivo comunista a escala internacional que afecta igualmente a Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Ecuador y Bolivia".

Al dar cuenta de las andanzas de tres agentes soviéticos de la KGB en América del Sur, dice el diario que "viajan disfrazados de "sindicalistas"" y que "uno de ellos, Lenov, es el mismo funcionario de la embajada soviética en México que entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón la suma de US$ 100.000 para los grupos subversivos de esa parte".

Lenov ha estado en compañía de los agentes de la KGB Alexander Operaznov y Victor Deonikov. Y ha sido notorio el hecho de que poco después de la visita de los "sindicalistas" a varios países del Continente, han estallado en ellos actos violentos contra las autoridades, terrorismo citadino y secuestros, como en el caso de Colombia, y más concretamente, en Medellín y Cali.

Alerta.

"El plan de los comunistas pro-soviéticos está encaminado a crear un nuevo clima de incertidumbre en el Continente", dice el diario limeño, "mediante la utilización de toda clase de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros, etc."

En el caso colombiano estos hechos están dirigidos, tal como a principios de este mes lo denunciaron altos funcionarios, a obtener recursos económicos para reorganizar el movimiento guerrillero de las FARC, actualmente en plena quiebra.

Los recientes atentados ocurridos en Medellín contra las residencias del jefe del DAS, de varios conocidos profesionales y el periódico "El Diario", lo mismo que el secuestro del hacendado antioqueño Rubén Noreña, forman parte del plan de los extremistas de la línea moscovita.

Crisis Nerviosa Sufrió el Médico al Ser Rescatado

Cali, 24 (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Familiares de Ernesto González P[illegible] y su hijo Ernesto, afirmaron que este, una vez que había regresado sano y salvo a su casa [illegible] sido conducido a una finca [illegible] en la que [illegible] en una clínica de reposo, después de las dramáticas horas que le tocó vivir.

No obstante, algunos empleados de la finca González [illegible] afirmaron que González Caicedo se encontraba en la residencia de su padre [illegible] desde tempranas horas de la madrugada, y fue atendido por varios médicos que esperaban su llegada.

De acuerdo con las informaciones recogidas, González Caicedo recibió calmantes para devolverle su estado de ánimo y vencer la crisis nerviosa que al parecer sufría al ser rescatado.

Familia Elogia la Información de EL TIEMPO

Cali, 24. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). Ignacio Valencia López, uno de los familiares de Ernesto González Caicedo, más accesible a la prensa, elogió la forma responsable y seria como El Tiempo suministró las informaciones sobre el secuestro de su cuñado.

Valencia López, hermano de Alma Valencia de González Caicedo, vino acompañado desde Popayán de su cuñado Aurelio [illegible], una vez se conoció la noticia del secuestro.

Estamos Reconocidos.

Valencia López anotó: "Estamos reconocidos con El Tiempo por la forma que presentó las informaciones en torno a este caso y destaco su serenidad y responsabilidad".

Sin embargo criticó algunas otras informaciones publicadas en órganos distintos a El Tiempo, que estuvieron a punto de hacer fracasar las negociaciones y el rescate de Ernesto González Caicedo.

No Hubo Intento de Secuestro en Tuluá

Cali, 23. (Por Cristian Martínez Sarria). — Quedó totalmente desvirtuado que en el caso de Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, se trataba de intentar un secuestro. Al respecto se reveló que se trata simplemente de un caso de extorsión cometido por un exagente del F-2 de la Policía Nacional, según lo informó un alto vocero de la institución armada.

Los hechos ocurrieron el martes en Tuluá, cuando Carlos Alberto Lozano, quien fuera agente secreto del F-2 y retirado de esta institución por mala conducta y acompañado de Plutarco Idárraga y José de Jesús Ortega, exigió a Ignacio Ayala Mosquera, quien varias veces fue detenido por ejercicio ilegal de la medicina, una fuerte suma de dinero bajo las amenazas de ponerlo preso.

Se aclaró, por parte de voceros de la Policía, que Lozano e Idárraga portaban fotocopia de carnés de la institución y placas que hábilmente lograron conseguir. Los tres particulares se encuentran detenidos en Cali para la correspondiente investigación.

201-132139

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EL SIGLO

Bogotá, D. E., Viernes 25 de Julio de 1969

Secuestros y Atracos del F.L.N.

Para Financiar el Movimiento Guerrillero

Las autoridades han recibido informes allegados por la Interpol en relación con el plan subversivo a escala continental que el comunismo internacional viene ejecutando en varios países con el fin de turbar el orden público y allegar fondos para el sostenimiento de los focos alzados en armas.

De acuerdo con los datos obtenidos por la Interpol y que ya han sido divulgados por el diario "La Tribuna" de Lima, una fuente allegada a los servicios de inteligencia adscritos a las secciones de orden público informó que los atentados dinamiteros ocurridos en la ciudad de Medellín, la distribución de propaganda subversiva y los saboteos ocurridos en los teatros en donde se exhibe la película "Las Boinas Verdes", hacen parte del plan denunciado por "La Prensa" de Buenos Aires y que por no alarmar a la ciudadania, algunas autoridades han afirmado que no se sabe nada.

Tambien se supo que las autoridades han dispuesto el adelanto de severas investigaciones y la intensificación de la vigilancia en varias regiones de los departamentos de Antioquia y Valle, en donde se ha venido notando la actividad subversiva, que de acuerdo a documentos hallados en el campamento de Jesús de Dios Aguilera, cuando huyó ante el avance de las tropas de la IV Brigada, de las cercanías de Segovia en Antioquia, está orientada por el comunismo pro-soviético, que intentan crear un clima de zozobra mediante la ejecución de atentados terroristas, atracos, secuestros y abigeatos, para asimismo financiar la reorganización de los grupos guerrilleros que han sido notificados en el sentido de que no recibirán más ayuda económica por haberse dilapidado los dineros en manos de los jefes.

En el Departamento del Valle, como ya se había informado hace pocos días, también se está notando un clima de incertidumbre, y dicen las autoridades, nada tendría de extraño que los secuestros de conocidos hombres de negocios, ocurridos recientemente, hagan parte del plan subversivo.

Sobre esta nueva ola de agitación la Interpol ha informado que se sabe de tres agentes soviéticos de la GKB que bajo la apariencia de "sindicalistas" y que han sido identificados como Victor Medinkov, Alexander Operarov y N. Lenov vienen recorriendo a Latinoamérica y quienes precisamente estuvieron recientemente en Colombia. El ultimo de los nombrados, segun la Interpol, fue el diplomático ruso que en México entregó al bandolero colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá la suma de 120 mil dolarés para que junto con una mujer que lo acompañaba los trajera al país y los hiciera llegar a los jefes de las FARC. Como se recordará Pachón fue descubierto en Eldorado por el DAS que le decomisó el dinero y lo puso a órdenes de un juez que lo mantuvo preso por algún tiempo hasta que hace poco fue beneficiado con una excarcelación.

Las revelaciones de la Interpol sobre las actividades subversivas en Latinoamérica y que ya en Medellin han dejado como saldo un muerto y varios miles de pesos en perdidas, también hacen mencion de las agencias TASS y Novosty, señalándolas como centros de agitacion, hecho del cual, anotaron las autoridades, se divulgo en el periódico "Ya" de Madrid.

En cuanto hace al terrorismo en la capital antioqueña, los servicios de inteligencia ya han efectuado cerca de diez capturas de conocidos extremistas contra quienes recaen graves indicios de estar comprometidos en los atentados terroristas ocurridos recientemente en Medellín.

Por otra parte se dijo que en cuanto hace a Bogota, el DAS investiga, dentro del mayor hermetismo, a unas ocho personas que fueron capturadas cuando transportaban apreciable cantidad de dinamita, fulminantes, cajas de proyectiles de diverso calibre y otros elementos bélicos, que se cree iban a ser enviados a otros lugares del país o a servir para perpetrar actos terroristas en esta capital.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 6, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

183

S E C R E T 182147Z JUL 69 CITE LIMA 5271

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS

REDTOP AEKICK (N03241) 1P 21 JUL 69 IN 06694

REF LIMA 5256 (NOT SENT PARIS)

1. ON 17 JULY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) DEPARTED PERU FOR SOVIET UNION VIA PARIS WHERE HE WILL STAY APPROX 2 DAYS ACCOMPANIED BY NORMA SERRA, MEMBER OF JCP/PCP, WHO WILL STUDY IN THE SOVIET UNION. PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE, LEONOV TOLD DULAUREL-1 THAT IF LATTER WANTD SEND CORRESPONDENCE OR MESSAGES VIA SOVIET DIPLOMATIC POUCH TO CONTACT VLADIMIR IVANOVICH SHPAKESVICH (201-343894) WHO WILL HANDLE IT.

2. ABOVE RECEIVED FROM DULINDEN-11.

3. FILE: 58-8786, 201-132139, 201-343894.

S E C R E T

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MICROFILMED
AUG 01 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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201-132139 ✓
21 July 69

SECRET

ORIG: STEINBUEHLER
UNIT: WH/3/Peru
EXT: 6223/9388
DATE: 11 JULY 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, EUR 6, RI/AN, CI/IC 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 11 22 21Z JUL 69 CITE DIRECTOR 201170

TO LIMA INFO: MADRID

REF: LIMA 5122 (IN 90235)*

1. NO HEADQUARTERS TRACES ON CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA. W ~~[illegible]~~. MEXICO CITY REPORT DATED NOVEMBER 1947 IDENTIFIED A CARLOS JIMENEZ, WRITER AND NEWSPAPERMAN, AS SIGNER OF A GREETING SENT BY GROUP OF SPANISH INTELLECTUALS TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO A SANTIAGO REPORT, JUNE 1949, CARLOS JIMENEZ, FORMER MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF MADRID (SIC), HAD DEPARTED CHILE IN 1943.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

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END OF MESSAGE

* Request for traces on Carlos JIMENEZ Ortega, Spanish journalist who the Station is considering recruiting as an access agent to Soviet Novosti representative LEONOV.

for WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3

201-132139
11 Jul 69

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-132139

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles - 9 julio de 1969

3995

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE RUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander Openkunov fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1964 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú como miembro de una misión sindical soviética Tanto Openkunov como Lenov que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K G. B , así como también Victor Mednikov y Boris Papov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situacion economica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El insignificante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios protocolarios. Sigue siendo igualmente pequeño y precario Los articulos que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, azúcar, no interesan a los rusos. El primero porque consumen muy poco café; para beber tienen otros liquidos más exitantes El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista Por lo que toca a los articulos que nuestros paises necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no los puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros paises y la URSS, carece asi de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderias de poca monta.

El segundo supuesto de que parten nuestros gobiernos para reanudar relaciones diplomaticas con Rusia, es suponer que los designios del comunismo internacional han cambiado, y que la subversión contra los gobiernos constituidos y la lucha de clases violenta, ya no son los propósitos de los soviéticos. Si nos atenemos a un análisis frio de la conducta moscovita en nuestros paises, veremos que no sólo sigue proclamando sin ambages sus pretensiones de conquistar el imperio mundial a ultranza, sino que las actividades de sus nutridas delegaciones diplomáticas, que nada tienen que hacer en materia de comercio, están dedicadas a exportarnos agitaciones y la rebelión contra nuestros gobiernos nacionalmente constituidos. En este aspecto, la presencia de los llamados "enviados sindicales" resulta muy importante.

201-132139

SOVIET LABOR UNION ENVOYS

By Felipe Russek

Source: El Universal Gráfico (Illustrated Universal Daily), 9 July 1969, Mexico City

The USSR has so little respect for the decisions of our governments that even though the Russian pseudodiplomat Aleksandr Openkunov was expelled by Colombian authorities in 1964 (for his subversive, not at all diplomatic, activities), he has now been sent by the Kremlin to Peru as a member of a Soviet labor union mission. Both Openkunov and Lenov, who is accompanying him, are officials of the KGB, as are likewise Viktor Modnikov and Boris Papov, who also were in Peru as Moscow's labor union representatives.

The Latin American governments that recently renewed diplomatic relations with the USSR did so on the basis of two completely mistaken assumptions. The first was to believe that they can substantially improve their economic situation by increasing their present trade with Russia. An examination of trade relations between our countries and the USSR reveals the illusory nature of those hopes. The insignificant trade with Soviet Russia is not increased by the protocolar agreements; it continues to be equally small and precarious. The articles that we can offer -- coffee, sugar, etc -- are of no interest to the Russians. Not coffee, because they drink very little coffee: they have other, more stimulating liquids to drink; and not sugar, because they are committed to buying it from the Communist Cuba of Castro. As for the articles that our countries need to buy abroad, the USSR is unable to offer them to us with the quality, or at the price, or on the terms that we can obtain them in Europe or the United States. The best executed trade treaty between our countries and the USSR is therefore incapable of justifying relations on a higher level than the present exchange of merchandise of small importance.

The second assumption on which our governments base their decision to renew diplomatic relations with Russia is to imagine that the intentions tions of international Communism have changed and that subversion of con-

[illegible] conduct in [illegible] continuing to pro- [illegible] world dominion [illegible] missions -- which have nothing to do in commerce with them -- are devoted to the business of exporting to us agitation and rebellion against our nationally constituted governments. In this respect, the presence of the so-called "labor union envoys" has proved to be very significant.



EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Miércoles 9 de Julio de 1969

Enviados Sindicales Soviéticos

Por FELIPE KUSSEK

Tan poco respetuosa de las decisiones de nuestros gobiernos es la URSS, que no obstante que el seudodiplomático ruso Alexander [illegible] fue expulsado por las autoridades de Colombia el año 1964 —a causa de sus actividades subversivas y nada diplomáticas—, ahora ha sido enviado por el Kremlin al Perú, como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto [illegible] como Lenov, que lo acompaña, son oficiales de la K.G.B., así como también Victor Mednikov y Boris Popov, quienes también estuvieron en Perú como representantes sindicales moscovitas.

Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que recientemente han reanudado relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS, parten de dos supuestos completamente erróneos. El primero es creer que pueden mejorar en forma sustancial su situación económica incrementando el actual intercambio comercial con Rusia. Un examen de las relaciones mercantiles entre nuestros pueblos y la URSS, pone al descubierto lo ilusorio de tales esperanzas. El insignificante comercio con Rusia soviética no aumenta con los convenios [illegible] que siendo igualmente pequeño y precario [illegible] que podemos ofrecer, tales como café, azúcar, no interesan a los rusos. Lo primero porque consumen muy poco café, pues para beber tienen otros líquidos más estimulantes. El azúcar, porque están obligados a comprarlo a Cuba Castrocomunista. Por lo que toca a los artículos que nuestros países necesitan adquirir en el exterior, la URSS no los puede ofrecer ni en la calidad, ni en el precio, ni en las condiciones que en Europa o Estados Unidos podemos conseguir. El trato comercial más formalizado entre nuestros países y la URSS, carece así de validez para justificar relaciones de más alto nivel, que los actuales trueques de mercaderías de poca monta.

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TO Chief, WH Division
(ATTN: Thomas C. [illegible])

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT [illegible]/Forwarding of Interrogation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY-0342

1. In accordance with Reference, forwarded herewith are two xerox copies of the results of the interrogation of Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas (201-248906).

2. SOURCE: LITEMPO-12 on 2 July 1969.

for/John A. PROBERT

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
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201-133139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-37402	DATE 2 July 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-124-162/3

mas, de los cuales el principal es el denominado "Modelo"; que la relación que en este acto tiene a la vista en fotocopias numeradas del uno al seis, que se inicia con el título de: "Domicilios de logias Ajef de diferentes partes de la República", los nombres y domicilios que aparecen en las mismas, corresponden a los miembros responsables de cada logia, pero esta relación la recibió el declarante de JORGE PAEZ, conservándola en su poder porque pensó que le sería útil para el caso de irse al Estado de Guerrero, ya que todos los citados en la relación son gentes de absoluta confianza, incluyendo desde luego las direcciones que corresponden a esos Estados, y por lo que hace a la relación compuesta de nueve hojas, igualmente en fotocopia, que contienen exclusivamente nombres y lugares del mencionado Estado de Guerrero, le fue entregada al de la voz por un compañero del Frente Revolucionario de Liberación, diciéndole que todos los nombres allí anotados son "contactos". Que en el mes de Diciembre del año anterior, el dicente solicitó a la Embajada del Perú en nuestro país que su Gobierno le concediera asilo político, toda vez que consideraba ese el único medio para salir de México, pero además con la intención de reunirse en la ciudad de Lima, con CARNERO HOCKE, para continuar sus trabajos pre-revolucionarios a nivel continental, pero como el asilo solicitado se le negó, optó a final de cuentas por trasladarse a Belice, como lo hizo, con la mira de obtener la protección de JORGE PRICE y además de continuar los trabajos del Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberación con el apoyo de éste, como Primer Ministro de aquella colonia Británica, pues el plan trazado era de viajar de todas maneras a Perú para hacer el contacto con CARNERO HOCKE y discutir sus problemas, como ya dijo, a nivel Continental, a efecto de insistir en la revolución en Belice, buscando su independencia, para de allí prolongar el movimiento armado hacia México, iniciándolo en Quintana Roo, para seguirlo a Yucatán y demás Estados del sureste hasta Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, por ser esta la primera fase conforme a la planeación hecha, teniendo la seguridad de poder contar para ello, con las armas y elementos en general que produjeran la re-

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RYBAT JMROD DULOXI

REF DIRECTOR 27524

14 AUG 69 IN 23909

1. CONCUR.

2. FILE 200-124-162/3; X-REF 201-76401, 201-248906, 200-300-55.

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FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 1 JULY 1969
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: CONTACT, SOVIET EMBASSY,
MEXICO CITY, JUNE 26, 1969

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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

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~~Rick~~
~~[illegible] PC~~
Patricia - Please
File: Peru/Lima

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Chief, S B
C/WHD, Chiefs of Stations Bogota, Caracas,
Santiago, and Mexico City

Chief of Station, Lima
REDTOP AEASSAULT AEKICK DUIRIS/
Forwarding of Clips

Reference: LIMA-5128, 27 June 1969

Forwarded for all addressees are copies of the clips described in Reference.

Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS/twb

Attachments:
B/W as stated above

Distribution:
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~~2~~ - C/WHD
2 - COS, Bogota
2 - COS, Caracas
2 - COS, Santiago
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-132139

HPLA-10143

27 June 1969
201-132139
201-213261; 74-120-60/3
58-126-32/3

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La Cronica
9 Junio 69
H/w/attachment
to HPLA-10143

Contrapunto

Por [illegible]

Los Manifiestos del Apra y AP

Sincronizadamente el Partido Aprista y Acción Popular emitieron anteayer comunicados, en vísperas de la fecha que el Gobierno anterior tenía pensada para la realización de las Elecciones Generales

Es respetable la posición de ambos Partidos al exigir al Gobierno Revolucionario que fije fechas y objetivos. Merecen también tomarse en cuenta las críticas que el APRA, especialmente, formula en su Manifiesto. El PAP admite que hay buenos propósitos al intentar la reforma de estructuras, pero que ésta sólo puede llevarse a cabo con una democracia representativa en el país.

Ayer muchos se hicieron esta pregunta: ¿Qué resultados estaríamos comentando de haberse realizado las Elecciones bajo el Gobierno de Belaunde?

A nada conduce, ahora, hacer especulaciones sobre el desenlace de un proceso que ni siquiera llegó a iniciarse. Pero, con todo, es interesante recoger opiniones y, siempre en el terreno de "lo que pudo ser", dar la propia

Muchos creen que Acción Popular (belaundista) y el APRA iban a formar un solo bloque en las Elecciones del 69. Basan esta presunción en el acercamiento que hubo entre ambos Partidos al final del Gobierno, y, también, en el rompimiento del APRA con la UNO, que dejó al Partido de Haya de la Torre sin el aliado —tradicional en las luchas políticas políticas de los últimos 25 años— que lo avalara ante las fuerzas de derecha. Y esos mismos piensan que para hacer frente al PAP-AP se hubieran unido UNO-MDP-PDC e Independientes, dejando en el "tercer frente" a la izquierda con los democristianos y los seoanistas.

Nosotros creemos que un pacto AP-APRA se habría tornado difícil por la designación del candidato a la Presidencia. Los apristas habrían reclamado uno de los suyos. Y en este caso, el nombre de Haya de la Torre tenía que salir al frente. Es difícil que AP gobiernista hubiera aceptado la candidatura de Haya. Más bien podía haber exigido la de un elemento independiente, pero el APRA ya no tenía salida ante sus huestes para pedirles que votaran por un candidato que no fuera aprista. Los motivos del 45 y del 57 habían desaparecido

El segundo frente se tornaba con muchas posibilidades, si consideramos el desgaste del Gobierno de FBT, muchos de cuyos errores eran compartidos al final por la mayoría aprista del Parlamento. Debemos admitir que esta colaboración del PAP se debió, en parte, a su deseo de hacer lo que fuera necesario para evitar el pronunciamiento militar y llegar a las Elecciones de 1969.

Para comandar ese "segundo frente" se sindicaba a Bedoya Reyes, aunque muchos consideran hasta ahora problemático que el Alcalde de Lima hubiera recibido el visto bueno del jefe de la UNO y de los líderes del MDP. Mas como todo es posible en política, la candidatura de Bedoya apoyada por esos sectores habría tenido una fuerza singular y una chance de primera.

El repunte en cifras de la izquierda estaba asegurado. Se dejó entrever en las Elecciones de 1967 con la buena votación de Malpica. El refuerzo del DC y seoanistas, aunque no muy cuantioso, hubiera significado de todas maneras pasar los 200 mil votos, lo que representaba llevar un bloque aceptable de representantes al Parlamento.

En fin, todas son especulaciones, considerando lo que era nuestra política por octubre de 1968. Lo que sí es hecho concreto que a los siete meses de establecido el nuevo Gobierno, los únicos grupos que están realmente en la oposición son el APRA y AP belaundista. Y ellos han sido, precisamente, los que acaban de añorar las Elecciones que pudieron haberse realizado ayer.

● A fines de la próxima semana llegarían a Lima los diplomáticos rusos que se establecerán en el Perú. Ha trascendido que antes de ellos vendría Nicolai Leonov con el objeto de escribir notas en torno a las relaciones peruano-soviéticas. Según publicaciones de diarios de Venezuela y Colombia, Leonov sería muy adepto a intervenir en los asuntos internos de los países que visita. Ultimamente habría residido en México, desde donde habría sido eje de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países americanos. "El Tiempo" de Caracas lo denunció el 24 de mayo de este año como el jefe de "Gregorian", un ruso expulsado de Venezuela. "El Siglo" de Bogotá (22 de mayo de 1969) sindicó a Leonov como el diplomático que entregó 120 mil dólares a dos grupos subversivos colombianos. "La República" de Bogotá (17 y 22 de mayo) sindica a Leonov como el elemento clave de una red de subversión y espionaje. ¿Qué hará en Lima? Ya lo veremos. Pero no deben echarse en saco roto las denuncias que se han formu-

abaratar el precio de los artículos alimenticios merece todo el apoyo de la ciudadanía. Lo propio debe ocurrir con el control de precios que entrará a regir dentro de seis días, pese a tratarse de una medida sumamente peligrosa.

El control que anuncia el Gobierno, si no es llevado cuidadosamente y si no se toman las providencias necesarias, puede constituirse en un remedio más grave que la propia enfermedad.

Y es que aun está fresco el recuerdo de lo que ocurrió hace 20 años, cuando el Gobierno de Bustamante y Rivero decretó el control general de precios que a la postre, originó el mercado negro y largas colas en los puestos de abastecimiento.

Creemos que la disposición dictada puede aceptarse como un paliativo, pero no como solución de un problema que radica en el acentuado déficit de la producción alimentaria.

El control de precios puede dar resultados si se lleva a efecto con el máximo cuidado posible, pero consideramos que el Gobierno debe también

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La Prensa 12 de Junio de 1965

Infiltración Soviética en Sindicatos Peruanos

Por la revelación de un soviético que se encuentra en Lima, se ha tenido noticia de que un grupo sindical peruano de inspiración comunista mantiene tratos personales constantes con miembros del Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Las organizaciones sindicales peruanas están ciertamente en libertad de mantener contactos con cualquier entidad similar extranjera, mientras esa relación no represente una interferencia foránea en problemas que son de incumbencia exclusiva de los peruanos. Pero no es éste el caso del vinculo entre el grupo sindical que, ni de hecho ni de derecho, tiene titulos para presentarse como la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, y el Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética.

Es menester señalar que el grupo sindical local no tiene la representación genuina y mayoritaria de los trabajadores peruanos. Se trata de conocidos dirigentes comunistas que aspiran desde hace tiempo a lograr la división de los sindicatos, objetivo que no han llegado a cumplir. Los dirigentes de la verdadera CTP conservan la representación de los trabajadores de los gremios y sindicatos principales. Los dirigentes de la CTP, conformando la representación peruana con el Ministro de Trabajo, han viajado a Ginebra a la reunión internacional que ha organizado la OIT, con la participación principal del Sumo Pontífice.

Es, pues, con una organización apócrifa con la que está manteniendo relaciones el Presidium de Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética. Y esto quiere decir que está interviniendo y alentando una maniobra divisionista en desmedro de los trabajadores peruanos que son contrarios al sistema totalitario de trabajos forzados y de represión de los trabajadores libres que encarna la Unión Soviética. En otras palabras: bajo la fachada de una organización sindical, la Unión Soviética está inmiscuyéndose, en convivencia con un grupo falsamente representativo de los trabajadores peruanos, en problemas que son de competencia de nuestros grupos laborales.

De otro lado, a nadie escapa que en la Unión Soviética no existe ninguna especie de libertad laboral y que los trabajadores están sometidos a un régimen completamente opuesto a la concepción sindicalista imperante en el mundo democrático. Si esto es así ¿qué clase de asesoramiento sindical pueden ofrecer quienes no son sindicalistas sino agentes de un gobierno totalitario que nunca ha admitido una reclamación salarial, una huelga o cualquiera de los procedimientos conocidos en Occidente?

El establecimiento de relaciones con la Unión Soviética implica riesgos como éste que se ha descubierto en el nivel sindical. Es imperioso que las autoridades gubernamentales impidan la intromisión soviética en los asuntos sindicales, porque, entre otras infracciones, significa el menoscabo de la soberanía peruana.



¿Espías em Casa?

Parece que los agentes extranjeros están últimamente muy activos en el Perú. Esta vez se trata de agentes de la Unión Soviética —pais con el que acabamos de entablar relaciones diplomáticas— que trabajan para la K.G.B., la tristemente célebre policia secreta que alguna vez estuvo dirigida por Lavrenti Beria.

En editorial del 14 de junio, CORREO se referia a dos presuntos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Beris Popov y Victor Mednikov, quienes han asistido como observadores a las reuniones de una rama fantasma de sindicatos que pretende erigirse como rival de la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú o CTP. Señalaba nuestro diario la contradicción que supone el hecho de que dichos señores se atribuyan calidad de dirigentes sindicales cuando es sabido que, en Rusia, el régimen sindical no es libre y los sindicatos son alli nada más que apéndice del régimen totalitario.

También ha estado en el Perú el titulado periodista Nikolay Leonov, y fue entrevistado por el diario "La Crónica". Respecto de Leonov, recuerda el diario "El Siglo", de Bogotá, en su edición del 17 de mayo del año en curso, que Leonov, actuando entonces como diplomático, fue sorprendido en México cuando entregaba a agentes extremistas la cantidad de cien mil dólares en efectivo presumiblemente destinados a financiar la insurrección. Por su parte, el diario "El Tiempo" de la misma Bogotá se refiere a la "red de espionaje y subversión que desde México dirige el seudoperiodista soviético Leonev, protegido además durante varios años, con el fuero diplomático como "segundo secretario" de la embajada rusa".

Según informa "La República", igualmente de Bogotá, en su edición del pasado primero de mayo, otro agente soviético Alexander Operkunov, quien fuera expulsado de Colombia en 1964, regresó como miembro de una misión sindical soviética. Tanto Leontov como Operkunov han estado, recientemente, en el Perú, lo que indica que a la Unión Soviética no le importa emplear en nuestro pais a los mismos agentes que ha empleado en otras latitudes, y lo que vendría a justificar a quienes estiman como peligroso el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Moscú.

SUCESO Dominical de CORREO

22 Junio 1969

"LA TRIBUNA" — Lima, Jueves 12 de Junio de 1969

ALARMANTE PENETRACION COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Por Nicolás LYNCH JR.

Se comentó ayer en esta misma página la expulsión del conocido agente del comunismo internacional, Ezequiel Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia. Y se recordó que ese agitador indeseable está realizando una activa campaña al servicio del imperialismo soviético con el título de "Secretario General del Comité de Abogados Pro Defensa del Petróleo Peruano", en una costosa gira a lo largo de todo el Continente que no se sabe quién paga.

Ayer, un diario local ha publicado con honores de primera plana, la prueba fotográfica de que otra organización fantasma —llamada "Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú"— celebra sus sesiones bajo el control y supervigilancia de dos procónsules sindicales soviéticos, llamados Boris Popov y Víctor Medinkov. Ambos actúan libremente en nuestro país e intervienen en la política obrera nacional sin que nadie se lo impida; pues la supuesta "confederación" no es sino una agencia más del comunismo imperialista internacional, cuyas actividades aquí son del dominio público.

La expulsión del agitador comunista Ramírez Novoa, ordenada por el gobierno de Colombia, y la reveladora fotografía e información publicada ayer, son dos expresivos testimonios de la avanzada intervención política rusa en nuestro país.

El comunismo que ya hizo su ingreso clandestino y sangriento en el Perú por medio de las bien financiadas y armadas guerrillas de tantas vidas han costado a nuestras fuerzas militares y policiales, vuelve ahora por los caminos legales y diplomáticos. Los enviados comunistas extranjeros tienen libre entrada. Y, como ya lo vemos, su derecho para tomar parte en actividades obreras, y consiguientemente políticas y sociales, parece ser irrestricto y público.

El comunismo internacional está actuando a dos manos en el país: Los soviéticos realizan la penetración pacífica. suave, agazapada y adiestran a sus agentes y secuaces en la infiltración burocrática; a tiempo que los "pekineses" se presentan como disidentes violentos y agresivos usando todos los medios de la delincuencia y del terror. El antagonismo entre unos y otros es aquí, en nuestro medio, más ficticio que real. Al usar como recurso y táctica la supuesta división entre dos bandos, la acción de cada uno está bien distribuida y ubicada. Uno encubre al otro y ambos engañan a los crédulos y tontos útiles al aparecer como contrapuestos.

Es innegable y es obligante remarcarlo que ya va cundiendo en la opinión pública una creciente alarma ante los desembozados avances de los agentes extranjeros del comunismo internacional en el Perú. Con muy buenas razones se comenta y se interroga acerca de los alcances y peligros de esa penetración. Hechos como los que comentamos justifican la inquietud general que las actividades solapadas de los comunistas del lado ruso y las vandálicas de los del lado pekinés están causando entre los peruanos que no quisieran ver a su patria arrastrada a los horrores que el comunismo causa a donde llega.

"LA TRIBUNA" Lima, Viernes 13 de Junio de 1969

¡ANTIMPERIALISMO, SI, PERO COMUNISMO, NO!

Por J. HIDALGO VALERA

Día a día aparecen nuevas pruebas de la torcida interpretación y del interesado aprovechamiento que el Comunismo Internacional está haciendo de las sanas corrientes antimperialistas que son sincera expresión democrática de la conciencia cívica del pueblo peruano.

Bajo el pretexto de un nacionalismo que no pueden sentir, quienes están a órdenes y paga de una potencia extranjera, los comunistas criollos esconden su mercenarismo apátrida al servicio del Imperialismo ruso apareciendo como "patriotas" peruanos adversarios del Imperialismo yanqui.

Y con esta máscara se embanderan como defensores de la "soberanía nacional" o del petróleo. Y ya realizando correrías continentales que cuestan muchísimo dinero — como es el caso del agitador Ramírez Novoa—, o ya organizando "confederaciones generales de trabajadores", bajo la auditoría vigilante de agentes del gobierno ruso, están actuando en el Perú en una siniestra obra de penetración disolvente.

Neutralizada Cuba como base irradiadora de la propaganda y subversión comunista, aparece claro que los grandes empresarios del imperialismo ruso han escogido al Perú para trampolín de sus actividades sobre América Latina. El aislamiento de la isla cubana, su incomunicación con América y el fracaso de su política de "guerrillas" han hecho que su propaganda resulte desacreditada e ineficiente. Pero las facilidades que el Perú depara ahora, con amplias relaciones diplomáticas y abierto paso a los emisarios de todo tipo y camouflage comunista, permiten un trabajo de penetración sin restricciones y de expansión continental, ilímite. A él contribuye la festejadora tolerancia de nuestra bien llamada "fuerza de los vivos", listos a todo acomodo, y dispuestos a entrar en tratos con Moscú como el mercader que caído en el pozo trataba de salir de él tirándose de las orejas.

La táctica de penetración rusa está actuando ventajosamente sobre la confusión de una llamada "clase dirigente u oligarquía peruana", (sin conciencia y sin clase), y valiéndose además del caos ideológico dominante en el improvisado oficialismo que por la fuerza gobierna al Perú. La odiosa ceguera antiaprista de "El Comercio". — gran mentor y mandamás reaccionario del país—, ha arrastrado a muchos "izquierdistas" de nuevo cuño a aceptar el lema proditor de "Primero los comunistas que el APRA", Y de aquí que por no haber aceptado el constructivo antimperialismo aprista, basado en el principio del "interamericanismo democrático sin imperio", de la integración y del fortalecimiento de una democracia social representativa jurídicamente institucionalizada, es que está cayendo el país en un confusionismo desmoralizador.

Bueno es recordar que el izquierdismo democrático aprista trajo al Perú la verdadera concepción e imagen de un antimperialismo de veras transformador y progresista. Jamás dijo el Aprismo que ser antimperialista era ser xenófobo o demagogo, ni menos enemigo del pueblo norteamericano. Y siempre afirmó que nuestra posición revolucionaria es resistir al imperialismo, pero sin olvidar que nuestro país necesita de capitales extranjeros y de ayuda tecnológica para su desarrollo.

En consecuencia, menos pudo el Aprismo propiciar nuestra entrega al colonialismo comunista como remedio contra los males que acarrea nuestra interdependencia con los Estados Unidos, tan mal llevada por ambas partes. Tal recurso habría sido copiar la receta castrista que por librarse de un amo al cual juzgaba malo se echó a los pies de otro que ha resultado peor.

No, el lema aprista ha sido y es el de propiciar una conciencia y actitud antimperialista constructiva y no caer bajo otro imperialismo rival, enemigo de la libertad del hombre. Nuestro antimperialismo es democrático y se basa precisamente en la libre integración de nuestros pueblos, en la afirmación de nuestra soberania continental sobre la base de las soberanías nacionales, que emanan de las soberanías populares libremente ejercidas y en el nuevo concepto de la justicia de pan y libertad.

"Sindicalistas" Soviéticos Pretenden Colonizarnos

Entre risas, protestas y estupor, se ha recibido la noticia de que dos "sindicalistas" rusos han estado en enjuagues con pretendidos dirigentes del sindicalismo peruano.

Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov, miembros del llamado Presidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos de la Unión Soviética, asistieron el lunes a una asamblea de delegados de la fantasmal Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú. Y en esta ocasión se hizo público que los "sindicalistas" rusos mantienen contacto con el laborismo peruano desde que se iniciaron las gestiones para que el Perú y Rusia entablasen relaciones diplomáticas.

Esta "confederación general", alentada por los comunistas y "El Comercio", carece de reconocimiento y sólo se representa a sí misma. La forman un puñado de trabajadores y agitadores que hacen, sin resultado alguno, la guerra a la Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), que sí es el organismo auténtico del sindicalismo peruano, goza de reconocimientos nacional e internacional y representa a los trabajadores en las cajas de los seguros sociales. A mayor abundamiento, la CTP también tiene la personería legal y masiva de los trabajadores peruanos, pues sus dirigentes, acompañando al Ministro de Trabajo, General Jorge Chamot, viajaron a la reunión de la OIT en Ginebra, donde el martes habló Paulo VI.

Si los "sindicalistas" rusos tuvieran honestos propósitos de solidaridad e intercambio laboral, podrían haber buscado contacto con la auténtica representación peruana, esto con la CTP. ¿Por qué, en cambio, "confraternizan" con la institución divisionista y fantasmal?

Una sola es la respuesta. En Rusia no existe sindicalismo. Sus entidades sindicales, su pomposo "Presidium", sólo son una farsa. Porque en Rusia los trabajadores carecen de derechos, están virtualmente esclavizados y jamás, desde que allí impera el comunismo, han hecho una huelga. Por eso Popov y Madnikov, "confraternizan" con sus pares, los comunistas peruanos que se suman a la mascarada moscovita.

Por lo demás, lo ocurrido —y más y más sucesos que tendremos que lamentar— era de esperarse. Las embajadas de los países comunistas según lo hacen en América Latina y en el resto del mundo, son agencias de penetración, propaganda y subversión.

Ya están llegando, como puntas de lanza, "sindicalistas", "periodistas" y "técnicos". Sin duda tienen buenos métodos de persuación, disponen de mucho dinero y dispensan favores a manos llenas. Frente a todo ello, por suerte, el auténtico sindicalismo está en alerta.

¡Medicinas Baratas!, Verdad...

El General FAP Eduardo Montero Rojas, Ministro de Salud, debe estar muy contento. La asistencia hospitalaria es necesariamente costosa, y los recursos que el Estado tiene nunca serán suficientes.

Pero ha recibido un ofrecimiento extraordinario: medicinas a precio de costo que pueden cubrir las necesidades de los múltiples servicios gratuitos que el Estado mantiene dentro de su política asistencial.

El ofrecimiento le ha sido hecho por la Asociación de Laboratorios Farmacéuticos del Perú (Alafarpe) "consecuente con su espíritu de servicio y su sensibilidad social".

Montero recibió el ofrecimiento de viva voz, de los directivos de Alafarpe que lo visitaron en su despacho. Agradeció, sin duda complacido, y dijo que una comisión especial estudiará debidamente el ofrecimiento.

Que una industria ofrezca sus productos renunciando a lícitas ganancias, para beneficiar a quienes lo necesitan, es algo que tiene muy pocos precedentes. Es cosa que recuerda los felices tiempos en que los perros eran amarrados con sartas de salchichas. Algo que a todos parece bien, que se agradece, y que, como queda dicho, debe tener contento a un Ministro que nunca tendrá todo el dinero que necesita su Ministerio.

Siete Dias. (La Prensa)

17 de Junio de 1969.

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DIARIO POPULAR PARA TODO EL PERU

DIRECTOR: Manuel Solano R.
EDITOR: Eduardo Obando Lino

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QUEBRAR SINDICALISMO DEMOCRATICO ES CONSIGNA COMUNISTA EN EL PERU

Con la llegada de las misiones diplomáticas y "especiales" de la Unión Soviética y con el apoyo que desde esferas del gobierno de facto se brinda al comunismo, en todo el país está arreciando la ofensiva contra el sindicalismo democrático, llevada a cabo por los agentes coloniales al servicio de la misma causa que provocó las guerrillas. La protección oficial está testimoniada por informaciones que se recogen diariamente en el ambiente sindical: en el Norte, donde los trabajadores saben que las autoridades "protejen" "toda maniobra destinada a eliminar apristas y reemplazarlos por dirigentes comunistas", maniobras que son patentes en Lambayeque y la Libertad; en el Sur y en el Centro, la ofensiva se está realizando en el sector bancario, así como en Loreto y en Lima; y hay que decirlo con claridad, con la protección inclusive de algunos torpes elementos patronales semiquebrados, que creen que contribuyendo a la división del sindicalismo democrático "se pondrán bien" con los comunistas y que mantendrán sus buenas relaciones con la Junta, para salir de su crisis.

En cuanto al apoyo exterior, es sabido que los "diplomáticos" comunistas y otros visitantes con pasaporte especial, visitan cuotidianamente a las organizaciones que se agrupan en la espuria Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, ofreciendo a esas organizaciones toda clase de apoyo. No es extraño este procedimiento, porque de él hay experiencia en todo el mundo. Pero lo que sí resulta insólito es que haya autoridades complicadas en esta política.

Para los comunistas romper el movimiento democrático es una línea necesaria y lógica. Ellos están en su juego internacional. Pero para lo peruanos, ese juego entraña los caminos de la traición, porque equivale a sujetar la fuerza básica de la producción a los intereses foráneos. Tan negativo es esto como la política que entregó el petróleo. Y si traición se llama a tal política, traición a la patria hay que llamar también a lo que facilite o proteja la penetración comunista en el país, a través de la quiebra del sindicalismo democrático.

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Infiltración Comunista en la Política Sindical

Es universalmente sabido que en la Unión Soviética no hay sindicatos. La férrea dictadura que impera en ese país, la organización totalitaria en torno a una sola fuente de poder y decisiones, que es el Partido Comunista, hacen tan imposible la existencia de asociaciones libres de trabajadores para la defensa de sus intereses colectivos, como sería la vida en el interior de un alto horno.

Que los rusos hayan decidido escamotear también esa verdad, esencia misma de su concepción doctrinaria del Estado y la sociedad, y llamen "sindicatos" a las organizaciones mediante las cuales el Partido todopoderoso ejerce precisamente su dictadura y su activismo entre el sector laboral, es cuestión que sólo interesa a los soviéticos. Ante tamaña mistificación sólo cabe sonreir.

Pero lo abismal es que los trabajadores comunistas peruanos, que protestan por la "política antisindical" del gobierno peruano, reciban con aplausos a dos "dirigentes sindicales" soviéticos, los señores Boris Popov, y Victor Mednikov, que han tenido la gentileza de concurrir a las celebraciones de la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), dominada por los comunistas peruanos, que a su vez están dominados por ellos.

Esta es la primera vez que la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, a menudo descrita en algunos órganos de prensa como "democrática", "independiente" o libre de influencia "sectaria" aprista, se identifica tan ostensiblemente con el centro productor de su energía, Moscú.

La penetración comunista en la vida sindical peruana no es, por cierto, nueva. Data de fines de la década del veinte. Pero rechazada por la abrumadora mayoría de los trabajadores nacionales, que quieren la satisfacción de sus aspiraciones colectivas y no servir de instrumento a una política cuyo sentido y proyecciones escapan del todo a su control; que desean, en una palabra, ser actores y no títeres, quedó simplemente reducida a las proporciones de un pequeño mecanismo, perfectamente localizado y de influencia reducida, de presión foránea.

Durante los últimos años, empero, el movimiento comunista sindical ha cobrado nuevo y peligroso auge en el Perú. Al amparo de la extraordinaria movilización laboral estimulada por el gobierno constitucional anterior, que reconoció muchos más sindicatos que los organizados en toda nuestra historia; escudados en esa sana política participatoria, propia de un estado democrático, los comunistas tomaron posiciones, precisamente para destruir la democracia.

Como resultado de esta política la Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, totalmente dominada por los comunistas, se ufana hoy de contar a medio millón de trabajadores peruanos en los organismos de base que controlan. Más todavía, sostienen que próximamente se agregarán a sus filas otros 150 mil trabajadores.

Aun pasando por el colador estos cálculos optimistas, no podemos dejar de expresar cierta preocupación por el logro obtenido hasta el momento por los comunistas en su permanente esfuerzo por infiltrar el movimiento sindical, a fin de desviarlo hacia sus propios fines, contrarios por igual a los intereses de la clase obrera y del país.

¿Cuáles son estos fines comunistas? La CGTP nos tiene, por suerte, bien informados. Son, entre otros, la modificación de la política económica con el establecimiento del control de cambios, la moratoria de la deuda externa, la explotación estatal del cobre, la nacionalización de las exportaciones, la anulación de las concesiones petroleras, los aumentos de sueldos por decreto, la prohibición del cierre de fábricas y varias medidas adicionales que bastarían para provocar un colapso del país y nuestra entrega, como presa de la miseria, a la dominación internacional del Partido Comunista, que —como bien lo sabe la CGTP—, jamás ganó una elección en país alguno, ni capturó pueblo que biese sido antes sacudido p conmoción social y económica

LAS RELACIONES PELIGROSAS.

Cuando se anunció que nuestro país iba a establecer relaciones con los países socialistas, entendimos que dichas relaciones serían aprovechadas convenientemente desde el aspecto comercial, sin descartar por supuesto la vinculación de amistad que siempre robustece transacciones y mejora el cuadro de los negocios a nivel internacional.

Al mismo tiempo que expresábamos nuestro respaldo pleno a dicha resolución, que marcaba, lo creíamos de buena fé, una nueva etapa con el ensanchamiento de las posibilidades económicas para el Perú; hicimos constar también nuestro recelos por los datos que aporta la experiencia acerca de este tipo de vinculación con países de la órbita roja, que siempre llevan escondido el propósito subversivo, de ingerencia en los asuntos internos, de penetración en sindicatos y de financiación de movimientos contra el órden establecido.

Estos temores estan recibiendo confirmación. Y lo estan siendo apenas iniciadas las relaciones con los países socialistas, en especial con la Unión Soviética. Cuando todavía no llega la delegación diplomática más importante ya han visitado el país prominentes miembros de organismos comunistas, caracterizados más que por una honesta función diplomática, por la acción subversiva que realizaron en otros países.

Uno de esos personajes que nos visitara recientemente bajo la inocente apariencia de una actividad periodística, fué NICOLAI LEONOV, elemento que registra antecedentes subversivos, que ha sido cabeza de un movimiento financiador de extremistas y que en distintos puntos de América ha dejado sentir su acción disociadora, de ingerencia en asuntos internos y como elemento de apoyo a movimientos nacionales de acción contra el órden establecido.

Nicolai Leonov ha sido sindicado por diversos órganos de prensa de América Latina, como elemento peligroso, tal como lo señalan diarios de Venezuela y Co-

Radio Victoria
12 June 65

lombia, como lo confirman autoridades y voceros de expresión de Méjico y como también lo deben haber registrado los servicios de inteligencia de varios países. En Méjico por ejemplo se le ha sindicado como cabeza de un vasto movimiento subversivo en países latinoamericanos. "El Tiempo" de Bogotá en su edición del 24 de mayo del presente año, lo señala como jefe de un sujeto apodado "Gregorian", ruso expulsado de Venezuela. Lo mismo sostienen los diarios "El Siglo" y La República de Bogotá.

Todo esto pues nos indica que, mientras el Perú tiende su mano amiga hacia el mundo socialista, concretamente, hacia la Unión Soviética, ya empiezan a deslizarse elementos que, coludidos o no con su Gobierno, esto deberán establecerlo nuestros servicios de inteligencia, tienen el propósito de inmiscuirse en nuestra política interna con propósitos subversivos.

Avala aún más este aserto ~~la~~ el concluyente registro gráfico de un diario local donde se muestra a dos miembros del Praesidium del Consejo Central de los Sindicatos, con sede en la Unión Soviética, participando en las deliberaciones de una llamada Asamblea Nacional de la denominada Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú, organismo paralelo a la CTP y que no es sino el reducto de ~~una~~ unos cuantos sindicatos comunistas.

Este era el tipo de relaciones que esperábamos con la Unión Soviética y los países del mundo socialista? Creemos que no. Y por ello convendría que se movilicen nuestros elementos de seguridad y detecten las actividades que realizan o van a realizar los diplomáticos que se han de establecer en nuestra Capital. Que tendamos una mano de amistad, no quiere decir que toleremos el abuso de confianza de quienes pretenden corromper nuestras instituciones par enfrentarlas con el órden establecido... Si los elementos Boris Popov y Victor Mednikov que aparecen en la foto con trabajadores peruanos, forman parte de la delegación diplomática no lo sabemos, pero de todos modos, estan avalando, auspiciando y quizá hasta financiando un movimiento laboral divisionista que no podemos permitir... por que ello no es amistad, sino abuso de confianza y penetración inadmisible en los asuntos internos de nuestro país.

PRENSA – [illegible]


YO TE VOY A ASESORAR EN TU TRABAJO
SINDICATOS ROJOS PERUANOS

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S E C R E T 262105Z JUN 69 CITE LIMA 5122 26 JUN 69 IN 90235

MADRID, DIRECTOR

4

REDCOAT

1. REQUEST TRACES CARLOS JIMENEZ ORTEGA, SPANISH JOURNALIST, DIRECTOR-GENERAL EFE IN LIMA. JIMENEZ BORN CIRCA 1923, MARRIED. HE IS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN LIMA. JIMENEZ HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH TDY SOVIET NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB.

2. STATION PLANS ASSESS JIMENEZ AS POSSIBLE ACCESS AGENT.

3. FOR MADRID: LIAISON MAY BE QUERIED.

4. FILE: 201-132139.

S E C R E T

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MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Lima

INFO.

FROM

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

REDTOP/AEKICK

Translations of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HPLA 10070, 16 May 1969

1. As requested by the Station in Reference, we have had translated the letters written by Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, and the translations are forwarded herewith.

2. The attachment to LEONOV's letter of 2 May, and all but the postscript of the 3 May letter are, as the Station pointed out, apparently pure propaganda. The same cannot be said, however, for the 2 May letter, which is full of less than laudatory comments on Lima, its climate, and the insect population of the Hotel Savoy. Of even more significance are LEONOV's opinions on the VALCARCELS, which appear in the 2 May letter, and the revelation in the 3 May letter postscript of the precarious financial position of the magazine. One wonders why an intelligence officer of LEONOV'S experience and intellect would include such matters in letters sent through the open mail.

NORMA W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment:
As stated H/W

Distribution:
3-COS, Lima

1 CCT

201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPLW 5320	DATE 24 JUN 1969 19 June 1969
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COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/SB/X/WH	19 June 69	E. P. Ernest
SB/CI/O	19.6.69	J. Walters
WH/3/P	20 June 69	R. L. Conolly

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	24 Jun	Spera

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(40)

DISPATCH

Post and Telecommunications of Peru

Mr. Khachaturov K. A. [as given]
Novosti Press Agency
Ploshchad Pushkina 4
Moscow USSR

Moscow, Attention K. A. Khauaturov [sic]

Sender: N. Leonov
Hotel Savoy 525
Lima
Peru

CS COPY

h/w att ltr HPLW-5320

201-132139

Lima 2, 5, 1969

Karen,

Beside my greetings, which you do not need, I wish to inform you of the following: all the assignments concerning the office I have completed to the best of my ability. Violetta is excessively subservient toward our people, and because of this I warned her [to see to it] that this side of her character shouldn't touch or infringe upon APN [Novosti Press Agency] interests. Our fellows are real cads. Her life is terrible: her husband is a cripple; besides that he is dangerous (he drinks), she has two children, barely makes it from one payday to the next, is torn between household duties and her work, and on top of that she has "guests," and what guests!! She works conscientiously, but she is short on experience and training and does not have much time. The print shop where the magazine is printed is excellent. It can function as well as the one in Mexico, and without difficulties. The owner insists that we immediately increase the circulation to 3,000 copies [, the number] currently needed to cover the cost. Based on the two issues published so far, we have discovered that we are selling [raskhodyatsya] [only] 50 percent. The remaining [copies] we distribute free after the next issue has been issued. She even complained about Arisalu, who has been selling his magazine in Peru at a cheaper price. They settled that question between themselves.

At her place I saw newspaper clippings covering our materials: there are not many of them, but they are there, and she insists that she sent duplicates to you. Here the situation is worse than in Mexico (in the press) and one must maneuver between competing newspapers.

It seems I will have an interview with the president. Answers to questions will be in writing - guaranteed 100 percent. But I want a personal interview. And that is the whole business.

The situation is altogether normal. The humidity is terrible: 98 percent. I am wet all day long. A strange city: the skies are sullen all day long but there is not a drop of water, and they tell me there never is. Can you believe it, the annual rainfall is 1 mm, but dampness penetrates to your intestines. In comparison with Mexico this is a backward province and one can see this in everything. But it has much charm. Its colonial buildings are good. I cannot talk about the provinces, I have not seen them, but I have heard that in their picturesqueness they are unique. There are as few hotels as in Moscow. I live in a [illegible] for 8 dollars and kill cockroaches day and night and place patches on the scratches on my legs which I do not know where to put because of the restricted area. I am very happy that this one was built for the Americans. They deserve it.

Give me a call. It seems everything is in order [illegible].

/s/ N. Leonov

For Kuznetsov, Yu.

International Information

Lima 2 May 1969

Robbery on the High Seas

"To a strong man it is a weakling who is always guilty" - that is the sad conclusion to which Latin Americans have come again when they face the payments for deeds with which they had nothing to do. Some time ago the dock workers of the Pacific coast of the U.S.A. went on a strike which lasted almost 2 months. As a result of interference in loading and unloading operations, the vessels' demurrages greatly increased and the curve line of profits of the shipping companies turned downwards. The shipowners, instead of helping with a speedy solution of this labor conflict, decided to turn to the high seas robbery to compensate for their "losses," which is their name for the profits they have missed. With this in mind the U.S. companies arbitrarily introduced on 12 March a 10-percent increase in rates for transporting goods to the Pacific ports of Latin America.

This piratic step means that the Latin American countries from now on will be losing annually 60-80 million dollars, paying for the internal disturbances in the U.S. In former times pirates attacked only defenseless ships. These habits have lasted up to these days. The U.S. monopolies calculated that Latin America, which has no meaningful navy, will simply have to turn out its pockets. But these calculations overlooked the fact that now resistance to the economic dictations of the U.S. is increasing daily in Latin America.

In reply to the freight rate increases, the victimized countries--Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile--are planning to raise the cost of port services for the ships of the U.S. companies and to adopt measures for utilization of their own vessels for sea-borne transportation. Taking into consideration increased competition and the chance that vessels of other countries will engage in the transport of Latin American goods, it may still happen that the sea robbers who aimed to clip will find themselves clipped.

[Signature: ~~illegible~~]
N Leonov

Post and Telecommunication
of Peru

Certificate No 220936
Receiver: Mr. Khachaturov, K.A.
Agency Prensa Novosti
Pushkin Ploshchad 4
Moscow USSR

Sender: L. Neonov
Hotel Savoy 525
Lima
Peru

for Yu. Kuznetsov

International Information

Lima, 3 May, 69

Peruvians Are Becoming More Determined To Defend Their Independence.

From ancient days, there has existed a custom in Latin America to convene in the time of great danger open meetings by representation of all the estates to adopt special measures. So in times of attacks by pirates, of large-scale domestic disturbances, unusual natural calamities, and at present in connection with the threat of economic intervention in Peru as a revenge by the US for the nationalization of the property of the American oil firm International Petroleum Company this ancient custom has been resurrected.

Not very long ago such a meeting took place in the largest Peruvian port, Callao, where the participants adopted a "Declaration To Proclaim The Economic Independence of Peru." It was pointed out there that the people of Peru will not abandon their just demands and that they will achieve their economic independence in the same manner as they won their political freedom.

Yesterday an all-peoples gathering took place in Arequipa, the second largest city in the country. The public court dealing with the imperialist policies of the U.S.A. lasted approximately 4 hours. It has been a long time since Arequipa heard such passionate and patriotic speeches. The speakers petitioned the government to organize a general campaign of protest against USA policies to get the people out on the squares and streets, to arm them if possible to repel any attempts by the USA to carry out military or economic attacks.

The question was brought up of returning to the Peruvians all the natural resources of the country, particularly copper and [illegible] which are owned by American companies. One should point out that USA capital investments in mining are six to seven times as great as those in the nationalized oil company, whose property has been appraised at 72 million dollars.

The open meeting of the inhabitants of the city of Arequipa sent a messenger to the president of the country assuring him of their support for the nationalistic policies of the government. After this act the spontaneously assembled demonstration went along the main streets of the city accompanied by the sound of a historical bell, which in its day called the people to resist the Spanish aggression of 1866. The bell was especially brought to Arequipa for this occasion.

The powerful [illegible] of patriotism of the Peruvian people has blossomed forth. No internal or external enemy will be able to control it. The hope of these enemies is to lull it to sleep or to cheat it.

/s/ N. Leonov

P.S. Everything is o.k. with me.

The office has received no money. The situation is desperate. The mess is unendurable. If this continues, there will be no work done. I question whether EY will be published on time because the printers will not do this just on my promise. They require 50 percent deposit before they begin with their work. This is no Mexico, where [illegible] cooperation became the basis for great trust. Here everything is just beginning to take shape; because of this, accuracy is very much needed.

What will the readers say when they do not receive their next issue?

201-132139

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
.....

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mockba,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

COBREO AEREO

Лима 2. 5. 1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро я выполнил по мере сил моих. Вначале сразу [illegible] усердствовала по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я ей предупредил, чтобы эта [illegible] характера не [illegible] и не унижала интересы АПН. А наш брат — [illegible] хам. Удивляюсь как у Смирнова С.Р. нехватило такту оставить Виолетту в покое. У неё ужасная жизнь: муж калека, да к тому же алкоголик (запои), двое ребят, мать от получки до получки с палочкой, сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "интриги" да какие!! Работает она добросовестно, но опыта у нее не хватает, подготовки тоже, да и с временем худо. Типография, где печатается журнал обычный, может работать так же как в Москве без трудностей. Виолетта настаивает на немедленном увеличении тиража до 3 тыс. при нынешней себестоимости книги. Пока по первым двум номерам данные о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальные идут после выхода следующего номера в бесплатную рассылку. Она даже [illegible] на [illegible], который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у нее видел. Вырезки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она убеждает, что публикуют [illegible]. Здесь, конечно, обстановка другая чем в Москве (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня видимо интервью с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%, но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и всё дело.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98°. Целый день мокрый. Чужой город: небо весь день хмурое, а дождей никаких и, вообще, никогда не бывает. Представление — о них: годовые осадки, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Москвой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всём. Но своих прелестей много — хорошие колониальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по [illegible] бесподобно. Зелени мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а днём и ночью тараканы и зелёные [illegible] по номеру, которые [illegible] от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это тоже признак для акклиматизации: так им и надо.

Поздравь маму. Скажи, что все в порядке, что, мол, [illegible] и т. п. Телеграмму —

Для [illegible] международной информации Р.

CORREO AEREO



Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

ГРАБЕЖ НА МОРСКИХ ДОРОГАХ.

„У сильного всегда бессильный виноват" — к такому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые наказаны через необходимость расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад тихоокеанское побережье США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко возрос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои „убытки", под которыми они понимают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольное увеличение на 10% всех тарифов на транспортировку грузов в тихоокеанские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно сумму от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на беззащитные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и поныне. Монополии США рассчитывали, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей сколь-нибудь значительного флота, придётся покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упустили из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на увеличение грузовых тарифов, пострадавшие страны — Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили — намерены поднять ~~цену~~ расценку на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и принять меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, может случиться, что морские разбойники, когда не ждут, вернутся сраженными.

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
•••••

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.
Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

Кузнецова Ю.
межд информация

CORREO AEREO

Лима [illegible] марта 69.

Крепнет решимость перуанцев
защитить свою независимость

В давние времена в Испанских владениях существовал обычай, созывать в дни особой опасности, открытое собрание представителей всех сословий для принятия ~~[illegible]~~ чрезвычайных мер. Так было в периоды налетов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, стихийных бедствий. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в отместку за национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум к°" - этот древний обычай возрожден.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем портовом городе Перу - КАЛЬЯО, где присутствовавшие приняли текст ~~[illegible]~~ "Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу", в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьется экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече состоялось в ~~[illegible]~~ АРЕКИПЕ, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов проходил шумный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обращались к президенту с просьбой организовать всеобщую кампанию протеста против политики США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возможно, для отражения любой попытки военного или экономического нападения со стороны США.

Был открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении государству всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и главным образом меди и железа, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз большую чем долги национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой перешло в

CORREO AEREO



в 7.2 мил. долларов.

Открытое собрание жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заверило его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта стихийно собравшаяся демонстрация уже в 11 часу ночи прошла по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866 г., и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Могучий дух патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним врагам, вся надежда которых состоит в том, чтобы усыпить либо обмануть его

P.S. У меня всё О.К.

Деньги в Боготе так и не получил.
Положение [illegible] [illegible]. Бардак невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдет.
Стоит вопрос о том, что N 4 не выйдет в свое время
[illegible] [illegible] не хочет [illegible] ни одного слова.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ.' Это не
нормально, за четверть века сотрудничества должно быть
больше доверия. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
поэтому [illegible] от нас нужно.
И что [illegible] [illegible], не получив предоплату?

Ref dsp 4iLA 10124, 20 Jun 69



NIKOLAY SERGEEVICH LEONOV
Photo taken By DULINDEN-8
on 13 June 1969 at Lima Airport.

201-132134

201-132139

RUSSIA FINANCES GUERRILLA WARFARE IN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA

[Unsigned article; San Jose, Costa Rica; La Prensa Libre; Spanish, 19 June 1969]

Caracas (PI). There exists adequate proof that journalist Mario Renato Menendez Rodriguez, the former director of the journal Sucesos and of the new subversive publication Por Que?, has met with Soviet agents and received the 50,000 dollars directed toward the guerrilla warfare in Colombia and Venezuela which have been reported by the international press.

Menendez Rodriguez, who once more foiled the Venezuelan police, is being actively sought in Colombia, where he arrived following his interview with Venezuelan guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo. Two years previously, the same Menendez visited Colombia and went on to Venezuela, where he carried out another mission of economic aid from the Soviet Union to the armed groups in that country. Now it is known with firsthand proof that a third mission will be directed to Venezuelan territory, following the assumption of the presidency by Dr. Rafael Caldera.

The 50,000 dollars. It has been reported that the 50,000 dollars carried by the Mexican to the two countries in question were destined for the Colombian bandit leader "Tiro Fijo," but subsequent documentation proves that the sum delivered on this occasion by the Soviet Union is approximately 200,000 dollars, part of which is to go to the armed groups in Venezuela.

Another Communist agent, Colombian Feliciano Pachon Choconta, traveled to Bogota carrying 100,000 dollars of the 150,000 he had received in Mexico, and 60,000 of which he had delivered to a dealer in clandestine arms in Panama. Choconta was arrested at the "El Dorado" international airport, and the police confiscated the 100,000 dollars. The sum had been delivered to him by a member of the embassy of the Soviet Union.

"Communist unity" money. The activities of the Soviet embassies in Mexico and Colombia — especially with regard to Menendez Rodriguez — confirm the great falsehood that Russia and Castro are marching "apart" with respect to armed subversion, with the dictator of Cuba being depicted as the great seditious and interventionist chief and the Soviet Union as the great power opposed to Castro's methods.

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The money which Moscow has been supplying with criminal objectives against the democracies of Latin America, especially against Venezuela and Colombia, throws off the mask and shows that "communist unity" between Russia and Castro with respect to subversion is as clear as the impunity which the Soviet diplomatic missions enjoy in Bogota and Mexico City.

It is believed here that, with the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and Venezuala, Menendez Rodriguez and his accomplices, with a Russian embassy in Caracas, will not have to travel such a long way. Instead, the funds for the guerrilla groups of the two countries will flow from the Venezuelan capital itself.

For now, the third "economic" mission to Venezuela is "approved" and ready. With respect to the denial issued by Colombian police authorities with respect to the activities of Menendez Rodriguez in that country, it is known here that this involves instructions issued by the Presidency of the Republic for the purpose of minimizing the importance of the subversive activities, because of the fact that there is a Soviet mission in Bogota. The Colombian press has criticized the Lleras Restrepo government because of its existence.

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Rusia financia a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela

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CARACAS —(PI)— Hay suficientes pruebas de que el periodista Mario Renato Menéndez Rodríguez, ex-director de la revista "Sucesos" y de su nueva publicación subversiva "¿Por qué"?, se entrevistó con agentes soviéticos y recibió los 50 000 dólares de que ha informado la prensa internacional, dirigidos a las guerrillas de Colombia y Venezuela.

Menéndez Rodríguez, quien una vez más burló a la policía venezolana, es activamente solicitado en Colombia, adonde llegó después de su entrevista con el jefe guerrillero de Venezuela Douglas Bravo. Dos años antes el mismo Menéndez visitó Colombia, y pasó a Venezuela donde igualmente cumplió una misión de ayuda económica de la Unión Soviética a los grupos en armas en ese país. Ahora se sabe de acuerdo con elementos probatorios a la mano que una tercera misión será dirigida a territorio venezolano, después de la toma presidencial del doctor Rafael Caldera.

Los 50.000 dólares.— Se había informado que los 50 000 dólares llevados por el mejicano a los dos países en cuestión estaban destinados al jefe de bandoleros colombianos "Tiro Fijo", pero documentación posterior prueba que la suma entregada esta vez por la Unión Soviética se aproxima a los ... 200.000 dólares, parte de los cuales corresponde a los grupos en armas en Venezuela.

Otro agente comunista, el colombiano Feliciano Pachón Chocontá, había viajado a Bogotá llevando 100 000 dólares, de ... 150.000 que había recibido aquí en Méjico y de los cuales entregó 60.000 a un vendedor de armas clandestinas en Panamá. Chocontá fue detenido en el aeropuerto internacional de "El Dorado", y la policía le incautó los 100.000 dólares. La suma le había sido entregada por un miembro de la Embajada, de la Unión Soviética.

Dinero de "unidad comunista".— Las actividades de las Embajadas de la Unión Soviética en Méjico y Colombia, especialmente en cuanto a Menéndez Rodríguez se refiere, confirman la gran mentira de que Rusia y Castro marchaban "separados" en cuanto a la subversión armada, mostrando al dictador de Cuba como el gran jefe sedicioso e intervencionista y a la Unión Soviética como la gran potencia contraria a los procedimientos de Castro.

El dinero que viene suministrando Moscú con fines criminales contra las democracias de América Latina especialmente contra Venezuela y Colombia descorre el velo y muestra q' la "unidad comunista" entre Rusia y Castro en materia de subversión es tan clara como la impunidad de que vienen gozando las misiones diplomáticas soviéticas en Bogotá y Méjico.

Se considera aquí que la extensión de las relaciones de la Unión Soviética a Venezuela significa que Menéndez Rodríguez y sus cómplices de situarse una embajada rusa en Caracas no tendrán que viajar tan largo trecho sino que, desde la propia capital venezolana, fluirán los fondos para grupos guerrilleros de los dos países.

Por ahora, está "aprobada" y lista la tercera misión "económica" hacia el país venezolano. En cuanto al desmentido dado por las autoridades policiales de Colombia sobre lo actuado por Menéndez Rodríguez en ese país, se sabe aquí que se trata de instrucciones impartidas por la Presidencia de la República a fin de minimizar la importancia de las actividades subversivas, por el hecho de que en Bogotá existe una misión de la Unión Soviética respecto de la cual la prensa colombiana ha hecho críticas al gobierno de Lleras Restrepo.

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LA PRENSA LIBRE
SAN JOSE COSTA RICA
19 JUN 1969

13 JUN 1969

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
[illegible] SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letters

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HPLA-10070, 16 May 69

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, the NOVOSTI representative described in Reference. The letters were intercepted through liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with request for translations.

2. Attachment A was translated into Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3, while Attachment B was translated into English by our Headquarters translator. The latter attachment was subsequently translated from English to Spanish by Byron W. GUTRADT.

3. For the information of the WH Desk, we are forwarding (as Attachment C) a Spanish translation of Attachment A and an English translation of Attachment B.

for Clarke A. Stodola
Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachments: hw/
A,B,C as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/atts. A,B,
1 - C, WHD w/att. C

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: [illegible]
Signed: Donald E. [illegible]
R.O. #323 - Unit SB/C1/X
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

WH/C1 W/ATT
D W/O ATT.

CS COPY

2 ATT.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLA-10111 ✓

DATE
6 June 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ 201-132139

для Ю. Кузнецова
международная информация.

CORREO AEREO



Лима, 6 мая 1969.

Политическая карьера и воровство

В Лиме, в ресторанные часы "пик" в лучших местах обжорства, собираются группами бесчисленные профессиональные (политические) дельцы и просто бывшие околоправительственные приживалы, отброшенные сейчас от государственной кормушки военным правительством президента Веласко Альварадо. Эти "канцлеры в отставке" и пикейные жилеты на все лады критикуют нынешнее правительство, с каким-то прямо садистским наслаждением обсасывают действительные и воображаемые экономические трудности, которые, по их мнению, вот-вот придавят военную администрацию, и тогда вновь будет открыт путь к вакханалии казнокрадства и [illegible]. Все те, кто ныне больше других шумит о демократии, о народном представительстве, те, кто 7 месяцев назад стоял у власти в Перу, они более других повинны в тяжелом экономическом положении страны. Буржуазные политические партии Перу полностью обанкротились в глазах общественного мнения страны. Глумясь над самим понятием "демократия" политические дельцы этих партий грабили и разворовывали и без того скудную казну нации.

Рано пока судить о военной администрации президента Веласко Альварадо. Время, и весьма недалекое, покажет, сколь глубоко лемех реформ взрежет панцырь феодальных отношений и зависимости от США. Но сейчас факт остается фактом: то, о чем без умолку болтали профессиональные политики на протяжении многих лет, т.е. о необходимости национализации американской нефтяной компании "Интернэшнл петролеум", сделали военные через 6 дней после прихода к власти.

То, что было нормой при правительствах "представительной демократии", т.е. спекуляции, казнокрадство и злоупотребление служебным положением в корыстных целях — стало теперь законно квалифицироваться как преступление. Кампания по оздоровлению нравов, аресты и отдача под суд

ATTACHMENT A
HPLA-10111

Encl. SB

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жуликов и воров государственного масштаба, лучших всех проходимцев, для которых политическая карьера была синонимом самого бессовестного личного обогащения. О морали этих людей, брюзжащих в адрес военной администрации, говорит скандальный эпизод разыгравшийся на днях в Нью-Йорке.

Член Верховного Суда Перу (с 1967.) Феликс Портокарреро Олаве выехал 27 июня в Нью-Йорк, испросив 30-дневный отпуск для лечения. Однако вместо госпиталя, он махнул в Тель-Авив, где послом Перу занимает его брат Фелипе Портокарреро. В поездке его сопровождал не врач, а известный перуанский ювелир Эктор БАНЧЕРО. Купив на черном израильском рынке бриллиантов на сумму более 100 тыс. долларов эти блюстители законности с дипломатическими паспортами в карманах, пытались нелегально провезти их через США в Перу, где уже обеспечили их продажу за 170 тыс. долларов. В аэропорту Нью-Йорка пассажиры стали свидетелями тяжелой сцены, когда таможенник один за другим извлек из карманов вельможного контрабандиста 5 мешочков с бриллиантами.

Правительство Перу дало знать властям США, что они могут поступить с Портокарреро по законам их страны, ибо действия его не совместимы с дипломатическим статусом. Он уже исключен из Верховного Суда Перу и будет лишен права заниматься адвокатской практикой.

Случай с Портокарреро яркий, но, к несчастью для Перу, рядовое явление. Под следствием находится бывший министр финансов Сандро МАРИАТЕГИ, обвиненный в содействии крупным долларовым хищениям. Мелкая сошка не отставала: бывший депутат конгресса НАПОЛЕОН МАРТИНЕС МАКАЙРА ввез беспошлинно 10 автомашин из ФРГ, нажив немало денег на перепродаже. Более миллиона солей присвоил себе бывший начальник продовольственного отдела министерства здравоохранения Луис Бернанес, который от суда укрылся в Гвате-

CORREO AEREO

мальском посольстве, изображая из себя политического беженца.

Военное правительство Веласко Альварадо получило всенародную поддержку в конфликте с "Интернэшнл петролеум" и вызвало понимание в борьбе с коррупцией, насквозь изъевшей механизм буржуазной политической машины.

Н Леонов

P.S. Как в Москве все [illegible]. У меня вроде все О.К. Привет всем родным и знакомым.

Есть возможность заснять интервью с президентом для телевидения Москвы и записать его голос. Этого добивалась находившаяся здесь группа наших телевизионщиков во главе со Шрагиным В. У них не получилось из-за нехватки времени. А я смог бы за 5 минут отснять с помощью местных операторов. Стоимость — 100-150 долларов. Если Вы считаете возможным и нужным дай [illegible] [illegible], а если нет, то нет.

С большим уважением

Для Ю. Кузнецова
международная информация.

CORREO AEREO

Лима, 6 мая 1969.

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и воровство

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Н. Леонов

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С большим приветом

LIMA, 6 de MAYO de 1969

CARRERA POLITICA Y ROBO

EN LIMA, EN LAS HORAS NORMAL DE RESTAURANTES EN MEJORES ALTARES DE GOLTONERIA, SE REUNEN LOS GRUPOS PROFESIONALES Y POLITICOS, EX EMPLEADOS DEL GOBIERNO Y LOS ACOSTUMBRADOS ABANDOÑADOS DE LA ALIMENTACION DEL GOBIERNO, POR EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE VELASCO ALVARADO. ESTOS "CANCILLERES DESTITUIDOS" CON CHAQUETAS DE PIQUE POR TODOS LADOS ESTAN CRITICANDO AL GOBIERNO ACTUAL, CON MUCHA DELICIA SADICOS ESTAN CHUPANDOS DE FANTASIA IMAGINANDOSE DE GRANDES DIFICULTADES ECONOMICAS, LOS CUALES, SEGUN OPINIAN ELLOS, ESTAN APRETANDO LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, Y ENTONCES SERA DE NUEVO ABIERTO EL CAMINO BACANAL, DILAPIDACION Y SAQUEO. TODOS AQUELLOS, QUIENES ACTUALMENTE HACEN MAS RUIDO SOBRE LA DEMOCRACIA Y REPRESENTACION DEL PUEBLO, 7 MESES ATRAS, LOS MILITARES LLEGARON AL PODER EN PERU ELLOS MAS QUE LOS OTROS SON INOCENTES EN ESTA DIFICIL SITUACION ECONOMICA DEL PAIS. PARTIDOS DEMOCRATICOS-BURQUESES DEL PERU TOTALMENTE ESTAN EN QUIEBRA EN VISTA DE LA OPINION PUBLICO DEL PAIS. BURLANDE SOBRE LA NOCION "DEMOCRACIA" NEGOCIADORES POLITICOS SAQUEABAN Y ROBABAN TODO LA POBRESA DE LA CAJA DE LA VIDA.

ES TODAVIA TEMPRANO PARA JUZGAR LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR DEL PRESIDENTE ALVARADO TIEMPO, EN LA PRIMAVERA, VEREMOS QUE PROFUNDIDAD REJA DE REFORMAS EXCAVARA EL CORAZON FEODAL DE LAS RELACIONES Y DEPENDENCIAS DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. POR EL MOMENTO HECHO SE QUEDA HECHO: ES DECIR, DE QUE SIN CESAR DE HABLAR LOS POLITICOS PROFOSIONALES DURANTE LARGOS AÑOS HABLABAN SOBRE LA NACIONALISACION DEL PETROLEO DE LA COMPANIA AMERICANA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM", PERO LOS MILITARES LO HAN HECHO DURANTE 68 DIAS DESPUES DE LLEGAR AL PODER DE GOBERNAR.

EN LOS TIEMPOS PASADOS "REPRESENTACION DEMOCRATICA, E DE LA DEMOCRACIA" DE LOS GOBIERNOS FUERON DILAPIDACION Y ABUSO DE AUTORIDAD EN PROVECHO PERSONAL-AHORA LEGALMENTE ESTA CALIFICADO COMO CRIMEN. LA COMPANIA DE MEDIDAS, O SALUBRIDAD DE LAS COSTUMBRES, O MORALIDAD, ARRESTOS Y ENTREGA AL JUICIO LADRONES Y ESTAFADORES EN GRAN ESCALA DEL GOBIERNO SE ASUSTA A TODOS BRIBONES, PARA CUALES LA CARRERA POLITICA ERA SINONOMA, O COMO SINONIMO. LA MORAL DE ESTA GENTE, REFUNFUNANDO EN DIRECCION DE LA ADMINISTRACION MILITAR, SEÑALA, O DEMUESTRA DE UN EPISODIO ESCANDALOSO DESENDADENADO EN ESTOS DIAS EN NUEVA YORK. MIEMBRE DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO EN PERU DESDE 1967, FELIX PORTOCARRERO OLAVE PARTIO 27 DE ABRIL A NUEVA YORK, PEDIENDO PERMISO POR 30 DIAS PARA CURARSE. SIN EMBARGO, EN LUGAR DE IR AL HOSPITAL, EL PARTIO A TEL AVIV, EN DONDE SU HERMANO FELIPE PORTOCARRERO OCUPA CARGO DEL EMBAJODOR. EN SU VIAJE EN LUGAR DE SER ACOMPAÑADO POR EL MEDICO, FUE ACOMPANADO POR EL CONOCIDO JOYERO PERUANO HECTOR BANCHERO. COMPRANDO EN EL MERCADO NEGRO ISRAELITA LOS BRILLANTES POR MAS DE CIEN MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS, ESTE GUARDIAN DEL ORDEN PUBLICO CON PASAPORTE DIPLOMATICO EN SU BOLSILLO, LLEVADA LOS BRILLANTES ILEGALMENTE ATRAVES DE USA AL PERU, EN DONDE TENIA GARANTIZADO Y ASEGURADO VENDERLOS POR UN VALOR DE 170 MIL DOLLARES AMERICANOS. EN EL AEROPUERTO DE LOS ESTADO UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA LOS PASAJEROS FUERON TESTIGOS DE LA ESCENA E ESCANDALOSA Y PENOZA, CUANDO LOS ADUANERO UNO POR UNO EL EXTRAJERON DE BOLSILLOS AL ALTO DIGNATARIO DEL CONTRABANDO 5 SAQUITOS DE BRILLANTES.

EL GOBIERNO DEL PERU HA DADO CONOCER AL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTE AMERICA, QUE LOS AMERICANOS PUEDEN APLICAR LAS LAYES DE SU PAIS A PORTOCARRERO PORQUE EL EFECTO, O ACCION NO RESPONDEN AL ESTATUTO DIPLAMATICO. EL, YA ESTA EXPULSADO DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DEL PERU Y SERA RETIRADO DEL DERECHO DE PRACTICAR LA CARRERA DE ABOGACIA. ACONTECIMIENTO DE PORTOCARRERO ____________________, NO, DESGRACIADAMENTE EL FENOMENO ES ORDINARIO PARA EL PERU. BAJO DE LA INSTRUCCION JUDICIAL ESTA ES EX MINISTRO DE FINANZAS SANDRO MARIATEQUI, ACUSADO DE LA, O CON LA COOPERACION DE GRAN ROBO DE DOLLARES. EL CAÑON PEQUEÑO NO SE QUEDO ATRAS: EL EX DIPUTADO DEL CONGRESO NAPOLEON MARTINEZ MACAYRA IMPORTO SIN DERECHOS DE ADUANA 10 AUTOS DE ____________________, GANANDO MUCH PLATA DE REVENTA. MAS DE UN MILLON DE SOLES USURPO EX JEFE DE ABASTECIMIENTO DE ALIMENTACION DEL MINISTERIO DE LA SALUD PUBLICA LUIS BERNALES, CUAL POR EL MIEDO SE ASILO EN LA EMBAJADA DE GUATEMALA, COMO REFUGIADO POLITICO.

EL GOBIERNO MILITAR DE VELASCO ALVARADO HA RECIBIDO EL APOYO DEL PUEBLO EN EL CONFLICTO CON LA "INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY" Y ENCONTRARIA ENTENDIMIENTO, O COMPRENCION LUCHANDO CONTRA LA CORRUPCION, DE PARTE A PARTE ROER, O CORROER EL MECANISMO DE LA MAQUINA POLITICA PERUANA.

P.S.
ME PARECE QUE TENGO TODO O.K.

TENGO POSIBILIDAD DE FOTOGRAFIAR, O RETRATAR UNA ENTREVISTA CON EL PRESIDENTE PARA LA TELEVISION DE MOSCU Y INSCRIBIR SU VOZ. EL GRUPO DE NUESTROS TELEVISORES HAN TRATADO DE CONSEGUIR ESTA POSIBILIDAD CUANDO ELLOS ESTABAN AQUI CON EL JEFE SCHRATIN V. ELLOS NO LO HAN PUDIERON HACER POR FALTA DE TIEMPO. YO LE PODRIA HACER EN 5 MINUTOS. EL PRECIO ES DE 100 a 150 DOLLARES. SI HUBIERA POSIBILIDAD Y NECESARIO ______
TELEGRAMA, Y SI NO, ______
CON MUCHOS SALUDOS.

33

[illegible] of the Peruvian [illegible]

Latin-American public intensively has been [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] with [illegible] over the [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] nation [illegible] of Latin America as 'gorillas' at any time ready to come with assistance of the American Monopolies interests. The Peruvian generals and officers turned into energetic courteous diplomats, seeing their countrys future only in safeguarding of its economic and political independence. The Military Government shapes and takes ~~necessary~~ steps which carry wise and necessary for the country characteristics under difficult economic situation created by sever cuts in influx of foreign credits due to the conflict with the American oil company and the Peruvian wealthy class, preferring at the present situation to hold their capital, or for safety reason, to transfer it abroad.

Few years ago in sparsely populated area of Peru the construction of ironic famo luxurious highway was undertaken. It was one of those constructions not for (accomplishments) of countrys real needs, but it was dictated only by self-satisfaction of commericial leaders wishing at any cost that their

ATTACHMENT B
HPLA-10111

Chief, SB

H/Watt. #2 t. HPLA-10111 CS COPY 201-132139 name is written in history books. At the time when the population had [illegible], distress because of lack of good [illegible] in irrigation system and shortage of electric power, the construction of the superhighway became a haemorrhage wound in the country's economy. American companies had sucked 9 million soles for 1 mile of road from the skinny Peruvian treasury for the building and supervising at the time when average cost of highway did not exceed 1-2 million soles (1 dollar = 43 soles). maintaining USA Fragile technical personnel Peruvians were bearing huge charges. However, the patience got exhausted when the company - contractor presented an additional bill in amount of 130 million soles besides the fantastic estimate.

The Finance Minister, general ("Hanibal Mesa Quadra") announced that supervision over works in the future will be carried out by the Peruvian engineers, that construction will be re-examined into more convenient direction of the route and that necessary steps were taken to use construction as means of contractors enrichment.

Recently the Government decided to nationalize land and live-stock belonging to the American company "("Sierra de Pasco Corporation. Over 96,000 hectares of land and tens of thousands of cattle went under control of the Government. Naturally, the nationalization was accomplished with condition to pay off a considerable sum as a compensation, however, it is necessary to say that Americans are not accustomed to such treatment in Peru.

Even more they are worried by a unclear future. Hints by Peruvian generals that in the future the Government will develop state-owned sector in mining industry as a counterbalance vis-a-vis American capitals, and that it intends little by little to force out foreigners from banking system, etc, chills and puts in fever USA businessmen because their investments in Peru exceed 600 million dollars and they never before experienced such a disturbing time?

P.S. Everything is OK. Regards to all. On the 20th [illegible] I'm leaving for Chili, ~~After the arrival of the Embassy it became more gay,~~ if there are no unencountered unexpected difficulties. Life became more joyous after the arrival of the Embassy. (Kitten?), I ask you to phone (Lera?) and tell her literally the following: "The hero forgot your letter in Moscow and after the arrival to Mexico mixed up everything. He gave all your [illegible] and Voskoboynikova reports to Alla and she does not know what to do with them. Take steps you consider necessary. The Vorobyukhins, who came from Mexico to Lima told me about this." To comfort her, tell that books in her line I will collect: I have already 5 good (researchers/or explorations) concerning Peru and a choice of [illegible] concerning agrarian reform.

Not a word from you. I am sending this as to the other world. Answer at least a few words, fear overcomes me.

Sr. Jachaturov K.A
Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin Nº4
Moscu
Urrs

Цицину
инд. Кацарнадзе.

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима. 13 мая 1969.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

Латиноамериканская общественность пристально следит за развитием событий в Перу, где руководство вооруженных сил, взявшее контроль над страной, серьезно поколебало традиционное представление о латиноамериканских военных, как о "гориллах", готовых в любое время придти на выручку интересам американских монополий. Перуанские генералы и офицеры превратились в энергичных администраторов, умелых дипломатов и прежде всего в политиков, которые видят будущее своей страны только в защите её экономической и политической независимости. В условиях тяжелой экономической обстановки в Перу, вызванной резким сокращением притока иностранных кредитов из-за конфликта с американской нефтяной компанией и трусостью имущих классов Перу, предпочитающих в нынешней обстановке придерживать капиталы или вывозить их ради сохранности за границу, военное правительство формулирует и принимает меры, которые носят разумный и нужный стране характер.

Несколько лет назад в Перу было предпринято строительство роскошного шоссе по малонаселенным районам тропической сельвы. Это было одно из тех строительств, которые не вызываются насущными экономическими требованиями страны, а продиктованы лишь тщеславием политических руководителей, желающих любой ценой ~~[illegible]~~ попасть в историю. В то время как население страдало от безработицы, отсутствия средств транспорта, от катастрофической нехватки жилищ, строительство супершоссе превратилось в кровоточащую рану в экономике страны. Строившие и осуществлявшие контроль над строительством американские

компании драли с тощей перуанской казны по 9 млн. солей за 1 км. дороги, в то время как обычная стоимость дорожного строительства не превышает 1-2 млн. солей (1 доллар=43 сол.) Огромные расходы несли перуанцы по содержанию технического персонала США. Однако чаша терпения лопнула, когда компания-подрядчик потребовала к оплате счета ещё на сумму в 100 млн. солей сверх бюджета и без того фантастического.

Министр транспорта генерал Анибаль Меса Куадра заявил, что впредь контроль над работами будут осуществлять перуанские инженеры, что строительство будет переориентировано в более выгодном направлении трассы и что будет положен конец использованию стройки в качестве орудия обогащения подрядчиков.

На днях правительством было принято решение о национализации земель и скота, принадлежавших американской горнорудной компании "Серро де Паско Корпорэйшн". Более 96 тс. га земли и десятки тыс. голов скота перешли под контроль правительства. Правда, национализация была совершена при условии выплаты солидной компенсации, но при всем этом нельзя не признать, что к такому обращению с ними в Перу американцы не привыкли.

Ещё больше их беспокоит "железное" будущее. Намеки перуанских генералов на то, что впредь правительство

CORREO AEREO

будет развивать государственный сектор в горнорудной промышленности в качестве противовеса американским капиталам, что оно намерено мало-помалу вытеснить иностранцев из банковской системы и т.д. бросают в жар и холод бизнесменов США, чьи вклады в Перу превышающие 600 млн. долларов, никогда еще не переживали здесь дней "смутного времени."

Иванов.

P.S. Все O.K. Привет всем. Числа 20 еду в Чили, если не возникнут непредвиденные трудности. По уходе посольство ещё стало веселее.

Карен, прошу тебя позвони Леде и скажи ей текстуально следующее:

"Богатырев забрал твое письмо в Москве и по приезде в Мексику все прочитал. Отдал все ~~[illegible]~~ твои шмотки и просьбы Воскобойниковой Алле, которая не знает, что с ними делать. Принимай меры, которые сочтешь нужными. Обо этом мне сказали Корнюхины, приехавшие из Мексики в Лиму". Скажи ей в утешение, что мне по её теме я ей подберу: уже есть 5 хороших исследований по Перу и текст закона об аграрной реформе.

От Васи ни слуха, ни духа. Посылаю как на тот свет. Хоть письмишко в ответ, а то страх одолевает.

[illegible]
нач. [illegible].

CORREO AEREO

г. Лима, 13 мая 1969.

НАЦИОНАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ШАГИ ПЕРУАНСКОГО ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВА.

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Ещё больше их беспокоит "неясное" будущее. Намёки перуанских генералов на то, что впредь правительство

будут развивать государственный сектор в горнорудной промышленности в качестве противовеса американским капиталам, что оно намерено мало-помалу вытеснить иностранцев из банковской системы и т.д. бросают в жар и холод бизнесменов США, чьи вклады в Перу превышающие 600 млн. долларов, никогда еще не переживали здесь дней "смутного времени."

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REDTOP AEA[illegible]

REF A. BOGOTA 298[illegible] (IN [illegible])

B. BOGOTA 2984 (IN [illegible])

1. STATION PLACEMENT [illegible] GREGORIAN APPEARED 24 MAY EL TIEMPO [illegible] EXPULSA A UN ESPIA SOVIETICO [illegible] GREGORIAN DECLINED REVEAL [illegible] WHEN DETAINED VENEZUELA AND ASK[illegible] CONSUL. [illegible] ALSO IDENTIFIED [illegible] DIRECTOR[illegible] SOVIET DIPLOMAT [illegible].

2. FORWARDING CLIP FOR [illegible] FROM REF A AND B.

3. FILE [illegible] AND [illegible]

S E C R E T

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DIRECTOR INFO: LIMA, MEXICO CITY, ~~SANTIAGO~~, CARACAS

24 MAY 69 IN 65682

REDTOP AEASSAULT

4

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99095 (SENT LIMA, MEXICO CITY)

B. LIMA 4775 (IN 62617) (SEND SANTIAGO)

C. BOGOTA 2114 (IN 47944)

2P

1. STATION PLACED ARTICALS "LA REPUBLICA" AND "EL SIGLO" 17 MAY WHICH IDENTIFY SOVIET NIKOLAY LEONOV AS DIPLOMAT WHO PASSED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PLUS US DALLARS TO COLOMBIAN FELICIANO PACHON IN MEXICO CITY IN APRIL 1968. PACHON ARRESTED ENTERING COLOMBIA WITH FUNDS. ARTICLES TIE LEONOV TO PACHON BY REVEALING THAT SCRAP OF PAPER IN POSSESSION PACHON WHEN CAPTURED HAD WRITTEN NOTATION OF "AVENIDA MAZATLAN." LEONOV OFFICE ADDRESS WHILE PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO REVEALED AS SAME "AVENIDA MAZATLAN, NO. 206." FACT THAT LEONOV RECALLED TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARREST PACHON ALSO CITED AS CONFIRMING EVIDENCE.

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

2. LEONOV IDENTIFIED AS KGB FORMERLY INVOLVED SUPPORT L.A. GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS, WHO ON 23 APRIL TRANSITED BOGOTA WHERE HE MET IN AIRPORT WITH SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CLANDESTINE

AN [illegible]
AB X
~~IN~~
PS [illegible]
BX 9
[illegible]
FI

74-120-115

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201-132139
24 May 69

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INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MAY 69 CITE BOGOTA 2281 SECRET

APPARAT. INTERPOL SOURCES QUOTED AS SAYING LEONOV SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT NEW GUERRILLA FRONTS PANAMA-COSTA RICA BORDER, VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND URBAN TERRORISTS PUERTO RICO.

3. FORWARDING CLIPS. SUGGEST REPLAY CONTAIN DETAILES AND GUIDANCE PER REF C. DEFER HEADQUARTERS TO FORWARD CLIPS ADDITIONAL STATION.

4. FILE: 74-120-115/1 AND 201-132139.

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ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE. VR. E1/BG, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

787

SECRET 201845Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4775 20 MAY 69 IN 62617

SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR, BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), KNOWN KGB, SUB-DIRECTOR OF NOVOSTI FOR LATIN AMERICA, TRAVELED FROM LIMA TO SANTIAGO VIA AIR FRANCE 19 MAY 1969.

2. SUGGEST FUDUEL-5 DETERMINE IF LEONOV HAS FURTHER TRAVEL RESERVATION FROM SANTIAGO. LEONOV MAY BE RETURNING LIMA AFTER TDY SANTIAGO. IF SO PLEASE CABLE TRAVEL DATA.

3. FILE: 201-132139

SECRET

AN	CRP
AB	X
~~IM~~	
~~PS~~	
~~EX~~	
~~DEFERRED~~	
FI	

CS COPY

201-132139
20 May 69

SECRET

C, SB

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	XXX
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima CAS

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK - Forwarding of Intercepted Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-132139

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment A are copies of two letters written by Nikolay LEONOV, a Soviet journalist with "NOVOSTI" who is currently in Lima on an extended TDY. The letters were intercepted and reproduced by liaison (DUBRIDE) and passed to the Station with a request for a Spanish translation.

2. The letters were translated for the Station from Russian to Spanish by DUMAGENTA-3. Following the correction of some obvious Spanish grammatical erros by DUMAGENTA-3 and a re-typing for security reasons, the translation was passed to DUBRIDE. A copy of the Spanish translation (marked as Attachment B) is attached for the information of the Desk. The letters give the appearance of being pure propaganda and the information contained therein may well appear in the Soviet press.

3. We assume that the Attachment will be translated from Russian to English and we would appreciate a copy of the English translation being forwarded to the Station.

Samuel K. CASTELON

CAS:mes

Attachment: h/w
as stated

Distribution:
2 - C, SB w/att. A
1 - C, WH w/att. B
1

CS COPY

2 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPLA 10070 ~~HDLA-10070~~	16 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139 ~~201 LEONOV~~

ATTACHMENT A
(HPLA-10070)

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú
•••••

Sr. JACHATUROV K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti
Plaza Pushkin 4
MOSCU
URSS

Mookba,ATT,K.A.Xayatypoby

Remite: N.Leonov,Lima Perú
H."Savoy"525

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L/W Att 1 TO ~~[illegible]~~ HPLA-10070

201-132139

COBREO AEREO



Лима 2.5.1969 г.

Карен! Кроме моих приветов, в которых ты мало нуждаешься, хочу тебе сообщить следующее: все поручения, касающиеся бюро, я выполнил по мере сил моих. Виолетта страдает избытком усердия по отношению к нашим людям, поэтому я её предупредил, чтобы эта черта характера не затрагивала бы и не уменьшала интересы АПН. А наш брат — королевский хан. Удивляюсь как у Смирнова С.Р. хватило такту оставить Виолетту в покое. У неё ужасная ситуация: муж калека, да к тому же злостный (запой), двое ребят, живут от получки до получки с [illegible], сама разрывается между хозяйством и работой, а тут ещё "шеф" до кучи!! Работает она добросовестно, но опыта у неё нехватает, подготовки тоже, да и с временем худо. Типография, что печатает журнал отличная, может работать так же как в Москве без трудностей. Виолетта настаивает на немедленном увеличении тиража до 3 тыс. при нынешней себестоимости журнала. Пока по первым двум номерам данные о продаже свидетельствуют, что расходится 50%. Остальные идут после выхода очередного номера в бесплатную рассылку. Она даже жаловалась на Арисалу, который продавал в Перу свой журнал по несколько более низкой цене. Этот вопрос они решили между собой.

Я у неё видел вырезки из газет с нашими материалами: их немного, но они есть, и она утверждает, что публикаций много тебе. Здесь, конечно, обстановка лучше чем в Москве (в прессе) и надо лавировать между соперничающими газетами.

У меня видимо выйдет интервью с президентом. Ответы на вопросы в письменной форме — гарантия на 100%. Но я хочу всё-таки лично. Ну вот, собственно, и все дела.

Обстановка в целом нормальная. Только ужасная влажность: 98°. Целый день парит. Чудной город: небо весь день хмурое, а дождей никогда и, говорят, никогда не бывает. Представляешь — 0 мм. годовых осадков, а сырость до кишок пробирает. По сравнению с Мексикой это конечно глубокая провинция и, видно, это во всем. Но своих прелестей много — хороши колониальные постройки. О провинции говорить нечего — я пока не видел, но говорят по контрасту бесподобные. Бумаги мало как в Москве. Живу в отеле за 8 долларов, а весь день и ночь тараканы и [illegible] [illegible] на полу, которые никуда [illegible] от [illegible]. Одно радует, что это очень страшно для [illegible]: так им и надо.

Поклоны маме. Скажи что все в порядке, что, мол, [illegible]

Для
журнала
Международной
информации

Р.

CORREO AEREO



Лима 2 мая 1969 г.

Грабеж НА МОРСКИХ ДОРОГАХ

«У сильного всегда бессильный виноват» — к такому печальному выводу ещё раз пришли латиноамериканцы, которые поставлены перед необходимостью расплачиваться за дела, к которым они не имеют никакого отношения. Некоторое время тому назад Атлантическое побережье США охватила забастовка докеров, продолжавшаяся почти 2 месяца. В результате нарушения погрузочно-разгрузочных работ, резко возрос простой кораблей и покатилась вниз кривая доходов пароходных компаний. Судовладельцы, вместо того чтобы способствовать скорейшему разрешению этого трудового конфликта, решили встать на путь морского грабежа, чтобы компенсировать свои «убытки», под которыми они понимают недополученную прибыль. С этой целью компании США ввели с 12 марта с.г. произвольно увеличенные на 10% новые тарифы на транспортировку грузов в тихоокеанские порты Латинской Америки.

Этот пиратский шаг означает, что латиноамериканские страны теперь будут терять ежегодно сумму от 60 до 80 миллионов долларов, расплачиваясь за внутренние неурядицы в США. В старое время морские разбойники нападали только на беззащитные суда. Эти повадки сохранились и ныне. Монополии США рассчитывают, что Латинской Америке, не имеющей своего сколько-нибудь значительного флота, придётся покорно вывернуть карманы. Но эти расчеты упускают из виду одно обстоятельство, что теперь в латиноамериканских странах с каждым днем растет решимость к сопротивлению экономическому диктату США.

В ответ на увеличение грузовых тарифов, пострадавшие страны — Перу, Эквадор, Колумбия и Чили — намерены поднять ~~цены~~ расценки на портовое обслуживание кораблей компаний США и принять меры по всемерному использованию своих собственных судов для морских перевозок. Учитывая большую конкуренцию и возможность фрахта кораблей других стран для перевозки латиноамериканских товаров, может вполне случиться, что морские разбойники пойдя по шерсть, вернутся стриженными.

201-13 2129

Correos y Telecomunicaciones
del Perú

Carta Certificada Nº 220936

DESTINATARIO: Sr. Jachaturov K.A.

Agencia Prensa Novosti, Plaza Pushkin, 4

MOSCU URSS.
Mockba,

REMITENTE: L. Neovov, Lima Perú,
Hotel Savoy 525.

CS COPY

[illegible] — HPLA-10025

Для Кузнецова Ю.
межд. информация



CORREO AEREO

Пис. МАЛСУ

Крепнет решимость перуанцев защитить свою независимость

В трудные времена в Латинской Америке существовал обычай, созывать в дни особой опасности, открытые собрания представителей всех сословий для принятия ~~[illegible]~~ ответственных решений. Так было в период налётов пиратов, крупных внутренних потрясений, освободительных [illegible]. Сейчас в связи с угрозой экономической интервенции в Перу в ответ на национализацию имущества американской нефтяной компании «Интернэшнл петролеум К°» — этот древний обычай возрождён.

Не так давно такое собрание состоялось в крупнейшем портовом городе Перу — КАЛЬЯО, где присутствовавшие приняли текст ~~[illegible]~~ «Декларации о провозглашении экономической независимости Перу», в которой указывается, что народ Перу не отступит от своих справедливых требований и добьётся экономической свободы, так же, как он завоевал свободу политическую.

Вчера, всенародное вече собралось в ~~[illegible]~~ АРЕКИПЕ, втором по величине городе страны. Около 4 часов происходил публичный общественный суд над империалистической политикой США. Давно Арекипа не слышала таких страстных, патриотических речей. Ораторы обращались к правительству с просьбой отказаться выплачивать компании [illegible] угрозы помощи США, вывести народ на площади и улицы, вооружить его, если это возникнет, для отражения любой попытки военного или экономического нажима со стороны США.

Был открыто поставлен вопрос о возвращении государству всех без исключения естественных богатств страны и особенно стратегических меди и свинца, которые находятся в руках американских компаний. Кстати, следует отметить, что капиталовложения США в горнорудную промышленность составляют сумму в 6-7 раз более крупную чем доходы национализированной нефтяной компании, имущество которой передано в

CORREO AEREO

в 7.2 млн. долларов.

Открытое собрание жителей города Арекипы в послании президенту страны заверило его в поддержке националистической политики правительства. После окончания акта стихийно собравшиеся демонстранты уже в 11 часу ночи прошли по главным улицам города под набатный звон исторического колокола, созывавшего в свое время людей для отражения испанской агрессии в 1866, и который был специально привезен на этот случай в Арекипу.

Могучий дух патриотизма перуанского народа вырвался наружу. Совладать с ним не под силу ни внешним, ни внутренним ~~[illegible]~~ врагам, вся надежда которых сводится к тому, чтобы усыпить либо обмануть его.

P.S. Лично для С.К.

Деньги в Боготе так и не получил.
Положение просто отчаянное. Бюджет невыносимый.
Если так будет и дальше, то работа не пойдет.
Стоит вопрос о том, что N 4 не выйдет в свое время
полностью. Типография не хочет делать под честное слово.
Она требует 50% задатка до начала работ. Что же
можно, [illegible] сотрудничество дать без
большого доверия. Она все равно колеблется,
поэтому аккуратность ох как нужна.
И что скажут читатели, не получив предыдущего?

SECRET 132104Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4745

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, REPLANT   13 May 69 IN 57530 3/0

INTEL

SUPDATA DULINDEN SOURCE DULINDEN-8 WHO OBTAINED INFORMATION FROM VIOLETA CALVARCEL. CITATION PARA 2 IS FROM HPL-4987, NOT USED AS REFERENCE BECAUSE OF LIMITED DISTRIBUTION. INDEX BOGODOVOV, SERGEYEVICH. FILE: 58-8-1.

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[illegible]

SECRET

13 MAY 69

58-8-17

201-132139

14-00000

COUNTRY: PERU/USSR

DOI : 12 MAY 1969

SUBJECT: PRE: COMMENTS BY VIOLETA CARNERO HOIE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE, REGARDING THE VISIT TO PERU OF ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET GEOLOGIST

ACQ : PERU, LIMA (13 MAY 1969) FIELD NO. HPL-4939

SOURCE : A MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU. SOURCE HAS BEEN REPORTING FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR AND HIS INFORMATION AT TIMES HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES.

1. VIOLETA CARNERO HOIE DE VALCARCEL, NOVOSTI REPRESENTATIVE ZZ IN PERU AND LONG-TIME MEMBER OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY [illegible] USSR OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET), SAID THAT ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, SOVIET occ. GEOLOGIST WHO ARRIVED IN A. PERU LIMA ON 7 MAY, IS MAINTAINING CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND ENERGY. SHE SAID BOGODOVOV HAS COME WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO STUDY AND DETERMINE IN WHAT MANNER THE SOVIETS MIGHT ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU IN EXPLOITING AND ADMINISTERING THE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

14-00000

IN -57538

TDCS -314/07080-69

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COPPER INDUSTRY IF THE INDUSTRY WERE UNDER STATE CONTROL. SHE SAID HIS PRESENCE IN PERU IS VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT SHE WAS INTRODUCED TO HIM BY NOKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, A or NOVOSTI JOURNALIST ~~CURRENTLY VISITING PERU.~~

2. (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, ALEXEI BOGODOVOV, GEOLOGIST AND PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD TECTONIC MAP COMMITTEE, IS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF GEOLOGY WHICH IS BEING HELD IN PERU. ANOTHER SOURCE, USUALLY RELIABLE, HAS REPORTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU PLANS TO NATIONALIZE THE COPPER INDUSTRY IF IT RECEIVES ASSURANCE OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SOURCE ALSO CITED GENERAL JORGE FERNANDEZ MALDONADO SOLARI, MINISTER OF ENERGY AND MINES, AS THE FURTHEST LEFT MEMBER OF THE CABINET.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USAID USIS CINCSO CINCLANT.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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S E C R E T 131715Z MAY 69 CITE LIMA 4733 13 MAY IN 57264

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REF: BOGOTA 2193 (456480)

1. LEONOV EXPECTED REMAIN LIMA APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS. DO NOT ANTICIPATE DEPARTURE PRIOR JUNE 69.

2. FILE: 74-120-115/1, 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AH	RRP
AB	X

CK

201-132139
13 May 69

SECRET

H. Mulloy
WH/3/C
1535
9 May 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

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4		8	

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F: WH 8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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0921 35Z MAY 69

CITE DIRECTOR 0070[illegible]

PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY LIMA

REF: BOGOTA 2157 (IN 53837)*

1. APPROVE USE MAZATLAN ADDRESS.

2. FILE 201-841194.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref requested approval to surface Mexico City address of N.S. Leonov who known RIS.

C/WH/3/P Conolly

SB/X/WH D Davis

SB/PO Thomas F. Thiele

SB/CI/O F Walters

C/WH/1 Charles M Bauerd

C/WH/CA ✓

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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COPY NO.

201-132139

14-00000

DISPATCH | SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: JMTEAK
Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Guatemala City, see Paragraph 6.

1. Attached for Mexico City and Guatemala City Stations is a Guatemalan Personality Report (GPR) on Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (201-042366). The GPR covers his activities up to 25 March 1968. In preparing this GPR, we have noticed a few items which addressees may wish to comment on and, if possible, provide Headquarters with information, as it may become available, to supplement the available information on CARDOZA.

2. We would appreciate Station Mexico City furnishing additional information on CARDOZA's legal status in Mexico. From subsequent immigration material (on CARDOZA or his wife), please determine if CARDOZA ever informed the Mexican authorities of his departure from Mexico following his obtaining political asylum there on 22 June 1954? Note he left Mexico clandestinely in September 1961 destined for Guatemala. Further, the Mexican Immigration Department, as of August 1967, had no intention of granting him any immigration documents.

3. Following are some questions concerning CARDOZA's health. In addition to his heart ailment, does he also have (or did have) liver trouble? This is raised because [illegible] reported in [illegible], CS-311/10746-67, dated 18 October 1967, that CARDOZA, while in the USSR, was to receive medical treatment for a liver ailment according to statements made by Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT. On the other hand, [illegible] reported that CARDOZA was traveling to the USSR and would remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart. As for the number and the significance of CARDOZA's heart attacks, the following questions are raised: Has his health affected his attitude and motivation towards his involvement and dedication in PGT activities? Will any medical assistance remedy or control his problem? What exactly is his illness? Who are the doctors in Mexico and the USSR who are treating CARDOZA?

4. Following are questions concerning CARDOZA's attitudes towards his family which may have a bearing on his motivation.

CONTINUED...

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-160430
201-821311
201-828917

Leonor
P.5
At.

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HGGW-4744

DATE: 6 May 69

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-042366

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/2/CI	M. Osborne	bjr 201-135139	4438

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/G		
WH/1		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/2		John C. Murray

What are his feelings toward his wife and toward his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ? What are his attitudes and aspirations for his children?

5. In connection with his financial status, we would appreciate learning if the PGT is still supporting and paying him a salary? If so, please furnish details concerning the salary.

6. For Guatemala City: Headquarters defers to Guatemala City as to whether Mexico City may query liaison.

Milton C. SANFRELLA

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
2 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att
2 - COS, Mexico City, w/att

22 April 1969

Guatemalan Personality Report (GPR)

201-023466

NAME: Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar (2)

ALIASES:
1. Julian was his alias when he was secretary of the Buro in 1956 in Mexico City (7).
2. Robert ROCA was his pseudonym when, in May 1961, he was chief of the Department committee (10).
3. Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (variations: Roberto RODRIGUEZ, Roberto URGUETA Rodriguez) was the name which appeared on documents which he used for his 1967 travel to Havana and to the USSR (14).
4. ANITA was his cover name which he used in his correspondence between Cuba, Mexico and Guatemala as of 13 June 1962 (18).
5. Claudio AVILA Godoy was the name on documents which he used for his 30 September 1961 trip to the USSR (13).
6. MARIO is his PGT alias in Mexico as of 6 September 1968 (15).
7. CHAYO is his PGT alias in Guatemala as of 6 September 1968 (15).

DPOB: 1922 in Guatemala (2).

CITIZENSHIP: Guatemala (2).

OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYMENT: Printer (2, 20).

By letter on 21 October 1955, he provided the Mexican Immigration Department with reasons and information on his prospective employment at Impresiones Moderna, S.A., a publishing house in Mexico City. The Immigration Department granted him authorization to work for Impresiones Moderna, S.A. on 10 March 1955 provided that within 60 days from 10 March 1955 he offer proof that he had paid to the cashier of the Immigration Department the fee provided in Article 1, Paragraph (F) of the Immigration Taxes Act (20).

ADDRESS(ES):

Current -

July 1955 - 15 Avenida and 14 Calle No. 14-27, Guatemala City (20).

September 1954 - Pension Zalamel, at Jose Maria Iglesias and Edison, Mexico City, Mexico (20).

1953 - 21 Avenida y 2A Calle de la Palmita No. 82, Guatemala City (3).

PASSPORTS AND DOCUMENTS:

1. Jose Alberto CARDOZA Aguilar's Official Passport 1483 was issued on 29 October 1951 and was valid until 29 October 1953 (2).
2. For his travel to the USSR on 20 September 1961, he used a passport which was issued to Claudio AVILA Godoy who was described as a bachelor farmer, born in Guanagazapa, Escuintla, Guatemala and living at 3 Avenida 40, Escuintla (13).

3. For his 1967 travel to Havana, he used Passport 20[illegible]39 issued in the name of Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez, born 13 May 1924, Guatemala and a commercial agent (17). (COMMENT: The application for the above described passport did not bear a signature of any issuing immigration official. The photograph on the application without any doubt was that of CARDOZA).

4. With reference to the fraudulent Cedula A1-19334 which he used for the 1967 travel to Havana, this number was issued to a woman named Maclovia ROMERO Lopez (17). (COMMENT: No traces as of 30 October 1967).

5. Travel records reflect information on one Julian GONZALEZ, a Guatemalan Army man who was in Havana on 26 June 1967.

6. On 13 August 1954, CARDOZA and his wife were granted safe-conduct numbers 13564 and 12899 and issued document no.'s 890 and 891, dated 7 September 1954, by the Mexican Embassy, Guatemala (20).

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:

A. Race:

B. Height:

C. Weight:

D. Hair:

E. Eyes:

F. Health:

G. Dress:

H. Handwriting Specimen:

I. Fingerprints:

J. Other Physical Characteristics:

K. Photograph(s):

POLITICAL AFFILIATION:

He is currently a central committee member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT - Guatemalan Communist Party) (2, 7, 10). (COMMENT: As early as 1953, he was reported as being possibly a central committee member of the PGT (3). As of 6 April 1961, he was serving as the PGT liaison with the printers' cell of the PGT (11). As of 9 May 1961, he was Chief of the Department Committee of the PGT for the Department of Guatemala (16). Sometime prior to 13 September 1966, he was named Secretary of the PGT Political Commission for Workers and Peasants (10).

LANGUAGE(S):

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND INFLUENCE:

FINANCIAL STATUS:

VEHICLES OWNED/USED BY SUBJECT:

ARREST RECORD:

RELATIVES:

WIFE: Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga was born in 1931 and is a Guatemalan citizen (20). They were married on 28 March 1953 (3). Her PGT alias is OFELIAS as of 14 February 1958 (7). Sometime prior to 26 November 1968, she visited CARDOZA in Mexico City, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez and Carlos Enrique FORNO (15). On 30 May 1951, one Yolanda RODRIGUEZ, a suspected communist sympathizer, departed Guatemala for Mexico with Eliosa de RODRIGUEZ, Alicia RODRIGUEZ and Luis I. RODRIGUEZ, Mexican Ambassador to Guatemala (29). (COMMENT: It is not known if the above Yolanda RODRIGUEZ is identical with CARDOZA's wife who was 20 years old in 1951).

CHILDREN: A son, Jorge Alberto CARDOZA Rodriguez was born in January 1954 (20). This son and Cristobal CARDOZA Rodriguez accompanied their mother back to Guatemala sometime after 19 October 1956 (9).

FATHER. MOTHER: CARDOZA is the legitimate son of Patrocino CARDOZA and Angela AGUILAR de CARDOZA (3).

BROTHER(S):

SISTER(S):

ASSOCIATES:

1. ALVARADO Arellano, Huberto (201-065125), PGT member.

On 4 April 1957, CARDOZA suggested that ALVARADO Arellano replace him on the three-man secretariat of the BURO of the PGT in Mexico City since CARDOZA planned to return to Guatemala (7).

2. AREVALO, Juan Jose (201-006603), former President of Guatemala.

On 18 March 1957, CARDOZA was in mail contact with AREVALO and addressed a letter to AREVALO using the latter's alias Juan Francisco CLAYTON. AREVALO was receiving mail at P.O. 10396, Santiago, Chile (30).

3. CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO, Ernesto (201-086191), Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico City.

On 17 July 1966, CARDOZA informed Manuel CONTRERAS, a member of the CAOC, to contact CAPUANO for travel arrangements to Cuba via Mexico (14). (COMMENT: Although, there is no reporting on CARDOZA and CAPUANO's relationship, CAPUANO is included due to his apparent importance in the lines of communications between Guatemala via Mexico to Cuba as well as the likely possibility that both are collaborators).

4. *DEBROT Yaguin, Guillermo

In 1957, CARDOZA gave DEBROT Yaguin's address: Septima Calle 1-35, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7). In April 1967, DEBROT, Jr. in Guatemala P.O. Box 342, was listed as presumably a correspondent of Carlos Manuel PELLECER (201-225) (7).

5. DEL CID, Oscar (201-149558), former active member of the PGT.

On 3 January 1957, DEL CID contacted CARDOZA in Mexico. They had been very close through DEL CID having served as assistant secretary of the federation and as a member of the Graphic Arts Union of Guatemala. Through his friendship with CARDOZA, DEL CID won the confidence of the PGT directors in Mexico City and carried out political tasks of some significance, including serving as one of Jacobo ARBENZ' bodyguards (7).

6. *GALICIA, Concha - Influential PGT member (6)

CARDOZA's wife lived at Concha GALICIA's home in February 1958 and reportedly the home served as a means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7). In 1957, she was the mistress of Florencio MENDEZ Orozco, (201-787943) who in 1965 was a businessman, owner of a drug store, in Guatemala.

7. GONZALES Coronado, Otto Raul (201-066999), alias Otto Raul GONZALES, is a PGT member.

GONZALES was named as successor to Subject as one of the delegates of the PGT to the meeting of the UPG as of 26 March 1957 (7).

8. *GUTIERREZ Garbini, Victor Manuel, Secretary-General of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG) (7)

During December 1961 to February 1962, relations between Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA worsened considerably (7). In January 1962, GUTIERREZ told friends that he and CARDOZA have not had good relations, since CARDOZA is jealous of GUTIERREZ (7). Further, CARDOZA, then secretary of organization of the PGT, had raised obstacles to prevent GUTIERREZ from regaining the power he once had in the PGT and has tried to keep him out of the limelight (7). As of 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take the place of GUTIERREZ who had been the head of the PGT in Mexico. GUTIERREZ was killed by Guatemalan police in early 1966 (15).

9. LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (201-132139), former Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and known KGB officer.

CARDOZA and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160330) as of 18 October 1968 were in direct contact with LEONOV for handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and for receipt of money from the Soviets. When handling travel matters, contact was arranged by having the Guatemalan travelers to the USSR, accompanied by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL, go near the Soviet Press Office in a car. The Guatemalan travelers were given an identification document to present to LEONOV and they then would visit the office alone. When arranging for receipt of money or the exchange of documents, contact was accomplished by CARDOZA or BALCARCEL by one of them going directly to the Soviet Press Office (15). However, the wife of BARCARCEL has had most of the contact with LEONOV as an extra precautionary measure. LEONOV and family departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968 and Svyatoslav Federovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) replaced LEONOV as the Soviet Press Attache (21).

10. fnu LNU.

As of 26 November 1968, a secretary at the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Mexico City was a contact of CARDOZA. BALCARCEL has been present on two occasions when Subject and the secretary met (15).

11. LOMBARDO Toledano, Vicente (201-000229)

As of 10 March 1955, CARDOZA was receiving mail, from the Mexican Immigration Department, at LOMBARDO Toledano's address: Villa Obregon, D.F., Mexico City, Mexico (20).

12. MACIAS Mayora, Julio Cesar (201-303518) alias Cesar MONTES, leader of the FAR.

In 1967 when CARDOZA was preparing for his trip to Cuba in behalf of the PGT at the First OLAS Conference, Bernardo ALVARADO Moñzon, PGT Secretary General, cautioned CARDOZA that MACIAS may attempt to attend the OLAS despite an agreement with the PGT that MACIAS would not attend (14).

13. PELLECER Duran, Carlos Manuel (201-00225)

Subject in 1957 gave PELLECER's address: Primera Calle Poniente 6, should aid be necessary during his re-entry into Guatemala (7).

14. REYES, Olegario (201-733761), FAR member.

CARDOZA, Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, and Huberto ALVARADO Arellano were seen riding together in the PGT "undercover" vehicle prior to 8 September 1966 (1, 15).

15. RODRIGUEZ Padilla viuda de LEON, Fantina (201-828917), PGT member.

She is CARDOZA's mistress. On 11 July 1967 when CARDOZA was departing Guatemala for Cuba, she took him to the Guatemala Airport (14). Sometime prior to 5 December 1967, she received a letter from CARDOZA who was then in Moscow (14). The above mentioned letter arrived in Guatemala from the Soviet Union via Peru (14).

16. SANCHEZ Gonzales, Hector (201-[illegible]), bonefide Cuban Diplomat and suspected DSE officer.

.. Between 11 and 18 October 1966, CARDOZA met Hector SANCHEZ Gonzales and the latter informed CARDOZA that he has authority from Cuban government to do whatever is necessary to reorganize FAR (15).

17. SOLIS Barrios, Rafael (201-225483), PGT member.

In 1957, SOLIS, CARDOZA and families were photographed together. In the transmittal dispatch it is not clear whether the SOLIS and CARDOZA families are related (7).

CURRICULUM VITAE:

1922	born in Guatemala (2) .
29 August 1952	issued an official visa for China (2)
30 August 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
	issued an official visa for Cuba (2)
1 September 1952	traveled via Mexico en route to China by TACA according to Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952 and (5).
5 September 1952	arrived in Mexico City via TACA Flight 100 (Travel)
6 September 1952	departed Mexico City for Miami via Guest Flight 100 with reservations for connections with EAL Flight 602, for Idlewild to travel on to Zurich (Travel).
7 September 1952	was to depart Idlewild for Zurich via TWA Flight 902, (Travel). He was traveling without a visa for the U.S. but with an official Guatemalan passport.
8 September 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2).
14 September 1952	departed Switzerland (2).
14 November 1952	arrived in Switzerland (2).
17 November 1952	issued an official visa for Mexico (2)
18 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
18 November 1952	arrived in France (2)
23 November 1952	departed France (2)
	arrived in Switzerland (2)
25 November 1952	departed Switzerland (2)
February 1954	traveled from Guatemala to Mexico City (5)
29 June 1954	requested political asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala (20).
8 September 1954	arrived in Mexico at Tapachula, Chiapas from Guatemala with his family (20).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico (7).
23 December 1956	Arrived in Mexico City from Tapachula (7).

12 April 1957	and his family departed Mexico for Veracruz where they were to remain for one day and then go by train to Tapachula. His wife and son were to travel legally to Guatemala while he planned a clandestine re-entry into Guatemala (7).
June 1959	traveled to Czechoslovakia (10).
30 September 1961	was planning to travel via Panama and South America to the USSR where he planned to attend the 1961 CPSU Congress (13). Early in the morning of 30 September 1961, he departed Guatemala by land for Mexico enroute to Moscow, USSR (13).
3 October 1961	arrived in Mexico by air from Guatemala (7).
January 1962	was in Moscow and was expected to return to Guatemala by the following route: Moscow, Havana, Ecuador, Central America, Guatemala (7).
February 1962	was in Moscow and planned to travel to Havana (7).
7 December 1962	was in Moscow and attended the WFTU Conference (7).
2 January 1963	was in Cuba (12).
26 June 1967	arrived in Cuba possibly traveling in the name Julian GONZALEZ according to travel records.
11 July 1967	had plans of leaving Guatemala by air for Mexico City destined for Havana and to attend OLAS (14). He departed Guatemala City for Mexico by ACR at 1930 hours but the plane had to return to Guatemala City the same night because of engine trouble (14).
12 July 1967	departed Guatemala City 0845 by Air PANAM for Mexico City using fraudulent documents in the name of ARGUETA (14).
18 July 1967	departed Mexico for Europe on Aeronaves/BOAC airlines Flt. 676/068 using fradulent documentation (ARGUETA). He was expected to travel via Prague to Cuba (15). He was to travel to the USSR and remain there for three months to undergo medical treatment for an ailing heart (15).
19 July 1967	traveled to Mexico via London, UK and was destined for Cuba according to travel records.
22 July 1967	traveled from the United Kingdom via Frankfurt to Czechoslovakia and to Cuba according to travel records.
26 July 1967	traveled to Cuba possibly using the name Julian GONZALEZ, according to travel records.
August 1967	traveled from Cuba to the USSR probably using the passport of ARGUETA (15).
As of 5 December 1967	was in the USSR and planned to remain there until June 1968 (14).

8 April 1968	was to return to Mexico within a few days according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
15 April 1968	arrived in Mexico according to Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez who said on 23 April that CARDOZA had arrived in Mexico some 8 days previous (14).
28 May 1968	was in Mexico according to his mistress Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de LEON (14).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but planned to travel to Salvador and then return to Mexico with a new visa (15).
Prior 26 November 1968	his wife, Yolanda Consuelo RODRIGUEZ Artiaga visited him for a week in Mexico (15).

PERSONALITY, ASSESSMENT AND HEALTH:

1. As of 10 March 1952, his name was on a list of persons considered by CTAL as being loyal to WFTU policies and to Marxism (27). He requested political asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala on 29 June 1954 because he was subject to persecution by forces of the new administration in Guatemala due to his political ideals and his sympathy with the former ARBENZ administration. He served as Deputy in the Congress of the Republic of Guatemala (20). In January 1957, he was unhappy in Mexico and was anxious to return to Guatemala because he believed life would be better in Guatemala. He personally set April 1957 as the target date for his departure from Mexico (7). As of 7 February 1957 at a Buro meeting of the PGT, he announced to other members on the Commission of Organization and Control that he would be replaced since they (PGT in Guatemala) had summoned him to Guatemala and he was in the process of preparing for the trip (7). On 6 July 1957, he was in charge of notifying the interested persons of the exact date of the Central American Labor Conference and he apparently forgot to do so and one delegate was delayed in attending the conference (7).

2. In early September 1961, he was planning to travel to the USSR and to seek medical treatment for a stomach ailment believed to be aggravated by ulcers (10). In the USSR he was to serve as a Guatemalan delegate to the CPSU October 1961 celebrations (10). When discussing his problems and aprehensions on his prospective travel to the USSR for the 1961 Congress, he feared that the Guatemalan Government would unleash a wave of persecution against the Communists because of rumors that the Communists were ready to attack the government. He blamed the rumor on the Cubans who had issued a news bulletin claiming that the Guatemalan and Salvadoran Communist Parties had agreed to take up arms to overthrow their respective governments (13). Also in September 1961 when he was using a fraudulent passport for his travel to the USSR, he became worried because a border official asked him if he would be accompanied on the trip since another Guatemalan traveler on the previous day had the same visas listing Mexico, Switzerland, Europe. He reported the incident to the PGT central committee (13).

3. In January 1962 he had a heart attack in Moscow and had been seriously ill according to comments made by GUTIERREZ. CARDOZA had recuperated physically, but he was morally depressed and felt that he would be an invalid (7).

4. As of 5 December 1967, CARDOZA had suffered another heart attack and would remain in the USSR until June 1968 (14). He was expected to come to Mexico from the USSR within a few days after 8 April 1957, according to Jose Luis [illegible]

5. As early as April 1958, he was recuperating from a heart ailment which resulted from a highly nervous condition (15). As of 26 November 1958, he was in Mexico City and still undergoing treatment for a heart condition (15).

6. As of 15 February 1959, he had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home (15). According to BALCARCEL on 19 February 1959, BALCARCEL's replacement as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico by CARDOZA has caused discontent among PGT exiles. BALCARCEL thought the change had been made in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee and felt that CARDOZA was not suited for the post because CARDOZA is ill and in Mexico illegally (15).

COMMUNIST AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:
(Political and Organizational Involvement)

5 - 11 September 1949	attended the American Continental Congress for Peace as the Guatemalan delegate. The Congress met in Mexico City (5, 27).
6 September 1950	was very active in FSG affairs, holding executive offices and signing among other things, a resolution affiliating the FSG with the CTAL and the FSM and a letter from the FSG to the Venezuelan government dated 6 September 1950 which protested the rumored round-up of Spanish Republicans into concentration camps for deportation to Spain (9).
13, 18 and 19 September 1950	was a delegate and present in the gallery of the Guatemalan National Congress. He tried to influence the Congress against ratifying the Rio Treaty (9).
7 November 1950	attended the October celebration of the 33rd anniversary of the Russian Revolution (9).
14 December 1950	was a Congressional candidate of the "PAR RN CPNT" coalition and made a communist-line speech at the Concha Acustica in Guatemala City (9).
March 1952	was invited to the Conferencia Continental Americana por la Pas in Brazil (26).
1 September 1952	was one of fifteen Guatemalan delegates to the Peking Peace Conference which was held in October 1952 in China (5). According to the Guatemalan daily newspaper Nuestro Diario, 31 July 1952, he was to be a delegate to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference (9).
1951, 1952, 1953	was an addressee on three different occasions for letters from Cuba. Prior to 6 March he had received letters from Cuba addressed to him as Deputy, Congreso de la Republica, Guatemala, April 1952. He was on the mailing list of Prensa Continental Publication, dated 5 April 1952. On 3 August 1953, he was the addressee for a letter sent by the PSP (Cuban CP) calling for solidarity against BATISTA, liberty for the arrested PSP leaders and CP propaganda (25).

10 March 1953	was one of the signers of an open letter to the Soviet Government and people expressing sympathy on the death of Stalin. The letter was published in the 10 March 1953 edition of La Hora (3).
18 March 1953	was a member of the greeting party at the Guatemala City Airport to meet Vicente LOMBARDO Toledano and Henri JOURDAIN (WFTU directors who stopped on the way to CTAL Congress in Santiago) (3).
As early as April 1953	was a member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) (2, 3). As of 18 June 1953, he was serving as a Congressional deputy to the National Congress from the Department of Guatemala, having been elected on the ticket of the PGT. His term was to expire in 1955 (2, 3).
18 June 1953	was regularly receiving the News Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City at the address of the Communist-dominated Sindicato de Artes Graficos (SAG) (3).
October 1953	was scheduled to act as Secretary General of the CGTG while Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ and four other CGTG members attended the World Federation of Trade Unions' Third World Labor Conference, which was to meet in Vienna, Austria, in October 1953, according to the Communist newspaper Tribuna Popular (5).
1954	was in Caracas and acting as Secretary General of CGTG. He denounced the U.S. proposal to put the question of Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere on the agenda of the Tenth International.
As of 20 January 1954	was a member of the presidium of the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress (19).
28 January 1954	was among the members of the presidium at the Second Guatemalan Syndical Congress which was inaugurated in the Teatro America before a large audience (28).
February 1954	was a delegate to a mass meeting in Mexico City which was sponsored by the Society of Friends of Guatemala (5).
5 May 1954	met Obdulio BARTHE and family at the La Aurora Airport, Guatemala City and was accompanied by other Guatemalan Communist leaders and leftists (9).
29 June 1954	requested for himself and his family asylum in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala.
14 September 1954	he and his family appeared before Licenciado Gustavo GARCIA Guerrero, Assistant Chief of the Immigration Department, Department of the Interior, in Mexico City for the purpose of clarifying the matter of his internment and stay in Mexico (20).
30 October 1954	was listed as an exile on whom extradition procedings had been filed (4).

25 January 1955	was included on a list of exiled Guatemalans who applied for political asylum in Mexico (8).
June 1956	was identified together with Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, Cesar MONTENEGRO and Rafael SOLIS Barrios as being directors of the Central Guatemalan Confederation of Trade Unions in Exile (CGTG). In June 1956 the CGTG and other various exile groups in Mexico joined together in the Union Patriotica Guatemalteca (UPG) to form both a clandestine and legal group inside and wherever possible as an opposition party to the Guatemalan Government (24).
19 October 1956	his wife, Yolanda Rodriguez de CARDOZA, name appeared on a list of 157 exiles who were being permitted to return to Guatemala according to the Ministry of Foreign Relations (9).
As of 3 December 1956	in Mexico, he was the Secretary of the Directive Organism (BURO - Buro de la Fraccion del Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT) (7). Also he was a member of the PGT central committee which was located in Mexico. At the time there were two PGT central committees, one in Mexico and one in Guatemala (6). During 1954-57, he was a member of the PGT cell "LUBE" in Mexico (7).
5 December 1956	attended a meeting of the Directive Organism (BURO) in Mexico where he with others discussed political problems of one Guatemalan member in Prague (7).
14 December 1956	departed Mexico City for Tapachula, Mexico where he met a courier. He coordinated the plans of the PGT as to the stand to take in the event of a revolt which was planned for 24 December 1956 (7).
23 December 1956	returned to Mexico City after having made clandestine contact with a party leader from the interior (7).
18 January 1957	he would be pulled off of his job in the printing shop at Tabasco 2750 in Mexico in order to make him into a professional of the PGT, but the possibility was remote since it was difficult to obtain a job as advantageous as that which he then had, one which permitted him to take part in political activities during the afternoon (7).
24 January 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT faction in Mexico where a communique on the Hungarian Problem was made known to the rank and file of the PGT in Mexico (7).
7 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY where he and others discussed the organizational report first presented by the PGT in Mexico (7).

12 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ to discuss the regulations governing the UPG as proposed by the Partido Accion Revolucionario Unificado (PARU) (7).
14 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Manuel SANCHEZ (7).
21 February 1957	attended a meeting of the Buro of the PGT in Mexico which was held at the home of Jose Manuel FORTUNY (7).
April 1957	in Guatemala, he replaced Carlos Rene VALLE y Valle, PGT member, who was then ill (7).
	carried eighty dollars from Mexico to Guatemala. The funds had been sent to Mexico by the Guatemalan exiles in Costa Rica (7).
16 April 1957	was to enter Guatemala to carry out clandestine work for the PGT there according to a letter that Alfredo GUERRA Borges received from Mario SILVA Jonama (7).
31 May 1957	signed a petition dated 31 May 1957 which was prepared by the members of the UPG for the Consul General of Guatemala in Mexico to request the restoration of his passport and permission to return to Guatemala (23).
14 February 1958	his wife was living at the home of Concha Galicia. GALICIA's home served as one of the principal means of communications between Guatemala and Mexico (7).
June 1959	traveled to Czechoslovakia to work on the publication, Problemas de la Paz y del Socialismo (10).
18 February 1961	was director of El Militante, internal organizational bulletin of the PGT (10).
7 September 1961	attended a meeting with members of the Departmental Committee of the PGT in a home located at 5 Avenida 5-42, Zone 7, Guatemala City (13).
21 September 1961	attended a meeting of the Departmental Committee and delivered a lecture on the foundation, growth and strengthening of the Party (13).
October 1961	was to attend the CPSU Congress. He was making plans in early September and was to serve as one of the two Guatemalan delegates (10).
7 December 1961	attended the WFTU Conference in Moscow (7, 13).

As of early January 1963	was aware of the possible return of Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman to Guatemala with a Cuban guerrilla group. He and ARBENZ were in Cuba as of 2 January 1963.
29 January 1963	met with labor leaders of the PGT at the home of Manuel Francisco CONTRERAS to consider and approve a document which sets forth the 1963 PGT line for labor matters (12).
14 February 1963	he and eight other top labor leaders of the Labor Commission of the PGT were arrested. The PGT and the Communist (PGT) controlled FASGUA were without leaders (13).
29 June 1963	released by a Guatemalan military court. He and others had been accused of having plotted against the Ydigoras government in accordance with International Communist plans according to El Impercial, Guatemala City, 29 June 1963.
July 1963	assumed the direction of the Comision Sindical, the labor commission of the PGT, in Mexico (13).
October 1963	planned to be made head of the Escuintla Departmental Committee of the PGT (13).
November 1963	was a member of the Labor Commission of the PGT which is under the direct authority of the central committee which was formed to fulfill the following missions: 1. direct the activities of the Chamale Committee (Communist faction of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA-Communist dominated labor federation); 2. issued propaganda favoring the working class; run a labor school in Quezaltenango for Party members involved in labor matters, etc. (12). and others were PGT members who received a salary from the Party. The lowest paid is sixty quetzales (U.S. $60) and the highest at least two hundred quetzales (U.S. $200) per month. In addition to salaries, the Party pays the expenses for houses, cars, and maintenance and the cost of printing leaflets and other publications (13).
3 December 1963	met with other leaders of the PGT in the Headquarters of the Federacion Autonoma Sindical Guatemalteca (FASGUA - PGT dominated labor federation). The group discussed the current political and general situation in Guatemala (14).
8 March 1965	had been delegated by other Party leaders to come out of hiding in order to make plans for an important meeting of opposition leaders (14).

23 December 1965	Huberto ALVARADO Arellano, and Arturo HERNANDEZ Garcia met in TASGUA headquarters with a small group of PGT party members to discuss the expected overthrow, probably on 24 December 1965 of the government of Colonel Enrique PERALTA Azurdia. CARDOZA and ALVARADO ordered the members of the group to remain within their homes on call on 24 December (14).
24 - 27 February 1966	was renamed to the PGT central committee at the National Conference of the PGT which was held 24 through 27 February 1966 (14).
27 March 1966	was in charge of a meeting which PGT leaders attended in order to discuss the status of the investigation on the disappearance of some PGT members (14).
19 April 1966	told a group of leading members of Party and Party Labor leaders that a new labor policy has been adopted by the PGT and the FAR, in response to instructions from Moscow (14).
	was the chief spokesman at a meeting of a group of 15 leading members of the PGT and announced that the PGT and FAR have decided to initiate a new campaign of violence on 1 May 1966 (14).
28 April 1966	and Armando CASTILLO Morales, PGT and FAR members, met with a group of Party members and labor leaders on 23 April to discuss plans for May Day and a week of terrorism. According to CARDOZA, the PGT would go along with a peaceful parade on May Day. However, if the police attempt to obstruct the parade or halt the speeches, the PGT and FAR will be ready to put up strong resistance (14).
9 and 11 May 1966	met with PGT and PGT labor leaders to bring them up to date on the attitude of the Party toward the present state of siege and to reveal Party plans for the adoption of a new labor policy (14). CARDOZA informed the group that the PGT and FAR are ready to initiate a new type of labor plan, as a result of which Communist-controlled labor throughout Guatemala would be geared to acts of violence, sabotage, and terrorist activity in general. According to CARDOZA, the first step in the plan was to give military training to selected key labor people (14).
18 May 1966	met with leaders of the PGT for the purpose of furnishing them with a report on the National Party Conference which was held in late February 1966 and to distribute a booklet entitled La Guerra Revolucionaria del Pueblo (14).

29 May 1966	met with a group of PGT labor leaders and members of the FAR. It was announced that a meeting will definitely be arranged with representatives of the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre (MR-13 November Revolutionary Movement), guerrilla organization headed by Marco Antonio YON Sosa (14).
13 -17 July 1966	was at meetings of the Comision de Asuntos Obreros y Campesinos (CAOC - Commission for matters concerning peasants and workers), labor commission of the PFT which were held on 13 and 16 July 1966. He had extensive knowledge about Guatemalans who already were in Cuba and others who were scheduled to go there (14).
Prior 8 September 1966	was seen in Zone 6, Guatemala City with Jose Luis RAMOS Martinez, Huberto ALVARADO Arellano and Olegario REYES. They were riding in one of the "undercover" vehicles used by the PGT and the FAR (1).
22 November 1966	was in charge of a meeting of the National Labor Commission of the PGT which met in the home of a Party member in Guatemala City to discuss the present situation in Guatemala insofar as the PGT and its revolutionary fighting arm, the FAR, are concerned (14).
12 January 1967	gave members of the PGT's National Labor Commission a situation report on the results of the PGT central committee members who had been in the mountains of Guatemala with a leader of the FAR (14).
25 January 1967	discussed with PGT labor leaders the growing dissension between the PGT and the FAR (14).
24 February 1967	came to Guatemala City from Escuintla, where he has been in hiding, to meet with PGT labor leaders. He and other political commission and central committee members of the PGT had been in hiding since 20-22 February as a means to avoid capture by the military and police forces. The Party at that time was underground and almost completely inactive. According to him, for all practical purposes the PGT and the FAR were then two separate organizations (14).
9 March 1967	called an urgent meeting with Party Labor leaders to inform them that during the latter part of March 1967, he would be occupied in organizing and later, attending a National plenum of the central committee of the PGT (14).
27 March 1967	gave Party labor leaders a hasty and incomplete version of the so-called plenary session of the PGT central committee held at an undisclosed site in the mountains of Guatemala from 20 through 24 March. Among the few agreements reached was that the PGT will form its own guerrilla force and call it "Guerrilla Leonardo Castillo Flores" (14).

22 April 1967	gave Party Labor leaders information on the PGT plans for May Day celebration and explained that the party will cooperate with the Rebel Armed Forces in a terrorist campaign after 1 May 1967 (14).
8 July 1967	was to head the PGT delegation to the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS). After OLAS he had plans to travel on to the USSR (14).
11 July 1967	was provided false bottom suitcase to carry documents to Cuba prior to his departure from Guatemala City enroute to Cuba via Mexico City (14).
22 July 1967	transitted Orly Airport for Prague with documents belonging to Roberto ARGUETA Rodriguez (16).
14 - 27 July 1967	under the name Julian GONZALES, he was reported as having arrived in Havana as a "FAR delegate" to LASO according to a 28 July 1967 Havana broadcast.
27 July - November 1967	was to receive a two-month course in military tactics as well as medical treatment for a liver ailment in the Soviet Union following his attendance at the 1967 LASO Conference according to Bernardo ALVARADO Monzon, Secretary General of the PGT (14).
11 August 1967	The Mexican Immigration Department by letter on 11 August 1967 informed the Mexican Consul (presumably in Guatemala) that the Immigration Department would not issue any document granting any immigration status, nor would CARDOZA be allowed to enter Mexico without the previous authorization of the Immigration Department (20).
Late December 1967	was Chief of the Mazatenango Regional Committee of the PGT and the FAR, which consists of the Departments of Retalhuleu and Suchitepequez for the most part, according to Francisco HERNANDEZ Alvarez during his interrogation (22).
Early April 1968	had strict orders to remain inactive in Mexico and do no work as CARDOZA is recuperating from a heart ailment. CARDOZA probably would remain inactive for at least one year according to Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (15).
28 May 1968	was to stay in Mexico and work with PGT exile community there, according to his mistress, Fantina RODRIGUEZ Viuda de Leon (14).
18 July 1968	is receiving complete financial support from the Mexican Communist Party because of his high position in the PGT. This support includes money for room and board and doctor bills. In Mexico, he visits his doctor once a week (15).
9 August 1968	was still in Mexico but was to leave Mexico because his visa has expired, according to Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez. Also, CARDOZA had plans of traveling to Salvador and then returning to Mexico with a new visa because he needed approximately six more months of medical treatment (15).

5 October 1968	met Jose MEJIA, aka Carlos SALINAS Murillo on the street and latter told CARDOZA about the attempted recruitment of him by a "special agent". MEJIA asked CARDOZA for money but the latter refused (15).
As of 18 October 1968	he and Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez are handling travel of Guatemalans to the USSR and receipting for funds and documents directly with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, know KGB officer and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico (15).
4 September 1968	headed a meeting of Guatemalan Communist exile leaders in Mexico and they discussed the reorganization of the exiles in Mexico (15).
15 February 1969	had been named overall Chief of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile apparatus in Mexico to replace Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez, according to Carlos Enrique FORNO Reynoso. The change had been made as the result of instructions which had just been received from the PGT in Guatemala. The change was twofold. CARDOZA is a member of the central committee of the PGT whereas BALCARCEL is not, and BALCARCEL has been lax in his duties, once being unavailable when some important PGT members passed through Mexico. However, BALCARCEL will continue to act as chief of the exile group until CARDOZA is on his feet again since the latter had suffered another heart attack and was confined to his bed at home. Until this change CARDOZA had been the central committee representative in Mexico and had functioned as an advisor (15). Presumably BALCARCEL replaced GUTIERREZ and CARDOZA replace BALCARCEL although on 4 September 1968, CARDOZA was to take GUTIERREZ' place in Mexico (GUTIERREZ was killed in Guatemala in 1966) (15).
As of 19 February 1969	was replaced by BARCARCEL as Chief of the PGT exile group in Mexico in order to justify CARDOZA's continued membership on the PGT central committee (15).
Prior 9 March	met with Jose Maria ORTIZ Vides who had recently arrived in Mexico City from Cuba. ORTIZ informed CARDOZA that the Cubans had sent him to Mexico to "spy" on the PGT in Mexico in behalf of Cuba (15).

SOURCES

(1) ESRECESS-19

(2) No source, passport

(3) ESCONSON

(4) ESODIC-1

(5) LNPURE

(6) ESGEM-7

(7) LINLUCK

(8) LIBETHERITE-4

(9) No source

(10) ESPEG-1

(11) ESADAGE-1

(12) ESRECESS-11

(13) ESMESSAGE-3

(14) ESRECESS-16

(15) LIREBEL-2

(16) UNBOUND travel information

(17) ESMICA

(18) LNERGO

(19) ESCROW

(20) LIKAYAK-2

(21) LIFEAT, LIENVOY

(22) ESRECESS-17

(23) HUSSY

(24) ESABIDE

(25) AMPLECT

(26) JURANT

(27) LIFTER

(28) ESCROW

(29) ESCALATOR

(30) FUGLEMAN-13

ORIG: J.Castoro
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 1535
DATE: 5 May 69

MESSAGE FORM
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CONF: WH-8 INFO FILE, VR. KI/AN, CA-5, CA/PROP, SB-8, CA/PEG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 05 22 18z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 99095

TO BOGOTA INFO LIMA MEXICO CITY

PSYCH

REFS: A. BOGOTA 2114 (IN 47944)*

B. LIMA 4575 (IN 44867)**

C. MEXICO CITY 5719 (IN 20342)*** (BEING RELAYED TO LIMA)

1. IF NOT ALREADY PLANNED, SUGGEST EXPLOIT LEONOV PRESENCE LIMA BY NAMING HIM PERSONALLY IN STATION-INSPIRED ARTICLES AS PAYMASTER FOR FABIO VASQUEZ GROUP AS HE WAS IN PACHON CASE. IF IMPLEMENTED COULD REPLAY WIDELY IN LA.

2. FILE 201-841194.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1

WH/3/P RLConnolly

SB/X/WH L.MESTRES

SB/POA V. VALPY

CONTINUED WH/CA -

201-133137

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 99095

TO

*Outlines prop play being conducted by Station Bogota in connection with recent discovery of an ELN cache.

**Reports arrival of Leonov in Lima a Soviet RIS officer who is under cover of Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

***Reports connection between Leonov and Pachon.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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639.

S E C R E T 011620Z MAY 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9169 (DIFFENDAL ACTING)

SAGO

1 MAY 69 IN 48858

d/

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 4603 (IN 46110)

B. SANTIAGO 9164 (IN 47992)

1. BELIEVE SUBJECT REF A IS GUILLERMO RAVEST SANTIS, POLITICAL EDITOR PCCH DAILY "EL SIGLO". 30 APRIL "EL SIGLO" REPORTED RAVEST IN LIMA COVERING IPC SITUATION.

2. INDEX: RAVEST.

3. FILE: 58-8-1.

S E C R E T

201-132139 ✓

1 May 69

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581

S E C R E T 301742Z APR 69 CITE SANTIAGO 9164 (DIFFENDAL ACTING)

SAGO

30 APR 69 IN 47992

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: LIMA 4608 (IN 46110)

1. PLEASE CHECK AND RETRANSMIT NAME OF CHILEAN JOURNALIST. NO TRACES ON GILLERMO RAVOSL S. RAVOSL.

2. FILE: 58-8-1.

S E C R E T

AN PRP

ID X

Leonov 201

Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich

201-132139 ✓

30 apr 69

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ACTION SB-8 ☐ RID COPY

496

INFO. FILE, VR. RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI-2

SECRET 291859Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4608

29 APR 69 IN 47110

DIRECTOR, SANTIAGO

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 20 APRIL FOLLOWING ARRIVED LIMA FROM SANTIAGO VIA LAN NO 4251:

A. LEV NOVIKOV, PASSPORT NO. 062220

B. VICTOR CHRAGQUINE, PASSPORT NO. C-159754, JOURNALIST

C. VILLY GOREMIKINE, PASSPORT NO. C-139862, JOURNALIST

ALL THREE STAYING HOTEL SAVOY, NOVIKOV ROOM 623 AND OTHER TWO ROOM 614. REQUEST TRACES ON B AND C ABOVE.

Guillermo RAVEST Santis, political editor PCCH daily "El Siglo"
No 201 ✓

2. REQUEST TRACES ON CHILEAN JOURNALIST, ~~GILLERMO RAVOSL~~ S. RAVOSL OCCUPIES ROOM 523 AT HOTEL SAVOY AND HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH B AND C ABOVE AS WELL AS NIKOLAI LEONOV (201-132139) NOVOSTY REP FROM MOSCOW AND KNOWN KGB WHO OCCUPIES ADJOINING ROOM 525 OF SAVOY.

3. FILE: 58-8-1

SECRET

PRP
X

Leonov ✓
201-132139
29 Apr 69

SECRET

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S E C R E T 252043Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4575

25 APR 69 IN 44867

DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: A. BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B. DIRECTOR 91987

NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH

1. LEONOV ARRIVED LIMA FROM BOGOTA VIA APSA FLIGHT 61 ON 23 APRIL. ACCORDING DUHIKE SURVEILLANCE, LEONOV MET BY DULAUREL-1 AND FAMILY, RICARDO TELLO NEYRA AND WIFE BEATRICE AND ONE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT. LEONOV TAKEN TO HOTEL SAVOY WHERE CHECKED INTO ROOM 525. EARLY AFTERNOON OF 23RD LEONOV WITH ABOVE PERSONS WENT TO DULAUREL-1 HOME WHERE REMAINED UNTIL EARLY EVENING. LEONOV LEFT DULARUEL-1'S HOME IN COMPANY ALL ABOVE PERSONS, TOOK DRIVE ALONG OCEAN AND HAD DINNER BEFORE BEING DROPPED OFF AT SAVOY WITH THE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT.

2. MORNING OF 24 APRIL VISITED FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH DULAUREL-1 AND HUSBAND AND MET ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AT FOREIGN MINISTRY. DURING AFTERNOON OF 24TH AND MORNING OF 25TH, LEONOV OBSERVED WITH ABOVE UNIDENTIFIED SUBJECT AND ON SEPARATE OCCASSIONS WITH GUSTAVO VALCARCEL AND RAUL ACOSTA SALAS.

3. ACCORDING TO DULINDEN-8, DULAUREL-1 INSTRUCTED HIM NOT GO TO AIRPORT TO MEET NEW VISITOR AS NO PHOTOS TO BE TAKEN OF

CS COPY

SECRET

25 APR 69
201-132139

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☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 LIMA 4575 SECRET

HIM.

4. DUHIKES HAVE DETECTED POLICE SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV AT HOTEL AND AREA OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. POLICE SURVEILLANCE APPEARS BE VERY CLOSE. STATION WILL ATTEMPT CONTINUE UNILATERAL COVERAGE TO EXTENT POSSIBLE BUT POLICE ACTIVITY WILL NECESSARILY LIMIT STATION EFFORT.

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-758184, 201-845308, 201-026294, 201-054508

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279

S E C R E T 241715Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2075 (BOGO)

25 APR 69 IN 44613

C

LIMA INFO DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REFS A) BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)

B) DIRECTOR 95945

1. DUE INDICATIONS FROM GIWREN BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) TRASITED BOGOTA 23 APRIL. UNFORTUNATELY COLOMBIAN AUTHORITIES DO NOT KEEP RECORDS OF PASSENGERS IN TRANSIT. CAN LIMA CONFIRM LEONOV'S ARRIVAL THERE?

2. FILE: 201-132139.

S E C R E T

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25 APR 69 ✓
201-132139

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

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ORIG: P. EARNEST
UNIT: SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412 1315
DATE: 23 APRIL 1969

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

24 23 28 z APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR

TO BOGOTA INFO LIMA

95945

REDTOP ALKICK

BOGOTA 2047 (IN 41592)*

1. APPRECIATE REFERENCE NOTIFICATION. TRACES ALREADY FORWARDED LIMA ON BASIS PREVIOUS INFORMATION ABOUT LEONOV TRAVEL.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

*Reference reported information acquired from Teltap that known KGB Officer LEONOV, who implicated in "PACHON Case", traveling to Lima.

C/SB/X/WH L.

SB/BIO

SB/CI/O Walters

WH/3/C Calvin M. Smith

C/WH/3/P Spera

AF MS
AB
IN
FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
fr C/WHD

SB/XO C T Malta

24 APR 69
201-132139

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PR! ... ICE

S E C R E T 221517Z APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047
BOGO

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LIMA HPL

22 APR 69 IN 41592

MICROFILMED
MAY 2 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REDTOP

1. GIWREN REPORTED JOSE ARIZALA POSSO (201-815588) CHIEF NOVOSTI OFFICE BOGOTA AND MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA, REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM PROSPERO MORALES, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY, CONCERNING LEGALITY OF SOVIET CITIZEN NICOLAY LEONOV ENTERING COLOMBIA ON TOURIST CARD. ARIZALA STATED HE HAD RECEIVED A CABLE INFORMING HIM LEONOV WOULD ARRIVE BOGOTA 22 APRIL ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 71 FROM PARIS AND WOULD TRAVEL TO LIMA ON 23 APRIL. ARIZALA ADDED LEONOV WAS AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO BUT HAD NOW GIVEN UP HIS DIPLOMATIC CARREER AND IS A MEMBER OF THE APN "TEAM". MORALES LATER TOLD ARIZALA THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM DAS THAT LEONOV COULD ENTER COLOMBIA ON A TOURIST CARD.

F
Pesc
CIT COLOMBIA
A COLOMBIA, BOGOTA
CONTACTED by JOSE ARIZALA POSSO /201-815588
RE SOVIET ENTERING COLOMBIA

d/
ZP

2. BELIEVE SUBJECT IS NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139) WHO ONCE STATIONED MEXICO CITY AS SOVIET EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE AND KNOWN RIS. SUGGEST HQS TRACES TO LIMA SOONEST.

CS COPY

SECRET

22 APR 69 Leonov
201-132139

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 APR 69 CITE BOGOTA 2047 SECRET

3. FILE: 201-132139 AND 201-815588. INDEX MORALES.

SECRET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Lima

INFO.

FROM
Chief, SB via Chief, WH

SUBJECT REDTOP AEKICK
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 92246, 13 April 1969

As promised in Reference, there are attached hereto two of the latest and best photographs available of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. The date of the photographs is sometime in 1964.

Norma W. LETCHWORTH

Attachment: H/W
Photographs H/W

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLW 5283

DATE 15 APR 1969
14 APRIL 1969

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SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓201-132139 ✓

RID
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SB/X/WH
WH/3/P

AN MS
AB ☒
FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SB/X/WH	D.Davis DD	bm	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SB/X/WH	14.4	
SB/CI/O	14.4.69	J Walters
WH/3/P	14 April 69	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	14 Apr	Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)
MFG 1-66

DISPATCH

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

ORIG: LEE G. MESTRES
UNIT: C/SB/X/WH
EXT: 6412/1315
DATE: 12 APRIL 1969

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BY 24 PER ____ #____

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CONF: SB-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI, CI/OA, WH-8, RI/AN, CI/IC-2, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET 13 01 30 Z APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 92246

TO PRIORITY LIMA ROUTINE MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

REFERENCE: LIMA 4446 (IN 34730)*

1. LEONOV DPOB AUGUST 1928, RYAZAN OBLAST. SUBJECT IS 170 CENTIMETERS TALL, SLENDER BUILD, BLOND HAIR, BLUE EYES. LEONOV IS VERY ATHLETIC AND HIS GENERAL FACIAL FEATURES AND BUILD ARE THOSE OF RICHARD WIDMARK, STEVE MCQUEEN, AND ALLAN LADD. HIS SPANISH IS FLUENT. HIS APPEARANCE IS NORDIC. OCCASIONALLY HIS LONG BLOND HAIR IS WORN IN CREW CUT STYLE.

2. LEONOV WILL BE SURVEILLANCE CONSCIOUS AND IS ADEPT IN COUNTERMEASURES.

3. POUCHING PHOTOGRAPHS PRIORITY WEEK 14 APRIL.

END OF MESSAGE

*HQS COMMENT: STATION REQUESTED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS PRIORITY TO FACILITATE SURVEILLANCE.

CSDO NOTE: TYPED AND RELEASED BY DIRECTION OF JOHN HORTON, DC/WH.

13 APR 69 ✓
201-132139

C/WH/3 AL SPERA (TELECOORD)

Cornelius G. McCauley
CORNELICUS MCCAULEY
CSDO
RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY
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CSDO

BY: D AT 2200 Z

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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PRECEDENCE

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/DIS, CS/DO, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, CI/IC 2

309

12 APR 69

IN-34730

SECRET 12205Z APR 69 CITE LIMA 4446

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

REDTOP AEKICK

REF DIRECTOR 91937 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY)

1. IN ORDER FACILITATE SURVIELLANCE KGB OFFICER, NOKOLAY SERGEYVICH LEONOV (201-132139) REQUEST DETAILED PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION BY CABLE AND PHOTOS BY POUCH.

2. FILE: 201-132139.

SECRET

335

CS COPY

SECRET

12 APR 69 ✓

201-132139

DIANA DAVIS
SB/X/WH
NIT: 6412 1315
.T: 11 APR 69
ATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

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33 PER ________ # ______ ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

ONF: SB 8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 22 APR 69 CITE DIRECTOR 91987

PRIORITY LIMA

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HEADQUARTERS SOURCE, FRENCH DOUBLE ENTRY TRANSIT VISA GRANTED TO NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO PLANS TRAVEL TO PERU DEPARTING MOSCOW 10 APRIL.

2. LEONOV IS SUBJECT OF 201-132139. HE WAS PREVIOUSLY PCS IN MEXICO FROM 1953 TO 1956 AS INTERPRETER AND AMBASSASDOR'S SECRETARY AND FROM 1961 TO 22 DECEMBER 1968 AS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB AND HIGHLY EXPERIENCED OFFICER. HE WOULD BE WORTHY OF DISCREET UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE (IF IT DETERMINED PERUVIANS NOT FOLLOWING HIM.) IT QUITE ~~PROBABLE~~ POSSIBLE THAT LEONOV IS NOVOSTI CHIEF TO WHOM DULINDEN-8 WAS REFERRING. RC RC

3. FILE 201-132139.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/X/WH L. MESTRES
SB/CI/O F. Walters
WH/3/P C. L. Conolly
C/WH/3 Spera

ms
X

11 APR 69
201-132139

CS COPY

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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L. MESTRES
SB/XO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO Chief, SB Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING
		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT REDTOP/AEKICK
○ Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LEONOV, his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, and Daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, departed Mexico PCS on 22 December 1968. They travelled on Sabena Flight 556 with destination Moscow via Brussels. Upon his PCS departure, LEONOV completed seven and one half consecutive years on his second tour in Mexico.

c37378

2. LIFEAT and LIENVOY have reported that Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV (201-087222) is replacing Subject as the Soviet Press Attache. LEONOV held the title of Second Secretary. KUZNETSOV is a First Secretary.

3. Travelling with the LEONOV family on the same flight was Petr Fedotovich GORELOV (201-265458).

for Willard C. CURTIS

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36147	31 December 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

File: S.F. KUZNETSOV

RA

DISPATCH

Leonov ✓

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
D ∅

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
POA and Trace Request

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-15480, 4 May 1967

(B) MEXICO CITY 7743, 22 October 1968

1. We would appreciate receiving Headquarters traces on Identity, subsequent to the negative results per ref. (A), and a POA for contact and assessment. We are considering Identity as a possible access agent in the REDTOP field, specifically against Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), known KGB, and his eventual replacement.

2. As Headquarters is aware, the Station maintains an active interest in LEONOV. Per ref. (B), he has been a principal contact and source of both funds and documents for Guatemalans travelling to the USSR and for Central American exiles, and he has also been linked repeatedly and prominently with the support activity provided to Latin American Communist parties.

3. Although LEONOV may depart before Identity can be used effectively against him, we feel certain that his replacement will be engaged in similar extra-Press Office activities of prime interest to us.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Identity Sheet, under separate cover

Distribution:
2 - C/WH, w/att. CS Copy in 201-342977
2 - C/SB, w/att.

Leonov ✓

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201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-35828

DATE
14 November 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

Separate Cover Attachment:

HMMA-35828, 14 November 68

IDENTITY SHEET

Identity: Rolando CABALLERO Pedraza (201-).

He has been an employee-messenger of the Soviet Press Office in Mexico City for several years. To supplement his salary, he took a job in November, 1966, as a salesman for Searle de Mexico, S.A., a pharmaceutical firm. Although he was considering resigning from the Press Office in May, 1968, to work for a higher salary in a detergent factory, he was still working in the Press Office as of September, 1968. As of July, 1966, he was married to Celia SILVA de Caballero and had two young daughters. He has several paramours, at least one of whom he has met regularly since 1966.

SECRET
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

201-770128
HMMA-35797
08 NOV 68
P2

LEONOV 15-23-04 SOV PRESS ATTACHE HIS HOME AND OFFICE PHONE NO /KNOWN KGB/ MENTIONED IN DOC RE SILANTYEV, V. I. /201-770128/

R 6811290831

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 18668

EXO

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

XXXXXX DIA NMCC/MC XXXXXXXXXX ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC XXXXXXXX SDO XXXXXXX

STATE/DIR NIC (HENDRICKSON ONLY) FBI D/NE DDI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/03882-68

DIST 24 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/MEXICO/USSR

21 36 Z OCT 68

DOI 18 OCTOBER 1968

24 21 35 Z OCT 68

SUBJECT IDENTITY OF SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN MEXICO CITY WHO SERVES AS INTERMEDIARY FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT TO THE USSR

ACQ GUATEMALA, GUATEMALA CITY (22 OCTOBER 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEMBER OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) WHO RECENTLY TRAVELLED TO MEXICO. HE HAS BEEN A RELIABLE REPORTER IN THE PAST. HE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A PGT TRAVELLER WHO TRANSITED MEXICO EN ROUTE TO THE USSR.

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER
TO FBI : FOR MR. S. J. PAPICH

5
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1

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1. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO CITY, IS THE CONTACT MAN FOR GUATEMALANS IN TRANSIT FOR THE USSR. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JOSE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR, EXILED MEMBERS OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) IN MEXICO CITY, SERVE AS LIAISON BETWEEN PGT TRAVELLERS AND LEONOV.

2. IF TRAVELLERS NEED TO CONTACT LEONOV ONLY TO FIRM UP TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, THEY ARE GIVEN AN IDENTIFICATION CARD BY BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA AND DROPPED OFF NEAR LEONOV'S OFFICE TO VISIT HIM ALONE. WHEN AN EXCHANGE OF MONEY OR DOCUMENTS IS INVOLVED, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO TO LEONOV'S OFFICE WITH THE TRAVELLER. (SOURCE COMMENT: LATELY BALCARCEL'S WIFE HAS BEEN MAKING MOST OF THE CONTACTS WITH LEONOV AS AN ADDED SECURITY MEASURE.) LEONOV'S MOST RECENT CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS WAS TO ARRANGE ONWARD TRAVEL FOR SIX PGT MEMBERS ENROUTE TO PARTY SCHOOLS IN MOSCOW. HE GAVE EACH ONE U.S.$600.00. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE HGG-4853, CS-311/09285-68 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS TRAVEL.)

3. LEONOV IS SOON TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM MEXICO CITY, BUT HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY ON CONTACT WITH THE GUATEMALANS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: LEONOV IS A KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN IN

MEXICO SINCE 1961.) (SOURCE COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR AS IF LEONOV ALSO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTACTS WITH OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENT
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1968
CLASSIFICATION: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMBER: 24962-601
SUBJECT: ENCOUNTER WITH SOVIET NATIONAL

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S E C R E T 230031Z OCT 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY GUAT 9611

IN 18707
23 Oct 68
4

MEXICO CITY [illegible] INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT MHIGLOO

REF: MEXICO CITY 7743 (IN 18668)

1. STATION GUATEMALA CITY MOST INTERESTED IN REF INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY EXILE INVOLVEMENT IN PGT FUNDING CHANNEL, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE INFO DISSEMINATED, PROVIDED, OF COURSE, ADEQUATE PROTECTION CAN BE GIVEN LIREBEL-2.

2. IT SUGGESTED THAT NOTIONAL BYLINE (I.E., MEMBER OF PGT WHO TRAVELLED TO MEXICO CITY AND RECEIVED INFO FROM BALCARCEL)) AND FULL CONTROLS ON REPORT MAY PROVIDE NEEDED SOURCE PROTECTION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES' COMMENTS.

3. NO INDEX. FILE 201-132139.

S E C R E T

AN CW
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FI

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NOV 13 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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23 OCT 68
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ACTION WH-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR. SB-8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2 FI-2, DDP, AddP

#759

S E C R E T 222220Z OCT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7743

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

22OCT68 IN 18668

REDCOAT MHIGLOO

1. AT HOME OF JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR EVENING 4 18 OCT 68, LIREBEL-2 RECEIVED FOLLOWING INFO DIRECTLY FROM CARDOZA.

2. JOSE LUIS BALCARCEL ORDONEZ AND JORGE ALBERTO CARDOZA AGUILAR ARE GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS IN MEXICO WHO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN MEXICO TO HANDLE TRAVEL OF GUATEMALANS TO SOVIET UNION AND FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM SOVIETS. THEIR CONTACT IS NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), PRESS ATTACHE WHO LIVES AT MAZATLAN 206 (PRESS OFFICE).

3. IF CONTACT REQUIRED FOR GUATEMALAN TRAVELLERS TO SOVIET UNION, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA TAKE TRAVELLERS NEAR PRESS OFFICE IN CAR AND THEN GIVE THEM IDENTIFICATION CARD TO PRESENT TO LEONOVM THEY THEN VISIT OFFICE ALONE. IF CONTACT FOR RECEIPT OF MONEY OR EXCHANGE OF DOCUMENTS, BALCARCEL OR CARDOZA GO DIRECTLY TO PRESS OFFICE. LATELY, WIFE OF BALCARCEL HAS HAD MOST CONTACT WITH LEONOV AS EXTRA PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.

4. ACCORDING CARDOZA, LEONOV TO BE TRANSFERRED SOON AND

201-132139

Leonov

SECRET

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7743 SECRET

HIS REPLACEMENT WILL CARRY ON CONTACT WITH GUATEMALANS. CARDOZA SAID HE BELIEVES LEONOV PROBABLY CONTACT FOR ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN EXILES BUT HE NOT POSITIVE OF THIS. MOST RECENT CONTACT WAS TO ARRANGE TRAVEL FOR SIX GUATEMALANS WHO TO ATTEND CONSOMOL SCHOOL IN SOVIET UNION (SEE MEXICO CITY 757S). EACH GIVEN 600 DOLLARS FOR TRIP.

5. LEONOV IS KNOWN KGB OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN MAKING PLANS FOR TRANSFER AFTER BEING IN MEXICO SINCE 1961.

6. DUE SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE, REQUEST ABOVE INFO BE LIMITED TO WOFIRM ONLY AND NO DISSEMINATION.

7. NO INDEX. FILE 50-6-141/4, 35-4-100 AND 201-132139.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, SB via Chief, WH Division
REDTOP AEKICK
Vladimir Ivanovich Silantyev (201-770128)

Reference: Mexico City 6054 (IN 39508)

Forwarded under separate cover is a LNERGO report concerning Subject. Persons mentioned by surname on page six of the report are identified at Headquarters as the subjects of 201-205304, 201-132139, 201-763035 and 201-285412 respectively. Can the Station identify any of the other persons mentioned on pages five and six?

Ambrose T. RIBARICH

Attachment:
as stated u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
w/attachments
u/s/c

24 OCT 1968

201-132139, 201-205304, 201-763035, 201-285412

HMMW-16779

16 October 1968

SECRET

201-770128

Internal Dist:
1 - 201-770128
1 - 201-205304
1 - 201-132139
1 - 201-763035
1 - 201-285412
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/K
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SB/CI/K F. Walters rah 6991

C/SB/CI

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FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, FI2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

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5	CI	10	

S E C R E T 262320Z SEP 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7359

26 SEP 68 IN 00477
M

DIRECTOR, INFO SAN JOSE

REDTOP

REF: A. SAN JOSE 0480 (IN 98375)

B. MEXICO CITY 7301 (IN 98545)

1. LIFEAT REPORTED KAREN ARMENOVICH KACHATUROV ARRIVED MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER. WAS MET BY NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

2. FILE HEADQUARTERS 201.

S E C R E T

Leonov
201 file

SECRET

201-132139.

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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INFO

FILE VR. RI/AN, SD 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, EUR 6, CI/OPS

CI/IC 2

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SECRET 281920Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6949

RIO DE JANEIRO, RECIFE INFO DIRECTOR

REDCOAT

28 Aug 68 IN 80609

REF: RECIFE 4670 (IN 79641)

M

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 24 AUG 68, FRANCSICO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV THAT DATE AND REAFFIRMED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIETS IN REFERENCE TO THE CZECH SITUATIONS. HE THEN MENTIONED BOOK H E JUST FINISHED WHICH SHOULD BE PUBLISED END SEPTEMBER. HE HAS A COPY IN FRENCH WHICH HE WANTS TO GIVE TO LEONOV. BOOK IS TO BE PUBLISHED IN MEXICO, FRANCE, ITALY, GERMANY, SWEDEN. LEONOV MIGHT BE ABLE TO HAVE IT PUBLISHED IN SOVIET UNION.

2. PER REQUEST PARA THREE REF, STATION ATTEMPTING OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO ON BOOK. WILL ADVISE.

3. ABOVE MAY BE PASSED CONGEN.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

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INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN SBP CAS CA/PROP FI 2

415 CI CI/OPS CI/IC 2 CA/PEG DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 240016Z AUG 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6885

PRIORITY RIO DE JANEIRO INFO ROUTINE DIRECTOR 24 Aug 68 IN 77213

REDCOAT

4

1. ACCORDING LIENVOY 22 AUG 68, FRANCISCO JULIAO DE PAULA CONTACTED NICOLAY LEONOV, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE IN MEXICO, AND KGB AND DECLARED HIS SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (APPARENTLY REFERRING TO CZECH SITUATION).

2. STATION PLANS INCLUDE THIS IN ROUNDUP OF LOCAL REACTIONS TO INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE SOVIET UNION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET 201-132139

2P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION:
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP DIZTAG: Unconfirmed Report of Travel to Mexico of Oldrich NOVICKY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. It was first reported by the LITEMPO airport personnel (according to their list of passports photographed by them at the airport) that Oldrich NOVICKY was among the passengers arriving in Mexico from Havana on 7 June 1968, at 0958 hours. According to the LITEMPO list, he was the only Czech on the CUBANA flight.

2. However, the CUBANA manifest did not list NOVICKY's name; the only Czech on the manifest was: F / manifesto; bio data.

Frantisek PROCHAZKA — CIT: CSR.

OCC Diplomatic Courier

Diplomatic Passport No. 3076 — Δ CSR.

Therefore, the LITEMPO film, accompanying the list, was checked carefully, and it was found that the only Czech passport actually photographed by LITEMPO was that of PROCHAZKA, (even though his name was not on their list).

3. The LIFIRE team was then queried (and showed a photograph of NOVICKY), and they responded that the only Czech they

.......continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

~~201-257691~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-8-34	HMMA-35196	7 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-257691

201-132139

recalled seeing arrive on the CUBANA flight was the courier PROCHAZKA; they could not recall having seen NOVICKY. LIENVOY reports during this period gave no indications of NOVICKY's presence here. LIHABIT-1 also reported that NOVICKY was not seen in the vicinity of the Czech Embassy.

4. Nevertheless, there are several mystifying aspects to the LITEMPO report. It is quite incredible that the LITEMPO airport team would know NOVICKY's name, and equally incredible that they could confuse this name with that of PROCHAZKA. They listed NOVICKY's full name, correctly spelled. Where then, if NOVICKY had not actually arrived, did they get his name?

5. Secondly, it is most unusual, and the only instance the Station can recall, for only one courier to make the trip to Mexico. They have always traveled here in pairs. (NOTE: It has been the case recently, however, for the couriers to travel to Mexico via Cuba and leave via Cuba, instead of traveling via Air France through New York, then to Havana, return to Mexico and depart Mexico via Air France again.) Further, PROCHAZKA's name is not on the list of known career couriers or audio technicians and sweepers of Book Dispatch 6423, dated 21 June 1968. A further curious departure from normal procedure was that according to LIENVOY (7 and 8 June 1968) reports, the courier PROCHAZKA did not stay at the Czech schoolhouse but at the Ambassador's residence. Per LIENVOY, and confirmed on the CUBANA manifest, PROCHAZKA departed Mexico on 10 June 1968, for Havana.

6. Finally, but quite possibly purely coincidental, there were two references to NOVICKY about the same time as his reported arrival. In one of the DISPERSE tapes, #351, in mid-June 1968, Oldrich STANCL (201-777862), in a rambling, slightly drunken speech, refers to one JIKA NOVICKY, as "his brother" (presumably referring to Oldrich NOVICKY). Another even more oblique reference, but again intriguing because of the timing was a reference in a LIFEAT report dated 7 June 1968; a local leftist journalist, Jorge ROSALES Natividad in a conversation with Nikolai LEONOV (201-132139), the Soviet Press Officer, sometime before 1120 hours, said that he "had asked NOVICKI for an opinion on SIEMPRE" (a Mexican magazine). There was no further explanation of who "NOVICKI" was, but Station records indicate ROSALES Natividad had been a regular contact of Oldrich NOVICKY, during the latter's tour here as Press Attache of the Czech Embassy. Just prior to this reference to "NOVICKI", ROSALES had been talking to LEONOV about having gotten a lot of material from Cuba (for an article about Che GUEVARA). Does Headquarters have any information about a possible trip or assignment for NOVICKY in Cuba?

7. In summary, the Station does not know exactly how, or why, NOVICKY, a Czech intelligence officer, might have entered Mexico clandestinely, but believes it was possible.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-257691

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 5

S E C R E T 020057Z JUL 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 6103

DIRECTOR

2 JUL 68 IN 41948

REDTOP

1. FERNINAND ROBERTOVICH GINNO (201-256876) ARRIVED MEXICO CITY 25 JUNE ON SABENA FLT 555. GINNO ACCOMPANIED BY NINE SOVIETS, WHO PER MAY 68 LICOZY-5 REPORT ARE HERE TO ATTEND THIRD INTERNATIONAL ENDOCRINOLOGY CONGRESS BEING HELD MEXICO.

2. LIENVOY REPORTED GINNO CALLED OLD FRIEND, NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) ON 26 JUNE. TOLD LEONOV HE TRAVELLING TO LEON, GUANAJUATO ON 27 JUNE TO RETURN 5 JULY. WANTED TO GIVE SOMETHING TO LEONOV. GINNO ADDED THAT GROUP WILL DEPART MEXICO 7 JULY.

S E C R E T

BT

CS filed 201-726604 (GINNO)

SECRET

201-132139

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET 33

ORIG: ROBERT BUCKMAN
UNIT: WH/3/C
EXT: 7271
DATE: 18 JUNE 1968

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CAS, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

18 22 31z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO PRIORITY BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS

REDTOP AEASSAULT

REFS: A) BOGOTA 0123 (IN 32576)* NOT SENT CARACAS

B) DIRECTOR 04579** NOT SENT CARACAS

C) BOGOTA 0127 (IN 32609)*** NOT SENT MEXICO CITY

1. UPON RECONSIDERATION HQS FEELS THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE IN TERMS OF GREATEST IMPACT TO SURFACE LEONOV CONNECTION WITHOUT PEG OF MAZATLAN ADDRESS. WITHOUT ADDRESS CONNECTION WOULD AT BEST BE TENUOUS.

2. IN VIEW REPERCUSSIONS FROM REF C LEAK CONSIDER IT INADVISABLE FOR TIME BEING TO CONTINUE EXPLOITATION ANY ASPECT PACHON CASE IN CARACAS. SP

3. FOR BOGOTA: PER REF C, HQS APPRECIATIVE NEED OF KEEPING EXPLOITATION UNATTRIBUTABLE AND KEEPING PRES. LLERAS' [redacted] NAME OUT OF IT. WILL CABLE ALL STATIONS TO ONLY REPLAY MATERIALS WHICH CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO OVERT COLOMBIAN SOURCES. /41 SP

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1

COORD: SB/O/WH Jim Noland (telecord)

WH/3/V Keith Gardiner (draft)

WH/CA

201-133139

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PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 09166

TO

WH Comments: *Station will continue to attempt placement of Leonov's connection in case in Bogota press

**Advised Station Bogota of pitfalls of surfacing Leonov connection without Mazatlan address, but deferred to Station's judgment.

*** Leak of case in Caracas newspaper. Information sourced to "a high official of American Intelligence Service."

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

TO	Chiefs of Station, Bogota and Mexico City
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, WHD
SUBJECT	AEASSAULT/Forwarding of Photographs on Nikolay Sereyevich LEONOV (201-132139)
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION

- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

Reference: DIRECTOR 08247

Forwarded herewith, for Bogota and Mexico, are seven photos of LEONOV.

James M. BEGLINGER

MICROFILMED
JUL 2 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachments: NO
Photos, h/w, for Bogota
Photos, h/w/, for Mexico
~~Negatives, h/w, for Mexico~~

Distribution:
2 - Bogota
2 - Mexico City

201-132139

20 JUN 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
D-17-4-135 CS COPY	HLBW-5907	17 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

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32 MF FILES
ABSTRACT INDEX

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WH/3/C	L. Therry	sh	7271

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/O/WH		(in draft)
C/WH/1	17/6/68	Walter J. Kaufman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	17 June 68	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

TO: Mr. Scott

FROM: Deputy Chief of Mission

By hand please

117

Ambassador Freeman
told me on 24 June that
he used this for full dis-
cussion with Foreign
Minister Antonio Carrillo
Flores on 22 June 1968

SECRET

17 June 1968

Discussed with ACP 6/22/68

MEMORANDUM TO : THE AMBASSADOR

FROM : Winston M. Scott

SUBJECT : Soviet Participation in Colombian Subversive Activities

Returned 24 June 68

1. On the morning of 16 April 1968 our surveillance of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who is a known KGB officer, determined that he had a clandestine meeting with a Latin American male. LEONOV passed a small bundle to this individual. We followed the Latin American to the Hotel Principal, Bolivar 29. Checks at the hotel revealed that he was registered at the hotel as Feliciano PACHON Chaconta, a Colombian citizen, and that a woman, Librada MORENO Leal, also a Colombian citizen, was registered in the same room with him. Airline checks revealed that PACHON arrived in Mexico City on 6 April 1968 and that MORENO arrived on 12 April 1968. Both came from Bogota. Checks with our representatives in Bogota showed that they were both important members of the (PCC) Communist Party of Colombia. Further checks revealed that PACHON and MORENO had air reservations for 20 April 1968 to return to Bogota on separate airlines. Our surveillance confirmed their departure from Mexico City on 20 April 1968 on separate flights.

2. We informed our representatives in Bogota who informed the Colombian Security Service. Both were picked up upon arrival in Bogota. PACHON was carrying $70,000 (U.S.) and MORENO was carrying $30,000 (U.S.).

3. Both couriers broke and provided considerable information, the most important of which is:

a. Identification of the entire clandestine leadership of the PCC and FARC.

b. FARC: personnel and plans.

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201-132139

c. One courier has made several trips to Mexico to receive money from the Soviets. The largest amount was $200,000 (U.S.) which he got from LEONOV in June 1967. The smallest amount received was $75,000 (U.S.).

d. The address and identification of the PCC clandestine printing press. The Colombians raided this installation and captured the operator plus false documents and passports, forging material, presses, etc. He talked and said that he had received 1 1/2 years of training in the USSR in forgery. All equipment and false passport blanks were supplied by the Soviets.

e. All clandestine support and direction to the PCC and FARC comes from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. The regular contact is Nikolay S. LEONOV. The chief referent for Communist Party matters in Latin America is Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

4. This whole affair has been personally very embarrasing to Colombian President LLERAS because he had just agreed to diplomatic relations with the USSR. (The new Soviet Ambassador to Colombia, Nikolay A. BELOUS, presented his credentials on 27 May 1968). LLERAS had already been criticized in the press, when it was learned after BELOUS had been accepted, that BELOUS had been declared Persona Non Grata in Argentina in 1958, for direct involvement in fomenting Communist inspired strikes. (COMMENT: In the official curriculum vitae which the Soviet Foreign Office sent to Colombia on BELOUS, his assignment in Argentina was omitted.) Although LLERAS ordered a forceful prosecution of this matter, he insisted that the blame be put on the Cubans rather than the Soviets in order to avoid personal embarrassment.

5. We have been covering LEONOV thoroughly because he is the principal KGB contact in Mexico for Communist Parties in other Latin American countries. He has been in Mexico for ten (10) years doing very little other than handling Communist Party matters.

6. One of the principal clandestine activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico is the support, direction and financing of Latin American Communist parties in those Latin American countries where the Soviets do not have diplomatic representation. The Soviets have diplomatic relations with only six (6) Latin American countries, namely, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Mexico. Thus, the importance of Mexico in this matter.

12,979

7. Please return this material to Room 521 for filing.

#12,979

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Mr. Scott

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ORIG: LEN THERRY:red
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DATE: 14 JUNE 1968

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14 15 10z JUN 68

CITE DIRECTOR 08247

TO BOGOTA INFO: MEXICO CITY

RYBAT ABASSAULT

REF: A. HLBA 10,698

B. MEXICO CITY 5893 (IN 29961)

1. CAN BOGOTA FORWARD ORIGINALS OF REF A LETTERS TO HQS. FOR POSSIBLE SW ANALYSIS?

2. HQS WILL POUCH SEVEN PHOTOS OF LEONOV 17 JUNE TO MEXICO AND BOGOTA. THESE INCLUDE TWO CLOSEUPS OF LEONOV (1964) AND FIVE OTHERS OF LEONOV WITH CASTRO AND KHRUSHCHEV. (1963)

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: SB/O/WH [illegible] (by phone)

Calvin M. Smyth
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Maurice J. Gremillion
MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

201-132139

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S E C R E T 130122Z JUNE '68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5893

(Mexi-5873)

PS	DEST	SB/C/WH
ABSTRACT	✗	INDEX

BOGOTA, INFO DIRECTOR

AEASSAULT

Nikolay S.

13 JUN 68 29081
T

1. PASSPORT AND OTHER PHOTOS OF LEONOV DO NOT APPEAR SUITABLE. AIRMAILING NEGATIVE OF PRESS PHOTO OF LEONOV SCOWLING OVER SHOULDER OF YEVGENIY YEVTUSHENKO. IN PHOTO LEONOV APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO CONTROL YEVTUSHENKO AND LOOKS VERY SINISTER. BELIEVE THIS PHOTO WILL BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR PRESS USE.

2. MEXICO STATION BELIEVES FROM PAST EXPERIENCE THAT ONCE LILISP-E PUBLISHERS ARTICLE REPORTING LEONOV INVOLVEMENT IN COLOMBIA SUBVERSIVE NET CASE, GOM WILL ISSUE ORDERS TO MEXICAN PRESS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY FURTHER ARTICLES ON THIS TOPIC. STATION THEREFORE IS HOLDING OFF ANY FURTHER PUBLICATION OF MATERIAL ON COLOMBIA SUBVERSION UNTIL IT CAN PUBLISH STORY OF LEONOV INVOLVEMENT. ONCE STORY PUBLISHED HERE STATION ASSET SIMONCINI WILL ALERT UPI CONTACT TO STORY IN ATTEMPT TO GET STORY RELAYED ON WIRE SERVICE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

13 June 68
201-132139

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5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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14.

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139                            017-004-135
SEX M DOB ?                           BOGO-00096
                                      11 JUN 68
CIT USSR ?
OCC ?
< MEXICO




HMM                                   R 6807170475
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(7-46)

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SEREYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

017-004-135
BOGO-00037
04 JUN 68

CIT USSR
OCC ?
< MEXI
SOV PRESS ATT MECICO CITY

R 6807170479

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PRECEDENCE

S E C R E T 290050Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5719 Mexi

PRIORITY DIRECTOR PRIORITY BOGOTA

29 MAY 68 IN 20342

FS-1

REDCOAT MHSHAWN AEASSAULT

REF: A. BOGOTA 0969 (IN 16602)

B. DIRECTOR 03594

C/SB/CI

ABSTRACT X INDEX

1. ON BASIS AVENIDA MAZATLAN NOTATION THAT PACHON WAS CARRYING AND FACT NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (201-132139) LIVES AND HAS OFFICE AT AV. MAZATLAN 206 AND IS KNOWN KGB WHO HAS CLANDESTINELY SUPPORTED CP ACTIVITIES, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LEONOV BE IDENTIFIED AS THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT IN REF A WHO GAVE PACHON MONEY IN MEXICO.

2. BY SURFACING ADDRESS BOGOTA CAN TELL PRESS CONTACTS ADDRESS BELONGS TO LEONOV ON WHOM BOGOTA OBTAINED FOLLOWING

TRACES: NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV DOB 22 AUGUST 1928 IS A KGB OFFICER WHO USES THE COVER OF SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVEMB IN MEXICO. ALL OF HIS FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS HAVE BEEN IN MEXICO WHERE HE HAS SERVED A TOTAL OF TEN YEARS STARTING IN 1953. HE IS THE MASTERMIND FOR SOVIET CLANDESTINE SUPPORT, DIRECTION AND FINANCING OF CPS IN LATIN AMERICA.

3. FYI - LEONOV ABOUT TO LEAVE PCS AFTER SEVEN YEARS MEXICO ON CURRENT SERIES OF TOURS. IF BOGOTA CAN SURFACE HIM, MEXICO

SECRET

action to SB/0/WH ✓ ~~[illegible]~~ 29 MAY 68
201-132139
~~[illegible]~~

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INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5719 SECRET

CAN PICK UP CONCURRENT WITH HIS DEPARTURE AND SAY HE BEING SENT HOME FOR POOR TRADECRAFT, UPSETTING CURRENT SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN LA, ETC.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES COMMENTS.

SECRET

BT

JAN 10 68

IB

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 27 MAY 68

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☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139 ✓

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, CA5, CA/PROP, CI/ICZ

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 03613

TO 28 19 01Z MAY 68

MEXICO CITY INFO BOGOTA

REDTOP

REFS: A. BOGOTA 0978 (IN 18170)

B. DIRECTOR 00038

SB/O/WH

ABSTRACT ✓ INDEX

IN VIEW RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS AS REPORTED IN REF A, REQUEST STATION ALSO FORWARD TO BOGOTA PRESS CLIPS REQUESTED IN REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH

C/WH/1

C/WH/3/C

C/WH/3

27 MAY 68 ✓
201-132139

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

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FILE VR. CA 5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB 8, WH/COG 8, SOD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY

25 MAY 68 IN 1 C 17820

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

M

MHSPAWN

#183

PAGE 6 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

BY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN EFFORT TO PUT SOME BACKBONE IN PRESIDING JUDGES.

6. DEFER TO HQS TO FILL IN OTHER STATIONS ON BACKGROUND THIS CASE.

7. SINCE AS PER PARA 4 ABOVE STATION IS AWARE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSION WHICH 24 MAY EL TIEMPO ARTICLE MAY PRODUCE ON PRESIDENT, STATION IS KEEPING LNPURE CLOSELY INFORMED ON CASE AND HAS ALERTED REELFOOT AND OTHER STATION SOURCES WITH ACCESS TO PALACE TO KEEP US INFORMED ON LLERAS' REACTIONS.

8. CLIPS BEING SENT KMFORGET.

S E C R E T

BT

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201-132139

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
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BY ____ AT ____ Z

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FILE RID ☐ RET TO ____ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE VR. CA-5, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, SB-8, FI, FI/INT-2, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, SOD-6

S E C R E T 241932Z MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 (KRUSKALL ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO: CARACAS MEXICO CITY

SECTION ONE FOR TWO

24 May 68 IN 18170

MHSPAWN

REFS: BOGOTA 0969 (IN16602)

1. FOLLOWING TWO DAYS OF DISTORTED, FUZZY, CONFLICTING ARTICLES APPEARING IN ALL BOGOTA DAILIES CONCERNING ROLL UP OF CLANDESTINE APPARAT OF PCC INCLUDING GRADUAL APPEARANCE OF PACHON AS A FACTOR IN CASE AND INSERTION OF THE UNCOVERING OF VAST LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVE NET INVOLVING COLOMBIA, BOLIVIA, MEXICO, VENEZUELA,, THE 24 MAY EL TIEMPO BROKE OUT WITH FOLLOWING HEADLINE: "LA RED SUBVERSIVA: EN MEXICO ENTREGARON LOS DOLARES A FELICIANO PACHON...ERAN 150,000 Y NO LOS 101,000 QUE LE HALLARON EN BOGOTA - PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE 'RAPIDOL', JEFE DE LAS 'FARC', AL SUR DEL CAQUETA. EL CASO DEL VENEZOLANO JOSE MARIA QUERALES MERCHAN. -LA 'AVANZADE CHE GUEVARA' FUE DESEMBARCADA EN VENEZUELA Y EN LAS BOCAS DEL AMAZONAS".

2. ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY "LA RED SUBVERSIVA DESENMASCARADA EN COLOMBIA ES APENAS PARTE DE UNA INMENSA CONJURA COMMUNISTA CON RAMIFICACIONES EN GRAN PARTE DE AMERICA LATINE...Y EN DESARROLLO DE UNA DE LAS CUALES

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201-132139

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PAGE 2 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 8978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

FUE CONDENADO EL SUJETO FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA, A QUIEN AGENTES DEL DAS Y UNO DE INTERPOL DETUVIERON EN ELDORADO, DESPUES DE SEGUIRLO DESDE MEXICO, Y EN SU PODER HALLARON LA NO DESPRECIABLE SUMA DE 101,000 DOLARES GIRADOS CON DESTINO A LOS 'FRENTES REVOLUCIONARIOS DE COLOMBIA' SEGUN FUENTES DIGNAS DE TODO CREDITO, FELICIANO PACHON CHOCONTA CONFESO HABER RECIBIDO LA VALIOSA SUMA EN MEXICO DE MANOS DE UN FUNCIONARIO DE LA EMBAJADA SOVIETICA EN CUBA, Y QUIEN SE TRASLADO A LA CAPITAL AZETECA CON ESTE FIN..."HAY SIN EMBARGO EN ESTE CASO UN DETALLE CURIOSO Y ES QUE, DE ACUERDO CON ALGUNAS INFORMACIONES, FELICIANO RECIBIO DE MANOS DEL DIPLOMATICO LA SUMA DE 150,000 DOLARES. Y EN ELDORADO UNICAMENTE LE HALLARON 101,000. LOS 49,000 RESTANTES DESAPARECIERON 'MISTERIOSAMENTE". ALGUIEN DIJO QUE HABIAN IDO A PARAR A MANOS DE 'LOS TESOREROS DE LA REVOLUCION' AL PARECER EN PANAMA." LOS ABOGADOS DEFENSORES DE FELICIANO PACHON MANIFESTARON AYER PARA UN PERIODICO LOCAL QUE LO OCURRIDO A SU PODER ANTE NADA TIENE QUE VER CON LAS GUERRILLAS Y QUE SIMPLEMENTE 'DON FELICIANO LO QUE ESTABA

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FILE, VR.

PAGE 3 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

ERA TRAYENDO DOLARES A PAIS'. PERO RESULTA QUE PACHON CHOCONTA ES HERMANO DE EDUARDO PACHON PRIETO, ALIAS 'RAPIDOL', UNO DE LOS MAS SOBRESALIENTES JEFES 'GUERRILLEROS' DEL GRUPO QUE OPERA AL SUR DEL CAQUETA (FARC) U QUE SIGUE LA LLAMADA 'LINEA DE MOSCU' Y PARA ESTE 'FRENTE' ESTABA DIRIGIDO EL DINERO ENTREGADO POR EL DIPLOMATICO SOVIETICO EN MEXICO, MIENTRAS LOS DOLARES QUE LLEGABAN POR VENEZUELA A TRAVES DE BOLIVIA TAL COMO AYER LO INFORMAMOS EN FORMA EXCLUSIVA, IBAN DIRIGIDOS PARA LOS ALZADOS EN ARMAS EN EL 'ALTO SINU' Y AL NORTE DE SANTANDER ESTABLECIENDOSE ASI UNA FUERTE RELACION ENTRE LOS CASOS DE FELICIANO PACHON Y EL DE LOS ARQUITECTOS CASAS Y TAPIA, QUE A LA VEZ SON APENAS ESLABONES DE LA MISMA CADENA QUE ENVUELVE A VENEZUELA, ECUADOR, PERU, BRASIL, Y BOLIVIA." ARTICLE GOES ON TO TIE RUSSIAN SHIP "KEGOSTROV" INTO TRANSPORTING A GROUP OF "GUERRILLEROS CASTRISTAS...PERTENECIENTES A UNA NUEVA UNIDAD DENOMINADA 'AVANZADA CHE GUEVARA'".

3. STATION THEREFORE HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO KEEP PROP PLOY BOILING ALONG LINES THIS CASE DRAMATIC PROOF

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE. VR.		

PAGE 4 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 SECRET (KRUSKALL ACTING)

SOVIETS HAVE NOT ONLY NOT CHANGED THEIR WAYS BUT HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO AND FACT THAT ALSMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH BELOUS ARRIVING IN COLOMBIA, OOZING SWEETNESS AND GOOD FELLOWSHIP, STOUTLY DECLARING SOV GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVER INTERFERE IN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN AFFAIRS AND EMPHAZING THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD EXPORT REVOLUTION OR COUNTER REVOLUTION, THAT SAME SOV GOVERNMENT WAS SECRETLY PUMPING IN FUNDS, MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND PRPAGANDA MATERIALS FOR SUBVERSIVE USE IN UNDERMINING COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT. TIMING MOST PROPITIOUS AS BELOUS PRESENTING CREDENTIALS AFTERNOON 24 MAY. PROP PLOY WILL ALSO HAVE SLANT THAT RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION MIGHT CONCEIVABLY PROVIDE USEFUL ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS BUT COUNTRIES PRESENTLY SO AFFILIATED PLUS THOSE CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATING SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET WOOING BEST BEWARE THAT BEAR BEARING GIFTS SINCE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SOVIET RELATIONS IS EXPORT OF SUBVERSION, NOT GOODS AND MATERIALS AND COLOMBIA IS ALREADY EXCELLENT CASE IN POINT.

4. ANY PROP PLAY THAT CAN BE GENERATED ALONG LINES PARA 3 MOST WELCOME. BOGOTA STATION CAUTIONS AGAINST

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR

PAGE 5 MAY 68 CITE BOGOTA 0978 S E C R E T (KRUSKALL ACTING)

ATTACKING OR ACCUSING PRESIDENT LLERAS PERSONALLY HOWEVER ~~SI~~SINCE HE REACTS UNPREDICATABLY AND SOMETIME RASHLY TO PERSONAL CRITICISM. THEREFORE REQUEST THAT COLOMBIAN PERSONALITIES BE KEPT OUT OF ANY PROP PLAY SINCE CURRENT SITUATION INEVITABLY WILL PRESENT LLERAS WITH EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND EMBARRASSING POLITICAL PILL TO SWALLOW AS WELL AS CREATE AN INTERNAL COLOMBIAN POLITICAL RHUBARB INVOLVING LLERAS GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY, AND THE OSPINISTAS. POSSIBLE RESULTS FROM SUCH A SITUATION COULD INVOLVE DISMISSAL OF GISOY-92 FOR PERMITTING STORY BE BREAK IN ALL ITS GLORY AND STATION WANTS TO MINIMIZE PERSONAL REPERCUSSIONS, SINCE ON~~E~~CE ST~~RO~~ORY STARTED LEAKING, STATION URGED GISOY-92 TO RELEASE AS FACTUAL A PRESENTATION AS POSSIBLE. WHETHER OR NOT STATION RECOMMENDATIONS HAD ANY WEIGHT IN PRODUCING WIDE-SCALE PUBLICITY, STATION COULD WELL BE MADE SCAPEGOAT BY LLERAS AND GISOY-92.

5. STATION ALSO MOVING TO HAVE VARIOUS PRESTIGIOUS LOCAL ATTORNEYS COME OUT WITH STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY TRIALS AND REFUTATIONS OF INANE POINTS BEING MADE

SECRET

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO.

FROM

Chief, WHD

SUBJECT Forwarding of Documents of Correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA and Nicolay Sergeyevech LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 99758, 14 May 1968

Action Required: For Information

Forwarded herewith are copies of documents relating to an exchange of correspondence between Carlos A. BONILLA Sanchez (201-273728) and the Soviet press attache in Mexico City, Nicolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The Station may wish to look into this relationship, possibly through G[illegible]OR-10.

James M. BEOLINGER

Attachment: documents, h/w

201-273728

Distribution:
2 - Bogota

201-132139 Leonov

20 MAY 1969

CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-132139	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBW - 5369	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-273728

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
O REDTOP/Headquarters Request for Press Clippings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 00038, 16 May 1968

1. Transmitted herewith are the press clippings described below. The Station has no record that the clips requested in Paragraph (5) of reference were ever received; though MONTERREY 0766 of 4 November 1963 stated clips were being pouched, a check of Station records does not reveal a transmittal dispatch.

2. In response to Reference Paragraph (3) request, only the Ultimas Noticias article was located. The original clip is forwarded as Attachment A. It will be noted that according to MEXICO CITY 4814 dated 1 June 1963, this is the same article as that appearing on the same date in Atisbos.

3. The article requested in Reference Paragraph (4) is forwarded as Attachment B, in copy, since the original was not in our files. It was Station inspired.

4. The clip requested in Reference Paragraph (6) is also forwarded in the original as Attachment C. This was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMYA-2032 (received HMYA-032) of 5 December 1963.

5. The Station is unable at this time to come up with additional information to support future exploitation, but will be on the lookout for material that may be of use.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Press Clippings, A,B,&C.

Distribution:
1 ~~2~~ - C/SB, w/atts.
2 - C/WH, w/o/atts.

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201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34693	20 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

(A)

Ultimas de Noticias
PRIMERA EDICION EXCELSIOR DIARIO DE MEDIODIA
MEXICO, D. F.—VIERNES 31 DE MAYO DE 1963
GERENTE GENERAL
J. JESUS GARCIA

México en los Planes de Castro y Krushchev



EN ESTA FOTO, tomada en la URSS, durante la actual visita de Fidel Castro, puede verse en el extremo izquierdo al tercer secretario y agregado cultural de la embajada soviética en México, Sergeyevic Lenov Nikolai, en animada charla con Castro Ruz y Krushchev. Discutieron la agitación en Iberoamérica, alentada desde Cuba y México.

Huyó Aniceto del Valle, que Estuvo Allegado a Castro Ruz

Dice que se Planea la Agitación Continental Desde Cuba y México

Aniceto del Valle, uno de los más conocidos abogados de La Habana y que hasta hace veinte dias parecia ser un simpatizador de Castro (ahora se ha exiliado) declaró anoche, antes de salir para Panamá, que la Unión Soviética prepara un plan subversivo para los paises de la América Central, especialmente.

Según Del Valle, "Cuba será la cabeza de playa visible y México el centro distribuidor de armas de marcas mexicanas y norteamericanas".

El abogado aseguró que él obtuvo esta información en el Departamento de Asuntos Latinoamericanos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba en donde tiene muchos amigos.

Dos "hombres-clave" son los más importantes para realizar el plan, según Del Valle: Sergeyevic Leonov Nikolai, tercer secretario de la embajada rusa en México y agregado cultural de la misma embajada; y el capitán mexicano Lorenzo Cárdenas Barajas, el encargado de comprar armas y el encargado de entregarlas a Nikolai, que es el distribuidor.

De estas dos personas se habla (dice Del Valle) en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Fidel Castro, como de los más importantes a los complotistas centroamericanos.

SIGUE EN LA PAGINA TRES

HUYO ANICETO DEL CALLE, QUE ESTUVO ALLEGADO

Sigue de la primera plana

Por otra parte, afirmó que Nikolai salió de México el 21 de abril de este año rumbo a la URSS para que su llegada a Rusia coincidiera con la llegada de Castro a Moscú. Así, Nikolai participó en las reuniones de Castro y Krushchev. Para el caso afirmó que Nikolai apareció fotografiado junto con Castro y Krushchev en el periódico "El Mundo" de La Habana. El periódico es del 8 de este mes y la foto se encuentra en la página 8.

(B)

Excelsior, Mexico City
26 March 65

Lee Oswald en México

Por ALBERTO WILLIAMS

HACE poco se exhibió en un bonito salón de cine de la ciudad de México, una pelicula que a quienes sómos admiradores del Presidente asesinado de los Estados Unidos, nos interesó y nos conmovió en alto grado. Era un filme muy realista, basado en la vida y la muerte del insigne estadista que supo ganarse el cariño y la admiración de todo el mundo. Se llama la pelicula "Años de Relámpago, dia de Tambores". Para la mayoria del público ese filme, no importa hasta qué grado haya despertado su interés, sólo significó un filme más acerca de John F. Kennedy.

Para nosotros los periodistas representó mucho más de eso, porque nos recordó la tragedia de Dallas y despertó nuevamente nuestra curiosidad respecto al asesino Lee Oswald y su visita a México en septiembre de 1963. Pensamos que tiene importancia el recordar a las personas con quienes tuvo tratos el asesino durante su permanencia en nuestra capital.

Aunque suele dudarse de la exactitud del informe rendido por la Comisión Warren acerca de sus investigaciones en torno a ese doloroso crimen, anotamos que ese reporte hace saber que Oswald visitó en la ciudad de México la embajada de Cuba comunista y la de la Unión Soviética. Como miembro activo que era de una organización llamada "Juego Limpio para Cuba en los Estados Unidos", ya se imaginarán los lectores que era bien conocido del presonal de la embajada de la Cuba comunista en México.

No se ha llegado a saber con seguridad los términos de la conversación que sostuvieron Lee Oswald y los rojos cubanos; pero es un dato seguro que Oswald salió de la embajada de Castro y se dirigió a la de la Unión Soviética, donde ya era conocido por los muchos años que pasó Oswald en el paraiso soviético. En esa misión diplomática sostuvo largas conversaciones con dos agentes rusos de la KGV, famosa agencia policiaca secreta cuya principal misión es dirigir campañas de terror y subversión desde puestos diplomáticos que simuladamente les asigna el Gobierno de Moscú para que actúen protegidos por un derecho internacional mal aplicado.

Diremos de paso que ese arreglo desleal de las cosas, que hace aparecer a la Unión Soviética como país amigo, en tanto que sus representantes diplomáticos asestan puñaladas traperas al pais que no sabe defenderse, facilita el que los agentes rusos enviados a paises pacificos como México, sean muchos y que cada embajada soviética disponga de un personal tan numeroso, que aquello no es un misión diplomática, sino una verdadera inmigración de rojillos.

Lee Oswald tuvo tratos con los agentes secretos Pavel Yatskov y Valery Kostikov. Estos "diplomáticos" de la KGV están todavia en servicio. El primero aparece como segundo secretario de la embajada rusa en la ciudad de México. Kostikov figura como "agregado" de la misma embajada. Este diplomático tiene fama de representar en forma destacada la escuela antigua de accion de la KGV. Es de carácter frio, brusco y de poco refinamiento. Muestra poco respeto para sus compañeros soviéticos y menos todavia para los mexicanos en general.

Yatskov, en cambio, es el ejemplo moderno de los agentes secretos graduados por aquella institución de espionaje. Cortés, atento, no expresa nunca criticas de México y de los mexicanos, como suele hacerlo su compañero Kostikov. Pero ambos son agentes activos y de mucha confianza de la KGV en nuestro pais. Los dos son personajes de cuidado, a quienes sin duda vigilan de cerca las autoridades para impedir que repitan el caso de otro esbirro soviético, Nikolai S. Leonov, que hace unos dos años estuvo dedicado por el Gobierno de Moscú a meter de contrabando armas de la Cuba castrista en los pacificos paises de la América Latina.

Nikolai S. Lenov, que vive y trabaja en la ciudad de México, dirige y realiza un amplio programa de distribución de impresos subversivos en la República, en Centroamérica y en la parte septentrional de la América del Sur. ¡Hay impresos que son más terribles que las armas y los pertrechos!

su discurso,
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201-132139

14-00000

MUNDO MEJOR (C)

México, D. F., 7 de Diciembre de 1963.

EN NUEVO LEON

Piden al Gobernador Meta en Cintura a los Rojos

Agentes Castristas, "Diplomáticos" Rusos y Rojos Criollos se Mueven en Monterrey, como Peces en el Agua.

DESCARADAMENTE, los agentes castristas que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León solicitan apoyo de los mexicanos para "las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional en Venezuela" en tanto que los marxistas hechos fuertes en el "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso", sección Monterrey, también abiertamente realizan labor de proselitismo entre el estudiantado, los obreros y otros fuertes núcleos ciudadanos.

En el número anterior, MUNDO MEJOR denunció que esos mismos "agentes castristas pretenden hacer un congreso comunista en Monterrey en complicidad con los rojos criollos, con intención de crear en esa ciudad el primer "Campamento Juvenil por la Paz y una Vida Mejor", uno de tantos señuelos de los rojos para engañar a la juventud mexicana". Nuestro periódico también dio cuenta de la propaganda abiertamente marxista que en favor de los rojos de Venezuela fijado y repartido por toda la ciudad los agitadores comunistas. He aquí las leyendas de algunos de esos carteles y volantes:

"Venezuela en armas. Hacer la patria libre, morir por Venezuela. Las fuerzas armadas de Liberación Nacional libran en estos momentos una lucha decisiva contra el imperialismo norteamericano y la pandilla entreguista y traidora de R. Betancourt. ¡Solidaridad con el pueblo venezolano! ¡Viva la revolución de América Latina! (Leyenda alrededor de una paloma que empuña un fusil que sirve como asta a una bandera tricolor en cuyo centro se leen las iniciales: FALN —Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional).

"Venezuela adelante en la revolución antiimperialista. Los pueblos de América Latina están contigo! Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".

"Los monopolios yanquis saquean las riquezas de América y nos hunden en la miseria y explotación. Apoyemos a un pueblo hermano que lucha heroicamente por liberarse: ¡Venezuela! ¡Adelante, los obreros, campesinos y estudiantes de toda América están contigo, pueblo hermano! ¡Vivan las F. A. L. N.: Juventud Comunista de Nuevo León".


VENEZUELA EN ARMAS
FALN
HACER LA PATRIA LIBRE
MORIR POR VENEZUELA
LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL LIBRAN EN ESTOS MOMENTOS UNA LUCHA DECISIVA CONTRA EL IMPERIALISMO NORTEAMERICANO Y LA PANDILLA ENTREGUISTA Y TRAIDORA DE R. BETANCOURT.
¡SOLIDARIDAD CON EL PUEBLO VENEZOLANO!
¡VIVA LA REVOLUCION DE AMERICA LATINA!

Uno de los volantes que han pegado en los muros de la ciudad de Monterrey agentes castristas y rojos criollos que agitan en la Universidad de Nuevo León. Asimismo, una "invitación" a estudiantes, obreros y campesinos del "Instituto de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso" de Monterrey a asistir "con su apreciable familia" a un acto en apoyo de las fuerzas comunistas de Liberación Nacional en América.

EL GOBERNADOR YA ESTA ADVERTIDO

Por otra parte, una muestra de la propaganda marxista que se incuba en el llamado Instituto de Intercambio Cultural (???) Mexicano-Ruso de Monterrey es esta invitación: "El próximo viernes... en el local de nuestro Instituto, el Honorable Agregado Auxiliar de la Embajada de la URSS en la República de México, señor Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov, disertará sobre el papel de la URSS en la lucha por la liberación nacional y las revoluciones populares de la América Latina.

Nos permitimos invitar a usted y a su apreciable familia, así como a sus amistades, y esperamos tener el gusto de verlo entre nosotros. La Directiva".

Por supuesto que el gobernador del Estado, Lic. Eduardo Li- Eduardo Livas Villarreal, ya tiene en su poder las denuncias y protestas contra esta situación por parte de más de 50 profesionistas —como también informó MUNDO MEJOR en su número anterior—, por los padres de familia y numerosos organismos de todo tipo, por lo que toca a ese mandatario tomar las medidas en forma energica con los alborotadores rojos, tal como el pueblo de Sabinas hace unos meses los arrojó de sus límites.

CS COPY

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY: AT. Z

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ACTION SB8 ☒ RID COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-132139

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET TO SB/[illegible]/WH BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG

INFO

FILE. VR. WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CI/IC2, CA5, CA/PROP

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	WH	6	CA
2	CI	7	
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5	RR	10	

temp cy - KI cy sent 21 may

SECRET 161828Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5583

DIRECTOR

REDTOP

REF: DIRECTOR 99929

ACTION

16 MAY 68 IN 12506

1. LISADDLE-2 DID NOT REOPEN CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE NOR DID HE MAKE EFFORT TO DO SO. HE CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS NEVER VALID EXCUSE OR OPPORTUNITY.

2. STATION SKEPTICAL ABOUT INFO IN PARAS FOUR AND FIVE OF HMMA-31117, 19 JANUARY 1967, DUE FACT ALLEGED VISITS TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE TOOK PLACE SOMETIME BEFORE HE REPORTED INCIDENT TO STATION, AND HIS PROVEN FABRICATION OF INFO IN OCTOBER 1967. ON OTHER HAND, EXCEPT FOR OCTOBER 1967 FABRICATION DURING PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO CIUDAD JUAREZ, HIS INFO BELIEVED BE RELIABLE. IN MANY CASES STATION WAS ABLE CHECK THROUGH OTHER SOURCES, AND ON STILL MANY OTHER OCCASIONS HIS INFO VERIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND PRESS.

SECRET

BT

tom ✓

File in Leonov 201

SECRET

201-132139

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: LEN THERRY:mlb
UNIT: WH/3/COLOMBIA
EXT: 7271
DATE: 14 MAY 1968

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CONF: WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-273728 x 201-132139

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA

S E C R E T Mr 14 22 07 Z CITE DIRECTOR 99758

TO BOGOTA

[redacted] REDCOAT

REFERENCES: A. BOGOTA 0735 (IN 88470)
B. BOGOTA 5109 (IN 33580) 1 DEC 64
C. HMMA 30130, 26 SEPT 66
D. HMMA 33295, 17 OCT 67

STATION MAY WISH TO LOOK INTO TIE-IN OF GITEMBLOR-15 (201-273728) WITH SUBJ (201-132139). AS HAVING POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH REF A. REFS C & D INDICATE HE HAS BEEN IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH 201-132139 IN MEXICO CITY SINCE AT LEAST 1966. REF B REPORTED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 HAD LEFT BOGOTA FOR MEXICO ON 26 NOVEMBER 1964. REF C NOTED THAT SUBJ 201-132139 WAS ALSO IN MEXICO CITY AT THIS TIME, AND THAT FROM A LETTER INTERCEPT IT APPEARED THAT GITEMBLOR-15 KNEW SUBJ AND HIS FAMILY PERSONALLY. MOST RECENT INDICATION OF THEIR CORRESPONDENCE IS A LETTER FROM MEXICO TO BOGOTA FORWARDED WITH REF D. WE WILL POUCH COPIES OF REFS B & C.

END OF MESSAGE

SR/O/WH Lee Mestres (by phone)

CONTINUED

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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JW
ORIG TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT. 6412
DATE: 14 MAY 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/O/WH BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-132139

INFO: FILE , VR . WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, ~~FI~~, FI/INT 2

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SECRET   MAY 15 17 30 Z   CITE DIRECTOR 99929

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ABSTRACT X		INDEX

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP

REF: HMMA 31117, 19 JANUARY 67

1. PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF RELATE ALLEGED VISITS BY LISADDLE/2 (FORMERLY LISATURN/1) 201-809883 TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE WHERE LISADDLE/2 SUPPOSEDLY RECEIVED SOME MONEY FROM VARIOUS SOVIETS. PARA 6 OF REF INDICATES LISADDLE/2 DIRECTED TO REOPEN THE CHANNEL TO SOVIET PRESS OFFICE. FILE DOES NOT REFLECT ANY FURTHER ACTION ON ABOVE. REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO ABOVE.

2. IN VIEW OF LATER DISCOVERY OF LISADDLE/2'S UNTRUSTWORTHINESS, REQUEST STATIONS COMMENTS RE VERACITY OF INFO IN PARAS 4 AND 5 OF REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH nolan

C/WH/1 [illegible] Kaufman

for C/WH Calvin M. Smyth

15 May 68

~~C~~ DC/SB/AO [illegible]

201-132139

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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ORIG: TOM WHITE
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 13 MAY 68

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET 4F 15 20 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO MEXICO CITY

REDTOP

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ABSTRACT X		INDEX

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 5455 (IN03860)
B. MEXICO CITY ~~4700~~ 4814, 1 JUNE 63
C. MONTERREY 0766, 4 NOVEMBER 63
D. HMYA 2032, 5 DECEMBER 63

1. REVIEW OF FILE, SUBJECT OF REF A, DISCLOSES CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLAY RE SUBJECT'S CONTACTS IN MEXICO ALTHOUGH SOME BACKUP MATERIAL MISSING FROM FILE. FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXPLOITATION REQUEST STATION FORWARD MATERIAL CITED BELOW AND ANY COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL INFO STATION MAY HAVE RELATIVE THERETO.

2. SUBJECT'S PERSONAL CARD (PLANTED) FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ WHEN LATTER ARRESTED 21 JUNE 56 BY MEXICAN POLICE AND THIS FACT APPARENTLY PLAYED UP IN PRESS AT TIME. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLE.

3. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARAS 2 AND ~~X~~ 5 OF REF B.

15 May 68
201-132139 ✓

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO. 804

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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INFO:
FILE , VR .

PAGE TWO

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 00038

TO

4. ON 26 MARCH 65 ARTICLE APPEARED IN "EXCELSIOR" UNDER TITLE "LEE OSWALD EN MEXICO." ARTICLE WRITTEN UNDER BYLINE "ALBERTO WILLIAMS" AND APPARENTLY STATION INSPIRED. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF ARTICLE.

5. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIPS OF PRESS ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF C AND PARA 2 OF REF C IF LATTER EVER CONSUMATED.

6. REQUEST STATION FORWARD ORIGINAL CLIP OF PRESS ARTICLE REFERRED TO IN PARA 1 OF REF D.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/O/WH

C/WH/1

C/WH

DC/SB/AO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

5 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB

Chief, WH

SUBJECT : Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, KGB Officer Possibly Linked to PACHON Case in Colombia

1. BACKGROUND:

Feliciano PACHON Choconta is the Colombian Communist courier apprehended by Colombian security officials in late April 1968 when alighting from a commercial flight from Mexico with U.S.$80,000 apparently destined for the Communist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Military Arm of Orthodox Communist Party - FARC). A female cohort of PACHON was picked up several hours later alighting from a second aircraft with U.S.$20,000. Both arrests were based on a tipoff by another Colombian Communist, Adelmo URREA Garcia, whose motives are as yet unclear. URREA who first claimed that the funds were of Cuban origin later changed his story to the effect that they are in fact Soviet. Subsequent interrogation of PACHON, URREA, and the female courier has failed to shed further light on either story.

2. However, a re-examination of PACHON's suitcase turned up a compartment in which were found several cryptic notes, including a reference to Avenida Mazatlan. Mexico City 5455 (IN 03860) reports Avenida Mazatlan 206 to be the address of the Soviet Press Office, and Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139) to be a KGB officer, known to have handled CP operations in the past.

3. A review of LEONOV's file reveals the following possibly significant information, when related to the PACHON case:

a. 1956: Subject's personal calling card was found in an address book taken from Fidel CASTRO Ruz when Fidel was arrested by Mexican police on 21 June 1956 in Mexico City. (See MEXICO CITY 6839, 27 June 1956, IN 55556.) This event was apparently reported in the Mexican press but the file does not contain a copy nor the date of publication, and there is some indication that the card may have been a plant. (See HMMW 10265, 24 Nov 61.)

NOTE:
CARD WAS
DEFINITELY
PLANTED BY
LIVOSTOCK-2.
This was discovered
by the Station much
later. [illegible]

SECRET

201-132139

b. 1963: April. Subject was Fidel Castro's interpreter during the latter's tour of the Soviet Union. The file contains many photos of the two with all the big-wigs of the USSR. The event was reported in El Mundo with a picture of Subject, Fidel, etc. on 8 May 63.

c. 1963: May. Subject was observed in a meeting with a former Mexican army captain Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas who was supposed to be an arms smuggler to the Guatemala guerillas. A Station inspired article appeared in the 31 May 63 edition of Atisbos, Mexican newspaper, accused Subject and Cardenas of being the key figures in Central American revolution plans. The source of the information was attributed to a former lawyer exiled from Cuba. The article was picked up and played in the 31 May 63 edition of Ultimas Noticias. A photo copy of the article is in Vol. 3 of Subject's file attached to HMMA 33295, 18 Oct 63.

d. 1964: A letter was obtained through LIMUD addressed to Subject from Carlos A. BONILLA S. (201-275728). The letter indicated that the two were apparent close friends. Bonilla at that time was the president of the Federation of Workers of Cundinamarca (FTC) and a leading Colombian Communist. (See HMMA 30130, 26 Sept 66 and HLBA 9425, 7 Oct 66.)

e. 1966: Subject was reported as being a close friend of Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza (201-91575) since 1955. LEMUS was at one time a prominent Guatemala communist, on Central Committee. Subject was also reported as being in contact with Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, also a prominent Guatemalan communist who is now dead, during January 62 (201-757506).

f. 1967: Soviet Press Office, where Subject also lives, was used as a payoff point for funds given to support the Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticas which organization is controlled by the Communist Party of Mexico. Subject was not the contact man for the funds. (See HMMA 31117, 19 Jan 67.)

g. HMMA 33215, 5 Oct 67, gives a rundown on other contacts of Subject with Guatemalan communists or guerillas.

4. LEONOV was in Mexico from July 1953 to October 1956, as Secretary to the Ambassador, and returned in July 1961 as a Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache. He has served since October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache.

James B. Noland
C/SB/O/WH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Yuliy Mikhaylovich VORONTSOV (201-113626)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY 5269

1. LIFIRE reported Subject's arrival in Mexico City on 9 April 1968 aboard PAA Flight 501. According to LIENVOY Subject departed Mexico City for Washington, D.C. on 13 April 1968.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Mexico City is unknown. LIFEAT reported that Subject was in contact with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Press Attache and known KGB officer. Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA described Subject as being "a husband of her friend, visiting from Washington". LEONOVA on another occasion stated that her husband was quite busy with a visitor and mentioned Subject by name. LIFEAT also reported that Subject was a guest at the LEONOV's house on 10 April.

3. LILYRIC reported that Subject visited the Soviet Embassy on 11 April 1968. He was seen arriving at 0953 hours in a car driven by Soviet Embassy chauffeur, Viktor Petrovich STRIZHOV (201-779301). It is not known with whom Subject had contact while at the Soviet Embassy. He left the Embassy at 1240 hours.

.......continued

Attachments:
- #1 - Legal Attache Memo
- #2 - Station Memo
- #3 - Photos

Distribution:
- 2 - C/SB, w/atts. 1, 2, &3
- 2 - C/WH, w/atts. 1 & 2 only

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

Xr. 201-132139

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-34575	2 May 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-113626

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34575

4. On 26 April 1968 the Legal Attache in Mexico City requested information concerning Subject's visit to Mexico City and to Brazil. Attached is a copy of this memorandum. Forwarded also is our answer to the Legal Attache, in which your attention is called to Paragraph 5. We leave it to Headquarters discretion on the dissemination of any further information on Subject, particularly that contained in RIO DE JANEIRO 5932 concerning Subject's request for a Brazilian visa.

5. Forwarded herewith for Chief, SB are photographs of Subject as obtained through LILYRIC.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

FORM 8-64 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2.

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, SB Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
REDTOP - Personality Sketch on 201-132139

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967

1. Transmitted herewith is a personality sketch prepared by LIFEAT transcriber Carol K. ZINSMEISTER on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139), Soviet Second Secretary and Press Attaché in Mexico.

CIT A MEXICO

2. Of the three persons mentioned in the sketch with whom LEONOV appears to be in clandestine contact, the only one identifiable is Juan *REJANO (Parras), 201-109935. He is a Spanish Communist, one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico, with close ties to other Communist groups, especially Cuban and Czech; and at least once he was seen going into the Cuban Embassy with a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party in Mexico. REJANO is in frequent contact with the Czech Press attaché. He is editor of the Czech bulletin published in Mexico. He is also frequently in touch with employees of the Soviet Press Office. In December 1967, according to an LNERGO report, REJANO gave NELSON (LNERGO double agent?) material on American bases in Spain when NELSON visited the Spanish Communist Party Headquarters in Mexico. On 28 January 1968, REJANO was among a group of "old friends" attending a dinner in Mexico City for Juan MARINELLO Vidaurreta, President of the Cuban-Mexican Society and Cuban UNESCO Ambassador.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Sketch

Distribution:
~~2~~ 1 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, W/o/att.

GROUP 1
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1 Att

CS COPY

201-132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO 3. 201-109935	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34470	DATE 15 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139 201-109935

1P

MICROFILMED
APR 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Nicolas LEONOV, Press Attache

LEONOV is an extremely bright, intelligent man, and very quick-thinking. He is popular among the press people because he appears very frank, open and nice to them. He is not the kind, like many other Soviets, who is afraid to make comments, in his own name, on news items and this pleases the press who like personal opinions if nothing more. He is helpful and hard-working and any reasonable request he makes an effort to fulfill.

Apart from his work with the press, he does appear to be involved in intelligence work. He meets with David, Juan Rejano and another man (name not known) on matters which appear to have nothing to do with his press activities. It is possible that money is channeled through LEONOV for economic aid to certain magazines and propaganda work (perhaps even to the University groups although he is very cautious and this many not be true).

LEONOV tolerates (but does not love) his wife, who is quite a shrew. He apparently continues to live with her for the sake of their daughter, Irina, but they appear to have nothing in common. LEONOV is very popular with nearly everyone, but LEONOVA is almost universally disliked.

The actual work of the Press Office he leaves nearly entirely in the hands of his employees, who appear to do their job quite well. They only consult him on special problems and money matters, but he appears to devote very little time to the actual work done at the office. He is busy making contacts, seeing people, visiting newspapermen and doing extra and special jobs for the Embassy (since his Spanish is so good and his personality so nice). He interprets for most of the important Soviet artists when they come to Mexico and he accompanies the Ambassador on many occasions. The previous Amb. apparently trusted his judgment greatly and called on him frequently.

LEONOV apparently plays chess quite well and likes to hunt and fish, but is unable to devote much time to this. He has quite a social life, but mostly alone, and he appears to be high in favor in the USSR since he is able to take vacations frequently and do, more or less, as he likes.

H/W att. #1 to HMMA-3N470 CS COPY 201 - 132139

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 REDTOP/Nikolay LABROV (201-) ✓ NO 201

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

occ · Historian

Photo retained

1. Headquarters attention is invited to Department Airgram A-696 of 4 February 1968 reporting on a lecture given by Subject at Mexico's National University on 30 January 1968. The lecture dealt with Latin American Studies in the USSR and carried the current Soviet line that what was progressive in the Mexican-American war was the fight of the Mexican people against U. S. imperialism.

2. Nikolay LABROV, a Soviet scholar, arrived in Mexico City in late October 1967 to do research on Mexican revolutionary history. He has booked return passage via Canadian Pacific for 27 February. During his stay he has resided with the family of Soviet Press Attache Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139). The information in this paragraph is from LIENVOY.

3. Forwarded herewith are photographs received from LILYRIC taken on 7 November 1967 of the man believed to be Nikolay LABROV with Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV and wife.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photos

Distribution:
2 - C/SB, w/att.
2 - C/WH, w/o/att.

GROUP 1
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201-132139 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-34078	DATE 15 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-~~132139~~



MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LEDNOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
VOL. V

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

966

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BY 19359

SECRET

1. A trace reply prepared for the FBI in November 1976 indicated that from 1956 until 1961 LEONOV was in Moscow during which time he was reported to have attended the KGB school from 1958 until 1960. From 1960 until 1961 LEONOV was at the Fifth Department of KGB Hqs. A statement was also included which said that during his tours in Mexico LEONOV was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities, particularly relating to Guatemala.

PDSTORAGE: As of 1976 LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of KGB Headquarters First (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate in Moscow. LEONOV has been considered for at least two Ambassadorial posts.

A statement that a reliable defector had identified LEONOV as a KGB officer was transmitted to the State Department in August 1966 (NOTE: DERYABIN's iden in September 1964 was inconclusive but could have been misinterpreted.)

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE PASSED TO
MR. CHEPANEK ON 9 August 1978
FOR PERUSAL OF MR. BRECKINRIDGE.

IF APPROVED, DOCUMENT WILL BE
SENT TO HOUSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATION. FOUR PHOTOS
WERE INCLUDED FOR PASSAGE.

MR. CHEPANEK IS LOCATED IN 2D18.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE
OF
NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV

1. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV was born on 22 August 1928 in Almazovo, USSR (also reported as Ryazan, USSR.) LEONOV graduated at an unknown date from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow. He was assigned as Interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from May 1953 until 17 October 1956. On 31 July 1961 LEONOV returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Officer. He served in this capacity until his PCS departure in June 1964. LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR from 21 April to 20 July 1963. During this leave LEONOV served as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. LEONOV was assigned to Mexico City again on 10 October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy. He departed PCS for the USSR on 22 December 1968. From April to July 1969 LEONOV served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency "NOVOSTI" in Lima, Peru.

2. Additional travel information reflects that LEONOV served as interpreter for Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and again in February 1960 when the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition was being held. LEONOV traveled to the Dutch West Indies and Trinidad in September 1962; his position and purpose of his

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trip are unknown. LEONOV was a delegate to the 31st Session of the United Nations General Assesmbly in New York City from 19 September to 10 October 1976. In late June 1977 LEONOV accompanied two other Soviet officials on a visit to Panama where they were scheduled to visit with Panamanian Government officials. The next day LEONOV traveled to Bogota, Colombia where he remained until 3 July 1977. On this date he departed for Frankfurt, West Germany, presumably enroute home to the USSR.

3. LEONOV and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovich, who was born 30 April 1928 in Ryazan, have a daughter, Irina Nikolayevna, who was born on 16 March 1962 in Mexico City. LEONOV reportedly speaks excellent Spanish, good English, some French and little German. He has been described as pleasant, outgoing, intelligent, shrewd, conscientious, and reliable. He has a sense of humor but displays a temper at times.

4. Based on his activities and associations in Mexico City during his tours of duty between May 1953 and December 1968 LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security.)



-/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CONF: IP/DP-7 INFO: FILE, RF, ODPD-D, (9/P)

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78 0800005 PAGE 001
TOT: 0514512 JAN 78 WASHINGT 234172

SECRET
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH 0514512 WASHINGTON 234172
TO: GUATEMALA CITY.

FROM KA/MGSB, INFO SE/X/LA
SUBJECT-NINTEL ESNOTCH

REF: DIRECTOR 222905

1. UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF FILE ON BERNARDO LEMUS MENDOZA (201-0091575) FOR CLEARANCE PURPOSES, ONE DOCUMENT WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO STATION INDICATES THAT LEMUS WAS IN CONTACT WITH A KGB OFFICER WHILE IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO HGGW-4035 DATED 2 DEC 66, INFORMATION TAKEN FROM CAPTURED PGT DOCUMENTS REVEALED THAT LEMUS, WHILE IN EXILE IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56, WAS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF KNOWN KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-0132139).

2. LEONOV WAS BORN 22 AUG 28 IN USSR. HE SERVED IN MEXICO FROM 1953-56 AS INTERPRETER/SECRETARY TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. (FYI: PER POSTORAGE FROM 56-61 HE ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT
KGB HQS.) DURING 1961-64 LEONOV WAS THIRD SECRETARY, ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER AT SOVIET EMBASSY, AND FROM 64-68 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE. DURING HIS TOURS IN MEXICO, LEONOV WAS REPORTEDLY CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN THE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. LAST KNOWN LOCATION OF LEONOV WAS TRIP TO BOGOTA FROM 27 JUNE TO 3 JULY 1977.

3. FROM ABOVE DATA IT WOULD SEEM THAT LEMUS KNEW LEONOV PRIOR TO LEONOV'S KGB TRAINING.

4. FILE: 201-0091575, 201-0132139. E2 IMPDET.> NO 1978 1978
ORIG LA/MGSB/GSB GUILIANI/HEILMA X1091 COORD SE/OR/X SE/OP/S SE/X/LA 1978
(PHIPPS); REL: C/LA/MGSB/GSB (SIEGLE); CL BY: 029163.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

Ducta
1974 NO

3 201-0132139

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DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH	
201-0132139	074-005-102
SEX M	SX-05555/74

CIT USSR

KNOWN KGB.

DATE 23 JUN 78 09616515

201-132139

E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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ACTION UNIT LA 8

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EPS/EG 2, SIA, SIA/IC, PES/INT

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T 996916 EIA255 PAGE 01-21 IN 338551

TOR:282235Z JUL 77 BOGO 31270

S E C R E T 282212Z JUL 77 STAFF

Margett
Sana

CITE BOGOTA 31270

TO: PANAMAC CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718) [illegible]

B. BOGOTA 31003 (IN 330958)

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS RECEIVED TODAY ONE NIKOLAI LEONOV ARRIVED IN BOGOTA ON 27 JUN ABOARD AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 301. HE HOLDS PASSPORT DK030674, VISA 53. HE IS A RUSSIAN NATIONAL, AGE 48, MARRIED AND A PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. WILL ADVISE WHEN AND IF SUBSEQUENT TRAVEL RECORDS INDICATE FURTHER TRAVEL TO PANAMA AND RETURN TO BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET

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CKTOP-Colombia

71 MFG 7/76

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ACTION UNIT LA8

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INFO RF. FILE. VR. 1 Ams SEP PCS/INT C14 EPS/EG2

T 976965 EIA122 PAGE 01-01 IN 330952

TOR:302110Z JUN 77 BOGO 31003

S E C R E T 302233Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31003.

TO: PANAMA CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

REF: PANAMA CITY 41831 (323660) 23 Jun

1. ACCORDING TO TRAVEL RECORDS COVERING PERIOD 20-26 JUN ONLY ONE SOVIET ENTERED COLOMBIA VIA BOGOTA. HE WAS ONE YURY TIMOFEEV, PASSPORT CK277749, AGE THIRTY-NINE, MARRIED. HE ARRIVED ON AVIANCA FLIGHT 83 ON 26 JUN AND LISTED HIS PROFESSION AS ENGINEER. HE APPARENTLY ARRIVED WITHOUT A COLOMBIAN VISA AND DID NOT LIST AN ADDRESS FOR HIS STAY IN BOGOTA.

2. FILE: 56-8-0. E2 IMPDET.

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SIA/IC, SIA, CA4, EPS/EG2
C/4

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3		6	

T 973902 EIA136 PAGE 01 IN 329718

TOR:292231Z JUN 77 PACY 41931

S E C R E T 292132Z JUN 77 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 41931

TO: BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL CKLEG INTEL

1. STATION IS ATTEMPTING TO IDENTIFY HIGH SOVIET OFFICIAL WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE CURRENTLY VISITING PANAMA. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE SOURCES, THE SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS EXPECTED TO VISIT COLOMBIA SOMETIME BETWEEN APPROXIMATELY 22-27 JUNE, AND FROM THERE TRAVEL ON TO PANAMA.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO BOGOTA MIGHT HAVE AS TO POSSIBLE IDENTITY THIS SOVIET OFFICIAL.

3. FOR HQS: ACCORDING TO HYGRUFF-1, THE THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS REFERRED TO IN PARA 3 OF PANAMA CITY 41917 (IN 329530) ARRIVED IN PANAMA ON 28 JUNE ABOARD KLM FLIGHT 779 FROM LISBON. THEIR ARRIVAL AND MEETING WITH PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REPORTED IN PANAMANIAN PRESS ON 29 JUNE.

4. FILE: 56-8-0. E2, IMPDET.

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14-00000

	LEONOV, IVAN LEONTYEVICH (T)					
270249	LEONOV, IVAN MAKSIMOVICH (T)			USSR		
252489	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
270113	LEONOV, IVAN PETROVICH (T)			USSR		
292539	LEONOV, IVAN SERGEYEVICH (T)			USSR		
080279	LEONOV, L (T)			USSR		
037653*	LEONOV, L I (T)			USSR		
118692	LEONOV, LEONID (T)	USSR		USSR		
062588	LEONOV, LEV IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
267822	LEONOV, MATVEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSK		
173604	LEONOV, MIFHA		+1965	+USSR		
203758	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	CA 16	USSR		
266615	LEONOV, MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
257778*	LEONOV, MIKHAIL IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
078288	LEONOV, MIKHAIL VASILEVICH (T)			USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	22 JUL 29	USSR		
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY ANDREYEVICH (T)	+USSR	+DEC 20	USSR	+201-0285216	+WIFE MARINA PETROVNA B
[illegible]	LEONOV, NIKOLAY GAVRILOVICH (T)	USSR	07 AUG 21	+USSR	+201-0285094	+WIFE TAISIYA B 19 FEB
~~003384~~	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	18 MAR 34	USSR	+201-0774548	+WIFE YULIYA SERGEYEVNA
~~052115~~	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	22 MAY 06	USSR	+201-0264522	
251597	LEONOV, NIKOLAY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
023539	LEONOV, NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH (T)	USSR	21 SEP 41	USSR	+201-0836586	+WIFE TATYANA ANATOLYEV
~~011155*~~	~~LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (T)~~	USSR	22 AUG 28	USSR	+201-0132139	+WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA
259455	LEONOV, PARFIRIY LUKICH (T)			USSR		
242286	LEONOV, PAVEL AFANASYEVICH (T)			USSR		
251028	LEONOV, PAVEL BORISOVICH (T)			USSR		
014515*	LEONOV, PAVEL SEMENOVICH (T)	+USSR	+01 JAN 16	USSR	+201-0309517	+WIFE KLAVDIYA GRIGORYE
003835	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH	+USSR	+13	+USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
003885	LEONOV, PETR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	13	USSR		+WIFE KLAVDIYA TIMOFEYE
266645	LEONOV, SERGEY ANDREYEVICH (T)			USSR		
271031	LEONOV, SERGEY ARKHIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
221860	LEONOV, STANISLAV (T)	USSR		USSR		+WIFE LYUDMILA IVANOVNA
259061	LEONOV, TIMOFEY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
246777	LEONOV, V A (T)			USSR		
071099	LEONOV, V. S. (T)			USSR		
408142*	LEONOV, VADIM VASILYEVICH (T)	USSR	19 AUG 49	USSR	+201-0948594	+WIFE-YEKATERINA VLADIN
246417	LEONOV, VALENTIN IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
227715*	LEONOV, VALERIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	20 OCT 42	USSR	+201-0915566	+WIFE FNU
284769	LEONOV, VASILIY DMITRIYEVICH (T)			USSR		
179071	LEONOV, VASILIY IVANOVICH (T)			USSR		
265862	LEONOV, VASILIY OSIPOVICH (T)			USSR		
017085	LEONOV, VASILIY PAVLOVICH (T)	USSR	24 JUL 05	USSR	+201-0732595	
405781*	LEONOV, VIKTOR (T)	USSR	36	USSR		+WIFE NEONILA B 37
186423*	LEONOV, VIKTOR IVANOVICH (T)	USSR	43	USSR		+WIFE TATYANA PAVLOVNA
228604*	LEONOV, VIKTOR MIKHAYLOVICH (T)	USSR	12 AUG 36	USSR	+201-0921769	+WIFE SVETLANA VLADIMIR
047955*	LEONOV, VILEN NIKONOROVICH (T)	+USSR	+29 APR 25	USSR	+201-0241239	+WIFE LENINA ANDREYEVNA

SECRET/NOFORN-E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877 08/07/77 PAGE 02547

** K03**

SECRET/NOFORN-

SOVIET GICS INDEX

M.D.NO	SURNAME,GIVEN NAME,MIDDLE NAME	POB	DOB	CITZ	201 NUMBER	WIFE NAME
295237	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH (T)			USSR		
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH	+USSR	+03 SEP 31	+USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
017021*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ALEKSEYEVICH (T)	USSR	03 SEP 31	USSR	+201-0732596	+WIFE ZINAIDA VASILIYEV
024730*	LEONOV, VLADIMIR ANDREYEVICH (T)	USSR	26 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0148594	+WIFE VALENTINA MIKHAYL
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR F		+06 DEC 38	+USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
053991	LEONOV, VLADIMIR FEDOROVICH (T)		06 DEC 38	USSR	+201-0788619	+WIFE OLGA PETROVNA B 1
284882	LEONOV, VLADIMIR PORFIRYEVICH (T)			USSR		
294423	LEONOV, VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH (T)			USSR		
226294*	LEONOV, VYACHESLAV STEPANOVICH (T)	USSR	13 JUN 39	USSR	+201-0916881	+WIFE VALENTINA YEGOROV
224483	LEONOV, YURIY	+USSR	+CA 33	+USSR	+201-0921125	
188315	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR		USSR		
224483	LEONOV, YURIY (T)	USSR	CA 33	USSR	+201-0921125	
094823	LEONOV, YURIY ALEKSANDROVICH (T)	USSR	03 JUN 26	USSR	+201-0831521	+WIFE TAMARA GRIGORYEVN
003886	LEONOV, YURIY BORISOVICH (T)	USSR	12 MAR 30	USSR	+201-0182275	+WIFE GALINA ALEKSEYEVN
040399	LEONOV, YURIY PETROVICH (T)		25 NOV 39	USSR	+201-0776624	+WIFE SVETLANA
27102?	LEONOVA, ALEKSANDRA FEDOROVNA (T)			USSR		

14-00000

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  72A01 R  ISTOMIN              [illegible]LEJ            [illegible]EVICH       [illegible]
  72A01 S   ITAL                ROME                      29 DEC 72
  72A01 T   REPLACEMENT-MOSKVICHEV CONTACTS TURNED OVER TO ISTOMIN
  72A01 U                       OIRA-56345                                  07 FEB 73
A 73A01 R  VOLCHANOV            VLADIMIR                  VLADIMIROVICH.    007483
A 73A01 S   ITAL                ROME                      24 FEB 73
A 73A01 T   REPLACEMENT-VOLCHANOV REPLACED MOSKVICHEV
A 73A01 U   PCS REPORTS         OIRA-56871                                  14 AUG 73
*************************************************************************************
  00A00 A 011155                201-017213[illegible]
  00A00 B  LEONOV               NIKOLAY                   SERGEYEVICH
  00A00 C   USSR                RYAZAN                    22 AUG 28
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 28 RYAZAN
A 61A01 B  LEONOV               NIKOLAY                   SERGEYEVICH
A 61A01 C   USSR                RYAZAN                    22 AUG 28
  00A02 D   USSR
A 53A01 [illegible]             [illegible]0724           MOSCOW            [illegible] 52
A 61A01     USSR                [illegible]
A 61A01 [illegible]             [illegible]063            MOSCOW            [illegible] 64
  64A01 [illegible]             [illegible]
A 50A01 [illegible] E4 GOOD                                                 [illegible]
08/07/[illegible]   PAGE   [illegible]                    011155
                     SECRET NOFORN SOV RICS FILE    E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]5877
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                                                               [illegible]
                         SECRET/NOFORN SOV RICS FILE
  011155                           CONT.

A 50A01 F   E4 GOOD                                                         POLISH
A 53A01 F   5 [illegible] 155 [illegible] BLD SMALL
A 61A01 F   WIFE VALENTINA IVANOVNA B 26 APR 28 RYAZAN
A 61A01 F   DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62
  61A02 E   E4 EXCELLENT                                                    SPANISH
A 61A04 [illegible]                                                         FRENCH
  00A0[illegible]  SUSP RIS FROB ST SEC
  00A0[illegible]  FREELMET.                              74-6-[illegible]
  00A0[illegible]  CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION
  00A0[illegible]  KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  00A0[illegible] N AUST                BADEN
  00A0[illegible] N MEX
  00A0[illegible] [illegible]                                               [illegible]
[illegible] 00A0[illegible] KNOWN SOV ST SEC
[illegible] 00A0[illegible] PHOTOGRAPH       5[illegible]-555[illegible]   4-5-[illegible]   [illegible]
[illegible] 00A0[illegible] SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
A 50A01 [illegible] EMPLOYEE
A 50A01 [illegible] SUSP RIS FROB ST SEC
A 50A01 [illegible] CONSULATE
A 50A01 N  POLD                 WARSAW                    CA 50             [illegible]
A 50A01 [illegible] PCS REPORTS ST-400                                      [illegible]
A 53A01 G  EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE
A 53A01 [illegible]                                                         [illegible]
A 53A01 M  EMBASSY
A 53A01 N  MEX                  MEXICO CITY               CA 25 MAY 53      [illegible]
A 53A01 U  PCS REPORTS          AT-400                                      [illegible]
  60A01 N  CUBA                 HAVANA                    60                UNK
  60A01 [illegible] MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION
  60A01 U                       REDCAP                                      13 NOV 64
A 61A01 G  3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER
A 61A01 H                                                                   M602777
A 61A01 M  EMBASSY
A 61A01 N  MEX                  MEXICO CITY               31 JUL 61         FR JUL 65
A 61A01 G  PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY FR JUL 65
A 61A01 U  PCS REPORTS          SCI                                         2 OCT 63
A 61A01 W  MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65
  61A02 M  PACHUCA CONDESA                                                  153/405
  61A02 N  MEX                  MEXICO CITY               61                64
  61A02 G  RESIDENCE
  61A02 U  REDCAP               HMMA 33203                201-132139        18 OCT 67
  61A03 N  USA                  NEW YORK                  61                UNK
  61A03 Q  SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61
  61A03 U                       REDCAP                                      13 NOV 64
A 61A04 G  2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE
A 61A04 K  KNOWN SOV ST SEC
A 61A0[illegible] M  EMBASSY
A 61A04 N  MEX                  MEXICO CITY               FR JUL 65         22 DEC 68
A 61A04 [illegible] PROMOTED FR JUL 6[illegible]
A 61A04 U  PCS REPORTS          HMMA 33203                201-132139        18 OCT 67
A 61A04 [illegible] HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68
A 61A04 X  LEONOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER               ENGLISH
C 62A01 J  OFFICER
C 62A01 K  KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  [illegible]  MEX              MEXICO CITY               62                UNK
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A [illegible] T   REPLACEM[illegible]
A 73A05 U   PCS REPO[illegible]
A 73A06 R   DEGTYAR[illegible]
A 73A06 S   MEX
A 73A06 T   REPLACEM[illegible]
A 73A06 U   PCS REPO[illegible]
A 76A06 R   ROGOV
A 76A06 S   UK
A 76A06 T   REPLACEM[illegible]
A 76A06 U   PCS REPO[illegible]
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  00A00 A 011180
  00A00 B  BURINSKIY
  00A00 C
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE TAIS[illegible]
T 46A01 B  BURINSKIY
  5[illegible]A01 B  [illegible]
T 46A01 [illegible]
  52A01 C
T 46A01 D   USSR
  52A01 D   USSR
08/07/[illegible]   PAGE
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  011180

T 46A01 E  WIFE TAIS[illegible]
A 51A01 F  WIFE TAIS[illegible]
A 51A01 F  DAU [illegible]
[illegible] 52A01 F  KNOWN SOV[illegible]
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T 00A01 W  [illegible]
T 46A01 G  EMPLOYEE [illegible]
T 46A01 H  UNRRA
T 46A01 N  USA
T 46A01 [illegible]  NATL ARCH[illegible]
T 46A02 G  CHIEF OF [illegible]
T 4[illegible]  UNRRA
T 46A02 N  [illegible]
T 4[illegible]  COVER[illegible]
T 4[illegible]  MARSHALL [illegible]
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  52A01 U  [illegible]
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  00A00 C
  00A00 D   SWED
  57A01 B  LNUBR
  57A01 C
  57A01 D   SWED
  57A01 G  DIPLOMAT
  57A01 J   TARGET,
  57A01 K   T/KNOWN S[illegible]
  57A01 N   USSR
  57A01 Q   EITHER UKR[illegible]
  57A01 U   POLADLE
  57A01 Z   LNU SWED[illegible]
*******************************
  00A00 A 011191
  00A00 B  MESHKOV
  00A00 C   USSR
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE VALENT[illegible]
A [illegible]  B  MESHKOV
F 00A01 C   USSR
  62A01 C   USSR
A 63A02 D   USSR
A 63A01 D
A 68A01 D
A 75A01 D
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 50A01 E  E4 GOOD                                                 GERMAN
08/07/77   PAGE     5309                         011155
                           SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
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                                                            ** C18**
                           SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                               CONT.

A 50A01 F    E4 GOOD                                                  POLISH
A 53A01 C   T 5/07 W 155 H HAR BLD SMALL
A 61A01 E   WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA B 28 AFR 28 RYAZAN
A 61A01 F    DAU IRINA NIKOLAYEVNA B 62
  61A02 E   E4 EXCELLENT                                              SPANISH
A 61A04 F                                                             FRENCH
  00A01 F    SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC
  00A01 H    FORELMET                                  74-6-626/A
  00A02 J    CHIEF OF TECHNICAL SECTION
  00A02 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  00A02 N    AUST                   BADEN
  00A03 N    MEX
  00A04 H                                                             50023018
C 00A06 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 00A06 U    PDSTORAGE              SX-5555/62         74-5-312       JAN 77
C 00A06 W    SEE HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
A 50A01 G   EMPLOYEE
A 50A01 F    SUSP RIS PROB ST SEC
A 50A01 M    CONSULATE
A 50A01 N    POLD                   WARSAW             CA 50          CA 53
A 50A01 U    PCS REPORTS            RT-400                            19 AUG 69
A 53A01 G   EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATIVE
A 53A01 H                                                             MB02778
A 53A01 M    EMBASSY
A 53A01 N    MEX                    MEXICO CITY        CA 25 MAY 53   17 OCT 56
A 53A01 U    PCS REPORTS            RT-400                            19 AUG 69
  60A01 N    CUBA                   HAVANA             60             UNK
  60A01 G    MEMBER MIKOYAN ENTOURAGE TO CUBA FOR EXPOSITION
  60A01 U                           REDCAP                            13 NOV 64
A 61A01 G   3RD SECRETARY/ASSISTANT CULTURAL OFFICER
A 61A01 H                                                             MB02777
A 61A01 M    EMBASSY
A 61A01 N    MEX                    MEXICO CITY        31 JUL 61      PR JUL 65
A 61A01 Q    PROMOTED 2ND SECRETARY PR JUL 65
A 61A01 U    PCS REPORTS            SCI                               2 OCT 63
A 61A01 W    MEXICAN DIP LIST JUL 65
  61A02 M    PACHUCA CONDESA                                          153/405
  61A02 N    MEX                    MEXICO CITY        61             64
  61A02 Z    RESIDENCE
  61A02 U    REDCAP                 HMMA 33293         201-13[illegible]  18 OCT 67
  61A03 N    USA                    NEW YORK           61             UNK
  61A03 G    SUBJ LEFT NEW YORK FOR MEX 31 JUL 61
  61A03 U                           REDCAP                            13 NOV 64
A 61A04 G   2ND SECRETARY/ PRESS ATTACHE
A 61A04 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
A 61A04 M    EMBASSY
A 61A04 N    MEX                    MEXICO CITY        PR JUL 65      22 DEC 68
A 61A04 Q    PROMOTED PR JUL 64
A 61A04 U    PCS REPORTS            HMMA 33293         201-132139     18 OCT 67
A 61A04 W    HMMA-36146, 31 DEC 68 HMMA-36147, 31 DEC 68
A 61A04 X    LEONOV AND WIFE FREQUENTLY AT ODDS WITH EACH OTHER       ENGLISH
C 62A01 J    OFFICER
C 62A01 K    KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 62A01 N    MEX                    MEXICO CITY        62             UNK

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                           SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
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                                                            *** D***
                           SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                               CONT.

C 62A01 U    PDSTORAGE-241          SX-3735                           14 MAY 63
C 62A01 W    CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
  62A02 N    [illegible]            CURACAO            62             UNK
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  52A01 C    USSR
  52A01 D    USSR

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011186

T 46A01 E    [illegible]
A 51A01 E    WIFE TA[illegible]
A 51A01 F     DAU GA[illegible]
T 00A01 K     KNOWN
T 00A01 [illegible]     OVERT
T 00A01 W     BARRON,
T 46A01 G    EMPLOYE[illegible]
T 46A01 H     UNREA
T 46A01 N     USA
T 46A01 Y     NATL A[illegible]
T 46A02 G    CHIEF [illegible]
T 46A02 H     UNREA
T 46A02 N     USA/DIS[illegible]
T 46A02 V     OVERT
T 46A02 W     HARSHA
A 51A01 G    DEPUTY
A 51A01 H     [illegible]
A 51A01 M     UN SOV
A 51A01 N     SUIS
A 51A01 U     PCS RE[illegible]
  52A01 G    EXECUTI[illegible]
  52A01 H     UN ECE
  52A01 J     OFFICE[illegible]
  52A01 K     KNOWN
  52A01 N     SUIS
  52A01 U     PDLACE[illegible]
  00A00 A 011188
  00A00 B  UNOPR
  00A00 C
  00A00 D   SVED
  57A01 B  UNOPR
  57A01 C
  57A01 C   SVED
  57A01 G  DIPLOMA[illegible]
  57A01 J   TAKGE[illegible]
  57A01 K   T/KNOWN
  57A01 N   USSR
  57A01 Q   EITHER
  57A01 U   PDLACE[illegible]
  57A01 Z   END SWI[illegible]
  00A00 A 011191
  00A00 B  MESHKOV
  00A00 C   USSR
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE VA[illegible]
A 61A02 E  MESHKOV
F 00A01 C   USSR
  62A01 C   USSR
A 61A02 D   USSR
A 62A01 D
A 65A01 D
A 75A01 D

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011191

A 52A01 E  E4 SOME
A 61A02 E  WIFE VAL[illegible]
A 61A02 F   DAU IR[illegible]
  62A01 E  E4 FLUEN[illegible]
```

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 MEX            MEXICO CITY           62              UNK

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A 75A01 D

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                                                      **E18**

                       SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                           CONT.

C 62A01 U   POSTORAGE-241            SX-3735                          14 MAY 63
C 62A01 W   CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
  62A02 N   DWIN                     CURACAO           62             UNK
  62A02 Q   SUBJ TO LEAVE MEX FOR DWIN 27 AUG 62 ENROUTE TRIN
  62A02 U                            REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  62A03 N   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       62             UNK
  62A03 Q   SUBJ RETURNED MEX FROM DWIN AND TRIN 8 SEP 62
  62A03 U                            REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  62A04 N   TRIN                     PORT OF SPAIN     62             UNK
  62A04 Q   SUBJ TO LEAVE DWIN FOR PORT OF SPAIN 28 AUG 62
  62A04 U                            REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A01 J   INTEL OFFICER
  63A01 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
  63A01 M   PACHUCA                                                   153
  63A01 N   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       63             UNK
  63A01 U                            REDCAP                           13 OCT 63
  63A02 N   USSR                     MOSCOW            63             UNK
  63A02 U                            REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A02 Y   SUBJ WENT MOSCOW WITH CASTRO SEE KRUSHCHEV RE PLAN FOR
  63A02 Z   SUBVERSIVE ACTION TO BE CARRIED OUT FROM CUBA AND MEX
  63A03 N   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       63             UNK
  63A03 U                            REDCAP                           13 NOV 64
  63A03 X   SUBJ IN CLANDESTINE CONTACT ARMS SMUGGLERS MAY 63
  64A01 N   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       64             UNK
  64A01 Q   RETURNED MEXICO CITY 10 OCT 64
  64A01 U   LIFIRE/LICRAVE-1         MEXI 1218                        14 OCT 64
  64A01 X   SUBJ HAD NEW PASSPORT BELIEVED BE WORKING AS TRANSLATOR
C 75A01 K   KNOWN SOV ST SEC
C 75A01 N   USSR                                       75
C 75A01 U   POSTORAGE                SX-5555/25        74-5-102       07 APR 75
C 75A01 W   CONTACT HOLDER OF FILE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO
B 76A01 G   DELEGATE
B 76A01 M   UNGA 31ST SESSION
B 76A01 N   USA                      NEW YORK          19 SEP 76      01 OCT 76
B 76A01 Q   PRESENCE REPORTS
B 76A01 U   FBI                      MACHINE DOSSIER   L-319 L UNS    22 NOV 76
  00A05 R   SHFALEVICH               VLADIMIR          IVANOVICH      017922
  00A05 S   MEX                      MEXICO CITY
  00A05 U                            201-SUMMARY                      1 APR 65
A 54A01 R   SAPRINOVA                VERA              VLADIMIROVNA   [illegible]
A 54A01 S   MEX                                        SEP 54         [illegible]
A 54A01 T   SAFRONOVA LIVED WITH LEONOV FAMILY
A 54A01 U   PCS REPORTS              SER                              13 JAN 55
  56A01 R   CASTRO                   FIDEL                            013138
  56A01 S   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       21 JUN 56
  56A01 T   WHEN CASTRO ARRESTED MEXI 21 JUN 56 HAD CALLING CARD LEONOV
  56A01 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
N 56A02 R   SALGO                    RENEE             BURGER         287911
N 56A02 S   FRAN                                       FEB 56
N 56A02 T   LEONOV CONTACT SALGO
N 56A02 U   AGENCY                   RT-400                           20 JUN 74
  61A05 R   BROVKIN                  ALEKSANDR         MIKHAYLOVICH   022520
  61A05 S   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       61             67
  61A05 T   LEONOV WORKS CLOSELY WITH BROVKIN

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                      SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE   E2 IMPDET CL BY 005877
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011191

A 52A01 E   EX
A 61A02 E   WIFE
A 61A02 F   CAU
  62A01 E   EX FU
  62A01 F   EX
A 68A01 E   SON
F 74A01 F   T S
F 00A01 U
F 00A01 W   201
A 52A01 G   ATTA
A 52A01 M   EMB
A 52A01 N   CSR
A 52A01 Q   FRO
A 52A01 U   PCS
A 52A01 Z   SEA
A 52A02 G   3RD S
A 52A02 M   EMB
A 52A02 N   CSR
A 52A02 Q   PROM
A 52A02 U   PCS
A 52A02 W   OFFA
  61A01 N   GERM
  61A01 Q   FRI
  61A01 U
A 61A02 G   2ND S
A 61A02 K
A 61A02 M   EMBA
A 61A02 N   ETHI
A 61A02 Q   FROM
A 61A02 U   PCS
A 61A02 W   ALAR
  62A01 X   SUSP
  62A01 W   ESC
  62A01 Q   HOPE
  62A01 U
A 63A01 G   1ST S
A 63A01 M   EMBA
A 63A01 N   ETHI
A 63A01 Q   FROM
A 63A01 U   PCS
A 68A01 G   COUNS
A 68A01 K   SOVE
A 68A01 M   EMBA
A 68A01 N   LIBY
A 68A01 U   PCS
A 68A01 W   TELE
  69A01 U   CEN
A 75A01 G   MINIS
A 75A01 M   EMBA
A 75A01 N   CHNA
A 75A01 U   PCS
A 75A01 W   ALAA
F 75A02 U   TEAR
F 76A01 L   14 M

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                                                      **E18**

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011155                           CONT.

  61A05 U   REDCAP                   HMMA 33293        201-132139     18 OCT 67
  62A05 R   NOVIKOV                  VLADIMIR          G              010484
  62A05 S   MEX                      MEXICO CITY       62
```

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011191

* 76A01 U
  61A03 R   NECHAY
  61A03 S   ETHI
  61A03 T   MESHM
```

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                                                              ** E18**
                          SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                                  CONT.

  61A05 U   REDCAP                HMMA 33293          201-132139      18 OCT 67
  62A05 R  NOVIKOV                VLADIMIR                            010484
  62A05 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         62
  62A05 T   LEONOV FORMERLY WORKED AS ASST FOR NOVIKOV
  62A05 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A06 R  BAZAROV                SEMEN               TARASOVICH      000559
  62A06 S   TWIN                  CURACAO             27 AUG 62
  62A06 T   LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV TRIP TO TWIN AND TRIN
  62A06 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A07 R  BAZAROV                SEMEN               TARASOVICH      000559
  62A07 S   TRIN                  PORT OF SPAIN       23 AUG 62
  62A07 T   LEONOV ACCOMPANYING BAZAROV ON TRIP
  62A07 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A08 R  KUZNETSOV              SVYATOSLAV          FEDOROVICH      003738
  62A08 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         62
  62A08 T   LEONOV WORKED FOR KUZNETSOV
  62A08 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A09 R  GLOTOV                 VIKTOR              NIKOLAYEVICH    008172
  62A09 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         62
  62A09 T   GLOTOV CRITICIZED LEONOV FOR FAILING APPEAR WHERE ORDERED
  62A09 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A10 R  SL[illegible]V         NIKOLAY                             006489
  62A10 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         SEP 62          JUL 64
  62A10 T   COLLEAGUE
  62A10 U   LILYRIC               HMMA-23983                          10 JUL 64
  62A11 R  FLORES                 HORACIO                             032096
  62A11 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         62
  62A11 T   NO REPORT ON NATURE LEONOV CONTACT WITH FLORES
  62A11 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  62A12 R  BAZAROV                SEMEN                               000559
  62A12 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         27 AUG 62       08 SEP 62
  62A12 T   UNKNOWN
  62A12 U   REDCAP                                                    05 OCT 64
  62A13 R  FLORES                 HORACIO             SANCHEZ         025125
  62A13 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         62
  62A13 T   NO REPORT ON NATURE OF CONTACT W/FLORES
  62A13 U   AGENCY                REDCAP                              13 NOV 64
  63A04 R  ANTONOV                SERGEY              NIKOLAYEVICH    015317
  63A04 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         SEP 63
  63A04 T   LEONOV IN FREQUENT TOUCH ANTONOV DURING TDY LATTER MEX
  63A04 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  63A05 R  CARDENAS               LORENZO                             032791
  63A05 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         [illegible] APR 63
  63A05 T   LEONOV VISITED HOME CARDENAS.
  63A05 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  63A06 R  FERRER                 OLGA                                032095
  63A06 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         0[illegible] SEP 63
  63A06 T   FERRER MADE ARRANGEMENT MEET LEONOV EVENING 02 SEP 63
  63A06 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  63A07 R  FLORES                 ROBERTO JARAMILLO                   032097
  63A07 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         05 AUG 63
  63A07 T   FLORES TALKED TO LEONOV RE URGENT MATTER AGUA PRIETA, SONOR
  63A07 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  63A08 R  JOHNSON JR             CHARLES WILLIAMS                    032101

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                                                              ** E18**
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011155                                  CONT.

  63A08 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         08 OCT 63
  63A08 T   LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS
  63A08 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  63A09 R  TULIO                  HUGO                                032110
  63A09 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         30 OCT 63
  63A09 T   TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS
  63A09 U   REDCAP                                                    13 NOV 64
  64A02 R  KONSTANTINOV           SERGEY              SERGEYEVICH     003200
  64A02 S   MEX                   MEXICO CITY         23 MAR 64
  64A02 T   UNKNOWN
  64A02 U                         201 SUMMARY                         19 MAR 65
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011191

F 72A01 U
  61A03 R
  61A03 S
  61A03 T
  61A03 U
A 68A02 R
A 68A02 S
A 68A02 T
A 68A02 U
A 72A01 R
A 72A01 S
A 72A01 T
A 72A01 U

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011192

  60A01 U
  61A01 M
  61A01 N
  61A01 P
  61A01 U
  62A01 M
  62A01 N
  62A01 P
  62A01 U
A 63A01 G
A 63A01 H
A 63A01 K
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14-00000

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   63A08 U   RECCAP                                                     13 NOV 64
   63A07 R   JOHNSON JR          CHARLES WILLIAMS                       032101

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                                                                   ** F1**

                                  SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011155                                  CONT.

   63A08 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          08 OCT 63
   63A08 T   LEONOV PHONED JOHNSON RE RUSSIAN LESSONS
   63A08 U   RECCAP                                                13 NOV 64
   63A09 R   TULIO                  HUGO                           032110
   63A09 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          30 OCT 63
   63A09 T   TULIO IN TOUCH LEONOV RE SUPPLY SOV BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS
   63A09 U   RECCAP                                                13 NOV 64
   64A02 R   KONSTANTINOV           SERGEY               SERGEYEVICH   003200
   64A02 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          23 MAR 64
   64A02 T   UNKNOWN
   64A02 U                          201 SUMMARY                        19 MAR 65
   64A03 R   SULIN                  VLADIMIR                           023605
   64A03 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          03 FEB 64
   64A03 T   COLLEAGUE
   64A03 U                          201 SUMMARY
   64A04 R   KURHARENKO             SERGEY                             018479
   64A04 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          10 OCT 64
   64A04 T   LEONOV TO REPLACE KURHARENKO AS CHIEF PRESS ATTACHE EMB
   64A04 U   STATE                                                 24 OCT 64
   64A05 R   FERRER                 OLGA                               032095
   64A05 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          29 JAN 64
   64A05 T   FERRER MET WITH LEONOV 29 JAN 64
   64A05 U   RECCAP                                                13 NOV 64
 A 65A01 R   BELFRAGE               CEDRIC               HENNING       015079
 A 65A01 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          65
 A 65A01 T   LEONOV AND WIFE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH BELFRGE AND WIFE
 A 65A01 U   PCS REPORTS            HMMA 33293           201-132139    18 OCT 67
   66A01 R   NIKOFOROV              LEONID               VASILYEVICH   027106
   66A01 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          DEC 66        67
   66A01 T   LEONOV PROB MET NIKOFOROV IN CHAPULTEPEC PARK
   66A01 U                          SPR                  201-756168    22 SEP 67
   67A01 R   CARDENAS               LORENZO              BARAJAS       032091
   67A01 S   MEX                    MEXICO CITY          67
   67A01 T   CLANDESTINE CONTACT
   67A01 U                          HMMA 33293           01-43.139     18 OCT 67
*************************************************************************************
   00A00 A 011162
   00A00 B  MALRAUX                 ANDRE
   00A00 C
   00A00 D   FRAN
   00A01 B  MALRAUX                 ANDRE
 T 29A01 B  MALRAUX                 ANDRE
 T 29A01 C
 T 29A01 D   FRAN
 T 33A01 E  WIFE CLARA
   00A01 U  *UNBOUND                OFPA 28540           100-6-113     15 MAR 57
   00A01 W   FROM INTERROGATION OF A 0E080 JANE ZLATOVSKY
 T 00A05 V   OVERT                  CD-864 P384          100-6-13974   63
 T 00A05 W   SERGE VICTOR.MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY
 T 29A01 G  WRITER
 T 29A01 N   USSR                   MOSCOW               29            UNK
 T 29A01 Q  ON VISIT
 T 29A01 V   OVERT                  CD-1100 P195-351                   41
 T 29A01 W   FISCHER, LOUIS MEN AND POLITICS

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                                                                   ** G1**

                                  SECRET/NOFORN SOV GICS FILE
011162                                  CONT.

 T 33A01 N   FRAN                   PARIS                33            UNK
 T 33A01 V   OVERT                  CD-1444 P277, 307    100-6-13974   67
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```
   60A01 N
   60A01 Q

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0111

   60A01 U
   61A01 M
   61A01 N
   61A01 P
   61A01 U
   62A01 M
   62A01 N
   62A01 P
   62A01 U
 A 63A01 G
 A 63A01 H
 A 63A01 K
 A 63A01 M
 A 63A01 N
 A 63A01 U
 A 63A01 W
 A 70A01 G
 A 70A01 H
 A 70A01 K
 A 70A01 M
 A 70A01 N
 A 70A01 U
 A 70A01 W
 C 75A01 K
 C 75A01 N
 C 75A01 U
 C 75A01 W
 F 77A01 G
 F 77A01 K
 F 77A01 R
 F 77A01 N
 F 77A01 U
 F 77A01 V
 F 77A02 U
 F 77A02 V
   00A05 R
   00A05 S
   00A05 T
   00A05 U
   00A06 R
   00A06 S
   00A06 T
   00A06 U
   63A02 R
   63A02 S
   63A02 T
   63A02 U
   63A03 R
   63A03 S
   63A03 T
   63A03 U
 A 67A01 R
 A 67A01 S
 A 67A01 T

08/07/77

 A 67A01 U
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T 041941 EIA533 PAGE 01-01 IN 355710

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S E C R E T 262216Z JUL 77 STAFF

CITE BOGOTA 31183

TO: DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY.

WNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE

REF: DIRECTOR 070125

in image

1. TRAVEL INFORMATION RECEIVED TODAY INDICATES LEONOV DEPARTED BOGOTA FOR FRANKFURT ON 3 JUL ABOARD VIASA FLIGHT #903.

2. FILE: 201-0132139; 201-0101794. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

PANAMA CI/OP

OUTGOING MESSAGE

11-3

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OMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ROUTING

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 070125

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0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER 32P
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		INDEX
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		RYBAT REST. CODE
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UNINTEL RYBAT CKLEG PDQUICK TRACE Y

REFS: A. X/00/9787-77, 18 JULY 1977 (NOT SENT BOGOTA)

B. DIRECTOR 060370

C. PANAMA CITY 41931 (IN 329718) Y

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR STATIONS' BACKGROUND ONLY. Y

2. BELIEVE SOVIET PERSON CITED REF A MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (201-132139), BORN USSR 22 AUGUST 1928. GRADUATED AT UNKNOWN DATE FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTOBER 1956 SERVED AS INTERPRETER AND SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. FROM 1956 TO 1961 REPORTEDLY ATTENDED KGB SCHOOL AND SERVED AT KGB HQS. HE TRAVELED TDY TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND TO CUBA IN 1960 AS INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE OF SOVIET EMBASSY AND SERVED THERE UNTIL JUNE 1964. FROM OCTOBER 1964 UNTIL DECEMBER 1968 HE WAS SECOND SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE AT MEXICO CITY EMBASSY. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

201-132139
22 Jul 77

B 201-101794

RECORD COPY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET E 2 IMPDET

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CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER:

CONF: INFO: FILE

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TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF SOVIET NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY IN LIMA. DURING TOURS IN MEXICO LEONOV WAS CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELATED TO GUATEMALA. Y

3. SENSITIVE FYI ONLY: PER PDSTORAGE, AS OF 1976 LEONOV WAS CHIEF OF SERVICE NO. 1 (INFORMATION) OF KGB FIRST (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE) DIRECTORATE IN MOSCOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: POSITION IS EQUIVALENT TO BKHERALD CHIEF OF REPORTS.) LEONOV HAS BEEN CONSIDERED FOR AT LEAST TWO AMBASSADORIAL POSTS. Y

4. REF A INDICATES THAT LEONOV RECENTLY WAS IN PANAMA. THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT VISIT WAS MADE IN COMPANY OF VLADIMIR KONSTANTINOVICH TOLSTIKOV, FELLOW KGB OFFICER WITH WHOM LEONOV SERVED IN MEXICO DURING 1962-66 PERIOD (REF B). WASHINGTON CUSTOMERS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS DURING VISIT TO PANAMA AND PROBABLY TO BOGOTA (REF C). HAVE STATIONS OBTAINED ANY INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC? Y

5. FILE: 201-132139, 201-101794. E2 IMPDET.

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RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
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STAFF DIRECTOR

CONF: / INFO: FILE

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ORIG: LA/PNC/P {THOMPSON-1454}; COORD: SE/CI/X {CROCKER}; LA/OPS {DiStefano}; SE/RR{EVERETT}; AUTH: C/LA/PNC {DESMOND}; REL: DC/LA {LAUDER ~~WARREN~~}.

LA COMMENT: A. SENSITIVE SOURCE INFORMATION REFERING TO SOVIET PERSON

B. TRACES ON SOVIET INTEL OFFICER WHO MAY RECENTLY HAVE VISITED PANAMA

C. PANAMA CITY REQUESTS BOGOTA STATION ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING SOVIET VISITOR

DATE: 22 JULY 77
ORIG: D. THOMPSON:RJ
UNIT: LA/PNC/P
EXT: 1454

SE/X/LA [illegible]
SE/RR - A. Everett

Lauder
DC/LA
RELEASING OFFICER

SE/CI/X
LA/OPS DiStefano
COORDINATING OFFICERS

Desmond
C/LA/PNC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

E 2 IMPDET

SECRET

28 JUL 1977

TO : Office of Central Reference/
Information Services Group
ATTN: Karen Davis, USSR Division

FROM : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich (U/AIUO)

1. (U/AIUO) Reference is made to your telephonic request dated 19 July 1977 for information concerning Subject.

2. (S) Our files show no indication of any connection between Subject and prominent Soviet officials.

3. (S) According to a reliable defector source, Nikolay LEONOV was identified as a KGB officer.

4. (S) Subject was graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations in Moscow, at an unknown date. From July 1953 until October 1956 he served as an interpreter and Secretary to the Ambassador at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico. He traveled to Mexico in November 1959 and to Cuba in February 1960 as an interpreter. In July 1961 he returned to Mexico City as Third Secretary and Assistant Cultural Attache at the Embassy and served in this capacity until June 1964. He was assigned there again in October 1964 as Second Secretary and Press Attache. He remained in this position until December 1968. From April 1969 until July 1969 he served temporarily as representative of the Soviet News Agency Novosti in Lima, Peru.

CIR-316/02384-77
IP/EIS: J Edwards/L Foltz/et
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER: C/IP/RB
BASED ON: XAE 1251 dated 15 October 1976
HMMA 29141 dated 8 June 1966
FILE IN: 201-132139
COORD IN DRAFT:
SE/CI/X: M Biskup
LA/MEXI: R Lehman

21 July 1977
316-02384 77
201-132139

RECORD COPY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

Classified by auth Officer
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TELEPHONIC REQUEST

DATE	
REQUESTING AGENCY ~~FBI~~ OCR via Karen Davis for State X9157	REPLY
REQUEST TAKEN BY Stacey	DATE 19 July 1977
ANALYST	
SUBJECT (Last, First, Middle) Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich	
AKA OR NEE	
DATE OF BIRTH 22 Aug 1928	PLACE OF BIRTH USSR
CITIZENSHIP	
OCCUPATION (Include Dates)	RESIDENCE (Country, Town/City, Street, include Dates)
FATHER (Last, First, Middle)	MOTHER (Last, First, Middle, include Nee)
OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA	

IP/[illegible] 20 July 77

ANALYST	Linda Foltz	
OFFICE	PRINTED NAME	[illegible]
SE/CI/X	[illegible]	M BISKUP
EA/MEX	R. LEHMAN	R. Lehman

OCR telephoned 20 July

REQUEST FOR: (Check appropriate box)

REPLY NEEDED BY
no later than noon tomorrow

☐ DEROGATORY INFORMATION

☐ ALL INFORMATION 201-132139

☑ SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED: Any intelligence affiliation or connection with prominent Sov officials

FORM 5-73 3541 SECRET CL BY: 007622 (4-38)

SECRET

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/68

KNOWN KGB

DATE 21 JUL 77 09524016

201-132139

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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SIE[illegible]
20-4-77



DESTACADO LATINOAMERICANISTA RUSO NIKOLAI LEÓNOV, QUE VIVIÓ 12 AÑOS EN MÉXICO, HABLA A SIEMPRE! DE LOS MUCHOS PROBLEMAS DE NUESTRA AMÉRICA

POR INNA VASILKOVA

Estimado Sr. Pagés:

Nikolái Leónov –uno de los principales latinoamericanistas soviéticos de hoy, doctor en Ciencias Históricas y hombre por lo regular moderado en manifestar sus sentimientos– se pone sentimental cuando se habla de México...

"Considero a México, hasta cierto punto, mi segunda patria –dice–. He vivido allí doce años en total. Me enamoré de él a primera vista y estoy seguro de que mi cariño a este país no se empañará con los años."

Poco amigo de las entrevistas, esta vez Nikolái ha hecho una excepción. Para **SIEMPRE!** y para mí.

Ante todo, hablamos de la capital. Tanto más que Leónov publicó hace poc[illegible]n la revista soviética *America Latina*, un extenso ensayo sobre ella. Pido a Nikolái que diga lo que, a su parecer, determina la fison[illegible]a de esa ciudad.

Leónov: Cuando rememoro la ciudad de México e intento dilucidar en qué conjuntos arquitectónicos de la capital mexicana está mejor reflejado el espíritu de la nación, me vienen a las mientes, ante todo, los nuevos monumentos. Esos en los que se ha perpetuado la heroica lucha del pueblo por su independencia política y económica. Y entre ellos, en primer lúgar, el dedicado a los "Niños Héroes", los cuales, aunque no pudieron librar de los norteamericanos a la ciudad, a costa de sus vidas salvaron el honor y la dignidad de la nación. Eso para mí es el símbolo de México... Recuerdo que el general Ridgway, verdugo del pueblo coreano, visitó México y depositó una corona al pie del monumento. A la mañana siguiente la corona estaba ante la puerta de la embajada de los EE.UU. con la siguiente inscripción: "De asesinos no admitimos coronas".

Un símbolo de México es también el monumento a los trabajadores del petróleo. No se puede ver con frecuencia en un Estado capitalista un monumento a obreros, y que además, éstos no estén representados en un estilo banal-alegórico, sino en el proceso del trabajo.

Al pensar en México, recuerdo siempre asimismo la obra simbólica de Francisco Eppens en la fachada de la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad. La gigantesca cabeza que ocupa el centro de la composición es, para mí, personificación de la nación mexicana; en ella parecen haberse fundido tres caras: la de una mujer india, la de un hombre español y la de un mestizo.

Y por último, la singular plaza de las Tres Culturas. Me parece que esa "triada" es precisamente lo que da a la ciudad de México su originalidad sin par.

Pregunta: Pero una ciudad no son sólo las

En 1968, en la inauguración de la XIX Olimpiada.

Leónov con Siqueiros, en su taller de Cuernavaca.

Leónov: Para comprender aunque no sea más que un poco el alma mexicana hay que ver, por lo menos, tres cosas: la plaza del Zócalo en la noche del 15 al 16 de septiembre, una corrida y la plaza de Garibaldi.

En la plaza del Zócalo se percibe con particular agudeza el hálito del pasado remoto, de la rica y turbulenta historia del país, que forjara el carácter de la nación. Allí se llega a comprender a fondo el arrogante amor de los mexicanos a su patria, sus seculares anhelos de libertad e independencia y su odio abrasador a los colonizadores de todo género, que hollaran inclementemente la antigua cultura y las tradiciones del país.

La corrida es una emocionante fiesta de valor, destreza y, de seguro, suerte, donde brota a raudales el fogoso temperamento de los mexicanos. Entre las infinitas tradiciones de la corrida mexicana, una es de mi grado en particular: la de perdonar la vida y poner en libertad al toro que por su bravura, potencia y tesón se gana la simpatía del público. Me subyuga la sabiduría del bicho que tiene como base tal costumbre y que emplear al habiar

nes que interpretaban mariachis. Para mí eso era siempre una fiesta. Y no sólo porque estoy enamorado del arte popular mexicano. Allí el alma mexicana se ofrece abierta de par en par, poniendo en evidencia su prodigalidad espiritual, su afecto y, lo que es más importante, la habilidad de compartir con uno –sin que ello resulte importuno– la alegría y la tristeza. Se sienta usted alegre y afligido, los mariachis están siempre dispueto a embellecer la alegría o a hacer romántica la tristeza.

El Robin Hood de América Latina

En agosto del año pasado, cuando Fidel castro cumplio cincuenta años, Leónov publicó en la revista soviética América Latina un artículo titulado "Salud te deseamos, Fidel". Aquello no era tanto una característica de relevante hombre, cuando una exposición de todo lo grande que tiene la nación cubana. Aparte de que, como historiador, Nikolái Leónov se ha dedicado a estudiar la Revolución Cubana y a sus líderes, con Fidel le liga

Rubén Figueroa Come
Ave De Las Tempestad

mía universitaria, entendida según el concepto ya generalizado de la libertad de cátedra y de investigación científica, no como zona extraterritorial en el marco de las instituciones jurídicas ni como fuero para vulnerar el orden público ni los intereses sociales". Insistió en que son las autoridades judiciales las que han realizado averiguaciones sobre la presunta injerencia de universitarios, maestros y alumnos, en el secuestro y muerte de varias personas. Ante eso Figueroa Dijo: "Yo no he inventado los secuestros; mucho menos los muertos, cosa bien difícil". Añadiría, tras otras consideraciones, que ya nadie se le ha detenido en razón de sus ideas o de su militancia políticas. Cuando éstas han salido a relucir en los procesos legales, ha sido por propia declaración de los inculpados". En 1976 el gobierno del estado concedió a la Universidad de Guerrero un subsidio total de 19 millones 610 mil 482 pesos con 64 centavos, que casi duplica el otorgado el año inmediato anterior al inicio del gobierno de Figueroa. El gobernador reveló ante el Congreso y el numeroso públicó, que hay sectores locales que le han llamado la atención sobre un uso inadecuado del subsidio por parte de las autoridades de la Universidad y afirmó que "toda institución que recibe un subsidio tiene la obligación ineludible de informar a la sociedad respecto de su empleo, del mismo modo que los gobernantes informamos de nuestros actos y de la aplicación del presupuesto".

Al margen de la polémica, que siguió mantenida en esta parte del informe –o quizás como consecuencia de ello– Rubén Figueroa, hizo una proposición que constituye novedad en la materia; advirtiendo que no se vaya a interpretar mal su opinión y se piense que él se propone proscribir la enseñanza superior en Guerrero. Lo que desea es –aclaró– contribuir a la búsqueda de una solución pronta, eficaz y realista a este problema. Su gobierno está en posibilidad de aplicar una parte equitativa de su gasto educativo en becas otorgadas a alumnos de escasos recursos que deberían asistir a lo que llamó la Universidad compartida y solidaria. En el ambiente quedó una interrogante que demandaba una explicación de este concepto sorpresivamente nuevo. No flotó por mucho tiempo, pues acto seguido el gobernador contestó así: "Entiendo por Universidad compartida y solidaria un sistema nacional de enseñanza superior que, independientemente del que existe en el Valle de México, pueda instituir en cada entidad federativa una o varias escuelas, institutos o facultades que adopten aquellas especialidades que reclamen las características y las más ingentes necesidades de cada estado, a fin de que no se despilfarren recursos ni se malogren esfuerzos en la repetición de las mismas especialidades o profesiones, lo que redunda en la formación de profesionales frustrados, que no tienen ocupación".

la pesca, actividades de enorme importancia y de gran
entidad, la cual carece de verdaderos especialistas. Esto n
carreras liberales, las cuales según el plán del gobernado
sujetas a otro régimen en el que los interesados cubran e
enseñanza, mediante becas, crédito educativo o cuotas rer
Otra vez frente a cualquier interpretación, el gobernador
"no estoy colocándome en el plan de reformador de l
universitaria a escala nacional. Sólo indago las posibilid
solución a un problema que particularmente en mi estado
y sobrepasa nuestra capacidad económica".

Refiriéndose en circulo íntimo esta incursión en
delicada cuanto conflictiva, el ingeniero Figueroa dijo al
más, propio de su estilo: "Ni modo, me lancé al agua fría
comentó: "¿Y qué? Si usted nada todos los días".

Al licenciado Reyes Heroles, el gobernador Figuer
llevarle al presidente López Portillo el recado de que e
toman en cuenta todas sus recomendaciones para impulsar e
del estado, en lo agropecuario, lo industrial, en lo educa
turístico, igual en lo relativo a la salud del pueblo como a la
familiar, lo mismo a los derechos sociales como a las
individuales, "pues deseamos que la incipiente democrac
Guerrero empieza a abrirse paso, lo sea sobre bases sólidas, e
y políticas, en un ambiente de verdadera solidaridad social".

Si bien el informe del gobernador no fue un mazacote h
reiterativas afirmaciones burocráticas, tampoco la respuesta
sentante presidencial, Reyes Heroles consistió en las palab
tradicional cortesía que el centro debe a los estados. Sí
Guerrero, por conducto de su gobernador, expresa su
decidida en la alianza democrática popular y revolucionari
producción, para satisfacer las auténticas necesidades de la
mayorías. Pero lo más significativo fue que el secretario de Gol
escogiera Guerrero para anunciar una serie de reformas que p
a las minorías tener representación reconocida. Y esas minoría
son más que los partidos y grupos de izquierda afuera del
electoral. Clamó allí contra la intolerancia que "sería el camir
para volver a México bronco y violento. Señaló, ante los enfre
tos ideológicos, a quienes desearían que surgiera la autor
derecho, y, en otro lado, a los que recurriendo a las vías d
violentas o atentatorias de derecho, desearían que en México se
triste caso del derecho sin autoridad. Para unos y otros, dijo, la
del Gobierno Federal es bien clara: ni autoridad sin derecho

Jinete sobre el espinazo de Améric

El 'Charro' Leono



Durante la ceremonia solemne de la entrega por Leonid Brezhnev a Fidel Castro de la Orden de Lenin y la Estrella de Oro del Héroe de la Unión Soviética, en mayo de 1963. A la izquierda, N. Leónov.

Castro es, sin duda, una Personalidad con mayúscula. ¿Cómo definiría usted el papel de él en la historia de Cuba?

Leónov: Los numerosos biógrafos de Fidel, de entre los historiadores burgueses, hacen desesperados intentos de hallar ciertos factores externos que puedan explicar la victoria de la Revolución en Cuba. Se suelen remitir a fenómenos de orden subjetivo, repitiendo la versión sobre la "culpabilidad" de Eisenhower, que prefirió jugar un partido de golf a entrevistarse con Castro cuando éste visitó los EE.UU. en la primavera de 1959. Y ninguno de esos "investigadores" ha querido analizar las regularidades objetivas de carácter socioeconómico ni el papel del mismo Fidel, quien sutil y oportunamente captó la orientación principal del desarrollo histórico y guió enérgicamente al país por el nuevo camino. Aquél fue un trabajo muy duro. Si antes Fidel hubo de dar reiteradas muestras de heroísmo personal, ahora ponía de manifiesto una colosal valentía política como hombre de Estado, asumiendo la responsabilidad por todas las decisiones relacionadas con la reestructuración del país. El aporte personal de Fidel a la primeros años consecutivos a la victoria de la Revolución había que dar a las masas trabajadoras la posibilidad de palpar inmediatamente los frutos de esa victoria, sus resultados prácticos. Y en un país subdesarrollado, atrasado, se buscaron los recursos para construir una vasta red de hospitales y escuelas.

Los sistemas de salud pública y educación, creados en breve plazo, son hoy los mejores de América Latina. Pero una reestructuración de la economía tan rápida y profunda no podía, naturalmente, llevarse a cabo sin dificultades ni errores. Hay que reconocerlo: Fidel ha admitido más de una vez lo erróneo de algunas decisiones, y eso únicamente ha reforzado su autoridad entre el pueblo.

Una cualidad relevante de Fidel es, a mi entender, que sabe inculcar a la gente una fe inquebrantable en la victoria de su causa. La gente le sigue dominada por la idea y segura de que todo lo ideado se hará realidad.

Me vienen ahora a la memoria las frecuentes intervenciones de Fidel por la televisión, en asambleas y mítines. Recuerdo cómo personas de miras superficiales, adoptando la pose de comentaristas políticos, pretendían ironizar [illegible]

Castro para educar al pueblo cuban colosal autoridad de Fidel, su profunc erudición científica y sus vivas dotes de mista desempeñaron un papel que es sobrevalorar.

Debido al gran porcentaje de analf que había en el país y a la débil prepa política de la población, las intervencio Fidel eran una verdadera academia p para el pueblo cubano

Hoy la autoridad de Cuba ha crec manera inconmensurable. Los nombres dirigentes no se caen de las páginas prensa mundial. Por pequeña que sea de la Libertad y por fuertes que se tradiciones imperialistas de no tener en ta los intereses de los pueblos [illegible] quei cubanos se han hecho respetar. [illegible] firr defender sus derechos es un ra[illegible] impe de la nueva política exterior de[illegible]is, d por Fidel Castro

Este hombre de sino legendario, el Hood de América Latina, el artífice de las revoluciones socialistas más originale Edad Contemporánea, cuenta sólo cinc años. Estamos acostumbrados a que los cos y estadistas extranjeros, a esa edad. regular sólo empiezan a dar los primeros en la palestra nacional e internacional. ha dejado tras de sí montañas de logros. todo eso quiero hablar yo en un libro Fidel Castro, el cual estoy escribiendo actualidad.

América Central en el Espejo de la Historia

Me han contado que cuando Nikolái nov defendió las tesis de su doctorad Ciencias Históricas, la sala de conferenci Instituto de América Latina de la Acad de Ciencias de la URSS estaba literaln de bote en bote, tan grande era el interé el tema del estudio: "La historia mode contemporánea de América Central".

Cuando esa disertación publicóse en M en separata, al cabo de unos días er imposible encontrarle en las librerías: e bajo atraía no sólo a los especialistas, también al más amplio círculo de lectore lo singular de los datos reunidos por el durante su estancia en América Latina.

Nikolái Leónov me contó que, en los a vos centroamericanos, la mayoría de los mentos de esos tiempos han sido destru los dictadores han procurado no dejar ni rastro de sus crímenes. Y Leónov reuni una en una, en archivos de México y d EE.UU. y comprándoselas a particulare pias de valiosísimos documentos, las c abriga el propósito de regalar en breve a [illegible]

cartas a Siempre!

ACLARACIÓN...

(Viene de la página 5) co muy a mi pesar (a pesar también de los esfuerzos realizados por el gobierno) por causas insuperables fue imposible emprender la construcción de una nueva Penitenciaría. Sin embargo, siempre he tenido confianza en las instituciones y los gobiernos, esperando con vehemencia que algún día continuará esa cruzada de humanidad carcelaria. Algún día también, habré de tener la oportunidad de comentar directamente al admirable Blanco Moheno, que en efecto mi sueño no es tranquilo, mientras existan problemas vitales que resolver en México. Como no soy millonario ni corruptor, siento como hombre y en carne propia las desgracias de los míos.

Agradeceré, señor Director, su benevolencia y atención para estas aclaraciones que espero sean publicables, rogándole de igual modo me tenga desde siempre, como amigo y devoto de SIEMPRE!

Respetuosamente,
Lic. Alberto Rosas Benítez.
Av. Corona 380-A 1º piso.
Guadalajara, Jal.

c.c. al Sr. D. Roberto Blanco Moheno.
Oficinas Generales de SIEMPRE!

A ESPAÑA...

(Viene de la página 15) multitudinario de la península.

Va a ser invitado don Gustavo a partidas de caza. En los Montes de Toledo, podrá echarle el ojo aunque difícilmente la bala al gato montés y al lince, al ciervo seguramente meterle en las paletas un pedazo de plomo y de todos modos abismarse con el espectáculo de las liebres trigaleras que por el rumbo se multiplican como estrellas en una noche de verano. Igual hará en Pontevedra, en la Sierra de La Estrada y Lalín; en Teruel igual. Y en Salamanca, con menos suerte que puntería cobrar un jabalí de los centenares que nomadean los cotos aledaños.

Y vuelta a la comida que no lo dejará jamás; que de él va a ser sombra y manera de calar sus excelencias de gastrónomo "Indiano". Y el vino, sin el cual no es imaginable tragar ningún bocado español. Vamos a ver, a repasar, a presentir el bicarbonato que don Gustavo utlizará de continuo: en la misma Pontevedra, para no ir más lejos, pulpos a la Marinera, chuletas de Moaña y empanadas de todo lo que vive la tierra, el mar y el aire. ¡Recuerda usted, jefe, las panzurronas de bacalao con pasas y piñones y las apretaditas de lampreas, anguilas, salmonetes y mejillones? Para que toda esa masa luculesca se quede en el fondo hay que ayudarla con melindres de Silleda y Fuenteareas.

Tendrá que beber don Gustavo. En verano, valdepeñas ligerito. Y llegado el invierno los vinos espesos de Rioja. Recuerdo, jefe, que allá en Logroño, una tarde de frío junto a la chimenea de don Augusto Chenel, di cuenta de unos bizcochos de Torrecilla que insistía en mojar en un riojano de color igual al terno de luces que Paco Camino estrenó un domingo en Madrid, cabe el recuerdo de una Feria de San Isidro. ¡Mi dios, qué vino aquél para darle calor a mis huesos y andando el tiempo a mis nostalgias! Volveré.

Si le digo cuántos primores más lucirá el Embajador de México obli-

gremio de pedantes que exige que debe saber tanto de España que pueda distinguir entre Picasso y Dalí, entre Gaudi y Tarragó, entre Albeniz y Falla, entre Camilo José Cela y Unamuno, entre un colmao y una venta de gitanos, entre una farruca y una bulería. ¡Bah! Tanto de todo eso saber. ni los nacidos allá.

Usted movía tristemente la cabeza cuando intentábamos el diseño del Embajador. Yo hacía lo mismo. El meneadero lo hemos interrumpido. Ya tenemos. Y hay que reiterar que no me parece mal. Don Gustavo tiene apariencia formal, muy formal. Pero no sé por qué presiento que también gusta de vivir intensamente, a la manera española.

Cosas que platicamos hace poco, jefe, en su casa de Emerson, mientras dábamos cuenta de un arroz con azafrán hecho por las manos bordadoras de doña Beatriz, su señora esposa; de un cordero chilindrón con igual sello culinario y de una montaña de Lacón de El Bierzo leonés.

No exijo exclusivamente tragón a don Gustavo. También, jefe, es menester que sepa beber. A más de otras cosas intrínsecamente españolas. Lo demás, será lo de menos.

Lo saludo con afecto
Luis Gutiérrez y González.

EL ANTICOMUNISMO...

(Viene de la página 34) París, consideraba que la batalla a ser trabada en 1978 por las fuerzas liberales en defensa del régimen actual será la última frente al programa común de los partidos de izquierda cuya meta es alcanzar una sociedad que no sólo se transformará en marxista sino que será irreversible.

[illegible]eigh y su grey no se convencen de que Europa siempre modeló el destino de nuestra América. De ahí partieron [illegible]stros conquistadores. De ahí vinieron las ideas liberales de la Revolución Francesa. De ahí se derivó el fascismo que, derrotado en la segunda guerra mundial, se refugió en nuestro Continente para vivir oculto en los países que, hoy, lo exhiben, como una fiera sedienta de sangre, aun sabiendo que sus días están contados.

Los crímenes que el fascismo comete en Chile, en Uruguay, Argentina y otros países, muestran que su naturaleza no mudó, mas no abaten la resistencia de los pueblos afectados, sobre todo cuando esos pueblos se alientan con las victorias alcanzadas en Europa contra Franco y Salazar, en Asia (Vietnam, Camboya, Laos) y en África (Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Argelia, etc.). Si los muros erguidos por el fascismo, el imperialismo y el neocolonialismo están cayendo, estrepitosamente, en otros Continentes, ¿por qué nuestra América habría de ser la excepción?

El mundo es una totalidad. Los dinosaurios de Asunción no pueden ignorarlo. Ellos suman 180. Y la América Latina son 300 millones. Es eso lo que los exaspera, que los irrita, que los atormenta.

Estas bestias ya no duermen. El marxismo es su pesadilla.

Francisco Juliao
Cuernavaca, 4/abril/77.

EL CHARRO...

(Viene de la página 43) una obra originalísima, que sin duda alguna llamará la atención también de los historiadores latinoamericanos.

Pregunta: ¿Por qué eligió usted precisamente ese tema?

Leónov: La historia de Centroamé-

queños países a quienes los grandes "manejaban" como les daba la gana. Y en segundo, quería rendir tributo de respeto al gran historiador y científico guatemalteco Víctor Manuel Gutiérrez, un hombre de extraordinaria honradez e inaudita valentía, quien me inculcó el cariño a la América Central y me regaló una parte de su biblioteca particular. Entonces me dijo unas palabras que resultaron proféticas: "Por lo que se ve, ni yo ni mis compañeros podremos ya escribir acerca de la sufridísima América Central. Tal vez eso lo hagas tú".

Víctor Manuel sucumbió en las mazmorras de la dictadura guatemalteca. Y esas palabras suyas devinieron para mí un mandato, que yo consideraba indispensable cumplir.

Pregunta: ¿Qué enseñanzas puede sacar la humanidad, a entender de usted, de la experiencia histórica de América Central?

Leónov: La historia de cada país, aunque sea pequeño, y más aún la de toda una subregión, es aleccionadora. Lo importante es seleccionar los problemas y acontecimientos significantes que caractericen con más plenitud las peculiaridades del desarrollo histórico de esos países precisamente.

A mí me parece que América Central, ante todo, da una lección de lucha por la unidad. Toda su historia es la mejor confirmación de una vieja y sabia verdad: "La unión hace la fuerza".

Al mismo tiempo, al analizar la lucha por la unidad en América Central, se llega a la conclusión de que la unidad por sí misma no es un bien o un mal. Todo depende de en interés de quién se realiza. En las condiciones históricas concretas del siglo XIX, la lucha unionista de Francisco Morazán y Justo Rufino Barrios era, sin duda, un fenómeno progre[illegible], pues se mantenía bajo las cons[illegible]s que postulaban la defensa de la [illegible]ependencia de la región, el acelera[illegible]esarrollo socioeconómico y la ampliación de la democracia. Pero no se debe olvidar que también el aventurero norteamericano Willian Walker, que se apoderara de Nicaragua, lanzó asimismo la consigna de la unidad centroamericana: "¡Cinco o ninguna!", pero a base del restablecimiento de la esclavitud y de la supeditación absoluta de esa región a los Estados Unidos. Los pueblos de América Latina rechazaron y rechazarán la unidad en tales condiciones.

Quisiera señalar otra importante enseñanza que se puede sacar al estudiar la historia de América Central: la importancia que tiene valorar y comprender a tiempo a los grandes patriotas y luchadores por la libertad, apoyarlos cuando aún están vivos. Por trágica ironía de la suerte, todos los verdaderos héroes de América Central fueron ejecutados o asesinados por compatriotas suyos, cuyos descendientes hoy idolatran literalmente a aquéllos. Esos héroes son hoy la gloria y el orgullo de las naciones. Pero como suele acaecer con frecuencia, el reconocimiento y la comprensión de sus ideales llegaron sólo muchos años después de haber muerto ellos.

Pregunta: En el libro de usted se menciona con bastante frecuencia a los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué podría decir usted del papel de los mismos en la história de América Central?

Leónov: A mi entender, la noción más plena sobre la política de los EE.UU. en esa subregión la dan las instrucciones redactadas por el Departamento de Estado para William Jeffers, el primer enviado extraordinario de los EE.UU. en América Central. Se decía en ellas que Centroamérica ofrecía un interés singular para los EE.UU. debido a la situación geográfica de la misma y a la posibilidad de

Central. En particular se decía en ellas que el bajo nivel de desarrollo industrial y la necesidad de capitales y de hombres diestros debían poner a América Central, para largo tiempo, en dependencia de los suministros extranjeros de diversas mercancías.

Ofrece gran interés en este plano, a mi entender, el discurso que pronunciara el 14 de septiembre de 1853 el enviado extraordinario norteamericano en Nicaragua, Solon Borlund, al hacer entrega de sus cartas credenciales. Declaró sin ambigüedades que la nación que ocupaba tan favorable posición geográfica no podía poseer esa riqueza sólo y exclusivamente en su propio interés, cerrando el acceso a todas las demás.

Mientras tanto, el enviado extraordinario mexicano en América Central (con residencia en Guatemala) escribía a México el 1 de abril de 1854 que los norteamericanos no ponían freno a sus actividades y con una insolencia inaudita procuraban el dominio de todo el subcontinente, apoderarse de él, por lo que crecía la necesidad de dar otro giro a las relaciones entre los Estados hispanoamericanos, pues se trataba ya de defenderse, mediante la creación de alianzas militares, de la catástrofe que les amenazaba.

Pregunta: Por cierto, ya que se ha tratado de México, ¿qué influencia ejerció éste, a juicio de usted, en el desarrollo del acontecer en América Central?

Leónov: Se dio el caso de que en algunos periodos, bajo la presión reaccionaria, México actuó en la región de común acuerdo con los EE.UU. Así fue, por ejemplo, en los tiempos de la lucha de Justo Rufino Barrios por la reunificación de América Central (1871-1885). Pero en general, el papel de México ha sido progresista. No cabe ninguna duda de q[illegible]el acontecer en México ejerció c[illegible]recuencia una gran influencia p[illegible]a en sus vecinos meridionales. C[illegible]o ejemplo aduciré aunque no sea más que el periodo de las Reformas en Guatemala, parecido al periodo de las transformaciones realizadas en México por Juárez, quien simpatizaba con sus correligionarios políticos en aquel país y los ayudaba.

Recordaré asimismo que precisamente a bordo de un buque de guerra mexicano marchó al exilio José Santos Zelaya, presidente de Nicaragua depuesto bajo la presión de los EE.UU. Y en los años veinte de nuestro siglo, el gobierno de México concedió a Sandino y a sus compañeros más inmediatos –en los tiempos más duros para ellos– la posibilidad de entrar en México para descansar y curarse y hasta se encargó del mantenimiento de los mismos.

Con frecuencia México hubo de hacer equilibrios en sus relaciones mutuas con sus vecinos norteño y meridionales. Así, explicando el porqué se había negado la ayuda en armas y municiones a los patriotas nicaragüenses, el expresidente mexicano Portes Gil decía en sus memorias que aunque el gobierno y el pueblo de México simpatizaban con la lucha de aquéllos, él no había podido entregarles armas, ya que durante los últimos dos años México mantenía las relaciones más cordiales con los Estados Unidos y él no debía dar ningún paso que redundara en perjuicio de dichas relaciones...

• • •

Para terminar le pregunto a Nikolái Leónov ,qué quisiera transmitir él a sus numerosos amigos en México.

"Mis más cordiales, más fervientes y más sinceros votos de felicidad, éxitos y salud", responde. A continuación toma mi libreta de apuntes y escribe en ellas: "Como P

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
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TRAVEL PROGRAM

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REF: MACHINE L■TING REQUEST NUMBER 00 04319 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1976 AND RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE 7 OCTOBER 1976

1. SUBJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH (MD NO 011155)
■■(AKA KOLYA AND KOLYECHKA LEONOV)
DPOB: 22 AUGUST 1928, ALMAZOVO, USSR (ALSO REPORTED AS RYAZAN, USSR)

2. CITIZENSHIP AND■ PASSPORT DATA: USSR; PASSPORT NO. 10724, ISSUED IN MOSCOW 29 JANUARY 1952; D 6■863, ISSUED 22 JULY 1964; D 18009.

3. CURRENT POSITION: EMPLOYEE OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

4. LANGUAGES: EXCELLENT SPAN■■H, GOOD ENGLISH, SOME FRENCH, LITTLE GERMAN.
IS

5. RELATIVES: SPOUSE: VALERI■■YA IVANOVNA LEONOVA ■■OB: RYAZAN,
DP

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8 Nov 1976

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USSR, 28 APRIL 1928. PASSPORT DATA: C 11507, ISSUED 28 FEBRUARY 1953; D 6862; D 18010. DAUGHTER: IRINA LEONOVA DPOB: 16 MARCH 1962, MEXICO CITY, MEXICO Pd

6. PHYSICAL DESCRI■■ION: AS OF 1966 SUBJECT WAS DESCRIBED AS THIN WITH A LONG FACE, BLONDE HAIR AND BLUE EYES. ■■■ HE WAS FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL. Pd

7. PERSONALITY TRAITS: SUBJECT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS PLEASANT, OUTGOING, INTELLIGENCT, SHREWD, CONSCIENTIOUS, AND RELIABLE. HE HAS A SENSE OF HUMOR BUT DISPLAYS A TEMPER AT TIMES.

8. CURRICULUM VITAE: SUBJECT WAS GRADUATED FROM THE INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN MOSCOW, AT AN UNKNOWN DATE. FROM JULY 1953 UNTIL OCTO■BER 1956 HE SERVED AS AN INTERPRETER AND ■■ SECRETARY TO THE AMBASSADOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEX■■ICO CITY, MEXICO./FROM 1956 TO 1961 HE WAS IN MOSCOW DURING ■WHICH TIME HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ATTENDED THE SCHOOL FOR THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY (KGB) ■FROM 1958 UNTIL 1960/ /FROM 1960 UNTIL 1961 HE WAS AT THE FIFTH DEPARTMENT OF KGB HEADQUARTERS/ HE TRAVELED TO MEXICO IN NOVEMBER 1959 AND T■O CUBA IN FEBRUARY 1960 AS AN

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INTERPRETER. IN JULY 1961 HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AS THIRD ■■■■■■■ SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE AT THE EMBASSY AND SERVED IN THIS CAPACITY UNTIL JUNE 1964. HE WAS ASSIGNED THERE AGAIN IN OCTOBER 19■64 AS SECOND SECRETARY A■ND PRESS ATTACHE. HE REMAINED IN THIS POSITION UNTIL DECEMBER 1968. FROM APRIL 1969 UNTIL JULY 1969 HE SERVED TEMPORARILY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY NOVOSTI IN■ LIMA, PERU./ DURING HIS TOURS ■IN MEXICO, HE WAS ■■■■■■■■■ CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN CLANDESTINE SUPPORT OF LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO GUATEMALA.//

9. FOR FU■RTHER INFORMATION YOU ARE REFE■RRED TO CSCI-316/■ 0■3956-66, DATED 5 AUGUST 1966, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH AN INFORMATION COPY TO YOUR BUREAU.

10. NO CRS INFORMATION

11. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

12. CLASSIFIED BY 062147. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY PARA: 5B(2). AUTOM■■■ATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE.H

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HMMA 18303, 15 DECEMBER 1961
MEXI 9740, [illegible]4 JUNE 1964
MEXI 1218, 14 OCTOBER 1964
HMMA 24698, 6 NOV 64
HMMA 29141, 8 JUNE 66
HMMA 29934, 31 AUG 66

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Ralph Katrosh
C/PCS/SLN
RELEASING OFFICER

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for Murray A. Reitch
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ANALYST: DH		NOTE:
OFFICE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE
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CONFIDENTIAL

15 October 1976

COVER MEMORANDUM FOR XAE-1251

SUBJECT: Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov (201-132139)

SOURCE : Petr Deryabin, a former KGB officer whose information has proven reliable in the past.

1. The attached report on Leonov was prepared by Deryabin, who knew him personally in Moscow as an officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

2. A review of Leonov's 201 file indicates that he had been granted a US visa as a member of a Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly scheduled to depart Moscow on 19 September 1976.

Thomas A. Ryan
C/CI/R&A/E

Attachment:
As Stated, XAE-1251

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11 September 1976

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Deryabin comments on (;-132131) Nikolay ~~Sergeye~~vich Leonov, KGB Officer and Personal Friend of Fidel ~~Castro of Cuba.~~

1. Soviet magazine Latinskaya Amerika, issue No. 4, for July-August 1976 (pp 127-142) published an article entitled "To Your Health, Fidel!" by N. S. Leonov, who is identified in the article as a "journalist".

On page 138 there is a photograph of Fidel Castro with the author of the article, journalist N. Leonov. In this photograph I definitely recognize KGB officer Nikolay Sergeyevich Leonov. I knew Leonov in Moscow as a KGB officer of the First Chief Directorate (FCD). The last time I saw him in KGB Hqs was during the summer of 1953. At that time I did not know in what department of the FCD Leonov worked. (Copy of this photo is enclosed)

2. I recognized another photo of Leonov, N.S., in the late 1950s or the beginning of the 1960's for the Agency or the FBI.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me on the photograph published in the Soviet book Viva Cuba, which was published in Moscow in 1963 or 1964. In this photograph Leonov appeared in the company of Khrushchev, Castro and Alekseyev (Shitov) Aleksandr Ivanovich, (also known to me personally as a KGB senior officer) the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba at that time.

N. S. Leonov also was recognized by me in the photograph published by Golos Rodiny, issue No. 32, for April 1963. In this photograph Leonov's face is shown between Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Castro at Vnukovo Airport on 23 April 1963 when Castro arrived on his visit to the USSR. (Copy of this photograph is enclosed)

XAE-1251
14 Sept. '76

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3. In his article, highly praising Fidel Castro, Leonov reviews Castro's life and his accomplishments as a "revolutionary leader". The author revealed that when Castro lived in Mexico, 1955-56, he established contact with Alberto Bayo, former colonel of the Spanish Republican Army, who emigrated to Mexico after the Spanish Civil War, and who became Castro's "military instructor". Also, in Mexico Castro was joined by Che Guevara, who became his close friend. The author briefly mentioned that the CIA had planned "a physical liquidation of Fidel Castro".

In 1963 Castro was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The article was written in connection with Castro's 50th birthday, which was on 13 August 1976.

The article provided photographs of Castro and some of his associates. The photographs for the article were provided by Novosti press agency, and by the Soviet magazine *Kuba*, which is published in Russian and in Spanish.

Petr Deryabin

CIRA/E Comment: According to information in Leonov's 201, he had applied for a visa as an employee of the MFA to the UNGA, in September 1976.

According to SE/CI/Ext. Leonov is presently chief of Service #1 (Information) of the First Chief Directorate.



Первое посещение Советского Союза. Рядом с Фиделем Кастро на трибуне митинга, состоявшегося на Уралмаше,— автор статьи, журналист Н. Леонов

Latinskaya Amerika # 4,
July-August 1976. (p 138)

Caption: "First visit to the Soviet Union. Next to Fidel Castro ... author of the article, journalist N. Leonov".



Golos Rodiny, # 32 for April 1963.

Caption under the photograph:
"23 April 1963. Arrival in Moscow of Fidel Castro, Prime-Minister of the Revolutionary Government Republic of Cuba. Greetings at Vnukovo Airport. From left to right: N. Khrushchev, Chairman Council of Ministers of the USSR, /N.S. Leonov/, L. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and F. Castro."

Attachment to
XAE-1251
14 Sept. 1976

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

PDSTORAGE
SBSR- 2051

Country: USSR

Subject: Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

DOI: 1975-1976

Source: Two sources Reporting Separately

Any dissemination of this information to field stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must be coordinated with SE/CI/X. As a general rule, PDSTORAGE information is not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison services or to any office outside the DDO.

1. LEONOV, a high-ranking KGB officer, is currently Chief of Service No. 1 (Information) of the KGB's First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate in Moscow. According to one source, LEONOV was to be appointed Ambassador to Poland, but that assignment was cancelled when he became Chief of Service No. 1. Another source reported in early 1975 that LEONOV was Chief of Service No. 1 and was scheduled to be appointed as Ambassador to Portugal when he received his Service No. 1 assignment instead.

2. LEONOV is very knowledgeable on Latin America and speaks excellent Spanish.

COMMENTS:

1. For previous PDSTORAGE reporting on LEONOV, please see PDSTORAGE report 984, 16 September 1964.

Con't

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

d-11996
1-132139

2. According to LEONOV's 201 file, he is scheduled to attend the 1976 session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

22 October 1976

Distribution:
1-C/SE/CI/X
1-SE/CI/X (Grimes)
1-C/SE/CI/R
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1-IP/AN - 201-132139

201-132139

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SE7

T 211605 E1A765 PAGE 01-01

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RUEHFB/DIRECTOR FBI
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN 5443
BT
UNCLAS MOSCOW 14177
DEPT FOR VO AND EUR/SOV INFO
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: CVIS UR/UN (KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMIROVICH)
SUBJECT: VISAS: SOVIETS TO UNGA
1. VISAS FEAR
2. KHRUSTALEV, YEVGENIY VLADIMORIVICH
JAN [illegible] 1927 ROSTOV NA DONU
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
3. LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
[illegible] 1928 RYAZANSKAYA OBL
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
4. TEKOV, PETR PORFIR'YEVICH
[illegible] 19[illegible] VOROSHILOVGRAD
EMPLOYEE OF MFA
5. ETD SEPT 19, 1976
6. MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION TO UNGA. STOESSEL

NAI to CSCI-316/03740-69, dated 29 Oct 69 & repu to FBI. 17SEP 1976 3

ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY

201-132139

create chrono copy.

IR-475

19 June 1975

SECRET

To: J. A. DJR's Preliminary Rundown of Soviet KGB Officers in Mexico City ~~Associated with~~ OSWALD Assassination of Pres. KENNEDY: ~~Notes on~~

This is what I could dig out so far.

1. Notes on : ALEKSEYEV, A. I., known to me personally, senior KGB officer.

2. LEONOV, N. S., known to me personally, KGB officer.

3. SAGATELYAN, M. R. I didn't know him personally, but I have no doubt he is an RIS/KGB officer.

4. ANDRONOV, I. On the basis of his writings, he is probably RIS/KGB officer. For certain, at least a co-optee.

5. KOSTIKOV, V. V. I don't remember whether I identified him previously. He is exposed as a known KGB officer.

6. YATSKOV, P. A. Known RIS KGB officer and I have no doubt about him.

7. I have found some interesting writings in the Star for 18 June 1975, in the column: Party Talk Is Always CIA, by Betty BEALE. There is a discussion about the KGB involvement in the assassination.

Also, in the Washington Post for 19 June 1975, in the editorial page "Russia Reports on the CIA." A copy of these articles is included.

Please let me know if I can provide more assistance to you.

Thank you,

cc chrono (p. 1 only)
Temp

Orig t J.A. 19/6/75

WT
EN/P/ar
C/CA

Att - 2 pages of clippings

LKM

SECRET

D.J.R.

1 XYASI

Cl by 012208
E2 Impdet
XAE-857
19 June 75
100-6-154/4

X-REF. SHEET S-E-C-R-E-T DATE 03/01/76

X-REF.	SYMB. NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DOC. FILED IN
201-0132139	HMMA-30416	28 OCT 66	201-0885685

THE ABOVE DOCUMENT(S) ARE CROSS-REFERENCED
TO THE 201 FILE CITED UNDER LEFT MARGIN.
FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LOCATION OF
THE FILE CONTAINING THE RECORD COPY DOCUMENT,
CALL FILES SECTION, EXTENSION 4127.

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY C54979

FILE IN 201-0132139

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X) MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIREALM Progress Report, 31 October 1965 through 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

14

3P

References: A. HMMA-27674, 2 December 1965

B. HMMA-28638, 6 May 1966

1. Attached is the second LIREALM progress report, which covers largely the period during which Robert L. EASBY has assumed the handling of this agent. It will be noted that the main headings are those laid out in the statement of objectives forwarded with reference B.

2. Each month, LIREALM gives EASBY a list of new contacts, a brief sketch of each, and any ideas he has on how they might be used to get at his main targets. These are routinely traced in order to give him indications of people of particular interest, or of possible danger to his cover. For example, when he listed Charles and Bertha SMALL as persons he had met at an art exhibit, he was told to avoid them and their group unless at a social function where they could not be avoided. We have no desire to have ODENVY open a dossier on him.

3. Of the attached listed contacts, Station has traces only on the following:

Attachment:
Progress Report, h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

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1 att

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201-773327

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28979	18 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	FFN:/ P-11185

a. Alimuddin LUBIS. The only material available is that contained in HMMW-14223, 22 December 1965.

b. Suzanne *FELICIEN. LIREALM has previously reported she is in charge of "medical relations" and scholarships at the French Embassy. The only other information in the files is that provided by Albert de BONFILS in June 1962 through a casual Station contact. Since we were never in direct touch with him, and owing to the questionable nature of the whole BONFILS background and the lack of any solidity, this information must be accepted with some reserve. "Extreme Communist--propagandist--extremely dangerous--bad influence on scholarship students whom she uses as instruments and contacts--head of the scholarship service--much favoritism in the distribution of scholarships--accepts and demands gifts and money--obliges certain applicants to take French lessons which she gives and charges for. These lessons are her method of indoctrinating them."

c. Jean-Claude *DUCLAY. A routine memo from Barbara C. HUFIG, dated 26 November 1964, mentioned subject as having been in charge of the intensive French course taken by members of the doctoral and the history programs at El Colegio de Mexico. On 23 November 1964 he married Irene *AZNAR, then about 27, who was also teaching in the course and who had been here only since 1963, coming directly from France where she had been a teacher.

d. Beno and Carol Cook *LIEBERMAN. LIREALM and his wife met Mrs. Lieberman shortly after they arrived here. Beno they met in late January at the Mexican Folklore Association, which they conduct weekly at their home. It is a variety of "hootenanny" where both hosts and guests perform, and occasionally visiting entertainers appear. It is a meager living indeed, with 25 pesos a person being charged, and fortunately they do not have to depend on it, since Carol Lieberman has a fairly well paying job at The News. Beno was described as aesthetic-looking, undernourished, ill-kempt and very Jewish looking. However, LIREALM found him sensitive, gentle and interested in people. It was at one of these evenings where LIREALM met Nikolay LEONOV (see below). The Lieberman's were also reported to have attended a luncheon at the home of Pearl GONZALEZ, one of the reporters for The News, at which two officers of the Soviet Embassy were guests.

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e. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132134)
Leonov and LIREALM spent the evening discussing chess and later made an appointment to play at LIREALM's house. This visit was marked by totally unpolitical conversation and Leonov asked no leading questions. The two couples got on well, and a return match is planned. (A personality report is being prepared on Leonov and will be submitted after the second meeting. LIREALM is being encouraged to see Leonov, about whom little concrete is known outside of his cover work.)

4. The format of these reports will require some reworking, and this will be done following EASBY's return from home leave. During EASBY's absence, LIREALM will report to Willard C. CURTIS whom he has already met.

R.L. Easby
for
Willard C. CURTIS

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45

LIREALM Progress Report

31 October 1965 - 31 April 1966

1. The period October 1965 to February 1966 was largely devoted to building a circle of useful contacts in the French colony and intellectual world and getting to know the case officer. When the latter left in early 1966, I was introduced to my present case officer. Past activity was reviewed and evaluated, targets discussed and objectives clearly defined.

2. The following will give some indication of advances made so far against the target objectives laid out in HMMA-28838:

   a. French Embassy floor plan. Under various pretexts, numerous visits have been made to the Embassy. A rough diagram is ready with the occupants of most of the offices identified. Remodeling of the building is in process. Some officers will be transferred from one room to another. The basic structure of the building will not be altered.

   b. Contacts leading toward the French target. Those persons named below have all been met at least once during April and are deemed to be worthy of further development for their apparent access in the French community. This number represents only a fraction of persons met and virtually discarded for lack of operational promise:

      201-[illegible] 68

      (1) Regis Thillaye du Boullay. Met on several occasions. Press Attache of the French Embassy, and possibly their Political Section head. Several sources

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CS C[illegible]

describe him as displeased with his present rank at the Embassy. Some bio data is now available, but further development is definitely warranted. He is friendly and approachable. His value lies in (a) his leading to other Embassy officers and providing bio data about them; (b) his being disgruntled and providing information wittingly; (c) his being an intelligence officer.

(2) Henri de *Coignac. Met on several occasions. Have made tentative tennis date. Is very close to the Ambassador. The nature of his relationship or the services provided to the Ambassador have to be determined.

(3) Genevieve *San Jose. Have seen on several occasions and have established fairly friendly relationship. She is a journalist with the Le Journal Francais. Has already been a source of some bio data about Embassy officers, introduced to some members of French colony, corroborated some information obtained elsewhere.

(4) Marie Bideault *Lesort. Switchboard operator at Embassy. Unmarried, friendly, helpful. Have visited her on various pretexts, now stop by just to say hello. Hope to set her up for another agent to meet and develop.

(5) Valentine *Honorat. Secretary to Jacques Seigle, Attache at Embassy. Elderly, friendly, helpful. Corrected letter I wrote to Ambassador. In return I gave her a box of chocolates for which she seemed genuinely grateful. Offered to help me in future in any way she could.

(6) Suzanne *Felicien. Assistant to Cultural Attache. Seen several times on business. Friendly. Known to mutual friends. Possible source of bio data on other Embassy personnel. Has invited my wife and me to dinner. This could be our first important break.

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c. Possibly Significant Contacts. Because of my close friendship with them, their access or their lack of apparent income.

(1) Jacques C. *Derney. Private businessman, "Artistic Counselor." Lives outside his apparent income, probably homosexual.

(2) Jean-Claude *Duclay. Professor at Centre Scientifique. Very friendly. Function of Centre and reason for its enormous staff not clear.

(3) Francois and Monique *Gilliot. Commercial Attache. He is very anti-U.S. She is friendly to my wife.

(4) Andre and Norma *Lesur. Close ties with Andre could lead to close friendship. Very prominent in French colony. Wealthy businessman. Possibly willing to collaborate with us wittingly.

d. Mexican Intellectuals

(1) Beno and Carol Lieberman. Run Mexican Folklore Association. Have access to large circle of Latin American semi-professional musicians and entertainers. Gradually obtaining bio data on Beno and his friends.

(2) Feliciano *Bejar. Prominent artist. Friend of the U.S., but has many friends among the Mexican left.

(3) Martin *Foley. British national. Manager of Bejar. Technical director of Ballet Folklorico. Brilliant, friend of many Mexican artists and intellectuals, left and right.

(4) Adrian *Leyva Schoonmaker. Professor at Unidad Prof, de Zacatenco. A professed socialist. Brilliant student, introverted and peculiar. Access to leftist circles.

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e. UAR

(1) Michel •Hamed. Low ranking member of Embassy. Met once, January 1966. No further progress or efforts made.

f. Indonesia

(1) Alimuddin •Lubis. Press and cultural attache. Very friendly. I have not yet followed up.

g. Soviet

(1) Nicolay T. Leonov. Press Attache. Off to a very friendly and casual start socially. Have permitted one month to pass without contacting him in order not to seem overly eager. I feel I can call him next week and proceed cautiously to develop him if mutual interest seems to be there.

3. Over the next few months, these contacts will be further refined, in coordination with the case officer. Owing particularly to the variety of French contacts, it should be possible to settle before too long on a handful of fairly productive sources of personality information.

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FROM APERTURE CARD SUBMITTED

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 984
Nikolay LEONOV (201-132,139)

DOI: 1964

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

1. Subject is an officer of the Fifth Department (Latin American), First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence), KGB who has been assigned to the residentura in Mexico City since approximately 1961. Source has no information on his specific assignments in Mexico.

2. Prior to his service in the KGB, Subject graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. He then served in Mexico for four years as a member of the Soviet representation there. Source does not know what his position in Mexico was. (Comment: Subject was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from July 1953 to October 1956). He then returned to Moscow and entered the KGB Intelligence School in ca 1958 and graduated in 1960. (Comment: Presumably Subject joined the KGB after his return from Mexico). He was then assigned to the Fifth Department, First Chief Directorate in KGB Headquarters where he served until his assignment to Mexico in 1961.

3. Subject is reported to be an excellent Spanish

SECRET

speaker. In Mexico he had additional duties as "government interpreter". He acted as Fidel CASTRO's interpreter during the latter's trip to the USSR. He also accompanied Anastas MIKOYAN on the latter's trip to Mexico and Cuba. In addition on several occasions he has served as interpreter to official Cubans visiting the USSR.

P.L.DILLON
C/SR/CI/KGB

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - SR/O/WH for 201-132,139
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1 - RID
1 - AESTORAGE chrono

P.Dillon,C/SR/CI/KGB:mbg 16 September 1964

SECRET

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

11 March 1964

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 928
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI : 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August, 1962, Source reported that Subject, reportedly assigned to Mexico City, was a KGB agent.

Distribution:
1 - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CC/S&T/CI:TRyan

SECRET

14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
Orig. - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

14-00000

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S E C R E T

DO DOCUMENT EXTRACT

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 DOSSIER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED FROM ANOTHER OFFICIAL DO FILE. PERSONS PERFORMING NAME TRACES ARE CAUTIONED THAT THE DOCUMENT FROM WHICH THIS EXTRACT WAS PREPARED CONTAINS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT AND SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM IP/FILES.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-0132139 074-005-102
SEX M SX-05555/25
POB USSR
CIT USSR

RES USSR. KNOWN KGB

DATE 28 APR 75 09274849

201-0132139

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NICHLAS
201-132139 050-008-010
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-32864
23 AUG 67

CIT COLOMBIA
OCC ?
PRESS ATTACHE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

HLR R 6709110184

FILE IN 201-~~132731~~
132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

14-00000

4. On 6 January 1956 the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] they were having some trouble getting the documents [illegible] because of the [illegible] but said they should be ready in about five days.

5. On 6 January 1956 Dr. Enrique CABRERA informed Juan Pablo [illegible] y Aguilar, [illegible], that on Tuesday (calculated to be 10 January) there would be a meeting at the home of General JARA. Later that day CABRERA told [illegible] there would be a meeting on Monday at [illegible] home at [illegible], a [illegible] of the "peace contact." CABRERA said the "other doctors" had been informed of it but that [illegible] (who is believed probably to be Lorenzo [illegible], active in the Peace Movement and the Partido Popular) had not yet been informed. CABRERA said that there would then be a meeting with the General Monday afternoon.

6. On 7 January CABRERA informed [illegible] that the meeting with the General had been changed to Monday (9 January) at 20.0 hours. Apparently, the group which would meet with JARA was to gather first at the home of [illegible] at 19.30. Among them, in addition to the names mentioned before would be Dr. [illegible] (believed to be Dr. Guillermo [illegible] Islas). (It is concluded that the meeting referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 must have referred to the Mexican Peace Committee since the people mentioned are all active in it.)

7. On 12 January 1956 Mrs. NIETO, daughter of General JARA, again called the Soviet Embassy about the clinical histories. They were not ready. She stated her father was ill in Veracruz. She gave her telephone number as 14-26-39, which is that of Dr. Daniel NIETO Roaro at calle [illegible] D.F.

Action: It is proposed that when [illegible]-2 is finally cleared, he be given the assignment of identifying as many as possible of JARA's supporters who have positions in the Mexican Government. It is believed that JARA still has many adherents in the government and that they, like the followers of Lazaro CARDENAS, are in a position to exert a good deal of influence.

Meanwhile, it seems likely that other [illegible] will be received through [illegible].

201-132139

[illegible]

HMM-A-3735
[illegible]
5 Dec. 1955
Page 79

73. NERVO, Rodolfo
[illegible] 94 Telephone: 36-32-14

On 23 May 1955 this subject called Nikolai [illegible] [illegible], Soviet Embassy employee, and was told: "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." [illegible] said he would take the books to [illegible] the next day.

On 3 August 1955 NERVO called the Embassy to inquire about the type of dress to be worn to a social function that evening.

This matter aroused the interest of the Station because it is not often that the Soviets deliver documents to private parties.

[illegible] was requested to supply information on this subject on 14 Sept. 1955. On [illegible] Sept. he replied (B-2) that NERVO was for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. He was never very distinguished. He is now about 75 yrs. old, inactive in the Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior. He is a brother of the poet, Amado NERVO.

Action: None contemplated.

-4600
23 [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. On 2 [illegible] 1961 Samuel [illegible] left a message for [illegible] that "If he has time hope he will come to [illegible] time."

3. [illegible] reference [illegible] indicates that [illegible] is a representative of the Mexican Chess Federation. On 7 March 1960 he called the Soviet Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico ([illegible]). In this conversation it was indicated that [illegible] has a telephone in his home and he [illegible] academic line of work. He stated that he was "back in classes" and that [illegible] could no longer be held in his home. He told [illegible] that a tournament featuring a person named [illegible] would begin [illegible] and invited [illegible] to see some of it. [illegible] said he would attend if he had time. [illegible] then asked when he could see [illegible] to give him a list of books he wants. [illegible] told him to come to the Embassy at any time and [illegible] he would [illegible] over.

4. Although the last reference may serve to explain the [illegible] relationship between [illegible] and the Soviets, the role of [illegible] is less clear. It should be kept in mind that the Soviets here are not accustomed to [illegible] time playing chess or socializing with people for the pure pleasure of the thing. Furthermore, the allegation that Andres [illegible] is a Communist should be noted.

5. The Mexico City telephone directory lists one Andres [illegible] at 5 de Mayo [illegible], with telephone 2[illegible]-61

6. The following information on the name [illegible] was reported by [illegible] on 2[illegible] April 1961:

a. Andres [illegible] Frankel de [illegible] Immigration file [illegible]
Born in Hungary.
Past addresses: [illegible] 101; [illegible] 131-2; [illegible]
Insurgentes [illegible] (present)
Occupation: [illegible]
No police record of record in Federal or [illegible]

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XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima CAS

SUBJECT
Operational/JMROD
Transmittal of Letter

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 26978

Forwarded herewith is a copy of the torn letter as requested per Reference.

fr Harriet J. Guillemine
Samuel K. CASTELL

DOC MICRO. SER.
FEB 11 1972
MICROFILMED

HJG/chf

Attachment: h/w
as stated

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1-C/SBD w/o att

1 ATT H/W
1 cc w/o ATT TO SB/X/WH

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
D 200-124-162/3

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLA-10216

DATE
3 August 1962

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~[illegible]~~
✓~~200-124-162~~/3

14-00000

att to HPLA-10216
in C/~~[illegible]~~ WHD

18 июня 1969 г. АПН

DOC. MICRO. SER.
FEB 11 1972
MICROFILMED

3P

ПЕРУ: ВСТРЕЧА С МИНИСТРОМ

Нужно немало поколесить по Лиме, прежде чем выберешься на окраины города. На одной из них, на пустыре возводится новое здание министерства энергетики и горнорудной промышленности Перу. Раньше такого министерства не существовало, так как соответствующие отрасли народного хозяйства были на откупе у монополий США. Но времена меняются. Перуанцы не только берут под свой контроль иностранные капиталовложения в столь жизненно важной сфере народного хозяйства, но намерены сами управлять этой отраслью ш ш ц экономики своей страны.

Третий этаж здания еще в лесах, крыши нет. Кругом - лязг и грохот, как на всяком строительстве. А в цокольном и первом этажах уже кипит работа. Сотрудники нового министерства разрабатывают основы политики в области энергетики и горнорудного дела.

Министр Хорхе Фернандес Мальдонадо, в январе этого года произведенный из полковников в генералы, один из активных участников военного переворота 3 октября 1968 года. Он согласился встретиться с корреспондентом АПН. Кабинет министра находится в полуподвальном помещении. Ни приемной, ни секретарей. Внутри - скромная мебель. За столом Фернандес Мальдонадо.

Нефть и горнорудная промышленность являются основой экономики Перу. (В 1968 году продукция этих отраслей составила 52 процента национального экспорта и дала стране

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8 aug 69

201-132139

440мн. долларов).

-Каковы будут главные принципы политики правительства в этих важных отраслях экономики? - Спросили мы министра.

- Революционное правительство намерено обеспечить эксплуатацию горнорудных богатств в интересах страны. Находясь в руках частного капитала, эти богатства нередко служили спекулятивным целям, - заявил он. - Мы примем законы , которые в обязательном порядке заставят концессионеров разрабатывать месторождения и не позволят приобретать за бесценок право собственности на эксплуатируемые месторождения.

Мы надеемся развивать мелкие и средние предприятия, росту которых будут содействовать и налоговые льготы, и особенно наша кредитная политика, система государственного строительства дорог, геологических исследований и т.д. Конечно, - подчеркивает министр, - это не значит, что мы [illegible] действовать развитию крупных горно- [illegible] й, когда их деятельность не будет противв [illegible] сам нации.

Учитывая частые заявления прессы и политических деятелей США о том, что в Перу-де начинаются "гонения" на американские капиталы, мы поинтересовались у министра, чем обоснованы подобные заявления.

- На иностранный капитал, - ответил Фернандес Мальдонадо, - у нас не накладывается других ограничений, кроме необходимости подчиняться перуанским законам. Мы намерены создать из разрозненных законоположений единый кодекс норм, регулирующих деятельность иностранцев. Этот кодекс охватывает проблемы налогообложения и контроля над использованием валютных средств, вопросы техники безопасности и гигиены труда, основы взаимоотношений между иностранными концессионерами и рабочими и т.д.

В области ископаемых энергетических ресурсов (нефть, газ, уголь) государство оставляет за собой преимущественное право добычи, обработки и реализации продукции. Основная нефтехимическая промышленность также будет принадлежать государству. Революционное правительство заявило: частный капитал будет допускаться только на основе временных производственных контрактов.

Касаясь перспектив укрепления энергетической базы страны, министр сказал, что сейчас в центральной части Кордильер ведется строительство гидроэлектростанции. Мощность первой очереди составит 325 тыс.киловатт. Затем она будет доведена до I млн.квт. Осуществление многих других проектов, имеющихся в портфеле министерства, пока задерживается из-за напряженности в платежном балансе страны. Специалисты министерства работают над проблемой быстрейшего использования для выработки электроэнергии попутных газов нефтяных месторождений.

Министр говорит о том, что придет время, когда Перу наверстает потерянное и сможет приступить к использованию ядерной энергии в народном хозяйстве. Для выполнения намеченных планов стране потребуется экономическая и техническая помощь извне, и любое участие СССР в этой области будет приветствоваться.

- Путь революции не усыпан розами, но мы готовы идти по нему вперед, невзирая на разные уколы и занозы, - сказал министр в заключение встречи.

Лима.

Н.ЛЕСНОВ,
спец.корр.АПН.

8 Aug 69

14-00000

[illegible] ATTITUDES

[illegible] IN [illegible] PASSED

[illegible] INSTRUCTIONS TO [illegible]

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-193170
DIR -105659
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ATTACHE, MEXICO 61-68

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21

WH-8 FILE, VR [illegible]

C20 DDP, [illegible]

S E C R E T 162238Z NOV 70 CITE LIMA 7932 16 Nov 70 IN 207552

DIRECTOR

REF: LIMA 7923 (IN 207566)

1. SUSPECT DULAM-2 SPEAKING FOR EFFECT ON HIS SPECIFIC AUDIENCE IN VIEW PAST COOPERATION WITH STATION, INCLUDING PART HE PLAYED IN LEONOV EXPULSION. IN JANUARY 1970 HE HAD SPOKEN FRANKLY OF HIS BELIEF THAT U.S. WAS BUILDING CHILEAN MILITARY STRENGTH AS COUNTER TO VELASCO GOVERNMENT BUT C/O HAD BELIEVED HE HAD DISABUSED HIM OF THAT MISCONCEPTION (LIMA 6345). (IN [illegible]) ATTEMPTS TO DISABUSE DULAMA-2 OF VELASCO GOVERNMENT ACCUSATIONS SURROUNDING CHAPPERS' DEPORTATION POSSIBLY LESS SUCCESSFUL. IN ANY CASE, DULINDEN-11'S ACCOUNT OF DULAMA-2'S OBSERVATIONS ACCEPTED AS FACT AND WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH THIS STATION CONTACT.

2. FILE: 201-852600 GP-1

S E C R E T

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207

S E C R E T 021729Z DEC 69 CITE LIMA 6145

DIRECTOR

2 DEC 69 IN 95959

[redacted] REDTOP AEKICK

REFS: A. LIMA 6094 (IN 90718)

B. LIMA 5278 (IN)

C. HPLW 5421

SB/X/IWH

1. IN RECHECKING REF A STORY WITH IDEN A REF A, DUBRIDE 20 LEARNED SOVIET INVOLVED WAS NOT NIKOLAY ROMANOV BUT KGB OFFICER NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV WHO WAS HERE ON TDY FROM 23 APRIL TO 17 JULY 69. HOWEVER IDEN A CLARIFIED REF A STATEMENT ON "QUIET" PNG ACTION BY STATING "IT IS PRESUMED" THAT DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING LEONOV'S DEPARTURE WAS PASSED TO SOVIET EMBASSY. IDEN A ALSO STATED THAT REASON FOR PNG ACTION BASED ON REPORT WHICH REVEALED THAT ON 8 JULY 69 LEONOV DELIVERED SPEECH AT LUNCHEON MEETING OF FLN COMMITTEE.

IDEN A ADDED THAT THIS REPORT, WHICH WENT TO (ARMY INTELL SIE), PROVIDED CONFIRMATION OF HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN PERU.

2. STATION ATTEMPTING CONFIRM "QUIET" PNG ACTION. WE KNOW DUBRIDE KEPT CLOSE WATCH ON LEONOV PARTICULARLY AFTER RECEIVING STATION TRACES ON HIM. SIE INTEREST PROBABLY AROUSED AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN NADELHOFFER AND DULAMA/2 ON 4 JULY 69 WHEN LATTER GIVEN LEONOV PAPER. QUIET PNG WAS DISCUSSED AS POSSIBLE COURSE OF

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PNG WAS DISC

Leonov file 2 Dec 69

201-132139

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PAGE 2 LIMA 6145 SECRET

ACTION DURING THIS MEETING. PER REF B, DELAMA/2 STATED 18 JULY THAT ORIGINAL OF PAPER WENT TO PRESIDENT VELASCO AND COPIES TO FOREIGN MINISTER MERCADO AND TO INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. DULAMA/2 ALSO STATED THAT MERCADO READ LEONOV PAPER TO CABINET 15 JULY THUS QUIET PNG TWO DAYS LATER APPEARS PLAUSIBLE.

3. STATION NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY THAT CURRENT GOP EFFORT AGAINST COS AND LNPURE OFFICER MAY BE CONNECTED WITH ABOVE ACTION PARTICULARLY IF GOP POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN DEALING WITH U.S. AND USSR.

4. VIEW ABOVE DEVELOPMENT, MODIFIED FORM OF REF C JMROD PAPER ON LEONOV MIGHT BE VERY SUITABLE FOR PRESS EXPOSURE IN BOGOTA OR SOME OTHER LA CAPITAL WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF REPLAY HERE AND IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA WHERE ESTABLISHMENT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS PENDING.

5. FILE 201-132139

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

7P

FROM: RID/CE OSER SB USSR

EXTENSION:

NO. CSCI 316/ 03740-69

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1969

TO (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI STAFF 2C 35	2 [illegible]			TO: STATE
2.				
3. RID/CE GA 10				
4.				
5. RID/AN GA 50	2 [illegible] 1969			
6. RID/CE/SB				
7. RID/EDI GB 34				
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DOCUMENT DATE [illegible] OCT [illegible]

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

21 Oct 69

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

EDC

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: VOLKOV, Valeriy
[aka. VOLKOV, Valeriy Vasilyevich]

[redacted]

1. Reference is made to your request dated 12 September 1969 concerning Subject.

2. On 22 December 1968, an article entitled "Russians Continue Passing Themselves Off As Journalists" appeared in La Prensa Libre, a newspaper published in San Jose, Costa Rica, which made the following statements concerning Subject. According to the article, Subject, a journalist, had shortly prior to the date of the article arrived in Chile to attend the Congress of the CUT (Central Worker's Union). In this respect Subject's name was linked with that of ~~one Mikhail~~ KOLESNIKOV and one Aleksandr OPEKUNOV, who were also to attend the Congress, and who, according to the article, on a previous visit to Colombia, had been accused of espionage activities by the Colombian authorities. La Prensa Libre article goes on to quote the Chilean magazine Politica, Economia, Cultura as stating that Subject "does not work for any publication or information medium of the USSR which operates regularly. He prudently has not bragged about doing it, because recently no less than 100 representatives of Soviet newspapers, radio, or information agencies who work abroad (Pravda, Izvestia, TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow) have been accused of being spies in the service of the KGB. In Latin America alone 15 Russian journalists have been declared persona non grata."

3. According to a report dated 12 August 1969 from a usually reliable source, Subject, the editor [sic] of Komsomolskaya Pravda, who had been permanently stationed in Havana, Cuba, since March of 1968, had visited Peru from 4 July to 5 August 1969. The files of this office contain the following reports concerning Subject's visit to Peru which may be of interest:

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a. A report dated 8 July 1969, from the same usually reliable source of paragraph 3, provided the information that on arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July, Subject was not met at the airport by representatives of the Soviet Embassy, but went directly to a private residence where he spent the night. Source stated that shortly following his arrival in Lima, Subject made comments to the effect that he was a very close friend of one Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV. For your information, LEONOV had arrived in Peru on 23 April 1969, as a NOVOSTI representative and remained until 17 July 1969. Based on his activities and associations during his tour of duty in Mexico from May 1953 to 22 December 1968, LEONOV is considered to be a staff officer of the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). Further comments by Subject on this occasion which were reported by Source referred to a trip to Moscow to attend a World Peace Conference which Subject had made shortly prior to the date of the report. According to Source, Subject stated that while in Moscow he met one Felix Cabada ARIAS Schreiber, a member of the Central Committee of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCP/Soviet) of Peru, and followed this statement with various questions concerning members of the PCP/Soviet, the situation in the universities, and the current strength of the revolutionary vanguard. Finally, Source also reported that on the following morning, 5 July 1969, Subject contacted the Soviet Embassy and was instructed to immediately obtain a room at the Savoy Hotel, where LEONOV was staying. According to Source, Subject was informed by the Soviet Embassy that staying at a private residence in Lima might create suspicions on the part of the local authorities and that the Soviet Embassy preferred to avoid such problems.

b. A second report, dated 11 July 1969, from a reliable source, provided the information that since Subject's arrival in Lima, Peru, on 4 July 1969, he had been in frequent contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Peru, one Yuriy Vladimirovich LEBEDEV, and with LEONOV (paragraph 3a). Source also stated that Subject was treated with notable deference by the Ambassador.

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c. According to a report dated 1 August 1969 from the same reliable source of paragraph 3b, during his Peruvian visit Subject contacted one Edwin PEREZ, Traffic Manager of Faucett Airlines, and offered to sell him a small aircraft on very attractive terms. Source stated that PEREZ is interested in planes for a small private air service which he runs apart from his job with Faucett Airlines.

d. In an additional report dated 11 August 1969, the same usually reliable source of paragraphs 3 and 3a reported that prior to his departure from Peru on 4 August 1969, Subject stated that he hoped to have his office of Komsomolskaya Pravda transferred from Havana, Cuba, to Lima, Peru. He stated that the Soviet government is extremely interested in the current situation in Peru and is watching developments closely. According to Source, Subject also stated that he believed he had made a good impression on the Peruvian government and had made friends in Peru. In this regard, Subject mentioned that he had become very friendly with one (General Marco Fernandez BACA Carrasco, the head of PETROPERU (Peruvian State Petroleum Agency). Subject also stated that BACA had arranged trips for Subject at the expense of the Peruvian government to Talara and Iquitos, Peru. [Comment: No immediate explanation was apparent for Subject's activities and comments as reported in paragraphs 3a and 3d.]

4. For your information, in the same 12 August 1969 report of paragraph 3, the same usually reliable source stated that Subject stated before his departure from Peru that he planned to return to attend the Congress of the Youth Faction of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party of Peru (JCP/Soviet), and stated that he planned to visit other Latin American countries, including Colombia and Ecuador, after leaving Peru. The comment was made in this report that Subject might also be planning to attend the meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth which was scheduled to be held in Bogota, Colombia, the 9th through the 12th of October 1969.

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CSCI-316/03740-69

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JFS/JLB/nkc

BASED ON: 201-850222

para 2: La Prensa Libre
article dated 22 December 1968

para 3: IN 22200
12 August 1969

para 3a: IN 98046
LIMA 5209
8 July 1969

para 3b: HPLA-10167
11 July 1969

para 3c: IN-15298
LIMA-5366
1 August 1969

para 3d: IN 21242
LIMA-5421
11 August 1969

para 4: IN 22200
12 August 1969

FILE IN: 201-850222

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO FBI WH FE CIA 70KF	FROM SCA/VO	DATE 9/12/6?

FULL NAME (married women include maiden name) VOLKIN, Valeriy	ALIASES NICKNAMES	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH May 24, 1938 Pinsan Region, USSR

HOME ADDRESS	SEX M	CITIZENSHIP Russian	MARITAL STATUS Married	SPOUSE'S NAME

OCCUPATION News a er man	NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

③

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE SCA/VO	TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
DATE 9/12/6?	
NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER OCDurke gcb	

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SB 3

RIS - NPTI
SCI - NPTI

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION

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15 SEP 1969

FORM DS 439
8-65

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SECRET

30 September 1969

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Interim Reply- VOLKOV, Valeriy

1. The final reply to your request for information on Subject is being delayed due to detailed analysis of file material that may be relevant. Every effort is being made to expedite this processing and to reduce any further inconvenience to you.

2. Should you desire additional information on the processing of this case you may contact this Office through normal liaison channels.

RETURN TO:
SCA/VO
GCBurke:geb

DATE:
12 September 1969

J. BARNES

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GROUP 1
[illegible]

S E C R E T 091703Z OCT 59 CITE LIMA 9823

HAB

BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR

REF: BUENOS AIRES 3335 (46/647)

1. PERUVIAN POLICE LIAISON CONTACT (DUBRIDE-30) ADVISED THE STATION ON 8 OCTOBER THAT COL. JORGE (ROSAS) BENEVIDES, CHIEF OF PERUVIAN ARMY INTELL SERVICE WAS ABOUT TO DEPART FOR TWO WEEK "BUSINESS TRIP" TO BUENOS AIRES. DUE TO SENSITIVITY OF SOURCE OF REF, THIS INFO MAY NOT BE OF VALUE, BUT COL. ROSAS WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE ALLY IN ANY EFFORT TO DISCREETLY REMOVE HUGO BRESCANO FROM PERU TO ARGENTINA.

Cit: Peru
Occ: Army

2. QUITE APART FROM ABOVE, IF BUENOS AIRES HAS CONTACT IN MILITARY INTELL THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE IN TOUCH WITH COL. ROSAS, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL TO LIMA IF ARGENTINE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS COULD BE DRIVEN HOME TO COL. ROSAS. GROWTH OF SOVIET OFFICIAL MISSION HERE IS ALARMING AND SHOWS NO SIGNS OF STOPPING. LARGE NUMBER OF TDY'ERS, MANY OF THEM KNOWN OR SUSPECT RIS, INCLUDE TWO [illegible] EXPERTS IN LABOR AFFAIRS, NICOLAI [illegible] AND VADIM KUCHERTOV (WHO NOW TRAVELLING IN PERU UNDER ALIAS VADIM LISTOV). PROOF OF EFFECTIVENESS THESE PROFESSIONALS IS FACT THAT ALMOST FROM A STANDING START, PCP/SOVIET CONTROLLED LABOR CONFEDER-

AW
[illegible]
[illegible]
IN
PC
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FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 LIMA 5823 SECRET

ATION HAS GROWN TO PRACTICALLY DOMINATE THE LABOR FIELD, AND WITHIN SIX MONTHS COULD HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER PERUVIAN LABOR AND REPRESENT DIRECT CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTING ANYTHING LESS THAN MOST RADICAL OF REFORM MEASURES. IF BUENOS AIRES STATION COULD ARRANGE SUCH A CONVERSATION, LIMA WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN ROSAS' VIEWS.

3. FILE: DEFER.

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LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
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CIT ?
OCC ?
VOICE SAMPLE ATTACHED

050-008-010
HMMA-37724
20 AUG 69
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R 6909030716

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5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB ?

201-850222
SX -16129
12 AUG 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONTACT IN LIMA PERU
WITH VALERIY VASILYEVICH VOLKOV
NOVOSTI REP AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER

R 7003100149

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

C 21141)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD; Chief, SBD	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Lima		MICROFILM

SUBJECT ∅ OPERATIONAL/REDLEG
Copy of EL CASO LEONOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None

References: A. HPLA-10157, 3 July 69
B. LIMA-5278

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of the Spanish language version of the paper EL CASO LEONOV which is the subject of paragraph three (b) of referenced dispatch. Please refer to Reference B for the details concerning the passage of this document on to DULAMA-2.

2. The Station inadvertently destroyed the rough English draft from which the Spanish version was made. Should a translation of this document be desired, it is requested that this be accomplished at Headquarters.

Samuel K. CASTELON

DPN:mes

Attachment: h/w
As stated

Distribution:
2 - C, WHD w/att.
2 - C, SBD w/att.

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1 ATT 2 cc w/ ATT TO SB/X/11 4

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HPLA-10204	DATE 6 August 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139 [redacted]

14-00000

HPLA-10204

EL CASO LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV arribó a Lima el día 23 de Abril de 1969. LEONOV, subdirector del servicio de prensa NOVOSTI en Latino-America, es experto en asuntos latino-americanos. Y también es alto oficial de la KGB, el servicio secreto de inteligencia de la Unión Soviética. Durante su estada de diez años en Mexico, funcionaba como segundo secretario y agregado de prensa de la Embajada Soviética para dirigir el curso y financiamente del apoyo clandestino de la Unión Soviética a todos los partidos comunistas de Latino-America. Si estos años de actividad subversiva muestran indicios del papel que desempeñó como representante oficial del gobierno soviético (y así lo indican los contactos que tomó) se puede suponer que el propósito de su misión en Lima no consiste meramente en informar al pueblo soviético sobre el Peru y los Peruanos.

Las actividades de LEONOV tambien incluyen apoyo a los movimientos guerrilleros. Como se vera, en Abril de 1968, mientras que desempeñaba su misión como oficial de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico, LEONOV fué identificado como el diplomático soviético que entregó más de cien mil dólares al colombiano Feliciano Pachon Choconta para uso de la FARC y el ELN. PACHON fué capturado al ingresar a Colombia con este dinero. (Al ser capturado PACHON, se le incautó un trozo de papel que contenía la dirección de la oficina de LEONOV en Mexico en la Avenida Mazatlán.) Como una prueba más de su complicidad en este caso, Moscú ordenó su regreso inmediato cuando el citado asunto fué desenmascarado por la prensa.

Pero, a pesar del riesgo que acarreaba la publicación de dicho incidente, de conducir a la ofensiva diplomática de los soviéticos en Latino-America hacia un fracaso, el régimen soviético persistió en su propósito de alentar la subversión en nuestro continente y para lograr su objetivo nos ha enviado a LEONOV por segunda vez. El 23 de Abril, cuando se encontraba de tránsito en Bogotá, tomó contacto en el aeropuerto con varios miembros de la unidad clandestina del Partido Comunista de Colombia. Se presume que en esta ocasión se discutió sobre la presunta complicidad de LEONOV y su dirección de los nuevos frentes guerrilleros que vienen operando en la frontera panameña-costarricense, así como también de los grupos en Venezuela y Colombia y los terroristas en Puerto Rico.

A su arribo a Lima el mismo día, LEONOV se reunió con los representantes locales a quienes dió a conocer su plan de establecer oficialmente un despacho de NOVOSTI en Lima---un bien establecido método de los soviéticos para sentar la base legal y abierta que luego se emplea para ocultar el verdadero propósito de los soviéticos que es la dirección y financiacion de la actividad subversiva. (Hasta la fecha no menos de cien representantes de la prensa soviética han sido publicamente desenmascarados como agentes de espionage en diversos paises del mundo. Treintaidos de estos fueron expulsados como persona non grata, incluso quince que operaban en Latino-America.)

LEONOV no ha perdido cualquier oportunidad para establecer sus contactos. De fuentes fidedignas bien informadas en Mexico se destaca que LEONOV ha tomado contacto en el Peru con estos miembros del PCP: Jorge Vladimiro del PRADO, Raul ACOSTA Salas; Isidoro BAMARRA Ramirez; Mariano Eleuterio MUNIZ Yabar; y con los activistas del FLN, Pedro Anibal MOROTE Cornejo; Angel CASTRO Lavarello; Walter SOLORZANO; Jesus HORNA Galvan; Purificacion ROMERO Esquivel; y Amelia FLORES, Ademas, ha visitado en Piura y Talara donde tomó fotografías de las instalaciones petroleras; y en Pisco y Tambo de Mora donde estableció contacto oon los sindicatos de obreros pesqueros; y en junio viajó tambien a Arequipa y Cuzco. Lev Aleksandrovich NOVIKOV, representante de Radio Moscú en Santiago de Chile y presunto agente de espionaje, se reunió en Lima con LEONOV y estuvo con él varios dias.

Durante su estada en Mexico, LEONOV viajaba a menudo a Cuba donde se reunía con altos dirigentes del régimen cubano, incluso

ATT 1 TO HPLA 10204

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con Fidel Castro y Che Guevara. Como entonces no existían relaciones diplomáticas entre la Unión Soviética y los países de Centro-America, ni tampoco con los de la costa norte de Sud America, uno de los cargos principales de LEONOV era coordinar con los cubanos la guerrilla armada, y especialmente en Venezuela y Colombia. Ademas LEONOV era el especialista de la Embajada Soviética en Mexico en las actividades con los exiliados comunistas que vivían en esa capital. Interesa saber que en 1961 LEONOV viajó a Cuba con el cargo especial de actuar como interprete en las charlas secretas sostenidas entre Fidel Castro y el entonces representante soviético a las Naciones Unidas, Anastas Mikoyan. No cabe duda de que entre la Unión Soviética y Cuba existen diferencias ideología y táctica, pero en lo que se refiere al establecimiento clandestino de focos guerrilleros en Centro-y Sud America, existe amplia evidencia de estrecha cooperación entre los dos gobiernos y del financiamiento soviético de estas operaciones. El caso Pachon, previamente citado en este informe confidencial, es uno de los muchos que se divulgó publicamente, gracias a la diligencia del servicio nacional de seguridad de Colombia. El interés de Cuba por los hechos que ocurren en el Perú sin duda estarían ligados a la presencia de LEONOV aqui y con sus largos y frecuentes viajes al interior. Ocurre preguntar: ¿ se le permitiría a un periodista peruano tomar fotografías de refinerías de petroleo en la Union Sovietica, tal como lo ha hecho LEONOV en el Peru? ¿Se le permitiría a un diplomático o periodista peruano viajar tan libre y extensivamente por la Unión Soviética, pretextando estar reuniendo informaciones y articulos para NOVOSTI? ¿Existe alguna relación entre los desordenes provacados por estudiantes y campesinos que se vienen desencadenando en el interior del país y los extensos viajés de LEONOV a esta región? La respuesta parecería lógica si se toma en cuenta la vasta experiencia de este agente en las actividades subversivas. Y más lógica aparece la conclusión cuando se sabe que estableció contacto clandestino en el Perú con el comunista Pedro Anibal Morote Cornejo, citado en los primeros parrafos de este informe, que también es miembro y dirigente del FLN. Morote se entrenó en la guerra de guerrillas en Cuba en 1962 y a petición personal de Fidel Castro se unió al FLN para actuar como enfermero. Ahora se encuentra en el Perú y ha tomado contacto con LEONOV. Precisa preguntar por qué, y para qué

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MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Lima
: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : JMROD/Monograph on Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See paragraph 2 and 3 below.

Reference : DIRECTOR 27524, 6 August 1969

1. Attached herewith is a draft version of the monograph on Subject, which has been prepared by JMROD per discussions between Thomas G. URQUHART and Samuel K. CASTELLON during the former's TDY to Lima in July 1969.

2. It is requested that the Mexico City Station review the paper and cable Headquarters and Lima as soon as convenient, signalling approval of the paper for passage to Peruvian liaison, or any changes which should be made. This paper has been reviewed and approved by the REDWOOD division and by the Guatemalan desk. For the convenience of Station Mexico, appended to the paper are copies of the references on which material pertaining to Mexico has been based.

3. Upon receipt of Mexico City's cabled approval Headquarters will prepare a Spanish translation and pouch it to Lima for passage to liaison.

Thomas G. Urquhart for
Wendy R. HARRIDGE

Attachments:
A. Monograph on Leonov h/w
B. Backup material h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Lima w/att A
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att A & B

Note: The paper was [illegible] deemed unsuitable for passage to Peruvian liaison. Because of the ~~ta~~ preponderance of Mexico City Station info.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
200-124-162/3	HPLW-5390	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-132139

Monograph of Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, the Soviet official who visited Peru from 23 April 1969 to 17 July 1969 as a representative of the Soviet news agency NOVOSTI, is a long-time,firmly identified KGB officer who served in Mexico during most of the period 1953-1968. Although he was able to function effectively in his overt jobs as Cultural Attache and later Press Attache, he was consistently active in clandestine support of Latin American revolutionary and subversive activities, particularly relating to Guatemala. Following are details of his career.

LEONOV was born 22 August 1928 in Ryazan oblast, USSR. His wife, Valeriya Ivanovna, was born 28 April 1928 in Ryazan. As of 1968 the LEONOVs had one daughter, Irina, born in 1962.

LEONOV was first posted to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico in May 1953. His initial position was secretary to the Soviet Ambassador. In addition to administrative duties and cultural matters, LEONOV functioned as a translator and interpreter, since he spoke excellent Spanish.

Two of LEONOV's most interesting contacts from his first tour in Mexico were:

a. Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO, who was in exile in Mexico from 1953-56, was arrested by the Mexican police in June 1956, and a ~~police~~ search revealed LEONOV's calling card in CASTRO's possession. [1]

b. Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza. LEMUS, an important Guatemalan Communist youth leader, was a close friend of LEONOV's dating from the period 1953-56, during part of which time LEMUS was in exile in Mexico. [2]LEMUS, who was a friend and former prison-mate of Raul CASTRO, allegedly conducted liaison in Mexico City during 1955-56 between the Cuban Communist Party exiles and the Fidel CASTRO group.

LEONOV and his wife departed Mexico City on 17 October 1956 for the USSR, where they remained until their return to Mexico in 1961. While in the USSR, LEONOV was used for important interpreting chores; most notably, he accompanied Soviet Vice Premier Anastas MIKOYAN on his trips to Mexico and Cuba in November 1959 and February 1960. During the

February 1960 trip to Cuba, LEONOV first met Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan Communist and revolutionary who was then in Cuba recovering from wounds received in a Cuban-sponsored, Nicaraguan-led movement to overthrow Nicaragua's President, General Somosa. Leonov was to have later clandestine contact with MIRANDA in Mexico.

On 31 July 1961, the LEONOVs returned to Mexico. This time, LEONOV was listed as Third Secretary and worked as assistant to the Cultural Affairs Officer, Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV. A KGB officer KUZNETSOV is, as of this writing, once again serving in Mexico, this time as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

During this tour of duty, LEONOV's particular responsibility for support of the Guatemalan revolutionary effort began to emerge. In January 1962, Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana, Guatemalan revolutionary mentioned above, passed through Mexico City on his way to Cuba for guerrilla training. MIRANDA, reported to be in charge of accumulating arms for the activist arm of the PGT (Guatemalan Communist Party), brought to Mexico a message for the Soviets. He delivered this message to the leading Guatemalan exile in Mexico in direct touch with the Soviets, Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, who passed it to his Soviet Embassy Contact.[2] During MIRANDA's stay in Mexico, LEONOV met with him. MIRANDA returned to Guatemala from Cuba in October 1963 and thereafter took a leading role in PGT/FAR guerrilla actions. As of 1965, he was a member of the Military Commission of the PGT and conducted terrorist actions. He had in his possession at that time sketches of the homes of various Guatemalan officials who were on the PGT/FAR assassination list. MIRANDA was arrested in September 1965 on charges of assassination of two Guatemalan businessmen. He apparently was released, or escaped, about mid-1966. He left Guatemala, and is believed to have gone to Mexico and to have had clandestine contact with LEONOV there in December 1966.[3] MIRANDA returned to Guatemala after spending some time in El Salvador, and was killed on 3 May 1967 near Guatemala City by unknown assailants.

In 1963, LEONOV was also in clandestine contact with a former Mexican army officer named Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas, who was heavily involved in the procurement of arms for the Guatemalan revolutionaries. CARDENAS, a fervent adherent of the revolutionary left, had contact with Victor N. GLOTOV, another KGB officer in the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, as well as LEONOV. LEONOV is known to have met CARDENAS clandestinely two days before LEONOV left for the USSR on vacation on 21 April 1963.

LEONOV is believed still to have been in contact with CARDENAS as recently as March 1967.[5] In recent years, CARDENAS has been active in the Movimiento Latinoamericano de Liberacion, a Latin American revolutionary organization founded in Mexico in 1964 and headed by Guillermo CARNERO Hoke, a Peruvian who has spent many years in exile in Mexico, and is now back in Peru. CARDENAS' activities have involved agitation among Mexican students and peasants, which led increasing difficulties with the police, and he claims to have asked for asylum in Peru in 1968.[6]

LEONOV and his family went on home leave to the USSR 21 April 1963 to 20 July 1963. During this leave, LEONOV renewed an old acquaintance with Fidel CASTRO, serving as CASTRO's interpreter in the USSR in May 1963. After home leave, LEONOV returned to Mexico, where he remained (except for two more trips to the USSR in 1964 and 1966) until 22 December 1968, when he and his family departed permanently from Mexico. Upon his return to Mexico from home leave in 1964, LEONOV was promoted to Second Secretary and Press Attache at the Soviet Embassy.

LEONOV, in his role as Press Attache, was energetic and effective. Although he was mainly responsible for the work of the Press Office, which was in the same building as his living quarters, he spent a great deal of time at the Soviet Embassy proper, going out frequently for his many meetings. He was popular among his wide contacts among newspapermen in Mexico and his most intimate press contact was Luis SUAREZ Lopez, a Spanish Communist journalist with the Marxist weekly magazine, Siempre. LEONOV saw SUAREZ very frequently on press placements and possibly other matters. SUAREZ has a long history of pro-Soviet activities, is a member of the Communist front International Organization of Journalists, and has traveled extensively in the Soviet bloc, Communist China, and Cuba.

As to LEONOV's personality, he has a pleasant, outgoing manner, is extremely intelligent, and gets along well with both his colleagues, and his numerous outside contacts. He is hard-working, generally accommodating to people, and is a good conversationalist. He enjoys playing tennis, volleyball and soccer. He also likes to hunt and fish, and enjoys chess. In addition to excellent Spanish, he speaks English. On the negative side, LEONOV gets along badly with his wife; they often quarrel violently, and he neglects her for his numerous sports and social activities. He is also quite unkind and cutting with those whom he regards as his intellectual inferiors, treating them quite rudely when he is in a bad mood.[7, 8, 9, 10]

As Press Attache, LEONOV had the pretext for contact with many people with whom he had apparently innocuous relationships, but probably developed for intelligence purposes.

As an example, he had close contact with Victor RICO Galan, a Spanish-born, naturalized Mexican Communist journalist, who has very close ties to both the Guatemalan revolutionary movement and the Cubans.[11] RICO was a founding member in 1962 of the MLN, a pro-Cuban Communist front organization. A regular writer for Siempre and Politica magazines, RICO acted, in Spring of 1965, as the Radio Havana representative in Mexico for coverage of the Dominican situation. LEONOV consulted frequently with him at this time, meeting in RICO's home or in cafes. LEONOV also established direct contact with certain Dominican exiles through RICO.[12] In August 1966, RICO was arrested and imprisoned because of his leading role in the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, which had been organizing an armed insurgent movement in the Mexican countryside.[14] This movement was reported to have secret radio contact with Cuba. RICO was arrested as he was about to board a flight to Cuba.[15.]

Other LEONOV's Mexican contacts of particular interest are:

Roberto JARAMILLO Flores, Mexican former President of the youth Section of the Mexican Socialist Party (JPS), and in 1967 involved with the revolutionary Students Front, youth affiliate of the National Organization of Revolutionary Action. JARAMILLO and LEONOV were in frequent contact, particularly in 1963-64, on matters involving the JPS, over which the Soviets were exerting active control.[16]

Juan REJANO Porras, Spaniard, member of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, leading intellectual and poet. REJANO and LEONOV had been in regular contact since at least 1965. Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office.[17] REJANO was, as of 1968, editor of the Czech Bulletin, published in Mexico by the Czech Embassy.

Enrique SEMO Calev, Bulgarian-born long-time member of the Mexican Communist Party. LEONOV and SEMO had frequent social contact, as well as dealings on press and cultural matters. SEMO assisted LEONOV in developing social contacts outside of his normal area of access.[18]

A particularly interesting foreign contact of LEONOV's was Carlos BONILLA Sanchez, Communist labor leader from Colombia. He and LEONOV, reportedly close friends, were in correspondence during 1966-67. BONILLA was President of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores de Cundinamarca (FESTRAC) until November 1964, when he was removed because of his Communist sympathies. He visited Cuba at the special invitation of Fidel CASTRO in November 1964, transiting Mexico on the way,[19,20] where LEONOV was at that time. It should also be noted that LEONOV traveled to Lima on 23 April 1969 via Bogota.

LEONOV's connections with Feliciano PACHON Choconta, Colombian Communist courier arrested in April 1968, have been discussed in a paper previously provided to you, and so will not be repeated here.

Although LEONOV's sphere of KGB activity obviously broadened considerably over the years, as he gained contacts and area knowledge; his involvement with Guatemalan matters continued throughout his long stay in Mexico. As recently as 1968, he was reliably reported to still be the main clandestine Soviet contact for the Guatemalan Communists in Mexico.[14]

The LEONOVs left Mexico permanently on 22 December 1968, and returned to the USSR.

LEONOV, during his years in Mexico, showed himself to be a capable, hard-working intelligence officer, who was able to fulfill his cover job with skill and at the same time pursue his clandestine missions. It may be presumed, on the basis of his capacities demonstrated in Mexico, that he will have worked effectively in his apparent task of setting up the Novosti news agency in Peru, and that he will also have begun to develop contacts among the Peruvian Communist Party and other sympathetic elements with an eye to spotting and assessing prospective agents for subsequent exploitation by the KGB reszidentura which will inevitably function as a part of the new Soviet Embassy.

Footnotes to LEONOV Monograph

1. MEXI 839, 26 June 1956, S: LIVESTOCK-3.

2. HCGW-4035, 2 December 1966 (Headquarters compilation), S: LINLUCK,
ESDEW-1.

3. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 20, para 51, S: LIFEAT.

4. HMM-6405, 22 May 1962, S: LINLUCK

5. HMMA-33215, 5 October 1967.

6. HMMA-37462, 2 July 1967, (CARDENAS Interrogation), page 10, S: LIEMPO-12

7. HMM-1524, 9 April 1956, S: Station compilation of mostly LIFEAT.

8. 7 March 1958, S: LIFEAT.

9. HMMA-29141, 8 June 1966, S: FRINGLASS (transcriber)

10. HMMA-34470, 15 April 1968, S: ZINSMEISTER (Transcriber).

11. HMM-10628, 24 August 1966, S: LIFTER-8.

12. HMM-6770, 5 October 1962, S: LICOOKY (RICO)

13. HMMA-26223, 28 May 1965, S: LIFEAT (raw LIFEAT-7 May 65)

14. MEXI 7743, 22 October 1968, S: LIREBEL-2.

15. MEXI 8310, 24 August 1966, S: Press Accounts (RICO).

16. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 17, 18, para. 38, S: LIENVOY.

17. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.), page 22, 23, para. 62, S: LIFEAT
since 5 April 1965.

18. HMMA-33293, 18 October 1967, (Spr.) page 20, 21, para 55, S: LIFEAT
(on LEONOV since 5 April 1965), (on SEMO).

19. HMMA-32864, 23 August 1967, S: LIMUD

20. HMMA-30130, 26 September 1966, S: LIMUD.

Comments on Dispatch HPLW-5390
Prepared by WH/SAO

These Comments
were Prepared by
Ernest
Tsikerdanos,
AC/WH/1.

SUBJECT: The LEONOV Matter (Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV, (201-132139)

REF : HPLW-5390, Typed 29 August 1969

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

1. With one exception (HGGW-4035, 2 Dec 66), the personality and biographic report on LEONOV is based entirely on Mexico City reporting. Much of this appears to be quite sensitive if passage to Peru liaison is intended.

2. Since the report concerns a Soviet official, the fact that the report is based upon WH Division material exclusively appears to be self-limiting and, possibly, self-defeating.

3. Although the writer of the report refers to its acceptability to SB Division, there is no SB coordinator.

4. It would appear that, to achieve the desired result (and we don't really know what this is), it would not be necessary to go into such exacting detail. A more generalized report, following more or less an AEASSAULT format, might achieve the results desired by Station Lima without the pitfalls of utilizing the sensitive material incorporated in the present compilation.

5. Seeking approval of Station Mexico City for the release of the total report seems to violate the concept of Headquarters control of operational information. Would it not be more appropriate to ask Station's opinions only in areas of doubt in the matter of source-sensitivity?

6. Although this dispatch was coordinated according to para 2 with SB Division and the Guatemalan Desk, the first inkling this Branch got of the paper is when the dispatch arrived on my desk.

7. This is a good paper for the Lima Station background information. For passing to a third liaison service, it poses some potential danger to the Mexico Station clandestine sources:

a. page 2 - LIVESTOCK-3 is now dead but he was also a Soviet Embassy contact in Mexico and was run by the British. He was fired by us for unreliability.

The search team that arrested Fidel CASTRO and did the interrogation was LITEMPO-4 (now an important Station contact) and only about four years or so ago told COS about the calling card of LEONOV.

b. page 3 - Specific information about MIRANDA trip in January 1962 and delivery of message to GUTIERREZ could pinpoint the source : LINLUCK/ ESDEW-1.

c. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between MIRANDA December 66 could pinpoint LIFEAT on LEONOV residence.

d. page 4 - Specific date of clandestine contact between LEONOV and CARDENAS 19 April 1963 might reveal surveillance (LIEMBRACE though probably would not identify team members. It could also be argued that Soviets have long ago identified these teams.)

e. page 5 - CARDENAS' request for asylum in Peru could pinpoint LITEMPO-12. In any event, references to the police sources throughout the report definitely tell Lima authorities that CIA is working closely in Mexico with the Mexican officials.

f. page 8 - REJANO Porras and LEONOV. The sentence "Meetings between them were arranged through a third person, another Spanish Communist employed in LEONOV's Press Office" implies clandestine coverage of that office (LIFEAT).

g. page 8 - the same is true with Enrique SEMO Calev and LEONOV.

h. page 9 - BONILLA Sanchez and LEONOV "being in correspondence" implies mail intercept (LIMUD) which it is.

i. page 9 - LIREBEL-2 is a sensitive source and about the main source right now on Guatemalan exile activities. The last sentence might implicate him. At least it tells the Peruvians that CIA has a penetration here.

8. Finally - It tells the Peruvians that the Station (CIA) Mexico has phone taps, mail intercepts, penetration of the Cuban IS, penetration of Guatemalan exiles, surveillance and police liaison.

It concentrates throughout that the information was developed by coverage of LEONOV while he was stationed in Mexico. These activities are treated in specific terms whereas his activities outside Mexico are treated in a very general manner.

The Branch would prefer to have the paper rewritten omitting all specific dates and references which reveal the clandestine collection technique which produced the information, and should incorporate AEASSAULT information and be coordinated with SB Division in writing. It might be pointed out that previous efforts to "burn" LEONOV have not been successful.

DISPATCH

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Lima

SUBJECT
REDLEG
Conversations between DULINDEN-11 and Nikolay S. Leonov and DULAUREL-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. On 15 July after leaving a local publisher's office DULINDEN-11 drove Nikolay S. Leonov to his hotel. DULAUREL-1 who accompanied them to the publisher's office was left at her home and DULINDEN-11 and Leonov were alone during the course of the drive. Leonov proceeded to ask DULINDEN-11 various questions about his private life including his economic situation and also queried him about his future goals in life. DULINDEN-11 responded to all questions and said he enjoyed his work with DULAUREL-1 and was interested in journalism and felt that he had learned quite a bit in the short time he has been involved in assisting DULAUREL-1 with Panorama Internacional. He said that he did not work with DULAUREL-1 for money alone but because he saw this as an opportunity to improve himself which would eventually lead to an improvement in his economic standard. DULINDEN-11 said that it was a relaxed conversation, Leonov was very friendly and appeared to be interested in DULINDEN-11's goals and aspirations.

2. On 16 July DULINDEN-11 saw DULAUREL-1 and the latter asked him how his conversation went with Leonov. DULINDEN-11 gave DULAUREL-1 a summary of what had been discussed and commented that Leonov appeared to have a genuine interest in his future. DULAUREL-1 then told DULINDEN-11 that previously she had a rather lengthy conversation with Leonov about DULINDEN-11 and told Leonov the problems he had with the party, the accusations made against him, her conversations with DULINDEN-11 during this period and the investigation she had conducted while DULINDEN-11 was under party control. Leonov told DULAUREL-1 the fact that DULINDEN-11 was under party control is of no significance and once again re-iterated his general disgust with the party leadership.

[illegible] 201-736290

KTR/cng

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

[illegible] 132139

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-850222
201-132139

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HPLA-10206

DATE
6 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-736270

3. It appears from the foregoing that DULAUREL-1 arranged the circumstances which led to the private conversation between Leonov and DULINDEN-11. The above "interest" displayed by Leonov in DULINDEN-11 might be nothing more than politeness on his part but the Station believes that DULINDEN-11 is undergoing an assessment by Leonov, DULAUREL-1 and Valeriy V. Volkov and at least up to this juncture apparently has made a favorable impression.

Samuel K. CASTELON

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

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ORIG: Patricia L. Johnson:ddm
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 9061
DATE: 5 August 1969

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☒ RETURN TO WH/SAO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____

CONF: WH8
INFO: FILE, VR. RI/AN SB8 F2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO LIMA

269778

REFERENCE: LIMA 5335 (IN 13361)*

1. IF [redacted] AVAILABLE TO [redacted] STATION, PLS POUCH COPY OF TORN UP LETTER CITED SUPDATA REF.

2. FILE: 200-124-162/3; 201-132139.

re
P-fly
file: [illegible]
Leonov 201 (pfy)

END OF MESSAGE

*DUBRIDE-30 provided info on interview between LEONOV and Minister of Energy and Mines FERNANDEZ MALDONADO based on torn up letter collected from wastebasket in hotel room occupied by Sovs.

C/WH/SAO

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ALFONSO G. SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-132139

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COPY NO.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ITKIN, HERBERT
201-836808

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

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2		6	53
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4		8	

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEN BY 34 PER 3

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE VR IP/AN CI/OPS CI/SO OI FI 201-836308

ACTION NO 890

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 15 1972
MICROFILMED

S E C R E T 282234Z AUG 72 STAFF

SDOM

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

201-836308

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT ITKIN ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN 19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCORDING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201-836808 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WH-SISM.

S E C R E T

AN	
AB	
IS	
PS	
BX	3
DF	2F0
FI	

CS COPY

28 AUG 72

D-22-2-20/3

SECRET

201-836308

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18-3

SECRET

2		6	57
3		7	
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ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT: WH/7/DR
EXT: 9156
DATE: 20 AUGUST 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. Sflpw, cilco, secur 4, ci, cilops,

DOC. MICRO. SER.
SEP 2 1972
MICROFILMED

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

25 AUG 72 23 CITE DIRECTOR 306944

21

TO SANTO DOMINGO

REF SANTO DOMINGO 13099 (IN 694715)

1. BELOW ARE ILLUSTRATIVE TRACES HERBERT ITKIN (201-836808), PARTNER LAW FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, GREENBAUM, NEW YORK.REGISTERED AGENT FOR "HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE" REPRESENTING LOUIS DEJOIE (201-240483) AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS 1963. REPORTEDLY FURNISHED MONEY TO GROUP INVADING HAITI AUG 63. A AND B ARE FOR STATION USE ONLY.

A. HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE USED SUBJECT'S OFFICES IN NEW YORK CITY; SUBJ SAID HE MADE PERSONAL LOAN OF $15,000 TO DEJOIE. (DBA-63510, 19 FEB 64).

B. SUBJECT'S FORMER FATHER-IN-LAW CALLED WODISH, NEW YORK TO SAY SUBJ CLOSELY TIED TO BKCROWN, GIVING IT MUCH ASSISTANCE HAITI AND ELSEWHERE, IMPLYING SUBJ TRUSTED INFORMANT OR AGENT, NOT STAFF EMPLOYEE. WARNED BKCROWN SUBJ NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF DOUBTS RE RELIABILITY, DISCRETION, ABILITY TO MEET FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, AND MENTAL EQUILIBRIUM. (WODISH MEMO, 15 FEB 66)

AN	
AB	
IP	
PS	4K
BX	4
DE3	HFD
FI	

C. NEW YORK TIMES, 9 MARCH 68, REPORTED U.S. OFFICIAL DESCRIBED SUBJ AS UNDERCOVER AGENT WHO INFILTRATED ORGANIZED

29 Aug 72

CS COPY (CONTINUED...)

201-836808

D-22-2-20/3
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:BA
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION SEP 5 9 32 AM '72
BY ________ PER ________ # ________
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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 366949

TO

CRIME, REPORTING REGULARLY TO LNERGO. ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SAID SUBJ RISKED HIS LIFE TO "STAND UP TO MAFIA." ARTICLE ALSO STATES SUBJ REGISTERED SEPT 63 AS FOREIGN AGENT DOM REP, MAKING NUMEROUS TRIPS THERE. (TM-ING COPY THIS ITEM.)"

D. WASHINGTON POST, 19 JULY 68, REPORTED SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES OF SUBJ, A KEY FIGURE IN JAMES L. MARCUS (FORMER NYC WATER COMMISSIONER) KICKBACK CASE, INDICATED CHARGES OF ANOTHER KICKBACK CONSPIRACY INVOLVING MORTGAGE APPLICATIONS MADE TO TEAMSTERS UNION PENSION FUND; TWO OF SIX ALLEGED ASSOCIATES IDENTIFIED AS MAFIA MEMBERS. SUBJ NOT INDICTED BUT NAMED IN FOUR OVERT ACTS CITED INDICTMENT.

E. NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 15 OCT 68, REPORTED SUBJ, LABOR LAWYER, TRYING HAVE HIS TRIAL MOVED FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT, CONTENDING HE ACTING AS LNERGO AND BKCROWN AGENT IN CONNECTION ABOVE CASE.

2. JULY 68 CHECK NUMEROUS BKCROWN COMPONENTS FAILED REVEAL ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBJ AND BKCROWN.

3. FILE: 201-836808 AND 22-2-20/3. E 2 IMPDET

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

14-00000

ORIG: ELISABETH VETTER:ba
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY_________ PER_________ #_________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO _________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _________

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S ~~E C R E T~~

CITE DIRECTOR 300944

TO

PAGE THREE

WH COMMENT: REQUESTED HQS TRACES SUBJ WHO ARRIVED DOM REP 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK, PROHIBITED FROM ENTERING, AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY.

CI/EXO F.E. HUBBARD - IN DRAFT

William P. MacLean
WILLIAM P. MACLEAN
C/WH/7

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

secret

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

US Army file ([illegible]) on ITKIN.

To Itkin folder

9 June 71
(DATE)

RM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

PRIORITY

FILE WHEN INITIALLED

NAME CHECK REPORT - MPRC

DATE CHECKED: 7 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: ITKIN, Herbert

CASE NO AND CATEGORY: 544867-FDB-HRK.

NAME(S) FROM RECORD: (No Middle Name)

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 19 NOV 1925 Richmond Hill, LI, N.Y.

ADDRESS (include date):
1738 48 St.
Brklyn, NY - (1/43)

SERVICE	RECORD	NR
ARMY	X	
NAVY		
AIR FORCE		
COAST GUARD		
USMC		

ACTIVE DUTY

	DATE (From-To)	SERIAL NO.	RANK	TYPE DISCHARGE
OFFICER	—		—	
ENLISTED	14 Feb 45 – 26 NOV 46	12 230 694	S SGT	Hon

MILITARY SPECIALTY OR CHIEF DUTIES: Admin.

EVALUATIONS (Efficiency, etc.): Exc.

FOREIGN SERVICE (date from - to): 8/45 – 10/46

THEATRE: APTO

EDUCATION (College, if shown): 1½ yrs - Cornell (44) / Brooklyn Coll (45)

CIVILIAN OCCUPATION: Student

SECURITY CLEARANCES

		DATED	BASED ON	BY	COMPLETED ON
X	NONE INDICATED				
	SECRET				
	TOP SECRET				
	CRYPTOGRAPHIC				

COURT MARTIAL(S) X NONE ☐ YES (see remarks)

REMARKS – (Give details re court martials, disciplinary actions, special qualifications, language abilities, unusual info., decorations, citizenship, etc. Use extra page and/or add attachments if apropos.)

1) Mother: ~~E~~ ITKIN, Edythe
2) Good Cond. Med.

WILLIAM P. KOSTERMAN
Special Agent in Charge
7 JUN 1971

DISTRIBUTION: HQCS ☐ ORIG X ORIG & 1 ☐ OTHER X CC-CFO

ATTACHMENTS: YES ☐ NO X

Herbert ITKIN

Date and Place of Birth: 19 Nov. 1926, Queens (also given as Jamaica, L.I., New York).

Description: 5'11". Brown hair. Brown eyes. (Photos in file).

Passports and Travel:

Ppt. B122634, issued 4 Jan. 1961. Renewed 11 Feb. 1964.

Ppt G097867, issued 14 Jan. 1966.

a. Was to depart NYC for UK, BOAC 506 o/a 14 Jan. '66. Had made 4 trips abroad in earlier 12 months.

b. Was to depart o/a 8 Jan. '61, UK & Western Europe. Two weeks vacation.

Father: Arthur ITKIN. Born 18 May 1901, Russia (also given as "Poland", 18 May 1900). US citizen (by naturalization? marriage?) Last stipulated residence: 118 Front St., Dublin, Ga (?).

Mother: Edith HAVES, born 27 April 1907 (also given as "27 April 1905"). US citizen by birth.

Permanent Residences:

440 E. 79th St., NYC (Jan. 1966)

33 Greenwich Ave., NYC (Jan. 1964)

168 Rim Lane, Hicksville, New York (Jan. 1961)

Shelton Towers Hotel, Lexington Ave., NYC (Aug. 1966)

300 Madison Ave., NYC (Legal offices, 1965).

Marital Status/Spouse:

Adah Itkin, born 4 May 1925, married 12 Dec. 1963

Diana Kane, born 8 Feb. 1930

DEPT OF STATE PASSPORT APPLICATION

DATE: 14 JANUARY 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: HERBERT ITKIN

RH:

[illegible]

Is there a current appl. for this person? If so, this c/B should be attached to it.

Jon 1/18

Not in file yet 1/19/61 - Datchu

1/24/61

1/30/61

2/1/61

2-2-61

ITKIN HERBERT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EFERENCE SLIP | 1-13-60

TO: NAME OR TITLE	ORGAN. SYMBOL	ROOM NO.	BLDG.	INITIALS	DATE
1. PT/RAF					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

☐	APPROVAL	☐	NOTE AND FORWARD
☐	AS REQUESTED	☒	NOTE AND RETURN to applicant
☐	COMMENT	☐	PER CONVERSATION
☐	FOR YOUR INFORMATION	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	INITIAL FOR CLEARANCE	☐	SEE ME
☐	NECESSARY ACTION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Our records indicate ppt.
B122634 Issued 1-4-61

FROM (NAME AND ORGANIZATION): PT/NY

ROOM NO. AND BLDG.:

SIGNATURE:

PHONE NO.:

TATE.
ENCY
CENTER
630 FIFTH AVENUE
EW YORK 20, NEW YORK

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PASSPORT OFFICE

1/4/61
B122634

IT5IN

NEW YORK PASSPORT AGENCY
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Itkin, Herbert



Bureau of Records and Statistics Department of Health The City of New York

CERTIFICATION OF BIRTH

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Herbert Itkin

Sex Male was born in the City of New York on Nov. 19 1926

according to Birth Record No. 11185 filed in the QUEENS

Office of this Bureau on Dec. 3, 1926

In witness whereof, the seal of the Department of Health of the City of New York has been affixed hereto this 4 day of Jan 1961

Carl L. Erhardt
Director of Bureau

Borough Registrar

Warning: This certification is not valid if it has been altered in any way whatsoever or if it does not bear the raised seal of the Department of Health.

Q 60104

5411-115A1 701361(59) 114

14-00000

[illegible]

DISSEM BY 90

ACTION UNIT

WH8

FILE VR [illegible]

ACTION NO.

890

S E C R E T 232234Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE SANTO DOMINGO 13099

694715

DIRECTOR.

WOMUSE EMPYREX

1. EMPYREX LIAISON ADVISES HERBERT ITKIN ARRIVED SANTO DOMINGO 22 AUG 72 FROM NEW YORK PAA 235 PROHIBITED ENTRY AND RETURNED NEW YORK SAME DAY PAA 236. ITKIN BORN 19 NOV 26, NEW YORK, US PP B 1220178.

2. NO STATION TRACES. EMPYREX RECORDS INDICATE SUBJ BLACKLISTED BECAUSE HE ENGAGED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND HAS MAFIA CONNECTIONS. ACCORDING SAME FILE, NY TIMES REPORTED SUBJ PROVIDED INFO TO BKCROWN ON PERSONS IN DOMREP.

3. TRACES REQUESTED.

4. INDEX. FILE 201- , 22-2-20/3. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM.

S E C R E T

Coord: CI ~~[illegible]~~

CI/EXO

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CURRENT CABLE

FROM: RID/SD 17
1 D 17
DW-3

EXTENSION

NO

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. E/BC			W
2.			
3.			
4.			
5. DC/CI Office	8 JUN 1970	12 JUN 1970	✓ P
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.		yes	

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO: ACTION ADDRESSEE

1. Cables forwarded herewith have not been integrated into the CS record system.
2. If you feel they should be classified into a CS file, please indicate file number (and other necessary processing) and return to RID/SD, Room 1 D 17, TUBE: DW-3.

RETAIN: ______________
CS File Number

INDEXING: YES NO
(If yes, indicate names.)

3. If these cables do not require processing into the CS Records System, please destroy.

To 5: E/BC cable action turned over to Office of General Consul with DIRECTOR 035476, 19 May 70; with following from CI office DIR 037202. No file designation on either outgoing. Per telecom with DC/CI Secy forwarding RID cable for proper disposition on clandestine element. Particularly info that sheds some unfavorable publicity toward Agency.

D: We have this already don't we?

[illegible]: Yes we have c/e cy. Shall I just file this in his 201 file?
D–

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED
OP 129 3-70

14-00000

EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

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☐ ☐ SLOTTED

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ______

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ______

30 PER ______

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ______

C/EUR5 FILE, VR C/RI/SO C/CI C/FI2 DDP ADDP CSDO

C 513

S E C R E T 181745Z MAY 70 CITE LONDON 1613 (LAUTERBACH ACTING)
LOND

DIRECTOR

AN
F:
ABSTRACT: INDEX

IN 005508

RYBAT KEYWAY

1. SMOTH (SMUPROOT) EXPECTS BE ASKED BY HMG TO COMMENT ON ACCURACY LONDON TELEGRAPH ARTICLE 16 MAY TO EFFECT THAT MR. HERBERT ITKIN, AMERICAN LABOR LAWYER, WAS ON JKLANCE SECRET MISSION IN BRITAIN IN 1965. ARTICLE SAYS JKLANCE HAS FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED IN PAPER SUBMITTED TO NEW YORK SUPREME COURT THAT ITKIN WORKED AS AN AGENT IN BRITAIN AND THAT THIS ONLY SECOND TIME JKLANCE HAS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN UNDERCOVER AGENT NOT OFFICIALLY ON JKLANCE PAYROLL (POWERS WAS FIRST).

2. ACCORDING LOCAL LNERGO, IT ACTUALLY HANDLED ITKIN IN LONDON AS INFORMANT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS IN 1965. JAGUAR AWARE OF THIS. HOWEVER, LOCAL LNERGO AS CONFUSED AS WE ARE AS TO ITKIN'S JKLANCE CONNECTION AT THAT TIME.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE WHAT WE MAY TELL SMOTH.

4. NO STATION RECORD ITKIN.

5. FILE DEFER.

18 May 70

CS COPY

GP-1

S E C R E T

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Holmes CI/R&A		
2			
3	We would appreciate compliance		
4	at your earliest convenience and at		
5			
6	a prior indication of G's response		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks: if one is forthcoming on the

Seen by John Greaney and John Warner. Neither has any problems with it.

questions concerning G's knowledge of HARBM. If ~~there is any question~~ ~~in this dispatch~~ the is anything unclear in this ~~intent of this~~ dispatch is not clear, hqts would welcome any questions by cable.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
OGC	2/13/69

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, San Salvador		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, WH Division	X	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WOMUSE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Interview of Mr. Luis E. GUTIERREZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See paragraph 1 below.

1. Your assistance is requested in interviewing the Salvadorian citizen, Luis E. GUTIERREZ, for information which would be helpful to this Government in determining the accuracy of certain claims made confidentially by Herbert L. ITKIN. Mr. ITKIN is a prime witness in legal proceedings presently underway in New York City involving the Mafia and related underworld organizations. ITKIN lives under the protection of U.S. Federal Marshals.

2. The following data is for your information. It should not be used in dealing with GUTIERREZ or outside of this Organization. ITKIN has been an FBI informant since March 1963. He has now claimed to have worked for this Organization during the period 1954/55 to 1960. ITKIN asserts that his contact during these years was one Philip HARBIN. This inquiry is concerned solely with ITKIN's claimed relationship with this Organization from 1954/55 to 1960 when he alleges HARBIN was his contact. As will be seen, GUTIERREZ, ITKIN alleges, also knew HARBIN during that time and that fact, therefore, is material to the credibility of ITKIN's story.

ITKIN's first contact with Philip HARBIN was in 1955 when he claims to have been contacted pursuant to a meeting he, ITKIN, had in Philadelphia with a leading personality of this Organization and another high-government official late in 1954 or early 1955. According to ITKIN, HARBIN never made the specific claim of being from this Organization but that was ITKIN's assumption.

ITKIN describes HARBIN as about 42 or 43 (in 1955), an American. He had receding hair, combed back but parted. He was about 5'8" in height,

Attachments:
As stated (2 copies)

Orig & 1 - COS, San Salvador

5 ATT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HSSW-2742	DATE 14 February 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-836808

Dist:

2 - COS, Salvador w/a
1 - WH/2/ES&HD w/o
1 - CI/R&A w/a
1 - 201-836808 w/a

CI/R+A

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
CI/R&A	R. B. Holmes	np	7468

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/2/ES&HD	14 Feb	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/2	14 FEB 1969	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-66 (40)

DISPATCH

well-built with little evidence of fat. He always wore a vest. He spoke fluent Spanish and could have been of Polish or Russian family background. HARBIN always drank tea, never coffee. He appeared affluent with a professorial air about him.

Following an initial meeting, ITKIN alleges that he and HARBIN met periodically in New York City. ITKIN alleges that he passed to HARBIN copies of the correspondence developed by his law firm, Delson, Levin and Gordon, dealing with Indonesia, Burma, and India. ITKIN left that law firm in mid-1957, presumably thereby losing total access. Among the materials ITKIN claims he passed to HARBIN before he left the Delson, Levin and Gordon firm was information he picked up from a friend who worked at the United Nations for the Government of El Salvador. This friend was Luis E. GUTIERREZ (see biographic sketch, Attachment A). ITKIN claims that he became very friendly with GUTIERREZ, who was studying either at New York University or Columbia where he prepared a master's thesis on El Salvador's economic position. HARBIN, he says, was interested in the topic and ITKIN alleges he furnished HARBIN notes of GUTIERREZ' monograph.

Sometime presumably after mid-year 1957, HARBIN asked ITKIN if he knew anybody else who could do (intelligence) work. ITKIN recalled GUTIERREZ, who meanwhile had moved to the position as Consul General of El Salvador in New Orleans, Louisiana. HARBIN--ITKIN says--accepted the suggestion and ITKIN provided an introduction for HARBIN by letter, which he sent to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans. ITKIN asserts that HARBIN--according to his own statement--went to New Orleans and made the "new contact". ITKIN claims he last saw HARBIN in 1960.

3. A comparison between the key points of ITKIN's account as summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph with the data set out in Attachment A and E will show immediate contradictions that tend to destroy any credibility in ITKIN's account, particularly with respect to his relationship to GUTIERREZ. We also point out, solely for your information, that we have found no confirmation in our records of any relationship between this Organization and ITKIN during the period 1954-1960. No traces have been found in our records or anywhere in government thus far of a Philip HARBIN, and there is explicit denial that there was any meeting in Philadelphia in 1954 between ITKIN and the high officials he nominates. Finally, there is no substantiation in our files of any of the intelligence product which ITKIN allegedly passed to HARBIN. This case, however, is of such a nature that we must strive, if possible, to have GUTIERREZ' own statement for the record.

4. We leave to the Station determination of the best manner to approach GUTIERREZ. It is our preference that a Station officer, under suitable cover, perform the interview, but it may well be that a consular or embassy officer might be the best person to do the job. We repeat that we are concerned in this matter solely with the verification or denial of ITKIN's statements, specifically the allegation that he introduced HARBIN to GUTIERREZ in New Orleans and that as a consequence GUTIERREZ would be in a position to identify and describe HARBIN in a way that would permit us to locate him if he exists. The request for GUTIERREZ' assistance in this matter is in no way predicated upon hostility towards ITKIN nor is there any predisposition against his claims if indeed evidence is found to back them up. If GUTIERREZ indicates that he is willing to provide whatever information he can, you can assure him that his information is solely for U.S. Government use and will not be made public by us at any time without his expressed consent. Also, it is clear that we are prepared to accept his decision to give no assistance in the matter.

5. We have compiled a short statement that might be used by the interviewer to explain to GUTIERREZ the purpose of the interview (see Attachment B). A list of questions, which should be given orally, is elaborated in Attachment C. You will note that these questions concern the larger as well as narrower elements of GUTIERREZ' relations with ITKIN. We are willing to settle for a specific answer to the narrower question of Philip HARBIN in preference to generalizations about the whole relationship. If, as a consequence of your handling, GUTIERREZ is willing to talk in depth, we will be grateful.

6. Attachment D is a copy of a New York Times article concerning ITKIN and one of the completed federal cases in New York City. This item is attached for your background reading. This may be shown to GUTIERREZ, of course. Attachment E is a copy of a letter dated 26 February 1965 from GUTIERREZ to ITKIN. Again, the content of this letter tends to support the theory that ITKIN's story, as elaborated in paragraph 2 above, is a fabrication. While possibly based on a real relationship, it appears to be a fabrication with respect to chronology and with respect to the exact mutual interests involved. Also included in this attachment is ITKIN's answer to the letter. We feel in retrospect that GUTIERREZ might be unhappy to read his own letter in the course of a consular interview. We, therefore, suggest that this not be shown to him. However, there is no objection to an indication that the U.S. Government is aware that GUTIERREZ was in perfectly correct correspondence with ITKIN during 1965 on business matters.

7. We would appreciate compliance at your earliest convenience and a preliminary indication by cable of GUTIERREZ' response, if one is forthcoming, on the questions concerning GUTIERREZ' knowledge of HARBIN. If there is anything unclear in this dispatch, Headquarters would welcome any questions by cable. All correspondence should be addressed Chief, WOMUSE, via Chief, WH.

James R. Rumsey

SECRET/RYBAT

Attachment A to HSSW-2742

GUTIERREZ, Luis Enérique

Born in San Salvador, El Salvador, on 15 July 1916; son of Luis and Concepcion G.; B. Commerce from Sir George Williams University, 1948; M.A. from New York University, 1951; Ph.D. in Economics, University of San Salvador, 1959; married Lydia DIAZ on 21 September 1940; one daughter, Maria Marta; vice consul of El Salvador in Montreal, 1944-1949; consul in New York City, 1949-1952; consul general, New Orleans, 1952-1958 (30 December 1952-3 April 1958)*; supt. banks and corporations, El Salvador, 1958-1961; general manager inversiones commerciales, 1961 - present; professor of economics, University of El Salvador, 1958 - present; commissioner, City of San Salvador, 1964 - present; served to first lieutenant, Salvadorian Army, 1933 - 1939; member of American Economists Association, Association of Salvadorian Economists; home: 83 avenida Norte 619; office: Apartado Postal 1144, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Who's Who in Commerce and Industry, 1968-1969, page 558.

* Foreign Consular Offices in United States, 1954 through 1959.

Attachment B to HSSW-2742

Suggested Statement to GUTIERREZ

I understand you have a friend named Herbert ITKIN, a lawyer, now living in New York. Mr. ITKIN is under the protection of United States authorities because he is the prime witness in very significant legal cases presently pending before the Federal court in New York City. Mr. ITKIN, in private testimony to U.S. authorities, has indicated that you were a friend of his; he met you in New York while you were at the United Nations. He has also indicated that sometime in 1957 he sent a letter of introduction to you in New Orleans, presenting one Philip HARBIN whom ITKIN claims did go to New Orleans and introduced himself to you. Your answers to questions relating to the above would be of great help to the U.S. Government in determining the veracity of ITKIN's statements.

H/W att to HSSW-2742

201-836808

SECRET/RYBAT

Attachment C to HSSW-2742

Questions to be presented orally to Luis E. GUTIERREZ

Would you describe the circumstances leading to your introduction to Mr. Herbert ITKIN and the nature of your contacts with Mr. ITKIN? When did you first meet Mr. ITKIN? Where were you working at the time? What was your position?

What school or university were you attending at the time? For what degree were you preparing? In what subject? What subject did you use for your thesis? Did you show it to ITKIN and/or did you give him a copy?

Did you continue to maintain contact with him after your departure from New York? Do you still maintain correspondence with him? When did you last have contact with Mr. ITKIN?

In 1957 or 1958 did you receive a letter from Mr. ITKIN introducing a Philip HARBIN?

Did a man named Philip HARBIN come to New Orleans and introduce himself to you? Did he have a letter of introduction from Mr. ITKIN? (How did he represent himself, i.e., whom did he represent?) Would you describe Philip HARBIN? Would you describe your first meeting with Philip HARBIN? What subjects were covered? How long were contacts maintained? When were they terminated? For what reason?

SECRET/RYBAT

COPY

H/W att # 3 to HSSW-2742

201-836808

Attachment E to HSSW-2742

DR. LUIS E. GUTIERREZ
ECONOMISTA

APDO. POSTAL 1441
TELEFONO No. 7196

SAN SALVADOR,
EL SALVADOR, C. A.

February 26,1965.

Mr. Herbert Itkin,
300 Madison Ave.,
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Herby:

It was a real good surprice to receive your letter of February 15, 1965. I had written you twice in the last three years, and I had no answer. I went to New York to the C.I.O. Convention in September 1963; then I looked for you every where, but I found you nowhere. So I realized that you had disapeared from New York and moved to another place. But what a relief now;; You still are in the Empire State kicking around and thinking about your old friends.

As you probably remember we do not see each other since 1952. Let me give you a rough breifing on what happens during this time. In November 1952 I was appointed Consul General of El Salvador at New Orleans; in 1958 I resigned and came back to my country and was appointed Comptroler of the Bank Inspecting Bureau; then in 1960 I was appointed General Director of the Social Security Bureau. then in 1961 I moved to private business as General Manager of INVERSIONES COMERCIALES, S.A., a small insurance company. Among some of my present extra activities, I am: a) member of the City Government (City Commissioner); b) member of theAdvisory Board of the Central Bank and c) Professor of Economics and Business Management at the School of Engineering of the University of El Salvador.

Although, as you can see, I am in the High Brass category I belong at the same time to the low income bracket group. For that reason I have been looking for a more juicy business, but so far I have found nothing. That is why I would say you are just on time offering me to do some business with you. I hope you will write and tell me more about what you have in mind. Also I will be waiting for you in April or any other time; the sooner the better.

There is something else I must tell you. I want to go back to New York and I need your help very badly. You know that in order to work in the States one must have a resident visa and to obtained such visa one must have an affidavit from an American Citizen. Could you be so kind giving me such a help? I hope you will say YES.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,
Luis

H/W att. #5 to HSSW-2742

CS COPY

201-836808

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ 300 Madison Avenue
(14th Floor)

March 2, 1965

Dr. Luis E. Gutierrez
APDO, POSTAL 1144
San Salvador, Central America

Dear Luis:

I will plan to see you in April and will let you know a few weeks before.

I am sure that we will be able to work out something together that will be to our mutual benefit in getting you back to America.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Itkin

HI:gtc

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MARCH 2, 1968

U.S. Officials Say Itkin Was an Agent, Reporting to F.B.I.

ITKIN AN INFORMER WHO HELPED F.B.I., U.S. OFFICIALS SAY

Figure in Marcus Case Said to Have Risked Life to 'Stand Up to Mafia'

By BARNARD L. COLLIER

Herbert Itkin, one of six persons indicted in the Marcus kick-back scandal, has been described by Federal officials as an undercover agent who infiltrated the world of organized crime and reported regularly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Itkin, now under 24-hour armed guard by Federal marshals, is to be the Government's key witness in a Federal conspiracy case. He is a co-defendant along with former Water Commissioner James L. Marcus; a reputed Mafia leader, Antonio (Tony Ducks) Corallo; Henry Fried, owner of a New York construction company; Daniel J. Motto a union leader, and Charles J. Rappaport, a former law partner of Mr. Itkin.

Mr. Itkin—called one of the most important Government informers in recent years—is described as having provided undercover information to the F.B.I. while he engaged in numerous private business ventures around the world.

There is no solid information on his motives for becoming an informer. However, one high Federal official has called the 41-year-old Manhattan lawyer a "strange" man who risked his life to "stand up to the Mafia."

An Element in Other Cases

Federal officials disclosed that Mr. Itkin was providing the Government with large quantities of "inside" information on underworld characters and their dealings. He is a potential witness, they say, in numerous criminal cases apart from the Marcus affair.

These cases are said to involve labor racketeering, gambling, bribery, income-tax evasion and a whole range of other frauds at the city, state and federal levels, some with international dimensions.

The story of Mr. Itkin's activities as an undercover agent was pieced together by The New York Times—and then confirmed by Government officials—after extensive interviews and a search of public and private documents and letters in New York, Washington, the Caribbean area and elsewhere.

Along with his activities as an undercover agent, Mr. Itkin was involved in numerous international business ventures.

Some of His Involvements

His associations and business dealings—at least those indicated by the available documents and by people who are willing to talk about him—show that his involvement was not only with Mafia figures like Corallo and public figures like Mr. Marcus, but with politicians in the Dominican Republic, coup-minded exiles from Haiti, businessmen in Miami, union officials in New York and Detroit, and gamblers in London.

Investigations are already proceeding on the basis of in-

Continued on Page 35, Column 2

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

In addition, Mr. Itkin has provided. Federal officials say they are hopeful that the inquiries will enable them to obtain several indictments in the near future.

Government officials would not specify whether Mr. Itkin was a paid or unpaid informant.

Government officials are quick to point out, however, that Mr. Itkin, despite his free-spending ways over the last several years, did not, as far as is known, amass a lot of money from his business activities.

"In fact," said one Federal official, "he is damned near broke, his family life is in a mess, he can't practice law and he can't do anything but wait it all out."

Concern has been expressed by some high Government officials about a disclosure of Mr. Itkin's background.

"There are many people," said one official, "who would like to discredit Mr. Itkin as a witness in this [Marcus] case and in other cases that might be made."

Edward Bennett Williams, the Washington lawyer who is representing Mr. Marcus in the conspiracy case, said he could not comment on the disclosure of Mr. Itkin's role.

Also of concern, some Government officials say, is Mr. Itkin's personal safety.

"But we are going to preserve him in good health until he can testify," one official said. Federal investigative agents say privately that Mr. Itkin had already been the target of an alleged murder plot for which two Long Island men are now under Federal indictment, although he has never been officially identified as the intended victim.

In a development of this aspect yesterday, Federal Judge Marvin E. Frankel ordered the Government to disclose officially who the murder target was. The indictment did not name anyone as the intended victim.

Identification Due Soon

Assistant United States Attorney Robert G. Morvillo said he would identify the alleged victim next week to the lawyers for two men indicted in the murder plot.

The two under indictment are Robert Schwartz, 43, a lawyer, of Huntington Station, L. I., and Robert Roden, 39, of Uniondale, L. I., a carpenter. No motive has ever been ascribed to the alleged plot, but it is said that it had nothing to do with the Marcus kickback case.

Judge Frankel also ordered that the Government name the city or other place where the two men or "collaborators carried on any activities connected with 'arranging the murder' as charged in the indictment," and the names of any persons who allegedly collaborated or conspired in "arranging the murder."

Mr. Itkin's relationship with Mr. Marcus, as far as is now known, was as a friend, business partner and his personal lawyer. City Hall officials say that Mr. Marcus introduced Mr. Itkin to other commissioners and city officials as "my lawyer."

According to some of these commissioners, Mr. Itkin made attempts afterward to meet and discuss business matters with them.

Mayor Lindsay has said that every city official who came into more than casual contact with Mr. Marcus or Mr. Itkin has reported in full to city investigators.

Mr. Itkin has been under protective custody since shortly after he was arrested by the F.B.I. last Dec. 18 in connection with the Marcus case. Aside from Federal and local law-enforcement officials, only a few close friends know his whereabouts.

People who have spoken recently to Mr. Itkin describe him as extremely nervous. His second wife is under guard with him.

Several of Mr. Itkin's friends have described him as confident that when the Marcus case comes to trial his "real role" as an undercover agent will be made clear.

"Won't Be a Defendant"

"I won't be a defendant when the case comes up," Mr. Itkin is quoted as having told a friend. "I didn't do anything I didn't have to do to keep from being suspect."

His current status as a defendant in the Marcus case could be changed before the trial and the charges against him could be dropped, Federal officials say.

Mr. Itkin has also told close friends that within the last five years he provided information to the Central Intelligence Agency on the activities of persons in the Dominican Republic, where he often traveled, and in Haiti, where he is also known to have had dealings.

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency denied that there was anything about Mr. Itkin in its files.

Mr. Itkin appears to have been many things to many people. To some lawyers who knew him he was, as one put it, "brilliant in his law practice." Another described the swarthy, well-dressed Brooklyn Law School graduate as "formal, retiring, not one to seek the spotlight."

Called a 'Fast Talker'

But a friend describes him as "a fast-talking guy, a fast-thinking guy, who said he knew everybody and could make a deal in the blink of an eye." He added: "Herb was always on a jet going somewhere—to London, Geneva, Rome, Santo Domingo, Haiti, Puerto Rico."

Many people regard Mr. Itkin as a specialist in labor law, but several labor leaders and mediators say they know little of his activities for unions.

It was the highly publicized Marcus case, a scandal that stunned Mayor Lindsay's administration, that first brought Mr. Itkin to wide public attention.

He was charged in a Federal indictment, along with Mr. Marcus, Corallo and others, with being part of a scheme whereby 5 per cent of an emergency contract awarded without bidding by the Department of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity would be paid as a kickback.

The contract, estimated at [illegible], was awarded to S. T. Grand, Inc., which is owned by Mr. Fried and his family. It called for the cleaning and refurbishing of the Jerome Park Reservoir in the Bronx.

The indictment charges that Mr. Fried and his company paid Mr. Marcus 2 per cent of the total contract price, and gave 1 per cent each to Mr. Itkin, Mr. Motto, and Corallo.

It further charges that the conspiracy began on or about Jan. 1, 1966—eight months before Mr. Marcus became Water Commissioner on Sept. 1 and 19 months before Mr. Marcus awarded the contract to S. T. Grand.

At the same time the alleged conspiracy began, Mr. Marcus was acting as an unpaid mayoral assistant—he took responsibility for water department business and Mr. Itkin was his lawyer and partner in several joint ventures.

On Jan. 11 the case took its bizarre murder twist when the F.B.I. arrested Mr. Roden on charges of trying to buy the murder—for $2,500, a Federal official said then—of an unidentified witness in the Marcus affair. Mr. Itkin was said then to have been that witness.

Four days later, Mr. Schwartz, the Long Island lawyer, was arrested in Manhattan as a participant in the same alleged murder conspiracy. He was charged with being involved in an attempt to murder "a witness and defendant" in the Marcus case.

Exactly a month after the Federal kickback indictment was obtained by United States Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, both Mr. Marcus and Mr. Itkin were arrested for the second time on a warrant by District Attorney Frank S. Hogan.

They were charged with having accepted a $10,000 bribe as a down payment on any emergency contracts that a company called Vintray Enterprises, Inc., might receive from Mr. Marcus's department.

Scarcity of Documents

There are very few public documents in which Mr. Itkin's name appears. And even what is available only serves to deepen the mystery surrounding his career.

On Sept. 16, 1963, for example, Mr. Itkin filed with a form with the Justice Department to register himself as a foreign agent of the Dominican Republic.

He declared that his purpose was to act for a Coral Gables, Fla., company called Westrade, Inc., in efforts "to negotiate on behalf of the Dominican Republic and bank or brokerage company in the United States, a bond issue in the amount of $35-million to extend over a period of 15 years."

Westrade, Inc., described as

a concern that dealt in the export of furniture and the production of prefabricated buildings, has since gone bankrupt and was formally dissolved last year for nonpayment of Florida state taxes.

Despite the filed registration, the company's former president, a Haitian-born Miami businessman named Robert Deschamps, denies that Mr. Itkin was ever authorized to represent him or the company.

"I spoke to him exactly twice," Mr. Deschamps said recently. "Once in New York and once in Miami in either late 1961 or early 1962. He was sent to me, I recall, by Louis Dejoie [a Haitian political exile who opposed the Haitian President, François Duvalier]. He said he had met Dejoie in the Dominican Republic.

"We talked first in a hotel in Miami and he told me he could get us financing from a union pension fund—I think he said the teamsters, or maybe the teachers union. I told him to see what he could do and we'd discuss it again."

"Then I went to New York," Mr. Deschamps said, "and saw him in his office. I was put off by him right away. One thing was, he opened a black cabinet behind his desk and I saw a secret telephone and a nightstick. I had done some checking on him and I didn't like all the secrecy business."

Can't Recall '$2,000 Fee'

Mr. Deschamps insists that the New York meeting was the last he had with Mr. Itkin, and that he is completely unaware of any agreement between Mr. Itkin and Westrade, Inc.

As for a $2,000 fee that Mr. Itkin stated in the registration form that he received from Westrade, Inc.: "Perhaps that was for some expenses he might have had, but I don't remember paying it," Mr. Deschamps said.

Mr. Itkin was also registered as a foreign agent for the Provisional Government of the Republic of Haiti in San Juan, P.R. This exile group was headed by Mr. Dejoie.

In an agreement filed with the registration and dated May, 1963, Mr. Itkin was to be paid an annual retainer of $50,000 for a period of two years—"immediately due and owing as soon as the said Provisional Government becomes the de facto or de jure Government of the Republic of Haiti and Haitian Territory."

The records indicate that the relationship between Mr. Itkin and the Haitian group was terminated in September, 1964, and that instead of getting his retainer, Mr. Itkin personally lent Mr. Dejoie $15,000 for unstated purposes.

Mr. Dejoie was unavailable for comment, but Haitian exiles, who asked not to be identified, said that during the time the registration was in effect Mr. Dejoie was often in the Dominican Republic, and was active in one abortive attempt in 1963 to invade Haiti across the Dominican border.

A Washington public-relations man, who also asked not to be named, said that during that same period Mr. Itkin met with him [illegible] in New York to discuss the possibility of [illegible] arms and developing a clandestine organization to help overthrow the Duvalier regime in Haiti.

In the years since, Mr. Itkin's contacts in the Dominican Republic have been maintained, and records show that he traveled to Santo Domingo numerous times up until his indictment last fall.

Dominican 'Mission'

According to businessmen, Mr. Itkin made about 20 visits to the Dominican Republic in 1965, beginning shortly after the civil war broke out in April of that year.

A close friend said Mr. Itkin described his trips to Santo Domingo as "missions" having to do with United States efforts to bring stability to the war-torn country.

It is not clear exactly when Mr. Itkin first became involved with Corallo, the reputed Mafia figure, but federal officials say it was before 1965 and after 1961.

The officials confirm that Mr. Itkin traveled with Corallo to London—a city Mr. Itkin visited often—in 1966, when the British Government refused to permit Corallo to remain. The reported cause of Corallo's ouster was that he was trying to gain control of some of England's legal gambling casinos for Mafia "families" in the United States.

John F. Malone, assistant director in charge of the F.B.I.'s New York office, said he would not comment on any aspect of the Marcus case. United States Attorney Morgenthau was unavailable for comment.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Newspaper Argicle on Herbert Itkin

On 22 October 1968, the attached article from the 15 October 1968 edition of the New York Daily News concerning James Marcus and Herbert Itkin was shown in a low key to Mr. Edward Long, Country Director ARA/CAR, by Mr. Paul V. Harwood, Chief, WH/7. Mr. Long expressed no interst in the article.

Bob Berg
WH/7/Ht

CONFIDENTIAL

New York Daily News
15 October 19[illegible]

Marcus Sentencing Put Off

The sentencing of former city Water Commissioner James L. Marcus on state charges of bribery was put off yesterday for two months pending developments in the related case of labor lawyer Herbert Itkin.

Marcus, 37, is serving a federal term for conspiracy to obtain a $10,000 kickback on a job bid. He was to have been sentenced in Manhattan Supreme Court on charges for which he had been indicted with Itkin. Marcus pleaded guilty.

Sentencing was put off until Dec. 18 to await the outcome of Itkin's effort to have his trial moved from state to federal court. Itkin contends he was acting as an agent for the FBI and CIA when he committed the criminal acts. Itkin's trial in State Supreme Court is tentatively set for Nov. 6.

Note:



[illegible]

The [illegible] Marcus on state charges of [illegible] Supreme Court [illegible] was put off yesterday [illegible] for two month's pending develop- ments in the [illegible]

Marcus, 37, is serving a [illegible] He was [illegible] sentenced in Manhattan Supreme Court on charges for which he had been indicted with [illegible] Marcus [illegible]

Sentencing was put off [illegible] from state to federal court. [illegible] acting as an agent for the FBI.

Note:

Reminder: do you Oliver this or does Harwood Long it?
(He prefers the latter.)
JH

C/WH 7

Long it
B

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, WH/FI

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin ([illegible])

1. There has been no Agency contact with ITKIN. Ray ROCCA, C/CI/R&A stated that CI Staff definitely never was in contact with him. Ray ROCCA's source of info on the DEJOIE-Max BOLTE-ITKIN & Company, activities was Max BOLTE and not ITKIN.

2. Offices checked for possible contact, all of which proved negative, were: Office of Security, Domestic Contacts Service, Domestic Operations Division, CA/3, CA/4, WH/7 and CI/R & A.

3. On 13 May 1963 ITKIN reported to DIA in San Juan the results of his meeting with DEJOIE, BOLTE, FIGNOLE and Luc STEPHEN in their formation of the Provisional Haitian Government in Exile formed in San Juan on 12 May & that ITKIN had been hired by that group as its Attorney. On 10 June 1963 ITKIN registered with the Department of State as a Foreign Agent for this group adding that he made a personal loan to DEJOIE of $15,000.

4. A 22 May 1963 Memorandum of Conversation from the Department of State sets forth the results of an informal meeting (possibly held on 28 April 1963) attended by Forrest E. ABBUHL (Officer in Charge, Haitian Affairs, State ARA/CRA), DEJOIE, BOLTE, a (fnu) BRODIE, and ITKIN, in which DEJOIE expressed his political views, asked for U.S. support for an invasion of Haiti, U.S. recognition of the Provisional Government in Exile, etc.

5. Appropriate documents substantiating above are herewith attached.

James T. O. Braafladt

James T. O. Braafladt
C/WH/7/CI

19 July 1968

Cc in 201's/
Dejoie
Fignole
Bolte
Stephen

201-836[illegible]

18-19 July 1968

Herbert ITKIN (201-[illegible])

Security (Frederick [illegible])
Security has checked this name out many times & still comes up NEGATIVE on any Agency connections

Domestic Contact Service ([illegible]) ([illegible])
No contact w/ DCS. In 1966 ITKIN's (former) father-in-law (E. Kent KANE, a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Republican politician & close to Hugh SCOTT) called DCS in N.Y. asking if ITKIN was affiliated in any way w/ CIA as ITKIN bragging of being agent for CIA. DCS says that for years ITKIN has bragged of being agent or informer for CIA, but he is not.

Domestic Operations (John MARKHAM)
No record of any contact..

CA/4 - Labor - ([illegible])
No record of any contact. However, since info in D.O.'s file indicates some Haitians were involved w/ ORIT - CA/4 will check w/ an ORIT asset over weekend & will advise Monday 22 July of any possible connection of ITKIN with ORIT.

CA/3 (Glenn [illegible])
No record of any contact with ITKIN.

CI/[illegible] Ray Rocca - No contact with ITKIN whatsoever by WH Division or CI/R&A. [illegible] 201-836808

14-00000

ITKIN, Herb

[illegible] Eric Eisenstadt of Funding Branch reported on 1 Apr 68 that he found a piece of paper which said that subject was once registered as a Duvalie agent: WH/7/HT checked with State who in turn checked with Mr. Lanvin of Registration Section of Justice who said there is no record of Itkin as ever having been a Duvlaer registered agent. In Jun 63 he registered as a representative of the Dejoie-Fignole provisional government in exile and was to have been paid $50,000 when this government took power. No further info. —orded

ITKIN, Herbert

JMWAVE 1109
[illegible]
1 [illegible] 1968

Louis Dejoie [illegible] Herbert Itkin, 103 Park Ave, NY [illegible] contact for funds against Duvalier. Dejoie stated Itkin previously gave Dejoie $200,000 and [illegible] provide additional financial [illegible] date (JMWAVE 0902, 2 July 1968) —orded

Unbelievable that Itkin gave Dejoie $200,000. In 1961 Dejoie still had enough following so that if he had that kind of money he would have upset the [illegible]

ITKIN, Herb

New York Lawyer and friend of Ambassador Goldberg. Wayne Carley (formerly of WH/7) called desk to advise that subj had advised the ambassador that [illegible] revolutionary undertaking would take place in Haiti on [illegible] in Aug. Mr. Carley did not know what subj's connections with [illegible] matters is nor the source of his info. (Desk Comment: Nothing happened.) Source: Harold C. [illegible] Date 1[illegible] Aug 67.

Article about subject appeared in the New York Times on 13 January 1968. Described as a superb story teller, fast mover and wheeler. Article filed in 200-9-16.

ITKIN, Herbert HAITI

Subj, under the Foreign Agents Registration [illegible] as follows

Foreign agent for Provisional [illegible] Government of the Republic of Haiti San Juan, Puerto Rico. Had various meetings with Mr. Louis DEJOIE who was Leader of the Provisional Government. On [illegible] Jun 1963 made personal loan of $500.00 to Louis DEJOIE (Chairman Prov Gov't of the Republic of Haiti - San Juan, Puerto Rico.)

Address: 103 Park Avenue, N.Y. 10017
Residence: 33 Greenwich Avenue, NY.NY.

[illegible]
17 Oct 1963
Files: 201-[illegible]

CI/R+A

201-836818
201-[illegible]

Washington Post
19 July 68

N.Y. Jury Indicts 6 in Marcus Kickback Case

NEW YORK, July 18 (UPI)—A Federal grand jury indicted today six alleged associates of attorney Herbert Itkin, key figure in the Marcus kickback case, on charges of another kickback conspiracy involving mortgage applications made to the Teamsters' Union pension fund.

U.S. Atty. Robert Morgenthau identified two of the defendants, Salvatore Granello, 45, and James Plumeri, 65, both of New York, as members of the Mafia. Their codefendants were David Wenzer, 57, Great Neck, N.Y.; John Kielly, 37, Oyster Bay Cove, N.Y., and Hyman Levine, 58, of Coral Gables, Fla., and Leonard Russo, 45, of Larchmont, N.Y.

Itkin was not indicted but was named in each of four overt acts cited in the indictment.

HE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1968

6 LINKED TO ITKIN INDICTED BY U.S.

Accused of Kickback Plot Involving Teamster Fund

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Six men linked to Herbert Itkin — the key Government informant in the James Marcus kickback case — were indicted yesterday by a Federal grand jury in an alleged kickback conspiracy involving a teamster union pension fund.

Itkin was not indicted, but was named in most of the overt acts charged in the indictment, and he appeared to be the unifying figure in the conspiracy.

Itkin, who was an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified in Federal Court that he had paid off teamster officials and criminals to arrange loans from the fund on behalf of individuals and corporations.

Itkin did not name the persons who allegedly received the payoffs. However, Government officials indicated privately that the indictment—and three previous indictments involving teamster pension funds — had resulted from Itkin's information.

Construction Involved

Yesterday's indictment charged that the six men had participated in a scheme to get a $1,350,000 mortgage for Big Value Discount Department Stores, Inc., of 24 West 25th Street, for the construction of three discount centers in Pompano Beach, Cocoa and Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Robert M. Morgenthau, United States Attorney, said that the men had obtained a tentative mortgage commitment from the Central States Southwest and Southeast Areas Pension Fund of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, based in Chicago. Mr. Morgenthau added, however, that the loan never was made.

This was the fourth indictment involving the pension fund since May. Three of the

201-536808

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
LIGrant/bm
DCS/Operational Support Staff
900 Key Bldg.

EXTENSION: 2268

NO:

DATE: 12 March 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	13 MAR 1968			Attached is copy of the letter our New York office sent to Kune in answer to his inquiry re ITKIN.
2.				13 Mar: 1 cy: DC/WH Mr. Goodwin
3.				

P.O. Box 1294
Grand Central Station
New York 17, New York
February 18, 1966

Mr. E. Kent Kane
R. D. #1
Kane, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Kane:

While in New York on February 15, 1966 on your way to Florida, you phoned me to inquire about a New York attorney. You will recall that I promised to make some inquiries and communicate the results to you. Please be advised that the gentleman in question is not affiliated or connected with my colleagues or myself.

I regret I was unable to convey this information to you prior to your departure from New York.

Very sincerely yours,

W. L. Freund

WLFreund:mac

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTER USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDEN..AL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert Itkin, New York Lawyer

FROM: Lillian I. Grant/js DCS/Operational Support Staff 34 900 Key Building			EXTENSION 2203	NO. CG 3051 DATE 5 March 1968
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CCS/Funding Mr. Erich Isenstead	8 MAR 1968			Per our conversation, attached is copy of our file record re: Mr. Herbert Itkin. This office has no record of direct contact with Itkin at any time.
2.				
3.				
4.				1 copy to CI/LPGLOBE 11 MAR 1968
5.				1 COPY TO IC/NH
6.				1 COPY TO MR. GOODWIN

CONFIDENTIAL

NY 104-66
15 February 1966

FOR : Director, Domestic Contact Service
C. Delaney

Chief, New York Field Office

Inquiry Concerning CIA Connection of Herbert ITKIN, New York Lawyer

1. A call received on the listed telephone of the New York Office on the afternoon of 15 February 1966 concerned claims by Herbert Itkin, a lawyer now practicing in New York City, to the effect that he was closely tied in to the CIA.

2. The call was made by Mr. E. Kent Kane, R.D. #1, Kane, Pennsylvania. Mr. Kane is a prominent attorney in Pennsylvania, Naval Reserve Officer (USNR 192547), a Republican politician who gave the present Governor and Senator Hugh Scott as references.

3. Herbert Itkin is a former son-in-law of Mr. Kane's. Itkin allegedly claimed that he had been of considerable assistance to CIA in Haiti and elsewhere. The implication was that he was a trusted CIA informant or agent, not a staff employee.

4. Mr. Kane contacted this office for two specific reasons:

(a) He wanted to warn CIA that Itkin was not at this time a desirable CIA contact because of doubts concerning his reliability, discretion, ability to meet his financial obligations, and mental equilibrium.

(b) He (Kane) did not wish to proceed any further in pursuing his (unspecified) course of action against Itkin if there were any substance to Itkin's claims. Put in another way, Kane is planning to take some action against his former son-in-law, and he wants to disprove the latter's claims of some CIA affiliation or backing before proceeding further.

5. Mr. Kane phoned the New York office from a room at the Hotel Drake, New York City, prior to his departure for

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NY 104-66
15 February 1966

Florida. He thought perhaps this office could clear up his problem. Recently, Itkin phoned Kane from New York and put on an alleged CIA staffer, who identified himself only as "Charley" and who dutifully confirmed Itkin's great value to the Agency. Kane is suspicious of the whole business.

6. We explained that it would take some time to have our headquarters check this out. Although Kane would have liked an immediate response, he agreed that a written advice to his Kane, Pennsylvania, address within two weeks would satisfy him. Such a reply could be quite cryptic and need not be signed. We assumed that it would originate in Washington rather than in New York. Mr. Kane did not ask for our name and was given no name.

Jay B. L. Reeves

WLFreund:mae

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

INDEX ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM 26

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI

S E C R E T 292324Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1469 —ADDED: C/WH 6 VR

DIRECTOR

IN 61161
m

RYBAT JMOCEAN

REF: JMWAVE 1464 (IN 61103)

FOLLOWING TRACES SUBJECTS LISTED IN PARA 3 REF:

1. ROBERT DESCHAMPS (201-748948), HAITIAN EXILE AND OWNER OF WESTRADE IMPORT-EXPORT COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA; SUPPLIED HAITIAN EXILES WITH ARMS; ASSISTED BY BUSINESS ASSOCIATE LOUIS DEJOIE (201-242483), CONTACT OF EVLUCID FEBRUARY 1964. (UFGA-14392, 2 MAR 64; UFGA-17300, 17 AUG 64; UFG-6428, 29 DEC 64) LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 25 NOV 28, ST MARC, HAITI; ARRIVED IN U.S. AS PERMANENT RESIDENT 28 JAN 60, RESIDED 5010 SAN AMARO DRIVE, CORAL GABLES. GENERAL REPUTATION: GOOD. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO IN DEC 1961 IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT WITH HAITIAN EXILE GROUP, PATRI. STATED HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF PATRI AND WHILE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE AIMS OF THE HAITIAN EXILES AND DESIROUS OF SEEING A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN HAITI, WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE FUNDS OR OTHERWISE INVOLVE HIMSELF IN HAITIAN POLITICAL MATTERS. DESCRIBED AS A MAN OF MEANS WHOSE NET WORTH WAS APPROXIMATELY

SECRET

SECRET

$500,000. LNERGO CLOSED CASE ON 29 DEC 61.

2. ROBERT LEGER: HAITIAN COMMUNIST, SECRETARY FOR LOUIS DEJOIE AND ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 6104, 16 DEC 64; EVLANE/4 CONTACT REPORT 3 JAN 66) (201-727690). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE BORN 16 FEB 30, PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI. OCTOBER 1961 RESIDED AT 5840 SW 93RD COURT, MIAMI AND WAS TRAVELING SALESMAN FOR WESTRADE, INC. JANUARY 1962 WAS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF WESTRADE, INC. INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AND STATED HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY HAITIAN EXILES BUT DID NOT PLAN TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH THEM. LNERGO CLOSED CASE 13 JULY 62. (SISTER, LISA LEGER, ALSO WORKED FOR WESTRADE.)

3. LOUIS DEJOIE (201-240483): FORMER HAITIAN SENATOR BORN 23 FEB 96, AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. SINCE EARLY 60'S EXILE LEADER PLOTTING AGAINST DUVALIER, TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY. ARRIVED MIAMI JULY 1964 AND BECAME ASSOCIATED WITH EVLUCID-1. BUSINESS ASSOCIATE OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS (WAVE 8541, 8792, 8916 (1964), UFGA 17300, 21374, 22527). LNERGO TRACES INDICATE HE REPUTED TO BE INVOLVED IN HAITIAN ACTIVITIES IN OCTOBER 1958 AND RESIDED 16 E. 96TH STREET, NEW YORK CITY

SECRET

IN JUNE 1964 WAS INTERVIEWED BY LNERGO AT HOME OF ROBERT DESCHAMPS, 5150 GRANADA BLVD., CORAL GABLES, DISCLAIMED ANY INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-DUVALIER ACTS. OCTOBER 1964 WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AS A SALES MANAGER FOR WESTRADE, INC. LNERGO CLOSED CASE DECEMBER 1964.

4. BUENAVENTURA (SANCHEZ) FELIX (201-130312): DOMINICAN EXILE, ANTI-COMMUNIST, RESIDED HAVANA, CUBA DURING LATE 50'S AND WAS STATION SOURCE. ASSOCIATE OF JUAN BOSCH (TKH-1383, 1459, 1474, 1484) MINISTER OF EDUCATION DURING JUAN BOSCH'S ADMINISTRATION AND LEADER OF PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO (PRD) 1964. APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELA, AUGUST 1966 ((UFG-3958, 4718; SDOM 1537). NO LNERGO TRACES.

5. VICTOR AYBAR - NO STATION TRACES. LNERGO TRACES INDICATE FULL NAME VICTOR LEON (AYBAR) DE SOSA; DPOB 15 MAR 28, SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.; MARRIED TO MARY BOSWELL, AMERICAN CITIZEN; FORMER D.R. CONSUL IN CHICAGO. LNERGO HAD ALLEGATION HE WAS AGENT OF SIM. INTERVIEWED IN JULY 1961 AND DENIED ANY SIM CONNECTIONS. STATED HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SIM WHILE IN CHICAGO AND THAT WAS THE REASON HE HAD LEFT

THE D.R. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE. WAS EMPLOYED BY WESTRADE, INC., BUT RESIGNED AND RETURNED TO OTHER EMPLOYMENT IN CHICAGO.

6. GUARCA (VE) LAZQUEZ - NO STATION TRACES; NO LNERGO TRACES.

7. COL (?) WILLIAM BOND: POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH MAXWELL WILLIAM BOND (JR.); DPOB: 30 APRIL 21, SAN FRANCISCO. SUBJECT OF 201-283995 WHICH NOT AT STATION. POA REQUESTED 7 SEPT 60 WHEN HE WAS PROCUREMENT OFFICER AT THOMPSON-CORNWALL INC., CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IN GUATEMALA. POA GRANTED 29 SEPT 60; LATER CANCELLED. NO SUBSEQUENT RECORD AND NO LNERGO TRACES.

8. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING ITEM ON HERBERT ITKIN: LOUIS DEJOIE PROPOSED HERBERT ITKENS (SIC), 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, AS POSSIBLE CONTACT FOR FUNDS AGAINST DUVALIER. DEJOIE STATED ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE. (WAVE 8792, 2 JULY 64)

9. JMWAVE FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING TIDBITS ON BARNARD (ALSO BERNARD) COLLIER; WAS OCCASIONAL CONTACT OF AMCARBON-1

SECRET

PAGE FIVE JMWAVE 1469 S E C R E T

IN 1964-65. HAD SERIES OF EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN SUMMER 1964, COMMENTED UPON IN WAVE 8640, 17 AUGUST 64. WORKED FOR NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE AT THAT TIME. DENIED CUBAN VISA IN FALL 1965. ALLEGEDLY WROTE REPORT ON FOREIV PROCUREMENT IN U.S. OF T-28 AIRCRAFT CRITICAL OF WOFIRM AND LNERGO IN 1966. THIS DOCUMENT WAS OFFERED FOR SALE TO A STATION CONTACT BY LOCAL HOTEL OPERATOR, BILL THOMPSON IN OCTOBER 1966; NO OFFER WAS MADE AND MATTER DROPPED.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPT OF STATE DOCUMENT   OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

DATE: 30 JUNE 1966

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO THE INAUGURAL CEREMONIES AT SANTO DOMINGO, D.R.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DOCUMENT

REGISTRATION STATEMENT (REGIS. NO: 1774

NAME OF REIGSTRANT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE, AKA
MAX BOLTE

DATE: NOT LEGIBLE

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 4 AUGUST 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SUBJECT: LOUIS DEJOIE

FBI FILE NO: 105-31661 (NEW YORK)

14-00000

37 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DIRECTOR

201-240483 ✓

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, SCO 6, CA 2, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2, WH/SA 8, VR, DA

ROUTING

RID/MIS

RID/FI

Call cover to DR DESK

SECRET 032103Z

DIR INFO PRIN CITE WAVE 8792

13 JUL 64 IN 20818

DYVOUR PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 8541 (IN 15961)

ABSTRACT

1. DEJOIE LEFT 30 JUNE 64 FOR VISIT NEW YORK AND TALK JOAQUIN BALAGUER RE LATTER'S COLLABORATION DEJOIE OPERATIONS AGAINST HAITI. WILL PROBABLY VISIT WASH BEFORE RETURN MIAMI. PRIOR LEAVING, DEJOIE JOINED FORCES WITH EVLUCID-1. UNTIL DEPARTURE, DEJOIE AND EVLUCID-1 WERE PLANNING ORGANIZATION OF HAITIAN GOVT FOLLOWING TAKEOVER BUT STILL NOT SUCCESSFUL IN MUSTERING WHEREWITHAL MOUNT INVASION. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3 AND UOAMBER-6 COMBINED.)

2. DEJOIE SAID HE MET ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO IN SDOM EARLY JUNE AND CLAIMS GUTIERREZ SAID HE HAD CUBAN EXILE ARMS CACHED IN IGUANA ISLAND BUT USE OF ARMS FOR DEJOIE FORCES NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT KUBARK APPROVAL. DEJOIE GETTING SAME STORY OTHER CUBAN EXILE GROUPS. (SOURCE: 201-240483

201-240483

~~201-[illegible]~~

D 36-124-23/3

SECRET

FORM 1-64 1389 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

201-836505

UOAMBER-6, 29 JUNE.)

3. ON 1 JULY E-1 CONTACTED BY ELISEO GOMEZ, BUSINESS PARTNER OF TEOFILO BABUN, CUBAN SHIPPING MAGNATE WHO NOW OPERATING IN MIAMI AND PROBABLY INVOLVED CONTRABAND ACTIVITIES. GOMEZ TOLD E-1 THAT GOMEZ REPRESENTED GROUP WHO ABLE TO HELP E-1 IN OPS AGAINST HAITI AND WOULD COLLABORATE IN RETURN FOR HAITIAN BASES. E-1 ASKED UOAMBER-3 OPINION GOMEZ, WAS TOLD THAT HE BUM AND DEALING WITH GOMEZ GROUP SURE TO END IN FAILURE IN VIEW FACT BABUN AND COMPANY AFTER MONEY ONLY AND WITHOUT SCRUPLES. WOULD PROBABLY LEAD E-1 ON FOR ADVANCE ON ARMS, THEN NOT DELIVER MID-STREAM. (SOURCE: U-3 FROM E-1, 1 JULY).

4. CONTACTS PROPOSED BY DEJOIE FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE INCLUDE HERBERT ITKENS, 103 PARK AVE., NEW YORK, IN EFFORT OBTAIN FUNDS FOR ANTI-DUVALIER OPERATION. (DEJOIE SAYS ITKENS PREVIOUSLY GAVE DEJOIE $200,000 AND MAY PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BACKING SOME FUTURE DATE.) DEJOIE ALSO PLANNING APPROACH EDWARD JOSEPH, 17 BATTERY PLACE, NEW YORK. (JOSEPH APPARENTLY LEGAL COUNSEL FOR BALAGUER AND DIEGO BORDAS.) WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT OTHER CONTACTS MIAMI AREA ON RETURN. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-6).

SECRET

5. IN DISCUSSING FINANCIAL SUPPORT HAITIAN OPS DEJOIE SAID EX-DOM GEN LUIS REINISO TRUJILLO PASSED DUVALIER $370,000, LATER GAVE ADDITIONAL $140,000 FOR DUVALIER PROTECTION TRUJILLO CLAN. DEJOIE DID NOT REVEAL WHEN FUNDS PASSED BUT SAID USED BY DUVALIER FOR PURCHASE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. (SOURCE: UOAMBER-3, 28 JUNE.)

SECRET

RI COPY

C/S COMMENT: * GAVE SUMMARY DEJOIE ACTIVITIES FOR 24 AND 25 JUNE 64.

RI COPY

RI COPY

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1964

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: JEAN ANTOINE MAX BOLTE

FBI FILE NO: 97-1576 (NEW YORK)

[illegible]

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Port au Prince

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Conversation with IDEN-A on 3 October 1963 with HQS Rep (Using Alias)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. I called on IDEN-A at the home of his son-in-law in ZRMETAL. IDEN-A remembered me from our previous meeting in May of this year, and his greeting was cordial. He said that he was in ZRMETAL and was going to New York for the purpose of making the situation of his followers known and to see if he could obtain support for maintaining his activist following in the DR.

2. IDEN-A believes that it has now been proven that no reliance could be placed on any of the Haitian military: EVLUSH/1 is obviously finished; EVLITE/1 is unwilling to act without positive guarantees of ODYOKE support; Colonel Armand is able but weak; and General Boucicaut lacks courage. Colonel Biambi is a good man but is being supported by the Dominican government. If anything effective is to be done, it must be done through non-military personalities. Only a national leader who has the support of the people can do anything effective. Had he been in charge of the EVLUSH/1 effort, the peasants would have rallied to the invading forces, but they will not do so to a force under the command of a military man.

3. IDEN-A's camp is still in existence in the DR and contains about 70 men at present. Among these are EVLUTE/4 and Henri Clermont. He said that EVLUTE/4 is able but somewhat erratic and he (IDEN-A) fears that he would accept support from any source including the Communists, though he knows that EVLUTE/4 is not himself a communist. He likewise mistrusts the EVLUTE group because it s leadership is too far to the left. Again, he does not believe that the members of EVLUTE are themselves Communists, but they attempted to obtain support from Mexican Communists.

4. IDEN-A concerned at the moment in obtaining support to enable him to continue feeding the men in his camp. He said that he has been informed that the former followers of EVLUSH/1 are now flocking in, thus placing an intolerable burden on his slim resources. He needs a few thousand dollars for food supplies and hopes to get some help in New York from CARE or some other philanthropic organization.

5. IDEN-A regrets the overthrow of the Bosch government. He says that he is aware of Bosch's shortcomings as an administrator, but that he had the interests of the Dominican Republic at heart and had demonstrated his sympathies for IDEN-A and his followers. Nevertheless,

CONTINUED

201-240483

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HTPW-627

CS COPY

DATE: 9 October 1963

11 OCT 1963

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-240483

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/6

OFFICER: Norman Pescoteaux ND

TYPIST: jar

EXT: 4596

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
		201-836808

ROUTING | INITIAL
RID/AN
RID/MIS
RID/FI

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WHD

DATE: 9 Oct 63

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: J. C. KING

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

IDEN-A believes that he will be able to have a friendly relationship with the new regime. He has an appointment to see Ambassador Jose BONILLA Atiles today and hopes to obtain his support. He also is a good friend of [illegible] and believes this will stand him in good stead. He thinks that the new government must be recognized within 60 days.

ITKIN [illegible]

6. He has received some aid from PBPRIME friends and from Cuban and Dominican private individuals. He did not further identify them other than to say that they were not the same persons who had supported EVLUSH/1 who had been counting on the support of Masferrer. This support had not been forthcoming due to the fact that certain of the Haitians and Cubans that Masferrer was supposed to provide, refused to work with Masferrer. IDEN's Cuban supporters' aim is to use Haiti as a base against Cuba. He agrees this should be done.

7. IDEN-A is certain that Garrido informed EVMAYA of EVLUSH/1's plans. He said that Garrido was greedy and would take money from any source.

8. IDEN-A says that ODYOKE plans to send a new ambassador to Haiti will greatly strengthen the government. He said this fact is known and has caused considerable disappointment among exiles. (I made no comment on this.)

9. IDEN-A had wanted to bring these matters to the attention of IDEN-B. He has no selfish ambition. In outlook, he is a Catholic and a capitalist who wants to do what he can for his country. This is his sole reason for wanting to be President. I explained that his views would be made known to IDEN-B and other interested senior officials. IDEN-B regretted not being able to talk to him personally, but was prevented from doing so at present due to the many demands on his time caused by the present critical situation in the Caribbean.

10. Our parting was cordial and IDEN-A said that when he returned to the DR in the next few days, he would be glad to establish contact with one of my associates should we desire to do this. I told him that should it be necessary to get in touch with him, the person chosen would identify himself as my friend.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
- Original & 1 - Port au Prince

IDENS (U/S/C)

FBI DOCUMENT

DATE: 21 AUGUST 1963

CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN

SUBJECT: :PIOS DEJOIE - REGISTRATION ACT - HAITI

FBI FILE NO: NONE GIVEN (WASH., D.C.)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 6 AUG 63 30

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : DODS

ACTION: WH 8. (WH & IW NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1715 6 AUG BP)

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2 CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, DD/I, AD/CI 2, RF 2.

ROUTING

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3		6	

AUG 6 2108Z 63

PRIORITY

IN 94397

TDCS [illegible]

PRITY DIR CITE DODS 0466

INTEL

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO.[1] WUARMOR/1[2] WHO RECEIVED HIS INFORMATION BY PHONE ON 6 AUGUST 1963 FROM ARTHUR HAAS, PRESIDENT OF CARIBBEAN MILLS, OWNER OF THE BIGGEST FLOUR MILL IN HAITI WHO RESIDES IN DALLAS. HAAS OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION ON 6 AUGUST FROM HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK CITY LAWYER WITH THE FIRM ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE, ONE OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS, AND GAVE HAAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS INFORMATION COMES FROM DEJOIE. ITKIN TOLD HAAS THAT, BECAUSE ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILES ARE NOW WORKING TOGETHER, HE REPRESENTS ALL OF THE EXILES AS WELL AS DEJOIE. HAAS TOLD WUARMOR/1[2] THAT CARIBBEAN MILLS WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT THE INVASION OF HAITI IF IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE INVADING FORCE WILL SUCCEED

IW COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: CS [illegible] 36-1-6

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

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3	6

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

IN 94397

TDCS

AND IF ALL OF THE OTHER COMPANIES CONCERNED CONTRIBUTE. WUARMOR/1[2] HAS ASKED DODS WHETHER KUBARK[3] WOULD ADVISE THAT HIS COMPANY CONTRIBUTE ALSO. DODS UNDERSTANDS KUJUMP[4] DALLAS OFFICE RECEIVED SIMILAR AND AMPLIFIED REPORT FROM HASS DIRECTLY AND THAT THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PASSED BY KUJUMP[4] TO HQS BY PHONE. HQS MAY PREFER DISSEM AS FROM HAAS ONLY AND OMIT WUARMOR/1[2]. REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD CONTROLLED DISSEM. HAITI SUBJ: HAITI INVADING FORCE DOI: 6 AUGUST 1963 PADA: OMIT PLACE ACQUIRED 6 AUGUST 1963 APPR: DEFER HQS. UWC-22 SOURCE: AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH INTERESTS IN HAITI (F) FROM A SECOND AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WHO OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM HERBERT ITKIN, NEW YORK ATTORNEY WITH THE FIRM OF ITKIN, ROBERTS, AND GREENBAUM WHO SAID THAT HE REPRESENTS LOUIS DEJOIE AND ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE LEADERS. ITKIN GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT LOUIS DEJOIE IS HIS SOURCE FOR THIS INFORMATION.

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

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REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, USC Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE & DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS
DATE DISTR.
PRECEDENCE
REFERENCES IN 94397
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE FORCE INVADING HAITI ON 6 AUGUST 1963 REPRESENTS ALL OF THE HAITI EXILES AND IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE ONLY OF THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH LEON CANTAVE. ACCORDING TO LOUIS DEJOIE, HAITIAN EXILE LEADER THE PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES SOME TIME AGO ARRANGED THAT ALL OF THE HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS SHOULD ACT TOGETHER AS ONE BODY.

2. THE FORCE IS COMPOSED OF 500 ARMED MEN RATHER THAN THE 250 FIRST REPORTED BY THE PRESS. THE GROUP HAS 1500 ARMED MEN STANDING BY. (FIELD COMMENT. WHERE THE GROUP IS STANDING BY IS NOT STATED.)

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

3

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(WHEN FILLED IN)

TDCS

IN 64297

PAGE 2

3. THE FORCE MUST RAISE U.S. $250,000. IN ORDER TO MAKE THE INVASION SUCCESSFUL. HALF OF THAT AMOUNT HAS ALREADY BEEN RAISED IN EUROPE. HERBERT ITKIN, A NEW YORK ATTORNEY REPRESENTING LOUIS DEJOIE AND OTHER HAITIAN EXILE GROUPS, IS PHONING AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN IN AN ATTEMPT TO RAISE THE OTHER HALF.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(WHEN FILLED IN)

STATE DEPT DOCUMENT - MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 22 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF HAITIAN OPPOSITION LEADER LOUIS
DEJOIE

FILE NO: 819192

DEPT. OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

DATE: 16 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL - NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: HAITIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

REPORT NO: 2231011563 (Puerto Rico)

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DH-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible]

OFFICE [illegible]

ROOM [illegible]

PHONE

TUBE ADDRESS [illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) [illegible], (First) [illegible] (Middle) 01

5. 201 NO. 336508 02

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			
02			

7. SEX M F 01

8. DATE OF BIRTH 01

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH [illegible] 01

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible] 01

11. CITIZENSHIP US 01

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) Lawyer 01 OCC. CODE [illegible] 02

13. SWL 01

14. OI CODE 01

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER [illegible] 01 DATE [illegible] 01

16. RESIDENCE [illegible]

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

[illegible] in 196[illegible]. Partner in law firm of 01

[illegible], Roberts & Grossman 01

01

01

01

01

01

01

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION [illegible] CODE [illegible] 01

19. ACTION DESK [illegible] CODE [illegible] 01

20. SECONDARY DESK [illegible] CODE [illegible] 01

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES [illegible] 01 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. 336308

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
VOL. III

INCLUSIVE DATES: JAN 65 - JAN. 75

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

Vol. 1	STATE DEPT (Moscow #19074, 28 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #20771, 31 Aug 59)	
	STATE DEPT (Moscow #22299, 30 Jun 61)	
Vol. II	STATE DEPT fm Tijuana	14 Mar 63
	STATE Memo fm Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	STATE Tijuana	15 Mar 63
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	2 Apr 63 re TUMBLEWEED
	FBI (Hoover to CIA)	31 May 63 re TUMBLEWEED (E)65-65652
	FBI (Excerpt only fm document dated 27 May 63 (CIA #DBA 43665)	
	STATE (Tijuana ConGen)	10 Sep 63
	STATE Dept #CA-3646	29 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Oct 63
	STATE Airgram A-12 fm Tij	10 Oct 63
	STATE Official-Informal Memo fm Mexico to Tijuana	10 Oct 63
	FBI (San Diego)	7 Feb 64
Vol.III	STATE (Mexico #4042)	23 Jul 69
	STATE (Moscow #4192)	12 Aug 69
	FBI - travel items (4)	August-October 1969
	FBI (San Diego)	18 Dec 69
	STATE (Mexico #4475)	14 Aug 70
	STATE (Mexico 4693)	26 Aug 70
	FBI travel items (2)	10 Sep 70 re KOSTIKOVA
	STATE Request for Bio	29 Sep 70
	FBI travel items (2)	21 Oct 70
	FBI travel items (2)	30 Oct 70
	FBI (San Antonio #78206)	13 May 71
	STATE (Mexico #5211)	14 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	28 Sep 71
	FBI travel items (2)	1 Oct 71
	FBI (Oklahoma City)	24 Jan 75 re TUMBLEWEED

Rv'd by [illegible]
7/12/[illegible]

SECRET

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

FROM: NAME (Use gummed labels) Hopkins Chas		BLDGE NO. 1C-516	
BRANCH LAD/COG	ROOM 3D57	EXTENSION 4272	DATE 12 Apr 77
IP/FI CONTROL NO.			

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	04/12/77	Go
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DB-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (Doc. Ref.)

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (TO IP/IN)

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME KOSTIKOV	GIVEN NAMES Valery
SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED	201 NO. IF KNOWN 201- 305052
AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐ NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT

☐ SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES

☒ INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED

☐ THERE ARE ______ RECORDS OF WHICH ______ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

122019 1977 APR 12 AM 9:35

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622 (4-5-38)

XAE - 852 - 20775

```
                                  S-E-C-R-E-T
                         MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                            122019      016
                                                                               ***IMMEDIATE***
    REQ NO: 122019A01    REQUESTER: HC516  HOPKINS CHRI  LA/C/CI  305331  9061  BU7

    NAME: KOSTIKOV, VALERY                                YOB:      SEX:   CIT:
    ORIGIN:A  DOR:    PURPOSE:FOS  PRTY:I  OTPT:D999  FNU:    SPELL:    MASK:    MAT:

    CONTROL CODE 016-VCF-770412-093553-00002     093550
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    0001 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH                           074-005-102
         SEX M                                                     SX-05555/05
         CIT USSR
         RES MEXICO
         FORMERLY: 00 NO DATE,
         ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO SE/CI/X, 4D18    , 1203, 13/03/75
         SX-05555/05                            01 FEB 77  02175526

    0002 KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH                           201-0305052*
         SEX M DOB 17MAR33                 POB USSR, MOSCOW        TYPE NAME T
         CIT USSR                                                  RCD DATE 61
         REF HMMA-25722, 02 APR 65
         RES USSR KGB OFFICER, FORMER EMPLOYEE SOV EMB,
         MEXICO CITY, DEPARTED PCS 04 AUG 65. WIFE KOSTIKOVA,
         RIZA ALEKSANDROVNA
         ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                                                31 DEC 65  00150737

                                                                              PAGE 0001
    ---CONTINUED---      HC516                                                122019     016
                          S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

CI

X

```
                                    S-E-C-R-E-T

   0003 KOSTIKOV,                                                 ARDP-00011
        OSS REFS ARE AVAILABLE TO THIS NAME IN THE MAIN          01JAN46
        INDEX CAT. III FILE. THESE REFS MUST BE MANUA LLY
        SEARCHED AND APPLICABLE CARDS REPRODUCED AN D ATTACHED
        TO THE NAME TRACE REQUEST.
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        ARDP-00011                          01 JAN 46  01859765


   0004 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                             078-004-002
        APPEARS TO HAVE LEFT PERMANENTLY. POSSIBLY PETER          KAHI-00650
        PAKHOMOVICH, BORN 21 SEP 11 CHAUFFEUR SOVIETS             01JUN53
        STATIONED IN KARACHI.¬                                    SER-41
                                                                  IN29381
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        KAHI-00650C0653                     24 AUG 59  05877390


   0005 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                             041-008-005
        AKA ANIRUT KALITROV KOSTOKOV AKA KOSTAKOV, ISSAD           NIT-00693
        KALISTROVICH                                              27MAR54
                                                                  74-7-2041.206-
                                                                  4
        FORMERLY: FCN NO FCN, OD NO DATE.
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        NIT-00693                           27 MAR 54  07478948


                                                                              PAGE 0002
   ---CONTINUED---      HC516                                         122019      016
                                    S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
                                    S-E-C-R-E-T

   0006 KOSTIKOV, FNU                                               EGQA-89069
        RIS OFFICER, EAST GERMANY                                   13MAY57
                                                                    11 MAY 56
                                                                    ATT DATED
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        EGQA-89069                        13 MAY 57  07602864


   0007 KOSTIKOV                                                    201-0805767
        SEX M                       OCC INTELL                      DST-14913
        CIT USSR                                                    07OCT66
        < USSR, SAMARKAND AKA OF KOLCHOV 6FT 1IN TALL,              STATE
        SLENDER BUILD, RECEDING HAIR, REDDISH IN COLOR. SMALL       P9
        V-SHAPED SCAR ON UPPER LEFT FOREHEAD. RESPONSIBLE FOR
        INTURIST RELATIONS WITH THE SAMARKAND AUTHORITIES. MAJ
        FIGURE IN LT. JON VIEGEL /201-805767/ CASE. QUESTIONER
        AND INTER+#DEFERRED
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
                              APERTURE CARD AVAILABLE
        DST-14913                         18 APR 67  03492759


   0008 KOSTIKOV                                                    074-005-011
        SEX M                                                       CD-00406
        < OF KRAVCHENKO, M. KH. NAME APPEARED IN GERMAN             08APR65
        PROPAGANDA LEAFLET WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN WHICH CONTAINED       P4
        NKVD AGENTS AND INFORMANTS PLANTED IN SOVIET 44TH
        RIFLE DIVISION, 42
        ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CFS - GC-52
        CD-00406                          25 AUG 65  03694375


                           END OF REPLY - 0008 RECORDS LISTED

                                                                         PAGE 0003
                  HC516                                         END OF  122019    016
                                    S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

Ross

1. Which [illegible] TUMBLEWEED - seems related with Dept. 13 of KGB - (assassinations). KOSTIKOV ever involved in TUMBLEWEED. Was in clandestine contact with TUMBLEWEED.

CONFIDENTIAL

XAE-852
7 October 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Photo Identification of Valeriy Vladimirovich
KOSTIKOV, XAE-852, 20 June 1975

The attached photo identification request was generated by DJR himself on the basis of XAE-851, also attached. It is being processed into the record as a part of a backlog which is currently being processed.

Lee H. Wigren
C/CI/R&A/E

File: 201-305052
D-100-6-154/22

R1B.

L

[illegible]

SUBJ on Pg 2→

RECORD COPY

D-100-6-154/22

7 OCT 75
201-305052

E2 IMPDET CL BY 02201

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Mexico City Soviet Personality Files

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith, for inclusion into their Headquarters 201-files, are the Station's Personality Files of the following Soviet Diplomats who were previously assigned to Mexico City. The Files have been purged of all Headquarters correspondence.

BOLSHAKOV, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	201-[illegible]
FEDIN, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	201-[illegible]
KOSTIKOV, Valeriy Vladimirovich	201-[illegible]
KUCHEROV, Valentin Ivanovich	201-758017
PETROV, Vladimir Stepanovich	201-[illegible]
VANOVSKIY, Yuriy Yakovlevich	201-[illegible]

Felix C. Pecaturo
Felix C. PECATURO

Distribution:
2 cys - C/SBD, w/att h/w
1 cy - C/WHD, w/o att

CLASSIFIED BY ...

EXEMPT ...
OF E ...
§ 5B(1) 0
APDi2

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-42157

DATE
21 July 19[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

KOSTIKOV VALERIY VLADIMIROVICHA-018973 S 036780

DPOB: 17 MAR 33 MOSCOW 201-0305052 PPT

WIFE: ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA B 02 MAR 32 REF: OBBA 31097 07 JUL 72



Deleted from photo system

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2/8 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY

ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

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Y ______ AT ______ Z

ISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

CTION UNIT SB8 FILE, VR IP/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

CTION NO 115

S E C R E T 310020Z MAY 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19978

DIRECTOR

REDTOP (IN 543028) 30May 72 IN 623421

R

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 19049, 22 FEB 72

B. DIRECTOR 237413, 29 FEB 72

1. XDADORN REPORTED PCS ARRIVAL 22 MAY 1972 AEROMEXICO FLT 401 OF:

A. VLADIMIR MIKHAYLOVICH MELNIKOV (201-820393), DIP PASSPORT D-003383, ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, TATYANA IVANOVNA AND SON, MIKHAIL, AGE THREE. BIO DATA CONTAINED IN AMEMB MOSCOW 1153, 8 FEB 72. PER SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE, MELNIKOV IS THIRD SECY, TO OCCUPY SLOT VACTED BY VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), KNOWN KGB.

B. ANDREY BORISOVICH GLIKHOVTSEV (201-897655), SERVICE PASSPORT S-253248. SEE AMEMB MOSCOW 5264, 26 JULY 1971. GLIKHOVTSEV TO OCCUPY ADDITIONAL SLOT AS "TRAINEE" AND GUARD AT SOVEMB. NO FAMILY REPORTED.

2. TRAVELLING WITH MELNIKOV FAMILY WAS VADIM V. VENEVTSEV, 14 YEAR OLD SON OF 201-738468, TO SPEND VACATION WITH PARENTS.

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

CS COPY FILED IN 201-820393 SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

Chief, [illegible]

Chief, Western Hem[illegible]

Chief of Station, Mexico City

[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: [illegible]

REFERENCE : [illegible]

1. [illegible] collected [illegible]

2. [illegible] late afternoon. He was not [illegible] drinking. [illegible] with Subject than with [illegible] appeared [illegible] but [illegible]-10 offered him some [illegible] glasses. [illegible] son, [illegible] and now living in Guadalajara.

3. While talking about [illegible] 10 would understand his feelings [illegible] learned that his only son, [illegible] being inducted into the Soviet Army. [illegible] would be sent to the Chinese border, [illegible] had served for one year, [illegible] Subject stated that there are as many as 20 [illegible] killed daily at this border [illegible] known in the USSR. Subject [illegible] there himself and from [illegible] Subject indicated that he could [illegible] his son transferred but he was [illegible] friend [illegible] and "Vladimir" (Inu) could help him get his son [illegible] would not ask for their help.

4. Subject became very emotional as he [illegible] son. [illegible]-10 reported that Subject was c[illegible]

CS COPY 201-351744

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/SBD
1 - C/WHD

Kostikov

DUPLICATE COPY
FOR CROSS FILING IN
201- 305052

HMMA-41,79

29 [illegible] 197[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] noted as KDADAGE-10 that [illegible] Chinese and [illegible].

5. Subject, who arrived in [illegible], developed [illegible] friendship and [illegible] visits to the [illegible] contacts [illegible] there [illegible] KDADAGE-10 [illegible] Subject has [illegible] and sometimes [illegible] girl.

6. Dulcin is officially an employee of the Polish [illegible] Commercial Office, although he physically works in the [illegible] of the Embassy and spends the entire working day there. He functions as an all-night security guard once a week at the Embassy. He is paid and also takes his turn at guard at the Polish Commercial Office. We carry Subject as a [illegible] officer [illegible] almost exclusive contacts with [illegible] officers, [illegible] pattern of activities, the fact that he replaced a known [illegible] officer in slot, and from [illegible] identification. [illegible] functions as the [illegible] code clerk [illegible]. [illegible] folder appears on KDBADGER, so there is no information available on his outside contacts.

7. In January 1971, Subject and family moved to General Zuazua 39, Apt. 102, Colonia San Miguel Chapultepec. He drives a recently purchased 1972 yellow-brown Opel with diplomatic license plates AA[illegible].

8. We felt the information provided by [illegible]-10 was of sufficient significance to forward to Headquarters for your information. Our only viable access to Subject is [illegible]; Subject has no known outside contacts; and he is [illegible] diplomatic [illegible], a situation which precludes social access by [illegible] officers. We will continue to monitor [illegible]'s activities through KDADAGE-10 and seek some other way to get to know him better.

[illegible] H. [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SUBJ DEPARTED MEXICO PCS IN 71 REFER TO DOC
FOR ADDITIONAL INFO

050-008-010
HMMA-41550
26 JAN 72
P2

R 7202110020

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 305052			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-41,070, 27 September 1971

TO : Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET

201-305052

CS COPY

H/w att. 1 to HMMA-41070

① Bear Priority
② PR
③ Hors 9/15

request reply by COB
Sept 15.

No. 347

La Embajada de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas saluda muy atentamente a la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América y tiene el honor de pedir que se sirva extender las visas de tránsito en los pasaportes diplomáticos del Sr.KOSTIKOV Valeri, Segundo Secretario de la Embajada de la URSS en México, y pasa su esposa Sra.KOSTIKOVA Roza.

Las personas mencionadas salen de México a Nueva York el día 20 de septiembre del año en curso por la cía "EA-902" y van a continuar su viaje rumbo a Moscú el día 22 de septiembre por la cía "Aeroflot".

La Embajada de la URSS agradece de antemano la atención que la Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América tenga a bien de prestar a esta solicitud y aprovecha la oportunidad para reiterar las seguridades de su más alta y distinguida consideración.

México, D.F., 13 de septiembre de 1971

A LA EMBAJADA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
DE AMERICA



...CATION FOR
NONIMMIGRANT
VISA
AND ALIEN
...

APELLIDO Costikov	**NOMBRE** Valeri	**SEGUNDO NOMBRE** Vladimirovitch	**DOCUMENTO DE VIAJE** pas diplomático D N° 022184
RESIDENCIA Embajada de la URSS en México			
FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Moscú	**DIA** 17	**MES** 3	**AÑO** 1933 · **TEZ**
CABELLO · **OJOS**	**ESTATURA**	**NACIONALIDAD** Rusa	**SEÑAS**
ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	**SEXO** ☒ M ☐ F	**PROFESION** 3o secretario de la Embajada de la	**DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU** URSS. Tránsito por Nueva York por 3 días

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido suministrada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

el:

Костиков

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM ES-257 SPANISH

Form Approved

CLASSIFICATION	**POST SERIAL NO**	**REMARKS** 9/13/71 Visa. Blanc
ISSUED ON	**FOR** Valid for ( ) Appl	
VALID THROUGH	**REFUSED**	
SERVICE NO.		
TARIFF ITEM NO		
FEE PAID: U S $		
LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT		
APPLICATION FOR NONIMMIGRANT VISA AND ALIEN REGISTRATION		





UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022184

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022184

RESIDENCIA *Embajada de la URSS en Mexico*

FECHA Y LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO *Región de Arjangelsk*			DIA *2*	MES *2*	AÑO *1932*
CABELLO	OJOS	ESTATURA	NACIONALIDAD *Rusa*	SEÑAS	
ESTADO CIVIL ☒ C ☐ S ☐ V ☐ D	SEXO ☐ M ☒ F	PROFESION *Esposa del segundo secr. [illegible] Embajada*	DURACION Y PROPOSITO DE ESTANCIA EN LOS EE UU *Tránsito por 20 horas México [illegible]* *3 días*		

Entiendo que la posesión de una visa no le concede al portador el derecho de entrar a los EE UU si al llegar al puerto de entrada se descubre que es inadmisible.

Certifico que la información que figura en la presente solicitud, inclusive cualesquiera declaraciones que formen parte de la misma, ha sido examinada por mí y es correcta y completa según mi saber y entender.

El solicitante fué entrevistado por mí y su solicitud fué firmada en mi presencia.

(Firma del solicitante)

FORM FS-257 (Spanish)

Form Approved

CLASSIFICATION	POST SERIAL NO	REMARKS
ISSUED ON	FOR Unltd	
VALID THROUGH	REFUSED ON	
SERVICE NO		
TARIFF ITEM NO		
FEE PAID U. S. $		
LOCAL CY. EQUIVALENT		

APPLICATION FOR
NONIMMIGRANT
VISA
AND ALIEN
REGISTRATION



9/13/71

Vera, [illegible]



UNION
DES RÉPUBLIQUES
SOVIÉTIQUES SOCIALISTES

PASSEPORT
DIPLOMATIQUE

Д № 022185

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ
РЕСПУБЛИК

ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИЙ
ПАСПОРТ

Д № 022185

Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: He is a 38-year-old officer of the KGB who occupies the cover position of Second Secretary. He first visited Mexico in 1959 for a Soviet Industrial Exposition and later came from September 1961 until August 1965. He returned again in September 1968 to replace another KGB officer. KOSTIKOV is considered to be one of the most effective and dangerous of the intelligence officers in Mexico. He has had a wide range of responsibilities which have included operations among emigre groups in western Mexico, operations directed against the United States and currently against the governments of Central America. He presently meets with exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras. He is known to have passed funds to these groups as well as tactical guidance.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY ________ AT ________ Z

DISSEM BY 38 PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT SBB

ACTION NO. 333

INFO FILE, VR, ~~WH/~~ [illegible], WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI,

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

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11

DOC. MICRO. SER.

DEC 17 1971

MICROFILMED

(9)

S E C R E T 262220Z OCT 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 18258

DIRECTOR

26 OCT IN 454800

L

2P

REDTOP AEKICK AESMASH Soviet Travel from Mexico

REF: DIRECTOR 194115

1. VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH PETROV (201-858287), KNOWN KGB OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY ON 13 AUGUST 71 ON WHAT PRESUMED BY STATION TO BE HOME LEAVE, ~~DIE~~ DUE HIS LENGTH OF SERVICE IN MEXICO, AND DUE FACT OUR COVERAGE SOVIET INSTALLATIONS GAVE NO INDICATIONS PRIOR DEPARTURE THAT PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR PCS MOVE, KDBADGER OF 7 OCTOBER 71, HOWEVER, CONTAINED REFERENCES TO PACKING AND SHIPMENT OF PETROV'S HHE. STATION INCLINED BELIEVE NON-RETURN OF PETROV LINKED WITH HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN VALINK CASE (SEE MEXICO CITY 17460 (IN 405813) AND RELATED TRAFFIC). WHILE NOT CONNECTED AESMASH DEFECTION, REFERENCE POSES POSSIBILITY OUR SUSPICIONS VALID AND KGB FEARED FLAP POTENTIAL IN PETROV'S CONTINUED PRESENCE IN MEXICO.

2. VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), KNOWN KGB AND SUSPECTED DEPARTMENT 13 OFFICER, DEPARTED MEXICO WITH FAMILY 20 SEPTEMBER 71. KOSTIKOV ARRIVED MEXICO 13 SEPTEMBER 68, AND PCS DEPARTURE MAY HAVE BEEN ROUTINE, ALTHO 1 JUNE 71

AS
~~AB~~
P
4

26 Oct 71

B201-858287

D74-6-756/3

201-305052

CS COPY

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Soviet Bloc Division

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City 52

SUBJECT
○REDTOP/AEKICK - Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.

1. KDADORN reported the 20 September 1971 departure of Subject and his wife Roza Aleksandrovna for New York via Eastern Airlines Flight 902 en route to Moscow.

2. Although Station has no information concerning a replacement, recent KDBADGER coverage has contained comments regarding the packing and moving of Subject's household effects, indicating his departure was PCS.

3. Attached for Subject's Headquarters file is a copy of his visa request, including a photograph, and the opening page of his passport. Subject's Station file will be retained until it is known that his departure was PCS.

Olive S. Eckholm
Olive S. ECKHOLM

ATTACHMENT:
Envelope containing visa requests and applications and opening page passports, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - C/SBD (w/att, h/w)
1 - C/WHD (w/o att) - info to WH/1

RIS INPUT NO. 33

CS COPY

1 att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-41,070	27 September 1971
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-305052

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

200-124-200
MEXI-16022
24 MAR 71

CIT ?
OCC ?
PHOTO AVAILABLE

HVCHRSHLBHBRHBBHBC-

R 7104120340

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

ACTION NO. 419

S E C R E T 241956Z MAR 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 16021

24 Mar IN 295186

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. MEXICAN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1581 (#994607

*B. GUATEMALA CITY 12912 (IN

1. TO BE READY FOR ANOTHER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON GUATEMALA BY KDGLACIERS ON BEHALF ECHEVERRIA, TORMET IS PULLING TOGETHER INFORMATION ON INDIVIDUAL PGT AND FAR TARGET PERSONALITIES LOCATED MEXICO. IN CASE OF FAR, OUR KNOWLEDGE THEIR ACTIVITIES MEXICO SO LIMITED FEEL WE HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE IN TRYING BRING GOM DOWN ON HEADS OF LEADING SUSPECTS TO SEE WHAT WE CAN TURN UP. RE PGT, WE PLAN PASS NAMES OF MOST PROMINENT ACTIVISTS, LEAVING OUT KDLADDER-1 AND OTHER SECRET MEMBERS. WE PREPARED PASS INFORMATION ON FUNDING OF PGT BY SOVIETS, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION OF VALERIY KOSTIKOV AS PGT CONTACT IN SOVIET EMBASSY. ALSO PREPARED USE INFORMATION ON PURCHASE OF ARMS IN U.S. FOR PGT BY CARLOS MANUEL PERZABAL MARCUE. IN BOTH CASES WILL TAILOR INFORMATION IN SUCH A WAY TO INSURE PROTECTION KDLADDER-2.

2. THIS WOULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ECHEVERRIA

* BEING SVC'D.

LEE
CON 7
CHA
CLY
DIA D
KAT K
BOB
FIL Kostikov
DES
RET

SECRET

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BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ #

ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 16021 SECRET

BACKGROUND BRIEF WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO TAKE STEPS IN MEXICO AGAINST PGT OR FAR. DEFER TO YOU AS TO WHETHER YOU OR HQS PREPARE IT BUT SUGGEST YOU DO SO.

3. HEADQUARTERS: REALIZING DIFFICULTY YOU HAD MEETING ECHEVERRIA'S PREVIOUS REQUEST, WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT MERELY TRYING TO "BRIEF LIAISON" BUT TO ENCOURAGE ECHEVERRIA TAKE ACTION OF THE SORT COS, GUATEMALA, HAS BEEN SEEKING IN MEXICO FOR SOME TIME. THUS, WOULD APPRECIATE RELAXING PREVIOUS STRICTURES AGAINST PASSAGE OF INFORMATION FOR PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHING AN END WHICH, IT SEEMS TO US, IS TO U.S. ADVANTAGE.

4. IF KDGLACIERS DO NOT ASK US FOR INFORMATION, THINK WE CAN EVENTUALLY COME FORWARD WITH IT ON BASIS PAST REQUESTS (AND ON BASIS RECENT SURVEILLANCE TEAM FLAP IN ARANA'S MEET WITH ECHEVERRIA.

5. GUATEMALA CITY: PLS POUCH PHOTOS ARTURO "CHINO" RIVERA ESCOBAR, PERCY AMILCAR JACOBS DE LEON, AND FRANCISCO ANTONIO VASQUEZ RIVERA, AND ADVISE US OF YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT ABOVE. GP-1

SECRET

FORM 3013 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
5-69

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION UNIT WH 4

INFO FILE. VR. [illegible]

SERVICE

ACTION NO.

MEXICO CITY 1[illegible]21 — STA & NR

2[illegible] MARCH 71 — DATE

[illegible]1[illegible]-A — IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"REF B. GUATEMALA CITY 12192"

ALSO CORRECT PARA FOUR (4) TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"TEAM FLAP TOO)

WITHOUT REVEALING THAT WE HAVE TAKEN ANY INITIATIVE IN"

SECRET

14-00000

201-305052
Kostikov
Mexico

FOR PRESS MATERIAL PERTAINING TO SUBJECT OF THIS 201

SEE FILE # 74-126-60/3. (AEASSAULT Program, SB/PO/A, LD30)

201-305052

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4		8	

ACTION UNIT SB-8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2 FI-2

ACTION NO. 921

SECRET 222214Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 5743 (Midi)

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY 3712 (IN 135025)

22 JUL 70 IN 127835

1. CUBANA MANIFEST SHOWS VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV RETURNED MEXICO 17 JULY FROM HAVANA ABOARD FLT 464.

2. FILE: 201-305052. GP-1

SECRET

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SECRET

22 July 70

201-305052

J4742

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ACTION UNIT SB8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI2

ACTION NO. 728

17 JUL 70 125025

4

S E C R E T 171921Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3712

TTJULY

DIRECTOR

REDTOP AEKICK

1. /VALERIY V. /KOSTIKOV (201-305052) UNEXPECTEDLY DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 13 JULY ON COBANA FLT 465. REASON FOR TR0P UNKNOWN AND UNEXPECTED. WIFE AND CHILD REMAIN MEXICO.

2. FILE: 201-35052. GP-1

S E C R E T

AN YE10	
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FI	

CS COPY

SECRET

17 July 70

201-305052

60-55 29 Sep. 64 L34-[illegible]-1329 #304
In. 1352 hrs. Casa de Modas Bell (?) talks to KOSTA in Spanish.
Mrs KOSTIKOVA speaks excellent Spanish, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~English.~~

2.
15-60-55 3 Oct. 64. L34-M8-T535 #122
Out. 2034 hrs. MO (KOSTA) asks to talk to her husband, he answers but starts to fool around talking to her in Spanish, French, English and Russian. Both KOSTIKOV and Roza KOSTIKOVA speak~~s~~ Spanish well and very little English.

Voice samples,
Kostikov

Voice sample
Kostikov

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
REDLEG AEKICK AEBURBLE/Request for Assessment Information on Subject of 201-305052.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Send Assessment if available.

Reference: A. HMMA-36888, dated 9 April 1969
B. DIRECTOR 021485

In our review of AEBURBLE's Headquarters file, we noted that he has been in a position to provide PAQ (now PCQ per reference B) information on Subject of 201-305052 according to reference A. Please advise if Station can arrange to obtain the PAQ information from LNERGO locally. If not, we will attempt to obtain the assessment information through LNERGO Headquarters.

Milton C. SANTRELLA

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
[redacted]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-17908

DATE
27 MAY 1970
14 May 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-305052
[redacted]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1 L.M.Osborne	lmr	4167

1 - RI-
1 - Chrono
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - CI/OPS/WH
1 - SB/CI/O

AH
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COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SB/X/WH	21/5/70	
CI/OPS/WH	21/5/70	F. W. Hughes
CI/OPS/SB	22 May	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	14 May 70	John C. Murray

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

57) Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV: Works in the consular department. He goes out a lot at night and always alone. He travels often in the interior of the republic. He has Mexican friends. He studied philology in the University of Moscow. He is very intelligent and clever in carrying out his work, which he does meticulously, taking every precaution. He apparently belongs to the KGB group. He was in Mexico as a bachelor more than 10 years ago.

58) Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA: Wife of above. Speaks very little Spanish. Apparently has no job.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City HGG
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM

SUBJECT
LIARENA/REDLEG/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: None, FYI.

References: A. HMMA-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. <in contact with Subject of 201-305052) LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for 30 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued........

MICROFILMED
FEB 26 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
~~B 201-160430~~

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-38463

DATE
13 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
~~201-160430~~
✓201-305052
~~cc: 35-4-3~~

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note his contact with Subject 201-305052 ~~that past LIENVOY reporting has shown~~ KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

Leonard S. Tervant by MWF
for/Horace E. PRALLETT

201-305052

14-00000

2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Phone Call from AEU Representative to Valery KOSTIKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

Reference : MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970

1. LIENVOY reported that on 6 February 1970 Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2nd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, received a long-distance telephone call from Guatemala. The operator asked for KOSTIKOV by name, then told the caller "Mr. MONTENEGRO, I have your call to Mexico ready". When KOSTIKOV came to the phone, the caller stated he was calling on behalf of the Guatemalan University Students Organization, but did not further identify himself. The caller and KOSTIKOV discussed the USSR national soccer team and its scheduled appearance in Guatemala. KOSTIKOV stated he was not certain exactly what date the team was scheduled to arrive in Guatemala, and suggested that the caller contact the soccer federation in El Salvador, where the team would be playing prior to its arrival in Guatemala. The caller also inquired whether there was any information on the Ballet (Reference) and was told that there was none.

2. It should be noted that normally queries concerning the Soviet soccer team or the appearance of a Russian Ballet troupe would be handled by one of the Cultural or Sports Affairs officers of the Embassy. KOSTIKOV's participation in these matters, as reported above, would seem to confirm previous Station reporting that KOSTIKOV handles dealings between the Soviet Embassy in Mexico and Guatemalan leftist organizations.

For: Horace E. PRALLETT

Distribution: Orig. + 1-COS, Guatemala City
2-Chief, WH Division

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FEB 19 1970
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CROSS REFERENCE TO
050-4-124

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-38,449

DATE
Typed: 10 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-305052
~~35-8-9~~

[illegible] 2 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM :

SUBJECT : TUMBLEWEED
(65-485)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 6 March 1970.

2. The telephone number (14-16-34) given to Subject as one he could use in contacting the Soviets if necessary, is an unlisted number registered to Rolla WEISS Sajovits at Liverpool 165-702.

3. This is the same telephone number given to Subject by his Soviet case officers on 4 February 1969, to be used only if it was absolutely necessary to contact the Soviets. We refer you to page 19 of your Memorandum, same Subject as above, dated 1 April 1969.

4. Our coverage of Rolla WEISS Sajovits is continuing. We would like to be informed if Subject is given a new address to be used as a letter drop in Mexico City.

#14,210

THIS INFORMATION IS FROM A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. IT MUST NOT BE DISSEMINATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART OUTSIDE YOUR OFFICE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE ORIGINATING OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY.

Grace H. FARNSWORTH:mas (23 March 1970)

Distribution:
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1 - P-12,375
1 - Memo chrono
2 - Hqs pouch (return to SB/SEC)

792502

305052

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/CS C/CI C/WH2

ACTION NO. 182

II

S E C R E T 252314Z FEB 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2565

DIRECTOR

RYBAT REDTOP AEMIDRIFF FJPASTIME

26 FEB IN 031930

M

REF: MEXICO CITY 2557 (IN 031735)

1. PER REF, AEMIDRIFF CONTINUED REVIEW OF PHOTOS WITH HQS DEBRIEFER AND LITEMPO-14. REVIEW OF 83 PHOTOS (INCLUDING WIVES) DURING 20 AND 21 FEBRUARY SESSIONS PROVIDES FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS IN ADDITION TO OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WAS ALREADY KNOWN:

VALENTIN BAKULIN: CHIEF OF ONE OF AEGRIP SECTIONS. EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA FROM PRIOR TOURS BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA.

LEV GOLOUZOV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN (WHICH TENDS CONFIRM AEGRIP STATUS PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED). WHILE DRUNK AND NASTY, INFORMED AEMIDRIFF SHE BEING SENT HOME.

SERGEY PROVOROV: WORKS UNDER BAKULIN. AEGRIP.

NIKOLAY SOKOLOV: CHIEF OF REFERENTURA.

LYUDMILA SHAPOVALOVA: WORKS UNDER SOKOLOV IN REFERENTURA. SERVED IN CUBA AT ONE TIME.

ALEKSANDR KOZLOV: WORKS IN REFERENTURA UNDER SOKOLOV. IN CHARGE OF PHOTO PROCESSING AND MICROFILMING. ALSO WORKS AT INTERNAL SECURITY AND AS WATCHDOG. HAPPY AND AGREEABLE PERSON.

LEE ____
BOB __QV__
JACK ____
JERRY ____
TRISH ____
KATHY ____
DIANA ____
BARB ____
KATHY ____
FILE AEMIDRIFF
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VLADIMIR TSERADZE: WORKS IN REFERENTURA BUT IS ALSO UNDER ORDERS OF BAKULIN. TIMID, DOMINATED BY WIFE.

YURIY ROMANENKO: WORKS IN REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES PAVEL KOVALEV OUT AT NIGHT. DRINKS A LOT AND HAS TROUBLE WITH WIFE BECAUSE OF IT.

YURIY KUPLYAKOV: HAS JOB SIMILAR TO KOLOMYAKOV'S. VERY IMPORTANT PERSON WITHIN EMBASSY AND HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. VERY REFINED AND CULTURED. MANY IICMU CONTACTS THROUGHOUT MEXICO AND ALSO CULTIVATES FRIENDSHIPS WITH DIRECTORS OF MUSEUMS, LIBRARIES AND OTHER SUCH INSTITUTIONS.

BORIS CHMYKOV: VERY EXPERIENCED. SEEMS TO HAVE PERFORMED BRILLIANTLY IN PAST WITH NO FAILURES. SOMETHING OF A LADIES' MAN AND HAS, ON OCCASION, BEEN MIXED UP IN INTERNAL SCANDAL. ENAMORED OF SOKOLINA. TRAVELS FREQUENTLY THROUGHOUT MEXICO.

VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN: AEKICK. SERVED IN BRAZIL, SEVERAL MONTHS IN FRANCE AND FOUR TO SIX MONTHS IN ARGENTINA. SPEAKS SPANISH, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE.

VALERIY KOSTIKOV: AEKICK

OLEG KOROLEV: AEKICK

VLADIMIR MAKAROV: NOT CERTAIN, BUT PROBABLY AEGRIP. HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES BOLSHAKOV. APPEARS COLD AND CRUEL. ONE

SECRET

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PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

OF AEMIDRIFF'S WATCHDOGS DURING JANUARY 1970. SPENT TIME IN RED CHINA.

IOAKIM BULAVIN: ASSIGNED TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE BUT DOES NOT PHYSICALLY WORK THERE. PROBABLY WORKS FOR KOLOMYAKOV, AEKICK REZIDENT.

SERGEY VERBENYEV: RIS, SERVICE UNKNOWN. PERFORMS INTERNAL SECURITY AND WATCHDOG FUNCTIONS.

VLADIMIR GORDEYEV: BELIEVES HE AEKICK WORKING FOR SOKOLOV AND KOLOMYAKOV.

PAVEL KOVALEV: CONSIDERS HIM DANGEROUS. SPEAKS SPANISH AND ENGLISH ALMOST WITHOUT ACCENT. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION.

ANATOLIY STEKLYANNIKOV: BACHELOR. BODYGUARD FOR KOVALEV. WORKED FOR SECRET POLICE IN MOSCOW AFTER THREE YEARS IN MILITARY. WILL RETURN MOSCOW SOON.

KONSTANTIN BOGATYREV: CHIEF OF ALL GROUPS OF MILITARY INTEL IN MEXICO. (AEMIDRIFF PREVIOUSLY INDENTIFIED CHMYKOV AS AEGRIP CHIEF. STATION BELIEVES CHMYKOV POSSIBLY CHIEF FOR THOSE UNDER CIVILIAN COVER BUT JUNIOR TO BOGATYREV.)

OLEG SHEVCHENKO: SPEAKS SPANISH WITH ARGENTINE ACCENT. THIS IS FIRST TOUR IN LATIN AMERICA.

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PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 2565 S E C R E T

VALENTIN LOGINOV: ALTHOUGH HAD AFFAIR WITH AEMIDRIFF, RECALL SIX MONTHS EARLY WAS DUE TO SOME FAILURE AND NOT TO AFFAIR.

VALERIY SOKOLIN: RECALLED SIX MONTHS EARLY DUE TO SOME FAILURE ALSO.

VIKTOR IVANOV: LIKED TO LIVE WELL. OWNED 27 SUITS AND OFTEN CHANGED TWO OR THREE TIMES A DAY. GOOD FRIEND OF OCTAVIANO CAMPOS SALAS, SECRETARY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE. NOW IN MOSCOW IN CHARGE EXPORTING FURS FOR SOYUZPUSHNINA.

BORIS KAZANTSEV: SERVED IN CUBA WHERE HAD SOME PROBLEM OR FLAP DUE TO DRINKING AND HIS CHARACTER. DOMINATED BY WIFE WHO INFLUENCES MANY OF HIS DECISIONS. WIFE WORKS AS TYPIST IN REFERENTURA. SHE VERY JEALOUS OF HUSBAND, YET FLIRTS WITH YOUNGER OFFICERS WHICH HAS CAUSED MARITAL PROBLEMS.

FEDOR YEVESYEV: BELIEVES HE RIS, PROBABLY AEGRIP. BODYGUARD FOR AMBASSADOR AND CURRENTLY FOR CHARGE. BELIEVES HE HAS NO OTHER FUNCTION.

MIKHAIL DAVIDOVSKIY: GRADUATED MFA ACADEMY ABOUT THREE YEARS GO, MEXIC IS FIRST POST. AEKICK. HAS ACCESS TO REFERENTURA. FREQUENTLY ACCOMPANIES KAZANTSEV AND YEVSEYEV.

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PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 2565 SECRET

HAS MARITAL PROBLEMS DUE TO NEUROTIC WIFE AND FACT HE HAS, BY FORMER WIFE, EIGHT YEAR OLD CHILD WHO MENTALLY RETARDED FROM INFANTILE PARALYSIS.

DMITRIY DYAKONOV: MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU. BELIEVES HE AEKICK. HAS MANY FRIENDS IN GOBERNACION AND RELACIONES EXTERIORES. SERVED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. MORE REFINED AND INTELLIGENT THAN PRESENT CHARGE, KAZANTSEV.

BORISKOLOMYAKOV: AEKICK REZIDENT, THIRED IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. GRADUATE ACCOUNTANT, SERVED AS ACCOUNTANT IN USSR, ARGENTINA AND FIRST TOUR MEXICO. RETURNED TO MEXICO AS REZIDENT. VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD, STRONG PRINCIPLES. DRINKS MODERATELY. CLOSE FRIENDSHIPS WITH ARGENTINE DIPLOMATS. FREQUENTLY TRAVELS WITH KAZANTSEV, SOMETIMES WITH BOLSHAKOV.

YEVGENIY FEDIN: FOURTH IN IMPORTANCE IN EMBASSY. FREQUENTLY WORKS IN REFERENTURA. HAS FEW FRIENDS WITHIN EMBASSY BECAUSE OF FICKLE CHARACTER, AND FACT HE AT ROOT OF MANY INTERNAL INTRIGUES BY SENDING ANONYMOUS ACCUSATORY LETTERS.

VALERIY NIKOLAYENKO: AEKICK. IN CHARGE OF ASSIGNING HOUSING AND FURNISHINGS. SPENT SIX MONTHS IN CUA AS EMPLOYEE, RATHER THAN DIPLOMAT, BEFORE MEXICO. ATTENDED MFA ACADEMY IN MOSCOW.

2. FILE: 201-835670. GP-1 SECRET

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Guatemala City
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIARENA/ZEDLEG/Confirmation of Contact Between Valery KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and Guatemalan Communist Party Representative in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI.

J.H. Jerry
2. Kostikov 201

References: A. HMMA-38449, 10 February 1970.
B. MEXICO CITY 2303, 21 January 1970.

1. On 10 February 1970 LIREBEL-2 provided the details of his 6 February meeting with Jose Luis BALCARCEL Ordonez (201-160430), leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) exile organization in Mexico. LIREBEL-2 reported that he arrived at BALCARCEL's home at 2000 hours on the 6th, and found BALCARCEL about to leave. BALCARCEL requested that LIREBEL-2 take him to a garage where his car was being repaired, which LIREBEL-2 did. Since BALCARCEL's car was not ready, BALCARCEL asked LIREBEL-2 to drive him to a meeting which he had scheduled for 2100 hours with his "Soviet contact." (Note: BALCARCEL had previously told LIREBEL-2 that Valery KOSTIKOV was his contact in the Soviet Embassy.) LIREBEL-2 and BALCARCEL drove to the "Parque Escondido," also known as the "Parque Hundido," located on Insurgentes Sur between Gomez Farias and Millet Streets. LIREBEL-2 parked and BALCARCEL held his meeting with his "Soviet contact" standing on the sidewalk of Gomez Farias Street bordering on the park. The meeting lasted for 30 minutes.

2. BALCARCEL commented after re-joining LIREBEL-2 that his "Soviet contact" had been very upset about a long distance telephone call which he had received from a Guatemalan student. The student had asked to talk to the Soviet by true name and asked him for some information on the Soviet national soccer team, which is scheduled to play some games in Guatemala. The Soviet told BALCARCEL that he had told the student that he could not provide any current information on this subject, and that the student should try to get this information from El Salvador, where the team was to play some games prior to their arrival in Guatemala. BALCARCEL said that the Soviet was angry that this student had asked for him by true name, and he speculated that the University Students Association (AEU) leader who was recently in Mexico (see Reference B) may have been indiscreet in giving his name out to unauthorized persons.

Continued.........

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-38463

DATE
13 February 1970

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-160430
201-305052
cc: 35-4-3

3. Addressees will recall that per Reference A, LIENVOY reported that KOSTIKOV received a long distance call on 6 February in which the conversation conformed exactly to that described by BALCARCEL to LIREBEL-2 in paragraph 2 above.

4. It is of interest to note that past LIENVOY reporting has shown KOSTIKOV setting up clandestine contacts with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689), leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party exile organization in Mexico, and similarly with Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero (201-045172), a Honduran Communist in Mexico. By virtue of these contacts, it appears that at least one of KOSTIKOV's responsibilities is maintaining contact with representatives of Central American Communist Parties in Mexico.

for/Horace E. PRALLETT

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City SB/X/WH

SUBJECT
REDLEG
LISACK Progress Report, 1 July - 30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-37451, 1 July 1969

1. Operations

Under this roof project, operations continue to be directed against the HMMARSH target and, on occasions, Bloc targets. Activities covered by the Project include providing information on HMMARSHers, their activities, personalities, visitors, and contacts (LISACK-2, -4, -6, and LICOWL-1); serving as access agents (LICRAVE-1, -2, -3, LIROCKET-1, and BESABER); spotting, assessing and occasionally recruiting access agents (LIEMPTY-3); providing information on DMLET activities (DMPETAL-1) and BEDOX activities (BESABER); and performing such other tasks as may be required on an ad hoc basis (LISACK-7 and all other assets of the Project).

2. Administration

As assets take on a permanent character in terms of expenditure or other continuing administration, they are transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK for orderly handling. Beginning with this reporting period, and as outlined in the LISACK Project Renewal, BESABER, DMPETAL, and LICOWL-1 were transferred from SB/OOA to LISACK. Details of the functions, security, and meeting procedures are reported below for each asset.

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201-305052

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-38126

DATE
18 November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
✓ ~~50-6-144/3~~

3. Assets

a. LICRAVE-1, -2, and -3: The activities of these assets have been covered in detail in recent and continuing correspondence dealing with AETAKEOFF. Please see HMMA-38064 of 5 November 1969.

b. BESABER: During the reporting period, BESABER was met six times. When he travels to Mexico City, meetings are held in his hotel room at a pre-arranged hour using a telephone code to establish the location. On occasions, he is met at his home in Cuernavaca. BESABER is currently targetted against Subject of 201-268115, with whom he has re-established a good social relationship. Through Subject of 201-268115 he also met Subject of 201-276184, Chief of the Referentura. In addition to serving as an access agent to Subject of 201-268115, he has fulfilled spot requirements such as providing information on Centro Intercultural de Documentacion (CIDOC) and personalities of Station interest. Although BESABER has a fairly good social relationship with the BEDOX Ambassador and his wife and has entree to other BEDOXers and MHHARSHers, we are having him concentrate his efforts on the higher priority MHHARSHer, Subject of 201-268115.

c. LICOWL-1: He was met routinely once a month during the reporting period. Each meeting date is established at the preceding meeting and no further contact or confirmation is required. LICOWL-1 arrives by bus at a car pick-up point and is then driven by the case officer to a small coffee shop where he reviews his diary with the case officer. Due to the nature of his job and the level of his access, LICOWL-1 is not in a position to do more currently than to report on the brief encounters he has with MHHARSHers who come into his store. His reports normally consist of his assessment of personalities, description of new arrivals and, occasionally, biographic information he has been able to pick up. He also gives timely reports of demonstrations and other unusual activity in the vicinity of the MHHARSH installation.

d. LIEMPTY-3: LIEMPTY-3 is met at irregular intervals at various out-of-the-way restaurants for the purpose of briefing and debriefing on operational assignments and discussion of his written reports. Meetings are arranged by phone using open code. His most recent assignment has been the development, assessment, and recruitment of 201-810981. LIEMPTY-3 has few peers at the art of developing an operational lead, but his extensive operational activity in past years against the MHHARSH target has required that he be used sparingly, selectively, and always under alias. Development of 201-810981 has been his only assignment during the reporting period, and LIEMPTY-3 made good early progress. Purporting to be the representative of a film club for architects, LIEMPTY-3 was able to get 201-810981 to agree to become a consultant. Thereafter, LIEMPTY-3 continued to ask questions about 201-810981's work, to the point where 201-810981 realized that more than a film club for architects was involved. At this point it was decided to let LIEMPTY-3 break cover, recruit 201-810981 to supply information on the work of his office (but not--at this point--the people in his office), and continue to handle him until the recruitment was firm and previous questions about the stability and reliability of 201-810981 had been resolved. This was done, and 201-810981 accepted recruitment, knowing that WOLADY intelligence was involved. LIEMPTY-3 held several meetings with 201-810981 after recruitment, and countersurveillance did not reveal any signs of MHHARSH surveillance. For about a month, however, LIEMPTY-3 has not been able to contact 201-810981, and it is possible that the latter has developed cold feet. If LIEMPTY-3 can reestablish contact, he will continue to handle this case for the time being. If he is unable to reestablish contact, he will be given another lead to follow up. LIEMPTY-3 is a very active person who has an extremely full business day, with many contacts. The Station believes that within this busy "cover" life, LIEMPTY-3 can handle selected operational tasks without coming to hostile attention. As long as proper security precautions are taken by him in his operational activities, and by him and the Station officer (who meets him in alias) in their meetings, there is no reason why LIEMPTY-3 cannot be a useful part-time contributor to the Station's REDTOP program for the foreseeable future.

e. LIROCKET-1:

1) LIROCKET-1 is met monthly, time and place arranged at the previous meeting. During these meetings he is debriefed on his twice-weekly teaching sessions at the MHHARSH Embassy. His regular student has been the Subject of 201-028975, and he has had occasional dealings with other MHHARSHers, particularly AESEASICK. The meetings with 201-028063 have not been of particular interest, and we had been waiting impatiently for the latter's replacement to arrive, so that LIROCKET-1 would have a better target to work on. It was LIROCKET-1 who came up with the first local confirmation of the identity of this replacement (MEXICO CITY 1105, 2 August 1969). Dealings with AESEASICK have been concerned with attempts by the director of the school where LIROCKET-1 teaches to borrow sociological films from the MHHARSH film office.

2) It now appears, however, that LIROCKET-1 has reached the end of the line. For some time he has been involved in a rather messy divorce action, and in August LIROCKET-1 reported that his wife had denounced him to Mexican authorities as an RVROCK agent (a few months previously, she had denounced him as an MHHARSH agent). LIROCKET-1 was not inclined to take his wife's ravings too seriously since he considered her slightly nuts. However, LIENVOY reported that on 16 September 1969 LIROCKET-1's wife called 201-028975 and told him she had to see him urgently on something of extreme interest about her husband. 201-028975 told her to come to the Embassy, which she did, and she presumably repeated her accusation. Since that time, LIROCKET-1 has received a polite brush-off. He has been told that the MHHARSH Embassy has run out of funds for English language training, and that there would be no more lessons unless 201-028975's replacement, or the new Ambassador (when and if one arrives) wanted to rehire him. He was told, however, to check in regularly, and he was given, as usual, an invitation to the annual MHHARSH national day reception (he did not attend because he was ill). LIROCKET-1 has not spoken with 201-028975 since his wife's visit--all dealings have been through AEPOLYP, who has for some time been the paymaster for LIROCKET-1.

3) LIROCKET-1 was not aware of his wife's visit, and even after the case officer, without telling him that we knew of the visit, brought LIROCKET-1 around to the conclusion that she might have done this, he still does not think that she spilled the beans to 201-028975. (It is apparent that the MHHARSHers, whether or not they believe Mrs. LIROCKET-1's story, have concluded that LIROCKET-1 represents a security hazard, and they are simply going to drop him. LIROCKET-1 will continue to press the MHHARSHers for an answer regarding his future with them, and if, as suspected, they keep putting him off, he will be instructed to break contact and he will be terminated by the Station.)

4) Other than the blowing of LIROCKET-1 himself, little damage has been done. The wife has never seen the current case officer and knows none of the meeting arrangements or other

details, and neither she nor LIROCKET-1 knows the true name of any of LIROCKET-1's past or present handlers. Necessary security precautions have been taken at all meetings with LIROCKET since his wife's conversation with 201-028975, and there have been no signs of MHHARSH surveillance.

f. DIMPETAL-1: She has been met weekly for a total of 13 times during the period. Meeting hours are prearranged and the location is always a safehouse. Her normal function has been to report on the activities at the DMLET installation where she is employed as the secretary to the DMLET Ambassador. In addition, she performed some casing and investigation in support of the AETAKEOFF audio operation. Since the DMLET target is of low priority, DIMPETAL-1 has been attempting to increase her usefulness to us by trying to obtain a job in the office of the President of the PRI, the ruling political party, with excellent prospects for success.

g. LISACK-2: Until he lost his job in September, he was the resident administrator of the apartment building in which both AEMERGER and AEMAESTRO reside. Meetings were held bi-weekly for a total of four times, pre-arranged by telephone call several days in advance to his office in a publishing firm. Meeting location was a restaurant/cafe and meetings normally lasted about thirty minutes. He provided information on the activities of these two MHHARSHers and their families, license plate numbers, and descriptions of visitors.

h. LISACK-4: He is the portero of the apartment building in which Subject of 201-305870 resides. He maintains a daily log of the movements and activities of this and other MHHARSHers, and he reports the license plates and description of visitors to the building. He was met weekly for a total of 12 times, always in a small restaurant within walking distance of the downtown office where he works a half day. Meeting hours are pre-arranged to permit LISACK-4 to attend on the way to or from this second job. He compensates for his lack of formal education by responsiveness to case officer direction, natural intelligence and cooperation.

i. LISACK-6: He is the portero of the building in which Subjects of 201-837203 and 201-788861 (who took the apartment of Subject of 201-205304) reside. He maintains a daily log of these two MHHARSHers, their families and visitors. He was met 12 times during the period. Since he cannot be absent from the building for over thirty minutes without arousing suspicion, meetings are always for a brief ten minutes and are held in a nearby park. As has been reported, the case officer who handles LISACK-6 became the target of unknown surveillance in August, and again in October, following meetings with LISACK-6. The Station believes that the surveillance was accidental, in that the meeting place was in a neighborhood frequented by male and female prostitutes and other undesirable characters. In any event, LISACK-6 has been put on ice, to be revived if the occupants of his building become higher priority targets.

j. LISACK-7: She was not met during the reporting period. She remains a "reserve asset" for special requirements in the real estate field for such potential uses as safehouse rental, key acquisitions and locating tenants when needed. Although there is no immediate requirement for her talents, we would like to maintain her Operational Approval so that she can be called on as a cleared asset when needed.

4. Problems

There are no problems connected with this Project.

14-00000

5. Security

There are no known unresolved problems of security. The security problems relating to LIROCKET-1 and LISACK-C (discussed above) are under control with no adverse effects noted.

6. Plans

a. There are several assets of the REDTOP section who have been carried under SB/COA for a fairly long period of time. Since the targets of their access change from time to time, as well as the nature of the information they provide, we do not believe they warrant special or new projects to cover them. We do believe, however, that they should be brought under a project to facilitate orderly reporting and administration without resorting to separato progress reports on each.

b. Since their activities closely parallel those of assets already covered by LISACK, we believe it would be logical to include LIROBBIN-1 and -2, LIORDER-1 and Subject of 201-843659 (on whom we are awaiting an Operational Approval) in this Project. Although none of these is paid a salary, such a change will require some cost amendment to the Project to account for minor operational expenses which have heretofore been charged to SB/OOA. Separate correspondence will follow on these assets.

c. There are several additional assets currently in the developmental stage who may eventually be administered under LISACK. These include Subject of HMMA-37742 of 28 August 1969, targetted against AEPOLYP; Subject of 201-851552, targetted against AEMERGER; Subject of 201-848881, currently in social contact with Subjects of 201-259583 and 201-029068 under Station direction; and Subject of 201-859225, who reports on his contacts with Subjects of 201-305052 and 201-744341, among other MHHARSHers.

Timothy M. Archbold
for/John A. PROBERT

201-305052

~~50-6-144/3~~

entitled "[illegible] que trabaja poco" ("Russian Embassy in Mexico has a ~~[illegible]~~ large staff which does ~~[illegible]~~ little work") Cy sent to 201 in Aug 69 with translation.

vv - SB/PO/A z6495

3

"EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO"

Viernes 17 de enero de 1969

Las "Instalaciones Diplomáticas" Rusas en Lima

Por CARLOS MONTIEL

En una carta llegada a esta redacción, periodistas peruanos me informan que, enterados de mi artículo del 11 de enero "Ahora Perú", preguntaron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representación diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos semanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el 14 de enero, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indiscreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva al cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G., publicó el 20 de diciembre una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Koromovshkin y Valeri Kosazov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes sino que también están [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]cas.

El Canciller peruano, Mercado Jarrín, quien anuncio la llegada de la misión comercial rusa, respondio a la pregunta de los periodistas con un lacónico "oportunamente tendrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante acaba de publicar en un artículo de "El Sol de Mexico" (14 de enero de 1969), bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias contadas que tienen trato con el público —sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre Mexico y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues, ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un sólo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de Mexico en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

201-305052

UNIT: WH/1 3E04
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 15 October 1969

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CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, SB8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T 16 23 24 Oct 69 CITE DIRECTOR 47091

TO MEXICO CITY

REDLEG AEKICK

REF: MEXICO CITY-1672 (IN 64675)*

1. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED 201-859225. HQS TRACES FOLLOW:

A) HMMA-30563, 17 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACT WITH 201-756168, KNOWN KGB.

B) HMM-10877, 30 NOV 66. SUBJECT IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET EMBASSY CONCERNING TRAVEL OF SOVIET TOURISTS.

C) HMMA-31965, 9 MAY 67. SUBJECT AND 201-744341, KNOWN KGB, IN APPARENT FREQUENT PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONTACT. BOTH WERE PLANNING TO MEET LATER WITH 201-202379, KNOWN KGB.

2. POA ACTIONS BEING DEFERRED PENDING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CASE. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECT ENCOURAGING, BUT IN VIEW OF REPORTED CONTACTS WITH KGB STAFFERS, SINCE 1966, BELIEVE CASE BEST HANDLED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CSI-F-10-5, PARA 19. COVERT NAME CHECKS IN PROCESS.

3. FILE: 201-859225.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ONF: INFO FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CITE DIRECTOR 47091

PAGE TWO

WH Comments: *Heriberto SAGREDO Mugica, Senior Sales Rep. for Sabena Airlines in Mexico City, has good access to a number of Soviet KGB Staffers.

(Soviets above are: 1 a., Leonid V. NIKIFOROV; 1 c., Vladislav S. KORMUSHKIN and Aleksandr V. PRIKHODKO.)

SB/X/WH D Davis
SB/CI/O
CI/OPS/WH
CI/OA J. F. Kally
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO. FILE, VR. RI/AN, SB 8, CI/OA

317

S E C R E T 132342Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1672

DIRECTOR

13 Oct 69 IN 64675

REDLEG

1. REQUEST TRACES, POA HERIBERTO SAGREDO MUGICA, MEXICAN CITIZEN DPOB: 13 JAN 32, MEXICO, D.F. HE IS EMPLOYED LOCALLY AS SENIRO SALED REP FOR SABENA AIRLINES AND IS CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR POSITION OF MANAGER OF CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES IN GUADALAJARA.

2. SAGREDO IS IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCAIL CONTACT WITH VARIOUS MHHARSHERS, AMONG THEM, SUBJECTS OF 201-305052 AND 201-744341. HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED AND ASSESSED AS COOPERATIVE, RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORHTHY BY BRUCE H. FERNALD (P) AND HAS PROVIDED INITIAL REPORTS ON HIS CONTACTS WITH MHHARSHERS.

Restricted

Kcmushkin

3. WILL FORWARD PRQ APRTS I AND II WHEN COMPLETED.

4. FILE 201-SAGREDO.

S E C R E T

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WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, SB 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO.
303

S E C R E T 012230Z OCT 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1547

1 Oct 69 IN 56648

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

LIARENA REDLEG

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1433 (IN 55393)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 0754 (IN 56342)

C. MEXICO CITY 1102 (IN 15322)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 SEPT HE CONTACTED BY JORGE ANTONIO (CRUZ) ROJAS AND CARLOS ENRIQUE (RODRIGUEZ) ECALANTE 28 SEPT. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIREBEL-2 THEY HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM GUATEMALA AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PGT CONTACT LIREBEL-2 UPON ARRIVAL HERE. CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ REQUESTED LIREBEL-2 ARRANGE FOR MEETING WITH JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) SO THAT BALCARCEL COULD ARRANGE FOR ONWARD TRAVEL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ TO PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW.

2. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED HE PASSED ABOVE MESSAGE TO BALCARCEL 29 SEPT. BALCARCEL ADVISED LIREBEL-2 TELL CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ GO TO SOVIET EMBASSY AND ASK FOR VALERY KOSTIKOV (201-305052), WITH MESSAGE THAT "THEY SENT BY SRA. MARTHA." KOSTIKOV WOULD THEN MAKE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRAVEL TO USSR. BALCARCEL ALSO TOLD LIREBEL-2 THAT KOSTIKOV WOULD GIVE CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ AN ENVELOPE

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1547 S E C R E T

FOR THEM TO DELIVER TO LIREBEL-2, AND THAT LIREBEL-2 SHOULD DELIVER THIS ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. LIREBEL-2 SHOWED ENVELOPE TO TORVESTAD, WHICH HE REPORTED HE HAD RECEIVED FROM CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ MORNING 30 SEPT. ENVELOPE CONTAINED THREE STAPLES AND HAD SCOTCH TAPE ALONG FLAP AND COMPLETELY AROUND ENVELOPE. UNDER TAPE ALONG FLAP WAS SHORT, WAVY INK LINE. DUE APPARENT TRAP AND FACT LIREBEL-2 FELT HAD TO GET ENVELOPE TO BALCARCEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NO ATTEMPT MADE TO OPEN IT. HOWEVER, TORVESTAD CERTAIN ENVELOPE CONTAINED MONEY PLUS SOME NOTES. LIREBEL-2 TO ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT IN ENVELOPE WHEN HE DELIVERS IT TO BALCARCEL.

4. ACCORDING LIREBEL-2, CRUZ AND RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MEXICO CITY VIA AIR FRANCE ON 30 SEPT, EN ROUTE TO MOSCOW.

5. LIREBEL-2 ALSO REPORTED ANA MARIA (GOMAR) VILLACORTA DE ORTIZ SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 4 OCT. FOR GUATEMALAN FRONTIER BY BUS. STATION WILL FORWARD PRIORITY ANY CHANGE GOMAR TRAVEL PLANS OR CONTACT PLAN FORWARDED REF A.

6. INDEX CRUZ, RODRIGUEZ FILE : 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SB Division

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP AEKICK
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXICO CITY 1102, 1 August 1969

1. LIFIRE reported that Subject had departed for Moscow on 29 July 1969. Previously LIENVOY had reported that Subject would be going to Moscow for approximately one week. Subject's wife did not accompany Subject to the USSR. LIFIRE reported that KOSTIKOV returned to Mexico City on 18 August 1969 on Air France flight 707.

2. The reason for Subject's trip to Moscow is unknown, but such TDYs are unusual.

for/John A. PROBERT

SB TRAVEL INPUT PROGRAM

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-37839

DATE: 17 September 1969

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

SECRET

24 SEP 1969

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

201-305052

SUBJECT: 0 KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 August 1969 concerning Subject.

2. The files of this office contain the following information concerning Subject. On 19 September 1961 Subject arrived in Mexico City, Mexico, as an employee of the USSR Embassy. Subject was subsequently promoted to the rank of Vice Consul, and as of March 1963, held the position of Consular Attache. Subject was reassigned to Moscow on 4 August 1965. On 13 September 1968 Subject was again assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, this time as a Second Secretary of the Embassy. Subject is currently serving in this position.

Nic 201

3. In a report from a reliable source dated 27 June 1967, Source stated that Subject was in constant contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ ALEGRIA, the leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PCN), while the latter was in Mexico City during June and July 1965.

CIT: NICARAGUA
A NICARAGUA
SUBJ. MENTIONED AS CONTACT OF ONE [redacted] VALERI V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
IN TRACE REPLY ON
KOSTIKOV SENT:
TO [redacted] STATE
DEPT. CONTACTS
BETWEEN THE TWO
TOOK PLACE IN
MEXICO CITY
JUN AND JUL 65

4. On 13 December 1968, a reliable source reported that Subject and another member of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were arrested in Ciudad Victoria, Mexico, on 12 December 1968 for physically assaulting four Mexican citizens with whom Subject and the second Soviet had been socializing. Subject and the second Soviet claimed diplomatic immunity and were released by the Mexican authorities.

MICROFILMED
DEC 16 1969
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201-305052

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5. Based on his activities and associations while in Mexico City, Mexico, this office considers Subject to be a staff officer of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

6. For additional information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03381-69

~~Encl. 1 name check~~

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation
with copy of name check

RID/CE: JKS/EGV/akc

BASED ON: 201-305052*

para 2: 201-305052*

para 3: 201-305052
HMMA-32359
27 June 1967

para 4: 201-305052
MEXI-8437
13 December 1968

para 5: 201-305052*

FILE IN: 201-305052

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPY REQUEST - Original is dated 7/25/69

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: CIA

FROM:

~~DATE~~

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name): Valeri Vladimyrovich KOSTIKOV 305052

ALIASES, NICKNAMES:

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: March 17, 1933 Moscow

HOME ADDRESS: previous check 7/3/61

SEX: m

CITIZENSHIP: Soviet

MARITAL STATUS:

SPOUSE'S NAME:

OCCUPATION:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER:

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

①

Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico

C-3 visa issued; arriving NY July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700.
Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

SB/BIO
1. #18973 - memo [redacted]
2. Ref - ND

Ref
26/8/69

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE: Visa Office

DATE: 8/25/69

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER: SCA:VO:BWDuncan

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM:

FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILE IN 201-305052

10 Sept. 1969
EJU

SB	SB/CI/O	
SB	SB/X/OC	
SB	SB/X/WH	
WH	WH/1	CMS

3

26 AUG 1969

FORM 9-65 DS-939

201-305052

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ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8 FI2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

ACTION NO 787

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102 MEXI

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 Aug 69 IN 15322

LIARENA REDCOAT

1P

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R ET

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BX	4
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WH	1

MICROFILMED
AUG 19 1969
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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Colleen: Pls file ↓

D50-6-151/3
B201-160430

SECRET

201-305052
02 Aug 69

19 SEP 1969

SECRET

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: KOSTIKOV, Valeri Vladimyrovich

1. Reference is made to your request dated 25 July 1969 concerning Subject.

2. In a report dated 27 August 1962 from a reliable source, Subject was listed as a known or suspect KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) officer. Although this report did not specify how Subject's position or possible position as an intelligence officer was determined, numerous additional reports have established that Subject is an officer in the KGB. Several of these reports are noted below.

   a. A report dated 12 January 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject had a background which "smelled strongly" of Soviet intelligence service (RIS) connections (i.e., a graduate of the Foreign Language Institute and/or the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Moscow). Subject was described as possibly RIS as early as 1959 when he attended an Electrotechnical Congress held in Madrid, Spain, from 30 June to 10 July 1959. During this congress, Subject was frequently absent from the delegation, studiously avoided having his picture taken, and was generally noted for his "suspicious" behavior.

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201-305052

SECRET

b. According to a report dated 16 March 1962 from a reliable source, Subject participated in a Soviet effort to cultivate an American Embassy employee.

c. A report dated October 1962 from a reliable source indicated that Subject was believed to be a KGB officer because of his position in the Consular office where most of the personnel were connected with the KGB. Subject had been known to attend meetings in place of other identified KGB officers.

SUBJECT IS MENTIONED AS AN CONTACT OF ONE VALERI V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052) IN A TRACE REPLY ON KOSTIKOV SENT TO DEPT. OF STATE.

d. According to a report dated 20 December 1963 from other reliable sources, Subject KOSTIKOV had apparently taken over as the case officer for one Margarito LNU, an agent of the Soviets who was formerly handled by First Secretary ~~Viktor Nikolaevich~~ GLOTOV. 201-003674 GLOTOV was suspected by reliable sources to be the KGB Resident in Mexico City. Subject also had VALERI V. KOSTIKOV HAS considerable contact with Ivan Gavrilovich 201-236701 ALFERYEV, the Pravda correspondent and suspect KGB officer with whom Subject KOSTIKOV traveled to Tijuana, Mexico, on 1 September 1963. Subject frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as far as was known, strictly a KGB responsibility. This same report identified all of Subject's close friends as KGB officers.

PER TRACE REPLY ON KOSTIKOV (201-305052) SENT TO DEPT. OF STATE

3. In a report dated 14 May 1965, a reliable source, in an attempt to analyze the KGB Residentura in Mexico City, Mexico, stated that Subject was probably a KGB officer.

4. According to reports dated 22 December and 27 June 1967 from reliable sources, when Subject came to Mexico he replaced a suspect KGB officer. When he left Mexico, he was replaced by an identified KGB officer.

4. For further information concerning Subject, you are referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CSCI-316/03145-69 SECRET

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation with copy of name check

Encl. 1 name check

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RID/CE: JKS/SC/nkc

BASED ON: Review of 201-305052*

Para 2: HMMA-19696, 27 August 1962

Para 2a: OSMA-13451, 12 January 1962

Para 2b: HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962

Para 2c: HMMA-19996, 10 October 1962

Para 2d: HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963

Para 3: HMMA-26081, 14 May 1965

Para 4: HMMA-32359, 27 June 1967
HMMA-30941, 22 December 1966

FILE IN: 201-305052*

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declassification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

TO: C/1bo1+

FROM:

DATE

FULL NAME (Married woman include maiden name)
Vladimyrovich
Valeri KOSTIKOV

ALIASES, NICKNAMES

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
March 17, XX 1933
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

HOME ADDRESS
previous check 7/3/61

SEX
M

CITIZENSHIP
Soviet

MARITAL STATUS
UK

SPOUSE'S NAME

OCCUPATION

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Mexico.

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

C-3 visa issued; arriving New York July 29, 1969 via Air France flight 700. Departing for Moscow July 30, 1969 via Aeroflot 001.

GN
30/7/69
REF

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE
Visa Office (Room 511 SA-2)

DATE
July 25, 1969

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER
SCA:VO:BWDuncan:bjf

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM
V FEDIN, Evgeni I.

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(*)
SB/B10
*14973
1
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MEMORANDUM & COORDINATION
Date 14 AUG 1969 INITIALS
RI ANALYST SC
DIV. BRANCH
SB/X/DO
3E04 WH/1
482607 E/B/5 LFR
RI EDITOR

SB/CI/O

28 JUL 1969

FILE IN 201-305052

201-305052

FORM 9-65 DS-939

14-00000

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN SB8/F2 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2

ACTION NO 787

S E C R E T 012320Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1102

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

2 AUG 69 IN 15322

m

LIARENA REDCOAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 0831 (IN 93513)

1. LIREBEL-2 REPORTED 30 JULY HE TOLD BY JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) 27 JULY THAT "VALERIAN" LEAVING THAT WEEK-END FOR MOSCOW.

2. ACCORDING AIR MANIFESTS, VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) DEPARTED MEXICO CITY 29 JULY FOR MOSCOW. ACCORDING LIENVOY, KOSTIKOV RETURNING MOSCOW FOR 8 DAYS CONSULTATIONS.

3. ABOVE ADDS WEIGHT TO REF SPECULATION THAT "VALERIAN", WHO REPORTED BY BALCARCEL BE CONTACT OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO, IDENTICAL WITH KOSTIKOV.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430, 201-305052.

S E C R ET

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S E C R E T 020007Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0831

2 JUL 69 IN 93513

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

LIARENA REDCOAT

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH LIREBEL-2 27 JUNE, JOSE LUIS (BALCARCEL) ORDONEZ (201-160430) COMMENTED UPON DIFFICULTIES GETTING RAPID

ACTION IN HIS CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY HERE. IN THIS CONTEXT BALCARCEL STATED HIS CONTACT IN EMBASSY ONE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED SOMETIMES "VALERIAN" TAKES HIM INSIDE SOVIET EMBASSY GROUNDS IN "VALERIAN'S" CAR, BUT OTHER TIMES HE MUST GO TO EMBASSY FRONT GATE AND ASK SEE "VALERIAN". BALCARCEL STATED HE AND "VALERIAN" USUALLY MEET IN OFFICE OF "KUNETSOV", SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE.

how about AKTAKEOF?

2. THERE NO SOVIET OFFICIALS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED MEXICO CITY WITH FIRST NAME "VALERIAN". IT POSSIBLE "VALERIAN" IDENTIFIABLE WITH VALERY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), 2ND SECRETARY IN EMBASSY AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. ACCORDING STATION FILES, IN 1965 KOSTIKOV IN CONTACT WITH ALEJANDRO (BERMUDEZ) ALEGRIA (201-62689), NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCN) LEADER WHO SUSPECTED RECEIVE FUNDING FROM SOVIET FOR USE BY PCN. SEE ALSO HMMA-37406, WHICH REPORTED ONE RICARDO RAMIREZ, POSSIBLE IDENTIFIABLE WITH RICARDO (RAMIREZ) DE

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0831 S E C R E T

LEON (201-083287), CALLED SOVIET EMBASSY 18 JUNE ASKING SPEAK WITH KOSTIKOV.

3. "KUNETZOV" ASSUMEDLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH SVYATOSLAV KUZNETSOV (201-87222), CURRENT SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE MEXICO AND KNOWN KGB OFFICER. HOWEVER, SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE OFFICE LOCATED IN HOME KUZNETSOV, RATHER THAN IN EMBASSY.

4. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-160430; 201-305052.

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201-305052

Embajada rusa en México tiene un gran personal que trabaja poco

Por Carlos Montiel, desde México.

En una carta llegada a esta redacción, periodistas peruanos me informaron que, enterados de mi artículo "Ahora Perú", preguntaron al Canciller de aquel país, Edgardo Jarrin, si la llegada de una misión comercial rusa a tierras peruanas sería sólo la primera entrega de otra misión más importante, la de una representación diplomática soviética.

En ese artículo comentaba que miembros de la Embajada moscovita en México, habían asegurado en los corrillos sociales de esta ciudad, que en menos de dos semanas Perú establecería relaciones diplomáticas con el Kremlin, a nivel de embajada.

Según me informan en esa misiva, apenas tres días después, el diario limeño "La Prensa", confirmó en su primera plana la noticia que comenté en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, y que obtuve gracias a la indisreción de los diplomáticos soviéticos que figuran en el "circuito coctelero" que aquí se lleva a cabo por los embajadores y encargados de negocios de las naciones extranjeras.

Recuerdo que también en EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO, el colega Alonso Fonseca G., publicó una nota titulada "Alegres Diplomáticos", con la divertida historia de la "juerga de Vladislav Korcmovshkin y Valeri Kostikov, agregado y segundo secretario, respectivamente, de la embajada rusa en México, quienes la empezaron "entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y se vieron obligados a ponerle fin en Ciudad Victoria entre sus insultos a México bajo inmunidad diplomática". Al parecer los diplomáticos soviéticos no sólo han renunciado a ser decentes, sino que también están demostrando ser incapaces.

El Canciller peruano Mercado Jarrin, quien anunció la llegada de la misión comercial rusa, respondió a la pregunta de los periodistas con un lacónico "oportunamente tendrán información si es que el Gobierno decide dar ese paso" (el de establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con la URSS). Antes de que el Gobierno de Lima "decida dar ese paso", quisiéramos pasarle traslado de estos dos párrafos que el periodista Bernardo Escalante, publicó en un artículo de "El Sol de México", bajo el título: "La Embajada Misteriosa".

"Lo extraño está en que la Embajada de la URSS es una de las que cuentan con personal más numeroso y las que menor quehacer tienen. Las dependencias contadas q' tienen trato con el público —sección consular, sección cultural, agencia turística— laboran sólo cuatro horas a la semana. Con los dedos de la mano se podrán contar los mexicanos que en un año van a solicitar una visa. El comercio entre México y la URSS es casi nulo. Las "relaciones culturales", como todos lo saben, consisten sólo en hacer propaganda "de allá para acá", ya que en los dominios de Brezhnev y de Kosygin ni idea tienen de lo que es México".

"¿A qué se dedica, pues ese enjambre de personal ruso —en esa Embajada en que no trabaja un solo mexicano y hasta la servidumbre es soviética— en esa enorme mansión que podía ser guarida de vampiros? El misterio sube de punto si se toma en cuenta que la Embajada de México en Moscú apenas si está integrada por unas seis o siete personas, y en cambio la URSS mantiene aquí más de un centenar. ¿Por qué la URSS tiene una Embajada tan numerosa en nuestro país, si hace lo mismo que la nuestra en Moscú?

LA PRENSA LIBRE
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
6 - MAY 1969

201-305052

SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO HAS LARGE STAFF WHICH DOES LITTLE WORK

by Carlos Montiel

Source: La Prensa Libre (Free Press), 6 May 1969, San Jose, Costa Rica

Mexico City -- In a letter addressed to our editorial department Peruvian newsmen informed me that, being acquainted with my article "Ahora Peru" [Now Peru], they asked that country's chancellor, Edgardo Jarrin, whether the arrival of a Soviet trade mission in Peru would be only the prelude to another more important mission, that of Soviet diplomatic representation.

In that article I had observed that members of the Soviet embassy in Mexico City had predicted in that city's social circles that in less than 2 weeks Peru would establish diplomatic relations with the Kremlin at the embassy level.

According to the letter, barely 3 days later the Lima daily La Prensa confirmed with prominent play the report that I had made in El Universal Grafico whose substance I had obtained thanks to the indiscretion of Soviet diplomats included in the "cocktail circuit" organized here among the ambassadors and trade representatives of foreign countries.

I recall that also in El Universal Grafico my colleague, Alonso Fonseca G., published a note entitled "Alegres Diplomaticos" [Tipsy Diplomats] recounting the entertaining story of the "binge of Vladislav Koromovshkin and Valery Kostikov, attache and second secretary respectively ~~of~~ at the Soviet embassy in Mexico. These officials began their spree "between glasses of expensive wines in the 'red' district of Mexico City but had to bring their adventure to a close at Ciudad Victoria amidst the abuse they hurled at Mexico under the diplomatic immunity which they enjoyed." Apparently, the Soviet diplomats not only have given up decent beha but are also demonstrating their incompetence.

The Peruvian chancellor, Mercado [sic] Jarrin, who announced the arrival of the Soviet trade mission, answered the newsmen's question with a laconic comment that "at the appropriate time you will learn whether the government has decided to take that step" (of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR). Before the Lima government "decides to take that step," we would like to reproduce these two paragraphs which the journalist Bernardo Escalante published in an article entitled "La Embajada Misteriosa" [The Mysterious Embassy] in the newspaper El Sol de Mexico.

"The strange thing is that the Soviet embassy is one of those with the largest staff but with the least to do. Those branches that have contact with the public -- consular section, cultural section, tourist agency -- work only 4 hours a week. One can count the number of Mexicans applying for a Russian visa on the fingers of one hand. Trade between Mexico and the USSR is practically nil. The 'cultural relations,' as everyone knows, consist simply in making propaganda 'from one place to another' inasmuch as in the land of Brezhnev and Kosygin they do not even have a remote idea of what Mexico is like.

"What is this plethora of Soviet personnel used for then in that embassy where not even a single Mexican citizen is employed, where the domestics themselves are Soviet, in that huge mansion that could serve as a den of vampires? The mystery deepens if one considers that the Mexican embassy staff in Moscow barely numbers six or seven employees whereas the USSR has more than a hundred in Mexico. Why does the Soviet Union have such a large embassy staff in our country if it does what ours does in Moscow?"

201-305052

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes 20 de Diciembre de 1968 (MEXICO)

Tomo 5[illegible]

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector: esta es la divertida historia de una "parranda" que empezó en la [illegible] madrugada del 13 de diciembre, entre [illegible] de hippies rusos en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y que terminó [illegible], en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS que por haber sido las cabezas de la [illegible] tiranía de los diplomáticos [illegible] [illegible] el [illegible] en [illegible] burgueses, no para integrarse y olvidar unas con otras tristezas que les [illegible] el comunismo, sino para lanzar una andanada de desmanes e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que, cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Koromovalkin, agregado, no sólo olvidaron entre hippies la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época, sino que en medio de una gran "bola" a base de whiskey [illegible] y [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] acompañados [illegible] ingenieros de PEMEX en su viaje en automóvil a Ciudad Mante, [illegible], después de [illegible] que elevaron los vapores del alcohol, la "bola" [illegible] a los [illegible] [illegible] la [illegible] sin [illegible] "comunismo", de [illegible] que la [illegible] de la [illegible] señala como las grandes [illegible] conquistados por los hombres [illegible] del [illegible], y [illegible] los [illegible] contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido— defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin [illegible], los rusos se convirtieron [illegible] en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda [illegible] la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad [illegible] pistolas [illegible], se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al deseo unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, exigieron el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. [illegible] nota de la agresividad de ambos [illegible] al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral con [illegible] de quienes creen que con la conquista soviética del poder en Rusia el [illegible] y la decisión en todo el [illegible] [illegible]

201-744341

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TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP/AEKICK/AEBURBLE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-36517, 14 February 1969

1. On 1 April 1969 the Station received a memorandum from local LNERGO concerning the latest meeting AEBURBLE had with his Soviet Case Officers. This memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #1. The meeting took place in Mexico City on 3 and 4 February 1969. The Soviet case officers were Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN (201-784917) and Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. On 8 April 1969 we answered LNERGO's memorandum with comments concerning NIKITIN's and KOSTIKOV's whereabouts on 3 and 4 February 1969, the possible meeting place on 4 February 1969, and the cars used. Recent photographs of NIKITIN and KOSTIKOV were forwarded to local LNERGO also. This Station memorandum is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment #2.

3. It is interesting to note that the 1969 Volkswagen with Mexico City plates 787 IW, assigned to Stanislav Vasilyevich SYCHEV (201-326963) was used as the vehicle to drive AEBURBLE to the meeting site on 4 February 1969. The use of SYCHEV's vehicle, which is one of two Soviet vehicles which do not have diplomatic license plates, strengthens our suspicion that SYCHEV is a KGB officer.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. LNERGO Memo u/s/c
2. Station memo u/s/c

Distribution:
2 - C/SB w/att u/s/c
2 - C/WH w/o att

201-248427

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file 201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-784917 201-305052	HMMA-36888	9 April 1969
201-326963	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-248427

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27 FE[illegible]

F.O

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV
Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN

Per your request, enclosed are the following most recent photographs available of subject Soviets who are presently assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City:

a. Photo 1: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born: 13 March 1933, Moscow, photo dated 1959.

b. Photo 2: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV - 1965

c. Photo 3: Rosa Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA, born: 2 March 1932, Arkhangelsk, photo dated 1965.

d. Photo 4: Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, born 7 June 1929, Sverdlovsk, photo received 1965.

e. Photo 5: Nina Afanasyevna NIKITINA, born 1931, Arkhangelsk Oblast, photo received 1965.

CSCI-316/00518-69

SB/CI/P:AJHPeck X-4496 17 Feb 69

Distribution:
1 - CI/LS
1 - CI/OPS/SB
1 - CI/R&A
1 - SB/X/WH
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Chrono
1 - SB/CI/P/AP - Comeback
2 - RID/AN/SB - Please classify: ✓KOSTIKOV, 201-305052
NIKITIN, 201-784917

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201-305052

Valeri V.Kostikov I have met him but I do not know him much.

Valentin Longuinov, in charge of consular affairs, his wife Alexandra has been an ~~ekmimgxxxxm~~ skating star, both are / [illegible] very nice, speak very good Spanish and fair English. Their daughter ~~Kxxxxxxm~~ Kirina, sixteen years old, very sophisticated, came here for a holiday. The only child of that age we have ever seen here. They have another child, who is in Moscow. Both have been at our house for a party. In general soviet people come alone, leaving the wives behind. Longuinov was an exception.

Dmitri Prygov, wife Natalia, have an small child born here, he has been writing a book on the Mexican revolution. We are fairly good friends. He was introduced to me by Boris Kazantsev who invited me for lunch for the ocasion. When we go to the Soviet embassy both he and Tchmykhov are always very attentive.

I know several other people from the Soviet embassy but really I could not place them together with their names.

Extract from HMMA-36436, 12/2/69 (RedTop Ops)

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S E C R E T 211825Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8796

DIRECTOR INFO LIMA, BUENOS AIRES

21 JAN 69 IN 76296

MHSPAWN REDCOAT

REF: LIMA-3640 (IN 71317)

201-305052

1. FOLLOW UP STORY PER REF PARA 2 PUBLISHED IN "EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO" OF 17 JAN. POUCHING CLIPS ALL ADDEES.

2. FILE 50-126-22/3.

S E C R E T

Montiel-
Koromorolkin
Krotikov

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201-305052

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TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (201-185114)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMS-6229, 19 December 1968

1. LIFIRE reported the PCS departure of the BROVKIN family on 22 September 1968 aboard Sabena Flight 556. Subject travelled on Soviet Diplomatic Passport D-008133.

2. BROVKIN held the position of Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He was replaced by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), who assumed the title of Second Secretary.

3. Forwarded herewith are recent LICALLA photographs of Subject.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Photo h/w

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2 - C/WH w/o att

185114
CS copy filed in 201-~~80~~
file in 201-305052

[illegible] automatic [illegible] and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-305052

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-36121

DATE
27 December 1968

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-185114

14-00000

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CAS CA/PEG CA/PROP DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 241800Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8531

DIRECTOR

24Dec 68 IN 60590

REDTOP AEKICK AEASSAULT

REF: MEXICO CITY 8437 (IN 54340)

1. LILYRIC REPORTED THAT KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV LEFT THE SOVIET EMBASSY TOGETHER AT 16:33 ON 9 DECEMBER. THEY WERE NOT SEEN UNTIL THEY RETURNED TOGETHER AT 15:00 ON 20 DECEMBER. THEY LEFT AND RETURNED IN THE REGULARLY ASSIGNED TO YURIY S. CHERMYSH. UPON RETURN KORMUSHKIN, KOSTIKOV, AND THE CAR WERE GRIMY AND DIRTY.

2. ON 20 DECEMBER ONE OF LIQUIFIER'S WRITERS PLACED STATION WRITTEN ARTICLE IN EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO. ENTITLE "HAPPY DIPLOMATS," IT IS TONGUE IN CHEEK TWO COLUMN ARTICLE STATING TWO SOVIETS GOT OFF MARX-LENINIST WAGON TO ENJOY BOURGEOISE JOYS AND ENDED UP INSULTING MEXICO AND PULLING GUNS. THEY DEMANDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WITH INSULTING ARROGANCE. INVITES READERS TO CALL SOVEMB TO CONFIRM STORY.

3. AMBASSADOR WHO INTRIGUED WITH STORY PASSED IT TO HIS FRIEND, GARCIA VALSECA, PUBLISHER OF EL SOL CHAIN. VALSECA SENT REPORTER FROM TAMPICO TO CIUDAD VICTORIA. ON 21 DECEMBER EL SOL FRONT PAGED STORY ENTITLED " MEMBERS OF SOVIET EMBASSY, DRUNK,

D. 74-126-60/3

B 201-305052

24-12-68

201-744341

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8531 SECRET

TREACHEROUSLY ATTACKED TWO MEXICAN ENGINEERS," A PURE MIRACLE THAT THE TWO MEXICANS WHO ARE NAMED ESCAPED WITH THEIR LIVES WHEN SOVIETS THREATENED THEM WITH A RIFLE AND PISTOL AFTER DRIVING THEM TO REMOTE POINT. INDIGNANT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SET FREE WITH ONLY 200 PESO FINE. HOPES FOR INVESTIGATION ABOUT WHAT SOVIETS DOING IN TAMAULIPAS (STATE) AND SPECUALTES THEY ENGAGED SUBVERSIVE WORK. UNFORTUNATELY KORMUSHKIN'S NAME IS HOPELESSLY GARBLED.

4. ON 22 DECEMEBER THE NEWS, ENGLISH DAILY, RAN SHORTER VERSION OF EL SOL STROY. ON 24 DECEMBER THE NEWS IN FOLLOW-UP GIVES MORE DETAIL AND QUESTIONS LENIENCY OF 200 PESO FINE. NOTES THAT KOSTIKOV IS IN DIPLOMATIC LIST BUT CANNOT FIND NAME OF VLADISTOK KOMOSKID(KORMUSHKIN) THERE.

5. ON 23 DECEMBER COS GAVE AMASSADOR PICUTES OF KORMUSHKIN AND KOSTIKOV WITH FACT THEY GONE FROM MEXICO CITY FROM 9 TO 20 DECEMBER AND CORRECT SPELLING FOR KORMUSHKIN. AMBASSADOR PASSED TO GARCIA VALSECA WITH SUGGESTION HE DO FOLLOW-UP STORY INSISTING ON INVESTIGATION AND EXPLANATION BY SOVEMB ABOUT ABSENCE OF SOVIET "DIPLOMATS" FOR 11 DAYS PROWLING MEXICAN COUNTRY SIDE. WILL ALSO SUGGEST THAT GARCIA PUBLISH STORY AND PICTURES IN HIS CHAIN OF

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INFO

FILE. VR.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8531 SECRET

PROVINCIAL PAPERS ASKING READERS IF THEY SAW THESE TWO SPYS DURING ABOVE PERIOD.

6. LITEMPO-12 HAS STATED THAT STORY WILL APPEAR IN 24 DECEMBER EDITION OF "ALARMA," A WEEKLY SCANDAL MAGAZINE.

7. ON 20 DECEMBER USIS GAVE STORY TO LOCAL UPI AND AP CORRESPONDENTS. DO NOT KNOW IF STORIES CABLED.

8. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND POUCH COPIES ALL ARTICLES.

9. FILE: 74-126-60, 201-744341, AND 201-305052.

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

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3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

050-002-004
HMMA-36090A01
20 DEC 68
P3

CIT ?
OCC ?
12 DEC VALERIY KOSTIKOV 2ND SECY AND
VLADISLAV KORMUSHKIN ATTACHE LEFT HOUSE
OF PROSTITUTION HAD SPENT ENTIRE EVENING
DRINKING IN ZONA ROJA COMPLETELY DRUNK LEFT
WITH FOUR PEMEX ENGINEERS ARGUMENT BROKE OUT
INTO FIST FIGHT BOTH DREW PISTOLS MEXICANS
DISARMED THEM PREFERRED CHARGES CLAIMED
DIPL IMMUNITY NOT SEEN SOV EMB SINCE

R 6901020073

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-62)

EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO

Viernes 20 de diciembre de 1968

201-305052

Alegres Diplomáticos

Por ALONSO FONSECA G.

Querido lector, ésta es la divertida historia de una "parranda" que empezó en la pálida madrugada del 12 de diciembre, entre burbujas de vinos caros en la zona rosa de la ciudad de México, y que terminó muy lejos, en Ciudad Victoria. Se trata de dos marxistas-leninistas de la URSS, que por haber roto las cadenas de la oprobiosa tiranía de los diplomáticos decentes, "empinaron el codo" en bares burgueses, no para alegrarse y olvidar una que otra tristeza que les rasguñaba el corazón, sino para lanzar una andanada de denuestos e injurias a México y a los mexicanos, con el pretexto de que, cuando uno está "alegrito" todo se le dispensa.

Los diplomáticos de la embajada rusa en México, Valeri Kostikov, segundo secretario, y Vladislav Koromovshkin, agregado, no solo olvidaron entre hippies la moral socialista, para colocarse una "guarapeta de esas que hacen época, sino que, en medio de una gran "feria" a base de odiosos [illegible] y [illegible] capitalistas, decidieron acompañar a cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX en un viaje en automóvil a Ciudad Mante. En el camino, después de los desmanes habituales que provocan los humos del alcohol la "cruda" los hizo llegar a los peores extremos de la grosería, expuesta sin ningún "academicismo", de esos que la Universidad de la Amistad de Moscú señala como los grandes derechos conquistados por los hombres avanzados del leninismo, y llovieron los denuestos contra los mexicanos. Los cuatro ingenieros de PEMEX —como lo hubiera hecho cualquier hijo bien nacido—, defendieron con firmeza a su Patria. Sin más, los rusos se convirtieron súbitamente en diplomáticos pistoleros, al empuñar sus armas contra los ingenieros, pero sin duda porque la preparación rusa consiste más bien en el manejo de cohetes teledirigidos hacia la Luna, que en manejar con habilidad prosaicas pistolas obsoletas, se vieron prontamente desarmados por los mexicanos.

Al llegar a Ciudad Victoria, los ingenieros de PEMEX entregaron a las autoridades locales los agregados rusos y sus pistolas. Pese al deseo unánime de todos los allí presentes para que los soviéticos fueran castigados, éstos, con arrogancia insultante, exigieron el respeto a su inmunidad diplomática. Corremos nota de la agresividad de ambos moscovitas al gobierno chino de Mao Tse Tung tan empeñado en seguir la línea dura, aunque no creemos que los contrate, ya que son pistoleros malos.

El lector que quiera confirmar los detalles de esta borrachera interplanetaria y sideral, con desmanes de quienes creen que con la conquista soviética del poder en Rusia el respeto y la decencia en todo el [illegible] de [illegible], puede llamar al teléfono 15-30-35.

201-305052

TIPSY DIPLOMATS

by Alonso Fonseca G.

Source: ~~Not identified.~~ [illegible]

This is the amusing story of a "spree" which began in the frosty dawn of 12 December among bubbles of expensive wines in the "red light" district of Mexico City and reached its conclusion very far off, at Ciudad Victoria. What are involved are two Marxist-Leninists from the Soviet Union who, on breaking the chains of disgraceful tyranny weighing on respectable diplomats, "tanked up" in bourgeois bars, not in order to cheer up and forget some sorrowful episode or other that gnawed at their hearts but rather to fire a broadside of abuse and insults at Mexico and Mexicans under the pretext that when one is "tipsy" everything that he does is absolved.

The diplomats of the Russian embassy in Mexico, Valery Kostikov, second secretary, and Vladislav Koromovshkin, attache, not only forgot among hippies the socialist ethics in order to indulge in a "small drink among those who are in the limelight" but, in the midst of a big "binge" made possible by hateful capitalist brandy and whiskey, they decided to accompany four engineers of PEMEX [Petroleos Mexicanos; Mexican Petroleum] in an old automobile to Ciudad Mante. On the way, after the customary excesses that alcoholic fumes provoke, the "wine" drove the Russians to the worst extremes of crudeness exhibited without any of the "academic bearing" that the Friendship University of Moscow notes as the major assets acquired by the progressive men of Leninism. Accordingly, abuse rained on the Mexicans.

The four PEMEX engineers, as any well-born sons would have done, defended their country with firmness. Thereupon, the Russians suddenly became transformed into diplomat-gunmen, brandishing their weapons at the engineers. However, no doubt because Russians are better at getting ready to handle remote-controlled spaceships directed at the moon than in the skillful discharge of prosaic pistols, they found themselves disarmed in short order by the Mexicans.

On reaching Ciudad Victoria the PEMEX engineers handed the Russian attaches and their guns over to the local authorities. Despite the unanimous desire of all those present to see the Soviet representatives get their comeuppance the latter, with insulting arrogance, insisted that their diplomatic immunity be respected.

Let us compare the aggressive stance of both Muscovites with the Chinese government of Mao Tse-tung so insistent on following the hard line even though we do not believe that Mao would hire Russians of this ilk considering how ineffective gunmen they proved to be.

201-305052

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8; CI, OPS, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO.

S E C R E T 140225Z DEC 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR

13Dec68 IN54340

REDTOP AEKICK

1. ON 13 DEC LITEMPO-12 CALLED COS AND SAID HIS MAN IN CIUDAD VICTORIA HAD REPORTED THAT AT CA 05:02 ON 12 DEC VLADISLAV S. KORMUSHKIN (201-744341) AND VALERIY V. KOSTIKOV (201-305052), BOTH KNOWN KGB, LEFT A WHORE HOUSE IN CIUDAD VICTORIA WITH FOUR MEXICAN PEMEX ENGINEERS. ENTIRE PARTY WAS DRUNK. ALL GOT INTO

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

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DISSEM BY ______ PER #	FILE RID ☐ RET. TO	BRANCH ☐	DESTROY ☐ SIG.
ACTION ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR.		

A CAR AND STARTED TOWARD CIUDAD MANTE. ON WAY ARGUMENT BROKE OUT BETWEEN SOVIETS AND MEXICANS. CAR WAS STOPPED AND FIST-FIGHT ENSUED OUTSIDE. BOTH SOVIETS DREW PISTOLS AND COVERED MEXICANS. MEXICANS MANAGED TO DISARM THEM BY TACKLING FROM BEHIND AND TOOK THEM IN CUSTODY TO CIUDAD VICTORIA WHERE CHARGES AGAINST SOVIETS WERE PREFERRED. SOVIETS PRODUCED DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS AND CLAIMED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY WHEREUPON JUDGE RELEASED THEM. DISPOSITION OF PISTOLS UNKNOWN.

2. LITEMP-12 STATED GOBERNACION IS PREPARING FACTS FOR MEMO TO RELACIONES EXTERIORES WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT SOVIETS BE PNGED FOR ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC STATUS.

3. STATION IS ENCOURAGING LITEMPOS TO GET INCIDENT INTO PRESS IN SENSATIONAL MANNER WITH PHOTOS.

4. FILE: 201-744341 AND 201-305052.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, FI2

S E C R E T 192015Z SEPT 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 7224 MEXI

1P

DIRECTOR

19 SEP 68 IN 95628

REDTOP AEKICK

REF: DIRECTOR 16046, 13 JULY 1968

AN
AB
IN
PS
FX
~~[illegible]~~
FI
SB/6/WH

1. LIFIRE REPORTS PCS ARRIVAL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052), ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE, ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA AND DAUGHTER, SVETLANA. THEY ARRIVED 13 SEPTEMBER ON KLM FLIGHT 683. KOSTIKOV TRAVELLED ON DIP PASSPORT D-022184. WIFE AND DAUGHTER ON DIP PASSPORT D-022185.

2. PER REFERENCE KOSTIKOV 201-305052 SCHEDULED REPLACE ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH 2R BROVKIN (201-185114), THIRD SECRETARY. ACCORDING TO LICOZY-5, BROVKIN HAS RESERVATION TO DEPART MEXICO 22 SEPTEMBER.

3. LIFIRE REPORT INDICATES KOSTIKOV HAS TITLE OF SECOND SECRETARY.

4. FILE 201-305052. CROSS FILE 201-185114.

SECRET

BT

MICROFILMED
OCT 4 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19 Sep 68

CS COPY

201-305052

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: DIANA DAVIS
UNIT: SB/O/WH
EXT: 6412
DATE: 11 JULY 68

SECRET

44

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BY 3 PER ____ #____

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☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052
x- 201-185114 (BROVKIN)

CONF: SB8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE RI AN, WH8 ci/ops. ci/ic,
CI, F

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET ... 11 July 68 CITE DIRECTOR

22 05z JUL 68

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO MEXICO CITY
REDTOP

Box 4

AH/113 FI		
PS 22	CS31	
ABSTRACT ☒	INDEX ☒	

16046 P

1. ACCORDING TO SENSITIVE HQS SOURCE VALERIY KOSTIKOV, WIFE ROZA AND DAUGHTER SVETLANA HAVE BEEN GRANTED NINETY DAY DIP VISAS, EXTENDABLE IN PROTOCOL OFFICE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY. < KOSTIKOV IS SCHEDULED TO REPLACE BROVKIN, ALEKSANDR MIKHAYLOVICH >

201-305052

ZR 201-185114

2. SUBJECT IS IDENTICAL WITH VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (201-305052) PREVIOUSLY PCS MEXICO 1961-1965. HE IS ~~XXX~~ KNOWN KGB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACSB/O/WH L Hestres
C/SB/CI/K T Connie
for C/WH/1 W Belt

C/WH+ Wm Polgar

CS COPY

DC/SB/AO H. Hestres
11 JUL 68
201 - 305052

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

Chief, WH Division

Chief, SB; COS, Managua; COS, Panama City

Chief of Station, Mexico City

REDCOAT [illegible]

Soviet Contact with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria (201-062689)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The Station believes that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, Nicaraguan Communist living in exile in Mexico and known to have been the link between Moscow and the Nicaraguan Communist Party in regard to sending Nicaraguans to both CPSU school and Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, is identical with the Modesto *RIVAS who in 1965 was reported in contact with identified KGB officer Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) as well as with the Modesto *BERMUDEZ, originally thought to have been a Panamanian, who in 1965 was reported in contact with KOSTIKOV and then with his successor, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN (201-744341), who is also an identified KGB officer. It is noted that Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria uses the alias Modesto RIVAS for receiving mail at his post office box letter drop.

2. Following is a chronology of the LIENVOY reporting on "Modesto's" contact with the Soviets. As will be seen, it appears that the combination "Modesto BERMUDEZ" was a conclusion jumped to by LIENVOY and was in fact probably never given as such. The references to "Panamanians" could be a cover for "Nicaraguans."

a. On 1 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV and arranged to meet him at four o'clock "in the same place."

........continued

Attachment:
Photograph

Distribution:
- 2 - C/WHD, w/att.
- 1 - C/SB, w/att.
- 1 - COS, Managua, w/att.
- 1 - COS, Panama City, w/att.

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32359	27 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-062689

b. On 29 Jun 1965 "Modesto RIVAS" called KOSTIKOV to say he would like to talk with him and also to give him the message that Ricardo was waiting in his office for him. KOSTIKOV asked if Modesto was working that day, and when Modesto said no, he would be working at home all day, then KOSTIKOV said he would stop by his house in the afternoon.

c. On 6 Jul 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV and asked if there was anything new about the people travelling to Helsinki. KOSTIKOV said nothing yet, but he hoped to have word by the end of the week. KOSTIKOV also asked if Modesto had received any news from the doctor, and Modesto said no, even though he had sent a telegram. Modesto said he would keep a copy of the telegram he sent for KOSTIKOV.

d. On 7 Jul 1965 "Modesto" told KOSTIKOV that, after he had talked to him the day before, he had received a cable asking the same question, i.e., what was with the trip to Helsinki, and Modesto wanted to know what to answer. KOSTIKOV said that they would have to wait about two more days but that he would send a cable to pressure for an answer. Modesto said he would answer his cable saying that they were trying to get a cabled reply and added that he would be in his office in the afternoon, if KOSTIKOV wanted to reach him.

e. On 8 Jul 1965 a man identified by voice as the above Modesto called at the Soviet Embassy for the Vice Consul (i.e. KOSTIKOV). He was told to call back, and when asked who was calling, he said he was calling on behalf of the Panamanians ("de parte de los panamenos").

f. On 9 Jul 1965 a man called at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV, who was out. The man then said to leave the message that "BERMUDEZ...no...tell him that Modesto called." (This is evidently what made the LIENVOY monitors assume that the caller's name was "Modesto BERMUDEZ.")

g. On 9 Jul 1965 a man left a message at the Soviet Embassy for KOSTIKOV saying that Modesto had called. (This comes out in LIENVOY as being a call from "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno," but this was probably the monitor's way of identifying the same man of the above conversations and not what the man actually said.)

h. On 12 Jul 1965 Modesto again spoke to KOSTIKOV (and is again described by LIENVOY as "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno"). Modesto informed KOSTIKOV that the job from Ensenada ("el encargo de Ensenada") had arrived. KOSTIKOV suggested meeting Modesto at the usual place and asked if (he, she, it?) was with Modesto. Modesto said yes, at his house, and KOSTIKOV said then it would be better for him to visit them at his house. Modesto also asked about the "other matter," but KOSTIKOV still had no news.

i. On 14 Jul 1965 it was again reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called and left a message to tell KOSTIKOV that he had called. (Again, the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" is probably a LIENVOY assumption, rather than what Modesto actually said.)

j. On 4 Aug 1965 "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" (again, probably the LIENVOY assumption) called at the Soviet Embassy for KORMUSHKIN and was told to call him on another number. (No record of a second call.)

k. On 12 Aug 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called KORMUSHKIN and asked whether the young man had been dispatched. KORMUSHKIN said he had just left. [illegible]

201-305052

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

SECRET

HMMA-32359

l. On 22 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called from inside the Soviet Embassy at 1128 hours to a local travel agency (T.[illegible]/Greyhound) and spoke with Miss LABASTIDA, asking her about the price of the ticket to Prague under the same system they had used to send the other people. LABASTIDA asked for one of the names in order to pull the card to see how it had been done, and "BERMUDEZ" gave her the name Guillermo *AGUIRRE. LABASTIDA gave him various possible flights and asked that he call back in the afternoon for more definite information. (Station traces show that Guillermo AGUIRRE Rodriguez, 201-245711, is a Nicaraguan who was at the CPSU school in Moscow in 1965.) (LILYRIC reported that the man in the attached photograph, who is undoubtedly identical with Alejandro BERMUDEZ Alegria, visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City from 1111 to 1137 hours. There therefore seems no question that he is the "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" who has been reported by LIENVOY in all the above conversations.)

m. On 29 Sep 1965 LIENVOY reported that "Modesto BERMUDEZ, panameno" called KORMUSHKIN and said he had some things ("encargos") for him. KORBUSHKIN said he would see Modesto at seven o'clock in the usual place.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

201-305052

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SB Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDTOP - Voice Samples of Soviets in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters retention are voice samples, taken from LIENVOY, of the following Soviets previously stationed in Mexico :

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (201-236701)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV (201-230429)
Ivan Afanasyevich BEKETOV (201-754500)
Ina Nikolayevna BOLDOVA (201-245416)
Vasiliy Karpovich BUTSEV (201-273883)
Yuriy Aleksandrovich DOMRACHEV (201-297666)
Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV (2010277418)
Vladimir Petrovich GULIN (201-734985)
Viktor Petrovich KALININ (201-735049)
Nikolay Konstantinovich KHLEBNIKOV (201-227420)
Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV (201-101794)
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)
Sergey Semenovich KUKHARENKO (201-260831)
Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870)
Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV (201-731394)
Ivan Dmitriyevich OSYEDKOV (201-779495)
Aleksandr Petrovich PAVLOV (201-761265)
Georgiy Aleksandrovich SHCHUCHKIN (201-242728)
Vasiliy Vasilyevich SIMONOV (201-735055)
Sergey Iosifovich SOKOLOVSKIY (201-025485)
Gennadiy Fedorovich STROGANOV (201-735056)
Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (201-243602)

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Voice samples

Distribution:
2 - CSB, w/att., H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

file Kostikov
201-30505

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 31217	27 JANUARY 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-8-10/1

Wayne CTS
Jackie
John
Va.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

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ROUTING			
①	DA	5	BI
2	WH	6	CI
3	C	7	RR
4	6	8	

ORIG : J. CARLSON
UNIT : SR/077A
EXT : 8208 6213
DATE : 15 APR 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-305052

26 SECRET
201-305873

18 APR 66 20 12z

TO : SANTIAGO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF : SR 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INTZ,

TO SAGO INFO CITE DIR 97152

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI 6866 [illegible] (IN 95002)*

THE FOLLOWING IS FYI:

A-Y-I-F-F

1. NECHIPORENKO OF REF BORN 4 JUL 32, WIFE LIDIYA N. ATTENDED CONFERENCE CARACAS ALSO [illegible] POSSIBLY BUEN DEC 57, VICE CONSUL [illegible] MEXI AUG 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH. ABLE TO PASS AS MEXICAN. CLEVER, INTELLIGENT, RESERVED. THOROUGH BACKGROUND MEXICAN CULTURE.

A 18173

2. KOSTIKOV OF REF BORN 17 MAR 33, WIFE ROZA ALEKSANDROVNA BORN 2 MAR 32. IN 58 AND 59 ATTENDED CONFERENCES IN MADRID, IN 59 AND 60 INDUSTRIAL FAIRS IN MEXI AND HAVANA. EMPLOYEE THEN VICE CONSUL MEXI SEP 61 TO AUG 65. SPEAKS GOOD ENGLISH AND SPANISH.

3. BOTH SUBJS KNOWN KGB PER EXTENSIVE ACTIVITIES MEXI. KOSTIKOV BELIEVED IN THIRTEENTH DEPT FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE.

4. EXTENSIVE TRACES SUBJS AVAILABLE HQS. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST IF SUBJS ARRIVE SAGO. WILL THEN POUCH SPRS WITH PORTION FOR LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

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4		8	

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

18 APR 66 20 12z

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 97152

*REF ANNOUNCED POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT XOXSAGOMORXBMBXSXM OF SUBJS TO SAGO.

BDC0SB0000BX

DC/SR/O/PA Jos. P. Fedyna
SR/O/WH T. Cormin
SR/CI/K
WH/4/CH

C/WH Thomas Polgar
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SR/COP F. Gasicki
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 45

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION SR

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UNIT TIME BY

ACTION

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S E C R E T 121526Z

SAGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6866

12 Apr 66 IN 95002

REDWOOD

LICOWL-1 REPORTS THAT ON 2 APR SOV EMB GUARD STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNIKOV 201-271103 TOLD HIM THAT VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 WAS NOW CONSUL IN CHILE, ADDED THAT PROBABLY OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 AND VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305052 WOULD ALSO BE GOING TO CHILE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6866 LICOWL-1 2 APR SOV EMB STANISLAV SERGEYEVICH SILNXEV 201-271103 VITALIY BORISOVICH SHUBIN 201-266547 CHILE OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO 201-305870 VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV 201-305052

BT

SECRET

Kostikov

3 March 1966
HMMA 28421
File: 201-305025) (KOSTIKOV)

From the LICOWL-1 Progress Report

HMMA 28421, 3 March 1966

(Original filed in 201-741655)

Processed by Millie Rodriguez, SR/O/WH. Date Process: 28 March 1966

Valeriy V. KOSTIKOV (201-305025) [Subject reported on KOSTIKOV in detail in Reference]. During the summer of 1965, KOSTIKOV also asked Subject to obtain a prostitute for him. Subject did so but KOSTIKOV failed to meet the girl. Shortly thereafter, KOSTIKOV returned to Moscow. ak

Reference mentioned is : HMMA 25677, March 1965

201-305052
~~201-305025~~

SECRET

SECRET

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
LEFT MEXICO PCS DURING 4 AUG 1965-

050-008-010
HMMA-27102
08 SEP 65
P2

R 6509151382

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

H. CSR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, SR Division

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ~~REDWOOD - Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 of Subject, his wife and daughter. Subject was travelling on Soviet diplomatic passport no. 2240, his wife and child on no. 2241. Travelling on the same flight with Subject, was Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV, who has been assigned as guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and was returning to the USSR.

[illegible]

2. Subject has left Mexico PCS. His replacement, Vladislav Sergeyevich KORMUSHKIN, arrived on 27 July 1965.
of USSR (201-744391)

3. The bulk of Station information on Subject has already been reported to Headquarters. Below are a few additional items of interest.

Kostikov's (201-305052)

4. LICOWL/1 reported that Subject's only close friends among the Soviets in Mexico were Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (201-305870) and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV (201-756168). LICALLA reports also show that ~~Subject~~ Kostikov is almost constantly seen at the Embassy with these two individuals.

5. Subject speaks French (Source: LIENVOY, 14 June 1965).

6. Subject has hemorrhoids (Source: LIENVOY, 2 June 1965).

7. Subject has occasionally made appointments to see individuals "at the same time" or "at the same place." The Station has not, however, been able to identify these individuals. These individuals have identified themselves on the telephone as :

a. "Senora MONTIEL."

b. "Ricardo."

MICROFILMED
AUG 20 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

-continued-

Attachment: Photos of Subject & wife
Appropriate photos retained in B.O

Distribution:
12 - CSR, w/att, H/W
1 - CWH, w/o att.

CS COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26853	11 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052 FFN: P-7455

c."Froilan." The latter is possibly identical with a "Froilan TIRADO" who called Subject on 29 March 1965. There are no Station traces on Froilan TIRADO.

Source of the above is LIENVOY.

8. Attached are LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs of Subject and his wife.

for
Willard C. CURTIS



KOSTIKOVA

20 May 65

LILYRIC



V.V. KOSTIKOV

19 Jun 66

LICALLA

Att to HMMA-26853 11 Aug 65 201-305052

(When Fi...

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
IDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER.

201-744341
HMMA-26823
10 AUG 65
P1

R 6508251399

FILE IN 201-305052

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO
Chief, SR Division

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
REDWOOD - Ivan Dmitriyevich OBYEDKOV (201-779495)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. LIFIRE reported the departure on 4 August 1965, Sabena flight 556 for Brussels (and Moscow) of Subject. (It is not known whether Subject's travel was PCS or TDY. Subject's wife and son had left Mexico on 7 July 1965).

2. LIFIRE reported that Subject was travelling on Soviet service passport no. 009260; his wife and daughter had travelled on no. 009270. Subject's age was given as 35, that of his wife as 34, and that of his son Vladimir as 9. (Comment: These ages may be as of 1962, when Subject originally entered Mexico.)

3   3. Travelling on the same flight with Subject were Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052) and his family. KOSTIKOV is an identified KGB officer who was returning to the USSR PCS.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
2 - CSR
1 - CWH

COPY

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26824	DATE 10 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-779495 FFN: P -8125

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE   TOTAL COPIES   35

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GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED   9 AUG 1965

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	PA	5	B1
2	WH	6	CI
3		7	RR
4		8	

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
SR8   ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED   UNIT   TIME   BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH8, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT, WH/C8

SECRET 261701Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4349   6 Aug 65 IN 27258

REDWOOD

1. LIFIRE AND LITEMPO REPORT ARRIVAL 27 JULY VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN, AGE 31, WIFE INNA NIKOLAYEVNA AGE 30, SON SERGEY AGE 5. KORMUSHKIN ASSIGNED AS ATTACHE SOVIET EMB, BELIEVED REPLACING KOSTIKOV (201-305052).

2. REQUEST TRACES AND 201.

SECRET

CFN: 4349 LIFIRE LITEMPO 27 VLADISLAV SERGEYEVICH KORMUSHKIN 31 INNA NIKOLAYEVNA 30 SERGEY 5 KORMUSHKIN SOVIET EMB KOSTIKOV 201-305052 201

BT

SECRET

~~201-744311~~

~~A-22936~~

File
201-305052

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES: 4

SECRET

GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CI	5	/31
(2)	WH	6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, SR8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S

SECRET 252244Z

file KOSTIKOV

26 JUL 65 IN 19199

DIR CITE MEXI 4247

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

1. ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK (PHONETIC) CALLED SOVEMB FROM PBPRIME ASKED FOR SOV CONSUL WHO NOT IN. CALLED TWICE AGAIN 15 JULY WAS TOLD CONTACT KOSTIKOV (201-305052) WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH.

2. 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN CALLED SOVEMB ON PART AMERICAN WHO JUST ARRIVED BY BUS FROM PBPRIME AND WHO HAD SPOKEN KOSTIKOV. SINCE K NOT IN MAN CALLED AGAIN 1104 HRS SAID WAS MR BRECK. ARRANGED SEE K SAME DAY 1200 HRS AT EMB.

3. LIEMPTY 6 RPTED YOUNG AMER TYPE MALE ENTERED SOVEMB 1233 HRS 19 JULY. LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE MOUNTED WHEN HE LEFT EMB AT 1317 HRS. NOT DROPPED UNTIL 23 JULY WHEN HE IDENTIFIED BY LIEMBRACE THROUGH HOTEL AS EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE, "RADIO ANNOUNCER," 1257 ROBERT ST., "DESMOINES, IOWA."

4. EMB CHECK SHOWED PROTECTION WELFARE CASE JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT, IOWA. RES 1257 ROBERT ST., HILLSIDE, N.J. BREKKE COULD NOT PAY HOTEL BILL AND SOUGHT EMB AID.

5. 23 JULY STA OBTAINED ACCESS TO LARGE ENVELOPE CONTAINING LTRS TO BREKKE. ENVELOPE MAILED FROM JULIA BREKKE, 605 STOCKDALE

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET

IN 19199 2/2

S
T. WEBSTER CITY, IOWA. SENT C/O MR. E. PEARSON, 4001 FREIDA ST., LITTLE ROCK ARK. PEARSON APPARENTLY SENT TO PDSWING. LTRS TO BREKKE SHOWED HE WRITING BAD CHECKS, SEEKING IMMIGRATION AUSTRALIA, BEHIND ON LOANS, SEARCHING FOR HIS FATHER, ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE AND HAS MADE FCC APPLICATION FOR RADIO OPERATOR'S LICENSE.

6. POUCHING PHOTOS AND FURTHER DETAILS. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. REQUEST HQS TRACES.

SECRET

CFN 4247 ACC LIENVOY 15 JULY MR BRECK NOT IN 15 JULY KOSTIKOV (201-305052 ENGLISH 0952 HRS 19 JULY UNK MEXICAN AMERICAN BUS K NOT IN 1104 HRS MR BRECK K 1200 HRS LIEMPTY 6 RPTED 1233 HRS 19 JULY 1317 HRS NOT DROPPED 23 JULY HOTEL EUGENE ALLEN BREKKE 1257 ROBERT ST "DESMOINES IOWA JULY 64 EUGENE ALLYN BREKKE DPOB 4 MAY 37 BRITT IOWA RES 1257 ROBERT ST HILLSIDE N.J. NOT PAY HOTEL 23 JULY BREKKE JULIA BREKKE 605 STOCKDALE ST WEBSTER CITY IOWA C/O MR. E. PEARSON 4001 FREIDA ST LITTLE ROCK ARK AUSTRALIA ANTONE SAUERIN BREKKE FCC HWS

BT

SECRET

NNN

14-00000

1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Panama City H2 P

INFO. Chief, WH; Chief, SR

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT REDCOAT - Modesto BERMUDEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES Δ MEXICO CIT PANAMA

MICROFILMED
JUL 23 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: PACY - 7321, 8 July 1965

1. Panama City traces are requested on Modesto BERMUDEZ, a Panamanian currently in Mexico City. BERMUDEZ has been in touch with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052), Vice Consul at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and identified KGB officer. on several occasions

2. On 7 July 1965 "Modesto" called KOSTIKOV, saying that he had just received a cable asking about the trip to Helsinki, to which "Modesto" wanted to cable a reply. KOSTIKOV said that they had to wait a day or two, but that he would send an urgent cable. On 8 July 1965 an individual identified by voice as the "Modesto" above called KOSTIKOV, who was out, and left the message to tell him that he had a call "from the Panamanians." On 9 July "Modesto BERMUDEZ," a Panamanian, left a message for KOSTIKOV to call him. (Source: LIENVOY.)

3. It appears that the conversations above refer to the Panamanian delegation to the World Peace Congress being held in Helsinki 10-17 July 1965. BERMUDEZ is not, however, one of the Referenced six Panamanians who arrived in Mexico on 6 July on their way to the Congress.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Panama City
- 1 - CWH
- 1 - CSR 1cc SR/c/WH

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26602

DATE 14 July 1965

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 ffn: 7455

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: REDWOOD
SPR ON Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, for information only.

REFERENCE : HMMA-25722, 2 April 1965

Subject SPR typed in final form is forwarded herewith.

John T. Ossenbrink

3-COS, Mexico City, W/attachment
ATTACHMENT:
Orig & 1 SPR

1ull

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13801 CS COPY	DATE ~~15 JUL 1965~~ 9 July 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052

1-WH/1 w/att
1-SR/O/WH w/att
1-RID w/att

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
SR/O/WH	George Finney	lam	6412

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SR/O/WH	9 July	Kendall L. Lyon
C/NH/1		

AN	FI	OR
FS	DEST	SR/CI/H
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH		

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

SECRET

SPR PREPARED BY: Vera T. WEISCARVER

DATE: 15 February 1965

201 NUMBER: 305052

A-NUMBER: 18973

1. NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

2. DPOB: 17 March 1933, Moscow. (1)

3. CITIZENSHIP AND PASSPORT DATA (including past citizenship and passports, with dates):

   Soviet citizen.

   Service passport no. C-64352, when he arrived in Mexico City on 19 September 1961. (2)

4. ETHNIC ORIGIN:

   Unknown.

5. OTHER NAMES USED (with dates, circumstances, DPOB, citizenship and passport data, if appropriate):

   Unknown.

6. CURRENT POSITION (non-intell):

   When Subject arrived in Mexico City, he had employee status. Later Subject was raised to the rank of Vice Consul and, since March 1963, Subject has held the rank of Attache in the Consular Office. (3)

SECRET

Att. #1 -HMMW-13801

201-305052

7. RELATIVES (including DPOB, location/address, passport and other personal information where available and appropriate):

a. **Father:** Not known.

b. **Mother:** Not known.

c. **Spouse** (including maiden name and date of marriage):

Roza Aleksandrovna KOSTIKOVA

DPOB: 2 March 1932, Arkhangel Oblast. (1)

Service passport No. C-64353, 19 September 1961.

According to LICOWL/1, Subject's wife has blond hair, blue eyes, is short in stature and speaks excellent Spanish. LICOWL/1 also stated that Subject's wife appears to be in charge of the Embassy kitchen. (4) (5)

About 18 February 1964, Subject's wife underwent a stomach operation for an unknown ailment. (6)

Dr. SORIANO (See Western Contacts) has treated Subject's wife for her illnesses. (7) (8) (9)

Subject's wife was to be the Soviet Representative in the annual U.N. Parade held in Mexico City in October 1962. (10)

d. **Children.**

Daughter - Svetlana Valeriyevna. DPOB: 1959, Moscow. (11)

Passport No. C-64353. (Child arrived in Mexico on Mother's passport.)

e. **Others:**

None known.

8. LANGUAGES (with degree of fluency):

   a. English:: Good. (11)

      Subject used English while conversing with NAMSTROM (See Western Contacts). (12)

   b. Spanish: Good. (11) (13)

   c. Subject is reported to be a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Languages: (14)

9. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND PHOTOS:

(March 1965 - basis LIEMPTY, LICOWL/1 and Staffer Observation.)

a. Apparent age - 35-38 years.

b. Height - 5'10".

c. Build - Stocky, paunchy stomach.

d. Hair - Dark brown, receding hairline, giving effect of widow's peak, kinky hair.

e. Eyes - Small, color not definitely known but believed to be hazel, always wears tinted sunglasses.

f. Complexion - White, rough, with heavy beard that is not always well shaved.

g. Shape of face - Round, somewhat heavy jowls, thin lips, wide nostrils, Head goes up to point at top but this is covered by his hair.

h. General appearance - More Semitic or Near Eastern than Slavic. In general a sloppy dresser with ill fitting clothes.

i. Outstanding features and identifying marks - Always wears tinted sunglasses.

j. Others - Drinks, uses profane language. (Source - LICOWL/1)

Public photographs taken at the Mexico City Airport in 1964. Picture attached to original only.

10. PERSONALITY, CHARACTER, HABITS (with specific details and examples where appropriate including subjects covered in personality/operational assessment questionnaire):

Subject plays volleyball. (16) (17)

Subject is a frequent visitor to LICOWL/1's store and according to LICOWL/1, Subject is a person who can be very polite and very kind. LICOWL/1 and Subject have a very friendly relationship. (16) (19) However, see also HMMA-25516, 4 March 1965.

LICOWL/1 gave a fiesta at his home on 12 September 1964, which was attended by several Soviets. Subject and Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) became drunk and sick. When Subject fully realized what a state KALININ was in, he pulled himself together and drove KALININ home. During this fiesta, Subject became interested in Juana Valdes aka Juana Prieto GONZALES (see Western contacts). Sra. GONZALES (see Western contacts) Juana's mother, told LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered the girl 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. (4) (20)

Prior to the fiesta, LICOWL/1 told Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ (see Soviet contacts) that Subject and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) were also invited. KALININ stated that he did not like these two, that they were tyrants and felt that they were important personnel since they were diplomats. KALININ also said he did not like the idea of their attending the fiesta, and while speaking appeared to be very disgusted and spat on the floor. (21)

11. CURRICULUM VITAE:

Date	Entry	Source
	Subject graduated from higher studies at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages.	(22)
September-October 1958	Subject was a member of the Soviet Bloc Delegation to the 17th International Railroad Congress Meeting in Madrid, Spain.	(22)
June 1959	Subject visited Barcelona after the Congress, listed as an interpreter, and used passport no. S-39990.	(22)
June 1959	Subject attended the CEI Congress in Madrid.	(22)
September 1959	Subject requested a U.S. visa as a member of KHRUSHCHEV's party. Subject was listed as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	(22)
November 1959	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Mexico City.	(22)
6 January 1960	Subject flew from Mexico City to Havana.	(22)
February 1960	Subject attended the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Havana, Cuba.	(22)
7 March 1960	Subject departed Havana for Europe, still using passport no. S-39990.	(22)
19 September 1961	Subject arrived in Mexico City, accompanied by his family, via Sabena no. 555.	(23)
8 December 1961	An unidentified male called the Embassy and asked for Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN (Third Secretary, suspect KGB officer). The caller was told BROVKIN had left Mexico and Sr. KOSTIKOV had taken his place.	(24)
6 January 1963	Subject was in Vera Cruz.	(25)
7 April 1963	Subject departed Mexico City, via Sabena no. 556, accompanied by his family for home leave in the USSR.	(26)
14 May 1963	Subject returned from home leave, accompanied by his family.	(27)
4 December 1963	Subject's address was Progreso 9, Apt. 6. In early 1965, Subject still had the same address.	(28) (29)
	March 1965, "Diario Official" lists Subject at this same address.	
7 December 1963	Subject went to Cuernavaca.	
	(COMMENT: Duration of his stay unknown, but believed to have been a pleasure trip.)	(30)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION (including justification, sources and narrative discussion):

Subject is a known KGB Officer probably from the 13th Department of the First Chief Directorate, identified as such through the AEBURBLE case. (See Intelligence Activities). (31)

Subject was a member of the group who met Sergey Nikolayevich ANTONOV, Chief of the Latin American Department of the KGB, at the Airport. (32)

Subject continued the clandestine contact with Margarito LNU (See Western Contacts), an unidentified agent previously handled by First Secretary Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV, formerly KGB Rezident. (33)

Subject has frequently escorted diplomatic couriers to and from the airport, a function primarily of the consular section officers and, as far as is known, principally a KGB responsibility. (33)

In the consular office all of Subject's immediate associates are identified KGB officers. (See Soviet contacts). (34)

13. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, functions, agents, contacts, other details, including how we learned about each item, all in chronological order including narrative summary where necessary, such as D/A cases, incidents, etc):

About March 1963, Subject and CARMASHEV (see Soviet Contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana, Baja California, where they rented a Hertz car allegedly for a recreational visit. The men travelled to Mexicali and Ensenada and departed for Mexico City on 13 March 1963. (35) (36)

On 1 September 1963, Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) flew from Mexico City to Tijuana where they rented a Hertz auto. While renting the auto, Subject was asked for identification. Subject stated he was an employee of the Mexican Department of Exterior Relations. Later, when pressed for identification, Subject stated he was an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Subject and ALFERYEV spent most of their time in the company of Isaak Carlos Chapluk (see Western contacts). The Soviets visited Estero Beach, Punta Banda and Nuna SIMANOVICH's curio shop (see Western contacts). On 7 September 1964, they visited the Bahia Motel for dinner and a floor show in the company of Miguel POPOFF (see Western contacts). On 10 September 1963 the Soviets purchased 20,000 bales of cotton to be shipped to Ensenada, final destination unknown. Subject and ALFERYAV were also in contact with Demetrio ALMAGUER (see Western contacts). ALMAGUER was allegedly authorized by the Soviets to find three Mexican youths to travel and study in the USSR. The two Soviets departed Tijuana on 13 September 1963. (37)

On 19 January 1964, when LICOZY/5 (a Station double agent) returned to his apartment building, SHUBIN (see Soviet contacts) and Subject were seated in a car outside and NECHIPORENKO (LICOZY/5's case officer) was about to ring the door bell. NECHIPORENKO told LICOZY/5 that PRIKHODKO (the former KGB case officer) was in town and wanted to see LICOZY/5. NECHIPORENKO also gave LICOZY/5 tickets for the Soviet Soccer game on 19 January 1964. (38)

(COMMENT: LICOZY/5 is being handled by NECHIPORENKO and is a KGB agent. This is the only known occasion of Subject being involved with LICOZY/5 in anything but an overt business contact.)

Subject met with AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963 and received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME. Subject also gave AEBURBLE requirements of the same nature to be carried out in the future. Subject made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City, with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963, AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the U.N. Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive reliable source as a member of the KGB's 13th Department. (31)

Substantiating information that Subject is a member of the KGB is derived from his connections with Margarito LNU (see Western contacts) undoubtedly an agent (unidentified) formerly in contact with the former First Secretary and KGB Rezident Viktor Nikolayevich GLOTOV. (33

Subject attempted to cultivate David T. PATON (see American contacts) an American Embassy officer formerly assigned to the Visa Section and who now has protocol functions (1965). This cultivation ceased, as far as is known to the Station, immediately after the Station (with Embassy approval) advised PATON to indicate to Subject his disinterest in socializing with him. (33)

201-305052

Since 1 August 1964, Subject has received in double talk, apparently clandestine calls from Ricardo LNU, an unidentified male with a Central American or Cuban accent. Meetings have been arranged at unnamed places.

(COMMENT: A Ricardo LNU with a Central American or Cuban accent has been in contact with Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, Second Secretary and Intelligence Officer, Cuban, Embassy, Mexico City.) (39) (40)

On 11 March 1963, one Ricardo PEREZ (not further identified) attempted to call Subject and left a message that he would like to meet with Subject the "place Subject knows" on the next Friday. (41)

(COMMENT: Ricardo PEREZ may be identical with RICARDO LNU of the above paragraph because of the similar trend in conversation in arranging meetings. One Ricardo PEREZ called the Cuban Embassy, on 26 June 1964 to tell Antonio GARCIA Lara, 201-328338, Commercial Attache and Intelligence Officer, Cuban Embassy, Mexico City, that he had a message for GARCIA from Marguerita DALTON Mexican citizen, student at University of Havana and sister of Raque DALTON, Cuban IS Agent. (42)

14. NON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (positions, function, contacts, general activity):

On 18 January 1962, Subject called Valeriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU Chauffeur, and asked for data on the trade of Mexico with Red China for "this year". (43)

On 27 March 1962, Subject called the Belgian Embassy to obtain transit visas for two Soviet artists transiting Belgium. (40)

On 7 July 1962, Subject was in Cuernavaca, probably for a pleasure trip. (44)

Subject called LICOZY/5 on 24 August 1962, and asked about travelling by plane from Mexico to Trinidad. LICOZY/5 explained that one would have to go from Mexico to Caracas to Trinidad. Subject stated he would order tickets in September. (19)

(COMMENT: The Station has no additional information on this matter.)

Subject called Jorge RUEDA to complain because two weeks previously an order had been placed with RUEDA to find a specialist to repair the billiard table at the Embassy. (45)

On 7 January 1963, Subject called GARMASHEV (see Soviet contacts) long distance from Vera Cruz, where he had gone to make medical arrangements for a Soviet seaman burned in a shipboard fire. Subject had an automobile accident while on his trip which he related to GARMASHEV. GARMASHEV told Subject he would have to pay his own expenses back to Mexico City and also pay his expenses when he returns for the car after it's repaired. (25)

In mid-November 1963, Subject went to Cuautla, (near Mexico City) apparently for recreational reasons. (46)

On 16 April 1964, Subject called the Embassy and aksed that Aleksandr Mikhaylovich DENISOV, Third Secretary and GRU officer, call New York and tell "them" (not further identified) the couriers left on Aeronaves de Mexico, flight # 400 at 10:45 am and also asked that DENISOV then call Vladimir P. GOULINE, Attache-Chief of the Secret Files and Suspect KGB Officer, and tell him "everything is all right". (47)

On 29 January 1963, an unidentified man called the Embassy and left a message for Subject to go to the EDITORIAL to see the new edition. The caller also said "it's urgent". (48)

(COMMENT: EDITORIAL may be identical with Editorial Jus S.A. Plaza de Abasolo 14, Col. Guerrero, Mexico 3, D.F.)

In September and October 1963, Lee Harvey OSWALD (see Western contacts) was in contact with Subject regarding a visa so that OSWALD might return to the Soviet Union.

On 14 September 1964, FNU ALFARO of Mexicana de Aviacion called Subject to say that Subject's Customs Declaration for importing two cameras to Mexico was valid until the 17th, and that he (ALFARO) needed information for the financial details to be arranged. (50)

Subject has made travel arrangements for members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and also visiting delegations and Soviet TDYers. Subject has ~~[illegible]~~ relationship with Sabona, Cubana and LICOZY/5 for this purpose. (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59)

Subject has acted as an interpreter and guide for visiting Soviet delegations. (60) (61) (62) (63) (64)

Subject directed Sr. HERON (see Western contacts) in sending packages to the USSR. Subject advised that the duties for the Soviet value for the articles to be sent had to be paid in Mexico. (65)

Subject has often been in contact with Villana Cia, a customs brokerage firm, about shipments of articles to or from Mexico. (66) (67) (6)

Subject is a member of the Consular Corps in Mexico (Organization of Consular Officers). (68) (69)

15. CONTACTS (all known friends and associates; including foreign diplomatic, business and social contacts, with dates, nature of association and identifying data broken down in the following categories):

a. Soviet friends and associates:

Luz Maria Koulfman de SERLOVA aka Luz VERNOVA, wife of Carlos LAGUNAS Zavala (201-138040). Subject was called on 5 June 1962 by SERLOVA, who said she would like to see him. The arranged a time. (70)

Oleg Pavlovich MOSKVICHEV: Former employee of the Commercial Office and identified KGB Officer for S&T work. Subject called MOSKVICHEV on 13 November 1962tto ask if he might borrow MOSKVICHEV's car to go to the dentist. (71)

Antonia Libertad PATAN Lopez: Spanish "nino" employed in the Soviet Information Bulletin Office. PATAN called Subject on 21 November 1962 and stated that she'd left some documents at the Consular Office and was told to call Subject. Subject said he looked through her documents and they were all in order. (72)

(COMMENT: It is unknown what kind of documents these were, but they may have concerned a Soviet passport.)

Aleksey Ivanovich GARMASHEV: First Secretary and KGB Officer, suspect deputy KGB Rezident. Subject and GARMASHEV flew from Mexico City to Tijuana in March 1963. (35)

Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO: Vice-Consul and known KGB Officer. Subject and NECHIPORENKO are social contacts. NECHIPORENKO called Subject at the Embassy on 26 June 1964 and told Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, Employee Guard and suspect KGB Officer, to get Subject on the phone, "but don't say anything to the others". NECHIPORENKO instructed Subject to go to his (NECHIPORENKO's) house and said, "I'll wait for you near the store that sells paints, but not the nearest one, the one on the corner." NECHIPORENKO called Dr. SORIANO (see Western contacts) for Subject who was sick in bed. Subject and NECHIPORENKO share the use of a Volkswagon. (73) (74) (75) (13) (76)

Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV: Pravda Correspondent and identified KGB Officer. Subject and ALFERYEV flew to Tijuana on 1 September 1963. (77)

Vitaliy Borisovich SHUBIN: Attache and identified KGB Officer. Subject and family and the SHUBINs have taken vacations together at Cuernavaca. SHUBIN and Subject are personal friends. (78) (79) (80) (13)

Igor KRUGLIY: Member of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation visiting Mexico in December 1963. Subject accompanied and interpreted for members of this group. Subject and SHUBIN drank with KRUGLIY while on the town one night. (64)

Sergey Sergeyevich KONSTANTINOV: First Secretary and KGB Rezident. Subject and KONSTANTINOV are in business and social contact. (13) (76)

Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV: Minister Counsular and suspect KGB Officer. Subject has dined at the KAZANTSEV home. (13)

Rudolph Petrovich SHLYAPNIKOV: Soviet Youth Leader on UNESCO scholarship (suspect KGB) who visited Mexico during September 1964 and was in contact with Subject at this time. (81)

Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV: INTOURIST Representative in the Commercial Office and suspect KGB Officer. Subject used NIKIFOROV's car in January 1965, after he'd had an accident with his own car. (82)

Yuriy Demitriyevich KALININ: KGB Chauffeur. He visits LICOWL/1's store frequently and Subject is often with him. Subject drove KALININ home after KALININ got very drunk at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. (20) (83)

Jana KANKOVSKA: Secretary at the Czech Commercial Office. KANKOVSKA called Subject on 16 December 1964 and apologized for not being at home when Subject came over to pick up the "notes". (84)

Alfredo MIRABAL Diaz: Cuban Consul in Mexico City and known Cuban Intelligence Officer. MIRABAL called the Soviet Embassy on 22 November 1963 and asked to speak to Pavel Antonivich YATSKOV, Consul and identified KGB Officer, who was unavailable. Subject took the call and spoke to MIRABAL using the familiar tu.

SUBJECT: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIRABAL: Did you recover the suitcase?

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

SUBJECT: Yes.

MIRABAL: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

SUBJECT: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you. (At this point Subject in error addressed MIRABAL as AZCUE and MIRABAL corrected him. COMMENT: MIRABAL replaced Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, Former Cuban Consul. COMMENT: According to LILYRIC Subject did not go on a trip.) Have you already talked with NECHIPORENKO?

MIRABAL: I'd like to talk with Pavel YATSKOV.

Subject: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIRABAL: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour on # 11-28-47 (phone).

SUBJECT: Okay. (121) (122) (123)

b. PBPRIME citizens, official and non-official, including KUBARK staff officers and contract types:

Lee Harvey OSWALD: When OSWALD was attempting to return to the USSR he contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and spoke with Subject. (49)

David PATON: U.S. Embassy Clerk in charge of processing diplomatic visas. Subject was in contact with PATON, when Subject went to the U.S. Embassy to obtain a transit visa for Yelena Nikolayevna FILIPPOVA. Subject handed to PATON, CARMASHEV's calling card on the back of which was a time notation for a previous invitation CARMASHEV had extended to PATON. PATON explained to Subject that he could not accept this invitation. Subject continued to have legitimate contact with PATON arranging transit visas for travelling Soviets. (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92)

Carol MILLER: Employee of Life Magazine. MILLER called Subject on 2 October 1964 to ask if there were anything the Soviets wished to add to an article being printed in Life magazine. Subject said no. (149)

LIERECT-1: A former Mexico City Station asset of current interest to the Station as an LCIMPROVE possibility. See 201-212649 Subject visited LIERECT-1's Cuernavaca home on Easter 1964. (158)

c. Other Western officials and citizens:

LICOZY-5: Subject has had legitimate business contact with LICOZY/5 while making travel arrangements for Soviets. Subject has also been in social contact with LICOZY/5. (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (72) (98)

Dr. Mario LAGUNILLA Leca: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject has been in contact with LAGUNILLA for medical reasons. (7)

Margarito LNU: An unidentified male who has been in seemingly clandestine contact with members of the Soviet Embassy since 27 January 1961. Subject has had several calls from Margarito arranging times to meet at places "they know". Margarito has usually stated in his calls that he has some new books. (99) (100) (101) (102) (103)

Oscar GUTIERREZ: A Cuban who called the Embassy on 28 November 1962 and asked for "Valeriy". (104)

201-305052

Natalia DARE: (Not further identified.) DARE called Subject on 21 October 1963 and left a message that "Natalia DARE from Acapulco called and she will return to do it because tomorrow she is leaving by plane". (105)

Maria de la Paz CERVANTES: Mexican employee of Sabena Airline's downtown office. Subject has made travel arrangements with CERVANTES. On 16 April 1962, CERVANTES called the Embassy to invite Soviets to a dinner she was giving for Igor OISTRAKH, the violinist, to which Subject invited himself.

(COMMENT: The entire guest list consisted of RIS types.)

CERVANTES and Subject have a friendly relationship and on one occasion after she had taken care of some problems with passports for him, Subject asked what he owed her. The answer was "caviar", Subject then asked what else, CERVANTES replied "a kiss". (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120)

Dr. Emilian SORIANO: Medical doctor used by Soviet Embassy personnel. Subject was in contact with SORIANO on several occasions because his wife required an operation. (7) (124) (9) (125)

Lorenzo ZELAYA Romero: Honduran Communist and members of the PPS in Mexico. ZELAYA called Subject on 4 January 1963 to ask if Subject had heard anything about Rafael LNU (not further identified). Subject has been in subsequent contact with ZELAYA for unknown reasons. (64) (126) (127)

Jorge de la GARZA Corcho: Employee of La Libertad Cia Gral de Seguros, S.A. Insurance Company. Subject was in contact with GARZA following his car accident in Vera Cruz. (128) (129) (130) (131) (103) (132) (133)

Terro de WANSTROM or WANSTROHM (phonetic): Swedish citizen. On 12 November 1963, WANSTROM called the Soviet Embassy and asked to speak to Mr. Andre PURITS (phonetic) later spelling it as Anheny PYRCZ, who alledgedly worked for the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, in the Trade Commissions Department. WANSTROM stated he had met this man in a restaurant in Oaxaca and related his problem of finding a ship on which to travel to Europe. The unidentified man suggested he call the Soviet Embassy, which WANSTROM did, and was referred to Subject with whom he spoke. On 13 November 1963, Subject told WANSTROM there was a Polish Ocean Lines Co., at Alvaro Obregon 223-102, leaving Vera Cruz and going to Bremen, Germany, and Gdynia, Poland. WANSTROM thought Bremen would suit their purpose. Subject gave WANSTROM the telephone number of the company and was most solicitous about WANSTROM's arranging proper accomodations. (134) (12) (135)

(COMMENT: The response of the Soviet Embassy Officials was very unusual in this case. Requests of this nature are usually brushed aside and most often in a very rude manner. Judging by his non-British accent and almost flawless English, WANSTROM must have lived in the U.S. or Canada for some time.)

Dr. Antonio KARCZMAR Bugarskiy: Medical Doctor used by the Soviet Embassy. Subject's wife was treated by KARCZMAR. (66)

Ramon PENUNERE and Dometrio ALMAGUER: PENUNERE is an MLN member and a farmer residing in the Ejido Mezquital, Mexicali, Baja California. ALMAGUER is a PCM member residing in Mexicali, Baja California. (136)

ALMAGUER contacted PENUNERE some time before mid-November 1964, stating he'd been in contact with to two Soviets in Tijuana. ALMAGUER said the Soviets had authorized him to locate three youths for travel and study in the USSR. ALMAGUER asked PENUNERE if he had a son who could meet the qualifications. PENUNERE subsequently stated he had received information leaflets on scholarships in the USSR from ALMAGUER, who allegedly had gotten them from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City when he visited there. ALMAGUER later stated he had seen Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) in Baja California and that they had given him two bottles of vodka and instructed him to select two students to attend the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in the USSR. (136)

Antonina SHIPPER Podornick: SHIPPER is a contact of Pavel Atonovich YATSKOV, Consul and KGB Officer. YATSKOV apparently instructed SHIPPER to call Subject. On 29 June 1964, she requested that Subject go to the Judge with her, since she had problems arising from the fact her father died leaving an estate without a will. (138) (139) (140)

Sr. Justo BRETON: (not further identified) BRETON called Subject on 3 July 1964 about a "help" certificate (certificado de ayuda).

LICOWL/1: Owner of a store frequented by Soviets. Subject has attended parties at LICOWL/1's home, and also frequents the store. (143) (144)

Ricardo LNU: (Not further identified) Ricardo LNU calls Subject at the Embassy, and meetings at unstated places are arranged. These calls do not seem to have a specific pattern but definitely seem to be clandestine. Ricardo LNU and Subject always know where they will meet, usually the calls are for arranging the time. (145) (146) (147) (148) (61)

Isaac Carlos CHAPLUK: (201-229418) Owner of Playa Bungalows in Ensenada, Baja California. Subject and ALFERYEV were guests of CHAPLUK's for dinner on several occasions when they visited Ensenada. CHAPLUK also took them to SIMONOVICH's store (see Western contacts). (37)

Miguel POPOFF: Allegedly Richfield Oil Distributors in Ensenada, Baja California. Russian-born with Mexican citizenship. Subject and ALFERYEV were in contact with POPOFF in September 1963, while in Ensenada. (37)

Miguel BAZHER: Hungarian living in Mexico. BAZHER spoke to Subject on 17 October 1964 in regard to bringing a Hungarian to Mexico. Subject stated he was only authorized to handle problems of this nature for Soviets, but, that if BAZHER could get a letter from Hungarian officials, Subject would see what could be done about it. (150)

Unidentified Nicaraguan: An unidentified Nicaraguan male called Subject on 8 November 1965 and stated he had something for Subject. Subject asked him to come by the Embassy the next day. (151)

Virginia GOMEZ Nieto: Hairdresser, member of the Women's Group of International Organization of Journalists, and a leftist. GOMEZ called the Embassy and left a message for Subject, stating she would be over to see him on the following Monday. (152)

Sra. Maria GONZALEZ and her daughter Juana: Subject became interested in Juana at LICOWL/1's fiesta in September 1964. Maria GONZALEZ stated to LICOWL/1 that Subject had offered her daughter 300 pesos a week to be his girl friend. Subject and Viktor KALININ, Administrator, met with Maria GONZALEZ and Lourdes CUEVAS on 26 Septomber 1964, in an attempt by GONZALEZ to fix Subject up with CUEVAS, because she didn't want her daughter going with Subject. (4)

Sr. fnu HERON or HARON: HERON called Subject on 19 January 1965, in order to find out how to mail a package to the Lithuanian USSR. Subject gave HERON a detailed explanation. (65)

Dr. Arseny LEPEAUCA: Medical doctor residing at Sinaloa 109, telephone 28-95-28. LEPEAUCA called Subject on 5 January 1965 to invite him to a "Rosca" party at his home the next day. (153) (155)

Jose Luis FERNANDEZ: FERNANADEZ was in contact with Subject concerning a trip to the USSR for an operation. (154) (155)

Manuel SUAREZ Angeles: Pianist who has studied music in Moscow (1963). Subject, NECHIPORENKO (see Western contacts) and the Ambassador were invited to the SUAREZ home. (156)

Dr. Luis QUINTANILLA del Valle: Leftist Director of the Institute for Living, Mexico. QUINTANILLA's secretary called the Embassy and told Subject, 19 manuals of Marx were missing from the package Subject or Svyatoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, First Secretary, Cultural Officer and KGB Officer, sent over and would they please send copies when they are again available. (158)

fnu SAN MARTIN: Employee of Television Channel 11. SAN MARTIN called the Embassy on 5 March 1964 to cancel a date he had with Subject. (159)

Armando MARTINEZ: MARTINEZ called the Embassy on 26 October 1964 and left a message that he wanted to speak to Subject. He also stated that he had told Subject he would call, and that it was urgent. (29)

Nuna SIMANOVICH: Owner and operator of the NUNA SIMANOVICH Curio Shop, Ruiz Ave., Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico. Subject and ALFERYEV (see Soviet contacts) visited SIMANOVICH's store in September 1963, and Subject told him if he wished to travel to the USSR, it could very easily be arranged. Subject also told SIMANOVICH he was attached to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (136)

Marta BORQUEZ de la Fuente (201-745287): BORQUEZ called the Embassy on 29 April 1964 and asked for the Vice-Consul. It is unknown whether she meant Subject or NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts), as neither was available.

d. OTHERS (Subject has numerous business and social contacts at Sabena Airlines, especially the following):

Jorge CORTES R.: Assistant Station Manager of Sabena Airlines at the Mexico City Airport. CORTES has invited Subject for a beer at his house and was also one of the signers of a Christmas card sent to Subject by Sabena Employees. (106) (107) (73)

(COMMENT: NECHIPORENKO (see Soviet contacts) LICOZY/5's case officer, levied a requirement on LICOZY/5 for information on CORTES. According to LICOZY/5, CORTES is a young, serious, honorable employee who was previously in Sabena's cargo department, later promoted to assistant Station Manager and is now on his way up.)

Adolfo BUCIO G.: Employee of Sabena at Mexico City Airport. BUCIO called Subject to invite him to a party at the home of Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH. Subject often calls BUCIO to find out arrival times of planes. BUCIO was also a signer of the above Christmas card. (108) (109) (57) (110) (111)

Maria del Socorro VOLLRATH: Employees at Sabena Mexico City Airport. VOLLRATH resides at Pennsylvania 254, Apt. 2. VOLLRATH signed the above Christmas card and is apparently on a friendly relationship with Subject. T She expected Subject to meet her at the airport "with a drink" when she returned from a trip to Europe. (57) (109) (110)

The following are employees of the Sabena office at the airport which LIFIRE found to be in contact with Subject. (112)

Alberto L. ALFARO
Carlos ALANIS Cantu
Jorge CASTILLO Carrera
Carlos MENDOZA S., Jr.
Enrique NUNEZ S.
Yvonne HENONIN

16. PAST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AGAINST SUBJECT:(chronological, with narrative summary of each item):

During his tours in Mexico City, Subject has been under routine LIENVOY and LIEMPTY surveillance. However, during the period following 22 November 1963, LILYRIC, LIEMBRACE, LIMITED and LIRICE surveillance were mounted on Subject because of his telephone contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. (49)

After 23 November 1963, the LIEMBRACE surveillance team and LILYRIC and LIMITED base houses all reported Subject under DFS surveillance and Station surveillance was dropped. (160)

On 19, 20 and 21 January 1965, Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance as a followup to a report from LIEMPTY stating that Subject was not behaving in his normal fashion. Nothing significant was developed. (16)

17. OPERATIONAL PLANNING DATA:

a. for access:

(1) current residence (address, floor plan, owner, neighbors, other pertinent data):

Subject lives at Progreso 9, Interior (apartment) 6, Mexico D.F. (28)

(2) phone:

Subject has no known home phone.

(3) Car (license, description, where garaged and serviced):

Subject shares a 1963 white Vokswagon, license # D-336, with NECHIPORENKO. During 19,20 and 21 January 1965, while Subject was under LIEMBRACE surveillance, it was noted Subject had had an accident and was using a white 1963 Volkswagon, license # D-335 usually used by NIKIFOROV (see Soviet contacts) and Boris Sergeyevich ZOBNIN, Commercial Officer Employee and suspect KGB officer. (13) (34) (82)

(4) Office (location, floor plan, phone number, immediate associates, etc.):

Subject usually occupies a desk on the second floor of the Embassy in an area allotted to the Consular section. (76)

(5) current pattern of daily activity (including routes taken, hours, where eats, sports, hobbies, clubs):

Subject arrives at the Embassy at approximately 9:00am and leaves and re-enters many times during the day. (161)

(6) usable contacts:

Members of the Consular Corps:

Subject seems to be more than moderately active in this organization.

LICOWL/1

b. for assessment:

(1) exploitable points

(2) Other data

(3) Handwriting samples

18. OPERATIONAL STEPS TO BE CARRIED OUT NEXT YEAR (planning, with concrete steps for action or investigation, acquisition or further data, etc):

a. Continuance of regular LIEMPTY and LIENVOY reporting and occasional coverage by LIEMBRACE surveillance.

b. Continuance of LICOWL/1 regular reporting on Subject and, in addition, further LICOWL/1 effort to get Subject embroiled in intimate relationship with indigenous females.

c. Effort to obtain another access agent against Subject. The Station is presently investigating the possibility of developing one of Subject's several Sabena Airlines contacts for this purpose.

19. SOURCES

(1) USEMB Moscow 3662, Control 22299, 30 June 1961

(2) LIFIRE, 29 September 1961

(3) KUBARK Memo to Political Section, 25 September 1963

(4) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 29 September 1964

(5) LICOWL/1, Contact Report, 27 August 1964

(6) LIENVOY, 18 February 1964

(7) LIENVOY, 27 October 1962

(8) LIENVOY, 29 October 1962

(9) LIENVOY, 9 November 1962

(10) LIENVOY, 17 October 1962

(11) DIR-20944, 28 February 1963

(12) LIENVOY, 13 November 1963

(13) LIENVOY

(14) Memot to State Dept, 25 September 1963

(15) Memo to Legal Attache, 13 November 1964

(16) MEXI-7061, 25 November 1963

(17) LIENVOY, 19 February 1964

(18) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 20 August 1964

(19) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 24 August 1964

(20) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 17 September 1964

(21) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 3 September 1964

(22) REDCAP Sheet from Headquarters

(23) MEXI-9079, 3 October 1961

(24) LIENVOY, 78 December 1961

(25) LIENVOY, 7 January 1963

(26) MEXI-4126, 9 April 1963

(27) MEXI-4615, 16 May 1963

(28) LIENVOY, 4 December 1963

(29) LIENVOY, 26 October 1964

(30) LIENVOY, 7 December 1963

(31) HMMW-13305, 13 January 1965

(32) MEXI-7690, 8 January 1964

(33) HMMA-22652, 20 December 1963

(34) STATION OBSERVATION

(35) PBSWING Telegram, 14 March 1963

(36) PBSWING Memo, 15 March 1963
(37) FBI Memo to KUBARK, 31 January 1964
(38) MEXI-7930, 24 January 1964
(39) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 6 March 1962
(40) Cuban LIENVOY Resumen, 27 March 1962
(41) LIENVOY, 11 March 1963
(42) Cuban LIENVOY 26 June 1964
(43) LIENVOY, 18 January 1962
(44) LIENVOY, 7 July 1962
(45) LIENVOY, 21 August 1962
(46) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963
(47) LIENVOY, 16 April 1964
(48) LIENVOY, 29 January 1963
(49) MEXI-7025, 23 November 1963
(50) LIENVOY, 14 September 1964
(51) LIENVOY, 6 August 1964
(52) LIENVOY, 5 April 1963
(53) LIENVOY, 17 August 1964
(54) LIENVOY, 26 September 1964
(55) LAENVOY, 19 July 1963
(56) LIENVOY, 9 January 1964
(57) LIENVOY, 3 March 1964
(58) LIENVOY, 18 September 1964
(59) MEXI-0277, 15 July 1964
(60) LIENVOY, 31 January 1964
(61) LIENVOY, 1 October 1964
(62) LIENVOY, 6 November 1964
(63) LIENVOY, 3 November 1964
(64) LIENVOY, 6 December 1963
(65) LIENVOY, 19 January 1965
(66) LIENVOY, 19 Febeuary 1964
(67) LIENVOY, 24 February 1964
(68) LIENVOY, 14 February 1962
(69) LIENVOY, 6 October 1964
(70) LIENVOY, 5 June 1962

(71) LIENVOY, 13 November 1962
(72) LIENVOY, 21 Nobember 1962
(73) LIENVOY, 23 May 63
(74) LIENVOY, 26 June 1964
(75) LIENVOY, 6 January 1965
(76) LIEMPTY Observation
(77) PBSWING Memo, 10 September 1963
(78) LIENVOY, 23 October 1963
(79) LIENVOY, 8 December 1963
(80) LIENVOY, 29 May 1964
(81) MEXI-1242, 14 October 1964
(82) LIEMBRACE
(83) LICOWL/1 Contact Report, 10 September 1964
(84) LIENVOY, 16 December 1964
(85) HMMA-18727, 16 March 1962
(86) LIENVOY, 21 March 1962
(87) LIENVOY, 28 May 1962
(88) LIENVOY, 6 June 1962
(89) LIENVOY, 2 July 1962
(90) LIENVOY, 21 July 1962
(91) LIENVOY, 13 July 1962
(92) LIENVOY, 16 July 1962
(93) LIENVOY, 24 August 1962
(94) HMMA-20199, 14 November 1962
(95) HMMA-20775, 20 February 1963
(96) LIENVOY, 9 August 1963
(97) LIENVOY, 18 July 1964
(98) LIENVOY, 27 August 1964
(99) MEXI-7051, 24 November 1963
(100) RESUMEN, 15 August 1962
(101) LIENVOY, 22 November 1962
(102) LIENVOY, 4 January 1963
(103) LIENVOY, 25 February 1963
(104) LIENVOY, 28 November 1962
(105) LIENVOY, 21 October 1963

SECRET

(106) MEXI-2436, 8 February 1965

(107) LIENVOY, 22 October 1963

(108) LIENVOY, 26 August 1964

(109) LIENVOY, 26 September 1963

(110) LIENVOY, 21 April 1964

(111) LIENVOY, 28 May 1964

(112) LIFIRE, 21 March 1964

(113) LIENVOY, 16 April 1962

(114) LIENVOY, 24 December 1963

(115) LIENVOY, 10 December 1963

(116) LIENVOY, 28 March 1963

(117) LIENVOY, 10 June 1964

(118) LIENVOY, 20 May 1964

(119) LIENVOY, 6 March 1964

(120) LIENVOY, 9 March 1964

(121) MEXI-7035, 23 November 1963

(122) LIENVOY, 22 NOvember 1963

(123) MEXI-7038, 23 November 1963

(124) LIENVOY, 29 October 1963

(125) LIENVOY, 10 November 1962

(126) LIENVOY, 17 March 1964

(127) RESUMEN, 4 January 1963

(128) LIENVOY, 21 January 1963

(129) LIENVOY, 22 January 1963

(130) LIENVOY, 21 February 1963

(131) LIENVOY, 22 February 1963

(132) LIENVOY, 27 February 1963

(133) LIENVOY, 6 March 1963

(134) LIENVOY, 12 November 1963

(135) HMMA-22630, 19 December 1963

(136) Memo from Legal Attache, 11 March 1964

(137) LIENVOY, 29 April 1964

(138) LIENVOY, 3 June 1964

(139) LIENVOY, 2 June 1964

(140) LIENVOY, 29 June 1964

SECRET

(141) LIENVOY, 1 July 1964

(142) LIENVOY, 3 July 1964

(143) HMMA-23982, 27 July 1964

(144) LICOWL/1, Contact Reports

(145) LIENVOY, 5 October 1964

(146) LIENVOY, 1 August 1964

(147) LIENVOY, 9 December 1964

(148) LIENVOY, 18 December 1964

(149) LIENVOY, 2 October 1964

(150) LIENVOY, 17 October 1964

(151) LIENVOY, 8 November 1963

(152) LIENVOY, 15 November 1963

(153) LIENVOY, 5 January 1965

(154) LIENVOY, 31 July 1964

(155) LIENVOY, 5 August 1964

(156) LIENVOY, ~~25 April 1964~~ 9 June 64

(157) LIENVOY, 24 April 1964

(158) Memo, 2 April 1964

(159) LIENVOY, 5 March 1964

(160) MEXI-7041, 23 NOvember 1963

(161) LILYRIC Logs

201-30505-

14-00000

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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PAGE 1 OF 2

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM

Mexico City

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, ADDP, C/SRS, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CI/SD

S
E C R E T 222354Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3885

MEXI 3885

SUBJ TO LEAVE MEXI 28 APR FOR ABOUT A WEEK TRIP NEW YORK / WASH.

KAPOK REDCOAT CIMPROVE LICOZY 5

23 Jun 65 IN 96432

REF MEXI 3339 (IN 61154)*

per CSN 43-43

22 June 65

1. SUBJ RETURNED MEXI 13 JUNE. NECHIPORENKO AND KOSTIKOV AT HIS OFFICE 14 JUNE ARRANGE EMB RESERVATIONS. HAD LUNCH WITH N 17 JUNE.

2. RE EUROPEAN TRIP, N ASKED IF HAD LOOKED UP TOUR OPERATOR ASSOCIATES. GOT GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE FROM SUBJ WHO EXPLAINED CONDUCTED LITTLE BUSINESS SINCE WITH FAMILY. OUT OF BLUE, N ASKED IF SUBJ KNEW GINETTE PALACCI OF SIRTAM VOYAGES 49 RUE ST ROCHE PARIS. L 1 SAID SUPERFICIALLY ACQUAINTED, SHE ABOUT 27, JEWISH ORIGIN, LEFT CAIRO AFTER SUEZ CRISIS, WENT PARIS AFTER STAY ROME. N SAID SHE OF INTEREST SINCE MARRIED BRIT ABOUT FEW MOS AGO, AND BRIT IS NATO EMPLOYEE. INSTRUCTED SUBJ ASSESS CULTIVATE WHEN NEXT SEES HER. L 5 DID NOT CATCH BRIT'S NAME AS GIVEN BY N.

3. N ADVISED SUBJ OF HIS "PROMOTION" TO CAPTAIN AND SAID WOULD BE ADVISED MORE FORMALLY OF SAME BY PRIKHODKO OR HIGHER LEVEL PERSON IF SUBJ VISITS MOSCOW. SUBJ JUST ABOUT TOLD N THIS A JOKE, WENT ON VEHEMENTLY ASK N WHAT WAS OP ALL ABOUT, WAS THERE POSSIBILITY END OF SOV PROCRASTINATION RE BRANCH OFFICE, HAVE THEY

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET N 96432 PAGE 2 of 2

LEARNED BY NOW HE HAS NO TIME OR INCLINATION SNEAK AROUND SATISFY PERTH AMBOY TYPE REQUIREMENTS. WOUND UP ASKING IF COULD DISCUSS MATTERS WITH PRIKHODKO. N REPLIED WITH USUAL ROUTINE OF NECESSITY PATIENCE, SUBJ'S INVALUABLE POTENTIAL, THAT PRIKHODKO'S PRESENT HIGH OVERT POSITION INHIBITED CLANDESTINE MEETS. SAID HAD WRITTEN ANOTHER REPORT HOME RE BRANCH OFFICE, INCLUDING INFO OF SUBJ'S AFL CONNECTIONS AND THEREBY POINT OUT THAT BRANCH WOULD HAVE NO MONEY LOSSES. BUT NO MOSCOW REPLY YET. N STILL WANTS SUBJ FIND CANDIDATES BRANCH MGR.

4. NO ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR NEXT MEET.

5. SUBJ TENTATIVELY PLANNING GO LOS ANGELES 9 JULY FOR BUSINESS WITH UNITOURS.

6. INDEX PALACCI.

SECRET

S E C R E T

14-00000

KOSTI.YOU

DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO Chief, SR Division

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Operational/REDCOAT/Sylvia MCDONALD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI 3395

Transmitted herewith is a report amplifying reference information.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachment:
Contact Report

Distribution:
2 WHD, w/att, (2 copies)
1 SRD, w/att, (1 cy)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-2618
HMMA-2618

DATE
21 May 65
21 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

12 May 1965

SUBJECT: Contact Report/ Silvia McDonald
12 May; Maria Cristina garden

1. Gestetner, known as Don Jackson, and Marheims, introduced as Mort Bryan, met Subject on 12 May. Subject reported on her attendance at the WWII Victory celebration at the SovEmb held on 9 May, and its aftermath on 11 May at the art gallery of Alfredo Santos.

2. Subj, who attended the reception alone, her invited friend Georgina did not go, attracted a small circle of companions during the evening. First, there was a Guatemalan, a professor at the National University, who made conversation, learned she was a singer, and spoke of having her appear at a concert in Puebla. Next, Vladimir Andreev, his receiving line duties ended, joined her. Their conversation dealt with artists in Mexico, a pick-up from the first time they had met at the Santos Gallery some two months ago. Then, Valeriy came by and seemed to be mostly interested in watching Subject. Subj took an instant dislike to Valeriy (probably Kostikov). A short, blond Russian then drifted into the group, whom Subj pegged as a parachutist. This turned out to be accurate (probably Nikolai Leonov). Andreeva came by just about the time Subj was inviting the group to visit the Santos Gallery. Subj was just about able to include Andreeva in the invitation, and then Andreeva was gone from the group. The invitation was for 11 May at 1100. During the evening Andreev mentioned that he would like Subj to perform at the SovEmb. Subj said she would, but ~~no~~ details for the engagement were made.

3. On 11 May Andreev and Valeriy showed up at the Santos Gallery. Subj introduced them to Alfredo Santos. Andreev seemed to be enchanted by the Gallery; Valeriy was less demonstrative. They had brought a bottle of Vodka and passed a few hours in the company of Alfredo. Subj confirmed her distaste for Valeriy, and formed her impression of Andreev that he wanted to break out of dull Soviet circles into the gayer, freer atmosphere of the artist set in Mexico. No specific appointment was made for Subj to see either of the two Sovs another time.

4. Subj, in her concern to know where this operation was taking her and the part she was to play in it, rang in some additional characters in her personal life. There was Georgina (lnu), her very good friend, aimless, clinging to Subject's orbit, student at U of A, who considered Andreev a "dear." Subj considered that Andreev and Georgina might very well develop a relationship

because she, Subject, though willing to pursue a platonic friendship with Andreev would have none of the other, and it was not unlikely that Georgina might captivate Andreev. There was Antonio Garza, Subject's current boy-friend, a bodyguard to Diaz Ordaz, who was giving evidence of growing serious about her. Subj was concerned that her participation in the operation might in some way cause harm to Antonio. Subject who entertains a host of artist friends at her home expressed concern that if she were followed and spied upon, a misleading impression might be gained.

5. Other personal matters about Subject that came out in the conversation were that she has income from stocks (sufficient to maintain her in Mexico), she is in visitante artista status, would like to attain inmigrado because she has difficulties with the Musicians Union (AMDA) that hampers pursuit of her profession; she is not interested in marriage; she is opposed to by-passing the limitations on her work imposed by her status.

6. The C.O.'s, in their guidance to Subject, made it clear that she could pull out of the operation any time she wanted, that it was in her power to terminate it either with us or with the Sovs, if she got involved with them. She was told that there was absolutely no harm that could befall her boy-friend, Antonio, from her continued participation. As for Georgina, the chips would have to fall as they may with Andreev; since Subject was Georgina's confidante, we would be appreciative of knowing about Andreev's involvement in any affair. She wanted to know why we were interested in Andreev, and the C.O.'s gladhanded her to the extent of telling her that it was our business to know about important Soviets, since one never knew when a Soviet might be in need of "help." Subject indicated she was willing to go along further at a slow pace.

7. In talking about the Soviet Victory reception, the presence there of LICRAVE-1 (his picture had been in the News) came up. Subject said she knew L-1. She characterized L-1 as flighty. She said he didn't get along with his wife. She intimated that when L-1 was lonely, he chasedxf after female companionship. L-1 drops by Subject's place every so often. She knew that L-1 had left his father's business and had gone in for crop-dusting (a relatively recent development).

8. Arrangements were made that "Mort" would keep in touch with Subject about once a week by phone (Tel. 46-71-06, Calle Rio Nova #32) and that later she would be given an emergency number to call.

PRM

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, V. V.
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
C/O 13TH DEPT.
MEMBER KGB REZIDENTURA, MEXICO CITY.

050-008-010
HMMA-26081
14 MAY 65
A01 P1

R 6505262127

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S E C R E T 130150Z

KOSTIKOV

DIR CITE MEXI 3395 MEXI 3395

13 May 65

13 May 65 IN 65759

REDCOAT

1. SUBJ IS SYLVIA MCDONALD NEE MELANSON BORN 25 AUG 1934 BEVERLY, MASS. MARRIED 11 YEARS, DIVORCED MAR 1964 FROM BENSON MARION MCDONALD, AGE 40, RESIDENT MULLBERY, FLA. FATHER GREGORY MELANSON, MOTHER CAROLINE. SUBJ'S PROFESSION IS CONCERT LIEDER SINGER, RECENTLY CHANGING OVER TO POPULAR AND FOLK SINGING, ABOUT TO HAVE RECORDING RELEASED. IN MEXI THREE YEARS, VISITANTE STATUS. LIVES RELATIVELY POORLY, INCOME PRINCIPALLY FROM STOCKS DERIVING FROM ALIMONY SETTLEMENT. NO STA OR EMB TRACES.

2. PHONED EMB POLITICAL SECTION 8 MAY ASKING ADVICE RE PROPRIETY ATTEND 9 MAY SOVEMB RECEPTION. STATION DEBRIEFING YIELDED FOLL: ABOUT TWO MOS AGO SENT INVITATIONS TO ENTIRE DIP CORP FOR PAINTING EXHIBITION OF FRIEND. ONLY SOV ATTENDING WAS FIRST SEC VLADIMIR IVANOVICH ANDREYEV, SUSPECT KGB. LATTER THEN TENTATIVELY INVITED SUBJ TO EMB RECEPTION, EXPRESSED MUTUAL INTEREST FOLK SINGING, ALSO INVITED SUBJ HIS HOME HEAR SOV RECORDS BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC DATE. BASIS STA CURRENT INTEREST ANDREYEV (SEE BELOW), C/O ASKED SUBJ ATTEND, TAKE NO INIATIVE CULTIVATE A, REPORT RESULTS.

SECRET 201-305052

SECRET

3. 12 MAY SUBJ ADVISED THAT A, KOSTIKOV AND LEONOV SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AT RECEPTION, SMALL TALK PRINCIPALLY, BUT THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST VISIT FRIENDS ART GALLERY AND THAT SHE GIVE RECITAL AT EMB. A AND KOSTIKOV AT GALLERY 11 MAY FOR TWO HOURS WITH HER.

4. SUBJ'S IMPRESSION OF ANDREYEV FOLL: ADEQUATELY SOPHISTICATED AND WESTERNIZED, PROBABLY UNHAPPILY MARRIED, ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN ASSOCIATIONS AND MENTAL CLIMATE AWAY FROM SOVEMB ENVIIRONMENT.

5. APART FROM SPR ON A, STATION'S ONLY RECENT SUBSTANTIAL INFO IS FROM SMATTER WHO SAYS A RELATIONSHIP WITH WIFE PARTICULARLY STRAINED, AND IS ONLY SOV HAS NOTED WITH POSSIBLE VULNERABILITY AT EMB. (AS SEPARATELY REPORTED, SMATTER AND A HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN ACT MUTUAL CULTIVATION.)

6. ALTHOUGH PREMATURE JUDGE SUBJ'S ABILITY AND INTEREST FOR LONG TERM ACCESS ROLE, SHE ATTRACTIVE, APPEARS INTELLIGENT PERSONABLE AND LEVEL-HEADED. REQUEST TRACES AND INITIATION POA.

7. ALSO REQUEST HQS RETRACE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ANDREYEV, PARTICULARLY FROM ODENVY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

2nd ; pers rotation associates with LA dips

55-60 attaché, 3rd Secty Wash,

63 — Mexi, 2nd Secty

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4	B	8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT

TIME

BY

VR. FILE, SB 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, [illegible]

E C R E T 200226Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3151 (EASBY ACTING)

SIH1
COL

REDCOAT LCIMPROVE

REF A MEXIC 3090 (IN 43571)

B MEXI 3113 (IN 45367)

19 APR 65 IN 47738

1. FOLL RESULTS INTERROGATION SUBJ 19 APRIL:

A. BOTH SUBJS (SEEN SEPARATELY) FREELY ADMITTED TWO VISITS SOVEMB. MET AT FIRST SESSION 12 APR BY SOV FITTING DESCRIPTION SERGEY NIKOLAYEVICH LEONOV (KGB). LATTER ACTED SYMPATHETIC THEIR INTEREST LIVE USSR, GOT SOME BASIC BIO DATA, AND ASKED THEM RETURN 13 APR TO SEE CONSUL.

B. SOV AT SECOND VISIT FITS DESCRIPTION VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV (KGB). THEY FILLED OUT AND SIGNED LENGTHY SPANISH OR RUSSIAN LANG FORM COVERING BIO DATA, AND ALSO WROTE AUTO-BIOGRAPHIES. ACCORDING CRAYNE, GREEN AGREED JOIN COMMUNIST PARTY AND ACT AS SPY. ACCORDING GREEN, NO MENTION WHATEVER OF ESPIONAGE. SOV GAVE THEM IMPRESSION THEY WOULD GET ASYLUM USSR, SAID PROCESSING WOULD TAKE 2-3 MONTHS, IMPLIED SOVEMB WOULD GIVE THEM LIVING EXPENSES IN MEXICO UNTIL THEN. TOLD THEM RETURN THE NEXT DAY FOR POSSIBLE HANDOUT.

SECRET

201-305052

SECRET IN 47738 -pg. 2

C. SOV ASKED CRAYNE IF HAD BEEN IN ARMY, GOT NEGATIVE REPLY. SOV ASKED IF COULD JOIN ARMY. YES. SOV IMPLIED INTEREST BUT NO FURTHER COMMENT. SOV APPEARED INTERESTED GREEN ALLEGED ABLITY READ BLUEPRINTS.

2. SUBJS ADMITTED THAT TALE REF APUREFABRICATION. NOW ACT REPENTANT AND MEK ABOUT ENTIRE MISADVENTURE.

3. LOCAL ODENVY ADVISED. SUBJS WILL BE DEPORTED THIS WEEK.

SECRET

CFN

* INFO ON ABOVE SUBJS,

SECRET

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	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
CONSULAR OFFICE ATTACHE. KNOWN KGB OFFICER.

074-126-060/01
HMMA-25843
16 APR 65
A01 P4

R 6505032151

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(7-46)

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6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMEROVICH
201-305052 050-008-004
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-25800
08 APR 65
CIT ? 050-8-4/2-1
OCC ? P1
ATTACHE IN THE CONSULAR OFFICE OF THE USSR
EMBASSY, MEXICO. RE 19 MAR 65 CONTACT WITH
LUBOMIR BLAZIK /201-206043/ 2ND SECT CONSUL
AT CZECH EMB IN MEXICO.

R 6504260537

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201-305052

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MICROFILM

TO : Chief, SR Division

INFO. : Chief, WH Division

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT : REDWOOD/Transmittal of Soviet Personality Report on Identified KGB Officer, ~~Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV~~

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is the completed SPR on Subject prepared by Vera T. WEISCARVER.

2. Because of the lack of secretarial help, the Station is transmitting this to Headquarters with the request that one copy be returned to the Station in final form when Headquarters has the possibility of re-typing it.

for
Willard C. Curtis

Attachement:
as stated above

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	HMMA-25722	2 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 FFN: P-7455

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?
CIT USSR
OCC ?
RE SUBJ ACTS IN MEXICO CITY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJ OF 201-741655.

201-741655
HMMA-25677
26 MAR 65
P8

R 6504091301

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5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH	
201-305052	201-101794
SEX M DOB ?	HMMA-25693
	26 MAR 65
CIT ?	0P-8187
OCC ?	P2

OLEG MAKSIMOVICH NECHIPORENKO AND SUBJ,
BOTH KGB

R 6504070066

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(7-48)

DISPATCH

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MICROFILM

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO. : Chief, SR Division
: Chief, KUDESK

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City W.

SUBJECT: Operational/REDCOAT/LCIMPROVE/Characterization of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Forwarded herewith is a characterization of Subject prepared by Douglas J. FEINGLASS. The SPR on Subject has been prepared and will be forwarded as soon as typed.

2. It is interesting to note that LICOWL-1 describes KOSTIKOV as follows: He is a man who would do anything to anybody. He is without morals, education or manners. He uses foul language and has no respect for others. When KOSTIKOV drinks at his (LICOWL-1's) establishment, with Soviet women present, KOSTIKOV will run his hand over the legs of the wives of other Soviet employees, while their husbands are present, and think nothing of it. According to LICOWL-1, the husbands say nothing when KOSTIKOV does this. (Comment: However, from a recent LICOWL-1 tape, it appears that Yuriy Aleksandrovich ANDRIANOV, GRU chauffeur, was complaining to Viktor Petrovich KALININ, administrative employee, that his wife was running around with KOSTIKOV and he (ANDRIANOV) was going to say something to KOSTIKOV - someday - but had not said a word to him as yet.)

Willard C. CURTIS

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201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25516	4 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-305052 FFN P-7455

Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV is approximately 35 years of age, corpulent and paunchy, with a round somewhat fleshy face that sports a 5 o'clock shadow, and wears oversized tinted glasses in dark heavy frames, which partially obscure a pair of small, but piercing eyes. His heavy jowls thin lips, wide nostrils and dark hair add to an impression that his features are more of a Semitic, or a Near-Eastern type than that of a Slav. A shapeless dark suit-coat, carelessly put over a white shirt, with unbuttoned collar, through which protrudes a tuft of dark hair complete a photograph of Valerly Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, Attache ot the Consular Office and identified member of the KGB.

KOSTIKOV arrived in Mexico in December 1961 and assumed his duties as an attache at the USSR Consulate at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Owing to his extrovert nature and propensity for drinking, he soon acquired several "buddies" of similar background and with similar tastes. Among these individuals, his closest associates have been, or still are, the following: Vitally Borisovich SHUBIN, Attache and identified member of the KGB, who left for the USSR in July 1964; Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERIYEV, Pravda Correspondent and KGB officer, who left for the USSR in October 1964; and Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, Vice-Consul and identified member of the KGB, who is still in Mexico, and who has accepted KOSTIKOV into his circle of intimate friends.

att 1 to HMMA 25516 CS COPY 201-305052

However, it was mostly with SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV that KOSTIKOV felt entirely at ease. Many a time KOSTIKOV would talk to either one of them on the phone and indulge in a friendly exchange of obscenities, whereas he has never spoken to NECHIPORENKO in a like manner, even though KOSTIKOV has been a frequent guest at NECHIPORENKO's house. KOSTIKOV developed an exceedingly close relationship with SHUBIN. They used to travel together to various parts of the country and to spend time together with their families at the Casino de la Selva, a hotel in Cuernavaca. But it was ALFERIYEV's wife Roza, who became the prime target of KOSTIKOV's attentions. An embittered acrimonious woman, Roza, who despised her husband and had a fierce hatred for NECHIPORENKO, was transformed into a different human being when KOSTIKOV talked to her on the phone in his best unctuous and ingratiation manner. It is impossible to say whether they had sexual relations, but the obvious and strong sexual overtones in Roza's voice led one to presume that she had more than just a friendly interest in KOSTIKOV, who on the other hand, was probably using Roza as a target for his amorous or illicit aspirations.

It seems that KOSTIKOV is quite preoccupied with matters of sex and if given an opportunity would turn into a veritable profligate. Apparently his wife Roza has a tolerant attitude towards KOSTIKOV's probable incursions into the domain of marital infidelity, since, on one occasion, when KOSTIKOV had been invited to a supposed stag party at ALFERIYEV's home, and Roza KOSTIKOV had phoned to caution KOSTIKOV against drinking too much, a woman answered the call and then called KOSTIKOV to the phone. When Roza talked to KOSTIKOV it sounded that she was more peeved at the fact that she had not been invited to the party rather than that other women were present there at the time.

When KOSTIKOV started talking to his wife on this particular call, he already had had a few drinks and in disguised voice spoke to her in Spanish, French and English, possibly to impress those who were present. His Spanish is quite good and fluent, his French is rather tolerable, but his English is somewhat stilted and of a school-room type. Possibly, he studied these languages at the Moscow Institute of Languages.

This fluency in Spanish affords KOSTIKOV a great latitude for making friends among Mexicans and his easy-going earthy approach is presumably of considerable help to him in developing contacts. Since his consular duties are quite negligible, he can easily engage in this sort of activity. In fact, this neglect of official duties prompted a heated argument between NECHIPORENKO and the visiting Soviet correspondent Timur GAYDAR, who declared that ostensibly the consular staff does not preform any useful function, but just loafs around. His assertion has been confirmed in part by the attitude of this particular group of Soviet Embassy employees, who quite often seek some diversion of a non-intellectual type. Thus, on one occasion, when a group of Soviet tourists has a brief stay in Mexio, one of them - a woman, complained during a phone call to the Embassy that KOSTIKOV and Leonid Vasilyevich NIKIFOROV, Intourist representative in Mexico, had taken the group leaders to NIKIFOROV's apartment in order to have a few drinks, leaving the rest of the tourists without any information about their next move and letting them shift for themselves.

Since the departure of SHUBIN and ALFERIYEV, KOSTIKOV has started to "cultivate" NIKIFOROV, presumably as a potential drinking companion, and has been talking to him on the phone a number of times recently in quite a familiar tone of voice. It seems that NIKIFOROV, a younger man, is being influenced by KOSTIKOV to a certain degree.

KOSTIKOV's family life does not appear to be a stormy one, because his wife Roza A. sounds easy-going and friendly. She is in charge of the Embassy's dining-room. Her co-workers treat her with a good-humored tolerance and a slight contempt. KOSTIKOV's daughter Svetlana, born in 1959, seems to be an average child, who does not present any outstanding problems to her parents.

To summarize KOSTIKOV's character traits and abilities: KOSTIKOV is well trusted to take trips around the country in the company of another Soviet Embassy employee on various matters of importance and, on occasions, he acts as an interpreter for visiting Soviet officials. His known physical defect is weak eyes. Sometime ago KOSTIKOV called up an eye-specialist for an appointment, because his eyes were troubling him and that is probably the reason for his wearing tinted glasses. Sometimes Mexicans refer to him as the man with glasses. It is quite possible that an auto accident KOSTIKOV had in Veracruz may have been caused by his somewhat defective vision and was not the result of carelessness. However, when KOSTIKOV was excusing himself for it, GARMASHEV, to whom he spoke on the phone, told him dryly that it was about time KOSTIKOV learned to drive.

Owing to this shortcoming of having weak eyes and his physical make up, KOSTIKOV does not participate in various indoor or outdoor sports as much as do other members of the Soviet Embassy. It seems that billiards are about the most strenuous exercise that he undertakes. However, it must not be surmised that he is a weak individual in a physical sense and will probably give a good account of himself if a situation will demand it. Many of his intimate collaborators call him "Kopchenyy" or "Smoked" which in Russian slang may mean an individual with a dark skin, or may refer to the fact of his wearing tinted glasses, or it may signify that he went through a school of hard knocks

It is quite certain that KOSTIKOV and ALFERIYEV belong to the same group of former hooligans, who by dint of sheer disregard for moral standards forged ahead and became "somebodies".

KOSTIKOV seems to be quite unsrupulous, ready to perform any sort of task set before him, not in a cold and methodical way, but with a certain zest and bravado. It appears that he has no moral, religious, or any other type of scruples. He is vulgar, untidy and lecherous, with a penchant for using lewd and obscene expressions in conversation with his "buddies", with whom he drinks quite a lot, circumstances permitting. In addition, it must be noted that he is a shrewd and resourceful individual unquestionably loyal to the Communist system.

14-00000

KOSTIKOV

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

VR. FILE ADDP, C/SR 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN/DUMMY, C/CI 4, C/WH 3

S E C R E T 292230Z

DIR CITE MEXI 2337

30 JAN 65 IN 70188

KAPOK REDCOAT ICMPROVE LICOZY-5 AEPETREL.

DECLASSIFIED per CSH 43-48

REFS A 2123 (IN 55744)

B MEXI 1977 (IN 39578)

1. 11 JAN PRIKHODKO WENT SUBJ OFFICE, ASKED L-5 GET ASTHMA MEDICATION FOR HIM WHICH PRODUCED BRAZIL. SUBJ PROMISED DO SO THRU FRIEND TRAVELLING RIOD. REQUEST HQS CHECK P STORY THAT WENT RIOD DURING 63 OR 64 WITH SOV SOCCER TEAM. P SAID WOULD SOON HAVE OP MEET WITH HIM AND NECHIPORENKO.

travel list

2. 12 JAN N WENT SUBJ OFFICE CANCEL TRAVEL RESERVATIONS SOV FAMILY, URGED SUBJ PREPARE REPORT IN ANSWER QUERIES REF B AND MAKE REPORT ON IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS PROCEDURES ENTER U.S. L-5 TOLD N GOING LOS ANGELES ON BUSINESS, N HAD NO REQUIREMENTS.

3. 25 JAN SUBJ PREPARED REQUESTED REPORTS, CLEARED BY STA, PASSED TO N 28 JAN. (SEE HMMA 25275 FOR REPORTS) N APPEARED REASONALY SATISFIED REPORTS, BUT QUIZZED SUBJ CLOSELY ON STATEMENT THAT TOWN PARA 3 C REF B KEPT ONLY ONE REGISTRY BOOK. L-5 EXPLAINED LACKED TIME MAKE CAREFUL INVESTIGATION, BUT OBTAINED GENERAL INFO RE SMALL TOWN FROM CIVIL REGISTRY PERSON. (L-5 DID NOT

201-305052

SEE TORTELLA. HIS INFO BASED ONLY ON TALK WITH NOTARY AT RECENT CIVIL WEDDING.)

4. BASIS NOTES WHICH CONSULTED CAREFULLY, N GAVE SUBJ FOLL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. NOW HAS CONCRETE DEAL. WANTS SUBJ SPOT AND NAME 3-4 CANDIDATES PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED OPEN BRANCH OFFICE NEW YORK. PERSONS MUST NOT NECESSARILY BE AMERICAN BORN, BUT SUBJ MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEM FOR HIS PURPOSES AND ALSO FOR OWN PURPOSES [illegible] BE USED FOR MANY THINGS BY US". [illegible]

N WANTS LIST IN MARCH WHEN SUBJ RETURNS FROM EUROPE. L-5 ASKED IF REQUIREMENT MEANT CANCELLATION MOSCOW MAN. N SAID BY NO MEANS, HIS ARRIVAL WILL BE DELAYED CONSIDERABLY DUE NECESSITY PLAN EVERY ASPECT CAREFULLY. L-5 REMONSTRATED THAT TIME SPAN SPOTTING AND HIRING BRANCH MGR COULD NOT BE PROTRACTED, ASKED IF N PREPARED EXECUTE THIS PLAN QUICKLY IF CAME UP WITH SUITABLE TYPE. N DID NOT [illegible].

(COMMENTS: A. IT PATENTLY UNREALISTIC FOR COS BELIEVE L-5 [illegible] SHORT TRIPS TO NEW YORK CAN SPOT PERSONS WHO COULD [illegible]. AT NEXT MEET 3 FEB SUBJ WILL ASK FOR CLARIFICATION [illegible], SAY HAS THOUGHT OVER REQUIREMENT AND CATEGORICALLY [illegible] UNABLE UNWILLING GO FAR ENOUGH WITH CANDIDATES TO ASSURE WOULD

ENGAGE ESPIONAGE, REQUIREMENT RUNS COUNTER COM PROMISES HE NOT ENDANGER SELF. 9. ABOVE FLIP IN KGB PLANS OBVIOUSLY STRANGE. DEFER HQS-, ODENVY IF AND HOW INSERT CONTROLLED AGENT AS MGR. PLS ADVISE. NOTE ALSO N ASKED IF SUBJ PREFERRED OPEN BRANCH IN LOS ANGELES RATHER THAN NEW YORK. SUBJ SAID HAD NO BUSINESS INTEREST WHATEVER IN BRANCH, CHOICE IS SOVS.

B. N SAID WESTERN EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATORS (AS DISTINCT FROM TRAVEL AGENCIES) WHO RUN TOURS INTO USSR BEING UTILIZED BY RIS INSERT/AGENTS INTO TOURS. WANTS SUBJ PROVIDE LIST HIS EUROPEAN TOUR OPERATOR FRIENDS BY NEXT MEET. UPON L-5 RETURN FROM EUROPE WANTS SUBJ'S RECOMMENDATIONS OF CANDIDATES WHOM "OUR PEOPLE IN EUROPE CAN WORK ON".

C. N URGENTLY NEEDS INFO ON JORGE CORTES, ASSISTANT STATION MGR FOR SABENA. L-5 KNOWS BY SIGHT ONLY. (COMMENT: WILL FORWARD BIO DATA WHEN OBTAINED. ONLY STA TRACES ARE LIENVOY. ON 16 JAN 65 CORTES CALLED FOR IDEN KGB VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV WHO NOT IN. 1[illegible] JAN CORTES TOLD K THAT SINCE NOW IN SABENA TRAFFIC DEPT HAS TIME BEING RUSSIAN LANG STUDY AND ASKED K'S HELP ON ENROLLMENT (PRESUMABLY FOR IICMR). K SAID WILL HELP AND SET MEET FOR 19 JAN.)

SECRET

14-00000

IN 701264

INTERESTING NOTE THAT HECH ASSOCIATES MOSTLY WITH K AND THEY
~~[illegible]~~
WELL ACQUAINTED
~~[illegible]~~ SABENA PERSONNEL.)

D. N WANTS NAMES OF MEXICAN POLICE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY OF FED JUDICIAL POLICE, WHO VISIT HIS OFFICE SOLICITING ADS FOR THEIR PUBLICATIONS (IN EFFECT FOR PETTY GRAFT).

E. DURING MEET N BORROWED COIN TO MAKE PHONE CALL. WHEN RETURNED L-5 ASKED WHO CALLED, ANSWERED PABLO KUSHER. (COMMENT: L-5 TOLD C/O FOR FIRST TIME THAT N HAD MADE COUPLE CASUAL INQUIRIES RE KUSHER RECENTLY, L-5 GIVING INFO THAT NOT ACQUAINTED WELL, K IS YOUNG JEWISH LAD WORKING FOR U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE OFFICE CONNECTED BUT LOCATED APART FROM AMEMB. NO STA TRACES BUT SEC FILES REFLECT FOLL: PABLO KUSHER RAZOVSKY BORN 28 OCT 1942 MEXICO CITY, EDUCATED MEXICO CITY, FATHER NU DECEASED, MOTHER CIMA NEE RAZOVSKY BORN 5 SEP 23 BARANOVICH, POLAND. WORKED FOR AERONAVES FROM SEP 59 TO AUG 63 WHEN EMPLOYED AS TRAVEL PROMOTION CLERK U.S. TRAVEL SERVICE.)

F. N TOLD L-5 PHONE ROSENBLUTH WHEN PASSES THRU NEW YORK 7 FEB ENROUTE EUROPE, AND ALSO MAKE VISUAL OBSERVATIONS PERTH AMBOY. SUBJ HEATEDLY REFUSED PERTH AMBOY REQUIREMENT, WHICH PROVOKED N STATE SUBJ COULD NOT REFUSE ANY ASSIGNMENT (NELZYA OTKAZATSA). SUBJ STUCK TO GUNS, N CALMED DOWN AND DID NOT PRESS.

14-00000

IN 73177 PAGES

5. IN DISCUSSING PRIKHODKO, N CONFIRMED STATEMENTS REF A THAT P NOW THIRD RANKING MAN SOVEMB.

6. INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

X ASKED FOR SOV TIMETABLE OF PLANS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

OPERATIONAL/REDCOAT
Aleksandr Mikhaylovich BROVKIN,
Third Secretary, and Suspect
KGB Officer

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-18511

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-25256

4. DATE 28 Jan 65

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LIEMPTY

8. DATE OF INFO. Jan 65

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST Virginia Sturdivant

6. DATE PROCESSED 3 Feb 65

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

2. According to LIEMPTY, BROVKIN has been seen within the compound mostly with Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV and Aleksandr Ivanovich PRIKHODKO, KGB officers, since his arrival. LIEMPTY also reports that he has been using a 1964 green Ford sedan, also driven by YATSKOV and KGB chauffeur, Vasiliy Stepanovich MIROSHNIKOV, and a 1962 beige Volkswagon which has also been used by Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, KGB officer and Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV, Tass Correspondent and suspect KGB.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-505052

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
KNOWN KGB OFFICER

201-727109
HMMA-25188A01
22 JAN 65
P2

R 6502033268

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-40)

13 Jan 65

AEPURPLE

AEPURPLE positively identified photo of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV as Soviet who had met him in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 Feb 1963. KOSTIKOV gave PURPLE meeting arrangements for next meeting to be in NYC. Soviet who appeared in NYC was Oleg D. PRYKIN. PRYKIN has been identified as member 13th Dept of KGB's FCD.

PURPLE is naturalized German American, has crop dusting business in Middle West, furnished info on industrial and missile sites in area. PRYKIN particularly interested in pipelines, [redacted]

The 13th Dept may have exercised its prerogative and taken over case from First (American) Dept. Former case officer Yuriy V. KOSTIKOV was apparently from American Dept, not 13th. But it appears that PRYKIN asked PURPLE for same ~~xxxx~~ type of info assigned by KOSTIKOV, suggesting that KOSTIKOV was from same KGB dept as PRYKIN.

SR/CI/G
ch

This information should not be released without permission of SR/CI.

14-00000

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED

DATE RETURNED

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

FROM: Chief, SR via Chief, WH

SUBJECT: REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE
Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV (201-305052)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

C - 9464

1. We have recently reviewed available information on Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a consular attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. It appears quite possible that KOSTIKOV may be a member of the Thirteenth Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, as will be seen below.

2. KOSTIKOV has been positively identified as the Soviet who met AEBURBLE in Mexico City on 9, 11 and 12 February 1963. (Mexico City Station identified KOSTIKOV as the only Soviet in Mexico who fit the description, and subsequently AEBURBLE identified him from a photo spread.) KOSTIKOV received information from AEBURBLE on industrial and missile sites in PBPRIME and gave him requirements of the same nature for the future. KOSTIKOV also made arrangements with AEBURBLE for his next meeting, to be held in New York City with a different, unidentified Soviet. On 6 May 1963 AEBURBLE was met in accordance with the above arrangements by Oleg Danilovich BRYKIN (201-292588), a translator assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in New York City. BRYKIN has been identified by a sensitive, reliable source as a member of the KGB's Thirteenth Department. AEBURBLE passed BRYKIN aeronautical charts and was given additional requirements particularly relative to missile bases. Nothing transpired during the latter meeting to suggest that BRYKIN wished to change the nature of the case, and in fact he told AEBURBLE that he was doing a good job. It therefore can reasonably be assumed that BRYKIN and KOSTIKOV both were representing the same KGB department.

(Continued)

3 - COS, Mexico City

201-305052

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-13305

DATE: 13 January 1965

21 JAN 1965

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-305052

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
SR/CI/G	C. Hausmann	FS	7735

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
SR/CI/K		IN DRAFT V.Valpey
C/SR/CI		IN DRAFT T.Bagley
CI/OPS/SS	15 Jan 65	William Patrick
SR/O/WH	15 Jan 65	
WH/1/Mex		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	18 Jan	

ROUTING	INITIALS
1 - RID	
1 - SR/CI/K	
1 - SR/CI/G	
1 - SR/O/WH	
1 - CI/OPS	
1 - WH/1/Mex	
SR/CI/G	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

3. It has been reliably reported that at present the KGB's Thirteenth Department places the greatest emphasis on its sabotage mission. Sabotage targets include the most important strategic military and industrial facilities of Western countries. The requirements assigned to AEBURBLE by both KOSTIKOV and BRYKIN correspond to this mission.

4. In view of the obvious ODYOKE interest in any activities of the Thirteenth Department, we urge that you prepare an analysis of KOSTIKOV's activities and contacts in Mexico.

JONATHAN L. WEENING

[illegible]

SECRET

KGB 201 FILE REVIEW CHECKLIST

NAME: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV 201-305052

ACTION **DATE** 12 Jan 65

FULL TRACE CONSOLIDATION no

RIS INPUT SYSTEM done

INTEL AFFILIATION known KGB (AEBURBLE, LINILE c/o)

ASSIGNMENTS
Sep 61 - attache & Vice Consul in Mexico

FUNCTIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT possibly 13th dept. (AEBURBLE case)

AGENTS/OPERATIONS
c/o for AEBURBLE in 63

COMPROMISE

AEASSAULT

MISCELLANEOUS CHECKLIST TDY trips

KUBARK OPS AGAINST

(This form is primarily for the use of SR/CI/K and should be attached to the 201 file of any known or highly suspect KGB officer. Its purpose is to enable SR/CI/K to determine quickly whether, and if so when, a file has been reviewed and what degree of action has been taken regarding extraction of certain categories of operational information of special interest to SR/CI/K. For additional information, consult SR/CI/K.)

SECRET

201-305052

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KORENGOLD, ROBERT

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

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SECRET

SX-25505
1 Sept 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

Soviet Personalities

AG-875
74-6-636/3

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

H

Viktor MARTYNOV

Age about 30-35. Not very tall. Rather French looking. He is a photographer for Novosti. Source met him through visitors from Paris Match, whom MARTYNOV makes a practice of guiding around town. He has never been stationed abroad but comes out to Paris once in a while. The next time he comes he will look up Source. He speaks very good French, and has a pleasing personality. He is rather outspoken at times. For instance, when someone said "bunch of stupid people" about the Soviets, MARTYNOV replied, "You're damn right." He appears to be tempted by western living. He concentrates on the French. He is married to a nice girl with brown hair and eyes. They have children, but Source is not sure whether one or two.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Vladimir y H ZAKHAROV

About 40 years old, he is the administrator of the Conservatory, and Source will see him in Paris when he next goes there. He speaks very good Spanish, having formerly been stationed in Buenos Aires as a cultural attache or something. He is probably a KGB officer, but he works hard at his cover job. During a trip to Paris, he called Source's father to arrange for the quick renting of two pianos for the orchestra he was with. He looks like a frog and is rather bald, short, blond, with dark blue eyes. He is very friendly and accommodating, lively, and nice. He goes out a lot, and sees a lot of foreign colony, particularly Argentines and other Spanish speaking people. He is married and has a little boy called Emilyan. He once invited Source to go to his dacha, but she didn't have time. She intends to send him a postcard with her new address.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

VR 201-875492

Valeriy LEDNEV

Works for Sovietskaya Kul'tura. Speaks no foreign languages. Blond, almost bald. Blue eyes, very nearsighted. Wears glasses. Roman profile. A little plump. Tall. Formerly stationed in Iran for TASS or Izvestiya. Source thinks undoubtedly KGB. A big flirt. Chases women. Likes to have a good time. Knows the KORNGOLDS very well. Expects to come to Paris for two weeks circa 15 September 1966, where he will contact Source, who expects to take him to see some striptease acts.

CO Comment: Attached are Headquarters traces on Subject.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Valeriy Vadimovich LEDNEV

1. Subject, an IZVESTIYA correspondent, was identified as a good source of information for two American journalists in Moscow who were suspected of having been recruited by the KGB.

2. Although we have no record of his being stationed abroad, Subject has made several visits to non-bloc countries. In June-July he visited New Delhi and Bangkok. In December 1962 he visited Iran. While in Iran he was introduced as IZVESTIYA's special correspondent. He corrected the individual who was making the introduction by saying that he was an international observer.

3. Subject visited Turkey in April 1963. While in Ankara he is reported as having participated in "propaganda tactics" and made an "attempt to feel the pulse of the public" as part of the Soviet efforts at that time to establish closer relations with Turkey. During visits with various heads of mass media organs he commented that while in Iran he had written "friendly articles" which were well received by the Iranians. As a result he was the first Soviet journalist to be admitted to the oil regions of Abadan and Ahvas.

4. LEDNEV is described as tall, balding dark hair, high cheek bones, small mouth, wears clear plastic-rimmed glasses, smokes Kent cigarettes. He speaks English, but speaks better German.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

~~FC-295~~

SX-25502
15 Sep 66

AEWIGWAG/2

September 1966 Debriefing

New Third National Personalities

SX-25502
~~FC 295~~ is
15 September 66 briefing
C'65 briefing is SX-4896

SECRET

74-6-636/3

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Omar H OUSSEDIK, Algerian Ambassador

He came to Moscow after the fall of Ben Bella. He is intelligent, but rather pro-Soviet. He was very active in the FLN. He and his wife are both Kabyles, a non-Arab tribe.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Frank H BOURGHOLTZER, American NBC Correspondent, 1962-?

After this tour in Moscow, BOURGHOLTZER returned to Moscow without his wife, lived in a hotel, and went around with a lot of Soviet girls.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEKIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

H

Jose Antonio y MENDIA, Counsellor (Cultural and Press)
Argentine Embassy

He was chief correspondent of La Prensa in Paris and married a Frenchwoman. Source thinks he is a likely target of the KGB because he needs a lot of money. This is because his wife is very snobbish and ambitious and insists on buying quantities of expensive clothes. MENDIA thinks he is shrewd, but he is not.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

J.A.L.H MORGAN, 1st Secretary, British Embassy

He had an affair with the ballerina PLISETSKAYA eight or nine years ago, while previously stationed in Moscow, and was kicked out of Moscow for it. However, he is now married, apparently happily, and has three children. He is a very bright and charming man who speaks Mongolian and Chinese. He is a cultural officer, but since these languages are rare among cultural officers, Source assumes that he is MI-6.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Huy KANTHOUL, Cambodia Ambassador

Very anti-American regarding the war in Viet Nam, but doesn't like the Chinese. He hopes the Soviets will step up aid to Cambodia.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AENIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Catherine BARSACQ, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

She is young and speaks Russian well. She is the daughter of the well-known French theatrical producer (?) Andre BARSACQ. She works in the cultural office of the Embassy. She goes out with Soviet men, one of them Andre VOLKONSKY, the well-known pianist.

C.O. Comment: VOLKONSKY, as a teen-age boy, came to the USSR after World War II with his father, who repatriated voluntarily from France. He was the target of an SR/10 recruitment operation, since he groused openly about his father's decision to leave France and go to the USSR.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Marina LOPOUKHINE, Secretary Archivist, French Embassy

This girl comes from a prominent family in imperial Russia, now in the emigration in France. She resigned to marry a Soviet (NU) who is a translator for the Moscow News. She will stay in the USSR, but will retain her French passport.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Daniel PRIOLLET, Agence France Presse

This is a very nice bachelor, who recently arrived in Moscow. Source warned him against taking on Jean RAFAELLI's Soviet girl-friend Olga Lnu, which he has not done. He has a girl friend, Gerda Lnu, who works as a secretary at the West German Embassy. Source has absolutely nothing against this girl, but she refugeed out to West Germany from East Germany and still has relatives there. She is unmarried, attractive, and goes out with a lot of Americans (unspecified).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Georges H BORTOLI, Representative of Radiodiffusion Television Francaise (ORTF)

His wife is an emigre Russian who thinks everything is wonderful in the USSR and wrote an article to this effect in Paris Match, praising the wonderful Moscow markets. BORTOLI is under his wife's influence, but Source does not know his politics. (Source obviously was concealing something she knew about BORTOLI, as she sometimes does about the French).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-125368

Igor WITSINOS, Correspondent for Der Spiegel (West Germany)

His wife is a Soviet citizen, Jewish. He is a German citizen, but of Latvian or Russian origin. They have been in the USSR a long time. Source thinks his wife has been allowed out. She doesn't know their political views.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

H

George D. VARSAMY, Greek Ambassador

Looks like a peanut vendor. His wife is always covered with vulgar jewelry, and she looks like a manicurist. He endulges in a great deal of commercial operations (personal) buying and selling rugs, icons, etc.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dimitri S. MANOLATOS, First Secretary, Greek Embassy 1963-?

MANOLATOS conducted an extensive trade in icons and rugs, far above the norm even for Greeks in Moscow.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

zR 201-766698

Ahman MIRFENDERESKI, Iranian Ambassador

He is a very interesting character. His grandfather was Ambassador to Russia before the revolution, and he speaks extremely good Russian. He is a very sharp man who knows a lot of Soviets, and has excellent rapport with them because of his language and open manner. In his diplomatic pose, he doesn't seem to be anti-Soviet, but Source does not know his true feelings on that score. He is not anti-American, although he sometimes considers some American actions stupid. He is married, but his wife is often out of Moscow. He is able to stand a lot of liquor.

C.O. comment: AEPASSIVE stated that the Ambassador had some of his primary education in Russia and confirmed his expertise in the language and knowledgeability, but stated definitely that the ambassador is 100% anti-Soviet.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

PR 201-868224

Giovanni MIGLIUOLO, Counselor, Italian Embassy

Married to a Czech. They both speak fluent Russian, English, German, French, and Italian. He married his wife while stationed in Prague. He is a very bright, intelligent man, whom Source regards as an intelligence officer. He is tremendously interested in politics, and is a Kremlinologist. Source does not know his attitude toward the Soviets.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Dino H CAPELLO, Italian Counsellor (Commercial)

He is from Sicily and is a member of the Mafia.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

LUCCAN, Fnu

A correspondent for an Italian paper, age about 42, who lives in Source's building. (Not listed Information Moscow). He has been in Moscow for at least ten years and is married to a Soviet woman. They have two children. His Soviet wife has a miserable life and never leaves the apartment. He is always out, hanging around the Hotel National bar, trying to make friends with businessmen and journalists. He is a crashing, insensitive, boor and bore. He drinks a lot and probably goes out with girls. He comes to a lot of cocktail parties without an invitation, always without his wife, whom Source has never seen. He has another wife in Italy, which causes him serious financial problems, but in spite of this he has a very expensive apartment. He speaks Russian, French, and English, and occasionally makes anti-Soviet remarks. Source is certain he is a KGB agent because of his Soviet wife, his need for money, his expensive apartment, and the way he operates in trying to make contacts and crash parties.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-271372

Kaname TAKAHASHI, business representative of International (Japanese firm)

This man is about 55 and lived in China for a long time. He married a White Russian girl from Harbin. They left Shanghai in 1951, which Source considers strange, i.e. it would have been normal for them to leave in 1949 when the Communists took over. They have a son in the United States who is married, and possibly a daughter there as well. They have another daughter, unmarried, Svetlana TAKAHASHI, who lives in Japan. Source met her by chance at Orly airport and also in Moscow. She is a beautiful girl, half Japanese and half Russian. She speaks good Russian, as does her father. Her mother, TAKAHASHI's wife, is in Japan. TAKAHASHI also speaks Chinese and poor English. He has a lot of Soviet contacts. Source thinks he is probably somebody's agent, theirs or ours, probably ours and/or the Japanese. A curious and interesting man.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Edward GHORRA, Lebanese Ambassador, 1960-63

GHORRA's wife was an American who had an antique shop in New York City. The two of them made a great deal of money in a three-way antique business, Moscow-Lebanon-New York, using their diplomatic privileges.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

Hassine H EL GHOUYEL, Tunisian Counsellor

Drinks a tremendous lot. Source saw him dead drunk at the British Club. He stayed at the Ukraina Hotel without his family for a while. The police took his car keys away so he couldn't drive in a drunken condition. He is a very weak man.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date acquired: September 1966

2R 201-140017

Yusuf Abd-al-Aziz SHARARA, First Secretary, UAR Embassy

He has a very good looking wife, for which reason he is always invited out in ambassadorial circles, which he normally would not be in. Source instinctively thinks he is an intelligence officer, without being able to say why.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

CANADIAN

Mr. Robert A. D H FORD

Position (Jan 65): Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, USSR

Closest English speaking friend of SOURCE in Moscow. Anti-Gaullist in outlook but otherwise quite "French-friendly." Is a cripple but often tries to take a few steps on the dance floor. Suffers from Polio. Former university professor in Canada (medieval history) before becoming diplomat. Wife is the most charming ambassador's wife in Moscow. She was introduced to FORD by the former Brazilian ambassador to Moscow (currently the Brazilian foreign minister) when the latter served at the UN in New York as a member of Brazil's delegation. The Fords are very much in love with each other and are a fine couple. Mrs. Ford is the best dressed, most cultured woman in town, also has the best jewels. Her name is Terese. Both speak good Russian and he is probably one of the most competent ambassadors in the Soviet Union. Mrs. Ford is a particularly close friend of the Israel ambassador Mr. TEKOAH.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He is very pro-American.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

SECRET

74-6-654/3

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

MUGBOOK Debriefing

C. O. Comment: The following information is the result of a hurried debriefing which lasted one hour only.

I Previously identified by Source, not yet in new book.

#1 (SAMOYLOV, Nikolai A.)

Nothing to add. Has not seen in a long time.

#2 (ZARUBINA, Zoya V.)

Has something to do with the press or Inturist. Speaks French.

#3 (TOCHILIN, Sergei)

Has seen, but remembers nothing.

#4 (MEDVEDEV, Vladimir A.)

Source remembers this man, because he is a dead ringer for Kosygin. The picture is a good likeness, although he now has somewhat less hair. He is about 55, is dark and of medium height.

#5 (KHARLAMOV, Mikhail A.)

This is a good likeness. He is of medium height, with a "typical Soviet figure." Nothing more remembered.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

#6 (SHIBAYEV, Pyotr A.)

Source does not remember seeing this man.

#7 (KOBYSH, Vitally)

Source has not seen this man.

#8 (NOSENKO, Yuriy A.)

Source has never seen this man, nor #192 in regular Mugbook.

#9 (VLADYKIN, Nikolai A.)

Source had difficulty identifying this picture. Said she hardly knows this man.

II New Mugbook: Previously identified by Source

#13 and #60 (SUNTSOV, Aleksei V.)

Source has never seen this man.

#25 (PETROV, Vladimir I.)

Source has never seen this man.

#27 (SHUBNYAKOV, Fyodor G.)

The picture looks familiar to Source, but she can state nothing about the man.

#32 (SUMSKOY, Mikhail M.)

Source has never seen this man.

#34 (SHCHERBAK, Fyodor A.)

Source definitely has seen this man, but can say nothing about him, other than that he is about fifty, stout, upper medium height, and she saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

#37 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source does not recognize this man.

#40, 93, 138, 172 (PANASENKO, Ivan A.)

#40: Source thinks this man has something to do with the military; she has seen him with military attaches.

#93: No recognition.

#138: This man is from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaks a lot of languages, including English and French. He is a good-looking, charming man, about 38-40 years old, 178 cm. tall, well built. She saw him at the 14th July French reception, 1966.

#49 (SUNTSOV, Aleksandr V.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#72 (KURILENKO, Ivan P.)

At first Source did not recognize this picture. She later said she had seen him during the de Gaulle visit and at various national day parties.

#97 (DITYATYEV, Dmitriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

15 SEP 1966

#101 (GLAZUNOV, Ilya S.)

Source recognized this picture by name. GLAZUNOV is about 35; the picture is a good likeness but makes him look too healthy. He looks like an "uncooked spaghetti," pale complexion, thin, short. He speaks Italian. Source considers GLAZUNOV not intelligent, and entirely too eager to mix with foreigners. Source sent the Canadian, Benoit de Margerie, to GLAZUNOV when the Canadian was interested in having his portrait painted. GLAZUNOV's wife (NU) is about thirty, has long dark hair; is very intelligent.

#106 (SHVARTS, Ilya P.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#122 (FILIPPOV, Grigoriy A.)

Source did not recognize this picture.

#163 (GUK, Yuriy I.)

Source stated she may possibly have seen this man a long time ago at a diplomatic party.

#192 (NOSENKO, Yuriy I.)

Source did not recognize this picture, nor #8 in Section I.

15 SEP 1966

III New Mugbook: new identifications.

#5 (FEDYANIN, Vladimir P.)

Source has seen this man but could not remember anything about him.

#20 and #76 (ALYOSHIN, Yevgeniy N.)

Source thought these two pictures might be of her husband's "friend", meaning the case officer who keeps dogging him, turning up at the next seat in the theatre, etc. She said she would check with her husband as to this man's name, and ask him for details. She said she already discussed this "friend" during the last debriefing. He poses as a history professor.

#39 and #63 (ZHUKOV, Georgiy A.)

Source identified this picture as that of Yuriy ZHUKOV, either TASS or MFA press department man. She last saw him at the farewell party for Source and her husband at their embassy. She could not remember anything else about him, but promised to ask her husband, who, she knows, hates him for some reason.

#61 (ZAITSEV, Lev N.)

Source identified this picture as that of a Novosti man, or at least a journalist. He is about 35, tallish, good looking. Speaks French. Has been abroad. Deals with foreign journalists.

15 SEP 1966

#125 (LOUIS, Viktor)

Source identified this picture as Viktor LOUIS. There was no time to update her previous information. She made the remark that she was sorry to see him in such sorry company, meaning in the Mugbook.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Source: AEWIGWAG/2

Date Acquired: 13 August 1966

Tatyana PHILIPOV or PHILIPOVA

Has an American passport. She was employed by Waldemar VICHNEVSKY, AFP correspondent in Moscow, as a governess for his children. Source claims Subject was a bad children's nurse and very stupid. VICHNEVSKY wanted to fire her. She always goes around with Soviet men. She went off for a three day weekend and was gone for eight days. VICHNEVSKY reported this disappearance to the French Embassy.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

14-00000

SECRET

AEWIGWAG/2

1965 and 1966 Debriefings

U.S. Citizens in Moscow

SX-4876(65) 74-6-636/3

SECRET ~~HC-8470(66)~~ 15 SEP 1966

SOURCE : AEWIGWAG-2

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966

American Intelligence Officers in Moscow

During the debriefing, Source was encouraged to state which diplomats in Moscow she thought were intelligence officers, including the Americans.

Source said she and her husband had wondered about which Americans were intelligence officers and had come to the conclusion that the following Americans were:

Roger Kirk

Alan Logan

Abraham Katz

Their reasons for picking Logan and Katz are contained in the individual reports on these two gentlemen.

19 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Peter GROSE

Position (July 1965): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Appears to be a very intelligent chap, new on the scene in Moscow. Getting married to a 19 year old girl. He is Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

He married an American girl who appears to be of good family. She is expecting a child and has been very sick during her pregnancy, so they both stayed home. Normally they give occasional cocktail parties with a lot of Soviets present. The only Soviet friend of theirs that Source knows about is (Fnu) Shnirson, a music critic. They are friendly with the Loorys (NY Herald Tribune) and Hughes Rudd (CBS).

15 SEP 1966

LIFE MAGAZINE

Mr. Robert BRIGHAM

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for LIFE MAGAZINE in Moscow, USSR

No Comments - SOURCE only knows him slightly.

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

BALTIMORE SUN

Mr. Adam CLYMER

Position (JAN 65): Correspondent for BALTIMORE SUN in Moscow, USSR

Called "head of the calf" (French expression) because he accident-prone.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

Mr. Nicholas DANILOFF

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Very nice, intelligent man. Not Jewish. Overworked by SHAPIRO, who tends not to like him. Very sick when he left Moscow (ca. March/April 65). Saw a good many Russians and tended to be well informed. Has good promise as a journalist.

Very close to Korengolds.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Henry TANNER

Position (Jan 65): Chief, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Peggy Tanner, secretary-archivist in the Danish embassy, is TANNER's wife. Terribly intelligent and good-hearted individual. Both SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like them a lot. Remarkable thing about TANNER is that he never gets mad and is always smiling, even when things are most trying. Appears to be a very good, happy marriage. Both are first class people. Neither is Jewish. Transferred to Paris in the late spring of 1965.

15 SEP 1966

NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. Theodore SHABAD

Position (Jan 65): Member, New York Times Bureau in Moscow, USSR

Most Jewish type of Jew in the entire Moscow press corps (exactly what SOURCE means by this hard to pind down - but would appear she means he keeps to his own co-religionists, and does not mix with others.) Lives in the same entryway as SOURCE. Did not like TANNER (Bureau Chief) and TANNER felt the same way about him. Has a stupid wife who talks too much at parties.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

Shabad's wife had a nervous breakdown and left Moscow.

& How to be a Jewish Mother

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

America House Club

SOURCE comments this is little more than a brothel where the lower echelons of the foreign diplomatic colony arrange trysts. There is a great deal of passing whiskey and cigaretts here, particularly among the foreign service personnel (maids, etc) of members of the diplomatic corps. At least within the French embassy the general feeling is that one should stay away from the place, since no diplomats of status go there, except on rare occasions (an especially good film). The enlisted American military personnel are known to use the facilities of the club to shack up with foreigners.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

The tone of the Club has improved greatly owing to security measures which have been introduced in controlling the people who may enter. It has now become chic and even ambassadors go there.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Marshall BREMENT

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US Embassy in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE speculates B. may be an intelligence officer because of the penetrating questions he asks. Also he appears to be far better informed than the run-of-the-mill American foreign service officer. Has a good memory and speaks some Chinese. Wife is socially cautious.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

He drinks and flirts. His wife is very jealous. He loves girls but Source does not think he goes around with Soviet girls.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Abraham KATZ

Position (Jan 65): First secretary, US Embassy, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and her husband see more of KATZ and his wife at than almost any other Americans of the US embassy. He is quite sharp and intelligent and SOURCE's husband has a high professional regard for him.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source's husband thinks he is an intelligence officer because of his position in the Embassy.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEWSWEEK

Mr. Robert KORENGOLD

Position (Jan 66): Correspondent for NEWSWEEK Magazine in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like the K's a lot, they are clever people and both well informed. Has good Soviet contacts and digs out the news through them. Both speak good Russian. He goes by the name of "Bud". Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Wife is French and would be a very good source for information on the nefarious activities of third nationals in Moscow. She is not Jewish as previously stated.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Alan LOGAN

Position (Jan 65): Second secretary, US embassy, Moscow, USSR

A too serious type, wife never smiles. Very impressed with his position in the embassy - a "heavy" person. Both drink a good deal and only after they've had a few drinks do they let their hair down. His wife is French. SOURCE sees them at a number of American and British parties. Frequently present at African parties, since he is embassy officer responsible for African affairs. Wife is a bore.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source and her husband think LOGAN is an intelligence officer because the Soviets are very interested in him and publicized him as a spy for his interests in Africans in Moscow. After this article, the Africans stopped seeing LOGAN. He was very well liked however.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Mr. Stuart H. LOORY

Position (Jan 65): Chief New York Herald Tribune Bureau in in Moscow, USSR

Both LOORY and his wife are Jewish. SOURCE considers them nice but does not see a very great deal of them socially.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Has problems with his job because of the closing down of the New York Herald Tribune.

SECRET 15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Mr. Roger A. PROVENCHER

Position (Jan 65); Second secretary, US embassy in Moscow, USSR

They are the most socially adept members of the US embassy. They entertain well and their parties are fun. They both dance well. She serves wonderful buffets. She is French. Has visited SOURCE's father in Paris on one occasion. SOURCE has had the Provenchers to her apartment about 15 times (since Oct 62). SOURCE speculates Provencher may be an intelligence officer based on the fact that he has "too good" an apartment for his rank and more care is taken of him than of Mr. Logan in the political section.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source says her husband has changed his mind about PROVENCHER's being an intelligence officer. Possibly he is one, but not in Moscow.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

WASHINGTON POST

Mr. Stephen ROSENFELD

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent, WASHINGTON POST (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Noted for fact that he has a very large apartment by Moscow standards. Wife knows what she wants and gets it from the UPDK by constant badgering of this office. Lives in same block with SOURCE but entryway three. Wife was in Moscow before as a single girl correspondent. They both speak very good Russian. Both are Jewish.

DATE ACQUIRED: SEPTEMBER 1966

Source heard no comments from the Soviets about ROSENFELD's PNG for the Washington Post publication of the Penkovskiy Papers Third National Colonies also had no comments but were very sorry for ROSENFELD.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Henry SHAPIRO

Position (Jan'65): Chief, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband like S. He is Jewish, sharp and quick, speaks excellent Russian. Knows a tremendous amount about Russian, very well informed. SOURCE speculates SHAPIRO may have helped the Russians in the past (she means the RIS) but does not think he has to now that he has established himself. SOURCE comments that SHAPIRO, like all Western press people have to be extremely careful what they file, otherwise they will be thrown out of the SU. This is very true in SHAPIRO's case, since he married to Soviet national who might not be able to leave with him if he were thrown out. Most noteable thing about SHAPIRO is his very extensive contacts in the dip circuit - Henry literally knows everybody worth knowing. On very good terms with past US ambassador (Thompson). Probably because of religious bonds, he is also on very good terms with current Israeli ambassador.

DATE ACQUIRED : September 1966.

Shapiro hates to spend money. He is very hard on his assistants, and very quick-tempered. He hates Edmund Stevens and his wife. He is close to the Austrian ambassador (Walter Wodak), the Italian ambassador (Federico Sensi) and the Norwegian ambassador (Frithjof Jacobsen). Recently Shapiro decided to do a story on the prostitutes who hang out at the Hotel National. He sent someone to interview some of these girls. As a result he was attacked in Pravda. Shapiro was terribly upset at this, almost crying. He is normally a very careful man. He knows all the Soviet journalists well, and possibly cooperates with them.

15 SEP 1966

NEWSDAY

Mr. Edmund STEVENS

Position (Jan 65): Correspondent for NEWSDAY (USA) in Moscow, USSR

Neither SOURCE nor SOURCE's husband like. Drinks a lot, especially early in the morning - often drunk, and when so tends to make stupid remarks. However, terribly well informed about what is going on in the Soviet Union, in fact one of the best informed Western correspondents in Moscow. He has a find collection of modern paintings. SOURCE believes he probably works for the KGB, since he openly involved in black marketing, selling of ikons, and always seems to have more than enough money. He is the type who would sell his sould for cash. Daughter now in Rome, trying to become a movie actress. She was formerly a student at the Bolshoi Theater, studying ballet. She was something of a whore and slept with a number of Russians.

15 SEP 1966

Edmund Stevens

Date Acquired: September 1966

STEVENS' wife told Peter GROSE of the New York Times that she wasbuying up paintings from Soviet artists and reselling them for a profit. Source considers Mrs. STEVENS a real bitch. STEVENS argues with her a lot. Source thinks he is no longer capable of having a sex life. Source has no doubts that he works for the KGB.

STEVENS' contacts in the foreign colony are extensive. He sees most of the important ambassadors, including KOHLER (US), HARRISON (UK), and SENSI (Italy). Among the many Americans he sees are GUTHRIE and ARMITAGE.

The only Soviet contacts of the STEVENS whom Source knows are figures from the artistic world: musicians MOISSEYEV and KAGAN, and the ballerina PLISETSKAYA.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

US EMBASSY MOSCOW

General Comments:

Embassy officers all believe they are very important people by virtue of the fact that the Department sent them to Moscow to represent the States. They try to impress everybody with their position and with their knowledge of Soviet affairs (which is not too good in the first place). They tend to live a ghetto-like existence, do not mix with other members of the dip set. Stay at home or in the embassy and do not get out around in the city. From a social point of view they are for the most part boring - only wish to talk business and office politics. No lightness of sense for "things gay." Heavy. Do not have many of the social graces, do not dance well, do not play cards well, etc. Wives are poor dressers and can not cook.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (UPI)

Mr. Jordan AXELBANK

Position (Jan 65): Member, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL Bureau, in Moscow, USSR

"Jay" is stupid, more so than average press correspondents. Not intellectually quick. SHAPIRO runs rings around him.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

UNITED STATES

Capt. James W. BIZZELL, USAF

Position (Jan 65): Assistant air attache (medical), US Embassy, Moscow

SOURCE is very fond of Dr. Bizzell and considers him an excellent doctor, especially for children. Much more friendly than this predecessor. SOURCE gave Dr. Bizzell the name of her sister (UNSOX 10) and suggested he look her sister up when he went to Paris on vacation. The sister would show him around Paris. SOURCE does not know whether Dr. Bizzell contacted her sister. Mrs. Kohler is very fond of him. Bizzell used to squire young Miss. Stoessel around town. Dances well; plays good bridge.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP)

Mr. Henry S. BRADSHER

Position (Jan 65): Chief of the ASSOCIATED PRESS Bureau, Moscow, USSR

SOURCE and SOURCE's husband do not like B. Consider him rude, barbarian. He is a very nervous man. Tries very hard (but does not make the grade) to keep up with chief AFP man (ULIMAN) and chief UPI man (SHAPIRO).

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY

Mr. Sam JAFFE

Position (Jan 65): Representative, AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY in Moscow, USSR

Sam and June are attractive people and SOURCE would like to become more friendly with them. However, neither SOURCE nor her husband trusts the JAFFES completely - in their view something about them does not add up. JAFFE good newspaper man - knows how to ask questions that will get news. SOURCE feels she has to watch what she says to JAFFE, lest he uncover some of her husbands "sources" for news. JAFFE does a good job, knows the ropes of his profession and is a thoroughly competent journalist. Knows a great many Russians and now has very good contacts with the North Vietnamese - this rather unusual for an American correspondent in Moscow. Both are Jewish.

His Soviet news contacts? No info
Photos 56 and 77? X no info

15 SEP 1966

SECRET

Mr. Foy D. KOHLER

Position (Jan 65): US Ambassador in Moscow, USSR

SOURCE wonders why, in view of his position, Mr. Kohler has a Chinese cook - she thinks this is a poor security practice. SOURCE knows of no specific things about the ambassador's cook which would make him a security risk other than his nationality. The fact that the American ambassador has a Chinese cook is often the subject of conversation on the Moscow dip circuit. Wife has no taste in clothes.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

Mr. Walter J. STOESSEL, Jr.

Position (Jan 65): US Minister-Counsellor in Moscow, USSR

The STOESSELs tried to entertain in a grand way but were obivously amateurs. They would serve entirely too much liquor before dinner and get their guests potted. Their food at dinners was indifferent though of good quality. They did serve good French wines. One got the impression Mrs. STOESSEL did not take too many pains in planning and serving her dinners. She has a terrible cook. SOURCE entertained the STOESSELS in her home on about 10 occasions (from Oct 62 to the time the STOESSELS left). Wife dresses badly, even worse than Mrs. Kohler.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

UNITED STATES

Mr. Malcolm TOON

Position (Jan 65): Counsellor for political affairs, US Embassy, Moscow

Socially better than most of the US Embassy personnel.

Wife dresses badly.

SECRET

15 SEP 1966

201-132139

Moscow News - 8 Jun 63



The hero of the Island of Freedom about to leave for home. Fidel Castro and his party were seen off by N. Khrushchov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and R. Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defence.



The handshake followed the signing of the Soviet-Cuban joint statement in the Kremlin

Soviet Weekly
6 Jun 63

201-132139

14-00000

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, SR 6, S/C 2

S E C R E T 312304Z

IN50644

DIR CITE MEXI 4811

1 JUN 1963

LCIMPROVE

REF MEXI 4329 (IN 24821)+

RE REF PLEASE RECHECK DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DIP PLATE 171.

SAME CAR AND PLATES OBSERVED AGAIN, PLATES EXPIRED 3-31-60.

S E C R E T

201-132139

SECRET

GROUP 1
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S E C R E T [illegible]

DIR CITE MEXI [illegible]

[illegible] LCIMPROVE

REF: MEXI [illegible] (IN 24[illegible])

[illegible] JUN [illegible] IN [illegible]

1. 8 MAY ISSUE OF HAVA NEWSPAPER EL MUNDO PUBLISHED PHOTO OF NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV TOGETHER WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND FIDEL CASTRO IN USSR, LEONOV EVIDENTLY INTERPRETING.

2. 31 MAY STATION PLACED ARTICLE IN [illegible] ENTITLED "PLAN PREPARED COMMUNIZE ALL LATIN AMERICA". ABOVE PHOTO ALSO APPEARED. NOTIONAL CUBAN EXILE RELATED SOV-CUBAN PLAN FINANCE SUBVERSION LA, AND WET ON TO STATE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT LEONOV IN CHARGE OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO CENTRAL AMERICA, AND LATTER WORKS WITH UNNAMED MEXICAN ARMY CAPTAIN THIS PURPOSE.

3. DIRECT HQS ATTENTION REF RE CARDENAS INVOLVEMENT WITH LEONOV.

4. FORWARDING CLIPS MAJOR STATIONS FOR REPLAY.

5. ADDENDUM: SAME ARTICLE WITH PHOTO APPEARED 31 MAY FRONT PAGE ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, NAMED LORENZO CARDENAS BARA[illegible] AS MEXICAN CAPTAIN INVOLVED.

[illegible]

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED SURVEILLANCE OF LEONOV.

SECRET [illegible] EXCLUDED [illegible]

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

201-132139

MOSCOW NEWS Saturday, May 25, 1963



At the Bratsk hydroelectric project.

201-133139

In the assembly shop of the "Uralmashzavod" enterprise in Sverdlovsk.

201-132139

25 May '63

MAGNIFICENT PAEAN TO SOVIET-CUBAN FRIENDSHIP



"Long live eternal friendship!" Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Luzhniki Stadium during the Soviet-Cuban friendship rally.

14-00000



CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, FIDEL (L3) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L2) USSR, V.F. PROKYSLOV [illegible]
BREZHNEV, (L6) USSR, AT FRIENDSHIP MEETING, CENTRAL LENIN STADIUM [illegible]
NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L1) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIA-P-[illegible]


¡Saludo caluroso al comp
ГОРЯЧИЙ ПРИВЕТ МУЖЕСТВЕ

CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, (L1) CUBA, RESPONDING TO ACCLAIM ACCORDED HIM DURING SPEECH [illegible]
MIKOYAN (L4) USSR, JOINS IN APPLAUSE. NIKOLAY S. LEONOV (L2) USSR, INTERPRETER FOR
CASTRO ON VISIT TO USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIA-P-162771

201-132139

Fidel Castro visiting the Volgograd Tractor Works.
(For material on Castro's visit to the USSR see pages 3 and 7.)

18 May 63,
Moscow News

201-132139

- Moscow News 18 May 63



Fidel Castro watches the antics of a "Baikal" bear cub he has received as a present.

201-132139

Moscow News 18 May 68

'WE ARE FORGING HAPPINESS AND PEACE ON EARTH'

Fidel Castro at the Bratsk Hydropower Station.

201-132139

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SX-3735
14 May 1963

SUBJECT: AESTORAGE No. 841
Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

DOI: 1962

NOTE: AESTORAGE represents a collation of information provided by several reliable and sensitive sources, some of them documentary. AESTORAGE information is not to be released outside of the Clandestine Services Components of CIA unless written authorization has been granted by C/SR/CI. AESTORAGE information may be transmitted to CIA field stations only after it has been coordinated with C/SR/CI.

In August 1962 Source identified Subject as a KGB officer, presently assigned to Mexico City.

Distribution:
Orig. - LEONOV dossier
1 - DC/SR/CI
1 - SR/CI/K

SR/CI/K:DRyan

CS COPY

RIS INPUT NO. 6
27 May 63

[illegible]

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

✓
201-132139

Moscow News
11 May 63

201-132139

201-132135

Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro. In the background, right, Leonid Brezhnev

Soviet Weekly
9 May 63

◆

Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro at the Likhachov Automobile Works, which they visited the day before May 1.

The workers of the plant were holding a social evening at their Palace of Culture, and the distinguished guest was greeted by thousands of people. Both Nikita Khrushchov and Fidel Castro were presented with models of the ZIL car made at the Works. Before the concert, Nikita Khrushchov, Fidel Castro and his party saw a documentary film about the Works, which was the first Soviet automobile plant. Famous performers and amateurs took part in the concert, which wound up in the "July 26th March". The last rs were drowned in enthusiastic applause, and cries of "Viva Fidel!" and "Viva Cuba!" resounded in the hall long afterwards.

◆



Moscow News

-732/57



Fidel Castro (*centre*) pictured with Nikita Khrushchov and Leonid Brezhnev on the tribune in Red Square, during the Cuban leader's tumultuous welcome last weekend

Soviet Weekly
3 May 63

201-132139

14-00000

LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES-Soviet Directed Insurgency

Monthly CI Report
OSI District 30
May 1963

See Times
Publication
Their Source was HCSI

(S) (Gp-1) A Soviet Embassy official in Mexico City, Nikolai S. LEONOV, is allegedly actively planning an insurgent movement in Latin America. LEONOV left Mexico for the USSR on 21 April to confer with KHRUSHCHEV and CASTRO. Credence is given this report by the publication of a photograph of the three on 8 May in a Cuban newspaper. The photograph was purportedly taken during a recent meeting.

(S) (Gp-1) Cuba and Mexico, according to LEONOV's schemes, would serve as bases for the insurgency. Cuba would be the "invisible beachhead" and Mexico the point for covert distribution of arms.

(S) (Gp-3) The individual selected as the contact man for arms acquisition is said to have been engaged in similar activity in Guatemala about a year ago.

(S) (Gp-3) Another report from sources in Colombia stated that pro-CASTRO ex-President CARDENAS planned to call a meeting in Mexico City of "leftist bent", disgruntled retired military officers from Latin American countries on the subject of insurgency. (DIA, 3 June 1963)

201-132135

NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY, MAY 5, 1963.

WS OF THE WEE

CASTRO AND SOVIET LEADERS WATCH MAY DAY PARADE IN MOSCOW



132139

SUBJ in Moscow WITH This Group As interpreter Apr MAY 63



CUBA-USSR APRIL 28, 1963
CASTRO IN USSR. LEFT TO RIGHT, LEONOV, N, USSR; KHRUSHCHEV, N., USSR; CASTRO, F., CUBA; BREZHNEV, L., USSR; SHVERNIK, N., USSR; SUSLOV, A., USSR; KOSYGIN, A., USSR; AND POLYANSKY, D., USSR.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA-P-163872

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

1	C/(A)	4	13
2	4	5	RP
3	C	6	6

30

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI 2, S/C 2

S E C RFICBXW52226Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4327

25629

26 APR 1963

REDCAP

ACCORDING LIFIRE NIKOLAY LEONOV LEFT MEXI FOR USSR WITH FAMILY 21 APR ON SABENA.

SECRET

Bill

Frank

201-132139 25 APR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
CABLE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
2. RI FILE NO. 201-28906
3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. MEXI-04309
4. DATE 24 APR 63
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
8. DATE OF INFO.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-132139
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH /201-132139/

NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV /201-132139/ STATIONED MOUNTED LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE FOR EVENTUALITY HE MIGHT MAKE LAST MINUTE CLANDESTINE MEETS. MEXI EFFORTS PAID OFF IN THAT TEAM ABLE SPOT OVIOUS CLANDESTINE HALF HOUR MEET EVE 19 APR. TEAM TAILED MEXICAN CONTACT WHOM STATION HAS NOW IDENTIFIED AS LORENZO CARDENAS BARAJAS, CIT MEXICO. FOR INFO CARDENAS, DIRECT HQS ATTENTION LINLUCK TRAFFIC MEXI 0545 ON 11 APR 62, MEXI 0563, 0698, 0827, 0873, AND ALSO OTHER MEXI REPORTING RE CARDENAS.

LIEMBRACE SURVEILLANCE LEONOV 20 APR DROPPED DURING LATE AFTERNOON AFTER LEONOV MADE OBVIOUS EFFORTS DETERMINE IF HE UNDER SURVEILLANCE. INTERESTING NOT E THAT LEONOV WAS THEN DRIVING AROUND SAME AREA WHERE HAD CLANDESTINE MEET PREVIOUS EVE. TEAM BELIEVES LEONOV DID NOT DETECT THEIR PRESENCE.

ACCORDING LATEST LIEONOV INFO, APPEARS LIKELY LEONOV RETURNING MEXI AFTER HOME LEAVE, USSR.

STATION FILES REFLECT THAT BASIS LINLUCK INFO, MEXI ADVISED LITEMPOS DURING APRIL 1962 THAT CARDENAS INVOLVED SMUGGLING ARMS GUAT, APR 63 MEXI LITEMPO PROVIDED FOLL INFO CARDENAS- ENROLLED MILITARY COLLEGE.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)
8-57

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET

COUNTRY	Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO.	1201-6770
SUBJECT	Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist, to Cuba	DATE OF REPORT	5 October 1962
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO. 27 July to 2 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (27 July to 2 October 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) in close contact with Rico Galan.
Para. 2: Person (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2

Rc 201

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement, rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, plans to write a political biography on Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Rico Galan, who proposed the idea to the Cuban Government and was accepted, will spend two months in Cuba working on the project.

2. On 2 October Rico Galan left Mexico for Habana, Cuba, on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mexican passport No. 51115, with a Cuban courtesy visa.

201 FILE OPENED ON THE BASIS OF THIS DOCUMENT

SECRET

201-336474

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

[illegible] 1725,084

14-00000

W

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET/[illegible] CONTINUED CONTROL	REPORT NO. [illegible]

FROM: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 22 May 1962

REPORTING OFFICER: Louis J. [illegible]

RD NO.: 200-7-[illegible]-1

REPORTS OFFICER: Portia L. [illegible]

PROJ.: [illegible]

APPROVING OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: [illegible]

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

Source got the information reported in the attached from his conversation with Lorenzo Cardenas on 5 May. Cardenas told Subject he received the information from Viktor Nikolayevich Glotov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

RI - PLEASE INDEX AS INDICATED AND FORWARD CARDS TO THIS STATION FOR ITS FILES.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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HCC

201-132139

COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES: None

NO. PAGES: 1

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

INDEX

52 5-1

SECRET/[illegible]
CONTINUED CONTROL

FORM 1967

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE. A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY Cuba/Guatemala/USSR/Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-6405

SUBJECT Soviet Assistance to Cuba and Guatemala

DATE OF REPORT 22 May 1962

NO. OF PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 5 May 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (5 May 1962)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Persons (B) with good connections in Guatemala Communist circles in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 2

The Soviet Government has assured the Cuban Government that it will give its assistance to the Cubans in the event of an aggression against Cuba. The Soviets consider Guatemala to be the most sensitive spot in Latin America at the present time, and are very interested in the Guatemalan problem. Because of this the Soviets are prepared to give their all out assistance to both countries in their current political struggles.

SECRET/NOFORN
CONTINUED CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION

COPY

DISPATCH

HMMA-18507

Chief, WHD

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
50-126-3

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
15 December 1961

SUBJECT
Possible Exploitation of Links of Soviet Embassy Officer with Cuban 26th of July Movement

RE "X" - CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCES
HMMW-10265, 29 November 1961

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV returned to Mexico 11 July 1960 and has been assigned to the Soviet Embassy staff, Third Secretary, diplomatic rank, as an assistant to Vladimir NUTIKOV in the Office of Cultural Affairs. While the Station feels that Fidel CASTRO Ruz's recent public statements admitting his long-time sympathies and associations with Communism somewhat lessens the exploitation impact of this "expose", it is also felt that LEONOV's Mexican background, dating back to 1955 and including the incident played up by the Mexican press in 1956, is worthy of press replay. LEONOV's return and present responsible position in the Soviet Embassy of Mexico will provide added interest in the story. The Station will therefore attempt to obtain the Mexican press accounts of the 1956 incident, updating this information into a press article for exploitation as suggested in reference.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

14 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
5 - Files

201-132139

FORM 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Chief, WH Division

KUCAGE/Operational/Exploitation of Possible Contact of Soviet Embassy Employee with Fidel CASTRO Ruz

ACTION REQUIRED: Publicize previous links of Soviet Embassy with Cuban 26th of July Movement and return of LEONOV, if feasible; see para. 5.

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-[illegible]39, (IN 35356)
B. HMMA-9793, 23 March 1958
C. MEXI-8593 (IN 49057)

1. Your attention is directed to reference A which mentioned the proposed KUCAGE exploitation of the finding of the personal calling card of Nikolai S. LEONOV in the address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz.

2. Although there were ODYSEY reports at the same time as reference A, which reported that the Mexican press carried a generally accurate and complete account of the breakup of the Cuban revolutionary conspiracy, that the leader was linked with the Soviet Embassy and that he carried in his wallet a card of LEONOV, secretary to the Soviet ambassador, it can not be determined at Headquarters whether there was specific Station play-up of this incident.

3. In reviewing Station dispatches pertaining to the CASTRO case, reference B was examined, as well as its attachment, the report of LEONOV. The latter apparently attempts to explain the circumstances under which the personal card of LEONOV was "planted" in the CASTRO address book. A discrepancy is noted in the reconstruction of the incident of the arrest of CASTRO and the discovery of LEONOV's card in that both the reference and the attachment describe the circumstances surrounding the arrest of CASTRO as occurring in November 1956 whereas reference A had already reported the arrest and discovery of the card in the address book as having occurred in June 1956.

4. Now, there is renewed interest in this matter due to the fact that reference C reported LEONOV's return to Mexico for what appears to be a second tour of duty.

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

201-132139

DATE TYPED: 24 Nov 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO: 201-132139

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW 10265

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 50-12[illegible]-3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

WH/3/Mexico A. E. Grunwell baf C/WH/3/Mexico 2555

COORDINATING

SR/10 Frank Levy (In Draft)

WH/C/CA

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono
1 - SR/10

See 2017 14 Nov 63
50-6-83

RELEASING

C/WH J. C. King

53

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-10265

5. The views of Station Mexico are requested as to whether it would be feasible to replay the original incident indicating the tie between CASTRO and LEONOV. Even if the incident was not exploited before, it is the opinion of Headquarters that it would be useful to cite a specific CASTRO tie with the Soviets before he took over in Cuba. From a Headquarters viewpoint the alleged action of LIVESTOCK/2 in "planting" the card would still not impair the replay of the original incident.

END OF DISPATCH

FPI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FPI FILE NUMPER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUPJECT: LEONOV, NIKOLAI SERGEEVICH aka
N. S. Leonov

14-00000

manifest # 360902
1-Sept 61

SECRET

1-1155

PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

201 NUMBER
201-132139 A#11155

NAME
LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich

TITLE (Position and country)
Asst CULTURAL ~~Employee??~~ OFFICER MEXICO * 3rd Secy

Dipl List
1 Sept 61

HMMA 17731
5 Sept 61

DATE OF ARRIVAL
31 July 1961

PCS DEPARTURE

MEXI 8593
6 Aug 61

PASSPORT NO.
D-18009 Wife: D-18010

DBF 85321
9 Aug 61

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
22 August 1928/Ryazan

MAILING ADDRESS
Pachuca - 153-405 Condesa

NAME OF WIFE
Valeriya Ivanovna

WIFE'S DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
30 ~~28~~ April 1928/Ryazan

CHILDREN
Dau: Irina, b. 62

HMMA 22430

LANGUAGES
Spanish EXCELLENT

HMMA 18913
27 APR 62

PHOTO

DESCRIPTION

HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	COMPLEXION

IDENTIFYING MARKS

OTHER (Include personality, habits, hobbies, vices, etc.)

MEXI 839
27 Jun 56

Subject's calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz when latter arrested in Mexi 21 June 1956.

HMMA 18305
15 Dec 61

Disptch re poss exploitation of Subj with Cuban 26th of Jul Movement.

HMM 8492
15 Feb 64

Subj's wife works at Sov. Emb. (capacity unknown, probably typist).

CAREER

1. See old REDCAP sheet from previous tour of duty Mexi 1953-56.
2. Subj accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Exposition February 1960.

RIS INPUT NO. ZU

FORM 5-59 498 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

201-132138

14-00000



USSR 1963

~~IVANOV, LEONID.~~

INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIA-P-163160

[illegible], Nikolay Sergeyevich



CUBA-USSR
CASTRO, FIDEL (L2) CUBA, WITH KHRUSHCHEV (L3) USSR, SHAKING HANDS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN RED SQUARE. NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV (L1) USSR, ACTING AS INTERPRETER FOR CASTRO.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIA-P-162805

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET [illegible] 4770

FROM
Mexico City

REPORTING OFFICER
Clyde K. SHROCK

REPORTS OFFICER
Portia L. SPARESUS Portia L. Sparesus

APPROVING OFFICER
Willard C. CURTIS

DATE OF REPORT
5 October 1962

RD. NO.
P-7354

PROJ.
LIFIRE

S'CE CR.
Para. 1: LICOOKY-1
Para. 2: LIFIRE

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS.

The information in paragraph one of the attached was taken from several small items submitted by LICOOKY-1 since 17 July. The information in paragraph two was taken from the LIFIRE airlists.

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COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES
None

NO. PAGES
1

SUBJECT

REFERENCES
201-132139

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FADA

APPR

SECRET

DOI

FORM 8-60 1467 ~~USE PREVIOUS EDITION~~ (20)

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201-336474

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1961
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA aka
V. I..Leonova

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]

ROUTING			
1		4	8
2	RP	5	6
3		6	

DATE : 4 AUG 61
363

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, SR 6, DD/I, AD/CI, S/C 2
COP, CI/IC 2

AUG 6 06 14Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 49057

DIR CITE MEXI (WARE ACTING) 8593

REDCAP

1. ACCORDING AIRLISTS FOLL ARRIVALS 31 JULY VIA AIR FRANCE 707: NIKOLAI SERGEYEVICH LEONOV AND WIFE VALERIYA IVANOVNA.

2. REQUEST HQS PROVIDE TRACES SUBJS ACTIVITIES SINCE DEPARTURE MEXI OCT 1956.

3. ODENVY ADVISED.

END OF MESSAGE

RI trace req 10 Aug 61
Bio card typed 10 Aug 61

SECRET

201-132139

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LEONOV NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH X X

22 08 28 USSR RYAZAN USSR USSR

Probably and interpreter

SR/6/Bio 706

Administrative clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City between March 53 and October 1956. In February 1960 accompanied MIKOYAN entourage to Cuba for the Soviet Cultural and Technical Exposition.

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FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1960
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
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SUBJECT: SOVIET CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL
EXPOSITION
HAVANA, CUBA
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SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, October 1956

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SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico
REPORT NO. [illegible]-2278
SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, October 1956.
DATE OF INFO: 1-31 October 1956
DATE ACQUIRED: 1-31 October 1956
PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City
DATE OF REPORT: 5 December 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico (B). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO:

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during the month of October 1956. Separate reports will be furnished on the Commercial and on Cultural and Propaganda Activities of the Embassy. References made below to the visiting Soviet musicians will be detailed in a special report concerning the activities of the musicians while in Mexico.

II. DIPLOMATIC:

A. Relations with Mexican Government:

1. On 1 October the secretary of Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Diaz, Private Secretary to Foreign Minister Luis PADILLA Nervo, conferred with Leonid [illegible], Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, about a dinner being given by the Embassy the following evening. Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy G. KULAZHENKOV invited ROSENZWEIG and his wife to attend a piano concert with him after the dinner. On 3 October ROSENZWEIG informed [illegible] that he was very embarrassed about what had happened the previous evening, but he had had a meeting with PADILLA Nervo and had not gotten out until 8:30 p.m. He had not known whether to go to the Embassy or to the concert, and asked that [illegible] excuse him with the Ambassador.

2. The private secretary of Jose GOROSTIZA, Sub-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, left a message at the Soviet Embassy on 3 October indicating he would be unable to accompany the Ambassador to the concert by a Soviet violinist that evening, as he had to attend a special dinner. However, GOROSTIZA had apparently accompanied the Ambassador to a piano concert the previous evening.

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3. Eduardo [illegible] of Pemex and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, also of Pemex, accepted invitations from Boris A. KAZANTSEV, recently appointed Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, to lunch on 5 October at 2:30 p.m. When GARCIA Rojas became ill that day, KAZANTSEV and [illegible] decided to lunch alone, and meet another day with GARCIA Rojas. Later [illegible] had to postpone the luncheon because of a special meeting with Antonio [illegible] of Pemex. Both [illegible] and GARCIA Rojas were invited and since the latter could not attend, [illegible] had to be present. [illegible] suggested to KAZANTSEV that they postpone their luncheon date until 8 October when GARCIA would probably be able to attend also.

4. On 4 October KAZANTSEV contacted Bernardo [illegible] Morales of the Press Section of the Foreign Ministry and apologized for not being able to obtain a third ticket for him for a concert that evening. [illegible] had requested a ticket for his daughter, but KAZANTSEV assured him that since their tickets were for the balcony all three could probably enter on the two tickets.

5. The secretary of Ricardo J. ZEVADA (of the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior) informed the Embassy on 8 October that ZEVADA was back at work. The Embassy had been trying to contact him, probably for the purpose of inviting him to a dinner or concert.

6. On 10 October a farewell reception was held at the Soviet Embassy in honor of Mikhail F. CHERKASOV, Counselor of the Embassy, who was scheduled to leave Mexico on 17 October. On 9 October Jose MARTINEZ Ceballos of the Protocol Office told Viktor N. GLOTOV, First Secretary, that Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Foreign Office wanted to know if it would be possible for the Embassy to give four invitations to the following friends of Mrs. PADILLA Nervo (believed to be the wife of Luis PADILLA Nervo, Secretary of Foreign Relations): Enrique [illegible] and wife; Dr. Grover [illegible] and wife; M. [illegible]; and Mrs. Mary [illegible]. The Embassy agreed to send the invitations to Mrs. PADILLA Nervo, who would pass them on to her friends. MARTINEZ Ceballos also indicated that in case the Ambassador and CHERKASOV did not know, that Eduardo ESPINOSA Prieto of the Mexican Diplomatic Service, and his wife Tamara were in Mexico and it would be a good idea to invite them. GLOTOV replied that these people were their good friends. MARTINEZ Ceballos did not know if Minister PADILLA Nervo and Sub-secretary GOROSTIZA would be able to attend, but added that he and MUNOZ Zapata would be there. Federico A. MARISCAL, new Director of Protocol, also planned to attend. Pablo CAMPOS Ortiz of the Foreign Ministry could not be there because he was still in the hospital recovering from an operation.

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7. Eduardo CHAVEZ Ramirez, Minister of Hydraulic Resources, and his wife received an invitation to a concert of the Soviet musicians on 21 October and requested eight seats. On 20 October they asked that eight seats be reserved for the 28 October concert.

8. Enrique ROSA Pontones, private secretary of Antonio CARRILLO Flores, Minister of Finance, informed KAZAKOV on 15 October that CARRILLO enjoyed attending the concert with the Ambassador on Sunday, but would not be able to accompany him on Wednesday, 17 October because of a meeting with the French Economic Commission.

9. Soviet Ambassador KULAZHENKOV made an appointment to meet with Director Rodrigo GOMEZ of the Banco de Mexico on 18 October at 12:00 noon.

10. On 16 October the Ambassador consulted with MUNOZ Zapata concerning an idea he had of organizing a small concert at the Embassy for a very restricted group - only Secretaries and some Sub-secretaries and their wives. MARISCAL and told MUNOZ Zapata that the question of attending was difficult because of the limited time and the protocol. MUNOZ Zapata suggested that the Ambassador send out invitations or indicate to him who might be interested. He and MARISCAL could not attend on the 17th because they were invited to a cocktail party in the afternoon at Bellas Artes and a dinner in the evening. MUNOZ had already heard the artists at Bellas Artes and at the cocktail party at the Embassy.

11. On 24 October, KAZANTSEV received a message from Salvador OLMOS, secretary of President RUIZ Cortines, thanking the Embassy for offering a concert by the Soviet artists as mentioned in the note received from the Soviets. However, they would not be able to attend due to the fact that the wife of the president had some engagements out of town.

12. The private secretary of GOROSTIZA informed KAZAKOV on 27 October that GOROSTIZA had received the Ambassador's invitation to the concert on 28 October, but had to go out of town and would not be able to attend. He asked that the tickets be given to his son.

B. Relations with Other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Ambassador KULAZHENKOV made arrangements with Gral. Gabriel ARCE Quiroga, Bolivian Ambassador, to meet at the Bolivian Chancellery on the afternoon of 2 October.

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2. On 5 October [illegible] contacted Jorge [illegible], Attache at the Panamanian Embassy, to [illegible] appointment with Ambassador Eusebio A. [illegible]. However, the ambassador was in Panama City so [illegible] made arrangements to meet with RAMIREZ the following day.

3. On 17 October [illegible] informed (Dr) Otto [illegible] Salazar, Second Secretary at the Nicaraguan Embassy, that the Soviet Ambassador would participate in the ceremony in honor of Carlos PIGN del Valle, former Chief of the Mexican Protocol Office. The Soviet Ambassador had indicated that they could handle the matter of the money as they liked, taking from the funds of the diplomatic corps if they wished.

4. On 31 October [illegible] invited Bolivian Ambassador ARCE and First Secretary Raul Alfonso [illegible] and their wives to lunch on behalf of the Soviet Ambassador as a farewell to ARCE. However, ARCE was leaving on a trip that day and could not accept.

C. Relations with Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Czech Legation: On 2 October Ambassador [illegible] invited Czech Minister Bedrich PISTORA and his wife to attend the concert of Soviet pianist [illegible] to be held that evening at Bellas Artes. On 4 October Karel [illegible] of the Czech Legation met [illegible] CHERKASOV. PISTORA and [illegible] and their wives accepted invitations to the farewell cocktail party for CHERKASOV given on 10 October. On 29 October Boris P. [illegible], Attache, invited Bedrich [illegible] and Lubomir BLAZEK to a small recital which the visiting Soviet artists were to give at the [illegible].

2. Polish Legation: Polish Charge d'Affaires Bernard [illegible] was scheduled to visit the Soviet Embassy the evening of 1? October, probably with his wife.

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations:

1. CEPAL: On 1 October [illegible] made arrangements to visit (fnu) VILLASECA, assistant to (fnu) URQUIDI of CEPAL (Comision Economica para la America Latina).

2. Indian Embassy: [illegible] K. [illegible] of the Indian Embassy received an invitation to the farewell party for CHERKASOV on 10 October. He also invited CHERKASOV to lunch on 15 October and indicated that CHERKASOV should bring along any other friend or couple he chose. It is believed that Ambassador [illegible] attended the luncheon. On 20 October [illegible] and his wife were invited to a concert of Soviet singer [illegible].

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3. Office of the Indonesian Republic: On 1[illegible] October the Soviet Embassy was informed that the Indonesian Charge d'affaires would not be able to attend (the reception for [illegible]) that day because of illness. The following days the secretary of the Indonesian Charge contacted the Soviet Embassy concerning the premiere of some Indonesian dancers on 21 October, indicating that she would send invitations to the Ambassador, [illegible], [illegible], and First Secretary Victor N. [illegible]. She also expressed an interest in learning Russian and was directed to contact the IICR. On 26 October the Indonesian Charge and Bees Effendi were invited to lunch by the Soviet Ambassador.

4. French Embassy: Mme. Guillaume [illegible]-PICOT, wife of the French Ambassador in Mexico, attended a dinner and showing of two films at the Soviet Embassy on 23 October. While with the Soviets she contacted the French Embassy and asked someone there to inform Mrs. ROSENZWEIG Diaz of a change of a meeting time at the hotel Alffer the following morning.

5. Yugoslav Embassy: The Soviet Ambassador invited Mirko [illegible], First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, and (fnu) [illegible] (pn), new Charge d'affaires, and their wives to dinner on 29 October at 1:30 p.m.

6. Israeli Legation: On 31 October the Minister of the Israeli Legation received the Soviet Ambassador at the Chancellory, Alejandro Dumas 231, Mexico, D.F. Vladimir N. [illegible] of the Soviet Embassy had attempted to make an appointment for KULAZHENKOV with the Minister earlier in the month, but the latter had been on a trip to Panama, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY:

A. Nikolay I. [illegible]OSCHIN, employee in the office of the Soviet Naval Attache, contacted Enrique [illegible]AZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Mexican Navy, on 3 October and said he had received a letter stating that the Secretary of the Navy could not attend a reception by the Ambassador to be held sometime between 5 and 10 October. KOSCHIN wanted to know if the other officers could attend, or whether they should wait until the Secretary could come also. KOSCHIN suggested that perhaps the Secretary could come sometime after 10 October, but [illegible] indicated that he was not sure, because the Secretary was often out of town on inspection tours. [illegible] consulted with Comandante [illegible] and said they would let KOSCHIN know later about the date and whether the officers would attend. KOSCHIN said they would be glad to give a reception to the Secretary on any date he chose. (Comment: As usual, [illegible] did not seem particularly enthusiastic in his dealings with KOSCHIN.)

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B. On 4 October [illegible] (lnu) [illegible]EROZ contacted Nikolay M. [illegible], Assistant Naval Attache, on behalf of the "Comandante" and stated that the latter could not (see [illegible]) that evening because he had been called to Veracruz.

C. On 4 October an unidentified person in Vancouver, Canada unsuccessfully attempted to contact the Soviet Military Attache.

D. Comandante Alfonso [illegible] Gomez of the Comision Inspectora invited [illegible] to join him on 6 October. However, [illegible] had plans to go fishing at the Lack of Valle de Bravo, and since it had ben four Saturdays since he had been able to go, he would prefer to get together some day during the week.

E. On 3 October Major Alfredo [illegible] Arguello of the Army Second Section asked Vladimir N. [illegible] of the Soviet Military Attache's office, how General (lnu) [illegible] could send some things to his relatives in the USSR. [illegible] suggested he send them by international airmail.

F. On 19 October Major [illegible] informed KAL[illegible] that the list of high officials of the Defense Department which he had requested, was ready. On 25 October [illegible] informed [illegible] he would like to talk with him about some motion pictures.

G. On 27 October Major Miguel [illegible] Penduri was in contact with Nikolay [illegible], employee of the Office of the Military Attache and a known Soviet Intelligence Officer. (see [illegible]-2061)

IV. [illegible]:

A. Communist and Pro-Communist Contacts:

1. An unidentified hotel employee called the Soviet Embassy on 1 October on behalf of Mrs. Arten Ovanim[illegible] [illegible], wife of Communist professor Macedonio GARZA, and inquired whether Consul [illegible] had received a reply from Baku, USSR or if he had received a copy of the bachelor's certificate from that city. The Embassy informed him that [illegible] was no longer in Mexico and that the new Consul would be receiving the public on the following day.

2. Ema de RIVERA, wife of Communist artist Diego RIVERA, informed KALATSHEV on 2 October that she hoped they could enjoy together some of the vodka she had received from the Ambassador. She had just come from Acapulco where her husband still was staying, and she was planning to return that afternoon. [illegible] would call the Ambassador when they came back to Mexico City the first of the week. (For further contacts between the RIVERAS and members of the Soviet Embassy, see [illegible].)

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3. An unidentified individual from FOARE (Federacion de Organismos de Ayuda a la Republica Espanola) asked [illegible] on 3 October if he could sell him an ampoule of Bogomolets. [illegible] replied that they expected to have some in a few months, but did not have any at the moment. ?

4. One Zita Vasich de CANESSI was in contact with Vladimir [illegible], Second Secretary, on 3 October concerning an ampoule (of Bogomolets) he had for her. He indicated that this one was free, but in case she needed more there were six other ampoules for sale in Mexico and they would cost seventy-five pesos each. (Comment: The caller is the wife of Federico CANESSI, pro-Communist artist.)

5. Jose REVUELTAS, pro-Communist writer, and (fnu) [illegible]OS, a lawyer, visited [illegible] during the month of October.

6. (Miss) Rosario SANSORES, journalist, accepted an invitation from KOLOMYAKOV to a cocktail party at the Soviet Embassy on 8 October. (Comment: SANSORES is known to be pro-Communist.)

7. On 12 October (Dr.) [illegible] de [illegible] of the Society of Friends of China attempted to contact KAZANTSEV concerning some pictures.

8. On 19 October Joaquin MACGREGOR Sanchez told [illegible] that he had looked for him at DOLUKHANOVA's concert but had not seen him there. MACGREGOR went on to say that he had seen an article about a Brazilian man of science who was in the USSR. [illegible] informed him that this man was an Armenian who had been repatriated from Brazil to the USSR. MACGREGOR indicated that he might be the right person to read his thesis, since he had studied existencialism, spoke Spanish, and was enrolled in the Soviet Academy of Science. [illegible] said the thesis had been sent two months ago, and that they were working on it and would probably show it to the individual mentioned.

9. Josefina ZAVALA of the Propaganda Office contacted (fnu) [illegible] on 19 October to ascertain if she had issue #9 of the magazine Comunist, but it has not arrived. ([illegible] is believed to be identical with one Sra. del [illegible] [illegible] Pucni, who is connected with a shop known as "Todo para el Nino," located at Pte. de Alvarado 91-B. She is believed to be a Communist and is frequently in contact with the Czech Legation.)

10. On 30 October Rosa CASTRO, pro-Communist journalist, arranged to go by the Embassy to see KAZANTSEV concerning some articles she had written and wanted to send to TASS, Soviet news agency.

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B. Contacts of Special Interest:

1. On 26 October (fnu) RIVERA, a lawyer, informed KOLOMYAKOV that he had found an article in the "Diverse Column" of Universal which suggested the name of one Ing. DIAZ as a person to assist people with the type of problem KOLOMYAKOV had been handling for RIVERA. (Comment: The newspaper advertisement read as follows: "Tiene Ud. algun problema migratorio? Se lo arreglo. Mexico Tacuba 598. Ing. Diaz" (Do you have any migration problem? I will arrange it for you. Mexico Tacuba 598. Eng. Diaz.) It appears that RIVERA and KOLOMYAKOV have been having discussions concerning migratory matters.

2. A. MONTASSI Bradley and Lev [illegible]KOV, First Secretary, arranged to meet for lunch on 31 October. MONTASSI suggested meeting somewhere other than their usual place since there were so many couples, etc., there, and he didn't like it. However, ZHUKOV replied that they would meet "alone" at the usual place. (An article in the 24 November issue of Excelsior listed one A. MONTASSI Bradley as attending the inauguration of an art exhibit by Diego RIVERA. MONTASSI is believed to be identical with the individual previously reported as (fnu) [illegible] y Bradley. There is no record in station files on MONTASSI.)

3. Mauricio de la SELVA was in contact with KOLOMYAKOV on 22 October. (see HMM-2055)

4. (fnu) [illegible] contacted KOLOMYAKOV on 23 October and suggested that they get together for a chat and a drink. They arranged to meet that afternoon "in the old place."

5. On 27 October Nicolas (probably [illegible]) called David ALFARO, son of Mexican Communist artist David ALFARO Siqueiros. On 20 October ALFARO was in contact with Matvey P. [illegible] of the Soviet Commercial Office (see HMM-2062).

6. On 30 October Sergio [illegible], leftist journalist, attempted to contact MASTYUKEVICH or [illegible]. On 27 October he conferred with MASTYUKEVICH (see HMM-2065).

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. On 20 October Lic. (fnu) [illegible] Mejia contacted Sergey [illegible] of the Commercial Office on behalf of Lic. [illegible] about some Bogomoletz serum.

2. On 20 October MASTYUKEVICH attempted to call Federico de la [illegible] Sotomayor, indicating that [illegible] had left a visiting card at his home.

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3. Carlos LA[illegible] contacted Pavel [illegible] on 27 October concerning a visa to the USSR. (see HMM-2066)

4. On 30 October [illegible] contacted Jose Alfredo [illegible] (see HMM-2117)

5. Yuriy N. PAPOROV, Cultural Attache, and his wife, were invited on behalf of Diego [illegible] to a cocktail party begin given on 5 November by Silvia [illegible] to show the portrait RIVERA had painted of her. The party was to be held at Avenida de los Fuentes 629, Jardines del Pedregal. PAPOROV indicated he still had no fixed address, but would send out address cards when he found a permanent place of residence. (Comment: [illegible] is a movie actress.)

6. On 20 October [illegible] contacted Carlos CALDERON of the Asociacion Nacional de Importadores y Exportadores de la Republica Mexicana, I Isabel la Catolica 38, and informed him that the Ambassador would like to postpone their dinner to 25 October.

7. One Luis Julio [illegible] arranged to visit PAPOROV at the Embassy on 26 October.

V. GOODS AND SERVICES:

A. On 3 October the wife of Leonid I. [illegible], Commercial Counselor, visited Dr. Walter [illegible], a dentist with offices at J. [illegible] 12, to have her teeth cleaned.

B. During October members of the Soviet Embassy were in contact with Mrs. Mercedes [illegible] of Tokyo [illegible], a seamstress.

C. On 22 October Albert A. [illegible], Attache, ordered a tank of oxygen from 11-31-74, Unidad Medica de Oxigeno. They promised to send him the note for renting the other tanks. (In the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory this number is listed under the name of Dr. Guillermo de [illegible], Plaza Miravalle 3-A, and also under Oxigeno Para Enfermos at the same address.)

D. Also on 22 October [illegible] contacted Juan DIAZ Rodriguez, Extinguidores, Moctezuma 246, and asked that they send mechanics to check and recharge the fifteen or sixteen extinguishers at the Embassy.

E. Aleksey D. [illegible], Assistant Commercial Officer, contacted Dr. Jorge [illegible] Millan, well-known doctor with offices at Articulo 123 #116, on 25 October concerning some x-ray treatments for his heart.

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VI. PERSONNEL

A. One Daniel [illegible] is believed to be the new chauffeur for the Soviet commercial office.

B. On 4 October [illegible] reserved a room, the cheapest available with a ten-percent Embassy discount, at the Hotel Roosevelt for Yevgeniya Petrovna [illegible], new employee in the Commercial office who arrived in Mexico on 5 October.

C. On 9 October Nikolay S. [illegible], Secretary to the Ambassador, contacted one Licenciado [illegible] (ph) and informed him that [illegible] had to leave Mexico in a hurry, and would like to postpone their appointment until Thursday, 11 October.

D. Georgiy [illegible], new employee in the Soviet Commercial office (motion pictures), arrived in Mexico on 10 October.

E. On 11 October KAZANTSEV explained to an unidentified person that the Embassy did not have a Press Attache, but that MASYUKEVICH was head of publications and he ([illegible]) was in charge of the press department.

F. On 17 October [illegible] was reported to be in Veracruz and was expected back in Mexico City on the 20th.

G. CHERKASOV, [illegible], and wife, and LAPIN and wife and children departed Mexico on 17 October as previously reported.

H. Mariya [illegible] and Yuriy and Galina [illegible] returned to Mexico on 23 October following home leave. The [illegible] were accompanied by their son.

I. Soviet diplomatic couriers Jouri (Yuriy) [illegible] and Anatoli [illegible] are believed to have arrived in Mexico on 22 October. According to Air France manifests, they departed on 29 October for New York.

J. Tamara [illegible], the wife of Second Secretary Nikolay [illegible], is working in the film section of the Soviet Embassy.

K. Mariya [illegible], wife of the Soviet Naval Attache, appears to be having a clandestine affair with a person believed to be Nikolay [illegible], subordinate to her husband and assistant Naval attache.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

A. On 12 October Vitaliy [illegible], First Secretary, left a message for one (fnu) [illegible] (ph) at Departamentos de la

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Paz, Iturbide 18, that he would not be able to visit them that day, because they were having a reception.

B. On 16 October [illegible] talked with (fnu) RIVERA concerning a recorder which the Embassy wished to buy to use for music. RIVERA said that the National University had ordered three and he had asked for one extra so as to get it into the country without taxes. There was also the possibility of obtaining one in Mexico. [illegible] promised to discuss the possibilities with the friend who was interested.

C. Ultramar Express contacted [illegible] of the Commercial Office on 16 October concerning data on visas for Mexican citizens going to the USSR. They were making up a list (of visa regulations) for Consulates and Embassies.

D. [illegible] contacted Mariano JIMENEZ Huerta during early October and indicated that a family would be moving from one of JIMENEZ' apartments at Cuautla 121, and another family would like to move in. JIMENEZ replied that since they were from the Soviet Embassy there would be no problem and they could make whatever arrangements would be easiest for them. The family leaving were in apartment 9 and would move out on the 19th. ([illegible] is listed as living at Cuautla 121-9.)

E. On 19 October the Soviet Commercial Office moved to Saltillo 19, Mexico, D.F.

F. General Alberto SALINAS Carranza, Director of Civil Aeronautics, informed KALININ on 25 October that during the month of November there was to be a series of lectures at the Department of Communications and SALINAS was to give one of them on the subject of "The Future of Civil Aviation." He wanted to obtain some data on Soviet commercial planes and planes from the other countries in that part of Europe. KALININ indicated that if they had anything he would be glad to give it to him.

G. On 23 October [illegible] called Alfonso ROSENZWEIG Diaz of the Foreign Office and reported that a group of some one-hundred persons had met in front of the main door of the Soviet Embassy and were shouting imprecations, making a lot of noise, and obstructing passage to and from the Embassy. [illegible] asked ROSENZWEIG if he could do anything, since he could not get in touch with Protocol or any other responsible person. ROSENZWEIG made arrangements for members of the Mexican police force to give protection to the Embassy.

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. EM-2038

SUBJECT: Activities of the Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, September 1956.

DATE OF INFO: 1-30 Sept. 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 1-30 Sept. 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City.

DATE OF REPORT: 7 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Source having access to Soviet diplomatic circles in Mexico (B). Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

I. SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO:

The following information on the activities of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico was developed during September 1956. Information on Soviet commercial activities is detailed in a separate commercial report.

II. DIPLOMATIC:

a. Relations with Mexican Government:

1. On 11 September Jose MUNOZ Zapata of the Mexican Foreign Ministry invited Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Georgiyevich [illegible] to a luncheon to be held on 12 September in honor of Jose FIGUERES, President of Costa Rica, visiting in Mexico. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, informed (fnu) CARRION Andrade of the Protocol Division that he would accept the invitation to the luncheon for FIGUERES, but that he would attend alone as his wife was in Moscow.

2. On 12 September Rafael FUSONI, formerly of the local United Nations Office of Information, thanked Mikhail Frolovich CHERKASOV for the use of the typewriter, and asked what the Russian delegates had thought of the Geology Congress. CHERKASOV indicated that they thought it "magnificent." FUSONI also informed CHERKASOV that on Friday evening, 14 September at 8:00 p.m., a small dinner was being held at his home for an engineer named Eduardo GUZMAN of Pemex, (fnu) GARCIA Rojas, and some other engineers who helped organize the Congress, and that he would like to invite CHERKASOV and the man who accompanied him the last time. CHERKASOV indicated that he and Vitaliy Aleksandrovich KHARITONOV, First Secretary, would be pleased to attend.

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FORM NO. 1 NOV 51 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

3. KAZANTSEV informed the Oficina de la Comision Economica para la America Latina (CEPAL) on 13 September that the Ambassador would be unable to attend the reception that day, but that CHERKASOV would come in his place.

4. The Ambassador's request for an audience with the Mexican Foreign Minister was postponed until 11:00 a.m., Tuesday of the following week, 18 September, which is the usual reception day.

5. On 19 September Carlos/PEON del Valle, Chief of Protocol, informed Nikolay Sergeyevich/LEZHOV, Secretary to the Ambassador, that he would be unable to accept Ambassador KULAZHENKOV's invitation to dinner on 27 September because of a previous engagement with the Ecuadorean Ambassador.

6. On 20 September, Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary, discussed with Cristobal/LARA of CEPAL a meeting of the Economic Commission scheduled to take place in La Paz, Bolivia at the beginning of 1957. No definite date has been set, but LARA estimated it would probably be held in May of the following year. Since LARA was leaving the city on Monday, 24 September, for a two-week vacation, he could not accept KAZANTSEV's invitation to lunch, but promised to call him on returning to Mexico City.

7. On 25 September KAZANTSEV indicated he was sending a gift to Delfin/SANCHEZ Juarez, a lawyer, of the International Affairs Office of Seguro Social (Social Security).

8. Also on 25 September KAZANTSEV tentatively arranged a luncheon date for Thursday, 27 September, with Eduardo GUZMAN and (fnu) GARCIA Rojas to thank both of them, in the name of the Ambassador, for all the attention they had paid to the Soviet delegation to the Geological Conference.

9. Alfonso/ROSENZWEIG Dias of the Foreign Ministry invited Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich/POPOV, Third Secretary, and his wife to dinner at his home on Tuesday, 2 October. POPOV, who expected to be out of town from Saturday until Tuesday or Wednesday, suggested a later date. Arrangements were then made for Thursday, 4 October, at 8:30 p.m. at ROSENZWEIG's home, Pirules 136. ROSENZWEIG promised to send POPOV directions for reaching his home, since it was a little difficult to find.

10. Octavio/PAZ of the Foreign Ministry accepted an invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

11. Arrangements were made for KAZANTSEV to meet with Bernardo REYES Morales of the Direccion General de Prensa (Foreign Ministry Press Section) on 29 September at 12:00 a.m.

B. Relations with other Latin American Diplomats:

1. Vladimir Mikhaylovich PANOV of the Soviet Embassy arranged a meeting between CHERKASOV and the Venezuelan Ambassador on 4 September. The Ambassador had previously expressed a desire to see CHERKASOV on that date.

2. On 3 September PANOV made arrangements for CHERKASOV to see the Haitian Ambassador ~~at 1:00 p.m.~~ at the Haitian Embassy. PANOV also made similar appointments at the Guatemalan, Dominican, and Costa Rican Embassies. An attempt to contact the Honduran Charge d'Affaires was unsuccessful at that time, but an appointment was made later in the week.

3. Gaston MORALES Barragan, Second Secretary of the Peruvian Embassy, contacted the Soviet Embassy on 7 September concerning a communication about the disarmament question addressed to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and a note of Soviet opinion on the Suez question. Since Peru does not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, MORALES could not send these notes to his country, and would return them to POPOV.

4. On 12 September KAZANTSEV contacted Hugo NAVARRO Bolandi, First Secretary of the Costa Rican Embassy, who said he had attempted to reach KAZANTSEV about a certain matter, for President FIGUERES had told him that he would have an opportunity to see the Russian Ambassador both at dinner at the Foreign Office that day and at the reception in the evening.

5. On 17 September the secretary of the Nicaraguan Ambassador made arrangements through Nikolay LEONOV, Embassy official, for a meeting between the two Ambassadors for 27 September at 8:00 p.m. in full dress.

6. KAZANTSEV attempted on 19 September to arrange a meeting with Antonio CHOCANO Batres, First Secretary of the Guatemalan Embassy. CHOCANO appeared hesitant to commit himself to a specific date, and finally asked KAZANTSEV to call him on the 25th. KAZANTSEV seemed to ignore CHOCANO's disinterest in the matter.

7. On 19 September LEONOV left a message at the Ecuadorean Embassy, saying that Ambassador KULAZHENKOV wished to invite the Ecuadorean Ambassador to luncheon or dinner on 25 or 26 September. No definite plans were made.

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8. On 20 September the Argentine Ambassador attempted to contact KULAZHENKOV who was busy at the time with the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires. He wished to know the time of the Soviet dinner on 27 September as the Venezuelan Embassy was having a ceremony from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. on the same day, and he would like to attend both functions. The Soviet invitation was for 8:00 p.m. so the Argentine Ambassador decided he would go to the Venezuelan ceremony first, and arrive a little late for the Soviet dinner.

9. On 21 September the secretary of the Cuban Ambassador informed Albert Alekseyevich MATVEYEV, Attache, that she had just talked to the Cuban Ambassador who was ill, and would like to postpone their luncheon date for that day until Thursday or Friday of the following week. They decided on Friday, 28 September and MATVEYEV said that the Soviet Ambassador would also like to invite the wife of the Cuban Ambassador to a motion-picture showing that same day. After checking with the Ambassador arrangements were made for 7:30 p.m., Friday, 28 September. The Cuban Ambassador and his wife, and Francisco DOMINGUEZ Comani, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy, would attend.

10. Plans were made for KAZANTSEV and DOMINGUEZ of the Cuban Embassy to meet for lunch on Wednesday, 26 September. However, KAZANTSEV later cancelled the date upon learning that they would have an opportunity to see each other at the Soviet Embassy.

11. On 25 September KAZANTSEV talked to Francisco AGUILAR, Counselor of the Salvadoran Embassy, concerning some records which [illegible] had sent to AGUILAR. The latter put off a proposed meeting with KAZANTSEV, suggesting that he contact him the following week.

C. Relations with other Iron Curtain Missions:

1. Appointments were arranged between CHERKASOV and Bedrick PISTORA, Minister of the Czech legation, for 3 and 10 September.

2. Plans were made between Boris FUTILIN, employee of the Soviet Embassy, and Lubomir BLAZIK, Czech Cultural and Propaganda Officer, for a volley-ball game to be held at 10:00 a.m., 9 September, at the Balneario Olimpico.

3. On 7 September Bedrich KUBES, Attache of the Czech Legation, made arrangements to stop by the Soviet Embassy on 10 September to discuss some motion pictures. Although the Soviets had no special representative for motion pictures, KUBES was told that either Leonid Ivanovich BOLSHAKOV, Commercial Counselor, or Aleksey Danilovich MAYEVSKIY, Assistant Commercial Officer, could help him.

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4. Czech Minister PISTORA and his wife were expected at the Soviet Embassy at 1:00 p.m. on 19 September.

5. On 22 September a member of the Czech Legation informed Mariya ZINOVOYVA, Soviet employee, that Minister PISTORA accepted the invitation to dinner at the Soviet Embassy. On the same day BLAZIK arranged to confer with Lev Nikolayevich ZHUKOV, First Secretary, concerning the fiesta which was to be held at the Minister's residence, Amores 923, on 29 September. Further information indicated that some forty Soviets were expected to attend the party.

6. On 27 September an appointment was set up for Karel STARECKY, Counselor of the Czech Legation, to visit the Soviet Ambassador that day.

7. The Czech Legation contacted the Soviet Embassy on 29 September to ask if they had a truck or pick-up that could be used to transport a ping-pong table from the Czech Legation to the Minister's residence for the party that evening. At first PANOV replied that they did not have such a vehicle, but later offered to pick up the table for them in their "truck."

D. Miscellaneous Diplomatic Relations

1. On 7 September Mrs. (fnu) MARCHETTI of the Italian Embassy thanked KHARITONOV for the photos he had sent her, and indicated that she and her husband were planning to have a dinner at her home for the people, including CHERKASOV, who had been together in Aguascalientes. (This probably refers to the group who attended the Grape Fair in Aguascalientes in August.)

2. The Indonesian Charge d'Affaires accepted an invitation to a motion picture showing at the Soviet Embassy for 8 September.

3. On 14 September a woman from the Association of Diplomats advised GLOTOV, KAZANTSEV, POPOV, and ROMANOV that the association would meet at 1:30 p.m. on 17 September at the Restaurant 1-2-3. GLOTOV informed her that all would probably attend, and that KAZANTSEV would like a receipt for his association dues.

4. Arrangements were made for Ambassador KULAZHENKOV to receive the Israeli Minister at 12:00 on 17 September, and the Norwegian Charge d'Affaires at 11:45 on 18 September.

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5. KULAZHENKOV, CHERKASOV, and POPOV and their wives were invited to attend a reception on Friday, 28 September at the Lebanese Legation in honor of the Lebanese Ambassador to Washington, D.C., who was passing through Mexico. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires also accepted an invitation for dinner at the Lebanese legation on 29 September at 8:00 p.m.

6. On 19 September ROMANOV made arrangements to call on (Dr) Guillermo de ASSA (ph) of the Cultural Committee of the Organization of American States, who had recently been home to Argentina. ROMANOV mentioned that he had also spent three months away from Mexico on vacation in the Soviet Union.

7. Felice STERN (ph) of the British Embassy contacted CHERKASOV on 19 September concerning plans for a luncheon and some table tennis games on Saturday, 22 September at 1:00 p.m. Since she could only seat ten persons and there would be five from the British Embassy, she would like to invite five of the Soviets. They decided on the Ambassador, CHERKASOV, AKSENOV and his wife, and GLOTOV and his wife. However, since that added up to too many guests, CHERKASOV agreed to let her know exactly the following day, and added that since he played table tennis badly, he would serve as referee.

8. On 21 September J. K. Ganju of the Indian Embassy congratulated KAZANTSEV on his promotion (see section on Personnel) and asked about the chart which the Soviet geologist delegates had distributed at the cocktail party at the Embassy. Part of the chart received by the Indians was missing and they would like another copy. KAZANTSEV said that all but six or eight of the delegates had returned and the rest were visiting in Yucatan. He would try to get another copy, but if he could not, he was sure the Indian delegates could get it through the Soviet delegate at New Delhi.

9. Olavi K. MURTO, Charge d'Affaires of the Finnish Legation and his wife, accepted an invitation to a reception at the Soviet Embassy on 27 September.

III. CULTURAL AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES:

A. Relations with Cultural Institutes:

1. Instituto Mexicano Bellas Artes

    a. On 12 September Luis SANCHEZ Arriola of Bellas Artes invited Vladimir K. KHASYUKEVICH, Second Secretary, and Boris P. [illegible]

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KOLOMYAKOV, Attache in the Cultural Office, to a cocktail party being given at the Palacio de Bellas Artes that same day in honor of Maestro (fnu) HERRERA de la Fuente who was leaving for Europe. SANCHEZ apologized for not having been able to notify them sooner, but stated that he had been sick. He informed MASYUKEVICH that Jan PAWALOWSKI, Cultural Attache of the Polish Legation, was going to attend and that he thought that it would be very interesting for the people from the Soviet Embassy to speak with the people that were going to be there. MASYUKEVICH promised he would do everything possible to be there.

b. On 13 September SANCHEZ Arriola apologized to MASYUKEVICH for not having come that morning and said he had been with KOLOMYAKOV the night before. MASYUKEVICH was aware of this and said arrangements had been made. SANCHEZ inquired about some pictures, but KOLOMYAKOV knew nothing about them and was leaving next day for San Luis Potosi, so MASYUKEVICH would talk to him about it later.

c. Arrangements were made for the Ambassador to see Miguel ALVAREZ Acosta, Director of Bellas Artes, at 1:30 p.m. on Monday, 24 September.

2. IICMR (Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Interchange)

a. KOLOMYAKOV contacted the IICMR on 13 September and told Tomas CHAVEZ Morado that it would not be necessary for the Institute to send over an operator and projector as they had been able to obtain a 35mm copy of the film they were going to show.

b. On 25 September the president of the Sociedad de Guerrerense contacted the Soviet Embassy and requested some motion pictures to take on a cultural tour through his state of Guerrero. He was referred to the IICMR as the films were not kept at the Embassy.

B. Specific Cultural Activities of the Embassy:

1. Art:

a. Ignacio MARQUEZ Rodiles, prominent Mexican leftist in education and artistic circles, informed KOLOMYAKOV on 7 September that he had received at the Comite del Trece a letter from the Soviet Painters' Federation or Union, and would like to talk to KOLOMYAKOV concerning it, because it was related to a plan which they had already taken up at the Embassy about Mexican cultural relations. An exposition of Mexican paintings would be ready to leave China around the end of November and they must decide whether it would return to Mexico, or whether

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they should take advantage of the invitation which the Soviet painters had made for 1957. The Soviet painters could not receive the exhibition this year because of lack of space and other expositions being presented. MARQUES indicated that they would like to have the exhibition go to the Soviet Union, and he would like to talk with both KOLOMYAKOV and the Ambassador concerning this matter.

b. MARQUEZ called MATVEYEV on 7 September, and told him that the committee of the Frente Nacional de Artes Plasticas, of which he is a member, had received a letter from the Union de Artes Plasticas in the USSR and he would like to talk with the Ambassador concerning it. He was told to take the matter up with the Cultural Attache first. Later arrangements were made for MARQUES to see the Ambassador at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, 13 September. MARQUES wished to bring all the committee with him, because of the importance of the matter, but was told to bring just one other person.

2. **Motion pictures:**

a. Gaston/GARCIA Cantu (of previous record) contacted MASYUKEVICH to ascertain if he had any photographs of the film "Viva Mexico." MASYUKEVICH replied negatively, but added that they did have a photograph of "Sergio" and he would look for a copy.

b. On 15 September MATVEYEV conferred with Mario/CALVET to see if he had received the new Soviet films. CALVET said they had received the following: "Las Damas"; a short entitled "Monumentos Historicos del Kremlin"; "El Gallito de la Cresta de Oro"; a short, "Antilope de Oro"; "Kashtanta"; and "La Daga" of which they had a previous copy. Later the same day a man from CALVET's office contacted BOLSHAKOV to see if he could come by/for the film, "Cerilla Sueca," which was to be used for a matinee showing to the Sindicato de Cinematografistas (Motion Picture Union), who had requested it. The man was told to come by the Embassy and ask for Boris [illegible]KOV.

3. **Dance - Theatre:**

a. On 22 September, Luis SANCHEZ Arriola, of INBA asked MASYUKEVICH if Juan TOLEDO had to ask authorization to put out publicity on the ballet. MASYUKEVICH said he only had to make some arrangement with the Soviet Embassy so as to be in agreement about the publicity, but he believed they could publish what they wanted.

b. KOLOMYAKOV confirmed to Juan TOLEDO on 19 September what they had previously said, and stated that they were supporting his idea. TOLEDO said that it was only a matter of consultation

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because (fnu) LUMBROSO had told him that they usually asked for the opinion of the Embassies of each country to be certain that no country would object. Soviet opinion was positive. KOLOMYAKOV promised to go by one day and greet TOLEDO in person.

e. Jose Luis MARTINEZ of Esto informed MASYUKEVICH that the article on the Russian ballet had been published.

C. Soviet Information Bulletin:

1. During the month of September Honorio MATEOS Mendez, of Privada General Jesus A. Flores 3, Colonia del Coservatorio, D.F., called the Soviet Embassy and requested that they send his copy of the bulletin to his new address as listed above.

2. On 18 September Salomon KAHAN, music critic for Tiempo, contacted the Embassy to ascertain how he could obtain a copy of the bulletin which carried an article about the Russian pianist, Yevgeniy MALININ. KAHAN gave his address as: Tribuna Israelita, Bolivar 36, office 505, DF.

Public.

3. Honorato de CASTRO called the Embassy to give them a change of address for mailing his bulletin: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 547, Colonia Irrigacion. (CASTRO is a member of the Spanich Peace Committee)

D. Miscellaneous Cultural Activities:

1. On 3 September an unidentified woman contacted the Soviet Embassy in an attempt to locate some pamphlets on Hungary. She was referred to the Soviet Cultural Attache.

2. Also on 3 September an unidentified man called the Embassy, stating he was interested incobtaining literature on the Social Security Law of the USSR. He was told to contact Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV, the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. On 17 September Srta (fnu) FLORES Covarrubias of Pemex, Paleontology Laboratories, informed SAFRONOVA that on Saturday she had delivered some micro-paleontological samples to the Embassy for Madame ZUBOTINA, in care of KUZTASHKOV (phonetic), and she wanted to be sure they had reached the proper persons, as the gateman to whom she had given them spoke very little Spanish. She also stated that she had left a small box containing a silver item and Mexican cent-piece which she was sending to ZUBOTINA as a remembrance of Mexico. Sra Maria Luisa ROBLES, Chief of Paleontology of Pemex, had asked her to check on these things. She would stop by the Embassy around 3:00 p.m. to check further, as she lived near by.

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4. On 28 September MASYUKEVICH talked to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro and his wife and apologized for the glass broken by their child when they were at the RODRIGUEZ home. He said he had some gifts for them, perfumes from Moscow, and was only awaiting an occasion to give them to them. RODRIGUEZ told MASYUKEVICH that he had his lighter. MASYUKEVICH had thought it lost and bought another. RODRIGUEZ mentioned that he had been in Veracruz and had seen [illegible] there. He also had spoken with Alberto BELTRAN, pro-Communist artist, concerning the possibility of going out to the country on Sunday. MASYUKEVICH thought it an excellent idea.

IV. ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY:

1. Captain Carlos SANTANDER Bonilla of the Second Section of the Mexican Army Staff informed Naval Attache Nikolay [illegible] REMIZOV on 2 September that Captain Vladimir Nikolayevich KALININ, of the Soviet Military Attache office, had brought them a list of Soviet tecnicolor movies from which they could choose. It was arranged that KALININ would talk to SANTANDER about sending the following pictures which they had chosen: "Circo Ruso," "Los Virtuosos del Ballet Ruso," "Cerilla Sueca," "Romeo y Julieta," "Deporte Sovietico 57," and "Vuelo a la Luna." On 5 September KALININ contacted the office about the movies, stating that they could not send them all at once, but that he would bring by "Los Virtuosos de Ballet Ruso" and "Romeo y Julieta" when they were ready.

2. Naval Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero cancelled a luncheon engagement with REMIZOV on 4 September because of the illness of his daughter. (Field Comment: RAZO, who joined the Mexican Navy on 14 September 1939, was promoted to Lt. j.g. in 1958, served as an assistant at Petty Officers School in 1950, and currently is an aide to Vice Admiral CHAPITAL, Inspector General of the Navy.)

3. On 6 September REMIZOV contacted Comandante Alfonso CASILLAS Gomes and asked when they were going to "hear Mexican music." Arrangements were made to get together at 8:00 p.m. on 11 September at REMIZOV's home. Both men sent greetings to each other's families.

4. Nikolay Demidovich BYKOV, Assistant Naval Attache, talked to (fnu) RAY at the Second Section concerning the invitations they had received to the ceremony of delivering of flags to the Naval Units of Mexico and checked on the address.

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5. On 11 September ROSCHIN attempted to make arrangements for Admiral Mario RODRIGUEZ Malpica to visit Grigori Korneyevich NIKIPORETS, Naval Attache, at the latter's home. However, RODRIGUEZ was leaving for Guaymas early the next morning and would not be back until January. RODRIGUEZ expressed the hope that NIKIPORETS would still be in Mexico when he returned so they could renew their "friendship."

6. On 12 September Major Ivver [illegible] (of previous record) left work with TROFIMOV for NIKIPORETS and the Military Attache that he would be pleased to have them attend a luncheon at "Jardines del Pedregal" on Friday, 14 September to celebrate the inauguration of his equestrian school. He also invited TROFIMOV and told him that the school is on Boulevard de la Luz at its furthest point.

7. On 13 September REMIZOV informed Enrique BALTANAZ Holt, Acting G-2 of the Navy under [illegible], that ROSCHIN had not received an invitation to the Independence Day parade. BALTANAZ later contacted ROSCHIN to say that the Defense Department had sent out invitations to four officers in the Naval Attache's office, but they had obviously been mislaid. A duplicate would be sent to ROSCHIN, but in case it was not received in time ROSCHIN would have no problem getting into the stand, as he was expected. ROSCHIN was business-like in the conversation to the point of being curt. Later KALININ called Major Alfredo NUNEZ Arguello, Army Second Section, concerning the same matter of the invitations.

8. Comandante SANDOVAL of the Naval Staff contacted ROSCHIN on 18 September and said he had just received a letter from Luis NUNEZ Cepina (ph), whom he described as a very small man. ROSCHIN knew to whom he was referring. NUNEZ has asked SANDOVAL to convey his thanks to ROSCHIN, stating that the injections had a marvelous effect, and that his wife would require further injections in four or five months. He said he would make another request for serum at that time, and ROSCHIN promised to order five more ampoules for December. ROSCHIN also expressed his pleasure at the recovery of Comandante ZETINA and sent greetings to ZETINA and SANDOVAL. (Field Comment: The Soviets appear extremely polite with all members of the Naval Staff, surpassing all efforts at courtesy with other officials in the Mexican government. This may possibly be attributed to better indoctrination of the Naval Attache's staff.)

9. The secretary of the Guatemalan Military Attache advised REMIZOV on 19 September that invitations were on the way for the Military Attaches Association meeting to be held on 21 September in the Restaurant Los Montejos, Insurgentes 675. After checking, REMIZOV advised that the following would attend: NIKIPORETS

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and his wife, MAKOVIN and wife, REMIZOV and wife, BYKOV and wife, and CHELPANOV. He was not certain about CHELPANOV's wife, who had a one-month old baby at home.

10. An appointment was made for NIKOPORETS to see SANDOVAL at 12:00 on 24 September. NIKIPORETS also wanted to see Comandante OROZCO but the latter had not yet returned from Tamaulipas.

11. On 24 September KALININ informed Ricardo RAMOS Flores, then Army G-2, of the proposal of the Ambassador "for this meeting" on 29 September. RAMOS Flores agreed to inform the appropriate persons.

12. On 27 September ROSCHIN took a message for REMIZOV that Lt. Jesus RAZO Reguero of Comision Inspectora had to go out of town and could not meet with REMIZOV that day.

13. On 28 September Yuriy Alekseyevich CHELPANOV talked to Col. RAMOS Flores and asked if General Tomas SANCHEZ Hernandez were coming to the reception at the Embassy the following day. However SANCHEZ had left for Toluca and Tenancingo, and Col. Eduardo SOBRINO Quintero, Chief of Staff, Air Force, would attend alone, as his wife was ill. In all, four persons with wives would attend and SANCHEZ without his wife. RAMOS Flores mentioned that Col. Rosendo ESPARZA Arias would be taking his place on the first of January, and asked if they would like for him to invite ESPARZA also. However, CHELPANOV apparently did not understand, and they decided only on those mentioned previously.

14. On 29 September ROSCHIN contacted Lt. Miguel LOSADA of the Second Section of the Navy and asked why they hadn't sent for any motion pictures. LOSADA answered that the projector had been out of order for about a month, and was being fixed at Casa Steele. ROSCHIN said that they had some new pictures, and that BALTAZAR should let them know when they wanted some.

V. CONTACTS:

A. Communist and Pro-Communist Groups:

1. On 6 September Jose REVUELTAS, calling from the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Produccion Cinematografica de la RM, Seccion de Autores y Adaptadores (Sindicate of Motion Picture Workers of Mexico, Section of Authors and Adapters), attempted to contact CHERKASOV.

2. On 19 September Rosa CASTRO, pro-Communist journalist, and MASYUKEVICH held a friendly conversation. MASYUKEVICH who had been meaning to call her, but had had a great deal of work, indicated that his wife had seen Rosa in the Regis. Rosa mentioned that she was writing an article on a place she had visited and was afraid the dimensions were wrong because she had two different sets of data. MASYUKEVICH said he could not help her. Rosa invited him out to eat, and he indicated he would call her early the following week to set the time.

3. Juan REJANO, Spanish Communist, contacted MASYUKEVICH on 27 September, and said that he would like to see him for just a few minutes. MASYUKEVICH who appeared glad to hear from him, stated that he had to go out for ten minutes, but that if REJANO wanted to come by in about twenty minutes, he would be back.

B. Contacts of Special Interest:

1. (fnu) MONTES y Bradley (ph) - On 3 September (fnu) MONTES y Bradley contacted First Secretary Lev ZHUKOV, who asked if he had something so they could get together for lunch the following day. MONTES replied that he wanted to invite ZHUKOV for 5 September, and said he would go by the Embassy for him. However, on the fifth, ZHUKOV suggested meeting at a bar. On 13 September MONTES contacted ZHUKOV and explained he was unable to call him on the day they had agreed upon, for he had been out of town and had just returned three days ago. Arrangements were made to meet at the Embassy at 10:00 a.m. the following day and lunch together afterward. (MONTES' phone number, 21-96-07, was listed in the 1956 Mexico City telephone directory under the Hotel Apartamentos Dolores, Sombrereros 9.) On 27 September MONTES talked to ZHUKOV and indicated that he had not been able to do some work, as he had been very busy. MONTES suggested they have coffee together, and ZHUKOV said he would phone him about the hour.

2. Sra. de ESCAME - On 4 September one Mrs (fm) ESCAME and Aleksandr DRUZHININ of the Military Attache's office discussed the matter of the books which her husband wanted to know about, because he had to have some bound, and needed to know the quantity of which DRUZHININ planned to dispose. She asked DRUZHININ to call her on the following day to let them know, because they were leaving on the 11th. She added that her husband has few books bound and these are for the Sidururgica (Steel Works). The following day Mrs. ESCAME contacted DRUZHININ who informed her he had only talked to one man, but that he told him he would talk with his friends. He had not seen him yet because they were all busy attending the congress. Mrs. ESCAME gave him the following number to use to contact her: 31-91-57. This number belongs to a woman who lives in front of her, and she can be phoned there at any hour. (The 1956 telephone director lists this number in the name of Luisa GARCIA Galva, Revillagigedo 108-304, D.F.

3. Sergio NOVELO - On 21 September Sergio NOVELO, leftist journalist of previous record, cancelled an appointment he had for that day with MASYUKEVICH and "Nikolay", because something urgent had come up. On 27 September he unsuccessfully attempted to contact AKSENOV. The same day he chatted with MASYUKEVICH who greeted him with pleasure, calling him "the disappeared one." NOVELO apologized, saying he had had a great deal of work and adding that he wanted to issue them an invitation for today at 6:00 p.m. MASYUKEVICH replied that he could accept, but Nicolas had gone out, and it would be better to make the date for the following day. He would notify Nicolas.

4. On 21 September KAZANTSEV contacted Genaro CARNERO Checa, Peruvian Communist journalist, and arranged for an appointment for Tuesday; 25 September. CARNERO suggested they meet at the same place where they had been with "Paco" (Francisco MARTINEZ de la Vega) the day before.

C. Miscellaneous Contacts:

1. Jorge SUAREZ advised LEONOV on 13 September that they would be playing chess at his home that day from 4:30 p.m. on. LEONOV promised to come if he had time.

2. LEONOV called Estudios Universitarios on 13 September, identifying himself as the Attache from the Soviet Embassy who called on Hector MURILLO a week ago, and added that he would like to speak to him concerning an inquiry about requirements for receiving a doctorate. MURILLO was not in.

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3. On 19 September Mikhail SKLERAU Kogan (of previous record) unsuccessfully attempted to contact KOLOMYAKOV, and left a message to call him at the Joyeria Louvre.

4. On 19 September ROMANOV received a message that (Lic) CASTANEDA was pleased to accept the invitation to luncheon on 25 September at the Normandia.

5. On 20 September one Pedro AGUILA called the Embassy concerning Russian lessons. He was told that the lessons were given at the Institute.

6. On 26 September "Paco" and Lino, husband of Consuelo(lnu) of the Propaganda Office, contacted Consuelo to determine the address of Santiago ALVAREZ, who lives in the same place as Martin IGLESIAS. Consuelo offered to ask IGLESIAS who was in the Embassy, but Paco did not want to bother him, and Lino said they could check with IGLESIAS' wife.

See Mem. 117 7. On 27 September Consuelo unsuccessfully attempted to contact Gordon CARMONA on behalf of MASYUKEVICH.

VI. GOODS AND SERVICES:

1. Hermanos Rosas, Enceradores de Pisos, Martires de Tacubaya 7, D.F., were contacted during the month of September concerning cleaning and waxing floors.

2. On 5 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered two tubes of ink from Guillermo PAIRO. (The phonenumber, 23-89-10, is listed in the 1956 phone directory under the name of Luis BAZ, Av. Col. del Valle 104-2, D.F.)

3. An appointment was made for the Ambassador to see (Dr) SODI y Pallares at the Cardiology Institute on Monday, 17 September at 11:00 a.m.

4. On 13 September Josefina ZAVALA ordered 50,000 sheets of paper from one (fnu) ARGUELLES.

5. On 20 September MASYUKEVICH tried to contact one Teodoro ESTRADA of the Mexico Auto Service, 13-18-02. This number is listed under Mexico Auto Service, S.A., Atenas y A. Gonzalez, DF.

6. On 20 September TROFIMOV made arrangements to see (Dr) Jose Felix VALDES, Gutenberg 61-6, D.F.

7. On 24 September MASYUKEVICH called one (fnu) ARANDA (at 11-61-59, listed under the name of Francisco LEON Dias, Puebla 377-3) at

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Consultorio Medico, and asked when they could come by so the doctor could see his wife. ARANIU informed them that the new office was on Puebla. MASYUKEVICH asked about Ofelia, and ARANIU told him that she had gone to New York on a scholarship. MASYUKEVICH was afraid they would have a problem bringing the child then, but ARANIU said he could recommend a friend of Ofelia, who was dedicated to ortodoncia. Arrangements were made for an appointment.

8. A representative of Jose R. Villesana y Cia., Landero y Coss 31, Veracruz, forwarded information to the Embassy concerning some things for them that had arrived in port.

VII. PERSONNEL:

1. The home address of Vasiliy Mikhaylovich DRONOV was established as Tacambaro 4-6. DRONOV's wife recently had an operation.

2. Matvey Petrovich IZOTOV of the Commercial Office serves as the representative of International Book in Mexico.

3. Soviet couriers Gennadi ZHUKOV and Konstantin IPATOV held reservations for a flight to New York on 5 September, departing Mexico City at 8:00 a.m.

✓ 4. KULAZHENKOV and KAZANTSEV returned to Mexico from the Soviet Union on 6 September.

✓ 5. The following Soviet Embassy personnel planned to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October: CHERKASOV; LEONOV and wife; LARIN, wife and two children. They held reservations on the Queen Elizabeth which was scheduled to leave New York for Southhampton on 24 October, and on the Molotov, scheduled to leave London on 31 October. They planned to be in Leningrad on 5 November.

✓ 6. A reporter from Public *Excelsior* was told on 21 September that Boris KAZANTSEV was promoted from First Secretary to Counselor of Embassy.

7. BYKOV told Rafael MUNOZ that he was now working in "Communications" and usually arrived home late. MUNOZ invited him to his home to have a drink "with some friends." Apparently it was the first time BYKOV had been invited for he asked for the address - Jardin 5.

8. An Operation on (Sra.) ZURAVKOVA was scheduled to take place on 27 September. She was to be in the hospital located at Guadalquivir 78.

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9. LUKASOV informed BOLSHAKOV on 27 September that he had returned from his trip and would be in town for one more day, then would leave at 8:00 a.m. by air the day after for New York, and from there on to Paris and Moscow.

10. A son was born to DRUZHININA on 28 September.

11. AKSENOV was reported to be in Veracruz during September, according to (fnu) RODRIGUEZ Toro who saw him there.

SECRET 50-4-1-294

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Mexico/USSR	**REPORT NO.**	CS -LT-10962
SUBJECT	Photographs of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	**DATE DISTR.**	2 November 1956
		NO. PAGES	1
		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	1 October 1956		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City 1 October 1956		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person with good contacts in diplomatic circles (B).
Appraisal of Content: Documentary.

Available from CIA Graphics Register are photographs of the following former members of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who left Mexico on 17 October 1956:

a. Mikhail Frolovich Cherkasov, Counselor of Embassy, born on 16 September 1909 at Moscow. Cherkasov arrived in Mexico with his wife, Aleksandra Cherkasova, and their minor son on 27 September 1952. His wife and son left Mexico on 24 July 1956.

b. Nikolai Dementyevich Larin, chauffeur, born on 15 January 1922 at Riazan; and his wife Praskovia Artemovna Larina, born on 30 November 1923 at Riazan; and their minor children, Aleksandr and Irina. The Larins arrived in Mexico on 11 September 1953.

c. Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov, administrative employee, born on 22 August 1928 at Ryazan; and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna Leonova, born on 30 April 1928 at Moscow. The Leonovs arrived in Mexico on 11 July 1953.

Distribution of Attachments:
OCR Graphics Register (Retention)

S-E-C-R-E-T

201-132139

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	X	AEC		I&NS	X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

EE		SR	x	CI	x	WH/CP	x			HMMA-5440; 5439;5438	HL LNZ
FE		WE		CI/ICD	x	WH/PW	x				LNG LNG
NE		WH	x	(IE-Brit, Fr)		WH/3/Mexi	4				MK
SE		IO		SR/CE/Redcap	x					NONE	des.

14-00000

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOV, NICOLAI SERGEVICH
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)

FBI DOCUMENT
DATE: 25 OCTOBER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: NONE GIVEN
FBI FILE NUMBER: NONE GIVEN (NEW YORK)
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS
LEONOVA, VALERIA IVANOVNA

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONAL INFORMATION DATA

USSR ADDRESS	NAME LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich
OFFICE ADDRESS	ALIAS OR CRYPTONYM
HOME ADDRESS	TITLE Administrative Employee, Embassy Mexico City
INCOME	DATE OF ARRIVAL c. 25 May 1953 Date of Dep-last Tour 17 Oct 56-
HEIGHT / WEIGHT	PHOTO
EYES / HAIR / COMPLEXION	
DATE OF BIRTH 22 August 1928	
BIRTHPLACE Ryazan	

FAMILY

Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, born 28 April 1928 Ryazan

DOCUMENTATION

Service PP 10724 issued 29 October 1952
Wife's 11507 issued 28 February 1953

LANGUAGES

Spanish (good)

PREVIOUS CAREER AND EDUCATION

Prior January 1950: One Nikolay Alekseyevich LEONOV, mechanic, arrived India. Description: 5'5", fair complexion, brown hair & eyes, previously AMTORG employee U.S. from 1947 to Oct 48 (NELA 6701). One N. L. LEONOV private secretary to Ambassador in India (ZID 38).

8 October 1951: Above LEONOV arrived Italy from India (WIR 258) en route USSR.

PERSONALITY *(Habits, use of money, hobbies, literature, vices)*

FORM NO. 498
1 FEB 55

SECRET

201-132139

RIS

(AEDIPPER: Negative

CONTACTS

MISCELLANEOUS

9 May 1953: Subject arrived Rome from Moscow. Stayed Primrose Pensione (R-374-53 6/53).

13 May 1953: Subject departed for Genoa to leave by sea for Mexico (R-374-53).

c. 25 May 1953: Subject and wife met in Vera Cruz by Aleksandr BELYAKOV (HMM 370 7/53).

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A- 5438

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE [illegible]0 OCT 1956

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV,
Secretary to Ambassador,
Soviet Embassy, Mexico

REF: MEXI 137, MEXI 230

ACTION REQUIRED: None

1. A U. S. transit visa has been issued for subject and his wife, Valeriya Ivanovna LARINA. Subject plans to depart Mexico by rail on 17 October 1956, entering the United States through the Port of Laredo. Subject will depart the United Stated on 24 October 1956 on the "Queen Elizabeth" through the Port of New York.

2. Two sets of photostatic copies of subject passport and of the accompanying completed questionnaire which was furnished to the Embassy visa section are enclosed. With these are included 6 additional photos of subject. Photostats, identical in number, are furnished of the same items for subject's wife.

SOURCE: Visa Section
DISSEM: ODENVY

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:

Photostats(2 sets each)

8 October 1956

Distribution:
4 - HQS(1 for REDCAP)(w/atts)
2 - Files(w/atts)

gfb

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. MAR 1949 51-28A

RI COPY

201-132139

14-00000

OCT 6 02 54 '56

481 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ED/WS

DATE : 05 OCT 56

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

IN 34844

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RI 2, SR 3, S/C 2

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: MEXI 231

RE: MEXI 137 (IN 27164)

1. U.S. TRANSIT VISAS ISSUED 1 OCT TO FOLLOWING SOV EMB PERSONNEL:

NIKHAIL FROLOVICH [redacted] CHERKASOV, COUNSELOR;

NIKOLAY LEONOV, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, VALERIA;

NIKOLAY LARIN, EMPLOYEE AND WIFE, PRASKOVIA, CHILDREN ALEKSANDR AND IRINA.

2. GROUP DEPARTING MEXI 17 OCT BY RAIL, ENTERING U.S. VIA LAREDO; DEPARTING NEW YORK 24 OCT ON QUEEN ELIZABETH. SOURCE: VISA SECTION, EMBASSY; DOC. DISSEM: ODENVY, KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

201-132139

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM
FROM MEXICO CITY TO SECRETARY OF STATE
DATE: 1 OCTOPER 1956
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FILE NUMPER:
NUMPER 566, OCTOPER 1
SUPJECT: NONE GIVEN

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich

MEXI-839 27 Jun 56	Personal calling card of subject found in address book of Fidel Alejandro CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary who was arrested by Mexican police on 21 Jun 56. (LIVESTOCK-3; B-Doc)
USArma MexCity MEX C-20 28 Jun 56	At time of his arrest Cuban revolutionary Fidel CASTRO had in wallet personal card of Nicolas L. LEONOV, adminis officer in Soviet Embassy and Secretary to Soviet Ambassador.
HMM-1752 5 Sep 56 No dissem	Translator for Soviet delegates to Eighth Internat'l Radiology Congress at Mexico City, 22-29 Jul 56.
Tele 566 AmEmb MexCity 1 Oct 56	Embassy today issued C-3 visas to: Mikhail CHERKASOV, b. Moscow, 16 Sep 1909, Counselor Nicolai Sergevich LEONOV, b. Russia 22 Aug 1928, Clerk Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA, b. Russia, 30 Apr 1928 Nicolai Dementievich LARIN, b. Riazan, 15 Jan 22, Clerk Praskovia Artemovna LARINA, b. Riazan 30 Nov 1923 minor children Alexandre LARIN and Irina LARINA Departing Mexico 17 Oct by train via LAREDO; dep NYC 24 Oct 56 via QUEEN ELIZABETH.
MEXI 231 IN 34844 5 Oct 56) OUT to FBI	(Same info as above)

201-132139

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO. 201-124630

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-04994

4. DATE 4 Aug 1956

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE 201-132139

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT HELD IN OG/SIS.

TS#-145923

(This document contains no information pertaining to the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.)

LEONOV, Nikolay S.

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-132139

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

4P

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]-A-1833

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE 29 June 1956

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational/REDCAP
SPECIFIC Soviet Embassy Personnel

1. In an effort to standardise spellings of names of personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and to conform with the transliteration table employed by KUBARK, the following spellings are being provided. Inasmuch as many of the names have not been seen, verification through pronounciation and their spelling has been made by Faith S. GRIELS while on TDY here. In the future, reports concerning local Soviet Embassy personnel will carry the spellings are provided herein.

AKSENOV, Nikolay Vasilyevich - Second Secretary
wife: Tamara Aleksandrovna AKSENOVA
dau: Natalia Natalya

BOGUNOV, Mikhail - employee
wife: Nadeshda N. BOGUNOVA
son: Georgiy (or Yuriy)

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich - Commercial Counselor (on leave)
wife: Tamara Sergeyevna BOLSHAKOVA

BURENKOV, Boris Stepanovich - employee/guard
wife: Nadeshda Grigoryevna BURENKOVA
dau: Olga

DEMYANOVICH,
BYKOV, Nikolay Damidovich - Asst. Naval Attache
wife: Taisiya Pavlovna BYKOVA

CHELPANOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich (or Aleksandrovich) - Asst. Military Attache
wife: Valeriya CHELPANOVA

CHERKASOV, Mikhail Frolovich - Counselor of Embassy
wife: Aleksandra Vladimirovna CHERKASOVA
son: Andrey

COPY	ROUTING
1	[illegible]
2	[illegible]
3	[illegible]
4	
5	

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

RI

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201-132139

DRONOV, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich
wife: Galina M. DRONOVA
son: Vyacheslav

DRUZHININ, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Irina M. DRUZHININA
son: Andrey

GLOTOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - First Secretary
wife: Klavdiya Mikhaylovna GLOTOVA
sons: Yuriy and Aleksandr

GUNDAREV, Ivan Yefimovich - employee, Cultural Office
wife: Lyudmila Ivanovna GUNDAREVA

ILIN, Vasiliy Semyonovich - Attache
wife: Valentina ILINA

IZOTOV, Matvey Petrovich
wife: Anastasiya IZOTOVA
sons: Igor and Aleksandr

IVASHKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich - employee/guard
wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna IVASHKOV
dau: Tatyana

KALININ, Vladimir Nikolayevich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Olga N. KALININA
son: Yevgeniy

KAZANTSEV, Boris Aleksandrovich - First Secretary
wife: Varvara Andreyevna KAZANTSEV
son: Boris
dau: Irina

KOLOMYAKOV, Boris Pavlovich - Attache
wife: Lidiya Alekseyevna KOLOMYAKOVA
dau: Irina

KOTOV, Sergey Maksimovich - Third Secretary
wife: Valentina Ivanovna KOTOVA
dau: Galina

KULAZHENKOV, Anatoliy Georgiyevich - Ambassador(on leave in USSR)
wife: Yekaterina Ivanovna(in USSR) KULAZHENKOVA

50-4-1-282

LARIN, Nikolay Demyanovich - chauffeur
wife: Praskovya Artemyevna LARINA
son: Aleksandr
dau: Name unknown

LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich - Secretary to Ambassador
wife: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

MAKOVKIN, Vladimir Sergeyevich - Military Attache
wife: Sofia MAKOVKINA
sons: Arkadiy and Aleksandr

MASYUKEVICH, Vladimir Ilyakovich - Second Secretary
wife: Lyudmila Kirillovna MASYUKEVICHA
son: Aleksey

MATVEYEV, Al'bert Alekseyevich - (employee? - attache?)
wife: Yelizaveta Zakharovna MATVEYEVA
dau: Yelena

MAYEVSKIY, Aleksey Danilovich - Asst. Commercial Officer
wife: Zoya Ivanovna MAYEVSKIYA
son: Viktor and Vladimir

MITROFANOV, Vasiliy Vasilyevich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Klavdiya Semenovna MITROFANOVA
son: Yevgeniy

NASEDKIN, Dmitriy Pavlovich - Guard/chauffeur
wife: Lidiya Grigoryevna NASEDKINA
son: Boris(not believed to be here)

NAUMOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Yevgeniya NAUMOVA

NIKIFORETS, Grigori Korneyevich - Naval Attache
wife: Mariya Antonovna
son: Viktor

PANOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich - employee, Commercial Office
wife: Lyudmila Vasilyevna PANOVA
dau: Tatyana

POPOV, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich - Third Secretary
wife: Vera Dmitriyevna POPOVA
son: Yevgeniy

PUTILIN, Boris - employee
wife: Margarita PUTILINA

50-4-1-282

SECRET

REMIZOV, Nikolay Matveyevich - diplomat, Naval Attache office
wife: Nelli A. REMIZOVA -
son: Aleksandr
dau: Larisa

ROSHCHIN, Nikolay I. - employee, Naval Attache office
wife: Larisa ROSHCHINA

SAFRONOVA, Vera Vladimirovna - employee

SHIKIN, Aleksandr Sergeyevich - employee
wife: Lilya Nikolayevna SHIKINA
son: Yevgeniy

SIDYAKIN, Vasiliy Fedorovich - employee
wife: Aleksandra Nikolayevna SIDYAKINA

SOKOLOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich - Asst. Military Attache

TROFIMOV, Nikolay Ivanovich - employee, Military Attache office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
son: Sergey
dau: Nataliya

TROFIMOV, Viktor Nikolayevich - employee, commercial office
wife: Lyudmila TROFIMOVA
dau: Nataliya

VERIN, Konstantin Andreyevich - employee/guard
wife: Lyudmila Vladimirovna VERINA
dau: Larisa

ZABRODIN, Fedor Nazarovich - employee/guard
wife: Mariya Konstantinova ZABRODINA
daus: Nina and Margarita

ZHUKOV, Lev - First Secretary

ZINOVYOVA, Mariya Ilinichva - employee

2. This list comprises a roster of personnel known to be present at the Soviet establishment as of 15 June 1956 and includes positions which they are known or presumed to hold.

Gene F Braddock
Gene F. BRADDOCK

Distribution:
4 - Wash(1 for REDCAP)
2 - Files

28 June 1956

HMM-A-1833

SECRET

60-4-1 — 7

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Mexico | Report No: [illegible] | Local File No:

No. of Pages: 1 No. of Enclosures: 1 (5 pages)

Report Made By: Howard O. [illegible]/Inc | Approved By: Peter R. [illegible]

Distribution:
By copy to:
2 - Headquarters
1 - Embassy (incl LA & MA)
1 - Havana
2 - Files

Orally to:

28 June 56

Source Cryptonym: [illegible] | References: [illegible]-839

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

Subject/ Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

Classification

FORM NO. 51-60
FEB 19[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL RI COPY

201-97456

E1-132139

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-1640

SUBJECT: Arrest of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban Exile in Mexico

DATE OF INFO: 22 June 1956

DATE ACQUIRED 22 June 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 23 June 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Person with connections in Mexican Federal Security Police (B).

Appraisal of Content: 2

Among the personal effects of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban exile arrested 21 June 1956 by the Mexican Federal Security Police as a suspected plotter against the government of Cuba, was an address book. ~~Addresses extracted from this book are attached to this report.~~ The contents, including addresses and telephone numbers, are listed below.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED.

201-9743-6

CONFIDENTIAL

ALDAMA, Hector
[illegible] 17 (Junto a la iglesia)
~~Junto a la Iglesia~~ Mexico D.F.
46-50-64

ALVAREZ, (Dr)
13-03-55

BARRECO, Rodolfo Armand
H. Royalty
hab no.29 ~~(13-48-22)~~
18-42-20 [illegible]

PENCISIA, Armando
313 Vandelinda Ave.
Teaneck, New Jersey, USA
[illegible]-1155

VANEGAS, Arsacio
2a. Penitenciaria 27
Colonia Morelos. Mexico D.F.
22-38-54

Blanco
Luis Moya 87. Apto 105
~~Apto.-105~~ Mexico D.F.
21-41-99

BOUDET, Ooispio
Emilio Carranza 93
Col. Mocleannis. Mexico D.F.
22-27-29 (Cafeteria)

BODIA, Alfonso
Cadiz 215-B. Mexico D.F.

BOSH, Juan
Roma 37-(13). Mexico D.F.
36-52-54

BENITEZ R.
14-06-76

CABRERA, José (para DIAZ, Eulardo).
1397 Webster
Corner 170 Bronx, N.Y.C.

NIEVA, Carlos
B no.510 - 25 y 27
Vedado Habana. Cuba
FO-2554

CASTRO, Orlando
Infanta 53.
Apto 302
Habana. Cuba

CARDENAS, Lorenzo
R. Cuba 19, Apto 801.
(Luz 360 Este. Vibora
Habana. Cuba

ROMAN, (Dr.) Alfonso
Castro Madero 34
Apto 38
"Edif. San Luis". Mexico D.F.

CABALLERO, Catalina
(51/no. 5525)
Lopes 52-293. Mexico D.F.
(28-07-22)

CALZADILLA, Miguel
Victoria 94, Apto 1. Mexico D.F.
18-46-25/Trata(?)

CASTRO, Lydia
18 no.312 Apto 15
Vedado Habana. Cuba
F-9022

DARO, Cartoya
14-01-61

DUBOIS, Elia (altos)
Godines no. 3118, Apto 4.
Esq. a 33 Marianao, Habana, Cuba

ROCHA, David D.
21-95-24
Etex 53-C. Mexico D.F.

FRANCO, Mary
Alejandro Dumas 131
altos Tenancingo 8, Montes
de Oca. y Juan Escutia
14-11-17
(Col. Polanco & Col. Condera)
Mexico D.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIDALGO, José M.
Agustín Lara no. 8-D
Veracruz. Mexico

FERNANDEZ, Angel
Calle 18 no. 371
Lawton, Habana, Cuba

GARCIA, Fela Campo
Luis Moya 87/312. Mexico D.F.
21-44-90

GOMEZ, Cesar
Ave. Chapultepec 512
(San Antonio) Apto 21. Mexico, D.F.
11-71-84

ANTONIA, Maria
13-25-52

GONZALEZ, Isidoro (& Lucrecia?)
Rio de la Plata 55. Mexico D.F.
28-86-68

ANGUSTIA, Gailan
Fronton, México
[illegible]-84-62

GUTIERREZ, Norma
Lopez no. 134
Altos 2. Mexico, D.F.
21-34-99

GUTIERREZ, Alberto
Ponciano Arriaga 16
Apto.B. Mexico D.F.

GUEVARA, E.
Napoles 40
Apto 105 Mexico D.F.
laboratorio: 19-27-69

Guadalupe
Espinish
Igrl Mariscola
36-31-80

GOMEZ, Mercedes(de Alvarez)

GUTIERREZ L., Alfonso
Av. Juarez no. 119-53, Mexico D.F.
14-99-22 office: Perforaciones,S.A.
21-37-25, 21-36-42

JIMENEZ, Eva y Cra.
Independencia y Balderas
Edif. Altamira, Mexico
~~Apto 12~~ Mexico D.F.
18-14-94

Juan Manuel
26-42-17

Lucy
Atenas 31. Mexico D.F.
36-23-16

LOPEZ, Nico
MI-0501

LOPEZ, Juan
Gutenberg 16
Apto no. 1. Mexico D.F.
11-22-05

LINARES, Gloria
Caluzo no. 92
Cd. Peralrillo
Apto 8. Mexico D.F.
26-93-77

Granado 139

VELAZQUEZ, Lucila
Rhin 28, Apto 17. Mexico D.F.

LOZANO, Pascual
Rio Tigris no. 42-3
Col. Cuauhtémoc. Mexico D.F.

MARGOLLES, Fdo.
P.O.Box 351
2477 N.W. 34 St.
Miami 48, Fla., USA.

MENDEZ, Marta Cabezón
San Frco. 712,(alto)14 y 15
edo e/o Lauiton, Habana Cuba

de JESUS, Mario
Casa 16-06-92
Trab. 35-57-49

MENENDEZ, Victor Ruiz
Tamaulipas no. 65. Mexico D.F.
23-36-69

CONFIDENTIAL

MARTINEZ, Carlos ([illegible])
Cerrada de Vallarta no. 10. Mexico D.F.
13-83-46

NUIRY, Juan.
B-7958

OSUNA, Maria Luisa
Rn Guzmán 19,Apto 5 Mexico D.F.
Alfredo
21-07-45

PEREZ, Alvaro
Canaria 60, Apto 2
Colonia Portales
Mexico. D.F.
(above X'd out)

PEREZ, Dora
Dominguez no. 4507
Steinhart, Rosendo Collazo
Marianao. BO-9691

PIFERRER, Ramón Aguiler
Cuauhtemoc no. 647
Apto no. 6 Colonia Narvarte. Mexico D.F.

COELIO, Pina
Ave. México
Cd. Hipódromo, Mexico D.F.
13-54-23
Frontón 35-25-82
Casa : 25-37-51
Apto 302

"PAPI" Fotografía
Insurgentes Sur 18. Mexico D.F.
12-66-05.

PEÑA, Lazaro
Lopez 44-203. Mexico D.F.
36-10-66

MORERA, José
PI, Aida
Nicolas San Juan 125
Apto 3 (23-37-81). Mexico D.F.

NARVARTE, Col.
Pardo Lleda
C.O.C.O. Reina 314
Habana Cuba

RODRIGUEZ, Raúl Santos
29-16-38

ROSELL (Chapa)
Apto 1
11-90-55

SABADI, Ramón
A-31-27

SANCHEZ, Fdo. Amaya
Ramón Guzmán no. 6. Apto. 21
~~Apto21~~, Mexico. D.F.
21-31-51

SEVILLA, Ninón
36-82-89

SAVIUR (John Sabatin)
Benoit
23-13-55 (apto. 7)

SOLIZ, Piedad
Trab. 18-06-60, ext 222
13-44-28

SPINDOLA

TULIO, Guido
18-53-50

VEGA, Juan Valero
Garaje "Mirtío"Uncanta y 23
Vedado, Habana. Cuba
(above X'd out)

VANEGAS, Arsacio Arroyo
2a Penitenciaria no. 27
Col. Morelos, Mexico D.F.
22-23-98 H 22-93-57

VASALLO, Antonio
Figuras 52 (bajas)
Esq. Lealtad, Habana Cuba

VERTIS, Capitán
Bar Riviere
Col. Polanco. Mexico D.F.
13-08-93
gobernación 12-95-96
botica 20-58-53
casa 20-13-13

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WALBERO, Enrique
22-34-14

Miscellaneous, cards, etc.

LEONOV, Nikolas S.
Embajada de la U.R.S.S. Mexico D.F.
Tel. 15-61-55

SUAREZ, Jose Blanco
República no. 120
Artemisa
~~P[illegible]~~ Pinar del Rio
Cuba

SANTOS, Francisco Herrera
(Pintura General)
Don Martín no. 19
Col. Irrigación
20-39-35
México, D.F.

FERRER, Marta
Sec. Defensa
Lomas de Sotelo Camión
Reformas: Hosp. Militar
(en la puerta)

CASTRO, Alfonso Ramón
Madero 34, Apto 38, Mexico D.F.

Radio Servicio Franco
Laboratorio Tecnico de Radio y TV
(Ing.) FRANCO, Roberto T., Dir.
Niños Heroes No. 191 y Dr.
Erazo Lts. D y E. Mexico D.F.
tels: 13-45-01, 36-07-73

VERTIZ (Dr.) Papy, No. 631
13-31-30, 19-32-50

PERFORACIONES, S.A.
Av. Juarez No. 119-55
21-37-25 y 21-36-42
Mexico, D.F.
Ing. GUTIERREZ, Alfonso L. (gerente)
Fuego 731, esq. Risco. Mexico D.F.
14-39-22 (casa)

GONZALEZ, Eduardo Reyes
Tigris 42, esq. Balsas
Apto 8
Col Cuauhtemoc. Mexico D.F.

[illegible], S.A.
SANDOVAL, Gonzalo E.
Libreria Juarez
Av. Juarez 152, Mexico D.F.
Revillagigedo 25.
tel. 21-35-74

[illegible]
Calzada de Guadalupe, no. 35, Mexico D.F.
17-17-05

GREAVES Y CANTAYA
(compra y venta de autos.)
CANTAYA, David de J.
Av. Chapultepec 451
Mexico, D. F.

ROCHA, D.
Donceles 24-C
Apto 55-C
Altos Teatro Fabregas. Mexico D.F.

Importadora Fotográfica, S.A.
Insurgentes Sur 13
(antes Ramón Guzmán)
Mexico 4, D. F.
tel. 12-55-05

"California"
Gral. Prim y Paseo de la
Reforma
Mexico, D. F.
35-55-75, 35-73-55 (hab 205)

PADRON, Arnaldo
203 W. 85th St., Apt. 5
New York, N.Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COTU, Enrique
No. 439
Reforma y Elba. Mexico D.F.
28-63-13

FERNANDEZ, Sr. Roberto
Gagueruela no. 17
Esq. Agustina
Vibora, Habana. Cuba

CHICO, Srta. Cruz
25-06-60

Juan de la BARRERA, ~~Juan~~ 95
~~no.~~ 95
Colonia Condesa, Mexico D.F.

MARTINEZ, R.
Calle 11 no. 1007, 10 y 12
Apto. 12
Vedado - Habana, Cuba

BUSTAMANTE, Guido
Hotel Rey
C. no. 21

Yolanda L
Ave. Cuitlahuac, Mexico D.F.
23-44-48

Nicolas SAN JUAN, ~~Nicolas~~ 125 (?)
Apto 3
Colonia Navarte. Mexico D.F.

ANDRADE, C.
Mina 137, apto 305
Col. Guerrero
Mexico, D. F.

REYES, Esther Fina.
20 Nor. no. 53
Veracruz, Ver., Mexico

CAZALI, Augusto Avila

CONFIDENTIAL 201-9705C

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3736 5 Dec. 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4336).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that ~~xx~~ he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35358 REF: MEXI 826 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMM 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elisabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

14-00000

Leonov

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

204 RIG/M.

DATE : 26 JUNE 56

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/RQM 3, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SR 3, S/C 2, (SUSPENSE DD/I)

Revolutionary Activities - Cuba

MEXI 839 (IN 35356) 1520Z 27 JUN 56 ROUTINE PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: HAVA CITE: MEXI

RE: MEXI 825 (IN 34161) July

not Police [illegible]

1. PERSONAL CALLING CARD OF NIKOLAS S. LEONOV, SOV EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, FOUND IN ADDRESS BOOK OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. SOURCE LIVESTOCK 3, EVAL B-DOC.

2. PLANNING KUCAGE EXPLOITATION.

END OF MESSAGE

Frank: copy was sent to Paul Oberst
18 Aug 61.

19 7 6

Mexi 817

DATE 30 July 56

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No

201-132139

~~TOP~~ SECRET

S: mainly LIFEAT

Personal Data

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1923, Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 with wife
Documents: Soviet Service Passport 10724 issued 29 January 1952
✓ **Title:** employee
✓ **Position:** Believed to be administrative. Secretary to the Ambassador. Possible Translator and interpreter overlapping with the cultural section work
Residence in Mexico: July 53 - Nov 53: Industria 71-6
Nov 53 - ?? Juanacatlan 81
✓ at least Feb 54 to ?? : Cuautla 161-8
Jan 55 to present: Unknown, possibly in Embassy, possibly at Juanacatlan 71
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna, nickname "Lera"
Children: None known
Languages: Spanish (good to excellent)
✓ **Other Personal Data:** Nicknames "Kolya," "Kolyechka"
Drives car

Official Activities

LEONOV remains an obscure figure and although we assume he is employed in the administrative section of the Chancellery, we cannot pinpoint his duties. He has identified himself from time to time as the secretary to the Ambassador, has been noted taking his turn as embassy duty officer and has taken hospital bedside guard duty. During 1953, before the arrival of the regular administrative officer, Vladimir Ivanovich ZHUKOV, in November 1953, LEONOV was handling calls concerning goods and services but was probably merely filling in, because of his facility with the Spanish language, until ZHUKOV's arrival. In December 1954 APARINOV asked one of the guards whether he had the keys to LEONOV's room in the embassy. Since, during that time, we believe LEONOV was residing at Industria 71, it would appear that LEONOV had a private office in the embassy, one which was apparently kept locked when he was away. One or two other very vague references indicate he might have something to do with communications work. Beginning about November 1955 LEONOV began to emerge as an interpreter and translator. He spent a good deal of time with the Social Security delegation, with Soviet pianist GILELS and with Soviet movie director ALEKSANDROV, each time appearing as the interpreter or translator. His recent association in January 1956 with the daughter of Communist General Heriberto JARA also involved translation work. Other more recent references make us begin to wonder now if LEONOV might not be connected with the Cultural Section. During the last two months of 1955 he appeared to be associated in work with MASYUKEVICH, director of the Soviet Embassy Information Bulletin. In March 1956, when PAPOROV could not keep an appointment at University City at the invitation of Mexican President RUIZ CORTINES, he asked that either LEONOV, GUNDAREV or POPOV keep the appointment. It is known that PAPOROV, GUNDAREV and POPOV are all definitely assigned to the Cultural Section indicating further that LEONOV may be associated with that group. We, therefor, classify LEONOV as

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having worked in the administrative section until late 1955 when his position began to appear as that of translator and interpretor, perhaps more clearly associated with the cultural section. Again, however, he may still be assigned to administrative work in the Chancellery which overlaps with the cultural end.

LEONOV's contact with Samuel RAMOS as dispatched in HMM-A-4356 (19 March 1956) was reported again on 7 March 1956 when RAMOS called LEONOV and the two discussed a chess tournament to which Soviet delegates were apparently to be invited. When LEONOV asked from where RAMOS was calling, he replied from his home. RAMOS stated he was now back in class "at the University" and so "we won't be able to meet at my house now." RAMOS invited LEONOV to one of the tournaments the following week and also made arrangements to visit subject at the embassy to give him the list of books "which we (want)..."

Unless LEONOV has something to do with consular affairs, we are at a loss to explain the following LIMERICK reference. On 10 November 1955 a man identifying himself as "your friend, Col. GONZALEZ" asked LEONOV if he had found out about some matter he had requested. It appeared that LEONOV had forwarded the "request" to the USSR and that the Mexican Ambassador to the Soviet Union was to notify Col. GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ stopped short after starting to ask what happened to that matter, explaining it would be better if they got together and talked it over. The two arranged to meet at the embassy. At the beginning of the conversation GONZALEZ, in recalling to LEONOV's mind who he was, stated,"We were chatting about this project which I have to present to the Presidencia about the use of the waters from the Toluca volcano, Chinantecatl." The Cia. Exportadora e Importadora Mexicana, S.A. (CEIMSA) had commissioned GONZALEZ to go to Chihuahua to see some farmers and therefore he was not able to contact LEONOV earlier.

Other than the two preceding LIMERICK references, which in themselves are inconclusive, we have no indication that LEONOV is engaged in RIS activities.

There are vague references suggesting that the LEONOVs may be leaving Mexico in April 1956.

Private Activities

During February 1954 LEONOV was hospitalized at the Sanatorio Dalinde where he underwent an appendectomy performed by Dr. Gustavo BAZ.

A LICOOL-2 reference of August 1954 revealed that former Soviet Consul MELNIKOV and his wife agreed that LEONOV played well (possibly a musical instrument or a ball game ??). During March 1955,after he had arranged a movie or given a lecture, two of the embassy wives remarked on how good LEONOV was. (It is known that LEONOV has taken his turn at giving Political Information Class lectures.) LEONOV also appears to enjoy athletics -- he plays tennis, attends shooting matches, arranges football games with the Czechs, and plays volleyball. He takes some sort of lessons, not necessarily Spanish, in the embassy. As for LEONOV's feeling about American movies, he was heard to tell one of the Social Security delegates, "You can really run into trash in an American film."

It is reported by LIMERICK that LEONOVA gives some sort of instruction to embassy personnel and although it is not known just what type of lessons these may be, we venture a guess that she teaches Spanish. During October 1955 LEONOVA underwent a very serious operation, lasting two hours, during which the anesthetization had to be discontinued because her heart could not take the strain. LEONOVA returned to work again in November 1955.

Although one vague reference hinted that LEONOVA may be pregnant now, there have been no allusions to any children the LEONOVs might have. When MATVEYEV returned from home leave in the USSR in October 1955, while LEONOVA was undergoing her operation, he said he had seen LEONOVA's father but,because of his age,it would be better that he not be told of her sickness.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name Jm Galbraith WA
Office TSO [illegible]
Date 14 June 56

AIR

HMM A-4336

Chief, WHD

29 March 1956

Chief of Station, Mexico

Operational/LCIMPROVE
Samuel RAMOS; Renee SALGO Burger; et al

1. LIMERICK reported that on 24 February 1956 one Samuel RAMOS contacted Nikolai S. LEONOV, who acts as secretary to the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." LEONOV replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order" through LEONOV.

2. On the face of it, this conversation appeared to be quite unusual and attracted the interest of this Station. Furthermore, it is known that for years the Soviets have used the hours between 1900 and 2000 for meeting clandestine or unusual contacts in Mexico.

3. The following steps were taken to ascertain general information on RAMOS and "SALGO":

   a. Station file record on Samuel RAMOS resulted in no clear identifications. There is a Samuel RAMOS who was listed in 1948 as Rector of the School of Philosophy and Letters of the University.

   b. LIESTHENITE ascertained that the address mentioned is occupied by a female doctor named Renee SALGO Burger, allegedly of French nationality, who operates a beauty parlor. This is confirmed in the telephone book.

   c. Files of this office indicate an ODENVY report that one Renee SALGO was a member of the Hungarian club EMUNA in 1951. The files also show that one Alejandro BURGER was a member of the club and that he and Renee lived at the same address. The file further shows that one Andres SALGO was a member of the club and describes him as a Communist sympathizer.

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4. Further investigations of the SALGOs will be conducted and their name, together with that of RAMOS, included in our CE suspects list.

Thomas G. URQUHART

Distribution:

4 - Wash(1 for LCIMPROVE)
2 - Files

~~TOP~~ SECRET

From: Mexico City

Report No.: HMM-1464

Local File No.:

Number of pages: 8

Number of enclosures: none

Report made by: Arthur S. Stough

Arthur S. Stough

Approved by: Peter R. Aumont

5 Mar 56

Distribution:
By copy to: 3 - Headquarters
2 - Files

Orally to:

Source cryptonym: LIFEAT/LIERICK

References: none

Source, operational data, and comments:

Subject: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

Comment: —

1. Forwarded herewith is the first in a proposed series of monthly reports on Soviet commercial activities in Mexico City. Source LIFEAT has since December 1955 developed so much more information on this subject than ever before, that this Station feels a separate monthly summary should be put out.

2. This initial report contains some general background and personnel information on the Soviet commercial office in Mexico for the guidance of Headquarters.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
Changed to Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name In Coalhoath
Office [illegible]
Date 5 June 56

Classification TOP
SECRET / [redacted]

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173
1 · 132137

~~TOP~~ SECRET

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-1464

SUBJECT: Soviet Commercial Activities in Mexico

DATE OF INFO: December 1955

DATE ACQUIRED: Same as above

PLACE ACQUIRED Mexico City.

DATE OF REPORT: 5 March 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: LIFEAT/LIMERICK. B-Documentary.

I. ORGANIZATION:

The commercial office of the USSR is located at Calle General Leon 32, in Mexico City. The phone number of the commercial office is 15-12-64. The commercial office was formerly located in the Soviet Embassy, main building at Tucubaya 204. Due to expansion of activities, additional personnel, and the resultant need for greater operating space, the office was moved in April 1955 to its present address.

II. PERSONNEL:

A. Commercial: Soviet Commercial Office - Mexico City

(1) BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, Diplomat-Commercial Counselor, since September 1954.
Diplomatic Passport - 04300
Residence - Calle General Leon 32
Phone - 15-12-64
Arrived in Mexico, 9 September 1954, accompanied by wife Tamara Sergeyevna
Children in USSR.

(2) VAYEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, Employee-Assistant Commercial Officer (and intelligence officer): Not on diplomatic list.
Soviet Service passport - 13973
Residence - Carlos B. Zetina 2-3?
Phone - None.
Arrived in Mexico, 20 March 1954, accompanied by wife Zoya Ivanovna, and sons Viktor and Vladimir, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(3) IZOTOV, Matvei Petrovich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport - 18051
Residence - Tamaulipas 125?
Phone - None Known
Arrived in Veracruz 25 January 1955, accompanied by wife Anastasiya and sons Igor and Aleksandr, aged eight (8) and four (4) respectively.

(4) TROFIMOV (or ATROFIMOV), Viktor Nikolayevich, Employee-Commercial Office.
Soviet Service passport -
Residence -

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FORM NO. 51-58 PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED

Phone - None Known
Arrived in Mexico 8 July 1955, accompanied by wife Lyudmilla, and daughter Natalia, age unknown.

B. Clerical: Soviet Commercial Office Mexico City

(1) KOTOVA, Valentina Ivanovna, Secretary-Typist since December 1954, does not work full time here (believed that commercial office has a branch in the Embassy and that KOTOVA works there too).

Passport -
Residence - Tacambaro 4-3
Phone - None
Arrived in Mexico May 1951, with husband and daughter Galina age unknown. (Husband is 3rd Secretary-Consul).

(2) PAPOROVA, Galina Petrovna, part time translator (Spanish?), since May or June 1955.
Passport -
Residence - Nuevo Leon 138-6
Phone - 11-35-67
Arrived April 1954 with husband and son Sergei age three (3) (husband is diplomat - 2nd Secretary, Cultural Attache).

III. HISTORY OF SOVIET COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION SINCE 1949:

SAMOILOV, Mikhail Kuzmich, was Commercial Officer from November 1949 to 14 November 1954, part of the time under Commercial Counsellor KUDIN, since departed.

MAYEVSKI, Aleksei Danilovich, went through a break-in period in administrative and operational routines from March 1954, to September 1954, with SAMOILOV still nominally in charge.

BOLSHAKOV, Leonid Ivanovich, appeared in September 1954, and also went through a similar break-in period until 14 November 1954, when SAMOILOV left. From 14 November 1954, to date, BOLSHAKOV has been in complete charge of the Commercial Office.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF THE COMMERCIAL OFFICE:

The main efforts of the Soviet Commercial Office as evidenced by its past and current activities are as follows:

(a) A determined effort to infiltrate into Mexican industry and trade, by the introduction and implementation of transactions advantageous to local industry and trade.

(b) Establishment of important economic and financial contacts in the Mexican government.

(c) Establishment of contacts with Mexican rank and file business people.

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(d) Coordination with Soviet Cultural Office in the procurement of certain films, books, and other propaganda material, and distribution of same.

(e) Utilization of Mexico as springboard for trade with other countries in Latin America.

V. METHODS OF ECONOMIC PENETRATION:

In order to attain economic objectives in Mexico, the Soviets utilize various methods. According to observations made about past and current activities, most of them fall under two headings, which overlap. These are:

(a) Extensive use of local business contacts.

(b) Cultivation of key people in various organizations which can be easily used as propaganda outlets (i.e., films and newspapers) or as more conventional contacts (banks and customs officials, etc.).

VI. SOVIET COMMERCIAL CONTACTS AND TRANSACTIONS:

Set out below is a listing of the contacts made by the Soviet Commercial Office during December 1955, together with details as to the nature of these contacts, and the transactions made or proposed with them.

A. Combined Propaganda and Commercial Contacts:

1. BANDERA, Molino, Juan,
Peliculas Mexicanas
Ejido 43-107-105
Phones: 85-53-55; 36-46-05; 10-12-99; 18-22-48; 18-60-05; 21-30-81; 10-12-74.

Mario

BANDERA is a direct contact of the Soviet Commercial Office in the matter of film procurement, as well as an intermediary in securing Mexican films for the Soviets. It is known that the Soviets must purchase a certain amount of Mexican films, in order to be able to sell and exhibit theirs here. BANDERA was consulted several times during the month of December 1955, on film procurement. On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI (see IIA 2 Personnel), consulted BANDERA in reference to having BANDERA procure a certain film on time, so that a contract could be signed. Due to BOLSHAKOV's absence on a trip (see HMM-A-4109, pp. 2,3,4, 6 February 1956), MAYEVSKI wished to have the contract signed before 1 January 1956.

On 20 December 1955, BOLSHAKOV consulted BANDERA on whether the Mexican film "Raices" could be acquired. BANDERA explained that Cimex (a film company) controlled this film, but arranged a meeting for BOLSHAKOV with the director of Cimex, for 1100 on 21 December 1955.

2. CALVET Mario Arce, CALVET Arce, Mario
Dicina Films De Mexico SA
Av. Morelos 45-206-Bis 7-8
Phones: 21-13-46; 35-98-04.

CALVET appears to be a very important contact for the Soviets in the coordination of various factors. According to information received, he is very

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active in handling Soviet films presented in Mexico, smoothing out customs difficulties, arranging for favorable publicity for Soviet films, and is making an effort to circulate Soviet films elsewhere in Mexico beside in the capital. CALVET, according to one report, is the sole exhibitor of Soviet films in Mexico.

On 1 December 1955, MAYEVSKI consulted CALVET about some books which he (MAYEVSKI) wished sent to the Soviet Export Film Office. MAYEVSKI had received a cable from Soviet Export Films on returning films which were on permit No. 117773242. CALVET arranged an appointment with Jorge FERRETIS, head of Cinematografia (Mexican Government film department), for MAYEVSKI on 3 December 1955. It is believed that FERRETIS is the man to see for withdrawal approvals.

On 17 December 1955, LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeyevich, an administrative employee of the Soviet Embassy, contacted CALVET in reference to possible receipt by CALVET of new Soviet films. CALVET informed LEONOV that the only information he had, had been given to MAYEVSKI a few days back.

Leonov

On 17 December 1955, it was ascertained that BOLSHAKOV had been shown parts of the films and titles of Soviet pictures, as revised for showing in Mexico. It was further ascertained that plans were afoot to inaugurate Soviet film showings at the "Teatro Ideal". The Teatro Ideal is alleged to have 1600 seats.

MAYEVSKI repeatedly told CALVET that he was interested in obtaining showings for the Soviet films, "Romeo y Julieta," and "Gran Familia."

On 17 December 1955, POPOV, Yevgeni Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, asked CALVET through MAYEVSKI to give certain films to the Soviet Embassy. Popov

Sov Embassy Mex

Arrangements were made for POPOV and ROMANOV, Leonid Mikhailovich, 3rd Secretary in the Embassy, to pick up some films. Among those obtained were "Gran Familia," "Romeo y Julieta," and the "Golden Antelope."

On 19 December 1955, it was arranged for POPOV to call on CALVET for certain films.

On 30 December 1955, the Soviet Embassy was notified by the Mexican Government that permission had been received for showing certain films, but not for "The Best in the World."

The

3. Editorial Popular (also known as Fondo De Cultura Popular).
Hidalgo 75
Phone - 12-37-77

Address Mexico
& Hidalgo 75
Mexico City
"Editorial Popular"

This Communist publishing and bookselling shop has been noted as an outlet for Soviet books and periodicals for years. Its two managers, Jesus LAZCANO and Miguel Angel VASQUEZ, are both Communist Party members. Over the years they have imported a steady though relatively small amount of Soviet material.

In general, contact between the Editorial Popular and the Soviet Commercial Office takes place through LAZCANO and VASQUEZ on the one hand, and IZOTOV and MAYEVSKI on the other.

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It was ascertained that in December 1955, the Editorial Popular was selling copies of two Maxim Gorki's works, their titles as translated into Spanish being "Los Sarta Monos" and "Mi Infancia."

4. GRIJALVO (or GRIJALBO) Serres, Juan,
General Manager of Exportadora De Publicaciones Mexicanas S. de R.L.
Av. De La Granjas 82
Phone: 27-46-57

On 20 December 1955, GRIJALVO sent word to the Commercial Office that a book entitled "Economia Politica," which the Soviets were apparently anxious to acquire, was ready and asked the Commercial Office to state the quantity needed.

B. Purely Commercial Activities:

1. EISENBERG, Jacques, was contacted on 16 December 1955, and reportedly told the Soviets that the affair with the electrodes would have to be postponed until 10 or 15 January 1956, due to his (EISENBERG's) sickness. This electrode transaction was connected with the visit to Mexico of two Soviet engineering experts (Comment: See HMM-A-4129, pp. 2-4, 6 February 1956). EISENBERG is known to be considering a deal with the Soviets in agricultural machinery, and to be participating in a trade agreement with the French Government in cotton. EISENBERG has been noted in connection with Czech commercial activities in Mexico.

2. GONZALEZ, Jose R.
Uruguay 55-218

[illegible]

GONZALEZ is a frequent contact of the Soviet Embassy Commercial Section, and their actual and proposed transactions cover a rather wide range.

a. Rails and Pipe:

Early in December GONZALEZ and MAYEVSKI discussed the prospects for importing Soviet pipe and standard gauge railway rails into Mexico. It is reported that the market for rails in Mexico was not considered to be very hopeful, but the Soviets believed they might be able to arrange some sales in Central America.

b. Petroleum:

GONZALEZ brought news that the Matarazzo industrial combine in Brazil had bought sufficient petroleum (from outside the Soviet orbit) to cover its needs for four months, but would need more when the above time expired. MATARAZZO asked for an estimate on about 15-20,000 tons of Soviet petroleum delivered in about 100,000 drums per boat.

c. Cellulose:

Firm - US

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a US firm named PARSONS & WHITTEMORE wished to know why GONZALEZ was selling cellulose to Brazil, and further wished to know GONZALEZ' source of supply.

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that an unnamed Chilean company wanted to buy a 1000 tons of raw cellulose. Other information given by GONZALEZ was to the effect that he had received correspondence giving Finnish and Swedish prices on cellulose.

d. Wood Pulp:

GONZALEZ informed BOLSHAKOV that a large wood pulp company in Brazil was interested in doing business. It was reported that the transactions would be made with a Senor AMARAL in Rio. The difficulty in dealing with AMARAL was that he wished to have cargos marked as coming from another country, rather than the country of origin.

e. Copper

It was also reported by GONZALEZ that someone named CHILOS was interested in making a deal in copper (no details).

3. NASSER Quinones, Guillermo,
Director-Manager of Compensacion Internacional SA
Bolivar 51
Phone: 21-70-63

NASSER engaged in talks with BOLSHAKOV on several occasions, discussing the following items:

a. Wood and the need for a factory and equipment of a (Sr.) RIVERA (fnu), probably sawmill machinery.

b. Samples of agricultural machinery from the USSR.

c. Information on unspecified chemical products.

d. Vague talk on watches, cigars, and medical equipment.

4. RIVERA, fnu,
Member of Comercial Ultramar SA
Hamburgo 138
Phones: 35-81-17; 35-81-18; 14-55-81.

RIVERA and BOLSHAKOV discussed the impending arrival of certain recorders reportedly due at the end of the month of December 1955 in Veracruz.

5. PEREZ Urizar, Adolfo,
Manager of Tractor Dept., Ford Motor Company SA
Calzada Guadalupe y Henry Ford
Phone: 17-50-00

PEREZ was visited twice in December 1955, by MATEVSKI; the talks were held on farm equipment, i.e., agricultural machinery, such as tractors, etc.

6. ROAAN, Mory De (For more detailed report see EM-A-1166, 16 Feb. 1956)

TOP SECRET

7. MORAN Valdes Ramon
Donatello 17

It is reported that MORAN discussed on various occasions the mechanics of credit modifications with MAYEVSKI. It was reported that MORAN mentioned the fact that other business firms had requested banks to modify the letters of credit, and it was also ascertained that the modifications for the letters of credit are done. MORAN may be connected with the Naval foodshop.

8. ZELLINGER [illegible]

A man named ZELLINGER also has various deals under discussion with the Soviets, among them being:

a) Alkalines and Alkaloids: ZELLINGER sought information on establishing a trade in alkalines. It is believed that this deal may be well advanced. ZELLINGER expressed a need for alkaloids and for a special machine needed for this. It is reported that BOLSHAKOV informed ZELLINGER that either the machine or information on the machine had already been sent, and that ZELLINGER had an excellent mechanic with General Electric experience to install this machine.

b) Acids: According to information received, the USSR claimed not to have Letters of Credit for transactions involving Red Black and Blue Black acids.

c) Radios: ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for radios on the condition that these not be imported fully assembled. The purchasing people desired information on parts, assembly, details and pictures. It was highly desirable to import and assemble the radios here. In conjunction with this ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for TV parts.

d) Drills (unspecified type): It is reported that ZELLINGER was involved in a transaction for $8,200 worth of drills (ZELLINGER is reportedly connected with ZLOTNIK, see below).

e) Medicines: It was ascertained that ZELLINGER had presented a list of medicines most widely used in Mexico. ZELLINGER, according to reports, had stated that he could sell as much of the medicines as could be provided him by the USSR.

f) Cameras: It was reported that ZELLINGER claimed to have a market for cameras.

9. ZLOTNIK, Abraham
Toltecas 166

[illegible]

ZLOTNIK appears to be both an independent businessman and intermediary for other businessmen dealing with the USSR. It was ascertained that most of ZLOTNIK's transactions during the month of December concerned dyes. According to information gathered, delay on shipment of several types of (unspecified) dyes, was caused by the wait for a Letter of Credit. Direct Violet K dye, for which a Letter of Credit was opened on or about 30 November 1955, was not sent evidently due to shortage of same. It was reported that the Soviet Commercial Office stated that, according to a contract dated 29 October 1955, all the dyes were packed and awaiting shipment from an unknown port of exp[illegible]. It was stated that no Letter of Credit had been received for certain dyes, but ZLOTNIK claimed to have sent a Letter of Credit some time back to Sojuz-Chemic Export, through the "Banco Popular."

ZLOTNIK stated that Violet Dye had arrived a few days back, but that he lacked information on how it was charged.

There was also some brief information to the effect that ZLOTNIK had given an order for tools.

C. Miscellaneous Commercial Activity:

Other transactions on which vague information has been received were:

1) Dyes: Confirmation received from Moscow on Letter of Credit 18 978 for Violet Dyes.

2) Coffee: BOLSHAKOV ridiculed a newspaper story that a Latin American country (Colombia?), claimed the Soviet Union was offering dollars for that country's coffee.

3) TV: Vague information has been received to the effect that Soviet Export Film is interested in the TV market in Mexico.

Information on certain contacts is rather vague; but it was ascertained that the Soviet Commercial Office had dealings with the following in December 1955, the exact nature of which was not clear:

1) GARCIN, Francisco, a member of the "Comision de Vigilancia" (Part of Mexican Social Security).

2) GARCIA Vidal, Raul, was contacted by BOLSHAKOV during the month of December 1955, with information that certain material was in readiness for GARCIA. It has not been ascertained exactly what GARCIA's relationship with the Soviet Commercial Office is.

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~~KAPOK~~ 8 [illegible]

VIA ______________
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA-12223

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, EE
Attn: Silvan A. Hobson

DATE 31 October 1955

FROM Chief of Station, Vienna

INFO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT
GENERAL Operational/GREPIC
SPECIFIC DS-623 Identifications from Soccer Match Photographs

1. Shortly following DS-623's defection in January 1955, and again on 28 April 1955, Douglas M. Moir of FOB showed him the Vienna Station collection of soccer match photos. DS-623 was able to make 43 identifications from this collection, some by name and position, some only by function. In a few instances, as indicated specifically below, his identifications were erroneous, but are nonetheless forwarded on the assumption that even this fact will be of interest to you.

2. A total of twenty-one (21) separate photographs, some of them merely sections cut out of the original enlargements, are sent as an attachment to this dispatch. Persons identified by DS-623 are indicated on them by a heavy black inked circle around their heads; in a separate circle to the side, or in some instances above the circle surrounding their heads, are the numbers keyed to the list in Paragraph 3 below. In the event you have difficulty deciphering the numbers inked in on the front of the photos, you may refer to the reverse side, on which you will find the same numbers in approximately the same positions. We have just completed transmission of all negatives of the photos represented in the attachment. From these negatives, it will be possible for Headquarters to make individual blowups of the personalities identified by DS-623 for the appropriate Washington files. As you are already aware, the numbering system used on these negatives is that devised by the USIA Photo Section, which was responsible for taking the photos. For the six different matches represented in the attached photos, the following are the pertinent references:

a. Series 9954: Austria vs. Germany, Fall 1951. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12175, 25 October 1955.

b. Series NFR 526: Austria vs. Portugal, 27 September 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12184, 25 October 1955.

c. Series NFR 532: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 October 1953. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1954.

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SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

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APERTURES SUBMITTED
FROM [illegible] FOR REPRODUCTIONS

~~KAPOK~~

EAVA-12223
Page 2.

d. Series NFR 582: Austria vs. Hungary, 11 April 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12185, 25 October 1955.

e. Series NFR 631: Dynamo Moscow vs. Austria Rapid, 20 July 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12183, 25 October 1955.

f. Series NFR 653: Austria vs. Yugoslavia, 3 October 1954. Negatives transmitted in EAVA-12195, 25 October 1955.

3. The following are DJ-623's identifications, the photo number(s) from which the identifications were made, and the DJ-623 identification number:

DJ-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(1)	NFR 526/8	(fnu) AKOPOV, Acting Chief of USIA between departure of KRIVOSHEIN and takeover by [illegible]. Comment: this name given as "OKOPOV" in EG-2005.
(2)	NFR 631/14	Georgi Azarovich [illegible], Acting Chief of A/O KABEL Accounting Section.
(3)	NFR 526/8	Ivan Alekseyovich [illegible], Secretary of CPSU Organization, A/O KABEL. Comment: this identification very uncertain.
(4)	NFR 582/8	(fnu) BARENKO, Chief of SMV-Energie-Abteilung.
(5)	NFR 631/16	Feodor Nikiforovich BARANOV, Chief Engineer of A/O KABEL.
(6)	NFR 526/5	NU, Soviet intelligence officer under SCC cover. Comment: apparently i/w individual holding Interzonal Pass in name of N. V. BELOV.
(7)	NFR 582/8	Alexander Petrovich [illegible], CPSU representative in Austria.
(8)	NFR 582/8	(fnu) [illegible]ICHENKO, General-Director of USIA A/O PODYOMNIK.
(9)	NFR 653/4	(fnu) [illegible], member of CO/MGB, Vienna Garrison. Comment: [illegible] (1) confirms identification of [illegible] (fnu) [illegible] as Deputy Chief, Vienna Detachment, CO/MGB, CGF Baden.
(10)	NFR 631/18) NFR 653/9)	Sergei Nikolayevich DYACHKOV, General-Director of (USIA) Siemens-Schubert I.

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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(continued)

DS-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(11)	NFR 653/9	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Afo-Varta.
(12)	NFR 582/4) NFR 582/6) NFR 631/14)	Sergei Vasilyevich GLADKIY, General-Director of (USIA) A/o KABEL, and his wife.
(13)	NFR 582/4	Petr A. GRICHIN, Chief of USIA.
(14)	NFR 631/18	(fnu) [illegible], General-Director of (USIA) Wiener-Kabel. Comments: incorrect, [illegible] SO identified this individual as D. A. [illegible], case officer of the Austria Group, KGB Residentura.
(15)	NFR 631/14) NFR 653/17)	Alexander Ivanovich IYEVLEV, head of the Finance Section, A/O KABEL.
(16)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) [illegible], member of the Commercial Section, A/O KABEL.
(17)	NFR 631/16	Alexander Ivanovich KRUPNOV, General-Director of (USIA) Brown-Boveri.
(18)	NFR 582/4) NFR 653/17)	Anatoly Kirilovich KRUTKO, Second Deputy-Chief of USIA.
(19)	NFR 582/8	Franz [illegible], Austrian interpreter at the Soviet Information Center, allegedly an RIS agent.
(20)	NFR 582/4	Gregori Alexandrovich KRYLOV, Secretary of the CPSU organization, USIA.
(21)	NFR 653/17	(fnu) LAVRICHEV, Deputy-Chief of USIA. Comments: name reported as "LAVRENOV" in [illegible]-2205.
(22)	NFR 582/4	Nikolai Sergeyevich [illegible], assistant to [illegible] and probably an RIS officer. Comments: [illegible] replaced V. I. [illegible], officer of the KGB Soviet Colony Group, in latter's cover position; DS-623's assumption that he is RIS, therefore, seems valid.
(23)	9954/3	Maria MAYER, Austrian interpreter in the 20th Bezirk Kommandatura. Comments: this identification made by DS-623 A.

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

(continued)

DS-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(24)	KFR 582/4	Vitaly Ivanovich/[illegible], KGB Officer under USIA Personnel Section cover. Cf. (22) above.
(25)		No. 25 eliminated; first identified by DS-623 as OSIPOV, later changed to [illegible].
(26)	KFR 653/3	(fnu)/[illegible], Chief Bookkeeper at (USIA) Porr A. G.
(27)	KFR 582/5) KFR 653/3)	Yevgeni Arsentiyevich/POLYAKOV, General-Director of an unspecified firm subordinated to A/O TEKSTIL.
(28)	KFR 631/14	Gregoriy Ivanovich/PUZYREV, Chief of Personnel, A/O KABEL.
(29)	KFR 582/4	Sergei Mikhailovich/ROZHKOV, Chief of Personnel, USIA.
(30)	KFR 653/4	NU, colleague of (fnu) CHERNISHEV, No. 9 above. Comment: this individual is, of course, Ivan I. [illegible], Chief, Vienna Detachment, OO/KGB, and CHERNISHEV's immediate superior.
(31)	KFR 582/4	(fnu)/[illegible], member of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Vienna. Comment: IDP in name of N. A./[illegible].
(32)	KFR 582/4) KFR 631/14)	Nikolai Fedorovich/SHIKHOVTSOV, Chief, Commercial Section, A/O KABEL.
(33)	KFR 631/18	Robert/[illegible], Austrian chief of the Technical Section, (USIA) AEG-Union.
(34)	KFR 631/16	Yevgeni Aleksandrovich/[illegible], member of the Production Section, A/O KABEL.
(35)	KFR 631/18	(fnu)/SVETLOV, Cultural Referent, USIA. Comment: incorrect; [illegible] SO has identified this man as Ivan I./[illegible] of the KGB Rezidentura.
(36)	KFR 631/18	(fnu)/VINOGRADOV, Chief Engineer of (USIA) Waagner-Biro.
(37)	KFR 631/14	Nikolai Savich/VOLCHENKO, Chief, Production Section, A/O KABEL.

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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Page 5.

(continued)

DB-623 Number	Original Photo No.	Identification and Station Comments
(38)	NFR 631/14) NFR 631/18)	(fnu) ZAVIALOV, Deputy to BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(39)	NFR 582/10	Sergei A. [illegible], coordinator of Soviet economic enterprises in Austria.
(40)	NFR 653/9	NU, Chief, Commercial Section, (USIA) Siemens-Schuckert I.
(41)	NFR 582/4	NU, bookkeeper in Soviet Military Bank.
(42)	NFR 631/18	NU, works with BRAZHNIKOV, CPSU representative (cf. No. 7 above)
(43)	NFR 582/4	NU, Soviet General-Director of (USIA) Walfrum liqueur distillery.
(44)	NFR 532/12	NU, frequently seen with V. I. [illegible], [illegible] officer under USIA cover (cf. No. 24 above).

4. Since the Vienna Station has adequate copies of photographs of the few individuals of current interest to Vienna among these identifications, strictly USIA personnel being of no further interest to us, the attached are for Headquarters use and files. No further servicing of them is required here.

Giles T. Crowen
Giles T. Crowen

Attachments: 21 photographs

Distribution: ← 1 cc destroyed 26 July 68 FR
3-[illegible] w/atts
1-[illegible]
1-CC3
1-CCPS
3-Crowen/2152/2712/2185

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6-64-1077

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA [illegible]
Specify Air or Sea Pouch

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE AUG 26 1955

TO Chief of Station, Vienna

FROM Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT
GENERAL Operational/[illegible]
SPECIFIC Possible Members of the [illegible]

REF: [illegible] 2207 — 201-69573

1. In the referenced report it is noted that [illegible] states he thought Nikolay [illegible]ergeyevich [illegible] and Grigoriy Ivanovich [illegible] were members of the [illegible]. Traces were run on these two men and are forwarded for whatever value they may be to [illegible].

a. [illegible] Nikolay [illegible]ergeyevich. Possible traces. Information evaluated [illegible] contained in [illegible] 1754 [illegible] 17 July 1952 from Karachi, Pakistan, states one [illegible], Passport No. [illegible], dated [illegible] April 1952; Visa No. 73, was leader of [illegible] agriculture delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference [illegible] held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

There are numerous references on one Nikolay Sergeyevich [illegible], born 22 August 1922 in [illegible]. This [illegible] has been, and believed to be at the present time with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. We did not collect the information on this person as it is not believed he is identical with the person in Vienna. However, if the [illegible] trace and [illegible] feels there is a chance that the two men are identical, the information can be obtained as well as photographs. There is also a photograph of the above mentioned [illegible]. There is a striking resemblance between the two men mentioned even although [illegible] is a much older man.

b. [illegible] Grigoriy Ivanovich. The only trace found was [illegible] dated 3 November [illegible], subject: "Miscellaneous Information from [illegible] Headquarters" states "The personnel head of [illegible] is [illegible]." No other information.

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[illegible] EE/A

Emily Styles/MBM
EMILY STYLES
EE/A

22 Aug 195[illegible]

Distribution:
- 3 Vienna
- 1 RI
- 2 EE/A

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SECRET

RI [illegible]

26 Aug 55
201-[illegible]

201-132139

FORM NO. 51-29

the young priests undergo a thorough study of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. After graduation they are appointed to parishes where they exercise their pulpit prerogative by preaching Communism to the faithful. ~~[illegible]~~ when one of these young priests is first appointed to a given parish, his first step is to go to the [illegible] Communist Party secretary and ask him what the Party missions in the area are and how the priest would be of assistance in carrying out these missions.

6. ~~[illegible]~~ religion is becoming a tool of the Communist Party of the USSR since most of the older priests of the last generation, who would have fought Communism, have died off or have been purged and the younger priests, who have replaced them, are completely dominated by Communist Party influence.

26 Aug 55

[illegible]

26 Aug 55
201-69572

SECRET

REPORT NO. DS-2207

DEFECTOR RECEPTION CENTER

COUNTRY USSR/Austria

SUBJECT Soviet Personalities in USIA

DATE OF INFORMATION Up to December 1954

PLACE ACQUIRED Germany

178

DATE DISTR. 23 Apr 55

NO. OF PAGES 16

REFERENCES: DS-2805

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE DS-623, a Soviet electrical engineer, born in 1914, is a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute. From May 1950 to January 1953, he was General Director of the USIV Siemens-Schubert plant in Budapest. From January 1953 until his defection in January 1955, he was General Director of the USIA AEG Union plant in Vienna. During the war he became a member of the Communist Party and was always active in Party affairs, primarily because he found such participation expedient in furthering his career. He defected to the West because he feared that lengthy imprisonment would result from a forthcoming investigation of production of faulty transformers at his plant. Source is a well-educated, intelligent, and shrewd individual. Source was relatively reluctant to provide data on personalities known to him personally.

Following are biographic sketches of USIA Soviet personalities known to source. For further information on the duties of these individuals, see the above referenced report.

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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SECRET

8 [illegible]

28 apr 55

~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

NAME: ANDREYEV, Georgiy Lazarovich

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1905

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Accountant

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Acting Chief of the Accounting Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. [illegible] kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Thin, sharp nose and face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as Chief Accountant of the "Asbest" Trust in the city of Asbest in the Urals, USSR, prior to coming to Austria in February 1954. Source knew nothing of his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member although not active

REMARKS: A careerist, subservient to superiors, unprincipled in matters pertaining to work

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February to December 1954.

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: ANDRONOV, Ivan Aleksandrovich

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1925

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown to source

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Osram Plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 168 cm. **WT:** c. 90 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member; he was the secretary of the Soviet Party organisation for A/O Kabel, USIA.

REMARKS: A stupid individual; blindly carried out the orders of the Party and his superiors at work without reflection

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: [illegible]ASHIN, Mikhail Vasilyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: A commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Supply and Sales Office of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Short, medium **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown to source

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Round "Russian" face. He wears glasses with metal frames.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married; he graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in 1946 or 1947.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member; active Communist

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: BARANOV, Fedor Nikiforovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: 1905-1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Deputy Director and Chief Engineer of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-174 cm. **WT:** c. 93 kg. **BUILD:** Quite stout **HAIR:** Blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to coming to Austria in March 1954, he worked as Chief of the Equipment Department of the Chief Directorate of Electrical Machine Building, Ministry of Electrical Industry (Otdel Oborudovaniya, Glavnogo Upravleniya Elektromashino - Stroyeniya, Ministerstvo Elektropromyshlennosti). Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, very active Communist

REMARKS: A very good engineer; fawns before his superiors in an effort to advance himself further. Does not treat subordinates fairly.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from March to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

NAME: ACHKOV, Sergey Nikolayevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert I, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 1[illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Was formerly Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel but was transferred to present position

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Good engineer, honest, and a thorough worker. Was frequently ill with some sort of stomach ailment.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: FELOSENKO, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1923

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY:

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Member of Production Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Thick, red **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full Russian face; wears reading glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

14-00000

NAME: GLADKIY, Sergey Vasilyovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Mechanical engineer (Inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 173-175 cm. **WT:** c. 85 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark, blond, partially bald **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, Austrian haircut.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Prior to World War II worked as a plant director in Leningrad. After the war he worked in East Germany as director of a USIG plant. Came to Austria in January or February 1954. Source had no information about his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, devoted Communist to point of fanaticism

REMARKS: Very dull person, rough, uncultured, poorly educated. Speaks Russian like a country muzhik.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January or February - December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: GRITCHIN, Petr Aleksandrovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

OSITION: Chief of USIA

T: c. 175 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Thick, black **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses for reading

ERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

MPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA from Moscow at the end of 1953; military record unknown

ARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: CP member, active Communist

EMARKS: A very competent chief, had reputation of being honest and fair; intelligent, was generally quiet, never shouted at subordinates.

ASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

NAME: IGNATYEV, Sergey Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Wiener Kabel and Ariadne plants subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown to source

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: Honest, a good technical specialist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: IEVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Financial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Financial Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Hunched shoulders, thin face, straight nose, wears reading glasses. His right hand has no index and middle fingers up to the second joint.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown to source

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member but not active

REMARKS: Liked to drink and was often drunk; considered a cultured, decent fellow who was well liked

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

NAME: KHAYLOV, Ivan Stepanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Electrical engineer (Inshener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Siemens Schukert II, plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as a plant director for USIG in East Germany before coming to Austria in July 1954. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A scoundrel, very impudent to equals and subordinates; typical careerist

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: KRUPNOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Brown Boveri plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 168 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: A big careerist who has no convictions. He would work as readily for any party that happened to be in power.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work since January 1953, when source came to Austria. **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

NAME: KRUTKO, Anatoliy Kirilovich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Ukrainian

DOB: c. 1908

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Second Deputy Chief of USIA, responsible for commercial and financial matters

HT: c. 180 cm. **WT:** c. 100 kg. **BUILD:** Heavy-set **HAIR:** Blond, brush-cut, slightly receding hairline **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide shoulders, athletic build, full Ukrainian face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduate of the Academy of Foreign Trade in Moscow

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came to USIA in beginning of 1954 from East Germany where he worked for USIG, presumably in a similar capacity; military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Very competent worker, however very stubborn; well thought of by his superiors

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: KRYLOV, Grigoriy Aleksandrovich
DEGREE OR RANK: Engineer

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Party worker

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Head of the Soviet Communist organisation in USIA

HT: c. 170 cm. **WT:** Unknown **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Brown **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Vienna about the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member, devoted Communist

REMARKS: None

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: [illegible]
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 190[illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: believed to be an economist
POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA Labor and Wage Section

HT: c. [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. [illegible] kg. **BUILD:** Slender **HAIR:** [illegible], partially gr[illegible] **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow to Austria in the summer of 1953; replaced [illegible] Military record is unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Lazy, not very competent in his job, always involved in intrigue

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: KUZNETSOV, Sergey Afanasyevich
DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian
DOB: c. 1915

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown
POB: Unknown

POSITION: General Director of the Paul Goerz plant subordinate to A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. [illegible] cm **WT:** c. 70 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Light **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member; active Communist

REMARKS: Deceitful individual; great "bootlicker" who would stoop to any baseness in order to advance himself or keep out of trouble

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from February 1953 to December 1954
DATE OF INFO: December 1954

SECRET

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: LAVRENOV, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1903

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Engineer

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief Engineer and First Deputy Chief of USIA

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 80 kg. **BUILD:** Short, stout **HAIR:** Blond, partially bald in front **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked for USIG in East Germany prior to coming to USIA in early part of 1954. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Very active CP member

REMARKS: Had reputation for being a heavy drinker, lazy except in Party work; not very competent in his work

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source actually met him only once.) **DATE OF INFO:** October 1954

NAME: LEONOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1920

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Personnel worker

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Deputy Chief of Personnel Section, A/O Kabel, USIA, in charge of personnel matters for Austrian personnel

HT: c. 160 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Short, thin **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in the Soviet Embassy in Poland before coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not an active CP member

REMARKS: Believed by source to be a member of the MGB (KGB)

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January 1954 to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

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[illegible]
53/54

APERTURE CARD

SECRET

NAME: LYKOV, Ivan Ivanovich

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian from Moscow

DOB: c. 1892

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of USIA Planning Section

HT: 170-175 cm. **WT:** c. 60 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Erect posture; lined face; wore pince-nez

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in GUSDZ in Moscow as planning accountant before coming to Austria about the end of 1953; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Cultured, intelligent, very competent specialist; gave appearance of an old Russian squire. Dressed very neatly, wore string tie; was generally well-liked

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

NAME: NAZAROV, (fnu)

DEGREE OR RANK:

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1902

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of the Labor and Wage Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 170 cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Grey **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A Party member but not an active Communist

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work

DATE OF INFO: December 1954

APERTURE CARD [illegible]

NAME: PECHATNAYA, (fnu) (female) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** c. 1930

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Secretary-typist **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: Secretary to GLADKIY, Chief of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 50 kg. **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Black, short, wavy **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long nose, thin face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Quiet, serious, hard-working girl, pleasant to everyone and seemed to be quite intelligent She did not like her boss, thought he was stupid, and stated as much to source.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: PULUCHKIN, (fnu) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian **DOB:** c. 1892

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Unknown **POB:** Unknown

POSITION: General Director of Sichtermann plant of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 170 cm **WT:** c. 70 kg. **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Gray **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wore glasses

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Competent worker, fair to subordinates

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: PUZYREV, Grigoriy Ivanovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian Jew

DOB: c. 1912

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Personnel worker, believed by source to be MGB (KGB) worker

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of Personnel Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: 165 [illegible] cm. **WT:** c. 75 kg. **BUILD:** Heavy **HAIR:** Red with bald spot combed over **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Long full nose

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a personnel section in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Party member; devoted to the Party, strong belief in the Party.

REMARKS: Very unpleasant individual

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: ROZHKOV fnu **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1910

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Personnel worker (also probably a worker for MGB/KGB)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Assistant to Chief, USIA, for personnel matters

HT: c 170 cm. **WT:** c. 65 kg. **BUILD:** Slender **HAIR:** Blond, balding on the sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: Unknown

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Came from Moscow at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954; military record unknown

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Active CP member

REMARKS: Reputed to be very stupid; generally disliked by everyone

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work. (Source met him on only one occasion.) **DATE OF INFO:** November 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

NAME: SEMIN, Vasiliy Nikitich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1900

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Economist

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief of the Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** c. 85 kg. **BUILD:** Stout **HAIR:** Dark, bald on the top and sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Full face, occasionally wears dark horn-rimmed glasses, inside and on dark days, and has another pair of glasses for reading

PERSONAL HISTORY: Divorced

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked in the Ministry of State Control in Moscow prior to coming to Austria. He lost [illegible] job in this organization along with many others as a result of large personnel cuts invoked by government in this and other organizations. He came to Austria in January 1954. Military record unknown.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active and loyal CP member

REMARKS: Acted like a lord (barin). He was used to commanding people all his life and did not like to work himself.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: SERGEYEVNA, Klavdiya (female) **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: Unknown

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Engineer

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Engineer economist on staff of Planning Section of A/O Kabel, USIA

HT: c. 165 cm. **WT:** Unknown **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Black **EYES:** Black

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Wide nose, wide face

PERSONAL HISTORY: Wife of SERGEYEV of Torgpredstvo

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Assistant to Vasiliy Nikitich SËMIN, Chief of Planning Section of A/O Kabel

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Unknown

REMARKS:

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTION

14-00000

NAME: [illegible]EHOVTSOV, Nikolay Fedorovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1920

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: Commercial specialist

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Commercial Section of A/C Kabel, USIA

HT: c [illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD:** Medium **HAIR:** Dark **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has a round Ukrainian face and wears his hair combed straight back

PERSONAL HISTORY: Graduated from the Academy of Foreign Trade (Akademiya Vneshney Torgovli) in Moscow in [illegible]. Married.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Served as Commercial Section chief in a division of USIG in East Germany prior to coming to Austria in December 1953. Military record unknown to source.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active Party member and a loyal Communist

REMARKS: He was lazy and did not know his specialty well.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from January to December 1954 **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: CHIKOV, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: Russian

DOB: c. 1928

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Electrical-technician (Tekhnik-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Engineer in the Production Section of A/C Kabel

HT: c [illegible] cm **WT:** c [illegible] kg **BUILD:** Short, thin **HAIR:** Thick, blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married.

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Had worked in East Germany for USIG prior to January 1954 when he arrived in Austria and began working as an engineer in Production Section of A/C Kabel, USIA. Military record unknown.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: An active CP member

REMARKS: An able engineer

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

28 April 55

NAME: [illegible] **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: [illegible] presumably Jewish

DOB: [illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY: [illegible] engineer (inzhener-elektrik)

POB: Unknown

POSITION: Chief engineer of [illegible] plant which was subordinate to A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] **WT:** [illegible] **BUILD:** Thin **HAIR:** Blond **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: None that were outstanding

PERSONAL HISTORY: [illegible]

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: He worked as an engineer at "Kabel" plant in Moscow before coming to Austria [illegible]. Never served in the army

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Not a Party member

REMARKS: Very [illegible] individual and a gossip. He would serve any government or organization which paid him good money.

BASIS OF INFO: [illegible] **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

NAME: [illegible] **DEGREE OR RANK:**

NATIONALITY: [illegible]

DOB: c. 190[illegible]

OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY: Mechanical engineer (inzhener-mekhanik)

POB: Unknown to source

POSITION: Chief of the Production Section of A/G Kabel, USIA

HT: [illegible] **WT:** [illegible] **BUILD:** Very thin **HAIR:** Dark and gray, long, balding on sides **EYES:** Unknown

OTHER PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: Has long neck, a long, thin nose and face, and very large mouth. "Looks like Chamberlain". Looks younger than he actually is.

PERSONAL HISTORY: Married

EMPLOYMENT; MILITARY RECORD: Worked as chief of a production section in a division of USIG prior to coming to Austria during the latter part of 1953. Source knew nothing about his military record.

PARTY AFFILIATION; POLITICAL ORIENTATION: A CP member and loyal Communist, almost a fanatic

REMARKS: Very egotistical, stubborn, and stupid. He liked to squabble and was always involved in intrigue.

BASIS OF INFO: Acquainted through work from beginning of 19[illegible] to December 19[illegible]. **DATE OF INFO:** December 1954

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3 - Files

LIMERICK, LIPSTICK, LIVESTOCK | HMM-562, dated 27 Jan 54

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CLASSIFICATION
CHANGED TO: Secret
BY AUTHORITY OF
Name: David Brady
Office: C/WH/3
Date 8 Nov 1959
M. Bradley
16

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~
#3
201-132139

Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA

[illegible]-623

2 Aug - 31 Dec 1953

Mexico City

same

B-Doc

24 March 1954

LIMERICK , LIPSTICK, LIVESTOCK

Name: Nikolai Sergeyevich LEONOV
Born: 22 August 1928 in Ryazan
Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953 aboard SS Andrea Gritti, Veracruz, with wife
Documents: Holds service passport 10724, issued 29 January 1952, in Moscow
Title: Unknown **Position:** Unknown
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Wife: Valeriya Ivanovna
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Spanish good
Other personal data: Nickname - KOLYA
Occasionally drives one of Embassy automobiles

Official Activities

Our few references to LEONOV make it appear that he, like BELYAKOV and ANTYASOV, with whom he seems to be vaguely associated, is a third echelon functionary who probably performs a variety of administrative tasks in support of one or another phase of the Embassy operations and might be in on-the-job training for a specialized job as assistant to, at a guess, SAMOILOV. In early August, shortly after his arrival, he called a woman instructor at an obscure local business school and was told that he could come by for his grades the following week. (We infer from another conversation that MATVEYEV was attending this school with him.) LEONOV was also with ANTYASOV and BELYAKOV when ANTYASOV was detained on their way "back from the University" at the end of September. (See: ANTYASOV.) This should indicate that he was principally occupied during the weeks after his arrival in acquainting himself with local business methods and commercial practices, and perhaps taking some further formal instruction. Otherwise, his appearances in the traffic have been limited to answering the telephone for both KOLOMYAKOV and SAMOILOV in their absence (without making decisions or taking any action) and, under the tutelageof LAZAREV before the latter's departure, making routine calls connected with ordering wine, repairing the movie projector, and the like. He has also occasionally been seen driving one or another of the Embassy automobiles, apparently filling in for one of the chauffeurs.

Private Activities

Our only information on LEONOV's private life is the fact that the ZHUKOVs moved into the LEONOVs' apartment (No. 4 at Industria No. 71) upon their arrival

LEONOV
HPS4-623
24 March 54
Page 2

on 7 November and the two couples lived together for about three weeks, when the LEONOVs moved into other quarters at Juancatlan 81. (There were no indications that the original arrangement had ever been intended to be other than temporary or that the subsequent move of the LEONOVs was due to friction between the two couples.) This raises the suggestion that ZHUKOV may be associated in some way with LEONOV within the Embassy as well, a possibility which is borne out to some extent by the fact that both habitually answer and make calls from the same Embassy telephones.

Comment

We cannot yet assess LEONOV for operational purposes.

~~[illegible]~~

SECRET

LEONOVA
184-623
24 March 54
Page 3

Name: Valeriya Ivanovna LEONOVA
Born: Unknown
Arrived in Mexico 11 July 1953 aboard SS Andrea Gritti in Veracruz with husband
No known title or position
Residence in Mexico: Juanacatlan 81
Children: None known. None in Mexico
Languages: Unknown
Other personal data: Nickname: LERA

Private Activities

Although we have no definite indications to that effect, there is a fair possibility that LEONOVA is employed in some administrative or clerical position in the Embassy, since she seems to be present in the Chancery area a good deal during office hours and, without children, would not otherwise have a great deal to do.

Our only information relating directly to LEONOVA occurs during a conversation between APARINOVA and MELNIKOVA on 26 October in which APARINOVA complained bitterly that LEONOVA was shirking her share of responsibility in preparing food for the 7 November reception. LEONOVA had apparently failed to buy ingredients, after being asked to do so, on the plea that she had not been told exactly what kind of apples to get nor where to buy them. APARINOVA: "KOMSOMOLTSI always brag about being in the front line, but in actuality, bah!" MELNIKOVA: "Yes, when I was at their home, we happened to discuss the reception, and Rita (ANTYASOVA) said, 'Why should we do the work for the reception?' I told her she should be ashamed of herself. I work in the Embassy and hold out during receptions and all holidays, and I don't complain. LEONOVA claims she is not going to do any shopping because she was not given the responsibility." APARINOVA: "What does she mean? I met her and said 'Lera. . .' She said she'd come over Sunday and make a list of the things to be bought." MELNIKOVA: "And she didn't come over. She was probably afraid of the work and the money involved. APARINOVA: "How silly. I told her we would refund all expenses."

Comment

We infer that LEONOV (and perhaps her husband as well) is a good KOMSOMOL and may be endowed with the aggressively unpleasant personality which the Soviet system seems to foster so often. As shown in our photo coverage, both she and her husband have the appearance of persons who could be the well-disciplined, unquestioning, devoted Communists idealised in Soviet propaganda.

TOP SECRET

LEONOV, Nikolai

LIMERICK TS 90085 HMM-370 24 Jul 53 P. 5

P. 5-6 Nikolai LEONOV, "collaborator", and his wife, Valeria LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz aboard an Italian vessel 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are copies of photos of the subjects taken by LIVESTOCK. LEONOVs were met at Veracruz by Alexander BELIAKOV.

P. 10 **Nikolai Sergeevich LEONOV and his wife, Valeria Ivanovna LEONOVA arrived at Veracruz by ship 11 July 1953. Forwarded with this report are the following pertinent photographs taken by LIVESTOCK;**

6 copies of the pair leaving the ship
6 copies of LEONOV leaning over the ship's rail
3 copies of BELIAKOV speaking with LEONOVA at the dock
1 copy of pages from LEONOV's passport
1 copy of pages of LEONOVA's passport
Foreign Ministry cards with photos of LEONOV and wife are also attached (see Attachments 2 and 3)

SECRET

201-132139

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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DISPATCH NO. HMA-743

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Mission, Mexico

FROM Chief, WH

DATE: JUL 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Soviet Embassy Personnel
SPECIFIC- Nikolai L[illegible]OV

REF: R[illegible]-5[illegible]; R[illegible]-542

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. L[illegible]OV, who may be identical with subject. [illegible] was not able to provide additional information.

According to information evaluated B-2 contained in P-K-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. L[illegible]OV, passport number [illegible], dated 2[illegible] April 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

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J. C. King
J. C. King

By R. Connail

2[illegible] June 1953

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CLASSIFICATION

201-132139

AIR SECRET Security Information HMMW-748

JUL 1 - 1953

Chief of Mission, Mexico City

Chief, WHD

Soviet Embassy Personnel
Nikolai LEONOV

REF: HMMA-5398, HMMA-5242

Headquarters files contain the information given below concerning one N. LEONOV, who may be identical with subject. KUPALM was not able to provide additional information.

> According to information evaluated B-2 contained in ROK-176, dated 17 July 1952, from Karachi, Pakistan, one N. LEONOV, passport number 09492, dated 24 April 1952, visa number 70, dated 25 April 1952, was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics held at Karachi on 3 May 1952.

J. C. King
By R. Connally

24 June 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	**DATE DISTR.**	2 June 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	16 May 1953	**REQUIREMENT NO.**	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (23 May 1953)	**REFERENCES**	CS-1.879

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Through an official Italian channel. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Nikolai Leonov, an employee of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, and his wife, Valeriya, left Genoa on 16 May 1953 aboard the SS ANDREA GRITTI, destined for Mexico.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC						

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

EE		SR	x	home	2x	WE/FI/Procaccino	2x		IN-28996 ROME-5898 H
FE		WE	x			SR/FI/Sanford	x		
NE		WH				WH/FI/Ogden	x		
SE		STD				STC/CB	x		

CABLE

DSO
WLG
JAF
EM

201-132139

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	Italy/USSR/Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS- 10879
SUBJECT	Travel of Soviet Diplomatic Personnel	DATE DISTR.	27 May 1953
		NO. OF PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	13 May 1953	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Italy, Rome (19 May 1953)	REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: An individual with good contacts in Italian Police circles. (B). Appraisal of Content: 3.

The following Soviet diplomatic personnel arrived in Rome on 9 May 1953 from Moscow and took lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 1953, when they departed for Genoa to proceed by sea to Mexico:

a. Nikolai Leonov, collaborator at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, who carries service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow on 29 October 1952; and

b. Valeria Leonova, wife of above, who was born in Moscow on 28 April 1928 and who carries service passport C 11507, issued in Moscow on 28 February 1953.

SECRET/CONTROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

STATE	x	ARMY	x	NAVY	x	AIR	x	FBI		AEC				

(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

EE		SR	x			~~WE/FI/Procacci~~no	2x	Rome	2x	IN-26713 ROME- 5842
FE		WE	x			WH/Ogden	x	STC//CB	X	
NE		WH	x			SR/Sanford	x			
SE		STD				SR/CE/Grady	x			

C A B L E

DSG
WLG
JAP
ACB

201-132139

ROME 5842
IN 26718
22 May 53

Nikolai LEONOV and wife Valeria arrived in Rome on 9 May 53 from Moscow and took lodgings at Primrose Pensione until 13 May 53 when they departed for Genoa to proceed by sea to Mexico. LEONOV carries service ppt C 10724, issued in Moscow on 29 Oct 52. Wife carries service ppt. C-11507, issued in Moscow 28 Feb 53

Nikolai b. Riozan (prob. Ryazan) 22 Aug 1928. Valeria b. Moscow 28 Apr 1928.

80-96339 22 Sept '52: One N. LEONOV, passport No. 09492 dtd 24 Apr'52 Visa No. 70. dtd 25 Apr'52, arrived in Peshawar from Kabul on 2 May'52. This individual is leader of Agriculture Delegation from Moscow on way to Karachi.(this info. taken from ROK-176 dtd 17 Jul'52 and was acquired in Karachi, Pakistan.) Purpose of this trip was to attend Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics which was held in Karachi 3 May'52.

14-00000

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

22 MAY 53 IN 26213

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP ROME

ACTION: WE 6

ROUTING [illegible] 22 MAY

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RCM/DB, CR 2, WH 2, FI/RI 2

ROME 5842

TO: DIR ,INFO: SMEXI CITE: SROME

INTEL REDCAP CONTROL

1. FOLLOWING ARRIVED ROME FROM MOSCOW 9 MAY, TOOK LODGING PRIMROSE PENSIONE UNTIL 13 MAY THEN DEPARTED FOR GENOA TO [illegible] BY SEA TO MEXICO:

A. NIKOLAI LEONOV, BORN RIOZAN (PROBABLY RYAZAN) 22 AUGUST 1928, COLLABORATOR SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, SERVICE PASSPORT C 10724 ISSUED MOSCOW 29 OCT 52.

B. VALERIA LEONOVA, BORN MOSCOW 23 APRIL 28, WIFE OF ABOVE, SERVICE PASSPORT C 11577 ISSUED MOSCOW 23 FEB 53.

2. SOURCE: DEVIATOR, RECEIVED 19 MAY, B 2. GENOA [illegible] DATA NOT RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COPY

ABSTRACT

DATE 2[illegible]

COPY NO.

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

201-132139

SECRET

TARGET PERSONNEL

NAME: LEONOV (Last) Nikolai (First) Sergeyevich (Patronymic)

ALIASES: Nickname - "Kolya"

TITLE: Collaborator at SovEmb, Mexico City

INCOME:

Height: **Weight:**

Eyes: **Hair:**

Complexion:

Special features:

Date of birth: 22 August 1928

Birthplace: Ryazan

Religion:



Wife: **Name:** Valeria (First) Ivanovna (Patron

Birthplace: Moscow

Description: **Date of Birth:** 28 Apr 1923 **Weight:** **Height:**

Eyes: **Hair:** **Complexion:**

Special features:

Comments: Service Passport C 11507, issued Moscow 28 Feb 1953

Religion:

Children: **Name:** None known. None in Mexico **Age:** **Residence:**

Name: **Age:** **Residence:**

Name: **Age:** **Residence:**

Documentation:

Nikolai LEONOV - Service Passport C 10724, issued in Moscow 29 Oct 1952.

201-132139



Отметки. Notes.

On present passport

136093

30 [illegible] 52

АННУЛИРОВАНО

[illegible]
Николай Сергеевич
~ один ~

15 [illegible] 53

АННУЛИРОВАНО

201-122187



a/ Nombre completo: Leonov Nicolai Serguevich

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 22 de agosto de 1918, URSS

c/ Dirección: Tacubaya 204. México D.F. [illegible]

d/ Ocupación: Empleado de la Embajada de la URSS en México

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulrres: no tiene

g/ Estatura: 170 cm

h/ Nombre completo y direccion del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y periódo de su estencia en los EE.UU.: desde el 19 de octubre de 1958 hasta el 24 de octubre de 1958. en viaje de tránsito.

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los EE.UU.: El 18 de octubre de 1958 en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: El 24 de octubre de 1958 de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco- Queen Elizabeth

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, 680



dans le present passeport

du present passeport

435329

шестнадцатого апреля, 53

Лескова

Валерия Ивановна

— одна —

СССР

01 (первого) июня, 53

Люб

Attachment to HMMA-5438, 10 Oct 56

a/ Nombre completo: [illegible]

b/ Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: 30 de abril de 1928, URSS

c/ Dirección: Tacubaya 204, México D.F. [illegible]

d/ Ocupación: ama de casa

e/ Color de pelo y ojos: rubio; azules

f/ Señas particulares: no tiene

g/ Estatura: 158 cm.

h/ Nombre completo y dirección del pariente más cercano en la URSS: no tiene

i/ Motivo y periódo de su estancia en los EE.UU.: desde el [illegible] de abril de 1956 hasta el [illegible] de octubre de 1956 en viaje de tránsito

Fecha y lugar de su llegada en los E.UU.: el 24 de abril de 1956 en Laredo (Tex)

Manera de viajar: por ferrocarril

Fecha y lugar de su salida de los EE.UU.: el [illegible] de octubre de 1956 de Nueva York

Manera de viajar: por barco

Dirección durante su estancia en los EE.UU.: Park Avenue, 680



МИНИСТЕРСТВО
ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР

СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

С № 11507



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE L'URSS

PASSEPORT DE SERVICE

C № 11507

[illegible]

Valerian [illegible]

[illegible]

A ces fins, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS prie toutes les autorités de l'URSS et des Pays Amis de laisser passer librement le citoyen Valerian [illegible] et de lui accorder aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le porteur a le droit, pendant la durée de la validité du present passeport, de retourner en URSS par tout poste de contrôle frontalier.

LE PASSEPORT EST DELIVRE

à Moscou

le 24 [illegible] 195[illegible]

LE PRESENT PASSEPORT EST VALABLE

jusqu'au 11 mars 195[illegible]

[illegible]



495125

[illegible] 53

Чеснока

Валентина Ивановна

[illegible] 53



- 8 MAI 1953



МИНИСТЕРСТВО
ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР

СЛУЖЕБНЫЙ ПАСПОРТ

С № 10721

Предъявитель сего, гражданин Союза Советских Социалистических Республик Леонов Николай Сергеевич сотрудник Посольства СССР в Мексике

родившийся 22 VII 1928 г. в Рязанской обл.
отправляется в Мексику
в сопровождении

[illegible] ина
Леонова Николая Сергеевича

[illegible] в Мек [illegible]

[illegible]

ПАСПОРТ ВЫДАН
в городе Москве
29 сентября [illegible]

НАСТОЯЩИЙ ПАСПОРТ ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН
до 15 - ноября [illegible]



MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES
ETRANGERES DE L'URSS

PASSEPORT DE SERVICE

C № 10724

Le porteur du présent, citoyen de l'UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOVIETIQUES SOCIALISTES
Nikolai Leonov
collaborateur de l'Ambassade de l'URSS au Mexique
Né le 22 VIII 1928 dans la r. de Riazan
se rend au Mexique
accompagné de

Le [illegible] Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS prie toutes les autorités de l'URSS et des pays amis [illegible] c
citoyen Nikolai Leonov
et de sa [illegible] de besoin.
Le porteur [illegible] valable du présent passeport [illegible]

LE PASSEPORT EST DELIVRE
à Moscou
le 29 septembre 1952
LE PRESENT PASSEPORT EST VALABLE
jusqu'au 15 novembre 1954



Отметки Notes

dans le présent passeport

au présent passeport

Николай Сергеевич



июня 1.55

21 Juin 1.55

апреля 1.53

avril 1.53

30 марта 1.5

30 mars

17 сент.

17 septembre

Nikolay LEONOV

20 May 1955: Rodolfo NERVO called Subject and was told "We have found the books and material you requested (re Soviet foreign policy)." LEONOV said he would take the books to NERVO the next day. NERVO for many years active in the Mexican Diplomatic Service, at one time being Charge of the Mexican Legation in Warsaw, Poland. Now about 75 and inactive in Government, but does write articles for the newspaper Excelsior (HMMA 3736 5 Dec 55).

6 January 1956: The daughter of General Heriberto JARA spoke with Subject at the Soviet Embassy saying she had been told that he was the person who could inform her of when she should come by to pick up translations of the "clincial documents" relative to herself and her father. Subject said they were having some trouble getting the documents translated because of the medical terms, but said they should be ready in about five days (HMMA 4200).

1 February 1956: Subject called Velia Jara de NIETO, daughter of General JARA, and told her that the translations of her father's clinical history had been made from Russian into Spanish. Mrs. NIETO said she would visit the Embassy the next day and ask LEONOV for the materials (HMMA 4410).

24 February 1956: One Samuel RAMOS contacted Subject who acts as secretary to Soviet Ambassador, Mexico. RAMOS told LEONOV "We are not going to meet at my house this afternoon, but at SALGO's (which is at) Insurgentes 429-51 at the usual hour." Subject replied that he thought he could get to the meeting at 1900 hours and sent greetings "to the boys." RAMOS said "we have some books we want to order through LEONOV" (HMMA 4336).

2 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS left a message for Subject that "if he has time I hope he will come to my house today" (HMMA 4600).

7 March 1956: Samuel RAMOS called Embassy and asked for data on the possibility of staging an international chess match in Mexico. In this conversation it was indicated that RAMOS is in the academic line of work. He stated that he was "back in classes" and that meetings could no longer be held in his home. He told LEONOV that a tournament featuring a person named "POMMARD" would begin Monday (12 March) and invited Subject to see some of it. LEONOV said he would attend if he had time. RAMOS then asked when he could see LEONOV to give him a list of books "we want". LEONOV told him to come to the Embassy at any time, and RAMOS said he would come right away (HMMA 4600).

c. 27 June 1956: Subject's personal calling card found in address book of Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Cuban revolutionary detained in Mexico (MEXI 839 IN 35356 REF: MEXI 825 IN 34161).

22-29 July 1956: Subject served as translator for Eighth International Radiology Congress Soviet delegates (HMM 1752).

1 October 1956: Subject and wife requested U.S. transit visas to leave Mexico 17 Oct by rail, entering U.S. via Laredo; to depart New York 24 October on Queen Elizabeth (MEXI 231 IN 34833 6 Oct 56).

201-132139

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LEONOV, NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH
201-132139
SEX M DOB 22 AUG 28

074-005-102
SX -05555/09
NO DATE

CIT USSR
OCC ?
KGB FIRST CHIEF DIRECTORATE LATIN AMERICAN
DEPT INPUT 2 NOV 67

711719

R 6803140507

FILE IN 201-132139

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CARD 1

(EMPLOYEE)

LEONOV, Nikolai Sergeevich ~~([illegible])~~

Nickname: KOLYA

"Collaborator" = EMPLOYEE

Arrived in Mexico: 11 July 1953—Veracruz
(met by BELYAKOV)

Departing by rail 18 Oct 56 for NY and then on Queen Elizabeth 24 Oct. 56

(FKG — ship manifest: Arrived 19 Jun 53 (11 July believed correct) aboard Andrea Gritti. LEONOV carrying ~~Dip~~ SV PP #10724 issued Moscow 29 Jan 52. ~~PP # also differs from LIVESTOCK #136693 above)~~ SV VISA (USSR) # ~~[illegible]~~ 136693

Residence: ~~[illegible]~~
cor Zitacuaro and Juanacatlan a/o 27nov53-Liquation — Juanacatlan 81
([illegible])

Wife: Valeria Ivanovna

*address - 21 Feb 54 - 3221: Cuautla 161-9 or [illegible]

Description: born 22 AUG 28, RYAZAN
Height: 170 cms Weight: Build: Hair: blond Eyes: blue
other:

Languages: Spanish good (Follicove jan54)
English (13372, 21 Sept. 56)
French (Visa section)

Skills: 6 Feb 54 — seen driving Black Packard (#65) - ess (he was driving up Gutenberg toward Melchor Ocampo - at 6:00 p.m. he was near that corner. a woman was in the back seat.

201-132139

HKW-W-748, dated 1 July 1953: One N. LEONOV was leader of an Agriculture Delegation from Moscow to attend the Asian Regional Conference on Epizootics hels in Karachi on 3 May 52.



201-132139

АЯ ВИЗА



132139



201-132139

(4) Lemov

P-442

Leonard



201-132139

Nikolay Sergeyevich LEON



201-132139

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 17 Oct 56	ACTION ☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RI/AN/FAHY	ROOM NO. 1509 K	TELEPHONE 8265

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 1. 201-132139	SOURCE DOCUMENT HMMA 5438

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.
Leonov, Nikolay Sergeyevich

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. ☒ YES ☐ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D 22 M 8 Y 29	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USSR	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. —	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Secretary to Ambassador - Soviet Embassy - Mexico

OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. Mexico	ACTION DESK 11. WH/3/M	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.

COMMENTS:

201- 132139

PERMANENT CHARGE ☐ YES ☐ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☐ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE Patricia Fahy

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 JUL 56

[illegible]

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

SECRET/KAPOK

PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM ____________

FIELD CASE OFFICER Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

STATION Mexico City

CHIEF OF STATION Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

FORWARDED BY SPLIT TRANSMISSION
NO FIELD DISSEMINATION.

CS COPY

SECRET/KAPOK

R. SIDE OF ATT. #12 HMMA-26353

50-124-28/1

L SIDE OF ATT. #12 HMMA-26353

SECRET

PROJECT OUTLINE

1. Identification

Mexico City, Mexico. Support for singleton contract agent operating into right-wing political milieu in Mexico for intelligence purposes with some covert action by-product.

2. Objectives

a. Objective The objective of this project is to provide support for a U.S. contract agent who has access to a wide variety of right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico.

b. Conduct of Project The contract agent, LIHUFF/1, was born in Mexico and has had a long history of business experience in Latin America, as well as, over the past fifteen years, in Mexico. At the present time, he is Executive Director of U.S. Chamber of Commerce of Mexico City, which gives him a great deal of mobility in both American and Mexican business circles. Generally, it is from the Mexican business community that the financing and support for right-wing political movements, organizations, and institutions eminate. Given the general trend of recent Mexican regimes, as well as the present one, toward more governmental regulation and manipulation of the economic life of the country, the Mexican businessmen continue to support right-wing political movements or ostensibly non-profit civic, research, and other types of organizations used by them as front instrumentalities for expounding their philosophy and taking action in the politico-economic fields. LIHUFF/1 has natural access through his present position and past extensive experience in the business community here. Over the years, as a matter of fact, his numerous associations with these elements have earned him their trust and respect. In addition, for the past four years he has funded Lic. Agustin NAVARRO Vasquez (was LIHUFF/2) organization, consisting primarily of Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales y Economicos, A.C. (IISE), "Espejo" (a magazine on politico-economic affairs), and Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientacion (MURO, a student organization). Also, he has handled LICHANT/1 who has a history of, and numerous associations in, the Mexican right-wing political arena. These and many other contacts of this type will provide the basis for his reports on this particular segment of the political spectrum in Mexico.

c. Targets Right-wing political elements and organizations in Mexico. This would include not only Lic. NAVARRO, IISE, "Espejo," and MURO, but Hugo SALINAS Price, Jorge SIEGRIST Clamont and numerous others of political significance on the Mexican scene. In connection with LICHANT/1's present

SECRET

position, it should be possible to obtain information on the Ministry of Education and other aspects of the Mexican education system which, according to the last word received from Headquarters, is somewhat of a priority requirement.

d. RMD. This project is responsive to Priority A3d and f of the Related Mission Directive for Station Mexico City (approved October 1963). This priority reads in part: "obtain information on the stability of the Government ... through high-level penetrations and through surveillances and controlled assets of other powerful political groups such as the Frente Civico... and through continued development and influencing of high-level government contacts." As an ancillary measure, the project could contribute to MHSPAWN objectives of the RMD under certain circumstances where use of right-wing platforms and organizations is merited.

3. Background.

a. Developments Leading up to Project.

(1) Mexico, politically, is a country in which, increasingly, a centrist political concensus is developing based on the impact of education and economic development. On either side though of this growing central political spectrum are extreme left and extreme right wings which are quite active and quite vocal and which have an influence in the form of individuals, organizations, and movements greatly out of proportion to their numbers. Political disturbances and efforts to induce lack of stability eminate in the main from these two extreme wings. As the centrist force grows slowly, it is possible and probable that these two wings will intensify their efforts and become more and more radical. The Station has intelligence coverage of the extreme left-wing, but has neglected the equally important extreme right-wing when, in the final analysis, any threat to Mexican political stability by fomenting unrest and incidents does, and will continue to, eminate from the right-wing as well as the left-wing. Assumin g that, as indicated in the present RMD, the long range national policy objectives of the U.S. toward Mexico are to encourage a stable democratic government and political environment, then coverage of the right-wing is required if for no other reason than meeting normal Station responsibilities for political reporting. HBFINCH contacts in this area have been, and probably will continue to be, virtually nil. In fact, at present in this area HBFINCH contacts are non-existent.

(2) LIHUFF/1 was first picked up as a contact by Station Mexico City in 1950 after having been a contract agent for Station Panama City for some three years (while engaged in business in Panama). He has been in a continuing

relationship of one degree or another with this Station ever since then. This relationship developed from "contact" into formal contract status in November 1962. LIHUFF/1 has handled Station contacts and activities with LIHUFF/2 as well as LICHANT/1 from 1962 to date. In addition, he has done a good deal of reporting on right-wing activities from other sources and other contacts of his. Subsidy of the LIHUFF activity for MHSPAWN purposes will be terminated effective 30 June 1965. Use of LICHANT/1 will be continued in an intelligence reporting capacity and, in a limited way, for covert action efforts.

b. Prior Negotiations. There have been no prior negotiations with the Mexican Government, intelligence or security services, or ODYOKE elements on this project. LIHUFF/1 has been used in the past, prior to his contract with KUBARK, as a source by ODIBEX and ODMARK.

c. Relationship to Other Projects. This project has no relationship to any other Station project.

d. Utilization of Same Operational Assets. LIHUFF/1 has not been utilized on any other project, past or present, except to the extent he was involved with the LIHUFF activity indicated in subparagraph 3a(2) above.

4. Operational Assets.

a. Personnel.

(1) LIHUFF/1 (OA granted on 10 October 1962 with no number forwarded to field) -- Subject was born in Mexico, is fluent in Spanish, and is about 49 years old. Since World War II, he has been in private business in Latin America, first in Panama and then in Mexico from 1950 on. During World War II, he was in Army intelligence in China and, therefore, had an understanding of covert operations prior to his KUBARK experience. While in Panama, he was employed by the Station there for several years " to organize a net directed against a target of high priority interest". This association was terminated by reason of his move to Mexico for business reasons. Although he was in contact with this Station virtually from his time of arrival in Mexico, he was not picked up as a contract agent until November 1962. His cover for his past and proposed activities has been natural: that of a businessman with a conservative political outlook and interested in the economic and political posture of the

Mexican Government. Contact with him is covered by a social relationship between his case officer and himself; this is easily maintained given the large American community in Mexico City. He has had no formal intelligence training other than that he received from the Army during World War II and on the job with KUBARK. Control of Subject is no problem inasmuch as he is an American citizen and has had considerable experience with KUBARK by now. His motivation is that of an attraction to this type of work, being a U.S. citizen in a foreign area, natural concern forhis business interests, and, probably, the compensatory return from KUBARK. He is witting of his KUBARK association and, aside from his World War II intelligence experience with ODIBEX, in 1961 he had an intelligence relationship with ODIBEX which has long since been terminated.

(2) LICHANT/1. (OA granted on 22 April 1963, but no number forwarded to field) -- Subject is a very conservative Mexican educator and intellectual about 49 years of age. He has alternated between working in various capacities for the Government of Mexico and in Mexican universities. At the present time, he is Private Secy. in Min.of Ed.,a position which gives him unique access in the government to the general fields of education and politics as well as considerable contact with other influential people in right-wing circles. He was recruited by LIHUFF/1 in August 1962 on the pretext of doing research work and collecting information for LIHUFF/1's general use for business purposes. Subject has natural cover for obtaining information on right-wing activities from others due to his long association with right-wing activities as a student, educator, and government servant. Contact between Subject and LIHUFF/1 is maintained under the guise of private business relationship. Subject has had no intelligence training from KUBARK other than that imparted by LIHUFF/1 in discussing his reports. There has been no problems in control since essentially Subject understands that this is a business relationship with certain requirements involved for it to be sustained. Subject's motivation is that of an intellectually-convinced conservative who has common objectives and outlook with LIHUFF/1 on political and economic matters plus the financial aspect of the LIHUFF/1 relationship. Subject is not witting of KUBARK or ODYOKE interest in his activities and reporting. He has no known contacts with other intelligence or security services, past or present.

b. Mechanisms. There will be no mechanisms involved in this project although LIHUFF/1 will continue to have access to Lic. NAVARRO, and, in turn, to IISE, "Espejo," and MURO for intelligence purposes.

5. Security Evaluation.

In the unlikely event of compromise, LIHUFF/1 could continue to claim that he was not doing anything that hundreds of other businessmen, U.S. and Mexican, aren't doing as commonly-accepted practice: trying to influence the politico-economic climate in Mexico for their own benefit. Whatever the extent of the compromise, there would be no repercussion insofar as other operations or activities per se were concerned except that there might be some tightening of the general operational climate for a while. If, somehow, LIHUFF/1's true role were disclosed, he could probably be backstopped with a minimum of publicity through high-level Station contacts with the Government (explaining the Station interest in right-wing circles as attempting to follow what they were up to in case they became a threat to the stability of the present government).

6. Coordination.

No coordination is desirable or required with other ODYOKE or PBPRIME elements, with the Mexican government, or with other governments and intelligence services. It is assumed that normal coordination with various elements within KUBARK Headquarters will take place.

7. Costs.

a. General. It is requested that this project be authorized in the amount of $9,000 per annum effective 1 July 1965.

b. Breakdown of Costs (per annum).

(1)	LIHUFF/1 salary	$3,600.00
(2)	Operational Expenses	3,000.00
(3)	Entertainment and Travel	2,400.00
	Total per annum	$9,000.00

No non-KUBARK funds will be involved in this activity.

c. Foreign Currency. It is anticipated that any forseeable foreign currency requirements will be within the Station's capacity to handle.

d. Commitments. No commitments have been made to LIHUFF/1 other than a salary of $300.00 per month with a thirty day's notice on termination.

e. Funding and Accountability. Since this project will only involve salary for the most part, no unusual requirements are deemed necessary for accountability. In the event that funds are passed for any type of special activity other than salary, normal standards of accountability will be used.

8. Annexes.

a. Administrative Plan or Fiscal Annex. Not applicable.

b. Communications. Not applicable.

c. Technical Support. Not applicable.

d. Logistics. Not applicable.

e. Intelligence. Not applicable.

9. Emergency Conditions.

If an official anti-USA atmosphere of sufficient intensity prevailed in Mexico, LIHUFF/1 very probably would not be able to maintain himself here, particularly if his employment continued in his present capacity. . This, however, is not seen as anything except a very remote contingency due to the Government of Mexico's dependence on the U.S. tourist trade. In a general war, it is probable that LIHUFF/1 would be able to continue in place without too much difficulty and would be willing to continue operating on current objectives or to undertake entirely new operations against new targets. Contact and communications should represent few problems in Mexico.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: RHSnowdon:sdb
UNIT: SB/CI/KGB
EXT: 6991
DATE: 8 JULY 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	CI	5	EU
2	CI	6	WH
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , EUR 8, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 11 18 51Z (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA) CITE DIRECTOR 18944

TO BRUSSELS THE HAGUE

REDBLOCK LCIMPROVE

1. NIKOLAY STEPANOVICH LEONOV, SECOND SECY (PRESS ATTACHE), SOVEMB MEXICO CITY ACCOMPANIED BY DAUGHTER IRINA WAS SCHEDULED DEPART MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE SABENA FLT 556 FOR BRUSSELS. LEONOV KGB OFFICER REPORTEDLY ON WAY MOSCOW FOR 20-DAY TDY. PLS CONFIRM ARRIVAL BRUSSELS AND DEPARTURE, PRESUMABLY NEXT AEROFLOT FLIGHT FOR MOSCOW.

2. SECOND REPORT THAT LEONOV PLANNED TAKE KLM FLT 684 FROM MEXICO CITY 29 JUNE FOR AMSTERDAM APPARENTLY IN ERROR BUT SHOULD BE CHECKED IF BRUSSELS CANNOT CONFIRM PARA ONE INFO.

3. MAY USE LIAISON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SB/CI/K

C/SB/O/EU

SB/O/WH

Stacy B. Hulse Jr.
C/E/BNL

E/BNL/B

DC/SB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

201-133139

RICHARDSON/as
ORIG : HEITSMAN
UNIT : FE/CMO/CIDI
EXT : 5743/5645
DATE : 20 MAY 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

21 MAY 64 20 45z

FROM: DIRECTOR

C-83492

CONF: FE 8

INFO: WH 7, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

DE SIG CEN

X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR

LCHARVEST

File

22 MAY 1964 **22829**

REF: MEXI 9468 (IN 83286)*

1. SUBJ DESCRIBED FOR YEARS AS LEFTIST, BUT ANTI-COMMUNIST AND STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN. HQS WANTS DEVELOP INFO HIS CURRENT POLITICAL BELIEFS AND WHY SUBJ WANTED VISIT CHINA. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED MAN OF STATURE BY CHICOMS, COULD PROBABLY SWING NEW INVITATION TO VISIT CHINA. WE WANT EVALUATE ANSWERS PARA 2 AND 3 QUESTIONS TO DETERMINE HIS ABILITY PROVIDE INTEL, WITH VIEW TOWARD RECRUITING HIM FOR BRIEFED MISSION OR RESIDENCE IN CHINA. DO LINLUCK-1, LICOOKY-1 FEEL HE APPROACHABLE UNDER ANY GUISE? IF HE ASSESSED UNWILLING COOPERATE ODYOKE, SUGGEST CONSIDER FALSE FLAG RECRUITMENT.

2. CHICOMS MAY CONSIDER HIM COMMIE; IF SO HE MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED CARRY BACK MESSAGES, MONEY, OR PERFORM OTHER SERVICES IN MEXI. SUGGEST LINLUCK-1 OR LICOOKy-1 TRY QUERY HIM THESE POINTS. ALSO REPORT DATES TRIP, ITINERARY, INSTALLATIONS VISITED, INDOCTRINATION GIVEN, IF ANY, AND LECTURES SUBJECT GAVE.

3. AS OUTLINED PAGE 15, NEW PART IV/A CHINA HANDBOOK, DESIRE SUBSTANCE SUBJ'S CONVERSATIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS, DATES

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1
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4
5
6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO GUAT INFO CITE DIR 22829

AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HELD. PARTICULAR TOPICS OF INTEREST:

CHINA'S POSITION TOWARD UN ADMISSION AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.

TRADE WITH AND RECOGNITION FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

MORAL, FINANCIAL, LOGISTICAL, AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR LATIN AMERICAN CP'S AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS--PARTICULARLY IN GUATEMALA.

REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT OF CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION ON VARIOUS ISSUES (INCLUDING NON-ALIGNED AND BANDUNG CONFERENCES) FROM LATIN AMERICAN PRESS, CP'S, GOVERNMENTS.

STATUS AND PLANS FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION NCNA AND TRADE OFFICES MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested rqmts for two Mexi Station assets use in eliciting info from exiled Guatemalan journalist on his recent trip China.

ADCFE(C) Andrew Posey

C/WH/3

W Hood
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

414

DATE : 9 NOV 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1500 9 NOV)

INFO : CA 2, CA/P&G, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, BELL 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

NOV 9 1933Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 20212

PRITY MEXI INFO PRITY DIR ROUTINE CARA CITE GUAT 1824 CHATEMAN ACTING

REFS: A. GUAT 1822 (IN 19554) (IN 19767)*

B. MEXI 9373 (NOT SENT CARA)

file

1. FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWS AMUPAS-1 TRIED LAND GUAT 3 NOV. WHEN DENIED ENTRY DUE LACK TOURIST CARD, CREATED SCENE, TRIED PURCHASE CARD, DELAYED PLANE DEPARTURE SEVERAL MINUTES.

2. A-1 RETURNED GUAT 7 NOV. SUITCASE SEIZED PER REF A PARA 1. A-1 STAYED HOME OF RODRIGO ASTURIAS AMADO, 12 AVENIDA AT 9 CALLE, NO. 12-12, ZONE 1. WAS ARRESTED THERE 0803 8 NOV. BY AGENTS OF GUARDIA JUDICIAL. STATION INFORMED A-1 CARRYING TWO U.S. PASSPORTS, NO. 273304 ISSUED 21 SEPT 1948 AND NO. 12404 ISSUED 28 SEPT 1953, AND THAT A-1 TO BE EXPELLED FROM GUAT 8 NOV ON CHARGE TRANSPORTING COMMIE PROPAGANDA.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION :

INFO :

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

PAGE 2

IN 20212 GUAT 1824

3. CONSUL ADVISED BY IMMIGRATION 9 NOV THAT A-1 WAS TAKEN BY ROAD TO MEXI BORDER 8 NOV AND PUT ACROSS IN VICINITY TAPACHULA. THIS CONFIRMED TO STATION BY COLONEL MONZON OF ESTADO MAYOR.

4. ARREST AND EXPULSION GIVEN PROMINENT PRESS PLAY HERE AND AP STRINGER FILING STORY TO STATES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *AMUPAS 1 ARRIVED MEXI 3 NOV. DECIDED CONTINUE MEXI AND NOT PRESS ATTEMPT STOP GUAT.

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Joseph
201-0119523 Vol III

INCLUSIVE DATES: 21 Feb 1966 - 3 May 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Raymond H. [illegible]

523

OL III

65-

THIS AGENT IS ACTIVE UNDER PROJECT LIEMPTY

HMM/94 [illegible] LIPSTICK-20 (201-119523) C-32743

Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ DuRant

RI ck - 27 June 55 (NPII 5 July 55) Part I - HMMA-3165

GL# 54229 - 1 July 55 (NPII 21 July 55)

To write contract for subj - wait answer to HMMW 2395.
answered by HMMA-3394, 4 Aug. 1955

Pseudo: Raymond H. GERENDE

Field advised of contract approval in DIR 44689 (OUT-63196), 26 Jan 56 Amt: $3,600.
Copies of contract fwd'd to field in HMM-W-

Married to LIEMPTY-19

1954 1958

classified documents and CS documents without file numbers should be sent to IP/AN for proper processing.

2. Maintain the material in this dossier in chronological order.

3. To transfer the charge for this dossier to another component or individual, call IP/Files, extension 4362.

4. Contact your Division/Staff Records Management Officer if you have any questions concerning the maintenance or disposition of this dossier.

NOTE: This dossier may not be complete. A listing of all CS material processed for this file may be ordered via Form 3414 "Request for File Content List" or by calling IP/Files, extension 4127 or 5831.

08/29/ SECRET FRP,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (444) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DWS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0650621 PAGE 001 IN 0650621
TOR: 031854Z MAY 78 MEXI 44921

S E C R E T 031745Z MAY 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44921

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 215553
B. MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. STATION APPRECIATES RECEIVING REF A FILE SUMMARY ON RAYMOND H. GERENDE. STATION DOES NOT PLAN MAKE CONTACT NOR USE GERENDE OPERATIONALLY.

2. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

S89

RECORD COPY

3 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/29/ SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DD, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

78 0645361 PAGE 001
TOT: 021957Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215553

SECRET
STAFF 021953Z DIRECTOR 215553
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE, (IDENTITY A) WAS RECRUITED IN MARCH 1955 AS A MEMBER OF A STATION UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE TEAM. GERENDE RECEIVED AN OPERATIONAL APPROVAL ON 28 FEB 55 AND ON 1 OCT 55 WAS CONVERTED TO CONTRACT STATUS WITH AN INITIAL ANNUAL SALARY OF $3600. BY LATE 1956 HE HAD BECOME THE P/A IN CHARGE OF THE SURVEILLANCE TEAM AND ADDITIONALLY WAS IN CHARGE OF PHOTO SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOVIET MISSION, INCLUDING PROCESSING THE FILM. AT THIS TIME HE WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING "CONSCIENTIOUS, LOYAL, HARDWORKING AND DEDICATED." IN 1957 HE WAS GIVEN FIVE WEEKS OF CLANDESTINE OPS TRAINING IN THE HQS AREA, BEING DESCRIBED BY HIS TRAINER AS MORE "PRO-AMERICAN THAN MEXICAN." IN LATE 1958 HE WAS DESCRIBED AS ONE OF THE STATION'S "MOST VALUABLE ASSETS", ETC.

2. ON 12 DEC 58 GERENDE MARRIED LIEMPTY-19 (IDENTITY B), WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS AS A PART-TIME SUPPORT ASSET. IN GENERAL GERENDE APPEARS TO HAVE PERFORMED A CREDITABLE JOB AS THE P/A FOR THE KDFACTOR ACTIVITY, WHICH PROVIDED SURVEILLANCE AND PHOTO COVERAGE OF THE SOVIET TARGET. AT THE TIME OF TERMINATION, HIS CONTRACT AGENT SALARY HAD INCREASED TO $7000 PER ANNUM. SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEPT FOR GIVING ENGLISH LESSONS AND OTHER MINOR COVER ACTIVITIES, GERENDE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYEE. HE PERFORMED A NUMBER OF TASKS IN ADDITION TO KDFACTOR, INCLUDING SERVING AS LP KEEPER AND TRANSCRIBER/TRANSLATOR OF AN AUDIO OPERATION, INVOLVEMENT IN OPS AGAINST THE CUBAN MISSION AND CUBAN EXILE GROUPS, GENERAL OPS SUPPORT, AND SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT. ON 8 OCT 1963, GERENDE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED AN SGSWIRL, ALTHOUGH IT EMERGED THAT HE HAD NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ALL FUNDS PASSED TO HIM (THE STATION DISMISSED THIS PROBLEM) AND FELT THAT HE WAS BEING UNDEREMPLOYED BY RTACTION. CONCERNING THE LATTER CHARGE, THE STATION SEEMS TO HAVE HAD PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT THE 1960'S KEEPING GERENDE FULLY OCCUPIED, SINCE FOR SECURITY REASONS THERE WAS RELUCTANCE TO INTRODUCE HIM TO ANY MORE OPERATIONS THAN THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBER HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OF. (FYI: IN ADDITION TO HIS WIFE, GERENDE'S MOTHER, 201-0262488, AND TWO BROTHER-IN-LAWS (KDFACTOR-1) AND (KDADAGE-14) WERE ALSO STATION ASSETS.

RECO[illegible] SECRET

02 May 78

201-119523

3. IN 1969 GERENDE SEPARATED FROM LIEMPTY-19 IN WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE THE BEGINNING OF AN EXTREMELY ACRIMONIOUS DIVORCE PROCEEDING AND FIGHT FOR THE CUSTODY OF THEIR THREE CHILDREN. IN DECEMBER 1969 GERENDE WAS PUT ON HALF PAY AND HAD HIS OPS DUTIES SUSPENDED BY THE STATION BECAUSE OF HIS FULL-TIME INVOLVEMENT IN LEGAL MATTERS SURROUNDING THE DIVORCE. ON 26 JUNE 1970 GERENDE AND LIEMPTY-19 SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS. GERENDE WAS PAID $10,000 AND LIEMPTY-19 $2500 AS TERMINATION BONUSES, AND THE PAYMENTS WERE MADE ON A MONTHLY BASIS SO THAT THE STATION WOULD HAVE SOME CONTROL OVER THE TWO AND THEREBY KEEP THEIR RTACTION STATUS FROM EMERGING DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS. ON 8 JULY 1970 LIEMPTY-19 UNEXPECTEDLY APPEARED AT HQS IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET A LARGER TERMINATION BONUS. SUBSEQUENTLY LIEMPTY-19 AND HER CHILDREN WENT TO RESIDE IN THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS, WHERE SHE WAS PAID THE REST OF HER TERMINATION BONUS VIA MONTHLY CHECKS SENT TO HER BROTHER IN THE HQS AREA. SHE WAS LAST REPORTED TO BE WORKING AS A SECRETARY AT THE U.S. MISSION IN THE HAGUE.

4. ACCORDING TO MEXICO CITY 19452, 10 APRIL 72, THE LAST STATION CONTACT WITH GERENDE WAS IN MAY 1971, WHEN HE RECEIVED THE FINAL INSTALLMENT OF TERMINATION BONUS. CABLE NOTED THAT GERENDE APPEARED FINANCIALLY PRESSED, BUT WAS GIVING DAILY ENGLISH CLASSES AND RENTING HIS HOUSE TO STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT EITHER GERENDE OR HIS WIFE HAD VIOLATED THEIR SECRECY AGREEMENTS. STATEMENT WAS MADE THAT HE NO LONGER APPEARED TO BE DRINKING EXCESSIVELY.

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT GERENDE'S AGENT SERVICE RECORD QUALIFIES RECOMENDATION FOR HIS REUSE BY SAYING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT INCOME TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR FULL-TIME RTACTION EMPLOYMENT, AND HAVE RESOLVED HIS PERSONAL PROBLEMS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT EXCEPT FOR A POSSIBLE ROLE IN SERVICING SPECIFIC OPS SUPPORT TASKS, GERENDE OFFERS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR THE STATION. SUGGEST THAT THE STATION MAY WISH TO DISCUSS GERENDE WITH THEODORE G. KINDOPP (P) UPON HIS ARRIVAL, SINCE GERENDE WAS HIS LANDLORD DURING PREVIOUS STAY IN MEXICO.

6. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LAOMGSB (T-CHAMBERLAND); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.<

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

/30/ SECRET FRP:

STAFF

CONF: LA-8 INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, DDO/DO, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (25/P)

78 0645456 PAGE 001

TOT: 022016Z MAY 78 DIRECTOR 215575

SECRET
STAFF 022016Z DIRECTOR 215575
TO: MEXICO CITY.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME Iden cable to

REF: DIRECTOR 215553

1. IDENTITY A - RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT
DPOB: 7 DECEMBER 1933, NEW YORK CITY
GRADUATED FROM AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL IN MEXICO CITY IN 1952; RECEIVED B.A. IN LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES FROM MEXICO CITY COLLEGE IN 1955. RENOUNCED U.S. CITIZENSHIP IN 1952 TO PARTICIPATE ON MEXICAN OLYMPIC TEAM AND TO AVOID U.S. DRAFT. BILINGUAL IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH.

2. IDENTITY B - HESTER ROOS DE ALVAREZ
DPOB: 24-DECEMBER 1930, BANDUNG, INDONESIA, DUTCH CITIZEN.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2 IMPDET.>
ORIG: LA/MGSB/M (CHAMBERLIN); AUTH: AC/LA/MGSB (LEHMAN); REL: DC/LA/NR (DESMOND). CL BY 029163.

RECORD COPY

2 May 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

55/48/ SECRET FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (149) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0613988 PAGE 001 IN 0613988
TOR: 260154Z APR 78 MEXI 44820

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44820

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME Iden Cable to

REF: MEXICO CITY 44819 0613976

IDEN A: HARRY MAHONEY

IDEN B: RAYMOND H. GERENDE

E2 IMPDET.

889

26 APR 78

201-119523

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END OF MESSAGE SECRET

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55/48/ SECRET FRP: ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA-8 (150) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-4, C/PCS, CA, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DMS, ODPD-D, PCS/DEF, (24/W)

78 0613976 PAGE 001 IN 0613976
TOR: 260153Z APR 78 MEXI 44819

S E C R E T 260025Z APR 78 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 44819

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL FJPASTIME 0

1. ON 25 APRIL 1978 RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT (201-119523) WALKED INTO U.S. EMBASSY AND OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION. HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY U.S. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER (NOT STATION OFFICER) AND REPORTED THAT HE WAS RECRUITED BY IDEN A IN 1955 AT UNIVERSITY OF THE AMERICAS AND WORKED FOR RTACTION UNTIL 1969. HIS PSEUDO WAS IDEN B. AFTER READING ARTICLE IN 17 APRIL 1978 ISSUE OF TIME HE DECIDED TO OFFER HIS SERVICES TO RTACTION ONCE AGAIN. ALVAREZ IS CURRENTLY A PARTNER AT LOCAL RESTAURANT.

2. STATION FILE ON ALVAREZ WAS DESTROYED SHORTLY AFTER HIS TERMINATION IN 1970. INDEX CARD INDICATES THAT HE WAS RECOMMENDED FOR RE-USE. REQUEST HQS SUMMARY OF ALVAREZ 201 FILE AND HIS PREVIOUS DUTIES FOR RTACTION.

3. FILE: 201-119523. E2, IMPDET.

RECORD COPY

26 APR 78

201-119523

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET
(When Filled In)

4 Feb 75
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ Should be closed. (If this category applies, affix Records Officer stamp.)

☐ Unwitting collaborator. OI Code A7.
Explanation: ______________________

☐ Witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ Potential witting collaborator; date opened: ______________________
OI Code A2.

☒ Former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ Potential witting collaborator never contacted. OI Code A4.

☐ Counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ All others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Glenn (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/FI (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 75 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file. 201-119523

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 061475

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

4 Feb 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on ~~[illegible]~~ ALVAREZ (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ______ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed ______ (name) IA (title) LA/M (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed NR (initials) 12 Feb 1975 (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

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201-119523

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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ACTION UNIT WH8

FILE, VR IP/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI,

ACTION # 998

APR 10 11 05 PM '72

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 102318Z APR 72 CITE MEXICO CITY 19452

DIRECTOR

KDFACTOR

10 Apr IN 582033

REF: DIRECTOR 252261

1. BRUCE H. FERNALD MET MONTHLY WITH RAYMOND H. GERENDE FROM JULY 1970 TO MAY 1971 TO PAY TEN INSTALLMENTS OF TERMINATION BONUS. LAST MEET WAS 4 MAY 1971. ALL IMPORTANT INFO ON PROBLEMS OF GERENDE AND WIFE (FORMERLY LIEMPTY-19) WAS REPORTED BY CABLE DURING THIS PERIOD, EXCEPT FOR NEWS THAT GERENDE VISITED HOLLAND DURING CHRISTMAS 1970 WHEN HAD AMICABLE VISIT WITH WIFE AND CHILDREN.

2. GERENDE IS OWNER OF HOUSE RENTED AUGUST 1970 BY STATION STAFFER JESSE R. GARDALPHE. HE STILL TEACHING ENGLISH TO EMPLOYEES OF TWO LOCAL FIRMS AND APPEARS FINANCIALLY PRESSED SINCE CLASS SCHEDULE REDUCED RECENTLY FROM SIX TO TWO HOURS PER DAY. STILL DRINKS, BUT APPARENTLY IN MODERATION. HAS INDICATED HE MIGHT VISIT WIFE IN HOLLAND THIS SUMMER. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INDICATE GERENDE HAS VIOLATED HIS SECRECY AGREEMENT OR PROBED INTO LNLUTE STATUS OF GARDALPHE.

201-119523

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 19452 SECRET

3. FILE: 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

Julie Paulas

ORIG: Julie Paulas
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167
DATE: 6 APRIL 1972

MESSAGE FORM 13-1
TOTAL COPIES:

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-74/3

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE VR. C/CPS, C/OA, IP/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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[illegible] 0 [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 252201

TO MEXICO CITY

KDFACTOR

REF: A. HMMW-18,773, 23 DECEMBER 71
B. HMMA-41734, 10 MARCH 72

1. IN ORDER COMPLETE REF A KDFACTOR SECURITY REVIEW RE KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF TERMINATED AGENTS AND FAMILIES, STATION REQUESTED FURNISH BRIEF SUMMARY OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES FROM TERMINATION IN JUNE 1970 TO PRESENT. ABOVE INFO NEEDED PRIOR TO COB 11 APRIL, IN ORDER PROVIDE NEEDED DETAIL TO REF B.

2. FILE: 50-6-74/3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A requested an updated security review of KDFACTOR Operations and knowledgeability of terminated agents and families. Reference B is Station answer to Reference A. Reference B lacks detail regarding GERENDE, who handled KDFACTOR up to late 1970, present activities.

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

LAWRENCE C. LASER
AC/WH/1

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INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EURG, CI/OPS, FI

ACTION NO. 295

S E C R E T 260926Z JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9222

(HASU)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

26 Jan 71 251867

REF: DIRECTOR 104743

1. DCM, POLITCAL COUNSELOR AND ADMIN OFFICER ALL BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY/19 BACKGROUND PRIOR TO HER EMPLOYMENT. THIS SATISFIES STATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO EMBASSY AND SEE NO NEED RAISE MATTER WITH GPOUGHT AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1.

S E C R E T

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FEB 12 1971
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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Gerende
B - 201-119523

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LIEMPTY/19
26 JAN 71
201-241621

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ORIG: FRED KRAVCOV:tr
UNIT: WH/1/FI/CI FK
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 22 Jan 71

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17-1

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CONF: WH 8 | INFO | FILE, VR. RI/AN, EUR6, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 23 JAN 71 03 12z CITE DIRECTOR 04743

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: A. THE HAGUE 9008*

B. ONHW 18507, 13 AUG 70 **

1. SUGGEST GPOUGHT BE BRIEFED ON LIEMPTY-19 PAST JKLANCE STATUS, STRESSING FACT SHE TERMINATED WITHOUT PREJUIDICE 30 JUNE 70, MARITAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT HQS MAINTAINING CORRESPONDENCE WITH HER VIA HER BROTHER FOR PURPOSE OF FORWARDING PAYMENTS DUE HER. NO OTHER CONTACT WITH HER EXPECTED OR DESIRED.

2. REF B. AND ATTACHMENTS CONTAIN SUMMARY LIEMPTY-19 CASE WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL IN BRIEFING.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: * LIEMPTY-19 assumed position as social secretary and receptionist to GPOUGHT.
**LIEMPTY-19 employment and termination data, Agency service record and quit claim.

C/WH/1
C/WH/FI
AC/E/BNL Wes Parker (in draft)

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

201-119523

H. Gerende

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INFO FILE, VR DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP CS/RF, CI, CI/OPS, FI, R/AN,

ACTION NO. 872 EUR6

S E C R E T 211552 JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 9208

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 103241*

* LIEMPTY/19 (1) wrote a letter to the Director dated 30 Nov. '70 reviewing her complaints against her ex-husband.

21 JAN 71 249123

1. ON 1 JAN 71, LIEMPTY [1] ASSUMED POSITION AS SOCIAL SECRETARY AND RECEPTIONIST TO GPOUGHT [2] AND OCCUPIES DESK IN LNCUFF [3]. SO FAR AS WE AWARE, SHE HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION HER PREVIOUS JKLANCE CONNECTION AND HAS DISPLAYED NO INTEREST JKLANCE PERSONNEL. WE SHOULD ASSUME, HOWEVER, THAT IN NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS SHE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME AWARE JKLANCE PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY COS.

2. ON POSITIVE SIDE, THIS JOB PROBABLY SOLVES ANY PERSONAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS SHE HAS HAD AND AT SAME TIME SHOULD INHIBIT HER FROM TAKING ANY ACTIONS AGAINST JKLANCE THAT WOULD PLACE HER JOB IN JEOPARDY.

3. FILE: 201-241621 AND 201-119523. GP-1

S E C R E T

K

GERENDE

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

FRED KRAVCOV:lml
WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1973
25 NOVEMBER 1970

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CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, E/BN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

27 NOV 70 23 15z

CITE DIRECTOR 090057

TO: THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

REF: THE HAGUE 8743* (IN 212100)

1. CONCUR STATION SHOULD AVOID INVOLVEMENT WITH LIEMPTY/19. NO NEED INTERFERE WITH LIEMPTY/19 EMPLOYMENT PLANS.

2. HQS WILL CONTINUE HANDLING LIEMPTY/19 VIA IDENTITY D, DIR 057055 WHO IN TURN IS HANDLED BY WOBONE.

3. CURRENT READING WILL BE OBTAINED FROM IDENTITY D, DIR 057055.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

MICROFILMED
DEC 1 1 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

*WH Comment: LIEMPTY/19 visited LNCUFF at The Hague attempting to contact JKLANCE.

C/WH/1 John C. Murray

for C/WH/SEC R.B. Wright (in draft)

WH/NOC Ralph Hatrey (in draft)

E/BNL/N

AN
AB X
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PS HR
EX 4
~~DES~~ RFD
~~FI~~
WH/1

Liempty-1
Gerende
27 NOV 70

JOHN L. HART
CHIEF, EUR

B-201-241621

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WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

201-119523

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ORIG: HELLER:lml
UNIT: C/WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 1970

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, ADDAN EUR6 CI CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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13NOV70 23 40z

CITE DIRECTOR 56582

TO MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

2P

REF: MEXICO CITY 4801 (IN 204131)

1. GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BOTH WERE TERMINATED MAINLY BECAUSE OF INSOLUBLE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES, AND JKLANCE HAS LESS WARRANT OR DESIRE THAN EVER TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY. WE SPECIFICALLY DESIRE HOLD STATION INVOLVEMENT, EITHER MEXICO CITY OR THE HAGUE, TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, AND CERTAINLY DO NOT WISH INVOLVE DUTCH.

2. GERENDE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE ANY HAGUE STATION CONTACT FURNISHED. FILE SHOWS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LIEMPTY/19 NOT SO COMPLETELY UNSTABLE THAT SHE WOULD CREATE SCANDAL. PRINCIPAL REASON WE INSISTED PAYING HER TERMINATION BONUS OVER PERIOD OF TIME WAS TO RETAIN SOME SEMBLANCE OF CONTROL IN SITUATION SUCH AS THIS. BOTH SHE AND GERENDE SIGNED TERMINATION AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS, AND WE INTEND TRY HOLD THEM BOTH TO THEIR COMMITMENTS.

3. RECOMMEND STATION AVOID GIVING ANY INDICATION OF TAKING SIDES. WHILE THESE MARITAL DIFFICULTIES DEPLORABLE, THEY ARE PURELY PERSONAL AFFAIR NOW AND BEST HANDLED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS. HQS SUGGESTS THAT HINT OF STRONG TONE TAKEN WITH GERENDE NOW MIGHT SAVE

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CITE DIRECTOR 026622

TO

PAGE 2

US EMBARRASSMENT LATER.

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

E/BNL/N John Dixon - by phone

WH/Security

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

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JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

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INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, EUR6, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2

ACTION NO. 559

S E C R E T 101925Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4301

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE

10 Nov 70 IN 204131

REF: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 137093) (DIVORCE

B. HMMA 39384

1. 5 NOVEMBER RAYMOND H. GERENDE (P), HUSBAND OF LIEMPTY -19, TOLD US THAT 13 OCT COURT DECISION FOUND NO GROUNDS TO GRANT DIVORCE. THIS SHOCKED BOTH GERENDE AND ATTORNEY VIEW FACT LIEMPTY-19 FAILED APPEAR FOR 5 AND 3 AUGUST HEARINGS (WHICH NORMALLY SHOULD FORFEIT HER CASE BY DEFAULT) AND FACT SHE LEFT MEXICO ILLEGALLY WITH CHILDREN. GERENDE APPEALING DECISION WHICH MAY TAKE YEAR RESOLVE.

SI Ugn
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WH/1

2. ON RECENT TRIP TO ARIZONA TO BROTHER OF LIEMPTY-19, GERENDE CONFIRMED HIS SUSPICION THAT WIFE IN NETHERLANDS (WHICH WE HAD AVOIDED TELLING HIM), AND PESUMABLY LEARNED HER ADDRESS. FROM DUTCH EMBASSY MEXICO, HE ALSO LEARNED THAT DUTCH MFA IN ALMOST WEEKLY TOUCH WITH EMBASSY ON LIEMPTY-19 BEHALF, ATTEMPTING HAVE EMBASSY PROCURE ATTORNEY FOR HER.

3. GERENDE DISTRAUGHT OVER COURT DECISION AND PROSPECT LENGTHY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE REGAINING CUSTODY OR EVEN SEEING CHILDREN. CLAIMS HE ABOUT DECIDED GO NETHERLANDS THIS MONTH TO

LIEmpty-1

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B 201-241621

201-119523
10 Nov 70

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10-61 EDITIONS

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 4801

MEET WIFE REGARDING CHILDREN AND, IF POSSIBLE, PRSUADE HER GIVE MARRIAGE ANOTHER TRY. THOUGH WE TRYING DISSUADE HIM FROM THIS COURSE, PROBABLY WTHOUT SUCCESS, HAVE ALSO URGED HE ADVISE IF AND WHEN HE PLANS GO FOR CONFRONTATION. SINCE HE MAY GO ON SPUR OF MOMENT WITHOUT ADVISING US, WE WISH ALERT THE HAGUE TO POSSIBILITY OF GERENDE'S UNANNOUNCED ARRIVAL WITH COINCIDENT SCREAMS BY LIEMPTY-19 AT LNCUFF, MEXICAN EMBASSY, DUTCH MFA OR ALL THREE. SHE UNSTABLE TO POINT OF CLAIMING IN PAST THAT GERENDE WANTS KILL HER.

4. DEFER TO HQS AND THE HAGUE ON BEST COURSE TO FOLLOW IF GERENDE MAKES TRIP. ONE POSSIBILITY IS GIVE HIM STAICN CONTACT IN ORDER STAY ON TOP SITUATION AND AVOID UNPLEASANT SURPRISES.

5. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

: J.J. Barry:lml
: C/WH/1/FI/CI
4167/1975
: 2 October 1970

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3 OCT 70 03 15z

CITE DIRECTOR 074223

MEXICO CITY INFO THE HAGUE

RYBAT

AN | PS WH/1 | AR

REFS: A. THE HAGUE 8217 (IN 138093)

B. MEXICO CITY 3880 (IN 137738)

C. DIRECTOR 057054

D. DIRECTOR 057055

MICROFILMED
OCT 30 1970
DOC. MICRO. SER.

28

1. AT REQUEST OF HQS WOBONE REP CONTACTED IDEN D, OF REF D, AND REQUESTED HIS COOPERATION IN FORWARDING TERMINATION PAYMENT CHECKS TO LIEMPTY/19. IDEN D MOST COOPERATIVE AND ACCEPTED STERILE CHECK IN LIEMPTY/19 TRUE NAME FOR FORWARDING ON TO HER VIA INTERNATIONAL MAIL. FIRST CHECK FOR $750 FOR MONTHS JULY, AUG, SEPT PASSED AND FUTURE MONTHLY CHECKS, AT $250/MONTH, WILL BE MAILED TO IDEN D, FOR FORWARDING TO L/19.

2. HQS DOES NOT PLAN CORRESPOND DIRECTLY WITH LIEMPTY/19 ON ABOVE MATTER.

3. FYI THE HAGUE: HQS ASSUMES LIEMPTY/19 WILL NOT APPROACH LNCUFF ONCE CHECKS BEGIN ARRIVING.

Liempty-1 Gerende
201-119523

EXBXGKXXKESSAGE CONTINUED

CS COPY

B 201-241621

30 Oct. 1970

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR 674223

PAGE 2

4. FILE: 201-119523 AND 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref C advised The Hague and Mexico City that hqs attempting contact LIEMPTY/19 and pay her monthly termination bonus of $250/month for 10 months or total $2500.00. L/19 then resident in The Hague and corresponding with Hqs on matter. Ref C also noted Hqs would attempt use L/19 brother in Hqs area as cut out for funding, and Ref A &B concurred with this approach.

WH/NOC ________

WH/CONTRACTS ________

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

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2 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. John F. Lally

SUBJECT : Forwarding of Agent Service Record on LIEMPTY/1 (201-119523)

Per the telephone conversation of 2 October 1970 between Mr. Lally and Mr. Lunsford regarding LIEMPTY/1, attached herewith is a copy of HMMA-39129 and a copy of LIEMPTY/1's Service Record for retention in your records.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachments:
1 - HMMA-39129
2 - Service Record

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-119523
1 - WH/1 Chrono

WH/1/CLunsford:lml/4167:1973/3E04

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22 September 1970

Mr. Maurits Roos
4744 Kenmore Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Mr. Roos,

As you may be aware, your sister, Hestor Roos de Alvarez was associated with this Agency in Mexico City for a number of years, and due to personal problems with her husband, her services (and those of her husband) with this Agency were formally terminated on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 payable in ten monthly installments of $250 beginning 31 July 1970. Since Mrs. Roos departed Mexico City in July 1970 and came to the U.S., she could not be contacted in Mexico City to receive these payments. While in the U.S., Mrs. Roos de Alvarez contacted our Agency on 8 July 1970 and requested we pay her the funds here; and while her request was being considered she departed the U.S. for Mexico, and later went to The Hague where she is residing at Ary Schefferstratt 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written to this Agency from the Hague requesting we forward the payments to her via international mail. If you concur, this Agency would perfer to forward these payments to you directly, and request that you forward them to your sister via the international mails. The initial check for $750 covers payments for the months of July, August, and September 1970; and hereafter, we will forward to you monthly a check (from October 1970 through April 1971) in the amount of $250 in your sister's name so that you can forward them on to her every month. We appreciate your cooperation in this matter and request that these payments not be discussed with anyone except your sister, Mrs. Hestor Roos de Alvarez, since the case is considered to be a sensitive matter by the United States Government.

file GENERIC
201

SECRET

21 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/OSD

VIA : Chief, WH/Security

SUBJECT : Mr. Maurits ROOS

1. Mr. Maurits Roos is the brother of Hester Roos de Alvarez, an asset of Mexico City Station, who was terminated without predjudice on 26 June 1970. In the termination agreement, this Agency agreed to pay Mrs. Roos de Alvarez a bonus payment amounting to $2500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. Since termination, Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has departed Mexico City and is now resident at: Ary Schefferstraat 47, The Hague, Netherlands. Mrs. Roos de Alvarez has written directly to this Agency requesting that we forward the monthly payments directly to her or via her brother. For security reasons, this office has decided to obtain a cover check in the amount of $750 (USD) made out to Mrs. Hester Roos de Alvarez, to cover payments for July, August, and September (@ $250 (USD) per month); and it is requested that a representative of your office establish contact with Mr. Maurits Roos, her brother, brief him on the background of the case, and request he forward the check on to his sister in The Hague. A brief note for Mr. Roos to read is attached to this Memorandum and will explain how future monthly checks for his sister will be forwarded through him.

2. As the result of any inquiry to your office in August of 1969, the following information was developed on the Subject: Mr. Roos is presently a GS-13 research cryptographer at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia and has been employed by the U.S. Government since May 1952. Employment records further disclosed that Roos is a U.S. citizen, was born 2 January 1927 in Java and was granted a top secret clearance on 3 April 1970 by the U.S. Army. His local telephone number is 931-8132 and he resides at 4744 Kenmore Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia.

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3. On 8 July 1970 Mrs. Roos de Alvarez appeared at the main gate of Headquarters building, and subsequently was interviewed by Mr. Paul Leverone, the Security Duty Officer; and a statement was taken from her. Mrs. Roos was given an Agency Security office telephone number for future contact while in the U.S., and on 13 July 1970, her brother, Mr. Maurits Roos, called the Agency and informed us that his sister had returned to Mexico and could be reached there at a certain address, so we are certain that Mr. Roos is aware of the fact that his sister was employed at one time by this Agency in Mexico City.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Attachment:
1 - As stated para. 2

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - LIEMPTY/19
① - GERENDE, Raymond H. (P)
1 - WH/FI/NOC
1 - WH/1 Chrono

C/WH/1/FI/CI:JJBarry:lmr:4167/1973:3E04 (21 Sept. 70)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 7 August 1970 JM
TO: WH/1 J. Barry	C NO. 201-119523 C-32743
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please forward Agent Service Record on Subject.
Form #1689 "Termination of Contract Personnel" of 4 August 1970 noted.

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ACTION C/WH 8 FILE, VR C/EUR5, C/RI/SD, C/CI, C/FI2

ACTION 457

S E C R E T 071110Z AUG 70 CITE THE HAGUE 8217 (GERNAND ACTING)

Hagu

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PROPOSAL REF.

2. IF LIEMPTY/19 NOW RESIDENT THE HAGUE AND UNHAPPY WITH JKLANCE TREATMENT ASSUME THAT SOONER OR LATER SHE WILL SHOW UP ON DOORSTEP LNCUFF. PLEASE POUCH ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND, BIO AND PHOTOS, ETC. THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL SHOULD WE EVENTUALLY HAVE TO DEAL WITH HER HERE.

3. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1.

S E C R E T

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CS C...

201-119523 WH-1

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B 201-241621
LI Empty-19

~~[illegible]~~ [illegible], Ramon

LI Empty-1

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INFO: FILE, VR C/RI/SD, C/EUR5, C/CI

ACTION NO.: 407

MEXI

S E C R E T 062054Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3880

DIRECTOR INFO THE HAGUE

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 057054

1. CONCUR HQS LATTER PORPOSAL REF.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

S E C R E T

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B201-241621

201-119523

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ORIG: C.M. LOUNDS:dp
UNIT: AC/WH/1
EXT: 7375/9354
DATE: 5 AUG 1970

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CG 13 22 22 AUG 70

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

WH/1

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

057054

3P

1. THE FOLLOWING IS FWDED FOR YOUR INFO:

A. ON 26 JUNE MEXICO CITY STATION TERMINATED LIEMPTY-19, IDEN A. L-19 HAD BEEN UTILIZED INTERMITTENTLY SINCE 1958 AS A SUPPORT ASSET EMPLOYED UNDER MEMO OF ORAL COMMITMENT PRIMARILY IN SUPPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF IDEN B, HER HUSBAND. THE HUSBAND HAD BEEN A CONTRACT AGENT SINCE 1955 AND WAS ALSO TERMINATED ON 26 JUNE. L-19 WAS GIVEN A TERMINATION BONUS PAYMENT OF $2,500 PAYABLE IN TEN MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS.

B. L-19 AND HUSBAND HAVE HAD SERIOUS MARITAL PROBLEMS CULMINATING IN A SEPARATION IN NOV 69 AND DIVORCE ACTIONS WERE INITIATED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS ARE STILL IN THE COURTS AND BITTER DISPUTES HAVE RESULTED BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES CONCERNING CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, DIVISION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MONETARY SETTLEMENTS.

C. ON 3 JULY L-19 APPEARED AT THE MAIN GATE OF JKLANCE HQS. SHE WAS INTERVIEWED BY WOBONE AND MADE THREE SEPARATE REQUESTS; TO BE RELEASED FROM THE STIPULATION OF HER SECRECY

LEREADE
6 Aug 70

CONTINUED....

B 201-241621 CS COPY

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201-119523

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 057054

AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITED HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HER HUSBAND'S AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, OR IF THIS COULD NOT BE DONE, SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE, OR FINALLY IF NEITHER OF THESE COULD BE DONE, SHE BE SENT THE MONEY DUE HER TO AN ADDRESS OF HER OWN CHOOSING.

D. L-19 DEPARTED WASHINGTON WITHOUT FURTHER CONTACT WITH JKLANCE AND MEXICO CITY STATION WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT HER.

2. ON 4 AUG HQS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM L-19 ADDRESSED TO JKLANCE ATTN: DUTY OFFICER, WOBONE. THE RETURN ADDRESS WAS SHOWN AS IDEN C. IN THE LETTER SHE ASKED IF THE PAYMENTS DUE HER COULD BE SENT TO IDEN C ADDRESS. SHE MENTIONED THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS QUITE AWARE OF HER SITUATION AND WAS OFFERING EVERY ASSISTANCE. SHE REQUESTED THAT HER WHEREABOUTS BE KEPT QUITE CONFIDENTIAL, ESPECIALLY THAT HER HUSBAND NOT BE TOLD. SHE ALSO ASKED THAT WE WITHHOLD PAYING HER HUSBAND HIS TERMINATION BONUS UNTIL HE HAD SETTLED HIS DEBTS WITH HER FAMILY.

3. WITH MEXICO CITY AND THE HAGUE CONCURRENCE, HQS PLANS ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT HER LETTER, TELL HER THE ONLY CONDITION THAT

CONTINUED

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 057054

TO

CAN BE MET IS TO FORWARD HER MONEY TO IDEN C ADDRESS AND REMIND HER THAT THE STIPULATIONS IN THE PAPERS SHE SIGNED ON 26 JUNE ARE STILL IN EFFECT. ALTERNATIVELY, HQS CAN REPLY TO L-19 AND FWD HER PAYMENTS TO IDEN D WHO ALREADY HAS BEEN USED AS AN INTERMEDIARY BY L-19. HQS PREFERS LATTER.

4. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. FILE: 201-119523; 201-241621.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SECUR

C/EUR

WH/FI/NOC

William V. Broe
C/WHD

E/BNL/N. W.H. Eckstein(draft)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO THE HAGUE INFO MEXICO CITY 057055

RYBAT

REF: DIR 057054

IDEN A - HESTER ROOS, BORN 24 DEC 30, BANDUNG, INDONESIA

IDEN B - RAMON JOSEPH ALVAREZ DURANT

IDEN C - ARY SCHEFFERSTRAAT 47, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS

IDEN D - MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

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GERENDE

WH/SECUR

5-8-70

WH/PI/NOC

C/EUR

E/BNL/N W.H. Eckstein(draft)

William V. Broe
C/WHD

B201-241621

201-119523

RELEASING OFFICER

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ACTION NO. 1A2

S E C R E T 041515Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3847 IN 135863
4AUG70

DIRECTOR

REDLEG

REF: MEXICO CITY 3839 (IN 135330)

1. ACCORDING FLIGHT MANIFEST, LIEMPTY-19, ACCOMPANIED BY HER THREE CHILDREN, DEPARTED MEXICO FOR SAN ANTONIO 30 JULY VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58.

2. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

S E C R E T

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ACTION NO. 118 | - EYES ONLY -

SECRET 030001Z AUG 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3839

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

4 AUG 70 135330

M

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REF, BRUCE H. FERNALD ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY-19 BY PHONE AT NETHERLANDS EMBASSY 16 JULY. WAS TOLD SHE NO LONGER THERE AND WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHEN FERNALD ASKED IF IT POSSIBLE SEND LETTER TO HER VIA EMBASSY, WOMAN ON DUTY SAID NOT UNLESS L-19 HAD MADE PLANS FOR MAIL PICKUP, WHICH SHE NOT AWARE OF, AND THAT NO FORWARDING ADDRESS HAD BEEN LEFT.

2. ON 29 JULY, FERNALD WENT TO PREARRANGED SITE AT SPECIFIED HOUR, PREPARED TO PAY TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ADVISE L-19 REF TERMS. WAITED ONE HOUR BUT L-19 FAILED SHOW.

3. ON 31 JULY, FERNALD MET WITH GERENDE, PAID TERMINATION INSTALLMENT AND ASKED WHY L-19 HAD FAILED COME TO HER MEETING. GERENDE WAS DESPONDENT, REPLIED THAT L-19 APPARENTLY LEFT COUNTRY WITH CHILDREN AND OFFERED FOLLOWING DETAILS:

A. L-19 FAILED COME TO 1 JULY MEETING WITH GERENDE FOR BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION OF ELDEST CHILD. SINCE PLANS HAS ALSO

GERENDE

AC CWB

~~DC~~

~~CA~~ K

SECRET

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3839 SECRET

BEEN MADE FOR 4 JULY MEETING WITH CHILDREN, GERENDE ASSUMED L-19 HAD CHANGED MIND ABOUT 1 JULY BUT WOULD COME ON 4 JULY.

B. ON 4 JULY, BRITISH DIVORCEE FRIEND OF L-19 BROUGHT KEYS FOR GERENDE'S CAR TO GERENDE'S SISTER. STATED SHE FOUND KEYS AND INSTRUCTION FOR DELIVERY UNDER DOOR MAT. CLAIMED DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT APPARENTLY HAD GONE ON TRIP.

C. UPSET AT PROSPECT WIFE AND CHILDREN HAD SKIPPED, GERENDE SCOUTED NEIGHBORHOOD WHERE HE BELIEVED L-19 LIVING. QUERIED CHILDREN PLAYING IN STREETS AND LOCATED HOUSE WHICH OWNED BY BRITISH COUPLE. COUPLE ALLEGED THAT L-19 CHILDREN AND BELONGINGS GONE WHEN COUPLE RETURNED TO HOUSE 30 JUNE, DID NOT KNOW WHERE. GERENDE PAID SMALL AMOUNT BACK RENT BALANCE PLUS SMALL AMOUNT DAMAGES CLAIMED DONE BY CHILDREN.

D. GERENDE PAID CALL ON DUTCH AMBASSADOR 6 JULY AND WAS CORDIALLY RECEIVED. AMBASSADOR DID NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS L-19 BUT BELIEVED HE HAD SEEN HER 2 JULY DRIVING IN AREA SOUTH OF CITY. AMBASSADOR FEARED SHE HAD GONE TO NETHERLANDS SINCE SHE HAD REPEATEDLY ASKED WHAT HER SITUATION WOULD BE IF SHE WENT. SAID HE HAD TRIED DISSUADE HER ON GROUNDS THAT SHE WOULD BE IN UNFAVORABLE POSITION RE MEXICAN LAW.

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ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 3839 SECRET

E. FRIEND OF GERENDE EMPLOYED AT LUFTHANSA TOLD GERENDE WIFE AND CHILDREN DEPARTED FOR NEW YORK 3 JULY. (UNKNOWN IF ABOARD LUFTHANSA OR THAT FRIEND HAD SEEN HER BOARDING SOME OTHER LINE'S PLANE.) CHECK OF ALL 3 JULY OUTGOING MANIFESTS NEGATIVE STATION NOW CHECKING ALL OUTGOING MANIFESTS FROM 29 JUNE THROUGHT 4 JULY.

4. GERENDE BELIEVES WIFE GONE FOR GOOD BUT THAT SITUATION WILL BE CLEARER 5 AUGUST WHEN BOTH GERENDE AND L-19 DUE FOR COURT HEARING. WHEN GERENDE'S ATTORNEY CONTACTED L-19'S ATTORNEY, WAS INFORMED HE NO LONGER REPRESENTS L-19. GERENDE'S ATTORNEY SPECULATES IT POSSIBLE L-19 HAS ALREADY OBTAINED CROOKED OR QUICKIE DIVORCE, BUT THIS PURE SPECULATION THUS FAR. WILL ADVISE RESULTS 5 AUGUST HEARING WHEN KNOWN AND RESULTS MANIFESTS CHECK IF POSITIVE.

5. FILE 201-119523 AND 201-241621. GP-1

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17 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (P) and Wife.

1. Raymond H. GERENDE is a Mexican citizen and contract agent who has been employed by the Agency in Mexico City since 18 March 1955 under an MOC, during which time he has served this Agency well. During the past fifteen years GERENDE has been generally engaged in the area of operational support activities in Mexico City. For the past two years he served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project, LIEMPTY; was used in unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; and in special support investigations. Mrs. GERENDE, who is LIEMPTY/19, has been employed off and on since 1958 as a support asset, (transcriber/translator) under MOC, and during the past two years has worked intermittently transcribing unilateral telephone tap tapes.

2. During the past year GERENDE and his wife have had serious marital problems which culminated in a separation in November 1969, and divorce actions were initiated by both parties. The divorce proceedings are still in the courts, and bitter disputes have resulted between both parties concerning custody of the children, division of personal property, and the monetary settlements. The above problem is compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in some considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behalf of the Agency and if she exposed him, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of operations LIEMPTY, LIMESA, LIEMBRACE, and LIFEAT, as well as numerous individual Station assets such as LISTERINE, LIRAZOR/1, LIBAND/1, and David M. WILSTED (P). Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort has been made by the Station to have

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

File: GERENDE (P)

both parties settle the divorce amicably and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the projects. Because of the above family problems which threatened GERENDE's personal cover and security, he was relieved of all operational responsibilities and placed on half salary in December 1969.

3. In March of 1970, Mexico City Station decided that GERENDE's personal problems were not being resolved, and because of the continuing security threat, plans were made to terminate both GERENDE and his wife by the end of FY 1970. The LIEMPTY Project renewal, approved in May 1970, was amended to include a termination bonus for GERENDE of $10,000 for 15 years of service with the Agency, and in addition approval was received to pay Mrs. GERENDE the sum of $2,500 as a security measure designed to keep her from revealing her husband's Agency affiliation and what she knows about Agency operations in Mexico. This project approval carried the ADDP caveat that the termination bonuses to both GERENDE and his wife be paid on a monthly basis rather than in one lump sum as a security measure to assure at least an element of control over both individuals, since the continued receipt of these monthly payments depended on their loyalty to the Agency. GERENDE and his wife were terminated by Station representatives in Mexico on 26 June 1970 under standard Agency procedures, and separate Quit Claims and Secrecy Agreements were signed by both GERENDE and his wife. Neither GERENDE nor his wife had any objection to the wording of the Quit Claims or the Security agreements, and both appeared to be satisfied with the terms of the settlement, and with the fairness of the Agency's position.

4. On 8 July 1970 at 1115 hours, Mrs. GERENDE appeared at the main gate of the Headquarter's building, and requested to see an official from the Office of Security. During the subsequent interview, Mrs. GERENDE established her identity, and supplied the interviewer with details on her and her husband's past employment with the Agency in Mexico City and the fact that they had terminated said employment in late June 1970. Mrs. GERENDE made three specific requests of the Agency:

"A. That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.

"B. If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the .NCE. Agency.

"C. If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her."

In addition to the above, Mrs. GERENDE stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and that she cannot meet her Agency contact in Mexico City as specified in her termination, to receive the monthly payments from him. Mrs. GERENDE has been given the phone number of the Agency Security Duty Officer and her local phone number and address, where she is temporarily residing, was obtained. She was advised she would be contacted within the near future with an answer to her requests.

5. Upon receipt of the above information, Mexico City Station was notified by cable of the situation and their comments were requested. The Station, on 10 July, recommended that Headquarters hold Mrs. GERENDE to her secrecy agreement, not grant her any increase beyond the amount agreed upon in her termination, and proposed that she be given her termination payment in one lump sum or that checks be mailed to her monthly.

6. Headquarters, in agreement with the Station's position on the case, attempted to telephone her without success on 13 July 1970. That same afternoon at 1400 hours, Mrs. GERENDE's brother, a naturalized U.S. citizen who resides in Alexandria, Virginia, and works at Fort Belvoir, called the Office of Security, using the number supplied to Mrs. GERENDE, and informed the security official that since Mrs. GERENDE had not received any response, she expects to hear from JKLANCE by letter in care of the Netherlands Embassy, Mexico City.

7. On 14 July 1970, Headquarters cabled Mexico City Station advising them of the above development, and requested they contact Mrs. GERENDE and inform her of the following Headquarters answers to her requests (as outlined in paragraph 4 above):

A. We cannot release her from her from her security agreement.

B. We cannot consider awarding her additional financail benefits beyond the amount stated in the termination agreement, which she accepted.

C. We are willing to forward checks to her by mail, but request an address other than the Netherlands Embassy.

8. Headquarters has also requested that Mexico City Station keep Headquarters advised of developments in the case of Mrs. GERENDE.

John C. Murray
Chief, WH/1

Distribution:
Original & 1 - C/WHD
1 - 201-119523
1 - 201-241621
1 - WH/1 Chrono

WH/1/J.J.Barry:lmr/3E04/4167:1973 (17-7-70)

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET

ORIG: J. J. Barry:lmr
UNIT: C/WH/1/FI/CI
EXT: 4167/1973
DATE: 14 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 3E PER RF e ad/mc

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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CONF: C/WH 8 [illegible] D/OCC, DDP, ADDP, D/SEC, CI/CI,
- EYES ONLY -

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(date and time filed) 14 23 53 z JUL 70
(elite) (reference number)
CITE DIRECTOR ~~051096~~ 051095

55 50

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 049889

B. MEXICO CITY 3649 (IN 120669)

1. ON 13 JULY 70, HQS ATTEMPTED CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 BY TELEPHONE WITHOUT SUCCESS. AT 1400 HRS 13 JUL 70 IDENTITY TELEPHONED THE WOBONE DUTY OFFICER, USING TELEPHONE NUMBER SUPPLIED TO LIEMPTY/19, AND INFORMED US THAT LIEMPTY/19 WOULD BE EXPECTING A REPLY TO HER SPECIFIC REQUESTS (SEE PARA 2, REF A) VIA LETTER CARE OF THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, D.F.

2. REQUEST STATION CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 WITHOUT INVOLVING GERENDE AND INFORM HER HQS HAS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED HER REQUESTS OF PARA 2, REF A AND HAS FOLLOWING ANSWERS:

A. WE CANNOT RELEASE HER FROM HER SIGNED SECRECY AGREEMENT.

B. WE CANNOT CONSIDER AWARDING HER ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS BEYOND AMOUNT STATED IN TERMINATION AGREEMENT, WHICH SHE ACCEPTED.

C ______
GERENDE CONTINUED- ~~ADC~~
~~REFS~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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Barry
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIGINATING DISSEMINATION

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pic) (reference number)

SECRET PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 057095
057096

C. WE WILLING TO FORWARD CHECKS TO HER VIA MAIL, BUT REQUEST ADDRESS OTHER THAN NETHERLANDS EMBASSY.

3. REQUEST HQS BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

4. FILE: 201-119523, 201-241621

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/NOC Ralph Hatry (in draft)
CGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney
WH/SO
C/WH/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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J.J. Barry
C/WH-1 FI/CI
4167/1973
13 Jul 70

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C/WH 5 D/OGC, DDP, ADDP, D/SECUR, C/CI,

— EYES ONLY —

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 14 23 53Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051037

MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 051095

IDENTITY: MR. MAURITS ROOS, BROTHER AND NATURALIZED U.S. CITIZEN WHO EMPLOYED AT FORT BELVOIR, VA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/FI/MCC ✓

OGC /TELECON Mr. John Greaney/

WH/SO /MR. Greg Maruca/

WILLIAM V. BROZ
C/WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

INFO FILE, VR DDP ADDP C/CI OGC D/SECUR

ACTION NO. 054

- EYES ONLY -

S E C R E T 101940Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3649

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT

10 JUL 70 IN 120669

M

REF: DIRECTOR 049889

1. IN STATION OPINION CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LIEMPTY-19 FOR WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN PER PARA 3 REF IS PARTLY PARANOID AND PARTLY CONTINUATION ATTEMPTED BLACKMAIL OF JKLANCE FOR MONEY. HER POSITION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT (A) GERENDE WOULD LIKE TO KILL HER AND HAS EVEN TRIED TO DO SO, AND (B) GERENDE REFUSES PAY ANY MONEY TO SUPPORT HER AND CHILDREN. GERENDE DENIES MURDER THREATS EXCEPT AS RHETORICAL IN HEAT OF PAST ARGUMENTS PRIOR TO SPLIT, BUT ADMITS TO MINIMAL SUPPORT PAYMENTS ON GROUNDS AMOUNT OF SUPPORT MUST BE DECIDED BY COURTS. UNTIL THIS DONE HE REFUSES MAKE ANY COMMITMENT.

2. SINCE LIEMPTY-19 BLACKMAIL HAS ALREADY SUCCEEDED TO EXTENT 2,500 USD, DOUBT THAT ANYTHING BUT LARGE AND UNWARRANTED INCREASE WOULD HAVE DESIRED EFFECT. SUGGEST INSTEAD THAT EITHER SHE BE GIVEN PAYMENT IN ONE LUMP SUM OR PROCEDURE PROPOSED PARA 2 C REF BE FOLLOWED. BELIEVE SHE SHOULD BE WARNED ANY VIOLATION SECRECY AGREEMENT COULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER WOLADY VISA.

C/______

ADC______

RFTS______

______

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3649 S E C R E T

3. VICTOR BELLINI IS ALIAS USED BY BRUCE H. FERNALD, WHO HAD HANDLED GERENDE PRIOR TO SUSPENSION AND WAS INTRODUCED TO LIEMPTY-19 AT TERMINATION TO GIVE HER NON-TRUE NAME NON-LNPURE CONTACT FOR MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS. BILL MILLS IS LNPURE POLITICAL OFFICER WHO IN EARLY JUNE, WHILE HE WAS ACTING CHIEF OF POLITICAL SECTION, WAS APPROACHED BY LIEMPTY-19 WITH HER HARD LUCK ST~~RO~~ORY. (LIEMPTY-19 IS FRIEND OF MILLS' DUTCH WIFE AND WAS AT HIS HOME FOR BRIDGE.) LIEMPTY-19 APPARENTLY ASSUMED MILLS WAS JKLANCE CHIEF. MILLS (WHO CHARACTERIZED LIEMPTY-19 AS HIGHLY UNSTABLE) REPORTED APPROACH TO ACOS, WHO SAID HE HAD NEVER HEARD OF HER AND THAT HER STROY "SIMILAR TO MANY WE HEAR FROM UNSTABLE PEOPLE".

4. FILE: 201-241621; 201-119523. GP-1

S E C R E T

7

SECRET

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ORIG: J.J.BARRY:EK
UNIT: WH/1, 3E05
EXT: 3167, R1972
DATE: [illegible]

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T

CITE DIRECTOR

Return to C/WH/1/SI/CI

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 048632

B. MEXICO-3612 (IN 117477)

1. ON 3 JULY 1979 AT 1115 HRS LIEMPTY/19 APPEARED AT JKLANCE HQS REQUESTING SEE A WODONE OFFICIAL. DURING INTERVIEW BY A WODONE OFFICER SHE SUPPLIED HIM WITH DETAILS HER EMPLOYMENT WITH JKLANCE MEXICO, AND RECENT HISTORY ON TERMINATION OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE AND HERSELF INCLUDING AMOUNT TERMINATION PAYMENTS.

2. LIEMPTY/19 MADE THREE SPECIFIC REQUESTS OF JKLANCE:

A. THAT SHE BE RELEASED FROM STIPULATION IN HER TERMINATION SECRECY AGREEMENT WHICH PROHIBITS HER FROM REVEALING HER OR HUSBANDS AFFILIATION WITH JKLANCE, IN ORDER THAT SHE MAY SUBSTANTIATE HER HUSBAND'S "SALARY" IN ORDER TO BE AWARDED HIGHER SUPPORT PAYMENT IN CURRENT DIVORCE ACTION MEXICO.

B. IF ABOVE NOT POSSIBLE, "THAT SHE BE AWARDED A HIGHER AMOUNT OF SUPPORT FROM JKLANCE."

C. IF NEITHER ABOVE POSSIBLE, REQUESTED THAT JKLANCE FORWARD HER MONTHLY $250.00 CHECK TO EITHER A LOCAL ADDRESS WHERE SHE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR

TO

STAYING OR C/O EMBASSY OF NETHERLANDS, MEXICO CITY, WHERE MAIL BEING ACCEPTED FOR HER.

3. LIEMPTY/19 STATES THAT "SHE CANNOT STAY MEXICO BECAUSE OF HUSBAND'S ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST WELFARE HERSELF AND CHILDREN." BY WAY OF REFERENCE SHE MENTIONED NAMES JKLANCE PERSONNEL WHOM SHE KNOWN MEXICO: "VICTOR BELLINI," "BILL MILLS," AND TRUE NAME VINCENT P. RIZZUTO. PLEASE ADVISE TRUE IDENTITIES OF ALIAS NAMES ABOVE.

4. REQUEST STATION COMMENT ASAP ON SPECIFIC REQUESTS OUTLINED PARA 2 ABOVE, [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS WILL NOT CONTACT LIEMPTY/19 UNTIL STATION COMMENT RECEIVED. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Reference A advised Mexico that LIEMPTY/19 in Washington area requesting contact with "senior representative" JKLANCE, and requested Mexico City Station comment. Reference B from Station advised termination of LIEMPTY/19 and GERENDE had taken place 26 June 1970 and all necessary termination agreements etc. signed. Advised Hqs. not to contact LIEMPTY/19.

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(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) PAGE THREE
(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

WH/FI-DOC ______

OGC John Greaney

WH/SA ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

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CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM:

BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE 8 July 1970

TIME 1330 Hours

NAME Hester Roos de Alverez GRADE N/A OFFICE N/A
Temp. 4744 Kenmore Avenue
Add. Alexandria, Virginia

INCIDENT Request for Assistance TIME 1115 PLACE Headquarters

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT came to the Main entrance of the Headquarters building and asked the guard on duty to place her in touch with someone from the Office of Security. The undersigned responded to the Main entrance and escorted SUBJECT to the Main Reception area where she was interviewed. After displaying some reluctance to speak openly, SUBJECT related that she had been employed on a contract basis by the Agency at the Embassy in Mexico City. She gave in way of biographic data that she is the daughter of a former Dutch embassy official statione in Washington, that she was employed at the Dutch embassy in Mexico City, and it was there that she met her presently estranged husband Ramon Alverez, who at the time of their meeting was employed also on a contract basis with the Agency. She stated that both she and her husband renounced their former citizenships to become citizens of Mexico. After her marriage to Alverez she gained employ with the Agency and stated that her specific duties included but were not restricted to the monitoring and translation of tapes. SUBJECT stated that her husband was terminated from Agency employment for Security reasons within the past year, and received at the time of his termination, six months salary and the promise of $1000.00 per month for 10 months. She stated that inasmuch as she is in the process of filing for divorce from her husband, and could not substantiate her husband's salary in a court of law because of the termination agreement she has signed, the Agency has agreed to and is paying her the sum of $250.00 per month which she is using to support her four children of whom she has been awarded custody. She stated that she is presently employed as a school teacher, but feels that she cannot provide ample support to her children on her salary and the allowance furnished by the Agency.

(Continued.....)

CONFIDENTIAL

INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE

TIME

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE OFFICE

INCIDENT TIME PLACE

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: SUBJECT made three specific requests of the Agency:
A) That she be released from the stipulation in her secrecy agreement which prohibits her from revealing her or her husband's affiliation with the Agency, in order that she may substantiate her husband's salary to be awarded support payment from her husband.
B) If her first request cannot be fullfilled, that she be awarded a higher amount of support from the Agency...
C) If neither of the above two can be fullfilled, that she be sent the Agency check (in present amount) either at the address mentioned above or in care of the embassy of The Netherlands in Mexico City, which is accepting mail for her. She stated she feels she must permanently leave Mexico City because of threats made on her life by her husband, and cannot meet Victor Bellini (allegedly Agency contact) at the specified restaurant location on a monthly basis to receive her check, as is the present requirement.

SUBJECT reiterated her statement that she cannot stay in Mexico City because of her husband's activities directed against the welfare of both herself and her children. By way of reference, SUBJECT mentioned the names of Victor Bellini, Bill Mills, and Don Vogel; all of whom are allegedly Agency personnel in Mexico City.

SUBJECT was advised that the undersigned could not make a decision on any of her requests but that a report of the interview would be made and forwarded to

ACTION TAKEN:

(Continued....)

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM

INCIDENT REPORT

BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

DATE

TIME

NAME Alverez (Continued....) GRADE OFFICE

INCIDENT TIME PLACE

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: the appropriate Agency officials. SUBJECT was given the phone number of the Security Duty Office and was requested to contact the undersigned later in the day when perhaps she could be given some concrete information. SUBJECT thanked the undersigned for the interview afforded her and departed the building stating that she would contact the OSDO later in the day. Responded to SR&CD and initiated an indices search which produced records of one covert source on each Mr. and Mrs. Alverez, and one covert reference file on Mr. Alverez. The Covert source files had been retired but will be forwarded to Mr. Kenneth Carroll at his request. Contacted and briefed Ed Duffy and Jack Poirier, PSD/OS, who referred the matter to Messrs. Kenneth Carroll, OS, and Greg Maruca, WH/SO, who requested and will be furnished with a copy of this report, and will initiate further checks within WH Division.

In the opinion of the undersigned, SUBJECT was completely coherent and sincere in her conversation, and seemed completely rational in her conversation and actions.

ACTION TAKEN: As stated above.

PAUL W. LEVERONE
REPORTING OFFICER

CHARLES B. GOOD JR.
CHIEF, BUILDING SECURITY BRANCH

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201-119523

FORM 1798 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

7 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: GERENDE's Wife's Visit to Washington

1. On 6 July 1970, Mr. Walt Raymond of the CA Staff advised that GERENDE's wife was in Washington and had been in touch with him. Apparently Mr. Ramond and GERENDE's wife had been acquainted for some time in the past. Neither admits that Mr. Raymond is an Agency employee. GERENDE's wife advised that she wanted to get in touch with someone in Agency Headquarters. Mr. Raymond advised her he would contact his liaison people to see what could be done.

2. DIRECTOR 048632 was sent to the Station outlining this and requesting Station's advice as to whether a Headquarters representative should meet with GERENDE's wife. MEXICO CITY 3612 (IN 117477) outlined details of the termination of GERENDE and his wife and recommended against seeing her.

3. I discussed this matter briefly with Mr. John Green, Legal Counsel's Office, who felt even if Station should recommend seeing GERENDE and his wife, that it would be limited to WH Division representation. On 7 July I advised Mr. Raymond of the Station's answer as contained in MEXICO CITY 3612. He said he would contact GERENDE's wife approximately 8:30 of the evening of 7 July, and tell her that his liaison contact had been unable to find anyone who would see her. Mr. Raymond was uncertain as to what GERENDE's wife might do.

Charles M. Bounds

Charles M. Bounds
ADC/WH/1

secret

group 1:

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks: DIR 03225 20 MAY [illegible]

DIR 038379 GERENDE

" 048632

Office of General Counsel -
How long in Washington?
are children with you
What are your plans - temp hotel accomodations?
Travel -
DDP Dudley in room.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/BSB 1-E-20	

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 1-67 Use previous editions (40)

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family (specifically my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant), with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship (or that of my husband's) with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $2,500 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $250 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family, including that made to my husband, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970
Date

Hester Roos de Alvarez
Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ

WITNESS:

26 June, 1970
Date

Ramon Alvarez D
Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

26 June 1970
Date

Donald F. Vogel
Donald F. VOGEL

June 26, 1970
Date

V E Bellini
Victor E. BELLINI

S/C att. #2 to HMMA-39130 CS COPY 201-341621

RELEASE AND SECRECY AGREEMENT

I, Ramon ALVAREZ Durant, do hereby forever release the United States Government from any and all claims and demands of whatever nature which I or any member of my family has against the United States Government.

I agree to keep forever secret the fact of my confidential relationship, and that of other members of my family, with the United States Government. I also agree to keep forever secret my knowledge of all persons, methods, and equipment which I acquired in the course of my relationship with the United States Government.

I understand that I am to receive a bonus payment amounting to $10,000 (USD) payable in ten monthly installments of $1,000 (USD) beginning 31 July 1970. I further understand that payment of this sum is contingent upon full compliance with this secrecy agreement, and that the United States Government shall be the sole judge of such compliance. Furthermore, I specifically renounce any claim to any similar bonus or other payment made to any other member of my family.

This Release and Secrecy Agreement is effective as of the date it is signed. I acknowledge that I have read it and I fully understand its meaning.

26 June 1970
Date

Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

WITNESS:

26 June 1970
Date

Hester ROOS de ALVAREZ

26 June 1970
Date

Donald F. Vogel
Donald F. VOGEL

June 26, 1970
Date

V E Bellini
Victor E. BELLINI

CS COPY

S/C att. #2 to HMMA-39129

201-119523

S E C R E T

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

Pseudonym
1. Agent XXXXXXX: Raymond H. GERENDE

2. Project: LIEMPTY

3. Agent Recruited By: Matthew S. DINGLEY Date: 18 March 1955

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: LIEMPTY Project principal agent, formerly member of surveillance team, also LIFEAT basehouse keeper.

5. Rate of Pay: $7,000.00 (USD) per annum

6. Other Commitments: Termination payment equal to one month's salary for each full year of service after 18 March 1955.

7. Agent Dismissed By: Vincent P. RIZZUTO Date: 30 June 1970

8. Reason for Dismissal: Subject became involved in a bitter divorce action with his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The protracted legal battle forced the Station to suspend GERENDE from operational activity for six months for security reasons. When it became evident that no early solution was in sight, termination had to be effected.

9. Security Risks:

See attached sheet

10. Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, assuming that his earlier service has not been exposed, that his marital problems have been resolved, and that he has sufficient outside employment income to obviate the need for full-time employment by JKLANCE.

11. Manner of Dismissal: Amicable. GERENDE expressed thanks for the generous settlement and swore to preserve security.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: Yes.

13. Cost of Termination: $10,000.00 (USD), payable in ten monthly installments.

Station Case Officer: Vincent P. Rizzuto
Vincent P. RIZZUTO
(Signature in Pseudonym)

Acting
Chief of Station: Horace E. Prallett
Horace E. PRALLETT
(Signature in Pseudonym)

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1/w att. #1 to HMMA-39129

201-119523

SECRET

Paragraph 9 of Agent Service Record:

Security Risks: GERENDE has known a number of Station officers in true name, although with the PCS departure of RIZZUTO the last of these will have left Mexico. (GERENDE's remaining contact will be Bruce H. FERNALD, whom he knows in alias.) GERENDE knows all agents currently associated with the LIEMPTY operation, as well as LIEMPTY-10 and -11, currently working with the LIEMBRACE team. He also knows LIEMBRACE-1, -2, and -4, and is, of course, aware of the objectives and methods of the LIEMPTY and LIEMBRACE operations. He knows that the Station has access to the entire LIMESA complex, although he does not know of the LIMUST operation. GERENDE knows the true names and JKLANCE status of Oliver G. SCANTLING, David N. WILSTED, and Raymond L. BARCENAS. He knows of the LIFEAT operation through his own former activities as well as those of his mother (LIFEUD-19) and his wife (LIEMPTY-19). The husbands of his two sisters work for the Station. One is LIEMPTY-4, who was handled by GERENDE, and the other is LIBAND-1, whose activity is not supposed to be known to GERENDE. In past years GERENDE was exposed to almost all phases of Station support activity. In recent years he has been more compartmented. GERENDE received five weeks of Headquarters covert training in 1957.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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C/WH EO

BY: M AT: 0220z

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PRECEDENC

ACTION UNIT C/WH 2

INFO FILE, VR DDP, ADDP

ACTION NO. 661

"EYES ONLY"

S E C R E T 060047Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3612 (PRALLETT ACTING)

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT

REF: DIRECTOR 048632

C

ADC C WH 2

~~RPTS~~

file Gerende 201

7 JUL 70 I 17477

M

1. GERENDE AND WIFE TERMINATED IN JOINT CEREMONY 26 JUNE. TERMS OF TEMINATION PAYMENTS EXPLAINED TO EACH, AND EACH SIGNED QUIT CLAIMS (AND SIGNED THE OTHER'S AS WITNESS) WHICH SPECIFICALLY RENOUNCED ANY CLAIM TO TERMINATION PAYMENT MADE TO THE OTHER, OR TO ANY OTHER PAYMENT FROM WOLADY. EACH APPEARED SATISFIED WITH SETTLEMENT AND SIGNED WITHOUT PROTEST. DETAILS POUCHED 3 JULY IN HMMA-39129 AND 39130. GERENDE'S WIFE SAID NOTHING ABOUT TRIP TO WASHINGTON AND IN FACT THIS UNLIKELY AS SCHOOL SHE TEACHING AT STILL IN SESSION. ?

2. DIVORCE ACTION STILL BASICALLY AT IMPASSE DESCRIBED IN ATTACHMENTS TO HMMA-38700. IF GERENDE'S WIFE ACTUALLY DOES DESIRE CONTACT PER REF, IT PROBABLY TO SEEK MONEY RATHER THAN HELP OR ADVICE ON DIVORCE ACTION. VIEW ABOVE AND FACT THAT GERENDE'S WIFE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER JKLANCE CONTACT EXCEPT FOR CASE OFFICER HANDLING MONTHLY TERMINATION PAYMENTS, AND THAT SHE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY VIOLATION OF SECRECY AGREEMENT WOULD RESULT IN CANCELLATION HER TERMINATION PAYMENT, RECOMMEND

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET

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ORIG: Charles M. Bounds
UNIT: ADC/WH/1
EXT: 7376/9354
DATE: 6 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

BY DDP/21 PER SDP = 123 (EC) ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: C/WH 2 * INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP

— EYES ONLY —
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 06 20 02 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 048632

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT

1. HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY FRIEND OF GERENDE'S WIFE THAT SHE IN WASHINGTON AREA AND DESIRES CONTACT WITH "SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE" JKLANCE. ASSUME THIS IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING DIVORCE ACTION.

2. PLEASE ADVISE BY 1200 WASHINGTON TIME 7 JULY. STATUS DIVORCE ACTION BETWEEN GERENDE AND HIS WIFE. ALSO REQUEST STATION ~~ADVISE~~ Comment ADVISABILITY HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION WITH GERENDE'S WIFE AND LINE TO BE TAKEN IF STATION RECOMMENDS DISCUSSION.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

C ______
A DC Cm
RPTS ______

file

* C/S COMMENT: SUGGEST ADDITIONAL DISSEM TO D/OGC.

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

c: W.R. Hazen
t: WH/1
: 4167/1973
te: 28 May 70

INDEX CARD FORM
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ILE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ____________

NF: WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR. ... ...

(elite) (pica)
(reference number)
(classification) (date and time filed)

S E C R E T 28 23 22 MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

x DIR 032253 PROBABLY INTENDED

03337 9

LIEMPTY

REF: DIRECTOR 03225*

1. LIEMPTY AMENDMENT APPROVED TO PAY MAXIMUM $10,000 TERMINATION BONUS FOR GERENDE AND $2,500 FOR LIEMPTY/19.

2. APPROVAL CARRIED CAVEAT THAT BONUSES BE PAID ON MONTHLY BASIS RATHER THAN IN ONE LUMP SUM. THIS ARRANGEMENT SHOULD GIVE YOU SOME CONTROL OVER FUTURE ACTIONS GERENDE AND LIEMPTY/19 BECAUSE THEY WILL KNOW THAT CONTINUED RECEIPT OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS DEPENDS ON THEIR CONTINUED LOYALTY TO JKLANCE.

3. FILE: 201-119523

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Ref informed field that Hqs would advise when LIEMPTY ammendment approved to pay GERENDE and wife termination bonuses.

AN
~~AB~~
~~IN~~
~~FE~~
~~RX~~
~~DES~~ ~~NFD~~
~~FI~~
WH/1

WH/FI ________

WH/B&F THOMPSON/s/
(in draft)

WH/Contracts RENEHAN /s/
(in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

201-119523

28 May 70

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GERENDE

COPY NO.

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LIEMPTY/1

AC/WH/1/FI/SI
…O: W.R. Hazen
…IT: WH/1
…T: 4167/1973
…TE: 6 May 1970

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…NF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. P/AN LIPT/BG CCS2

(elite) (pica)

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET [illegible] MAY 70 CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

LIEMPTY

032255

REF: MEXICO CITY 3069 (IN 072365)*

1. WE CURRENTLY PROCESSING PROJECT LIEMPTY AMENDMENT TO COVER COST GERENDE TERMINATION IN FY 70. HOWEVER, UNTIL THIS AMENDMENT APPROVED, WE UNABLE AUTHORIZE TERMINATION PAYMENTS REQUESTED REF. SUGGEST YOU PLAN TERMINATION FOR 30 JUNE 1970 INSTEAD OF 31 MAY 1970. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS AMENDMENT IS APPROVED.

2. FILE: 201-11952~~6~~3.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Ref. requests concurrence termination GERENDE effective 31 May 1970 and pay $10,000 termination bonus.

AN | AB | IN | PO | BX | ~~DRS NRD~~ | ~~PI~~ | WH/1

WH/FI

WH/B&F Everett Ockert

WH/Contracts

WILLIAM V. BROE
CHIEF, WHD

Claire M. Sum…
JOHN C. MURRAY
CHIEF, WH/1

~~201-119526~~
201-119523
07 May 70

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR Bilan MPS/BG

ACTION NO. 227

S E C R E T 282205Z APR 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3069 MEXI

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY 28 Apr IN 072365

REF HMMA-38700, PARA 11

1. ~~STATION~~ WISHES GIVE GERENDE TERMINATION NOTICE BY 30 APRIL, TO PERMIT SALARY CUTOFF BY 31 MAY.

2. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE AND APPROVAL TERMINATION BONUS AS PROPOSED REF.

3. FILE: 201-119523 ~~UPQAQGOIWEV~~ 50-6-74/3. GP-1.

S E C R E T

AN	
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EMPTY 4/1
GERENDE (P)
201-119523
28 apr 70

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.
Chief, SB Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY Progress Report 1 November 1969 - 25 March 1970

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-38119, 18 November 1969 P R I O R I T Y

SUMMARY

1. The LIEMPTY Project has thus far survived the absence from duty of its principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, as well as the threat to the security of the Project represented by GERENDE's marital problems. Bruce H. FERNALD has been handling all Project personnel since early December 1969, when GERENDE was deactivated and placed on half-pay. No problems have resulted from this, other than a delay in the receipt of photos (FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY personnel as frequently as GERENDE was). The security threat will remain as long as GERENDE's estranged wife has it within her power to expose GERENDE's RVROCK connection and the type of work he was engaged in. She has continually promised not to do this, and thus far she has kept her word.

2. The LIEMPTY product continues to be a valuable one for the Station. It continues to play an important CI role (particularly for LIERGO and LIREAD) but its greatest value, as far as the Station is concerned, is in the positive field. Two recent examples underline this: The early (and thus far only) debriefing of AEMIDRIFF was accomplished almost exclusively by showing her photos of all MEHARSH Embassy personnel and getting from her a character sketch on each individual. These photos were all obtained by LILYRIC and LICALLA. Secondly, LIEMPTY observations (as opposed to

Attachment:
Reports u/s/c

1cc w/ att to SB/[illegible]

Distbituion:
2 - C/WH w/att u/s/c
1 - C/SB w/att u/s/c

3 att's

FILE. GERENDE

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-38700	25 March 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/3

photos) played an important role in our total coverage of AESEASICK during the recent operational activity undertaken against AESEASICK. In short, LIEMPTY remains a highly effective and highly useful support asset, whose product is obtained in order to be used operationally, not simply collected for the files.

GERENDE

3. The GERENDE problem is unquestionably a serious one. We are forwarding under separate cover copies of several memoranda prepared by GERENDE. One outlines the history of his marital problems, another describes the current legal situation, and a third outlines proposals for a settlement. There is no hope of reconciliation. The Station's position with GERENDE from the start has been that he must agree to an amicable settlement with his wife in order to insure that she would not feel forced to take steps which would jeopardize the security of Station operations. For this reason, the Station insisted from the beginning that any financial settlement with his wife would have to take into account the fact that he was receiving a certain salary from RVROCK, and that he could not fairly keep this salary out of the settlement on the grounds that his wife could make no legal claim to that salary. GERENDE's wife was made aware of our position on this, and she was grateful, even though she realized that this arrangement was strictly informal. The Station felt that GERENDE could not be allowed to use his RVROCK salary as a weapon in the dispute with his wife, because if he did, she could hardly be expected to refrain from exposing his connections. Indeed, events have shown that GERENDE's wife is a vindictive woman, and if it had not been clear to her that she, as well as GERENDE, would lose money if he loses his job, she might have blown the whistle long ago. GERENDE, for his part, would have preferred to keep his RVROCK salary entirely out of the picture. Eventually, however, he agreed that the Station position was fair, and he said he would conform.

4. The attached memoranda from GERENDE are, in the Station's opinion, basically fair accounts. In the beginning, the Station was inclined to give GERENDE's wife (LIEMPTY-19) the benefit of the doubt, largely because her description of GERENDE's character weaknesses came as no surprise (particularly his tendency to procrastinate, even when his marriage was at stake). Early in the conflict, LIEMPTY-19 contacted RIZZUTO and asked point blank what she could tell her lawyer about GERENDE's salary. She was told she could not mention the RVROCK portion under any circumstances, and that if she told anyone that GERENDE had any connection with LNPURE, the connection would be denied and GERENDE would be terminated. She appeared to accept this gracefully, even though it meant she would have to scale her support demands down to the level of GERENDE's overt income (GERENDE's monthly salary from RVROCK was over 7,000 pesos; he earned an additional 4 to 5,000 pesos teaching English, and he has since rented their house, for which he is receiving slightly less than 7,000 pesos monthly). Subsequently, LIEMPTY-19 was told that the Station would see to it that as long as GERENDE continued to receive an RVROCK salary, he would give her the same proportion of this salary that the courts determined should be paid from his overt income. This, of course, was strictly an informal arrangement, one which would stop the minute GERENDE stopped receiving a salary. Later, as LIEMPTY-19's position hardened and her vindictiveness began to rule her actions, LIEMPTY-19 was reminded by the Station that the longer it took for an amicable solution to be reached, the greater was the chance that GERENDE would lose his job. If she persisted in having him arrested (which she succeeded in doing twice), his job would be jeopardized. While she continued to repeat sweetly that she had no intention of causing his termination, and had never breathed a word to a soul about his RVROCK affiliation, her attitude was in fact jeopardizing his job and if he lost his job, she and the children, as well as GERENDE, would lose income. Her attitude is

doubly disappointing in view of the fact that as she became more and more unreasonable, GERENDE was moving in the other direction.

5. The outcome can still not be predicted. As can be seen from GERENDE's memos, the two sides are still far apart on a number of points, including specifically money. LIEMPTY-19 insists on 10,000 pesos per month. GERENDE is willing to pay 5,000. GERENDE is currently on half-pay, which means that his total (all source) monthly income is around 14,000 pesos. From this, he would not only have to pay the amount which is finally agreed upon, he must also continue payments of 2500 pesos per month to LIEMPTY-19's father (paying off a loan obtained to build their house). The complicating factor is the uncertainly of GERENDE's future with RVROCK. The Station has maintained for some time that it is impossible to continue to pay GERENDE his full salary solely torun the LICALLA and LILYRIC basehouses. Now that FERNALD has absorbed this duty with only small inconvenience and some loss of timeliness, it makes even less sense to put GERENDE to work only to do this. GERENDE has long been aware of the Station's thinking in this regard, and prior to the current personal crisis he had been told that he would have to work harder at a greater variety of tasks in order to retain his position. As Headquarters is aware, he had been given additional tasks, and, as reported in reference, he had begun to respond very well. There has never been any question of GERENDE's ability. As we have previously stated, he is personable, intelligent, bilingual and binational, and has had good training and experience in certain fields. On the other hand, there has long been doubt about his seriousness of purpose, his initiative, and his ambition. The "reversal of roles" which he describes in one of the attached memos, which took place when he was confined to his home as an LP keeper, did more than cause domestic problems -- it apparently deprived him of the discipline of a daily job. His well-deserved reputation for being lazy was earned years ago.

6. The question which must be answered is whether or not to terminate GERENDE. He can be useful to the Station, but the Station has learned to get along without him. What are the security hazards involved? The general range of his knowledge is described in paragraph 5 of reference. If all of this were blown, the loss to the Station, particularly in terms of support operations against the MHHARSH target, would be considerable. The Station does not believe that GERENDE would deliberately expose any of this, but it is impossible to predict what LIEMPTY-19 might do, particularly since she would feel that she had nothing to lose, having already lost a possible source of income through the termination. GERENDE's termination bonus would probably be in the neighborhood of ten thousand dollars. Presumably LIEMPTY-19 is aware of the fact that he would get such a bonus, although the Station has never discussed this with her and the possible division of such a bonus between the two of them has never been mentioned.

LICALLA

7. The LICALLA basehouse continues to function without changes, except for the fact that Bruce H. FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-9 since 9 December 1969. Brief meetings with LIEMPTY-9 are held once a week at pre-arranged times and places (well away from the MHHARSH area). Occasionally special meetings are called, by phone, by FERNALD, if special coverage is desired (as in the AESEASICK case, for example). There have been no problems, operational or personal, involving the basehouse or LIEMPTY-9 during the reporting period. LIEMPTY-9 provided 1,728 photographs during the reporting period, and in addition to his regular reporting on observed activities of MHHARSH personnel, he provided special coverage as requested. This "special coverage" consists of his observations of a selected individual -- who does he spend his time with, how is he behaving, when was he present (or absent), etc. LIEMPTY-9 spends over 40

hours a week just watching (and photographing) MHHARSH personnel, and over the years he has gotten to know them, and their habits, very well. He can spot unusual or atypical behavior, and when he is asked to put a certain individual under close scrutiny, his comments can be very useful. Newcomers, no matter what their cover, will frequently gravitate to their IS colleagues in the "safety" of the MHHARSH back yard, thereby enabling us to make tentative AEKICK or AEGRIP identifications. TDYers can often be linked up with their internal escort officers. In the case of specific targets, LICALLA special coverage can sometimes give clues to personal relationships which can be exploited. During the reporting period we had special coverage on AESEASICK (to determine any changes in pattern following the AEMIDRIFF defection and following the operation against him -- and in both cases LICALLA did report some change in pattern); 201-305870 (for much the same reason, although here the evidence was not as clear); AEPOLYP (to gather information on his patterns and his associations); AETAKEOFF (for the same reason); and 201-838166 (to find out if he did, in fact work in the "restricted area" and who his associates were, a requirement which was quickly satisfied). Also, LICALLA has been asked to report on the arrival and activities of TDYers such as the AEKICK security inspectors (he is not, of course, told that "security inspectors" are expected -- he is told of the expected arrival of visitors, and he can spot a visitor or newcomer immediately), the possible arrival of 201-314616 and, currently, to attempt to identify, at least by association, the person who went out to meet an LNREAD agent (subject of MEXICO CITY 2741, 17 March 1970). The value of LICALLA to the REDTOP program in Mexico City can scarcely be overstated.

LILYRIC

8. There have been no changes during the reporting period of the operation of the LILYRIC basehouse activity, except that Bruce H. FERNALD took over the handling of the LILYRIC personnel from GERENDE in early December. FERNALD normally meets only LIEMPTY-13, at pre-arranged sites and times (also well away from the MHHARSH area), once a week for pick-up of the films and reports. He occasionally meets LIEMPTY-14 (LIEMPTY-13's wife) when LIEMPTY-13 may be out of town. The LILYRIC coverage is a family enterprise with the work equally divided among LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27, who split up the hours of duty so that there is uninterrupted coverage Mondays through Fridays from 0800 to 1800 hours, and 0800 to 1500 hours Saturdays. (Extra-hour or week-end coverage may be requested as necessary, and the LILYRIC personnel responded to the Station request for such extra coverage during the AEMIDRIFF and AESEASICK cases.) The family has continued to provide reports during the reporting period on all activity centered on the front entrance of the MHHARSH Embassy. Such coverage included, as in the past, daily logs on the comings and goings of MHHARSH officials, up-to-date recording of MHHARSH license numbers, special activities and visitors (particularly Americans, of whom five were spotted and reported on during the reporting period), and some 3,500 photographs. As an example of the value of LILYRIC coverage, within one week of the change of license plates at the MHHARSH Embassy (a biannual change affecting all of Mexico, with new numbers bearing no relation to the old), LILYRIC had provided a complete list of the new numbers (along with the cars to which the plates are assigned). Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify AESEASICK's companions during his last few days in Mexico. Without LILYRIC, identification of the new license plates would have taken months and would have handicapped our operations. LILYRIC has also provided special coverage of the visit of a Latin American CP representative, and is currently watching for the two AEKICK security technicians, 201-314616, and the man who went to meet the LNREAD agent. Also, LILYRIC has reported on visits of Mexican students and the identity of the MHHARSH representatives who deal with them or hand out literature to them. In short, LILYRIC's services, even though the

MHHARSHers undoubtedly assume we have a LILYRIC-like facility, and act accordingly, are another vital element of the REDTOP program.

LIEMPTY-4

9. LIEMPTY-4 has continued to develop and to print all of the LICALLA and LILYRIC photographs. He has been met regularly by Bruce H. FERNALD (taking over for GERENDE) since 26 November 1969. The first few meetings at that time (late November and early December) were arranged by FERNALD by telephone to LIEMPTY-4 and primarily concerned LIEMPTY-4's reports on GERENDE's family problems and related security arrangements. Since mid-December, LIEMPTY-4 resumed a regular schedule (usually weekly) of meetings at pre-arranged sites and times. LIEMPTY-4 has been given a special extension in the Station to which he may call as "Dr. Carlos" to leave a message for "Victor" (FERNALD). FERNALD can change meeting plans by directly calling LIEMPTY-4. The only personal problem directly involving LIEMPTY-4 was surgery on his knee which required his wearing a full cast on his leg for over six weeks. During this period when LIEMPTY-4 has been unable to drive, FERNALD has been meeting LIEMPTY-4, for the exchange of LICALLA/LILYRIC films and prints, at LIEMPTY-4's office, under a suitable pretext and with appropriate security precautions. LIEMPTY-4's services are invaluable since the Station could not, on a continuing basis, process the LIEMPTY material in its own photo lab.

SECURITY

10. Other than the security problems inherent in GERENDE's personal problems, there have been no security problems during the reporting period.

FUTURE PLANS

11. As for GERENDE, the Station has reached the conclusion that he must be terminated. This is not an easy decision to make, nor will it be easy to confront GERENDE with this decision. He has, after all, devoted 15 years of his life to RVROCK. However, as noted above, in spite of his talents the Station has been able to get along without his services. Furthermore, the constant security risk posed by his wife is, frankly, an unacceptable risk. To try to molify her by promising her a portion of his salary is probably unworkable in realistic terms, particularly since her attitude has progressively hardened. The Station, therefore, intends to terminate GERENDE prior to the end of FY 1970. GERENDE's contract calls for a termination bonus of one month's salary per full year. This would come to $8,750 (USD). For various reasons, including the need to preserve the security of the operation by ensuring that the termination is amicable, it will probably be necessary, as stated in paragraph 6, to give GERENDE about $10,000 (USD). Furthermore, it will be necessary to inform LIEMPTY-19 of the termination, and, to keep her from revealing what she knows, she will undoubtedly have to be given some money herself. The Station does not believe that it would be equitable or sound from a security point of view to use the money which GERENDE himself has earned for this purpose. Therefore, while the figure will remain negotiable, the Station believes that the sum of $2,500 (USD) would be a reasonable amount. Total obligations for FY 1970 in the LIEMPTY Project are currently estimated at slightly less than $33,000 (USD). The Project has been approved in the amount of $38,970 (USD) leaving unobligated approximately $6,000 (USD). It is therefore requested that the LIEMPTY Project be amended for FY 1970 to provide an additional $8,000 (USD) to be used in the GERENDE termination. Funds will be available at the Station.

12. Regarding the project renewal for FY 1971, as far as LICALLA, LILYRIC, and LIEMPTY-4 are concerned, no changes in procedure are planned. The product is useful, it is as timely as present circumstances permit, and the personnel involved are doing their jobs well. The only change foreseen is an increase in salary for some, if not all, of these agents. The most recent salary increases took effect in May 1968. LIEMPTY-4 has not had an increase since January 1967, and LIEMPTY-13 since January 1964. Increase in cost of living alone would be sufficient justification to raise salaries, but in the case of these agents their consistently excellent work deserves to be rewarded. These salary increases will probably range between 10 and 20 percent.

13. As for other project expenses, LIEMPTY-10 and LIEMPTY-11 will no longer be funded under LIEMPTY, but have been transferred to LIEMBRACE effective 1 July 1970. Real estate expenses should remain fairly constant, with perhaps a slight allowance for inflation. The rent on GERENDE's dark room (MEXI 137) will no longer be paid with his termination. MV-2823 will be sold or otherwise disposed of and should not be included in the project for FY 1971. Equipment and operational expenses should remain constant.

Vincent P. [illegible]
for/John A. PROBERT

50-6-74/3

SECRET

15 March 1970

TO : Case Officer and Chief of Station

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Background and Status Report of Present Marital Conflict

1. While this is not intended to be a full exposition of my personal and private life over recent years, I would like to make known some of the factors that have, from my point of view, led up to the present situation.

2. I realize that the interests of the organization and the interest of the individuals who may have opportunity to come in contact with my case dictate as little personal involvement as possible in the lives of agents. Indeed, the requirements of security, compartmentation and efficiency prescribe the modus operandi and, to a great extent the modus vivendi, of agency personnel not only in the sense of earning a living but also in manner of living. Ideally, the less said about an agent's private life, the better, but, as the years go by, changes may occur which go unreported or unnoticed and which may bring about unexpected events and repercussions. When a person has been working for the Station, as I have, for fifteen years with little or no personnel handling problems, no security flaps, no obvious problems on the job, and something comes up like the abrupt separation of my wife (LIEMPTY-19) and me with the personal and potential security risks it has entailed, I feel that some explanation is necessary. Should it be in order, I would like this explanation to reach not only my present case officer and Chief of Station but also the former Chief and officers with whom I have had the privilege to work over the years.

3. I would like to give thanks, in advance, for the patience and understanding that have been shown me thus far. Whatever the final outcome, I know that people have been bending over backward to be helpful and patient in hopes of an early solution to the conflict.

4. Back in September 1959, shortly after our wedding in late 1958, my wife and baby girl, were moved, by the agency, into a

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50-6-74/3

spacious, carpeted, furnished apartment near the DIZTAG Embassy, which served intermittently as a listening post-basehouse for the agency. At the time, LIEMPTY-19 was working as the manager of the bookstore at the University of the Americas and, at the same time, studying for a B.A. in philosophy. These were happy times. We received a two-month leave, went to Europe, the Rome Olympics and visited LIEMPTY-19's family in Holland. Back in Mexico, when the base was in operation I stayed home a lot (one of the requirements), minded the dial and tape recorders and the baby -- an unfortunate reversal of marital roles. After exactly five years the basehouse was closed down and we lost rent, LIEMPTY-19's salary and my mother's salary which she had been receiving as part-time basehouse keeper. My mother and youngest sister gave considerable help in taking care of the baby while LIEMPTY-19 worked and when we went to Europe and left the baby with them. This was during the first three years at the base until we had our second child, Christopher.

5. We moved to a small apartment in Lomas and, to supplement the loss of salary and rent allowance, the Station began paying 1,000 pesos a month for the use of a dark room I had built on the roof of the building. We had our third child, Madeleine, unplanned, two months after settling in the two-bedroom apartment. The apartment need not have been so small but we had chosen it for its location and style and because it was to be a temporary stop until we could find something better. We missed going to the Olympics in Tokyo which we had planned to do (1964) and instead began negotiating to buy a home building site at Rio Escondido but when the deal fell through, we decided to go on leave to Europe again, this time with the two older children, leaving the baby with my sister. We visited with LIEMPTY-19's parents in Holland (they had moved back to Holland after having lived in Washington, D.C., since 1943) and the two children stayed with them while LIEMPTY-19 and I made side trips. Traveling is LIEMPTY-19's greatest love in life. Upon our return to Mexico (I came back two weeks earlier), LIEMPTY-19 was so depressed at leaving Europe and being back in Mexico she was emotionally and physically inaccessible for about six weeks. She had not fully adjusted to living in Mexico or to settling down and becoming a housewife. Our cramped quarters, way of living, lack of money, my job, my irregular hours and habits, my Friday night poker games, the three children, all these got her down.

6. In the fall of 1965 after our return from Europe I began teaching English to beginners in the adult education program at the American School in the evenings. This started as a two-hour a week moonlighting experiment but by early 1966, through student contacts made at the school, I had branched out to teaching at the offices of Carnation Milk Co., Singer Sewing Machine, and Richardson-Merrell Drug Co. for a total of about twenty hours per week. LIEMPTY-19, meantime, was working part-time at the Hamilton School in Lomas where the two older children were attending. The family finances improved and I was able to convince LIEMPTY-19 that

the best thing to do was to invest in land and build a house big enough for our growing family which by now had a fourth child on the way. With three friends as partners, I entered on a land-buying deal which turned out to be complicated as we bought the land in the form of company stock. The company was liquidated and the assets were distributed, as land, to the four partners. I paid for our share with the proceeds from the sale of a small lot I had been paying for since 1955. LIEMPTY-19 was at first reluctant to tie us down with a house but when we finally got the papers and land deed straightened out, she threw herself wholeheartedly into the project and the building which began in August 1967. While LIEMPTY-19 supervised the construction, I worked during September and October almost full-time for the Olympic Organizing Committee and the group from Czechoslovakia which came to train in the pre-Olympics. My father-in-law deposited money in Mexico to help us with the major part of the financing of the house. We used $286,500 pesos of his money and about $60,000 that LIEMPTY-19 and I had saved and got the house finished enough to move in in March 1968. We were very short on furniture and shortly after moving in bought three bedroom sets, an automatic washer and even a piano. Naturally, cash was scarce, dirt was plentiful. The yard was a pile of rubble, the carpentry work had just begun, there were no closets, the house was unpainted. Thereafter, we did things on the house as the money came in: continued with carpentry, finished the driveway, put in grass, built a fence and front gate.

7. Six months after moving in came time for the Olympics and I worked, unofficially this time, with the water polo team from Australia. LIEMPTY-19 worked for the month with the Dutch and Belgian radio and TV group. LIEMPTY-19 was, once again, caught up in the atmosphere of being among Europeans and doing something exciting and out of the routine of home and children. She fell in love with the Australians as well, and for several months all she could talk of was that we should move to Australia. I gave it some thought but decided that we had neither the money to invest nor the youth and technical training to make it as pioneers "down under" and, on the other hand, family, friends, a house, and job seniority here in Mexico.

8. Toward the end of 1968, LIEMPTY-19 decided it was time for me to move out of the master bedroom as she could no longer face that aspect of our married life. For several months we tried this but it did not work out for me. One night in March 1969 after we returned home from a party, she asked me to help her undress and when she, once again, refused to have anything to do with me, I got rough with her, prompting a decision on her part, which she had already been pondering, to visit her parents in Holland as soon as possible. Her father provided the plane fare and she left in April for the United States to visit her brother and sister and Holland, for what she said would be a five week trip. She stayed away ten weeks. The four children remained with me, the maid, and

my mother who came to help three days a week. Upon her return, LIEMPTY-19 bore an air of resignation rather than of enthusiasm and, again, as on her previous return from Europe, was physically down and mentally unhappy. When asked about her thoughts on Australia she said that if she had wanted to live in Australia, she should have married an Australian. The separation had not improved our intimate relationship.

9. In August I was to take five weeks' leave and go with the children to Astro-World in Houston and visit my mother's family in South Carolina. When I suggested postponing making monthly payments on her father's loan until December when the Christmas Bonus would cover the back debt, in order to make the trip, she was adamant. saying that if I did not have the cash for going, I should not take leave. I borrowed from my life insurance policy and left with the three youngest children. Adriana had a touch of hepatitis and joined us three weeks later. After spending the month in South Carolina, we returned to Mexico to find that LIEMPTY-19 had very much enjoyed her solitude. We had already talked about divorce before her trip to Holland in the spring. I had told her that I would not consider parting with the children and she said she would consider leaving them to me if I would settle the debt to her father as well as give her a substantial share of what she considered was her part of the house. The title of the house was in my name and had been since the buying of the land. LIEMPTY-19 said I could mortgage or sell the house but that the money was what she was mainly interested in. I told her that the sale of the house was not financially wise in its unfinished state and that the house and land are very likely to appreciate sharply over the next three or four years considering the housing developments going on in the area. Added to this was the sentimental attachment to the house and area. A mortgage, on the other hand, for the amount of her father's loan plus what she was asking, was something I could not afford considering the more than 12 percent cost of such a mortgage in Mexico.

10. At the same time, during September 1969, that we were going through the above-mentioned discussions, LIEMPTY-19 was taking a course at Japan Airlines to become a tour guide and group leader for trips to the Orient as early as November 1969 and, certainly, to Expo '70 in Osaka during the spring and summer of 1970. She received a diploma to that effect. I told her that if she wanted out of the marriage and wanted to be free to travel it was all right by me but that the children would stay with me and I would continue to repay her father at the agreed rate ($2500 per month and 5 percent per year). She then sought legal advice from an old friend, Dutch lawyer Guillermo Floris Margadant who, in turn, steered her to a young woman lawyer, Dra. Berta Martinez, who must have advised LIEMPTY-19 that under the local legal system the only way to try for a sizable cash settlement and considerable support was to hang on to the children because LIEMPTY-19 made a radical "about-face" in her attitude concerning them and she now said that she could not

"abandon" the children. I refused to visit her lawyer with her saying I was not interested in getting divorced, whereas she said that her mind was made up and that we would have to split up.

11. Things came to a head on the night of 12 November when I got home around 9 PM and she suggested we have a drink and talk things over. I mixed some martinis and she began laying down the terms under which she thought we should get divorced, i.e. I should move out of the house, mortgage to pay back her father's money, grant her custody of the children and support of 2,000 pesos per month per child ($8,000). I said I would not get divorced under those conditions and we discussed and argued in the kitchen for about three hours, killing a bottle of gin in the process. We went upstairs and when I tried to make up to her she tried to rouse the children, unsuccessfully, and then tried to leave the house which I would not let her do. She got hysterical, phoned a neighbor, Uta de la Hoz, then she went into the front yard and awakened the next door neighbors, Walter Hurley and his wife, and asked to go to their house. A few minutes later, Uta and her husband Guillermo came and LIEMPTY-19 went with them to their home two blocks away. About a half-hour later I walked up to Uta's to ask LIEMPTY-19 to come home but was told that she was busy phoning her lawyer and would not return.

12. The following morning I took the children to school as usual and my sister Marcia (LIEMPTY-4's wife) picked them up and took them to her house where I joined them for lunch. LIEMPTY-19 came by in the late afternoon while my sister was out, picked up the children saying she was taking them home, failed to do so, then disappeared and was not to be found.

13. It was the subsequent action taken by LIEMPTY-19 in dropping her lawyers and taking on the services of Bernabe Jurado, the most notorious penal attorney in Mexico, that led to the potential security hazards that ensued.

SECRET

9 March 1970

TO : Case Officer

FROM : GERENDE

SUBJECT: GERENDE Status Report

The present situation of the marital conflict between GERENDE and his wife (LIEMPTY-19) is as follows:

1. GERENDE is living at his mother's apartment at 99 Carlos B. Zetina Street, Apartment 9. He has rented a three-bedroom apartment at Tornel 3 corner with Pedro Antonio de los Santos where he has stored the household effects and furniture removed from his former address at Ladera 39, Lomas de Bezares.

2. The house at Ladera 39 is rented to an executive of Chrysler Corporation International, Dr. Leon MARKIEWICZ, his wife, and fifteen-year old daughter, all of Argentine nationality. The monthly rent is 6,700 pesos M/N and the contract is for two years, beginning 1 February 1970.

3. LIEMPTY-19 and the four children are apparently still living at the residence of the Netherlands' Ambassador, Baron Schelto Van Heemstra at Peña 360, Jardines del Pedregal. It seems fairly certain they are at that address from things that the two older children, Adriana and Chris, have said to GERENDE on the last two occasions he has seen them. They have been there since 5 December 1969. LIEMPTY-19 has denied that she has a fixed address and says that she is staying with "friends."

4. LIEMPTY-19 is continuing to use the services of Bernabe Juardo as her lawyer and, through him, is pressing for even more advantageous terms in the divorce than she had asked in November. Please see the attached copy and translation of the latest proposal made by Juardo on 4 March 1970.

5. The charges and accusations made by LIEMPTY-19 against GERENDE are still not completely resolved and are as follows:

a. Insults, threats and attempted homicide -- this charge rests at the 5º Juzgado Penal, 2ª Corte Penal located at

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Lecumberri. The judge is CRUZ Mellado. These charges have not been pressed since they were originally made on 13 November 1969 by LIEMPTY-19. The ruling on these charges, should the case come to trial, must be made by three judges of the 2^{a} Corte Penal composed of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Juzgados Penales. The judge of the 6° Juzgado is Lic. QUIRAZCO, an alumnus of GERENDE's lawyer, Jorge Mario MAGALLON. Together they have, on two occasions, been to speak to Judge CRUZ Mellado who agreed not to issue an arrest warrant and who has, finally, called for a hearing on 16 March (subsequently postponed) at 10:00. MAGALLON has given GERENDE assurances that the charges are likely to be dismissed.

b. Fraud -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 and her lawyer on 11 December 1969, the day after GERENDE left the Villa Obregon jail after having spent a week there for disobeying a court order. (The court order had consisted of an unfounded request to have GERENDE expelled from his house and to have LIEMPTY-19 reinstated there with her father, as the temporary custodian of the children. GERENDE refused them admission under those terms, hence disobeying the Villa Obregon judge's order, so the judge's secretary arbitrarily ordered, on the spot, a 10-day detention. Subsequently, the judge, LUCAS del ARENAL, was forced to lift the detention after seven days and dismiss himself from the case and divorce proceedings as incompetent. The judge has had to face charges of collusion from and with the lawyers of both parties, i.e. Magallon and Jurado. The charge of fraud rests at Mesa 31^{a} of the Procuraduria del Distrito Federal. The Public Ministry Agent in charge of that table is Jorge GUTIERREZ Cruz. LIEMPTY-19 claims that the money lent to her and GERENDE for building the house at Ladera #39 was actually loaned to buy the house and that GERENDE, knowing they were married under the separate property marriage clause had wrongfully placed the property in his name only, thereby committing fraud. Actually, the land was bought by GERENDE before Christmas 1965 in a complicated transaction involving three other partners: Robert Bancroft WHITEHOUSE, John (Dick) RENNA, and James Walter HURLEY, and each of the partners placed the property in their respective names with the complete knowledge of their spouses. Later the land was subdivided and after nineteen months the deeds were issued. LIEMPTY-19 supervised and prodded the notary who made the transaction and she was perfectly aware that the property was in GERENDE's name. In August 1967 when construction of the house began, LIEMPTY-19's father's money was used which he had deposited in Mexico for the purpose. Since January 1969, according to the terms of the loan agreement, GERENDE has been paying it off and has receipts from LIEMPTY-19 to show for it.

GERENDE has presented both the land deed ("escritura") pre-dating the construction of the house and the receipts showing up to date payment of the loan at the "Mesa 31ª." No further action has been taken by LIEMPTY-19 or her lawyer on this matter but the charge has not finally been settled and is still pending. The charge is, of course, unfounded and is awaiting the proper "lubrication" in order to be filed away.

c. Neglect -- this charge was made by LIEMPTY-19 in December 1969 at the 7° Juzgado Mixto de Paz claiming that GERENDE had abandoned LIEMPTY-19 and the children to their fate and that they were utterly destitute. GERENDE was not notified of this charge and on 9 February after attending a hearing at the Villa Obregon juzgado (see below), once out on the sidewalk, Judicial police agents detained GERENDE, took him to the Procuraduria and from there to Lecumberri. This process involved being finger-printed and mugged. The following day GERENDE was out on a 2,000 pesos bond and three days later, 13 February, the justice of the peace (a woman) formally set GERENDE free for lack of evidence. GERENDE and Magallon went back on 5 March to pick up the bond money and see if Jurado had appealed but he had not and, apparently, that matter is closed.

6. On 14 November 1969, one day after LIEMPTY-19 disappeared from home taking the children with her, GERENDE brought charges against her for minor lesions and showed medical proof thereof. The hearing of 9 February after which GERENDE was detained, was called by Villa Obregon judge Bonfilio SEGURA. GERENDE reiterated the charge, LIEMPTY-19 denied it, the judge ruled against her, ordered her to prison but since the injuries were minor, it does not require privation of liberty and she must only go and sign-in once a week.

7. LIEMPTY-19 is at present teaching school at the Edron Academy on Caleri Street in San Angel Inn. The two older children are going to school there. During the latter part of November, all December and half of January, the children did not attend any school. On three occasions GERENDE has been to the school at 13:30 to try to speak to LIEMPTY-19 and see the children. LIEMPTY-19 has objected to this and the meetings have been short and fruitless except for GERENDE learning that they are still staying at the Dutch Ambassador's. GERENDE's last visit there was on 3 March (Tuesday).

8. After the Villa Obregon judge dismissed himself from the divorce proceedings, according to standard procedure, the case went to Coyoacan and Xochimilco respectively where the judges, in turn, excused themselves from the case and it has finally come to reside at the 1st Juzgado Civil in the D.F. The judge is Olda CORREA (woman) and has the reputation of being tough and pretty straight. Since LIEMPTY-19 has not given an address where divorce suit papers can be served her, the suit has not yet been initiated on GERENDE's part. LIEMPTY-19, on the other hand, has not had

GERENDE served with papers though his current address is known, apparently because she is still seeking a voluntary divorce along the lines and terms which are stated in the accompanying set of proposals. GERENDE cannot begin to accept these proposals in their present form as they are patently unfair and hardly a point to beginning bargaining from.

8 March 1970

The following proposals were made to GERENDE on 4 March 1970 (Monday) by LIEMPTY-19's lawyer, Bernabe Jurado, through a mutual friend, Licenciado Carlos Heyn, to wit:

TERMS under which the problem of [LIEMPTY-19] and [Raymond H. GERENDE] could be solved.

1. The right (patria potestad) to the minors would be kept by both the mother and father.

2. The guardianship and custody of the four children is entrusted to the mother. The father may visit the children once a week between 10:00 and 19:00 hours; he may take them out once a month and will return them to the mother's address before 19:00.

3. The father is obliged to pay the mother the sum of 10,000 pesos MN, in advance, per month beginning with the month of November 1969, since which time he has not given the mother or children any money at all.

4. This agreement will be raised to the level of a formal public writ the day it is signed by both parties.

5. Both spouses agree to divorce voluntarily under the terms of this agreement.

6. Upon termination of the divorce procedure, by mutual consent, both parties will desist from the civil and penal actions that either might have initiated against the other.

7. Both spouses are obliged to attend punctually the meetings that the legal procedure establishes as well as grant the guarantees demanded by the Public Ministry and acting Judge for the approval of this agreement and granting of the divorce.

8. In order that the father may visit his children and take them out, the mother is obliged to give notice of every change of address.

9. With the exception of the one day a week that the father may visit the children and the one day a month when he may take

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them out, the father contracts the obligation of absolutely abstaining from calling on the mother's address, so that she may carry on her life freely without neglecting her children.

10. While the voluntary divorce is being processed, the mother and children will live at ______________________ and, as above stated, to satisfy their needs, the father will make the first monthly payment of $10,000.

11. Neither the father nor the mother may take the children out of Mexican territory without the authorization of the other.

12. Since GERENDE owes the parents of LIEMPTY-19 the sum of $286,500 plus agreed-on interest, minus whatever payments he has been able to make, the said GERENDE is obliged to mortgage the house at 39 Ladera, Lomas de Bezares in this city, precisely during the course of the divorce procedure by mutual consent as established in the antecedent clauses and before the divorce is granted so that LIEMPTY-19's parents are reimbursed on their loan or on the outstanding unpaid balance.

13. The expenses of making this agreement a formal writ as well as the fees of B. Juardo will be paid by GERENDE but these will be fixed in an equitable manner by Carlos Heyn to whose decision both will submit.

14. In case of failure to comply with any of the clauses of this agreement at any time or for just one time, either by GERENDE or LIEMPTY-19, both agree to expressly establish the following sanctions and terms:

15. If GERENDE is the one who violates any clause just one time, he will forfeit the house at Ladera 39 to the mother and children, LIEMPTY-19, Adriana Juliette, Christopher Ramon, Maria Madeleine, and Laurence Fernando, and said property will belong to the above mentioned persons.

16. If LIEMPTY-19 is the one who violates the terms of this agreement for just one itme, she will lose the custody of children in favor of the father or whatever person he designates for the guardianship and custody of the minors.

17. Since LIEMPTY-19 has to establish an appropriate place to live, in the company of her four children, both parties agree that the household effects will be turned over by GERENDE, to LIEMPTY-19 for that purpose, as well as the automobile she has been using throughout the marriage.

Mexico, D.F., 4 March 1970

NOTE: GERENDE's lawyer advised him not to make a counter proposal. His comments on the above terms are as follows (keyed to above):

1. OK

2. Visitation rights everyday at any time; he may take them out overnight once per week.

3. Will pay 5000 pesos per month, to begin with date of settlement (i.e. not retroactive)

4. OK

5. OK, assuming that agreement is reached on terms

6. OK

7. OK

8. OK

9. Revise to agree with GERENDE's version of paragraph 2

10. OK, except payment is to be 5000 pesos.

11. OK

12. No. GERENDE prefers to continue paying off under the terms of the loan agreement with LIEMPTY-19's father. Later, if a mortgage can be obtained at an acceptable interest, GERENDE might consider this.

13. No. GERENDE and LIEMPTY-19 will each pay their own lawyers.

14. See below

15. Not acceptable

16. Not acceptable (in context of paragraphs 14, 15, and 16)

17. She may receive household effects, but not the car.

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DIRECTOR

RYBAT LIEMPTY-1 GERENDE

C 26 Nov 69 IN 93191

DC Gw

RPTS CWS

Diary JM. 11/28/69

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 1879 (IN82190)

B. HMMA 38119

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PUT ON HALF PAY AND SUSPENDED FROM OPS DUTY FOR MONTH OF DECEMBER. PERSONAL PROBLEM MENTIONED REF A AND SPELLED OUT IN GREATER DETAIL REF B IS DIVORCE ACTION INSTITUTED BY WIFE, WHO CLAIMING MENTAL CRUELTY AND PHYSICAL ABUSE. GERENDE WARNED BY STATION HE OBLIGATED TO HANDLE SITUATION IN MANNER BEST CALCULATED AVOID EXPOSURE HIS RVROCK CONNECTIONS. WIFE PROMISED STATION HER COOPERATION THIS RESPECT AS HAS GERENDE, BUT SITUATION WORSENING DAILY, MAINLY DUE BATTLE OVER EVENTUAL CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

2. AS GERENDE COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED BY THIS PROBLEM, TO DETRIMENT HIS OPS ACTIVITIES AND WITHOUT REGARD FOR POSSIBLE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, STATION DECIDED ON SUSPENSION AND 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD IN WHICH HE TO PULL SELF TOGETHER AND SETTLE PROBLEM IN WAY WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE SECURITY OF OPS.

3. STATION NOT SANGUINE GERENDE CAN CHANGE ATTITUDE SUFFICIENTLY TO SALVAGE SITUATION. BELIEVE TERMINATION PRIOR TO END FY 70 DISTINCT

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, OP 2

ACTION NO. 712

SECRET 071828Z NOV 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1879 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR

7 Nov 69 IN 82190

LIEMPTY-1

REF DIRECTOR 51804

1. AS DISCUSSED WITH RAULERSON, GERENDE CURRENTLY "ON TRIAL" TO DETERMINE IF HE ABLE AND WILLING ASSUME ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND EARN RETIREMENT BENEFITS WHICH STATION WILL RECOMMEND IF HIS PERFORMANCE WARRANTS. GERENDE RESPONDING WELL TO CHALLENGE BUT HE NOW INVOLVED IN PERSONAL PROBLEMS WHICH MAY AFFECT HIS FUTURE WITH RVROCK. WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS STATUS RESOLVED.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

SECRET

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201-119523

07Nov69

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ORIG: Jack Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6754
DATE: 4 November 69

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CONF: WH-8 | INFO | FILE, VR. RI/AN, OP-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

S-E-C-R-E-T 04 23 22z Nov 69 CITE DIRECTOR 51804

TO MEXICO CITY

REF: DIRECTOR-33808

1. PRIOR TO FURTHER HQS ACTION PER PARA 2, REF, REQUEST STATION ADVISE AS TO FUTURE PLANS UTILIZATION RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Reference advised Hqs reviewing feasibility of self participating commercial annuity in lieu termination/resignation provision for GERENDE.

AB

C/WH/CONTRACTS William Renehan (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

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JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

201-119523
04 Nov 69

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIRAZOR/Progress Report for the Period 1 August-30 September 1969

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : HMMA-37623, 4 August 1969 (Last Progress Report)

1. Although this report might normally be submitted one month from now, the use of Oliver G. SCANTLING has shifted sufficiently to warrant a special report at this time. Our next progress report will be submitted for the period 1 October through 31 December unless exceptional circumstances justify another change.

2. The fundamental change in the use of SCANTLING (who has suffered the past six weeks from paratyphoid) is that he has been divorced from routine cut-out operations and will henceforth be used for priority tasks and targets which will better utilize his proven talents. First, in late September ZARBOCK took over LICASA-1 for direct handling. The LICASA operation offered no particular challenge to SCANTLING and it is doubtful that his intermediary role offered any particular additional security in this case. In fact, if a flap should ever develop in this case SCANTLING would just add one more local who would have to be extricated from the tongs of the GOM. Second, it has been decided that SCANTLING will very soon turn LIANVIL-1 over to Raymond GERENDE. The details are presently being worked out.

3. PLANS: In line with our decision to use SCANTLING for recruitment efforts principally (and less so for routine agent handling) he is presently preparing for a recruitment attempt against Subject of * MEXICO CITY-1502. When that operation is completed he will be targeted against the MHHARSH target both through a commercial outlet of the Bloc and through various clubs and sports centers where he may have access to MHHARSH types. Aside from these responsibilities, he will be used as needed in other recruitment situations especially in support of a new surveillance team.

for/John A. PROBERT

* Luis Castillo [illegible]
(201-822575) [illegible]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37913

DATE
7 October 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
GERENDE 201
~~50-6-130/3~~

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Ray. H. Gerende	9/1/69	
2	(1) WH/Contracts Renahan has		
3	action draft proposal re Annuity		
4	System.		
5	(2) Held for review with Wilsted		
6	re relationships.	9/10/69.	

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

* Note: Gerende's wife works for Wilsted as LIEMPTY-19.

Cable drafted to send 11/4/69.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions GPO : 1968 O - 297-542 (40)

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1969, said contract is extended for a period of one year and is amended by increasing your basic rate of compensation to $7,000 per annum.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

Contracting Officer

SECRET

[illegible]

ORIG: WSReneban
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 28 August 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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BY ______ PER ______ # ______

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CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR. OP2

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 28 22 46z AUG 69
(elite) (reference number) (pica) CITE DIRECTOR 33808

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS LIEMPTY

REF: MEXICO CITY 1263 (IN 30562)

1. GERENDE CONTRACT AMENDED 1 OCTOBER RAISING COMPENSATION TO $7,000. PER ANNUM.

2. REVIEWING FEASIBILITY OF SELF-PARTICIPATING COMMERCIAL ANNUITY IN LIEU TERMINATION/RESIGNATION PROVISION. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref attached.

COORD: Barry Jr.
AC/WH/1

AC Ext
ADC Cmt
Barry

John R. Horton
AC/WHD

William S. Reneban
C/WH/Contracts

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ACTION UNIT WH-8

INFO FILE, VR OP-2, RI/AN

ACTION NO. 295

S E C R E T 252345Z AUG 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1263 MEXI (PRALLETTI ACTING)

DIRECTOR

LIEMPTY/1

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21679

B. MEXICO CITY 0967 (IN 05042)

25 AUG 69 IN 30562

1. PLS ADVISE STATUS REF AMENDMENTS TO RAYMOND H. GERENDE CONTRACT. GERENDE RETURNING FROM ANNUAL LEAVE 8 SEPTEMBER AND STATION WISHES USE INCREASED BENEFITS INVOLVED AS PEG TO DISCUSS AND MOTIVATE FUTURE PERFORMANCE.

2. FILE 201-119523.

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AC/WH-1 says
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SECRET

201-119523
25 AUG 69

SECRET

22 JUL 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, Independent Contractor be amended effective 1 October 1969 to extend the term for an additional year and to increase compensation from $6,500. to $7,000. per annum.

2. The Mexico Station recommendation, concurred with by WHD, was based on GERENDE's initiative overall performance, and demonstrated capability to perform assigned duties.

Carroll L. [illegible]

John R. Horton
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSBenehan:atl (18 July 1969)
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#402

S E C R E T 180035Z JUL 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0967

05042

18 JUL 69 IN 05042

M

DIRECTOR

ADMIN

REF: DIRECTOR 21679

1. CONCUR SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE BUT WOULD PREFER IT BE MADE EFFECTIVE ON CONTRACT ANNIVERSARY DATE, 1 OCTOBER 69.

2. FILE: 201-119523.

S E C R E T

Jack: O.K. by me.

AC

ADC

Barry

SECRET

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ORIG: J.J. Barry
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 16 July 1969

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pick)

SECRET 17 19 50z JUL 69 CITE DIRECTOR 21679

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN

REF: HMMA 36312

1. HQS REQUESTING AMENDMENT RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S CONTRACT AS PROPOSED BY STATION PARA 4 REF.

2. IN PARA 2 REF STATION NOTED "MORE THAN SATISFIED WITH GERENDE'S PERFORMANCE AND ANXIOUS TAKE ADVANTAGE FULL POTENTIAL." IN LIGHT ABOVE, AND SINCE GERENDE'S LAST SALARY INCREASE WAS GRANTED JULY 1965, HQS SUGGESTS A SALARY INCREASE FOR GERENDE FROM $6,500 TO $7,000 PER ANNUM EFFECTIVE 1 AUG 69, SUBJECT TO STATION'S CONCURRENCE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-119523.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CONTRACTS
WH/FI Roylin Shatery

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
ERNEST J. TSIKERDANOS
AC/WH/1

Barry

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/J. J. Barry

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 14 July 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. AC/WH/1		14/7	
2.			
3. WH/Contracts	14 JUL 1969	Jul 14	
4.			
5. WH/FI	14 JUL 1969		
6.			
7. WH/EXO	15 JUL 1969		
8.			
9. C/WH/1			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

My comments re the retirement/resignation are contained in my memo of March 25. Contract also provides for Christmas bonus of one month's salary. Also receives $960. per year for use of one of his residence for darkroom and related electricity and water in processing LIEMPTY take.

5 to 7:

Thoroughly reviewed the file, talked to WH/1, believe the proposed contract amendments are proper (and perhaps overdue). RECOMMEND APPROVAL.

(Once this is done, I have suggested that the Branch should go out to the field and discuss salary adjustment as well as appropriateness of an annuity arrangement--as well as closer operational supervision and additional tasking).

15 July 1969

This seems reasonable and proper.

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Western Hemisphere Division

VIA : WH/FI
WH/CONTRACTS

SUBJECT : Recommendation to Amend the Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (Contract Agent) to Include Improved Termination Benefits and a Salary Increase

1. During the past year Mexico City Station has submitted several dispatches recommending that paragraph 11 of Subject's contract be amended to include new benefits in the event of Subject's termination and/or resignation from Agency service. These Station recommendations have been carefully reviewed by C/WH/Contracts and a Memorandum was forwarded to C/WH/1 containing guidance on the suggested contract amendment.

2. The above information has been reviewed again by AC/WH/1, and we are requesting approval for the following amendments to paragraph 11 of Subject's contract:

A) In the event of GERENDE's termination by the Agency he will receive three month's pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

B) In the event of resignation and/or voluntary retirement upon 60 days notice the following schedule would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a terminal payment as follows:

(1) Less than 15 years service (prior to March 1970) 20 days pay for each full year of service.

(2) Over 15 years service, but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975) three months salary plus 20 days pay for each full year of service.

SECRET

(3) Over 20 years service, three months salary plus one month's pay for each full year of service.

(4) All payments above are to be calculated at the rate of pay applicable at the time of retirement and/or resignation.

3. As to the points raised by WH/Contracts in their Memorandum concerning this amendment we would like to note the following:

A) GERENDE is a Mexican citizen, working for the Agency since 18 March 1955 under an MOC, who considers himself to be a "career" employee of the Agency, and whose initial local employment for cover purposes was largely notional under a system of "ghost payrolling". GERENDE received no income or benefits from this "cover" position which terminated due to the demise of the company on 31 December 1967. GERENDE's other "cover" is self generated in that he gives English lessons in his spare time to middle management Mexican nationals employed by American owned companies in Mexico City. His income benefits from this "cover" are minimal, but suffice for satisfying acquaintances as to the source of his income. In conclusion, GERENDE is considered by the Station to be a full time contract agent, on call at all times for operational activity. Any other local benefits which may accrue to him by the virtue of his being a Mexican citizen should not, we feel, be a concern of this Agency given the above circumstances of his employment with us.

4. This Branch is of the belief that the resignation and/or retirement schedule outlined in paragraph 2, B above provides career benefits for GERENDE in the event that he must resign and/or retire in the event of unforseen personal circumstances. It additionally rewards him for his loyalty of service, and at the same time provides him with incentive to remain in Agency service for the additional financial benefits that will accrue to him providing both future security and incentive.

5. During the past two years GERENDE has served as a principal agent handler for a sensitive fixed surveillance project; has carried out unilateral recruitment approaches against the Cuban target; has been used in special support investigations; and is presently being considered for use in special operations of a sensitive nature. A review of the progress reports in GERENDE's operations discloses that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. GERENDE's last salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum was granted in July 1965, and there have been no increases since. Since the Field Station/Headquarters negotiation over amendment of paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract has been in progress for over one year and a half, we are of the belief that the Station wished to finalize this amendment prior to requesting a salary increase for the agent. It is therefore requested, considering the above, that approval be given for a salary increase from $6,500 to $7,000 effective 1 August 1969, and that his contract be so amended. The Field Station will be queried for their approval via cable prior to implementation of the contract amendment.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C/WH/1 DATE: 7 March 1969

FROM : C/CS/Contracts

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE - Severance/Retirement/Resignation Pay

REF : HMMA-36512

1. Reference asks that GERENDE's contract be amended to provide the following:

a. Three months pay for purposes of a termination payment.

b. The following schedule in the event of resignation upon 60 days notice which would be acceptable to the Agency as being in its best interests and a payment considered as a termination or terminal payment as follows:

Less than 15 years service (prior 18 March 1970)--20 days for each full year.

Over 15 years but less than 20 years service (prior 18 March 1975)--three months plus 20 days for each full year.

Over 20 years--three months plus 1 month for each full year.

2. The Station has pointed out that Mexican law requires an employer (presuming that we are being considered as an employer in the sense of Mexican law) to grant an employee who is terminated three months pay plus an additional 20 days pay for each full year of service. In the event of resignation, Mexican law does not make any requirement for payment by the employer to the individual.

3. GERENDE's basic contract was effective 1 October 1955. An amendment, effective 1 July 1959, provides for a terminal payment of one months salary for each year of service since 18 March 1955, and thus bears out the Station's use of the date 18 March 1955 for service computation.

SECRET

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

4. It is to be noted that [illegible], who was born December 7, 1932, will have 20 years service in March 1975, and in December 1975 he will be 43 years of age.

5. The Station did not indicate whether or not [illegible]'s overt employment provides him any termination pay or pension benefits. Mexican law does provide that an individual covered under their "Social Security benefit" program is eligible for annuity at age 65. Should he retire between the ages of 60 to 64, he would receive a reduced annuity.

6. I believe the Station's proposal is quite practical except it does, of course, give the individual an option of resigning at any time and thus being eligible to receive a "resignation payment" rather than what should, I believe, be considered as a retirement payment or program. I, therefore, suggest the following:

a. That prior to effecting a contract amendment providing for a resignation payment for acceptable reasons, information be obtained as to whether [illegible] would actually be entitled to receive from his overt employer additional payment(s) for termination and/or retirement. This then could be used as a basic figure on which to build in terms of termination and/or retirement.

b. The proposed schedule certainly appears adequate. As there is no limit on the accumulation, the individual might well reach a point of "temptation" to resign. I believe there should be a maximum limit on accumulation - why encourage the individual to resign?

c. As both the Station and [illegible] want some program for purposes of security and incentive, I believe more emphasis should be given to such a retirement program rather than on "resignation". Similarly, retirement would not be thought of at age 43.

A retirement program could provide for participation by the individual and also take into consideration what the individual would receive from his country's Social Security program. This type of plan would give the individual a vested interest as well as a feeling of security in terms of the future.

7. It is recommended that your dispatch in answer to Reference be coordinated with the appropriate WH Staff and WH/[illegible].

William S. Renchen
C/WH/Contracts

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
C Raymond H. GERENDE's Cover Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. In preparing a recent request for an amendment to Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, it occurred to us that it would probably be useful to bring Headquarters up-to-date on GERENDE's cover status. As a full-time contract agent, GERENDE is on call at all times for operational activity. His cover activity not only provides him with the necessary flexibility, it is also solid enough to provide him with a plausible explanation of his existence and his income.

2. GERENDE has two major cover activities. One is the teaching of English, mainly to middle-management personnel of American-owned firms in Mexico City. This is done on a regular basis for a few hours each day and earns GERENDE an income of about 5000 pesos per month. His second cover activity, and one which is largely a cover and not really activity, is working as a salesman for IDEN A. GERENDE actually earns only about 500 pesos per month from this, but this fact is a closely guarded secret. GERENDE's acquaintances assume that a good part of his income comes from this cover. Previously, GERENDE had been able to "prove" a total income of about 8000 pesos per month, ostensibly from IDEN B. IDEN B was owned by LISTERINE, and for years he had carried GERENDE on his payroll as an independent salesman on commission. He would ostensibly pay GERENDE a certain amount of money, and IDEN B's accountant would duly file income tax returns and social security based on this alleged payment. IDEN B would also pay whatever taxes were called for by the statements filed. This

OSRAM

CENSA

Attachment:
IDENs u/s/c

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S/c att:1

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-36320	28 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓ 201-119523 [redacted]

system of "ghost payrolling" is quite common in Mexico, as everybody gains: the company because its declared profit is lower than it really is and, therefore, subject to less tax, and the individual because he is ordinarily given a kickback for allowing his name to be used (or in GERENDE's case, because it provided cover).

3. All this ended on 31 December 1967, when LISTERINE sold IDEN B to IDEN A. For a while thereafter, GERENDE paid taxes only on the money he actually earned with IDEN A, which was, as stated, about 500 pesos per month. As of 1 July 1968, however, LISTERINE arranged, at GERENDE's request, to have his accountant (who continued to handle GERENDE's taxes as a favor to LISTERINE) to lump together all of GERENDE's earnings (from teaching as well as IDEN A) as "professional earnings" and to file returns for GERENDE which included the total amount. This is not quite as satisfactory as the old arrangement (among other things GERENDE must now pay his own taxes) but for cover purposes it is entirely adequate. Other than LISTERINE and the accountant, no one knows that GERENDE's ostensible earnings have dropped, and, as far as we know, LISTERINE is the only person who is aware of GERENDE's tie with WOFIRM.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References:
A. HMMT-8751, 20 February 1968
B. HMMS-5971, 17 June 1968
C. HMMS-6090, 15 August 1968
D. HMMT-9286, 5 September 1968

1. The Station has finally compiled the information necessary to answer the questions raised in Ref B and, in doing so, wishes to repeat the request originally made in Ref A to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a certain amount of job security.

2. First, Ref B raised the point that there had been no efficiency reports written on GERENDE or "evidence of outstanding performance." GERENDE's performance has been evaluated regularly within the context of the regular LIEMPTY Project progress reports, and a review of the past several reports will demonstrate that the Station has been more than satisfied with GERENDE's performance and is anxious to take advantage of his full potential. The Station does not believe, however, that "evidence of outstanding performance" should be a prerequisite for the type of contract amendment being requested. It is perfectly true, as pointed out in Ref B, that the Station had gone on record in 1959 that GERENDE should not be paid a termination bonus if he should resign simply to get the extra money or to pursue another career. By now, however, GERENDE has cast his lot with WOFIRM. He really has no other career, and to try to start one at this point would be extremely difficult. On the other hand, if he should decide to try his hand at something else, the Station would

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	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓201-119523

undoubtedly wish to reward his long years of loyal service with a generous termination payment. He has earned it, and only termination for cause per paragraph 10 (b) of his contract would prevent him from receiving it.

3. Mexican law (it is the law, not custom) says that an employee who is fired must be paid three months' salary plus twenty days' salary for each full year employed by the company at the pay rate existing at the time of separation. GERENDE's current cover company adheres to this formula. Since GERENDE's termination clause has always read that he would be paid a full month's salary for every year of service (in the event of his termination by WOFIRM), we would not want to change that, and in fact we wish to add to it the three months' pay guaranteed by Mexican law. At the same time, we do see some virtue in the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Ref B that full retirement benefits (in the event of GERENDE's resignation) would apply only after 20 years' service, with lesser benefits until then. Our suggestion would be that in the event of his resignation prior to 15 full years of service (i.e. prior to 18 March 1970) he be paid twenty days' salary for each full year, that after 15 years but prior to 20 he be paid this amount plus three full months' salary, and that after 20 years he be paid three months' salary plus one months' salary for every full year. It is true, of course, that Mexican law does not make any provision for payment of a termination bonus to an employee who resigns, but most enlightened companies have some sort of retirement program, and, as Ref B correctly points out, "working for WOFIRM is a very special case and deserves exceptional financial consideration." In the case of GERENDE, we are not attempting to establish any pattern. This is a special case (as are most) and the Station merely wishes to insure that GERENDE, who has made WOFIRM a career without receiving any career benefits in return, is rewarded for his loyalty and is given some incentive for the future. GERENDE is not without his faults, and he is being adequately compensated for the work he performs, but we cannot expect to get more out of him without showing him greater respect.

4. The Station requests, therefore, that the following amendment be made in paragraph 11 of GERENDE's contract:

a. In the event of GERENDE's termination by WOFIRM, he will receive three months' pay plus one month's pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955, calculated at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by WOFIRM as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for terminal payment according to the following formula: Prior to 18 March 1970, GERENDE will receive 20 days' pay for every full year of service since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1970 but prior to 18 March 1975, GERENDE will receive three months' pay plus 20 days for every full year since 18 March 1955; after 18 March 1975 GERENDE will receive three months pay plus one month for every full year of service since 18 March 1955. All payments are to be calculated at the rate applicable at the time of resignation.

5. Paragraph 10 (b) will, of course, remain in force.

6. Ref D asked that GERENDE's contract be extended for another year without change. We assume that this has been done, although we have not been notified.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

SECRET

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO HMMA-36320, 28 JANUARY 1969

IDENTITIES

IDEN A - OSRAM

IDEN B - Cia. Electrica Mexicana S.A. (CEMSA); light bulb manufacturer

CS COPY

S/c att 1
HMMA-36320

201-119523

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

TO Chief, WH Division	XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, SB Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
6 LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 July through 31 December 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMA-35030, 22 July 1968

SUMMARY

1. There have been no basic changes in the operation of the project during the reporting period. Raymond H. GERENDE continues as principal agent, handling the personnel of the two base houses, LILYRIC and LICALLA, and performing other additional tasks. On 27 December 1968, consistent with our effort to get as much of the support activity as possible handled by outside officers, direct agent-handling responsibility for GERENDE and the LIEMPTY project was turned over to Bruce H. FERNALD. Vincent P. RIZZUTO remains as alternate and as FERNALD's inside contact.

GERENDE

2. Until the introduction of FERNALD, there was no change in the meeting arrangements with GERENDE. Meetings were held on an average of three times per week until October, when LIEMPTY-19 (GERENDE's wife) was relieved of the responsibility of transcribing the Spanish-language portions of LIENVOY coverage of the BEDOX installation. Thereafter meetings averaged twice per week, the main business being the transfer of LIEMPTY base house material and discussion of base house business.

Distribution:
(2) - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2cc - SB/X/WH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-36272	DATE 22 January 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER ✓50-6-74/3

3. GERENDE's agent handling responsibilities within the LIEMPTY project remain as previously reported. He had also handled [illegible]-3 until the latter's termination in August 1968. He developed a good relationship with [illegible]-3, and he showed that he is quite capable, with proper case officer guidance, of providing useful service to the Station in the handling of agents beyond the support type to which he had been limited in the past. The Station intends to try to expand this role, with due regard for security and for GERENDE's limited experience. Furthermore, the Station still has every intention of using GERENDE selectively in cultivation and development of operational leads, as outlined in reference. No such leads were found for GERENDE during the reporting period (among other reasons, we have no intention of giving GERENDE a lead simply for the sake of giving him something to do), but as soon as a suitable lead is uncovered, it will be passed to GERENDE.

4. GERENDE was particularly useful during the Olympic period. While he did not get a job with the Olympic Committee as he had hoped, his wife was employed as a translator by the European television networks who had come to cover the games. This, plus other personal contacts, gave GERENDE a certain amount of access to Olympic facilities. Both GERENDE and his wife helped considerably in the distribution of AEEGGHEAD material, and GERENDE performed a number of miscellaneous tasks assisting the Station in various Olympic responsibilities.

5. GERENDE has also been used in support of JMROD operations, such as making mail pick-ups and delivering material and making phone calls to AMBASSOON. Following the Warsaw Pact Powers' invasion of Czechoslovakia, GERENDE was asked to cover a demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy, and he wrote a good report which was used in Embassy briefings. Recently, GERENDE has enrolled at the University of the Americas to work for an M.A. in contemporary Mexican history. The Station will explore the possibility of his getting access to persons or information of interest on the University campus.

LICALLA

6. LIEMPTY-9's work (in the LICALLA base house) was inhibited in July due to the construction of a maid's room near his working quarters. During the reporting period, however, he took a total of 2,217 operational photos. His regular reporting and commentary continued as in the past. LIEMPTY-9 is a steady and dependable performer, and his unique vantage point remains the source of the most interesting and revealing photos as well as often very informative reporting.

LILYRIC

7. LIEMPTY-13, -14, -26, and -27 have been able to keep the LILYRIC base house manned on a regular basis from 0800 to 1800 hours weekdays and 0800 to 1500 hours on Saturdays, with other hours coverable upon request. This has proven to be a far better arrangement than depending on LIMITED for some of this coverage. In addition to the 6,763 operational photos taken during the reporting period and the daily fixed surveillance reports, LILYRIC reporting is of considerable help in compiling current vehicle and license plates lists, PCS arrivals and departures, unusual activities such as demonstrations or protests, unusual or lengthy absences of personnel, etc., all of which have obvious CI importance. It was LILYRIC photos which made it possible for LNERGO to identify the Subject of 201-841520, who had been in clandestine contact with AEGRIP officers. LILYRIC also reported on a half dozen other American (or American appearing) visitors, some of whom it was possible to identify through tracing license plates.

Charlie - who was this?

LIMITED

8. As reported in Ref, LIEMPTY-6 has been terminated and the LIMITED base house closed. All equipment has been turned in, and it can truthfully be said that due to the continuing quality performance of LICALLA and LILYRIC, LIMITED has not been missed at all.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4 continues to process all photos made by the base houses. In addition, 101 enlargements were made during the reporting period, and 210 prints for LIMTRAP. The quality of LIEMPTY-4's work is good, and he rarely misses his routine deadlines.

Vincent P. Rizzuto
for/Willard C. CURTIS

9/27/68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR : Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1968, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY
Contracting Officer

Notified
TM-274636
30 Sept 68.

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DISPATCH

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
JMROD/Jorge Francisco TIMOSSI Corbani

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

LIENVOY of 24 October 1968 reported that Subject was contacted by Felix LUNA Maderos, First Secretary and suspect replacement for Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez, who is believed to be the equivalent of the Cuban COS. TIMOSSI and LUNA agreed to meet that afternoon at the Embassy to take care of the matter which was pending between them. It is not known if this might possibly concern the material passed to TIMOSSI by GERENDE.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD

GERENDE 201-

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 35706

DATE
28 October 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

File Gerende 201

SECRET

S/C Attachment #7 to HMMT-9317
dated 23 September 1968

Jorge MARTINEZ Durán:

Department of Defense Advisory Council
Army Liaison Staff

Alias Document available to GERENDE.

SECRET

SECRET

201 file

16 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Contracts

SUBJECT : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE (P)

Will you please arrange to have the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE extended for one year on the present basis but with one amendment, namely, provision of a termination or resignation bonus of 3 months' salary plus one-month's-salary-for-each-year-worked. His present contract expires on 30 September 1968. He has worked faithfully for the station since 1955 and definitely intends to make a career of his association with the Mexican station.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
AC/WH/1

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

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MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-6090, 19 August 1968

Please extend GERENDE's contract, without amendments, for one year. We had hoped to have answers to HMMS-5971 prepared in time to have amendments included in the annual extension, but GERENDE's "cover company" has recently undergone a change of management, and we have been waiting for GERENDE to provide us with a written statement of his current cover status, as well as a statement of the retirement rights and benefits provided legitimate employees of the cover company. Our intention is to have GERENDE's contract provide, in so far as possible, termination benefits equivalent to those granted by his cover company to a normal employee. As soon as this information is available, a comprehensive reply to HMMS-5971 will be pouched.

for/Bernard A. EGGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-9286	9 September 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-119523

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 16457 of 12 June 1968

GERENDE's contract expires on 30 September 1968, so we would appreciate receiving a reply to reference well before that time.

Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-6090	15 August 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-119823

[illegible]

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.: Chief, SB

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY Progress Report, 1 November 1967 through 30 June 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : HMMA-33459, 8 November 1967

Summary

1. During the reporting period, the project's principal agent, Raymond H. GERENDE, was assigned additional tasks, aimed at broadening his usefulness to the Station. These tasks included spotting and assessment as well as the handling of a recruited agent, ERFAIN-3.* GERENDE did well, and it is believed that a new dimension has been opened for him, and by the same token, the Station has, in effect, gained a new asset. The LIEMPTY base houses continued to produce at their usual rate and with their usual effective support to Station REDTOP operations. The LIMITED Base House and its operator, LIEMPTY-6, were terminated on 31 May 1968. Termination was decided upon partly to save money and partly because advancing age had measurably decreased the reliability and effectiveness of LIEMPTY-6's work. LIEMPTY-26 was rehired, which permitted the LILYRIC Base House to give us the same total hours of coverage as LILYRIC and LIMITED had together in the past.

.........continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ 1 - C/WH
2 - C/SB 2 cc-SB/0/WH

Alvarez/ Durant
Ramon Joseph

CS COPY

GROUP 1
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declassification

50-6-74 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-35080

DATE
22 July 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

This sounds great except that ERFAIN/3 is being terminated, acc. to Marvin Francis!

GERENDE

2. During the reporting period, the case officer has been meeting GERENDE an average of three times per week. Meetings are usually pre-arranged, at various sites and times. Meetings average 20 to 30 minutes. GERENDE turns over to the case officer negatives, prints, logs, and other reports which he has picked up from the base houses since the previous meeting, along with brief contact reports on his meetings with base house representatives. Reports on other operational activities are also turned in and discussed, and GERENDE is given instructions, notes for the base houses, and negatives for any enlargements which may be desired by the Station. Also, LIENVOY tapes and transcripts are exchanged at each meeting. (The departure of LIACUTE-1 at the end of April 1968 left the Station without a BEDOX transcriber. As a temporary solution, pending the return of LIACUTE-1 or the recruitment of another BEDOX transcriber, GERENDE's wife, LIEMPTY-19, has been hired at the rate of 31.50 pesos per hour to transcribe the Spanish language portions of the tapes. She does the work in her home, and GERENDE transports the tapes.)

3. GERENDE has the direct agent-handling responsibility for the following LIEMPTY agents: LIEMPTY-4 (photo-processor; met twice per week); LIEMPTY-6 (LIMITED; met once per week until termination); LIEMPTYs 13, 14, 26, and 27 (LILYRIC; LIEMPTY-13 normally met twice per week -- in his absence LIEMPTY-27 makes meetings); and LIEMPTY-9 (LICALLA; met twice per week). He is responsible for directing their work, paying them, and handling all of the administrative problems which may develop. To judge from the results, GERENDE has excellent rapport with these agents and is able to get a consistently high performance rate from them — particularly LICALLA and LILYRIC personnel.

4. As noted in reference, GERENDE was employed by the Mexican MHRAVEL committee, which we found a useful side benefit. His MHRAVEL activity during the reporting period has been minimal, but we expect it to start picking up again. GERENDE has conducted a few discreet inquiries and investigations for us within the MHRAVEL complex, and we have instructed him to try to get an assignment which will keep him as close to the FJSTEAL delegation as possible.

5. Reference also pointed out that GERENDE had performed nicely in the cultivation and development of an operational lead, and that the Station planned to give GERENDE more of the same. Furthermore, GERENDE's standing assignments (LIEMPTY base houses, MHRAVEL activity, and occasional support of JMROD requirements) were not challenging enough or occupying enough of GERENDE's time. GERENDE is rather firmly committed to WOFIRM by virtue of the fact that he has worked for WOFIRM for over 13 years and has no other outside employment of any consequence. By the same token, he was, through no fault of his own, doing less work for WOFIRM than at any time in his career. GERENDE's operational exposure through the years dictated more and more restrictions on his activity, for sound security reasons. The solution to GERENDE's problem (lack of a promising future) and the Station's (not getting its money's worth) seemed to be to give GERENDE additional tasks which he could handle under suitable cover and with due regard to security precautions. Since most of GERENDE's support activities had been against the FJSTEAL target, particular care would have to be taken in committing him further in this direction. It was decided, therefore, that his principal retooling would be in a non-FJSTEAL field.

CS COPY

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-35080

6. In line with the above reasoning, GERENDE was introduced to Andrew R. DOSCHER on 17 February 1968. The idea was that GERENDE would be trained to assist DOSCHER in some of his operations against Central American targets. GERENDE's principal duty thus far has been to take over the handling of ERPAIN-3, under DOSCHER's close supervision and guidance. GERENDE has performed quite creditably in this task. He seems interested in the work and has learned quickly. On the other hand, an apparently ingrained habit of procrastination has resulted in dilatory reporting. If GERENDE can overcome this (and both case officers are working hard to teach GERENDE the importance of prompt and complete reporting) there seems to be every reason to believe GERENDE will develop into a competent agent handler.

7. GERENDE was also given the task of locating and developing (in alias) a girl who, per LIENVOY, was being cultivated by AERODENT. Although GERENDE had to be continually reminded of the assignment, he did an excellent job of meeting the girl and gaining her confidence. It is quite likely that he could have recruited the girl as an access agent against AERODENT, but as this point was reached another operation against AERODENT was launched and it was not felt that attempting to recruit the girl would serve any useful purpose, for the time being at least (among other things, there was no indication that she had had any contact with AERODENT for some months). The only flaw in GERENDE's performance was the time it took him to get around to doing the job. It should be mentioned, however, that at the same time GERENDE had a number of pressing personal matters to attend to, including overseeing the completion of his new house, which he finally moved into on 10 March 1968, even though construction is still not entirely completed.

8. Among other assignments completed by GERENDE in the reporting period were the renting of an apartment for use as a listening post; and initiating a relationship with a Russian translator working for the MERAVEL committee.

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED.

INFO.

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMT 8751

1. Before amending GERENDE's contract in accordance with reference, we would like to clarify a few points about GERENDE and about terminations and resignations in general.

2. We assume from the files that GERENDE's performance has been entirely satisfactory but since there are no efficiency reports or actual evidence of outstanding performance, we would like to have a statement from the station which would justify the requested amendment. Nine years ago the station said, in HMMA 13571 that "station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career." That was a long time ago, however, and thirteen years of loyal collaboration may very well have changed your mind on this point.

3. Reference says that GERENDE has no intention of resigning, and we hope this is true if you feel that he is still as valuable as he ever was. Assuming, however, for a moment that he might have in the back of his mind the idea of leaving in a few months to take a more secure and productive job while the taking is good - do you feel that if he quits at his own convenience he is entitled to the same benefits that would normally accrue to him if he had worked longer and was released at our convenience? Assuming that he were to quit next week, would you still want to pay him the proposed termination bonus? Or would you want to include in the

...continued

17 June 68

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMS-5971	12 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	rc	6954

RI
CHRONO

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/Contracts		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	12 June 68	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66
(40)

DISPATCH

contract the proviso that full retirement benefits (three months salary plus one month's salary for each year worked) should apply after, say, twenty year's service, with lesser benefits to apply between now and then?

4. Could you recapitulate for us the prevailing Mexican law or custom (which is it?) on termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer? A number of months ago you told us that it was three months pay plus 20-days-per-year-worked, but the LIFIRE/4 and 5 MOC's said that "following local custom of termination subject only has to be paid one month's salary for each year of employment". Your proposed GERENDE terminal payment formula, (which may be a special case rather than a pattern and which, as we understand it, makes no distinction between voluntary resignation and termination-at-the-convenience-of-the-employer) is one month's pay for each full year of employment, plus three months pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination. Does this imply that the one month's pay for each year worked is computed at the rate of pay prevailing during each respective year worked? Does Mexican law or custom dictate the payment of terminal bonus to employees who resign voluntarily? (Working for WOFIRM is a very special case, obviously, and deserves exceptional financial consideration, but we do want to understand the background as it applies to commercial work so that we may have a frame of reference or point of departure).

5. We apologize for the long delay in sending this dispatch. It was originally written in March, and mislaid in transit, but we thought it had been pouched.

6. Apart from the foregoing, do you recommend any changes in GERENDE's contract which will be due for renewal on 1 October 1968?

Theresa H. BACHARDY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

Amendment of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. It is requested that the following amendments be made to Paragraph 11 "Terminal Payment" of Raymond H. GERENDE's contract (see reference):

a. The amount of terminal payment, in addition to one month's compensation for each full year of employment since 18 March 1955, should also include three months' pay at the rate applicable at the time of termination.

b. GERENDE's resignation upon 60 days' notice will be accepted by the government as being in its best interest, and GERENDE will be eligible for full terminal payment.

2. The revision requested in paragraph 1 a above is for the purpose of having the contract conform to Mexican law, which calls for three months' salary plus one month for each year of service. The second revision is designed to give GERENDE the option of resigning without jeopardizing his terminal payment. He has no intention of resigning, but he feels that the contract, as it stands, leaves him with no security. The terminal payment is his only retirement program, but as written it does not give him the option of retiring. The Station advised GERENDE that any request of his to retire would undoubtedly be accepted as long as there were no adverse security or operational factors, but agrees that in fairness to GERENDE, who has, in effect, chosen a career with WOFIRM, the clause should be rewritten to guarantee him a termination payment. GERENDE understands that paragraph 10 (b) of the contract will remain in force, and if invoked will deprive him of any terminal payment.

for/Bernard A. EDGEBROOK

Distribution:
3 - C/WH

GROUP 1
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
50-6-74/2	HMMT-8751	20 February 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

GERENDE - 201

9. "As reported in reference, (HMMA 32721, 7 Aug 67) GERENDE had been developing a possible access agent to LIRING. This eventually culminated in an attempted recruitment of the prospect by GERENDE. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, GERENDE exhibited considerable resourcefulness and operational skill in developing the target to a point where the recruitment attempt was possible. We plan to use GERENDE in similar roles in the future as opportunities arise, and for this reason we plan to document him with a set of false Mexican documentation. GERENDE is collecting exemplars and getting the background information needed and once the necessary data are assembled, headquarters (WOACRE) support will be requested."

HMMA 33459, 8 Nov 67
LIEMPTY progress rpt,
1 Aug thru 31 Oct 67

file GERENDE 201

201-119523

Initial approach IDEN (who previously selected by station for this job) by Raymond H. GERENDE under cover local detective Bureau operator took place 1 July. Will pouch details after G's second meeting wit IDEN. Would appreciate traces IDEN. Local traces Negative.

MEXICO CITY 2219,
21 July 67

6 B. At station directive Raymond GERENDE made contact on 18 July with a young Mexican woman* spotted by this Station as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend. The girl was found to be ideal for our purposes; she is attractive and has a good head on her shoulders. She was, however, unconvinced by GERENDE's story. Further meetings are planned.

HMMA 32957,Activities
Against Cuban targets,Jul067
31 August 67

The girl* with whom Raymond GERENDE had been in contact as a possible candidate to act as LIRING/9's girlfriend finally decided that she was not interested in working for the intelligence organization he claimed to represent (with the support of false documentation).

HMMA 33425, 3 Nov 67
Ops against Cuba
1 Aug-30 Sept 67

*Silvia TREVIÑO Caspani. 201-821734

F 27

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG1, CCS3, C/CPS, C/CA, FI, C/CI2

SECRET 071810Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2711

DIRECTOR

7 [illegible] 47466

PBRUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

B MEXICO CITY 2643 (IN 42349)

C. DIRECTOR 33547

1. IT OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE SGSWIRL SUBJECT REFS A AND B WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING HEG COOPERATION. AS PREVIOUSLY POINTED OUT OFFICIAL LOOKING DOCUMENTATION IS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE THIS. AS ALSO MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY, FEEL WE CAN NOT WAIT ANY LONGER (REF A SENT ON 18 AUG) IF WE ARE TO HAVE A CHANCE TO RECRUIT WHAT APPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE FOR OUR PURPOSES.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE, STATION ISSUING FALSE U.S.Govt LNHARP INTEL CREDENTIALS TO GERENDE TO ENABLE HIM PURSUE INITIAL CONTACTS WITH SUBJECT REFS A AND B AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

SECRET

BT

WH/1

201-821734

14-00000

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 6 September 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 44/53 PER ______ # ______
CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

SEP 6 23 03Z CITE DIRECTOR 33547

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 2643 (IN 42349)

B. MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

1. SUBJECT'S POA WAS REQUESTED. ~~ON ROUTINE BASIS SINCE STATION'S REQUEST NOT MADE ON PRIORITY BASIS AND HQS UNAWARE TIME ELEMENT MENTIONED REF A.~~ WILL CABLE PROMPTLY UPON RECEIPT. MEANWHILE CAN CONTINUE ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT.

2. WE RELUCTANT @ AUTHORIZE REQUESTED DOCUMENTATION IN CASE THIS NATURE AT OUTSET. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER SGSWIRL, ASSUMING POA BY TIME OF ARRIVAL NEXT OPERATORS LATE SEPTEMBER. IF SGSWIRL SATISFACTORY AND FURTHER BONA FIDES STILL NEEDED, DOCUMENTATION COULD THEN BE INTRODUCED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: * Mexico City wishes to actively pursue development to point of recruitment of Sylvia TREVINO Caspari, whom Station wishes to put in orbit of LIRING-9 to elicit info on Cubans and place financial strain on him.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

WH/COG/CICS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 22 PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 26 COPIES

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

NOTIFICATION TO ☐

ADV COPY

☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED BY: AT:

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

INFO:
FILE. VR, WH/C/CA 8, TSD 6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

SECRET 310015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2643

31 [illegible] 42349

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF MEXICO CITY 2514 (IN 34914)

WOULD LIKE ACTIVELY PURSUE DEVLOPMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF TO POINT OF RECRUITMENT. THE LONGER WE WAIT TO PUSH AHEAD THE LESS CHANCES WE WILL HAVE TO RECRUIT THE GIRL. REQUEST HDQS APPROVE ISSUE OF FALSE DOCUMENTATION CITED PARA TWO REF TO GERENDE AND THAT, PENDING RECEIPT OF POA, GERENDE BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED PER REF.

SECRET

3T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICG, CI/OA

S E C R E T 190110Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2514 19 Aug 67 IN 34914

DIRECTOR

BPRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2219 (IN 16109)

B. MEXICO CITY 2220 (IN 16099)

1. IN LINE WITH STATIONS PLANS TO ATTACK LIRING-9 AS LONG RANGE TARGET (SEE PARA FIVE REF A AND ANALYSIS BEING POUCHED) ACCESS AGENTS ARE BEING SOUGHT. CONSENSUS IS THAT A FEMALE IS PROBABLY BEST AVENUE DESPITE REPORT MEXICO CITY 2490 THAT HE PLANNING MARRIAGE. (LIRING-9 REGULARLY GOES OUT WITH YOUNG MEXICAN BUT HAS HAD TROUBLE WITH HER FAMILY AND IS LOOKING FOR A NEW GIRLFRIEND.)

2. SUBJ REF B APPEARS BE EXCELLENT CANDIDATE. IN TWO EXPLORATORY MEETINGS AND NUMBER FOLLOWUP TELECONS WITH GERENDE, LATTER BROACHED POSSIBILITY OF HER WORKING FOR HIM PART TIME IN NEW INVESTIGATING FIRM. SUBJ REF A REFUSED COMMIT HERSELF OVER PROPOSAL UNTIL GERENDE COULD PROVE BONAFIDES AND UNLESS HE COULD SATISFY HER THAT THE WORK WAS "SERIOUS", IMPLYING SOMETHING "OFFICIAL" (SHE MENTIONED SHE DIS APPOINTED GERENDE NOT LNERGO MEMBER). GERENDE ASSESSMENT IS SHE MIGHT BE WILLING COOPERATE IF HE CAN REVEAL LNHARP BANKING. IF APPROVAL GIVEN BY HDQS OWN ISSUE GERENDE FALSE "DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, ARMY LIAISON STAFF" CREDENTIALS FOR BONA FIDES.

TREVINO

14-00000

JOAN P/L GERENDE 201

SECRET

Attachment D to HMMA-33166 3 Oct 67

AUTHENTICATION

A "Defense Department Advisory Council Card" was issued to Raymond W. GERENDE in the name of Jorge MARTINEZ DURAN. This card was issued for one operation and is to be returned after it has served its purpose.

TSD/Doc says this is U.S. Defense Dept not a translation of an ostensible Mexican card inscription

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIEMPTY/Progress Report for the Period 1 May through 31 July 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference : HMMA-32068, 23 May 1967 (Previous Progress Report)

1. From 1 May through 31 July 1967, 26 operational meetings were held with Raymond H. GERENDE, Principal Agent for the LIEMPTY Project. With the exception of one unscheduled meeting, meetings during this period were prearranged and meeting times and sites were varied. The unscheduled meeting was arranged via telephone using a prearranged open code. During the absence of GERENDE, two operational meetings were held with Oliver G. SCANTLING, alternate Principal Agent for LIEMPTY, and four with LIEMPTY-4, photo lab operator. All of these meetings were prearranged.

2. GERENDE met with LIEMPTY-4, -9, -10 and -13 on a twice a week basis and with LIEMPTY-6 on a once a week basis during this period. GERENDE's meetings with these assets were all prearranged. SCANTLING met with LIEMPTY-9 and -13 on two occasions and with LIEMPTY-6 once during the absence of GERENDE.

continued...

Distribution:

③ - Chief/WHD

201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 32721

DATE
7 August 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-74/3

3. All assets involved in the LIEMPTY Project performed in a satisfactory manner during this period. Effective 1 July 1967 LIEMPTY-4 and LIEMPTY-11 were given slight salary increases, because of their increased activity.

4. There were no known security incidents affecting the LIEMPTY Project or the assets involved during the three months under review.

LICALLA

5. This basehouse, the operator of which is LIEMPTY-9, provided 1277 frames of operational photographs covering the patio and garden area of PJSTEAL. LIEMPTY-9 also prepared fixed-surveillance reports, sighting reports and special notes and comments.

LILYRIC

6. The LILYRIC basehouse, which is staffed by LIEMPTY-13, -14 and -27, produced 2854 frames of operational photograph during the period. The LILYRIC basehouse operators continued to prepare fixed-surveillance reports on each member of PJSTEAL and turned these in on a weekly basis. LIEMPTY-27 resumed his duties on 1 July as scheduled and this basehouse has now reverted to its normal hours of coverage. (See reference relative to the absence of LIEMPTY-27.)

LIMITED

7. The LIMITED Basehouse, operated by LIEMPTY-6, produced 279 frames of operational photographs plus weekly fixed surveillance reports on each of the members of PJSTEAL. The LIMITED basehouse was closed from 17 through 22 July because of the illness of LIEMPTY-6. During this period LIEMPTY-6 did very little radio-alerting for the LIEMBRACE surveillance team because of the variation of the surveillance team's activities.

LIEMTRAP

8. The LIEMTRAP mobile photo vehicle had a decrease in activity during this period because of the dismantling of the old LIEMTRAP vehicle and the modification and installation of equipment in the new vehicle. The old LIEMTRAP vehicle was used to cover photographically all of the residences of opposition elements in Mexico City. As in the past LIEMTRAP provided photographic coverage of addresses of the local Communist parties, residences of members of other Hemisphere parties and several PBRUMEN targets. A total of 332 frames of operational photographs were provided by LIEMTRAP.

PHOTO LAB

9. LIEMPTY-4, the operator of the LIEMPTY photo lab, processed all of the operational photographs mentioned above as well as providing from 2 to 6 enlargements of 299 frames of photographs of special interest taken by the basehouses. LIEMPTY-4 does the photo processing on Tuesday and Thursday nights.

10. Raymond H. GERENDE started the development of a possible access agent to LIRING and also continued to provide support for the JMROD operation. These task being aside from his regular LIEMPTY duties. GERENDE was on vacation from 25 May through 4 June 1967.

11. There will be one administrative change during the coming period when Vincent P. RIZZUTO will assume the Case Officer responsibilities for GERENDE/LIEMPTY. No problems are envisioned in this change over. No other significant changes are planned.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City | X | NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO.: | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division | MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Renewal of Raymond H. GERENDE's Contract

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: HMMA - 32229

Effective 1 October 1967, GERENDE's contract will be renewed with no changes for a period of one year.

T.H.B.
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CS COPY

17 JUL 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15590	DATE 11 July 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	RECEIVED	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	7/13	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Raymond H. Gerende

1. Effective 1 October 1967, the contract, as amended, for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED	XX
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief/WHD

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: As indicated

Reference : HMMW-15530, 2 June 1967

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE be renewed for the coming period without change.

For/Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
③- Chief/WHD

201-119523

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-32229	13 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-119523

14-00000

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM

SUBJECT
0 Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Subject's contract expires 30 September 1967. Shall we renew it on the present basis or do you wish to suggest any amendments?

Theresa H. Bachardy
Theresa H. BACHARDY

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

201- 119523
LIEMPTY-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-15530	DATE JUN 1967 2 June 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET downgrading and declassification	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	N. Perkins	sas N Perkins	6954

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/5	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-66

DISPA

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2,

27 SEP 66 IN 04583

SECRET 271910Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8647

DIRECTOR

REF DIRECTOR 38346*

HMMW-14620 ANSWERED BY HMMT-7164, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1966.

SECRET *REQUEST REPLY ON GERENDE'S CONTACT

BT

SECRET

HMMT-7164 requests attention without change — memo sent forward by Rashan's office. [illegible]

Gerende 201

18

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

ORIG: C. BUSTOS/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 26 SEP 66

☐ FILE
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-119523

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, CCS 3 CS/CS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 27 1133Z CITE DIRECTOR 38346

TO MEXICO CITY

REQUEST CABLE REPLY HMMW-14620 ON GERENDE'S CONTRACT.

END OF MESSAGE

*HMMW-14620 notified the Station that Gerende's contract expires on 30 Sept 1966 and requests Hqs be notified whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended.

Gerende 201

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Jane-file

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Acting
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - Contract for Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMW-14977, dated 12 September 1966

Please extend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract for one year.

ROBERT L. EASBY

Distribution:
(3 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-7164	DATE 22 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER Pers

14-00000

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GEREHDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-14620

Please reply immediately to Reference concerning GEREHDE's contract since it expires on 30 September 1966.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
  2 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14877		DATE 12 September 1966
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T		HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

ABSTRACT X
WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1.	Charlotte Bustos	mr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	SEP 13 8 AS WH 66	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	9/12	W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City | XX | MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM: Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMS-4239

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1966. Please notify Headquarters whether any changes are desired and whether it should be extended for another year.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
 2 - COS, Mexico City

6 June 1966

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14620	DATE 9 JUN 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

GS COPY

RI
Chrono
WH/Pers/Renehan

AN 2107	FI	
~~PS~~	~~DESK~~	
ABSTRACT ✗	~~INDEX~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	Charlotte Bustos Dick	nr	3654

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	6/7	J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, WH Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE
Emergency Contact System

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-15981, dated 23 November 1960 201-119523

1. In compliance with KUBARK regulation, CSI-F 230-60, the following revised and up-dated Emergency Contact System, applicable to Raymond H. GERENDE, is forwarded for Headquarters' records.

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a) Present Residence: IDENTITY A
b) Present Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY B

If Subject cannot be located at either of the above addresses, he possibly could be located through LIEMBRACE-3.

3. The following oral recognition dialogue, using the English language, is to be employed as indicated:

CONTACT: "Mr. (GERENDE, true name) Your Aunt and Uncle in the 'States' asked me to look you up."

GERENDE: "Then you are referring to the IDENTITY C"

CONTACT: "No, I meant your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY D"

GERENDE: "Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding herewith the right-hand portion of a one peso note bearing the serial number V997634.

continued...

Attachments:
As stated herewith
Identities u.s.c.

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division

14#

CS Copy

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO 50-6-74/3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28333	DATE 21 February 1966
GERENDE Pers	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-74/1

GERENDE has been given the left-hand portion bearing the same serial number and has received a briefing on its use and purpose. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition dialogue has been accurately completed and his new contact has requested to see his bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the other portion of the one peso note. (NOTE: These arrangements supersede those contained in reference). After visual identification of his new contact's bona fides, GERENDE will accept the new contact as his Case Officer.

for/ Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333

TO: Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SECRET


Y997634
SERIE
LD

UNDER SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-28333, dated 13 February 1966

IDENTITIES.

A. Sierra Amatepec 336 - Apt. 3
Lomas/Barrilaco
Mexico, D. F., Mexico
Telephone - 20-31-61

B. Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S. A.
Corner of Victoria and Escape
Fraccion Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Estado de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

C. "The Pates"
Mr. and Mrs. A.M. PATE
501 Capitol Place
Columbia, S. C.

D. "The Kolbs"
Mr. and Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S. C.

SEP ATT 1 TO HMMA-28333

CS COPY

201-119523

Date:

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Effective 1 Oct 55 all contracts written or oral entered into between you and the United States are hereby terminated and in lieu thereof the following contract is substituted:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for the purchase of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $3600 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized operational travel. All expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations.

4. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

7. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or Government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the representative of the Government executing this agreement.

stitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

8. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

9. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 October 1955, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be renewed for successive periods of one year each upon notice from the Government accepted by you. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Caresds

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF
THE REVOLUTION

P2

FILD INDEX ONLY

HMMA 656

73.25

Manuel [illegible] Llosas

DOB: 13 November 1923 in [illegible], Oriente Cuba

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

OCCUPATION: Owner and Manager [illegible], S.L. [illegible]

To be used to report on activities of Cuban revolutionaries [illegible], [illegible] as a political action asset. Friendship with Castro and members of the Cuban government.

POA granted 8 Jan 60

OA granted 6 June 60 C [illegible]

[illegible]

MACHADO, Manuel (Llosas)

[illegible]

HMMA-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

OSS-[illegible] 17 Dec 58 [illegible]
Subj. [illegible]

[illegible]

HMMT 6551 13 Oct 59
Station [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Fidel [illegible] Fidel. [illegible] U.S. Intimate friend Fidel and [illegible]...

HMMW 6579 8 Dec 59
Source of info.

G-MACHADO

RI Trace,

OL 697272, 7 Dec. 59. Info in file, 27 Dec 59.

POA/OA req'd 7 Dec 59. Acknowledged by CI/OA, 14 Dec 59.

POA granted 8 January 1960. Field informed [illegible], 21 January 1960.

OA granted 6 June 1960. Field informed [illegible], 7 June 1960.

Manuel MACHADO Llosas

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
Memo Draft	13 Sept (72?)				

DOC. SUBJECT
Results of Our Survey of Cuban Assets

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM

DATE OF INFO.

TEXT C

1. COS Lima did well to raise the question as to what will happen, vis a vis our operational security, when the Cubans achieve diplomatic recognition in the various Latin American countries where this is gradually occuring. The responses from the Branches indicate that we do have a considerable amount of operational activity and equity that revolve around our Cuban assets and that we would do well to begin a gradual cut-back in our use of Cubans, given the targetting that we presume will be made on them as the Cuban CI effort begins in the various countries.

2. However, the solution to our problem should be a gradual one and keyed initially to where the official Cuban presence is, and then to those countries where it is coming. Therefore we start with Peru.

b. GICITRON-4, who has been Treasurer of the 26th July movement in the period 1957-58 provides the cover for LITHGOE.

X

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
GICITRON-4

201-

FORM 867 8-68 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

S E C R E T

15 August 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/FI

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4

a. GICITRON-4

b. Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover, status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. LITHGOE, also a Cuban, who is nominally Subject's partner in the business [illegible] enterprise.

c. Cuban

d. Legitimate businessman who was formerly in Mexico and now manages a Mexican business firm in Bogota.

e. Resident alien of Colombia.

f. Subject has received no training in clandestine operations, though he was involved in several clandestine Cuban activities while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

g. Since Subject provides cover for LITHGOE, he is not required to utilize any tradecraft. Having his own company provides for adequate cover.

h. Due to his position, Subject is probably well-known in the Cuban community, but he performs no operational tasks.

S E C R E T

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11-1

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG: DON MCCABE:SV
UNIT: WH/3/CO
EXT: 5269/1034
DATE: 7 AUGUST 1972

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ✓ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE. VR. LF/AN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET

7 AUG 72 21 17z

CITE DIRECTOR

TO BOGOTA

298135

1. HQS ATTEMPTING ASSESS THREAT GROWING PBRUMEN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN HEMISPHERE CREATES FOR GKTRUST EMPLOYED PBRUMEN ASSETS.

2. HQS RECORDS SHOW ERROL A. LYTHGOE, REGINALD M. DACIEK, GICITRON-4 AND GICITRON-5 IN BOGOTA. PLS INDICATE IF STATION HAS ADDITIONAL PBRUMEN ASSETS WE UNAWARE OF, OR OTHERS WHOSE FILES SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

3. DOES GICITRON-5 CONTINUE WORK FOR LYTHGOE ANY CAPACITY?

4. FILE 17-120-21. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM.

END OF MESSAGE

HQS COMMENT: BASED ON MEMORANDUM, "SURVEY OF CUBAN EXILE ASSETS," DATED 25 JULY 1972, C/WH/FI.

C/WH/FI ✓

S.V.

Mon-agn

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CLASSIFIED BY GRH
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
APPROVAL OF DIRECTOR
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

GARDNER R. HATHAWAY
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ief of Station, Bogota	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT GICITRON-4 (201-267298)	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HLBA-12320, 10 November 1970

Operational Approval was granted on 8 February 1971 for the use of GICITRON-4 as requested in Reference.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBW-6561	DATE 17 FEB 1971 typed 11 February 1971
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RID
1 - WH/3/C (Chrono)

WH/3/C

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb. (11 FEB 71)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C		Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	12 Feb 71	Alfonso Spera

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11 69 (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

No. 201-267298

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/C - P. Kaylor

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of GICITRON/4 ______________________, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: .

As outlined in Section VI (4) of Part II (undated).

Field Notified
11 Feb 71

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ John E. Howard

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 8 February 1971 lc

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

2 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

REFERENCE : Form 889, dated 19 January 1971

The information on GICITRON-4 contained in DBF-9745, 16 September 1958, was located and reviewed. The information is considered non-derogatory by this Desk. It duplicated information already in Subject's 201.

Pattie S. Kaylor
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201 File
1 - 1.1 Chrono

PSKaylor:WH/3/C:blb (2 February 1971)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 1 February 1971 lc
TO: C/WH/3/C - P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267288
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John B. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND XX THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Answered on 1 Feb 71.

FORM 65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 19 January 1971 lc
TO: C/WH/3/Col. P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

		☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	XX	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)
☐	GREEN LIST		

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☒ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

Not considered de-rog.

DBF 9745, 16 Sept 58, 100-2-18.

Located in Llerena's 201-215431.

14-00000

188 JAN 71

SECRET
(when filled in)

DT- 6

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)

KAYLOR PATTI
WH/3/CO
EXT. 5269

GG-196
3B2627
TUBE BS4

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.
12 Jan 1971		

	TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	RID/FILES DT- 6			LHD
2	REQUESTER			
3	RID/FILES			
4				
5				

SUBJECT

LLERENA Rodriguez, Rafael Mario

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

VERIFIED

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from RID/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than RID/Index.

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
100-2-18	~~FBI report~~	~~21 August 1958~~
	DBF-9745	16/9/58

NOT FOUND IN RID FILES
If Further Search Desired
Call X7672

Called 14 JAN 1971

FORM 11-64 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 18 December 1970 lc
TO: C/WH/3/Col - P. Kaylor	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please locate and review FBI data re Rafael Mario LLERENA Rodriguez, sent to this Agency on 8-21-58, p. 1.

Please forward your analysis as to whether this information is derogatory or non-derogatory.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Bogota KNP

SUBJECT
c GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: Process for OA

REF : HLBS-2641, 28 October 1970

Forwarded herewith are three copies of Subject's updated PRQ Part II as requested in Reference.

Orrin K. Banasiak
Orrin K. BANASIAK

DISTRIBUTION:
3-Chief, WHD w/att h/w

cc forwarded CI/OA 25 NOV 1970 on

CS COPY

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBA-12320	DATE 10 November 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM: GICITRON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED. First contacted by Mexico Station CO Clyde SHRYOCK (ps) on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). SHRYOCK visited Subject's business office and presented self as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS Bergnes, who at that time was Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium and a former contact of SHRYOCK while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to 1959. Purpose of meeting was to assess Subject's attitude towards the Castro regime. Subject was subsequently utilized by Mexico City Station to assist in coordinating anti-Castro activities.

Bogota Station contact with Subject established in 1970 through Station Contract Agent under non-official cover, Errol R. LYTHGOE. GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE are long-time friends and preformed operational tasks for JKLANCE when both werer Mexico City assets.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Spanish speaking Case Officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

CS COPY

H/watt to HLBA-12320

201-267298

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject became disillusioned with the Castro regime early in 1959 because of the communist infiltration in the Cuban revolution. Subject is strongly anti-communist and anti-Castro and thus willing to lend his services to combat these regimes.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Except for long-time relations between Subject and Errol R. LYTHGOE, No actual control exists over Subject.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

NA

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject presumably knows he is cooperating with JKLANCE

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

None.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several Cuban clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26th of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

In 1960 Subjct was utilized by the Mexico City Station to assist in the coordination of anti-Castro activities as part of the XX AMWAIL operation. Subject was rated a reliable source by the Mexico City Station.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is used by the Bogota Station to provide cover for status and funds for an operation handled by Errol R. Lythgoe who is Subject's nominal partner in the enterprise.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of JKLANCE.

SECRET

SECTION IX

QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject has been in Latin America for a number of years during which time he has numerous contacts and friends.

SECTION X

COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT; IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is not paid a salary by the Station.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI

CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Mexico City Station files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Operational Approval	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 6 June 1960

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject is an exile Cuban businessman with a strong character who is highly respected in the Bogota business community. Subject is an independent thinker and not easily manipulated.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

In 1960 Mexico Station CO Clyde K. SHRYOCK and Subject met several times in his business office. While at the office a Cuban representative, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, saw SHRYOCK and on 2 occasions talked with the CO. At the time Subject felt VIDAL would not talk about these contacts to Cuban officials. This occurred ten years ago in Mexico and the Bogota Station does not believe this incident will adversely effect the present operational use of Subj

SECTION XII

SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any overt vices.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks of Mexico City and Bogota Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra.)*

NA

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS (I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W) WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Not applicable for the circumstances in which he is being used. Should there be a break between GICITRON-4 and LYTHGOE and this or another Station want to meet with him to assess him for other operational activities in the future it would only be necessary to mention his friendship with SHRYOCK and his activities in conjunction with LYTHGOE.

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER Orrin K.

201-262298

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,

WH/3/Col - B. Merrell

NUMBER
201-267298

SUBJECT
GICITRON/4

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
28 October 1970 mss

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

For limited use as requested in your memo of 28 October 1970, the POA is reinstated until 30 January 1971.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John E. Howard

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	30 October 1970

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

SECRET

28 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

1. We have received your memorandum of 22 October 1970 informing us that GICITRON-4's file has been closed. However, from Bogota Station correspondence we know that GICITRON-4 is still of operational interest and there is a strong probability that the missing PRQ Part II has been delayed by the recent restriction on pouching material to and from the field.

2. It is requested that the file on GICITRON-4 be reopened and his POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time for the PRQ Part II to arrive or to be prepared if need be.

Burdell Merrell
WH/3/Colombia

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 1.1 File
X - 201 File

WH/3/C:BMerrell:blb (28 October 1970)

SECRET

Acting Chief of Station, Bogota	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Forward PRQ Part II

REFERENCE: HLBS-2626, 15 September 1970

1. We have been notified that the POA for GICITRON-4 was cancelled on 22 October 1970 because we failed to provide a PRQ Part II showing the details of our present relations with him. We made an attempt to complete this Part II here at the desk, but found that there were too many items of information that we do not have.

2. We have requested that GICITRON-4's POA be extended for an additional 30 days to allow time to provide the Part II. We indicated that perhaps the document has been delayed by the recent pouch restrictions.

3. We would appreciate the receipt of the PRQ Part II within the next 30 days. If it has crossed this dispatch in the mail, please disregard this notice.

Ernest A. PUKALA

DISTRIBUTION:
2-ACOS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS-2641	DATE 30 OCT 1970 typed 28 October 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	BMerrell	blb (28 October 1970)	1034R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	28 Oct 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	28 Oct 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-69 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE 22 October 1970 lc

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/3/C

ATTENTION : C. Roberson, Jr.

Cms

PSR -
what is status?

201- 267298
C

The file on GICITRON/4 is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Failure to submit PRQ-II as required under CSI No. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest in obtaining approval for the operational use of Subject.

Field notified
28 Oct 70

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/S/ John E. Howard

CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

FORM 6-65 691a SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(9)

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, Bogota
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Please forward PRQ Part II.

The POA on GICITRON-4 expired on 6 September 1970. Please submit a PRQ Part II based on the current proposed use of GICITRON-4 within 30 days.

Gracia V. TILLING

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO

1 - RI (F201)
1 - Chrono

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLBS-2626

DATE
16 SEP 1970
15 Septembe

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267298

ORIGINATING

OFFICE

OFFICER

TYPIST

EXT.

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE
Se

OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	15 S 70	for Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

MFG. 11 69

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
7 September 1970 JR

TO:
WH/3/C C. Roberson, Jr.

C NO.
201-267298

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT:
GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Limited POA expired 6 September 1970. Please submit PRQ II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

[illegible] SECRET

TO	Chief of Station, Bogota
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	Forwarding of PRQ's I and II on GICITRON-4

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None.

REFERENCE : HLBS-2533, 6 April 1970

Forwarded herewith as Attachment 1 for Station information and the file are two (2) copies of PRQ Part II for GICITRON-4 (formerly LITAMIL-1). Separate Cover Attachment, Number 2, to this dispatch consists of two (2) copies of PRQ Part I.

Gracia V. TILLING

ATTACHMENTS:
1. PRQ Part II, h/w
2. PRQ Part I, u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - COS/Bogota (w/atts 1 & 2 /two copies each/, h/w & u/s/c)

20 MAY 1970

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS-2564	DATE ~~[illegible] MAY 1970~~ 13 May 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

1 - RI (201)
1 - Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	PSKaylor	ecw (13 May 70)	9494R

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	13 May 70	Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	13 May 70	Alfonso Spera

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE DOI-11/27/5 **PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**	PRO NO.
INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly. 2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA" 3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.	DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Manuel		MACHADO Llones	

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT	3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

"Mangelito"

5. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] December 1913	6. PLACE OF BIRTH Aurna, Oriente

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX M ☐ F ☐	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT [illegible] lbs	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
h. COLOR OF HAIR black	i. COLOR OF EYES brown	j. TEETH		k. BUILD	l. POSTURE	

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
[illegible]

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
[illegible]

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible]

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
United States
Cuba - 1959
[illegible]

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY *(Per annum)*
[illegible] of Printi	[illegible]	

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*
(Well-off financially)

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Former Treasurer of the 26 of July Movement in Mexico

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
PABLO MACHADO LLOPIS	X				

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

14-00000

SECRET

201-

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

CICILLON-4 (Originally LITAMIL-1)

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case officer, Clyde K. SHRYOCK (ps), made contact with LITAMIL-1 on 21 Oct 59 (MEXI-4554). Case officer went to the business office of Subject as a "friend" of Gustavo ARCOS y Bergnes, who is presently Cuban Ambassador in Brussels, Belgium, and formerly a contact of Case Officer's while ARCOS was in Mexico prior to the downfall of BATISTA. Case Officer made contact with Subject in order to "feel him out" re his attitude toward the CASTRO regime.

Station, through LIFEAT, was able to evaluate Subject well before the approach was made.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any Case Officer with a speaking knowledge of Spanish.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None

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SECTION II **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject, a highly respected Cuban businessman in Mexico, supported 26 of July Movement for idealistic reasons, i.e. rid the country of BATISTA & bring democracy again to Cuba. However, Subject has been convinced that the CASTRO regime has been infiltrated by Communists and CASTRO, his former friend, has done nothing about it. Subj, therefore, is motivated by patriotism, i.e., to rid Cuba of the

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Case Officer has little control or no control over Subject, it is more of a cooperative arrangement wherein Subject is willing to assist PBPRIME in its desire to get rid of CASTRO.

SECTION III **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meeting usually at LITAMIL-1's business office, where Case Officer could pass as a client

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject, a long time friend of officials of the Cuban Embassy, merely listens to his friends relate their problems & activities.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Subject knows he is cooperating with PBPRIME intelligence agency.

SECTION IV **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

Subject is not known to have worked for any intelligence service, however, his service with the 26 of July Movement during the period 1957-58, has equipped him well for intelligence work.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

LITAMIL-2 knows that Subject is cooperating with PBPRIME.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None. However, Subject was involved in several clandestine movements while treasurer of the 26 of July Movement during 1957-58.

SECTION V **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Cuban Government.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE WAS FURNISHED.

During 1958 Subject was aware of Gustavo ARCOS' contact with the Case Officer and on one occasion called the Case Officer to say that ARCOS would not be able to make a meeting

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains his information from officials in the Cuban Embassy as a friend.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is aware that the information he provides is sent to Washington.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject will assist in coordinating anti-CASTRO activities in Mexico as part of the AMMAIL operation.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is an unpaid field agent of KUBARK.

SECRET

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject owns a printing plant and therefore could if necessary provide printed material clandestinely.

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject will be given gifts at appropriate times during the year.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station Havana and Headquarters files have been checked re Subject.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

A financial check by Dun and Bradstreet was also run on Subject.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Provisional Operational Approval

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

8 January 1960

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subj is a liberal Cuban businessman who dedicated time & money to the Cuban 26 of July Movement in Mexico during 57-58. He is of strong character & highly thought of by most members of the Cuban colony in Mexico. He is an independent thinker & cannot be "pushed around"

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT. The Case Officer has met LITAMIL-1 on several
occasions during the past year at his business office. While at
the office, Ricardo VIDAL Dominguels, Cuban Chargeas has been
Case Officer at the office and on two occasions talked with Case
Officer. LITAMIL-1 believes that VIDAL will not talk about these
contacts to Cuban officials.

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

Subject not known to have any obvious vices.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Boxing enthusiast

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject could pass as a native of any Latin American country.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Information obtained through LIFEAT, name checks Station files, Mexican Government files, Dun and Bradstreet, and Headquarters.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 63b, supra)*

NA

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject is owner and operator of a print shop employing approximately 50 employees

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

TO Chief of Station, Bogota	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	MICROFILM
SUBJECT GICITRON-4	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HLBT 1475
B. DIRECTOR 006731

Headquarters will prepare PRQs I and II and forward copies to Station Bogota. Reference B was a summary of pertinent information from GICITRON-4's 201 file.

Anita G. POMARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS 2533	DATE 10 APR 1970 ~~6 April 1970~~
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267288

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER - TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes (mac 6 April 1970)	9494

~~1~~ - RI
1 - Chrono

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	7 Apr 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DC/WH/3	7 Apr 70	Richard Conolly Richard Conolly

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MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Bogota

SUBJECT
GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. HLBS-2503, 16 March 1970

B. BOGOTA 3483, 20 January 1970.

1. The receipt of Reference A Provisional Operational Approval for Subject was much appreciated. We were puzzled, however, by the request for PRQ Parts I and II on GICITRON-4 since all biographic and operational data on him with the exception of References and DIRECTOR 006731 is on record only at Headquarters as far as we are aware unless Mexico City has retained their old file on him. Paragraph 3 of Reference B specifically requested that pertinent material from Subject's 201 be forwarded to Bogotá, but we have never received it.

2. Errol C. Lythgoe, despite his old friendship with Subject, has no present justifiable reason consistent with cover to question him regarding all the biographic details required for preparation of a full PRQ Part I. Nor could Lythgoe logically elicit from Subject the answers to such PRQ Part II items as "How, when, where, why and by whom Subject was first contacted or developed" by KUROCK, "List other case officers who have handled Subject or whom he knows or has known...", and the like.

3. Subject's proposed present operational use is detailed in Reference B, and Headquarters has the rest of the basic data necessary for preparation of both parts of the PRQ. It is therefore suggested that this be done at Headquarters, with copies being forwarded to Bogotá for updating.

Joseph R. KENDON

DISTRIBUTION:
Original and two - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HLBT-4475

DATE
25 March 1970

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-267298

SECRET

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Bogota

INFO

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

GICITRON-4

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. BOGOTA 3483
B. DIRECTOR 06731

1. On 6 March 1970 a POA was granted GICITRON-4 to permit him to form a corporation to provide funding cover for Errol R. LYTEGOE. No other operational use is authorized.

2. Please submit a PRQ I and II as soon as possible.

Anita G. POMARLEN

Distribution:
2 - COS/Bogota

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~2~~ - RI (201-267298)
1 - Chrono

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HLBS 2503	DATE 17 MAR 1970 16 March 1970
CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/C	Judy Hoopes	(mc 16 Mar 70)	9494

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3/C	16 Mar 70	Calvin M. Smyth Calvin M. Smyth

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/3	16 Mar	Alfonso Spera Spera

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MFG. 11-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, **WH/3/Col - C. Smyth**	NUMBER 201-267298
	SUBJECT GICITROE/4
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 22 January 1970 mss

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTEGOE business and funds on a strict need-to-know. No other operational use authorized.

Station notified
J.

13 MAR 1970

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/S/ John E. Howard

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	6 March 1970

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SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

SECRET

4 March 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Counter Intelligence/Operational Approval and Support Group

ATTENTION : Mr. Jack Lally

SUBJECT : GICITRON-4 (201-267298)

A review of the Staff D dossier on Subject reveals no derogatory information.

Joel H. Beyer
WH/3/C

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - CI/OA
~~1~~ - (201-267298)
1 - Memo Chrono
1 - Extra copy file

WH/3/C-JHBeyer:mac/x9494 (4 March 70)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 24 February 1970 mss

TO: WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.

FILE NO.: 201-267298

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/S/ John E. Howard

SUBJECT: GICITECH/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☒	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER to CI/OA
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☒ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 9 February 1970 mss
TO: WH/3/C - C. Roberson, Jr.	C NO. 201-267298
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /S/ John E. Howard	SUBJECT: GICITRON/4

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☒	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER TO CI/CA
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/CA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK

DATE 22 Jan 70

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME C. Roberson, Jr.
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/C
ROOM, BUILDING 3B 2627
EXTENSION X. R-9494

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
201-267293
MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.
"Manuelito"

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
12 Dec 13, Auras, Oriente, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-headquartered Printing firm, Bogota, Colombia

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Printing

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Owner and Manager of "Machado, S.A." (Lithograph Plant)	Tlalpan #710 Mexi City, Mexi	Nov 59
Treasurer, 26th July Movement	Mexico City	'59

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Pablo MACHADO Llosa (Brother)

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
All information

FEB 10 53 AM '70

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET (9)

SECRET

TO: C. Roberson, Jr.

FEB 1970
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ FI/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: C. M. Smyth
UNIT: C/WH/3/C
EXT: 9494
DATE: 30 Jan 70

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2		7	
3		8	
4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 7 PER #

CONF: C/WH 8

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR [illegible]

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 31 18 02Z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 006731

TO BOGOTA INFO MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY

GICITRON TECES

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)*

1. SUBJECT PARA 2 REF ASSIGNED GICITRON-4 AND 201-267298. HE WAS ORIGINAL MEMBER 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT BUT BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE OF CASTRO REGIME (HE INVESTED $50,000 IN REVOLUTION) AND SOVIETIZATION OF CUBA. HE TURNED AGAINST CASTRO IN 1959 AND WITH OTHER ANTI-CASTRO REVOLUTIONARIES SUPPLIED ARMS TO CUBAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES FROM HIS EXILE IN MEXICO. WHILE IN MEXICO HE HAD EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN CUBAN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES AND WITH CUBAN UNITED NATION AND MEXICAN POLICE OFFICIALS. HE WAS RATED RELIABLE SOURCE BY STATION MEXICO CITY. HE WAS GRANTED OA 6 JUNE 60 FOR ASSISTING IN COORDINATION OF ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AS PART OF AMWAIL OPERATION. BY 1963, HOWEVER, HIS OPERATIONAL CONTACTS HAD BECOME MARGINAL AND THEREAFTER HE WAS NOT USED BY STATION. THERE IS NO INFO AT HQS TO PRECLUDE YOUR PROPOSED USE OF HIM. WE PROCESSING POA.

8

AN WH/A
AB
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BY~~
~~DEC~~ NPD
FI
WH/3/C

201-267298
31 JAN 70

CONTINUED . . .

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
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4		9	
5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION FEB 9 08 AM '70

BY ______ PER ______ #

COMP: RID/EDI RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

FEB 10 2 24 PM '70

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR RID/EDI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 006731

TO PAGE TWO

2. CONCUR IN REF PROPOSAL THAT IMPROVEMENT GICITRON RECEPTION COULD IMPROVE PRODUCT AND, HENCE, WORTH PURSUING. THOUGHT OCCURS TO HQS THAT GISOY-92, BEING AWARE GICITRON OPERATION, WOULD PROBABLY SUSPECT PROPOSED LYTHGOE COVER OFFICE IN GICITRON BUILDING IS NEW LP. DO YOU PLAN MAKE GISOY-92 WITTING OF LYTHGOE ROLE? IF NOT, WOULD HE BE PIQUED IF HE LATER LEARNED OF IT? WHAT REPERCUSSIONS COULD THIS HAVE ON STATION/GISOY RELATIONS? WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS.

3. FILE: 201-267298.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref proposed renting office space in building where Novosti news agency is located so that Station could acquire clocer LP for monitoring "take" from present tech installation of Novosti.

WH/1
WH/2/P
SB/X/WH
TSD/AOB - Mr. Collyer (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 22 Jan 70

TO:	X	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☐	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: C. Roberson, Jr.
WH-3-C 3B 2627
X. R-9494

SUBJECT: (True name) MACHADO Llosa, Manuel C-80433

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
LITAMIL-1 (Former Crypt)
"Manuelito"
GICTERCK-1

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-267298

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Bogota, Colombia

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

To form a corporation to provide cover for Bogota Station asset Errol R. LYTHGOE business and funds.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

JAN 27 3 07 PM '70

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED Bogota & [illegible] Station	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER William Roberson Jr	EXTENSION R-9494	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF Spera

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

27 January 1965 travelled from Mexico City to Venezuela on a tourist visa.

14 April 1964 travelled from Cuba to Mexico on Ppt #696, file # 532/59 issued 19 January 1959. The passport was extended 14 April 1964 for 3 years by the Cuban Consul, Mexico City.

WH/3/C

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

MACHADO Llosa, Manuel		201-267298

WH/3/C

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 7-58 44 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

2 Feb 70

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 26 72 98			

FORM 8-68 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(7-46)

MACHADO, MANUEL

SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE CUBAN GOVERNMENT BOOK ON MEXICAN PHASE OF
THE REVOLUTION

050-006-128/03
HMMA-33839
17 JAN 68
050-6-128/4
P2

UFG 050

FLD INDEX ONLY

WH/COG Cards
20 Jan 1970

Llanes.　　C [illegible] 1(e)　　(201-267998)

MACHADO, Manuel

[illegible] of Pablo [illegible]

Subj., Cuban exile in Mexico, has done well financially in own printing establishment, Manuel Machado S.A., located at Tlalpan 710, Mexico, D.F.　　[illegible]

Cuban businessman in Mexico & one of leaders of [illegible]. His business address is Calzada de Tlalpan 710, Mexico D.F. [illegible] entitled Circular de Organizacion from [illegible], Cuban exile in Miami.　　[illegible]

Subject says two airplanes recently seized from Cuba [illegible] will be returned to Cuba. Subject [illegible] Cuban [illegible] in [illegible], and is owner of printing firm [illegible] S.A., [illegible] Mexico City. (File: [illegible])　　[illegible]

Subj. planned to leave Mexico City for Havana 13 June 1959. 13 June he expected to leave for New York. Hopes to be back in Mexico City on Sunday 14 June. Prime purpose in going to Havana was to report to Fidel Castro the excellent work being done by Salvador Massip Valdes, Cuban ambassador in Mexico. Massip is being considered for a position in Castro's cabinet.　　[illegible] 15 June 1959 Destroyed

---

MACHADO Llanes, Manuel　　15　　201-267998

Subj leaving [illegible] 12 Feb and will [illegible] Raul [illegible], Pedro [illegible], Hector [illegible], [illegible] Perez. Returning [illegible] 17 Feb at latest.　　[illegible] 13 Feb 61

Reliably reported that subj was approached, in late Dec 59, by Leopoldo [illegible] while in Mex City. Purpose of contact was to have subj introduce [illegible] to people in Cuba who could provide arms for Alfaro Siqueiros group in Mexico. Alfaro Siqueiros, well-known Mex artist, reported heading group seeking a leftist-Communist overthrow of GOM.　　[illegible] 1 Mar 60 [illegible]

Add. inf. available in [illegible]. 201-267998.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET
(When Filled In)
GROUP 1

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3		7	
4		8	

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BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 16 PER ________ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, TSD 6

ACTION NO. 881

S E C R E T 261705Z JAN 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 2329 (PRALLETT ACTING)
MEXI

BOGOTA INFO DIRECTOR, PANAMA CITY

GICITROH TECHS

26 JAN IN 013404

REF: BOGOTA 3483 (IN 010310)

1. NO DATA MEXICO CITY STATION WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO PER PARA 2, REF.

2. FILE: 201-267298.

S E C R E T

AN UG
AB ~~X~~
~~IN~~
~~IS~~
~~N~~
~~DDC~~ NFD
~~SI~~
WH/1

WH/1, CI

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298
26 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED WH/3/C

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DISSEM BY: 33 PER #

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO.

X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

3		5
4		6
		7
		8

I

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN CI CI/OPS CI/RA FI 2 TSD 6 CCS 2

ACTION NO. 482

S E C R E T 202245Z JAN 70 CITE BOGOTA 3483

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO: PANAMA CITY

20 JAN 1970 10310

GICITRON TECHS

1. STATION HAS LEARNED OF SPACE BECOMING AVAILABLE IN GICITRON TARGET BUILDING WHICH SHOULD IMPROVE RECEPTION AND THEREFORE TAKE CONSIDERABLY. FOR VARIETY REASONS BELIEVE ERROL R. LYTHGOE (FOR MEXI: FORMERLY LITAINT-1) SHOULD RENT AND SERVICE AND TOLD HIM TO FORM A COMPANY WHICH COULD PROVIDE COVER FOR THIS. HE SAID HE HAD ALREADY FORMED ONE FOR TAX PURPOSES IN CONJUNCTION WITH MANUEL MACHADO LLOSA, CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS Y CIA., MEXICAN-HEADQUARTERED PRINTING FIRM. MACHADO IS LONG-TIME FRIEND OF LYTHGOE WHO PERFORMED OPS TASKS FOR RVROCK IN MEXICO AND IS AWARE OF LYTHGOE'S OPERATIONAL HISTORY.

201-267298

AN
~~AD~~
~~FC~~
~~DX~~
FI

2. IF THERE NO DATA HEADQUARTERS OF MEXICO WHICH MILITATES AGAINST USING MACHADO OPERATIONALLY REQUEST HEADQUARTERS OBTAIN CLEARANCE OF PRIORITY BASIS TO PROVIDE COVER FOR LYTHGOE'S BUSINESS AND FUNDS. ALTHOUGH HE NOT ~~TO~~ TO BE INVOLVED DIRECTLY IN OPERATING IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT,

CS COPY

SECRET

201-267298

20 JAN 70

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	1 ___ 5 ___ 2 ___ 6 ___ 3 ___ 7 ___ 4 ___ 8 ___
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	
	INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	
	CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ___	
BY: ___ AT: ___ Z	X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ___	
DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ # ___	☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ___	
ACTION UNIT	INFO FILE, VR	
ACTION NO.		

PAGE TWO CITE BOGOTA 3483 S E C R E T

CUBANS BEING CUBANS, HE WILL BE MORE THAN GENERALLY AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON.

ADVISE SOONEST IF ANY HINDRANCE TO USING MACHADO SINCE MUST MOVE FAST TO SECURE THE SPACE.

3. PLEASE FORWARD PETINENT MATERIALS FROM MACHADO 201, CRYPTONYM AND 201 NUMBER.

4. NO INDEX. FILE MACHADO 201.

S E C R E T

★ * PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED

30 JAN 1970

80

SECRET

PRQ PART I EQUIVALENT

NAME: MACHADO Llosa, Manuel

DPOB: 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba

OCCUPATION: Manager for Colombia of Galas y Cia., Mexican-Headquarted Printing Firm in Bogota, Colombia

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

BROTHER: Pablo MACHADO Llosa

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: Name

OFFICE

ROOM

PHONE

TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION		OPEN	2. FILE RESTRICTED		YES	3. PERMANENT CHARGE		YES
		AMEND			NO			NO

4. TRUE NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* D1

5. 201 NO. E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES *(see Instructions, item 6)*

TYPE	*(Last)*	*(First)*	*(Middle)*
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			

7. SEX F1 M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH F1

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH G1

11. CITIZENSHIP H1

12. OCCUPATION *(clear text)* J1 OCC. CODE J2

13. SWL

14. ORGANIZATION OR INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER E1 DATE E1

16. RESIDENCE

17. COMMENTS *(text for Index cards)*

N1

P1

R1

S1

T1

U1

V1

W1

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE B1

19. ACTION DESK CODE B1

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE B1

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES B1 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM 4

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO.

FORM 12-67 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(36-51)

EXT. 5126

382627
TUBE 854

RID CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 19 Jan 70

RID CONTROL NO.

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
RID/INDEX	DT-5		21-1-70		ml
REQUESTER					②
RID/FILES	DT-6				
REQUESTER					③
RID/ANALYSIS	GT-7				
RID/201	DW-6				
RID/INDEX	DT-5				

CHECKING INSTRUCTIONS

JAN 21 3 07 PM '70

SUBJECT TO BE CHECKED

SURNAME: MACHADO LLOSA

GIVEN NAMES: MANUEL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE CHECKED

201 NO. IF KNOWN

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.): CUBAN MANAGER FOR COLOMBIA OF GALAS y CIA, MEXICAN HQS PRINTING FIRM.

SEX: M

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

RESIDENCE: BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

RESULTS OF RID/INDEX CHECK

☐ NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

☑ CARD REFERENCES ATTACHED

COMMENTS: C-25 frms

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

IN ALL CASES

① Use gummed label; type or print all entries.

② Upon receipt of index card reproductions draw a green diagonal line across the items you do not want.

③ Edit (use green) the reproduced index cards to indicate:

(a) cards to be destroyed (mark with green D and note reason for destruction) Examples: document destroyed; duplicate or less informative than retained information; information of no CS value.

(b) corrections and additions, including infinity symbol ∞ when card includes all facts contained in the document.

201 CONSOLIDATION

1. Return this form with the card reproductions, also return pertinent documents, aperture cards and the dossier if a 201 on the subject exists.

2. For each document to be included in the consolidation (i.e., copy or cross reference to be placed in the 201 file), green D the corresponding card and check (a) or (b) below:

(a) ☐ Consolidate into 201-

(b) ☐ Open 201 file on subject.

RESTRICTION (If any)

CRYPTONYM ASSIGNED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

OTHER INTERESTED DESKS OR STATIONS

FILE TO BE KEPT: ☐ RID ☐ DESK

Note 1. Records of COI, SSU, OSS and CIG are in RID/ARD, and those that meet indexing criteria in CSHB 70-1-1 are carded in the CS Main Index. If you believe there could be additional information of value in these records, you must request an Archives Index search.

Note 2. Information concerning foreign public personalities (except military) may be available in BR/OCR x7997.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

FORM 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-8-38)

@ 'MANUELITO'
Δ MEXICO
OWNER AND MANAGER OF 'MACHADO, S. A.'
/LITHOGRAPH PLANT/. LEADER OF 26 JULY GROUP,
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY. /MEP/

LLOSA, MANUEL B.

Peru- 17 Jun 48

New Minister of Finance.

IN 45700
Lima 387
OUT 64458
From: CIA
To: State

310603

MACHADO, Manuel Vieira

VIEIRA MACHADO, Manuel

61-0-1-409
(HFLA-1538)
(Book I)
(Pg. 94)

THIS CARD FILED IN [illegible] INDEX

9 MAR 55

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12 February 1925
Hudson, Massachusetts

The files of SO (Security Office) contains information on the subject of this card.

323127

RES. OCCUPATION

16 JUL 57

THIS CARD FILED IN MAIN INDEX

[illegible]

MACHADO, Manuel Richard
Born: 12-Feb 1925
Hudson,Mass,

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] FILE

[illegible]

013123 IN MAIN INDEX

MACHADO, MANUEL JUAQUIM LOPES (DE) (SA)

201-852461*

SEX M DOB 20 JAN 35
PORTUGAL, MASOUCO
CIT PORTUGAL
OCC DIPLOMAT
REF HBB -1000, 12 MAY 69

TYPE NAME T
OCC CODE DIPT

OI CODE ?

< BRAZIL, BRASILIA
COUNSELLOR IN BRASILIA, BRAZIL
HUSBAND OF (SA) MACHADO, REGINA

010010061HBBHBROPL

6906111271

MACHADO, MANUEL GINESTAL /DR./

061-004-117
CPL -00808 E01
09 JUN 60
P 27

SEX M DOB ?

CIT PORTUGAL
Δ RUA DE S. NICOLAU, 36
MEMBER OF THE SANTAREM DISTRICT COMMISSION OF THE MOVIMENTO DE UNIDADE DEMOCRATICA /MUD/ AS OF 1947.

U

013123

dreas

✓MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca
MENDONCA, Catelina Adelaide
de FREITAS, Maria Alice
✓MACHADO, Celina M. Freitas
MACHADO, Antonio Mendonca Jr.
MACHADO, Jose Mendonca

AZORES

This card filed in MAIN INDEX 15 Jan 1954

USA
"

2

SPONSORS:

013124

MACHADO, Manuel

Madrid-X-2-Pts-10
Folder H

3

D

[illegible]

A-1783

REFERENCE CARD

MACHADO, MANUEL

Writes German and Italian propaganda for Legiones y Falange.

S-13 Jan. 2, 1943

3

013121

MACHADO, Manuel Richard

200-[illegible]

THIS CARD FILED
6MAY1954
IN MAIN INDEX

013126

SECRET

14-00000

Member of the Spanish Academy

T ED

3

[illegible]

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

201-005839
TMM -02878
09 SEP 52
SER. 16

CIT VENEZUELA

RES: MEXICO

ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA.

013113

MACHADO, MANUEL
DOB ?

050-004-012
TMM -02758

CIT VENEZUELA

SER. 245

RES: MEXICO

MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

013114

SECRET

MACHADO, MANUEL

019-009-0008
MEXI-02164
14 AUG 58

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY IN MEXICO.

013120

X-2 H-5207

MACHADO, MANUEL

SEE X-2 H-5207 0-15 MARTINS, ANTONIO

1001
2/2/44

013122

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 21

SECRET

ACTION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

9 JUN 65 IN 86780

S E C R E T 092228Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3735

File 201 LITAMIL-1

PBRUMEN LITAMIL

1. LITAMIL-1 SUBMITTED FLWG NAMES IN RESPONSE SPOTTING RQM. (A) ING. MIGUEL L. PALMER, FORMER CHIEF FERROCARRILES OCCIDENTALES DE CUBA WHO WORKED FOR MANOLO RAY IN SABOTAGING CUBAN RR SYSTEM UNDER BATISTA (B) LUIS ARGIBAY, BORN C. 1930, CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH CURBELO OF CUBAN EMB IN ATTEMPT OBTAIN EXIT VISAS FOR ARGIBAY FAMILY. (C) RAUL VIANELLO GARCIA, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL GENL MEXI.

2. REQUEST TRACES ON ALL THREE WHO NOW MEXI. VIANELLO INTENDS PROCEED U.S. MOMENTARILY TO JOIN FRIEND DR. RODRIGO BUSTAMANTE AT V.A. HOSPITAL, WOOD, WISCONSIN (SIC). VIANELLO WAS NOT DEBRIEFED BY LICOMETS. L-3 SUGGESTS USE HIS TRUE NAME (IDEN) AS BONA FIDES IN EVENT FOLLOWUP ON VIANELLO.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

FILE IN 201-267298

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
MACHADO LLOSAS, Manuel	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Mary Theven
WH/3M

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT
OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 80638

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-262298

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

GROUP 1

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	R

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

☐ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2

ACTION 9 [redacted] 86782

SECRET 092229Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3737

FBRUMEN LITAMIL

REF MEXI 3736 (86783)

IDEN: DR. RICARDO VIDAL ("VIDALITO").

[illegible]

SECRET

CFN

201-267298

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

MACHADO LLOSAS, MANUEL
201-267298
SEX M DOB ?

019-005-001
UFGA-21693/14
01 JUN 65
P35

CIT ?
OCC ?
BELIEVED IDEN/W MACHADO MANUEL WHO WAS CONTACT OF SUBJ OF 201-754938.

R 6506161148

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-267298

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-60)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: *(Division)* WHD/3 *(Case officer)* Bustos *(Extension)* 6026

SUBJECT'S NAME *(Pseudo, crypt or true may be used)*: LITAMIL-1

NAME SHOWN IS: ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.: C-80638

201 NO.: 201-267298

PROJECT: none

DATE OF BIRTH: 12 Dec 1913

PLACE OF BIRTH: Auras, Oriente, Cuba

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☒ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

became marginal

DATE: 23 August 1963

SIGNATURE:

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

1P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITAMIL-1 and LITAMIL-5 now [illegible]/1 - 201-308134

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
now amlumber/1 - 201-267298

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCES: A. HMMW 11727

B. HMMW 11729

Agent Service Record on Subjects are enclosed as requested in the References.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att
3 - Files

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

CS COPY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-267298

CROSS REFERENCE TO
D-201-308134 (cc filed)
Encl-1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 21924

DATE
9 August 1963

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

1P

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

1. Agent Cryptonym: LITAMIL - 1

2. Project: LITAMIL

3. Agent Recruited By: Clydo K. SHRYOCK Date: 6 Nov. 1959

4. Capacity in Which Agent Served: Spotter, info Cuban exiles, Cuban Officials, penetration 26 July movement.

5. Rate of Pay: None. Was given $10,000.00MN as a loan, will probably never be repaid.

6. Other Commitments: None.

7. Agent Dismissed By: Not dismissed, but not recontacted after SHRYOCK's departure. Date: June 1963

MICROFILMED
AUG 16 1963

8. Reason for Dismissal: Became marginal.

9. Security Risks: None.

10. Is the Agent Recommended for Reuse: Yes, depending on circumstances.

11. Manner of Dismissal: No recontact made after SHRYOCK's departure.

12. Letter of Termination Signed: No

13. Cost of Termination: See 5 above

14. Station Case Officer: Terrence P. MCGEE
(Signature in Pseudonym)

15. Chief of Station: Willard C. CURTIS Willard C. Curtis
(Signature in Pseydonym)

SECRET

Encl #1.
to HMMA - 21924

CS COPY

201-267298

TO

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM

: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT

: PBRUMEN/LITAMIL-1

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Headquarters files reveal no Station contact with LITAMIL-1 since October 1962. It is requested that the Station report on its current relationship with LITAMIL-1. If this agent has been terminated, please submit an Agent Service Record.

END OF DISPATCH

CS COPY

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-267298

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-11727	11 JUL 1963 2 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-267298

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:dd			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	3 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/M	
~~DESTROY~~	

FORM 53 1-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

081

L = LITAMIL-1
" -2
" 3
5

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3	FC	6	

DATE : 17 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 3, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2*

OCT 17 0508Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 40768

DIR GUAT INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 2221

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

GYROSE/LITAMIL

REF MEXI 2222 Cn 40773

1. ON 16 OCT 62, LITAMIL-2 REPORTED MTG PRO-UNIDAD "CLANDESTINE UNIT" NIGHT 15 OCT COMPOSED FOL: LITAMIL-1, LITAMIL-2, LITAMIL-3, LITAMIL-5, HORACIO WIESZESUK GUERRERO, JOSE MANUEL LOPEZ ALFONSO, TULIO PRIETO RUIZ, FERNANDO OROZCO, AND DR. ALFREDO FERRER.

2. AT MTG LOPEZ TOLD GROUP THAT COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA AZURDIA, GUAT MINDEF, WHO CAME MEXI OFFICIAL VISIT SEPT 62, MADE CONTACT LOPEZ AND OFFERED ARMS, AMMO AND (SLOW) VESSEL. PERALTA LONGTIME FRIEND LOPEZ. LOPEZ SAID THAT COURIER PERALTA ARRIVED MEXI FEW DAYS AGO AND SAID PERALTA OFFER STILL STANDS BUT THAT DIRECT CONTACT MUST BE MADE WITH PERALTA GUAT. GROUP CHOSE LITAMIL-2 OR LITAMIL-3 AS MOST LIKELY PUC COURIERS VIEW FORMER'S BUSINESS INTEREST GUAT AND LATTER'S DIP CONTACTS. ACCORDING LOPEZ CONTACT WITH PERALTA SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE END OCT. PUC PLANS COLLECT FUNDS SEND COURIER GUAT SOONEST. WILL ADVISE. LOPEZ DID NOT IDENTIFY PERALTA COURIER.

3. L-2 REPORTED 16 OCT HE GAINING MORE CONFIDENCE WIESZESUK. DOES GUAT HAVE ANY INFO RE PARA 2?

4. ABOVE NOT BEING DISSEMINATED VIEW OPS INTEREST.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — file LITAMIL-1 / AMLAW-1

SECRET WD

024

DATE : 7 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2	FI	5	
3		6	

SEP 8 0248Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 18812

DIR INFO WAVE SJAN CITE MEXI 1889

GYROSE/AMLAW-1/LITAMIL-1

REF A. MEXI 1614 (IN-40150)

B. DIR 28483 (Cont 635557)

1. ON 5 SEPT 62, AMLAW-1 CALLED LITAMIL-1 AND ARRANGED MTG APARTMENT RAMON SINOBAS AT 1800 THAT EVENING.

2. AM-1 TOLD L-1 HE FELT HAD OBLIGATION MAKE CONTACT AS PROMISED PRIOR DEPARTURE FOR HAVA RE POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS MEXI. SAID UPON ARRIVAL HAVA SAW RAUL ROA AND FIDEL CASTRO FIRST TWO DAYS THEN DISCUSSED SUBJ MATTER OF INTEREST L-1. HE DID NOT SAY WITH WHOM HE TALKED RE MATTER. AM-1 SAID THAT CUBAN GOV'T IN VIEW THREATS AND AGRESSIVE ACTION INCLUDING SHELLING CUBAN COAST COULD NOT CONSIDER "TALKS" IN MEXI. ANY "TALKS" WOULD DEPEND ON THE U.S. CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT IT REALLY INTERESTED IN "TALKS", THAT IS, THAT U.S. STOP ITS AGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND PROVE INTERESTED PEACEFUL APPROACH PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THEY IN CUBA FELT THAT "TALKS" MEXI MERELY STALL FOR TIME

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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201-267298

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

MEXI 1889 IN 18812

WHILE U.S. PLANNED FURTHER AGRESSION. AM-1 THEN TOLD L-1 HE NOT ABLE UNDERSTAND DUALITY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, THAT IS, WHILE L-1 MEXI TRYING ARRANGE "TALKS" WITH U.S. REP OTHER AGENCIES PLANNING AGRESSION. L-1 TOLD AM-1 HE DID NOT KNOW REASON THIS, IF TRUE, BUT SUPPOSED DIFFERENT GROUPS INTERESTED CERTAIN ASPECTS PROBLEM AND THAT CAUSING DUALITY.

3. AM-1 ASKED L-1 WHY HE CONSIDERED VULNERABLE "DEFECTION". L-1 TOLD HIM THAT ALL EXILES SURPRISED SEE HIM REMAIN WITH REGIME WHICH THAY FELT NOT TO HIS TASTE. AM-1 SAID THAT WHILE HE HAVA PRESS RELEASE FROM STOCKHOLM REPORTED AM-1 HAD TAKEN ASYLUM.

4. L-1 SAID THAT AM-1 VERY MUCH ALARMED SITUATION. CONVINCED U.S. PLANNING AGGRESSION. TOLD L-1 HE PLANNED BREAK NEWS TO PRESS RE PLANNED AGRESSION TWO OR THREE DAYS. (COMMENT: AM-1 STATEMENTS APPEARED PRESS MORNING 6 SEPT). DOOR "LEFT OPEN" FURTHER CONTACT IF FELT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

**RE RECRUITING SUBJ.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 5

[illegible], ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

AUG 10 0512Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 44830

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1681

REF DIR 27823 (out 63558)

[illegible]/AMLAW-1/LITAMIL-1

1. ON EVENING 9 AUG LITAMIL-1 CALLED AMLAW-1 AT CUBAN EMBASSY (LIENVOY CONFIRMS). L-1 USING TRUE NAME LEFT TEL NUMBER WITH ANA MARIA BLANCO T., AMB'S SECRETARY ORDER AM-1 RETURN CALL. HALF HOUR LATER AM-1 CALLED FROM CUBAN EMB (LIENVOY CONFIRMS) AND WAS TOLD THAT RE "CONVERSATION WE HAD" THAT THOSE MEN ("AQUELLOS SENORES") [illegible] WITH HIM. [illegible] QUESTION WAS WHETHER PERSON SHOULD [illegible] FROM "THERE" ("DE ALLA") OR "HERE" ("AQUI MISMO"). L-1 SAID [illegible] ACCEPTABLE. AM-1 SAID WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE TRIP CUBA FEEL [illegible] THERE ("TANTEAR LA COSA ALLI") AND UPON RETURNING [illegible] SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE. AM-1 ADDED THAT UPON RETURN WOULD CALL L-1 AND LET HIM KNOW.

2. [illegible] CURTIS SEES NO PROBLEM EMB/ODACID RELATIONS. [illegible] ODACID CHIEF HERE THAT EITHER LOCAL OR HQS [illegible] CONTACT AM-1. CHOICE [illegible] MORE DIFFICULT AS PERSON [illegible] FIRST CONTACT MUST SPEAK FLUENT SPANISH AND BE FULLY [illegible] INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS CUBAN PROBLEM. SHOULD AM-1

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

THROUGH L-1 DEMONSTRATE DESIRE DISCUSS PERSONAL SITUATION CURTIS BELIEVES THIS COULD BE HANDLED LOCALLY ON CLANDESTINE BASIS. AT ANY RATE FUTURE ACTION DEPENDS REMARKS AM-1 WHO PLANS RETURN END AUG.

3. ANY DEVELOPMENTS RE MAN PLANNED CONTACT AM-1'S BROTHER-IN-LAW?

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT CABLES.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

10 Aug 62

[illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible] a regular [illegible] reporting has as yet [illegible] for [illegible] of the [illegible] have expanded considerably during July, and this report will attempt to give a birds-eye view of the overall activity as a basis for future progress reporting. In summary during July 1962 the [illegible] recruited a new penetration of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and a former employee of that Embassy with excellent access to [illegible] Embassy circles; they had one [illegible] channel functioning actively during the month; they located a site for their clandestine radio; they have a cover company possibility which is being seriously considered for activation; and they have approximately seven legal traveler operations under development or active. The [illegible] now number 13, practically all of whom are [illegible]

10 August 62

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
RYBAT

ORIG: EDWARD MARELIUS.kk
UNIT: C/TFW/FI
EXT: 6072
DATE: 6 August 1962

1535

1535

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

Aug 67 19 05z

TO: MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/TFW 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, S/C 2

① [illegible] FYI

② Mueller F

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT ~~63555~~ OUT 63555

TO MEXI INFO WAVE

CITE DIR 28483 28483

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

RYBAT GYROSE LITAMIL-1

REF: A. MEXI 1614 (IN 40150)

B. HMMA-19172, 8 JUNE 1962

1. SUBJECT REF A ASSIGNED CRYPTONYMN AMLAW-1.

2. CONCUR STATION OPINION REASONS AMLAW-1 INTEREST FURTHER MEETS AND DESIRE FOLLOW UP BY INTRODUCTION KUBARK STAFFER AT APPROPRIATE TIME. APPEARS FROM WHAT WE KNOW OF A-1 AND INTIMATIONS REF B, HE MORE INTERESTED IN HONEST BROKER ROLE THAN DEFECTION OR ANY OTHER TYPE ROLE IN PLACE. FEEL THEREFORE WE SHLD APPROACH HIM WITH THIS IN MIND AND PLAY HIM FOR INTEL, PREPARED HOWEVER TO PUT HIM ON PAYROLL OR CATCH HIM IF HE DROPS.

3. ABOVE RAISES PROBLEM OF HANDLING (1) VIS A VIS EMB AND ODACID AND (2) SELECTION APPROPRIATE STAFFER, I.E., SUFFICIENTLY SENIOR SPANISH SPEAKER PREFERABLY, WE ASSUME, FROM OUTSIDE MEXI, WHO AVAILABLE FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET
RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONT.......

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

201-267298

ORIG : EDWARD MARELIUS:kk
UNIT : C/TFW/FI
EXT : 6172
DATE : ~~6 August 1962~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
RYBAT

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

8 [illegible] 19 05z

TO : MEXICO CITY JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE TWO

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 63555

TO INFO CITE DIR 28483

WLD HAVE RENARD AVAILABLE THIS PURPOSE IN ABOUT A MONTH. REQUEST CURTIS COMMENTS ON ALL ABOVE. ESP ODACID/EMB ANGLE.

4. MEANWHILE, SUGGEST LITAMIL-1 RECONTACT A-1 PRIOR LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR ANOTHER GENERAL TALK ALONG LINES STATION SUGGESTS WITH ADDED FILLIP THAT HE ABLE GUARANTEE CHAT WITH ODYOKE OFFICIAL ON A-1 OSTENSIBLE TERMS AFTER PBRUMEN TRIP.

5. IF IT TURNS OUT THERE IS MORE BEHIND A-1 CALL THAN WE HAVE READ INTO IT, HQS PREPARED AND STATION AUTHORIZED GO ALL OUT MAKE A DEAL WITH HIM.

(END OF MESSAGE)

TFW/SA

WH3/MEX

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

264

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 4 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/TFW 5 (MR MULLOY TFW NOTIFIED & COPY SLOTTED AT 1745, 4 AUG)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING
1 F1 4
2 5
3 6

AUG 4 2025Z 62

PRIORITY

IN 40150

PRITY DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 1614

REF MEXI 1475 (IN 32730)

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

GYROSE/LITAMIL-1/RYBAT

1. NIGHT 3 AUG, CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA, CUBAN AMB MEXI CALLED LILAMIL-1 AND ASKED HIM WHAT HAD DEVELOPED RE CONTACT PARA 4 REF. L-1 SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD BUT SUPPOSED CASE STILL UNDER STUDY.

2. LECHUGA MOVE HIGHLY INTERESTING AS L-1 WAS TO HAVE MADE CONTACT LECHUGA WHEN NEWS RE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

3. MEXI OPINION L-1 SHOULD CONTACT LECHUGA SOONEST ORDER EXPAND DISCUSSION REF AND SEEK COMMON GROUND RE LECHUGA PERSONAL POSITION. IN VIEW LECHUGA SCHEDULED TRIP HAVA 10 AUG REQUEST HQS COMMENTS SOONEST AS TO WHAT L-1 MIGHT SAY. STATION OPINION LECHUGA INTERESTED U.S. CONTACT ORDER DISCUSS CUBAN U.S. RELATIONS OR PERSONAL SITUATION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *LITAMIL 7 TOLD CARDOS LECHUGA THAT LITAMIL 1 INTERESTED TALK TO HIM RE PERSONAL MATTER.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-267298

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

22 MARCH 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: Transfer of Agent Files to TFW

The following agent files have been permanently transferred to TFW. They will assume all responsibility for these agents effective this date. The area of operations and duties for the agents will not change, therefore, no PRQ II amendments will be submitted and the effective clearances are valid.

LITAMIL-1	C-80638	201-267298
LITAMIL-2	C-82583	201-275992
LITAMIL-4	C-86903	201-275058
LITAMIL-6	C-93632	201-304783

N. P. Holman
C/WH/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: Anita Potocki
UNIT: FI/D
EXT: 6471
DATE: 17 April 1961

TO: Tokyo
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

Not Sent

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
XX ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO TOKY INFO CITE DIR

RYBAT LCIMPROVE ZRPERUSAL ZRGRACE

REF: TOKY-6171 (IN 24886)

1. APPRECIATE REF, WHICH FIRST REPORT MARTIN CONTACT WITH DR JAKOB Y. FISCHER.

2. RE PARA 2B REF, FIND FISCHER QUOTE VOLUNTEERED COMMENTS END QUOTE AND ONI REACTION INTERESTING, ESPECIALLY REPORT QUOTE HE APPEARED INTRIGUED BY IDEA USE HIS PLACE FOR MTGS END QUOTE. THIS OUT OF CHARACTER IN LIGHT HIS KNOWN CONTACTS VARIOUS INTEL OFFICERS, INCLUDING KUBARKERS WHO USED HIS RESTAURANT FOR MTGS. PRESUME REF QUOTE YURI RASTVOROV AMER FEMALE CONTACT END QUOTE REFERS MISS MAUDE L. BURRIS (ALIAS QUOTE MRS. BROWNING END QUOTE), BORN TEXAS, ELDERLY DAC EMPLOYEE OF AEP SCHOOL TOKY, RASTVOROV'S ENGLISH TEACHER 48-END 53 AND CLOSE CONTACT. BURRIS WAS JOINT ODOPAL/KUBARK ASSET THROUGH WHOM ACTUAL DEFECTION CONTACT JAN 54 ESTABLISHED. (CF. JACO-1564

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

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☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE TWO

(IN 12657) 27 JAN 54.) JULY 56 SHE REPORTED CHIEF EDUC ADVISOR HQS FIRST CAVALRY DIV, ASSIGNED TROOP INFO AND EDUC OFFICE TOKY, WHO PRIOR 25 JUL 56 PUBLICATION RASTVOROV ARTICLES IN QUOTE YOMIURI TOKY NEWS END QUOTE WAS PATIENT DR. YEVGENIY AKSENOV, M.D., NAMED BY R. AS KGB AGENT SINCE 47. HOWEVER, SUSPECT COMMENT MAY ALSO BE VEILED REF TO ANTONINA JOHANSSON, CO-OWNER WITH VERA DUNAYEVA OF BEREZKA RESTAURANT, 21, ONE-CHOME, KAMIDORI, SHIBUYA-KU, SUSPECTED AS MTG PLACE AND POSS BASE OF OPS FOR SOV INTEL ORGANIZATION ALLEGEDLY FINANCED BY SOV MISSION TOKY. (CF: FJTA-13051, 18 SEPT 56; FJTA-13786, 30 OCT 56 AND FJBA-8146, ATT. 21 DEC 55 - AEMARBLE REPORT).

3. IN RE ABOVE, NOTE VALENTIN VALKOV, EX-SPOUSE MRS. TWILLEY, FORMER EMPLOYEE JOHANSSON AND DUNAYEVA AS MANAGER BEREZKA, ALLEGEDLY FIRED FOR PRO-SOV REMARKS TO CUSTOMERS. ALSO NOTE DUNAYEV AND WIFE MEMBERS CATHEDRAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM: DIRECTOR
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☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE THREE

NICOLAI-DO, AS ARE ANTONIOS E. PAPPADOPOULOS, MUEHLENBERG AND TWILLEY, PER ENCL. FJTA-32421, 26 APR 60. TWO LATTER INDIVIDUALS OF COURSE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FIRST HANDLING RASTVOROV AND PROBABLY KNOWN JOHANSSON. ALSO NOTE AEMARBLE REPORTS 801 AND 807 OF FEB 57 SHOW AKSENOV IN CONTACT U.S. OFFICIALS VISITING BISHOP IRENEY AND SISTERHOOD OF NICOLAI-DO. FYI ONLY: FJTA 32421 INFO ON MEMBERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE CATHEDRAL AMONG INFO ON PAPPADOPOULOS SENT ODINCH, ODIBEX/ACSI AND ODENVY. THIS INFO MAY BE PASSED ONI THROUGH ODEARL/ACSI COMMITTEE AS IN CASE 18 NOV 60 PERIS MEMO.

4. CONCUR VIEWS PARA 4 REF RE LIAISON ONI. IN EFFORT EXPEDITE DIRECT REPORTING, WILL MERELY REQUEST DNI AT HQS LEVEL FURNISH TRACES GEORGE PERIS AND CONTACTS, INCLUDING PAPPADOPOULOS,

5. RECEIVED FIRST ODINCH REPORT DTD 4 JAN 61 INCLUDING FULL REPORT ONI:

INVESTIGATION JAPAN: NO MENTION PERIS ET AL. FOLLOWING

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE FOUR

ITEMS OF INTEREST:

A. JOHN J. CASEY RESIDENT NATICK, MASS. NAMED AS MUTUAL CONTACT AND CO-WORKER MITCHELL AND MARTIN WHILE ON DUTY YOKOSUKA. OCT 60 CASEY, SUSPECTED HOMO, IN LETTER CONTACT GARY A. LONG, USNR ENSIGN STATIONED YOKOSUKA. LONG ADMITTED HOMO UNDER ONI INVESTIGATION.

B. MARTIN REPORTED CLOSE CONTACT AND CO-WORKER AS DAC CIVILIAN TOKY OF JOSEPH W. JASON AKA JOSEPH W. GESUSK, DPOB 6 SEPT 26 WORCESTER, MASS. EMPLOYED AS GS-5 IN TELETYPE SECTION, FEC SIGNAL SERVICE BATTN, PERSHING HTS. JASON APPLIED KUBARK 1951, DECLINED APPOINTMENT TO ACCEPT ANOTHER JOB PRIOR COMPLETION BACKGROUND INVESTIG. AND CLEARANCE. FEB 45-DEC 46 SERVED AS T-5 ODIBEX DENTAL TECHNICIAN AT CAMP CROFT AND OSAKA, JAPAN. FEB 47-NOV 48 GOVT EMPLOYEE DENTAL TECHNICIAN, CONNECTED GRAVES REGIS-

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER S-E-C-R-E-T AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

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FROM: DIRECTOR
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PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE FIVE

TRATION, MANILA AND OKINAWA. EOD TOKY UNKNOWN BUT DEPARTED 1956. AS OF NOV 60 ASSIGNED RUAW STARCOMM (RELAY STATION) ODIBEX, RYUKYU ISLAND, OKIE.

C. MARTIN ALSO CONTACT OF MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE, DAC EMPLOYEE FEC SIGN BATTN, SUSPECT HOMO, CLOSE FRIEND J. W. JASON. RESIGNED TOKY JOB DEC 55 AND PLANNED RETURN ZI VIA EUROPE. RECORDS SHOW ROCHELLE STOPPED ENROUTE PARI WHERE HIRED AS DAC BY UNIDEN PBPRIME UNIT. LATER LEFT FRANCE ALLEGEDLY RETURNED NY WHERE HIRED AS TELETYPE OPERATOR BY ODUNIT.

D. 10 NOV 60 ONI INTERVIEW ROLAND ORA BELCHER, CT-2, IN HAWAII, SHOWS BELCHER FROM CA DEC 52 THRU JUL 55 MARTIN CO-WORKER KAMISEYA AND LATER TOKY. SHARED MARTIN QUOTE WATCHES END QUOTE. REPORTED PRIOR DISCHARGE, MARTIN OCCASIONALLY VISITED MALE JAPANESE ARTIST-POTTER WHO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM: DIRECTOR
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PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE SIX

OWNED KILN LOCATED WITHIN 50 MILES KAMISEYA. RECALLED INSTANCE, PRESUMABLY SPRING 55, WHEN MARTIN RELATED HE GUEST AT LARGE PARTY ARRANGED BY ABOVE POTTER WHERE MARTIN MET QUOTE SOME ABOVE AVERAGE PEOPLE END QUOTE. MARTIN VISITED KILN DURING QUOTE TIME ON LIBERTY END QUOTE.

5. CONSIDER ABOVE MARTIN REMARK OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT PRESENCE TOKY SPRING 55 OF AETANKARD 4 WHO INTERESTED ARTS, AND TRIP APR 55 TO TOKY OF AETANKARDS 1 AND 2. KILN OPERATOR COULD BE MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCE OR IN CONTACT SUCH OF MARTIN AND AETANKARD-4. REALIZE THIS EXTREMELY SLIM LEAD BUT SUGGEST BEAR IN MIND AND ATTEMPT THROUGH LIAISON WITH ODENVY AND ONI REPS OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS JAPAN CONTACTS OF AETANKARD-4 AND MARTIN IN EFFORT IDENTIFY POTTER-ARTIST AND PARTY GUESTS.

6. REQUEST STATION TRACES JOHN JOSEPH CASEY, JOSEPH W. JASON AKA GESUSE AND MAJOR PAUL ROCHELLE. ALSO ADVISE IF BURRIS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

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DATE :

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAGE SEVEN

STILL TOKY.

END OF MSG

C/FE/JAO

C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

C/CI/OPS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/FI/D
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ALVAREZ, Ramon Jr.
201-0119523 VOL II

INCLUSIVE DATES: 25 Jul 1956 - 14 Jul 1965
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO
ROOM: 3D57
DELETIONS, IF ANY: None

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

II
57-65

SEE VOL III

1957-65

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan

EXTENSION: 6576

NO.:

DATE: 14 July 1965

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/PERS			
2. ~~WH/SI~~ C/WH/SS		8/2 7/15	ccb
3. C/CPD 5E 69	22 JUL 1965		WO
4. O/F			
5.			
6. CAAS		7/29	
7. WH/Pers/Renehan GH-4404 Headquarters			
8.			
9. WH/1 Mrs. Butler			B
10.			
11.			
12.			
13. [illegible]			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Mr. Renehan.
Per conv. this date with Charlotte B WH/B-1 this man is Foreign Natl No need for us to have.

7-8 - The attached for your retention

Thanks
J.D.

Copy sent Station under HMMW-4239 - 28 Jul 65

file 201

HEARTY-1

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

14 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent, be further amended as follows.

a. Increase compensation to $6500. per year effective 1 July 1965.

b. Extend period of contract for one year from date of expiration.

2. The recommendation of the Mexico City Station, concurred with by WHD, was based on his demonstrated technical ability and professional competence.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1965 said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $6000 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $6500.

Effective 1 October 1965 said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DATE: 2 July 1965

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part I - Request for Action

Raymond H. GERENDE — Contract Agent

Name (Pseudonym) — STATUS (Career Agent, Contract Agent, Contract Employee)

Raise in salary - $500 per annum

PROPOSED ACTION (Include Branch and/or field recommendations; specific operational task performed by individual; views re long and/or short range utility of individual for Branch area and overall Division needs)

The contract for Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. The Mexico City Station has recommended that the contract be extended for one year, and that GERENDE be granted a salary increase from $6,000 to $6,500 per annum.

GERENDE received his last salary raise on 1 August 1963, from $5,500 to $6,000. He was first placed under contract on 1 October 1955 at $3,600.

There are sufficient funds in the LIEMPTY Project to cover this salary increase, and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

BOARD ACTION:

DATE: ____________

APPROVED BY: ____________

SECRET

LIEMPTY-1

Gerende

201

201-119523

Date: ______________

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part II - Biographic Data

NAME--True ☐ Pseudo ☒	DOB	CITIZENSHIP	201 Number
Raymond H. GERENDE	New York City 7 Dec 1933	Mexican	201-119523

MARITAL STATUS DEPENDENTS--RELATIONSHIP--DOB

wife: Hester Roos de Alvarez	2 sons - 4 and 1 1 daughter - 6 yrs old

EDUCATION

Dates	Name of School	Location	Degree	Major Studies
1952	American High School	Mexico City	high school	
1955	Mexico City College	Mexico City	B.A.	Latin American Studies

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES--Indicate Proficiency--R-W-S-U

English - native)bilingual
Spanish - native)
French - poor

NON-AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Include Military Service (5 years prior to Agency connection)

Dates	Name of Employer	Location	Job or Function	Salary/ Grade
	Other than part time jobs which were many:			
May 1953- Dec 1954	Roger McCann & Chas Davis,	Mexico City,	Sales Manager	$40-50/montl

AGENCY EXPERIENCE--Staff ☐ Contract Agent ☒ Career Agent ☐ Contract Employee ☐

Dates	*Cover Employer Name	Location	Basic Salary	Ops Tasks
Mar 1955	Farolitos de Mexico (bona fide) salary offset	Mexico City	$3,600	Member of surveillance team, cutout/ P.A to phogographic bashouses, investigator, etc. basehouse operator and processor of tapes

*Indicate also nature of business and whether bona fide or Agency mechanism.

SECRET

WHD AGENT BOARD

Part III

Chronological Narrative
Performance Report

NAME/PSEUDONYM:

(Summary of evaluation of past performance /if applicable/ with emphasis and details of current performance for assigned operational tasks)

DATES LOCATION AGENCY TASK

GERENDE was recruited in March 1955, just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He was trained as a member of a surveillance team, and was also used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was leader of the team.

He was also used as a basehouse keeper in an audio operation and processor of tapes. He excelled in this type of work because of his bilingual Spanish/English facility, and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permited him to spot operational leads.

Since 1958 his primary use has been as main cutout/principal agent to a group of photographic basehouses targeted against the Soviet Embassy, and one mobile photographic truck. He processes the raw photographic take and services the majority of the accomodation addresses used by the Station. He has contributed significantly to the AMROD operation

He performs all his tasks in a professional manner. He is well suited to intelligence work, and plans to make KUBARK his career. The Station depends heavily on him because of his knowledge of Mexico, and his mobility as a Mexican. He works full time for KUBARK; cover company requires very little time.

In case of "New Hire" give a personality assessment in terms of capability, attitude, and projected suitability; state names of Division personnel who have interviewed him; give account of his performance in current non-Agency job.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	XX
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-13688, 7 June 1965

1. Reference notified Station Mexico City that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE will expire on 30 September 1965. In recognition of GERENDE's increased operational responsibility and the professional manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to provide for a salary increase from $6,000 U. S. per annum to $6,500 per annum.

2. Project LIEMPTY can absorb this additional expense and GERENDE's local cover job can logically cover this additional income.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-26449	DATE 24 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

14-00000

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM
Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-24,220

1. The contract for GERENDE expires on 30 September 1965. Please notify Headquarters whether you wish to have the contract extended another year, and whether any changes are desired.

2. Headquarters regrets that the Station inadvertently was not notified last year of the extension of the contract.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

20- 119523
10 JUN 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-13,688 CS COPY	DATE 7 June 65
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

RI
Chrono

WH/1
ABSTRACT

ORIGINATING
OFFICE WH/1/C. OFFICER Bustos-Videla: TYPIST mep EXT. 4507

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
	JUN 12 4 23 PM '65	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH0D		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

MEMORAND[illegible]

FROM [illegible]

[illegible]

Raymond H. Gerende

1. [illegible] **1 October 1964** [illegible]

amended, [illegible] **1 October 1955**

[illegible] **one (1) year**

[illegible]

remain [illegible] and effect

UNITED STATES [illegible]

2. ______________________

[illegible]

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded [illegible]

LIEMPTY-1

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

FROM : Renewal of Contract of Raymond H. GERENDE

Please extend for a period of one (1) year without change the contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, Contract Agent. The contract expires on 30 September 1964.

W. E. Brooks
Chief WH Support

Distribution:
Orig - Contract Personnel Div.
1 - WH/Pers
1 - Subject

SECRET [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

XX MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-12844, 21 August 1964

It is requested that Subject's contract be renewed as presently written. No changes are requested at this time.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-24220	1 September 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1964. Please advise by return dispatch whether the contract should be renewed and if any changes are desired.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
C&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-12844

DATE 24 AUG 1964
21 August 1964

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

~~Distribution:~~
1-Chrono

ROUTING	INITIALS
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	✓
[illegible]	
RID/FI	

~~DESTROY~~

ORIGINATING

OFFICE — OFFICER RLR TYPIST EXT.
WH/1/R. L. Lehman:chk 4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/PERS	21 Aug 64	[illegible] for [illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		Desmond FitzGerald

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 20 March 1964 dlr

TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichhardt

/s/ Edward P. Brown

C NO. C - 32743

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please come to CI/OA to discuss HMMA-22920.

discussed
CI/OA recommends
[illegible] [illegible].

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-63 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

Rud

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/RYBAT

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MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division JFK

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: HMMW-12284 dated 24 January 1964

1. Station Mexico City fully agrees with Headquarters evaluation of Subject as a "valuable long term asset with stay behind potential." In order to place the matter of the 2,100 pesos in the apropriate frame of reference it is felt that a few background points should be noted.

In January 1956 the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC basehouse was set up and placed in operation in a site which provided visual coverage of the LIMERICK installation. A deposit of three months rent was made per terms of the rental contract at that time (2,100 pesos.) In April 1961 the building in which LIEMPTY/LILYRIC is located was sold by the owner. Normally the rental deposit would have been transferred to the new owner as part of the sale transaction. However, approximately three months after the transfer of the property to the new owner, the rental deposit was returned to the basehouse operator, LIEMPTY-13. The deposit was then returned to GERENDE. GERENDE did not inform the then LIEMPTY case officer nor the present case officer of the return of the LIEMPTY/LILYRIC deposit. This 2,100 pesos continued to be carried on the Station books as an outstanding operational advance charged to GERENDE. GERENDE used part of this 2,100 pesos to make loans to two sub-agents (LIEMPTY-6 and LIEMPTY-9.) It is probably that he also used some of this on ocassion for his own purposes.

On 16 October 1963 GERENDE returned the 2,100 pesos to the case officer and the Station has adjusted its books to reflect the return of this money. GERENDE noted at the time of the return that he had this money intact but did not know how to go about returning it so long after having received it. This is the same as he stated at the time of the LCFLUTTER interview. GERENDE was obviously impressed with his inability to "beat" the LCFLUTTER. He was sincerely remorseful when talking to the case officer

(Continued)

Distribution:
(3) C/WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22920	17 February 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/RYBAT	201-119523

about the incident and has twice stated that nothing of this nature would happen again. With the reality of future LCFLUTTER tests set firmly in GERENDE's mind, it is believed that he will not attempt any such action again.

As to what can be done of a positive nature (other than periodic re-LCFLUTTER) to prevent recurrence it must be noted that GERENDE kept apart the 2,100 pesos which were really still charged to him and the Station had no way of knowing that the money had been returned to him by the basehousekeeper. Only when the close down of the LI[illegible]/ LILYRIC basehouse would be effected would the Station expect to have the rental deposit returned. Until such time the deposit would remain charged to GERENDE. The only way to completely safeguard against this type of action would be for the case officer to meet directly with the basehouse keepers, thereby eliminating GERENDE from the operation and causing unacceptable security risks. It is believed that periodic LCFLUTTER of GERENDE is the best insurance against a similar occurence in the future.

As to GERENDE's regular operational revolving fund, irregularities have never been discovered in his handling of these funds. Cash counts are conducted by the case officer to control the unspent portion of the revolving fund by comparison with accountings (receipts) GERENDE makes every two weeks. GERENDE's revolving fund is kept at the minimum amount consistant with efficient conduct of the operation for which GERENDE is responsible.

The "other false claims" GERENDE admitted making involved occasional use of his QP vehicle for personal driving while entering all receipts for gas on his KUBARK accountings. Station does not consider this a major problem. If GERENDE used his QP car for only operational employment any hostile surveillance of him would be relatively easy (i.e., surveilling only when he is using his QP vehicle) and it is believed that latitude must be allowed in this area for indigenous agents.

2. In the area of GERENDE's morale and his statement that he "is not being utilized to his full potential" the Station is as fully concerned as Headquarters. It should be noted however, that GERENDE has never written the report setting forth what he thinks he can do and when prodded on this has stated that he had been thinking about what additional work he could assume and that he "just does not know". The reason he gives is he does not know what else is being done in the operations area other than that to which he is already exposed. Additional operational work is assigned to GERENDE when this can be done securely and taking into account compartmentation of operations. An example of this was his introduction to the AMROD operation. Station is reluctant to expose GERENDE to additional operations only for the purpose of "improving his morale" since he already has considerable knowledge of many Station past and going operations. The Station appreciates Headquarters comments on the results of GERENDE's LCFLUTTER and will make every effort to determine the best possible utilization of GERENDE in the future.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO 2

[illegible] | SECRET [illegible]

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division	MICROFILM

SUBJECT

Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMW-12065

1. Reference is made to the results of the LCFLUTTER interview of Raymond H. GERENDE which was held on 8 October 1963. Headquarters would like to have a progress report on what steps have been taken by the Case Officer with regard to the 2,100 pesos which he had kept but belonged to KUBARK. Headquarters is also interested in what has been done about other false claims he admitted making in his accountings, and what precautions are being taken to see that this does not continue in the future.

2. The Station's comments are requested on GERENDE's statement that he is not being utilized to his full potential and that he often has free time. Headquarters would be interested in seeing a copy of the report which the LCFLUTTER examiner suggested he write, setting forth what he (GERENDE) thinks he can do and what he would like to do. Headquarters considers GERENDE a valuable long term asset with staybehind potential, and it is hoped that the Station will do what it can within the limits of security, to raise his morale and see that KUBARK is receiving full benefit of his services.

Oliver G. GALBOND

Distribution:
O&1-COS, Mexico City

Gerende 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-12284	DATE 20 January 1964 21 JAN
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

Distribution:
cc-CI/OA
1-RI
1-Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico/C. Bustos:chk			5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
CI/OA	20 Jan	Lolly (in draft)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	20 Jan 64	J.C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 30 December 1963 dlr

TO: WH/3/Mexico - Mr. Reichaardt

C NO. C - 32743

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☒	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☒ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. [illegible], Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMW-3077, 7 August 1963

Attached is executed copy of contract amendment in accordance with reference.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment
As stated (h/w)

Distribution
3 - WH w/att (h/w)

[illegible]
201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-3986	20 August 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 August 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5500 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation", and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $6000.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

29 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Increase in Compensation,
Raymond H. GERENDE

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended, for Raymond H. GERENDE be further amended to provide increase in compensation from $5,500 per annum to $6,000 per annum.

2. This request, submitted by the Mexico Station and concurred with by WH Division is in recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibilities and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, WH Division		MICROFILM
SUBJECT Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The contract of Raymond H. GERENDE expires on 30 September 1963. It is requested that the Station forward a request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments desired, to arrive at Headquarters by 1 September.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
0 & 1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-11732	DATE 11 JUL 1963 3 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-119523

Distribution:
1 - Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	DM
~~[illegible]~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
WH/3/m	
~~[illegible]~~	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	T. Ward	db	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1963	for J. C. King

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Salary Increase - Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

In recognition of GERENDE's operational responsibility and the manner in which he carries out his operational assignments, it is requested that his contract be amended to grant him a salary increase from $5,500.00 p.a. to $6,000.00 p.a. effective 1 July 1963.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution
3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[illegible]-3885	3 July 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LIEMPTY-3
201-117758
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
BUSINESS ASSOCIATE IN CUNASA OF
GUILLERMO SALAZAR POLANCO 201-239372

201-239372
HMMA-20956 E01
22 MAR 63
P5

1314294

PAZR

1 314 294

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 20 FEB 63

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, CS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FEB 21 0310Z 63

ROUTINE

DIR CITE MEXI 3513 JN72031

REF DIR 17796

1. MEXI LCFLUTTER CANDIDATES: RAMOND H. GERENDE (BILINGUAL), OLIVER G. SCANTLING (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-1 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-2 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-3 (BILINGUAL), LIEMBRACE-4 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-5 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-6 (SPANISH), LIEMBRACE-9 (SPANISH) (NOTE - PLAN USE LIEMBRACE-3, SURVEILLANCE TEAM LEADER, AS INTERPRETER FOR OTHER LIEMBRACE TEAM MEMBERS), AMSPRAWL-2 (BILINGUAL), LIFIRE-4 (SPANISH) AND LIFIRE-5 (SPANISH) (NOTE - NO STATION ASSET AVAILABLE INTERPRET FOR LCFLUTTER OF LIFIRE/4 AND 5. IF LCFLUTTER OPERATORS DO NOT SPEAK SPANISH CAN HQS PROVIDE INTERPRETER TDY THIS PURPOSE?) LIMOTOR-22 (ENGLISH). IF TIME AVAILABLE ALSO DESIRE LCFLUTTER LIMUST-7, LUMUST-5, LIMOTOR-19. ALL THREE SPEAK ENGLISH.

2. HQS EQUIPMENT BE POUCHED MEXI.

16 copies
in each 201

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *TWO MAN LCFLUTTER TEAM LEAVING HQS ABOUT 10 MAR. NAME CANDIDATES AND SPECIFY CASES FOR WHICH INTERPRETER AVAILABLE.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-119523
201-119523

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : Charlotte Bus . .s:sj
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 4 Dec 62

TO MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO : CI/OA, CCS 2, S/C 2

Ri File
No indexing
C. Burks

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 DEC 62 15 39z

~~SIG CEN~~
DEFERRED
R ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 03369

03369

REF HMMA-19978*

GERENDE CONTRACT AMENDED 8 NOV TO INCLUDE CHRISTMAS BONUS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *Requested amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (201-119523) contract for a one month's bonus at Christmas.

WHBM Fravion

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/PS~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

WH/PERS/RENAHAN
WH/~~COPS~~

11 9 23 AM 62

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

TO	: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO.	
FROM	: Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT	: Raymond H. GERENDE

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	ABSTRACT
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HMMA-19978

Attached is a copy of the contract amendment providing Subject with a Christmas bonus.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment: 1

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

201-119523

ROUTING	INITIALS
1 - RI RID/AN 1 Chrono	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/FE~~	
RID/FI	
~~DESTROY~~	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 Dec 62	7 DEC 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HMMW-11145

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico -	Bustos	sj	5940

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 DEC 1962	J. C. King

FORM 8-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GREENE, Contract Amendment

1. Effective 18 October 1962, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GREENE dated 1 October 1955 is amended to provide an annual Christmas bonus equal to one month's basic compensation.

2. All other provisions of the contract as amended remain in effect.

WH Contract Approving Officer

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

18 October 1962

MEMORANDUM TO: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the current contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, be amended to include a Christmas bonus of one month's salary. This amendment should be affective immediately.

2. GERENDE is an indigenous agent, and this Christmas bonus is normal for all employees in Mexico.

Paul E. Arneson
C/WH/Support

O&1 - CPD
1 - WH/Pers
1 - C/WH/Support
1 - Subject

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACTION COMPLETED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to Subject's contract so that it will include as Christmas bonus one month's salary. This Christmas bonus is normal for all indigenous employees in Mexico, and should be included in Subject's contract.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
8 Oct. 1962

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-19978;KAPOK-1991

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-119523

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

Excluded from

045

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 17 SEP 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH 7, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 18 0435Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 23918

DIR CITE MEXI 1957 (OUSLER ACTING)

NYXIS BEDOX

1. DUE LATE WORD THAT LAW SCHOOL STARTS 17 SEPT BETUMBLE DEPARTED MEXI 17 SEPT VIA AMERICAN FLIGHT 58. INSTRUCTED THAT HQS MAY CONTACT ALTHOUGH FINANCES (INCL. SALARY THROUGH 17 SEPT, OPS EXPENSES, TRAVEL AND 50 DOLLARS LIVING EXPENSE AUTHORIZED ORAL AGREEMENT, BUT NOT BONUS) CLEARED MEXI PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE.

2. AT LAST MEET WITH POTASZ 14 SEPT, WHICH AUTHORIZED BY CO, POTASZ INDICATED ALTHOUGH NOT PARTICULARLY SATISFIED WITH LIFE HE LONG AGO HAS CHOSEN POLAND. BETUMBLE ASSESSMENT HE WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH KUBARK. POTASZ DOES HAVE BETUMBLE ADDRESS WASH.

3. AT DINNER WITH POTASZ 5 SEPT IN RESTAURANT BETUMBLE TOOK ALONG HIS FRIEND RAYMOND H. GERENDE, STATION CONTRACT AGENT. CO NOT

Gerende 201 ([illegible])

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

AWARE GERENDE FRIENDSHIP WITH BETUMBLE OR BETUMBLE PLANS HAVE GERENDE JOIN HIM AND POTASZ FOR DINNER. DUE GERENDE SENSITIVE STATUS AND LACK RAPPORT BETWEEN HIM AND POTASZ DOUBT ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ALONG THESE LINES CAN BE EXPECTED.

4. POUCHING REPORT BETUMBLE TDY EVENTS.

END OF MESSSAGE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMM-T-2553

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
9 February 1962

SUBJECT
Contract Amendment -
Raymond H. [illegible]

RE "GT" - CHECK "X" ONE
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith are copies of a contract amendment for Subject effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

8 February 1962

Attachment - as stated

DISTRIBUTION
3-WH Division w/attachment
2-Files

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACTION FINISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Amendment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached please find the original and two copies of the above Subject's contract amendment, effective 1 January 1962 and increasing Subject's compensation from $5040 to $5500.

2. The original copy is to be retained in the Field, and a signed carbon copy of the amendment returned to Headquarters.

3. All other terms of the contract remain in full force.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachments:
Per paragraph 1

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City, w/atts.

✓ 1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry, w/o atts.
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono, w/o atts.

D.K.

DATE TYPED: 11 January 1962

DATE DISPATCHED: 17 JAN 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMM-W-10367

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	D. Winters	mrd	3163

C/Mexi

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	12 JAN 1962	J. C. KING

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 61-0b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET

201-119523

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

(SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

(SIGNED) P. E. ARNESON
CONCUR: C/WH/Support

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1962, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $5340 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5500.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:__________________

APPROVED:

____

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

27 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, renewed on October 1961 for a period of two years, be amended to reflect an increase in annual salary from the current $5,040 to $5,500. This increase in salary should be effective 1 January 1962.

NED P. HOLMAN
Chief, WH/3

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | KAPOK-1941

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 11 Dec 1961 ?

SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Amendment of Subject's contract

REFERENCE(S) HMMW-9364, 29 December 1960

1. By reference Subject's annual salary was increased to its present figure of US $5,040.00.

2. Station hereby requests a further increase in Subject's annual salary to US $5,500.00 based upon Subject's outstanding performance as Principal Agent in the LIEMPTY project. The latest LIEMPTY Project Renewal Request, recently forwarded to Headquarters, detailed GERENDE's duties. In Station's opinion, the noted salary increase is considered justified not only from agent's excellent job performance, but also as an incentive to continued superior work as well as an offset to the inflationary trend of the cost of living in Mexico.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate the appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly salary to the noted figure of US $5,500.00 to be effective 1 January 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

11 December 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK ☐ CONTINUED PAGE NO.

[illegible]	ACTION	[illegible]
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Contract Extension for Raymond H. GEHENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA-17499, 4 August 1961

Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for GEHENDE, effective 1 October 1959, is extended for a period of two (2) years. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

DATE TYPED	25 August 1961
DATE DISPATCHED	29 AUG 1961
CROSS REFERENCE TO	
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	HMMW-10039
CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	201-119523

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico/Chrono

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	D.K.
RI/FI	
RI/EI	

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH3/Mexico	C.Bustos-Videla	bj	2555

AC/WH3/Mexico

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	25 AUG 1961	J. C. KING

10039

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 610b WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GERENDE

1. Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECRET

15 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)
Request for Contract Extention

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE be extended for a period of two years or through 30 September 1963.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

Ned P. Holman
C/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject's 201 file ✓
1 - Chrono file

Basic HMMA-17499, 4 Aug 61.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
HMMA-17499

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
201-119523

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
4 August 1961

SUBJECT
-0 Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal
[illegible]

RE: "43-3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
- Renew GERENDE's Contract.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-9873, 5 July 1961

It is requested that Subject's contract, as amended, be renewed for a two year period, 1 October 1961 through 30 September 1963. The Station does not desire to make any changes in Subject's contract at this time.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

2 August 1961

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Operational/Raymond H. GERENDE/Contract Renewal

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Subject's contract will expire on 30 September 1961. The Station is requested to pouch their request for renewal, together with any changes or amendments they may desire, in order that it may reach Headquarters by 1 September 1961.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City

1 - RI
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mexico

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 5 July 1961

DATE DISPATCHED: 7 JUL 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9873

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/3/Mexico	J. Brooke/bj	AC/WH/3/Mexico	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	5 JUL 1961	J. C. KING

9873

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

TO
Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 16 June 1961

SUBJECT
Amendment of Contract - Raymond H. GERENDE

RE: "43-I" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCE(S)
HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

In reviewing GERENDE's personnel file, it was noted that a signed copy of an amendment to his contract, which was forwarded to the Station under reference, had never been forwarded to Headquarters. We therefore, are attaching a signed copy of the contract amendment for your files.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

13 June 1961

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att
2 - Files

FORM 10-57 (40) 53
USE PREVIOUS EDITION
REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:
Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

REVIEWED:
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, KURIOT

SUBJECT
AQUATIC/Operational
UV Lamp for Raymond H. GERENDE

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-16102, 9 December 1960

1. As requested by reference, KURIOT is herewith forwarding the following:
(Confirming documentation charging you for this item will be issued in the near future.)
1 each Mineralight Model SL-3660
Long Wave Ultraviolet Lamp

2. For ordinary F&S work, the difference between long and short wave lamps is very minor and the long wave UV lamp should prove adequate for the needs of Raymond H. GERENDE. Should a special need arise demanding the use of a short wave UV lamp by GERENDE, it will be supplied by KURIOT.

3. Disclosure of the existence, advantages, or uses of short wave UV lamps, or in any way making available such lamps to other than KUBARK personnel requires prior Headquarters approval. A copy of Instruction No. 20-2 containing the basic KURIOT policy governing the use of short wave UV lamps is herewith enclosed for your guidance.

4. Short wave UV lamps embody a definite health hazard and should be used with caution. Short wave UV rays quickly cause sunburn, to which the eyes are particularly susceptible, and should not be used without wearing protective goggles. Ordinary eye glasses cut out most of the harmful rays, but even persons wearing glasses may receive harmful eye burns from UV rays entering at the sides of the glasses. Short wave UV lamps also produce small quantities of ozone so that the lamp should be used in a well ventilated room, which, of course, must also be darkened. For the above reasons, it is advisable to use only a long wave UV lamp whenever possible.

Arthur B. Wielatz
ARTHUR B. WIELATZ

Enclosures: (1 Box and 1 Envl)
1. UV Lamp
2. Instruction No. 20-2

Distribution
3 - COS, Mexico City w/encls

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 April 61	10 APR 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-9666

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201- 119523

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 - RI w/o encls
~~1 - TSD/SSS w/o encls~~
1 - WH/3/MEX w/encls
1 - TSD/SAB w/o encls
1 - WH/LOG w/o encls
1 - TSD/LOG w/o encls

RI/FI

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
TSD/SAB	ATejeda	ja	2922

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/3/MEX	3 April 61	COORD. BY PHONE Stewart Burton (x2555)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/TSD/TA	7 APR 1961	ROBERT K. CRAVEN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HMMA-16378

TO : Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-119523

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 1 February 1961

SUBJECT: -Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: - None.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-9364, 4 January 1961

As requested in reference, returned herewith is one copy of GERENDE's contract amendment. The original copy has been retained by the Station. The Station and GERENDE appreciate Headquarters prompt action in processing the request for an increase in salary.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

26 January 1961

Attachment:
    As stated above.

Distribution:
    3 - WHD (with one copy of attachment)
    2 - Files (with original of attachment)

[illegible] DIVISION
RECEIVED
[illegible] 3 3 38 PM '61

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

CS COPY

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

Special [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

[illegible] SECRET

PROCESSED	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WHD

SUBJECT
Raymond H. GERENDE (pa)

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION: Execute attached contract and return one copy to Headquarters

REFERENCE: HMMA-16065, 30 November 1960

1. The salary raise for Subject which was requested in reference has been approved. The amendment to his contract has been prepared and the approving signature has been executed at Headquarters.

2. It is requested that the Station and Subject sign the attached contract amendment. Since Headquarters has no interest in the funding of Subject, the Station should retain the original of the amendment in their financial files. Please return one signed copy to Headquarters.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment:
Contract Amendment

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City (w/a)

1 - RI
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/3/Mexico

RI 19 WH 391

DATE TYPED: 29 December 1960
DATE DISPATCHED: 6 JAN 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-9364

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-119523

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/3/Mexico	C. Gehrung	new	2555

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/Pers	29 Dec 60	JC Bowers

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD		J. C. King

PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 6100 WHICH MAY BE USED (40)

DISPATCH

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 January 1961, said contract, as amended, is further amended by deleting the figure $4560 from the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $5040.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Field Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:

____

mmw -

SECRET

13 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Finance Division

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

It is requested that the contract for Raymond H. GERENDE, effective 1 October 1955, as amended and extended, be further amended, effective 1 January 1961 to raise the yearly compensation to $5,040.

Ned P. Holman
AC/WH/3

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject

WH/3/Mexico/[redacted]Zehrung:bk

SECRET

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1850

TO : Chief, WH Division

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 30 November 1960

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE "433" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - Amendment to GERENDE's Contract

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-8281, 2 December 1959

1. The referenced dispatch forwarded the most recent contract amendment raising GERENDE's salary to $4,560.00 per year.

2. In the Station's opinion, GERENDE's continued Superior performance of his LIEMPTY Principal Agent duties justifies another salary increase. Headquarters attention is invited to the recent Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY wherein GERENDE's duties were specified.

3. It is requested that Headquarters initiate an appropriate amendment to GERENDE's contract increasing his yearly compensation to $5,040.00. This amendment should be effective 1 January 1961.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

28 November 1960

Distribution:
3 - WHD
2 - Files

[illegible] submitted
13 Dec 60

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

201-119523

DISPATCH | SECRET/KAPOK | KAPOK-1843

TO : Chief, WH Division
INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO
201-119523
50-6-74/1

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 23 November 1960

SUBJECT - Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)/Emergency Contact Arrangments

RE 433 - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - None, for Headquarters information only

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-15979, KAPOK-1842 dated 18 November 1960

1. In compliance with the KUBARK regulation, CSI-F No. 230-60, Annex A, concerning contact arrangments under emergency conditions, the following information, including recognition signals and bona fides, is forwarded for Headquarters records. Due to the sensitivity of the information, it was believed more appropriate to forward it separately rather than to include it with reference (Request for Renewal of Project LIEMPTY).

2. Insofar as can be determined at the present time, GERENDE could probably be contacted at one of the following places:

a. Present Residence: IDENTITY A

b. Mother's Residence: IDENTITY B

c. Cover Employment Address: IDENTITY C

3. The following oral recognition signals, using the English language, are to be used as indicated:

CONTACT: "Mr. (GERENDE-true name), I bring the most sincere wishes and greetings from your Aunt and Uncle."

GERENDE: "Then you are referring to the IDENTITY D."

CONTACT: "No, I am referring to your other relatives in South Carolina, the IDENTITY E ."

GERENDE: "Yes, Auntie is my Mother's sister."

4. For use as physical bona fides, the Station is forwarding a one peso note with the serial number T348510 for Headquarters files. GERENDE has been given a one peso note with the next higher serial number, T348511, to keep in a safe place pending his having to show it to some future KUBARK contact. It has been explained to GERENDE that he is to show his half of the physical bona fides only after the recognition signals have been completely and accurately recited and his new contact has requested to see his physical bona fides. GERENDE has also been instructed to assure himself of his contact's bona fides by asking to see the contact's one peso note (T348510).

5. Assuming that adequate time will be available at the beginning of an emergency condition, it may well be possible to instruct GERENDE in Secret Writing so that correspondence could be conducted using IDENTITY D or E addresses.

CS COPY

201-119523

6. It is assumed that Headquarters will advise the Station should more detailed or sophisticated contact arrangments be desired.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

17 November 1960

Attachments:
Peso note - attached herewith.
Three copies of Identities - under separate cover.

Distribution:
3 - WHD (with attachments)
3 - Files (with attachments)

201-119523

SECRET/KAPOK

IDENTITIES TO HMMA-15981, KAPOK-1843 dated 23 November 1960

IDENTITY A -
Suderman 304 - Apt. 401
Colonia Polanco
Mexico, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 45-42-06

IDENTITY B -
Ometusco 98
Colonia Hipodromo
Mexico 11, D.F., Mexico
Telephone: 15-32-28

IDENTITY C -
Cia. Electrica Mexicana, S.A.
Victoria y Escape
Fracc. Alce Blanco
San Bartolo Naucalpan
Edo. de Mexico
Telephone: 27-52-38

IDENTITY D -
"The Pates"
Mr. & Mrs. A. M. PATE
2130 Santee Ave.
Columbia, S. C.

IDENTITY E -
"The Kolbs"
Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3111 Grace Hill Rd.
Columbia, S.C.

SECRET/KAPOK

CS COPY

201-119523


BANCO DE MEXICO
T348510
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AMERICAN BANK NOTE COMPANY

[illegible] / / / 0 7

TO : Chief, KURIOT Attn: C/KURIOT/Training INFO : Chief, WH Division	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 50 - 6 - 61
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 18 Nov. 60
SUBJECT : Flaps & Seals Training of Raymond H. GERENDE : AKBATIC/Operational	RE 43 X — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED : None	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
REFERENCES:	

1. In compliance with a Station Request, LIEMPTY principal agent Raymond H. GERENDE, is being given training in basic flaps and seals techniques. It is felt advisable to have a second person outside the Station who can service this type of requirement in case MULFORD is prevented from doing so by the security situation arising from the ALPHUR case.

2. As an aid to this training, a copy of the portion of the MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.1.) dealing with basic flaps and seals work has been made and turned over to GERENDE. A second copy is being forwarded herewith to Headquarters. This material was prepared on the basis of the content of the KURIOT training course of mid-1957. If KURIOT training is in possession of newer and improved techniques in this field and will make them available to MULFORD for use here, it would be greatly appreciated.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

14 November 1960

ECMULFORD/LCB

Attachment: 1 MKCHARITY Operations Manual (Section I.D.1.)

Distribution:
3 - HQS (2 & KURIOT) — OK/w/att. — To TSD
3 - File

FORM 10 57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51 28, 51-28A AND 51 29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 3 DEC 1959

SUBJECT : LIEMPTY/Raymond H. GERENDE (ns)

RE "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED : Execution and Retention of Revised Contract Amendment

REFERENCE(S)

a. HMMT-1056, 9 October 1959
b. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959
c. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959
d. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. Reference (c) forwarded a contract amendment which provided increased compensation and a termination settlement for Raymond H. GERENDE. This dispatch also requested that the Station comment on the provisions of the Terminal Payment clause as written into this amendment.

2. Since the provisions of the original contract amendment were written in general terms and did not specifically cover the circumstances under which GERENDE would be eligible for a terminal settlement as interpreted by the Station and outlined in reference (b), a revised contract amendment was written. The attached contract amendment also shows corrected compensation figures. The original contract amendment was incorrect due to the absence of the amendment, effective 1 September 1957, which increased GERENDE's compensation from $3,600 to $4,080.

3. Since GERENDE's original contract was prepared at Headquarters and forwarded to you for execution and retention, this amendment should follow the same procedure. Therefore, the original and one copy are attached for your action and retention. Return one signed copy.

4. Reference (a) requested Headquarters to comment on a two-year extension for GERENDE's contract, indicating that the extension should be from 1 July 1959, the date of the last amendment, to 1 July 1961. There seems to be some confusion on contract extension procedures which Headquarters would like to clarify at this point. Contract extensions are based on the date of the original contract not the amendments. Accordingly, GERENDE's contract, originally effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, was further extended for a period of two years from 1 October 1959 to 30 September 1961.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

30 November 1959

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/3/Mexico
~~1~~ - RI

WH/3/Mexico/H. THERRIEN:ngw

CS COPY

3 Dec

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond E. [illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 1961, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1959, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

HMW-8281

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
Room 801, [illegible] 3565, 3909

NO.

DATE 18 November 1959

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH Contract Approving Officer	20 Nov	✓	DCB
2. C/WH/3 Attn: Mary Therrien			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

0 to 1: For approval in pseudo

0 to 2: Terry. Sorry for the delay/hope this is adequate. Hqs. Finance Division has no financial interest in this individual, therefore, please have the field execute and retain the original of this amendment in their Station financial files. The field can then send a signed copy back to WH and you in turn can notify us of its receipt so our records will show that this transaction has been finally completed. Any questions, give me a call.

Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher

1703

Please call me on this since Mr. Arms will not return until 21 Nov.
Bowers

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-476731

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, the amendment effective 1 July 1959 to said contract is revised to read as follows:

(a) The figure $4080 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

(b) The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10), entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event your contractual relationship with the Government hereunder is severed for one of the reasons set forth below, you, or your estate, will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time said payment becomes due."

(a) Said contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above, or

(b) Said contract expires and is not renewed by the Government, or

(c) Your resignation hereunder is accepted by the Government as being in its best interests (the Government's determination as to what constitutes its best interests shall be final and conclusive), or

(d) In the event of your death during the period said contract is in effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

HHMW-8281

SECRET

SECRET

22 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that effective 1 October 1959, the contract (as amended) for Raymond H. GERENDE, effective 1 October 1955 and extended to 30 September 1959, be further extended for a period of two years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract should remain in full force and effect.

R.X. Dahlgren,
C/WH/III

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Subject
1 - Chrono

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH SECRET HMMT-1056

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 9 October 1959

SUBJECT Raymond H. GERENDE Contract Renewal

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED See below.

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-13571, 21 August 1959
B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959
C. HMMA-13063 (RYBAT-1152), 5 June 1959

1. Reference C requested that a new two-year contract (with amendments) be prepared for Raymond H. GERENDE to be effective 1 July 1959. Reference B forwarded the amendment to the contract, but made no mention of the two-year renewal.

2. Therefore, unless we are notified otherwise by Headquarters, we will assume that GERENDE's present contract is due for renewal on 1 July 1961.

Willard C. Curtis

Willard C. CURTIS

vps
5 October 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

Amendments effective, July 59
Contract " " , Oct 59

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HMMA-13571
TO Chief, WH Division INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		DATE 21 August 1959
SUBJECT LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)		RE "437" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters information only.		☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

A. HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959.

B. HMMW-7959, 12 August 1959.

1. Forwarded herewith as Attachment No. One is GERENDE's signed contract amendment. GERENDE is most appreciative for the raise in salary and is delighted with the new Terminal Payment clause.

2. The Station interprets the Terminal Payment clause to mean any termination by the Government or acceptance of GERENDE's resignation in the "best interests of the Government." Examples in connection with the "best interests of the Government" interpretation would involve GERENDE's resignation for health reasons or other logical personal reasons such as a change of residence to some geographical area where his services could not be utilized by KUBARK. Assuming that no security problems are involved in making such a payment, the Station also interprets the clause to be applicable for payment to GERENDE's estate in the event of his death while in the employ of KUBARK.

3. The Station understands clearly why the clause was not written as originally requested and concurs in Headquarters reasoning. Certainly, the Station would not want to give GERENDE a terminal payment, and he has been so informed, if he elects to resign just to receive some extra money or to pursue some other career. The Station hastens to add, however, that to the best of its knowledge, GERENDE has no intention of resigning from his present KUBARK job.

4. As requested in Reference B, enclosed as Attachment No. Two are the original and one copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957. Headquarters will note that the amendment was accepted by GERENDE and approved by the Chief of Station, but was not formally witnessed. It is suggested that Matthew S. DINGLEY (ps), who is presently in Headquarters, be requested to witness the document. DINGLEY was the Case Officer handling GERENDE at the time this amendment became effective.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
20 August 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachments as stated above

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED
			PAGE NO.

SECRET

13 August 1957

Mr. Raymond H. GERENDE

Dear Mr. GERENDE:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955.

Effective 1 September 1957, said contract is amended by deleting paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation," and substituting in lieu thereof the following paragraph:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the purchase of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $4,080.00 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:
Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. GERENDE

WITNESS:____________________

APPROVED:
Willard C. Curtis

SECRET

Mr. Raymond H. Gerende

Dear Mr. Gerende:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 October 1955, as amended.

Effective 1 July 1959, said contract, as amended, is further amended the following manner:

a. The figure $3600 is deleted from the first sentence of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted.

b. The following paragraph is added after paragraph ten (10) entitled "Term":

"11. Terminal Payment. In the event this contract is terminated by the Government under subparagraph (a) of paragraph ten (10) above or in the event of its expiration and nonrenewal by the Government, you will be entitled to a terminal payment of one (1) month's compensation for each full year of your utilization by the Government after 18 March 1955. Said amount shall be calculated at the contractual rate of compensation applicable at the time this payment becomes due."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

not mailed

ACCEPTED:

Raymond H. Gerende
Raymond H. Gerende

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

Willard C. Curtis

SECRET

ATTACHMENT NO. ONE
TO
HBCIA-1357

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM : Chief, WHD

DATE 12 AUG 1959

SUBJECT - LIEMPTY/Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

RE 43 J - (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED - See paragraphs 2,3, and 4.

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. In accordance with your request to amend Subject's contract providing him with an increase in compensation and a termination payment, the attached contract amendment was written.

2. Paragraph (a) of this amendment states that the figure $3600 is deleted from GERENDE's contract and in lieu thereof the figure $4560 is substituted. This figure of $3600 is the amount GERENDE was to receive under his original contract, dated 1 October 1955. According to the referenced dispatch, however, Subject's contract was amended on 1 September 1957 to provide him with an increase in compensation, bringing his salary up to $4080. Neither Contract Division nor your area desk has a copy of this amendment. Please forward a copy to Headquarters for our files.

3. Your attention is also directed to the "Terminal Payment" clause. Under the provisions of the attached amendment, GERENDE is not eligible for a termination settlement if he resigns from KUBARK. Only in the event that we give him 30 days' notice of termination or fail to renew his contract is he eligible for this termination payment. Your comments on the stipulations as written into the attached amendment are requested. In the event you feel that GERENDE should be entitled to a termination payment should he resign his position, the clause will be rewritten.

4. The attached amendment should be returned to Headquarters with your comments and a copy of the contract amendment dated 1 September 1957.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

10 August 1959

Attachment:
As described above.

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Mexico Chrono
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/M.Therrien:jmh

CS COPY

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

RECORD COPY

RECORD COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT : Contract for GERENDE

In reviewing the last contract amendment, it came to note that CPD was deleting the original compensation figure of $3600 instead of the figure sent by the Station which was $4080. In checking this out, we find that we have no copy or notification of the amendment dated 1 September 1957 increasing his salary from $3600 to $4080. CPD is rewritting the contract without using a compensation figure for the amount to be deleted.

When we send this to the field, ask them to send us a copy of the contract amendment, dated 1 September 1957. Also inform them that they are to execute and retain the original copy of this new contract amendment. It may be well to point out that Subject's termination clause stipulates that he will received this benefit only if we terminate the contract.

MTherrien

file HHMW-7959

SECRET

22 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that Raymond H. GERENDE's contract, effective 1 October 1955 (as amended), be further amended to provide him with compensation at the annual rate of $4,560, effective 1 July 1959. It is also requested that a termination clause, effective 18 March 1955, be written into his contract stipulating that GERENDE will receive a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of his termination, for each full year of his employment with the U.S. Government. GERENDE was employed by the Mexico City Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. All other provisions of his contract should remain in force.

2. GERENDE is covered by the LIEMPTY Project which was amended to include the above commitments to GERENDE and approved by Chief, FI on 16 July 1959

R. E. Gomes
AC/WHD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chrono
1 - Subject

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET RYBAT | HMMW-7593

TO INFO	: Chief of Station, Mexico City	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	201-119523 50-6-74/1
FROM	: Chief, WHD	DATE	21 JUL
SUBJECT	- LIEMPTY Project Amendment Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)	RE "43 3" – (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		☐	MARKED FOR INDEXING
		☒	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED		☐	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

HMMA-13063, 5 June 1959

1. On 16 July 1957, an amendment to the LIEMPTY Project was approved granting permission to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560 per year. No additional funds were requested for the Project.

2. A request to amend GERENDE's contract to include the benefits listed above has been submitted. You will be notified when the contract has been amended.

3. A copy of the approved Project amendment is attached for your information and records.

OLIVER G. GALBOND

21 July 1959

Attachment:
1 - (RYBAT)

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Mexico RYBAT Chrono
1 - Subject
[redacted]

Scaletti

WH/III/Mexico/E.I. SCALETTI:jmh

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE | CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT | ☐ CONTINUED | PAGE NO

RECORD COPY RECORD COPY

DISPATCH | SECRET/RYBAT | HMMA-13003 rybat-1152

TO Chief, WH Division INFO	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO 201-119523
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City	DATE 5 June 1959
SUBJECT New Contract for Raymond H. GERENDE (p)	RE [illegible] — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters preparation of a new contract.	

REFERENCE(S)

HMMW-5626, 3 December 1957

1. Raymond H. GERENDE was initially employed by the Station on 18 March 1955 under provisions of an oral agreement. Effective 1 October 1955 GERENDE was placed under a written contract, prepared by Headquarters, with an annual salary of $3,600.00. On 1 September 1957 his contract was amended to increase his salary to $4,080.00 per annum, which is the salary he is presently receiving. It is requested that a new two year contract be prepared, to be effective 1 July 1959, providing an increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum and including a termination clause which will give GERENDE a termination payment of one month's salary, calculated at the prevailing rate of compensation at the time of termination, for each full year of his KUBARK employment. All other provisions of GERENDE's initial contract should remain in force. (The increase in salary to $4,560.00 per annum is already covered by the LIEMPTY Project.)

2. As pointed out in the attachment to HMMA-11368, 22 October 1958, paragraph three of MEXI-2836, 25 November 1958, and in the LIEMPTY Field Project Outline, GERENDE is a highly valued full-time Station asset who carries a significant work load and who has a great deal of responsibility. He is the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Paragraph eight of HMMA-12095, 4 February 1959, indicated that the Station was considering amending GERENDE's contract to provide for some type of retirement benefits. Although it is recognized that indigenous agents are not usually granted such contract provisions, the Station believes that GERENDE should have monetary incentive, in addition to his idealogy, to make a long career with KUBARK. Accordingly, the Station recommends that GERENDE's new contract provide for a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he has worked for KUBARK. In other words, should GERENDE's career with KUBARK last for 24 years and his yearly salary at the end of this period is $8,000.00, then he, or his heirs, would receive a lump sum payment of $16,000.00. After considering different types of insurance plans, an escrow account and several other ideas, the Station considers the above proposal to come closest to meeting the criteria of control, production incentive and creation of the desire to make KUBARK a career. The date, 18 March 1955, should be used as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits.

Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
3 June 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

SUBJECT : Project LIEMPTY Amendment

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:
Name: J. B. Brady
Room: 2114 Barton Hall
Ext.: 2555
Date: 23 June 1959

1. It is requested that approval be granted to amend Raymond H. GERENDE's contract to provide him with a termination settlement of one month's salary for each full year that he works for KUBARK and to raise his salary effective July 1959 from $4,080 to $4,560.00 per year. His last salary increase was granted on 1 September 1957. The date, 18 March 1955, has been suggested by the Station as the beginning date for the computation of GERENDE's termination benefits. The Station believes that this benefit will provide GERENDE with the necessary incentive to make KUBARK a career and at the same time will give the Station an additional element of control.

2. As pointed out in the LIEMPTY Project Approval, GERENDE, an indigenous agent, is one of the Station's most valuable assets. He has a responsible full time job as the LIEMPTY Principal Agent who handles the LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA base houses, the LIENTRAP operation, the outside photographic processing and translation service and all the agents participating in these activities. He performs his duties in a conscientious and professional manner and his already excellent abilities are showing continued improvement.

3. Money was already allocated in the LIEMPTY Project approval for the salary increase. With the effective date of 18 March 1955, for the termination clause, GERENDE will already have accrued $1,520 (his salary is $4,560 per year) if he should resign today. The LIEMPTY Project, as approved, has sufficient funds to cover this cost if it is necessary to obligate this amount during the present Project year. Therefore, no additional funds are requested.

Attachments:
Folder with past approval
Envelope with true name

R. W. Dahlgren, C/WH/III

Concur: ____________________
Chief, FI/OPS

C. W. Anderson, WH/FI

Approved: ____________________ Approved for Transmittal:
Chief, FI

J. C. King, C/WHD

Date: ____________________
Senior Staff Coordination
For C/FI/OPS -s/R. Bryant
For CI Staff -s/R. Brown

Approved:
J. C. King, C/WHD

____
Date

SECRET

627 ER/OBS

ORIG : STANLEY J. SHULTZ:ms
UNIT : TSS/ID/FB#4
EXT : 8315
DATE : 26 MARCH 1959

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	MAR 27 20 58 Z 59
X	ROUTINE	REC'D CABLE SECT.
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87295
OUT 87295

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 19063
19063

TECHS

RE MEXI 3522 (IN 34110)

REFERENCE PARA 3 YES

- End of Message -

RI Comment: Does HQS desire naturalized
Mexican citizen obtain tourist visa?

file
GERENDE

C.V.S. Roosevelt
C. V. S. ROOSEVELT
DC/TSS
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/3H (coord by phone w/
Charles W. ANDERSON) ED

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES J. RYAN
ASSTC/TSS/AUTH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

441/SE/IES/88

DATE : 19 MAR 59

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: TSS 4

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, WH 4, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAR 19 2329Z 59

ROUTINE

IN 34110

TO DIR INFO GUAL SANJ CITE MEXI 3522

AQUATIC

RE: DIR 16313 (OUT 82047)*

1. RAYMOND H GERENDE ADVISED BY CUBAN EMB 17 MARCH THAT DOES NOT NEED VISA ENTER CUBA AS TOURIST ON MEXICAN PASSPORT SINCE MEXI PP GOOD FOR 29 DAY STAY AND CAN EASILY BE RENEWED ONCE IN CUBA.

2. CUBAN EMB ADVISED ODACID BY PHONE 18 MARCH THAT TOURIST VISA NOT REQUIRED FOR ANY NATIVE BORN LATIN AMERICAN, U.S. BRITISH, FRENCH OR SWISS CITIZEN. TOURIST VISA IS REQUIRED FOR ANY ABOVE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. TRANSIENT VISA REQUIRED ON ANY NATIONALITY WHO TRAVELS VIA CUBA TO COUNTRY OTHER THAN HIS OWN.

3. DOES HQS DESIRE NATURALIZED MEXI CITIZEN OBTAIN TOURIST VISA?

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: *REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY ON LOAN CUBAN TOURIST VISAS IN ORIGINAL PASSPORTS OTHER THAN U.S.

file GERENDE

SECRET

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DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

HMMA-12069
KAPOK-1543

Chief, WH Division

50-6-74/3

Chief of Station, Mexico City

4 February 1959

LIEMPTY Progress Report - July thru Dec 1958

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None, for Headquarters information and files only.

SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS

1. During the period covered by this report, a new Case Officer, Quinton N. OUSLER, assumed operational direction of several LIPSTICK assets (Oliver G. SCANTLING, Raymond H. GERENDE, LIMITED, LICALLA, LIENTRAP and several support agents), the LIJERSEY surveillance team and the LILYRIC Base. The Station has continued to use SCANTLING, primarily, to follow up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFLAT and the photographic bases; however, no positive results have been realized from his prodigious efforts except the collection of a considerable amount of operational information. GERENDE performed his principal agent responsibilities for the photographic bases. LIENTRAP, LIJERSEY and until 19 December 1958 handled the LIFEAT/ECMORNING and LIFEAT/[illegible] radio operations. The LIJERSEY surveillance team has been used sparingly for [illegible] investigations and routine static surveillances; however, a principal agent, [illegible] G. CLACKETT, is currently being trained in Headquarters to assume the full-time direction, control, training and development of the LIJERSEY team. The new project, LIEMPTY, combining all the assets discussed in this report was submitted to Headquarters on 3 October 1958 with requested project year approval period from 1 December 1958 through 30 November 1959. An operational security review of Raymond H. GERENDE's activities was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11363, 22 October 1958.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - OLIVER G. SCANTLING SEGMENT

2. Agent Information - Oliver G. SCANTLING has continued to perform his assigned tasks in an outstanding manner. SCANTLING's poise, common sense, education, ideology and native ability for the pursuit of clandestine activities make him one of the most valuable support assets available to the Mexico City Station. The fact that SCANTLING has full time overt occupation as Chief Engineer and Production Manager for a local manufacturing company adds to his long-range potential as a KUBARK agent. On two occasions during the past six months SCANTLING has indicated to his Case Officer that he would like to resign from his overt position and devote full time to his KUBARK operational duties; however, the Case Officer has discouraged him from doing this on the basis that he has more long-range potential when his cover occupation is legitimate. Of course, SCANTLING would be more valuable if he could work full time for the Station, but not sufficiently so to warrant his resignation from his overt job (his monthly salary in his overt job is in excess of $[illegible] U.S.). The only significant limitation that SCANTLING has evidenced to his present Case Officer is his occasional delay in preparing written reports of investigations and other matters requiring reports for the files. However, this limitation gradually is being overcome and it is expected that SCANTLING's reports will continue to be factual, comprehensive and soon will be promptly submitted.

2. Security Developments - SCANTLING is constantly under a considerable amount of exposure and pressure when following up LIMESA leads obtained from LIFLAT and the photographic bases. Since time is always of the essence when using such perishable leads, SCANTLING frequently is directed to make approaches to individuals performing services for the LIPSTICK target after routine, and sometimes only cursory, investigation. Therefore, the possibility always exists of his entanglement in an undesirable security incident. This necessarily

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[illegible] calculated risk which both SCANTLING and the Station must take if penetration of the primary target is achieved, whether technically or by a recruitment in place. It is to SCANTLING's credit that he has not yet become involved in an incident which [illegible] has compromised him and/or alerted the target of KUBARK's many [illegible] efforts against them. The closest SCANTLING has come to being compromised and to being identified as a KUBARK agent stems directly from the LIPSTICK installation [illegible] of June 1958. The car [illegible] used by the surveillance team was [illegible] by SCANTLING in his true name at the time that he was leader of the team. No [illegible] indication, however, has been uncovered which points to SCANTLING as a target of investigation by a local police service. SCANTLING and the Station have been alert and will continue to watch closely for any sign of local police and other [illegible] interest in his activities.

4. Operational Success and Effectiveness - Briefly discussed below are some of the many operational activities in which SCANTLING participated during the period covered by this report:

A. Juan *CASTRO (201-) - SCANTLING continued seeing CASTRO through October 1958 following the last [illegible] of [illegible] the original LIMESA/MCLIGHTING operation through CASTRO. As late as September 1958 possibilities existed, or appeared to exist, that CASTRO would complete his work in the [illegible] LIMERICK office and that it might be possible to install MCLIGHTING. While CASTRO, through SCANTLING, was the principal source of this information, portions were also confirmed by LIFEAT. During July, August and September 1958, SCANTLING had approximately eight meetings with CASTRO. In late September 1958 LIFEAT indicated that the LIMERICK target was making [illegible] of one of their regular local employees, Antonio *ZEPEDA (201-2[illegible]), to complete some of the work CASTRO was supposed to finish and that other contractors were doing jobs around the target area which CASTRO would normally have been expected to do had he still been in the employ of the target. Also, [illegible] and LIFEAT confirmed that the LIMERICK target had lost interest in CASTRO - he was not seen visiting the target installation nor did the target people attempt to get in touch with him. In view of this, SCANTLING was instructed to cease all contact with CASTRO as of 1 November 1958.

B. Pablo *MOM Rosas (201-) - During the period covered by this report SCANTLING had two interviews with MOM Rosas. SCANTLING's most recent report was forwarded to Headquarters as an attachment to HMMA-11143, 1 [illegible] 1958. Unquestionably the Station has identified MOM Rosas as the technician who services LIMERICK [illegible]. SCANTLING will continue his development of MOM Rosas (please see HMMA-11711, 19 December 1958).

C. [illegible] *VIDALES (201-) - SCANTLING's activities in connection with the LIMESA/MCLIGHTING operation were summarized in HMMA-11597, 23 October 1958, and previous correspondence.

D. HERRERIA GARLICH - This is the firm that made the steel vault door for the LIMERICK installation. SCANTLING made two visits to this firm's work shop and succeeded in obtaining enough information to make an

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIMERICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.

E. Casing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West German Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregariousness permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropriate cover story, and retain minute details which later he commits to paper and emerges with a comprehensive floor plan and important construction data.

F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with this target from the casing standpoint provides the Station with an unparalleled source of information about LIMERICK construction activities, modifications and reasons for same. All of the LIMERICK casing reports on file in Headquarters are the product of SCANTLING's unusual ability and knowledge. Discussions with Station Officers about LIMERICK construction have been of benefit to the Station during this reporting period and they will continue to be of worthwhile importance.

G. Routine Investigations and Surveillances - Although the Station has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveillances, SCANTLING is still used in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and dependability. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick Kirschhoff (201-[illegible]) of LCMAY-TOWL interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on investigations (see HMMA-11749, 17 December 1958).

H. ESGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the contact with ESGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and dependable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ESGEM-15 case; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.

I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administrative matters connected with L/3. Lewis M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Station had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the operational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLGO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILLGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's unusual personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO's and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems.

J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - During GERENDE's absence from

Mexico City in December 1958 and January 1959, it was considered appropriate for SCANTLING to handle LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP. Although this procedure defeats some compartmentation principles, it was the only manner in which the Station could maintain continuity with the three operations listed above. SCANTLING has known the agents involved with LIMITED, LICALLA and LIENTRAP for several years. In fact, he was at one time the agent in charge of these three operations.

5. Operational Methods Evolved During the Period - The VIDALES operation (see paragraph 4 (C) above) indicated to the Station the necessity for thorough briefings and discussions with the agent making an approach to a target. This can hardly be described as a new operational method, but it does serve to illustrate the mechanics of [illegible] that should be followed. The technique that LI[illegible] IV [illegible] whereby SCANTLING meets more of the background of the target's [illegible] [illegible] offering SCANTLING and the Station the opportunity to prepare a thorough study for SCANTLING's recruitment pitch. The [illegible] documentation prepared by [illegible] and the story being created by SCANTLING and the Station should increase the [illegible] on SCANTLING's cold approaches. (See HMMA-11356, 22 October 1958, and HMMW-7000, 21 November 1958, for additional details on this subject.)

In a general sense, one other conclusion can be made about any Station's support assets - where technical and photographic operations are possible, the utility of the information obtained is enhanced considerably by accurate, comprehensive and timely casing reports. SCANTLING, as previously mentioned, is an invaluable asset for this type of support.

6. Administrative - SCANTLING's contract expires on 18 February 1959. As of this date SCANTLING will have received an annual salary of $3,600.00 U.S. for two years. The Station plans to raise his annual compensation to $4,[illegible].00 U.S. No other significant administrative problems exist.

7. Outlook for Future Development - Station plans call for the continued utilization of SCANTLING in the same manner as he is presently being used. The Station will keep SCANTLING as an independent asset and, it is hoped, resist the temptation to make him a principal agent in charge of numerous sub-agents. It is believed that SCANTLING is the type of support asset that can be of value to the Station for many years to come and that every effort should be made to protect his security and value to KUBARK.

ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS - RAYMOND H. GERENDE SEGMENT

8. Agent Information - Aside from the agent information given in HMMA-11356, 22 October 1958, the only significant development was GERENDE's December 1958 marriage to a U.S. educated girl of Dutch citizenship. The $[illegible].00 U.S. for the purchase of two plane tickets as a wedding gift to GERENDE was designed to impress GERENDE with the fact that KUBARK thinks highly of him as an individual and that KUBARK has a great interest in his intelligence career. GERENDE is at the age and stage in life where he is beginning to wonder just what the future holds for him. In the near future, the Station will propose a salary raise for GERENDE

and request a new contract that provides for some type of retirement benefits - perhaps similar to the Civil Service Retirement program for KUBARK employees.

9. Security Developments - Again, the information on this subject was covered adequately in HMMA-11[illegible]. GERENDE was relieved of his LIFEAT/[illegible] and LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles cases on 10 December 1958. This, of course, was in line with recommendations contained in HMMA-11[illegible] and represents a definite security improvement. GERENDE was told that LIFEAT/[illegible] was being terminated because it had not been productive of enough significant information and that LIFEAT/Cuban Exiles was being terminated because the occupants of the target apartment had moved. (Note: This was true where the Cubans are concerned.) Additional security improvements will be made when [illegible] D. CLACKETT returns to Mexico and relieves GERENDE of responsibility for the [illegible] surveillance team.

10. Operational Successes and Shortcomings - Briefly outlined below are the major operational activities which GERENDE managed during the period covered by this report:

A. LIMITED - This base functioned smoothly, securely and effectively during the period July through December 1958. The base operator, LIEMPTY/6, demonstrated his usual competence and devotion to duty. In addition to the primary objective of taking photographs of individuals of interest, L/6 also prepared detailed daily logs on the arrivals and departures of all target personnel, weekly reports of workers activities at the LIMERICK installation, performed three one-man surveillances of Mexicans working at LIMERICK in an effort to identify them by name and home address, and provided SCANTLING with information on LIMERICK construction. During this six-month period, LIEMPTY/6 took approximately 800 photographs from the LIMITED base.

B. LILYRIC - This base is operated by LIEMPTYs/13 and 14, with LIEMPTY/12 serving as a contact between the base and GERENDE. LIEMPTY/14 does most of the photography and reporting for the base since LIEMPTY/13 has a regular job and is not on the premises during regular daytime working hours. L/14 devotes approximately six hours (0900-1[illegible]) each day to photography and the remaining time is spent preparing reports. The base prepares and compiles individual logs on each target personality indicating their arrivals and departures from the LIMERICK installation. (Note: These reports are filed in the appropriate target's 201 file and are available to case officers in analyzing a target personality's pattern of daily activity). LILYRIC also prepared a weekly report on workers activities at the Club and reports the license plate numbers of all vehicles discharging or picking up individuals at LIMERICK. (Note: These license plate numbers are then checked out through LIF[illegible]/2 for the owners names and addresses - in case of immediate or later operational interest.) During GERENDE's recent absence from Mexico City, [illegible] met directly with LIEMPTY/12. During this period approximately 2,000 photographs were taken from the LILYRIC base.

C. LICALLA - While LILYRIC and LIMITED are excellent bases for photographing individuals entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation, the LICALLA base is the Station's best source of photographs of LIMERICK employees. LICALLA is so situated that photographs can be made of target personnel in the parking area of LIMERICK. LIEMPTY/9 is the base operator for LICALLA and in the Station's opinion performs his job in an excellent manner. As reported in HMMA-11[illegible], LIEMPTY/9 is the brother of former LIPSTICK/27 (the first LIPSTICK surveillance team member arrested in June 1958). No repercussions, or indications of any impending ones, have resulted to this family relationship. This, certainly, is the major security problem faced by L/9 during this reporting period. L/9 and his family may even still have to vacate the LICALLA base for the period of time required to remodel it. The Station is making sure that L/9 never knows that his covert employer owns the LICALLA base and the three adjoining houses and every effort is being made to protect this secret from L/9. (See HMMA-12[illegible], 28 January 1959, for a more detailed explanation.) Of course, during the remodeling of LICALLA there will not be any LICALLA reporting or photographs. In addition to taking approximately 2,500 photographs during this six-month period, the LICALLA base also prepared weekly reports on LIMERICK garden activities. These reports indicate which LIMERICK employees are seen together each day, which vehicles different employees are accustomed to using, construction activities and other matters which appear of significance to L/9.

D. LIENTRAP - LIENTRAP continues to be a worthwhile Station asset. Approximately 1,400 clandestine photographs have been made of numerous targets during this reporting period and LIENTRAP type activities will undoubtedly remain one of the Station's best investigative assets. As explained in the Field Project Outline, forwarded to Headquarters on 8 October 1958, the Station is of the opinion that the LIENTRAP vehicle should be replaced as soon as possible. Nearly four months have elapsed without receiving Headquarters authority to replace the vehicle. The necessity for action is even more acute now than at the time of the request. LIEMPTYs 10 and 11 do an excellent job on LIENTRAP operations.

E. LIERSEY - This operation can be characterized as somewhat dormant for the July - December 1958 period. Because of GERENDE's other important activities, he did not have the time to train and work with the surveillance team. Also, the Station considered that it would be extending security just a bit too far to have GERENDE engaged in surveillance at the same time that he was handling the photographic base houses and performing monitoring chores for LIFEAT/SCHORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Embassy. The expected arrival of Steven D. CLACKETT in April and his relieving GERENDE of LIERSEY will enable the Station to train, within a year, an effective mobile surveillance team. At present, LIEMPTYs/15, 16 and 17 compose the LIERSEY team.

F. LIFEAT - Until 10 December 1958 GERENDE served as monitor in the base houses covering LIFEAT/SCHORNING and LIFEAT/Cuban Embassy. In addition to living in the base house, GERENDE also transcribed the majority of the SCHORNING and Cuban Embassy tapes. He performed these jobs satisfactorily even though his efficiency was handicapped by numerous other duties. Relieving GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties enables him to devote more time to his other operations with a corresponding increase in the security of all his activities.

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

c. LIEMPTYs/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of developing and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OALLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GEREMDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.

11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIENSET and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were combined into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.

12. Outlook for Future Developments - Although not meaning to be repetitive in dwelling upon these recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GEREMDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. With the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GEREMDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GEREMDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written communications procedures, by thoroughly briefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detailed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photographic techniques. GEREMDE will continue to be used on occasional sensitive investigational and operational travel support tasks and to perform other services for the Station which will not impair the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life into the LIEASY surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first class investigative group to support other Station operations.

Willard C. CURTIS

WCC/vpe
21 January 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs

SECRET/KAPOK

KAPOK-1515

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 24 December 1958

SUBJECT Raymond H. GERENDE's Itinerary

RE "433" – (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters information only.

REFERENCES:

1. In the event Headquarters desires to contact GERENDE while he is in the U. S., his itinerary is as follows:

24-30 December 1958
% Mr. & Mrs. Peter ARNOTT
1640 Aqua Vista Road
Richmond, California
Tel: BEacon 3-4188

30 December - 12 January 1959
% Colonel & Mrs. R. ROOS
3628 Windom Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Tel: EMerson 2-3543

12-16 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. Joseph HANTIN
332 West 88th Street, Apt. B-1
New York, New York
Tel: LYceum 5-0333

16-24 January 1959
% Mr. & Mrs. R. F. KOLB
3531 Yale Avenue
Columbia, South Carolina

2. Reference to Quinton N. OUSLER's true name will be sufficient to establish the bona fides of a Headquarters officer.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
22 December 1958

Distribution
3 Hqs

201-119523

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH SECRET/KAPOK

[illegible]

KAPOK-1565

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-163574
50-6-74/1

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE: 4 February 1959

SUBJECT: LIEMPTY/20 (formerly LIEARL)

RE [illegible] - (CHECK [illegible] ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: Amended Operational Approval

REFERENCE(S):

A. HMMA-6321, 15 March 1957
B. HMMA-9807, 2 April 1958
C. HMMW-6572, 12 July 1958

1. Forwarded herewith are the requisite number of copies of a revised PRQ, Part II, on the Subject individual. It is requested that the Operational Approval for the use of Subject be amended to permit his use on LIEMPTY/LIJERSEY.

2. It is also requested that Subject's cryptonym be changed to LIEMPTY/2 and that the necessary Headquarters action be taken to include Subject in the LIEMPTY project.

Willard C. CURTIS

QND/vps
2 February 1959

Distribution
3 Hqs w/attachment in triplicate

per HMMW-7342
re Project action

BASIC DOCUMENT FILED IN 201-163574

Liempty/1
50-6-74/1

FORM 10-57 53 (40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.

038 ER/JG/JG kwT 8

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3

SECRET

DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 10 15:50

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 35553

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2915

RE: A. MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *
B. MEXI 2836 (IN 30929)

SINCE GERENDE WEDDING SET FOR 12 DEC, REQUEST ANSWER REFS BY 10 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: * REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE AND BRIDE AS A WEDDING GIFT IN RECOGNITION OF GOOD WORK HE HAS DONE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

538 RLG/SW/ ✓ 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 9 1937Z 58
SERVICE

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 5

INFO : S/C 2

PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

DIR 03774

OUT 52222 A

TO INFO CITE DIR

C/S COMMENT: UNDERSCORED ABOVE IS CORRECT DIR NUMBER ORIGINALLY DISSEMINATED AS DIR 30774.

file [illegible] 201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

500 MJ/BM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

500

ORIG : C. ZEHRUNG
UNIT : WH
EXT : 2555
DATE : 8 DECEMBER 1958

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO : S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

PRECEDENCE

	DEFERRED	DEC 9 13 50 Z 58
	ROUTINE	REC[illegible] SECT.
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

[illegible]2
OUT 52222

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR [illegible]
30774

REF: MEXI 2781 (IN 26585)*

GERENDE GIFT AS OUTLINED PARA 2 REF APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT:* CONCERNED PROPOSED KUBARK WEDDING GIFT FOR RAYMOND H. GERENDE.

File Gerende 201
(exempty -1)
" Proj

R E Gomez

R. E. GOMEZ, AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R N Dahlgren

R. N. DAHLGREN, CWH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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441 MM/MCB/JSB,1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 25 NOV 58

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

NOV 26 02 10:58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 30929

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2836

REF MEXI 2781 (IN 26585) *

1. STATION INFORMED ORALLY THAT HQS NEEDS KNOW IF GERENDE SALARY RAISE IS DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE FOR $600 WEDDING GIFT.

2. STATION PREFERS GIVE $600 GIFT WITHOUT REF TO SALARY. CONSIDER SALARY RAISE AS RECOGNITION FOR GOOD WORK PERFORMANCE AND NOT AS REWARD FOR MARRIAGE, THEREFORE, GIFT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO SALARY.

3. ASSUMING GERENDE CONTINUES GOOD WORK, STATION PLANS REQUEST SALARY RAISE WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS TO U.S. FOR GERENDE.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14-00000

SECRET

17 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/PS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Wedding Gift for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), Contract Agent

1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorized to give Raymond H. GERENDE (ps), as a wedding gift, two airplane tourist class tickets from Mexico City to San Francisco and Washington D.C. and return to Mexico City. Although this trip may appear to be a generous and unusual wedding gift, the Station considers it is more than justified in view of GERENDE's outstanding performance of his duties for the Station and his future value as a principal agent. GERENDE has been working for the Station since February 1955.

2. The Station estimates that the cost of the plane tickets will be $600.00. The LIPSTICK Project, which covers GERENDE, can absorb this added expense.

R. E. Dahlgren
Chief, WH/III

WH/3/Mexico/C.Zehrung:ngs

Distribution:
Orig & 1- Addressee
1- WH/Mexico Chrono
1- Subject

SECRET

14-00000

433 CWT/WG DS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

DATE : 14 NOVEMBER 58

433

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 5

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FE 4, OS 2, S/C 2

Nov 15 04 32 '58

REC'D CABLE SECT.

IN 26585

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 2781

RE: MEXI 2780* (IN 26525)

1. RAYMOND H. GERENDE PLANNING MARRY SUBJ REF 12 DEC.

2. AS KUBARK WEDDING GIFT REQUEST AUTHORITY PURCHASE PLANE TICKETS FROM MEXI TO SAN FRANCISCO TO WASH TO MEXI. ESTIMATE COST TOURIST CLASS TICKETS $600 U.S. COUPLE PLAN VISIT FRIENDS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND BRIDE'S PARENTS IN WASH.

3. ALTHOUGH TRIP GENEROUS AND UNUSUAL WEDDING GIFT, STATION CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE AND MORE THAN JUSTIFIED IN VIEW GERENDE PAST AND FUTURE VALUE AS PRINCIPAL AGENT MEXI SUPPORT OPS.

4. NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID TO GERENDE ABOUT PROPOSED GIFT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED TRACES ON HESTER ROOS.

Gerende 201

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

2[illegible] October 195[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: Change of Cryptonyms

1. The following subjects, [illegible] have been carried under the [illegible] and [illegible] Projects, are now being transferred to the [illegible] Project which will replace the [illegible] and [illegible] Projects. Please change your records to reflect the new cryptonyms assigned [illegible].

[illegible] Number	New Crypt	Old Crypt
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-1	LIPSTICK-20
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-2	LIPSTICK-19
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-33
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-5	LIPSTICK-40
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
C-[illegible]	LIEMPTY-7	LIPSTICK-27
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-28
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-9	LIPSTICK-39
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-10	LIPSTICK-2
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-11	LIPSTICK-24
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-12	LIJERSEY-5
C-[illegible]	[illegible]-13	LIJERSEY-2
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
C-52507	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected by their present PRQ, Part II's. Therefore, no new [illegible] will be submitted.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] October 195[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] have been carried under the [illegible] transferred to the [illegible] and LI[illegible] Projects. [illegible] the new cryptonym assigned [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
C-27[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-20
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-19
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-32
[illegible]	[illegible]	LIPSTICK-33
C-[illegible]	L[illegible]	LIPSTICK-30
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-14
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-27
[illegible]	L[illegible]	LIPSTICK-28
[illegible]	LI[illegible]-9	LIPSTICK-39
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]	LIPSTICK-2
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-11	LIPSTICK-24
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-12	LIJERSEY-5
C-[illegible]	[illegible]	LIJERSEY-2
[illegible]11 3	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-12
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-4
[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-8
C-[illegible]	LI[illegible]-1[illegible]	LIJERSEY-13

2. Subjects will continue to be used in the same work as reflected in their present [illegible], Part II's. Therefore, no new [illegible] submitted.

[illegible] -1

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24 Oct 58

ACTION: ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: Charlotte L. Zehrung

ROOM NO: 2120 Barton Hall

TELEPHONE: 2758

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonyms or pseudonyms, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☐ NONSENSITIVE

201 NO: 201-119523

1. SOURCE DOCUMENT:

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title):

SEX 3: ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title):

PHOTO 4: ☐ YES ☐ NO

BIRTH DATE 5: D M Y

COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6:

CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7:

OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8: 1 2 3

OCCUPATION, POSITION:

OCC. POS. CODE 9:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM: LIEMPTY-1 (formerly LIPSTICK-20)

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.:

ACTION DESK 11: WH/3M

SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.:

THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a:

COMMENTS:

Note change in subject's cryptonym from LIPSTICK-20
to LIEMPTY-1

201- 201-119523

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SIGNATURE: Charlotte Zehrung (KS)

Form No. 831 Use previous editions.
1 Oct. 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

PUNCHED

(38)

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

50-6-25/3
201-119523

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 22 October 1958

SUBJECT **Review of Raymond H. GERENDE's Operations and Activities**

RE [illegible] — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING

☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED

☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED Headquarters study and comments.

REFERENCE(S)

1. The subject paper is attached. It is believed that Headquarters will have a clearer picture of what GERENDE is doing at the present time together with several informative facts concerning the security of GERENDE's operations. Also included in this paper are several recommendations which the Station proposes to implement through Project LIEMPTY. Obviously, some of the recommendations are goals to work for and, because of a lack of personnel and other valid reasons, cannot be immediately adopted.

2. The attached paper should be read in conjunction with the new LIEMPTY field project outline, which was recently forwarded to Headquarters. Please note, however, that the old agent cryptonyms are used in this paper.

3. The attachment has been read and approved by Matthew S. DINGLEY, who recruited this excellent agent (GERENDE) and was his Case Officer until GERENDE was recently assigned to Quinton N. Ousler.

4. GERENDE is one of the most valuable assets of this Station. This review is considered to be a worthwhile exercise; but under the present operational pace and with present assets, security compartmentation, which is desirable, cannot be achieved. The main security precaution (viz getting GERENDE out of Mexico City and well hidden in case of an emergency) will constantly be kept in mind.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

QNO/vps
21 October 1958

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3 Hqs (w/attachments)

FORM 10-57 53

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OPERATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW OF RAYMOND H. GERENDE'S OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

1. SITUATION

As a result of the June 1958 LIPSTICK flap, it was decided by the Chief of Station on 30 June 1958 that Quinton N. OUSLER would assume direct contact with several of Matthew S. DINGLEY's agents, one of whom was Raymond H. GERENDE. After being introduced to GERENDE by DINGLEY on 1 July 1958, OUSLER assumed contact responsibilities with GERENDE on 2 July 1958. On 18 July 1958, the Chief of Station decided that OUSLER should be assigned permanent responsibility for the management and handling of GERENDE and GERENDE's operations.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this operational security review is threefold:

- a. To identify possible security problems and conditions;
- b. To establish a framework for recommendations which will result in the Station's submission of a new support project (LIEMPTY) with Raymond H. GERENDE as a principal agent; and
- c. To acquaint the new case officer with the operational problems and agent personnel with which he should have a comprehensive knowledge and detailed understanding.

3. PRINCIPAL AGENT - Raymond H. GERENDE

a. Background - GERENDE has been employed by KUBARK since 18 March 1955, which was just prior to his graduation from the Mexico City College. He is now only 24 years of age, but in the Station's opinion, is a mature, experienced and dedicated KUBARK contract agent. During the three and one-half years that he has been working for the Mexico City Station, GERENDE has participated in a varied assortment of support and intelligence operations. Initially, he was trained and used by Matthew S. DINGLEY as a member of the LIPSTICK surveillance team. In addition, to surveillance work, he was used as an investigator to collect operational data on persons and organizations of interest to the Station. He quickly demonstrated a capacity for leadership and at one time was the leader of the LIPSTICK team. He has been used as a LIFEAT Base House operator and processor of tapes; he has excelled in this type of work because of his bi-lingual Spanish/English facility and, more importantly, due to his diversified experience in clandestine operations which permits him to spot operational leads much more readily than the average LIFEAT monitor.

b. Duties - GERENDE is currently serving as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LICALIA, LIPSTICK Photo Truck, LIJERSEY Surveillance Team and LILYRIC. In addition, he monitors and processes the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps. He also supervises the photographic processing of LIPSTICK-38 (his brother-in-law) and the translation work of LIPSTICK-40 (his sister). He maintains contact with and provides administrative support to LIMITATIONS 5 and 6, LICOOL-7 Base operators. Quite obviously GERENDE's many duties overlap the bounds of several Station operations, namely LIPSTICK, LIJERSEY, LIFEAT, LICOOL and several activities which are not listed under formal projects such as BGMORNING. It is recognized by the Station that it is not advisable to have one principal agent connected with as many operations as is GERENDE. However, the present scarcity of both staff and contract agents of the principal agent type necessitate such efficiency measures. Every effort is being made to compartment the various segments of GERENDE's operations and to decrease, and to eliminate where possible, all lateral communications between agents.

c. Security Problems - The most serious security situation surrounding GERENDE and his many activities is the fact that LIPSTICKS 12 and 30 (two of the LIPSTICK Team members arrested in the June 1958 flap) know GERENDE by true name, and knew that he also worked for KUBARK. In fact, LIPSTICK-30 is a close personal friend of GERENDE's and was originally recommended for KUBARK employment by GERENDE. The operational security hypothesis that can be constructed from these existing acquaintances are too numerous to list in this brief review; suffice to say that should GERENDE be arrested by one of the local police agencies, most of the remaining support assets would be destroyed or so seriously compromised that the Station would indeed be foolish to continue using them. It is appropriate to state here, however, that neither GERENDE nor the Station believes that GERENDE has yet been named or otherwise identified as a result of the LIPSTICK flap. It is granted though that any future questions by one of the local police agencies to the compromised LIPSTICKERS represents a continuing type of danger for GERENDE. Based on the duties which GERENDE is currently performing, the readers of this review can well imagine what the consequences to several operations would be if GERENDE were arrested by one of the local police agencies and interrogated in detail. Also, the Station must forever be aware that the local police agencies are certainly capable, for only a few dollars, of selling information concerning KUBARK to the Soviets and/or Satellites.

d. Recommendations - It would be unwise to consider terminating GERENDE since he is a highly competent agent and since his termination would not eliminate the fact that he knows a great deal about the Station's support operations. He has been reminded several times, and the Case Officer will continue to remind him, that his tradecraft professionalism must improve and stay ahead of the increasing sophistication of the local police agencies and opposition services operating in Mexico.

It is the opinion of the Station that GERENDE should continue to be used in about the same manner that he is presently being used. It would be advisable, however, to separate him from the two LIFEAT functions he is currently handling, BGMORNING and the Cuban Exile taps. This is suggested not only because of the possible future security ramifications, but also because GERENDE does not have time to run properly his support mechanism and to monitor taps seven days a week.

To provide for a situation whereby one of the local police agencies becomes aware of GERENDE's illegal activities and assuming that either GERENDE or the Station learns of this before the local police agency can take positive action, it is imperative that a warning system of communications be established to facilitate GERENDE's removal from Mexico. Arrangements such as those used for Wilfred O. CLOWER could be set up or local arrangements could be made with ODUNIT or ODOATH for a more expeditious exit from Mexico. The Case Officer will develop this plan in detail.

4. OPERATIONS

a. Limited

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-14 is the agent in charge of the LIMITED Base. According to GERENDE, LIPSTICK-14 is conscientious, security minded, speaks no English, and on occasion is a bit over confident. He performs his operational duties competently and with discretion. In addition to his photographic duties, he is also used occasionally as a one-man

foot surveillance to follow individuals leaving the LIMERICK installation, LIPSTICK-14 receives a monthly salary of $1,800.00 (MN) and free rent and utilities at the LIMITED Base. His wife (LIPSTICK-27) and son (LIPSTICK-28) live with him at the LIMITED Base.

LIPSTICK-28 until 15 July 1958 assisted his father with photographic work at the LIMITED Base. However, on the above date he decided to resign from his LIMITED job and, strange as it may seem, to devote full time to working on a chicken farm. LIPSTICK-28 made this decision on his own and against the wishes of his father. He will continue to live at the LIMITED Base and it is believed that no security problems will result, since any security difficulties could adversely affect his mother and father. Although LIPSTICK-28 has been terminated and a termination report forwarded to Headquarters, it is suggested that we maintain his operational approval since he continues to live in the LIMITED Base.

(3) Communications - At the present time GERENDE meets with LIPSTICK-14 three times a week at contact points away from the Base. They have seven separate contact points which are used for their meetings. Usually the place of contact is pre-arranged at the previous meeting; however, a rapid means of communication exists whereby GERENDE telephones LIPSTICK-14 and through a pre-arranged open code, utilizing insurance policy numbers, sets the time and place of contact. LIPSTICK-14's overt occupation is that of an insurance salesman and adjuster; consequently, there is a cover basis for such a telephonic conversation. A reserve system of communication with LIPSTICK-14 has not yet been arranged. GERENDE has been instructed to do this as soon as possible, thereby giving the Station a means to contact LIPSTICK-14 directly should the need ever arise.

(4) Security - Excluding KUBARK staff personnel, the LIMITED Base is known to LIPSTICKS-2, 14, 27 and 28 and to Oliver G. SCANTLING and Raymond H. GERENDE and possibly to LIPSTICK-12 (GERENDE's opinion). Since LIPSTICK-14 has known LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) for many years and since LIMEWATER is LIPSTICK-2's brother, it is important to recognize that the desirable degree of compartmentation between LIPSTICK/LIMITED and LIFEAT probably does not exist. Although LIMEWATER must be aware of LIPSTICK-14's and 2's PBPRIME employment, it has not been possible to ascertain the extent of LIMEWATER's knowledge about their specific activities, and vice versa. LIPSTICK-14

worked with James O. AYCALL (LIMESTONE) during WW-II; however, he claims that the only members of AYCALL's family that he ever met was AYCALL's "alleged wife." Since she saw him only one time many years ago, LIPSTICK-14 does not believe that she would recognize him now.

Neither GERENDE nor LIPSTICK-14 are aware that KUBARK owns the LIMITED Base House. The extent of their knowledge is that LIMOUSINE is the owner and we simply rent from him.

(5) Recommendations - It is recommended that GERENDE continue to meet with LIPSTICK-14 and to supervise his operation. In this connection, GERENDE has been instructed to reorganize his existing communications arrangements with LIPSTICK-14 to include a new regular system, a rapid non-scheduled system and a reserve system. Also, GERENDE is to review with LIPSTICK-14 their cover reasons for meeting and knowing each other and to be prepared to use this cover story should they ever be apprehended together.

LIPSTICK-14 was instructed on 8 August 1958 to cease all social and business contact with LIPSTICK-2. Oliver G. SCANTLING, who has previously handled LIPSTICK-14 and sees him occasionally even now, has been directed to cease all contact with the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14 except when approved by the Case Officer. (NOTE: It is necessary at times for SCANTLING to debrief LIPSTICK-14 for LIMESA leads).

b. LILYRIC

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons entering and leaving the LIMERICK installations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-5 is personnel manager of a Mexican affiliate of a large PBPRIME company. In addition to serving as a spotter for potential surveillance team members, he also serves as the cutout for the LILYRIC Base. GERENDE manages and directs the LILYRIC Base through LIJERSEY-5. LIJERSEY-5 maintains direct contact with LIJERSEY-2, the Base House operator, and his wife, LIJERSEY-12, who does most of the photographic work. LIJERSEY-5 is a PBPRIME citizen. He is paid a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN).

LIJERSEY-2 is the LILYRIC Base operator. He is a Captain in the Mexican Army Reserve and is also employed by Colgate-Palmolive Peet Company as an industrial engineer. He receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN) and he and his wife live rent and utilities free in the LILYRIC Base.

LIJERSEY-12 is the wife of LIJERSEY-2. She does most of the photographic and reporting work at the LILYRIC Base and has proven herself to be a capable and worthwhile asset. It has been necessary for her to become proficient in the LILYRIC work since her husband works at his regular job during the day. She receives a monthly salary of $800.00 (MN).

(3) Communications - GERENDE contacts LIJERSEY-5 twice weekly at prearranged contact points during the late afternoon hours. LIJERSEY-5 contacts LIJERSEY-2 two to three times weekly at prearranged car contact points and receives the "take" from the LILYRIC Base. On occasion GERENDE has contacted LIJERSEY-2 directly, but this procedure is used only when LIJERSEY-5 is out of town or otherwise not available. GERENDE does not know LIJERSEY-12 or vice versa. No reserve system of communications exists whereby a Station officer could contact LIJERSEY-2 directly should the need arise; however, GERENDE has been instructed to set up such a system of communications. The same will be done with LIJERSEY-5, although he is known to several Station officers and little difficulty would be experienced in contacting him directly.

(4) Security - The security of the LILYRIC Base appears, at least on paper, to be in better shape than the Limited or LICALLA Bases. Insofar as the Case Officer has been able to determine, the only indigenous agents aware of the LILYRIC Base are GERENDE, LIJERSEYS 2, 5 and 12, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40, and all of these individuals have a close connection with the operation of the Base. The only tie-in the LILYRIC Base has with the LIPSTICK operations is through GERENDE.

(5) Recommendations - GERENDE has been instructed to change his meeting plans with LIJERSEY-5 and to review the communications set-up between LIJERSEY-5 and LIJERSEY-2 (L-5 and L-2 are long-time friends and, consequently, the cover problem is minimized). A staggered schedule of coverage of the LIMERICK target between LILYRIC and LIMITED was initiated on 18 August 1958. Although the operators of these two bases are unaware of the existence of the other, a suitable cover story has been worked out to satisfy any

curiosity that LIPSTICK-14 and LIJERSEYS-2 and 12 may have. This procedure is believed desirable due to the confining nature of the photographic tasks and the lack of additional personnel to assist at each of the bases. Also, this staggered schedule of coverage should reduce some of the duplication presently coming in from the two bases.

c. LICALLA

(1) Target - Stationary photographic surveillance of persons and activities in the garden area of the LIMERICK installation.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-39, his wife and three small children live at the LICALLA Base. He is an accountant for a local bus line and works at his cover job in the evenings. LIPSTICK-39 does an excellent and conscientious job of photographic coverage at the LICALLA Base. In addition to the photos he takes, he writes a narrative description of the events which take place in the target's garden area. He receives a monthly salary of $2,000.00 (MN) and free rent at the LICALLA Base.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-39 twice weekly, usually on Tuesdays and Thursdays. They have four contact points, one of which is selected at each meeting for use for the next meeting. In the event that contact is not established, GERENDE has the initiative in contacting LIPSTICK-39 by phoning him at the bus line office during the evenings. Then, by prearranged open code, a meeting site and time are agreed on. Since Oliver G. SCANTLING is also acquainted with LIPSTICK-39, it would be possible to contact him through SCANTLING should something happen to GERENDE. However, to facilitate proper and secure communications procedures, GERENDE has been directed to establish a reserve system of communications with Lipstick-39, using the customary oral and physical bonafides.

(4) Security - The most serious security problem concerning LICALLA is the fact that LIPSTICK-39 is the brother of LIPSTICK-47 (the first agent arrested by the local police agency during the recent LIPSTICKflap). Although it is generally believed by Station officers that LIPSTICK-39's name was not mentioned by LIPSTICK-47 nor that any indication was given concerning LIPSTICK-39's job, it must be understood that should the local police agency decide later to interrogate LIPSTICK-47, the probability exists of compromising LIPSTICK-39 and LICALLA. The Station sees no way to overcome this possibility.

It is important to note here that LICALLA occupies one of the four LIMUST properties. While it is believed that LIPSTICK-39 does not know that KUBARK owns the Base or has anything to do with the other three houses, it is entirely conceivable that should one of the local police agencies or the LIMERICK personnel become aware of LICALLA activities, they could very easily arrive at some logical conclusions about all of the LIMUST property. This would be detrimental, if not fatal, to our aims. However, another Station viewpoint on this same problem is that if compromised, LICALLA would divert suspicion from, rather than to, LIMUST. Should one of the local police agencies begin an investigation which might involve LIMUST and LICALLA, then LICALLA could be sacrificed to protect the LIMUST Base. These possibilities become somewhat theoretical and perhaps impractical due to the lack of predictibility of the local police agencies, but nevertheless must be weighed one against the other.

In view of the apparent importance of the LIMESA/LIMUST operation a lot of thought and discussion have transpired at the Station about continuing the LICALLA operation in its present location or suspending it for the immediate future and attempting to find another suitable location away from the LIMUST property. A sound argument can be made for terminating the base since such an alternative might have the effect of limiting any knowledge LIPSTICK-39 may have about the LIMESA/LIMUST installation. However, the termination of a productive base such as LICALLA would require an explanation to LIPSTICK-39 which could not help but leave him a bit suspicious. For Headquarters information, the local rental laws are such that LIPSTICK-39 would not be able to comprehend why we did not insist on him maintaining "squatters rights" (as stated previously, LIPSTICK-39 apparently does not know that we own LICALLA or even have an interest in any of the other LIMUST properties) which can easily be done in Mexico. Therefore, any attempt to terminate LICALLA might cause more of a security problem with LIPSTICK-39 than permitting LICALLA to operate as it is now. Another possibility would be terminating LIPSTICK-39 and putting another agent in the present LICALLA Base. If this measure were followed, it would not eliminate the fact that LIPSTICK-39, even if terminated, would still know of the existance of the present LICALLA Base. Still another possibility would be to terminate LIPSTICK-39 and the LICALLA Base; however, since LICALLA and the other LIMUST properties are ostensibly owned by one man, LIMOUSINE, suspicions and investigations could still lead to LIMUST.

(5) Recommendations - The Station is inclined not to "rock the

boat" at this stage of the game and suggests that we maintain LICALLA at its present location and with its present operator, LIPSTICK-39. One alternative appears to be about as good as another in this case, and it is an acknowledged fact that LICALLA, at its present location, is a worthwhile and productive asset. Headquarters ideas and comments on the LICALLA Base would be appreciated.

At the present time it is planned to move LIPSTICK-39 and family to a furnished apartment when the time comes to remodel the LICALLA Base. After completion of the remodeling, LIPSTICK-39 and family will return to the present LICALLA Base.

d. PHOTO TRUCK

(1) Target - Investigative asset used for taking surreptitious photographs of persons, places and things that are from time to time of interest to the Station and Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIPSTICK-2, as indicated by the low numerical designation of his cryptonym, has been employed by KUBARK for several years. At the present time LIPSTICK-2 is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the photographic surveillance truck. He is also used occasionally to spot and rent operational apartments. In the past, LIPSTICK-2 has served as team leader of a low level surveillance team (which was compromised and subsequently disbanded), as a LIFEAT line inspector (when he was not busy with the photo truck), and as a static surveillance man (i.e., used as an outside sentry during the March 1958 entry of the LIMUST Base by KUTUBE/D, KURIOT and KUCLUB technicians. (NOTE: LIPSTICK-2 was assigned the task of watching the entire area during the day for any unusual activity on the part of target personnel. He was not told that he was to watch a specific house. He was dismissed from his static surveillance before dusk and the Headquarters technicians did not enter LIMUST until after 2030 hours.) LIPSTICK-2 is the brother of LIMEWATER (LIFEAT Project) and LIPSTICK-34 (LIPSTICK Surveillance team member) is LIPSTICK-2's wife's nephew. LIPSTICK-2's cover is buying and selling cars; however, about the only business he has in this connection is when he buys and sells cars for KUBARK. His cover is quite weak. He receives a monthly salary of $3,200.00 (MN) plus $600.00 (MN) per month for the use of his personal car.

LIPSTICK-24 does not know GERENDE and, presumably, knows only LIPSTICK-2, with whom he works on the photo truck. His cover is as a salesman of electrical appliances; however, he does not pursue his cover job to the desirable extent. LIPSTICK-24 was recruited by LIPSTICK-2 about one year ago and is currently receiving a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month. Since he has now worked a year for the Station, and performed satisfactorily, his salary should be raised to $1,200.00 (MN) per month (LIEMPTY will provide for this increase).

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets LIPSTICK-2 two to three times a week. These meetings are arranged by phone and take place at previously selected contact points which can be referred to in telephonic conversations by innocent sounding code names. LIPSTICK-2 also knows GERENDE's true name, where he lives, and his phone number. In the past he has had occasion to telephone GERENDE at the latter's home. LIPSTICK-2 knows DINGLEY, and could, in an emergency situation, contact DINGLEY. However, GERENDE has been instructed to arrange a complete communications plan with LIPSTICK-2, including a reserve means of contact. For security reasons, GERENDE has been instructed to inform LIPSTICK-2 that his only contact is with GERENDE and that in the future he is not to contact anyone else in the organization without GERENDE's permission. Also, that should contact with GERENDE be disrupted, he is to await for the higher echelon to establish contact with him (all agents under GERENDE are being so instructed). This is particularly important in the case of Lipstick-2, since he has by-passed GERENDE in two or three instances in the past.

(4) Security - Probably the most serious security situation involving the photo truck, LIPSTICK-2 and Lipstick-24 is the basic knowledge of the LIPSTICK surveillance team that such an asset exists, even to the point that one of the team members (LIPSTICK-34) is the listed owner of the photo truck. The personal knowledge of LIPSTICK-2 about the LIFEAT operation also represents a security hazard of the first class. For example, if LIPSTICK-2 were compromised and arrested as a result of his activities, there is a possibility that he could compromise his brother, LIMEWATER, the LIMITED Base and LIPSTICK-14, GERENDE and our interest in the highly sensitive LIMESA/LIMUST operation. (NOTE: According to the LIFEAT Case Officer and the former LIPSTICK Case Officer, both LIMEWATER and LIPSTICK-2 have been reminded on several occasions during the past few years that they were not to discuss any aspect of their operations with each other. Also, LIPSTICK-2, to the best of the Station's

knowledge, does not know the location of any of the LIFEAT Base houses).

A new truck should be purchased as soon as possible to replace the present truck. The new truck should be purchased in an assumed name and vehicle papers should list an untraceable address. LIPSTICK-2 has already been informed that he is to have no contact with LIPSTICK-14 or any other operational personnel he may know except, of course, LIPSTICK-24, with whom he works, and GERENDE, who supervises his activities. In addition to the above, the Station should begin thinking about a replacement agent for LIPSTICK-2 and every effort should be made to set up an independent and compartmented photo truck operation. This would permit the eventual termination of LIPSTICK-2, after we have given him several months to reduce his knowledge of current operations.

d. LIJERSEY

(1) Target - Foot surveillance and investigative support of other Station operations.

(2) Personnel - LIJERSEY-4 is of a low social class and lives with his mother in a slum area of Mexico City. He is the sole support for his mother and several younger brothers and sisters. He is described by GERENDE as having a lot of ambition and a strong desire to improve his standard of living and position in life. The Station has found him to be a good observer and, consequently, adequate for static surveillance work. Although he now has his drivers license, he is not a capable driver and probably will never develop into one. GERENDE has been encouraging LIJERSEY-4 to obtain employment as a salesman to supplement his KUBARK income of $1,000.00 (MN) and to establish himself in a cover job. However, LIJERSEY-4 has not yet obtained such employment. It is the Station's opinion that LIJERSEY-4 is definitely an asset of limited value and will never develop into the high-calibre surveillance asset which the Station really needs.

LIJERSEY-8's situation is about the same as LIJERSEY-4's. He lives with his family and is currently taking highschool courses (LIJERSEY-4 is doing the same). He is not an imaginative talker and has difficulty making up cover stories and spur-of-the-moment excuses and explanations - the vital qualifications for a good surveillance man. He is the best driver of the three LIJERSEY team members and with more practice will probably develop into a capable and dependable driver. LIJERSEY-8 has recently shown a commendable amount of initiative where his cover situation is concerned. He has obtained a job as a commission salesman for UNDERWOOD typewriters and, according to GERENDE, is making a substantial amount of "pin" money. However, as in the case of LIJERSEY-4, LIJERSEY-8 is at best an asset of only limited value. LIJERSEY-8 also receives a salary of $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

LIJERSEY-13 does not know LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 and vice versa. LIJERSEY-13 is better dressed than the other two team members and can pass as a better educated and more socially flexible individual. He speaks fairly good English. He performs pretext investigation assignments with facility and imagination and is adept at making up cover stories. In brief, he makes a good impression on the people he interviews. He is not a good driver and is too nervous to develop into one. His salary is $1,000.00 (MN) per month.

(3) Communications - GERENDE has daily contact arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS. Prearranged meeting places are used on designated days of each week and the LIJERSEYS are instructed to go to each meeting. They have standing instructions to continue going to their meeting sites for two weeks; if they have not been contacted during that period of time, they can discontinue their communications plan and await contact by GERENDE or another appropriately selected agent at their respective homes. None of the LIJERSEYS have home telephones; hence, it is impossible to arrange any type of communications using this means. GERENDE is currently in the process of setting up new and more complete communications arrangements with the three LIJERSEYS.

(4) Security - Insofar as knowledge of other operations, personnel and assets is concerned, the LIJERSEYS appear to have the best security of any of the operations handled by GERENDE. New communications plans with the LIJERSEYS will do much toward increasing security and ability to meet contingencies. GERENDE will be instructed to give refresher training to all three LIJERSEYS in operational security, cover and communications. The major danger existing with the LIJERSEY team, and with any surveillance team, is the possibility of compromise and arrest by one of the local police agencies. Should this happen, GERENDE and his other operations would be placed in considerable danger.

For this reason, it is not advisable to have GERENDE connected with a surveillance team and also contacting and directing the sensitive photo base houses. Therefore, until such time as a suitable asset can be developed or acquired to take over the LIJERSEY team, their actual surveillance assignments will be kept at the minimum.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that the LIJERSEY framework be used for the recruitment of at least three competent and higher class local nationals for use on surveillance assignments. After the recruitment of such individuals, it may be suggested that LIJERSEYS-4 and 8 be terminated. LIJERSEY-13 should remain as an independent investigative asset to conduct "credit" and other type of inquiries which he can do without help from other agents. LIJERSEY-5 has already been asked to spot prospective candidates of a higher social standing for use on a new surveillance team; however, even under optimum conditions, one and a half years will be required to get such a team functioning. In order to recruit the type of team member that will be most worthwhile to the Station, we must plan to pay a minimum starting salary of $1,600.00 (MN) per month. The cost of living in Mexico is continually on the rise and where $1,000.00 (MN) was a good salary one to two years ago, it really is not adequate today.

f. LIFEAT

(1) Target - Conversations coming from two telephone taps, BGMORNING and Cuban exiles.

(2) Personnel - GERENDE lives in the apartment where these two lines are maintained. He personally processes the take from the lines and passes it to OUSLER for Station dissemination to Robert B. RIGGS (BGMORNING) and Calude K. Shyrock (Cubans). GERENDE, in accordance with LIFEAT procedures, is supposed to remain in this apartment seven days a week. However, this is impossible due to his other operational assignments and activities.

(3) Communications - GERENDE meets daily with OUSLER to pass the LIFEAT "take" and to discuss other operational matters.

(4) Security - It is not a good security practice to have a LIFEAT monitor working on anything except LIFEAT. Other duties, which GERENDE certainly has, limit one's capability for maintaining the required security alertness for telephone

repairmen and others who might accidentally discover one of our LIFEAT taps. Also, should GERENDE be compromised through any of his other operations, it is conceivable that the ECMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps would be discovered by one of the local police agencies.

(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that a replacement be found as soon as possible to relieve GERENDE of his present LIFEAT duties.

g. LICOOL-7

(1) Target - A planned technical installation against a person of interest to the Station and to Headquarters.

(2) Personnel - LIMITATION-5 and his wife, LIMITATION-6, are the LICOOL-7 Base House operators. LIMITATION-5 has been with KUBARK for several years. He was at one time the LIAXIOM Base House operator. He presently works for the DuPont Company. He dresses well, speaks some English and could be described as belonging to the rising middle class of Mexicans. His wife can do photographic work and has had previous experience with KUBARK in the dispatching of car surveillances by radio. LIMITATIONS-5 and 6 are not participating in any active work pending the installation of LICOOL-7 in their apartment. LIMITATION-5 receives a monthly salary of $600.00 (MN) and LIMITATION-6 receives $400.00 (MN) monthly.

(3) Communications - A complete communications plan does not exist between GERENDE and LIMITATION-5. At the present time it is only necessary for GERENDE to see LIMITATION-5 on pay day and when Harvey C. MULFORD desires to visit the apartment for technical surveys and other work. Therefore, GERENDE and LIMITATION-5 utilize an open code telephonic means of getting together. So far, this has worked quite well, but it will be necessary later to set up a more sophisticated communications system.

(4) Security - The operational aspects of LICOOL-7 are under the jurisdiction of Matthew S. DINGLEY; therefore, the author of this report is not familiar with the security ramifications, if any, surrounding this technical installation and the agents operating it.

(5) Recommendations - None.

h. MISCELLANEOUS

Also on the payroll as worthwhile assets are GERENDE's brother-in-law, LIPSTICK-38, and his sister, LIPSTICK-40. GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 process and print all the LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and truck photos. LIPSTICK-40 does non-sensitive translation work for the Station. Both LIPSTICKS-38 and 40 are handled by GERENDE. They do not have contact with other agents or with station officers. LIPSTICK-38 receives a monthly salary of $1,000.00 (MN). LIPSTICK-40 receives the equivalent or $1.75 U. S. in pesos per hour for her work.

Although it is not adviseable from the security point of view to have any indigenous agent aware of all three of our LIMERICK photographic bases and the photo truck, the load on the Station photographer several months ago resulted in just such a solution to the problem. Previously, GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 had processed only the photographs from LIMITED, LILYRIC and the truck.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been included in several sections of this paper. These same recommendations, excepting those which have already been carried out or are in the process of implementation, are listed below in a composite form to facilitate the readers' overall comprehension.

a. Continue the reorganization of communication arrangements with all agents.

b. Relieve GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties (B GMORNING and Cuban Exiles taps) as soon as possible.

c. Continue to use GERENDE for the time being as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, the Photo Truck, LIJERSEY, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40.

d. Arrange a warning system of communications for removing GERENDE to PBPRIME should he be compromised to one of the local police agencies.

e. Purchase a new photo truck for use by LIPSTICKS 2 and 24.

f. Begin planning for a compartmented photo truck operation which will later permit termination of LIPSTICK-2.

g. Spot and recruit at least three indigenous agents from the middle class social level to form the nucleus of a new LIJERSEY surveillance team.

h. Eventually separate GERENDE from either LIJERSEY surveillance team duties or the three photographic base houses, preferably the former. The two types of activities are not compatible with each other and should not be handled by the same principal agent.

i. Implied, but not specifically stated elsewhere in this paper, is the suggestion that GERENDE be given a "cooling off" and training period of two to three months in PBPRIME. Of course, this will not be possible until other assets are developed to take over GERENDE's present duties. After his return from PBPRIME, GERENDE could be used to develop new support assets which would be completely compartmented from all of his previous operations, personnel and activities.

6. CONCLUSIONS

It would take several weeks of uninterrupted study of files to write a really comprehensive security review of GERENDE's operations and activities. However, based on the facts contained in this paper, it is the Station's opinion that GERENDE probably is not now known to the local police agencies as a KUBARK or PBPRIME agent. It is believed that GERENDE could be identified by the local police agencies at any time they choose to interrogate LIPSTICKS-12 and 30 in detail or when one of the other agent assets formerly or currently associated with GERENDE is compromised. Furthermore, if GERENDE is arrested, he could compromise most of the Station's support assets, plus the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles portions of LIFEAT.

Given several months time, the slow process of compartmentation can be introduced into GERENDE's operations. Such compartmentation, however, will never reach the truly desirable point, but some improvement over the existing situation can be made. If GERENDE can emerge basically unscathed from the current incidents, then KUBARK will have an extremely valuable long-range support asset.

Quinton N. OUSLER

21 October 1958

SECRET

SECRET

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF RAMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIES


LIFEAT
CAMERAMEN &
CUBAN EXILES
GERENDE
PHOTO PROCESSING & TRANSLATIONS
LIPSTICK - 38
LIPSTICK - NC
LICOOL - 7
LIMITATION - 5
LIMITATION - 6
..LA
- 34
LILYRIC
LIJERSEY - 2
LIJERSEY - 5
LIJERSEY - 2
LIMITED
LIPSTICK - 14
LIPSTICK - 54
LIPSTICK - 23
PHOTO TRUCK
LIPSTICK - 2
LIPSTICK - 24
LIJERSEY
LIJERSEY - 4
LIJERSEY - 8
LIJERSEY - 12
passes thru Gerende

1958

SECRET

Chief, WH Division

50-6-23/3

Chief of Station, Mexico City

23 July 1958

Operational/Security
Security Review of Project LIPSTICK

Comments on proposals in Paragraph 7

MARKED FOR INDEXING
Y NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

REFERENCES:

A. MEXI 1743
B. MEXI-1755
C. MEXI-1771

1. References outlined the arrest of LIPSTICK-47, the subsequent arrests of LIPSTICKs 12 and 30, their interrogation by the Mexican Secret Service and their eventual release from prison. References truly portrayed the incident with the following exceptions:

a. None of the arrested men was tortured.

b. LIPSTICK-45 was never arrested.

c. Only LIPSTICK 12, 30 and 47 were arrested.

d. LIPSTICK-29 was not taken from his home by force. In fact he was never arrested.

2. While under detention the arrested men told the story as it appears in Attachment A which was written by LIPSTICK-30. It is not believed that the men told anything more because:

a. The substance of the story was told to Station Mexico identically by three (3) separate and compartmented sources, i.e. from the arrested men, from the attorney, Raul F. CARDENAS, and from the Counselor of Canadian Embassy, Sidney FREIFELD.

b. Each operation mentioned in Attachment A, which was susceptible to a check by the Secret Service, was investigated by them. However, no operation not mentioned in Attachment A was investigated by the Secret Service.

c. LIPSTICK-47, who had only been with the team about one and a half months and who did most of the talking, did not know any information other than that in Attachment A.

d. LIPSTICK-12 and 30, who knew considerably more about our operations, are both made of sterner stuff than LIPSTICK-47 and have keener minds.

e. The "ring of truth" that Attachment A has. It is not believed that the Secret Service is sufficiently sophisticated to concoct such a believable story.

f. The combined opinion of every Case Officer who has known LIPSTICK-12 and 30 that they did not reveal any information other than that contained in Attachment A.

g. On 10 July 1958 LIPSTICK-12 and 30 were examined by Martin F. REMALEY on LCFLUTTER. REMALEY was satisfied that the results of this examination completely exonerated LIPSTICK-12 and 30 from any cooperation with the Mexican Police. The results of these tests are attached as Attachment B.

3. In order to assess what possible damage might have been done to Station Mexico's operations if the arrested men had told the Secret Service everything they knew, there follows a list of those operations known to the arrested men:

a. LIPSTICK-47 did not know anything more than he told the Secret Service as outlined in Attachment A.

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK

☒ CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

b. LIPSTICK-12:

(1) He was recruited by LIMITATION ~~and knows~~ that he works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity LIMITATION is employed.

(2) He knows that LIQUATION, LIMITATION-3 and LIMITATION-6 work for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacities they work.

(3) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Oliver U. SCANTLING, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Raymond S. GERENDE, Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ, Boyd I. [illegible] and Clyde K. SEROCK.

(4) He knows all of the details of the FUMARIC 9 and [illegible] operations.

(5) He participated in the raid on Alfredo Guerra Borges' apartment.

(6) He knows of LIPSTICK Car #6 (photo truck).

(7) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK surveillance team and LIPSTICK-2 and 14 who used to be with the team.

(8) Through surveillance, he knows of the following operations:

LIARONE
LIJAG
LIAXIOM
Roland Abbiate (Francois Rosen)
[illegible]
Alfred Kaufman & Martha Dodd Stern
LIVESTOCK-3
LIVESTOCK-1

Samuel Brooks
Maurice Halperin
9 indigenous employees of the U.S. Embassy in MexicoCity
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] (Michael ROUX & Jose Maria RIBEIRO Antunes

Surveillance of various officials of the Partido Comunista Mexicano
Surveillance of various Soviet officials. He probably knows of the existence of the LIMITED base since this base dispatched the radio cars on surveillance of Soviet officials.
Samuel RODRIGUEZ Rodriguez - individual who desired to purchase the LIEMPTY base.

c. LIPSTICK-30:

(1) He was recruited by Raymond S. GERENDE. He knows that GERENDE works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity.

(2) He knows the true names of Thomas G. [illegible], Edward P. SECHEN, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Wilfred O. CLOWER, Oliver U. SCANTLING, and Harvey P. DENENHOLTZ.

(3) He participated in the raid on the apartment of Alfredo Guerra Borges.

(4) He knows of the LIPSTICK #6 vehicle (photo truck).

TO	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	
FROM	DATE
SUBJECT	RE "RQ" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCES	

(5) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK team and LIPSTICK-12 and 14.

(6) Through surveillance, he has learned of all the operations as listed in the case of LIPSTICK-8.

4. At the present time the LIPSTICK team is inoperative. The team members are working at their various cover jobs and writing a critique on the surveillance techniques they used which caused these three to be arrested.

Matthew S. DINGLEY has stopped all sensitive contacts and turned them over to Quinton N. CUSLER as a precautionary measure should DINGLEY be under surveillance. DINGLEY continues to see LIPSTICK-30 who now administers the team, and DINGLEY also continues to be the case officer for LIVEROCK.

LIPSTICK-47 has been fired and the LIPSTICK offices have been vacated and the furniture stored in a public warehouse. With the excellent cooperation of Nogales and Monterrey Bases, Wilfred O. GRANER was smuggled out of Mexico.

5. Future planning for the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the results of operational tests and additional defective reassessment based upon the actions of the team and the results obtained. General Miguel MOLINAR Simondi, Chief of the Mexican Secret Service, has agreed to protect the team fully and assume responsibility for their actions for the sum of $240.00 U.S. per month. MOLINAR has also promised to issue the team credentials from the Secret Service, or some other official investigative group, after the presidential inauguration in November of 1958. The future of the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the following factors:

a. It is not believed that the Secret Service demanded, nor even suggested, that the team report future activities to the Secret Service. (Test leads, susceptible of checking, will be given to the LIPSTICK team to determine if they are being reported to the Secret Service).-

b. Degree of access to Secret Service files given to the LIPSTICK team.

c. Effectiveness of General MOLINAR's protection.

7. Station Mexico recommends that the LIPSTICK team be allowed to continue operations for a period of three months at which time a reassessment will be made based upon the evidence accumulated over that period of time. The reassessment will be concerned mainly with whether or not the team is really under the control of the Secret Service and the degree of success of their "penetration" of the Secret Service.

Willard C. Curtis

Encls.
MSD/bct
22 July 1958
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

SECRET

6 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/Mexico

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE

REFERENCE: HMM-A-11368

1. This dispatch represents the type of operational reporting we need. I think any answer to the Station should lead off with an expression of appreciation for a good job. Maybe it will encourage them to write more of this type.

2. GERENDE is very exposed and should be taken off some of his jobs at once. Specifically, my ideas are as follows:

3. Re para. 3 a, agent is very capable and should be retained if secure means can be found. Getting rid of him would not solve the problem. As long as he is in Mexico he is vulnerable. Some thought should be given to how he would be supported in the event of arrest. Personally, I believe the Station would do better to sacrifice a case officer than permit things to drag on to the point where GERENDE might tell all to the police.

Recommendations:

a. GERENDE be briefed so as to be ever ready with an innocuous story to tell the police in the event of arrest.

b. GERENDE be told to contact one of already blown Station officers like HAZLETT in the event of arrest and that the Station officer be ready to appear personally at police station to free GERENDE. If the case officer named for this duty and GERENDE both know the innocuous cover story, there should be little problem. I have done it myself. A good cover story is "looking for draft dodgers" or some such tale which does not have implications of working against Mexican citizens.

c. That if not allowed to communicate directly GERENDE should tell the senior officer present at police station that he works on (cover story) for HAZLETT and insists HAZLETT be sent for.

d. That a second blown case officer's name be given as an alternate for HAZLETT, who is often out of town and unavailable.

SECRET

e. That GERENDE be taken off LIFEAT at once and all suspicious audio equipment be removed from his home or offices. At present, LIFEAT is the only illegal activity being engaged in by GERENDE; if he is made merely in connection with his physical surveillance activities he is not likely to be hurt by the Mexicans.

f. Concur preparations should be made to hide out GERENDE if it is known he is to be arrested.

4. Re para. 4 a, GERENDE's participation in LIMITED is O. K. I believe no law is being broken. However, LIMITED is probably blown to the Soviets. Here is the more real danger. Station should find out who is the registered owner of the phone at LIMITED. Prior to leaving Mexico I noted to MAHONEY it was still held in the name of LIMESTONE-3 (now fired and hence a possible threat).

5. Re para. 4 b: This is the same situation as LIMITED but not so likely blown to the Soviets. There is no reason why GERENDE should not continue this work.

6. Re para. 4 c, LICALLA is a very special problem and should be taken up at once with Headquarters elements working on LIMESA/LIMUST. I thought LICALLA had been cancelled out when LIMESA began to shape up. I consider it a danger to LIMESA. Has LICALLA produced anything of value? I think we could vacate this in such a way that the agents in LICALLA would have no cause to be suspicious. (Put an obvious tail on the agent, scare him off, etc. This would throw off the Mexican police, too, in the event they are already wise to LICALLA through LIPSTICK 47. We could pretend to believe the Soviets ran the tail and the game is up.)

Recommendation: Get rid of LICALLA unless very productive. Better do this before the remodeling begins.

7. Re para 4 d, photo truck. LIPSTICK-2 does know of the locations of some of the basehouses on LIFEAT since he was a line inspector.

Recommendations:

a. New compartmented truck should be set up. Don't use false names and addresses. It could result in great harm.

b. LIPSTICK-2 be sent off to some small town as "resident agent" for general work and to get him out of the area.

8. Re para. 4 e. I have no particular thoughts on LIJERSEY but think it consistent for GERENDE to handle it.

9. Re para. 4 f: GERENDE should be taken off LIFEAT at once, even if it means losing lines. As of March this year the Station had enough agent personnel to handle bases for 24 lines. They should be able to fill the gap even though LIMESTONE-3 and his tribe were fired. Only 12 lines are now being handled (latest report). The way GERENDE is handling his LIFEAT work seems to be breaking all the rules we set up inseven years of experience.

10. Re para. 4 g, LICOOL-7. I see no harm in GERENDE's handling the operational aspect of this case. But through LIMITATION-5 the police could get back to LIMITATION and the main LIMERICK tap, that is, if they were able to make GERENDE talk before we could save him. The danger to LIMITATION was not brought out in the Station's survey.

11. In re para. 5, recommendations -

a. Approve.

b. Get him off LIFEAT right now.

c. Concur, but liquidate LICALLA.

d. This needs some discussion. What do we do with GERENDE in the U. S.?

e. Concur.

f. Concur with reservation noted above.

g. O. K.

h. I don't see why he can't handle all these jobs since they are physical surveillances.

i. Not a bad idea.

12. Final observations:

a. What is GERENDE's cover?

b. We must be sure he is not overworked. Sloppy work has resulted from people being overworked.

CH

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/FI

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ATR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMMW-5760

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

24 DEC 57 13 01

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. [illegible]

ACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract Extension

Attached are original and two copies of an extension of Subject's contract to be signed and witnessed and returned to Headquarters.

J. C. KING
CHIEF, WHD

COPY

19 December 1957

Attachment
3, as stated above

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:jck

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ [✓ SECRET]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Contract Personnel Division O/K
Room 801 1016 16th St.

NO.

DATE 10 December 1957

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECD	DATE FWD	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FI/OPS/Projects 1709 L Bldg.	12 DEC 1957	13 Dec	✓	The original of this contract was prepared in headquarters and forwarded to the field for their execution and retention. This amendment should follow the same procedure. Please let CPD know when subject has signed his extension so a copy of this document can be forwarded to Finance Division for their records.
2. WH Division 1405 Barton Hall	[illegible]	1957	P	
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				Contract to file, HANW-5760
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 55 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ [✓ SECRET] ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. H[illegible]-5626

201-11[illegible]523

DEC 3 1957

[illegible]ET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond M. G[illegible]

1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for Subject, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

JCKing
[illegible]. KING
[illegible], WHD

COPY

26 November 1957

Distribution:
3- Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - Subject
1 - RI

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

Charles E Apple
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

J. C. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
for

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

14-00000

LIPSTICK Quarterly Report

ma 8773
27 Nov 57

c. Raymond H. GERENDE, a contract agent, uses cover provided by LI[illegible] and is responsible for LIPSTICK office number 2. GERENDE supervises the work of LI[illegible]-[illegible] who processes the film from LIMITED, LICALLA, and LILYRIC basehouses. GERENDE directs the activities of the LIEMBRACE surveillance team (a separate project discussed in [illegible]-0151). GERENDE is also responsible for the activities of the fixed surveillance basehouse, LILYRIC.

(1) LILYRIC is a second story apartment which affords a view into the right angle of the main gate of the LI[illegible] installation at an angle which photographs from the top of the heads downward. The equipment is the same as that used in LIMITED and LICALLA and the film is processed in the same way. LIEMPTY-12 lives in this apartment and is responsible for the photographic and physical surveillance. His reports supplement but do not duplicate those submitted by the LIMITED basehouse. The photographs from LILYRIC are superior in quality to those obtained from either LIMITED or LICALLA. LIEMPTY-12 is an efficient stenographer and good photographer. Also, this base offers a better position from which to take photographs.

(2) GERENDE's contacts in private investigative agencies are used to check leads from other operations. During June and July 1957 GERENDE received training at Headquarters and both he and the Case Officer feel this training has been most beneficial.

SECRET

Air Pouch

HMMA-8700

Chief, WH Division

19 November 1957

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Operational

William [illegible] BRAGG (201-2008)

Reference: HMM-5262

ACTION REQUESTED: None

1. There is attached for Headquarters retention a translation of a report concerning the Subject. The original report was obtained through a private detective agency in Mexico City which had been contacted by Raymond H. [illegible]. [illegible] posed as a businessman seeking credit and character reports on the commercial firm of Gibbon, Alonson y Cia., S.A. de Mexico. This was a trial assignment for the detective agency in order that Station Mexico could assess the investigative assets of the agency for possible future operational exploitation.

2. The sub-source of HMMA-0021, the former [illegible] chief in Mexico, knows the Subject personally. The Case Officer will contact him direct for additional information on the Subject and his activities.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
15 Nov 57

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

COPY

SECRET

LIPSTICK/20

4UCVS

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Extension for **Raymond H. Gerende**

1. Effective **1 October 1957**, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective **1 October 1955**, is extended for **a period of two (2) years**.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-W-5261

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 10 Oct 57 11 57

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

The following is the evaluation of Raymond H. GERENDE written by the instructor of foreign trainees on 12 September 1957.

1. Instruction commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE and CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques. and briefings in photo and use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was know as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily, and although in the field of CI and CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

COPY

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

HMM-W-5221
Page Two

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Kay benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

25 September 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/Mailroom
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - RI
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

Based on: CT/OS/TR memo, 12 September 1957

RI COPY

Charles E. Apple
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

SECRET

23 September 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : FI/OPS - Projects Branch

SUBJECT : Raymond H. GERENDE (ps)

1. It is requested that the two-year contract of Raymond H. GERENDE, (LIPSTICK-20), which was executed on 1 October 1955, be extended for a two year period, effective 1 October 1957.

2. Raymond H. GERENDE's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing film, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, and handling cash advances, accountings and property.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/III/Mexico
1 - Subject

WH/III/Mexico/LSule:mjm

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH/3
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc

DATE: 12 September 1957

FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Evaluation of trainee in Special Project LIPSTICK

1. Instruction in this project commenced 10 June and was concluded 12 July 1957. It covered tradecraft, observation, description, casing and reporting, principles of CE&CI, elicitation and interviewing, investigative techniques, and TSS briefings in photo and the use of recording machines.

2. Trainee was known as "Ray". He was easy to work with. He was always pleasant, courteous, cheerful and seemed genuinely interested in every phase of the training. He can speak, read and write English without any difficulty.

3. Ray seemed well motivated; more Pro-American than Mexican. He possesses a strong interest in clandestine work. He is an avid reader. He demonstrated ability to apply principles he had learned from reading and study. He seemed possessed of initiative although there was a limited opportunity of observing this quality in action.

4. While Ray's duties to date apparently have not given him a wide and varied experience in clandestine activity, he seemed to grasp the material quite readily; and although in the field of CI&CE he stated he had never thought of many of their aspects as applying to him, he seemed glad of the opportunity to learn and absorbed them quite readily. He now possesses a good working knowledge of fundamental principles involved. However, it is felt that if he is to work primarily in this field, it should be under the supervision of a case officer with considerable experience and background in this type of activity.

5. As previously indicated, Ray was an avid reader. In addition to certain case studies, he read the following books:

"Handbook for Spies"
"The Spy Web"
"Out of Bondage"
"London Calling North Pole"
"A Spy Has No Friends"

SECRET

The following films were exhibited and critiqued:

"House Search"
"Surveillance"
"Body Search"
"Under Cover"

6. It is felt that Ray benefitted considerably from this course of instruction. We feel that his concept and understanding of principles of clandestine activity have been broadened and strengthened. His interest, enthusiasm and production should reflect this in his future work.

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 8 AUG 1957

Attention : Mr. Lawrence R. Sulc, WH/III/Mexico
Room 2114 Barton Hall

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT: COVERT SITE
Apartment D-22
The President Madison
Presidential Gardens
Alexandria, Virginia
#122877

1. Reference is made to your request (Requisition No:57-51) for safehouse facilities. Further reference is made to your subsequent request that a survey be scheduled of the Subject covert site and that you be advised of the results thereof.

2. It is the understanding of this office that the Subject covert site was utilized for the training and housing of an agent of interest to your office in connection with Project LIPSTICK. It is further understood that motion pictures would be used as part of the training program at the site. The Subject apartment was leased in the name of Rufus KING, cleared attorney.

3. This confirms previous verbal advice that a security survey was conducted at the Subject premises with favorable results. You were previously advised of security approval for the use of the Subject premises for the above purposes.

4. In view of the fact that you have completed your use of the Subject covert site, copies of the report of the survey of the site are being retained in this office. Safehouse Branch and the Central Cover Branch are being advised of the confirmation of the security approval for the use of the site by copies of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Robert H. Cunningham
Robert H. Cunningham

cc: Chief, Safehouse Branch
Central Cover Branch

Lipstick (20)

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-4930

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 2 AUG 57 13 21

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT GENERAL - Operational/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE

Reference: HMM-4554, 21 May 1957.

1. Subject departed from Washington, D.C. on 13 July 1957 to visit his relatives in South Carolina prior to returning to Mexico. He completed five weeks training on 12 July - an evaluation of the Subject by his instructors will be forwarded in the near future.

2. Subject was advanced two weeks per diem at the rate of $12 by Mexico Station. Since his lodgings were provided by Headquarters it was decided to pay him per diem at the rate of $6. Thus station's payment was extended to cover four weeks and Subject was advanced $42 on 3 July to cover the fifth week (7 July through 13 July).

3. The net amount of Subject's telephone bill was not known at time of Subject's departure. Headquarters has Subject's receipt in the amount of $14.29 to cover the money order made out by him to the telephone company. Some of this amount will probably be returned to Subject whereupon he should be reimbursed for the net amount of the telephone bill.

J C King
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

COPY

25 July 1957

Distribution:
- 3 - Mexico City
- 1 - WH/ Mailroom
- 1 - WH/III/Chrono
- ~~1~~ - Subject
- ✓1 - RI

WH/B&F WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:rms

(Releasing officer) (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

Charles E. Apple
for
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

R. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMM-A-7427

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 12 July 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Ramon ALVAREZ Durant

Reference: HMM-W-4554

ACTION REQUESTED: None

Attached for Headquarters retention are two copies of the subject's visa application obtained from the Visa Section of the United States Embassy in Mexico City on 6 May 1957.

Willard C. Curtis

Encl.

MSD/bct
11 July 1957

Distribution
3 - Hqs w/atchmt
2 - Files

RI COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-117523

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28 A

[redacted]

1.- Nombre como está en el Pasaporte.

Ramón Alvarez, Durant

2.- Telefono en Mexico

15-65-02

3.- Fecha en que piensa salir para los E. U.

15 MAYO

4.- ¿Como va a viajar? (tren, avion, coche, camion):

AVION

5.- Frontera por donde entrará o primer punto que tocará de los E. U.

MIAMI

6.- Dirección exacta y completa en donde se le pueda localizar en los E. U.

3135 Yale Ave. (Mr & Mrs R.F. Kolb)
Columbia S.C

[illegible].-31

[redacted]



shall be required to depart from the United States at the expiration of my stay as authorized by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. I hereby agree that if permitted to proceed to or to enter the United States
risk and assume all responsibility for losses or damages which may result in the event I
nited States, or in the event my departure should be delayed I do
pplication are true to the best of my knowledge and belief

(Signature of Alien)

Subscribed and sworn to, or affirmed before me
APR
at

Consul of the United States of America
APR

nimmigrant classification B-2
CFR 41.5 and Sect. 101 (a) (15), Immigration and Nationality Act.
, pursuant

Fee Numbers 11923

22

5.00

62.50

Application for Nonimmigrant Visa and Alien Registration

FAMILY NAME GIVEN NAME INITIAL

[illegible], Baron

2 PLACE AND DATE OF BIRTH Dec. 7, 193[illegible] Mex[illegible]

3 V-2322298

4 HOME ADDRESS [illegible] # 9[illegible], Mexico, D.F. [illegible]

5 ACCOMPANIED BY

6 ADDRESS IN U S South Carolina

7 NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON TO WHOM DESTINED Mr. & Mrs. [illegible] Columbia, S.C.

8 Name and address of nearest relative in home country Sra. [illegible] de Alvarez [illegible]

9 TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PRESENTED [illegible] FC [illegible]/5[illegible] [illegible]/5/[illegible]

10 Hair Br.

11 Eyes Br.

12 Height [illegible] FT [illegible] IN

13 Weight 1[illegible]7

14 Nationality Mexican

16 Race White

15 Complexion [illegible]

17 Ethnic Classification Mexican

18 SEX M X F

19 MARITAL STATUS MAR ☐ SGL ☐ WID. ☐ DIV ☐

20 OCCUPATION [illegible]

21 DISTINGUISHING MARKS none

22 Have you ever been arrested in, or deported or excluded from any country?

23 DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION TO U. S. (TO BE INSERTED BY IMMIGRATION OFFICER)

24 PURPOSE AND INTENDED LENGTH OF STAY IN U. S. Pleasure trip 2 months

ITEMS BELOW HEAVY BLACK LINE TO BE FILLED IN BY IMM. OFFICER

25 ARRIVED BY

26 DATE TO WHICH ADMITTED

27

mem

U. S. IMMIGRATION OFFICER

Except as hereinafter stated, I have never been refused a visa, or deported, removed, or excluded from the United States. I understand that I

FORM FS-257c 9-1-52

S

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH/71

SUBJECT Audio Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July 1957 (1330 hours)

On 3 July 1957 an Audio Briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. The major portion of the briefing was on the Revere T-700 tape recorder. When asked if he knew anything about recorders, GERENDE stated that he was quite familiar with the Revere T-700 as he had had some experience with this recorder when he was a disc jockey in a radio station. A step by step operation of the recorder was explained to him, the tape recorder head was explained also how the sound was recorded on the tape. The following were also explained to him: tape speeds, frequency response, footage indicator, dual tracks—how they can be used in the Revere T-700—, the mechanical section of the recorder and the amplifier.

The recorder was removed from the case by the Subject and the possible breakdown points were shown to him, the recorder and amplifier units were taken out of the case by him and the operation of the sections explained. The recorder was then put together by GERENDE.

GERENDE asked many questions relative to microphones and microphone installations. There were explained to him—carbon microphone, crystal microphone, dynamic and controlled reluctance.

He appeared to be intelligent and was interested in the subjects discussed.

EDWARD A. SIVIK
TSS/TRD/Instructor

Please return ~~[illegible]~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return ~~[illegible]~~ copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - CTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSS EVALUATION

NAME Raymond H. GERENDE DIVISION WH

SUBJECT Photography Briefing

DATES TRAINED 3 July - 0930-1230

On 3 July 1957 a Photography briefing was given to Raymond H. GERENDE. Mr. GERENDE was briefed on film processing, printing, telephoto lens, fixed and mobile surveillance. He was shown the following equipment: Leica, Exacta, Mikroma, Minox and Robot cameras, the hidden device for Robot Camera, Morse 100 ft. tank and Nikor Multiple tank. The briefing lasted three hours.

GEORGE O. KELLNER
Tss/TID Instructor

Please return ~~four~~ 5 copies of this form to TSS/TD for overt distribution.
Please return two 3 copies of this form to TSS/TD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/Registrar
1 - Office of Personnel
1 - TSS/TD File

COVERT DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Operations Officer
1 - TSS/TD
1 - Senior Staff

SECRET

11 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDE (ps) Training

1. At 1000 - 1030 hours, 7 June 1957, I met with Mr. Robert Melberg, Chief Instructor, OTR/Covert Training and Mr. George Orton in the office of Mr. Oscar Sells, C/Covert Training (x2778, x8175).

2. Subject's training was discussed. Mr. Sells will take me to Subject's apartment (safehouse) at 0930 on 10 June to be introduced to Subject. He will be known as Mr. Stoker. At 1000 Mr. Melberg (to be known as Bob Brice) and Mr. Orton (George) will arrive to take over training.

3. At 1100 hours, 7 June 1957, I talked by telephone to Mr. Mexell (safehouse procurement officer). He informed me that a check for four weeks rent had been sent to the apartment firm by Mr. Rufus King's office to cover the cost of the apartment (safehouse).

L. SULC
WH/III/Mexico/PI

Distribution:
WH/III/Chrono
✓Subject

SECRET

SECRET

4 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: LIPSTICK
Raymond H. GERENDE

(home phone. OL 2-9514)

1. On 28 May 1957, Harry Mexell (Safehouse Procurement Officer, X8185), William Lidenheimer (S.C.) and the undersigned met to obtain a safehouse for Raymond H. GERENDE (ps). The safehouse obtained was the following:

Apartment D-22, Madison
Presidential Gardens Apartment Hotel
Mount Vernon Avenue and Russell Road
Alexandria, Virginia
Telephone: TEmple 6-4400

2. This apartment was tentatively approved orally by Mr. Lidenheimer from a security standpoint. Registration was made by me in the name of Rufus KING, attorney, Southern Building, Washington, D. C. NAtional 8-3115. GERENDE will be ostensibly a legal client of Mr. King and will be registered in true name upon his arrival. His name was not given upon obtaining the apartment nor was mine. Only Mr. King's name was used.

3. My cover story, if necessary to use one, was to be that of law clerk, Larry HERMAN, in Mr. King's office. Mr. Mexell has cleared this cover with Mr. King's office. Mr. King's office, according to Mr. Mexell, will pay for the apartment by check.

4. The apartment was rented at the rate of $155 a month from 8 June 1957 onward (to be through 13 July 1957).

5. Mr. Frazes of S.C. (SB/2, X547 and X3071) informed me telephonically on 31 May that the safehouse site had been approved.

Lawrence B. Sulc

File
Gerende

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, WH-3 DATE: 28 May 1957
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
FROM : Instructor, Foreign Trainees

SUBJECT: Special Project LIPSTICK

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LIPSTICK:

1. Originator: WH-3 Mexico
2. Approvals: C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff
3. Case Officer: Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555
4. Chief Instructor, CT: Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2778
5. Purpose: To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.
6. Clearances: Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 19 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.
7. Number of Trainees: One
8. Nationality: Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)
9. Biographical Data: Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish. He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.
10. Cover: Tourist

SECRET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

Oscar H. Sells
OSCAR H. SELLS

SECRET

APPENDIX I

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June — Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June — Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
    Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
    Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
    Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
    Elements of Clandestine Activity

(2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)

(3) Principles of Organization for Clandestine Activity
    Concepts of Compartmentation

(4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
    Requirements of Cover
    The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups

(5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
    Active Opposition
    Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation

(6) Clandestine Communications
    Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
    Criteria for Clandestine Communications
    Methods of Clandestine Communications
    Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
    Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
    The Personal Meeting
    Signals
    The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
    Introduction
    Agents and Their Functions

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

24-28 June	Observation, description, casing, reporting. The latter will include operational reporting, surveillance reporting, CE type reports and principles of positive intelligence reporting.
1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 ⟨
2
3
4
5
6

DATE: 495 ES/DM/BO
29 MAY 1957 495

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 1-2

INFO: COP 3, C/FI/OPS 4-5, DD/S 6, SSA 7, D/OP 8, S/C 9-10

MAY 30 17 54 '57
REC'D CABLE SECT.

ROUTINE

IN 49174

TO DIR INFO CITE MEXI 463

RYBAT ADMIN

REF HMMW 4554

SUBJECT REF DEPARTS MEXI 9 JUNE 1100 HOURS PAA FLIGHT 502. DEPART HOUSTON EAL FLIGHT 502 ARRIVE WASH 2140 HOURS 9 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

Edward H. Bernard (?)

K

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

Chief, WH-3 29 May 1957
ATTN : Mr. Larry Sulc
Instructor, Foreign Trainees

Special Project LI[illegible]

A. The following outlines the Special Project Training Plan for Special Project LI[illegible]:

1. **Originator:** WH-3 Mexico

2. **Approvals:** C/WH; C/WH-3, FI/TRO; CI Staff

3. **Case Officer:** Mr. Larry Sulc, ext. 2555

4. **Chief Instructor, CT:** Mr. Robert Melberg, ext. 2778

5. **Purpose:** To provide instruction and training which will assist trainee in carrying out field objectives of obtaining CE and opererational information thru surveillance and other means, working against designated targets.

6. **Clearances:** Project was approved 2 November 1956. OA amended approval, dated 13 March 1956. Trainee is a contract agent.

7. **Number of Trainees:** One

8. **Nationality:** Mexican (formerly U.S. citizen)

9. **Biographical Data:** Trainee was born 7 Dec. 1933, New York City. He received his education at the American High School, Mexico, D.F., Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June, 1955. He speaks English and Spanish.
He has received no formalized intelligence training, but some on the job training has been given.

10. **Cover:** Tourist

File:
GERENDE
([illegible])

RET

11. Time Table: Instruction will commence 10 June and be completed on or about 13 July 1957.

12. Training Area: Training will take place in the Washington area in a safehouse secured by the Division.

13. Language of Instruction: English

14. Course of Instruction: See Appendix I

15. Finances: Financial expenses will be handled by the Division.

B. Copies of this memorandum are being distributed as follows:

Original and 1 - Chief, WH-3
Attn: Mr. Larry Sulc
1 - CI Staff
1 - AC/OS/TR; C/OS/TR
1 - Covert Files

OSCAR H. SELLS

APPENDIX 1

PROJECT LIPSTICK

SCHEDULE OF INSTRUCTION

10 June — Security Briefing. Discussion of the program. Review of Intelligence terminology.

11-21 June — Tradecraft

(1) Nature and Characteristics of Clandestine Activity
Clandestine Activity of the Individual and the Group
Clandestine Activity of the Sovereign State
Relationship of Overt to Clandestine Activity
Elements of Clandestine Activity

(2) The Nature of Clandestine Action (By Political Entities)

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Concepts of Compartmentation

(4) Concepts of Cover and Concealment
Requirements of Cover
The Cover Problem as Applied to Individuals, Groups

(5) Basic Obstacles to Clandestine Activity
Active Opposition
Administrative and National Boundaries as a means of Compartmentation

(6) Clandestine Communications
Introduction and Concepts of Clandestine Communications
Criteria for Clandestine Communications
Methods of Clandestine Communications
Principles in the Use of Codes, Secret Writing, Microphotography and Ciphers
Cutout Devices: Accommodation Address, Drops, The Courier, The Intermediary or Cutout
The Personal Meeting
Signals
The Safehouse

(7) Agent Personnel
Introduction
Agents and Their Functions

(8) Spotting
Check and Investigations
Selection of Agents
Recruiting Methods
Training, Briefing, and Debriefing
Handling of Agents
Termination of Agents

Special emphasis will be devoted to agent spotting, acquisition and management.

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1-2 July	Missions, functions, & principles of CE & CI.
3 July	TSS briefings, audio & photo
5-9 July	Continuation of CE & CI.
10-11 July	Principles, procedures, techniques of elicitation, interviewing.
12 July	Seminar on covert investigative techniques.

14-00000

Basic Training 2 weeks.

Observation, Description, casings 3 days
Reporting - 1 week

Fundamentals of CI + CE. 1 week

Elicitation, interviewing
Investigative Techniques } 2 days.
Photo + Audio Briefing 1 day.

Mr. Bellis
201 T-30
OTR

Harry Mixell, Safehouse Procurement Officer
x 8185 2C54 Quarters Eye
Reg. 243-1006
Reg. 45-1025

GERONIC works for LIPSTICK-19 as purch. agent.

LIPSTICK/LIMITED - (Photo) GERENSE ← LIPSTICK-19

" /LILYRIC - (Photo) "

" /LIIXIOM - (Photo) " ← LIMITATION-5, -6

LINSTOCK (Radio maintenance & tech) LINSTOCK

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

KAPOK

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HMM-W-4554

201-119523

21 MAY 1957 KAPOK #500

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE

FROM : Chief, WHD

PRIORITY

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See Paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on workdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

(Releasing officer) KAPOK (Coordinating officer) (Authenticating officer)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

KAPOK
SECRET

HMM-W-4554
K-POK # 500
Page Two

1803 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachment:
1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

John T. Flynn
J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

JG Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

KAPOK
SECRET

SECRET

17 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/WH/Support

Attn: WH/B & F

SUBJECT : Contract Agent Covert Training
Raymond H. G[illegible] (ps)

1. Subject, Project LIPSTICK contract agent, will arrive in Washington on approximately 8-9 June 1957 for five weeks of covert training. Covert training has been arranged and a safe house obtained.

2. The matter of entertainment of Subject was discussed with Mr. Wattles, C/WH/Support, who said that entertainment of contract agents is authorised under certain conditions and that it would be permissible to entertain Subject conservatively while in Washington. He spoke to Mr. Price of the General Counsel's Office who supported this view.

3. To favorably impress Subject and to maintain his morale while in Washington, it is contemplated that the desk operations office will entertain him with dinner and drinks approximately twice a week during the first and final weeks and once a week during the intervening weeks.

W. GALBRAITH
Chief, WH/III

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓1 - Subject - Lipstick 20

WH/III/Mexico/LSalesers

SECRET

SECRET

15 May 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Safehouse Branch, Office of Logistics

THROUGH : Chief, Central Cover Branch, DD/P

REQUESTING OFFICE : WH/III/Mexico

CASE OFFICER : Lawrence B. Sulo - Extension 2555

PROJECT : LIPSTICK Allotment: 7-3570-83-130

Reference: R 45-1025, 25 June 1956.

Type of safehouse requested: Furnished apartment (efficiency apartment or larger). The apartment should be large enough to show motion pictures to trainee.

Location and Environment: Washington, D. C. Middle class or above type of environment.

Maximum Price Range: $10 per day.

Occupancy from: 8 June 1957 To: 14 July 1957

Intended Use: Safehouse will be occupied by one (1) agent for residence and training. The agent is a Mexican (completely bilingual in Spanish and English, was born in the U. S.), aged 23, a college graduate and purchasing agent for a Mexico City firm. He will occupy the safehouse most of the time, both day and night, for five weeks. Three or four other persons (from CTR and possibly the case officer) will spend time in the safehouse during the day. Sensitive material will be in the house during the day.

Cover Arrangement: Subject will be in the U. S. as a tourist from Mexico. He has American relatives in North Carolina. WH Division's memorandum requesting training for Subject, and which included this cover plan, was approved by the FI and CI Staffs on 14 May 1957.

Funds are available:

BUDGET OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET

WH/III/Mexico/IBSulc:mjm

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CCB/DD/P
1 - WH/III/Chrono
✓2 - Subject

SECRET

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-6873
(201-119523)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WH Division

DATE: 15 May 1957

FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Raymond E. Gerende

Reference: HMM-W-4410

ACTION REQUESTED: Contact with Gerende

1. The Subject has made reservations at the Hotel Emery, 1812 G Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., Telephone Republic 7-1812, for 9 June 1957. He will wait at this hotel for a telephone call from Malcolm Q. EDELAND sometime before 1200 hours on 10 May 1957. The Subject will meet EDELAND in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at the time stated in the conversation. Should this contact fail the Subject will remain at his hotel from 1300 hours until 1800 hours on 10 May 1957 and the same times on successive days until contact is made.

2. Station Mexico appreciates the efforts of the Headquarters desk in arranging this training.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. Curtis

MSD/bct
15 May 1957
Distribution
3 - Hqs
2 - Files

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

~~RI COPY~~

201-119523

KAPOK
SECRET

AIR

HMM-W-4554

201-119523

KAPOK #500

: Chief of Station, Mexico City

: Chief, WHD PRIORITY

- Operational Matters/LIPSTICK
- Raymond H. GERENDE/Training

Reference: HMM-W-4410, 26 April 1957 (201-119523)

ACTION REQUESTED: See paragraph 5.

1. Subject is scheduled for covert training to begin Monday, 10 June 1957, and to last five weeks. Subject should arrive in Washington, if possible, on 8 or 9 June.

2. It is planned that Subject stay in a furnished apartment where he will also be trained on weekdays. For food, laundry and incidentals he will be given per diem of $6. Entertainment of Subject will be conservative.

3. It is suggested that Mexico City Station provide Subject with a round-trip ticket by air. From a cover standpoint it might be wise to have Subject visit his mother's relatives in South Carolina on the way to Washington. If feasible he should create the impression that he is visiting New York City or both New York and Washington on this trip.

4. Subject's cover while in the U. S. will be that of tourist.

5. Please cable Subject's time of arrival and flight number. He will be met at the airport by the desk operations officer, "Larry." In the event the meeting is not made he should call the telephone number forwarded under separate cover and ask for "Larry." In the event he is still unable to make contact he should go to the National Hotel,

KAPOK
SECRET

~~HMM-W-~~4554
KAPOK #500
Page Two

1808 Eye Street, N. W., take a room and wait for a call. If unable to get a room he should leave a forwarding address for further contact.

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

Attachments:
1 - As described above, u/s/c

17 May 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/att. u/s/c
1 - WH/III/KAPOK Chrono, w/o/att.
1 - Subject, w/o/att.

WH/III/Mexico/LSulc:mjm

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA ~~AIR~~ (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~HMM-W-4410~~

201-119523

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE 26 APR 57 14 442

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational Matters
SPECIFIC - Raymond H. Geronde

References: HMM-A-5861, 19 December 1956 (50-6-4-1316)

COPY

1. Plans are underway to bring subject to Headquarters for training as requested in reference. Geronde is tentatively scheduled to begin his training on 10 June 1957.

2. It is anticipated that subject will be trained in Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE matters, Photography and some audio surveillance. He should be able to complete his studies in about five weeks time.

3. It is believed that tourist cover for subject's visit to this country will be satisfactory, inasmuch as he has relatives living in South Carolina.

4. As further and more definite arrangements are made regarding the matters discussed in this dispatch, you will be so advised. Headquarters regrets the delay in answering reference dispatch.

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

19 April 1957

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City
1 - WH/III/Chrono
1 - WH/Mailroom
✓1 - RI
1 - Subject

(Originating officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

WH/III/Mexico/MPCondon:elw

John T. Flynn
for J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Galbraith
W. GALBRAITH, C/WH/III

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

201-119523

SECRET

Gerende
(Lip - 20)

22 April 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/TR

ATTENTION : Assistant Chief For Covert Training, CS/Tr

FROM : WH/3/Mexico

SUBJECT : Request For Covert Training

Project: LIPSTICK

Pseudo : Raymond H. Gerende

1. Initiated by: WH, Branch 3, Mexico - FI

2. Date of Project Approval: 2 November 1956

Type and Date of Clearance: Amended Operational Approval C-32743 effective 19 March 1956. Supersedes OA granted 28 February 1955.

3. Agent Status: Contract Agent

4. Agent Nationality: Born in U.S., but renounced citizenship to become Mexican citizen on 31 July 1952.

5. Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Known to student as: Larry Room 2114, Barton Hall, x-2555

Alternate Operations Officer: John B. Brady Known to student as: Jack Room 2111, Barton Hall, x-3162

6. Training dates: Beginning about 10 June 1957 for approximately 5 weeks.

7. Complete biographic background of trainee:
See memorandum attached.

8. Previous intelligence training: Trained in surveillance and related techniques by his field case officer. No formalized training.

9. Project Objective: Physical surveillance in Mexico City area to obtain CE and operational information on Soviet/Satellite and Communist Party personnel, plans and activities. This project supports a technical surveillance project in Mexico. Some of the basehouses under Project LIPSTICK support the physical surveillance aspect of Station operations whereas some of the basehouses support technical surveillances.

SECRET

10. Description of agents duties in the field: Under the direct supervision and guidance of the Case Officer, full operational and administrative responsibility and control of the following:

    a. LIPSTICK Team
    b. LIPSTICK Car #4
    c. LIPSTICK/LIMITED basehouse
    d. LIPSTICK/LILYRIC basehouse
    e. LIPSTICK/LIONION basehouse
    f. LIPSTICK
    g. LIPSTICK office #2
    h. Pretext investigations
    i. Spot assignments

    In summary it can be said that the subject's principal duties are administration and operational direction of the LIPSTICK team, processing 35 to 40 rolls of 35 mm film each week, contacting agents and acting as cut-out for the Case Officer, conducting individual investigations, handling cash advances, accountings, and property.

    Description of agent's cover in the field: Gerende is perfectly covered working for LIPSTICK 19 as purchasing agent. He spends approximately three to four hours per day working on his cover duties. This cover is believed by all his friends, is durable and allows sufficient freedom for operational activity.

11. Proposed cover to be used during training: It is anticipated that subject will come to the U.S. as a tourist. Inasmuch as Gerende's mother has six sisters and three brothers living in either Columbia or Sumter, South Carolina, (as of June 1955) tourist cover for him would appear to be appropriate.

12. Student availability for training: full time.

13. Specific problems to be considered in handling trainee: None envisioned at this time. Subject speaks English.

14. Specific training subjects to be covered: Basic Tradecraft, CI/CE course, Photography, and some audio surveillance techniques.

15. Technical training requirements: Photography and audio surveillance techniques.

16. Has student in the past, or does he at present, visit overt installations of the organization? Never in the Washington area. Presumably he has never been in the Station in Mexico City.

17. Special attributes to be evaluated:

J. C. KING
Chief, WHD

APPROVALS:

Senior Staff Training Officer

CI Staff

Attachments: Biographic Data

WH/III/Mexico/[illegible]

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 Addressee - w/attach
        1 WH/III/Chrono - w/attach
        1 Subject- w/attach

ATTACHMENT TO TRAINING MEMO

Name : Ramon Joseph ALVAREZ Du Rant

Born : 7 December 1933 in New York City

Citizenship : Mexican

Father : Fernando ALVAREZ (deceased), Mexican citizen

Mother : Janie Du Rant, vda. de ALVAREZ, U.S. citizen, born 13 December 1906 at Sumter, So. Carolina

Sisters : Marcia and Adria

Official Identity Papers : Mexican passport #41776 issued in Mexico City 19 December 1953; renewed 16 November 1954 #7714, good until 16 November 1956, Mexican draft card #1963865.

Religion : Protestant - non-denominational

Education : American High School, Mexico, D.F., diploma July 1952 Mexico City College, B.A. in Latin American studies, June 1955

Languages : English and Spanish

Military Service : January-December 1953—Mexico City—XV'a Division de Infanteria, 15/a Compania de Transmisiones Corporal

Physical Description :

Age	23
Height	5' 9½"
Eyes	hazel
Face shape	oval
Complexion	fair
Posture	erect
Weight	145 lbs.
Teeth	normal, straight
Hair	dark brown
Scars	½" horizontal on tip of chin
Build	medium

SECRET

REQUEST FOR COVERT TSS TRAINING

IMPORTANT: a) Approval of Staff Training Officer must be indicated on this form.

b) *Approval of CI Staff must be indicated on this form.*

c) If student is a member of a foreign intelligence or security service, the name of the service must be indicated in the space provided.

d) If student is a contract agent, he must have full operational clearance, must have signed his contract, and project must be an approved project.

e) TSS will provide training site facilities provided that the sites are available on the dates training is requested.

f) Should it be necessary for the student to enter agency buildings (other than safehouses), the requestor will undertake to procure CI staff approval, also building passes or badges when necessary.

1. Name of student: Raymond H. Cerende ☐ True ☒ Pseudo ☐ Crypto

2. Training alias to be employed: "Ray"

3. Name of Operations Officer: Lawrence B. Sulc Division: WH

Senior Staff: Room No. and Bldg.: 2114 R.H. Extension: 2555

4. Name of Approved Project: LIPSTICK Date and Type of Clearance: OA, 19 March 1956

5. Operations Officer known to student as: (Name) "Larry"

6. Nationality of student: Mexican

7. Status of student:

a. Staff agent: ☐ b. Contract agent: ☒

c. Foreign Intell. or Security Service Official (specify name of service): Not applicable

8. Language in which training will be conducted: English

(Note: Requestor agrees to provide interpreter should such be required.)

9. Country or area in which student will operate: Mexico

10. Will agent train others? Yes ☐ No ☒

11. Dates during which student will be available for training: From 10 June 1957 To 12 July 1957

12. Will training take place in:

a. TSS training site: ☐ b. Site provided by Area Division: ☒ (OTR will provide safehouse)

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig. & 1 – For one subject
1 – For each additional subject } TSS/TD
1 – CI Staff

Page One

SECRET

.. be given, indicating whether proficiency (development of skill) or familiarization (briefing) is desired. ..ining is to take place, if known.

..bject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency	Will agent train others in subject
..mass work					
..landestine work					
..ly)					
			X		
			X		
..iques:					
..ng			X		
			X		
..ue:				*	

..ncy training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

Subject	Dates From	Dates To	Briefing	Proficiency
SECRET WRITING:				*
a. *General technique:*				
b. *Will trainee be issued system:* ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
c. *Is system now used in the field:* ☐ *Yes* ☐ *No*				
d. Other (Specify):				
AUDIO SURVEILLANCE:				
1. Microphone installation				
2. Wireless microphone installation				
3. Telephone tap installation				
4. Detect kits				
5. Other (Specify) Tape Recorders			X	
COVER AUTHENTICATION:				
1. Aspects of document authentication (Specify area)				
2. Use of documentation in CI activities				
3. Use of documentation in PP activities				
4. Document collection (Specify area)				
LOCKS & PICKS:				
All other TSS subjects should be specifically requested using a separate sheet as part two of this form.				

* Requests for proficiency training in these subjects must be preceded by a discussion with C/TSS/Training Div.

APPROVED: ....
Staff Training Officer

....
Requestor's Signature

....
C/CI/OA

SECRET

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 25 July 1956

FROM WH/III/Mexico	ROOM NO. 1026 Barton Hall	TELEPHONE 2555

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name, and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym if assigned. If true name is sensitive, fill in the 201 number and Section II only. If true name is non-sensitive, both Sections I and II must be completed.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

201 NO. 1. 119523	NAME (Last) ALVAREZ DuRant,	(First) Ramon	(Middle) Joseph	(Title) 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☒ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. 071233	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USA	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. New York City	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM OR PSEUDONYM Raymond H. GERENDE	☐ SENSITIVE ☒ NON-SENSITIVE

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX	ACTION DESK 11. WH/3M	2ND CITY INTEREST 12.	3RD CITY INTEREST 12A.

COMMENTS:

Permanently charged to WH/III/Mexico

201-119523

OPEN FILE ☐ YES ☒ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☒ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE Kenneth S. Scafe Jr.

FORM NO. 831 TEST
1 NOV 55

SECRET

(38)

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

Card

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	ACTION ☐ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE
FROM RI/AN	ROOM NO. 1504K	TELEPHONE 2919

INSTRUCTIONS: *Form must be typed or printed in block letters.*

SECTION I: *List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.*

SECTION II: *List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.*

SECTION III: *To be completed in all cases.*

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE ☐ NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. 119523 1.	SOURCE DOCUMENT

NAME (Last) (Middle) (First) (Title) 3.

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)

RECORD COPY

PHOTO 4. ☐ YES ☐ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D M. Y	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8. 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION	OCC/POS. CODE 9.

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM GERENDE, RAYMOND H.

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. MEX	ACTION DESK 11. WH/3 M	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 119523

PERMANENT CHARGE ☑ YES ☐ NO	RESTRICTED FILE ☑ YES ☐ NO	SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUL 56

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

(38)

SECRET

12 DEC 1975

SE/CI/I

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
National Security Agency

ATTENTION : Mr. Benson Buffham

SUBJECT : William Hamilton Martin 201-282338 and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell 201-282337

1. Attached is a copy of a report recently received through Canadian liaison channels concerning a conversation between Canadian professor Dr. Hans Kunov and Martin in Moscow. The attachment outlines the conversation Kunov had with Martin and indicates that both Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR.

2. Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich Torgov, 201-0862574 Kunov's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center.

3. The Canadians have advised us that the FBI has received the information contained in the attachments.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

George T. Kalaris
George T. Kalaris

Attachments:
As stated

CIOL-00184-75
DDO/CI/R&A/E:W.Kerbe:dnj (12/12/75)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addee w/att
1 - C/CI w/att
2 - CI/R&A/E 1 w/att
1 - C/DIVD w/att
1 - DIVD/TCB

COORDINATION:

Paul L. Rinaldo
C/DIVD/TCB in draft
12 Dec 1975

201-282338

B-201-0862574
B-201-0282337

SECRET

6198

Dr. H[illegible] KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

SECRET

The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

5'7' or 8" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, pot bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.
- telephone number - 433-03-81

117421 Obrucheva Street
Building 4-1
Apt. 126
Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

(f) MARTIN stated that in the past American journalists have tried to contact him many times, asking for interviews but their requests have been refused by Russian authorities. He said he hoped some day that one of these journalists would be able to just knock on his door and talk to him.

.../3

SECRET

SECRET

TORGOV and KUNOV spoke in general terms about MARTIN after the first meeting. TORGOV does not claim to know MARTIN well. MARTIN has been at the centre for approximately 6 to 8 months assigned to TORGOV's group. Prior to that he worked as a consultant in another area of the Academy of Sciences. TORGOV commented that MARTIN does much of his work at home. He said he felt sorry for MARTIN because he was not accepted by the Russians in the Academy. He also stated that he felt MARTIN was a basically honest man.

KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on huminatarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

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SECRET

Re: [illegible] Igoryevich TORGOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

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SECRET

201-282338

14-00000

The RCMP Liaison Office
2450 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

US/75/539
75WLO-11S-38

2 December 1975

SECRET

Mr. George Kalaris
C.I.A.

Dear

Re: William Hamilton MARTIN, and
Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL

Further to your letter of 6 October 1975, we have identified and spoken to the Canadian professor, Dr. Hans KUNOV, referred to in your letter as Harry KERNOV. The attachment outlines the contact between KUNOV and MARTIN and MITCHELL. KUNOV has proven co-operative as a source on previous occasions and we believe he will continue to assist us within limits.

Also attached is a report on Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV, KUNOV's host at the USSR Academy of Sciences Computer Center. In addition to any comments you may wish to make concerning MARTIN's approaches to KUNOV, we would welcome an assessment of TORGOV, if available.

The F.B.I. has received the information contained in the attachments.

Yours truly,

E.R.J. Miller,
Assistant Liaison Officer.

att. (2)

This document is the property of the Government of Canada. It is provided on condition that it is for use solely by the intelligence community of the receiving Government and that it [illegible] disseminated without the express permission of the Government of Canada.

SECRET

Re: W.H. MARTIN and B.F. MITCHELL

Dr. Hans KUNOV professor, University of Toronto, visited Moscow from September 1-14, 1975 to undertake research at the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the USSR/Canada General Exchange Agreement. The research was carried out at the Academy of Sciences Computer Centre, 40 Vavcoha Street. KUNOV's host was Yuriy I. TORGOV, 2nd in charge of the Computer Centre and on whom a separate personality sketch is attached.

On September 3 while having a coffee break in the Computer Centre KUNOV was approached by a man who identified himself as William MARTIN, an American who defected to the USSR in 1960. MARTIN openly spoke about his past and stated that he now lives in Moscow and that he is a consultant to TURGOV's group at the Computer Centre. He said much of his work is done at home but he does drop into the Centre weekly.

It was at this time that MARTIN told KUNOV that he would like to get out of the USSR even if he has to run certain risks. He also said that (Bernon) MITCHELL feels the same and has voiced his desire to the Soviet authorities.

MARTIN asked KUNOV if he might enquire with the Canadian authorities on his behalf to see what his status would be in this country or if there was any chance of his being allowed in here as a political refugee. KUNOV agreed to contact the Canadian Embassy in Moscow to see what the official view would be and notify MARTIN at a later date. MARTIN seemed most pleased at this and left KUNOV his home telephone number, cautioning him not to say anything over phone that would tip off the Soviet authorities as to his intentions. This first meeting lasted a little over one half hour and took place in the coffee lounge area of the Centre. There were other Soviets present in the lounge, however, TORGOV was not among them. KUNOV does not believe the others were aware of their conversation.

On the 5 September 75 KUNOV called at the Canadian Embassy, Moscow and spoke to a doorman asking him who he might speak to regarding some Americans living in the USSR who would like to immigrate to Canada. The doorman referred KUNOV to the office of a Mrs. Louise O'CONNOR. KUNOV then spoke to a U/M who stated that he was the under secretary to Mrs. O'CONNOR. KUNOV enquired about the Americans living in the USSR and asked could they be allowed to immigrate to Canada. The Embassy official would not commit himself and stated that, KUNOV should enquire officially with the nearest office of Manpower and Immigration when he returned to Canada. KUNOV did not give this official MARTIN or MITCHELL's names. KUNOV telephoned MARTIN after the Embassy visit and stated that the reply from the Embassy was negative. MARTIN seemed upset that KUNOV should phone him, then he later stated that it would probably be all right.

MARTIN met KUNOV on at least two occasions after the 5 September, all at the Centre, usually in the coffee lounge and in the general presence of others. They spoke English at all times. MARTIN thanked KUNOV for his trouble in enquiring at the Embassy and cautioned KUNOV not to get personally involved with him in this venture as it would be bad news. KUNOV promised MARTIN that he would check with Canadian Manpower and Immigration authorities on the matter when he returned to Canada.

SECRET

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The following observations were made by KUNOV regarding MARTIN:

(a) Physical Description

5'7' or 3" tall, fair hair, crewcut, balding at the temples, pot bellied.
- may suffer from a nervous condition, and bears the mark of a man who has experienced rough times.
- always dressed with a shirt, tie and jacket.
- spoke perfect English with a slight Russian accent on certain words.

(b) MARTIN provided KUNOV with the following home address and telephone number, cautioning him that his telephone was bugged.
- telephone number - 433-03-81
117421 Obrucheva Street
Building 4-1
Apt. 126
Moscow, USSR

(c) MARTIN stated that his friend MITCHELL lives in Leningrad and is married to the Dean of the Music Conservatory in Leningrad. MITCHELL is very unhappy and he has openly asked Soviet authorities for permission to leave Russia and return to the USA. Apparently he has never been able to adjust to the Soviet way of life and is now very desperate. MITCHELL is willing to divorce his wife and take any risk to get out of the USSR. To date however he has been met with a wall of silence by the Soviets.

(d) MARTIN is unmarried. He claims to have a comfortable apartment and feels that he has adjusted to the Soviet life and is accepted in the USSR. He does not want to return to the USA but would like to get out of the USSR. He said he would have quite a story to tell about his life in Russia as well as his past and that he would have no compunctions about telling all about the Russians. MARTIN at one point stated that he would not consider attempting to escape from the USSR.

(e) MARTIN claims that he is constantly harrassed by Soviet officials. His apartment has been broken into on several occasions and he refused to use the Soviet mail system. He has also refused to show up for work in the past as a form of protest. MARTIN also indicated that he has had several contacts with Americans in Moscow and that they have not shown any animosity towards him. He actually dated an American woman for some time but did not mention her name.

(f) MARTIN stated that in the past American journalists have tried to contact him many times, asking for interviews but their requests have been refused by Russian authorities. He said he hoped some day that one of these journalists would be able to just knock on his door and talk to him.

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TORGOV and KUNOV spoke in general terms about MARTIN after the first meeting. TORGOV does not claim to know MARTIN well. MARTIN has been at the centre for approximately 6 to 8 months assigned to TORGOV's group. Prior to that he worked as a consultant in another area of the Academy of Sciences. TORGOV commented that MARTIN does much of his work at home. He said he felt sorry for MARTIN because he was not accepted by the Russians in the Academy. He also stated that he felt MARTIN was a basically honest man.

KUNOV said his motives for trying to assist MARTIN and MITCHELL are based on huminatarian grounds, only, as he feels they are suffering under the Soviet system. He does not intend to take any further action to assist them in leaving the Soviet Union. KUNOV hopes to return to the Soviet Union next year for a more extended period of study.

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(d) [illegible]

(e) [illegible]

Re: Yuriy Igoryevich TORGOV

TORGOV, DOB 6 June, 1932 Vitebsk, USSR, Head of Laboratory, Computer Centre, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, was a visiting professor in Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, for four months - November 1974 to February 1975.

A number of sources were impressed by TORGOV's frankness and his willingness to speak out, at social gatherings, on current problem areas in the Soviet system. For example he discussed dissidents in Soviet society and commented on one occasion that present day Soviet society allowed for far greater freedom of expression than had been allowed previously. He said that things were being said in Moscow that one would never have heard in Stalin's era. Nevertheless, TORGOV argued that a return to "terror tactics" under Soviet rule was always possible. He considered that such tactics were unlikely at this time because of the personal philosophy of Premier Leonid BRESHNEV.

TORGOV is reported to be the son of a scientist and party member and he himself is an admitted party member. He is married with three children. He is considered to be one of the top experts on his field (computers) in the Soviet Union. He mentioned having travelled to other Western countries two or three times. His English is good. He was very friendly towards Canadians during his visit but it was observed that he did not associate with three other Soviet research students at the same institution. On one occasion in Ottawa he was berated quite severely by a Soviet Embassy official for his failure to report periodically, as required, to the Embassy. TORGOV later told a source that this Embassy official "could be a dangerous man to your country".

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6 OCT 1975

US/75/539

Dear Harry,

We have learned that on the evening of 8 September 1975, James WILKINSON of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had a conversation of interest with a Canadian Embassy Officer. Wilkinson stated that while attending a social function at the Australian Embassy, he engaged Canadian Consular Officer Geoffrey FARROW in conversation. Farrow advised that he had been recently approached by Dr. Harry KERNOV, an Associate Professor of English at the University of Toronto in Canada, regarding American defectors Bernon F. MITCHELL and William H. MARTIN. Kernov implied that he had had recent personal contact with one or both of the defectors and recommended that the Canadian government give Martin and Mitchell permission to emigrate to Canada. Farrow furnished no further details regarding Kernov's contact.

During the same conversation Farrow asked Wilkinson if he could supply any basic background material on Mitchell and Martin. Wilkinson replied that he would pass Farrow's request on to the Consular Section of the Embassy. Subsequently, Farrow was given an unclassified article concerning the defectors which appeared in the June 1961 issue of True magazine.

We would, of course, be interested in any indications that Martin and Mitchell are attempting to leave the USSR and would be grateful for any information you may be able to provide us in regard to the above.

I am using the CAZAB channel in this instance as this information has been passed to us informally.

Yours,

George T. Kalaris

George T. Kalaris

Mr. Harry Brandes

DDO/CI/R&A/T:LHWigren(2Oct75)

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1 - Reading File

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201-282338

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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

4 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 17 July 1961, captioned as above, and also to Bureau letter dated 13 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, Subject: "Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN, MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING".

2. The following information supplements the material on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, reported in paragraph 4 of our 17 July 1961 memorandum, referenced above.

a. Our representatives in Melbourne advised that Australian Security Service indices reflect that Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCOS, Greek national born 10 March 1921 at Alexandria, Egypt, arrived in Sydney, Australia, for permanent residence on 24 October 1956, aboard the S. S. STRATHNAVER, traveling on Greek Passport No. 2063/1949, issued 8 March 1949 at Alexandria, Egypt. At the time of his arrival in Sydney, DAMASCOU was in possession of Australian Visa No. 4232, issued in Cairo on 18 July 1956. He was described as follows: single, 5 feet 10 inches tall, normal build, brown eyes, black hair, occupation "writer". He departed Australia on 25 May 1960 aboard the S. S. ORONSAY, destination not indicated, and as of 18 July 1961 had not re-entered Australia.

b. Our representatives in Mexico City meanwhile had learned that Anastasia Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, sister of the above, on 8 July 1960 applied at the Mexican Consulate in San Antonio, Texas, for a Mexican Tourist Card to enter Mexico to visit her brother Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS, then residing at the Hotel

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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

New York to Mexico City. At the time of her application for an entry permit, she made no mention of any wedding plans. The Mexican Government approved her trip on condition that she deposit with the Consulate a 10,000 Peso bond, as a guarantee of her intention to depart Mexico upon expiration of her tourist card. Mexican Immigration files contain no record of her actual arrival in Mexico following approval of her 8 July 1960 application. The most recent correspondence on this case contained in Mexican files is dated 15 February 1961, reflecting that Anastasie DAMASCOU again requested a Tourist Card on or about the date of the letter, at which time her address in the United States was given as c/o Mexican Consul, San Antonio, Texas. In reply to her second application for an entry permit, Mexican authorities again replied with a request that she post a bond in the amount of 10,000 Pesos, to guarantee departure from Mexico upon expiration of her tourist visa. There is no further information currently available on her further travel plans.

c. With reference to Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU, on basis of the information reported in preceding paragraph, a recheck by our representatives with officials of the United States Embassy in Mexico City revealed that Nicolas Georges DAMASKOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, Egypt, holder of Greek Passport 1953 issued in Alexandria, Egypt, on 5 March 1949 and valid to 29 April 1961, with address of 3 Elizabeth Bay Road, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, was the recipient of a United States Visa on 12 October 1960. On his application, DAMASKCU indicated that he desired to visit the United States for a period of four months, described as a pleasure trip to visit his sister. His visa application did not include any destination address in the United States. It was also noted that the visa card maintained on Nicolas DAMASKOU in the Embassy in Mexico City contains a notation "I-633 to Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, May 29 1961."

d. Through a reliable confidential source our representatives in Egypt had learned in the interim that Nicolas DAMASCOU, who is identical with the individual described in preceding paragraphs, currently resides in Los Angeles, California, at 1430 North Gardner, Apartment 18, and that he advised his mother and younger brother, still residing in Alexandria, that he plans to marry the daughter of an American official, who is not further identified. The same source also advised that Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU, father of Nicolas and Anastasie DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, died during the summer of 1960. Following the demise of the father, Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS, widowed mother of Nicolas and Anastasie

DAMASCOU, in company of a younger son not identified by name, had planned to emigrate from Egypt to join her son Nicolas in the United States. However, prior to the realization of these plans, Angelika DAMASCOU suffered a stroke, exact details concerning which are not known, but she is reported as of this writing still to be paralyzed and obviously is unable to travel. No further information was available on the possible future emigration plans of Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS and/or of the unidentified younger brother of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU.

c. On basis of the reported filing of an application for a United States Visa in July 1956 at the U.S. Embassy in London by Anastasie DAMASCOU, our representatives in London were requested to initiate a check of British liaison indices in the names of Nicolas DAMASCOU and of Anastasie DAMASCOU. MI-5 advised that as of late July 1961, they held no traces on Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASKOS aka DAMASCUS, but that although they had no traces on Anastasie DAMASCOU, they were continuing to check her possible residence in London during 1956, based on the reported visa application date. MI-6 advised that they held no traces on either Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASKOU aka DAMASCUS or on his sister Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU.

3. It is suggested that the indices of the Department of State, Visa Section as well as the indices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, may contain further detailed information on the current immigration status, whereabouts in the United States, and also the contacts in the United States of Nicolas Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, of Anastasie Georges DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUA, and any other members of the family who may have applied for entry visas from abroad.

4. With regard to Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in above referenced memorandum of 17 July 1961 as a contact of Nicolas DAMASCOU aka DAMASCUS, it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain additional information on his activities during his service at the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C.

5. The information reported above is for the internal use of

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addressees only and may not be further disseminated without the prior permission of the originator.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

/S/

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency
Attn: Mr. [illegible]. Wesley Reynolds

SECRET
NOFORN [illegible]

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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

HX-17
17 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL,
William Hamilton MARTIN,
Espionage - R.

1. Reference is made to the following communications, which contain information pertinent to the new information reported in succeeding paragraphs:

a. Memorandum of 14 June 1961 from this Agency addressed to the National Security Agency, a copy of which was forwarded to your Bureau, captioned as above.

b. Bureau letter of 22 June 1961, addressed to the Director, National Security Agency, with copy to this Agency, captioned: Bernon Ferguson MITCHELL, William Hamilton MARTIN; MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

c. Department of Immigration Name Check Request Form, File A-2, dated 28 June 1961 addressed to your Bureau with copy to this Agency, in the name of Justo SIERRA, born 12 July 1914, Mexico, D. F., who entered the United States at New Orleans, Louisiana, on 13 June 1961 with destination address of Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Not sent information addressees)

d. Various earlier Department of Immigration Name Check Requests on Justo SIERRA covering his previous trips to this country. (Not to NSA)

e. Our memorandum of 29 December 1960, addressed to your Bureau, our reference CSCI-2/769,270 with enclosure, Subject: SIERRA, Justo; Visa - Mexican, and earlier communications forwarding name trace results on this individual. (Not to NSA)

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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

c. Further inquiries in Mexico by our officials there revealed that Nicolas DAMASCUS had been ordered to leave Mexico in October 1960 solely because of the expiration of his tourist card, which had been once extended. Mexican Records fail to show that he returned to Mexico, following his entry into the United States at Brownsville, Texas, from Matamoros, Tamaulipas on 24 October 1960. Upon arrival in Mexico on 22 June 1960, he indicated that the purpose of his visit was to attend the wedding of his sister, Anastasia, identified in preceding paragraph, however, as of 21 June 1961, there was no record of Anastasia DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU in official Mexican Files, and there was as yet no identification of the individual she was alleged to have been scheduled to marry. From the same source it was learned that for the period 22 June through 6 September 1960, the only address listed in official indices for Nicolas DAMASCUS is c/o Justo SIERRA, Reforma 95-407, Mexico City, which is the law office maintained by Justo SIERRA Casasus, former Counselor of the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., and who is further identified in the documents cited in paragraph 1. c. through h. above. DAMASCUS reportedly used SIERRA to attempt to obtain an extension of his tourist permit, although the details of his contacts with and knowledge of SIERRA himself are not known at this time. Neither has it been possible as of this date to verify the reported contact between Nicolas DAMASCUS and Subjects at the Hotel New Yorker, as reported by Mr. Thomas CONLON. Investigation efforts abroad by this Agency are continuing, however, and any further information developed will be forwarded as soon as available.

9. In light of the escape route used by the two NSA defectors, transitting Mexico and presumably Cuba enroute to the USSR, your particular attention is invited to the information concerning the contacts and views of Justo SIERRA Casasus furnished in the reports cited in paragraph 1. e., f., and g. above. It is noted Justo SIERRA Casasus is identical with the Senor Don Justo SIERRA, First Secretary at the Embassy of Mexico, mentioned in Bureau Reports cited in paragraph h. above as a contact of Boris A. KAZANTSEV, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1952-54. It is further noted that Boris KAZANTSEV, after returning to Moscow in 1954 and assuming the post of First Secretary in the Latin American Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was next assigned from 1955 to 1957 as First Secretary and subsequently Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and that as of 1960 he was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, in the position of Counselor, departing Havana for Mexico, in company of his wife and daughter, on 30 June 1961, and then proceeding to Canada on 2 July 1961.

[illegible]

f. Teletyped Information Report from this Agency, dated 9 April 1959, Report No. TDCS-3/639,947, Subject: Contacts Between Fidel CASTRO Ruz and Lazaro CARDENAS .

g. Intelligence Report of this Agency dated 7 September 1956, Report No. CS-102629, Subject: Marxist Indoctrination of the Partido Popular .

h. Bureau Report dated 17 June 1954, prepared at Washington, D.C. by Special Agent Boyd D. Adsit, captioned: Soviet Cultivation of Latin American Diplomats - Internal Security - R' and Bureau letter of 21 August 1954, addressed to this Agency, forwarding as Enclosure Washington Field Office Report of 16 August 1954, prepared by Special Agent William C. Cregar on the same subject. Bureau File Reference: 105-22386. (Not to NSA)

2. Since the writing of our memorandum of 14 June 1961, (cf. para 1.a. above), the following supplementary information has been developed concerning Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASKOS, who is a contact and client of Justo SIERRA Casasus, mentioned in the communications referenced in paragraphs 1. c. through h. above.

a. Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS reportedly is officially listed in Egypt under the name of Nicolas George DAMASCOU, born 10 March 1931 at Alexandria, the son of George DAMASCOU and Angelika DAMASCOU nee SAVOURAS. He is a Greek national and holds Greek citizenship. From 1947 through 1957, he resided at 57 Heliopolis Street in Alexandria. [Representatives of this Agency in Alexandria] advise that local available records indicate that as of May 1959, Nicolas DAMASCOU resided at 6 Birtley Place, Elizabeth Bay, Sydney, Australia, and that he listed his occupation as that of Clerk. Our field records indicate that as of May 1959, the United States Consulate in Sydney had some interest in him, and it is suggested that the indices of the Department of State may contain further information concerning this individual.

b. Anastasie (or Anastasia) George DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU, sister of Nicolas DAMASCUS, above, was born March 1933, place of birth not indicated but presumably Egypt, was identified by [our representatives in Alexandria] as having filed application for a United States Visa at London, England in July 1956, listing her occupation as that of entertainer. It is suggested that the Visa Files of the Department of State may contain additional information on this individual.

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NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

4. The records of this Agency indicate that Boris A. KAZANTSEV is a known Soviet Intelligence Officer, most probably representing Soviet State Security (KGB). It is requested that any further information which may be reflected in the indices of your Bureau, or those of information addressees, reflecting upon the relationship of Nicolas Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU and his sister Anastasia Georges DAMASCUS aka DAMASCOU with Justo SIERRA Casasus, on the latter's contacts with representatives or agents of the CASTRO government in Cuba, or on SIERRA's continued contacts with KAZANTSEV or other suspect Soviet officials or agents in this country or elsewhere be forwarded to this Agency as quickly as possible. A request along the same lines has already been forwarded to our representatives in Mexico City, and you will be kept advised of any further information which may be developed in this regard.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

WILLIAM K. HARVEY

2 cc: National Security Agency

DD/P/FI/D/APotocki:mem

Distribution:
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1 - CS Copy - 100-6-124/3
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Based on:
201-24592, SIERRA
ALEX 2793 (IN 37468), 12 Jul 61
MEXI 8266 (IN 28014), 21 Jun 61
DIR 49505 (OUT 79310), 7 Jul 61

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 8 AUG 61 560

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/BELL 5 (TEMPO COPY SLOTTED FOR BELL AT 2140, 8 AUG)

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, C/WH 2, S/C 2

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PRIORITY

IN 10213

PRITY DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 8621

JMZIP RYBAT

REFS: A. MEXI 8565 (IN 47539)

B. MEXI 8522 (IN 44276)

C. HMMW 9598

BARBOSA Ferrer, Nestor José

1. ON 6 AUG 61, LITAMIL-6 (IDEN A) WENT HAVA VIA MEXICANA ATTEMPT MAKE CONTACT HIS FRIEND LIOOZE-1 AND CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN HIM BY LITAMIL-5 IN PRESENCE CO RE CONTACT SABOTAGE TEAM STILL INTACT INSIDE CUBA. LITAMIL-6 ALSO CARRIED (IDEN C) WHICH WILL BE USED AS "CODE BOOK" WHEN CUBA/MEXI RADIO COMMO ESTABLISHED. LITAMIL-1 WHO RECRUITED LITAMIL-6 ONLY ONE AWARE HIS ATTEMPT CONTACT LIOOZE-1.

2. L-5 TOLD L-6 GO HAVA MAKE CONTACT WITH ENRIQUE COLLAZO (NOT KNOWN WHETHER SUBJ MEXI 7723) WHO LIVES CALLE "A" 509 VEDADO, HAVA. L-6 CARRIED OTHER HALF MEDICAL FLYSHEET AS "BONA FIDES" WHICH PREVIOUSLY TAKEN TO COLLAZO BY DIETER LAEGENFELDER (NO TRACES) GERMAN DRUGGIST WHO WENT HAVA 30 JULY PER L-5 INSTRUCTIONS. COLLAZO WILL TAKE L-6 TO "JESUS BADAL" (PSEUDO) WHO

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201-267298

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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DATE :

TO :

FROM :

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PAGE 2

IN 10213 MEXI 8621

ACTION MAN SABOTAGE UNIT. L-5 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KUBARK PBPRIME BY RADIO. ALSO IN RADIO CONTACT TAMAYO FNU ("INDIO AZUL") IN CARA. L-6 WILL GIVE "BADAL" CODE BOOK AND TELL HIM CLANDESTINE RADIO MEXI USING NAME "RADIO CUBA LIBRE" WILL BE OPERATION SOON. WILL ASK "BADAL" ATTEMPT MAKE RADIO CONTACT MEXI.

3. RADIO TRANSMITTER MEXI RECEIVED THROUGH (IDEN B) AS "GIFT" TO LITAMIL-1. STATION THROUGH LITAMIL-1 PAID TRAVEL EXPENSES LITAMIL-6 AND FAMILY (2) PRESENTLY CUBA WHICH WILL RETURN WITH HIM. EXPECT RADIO BE IN OPERATION WITHIN TWO WEEKS. PLAN USE L-6 "VOICE" "RADIO CUBA LIBRE". STATION REQUESTS UTMOST SECURITY RE OP CITED ABOVE AS "LEAK" BACK TO MEXI WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE RELATIONS LITAMIL COMPLEX HERE.

END OF MESSAGE

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(Carrillo)

MACHADO Llosas, Manuel 201-267298 (Mexi desk) JUN 1960

1. Biographical Data: Born 12 December 1913, Auras, Oriente, Cuba. He now lives in Mexico and is owner and manager of a printing establishment, "Manuel MACHADO, S.A.", Tlalpan 710, in Mexico City. He is single and well-off financially.

2. Political Activities: Machado was a member of the 26th of July group of Cuban revolutionaries in Mexico. Now he is in exile in Mexico. He was Treasurer of the Mexican movement and handled operational funds. He was a good friend of Fidel Castro, but became disillusioned with the Castro government some months ago and is ready to fight against it.

3. Security Aspects: Machado is a CIA Agent (LITAMIL-1, POA/OA requested 9 Dec 1959; POA granted 8 January 1960; OA granted 6 June 1960). The Mexico City Station planned to use him to report on the activities of Cuban revolutionaries and possibly, due to his friendship with Fidel Castro and members of the Cuban Government, as a "political action" asset. (Note - the Mexican Desk is interested in any action taken on Machado, since he is their agent. They hold his 201-267298).

4. Contacts: Machado is a friend of Ambassador Arcos y Bergnes. He also has a certain amount of prestige in revolutionary circles.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: POSADA, LUIS CLEMENTE
C-300985
VOL. II

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T 299644 EIA693 PAGE 01-01 IN 067846

TOR:132220Z OCT 76 CARA 31115

S E C R E T 132216Z OCT 76 STAFF

CITE CARACAS 31115

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AKULE

1. FYI, STATION HAS RECEIVED REPORTS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES WHICH INDICATE ALMOST CERTAINLY THAT WKSCARLET-3 WAS ARRESTED BY DISIP 12 OCTOBER AND IS BEING DETAINED UNDER SUSPICION OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE 6 OCTOBER DESTRUCTION OF CUBANA AIRCRAFT NEAR BARBADOS, ALSO, THAT WKSCARLET-3'S OFFICE WAS RAIDED AND ALL FILES CONFISCATED MORNING 13 OCTOBER.

2. FILE: 201-2300985, E2 IMPDET.

C/OPS: Please give me subject's file.

SECRET

Office of Security
Polygraph Results, 29 June 1973
Subject: 201. 300985

PHILIP SNARE
WH/3/V
1535
5 FEB 73

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 21-1

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☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO 300755 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE VR. plec, eur 6, ci, ci/ops, ci/ia, fi

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 052373Z FEB 73 CITE DIRECTOR 367030

TO PRIORITY CARACAS INFO ROME.

WKRALLY WKSCARLET

REF: CARACAS 21092 (IN 823647)*

1. AFTER CAREFUL RECONSIDERATION, BELIEVE IN VIEW CONSIDERABLE FLAP POTENTIAL THAT WKSCARLET-3 SHOULD NOT BE MET IN ROME. WE REALIZE THAT HE COULD PRODUCE SOME INTERESTING INTEL FROM THIS OP BUT DO NOT FEEL IN THIS INSTANCE THAT TIMELINESS OF REPORTING WORTH RISK INVOLVED.

2. SUGGEST YOU TELL WKSCARLET-3 CONTACT CANCELLED BECAUSE ROME CASE OFFICER [redacted] WHO WOULD HAVE MET HIM EXPECTS BE OUT OF TOWN AT TIME OF WKSCARLET-3'S VISIT AND NO OTHER APPROPRIATE CONTACT AVAILABLE.

FEB 1973

3. FILE 201-300985, 75-2-16/3. E2 IMPDET.

*REPORTED ON WKSCARLET-3 TRIP TO ROME TO BUG COLOMBIAN DELEGATION TO COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN BORDER TALKS.

E/I MR. PEAKE (TELECOORD)
C/WH/FI Burche

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
C/WHD

R L Conolly
RICHARD L. CONOLLY
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL. BY 057505

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 01 0332

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

(Please Type)

Supplementary Explanatory Notes For Those Items With An Asterisk (*) Following The Item Number Are Contained On The Reverse Side

TO: IP/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address: DN-5

DATE 29 25 Sept 72

FROM: NAME Nancy L. Davis

OFFICE DESIGNATION (CSN 5-50) WH/3/V

ROOM 3R 2627

PHONE 4522

TUBE ADDRESS BS-4

1.* TYPE OF ACTION (Select Only One)

OPEN 201	
AMEND 201	
ADD CRYPTONYM	X
CANCEL CRYPTONYM	0

2. TYPE OF FILE CONTROL (Select Only One)

HOLD UNRESTRICTED IN IP/FILES	
HOLD IN IP/FILES BUT RESTRICT TO DESK	
PERMANENTLY CHANGE TO DESK	

(IP Use Only)

3. ENTER CRYPTONYM(S) ONLY IF CRYPTONYM ACTION HAS BEEN INDICATED IN ITEM 1. USE ONE COPY OF FORM AND COMPLETE ITEMS 5, 14, 15, 18, AND 21. DO NOT INCLUDE TRUE NAME INFORMATION.

SUPERSEDED CRYPTONYM: CIFENCE/4

NEW CRYPTONYM: WKSCARLET/3

4. TRUE NAME (LAST) (First) (Middle)

5. 201 NUMBER 0300985

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (For Type, Use A For Alias, V For Variant or AKA, M For Maiden)

TYPE	(LAST)	(First)	(Middle)

7. SEX (Circle One) M F

8. DATE OF BIRTH, IF CIRCA CHECK BOX ☐ DAY MONTH YEAR

9. COUNTRY AND CITY/TOWN/PROVINCE OF BIRTH

(IP Use Only)

10. CITIZENSHIP

(IP Use Only)

11. OCCUPATION

(IP Use Only)

12. INTELLIGENCE AFFILIATION(S) OR TARGET ORGANIZATION(S)

13. OI CODE(S)

14. ACTION DESK [redacted] VENE CODE [redacted]

(IP Use Only) VENE

15. COUNTRY OF LOCATION VENE[redacted]

(IP Use Only) VENE

16. INTEREST DESK CODE

(IP Use Only)

17. CITE FIELD ADDRESSEES TO RECEIVE INDEX CARDS:

18. *DOCUMENT SYMBOL, NUMBER DATE DAY MO YR

19. COUNTRY, STATE, CITY/TOWN OF LOCATION

20. SUMMARY TEXT FOR INDEX RECORDS. (Insert additional identifying and descriptive data. Do not include Cryptonyms. If spouse record desired, provide spouse bio data here preceded by "Code R-")

21. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER Nancy L. Davis

22. 201 NUMBER 0300985

FORM 5-72 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E2 IMPDET

WARNING - SISAMI

(38-61)

14-00000

SECRET

No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/V Tracy L. Davis

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of [illegible], for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows:.

Unilateral penetration of CIRASH.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

Lee C.

Acting Chief, CI/OA

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: ______________________

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1-67 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

SECRET

FILE NO. 300955

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) NANCY L. DAVIS
2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: WH/3/V
3. DATE OF REVIEW 10 JULY 72
4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed: NO

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments:

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

(13-21-40)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	201 NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	HI TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES *(Incl. COMINT)*	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-38)

Office of Security Investigative Report
26 April 1972
Subject: 319235

14-00000

300985

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 19 January 1972 JR

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - 300985 SO - 319235

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: WH/3/V Venezuela

TYPE OF REQUEST: XX POA XX OA ☐ CNC ☐ SI ☐ SRP

OS INDICES RESULTS BY: ~~NRxsincex16xAugx1967x~~ ~~Nothing since 16 Aug. 1967~~ (Date) 26 January 72

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY: (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT: Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

IP	DIVISION (include comint)	FIELD	CRS/ISG
NDI	NDI	NDI	NR

ATTACHMENTS		PRQ/PART I		PARTIAL BIO		OTHER	

REMARKS

SO# 319235.

T/N: POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente
DPOB: 15 February 1928, Cienfuegos, Cuba

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE 20 Jan 72

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS indices results: OS # 319235 – No info since 11/71

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI ☐ ONI ☐ ACSI ☐ STATE ☐ PP ☐ CSC ☒ HCUA ☒ OSI ☐ I & N ☐ ☐ ☐

☒ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached: State, FBI.

☒ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, 1 reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

20 Jan 72
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 11-71 693 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (9) 1

SECRET

DATE:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

CHIEF, CI/OA

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

[illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) (Sex) [illegible]

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

(a) Bamby (nickname), Bedillo

5. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

6. PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

[illegible]

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX ☐ M ☐ F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES		j. TEETH	k. BUILD		l. POSTURE

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

[illegible]

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY *(Per annum)*
[illegible]		[illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

[illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

[illegible]

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

ATTACHMENT PRQ PART I HVCA-10757

DATE	PLACE	PURPOSE
1956	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1961	Mexico	Political exile
Feb 1961	Miami, Florida	Political exile
April 1961	Guatemala	Invasion (Cuba)
May 1961	Miami, Florida	Invasion (Cuba)
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Puerto Rico	Cuban Affairs
1964	Dominican Republic	Cuban Affairs
1964	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
Oct 1967	Miami, Florida	
Oct 1967	Venezuela	Work
1968	Miami, Florida	Tourist
1969	Miami, Florida	Tourist
Mar 1970	Miami, Florida	Reentry Permit
1970	Trinidad, Tobago	Revolution--business
Jun 1970	Bogota	Business
1970	Bogota	Business
May 1971	Aruba	Business
April 1971	Lima, Peru	Business
April 1971	Argentina	Business
April 1971	Brazil	Business
Oct 1971	Portugal	Business
Oct 1971	Rome	Business
Nov 1971	Vienna	Business
Nov 1971	Rome	Business
Dec 1971	Miami, Florida	Business
Dec 1971	Puerto Rico	Tourist

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

good markesman with small arm

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
[illegible]	[illegible] 19[illegible]	[illegible] 19[illegible]	127 Inf. [illegible]	[illegible]	Ft. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

USA

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26\.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS San José de las Lajas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

27\.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible], Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK [illegible]
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

28\.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible]
d. TYPE OF WORK
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

29\.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) [illegible]
b. EMPLOYER [illegible]
c. ADDRESS [illegible]
d. TYPE OF WORK
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

30\.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)
b. EMPLOYER
c. ADDRESS
d. TYPE OF WORK
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for divorce [illegible]

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) [illegible] (Middle) [illegible] (Nee) Gonzalez [illegible] (Last) [illegible]

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: [illegible]

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: [illegible], Ca.

36. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: [illegible]

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): [illegible]

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	Caracas, Venezuela	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME

42. YEAR OF BIRTH

43. PLACE OF BIRTH

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

46. OCCUPATION

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME

49. YEAR OF BIRTH

50. PLACE OF BIRTH

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

53. OCCUPATION

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	Cuban
[illegible]			[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Concepción [illegible]			19[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Unknown (See previous PRQ I)

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Concha Marina Posada (aunt)
Margot Carrillo (aunt)   address unknown

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE

SIGNATURE

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO:

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

[illegible]

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

See previous PRQ Part II, [illegible]-23189, dated 20 September 1965

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECTION II	MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

[illegible] his friends and individuals associated [illegible] interest [illegible]

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

Subject's present position and physical presence in Venezuela would be untenable if his cooperation with [illegible] became known to the Venezuelan government.

SECTION III	COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Meetings are clandestine. Plausible denial is basedon contact with CO in his official cover capacity.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Subject accomplishes this in the course of his actual employment.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

[illegible]

SECTION IV	INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

[illegible] previous [illegible]. In addition, Subject has been employed in [illegible], and [illegible].

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[illegible]; [illegible] (former [illegible])

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

Subject has had no formal training since being in Venezuela ([illegible]). Records not available here for period when Subject worked for Station [illegible].

SECTION V	COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Subject would not likely collaborate with any foreign power [illegible] from [illegible]

SECRET

SECTION VI	**OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT**

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from CI [illegible] and its files and informants in the course of his normal work as an official of [illegible].

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject ~~knows~~ from experience that information is disseminated throughout [illegible]

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is a unilateral penetration (UI) of [illegible].

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

N.A.

SECTION VII	**PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY**

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

   A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

   Subject is an official of [illegible]. He is [illegible] not involved in [illegible] of [illegible].

   B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER AGENCY OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

SECTION VIII	**AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT**

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT; I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

[illegible]

SECTION IX QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION X COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject is paid a regular montly salary of approximately US$ 335.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None; Subject has been assisted in retaining his permanent resident status.

SECTION XI CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

Station files. Derogatory info resolved.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

[illegible] 3 November 1971. See [illegible] No. 72[illegible] dated 2[illegible] November 1971.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

[illegible] 18 October [illegible]

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

POA 17 January [illegible]

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible] Subject continues to demonstrate reliability and [illegible] of [illegible] conditions. [illegible]

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

All known [illegible] have been previously resolved

SECTION XII SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject is increasingly able to disguise his PERUVIAN accent and pass as a Venezuelan. Among other latins, the accent would be detected in prolonged contact.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ-I obtained from Subject. PRQ-II from files and personal observation.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

N/A

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W: WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

Subject could be contacted by any of former case officers, or in name used by former CO's.

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

See previous PRQ-II.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
[illegible]	

SECRET

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,	NUMBER
	SUBJECT
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated

A Provisional ~~Operational~~ Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

Penetration of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention in Venezuela.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

Returned file to Mr. [illegible] CI/OA/WK

FILE NO. 300985

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) R TANSING
2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: CI/OPS/WH
3. DATE OF REVIEW 14 Jan 72
4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed: No

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments: Re WH/3/V memo 28 Dec 71, C/S should have been considered for an OA years ago. Suggest he now be processed for an OA not POA and Desk can supply updated PRQs I & II at later date when routinely procured from station.

R TANSING
CI/OPS/WH

I agree!!

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230 SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(13-21-40)

SECRET

28 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT: CIFENCE/4 (201-300985)

1. It is requested that a POA be granted for Subject's use as a penetration of the Directorate for Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP), a Venezuelan Security Service. Since Subject holds a key position in this organization, he will be able to monitor its intelligence operations as well as Venezuelan political matters.

2. All current traces on Subject are non-derogatory. (See attachment to Form 772 for additional information).

3. Request for Approval, COMINT Name Check and PRQ Part I (dated 28 May 68) are attached. Updated PRQ Part I and Part II will be requested from Station.

Nancy L. Davis
WH/3/V

Attachments:
As Stated Above

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 22 December 1971

TO:
☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: WH/3/V

SUBJECT: *(true name)* Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA, OR ALIASES: CIFENCE-4

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-300985

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SPECIFY)*
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B
☐	SECURITY AND RELIABILITY DETERMINATION		

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE penetration DISIP, a Venezuelan Security Service. Will also report on Venezuelan political matters.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		
F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.		

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE OF CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ STATUS

☒ PRQ I OR BIO DATA IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED
☒ PRQ II OR EQUIVALENT WILL BE FORWARDED PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF POA. 1 COPY

6. R.I. TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT (see attached)

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES-INCLUDING COMINT

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*8. FIELD TRACES **

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☒	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

9. CRS/ISG **

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

10. FI/D **

☐	SPECIAL CHECK NSA INDICES					☐	CS REFS TO FI/D (BR. FILES)
☒	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY/SIGNIFICANT ATTACHED

*LIST AREAS CHECKED | **IF NOT CHECKED - WHY? ☐ NOT APPLICABLE ☐ OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: [illegible] Isenstead

EXTENSION: 7271

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [illegible]

FORM 3-71 772 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

COMMENTS RE DEROGATORY TRACES
ATTACHMENT TO FORM 772

1. A POA was requested on Subject in January 1968 for his use as a penetration of Venezuelan General Directorate of Police. Cancellation was requested in February 1968 because of indications that Subject was involved in "clandestine sabotage activity and suspicions that Subject failed to report his activities to CIA. Thereafter, Subject was treated as a "hostile". In the ensuing months Subject was described as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of his important and accurate intelligence information and operational reports. Subject was given a polygraph examination to clear up questions about possible affiliation with Cuban intelligence, unreported association with gangster elements, etc. His responses showed no information which would prevent CIA using him for ops purposes. Request for POA was again requested on 7 September 1968. This POA request was turned down on 15 October due to Subject being an "agent of a foreign power."

2. Since that time Subject has continued to provide verbal and written information reports concerning Communist and subversive elements, guerrilla activities, Soviet activities, sabotage, etc. Subject continues to report accurately and often and has a very pro-U.S. attitude. Subject was again polygraphed on 29 November 1971 (a copy of which is contained in Subject's CI/OA folder). His responses indicated no deception concerning truthfulness of reporting to CIA, no compromise of his U.S. Government connections, non-involvement in illegal arms dealings, etc.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly. 2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable write "NA". 3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Luis	Clemente	Posada Carriles	

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

Bambi (nickname)

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

No record

MICROFILMED
JUN 5 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
☒ M ☐ F	40	37	FT. 5 IN. 10	180	Normal	
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE		
Black	Green	All	Strong	Normal		

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar, right-hand palm

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

Normal

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

None

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING. ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [illegible]-15485 [illegible]

14-20

SECTION II

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Cuban	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND [illegible]

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, [illegible])
Rent - [illegible], Av. [illegible], Ave. San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)
Miami, Florida

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes)

1964 - Dominican Republic - working for J.U.R.E organization (exiles ~~affairs~~)

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Ministry of Internal Relations	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum) Bs 1800 mo.

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)
None

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
None

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Political - Frente Revolucionario Jose A. Echevarria - 1960 in Cuba
Political - J.U.R.E. - 1963-1964
Political - Reco - 1967

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
Monserrate Cienfuegos, Cuba	Elementary	1963	1942	Yes
Instituto Cienfuegos, Cuba	S. High School Bachelor	1942	1947	Yes
Padres Dominicos Cienfuegos, Cuba	Sugar Chemist	1947	1950	No
Havana University	Medicine	1950	1953	No

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Hunting (good shot)

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
USA	1963	1964	197 Brgd 1st Batallion	2nd Lt.	F. Benning, Ga.

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY, INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

None

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

26. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1944-1945
b. EMPLOYER Pastora Sugar Mill
c. ADDRESS San Jose de Las Lajas Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 210 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING Transfer

27. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1946-1954
b. EMPLOYER San Agustin Sugar Mill
c. ADDRESS Cruces, Las Villas - Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK Chemist
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 310 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING Studying

28. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1956-1958
b. EMPLOYER Self -(Fumigadora)
c. ADDRESS Cienfuegos Las Villas, Cuba
d. TYPE OF WORK Fumigation
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 250 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

29. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1960-1963
b. EMPLOYER Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba, and Akron, Ohio
d. TYPE OF WORK Supervisor
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 500 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING Army

30. a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1963-1964
b. EMPLOYER U.S. Army
c. ADDRESS Fort Benning, Ga.
d. TYPE OF WORK 2nd Lt.
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 380 per month
f. REASON FOR LEAVING Cuban affairs

14-00000

Married December 1956: Divorced 26 June 1963 from Maria Concepcion Castaneda: Reason - ~~XX~~ Incompatibility.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last): Nieves Elina ~~XXXXX~~ Gonzalez

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 13 Aug 1963

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Colombus, Ga. - Muscogee County

36. DATE OF BIRTH: 13 Dec 1935

37. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

SELF wife of subject 201-300985

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased): Edif. Mayflower, Apt 24, Avenida San Juan Bosco, Caracas, Venezuela

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jorge Luis Posada	X		1955	Miami, Florida	American

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME: Luis Posada

42. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

43. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

46. OCCUPATION: Book Store

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE: 4110 Ave. 56, Cienfuegos, Cuba

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME: Dolores Carriles

49. YEAR OF BIRTH: Unknown

50. PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH: Cuban

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS:

53. OCCUPATION: Housekeeper

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE: Same as for father

[illegible] FULL NAME	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
Rob[illegible] P[illegible]	X		[illegible]	Cienf[illegible], Cu[illegible]	Cu[illegible]
Raul Posada	X		192[illegible]	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban
Maria Conchita Posada		X	1922	Cienfuegos, Cuba	Cuban

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)

None

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

Roberto Posada - Telephone co. - Cuba
Raul Posada - Electric & Power Co. - Cuba

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (Explain relationship)

Augusto Val-Des Miranda (friend)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)

I have aunts (2) and cousins (2) who are American citizens.
I do not know anything of certificates.

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE 23 MAY 68

SIGNATURE Luis Posada

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, Caracas

SUBJECT

PRQ Part I on Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

See below.

Forwarded herewith is an up-to-date PRQ Part I which was filled in by Subject on 23 May 1968.

Oscar C. KALBING

ATTACHMENTS:
A As stated (4 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - CH/WHD (w/4 atts, h/w)

MAY 30 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HVCA-15488

DATE

28 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

FILE NO. 300985

NOTICE TO: DIVISION PERSONNEL REVIEWING THIS FILE

Please complete the following steps:

1. NAME OF REVIEWER (please print) NANCY L. DAVIS

2. OFFICE DESIGNATION OF REVIEWER: WH/3/V

3. DATE OF REVIEW 12/21/71

4. Do you contemplate dissemination of information reviewed:

☐ to field

☐ to another US Government Agency (if so, to whom)

NO

The dissemination of any Office of Security investigative information, including FBI reports, must be coordinated with CI/OA and the Office of Security.

5. Comments:

DO NOT REMOVE THE ATTACHED FOLDER FROM CI/OA

FORM 8-70 3230 SECRET [illegible] (13-21-40)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO:	201 NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	U.S. COMINT TRACES
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES (*Incl. COMINT*)	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES (*Incl. COMINT*)	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]
[illegible]

FORM 7-71 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20-36)

Office of Security Polygraph
Results, dated 29 November 1971,
Subject: CIFENCE/4

30 09 85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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BY: ________ AT: ________ Z

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

DISSEM BY 30 PER ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT
WH 8

INFO
FILE, VR RI/AN FI 2 CI CI/OPS CI/OA SOD6 13 APR 1970

ACTION NO.
910

DDP ADDP CSDO

File

S E C R E T 102143Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4890

DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA, WH/MIAMI

10 APR 70 06 08 15

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

30 09 85

1. DURING RECENT TRIP TO MIAMI, CIFENCE-4 (IDEN FOR TEGUCIGALPA) WAS TOLD BY SOME CUBAN FRIENDS THAT ADOLFO MENDOZA, WEALTHY CUBAN RANCH OWNER IN HONDURAS WHO WORKED WITH JKLANCE AGAINST CASTRO AND INFILTRATED INTO CUBA FOR JKLANCE PRIOR BAY OF PIGS, IS ATTEMPTING PURCHASE ARMS CLANDESTINELY FOR HONDURAS. CIFENCE-4 FEELS ARMS FOR ACTION AGAINST EL SALVADOR AND NOT FOR ACTION BY CUBAN EXILES AGAINST CASTRO. FRIENDS ASKED CIFENCE-4 RE AVAILABILITY CERTAIN AMMUNITIION IN VENEZUELA AND HE SAID WOULD LOOK INTO MATTER. WILL TAKE NO ACTION UNLESS WE DESIRE AS MEANS MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH MIAMI FRIENDS AND OBTAINING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CARACAS PREFERS HE TAKE NO ACTION.

NR in CI/OH/[illegible]: per [illegible] 13 April '70

2. IF TEGUCIGALPA AND WH/MIAMI INVESTIGATE, DO NOT ATTRIBUTE INFO TO CIFENCE-4.

3. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

10-69 EDITIONS

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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BY: AT: Z

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DISSEM BY 30 PER #

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR RI/AN E2 CI CI/OPS CI/OA SOD 6

ACTION NO. 916

DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 102146Z APR 70 CITE CARACAS 4891

IN 060611

TEGUCIGALPA INFO DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF CARACAS 4890 (IN 060615)

IDEN: PENETRATION OF VENEZUELAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION.

GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY 78 PER #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR E/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SO, FI2

ACTION NO. 635

SECRET 082215Z APR 70CITE CARACAS 4858

DIRECTOR INFO GEORGETOWN, WH/MIAMI 8 APR IN 058848

REFS A. CARACAS 4838 (IN057022)

B. DIRECTOR 022665

1. CIFENCE-4 DENIES ANY INVOLVEMENT WITH HART AND GARCIA IN SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO VENEZUELA. SAYS HE HAS NEVER MET HART. DURING OCT 69 HE WENT TO MIAMI AT REQUEST OF CIFENCE-1 TO INVESTIGATE STORY THAT HART TRAVELLING TO MIAMI TO PURCHASE *3000,000 DOLLARS WORTH OF WEAPONS. PRIOR TO TRIP HE TOLD CO HIS SEVERAL CONTACTS AMONG CLANDESTINE ARMS DEALERS IN MIAMI WOULD FACILITATE INVESTIGATION. RE GARCIA, CIFENCE-4 SAID HE WAS INTRODUCED TO GARCIA CIRCA MAY 69 AND LAST TALKED TO HIM IN JUNE 69.

2. PERHAPS FBI MIAMI SOURCE IS ONE OF ARMS DEALERS CIVENCE-4 KNOWS AND TALKED TO DURING OCT INVESTIGATION OF HART. IF THIS TRUE, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SOURCE CONNECTED CIFENCE-4 WITH HART. GARCIA 201 FILE SHOWS HE DEALT WITH MIAMI ARMS DEALER IN OCT 63 ON BEHALF OF GOV. CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT GARCIA HAS HAD SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS.

3. FILE 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

*WILL SVC UPON REQUEST.

SECRET

7

W/H 8 FILE, VR [illegible]

951 DDP [illegible]

S E C R E T 121445Z AUG 70 CITE CARACAS 5507 (LAPALUS ACTING)

12 Aug 70 141174

DIRECTOR

CIGRAPE

formerly APICALVE-15 spec. 19

1. CIFENCE-4 INFORMED STATION EARLY MORNING 11 AUGUST THAT MEMBER CIFENCE ORGANIZATION WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR ~~TELEPHONE~~ TAPS INFORMED HIM THAT CIFENCE KNOWS THAT CIGRAPE-2 HAS "TELEPHONE TAP EQUIPMENT INN HIS APARTMENT AND CIFENCE BELIEVES HE WORKS FOR JKLANCE". CIFENCE-4 SAID THAT CIFENCE INVESTIGATING THE MATTER.

5 OCT 1970

2. STATION HAS CLOSED DOWN CIGRAPE OPERATION, TAKEN OFF ALL TAPS AT CENTRAL SWITCHBOARDS AND HAS REMOVED ALL EQUIPMENT FROM CIGRAPE-2 APARTMENT FOR STORAGE IN SAFE PLACE. ANY CIFENCE OR TELEPHONE INSPECTORS ENTERING CIGRAPE-2 APARTMENT WILL NOW FIND ONLY RUDIMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LEGITIMATE CIGRAPE-2 TELEPHONE ANSWERING SERVICE.

3. WILL KEEP HEADQUARTERS INFORMED. GP-1.

201-740849

S E C R E T

Finally
Pls. card
CIGRAPE-2
201-821684

Copy on circle, pls.

6 OCT 1970

CIFLUTE Project

Liaison Project

CIWOOD CIGLASS/2	SIFA	Armed Forces Intel Service
CIRASH CIRASH/17	DISIP	Directorate of Inspection and Prevention
CIFENCE CIFENCE/1	SCD	Central Documentation Service

~~[illegible]~~

13 APR 1970 — Jim Alcorn, CI/LNO/IE, said that no request for HQ approval of liaison w/ SCD had ever been submitted or approved.

CIOBETON is the only approved liaison

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ACTION UNIT WH-8 FILE, VR RI/AN DDP, ADDP, CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI, CI/OA, SOD-6, FI-2

ACTION NO. 096

SECRET 132319Z APR 70 CITE TEGUCIGALPA 8767 13 APR 70 IN 061804

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE/CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS-4890 (IN 060615)

B. CARACAS-4891 (IN 060614)

1. SEE NO NEED FOR CARACAS TO TAKE ACTION. MBDOZA KNOWN TO BE ENGAGED ARMS BUYING. PROABLY ANY INFO CIFENCE-4 (300985) ABLE TO TURN UP WOULD NOT BE WORTH RISK OR INVOLVING HIM.

2. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-300985. GP-1.

SECRET

File

14 APR 1970

T-8 June

to McNally

SECRET

30 09 85

DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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II

ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR Rafael a/cA FE Z

ACTION NO. 674

S E C R E T 051410Z MAR 70 CITE CARACAS 4632 5 MAR 70 IN 037053

c

DIRECTOR

REF HVCA-17339

1. PLEASE FORWARD PERTINENT PORTIONS OF 201 FILE ON

31 33 11 300985

RAFAEL (TREMOLS) FRESNEDA. ACCORDING CIFENCE-4

ASSESSMENT TREMOLS HAS EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT UCV, IS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS, AND WISHES TO RENEW CONTACT WITH RVROCK. CABLE SOONEST SUMMARY OF 201.

2. FILE: DEFER. GP-1

S E C R E T

8 MAR 1970

18 MAR 1970

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8 | INFO FILE, VR c/AN, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, MPS/AS.

ACTION NO. 197 DDP, ADDP

E

025095

C

S E C R E T 131453Z FEB 70 CITE CARACAS 4467 FEB 13

16 FEB 1970

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF HVCA-17103

Copy in [illegible] file

OVER

1. CIFENCE-5 SUCCESSFULLY SGSWIRLED 11 FEBRUARY SY LEONARD B. VANTZIAN. TO INCREAS TECHNICAL VALIDITY SGSWIRL OFFICER ADVISED LIMITING COVERAGE TO BASIC ISSUES OF ESPIONAGE AND DISCLOSURE OF STATION CLANDESTINE CONTACTS OR OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO SGSWIRL, CIFENCE HAS NOT INFORMED ANY VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF HIS CONTACTS WITH RVROCK AND CIMOTIF-1 ONLY OTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO AWARE HIS COLLABORATION WITH RVROCK. NO SGSWIRL INDICATION THAT CIFENCE-5 HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH ANY COMMUNIST OR CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SINCE HIS DEFECTION IN 1961.

2. BASED ON SUCCESSFUL SGSWIRL, REQUEST HEADQUARTERS PROCESS POA TO RECRUIT CIFENCE-5 AS PENETRATION CIFENCE. CIFENCE-5 ASVISES HE NOW CHIEF CIFENCE CONTROL DIVISION WHICH RESPONSIBLE FOR MIR, FALN, AND PCV PENETRATION AND INFORMANT OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, CIFENCE-5 STILL IN CHARGE OF CIFENCE FILES AND ONE OF FOUR IDENTITY PERSONS WHO HAVE UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO IDENTIY FILES AND ARCHIVES. HE IS WILLING USE HIS

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ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4457 S E C R E T

POSITION AND ACCESS HOWEVER RVROCK SUGGESTS.

77 37 27

CIFENCE-5 ACCESS COMPLEMENTS THAT OF CIFENCE-3

30 09 75

AND CIFENCE-4 AND WILL GREATLY EXPAND OUR ACCESSS

IN IDENTIY AND CIZENCE. WE CONVINCED HE WILL MAKE

A MOST VALUABLE ADDITION TO STATION COVERAGE OF A

NUMBER OF TARGETS. PROJECT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

16 FEB 1970

3. FILE: 221-287019.

S E C R E T

M/R – On 22 May 1969, CI/Ops/WH by memo, concurred in this use C/A for Sec. 19 of CSI F 10-5 for contact, recruitment and polygraph. CI/Ops/WH specified that no recruitment would take place until all above actions had taken place and results were provided to Hqs.

This is a Section 19 case – and not a PCA/CA.

16 FEB 1970

ORIG: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1335
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

S E C R E T

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE. VR. RI/AN, CI/OA, CI/OPS, SECURITY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 11 23 24 z FEB 70 12 FEB 1970 CITE DIRECTOR 089340

TO CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 3365 (NOT SENT WH/MIAMI)*

(FORMERLY AMCLEVE/15)

Proc. U., Pls. make crypt change. SP

1. HQS HAS LEARNED CIFENCE/4 AND WIFE HAVE PRESERVED THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN STATUS.

2. IT NOW NECESSARY AS MENTIONED REF FOR COUPLE COME TO U.S. TO FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. HQS MUST REVIEW COMPLETED APPLICATIONS BEFORE SUBMITTING THEM TO INS. AFTER APPLICATIONS REVIEWED BY HQS, COUPLE MAY RETURN CARACAS IF THEY HAVE SOME DOCUMENT WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM ENTER VENEZUELA. IF NOT, THEY MUST REMAIN IN U.S. THE TWO OR THREE WEEKS IT WILL TAKE HQS TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

300985

3. ALTHOUGH THIS CASE MIGHT BE HANDLED MORE RAPIDLY IF COUPLE CAME TO HQS AREA FOR PROCESSING, TRIP TO HQS AREA COULD POSE SECURITY HAZARD FOR CIFENCE/4 AS COUPLE WOULD NORMALLY TRAVEL TO MIAMI FOR THIS PROCESSING. ANY INDICATION COUPLE TRAVELLED

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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CONF: INFO: FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR 009340

TO PAGE TWO

TO HQS AREA MIGHT CAUSE CIFENCE/4'S SUPERIORS IN CIFENCE TO SUSPECT HE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH RVROCK; THEREFORE REQUEST WH/MIAMI MEET WITH CIFENCE/4 AND PROVIDE INS FORMS N-470 (CIFENCE/4 ONLY) AND TWO ORIGINAL I-131 FOR EACH TO FILL OUT. COUPLE MUST PROVIDE TWO PHOTOS EACH SIGNED ON LEFT HAND MARGIN AND ONE CHECK TO INS FOR THIRTY DOLLARS. WHEN FORMS COMPLETED THEY SHOULD BE POUCHED TO HQS. AFTER REVIEW HERE, HQS WILL CABLE WH/MIAMI AND THEN COUPLE CAN EITHER RETURN CARACAS OR WAIT MIAMI FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS.

4. FOR WH/MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF YOU HAVE CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE NEAR FUTURE WHO COULD MEET WITH CIFENCE/4. IF AFFIRMATIVE, PLS FORWARD CONTACT PLAN TO CARACAS. FYI. CIFENCE/4 (IDEN A) WAS WH/MIAMI ASSET FROM LATE MARCH 1965 to SEPT 1967 WHEN HE MOVED TO CARACAS WHERE HE HAS BEEN SERVING STATION AS PENETRATION OF CIFENCE (IDEN B).

CONT'D

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NFI: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR 009340

PAGE THREE

5. FOR CARACAS. IF WH/MIAMI ABLE HANDLE CIFENCE/4, PLS FORWARD COUPLES' ETA.

6. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS - JOHN ROONEY (TELECORD)
C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

*Advised steps necessary to preserve permanent alien resident status of CIFENCE/4 and wife and obtain new re-entry permits for them.

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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TO: M. BERGER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 1535
DATE: 11 FEBRUARY 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION ✓ PER ____ # ____

☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

INFO: WH 8 | FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/WA, C/OCS, SECURY

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 23 24 z FEB 70 CITE DIRECTOR 009341

CARACAS WH/MIAMI

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 009340

IDEN A - LUIS CLEMENTE POSADA CARRILES (201-300985)

IDEN B - CENTRAL DOCUMENTATION SERVICE (SCD), A NEWLY ESTABLISHED VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICE SP

END OF MESSAGE

Spera

JOHN R. HORTON
AC/WHD

ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR. RI/AN, SECUR 4, CI/OA

ACTION NO. 727

S E C R E T 231325Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4332 23 JAN IN 012086

DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REF: DIRECTOR 003365

1. RE-ENTRY PERMITS REQUESTED PARA TWO REF FORWARDED HEADQUARTERS 23 JANUARY VIA TM 658733 IN POUCH NUMBER 3407.

2. FILE: 201-300985

S E C R E T

26 JAN 1970

6772F

SECRET

14-00000

30 09 85

M. Berger

NO: M. BERGER

IIT: WH/3/V

T: 1535

ATE: 15 JANUARY 1970

MESSAGE FORM
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-300985

INFO: WH 8 | N/O | FILE, VR. RI/AN CI/CA SEC/UR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 00 01 z JAN 70 CITE DIRECTOR 00336 5

19 JAN 1970

CARACAS

CIFLUTE CIFENCE

REFS: A. CARACAS 4248 (IN 003688)*

B. DIRECTOR 62906**

1. FOLLOWING STEPS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE PERMANENT ALIEN RESIDENT STATUS OF CIFENCE/4 300985 AND WIFE AND OBTAIN NEW RE-ENTRY PERMITS FOR THEM:

A. HQS WILL VERIFY THAT REF A PARA TWO INFO IS IN SUBJECTS' IMMIGRATION FILES. THIS ACTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE MONTH.

B. AFTER ABOVE ACTION COMPLETED, SUBJECTS MUST COME TO HQS OR MIAMI FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK WHERE THEY WILL FILL OUT APPLICATIONS FOR RE-ENTRY PERMITS AND WHERE CIFENCE/4 WILL FILL OUT APPLICATION FOR PRESERVATION OF RESIDENCE. PROCESSING PROCEDURE NECESSITATES SUBJECTS' PRESENCE IN U.S. AT THAT TIME. FYI. IN WIFE'S CASE ONLY,

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE TWO

IN ORDER FOR PERIOD SPENT OUTSIDE U.S. TO COUNT TOWARD THE STATUARY PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. WHICH SHE MUST ACCRUE PRIOR TO PETITIONING FOR NATURALIZATION, WIFE WOULD HAVE TO BE EMPLOYED BY OR UNDER CONTRACT WITH RVROCK. IF THIS CLAIM CANNOT BE LEGITIMATELY MADE, WIFE WILL HAVE TO WAIT TWO YEARS AND ONE DAY AFTER HUSBAND RECEIVES HIS NATURALIZATION BEFORE SHE CAN RECEIVE HERS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WAITING PERIOD WOULD BE IF HUSBAND RECEIVED CITIZENSHIP, CONTINUED TO BE EMPLOYED BY RVROCK, AND RECEIVED ASSIGNMENT ABROAD TO WHICH WIFE WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM.

C. HQS WILL THEN PROCESS APPLICATIONS THRU INS AND RE-ENTRY PERMITS WILL BE FORWARDED TO SUBJECTS IN CARACAS. THESE PERMITS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND RENEWABLE FOR ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR. PRIOR TO END OF THIS TWO-YEAR PERIOD, HQS CAN OBTAIN NEW ONE-YEAR RE-ENTRY PERMITS WHICH ALSO

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ONF: INFO FILE, VR.

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 003365

PAGE THREE

RENEWABLE FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR. AS THIS ACTION NECESSITATES SPECIAL PERMISSION FROM INS, SUBJECTS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS DETAILS WITH ANYONE.

2. WILL ADVISE WHEN PARA ONE (A) ACTION COMPLETED AND WHETHER SUBJECTS SHOULD COME TO HQS OR MIAMI. PLS ADVISE IF EXPIRED RE-ENTRY PERMITS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SURRENDERED BY SUBJECTS AND IF SO, WHEN AND TO WHOM. IF NOT, PLS FORWARD THEM TO HQS.

3. FILE: 201-300985.

END OF MESSAGE

OS/AAS: JOHN ROONEY (telecord)

C/WH/COG James E. Flannery

WH Comments *Provided data previously requested concerning names of carriers and flight numbers used by CIFENCE/4 and wife for their travels to and from the U.S. **Requested travel and passport information pertaining to CIFENCE/4 and wife in connection with preserving their U.S. resident alien status and obtaining new re-entry permits.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Spera
ALFONSO SPERA
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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4	8	6 May 70

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR R/AN, CAG, 06A

ACTION NO 692

S E C R E T 082235Z JAN 70 CITE CARACAS 4249

DIRECTOR

8 JAN IN 003675

CIENCINE

REF: DIRECTOR 000084 86 2489

1. CIFENCE-4 (300985) INVESTIGATION REVEALS NESSELHAUF CITY OF BIRTH IS BADEN, GERMANY.

2. FILE: 201-862429.

S E C R E T

9 JAN 1970

Chg. Out - WH - 9 July

30 09 85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

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DISSEM BY 33 PER ______

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR BIAN SB8 ciops ciCA FI2

ACTION NO. 415

18 NOV 1969

S E C R E T 172125Z NOV 69 CITE CARACAS 4018

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

CIFLUTE AMCLEVE

17 Nov 69 IN 87480

M

30 09 85

1. AMCLEVE-15 CURRENT IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE POSITION IN GOV OF GREAT OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE VALUE TO CARACAS STATION. ANTICIPATE VALUE A-15 WILL INCREASE WITH ARRIVAL OF SOVIETS, AS HE IN CHARGE OPERATIONS AGAINST BLOC COUNTRIED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. BOTH A-15 AND STATION CONCERNED, HOWEVER, WITH FACT HE NOT VENEZUELAN CITIZEN AND POSSIBILITY SOMEBODY IN GOV WILL ASK WHY FOREIGNER (CUBAN) IN SUCH HIGH AND SENSITIVE POSITION WITHIN GOV. IF THIS HAPPENS, THERE GOOD CHANCE A-15 WOULD BE REMOVED FROM PRESENT JOB. A-15 SAYS CIVISTA-5 PERIODICALLY ASKS IN JOKING MANNER WHEN HE GOING TO BECOME CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 REPLIES HE HAS READY ALL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR APPLYING FOR VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP AND WILL BECOME CITIZEN IN DUE TIME. STATION FEELS PERHAPS GOOD JOB A-15 DOING FOR C-5 REASON C-5 DOES NOT PRESSURE A-15 INTO BECOMING CITIZEN.

74 08 49

2. BOTH STATION AND A-15 FEEL HIS POSITION WILL BE

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT

INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 4018 SECRET

STRENGTHENED CONSIDERABLY IF HE BECOMES CITIZEN VENEZUELA. A-15 PERFECTLY WILLING BECOME VENEZUELAN CITIZEN IF RECEIVES ASSURANCE DOING SO WILL NOT ANNUL HIS AND WIFE'S STATUS AS RESIDENTS UNITED STATES (BOTH HE AND WIFE HAVE FULFILLED REQUIREMENT OF FIVE YEARS CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE IN UNITED STATES) AND DESTROY THEIR CHANCES BECOMING UNITED STATES CITIZENS. HE SAYS FIRST LOVE CUBA AND SECOND LOVE UNITED STATES. SINCE HE CANNOT RETURN CUBA, PREFERS BECOME CITIZEN UNITED STATES. WIFE FEELS SAME WAY.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE PRIORITY IF ARRANGEMENT CAN BE MADE WHEREBY A-15 AND WIFE BECOMING CITIZENS VENEZUELA WILL NOT ANNUL UNITED STATES RESIDENCY STATUS AND WRECK CHANCES BECOMING CITIZENS. DURING RECENT TRIP MIAMI THEY APPLIED FOR BUT WERE REFUSED NEW PERMITS TO REENTER UNITED STATES BECAUSE (ACCORDING TO A-15) A-15 IS RESIDING AND WORKING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES AND HAS NO NEED FOR SUCH PERMIT. PERMIT A-15 EXPIRED 25 JULY 1969 AND PERMIT WIFE EXPIRED 13 NOV 1969.

4. STATION STRONGLY URGES HQS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

PAGE 3 CARACAS 4018 S E C R E T

RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM SOONEST IN FAVOR OF BOTH A-15 AND STATION.

5. FILE: 201-300985.

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SECRET

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ACTION UNIT WH 8

FILE, VR, RI/AN, CA 5, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/CA, CI/IC 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 171

S E C R E T 222045Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3864 — 22 Oct 69 IN 71090

PRIORITY WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR GEORGETOWN

REF CARACAS 3859 (IN 70765)

1. CIWOOD INTELLIGENCE SECTION CHIEF F. 4.95 ASKED [illegible]VROCK TO ASCERTAIN IF THERE IS AN ARREST ORDER ON JAMES HART IN MIAMI AND, IF SO, FOR WHAT REASON. ON QUESTIONING, HE ADVISED HART LEFT FOR MIAMI FROM MATURIN NIGHT OF 21 OCTOBER. WE ADVISING CIWOOD WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ARREST ORDER SINCE HART APPARENTLY HAS BROKEN NO U.S. LAWS BUT, DUE HIS KNOWN INVOLVEMENT IN JANUARY RUPUNUNI INCIDENT, POSSIBLE FBI OR CUSTOMS MAY WISH QUESTION HIM IN MIAMI. REQUEST WH/MIAMI ASCERTAIN IF ARREST ORDER DOES IN FACT EXIST OR IF ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY PLANS TO INTERVIEW.

23 OCT 1969

2. CIWOOD QUERY AND KNOWLEDGE HART'S ACTIVITIES STRONGLY INDICATES HE COOPERATING WITH CIWOOD. REF INFORMATION INDICATES HE BEING INVESTIGATED BY CIVISTA-5 (74 0249) GROUP WHO HAS SENT AMCLEVE-15 (203725) TO MIAMI TO INVESTIGATE ACTIVITIES OF RICHARD HART. COORDINATION BETWEEN VENEZUELAN SERVICES BEING WHAT IT IS, SITUATION LIKE THIS IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.

SECRET

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3. REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY.

4. FILE: DEFER.

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S E C R E T 162245Z OCT 69 CITE CARACAS 3820

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

16 Oct 69 IN 67171

DTDORIC JMDEVIL

REF: DIRECTOR 46526

1. FIELD TRACES FIVE NO NEW INFORMATION SAVE FOR LOCAL ADDRESS AND TOUTED MEDIA CONNECTION PER WH/MIAMI 4639 (IN 05005); OTHER GENERAL, NONDEROGATORY TIDBITS.

2. REGRET DELAY DETERMINING AMICE-31 ✓38 44 58 CURRENT STATUS REGARDING CLASC. PROBLEM HAS BEEN IN LOCATING HIM FIRST THROUGH AMCLEVE-15 ✓30 09 85, BOTH BEING MUTUAL FRIENDS, TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ACCESS AND STATUS CLASC AFFAIRS MERITING STATION DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. SUBJECT REPORTEDLY INVOLVED IN CHURCH FUND RAISING WORK AND SPENDS CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY FROM HOME. WILL ADVISE SOONEST BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES AMCLEVE-15 HAS HAD MERELY IN REACHING SUBJECT SINCE RECEIPT HVCW-8792, HAVE DOUBTS ON PROSPECTS FOR MISSION.

3. FILE: 201-284658, X-REF: 200-124-192/3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File
201-300935
10 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training
Attention: Chief, Covert Training OS/TR

SUBJECT : Covert Training Requirement for Station Caracas, Project CIFLUTE

REFERENCE : CSI No. 25-5

1. With regard to previous discussions between WH/3/Venezuela and Chief, Covert Training Branch, it is hereby requested that two instructors be assigned on TDY status to Station Caracas for the purpose of conducting operational training for selected members of the Directorate General of Police (DIGEPOL) and the Central Documentation Service (SDC). Names of the training candidates are included on a separate sheet attached to this memorandum.

2. This training program has been initiated at the direct request of senior Venezuelan liaison officers associated with Station Caracas. A general description of the situation, subject matter and identification of possible problem areas has been forwarded to you in the form of HVCA-16550, 9 May 1969.

3. Project CIFLUTE, under which this training will be conducted, was approved on 8 March 1963 and covers all liaison conducted by Station Caracas with the Venezuelan security services.

4. In this training program, we hope to attain several objectives. First, through training selected members of DIGEPOL and SDC we wish to present sound operational methods and techniques which will impress the trainees and serve as a guide to them in improving their operations. Secondly, it is desired to improve Station Caracas' liaison relationship with these services by presenting a highly professional training program. Third, we hope that through this good will, the Station will be able to develop potential unilateral agent recruits who will become penetrations of the Venezuelan services.

5. All of the trainee candidates (see attached list) are members of DIGEPOL and SDC. The first four individuals listed have extensive intelligence backgrounds and are experienced

operations personnel. The remaining six trainees may be assumed to have moderate experience - more in the field of law enforcement and police investigations rather than intelligence operations. 201 files are available at the desk on each individual and we will make these files available to the instructors to give them an idea of each individuals background.

6. Trainees will be available on a full time basis. A secure building has been obtained by the liaison services for exclusive use by instructors during the training cycle. Training will have to be conducted in Spanish.

7. Although evaluations on all trainees are desired, the last six individuals listed will require more attention since our relationship with these men is new and less is known about them. Station Caracas will provide guidance in this area. An additional point of interest would be any individual among this group who might have potential as an instructor.

8. Follow-up training and/or technical training will be based on instructor and Station recommendations. At this time we have no information on what, if any, technical skills the trainees have.

John R. Horton
Deputy Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

CI/OA

CONCUR:

DDP Training and Qualifications
Review Officer

1.AMCLEVE-15 Luis POSADA Carriles (201-300985) OA 18 Oct. 65 Cancelled OA 5 12 Feb. 68

2.CIHURON-1 Lorenzo Camera MALDONADO (201-791576) OA 6 Sept. 67 ✓

3.CITRUST-13 Gabor GAZSO Klingspor (201-773329) ~~OA 22 May~~ 68* 11 June '66, amended 22 May 1968.

4.CIVISTA-7 Jose GUTTMAN Klein (201-773827) ~~OA 11 Sept 68~~ POA mailed on 4 Dec 1969

(Clearences were due 30 May 1969 - still pending)

5. Arnoldo SANOJA Pena (201-851310)

6. Adolfo ROMERO Gomez (201-851309)

7. Rafael Alfredo RIVERO Munoz (201-851308)

8. Colfredo Rafael MASINI Perez (201-851307)

9. Fermin Jose MARMO~~S~~L Leon (201-851306)

10. Carlos VAN DEN BUSSCHE Lovera (201-851305)

*See 201 file for training record.

300985

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779

S E C R E T 121515Z MAY 69 CITE CARACAS 2539

12 MAY 69 IN 56236

13 MAY 1969

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

AMCLEVE CIURBAN

1. STATION UNILATERAL LIAISON ASSET AMCLEVE-15 REPORTED MANUEL CELESTINO (MARCANO) CARRASQUEL (201-797282) AND FAMILY LEFT CARACAS 28 APRIL FOR MADRID ABORAD SHIP "FEDERICO C". SUPPOSEDLY, MARCANO TO RESIDE IN MADRID AS RADIO NEWSCASTER FOR "RADIO CONTINENTE" BUT IN REALITY SERVING AS GOV UNDERCOVER AGENT. HOWEVER, DETAILS SPECIFIC INTEL OBJECTIVES UNKNOWN TO AMCLEVE-15. MARCANO UNDER ORDERS NOT TO CARRY OUT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS.

300985

OVER

2. SUMMARY MARCANO'S BACKGROUND: BORN 29 NOV 1923, BARCELONA, ANZOATEGUI STATE, VENEZUELA; VEN CIT, PP 148385, ISSUED 11 JAN 1965. MARRIED TO LEONIDES YOLANDA MONTANER GOMEZ. PROFESSION: ACCOUNTANT, NEWSCASTER. MARCANO WAS FORMERLY INTEL CHIEF MOVEMENT REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), A PRO-CASTRO ORIENTED EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION. IN OCT 1965 WAS EXPELLED FROM PARTY FOR DICIPLINARY REASONS. AFTER EXPULSION WAS RECRUITED BY CUBANS AGAINST MIR TARGET. IN NOV 1966 DEFECTED TO GOV AND SUBSEQUENTLY

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INFO

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 CARACAS 2539 SECRET

APPEARED BEFORE OAS COMMISSION IN CARACAS INVESTIGATING CASTRO SUBVERSION IN VENEZUELA. OVER PAST YEAR AND HALF MARCANO HAS BEEN EMPLOYED BY GOV (CIVISTA-5 SPECIAL GROUP) AS CONSULTANT ON MIR ACTIVITIES.

740849

3. CAN MADRID CONFIRM MARCANO'S ARRIVAL? WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFO COMING TO MADRID'S ATTENTION RE MARCANO'S ACTIVITIES.

4. FILE: 201-797282, 210-300985.

13 MAY 1969

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE
TO: [illegible]	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: [illegible] /15

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Per our conversation, please refer to CSI-F-10-5 Section #11 relative to the [illegible] of the issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval on the agents of a foreign power. We shall, therefore, be unable to process your POA request.

However, we should be glad to conduct a Covert Name Check since it is assumed that the authorization to DIR 71563 still obtains.

18 NOV 1969 — No further tickle. [illegible] Case discontinued

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

14-00000

CLASSIFICATION
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE 1[illegible] 1963
SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER 201-300985

I asked Jack Gower, WH/4, to come down and discuss his request for a POA/OA on AMCLEVE-15.

The latter (AM-15) is being handled as "in hostile", under CSI F 10-15 (Sec 19) as authorized by Frank Hughes, CI/Ops/WH, and [illegible], AC/WH/Four, with the restrictions that there be "no joint operations, nor requirements levied on him." (See [illegible] 71540).

I referred Gower to CSI F 10-5 (Sec 19) in which the HCP bars the processing of a POA/OA on such an individual (an agent of a foreign power) as meaningless since the decision is an operational one. Thus, we could not process his request. I called him down so that I could brief him orally and make sure that he understood. He said that he did now. I told him I would confirm this in writing.

I pointed out that the Station already had the approval to use him under Section 19, subject to the Division's (WH) and CI/Ops agreed restrictions. It looks as though the Station wants these restrictions eased; therefore, those who agreed to the original restrictions (WH Division and CI/Ops) should be appealed to.

Subject is being used in place of [illegible] of the [illegible] service.

Gower said that WH/4 had not been in touch with CI/Ops about easing or changing the restrictions since they were agreed on and levied on 1 Feb 1963.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 1-62 1954

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REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 186829

DATE 7 September 1968

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME JP Gower

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/3/Venezuela

ROOM, BUILDING 3 F 2631

EXTENSION 4721b/2494r

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CIC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
15 February 1928; Cienfuegos, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Intelligence officer Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL)

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
[illegible]
Mechanic; paramilitary trainer

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Auto Repair	Miami, Fla.	1965
Trainer JMWAVE activities		April 1965
[illegible] Police Official	Caracas, Venezuela	December 1967

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED
Catholic; Anti-Castro

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5:10	170	Green	Black	Cau	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Elina NIEVES Gonzales

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Roberto POSADA, Telephone Co., Cuba
Raul POSADA Electric and Power Co., Cuba Half brothers

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Information on membership in Communist Party or its front groups; connection with any other intelligence service; or other information which would make subject to blackmail.

5 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

1. Subject, a Cuban now living in Caracas, Venezuela, is a Station Caracas penetration of the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police and of the Special Group, a smaller, somewhat autonomous unit within DIGEPOL. A POA was requested on Subject on 25 January 1968, to use Subject as stated above. On 1 February 1967, WH/3/V requested cancellation of the POA request because of indications that Subject was involved in clandestine sabotage activity and there were suspicions that he had failed to report his activities to CIA or DIGEPOL. Station Caracas was directed to handle Subject as a "hostile". The Station was advised that they could maintain contact with Subject as a source of information on activities of DIGEPOL and the Special Group but that no requirements were to be levied on him. The Station was advised that they could make spot payments for information received from Subject. CI/OPS co-ordinated on these directions to Station Caracas.

2. The Station acknowledged their instructions but demurred on Headquarters' interpretation of AMCLEVE-15's activities. The Station stated, in effect, that assets are often unsavory individuals, who are never under complete control and who seldom disclose the complete range of their activities to their supervisors. The Station added that they were interested in Subject because of his position as a "trusted confidant" of certain highly placed Venezuelan security officials.

3. In the ensuing months the Station came to describe Subject as "an extremely valuable penetration" because of the intelligence information and operational reports he furnished. For example, he reported on the involvement of the Venezuelan military in a Cuban exile plan to attack Cuba. And, he also reported on a plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela

as part of an infiltration scheme. He has reported such operational information as a description of the capabilities, layout and equipment of DIGEPOL telephone tap operations. Included in this information was his report that, at least on paper, the U.S. Embassy was a target for tap operations. He has also reported on the personalities and workings of the organizations with which he is associated. At the same time the Station had an independent report that Subject was involved in a scheme to obtain "curare poison for approximately forty hypodermic needles". To avoid exposing the source of their information the Station did not query AMCLEVE-15 about the matter. The Station said that they disapproved of his involvement in wild Cuban exile schemes but that Headquarters restrictions in February 1968 prevented the Station from discussing this involvement with him.

4. In May 1968, the Station informed Headquarters that they believed that Subject was collaborating fully with CIA and, further, they believed that he would not expose, inform, or work against CIA. They added that Subject was still capable of engaging in independent Cuban exile activity without informing his Case Officer. The Station also requested a polygraph examination for Subject. √

5. Subject was given a polygraph examination to resolve specifically his bona fides, possible affiliation with Cuban Intelligence through relatives, unreported association with gangster elements, thefts from WOFIRM and other questions involving possible derogatory information on Subject. Subject's responses, described as substantially truthful by the examiners, appear to contain no information which would prevent CIA's operational use of Subject. On only one question, that involving Subject's association with an alleged racketeer, Lefty Rosenthal, did sensitivity persist. The examiner commented, "...In fairness to Subject this sensitivity is believed generated by genuine uncertainty over the amount of Para military items which he had been instrumental in getting for Rosenthal from Cuban exile arms supplies."

6. Station Caracas has requested that they be allowed to cease treating AMCLEVE-15 as a "hostile" and that he be processed for POA/OA to permit more effective utilization of this well placed penetration agent. WH Division endorses the Station's request.

John P. Gower
WH/3/V

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: [illegible] 196[illegible]

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: [illegible]
WH/3/[illegible]
[illegible] 2031[illegible] /[illegible]

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: AMCLEVE-15

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: [illegible]

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Caracas, Venezuela.

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) and as a penetration of the Humberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual special group.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

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6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO. [illegible]		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED [illegible] Caracas		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
	7494	

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(9)

300985

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S E C R E T 071943Z AUG 68 CITE CARACAS 0292

JMCOBRA INFO DIRECTOR

7 Aug 68 IN 66189

REF JMCOBRA 0497 (IN 64681)

300985

STATION HAS HAD COVERAGE FROM AMCLEVE-15 OF HELP GIVEN CUBAN EXILES BY VEN MILITARY. AMPAK-2 UNDOUBTEDLY IN TOUCH WITH SAME GROUP. HE MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE BETTER INFO, HOWEVER, AND STATION PLANS CONTACT HIM. REQUEST ALL PERTINENT PARTS HIS 201 BE FORWARDED CARACAS.

C-82509

S E C R E T

BT

8 AUG 1968

Copy in each.

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300985

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S E C R E T 021932Z JUL 68 CITE CARACAS 0030 2 JUL 68 IN 42713

DIRECTOR INFO ROME

CITILT

REFS A. CARACAS 9970 (IN 38022)

B. ROME 8295 (IN 37810)

3 JUL 1968

1. AIRLINE MANIFEST 8 JUNE SHOWS ARRIVAL GISELA PROVIDENCIA PASTORA (FALCON) DE OJEDA. AMCLEVE-15 HAS JUST CONFIRMED STATION ASSUMPTION THAT FALCON'S HUSBAND IS JMTIGER ALONSO DOMINGO (OJEDA) OLAECHEA (201-260267), POLITBURO MEMBER AND FORMER ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF PCV.

2. ROME MAY PASS PARA ONE ABOVE TO DEVIGILS IN ADDITION TO INFO THAT OJEDA IN SOVIET UNION UNDERGOING MEDICAL TREATMENT. CAN DEVIGILS PROVIDE INFO ON WHO FALCON SAW IN ROME?

3. EXPECT CIGRAPE BE OPERATIONAL BY END OF JULY AND PLAN TAP TARGET APARTMENT PHONE PER PARA THREE CARACAS 9290. WE ROOTING FOR SOVIET MEDICS CURE OJEDA AND SEND HIM HOME SOONEST.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO# [illegible]
201# [illegible]

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY): [illegible]

CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

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DIRECTOR INFO BOGOTA

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REFS: A. DIRECTOR 06901

B. CARACAS 9351 (IN 28741)

IDEN OF REF A IS OBVIOUSLY BROTHER OF CIURBAN-1, BUT ACCORDING TO THE PRESS REPORT, AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW, NO ONE WAS ARRESTED IN RAID WHICH NETTED DOCUMENTS. WE DO NOT WANT TO ALERT LIAISON TO OUR SPECIAL INTEREST BY QUERYING RE IDEN. WE USUALLY ARE INFORMED BY LIAISON OF SUBVERSIVE ARRESTEES, BUT THIS NOT CERTAIN THESE DAYS. AS REPORTED REF B WE NOW ALSO GETTING INFO ON CIURBAN-1 FAMILY CASE FROM AMCLEVE-15 AND THEREFORE HOPE BE ABLE MONITOR ANY ARRESTS. NONE OF CIURBAN-1'S FAMILY ARRESTED ACCORDING AMCLEVE-15.

471746

320755

S E C R E T

BT

25 JUN 1968

SECRET

14-00000

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S E C R E T 0052207Z JUN 68 CITE CARACAS 9808

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

25 JUN 1968

6 Jun 68 IN 25390

REFS A. CARACAS 9758 (IN 21750)

B. JMWAVE 2600 (IN 23543)

300985 334359

1. AMCLEVE-15 MET WITH LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ AT CIRASH-4'S DIRECTION AND HIS REPORTS LED TO THEIR ARREST. UNFORTUNATELY CIRASH-4 DID NOT COVER AMCLEVE-15 AND RODRIGUEZ IS CONVINCED HE FINGERED THEM AND HAS SWORN KILL AMCLEVE-15 AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

2. WHILE CARACAS UNDERSTANDS LNERGO WOULD NOT HAVE GREAT INTEREST THIS CASE, IS IT EQUALLY TRUE THAT NEITHER LNERGO NOR LNYUMA COULD ARREST RODRIGUEZ FOR LEAVING COUNTRY ILLEGALLY AND TRAVELLING ON FALSE DOCUMENTS? WE ANXIOUS PROTECT AMCLEVE-15 AND WONDER IF JMWAVE CAN PREVAIL ON LNERGO OR LNYUMA TO ACCEPT RETURN OF LUGO AND RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE ARREST AND INTERROGATION.

3. CIRASH-4 PLANS DEPORT THEM TO MIAMI ON 8 JUNE ON VIASA. WILL ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN FLIGHT.

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BT

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SEC/JR 4

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SECRET 271613Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9725 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

19272

REF: JMWAVE-2475 (IN 15683)

27 May 68 IN 19272

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 PASSED SGSWIRL EXAM 23 MAY WITH SATISFACTORY CLARIFICATION ALL POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS. POUCH FOLLOWS.

2. WISH THANK JMWAVE FOR REF WHICH MOST USEFUL IN PRE-TEST DISCUSSIONS WITH SGSWIRL OPERATOR.

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BT

28 MAY 1968

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S E C R E T 172050Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9646 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR

20 MAY 68

17 May 68 IN 13549

REF: DIRECTOR-99409

1. ALLEGATIONS AND SUSPICIONS AGAINST AMCLEVE-15 DISCUSSED WITH HIM BY CASE OFFICER AND HE DENIES THEM ALL AND IS COMPLETELY WILLING, EVEN EAGER, TO TAKE SGSWIRL IN ORDER CLEAR HIS RECORD.

2. THE 201 FILE ON AMCLEVE-15 FORWARDED BY JMWAVE IN SEPT 1967 WAS APPARENTLY STRIPPED DOWN VERSION AND NO PART IN HQS EVER RECEIVED; THEREFORE, WE DO NOT HAVE THE FACTS OF HIS FAILURE LIST BROTHER ROBERTO AS GOC EMPLOYEE. THIS POINT DISCUSSED WITH HIM, HOWEVER, AND HE STATES THAT HE DID NOT TRY CONCEAL HIS BROTHER'S STATUS BUT MERELY THOUGHT OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AS LOW-LEVEL AND NON-GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ARE TECHNICALLY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. IN ANY CASE, HIS ONLY COMMUNICATION WITH ROBERTO SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM CUBA IN FEB 1961 WERE TWO LETTERS SENT IN 1966, AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST, WHICH WERE NEVER ANSWERED. REFERENCE TO SEEING BROTHER IN APRIL 1961 WAS OBVIOUSLY CONFUSION OF EXACT DATES AFTER FIVE AND HALF YEARS. AMCLEVE-15

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INFO.

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9646 S E C R E T

WAS IN GUATEMALA TRAINING CAMP PREPARING FOR BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

3. WE WERE NOT AWARE THAT AMCLEVE-15 WAS SUSPECTED OF HAVING STOLEN WOFIRM DEMOLITION AND SABOTAGE ITEMS. WE DID NOT ASSUME FROM HVCA-14975, ON ALLEGED POSSESSION OF SOME SUCH ITEMS BY AMCLEVE-15, THAT HE HAD STOLEN THEM FROM WOFIRM. DID HQS SO ASSUME, OR IS THERE OTHER INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH CARACAS HAS NOT RECEIVED? WHAT WAS DATE OF ALLEGED THEFT? SUBSEQUENT TO LAST SGSWIRL IN APRIL 1966? AMCLEVE-15 TOLD CASE OFFICER THAT HE BROUGHT TO CARACAS SMALL SUITCASE OF SUCH ITEMS WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY RECE ORGANIZATION AND WHICH TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WERE COMMERCIAL ITEMS, NOT WOFIRM.

4. AMCLEVE-15 STATES HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ONLY ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS WERE AT SPECIFIC REQUEST JMWAVE (AS CONFIRMED BY JMWAVE-8866) AND WERE ALL FULLY REPORTED TO JMWAVE. AGAIN WE ASK DOES HQS HAVE SOME INFO IN THIS REGARD WHICH WE DO NOT?

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PAGE 3 CARACAS 9646 SECRET

5. IT APPEARS FROM REF AND REVIEW OF TRAFFIC SINCE START OF CONSIDERATION OF USE AMCLEVE-15 IN CARACAS THAT HQS IN POSSESSION DEROGATORY INFO NOT KNOWN TO CARACAS. WE SUGGESTED THIS IN HVCA-14978 AND REQUESTED THAT WE BE PROVIDED WITH ANY SUCH INFO. DIRECTOR-56598 OF 2 DEC 1967 HINTED AT SUCH INFO HELD BY HQS AND PROMISED DISPATCH "WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE," BUT DISPATCH NEVER RECEIVED. SGSWIRL OPERATOR STATES IT DIFFICULT TO RUN MEANINGFUL EXAM ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN TO HQS WITHOUT ALL FACTS. THEREFORE, REQUEST:

A. DETAILS OF WHAT AMCLEVE-15 DID LIST RE HIS BROTHERS ONMPRQ, AND REQUEST BY JMWAVE TO INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO AND RESULTS.

B. DATE AND DETAILS OF THEFT ON WOFIRM ITEMS.

C. DETAILS OF ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND [illegible] ASSOCIATIONS OTHER THAN THOSE UNDERTAKEN AT SPECIFIC WOFIRM REQUEST

D. ANY OTHER DEROGATORY INFO OR ALLEGATIONS KNOWN TO HQS OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT BEEN APPRISED.

6. PLEASE REPLY IN TIME FOR SGSWIRL, SCHEDULED FOR 22 MAY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

300985

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ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: C/WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 20 MAY 68

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SECRET Mr 20 19 23 Z CITE DIRECTOR 0131?

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

OVER

REFS: A. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)* (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

B. DIRECTOR 99409** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

C. CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)*** (BEING RELAYED JMWAVE)

1. WISH ASSURE STATION THAT HQS DOES NOT HAVE DEROGATORY INFO ON AMCLEVE-15 300985 WHICH HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO STATION. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IN ORDER FOR STATION OBTAIN PERMISSION LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON AMCLEVE-15 OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RE SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED IN REF A:

A. IN PRQ'S I DATED 1961, 1965 AND 1966 AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED BOTH BROTHERS IN "BROTHERS AND SISTERS" SECTION BUT ONLY LISTED RAUL AS EMPLOYED BY GOC. RAUL WAS DESCRIBED AS "ADMINISTRATOR FOR AN ELECTRICAL COMPANY" OR "ELECTRICAL ENGINEER BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYED BY GOC." FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ON BROTHER ROBERTO SEE ATTACHMENT TO HVCW-7776, 4 DECEMBER 1967. HQS HAS NO

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE TWO

DETAILS ON JMWAVE REQUEST THAT AMCLEVE-15 INITIATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH ROBERTO. IN ANY CASE BELIEVE POINT OF SGSWIRL IS TO RESOLVE ANY DOUBT THAT CONFUSION OVER BIOGRAPHIC DETAILS ANY MORE THAN NORMAL OVERSIGHT AND THAT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH BROTHERS (OTHER THAN 1966 EPISODE) SINCE DEPARTURE FROM CUBA.

B. HQS CONCERN THAT AMCLEVE-15 MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN THEFT OR DISPOSAL OF WOFIRM DEMOLITION OR SABOTAGE GEAR WAS CAUSED BY ATTACHMENT TO HVCA-14975, 5 DECEMBER 1967, WHICH STATED AMCLEVE-15 SHOWED 802569 (CIRASH-15) SOME STUFF HE HAD TAKEN FROM MIAMI INCLUDING FUSES, BOOBY-TRAP SWITCHES, DETONATING CORD, INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES AND TIME PENCILS. HQS HAS NO PROOF THIS GEAR STOLEN FROM WOFIRM BUT BELIEVE NATURE OF EQUIPMENT (PARTICULARLY INFRARED SIGNAL DEVICES) IS SUCH THAT AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD AT LEAST BE QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER HE HAS EVER STOLEN OR

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CITE DIRECTOR 91313

TO PAGE THREE

KNOWINGLY RECEIVED EQUIPMENT STOLEN FROM WOFIRM.

C. HQS HAS NO DETAILS ON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GANGSTER ASSOCIATIONS OF AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO STATION AND JMWAVE. PURPOSE OF SGSWIRL QUESTION WOULD BE DETERMINE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE HAS BROKEN OFF COMPLETELY WITH LEFTY ROSENTHAL GROUP AND THAT HE NOT CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN ANY ILLEGAL ACTIVITY WITH ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ GROUP WHICH COULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO U.S. GOVT, SUCH AS SMUGGLING BETWEEN MIAMI AND CARACAS.

3. REQUEST JMWAVE ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WHICH COULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO AMCLEVE-15 SGSWIRL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/ Paul E.

WH Comment: *Asked for further details on topics on which Hqs ~~deemed~~ desired AMCLEVE-15 be tested.

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CITE DIRECTOR 01313

TO

PAGE FOUR

WH Comment: **Agreed SGSWIRL for AMCLEVE-15, suggesting he be tested on possible involvement in theft or receipt of stolen WOFIRM equipment and whether past involvement in illegal activities make him vulnerable to blackmail.

***Asked permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. Stated testing would be restricted to whether he had in past or was currently involved in activity hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L Sternfield

LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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Office of Security
Polygraph Results
Subject: 201-0300985
7 June 1968

SECRET

6 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

SUBJECT : AMCLEVE-15 (201-300985)

Forwarded herewith are two copies of a current PRQ I on Subject.

John P Gower

John P. Gower
WH/3/Venezuela

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE **PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION**	PRO NO.
INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.* *2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."* *3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.*	DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Last)* *(Nee)*

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT	3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH	6. PLACE OF BIRTH

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX M F	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT FT. IN.	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE		

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

None

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From-To*)	b. EMPLOYER		c. ADDRESS
	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

[illegible]
[illegible] incompatibility.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE *(First)* *(Middle)* *(Nee)* *(Last)*

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)*

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX		YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
	M	F			

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER *(Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. *(Explain relationship)*

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. *(Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted)*

58 NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

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S E C R E T 212253Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2475

22 MAY 1968

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

22 MAY 68 IN 15683

AKULE PBUMEN

~~MEN~~ AMCLEVE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 01313

B. CARACAS 9646 (IN 13549)

300985

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15:

A. AMCLEVE-15 INSTRUCTED BY JMWAVE TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE WITH BROTHERS RAUL AND ROBERTO. THIS DONE LATE 1966 AFTER IT LEARNED ROBERTO HAD TRAVELLED ENGLAND ON GOC PURCHASING MISSION (JMWAVE 3182, SEPT 66). IN APRIL 1967, STATION ADVISED AMCLEVE-15 THAT ROBERTO WAS SUPERVISOR TELEPHONE COMPANY WHICH INFO OBTAINED FROM RECENTLY ARRIVED REFUGEE (UFGA-27444, APRIL 67.) AMCLEVE-15 TOLD FORMER CO HE LAST SAW BROTHER (ONE OR OTHER) AT HABANA AIRPORT PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO FEB 61.

B. AMCLEVE/15 WAS PRIMARILY USED BY STATION TO REPORT ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA. HAD CONTACTS WITH MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING EX STATION ASSETS, SELF STYLED EXILE LEADERS AND GANGSTERS. DURING ROSENTHAL

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INFO

FILE VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2475 SECRET

CASE MID-1967, AMCLEVE-15 FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS OF LNERGO AND STATION AT GREAT PERSONAL RISK AND INCONVENIENCE TO SELF AND FAMILY.

2. STATION WILL FORWARD COMPLETE FILES ON AMCLEVE-15 TO CARACAS.

SECRET

BT

300985

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FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, CI/OA, SOD 6, CI/PS
CA 5, CA/PEG, CS/SGO

S E C R E T 122233Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8894

10 FEB 1968

19 FEB 1968

13 FEB 68 42300

DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN AMSHADY AMCLEVE

REF: JMWAVE-1213 (IN 48140)

[redacted] Get HIR-11540 *

1. ORIGINAL SOURCE FOR DIGEPOL ON REF INFO RE CUBANS COMING VENEZUELA MAY HAVE BEEN AMCLEVE-15. 300985 ON 9 FEBRUARY AMCLEVE-15 INFORMED STATION THAT UNKNOWN NUMBER CUBANS MAY SOON BE INFILTRATED VENEZUELA, AMONG THEM TONY CASTELLS AND FNU CLADERIN. AMCLEVE-15 HAD RECEIVED THIS INFO FROM ROBERTO PARDON DURING AMCLEVE-15'S VISIT MIAMI LAST WEEK ~~XXJULY~~ JANUARY. AMCLEVE-15 DESCRIBED PARDON AS EX-WOFIRM AGENT WHO USED EXFILTRATE PEOPLE FROM CUBA AND STILL ENGAGED THIS ACTIVITY ON OWN. (REQUEST JMWAVE TRACES.) AMCLEVE-15 DID NOT MENTION SUSANA, BUT STATION FILES SUGGEST SHE MAY BE GUIOMAR (YEPEZ) PATINO, BRAVO FALN SUPPORT AGENT AND MEVAER YEPEZ PATINO FAMILY ALMOST ALL OF WHOM ACTIVE SUBVERSIVES.

IN 48140 X
10 Feb.

Mr. Kelly
Cable copies
of material mentioned
herein are attached
KS

2. AMCLEVE-15 HAS REPORTED TO STATION ON BUILD UP OF URBAN TERRORIST GROUPS AND INCREASED USE OF UCV CAMPUS AS HIDE OUT. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT ON 7 FEBRUARY DIGEPOL AGENTS CRUISING UCV CAMPUS WERE FIRED ON BY TERRORISTS WHO

SECRET

AM

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8894 S E C R E T

D

RECOGNIZED EX-TERRORIST IN CAR WHO NOW INFORMING TONZIGEPOL.

CARACAS STATION FEELS THAT IT WOULD DEFINITELY BE ADVANTAGEOUS

C-85197

HAVE LAMSHADY-1 ACCEPT DIGEPOL ASSIGNMENT, EVEN IF WOFIRM HAS NO DIRECT ACCESS TO HER. IF WE DO, THAT WOULD BE A BONUS. (WE TRUST THAT HER BEING HIRED BY SHADY CHARACTER SUCH AS GUSTAVO ORTIZ WILL NOT CAUSE CONCERN SIMILAR AMCLEVE-15 CASE.)

S E C R E T

SECRET

CIR1154-6

BT

ORIG: C.W. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: R-9494
DATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

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WH/COG 8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CS/DO, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71540

TO CARACAS FEB 2 00 03Z

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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CITE DIRECTOR 71548

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.

**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.

***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

Thom Polgar
WH/FI

by Jacob D. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

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S E C R E T 092316Z FEB 68 CITE JMWAVE 1213

13 FEB 68 IN 48140

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN AMSHADY

10 FEB 1968

19 File

1. ON 5 FEBRUARY 1968 GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1 IN MIAMI. ORTIZ INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS EMPLOYED BY DIGEPOL. HE TOLD AMSHADY-1 THAT INSURGENCY IS NOW BUILDING UP IN URBAN AREAS AND WITHIN THE UNIVERSITIES IN VENEZUELA AND THAT CUBANS ARE INVOLVED. HE SAID THAT DIGEPOL HAS INFORMATION THAT CAPTAIN LESTER RODRIGUEZ AND COMANDANTE TONY CASTELLS, BOTH OF THE CUBAN REBEL ARMY, ARE IN VENEZUELA OR EN ROUTE THERE FROM CUBA. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBABLE COORDINATOR OF THE URBAN TERRORISM IS A VENEZUELAN WOMAN WHO IS USING THE WAR NAME SUSANA BUT THAT DIGEPOL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HER FURTHER.

AMCLEVE-15
201-300785

2. ORTIZ SAID THAT HE WAS TO BE IN MIAMI ONLY A SHORT WHILE AND HE WANTED FROM AMSHADY-1 WHATEVER INFO SHE HAD OR COULD GET ON CURRENT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN INSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA. HE ALSO SAID THAT DIGEPOL WAS PLANNING TO TRAIN SELECTED UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, INCLUDING FEMALES, AS PENETRATION AGENTS AND HE ASKED AMSHADY-1 IF SHE WOULD BE

SECRET

PAGE-2 JMWAVE 1213 S E C R E T

INTERESTED IN GOING TO VENEZUELA, TEMPORARILY AT LEAST, AS A TRAINER.

3. AMSHADY-1 MADE IT CLEAR TO THE JMWAVE CASE OFFICER THAT SHE IS WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY WITH LEGITIMATE EFFORTS TO THWART CUBAN SPONSORED INSURGENCY INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF TRIPS TO VENEZUELA AND ELSEWHERE ON TRAINING MISSIONS. SHE REPORTED THAT SHE TOLD ORTIZ THAT SHE HAD NO NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING CUBANS IN VENEZUELA AND SAID SHE HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED THE TRAINING OFFER, WHICH SHE FELT TO BE MERELY TENTATIVE. SHE DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ORTIZ FOR WHICH PURPOSE HE GAVE AMSHADY-1 A POST OFFICE BOX NUMBER, HIS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN CARACAS.

4. JMWAVE REQUEST ADDEES COMMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT AND ANY INDICATION OF OPS INTEREST IN AMSHADY-1 COLLABORATION WITH DIGEPOL ALONG THESE LINES.

SECRET

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REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 -

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[illegible]

TYPE OF REQUEST

☐	POA	☐	OA	☐	CNC	☐	SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) [illegible]

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) [illegible]

USE OF SUBJECT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

DATE

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

FEB 6 1 35 PM '68

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE [illegible]
TO: [illegible]	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC., OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

[illegible]

Edward P. Brown

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/3/V cwc C. W. Cox

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/3/V		1/2	GM	
2.				
3.				
4. CI/OA				M/R – See cable traffic on his illegal possession of documents pertaining to CIA which he smuggled out of Warsaw to Yugoslavia, complicity of [illegible] etc. – JK
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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1 February 196~~7~~8

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles (201-300985)

REFERENCE : Our memorandum of 25 January 1968

Please cancel our request in Reference for a Provisional Operational Approval for Subject.

C. W. Cox
WH/3/Venezuela

FEB 2 9 54 AM '68

SECRET

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Clemente POSADA Carriles 201-300985

1. It is requested that a Provisional Operation Approval be granted for the use of subject as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization. The Caracas Station has requested that processing be expedited.

2. The Caracas Station has reviewed Subject's file and the documents sent by Headquarters and sees nothing that would preclude the use of Subject as a penetration of DIGEPOL. (copy attached)

3. Significant information in Subject's file concerns his two brothers who are currently in Cuba and his relations with a well known Miami gangster. One brother, Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect DSE official, is the Cuban Telephone Company supervisor for Area Norte, including Havana City. Subject has not seen either brother since he left Cuba in 1961. Subject has also been in contact with a well known gangster "Lefty" Rosenthal in the Miami area. Both JMWAVE and the FBI were aware of this contact which was maintained at the latter's request.

E. Tsikerdanos
C/WH/3/Venezuela

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S E C R E T 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978

B. HVCW-7776

C. DIRECTOR-56598

24 JAN 68 IN 38499

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

2. IT EVIDENT HE COMPLETELY WILLING WORK WITH STATION AS PENETRATION CIRASH. AT MEETING AMCLEVE-15 TURNED OVER FOR STATION COPYING SEVERAL VALUABLE DOCUMENTS FROM CIRASH PROVIDING OPS LEADS ON KEY TERRORISTS.

3. SALARY NOT DISCUSSED, BUT STATION WOULD PLAN PAY AMCLEVE-15 FROM 1,000 TO 1,500 BS. AMCLEVE-15 LEFT FOR MIAMI MORNING 23 JANUARY. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WILL BE HELD WHEN HE RETURNS CARACAS FOLLOWING WEEK.

4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 3748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

SECRET *Section Sent.

SECRET

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UPDATED BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME : Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles
(201-300985)

DPOB : 15 February 1928 Cienfuegos, Cuba

MOC : Effective 26 March 1965 as Training Branch
Instructor, JMWAVE

TERMINATION : Effective 11 July 1967 as CI informant, JMWAVE

CURRENT
OCCUPATION : DIGEPOL employee, Ministry of Interior, Caracas,
Venezuela

PRESENT ADDRESS: Caracas, Venezuela

Contacts : Miami "Lefty" ROSENTHAL, well-known gambler

Brother : Roberto POSADA Carriles, a suspect DGI official (Cuban IS), Cuban Telephone Co. supervisor for area north including Havana City

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REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION *(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)* *PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK*	DATE 25 January 1968
TO: ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY	FROM: E. Tsikerdanos C/WH/3/V 3B2631
SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Clemente Faustino POSADA Carriles	PROJECT
CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES AMCLEVE-15	CI/OA FILE NO.
	RI 201 FILE NO. 300985 / SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Venezuela

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

As a penetration agent into DIGEPOL and the Remberto UZCATEGUI Bruzual organization.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

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	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED		GREEN LIST ATTACHED NO. 181884

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	X	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER C. Cox	EXTENSION R-9494	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 772 OBSOLETE

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S E C R E T 241443Z JAN 68 CITE CARACAS 8748 (LYNER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. HVCA-14978

B. HVCW-7775

C. DIRECTOR-56593

25 JAN 1968

24 JAN 68 IN 35499

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 CONTACTED BY STATION OFFICER 22 JANUARY. HE STILL WORKING DIRECTLY WITH CIRASH-4 AND WILL ALSO WORK WITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS ARREST KEY SUBVERSIVES AND HANDLED CASE LEADING TO RECENT ARREST LINO MARTINEZ.

324359

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4. WE HAVE REVIEWED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED REF B AND

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 3748 SECRET

SEE NOTHING PRECLUDING AMCLEVE-15'S USE AS PENETRATION CIRASH. REQUEST POA BE EXPEDITED.

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CARACAS 8748 JAN 24 36499-A

STA & NR **DATE** **IN NR**

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

REF PARA 1 PORTION READS:

"ALSO WORK TITH UZCATEGUI. PRESENTLY INVOLVED IN"

SECRET

SECRET

CI PROJECTS CARD [illegible]

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE [illegible] OF: 5 April 1965 prc

DATE [illegible] REQ.: 1 April 1965 prc

201 #: 300985

TRUE NAME: POSADA Carriles, Luis Clemente

☐ POA ☒ CA ☐ CNC ☐ OP. IN

VARIATIONS:

CRYPTONYM: [illegible]

PSEUDONYM:

PROJECT: JMATE

DATE OF BIRTH: 15 February 1928

PLACE OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos, Cuba

CASE OFFICER: Roy Forslund (ALEX ARMOTA)

DIVISION: WH/C/HR/OSOA

EXTENSION: 7646

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.	—	[illegible]	[illegible] 65	Records on RIS Agents Checked in ~~CI/RAA, date:~~ 5 April 1965 Results: [illegible]
O.A.	—	WH/[illegible]	[illegible] Oct 65	
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED		[illegible]	AUG 1967	[illegible]
PRO I	biographic data 13 APR 65	RLR	14 APR 65	
PRO II	[illegible] Sept 65	RLR	18 Oct 65	
159988 GREEN LIST	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 65	
CRI TRACES	NDI			
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S.O. INDICES		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] DIS 8 APR MEMO [illegible]
FBI INDICES	MIAMI FBI NEGATIVE NP			
FBI COORD. REQUESTED				
FBI COORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	NP [illegible]	[illegible]	17 June 65	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible] 20 Aug 1965	
CI STAFF NOTIFIED				
CONT. COMPLETED				

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

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ORIG: C. W. COX
Secretary
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 38 PER

CONF: WH 8

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

FILE, VR: WH/COG 8, CI/OA, FI

4 DEC 1967

CITE DIRECTOR 63 9

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE 2172

300985

REF: CARACAS 8398 (IN 03338)*

1. ~~UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES~~, APPROVE STATION CONTACT ANCLEVE-15 IF YOU REALLY FEEL THIS IS NECESSARY FOR ELICITATION INFO ONLY. PLS FORWARD PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS. PROCESSING POA. ADDRESSEES PLS FORWARD UP TO DATE TRACES AND BIO DATA. FOR JMWAVE: FORWARD CONTACT REPORTS SINCE TERMINATION ANCLEVE-15.

FOR OUR CLARIFICATION DOES ANCLEVE KNOW ANCLEVE-15 [illegible]!

2. DOCUMENTS ARE BEING FORWARDED 4 DEC PRIMARILY TO ILLUSTRATE CAUTION TO USE IN DEALING WITH HIM. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH HQS COMMENTS OTHER ASPECTS THIS CASE. END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: *Station reiterates desire have ANCLEVE-15 as agent. Station believes need pay only supplement to DIGEPOL salary. Requested expedite documents and POA.

COORD: C/WH/COG

by James W. [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

[illegible]
A/WH/3

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G. Tsikerdanos

ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3
EXT: 4521
DATE: 27 SEPT 1967

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BY 30 PER ____ #____

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FI/INT 2 CI, SEP 27 19 30 Z
(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

27 SEP 1967 CITE DIRECTOR 38879

TO

PRIORITY

CARACAS JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 7291 (IN 59861)*

1. IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JMWAVE CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 (300985) PER PARA 4 REF AS THERE SUFFICIENT INFO OUR FILES TO APTLY ILLUSTRATE TYPE INDIVIDUAL FERNANDEZ (324359) IS AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS WOFACT. STILL WISH AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART TERMINATED AMCLEVE-15 THAT WOFACT WOULD SUBSIDIZE HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH DIGEPOL.

2. FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. ACCORDING CIRASH-12 (757343) HE TOTALLY IRRESPONSIBLE AS VEN CONSUL MIAMI, WHERE HE DRUNK MOST OF THE TIME. WILL ACQUIRE FURTHER DETAILS FROM CIRASH-12.

B. CIRASH-7 (732206) REPORTED 2 DEC 65 (CARACAS 3159) THAT FERNANDEZ IN TROUBLE WITH GOV BECAUSE OF CONDUCT MIAMI AREA AND THAT HE SIX MONTHS IN ARREARS ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING.

C. ON 7 OCT 65 CIARK-1 (C-54359) ASKED BY CIRATAL-1 (C-81436) TO LOOK INTO ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI: THAT HE NEGLECTING HIS JOB AND DEVOTING HIMSELF TO LIFE OF PLEASURE (HVCA-12834, 15 OCT 65).

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INFO: FILE , VR

SEP 1967

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 38873

D. 279604 CIRASH-9 REPORTED THAT FERNANDEZ AS DEPUTY CHIEF, DIGEPOL WAS EXPENDING $550 TO $670 FOR A NIGHTS ENTERTAINMENT. EXTRA SOURCE OF INCOME WAS APPROPRIATION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF COMMUNISTS, RELEASE OF PRISONERS FOR A PRICE ETC. (HVCA-11693, Sept 64).

E. STATION REPORTED IN HVCA-13182, 25 FEB 66 THAT FERNANDEZ SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH THE GOV. WHILE STATION NOT ANXIOUS PROVOKE QUARREL WITH HIM, HIS RETURN TO ANY POSITION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN VEN WOULD MILITATE AGAINST WOFACT INTERESTS.

F. IN UFGA-24884, 5 APRIL 66 768511 AMHARSH-1 REPORTED ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES OF FERNANDEZ IN MIAMI AREA AND THE SHIPPING OF WEAPONS TO VEN.

G. WE CAN ALSO CITE HIS POOR HANDLING OF NR CIURBAN-2 CASE IN WHICH AGENT WAS BLOWN TO MIR WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF TAKEOVER.

H. MONROE B. DIFFENDAL (P) WHO CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY ON TDY TRIP HANDLED FERNANDEZ WHILE LATTER DEP CHIEF DIGEPOL. WHEN HE RETURNS WILL QUERY HIM ON FERNANDEZ. HQS RECOLLECTS ONE PET GRIPE OF CASE OFFICER WAS THAT FERNANDEZ PASSED STATION INFO TO CIVISTA STATING IT CAME FROM HIS OWN (NON-EXISTENT) AGENT NETS.

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CITE DIRECTOR 38873

TO

3. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR STATION TO WORK WITH FERNANDEZ IF HE APPOINTED CHIEF, DIGEPOL BUT FEEL THAT SENSITIVE OPS SHOULD CONTINUE BE HANDLED WITH CIWOODS OR UNILATERALLY. IT IS TRUE THAT FERNANDEZ COOPERATED WITH STATION DURING HIS PREVIOUS TOUR AND APPEARED NOT BE ANTI-WOFACT BUT HIS GENERAL GREEDINESS AND LACK OF SCRUPLES MAKE HIM AN UNSAVORY PARTNER TO DEAL WITH AT THAT LEVEL.

4. IF STATION DOES NOT HAVE ABOVE DOCUMENTATION HQS WILL FORWARD. WILL DISCUSS FERNANDEZ WITH COS ON HIS ARRIVAL HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *COS, Minit and Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, for DC/Digepol met to discuss colaboration between Station and Digepol. Not clear if Fernandez to be new Chief. While F has bad rep not clear why. Fernandez was cooperative with Station previous time no clear indications he enriched himself by accepting bribes from left. Station would work slowly until full assessment acquired. Asked WAVE to work closely with AMCLEVE-15 during Fernendez stay in Miami to collect info on latter.

COORD: C/WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman (by phone)

by

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 24

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

30 OCT 67 IN 82922

S E C R E T 302301Z CITE JMWAVE 9996

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PERUMEN

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81988)

300985

1. JMWAVE RECD LETTER FROM AMCLEVE/15 ON 30 OCT 67. AMCLEVE SAYS HE WILL BEGIN WORK ON 1 NOV. ADDRESS IS AVENIDA JOSE FELIX RIVAS, QUINTA CLARITA, ~~CARACAS.~~

384359

2. ACCORDING AMCLEVE/15 NOMINATION OF CIRASH/4 AS DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL DELAYED BECAUSE CIRASH/4'S POLITICAL PARTY, ADECO, IS IN TROUBLE.

3. LAWRENCE R. DEROME IS ALIAS OF AMCLEVE/15'S JMWAVE CO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

300985

RIG: C. COX
NIT: WH/3/V
T: 4521
ATE: 30 OCTOBER 1967

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ONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY
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CITE DIRECTOR 47765

CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF: CARACAS 8190 (IN 81985)

1. HQ INITIATING PROCESSING OF POA FOR ASSESSMENT ONLY.

2. WE RECOGNIZE YOUR INTEREST IN AMCLEVE-15, (300985) BUT SUGGEST YOU REVIEW CAREFULLY DOCUMENTS WHICH WE ARE FORWARDING BY POUCH. what do they say?

3. PLEASE FORWARD SALARY INFO. HOW MUCH DOES STATION PROPOSE TO PAY HIM AND WHERE IN OPS BUDGET WILL IT COME FROM?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Station interested possibility pick up Luis POSADA Carriles as unilateral penetration of DIGEPOL if Erasto Fernandez Betancourt named Director. Requested authorization to contact POSADA for assessment as soon as JMWAVE advises permanent address Caracas.

324359

C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM 74

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-5, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 281910Z CITE CARACAS 8190

28 OCT 67 IN 81988

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9802 (IN 74736)

B. DIRECTOR 327.9

1. STATION DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITY PICKING UP AMCLEVE-15 AS UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF CIRASH IF AND WHEN CIRASH-4 IS NAMED DIRECTOR. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IF HE WOULD BE AS CLOSE AS PAST TRAFFIC SUGGESTS TO CIRASH-4, WHOM NEEDLESS TO SAY WE DO NOT COMPLETELY TRUST.

300985

324359

2. REQUEST HQS AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 FOR ASSESSMENT AS SOON AS JMWAVE ADVISES OF MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS CARACAS. PER PARA ONE REF B, IF AMCLEVE-15'S OA CANCELLED, PLEASE REINSTATE [illegible]

[illegible] ~~[illegible]~~ AT PRESENT. *

3. FOR JMWAVE: WILL APPRECIATE CABLE AS SOON AS AMCLEVE-15 ADVISES PLACE CONTACT CAN BE MADE. IS LAWRENCE R. DEROME TRUE NAME OR PSEUDO?

?

S E C R E T

SECRET

* Svc'd for confirmation

14-00000

35

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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ACTION WH 8 ☒ **RID COPY**

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR. WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, [illegible]

SERVICE

CARACAS 8190
STA & NR

29 OCT 67
DATE

81988 - 0
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PLEASE REINSTATE IT BASED ON INFO IN HQS"

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

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FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

5 DEC 67 IN 65624

S E C R E T 052352Z CITE JMWAVE 0497

DIRECTOR CARACAS

8 DEC 1967

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. CARACAS 8417 (IN 05744)

1. ALL PERTINENT INFO RE AMCLEVE/15 CONTACTS AVAILABLE IN HIS 201 FILE WHICH FORWARDED TO HQS WXST OCTOBER SUBSEQUENT CONTACTS REPORTED BY CABLE.

300985

2. AMCLEVE/15 DID NOT GIVE ANY OTHER MEANS FOR CONTACT OTHER THAN ADDRESS IN JMWAVE 9996 (IN 82922) WHICH, ACCORDING TO AMCLEVE/15 IS RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESS (VETERINARIAN CLINIC) OF GUSTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

4-65 JVIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, C/FI, 6, 6/WD2

S E C R E T 042220Z CITE CARACAS 0417

4 DEC 67 IN 65744

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: A. DIRECTOR 56598

B. JMWAVE 0422 (IN 02672)

1. FOR REASONS OF COMPARTMENTATION CIGOAL-1 (286705) HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTLY QUERIED, BUT HE HAS NEVER MENTIONED AMCLEVE-15 (300985) AND STATION BELIEVES THEY DO NOT KNOW EACH OTHER.

2. CARACAS STATION CAN ADD NO BIO DATA ON AMCLEVE-15 NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE HQS. STATION RECEIVED REPORT FROM CIRASH-15 (802569), HOWEVER, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT AMCLEVE-15 IS WORKING FOR CIRASH-4 (331359) AND UZCATEGUI AS STATED IN REF B.

3. FOR JMWAVE: DID AMCLEVE-15 EVER GIVE WAY TO CONTACT HIM IN CARACAS OTHER THAN ADDRESS PROVIDED JMWAVE 9995? WOULD PREFER TELEPHONE HIM IF POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FIRST MEETING.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Who is running anti-CIA operation for Venezuelan Gov't.

CLASSIFICATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD	DATE [illegible] 1967
SUBJECT	FILE NUMBER 201-300985

C. Cox, WH/3/V, called about status and what was needed to do for an approval.

Was told that last investigations were run in 1965, thus needed updating of all info + traces since 1965 and a POA/OA request.

His previous OA was cancelled in Aug. 1967; yet all negotiations etc. re Venezuela we have been carried on since then.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP [illegible]

(40)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO
FILE, VR, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/CA, MPS/BG2

S E C R E T 301738Z CITE CARACAS 8358 (LYNER ACTING) 30 Nov 67 IN 03338

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 1 DEC 1967

REF: A. JMWAVE 0422 ? (IN 02672)

B. DIRECTOR 47965

300985

1. REF A REINFORCES STATION OPINION AMCLEVE-15 WOULD PROVE VALUABLE AGENT. HIS SALARY OF 700 DOLLARS FROM CIRASH SUGGESTS STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY AMOUNT.

2. HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DOCUMENTS ON AMCLEVE-15 MENTIONED REF B. PLEASE EXPEDITE THESE DOCUMENTS AND POA.

S E C R E T

SECRET

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8 CI/OA

1 NOV 1967

S E C R E T 311525Z CITE CARACAS 8213

31 Oct 67 IN 83566

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 47955

300985

1. WILL NOT CONTACT AMCLEVE-15 UNTIL HAVE HAD CHANCE REVIEW DOCUMENTS BEING POUCHED.

2. IMPOSSIBLE KNOW WHAT AMCLEVE-15 SALARY WILL BE, IF ANY, BEFORE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. PREVIOUS HQS RESERVATIONS and other items THIS CASE WERE BUDGETARY, BUT WE ASSUMED BASIC PROBLEM WAS SOLVED WHEN JMWAVE ADVISED THAT AMCLEVE-15 WOULD BE PAID BY CIRASH THE SALARY HE FELT HE HAD TO HAVE. IT MAY BE THAT STATION WOULD NEED PAY ONLY TOKEN AMOUNT, WHICH COULD BE TAKEN FROM CIRASH BUDGET, BUT ONLY DIRECT TALKS WITH AMCLEVE-15 WILL GIVE US THE ANSWERS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, A, FI

10 Oct 67 IN 74936

S E C R E T 182122Z CITE JMWAVE 9802

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

AKULE PBRUMEN

REF CARACAS 7805 (1-51649)

300985

1. AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GISTAVO (ORTIZ) FAEZ ON 18 OCT 67. ORTIZ INFORMED AMCLEVE/15 THE ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETANCOURT WILL BE NAMED DIRECTOR OF DIGEPOL LATE OCT 67. ORTIZ ON BEHALF OF FERNANDEZ ASSURED AMCLEVE/15 DIGEPOL EMPLOYMENT AT PROPER LIVABLE SALARY.

324359

2. AMCLEVE/15 PLANS FLY CARACAS 23 OCT 67. WILL STAY TEMPORARILY AT HOME OF ORTIZ. STATION HAS ASKED AMCLEVE/15 TO NOTIFY JMWAVE WHEN HE HAS MORE PERMANENT ADDRESS AND WE WILL ADVISE CARACAS. IF STATION DESIRES CONTACT, PERSON SHOULD IDENTIFY SELF TO AMCLEVE/15 AS FRIEND OF LAWRENCE R. DEROME.

SECRET

SECRET

300985
3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, SOD 6, FI

S E C R E T 252203Z CITE JMWAVE 9448 25 SEP 67 IN 59289

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

FYI: 300985 AMCLEVE/15 REPORTS TELEPHONE CALL FROM GUSTAVO ORTIZ INFORMING HIM THAT 324359 ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) BETANCOURT WILL ARRIVE MIAMI ON TDY 27 SEPT 67. ORTIZ STATED FERNANDEZ WILL SEEK INFO FROM CUBAN EXILES MIAMI WHO MAY KNOW OR HAVE INFO ON CUBAN GUERRILLAS VENEZUELA. ORTIZ ASKED AMCLEVE/15 WORK WITH FERNANDEZ DRUING HIS TDY MIAMI: AMCLEVE/15 AGREED.

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300985

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LCC
ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 SEPT 1967

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BY 22 PER ___ #

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[illegible] (classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

Sep 15 20 42Z

CITE DIRECTOR 35982

19 SEP 1967

OVER

TO CARACAS INFO: JMWAVE

REF A: CARACAS 7805 (IN 51649)*

B: DIRECTOR 34096**

1. BELIEVE ANY FURTHER JMWAVE ENCOURAGEMENT 300985 AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB MAY BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS IMPLICIT COMMITMENT OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT ONCE HE REACHES VENEZUELA. WISH AVOID ANY SUCH MISUNDERSTANDING WITH AMCLEVE-15 SINCE NO ASSURANCE HE WILL BE OF SUFFICIENT OPS POTENTIAL TO MERIT EXPENDITURE STATION TIME AND MONEY. POINTS TO CONSIDER ARE:

A. ACCORDING TO 757243 CIRASH-12 DIGEPOL HAS NEITHER PERSONNEL, BUDGET NOR HIGH LEVEL POLICY DIRECTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT IT TO FUNCTION AS EFFECTIVE ANTI-SUBVERSION ORGANIZATION REGARDLESS WHO IS DIRECTOR.

B. APPARENT THAT DIGEPOL (AND, IN VIEW FORMATION OF NEW INTEL ORGANIZATION BY UZCATEGUI, ENTIRE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY) UNDERGOING SHAKEUP. DIFFICULT MEASURE AMCLEVE-15 POTENTIAL AS LOW TO MEDIUM LEVEL PENETRATION DIGEPOL AGAINST POSSIBILITY OBTAINING LOCAL PENETRATION AGENT UNTIL DUST OF

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ORIG: [redacted] L.K. Geva
LAC
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 13 MAY 1968

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CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, SECUR 4

(classification) (date and time filed) 14 17 31 Z (elite) 09409 (reference number) (pica)

~~PRIORITY~~ 2 IMMEDIATE

TO CARACAS

CITE DIRECTOR

File 12

15 MAY 1968

REF: CARACAS 9588 (IN 08516)

300985

1. CONCUR SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15. IN ADDITION AREAS OUTLINED REF BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD BE TESTED ON FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

A. STATUS OF HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS BROTHERS, IDEN A AND IDEN B. IDEN B IS BELIEVED TO BE A DSE AGENT AND IS TRUSTED BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD. NOTE AMCLEVE-15 CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO LIST IDEN B AS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN GOV IN PRQ'S FILLED OUT IN 1961, 1965, AND 1966 ALTHOUGH IDEN B WAS EMPLOYED BY CUBAN TELEPHONE COMPANY DURING THIS PERIOD. AFTER PHONE CALL FROM FAMILY IN HAVANA IN SEPTEMBER 1966, AMCLEVE-15 TOLD STATION JMWAVE OF IDEN B AND SAID HE HAD LAST SEEN HIM IN APRIL 1961. THIS AT VARIANCE WITH 1961 PRQ I WHICH SAYS AMCLEVE-15 ARRIVED IN U.S. IN FEBRUARY 1961.

B. REALIZE STATION WISHES AVOID QUESTIONS CONCERNING AMCLEVE-15'S EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES WHICH DO NOT DIRECTLY RELATE TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY AGAINST KUFIRM. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO CLARIFY DEGREE TO WHICH AMCLEVE-15 INVOLVED IN

CONT...

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE 2

99409

THEFT AND DISPOSAL OF DEMOLITION AND OTHER SABOTAGE DEVICES UNIQUE TO WOFIRM BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL HARM OF THESE ACTIVITIES TO WOFIRM. ALSO BELIEVE STATION SHOULD ATTEMPT ASCERTAIN WHETHER HE FEELS PAST ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OR ASSOCIATIONS WITH GANGSTER ELEMENTS MAKE HIM VULNERABLE TO BLACKMAIL.

2. HQS PREPARED CONSIDER LESS RESTRICTED USE OF AMCLEVE-15 IF SGSWIRL REVEALS NO DECEPTION. related to relevance by CI/Ops as "hostile" not in PCA/OA sense.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: CI/OPS/Mr. Hughes F. W. Hughes

OS/IRD/Mr. Bednar J. B. Bednar

WH Comment: Requests permission SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, restricting test to points designed determine that he has not, is not, and does not plan engage in activities hostile to WOFIRM.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

L Sternfield
LAWRENCE STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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DATE: 13 MAY 1968

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(classification) (date and time filed) 99410 (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO IMMEDIATE CARACAS

REF: DIRECTOR 99409

IDEN A: RAUL POSADA CARRILLES

IDEN B: ROBERTO POSADA CARRILLES

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 102037Z MAY 68 CITE CARACAS 9588

10 MAY 68 IN 08516

DIRECTOR

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 71540

B. HVCA-15159

13 MAY 1968

without any operational approval

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS PROVED EXTREMELY PRODUCTIVE AND VERY VALUABLE SOURCE SINCE PICKED UP BY CARACAS STATION FEBRUARY 1968. WE BELIEVE HE COLLABORATING FULLY WITH WOFIRM AND WOULD NOT EXPOSE, INFORM ON OR WORK AGAINST WOFIRM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE MIGHT NOT ENGAGE IN SIDE ACTIVITIES OF HIS OWN UNRELATED TO WOFIRM ACTIVITIES WITHOUT INFORMING WOFIRM.

2. BELIEVE GOOD TRADECRAFT REQUIRES HE UNDERGO SGSWIRL AT THIS TIME. ALSO WE WOULD LIKE REGULARIZE HIS STATUS, REIN-STATE HIS CLEARANCE AND REMOVE HIM FROM "HOSTILE" LIST SO WE CAN WORK WITH HIM MORE CLOSELY, LEVY REQUIREMENTS, AND THEREBY REAP FULL BENEFIT HIS POTENTIAL.

3. WE WOULD PROPOSE LIMIT EXAMINATION TO POINTS DESIGNED DETERMINE THAT HE HAS NOT, IS NOT, AND DOES NOT PLAN ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO WOFIRM. OUR ONLY REAL CONCERN IS TO BE ASSURED HE NOT WORKING AGAINST US. SINCE MUCH OF HIS VALUE TO CIRASH-4 IS BASED ON HIS OTHER ACTIVITIES AND HIS CONTACTS

334359

[illegible] opposed to [illegible] not C/CA.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 9588 SECRET

IN MIAMI, AS POINTED OUT REF B, AND SINCE WE ARE OBLIGED TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH CIRASH-4, WE WOULD PROPOSE NOT CONDUCT DIRECT QUESTIONING ON THIS ASPECT HIS ACTIVITIES.

4. REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO SGSWIRL AMCLEVE-15, BUT WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT PROPOSE USE EXAMINATION TO PROBE POINTS RAISED REF A; RATHER ONLY TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WORKING FOR AND NOT AGAINST US.

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S E C R E T 111509Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9364 (LYNER ACTING)

11 APR 68 IN 89759

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY MEXICO CITY

REF: CARACAS 9356 (IN 88953)

300985

1. AMCLEVE-15 REPORTS THAT "MONSIGNOR FROM MEXICO" ARRIVED CARACAS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO TO DO STUDY ON EXTREMISTS IN VENEZUELA. HE CALLED AT MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TO TELL OF HIS PLANS AND WAS DIRECTED TO CIVISTA-5. MONSIGNOR TOLD CIVISTA-5 HE HAD BEEN IN GUATEMALA RECENTLY CONDUCT SIMILAR STUDY AND HAD SPOKEN TO NUMBER OF GUERRILLA LEADERS THERE. MONSIGNOR'S PLANS CALL FOR INTERVIEWING SUBVERSIVE LEADERS VENEZUELA. HE TOLD CIVISTA-5 THAT HIS OBJECTIVES STRICTLY SCHOLARLY, HENCE HOPED CIVISTA WOULD ABANDON ANY THOUGHTS OF TAILING OR ARRESTING HIM.

NR

12 APR 1968

2. INFO ADDEES: PLS ADVISE WHETHER MONSIGNOR ILLICH HAS BEEN GUATEMALA IN RECENT MONTHS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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S E C R E T 282243Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 0021

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, ROME

29 FEB 1968

TYPIC

REFS: A. JMWAVE 1148 (IN 44547)

B. DIRECTOR 72678

C. JMWAVE 1177 (IN 46301)

1. ON 28 FEB 1968 AUNT OF AMPLOT-1 DENOUNCED AMPLOT-1 TO DIGEPOL VIA AMCLEVE-15 (WHO IS ACQUAINTANCE OF AUNT THROUGH CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY CARACAS). AMCLEVE-15 REPORTED UNILATERALLY TO STAPON. DENUNCIATION WAS THAT AMPLOT-1 IS COMMUNIST WHO INVOLVED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA IN PAST AND WILL BE ENTERING VENEZULLA SOON FROM ITALY TRAVELING UNDER FALSE NAME.

NR

300985

2. WE ASSUME DIGEPOL WILL PICK UP AMPLOT-1 WHEN HE ARRIVES, PRESUMABLY THROUGH TIP FROM AUNT. WE MIGHT BE ABLE APPROACH AMPLOT-1 THROUGH DIGEPOL OR AMCLEVE-15 SHOULD HQS SO DESIRE. AT VERY LEAST MIGHT BE ABLE GUIDE INTERROGATION IF HE ARRESTED. AMCLEVE-15 WILLING RUN INVESTIGATIONS OR OPS THROUGH DIGEPOL FOR STATION BY GIVING DIGEPOL TIPS AND INFO "FROM CUBAN CONTACTS MIAMI" WHICH NEVER QUESTIONED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 9021 SECRET

3. PLEASE ADVISE HQS INTEREST AND IF WE SHOULD ADVISE DIGEPOL VIA AMCLEVE-15 OF AMPLOT-1'S ALIAS "JUAN GARCIA" FOR POSSIBLE DETENTION AT AIRPORT OR IF SHOULD MEMRELY MONITOR AMPLOT-1'S ACTIVITIES.

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ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: WH/3/V
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DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1968

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FEB 24 15 21 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 77510

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

AMSHADY

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1343 (IN 55999)*

1. HQS GUIDELINES FOR SALARY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AMSHADY-1 AND CIRASH SIMILAR AMLEVEL-15 CASE. FIRST, SALARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AMSHADY-1 AND PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT WOFIRM INVOLVEMENT. SECOND, WOFIRM SALARY BE DISCONTINUED UPON AMSHADY-1 ARRIVAL CARACAS. THREE, HQS WILL APPROVE SUPPLEMENT TO AMSHADY-1 CIRASH SALARY ONLY IF AMSHADY-1 BECOMES PRODUCTIVE ASSET OF STATION CARACAS.

2. HQS CONCURRENCE PASSAGE NAME LIST DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE CONTINGENT ON HQS VERIFICATION NAMES WHICH WERE SURFACED BY DIAZ AND PROVIDED THROUGH LIAISON CHANNEL.

END OF MESSAGE

AMSHADY-1

WH Comment: *Requested concurrence the passage to AMSHADY-1 of names surfaced by [illegible] Diaz in connection with Cuban involvement in guerrilla activities in Venezuela; agreed with Station Caracas assessment of AMSHADY-1 utility in Caracas; suggested AMSHADY-1 initiate contact with individual who tentatively offered her

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CITE DIRECTOR 77516

PAGE 2

position with DIGEPOL.

COORD: D. Phillips C/WH/COG (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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Cleo Cox,
RIG: C.W. COX
NIT: WH/3/V
XT: R-9494
ATE: 1 FEBRUARY 1968

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PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR 71510

TO ⌜CARACAS FEB 2 03 03 Z ⌝

2 FEB 1968

REF: A. HVCA-14978*

B. HVCA-14975**

C. CARACAS 8748*** (IN 36499)

300985

OVER

1. IN VIEW REF B WE NOTE WITH ALARM AMCLEVE-15 CONTINUAL TENDENCY BECOME INVOLVED CLANDESTINE SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES, AND HIS FAILURE REPORT COMPLETE STORY TO WOFIRM OR CIRASH OF HIS ACTIVITIES WHICH HE FEELS HE WANTS WITHHOLD FOR WHATEVER REASON. THEREFORE, REQUEST FOR POA FOR AMCLEVE-15 HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND HE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A HOSTILE PER CSI-F 10-5 UNTIL HIS MOTIVES COMPLETELY ASCERTAINED. WE DOUBLY CONCERNED OVER SAME REPORT WHICH LISTS DEMOLITION ITEMS SMUGGLED INTO CARACAS FROM JMWAVE AREA BY AMCLEVE-15 INCLUDING DEVICES PECULIAR TO WOFIRM AND WHOSE USE COULD TIE WOFIRM THIS TYPE ACTIVITY AND BECOME SOURCE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO GOV DURING ELECTION YEAR.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO CONTINUED CONTACT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF CIRASH AND UZCATEGUI ORGANIZATIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM THRU THE NORMAL COURSE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND NO OBJECTION TO PAYMENTS FOR INFO RECEIVED. HOWEVER, THERE TO BE

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S E C R E T 2 FEB 1968 CITE DIRECTOR 71548

802569

TO PAGE 2

NO JOINT OPERATIONS, NOR REQUIREMENTS LEVIED ON HIM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *Explanation of Caracas station reasons for wanting AMCLEVE-15 as a penetration agent into DIGEPOL.
**Transmittal of CIRASH-15 report on meeting with UZCATEGUI after which CIRASH-15 was introduced to AMCLEVE-15 who disclosed at home of Gustavo ORTIZ Faez that he (AMCLEVE-15) had brought sabotage and infra-red signal devices from Miami (seen by CIRASH-15), and was engaged in conspiracy for sabotage with ORTIZ Faez unknown to Chief, DIGEPOL, CIRASH-4.
***Outlined proposed payments to AMCLEVE-15 and requested HQ expedite POA as penetration agent DIGEPOL.

324359

COORD: CI/OPS Frank Hughes (in draft)

WH/F1

by Jacob W. Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

MAURICE J. GREMILLION
AC/WH/3

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S E C R E T 202215Z FEB 68 CITE CARACAS 8566

20 FEB 68 IN 55134

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

[illegible]

REFS: A. CARACAS-8394 (IN-49508)

B. DIRECTOR 76204

1. CONFESS WE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY REF B. OBVIOUSLY, REF A MAY HAVE LACKED CLARITY. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING AMSHADY-1 TO GOV FOR ANY PURPOSE AS WE DID WITH AMOT-250. ORTIZ CONTACTED AMSHADY-1, NOT VICE VERSA, AND IF HE HIRING HER FOR CIRASH TO DO JOB FOR WHICH SHE HAS NO BACKGROUND, THAT IS CIRASH'S PROBLEM, NOT OURS.

2. IF AMSHADY-1 PRESENTLY INACTIVE (WHICH WE GATHER FROM PARA ONE REF B IS CASE) THERE CERTAINLY NOTHING TO LOSE BY HER COMING CARACAS TO WORK AT CIRASH EXPENSE. FEEL IT SELF-EVIDENT THAT WOULD BE DEFINITELY ADVANTAGEOUS HAVE CONTROLLED [illegible] ASSET INVOLVED IN CIRASH PENETRATION PROGRAM OF PCV AT UCV.

3. WE DID NOT PROPOSE [illegible] SHOULD SPONSOR ARRANGEMENTS IN ANY WAY IN CONTRAST TO AMOT-250 EMPLOYMENT WITH CIVISTA, AND IT OUR ASSUMPTION OUR CONTACTS WITH HER WOULD BE CLANDESTINE, AS IN CASE AMCLEVE-15. WE ONLY INTENDED INDICATE IN REF A THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AMSHADY-1'S PRESENCE CARACAS AS CIRASH EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 CARACAS 8066 S E C R E T

AND THEREFORE, ASSUMING HER WILLINGNESS AND AVAILABILITY AND JMWAVE'S CONCURRENCE, IT OUR SUGGESTION SHE ACCEPT PROPOSITION UNDER CONDITIONS OUTLINED ABOVE.

SAL

4. THERE MAY BE SALARY AND CAREER PROBLEMS WE UNAWARE OF. IF SO, PLEASE ADVISE.

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CITE DIRECTOR 35782

REORGANIZATION ~~[illegible]~~ON SETTLES.

C. HQS STILL BOTHERED BY SECURITY ~~ASPECTS~~ INHERENT PROBLEMS AMCLEVE-15 CASE, PARTICULARLY ~~CONCERNING~~ BECAUSE HIS BROTHER WHO IS ALLEGED TO BE A DSE AGENT. BELIEVE AMCLEVE-15 AS CUBAN IN EMPLOY OF DIGEPOL MIGHT EASILY COME TO ATTENTION OF CUBAN INTELLIGENCE.

2. UNLESS WE HAVE MISSED SOME POINT WHICH MAKES AMCLEVE-15 VITAL TO CARACAS OPS PROGRAM PREFER JMWAVE NOT ENCOURAGE AMCLEVE-15 SEEK DIGEPOL JOB. HOWEVER WE DO NOT OBJECT TO TELEPHONE CALL PER REF A.

324359

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Suggests JMWAVE have AMCLEVE-15 telephone Erasto Fernandez Betancourt, who has been nominated as new head of DIGEPOL, to attempt to firm up previous job offer by Fernandez. AMCLEVE-15 should delay actual departure for Caracas until his position is clarified. Requests Hqs concurrence.
**Hqs believes that, in view unsettled DIGEPOL situation and vague and unsubstantiated nature AMCLEVE-15 job possibilities, not advisable make financial commitment to him to enable him to return to Venezuela. If he returns on his own and Caracas determines he has operational potential, possibility of WOFACT employment can be reconsidered.

c/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

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S E C R E T 132203Z CITE CARACAS 7805

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 SEP 67 IN 51649

REFS A. JMEAVE 9205 (IN 49694)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

785552

1. CIGIRO 1 REPORTED EVENING 12 SEPT THAT HE HAD NOMINATED ERASTO FERNANDEZ BETANCOURT (324357) TO BE DIRECTOR DIGEPOL. CIGIRO 1 SAID PRESIDENT RELUCTANT APPROVE APPOINTMENT DUE FERNANDEZ BAD REPUTATION. CIGIRO 1 CONTINUING PRESS FOR APPROVAL APPOINTMENT ON BASIS HE WILL WATCH FERNANDEZ.

300985

2. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, STATION FEELS AMCLEVE 15 SHOULD PHONE FERNANDEZ TO TRY FIRM UP DIGEPOL JOB; BUT DELAY ACTUAL DEPARTURE TILL HIS POSITION CLARIFIED. THIS BEING SUGGESTED ON ASSUMPTION AMCLEVE 15 MAY NOT IMMEDIATELY LOCATE JOB IN U.S. AND WOULD BE WILLING CONTINUE TRY KEEP VENEZUELAN OPTION OPEN ON CHANCE IT MIGHT WORK OUT.

3. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE.

S E C R E T

BT

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 111655Z CITE CARACAS 7775

11 SEP 67 IN 49565

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REFS: A. JMWAVE 9177 (W48495)

B. DIRECTOR 34096

1. IN VIEW REF B, STATION WILL HOLD CONTRACT OFFER IN ABEYANCE UNTIL HE IN PLACE.

2. SUGGEST AMCLEVE-15 (300985) PHONE OR CABLE ERASTO FERNANDEZ AND OBTAIN DEFINITE COMMITTTMENT WHERE HE TO WORK AND EOD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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28

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 111851Z CITE JMWAVE 9205 11 SEP 67 IN 49694

DIRECTOR, CARACAS

REF A JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174) [illegible]

B DIRECTOR 34096

1. 300985 AMCLEVE-15 HAS DEFINITELY DECIDED NOT RETURN CARACAS FOR DIGEPOL JOB WITHOUT ASSURANCE SIMULTANEOUS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT DUE LOW SALARY MENTIONED REF A.

2. WE READ REF B AS INSTRUCTION TO JMWAVE TO TELL AMCLEVE-15 THIS ASSURANCE WILL NOT BE FORTHCOMING AND THAT HE CAN INTENSIFY SEARCH FOR MIAMI EMPLOYMENT. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

ET

SECRET

Jack [illegible]

4-65 JWIW

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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~~FROM~~ E1

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR WH/COG 8 C/OA CI/PS

SECRET 181600Z CITE CARACAS 7841

18S 67 IN 54359

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

REF: DIRECTOR 35982

IN VIEW HEADQUARTERS STRONG RESERVATIONS HIRING AMCLEVE-15, STATION DEFERS TO HQS VIEWS.

300985

SECRET

BT

SECRET

19 OCT 1967

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: E. TSIKERDANOS
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 12 SEPT 1967

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BY: JP PER ______ # ______

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CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

SEP 12 21 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 34915

TO JMWAVE, CARACAS

REF: JMWAVE 9205 (IN 49694)*

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT.

300985

19 OCT 1967

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *JMWAVE requested HQ advise them if they have properly interpreted HQ direction to mean that JMWAVE should tell AMCLEVE-15 that there is no assurance of simultaneous Caracas agency employment if he returns Venezuela to take low salary DIGEPOL job.

COORD: WH/COG/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

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FROM 25/21

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CC 3,

S E C R E T 082146Z CITE JMWAVE 9177

8 SEP 67 IN 48495

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7756 (IN 47455)

300985

NOT CLEAR IF JMWAVE SHOULD MAKE AMCLEVE/15 REF OFFER OR WAIT UNTIL CARACAS STATION OFFICER ARRIVES MIAMI MID SEPTEMBER. ALSO WHETHER CONTRACT HINGES ON PRIOR OBTAINING @ JOB WITH DIGEPOL. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, ADDP, C/CA, MPS/BKG 2, CA, G, GINT 2

S E C R E T 071919Z CITE CARACAS 7756 7 SEP 67 IN 47458

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: JMWAVE 9138 (IN46714)

300985

1. STATION WILLING ACCEPT AMCLEVA-15 FOR ONA-QAAR CONTRACT AT SALARY $350 PER MONTH PLUS CARACAS AND RETURN AIR FARE FOR ONE. CONTRACT REVIEWABLE AT ANY TIME. ALSO 30-DAY TERMINATION CLAUSE AT STATION OPTION.

2. WOULD HOPE THAT AMCLEVE-15 CAN REESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP WITH ERAETO FERNANDEZ, AS LATTER MAY SOON BE NAMED NEW DIRECTOR DIGEPOL AND IF NOT, HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN MININT INVESTIGATIVE APPARATUS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM K/7

ACTION WH 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 051500Z CITE CARACAS 7725

5 SEP 67 IN 45532

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

REF: A. JMWAVE 9020 (IN 44174)

B. DIRECTOR 32719

1. STATION CARACAS INTERESTED PROPOSITION CONTAINED REF A.

2. REQUEST JMWAVE FORWARD SOONEST PRQ DATA; EXACT DIVISION IN DIGEPOL FOR WHICH HE WORKING; NAME OF CHIEF AND NATURE OF JOB.

3. STATION OFFICER PLANNING BE IN MIAMI MID MONTH AND WILL INTERVIEW AMCLEVE-15.

300985

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.
FROM 22

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 26

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 7, C/(CA), CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 062218Z CITE JMWAVE 9138

6 SEP 67 IN 45714

CARACAS, DIRECTOR

REF A DIRECTOR 32719

B CARACAS 7725 (IN 45332)

OVER

1. FOLL IS AMCLEVE/15 PRQ DATA: 300985

A. BORN 18 FEB 1928, CIENFUEGOS. EDUCATED CIENFUEGOS RECEIVED DEGREE SUGAR CHEMISTRY 1952. EMPL AS CHEMICAL ANALYST, EXTERMINATOR CIENFUEGOS 1946 TO 1958. DEPT MANAGER FIRESTONE TIRE CO. HAVANA MAR 1958 TO MAR 1959. THEN UNEMPLOYED AND BECAME POLITICAL ASYLEE ARGENTINE EMB. ARRIVED US VIA MEXICO 28 FEB 1961. REMAINDER OF FAMILY (FATHER, MOTHER, BROTHERS, SISER) STILL IN CUBA. TRAINEE FOR BRIGADE 2506 BUT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN INVASION. EMPL FIRESTONE TIRE CO. AKRON OCT 1961 TO MAR 1963. MEMBER US ARMY MAR 1963 TO MAR 1964, DISCHARGED AS 2ND LT. EMPL AS EXTERMINATOR MIAMI SEPT 1964 TO MAR 1965.

B. RECRUITED BY JMWAVE MAR 1965 AND USED AS TRAINING INSTRUCTOR AND SUBSEQUENTLY AS REPORTER ON EXILE ACTIVITIES MIAMI AREA UNTIL TERMINATION JULY 1967.

C. HAS PM/MARITIME EXPERIENCE AND IS EXPERT IN WEAPONS

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 9138 S E C R E T SECRET

AND DEMOLITIONS.

D. MARRIED. ONE SON. HAS NATIVE SPANISH AND FLUENT ENGLISH.

2. AMCLEVE/15 DOES NOT KNOW IN WHICH DIVISION OF DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE EMPLOYED, ONLY THAT HE PREVIOUSLY WORKED DIRECTLY UNDER ERASTO (FERNANDEZ) WHO WORKS WITH OR UNDER THE DEFENSE MINISTER. AMCLEVE/15 CLAIMS HE HAS CHOICE OF WORKING FOR FERNANDEZ OR MAJOR NIEVES (CROES) OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE (G-2). NATURE OF DIGEPOL JOB AS DESCRIBED BY AMCLEVE/15 WOULD BE INVESTIGATIVE.

3. AMCLEVE/15 RECEIVED LETTER 5 SEPT 1967 FROM FRIEND RAFAEL TREMOL, DIGEPOL EMPLOYEE, IN WHICH TREMOL TOLD HIM HIS CONTRACT TO WORK IN VENEZUELA HAD BEEN APPROVED BY DEPT OF WORKS AND HE COULD NOW APPLY MIAMI VENEZUELA CONSULATE FOR VISA.

4. JMWAVE'S RESERVATIONS MENTIONED REF A, INCLUDING FACT AMCLEVE/15 WAS NAMED AS WOFACT AGENT ON HAVANA TV DURING LASO CONFERENCE, HAVE NO BEARING ON OPS USE AS DIGEPOL PENETRATION. STATION HAS NO FURTHER INFO INDICATING POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS.

5. POUCHING 201 FILE.

SECRET SECRET

BT

Do we have cards on these?

ORIG: K. GARDINER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 7 SEPT 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

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10 SEP

SEP 0 20 41 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 34096

TO CARACAS INFO JMWAVE

REF A. JMWAVE 9138 (IN 46714)*

B. JMWAVE 9080 (IN 44174)**

C. CARACAS 7756 (IN 47463)

1. HQS BELIEVES THAT, IN VIEW UNSETTLED DIGEPOL SITUATION AND VAGUE AND UNSUBSTANTIATED NATURE AMCLEVE-15 JOB POSSIBILITIES, NOT ADVISABLE MAKE FINANCIAL COMMITMENT TO A-15 TO ENABLE HIM RETURN VENEZUELA. SHOULD A-15 RETURN ON HIS OWN AND CARACAS DETERMINES HE HAS OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL, POSSIBILITY OF WOFACT EMPLOYMENT CAN BE RECONSIDERED.

300985

2. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO PROBABLY NOT AVAILABLE JMWAVE OR CARACAS AS FOLLOWS:

A. A-15 BROTHER ROBERTO CONSIDERED TRUSTWORTHY ENOUGH BY CUBAN GOVT TO TRAVEL OVERSEAS ON GOC MISSION LATE 1966.

B. A-15 CARACAS CONTACT GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ UNSAVORY CHARACTER WHO WAS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL MURDER OF ANTI-COMMUNIST PROFESSOR AT HAVANA UNIVERSITY.

3. WILL POUCH DETAILS.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica

CITE DIRECTOR 34696

TO

WH COMMENT: *REF gave AMCLEVE-15 PRQ data. Stated JMWAVE had no further info indicating possible security problems other than Havana broadcast during recent LASO conference naming A-15 as CIA agent which WAVE claims has no bearing on ops use as DIGEPOL penetration.

**A-15 stated DIGEPOL job paid about 250 dollars per month which he claims too little to live in Caracas. Would be willing work for DIGEPOL or Station in Caracas if had total income approx 600 dollars per month.

COORD: WH/COG/MO ✓ (in draft)

WH/3/V Llc

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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OFFICER

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201-300985

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, WH/COG 8, CI.

S E C R E T 012138Z CITE JMWAVE 9080 [illegible] [illegible]

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

REF: CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)
201-300985

5 SEP 1967

1. AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT DEFINITELY MADE UP MIND TO RETURN TO CARACAS. HIS JOB WITH DIGEPOL (WHICH HE SAYS STILL AVAILABLE TO HIM) PAID ONLY ABOUT 250 DOLLARS PER MONTH WHICH HE CLAIMS TOO LITTLE TO LIVE IN CARACAS. WHILE JOSE VENTURIN MIGHT BE ABLE PROVIDE JOB LATER, HAS NOTHING NOW. THUS AMCLEVE-15 ACTIVELY SEEKING JOB MIAMI.

2. AMCLEVE-15 STATES WOULD BE WILLING GO BACK TO DIGEPOL OR OTHER JOB IN CARACAS TO WORK FOR WOFACT, BUT WOULD REQUIRE TOTAL INCOME APPROX 600 DOLLARS PER MONTH DUE CARACAS COST OF LIVING.

3. WHILE AWARE EXTRA WOFACT INCOME COULD CREATE COVER PROBLEM, PERTINENT TO POINT OUT THAT IN YEARS WOFACT EMPLOYMENT AMCLEVE-15 HAS NOT BEEN UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT MONEY PER SE; THUS DO NOT BELIEVE HE PLAYING HARD TO GET. FURTHER, JMWAVE AGREES THAT WHILE WORKING FOR DIGEPOL HE WOULD BE A GOOD ASSET FOR WOFACT.

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER CARACAS WISHES PICK UP AMCLEVE-15

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PAGE 2 JMWAVE 9080 SECRET

ABOVE BASIS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

ORIG: C. COX
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 31 AUG 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 27

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR WH/COG8, CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) SEP 1 22 20Z

(elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO CARACAS, JMWAVE

REF: A. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)*

B. CARACAS 7694 (IN 41504)**

1. BASED ON INFO CURRENTLY AVAILABLE HQ NO OBJECTION TO STATION CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 PENDING CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER STATION SOURCES HE ACTUALLY WORKING FOR DIGEPOL AND IN WHAT CAPACITY. IF CONTACT DESIRED AMCLEVE-15 STANDARD CLEARANCE PROCEDURES MUST BE INITIATED.

2. CAN CARACAS DISCREETLY CONFIRM DIGEPOL JOB?

3. REQUEST WAVE DUPLICATE FIELD 201 SOONEST AND SEND TO CARACAS AND HQ FOR REVIEW. RE REF. B. DOES WAVE HAVE ADDITIONAL INFO FOR CARACAS SUGGESTING CAUTION IN CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE 15?

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *AMCLEVE-15 reported to Wave he obtained job with Digepol in Caracas and was involved in Digepol operation culminating in capture Espinoza, a Cuban guerrilla, who landed Falcon province July 66 with Luben Petkoff. A-15 stated to Wave he talked with Espinoza day following capture.

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CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 32719

TO

**Caracas believes to station advantage to have contact with A-15. Rejects Wave objections based on Cuban broadcasts. Requested WAVE tell A-15 Caracas wants contact him. Requested info re return A-15 to Caracas and info for contact.

COORD: C/WH/3/V
C/WH/COG

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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INFO

FILE, 11, VR/CO62, CI, CI/OPS, CI/ICA, FI, CI/PS 5126

S E C R E T 292210Z CITE CARACAS 7694

JMWAVE INFO DIRECTOR

29 Aug 67 IN 41504

REFS: A. JMWAVE 8866 (IN 31036)

B. CARACAS 7589 (IN 32164)

C. JMWAVE 8997 (IN 40592)

1. IT CLEAR FROM REF C THAT IT TO STATION'S ADVANTAGE HAVE CONTACT WITH AMCLEVE-15 (300935) IN CARACAS AS HE COULD HAVE INFORMED US OF CAPTURE OF CUBAN CONSIDERABLY BEFORE WE HEARD OF IT FROM GOV.

2. STATION DOES NOT FEEL REF A OBJECTIONS TO CONTACT ARE VALID, ESPECIALLY WITH AMCLEVE-15 WORKING FOR DIGEPOL. UNLESS JMWAVE HAS FURTHER OBJECTION NOT PRESENTED REF A, REQUEST AMCLEVE-15 BE TOLD STATION CARACAS DESIRES CONTACT HIM. PLEASE ADVISE WHEN AMCLEVE-15 WILL RETURN CARACAS AND HOW HE CAN BE CONTACTED.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

28

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6
CI

S E C R E T 282207Z CITE JMWAVE 8997 (STEADMAN ACTING)

28 AUG 67 IN 40592

PRIORITY CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

NO NIACT

REF CARACAS 7668 (IN 39526)

1. NO IDENTIFIABLE STATION TRACES EPINOZA. AMOT TRACES PENDING.

2. AMCLEVE-15, 300985 WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO MAIMI TO OBTAIN PROPER VISA TO ENABLE HIM WORK IN VENEZUELA, REPORTS HE OBTAINED JOB WITH DIGEPOL THRU RAFAEL TREMOL AND GUSTAVO ORTIZ FAEZ AND WAS INVOLVED IN ESPINOZA CAPTURE.

3. ACCORDING AMCLEVE -15, DIGEPOL RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT 0600 HOURS 25 AUGUST FROM INFORMANT WHO REPORTED BLACK CHEVROLET SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH 24 AUGUST BANK ROBBERY HAD BEEN SEEN IN URDANETA STREET NEAR PERITE BUILDING, ON ARRIVAL POLICE SAW FELIZ FARIAS, ALIA "COMMANDANTE CLAUDIO", WHO WANTED FOR 1965 FIRING SQUAD MURDER OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. FARIAS DREW REVOLVER AND WAS SHOT DOWN, PEOPLE IN APARTMENT 27 OF PERITE BUILDING BEGAN FIRING ON POLICE. POLICE ENTERED APARTMENT AND ARRESTED ESPINOZA AND TWO OTHERS, FOUND 240,000 BOLIVARES FROM BANK ROBBERY, ARMS, AMMUNITION, GRENADES AND

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SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 8997 SECRET

OTHER ITEMS. (AMCLEVE-15 PROVIDED LIST AND PICTURE).

4. AMCLEVE-15 TALKED WITH ESPINOZA 26 AUGUST. ESPINOZA STATED HE 33 YEARS OLD, BORN PALMA SORIANO, ORIENTE. CAME TO VENEZUELA FROM CUBA JULY 1966 WITH 13 OTHER CUBANS UNDER COMMAND LUBEN PETKOFF AND LANDED AT CHICHIRIVICHE BEACH IN FALCON PROVINCE. HAD APPROX TWO MONTHS TRAINING GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CUBA. AMCLEVE-15 SAID ESPINOZA VERY COOPERATIVE. HAD A NOT TOO SERIOUS WOUND IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD "PROBABLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE INTERROGATION".

5. AMCLEVE-15 SAID SOME OF ARMS LOOKED LIKE THOSE ISSUED BY WOFACT. WILL POUCH FURTHER DETAILS, INCLUDING ARMS WITH SEVERAL NUMBERS.

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SECRET

BT

201-321194

1787

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : P.A. MCBAIN
UNIT : WE/3
EXT : 5798
DATE : 22 JUNE 1962

WCS

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TO : PARIS MADRID
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WE 6
INFO : DD/P, CI, CI/OPS, TFW 5, S/C 2

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 97122

TO PARI INFO MADR CITE DIR 18855

KEYWAY PBRUMEN UNRUMBLE

RE PARI 1548 (In 14303)#
REGRET UNABLE IDENTIFY SUBJ. NEED MORE BI.

END OF MESSAGE

Requested traces Jorge XX FERNANDEZ.

RID (DPL)

TFW/FI Mr. Carroll by phone

Thomas P. Thiele
AC/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

WE/5 David Reardon
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WE/3 R. Owen
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. UFGA-1739
TO Chief, WHD INFO		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. Rasco
FROM Chief of Base, JMWAVE		DATE JUN 2[illegible] 1961
SUBJECT [redacted] - Transmittal of Letters Sent to Movimiento Democrata Cristiano Representative in Cuba		RE: "43 3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☒ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None		

REFERENCE(S)

WAVE 6771

1. Transmitted herewith are photostatic copies of two letters sent to Lucas Moran, representative of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano in Cuba. The original letters, one of which was written by Jose Ignacio RASCO and the other by Rafael AGUIRRE, deal with RASCO's connection with the MDC. They were obtained for duplication by AMULLA-1, who had been charged by the correspondents with getting them into Cuba in the diplomatic pouch carried by a courier of the Italian Embassy.

2. Please see the reference for the restrictions placed on the handling of the attached material.

[redacted]

Enclosures:
Two letters ← given to Translators — will add here when completed.

20 June 1961

Distribution:
3 - Addressee w/enc h/w
2 - Files

3
19 JUN 61

[illegible]

DIRECTOR
JMWAVE
C/BELL 8
COP, ADOP/A, C/WH 2, BELL 3/C

JUN 19 1707Z 61
Rasco
ROUTINE
IN 3367

BELL CITE WAVE 6771
JMZIP RYBAT
REF A. UFGA 1659
B. UFGA 1739

1. WAVE FORWARDING REF B COPIES TWO LETTERS SENT CUBA IN ITALIAN EMB POUCH 15 JUNE. LETTERS, ONE WRITTEN BY JOSE IGNACIO RASCO AND OTHER BY DR RAFAEL AGUIRRE, WERE ADDRESSED TO LUCAS MORAN AND DEAL WITH OPPOSING VIEWS RASCO'S CONNECTION WITH MDC.

2. AMULLA-1, WHO PROVIDED CO WITH ORIGINAL LETTERS IN ORDER COPY THEM, EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER KUBARK HANDLING HIS PREVIOUS EFFORT THIS FIELD. HE CLAIMS THAT COPIES OF LETTERS SENT TO AMBUD-1 VIA ITALIAN EMB POUCH ON 26 MAY, WHICH WERE SENT HQS IN REF A, WERE SHOWN AMBUD-1 BY ODYOKE OFFICIAL [redacted] OFFICIAL [redacted] DURING AMBUD-1'S RECENT VISIT ZRMETAL. UPON HIS RETURN WAVE AREA AMBUD-1 EXPRESSED GREAT DISMAY AND UNDUE INTEREST IN HOW COPIES OF LETTERS WERE OBTAINED ~~BY~~ SO QUICKLY BY PBPRIMERS. FORTUNATELY, AMBUD-1 INTEREST WANED BEFORE ANY FINGER POINTED TO AMULLA-1.

3. IF AMULLA-1 ASSERTIONS VALID, IT QUITE APPARENT HIS FUTURE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ACCESS TO SUCH MATERIAL AND PERHAPS POUCH ITSELF MAY BE JEOPARDIZED. THEREFORE, WAVE PLANS TO PLACE SECRET NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL RESTRICTIONS ALL MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM POUCH BY AMULLA-1.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Rico Galan Vol III
201- 0336477

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1 Sept 1966 - 20 Jul 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
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Victor RICO Galan

JMTIGER

201-336477

Vol III

66



VICTOR RICO GALAN

FEB. 1961

CE CARDS

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-336474 Card #1

[illegible] 16 Jan 57 Vladimir [illegible]VICH ; 2nd Secy, Sov Emb, told Enrique of the BIP (Buro de Investigaciones), that invitations to a reception were personal and that BORDES should tell Sergio NOVELO and Subj. DOI: 7 Nov 56.

BORDES

HMMA-[illegible]16 2 Apr 58 Forwarded a copy of Al Dia, anti-US mag. (Editor-in-chief is named Victor RICO Galan, prob Subj)

HMMW-5260 persons in above two dispatches are probably identifiable. No hqs traces on either Victor RICO or Victor RICO Galan.

[illegible] 26 Feb 60 Victor RICO Galan, writer for Siempre, was moderator at 1st mtg of Political Study Circle which has been formed in UNAM & thru which Commie sympathizers hope take part in student council elections. (C-3)

HMM [illegible] 29 Jul 60 CS Victor Rico Galan among those journalists who on 14 July elected to the Mexican preparatory committee for the Second International Congress of Journalists, ~~xxx~~ to be held in Austria during October 1960. ([illegible] B-2) Comments: He is leftist journalist [illegible] associated with Politica, [illegible] leftist semi-monthly)

HMM-[illegible] 26 Oct 60 CS- Manuel MARCUE Pardinas (dir-gen of Politica, leftist semi-monthly magazine) planned to send Subj (mbr of his reportorial staff) to see Emilio SANCHEZ Piedras (anti-US Deputy fm Tlaxcala) with problem. SANCHEZ said he wld be very happy to receive Subj. and thanked MARCUE for his [illegible] article praising him. (LIENVOY, B-2

HMM-5287 Subj is Chief of Information on Pueblo, anti-US and pro-Cuba newspaper,
11 Nov 60

HMM-5311 Cuban Emb instructed Cubana Airlines to issue ticket for Subj to travel to Habana
6 Jan 61 for second anniv celeb of Cuban rev in Jan 61. (LIFEAT, B-2)
[illegible]

HMM-5444 Subj is accused by Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, dir-gen of Politica, of being in the pay
3 Feb 61 of the Mex Gov and trying to delay the appearance of Politica. (LIENVOY B-2)
CS-

HMM 5458 another accusation of trying to delay issuance of Politica by MARCUE who wants to
15 Feb 61 get rid of subj; Rosendo GOMEZ Lorenzo cautioned that he has a public following &
CSLL- should not be dismissed. (LIENVOY B-2)

HMM-5607 Subj was to attend interview of LOPEZ Mateos relative to case of Cuba on 20 Apr 61.
21 Apr 61 Interview was planned on 19 Apr by CEM & Mex Organizing Committee of LAPC.
TDCS-3/472,253 (LIENVOY, B-2)

HMM-5791 Subj is a mbr of the Committee for Solidarity w/the Cuban Revolution. (LIFTER, B-2)
28 Jul 61
CS-3/482,611

HMM-6019 31 Oct 61 staff of official pub of Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN -
17 Nov 61 National Liberation Front) anti-US, pro-Cuba, Communist-front, was working over-
CS-3/494,285 time in effort to publish first issue newspaper 1 Nov 61. Staff includes
Subj., who was unable to collaborate in the work of first iss of pub. Enrique
GONZALEZ Pedrero planned to register pub 31 Oct under name Liberacion Nacional.
LIENVOY, B-2 SECRET/CONTROL

RICO, Victor (Galan) **Card 2**

HMM-5678
31 May 62



Victor RICO Galan ✓

RICO, Victor (Galan)

201-336474

Card 3

HMM-6302 6 Apr 62 CS-3/508, 797	Subj., Marxist journalist who heads MLN Press and Propaganda Committee, among persons who attended round-table discussion held by MLN 2 Apr 62 on subj of prison sentences imposed on David Alfaro Siqueiros, prominent Mex artist, and Filomena MATA, his fellow-prisoner, on 10 March. Subj.among speakers. (LIENVOY-2, B-2, CONTROL)
HMM-6486 19 June62 CS-3/515, 731	14 June 62 Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, prominent Mex Marxist who is dir-genl of Politica Mex Marxist, anti-US, pro-Cuba, semi-monthly magazine, discussed w/Teresa PROENZA Proenza, Cult Att of Cuban Emb in Mex, approaching 26 of July celebration in Habana. MARCUE recommended discreet high-level persons be named to Mex delegation and recommended Subj., among other Marxist and Communist writers for Politica as well-qualified, intelligent persons to send as delegates to Cuba. MARCUE said he hoped Subj wld be invited to attend because he had never visited Cuba and was very anxious to go there. (LIENVOY, B-2) SECRET/NOFORN - CONTD CONTROL
HMM-6770 5 Oct 62 CS-3/525, 084	Subj., Mex Marxist Journalist and head of National Press and Propaganda Committee of MLN, pro-Cuba, anti-US Com front, plans to write political biography on Fidel CASTRO Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Subj., who proposed idea to Cuban Govt and was accepted, will spend 2 mos in Cuba working on project. (LICOOKY-1, B-2) 2 Oct Subj left Mexico for Habana on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mex passport No. 51115, w/Cuban courtesy visa. (LIFIRE, B-2)
FBIS #227 **21 Nov. 62**	**Subj has been in Cuba about six weeks.**

TDCS-3/538,445 25 Feb 63 HMM 7050 MEXI 3552	Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, dir genl of Politica, Mex Marxist semi-monthly mag., has been suspended fm membership on natl committee of MLN, charged with lack of discipline and having attacked MLN openly in Politica in past several months. On 22 Feb Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero, mbr of MLN natl committee and member of staff of Politica, declared MLN mbrs who belong to staff of Politica must resign fm magazine. Subj among those who had doubts about resigning fm mag. (LIENVOY,B-2) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
MEXI 4847 IN 52485 6 May 63 LITAMIL-7 C-2	Victor RICO GALAN, Mexican, issued Cuban visa on separate piece of paper on 24 May 63. —
~~MEXI [illegible]~~	Reported his travel to Cuba. (where?)
HMM-7320 PTD. MEXI-4721 23 May 63 [illegible]-2	Victor RICO Galan, Mexi Marxist journalist, arranged to go Cuba to interview Castro on his trip to USSR. On 23 May RICO said did not think necessary go [illegible] when Castro returns (sched for 27 May). Rico plans go Cub. 25 or 27 May.
[illegible]-27-63 CE-37 LIEMPTY -2 June 63	Victor RICO Galan, Mexi Marxist journalist & head of Natl Press & Prop Committee of MLN, returned Mexi fm Cuba 22 June 63. Said spent 5 days w/Castro, & spoke with 6 other Cuban officials (see report for list). Report includes [illegible] on his interview w/Castro, arr at Mexi City airport (he arr w/the new [illegible]), saw Dr. Enrique Cabrera Cosio in Cuba. RICO planned write series of 4 or 5 articles dealing w/subjects of "theoretical interest" & of problems [illegible] having carrying out purposes of the Revolution.

[illegible]-553 - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 15 May 63
May 63 - [illegible]

14-00000

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-33[illegible] Card 4

HMM 7451, H.D. LIENVOY, B-2 June 63	Report on Victor RICO Galan's statements about the [illegible] the Galan intellectual.
A-198, 19 Aug 63 AmEmb, Mex. C. Filed PRI	Victor RICO Galan, in the 21 August 63 issue of Siempre, answered the charges of Romulo Sanchez Mireles, presiding officer of the Chamber of Deputies, which is Mexico's House of Representatives. Sanchez, before a meeting of the PRI, had attacked those who undermine Mexico's institutions, customs, government, and political leaders. Rico answered that he and thousands of other foreign born Mexicans are discriminated against.
HMM-7666 27 Aug 63 CS-3/558,382 LITEMPO- B-	Evening 21 Aug 63 15 Mex of known Marxist, Communist, or leftist ideology appeared at offices of Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, Min of Interior, including Subj., prominent leftist journalists. Altho grp had made no attempt make previous appt it demanded audience with DIAZ. Latter informed his aides to inform visitors request for appt with him must be in writing and explain applicant's business, and visitors were to lv immediately. They left peaceably, saying they wld send DIAZ telegram demanding audience. (FC: Subj one of principal organizers and participants in rally in favor of political prisoners held MexC 18 Aug 63. Rally failed to be held as result of police intervention. Subj and other leading participants were arrested and released same day. (HMM-7644, TDCS-3/557,044
A-1291 AmEmb, MexC 9 Apr 63	20 Mar iss of leftist wkly Siempre published art by Subj., regular contributor to mag., advocating creation of new pol party to reflect ideology of former Pres Lazaro CARDENAS.

RICO, Victor (Galan)

201-336474

Card 5

HMM-8262 MEXI 7695 IN 95254 9 Jan 64 TDCS-3/ 561,563	Subj.,Mex Marxist journalist, is making preparations to go to Dominican Republic fm Mexico in very near future; ostensible purpose to gather info for preparations of some arts on DR. (LIENVOY,B-2, NO FOREIGN DISSEM) (FC: Subj.,mbr of Propaganda Committee of MLN, pro-Cuba, anti-US Mex Communist front, and writer for Siempre, Mex leftist mag.,visited Panama, Guat.,Nic, Costa Rica Venezuela, and Brasil between mid-October and mid-Dec.63. Acc several earlier rpts, Subj spent 8 days in Cuba during May and June 63 interviewing Fidel Castro Rus, Prime Minister of Cuba, on latter's stay in USSR. During this period Subj given assignment to visit countries in South and Central America,where he was to persuade leftist parties to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take pressure off Venez. He was also instructed to pursue competing leftist factions in countries he visited to unify so their work would have greater impact.In various countries he visited, Subj conferred with leading Communists and leftists.
TDCS 3/569,940 [illegible] 9278 10 Jan 64	Rico Galan fm [illegible], according to [illegible] 12 Jan. [illegible] Arr Santo Dom 8 Jan, by air, fm Kingston, Jamaica.
DIR 94930 16 Jan 64 Based on SDOM-2619, IN 99172, 15 Jan 64	Ref.is made to TDCS-3/569,940 distributed 14 Jan 64,Subj: Travel of Subj to DR. Info has been recd fm Dominican Security Service that Subj left Santo for Miami,Fla., 15 Jan 64 on Pan American flt 432. Above to FBI & I&NS.

[illegible], Victor (Galan)

TDCS-3/570,335 10 Jan 64, RICO asked [illegible] Gutto, sister of Manuel, former pres
HDC-232 of APCJ (14th June Pol Group) for photos of cadavers of guerrillas
Sta Off fm killed at Las Manaclas 21 Dec 63. [illegible] unable get them. RICO also
Ramon Lora Espinal, req photos of Rafael [illegible], Dir of [illegible] Diario, but Herrera refused
photog - [illegible]-2 release them. (See report for details on pictures.)
Jan 64

[illegible] 8339 21 Jan 64, Subj asked CubEmb, Mexi re first avail flt to Cuba. Was told 24 Jan.
TDCS-3/570,[illegible]25 Subj said wanted to go 23 Jan, but might go on flt of 27 Jan.
[illegible] [illegible]-2 (FC: presumed going to confer w/Castro upon his return fm USSR.)
Jan 64

[illegible]-8366, RICO left Mexi for Habana by air 23 Jan 64. Visa 56341, courtesy visa. Planning
[illegible] stay at Hotel Riviera, Habana.
[illegible],

[illegible] 8391 Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] 53641, left Mexi for Cuba by air 23 Jan 64.
LIFIRE E-2.
Jan 64

[illegible] 28 Jan 64 [illegible] ([illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]) &
[illegible] 8324 [illegible] told [illegible] ([illegible]) that Victor RICO Galan had
[illegible] asked [illegible] to Cuban Govt [illegible] to [illegible]. [illegible] to go
Jan 64 [illegible] 5 Feb, then Mexi a month [illegible] USSR. RICO will accompany her fm
Mexi to Habana. (See report for details on [illegible] activities & travel.)
[illegible]

[illegible] 8600 Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] 53641, [illegible] by air 26 Feb 64.
Jan 64, [illegible]-2

14-00000

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-336474 Card 6

CS-3/ (Cover sheet info: Conversation 18 March Prensa Latina Office - RICO and
HMM 8659 Jorquera)
LIENVOY B-2 Carlos JORQUERA Tolosa, Chilean, head Prensa Latina in Santiago, Chile,
Mar 64. made appointment to meet RICO on 19 Mar 64. J was enroute from Santiago to Cuba. (Arr Mexi 17 Mar, left for Cuba 20 Mar.)

AMBASSADOR FREEMAN ATTACKED BY SIEMPRE FBIS No. 85, 30 Apr 64

Mexico City Correspondent's Dispatch in Spanish to PRENSA LATINA Havana 1910 GMT 25 April 1964--E (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

(Excerpt) Mexico City--In an article in the Mexico City magazine SIEMPRE on 25 April, Victor Rico Galan writes that U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman made a statement to the press about Cuba and Brazil. "In a violent style that seems to come from the caverns of the John Birch Society, he (criticized?) the constitutional government of Joao Goulart and the Cuban Revolution. He talked like a soapbox orator, as if issuing a political proclamation, forgetting that Mexico maintains friendly relations with the Cuban Government and did have very close relations with the deposed Brazilian President. Mr. Freeman behaved like a savage guest who spits on his host country.

"This is no great cause for surprise. U.S. ambassadors are constantly interfering in our domestic affairs as if it were the most natural thing. They feel as if they were on conquered ground, and act less like ambassadors than proconsuls who owe no consideration or explanation to anybody, as if this country belonged to them and they enjoyed boundless privileges.

"The surprising thing is that nobody has protested: the insult to Mexico has been passed over in absolute silence. Worse things will obviously come. No sooner does he arrive in Mexico than Mr. Freeman arrogates the right to shout anything he pleases, because Washington has become impatient with Mexico's independent policy, and the Texan style of the Johnson-Mann team (is?) alien to the relative tolerance of the Kennedy 'intellectuals.' Freeman comes to exert pressure violently and announces at the start that he is ready for anything. It is the policy of international gangsterism that requires the conduct of a bully in those who pursue it."

Further on, the writer says: "Either these saloon ruffians are stopped short or nobody will be able to stand them. That is why it is serious that nobody has raised his voice to teach Freeman some manners, and that, on the contrary, General Olachea, secretary of defense, should have paid him honors with all his general staff without daring to point out to him that this is an independent country and that proconsuls and viceroys are not allowed here.

"Every U.S. ambassador who comes to Mexico makes his predecessor look good by comparison, but at least in the beginning all try to make themselves liked. But not Fulton Freeman. He comes with sullen looks, raising his voice so nobody can be mistaken. He shows his hand right at the start and announces that he is not going to try to convince anybody but will give orders. This indicates quite clearly that the State Department thinks it has been too patient and feels circumstances are ripe for acting tough and violently."

14-00000

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201-336474 Card 7

	Commie
NavAtt, Mexi Rpt #5864014065 18 Mar 65	(Angel TORRALA Burgos, Guat/, who exiled to Mexi Jan 65, after he was involved in burning USIA garage in Guat.) The last mission of RICO Galan was the unification of the Guat guerrillas. (Cy of report filed in Arms file)
HMM-9727 4 June 65 LIFTER CS-311/ 07174-65 11 June 65	Leaders of the MLN and the FEP met near the end of March or the beginning of April 1965 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress for the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution. Subj. and members of the group will send out the notice of the Congress. Subj. is a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

RICO, Victor (Galan) 201 336474 7a

HMM 8569 12 Mar 64	LIENVOY: Raul Roa Kuri, Cuban Amb to Brazil said he was kept informed on activities of Mexi pro Commie activities of Fernando Carmona de la Pena through subj.
MEXI 9761 6 June 64	TDCS 3/583,176: Rico Galan prepared for trip to Guat by dealing directly with PGT in order make direct contact with Yon Sosa. However, special interest in the trip originated with the Chinese Commies who it seems had established secret info base in Guat. Subj said Chinese Commies were extremely pleased Yon Sosa was of chinese descent.
CS-311/02559-65 [illegible]-1290 [illegible] D-1 C-2 DOI 11 Jan 65	Julio SANCHEZ Diaz, editor of [illegible], publication of Dominican Popular Movement ([illegible]), [illegible] for Chile [illegible] Feb 65, where he will [illegible] scholarship. While in Chile, intends get in touch w/Victor RICO Galan, [illegible] Communist (sic) who writes for Siempre. ... PS: RICO arrd in [illegible] 9 Jan 65 & left 15 Jan. Ostensible purpose was to gather info for articles on the DR.
A-31 AmConsulate Merida 10 Feb65	See doc filed in State - Yucatan :- Subj Victor RICO Galan Again
HMM-9550 CS-311/ 03173-65 LICOZY-1	Subj went to Merida during first few days of February to make a personal of situation caused by decrease in price of henequen. A demonstration led by [illegible] took place in Merida 1 Feb 65, protesting increase in price of henequen; organized by [illegible] with others was arrested and later released. [illegible] Committee of [illegible] Has art. [illegible] Yucatan: [illegible] in issue no.10, dated 3 [illegible], of [illegible]

14-00000

201-326074

cit - Mexican
Mex PP 62115

RICO Galan, Victor MLN P-7354
DPOB 6 FEB 1928, El FERROL SPAIN
Communist Newspaperman
~~Head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of~~ Mem - MLN national Committee 65
~~the MLN(LOI~~ [illegible]
Went to Cuba on 25 May 63 returned Mexico 22 June 63.
RES: ~~PROVIDENCIA #33~~ calle Ernestina Larrainzar #14 B
~~MEXICO, DF.~~ Mexico 12, DF
Tel 43-27-94 ([illegible])
member of Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos
de Cuba - 61
member of Committee of Solidarity with
Cuba - 61
founded Mex - Cuban Institute of Cultural
Relations in Merida Yuc, in 68.

RICO Victor (Galan)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO/COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA/PANAMA/VENEZUELA/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/563,671

SUBJECT TRAVEL AND MISSION OF ALLEGED CUBAN AGENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 31 OCTOBER 63

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 20-22 OCT 63

REFERENCES IN 50142
TDCS 3/563,137 47784
TDCS 3/562,990 49213

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (24 OCT 63)

FIELD REPORT NO.

APPRAISAL

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CUBA-ORIENTED LEFTIST CIRCLES OF PANAMA.

(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN, ARRIVED IN PANAMA FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. RICO GALAN IS A MARXIST, A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA, MEXICAN MAGAZINES, AND IS THE HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN), A COMMUNIST-FRONT MOVEMENT HEAVILY INFILTRATED BY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN OCTOBER 1962 RICO GALAN WENT TO CUBA TO PREPARE A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF FIDEL CASTRO. IN MAY 1963 HE AGAIN WENT TO CUBA, RETURNING TO MEXICO 22 JUNE 1963. DURING THIS LATTER VISIT HE REPORTEDLY INTERVIEWED CASTRO AFTER CASTRO'S RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO SPENT A FIVE-DAY SEA-GOING VACATION WITH CASTRO, OF WHOM HE IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE FRIEND. RICO GALAN HAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS HE HAD WITH COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA, GUATEMALAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI [illegible] OCR ORR OO

STATE/FBI [illegible] FBI INS TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, AND WITH MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER.)

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN WHO "RECENTLY" SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA ON "VACATION" WITH FIDEL CASTRO, WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. RICO GALAN WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PERSUADE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO UNIFY SO THAT THEIR WORK WILL HAVE GREATER IMPACT. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN CLEARLY IMPLIED TO THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION THAT THE ASSIGNMENT HE IS NOW FULFILLING WAS GIVEN HIM IN JUNE 63.)

2. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HE HAD GONE FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA, WHERE HE MET WITH GOMEZ AYAY (FNU), A GUERRILLA LEADER WHOM HE ENCOURAGED TO BEGIN SABOTAGE AND VIOLENT ACTION. HE ALSO MADE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO A NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER RICO GALAN ACTUALLY VISITED NICARAGUA OR WHETHER HE SAW THIS PERSON IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.) IN COSTA RICA HE TALKED WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: EDUARDO MORA IS PRESENTLY IN COSTA RICA. HIS BROTHER, MANUEL MORA, LEFT [illegible] THE USSR, VIA MEXICO, 29 SEPTEMBER 1963. BOTH ARE LEADERS OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY.) RICO GALAN ARRIVED IN PANAMA 22 OCTOBER FROM COSTA RICA AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 29 OCTOBER 1963. IN CARACAS HE INTENDED TO CONTACT ARGELIA LAYA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: [illegible]

TO THE VENEZUELAN CONGRESS AND WIFE OF RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEADER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN - VENEZUELAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.)

3. IN PANAMA BETWEEN 20 -22 OCTOBER RICO GALAN CONTACTED HUGO VICTOR, PRESIDENT OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, A LEADER OF THE VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN - PRO-CUBAN, RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION). ON 24 OCTOBER A MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS UNITY OF THE LEFT, COMMENCEMENT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND A MERGER OF LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO THE ELECTIONS AS A BLOC SHOULD EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE ELECTIONS FAIL. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, ALVARO MENENDEZ FRANCO, THELMA KING, RENATO PEREIRA, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE PDP, REPORTED THE VISIT TO PANAMA OF "A CUBAN WRITER FOR SIEMPRE" WHO WAS ON A MISSION FOR THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE VISITOR WHOM SOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY BY NAME URGED THE PDP AND THE VAN TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND UNITE. HIS PROPOSAL WAS VIOLENTLY REJECTED BY THE PDP, WHICH INTENDS TO PROTEST THE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

201-326474

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN MEXICO

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN EL EXTRANJERO

EN CASO DE [illegible] O ACCIDENTE NOTIFIQUESE A:

DOMICILIO

ESTE PASAPORTE DEBE REFRENDARSE CADA DOS AÑOS. LA LIBRETA CADUCA A LOS SEIS AÑOS.

DERECHOS $ 80.00

2 6 FEB 1964

[illegible] en Cuba

[illegible] 19 on SABE

PASAPORTE NUMERO [illegible]

CONTIENE [illegible] PAGINAS

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE

VICTOR RICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA

X X X X

Y X MENORES

Nº 16837

ESTE PASAPORTE ES NULO SI TIENE RASPADURAS ENMENDATURAS O ENTRERRENGLONADURAS

CE PASSEPORT EST NUL S'IL Y A DES GRATTAGES CORRECTIONS OU DES INTERLIGNATIONS

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID IF IT IS ERASED, AMENDED OR INTERLINED

1

LA SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

de los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS concede libre y seguro pasaporte a

VICTOR RICO GALAN

de NACIONALIDAD MEXICANA

(Nationalité mexicaine / Mexican nationality) y suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares de los países por donde transite, que no le pongan obstáculos y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario.

Dado en la ciudad de MEXICO, D.F.

a los 9

días del mes de SEPTIEMBRE

del año de mil novecientos SESENTA Y TRES

P.O. DEL SECRETARIO

EL JEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE PASAPORTES

2

Este pasaporte es válido para dirigirse a: ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA, CANADA, CENTRO Y SUD AMERICA, INGLATERRA, FRANCIA, ITALIA, PORTUGAL, ESPAÑA, SUECIA, DINAMARCA, ALEMANIA, SUIZA, AUSTRIA, COMUNIDAD BRITANICA DE NACIONES,

LA VALIDEZ DE ESTE PASAPORTE EXPIRA EL

8 SEPTIEMBRE 1965

a menos de que sea refrendado por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores o por alguna oficina diplomática o consular de México en el extranjero.

OBSERVACIONES

El titular es [illegible] por [illegible] según [illegible] Nº 665

otorgado el 15 MARZO 1960

3

FILIACIONES

	TITULAR	ESPOSA
ESTATURA	1.75 MTS.	
COLOR	BLANCO	
OJOS	CAFES	
PELO	ENTRECANO	
SEÑAS PARTICULARES	NINGUNA	
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EL FERROL, ESPAÑA.	
FECHA DE NACIMIENTO	6 FEBRERO 1923	
OCUPACION	PERIODISTA	
ESTADO CIVIL	CASADO	

HIJOS MENORES

NOMBRE	EDAD	SEXO

4

FOTOGRAFIAS

FIRMA DEL TITULAR

FIRMA DE LA ESPOSA

ESTE PASAPORTE NO ES VALIDO SIN LA FIRMA Y HUELLA DIGITAL DEL INTERESADO

5

CONSULADO GENERAL DE HAITI
MEXICO D.F.

NUMERO [illegible]

DERECHOS COBRADOS [illegible]

VISTO en este Consulado General para dirigirse Haiti

y valido por un periodo de 90 [illegible]

Mexico, D. F. [illegible]

Gdes 500

11

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE [illegible]

ENTRADA [illegible] OCT [illegible]

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE EL SALVADOR
EN MEXICO, D. F.

Visa No. 2225 [illegible]

[illegible] para dirigirse a [illegible]

en calidad de TURISTA [illegible]

Vía [illegible]

[illegible] por [illegible]

Aut. de RR. EE. del ____ de ____ de ____

Derecho U.S. $ ____

Impuesto de Turismo U.S. $ ____

El interesado queda advertido que por ningún motivo, se le permitirá cambiar su calidad migratoria autorizada por esta visa.

México, D. F. 19 SET. 1963

[illegible] ACOSTA
CONSUL GENERAL
DE EL SALVADOR

VISAS

VISA [illegible] No. [illegible]

Bueno y válido para dirigirse a

la República Dominicana.

México, D. F., a [illegible] de [illegible] de 1963

[illegible]
Cónsul General

REPUBLICA DOMINICANA

[illegible] 15 [illegible]
AGENTE No. 7

VISAS

[illegible]
ENTRADA
11 OCT 1963

SALIDA
13 OCT 1963

14 OCT 1963

VISAS

[illegible] CONSULADO [illegible]

No. [illegible]

Bueno para dirigirse a [illegible]

Vía [illegible]

Válida [illegible]

Derechos [illegible]

México, [illegible]

Cónsul [illegible]



VISAS

BOLIVIA

AEROPUERTO EL ALTO

DIC 20 196

SALIDA

VISAS

Seen at the British Embassy,
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to
British Guiana within
three months of date hereof
if passport remains valid.

VISIT

(Signed)

British Consul
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

FOREIGN SERVICE



VISAS

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
SAN SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR, C. A.

Fecha -8 OCT 1963

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
EL SALVADOR

11 OCT 1963

84

VISAS

OCT

SALIDA

12 DIC 1963

ENTRADA

14-00000



VISAS

V22632

REPUBLICA DEL PERU
LIMA CALLAO
ADMITIDO
[illegible] 17 [illegible]

VISAS

P 05101

REPUBLICA DEL PERU
LIMA CALLAO
ADMITIDO
DIC 20 196[illegible]

MEXICO, D. F.
SALIO A
[illegible] 23
CUBA

"A sus Ordenes, Jefazo-Pagés"

Por LEON GUZMAN

Nuevo Sirviente Oficial: Rico, Galán y con Librea

El señor Víctor Rico Galán, escritor de "Siempre", trata de comprar su libertad haciendo de sirviente cínico al gobierno y a su revista "mater et magister del confusionismo". Bueno que este "mártir" trate de salir y que atiborre a quien lo lea de la bazofia trotskista; bueno que utilice la comprobada vía de escritor de "Siempre" para labrarse su salida; bueno que acuse a los remotos imperialismos y a grupos innominados de todas las culpas, escondiendo así la muy presente culpa del gobierno y de la clase dominante mexicana. Bueno para sus muy mezquinos y pequeñitos "objetivos", pues sus desahogos palabreros nada tienen qué ver con la lucha revolucionaria de los trabajadores mexicanos.

Víctor Rico Galán, como otros ex-presos políticos de su calaña, se desenmascaró abiertamente como traidor.



Desde la revista "Siempre", vocero del gobierno, Rico Galán sirve ahora a su "jefazo pagés" y al gobierno.

Desde la crujía "N", Rico Galán había mantenido un silencio meticuloso, hasta que llegó el momento de "hacer cualquier servicio al enemigo" con tal de salir; hasta que llegó el momento de encontrar el camino de volver a escribir en "Siempre" para labrarse su excarcelación, como ya lo hicieron otros antes de él; hasta que llegó el momento de olvidarse de las pillerías del director de "Siempre" quien, cuando al gobierno convino, le dio un [illegible] en volu-

sea la parte, y ahora que al gobierno conviene, le abre las puertas de su revistita gubernamental, bien cebada por la clase dominante para pregonar la confusión de una supuesta "izquierda" y defender con toda el alma al gobierno, al presidente en turno y a la clase dominante.

Basta leer "Siempre" para

[illegible] 121 30/12/71

encontrar, desde "siempre", un solo derrotero: el más destacado servilismo a todos los gobiernos, sumado a poses izquierdizantes atribuibles a algunos de sus escritores. Caro han vendido los dueños de la revista "Siempre" este sistema de confusión y apoyo activo a los dueños del poder: mucho papel, muchísimas dádivas, una enorme fortuna para el vanidoso "pepe pagés", el supremo "jefe" de esa pequeña élite de engañadores oficiales, y sueldos, sueldilos y sueldotes a sus "redactores" y "escritores", que han ido desde el "maestro Lombardo" hasta el director suplente, Francisco de la Vega, consejero de la Presidencia de la República.

"Siempre" dio lugar a la novela rosa de la "apertura". Desde sus columnas hablan los aperturistas oficiales a voz en cuello. Junto a los artículos de Regis Debray, se mezclan homenajes a todos los virreyes gubernamentales, y al rey-presidente más que a ninguno. Se pelean entre sí las comadres del "Jefe Pagés" para dar "idea de libertad de opinión"; pleititos intrascendentes que ocupan páginas y páginas inacabables; al fin que el papel no se paga.

"Siempre" buscó el modo de justificar la matanza del 2 de Octubre y la del 10 de Junio. Hablando vagamente en contra de "quienes quieren torcer la política revolucionaria" de cada gobierno y gobernante, lanzando culpas a desmedrados fantasmas, la revista "Siempre" manipula a sus escritores para apoyar "sesudamente" y desde una aparente "izquierda" al propio gobierno. Por esa labor le pagaban a Lombardo y le han pagado y pagan a Pagés.

Desesperado está el gobierno para hacer creer en su "apertura", en las libertades para crear "nuevos partidos". Vociferan y desesperan los secretarios de Estado, diputados, senadores y el propio Presidente, para hacer creer a los mexicanos en su "democracia" burguesa a la mexicana, perfecta y buena, según ellos mismos. Piden, gimotean y suplican para que se desacredite a los que están luchando por todas las vías (léase otra vez: POR TODAS LAS VIAS) en contra de la situación que vive el país, en detrimento de millones y para beneficio de una ridícula minoría de burócratas y prestanombres intermediarios del capital extranjero.

Toda la propaganda oficial y sus publicitarias "reformas" tienden a lo mismo: desacreditar a los que están luchando como pueden y aprenden a hacerlo en la vida diaria. Llamar "impotentes, idiotas, desesperados y provocadores" a los guerrilleros, como lo hace en su último "artículo" el discípulo de Pagés, Rico Galán ("Siempre" Nº 965, páginas 24 y 25), es hacer exactamente lo que ordena la clase dominante a sus pajes (¿o pagés?).

Un hombre honesto puede y debe cambiar de criterio cuando reconoce un error. Pero tiene que decir y explicar su error, si es que hubo. El "honesto" Galán no se toma molestias, de furibundo "guerrillero" de lengua, saliva y papel, cuando así convenía a sus particulares intereses personales, pasa ahora a detractor de la guerrilla, a llamar "idiotas" e "impotentes" a los que hicieron lo que él fue impotente de hacer o, tal vez, podemos afirmar, simuló hacer.

De insultar a Genaro Vázquez, viperinamente, pues babea confusionismo el discípulo de Pagés, pasa a insultar a los guerrilleros del Brasil, llamándolos "terroristas", y los declara extinguidos, exterminados en unos pocos meses por la dictadura.

¡El Sr. Galán está muy bien informado en su celda de la desaparición de los luchadores revolucionarios del Brasil!; y los brasileños revolucionarios han de estar "sumamente preocupados" por tales calumnias.

Y adelante. Como la revista "Siempre" en su actividad duplex publicó un documento de Regis Debray sobre la lucha guerrillera de los Tupamaros, ¡qué mejor que ahora insultarlo por conducto de un "ente" de la falsa izquierda mexicana y en la misma revista confusionista, para que nadie vaya a creerle. La clase dominante agradece bien tales favores, señores de "Siempre", y los paga al contado.

Tras de todo, antes de todo, sobre todo, el ombligo de estos narcisistas. Porque la "revista" dijo, o porque mandó una cartita un pobre Galán, sólo por eso ocurren las cosas y por eso se lanza a la grandilocuencia ridícula, a hablar de los futuros amaneceres revolucionarios y de la "sangre" y la "vida" de los revolucionarios, atribuyéndose tal calidad el pobre escritor. Tiene que ganarse su paga. Tiene que presentarse como la revolución verdadera, para que nadie crea en los que están combatiendo a la dictadura de aquí y de cualquier allá. Tiene que descargar eructos insultantes sobre la limpieza de los luchadores, que a él, como al gobierno de México, como a nuestros verdugos, como a su "jefe", le interesa ensuciar sobre todas las cosas. Dice en su bazofia: "es preciso, urgente, construir la organización a toda prisa: el partido de la clase obrera y el frente nacional revolucionario antiimperialista". Eso, nada más eso. ¡De prisa, mañana temprano, a las nueve en punto, como el dios de Abraham hizo al mundo! Rápido, como lo quiere y necesita el poder público en México, como lo buscan afanosos las vedetes gubernamentales desde "Siempre", ¿o no Heberto Castillo? Un partidito de pega y paga, útil para su "revolucionista", para el engaño y la trapacería.

Una carta o "artículo" en busca afanosa del premio oficial, es este escrito vergonzante del vergonzante "guerrillero" Galán. De un hombre que no le pide nada a las veletas. Nada más ayer escribió a su "jefe pagés" esta carta-renuncia: "2 de septiembre de 1966. — En relación con mi carta aparecida en el número 689 de su revista, debo decirle que, después de leer el editorial del mismo número, queda retirado lo que a usted se refiere, y en particular mi propósito de seguir colaborando en 'Siempre' con una selección sobre libros. Sin entrar a discutir un editorial en el que, no sólo se me condena cuando no lo ha hecho un juez, sino que se me cuelga un nuevo delito al llamarme 'motinero', me limito a aclarar que de ningún modo puedo admitir la limosna de que se me publique 'por elementales razones humanas'. Buscaré el modo de contribuir desde mi encierro al sostenimiento de mis hijos; pero, en último extremo, prefiero que vivan dignamente

Lo mismo contra Genaro Vázquez, que contra Regis Debray o Mario Menéndez, el nuevo sirviente oficial babea su [illegible] alcohólica impotente.

de la solidaridad revolucionaria y no de la limosna infamante, otorgada por malas conciencias que buscan una precaria tranquilidad. Independientemente de que siga usted encontrando 'elementales razones humanas' o se le hayan agotado las que exhibió, esta carta tiene importancia para mi dignidad personal y por ello esperaré a que la publique hasta el jueves, pero reservándome copia y el derecho de hacerla pública por otros medios en caso necesario. — Atentamente, Victor Rico Galán".

Eso fue ayer, pero hoy ya todo cambió: la mala conciencia del "jefe Pagés" se volvió buena; el héroe que rechazaba la "limosna" pagesina, se vuelve limosnero; quien se negó a escribir en "Siempre" por elementales razones de dignidad, se ha vuelto indigno. Ese es el camino que enseña el colaborador de "Siempre".

Insulta a Genaro Vázquez desde "Siempre", ¡vaya dignidad!

Escupir rabioso sobre Debray, sobre los guerrilleros brasileños; mentir, desapareciéndolos del mundo de los vivos, es obra de sucios plumíferos, cuando se usa la tribunita confusionista de "Siempre".

Bien informado está el maniquí del "jefe Pagés". No sólo sabe lo que les ha pasado a todos en Brasil; no sólo califica de "idiota histórico" a Debray, sino que puede afirmar que el responsable del asesinato de Pablo Alvarado B., no es "su" general Arcaute, sino que hay más por allí que difaman las culpas. El señor Galán *personalmente* afirma: "Me consta que el Presidente de la República estaba informado". *Sólo él*, que tiene comunicación con tan poderosos sujetos, él, el sabelotodo informado, puede calumniar a cuenta de su patrón con tan ridículas "razones" como las de que si el secuestrado Castrejón es de la Coca-Cola y, por tanto, miembro del *Opus Dei*, es increíble que Genaro no tenga una choza en Guerrero, por lo que no se puede creer a Castrejón que lo trajeran a salto de mata, siguiendo el paso de los guerrilleros. ¡Vaya lógica ignara!

¿Y como trata al extinto Pablo Alvarado Barrera?, así con el nombre escueto, ya que muchas veces lanzó en contra del extinto su venenosa baba de calumniador, acusándolo de agente de la CIA. Lo único grato que dice de Pablo es llamarlo "rehén", para más adelante, en el penúltimo párrafo de su "artículo", citarlo indirectamente y llamarle uno de esos "desesperados, aventureros, terroristas... que se mueren . . .". Pero ya el revolucionario Pablo Alvarado Barrera no puede responderle, como tampoco puede hacerlo directamente Mario R. Menéndez Rodríguez, desterrado por el gobierno en La Habana, Cuba.

Pero podemos, los que día a día luchamos por sacar esta revista, exigir a este pobre Galán y a sus amos de "Siempre" y a los amos de ambos, a los gobernantes de México y a la clase dominante que los sostiene, lanzarles una exigencia clara y terminante:

Ustedes, bien informados polizontes, bien informados criados con o sin librea, prueben con sus elementos que la Revista POR QUE? está financiada por la CIA o por instrumentos de la CIA. Demuestren, señores gobernantes de México, servil instrumento de todos los gobernantes en turno, "jefe Pagés", demuestren lo que afirma Rico Galán por órdenes de ustedes.

Esperamos sus "pruebas", y nos reímos de la pobre mentalidad de todos ustedes al asignar a nuestra Revista apoyos que ustedes mismos distorsionan, por lo que ha dolido a sus patrones gubernamentales la denuncia presentada por diversos periodistas en todos los instrumentos de las Naciones Unidas y en todas las asociaciones internacionales de periodistas. Ahora, prueben su dicho o queden allí como calumniadores. Y ojalá que pronto liberen a su sirviente los señores que gobiernan a México, para que el "héroe" pueda volver a su basurero.

97

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

Date completed: _ _

SWL PART II: WORKSHEET

1. TRUE NAME: Victor Rico Galan

2. OTHER NAMES:
Alias: Armando Conte

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 6 Feb 1928

4. PLACE OF BIRTH: El Ferrol, Spain.

5. CITIZENSHIP: Spanish at Birth, Naturalized Mexican 15 Mar 49.

6. OCCUPATION: Writer/Journalist

7. LOCATION: ~~(Residence~~ (as of Aug 65)
~~Providencia #950, Mexico City~~
Ernestina Larrainzar #17-8, Colonia del Valle, Mexico City

DO NOT

TYPE IN THIS

SPACE

10. PHOTOGRAP
Date of Photograp
[illegible]

8. POLITICAL AFFILIATION:

Subject has been a well known leftist journalist in Mexico since at least 1957. Subject has been a well known leftist journalist in Mexico since at least 1957. Since at least 1960 he has been a steady writer for the two leftist periodicals Siempre and Politica. Subject was a founding member of the MLN and subsequently headed that group's Press and Propaganda Committee. He has always been close and sympathetic to the CASTRO revolution and, in 1961, was reported to be a member of "Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba" and of the "Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution". As of June 1965, Subject was reported to be a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

9. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES: Subject was arrested in Aug 63 for participating in a pro-political prisoner demon- stration. Subject's pro-CASTRO/Communist writings as well as his contacts with known Soviet, Satellite and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico during the past few years leave no doubt as to his "~~CW~~ propaganda" role, under journalistic cover, on behalf of these interests. Subject visited Cuba during May-June 63 ostensibly to interview CASTRO after latter's return from the Soviet Union. During this contact with the Cuban government, however, he was given the mission of traveling through Central & South America to contact local Communist/guerrilla leaders for the purpose of persuading them to begin campaigns of violence and terror to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela. A secondary mission was to bring about greater unity among the various Communist and terrorist groups. Subject undertook this assignment during Oct - Dec 63, visited Caribbean and South American countries, and contacted key Communists in each. Subject visited the Dominican Republic in Jan 64, and as a result of the contacts made there with the AFCJ (militant, revolutionary, pro-CASTRO group) was able to serve during the Dominican crisis of May 65 as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the AFCJ and also as a reporting channel from Juan [illegible]. MEJIA, an AFCJ leader, to the Cuban Intelligence Service and the AFCJ's CASTRO-Cuban leadership in Cuba. Subject ~~xxxxxxxx~~ returned to Mexico from a trip to Cuba on 11 February 1966.

?

SOURCES OF WORKSHEET DATA

Entry No.(s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
				1963	[illegible]
2.	[illegible]	[illegible]	—	—	[illegible]
3.	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
2.	[illegible]				

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SOURCES OF WORKSHEET DATA (Continued)

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
10.	HNMA-3033	31 Oct 63	—	1963	Photo
8.	HMMA-26800	5 Aug 65	Sta files	—	Bio.
	HMM-5791	28 Jul 61	LIFTER	Jul 61	Cuban Solidarity Comm.
	HMM-9727	4 Jun 65	LIFTER	Jun 65	FEP, enemy of PPS.
9.	HMM-2323	16 Jan 57	—	1957	Sov contacts.
	HMMA-26600	5 Aug 65	Sta files	—	Bio.
	PACY-1033	23 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Panama CP contacts.
	PACY-1058	25 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Caribbean trip.
	PACY-1054	25 Oct 63	HYSAGE-1	Oct 63	Caribbean trip.
	HMM-7644	21 Aug 63	—	Aug 63	Arrested.
	HMM-26223	28 May 65	LIFEAT	May 65	Sov intell contact.
	HMMA-26286	7 Jun 65	ESLIDE-1	May 65	Yon Sosa contact.
	MEXI-3880	23 Jun 65	LIFEAT	Jun 65	Cuban intell contact.

Summary Instructions for SWL Form Part II: Worksheet

1. Enter only data suitable for release in case of need, without jeopardizing CS sources, methods or operations. Only substantiated, reliable information may be recorded.

2. Use only commonly accepted and readily recognized abbreviations. See Section II, para 8, in the Instructions under Item 8 concerning the abbreviations of organization

3. Sample standardized entries for several items for guideline purposes follow: (1) Jorge RAMIREZ Clauro; (3) 11 January 1917; (4) Bogota, Colombia; (5) Bolivi; (6) Teacher; (7) Residing at 12 Avenida Espana, La Paz, Bolivia, as of Februar 1965. See Section II, para 8, of Instructions for detailed guidance on completing items 1-10.

4. A precise record of source and documentation data for the information entries must be maintained. The researcher may simply enter the required source data for each item, referencing the appropriate item number under Entry Nos. column. Or, if he prefers, he may place a footnote number, beginning with (1), encircled or in parentheses, after the pertinent entry or bit of information. Record the footnote number under the Entry Nos. column with pertinent source and documentation data. Hence the same footnote number may be used repeatedly after any information entries where source, document, etc. are the same. Warning: In typing the items 1 through 10 data from the SWL Worksheet onto the preprinted ozalid master, the typist must be cautioned not to include the footnote reference numbers.

5. Upon completing the Worksheet, enter the date of completion in the upper right corner of the form. The Worksheet must be fastened and retained inside the left cover of the 201 dossier.

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SWL PART III: INVESTIGATIVE SUPPLEMENT---SOURCE SHEET

Summary Instructions for SWL Form Part III: Investigative Supplement

1. Enter only data in items 11-20 suitable for release to other U.S. or foreign security and intelligence services, since this form supplements SWL Part I (items 1-10) with those items of identification data considered of particular value to professional security and intelligence agencies in identifying and locating the SWL individual concerned and in developing reporting sources on him. See Section III, para 5, of Instructions for detailed guidance on completing items 11-20.

2. A precise record must be maintained and recorded below of source and documentation data for the information entries. The column Entry Nos. should correspond with the item numbers. Hence, when source and document are the same for information entered under two or more items, the pertinent item numbers may appear together under the Entry Nos. column with source and documentation data recorded only once.

3. When the completed Investigative Supplement is to be passed to another agency, the white page containing items 11-20 may be xeroxed in the required number of copies. The sensitive blue Source Sheet must not be reproduced.

4. The original of this completed form together with the Source Sheet must be permanently retained inside the left cover of the 201 dossier.

SOURCES OF DATA:

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
11, 13, 14	Subj's Dossier	Sep 63	LITEMPO	Sep 63	Description: Family
18, —	HMMA-26313	9 Jun 65	LIENVOY-2	—	"
	HMMA-26600	5 Aug 65	STA FILES	—	"
19.	HMMA-6770	5 Oct 62	LIFE	Oct 62 ✓	Havana Trip
	HMMA-7466	23 Jan 63	LIENVOY	May 63	Havana Trip
	PACY-10578	25 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	Caribbean Trip
	MANA-4562	31 Oct 63	—	Oct 63	" "
	RIOD-2720	22 Nov 63	ALACINE/ASTERIX	Nov 63	Brazil trip
	HMMA-2277	10 Jan 64	—	Jan 64	Dominican Trip
	HMMA-2366	Jan 64	LIFIRE	Jan 64	Havana Trip

(Space for additional entries on other side)

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TEST FORM

[illegible]

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SOURCES OF DATA: (Continued)

Entry No. (s)	Document Symbol and No.	Document Date	Source Identity (Cryptonym)	Date of Information	Comments
19. (CONT'D)	UFGA-21056/2	23 APR 65	—	MAR 65	Habana trip.
	TDCS-3/567,563	10 JAN 64	LIENVOY	Oct-Dec 63	Carib & L.A. trip.
	HMMA-26800	5 AUG 65	Sta files	1962-65	Travel data

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INVESTIGATIVE SUPPLEMENT

TRUE NAME: Victor Rico GALAN

11. ETHNIC ORIGIN: SPANISH

12. LANGUAGES: SPANISH, OTHERS UNKNOWN.

13. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
(Date(s) of Information: Sep 1963 .)

Sex: MALE Apparent Age: — Color: WHITE

Height: 5'9" Weight: APPROX 160 lbs Build: STOCKY

Hair Color: BLACK-GREYING Eye Color: BROWN Face Shape: —

Teeth: - Posture: ERECT Other: —

14. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES OR PECULIARITIES: Mustache, as of Sept 63.

15. FINGERPRINTS: None on file.

16. EDUCATION: Unknown.

17. EMPLOYMENT (last known): 1965, writer.
Employer: Siempre (~~[illegible]~~ weekly news magazine), Politica (bi-weekly [illegible] magazine)
Address. Mexico City

18. FAMILY Father: Victor Rico Gonzalez (born Spain, 6 Feb 28, arrived Mexico 6 Nov 1939); Mother: Fernanda Galan [illegible]; Wife: [illegible] DIENER de Rico Galan (born 11 May 27, Mexico); Brother: Fernando Rico Galan; Sister: Ana Maria Rico Galan.

19. TRAVEL:

Passport Number	From	To	Date	Purpose
57115	MEXICO	HABANA	2 OCT 62	WRITE CASTRO BIOG.
57115	MEXICO	HABANA	21 MAY 63	—
53641	MEXICO	[illegible]	OCT-NOV 63	COURIER / C.P. CONTACTS.
—	JAMAICA	DOMINICAN REP	7 JAN 64	
53641	MEXICO	HABANA	22 JAN 64	INTERVIEW CASTRO.
—	MEXICO	HABANA	24 MAR 66	~~[illegible]~~ —

20. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
Function/Position: Courier between communist/revolutionary groups in Central & South America.
Activities (supplementary resume): Communist/Castro propaganda writer.

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SWL PART IV: OPERATIONAL DATA

TRUE NAME: Victor Rico Galan

201 No.: 336174

SOURCES WITH DIRECT OR INDIRECT ACCESS TO SUBJECT:

LIFIRE
LIENVOY
LIONHEART
LIVACATE
LIEMBRACE
LIFTER
ESLURCT → [illegible]
ALSTAV/[illegible] 1963 [illegible]

RESUME OF OPERATIONALLY SENSITIVE DATA ON SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY:

Document References, Dates and Source Cryptonyms:

Instructions for SWL Form Part IV: Operational Data

1. This form will be used for maintaining a ready reference list of sources with direct or indirect access to subject and for recording operationally sensitive data on subject's subversive activities.

2. Data incorporated into this form are operationally sensitive and are intended to aid the field station responsible for investigative follow-up of an individual, in directing questions and leads promptly to other components with sources in a position to acquire data, or to components best able to evaluate new information.

3. In entering data on sources with direct or indirect access to subject, specify the cryptonym of source (either agent or liaison service). If a liaison service is involved, specify component, officer (by cryptonym), and, if possible, agent sub-source. If other than a professional source is involved, specify location and date of information; nature of contact as well as identity. (e.g., "Family contact-Juan MORELOS, Mexico City, May 1964.")

4. The information entries of operationally sensitive data on subversive activities must be sourced by reference and source cryptonym, to facilitate rapid referral of questions to the responsible desk or field station. Where an entry under this section deals with contact with an intelligence or security service, first give the service designation and name of the officer or known agent with whom contact has been recorded. Then specify succinctly the nature of the relationship or activity involved.

5. The completed form, or a copy thereof, should be affixed to and retained in the left cover of the 201 dossier.

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SWL PART V: INVESTIGATIVE ACTION RECORD

TRUE NAME: ______________________________

201 No.: ________________

ACTION REQUESTED (Summary)	REFERENCE		RESULTS (Summary)	REFERENCE	
	Document Symbol and Number	Date		Document Symbol and Number	Date

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TEST FORM

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Instructions for SWL Form Part V: Investigative Action Record

1. Intended for overall SWL program management purposes, this form permits the maintenance of an orderly record on a cumulative basis of action requested and results achieved concerning the SWL individual.

2. The form has six columns for entering summary information on action requested, results of action, and for recording reference data. Action requested should be described succinctly (e.g., "Name trace w. liaison," "Baggage search," "Check with last employer.").

3. This form must be incorporated permanently into the 201 dossier, attached inside the left hand cover.

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SWL PART VI: PROGRESS LOG

TRUE NAME: ____________________

201 No.: ____________________

	REFERENCE		ACTION		VALIDATED	
	Document Symbol and Number	Document Date	By	Date	By	Date
1. SWL Nomination						
2. SWL Acceptance					JH	10/1
3. Indicator Assigned						
4. Name Traced						
5. 201 opened or consolidated						
6. Worksheet completed					JH	11/12
7. Notebook Master Typed						
8. Photo Master Prepared						
9. Fingerprints Available						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13. Periodic Review						
#1						
#2						
#3						
#4						
#5						
#6						
#7						
#8						
#9						
#10						
#11						
#12						
#13						
#14						
14. Removed from SWL						

Instructions for SWL Form Part VI: Progress Log

1. Prepared for overall SWL program management purposes, the use of this form will reflect the SWL maintenance operations and periodic reviews concerning the individual in question.

2. This form will be fastened permanently inside the left cover of the 201 dossier when the designation of an individual for inclusion in the country SWL has been approved. Entries will thereafter consist of handwritten references, dates, and officer's initials only, reflecting administrative aspects of the SWL.

3. The form embodies a number of self-evident items against each of which will be recorded the following in appropriate columns:

   a. "Indicator Assigned" (item 3) - action taken via Form [illegible] 831, assigning the OI code "W" for the SWL individual. Preprinted Forms [illegible] are available from the Division SWL Officer for this purpose. All SWL individuals must have a 201 and must bear the OI code "W";

   b. "Reference" - document or cable reference if the action is reflected in a specific dispatch or cable;

   c. "Action" - initials of the analyst or officer responsible for the specific step, together with the date of action completed;

   d. "Validated" - initials of the responsible reviewing officer and date of such review action. Validation must always be recorded for items 6 and 7, which entails the approval of the final clean copy text of a listing for incorporation in the SWL Country Notebook.

   e. Items 10, 11, and 12 are reserved for possible future use.

4. Under the item "Periodic Review", the date when the next periodic review of the SWL listing will be made should appear immediately after the #. It is recommended that the officer responsible for the maintenance of the SWL for a specific country enter this date on the desk copy of the 201 print-out of all SWL personalities to use as a reminder. It is also recommended that the station copy of the SWL 201 print-out list carry, for each name, a "preliminary review" date at least one month earlier than the HQs review date. On the basis of this reminder the station can then undertake a final canvassing of available sources to bring entries on the individual up to date and transmit the results to HQs just prior to the periodic review in HQs.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 170752

DATE 29 August 1966

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Christopher D. Costanzo

OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1 Mexico

ROOM, BUILDING Ames 332

EXTENSION 3655

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)

☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED

☐ ADDITIONAL DATA

☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)

☒ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY

☐ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)

Victor RICO Galan

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

Armando CONTE

Sebastian KANELL

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

6 Feb 1928, El Ferrol, Spain

4. CITIZENSHIP

Mexican (Naturalized)

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Journalist, Mexico

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

Prominent Marxist and radical writer

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
See attachment		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

See attachment

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'9			Greying	Caucasian	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Ingebord DIENER de RICO Galan

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

Tilli PICHLER viuda de DIENER , mother in law

Fernando RICO Galan, brother; Ana Maria RICO Galan , sister

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Travel, biographic, education, subversive activities

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 9-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: Charlotte Bustos

14 Sept 1966
DATE

FROM: F1/D

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A. ☒ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F1/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F1/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☐ F1/D HAS NO PERTINENT INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F1/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F1/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F1/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F1/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Current Biographic Data on Victor RICO Galan as of 19 August 1966 from OCR/BR/Mex

S/NF CS 3/489-625 12 Oct 61 B-2
Elected to Propaganda Commission, MLN Federal District Committee.

S CS 3/482-611 4 Aug 61 B-2
Member Committee for Solidarity with Cuban Revolution.

S/NF CS 3/481-944 28 July 61 B-2
Invited to attend 26 July Celebration in Havana.

S/NF CS 3/489-630 12 Oct 61 B-2
Took part in a round-table discussion held by MLN regarding Lopez Mateos' report to Congress on 1 Sept 61. Rico pointed out that Lopez Mateos was, if not pro-US in his actions, then anti-left; his (Rico's) statements innocuous.

S/NF CS 3/496-988 26 Dec 61
Listed as a staff member of Liberacion Nacional, an MLN publication.

UNCL FBIS #? 22 Apr 62
In "A Third Position in IA?" in Siempre, Rico wrote: "it happens, then, that the Latin American Common Market with its tendency on the exercise of effective economic sovereignty, implies many things, such as trade with the socialist world--which next year will represent 52% of the world production, constituting a 3rd international position--and the defense and exercise of coexistence between nations of different Social regimes....Will there emerge now a 3rd position--Mexico and Brazil--which, basing itself on the IACM will maintain coexistence with an independent policy?"

S/NF CS 3/508-797 26 Apr 62 B-2
"Marxist journalist who heads the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee." (Still head May 31, 63--A-1557)

S/NF CS 3/520-508 23 Aug 62 B-2
Planned meeting to map out a campaign for the release from prison of David ALFARO Sigueiros, "prominent Mexican Communist artist" with Alfaro's wife.

CONF - 3 Oct 62 - ??
On a flight to Cuba on a Cuban plane with "other" Mexican Communists and 2 Soviet diplomatic couriers.

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S CS 3/525-084 17 Oct 62 B-2
"plans to write a political biography of Castro." Left Mexico on 2 Oct 62 with Mexican passport 51115 with Cuban courtesy visa. Spent 2 months there.
*See p. 6.

CONF A 1291 9 Apr 63
In 20 Mar issue of Siempre he "advocated the creation of a new political party which would reflect the ideology of Former President Lazaro Cardenas.."(bio: he is a founding member of the pro-Communist MLN and an ardent supporter of Castro. While in Cuba (Oct-Nov 62) he contributed weekly articles to Siempre in which he sustained the thesis that Cuba is now the center of the world's socialist revolutionary movement. The Left in Mexico needs a "party of L. Cardenas" which....would stand for socialism in internal matters and for independence from any bloc in external affairs.)

S/NF CS 3/552-990 10 July 63
To Cuba 25 May-22 June 63; spent 8 days with Castro

UNCL A-6 Merida 6 Aug 63
On 1 August attended the Pro-Castro Mexican-Cuban Institute in Merida accompanied by Luis Alberu the Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Cuban Embassy.

S CS 3/558-382 B-2 6 Sep 63
Rico, along with Marcue Pardinas and Carrion Villa was one of the principal organizers and participants in a rally in favor of the political prisoners held in Mexico City on 18 August 63. The rally failed to be held because of police intervention. All arrested and and released same day. On evening of 21 August they demanded, unsuccessfully, to see Diaz Ordaz, then Minister of Interior.

S/NF CS 3/560-130 25 Sep 63 B-2
"Rico planning trip to Guatemala" plans to interview Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, Chief of Guatemalan Government, also visit Guatemalan guerrillas.

UNCL A-451 24 Oct 63
Still on MLN National Committee.

S/NF TDCS 3/565-337 20 Nov 63 B-2
Interviewed YON Sosa in mid-October 63; listed as head of propaganda committee for MLN. TDCS 3/563-671 "reported that Rico had spent 8 days in Cuba with Castro and...was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America (Venezula, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Brazil) when he was to persuade Leftist parties to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela."

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S/NF CS 3/566-571 5 Dec 63 F-2
Rico had an interview in late October 63 with David Turner (Leader of the Vanguard of National Action [VAN]--radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group in Panama), Thelma King (pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly) and Hugo Victor (president of the Peoples Party, PdP Communist) discussing an armed movement in Panama.

B-2
An Armando Conte, "a writer for Tiempos in Mexico" reported to have come to Panama and talked to Hugo Victor around 5 Nov 63. He said he had come to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PdP would not be told what to do because it had its own line on the Panamanian revolution. (Field comment: travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico.)

S/NF TDCS 3/569-563 10 Jan 64 B-2
"Making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic in the very near future....ostensibly to gather information for the preparation of some articles on the Dominican Republic."

S/NF TDCS 3/569-940 14 Jan 64 B-2
Reports have identified Rico as an agent of Fidel Castro who in May 63 was assigned by Castro to visit Central and South American countries to confer with leading Communists in order to initiate programs of anti-US violence and sabotage. He reportedly arrived in Santo Domingo by air on 8 Jan 64 from Kingston, Jamaica to stay about a week.

S/NF TDCS 3/570-926 23 Jan 64 B-2
"While in the Dominican Republic he attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las Manaclas on 21 Dec 63 for propaganda purposes.

S CS 3/571-822 3 Feb 64 B-2
Left Mexico City for Havana by air on 28 Jan 64 (it might be noted that Castro returned from the USSR around that time).

S/NF CS 311/01556-65 4 Feb 65 C-2
Possibly in Chile. He met with members of the MPD while in the Dominican Republic.

CONF A-31 10 Feb 65 Merida
Visited Merida (had been there 28 Oct 64) and "[it] is quite certain that there will shortly appear in Siempre (Mexican leftist weekly) more articles on the henequen situation. It can be expected that Rico Galan will attempt to attribute all or a large portion of Yucatán's troubles to the 'imperialistic' US."

CONF CS 311/02173-65 15 Mar 65 "reporting so far accurate"
"Rico went to Merida during the first few days of February to make a personal investigation of the situation caused by the decrease in the price of henequen.." Rico wrote "Yucatan: Our leader is Hunger" in Issue #10, 3 Mar 65, of Siempre.

CONF A-1033 from Mexico 1 May 65
Re Dominican Republic: "Rico, writing in the ultra-left Diario de México favored Bosch's return, originally wishing him good luck, and later, after the apparent failure of pro-Bosch forces, complained that "the reactionaries always win out in Latin American coups, being supported by the US, or else the coups fail."

CONF/NF CS 311/07174-65 11 Jun 65
Veteran and trusted PPS member, prolific reporter of reliable information, described Rico as "member of the Peoples Electoral Front (FEP) and National Liberation Movement (MLN) [who] was one of those leaders who met in March or April 65 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress (on the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution)."

S/NF CS 311/04619-66 1 April 66 "source believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community"
Planning to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Carbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February. Source comment: "Rico could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio YON Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government."

CONF Incoming telegram 15986(?) 5 Apr 66
Alleged to have been one of two leaders (other was Jacinto Lopez UGOCM secgen) planned to lead mass meeting 6 April "to commemorate martyrs of September attack" (?? no further mention).

S/NF CS 311/06825-66 23 May 66 reporting believed reliable
Could not attend an MLN meeting because of illness.

UNCL FPIR 0112/66 23 May 66
In February became involved in a verbal editorial battle on the pages of Granma with Franc BARBIERI of the Yugoslav newspaper Politika. No conclusion reached.

CONF A-727 from Mexico 22 Jan 66
Rico...has been one of the most prolific and ardent apologists for Castro's Cuba in Mexico. In an interview between an Embassy officer

and the writer, Elena Garro de Paz, the latter states: "the Cuban Embassy had severely chided Rico for writing an article favorable to the guerrilla leaders who were killed recently during their assault on the army barracks at Madera, Chihuahua.... Rico had been close to "Che" Guevarra rather than Castro, and that since Guevarra's disappearance he had grown noticeably cooler toward Cuba." She added that although he is a Marxist and is anti-American, Rico is also very hostile to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

S/NF TDCS 314/10379-66 17 Aug 66 highly placed police official, reporting believed reliable
"Sufficient legal evidence is available to prove that Rico, Raul Ugalde and others were a part of a conspiracy advocating and teaching the overthrow of the Mexican government by violent means."

CONF/NF TDCS 314/10419-66 18 Aug 66 presumed B-2
12-13 August, Rico arrested with 40 others; the PPS is pleased and will do nothing to help them. "According to Carlos Sanchez Cardenas of the PPS National Executive Directorate, it is almost impossible to believe that a man like Rico could be the leader of an armed rebel movement. He has always been considered a Marxist intellectual belonging to no party who has confined his battles to the pages of magazines like Politica Siempre, and Sucesos. Lombardo Toledano frankly thought of him as incapable of doing anything that involved a mass following."

Additional information
From WH-1/Mexico:
Parents: Victor RICO Gonzalez
Fernanda GALAN Sieiros
(Spanish nationals--no information available, Mexican and Spanish files)
Wife: Ingabord DIENER de Rico
(No information available, Mexican or Scandinavian files.
In German files, there is reference to an Inge Diener; info dated 14 May 1956: born in Guben, 1920; of average intelligence; convinced, fanatical Communist; not liked; dangerous; of proletarian background; trained for administrative work; after 1945 worked for Cadre Department of city administration of Guben; from 1950-1952 studied at Academy for Administration in Forst-Zinna; afterwards obtained position in ministry; at first worked in Cadre Department, was responsible for embassy and trade mission personnel; transferred to present position because of disagreements with Vose (fnu); now responsible for currency matters; takes course during

6

SED Party School Year; mediocre qualifications; active in politics; member of Central Party Directorate and SED.

Pen names: Armande Conte--no info Mexican, Cuban, or Guatemalan files.
Sebastian Canell--no info Mexican files.

* CS 3/539-735 11 March 1963 B-2
One of a number of leftists (Terrazas Guerrero another one) who voted to reinstate Marcue Pardinas in the MLN.

SECRET

Victor RICO Galan

Basic Biographic Data

1. **Full Name** : Victor RICO Galan, has used pen name Armando CONTE and possibly Sebastian KANELL
2. **Place and Date of Birth**: El Ferrol (Galicia), Spain, 6 Feb 28
3. **Citizenship** : Mexican, naturalized 15 March 1949
4. **Official Documents**: Naturalization Certificate #445, 15 Mar 49
   Mexican Passport #57115
   Mexican Passport #53641, issued 9 Sep 63 and expired 15 March 1965.
5. **Father** : Victor RICO Gonzales, resident of El Ferrol, Spain, forced to leave Spain on account of Spanish Civil War, arrived Veracruz, Mexico, 6 November 1939.
6. **Mother** : Fernanda GALAN Sueiras, also a resident of El Ferrol, Spain, where she married RICO Gonzales in September 1922; she and her three children were separated from her husband during the Spanish Civil War and arrived in Mexico to join him in March 1940 as "asilados politicos".
7. **Siblings** : Fernando RICO Galan; PDOB: El Ferrol, Spain, 9 April 1929.
   Ana Maria RICO Galan; PDOB: El Ferrol, Spain, 14 September 1930.
8. **Spouse** : Ingebord DIENER de RICO Galan; PDOB: Mexico, 11 May 1929.
9. **Other Relatives** : Mother-in-law: Tilli PICHIER viuda de DIENER at whose home Subject and wife lived until June 1965: Providencia #930, Mexico, D. F., Tel: 23-07-92.
10. **Arrests** : Was among leading agitators arrested on 18 August 1963 by Mexican police for participating in demonstrations in favor of political prisoners; was released on same day.
11. **Physical Description**: Sex: Male, Color: White, Build: Stocky, Height: 5'9" (1.78m), Hair: Greying, Moustache as of Setpember 1963.
12. **Present Address** : (Since June 1965) Ernestina Lanainzar 19-B, Colonia del Valle, Mexico, D. F., Tel.43-54-94

SECRET

13. **Travel:**

In Cuba July 1962

Went to Cuba 2 Oct 62, joined by wife Nov 62, returned Mexico Dec 62

Went to Cuba 25 May 63, returned Mexico 22 Jun 63

Went to Guatemala early Oct 63 for a few days; may have spent short time in Salvador

Entered Honduras 11 Oct 63 and left 13 Oct 63

Entered Nicaragua 13 Oct 63 and left 17 Oct 63

Entered Costa Rica 17 Oct 63 and left 20 Oct 63

Entered Panama 20 Oct 63 and left 22 Oct 63

Entered Venezuela 22 Oct 63 and left 12 Nov 63

Entered Brazil 12 Nov 63; may have traveled to Cuba, perhaps clandestinely and reentered Brazil

Entered Argentina 4 Dec 63 and left 12 Dec 63

Entered Chile 12 Dec 63 and left 16 Dec 63

Entered Peru 17 Dec 63 and left same day

Entered Bolivia 17 Dec 63 and left 20 Dec 63

Entered Peru 20 Dec 63 and returned Mexico possibly on same day

Left Mexico and arrived Jamaica 8 Jan 64 en route to Dominican Republic where he arrived on the same day; he left on 15 Jan 64 and returned Mexico via Jamaica on the same day.

Went to Cuba 28 Jan 64 and returned Mexico 25 Feb 64

Possibly several clandestine trips to Guatemala in middle and late 1964.

Went to Cuba 29 Mar 65 with wife and returned Mexico 12 Apr 65

Went to Cuba in early 66 and returned Mexico 11 Feb 66

SECRET

Summary

1. Victor RICO Galan is a prominent pro-Castro Marxist journalist associated with Politica a pro-Communist bi-weekly news magazine and Siempre a Mexico City leftist news weekly. In 1961 he was reported to be a member of the Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba and the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. As of June 1965 he was reported to be a member of the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP). He was a founder of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) of which he was the head of the national press and propaganda committee as of 1962. RICO acted as a Cuban agent in trips to Central and South America in late 1963 and early 1964. His pro-Castro communist writings as well as his contacts with known Soviet and Bloc intelligence personnel in Mexico during the past few years strongly suggest a propaganda role under journalistic cover on behalf of their interests.

2. Little is known of RICO's early life or education beyond what is listed in his basic biographic data. There is a possibility that he was active in communist affairs in Costa Rica and El Salvador in the period 1946-1948 and in Colombia in 1949-1950.

3. RICO Galan's prominence in Mexican leftist circles has been primarily intellectual. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the true ideology of Lazaro CARDENAS. RICO felt that this would provide the Mexican left with a political party truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary, in RICO's view, because the MLN was an action organization rather than a political party, whose membership covered a political spectrum from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to the Partido Comunista de Mexico (PCM), and was therefore diluted in effectiveness. A new party would represent a "third position": Socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With such a political action arm, wrote RICO, the MLN would develop naturally into a broad national movement such as the FRAP in Chile.

4. Victor RICO Galan is an ardent supporter of Fidel CASTRO and is reported to be a close friend of his. In order to gather material for a biography of CASTRO, RICO, later joined by his wife, visited Cuba in October 1962 for about two months. He visited Cuba again during part of May and most of June 1963 when he spent eight days with CASTRO, five of them at sea in CASTRO's boat, ostensibly to discuss CASTRO's recent trip to the Soviet Union and his talks with KHRUSCHEV. On this visit the Cuban Government gave RICO a mission to travel through Central and South America to contact local communists and guerrilla leaders and persuade them to begin immediately campaigns of violence and terror in order to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela. RICO was also charged to try to bring about greater unity among the various leftist groups.

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5. In the Fall and Winter of 1963 and late 1964 undertook this mission. Even though a known leftist he possibly had some arrangement with the Mexican Government which may have gotten him special privileges and support from Mexican embassies in countries where he visited. In Guatemala RICO interviewed General Enrique PERALTA Azurdia the Chief of Government and then met Raul ALARCON Monsanto, military training leader of the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT), who took him to meet and interview Marco Antonio YON Sosa an anti regime guerrilla leader; RICO possibly also met a (fnu) GOMEZ Ayau also a guerrilla leader. In Nicaragua he met with Alvaca RAMIREZ Gonzales, Secretary General of the Mobilizacion Republicana (MR) and a member of the Central Committee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). In Costa Rica he met with one of the MORA brothers, a guerrilla leader. In Panama he met Hugo VICTOR, president of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP), and David TURNER, leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN), and attempted to reconcile them in their dispute for leadership of the revolution in Panama; he also urged an immediate program of sabotage and violence. RICO went on to Venezuela to meet Argelia LAYA; he was probably in contact with the MIR while there. He then went to Brazil where he contacted Paulo SCHILLING, coordinator of the Popular Mobilization Front. During this time he may have gone to Cuba briefly and returned directly to Brazil. After a few days back in Mexico RICO went to the Dominican Republic where he attempted unsuccessfully to obtain photographs of Dominican guerrillas killed the month before, probably to use them for propaganda purposes. As a result of his contact with the Agrupacion Politica Catorce Junio (APCJ) in the Dominican Republic he was able to serve during the Dominican Republic crisis of May 1965 as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the APCJ and also as a reporting channel from Juan B. MEJIA and APCJ leaders to the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ's CASTRO Cuban leadership in Cuba. After his return to Mexico City RICO visited Cuba again ostensibly to interview CASTRO on his most recent trip to the Soviet Union and probably to report on his mission.

6. RICO Galan continued his interest in the guerrilla struggle and was reported to have entered Guatemala clandestinely in August 1964 and possibly several times before then as well, to visit YON Sosa and his guerrillas. In March 1966, after having returned from Cuba the month before, he planned to travel again to Guatemala clandestinely in order to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ, leader of the PGT and of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who had recently returned to Guatemala.

7. RICO's writings show an ardent support for the guerrillas in Latin America and for their method in achieving the revolution. In October 1964 the Guatemalan Armed Forces captured a number of tape recorders and tapes from the guerrillas including one by

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Victor RICO Galan. This tape consisted mainly of an exhortation for unity between the PGT and the 13 November Group, and counseled against letting doctrine replace action. RICO's talk to the guerrillas under YON Sosa reveals him as an intellectual radical with a pragmatic approach towards current situations. The text of the tapes indicate that they were made between February and mid-October 1964. On 13 January 1966 El Heraldo, a Mexico City newspaper published an article quoting RICO Galan's taped speech as evidence of his efforts to undermine the January 1966 visit of DIAZ Ordaz to Guatemala. The text of the tape was possibly passed to El Heraldo by the Mexican authorities in line with the Government's campaign to neutralize all potential and existing opposition to the impending visit.

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Contacts:

Nikolay LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and KGB officer, with whom RICO may have arranged a meeting in May 1965 with Dr. Emilio CORDERO, Dominican exile in Mexico City.

Jovan MIRIC, a Yugoslavian journalist in Mexico and possible intelligence officer with whom RICO, around the middle 1965, discussed the Dominican situation and OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Branko MILIJANOVIC, an intelligence officer in the Yugoslavian Embassy in Panama who may have had contact with RICO; in Jan 64 MILIJANOVIC told Thelma KING, a prominent Panamanian Communist, that RICO wanted her to go to Mexico and Cuba and arrange a meeting between CASTRO emissaries and three left wing Panamanian political figures Carlos Ivan ZUNIGA, Fabian ECHEVERS, both members of the Panamanian Socialist Party (PSP), and Manuel SOLIS Palma, Panamanian Minister of Education.

Mireya de VAN RABEN, member of the Central Committee of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), with whom RICO had social contact in 1965.

Prof Juan MASCARO Neves, a Spanish national who, with his wife Carmen GARCIA de MASCARO, was active in connection with affairs of the Cuban Consulate in Tampico before he was deported to Venezuela in May 1966 for violating Mexican Immigration Law; he was a key contact of Victor RICO Galan during a visit the latter made to Tampico and Ciudad Monte in April 1966.

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Addendum

Basic Biographic Data

1. Education: Victor RICO Galan may have studied at the School of Philosophy and Letters at the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM). One report states that he may have studied philology at UNAM.

2. Siblings : In May 1966 his sister Ana Maria RICO Galan was reported married to Guillermo MENDIZABAL, a collaborator with Mexican Trotskyists. An August 1966 article in the Mexican newspaper *Excelsior* stated that Ana Maria RICO Galan used her ex-husband's name and called herself Carmen MENDIZABAL Lizalde. Another report of August 1966 states that Carmen MENDIZABAL Lizal, Victor RICO Galan's sister, may have travelled frequently to Guatemala and have been the contact between the Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCES) and the Partido Comunista de Mexico (PCM).

3. Travel : A farewell party was given for RICO on 9 September 1961 but there is no record of where he travelled.

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Summary

1. Victor RICO Galan joined the staff of Al Dia, an anti-U. S. magazine, in January 1956 and was listed as its editor-in-chief in 1958. In February 1957 he was editor-in-chief of a new magazine La Gazeta de Mexico, published by the Buro de Investigaciones Politicas (BIP) headed by a Communist Horacio QUINONES.

2. In 1956, according to an August 1966 article in the Mexico City newspaper El Sol de Mexico, Victor RICO Galan, Fidel CASTRO, and Raul CASTRO, received instruction in Guerrilla tactics from Alberto BAYO, a Spanish Communist, at Rancho San Miguel, Ayotzingo, Mexico. According to the article, on various occasions in 1956 RICO visited the CASTRO brothers at the ranch where they were receiving instruction.

3. In September 1960 Victor RICO Galan was Chief of Information of Pueblo, an anti-U. S. pro-Cuba newspaper and was a member of the preparatory committee for the second International Congress of Journalists to be held in Austria in October 1960. The following year he was reported to be a leader of the intellectual faction of the Mexican committee to give impulse to fight for peace and international cooperation which was making preparations for the Latin American Peace Congress scheduled for Mexico City in March 1961.

4. In November 1965 Victor RICO Galan was reported to have been a militant member of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR/T) middle guard headed by Juan POSADAS.

Contacts:

Victor RICO Galan is known to have been in contact with the Soviets as early as November 1956 when he was invited to attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Umanislaw RACZKA, employee of the Press and Propaganda Section of the Polish Legation in Mexico City was in contact with RICO in July 1959.

Aleksandr BEKIER, Counselor of the Polish Embassy in Mexico City and known Intelligence Officer. RICO arranged for him to meet Carlo COCCIOLI, a homosexual Italian pro-Communist writer for Siempre magazine.

Mariano GARCIA Perez, Cuban Consul in Merida, who while in Mexico City in July 1966 was in contact with Victor RICO Galan.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible] important
10/[illegible]

Current Biographic Data on Victor RICO Galan as of 19 August 1966 from OCR/BR/Mex

S/NF	CS 3/489-625 12 Oct 61 B-2 Elected to Propaganda Commission, MLN Federal District Committee.
S	CS 3/482-611 4 Aug 61 B-2 Member Committee for Solidarity with Cuban Revolution.
S/NF	CS 3/481-944 28 July 61 B-2 Invited to attend 26 July Celebration in Havana.
S/NF	CS 3/489-630 12 Oct 61 B-2 Took part in a round-table discussion held by MLN regarding Lopez Matocs' report to Congress on 1 Sept 61. Rico pointed out that Lopez Matocs was, if not pro-US in his actions, then anti-left; his (Rico's) statements innocuous.
S/NF	CS 3/496-988 26 Dec 61 Listed as a staff member of Liberacion Nacional, an MLN publication.
UNCL	FBIS #? 22 Apr 62 In "A Third Position in LA?" in Siempre, Rico wrote: "it happens, then, that the Latin American Common Market with its tendency on the exercise of effective economic sovereignty, implies many things, such as trade with the socialist world--which next year will represent 52% of the world production, constituting a 3rd international position--and the defense and exercise of coexistence between nations of different Social regimes....Will there emerge now a 3rd position--Mexico and Brazil--which, basing itself on the LACM will maintain coexistence with an independent policy?"
S/NF	CS 3/508-797 26 Apr 62 B-2 "Marxist journalist who heads the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee." (Still head May 31, 63--A-1557)
S/NF	CS 3/520-508 23 Aug 62 B-2 Planned meeting to map out a campaign for the release from prison of David ALFARO Sigueiros, "prominent Mexican Communist artist" with Alfaro's wife.
CONF	- 3 Oct 62 - ?? On a flight to Cuba on a Cuban plane with "other" Mexican Communists and 2 Soviet diplomatic couriers.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

S CS 3/525-084 17 Oct 62 B-2
"plans to write a political biography of Castro." Left Mexico on 2 Oct 62 with Mexican passport 51115 with Cuban courtesy visa. Spent 2 months there.
*See p. 6.

CONF A 1291 9 Apr 63
In 20 Mar issue of Siempre he "advocated the creation of a new political party which would reflect the ideology of Former President Lazaro Cardenas.."(bio: he is a founding member of the pro-Communist MLN and an ardent supporter of Castro. While in Cuba (Oct-Nov 62) he contributed weekly articles to Siempre in which he sustained the thesis that Cuba is now the center of the world's socialist revolutionary movement. The Left in Mexico needs a "party of L. Cardenas" which....would stand for socialism in internal matters and for independence from any bloc in external affairs.)

S/NF CS 3/552-990 10 July 63
To Cuba 25 May-22 June 63; spent 8 days with Castro

UNCL A-6 Merida 6 Aug 63
On 1 August attended the Pro-Castro Mexican-Cuban Institute in Merida accompanied by Luis Alberu the Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Cuban Embassy.

S CS 3/558-382 B-2 6 Sep 63
Rico, along with Marcue Pardinas and Carrion Villa was one of the principal organizers and participants in a rally in favor of the political prisoners held in Mexico City on 18 August 63. The rally failed to be held because of police intervention. All arrested and and released same day. On evening of 21 August they demanded, unsuccessfully, to see Diaz Ordaz, then Minister of Interior.

S/NF CS 3/560-130 25 Sep 63 B-2
"Rico planning trip to Guatemala" plans to interview Col. Enrique PERALTA Azurdia, Chief of Guatemalan Government, also visit Guatemalan guerrillas.

UNCL A-451 24 Oct 63
Still on MLN National Committee.

S/NF TDCS 3/565-337 20 Nov 63 B-2
Interviewed YON Sosa in mid-October 63; listed as head of propaganda committee for MLN. TDCS 3/563-671 "reported that Rico had spent 8 days in Cuba with Castro and...was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America (Venezula, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Brazil) when he was to persuade Leftist parties to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela."

S/NF CS 3/566-571 5 Dec 63 F-2
Rico had an interview in late October 63 with David Turner (leader of the Vanguard of National Action [VAN]--radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group in Panama), Thelma King (pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly) and Hugo Victor (president of the Peoples Party, PdP Communist) discussing an armed movement in Panama.

B-2
An Armando Conte, "a writer for Tiempos in Mexico" reported to have come to Panama and talked to Hugo Victor around 5 Nov 63. He said he had come to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PdP would not be told what to do because it had its own line on the Panamanian revolution. (Field comment: travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico.)

S/NF TDCS 3/569-563 10 Jan 64 B-2
"Making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic in the very near future....ostensibly to gather information for the preparation of some articles on the Dominican Republic."

S/NF TDCS 3/569-940 14 Jan 64 B-2
Reports have identified Rico as an agent of Fidel Castro who in May 63 was assigned by Castro to visit Central and South American countries to confer with leading Communists in order to initiate programs of anti-US violence and sabotage. He reportedly arrived in Santo Domingo by air on 8 Jan 64 from Kingston, Jamaica to stay about a week.

S/NF TDCS 3/570-926 23 Jan 64 B-2
"While in the Dominican Republic he attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las Manaclas on 21 Dec 63 for propaganda purposes.

S CS 3/571-822 3 Feb 64 B-2
Left Mexico City for Havana by air on 28 Jan 64 (it might be noted that Castro returned from the USSR around that time).

S/NF CS 311/01556-65 4 Feb 65 C-2
Possibly in Chile. He met with members of the MPD while in the Dominican Republic.

CONF A-31 10 Feb 65 Merida
Visited Merida (had been there 28 Oct 64) and "[It] is quite certain that there will shortly appear in Siempre (Mexican leftist weekly) more articles on the henequen situation. It can be expected that Rico Galan will attempt to attribute all or a large portion of Yucatán's troubles to the 'imperialistic' US."

CONF CS 311/03173-65 15 Mar 65 "reporting so far accurate"
"Rico went to Merida during the first few days of February to make a personal investigation of the situation caused by the decrease in the price of henequen.." Rico wrote "Yucatan: Our leader is Hunger" in Issue #10, 3 Mar 65, of Siempre.

CONF A-1033 from Mexico 1 May 65
Re Dominican Republic: "Rico, writing in the ultra-left Diario de México favored Bosch's return, originally wishing him good luck, and later, after the apparent failure of pro-Bosch forces, complained that "the reactionaries always win out in Latin American coups, being supported by the US, or else the coups fail."

CONF/NF CS 311/07174-65 11 Jun 65
Veteran and trusted PPS member, prolific reporter of reliable information, described Rico as "member of the Peoples Electoral Front (FEP) and National Liberation Movement (MLN) [who] was one of those leaders who met in March or April 65 to draw up a letter of convocation to the National Congress (on the Liberty of the Political Prisoners and the Repeal of the Law of Social Dissolution)."

S/NF CS 311/04619-66 1 April 66 "source believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community"
Planning to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garcia, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February. Source comment: "Rico could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio YON Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government."

CONF Incoming telegram 15986(?) 5 Apr 66
Alleged to have been one of two leaders (other was Jacinto Lopez UGOCM secgen) planned to lead mass meeting 6 April "to commemarate martyrs of September attack" (?? no further mention).

S/NF CS 311/06825-66 23 May 66 reporting believed reliable
Could not attend an MLN meeting because of illness.

UNCL FPIR 0112/66 23 May 66
In February became involved in a verbal editorial battle on the pages of Granma with Frane BARBIERI of the Yugoslav newspaper Politika. No conclusion reached.

CONF A-727 from Mexico 22 Jan 66
Rico...has been one of the most prolific and ardent apologists for Castro's Cuba in Mexico. In an interview between an Embassy officer

and the writer, Elena Garro de Paz, the latter states: "the Cuban Embassy had severely chided Rico for writing an article favorable to the guerrilla leaders who were killed recently during their assault on the army barracks at Madera, Chihuahua.... Rico had been close to "Che" Guevarra rather than Castro, and that since Guevarra's disappearance he had grown noticeably cooler toward Cuba." She added that although he is a Marxist and is anti-American, Rico is also very hostile to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM).

S/NF TDCS 314/10379-66 17 Aug 66 highly placed police official, reporting believed reliable
"Sufficient legal evidence is available to prove that Rico, Raul Ugaldo and others were a part of a conspiracy advocating and teaching the overthrow of the Mexican government by violent means."

CONF/NF TDCS 314/10419-66 18 Aug 66 presumed B-2
12-13 August, Rico arrested with 40 others; the PPS is pleased and will do nothing to help them. "According to Carlos Sanchez Cardenas of the PPS National Executive Directorate, it is almost impossible to believe that a man like Rico could be the leader of an armed rebel movement. He has always been considered a Marxist intellectual belonging to no party who has confined his battles to the pages of magazines like Politica Siempre, and Sucesos. Lombardo Toledano frankly thought of him as incapable of doing anything that involved a mass following."

Additional information
From WH-1/Mexico:
Parents: Victor RICO Gonzalez
Fernando GALAN Sueiros
(Spanish nationals--no information available, Mexican and Spanish files)
Wife: Ingabord DIENER de Rico
(No information available, Mexican or Scandinavian files. In German files, there is reference to an Inge Diener; info dated 14 May 1956: born in Guben, 1920; of average intelligence; convinced, fanatical Communist; not liked; dangerous; of proletarian background; trained for administrative work; after 1945 worked for Cadre Department of city administration of Guben; from 1950-1952 studied at Academy for Administration in Forst-Zinna; afterwards obtained position in ministry; at first worked in Cadre Department, was responsible for embassy and trade mission personnel; transferred to present position because of disagreements with Vose (fnu); now responsible for currency matters; takes course during

SED Party School Year; mediocre qualifications; active in politics; member of Central Party Directorate and SED.

Pen names: Armando Conte--no info Mexican, Cuban, or Guatemalan files.
Sebastian Canelli--no info Mexican files.

* CS 3/539-735 11 March 1963 B-2
One of a number of leftists (Terrazas Guerrero another one) who voted to reinstate Marcue Pardinas in the MLN.

Vol III

Other Agency · 201-0336474

1. U.S Dept. of Justice Form G-135, Oct 24, 1966
2. U.S. AiRGram, confidential, From AmEmb. Mexico to Dept. of State - The Rico Galan Case in Perspective, Oct. 9, 1966. A-344
3. U.S. AiRGram, From Amembassy ~~Mexico~~ Veracruz to Dept. of State, ~~the Rico Galan Case~~ Ocean Shipping: Communist Ships, Nov. 30, 1966. A-28
4. Airgram A-817. From Amembassy Mexico to Dept of State. Further Info on the Rico Galan Case. Feb 8, 1967.
5. FBI memo., Apr. 29, 1968. Raul Orlando Olmedo Carranza.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY
DIR 95773	20 JAN 64;	PACY 1459(71798), 2 Dec 63

DOC. SUBJECT

DIR 94953 16 JAN 64; SDOM 2619(99172), 15 JAN 64

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION
SDOM 2634(02099), 20JAN 64;		WAVE 0874(03059), 21 JAN 64

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

HMMA-22801, 24JAN64(201-336474); KUGS 1097(03663), 22JAN64

MEXI-7478(07726), 24 JAN64; SDOM 2659(08142) 29JAN64

Additional information on this Subject can be found in:

ZRNICK 200-005-038

File Name and Number ~~RICO - Galan, Victor, 201-330974~~

Job No. 75-752 Box No. 2 Folder No. 15

To ORDER: CONTACT IR/AR x 4598

ROUTE THIS FORM TO:

1. OP/CPD, 5 E 65 HQS, if the subject is/was a contract employee.
2. IP/CFS, G C 52 HQS, if the subject has a 201 number (for inclusion in the 201 file).
3. ______________________, if the subject
(SPECIFY COMPONENT DESK AND ADDRESS)
requires a 201 file opening. (This form must be included in the new 201 file when received.)

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)

201- 0336474

FORM 867

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E-2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			

DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB 06 FEB 28
MEXICO, EL FERROL
CIT MEXICO
OCC ?

056-300-001
HZP -06340
21 NOV 63

POSS PSEUDO OF SUBJ ARMANDO CONTE. AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO. INTERVIEW W/VAN AND CP LEADERS IN PANAMA

HMM UEQ

171701

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SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- 0336 474			

FORM 8-66 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(7-46)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
JMROD/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 31108, 17 January 1967

1. Referenced dispatch forwarded a memorandum written by Zeno B. LEEHOLD regarding his meeting with Subject on 13 January 1967. LEEHOLD used journalist cover in his meeting with RICO Galan.

2. RICO Galan was released from prison on 2 April 1972.
HMM-13,013 reported that on his release he and two other prisoners
released with him, held a conference for students during which
Subject indicated that conditions for a violent struggle in Mexico
do not exist. Subject indicated he was going to establish a new
political group known as the Socialist Front. On 9 March 1972 a
newspaper article reported that the head of the Popular Socialist
Party of Mexico confirmed that RICO Galan had renounced trotskism.
Since his release from prison he has been very quiet and the
Station has received no reporting on his whereabouts or activity
other than a series of leftist articles he is writing for "Siempre"
magazine.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Distribution:
(3) - C/WHD

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-42155	20 July 1972
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICC GALAN, VICTOR	
201-336474	C50-004-000
SEX M DOB ?	DBC -88049
	29 JUN 70
CIT MEXICO	FBI
OCC ?	P8

< MEXICO ACTED IN REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF
VARIOUS MARXIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MEXICO FROM
SEPTEMBER 1969 TO JUNE 1970

R 7007240193

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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14-00000

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

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12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO NAMED IN REPORT ON REVITALIZATION OF MEXICAN NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS /CMELEPO/ W/COMMUNIST STIMULUS

C50-009-019
HMM -12186
30 APR 70
P3

R 7005182077

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

ORIG: John D[illegible]gins: mw
UNIT: WH/7/DR/CI
EXT: 4537/K9156
DATE: 9 April 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 23 PER: 2

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 FILE, VR. [illegible]

S E C R E T 10 00 39Z APR 70 CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO MEXICO CITY, SANTO DOMINGO INFO: WH/MIAMI,
BY POUCH: LIMA, CARACAS

JMVERSE EMPARENT

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 2891 (IN 058695)** RELAYED MIAMI, BEING POUCHED LIMA, CARACAS

B. SANTO DOMINGO 9102 (IN 058856)** RELAYED MIAMI, BEING POUCHED LIMA, CARACAS

1. GUSTAVO OMAR SANCHEZ DIAZ (201-867485) LINKED TO EMPARENT-1 THRU NOTATION IN EMPARENT-1 CONFISCATED PAPERS (MAY 67): "MARIO MOLINA AND REBECA DE MOLINA, AVE IQUITOS 1089, LA VICTORIA, LIMA." (SANTO DOMINGO 3526, (IN 72172) 18 MAY 67). LIMA INVESTIGATION DETERMINED MARIO MOLINA MANTILLA AND REBECA FILOMENA CABEZAS DE MOLINA, OF ABOVE ADDRESS, ARE PARENTS OF SANCHEZ' WIFE, MARION REBECA MOLINA CABEZAS.

2. SANCHEZ BORN 27 MAY 37, DR, ENTERED PERU 22 APR 62 ON DOMINICAN PP 57278 ISSUED 16 OCT 61. ATTENDED NATIONAL ENGINEERING UNIV, LIMA, AND LIVED JIRON LINO CORNEJO 287/F. ON 11 JAN 64 LEFT LIMA FOR CARACAS RETURNING LIMA 10 AUG 64.

continued. . . .

10 April 70

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO

PAGE 2

ON 28 AUG 64 SUBJ AND WIFE, MARION REBECA MOLINA CABEZAS, BORN 8 MAR 42, LIMA, LEFT PERU FOR PANAMA, WITH WIFE TRAVELLING ON PERUVIAN PP 150639 ISSUED FOR TRAVEL TO DR. NO FURTHER INFO HER FATHER, MARIO MOLINA MANTILLA. HER MOTHER, REBECA FILOMENA CABEZAS DE MOLINA, BORN 22 NOV 11, LIMA, Peruvian PP 180076 ISSUED 5 NOV 65 FOR TRAVEL TO DR, LEFT LIMA FOR BOGOTA 21 NOV 65 RETURNING FROM OR VIA BOGOTA 19 JAN 66 (SEE HPLA 9268, 6 MAR 66 SENT MEXICO CITY AND SANTO DOMINGO).

3. SUBJECT IS COUSIN OF GUIDO GIL DIAZ (201-789609) PROBABLE CUIS AGENT WHO "DISAPPEARED" FOLLOWING DOMINICAN POLICE ARREST JAN 67 (SANTO DOMINGO 4016, 17 AUG 65).

4. SUBJ POSSIBLY BROTHER OF JULIO ALBERTO SANCHEZ DIAZ (201-770315) BORN 1 AUG 35, SALCEDO; MPD MEMBER AND FORMER EDITOR MPD PUBLICATION, "LIBERTAD". ON 23 FEB 65 JULIO AND WIFE, ALMA DOMINGUEZ M., LEFT DR FOR JAMAICA REPORTEDLY ENROUTE CHILE WHERE JULIO TO STUDY ECONOMIC PLANNING. IN CHILE, JULIO WAS TO CONTACT VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474) FOR UNKNOWN PURPOSE. JULIO SANCHEZ

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TO

PAGE 3

DIAZ POSSIBLY IDEN WITH JULIO SANCHEZ OF PEDRO HENRIQUEZ URENA 9-ALTOS, SANTO DOMINGO, WHO RECIPIENT CHICOM PROPAGANDA MAY 69 (HDCA 8004); AND/OR JULIO SANCHEZ, PEDRO HENRIQUEZ URENA 8, WHO LISTED ADDRESS BOOK OF ROBERTO HOSTOS POLEO, INTERNATIONAL REP OF VENEZUELAN MIR (HVCA 15329, 3 APR 68).

5. SANTO DOMINGO: CAN YOU PROVIDE DETAILS ON EMPARENT-1'S LIMA ADDRESS NOTATION AS Hqs ATTEMPTING LOCATE ATTS TO HDCA 6265. ALSO MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE CONTACT EMWAND-1 REGARDING SANCHEZ DIAZ AND FAMILY, PARTICULARLY RE POSSIBLE BACK CONNECTION WITH EMPARENT-1.

6. MIAMI, LIMA, CARACAS: EMPARENT-1 AMONG DOMINICAN "POLITICAL" PRISONERS CURRENTLY MEXICO.

7. INDEX: MOLINA CABEZAS, MOLINA MANTILLA, CABEZAS DE MOLINA, DOMINGUEZ, HOSTOS.

8. FILE: 200-5-38; 22-8-7; 22-4-15; 201-782812 AND OTHER 201'S NOTED.

END OF MESSAGE

continued. . .

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CITE DIRECTOR 024201

TO

PAGE 4

WH COMMENT: *Request traces Gustavo Cesar SANCHEZ Diaz who arrived Mexico from Santo Domingo and in frequent contact with Dominican political prisoners, especially EMPARENT-1.

**Furnished Santo Domingo traces.

C/WH/COG

DC/WH/3

JOHN C. MURRAY
C/WH/1

DAVID L. SMOCK
C/WH/7

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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15 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/SAO

ATTENTION : Mr. Charles Anderson

SUBJECT : JMROD Counterinsurgency Target List

1. Per your request, the following is an updated version of the target listing forwarded to you on 25 September 1967.

a. Herberto CASTILLO Martinez (201-789870)
Subject is a pro-Cuban leader of the MLN - National Liberation Movement. He reportedly was a leading figure in the student movement against the Mexican Government in the fall of 1968. He was president of the Mexican delegation to OLAS. Subject was arrested in May 1969 and as of August 1969 was still in jail.

b. Rafael ESTRADA Villa (201-263944)
A Marxist activist who favors Castro's violent route to revolution, Subject attended the OLAS Conference in Havana in August 1967 as one of Mexico's representatives. He is the former Federal Deputy leader of the now defunct ONAR - National Organization of Revolutionary Action. Subject was arrested in April 1969.

c. Victor RICO Galan (201-336474)
A Spanish-born Mexican Communist journalist, Subject is an agent of the Cuban Government known to have been sent by the Cubans to talk to Guatemalan guerrillas in 1963. He is presently in prison.

2. Those names on the 1967 target list which do not appear above should be deleted.

Ernest J. Tsikerdanos
Acting Chief, WH/1

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INFO FILE, VR E/BN, CI, CI/OPS, FI2, CAS,

ACTION NO. 349

S E C R E T 030009Z JAN 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2201

DIRECTOR

3 Jan IN 000731

1. LITEMPOS REPORT ATTEMPTED JAILBREAK STAGED BY POLITICAL PRISONERS AT LECUMBERI PENITENTIARY, MEXICO CITY ON 1 JAN 1970, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HOLIDAY VISIT OF FAMILIES AND FRIENDS.

2. ENTIRE AFFAIR REPORTEDLY PRE-ARRANGED WITH POLITICAL PRISONERS BELIEVING THEY COULD ENLIST SUPPORT OF OTHER PRISONERS. RIOT ERRUPTED WITH OTHER PRISONERS JOINING AUTHORITIES IN PUTTING DOWN DISTURBANCE. UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WOUNDED, NO DEATHS REPORTED.

3. COMPLAINTS BEING SWORN OUT AGAINST FOLLOWING POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE RING-LEADERS OF ABORTIVE BREAK:

RAMON DANZOS PALOMINO (201-46208)

VICTOR RICO GALAN (WOUNDED) (201-336474)

MANUEL MARCUE PARDINES (201-290811)

RODOLFO ECHEVERRIA MARTINEZ

RAUL ALVAREZ GARIN

FEDERICO EMERY ULLOA (201-822098)

PROF. ERNEST OLVERA SOTRES

RAFAEL JACOBO GARCIA (BADLY WOUNDED)

4. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

5. DEFER. INDEX. FILE 50-9-3.

S E C R E T

SECRET

PRO-CPR MARXISTS SENTENCED FOR SUBVERSION

Paris AFP in English 0006 GMT 25 Jan 69 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Mexico City, Jan 25 (AFP)--Six pro-Chinese Marxists were jailed for 8 years each here today after being found guilty of trying to organise guerrilla activities in Mexico. Nine others were given less severe sentences.

All 15, who were arrested in 1966 and charged with conspiracy and illegal possession of arms, were preparing to make guerrilla attacks in various places in the interior, according to the authorities.

Among those jailed for 8 years was Marxist theorist Victor Rico Galan, described in the court judgement as one of the most dangerous men in the country.

Names of Accused

Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 2105 GMT 25 Jan 69 C (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Mexico City--Newspaperman and writer Victor Rico Galan was sentenced today to 8 years in prison and a fine of 10,000 pesos. The district judge also sentenced Gilberto Balam Pereira, Gumersindo Gomez Vuevas, Isaias Rojas Delgado, and Doctors Miguel Cruz and Rolf Meiners to similar terms. They were all arrested in 1966 and accused of subversive activities. Ana Maria Rico Galan, sister of Victor, was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in jail and a fine of 4,000 pesos. Yesterday she was freed on a 10,000-peso bond.

BRIEFS

U.S. BOAT'S SEIZURE--Mexico City--A U.S. shrimp boat was seized for fishing in Mexican territorial waters. The boat, the Pan American, was captured shortly after other U.S. boats paid 30,000 pesos each for fishing illegally in Mexican waters. The captain of the boat and two sailors have confessed to fishing in Mexican territorial waters. (Havana PRENSA LATINA Spanish 1200 GMT 24 Jan 69 C) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

LOAN REQUEST--Mexico City--Mexican Finance Minister Antonio Ortiz Mena has disclosed that Mexico is seeking a 500-million dollar loan from the World Bank to finance forestry exploitation, hydraulic projects, federal highway building, and rural electrification schemes. The main projects were for a rationalization of exploiting timber resources and improving infrastructure to benefit tourism, a major source of revenue. (Mexico City REUTERS English REUTERS Buenos Aires 1756 GMT 24 Jan 69 P) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

RURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND--Mexico City--Mexican industrialists are studying a plan to come to the aid of the Mexican farmers by contributing part of their profits to a rural development fund, National Manufacturing Industries Chamber President Nazario Ortiz Garza said here. The chamber, with a membership of some 24,000 manufacturers throughout the country, has proposed that they contribute 1 percent of their annual profits to the fund, Ortiz Garza told the chamber's annual general meeting on 23 January. Details would be worked out later. (Mexico City REUTERS English REUTERS Buenos Aires 1756 GMT 24 Jan 69 P) (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
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OCC ?

050-004-110
HMMA-35632A01
16 OCT 68
P3

< MEXICO RE LIST OF THOSE ARRESTED DURING STUDENT RIOTS AND PERSONS VISITING THEM

R 6811050016

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(7-46)

exico City
File 201- Victor RICO Galan

regalarle a AURORA un reloj, la chica se alegra y sorprende.- Saludos. Se verán el jueves.-

Ad.- 3.1.- HF. CANDELA por TOÑA. La saluda. Asuntos familiares. CANDELA esperando bebé en unos cuantos días.-

LAS 14.00 h. del día 4 de junio de 1968

Ad.- 4.2.- HF. SUAREZ avisa a su mujer que llega a comer. Pregunta si llamó LUISITO.- No, dice PEPITA.-

Ad.- 4.3.- HF. LEONOV pregunta por SUAREZ.- No está, dice MD. PEPITA. Comentarios breves del viaje, les fué bien. LUIS acaba de llamar y llega a comer a casa, descansa pero antes de las 17.00 h. no sale.- volverá a llamarlo.-

Ad.- 4.8.- No contestan.

Sal.- 4.9.- 44-58-22.- MD. SUAREZ (v) pregunta si regresaron los señores.- No.

Sal.- 5.0.- 23-07-33.- MD. SUAREZ por la Sra. INDUZ. La saluda, le pregunta por VICTOR y la salud de todos. Le pregunta SUAREZ cuando la puede ver.- INDUZ le promete ir mañana después de las 18.00 h.- SUAREZ conforme, la esperará.- Deja saludos para VICTOR, espera visitarlo la semana entrante.- Saludos y bienvenida.-

Sal.- 5.3.- 11-77-19.- ocupado dos veces.-

Sal.- 5.4.- 11-77-19.- MD. SUAREZ saluda a MF. Fany PAVEL y hablan de las fotos de FANY, están en un sobre y listas para entregárselas, quizá olvidaron enviarlas pues los dejó listos desde antes de su salida.- FANY agradece, en cualquier momento pasará a recogerlas.- Saludos y gracias.-

Ad.- 6.0.- HF. Carlos SOLORZANO. Saluda a MD. PEPITA quien le informa que LUIS descansa, porque trabajó mucho, llamarlo en 45 m.- conforme.-

LAS 18.15 h. del día 4 de junio de 1968

Ad.- 6.1.- HF. Carlos SOLORZANO, saluda a HD. SUAREZ. Le quiere hacer una pro-

Source - Lienvoy

C.S.

201-331474

SIEMPRE, 3 [illegible] 65

AQUI, RIUS

→ SUS PRISIONES

51 PRESOS POLÍTICOS...



DE TODOS COLORES...


ROJOS
COLOR DE ROSA
ROJO FRENESÍ
VIOLETA

...DE 19 AÑOS DE EDAD EN ADELANTE...


¡deje ya de llamarme Papá..!

HABITAN UNA AISLADA CRUJÍA EN EL "PALACIO" DE LECUMBERRI (a) PENITENCIARÍA.


← CRUJÍA A vuelo de PÁJARO

TODOS ELLOS (MARXISTAS, TERRORISTAS, TROSKISTAS, IZQUIERDISTAS) COMPARTEN SU DESTINO -SIN PELEARSE- Y ESPERAN QUE LA JUSTICIA LOS ATIENDA...


Voy a acabar por creer que el único lugar donde los de izquierda no se pelean, es este

(LAS ÚNICAS BRONCAS QUE TIENEN, ES POR LOS POLICÍAS QUE LES DICEN A TODOS "COMUNISTAS"...)

P

¡otra vez que me lo diga y me quejo! ¡no soy troskista!

→ EL ENCARGADO DE LIDIAR ESA APARENTE OLLA DE GRILLOS, ES UN VIEJO CONOCIDO DE LOS LECTORES DEL "SIEMPRE!"...


¡MAYOR VÍCTOR RICO GALÁN PRESENTE!

PRESO DESDE AGOSTO DE 1966, ACUSADO DE QUERER TUMBAR AL GOBIERNO CON SEIS ESCOPETAS Y UNA BOMBA DE MEDIO USO...


creo que funcionaban mejor mis artículos que las dichosas escopetas, maestro.

AUNQUE DE HECHO VÍCTOR ESTÁ PRESO POR DEFENDER SU CONVICCIÓN DE QUE:


la miseria del pueblo mexicano..


no se puede curar con parches y curitas..


¡...ni con simples reformas!

...SINO MEDIANTE UN CAMBIO TOTAL DEL SISTEMA, QUE TERMINE DE CUAJO CON LA CORRUPCIÓN QUE NOS "GOBIERNA"...


¿Y para cambiar las cosas qué se necesita?
Pos yo diría que nomás una Revolución

(ESTE MISMO RAZONAMIENTO SE LO HACEN MILES DE MEXICANOS COMO RICO GALÁN. -INCLUIDOS SACERDOTES Y OBISPOS- PERO DE MOMENTO EL QUE ESTÁ BIEN PRESO [illegible] MÁS EL RTE...

PERO, BUENO... LA CUESTIÓN ES QUE VÍCTOR NO SE HA RAJADO DE LO QUE PIENSA, NI DE LO QUE HIZO...


¿Pa qué cantos brincos si el suelo está parejo..?

...NI LE ECHA A NADIE LA CULPA DE SUS ACTOS NI SE DESDICE DE LO QUE DIJO, NI PIDE FRÍAS.


nomás pido que me cumplan la Constitución, maestro.

PERO LOS ENCARGADOS DE JUZGAR A VÍCTOR O SE HACEN PATOS, O NO QUIEREN CUMPLIR CON LO QUE MANDA LA CONSTITUCIÓN:


"los acusados del orden criminal serán juzgados antes de 1 año."

Y V.R.G. YA SE PASÓ CON CRECES DEL PLAZO CONSTITUCIONAL, SIN QUE HAYA TODAVÍA INDICIOS DE QUE SE CIERRE PRONTO SU PROCESO... ¿POR QUÉ, SEÑORES?


¡ingenuos que son algunos caricaturistas!

¿POR QUÉ ALARGAR SIN NINGUNA NECESIDAD LA FARSA DE UN PROCESO, VIOLANDO LA CONSTITUCIÓN, O SEA, HACIENDO LO MISMO DE LO QUE SE ACUSA AL PROCESADO..?


¡nos falta carearlo con la señora que le vendía quesadillas!

(PERO MEJOR ME CALLO: ORA SE USA ACUSARLO A UNO DE VIOLAR LA CONSTITUCIÓN, POR PEDIR QUE SE CUMPLA...)

SECRET

25 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/SAO

ATTENTION : Mr. Anderson

SUBJECT : JNROD Counterinsurgency Target List

There follows a list of Mexican individuals who fall within the Subject categories:

a. Arnoldo MARTINEZ-Verdugo - First Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. He was the CP Mexico contact with the CP Panama in 1963. From 1954 to January 1956 he underwent training in the U.S.S.R. In 1956 he attended the Marx/Lenin Institute in Moscow for four months.

b. Manuel Jesus TERRAZAS-Guerrero - Newly elected Second Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. In 1966, he attended the Cadre School in Moscow for a year. He has made numerous trips to the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba and is reportedly a graduate of a Havana school for agitation.

c. Jose Encarnacion PEREZ-Gaytan - Newly elected Third Secretary of the PCM Secretariat. He was arrested in 1959 for his part in the railroad strike of 1959 and was released in 1963. In 1965 he went to Moscow to attend the 6-month Cadre School.

d. Alejo MENDEZ-Garcia - First Secretary of the Federal District Committee of the PCM. It is noteworthy that he functioned as liaison man between the PCM and the Cuban Embassy since 1962 after having been invited by CASTRO to visit Havana. He took a 2-year CP training course in the U.S.S.R. from 1950 to 1954.

e. Esther CHAPA-Tijerina. Prominent active Mexican Communist who works incessantly in behalf of the Chinese Communists.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

201-336471

f. Heberto CASTILLO-Martinez - Acting head of the MLN and head of the Mexican delegation to the Tricontinent Conference held in Havana in 1966.

g. Rafael ESTRADA-Villa - Politically estranged from Vicente LOMBARDO-Toledano and the PPS - Now head of the newly named (August 1967) National Organization of Revolutionary Action, a PPS faction. In August 1967, he was implicated with a group of 14 would-be guerrillas arrested by the CGM on 19 July 1967 and found to be backed by the Red Chinese.

h. Victor RICO-Galan - Presently in prison.

i. Vicente VILLAMAR-Calderon - A member of the newly elected Executive Central Committee of the JCM. He arrived in Cuba in July 1962 from Moscow, where he reportedly specialized in infiltration. He was carrying instructions from Moscow to CASTRO.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X

TO: Chief, SB

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: REDTOP MHIGLOO - Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (201-132139)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[illegible] (201-132139)

1. In reviewing Subject's file the Station has come across a surprisingly large number of reference to Guatemala, which are pulled together below. Please note, however, that some of the Guatemalan ties given below are hypothetical and that the Guatemalan side of the picture has been particularly stressed for the purposes of this dispatch.

201-248906

2. Lorenzo CARDENAS Barajas (P-5409). In April-May 1962 a Guatemalan Communist source was dealing with CARDENAS in procuring arms for Guatemala, and CARDENAS told the source that he had a great friend in the Soviet Embassy who was aware of CARDENAS' arms procurement activities (Source: LINLUCK). On 19 April 1963 Subject was observed holding a half-hour meeting in a restaurant under obviously clandestine circumstances with CARDENAS (Source: LIEMBRACE). On 31 May 1963 the Station placed an article in a Mexico City newspaper stating that Subject was working with CARDENAS on smuggling arms to Central American countries. On 21 February 1967 Subject's car was seen passing slowly by CARDENAS, who was standing on a street corner with a friend; Subject's wife was driving the car (Source: LIEMBRACE). On 30 March 1967 Subject, with his wife as passenger, drove twice within a few minutes past CARDENAS, who was sitting at an outdoor cafe with two friends (Source: LIEMBRACE).

.......continued

Distribution:
~~2~~ 1 - C/SB
2 - C/WH

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-33215	5 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-132139

FR [illegible] Guatemala

3. Ricardo *MIRANDA Aldana (201-787306), Guatemalan Communist who received guerrilla training in Cuba February - October 1962. MIRANDA has said that he was in contact with Subject when he was in Mexico in January - February 1962 on his way to Cuba. MIRANDA also said that he had met Subject before when Subject was with Anastas MIKOYAN in Cuba (in February 1960). MIRANDA has said that Subject has been a close friend of Guatemalan Communist leader Bernardo LEMUS Mendoza (P-8023, 201-091675) since 1953 (when Subject first came to Mexico). (Source: captured documents). On 7 December 1966 a "friend from Guatemala" called Subject's office, saying that he already knew Subject but that Subject did not know that he was in Mexico and that he did not want to go to Subject's office or use the telephone. He was told to call back the next day. The next day "MIRANDA" (probably Ricardo MIRANDA Aldana) called Subject's office, and Subject asked him to come to his house (same as office) the following day at 1000 hours. (Source: LIFEAT).

4. Lilian JIMENEZ Consuegra de LEIVA (P-5169, 201-228386), Salvadoran Communist employed at the Imprenta Madero to proofread the Soviet Information Bulletin and paid by the Soviet Press Office. She is married to Raul LEIVA Munoz, a Guatemalan Communist writer. Lilian has been occasionally reported asking for an appointment with Subject in order to discuss unspecified matters. For example, on 22 September 1967 she said she had an urgent matter to discuss with Subject, and Subject agreed to see her at her house at 0900 hours on Monday, 25 September (Source: LIFEAT). [illegible]

5. Jose Maria ALVAREZ Posada (P-4415) is a Spanish Communist employed by the Soviet Press Office as an editor for their Bulletin. He seems to be very active among Spanish Communists in Mexico and also frequently sets up meetings between Subject and Juan REJANO Porras (P-1027, 201-109935). The latter is one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party in Mexico but also has close ties to other Communist groups, particularly the Cubans and Czechs as well as the Mexicans, and on at least one occasion he was seen going to the Cuban Embassy with one of the leaders of the Guatemalan Communist Party in Mexico. REJANO is in almost daily contact with ALVAREZ Posada, often says that he needs to see Subject urgently, has several times asked about scholarships to the USSR for unidentified persons. On 21 July 1967 it was reported that Subject had given ALVAREZ Posada a letter that was to be returned to REJANO, but often Subject arranges to see REJANO personally at the latter's house. (Source: LIFEAT).

6. In view of ALVAREZ Posada's apparent acting as a cut-out for Subject, as described above, the following item may also be connected with Subject. On 29 June 1967 "Max" told ALVAREZ Posada that there was a letter "there" from Guatemala that had been there since 22 June but "Max" had not been able to reach ALVAREZ Posada before. ALVAREZ Posada said he would be home after 1600 hours (so that "Max" could bring him the letter). (Source: LIFEAT). Although it is pure guesswork, the Station suggests that "Max" might be Maximiliano *SALAZAR Garcia (201-183293), a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. SALAZAR has been very quiet recently, but on 14 July 1965 he was reported in contact with Carlos ILLESCAS Aguirre (cf. below) about finding housing and a job for an unidentified boy, and it is entirely possible that he continues to be active behind the scenes in Guatemalan exile affairs.

7. Since June 1965 until as recently as March 1967 Subject has been reported receiving telephone calls from a "Carlos" with a non-Mexican accent. Normally Subject and "Carlos" simply agree to meet, without naming the place. Twice "Senor Jacobo" has been mentioned in an unclear context during their conversations. (Source: LIFEAT). Although "Carlos" as a name is not much of a lead, the Station suggests that he might be identical with Carlos ILLESCAS Aguirre (Hernandez) (P-1901, 201-764855), Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. Although ILLESCAS has been very quiet since 1964, when the Mexican authorities clamped down on him, he is known to have been used by the Soviets in the past and probably still works with them. In 1953, when ILLESCAS was still working at the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico, he reportedly was very active as a courier for the Soviets (Source: LINLUCK). In 1959 ILLESCAS was reported in contact with Nikolay Vasilyevich AKSENOV (201-106469), suspect KGB officer who was then Assistant Soviet Cultural Attache, a job later taken over by Subject (Source: LIFEAT). In 1961-62 ILLESCAS was reported to be still in contact with the Soviets in regard to guerrilla plans for Guatemala (Source: LINLUCK). On 23 August 1967 it was reported that ILLESCAS passed 22,000 Mexican pesos to one of the Guatemalan Communist leaders in Mexico. This money was described as a monthly subsidy from either the Cubans or the Soviets intended to help the Guatemalan Communists in jail in Mexico. (Source: LIREBEL-2). The above references to "Senor Jacobo" might possibly have meant Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman, former president of Guatemala; unfortunately the tapes of the conversations have been erased and the exact context in which this name was mentioned can no longer be reconstructed.

8. Hava (Eva) (P-11484), wife of Guatemalan Communist Sergio de la PENA, was reported to have met Subject in May 1965. On 29 May 1965 Subject invited Hava to dinner, apparently at the suggestion of Enrique SEMO Calev, Mexican Communist leader. Subject told Hava that he was interested in her contacts with other embassies and particularly asked her to put him in touch with Americans. Hava was subsequently reported having Subject and his wife to dinner on several occasions. (Source: LIFEAT). (It seems obvious that Subject was fishing for leads through Hava; however, Hava's Guatemalan contacts may well have been of no interest to Subject.)

9. Victor RICO Galan (P-7354, 201-336474), Spanish-born Mexican Communist journalist, agent of Cuban government known to have been sent by the Cubans to talk to Guatemalan guerrillas in 1963, in prison since August 1966 for subversive activities allegedly directed against the Mexican government was in frequent contact with Subject in 1965-66. They usually simply arranged to see each other to discuss undisclosed matters, and Subject apparently called RICO from a pay phone rather than from his office. (Source: LIFEAT) (Subject has apparently provided RICO with propaganda for news articles, but they appear to have had other common interests as well, one of which could well have been RICO's guerrilla activities.)

for/Bernard A. EDGEBROOK

CS COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474 050-120-022
SEX M DOB ? HMMA-32888
28 AUG 67
CIT ? P2
OCC ?
PROPOSED CANDIDATES FOR INTERNATL COMMUNIST WATCH LIST.

HMY R 6709260126

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
JMROD Operational/Transmittal of Letter for Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None; FYI

REFERENCE: HMMW-15207, dated 30 January 1967

Upon receipt of the letter sent via the reference above, the Mexico City Station officers concerned discussed the best method of delivering the letter to Rico Galan so the operation would appear natural and also to be sure the letter would be received by him. It was decided, finally, to have LIRICE-11 deliver the letter to Rico's wife with a short explanation of its background. Two weeks were spent in trying to locate Inge de Galan and the efforts were fruitless. The Station then decided to have LIRICE-11 deliver the letter to Elena Garro an old friend of Rico's. LIRICE-11 tried for a week and one half to find her at home with negative results. The Station then instructed him to leave the letter at her home with a request that it be passed to Rico. Attached is a copy of the covering letter LIRICE-11 left for Garro.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/att

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31546

DATE
9 March 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

México D.F. 7 de marzo de 1967.

Señora
Elena Garro de Paz
Alencaster # 220
Lomas
México 10, D.F.

Muy señora mía,

En vista de que en varias ocasiones he tratado de entrevistarme con usted personalmente sin poder lograrlo, ahora por medio de ésta carta ruego a usted de la manera más atenta hacerle llegar este sobre adjunto al señor Víctor Rico Galán a sabiendas de que usted tiene una buena amistad con él.

Agradeciéndole de antemano el favor que le pido y la atención a estas líneas, quedo de usted como su seguro servidor.

R. Reyes

CS COPY

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

#178

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

SIG. C. M. BOUNDS	ROUTING			
UNIT C/WH/1/R	1		4	
EXT. 0024	2		5	
DATE 6 FEBRUARY 1967	3		6	

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 17

TDCS-314/02002-67

INFORMATION COPIES
CI/OPS, CI/ICG, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA/O, CA/PEG, CA 2, DO 2, DO/H 4, C3/DO, FI.
WH/COG 8, SB 8

DATE DISTRIBUTED
6 FEBRUARY 1967

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

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WH/R	1	WH/3/Y	1
WH/FI	1	WH/COG/R	8
WH/CA	1	WH/MEXI	1
WH/1/R	6	WH/PACY	(CINCSO) 1
WH/2/C	2	SB/RR/P	8

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
TX-2110
NO
(CAO)
LIAISON: *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

Rico Gacon's 201-

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Charles M Bounds
C/WH/1/R

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/2/C (in draft)
WH/3/Y (in draft)
WH/COG (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WE/R

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

COPY NO.

FORM 10-61 1b-1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OOO ONE OCR ORR OCS COS CIA/NMC

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

TDCS -314/0[illegible]2-67

DIST 6 FEBRUARY 1967

COUNTRY MEXICO/CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

DOI LATE JANUARY 1967

[redacted]

SUBJECT VICTOR RICO GALAN'S VIEWS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND ON FIDEL CASTRO

ACQ 31 JANUARY 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE LEFTIST JOURNALIST WHO TALKED WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN IN THE LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY IN MEXICO CITY. SOURCE IS A RELIABLE REPORTER.

1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, PRO-CUBAN JOURNALIST WAS ARRESTED ON 12 AUGUST 1966, TOGETHER WITH SOME FORTY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP). RICO GALAN WAS CHARGED WITH INCITING REBELLION, CONSPIRACY, AND ACCUMULATION OF ARMS. UNDER THESE CHARGES, HE IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR BAIL.)

2. RICO GALAN BELIEVES THAT VIOLENT REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA IS "INDISPENSABLE," SINCE THE PEACEFUL ROAD TO CHANGE IS BLOCKED EVERYWHERE. REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS ARE ON THE RISE EVERYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA, ACCORDING TO RICO GALAN. IN HIS OPINION, THESE MOVEMENTS ARE MARXIST, WITH LIBERAL TENDENCIES, AND ARE NOT AS RIGID AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST [illegible] LINE. RICO GALAN STATED THAT CASTRO HAS THE DOMINANT INFLUENCE WITHIN THE

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN VENEZUZIA, GUATEMALA, COLOMBIA, AND ALL OF CENTRAL AMERICA. THE SOVIETS HAVE DOMINANT INFLUENCE IN CHILE, ARGENTINA, AND MEXICO. IN MEXICO, HOWEVER, CASTRO AND MOSCOW SEE EYE TO EYE, ACCORDING TO RICO GALAN, AND HAVE PARALLEL POLICIES; BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS THE PRIMARY POWER PROMOTING THESE POLICIES.

3. GUATEMALA AND VENEZUZIA ARE THE TWO COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS ARE THE MOST ADVANCED, IN RICO GALAN'S OPINION. HE HAD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO MAKE ON THE SITUATION IN THESE TWO COUNTRIES:

A. GUATEMALA. IN GUATEMALA, UNLIKE VENEZUELA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD NOT INITIATED THE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE TWO GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE ARMED STRUGGLE WERE THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP LED BY MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA AND THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) LED BY CESAR MONTES, SINCE THE DEATH OF LUIS AUGUSTO TURCIOS. THE 13 NOVEMBER GROUP HAS TROTSKYITE INFLUENCE, WHILE THE FAR IS "CASTRISTA INDEPENDENT" WITH TIES TO THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT). NINETY PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE ARE PEASANTS, AND THE MAJORITY OF THEM SYMPATHIZE WITH AND SUPPORT THE ARMED STRUGGLE.

B. VENEZUELA. BOTH THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR) LAUNCHED THE ARMED STRUGGLE, BUT BOTH HAVE NOW ABANDONED IT. BOTH MOVEMENTS CONFINED THEIR EFFORTS MOSTLY TO THE CITIES AND ENGAGED MOSTLY IN TERRORIST ACTS. THESE

TACTICS DID NOT PROMOTE THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE AT ALL. THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS NOW DIRECTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN) LED BY DOUGLAS BRAVO AND WILL NOW SUCCEED. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN IS ECHOING THE LINE OF DOUGLAS BRAVO, LEADER OF THE DISSIDENT FALN, IN ACCUSING THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) AND THE MIR OF ABANDONING THE "ARMED STRUGGLE." BOTH THE PCV AND THE MIR HAVE HAD, AND CONTINUE TO HAVE, RURAL GUERRILLA FORCES AS WELL AS URBAN TERRORIST UNITS. ALTHOUGH A SOFT-LINE FACTION OF THE MIR RENOUNCED VIOLENCE EARLY IN 1964, THE MORE MILITANT WING CONTINUED THIS POLICY, AFTER FIRST OUSTING THE SOFT-LINERS.)

4. RICO GALAN DESCRIBED MEXICO AS AN APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT A "POLICE STATE, TIGHTLY HELD." HE BELIEVED THAT POPULAR MOVEMENTS IN MEXICO AND ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA WERE ON THE RISE. SINCE THERE WERE NO LEADERS LIKE CASTRO AROUND, RICO GALAN BELIEVED THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE POPULAR MOVEMENTS WOULD COME FROM THE WRITERS, THE INTELLECTUALS, AND THE LAWYERS.

5. REGARDING FIDEL CASTRO, RICO GALAN SAYS THAT NO ONE KNOWS WHETHER CASTRO IS A COMMUNIST OR WHAT KIND OF COMMUNIST HE MIGHT BE. HE IS A GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND A GREAT TACTICIAN, BUT HE CANNOT PLAY THE ROLE OF LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA FOR HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE SOVIET UNION CONTROLS HIM TIGHTLY. REGARDING CUBA-SOVIET CONFLICTS, RICO GALAN SAID THEY WERE MORE APPARENT

THAN REAL.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: RICO GALAN SPOKE LIKE A CONVINCED, UNREPENTENT, AND FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY. HE BELIEVES THAT HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH A WINNING CAUSE.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
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ORIG: L.A. DESANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 30 JANUARY 67

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: Zl PER: [illegible] 2

CONF: C/WH/COG ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☒ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 4, C/CI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 30 1936 Z CITE DIRECTOR 70841

MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 0113 (IN 87331)*

ABSTRACT INDEX WH/1

1. REF LETTER POUCHED WITH HMMW-15207 30 JANUARY. COPY INCLUDED FOR STATION AND TRANSLATION FOR LITEMPO/8 IF STATION DESIRES PASS IT.

2. LETTER IS DATED 31 JANUARY ON HOTEL EL CONTINENTAL, PANAMA PAPER. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR DELIVERY TO RICO ANY DAY AFTER 1 FEBRUARY. REQUEST ANDREW F. DOSCHER ~~[illegible]~~ SIGN LETTER IMITATING SIGNATURE IN 13 JANUARY LETTER TO RICO AVAILABLE AT STATION.

3. PLEASE ADVISE DATE LETTER DELIVERED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SAO Comment *Station concurred with proposed follow-up letter to Rico Galan.

WH/1/M J Stewart

by J D Esterline
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

Charles W. Anderson
CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/SAO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336-474
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 33/M PER

ACTION C/WH/COG-5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-2, DDP, C/CI

S E C R E T 262300Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0113 MEXI

ABSTRACT INDEX

DIRECTOR

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

26 JAN 67 IN 87331

REF: DIRECTOR 69248

1. CONCUR LETTER TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS OPERATIONALLY. LITEMPO-8 CAN BE ASKED MAKE DELIVERY.

2. BELIEVE PORTION OF LETTER SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS NOT SENT REGULAR MAIL SERVICE. ALSO, SHOULD BE DATED TO COINCIDE WITH LEEHOLD VISIT MEXICO WITH EXPLANATION WHY IT WAS NOT DELIVERED SOONER OR CARRY CURRENT DATE BUT ON HOTEL OR OTHER APPROPRIATE STATIONERY FROM OTHER COUNTRY WITH EXPLANATION IT HAND CARRIED TO MEXICO BY FRIEND.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Rico's so!?? yes!

14-00000

L.D.S.

ORIG: L.A.DESANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 24 JANUARY 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: (12)

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 55 PER WH/COG # 2
CONF: C/WH 2 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

INFO: FILE, VR, DDP, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 24 21 12 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (elite) (reference number) 69248 (pica)

CI

WH/1
ABSTRACT
INDEX

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 9925 (IN 77985)

1. DESIRE TAKE ADVANTAGE LEEHOLD INTERVIEW WITH RICO GALAN IN LIGHT FOLLOWING FACTS.

A. INTERVIEW WAS ENDED ABRUPTLY AND BELIEVE RICO EXPECTED FOLLOW UP SESSION. HOWEVER LEEHOLD WAS UNABLE TO GET IN TO SEE RICO FOR SECOND SESSION.

B. AT END OF INTERVIEW LEEHOLD GAVE RICO COPY OF LINLUCK'S BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD WHICH RICO WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE. LEEHOLD ALSO BROACHED MATTER OF RICO WRITING ARTICLE FOR HIS PERIODICAL "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

2. PROPOSE THAT A LETTER BE DELIVERED TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD (DE MARCHI). LETTER WOULD EXPLAIN INABILITY TO SEE RICO AGAIN AND EXPRESS HOPE TO SEE HIM AGAIN ON WAY BACK FROM LA TOUR. LETTER WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO RICO THAT MEANWHILE HE WRITE FOR A FEE A REVIEW OF BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

3. PURPOSE IS TO GET RICO TO EXPRESS VIEWS IN WRITING ON CUBAN

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

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5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 69248

PAGE TWO

TO

COMMIE SITUATION, CASTRO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OBTAIN RICO'S ANALYSIS OF BOOK. MIGHT ALSO BEGIN SOFTEN HIM UP TO PROVIDE REAL INFO AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

4. WOULD PREPARE LETTER IN ITALIAN AT HQS AND FORWARD TO STATION. LEAVE TO STATION TO DETERMINE BEST MEANS OF DELIVERY, BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE THRU LITEMPO/8.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION COMMENTS AND/OR CONCURRENCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1 C. Bustos
C/WH/COG

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/SAO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Operational/JMROD
Transmittal of Letter for Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Arrange for Delivery of Letter.

REFERENCE: Mexico City 0113, 26 Jan 67

Transmitted herewith is the letter mentioned in reference. Further instructions will be sent by cable.

Z BL
ZENO B. LEEHOLD

Attachment:

1. Letter, (orig.&copy &
translation), h/w

Distribution:

3 - COS/Mexico City, w/att., h/w

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-15207

DATE
30 Ja[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

Internal Dist.

1 - RID, w/o/att.
1 - WH/1, w/o/att.
1 - WH/REG, w/o/att.
1 - WH/SAO, w/o/att.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT
WH/SAO Louis A. DeSanti/pap		7208
30 Jan 67		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/SAO	2 Jan 67	CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/1/M	1/26	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C.WHD		WILLIAM V. BROE

31 gennaio 1967

Egregio Dottore:

Sono il pubblicista italiano Luigi De Marchi che ebbe l'onore di una breve intervista con Lei il 13 gennaio u.s. Ho cercato, finora senza successo, di riunirmi con Lei di nuovo per continuare la nostra conversazione. Mi auguro la presente la trovi in buona salute. La affido ad un amico "de confianza" che si incaricherà di fargliela pervenire.

Sono tuttora in viaggio e farò tutto il possible rivederla presto. Nel frattempo gradirei moltissimo, Lei consenziente, avere una sua critica sul libro che le lasciai, UTILES DESPUES MUERTOS, per una eventuale pubblicazione sul periodico romano Corrispondenza Socialista. Resta inteso che Le rimetteremo prontamente l'onorario stabilito.

Con i miei più distinti saluti,

31 January 1967

Dear Sir:

I am the Italian journalist Luigi De Marchi who had the honor of a brief interview with you on the 13th of January. I have tried, up to now without success, to get together with you again to continue our conversation. I trust that this letter finds you in good health. I am entrusting it to a friend "de confianza" who will try to see to it that it reaches you.

I am still traveling and I'll do everything possible to see you again soon. Meanwhile I would be very pleased if you would agree to write a review of the book I left with you, UTILES DESPUES MUERTOS, for eventual publication in the Roman periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. Rest assured that you would be paid promptly the usual fee.

With best regards,

Luigi De Marchi

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 12

SECRET

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
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S E C R E T 252300Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0113 c/WH/COG/CA/PA

DIRECTOR Charlie Anderson

KAPOK AMROD PBRUMEN AMROD.

26 JAN 67 IN 87331

REF: DIRECTOR 59248

1. CONCUR LETTER TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS OPERATIONALLY. LITEMPO-2 CAN BE ASKED MAKE DELIVERY.

2. BELIEVE PORTION OF LETTER SHOULD EXPLAIN WHY IT WAS NOT SENT REGULAR MAIL SERVICE. ALSO, SHOULD BE DATED TO COINCIDE WITH LEEHOLD VISIT MEXICO WITH EXPLANATION WHY IT WAS NOT DELIVERED SOONER OR CARRY CURRENT DATE BUT ON HOTEL OR OTHER APPROPRIATE STATIONERY FROM OTHER COUNTRY WITH EXPLANATION IT HAND CARRIED TO MEXICO BY FRIEND.

S E C R E T

BT

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201

VICTOR RICO GALAN

14-00000

ORIG: [illegible] DE SANTI/pap
UNIT: WH/SAO
EXT: 7208
DATE: 24 JANUARY 67

MESSAGE FORM
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INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK JMROD PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 9025 (IN 77985)

1. DESIRE TAKE ADVANTAGE LEEHOLD INTERVIEW WITH RICO GALAN IN LIGHT FOLLOWING FACTS.

A. INTERVIEW WAS ENDED ABRUPTLY AND BELIEVE RICO EXPECTED FOLLOW UP SESSION. HOWEVER LEEHOLD WAS UNABLE TO GET IN TO SEE RICO FOR SECOND SESSION.

B. AT END OF INTERVIEW LEEHOLD GAVE RICO COPY OF [illegible] BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD WHICH RICO WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE. LEEHOLD ALSO [illegible] TO RICO [illegible] ARTICLE FOR HIS [illegible] "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

2. PROPOSE THAT A LETTER BE DELIVERED TO RICO FROM LEEHOLD (DE MARCHI). LETTER WOULD EXPLAIN INABILITY TO SEE RICO AGAIN AND EXPRESS HOPE TO SEE HIM AGAIN ON WAY BACK FROM LA TOUR. LETTER WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO RICO THAT MEANWHILE HE WRITE FOR A FEE A REVIEW OF BOOK USEFUL BUT DEAD FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA."

3. PURPOSE IS TO GET RICO TO EXPRESS VIEWS IN WRITING ON CUBAN

(CONTINUED)

Rico Galan
201

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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S E C R E T

PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR

TO

COMMIE SITUATION, CASTRO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND OBTAIN RICO'S ANALYSIS OF BOOK. MIGHT ALSO BEGIN SOFTEN HIM UP TO PROVIDE REAL INFO AT SOME FUTURE DATE.

4. WOULD PREPARE LETTER IN ITALIAN AT HQS AND FORWARD TO STATION. LEAVE TO STATION TO DETERMINE BEST MEANS OF DELIVERY, BUT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE THRU LITEMPO/8.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE STATION COMMENTS AND/OR CONCURRENCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C________

C/WH/COG________

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

CHARLES W. ANDERSON
WH/S/O

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

14. PERTINENT INFORMATION

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-798301
MEXI-00019
21 JAN 67

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN CP HAS DECLARED SUBJECT A TRAITOR
AND HAD RULED HIM OUT OF PARTY

UFG

R 6702270055

FILE IN 201-[illegible]

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

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Dissem by 24

ACTION
WH/C/C-8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/INT-2, DO-7

S E C R E T 202340Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0219 21 JAN 67 : 83217

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9984 (IN 81261)

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED WALLACE B. ROWTON AT MEETING 18 JAN 67 THAT CARMEN MOLINA ENRIQUEZ Y VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, WIFE OF JUAN CARRASCO ZANINI Y ZUBARAN, HAD TOLD HIM PRIVATELY EVENING 17 JAN THAT MEXI COMMIE PARTY HAD DECLARED VICTOR RICO GALAN A TRAITOR AND HAD RULED HIM OUT OF PARTY. CARMEN TOLD L-3 SHE CONSIDERED ACCUSATION A MALICIOUS LIE AND HOPED L-3 WOULD NOT BELIEVE IT. (COMMENT: STATION HAS NO INDICATION RICO EVER PCM MEMBER.)

2. IT POSSIBLE ACCUSATION MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM LETTER SIGNED BY RICO AND CARRIED OUT OF PRISON BY ELENA GARRO DE PAZ.

3. L-3 TOLD ROTOWN HE VERY CLOSE TO DR. CARRASCO AND CARMEN DURING THEIR RESIDENCE IN CUBA FROM 1951 TO 1965 AND THAT THEY FREQUENT VISITORS HIS HOME SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM HAVA TO MEXI CITY IN 1966. L-3 DESCRIBED CARMEN AS NEUROTIC AND HAVING MARITAL TROUBLES WITH CARRASCO AND ABOUT TO BREAK UP. L-3 TOLD TOWTON HE FIRST MET RICO GALAN AT CARRASCO HOME AND THOUGH CARRASCO AND RICO CLOSE FRIENDS CARRASCO HAD COMPLAINED TO L-3 IN PAST THAT RICO WOULD NOT TAKE HIM

SECRET

PAREN CARRASCO END PAREN INTO RICO NETWORK.

4. ROWTON TOOK OCCASION TO REVEAL TO L-3 THAT HE HAD HEARD SOME HIGH LEVEL FRIENDS IN GOVERNACION SAY THAT RICO GALAN HAD WRITTEN A LETTER STATING HE WILLING BETRAY MANY SECRETS CONCERNING FIDEL CASTRO ON CONDITION HE BE RELEASED FROM PRISON. ROWTON ADDED HE UNDERSTOOD WOMAN WHO EX-WIFE OF MEXICAN AMB TO INDIA HAD BEEN INTERMEDIARY. L-3 INMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT WOMAN WOULD BE ELENA GARRO DE PAZ WHOM HE KNEW WELL AND CONSIDERED CAPABLE PERFORMING THIS ACT.

5. ROWTON SUGGESTED L-3 ATTEMPT OBTAIN COPY BUT L-3 STATED HE PREFERRED NOT APPROACH GARRO ON THIS MATTER SINCE LAST MEETING HAD BEEN UNFRIENDLY. ROWTON PROMISED HE WOULD ATTEMPT OBTAIN COPY AND L-3 STATED ONCE OBTAINED HE COULD LATER STATE HE GOT IT FROM BARRO OR CARMEN MOLINA. L-3 STATED ONCE LETTER OBTAINED HE WOULD CARRY DIRECTLY TO FIDEL CASTRO ENLISTING AID OF ISMAIL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ, COMMERCIAL REP OF CASTRO NOW IN MEXI, TO SET UP MEETING BETWEEN L-3 AND CASTRO.

6. L-3 HAS NOT YET REPLIED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS' INVITATION RETURN HAVA FOR ADDITIONAL TALKS WHICH MENTIONED REF. DID NOT MAKE PHONE CALL AS REPORTED BECAUSE HE DISCUSSED SUCH CALL WITH SUAREZ AND LATTER RECOMMENDED AGAINST IT. INSTEAD L-3 WRITING LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 0019 SECRET

SUAREZ WILL GET ON NEXT INBOUND PLANE. IN LETTER L-3 WILL TELL RODRIGUEZ HE PREFERS VISIT HAVA AFTER NEXT BUSINESS TRIP TO GUAT UNLESS RODRIGUEZ HAS IMPORTANT REASON SEEING HIM PRIOR TRIP.

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DISPATCH

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PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Reference: Mexico City-9925

1. Forwarded herewith are three copies of a memorandum written by Zeno B. LEEHOLD regarding his meeting with Victor RICO Galan on 13 January 1967.

2. Also forwarded are three copies of the Spanish translation which was passed to LITEMPO-8 on 16 January 1967.

3. Please call this dispatch and attachments to the attention of Chester D. DAINOLD.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
Memorandum
Translation (Spanish)

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/atts

CS COPY

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-31108

DATE
17 January 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

SECRET

13 January 1967

SUBJECT: Meeting with Victor RICO Galan

1. The writer had about a one-hour meeting with Victor RICO Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January 1967. The meeting was held at the central reception room with several armed guards present; my civilian escort also remained in the general area, and there were also some other civilians present from time to time (I think waiting to see other prisoners).

2. RICO Galan arrived at the meeting area at about the same time as I did. After an exchange of greetings and a warm handshake, I gave RICO Galan my letter of introduction (a copy is attached). He read it carefully and then told me how glad he was to see me. He inquired about his friend Carlo Coccioli; I replied simply that I had seen him in Rome before he left for Paris and he was fine. (At the end of the meeting, RICO Galan asked me to convey his greetings to Coccioli when I returned to Italy, and of course I said I would.) I also explained to RICO Galan that I had a bottle of whiskey for him, but the guards had refused to let me bring it in. I think he appreciated the thought.

3. Because of my connection with Coccioli, a pro-Communist journalist and a friend of RICO Galan in Mexico for several years, plus the name of my periodical, Corrispondenza Socialista, RICO Galan apparently assumed that I was (and accepted me as) a fellow Marxist. He expressed himself spontaneously and I believe he revealed his true thoughts during the discussion and in answer to questions. A friendly rapport was immediately established between us.

4. I explained at the outset that I was on a tour of Latin America to study conditions and revolutionary movements. If he were agreeable, I said I also wished to write a piece on him for Corrispondenza Socialista. RICO Galan was very agreeable. I also said that if he wished to write an article for my periodical, we would pay him. He also found this idea agreeable; but qualified his approval by saying he first wanted to take a look at the periodical to see its "line" and format.

5. My first substantive question was how he viewed the revolutionary situation in Latin America. I asked whether he thought "violent revolution" a necessary stage in the development of Latin America. He answered quickly and

att to HMMA-31105

CS COPY

201-336474

emphatically that "violent revolution" throughout Latin America was "indispensable" because the peaceful road to necessary change was "blocked everywhere". He saw revolutionary movements on the rise everywhere in Latin America. I asked for the ideological nature and affiliations of these revolutionary movements. He replied that they are Marxist, but with liberal tendencies, not as rigid as the international communist revolutionary line.

6. I asked in which countries the revolutionary movements were most advanced. He named Guatemala and Venezuela in a category by themselves; there the revolutions were certain to win power. Then he gave me a general briefing on these two countries.

a. Guatemala: In Guatemala, unlike Venezuela, the Communist Party had not initiated the armed struggle. The two groups involved in the armed struggle were the "13 November" group led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, and the "Fuerza Armada Rebelde (FAR)", led by Cesar Montes, now that Luis Augusto Turcios is dead. The "13 November" group, he said, had Trotskyite influences, while the "FAR" was "Castrista/Independent", and with ties to the Guatemalan CP but also having differences with the CP. He said 90% of the people in Guatemala are peasants and the majority sympathize and support the armed struggle.

b. Venezuela: Both the CP and the MIR launched the armed struggle, but they have now abandoned it. I asked why. He said both movements confined their efforts mostly to the cities and took the form of terroristic acts. These tactics did not get the revolution anywhere. Now the Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) led by Douglas Bravo was directing the armed struggle, and this effort will succeed.

RICO Galan asked me to read a recent article on Venezuela by Mario Menendez Rodriguez, Director of Sucesos, who had recently been to Venezuela and had interviewed the FLN leaders. In answer to my question, RICO Galan described Menendez as a "periodista Castroista".

7. RICO Galan described Mexico as an apparent democracy but "police state, tightly held". Here the "popular movements" are on the rise. In answer to my question as to who was leading these "popular" and revolutionary movements in Mexico and Latin America, RICO Galan replied that there were no leaders like Castro around, and the leaders would come from the writers, intellectuals and lawyers.

SECRET

8. I asked RICO Galan for his appraisal and total evaluation of Fidel Castro Ruz. He said, first of all, if Castro is a Communist or what kind of a Communist he is, nobody knows. He is a great revolutionary leader and a great tactician, but he can not play the role of liberator of Latin America for he is too dependent upon Russia and Russia controls him tightly. I think RICO Galan meant to imply that Castro has become a tool of the Soviets. He said, Ernesto "Che" Guevara really wanted Cuba to break away from the Soviet chains, but Castro is not able to do this. As to the whereabouts of "Che", RICO Galan said that perhaps not even Fidel Castro knows where he is.

9. Regarding Cuban-Soviet conflicts, RICO Galan said they are more apparent than real. Then I asked him to name countries of primary Cuban or Soviet influence. He said Castro has dominant influence within the revolutionary movements in Venezuela, Guatemala, all of Central America, and Colombia. The Soviets have dominant influence in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. However, he added, in Mexico, Castro and Moscow see "eye to eye" and have parallel policies, but the primary power to push these policies is Russia.

10. RICO Galan said Communist Chinese influence in Latin America is negligible.

11. After about an hour, our meeting ended abruptly for a guard from the office of the prison director came to get RICO Galan, his lawyer was there to see him. I held him back for an extra minute and then we parted, reluctantly, with a warm handshake.

12. The foregoing clearly reveals RICO Galan to be an unrepentant, fervent revolutionary. He believes, on the basis of what he said, that he is associated with a winning cause. He was in high spirits and looked fine.

13. I returned to the Lecumberri Penitentiary at about 5:15 P.M. the same afternoon for another session with RICO Galan. The main door entrance was closed. I knocked and a guard opened a little window. I asked to see the Director, but the guard said he was not there. I explained who I was and what I wanted; when he heard the name of RICO Galan, the guard said it was impossible to see him and closed the window. A moment later I knocked again. I asked the guard if he would deliver a message to RICO Galan from me. He said that also was impossible, only the Director could do that. The guard certainly did his duty.

12 Gennaio 1967

Egregio Signore:

Mi permetta di introdurmi - Luigi De Marchi, italiano, scrittore per il periodico "Corrispondenza Socialista" di Roma.

In breve, stò facendo un giro d'orizzonte per l'America Latina. Un amico suo, e compagno di lavoro mio, Carlo Coccioli, cui vidi a Roma in dicembre prima della sua partenza per Parigi e della mia por l'America Latina, mi accenno' di Lei e mi prego' di farle una visita. Eccomi qui: Vorrei anche approfittare di questa visita per fare un cambio di punti di vista con Lei.

Prego tenga la gentilezza di darmi un po' del suo tempo.

Rispettosamente,

Luigi De Marchi

ASUNTO: Reunión con VICTOR RICO GALAN

16 enero 1967

1.- El que esto escribe se reunió durante casi una hora con VICTOR RICO GALAN en la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri el [illegible] del actual. La reunión [illegible] en el salón [illegible] [illegible] varios [illegible] y los [illegible] civiles [illegible] en el área, y había de cuatro a cinco civiles presentes y que esperaban ver a algunos prisioneros.

2.- RICO GALAN y yo llegamos simultáneamente al lugar de la entrevista. Después de un intercambio de saludos y un entusiasta apretón de manos, le entregué a RICO GALAN mi carta de presentación, una copia de la cual adjunto. El la leyó cuidadosamente y entonces comentó que le daba gusto conocerme. Inquirió sobre su amigo C.[illegible] COCCIOLI, y simplemente le respondí que lo ví en Roma antes de su salida hacia París y que se encontraba bien. Al terminar nuestra reunión, RICO GALAN me pidió diera saludos a COCCIOLI cuando yo regresara a Italia, y desde luego le prometí que así lo haría. También le expliqué a RICO GALAN que le traía una botella de whiskey pero que los guardias no me permitieron introducirla. Creo que él apreció este gesto.

3.- Debido a mi asociación con COCCIOLI, que es un periodista pro-comunista y amigo de RICO GALAN desde hace muchos años, además de por el nombre de mi periódico, [illegible], RICO GALAN aparentemente asumió que yo soy un compañero marxista y me aceptó como tal. Se expresó en forma confidencial y creo que reveló sus pensamientos verdaderos durante nuestra discusión y al responder a mis preguntas. Inmediatamente se estableció entre nosotros una corriente de simpatía.

4.- Yo expliqué desde luego que estaba efectuando una gira por América Latina para estudiar las condiciones y los [illegible] [illegible]. Le pedí que si así lo deseaba podría escribir [illegible] a él para el periódico [illegible]. RICO GALAN aceptó. También le dije que le agradaría si deseaba escribir un artículo para mi periódico. Le pareció buena la idea, pero antes me dijo que quería ver un ejemplar del periódico para saber su línea y formato.

5.- El primer punto importante fué su opinión sobre la situación revolucionaria en América Latina. Le pregunté si pensaba que era necesaria una revolución violenta para el desarrollo de América Latina. Respondió rápida y enfáticamente que una revolución violenta es indispensable en todo

América Latina debido a que la vía pacífica a todo cambio necesario, está bloqueada. Predijo el surgimiento de movimientos revolucionarios en toda la América Latina. Le pregunté sobre la naturaleza ideológica y afiliaciones de estos movimientos revolucionarios. Me respondió que son marxistas, pero con tendencias liberales, no con la rigidez de la línea revolucionaria comunista internacional.

6.- Le pregunté que en cuales países están más avanzados los movimientos revolucionarios. Nombró en primer término a Guatemala y Venezuela, ya que allí las revoluciones ciertamente se harán del poder. Luego me hizo un resúmen general de esos dos países.

a.- Guatemala: en Guatemala, a diferencia de Venezuela, el Partido Comunista no inició la lucha armada. Los dos grupos involucrados en el levantamiento, fueron el grupo " 13 de Noviembre " dirigido por MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, y la " Fuerza Armada Rebelde ", dirigida por CESAR MONTES, ahora que LUIS AUGUSTO TURCIOS está muerto. El grupo 13 de Noviembre, según dijo, tenía influencia trotskista, mientras que el F.A.R. era castrista independiente pero con ligas al Partido Comunista Guatemalteco, a la vez que teniendo diferencias con el mismo. Dijo que el noventa por ciento de la población de Guatemala, son campesinos y que la mayoría simpatiza y apoya la lucha armada.

b.- Venezuela : Tanto el Partido Comunista como el MIR iniciaron la lucha armada, pero ahora la han abandonado. Pregunté la razón. RICO GALAN respondió que ambos movimientos confinaron sus esfuerzos principalmente a las ciudades y tomaron la forma de actos terroristas. Estas tácticas no llevaron la revolución a meta alguna. Que ahora el Frente de Liberación Nacional dirigido por DOUGLAS BRAVO está llevando a cabo la lucha armada, y que este esfuerzo sí tendrá éxito.

RICO GALAN me pidió que le leyese un reciente artículo sobre Venezuela escrito por MARIO MENENDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Director de Sucesos, quien hace poco estuvo en Venezuela y entrevistó a los líderes del FLN. Así lo hice, y a una pregunta mía, RICO GALAN describió a MENENDEZ como un periodista castrista.

7.- También hizo una descripción de México como una aparente democracia, siendo más bien un Estado Policíaco férreamente sostenido. Dijo que aquí se están comenzando a iniciar movimientos populares. También a una pregunta mía sobre quién dirije estos movimientos populares y revolucionarios en México y en América Latina, RICO GALAN replicó que ya no hay líderes como CASTRO y que los mismos surgirán de entre los escritores, intelectuales y licenciados.

8.- Pedí a RICO GALAN me diese su concepto y una total evolución de FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Dijo, antes que nada, que si CASTRO RUZ es comunista o qué clase de comunista, nadie lo sabe. Que es un gran líder revolucionario y un gran táctico pero que no puede jugar el papel de libertador de Latinoamérica porque depende demasiado de Rusia y que esta nación lo controla estrechamente. Pienso que RICO GALAN quiso decir que CASTRO se ha convertido en un instrumento de los soviéticos. También dijo que ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA quería realmente que Cuba rompiera las cadenas soviéticas, pero que CASTRO no es capaz de hacerlo. Con respecto al paradero del CHE GUEVARA, dijo que tal vez ni el propio FIDEL CASTRO sabe dónde está.

9.- En relación con los conflictos Cubano-soviéticos, RICO GALAN dijo que son más aparentes que reales. Luego le pedí me nombrase países que principalmente tengan influencia cubana o soviética. Respondió que CASTRO tiene influencia dominante dentro de los movimientos revolucionarios en Venezuela, Guatemala, todo Centroamérica y Colombia. Que los soviéticos tienen influencia dominante en Chile, Argentina y México. Agregó sin embargo que en México CASTRO y Moscú se ven frente a frente y tienen políticas paralelas, pero que la fuerza principal que empuja estas políticas, es Rusia.

10.- RICO GALAN dijo que la influencia Chino-comunista en América Latina es insignificante.

11.- Después de aproximadamente una hora, nuestra entrevista terminó abruptamente, porque un guardia de la oficina del Director de la Prisión vino a llevarse a RICO GALAN pues que su abogado quería verlo. Sólo lo retuve un minuto más y muy a nuestro pesar nos despedimos con un fuerte apretón de manos

12.- Todo lo anterior revela claramente que RICO GALAN es un convencido y ferviente revolucionario. De acuerdo con lo que dijo, creo que está asociado a una causa victoriosa. Tenía muy alta la moral y muy buena apariencia.

13.- Regresé a la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri aproximadamente a las diecisiete quince horas de esa misma tarde para otra charla con RICO GALAN. La puerta principal estaba cerrada. Toqué y un guardia abrió una pequeña mirilla. Pedí ver al Director, pero el guardia me dijo que no se encontraba. Le expliqué quién era yo y qué era lo que deseaba, pero cuando el guardia oyó el nombre de RICO GALAN, dijo que era imposible verlo y cerró la mirilla. Un momento después toqué de nuevo. Le pregunté al guardia que si podía pasarle un mensaje a RICO

GALAN. Me respondió que éso era también imposible; que sólo el Director podía hacerlo. En realidad el guardia estaba cumpliendo con su deber.

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

TRADUCCION DE LA CARTA DE PRESENTACION QUE LUIGI DE MARCHI ENTREGO A VICTOR RICO GALAN.

Estimado señor:

Me permito presentarme ante usted - LUIGI DE MARCHI, italiano, colaborador del periódico " Corrispondenza Socialista ", de Roma.

Estoy efectuando una gira por América Latina. Un amigo suyo y compañero mío de labores, CARLO COCCIOLI, a quien vi en Roma en diciembre antes de su partida para París y de la mía para América Latina, me habló de usted y me pidió hacerle una visita. Por lo tanto quisiera aprovechar esta visita para tener un cambio de puntos de vista con usted.

Le ruego tenga la gentileza de concederme un poco de su tiempo.

Respetuosamente

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

SECRET

10 JAN 1967

TO: The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: RICO Galan, Ana Maria
aka: MENDIZABAL Lizalde, Carmen
MENDEZ Mendizabal, Ana
MENDIZABAL, Ana

1. Reference is made to your request dated 12 December 1966 concerning Subject (File No. A14 546 455). The files of this office contain the following information pursuant to the request.

2. According to a press release from the Mexico City Police Department on 16 August 1966, Subject was reported to be one of 49 persons arrested for conducting a school of guerrilla warfare, with the purpose of overthrowing the government of Mexico. Victor RICO Galan, Subject's brother and one of the leaders of the group, admitted that the school was operated by the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP). Subject was one of nine members of the group indicted on 22 August 1966 for conspiracy, incitement to rebellion, and accumulation of arms.

3. An article published in the Mexican daily newspaper El Dia, dated 23 August 1966, stated that Subject admitted that meetings were held in her home to discuss the activities of the MRP.

4. According to information dated 2 July-28 October 1953 from a source of unknown reliability, one Carmen H. de MENDIZABAL, probably identical with Subject, had acted as a teacher at the Communist Universidad Obrera de Mexico.

Rico-Galan

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FILE IN 201-336894

SECRET

5. According to information dated 5 December 1955 from a usually reliable source, one Carmen H. de MENDIZABAL, probably identical with Subject, was listed as a voting member of the Sociedad de la URSS (SAURSS, Society of Friends of the Soviet Union; a Communist front organization).

6. For further information regarding Subject you are referred to TDCS-314/10347-66; subject: Arrest of Subversives Headed by Victor RICO-Galant Pemex Explosion in Poza Rica, Veracrus. A copy is attached for your retention.

CSCI-316/00191-67

Encl. 1 name check
1 attachment as stated above

RID/CE: JMA/FB/bdt

BASED ON: MEXI-3416
HMMA-30265
HMM-516 (LIQUEUR)
HMM-1394 (LIFTER)
201-336474

FILE IN: 100-2-82

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FILE IN 201-336474 (RICO-GALAN Victor)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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S E C R E T 132323Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9925

14 JAN [illegible] 77S85

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ROME

RYBAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 9899 (IN 7[illegible]) *

1. LEEHOLD HAD SUCCESSFUL ONE HOUR MEETING WITH RICO GALAN AT LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY MORNING 13 JANUARY. MEETING ENDED ABRUPTLY BY CALL FROM DIRECTOR OF PRISON THAT LAWYER THERE TO SEE RICO.

2. LEEHOLD HAD LETTER INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS ITALIAN WRITER FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" AND AS ACQUAINTANCE OF CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMIE JOURNALIST WHO FRIEND OF RICO IN MEXICO AND WHO CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. AS RESULT RICO ASSUMED AND ACCEPTED LEEHOLD AS FELLOW MARXIST AND FRIENDLY RAPPORT ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY. MOST PROBABLE THAT RICO EXPRESSED HIS REAL THOUGHTS IN DISCUSSION AND ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

3. IN BRIEF, RICO REVEALED HIMSELF AS CONVINCED, UNREPENTANT, FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY SEEING VIOLENT REVOLUTION "INDISPENSABLE" THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA SINCE PEACEFUL ROAD TO NECESSARY CHANGES "BLOCKED EVERYWHERE". DESCRIBED MEXICO AS "APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT REALLY POLICE STATE TIGHTLY HELD", WHERE STRENGTH OF "POPULAR

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9925 S E C R E T

MOVEMENTS ON THE RISE. EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT REVOLUTIONS WILL WIN IN GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA. CHARACTERIZED CASTRO AS GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND TACTICIAN BUT NOT ABLE PLAY ROLE AS LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS WHO TIGHTLY CONTROL HIM. SAID CASTRO INFLUENCE DOMINANT WITHIN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, ALL CENTRAL AMERICA, COLOMBIA. SOVIETS DOMINANT IN CHILE, ARGENTINA AND MEXICO. SAID CHICOM GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA ARE THE SMALLEST AND MOST DISREPUTABLE.

4. COS AND LEEHOLD BRIEFED LIENVOY/2 AFTER MEETING. BELIEVE MEXICANS PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE THAT MEETING CONFIRMED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RICO AS UNREPENTANT REVOLUTIONARY. LEEHOLD ATTEMPTING SEE RICO AGAIN AFTERNOON 13 JAN.

5. LEEHOLD ETA WASHINGTON 1600 14 JANUARY EASTERN 904. PLEASE ADVISE WIFE.

SECRET SIM Has Put Lienvoy/2 in Contact with Leehold

BT

SECRET

Addenda, 17 January 1967, at Headquarters

1. My offer to Rico Galan (para 4) to pay him for an article he might write for CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA was made at the suggestion of LIENVOY/2.

2. The only time Rico asked me not to quote him (in any article I might write) was after he had finished telling me that Castro was too dependent on the Russians (para 8). Of course, I agreed. Also, Rico qualified his comment that Castro was a great leader by saying Castro was unpredictable; he would say one thing one day and do something different the next day.

3. Regarding the abrupt ending of the meeting after just one hour (para 10) I think it is probable that this came about through an order coming down from LITEMPO/8.

4. General Comment: I was given a fairly rough time by the authorities at the Lecumberri penitentiary. The Director told me in no uncertain terms that I could not bring a bottle of whiskey to Rico which I had in my ALITALIA bag. On my way to the main reception area where the interview was held, I had to go through several offices and guards. At one point I was asked for my passport and the guards were quite indignant when I told them that I had left my passport at the hotel. When I showed them my Italian calling card instead, they were not at all satisfied but let me pass on to the next processing point. Then I was taken to a private cell for a body search. I also had to sign in and out, presumably like any other visitor to the penitentiary.

5. The above incidents, though unpleasant for me at the time, indicate that LITEMPO/8 had not made the Lecumberri authorities witting of my true mission.

L.D.S.

L. A. DeSanti
Office of WH/SAO

SECRET

Translation of letter of introduction to Rico Galan

12 January 1967

Dear Sir:

Permit me to introduce myself: Luigi De Marchi, an Italian writer for the periodical "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" of Rome.

In brief, I am on a tour of Latin America. A friend of yours and a fellow journalist acquaintance of mine, Carlo Coccioli, whom I saw in Rome in December before he left for Paris and I left for Latin America, mentioned your name to me and asked me to pay you a visit. Here I am.I would also like to take advantage of this visit to have an exchange of views with you.

I beg you to have the kindness to give me a little of your time.

Respectfully,

Luigi De Marchi

19 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : LEEHOLD'S Contacts with LIENVOY/2 on Rico Galan case, Mexico City, 11-13 January 67

REFERENCE: Mexico City 9890 (IN 75995), 11 Jan 67

1. Reference reported that the Mexico City Station put LIENVOY/2 in telephone contact with the undersigned on 11 January. Following is a full account of my subsequent contacts with LIENVOY/2 on 12-13 January on the Rico Galan case. L/2 served as cut-out between the Station and LITEMPO/8 in arranging my interview with Rico Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January.

2. The evening of 11 January L/2 phoned me at my hotel and asked to see me the next morning; he suggested having breakfast together at my hotel at 0830. He came on time and we spent about an hour together. He stated that his purpose was to find out for LITEMPO/8 what my cover story and detailed plan were for the interview with Rico. At the outset he wanted to know whether I was an American or Italian citizen. He must also have been curious about my exact relationship with the Agency, but did not probe at all, and of course I refrained from volunteering any info.

3. L/2 seemed satisfied with my cover as an Italian journalist on a tour of Latin America for the Rome periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. He approved also of the idea of my mentioning Carlo Coccioli to Rico as a fellow journalist who had asked me in Italy in December to pay Rico a visit during my forthcoming trip to Mexico. L/2 expressed the view, however, that it was rather unlikely that Rico would agree to see me. He said in Mexico prisoners in general and especially Rico, were very suspicious and rarely wanted to see strangers in prison. He then gave me a briefing on

Rico which painted Rico as an extremely evil and clever character, who did not possess one ounce of sincerity, and who would never cease being a Marxist revolutionary, for stripped of his Marxist propaganda weapons Rico was a nobody - and Rico did not want to be a nobody.

4. I told L/2 briefly of my successful experience with a similar case in the Philippines. He commented that it was easier to be successful in the Philippines "for the level of Culture there, perhaps, is not as high as here."

5. We parted with the understanding that L/2 would phone me at the COS's office later that morning after his meeting with LITEMPO/8. When he called, at about 11:00, L/2 said LITEMPO/8 liked the cover story and the plan but he wanted to increase the chances that Rico would see me through the following manouver. LI/8 wanted to send Elena Garro De PAZ (the same woman who had brought out Rico's signed statement of his willingness to tell all in return for his freedom) to Rico carrying my calling card and an issue of my periodical; she would then persuade Rico to see me.

6. During a later phone conversation with L/2 I pointed out the risk involved in bringing Elena Garro into the operation. (The Station's position was definitely against her involvement). Being wealthy, influential, unpredictable and uncontrollable, Elena Garro, I pointed out, might make a phone call to the periodical in Rome and expose our hand. L/2 reported back to LI/8, who agreed with our position. L/8 then came up with the idea of my writing a letter of introduction for Rico and requesting an interview. I agreed to this scheme. Later that evening I received instructions from L/2 that at 11:00 the next morning I should go to the office of the Director of Lecumberri penitentiary and request to see Rico. The previous day L/2 had stated that LITEMPO/8 wanted to go over the "whole agenda" with me before I went to see Rico, but plans apparantly changed and I did not have any contact with LITEMPO/8.

7. At the meeting with Rico I personally handed Rico the letter of introduction, and got it back from him after he had read it. In the middle of our interview Rico asked to have the letter again and I handed it to him. My plan had been not to have the letter end up in Rico's hands if possible, but the abrupt ending of the meeting prevented my getting it back. During the briefing of L/2 by the COS and

me after my meeting with Rico, we asked that LITEMPO/8 try to get this letter back from Rico through the penitentiary authorities. L/2 agreed that it would be a good idea to get the letter back and said he would discuss this matter with LITEMPO/8.

ZBL
Zeno B. LEEHOLD
Office of WH/SAO

Distribution:
1-Rico Galan's 201-336474
1-WH/1 LIENVOY/2
1-WH/SAO
1-WH/COG

APUNTES [illegible] ENTREVISTA CON VICTOR RICO GALAN

16 enero 1967

1.- El [illegible] se realizó durante casi una hora en [illegible] Penitenciaría de Lecumberri el [illegible] del actual. [illegible] en el salón [illegible] [illegible] civiles [illegible] en el [illegible] civiles presentes y creo que se [illegible] por algunos [illegible].

2.- RICO GALAN y yo llegamos simultáneamente al lugar de la entrevista. Después de un intercambio de saludos y un [illegible] en cuestión de [illegible], le entregué a RICO GALAN mi carta de presentación, una copia de la cual adjunto. Él la leyó cuidadosamente y entonces comentó que le daba gusto conocerme. Inquirió sobre su amigo CARLO COCCIOLI, y simplemente le respondí que lo vi en Roma antes de su salida hacia París y que se encontraba bien. Al terminar nuestra reunión, RICO GALAN me pidió diera saludos a COCCIOLI cuando yo regresara a Italia, y desde luego le prometí que así lo haría. También le expliqué a RICO GALAN que le traía una botella de whiskey pero que los guardias no me permitieron introducirla. Creo que él apreció este gesto.

3.- Debido a mi conexión con COCCIOLI, que es un periodista pro-comunista y amigo de RICO GALAN desde hace muchos años, [illegible] por el nombre de mi periódico, [illegible], [illegible] aparentemente que yo soy un [illegible] y me aceptó como tal. Se expresó en forma espontánea y creo que reveló sus pensamientos verdaderos durante nuestra discusión y al responder a mis preguntas. Inmediatamente se estableció entre nosotros una corriente amistosa.

4.- Yo expliqué desde luego que estaba efectuando una gira por América Latina para estudiar las condiciones y los movimientos revolucionarios. Le pedí que si yo lo [illegible] ya podía escribir algo acerca de él para el periódico [illegible]. RICO GALAN aceptó. También le dije que le agradaría si deseaba escribir un artículo para mi periódico. Lo [illegible] hacerlo, pero antes me dijo que quería ver un ejemplar del periódico para saber su línea y formato.

5.- La primera pregunta importante fué que cómo miraba la situación revolucionaria en América Latina. Le pregunté si pensaba que era necesaria una revolución violenta para el desarrollo de América Latina. Respondió [illegible] y enfáticamente que una revolución violenta es indispensable en toda

8.- Pedí a RICO GALAN me diera su concepto y una total evaluación de FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. Dijo, antes que nada, que si CASTRO RUZ es comunista o qué clase de comunista, nadie lo sabe. Que es un gran líder revolucionario y un gran táctico pero que no puede jugar el papel de Libertador de Latinoamérica porque depende demasiado de Rusia y que esta nación lo controla estrechamente. Pienso que RICO GALAN quiso decir que CASTRO se ha convertido en un instrumento de los soviéticos. También dijo que ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA quería realmente que Cuba rompiera las cadenas soviéticas, pero que CASTRO no es capaz de hacerlo. Con respecto al paradero del CHE GUEVARA, dijo que tal vez ni el propio FIDEL CASTRO sabe dónde está.

9.- En relación con los conflictos Cubano-soviéticos, RICO GALAN dijo que son más aparentes que reales. Luego le pedí me nombrase países que principalmente tengan influencia cubana o soviética. Respondió que CASTRO tiene influencia dominante dentro de los movimientos revolucionarios en Venezuela, Guatemala, todo Centroamérica y Colombia. Que los soviéticos tienen influencia dominante en Chile, Argentina y México. Agregó sin embargo que en México CASTRO y Moscú se ven frente a frente y tienen políticas paralelas, pero que la fuerza principal que empuja estas políticas, es Rusia.

10.- RICO GALAN dijo que la influencia Chino-comunista en América Latina es insignificante.

11.- Después de aproximadamente una hora, nuestra entrevista terminó abruptamente, porque un guardia de la oficina del Director de la Prisión vino a llevarse a RICO GALAN pues que su abogado quería verlo. Sólo lo retuve un minuto más y muy a nuestro pesar nos despedimos con un fuerte apretón de manos.

12.- Todo lo anterior revela claramente que RICO GALAN es un convencido y ferviente revolucionario. De acuerdo con lo que dijo, creo que está asociado a una causa victoriosa. Tenía muy alta la moral y muy buena apariencia.

13.- Regresé a la Penitenciaría de Lecumberri aproximadamente a las diecisiete quince horas de esa misma tarde para otra charla con RICO GALAN. La puerta principal estaba cerrada. Toqué y un guardia abrió una pequeña mirilla. Pedí ver al Director, pero el guardia me dijo que no se encontraba. Le expliqué quién era yo y qué era lo que deseaba, pero cuando el guardia oyó el nombre de RICO GALAN, dijo que era imposible verlo y cerró la mirilla. Un momento después toqué de nuevo. Le pregunté al guardia que si podía pasarle un mensaje a RICO

GALAN. Me respondió que éso era también imposible; que sólo el Director podía hacerlo. En realidad el guardia estaba cumpliendo con su deber.

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

TRADUCCION DE LA CARTA DE PRESENTACION QUE LUIGI DE MARCHI ENTREGO A VICTOR RICO GALAN.

Estimado señor:

Me permito presentarme ante usted - LUIGI DE MARCHI, italiano, colaborador del periódico " Corrispondenza Socialista ", de Roma.

Estoy efectuando una gira por América Latina. Un amigo suyo y compañero mío de labores, CARLO COCCIOLI, a quien vi en Roma en diciembre antes de su partida para París y de la mía para América Latina, me habló de usted y me pidió hacerle una visita. Por lo tanto quisiera aprovechar esta visita para tener un cambio de puntos de vista con usted.

Le ruego tenga la gentileza de concederme un poco de su tiempo.

Respetuosamente

LUIGI DE MARCHI.

Questions to [illegible] during [illegible] interview", [illegible]
6 Jan 67

1. Do you think a violent Communist revolution is a necessary stage in the development of Latin America?

2. Do you agree with the view expressed by Fidel Castro that most Latin America countries are ripe for violent revolution?

3. In your view, which groups and leaders have the biggest potential for leading revolutionary movements in Latin America? Do you think guerrilla warfare can bring Communism to any L.A. Country?

4. In your view which ~~regimes~~ countries are most successful in coping with their internal problems.

5. In your view, what impact is Fidel Castro ~~having~~ ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] revolution ~~on~~ Latin America?

6. Who is doing more to promote Communist revolutions in Latin America, Cuba, the Soviet Union or China. How do you see the role of each country?

7. How do the revolutionary theories of Cuba, Moscow and Peking differ from each other as applied to Latin America.

8. In your view, are the Soviets using Castro as an instrument to promote their revolutionary line and interests, or is Castro's line opposed to the Soviets in Latin America.

9. Is the Alliance for Progress having much effect in promoting economic development and political stability in Latin America?

10. Can Europe play more of a role in Latin America to promote economic development? How?

11. It is said in journalistic circles that the Soviets resent and oppose Castro's tactics in Latin America because they undermine the position of the orthodox Communist Parties loyal to Moscow. It is also said that the Soviets are plotting to eliminate Fidel Castro.
Is this information correct?
If so, do you think Castro is aware of the Soviet plans?
Did Castro ever discuss with you his conflicts with Moscow? What is his solution?

12. In your view how large is the Castro apparatus operating in Latin America to promote guerrilla warfare and revolutions. From what elements of society do the Cubans get their support?

13. Is China an obstacle to the expansion of Cuban and Soviet influence in Latin America?

14. How serious, in your opinion, is the discord between Havana and Moscow regarding revolution in Latin America?

15. The Italian Communist Party is believed to be the "directing" Party" for several Latin America Communist Parties. In your view, how influential is the role of the Italian CP in Latin America.

16. What is the effect in Latin America of the Sino-Soviet split and of the crisis in international Communism?

17. I would be interested in your observations and comments on the Red Guards and the Chinese "Cultural Revolution."

18. You may have heard that the Yougoslav ex-Communist leader, Djilas, was released from prison on New Year's Day. How do you view Djilas, what do you think of him?

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5	Paula [illegible]		
6			

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Remarks:

The attached memos give a full account of my activities in Mexico City & of my meeting with Pino Gala.

W.A. De Santo
WH/SAO

[illegible]

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19 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : LEEHOLD'S Contacts with LIENVOY/2 on Rico Galan case, Mexico City, 11-13 January 67

REFERENCE: Mexico City 9890 (IN 75995), 11 Jan 67

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ZBL
Zeno B. LEEHOLD
Office of WH/SAO

Distribution:
1-Rico Galan's 201-336474
1-WH/1 LIENVOY/2
1-WH/SAO
1-WH/COG

17 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG

SUBJECT : Possible Re-Interview of Victor Rico Galan (201-336474).

REFERENCE : Mexico City 9925 (IN 77986), 14 Jan 67

1. Reference summarized the undersigned's first interview with Rico Galan at the Lecumberri penitentiary on 13 January. At that interview Rico apparantly assumed and accepted that I was a fellow Marxist journalist, on a tour of Latin America for the Italian periodical, CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA. He talked freely as a revolutionary in general terms about revolutionary movements and leaders in Latin America, including the Cuba and Soviet roles.

2. My attempt to have a second interview with Rico was not successful, due to circumstances beyond my and Rico's control. The question now is whether we should plan to go through with a second interview. The purpose would be to obtain further information on revolutionary movements and leaders. (The requirements of the Mexican Government were satisfied with the first interview).

3. One possibility might be for me to see Rico in about 10-12 days, ostensibly after a return trip to Mexico from Panama (or Guatemala or some other country). I could mention to Rico the names of one or two Communist leaders of the country visited who had briefed me; I could also reveal some other deception or slanted information; including names of Castroite leaders; then wait for, or elicit, Rico's comments and observations.

4. As noted above, the purpose of a follow-up interview would be to obtain more detailed information from Rico on the Castro and Soviet roles in supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America, not merely to obtain further information on the country visited. The approval of the Mexican Government (LITEMPO/8) would again be necessary for such a follow-up interview.

Louis A. DeSanti
Office of WH/SAO

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1 - WH/SAO Chrono

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C/WH/COG-5	☑ RID COPY	☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED	CSDO	2045Z	B

INFO
FILE, CSDO/VR, C/CI, C/WH 6, C/EUR-4, C/CA-2, C/DO-7, C/FI-2, C/SB-5, DDP, ADP, C/FE-8, C/CCS-3, C/CSPS

S E C R E T 132323Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9925

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ROME

14 Jan 67 77985

RYBAT

REF: MEXICO CITY 9892 ([illegible]) *

1. LEEHOLD HAD SUCCESSFUL ONE HOUR MEETING WITH RICO GALAN AT LECUMBERRI PENITENTIARY MORNING 13 JANUARY. MEETING ENDED ABRUPTLY BY CALL FROM DIRECTOR OF PRISON THAT LAWYER THERE TO SEE RICO.

2. LEEHOLD HAD LETTER INTRODUCING HIMSELF AS ITALIAN WRITER FOR "CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA" AND AS ACQUAINTANCE OF CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMIE JOURNALIST WHO FRIEND OF RICO IN MEXICO AND WHO CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. AS RESULT RICO ASSUMED AND ACCEPTED LEEHOLD AS FELLOW MARXIST AND FRIENDLY RAPPORT ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY. MOST PROBABLE THAT RICO EXPRESSED HIS REAL THOUGHTS IN DISCUSSION AND ANSWER TO QUESTIONS.

3. IN BRIEF, RICO REVEALED HIMSELF AS CONVINCED, UNREPENTANT, FERVENT REVOLUTIONARY SEEING VIOLENT REVOLUTION "INDISPENSABLE" THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA SINCE PEACEFUL ROAD TO NECESSARY CHANGES "BLOCKED EVERYWHERE". DESCRIBED MEXICO AS "APPARENT DEMOCRACY BUT REALLY POLICE STATE TIGHTLY HELD", WHERE STRENGTH OF "POPULAR [illegible]

MOVEMENTS ON THE RISE. EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT REVOLUTION WILL WIN IN GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA. CHARACTERIZED CASTRO AS GREAT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER AND TACTICIAN BUT NOT ABLE PLAY ROLE AS LIBERATOR OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE HE IS TOO DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS WHO TIGHTLY CONTROL HIM. SIAD CASTRO INFLUENCE DOMINANT WITHIN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN FOLLOWING COUNTRIES: VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, ALL CENTRAL AMERICA, COLOMBIA. SOVIETS DOMINANT IN CHILE, ARGENTINA AND MEXICO. SAID CHICOM GROUPS THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA ARE THE SMALLEST AND MOST DISREPUTABLE.

4. COS AND LEEHOLD BRIEFED LIENVOY/2 AFTER MEETING. BELIEVE MEXICANS PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE THAT MEETING CONFIRMED THEIR ASSESSMENT OF RICO AS UNREPENTANT REVOLUTIONARY. LEEHOLD ATTEMPTING SEE RICO AGAIN AFTERNOON 13 JAN.

5. LEEHOLD ETA WASHINGTON 1600 14 JANUARY EASTERN 934. PLEASE ADVISE WIFE.

S E C R E T STM HQS Put Lienvoy/2 in Contact with LeeHold

SECRET

BT

abo
1a

Lecumberri penitentiary
7. as held
with

armed ;

also

; and there were also
civilians present from

).

greetings

it

inquired about
Cocciolo;

✱

[illegible] the fine [illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] Central [illegible]

[illegible] Daily, and

course I [illegible] (I [illegible]).

I also [illegible] that [illegible]

3. Because of my [illegible] with Communist (a [illegible] Communist

Italian journalist [illegible] in Mexico for several years, [illegible] periodical, CORRESPONDENT [illegible])

[illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] I believe

[illegible] rights

[illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] given on [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

I also said that I'd like him to write an article for my periodical ~~[illegible]~~ as [illegible] [illegible]. He also found this idea agreeable, but qualified his approval by saying he first wanted to take a ~~look at~~ the journal to see its [illegible] and format.

5. My first substantive question was how he viewed the evolving situation in Latin America; did he think "military revolution" a necessary stage in the development of Latin America. He answered quickly and emphatically that military revolution throughout Latin America was "inevitable"; for the present moment [illegible] may [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]!

[illegible]

He [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. He [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],

[illegible]

people are peasants and the majority [illegible] for Lajas and [illegible] to armed struggle

[illegible] Vanguardia [illegible] and MIR [illegible] to armed struggle, but they have now abandoned it. I asked why. He said both movements confined their efforts mostly to the cities and took the form of terrorist acts. Their tactics did not get the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Frente de Liberacion Nacional ([illegible]) led by [illegible] Blanco [illegible] [illegible] the armed struggle, and their effort [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] asked me [illegible] read a recent article [illegible] la Ana Maria Menendez Rodriguez) [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] FALN [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] a [illegible].

(after considering he:

7. Rico described Mexico as an "apolitical state, tightly held." Here the "popular movements" are on the rise. In answer to my question as to who was leading these "popular" and revolutionary movements in Mexico and Latin America, Rico replied that there was no leader like Castro around, ~~and~~ and the leaders would come from the students, intellectuals and laborers.

7. I asked Rico for his opinion and total evaluation of Fidel Castro. Fidel, he said, Castro is a Communist [illegible] kind of a Communist he is, nobody knows. He is a great revolutionary leader and a great tactician [illegible] [illegible] of Latin America [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. I think [illegible] [illegible] and a prisoner [illegible]

Soviets. He thought Che Guevara really wanted to break away from the Soviet chains, but Castro is not able to do this. ~~As to~~ the whereabouts of Che, Pico said that perhaps not even Fidel Castro knows where he is.

9. [illegible] regarding Cuban-Soviet conflicts, Pico said they are more apparent than real. Then I asked him to name countries of primary Cuban or Soviet influence. He then said Castro has dominant influence within the militant movements in Venezuela, Guatemala, all of Central America, and Colombia. The Soviets have dominant influence in Chile, Argentina and Mexico. However, he added, in Peru, Castro [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] particularly [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible]

8.

10. After [illegible] [illegible] time (our meeting was ended abruptly), a guard
[illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] prison
director [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Paris;
~~[illegible]~~ was [illegible] waiting
to see him. I held him
back for an extra minute, and
then we parted, reluctantly,
with a warm handshake.

11. After [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
apparently [illegible] [illegible],
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], that
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and
looked [illegible]

12. I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
a letter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Director [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]
I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the name of [illegible] Cuban, this [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] possibly [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the window. [illegible] later I knocked again. I asked the guard if he would deliver a message to Rice from me. He said that also was impossible, only the Director could do that. The guard certainly did his duty.

[illegible]

F

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI

S E C R E T 111950Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9890

DIRECTOR

RYBAT TYPIC

11 JAN 67 75995

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 63461

STATION HAS PUT LIENVOY/2 IN CONTACT WITH LEEHOLD. L/2 SERVING AS CUT-OUT IN ARRANGING MEETING WITH RICO. MEETING DELAYED SLIGHTLY SINCE LITEMPO/8 OUT OF CITY.

S E C R E T

Re LeeHold ETA mexi

BT

NNNN

SECRET

201-336474

DEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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REF TO FILE NO.

LE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

ESTROY ☐ SIG.

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4		8	C

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UNIT

TIME

INFO

FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CCS

SECRET 041946Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9813

DIRECTOR

4 JAN 67 IN 71102

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 63461

RESERVATIONS CONFIRMED AT HOTEL GENEVE 8 JAN 67 FOR MR. LOUIS DE SANTI.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

ORIG : L.A.DESANTI/pap ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA ☐ INDEX
EXT : 2975 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 3 JANUARY 1967 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

LAS

S E C R E T

ROUTING

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4		8	

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR , FILE ☑ RID COPY C/RI/SD C/WH 6 C/CCS 3

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T (DATE AND TIME FILED) 3 19 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 63461

TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: DIR 61904

ZENO B. LEEHOLD ETA MEXICO CITY 8 JANUARY 2317 EASTERN 905. NO NEED MEET. PLEASE RESERVE ROOM AT GENEVE. ADVISE. LEEHOLD WILL CALL STATION MORNING 9 JAN.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA C. Anderson
C/WH/COG/CA
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

THOMAS J. FLOR
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

3-2

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

13

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	PA	5	FI
2		6	TC
3	CA	7	
4	CI	8	

FROM HY

ACTION DC/WH/CCG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C6, C/EUR4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/CCS 3

ACTION

S E C R E T 291512Z CITE ROME 1666 (FILANDER ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 62639 ✗

29 DEC 66 68117

1. COPIES TWO ARTICLES BY DE MARCHI IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER ISSUES CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA AIRMAILED TO REF, PARA 2 ADDRESS.

2. SINCE STATION HAS NO ACCESS TO DE MARCHI, WHO BESIDES NOT PROMINENT, AND DEPLUNGE CANNOT BE QUESTIONED, PER REF, PARA 1, CAN PROVIDE NO RELIABLE INFORMATION RE HIS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS. DE MARCHI RESIDES VIA TOLMINO 5, ROME, IS SECRETARY ITALIAN ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOGRAPHIC EDUCATION, ENGAGED BIRTH CONTROL RESEARCH.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

✗ RE PLAN TO USE DE MARCHI FOR COVER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG : L. DESANTI:jmg
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA
EXT : 2975
DATE : 28 DECEMBER 66

○ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING

1	PA –	5	C/WH/COG
2		6	
3	CA	7	
4		8	

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

PRIORITY

28 22 26 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 62639

TO ROME INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: ROME 1650 (IN 66483)

1. PLAN USE DE MARCHI COVER, SUGGESTED PARA 4 REF. DEEM BACKSTOPPING NOT NECESSARY. DO NOT INFORM DEPLUNGE.

2. HAS ANY ARTICLE BY DE MARCHI APPEARED IN LATEST TWO ISSUES OF CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA OR ELSEWHERE? IF SO PLS AIRMAIL TO SAME [redacted] ADDRESS MENTIONED DIRECTOR 61116. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFO CURRENT WHEREABOUTS DE MARCHI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA L. A. DeSanti

WH/1

EUR/Cuba

C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER 28-9

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3 PER /

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	[illegible]	6	
2	CA-PA	7	
3	FI-TC	8	
4	D	9	
5		10	

ACTION C/WH/CAG 5

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/EUR 4, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 271105Z CITE ROME 1650 (GILANDER ACTING) 27 DEC 66 IN 66483

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 61614

B. ROME 1645 (IN 65727)

C. DIRECTOR 62160

1. REF B SUGGESTION WAS NOT THAT LEEHOLD POSE AS DEPLUNGE, BUT THAT DEPLUNGE BE REQUESTED PROVIDE NAME OF FICTIONAL ITALIAN JOURNALIST OSTENSIBLY WORKING FOR DEPLUNGE'S JOURNAL WHICH NAME LEEHOLD COULD ADOPT AS ALIAS. THUS IF DEPLUNE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVES INQUIRY RE THIS JOURNALIST, HE CAN BACKSTOP.

2. IF HEADQUARTERS DESIRES, DEPLUNGE CAN BE ASKED PROVIDE NAME OF ACTUAL ITALIAN JOURNALIST. DISADVANTAGE IS IF LATER SUBSEQUENTLY ACTUALLY TRUCED AND QUERIED COULD DENY INVOLVEMENT.

3. FOR BEST BACKSTOP HOWEVER BELIEVE MOST EFFICIENT ENLIST DEPLUNGE ASSISTANCE AS OUTLINED ABOVESGO AT LEAST SOME INITIAL BACKSTOP PROVIDED BY HIM.

4. IF ONLY NAME OF NON-PROMINENT BUT ACTUAL

SECRET

ITALIAN JOURNALIST DESIRED WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE

BACKSTOP ARRANGEMENT, SUGGEST LUIGI DE MARCHI, PSU, OF CORRISPONDENZA SOCIALISTA, CAMILO BENEVENTO, PSU, OFSLLAVORO ITALIANO, ENRICO LANDOLF, PSU, OF AVANTI AND LAVORO ITALIANO.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	CTCS-	5	C/WH/COG
2		6	PF
3	CA	7	FI
4	PA	8	TS

ACTION C/WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/EUR 4, C/WH 6, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 231450Z CITE ROME 1643 23[illegible] 35727

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF DIRECTOR 61614 *

STATION HAS NO OBJECTION REF OPS PLAN, BUT SUGGESTS ACTUAL BACKSTOPPING WITH ITALIAN PUBLICATION BE AFFORDED LEEHOLD. ROME PREPARED, SUBJECT HQS CONCURRENCE, DISCUSS BACKSTOP WITH DEPLUNGE WHO EDITOR SMALL ITALIAN LEFTWING JOURNAL, LOCATED ROME. IN THIS DISCUSSION PROPOSE NOT MENTION LEEHOLD'S NAME. IF HQS AGREES ABOVE PROPOSAL, REQUEST ALIAS FOR LEEHOLD BE PROVIDED ROME.

BT

TS

S E C R E T

* RE PLAN TO EXPLOIT IMPRISONMENT VICTOR RICO GALAN

BT

J. FLORES
WH/COG
EXT : 3481
DATE : 23 DEC 66

☐ FILE &
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TOTAL COPIES: 27

SECRET

ROUTING

1	C/WH/COG	5	
2	CA-OK	6	
3	RI-TC	7	
4	D	8	

DISSEM BY 22 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/EUR 4 C/WH 5 C/CI 3
C/MPS/OC C/CA 2 3 C/CA/O 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

CITE DIRECTOR 62160

SECRET

TO PRIORITY ROME INFO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 61614

REVIEW REQUEST PARA 2A REF SHOWS THAT USE OF COVER AS ITALIAN EX-COMMUNIST POSES CERTAIN BUILT-IN DISADVANTAGES. THEREFORE REQUEST ROME ALSO PROVIDE NAME OF ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHO NOT TOO PROMINENT AND WHO NOT PREVIOUSLY COMMIE, BUT CLEARLY LINKED TO NON-COMMIE LEFT GROUP SUCH AS NENNI SOCIALISTS. BY-LINE SHOULD NOT BE APPEARING CURRENTLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA P. L. Johnson
C/WH/1 C. Bustos (by phone)
~~EUR/CUBA~~ ____

C/EUR/ Johnny

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG : L.A.DESANTI/pap
UNIT : WH/COG/CA/PA
EXT : 2075
DATE : 22 DECEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

ROUTING

1	FA-	5	CI
2		6	C
3	EL-TC	7	D
4	CA	8	X

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ #

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/KOPS 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☑ RID COPY [illegible] C/WH 4 C/CA 3

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 23 18 06 Z CITE DIRECTOR 61904

TO MEXICO CITY
KAPOK TYPIC LIRAMA
REF: DIR 61614 *

PENDING COMPLETION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR "COVER" AND NOTIONAL IDENTITY, MR. LOUIS DE SANTI ETA MEXICO PROVISIONALLY SET FOR 6 JANUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

* PROPOSE SEND L SANTI MEXICO TO INTERVIEW VICTOR RICO GALAN.

C/WH/COG/CA/PA C. [illegible]
~~WH/COG/OPS~~
WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

23-2

SECRET

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XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
1	C/WH/C	5	RN
2	CA-PA	6	D
3	FI	7	
4	CI	8	

IG : T.J.FLORES
IT : C/WH/COG
T : 2975
TE : 22 DECEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

DISSEM BY 22 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

OM: DIRECTOR

NF: C/WH/COG 5 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY C/CA R4 C/WH 4 C/CI C/FI 3
C/CA 3

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 22 1808 Z CITE DIRECTOR 61614

TO PRIORITY ROME INFO: MEXICO CITY

RYBAT TYPIC
REF: MEXICO CITY 9716 (IN 64428) (NOT SENT ROME)

1. FYI. VICTOR RICO GALAN, CUBAN AGENT IMPRISONED MEXICO CITY ON CHARGES PLOTTING AGAINST MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, HAS SENT OUT FEELERS INDICATING THAT HE WISHES TO PROVIDE INFORMATION "EXPOSING CASTRO AND HIS AGENTS" IN EXCHANGE FOR RELEASE. STATION MEXICO CITY AND MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS WORKING TOGETHER ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION. MATTER REVIEWED BY DAINOLD AND MEXICAN MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT DURING FORMER'S RECENT VISIT MEXICO CITY.

2. FOLLOWING PLAN EVOLVED AS FIRST STEP TO EXPLOIT INHERENT POSSIBILITIES. BEST ESTIMATE RICO'S MOTIVATION IS THAT HE WILL TRY TO TRADE MINIMAL INFORMATION FOR RELEASE:

A. SEND MR LOUIS DESANTI TO MEXICO TO INTERVIEW RICO GALAN USING DISGUISE AND POSING AS ITALIAN EX-COMMUNIST NOW JOURNALIST WITH LIBERAL JOURNAL.

B. ALTHOUGH TAKE FROM INTERVIEW NOT EXPECTED RESULT IN TOTAL REVELATION OF RICO'S ACTIVITY IT WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR STAFFER ASSESSMENT AND MIGHT BE FOLLOWED UP WITH SUFFICIENT

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER 22-2 SECRET GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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11

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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4		8	

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

PER ______ # ______

DIRECTOR

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 61614

PRESSURES TO INDUCE HIM TO TALK OR POSSIBLY TO BREAK HIM.

3. NAMES OF ITALIAN JOURNAL AND OF NOT TOO PROMINENT ITALIAN JOURNALIST AS DE SANTI ALIAS NOT YET SELECTED. SINCE ABOVE COVER WILL BE NEEDED ONLY FOR RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD, AND A LIMITED NUMBER OF MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS WILL BE AWARE THAT IT IS A COVER, BELIEVE NO BACKSTOPPING ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ROME COMMENTS.

5. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ For Mexi: WILL PROVIDE DATA REQUESTED REF BY SEPARATE CABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CA/PA

C/WH/1 J. Kaufman (in draft)

EUR/Cuba L. Raty (in draft)

John [illegible]
C/EUR/4

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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kb

S E C R E T 212330Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9716 22D[illegible] 64428

DIRECTOR

KAPOK LIRAMA

REF: HMMA 30816

1. DURING 17 DECEMBER CONFERENCE WITH DAINOLD, LITEMPO/8 STATED THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN, NOW BEING HELD IN JAIL UNDER CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO OVERTHROW GOM, HAS PROCLAIMED HIMSELF DISAFFECTED WITH CASTRO RUZ AND WILLING TO DISCUSS HIS PREVIOUS CONNECTION WITH CUBANS IN DETAIL. PRICE, WHICH IS TOO HIGH FOR MEXICANS, IS HIS RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT. LITEMPO/8 ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD SOME OF HIS BEST INTERROGATORS WORKING ON RICO GALAN, HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXTRACT ANY INFORMATION OF SIGNIFICANCE FROM HIM.

2. DAINOLD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD AVAILABLE A LEFTIST ITALIAN JOURNALIST WHOM HE REGARDED HIGHLY AS INTERROGATOR, AND WHO HAD RECENTLY HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN DEBRIEFING A TOP HUK LEADER IN PHILIPPINES. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS PERSON MIGHT USEFULLY BE INTRODUCED INTO RICO GALAN INTERROGATION. LITEMPO/8 AGREED, AND NOW EXPECTS HIM NEAR FUTURE.

Rico Galan

3. STATION NEEDS IDEN, COVER DESCRIPTION, PERSONALITY, **SECRET**

3

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9715 SECRET **SECRET**

BACKGROUND, AND PROBABLE ETA. SUGGEST IF POSSIBLE HE COME DURING CHRISTMAS WEEK. IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER 6 JANUARY TWELFTH NIGHT FIESTA.

4. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SENT BY REFERENCE.

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INS CFIS-1 Nogales 12/16

5. SUBVERSIVE

FBI - Rose

OIA - Col. Carey

CIA - Tenney

The newspaper, EL MEXICANO, published at San Luis, Sonora on November 19, 1966, carries an article captioned, "The Lot Owners Union Now Does Not Show Signs of Activity." The story indicates that the Mexican Supreme Court had ruled that the expropriation of the lands belonging to the Ejido San Luis was legal. (Reference is made to Nogales, Arizona Intelligence Report of August 5, 1966.) (UNCLASSIFIED)

The Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) has held infrequent meetings about twice a month in San Luis, Sonora recently, according to a reliable source. In February, they plan to hold meetings weekly in connection with stepped-up activities during the coming political campaign. The local committee from San Luis, Sonora, headed by LORENZO-MOLINA-VILLA, recently were successful in forming a bloc or group of the PPS at Camp 57, Sonora. The source states this group has been organized strictly for political purposes and that the membership have not so far been indoctrinated as regular members of the PPS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

This source also reported concerning stories brought back from PPS headquarters at Hermosillo, Sonora recently by LORENZO MOLINA-VILLA. One of these alleges that two Americans with United States

Victor Rico Galan

Communist's credentials (reference is made to Nogales, Arizona Intelligence Report of November 4, 1966) had been instrumental in the arrest of RICO-GALAN and associates a few months ago by Mexican authorities. They are said to have gained the confidence of this group, furnished money for arms, and then denounced them to the Mexican government. They are believed to be CIA agents. Another incident was the occasion when two Americans with United States Communist's credentials visited the president of the PPS at Culiacan, Sinaloa, Mexico, who then communicated with VICENTE LOMBARDO-TOLEDANO, who in turn arranged for photographs of the men to be sent to the United States to be identified to see if they were United States Communists. It was said that they could not be identified and, therefore, were believed to be CIA agents. (CONFIDENTIAL)

A plenum of the PPS was to be held at Hermosillo, Sonora on December 9, 1966. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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ABSTRACT X INDEX X

S E C R E T 061945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9519

6 DEC 66 IN 53380

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. ACCORDING TO AMCONSUL VERACRUZ REPORT A-28 DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1966, THE EAST GERMAN CARGO SHIP, J.G. FICHTE LEFT VERACRUZ ON 12 NOV FOR HAVANA, CUBA, WITH THE FOLLOWING PASSENGERS: FERNANDO RICO GALAN, TEACHER, DOB: 1929; HIS WIFE GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO, DOB: 1929 AND THEIR CHILDREN MARIA P. RICO BARRON, DOB: 1963, MONICA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1964 AND GRACIELA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1965. THE RICO FAMILY GAVE THEIR ADDRESS AS CALLE BALBOA 22, COLONIA PORTALES, MEXICO 5, D.F.

CIT MEXICO

TRAVEL TO

wife of brother of Victor Rico Galan (201-336474)

SELF

2. FERNANDO RICO IS THE BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474). THE RICO FAMILY DID NOT SAY HOW LONG THEY PLANNED TO REMAIN IN CUBA.

3. INDEX FERNANDO RICO AND GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO TO P-7334.

S E C R E T

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6 DEC 66

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TO
: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
: COS, Mexico City

SUBJECT
: Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a piece written and signed by Victor RICO Galan (Attachment "A") which he gave to Elena Garro DE PAZ to pass to LNPURE. She handed it to IDENTITY who in turn gave it to Bernard A. Edgebrook. Attached also is a copy of the covering note written by Mrs. DE PAZ (Attachment "B") and rough translations of both pieces.

2. On 1 December COS gave LITEMPO-8 a photostatic copy of Attachment "A". LITEMPO-8 said that he too had received a copy of the piece which he had given to LITEMPO-4 who sent one of his officers to interview RICO. RICO readily admitted that the signature was his, that he and Mrs. DE PAZ had discussed the matter, that Mrs. DE PAZ had typed out the copy and had brought it to him in prison where he had signed it. LITEMPO-8 said also that RICO Galan had said that he was eager to talk to a WOFACT representative. LITEMPO-8 said that he had no objection to such an interview.

3. In the opinion of LITEMPO-8 the RICO Galan statement is merely a maneuver by which RICO Galan hopes to get out of jail by promising to supply information and to oppose Fidel CASTRO.'

ATTACHMENTS
"A" - Copy and translation of a piece written by Victor RICO Galan h/w
"B" - Covering note written by Mrs. DE PAZ. - h/w
"C" - IDENTITY - u/s/c

19 DEC 66

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201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30780	6 December 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-30780

4. On 5 December, LITEMPO-4 told COS that RICO Galan is "almost crazy" for several reasons; confinement of course; his fear that his "friends" are going to kill him or that the Mexican Government will "arrange his death" and because he has learned that his wife, Inge, is sleeping with Manuel MARCUE Pardinas, editor of POLITICA. (NOTE: According to Mrs. DE PAZ, Rosendo Gomez Lorenzo of SUCESOS is pursuing Mrs. RICO Galan.) LITEMPO-4 commented that right now RICO Galan is willing to do almost anything to get out of jail.

Olivia G. Raquity

for / Willard C. CURTIS

CS COPY

SECRET

Attachment "A"
HMMA-30780
6 December 1966

(Translantion)

"6 November 1966, Mexico D.F.

"Having taken part in the serious discussions which arose between Fidel Castro and Che Guevara before the Dominican conflict on tactics, policies and agreements to follow in Latin America and which caused the disappearance of Che Guevara, I consider myself authorized to write a political testament to unmask Fidel Castro before the revolutionaries of Latin America as an agent of Stalinism. The fall of Caamano, the murder of the Peruvian leader Uceda, the crime of Turcios, etc., have been carried out by Castro agents, charged with the murder and destruction of everything that differs with Castro's line. (Rolf) Meiners (Huebner), (Miguel) Cruz (Ruiz) and myself have been delivered up by agents such as (Luis) Lizaldo, Menendez, and others to silence the truth that should be known by the Latin Americans. The next victim is Yon Sosa and many more who have hidden themselves for the moment from the assassins. My testimony would be political and ideological since I myself wrote many of Guevara's articles and it would omit nothing of names and details necessary to unmask Fidel Castro and his agents."

signed Victor Rico Galan

SECRET

ATT #1 TO HMMA 30780 CS COPY 20[illegible]-33[illegible]774

SECRET

Attachment "A"
HMMA-30780
6 December 1966

(Translantion)

"6 November 1966, Mexico D.F.

"Having taken part in the serious discussions which arose between Fidel Castro and Che Guevara before the Dominican conflict on tactics, policies and agreements to follow in Latin America and which caused the disappearance of Che Guevara, I consider myself authorized to write a political testament to unmask Fidel Castro before the revolutionaries of Latin America as an agent of Stalinism. The fall of Caamano, the murder of the Peruvian leader Uceda, the crime of Turcios, etc., have been carried out by Castro agents, charged with the murder and destruction of everything that differs with Castro's line. (Rolf) Meiners (Huebner), (Miguel) Cruz (Ruiz) and myself have been delivered up by agents such as (Luis) Lizalde, Menendez, and others to silence the truth that should be known by the Latin Americans. The next victim is Yon Sosa and many more who have hidden themselves for the moment from the assassins. My testimony would be political and ideological since I myself wrote many of Guevara's articles and it would omit nothing of names and details necessary to unmask Fidel Castro and his agents."

signed Victor Rico Galan

SECRET

4H A

Noviembre 6 de 1966 Mexico D.F.

Habiendo tomado parte en las graves discusiones surgidas entre Fidel Castro y Che Guevara antes del conflicto de Santo Domingo, a proposito de las tácticas, lineas y pactos a seguir en America Latina y que ocasionaron la desaparición del Che Guevara me considero autorizado a escribir un testimonio politico que desenmascare a Fidel Castro ante los revolucionarios de la America Latina como a un agente del stalinismo. La derrota de Caamaño, el asesinato de Uceda el líder peruano, el crimen de Turcios etc. han sido ejecutados por agentes castristas, encargados de asesinar y destruir a todo aquel que difiera de la linea castrista. Meneses, Cruz y yo mismo hemos sido entregados por agentes tales como Lizalde, Menendez y otros, para callar una verdad que debe ser conocida por los latinoamericanos. La próxima víctima es Yon Sosa y muchos más que en estos momentos se esconden de los asesinos. Mi testimonio sería politico e ideologico ya que yo mismo escribí muchos de los articulos de Guevara, sin escatimar todos los nombres y detalles necesarios para desenmascarar a Fidel Castro y sus agentes.

SECRET

SEPERATE COVER ATTACHMENT
HMMA-30780
6 December 1966

IDENTITY

Second Secretary of the Embassy
Charles Thomas

SECRET

SC ATT TO HMMA 30780

CS COPY

201-336474

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FILE RF WH/COG 8 CI/AN CI/OPS

SECRET 061945Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9519 6 Dec 66 53980

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

1. ACCORDING TO AMCONSUL VERACRUZ REPORT A-28 DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1966, THE EAST GERMAN CARGO SHIP, J. G. FICHTE LEFT VERACRUZ ON 18 NOV FOR HAVANA, CUBA, WITH THE FOLLOWING PASSENGERS: FERNANDO RICO GALAN, TEACHER, DOB: 1929; HIS WIFE GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO, DOB: 1929 AND THEIR CHILDREN MARIA P. RICO BARRON, DOB: 1963, MONICA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1964 AND GRACIELA RICO BARRON, DOB: 1965. THE RICO FAMILY GAVE THEIR ADDRESS AS CALLE BALBOA 22, COLONIA PORTALES, MEXICO 5, D. F.

2. FERNANDO RICO IS THE BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474). THE RICO FAMILY DID NOT SAY HOW LONG THEY PLANNED TO REMAIN IN CUBA.

3. INDEX FERNANDO RICO AND GRACIELA BARRON DE RICO TO P-7354.

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Rico Galan 201

[illegible] de Cuba: [illegible].-
[illegible] Nov. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] - [illegible].

[illegible]. Entrada 0934.- El Dr. Alberto [illegible] al no encontrar al embajador, queda de volver a llamar. Olga: bien.- 011.-

011. Entrada 1034.- Mercy con Olga para decirle que la señora que está con Delfín Sánchez ahora va para allá para el asunto del pasaporte, la cual lleva el catálogo de Avón para Regla y ésta se lo regrese lo más pronto posible. Olga: bien. 10.

010. Salida 1040.- El embajador después de enterarse de que la señora Elena Garro recibió el periódico Granma y lo leó con mucho interés, pregunta cuándo puede pasar a verla para charlar sobre el Festival de teatro. Elena lo invita para que ésta noche pase a cenar a su casa. Armas acepta y queda de ir a las 9.- 004.-

004. Entrada 1105.- Ramírez Pérez con Olga para decirle que quisiera hablar con el embajador, ya que Miravel le acaba de indicar que no ha habido nada hasta el momento. Olga: que el embajador no está, pero ayer le dijo que habían agotado todos los recursos y hasta ahora no han recibido ninguna respuesta sobre sus visas; que tan pronto tengan la autorización, lo llamarán ó si gusta puede volver a llamar cuando guste. Ramírez acepta y aclara que si no viajan a más tardar la semana entrante, tendrán que prescindir del viaje en contra de su voluntad, pero si ésto sucediera de cualquier manera quisieran ver al embajador para darle las gracias. Olga queda de comunicárselo al embajador.- 106.-

File

201 - [illegible] RICO - G.
Elena Garro de Paz
V9 (50-6-75/4)

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) Contacts with Communist Officials Stationed in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMA 30355, 21 October 1966

1. Attached herewith for Headquarters information and retention is a copy of the translation, done by LIENVOY, for LIRAMA, of Victor RICO Galan's contacts with Communist officials in Mexico, prepared by Station and forwarded to Headquarters on 21 October 1966.

for/ Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: Herewith as stated

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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA 30405

DATE
27 October 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
P-7354
201-336474

Informe sobre VICTOR RICO GALAN

22 octubre 1966

Lo presente es una relación de las ocasiones en que el periodista VICTOR RICO GALAN se puso en contacto con conocidos funcionarios de las Embajadas Cubana, Yugoeslava, Soviética, Polaca y Checoeslovaca, a la vez que con chino-comunistas, todos éllos estacionados en México.

Del 16 de enero de 1957 al 12 de agosto de 1966 VICTOR RICO GALAN tuvo:

a.- 256 contactos con funcionarios de la Embajada Cubana, estacionados en México;

b.- 33 contactos con funcionarios yugoeslavos estacionados en México;

c.- 31 contactos con funcionarios soviéticos estacionados en México;

d.- 7 contactos con chino-comunistas estacionados en México;

e.- 6 contactos con funcionarios de la Embajada Polaca, estacionados en México;

f.- 4 contactos con funcionarios checoeslovacos estacionados en México.

Esto representa un total de 337 contactos con elementos de esas instalaciones comunistas, 327 de los cuales fueron hechos por RICO GALAN en un período menor de cuatro años. La mayoría de esos contactos son conocidos elementos del servicio de inteligencia:

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
16 Ene. 57	Embajada Soviética	Aceptó invitación a recepción.
9 Jul. 59	STANISLAW RACZKA Dept. Prensa y Propaganda Emb. Polaca	Reunirse.
22 Jun. 60	ALEKSANDER BEKIER, Consejero Emb.Polaca.	Para presentarlo a CARLO COCCIOLI.
12 Jul. 61	TERESA PROENZA. Agreg. Cult.Emb.Cubana.	Fué invitado a la celebración del 26 de julio.

Note: This is translation (of our memo) by Lienvoy for Litama

CC: 50-6-75/2

Attachment h/w

HMMA-30405,
27 Oct. 66

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
12 Sep. 61	FROYLAN C. MANJARREZ Reportero de Prensa Latina.	RICO dió despedida a reporteros izquierdistas que van a Praga y Moscú.
10 Abr. 62	PIOTR WASILUK de Embajada Polaca.	Asistir a comida dada por ALEKSANDER BERIER.
10 May. 62		RICO recibirá invitación para ir a Cuba.
14 Jun. 62	TERESA PROENZA PROENZA.	RICO fué recomendado por el Embajador CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA para un viaje a Cuba.
4 Jul. 62	PIOTR WASILUK	Enviará a RICO algún material.
14 Jul. 62	HECTOR ANAYA, de Prensa Latina.	RICO solicita material de Cuba para publicar en la Revista Siempre.
11 Sep. 62	YOLANDA PALACIOS, de Prensa Latina.	Discutiendo declaración del Depto.de Estado Norteamericano en el caso de Cuba
12 Sep. 62	FERNANDO REVUELTA, de la Embajada Cubana.	Gestionando reunión con el Embajador CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA.
26 Sep. 62	ANA MARIA BLANCO, de la Embajada Cubana.	RICO solicita que el Embajador LECHUGA le de visa para ir a Cuba.
28 Sep. 62	Habana vía N.York.	Piden a EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina, diga cuándo sale RICO a Cuba.
1 Oct. 62	EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
4 Oct. 62		RICO recibió visa de cortesía para ir a Cuba.
22 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina.	El hermano de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON información sobre aquél.

24 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina	La mamá de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON informes sobre su hijo.
28 Oct. 62	Prensa Latina	La mamá de RICO pide a EDMUNDO JARDON informes sobre su hijo.
13 Dic. 62	Revista Política	EDMUNDO JARDON, de Prensa Latina, dice el Ing. MANUEL MARQUEZ PARDINAS que RICO regresará la semana próxima.
15 Ene. 63	Embajador Cubano CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA.	RICO se encontró con LECHUGA en el Aeropuerto.
15 Feb. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO, Consejero Emb.Cubana.	Discuten sobre la Revista Siempre.
18 Feb. 63	SAUL ALVAREZ, de Prensa Latina.	Discuten la firma de un documento para el periódico.
28 Feb. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Planean reunirse.
13 Mar. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Planean reunirse.
25 Mar. 63	YURIY K. ALEKSANDROV, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Rusa.	Planean reunirse.
26 Mar. 63	YURIY K. ALEKSANDROV.	Invita a RICO a comer.
29 Mar. 63	JOVAN MIRIC, Rep.Agencia Prensa Yugoeslava TANJUG.	Reunirse.
30 Mar. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse con SIMOBAS y JOVAN MIRIC.
24 Abr. 63		Concurrió a una comida en la Embajada Yugoeslava.
26 Abr. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Charla.
29 Abr. 63	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
23 May. 63	EDMUNDO JARDON	Discutiendo el viaje de RICO a Cuba para entrevistarse con FIDEL CASTRO.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
25 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
25 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Discutiendo el viaje a Cuba.
26 May. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
28 May. 63		RICO recibió visa de cortesía para ir a Cuba.
12 Jun.63	Embajada Cubana.	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO habla con el Emb.CARLOS LECHUGA HEVIA sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
19 Jun. 63	Consulado Cubano.	INGE DE RICO GALAN habla con RAMON SINOBAS CASADO sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
19 Jun. 63	Revista Siempre.	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO habla con JOSE PAGES LLERGO, Director de Siempre, sobre el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
22 Jun. 63	YOLANDA PALACIOS, de Prensa Latina.	RICO trajo material para Prensa Latina.
2 Jul. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
4 Jul. 63	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
7 Jul. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, Agreg.de Prensa Embajada Cubana.	Discutiendo el coctel dado por RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.
11 Jul. 63		RICO asistió a una recepción en la Embajada Cubana.
18 Jul. 63		RICO será orador en la celebración del 26 de Julio en Tampico.
29 Jul. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discutiendo sobre un coctel en la Embajada Checa.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
26 Jul. 63	LUIS ALBERU SOUTO, Agr. Cult. Emb. Cubana; WILFREDO GONZALEZ, Vicecónsul cubano en Tampico; JOSE LUIS MOLINA, Presidente de la Sociedad José Martí.	Todos son oradores en el presidium junto con RICO, para los discursos del 26 de Julio en el Aeropuerto.
26 Jul. 63		ENRIQUE GONZALEZ PEDRERO, escritor en la revista Política, discute con RICO la ubicación del Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Cubano en Mérida.
1 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI, diplomático cubano.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Mérida.
5 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
12 Agt. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
12 Sep. 63	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
29 Oct. 63	MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA Comdte. del Movimiento 13 de Noviembre - organización de guerrilla guatemalteca.	Entrevista.
15 Nov. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
23 Dic. 63	JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
16 Ene. 64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
21 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA, de Embajada Cubana.	RICO quiere ir a Cuba.
24 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla. FERNANDEZ está enfermo.
26 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
28 Ene. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
28 Ene. 64		RICO partió a Cuba con visa de cortesía.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
5 Feb. 64	BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, 1/er.Srio.de la Emb. Yugoeslava.	RICO envía mensajes a los izquierdistas panameños.
11 Feb.64	RAUL PEREYRA, mesero de la Embajada Cubana.	Discuten el viaje de RICO a Cuba.
15 Feb.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ, portero Emb.Cubana.	Avisándole a la esposa de RICO que llegó carta de Cuba.
27 Feb.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Avisándole a la esposa de RICO que llegó carta de Cuba.
29 Feb.64	RAUL ROA KOURI	Reunirse.
16 Mar.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
19 Mar.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
20 Mar.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
25 Mar.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
30 Mar.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
2 Abr.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Discuten noticias de Brasil.
3 Abri.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
3 Abr. 64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Planean reunirse.
10 Abri64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
15 Abr.64	JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS, Emb.de Cuba.	Invitación a la comida del Embajador.
22 Abr.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Hablan sobre la borrachera de RICO con un individuo.
27 Abr.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Reunirse.
27 Abr.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
28 Abri64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
4 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Charla.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
9 May.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
13 May.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Discuten transmisión de Radio-Habana.
14 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Charla.
18 May.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Hay carta para RICO en la Embajada.
18 May.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla.
19 May.64	HEBERTO JORRIN MUÑOZ.	Charla.
19 May.64	RAUL PEREYRA.	Reunirse.
19 May.64	JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA.-Emb.Cubana.	Reunirse.
21 May.64	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV, 2/o.Srio.de la Embajada Soviética.	Reunirse.
21 May.64	PIEN CHENG, Director de Agencia China de Noticias.	Invitación para que RICO vaya a China.
30 May.64	PIEN CHENG.	Reunirse.
1 Jun.64	RAUL ROA KOURI.	Gestionando reunión con Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.
10 Jun.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
12 Jun.64	BORIS ALEKSANDROVICH KAZANTSEV, Consejero de Embajada Soviética.	Reunirse.
13 Jun.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
16 Jun.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse.
18 Jun.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
3 Jul.64	RAUL APARICIO NOGALES Agregado Cultural Cubano.	Planeando reunirse.
10 Jul.64	JACINTO VAZQUEZ DE LA GARZA.	Reunirse.
13 Jul.64	PIOTR WASILUK.	Discutiendo publicaciones.
21 Jul.64	RAUL APARICIO NOGALES.	Reunirse.
31 Jul.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Reunirse.
31 Jul.64	PIOTR WASILUK.	RICO concurrirá a la despedida de WASILUK en la Embajada Polaca.
3 Agt.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	RICO proporciona dirección y teléfono de los chino-comunistas.
11 Agt.64	IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERIEV.-Embajada Soviética.-Corresponsal de PRAVDA.	Invita a RICO a comer.
17 Agt.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ, 2/o.Secretario de Embajada Cubana.	Reunirse.
20 Agt.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Agt.64	RAUL FERNANDEZ ROA.	Charla.
2 Sep.64	OLDRICH NOVICKY 2/o. Srio.y Agreg.Prensa Embajada Checa.	Reunirse.
10 Sep.64	LUBOMIR BLASIK, 2/o. Srio.y Cónsul de la Embajada Checa.	LUIS SUAREZ LOPEZ, de la Revista Siempre, pide a BLAZIK invitar a RICO a la recepción. De acuerdo.
15 Sep.64	ARMANDO HART, Ministro Cubano de Educación.- Emb.Cubana,	Reunirse.
18 Sep.64	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Reunirse,

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
23 Oct.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
31 Oct.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
2 Nov.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
5 Nov.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
7 Nov.64	ANTONIO CARAM, de Prensa Latina.	RICO envía mensaje a Cuba.
10 Nov.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
11 Nov.64	OLDRICH NOVICKY.	Reunirse.
16 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
22 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
30 Nov.64	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Charla.
8 Dic.64	IVAN GAVRILOVICH ALFERYEV.	Reunirse.
12 Dic.64	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, 3/er.Srio., Agreg.Prensa y Cultura Emb.Cubana.	LOPEZ DIAZ envía a RICO arreglo floral por aniversario su matrimonio.
14 Dic.64	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
22 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
23 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
28 Dic.64	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
2 Ene.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ, 3/er.Srio.Embajada Cubana.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
6 Ene.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
10 Ene.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
11 Eno.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
17 Eno.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trató de reunirse con él.
18 Eno.65	KAREL HANUS, Embajador Checo.	Almuerzo en la casa de HANUS.
18 Eno.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
20 Eno.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
21 Eno.65	OLDRICH NOVICKY.	Comer juntos.
27 Eno.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Eno.65	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
12 Mar.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Charla.
17 Mar.65	RAMON SIMOBAS CASADO.	Discutiendo becas para Cuba.
25 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
20 Mar.65	Embajador JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS.	Charla.
26 Mar.65	ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON, 2/o.Srio. y Cónsul Embajada Cubana.	Charla.
27 Mar.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Le informa a RICO que están listos sus pasajes para Cuba.
27 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Comer juntos.
27 Mar.65	ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON.	Trató de reunirse con RICO.
12 Abr.65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES, Depto.Cultural Embajada Cubana.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
13 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	FROYLAN MANJARREZ.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	MARIANO GARCIA, del Consulado Cubano en Mérida.- De visita aquí.	Reunirse.
13 Abr.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse con él.
14 Abr.65	FROYLAN MANJARREZ.	Charla.
19 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
20 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
20 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer juntos.
20 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer juntos y con RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.
21 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
23 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
25 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
26 abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
1 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse.
2 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Desayunar juntos.
4 Feb.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	CHARLA.
11 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
12 Feb.65	MARIANO GARCIA PEREZ.- Consulado cubano en Mérida.	Charla.
16 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Se pospone la reunión porque RICO está enfermo.
16 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
16 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
18 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
18 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
24 Feb.65	Embajada Soviética.	No identificado.
25 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Comer en casa de RICO.
25 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Feb.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	RICO trató de reunirse.
27 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Feb.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 Feb.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
1 Mar.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
2 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Cubana.	Reunirse.
2 Mar.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	RICO trató de reunirse.
3 Mar.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA. Consulado Cubano Tampico.	RICO trató de localizar a POSADA.
3 Mar.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
5 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 Mar.65	MANUEL EUGENIO VEGA PEREZ.	Reunirse.
11 Mar.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
26 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
26 Abr.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	RICO trata de reunirse.
28 Abr.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV.-Corresponsal de TASS en México.	Reunirse.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Conferencia de prensa.
29 Abr.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
30 Abr.65	ORLANDO FUNDORA. Llamada de Cuba - Radio-Habana.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
1 May.65	ORLANDO FUNDORA.- Radio-Habana.	Discutiendo sobre la Republica Dominicana.
2 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Charla.
2 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
2 May.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
2 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Discutiendo el discurso de FIDEL CASTRO.
2 May. 65	YOLANDA PALACIOS.	Reunirse.
3 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 May.65	Cubano MARIO TAMBIO.	Le trajo a RICO un libro de Cuba.
4 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Reunirse.
4 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
4 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Comer en el Club de Corresponsales.
6 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
6 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
7 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
7 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ y JOVAN MIRIC.	Almorzar juntos.
9 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
9 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse en casa de LEONOV.
9 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
10 May.65	EDMUNDO JARDON.	Discusión sobre la República Dominicana.
10 May.65	ANTONIO CARAM, de Prensa Latina.	Discutiendo sobre la República Dominicana.
10 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Invita a RICO a tomar café.
11 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Invita a RICO a tomar café.
15 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
18 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
19 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
19 May.65	CHUNG CHIA MAO. Agencia China Noticias.	Charla.
20 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
21 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
21 May.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
21 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
22 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGHYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
25 May.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
25 May.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO	Reunirse.
25 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Traten de reunirse.
25 May.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Traten de reunirse.
25 May.65	PIEN CHENG.	Traten de reunirse.
25 May.65	ROGELIO RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ.	Reunirse.
28 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 May.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Traten de reunirse.
29 May.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
1 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
2 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	EDUARDO JARDON.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	VLADIMIR AGAFONOVICH DOLGOV. Corresponsal de PRAVDA en México.	Traten de reunirse.
3 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
3 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
4 Jun.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
14 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
18 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
19 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
20 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
21 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Tratan de reunirse.
21 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Tratan de reunirse.
22 Jun.65	PIEN CHENG.	Tratan de reunirse.
23 Jun.65	VALENTIN IVANOVICH MICHEROV.	Reunirse.
23 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
24 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	planean reunirse.
28 Jun.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
29 Jun.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
29 Jun.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Visita a RICO en su casa.
30 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Charla.
30 Jun.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Reunirse.
3 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.
5 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
6 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
8 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
9 Jul.65	JOVAN MIRIC.	Reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
9 Jul.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Reunirse.
20 Jul.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Planeando reunirse.
21 Jul.65	REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.	Comer en casa de RICO.
26 Jul.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunión en casa de SINOBAS.
30 Jul.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Discuten el viaje de LOPEZ a Mérida.
31 Jul.65	JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ.	Se reunieron 4 veces.
7 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Invita a RICO a una recepción en la Embajada.
17 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
24 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
24 Agt.65	LUIS ABREU.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 Agt.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO.	Reunirse.
31 Agt.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA, Cónsul cubano en Tampico. Estando en México.	Tratan de reunirse.
2 Sep.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
3 Sep.65	MARIANO GARCIA.	Tratan de reunirse.
6 Sep. 65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES.	Reunirse.
26 Sep.65	FELIPE ROJAS MORALES.	Reunirse.
27 Sep.65	GEORGIY STEPANOVICH VISKO, Consejero Comercial Emb.Soviética.	Tratan de reunirse.
5 Oct.65	RAMON SINOBAS CASADO y MARIANO GARCIA.	Junto con RICO comerán en casa de SINOBAS.
12 Oct.65	NIKOLAY SERGEYEVICH LEONOV.	Tratan de reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
15 Nov.65	CARLOS BASURTO TREJO, de Agencia China de Noticias.	Tratan de reunirse.
26 Nov.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA, acabando de regresar de Cuba.	Tratan de reunirse.
3 Dic.65	ALFREDO VIÑAS, de Radio-Habana.	Pide la opinión de RICO sobre Congreso Tricontinental.
5 Dic.65	RAMON SIMOENS CASADO.	Tratan de reunirse.
16 Dic.65	ALFREDO GUEVARA, antes de regresar a Cuba.	Tratan de reunirse.
27 Dic.65	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
13 Ene.66	JOSEFINA, agente cubano.	Le mostrará a RICO las fotos del mulato contra el gringo.
14 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO, 1/er.Srio.Emb.Cubana.	LOZANO recibió carta de Cuba, donde esperan a RICO urgentemente.
24 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
27 Ene.66	CARLOS BASURTO TREJO.	Charla del viaje de RICO a Cuba y de artículos en Siempre.
27 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Charla del viaje de RICO a Cuba.
27 Ene.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC, Rep. Agencia Noticiosa Yugoeslava TANJUG, que reemplaza a JOVAN MINIC.	Charla sobre Cuba.
27 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Reunirse.
28 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Llevó a RICO al Aeropuerto.
28 Ene.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Visitando la casa de RICO.
11 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
12 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Reunirse en casa de RICO.
15 Feb.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC.	Comer en casa de RAFAJLOVIC.
16 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
16 Feb.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
21 Feb.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	RICO solicita visas para tres doctores que viajarán a Cuba.
1 Mar.66	RAUL PEREYRA.	Charla.
3 Mar.66	BOZA RAFAJLOVIC.	Tratan de reunirse.
7 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
12 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Deja libro en casa de RICO.
19 Mar.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 Mar.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
5 Abr.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Reunirse en Tampico.
19 Abr.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	RICO va a casa de LOZANO.
30 Abr.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
15 May.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
17 May.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 May.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
25 May.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
15 Jun.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
24 Jun.66	JOSE LUIS POSADA.	Tratan de reunirse.
4 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO y MARIANO GARCIA.	Reunirse en casa de RICO.
14 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
22 Jul.66	MARIANO GARCIA.	RICO invita a GARCIA a desayunar.

FECHA	CONTACTO	MOTIVO DEL CONTACTO
27 Jul.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
4 Agt.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Tratan de reunirse.
12 Agt.66	MIGUEL ANGEL LOZANO.	Se verán en el Aeropuerto para despedir al hermano de NICO que va a Cuba.

DISPATCH

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MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) - Contacts with Communist Officials Stationed in Mexico

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The attached is a listing from Station records of 337 known contacts of Victor RICO Galan with officials of the Cuban (256), Yugoslav (33), Soviet (31), Chinese Communist (7), Polish (6) and Czechoslovakian (4) installations in Mexico City.

2. This list (without sources as listed in the right of each page) was sent to LIRAMA in reply to his personal request. LIENVOY will translate this into Spanish for LIRAMA.

3. A copy of the Cover (blind) Memorandum which will be put into Spanish (by LIENVOY) is also attached.

Willard C. Curtis

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

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1 ATT

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201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30355

DATE
21 October 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
P-7354
201-336474

14-00000

ATT TO HMMA 30355

21 October 1966

SUBJECT: Victor RICO Galan

Attached is a listing of known contacts of Victor RICO Galan with offices of the Cuban, Yugoslav, Soviet, Polish and Czech Embassies and with Chinese Communist persons stationed in Mexico.

During the period from 16 January 1957 through 12 August 1966, Victor RICO Galan is known to have had

a) 256 contacts with Cuban Embassy officials stationed in Mexico;

b) 33 contacts with Yugoslav officials stationed in Mexico;

c) 31 contacts with Soviet officials stationed in Mexico;

d) 7 contacts with Chinese Communists stationed in Mexico;

e) 6 contacts with Polish Embassy officials in Mexico;

f) 4 contacts with Czechoslovakian officials in Mexico.

This represents a total of 337 contacts with officials of these (Communist) installations by Victor RICO Galan; 327 of these contacts were made in less than a four (4) year period of time. Most of the persons contacted by Victor RICO Galan as shown on the attached list are known intelligence officers.

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ATT TO HMMA 30355

201-33297

SECRET Att. to HMMA [illegible]

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
15 Jan. 57	Soviet Embassy	Accepted invitation to Reception	LIFEAT/ LIMERICK
9 July 59	Stanislav RACZKA, employee of Polish Legation (Press and Propaganda Section	Meeting	LITMUS
22 June 60	Aleksander BEKIER, Counselor Polish Embassy	Arranged to introduce BEKIER to Carlo COCCIOLI	HMMA 15203
12 July 61	Teresa PROENZA Proenza (of Cuban Embassy - Cultural Attache	Invited to 26 July 61 celebration	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 61	Froylan C. MANJARREZ Manjarrez (Prensa Latina reporter)	Subject gave despedida for leftist newspaperman going to Prague and Moscow	LIENVOY
10 Apr. 62	Piotr WASILUK (of Polish Embassy)	To attend dinner party given by Aleksander BEKIER	LIENVOY
10 May 62		Subject will receive invitation to Cuba	LIENVOY
14 June 62	Teresa PROENZA Proenza	Subject was recommended to Ambassador Carlos LECHUGA Hevia for trip to Cuba	LIENVOY HMM 6486
4 July 62	Piotr WASILUK	Will send Subject some material	LIENVOY
14 July 62	Hector AMAYA (of Prensa Latina)	Subject requests material from Habana for publication in Siempre	LIENVOY
11 Sept. 62	Yolanda PALACIOS (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing statement issued by U. S. Department of State on case of Cuba	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 62	Fernando REVUELTA (of Cuban Embassy)	Arranging meeting with Ambassador Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	LIENVOY
26 Sept. 62	Ana Maria BLANCO (of Cuban Embassy)	Subject requests visa for Cuba from Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	LIENVOY
28 Sept. 62	Habana via New York	Asks Edmundo JARDON (of Cuban Embassy) when Subject would go to Cuba	LIENVOY
1 Oct. 62	Edmundo JARDON (of Cuban Embassy)	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
4 Oct. 62		Subject received courtesy visa to go to Cuba	LITAMIL-7

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
22 Oct. 62		Brother of Subject calls Edmundo JARDON asking for info on Subject	LIENVOY
24 Oct. 62		Subject's mother calls Edmundo JARDON for news of Subject	LIENVOY
28 Oct. 62		Subject's mother calls Edmundo JARDON for news of Subject	LIENVOY
13 Dec. 62		Edmundo JARDON tells Manuel MARCUE Pardinas that Subject will return next week	LIENVOY
15 Jan. 63	Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia	Subject met LECHUGA at airport	LITAMIL/9
15 Feb. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada (Counselor of Cuban Embassy)	Discussing Siempre magazine	LIENVOY
18 Feb. 63	Saul ALVAREZ (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing signing document for newspaper	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
13 Mar. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 63	Yuriy K. ALEKSANDROV (First Secretary of Soviet Embassy)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
26 Mar. 63	Yuriy K. ALEKSANDROV	ALEKSANDROV invites Subject for dinner	LIENVOY
29 Mar. 63	Jovan MIRIC (Representative of Yugoslav Press Agency TANJUG)	Meeting	LIENVOY
30 Mar. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Meeting with SIMOBAS and Jovan MIRIC	LIENVOY
24 Apr. 63		Attended dinner at Yugoslav Embassy	LIENVOY
26 Apr. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Chatter	LIENVOY
29 Apr. 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 May 63	Edmundo JARDON	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba; Subject invited to meet with Fidel CASTRO	LIENVOY
23 May 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 63	Ramon SIMOBAS Casada	Discuss trip to Cuba	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
26 May 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 May 63		Subject received courtesy visa to Cuba	LITAMIL/7
12 June 63		Ramon SINOBAS Casada talks with Amb. Carlos LECHUGA Hevia about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
19 June 63		Inge RICO (wife of Subject) talks with Ramon SINOBAS Casada about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
19 June 63		Ramon SINOBAS Casada talks with Jose PAGES Llergo (Director of Siempre magazine) about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
22 June 63	Yolanda PALACIOS of Prensa Latina (Prela)	Subject brought material for Prela	LIENVOY
2 July 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
July 63	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
7 July 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa (Press Attaché of Cuban Embassy)	Discussing party given by Ramon SINOBAS Casada	LIENVOY
11 July 63		Subject attended Reception at Cuban Embassy	LIENVOY
8 July 63		Subject will be speaker at 26th of July celebration at Tampico	LITAMIL/9 BARKER
9 July 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Discussing party at Czech Embassy	LIENVOY
6 July 63	Luis ARNEU (Cultural Attaché of Cuban Embassy), Wilfredo GONZALEZ (Cuban Vice Consul, Tampico), Jose Luis MOLINA (President of Jose Marti Society)	All on speakers stand, with Subject, for 26 July speeches at airport	LIERGO
5 July 63		Enrique GONZALEZ Pedrero (writer for Politica magazine) discusses with Subject, the new location of Mexican-Cuban Cultural Institute in Merida	LIENVOY
Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri (Cuban Diplomat)	Discussing Subject's trip to Merida	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
5 Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Aug. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Sept. 63	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
29 Oct. 63	Marco Antonio YON Sosa (Commander of 13 November movement - Guatemalan guerrilla organization)	Interview	MEXI 672
15 Nov. 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Dec. 63	Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Jan. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa of Cuban Embassy	Subject wants to go to Cuba	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter (Contact is ill)	LIENVOY
26 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Discussing Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 64		Subject left for Cuba with Cuban Courtesy visa	LIENVOY
5 Feb. 64	Branko MILIJANOVIC (First Secretary of Yugoslav Embassy)	Subject sends messages to Panamanian leftists	PACY 2324
11 Feb. 64	Raul PEREYRA (waiter at Cuban Embassy)	Discuss Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
15 Feb. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz (Receptionist, Gatekeeper at Cuban Embassy)	Advising Subject's wife letter arrived from Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Feb. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Advising Subject's wife letter arrived from Cuba	LIENVOY
29 Feb. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Mar. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 Mar. 64	Heberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
20 Mar. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
30 Mar. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Apr. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Discuss news from Brazil	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
3 Apr. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
3 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
15 Apr. 64	Cuban Ambassador Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Invitation to Ambassador's dinner	LIENVOY
22 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Discussing Subject getting drunk with unidentified Pole	LIENVOY
27 Apr. 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Meeting	LIENVOY
27 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Apr. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
4 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Chatter	LIENVOY
9 May 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 May 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Discuss Habana radio broadcast	LIENVOY
14 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Chatter	LIENVOY
18 May 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Letter for Subject in Cuban Embassy	LIENVOY
18 May 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Roberto JORRIN Muñoz	Chatter	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Raul PEREYRA	Meeting	LIENVOY
19 May 64	Jacinto VAZQUEZ de la Garza (of the Cuban Embassy	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 May 64	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV (Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
21 May 64	PIEH Ch'ang (Director of New China News Agency)	Invited Subject to China	LIMUD
30 May 64	PIEH Ch'ang	Meeting	LIFEAT
1 June 64	Raul ROA Kouri	Arranging meeting with Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	LIENVOY
10 June 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
12 June 64	Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV (Soviet Minister Counselor)	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 June 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 June 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 June 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
3 July 64	Raul APARICIO Nogales (Cuban Cultural Attaché)	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 July 64	Jacinto VAZQUEZ de la Garza	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 July 64	Piotr WASILUK	Discussing publications	LIENVOY
21 July 64	Raul APARICIO Nogales	Meeting	LIENVOY
31 July 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Meeting	LIENVOY
31 July 64	Piotr WASILUK	Subject will attend WASILUK's despedida party in Polish Embassy	LIENVOY
3 Aug. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Subject gives address and telephone number of Chinese Communists	LIENVOY
11 Aug. 64	Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV (of Soviet Embassy - Pravda correspondent)	Invites Subject to dinner	LIENVOY
17 Aug. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (Second Secretary of Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Aug. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
26 Aug. 64	Raul FERNANDEZ Roa	Chatter	LIENVOY
2 Sept. 64	Oldrich NOVICKY (Second Secretary and Press Attaché of Czech Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
10 Sept. 64		Luis SUAREZ Lopez (of Siempre magazine) asks Lubomir BLAZIK (Second Secretary and Consul of Czech Embassy) to invite Subject to reception. BLAZIK agrees.	LIENVOY
15 Sept. 64	Armando HART (Minister of Education, Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
18 Sept. 64	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Oct. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
31 Oct. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Nov. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
5 Nov. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
7 Nov. 64	Antonio CARAM (of Prensa Latina)	Subject sends message to Cuba	LIENVOY
10 Nov. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
11 Nov. 64	Oldrich NOVICKY	Meeting	LIENVOY
16 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
22 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
30 Nov. 64	Edmundo JARDON	Chatter	LIENVOY
8 Dec. 64	Ivan Gavrilovich ALFERYEV	Meeting	LIENVOY
12 Dec. 64	Julian LOPEZ Diaz (Third Secretary, Press and Cultural Attaché of Cuban Embassy)	LOPEZ Diaz sends Subject flower arrangement for wedding anniversary	LIENVOY
14 Dec. 64	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
22 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
23 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Dec. 64	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Jan. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez (Third Secretary Cuban Embassy)	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
6 Jan. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
10 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
11 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
17 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
18 Jan. 65	Karel HANUS (Czech Ambassador)	Lunch at HANUS' house	LIFEAT
18 Jan. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Jan. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LITAMIL/9
21 Jan. 65	Oldrich NOVICKY	Dinner together	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Jan. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
12 Mar. 65	Jose Luis POSADA	Chatter	LIENVOY
17 Mar. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Discuss scholarships to Cuba	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 Mar. 65	Amb. Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas	Chatter	LIENVOY
26 Mar. 65	Abelardo CURBELO Padron (Second Secretary, Consul - Cuban Embassy)	Chatter	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Advising Subject tickets are ready for Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Eating together	LIENVOY
27 Mar. 65	Abelardo CURBELO Padron	Tried to arrange meeting with Subject	LIENVOY
12 Apr. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales (Cultural Section, Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Froylan MANJARRAZ	Meeting	LIFEAT
13 Apr. 65	Mariano GARCIA (of Cuban Consulate in Merida - visiting Mexico City)	Meeting	LIENVOY
13 Apr. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Subject tries to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
14 Apr. 65	Froylan MANJARRAZ	Chatter	LIFEAT
19 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
20 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Eating together	LIFEAT
20 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Dinner together with Ramon SINOBAS Casada	LIFEAT
21 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
23 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
1 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
2 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Breakfast together	LIENVOY
4 Feb. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Chatter	LIENVOY
11 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
12 Feb. 65	Mariano GARCIA Perez (Cuban Consulate, Merida)	Chatter	LIHACK
16 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting called off. Subject ill.	LIFEAT
16 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
16 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIEMBRACE-3
18 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	"
24 Feb. 65	Soviet Embassy	Unknown	LIENVOY
25 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Dinner in Subject's home	LIENVOY
25 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
26 Feb. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
27 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
28 Feb. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIENVOY
1 Mar. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez (First Secretary Cuban Embassy)	Meeting	LIENVOY
2 Mar. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Subject tried to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
3 Mar. 65	Jose Luis POSADA (Cuban Consulate, Tampico)	Subject tried to call POSADA	LIENVOY
5 Mar. 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIENVOY
5 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 Mar. 65	Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez	Meeting	LIENVOY
11 Mar. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
26 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Apr. 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Subject tries to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
28 Apr. 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV (TASS Correspondent in Mexico)	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Press conference	LIFEAT
29 Apr. 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
30 Apr. 65	Orlando FUNDORA (call from Cuba - Radio Habana)	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIFEAT
1 May 65	Orlando FUNDORA - Radio Habana	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIFEAT LIENVOY
2 May 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Chatter	LIENVOY
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Discussing Fidel CASTRO's speech	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 May 65	Yolanda PALACIOS	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 May 65	Mario TARBIO (Cuban)	Brought book from Cuba for Subject	LIENVOY
4 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
4 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Dinner of Press Club	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz and Jovan MIRIC	Luncheon with Subject	LIFEAT
7 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIENVOY
9 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting (in LEONOV's house)	LIFEAT
9 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
10 May 65	Edmundo JARDON	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
10 May 65	Antonio CARAM (of Prensa Latina)	Discussing Dominican Republic	LIENVOY
10 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Invites Subject for coffee	LIENVOY
11 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Invites Subject for coffee	LIENVOY
15 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
19 May 65	Ramon SIBORAS Casado	Meeting	LIFEAT
19 May 65	CHUNG Chia-mao (New China News Agency representative in Mexico)	Chatter	LIENVOY
20 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
22 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
25 May 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 May 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
25 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	PIEN Ch'eng	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 65	Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez	Meeting	LIFEAT
28 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 May 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
29 May 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
1 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
2 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Edmundo JARDON	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Vladimir Agafonovich DOLGOV (Pravda correspondent in Mexico)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
4 June 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV	Meeting	LIFEAT
14 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
18 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
19 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
21 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
22 June 65	PIEN Ch'eng	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
23 June 65	Valentin Ivanovich KUCHEROV	Meeting	LIFEAT
23 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
28 June 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 June 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
29 June 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Visited at Subject's house	LIFEAT
30 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Chatter	LIENVOY
30 June 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Meeting	LIFEAT
3 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
5 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
6 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
8 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 July 65	Jovan MIRIC	Meeting	LIFEAT
9 July 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Meeting	LIFEAT
20 July 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 July 65	Reynaldo CEPEDA Hernandez	Will eat at Subject's house	LIENVOY
26 July 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting (at SINOBAS's house)	LIFEAT
30 July 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Discuss LOPEZ's trip to Merida	LIENVOY
31 July 65	Julian LOPEZ Diaz	Meetings (4 times)	LIFEAT
7 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Invites Subject to Embassy party	LIFEAT
17 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
24 Aug. 65	Luis ABREU	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
25 Aug. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Meeting	LIFEAT
31 Aug. 65	Jose POSADA (in Mexico City from Tampico)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY

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DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
2 Sept. 65	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 Sept. 65	Mariano GARCIA	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
6 Sept. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales	Meeting	LIFEAT
26 Sept. 65	Felipe ROJAS Morales	Meeting	LIFEAT
27 Sept. 65	Georgiy Stepanovich VISKO (Commercial Counselor of Soviet Embassy)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
5 Oct. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada Mariano GARCIA	With Subject, will eat at SINOBAS' house	LIENVOY
12 Oct. 65	Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
15 Nov. 65	Carlos BASURTO Trejo (of New China News Agency)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
25 Nov. 65	Jose POSADA (just returned from Cuba)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
3 Dec. 65	Alfredo VINAS (of Radio Habana)	Requests Subject's opinions on Tricontinental Congress	LIENVOY
5 Dec. 65	Ramon SINOBAS Casada	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Dec. 65	Alfredo GUEVARA (before returning to Cuba)	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
27 Dec. 65	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
13 Jan. 66	Josefina (last name unknown - Cuban accent)	Arranging for Subject to see pictures Subject wanted about the mulatto against the gringo	LIENVOY
14 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO (First Secretary of Cuban Embassy)	Contact received letter from Cuba for Subject to go to Cuba urgently	LIENVOY
24 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Carlos BASURTO Trejo	Chatter about Subject's trip to Cuba, articles in Siempre	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Chatter about Subject's trip to Cuba	LIENVOY
27 Jan. 66	Bosa RAFAJLOVIC (Representative of Yugoslav Press Agency TANJUG, who replaced Jovan MIRIC)	Chatter about Cuba	LIENVOY

CS COPY

ATT TO HMMA 30355

SECRET

201-336474

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
27 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Meeting	LIFEAT
28 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Took Subject to airport	LIFEAT
28 Jan. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Visiting in Subject's house	LIENVOY
11 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
12 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Meeting in Subject's house	LIENVOY
15 Feb. 66	Boza RAFAJLOVIC	Dinner in RAFAJLOVIC's house	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
16 Feb. 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging meeting	LIENVOY
21 Feb. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Subject requests visas for three doctors to travel to Cuba	LIENVOY
1 Mar. 66	Raul PEREYRA	Chatter	LIENVOY
3 Mar. 66	Boza RAFAJLOVIC	Trying to arrange meeting	LIENVOY
7 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
12 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Leaves book at Subject's house	LIENVOY
19 Mar. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
25 Mar. 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
5 Apr. 66	Jose POSADA	Meeting in Tampico	LIENVOY
19 Apr. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Going to LOZANO's house	LIENVOY
30 Apr. 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Trying to arrange a meeting	LIENVOY
15 May 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
17 May 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
24 May 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
25 May 66	Jose POSADA	Trying to arrange a meeting	LIENVOY
15 June 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
24 June 66	Jose POSADA	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
4 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO Mariano GARCIA	Arranging a meeting in Subject's house	LIENVOY

SECRET

SECRET

DATE	CONTACT	REASON FOR CONTACT	SOURCE
14 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
22 July 66	Mariano GARCIA	Subject invites GARCIA to breakfast	LIENVOY
27 July 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
4 August 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arranging a meeting	LIENVOY
12 August 66	Miguel Angel LOZANO	Arrange to meet at airport to see off Subject's brother who is going to Cuba	LIENVOY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ATT TO HMMA 30355

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201-336474

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/14014-66
SUBJECT	Eighth Regional Congress of the Union of Local Societies of Collective Farm Credit 40-66 in Torreon, Coahuila	DATE DISTR.	18 October 1966
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	19-21 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Monterrey (7 September 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMY-1267

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Medium-level member of the Mexican Communist Party in the Laguna area whose Party position requires attendance at policy-making meetings. His reporting on Communist activities has been reliable.

1. On 19-21 August 1966 the Union of Local Societies of Collective Farm Credit 40-66 (USCE 40-66 - Union de Sociedades de Credito Ejidal 40-66), a Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) peasant front, held its 8th Regional Congress at the USCE 40-66 headquarters in Torreon, Coahuila, with an attendance of 800 to 1,000 people. Every state in Mexico was represented. The meeting was presided over by Arturo Orona Gamez, member of the PCM Central Committee and Secretary for Peasant Affairs of the PCM Coahuila State Committee, and Ramon Danzos Palomino, also a member of the PCM Central Committee and head of the Independent Peasants' Central (CCI - Central Campesina Independiente), another PCM controlled group in the Laguna area. In addition to these two who spoke, the speakers were Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, First Secretary of the PCM Central Committee, and Agustin Borrual Gomez, Secretary of Organization of the PCM Coahuila State Committee. Conspicuous by their absence were Antonio Morin Rodriguez, member of the PCM Presidium with special interest in PCM political affairs in the Laguna area, and Juan de los Reyes, member of the PCM Central Committee who lives in the Torreon area. The main theme of the Congress was the aim of the USCE 40-66 to promote the nationalization of all privately held agricultural land in the Laguna area. It wants to divide all land in the Laguna area into communal farms and completely do away with small private land holding. Martinez said that the Mexican Government was trying to plot against the PCM and gave as an example the 12-13 August 1966 arrest of Victor Rico Galan and some 40 others of the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MRP-Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo). He said that the PCM did not espouse the armed revolutionary policies of Galan, and that the Party was pacifist.1

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	
#								FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	HMY-1267
CI/OIS/WH	1	WH/1	10	LIRULE
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	1	(LIRULE-1)
CA/PROP	1	WH/MEXI	#	CS-311/14014-66
CA/B4	1	WH/FACY	#	COORDINATING OFFICERS
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 3, WH 11 (1), DO/H 1.	LIAISON	●	HK: CMB; POH

2. The Administrative Council for the USCE 40-66 which was elected on 21 August at the above Congress is as follows:

Manager	Arturo Orona Gamez
Assistant Manager, in charge of Commerce and Insurance	Agustin Borroel Gomez
Social Services	Alberto Loera Juarez
Machinery Manager	Alberto Munoz
Agricultural Livestock	Jesus Cedillo
Organization	Ramon Aguilera Delgado
Fruit Growers	Juan Francisco Espino
Agrarian Organization	J. Cruz Chacon Sifuentes 2

3. Also present at the USCE 40-66 Congress was Oscar Guajardo Gutierrez, Secretary of Organization of the PCM Nuevo Leon State Committee. He was trying to organize an interchange of ideas between the Nuevo Leon and Coahuila PCM State Committees, especially in the field of organizing new cells. Guajardo said that he had organized various neighborhoods of Monterrey against the police and the government. He was especially interested in contacting Orona and Jose Luna Ortiz, First Secretary of the PCM Coahuila State Committee.

1. Source Comment: Martinez Verdugo was trying to get the support of the crowd.

   Headquarters Comment: A report on this Congress and the speech made by Martinez Verdugo on 21 August 1966, the closing day, appears in issues nos. 1845 and 1846, dated 28 August and 4 September 1966, respectively, of La Voz de Mexico, official newspaper of the PCM. The second part of the speech in no. 1846 is extremely interesting in that Martinez Verdugo takes issue with the manner in which General Lazaro Cardenas del Rio, leftist former President of Mexico (1934-1940), proposes to achieve agrarian reform. Further, Martinez Verdugo decries Cardenas' again giving his political support to President Diaz Ordaz, as he did on 11 August at Ciudad Altamirano, Guerrero, when he also expressed his views on agrarian reform (Cf. Airgram no. 161, Joint Weeks no. 32, dated 12 August 1966, from the American Embassy, Mexico City).

2. Field Comment: All of the members of this USCE 40-66 Administrative Council are members of the PCM.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/WOPROP
EMFOE-1/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
201-336474

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE : HDCW-2268, 26 August 1966

1. EMFOE-1, shown the photographs of Victor RICO Galan, forwarded by reference, affirmed 15 September 1966 that Victor RICO Galan definitely is not the Mexican journalist who attended the July 1966 Second Congress of the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4).

2. Since at least one of the photographs attached to reference appear to be an original clipping, the photographs were reproduced for Station indices and are forwarded herewith for Headquarters' retention.

Could be Jorge Timossi [illegible]

Michael C. CHOADEN

Attachment:
Photographs h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w
1 - COS, Mexico City w/o att
2 - Files w/o att

1 att

EKD/kac

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201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HDCA-5679	11 October 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474



att 1 To
HDCA 5679

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/China	REPORT NO.	CS -311/13138-66
SUBJECT	Contact by Fernando Rico Galan With the Mexican Society of Friendship with People's China (SMACP)	DATE DISTR.	28 September 1966
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	5 September 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (6 September 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10677

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

On 5 September 1966, Fernando Rico Galan, one of those arrested, but later released, in the roundup of a group of subversives headed by his brother, Victor Rico Galan, and Raul Ugalde Alvarez, visited the offices of the Mexican Society of Friendship with People's China (SMACP - Sociedad Mexicana de Amistad con China Popular). Rico held a closed-door meeting with Luis Torres Ordonez and Juan Larios Tolentino, both officers of the SMACP, for an hour and fifteen minutes. The subject matter of the discussion is not known.

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
4								3
CINCSO 4							USIA	INS

Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	HMM-10677
CI/OPS/WH	1	[illegible]	1	LITEMPO
CA/INT	1	[illegible]	1	(LITEMPO-12)
CA/[illegible]	1	WH/MYT	8	CS -311/13138-66
CI/IA	9	WH/TACT	8	
TOTALS	IS 8, CI 6, FI 1, CA 0, FE 9 WE 6 (1), DO/H 1.			CO/IR:BAGIK
				[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS-311/13134-66

SUBJECT Activities of the Mexican Communist Party in Nuevo Leon

DATE DISTR. 28 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 17-22 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Monterrey (23 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMY-1262

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A ranking member of the Mexican Communist Party in Nuevo Leon who has access to Party plans. He has reported reliable information on the Party for about six years.

1. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) will take place in Mexico City on 25, 26, and 27 September 1966.

2. The Campesino Congress of Torreon was attended by Oscar Guajardo Gutierrez of the Nuevo Leon State Committee. Guajardo will remain in Torreon until 24 August to attend the national plenum of the Independent Peasants' Central (CCI - Central Campesina Independiente) which is being held concurrently with the Campesino Congress.

3. Lino Medina Salazar, in his capacity as member of the Central Committee and member of the National Trade Union Commission, was in Monterrey from 17 to 19 August to participate in a meeting of the State Committee to discuss the Party's trade union activities, because so little has been done in this field which the Party has had difficulty in penetrating. It was agreed that the publication of Accion Sindical, which has been dormant for some time, would be resumed as an initial step in planning trade union activity and that a study of the labor situation should be undertaken. Medina, who was not pleased with the outcome of the meeting, promised to return and to personally follow the progress of the trade union program since he is the Central Committee member responsible for supervising the activities of the Party in Nuevo Leon.

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
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	CINCSO #						USIA	INS

(Note Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	CA/[illegible]	1	WH/MEXI	#1	HMY-1262
CI/OPS/WH	1	CA/[illegible]	1	WH/MNTY	1	LIVACATE
CA/INT	1	CA/[illegible]	1	WH/[illegible]	#	(LIVACATE-1)
CA/PROP	1	WH/R	1			CS-311/13134-66
CA/CP	1	[illegible]	1			

TOTALS IR 2, CI-[illegible], [illegible]-3, CA 5 (1), WH 13 (2), DO/H 1, LIAISON

RR
CS:POM[illegible]

4. A meeting of members of the Independent Central of People's Organizations (CIOP - Central Independiente de Organizaciones del Pueblo) was held on 10 August to discuss plans to carry out agitational activities early in September in support of busdrivers and other unionized groups.

5. The campaign in support of political prisoners has been suspended until 25 September. The situation has become more complicated because of the recent increase in the number of prisoners, although in Nuevo Leon there have been no repercussions because of the roundup of the Ugalde-Rico Galan group.

6. With regard to the national meeting of university students, it cannot be said that it was successful since only three delegations were present - those from Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, and Jalisco. Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, Jose Encarnacion Perez Gaytan and other members of the Party Presidium were present, which suggests that the Party attaches considerable importance to its program for university action. This meeting was considered to be the first stage, to be followed by others. It is assumed within the Party that the Nuevo Leon State Committee is experienced in university matters since it organized the University of Nuevo Leon Union (STUNL - Sindicato de la Universidad de Nuevo Leon).[2]

7. With respect to the PCM's electoral campaign, as yet no candidates have been agreed upon, and it is clear that among those under consideration none is of impressive stature.

8. Of interest are the efforts of Porfirio Diaz, head of the National Youth Institute in Monterrey, who is departing from the Party line in attempting to form a youth group in which the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI - government party) would participate along with the PCM and other leftist organizations. Diaz has held meetings attended by Octavio Leal Moncada of the CIOP, Javier Rojas Sandoval of the PCM, Jose Luis Sustaita of the National Democratic Students' Central (CNED - Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democraticos), other members of the PCM, and representatives of the PRI.

1. Headquarters Comment: Issue No. 1845, dated 28 August 1966, of La Voz de Mexico, official newspaper of the PCM, reported that the Union de Sociedades de Credito Ejidal de la Comarca Lagunera 1940-1965 (USCECL-1940-1966), headed by Arturo Orona Gomez, held its VIII Ordinary Congress in its headquarters at Torreon, Coahuila. Issue No. 1846, dated 4 September 1966, contained an article dated Torreon, Coahuila, August 1966, saying that the national plenum of the CCI had resolved to disassociate itself from the National Liberation Movement (MLN-Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional), because of the latter's divisionist activities.

2. Source Comment: In fact, the STUNL was not formed by the Party since, when it was organized, there were no Communists among the teachers and other university workers. The union came into being as a result principally of the activities of a group of teachers from Preparatory School N . 1, and it had the support of the then acting Rector, Alfonso Rangel Guerra, who saw in the union possibilities for creating problems for Eduardo Livas Villarreal, the Governor of Nuevo Leon. It was almost a year later that Rolando Guzman, Tomas Gonzalez de Luna, and Horacio Salazar joined the PCM, but their influence in the union cannot be attributed to this fact. The union has continued to exist because it has maintained its activities within legal bounds, demanding minimum wages and improved working conditions. PCM influence in the union is negligible since, in addition to Guzman, Gonzalez, and Salazar, there are only four or five other PCM members. The possibilities of forming a national university union would appear to be remote, and it is doubtful that present plans in this direction will ever materialize.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS-311/12962-66

SUBJECT Reaction to Siempre! Editorial On Victor Rico Galan

DATE DISTR. 26 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 2-6 September 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (7 September 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10658

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although they disagree politically. Source has reported infrequently but reliably on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan and from a journalist.

Field Comment: The 7 September 1966 issue of Siempre! magazine, which appeared on the stands on 1 September, carried on pages 10 and 11 a letter written from prison by Victor Rico Galan explaining and defending his position and accusing the Mexican Government of being the real violators of the Constitution. On the following pages an editorial titled "Mexico No Es Una Insula de Gorilas" (Mexico Is Not A Police State), which rejected the points put forth by Rico Galan, defended Mexican institutions and concluded that because of the magazine's devotion to freedom of expression, time and space had been devoted to what should properly be recorded as a minor police incident.

1. Inge de Rico Galan, wife of Siempre! writer Victor Rico Galan, said on 2 September 1966 that her husband was resigning from Siempre! because of the harsh editorial against him and his ideas which appeared in the 7 September issue of the magazine. Mrs. Rico Galan said that the editorial was far harsher than even President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz' comments on the matter which he included in his 1 September State of the Union message.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 13
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	5
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/R	1
CA/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1
CA/PROP	1	WH/MNTY	0
FI/INT	1	WH/FACY	6

TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH 6 (1), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

HMM-10658
LIENVOY
(LIENVOY)
CS-311/12962-66

COORDINATING

RELEASING HK/
POH:BB:k

2. If Siempre! refuses to publish her husband's letter of resignation, and she seemed to feel that this might be the case, Manuel Marcue Pardinas of the leftist newsmagazine Politica, has assured Rico that he will publish it.[1]

3. On 6 September, the journalist Froilan Manjarrez told Antonio Caram, of the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina, that Eduardo de los Rios (Rius), the political cartoonist, had resigned from Siempre! in protest over the magazine's treatment of Rico Galan. Since it was doubtful that Siempre! will publish Rius' letter of resignation, arrangements have already been made with Marcue Pardinas to publish it in Politica.

4. Manjarrez remarked that Siempre! publisher Jose Pages Llergo had blundered badly in his handling of the Rico Galan affair and that people who had never been especially sympathetic to Rico Galan were nonetheless totally disgusted with Pages. Rico is being spoken of as a brave man and Pages as a contemptible one, according to Manjarrez, as a result of the editorial.[2]

[1] Field Comment: CS-311/12195-66 reported that it was uncertain that Politica would continue to publish after the 15 August 1966 issue.

[2] Headquarters Comment: The 14 September 1966 issue of Siempre carried a letter to the editor written by Rico Galan, in which he expressed his intense displeasure with the publication's editorial of the previous week. He asked that Siempre consider withdrawn his intention to continue collaborating with it on a book section, saying that he would seek means of support for his family despite his confinement, that they may live in a manner worthy of revolutionary solidarity, not from alms granted by evil consciences seeking precarious tranquility. In a note of reply Siempre reiterated its disagreement with Rico Galan's viewpoints but added that it claimed neither to qualify nor to judge the personal conduct of a friend with whom the magazine was permanently bound.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FILE, VR, WH/CB, CA2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, FI, CI,

S E C R E T 212004Z CITE SAO PAULO 7146 21 SEP 66 IN 00837

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, RIO DE JANEIRO

PSYCH RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY

REF MEXICO CITY 8416 (IN 85559)*

ALWALTZ-2 EDITORIAL ON GALAN CASE APPEARED IN 21 SEPTEMBER EDITION "DIARIO DE SAO PAULO." MAILING CLIPS.

S E C R E T
BT

*SUBVERSION CASE

SECRET

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Pls file
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Guatemala

REPORT NO. CS-311/12488-66

SUBJECT Reaction of Guatemalan Exile Leader in Mexico to the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan

DATE DISTR. 15 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10629

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla organization in Guatemala, who is believed to have good access to Guatemalan exiles in Mexico.

V R Galan

1. Rolando Collado Ardon, leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico and a member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT - Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo), said that the arrest of Victor Rico Galan on charges of subversion was a good thing for the PGT. Collado was referring to Rico Galan's influence on Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. According to Collado, Rico Galan prevented the PGT from persuading Yon Sosa to join the Party in 1963 because of Rico's Trotskyist interference and the aid he gave to Yon Sosa at the time.[1]

2. Medical doctors Miguel Cruz Ruiz and Rolf Meiner Huebner, two of those arrested with Rico Galan, have been associated with Rico since early 1965. Both were very much involved in the medical doctors' strikes of late 1964 which continued into 1965. When the strikes were finally settled both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Heubner were dismissed from their jobs at the Social Security Hospital at Cuauhtemoc 330. They went directly to Rico Galan who put them to work, mainly writing medical articles for the magazine Sucesos for which Rico Galan worked.[2]

3. Rico Galan sent both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner to Cuba in 1965 and both are well indoctrinated Communists.[3] However, neither belongs to any Communist Party or organization. Both, as well as Dr. Jorge Velez Trejo, also very active during the medical strikes, have traveled through Latin America making

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO # (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)						USIA	I&NS

(Note: field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	5	WH/GUAT	#	HMM-10629 LIREBEL (LIREBEL-1) CS-311/12488-66
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/MEXI	1			
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	#			
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	#			
WH/R	1	WH/2/0	1			COORDINATING WH/2/C: CB
TOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 7 (1), DO/H 1.					LIAISON #	RELEASING HK POH:klm

contact with medical groups and attempting to inspire them to anti-government activity in their respective countries.[4] Also, while Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner were working for Rico Galan at Sucesos they were giving classes in revolutionary activities to groups organized by Rico Galan.

Field Comments

1. In October-November 1963, Rico Galan, ostensibly as a purely journalistic exercise, went to Guatemala where he interviewed Yon Sosa in the guerrilla leader's camp.

2. CS-311/12133-65, 4 October 1965, presents an over-all picture of the medical strike situation.

3. TDCS-314/02438-66, 22 February 1966, reported that Rico Galan arranged passages for Mexican doctors who attended a medical congress in Havana in February 1966.

   Headquarters Comment: This report, however, does not give the names of Drs. Cruz and Meiner as having been invited to attend the XI Medical Congress and the VII National Stomatology Congress but states that Rico Galan, who was making ticket arrangements, had names of others invited to the Congresses.

4. TDCS-314/02464-66, 22 February 1966, reports on the Central American activities of Drs. Meiner and Velez.

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

SUBJECT Mexican Communist Party Views on Recent Arrest Of Subversive Group

REPORT NO. CS-311/12430-66

DATE DISTR. 13 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 24 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (26 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10646

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

1. At a meeting of leaders of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano), attended by Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, Fernando Granados Cortes, Manuel Terrazas Guerrero, Gerardo Unzueta Lorenzana, and Marcos Leonel Posadas Segura, there was some discussion of the status of members of the group, headed by Victor Rico Galan and Raul Ugalde Alvarez, which was recently arrested for engaging in subversive activities. It was revealed at this meeting that Ugalde had submitted an application for membership in the PCM but that he had not been accepted.[1] He is not, therefore, considered to be a member of the Party. The same is true of Guillermo Balam Pereyra.[2] It is true that Venancio Garay Zuniga and Artemio Garay Zuniga are PCM members, but they aligned themselves with the Rico Galan "guerrilla" group on instructions from the Party to serve as spies in order to keep the Party informed on the group's activities.[3]

2. At a meeting of the Permanent Committee of the National Assembly for the Freedom of Political Prisoners, Filomeno Mata Alatorre stated that he was completely removed from the subversive group and that he had had nothing whatsoever to do with it. Guillermo Calderon Ita raised the question of the most recent group of prisoners (the Rico Galan group), and it was agreed that that group had chosen the easy path - that of taking up arms; that such a movement would come about eventually, but that now is not the time; there is no chance for success of an armed movement. It was agreed that even though the Committee

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	INS

(Note. Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/1	6	
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/MEXI	1	
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	[illegible]	
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	[illegible]	
[illegible]	1			

HMM-10646
LITEMPO
(LITEMPO-12)
CS-311/12430-66

TOTALS IE [illegible] CI 4 FI 3 CA 2. WH 7 (1), DO/H 1.

LIAISON

COORDINATING

RELEASING HK [illegible]

P H:klm

was not in accord with the tactics, or even the ideology, of the Rico Galan group, the latter group should be defended in the same way as are other political prisoners. The Rico Galan group has engaged the same lawyers used by the Committee. In fact, the campaign in behalf of political prisoners must be pursued with even greater vigor because under the present Mexican Government policy the PCM or the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista) could be accused of operating schools for training of subversives. At the close of the meeting it was reported that a message had been received from the Fourth Latin American Students' Congress (CLAE) in Havana advising that as part of the Campaign for the Release of Political Prisoners, which will be highlighted during the period 25 September to 2 October 1966, telegrams will be sent to the President of Mexico from all countries in Latin America.

Field Comments

1. While there does not appear to be any firm evidence of Ugalde's membership in the PCM, his activities as a leading figure in the People's Electoral Front (FEP-Frente Electoral del Pueblo), which is controlled by the PCM, have been well reported.

2. In a document seized by Mexican police during a raid on PCM headquarters on 12 April 1965, Dr. Balam Pereyra was listed as a member of the Dr. Angel Martinez Villarreal cell, having joined the Party in August 1964.

3. According to the Mexico City daily, El Dia, of 30 August 1966, the office of the Attorney General for the Federal District protested against the action of a Federal District judge in releasing the Garay Zuniga brothers from custody on 22 August.

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. CS -311/12432-66

SUBJECT Financial Aid to Victor Rico Galan

DATE DISTR. 13 September 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 26 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (29 August 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMCI-10650

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, although he disagrees with him politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from his wife.

1. According to Inge de Rico,[1] wife of Victor Rico Galan who was arrested on 12 August and who has been charged with conspiring against the Mexican Government, her husband is quite well. She said that she is allowed to see him every day and to take him food, clothing, books, papers, and other things which he has requested. She also said that friends have been very kind. In fact, her husband has told her that he wants the money which has been offered to him to be shared among the other prisoners who have none and who are trying to get bond.[2]

2. As to her husband's chances for being released on bail, she said that a number of legal experts on this type of case have been consulted and their opinions have been rather pessimistic.

3. Sra. de Rico has been asked to have her husband prepare a message for students at the University and in some of the Preparatory Schools who are urging that he be freed. Many of Rico's readers are young students who greatly admire him.

[1] Headquarters Comment: Her full name is Ingebord Diener de Rico Galan.

[2] Field Comment: An independent, usually reliable source reported that the National Liberation Movement (MLN) had taken $120.00 (U.S.) from its pro-Vietnam fund and given it to Rico Galan. Also, Ramon Zorrilla, teacher at the Ibero-American University, press chief of the National

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	[illegible]
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/[illegible]	3	LIENVOY
FI/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1	(LIENVOY)
CA/INT	1	WH/CCTY	#	CS-311/12432-66
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	#	COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible] 1 FI 6 CA 2 WH 4 (1). DO/H 1. LIAISON

Institute of Fine Arts, and member of the Movimiento Social Democrata Cristiano (MSDC), has undertaken to collect funds for Rico from among their mutual friends. Sra. de Rico has told Zorrilla that she and her husband do not need money at present, but that he is eager to share any funds they do collect among the needy prisoners.

Headquarters Comment: According to another independent, usually reliable source, the MSDC was formed by the National Action Party (PAN-Partido Accion Nacional), pro-Catholic Party, in April 1963 and took part in the anti-Diaz Ordaz demonstrations in Chihuahua during April 1964 when the President was a candidate for this office.

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
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CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO SEE DOCUMENT FOR SUBJECTS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE POR THE MEXICAN SECTION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, A TROTSKYITE ORGANIZATION. ALSO ONE OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATION OF A SCHOOL PURPORTEDLY SPONSORED BY THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO /MRP- PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT/

050-006-008
DIR -60121
05 SEP 66
UFI
IPO

- 5610040379

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/12196-66
SUBJECT	Popular Socialist Party Skepticism Concerning the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan And Others	DATE DISTR.	9 September 1966
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	17 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (30 August 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	[illegible]-10628

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Veteran and trusted member of the Popular Socialist Party who has close, personal connections with ranking members of the Party. He has been a prolific reporter of reliable information. The reported information was obtained directly from leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico. The substance of these persons' comments is believed to be accurately reported; its validity, however, cannot be assessed.

1. (Summary: Popular Socialist Party (PPS) attitudes toward the arrest of Victor Rico Galan and others on charges of conspiring against the Government remain unsympathetic. The Party intends to stay outside the entire matter, although PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano may seize the opportunity to strike back at some of his enemies by issuing a statement condemning the plans attributed to Rico Galan as Trotskyist. Within the Party there is considerable skepticism about the truth of the published charges. While several Party leaders do not doubt that there is some truth to the charges, they are quite convinced that there was no danger of imminent rebellion and that Mexican institutions stood in no peril from Rico Galan and his friends. The suspicion exists that Rico Galan's case is a Government maneuver, successfully used in the past. Also, it is believed in the PPS that police accounts of their role in the matter have been exaggerated to enhance the reputation of the police both with the President and with the public. The rumor that the Guatemalan Government may have asked the Mexican Government to silence Rico Galan because of his violent attacks against the new Guatemalan administration is generally discounted since the complaints of Guatemalan officials are certainly of no concern to Mexico.)

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	
	CINCSO #	(ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)					USIA	[illegible]

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CI/OPS/WH	1 WH/[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CA/[illegible]	1 WH/C/[illegible]	1		(LEDT[illegible]-3)
CA/PROP	1 WH/[illegible]	1		CS-311/12196-66
[illegible]	1 (L/MEXI/WH) #			COORDINATING OFFICER
TOTALS	IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WE 7 (2), DO/H 1.		LIAISON	[illegible]

2. Victor Rico Galan and his associates can expect neither sympathy nor help from the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista). Although no official decision has yet been made by the Party, PPS leaders who have commented unofficially on the matter have said that for the moment the Party will no doubt stay completely outside the whole affair, thus proving its total lack of interest in this type of revolutionary activity. It is of course possible that PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano will seize the opportunity to issue a statement condemning the entire affair as Trotskyist, criminal, and utopian. Lombardo may decide to use this opportunity to strike back at the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) and others who have attacked him.

3. Among leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (UGOCM - Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), there is a certain skepticism about the truth of the matter as it has been presented in the press. It is probably true that arms and materials for manufacturing explosives were confiscated. It is probably true that indoctrination sessions on political and revolutionary matters ,were held in the houses where the arrests were made. And probably the group did have some kind of plan for action. But, it is simply not true that there was the slightest danger of immediate and formidable rebellion from Rico Galan and his friends.

4. This latter conclusion is based on the fact that Rico Galan is no guerrilla leader. He is an aggressive intellectual, a radical, but he is not in jail for what he has done but for his ideas. As for Raul Ugalde Alvarez, named with Rico Galan as one of the leaders of the group, he has the reputation of being fuzzy-minded, a leftist adventurer and certainly neither brave nor dedicated. Further, and Rico Galan is well aware of this, popular support is essential to the success of rebellion; it does not exist. The peasants are divided. The workers are controlled by the Government, and the middle class is content with the way things are. Also, there is the formidable precedent of Government action against any kind of rebellion, trade union, armed, and particularly any sort of activity which is Cuban-connected. The Government has always moved with energy, speed, and efficiency to combat such threats as, for example, during the Railway Workers Strike of 1959. Several leaders of that strike are still in jail and likely to remain there. Another example is the September 1965 attack on a military camp at Ciudad Madera, Chihuahua. While the Government did not feel that this incident posed any real threat to it, it did not want the bad international publicity, so vigilance was increased, activities of would-be guerrillas were blocked, some were bought off with money, others with promises, and the matter was promptly and efficiently controlled.

5. There no doubt is a degree of truth to police charges, but the melodramatic, almost childish character given to the Rico Galan movement, the lack of any proven connection between the movement and leftist/Communist organizations, Rico Galan's open and well-known connections with Guatemalan guerrilla leaders and his public support of the Cuban revolution, make it very hard to discount the suspicion that this is simply a Government maneuver. Also, while the police no doubt did confiscate arms and other materials, the suspicion exists that the police have inflated their role in order to make themselves look good both to the President and to public opinion.

6. There is even a rumor that because of Rico Galan's harsh attacks on the new Guatemalan administration, the Guatemalan Government asked the Mexican Government to deal with Rico Galan. This rumor, however, is regarded as rather ridiculous, since the Mexican Government certainly cares nothing for the opinion of Guatemalan officials.[1]

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[1] Field Comment: TDCS-314/10419-66, 18 August 1966, reported earlier PPS reaction to the arrests.

Headquarters Comment: In his inaugural address in December 1964, President Diaz Ordaz made a point of stressing his desire for harmonious relations with Mexico's neighbors both to the north and to the south. His Central American trip in mid-January 1966 was, among other things, to promote such relations. Guatemalan friendship has lately been said to be a cardinal objective of Mexican foreign policy (Cf. State telegram no. 1245, dated 30 August 1966, from the American Embassy in Mexico City).

14-00000

ATT TO
DISPATCH RIO
HMMA-30002
Galan 201
8 Sept 66

PESO #490

JULY 29, 1966

O/B - 9:40 to 18:15 hrs.

From #1 to 3 on ft.counter, voices in distance.

At #39, voices in distance which sounds like a telephone conversation, to #61.

At #104 Basurto and CHUNG are commenting on the Coca-Cola problem in Mexico.

At #137 Basurto is heard saying: But there are people who went to Santo Domingo: Rico Galán, Luis Suarez, Renato. They earn 1,000 pesos per week. (Adds something else which not understood).

CHUNG: And where does "Siempre" get all this money?

Basurto: It is a great business. The government gives them money. (Basurto makes some remark that they make easily 3,000 pesos per month).

CHUNG asks something and mentions a name which sounds like "Victor Alba".

Basurto says no.

CHUNG says: 100 pesos per hour.

Basurto: It varies.

(There is much noise and cannot hear clearly)

Basurto: I think much more than that.

(They talk about some cousin of Basurto's. Basurto says his cousin tells him everything. CHUNG says he is a very special cousin.

BASURTO: I saw him yesterday.

CHUNG: Is he a student?

Bas: I don't know, I don't like to pry in other people's private lives. But he told me himself that he was going, that he was going to be in Mexico only two more weeks and that he was going to stay there for good. We won't see him anymore.

CHUNG: Where is he going?

Bas: To Cuba, he's going to become Cuban by naturalization. He already has work and everything over there. He's going to be in charge of a magazine. (Few words not understood), then Basurto continues: I don't like the hot weather, I prefer the cold weather. Did you see the SIEMPRE photos?

(Pause) Basurto says something that they are going to make them now in 3 hours.

(There is much noise and cannot understand complete conversation)

From #305 to #312 CHUNG and Basurto continue talking but unable to understand.

At #320 Basurto says: He has a big house, a luxurious house in San Angel. His way of life is very high, he lives like a king. Just the subsidy he gets from the government -- (few words not understood). That's why they call it "paid opposition".

CHUNG makes some remark and Basurto answers: $5,000 plus compensations. (There is much noise and cannot hear voices clearly) Basurto mentions the Conference in Cuba about Marxism and the Cuban Revolution. Also mentions the Mexican political parties "PRI" and "PPS" but there is much noise and cannot understand complete phrase.

At #380 voices in distance talking in Chinese.

At #393 Basurto mentions the blackouts in Tijuana and Cd.Juarez and how they have harmed the stores.

At #417 voices in distance talking in Chinese.

At #544 maid answers phone. Maid at telephone from #592 to 600.

At #617 start hearing TV to 883, followed by strange sound like rain.

At #930 TV continues up to #1010.

Sound off at #1129 which is end of recording.

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10658	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 7 September 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIENVOY	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY	TDCS DISSEMINATION

3P

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~3~~ - Hqs. 1 - MNTY HMY 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 6 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Reported information taken from LIENVOY of 2 and 6 September 1966.

MICROFILMED
SEP 15 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1467

CS COPY

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

SUBJECT Reaction to Siempre! Editorial On Victor Rico Galan

201-336474

REPORT NO. HMM-10,658

DATE OF REPORT 7 September 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 2-6 September 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (7 September 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although they disagree politically. Source has reported infrequently but reliably on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan and from a journalist.

Field Comment: The 7 September 1966 issue of Siempre! magazine (which appeared on the stands on 1 September) carried on pages 10 and 11 a letter written from prison by Victor Rico Galan explaining and defending his position and accusing the Mexican Government of being the real violators of the Constitution. On the following pages an editorial titled Mexico No Es Una Insula de Gorilas (Mexico Is Not a Police State) which rejected all of the points put forth by Rico Galan, defended Mexican institutions and concluded with the observation that time and space had been devoted to what history would properly record as a minor incident because of the magazine's devotion to freedom of expression.

1. Inge de Rico Galan, wife of Siempre! writer Victor Rico Galan, said on 2 September 1966, that her husband was resigning from Siempre! because of the harsh editorial against him and his ideas which appeared in the 7 September issue of the magazine. Mrs. Rico Galan said that the editorial was far harsher than even President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz's comments on the matter which he included in his 1 September State of the Union message.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

(201-99081)

2. If Siempre! refuses to publish her husband's letter of resignation, and she seemed to feel that this might be the case, Manuel Marcue Pardinas of the Communist newsmagazine Politica has assured Rico that he will publish it in Politica.[1]

3. On 6 September, the journalist Froilan Manjarrez told Antonio Caram of the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina that Eduardo de los Rios (Rius), the political cartoonist, had resigned from Siempre! in protest over the magazine's treatment of Rico Galan. Since it was doubtful that Siempre! will publish Rius' letter of resignation, arrangements have already been made with Marcue Pardinas to publish it in Politica.

4. Manjarrez remarked that Siempre! publisher Jose Pages Llergo had blundered badly in his handling of the Rico Galan affair and that people who had never been especially sympathetic to Rico Galan were none-the-less totally disgusted with Pages. Rico is being spoken of as a brave man and Pages as a contemptible one, according to Manjarrez, as a result of the editorial.

1. Field Comment: HMM-10,625 reported that it was uncertain whether Politica would continue to publish after the 15 August issue.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

RI FILE NO.

DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

ANALYST

DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB 06 FEB 28
SPAIN, EL FERROL
CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO SEE DOCUMENT FOR SHORT SUMMARY ON
SUBJECTS ARREST FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
AND POS- SIBLE COMMUNIST CONNECTIONS.

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HMMA-30265A01
06 OCT 66
P3

R 6610170076

FILE IN 201-336474

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-60)

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,650	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 1 September 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY OCV	PROJECT LIENVOY	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
~~3~~ - Hqs. 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 3 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIENVOY of 26 August is the source of the reported information; Ing. Rico Galan and Julieta de Munoz Rosas.

LITEMPO/12 is the source cited in the Field Comment. According to information supplied by LINOODLE/2 on 10 September 1965, Zorrilla is a thinker, fine writer, philosopher, personally and professionally upright and honest, and firmly Christian. According to the LITEMPO/12 report Rico Galan and Zorrilla met daily for coffee and talk at the Cafe ~~EM~~ Flore and the bond between them is these daily meetings.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

201-336474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO. HMM-10,650

SUBJECT Financial Aid to Victor Rico Galan

DATE OF REPORT 1 September 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 26 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (29 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan although he disagrees with him politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained from Mrs. Rico Galan.

1. According to Inge Rico Galan, wife of Victor Rico Galan who was arrested on 12 August and who has been charged with conspiring against the Mexican Government, her husband is quite well. She said that she is allowed to see him every day and to take him food, clothing, books, papers, and other things that he has asked for. She said also that friends have been very kind. In fact, her husband has told her that he wants the money which has been offered to him to be shared among the other prisoners who have none and who are trying to get bond.[1]

2. As to her husband's chances for being released on bail, Mrs. Rico Galan said that a number of legal experts on this kind of case have been consulted and their opinions have been rather pessimistic.

3. Mrs. Rico Galan was also asked to have her husband prepare a message for students at the University and in some of the Preparatory Schools who are urging that he be freed. Many of Rico's readers are young students who greatly admire him.

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[1] Field Comment: An independent, usually reliable source reported that the National Liberation Movement (MLN) had taken $120.00 (U.S.) from its pro-Vietnam fund and given it to Rico Galan. Also, Ramon Zorrilla, teacher at the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

Ibero-American University, press chief of the National Institute of Bellas Artes, and member of the Movimiento Social Democrata Cristiano (presumably the Christian Democratic Movement) has undertaken to collect funds for Rico from among their mutual friends. Mrs. Rico Galan has told Zorilla that she and her husband do not need money at present but that her husband is eager that any funds they do collect be shared among the other prisoners who are in need.

7. Lecumberri ~~prison~~ penitentiary, Mexico City.

9. RICO was arrested on 12 August 1966 together with some 40 other members of the Popular Revolutionary Movement. They were charged with inciting rebellion, conspiracy, and accumulation of arms, and under these charges are not eligible for bail. ~~Subject is presently~~, As of October 1967, Subject is serving out his sentence in Lecumberri penitentiary.

[illegible]

HOUSE [illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Rico Galan Vol II
201-336474

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 Oct 1962 - 22 Dec 1964

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXO

ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY [illegible]

MATERIAL FILED IN TH
IS IN CHRONOLOGIC

14-00000

2731

SECRET

Other Agency
2 Docs Enclosed

201-306474
Vol I

3627 PEEL OFF LABEL AND REUSE ENVELOPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

SUBJECT
Tapes Confiscated by the GOG Military

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

REFERENCE: GUAT-4326

1. GENERAL

Transmitted herewith please find copies of three tapes confiscated by the GOG military from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to the guerrilla attack on the small garrison at Panzos (GUAT-4309, paragraph 4). The tapes were received by the Station from ODIBEX in mid-November. The Station made copies to pass to the Guatemalan Army and to ODIBEX and kept one copy for study. The originals were returned to the Guatemalan Army after a master copy was made.

2. THE TAPES

The original tapes were small and were eight in number and were recorded by the guerrillas at the speed of 1 and 7/8ths. According to information taken from the tapes, the recording was done on a Philips recorder. Judging from the sounds it is felt that the tapes were made indoors by inexperienced personnel. This belief is supported by one of the documents captured which went into detail on the problems the guerrillas were having with the recorder and on how to correct them. The master copy made by the Station (transmitted herewith) was recorded at the same speed on three tapes which total about 16 hours of poor listening.

(CONTINUED)

Attachment:

Tapes, h/w

Distribution:

3 - Hqs, w/att, h/w
2 - Files

AFD: wcf

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCGA-7617

DATE
22 December 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
35-2-8

3. INFORMATION FROM TAPES

A. Tape 1 side 1. A speech made by Victor Rico Galan (Mexican newspaperman who is very leftist) to guerrillas under the command of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. Generally, he informs the guerrillas that the revolution in Guatemala is the revolution of Latin America. He reports that persons in Latin America and Europe are keenly interested in the Guatemalan revolution and send letters to Galan affirming their support of it. He then goes into the problems of the apparent split between the 13 November Movement and the PCT leadership. He states that the PCT has not given the guerrillas the proper support and has taken too soft a line in the revolutionary struggle. He talked to the PGT leadership and asked that personal feelings be set aside and suggested complete cooperation with the guerrillas to overthrow the present government. At the end of the tape the guerrilla theme song is sung by a group of guerrillas.

B. Tape 1 side 2. This side discusses (voice unidentified) the interview Yon Sosa had with newspapermen in the Sierra de las Minas. The speaker explains how the interview was disseminated throughout Guatemala by Supplement # 1 of the Revolucion Socialista. The interview will soon be translated into German, French and other languages and will be sent to Mexico, Latin America and countries in Europe. The speaker then goes on to explain how the guerrilla publication, Revolucion Socialista, has created great enthusiasm (does not say where) and how it will make people aware of the role the guerrillas play in Guatemala. Its main object is to attack imperialism and the Guatemalan Government.

C. Tape 2 side 1. This side deals with generalities on the revolution going on in Guatemala. It discusses the need for a new government to represent the people. It states that the guerrilla movement is the vanguard of the masses of workers and campesinos. At the end of the tape it salutes the workers of the world.

D. Tape 2 side 2. An unidentified voice discusses, in very general terms, the problems of the guerrillas in shipping various articles (weapons, literature and tapes) to different parts of the country. The major obstacles to smooth movements of the articles throughout the country are police and military check points on the major roads and the fact that large truck shipments cannot be mounted, forcing the guerrillas to hand carry most of the material. Through negligence, many guerrillas have been captured with compromising material in their possession. Pseudonyms are repeatedly mentioned on this side - Rolando, Rudy, Adan, and Mateo - which cannot be identified by the Station.

E. Tape 3 side 1. This side is taken up by an unidentified person reading passages out of Revolucion Socialista and Marxist literature.

F. Tape 3 side 2. On this side there are discussions of the problems faced by the guerrillas The first problem is the trouble the Mando General was having with the Guatemalan Communist Party (the Party tended to isolate itself from the guerrillas). Other problems included communications between guerrilla units throughout the country; problems with the recording machine; and the problem of putting out propaganda which can be understood by the campesinos. All these problems were discussed in very general terms omitting names, places and dates.

4 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM TAPES

The information found on the tapes is of no operational value to the Station since it deals with propaganda and guerrilla problems already known by the Station What is of interest is the apparent effort by the guerrilla leadership to use tapes as a means of operational communications and to reach the illiterate campesinos and workers with spoken instead of written propaganda. The operational use of tapes would obviate the need for printed internal communiques which are bulky and easily compromised. A guerrilla can hide a tape on his person and travel through police and military check points without being detected. Since the people in whom the guerrillas are interested are for the most part illiterate (campesinos and workers) the spoken word would mean much more to them than would printed propaganda. The Station has not based these conclusions solely on the three tapes transmitted with this report. Two days ago, ESDEW-1 informed DOSCHER that the police recently confiscated 24 tapes from the guerrillas (raids on 8 and 9 December, HOGA-7612) and that these tapes consist of operational problems faced by the guerrilla leadership and propaganda. The Station will attempt to make copies of the tapes mentioned by ESDEW-1 if they can be obtained. If the tapes cannot be acquired the Station will receive copies of the scripts taken from the tapes (police are doing this now).

5. Since the tapes are not of operational value the Station feels it is not necessary to retain a copy for the files and is passing to Headquarters the master copy from which reproductions were made for ODIBEX and the Guatemalan Government.

Kenneth A. INWOOD

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING.

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM
Chief of Base, Merida

SUBJECT
[illegible] - Conference Given by Victor RICO Galan in Merida

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION: FYI

REF: HMM 22501, 24 Jan. 64

1. Attached are copies of press coverage of a conference given in Merida on 29 October 1964 by Victor RICO Galan, described in reference as a Mexican Marxist journalist and CASTRO agent. In summary, RICO reportedly sketched the Hispanoamerican situation briefly and spent an hour or more replying to questions from the audience; his eternal theme was North American imperialism.

2. It will be noted that RICO was invited by the Centro de Removacion Cultural and presented by journalist Mario [illegible] Rodriguez, who said that one might or might not agree with what RICO said but that he had a right to be heard. The Centro is of very recent unknown origin [illegible] is said to be sponsoring the visit each week of a journalist to Merida for similar conferences. Where the money is coming from has not yet been determined. [illegible] contacts have said that [illegible] himself paid for RICO's air travel, and that the hotel bill at the Panamericana was paid by the [illegible] tourist agency. However a hotel contact has stated that the bill was paid by the "State Government". LIRACK indicates that the Cuban Consul in Merida, Mariano GARCIA Perez, is in contact with [illegible], and, when it is recalled that the Cuban-Mexican Institute in Merida sponsored RICO's trip to Merida in 196[illegible], there would seem to be more than one possibility as to the source of funds for the new Centro. If the Centro plans are carried out as reported, annual expenditures might run as high as [illegible],000., a not inconsiderable sum.

3. [illegible] is a close [illegible] Merida contact and a personal contact of COS as well. He is a young, crusader-type member of the [illegible] family complex which owns and operates the Yucatan Peninsula's principal daily newspaper Diario de Yucatan. In 196[illegible], he spearheaded an expose accusing local [illegible] de Agrario officials of fraud. He seems to be on strained terms with his family and to have taken up with the extreme left. [illegible] for 26 [illegible] at 1[illegible], carries a letter from him accusing certain federal ministers and high officials of a new fraud involving some $45 millions of pesos

CC COPY

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]-657

DATE
30 October 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	[illegible]A-57

in the purchase of [illegible], the [illegible] owns practically all the [illegible] mills in [illegible]. About 20 August 19[illegible], [illegible], who was attending a [illegible] conference in Mexico City, cabled his wife in [illegible] to [illegible] the local [illegible] that he was cancelling his plans to attend a 30-day seminar of Latin American newspaper editors in [illegible] as a guest of [illegible]. A local Maryknoll priest who commented on the case last week said that he feared Mario had "gone on over to the other side".

4. Since MENENDEZ was Number 1 on the list of the ODACID "Coming Young Men" program, the above information is being forwarded on an interim basis until the return of the local ODACID chief, which is expected around 7 November. At that time it is anticipated that he will try to get down to the bottom of the matter, since he considers [illegible] as his contact. This dispatch is being forwarded with the knowledge of the acting chief of the local ODACID, who contributed information to it.

5. The base has no record of Eugenio HERRERO Garcia.

Andrew F. [illegible]

Attachments:
3 newspaper clippings

Distribution:
2-[illegible] w/atts (1)
2-[illegible] w/atts (1)
2-files w/atts (1)

[illegible]

Anoche, en el Teatro del Seguro Social

Visión de Hispanoamérica

CONFERENCIA DE VICTOR RICO GALAN

[illegible]ado por el Centro de Renovación Cultural, desarrolló [illegible] interesante conferencia sobre el tema Visión de Hispanoamérica, el distinguido periodista Víctor Rico Galán. La concurrencia —profesionales, estudiantes, hombres de empresa, el público que se interesa en los problemas de mayor proyección— llenó casi literalmente el cupo de la sala del Seguro Social.

Después de breve presentación del conferenciante por el Sr. Mario Menéndez Rodríguez, en que advirtió que se podía estar o no de acuerdo con el Sr. Rico Galán, pero que el Centro defendía el derecho de todos a expresar sus opiniones libremente, inició su disertación el intelectual visitante.

x X x

Más que el desarrollo de una lección literaria, científica o política, que es lo que propiamente se entiende por conferencia, la del Sr. Rico Galán fue en realidad un diálogo ágil, sencillo, fecundo, con el auditorio. Lástima que tan interesante conversación se viera mutilada desde el principio, pues el conferenciante advirtió que debido a cierto artículo del reglamento del Teatro del Seguro Social, en la mencionada sala no podía debatirse el tema de la política mexicana. Esa condición no sólo obligó a presentar una América Latina incompleta, de la cual era cierre nada provisionalmente nuestra patria, sino puso de manifiesto también que el Centro de Renovación Cultural tendrá que procurarse otro local para sus actividades, donde no se ponga ningún tropiezo, dentro de la ley, a la libre manifestación de las ideas.

Luego de una síntesis expositiva de las condiciones que privan en Hispanoamérica, el Sr. Rico Galán subrayó que la amplitud y diversidad del tema lo hacían inasequible para una sola conferencia, por lo que prefería desarrollarlo por medio de preguntas y respuestas. Esta modalidad comunicó insospechada serie de matices a la velada, máxime que el intelectual visitante, para enfocar mejor los tópicos, recordó que la suerte y el trato que se dispensaba a Latinoamérica cambiaron radicalmente desde el momento mismo en que Fidel Castro rompe con el tutelaje de los Estados Unidos. Entonces se nos empieza a enamorar de muy diversos modos "hasta con la Alianza para el Progreso".

x X x

A partir de esa delimitación, hábilmente practicada por el conferenciante, la plática giró siempre o casi siempre sobre el mismo eje: el imperialismo de los Estados Unidos como causa fundamental y generadora de todos nuestros males. Las preguntas surgían en ocasiones, por la espontaneidad con que eran formuladas, con el propósito de hallar una esperanza emancipadora en Cuba, en la Argentina, en el Perú, en Venezuela, en Colombia, en Panamá, en algún sitio de "esta América de sangre caliente", pero las respuestas, manipuladas por el Sr. Rico Galán con argumentos de primera mano y a veces hasta con anécdotas personales, [illegible] con el mismo diagnóstico [illegible] el imperialismo norteamericano.

Nadie [illegible] llegó a suponer [illegible] mente [illegible] diagnóstico [illegible] en que se perfilaron [illegible] actuales se había convertido ya el Sr. Rico Galán, encontrara en la terapéutica un remedio heroico para Hispanoamérica: otro imperialismo, por ejemplo, el de la Unión Soviética.

Pero no. Con la misma sencillez, con la misma agilidad, hasta con la misma modestia que fueron los denominadores comunes de su charla, el Sr. Rico Galán sugirió, sin dogmatizar, que la salvación de Hispanoamérica no está en emanciparse del imperialismo de los Estados Unidos por medio del tutelaje de la Unión Soviética o de la Francia del Gral. De Gaulle, sino aprovechando inteligentemente todos aquellos recursos o maniobras que se opongan o limiten, o suavicen la influencia material de Norteamérica en Hispanoamérica. "Y desde luego con limpia política de autodeterminación, como lo ha hecho el gobierno de México".

Hubo un instante —sólo un instante— en que el flujo y reflujo de la charla, en que el juego de las preguntas y las respuestas pareció perder agilidad, hacerse [illegible], hasta un punto obscuro y vacilante cuando una interrogación puso sobre el tapete el caso del imperialismo ruso en Hungría: el brutal sometimiento de esa pobre víctima del implacable oso moscovita. Pero al Sr. Rico Galán le bastó encender un cigarro y volver a esa actitud de modestia que le es habitual para desenredar el caso y conducir de nuevo la plática al tema inagotable del imperialismo yanqui. Reconoció también que a Rusia se le pasó la mano en el caso de Hungría.

x X x

Maestro del arte conversacional, el periodista visitante supo medir la atención del auditorio. El límite de una conferencia es la hora y cuarto, la hora y media. [illegible] Rebasó el tiempo en [illegible] minutos [illegible] cuando el Sr. Rico Galán escuchó la última pregunta [illegible] absolvió satisfactoriamente y en medio de [illegible] aplausos del [illegible].

Y en efecto, como [illegible] Menéndez [illegible] [illegible]

Diario del Sureste
Mérida
29 Oct 64

La Conferencia de Rico Galán

Invitado por el Centro de Difusión Cultural, el periodista Víctor Rico Galán [illegible] ayer [illegible] la [illegible] en el "Teatro" del Seguro Social.

En esta forma inició el [illegible] sobre sus actividades.

Rico Galán hizo un análisis de la situación general que priva en Hispanoamérica y luego explicó el porqué a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] por [illegible] de [illegible] con sus [illegible] [illegible].

Cuba, [illegible] [illegible], Panamá, Guatemala, Perú, etc., pasaron por el criterio analítico de Rico Galán.

Presentó al conferenciante, el periodista [illegible] [illegible].

Diario del Sureste
Sot.
24 Oct. 64

Próxima Conferencia del Periodista Victor Rico Galán, en Mérida

El Centro de Renovación Cultural ha estado circulando invitaciones para la conferencia que sobre el tema "Visión de Hispanoamérica" sustentará el conocido periodista Victor Rico Galán, en el teatro del Seguro Social de esta ciudad el próximo miércoles a las 21 horas.

Suscriben las invitaciones los Sres. Eugenio Marrero García y María Menéndez Rodríguez, presidente y secretario, respectivamente, del mencionado Centro.

July '64



[illegible] DEL TITULAR EN MEXICO

DOMICILIO DEL TITULAR EN EL EXTRANJERO

EN CASO DE MUERTE O ACCIDENTE NOTIFIQUESE A:

DOMICILIO

ESTE PASAPORTE DEBE REFRENDARSE CADA DOS AÑOS. LA LIBRETA CADUCA A LOS SEIS AÑOS.

DERECHOS $ 60.00

PASAPORTE NUMERO 53611

CONTIENE 32 PAGINAS

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE
VICTOR RICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA:
X X X X

Y X MENORES

Nº 10507

ESTE PASAPORTE ES NULO SI TIENE RASPADURAS, ENMENDATURAS O ENTRERRENGLONADURAS.

CE PASSEPORT EST NUL S'IL Y A DES RATURES, CORRECTIONS OU DES INTERLIGNATIONS.

THIS PASSPORT IS NOT VALID IF IT IS ERASED, AMENDED OR INTERLINED.

23333

[illegible]

de los ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS expide [illegible] y otorga pasaporte a

VICTOR RICO GALAN

de NACIONALIDAD MEXICANA (mexicano por nacimiento), y suplica a las autoridades civiles y militares de los países por donde transite, que no le pongan obstáculos y le presten ayuda y protección en caso necesario

Dado en la ciudad de MEXICO, D.F.

a los 9

días del mes de SEPTIEMBRE

del año de mil novecientos SESENTA

Y TRES

[illegible] ASUNTOS CONSULARES

Este pasaporte es válido para dirigirse a: ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA, CANADA, CENTRO Y SUD AMERICA, INGLATERRA, FRANCIA, ITALIA, PORTUGAL, ESPAÑA, SUECIA, DINAMARCA, ALEMANIA, SUIZA, AUSTRIA, COMUNIDAD BRITANICA DE NACIONES,

LA VALIDEZ DE ESTE PASAPORTE EXPIRA EL
8 SEPTIEMBRE 1965

a menos de que sea refrendado por la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores o por alguna oficina diplomática o consular de México en el extranjero.

OBSERVACIONES

El titular es MEXICANO POR NATURALIZACION, según carta número 146

otorgada el 15 MARZO 1949

FILIACIONES

	TITULAR	ESPOSA
ESTATURA	1.75 MTS.	
COLOR	BLANCO	
OJOS	CAFES	
PELO	ENTRECANO	
SEÑAS PARTICULARES	NINGUNA	
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EL FERROL, ESPAÑA	
FECHA DE NACIMIENTO	6 FEBRERO 1923	
OCUPACION	PERIODISTA	
ESTADO CIVIL	CASADO	

HIJOS MENORES

NOMBRE	EDAD	SEXO

FOTOGRAFIAS

MEXICO

FIRMA DEL TITULAR

FIRMA DE LA ESPOSA

ESTE PASAPORTE NO ES VALIDO SIN LA FIRMA Y HUELLA DIGITAL DEL INTERESADO



VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE COSTA RICA
MEXICO D. F., MEXICO
VISA DE TURISTA

Buena para ingresar a Costa Rica por [illegible] debiendo tener el portador [illegible]

[illegible] SET. 1963

CONSULADO GENERAL DE GUATEMALA

[illegible]

18 SET 1963



CONSULADO GENERAL DE HAITI
[illegible]

NUMERO [illegible]

DERECHOS COBRADOS [illegible]

VISTO en este Consulado General para dirigirse a [illegible]

y válido por un período de 90 [illegible]

México, D. F. [illegible]

VISAS

CONSULADO GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE [illegible] EN MEXICO, D.F.

[illegible]

Consul General



VISAS

VISADO EN ESTE CONSULADO GENERAL

Bueno para ingresar al Perú

en condición de No Inmigrante.

VALIDO por 90 días

México, D. F. 26 de Set. de 196[illegible]

BERNARDO ROCA REY

SEGUNDO SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA DEL PERU

[illegible] de orden 1508

[illegible] 475[illegible]

[illegible] .64

[illegible] 2

Tiene pasaje de vuelta por Pan American No 026-491-351-425

POR ESTA ACTUACION NO SE HAN PERCIBIDO DERECHOS COMPLEMENTARIOS

VISAS

[illegible] DE NICARAGUA

MEXICO, D. F.

Visa No. 203[illegible]/63

Bueno para Nicaragua

En viaje de Turismo.

[illegible] 30 días

Vía aérea

[illegible] 12 Sept. 1963

15



VISAS
CONSULADO GENERAL DE EL SALVADOR
EN MEXICO, D. F.

Visa No. 2223 — [illegible] Salvador C.A.
Pasa para dirigirse a ___
En viaje de TURISTA ([illegible])
Los [illegible]
Válida por [illegible]
Aut. de SS. EE. del ___ de ___ de ___
Derechos US $ ___
Impuesto de Turismo US $ ___

El interesado queda advertido que por ningún motivo, se le permitirá cambiar su calidad migratoria autorizada por esta visa.

México, D. F. 19 SET. 1963

DR. [illegible] COSTA
CONSUL GENERAL
DE EL SALVADOR

VISAS

VISA Corriente No. 120
Bueno y válido para dirigirse a la República Dominicana.
México, D. F., [illegible] de Sept. de 1963
Derechos gratis
Consul General

ENT
EN. 15 [illegible]
AGENTE No. 7



VISAS

SECCION CONSULAR DE LA EMBAJADA
DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA
VISTO BUENO:
TURISTA

CERTIFICADO [illegible]
Victor Rico Galan

[illegible]

[illegible] Art 37
[illegible] Gratis
México, 29 [illegible]

PAUL A. [illegible]
Secretario de Embajada
Jefe de la Sección Consular

SECCION CONSULAR 18

VISAS

[illegible] 1963

PARAGUAY
VICTOR RICO GALAN

CORTESIA
25 Setiembre 1963

CONSULADO GENERAL
REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY
MEXICO

CHILE
15 [illegible] 1963
SALIDO

14-00000



VISAS

ENTRADA

11 OCT 1963

S[illegible]

13 OCT 1963

[illegible] OCT 1963

20

VISAS

[illegible] EN EL CONSULADO [illegible]

Vi[illegible]

Vi[illegible]

[illegible] Honduras

21

VISAS

No. 2281

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to
TRINIDAD within
three months of date hereof
if passport remains valid.

"VISIT"

(Signed)

BRITISH VICE CONSUL
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

VISAS

No. 2282

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to
JAMAICA within
three months of date hereof
if passport remains valid.

"VISIT"

(Signed)

BRITISH VICE CONSUL
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 1963

FO[illegible] SERVICE

VISAS

RESIDENCIA

ENTRADA

[illegible] DE MIGRACION
BOLIVIA
AEROPUERTO EL ALTO
DIC 20 196[illegible]
SALIDA
ENTRADA
Firma

VISAS

22.03

SEEN at the British Embassy
Mexico City, Consular Section

Good for a single journey to British GUIANA within three months of date hereof if passport remains valid.

VISIT

(Signed)

Consul
Mexico City

(Date) 27 SEP 196[illegible]

[illegible] SERVICE



VISAS

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
SAN SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR C. A.
Fecha -8 OCT 1963

MIGRACION DE ILOPANGO
EL SALVADOR C. A.
Salió para
Fecha 11 OCT 1963

VISAS

SALIDA

CHILE
12 DIC. 1963
ENTRADA

AGENTE No. 4

VISAS

VR9632

CALLAO
ADMITIDO
DIC 17 19

VISAS

CA DEL PERU
LIMA - CALLAO
ADMITIDO
DIC 20 196

MEXICO, D. F.
SALIO A
CUBA

VISAS

[illegible] ON CONDITION THAT THE [illegible] ONE DAY [illegible] WITHIN THE ISLAND.

Mexico

15 JAN 1964

LANDED

JAMAICA, W.I.

JAMAICA

13/1/64

VISAS

No. 5

EMBAJADA DE CUBA EN MEXICO

MEXICO, D.F., Enero 24/64

BUENO PARA TRANSITAR A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION.

MEXICO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION			
		4. RI FILE NO.			
		5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		6. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
2. ANALYST	3. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-299755
HMM -08569
12 MAR 64

1911055

PAFR

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555555555555555555
666666 66 6666666666
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9999999 99999 9 99999

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
Δ MEXICO
SUBJ MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST. RE CONTACT WITH RAUL ROA KURI, 201-299755.

#UFG HBR HMY

1 911 055

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(19-40)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.
Chief of Station, Panama City; ~~Chief, WHD~~;
Chief of Station, Dominican Republic

FROM
Chief of Base, Merida

SUBJECT
Travel of Victor RICO Galan, Mexican Marxist
Journalist and Agent of Fidel CASTRO hus

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

REF: HMMA-22801

FYI

On 15 January 1964, Subject arrived Merida from Kingston, Jamaica, by Mexicana flight 304 in transit for Mexico City. (Source: airlists).

Andrew F. MERTON

Distribution:
- 2-Mexi
- 1-Pacy
- 1-DR
- ③-WHD
- 2-Files

CS COPY

201-335174

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
K.A-312

DATE
25 Feb. 64

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET ✓

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : ROME

ACTION : C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/WE, C/SAS, VR

12 FEB 64 IN 17813

S E C R E T 120940Z

DIR SDOM INFO MEXI CITE ROME 1921 (BERGER ACTING)

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF A. SDOM 2659 (IN 08142)

B. DIR 99499 (ALSO RECEIVED 99494)

NO STATION TRACES SUBJ REF A.** IF LOCATION RESIDENCE ITALY CAN BE ESTABLISHED CAN OBTAIN UNILATERAL CHECK POLICE FILES. OTHERWISE CAN RUN LIAISON TRACE IF DESIRED.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

** RE EMILION PAULON.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

TRANSMITTAL
OF
TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
059 SECRET

ORIG anna mc donnell
UNIT WH/3/panama
EXT. 6312
DATE 7 feb 64

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FEB 7 17 31 '64

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH-15

TDCS DB 3/659,422 SECT.

INFORMATION COPIES
CI, CI/IC, CI/OPS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW 1, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS, SAS 12, SR 4, EE 4.
DCI DDCI DDP ADDP

DATE DISTRIBUTED
7 FEB 64

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD RPT., PROJ.)
PACY 2324 (IN 13930)

NP (HYSAGE#1)
LIAISON*

DISSEMINATION

WH/R	1	SAS/H	12						#WH/CARA	
WH/POA	1	CI/ICG	2						#WH/MEXI	
WH/[illegible]	1	WH/COPS	1							
WH/3/P	4	WH/1/V	2							
WH/[illegible]	2									

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR						

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RECOMMEND FOR EXO
BASIC DOCUMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO OCI

REQUEST IS ATTACHED FOR RELAY TO CINCLANT.

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER

COPY NO.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY PANAMA/CUBA/USSR/MEXICO

TDCS DB-3/659,422

DATE OF INFO. 28 JANUARY - 5 FEBRUARY 1964

DISTR. 7 FEBRUARY 1964

SUBJECT

TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES OF THELMA KING, PRO-CASTRO DEPUTY TO THE PANAMA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (6 FEBRUARY 1964)

REF TDCSDB-3/659,136

IN 13930

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: LATIN AMERICAN POLITICIAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CENTRAL AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CIRCLES. THE PRIMARY SOURCE HAS PROBABLY REPORTED ACCURATELY BUT THE RELIABILITY OF THE SUBSOURCES CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

CURACAO

1. THELMA KING, PRO-CUBAN DEPUTY TO THE PANAMA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WAS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE PANAMA ON 5 FEBRUARY FOR CURACAO, FROM WHERE SHE WAS TO GO TO THE SOVIET UNION VIA CUBA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCSDB-3/659,136, OF 21 JANUARY, REPORTED THAT MRS. KING WOULD LEAVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA ON 24 JANUARY. SHE WAS MAKING THE TRIP TO SEEK FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR PANAMA FROM MOSCOW.)

2. ON 28 JANUARY MRS. KING MET "BRANKO", WHO TOLD HER THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN HAD ASKED HER TO GO DIRECTLY TO CUBA AND THEN TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DROP HER PLANS TO GO TO CHINA. "BRANKO" GAVE MRS. KING $1,[illegible] FOR HER TRIP, AND HE EXPECTS TO MEET HER IN CURACAO. (FIELD COMMENT: BRANKO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO [illegible]
[illegible] TREASURY [illegible]

IS PROBABLY BRANKO MILIJANOVIC, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND IDENTIFIED YUGOSLAV INTELLIGENCE AGENT. MILIJANOVIC CAME TO PANAMA ON 23 JANUARY AND LEFT FOR SAN JOSE ON 28 JANUARY. ON 27 JANUARY, ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, MRS. KING AND MILIJANOVIC HAD LUNCH TOGETHER, AND DURING THE LUNCHEON MILIJANOVIC HAD WARNED MRS. KING THAT THERE WAS GREAT DANGER OF A U.S.-SUPPORTED COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT CHIARI.)

3. FROM CURACAO MRS. KING WILL GO TO MEXICO CITY AND THEN TO HABANA. RICO GALAN WILL ACCOMPANY HER FROM MEXICO TO HABANA. ①

4. ONE REASON FOR THE TRIP IS TO ARRANGE A MEETING IN MEXICO IN THE NEAR FUTURE BETWEEN AN UNIDENTIFIED EMISSARY OF FIDEL CASTRO AND THREE PANAMANIAN LEFT-WING POLITICAL FIGURES: CARLOS IVAN ZUNIGA, FABIAN ECHEVERS, AND MANUEL SOLIS PALMA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCSDB-3/659,400, OF 6 FEBRUARY, CONTAINED A STATEMENT WHICH INDICATED THAT ZUNIGA CONTEMPLATED VISITING MEXICO. BOTH ZUNIGA AND ECHEVERS ARE PROMINENT IN THE PANAMANIAN SOCIALIST PARTY. MANUEL SOLIS PALMA IS THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT, CINCAFSA.

END OF MESSAGE

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

Chief of Base, Merida
Chief of Station, Panama City

Chief, WHD

FROM

Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

SUBJECT

10 Travel of Victor Rico Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

REFERENCE: HMMA-22801, 24 January 1964

Subject said at the airport in Santo Domingo on departure that he would travel to Miami. However, he was manifested to Kingston, and per KNGS 1097, traveled there and departed on Mexicana flight 304 to Mexico. WAVE did not have any information on his arrival there, per WAVE 0874. (NOTE: Neither KNGS 1097 dated 23 January nor WAVE 0874 dated 22 January were sent to Panama or Merida.)

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
- 2 - Mexico City
- 1 - Headquarters
- 1 - Merida
- 1 - Panama City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

HUCA-2542

DATE

4 February 1964

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : D. M. MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR&PR
EXT : 4524
DATE : 4 FEB 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 336474

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1	C/w4	4	
2		5	
3		6	

5 FEB 64 23 07z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO : ROME SANTO DOMINGO MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 5
INFO : **DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

Victor Rico (C Paulo)

TO ROME INFO SDOM MEXI CITE DIR 99494

REF SDOM 2659 (BEING RELAYED ROME) [illegible]

DYVOUR ZRKNICK

REQUEST TRACES SUBJECT REF. FYI SUBJECT OBSERVED TRAVELING WITH IDEN WHO IDENTIFIED CUBAN AGENT WORKING WITH LATIN AMERICAN CASTROIST SUBVERSIVE, INTEL AND INSURGENT GROUPS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: SDOM traces on Emilio Paulon.

C/S COMMENT: **DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

ROUTING	INITIAL

C/WH/6 Robert M [illegible]
WH/PO/A H B Priest
WH/3
SAS/CI
WE/4/CE

C/NE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. Wood
J. C. KING
C/WHD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : D. ~~[illegible]~~ MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DP&PR
EXT : 4524
DATE : 4 FEB 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
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6

TO : ROME SANTO DOMINGO MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : *DCP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

5 FEB 64 23 07z

DEFERRED SIG CEN
X ROUTINE

TO ROME INFO SDOM MEXI CITE DIR 99495

REF 99494

DYVOUR ZRKNICK

IDENTITY VICTOR RICO GALAN 201-336474

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT DYVOUR ZRKNICK CABLES.

C/WH/6

WH/PO/A

WH/3

SAS/CI

WH/4/CE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R Hawes
C/WH/K
RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

W Hood
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

21 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

RID

TDCS

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8.

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SR 7, SAS 8, AD/CI (E.O.) 2, DD/I (E.O.), AD/NE (E.O.), VR.

RI COPY

S E C R E T 290010Z 29 JAN 01462 64 IN 077240

DIR INFO WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 7976

INTEL

REF MEXI 7890 (IN 03343)
MEXI 7738 (IN 97485)

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND MARIA DEL CARMEN MARQUEZ, EMPLOYED AT MLN HEADQUARTERS, MEXICO CITY. TRAVEL CONFIRMED BY LIFIRE WHO FURNISHED INFO RE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

FILED 290010Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8366 MEXICO CUBA

SUBJ TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN DOI 27 AND 28 JAN 64 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 28 JAN 64

APP

ZZ PROCESS
11 Feb 64
T

# COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTIONS ... HAS BEEN MADE ... PENDING RELEASE ... UNIT.

ZZ

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	

TDCS
PRECEDENCE
ROUTING
PRIORITY

RELEASING INFO.

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON

LIAISON

38647

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: FEB 13 4 17 PM '64

FEB 0 39 PM '64

FROM:

ACTION:

INFO:

PAGE 2 IN 07724

TDCS

SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO

IN COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING

DATE DISTRIBUTED

BASED ON

LIAISON

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY

TDCS

DATE OF INFO.

DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 07724

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

RI COPY

Victor Rico-Galan (201-336474)

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST,, LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR HABANA, CUBA, BY AIR ON 28 JAN 64. HE CARRIED MEXICAN PASSPORT NO 56341 AND HAD A CUBAN COURTESY VISA. RICO'S TRAVL DOCUMENTS SHOWED THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO STAY AT THE HOTEL RIVIERA IN HABANA.

2. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS PRESUMED THAT RICO GALAN WILL INTERVIEW FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA, ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE USSR. IT ALREADY HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT RICO CONFERRED WITH CASTRO IN LATE MAY AND EARLY JUNE 1963 UPON CASTRO'S RETURN FROM HIS PREVIOUS TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT HAS ALSO BEEN

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

201-336474

RI COPY RI COPY

REPORTED THAT RICO IS AN AGENT OF CASTRO AND HAD BEEN ASSIGNED BY CASTRO TO VISIT VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO CONFER WITH COMMUNIST AND LEFTIST LEADERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INITIATING PROGRAMS OF ANTI-UNITED STATES VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. AMONG LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES VISITED BY RICO GALAN BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1963 WERE VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL, AND PANAMA. RICO GALAN VISITED THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM 8 TO 15 JAN 64).

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI ARMY NAVY AIR I&NS CINCSO CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 76 336
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[illegible] Ray Galvan [illegible]

C/WH/1/VR

[illegible]

34533

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : ~~C/SAS 5~~ C/WH

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, ~~C/WH~~, VR
C/SAS-5

[illegible] 0411

S E C R E T 2901132

29 JAN 61 IN 07726

DIR INFO WAVE SDOM KNGS POSN CITE MEXI 7978

TYPIC ZRKNICK

REF KNGS 1097 (IN 03663)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
[illegible]	
R[illegible]	
WH/3/Mex	
DESTROY	

ES COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, Dominican Republic
Chief of Base, Merida
INFO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Chief of Station, Panama
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist Journalist and Agent of Fidel Castro Ruz

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: Merida, Santo Domingo: See request in paragraph 2

REFERENCES: MEXI 7890, MEXI 7733, MEXI 7695, SDOM 2626
SDOM 2622, SDOM 2619, (None of which were sent to Merida)

1. MEXI 7695 (DOI 7 January 1964) reported that Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and agent of Fidel Castro Ruz, Prime Minister ofCuba, was making preparations to go to the Dominican Republic. SDOM 2610 reported that Victor Rico arrived in the Dominican Republic from Kingston, Jamaica, on 8 January 1964 aboard Pan American flight 431.

2. SDOM 2619 reported that Victor Rico left the Dominican Republic for Mexico via Miami on 15 January aboard Pan American flight 432. SDOM 2622 reported that Victor Rico left the Dominican Republic for Kingston on 15 January 1964 by Pan American airlines. Station Mexico City does not have the airlist in question. In order to keep an accurate record of Rico Galan's travel, Station Mexico City requests Station Santo Domingo and the Merida Base if possible to furnish specific and accurate information on Rico's return trip from the Dominican Republic to Mexico.

3. For the information of Merida Base, Rico Galan, a member of the propaganda committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), pro-Cuba, anti-United States Communist front, and a writer for Siempre, Mexican leftist magazine, visited Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Brazil between mid-October and mid-December 1963. According to a number of earlier reports furnished by usually reliable sources in Mexico, Panama, and other Latin American stations, Rico Galan spent eight days in Cuba during late May and early June 1963 interviewing Castro on the latter's stay in the USSR. During this period, Rico Galan was given an assignment to visit countries in Central and South America where he was to confer with Communist leaders and instruct them to begin immediate acts of sabotage and violence to take the pressure off Venezuela. He was also instructed to persuade competing leftist factions in the countries visited to unite so that their work would have greater impact. In all of the countries he visited, Rico Galan conferred with leading Communists and leftists. Rico Galan's trip to the Dominican Republic was ostensibly to collect material for newspaper articles. According to SDOM 2626 during his visit there, Rico Galan attempted to get photographs of Dominican guerrilla leaders killed at Las

CONTINUED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA - 22301

DATE
24 January 1964

SECRET

201-

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | SECRET | HMMA - 22801

Manuclas on 21 December 1963, for propaganda purposes. MEXI 7890 reported that Rico Galan was planning to fly to Cuba from Mexico by 27 January 1964. Station presumes that Rico Galan's purpose in going to Cuba is to confer again with Castro upon the latter's return to Cuba from his present visit to the Soviet Union, and receive further instructions from Castro re future anti-United States acts of sabotage and violence in Latin America. The local press of 24 January reported that Castro returned to Cuba from the USSR on 23 January. According to HKP 6340, Rico Galan has been known to use the name Armando Conte. CIT/MEXICO OCC JOURNALIST

AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ

THIS NAME IS AN AKA FOR VICTOR

RICO GALAN 201-336474

Willard C. CURTIS

2 - Dominican Republic
2 - Merida
1 - Headquarters
1 - Panama

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-

CLASSIF. TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO 95

~~RET. TO BRANCH~~ ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, DODS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 7, WH 13, SAS 12, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TDCS -3/570,926

SECRET 222037Z 23 JAN 64 0051Z IN 03843

DIR INFO SDOM WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 7890

NTEL

F MEXI 7738 (IN 97485)

SDOM 2626 (IN 00755)

MEXI 7695 (IN 95245)

SDOM 2622 (IN 00010)

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND FERNANDEZ ROA. AIRLISTS SHOWING RETURN OF RICO TO MEXICO FROM SDOM NOT AVAIL. NO INDEX FILED 222037Z

EPORT.CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8339 MEXICO/CUBA SUBJECT ROJECTED TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN DOI 21 JAN 64 PADA EXICO MEXICO CITY 22 JAN 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSON (B) WITH GOOD ONNECTIONS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

201-334474

ZZ PROCESSED
29 Jan 64
ZZ T.

COMMENT:

SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS

ES COPY

WH/REG	S	
WH/3/M	5	

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	gm
RID/MIS	
~~RID/~~	
RID	

TDCS PRECEDENCE

☒ ROUTINE

☐ PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: E. J. M. Delaney
E.J.M.DELANEY

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 23 JANUARY 64 2120Z

BASED ON: MEXI-7890 LIENVOY (ZRBALCE)

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO / CUBA

TDCS -3/570,926

DATE OF INFO. 21 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 23 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

PROJECTED TRAVEL TO CUBA OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (22 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 03843

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: PERSON (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. APPRAISAL: 2.

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-8339

1. ON 21 JAN VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ASKED JOSE MIGUEL FERNANDEZ ROA, THIRD SECRETARY AND PRESS ATTACHE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO WHAT THE FIRST AVAIL FLIGHT TO CUBA WOULD BE. FERNANDEZ SAID ON 24 JAN. RICO SAID HE HAD WANTED TO GO TO CUBA ON 23 JAN, BUT INDICATED HE MIGHT GO ON THE FLT OF 27 JAN.

2. FIELD COMMENT. EARLIER REPORTS FROM A NUMBER OF USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES HAVE IDENTIFIED RICO GALAN AS AN AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. IN LATE MAY AND EARLY JUNE 1963 RICO GALAN SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA INTERVIEWING CASTRO ON THE LATTER'S VISIT TO THE USSR. ON THIS OCCASION CASTRO ORDERED RICO TO VISIT VARIOUS CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

TREASURY I&NS FBI

FORM 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

TDCS -3/570,926

IN 03843

PAGE 2

FEB 3 8 21 '64

INSTRUCT LEADING COMMUNISTS THERE TO INITIATE PROGRAMS OF ANTI-UNITED STATES VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1963 RICO VISITED VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL, AND PANAMA AND CONFERRED WITH COMMUNIST LEADERS IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. ON 8 JAN 1964 RICO WENT TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM MEXICO. DURING HIS VISIT THERE, RICO ATTEMPTED TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERRILLA LEADERS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS ON 21 DEC 1963, FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. ACCCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, RICO WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO MEXICO FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BY AIR ON 15 JAN).

3. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS PRESUMED THAT RICO GALAN IS GOING TO CUBA TO AGAIN CONFER WITH CASTRO UPON THE LATTER'S RETURN FROM HIS PRESENT TRIP TO THE USSR. THE EXACT DATE OF CASTRO'S RETURN TO CUBA FROM THE USSR IS NOT KNOWN, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS OF 22 JAN, CASTRO LEFT MOSCOW FOR KIEV FOR A FOUR DAY VISIT, THENCE RETURNING TO MOSCOW. IT IS PRESUMED THAT CASTRO WILL THEN RETURN TO HABANA.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI ARMY NAVY AIR IBNS CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : KINGSTON
ACTION : C/SAS 5
INFO : DOP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/WH, VR

6

S E C R E T 221833Z

22 JAN 64 IN 03663

DIR INFO MEXI SDOM WAVE POSN CITE KNGS 1097

SANITIZED

RY[illegible]YPIC ZRKNICK

[illegible]F: WAVE 0374 (NOT SENT POSN) (IN 03059)

VICTOR RICO GALAN ARRIVED KNGS FROM SDOM 15 JANUARY 1964 ON PAA FLIGHT 432. HE CONTINUED SAME DATE TO MEXI ON MEXICANA FLIGHT 394. WHEN CHECKING IN FOR LATTER FLIGHT AIRLINE PERSONNEL NOTICED HE ACCOMPANIED BY FOLLOWING WHO TOOK SAME FLIGHT AND WITH WHOM HE APPRARED TO BE TRAVELING, AS IN A GROUP:

A. B. NOBUYUKI NKAIDO (SEE POSN 0371 NOT SENT SDOM MEXI)

B. ADALBERT CORTESI, MEXICAN NATIONAL.

C. EMILIO PAULON, ITALIAN NATIONAL WHO ALSO HAD ARRIVED KNGS FROM SDOM ON PAA 432 WITH RICO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2 Judkins	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : C/SAS 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, C/WH, VR

S E C R E T 212124Z

DIR INFO MEXI KNGS SDOM CITE WAVE 8874

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC ZRKNICK

21 JAN 64 IN 03059

REFS A. SDOM 2619 (NOT SENT KNGS) (IN 99172)

B. DIR 95773 * (NOT SENT SDOM)

C. DIR 94053

CHECK WITH ODURGE AND ODPOON REVEALED SUBJECT NOT ARRIVED WAVE AREA VIA PANAM 432 FOR PERIOD 14 JAN TO DATE. SUBJ NAME PLACED ON ODURGE AIRPORT WATCHLIST. WILL ADVISE IF SHOWS UP WAVE AREA.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN DISCREET COVERAGE (VICTOR RICO GALAN) ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DOP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

S E C R E T 201800Z

DESENSITIZED

DIR [illegible] MEXI CITE SDOM 2634

20 JAN 64 IN 02099

[illegible]BAT ZRKNICK

REF: A DIR 94953

B SDOM 2612 (IN 97349)

C SDOM 2626 (IN [illegible])

1. EMDAN-1 TOLD 13 JAN BY STATION THAT VICTOR RICO POSSIBLY IN DOMREP, THAT HE MEXICAN LEFTIST WHO BELIEVED BE WORKING FOR CASTRO CAUSE WHO HAD VISITED PANAMA AND OTHER WH COUNTRIES, AND WAS SORT WHO COULD TRY STIMULATE 14 JUNE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. POINTED OUT THAT AS WRITER HE UNDOUBTEDLY COULD PRINT UNFAVORABLE MATERIAL RE GODR AND SUGGESTED CIRCUMSPECT HANDLING. EMDAN-1 PASSED ABOVE TO EMOTH-[illegible] AND TO EMOLINT-1.

2. DURING RICO'S LAST HOURS HERE, EMDAN-1 SAID HE DISCREETLY SURVEILLED BUT NO INFO ON CONTACTS OBTAINED PROBABLY AS INFO HIS ARRIVAL REACHED THEM SEVERAL DAYS TOO LATE.

3. EMDAN-1 SAID DOMREP VISA SUBJECT ISSUED [illegible] SEPT JUST AFTER [illegible] DEPARTURE FROM MEXI TRIP AND FEW DAYS PRIOR [illegible] [illegible], BUT THERE NO RECORD [illegible] DOMREP FOREIGN

K

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

RELATIONS OFFICE AS WOULD BE NORMAL.

4. GODR DID NOT MOLEST RICO. HE HAD FIVE DAY VISA WHICH OVERSTAYED FEW HOURS BUT MADE NO REQUEST FOR EXTENSION, WHICH GODR PREPARED DENY HAD HE REQUESTED IT. TO DATE ALL INDICATIONS ARE INFO HIS PRESENCE HERE HANDLED DISCREETLY BY GODR.

5. NO INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *INTEL REPORT RE VICTOR RICO ATTEMPT TO PHOTOGRAPH DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. B. McGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR
EXT : 4523
DATE : 20 JAN 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

20 JAN 64 21 30z

TO : KINGSTON JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WH5

INFO : DDP, C/CI, C/FI/..., ..., VR

☐ DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO KNGS INFO WAVE MEXI CITE DIR 95773

DESENSITIZED

ZZHICK

REF: A. SDCM 2622 (IN 00010)

B. TDCS-3/569,940 (BEING RELAYED KNGS)

C. DIR 94953 (BEING RELAYED KNGS)

D. SDCM 2628 (IN 00755)

1. REFS B AND C CONTAIN BACKGROUND ON VICTOR RICO GALAN. REF C INFO AND INSTRUCTIONS ALSO APPLY JAMAICA VIEW PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES DUCOUDRAY AND OTHER DOMINICAN EXILES.

2. REQUEST YOU PASS CONTENTS REF B TO RUABBE WITH REMARKS EMPHASIZING SENSITIVITY AND IMPORTANCE, REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN DISCREET COVERAGE SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES. NOTE SUBJECT ALSO REPORTED DEPARTED DOMREP FOR MIAMI 15 JANUARY. HOWEVER HE HAS ALREADY TRANSITTED KNGS EN ROUTE DOMREP (8 JANUARY) AND LIKELY TRANSITTING OR VISITING AGAIN ON RETURN. MAY ALREADY HAVE DEPARTED FOR MEXICO OR OTHER DESTINATION.

3. PLEASE KEEP HQS ADVISED ON DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : DAVID MCGRATH
UNIT : WH/6/DR
EXT : 4523
DATE : 20 JAN 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 05773

WH COMMENT: Refs A, B, and C contain information on Victor RICO Galan and his travel to Dom Rep and advise SDOM concerning the handling of this matter with liaison. Ref D reports RICO's approach to a news photographer in Dom Rep to get photos of bodies of guerrilla leaders (especially M. TAVARES Justo).

C/WH/3 [illegible] for

C/WH/6/J [illegible]

C/WHD

C/WH/D

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-336974
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☑
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

49 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

S E C R E T 170048Z

SDOM INFO DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 7818

17 JAN 64 IN 00177

DYVOUR

REF SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)*

STATION HAS LOOK OUT CARD ON SUBJECT OF REF ON FILE WITH APPROPRIATE SECTION OF HBFINCH. SUBJ HAS NEVER APPLIED FOR ENTRY TO U.S. THROUGH HBFINCH NOR HAVE THEY RECD ANY QUERY CONCERNING SUBJECTS REQUEST FOR ENTRY. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM 432.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~RID/OPS~~	
~~RID/FI~~	
LUHS/MEX	
~~DESTROY~~	

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

RI COPY RI COPY

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

00000019

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: IW

INFO: DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, DODS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/PS, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WH 11, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, VR.

Rico Galan

MICROFILMED
MAR 16 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TDCS -3/570,355

HMM UFG H2P

SECRET 171907Z 17 JAN 20362 64 IN 00755

PRIORITY DIR MEXI INFO WAVE PACY LANT KNGS CITE SDOM 2626

3P

INTEL

SUPDATA STATION OFFICER FROM RAMON LORA ESPINAL, A PHOTOGRAPHER FOR LISTIN DIARIO WHO TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS. VICTOR RICO GALAN WAS PUT IN TOUCH WITH LORA THROUGH EMMA TAVAREZ, WHO HAD BEEN IN LAS MANACLAS WHEN LORA TOOK THE PHOTOGRAPHS.

FILED 171907Z REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM (COUNTRY) DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJ ATTEMPT BY VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS DOI 10 JANUARY 1964 PADA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, SANTO DOMINGO (16 JANUARY 1964) APPR 2 HDC 832 SOURCE DOMINICAN (F) WITH CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO

Index F

IW COMMENT:

NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

201-336424

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
[illegible]	
RID/FI	

WH/REG	8
WH/6/SRH/RE	3

TDCS PRECEDENCE
x ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:
W. Streeter Bass
W. STREETER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
18 JANUARY 1964
0020Z

BASED ON: HDC 832
~~NO PROJECT~~
[illegible] 1

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM 1389

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS -3/570,355

DATE OF INFO. 10 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 18 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

ATTEMPT BY RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO GET PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOMINICAN GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SANTO DOMINGO (16 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 00755

FIELD REPORT NO. HDC 832

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A DOMINICAN (F) WITH CONTACTS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO.

APPRAISAL: 2

1. ON 10 JANUARY 64, VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ASKED EMMA TAVAREZ JUSTO, SISTER OF MANUEL TAVAREZ JUSTO, ~~FORMER~~ PRESIDENT OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO (APCJ ~~- 14TH OF~~ JUNE POLITICAL GROUP), ~~FOR~~ PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CADAVERS OF THE GUERRILLAS KILLED AT LAS MANACLAS ON 21 DECEMBER 1963. (FIELD COMMENT. RICO, WHOSE TRAVEL THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS REPORTS, ARRIVED IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 8 JANUARY 64 AND DEPARTED 1[illegible] JANUARY 64 FOR KINGSTON,

SEX F CIT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
L DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
#201-325376
Tati
(Pro Castro Grp in DR)
Re
63 for Mexican Journalist Victor Rico.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

FORM 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

JAMAICA VIA PAN AMERICAN. TAVAREZ WAS KILLED BY THE DOMINICAN ARMED FORCES ON 21 DECEMBER 63. NO ONE HAS YET BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE HIM). EMMA TAVAREZ, HOWEVER, WAS UNABLE TO GET THEM FOR HIM. RICO ALSO REQUESTED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF RAFAEL HERRERA, DIRECTOR OF LISTIN DIARIO, BUT HERRERA REFUSED TO RELEASE THEM. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE PHOTOGRAPHS HAD BEEN TAKEN AS THE BODIES WERE REMOVED FROM A COMMON GRAVE, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN STACKED CROSSWISE. ALL THE VICTIMS HAD BEEN SHOT THROUGH THE HEAD. THE BACK OF TAVAREZ' HEAD HAD BEEN TORN AWAY BY GUNFIRE. HE HAD ALSO SUFFERED A KNIFE OR BAYONET WOUND IN THE STOMACH. THE PICTURES, WHICH HAVE NEVER APPEARED IN THE PRESS, ARE BEING HELD IN THE ARCHIVES OF LISTIN DIARIO.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO CINCLANT.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5940
DATE : 16 Jan 1964

File 201-336474
Rico Galan

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

16 JAN 64 19 15z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM : DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, VR

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO THIS AGENCY'S TDCS-3/569,940 DISTRIBUTED ON 14 JANUARY 1964, SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM A DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN LEFT SANTO DOMINGO FOR MIAMI, FLORIDA, ON 15 JANUARY 1964 ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 432.

3. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON SDOM-2619 (IN 99172), 14 JAN 1964.

RID COPY

JANE ROMAN
CI/LIA
RELEASING OFFICER

B.L. VETTER/WH/C/CR
COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

SECRET 161630Z

MEXI DIR INFO WAVE CITE SDOM 2622 16 Jan 64 IN 00010

REF: SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)*

1. VICTOR RICO, MEXICAN, LEFT SDOM FOR KNGS ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM. (SOURCE: AIRLISTS)

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *VICTOR RICO GALAN LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

[illegible]

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D.B.MCGYATT
UNIT : WH/6/DRGPR ☐ INDEX
EXT : 4523 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 16 JAN 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

1242
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SANTO DOMINGO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, VR

16 JAN 64 20 04z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO SDOM INFO MEXI, WAVE CITE DIR 94953

DESENSITIZED

RKNICK

REFS: A. SDOM 2619 (IN 99172)

B. DIR 79062 (BEING RELAYED SDOM WAVE)

C. TDCS 3/563,671 (BEING RELAYED SDOM WAVE)

1. REFS B AND C GIVE BACKGROUND TO VICTOR RICO GALAN. PURPOSE IN DOMREP PRESUMABLY SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN LATTER REFS AND PROBABLY RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO APCJ INSURGENCY.

2. DESIRABLE MAINTAIN GODR INTEREST IN SUBJECT VIEW PROBABLE SIGNIFICANCE HIS ACTIVITIES IN DR AND POSSIBILITY HE MAY GO THERE AGAIN. HOWEVER, OWING SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER, STATION SHOULD PASS NO FURTHER INFO BEYOND CONTENTS MEXI 7738, DRAWING ATTENTION SUBJECT'S PROBABLE CONNECTION WITH APCJ INSURGENCY.

3. PLEASE INFORM HQS DETAILS PASSAGE AND HANDLING BY SECURITY SERVICE AND OTHER GODR OFFICIALS INVOLVED. ALSO ADVISE ANY FURTHER DETAILS STATION ABLE ACQUIRE CONCERNING SUBJECT'S ITINERARY ACTIVITIES, CONTACTS IN DR,

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 94953

4. FOR WAVE: REQUEST EMPLOY LOCAL OFFICIAL ODYOKE LIAISONS FOR COVERAGE SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES YOUR AREA.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *A. Subject departed DomRep for Miami 15 January 1963.
B. Informed certain field stations of subject's itinerary and mission and specified types coverage required.
C. Gave details Subject's Castro connections and above mission.

SAS/CI Anita Potocki (in draft)

WH/PO/A Helen Priest (in draft)

WH/3 Charlotte Bustos (in draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. N. DAHLGREN
C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, RI/AN, SAS 8, DO/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR

SECRET 151645Z

15 Jan 64 IN 99172

DIR MEXI INFO WAVE CITE SDOM 2619

REFS: SDOM ~~2407~~ 1610* (NOT SENT WAVE)

MEXI 7738 (NOT SENT WAVE) (IN 97485) **

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, LEFT SDOM FOR MIAMI ON 15 JAN 64 VIA PANAM 432. (SOURCE/ DOMINICAN SECURITY SERVICE). NO FURTHER INFO AVAILABLE.

2. INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE. POSSIBLY SDOM 2610 (IN 97187) INTENDED.

**INTEL RPT RE TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET ✓

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, RI/AN, VR

SECRET 131200Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 2610

REF: SDOM 2606 (IN 96608)

1. VICTOR RICO, MEXICAN, PROBABLY IDENTICAL SUBJECT REF, ARRIVED SDOM PANAM 431 FROM KINGSTON 8 JAN (SOURCE: FLIGHT MANIFEST.

13 JAN 64 IN 97107

2. INDEX.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

[illegible]

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, VR

13 JUN 66 IN 57373

SECRET 131651Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7738

REF MEXI 7695 (IN 95254)**

IN VIEW IMPORTANCE PRESENT SITUATION PACY, PERMISSION GRANTED PASS INFO CONTAINED IN REF AS REQUESTED BY SDOM 2686.*

SECRET

CS COMMENT: *IN 96608

**INTEL RPT RE PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

CS COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT, IW, SAS 8, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, VR.

TDCS 3/569,940

S E C R E T 131939Z 13 JANUARY 2056Z 64 IN 97485

SDOM INFO DIR PACY CITE MEXI 7738

INTEL

REF MEXI 7695(IN 95254)
SDOM 2610(IN 97187)

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCONS BETWEEN WIFE OF RICO GALAN AND TIBOL. WIFE'S NAME UNKNOWN. AVAILABLE AIRLISTS DO NOT SHOW TRAVEL OF SUBJECT. ACCORDING HZP-6340, RICO GALAN HAS BEEN KNOWN TO USE NAME ARMANDO CONTE. SDOM HAS PERMISSION PASS INFO BELOW TO HIGH LEVEL GODR MENTIONED SDOM 2606.(IN 96608). VICTOR RICO REPORTED SDOM 2610 (IN 97187) OBVIOUSLY IDENTICAL RICO GALAN. SDOM ASKED, IF POSSIBLE, TO REPORT TO MEXICO SUBJECT'S ACTIVITIES IN DOM REP. FILED 132000Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 82 MEXICO/DOMINICAN

COMMENT:

NO DISSEMINATION ... ATTACHED
DISSEMINATION OF ... HAS BEEN
MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING
RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	
RID/MIS	
~~RID/...~~	
RID/...	

TDCS PRECEDENCE
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:
~~LIAISON~~

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

21-3 3647

1389

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR

Jan 21 4 31 PM '64

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION:

INFO:

MEXI 7738 IN 97485

TDCS

PAGE TWO

REPUBLIC. SUBJECT TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOI 10 JAN 64 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 13 JAN 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH FAMILY OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

IW COMMENT:

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO
S FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY	TDCS
DATE OF INFO.	DISTR.

SUBJECT

PLACE & DATE ACQ.	REF IN 97485
SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:	FIELD REPORT NO.

1. ON 10 JANUARY 1964 THE WIFE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, ADVISED RAQUEL TIBOL, PROMINENT MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST AND MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF POLITICA, MEXICAN COMMUNIST SEMI-MONTHLY MAGAZINE, THAT RICO GALAN WAS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. MRS. RICO GALAN EXPRESSED THE OPINION HER HUSBAND WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JANUARY.

2. FIELD COMMENT. AN EARLIER REPORT SAID RICO GALAN WAS PREPARING TO GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FOR THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF GATHERING MATERIAL FOR NEWSPAPER ARTICLES. OTHER EARLIER REPORTS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JAN 24 10 24 PM '64

TDCS

IN 07185

PAGE 2

HAVE IDENTIFIED RICO GALAN AS AN AGENT OF FIDEL CASTRO, WHO IN MAY 1963 WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT BY CASTRO TO VISIT CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO CONFER WITH LEADING COMMUNISTS IN ORDER TO INITIATE PROGRAMS OF ANTI-US VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. SINCE OCTOBER 1963 RICO GALAN HAS VISITED VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, BRAZIL AND PANAMA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR

11 JUN 64 IN 98608

SECRET 111505Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE SDOM 2606

REF: MEXI 7695 (IN 95254)

1. SDOM WOULD LIKE INFORM HIGH LEVEL GODR MEMBER [illegible] WHOM IN REGULAR CONTACT OF RICO GALAN TRAVEL EARLIEST [illegible], THUS WHEN TRAVEL VERIFIED BY LESS SENSITIVE SOURCE [illegible] CABLE SDOM SO INFO MAY BE PASSED.

2. NO INDEX.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *VERIFIED TRAVEL.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

INDEX ☑ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO
X-REF TO FILE NO 30
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: IW

INFO: ADDP, DDDS, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, WH 17, DD/I, AD/CI 2, VR.

TDCS -3/561,563

SECRET 091808Z 9 JAN 64 2054Z IN 95254

DIR SDOM INFO PACY CITE MEXI 7695

(IN 79596) (IN 64180) (IN 50626)

REF RIOD/2898, HZP 6340, TDCS 3/563/671, GUAT/3543, MANA/4562, DIR 79062, HMM 7746, HMM 7466

INTEL

SUPDATA SOURCE LIENVOY FROM TELCON BETWEEN FERNANDO CARMONA AND HEBERTO CASTILLO, BOTH NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE MLN. CARMONA PASSED THE INFO ON RICO GALAN TO CASTILLO.

FILED 091808Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM 8262 MEXICO/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJECT PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOI 7 JANUARY 64 PADA 8 JANUARY 64 APR 2 SOURCE PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH RICO GALAN.

W COMMENT: NO SEPARATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION IS BEING MADE OF THIS TDCS.

201-326474

WH/REG	8	
WH/3/M	5	
WH/O/DRH/RE	3	

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	JM
RID/MIS	
RID/	
RID/	

TDCS PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON HMM 8262
LIENVOY

LIAISON

RELEASING IO: W. Streeter Bass
W. STREETER BASS

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 10 JANUARY 1964 0055Z

SECRET

GROUP 1
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FORM 1389

[redacted]UCTION BY [redacted] [redacted] O[redacted] PROHIBITED. [redacted] 13.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
☐ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO / DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS-3/569,563

DATE OF INFO. 7 JANUARY 1964

DISTR. 10 JANUARY 1964

SUBJECT

PROJECTED TRAVEL OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (8 JANUARY 1964)

REF IN 95254

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 8262

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: PERSONS (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH RICO GALAN.

APPRAISAL: 2

201-336474

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN MARXIST JOURNALIST, IS MAKING PREPARATIONS TO GO TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FROM MEXICO IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THE PURPOSE OF RICO GALAN'S VISIT IS OSTENSIBLY TO GATHER INFORMATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF SOME ARTICLES ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: RICO GALAN; A MEMBER OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (MLN- NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT , PRO-CUBA, ANTI UNITED STATES MEXICAN COMMUNIST FRONT, AND A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE, MEXICAN LEFTIST MAGAZINE, VISITED PANAMA, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, VENEZUELA, AND BRAZIL BETWEEN MID-OCTOBER AND MID-DECEMBER 1962, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL EARLIER REPORTS.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO
FBI I&NS REPCINCLANT

CS COPY

FORM 1389

RI COPY RI COPY

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

JAN [illegible] '64

TDCS -3/569,563

IN 95254

PAGE 2

RICO GALAN SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA DURING MAY AND JUNE 1963 INTERVIEWING FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA, ON THE LATTER'S STAY IN THE USSR. DURING THIS PERIOD RICO GALAN WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATE ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. HE WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO PURSUE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS IN THE COUNTRIES HE VISITED TO UNIFY SO THEIR WORK WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT. ([illegible] IN THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES HE VISITED, RICO GALAN CONFERRED WITH LEADING COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS.)

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE FBI CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

28/30 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO , DIRECTOR

FROM , RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION, WH 8

INFO , DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RI/AN, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 121859Z

DIR POUCH L3RE INFO MEXI CITE RIOD 2398 13 Dec 63 IN 79596

REF: DIR-79862*

1. ABOUT 3 DEC ALSLAB-1 MET MEXICAN VICTOR RICO GALAN, EDITOR OF SIEMPRE, WHO SAID CAME DIRECTLY FROM CUBA WITHOUT STOPPING MEXI AND INTENDS RETURN CUBA SAME ROUTE VERY SOON (SIC). RICO WAS CONSEDERING TRAVELING TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 5 OR 6 DEC.

2. L9RE. RICO SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT ON SPECIAL MISSION FOR AMTHUG-1. IN BRAZIL WAS TO MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. DIR REQUESTS ANY INFO HIS TRAVELS AND ON HIS CONTACTS. CABLE ANY INFO PACY. RICO DPOB 6 FEB 1933, (also [illegible] 1927) ? EL FERROL, MEXI.

3. INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *RE REPORTS THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN IS TRAVELING THROUGH WH AREA.

CS COPY

SECRET

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Panama/Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-3/566,571
SUBJECT	Comments of Leaders of the Vanguard of National Action and The Partido Del Pueblo on Visit Of Castro Agent to Panama	DATE DISTR.	5 December 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	23 October - 5 November 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Panama, Panama City (30 October - 7 November 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HZP-6340

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Leader (F) of the Vanguard of National Action who was present when Turner made his remarks.
Para. 2,3: Leaders (B) of the Partido del Pueblo to whom Souza and Thomas made their remarks.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On 23 October 1963 David Turner, leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN - radical pro-Cuban revolutionary group), informed members of the VAN directorate that he had received a call from Thelma King, pro-Cuban deputy to the National Assembly, a few days earlier. Turner said that the purpose of the call was to arrange for Turner to meet Victor Rico Galan, a Mexican newspaperman who works for Fidel Castro.[1] Turner said that the interview took place in Rico's room at the Hotel International, and was attended by King, Turner, and Hugo Alejandro Victor, president of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP, People's Party-Communist), with which the VAN is disputing leadership of the revolution in Panama. Turner said that Rico questioned his guests about unity among the leftwing groups in Panama, and Victor oddly informed him only that effats were being made to reach an understanding. Turner refrained frommking any comment at that time. Rico invited his visitors to have lunch with him; however, Victor declined, and King went in search of copies of newspapers which had reproduced statements of Panamanian students warning against plans of the National Guard to stage a coup d'etat in Panama. Rico had specifically asked for those publications. This gave Turner an opportunity to talk alone with Rico, and he informed him of VAN activities and of the steps being taken by the VAN to bring about an armed movement in Panama, since conditions were ripe for such action.

2. Around 26 October 1963 Ruben Dario Souza Batista, national secretary-general of the PDP, said that a Cuban agent had recently visited Panama to urge the VAN and the PDP to resolve their differences and unite. The PDP, however, violently rejected the suggestion. Souza

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY #	AIR #	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI 3
REPCINCLANT		CINCSO #			USIA	I&NS	TREAS	

(Note field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/MEXI	#		HZP-6340
CA/PROP	1	WH/FI	1			(HYKIRK-2)	HYAB, HYADIZ
SAS/R	12	WH/3/P	4				CS-3/566,571
SAS/WAVE #	1	WH/7	1				
WH/R	1	WH/3/M	3				
TOTALS	DISSEM SEC 1, IE 3, CI 3, FI 3, CA 1, SAS 11 (1), WH 10 (1), DODS 1.					LIAISON #	LNG AHD;dc

said that PDP leaders planned to ascertain the correct name of the agent and submit a written protest concerning his activities to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

3. Around 5 November 1963 Ruperto Luther Thomas, national secretary of propaganda of the PDP, informed regional-level PDP leaders that Armando Conte, a writer for Tiempos in Mexico, recently came to Panama and spoke with Victor.2 He said that he was an emissary of the Cubans, and had come to Panama to convince Victor of the need to support the Cuban line of armed revolution. Victor told Conte that the PDP would not be told what to do, because it had its own line on the Panamanian Revolution.

Field Comments

1. Rico arrived in Panama from San Jose, Costa Rica, on 20 October 1963, at which time he provided the following personal date on his landing card:

Born on 6 February 1928 at El Ferrol /presumably in Mexico/
Citizen of Mexico, bearer of passport No. 16897
Occupation - newspaperman
Permanent Address - Providencia 930, Mexico, D. F.

Rico left Panama for Venezuela on 22 October 1963.

2. Travel records contain no information on the arrival of any person with the name Armando Conte during the period in question, and the name is believed to be a pseudonym used by Rico. It is interesting to note that two VAN sources identified the visiting Mexican journalist by the name of Rico or Risco; however, no PDP source has reported that name, and Souza's comments as reported in paragraph 2 tend to indicate that the visitor concealed his identity from the PDP.

Headquarters Comment. TDCS-3/563,671, of 31 October 1963, described Rico Galan's visit to Mexico in the same general terms.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CP C

30 SECRET

ROUTING	
1 JS	4
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3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1735, 22 NOV BP)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, VR

WH/3/Mexico

Renshaw

S E C R E T 221415Z

PRIORITY MEXI DIR CARA INFO ROUTINE GUAT MANA SJOS RECI SAOP

22 NOV 63 IN 66750

PACY CITE RIOD 2720

REFS A. DIR 79362 B. CARA 8158 (IN 65022) C. RIOD 2702 (IN 65816)*

ALACME/ALSTAVE 20 AND 21 NOVEMBER INDICATE THAT LEFTIST MEXICAN JOURNALIST NAMED "VICTOR", PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN, IN CONTACT WITH PAULO SCHILLING, COORDINATOR OF POPULAR MOBILIZATION FRONT, WHO ATTEMPTING GET THIS JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS WITH FEDERAL DEPUTIES LEONEL BRIZOLA AND NEIVA MOREIRA. SCHILLING INDICATES THAT THE JOURNALIST HAS TO LEAVE BRAZIL VERY SOON AND THAT THIS JORRNALIST SPENT TWENTY DAYS IN VENEZUELA AND WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE MIR THERE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *AS OF 20 NOV RIOD UNABLE CONFIRM THRU PCB PENETRATIONS ARRIVAL VICTOR RICO GALAN.

[illegible] / J have des 201 + a soft file.

[illegible]

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	5	
3	WH/3	6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION: WH 8 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1500-21 NOV 63)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, VR

21 Nov 63 IN 65816

S E C R E T 211708Z

PRIORITY MEXI DIR CARA INFO ROUTINE GUAT MANA SJOS RECI SAOP

PACY CITE RIOD 2702

REF A. DIR 79062

B. CARA 8158 (IN 65022)*

AS OF 20 NOVEMBER RIOD UNABLE CONFIRM THROUGH PCB PENETRATIONS ARRIVAL VICTOR RICO GALAN EVEN THOUGH ALSAC 3 BELIEVES HE WOULD KNOW OF ANY CONTACT WITH PRESTES BY TRAVELER FROM LA. WILL CONTINUE CHECKING STATION TRAVEL, PCB AND OTHER SOURCES AND WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REFERENCE IS RYBAT.

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : CARACAS

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 201935Z

20 Nov 63 IN 65022

PRIORITY RIOD INFO DIR PACY CITE CARA 8158

DESENSITIZED

PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 78513 (NOT SENT RIOD).

1. PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN. MEXICAN CITIZEN, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEB 1928 AT EL FERROL, MEXICO, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 933, MEXICO D.F. DEPARTED CARACAS 12 NOVEMBER VIA PAA FLT NO. 515/12 FOR RIO DE JANEIRO.

2. REF STATES GALAN TRAVELLING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA WITH MISSION PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TRY MAINTAIN THEM IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. POSSIBLE HAS SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS.

3. REF REQUESTED CARA DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE INFO RE GALAN ACTIVITIES. CARA ASSUMES SAME REQUEST APPLIED RIOD.

S E C R E T

K

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, VR

19 Nov 63 IN 64180

SECRET 19/2039Z

DIR CITE GUAT 3543

REF GUAT 3537 (IN 63391)

DIR 79062 *

1. MATERIAL RECEIVED FROM ESMESSAGE-3 19 NOV 63 CONFIRMS VICTOR RICO GALAN INTERVIEWED GUERRILLA LEADER YON SOSA MID OCT 63.

2. RICO GALAN MET BY RAUL ALARCON MONSANTO GUAT CITY AND TAKEN TO INTERVIEW YON SOSA UNKNOWN SITE.

3. ALARCON PGT MILI TRNG LEADER STUDIED IN MEXI AND CUBA.

4. WILL POUCH DOCUMENT RICO GALAN YON SOSA INTERVIEW AND INFO ALARCON.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUSPECTED PERUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN MEXI JOURNALIST REPORTLY TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICAN ON MISSION FOR AMTHUG 1

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, FI, VR

Priest

1 Nov 63 IN 52518

S E C R E T 011730Z
DIR CITE MEXI 6750
REF MANA 4562([illegible]) *

VICTOR RICO GALAN PUBLISHED INTERVIEW WITH EX PRESIDENT VILLEDA MORALES IN CURRENT ISSUE SIEMPRE. STATION WILL BEGIN POUCHING SIEMPRE REGULARLY TO HQ.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPARENTLY WRONG REFERENCE.

SECRET

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file

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
093 **SECRET**
~~Oct 31 12 27 '63~~

ORIG. anne mc donnell
UNIT wh/3/panama
EXT. 6312
DATE 31 october 63

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

REC[illegible]BLE SECT.

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH 18

TDCS 3/563,672

INFORMATION COPIES
CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS 1, SAS 12

DATE DISTRIBUTED
31 OCTOBER 63

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE | PRIORITY

DISSEMINATION

WH/POA	1	WH/3/M	1	CI/ICG	2
WH/POB	1	WH/B/CR	2		
WH/R	1	WH/1/Y	1		
WH/7	1	WH/5	1		
WH/3/R	2	SAS/R	12		

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
PACY 1054 (IN 47784)
PACY 1087 (IN 49213)
MEXI 6723 (IN 50142)
NP (NYSAGE-1),
NYAB LIAISON

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/3 J. H. Galloway

COPY NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET /NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO/COSTA RICA/NICARAGUA/PANAMA/VENEZUELA/BRAZIL
REPORT NO. TDCS 3/563,671
SUBJECT TRAVEL AND MISSION OF ALLEGED CUBAN AGENT IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA
DATE DISTR. 31 OCTOBER 63
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO. 20-22 OCT 63
REFERENCES IN 50142
TDCS 3/563,137 47784
TDCS 3/562,990 49213
PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (24 OCT 63)
APPRAISAL
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PANAMANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN CUBA-ORIENTED LEFTIST CIRCLES OF PANAMA.

(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN, ARRIVED IN PANAMA FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. RICO GALAN IS A MARXIST, A WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA, MEXICAN MAGAZINES, AND IS THE HEAD OF THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN), A COMMUNIST-FRONT MOVEMENT HEAVILY INFILTRATED BY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IN OCTOBER 1962 RICO GALAN WENT TO CUBA TO PREPARE A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF FIDEL CASTRO. IN MAY 1963 HE AGAIN WENT TO CUBA, RETURNING TO MEXICO 22 JUNE 1963. DURING THIS LATTER VISIT HE REPORTEDLY INTERVIEWED CASTRO AFTER CASTRO'S RETURN FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO SPENT A FIVE-DAY SEA-GOING VACATION WITH CASTRO, OF WHOM HE IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE FRIEND. RICO GALAN HAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS HE HAD WITH COL. ENRIQUE PERALTA, GUATEMALAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET /NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	OO
STATE/CINCSO			FBI	I&NS	TREASURY											

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT, AND WITH MARCO ANTONIO YON SOSA, GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER.)

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN NEWSPAPERMAN WHO "RECENTLY" SPENT EIGHT DAYS IN CUBA ON "VACATION" WITH FIDEL CASTRO, WAS GIVEN AN ASSIGNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD TO VISIT COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, WHERE HE WAS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. RICO GALAN WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PERSUADE COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO UNIFY SO THAT THEIR WORK WILL HAVE GREATER IMPACT. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: RICO GALAN CLEARLY IMPLIED TO THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION THAT THE ASSIGNMENT HE IS NOW FULFILLING WAS GIVEN HIM IN JUNE 63.)

2. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HE HAD GONE FROM MEXICO TO GUATEMALA, WHERE HE MET WITH GOMEZ AYAY (FNU), A GUERRILLA LEADER WHOM HE ENCOURAGED TO BEGIN SABOTAGE AND VIOLENT ACTION. HE ALSO MADE A SIMILAR APPROACH TO A NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER RICO GALAN ACTUALLY VISITED NICARAGUA OR WHETHER HE SAW THIS PERSON IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.) IN COSTA RICA HE TALKED WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: EDUARDO MORA IS PRESENTLY IN COSTA RICA. HIS BROTHER, MANUEL MORA, LEFT COSTA RICA FOR THE USSR, VIA MEXICO, 29 SEPTEMBER 1963. BOTH ARE LEADERS OF THE COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY.) RICO GALAN ARRIVED IN PANAMA 22 OCTOBER FROM COSTA RICA AND LEFT PANAMA FOR CARACAS 22 OCTOBER 1963. IN CARACAS HE INTENDED TO CONTACT ARGELIA LAYA. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: PROBABLY ARGELIA LAYA DE MARTINEZ, [illegible]

TO THE VENEZUELAN CONGRESS AND WIFE OF RAFAEL E. MARTINEZ, LEADER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN - VENEZUELAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.)

3. IN PANAMA BETWEEN 20 -22 OCTOBER RICO GALAN CONTACTED HUGO VICTOR, PRESIDENT OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, A LEADER OF THE VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN - PRO-CUBAN, RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION). ON 24 OCTOBER A MEETING WAS HELD TO DISCUSS UNITY OF THE LEFT, COMMENCEMENT OF AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND A MERGER OF LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO THE ELECTIONS AS A BLOC SHOULD EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE ELECTIONS FAIL. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, ALVARO MENENDEZ FRANCO, THELMA KING, RENATO PEREIRA, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT, USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE PDP, REPORTED THE VISIT TO PANAMA OF "A CUBAN WRITER FOR SIEMPRE" WHO WAS ON A MISSION FOR THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE VISITOR WHOM SOURCE DID NOT IDENTIFY BY NAME URGED THE PDP AND THE VAN TO RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND UNITE. HIS PROPOSAL WAS VIOLENTLY REJECTED BY THE PDP, WHICH INTENDS TO PROTEST THE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

28/30 SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JOSE

ACTION: WH 8 (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1635 31 OCT BP)

INFO : DDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

31 Oct 63

SECRET 312015Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PACY CITE SJOS 6350

IN 51648

REF DIR 79062*

1. SUBJECT REF, TRAVELLING IN TRUE NAME WITH MEXICAN PASSPORT 53641, ARRIVED FROM MANA ON TACA FLIGHT 101, 17 OCTOBER. HE LEFT FOR PACY 20 OCTOBER ON PAA FLIGHT 501.

2. QUERYING HURUM-1 RE LOCAL CONTACTS.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR GALAN.

Priest

CS COPY

SECRET

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14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	S-E-C-R-E-T
TO	Chief, WH Division
INFO	Chief of Station, Mexico City HMM
FROM	Chief of Station, Managua Ewr
SUBJECT	✓ Victor F RICO Galan (201-336474)

PROCESSING ACTION	
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: FYI

References: a. DIR - 79062

b. MANA - 4563

MICROFILMED
NOV 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

re:

Attached are newspaper clippings and text of radio interview mentioned in reference b.

See doc for [illegible] info

Peter R. Nalesnik
Peter R. NALESNIK

DISTRIBUTION:

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2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

ATTACHMENTS:

2 copies text and newspaper clippings

INDEX-F

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HNMA - 3033	31 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S-E-C-R-E-T	201 -

(WHD)

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

ENTREVISTA HECHA EL DIA 24 DE OCTUBRE DE 1963 AL SR. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, [illegible] ACERCA DE CIERTOS CARGOS QUE SE LE HAN FORMULADO A TRAVES DE LA PRENSA Y LA RADIO NACIONAL CON RELACION A ASPECTOS DE LA POLITICA ACTUAL.-

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

P.- Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, qué hay de cierto con los cargos, graves por cierto, que se le han formulado a través de emisoras y a través de Radio Periódico, ciertos elementos políticos ?

R.- Bueno, eh, los cargos son absolutamente falsos, una vez que Ud. me pregunte concretamente acerca de cada uno de ellos, yo iré desvirtuándolos, eh, con dar a conocer la verdad, sin embargo me interesaría, eh, anticipar la opinión de mi Partido acerca de por qué se ha desatado en los últimos días una campaña tan intensa de difamación contra el Partido Movilización Republicana, nosotros entendemos que ésta campaña se debe a la incómoda posición en que ha quedado la reacción nacional por la adopción por parte de los jóvenes de la Universidad Católica de un programa revolucionario, en efecto, tanto la declaración de principios de los jóvenes de la UCA como sus réplicas contundentes a Don PABLO ANTONIO CUADRA, al propio rector de la UCA, el Dr. [illegible] RIVAS, hacen creer en la justeza de su planteamiento.- Ahora bien, el hecho de que esta juventud que ha sido acogida en un alero propiciado por los señores Somoza y los señores de la reacción nacional, esté levantando su voz adoptando un lenguaje revolucionario como el de todos los pueblos de América Latina y el hecho de que esa declaración de principios de los jóvenes de la Católica, tengan alguna similitud real con el programa político del Partido Movilización Republicana, es la causa verdadera para que se haya levantado toda esta tempestad contra el Partido, sin embargo, eh, no podemos nosotros evitar que por una necesidad histórica del desarrollo social de los pueblos Latinoamericanos, como por razones de juventud, los jóvenes de la Católica vayan despreciando lo viejo, lo que ya murió en la sociedad nicaragüense y vayan solidarizando con los Partidos que como Movilización Republicana, representan lo nuevo, lo progresista, el fenómeno moderno y revolucionario dentro de nuestro país.-

P.- Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, quiero informarle que Radio Informaciones dió un amplio reportaje sobre lo que ya se ha dado en llamar una grave crisis entre los [illegible] y también una acusación grave contra el [illegible], en primer lugar, qué hay con respecto al caso del joven [illegible] VILLA ?

R.- Lo que se ha llamado el caso del amigo [illegible] VILLA, no es más que su renuncia de la dirección del semanario MR. así como de la dirección nacional del Partido Movilización Republicana, por causas puramente particulares debido a las ocupaciones personales del Sr. [illegible], jamás ha existido con ALBERTO [illegible] VILLA ninguna pugna o discusión ideológica dentro del Partido Movilización Republicana, es una especulación totalmente [illegible] decir que [illegible] VILLA, se vá porque tiene una postura nacionalista porque todo el Partido MR. tiene una postura nacionalista, es absurdo decir que [illegible] VILLA se vá porque sostiene que el MR. no debe sujetarse a Moscú ni a Pekín, porque el Partido Movilización Republicana jamás aceptaría sujeciones a ninguna potencia extranjera, el Partido Movilización Republicana traza su política dentro de las fronteras nacionales, nosotros nos dirigimos por nosotros mismos, ahora bien, para demostrar lo [illegible] falsos de las discusiones [illegible] que según la Prensa tuvo [illegible] VILLA con ciertos miembros del Partido Movilización Republicana en la Asamblea del domingo próximo pasado, es hecho simple, [illegible] VILLA no concurrió, no asistió a esa reunión, de manera que jamás pudo tener esas supuestas discusiones cuando no asistió siquiera a dicha reunión.-

[illegible] HMMA-3233 IW 201-336474

P.- Paso a hacerle otra pregunta Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, pero antes quiero decirle, como previsto quiero informarle a Ud. si es que usted está mal informado de que esa información aparecida en varias informaciones, la cubrí yo y la cubrí en una parte tan cierta como que Ud. se llama Alvaro Ramírez Gonzalez, de esta cuestión de [illegible] incluso se me dijo los detalles que acerca de la polémica que había sostenido con varios miembros del MR. el cual, en el cual existía de que debía de tener el Partido MR. una posición nacionalista sin China Roja y sin Moscú y sin otra influencia, pero Ud. ya explicó esta pregunta y ahora paso a la siguiente.- Se dijo también de que había graves cargos contra los dirigentes del MR. por haber dejado en las montañas abandonados a los jóvenes que habían ido a luchar allí con las armas en las manos, qué hay de estos cargos, graves por cierto ?

R.- El Partido MR. no ha tenido jamás alianza, acuerdos o pactos alguno con el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, autor de las guerrillas en el Norte del País, por manera que no tenemos ningún compromiso con los guerrilleros, mal podría culpársele de haber abandonado a nadie en una empresa por la cual nosotros jamás hemos participado.-

P.- También como la anterior pregunta Sr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ quiero advertirle de que en entrevista que dió el Lic. [illegible] dijo que muchachos que formaban parte de Movilización Republicana se habían ido con el FLN. ahora también se tuvo conocimiento de que aquí había venido un señor llamado RICO GALAN representante de la revista o de la publicación "SIEMPRE" y la revista también o publicación llamada "POLITICA" considerada eminentemente en México como izquierdista, también se dijo que Ud. se había entrevistado en el cuarto #427
d del Gran Hotel con este señor RICO GALAN, privadamente, le advierto que esta información la obtuve Radio Informaciones en fuente de tanto crédito como le merece su palabra.-

R.- Bueno, le ya, sobre la cuestión anterior que Ud. insiste en vincular al MR. con movimientos guerrilleros, las cosas [illegible] no son, el hecho es que el MR. jamás ha tenido participación en ninguna insurrección en Nicaragua, no la ha tenido ese es un hecho cierto, el hecho de que algunos miembros jóvenes del MR. hayan participado en alguna actividad guerrillera es un hecho que escapa al control oficial del Partido.- En cuanto a la visita del periodista VICTOR RICO GALAN debo decirles que es otra de las truculencias que se han inventado en estos últimos días, VICTOR RICO GALAN es un periodista de envergadura continental muy reconocido en su país, México, él como otros muchos periodistas extranjeros que visitan Nicaragua, llegó a mi oficina a hacerme una entrevista, supe por él mismo que había tratado de entrevistar al presidente Schick, que había logrado entrevistar a los funcionarios de la Secretaría de Información y Prensa, que había recibido un homenaje de parte del embajador de México en Managua y que se había visto finalmente con diversas personalidades políticas que a él le interesaban para oir su opinión y formarse un juicio acerca acerca de la situación política de Nicaragua, por otra parte el mismo diario La Nación le hizo una entrevista a VICTOR RICO GALAN sobre los últimos acontecimientos acaecidos en la República de Honduras, de manera que sus pasos por Nicaragua no tiene nada de clandestino ni de extraordinario, la revista "SIEMPRE" de la cual él es representante es una revista que solo por ignorancia o por mala fé, se puede calificar de un órgano izquierdista, cualquiera persona que haya estado en México y que haya ido ahí, pués con uso de razón, podrá darse cuenta de que "SIEMPRE" es una publicación completamente equilibrada, quiero decir con esto, de que en esa revista se publica tanto tesis de derecha como tesis de izquierda y que frecuentemente en esa revista VICTOR RICO GALAN ha expresado el pensamiento oficial del Gobierno Mexicano, en la revista "POLITICA", en, de la cual tengo aquí un número, puedo mostrarle que aparece precisamente un artículo de VICTOR RICO GALAN en que defiende la política exterior del presidente LOPEZ MATEOS, de manera...

R.- [illegible] que a este periodista se le puede calificar de cualquier cosa [illegible] de agente extranjero, ahora que él me entrevistó es un hecho que tuvimos intercambio de impresiones acerca de la situación nacional sin que éstas tengan nada de secreto y sin que tengan carácter de un convenio político que venía a pedir cuentas al Partido PP. como lo ha dicho algún periódico, esto es un absurdo que no tiene ninguna base cierta.-

P.- Le agradezco Sr. [illegible] contestación, pero antes de formularle la última pregunta quisiera que me contestara categóricamente, lo visitó Ud. en el Gran Hotel o no lo visitó, además quiero advertirle que no somos ni Radio Informaciones ni los periodistas nacionales los que hemos dado el [illegible] de extrema izquierda a las publicaciones que hace el Sr. [illegible], sino que son los diarios periódicos de México los que han dicho tal cosa, quisiera Ud. que me contestara la pregunta que me acaba de formular.-

R.- Como le dejo, el Sr. éste periodista me pidió una entrevista y me accedí a ella, resulta que él vino [illegible] tuvo conmigo pero su desconocimiento de la ciudad no podía localizar mi oficina y yo me ofrecí para pasar a buscarlo al Gran Hotel, así, simplemente lo fuí a buscar, él se vino conmigo a mi oficina, aquí estuvo alrededor de una hora y media y eso es todo lo que ha acontecido.-

P.- Es cierto [illegible] ha confirmado la noticia de que habló con él, por eso no nos da derecho a nosotros de especular en ninguna forma, está claro, pero en esa parte sí fué exacta Radio Informaciones.- Con respecto a la pregunta última, es lo siguiente. En la entrevista del día domingo realizada en algún punto de [illegible], que ignoraron periodistas y la ciudadanía en general, [illegible], o mejor dicho sus dirigentes políticos, tomaron una serie de acuerdos y resoluciones que no son del conocimiento público, en esa entrevista yo le ruego a mi estimado caballero, que tenga la gentileza de explicarnos a grosso modo cuáles son esas resoluciones ?

R.- La reunión que realizó el Partido [illegible] en un lugar de [illegible] se realizó en forma privada como ya es sabido por razones que nosotros lamentamos, porque nosotros habíamos pensado primitivamente realizar esa reunión nacional del Partido PP. en la misma forma en que se han realizado las anteriores, es decir en forma pública con acceso a los periodistas, ésa es nuestra conducta tradicional porque no tenemos nada que ocultar al pueblo [illegible], sin embargo en días pasados, la noche anterior de la fecha fijada para esta reunión que se iba a verificar hace poco más de un mes, la noche anterior como digo, a la realización de la reunión de [illegible] se había fijado como punto de reunión [illegible] nosotros interpretamos este hecho como una amenaza de enemigos del Partido [illegible] el desarrollo de la reunión, como nosotros no disponemos de medios para impedir esa clase de agresiones, decidimos dos cosas, en primer lugar postergar la fecha de la reunión y en segundo lugar realizarla en forma privada por una cuestión de elemental prudencia, no es [illegible] como se ha dicho de que nosotros quisiéramos ocultar [illegible] de las decisiones o la forma con que se ha especulado, porque [illegible] no existe, la reunión [illegible] la situación política nacional [illegible] así como examinar la situación crítica [illegible] por la [illegible] de una serie [illegible] su relación con este [illegible] la situación nacional [illegible] política ya [illegible] es decir [illegible] frente [illegible] nacional [illegible]

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8.- ...para abrir pláticas en tal sentido en los demás partidos opositores, por otra parte se trataron asuntos rutinarios de organización interna del Partido y de financiamientos de nuestro semanario ... que había pasado dificultades económicas, pero que con el aporte que ofrecieron los Delegados de todos los Departamentos se han solucionado y volverá aparecer el sábado próximo.

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Carta del Dr. Alvaro Ramírez sobre la crisis en su Partido

Señor
Don Róger Mendieta Alfaro,
Director del Diario
LA NACION,
Managua, D.N.

Estimado señor Director:

Con pena he leído en el Diario que usted dirige, en la edición de hoy, la información falsa que bajo las ocho columnas de "grave cisma en el MR" ofrece a sus lectores, toda vez que sus reporteros me habían entrevistado y en lugar de publicar la realidad de las cosas le dieron un folletín falso y tendencioso.

Digo con pena, porque hasta la presente ocasión, el Diario LA NACION había mantenido respecto a nuestro Partido actitud de respeto y tolerancia seguramente recíproca a nuestra posición frente al agüerismo y porque para romper tal statu quo no era necesario recurrir a la calumnia y a la injuria.

Mi partido no puede dejar sin respuesta negativa y enfática la aseveración que en dicho escrito hace LA NACION en el sentido de que algunos miembros de "MR" habrían lanzado la acusación contra nuestra dirigencia de ser responsable de la muerte de los guerrilleros en Río Bocay por haberles cortado la ayuda de nuestro Partido. Cuando se sabe muy bien los nombres y apellidos de los autores de esas muertes, resulta una infamia acusar al Partido Movilización Republicana de actos por los cuales no puede responder, ni por acción, ni por omisión. Es lo cierto que "MR" jamás ha prestado ninguna ayuda al movimiento insurreccional que actualmente se "bate desesperadamente en las montañas de Jinotega y otros sectores del Norte", según "LA NACION", debido a que no tenemos ni hemos tenido jamás ningún acuerdo con el "Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional". El MR sostiene una postura muy clara respecto del problema insurreccional, pues considera que como partido político no tiene capacidad actualmente para mezclarse en una lucha de esa naturaleza, y no ve perspectivas de éxito a tal clase de lucha en las actuales circunstancias. Esto no significa que neguemos el derecho de los guerrilleros a emprender la clase de lucha que estimen conveniente, ni mucho menos que no nos duela la muerte de varios estudiantes universitarios y otros jóvenes en circunstancias que habían sido hecho prisioneros, lo que nos llena de indignación y nos mueve a solidarizarnos con la protesta enérgica de los estudiantes de Nicaragua y otros sectores democráticos del país. En consecuencia, es completamente absurdo suponer, como lo hace LA NACION, que el periodista mexicano Víctor Rico Galán, haya venido a pedirnos rendición de cuentas a nosotros sobre las guerrillas del Norte, pues somos ajenos a tal movimiento y nuestra política la trazamos nosotros mismos y jamás dependemos de ninguna influencia extranjera. Una Revolución no podrá importarse de ninguna parte, y solamente será posible cuando el pueblo nicaragüense decida hacerla, entonces y solamente entonces "MR" ocupará el sitio que le señale su deber patriótico.

El periodista Rico Galán me entrevistó en mi Oficina; es cosa frecuente que hacen numerosos periodistas extranjeros que visitan el país, y las respuestas que di a sus preguntas periodísticas sobre la realidad nacional no tienen nada de secretas ni de clandestinas, bien pudieran ser dichas en una plaza pública. La Revista "Siempre" que él representa no corresponde a la realidad. Cualquiera, que no sea un ignorante sobre el periodismo mexicano podrá saber que "Siempre" es vehículo de información [illegible] de izquierda a [illegible] por tanto al Lic. Emilio Portes Gil como a Lombardo Toledano. Sé, porque así me lo relató él mismo, que cuando pasó por Managua Rico Galán trató de entrevistar, sin fortuna, al Presidente Schick y logró entrevistar a varias personalidades políticas cuya opinión le interesaba para formarse un criterio sobre la situación de Nicaragua, inclusive recibió alguna atención del Señor Embajador de México, y departió con los funcionarios de la Secretaría de Información [illegible] finalmente la [illegible] LA NACION le [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sobre las últimas [illegible]

Pasa a la 2ª Pág. Letra Y

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[illegible] cesa de Honduras. ¿Qué de misteriosa tiene el paso por Nicaragua? ¿A qué puede hacer creer a LA NACION que ese señor haya venido a regañar al MR?

Todo lo aseverado respecto del "caso" de Everts Vélez no pasa de ser producto de la mente calenturienta de sus reporteros. Jamás ha existido discusión alguna con el amigo Everts sobre la "pugna chino-soviética" pues hemos considerado en MR que tal problema es de la incumbencia exclusiva de los partidos comunistas, y si nos interesa, como a cualquier ser humano, es por el impacto que la política de dichos partidos tiene en todos los países del mundo. La verdad al respecto es que Evertz se ha retirado de la Dirección del semanario MR así como de la Dirección Nacional de nuestro Partido debido a sus ocupaciones personales.

Es lamentable que el diario LA NACION haya tomado parte en la campaña difamatoria levantada en los últimos días contra el Partido Movilización Republicana, pues la causa eficiente de esta campaña que no ha trepidado en utilizar medios vedados por la ética periodística, no es otra que la [illegible] de la reacción ante la posición ideológica adoptada por los jóvenes estudiantes de la Universidad Católica. Tanto la Declaración de Principios de estos jóvenes como sus réplicas al señor Rector de dicha Universidad a don Pablo Antonio Cuadra, al Dr. [illegible] Rivas y a cuantos han osado contrade

círculos han impuesto un silencio tan sepulcral que obliga a reconocer la justeza de su tesis, y como estas tesis revolucionarias de los jóvenes estudiantes de la UCA están emparentadas con los objetivos del Partido Movilización Republicana por coincidencia biológica y por necesidad histórica, la reacción ha creído necesario arremeter contra nuestro partido, sabedora de que las nuevas generaciones le han dado las espaldas definitivamente a lo viejo y caduco de nuestra sociedad, y hacen causa común con los partidos que como "MR" representan lo nuevo y lo progresista. No se escapa a nuestra comprensión que la desmesurada campaña de desprestigio trazada en torno al Partido Movilización Republicana, está vinculada a los esfuerzos de ciertos círculos conservadores, ultraderechistas que deseando opacar al Dr. Agüero y truncar su trayectoria política, desean llevar al Partido Conservador hacia un colaboracionismo servil con el régimen gobernante, ellos se dan cuenta y el pueblo nicaragüense lo sabe, que el Partido Movilización Republicana es un [illegible] contra la política [illegible] y por eso nos agreden.

Suplico a usted la publicación íntegra de la presente en LA NACION periódico [illegible] objetividad y espíritu democrático, quisiéramos [illegible] inalterable.

Agradeciendo de antemano la publicación de la presente me es grato suscribir.

Atto. y S. S.

Dr. ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ.

Secretario General del Partido Movilización Republicana.

Golpe contra Villeda Morales fue propinado por la Misión Militar

Declara un periodista mexicano

"El golpe de Estado que dió al traste con el Gobierno del Dr. Villeda Morales en Honduras, no fue producto del Ejército hondureño, sino que fue una acción directa de la Misión Militar Norteamericana residente en Tegucigalpa, obedeciendo órdenes del Pentágono", dijo ayer martes el periodista mexicano Victor Rico Galán, Redactor de la Revista [illegible] pre y quien [illegible] [illegible] por [illegible] [illegible] escala en la República de Venezuela.

El periodista Rico Galán expresó [illegible] [illegible] te la República de Honduras, donde pudo observar que [illegible] [illegible] al Presidente Villeda, el Coronel [illegible] [illegible] Arellano tuvo [illegible] [illegible] en conferencias con los demás Ejércitos Centroamericanos donde se decidieron las medidas militares encaminadas a presionar a los Gobiernos Civiles".

Luego dijo [illegible] la República de El Salvador actualmente no hay necesidad de un golpe de Estado, para el Presidente Coronel Julio A. Rivera [illegible] bajo la presión militar de los Jefes de la Guardia Civil y de Policía.

Pasa a última Pag. Letra A

de los Estados Unidos".

Luego refiriéndose a la política de su patria México, dijo: "Desde luego en México no existe el latifundismo como existe en Centroamérica, ni mucho menos, pero hay grandes problemas fundamentalmente en el campo, sobre todo en lo relativo a la organización adecuada de la explotación, del crédito y de la Comercialización, que una buena parte está en manos de empresas norteamericanas, como las algodoneras y otras".

El periodista Rico Galán manifestó: "El caso de los campesinos en México es, que éstos tienen tierras para trabajar, pero no son dueños de su producción, y las más de las veces tienen que vender sus cosechas por adelantado a precios explotadores".

Sin embargo, el periodista Rico Galán calificó al Presidente López Mateos como perteneciente en política a "centro izquierdismo" descalificándolo de reaccionario, como lo han tildado en otros países".

El señor Víctor Rico Galán concluyó diciendo en su entrevista al redactor Cole Chamorro que el "Tapadismo en México consiste esencialmente en la designación de un candidato presidencial, escogido en secreto o totalmente por los [illegible] del único partido actualmente permitido, por lo que la elección presidencial no se efectúa a través de un movimiento electoral popular [illegible]

El periodista Víctor Rico Galán, Redactor de la Revista Mexicana "SIEMPRE", quien pasó ayer por Managua rumbo a Venezuela, [illegible] el [illegible] Coronel Eduardo Casanova".

El señor Rico Galán dijo también [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] tares habían [illegible] con la [illegible] del régimen de Villeda Morales [illegible] [illegible] lo que [illegible] en Centro América [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MANAGUA
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 311625Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE MANA 4562 X

31 Oct 63 IN 51493

REF: DIR 79062

1. VICTOR RICO GALAN ARRIVED MANA 13 OCT VIA PAN AM FLT 501 FROM MEXI. HE LEFT MANA FOR SAN JOSE ON 17 OCT VIA TACA FLT 101. ACCORDING IMMIGRATION RECORDS, RICO BORN 6 FEB 1928 AT EL FERROL, SPAIN. ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY IS PROVIDENCIA 930. IMMIGRATION RECORDS SHOW HE ENTERED NICARAGUA WITH MEXICAN PASSPORT NUMBER 16897, BUT LEFT USING MEXICAN PP NUMBER 53641, ISSUED 9 SEPT 63. (PROBABLE ONE OF NUMBERS IS PP NUMBER AND OTHER IS REGISTRATION.)

2. RICO STAYED GRAN HOTEL, ROOM NUMBER 407, WHILE MANA. HIS VISIT WIDELY PUBLICIZED AND HE GAVE INTERVIEWS LOCAL PRESS. MET WITH VARIOUS NIC OFFICIALS FROM MINISTRY OF PRESS AND RECEIVED BY MEXICAN AMBASSADOR. HE SOUGHT INTERVIEW WITH PRES SCHICK, BUT LATTER DID NOT GRANT INTERVIEW.

3. UNABLE DEVELOP INFO RE VISIT WITH UNIDENTIFIED GUERRILLA LEADER MENTIONED REF, BUT RICO DID MEET ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH ALVARO RAMIREZ GONZALEZ, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF MOVILIZACION REPUBLICANA (MR-COMMIE POLITICAL FRONT) WHO ALSO MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE NIC COMMIE PARTY (PSN). HIS VISIT WITH RAMIREZ GIVEN PUBLICITY PRESS AND RADIO AS SECRET MEETING IN RICO'S HOTEL ROOM. RAMIREZ ANSWERED BY WRITING

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

LETTERS TO PAPERS SAYING HE MET RICO OPENLY IN HIS OFFICE AND THAT RICO HAD CALLED ON HIM BECAUSE HE JOURNALIST SEEKING INTERVIEWS VARIOUS POLITICAL FIGURES. ON 24 OCT RAMIREZ INTERVIEWED ON RADIO AND WHEN PINNED DOWN, ADMITTED THAT HE WENT RICO'S HOTEL ROOM, BUT SAID PURPOSE WAS TO TAKE RICO TO HIS OFFICE.

4. CLIPPINGS RE VISIT RICO BEING POUCHED HQS AND MEXI.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICA ON MISSION AMT HUG-1.

14-00000

Action Copy

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

file

S E C R E T 300108Z

PACY INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6723 [redacted]

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] ZAKNICK HYSAGE

10 OCT 63 IN 50142

REF: PACY 1033 (IN 46190)

PACY 1087 (IN 49215)

VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN OF SPANISH ORIGIN IS MARXIST WRITER FOR SIEMPRE AND POLITICA BOTH BIG CIRCULATION AND EFFECTIVE COMMY LINING MAGAZINES. HEADS PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE FOR MLN WHICH COMMY FRONT MOVEMENT RATHER THAN PARTY AND WHOSE LEADERSHIP IS HEAVILY PCM INFILTRATED. OCT 62 WENT CUBA TO WRITE CASTRO POLITICAL BIOG. JUNE 63 INTERVIEWED CASTRO IN CUBA AFTER RETURN FROM MOSCOW. RECENTLY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS WITH GEN PERALTA IN GUAT AND WITH YAN SOSA, ANTI-REGIME GUERRILLA LEADER. CHECKING BACK TO EARLY OCT SHOWS NO RECORD HIS TRAVEL TO OR FROM PANAMA. STATION HAS EXTENSIVE FILE ON RICO GALAN.

S E C R E T

CS COPY

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZRKNICK.

**CUBAN WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE" ARRIVED PACY.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Anne McDonnell
UNIT : WH/3/CAS ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6312 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 Oct 1963 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-3373

SECRET

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29 OCT 63 15:

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, ADDP, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

SIG CEN
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY MEXI, INFO
GUAT, MANA, SJOS, RIOD,
RECI, SAOP, PACY

CITE DIR 79062

1. SUSPECTED PBRUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN JOURNALIST, DPOB 6 FEB 20, EL FERROL, MEXI, APPARENTLY USING MATRONYMIC, REPORTEDLY TRAVELLING CENTRAL, SOUTH AMERICA ON MISSION FOR AMTHUG-1. RICO GALAN LEFT PACY FOR CARA 22 OCT.

2. FOR MEXI: RICO GALAN REPORTEDLY RECENTLY SPENT EIGHT DAYS PBRUMEN ON "VACATION" WITH AMTHUG-1, DURING WHICH TIME HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT ON WHICH HE NOW TRAVELLING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN LEFTIST, HE IS ABLE TRAVEL BECAUSE HAS SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXI GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXI EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. GALAN'S MISSION TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THESE IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. GALAN HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING BETTER UNITY AMONG COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO ENSURE GREATER IMPACT THEIR WORK. TO CONTACT IN PACY GALAN

Continued

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :	☐ INDEX	ROUTING	
UNIT :	☐ NO INDEX	1	4
EXT :	☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.	2	5
DATE :		3	6

15:

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

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INFO :

☐ DEFERRED

☐ ROUTINE

PAGE 2

TO INFO CITE DIR 79062

GAVE FOLLOWING ITINERARY BUT NO DATES: FROM MEXI TO GUAT: GUAT TO MANA: MANA TO SJOS: SJOS TO PACY: PACY TO CARA: CARA TO BRAZIL.

3. FOR GUAT: IN GUAT GALAN MET WITH GUERRILLA LEADER GOMEZ AYAU (FNU).

FOR MANA: GALAN MET WITH UNIDENTIFIED GUERRILLA LEADER.

FOR SJOS: MET WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS.

~~[illegible]~~

FOR RIOD, SAOP, RECI: GALAN TO MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. GALAN MENTIONED PRESENCE CUBA WIFE AND FAMILY JULIAO TO JULIAO'S ADVANTAGE.

4. REQUEST, GUAT, MANA, SJOS, ~~CARA~~ CONFIRM DATES ARR AND DEPARTURE GALAN AND ALL POSSIBLE INFO RE CONTACTS. REQUEST BRAZIL CONFIRM DATES ARR AND DEPARTURE AND MONITOR CONTACTS. CABLE REPLY REQUESTED. WITH INFO TO PACY.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB-
AC/WH/3
C/WH/5

T. KARAMESSINES
ADD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WH/D
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ROUTING	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5 (WH COPY SLOTTED AT 1410, 28 OCT 63 (P)

INFO ,DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

300

S E C R E T 281531Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 1084

DESENSITIZED [illegible] PBRUMEN HYSAGE

28 OCT 63 IN 49013

REF PACY 8054 (IN 47784)

FOLLOWING INFO OBTAINED HYSAGE-1 MEETING 24 OCTOBER INADVERTENTLY OMITTED REF:

VICTOR RICO GALAN TOLD HYSAGE THAT BLAS ROCA PLANS MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT CAPTURE CONTROL SINCE HE BELIEVES POSITION AMTHUG-1 HAS WEAKENED TO POINT THAT PROSPECTS PROMISING FOR SUCCESS. HYSAGE DID NOT PROVIDE ORIGINAL SOURCE THIS INFO, BUT INDICATED ~~IT~~ IT SOURCE CONCERN TO RICO GALAN.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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Copy No.

14-00000

25 Oct 63

F. COLE
ADC/WH/3
5515
23 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

CARACAS PANAMA CITY

(IMMEDIATE) CARA PACY

DESENSITIZED

PERUMEN

REF: A. PACY 1058 (IN 47963) NOT SENT CARA

B. PACY 1054 (IN 47796) NOT SENT CARA

1. PERUMEN AGENT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN CITIZEN, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEB 1930 AT EL FERROL, MEXICO, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 936, MEXICO D.F. DEPARTED PANAMA 23 OCT VIA PAA FLT NO. 319 FOR CARACAS. MANIFEST FOR FLT. NO. 319 LISTED HIM UNDER PATRONYMIC GALAN.

2. REF B. STATED IN PART GALAN TRAVELLING THRU CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA WITH MISSION PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THEM IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. POSSIBLY HAS SOME ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH GIVES HIM SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMBASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. GALAN CONTACT IN VENEZUELA MAY BE ONE ARGELIA LAYA.

3. REQUEST CARA DEVELOP ALL POSSIBLE INFO CONCERNING GALAN ACTIVITIES.

FRED COLE by direction of WM. H. HOOD, C/WH/COP

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION : C/WH 5 (MR COLE , WH NOTIFIED AND TEMPO COPY SLOTTED 1950, 25 OCT DD)

INFO : DOP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

S E C R E T 251956Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE PACY 1058

25Oct63 IN 47963

DESENSITIZED

[illegible] SAGE

REF: PACY 1054 (IN 47784)

1. TRAVEL RECORDS IDENTIFY PBRUMEN AGENT REPORTED REF AS VICTOR RICO GALAN, CITIZEN MEXICO, NEWSPAPERMAN, BORN 6 FEBRUARY 1928 AT EL FERROL, PERMANENT ADDRESS PROVIDENCIA 930, MEXICO, D.F. ARRIVED PACY BY AIR FROM COSTA RICA ON 20 OCTOBER 63, USING PATRONYMIC RICO IN PREPARATION LANDING CARD. MANIFEST FOR PAA FLIGHT 515 LISTED HIM UNDER PATRONYMIC,

GALAN, AS PASSENGER WHO LEFT FOR CARACAS, VENEZUELA, ON 22 OCTOBER.

2. HQS REQUESTED ALERT CARACAS.

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CS COPY

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

34 SECRET

ROUTING	
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PANAMA CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5* (WH COPY SLOTTED 1515 25 OCT LMG)

INFO : ADDP, DDP, C/CI, C/FI/D 4, C/SAS, RF, VR

S E C R E T 251602Z

25 OCT 63 IN 47784

PRIORITY DIR CITE PACY 1054

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT/HYSAGE

REF PACY 1033 (IN 46190) KK

1. DURING MEETING 24 OCTOBER HYSAGE-1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATION AND CLARIFICATION ROLE OF MEXICAN JOURNALIST, RICO GALAN:

A. GALAN, CONTRARY TO HYSAGE EARLIER STATEMENTS, RECENTLY SPENT EIGHT DAYS PBRUMEN ON "VACATION" WITH AMTHUR-1, DURING WHICH TIME HE RECEIVED OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT ON WHICH HE NOW TRAVELING THROUGH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. ALTHOUGH WELL KNOWN LEFTIST, HE IS ABLE TO TRAVEL BECAUSE HE HAS SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, DETAILS OF WHICH NOT CLEAR TO HYSAGE. ARRANGEMENT GIVES GALAN SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FROM MEXICAN EMASSIES IN PLACES HE VISITS. HYSAGE COMMENTED THAT MANY MEXICAN AMABASSADORS WILL BE ANGRY WHEN THEY LEARN HOW THEY HAVE BEEN USED GALAN.

B. GALANS MISSION IS TO PERSUADE LEFTIST PARTIES IN COUNTRIES HE VISITS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY ACTS SABOTAGE AND VIOLENCE AND TO TRY MAINTAIN THESE IN ORDER TAKE PRESSURE OFF VENEZUELA. GALAN HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING BETTER UNITY AMONG COMPETING LEFTIST FACTIONS TO ENSURE GREATER IMPACT THEIR WORK. IN THE CASE OF PANAMA, IN ADDITION FOREMENTIONED INSTRUCT.ONS, GALAN WAS TOLD

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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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TO INSTRUCT HYSAGE THAT SHE IS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NATIONAL COALITION PARTY AND OVERTLY JOIN ONE OF THE LEFTIST PARTIES, OR TRY TO FORM NEW ONE. THE INSTRUCTION IS CLEAR THAT THE LEFT IS TO GET TOGETHER. HYSAGE WAS ALSO AGAIN ENJOINED TO GET HER SON OUT OF PBPRIME. AFTER HEARING THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT GALAN HAD RE UNITY, HYSAGE TOLD GALAN THAT SHE, AS A WOMAN, COULD NOT ACCOMPLISH ALL THIS AND SHE DID IN FACT DECIDE TO BRING TOGETHER HUGO ALEJANDRO VICTOR, HER CLOSEST FRIEND IN PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP, PEOPLES PARTY COMMUNIST) AND DAVID TURNER, LEADER OF VANGUARD OF NATIONAL ACTION (VAN). (COMMENT: HER REMARKS INDICATED THAT SHE DID NOT INCLUDE JORGE TURNER BECAUSE HE IS APPARENTLY SERIOUSLY ILL). GALAN URGED VICTOR AND TURNER, AS REPRESENTATIVES THEIR RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, TO MAKE NEW EFFORT TO SETTLE DIFFERENCES TO BRING ABOUT A MORE COORDINATED EFFORT. AS RESULT OF GALANS VISIT, MEETING TOOK PLACE AT NOON ON 24 OCTOBER FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING UNITY, AGGRESSIVE ACTION, AND MERGER OF ALL LEFTIST UNITS TO GO TO ELECTIONS AS A BLOC IF ATTEMPTS TO STOP ELECTIONS SHOULD FAIL. THIS MEETING ATTENDED BY VICTOR, CARLOS DEL CID, RENATO PEREIRA, THELMA KING, ALVARO MENENDEZ, AND TWO UNIDENTIFIED STUDENTS. ALSO DURING MEETING "NEGRO" MARTINEZ, A PROFESSOR OF SPANISH AT UNIVERSITY, WHOM HYSAGE IDENTIFIED AS MEMBER OF COMMUNIST PARTY SECRET APARAT, CALLED VICTOR ASIDE FOR SHORT CONVERSATION. (COMMENT: BELIEVE THIS MAY BE JOSE DE JESUS MARTINEZ, PHILOSOPHY PROFESSOR UNIVERSITY). HYSAGE HEARD PART OF CONVERSATION WHICH WAS TO EFFECT THAT, AS REGARDS COORDINATION AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS, A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRET APARAT AND CENTRAL

COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE ON 29 OCTOBER AT A PLACE ON THIRTEENTH STREET. HYSAGE SAID THAT, REALIZING IMPORTANCE OF MEETING, SHE TRIED TO GET ADDRESS AND WENT SO FAR AS TO ASK VICTOR IF SHE COULD BE INVITED ATTEND. VICTOR TOLD HER THAT, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE FRIENDS, SHE IS NOT MEMBER OF PARTY AND CANNOT EXPECT ATTEND HIGH LEVEL SECRET SESSIONS THIS SORT.

C. AS RESULT THIS MEETING, DECISION WAS TAKEN, APPARENTLY BY HYSAGE, TO BEGIN ACTS OF VIOLENCE IMMEDIATELY. (COMMENT: THIS WAS EXTRACTED FROM HER AFTER FIVE HOURS OF INTENSIVE INTERROGATION WHICH BROUGHT HER PRACTICALLY TO POINT OF TEARS. LEADING UP TO THIS SHE KEPT SAYING THAT IT WAS TO LATE FOR HER TO DO THE THINGS SHE WANTED FOR POPULAR REFORM. PONCHAY KEPT IT ON THIS POINT AND SHE FINALLY BROKE DOWN AND ADMITTED SHE HAD GIVEN THIS ORDER AND THAT AT THE MOMENT THEY WERE TALKING, MENENDEZ, ONE VICTOR (COMMENT: POSSIBLY VAUGHAN), AND SEVERAL OTHERS WERE ENGAGED IN MAKING MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AND HOMEMADE BOMBS OF SOME SORT. SHE SAID TARGETS STARTING THE NIGHT OF 24 OCTOBER THROUGH THE NEXT WEEK WERE SUPPOSED TO BE PBPRIME EMBASSY, PBPRIME INDUSTRIES, CANAL ZONE, PBPRIME CONSULATE IN COLON, AND THE VENEZUELAN CONSULATE IN COLON. PONCHAY TOLD HER HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT SHE WAS REALLY IN CHARGE OF THESE MATTERS BECAUSE OF OTHER THINGS HE KNEW, BUT GAVE HER A SEVERE VERBAL LASHING FOR PERMITTING THIS TO GET THIS FAR WITHOUT TELLING HIM. HE EXTRACTED PROMISE FROM HER THAT SHE WOULD DO EVERYTHING HER POWER TO PREVENT ACTION AGAINST PBPRIME INSTALLATIONS. SHE SAID, AND AGAIN APPEARED TO BE TELLING THE TRUTH BECAUSE SHE WAS UNDER THE MOST INTENSIVE PRESSURE PONCHAY HAS EVER SUBJECTED HER TO, THAT SHE WOULD TRY TO HOLD OFF ACTION AGAINST PBPRIME EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES. SHE SAID SHE WAS CERTAIN SHE COULD NOT STOP THE ACTION AGAINST THE VENEZUELAN CONSULATE WHICH WAS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR NIGHT 24 OCTOBER, AND PONCHAY TOLD HER NOT TO TRY TO STOP THAT ACTION. (COMMENT: THIS PORTION OF INFO RE PLANS FOR VIOLENCE WAS DISSEMINATED VERBALLY TO LOCAL AGENCIES. ODTEST CONFIRMS THAT MOLOTOV COCKTAIL WAS THROWN AT VENEZUELAN CONSULATE COLON AT 0040 ON 25 OCTOBER.)

D. GALAN WAS ALSO TOLD TO GET FROM HYSAGE FOR DELIVERY TO AMTHUG-1 IMMEDIATELY, A STATEMENT IN HER OWN HANDWRITING SIGNED BY HER THAT SHE WILL ACCEPT NO FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM THE OLIGARCHY.

E. IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH HYSAGE, GALAN GAVE HIS ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS, HOWEVER, HYSAGE DOES NOT KNOW DATES:

FROM MEXICO HE TRAVELED GUATEMALA WHERE HE MET WITH GUERRILLA LEADER GOMEZ AYAU (FNU). HE GAVE HIM THE PITCH FOR ACTION.

HE HAD SIMILAR MEETING WITH NICARAGUAN GUERRILLA LEADER WHOSE NAME HYSAGE TRIED FOR TEN MINUTES RECALL WITHOUT SUCCESS.

GALAN THEN TRAVELED COSTA RICA AND MET WITH ONE OF THE MORA BROTHERS. FROM PANAMA HE INTEDED TRAVEL VENEZUELA WHERE HIS CONTACT WAS TO BE ARGELIA LAYA. HYSAGE DID NOT BELIEVE HE INTENDED GO COLOMBIA, BUT SAID HE WOULD PROCEED BRAZIL WHERE HE PLANNED MEET WITH PRESTES AND JULIAO. HYSAGE COMMENTED THAT GALAN POINTED OUT TO HER JULIAOS PRIME ADVANTAGE IN THE REVOLUTION, I.E., FACT THAT JULIAOS WIFE AND FAMILY IN CUBA WHERE THEY SAVE. GALAN INDICATED THAT HYSAGE WOULD BE WISE DO THE SAME THING. (COMMENT: HYKICK-2 AND HYJADE-1 HAVE BOTH REPORTED ON RECENT VISIT OF UNIDENTIFIED FOREIGNER.)

2. HYSAGE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PEOPLE AS IMPORTANT IN PANAMA COMMUNIST PARTY APARAT:

CAMILO PEREZ, A LAWYER (COMMENT: PEREZ REPORTED HZP-4384 AS MEMBER SUSPECTED PDP FRONT GROUP. HAS ALSO VISITED PBRUMEN). ~~KVX~~NUNEZ ZARZAVILLA OF THE FILY LA HORA. (COMMENT: PROBABLY RAUL NUNEZ ZARAVILLA MENTIONED HZPA-11329 AND HZP-4169).

3. HYSAGE SAID SHE HAD REASON BELIEVE THAT SHE NOW KNEW SUCCESSOR OF DIOGENES ALBERTO PINO. AS IN THE PAST, SHE SAID COULD NOT MENTION HIS NAME BUT WOULD PROVIDE ENOUGH LEADS TO PERMIT PONCHAY FIGURE OUT HIS IDENTIFY. OVER A PERIOD OF AN HOUR, SHE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING LEADS: THAT HE WORKS FOR CHIARI FAMILY, HAD BEEN A CLOSE FRIEND OF PINOS IN HIS YOUTH AND HAD BEEN PHOTOGRAPHED WITH A PROMINENT MEXICAN JOURNALIST WHO HAD BEEN PHOTOGRAPHED LEAVING AIRPORT IN PANAMA SOME MONTHS AGO AFTER MAKING SOME PRO CASTRO STATEMENTS. THINKING THIS OVER, PONCHAY SAID HE THOUGHT SHE MUST BE TALKING ABOUT SOMEONE CONNECTED WITH CHIARI RADIO AND TELEVISION NETWORKS. SHE CONCEEDED THIS WAS CORRECT, AND MENTIONED VARIOUS PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH TELEVISION STATION IN SUCH MANNER THAT IT APPEARS MOST PROBABLY SHE WAS TALKING ABOUT RODOLFO GARCIA DE PAREDES OR LUIS ESTRIBI. STATION IS CHECKING FURTHER.

4. REQUEST HQS RELAY APPROPRIATE PORTIONS OTHER STATIONS AS DESIRED.

SECRET

C/S COMMENTS: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZRKNICK CABLES.

**HYSAGE-1 REPORTED 22 OCT THAT RICO GALAN PBRUMEN AGENT ARRIVED PANAMA FROM BRAZIL OR VENEZUELA.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

201-003373
PACY-01033
23 OCT 63

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CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MARXIST JOURNALIST FOR MEXICAN MAGAZINE TIEMPO, POSS IDEN W/A RICO GALAN - WHO ALLEGEDLY HAS COVERT CONNECTION W/CASTRO AND CLANDESTINE MEETINGS W/CP LEADERS IN PANAMA

$HMM

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~~03 OCT~~

15.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-61)

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

REPORT: [illegible]-7746

FROM: Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT: 17 September 1963

REPORTING OFFICER: Jeremy K. [illegible]

RD. NO.: P-7354

REPORTS OFFICER: Portin L. [illegible]

PROJ.: LIFEAT

APPROVING OFFICER: Willard C. CURTIS

S'CE CR.: LIFEAT

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS

2P

The information in the attached was taken from the LIFEAT coverage of Arevalo of 9 September. In conversation between Arevalo and Alfredo Arankowski, Mexican leftist journalist, Arankowski told Arevalo of Rico's plans and that Rico had requested information on the United Fruit Company. Arankowski said that Rico did not know that Arankowski would ask Arevalo for the information. Arevalo agreed to meet Arankowski to give him the information.

cit Mexico

RI - Please index: Alfredo Arankowski ~~[illegible]~~ Journalist

Leftist - info given by subj

MICROFILMED
SEP 20 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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COUNTRY:

NO. OF ENCLOSURES:

NO. PAGES:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

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APPR:

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FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A: Completely reliable B: Usually reliable C: Fairly reliable D: Not usually reliable E: Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty regardless of their competence) F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2: Probably true 3: Possibly true 4: Doubtful 5: Probably false 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Guatemala	REPORT NO	[illegible]
SUBJECT	Planned Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist	DATE OF REPORT	17 September 1963
		NO PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	

DATE OF INFO 9 September 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (9 September 1963)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front organization, is planning a trip to Guatemala. While there Rico plans to interview Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, Chief of the Guatemalan Military Junta. Rico also plans to visit the Guatemalan guerrillas.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

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9. ANALYST / 8. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
AMONG LEADING MEXICAN MARXISTS AND COMMUNISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE PRO-POLITICAL PRISONER DEMONSTRATION ON 18 AUGUST 1963 WHO WERE ARRESTED BY MEXICAN POLICE.
PROMINENT LEFTIST JOURNALIST.

201-007132
HMM -07644
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MEXI-05855

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INDEX: YES ☐ NO ☑
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

~~201-336474~~
201-336474

ROUTING			
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, RF 2

RI COPY

S E C R E T 292606Z

29 JUL 63 IN 89232

DIR MRID CITE MEXI 5532

ON 26 JULY LIENVOY REPORTED THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXI LEFTIST JOURNALIST, GOING TO MERIDA 1 AUG IN CONNECTION WITH NEW LOCATION FOR MEXICAN CUBAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE THERE. GALAN SAID INSTITUTE HAD COMPLETED ITS TWO YEAR CONTRACT AND MUST MOVE. RICO PLANNED RETURN MEXI 2 AUG.

S E C R E T

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[illegible]
RID/MIS	[illegible]
~~RID/FS~~	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

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REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM	REPORT NO. HMM-7481

FROM Mexico City	DATE OF REPORT 2 July 1963
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	RD NO. P-7354
REPORTS OFFICER Portia L. SPARKSUS	PROJ. LIENVOY
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	S'CE CR. LIENVOY

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in the attached was taken from a LIENVOY conversation between Rico Galan and Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Mexican pro-Communist newspaperman and member of the staff of Politica, Mexican Marxist semi-monthly magazine.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

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COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	
APPR	DOI	

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201-336494 (60)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

REPORT NO HMM-7481

SUBJECT Comments of Victor Rico Galan on the Morale of the Cuban Intellectual

DATE OF REPORT 2 July 1963

NO PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 27 June 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (27 June 1963)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Persons (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan. Appraisal of Content: 2.

On 27 June 1963, Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement) rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front organization, said that during his recent visit to Cuba he noticed the morale among Cuban intellectuals was very low. Rico Galan said that certain Cuban intellectuals do not understand the problems which exist for them, and others are not well informed. Rico Galan further said that although this problem is not openly discussed, there have been certain newspapers and magazines published in Cuba which pointed out lack of curiosity on the party of the Cuban intellectuals and called for a greater realization of the problems confronting them.

1. Field Comment:

Rico Galan went to Cuba on 25 May 1963 to interview Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba, on Castro's trip to the Soviet Union. Rico Galan returned to Mexico on 22 June 1963. (Cf. HMM-7326, HMM-7466)

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REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	REP NO. HMM-7466

FROM Mexico City	DATE OF REPORT 28 June 1963
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	RD. NO. P-7354
REPORTS OFFICER Portia L. SPARESUS	PROJ LIENVOY
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	S'CE CR. LIENVOY

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS

The information in the attached was taken from a LIENVOY conversation of 23 June 1963 between Rico Galan and Enrique Gonzalez Pedrero, Mexican pro-Communist newspaperman and member of the Staff of Politica, Mexican Marxist semi-monthly magazine.

OPTIONAL: ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

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COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES None	NO PAGES
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	
APPR	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	

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201-736474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S E C R E T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba

REPORT NO HMM-7356

SUBJECT Comments of Victor Rico Galan on His Recent Trip to Cuba

DATE OF REPORT 28 June 1963

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 23 June 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (23 June 1963)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Persons (B) in close personal contact with Rico Galan.
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement), rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, returned to Mexico from Cuba on 22 June 1963.[1]

2. Rico Galan said that while in Cuba he spent eight days with Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister, and also spoke with the following Cuban Government officials: Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, President,
Ernesto ("Che") Guevara Serna, Minister of Industries,
Raul Roa Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations,
Francisco Wilfredo Blas Roca Calderio, Secretary-general of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party),
Regino Boti Leon, Minister of National Economy,
Jose Llanusa Gobel, director of the National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation.

According to Rico Galan, he spent five of the eight days with Castro at sea and Castro discussed his visit to the Soviet Union and his talks with Nikita Khruchchev, Premier of the Soviet Union. Rico Galan further said that the Cuban Government is now making an effort to improve its relations with the Mexican Government, which, according to Rico Galan have been neglected. These efforts by the Cuban Government will be made not only at the diplomatic level but also "at higher levels." Cuba will also try to improve its relations with Brazil, now that the Brazilian political situation is calmer.

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3. Rico Galan said that he received the impression upon his arrival at the Mexico City airport, that passengers returning from Cuba were being treated with more courtesy. Rico Galan returned to Mexico on the same flight as Joaquin Hernandez de Armas, now Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. He said that the international room at the airport was opened to Hernandez, and that he was met by Joaquin Bernal, Assistant Chief of Protocol of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations and received certain other considerations which are uncommon for an arriving ambassador.

4. Rico Galan also said that while in Cuba he saw Dr. Enrique Cabrera Cosio, prominent leftist Mexican cardiologist.[2] Rico Galan said that Cabrera was happy in Cuba, that he enjoyed prestige and the esteem of the Cubans, and that he was doing his best with the means available to him.

5. Rico Galan said he planned to write a series of four or five articles. His articles will deal with subjects of "theoretical interest" and of the problems the Cuban Government is having carrying out the purposes of its revolution.

Field Comments:

1. It was reported previously that Rico Galan had agreed to go to Cuba to interview Castro concerning his trip to the Soviet Union. He left Mexico on 25 May. (Cf. HMM-7326).

2. It was also reported previously that Cabrera went to Cuba in October 1962 as a guest of the Cuban Government, Cabrera was dismissed from the Mexican National Cardiological Institute in July 1962 because of his leftist activities. (CF. HMM-6902).

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

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PASAPORTE NUMERO 57115

PASAPORTE

EXPEDIDO A FAVOR DE

VICTOR PICO GALAN

A QUIEN ACOMPAÑA SU ESPOSA

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
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LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO EL FERROL, ESPAÑA

FECHA DE NACIMIENTO 6 FEBRERO 1928

OCUPACION ESCRITOR

ESTADO CIVIL CASADO

HIJOS MENORES

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FOTOGRAFIAS

MEXICO

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
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

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VISA DE CORTESIA Nº 96[illegible]

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MEXICO D F Septiembre 27/[illegible]

BUENO PARA TRASLADARSE A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION

SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA

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

VISAS

VISA DE CORTESIA No. 323.

EMBAJADA DE CUBA EN MEXICO

MEXICO, D F. Mayo 24 de 1963

BUENO PARA TRASLADARSE A CUBA

VIA A SU ELECCION

SECRETARIO DE LA EMBAJADA


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VISAS

CUBA

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Preséntese este pasaporte al solicitar otro nuevo.

En caso de pérdida o destrucción de este pasaporte, el interesado deberá comunicar inmediatamente el hecho y las circunstancias en que hubiere ocurrido a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México o al Consulado mexicano más próximo, y a las autoridades locales de policía.

Es válido para viajar por los países y hasta la fecha que se indique en la página 3 o en los refrendos correspondientes. Las oficinas expedidoras podrán autorizarlo para otros países y refrendarlo por un período de tiempo igual al originalmente concedido.

En beneficio de los mexicanos que se encuentren en el extranjero, la Ley ha facultado a los Cónsules de México para levantar actas del Registro Civil consignando el nacimiento y reconocimiento de hijos, matrimonio y muerte de los mexicanos residentes en sus respectivas jurisdicciones. Este importante servicio es de gran utilidad para quienes necesitan poseer las pruebas de su estado civil y de sus familiares.

Los mexicanos que permanezcan en un lugar fuera del país por un período mayor de seis meses, deberán matricularse en el Consulado Mexicano del lugar en que se encuentren o en el más próximo.

Es también de positiva utilidad [illegible] que los mexicanos [illegible]

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14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
RE POSSIBLE RESIGNATION OF SUBJ FOR POLITICS, MEXI MARXIST PUB FEB 63.

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HMM -07050
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MEXI-03552
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PAFR - 1406909

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REPORT COVER SHEET

SECRET

REPORT NO.
HMM-6770

FROM
Mexico City

DATE OF REPORT
5 October 1962

REPORTING OFFICER
Clyde K. SHRYOCK

RD. NO.
P-7354

REPORTS OFFICER
Portia L. Sparesus
Portia L. SPARESUS

PROJ.
LIFIRE

APPROVING OFFICER
Willard C. CURTIS

S'CE CR.
Para. 1: LICOOKY-1
Para. 2: LIFIRE

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

The information in paragraph one of the attached was taken from several small items submitted by LICOOKY-1 since 17 July. The information in paragraph two was taken from the LIFIRE airlists.

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COUNTRY

NO. OF ENCLOSURES
None

NO PAGES
1

SUBJECT

REFERENCES

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EVALUATION OF SOURCE A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable *(Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.)* F. Reliability cannot be judged *(Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)*

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET

COUNTRY	Cuba/Mexico	REPORT NO.	HMM-6770
SUBJECT	Travel of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist, to Cuba	DATE OF REPORT	5 October 1962
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	27 July to 2 October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (27 July to 2 October 1962)		

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Para. 1: Person (B) in close contact with Rico Galan.
Para. 2: Person (B) with good access to travel information.
Appraisal of Content: 2

1. Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Marxist journalist and head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN - National Liberation Movement, rabidly anti-United States, pro-Cuba, Communist front, plans to write a political biography on Fidel Castro Ruz, Communist Prime Minister of Cuba. Rico Galan, who proposed the idea to the Cuban Government and was accepted, will spend two months in Cuba working on the project.

2. On 2 October Rico Galan left Mexico for Habana, Cuba, on Cubana Airlines. He carried Mexican passport No. 51115, with a Cuban courtesy visa.

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October 62

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

C. Mexico to Czechoslovakia

There is a good chance that Mexico may participate in the Fifth Industrial Fair in Brno, Czechoslovakia, in September 1963. The announcement was made by Dr Emilio Vera Blanco, president of the National Chamber of Industry of Mexico, upon his arrival in Mexico City from Europe on 30 September 1962. While in Europe, Dr Vera Blanco had interviews with European industrialists and government officials, among them the Assistant Trade Minister of Czechoslovakia, who showed great interest in Mexico. (Mexico City, La Prensa, 1 Oct 62)

D. Mexico -- Contacts with Cuba

1. Soviet Couriers to Cuba

Russian diplomatic couriers Sergey Kulikov and Ivan Filitov left Mexico City for Havana recently in a Cubana de Aviacion airline plane on a special and very secret mission. They were carrying several bulky briefcases, which the Russian diplomats marked diplomatic pouch , and which weighed 120 kilos. Four special guards accompanied the couriers and their briefcases. The arrivals of Cubana de Aviacion airline planes in Mexico heretofore have caused incidents, as their passengers tried to smuggle Communist propaganda which the Mexican federal agents confiscated. Among the other passengers in the flight to Havana, in addition to the Russians, were the Mexican Communists [illegible] Orlando, a music composer, and Victor Rico Galan, a journalist. (Mexico City, El Universal, 3 Oct 62)

2. Cuban and Communist Propaganda Confiscated

Agents of the Federal Judicial Police at the airport in Mexico City, under the command of Maj Alberto Madrigal Nieto, confiscated Communist propaganda pamphlets from three Argentine citizens who arrived in the city from Havana on their way to Uruguay. The Argentines are Antonio Ricardo [illegible], Jose Ramon [illegible], and Margarita Grotsner Kreimer de Rodriguez. Among the propaganda materials are Fidel Castro's book La Historia me Absolvera (History Will Absolve Me), several Soviet and Cuban periodicals, and Patria o Muerte (Fatherland or Death) emblems. (Mexico City, Excelsior, 3 Oct 62)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

21 APRIL, ~~62~~ 61

Victor RICO Galan

SECRET MEXICO

President Adolfo LOPEZ Mateos of Mexico has promised to grant a group of prominent Mexican leftists, the majority of them journalists an interview relative to the case of Cuba on 20 April 1961. The group of leftists involved includes Alonso AGUILAR Monteverde, Dr. Gonzalo GUZMAN, Jesus SILVA Herzog, Dr Guillermo MONTANO Islas, Janitzio MUGICA, Elvira VARGAS, Rodol LORANTES, RENATO Leduc, Victor RICO Galan, Carlos FUENTES, Jos ALVARADO, Fausto CASTILLO, Ricardo ZEBADA and others.

TDCS-3/472/253, 21 April 1961, Mexico City [redacted]

SECCION A

México, D.F., Jueves

Comunistas Guatemaltecos y sus Enlaces en México Quisieron Sabotear la Visita de DO

GUATEMALA, Guatemala, C. A., [illegible]—Exclusivo para EL HERALDO DE MEXICO.—Mediante plagios y constantes actos de terrorismo, las fuerzas rebeldes que operan en las zonas montañosas del país, tratan de alcanzar sus fines, no importa que a diario sufran terribles reveses. Tanto para poner en entredicho al gobierno de la República, como para evitar que la influencia de México en la América Central supere a la que ellos piensan que tiene Cuba, planearon sabotear la visita del mandatario de la nación vecina, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, a estas tierras del quetzal.

Para tal objeto contaron, sin duda, con la ayuda de diversos agentes en el mismo México. Uno de ellos es el periodista español Víctor Rico Galán, redactor de las revistas mexicanas "Siempre", "Política" y "Sucesos para Todos", que se ufana de haber cruzado varias veces la frontera guatemalteco-mexicana subrepticiamente, con el propósito de estrechar lazos con dichos rebeldes.

Hace poco, en suelo guatemalteco, tras de haber cruzado ilegalmente la línea divisoria, Víctor Rico Galán grabó una declaración dirigida al grupo de rebeldes que comanda Yon Sosa.

La grabación cayó en poder de fuerzas leales al gobierno de Guatemala y de la fiel reproducción que se hizo por escrito de la misma se ofrecen en seguida sus párrafos más importantes:

Compañeros, aquí he llegado con el comandante [illegible], después de una serie de vicisitudes y muchos retrasos; yo y [illegible] hemos tenido una serie de razones que él les puede explicar a ustedes mejor que yo.

"Yo he venido [illegible]

[illegible] todos se les ocurra. Todo esto se los digo, quizá con cierta prolijidad, pues creo que ustedes, [illegible] aquí en la montaña, no se percatan del papel histórico que están jugando en este momento. Y también quiero decirles que aquí, en Guatemala, he podido ver, pues, el interés, la devoción, el entusiasmo con que se sigue la lucha de guerrillas. Mi opinión es que el movimiento guerrillero en Guatemala ha prendido definitivamente y que sólo terminará con el día del triunfo.

"Quiero decirles, también, que el comandante Guevara piensa exactamente lo mismo. Un compañero del Partido Comunista Mexicano, miembro del Comité Central, [illegible], periodista, jefe de redacción de la revista "Sucesos para Todos", visitó Cuba y, en una entrevista con el "Che" sobre cuestiones económicas, acompañado por otros periodistas mexicanos, el "Che" les hizo una serie de preguntas sobre México y, después, ellos le preguntaron sobre los movimientos de liberación de América Latina. El "Che" les dijo que, en su opinión, los dos países donde el movimiento es más sólido y más firme —a pesar de todas las dificultades—, eran Guatemala y Venezuela.

"Quiero decirles, también, algo: yo nunca he sido partidario de esa actitud, generalizada en América Latina, consiste en decir, bueno, ya ven lo que hizo Fidel, pues esto no lo hizo Fidel, pues esto sí lo hizo Fidel. Creo que esto es un error estratégico, porque, lo que hizo Fidel, lo hizo en circunstancias históricas muy [illegible] y lo que [illegible] es muy distinto y tiene que ser distinto.

"Se [illegible]

cuestiones que no tiene objeto discutir aquí, y no es que yo sea un campeón del abandono de la ideología, no; yo creo que ustedes, los dirigentes, las personas del núcleo central, deben estudiar, deben leer, deben leer a los clásicos. Por otra parte, en relación con este mismo tema, no es lo mismo tener el problema de derrotar a una burguesía como la francesa, con ideólogos, con gobernantes de la categoría de un De Gaulle, que tener el problema de derrotar a una burguesía idiota, como la guatemalteca. A Peralta se le puede tirar, casi, casi de una pedrada. Esto, todo esto tiende a indicar, pues, que el exagerar las cuestiones ideológicas ante las masas no nos conduce a nada.

"En este punto, esto lo digo más para el compañero Rolando, ya traduciendo estas ideas un poco teóricamente: habría que releer y estudiar aquel famoso escrito de Mao Tse Tung sobre la contradicción: cuando él explica cómo las contradicciones se van desplazando en la evolución de las sociedades y, particularmente, en una evolución, como la contradicción básica va desplazándose a otras contradicciones que, muchas veces, son las más aparentes y las que más se manifiestan ante las masas."

"Yo, para venir aquí, he sido ayudado por pequeños burgueses de la región, esos pequeños burgueses no son la burguesía nacional de que se habla en el programa del PGT, pero ellos se sienten burgueses. ¿Por qué vamos a enajenarnos esas colaboraciones? [illegible] yo le señalaba [illegible] como el de Pancho Villa [illegible]; no cabe duda que es un burgués, ideólogo burgués, político burgués, y [illegible]

[illegible]

SAN SALVADOR, [illegible]—Durante el banquete ofrecido al presidente de México y a su esposa, por el presidente de El Salvador, en la residencia presidencial, el presidente de El Salvador coronel Julio Adalberto Rivera pronunció un conceptuoso discurso de ofrecimiento, que fue contestado con trascendentales palabras por el presidente mexicano licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

El texto de los discursos es el siguiente:

PALABRAS DEL LIC. GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ

Hace media centuria, un salvadoreño escribió en frases que tienen la unción de las [illegible]: "Parece que entre los dos pueblos reviven, a través del tiempo y la distancia, los sentimientos solidarios del origen común, que no se destruyen en la historia ni se debilitan separados por la desvinculación política. El Salvador es Tolteca, pertenece a la rama de los pipiles, es decir "los muchachos" de aquella brava raza que descendió de las altas mesetas aztecas para venir a poblar la región occidental de Centroamérica. Hay en las arterias salvadoreñas glóbulos de aquella sangre heroica que asombró al [illegible] y que siguen alumbrando al alma con su fiera energía para defender el propio patrimonio y las glorias eternas de la raza".

Evoco respetuosamente los afanes, las glorias y los sacrificios de quienes nos precedieron en nuestros respectivos suelos; los evoco sólo como una ineludible obligación de poner empeñosamente el esfuerzo en el presente para conquistar un futuro mejor.

LAS VIRTUDES SOBREPASAN A LAS FALLAS

Nos sorprende la más extraordinaria revolución tecnológica de todos los tiempos, con el conocimiento pleno de lo que somos, con la certeza de que los [illegible]

[illegible] desplazar a ustedes mejor que yo.

"Yo he venido pasando secretamente y sin visa, porque el compañero En[illegible] parece que no me quería mucho...

"Les aclaro esto porque se ha especulado por [illegible] la idea de que yo venía enviado por los compañeros cubanos e incluso que estas opiniones no eran mías, sino la expresión de las opiniones de ellos. [illegible] algunos compañeros me insinuaron la conveniencia de que yo, pues, esto, mencionara esto aquí. Naturalmente, me negué por una razón fundamental: porque no es cierto. Yo no vine aquí en representación de los compañeros cubanos... De modo, pues, que desconozco todas sus opiniones al respecto; lo único que yo puedo hacer son especulaciones respecto de cuál pueda ser su pensamiento en la medida que conozco, pues son ideas generales y entonces, como sé lo que piensan de los movimientos de liberación que accionan en la América Latina, me puedo imaginar lo que puedan opinar respecto a este problema; pero eso también se lo pueden imaginar ustedes, que saben también qué es lo que ellos piensan. De modo que no tendría ningún sentido mi viaje, si éste tuviera por objeto manifestarles algo que ustedes pueden saber perfectamente.

"Lo que yo he expresado aquí ha sido bajo mi exclusiva responsabilidad y producto de mi cerebrito, trabajando solo.

"Yo he visto en el plan internacional la importancia que tiene el Movimiento 13 de Noviembre, como un símbolo de la lucha de liberación nacional, no sólo de Guatemala, sino de América Latina, y la importancia que tiene el comandante Adán como jefe, como cabeza de ese núcleo.

"En México, casi, yo les he hecho la broma de que parece que me consideraran el dueño de la revolución guatemalteca, porque cada vez que llega por allá una noticia, en un periódico, algún rumor, pues todas las personas revolucionarias me hablan por teléfono, me van a buscar para ver qué es lo que yo opino, como si yo tuviera un hilo directo con la S[illegible] de [illegible], para estar enterado de todas las cosas que a ustedes [illegible] país muy especial, y lo que usted está planteando es muy distinto y tiene que ser distinto.

"Sé muy bien que el plantear estos problemas [illegible] que estoy metido en lo que no quiero comprometerme, [illegible] no es eso. Les voy a [illegible] explicar la idea lo más claramente que yo pueda. Mi idea es esta: cuando se está luchando en un país altamente desarrollado, muy complicado, muy politizado, con una clase obrera con una gran experiencia, con conocimientos políticos, con militancia, donde incluso los propios campesinos tienen una aguda conciencia de los problemas y sus necesidades, vamos a decir, en Francia; vamos a decir, en Italia, todos esos análisis rigurosos sobre la composición de la burguesía, a los que ustedes son afectos; distinciones entre diversos sectores de la burguesía, análisis sobre las necesidades de la clase obrera, sobre el papel internacional de la lucha de los pueblos semicoloniales o coloniales, etc., son allá necesarias; y son necesarias, porque, para que un partido, para que un grupo tenga autoridad, necesita convencer a masas altamente politizadas.

"En nuestros países, no se nos plantea ese problema, porque las masas nuestras son suficientemente inconscientes de nuestro punto de vista político; o mejor dicho, en términos mejores, más claros, más exactos: tienen una conciencia muy elemental de sus problemas: la conciencia del campesino es por la tierra, y creo que no va más allá por el momento. Creo que si al campesino se le ofrece tierra, se le ofrecen escuelas para sus hijos y atención médica, etc., no pide más explicaciones, porque a él no se le plantean más problemas. Entonces, cuando yo leo "revolución socialista"; todas esas cosas que las masas bolivianas, que las milicias armadas, piensan que es una confusión verdaderamente espantosa, y yo lo digo, porque conozco y he estado allá y he visto cuáles son los problemas grandes. Cuando veo todo eso sobre [illegible] que las masas [illegible] voluntad. [illegible] Es un país [illegible] [illegible] verdade[illegible] parece [illegible]

[illegible] como el [illegible] Villagrán Kramer; no cabe duda que es un burgués, [illegible] burgués, podría ser burgués; y, sin embargo, pues ha prestado colaboración a ustedes y puede volver a prestarla, si la necesidad hay de pensar con él.

"Ahora quisiera decir algunas palabras para el compañero [illegible] que está en Cuba. No quería irse y me costó bastante trabajo convencerla; finalmente, lo logré. Le hice ver que, en todo caso, el compañero Rolando tenía que dedicar algún tiempo a su curación y que fuera que esto se hiciera en México, en Cuba o en Checoslovaquia, que ella estaría en condiciones de acompañarlo en el momento en que él quisiera. Se le avisaría, naturalmente, a La Habana o donde ella pudiera conectarse. Yo quiero, en todo caso, si el compañero Rolando decide salir por México, darle mi número de teléfono, para que pueda localizarme de inmediato y me pueda hablar, con el mismo nombre de Rolando. Allí me encuentra hasta las diez de la mañana o a eso de las tres y media de la tarde, que es el almuerzo en México.

"Les envío un abrazo cordial, a los que, además, conozco mucho a través de una serie de testimonios orales de cintas grabadas; este sistema de las cintas grabadas es muy útil, podría haberse implantado en Chihuahua. Me horrorizo bastante y veo que se han olvidado algunas cosas: en primer lugar, para Rolando, lo siguiente: el niño, su hijo, está naturalmente con su madre. Fue con ella en el viaje, iba en buenas condiciones. Yo lo vi unos días antes de mi salida de México, con motivo del cumpleaños de mi hija menor.

"Bueno, un saludo muy cordial otra vez, ahora sí ya definitivo, al comandante Herbert. Me divirtió mucho su grabación, y, además la recordé mucho la otra noche cuando venía yo subiendo para acá; aquella frase de él, donde dice que [illegible] no es bajo, pero es una montaña baja de... Supongo que se refería a una montaña mucho más baja de la que está, pero está para [illegible] porque [illegible] cansado arriba de [illegible] a veinte minutos [illegible]

Sigue en la Pág. 12-A

[illegible] LAS FALLAS.

Necesitamos de la más extraordinaria transformación tecnológica en breve tiempo, con el crecimiento justo de lo que somos, con la certeza de que las virtudes de nuestros pueblos [illegible] formas de nuestra política y de nuestra economía, con una [illegible] y los [illegible] que dejaron a la gran [illegible] si se hace digna de cumplir con lo que le tiene [illegible], comercio internacional [illegible], intercambio cultural con todas las naciones del planeta y feliz confluencia de todas las ondas del progreso.

[illegible] en lo económico, en lo social, en lo moral como [illegible] y como confraternidad, como interés [illegible] y [illegible] de nuestros medios de producción y de consumo.

El mundo actual oscila entre graves temores y vigorosas esperanzas, [illegible] y a la [illegible] de que el hombre muestra ser capaz, no sólo en el curso de la historia pasada, sino en las épocas recientes, cuyo recuerdo [illegible] la vida entera del mundo; pero [illegible] la certidumbre de que el hombre que ha sido capaz de conciliar el [illegible] y la justicia, sabrá [illegible] para resolver los problemas que afectan a todos los pueblos.

El derecho deberá garantizar el [illegible] de cada pueblo para encontrar la solución de sus problemas a través de sus propias instituciones, de manera que, asegurada la independencia de cada nación, pueda practicarse, para beneficio común, la solidaridad internacional basada en la justicia y hecha fuerza creadora por el impulso de la libertad.

BASES PERDURABLES DE LA AMISTAD

En la igualdad jurídica de los Estados y el respeto recíproco hallaremos las bases perdurables de nuestra amistad y el camino para disminuir desigualdades económicas.

Es muy grato que mi visita a los países hermanos de Centroamérica ocurra en momentos en que la cooperación económica dentro de nuestra región evoluciona en forma satisfactoria.

Nuestras [illegible] crecen más rápidamente que la [illegible] y esto ha hecho surgir en todo el Continente una [illegible]

Con [illegible] las dos organizaciones [illegible] la región [illegible] hermanos, sobre todo las del

[illegible]

Dijo que al dar la bienvenida al Presidente mexicano, "lo saludo como símbolo de una democracia auténtica de América, cuya grandeza inspira a cuantos amamos la libertad".

Este viaje, dijo, "entraña el feliz augurio de una acrecentada cooperación constructiva entre nuestros pueblos".

Cordial Abrazo... Viene de la Primera Pág. A

Mexicanos y salvadoreños, han coincidido en su fervor por la libertad y en la lucha por conquistarla. Si hemos coincidido en el pasado con mayor razón debemos estar unidos en el porvenir para acrecentar la solidaridad y la cooperación entre ambos pueblos.

AYUDA EN LO CULTURAL

Solidaridad y cooperación son precisamente nuestras más altas aspiraciones en el desenvolvimiento de nuestras relaciones sociales, políticas, culturales y económicas.

En lo político, queremos una América justa, democrática, humanitaria, donde las personas y las ideas tengan desarrollo [illegible] cabalmente, sin violencia interna, sin presiones del exterior.

En lo cultural tratamos de ayudarnos crecientemente, sabiendo que el de la cultura es el ámbito en el que los hombres pueden entenderse mejor.

En lo económico podemos hacer mucho más de lo que hasta ahora hemos hecho para fortalecer nuestra necesaria industrialización e intensificar el comercio de nuestros países.

Necesitamos urgentemente elevar el nivel de vida de nuestros pueblos, que con justicia reclaman pan y libertad; cultura y bienestar, salud y seguridad. Disponemos de recursos propios, de tierras generosas, de voluntad dispuesta a labrar un porvenir más justo para todos.

¡Ha llegado la hora del esfuerzo conjunto y de la cooperación honrada!

EL VALOR DE LA AMISTAD

Confío en que mi estancia en este país hermano resulte propicia para afianzar la cordialidad de nuestras Repúblicas y avivar, mediante actos prácticos y fecundos, la fe que depositamos en el valor de nuestra amistad.

Sé que interpreto a todos los mexicanos al desear al intrépido pueblo salvadoreño prosperidad en el trabajo, seguridad en la justicia y paz en la libertad.

Excelentísimo señor Presidente: La señora de Díaz Ordaz y yo, así como los miembros del gobierno mexicano que me acompañan, agradecemos a usted profundamente las palabras tan deferentes y amables que nos ha tributado como bienvenida y cordialidad con que el gobierno y el pueblo de El Salvador nos han ofrecido la hospitalidad que disfrutamos en [illegible] momento.

[illegible] señor Presidente, que en el

[illegible] una feliz estancia [illegible] República centroamericana.

25 minutos después inició el Presidente mexicano el recorrido del aeropuerto a la embajada de México, a 13 kilómetros de distancia, donde miles de personas lo saludaron efusivamente.

¡Viva México!... Viene de la Primera Pág. A

te de El Salvador, coronel Julio A. Rivera, durante su discurso de bienvenida.

Momentos antes, al descender el mandatario mexicano del avión que lo puso en suelo salvadoreño, el Presidente Rivera rompió el protocolo y se dirigió hasta la escalerilla del avión para recibir con un abrazo al jefe del gobierno mexicano. La multitud concentrada en el aeropuerto rompió en aclamaciones que fueron apagadas momentáneamente por los honores de ordenanza y 21 salvas en honor del ilustre visitante.

Antes de abandonar el aeropuerto, el mandatario mexicano y sus acompañantes remembraron el suelo patrio al escuchar las mexicanísimas canciones interpretadas por un grupo de mariachis.

El Presidente Díaz Ordaz había arribado a las 10.00 horas.

Durante su recorrido por las calles salvadoreñas, el pueblo se reunió a lo largo del trayecto para aplaudir al paso de la comitiva. Los dos mandatarios saludaban de pie a bordo de un automóvil negro descubierto. Las serpentinas y el papel picado caían de los edificios en lluvia de simbólica amistad y cariño entre los dos pueblos. El cruce de las calles de esa capital centroamericana, los postes, ventanas y escaparates de los comercios, lucían nuestros colores patrios y grandes y pequeñas fotografías del Presidente Díaz Ordaz y de su señora esposa.

Comunistas... Viene de la Pág. 11-A

lles de una ciudad, y aquí casi me tenía que arrastrar.

"Bueno, ahora sí ya me despido definitivamente. ¡Viva el gran Mao, viva la revolución socialista de América! ¡Hasta luego, compañeros!"

La labor subversiva y de agitación del comunista Víctor Rico Galán se patentizó también en México con agresivos escritos suyos, publicados en las revistas donde trabaja, y en los cuales censuró acremente la visita del Presidente de México, país en el que Rico Galán vive asilado. Reproducciones de sus artículos circularon entre los rebeldes guatemaltecos, con los cuales, mediante el periodista mencionado y otros agentes, mantiene estrecho contacto el Partido Comunista de México.

Por todo esto, el Gobierno de Guatemala creyó pertinente tomar todas las medidas necesarias que garantizaron la seguridad del mandatario mexicano y de los miembros de su comitiva, durante su visita a nuestra nación.

[illegible]

La ceremonia [illegible] gar en el Marco del Risco, casa donada por el internacionalista licenciado Isidro Fabela, en donde se reunieron varios de los más destacados jurisconsultos mexicanos, miembros de la Sociedad de Derecho Internacional, organismo mundial que preside el licenciado Miguel Alemán, por un periodo de dos años.

A nombre del ex presidente de México, hizo uso de la palabra el licenciado Luis G. Sevilla, quien exaltó los méritos profesionales del señor Robert [illegible] en bien de la causa del Derecho mundial, el que ha ejercido con rectitud a través de su vida, como miembro de la Sociedad de Derecho Internacional.

Asistieron a tan importante acto las siguientes personalidades: licenciado Miguel Alemán, senador Ezequiel Padilla, el señor Fulton Freeman, embajador de los Estados Unidos en nuestro país, licenciado Manuel J. Sierra, funcionario de la Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, licenciado Luis G. Sevilla, licenciado Juan González A. Alpuche, licenciado Octavio Trías Aduna, oficial mayor del Consejo Nacional de Turismo y otras personas más.

Recibió GDO las Llaves de San Salvador

SAN SALVADOR, enero 12 de 1966.- El Alcalde de San Salvador, ingeniero José Napoleón Duarte, entregó esta mañana al Presidente Díaz Ordaz, las llaves de la ciudad, momentos después de que en el aeropuerto de Ilopango el Presidente Julio Adalberto Rivera le había dado la bienvenida.

Al agradecer esta distinción el Mandatario Mexicano expresó:

"Mi esposa y yo agradecemos como una gran distinción este nuevo honor que la ciudad que nos ha abierto sus puertas nos dispensa, al entregarnos la llave no que abre el afecto, como usted dice señor Alcalde, sino que lo confirma, porque viene de muy hondas raíces y que es amplia, sincera y cordialmente correspondido por los mexicanos para su país. Muchas gracias."

Califican de Histórico el Viaje de GDO

GUATEMALA (AMSI) La prensa guatemalteca señaló que la actual visita a Centroamérica del Presidente mexicano Gustavo Díaz Ordaz afianza una tradicional amistad y abre nuevas posibilidades de desarrollo industrial a los países del mercado común.

El matutino "Impacto" califica de "histórico" el comunicado conjunto sobre la visita de Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala y subraya como punto medular de dicho documento el hecho de que "el convenio comercial entre México y Guatemala será estudiado para corregir el desnivel de la

[illegible]

SECRET

1. The attached passports were obtained from a sensitive photo coverage at the airport in Mexico City of passports of persons arriving on all flights from Havana, Cuba, and Brussels, Belgium. (Many Soviets travel to Mexico via Brussels.) The operation is conducted with the knowledge of a particular office of the Mexican Government but is not a liaison.

2. It is suggested that your desk review the passports of your citizens, and send the copy to the 201 file in RID if there is one, and take whatever other action you wish. There should be no dissemination of the passport and no exploitation thereof without prior coordination with WH/3/Mexico and without due care to protect the source.

3. Copies of these passports and the reels have been furnished TSD/IB therefore you should not send your copies to them.

4. The manifests have been sent to RID/ZZ for processing.

5. Any questions on the above or the attachments should be directed to the LITEMPO case officer, WH/3/Mexico, x6026 or x6110, Room 3B003.

SECRET

3357

The following pages contain a translation of a talk by Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan. The talk was recorded on a small portable tape recorder and was then taken to the hills and played to the Guatemalan guerrillas. This taped talk and seven other small rolls of taped propaganda and discussion were captured in mid October 1964 by the Guatemalan Army in a raid against guerrillas in the Panzos area of Alta Verapaz. The identities of some of the names used in the talk are as follows:

Commandente Adan: Marco Antonio YON Sosa, leader of the "13th of November" guerrilla movement. This is the first time we have heard of YON Sosa referred to by this name.

Companero Enrique: a mockingly respectful reference to Guatemalan Chief of Government Col. Enrique PERALTA.

The arrest of Galvan: Felipe Galvan Bartoluchi, Mexican courier to Guatemala was arrested in Guatemala City in March 1964. He was carrying two suitcases of communist literature and records at the time, and was himself documented as "Isidro Alfaro Ramos".

Sierra de las Minas: Mountain area north west of Zacapa; guerrilla safe area.

PGT: Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, the Guatemalan Communist Party.

Luis Turcios Lima: Second in command of the "13th of November" guerrillas.

Comrade Rolando: Obviously a pseudonym. We have been unable to establish this man's true identity.

Pancho Villagran Kramer: Francisco Villagran Kramer, leftist Guatemalan political leader; head of the URD Party.

Alfredo Guerra Borges: Central Committee member of the PGT.

Phone No. 23 07 92: Mexico City phone directories for 1962 and 1964 list this number as follows: DIENER, Tilli Pichler
Vda de Providencia 930

[illegible]

PUR: A Guatemalan revolutionary party, now rather inactive. [illegible]
A number of PGT members also belong to the PUR.

Compañeros:

I have arrived here together with Comandante Adan after a series of hardships and of many delays owing to a number of reasons which he can explain in detail even better perhaps than I could.

I have been making these trips without a visa because the compañero Enrique seems not be overly fond of me, and motivated by two reasons. One of them is to try to put my shoulder a little to the wonderful struggle you are carrying on, by a reportage on the guerrillas. The other reason was my concern over a number of circumstances, and basically the arrest of Galvan in Guatemala.

So I came with the wish primarily of giving you the items of information I had, and particularly to Comandante Adan. I make this clear because there has been considerable speculation to the effect that I was being sent by the Cuban comrades and even that my opinions were not mine at all but the expression of their opinions. In fact, some comrades suggested to me the advisability that I should mention this here.

I refused, of course, for a basic reason: because it is not so. I did not come here as a representative of the Cuban comrades, whom I have not seen since February 64, when none of these problems had arisen, or if they had arisen they were not acquainted with them, or if they were acquainted with them they did not tell me about them. So, I have no idea what their opinion on the subject may be. Consequently, all I can do is speculate on what might be their thinking to the limit that I am aware of their general ideas; and then, since I know what they think about the liberation movements in Latin America, I can imagine what they might think with regard to these problems.

But you also can imagine that, since you also know what they think. So there would be no sense to my trip here if its purpose were to tell you something that you may know perfectly well. What I have stated here has been on my own exclusive responsibility and as a result of my [word unintelligible] working alone.

I have told the Comandante that in my opinion there have arisen here a number of problems which have objective roots but which have become somewhat complicated and distorted to the extent of leading to a situation that may be dangerous in the future, that may convert the Trece de Noviembre into just another group, another sect, that may therefore isolate slightly from the masses in general or at least from a number of strata of the people whose support in the struggle is important.

On the international plane I have seen the importance of the Trece de Noviembre as a symbol of the struggle for national liberation not only of Guatemala but also of Latin America, and the importance of Comandante Adan as the chief or head of that nucleus. The reportage I wrote on it just a year ago 2.1.63 was successful partly owing to the collaboration of the Cuban comrades and partly because of the natural curiosity aroused by the subject. It was reproduced by newspapers in the United States, in Europe--for instance, L'Estrelle de Paris reprinted it; it was reprinted by the New Statesman of London; newspapers of a broad but important left wing in Europe--I even have a magazine from New Zealand which reprinted the reportage.

By that I convey to you the importance which was attributed to the movement. I have not mentioned Cuba or China, of course. You know that the interview was published by Hoy, the organ of the PURS, and in China it was reprinted by the Party organ, People's Daily.

I have also received a series of letters from various countries, and in my travels I have noticed how people would ask me with enormous interest about your struggle. In Mexico I pretty nearly told them in jest that it seems. that they regard me as the owner of the Guatemalan revolution because every time that some news item or rumor reaches them all the revolutionary people come and talk to me on the telephone or send for me to find out what my opinion is, as though I had a direct wire to the Sierra de las Minas there to be informed of every last thing that occurs to you.

I tell you all this in somewhat prolix detail because I am afraid that you, buried to some extent here in the mountains, may not be aware of the historic role you are playing at this moment. And I also want to tell you that here in Guatemala, where I have been for two weeks--although I was here covertly and that, of course, limited my activity--I have nevertheless been able to see the interest, devotion, and enthusiasm with which the guerrilla struggle is being followed.

My opinion is that the guerrilla movement in Guatemala has definitely taken hold and that it will end only on the day of victory. I want to tell you also recently I found out that Comandante Guevara thinks exactly the same. A comrade in the Mexican Communist Party, a member of the Central Committee and newsman, visited Cuba. A close personal friend of mine, he visited Cuba and had an interview with Che mainly on economic matters, together with other Mexican newsmen. They talked for a long time, and when they finished Che asked them a number of questions about Mexico and then they asked him about the liberation movements in Latin America. Che told them that in his opinion the two countries in which the movement was most solid and firm despite every difficulty were Guatemala and Venezuela.

I think for this reason that you must view your problems not as another group carrying on polemics with other groups but to some extent from the height in which you are placed, even physically. You must realise that the difficulties there have been are due basically to the fact that the comrades in the PGT have long delayed turning into deeds their own ideas on the struggle. They have set forth a line to the effect that aspects may not be discussed but that [phrase unintelligible] correct. The 11-point resolution of December which places the armed struggle and especially the guerrilla phase at the core of the revolutionary struggle seems to me to be correct in general. But they have had many difficulties because there have been debates, obscurities, some of them perhaps did not understand that or were opposed--I do not know, I do not have many details. But of course it has not been possible; they have not found it possible or else have lacked the capability to devote their activity to the armed struggle. Consequently their participation, which there has been--we cannot deny it; I think it would be unjust to deny the participation of the PGT--has been the participation of a rearguard, of support. They have lost cadres here in [Ixtabal?] and elsewhere , suffered the consequences of the struggle; some comrades of the PGT are actively persecuted--but always in connection with support activities.

I believe your role is to drag them into a more active participation in the struggle--not to fight them or fight them only to the extent that such a fight may lead them into the battle and not occasion a split. In my opinion this is going to be much easier from now on because, altough what happened with the publication of the newspaper is dangerous in my opinion--and it is dangerous because it poses a number of things which are not understood, you see? and in the second place they cause a state of confusion, especially among a people which is not politically sophisticated, as in Guatemala--, I think that despite those --- those negative things this has been the clang of a bell; has shown the comrades in the PGT the extent to which they had committed errors and abandoned a number of possibilities of struggle.

About that I have talked to them at considerable length and have talked to them in utter loyalty and clarity, and they admit that all that is taking place is not the product of error on the part of the Trece or a bad line of the Trece exclusively but a product of their very own errors also. They do assume their share of responsibility and I think it is important that you know and appreciate that fact--important for this reason, that there might arise in some comrades, and I am referring particularly to Rolando, a certain lowering of morale: that he might think that he erred in some things and might allow himself to be destroyed politically. I think this would be a serious error, do you not? and I think it would be false attitude. We must start from the premise that everybody has committed errors and that these errors have been commonplace everywhere. Let us remember, for instance, that in Cuba there was in the organisation of that famous strike, the one that failed, of April 1959, none other than a David Salvador, who was a Falangista, and there was none other than a [Bill DeWalt?] who was an imperialist agent; and that in Cuba there were public statements of the 26 July movement which Fidel Castro had to disown later, and there was constant misunderstanding between the people who were in the sierras and the militants in the cities; and there were very serious conflicts between the PC? and the 26 July movement; and there were all those parasites from the Escambray Second Front who were good for nothing. In short, a series of problems, which did not prevent attaining victory because the position they always maintained was that the fundamental nucleus of the 26 July organisation was an agent of cohesion of the revolutionaby forces, and they succeeded in polarising those revolutionary forces and succeeded in avoiding problems, and this in the end led the revolutionary forces to victory.

With regard to this, I would like to tell you something else: I have never been in favor of that attitude, very widely generalized in Latin America, which is to say: "Well, you can see what Fidel did. This was *not* done by Fidel; this *was* done by Fidel." I think this is abysmal error, because what Fidel did he did under very special historical circumstances, and what you are doing is different and has to be different. You have no reason at all to follow the Cuban or any other experience, but I do think it is advisable to learn from international experience and take advantage of it to the extent that it may be useful.

I say this because it seems to me that there has been here a certain idealistic tendency to take a position above the masses. I am referring to the debates on the character of the revolution, on the participation of the bourgeoisie, whether the Chinese or the Soviets are right, and a number of questions like that. I realise very well that when I say this you may say that I am half out of my mind or that I am unwilling to commit myself to a position. That is not so: I shall try to explain my idea as clearly as I can.

My idea is this: When you are struggling in a country which is highly developed, very complicated, politically very sophisticated, where there is a working class of great experience, politically informed, militant, where even the peasants themselves are acutely aware of their problems, their needs --let us say France, let us say Italy--all those rigorous analyses of the composition of the bourgeoisie, distinctions among various aspects of that bourgeoisie, analyses of the needs of the working class, of the international role of the struggle of semicolonial or colonial peoples, and so forth, are necessary. They are necessary because for a party, for a group to have authority it has to persuade masses which have high political sophistication. In our countries we face no such problems. We do not face such problems because our masses are thoroughly unconcerned from a political standpoint.

In another --- rather, stated in better terms, more clearly and more accurately, they have a very elementary understanding of their problems. The concern of the peasant is for the soil; I do not think it goes beyond that at the moment. I believe that if the peasant is offered land, is offered schooling for his children, medical care, and so forth, he will not demand any more explanations. He sees no other problems.

So, when I read in Revolucion Socialista all these things, about the Bolivian masses, the armed militias, it is a truly shocking confusion. And I say this because I know Bolivia, I have been there, I have seen their real problems. When I see all this about Peru, where the masses are said to be doing their will, with a semifeudal government, it is truly --- it seems to me that we are falling into a number of questions which there is no purpose in discussing here.

And it is not that I champion the abandonment of ideology. No, I think that you, the leaders, the people of the central nucleus, must study, must read, must read the classics. The other day I heard a recording by our comrade [Surcio?] with reference to this, and I think the attitude is very proper. You must have the clearest possible view, but I think it would be mistaken on your part not to realize that if you advance too far ahead you will isolate yourselves from the masses.

Also, and in connection with this same subject, it is not the same thing to face the problem of defeating a bourgeoisie such as the French bourgeoisie, which has ideologists and has rulers of the caliber of a De Gaulle, and to face the problem of defeating an idiotic bourgeoisie such as the Guatemalan bourgeoisie, with a ruler like comrade Enrique, is it? In other words, the weapon needed to shoot down De Gaulle--to state it thus in very simple and personal terms--has to be much more long-range and much more perfect than the weapon required to shoot down Peralta. Peralta can be brought down just about by pitching a rock at him, can he not?

This, all this tends to indicate that to exaggerate ideological questions to the masses will lead us nowhere. I have been able to observe that the following has happened with the newspaper--and I told Comandante Adan yesterday--: that those who understand it do not approve of it. And I am not referring to the people of the PGT but to many well-meaning people: for instance, to Rodrigo Asturias, who is in Mexico, a survivor of the [Cumquat?], a wholesome fellow, studious, concerned, who is very anxious to come here to join the struggle--he was really dumbfounded at the document. The same for honorable people like Carlos [Barquesada]. On the other hand, most of the people, the masses that do not understand it, cannot understand all that complicated terminology, all that obscurity, all those generalisations of concepts that do not stimulate anybody to the struggle, that do not pose actual and concrete objectives.

That is my opinion. I believe that on this point you must establish a very skilful, very intelligent balance between your own political training and your daily contact with the masses, and you will gradually be told [sic] what the masses must be told.

On this point--I say this rather to comrade Rolando--, putting those ideas into slightly theoretical form, it would be necessary to reread and study that famous document by Mao Tse-tung on contradiction, where he explains how contradictions are gradually displaced in the evolution of society and particularly, in a revolution, how the basic contradiction gradually displaces other contradictions which often are the most apparent ones and are most manifest to the masses and which all express the basic or fundamental contradiction but express it in different ways.

So we have no reason to propose the destruction of the bourgeoisie and alienate the support of a number of people who feel bourgeois. I myself, to come here, was helped by petty bourgeois of this area itself. These petty bourgeois, of course, are not the national bourgeoisie to which the program of the PGT refers, but they feel they are bourgeois. They cannot distinguish, when you condemn the national bourgeoisie in the newspaper, they cannot distinguish between themselves and whether they are or are not the national bourgeoisie. They feel affected. Why should we alienate their collaboration?

I even pointed out to the Comandante cases such as that of Pancho Villagran Kramer: there is no doubt that he is bourgeois, a bourgeois ideologist and a bourgeois politician, yet he has given you his collaboration and may give it again. What need is there to have a fight with him? One must maintain the firmness of principles, as Comandante Adan did in the interview, specify clearly the disagreements, but not picture him as an enemy. It seems to me that on this point Comandante Adan expressed the true policy, which consisted not in saying, "Villagran is our enemy because he is bourgeois"--which would be the logical consequence of what has been published in the newspaper--but to say, "He is my friend but I think that he is mistaken; that he is not going to accomplish anything." This seems to me the right thing to do. Also, the movement is at a stage where what it needs is friends.

Well, I think I have talked a good deal and rather haphazardly, but--I wish you had arrived; I was clinging to that hope, although I knew it was very unlikely, since you have already delayed too long. Unfortunately it has not been that way, has it? So I wanted to leave my greeting to you and some of the impressions I have of the situation.

I can add something to what I have already told you. The comrades of the PGT asked me after I had been here for quite a few days and they had shown me a number of things--I even think that they wanted to be sincere because they also showed me tapes in which they were harshly criticized, in which their own cadres criticised them--they arranged interviews for me with persons within the party who are in disagreement with the leadership--in short, I was able to get a considerably more objective picture--they asked me for my observations and criticisms, which I gave them in all loyalty.

The basic criticism I believe continues to be the lack of more active participation in the armed struggle and of the channeling of cadres to the armed struggle. This I think continues to be the main problem; they admit it. In general I must tell you that most of my criticisms were well received by them.

I even asked for a talk with Guerra Borges because I thought that his article in the International [i.e. World Marxist] Review contained some expressions of opinion which were not correct, although in others it was on the right track. We discussed it and he had a receptive attitude, and in the end admitted that there was some error, owing to the need to make the article too condensed.

On the point, which I think has been posed here rather insistently, of whether the bourgeoisie participates, the famous thesis of the four classes, in other words, they were telling me--I am referring particularly to the comrades of the political commission, with whom I had a lengthy meeting--they have applied it somewhat mechanically, somewhat as convention dictates, as has been done by a majority of the parties in countries such as this one, but without actually having a clear notion on the subject, and among them there were arguments, struggles, and disagreements with regard to the role of the bourgeoisie.

So I think that it is perfectly possible to debate on this point. I do not think that the policy should be to set out a public thesis, and even less a public polemic. I do not think that it is particularly important to the struggle that the theory of the four classes be uphold publicly. I do not think that anyone will be disappointed to see that in this country there is a peasantry or a proletariat so radical and so enlightened that it will refuse to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie. So I think it is a somewhat unproductive polemic.

I am also fully convinced that the national bourgeoisie has no revolutionary role to play at this time in Latin America and much less in Guatemala. And that it does not depend on the theories proposed or the thinking of Guerra Borges, or the thinking of Rubio or the thinking of anyone else. I believe that is a fact, and facts are above all else. And I think that the moment that the struggle grows up, that the revolutionary power grows strong and is established on a free territory, this will be seen still more clearly. But I see no reason why this should be announced a priori; that is, I do not see why we should make the revolution in the newspapers, if it is being carried on in the mountains.

Now I would like to say a few words for our comrade Rolando. They are nothing secret, but they are things which interest him personally.

Isabel is in Cuba. I left 15 days ago today; that is, yesterday, Saturday, it was two weeks. The day after my departure she was to leave for Cuba, by way of Europe, of course, so she would be able to return. The trip had already been set up by Comandante Guevara, and Isabel had been invited, but it had not been made definite because the Cubans move very slowly in some things. Just after the trip of [woman's name] and the letter Rolando sent me, and in view of what he was requesting of me in that letter--and the difficult situation that she was in, obviously, from every viewpoint, including the economic one, and the my difficulties in any attempt to give any help--I of course tried to activate the matter of her trip, went at it in a direct manner, and arrangements were made right away. She did not want to go. First of all she was very interested in knowing how the situation would come out here and what I would propose on my return, etc. In addition she was very concerned about the health and the morale of comrade Rolando. So she did not want to go, and I had a rather hard time persuading her. At last I succeeded; I showed her that in any event Rolando in my opinion would have to devote some time to his treatment. Whether this was done in Cuba, or Mexico, or Czechoslovakia, she would be in a position to accompany him; when he left she of course would be notified in Havana, and [from there] she could get in touch.

In any event, if comrade Rolando decides to go via Mexico, I want to give him my telephone number so he can locate me right away. He can use the name Rolando. My number is 23 07 92. He will find me the up to 1000 or about 1930 hours [several words unintelligible]. So if he goes clandestinely and has any problem he can talk to me, carefully, of course, as the phone is under surveillance. He can use the name Rolando and address me in the familiar form ["tú"], as an old friend who has come in from the provinces. Then I shall look for him and try to find a way to solve the problems he may have.

As to this matter of Rolando's health I think it is very important to discard the "theory" that it is nothing serious, etc., which he himself is spreading about. I do not think this situation can be allowed to remain indefinitely, with him in poor health. I have talked about this to the comrades in the PGT here, although it looks as though they are not very fond of him for the time being--and of course that makes sense--and they have promised to take care of the matter. I have also asked Comandante Adan as commander-in-chief to do something about the problem. I think it would be useful, do you not? [phrase blurred].

Well, that is all for the time being. I hope your meeting will be successful. I hope that the difficulties will be overcome, and that this situation will be taken advantage of to reshape all things and to give new drive to the struggle. I think the experiences acquired can be very useful--for instance the experience here of Comandante Adan and the boys with the peasants and the plan to organise them and occupy lands. I think it can be developed into ever more perfect forms. Of course that directive of occupying lands, given here in practice, is a provocation which can result in the peasants' being massacred, but when it is done in a planned manner, in a way that the guerrilla can offer them protection and in which they can be taught to protect themselves, as in the case that has happened here--I think it can be a first-rate revolutionary factor.

I think you ought to give special attention to these things--and above all else is the problem of unity. If on the one hand you do not feel you are in possession of the truth but on the other hand you do not feel you are victims of the possessors of the truth--I say this for comrade Rolando--I think you can accomplish a great change in the outlook and give a great push to the struggle. You have to know, be aware of, have a clear idea that the situation in the PCT is at this time rather good. A number of factors have contritbuted to this, including, for example, people who are attacked in Revolucion Socialista, such as the PUR. The PUR has had a very clear and well-defined attitude, very positive, consisting in declaring to the PCT that they were for unity at all times, but on the basis of its being real unity; that is, on the basis that they would, in every way possible, continue collaborating with the guerrillas at every moment. I think that in the base organizations of the PCT this attitude has been brought forth.

So, there is nowhere that I can see any real reason for a break nor the desire for a break on the part of anybody. The problems that have come up can be discussed as between equals, clearly, and they can be a positive factor, become a positive factor of impetus for the struggle, eliminating everything that is a burden or an error or a provocation.

I am sending a cordial greeting to both, those I know well as a result of oral expressions and recorded tapes--this employment of tape recorders is extremely useful--and whom I would have liked very much to hug personally. So long.

[Same man who recorded the above continues after a blank space on the tape.] ...in the first place ... Rolando ... said that he is of course ... trip ... Mexico ... in excellent health ... I saw him ... departure from Mexico ... very few days, 3 days ... took some photographs of both but I was unable to bring them because I left for here ... he was afraid I might have difficulties with .... I traveled with a lady who posed as my wife ... photos ... I could not bring them ... Rolando ... also I was delayed seriously the other night when I was coming ... the way is long but it is ... .

There is something else you might like to know ... I have had many contacts with him ... of course his attitude is still ... feels very bad ... also this becomes more serious owing to the situation ... that worries him very much because ... a letter to his wife ... some psychological trouble, nerves ... I have tried ... he did not send greetings because ... I remember all of you ... his attitude on the entire struggle, but I think he is ... it was then advisable ... send him a message by this same means of recorded tape. I have a Phillips tape recorder of standard size, not portable ... if you prepare a tape recording to tell him clearly and definitely ... decision, you can send it to me ... [Voice trails off.]

[Recording is now of conversation among several men.]

... they all sent letters asking that S.O.B. to ....

... in the morning, and that Pirulin was here as resident ...

... are agreed, that there are tactless people ... minimum salary to give the person enough to live on, pay for housing, eat, pay for his children's education ... sliding scale of wages ... money ... if life is inexpensive ... wages of 80 centavos for the peasant ... or 50 ... plantains ... she understands about that ... that BS ... hunger ... children's education...

... sliding wage scale ... minimum wages ... talked about "salario vital minimo," which is what a famility needs to support itself at today's cost of living levels. That, I can discuss as minimum wage.... Those are slogans for the struggle against capitalism. Capitalism is incapable of solving the problems of the masses. That is the basic problem.

... the worker gets 1.74 a day ... does not pay for housing. That has to be assured because ... workers of the "frutera" [UFCO, United Fruit Company] do not pay for housing, or electricity; that is, the only thing that he pays for is ... they give him food cards ... the only thing that the peasant ... "frutera" ... retirement is ... or else they give him nothing, blackball him ... lost his indemnity ... ... the peasant struggling for better wages ...

[Etc. One man does most of the talking, about the relative situation of the worker with regard to the UFCO, the union, and independent farming as to earnings, benefits, etc. They engage in an argumentative comparison of the treatment of the worker by the UFCO and the railroad company. Toward the end the discussion leads into the potential for revolution among the former and present workers of the UFCO.]

[After a blank space there is a lecture on the Guatemalan situation from its origins, starting with a detailed account of Columbus' voyages, Spain's exploitation, the plunder of the gold and riches of America, and the enslavement of the natives. The lecturer then shifts to present tasks of revolution. The intelligible points to be gleaned on this are as follows:]

"The main function of the guerrilla is to disrupt the regime, the capitalist system of private ownership." [The "disrupt the system" point is made also at the end as the gist of the lecture.] We must keep digging at the roots while shaking the trunk to cause it to fall. The newspapers declare that they are not allowed to publish interviews with guerrilla fighters, etc. Strikes are more frequent. The spirit of rebellion and disregard of law is spreading. We must encourage and exploit it.

Many people still think that the guerrillas are only supposed to kill soldiers. That is mistaken. We must get to the people and encourage their rebelliousness and opposition to the government, which is everywhere evident. The situation is deteriorating. The government of Peralta is not operating well. The guerrillas are playing an important role because they are [feeding] the people. They are not simply fighting; their role also is to solve problems for the people, to solve social difficulties for the people.

We must find out why the peasants do not respond the way they should to the guerrillas. There is strength for us and for the people in a close relationship. Thousands are watching us and what we do. In the villages we are welcomed because they realize we are fighting to solve their problems.

[End tape 1 - begin tape 2]

When the revolution is over, we are all going to solve our problems, the problems of all, not just of a few.

The struggle is going well; the government must be kept sharply conscious of us. Sometimes it seems no progress is being made, but from the standpoint of the revolutionary struggle it is being made. The thing is not to be discouraged but to be steadfast. For every 20 that the enemy kills, 100 will rise up.

[Quality of recording deteriorates so badly for a long stretch after this that summary is not feasible, as all crucial names (if any) and words are unintelligible. Then:] Strikes must be encouraged, because strikes go against the capitalist system, and what we want is to destroy, to replace the capitalist system. We want the means of production to be in the hands of the state controlled by the workers, for the benefit of all. The function of the guerrilla is to disrupt the regime, the social system. The revolution will continue for a long time. There is no way to stop it short of victory. [Occasional comments by the other two or three participants had been heard. More comments follow, all unintelligible as above.]

[A period of silence is followed by a series of recorded greetings, letters, other messages, short speeches, and songs, including mention of names and identities which are unintelligible.* The recording is poor, distorted, full of echoes. Upon the conclusion of this special section, there is a notable improvement in the tape quality, as reflected in the following pages.]

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* except for Marcantonio or Marco Antonio. Yon

Here ends the tape [recorded] by comrade [Calani]. [We appreciate] the material aid, the songs, the greetings, all of which make us firmer in the struggle and demonstrate that we are going well, that if the struggle was somewhat limited in the beginning it was because of lack of a clear program, of a line and of a program [several words] for which we are fighting. [The] last few words of comrade Rolando refer to [word], ~~is~~ to the takeover of power, although he does not make clear yet, at this time, the power for whom, to do what, but comrade Rolando [has a clearness] which we took to be emotion [toward?] the opening of the struggles for the socialist revolution. I can make no comment in this regard from the content of this tape, but [several words].

Before I say farewell, there are two points I was forgetting. By this courier we are sending No. 29 of [one word] Interno,* containing an article about the false Communism of the Russians and its historic lessons to the world. It is very important that the article be read, studied, and discussed there, because it will be material not only for our meeting but for further strengthening us in this line and in this program. Rich experiences [can] be gotten from it, so that we [words] some of the things pointed out here by the Chinese [words] the decay of the Russian Revolution represented by Khrushchev as the inheritor [continuador] of Stalin's bureaucratic line.

Also, I would like to read this note to you; I do not know whether you have received it. We, after my return from [word] [decided] to call a meeting of the [FAR]. We sent a message to comrade [Erlindo], to [Juan Chacon], and to [Mauricio]. Nobody showed up then. After eight days we again waited at the meeting place and [Mauricio] showed up. Before Mauricio arrived [Dondomita?] took this note to us, which I would like to read. It is dated 21 September 1964. It is a note which [Juan Chacon] sends to comrade Adan, and it reads as follows:

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* The [illegible] Peking [illegible]

> Compañero Comandante: I reiterate to you and the comrades our fraternal greeting and our wishes that you will [word] in a revolutionary manner for the good of the country. This is to ask you to issue instructions for a meeting of the titular leadership of the [FAR]. For that I shall go the place to which you may call me. I make this request because here the substitute command that had been operating since the event at [Simpa] ceased to operate at all for the last thirty days or longer. Also because since you, comrades of the Trece de Noviembre organization, publicly expressed your [word] toward us Communists, there have arisen problems which must be solved if unity is to continue. At a meeting of the titular command, with you in attendance, it shall be seen whether the problems arisen can be overcome or whether they are going to leave us disjointed [desarticulados], as we are now, with reference to the matters of major importance in our movement. Incidentally, the tasks assigned to the comrades as special responsibilities, are being carried out, so that the [FAR] [has been] operating in practice. However, it is not enough for each to carry his immediate tactical responsibilities. Matters [in prospect, or of perspective] have to be attended to, and these in the last few months, as I have said, have not been attended to with the proper authority and have been completely abandoned during the last month.
>
> Fraternal greeting.
>
> [Abencero Morit Kan?]

Copy to Armando and to Zona 3

That is all we got as their reply. So in effect they refuse to attend the meetings of the substitute command but want a meeting of the titular command. In that regard, the [several words] a meeting to [take up] the points, this note must be answered. The line that we conclude from this is the same line that they have tried to follow, that everything has been done by a small group, which is the group that is in the [city], that is directly with [Rudy], and that [it is Rudy] who has "disjointed", as they put it, all functioning of [words]. But now with the conversation held by comrade Adan the whole thing has been clarified and we are strong once more. In any event we have not failed to [ask them], including [several words] with comrade [Luz], so that in case of a meeting [they] would attend. We are ready to attend any meeting to which we are called; [we have] called them three times, and they have failed to attend in all three cases. Therefore we propose that this remain the way it is until we have met there, since [phrase].

These are the only --- the latest news; this courier has to leave. Before we close I shall save up some of the tape for a message comrade Jenaro has asked to be allowed to record. Since I have been working on this he came over and wants to send a greeting. So we shall listen to comrade Jenaro.

One more thing before Jenaro's message. In the event you wish to reply to the memorandum sent by [Juan Chacon], there will no objection on our part. We are at your service there, although [several words] the concrete statement of opinion that [several words]. What they are trying to do is [leave] us alone to see whether we are capable or incapable of continuing. They imagine that we going to be unable to get out even a bulletin or even less circulate anything, and that we would have to go looking for them. With these tactics of delay and of not attending the meetings they are trying to pressure us, to see --- to make us feel, they think, the need we have of them.

That is not the way the revolution is carried on; that is not the way the process can be advanced. But this we shall discuss up there. However, any decision you up there may want to make after discussion will be acceded to and respected by us.

Again I say farewell, with a fraternal, combative greeting to comrades Adan, Mateo, Marinero, [Sosa], and all the others who are there. Forward, comrades. Good health and good work.. Listen now to comrade [name].

[Another man:]

I greet you warmly, Mateo. I got your affectionate greeting, and we accepted it with love. It is actually [word], the manner, the assurance with which you express yourself, and we are working rather hard here, with great synchronisation and [word] and understanding of comrade [Rudy] and [pushing forward every task]. We are here to give impetus to the process, as you say, and we realise it.

Give my warm greeting to comrade Adan. I got his greeting also on the other recording. Greetings [grandes felicidades; probably congratulations intended] on the ~~sp~~ statement and the interview with the newsmen. Really, the statement and interview reveal great political maturity and demonstrate also the work being done by comrade Mateo with regard to the sharpening up [maduracion] of a team up there among the guerrillas.

To conclude: "abrazos" to both, comrades Mateo and Adan, although I do not have the pleasure of your personal acquaintance, but we are involved in the same enterprise, in the same great task of carrying out the socialist revolution in Guatemala. Forward, comrades. We shall soon see each other.

POR VICTOR RICO GALAN

En un editorial reciente, Siempre censuró con energía la conducta de nuestras autoridades policíacas en el aeropuerto, por los malos tratos y las vejaciones a que son sometidos los viajeros procedentes de ciertos países, sobre todo de Cuba y de España. Aceptaba nuestra revista como cosa normal la vigilancia sobre visitantes potencialmente peligrosos, pero acusaba a las innúmeras policías que el mexicano padece de realizar mal esa función o no realizarla en absoluto, a cambio de actuar con una insolencia y una prepotencia intolerables

Como por encargo, los acontecimientos posteriores han venido a darle a nuestro editorial más razón incluso de la que pretendía tener. El pasado día 7, un norteamericano que responde al nombre de Henry Agüeros Garcés, lanzó una granada de mano contra los talleres del periódico El Día, con intenciones verdaderamente siniestras: la granada fue lanzada en un lugar tal, que sólo la rápida intervención de los trabajadores del diario pudo evitar una catástrofe de *incalculables proporciones, de la que no estaría excluida* **la pérdida de muchas vidas humanas, tanto en el edificio del periódico, como en la zona aledaña.**

No se trataba, por otra parte, de un hecho único ni aislado. En fecha anterior, aunque reciente, el Instituto Mexicano-Ruso de Relaciones Culturales sufrió una agresión análoga, y el arma utilizada resultó ser idéntica —según la policía— a la que explotó en el patio de **El Día.** *Casi simultáneamente fue ametrallado el departamento que habitaba el corresponsal de la agencia yugoeslava* **Tanjug**, *y sólo la circunstancia de encontrarse en un quinto piso salvó la vida de su esposa, que bañaba a su hijita recién nacida, pues varios proyectiles de grueso calibre entraron por las ventanas y se alojaron en el techo de la habitación. En ambos casos, la lenidad y la indiferencia de la policía fueron evidentes. Ni aparecieron los culpables ni se hicieron investigaciones serias.*

Además, somos muchos los mexicanos que, por ocuparnos de cuestiones políticas nacionales e internacionales con un criterio opuesto al del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, recibimos un alud de amenazas y anónimos injuriosos, tanto por escrito como telefónicamente. La redacción de los anónimos y el lenguaje utilizado indica con claridad que son extranjeros quienes los hacen, y probablemente cubanos contrarrevolucionarios. Por [illegible] son del dominio público, es indiscutible que decir contrarrevolucionarios cubanos equivale a decir Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) de los Estados Unidos.

La ola de violencia, espionaje y amenazas ha llegado a un punto tal, que motivó una carta del director de la revista **Política** a las autoridades responsables, exigiendo que se aplique la ley a los autores de tales hechos delictuosos y denunciando los catastróficos efectos que para el país puede tener el tolerarlos. Sin embargo nada se había hecho hasta que se produjo el atentado contra **El Día** y fue capturado su autor.

Capturado, no como resultado de investigaciones policíacas, sino gracias a la diligencia de un joven obrero de los talleres de El Día, que lo persiguió y le dio alcance. Porque Henry Agüeros Garcés entró en México como Pedro por su casa, no fue molestado por policía alguno, no fue fotografiado en frontera ni aeropuerto, y pudo incluso utilizar un nombre falso para obtener alojamiento en un hotel. ¿Y cómo no? Las vejaciones a ciudadanos extranjeros que nos visitan tienen un reverso: el trato obsequioso y hasta abyecto que se da a los ciudadanos norteamericanos. Esos mismos polizontes que tan groseros y bestiales se muestran con quienes vienen de Cuba o de España son la imagen misma de la amabilidad y la obsecuencia cuando el que llega tiene una tarjeta de turista que lo acredita como norteamericano.

Ser norteamericano es, en México, una patente de corso. Y eso, a pesar de que por la frontera norte o en los vuelos internacionales que del norte proceden llega a México la peor gentuza. Hágase una estadística de los delitos cometidos en nuestro país por extranjeros, y se verá que los yanquis se llevan la palma, con cifras imposibles de igualar, y con crímenes cuya degradación moral es también inigualable. Todo lo cual prueba hasta qué punto era justa la censura a la policía que hacía SIEMPRE! *en su editorial ya citado: es una policía que injuria, humilla y veja, pero que no investiga los delitos reales y mucho menos es capaz de prevenirlos.*

Queda por aclarar hasta dónde esas innumerables policías mexicanas —ilegales y por eso imposibles de controlar legalmente— están penetradas por la CIA, la FBI, y otras agencias extranjeras dedicadas al terrorismo, al espionaje y a sembrar la zozobra en todas partes. Queda por aclarar hasta dónde de ese norte revuelto y brutal que nos desprecia, como decía Martí, es el que verdaderamente dirige a polizontes cuyos sueldos legales difícilmente justifican el derroche y el lujo en el que viven. Quedan por aclarar muchas cosas, si de verdad se quiere cumplir la prome- [illegible]

RICO-Galan, Victor aka 201-336474
Armando CONTE

As of June 1965, Subject was reported to be a member of the FEP and an enemy of the PPS.

HMMA 28329
19 Feb 66
LITEMPO

Traveled from Cuba to Mexico via Cubana airlines 11 Feb 66.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO : RID/201 Section

DATE

1. ACTION: OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE ☐

FROM:

ROOM NO.

PHONE

CHECK 2-4 FOR 201 REQUEST. DO NOT CHECK FOR IDN.

2. EXCLUDE TRUE NAME FROM MACHINE LIST: YES ☐ NO ☐

3. RESTRICTED: YES ☐ NO ☐

4. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES ☐ NO ☐

5. 201 NO.

IDN NO.

6. SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE

7. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)

8. SEX: M ☐ F ☐

9. PHOTO: YES ☐ NO ☐

NAME VARIANT				VARIATIONS IN BIO. DATA
10 TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	

11. DATE OF BIRTH: D M Y

12. COUNTRY OF BIRTH

13. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

14. COUNTRY OF LOCATION

CODE

15. CITIZENSHIP

16. AFFILIATION CODE P B PATTERN ONLY

17. ADDITIONAL CODES - P B PATTERN ONLY

63	64	65		66	67	68	69	70	71		72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

18. ORGANIZATIONAL OR GROUP AFFILIATION (Clear text)

19. ORG/GROUP CODE

20. OCCUPATION/POSITION (Clear text)

21. OCC/POS ABBREVIATION

22. ACTION DESK

23. CODE

24. SECONDARY DESK

25. CODE

26. CRYPTONYM

27. PSEUDONYM

28. COMMENTS

CS COPY

29. SIGNATURE

30. IDN-

201-

FORM 3-61 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (38)

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Victor Rico Galan Vol II
201-336474

INCLUSIVE DATES: 15 Jan 1965 - 7 Jan 1970
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: CI/EXD
ROOM: 3D57

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
			NOT REVIEWED BY HSCA

[illegible]

Vol II other Agency 201-336974

1. Dept. of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State. 16 Aug. 1966., Mexico 927.
2. Dept. of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State; Mexico 878, 13 Aug. 1966.
3. Dept of State telegram from Mexico to Sec. State. Mexico 879, 13 Aug. 1966.
4. Dept. of Justice, File # A 13 139 607 - dated 4/2/65. Subject - Rico-Galan, Victor
5. ~~Dept of State~~ Airgram from Merida to Dept. of State; Subject: Victor Rico Galan Again. A-31, 10 Feb 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
	1. RI FILE NO.		
	2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO-GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-008
HMM -14143
07 JAN 70

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO TOOK AN OUTSTANDING ROLE IN THE PRISON RIOTS

R 7001220444

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-009-008
MEXI-02201
03 JAN 70

CIT ?
OCC ?
MEXICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS

R 7001271816

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ⇨

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRIORITY	ACTION	ACTION MARKED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan (201-336474)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated.

Attached for both addressees are copies of a brief biographic sketch on Victor RICO Galan. As can be seen from the sketch, Headquarters knows something of his activities, but next to nothing about the man himself. During the discussion of the problem of RICO Galan at the recent CP Operations Seminar in Mexico City it was mentioned that both LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 were personally acquainted with him; perhaps these two sources could provide some impressions of RICO Galan that would flesh out this skeleton sketch.

for
CHESTER D. DAINOLD

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
2 - Mexi, w/1 cc att h/w
1 - Guat, w/1 cc att h/w

201-13422

1a 74

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
24 February 65	25 FEB 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW - 13422 CS COPY

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
	Carley		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

ROUTING AND INITIAL

SECRET

24 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474)

1. DPOB: 6 February 1928; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHIER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4. OCCUPATION: Writer for Siempre and Politica magazines in Mexico City; both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5. PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963).

6. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AND INCLINATIONS: As of 1962 Subject was the head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in Mexico City, a rabidly anti-U.S. and pro-Castro organization. Subject is close to Fidel Castro and company, and is considered as a Cuban "agent" (degree of Cuban control unknown). Subject was a founding member of the MLN. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, leftist former President of Mexico. This would have provided, in his belief, the Mexican left a political organization truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary because the MLN, whose membership covers the spectrum of Mexican Communist Party to PRI, could not take open political stands without antagonizing some of the membership. The new party would have represented a "third position", socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With a party such as this as its political action arm, the MLN would have developed naturally into a broad national movement such as the FRAP in Chile. (Some specious reasoning here.)

7. TRAVEL:

   A) To Cuba:

      1) July 1962 - return date unknown
      2) 2 October 1962 - returned Mexico December 1962
      3) 25 May 1963 - returned Mexico 22 June 1963
      4) 28 January 1964 - returned Mexico 25 February 1964

SECRET

Att to HMMW 13422

201-13422

B) Other:

1) Arrived Guatemala City 3 (8?) October 1963
2) Arrived Tegucigalpa 11 October 1963; left 13 October 1963
3) Arrived Managua 13 October 1963; left 17 October 1963
4) Arrived San Jose 17 October 1963; left 20 October 1963
5) Arrived Panama City 20 October 1963; left 22 October 1963
6) Arrived Caracas 22 October 1963; left 12 November 1963
7) Arrived Rio de Janeiro 12 November 1963
8) Arrived Buenos Aires 4 December 1963; left 12 December 1963
9) Arrived Santiago 12 December 1963; left 16 December 1963
10) Arrived Lima 17 December 1963
11) Arrived La Paz 17 December 1963; left 20 December 1963
12) Arrived Lima 20 December 1963
13) Departed Merida 8 January 1964
14) Arrived Santo Domingo 8 January 1964 (via Kingston); left 15 January 1964 for Mexico City (via Kingston)

Ingeborg Diener de RICO Galan, Subject's wife, traveled from Mexico to Cuba in November 1962. Subject was at that time in Cuba.

8. PASSPORT: Subject formerly carried Mexican passport number 57115, with Cuban courtesy visas. On 9 September 1963 Subject was issued Mexican passport number 56341 (or 53641).

9. ACTIVITIES: The reason for the October 1962 trip to Cuba was ostensibly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. The May/June 1963 trip was to interview Fidel Castro after his return from the Soviet Union. Subject claimed that he had spent eight days with Fidel during that visit, five of those aboard ship.

On 24 October 1963 HYSAGE-1 in Panama City reported that Subject had received an operational assignment from Castro (during the May/June 1963 visit to Habana) on which to travel through Central and South America. His mission was to persuade leftist parties to immediately begin acts of sabotage and violence, and to try to maintain these in order to take pressure off Venezuela. Subject was also instructed to bring about better unity among competing leftist factions to ensure greater impact for their work. Subject did, in fact, contact many Communist Party and leftist leaders during his Central and South America travel during the period October 1963 - January 1964. From the (fragmentary) reporting on Subject from October 1963 through January 1964 it appears that he did discuss the question of leftist unity.

10. In October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from the guerrillas in operations subsequent to a guerrilla attack on a garrison in Panzos, Alta Verapaz. Included in those tapes was one made by RICO Galan for delivery to the guerrillas. It consists mainly of an exhortation for unity (among the PGT and the 13 November Group)

and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

11. There is little at hand to indicate what manner of man is RICO Galan. His 201 file reflects facts but not impressions. He apparently is known personally by LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 in Mexico City, and these two sources should be queried.

14-00000

SECRET

24 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-334174)

1. DPOB: 6 February 1925; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHIER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4. OCCUPATION: Writer for *Siempre* and *Politica* magazines in Mexico City; both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5. PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963).

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and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

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14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
Memo for the Record	28 January 1969	200	-124	-162	/4

DOC. SUBJECT
Prensa Latina Study page 11

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

Please see document for further details.

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				

SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)
RICO Galan, Victor

201-330474

FORM 8-60 867 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-004-110
HMMA-36225A01
15 JAN 69

CIT ?
OCC ?
< MEXICO AMONG PERSONS BEING DETAINED BY
MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES CONSISTING OF
THOSE INVOLVED IN RECENT STUDENT
DISTURBANCES OR WHO HAVE VISITED EACH
PRISONER

R 6901280513

FILE IN 201- 336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

4. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

2. ANALYST

3. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO RE LIBERATED AND DETAINED PRISONERS

050-004-110
HMMA-36140A02
02 JAN 69
P1

R 6901140772

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

12: sec

↓

OIRW-26723,
dated 17 January 1968
(sensitive document)

201-236417

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

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RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474                          201-086191
SEX M DOB ?                         DBC -28004
                                    27 AUG 68
CIT ?                               FBI
OCC ?                               P3
RE CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO CAPUANO DEL VECCHIO
201-086191/
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R 6809181114

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE (20) TOTAL COPIES -3-

SECRET

☑ COPY ☐

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECEIPT ☑ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X-REF TO FILE NO

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19

FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT WH

TIME 0400

INFO
VR. FILE, C1, C1/OPS, C1/IC 2, F1, F1/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, SR 8

AH M	FI
PS bn	~~DEST~~
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX ✗

1P

SECRET 120110Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3374

12 MAY 65 IN 64770

NO NIGHT ACTION

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN FROM 1325 5 MAY TO 0625 6 MAY.

A. VALENTIN (PRESUMABLY VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV 201-281100) TO RICO, WHO IS NOT IN.

B. JOVAN MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC ASKS RICO HOW SITUATION LOOKS TO HIM. RICO DOES NOT THINK THEY (U.S.) WILL LEAVE THERE (D.R.) MIRIC THINKS WILL BE A LONG TERM THING. RICO ASKS IF OAS WILL APPROVE THE FORCE THERE. MIRIC SAYS YES THEY HAVE THE MAJORITY OF VOTES; SINCE D.R. DOES NOT VOTE NOTHING CAN BE DONE. RICO THINKS DOMINICANS ARE HANDLING THINGS WELL. MIRIC THINKS THIS CEASE FIRE IS DANGEROUS ... THINGS QUIET DOWN ... A COUP D'ETAT COULD TAKE PLACE. MIRIC IS GOING TO BE VERY BUSY WITH CEPAL MEETING STARTING TOMORROW. MIRIC SSYS ONE CAN GET ACCREDITED TO GO INTO SESSIONS. IF HE IS NOT ACCREDITED, CAN GET MATERIALS.

2. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

SECRET

CFN

MICROFILMED
JUN 14 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

12 May 65

201-336474

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
MEXICAN COMMUNIST JOURNALIST.
RE COVERAGE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN FROM CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN RICO GALAN AND CORDERO.

022-009-013
MEXI-03312
07 MAY 65
PI

R 6507071571

201-336474

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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SECRET 311545Z CITE SANTIAGO 2683 (THILLEN ACTING) 31 Aug 66 IN 86841

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 8416 (IN 85359)

B. SANTIAGO 2665 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY) (IN 84645)

C. DIRECTOR 30551

1. IN DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PRESS PLAY AND LIAISON WE WOULD OPT FOR LIAISON THIS CASE WITH SUGGESTION TO FUBRIAR-7 THAT MATERIAL BE PASSED TO FREI AND FURTHER COMMENT THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF GOC WISHED USE FOR PRESS PLAY. THIS WOULD END ANY OPPORTUNITY WE WOULD HAVE FOR EVENTUAL UNILATERAL PRESS PLAY (EXCEPT FOR REPLAY OTHER STATIONS PLACEMENTS). GIVEN PRESENT STATE OF CHILEAN/CUBAN RELATIONS CHANCES FIFTY-FIFTY GOC MAY CHOOSE PLAY SO WE CAN HAVE CAKE AND EAT IT.

2. AS NOTED REF B OUR PLOY IS TO USE MATERIAL TO PERSUADE FUBRIAR-7 OF NEED TO ASSIGN AT LEAST TWO FULL TIME OFFICERS TO NUT GROUP AGENT RECRUITMENT IN LINE WITH OUR AGREED POSITION THAT NUT GROUP COVERAGE MORE ECONOMICALLY AND EFFECTIVELY HANDLED BY FUBRIARS IF CAN BE PERSUADED TAKE MATTER SERIOUSLY. WISH GO ONE ADDITIONAL STEP AND OFFER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO SANTIAGO 2683 SECRET

TRAIN TWO SELECTED OFFICERS (IF FUBRIAR-7 GOES ALONG) IN ZRMETAL AT EARLIEST DATE.

3. REQUEST HQS REACTION ABOVE PROPOSAL SOONEST. IN INTERIM STATION WILL BEGIN PUTTING MATERIAL TOGETHER.

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Siempre
n 688
[illegible] 1966

Victor
Rico Galán

TODAVIA, LA OSCURIDAD

Rico Galán, incomunicación.

Hasta el sábado 20, la situación fue muy confusa en torno a las detenciones efectuadas por la policía del DF —el viernes 12— bajo los cargos de subversión y acopio de armas, entonces aún no configurados como delitos específicos. El paso del asunto a la Procuraduría General de la República y la consignación de ésta al juez segundo de Distrito del DF en Materia Penal, puso en claro, por ejemplo cuántos y quiénes son exactamente los detenidos. Las versiones atribuían números variables de acusados, quienes por fin, ante el juez, resultaron 46 por lo que se refiere a los que permanecieron más de una semana en los separos de la Jefatura de Policía.

A medida que pasaban los días —cada jornada salpicada por un amplio boletín de prensa de la Jefatura de la Policía— se fueron conociendo detalles, siempre pasados por el tamiz de los órganos policíacos, para quienes su actividad había de fundarse en el mayor acopio de hechos y declaraciones. Se vio entonces que las tendencias y actividades expuestas incluso en las informaciones policíacas no eran igualmente graves ni reprimibles, en el mismo grado desde el momento en que 17 de los apresados quedaron en libertad el sábado 20; otros 20 serían juzgados por el único delito de conspiración, con derecho a obtener inmediatamente la libertad, mediante fianzas variables; y 9, los consignados por tres delitos: conspiración, incitación a la conspiración y acopio de armas, quedarían presos a disposición del juez que dictaría el auto de formal prisión, sin el beneficio de la libertad provisional en ningún caso.

Las informaciones de la Policía resumían las impugnaciones a la existencia de un grupo llamado Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, que, en dos casas alquiladas —llamadas una "escuela Hidalgo", la otra "escuela Morelos"—, en las cuáles —decía— se hablaba de la organización de la lucha armada para el derrocamiento del gobierno de México. Nuestro colaborador Víctor Rico Galán y el Lic. Raúl Ugalde —quien fue dirigente del Frente Electoral del Pueblo— eran señalados como los dirigentes y principales responsables. La policía hablaba también de prácticas de tiro, y con alarde de su eficacia, daba cuenta de que tenía en sus manos el asunto y a los participantes, desde hacía 5 meses. A no pocos de los detenidos se les mencionaba como declarantes contra Rico Galán, al indicárselo por ellos como responsable principal. Incluso se dijo que la hermana de nuestro colaborador, la señora Ana María Rico Galán, había declarado contra éste inculpándolo de ser quien le explicó el manejo de armas.

Un amparo interpuesto por el abogado Juan Manuel Gómez Gutiérrez, mediante el cual un juez dictó la suspensión provisional de los actos, determinando que los detenidos quedaran a su disposición embrolló momentáneamente las cosas desde el punto de vista jurídico, por cuanto los retenía en los separos de la Jefatura, adonde hubieron de acudir los funcionarios y actuarios de la Procuraduría. Sólo el desistimiento del amparo podía encaminar a los 9 consignados sin derecho a libertad provisional, y a los 20 que no hubieran presentado las fianzas, a la cárcel preventiva de la ciudad.

El juez segundo de Distrito, Lic. Rafael Pérez Miravete, con apoyo en la consignación y en las respectivas tipificaciones de delitos hechas por la Procuraduría General, comenzó a despachar la fase de declaraciones preparatorias. La mayoría de los indicados no aceptaron como suyas las declaraciones presentadas por la Policía, aunque estaban calzadas con las respectivas firmas. Habían rendido esas declaraciones en condiciones morales terribles, bajo incomunicación, en diligencias que duraron toda una semana. El Lic. Ugalde aceptó toda la responsabilidad. él era el fundador del Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo, su dirigente principal, y había comenzado por elaborar documentos que abordan los problemas económicos y sociales del país. Ugalde había invitado a nuestro colaborador Víctor Rico Galán, a su hermana y a otras personas, a formar parte de esas discusiones que se hacían en las mencionadas "escuelas". Ugalde afirmó que el MRP es "una organización lícita, creada en ejercicio de derechos constitucionales irrenunciables".

Nuestro colega Rico Galán se negó a declarar el sábado 20. No lo haría hasta que no pudiera hablar con su abogado, y le fuera totalmente levantada la incomunicación. Rico dijo: "He estado 8 días incomunicado, salvo algunos minutos en que por un amparo dictado por el juez primero de Distrito, se me permitió hablar con mi esposa, pero con un testigo, un agente de la Jefatura de Policía; por tanto, no estoy en condiciones de declarar hasta poder hablar con mis abogados". Víctor se quejó también de haber estado 36 horas sin comer en un separo sin agua; de haber sido víctima de presiones morales, como la detención de su hermano Fernando —enfermo del corazón— quien, por cierto, estaba ya entre los 17 que habían puesto en libertad. Esta comunicación de Rico Galán con el exterior produjo en él emociones naturales, al conocer, por primera vez, qué otras personas estaban detenidas y por qué. Rico Galán no fue detenido en las "escuelas" donde según la policía había armas y una bomba, sino en el aeropuerto cuando iba a despedir a su hermano Fernando, quien viajaba a Cuba, para residir allí definitivamente.

El lunes 22 de agosto, los consignados debían pasar a la cárcel preventiva. Al entrar el proceso en términos de mayor normalidad, y cauces de ley, la opinión pública esperaba conocer mejor qué había, en realidad, en el fondo de lo que fue considerado como una "conspiración" por la policía, y hasta qué punto se estaban o no violando derechos individuales y constitucionales.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
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S E C R E T 300103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8416 MEXI

30 Aug 66 IN 85559

CARACAS, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY, SAO PAULO, RIO DE JANEIRO, LA PAZ, PANAMA CITY, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, BUENOS AIRES,

INFO DIRECTOR

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ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

PSYCH RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY

SECTION ONE ~~OF~~ TWO of 2

REF: DIRECTOR 30551

1. PURSUANT REF, FOLLOWING IS SYNOPSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE, FOLLOWING UP BASIC INFO RELAYED PER REF PARA 2.

2. IN 16 AUGUST PRESS RELEASE MEXICO CITY POLICE STATED THAT 6 OF THE 49 PERSONS ARRESTED FOR SUBVERSION HAD ADMITTED CONDUCTING A SCHOOL OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AIMED AT OVERTHROWING THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. IN SEPARATE RELEASE POLICE ISSUED EXTRACTS OF STATEMENTS QUOTED THE SIX AS SAYING THEIR SCHOOL HELD CLASSES IN TERRORISM, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ, WHO, TOGETHER WITH VICTOR RICO GALAN, WAS ONE OF TWO LEADERS OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL GROUP, ADMITTED GUERRILLA SCHOOL WAS ORGANIZED AND RUN BY CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION CALLED "MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO," WHOSE TACTICS INCLUDED USE OF VIOLENT MEANS TO PRODUCE A "POPULAR AND DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION" IN MEXICO.

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY POLICE RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR RICO GALAN:

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"TUVO CONOCIMINENTO DE LA INTEGRACION DE LAS ESCUELAS DENOMINADAS HIDALGO Y MORELOS, DONDE VIVIAN DIVERSAS PERSONAS, PRINCIPALMENTE DE ORIGEN CAMPESINO. EL LICENCIADO RAUL UGALDE LO INVITO A LA INAUGURACION DE LAS MIMAS, PERO QUE NO PUDO ASISTIR POR ENFERMEDAD. POSTERIORMENTE, A INSTANCIAS DEL LICENCIADO UGALDE, ACEPTO DAR PLATICAS DIARIAS, EN LAS CITADAS ESCUELAS, SOBRE ECONOMIA POLITICA, SOBRE E M MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO INTERNACIONAL Y SOBRE LA NECESIDAD DE UNA TRANSFORMACION DEL GOBIERNO ACTUAL, RECURRIENDO A LA VIOLENCIA Y A LA LUCHA ARMADA, SIEMPRE Y CUANDO EL GOBIERNO LLEGARA A EJERCER UNA PRESION CONTRA EL PUEBLO DE CARACTER VIOLENTO.

" ACEPTO HABER USADO EL SEUDONIMO DE 'MARIO".

"EN SUS PLATICAS HIZO ALUSION A SUS EXPERIENCIAS EN LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS ADQUIRIDA EN SU CALIDAD DE PERIODISTA CUANDO ESTUVO EN GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, SANTO DOIMNGO Y NICARAGUA.

"LAS EXPLICACIONES QUE EL DIO A LOS ASISTENTES A DICHAS ESCUELAS SOBRE LA INTENSIDAD DESTRUCTIVA DE LA DINAMITA Y EL USO DEL PLASTICO QUE COMO EXPLOSIVO USABAN LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL EN VENEZUELA, FUE DEBIDO A QUE LOS ALUMNOS LO INTERROGARON RESPECTO AL USO DE BOMBAS MOLOTOV Y OTROS EXPLOSIVOS.

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INSTRUYO A LOS ALUMNOS SOBRE EL ARME Y DESARME DE LOS MISMOS.

"MANIFESTO ADEMAS QUE DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA INMEDIATO ES NECESARIO UNA TRANSFORMACION DEMOCRATICA DEL GOBIERNO MEXICANO Y, DE NO SER ASI, EN FORMA MEDIATA UTILIZANDO LA VIOLENCIA ARMADA."

4. ACCORDING TO OTHER STATEMENTS MADE BY THE CONSPIRATORS, THE RICO GALAN GROUP USED BOOK ON GUERRILLA WARFARE BY CHE GUEVARA IN THEIR CLASS DISCUSSIONS. ALONG WITH THEORETICAL INSTRUCTION THE GROUP WAS GIVEN LESSONS ON DISSASSEMBLING AND ASSEMBLING PISTOLS AND RIFLES, MANUFACTURE AND USE OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS, TIME BOMBS AND PLASTIC BOMBS OF MURIATIC ACID. REFERENCES TO GUERRILLA EXPERIENCES IN GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, SANTO DOMINGO AND NICARAGUA WERE MADE DURING THE COURSES. ONE MEMBER OF THE GROUP, A FARMER, TESTIFIED HE HAD BEEN PAID TO ATTEND THE COURSES AND PREVENTED FROM LEAVING THE RESIDENCE WHERE THE CLASSES WERE GIVEN.

⑤ ON 22 AUGUST A MEXICO CITY JUDGE RETURNED INDICTMENTS AGAINST 27 OF THE ACCUSED PLOTTERS. NINE OF THE RINGLEADERS WERE INDICATED ON THREE COUNTS OF CONSPIRACY, INCITEMENT TO REBELLION AND ACCUMULATION OF ARMS. SENTENCES ON THESE COUNTS COULD TOTAL UP TO 18 YEARS IN PRISON FOR EACH OF THE NINE. THE NINE WERE VICTOR RICO GALAN, RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN (VICTOR'S SISTER), CARLOS AGUILERA DELGADILLO, GILBERTO BALAM PEREYRA, DR. MIGUEL CRUZ RUIZ, GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS, DR. ROLD MAINERS HUEBNER AND ISAIAS ROJAS DELGADO. IN HANDLING DOWN THESE INDICTMENTS THE JUDGE STATED THAT THE CHARGES AGAINST THESE NINE BY THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WERE PROVEN BEYOND A DOUBT. FOLLOWING MEXICAN LEGAL PROCEDURES, THE FINAL VERDICT ON THESE NINE WILL BE HANDED DOWN BEFORE THE END OF TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD FOLLOWING THEIR ARREST. OF THE REMAINING 27 ARRESTEES, 18 WERE HELD ON 100,000 PESO BAIL ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRACY AND TWO WERE RELEASED.

6. SUPPLEMENTING ABOVE, POUCHING ADDEES 30 AUGUST FULL TEXT OF COURT STATEMENTS AGAINST RICO GALAN AND CO-CONSPIRATORS.

7. TO HELP ADDEES TAILOR RICO GALAN CASE TO LOCAL SITUATIONS, PER MEXICO CITY 8354 PARA 2-B, STATION ALSO POUCHING WITH PARA 6 TEXT COPIES OF "PORTRAIT OF A CASTRO-COMMUNIST," A SIX-PAGE BIOGRAPHIC HISTORY OF RICO GALAN, AS OF AUGUST 1965, IN WHICH HIS CONNECTIONS WITH CASTRO AND LA GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ARE DESCRIBED. ADDEES CAN SELECT AND USE THIS MATERIAL FREELY IN PROP PLACEMENT OR VIA LIAISON, BUT IN LATTER CASE VERBATIM PASSAGE SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

8. FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE APPEAR PROVIDE GOOD PEGS FOR ADDEE EXPLOITATION GEARED TO "CASTRO EXPORTS REVOLUTION"

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 8416 SECRET

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THEME:

A. RICO GALAN HAS BEEN EXPOSED AS ONE OF CASTRO'S MOST IMPORTANT AGENTS AND CHANNELS FOR FORMENTING REVOLUTION AGAINST DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA. HIS PAST ACTIVITIES INDICATE HE REGARDED MEXICO ONLY AS A BASE OF OPS, A SPRINGBOARD, FOR LARGER HEMISPHERE OPERATIONS ON BEHALF CASTRO.

B. ALTHOUGH RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS CASTROITE, TROTSKYITE AND PRO-CHICOM, HIS CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACTS WITH LOCAL CUBAN EMBASSY AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS INDICATE HIS CONTINUING LOYALTY AND ADHERANCE TO CASTRO IN THIS CONNECTION A CURRENT MEXICAN NEWSPAPER ITEM DISCLOSED THAT RICO GALAN WAS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CASTRO AS FAR BACK AS 1956, WHEN CASTRO AND HIS FOLLOWERS WERE HIDING OUT IN MEXICO AND UNDERGOING TRAINING IN GUERRILLA TACTICS AT A RANCH NEAR AYOTZINGO IN MEXICO. THIS AYOTZINGO GROUP LATER FORMED THE EXPEDITION THAT SAILED ON THE "GRANMA" FROM TAMPICO, MEXICO, AND ULTIMATELY OVERTHREW THE BATISTA GOVERNMENT.

C. A NEWS REPORT FROM CARACAS REPLAYED LOCALLY STATES THAT THE VENEZUELAN JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION (ASOCIACION VENEZOLANA DE PERIODISTAS) HAS SENT A TELEGRAM TO MEXICAN PRESIDENT GUSTAVO

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FINAL SECTION OF TWO

DIAZ ORDAZ, PROTESTING RICO GALAN'S ARREST. THE LOCAL NEWS ITEMS QUOTED "INFORMED PERSONS" IN MEXICO TO EFFECT THAT ELEAZAR DIAZ RANGEL, PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION, IS A MEMBER OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY WHO WAS RECENTLY RELEASED FROM SAN CARLOS MILITARY PRISON IN VENEZUELA WHERE HE WAS IMPRISONED ON CHARGES OF CONSPIRING AGAINST THE LEONI GOVERNMENT. CARACAS STATION MAY BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON DIAZ RANGEL -- RICO GALAN TIE TO DOCUMENT HEMISPHERIC IMPLICATIONS OF RICO GALAN CASE.

D. COMMON PEG FOR ADDEE EXPLOITATION IS FACT THAT RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY, LIKE OTHER SIMILAR RECENT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LA COUNTIRES, WAS APPARENTLY HATCHED AND GUIDED BY TRI-CONTINENT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS EMANATING FROM HAVANA. FOLLOWING EXCERPTS FROM LEAD EDITORIAL IN 19 AUGUST EDITION OF PROMINENT MEXICO CITY DAILY NOVEDADES MAY SERVE AS PEG FOR ADDEE TIE-IN WITH LOCAL JMFRACAS ACTIONS. TITLED "ARTIFICO Y FONDO DE UNA CONJURA," EDITORIAL STATES: "LA INFORMACION QUE AYER PROPORCIONO NOVEDADES ACERCA DE QUE LOS TERRORISTAS SINDICADOS -- CON PRUEBAS TAN ABUNDANTES QUE LLEGAN HASTA LA CONFESION -- DE PRETENDER ATENTAR CONTRA LAS INSTITUCIONES Y SERVICIOS OFICIALES Y PRIVADOS, HABIAN SIDO YA PUESTOS A DISPOSICION DE LA PROCURADURIA

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PAGE A MEXICO CITY 8416 S E C R E T SECRET

GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA, NO CIERRA, SINO APENAS INAUGURA UN NUEVO CAPITULO PROCESAL DE ESTE PROGRAMA EXTREMISTA. NO PUEDE PREVERSE LO QUE SAQUEN A LUZ LAS INVESTIGACIONES JUDICIALES EN CUANTO A CONEXIONES E IMPLICACIONES; PERO LO EVIDENTE ES QUE NO SE PUEDE NI SE DEBE TOMAR COMO UN HECHO SIN IMPORTANCIA, O JOCOSO, O INGENUO, LA ACTIVIDAD DE ESTE GRUPO DE CONJURADOS, PORQUE YA HABIAN LOGRADO ENFOCAR SU INTREPIDA ACCION CONTRA LOS SERVICIOS Y EL ORDEN PUBLICOS, PLANES DE TERRORISMO DIRIGIDOS CONTRA LA TRANQUILIDAD Y EL BIENESTAR DE TODOS LOS MEXICANOS...NO ES EXACTAMENTE CIERTO QUE MEXICO ESTE AL MARGEN DE LOS PROGRAMAS SUBVERSIVOS INTERNACIONALES. LOS CASOS DE VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, PERU Y OTROS, ARROJAN SUFICIENTE CLARIDAD SOBRE LOS LINEAMIENTOS ESTABLECIDOS EN EL EXTERIOR PARA PERTURBA EL ORDEN SOCIAL Y POLITICO Y PONER A LATINOAMERICA ENTERA EN CONDICIONES SUBVERSIVAS. EN EL FONDO SO SE HA DESCUBIERTO NADA EN CONDICIONES SUBVERSIVAS. EN EL FONDO SO SE HA DESCUBIERTO NADA QUE NO SE SUPIERA YA, PORQUE NO SON UN SECRETO, NI MUCHO MENOS, LOS PLANES DE TERROR ADOPTADOS EN LA CELEBRE CONFERENCIA TRICONTINENTAL DE LA HABANA, AUSPICIADA POR CASTRO EN ENERO DE ESTE ANO. CUALQUIERA PUEDE ENTERARSE DE ESAS DIRECTRICES, QUE BUSCAN PESCAR EN EL RIO REVUELTO DEL CAOS, PORQUE HAN TENIDO SUFICIENTE PUBLICIDAD."

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PAGE 8 MEXICO CITY 8416 S E C R E T

E. GUATEMALA CITY STATION EMPHASIS ON RICO GALAN'S 1964 TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND CONTACT WITH YON SOSA WOULD BE DESIRABLE AS BASIS OTHER STATION PICK-UP AND REPLAY TO DOCUMENT RICO GALAN'S ACTIVIST ROLE AS CASTRO AGENT USING MEXICO AS BASE OF OPS. SIMILARLY, RICO GALAN TRIPS TO PANAMA, GUATEMALA, COSTA RICA, VENEZUELA, NICARAGUA, BRAZIL (IN 1963) AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN DOMINICAN REBELLION (BEGINNING JAN 1964) MAY PROVIDE PEGS FOR OTHER STATION FOLLOW-UP AND EXPLOITATION. DETAILS THESE ASPECTS INCLUDED IN PARA 7 "PORTRAIT" OF RICO GALAN BEING POUCHED ADDEES.

F. ADDEE EXPLOTITATION SHOULD INCLUDE CONGRATULATORY COMMENTS ON SWIFT AND EFFICIENT ACTION TAKEN BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES AGAINST RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY. MANNER IN WHICH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NIPPED THIS SUBVERSIVE GROUP IN BUD SHOULD SERVE AS EXAMPLE FOR OTHER LA GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WITH DEFENSE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. AT SAME TIME, FACT THAT RICO GALAN GROUP AIMED AT VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT SHOWS THAT CASTRO HAS ADDED MEXICO TO LIST OF TRI-CONTINENT TARGETS IN LATIN AMERICA. FACT THAT MEXICO IS ONLY LA COUNTRY MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND IS SERVING CASTRO WELL AS OPEN DOOR TO ENABLE CASTRO TO CHANNEL REVOLUTION TO OTHER CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTIRES DOES NOT

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APPEAR TO HAVE EXEMPTED MEXICO FROM CUBAN-DIRECTED SUBVERSION AIMED AT EXPORTING CASTRO'S REVOLUTION TO MEXICO ITSELF. IN LIGHT RICO GALAN CASE, MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED IN TAKING ANOTHER HARD LOOK AT THE SO-CALLED ADVANTAGES OF MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH CASTRO.

9. WILL ADVISE ADDEES ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RICO GALAN CASE WHICH MAY PROVIDE BASIS FOLLOW-UP REPLAY AND EXPLOITATION YOUR AREAS. REQUESTS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INFO OR ELABORATION ON ASPECTS OF CASE WHICH MAY BE APPLICABLE SPECIFIC ADDEE SITUATIONS WOULD BE WELCOME. ADVISE ACTIONS TAKEN. RELAY ALL CLIPS LATERALLY AND MEXICO CITY FOR POSSIBLE LOCAL REPLAY.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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COUNTRY	Mexico	REPORT NO.	CS-311/11736-66
SUBJECT	Treatment of Victor Rico Galan, Imprisoned Leftist Journalist	DATE DISTR.	29 August 1966
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	12-17 August 1966		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-10619

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, with whom he disagrees politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained both from Mrs. Rico Galan and from Francisco Martinez de la Vega.

1. Francisco Martinez de la Vega, writer for Siempre, Mexican leftist magazine, said that Colonel Eduardo Estrada Ojeda, in the police headquarters where Victor Rico Galan and others were being held after their arrest on charges of subversion, had been instructed to permit Rico Galan to receive packages from his wife.

2. Elena Garro,[1] writer, told Mrs. Rico Galan that she was going to speak to Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria to persuade him to ensure that Rico Galan would not be manhandled by the police during the interrogation.

3. She, also, expressed scepticism about the whole affair, saying that it was a farce and that she believed that many of those arrested with Victor had been paid to make the statements attributed to them.

Field Comment: An unsigned article titled "New Conspiracy?" appeared on page 8 of Siempre. It presented briefly an account of the arrest of and charges against Rico Galan; belittled what it termed the periodic paroxysms of patriotism which seize the Mexican police and lead to such arrests; then went on to suggest that Rico Galan, a political journalist accustomed to expressing his ideas in signed articles, could hardly be thought of as a conspirator. The article concluded with a plea for respect both for Rico Galan's constitutional rights and for the rights of a free journalism.

Headquarters Comment: This article appeared in issue no. 687, dated 24 August 1966, of Siempre.

[1] Elena Garro, Mexican playwright and novelist, was formerly married to Octavio Paz Lozano, prominent Mexican poet.

GROUP 1
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	CINCSO*						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "*")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	HMM-10619
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/1	1	LIENVOY
FI/INT	1	WH/MEXI	1	(LIENVOY)
CA/INT	1	WH/MNTY	[illegible]	CS-311/11736-66
CA/PROP	1	WH/PACY	[illegible]	

TOTALS IS 2, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH 5 (1), DO/H 1.

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RSH:klm

Rico Galan

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UNIT WH/C YA TTY   TIME 1553   BY J.

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, D/COMM 4

S E C R E T 250333Z CITE JMWAVE 2752

26 Aug 66 IN 04022

DESENSITIZED

TO DIRECTOR

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC AMCOMET SECUR COMMO

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 30747

BC

1. FOLLOWING WILL BE SENT 27 AUGUST BROADCAST. BEGIN AGENT MESSAGE: "TRES DOS X NUEVO REQUICITOS X MANDENOS REACCION DE SU OFICINA DEL ARRESTO DE VICTOR RICO GALAN X ESTA PEPE TODAVIA SALIENDO CON ANNIE CUENDOZ Y QUE SERIO SON SUS RELACIONES CON ELLA X QUIENES SON LOS OTROS CONTACTOS IMPORTANTES DE ELLA X EN RELACION A SU MENSAJE DOCE X QUIENES SON LOS DIRIGENTES VENEZOLANOS QUE SE REUNIERON CON PEPE EL ANO PASADO Y QUE PLANES DISCUTIERON X ABRAZOS" END AGENT MESSAGE.

RICO

2. TRANSLATION: THREE TWO X NEW REQUIREMENTS X SEND US ANY REACTION YOUR OFFICE HAD ON THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN X IS PEPE STILL DATING ANNIE CUENDOZ AND HOW SERIOUS IS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HER X WHO ARE HER OTHER IMPORTANT CONTACTS X RE YOUR MESSAGE TWELVE X WHO WERE THE VENEZUELAN LEADERS THAT PEPE MET LAST YEAR AND WHAT WERE THE PLANS THAT WERE DISCUSSED X EMBRACES X

S E C R E T   Requirements to Be Transmitted to Poncomet/1

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Santo Domingo

INFO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
c EMFOE-1/Victor RICO Galan

11P

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See below
Reference : HDC-3048 (not sent Mexico)

1. Attached are two pictures of Victor RICO Galan. Headquarters requests that the Station ask EMFOE-1 if this is the same individual as the subject of Paragraph 6 of the Reference.

2. If the pictures are identified as the subject of Paragraph 6 of the Reference, Headquarters requests that EMFOE-1 and other Station sources be queried for all available information concerning the Subject's activities and contacts while in the Dominican Republic as well as all possible travel information.

EPT
Eugene P. TANGUIST

MICROFILMED
SEP 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Attachment: (herewith)
2 pictures
Pages 1 & 2 HDC-3048

Distribution:
2 - COS, Santo Domingo w/pictures
1 - COS, Mexico City w/HDC-3048

att / NA

201-336474

5 SEP 1966

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
CS COPY	HDCW-2268	26 August 1966
D 22-4-16	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474 22-4-16

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1	Chris Costanzo	cr	3654

2 - RI
1 - WH/1/Chrono
1 - WH/7/DR

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/1	9/2	J. Fisher
	SEP 5 15 PM '66	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/7		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,629	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Andrew R. DOSCHER	DATE OF REPORT 25 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIREBEL	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIREBEL/1	TDCS DISSEMINATION

3P

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 - Hqs. 1 - Guatemala (HGG) 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 6 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA:

LIREBEL/1 obtained the reported information both from Rolando Collado Ardon and from his professional contacts.

MICROFILMED
SEP 1 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 1467

CS COPY

201-336474

14-00000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty regardless of their competence F Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources 2 Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5 Probably false 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Guatemala

REPORT NO HMM-10,629

Concerning

SUBJECT Reaction of Guatemalan Exile Leaders in Mexico to the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan 201-335974

DATE OF REPORT 25 August 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 18 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla organization in Guatemala, who is believed to have good access to Guatemalan exiles in Mexico.

(201-195151) C.I.T: GUATEMALA 201-336474

✓ 1. Rolando Collado Ardon, leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico and a member of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT - Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) said that the arrest of Victor Rico Galan on charges of subversion was a good thing for the PGT. Collado was referring to Rico Galan's influence on Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. According to Collado, Rico Galan prevented the PGT from persuading Yon Sosa to join the Party in 1963 because of Rico's Trotskyist interference and the aid he gave to Yon Sosa at the time.[1]

201-733510

OCC: DOCTOR X C.I.T. MEXICO X NO 201 C.I.T. MEXICO

✓ 2. Medical doctors Miguel Cruz Ruiz and Rolf Meiner Huebner, two of those arrested with Rico Galan, have been associated with Rico since early 1965. Both were very much involved in the medical doctors' strikes of late 1964 which continued into 1965. When the strikes were finally settled both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Heubner were dismissed from their jobs at the Social Security Hospital at Cuauhtemoc 330. They went directly to Rico Galan who put them to work, mainly writing medical articles for the magazine Sucesos for which Rico Galan worked.[2] OCC: Doctor

✓ 3. Rico Galan sent both Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner to Cuba in 1965 and both are well indoctrinated Communists.[3] However, neither belongs to any Communist Party or organization. Both, as well as Dr. Jorge Velez Trejo, also very active during the medical strikes, have traveled through Latin America making

(201-78 [illegible])

C.I.T. MEXICO

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

[illegible] 356474

contact with medical groups and attempting to inspire them to anti-government activity in their respective countries.[4] Also, while Cruz Ruiz and Meiner Huebner were working for Rico Galan at Sucesos they were giving classes in revolutionary activities to groups organized by Rico Galan.

Field Comments

1. In October-November 1963, Rico Galan, ostensibly as a purely journalistic exercise, went to Guatemala where he interviewed Yon Sosa in the guerrilla leader's camp.
2. HMM-9896 presents an overall picture of the medical strike situation.
3. HMM-10,163 reported that Rico Galan arranged passages for Mexican doctors who attended a medical congress in Havana in February 1966.
4. HMM-10,164 reports on the Central American activities of Drs. Meiner and Velez Trejo.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 51

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/IC 2, RI/AN, CI/OPS, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3 SB 8, EUR 8, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 251750Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8373 25 Aug 66 83466

DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR-29474 *

* REQUESTED TRACES ON GALAN

1. IN ADDITION HMMA-26313 AND HMMA-26800, STATION FILES CONTAIN FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES VICTOR RICO GALAN (VRG) PRIOR 1962:

File

A. HMM-1433 REPORTED THAT MARIO EZCURDIA, DIRECTOR OF LEFTIST MAGAZINE AL DIA, TOLD LIFTER/3 THAT VRG WAS ONE OF FOUR MARXISTS ADDED TO STAFF OF AL DIA 1 JANUARY 1956.

B. IN HMM-2323 LIFEAT/LIMERICK REPORTED THAT VRG INVITED TO ATTEND RECEPTION AT SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY IN NOVEMBER 1956.

C. IN HMM-2454 LIFTER/8 REPORTED THAT IN FEBRUARY 1957 VRG WAS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF LA GAZETA DE MEXICO NEW MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY THE BURO DE INVESTIGACION POLITICA (BIP), HEADED BY COMMUNIST HORACIO QUINONES.

D. ON 9 JULY 1959 LITMUS REPORTED THAT VRG WAS A CONTACT OF UMANISLAW RACZKA, EMPLOYEE OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA SECTION OF POLISH LEGATION IN MEXICO CITY.

E. HMMA-15203 REPORTED IN JUNE 1960 THAT ALEKSANDR

SECRET

Jone

VRG -
201 - 336974

BEKIER, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND COUNSELOR POLISH EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, ARRANGED TO MEET CARLO COCCIOLI, ITALIAN PRO-COMMUNIST, HOMOSEXUAL AND WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE", THROUGH VRG.

F. HMM-5075 REPORTED VRG AS MEMBER MEXICAN PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JOURNALISTS TO BE HELD IN BEDEN (BADEN?), AUSTRIA, 18-22 OCTOBER 1960.

G. HMM-5287 REPORTED THAT IN SEPTEMBER 1960 VRG WAS CHIEF OF INFORMATION OF PUEBLO, ANTI-UNITED STATES, PRO-CUBA NEWSPAPER.

H. IN HMM-5403 LIFTER/8 REPORTED VRG AKNMEOHER OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACTION OF THE MEXICAN COMMITTEE TO GIVE IMPULSE TO FIGHT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH WAS MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN PEACE CONGRESS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN MEXICO CITY IN MARCH 1961.

2. A REPORT FROM A LITEMPO/4 SOURCE IN THE POR/T DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1965 GIVING BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE MEXICAN TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT LISTS VRG AS A MILITANT MEMBER OF THE POR/T MIDDLE GUARD HEADED BY JUAN POSADAS. THIS REPORT IDENTIFIES VRG AS INTIMATE FRIEND OF VIDAL SOLIS, ALSO MILITANT POR/T MEMBER, SINCE THEY WERE SCHOOLMATES AT SCHOOL

PAGE THREE MEXICO CITY 8373 SECRET

OF PHILOSOPHY AND LETTERS AT UNAM. NOTE THAT EKG-37587 IS CATIDE REPORT ON MEXICAN TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT WHICH IS ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH THIS L/4 EXCEPT THAT CATIDE REPORTS SOLIS AND VRG STUDIED PHILOLOGY.

3. LIENVOY OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1961 REPORTS THAT A FAREWELL PARTY WAS GIVEN FOR VRG ON 9 SEPTEMBER BUT NO MENTION MADE OF WHERE HE WAS GOING. FILES HAVE NO SUBSEQUENT REFERENCE TO HIS TRIP OR HIS DESTINATION.

4. AN ARTICLE IN THE 19 AUGUST 1966 EDITION OF EL SOL DE MEXICO, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER, REPORTED THAT IN 1956 ALBERTO BAYO, SPANISH COMMUNIST, HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS IN GUERRILLA TACTICS TO FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO AND VRG AT RANCHO SAN MIGUEL IN AYOTZINGO, STATE OF MEXICO. ARTICLE QUOTED ERASMO RIVERA, OWNER OF RANCHO SAN MIGUEL, AS SAYING THAT ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS IN 1956 VRG HAD VISITED FIDEL AND RAUL AT RANCHO SAN MIGUEL WHERE THEY RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FROM BAYO.

5. STATION FILES GAVE NO OTHER INFOMATION ON VRG WHICH HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN SENT HQS.

6. INDEX SOLIS, BAYO AND RIVERA TO 200-4-56.

SECRET

BT

14-00000

4-88 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 3 PER F/D #1

ACTION

C/FI/D 4

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR, C/FI, C/WH 2, DC/WH/C 5

S E C R E T 250015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8369

DIRECTOR

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 29699

25 AUG [illegible] 2770

RYBAT [illegible]E ZRKNICK

DESENSITIZED

1. LITEMPO-4 GAVE STATION THREE PHOTOS OF CAPTURED ITEMS 24 AUGUST 66. BASED ON PRELIMINARY STATION ANALYSIS, RADIOS APPEAR TO BE COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE, CITIZENS BAND TYPE WALKIE-TALKIE TRANSCEIVERS. TAPE RECORDER APPEARS BE PHILLIPS MAKE WHICH COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE.

2. ONE PHOTO OF "TIME BOMB"; ONE OF FOUR (4) AUTOMATICS, AMMO AND MAGAZINE FOR BOTH HAND-GUNS AND RIFLES AND TWO WALKIE-TALKIE TYPE TRANSMITTERS; AND ONE PHOTO OF THE (SAME) TWO (2) TRANSMITTERS, A TAPE RECORDER THREE SPORTING RIFLES, FIVE M-1 CARBINES AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE A GARAND.

3. FORWARDING COPIES PHOTOS.

4. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFO REQUESTED REF AND WILL ADVISE RESULTS OBTAINED.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 25

ORIG: R. GRAHAM/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 24 AUG 68

○ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1	1	5	
2	3	6	
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4	5	8	

DISSEM BY 20 PER ____ # ____

○ DESTROY ○ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: H-9 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE . WH/C 2, FE, FI/INT 2, CA-2, CA/PROP, CA/EG

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET [illegible] Z

CITE DIRECTOR 30551

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS, BOGOTA, GUATEMALA CITY,
SAO PAULO, RIO DE JANEIRO, LA PAZ,
PANAMA CITY, SANTIAGO, MONTEVIDEO, BUENOS AIRES

REF MEXICO CITY 8354 (IN 81989)

1. CONCUR WITH REF PROPOSAL STATION PREPARE CABLE OUTLINE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE POINTS STATION CONSIDERS USEFUL AS HEMISPHERE PEGS. FORWARD THIS MATERIAL DIRECT INFO ADDRESSEES. REQUIREMENTS FOR FOLLOW UP INFO WILL BE DETERMINED BY REACTIONS RECIPIENTS AND THEIR PROPOSALS USE MATERIAL FOR PROP PLACEMENT OR LIAISON PASSAGE.

2. HQS WILL RELAY MEXICO CITY 8241 AND MEXICO CITY 8354 TO ADDRESSEES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Station proposes prepare basic guidance cable re RICO Galan case.

WH/C/CA/PP
WH/2
WH/4
WH/5
WH/3

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPORT COVER SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,628	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Leo R. MYLECHRAINE	DATE OF REPORT 24 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIFTER	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C.CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIFTER-8	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 - Hqs. 1 - MNTY 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - SMOTH 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIFTER-8 obtained the reported information from Carlos Sanchez Cardenas, Leopoldo Gutierrez Sagardi, and Gustavo Velasquez Hernandez.

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A Completely reliable. B Usually reliable. C Fairly reliable. D Not usually reliable. E Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources.)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2 Probably true. 3 Possibly true. 4 Doubtful. 5 Probably false. 6 Cannot be judged.

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

REPORT NO HMM-10,628

SUBJECT Popular Socialist Party Skepticism Concerning the Arrest of Victor Rico Galan And Others

DATE OF REPORT 24 August 1966

NO PAGES 3

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 17 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (19 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE Veteran and trusted member of the Popular Socialist Party who has close personal connections with ranking members of the Party. He has been a prolific reporter of reliable information. The reported information was obtained directly from leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico. The substance of these persons' comments are believed to be accurately reported; their validity however cannot be assessed.

1. (Summary: Popular Socialist Party (PPS) attitudes toward the arrest of Victor Rico Galan and others on charges of conspiring against the Government remain unsympathetic and the Party intends to stay outside the entire matter although PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano may seize the opportunity to strike back at some of his enemies by issuing a statement condemning the plans attributed to Rico Galan. Within the Party there is considerable skepticism about the truth of the published charges. While several Party leaders do not doubt that there is some truth to the charges they are quite convinced that there was no danger of imminent rebellion and that Mexican institutions stood in no peril from Rico Galan and his friends. Given the energy and efficiency with which the Mexican Government has dealt with less melodramatic threats in the past, one cannot but suspect that it is merely a tried and true Government maneuver. Also, it is believed in the PPS that police accounts of their role in the matter have been exaggerated to enhance the reputation of the police both with the President and with the public. The rumor that the Guatemalan Government may have asked the Mexican Government to silence Rico Galan because of his violent attacks against the new Guatemalan administration is generally discounted since the complaints of Guatemalan officials are certainly of no concern to Mexico.)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

CS COPY

2. Victor Rico Galan and his associates can expect neither sympathy nor help from the Popular Socialist Party (PPS - Partido Popular Socialista). Although no official decision has yet been made by the Party, PPS leaders who have commented unofficially on the matter have said that for the moment the Party will no doubt stay completely outside the whole affair, thus proving its total lack of interest in this type of revolutionary activity. It is of course possible that PPS Secretary General Vicente Lombardo Toledano will seize the opportunity to issue a statement condemning the entire affair as Trotskyist, criminal, and utopian. Lombardo may decide to use this opportunity to strike back at the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) and others who have attacked him.

3. Among leaders of both the PPS and the General Union of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (UGOCM - Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico), there is a certain skepticism about the truth of the matter as it has been presented in the press. It is probably true that arms and materials for manufacturing explosives were confiscated. It is probably true that indoctrination sessions on political and revolutionary matters probably were held in the houses where the arrests were made. And probably the group did have some kind of plan for action. But, it is simply not true that there was the slightest danger of immediate and formidable rebellion from Rico Galan and his friends.

201

4. This latter conclusion is based on the fact that Rico Galan is no guerrilla leader. He is an aggressive intellectual, a radical, but he is not in jail for what he has done but for his ideas. As for Raul Ugalde Alvarez, named with Rico Galan as one of the leaders of the group, he has the reputation of being fuzzy-minded, a leftist adventurer and certainly neither brave nor dedicated. Further, and Rico Galan is well aware of this, popular support is essential to the success of rebellion. None exists. The peasants are divided. The workers are controlled by the Government, and the middle-class is content with the way things are. Also, there is the formidable precedent of Government action against any kind of rebellion, trade union, armed, and particularly any sort of activity which is Cuban-connected. The Government has always moved with energy, speed, and efficiency to combat such threats as, for example, during the Railway Workers Strike of 1959. Several leaders of that strike are still in jail and likely to remain there. Another example is the September 1965 attack on a military camp at Ciudad Madera, Chihuahua. While the Government did not feel that his incident posed any real threat to it, it did not want the bad international publicity, so vigilance was increased, activities of would-be guerrillas were blocked, some were bought off with money, others with promises and the matter was promptly and efficiently controlled.

5. There no doubt is a degree of truth to police charges, but the melodramatic, almost childish character given to the Rico Galan movement, the lack of any proven connection between the movement and leftist/Communist organizations, Rico Galan's open and well-known connections with Guatemalan guerrilla leaders and his public support of the Cuban revolution, make it very hard to discount the suspicion that this is simply a Government maneuver. Also, while the police no doubt did confiscate arms and other materials, the suspicion exists that the police have inflated their role in order to make themselves look good both to the President and to public opinion.

6. There is even a rumor that because of Rico Galan's harsh attacks on the new Guatemalan administration, the Guatemalan Government asked the Mexican Government to deal with Rico Galan. This rumor however is regarded as rather ridiculous since the Mexican Government certainly cares nothing for the opinion of Guatemalan officials.

Field Comment: HMM-10,614 reported earlier PPS reaction to the arrests.

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIG.	Helene C. Walls:eb	ROUTING				106
UNIT	WH/C/RR/RE	1		4		
EXT.	3483	2		5		
DATE	24 August 1966	3		6		

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WHC 11

TDCS-314/10194-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED
24 August 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RE	3	WHC/SI	1			E/IB/R	1
WHC/RR	1	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/R	1	E/MADR	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	WH/1/R	2		
WHC/CI	1			WH/MEXI	1		
WHC/MO	1			WH/PACY (CI/CSO)		1	

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-8310 (IN-79989)
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

(a) Grilion
(c) Castanzo
pls file VEG's 201
(KPB)

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
Barbara Brown
WH/1/R - Pat O'Hara (in draft)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

RELEASING OFFICER
Flores
C/WH/C/RR

COPY NO.

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

•ROUTINE

IN -79989

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

REPCINCLANT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

24 1845 Z

TDCS-314/10194-66

DIST 24 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 18 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT EVIDENCE OF CONFLICT IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CONCERNING THE CASE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (20 AUGUST 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW, UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE HAS CULTURAL AND FAMILY TIES IN CUBA. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, VICTOR RICO GALAN, A SPANISH-BORN JOURNALIST RESIDING IN MEXICO CITY, WAS ARRESTED BY THE MEXICAN POLICE ON 12 AUGUST WITH 27 MEN AND 5 WOMEN AND CHARGED WITH "CONSPIRACY ON A NATIONAL SCALE". THE GROUP WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE HELD MEETINGS TO PLAN SUBVERSIVE TACTICS AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE NATION'S INTERNAL SECURITY. POLICE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE MEMBERS HAD BEEN IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA. THE 17 AUGUST EDITION OF EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO NOTED THAT THE POLICE WERE INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBILITY

OF "FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT" IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT RICO GALAN WAS READY TO BOARD A CUBANA FLIGHT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. FURTHER REPORTS CLAIMED THAT 48 PERSONS WERE DETAINED AS A RESULT OF THE ROUNDUP. FOR EARLIER REPORTING ON THIS CASE, SEE TDCS-314/10486-66, 20 AUGUST 1966, TDCS-314/10419-66, 18 AUGUST 1966, AND TDCS-314/10347-66, 15 AUGUST 1966.

2. ON 18 AUGUST ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON, CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY, SAID THAT THE SENDING OF AN OLD DC-4 AIRCRAFT TO MEXICO FROM CUBA ON 16 AUGUST WAS OSTENSIBLY A SPECIAL SERVICE PROVIDED FOR JOSEPHINE BAKER TO TRANSPORT HER AND HER 16 CHILDREN !! Orphans TO MEXICO. ACCORDING TO CURBELO, HOWEVER, THIS PLANE ALSO GAVE THE CUBANS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT EVACUATING THE MEXICANS IMPLICATED IN THE RICO GALAN CASE WHO WERE PRESSING THE CUBAN EMBASSY FOR SANCTUARY IN CUBA TO AVOID ARREST. CURBELO INDICATED THAT THE CUBANS WERE VERY FEARFUL FOR CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS IN VIEW OF THE RICO GALAN CASE AND DID NOT WANT TO BE ACCUSED BY THE MEXICANS OF GRANTING ASYLUM TO GUILTY PARTIES.

3. ON 15 AUGUST JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN PRESS AND CULTURAL ATTACHÉ, HAD ADVISED A FRIEND NOT TO TAKE THE 16 AUGUST PLANE TO CUBA BECAUSE THERE WERE GOING TO BE SEVERAL MEXICANS ABOARD TO ESCAPE ARREST IN THE RICO GALAN CASE. AS IT TURNED OUT, HOWEVER,

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

ONLY FIVE PERSONS FLEW TO CUBA IN THE DC-4 AND NO MEXICANS WERE AMONG THEM. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR CUBANA TO CARRY ONLY FIVE PASSENGERS ON ITS MEXICO-TO-HAVANA RUN.) WHEN ASKED WHY HE DID NOT DO MORE IN CULTURAL PRESS WORK FOR CUBA, LOPEZ REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT, BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS ASSISTING THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN MEXICO. (SOURCE COMMENT: LOPEZ IS PROBABLY A SECURITY OR INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY, SINCE HE IS VERY CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND APPEARED TO FEEL THAT THE MEXICANS CONNECTED WITH THE CASE WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN ARRESTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PASSAGE TO CUBA.)

4. ON 12 AUGUST FERNANDO RICO GALAN, VICTOR'S BROTHER, WAS OBSERVED IN THE CUBANA OFFICE IN MEXICO CITY ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE FOR A FLIGHT TO HAVANA. THE FLIGHT DID NOT COME TO MEXICO CITY THAT DAY AND FERNANDO WAS LATER ARRESTED IN THE ROUNDUP. ALSO ON 12 AUGUST ONE NOEL BARRA ZENIL WAS OBSERVED ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE PASSAGE TO CUBA. (SOURCE COMMENT: BARRA IS A RABID COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND UNTIL RECENTLY WAS A LONG-TIME RESIDENT OF HAVANA.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED THAT IN MAY 1956 ALVAR NOEL BARRA ZENIL WAS LISTED AMONG PERSONS CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF THE PARTIDO OBRERO-CAMPESINO MEXICANO (POCM, MEXICAN WORKER-PEASANT PARTY), A SMALL MARXIST SPLINTER GROUP. SEE CS-P02909, 18 SEPTEMBER 1956.)

(classification) (dissem controls)

[illegible] CINCLANT.

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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ACTION

S E C R E T 240110Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8354

24 Aug 66 IN 81989

81989

DIRECTOR

CS COPY

REF: DIRECTOR 29659

1. BELIEVE BEST WAY TO EXPLOIT RICO GALAN CASE PER REF WOULD BE TO TIE IT INTO OTHER EXAMPLES OF CASTRO REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LA COUNTRIES UNDER GENERAL THEME OF "IT CAN EVEN HAPPEN IN MEXICO." MOST FERTILE SURFACING AREAS FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD APPEAR BE VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA, AND GUATEMALA BUT HQS MAY WISH EXPAND THIS LIST.

2. SUGGEST FOLLOWING PROP CAMPAIGN: (A) ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND OF RICO GALAN CASE BE CABLED ABOVE STATIONS (AND OTHERS AS HQS CONSIDERS APPROPRIATE) AS BASIS MEDIA EXPLOITATION AND OTHER FEASIBLE POLITICAL ACTION (E.G., RE LIAISON) PEGGED TO CURRENT CASTRO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES RESPECTIVE AREAS. BACKGROUND COULD INCLUDE BASIC MEXICO CITY 8241 (IN 76854) INFO PLUS LATER DEVELOPMENTS AS REPORTED LOCAL PRESS ACCOUNTS FORWARDED UNDER HMMA-29305 (LATEST LOCAL EDITORIAL COMMENTARY BEING POUCHED 25 AUGUST). (B) TO TIE THIS TO "CASTRO-EXPORTS-REVOLUTION" THEME IN CONTEXT LOCAL COUNTRY SITUATIONS, ABOVE BACKGROUND MATERIAL SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ALL AVAILABLE INFO ON RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP WHICH INDICATES CASTRO

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201-

CA

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8354 S E C R E T

INVOLVEMENT. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE NEWS ITEMS ON RICO'S USE OF CHE GUEVARA TEXTS IN HIS CLANDESTINE GROUP, HIS PAST CONNECTIONS WITH CASTRO AND THE CUBAN EMBASSY, HIS TRIPS TO YON SOSA ON BEHALF CASTRO, ETC. BELIEVE WITH SUCH ITEMS CULLED FROM CURRENT MEXICAN PRESS, PLUS RELEVANT MATERIAL TAKEN FROM HMMA-26800, 5 AUGUST 1965 "PORTRAIT" OF RICO GALAN AND TWO MEMOS TO LIRAMA ON RICO FORWARDED MORE RECENTLY UNDER HMMA--29791, STATIONS WOULD HAVE GOOD BASIS FOR LOCAL REPLAY AND EXPLOITATION.

3. AS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE UNFOLD HERE, THIS INITIAL GUIDANCE COULD BE SUPPLEMENTED AS APPROPRIATE BY ADDITIONAL CABLE GUIDANCES.

4. IF HQS CONCURS, STATION WILL PREPARE BASIC GUIDANCE CABLE ALONG PARA 2 LINES FOR HQS RELAY TO APPROPRIATE STATIONS.

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	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC NEWSPAPERMAN
CHARGED IN MEXICO WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION, ACCUMULATION OF ARMS AND CONSPIRACY HE WAS ARRESTED AUG 12, 66, IN RAIDS ON TWO MEXICAN RESIDENCES AT WHICH CLASSES IN TERRORISM AND GUERRILLA WARFARE ALLEGEDLY WERE CONDUCTED.

035-004-003
DBB -58014
23 AUG 66
FBI
P4

R 6609190308

FILE IN 201-336474

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HMM-10,642

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BY (R)

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FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 4, DO 4, CI, CI/PS, FI/SPG, TSD 6, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/1/M 5.

S E C R E T 232020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8349 23 AUG 66 IN 81913

DIRECTOR INFO MONTERREY (POUCH) PANAMA CITY

INTEL

SUPDATA: LITEMPO/12 WHO WENT TO POZA RICA PERSONALLY TO INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION. HMM-10,602 REPORTED LITEMPO/4 CONVICTION POZA RICA EXPLOSION AND VICTOR RICO GALAN ARREST RELATED.

FILED 232020Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

① CA
② Costanzo for
Reca [illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -81913

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS COS CIA/NMC

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GROUP 1
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 232246Z CITE TDCS -314/10568-66

DIST 23 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 14-20 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIION OF PEMEX EXPLOSION AT POZA RICA, VERACRUZ

REF: HMM-10,602

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (22 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,624

SOURCE: MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION BY MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICIALS OF THE 14 AUGUST EXPLOSION AND FIRE IN THE PEMEX REFINERY AT POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, HAVE REVEALED NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE WHO MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPLOSION. INVESTIGATION IS HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT THE REFINERY ARE ALMOST NONEXISTENT. AT THE TIME OF THE EXPLOSION ONLY ONE GATE GUARD AND TWO SOLDIERS WERE ON DUTY IN THE ENTIRE PLANT.

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IN -81913

TDCS -314/10568-66

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. THE CONDITION OF THE SECTION OF THE GAS TRANSMISSION LINE WHERE THE FIRST EXPLOSION OCCURED INDICATES THAT THE LINE WAS RUPTURED BY AN OUTSIDE EXPLOSION SINCE THE EDGES OF THE PIPE AT THE POINT OF RUPTURE WERE TURNED INWARD.

3. THE EXPLOSION OCCURED AT A TIME WHEN MAXIMUM PROPERTY DAMAGE AND MINIMUM LOSS OF LIFE WERE ASSURED. (SOURCE COMMENT: HAD THE BLAST AND FIRE OCCURED DURING THE WORK WEEK IT IS PROBABLE THAT AT LEAST THREE HUNDRED PERSONS WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED.)

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE LINE AND THE TIMING OF THE EXPLOSION STRONGLY SUGGEST SABOTAGE. ALSO, THE DAMAGE IS MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THE PRESS HAS INDICATED AND IT WILL PROBABLY TAKE MUCH LONGER TO GET THE REFINERY BACK IN OPERATION THAN HAS BEEN ESTIMATED. RESERVES ARE BEING USED NOW TO PREVENT A GASOLINE SHORTAGE.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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ORIG: Anita Potocki/hm
UNIT: FI/D/CS
EXT: 7349
DATE: 22 August 1966

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TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

RYBAT TYLOTE ZRKNICK

REFS: A. DIR-27990

B. HMM-10602 (IN-76854)

1. REQUEST MEXI ADVISE DETAILS OF CAPTURED EVIDENCE THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN GROUP IN RADIO CONTACT WITH CUBA, INCLUDING MAKE, MODEL NUMBER, POWER OUTPUT, FREQ RANGE, ETC. OF CAPTURED TRANSMITTER, AND WHETHER LATTER CAN BE USED FOR AM/FM AND/OR CW (MORSE) TRANSMISSIONS. ALSO DESIRE DETAILED INFO RE ANY OTHER ASSOCIATED GEAR FOUND AT TRANSMITTER SITE WHICH MIGHT BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRANSMITTER, I.E., ANTENNAS, TAPE RECORDER, KEYER, POSSIBLE SPEED OF TRANSMISSIONS WHETHER AUTOMATIC OR MANUAL, ETC. ADVISE AVAILABILITY TRANSMITTER, INCLUDING KEYER, AND CAPTURED MAGNETIC TAPES FOR WOFACT EXAMINATION. CAN MEXI ASCERTAIN WHETHER TRANSCRIPT OF CONTENTS CAPTURED TAPES AVAILABLE FOR WOPROP/D AND WODART STUDY AND COMPARISON WITH KNOWN ZRKNICK SKEDS?

/CONTINUED/

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SECRET PAGE TWO CITE DIRECTOR 29699

TO

2. REQUEST STATION DETERMINE WHETHER ANY DOCUMENTS RELATING TO TRANSMITTER OPERATION, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SIGNAL PLAN, CIPHER MATERIALS, ETC. PICKED UP AT TIME OF RAIDS AND CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO WOFACT. OBVIOUSLY THESE OF PRIORITY INTEREST AND SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS PER CSIF-52-3.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/1/MEXICO J.Fisher(telecoord)
WH/FICI ✓
CI/OPS/WH
OC-SPS/CMT J.Boone (draft)

C/WH
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EXT: 5006
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1966

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(DATE AND TIME FILED) 22 22 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 29659

TO MEXICO CITY

RICO GALAN CASE APPEARS PRESENT EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR HEMISPHERIC PROP PLAY AS BLATANT EXAMPLE CONTINUING EFFORT BY CASTRO TO EXPORT REVOLUTION. REQUEST MEXICO CITY SUGGESTIONS RE BEST TIME AND PLACE INITIATE SUCH CAMPAIGN AS WELL AS MATERIAL BEST SUITED TO PLACE CASE IN LIGHT WHICH COMPLEMENTS GOM OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTES TO MAXIMUM LNFORT ADVANTAGE IN HEMISPHERE. REQUEST VIEWS SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE

201-

Jacob D. Esterline
JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/Cuba/CA/Swider
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. FISHER (B/...)
JOSIAH FISHER
AC/WH/1
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RID ABSTRACT X INDEX WH/1

S E C R E T 230030Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8339

MEXI

22 Aug 66 IN 81196

DIRECTOR

REF MEXICO CITY 8289 (IN 78356) 76

1. EXCEPT FOR STRAIGHT NEWS ACCOUNTS OF "DECLARACIONES" AND LEGAL INDICTMENTS OF RICO GALAN AND FILOW-CONSPIRATORS, VERY LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY HAS BEEN NOTED ON RICO GALAN CASE SINCE REF, INDICATING TIGHT LID IMPOSED BY GOVERNMENT STILL IN EFFECT. WHAT LITTLE EDITORIAL COMMENTARY HAS APPEARED HAS EXPRESSED EITHER MILD CONCERN OVER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ARRESTEES (E.G., 24 AUGUST SIEMPRE EDITORIAL ARTICLE), OR HAS RELATED ALLEGED ~~ALLEGED~~ CONSPIRACY TO LARGER SPECULATION ABOUT MEXICO AS TARGET FOR STEPPED-UP CASTRO AND/OR CHICOM SUBVERSION.

2. DEFENSIVE TYPE COMMENTARY HAS BEEN NOTED FROM LEFTIST QUARTERS BUT HAS BEEN MINIMAL. AT END OF 19 AUGUST ACCOUNT OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RICO GALAN CASE, EL DIA COUPLED BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARM PRESIDENT JUAN BARRAGAN CONDEMNATION OF RICO GALAN ATTITUDE WITH "NUEVO COMUNICADO" FROM THE MLN, REITERATING THAT CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (OF ARRESTEES) HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. SAME THEME ELABORATED UPON IN PAID ADVERTISEMENT PLACED BY MLN IN 23 AUGUST EXCELSIOR.

SECRET

201-336474
201-336474
22 Aug 66

SECRET

3. EDITORIAL WARNINGS ON LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF RICO GALAN CASE HAVE BEEN MORE NUMEROUS BUT STILL SCARCE. BARRIOS GOMEZ COLUMN IN EL HERALDO OF 15 AUGUST REVIEWED RICO GALAN'S CONNECTION WITH GUATEMALAN PRO-CHICOM GUERRILLA LEADER YON SOSA, NOTING THAT "PEKINISTA" RICO GALAN IS AN "AGITADOR INFLUIDA POR LAS PREDICAS DE CHINOS AMIGOS SUYOS, DE LA AGENCIA NOTICIOSA SINJUA." LEAD NOVEDADES EDITORIAL ON 19 AUGUST WARNED AGAINST ASSUMPTIONS THAT MEXICO IS IMMUNE TO EXTREMIST "INTERNATIONAL SUBVERSION" LIKE THAT WHICH HAS PLAGUED OTHER LA COUNTRIES LIKE VENEZUELA, GUATEMALA, PERU, ETC. OBLIQUELY CITING RICO GALAN CASE IN SENSE THAT "IT CAN HAPPEN HERE," EDITORIAL IMPLIES THAT RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY WAS HATCHED AT TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE IN HAVANA. TWO CARTOONS, IN EXCELSIOR 18 AUGUST AND NOVEDADES 20 AUGUST, DEAL WITH RICO GALAN ARRESTS. NOVEDADES CARTOON DEPICTS ESSENTIALLY SUPERFICIAL AND HUMOROUS VIEW OF RICO GALAN ARRESTS. EXCELSIOR CARTOON, IN CONTRAST, CARRIES OBVIOUS POLITICAL MESSAGE: CARTOON SHOWS LAZARO CARDENAS ANSWERING PHONE AND REPLYING TO RICO GALAN CALL, SAYING "Y PARA QUE ME ENVIA UN RELOJ, SENOR RICO." CONSERVATIVE EL SOL EDITORIAL TITLED "DIPLOMACIA SUBVERSIVA" MENTIONS RICO GALAN CASE AS PERHAPS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF COMMUNIST EFFORTS USE DIPLOMATIC

SECRE

SECRET

REPRESENTATION IN LA COUNTRIES AS CHANNELS INSPIRE LOCAL SUBVERSION. FPOALLY, ENGLISH-LANGUAGE THE NEWS RAN EDITORIAL ARTICLE BY JIM BUDD ON 22 AUGUST DESCRIBING RICO GALAN CONSPIRACY AS PROVIDING SALUTARY LESSON FOR MEXICO, IN THAT IT SHOWS, DESPITE "SCANT CHANCES COMMUNISM TAKING OVER MEXICO," THAT COMMUNIST EXTREMISTS LIKE RICO GALAN GROUP CAN STILL "JOLT MEMORIES" AND REMIND MEXICANS THAT ITS PROBLEMS ARE STILL GRAVE ENOUGH TO BE EXACERBATED AND EXPLOITED BY COMMUNISTS FOLLOWING EXAMPLE OF GUATEMALA AND VENEZUELA.

4. POUCHING CLIPS ABOVE ITEMS.

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
CHARGED WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION WITH INTENT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08317
20 AUG 66
HMM -10621
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EXT: 3654
DATE: 19 August 1966

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☐ INDEX
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CRH | WH/5 | ABSTRACT X | ~~INDEX~~

TO MEXICO CITY

1. RESULTS HQS TRACE VICTOR (RICO) GALAN SHOW LITTLE BIO DATA PRIOR 1961. REQUEST CABLE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE NOT ALREADY FURNISHED HQS HMMA 26313, TO INCLUDE EDUCATION, TRAVEL, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UP TO 62.

2. APPRECIATE RECENT STATION REPORTING THIS SUBJECT, FYI, THERE CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST THIS CASE OTHER ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. GOVT ELEMENTS AND CONTINUING NEED FOR INTERPRETIVE COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

8

William V. Broe
C/WHD

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

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201-336474

22 AUG 66

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MEXI

S E C R E T 180012Z CITE MEXICO CITY 22[illegible]

CS COPY

18 AUG 66 78356

DIRECTOR

1. TO DATE PRESS PLAY ON ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND FELLOW CONSPIRATORS HAS BEEN CONFINED TO DUTIFUL REPLAY OF POLICE HAND-OUTS. LATEST POLICE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED EVENING 16 AUGUST INCLUDED "STATEMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY" (BY IMPLICATION, CONFESSIONS) MADE BY RICO GALAN, ING GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS, DOCTOR ROLF MEINERS HUEBNER, PROF. RAMON SARINANA SARINANA, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN (RICO'S SISTER), SERGIO MENDOZA LOPEZ, JOSE HUMBERTO JUAREZ HERNANDEZ, OLIVARIO JUAN PEREZ GALICIA, AND EDUARDO ORTIZ AYALA. NO STATEMENT BY RAUL UGALDE PUBLISHED. NO EDITORIAL COMMENTARY NOTED TO DATE. THIS APPEARS BE RESULT TIGHT LID IMPOSED BY GOBERNACION ON PRESS TREATMENT BEYOND LINE AND FACTS CONTAINED POLICE HAND-OUTS.

No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201 No 201

2. EL UNIVERSAL GRAFICO AFTERNOON 17 AUGUST NOTED IN FRONT PAGE ARTICLE THAT POLICE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY "FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT" IN CASE, IN VIEW FACT RICO GALAN WAS READY TO BOARD CUBANA FLIGHT WHEN ARRESTED. AFTERNOON ULTIMAS NOTICIAS REPORTED THAT POLICE WERE ABOUT READY TO TURN OVER [illegible] OF DETAINEES TO ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR INDICTMENT.

3. REPORTS OF TWO MOLOTOV COCKTAILS THROWN AT CUBAN EMBASSY FROM

CS COPY

201-336474
18 AUG 66

(8)

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8289 S E C R E T

PASSING AUTOMOBILE WERE CARRIED AS BRIEF ITEMS IN AFTERNOON PAPERS 16 AUG. NO FURTHER MENTION THIS INCIDENT IN 17 AUG PRESS, POSSIBLY DUE GOVERNMENT DESIRE AVOID GIVING LEFTIST PRESS AMMUNITION WITH WHICH ATTACK GOVERNMENT CRACK DOWN ON RICO GALAN RING.

RID/201

1341

4. MANNER IN WHICH POLITICA AND SIEMPRE HANDLE RICO GALAN CASE IN NEXT ISSUES (DUE NEXT COUPLE DAYS) SHOULD BE HIGHLY INTERESTING AND INDICATIVE OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN REACTING TO ARRESTS. WILL ADVISE AS THESE ISSUES APPEAR.

5. POUCHING AVAILABLE STATION BIOG DATA ON ARRESTEES AND PRESS ACCOUNTS APPEARING TO DATE.

S E C R E T

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO
CHARGED WITH INCITEMENT TO REBELLION WITH INTENT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08317
20 AUG 66
HMM -10621
P2

HZPHMY

R 6609070915

FILE IN 201-

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FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 12

ORIG. C. Costanzo/kaw
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 19 August 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

ROUTING			
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☐ DESTROY ☑ RETURN TO WH/1 BRANCH

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE , CI/OPS

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22 AUG 15 21Z CITE DIRECTOR 29474

OKH	WH/1
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

TO MEXICO CITY

1. RESULTS HQS TRACE VICTOR (RICO) GALAN SHOW LITTLE BIO DATA PRIOR 1961. REQUEST CABLE AS COMPLETE DATA AS POSSIBLE NOT ALREADY FURNISHED HQS HMMA 26313, TO INCLUDE EDUCATION, TRAVEL, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UP TO 62.

2. APPRECIATE RECENT STATION REPORTING THIS SUBJECT. FYI, THERE CONTINUING HIGH INTEREST THIS CASE OTHER ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. GOVT ELEMENTS AND CONTINUING NEED FOR INTERPRETIVE COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

201-336474

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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MEXI

S E C R E T 180012Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2229

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18 AUG 66 78356

DIRECTOR

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RID/201

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S E C R E T

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DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

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13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
< MEXICO CONCERNING GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS ON NEWS COVERAGE OF ARRESTSOFVICTOR RICOGALANANDOTHERSFORSUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES.

050-009-008
MEXI-08287
18 AUG 66
HMM -10615
P2

HZPHMY

R 6609070886

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT Lee Blaw	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST GB / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

HMMA-29797 | 050-004-136 | 18 AUG 66
IN
TO WH/REG
BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON ARRESTEES FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Jl Victor Rico-Galan

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY-8281

1. Attached for Headquarters information and retention are copies of two memoranda concerning Victor RICO Galan which were passed to LIRAMA on 15 February and 6 April 1965.

2. As stated in Reference, the attached memoranda were at the request of LIRAMA who was investigating the possibility of de-naturalizing and deporting Subject.

Julie A. Penfold
for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/WH w/att (1 cy ea)

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29791

DATE
16 August 1966

9 CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336474

ATT TO HMMA-24791

SECRET

Victor Rico Galan was born 6 February 1928 at El Ferrol, Spain, and came to Mexico as a Spanish "niño" (year unknown). He became a Mexican citizen and is now a prominent leftist journalist for Siempre and Politica. He lives at Providencia 930, Mexico City. He is head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN). He was a member of the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and of the Periodistas Amigos de Cuba in 1961.

Victor Rico Galan is a close friend of Fidel Castro Ruz. He went to Cuba in October 1962 to write a political biography of Castro. He went to Cuba again in May 1963 and interviewed Castro in June 1963 upon the latter's return from the USSR.

Between mid-October and mid-December 1963, he traveled to Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Brazil and conferred with leading Communists and leftists in each of these countries. In early January 1964 he visited the Dominican Republic and on 28 January 1964 again traveled to Cuba, presumably to interview Fidel Castro who had just returned from another trip to the USSR.

In September 1964, Rico Galan had several contacts with Armando Hart Davalos, Cuban Minister of Education and Antonio Nuñez Jimenez, President of the Commission of the Academy of Sciences of Cuba, who were visiting in Mexico.

In November 1964, he published an interview he had with Guatemalan guerrilla leader Marco Antonio Yon Sosa.

Rico Galan has very frequent contact with Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, Second Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and identified member of the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI). He is also in contact with Oldrich Novicky, Second Secretary and Press Attache of the Czech Embassy who is an intelligence officer, and with Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev, Pravda correspondent in Mexico who is a Soviet intelligence officer.

Rico Galan, according to a number of unimpeachable sources, is a professional paid agent for the Cuban government. He has acted as a courier, carrying large sums of money to pro-Cuban groups in several Latin American countries. He supports the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in its propaganda activities, often using Siempre magazine in this work. His principal assignment, however, is to act as

15 Feb 1965

1-73 54 Victor Rico Galan

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201-336474

HMMA 24791

SECRET

Fidel Castro's chief political subversion agent in Latin America. During a recent trip to Guatemala, for instance, he attempted to orient politically the split Communist factions striving to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. A tape recording exists of a speech he made which was later distributed to Guatemalan guerrillas. In the speech Rico Galan claimed he was speaking as an individual, rather than as a representative of the Cuban government. In fact, he was acting on behalf of Castro, as he was instructed to do by members of the Cuban intelligence service in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, with whom he has been in very frequent contact for the past several years.

Attached find a copy of the tape recording mentioned above.

ATT TO HMMA-29791

SECRET

Victor Rico Galan's membership in the following organizations:

MLN - members subscribe to an active campaign to oust U.S. business interests from Mexico and all Latin America, and to fight against U.S. interests and influence in Mexico and throughout Latin America. Members support the Cuban revolution, the Mexican Government's policy of non-intervention and auto-determination and pledge themselves to participate in activities which will bring greater economic, personal and social freedom to the people of Mexico.

There is no indication (at least in public/official MLN documents) that the MLN or its members owe allegiance to any foreign power. It has, however, until 1965, been controlled and dominated by the Mexican Communist Party which DOES give allegiance to the Soviet Union. The MLN and the other Communist groups with which Rico Galan has been associated, support Soviet foreign policy objectives, usually without any reservations.

The Mexican Journalists Friends of Cuba and the Committee for Solidarity with Cuba follow the same lines as the MLN - with emphasis placed on the distribution of propaganda glorifying the Cuban revolution, and advocating the Cuban Government as the ideal for all Latin American countries.

Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - emphasizes exchange of cultural and economic information, exhibits materials, artists, etc., always, of course, extolling glorious Cuba and urging Mexico to follow Cuba's lead.

Arnaldo Orfila Reynal

His only known organizational affiliation is his membership in the Argentine Socialist Party.

One source reported that Orfila was a naturalized Mexican citizen - however we have no record of his having been granted Mexican citizenship, and as late as April 19[illegible], he was reported by Cubana Airlines as an Argentine citizen. It is reported that Cubana lists their passengers by-Citizenship.

6 April 1966

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,619	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	DATE OF REPORT 18 August 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY	PROJECT LIENVOY	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIENVOY	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
3 - Hqs. 1 - Panama City (for CINCSO) 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Reported information taken from LIENVOY of 12 through 17 August 1966.

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[illegible]

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A Completely reliable B Usually reliable C Fairly reliable D Not usually reliable E Not reliable (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence) F Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1 Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true 3 Possibly true 4 Doubtful 5. Probably false 6 Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

SUBJECT Efforts on Behalf of Victor Rico Galan by Friends

REPORT NO HMM-10,019

DATE OF REPORT 18 August 1966

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO 12 - 17 August 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ Mexico, Mexico City (18 August 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican intellectual who is a personal friend of Victor Rico Galan, with whom he disagrees politically. Source has reported infrequently on Rico Galan's activities. The reported information was obtained both from Mrs. Rico Galan and from Francisco Martinez de la Vega.

1. According to Francisco Martinez de la Vega of the magazine Siempre, Colonel Eduardo Estrada Ojeda at Police Headquarters where Victor Rico Galan and others were being held after their arrest on charges of subversion had been instructed to permit packages from Mrs. Rico Galan to be delivered to her husband.

2. Elena Garro, writer, told Mrs. Rico Galan that she was going to speak to Minister of Interior Luis Echeverria to try to get him to ensure that Rico Galan would not be manhandled by the police during the interrogation.

3. Miss Garro expressed a scepticism about the whole affair, saying that it was a farce and that she believed that many of those arrested with Victor had been paid to make the statements that they had.

Source Comment: On 17 August Francisco Galindo Ochoa, Press Secretary in the Presidencia, complimented Martinez de la Vega on the piece on Rico Galan's arrest which appeared in the most recent issue of Siempre.

Field Comment: A short, unsigned article titled New Conspiracy? appeared on page 8 of Siempre. It presented briefly an account of the arrest of and charges against Rico Galan; took a swipe at what it termed the periodic paroxysms of patriotism which seize the Mexican police; and then went on to suggest that

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DISTRIBUTION

Rico Galan, a political journalist accustomed to expressing his ideas in signed articles, could hardly be thought of as a conspirator, and concluded by pleading for respect both for Rico Galan's constitutional rights and for the rights of a free journalism.

14-00000

201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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TDCS-314/10419-66

HMM 10,614

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DIRECTOR INFO MONTERREY (POUCH), PANAMA CITY

INTEL

18 Aug 66 78385

SUPDATA: LIFTER/8. INDEX. ~~PPARAF~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 78385

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS COS CIA/NMCC

FBI

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CONFIDENTIAL

180434 Z CITE TDCS -314/10419-66

DIST 18 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 16 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: COMMENT IN THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY ON THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND OTHERS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (16 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,614

SOURCE: VETERAN AND TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) WHO HAS CLOSE PERSONAL CONNECTIONS AMONG RANKING MEMBERS OF THE PARTY. HE HAS BEEN A PROLIFIC REPORTER OF RELIABLE INFORMATION. THE REPORTED INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED FROM CARLOS SANCHEZ CARDENAS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS.

1. THE POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY (PPS) HAS NOT FORMULATED AN OPINION ON THE 12 AND 13 AUGUST 1966 ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND SOME FORTY OTHER PERSONS ON CHARGES OF SUBVERSION. HOWEVER, CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS HAVE SAID THAT THE PPS WILL DO NOTHING TO HELP THEM

AND IN FACT IS PLEASED TO SEE PEOPLE OF RICO GALAN'S STAMP ARRESTED BECAUSE THUS ARE ELIMINATED ENEMIES OF THE PPS AND OF ITS SECRETARY GENERAL VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO.

2. ACCORDING TO CARLOS SANCHEZ CARDENAS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE OF THE PPS, IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE THAT A MAN LIKE RICO GALAN COULD BE THE LEADER OF AN ARMED REBEL MOVEMENT. HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED A MARXIST INTELLECTUAL BELONGING TO NO PARTY WHO HAS CONFINED HIS BATTLES TO THE PAGES OF MAGAZINES LIKE POLITICA, SIEMPRE, AND SUCESOS. LOMBARDO TOLEDANO FRANKLY THOUGHT OF HIM AS INCAPABLE OF DOING ANYTHING THAT INVOLVED A MASS FOLLOWING.

3. AS FOR RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ WHO IS ACCUSED TOGETHER WITH RICO GALAN OF BEING A LEADER OF THE GROUP, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID THAT HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE ONCE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF THE RIGHTIST NATIONAL ACTION PARTY (PAN) WHO THEN WENT TO THE EXTREME LEFT AND BECAME A MEMBER OF THE PEOPLE'S ELECTORAL FRONT (FEP). HE WAS AN FEP CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST ELECTION, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID.

4. THE PPS ASSUMES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CERTAIN, THAT THE MAJORITY OF THOSE ARRESTED ARE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERA-

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

TION MOVEMENT (MLN) AND BELONG TO THE RADICAL SECTOR OF THE MLN WHICH WANTS TO CONVERT THE GROUP INTO A MARXIST-LENINIST PRO-CASTRO POLITICAL PARTY.

5. SANCHEZ CARDENAS OFFERED THE OPINION THAT THOSE ARRESTED ARE OBVIOUSLY MORE IN TUNE WITH THE CHINESE THAN THE SOVIET VERSION OF MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE. RICO GALAN AND POSSIBLY OTHERS HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIET, POLISH, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EMBASSIES. BECAUSE THEIR ALLEGED PROPOSALS FOR ARMED AND IMMEDIATE REBELLION ARE USELESS, PROVOCATIVE AND CRIMINAL THEY SHOULD BE CONDEMNED BY THE LEFT IN MEXICO BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT ONLY IMPERILED OTHER LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS IN MEXICO BUT THEY HAVE ALSO ENDANGERED THE SOCIALIST BLOC EMBASSIES WITH WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH. CONDITIONS IN MEXICO ARE NOT PROPER FOR LAUNCHING AN ARMED REBELLION. THE PROXIMITY OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD DOOM TO FAILURE ANY SUCH ATTEMPT. IN THE FACE OF SUCH NEGATIVE CONDITIONS ARMED REBELLION SHOULD BE CONDEMNED AS ANTI-MARXIST.

6. HOWEVER, DESPITE THE ABOVE STATEMENTS, SANCHEZ CARDENAS SAID THAT IT WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT ARMED REBELLION WAS

IN FACT PLANNED BY RICO GALAN AND HIS ASSOCIATES. IT IS INCREDIBLE THAT REASONABLY RATIONAL PEOPLE COULD ACTUALLY PLAN SO UNEQUAL A BATTLE WHOSE OUTCOME COULD ONLY BE TOTAL DEFEAT FOR THEM.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING

Intelligence Information Cable

IN-77639

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OOO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

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170155Z CITE TDCS -314/10379-66

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 17 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 16 AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARREST OF SUBVERSIVES

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (16 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-13,618

SOURCE: HIGHLY PLACED POLICE OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. PRESIDENT GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ HAS ORDERED THAT PUBLICITY ON THE ARRESTS OF VICTOR RICO GALAN AND SOME FORTY OTHER SUBVERSIVES ON 13 AUGUST 1966 BE PLAYED DOWN AND THAT THE PRESS [illegible] INFORMED THAT THE ROUNDUP DEVELOPED FROM INVESTIGATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER WAY FOR A LONG TIME. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE [illegible] "THE NEWS" OF 15 AUGUST QUOTED HIGHLY PLACED [illegible] OFFICIALS AS DESCRIBING THE ARRESTS AS [illegible]).

2. [illegible] IS AVAILABLE TO SHOW THAT [illegible] A PART OF A CONSPIRACY

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ADVOCATING AND TEACHING THE OVERTHROW OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENT MEANS.

3. THE TIMING OF THESE ARRESTS IS VERY FORTUITOUS SINCE IT PAVES THE WAY FOR THE INCLUSION OF A POLICY STATEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATION ON 1 SEPTEMBER. DIAZ ORDAZ WILL CITE THE ARRESTS TO SHOW THAT THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TOLERATE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OR INTERFERENCE BY EXTREME LEFTISTS.

4. ALTHOUGH PROOF IS STILL LACKING, THERE IS SUSPICION ON THE PART OF OFFICIALS IN THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE EXPLOSIONS IN THE PEMEX REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, WAS AN ACT OF SABOTAGE AND WAS CONNECTED WITH THE ARRESTS OF RICO GALAN AND HIS GROUP.

5. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS HOPED THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THIS GROUP AND CUBA, PRIMARILY VIA RICO GALAN, CAN BE DISCOVERED TO WARRANT A WARNING FROM DIAZ ORDAZ TO CUBA AND TO THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION TO KEEP HANDS OFF MEXICO.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ____ BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 8Y PER #

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE H TOTAL COPIES

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TDCS-314/10
HMM-10,610

ACTION IW (UMZ) ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME 0115 BY D

INFO VR. FILE. ADDP. CA 2. CA/PEG. CA/PROP. CI/OPS. CI/IC 2. FI. FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, CS/SGO, WH/REG 8, WH/1/M S.

8262 17 Aug 65 IN 77639

SECRET 162310Z CITE MEXICO CITY EEAAAAAAAAA

DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

SUPDATA LITEMPO/4 WHO HAD JUST COME FROM MEETING WITH LITEMPO/8. INTERROGATIONS CONTINUE AND STATION HAS BEEN PROMISED RESULTS. REF DIRECTOR 27990.

FILED 162310Z

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

DISSEM BY 33/3

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 9 TOTAL COPIES 32

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FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, C/SGO, CA 2, CA/O 4

MEXI

SECRET 172245Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3281

CS COPY

DIRECTOR

AN CRH FI
PS
ABSTRACT

17 Aug 66 78342

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2533 (IN 82883 FEB 65)
B. MEXICO CITY 2594 (IN 86943 FEB 65)
C. DIRECTOR 87826
D. HMMA 25478
E. MEXICO CITY 3262 (IN 77639)

1. FROM REFS IT WILL BE NOTED LIRAMA HAS LONG BEEN INTERESTED IN VICTOR RICO GALAN AND HAS CONSIDERED WAYS CURTAILING HIS ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION AT ONE POINT OF TRYING DENATURALIZE AND DEPORT HIM. DENATURALIZATION, UPON STUDY, APPEARED TOO DIFFICULT AND CUMBERSOME. WHILE RICO GALAN AND GROUP, AS CLAIMED BY PRESS AND AS TOLD TO COS BY LITEMPO-8 ON 16 AUGUST 66, OBVIOUSLY INVOLVED IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE MEXI GOVT'S KNOWLEDGE THESE ACTIVITIES RESULTED FROM LONG AND TEDIOUS SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATION OF RICO GALAN, PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS DEVELOP INFO ON WHICH ACTION COULD BE TAKEN.

2. FORWARDING COPIES TWO MEMORANDA PASSED TO LIRAMA VIA LIELEGANT IN FEBRUARY AND APRIL 65 CONTAINING INFO ON RICO GALAN. THIS DONE AT REQUEST LIRAMA WHO THEN CONSIDERING

SECRET

CS COPY

201-336474
2 Aug 66

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8281 SECRET
ACTION AGAINST HIM.

SECRET

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. · 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM · 8. DATE OF INFO. · 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST · 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN · 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICC GALAN, VICTCR
201-336474
SEX M DCB ?

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
PART OF A CONSPIRACY ADVOCATING AND
TEACHING THE OVERTHROW OF THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT BY VIOLET MEANS.

050-009-008
MEXI-08262
17 AUG 66
HMM -10610
P2

R 6609060856

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

~~DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID~~

ORIG: MILAN HALLA
UNIT: SB/C
EXT: 6165
DATE: 16 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
XX NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO SB/C BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SB 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH 8, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

22 17 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 29508

TO MEXICO CITY

REDBLOCK DIZTAG MHSPAWN

RE MEXICO CITY 8241 (IN 76854)

1. PLS AIRMAIL TO HETMANEK ADDRESS COPY 15 AUGUST THE NEWS ARTICLE AND ANY OTHERS SHOWING CZECH INVOLVEMENT.

2. PLANNING PLACE IN PRESS COMMENT FOR REPLAY ELSEWHERE.

END OF MESSAGE

SB/CA

C/SB/C

C/WH

WH/1

DC/SB/BLOC

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES

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TDCS-314/10347-66
HMM-10,602

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INFO VR. FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D CS/DO
FI/INT 6, SOD 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, CI/PS, RI/AN, CS/SGO, SB 8, WH/C 8, WH/REG 8
WH/1/M 5

CS COPY

16 AUG 66 IN 70354

S E C R E T 152226Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8241

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PANAMA CITY, MONTERREY (POUCH)

INTEL

SUPDATA LITEMPO/1 TO COS 14 AUG. TRACES ON ARRESTEES BEING SENT SEPARATELY. LIENVOY REPORTED BROTHER OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, FERNANDO RICO GALAN SCHEDULED TO GO CUBA 12 AUG, DAY HE ARRESTED. ALTHOUGH LITEMPO/4 REFERS MRP AS TROTSKYISTS PRESS HAS NOT SO FAR DESCRIBED GROUPS OR THOSE ARRESTED AS SUCH. INDEX

FILED 15/2225Z SECRET

O.K

CS COPY

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 3C

ORIG: J. STEWART/nr
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 15 AUG 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

SECRET

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FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/C8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, DDP, DO/H3

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 15 21 59Z

CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 27990

TO ~~PRIORITY~~ MEXICO CITY

~~DYVOUR PBRUMEN~~

A. MEXICO EMBTEL 878
B. MEXICO EMBTEL 879

RE ARREST RICO GALAN GROUP 12 AUG 66 REPORTED IN REFS AND REUTERS DISPATCH APPEARING WASHINGTON POST 13 AUG, HQS VERY INTERESTED RECEIVING STATION'S COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATION MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST BACKGROUND MEXICAN-CUBAN RELATIONS, AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL PERTINENT STATION DETAILS. NOTE THAT REUTERS ARTICLE MENTIONED MEXICAN POLICE CLAIMS THAT MEMBERS GROUP "HAD BEEN IN RADIO CONTACT WITH ORGANIZATION IN CUBA." ALSO NOTE IN THIS CONNECTION THAT JUAN MASCARO REYES, FORMER EMPLOYEE CUBAN CONSULATE TAMPICO ARRESTED AND DEPORTED TO VENEZUELA ABOUT 26 MAY 66 WAS REPORTED HMM-10415 BY RELIABLE SOURCE BE KEY CONTACT RICO GALAN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI E.J. Williamson

WH/C/CICS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E.J. Williamson

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 76854

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OOO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1 [illegible]

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET 160245 Z CITE TDCS-314/10347-66

DIST 15 AUGUST 1966

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 14 AUG 1966

SUBJECT: ARREST OF SUBVERSIVES HEADED BY VICTOR RICO GALAN: PEMEX EXPLOSION IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (14 AUG 66) FIELD NO. HMM-10,602

SOURCE: HIGHLY PLACED POLICE OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON SECURITY MATTERS. HIS REPORTING IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE.

1. FIELD COMMENT: THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT ANNOUNCED ON 12 AUGUST 1966 THAT INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SOME GROUPS WHICH HAD BEEN CONDUCTED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAD PROVEN THAT THESE GROUPS WERE PLANNING CLEARLY SUBVERSIVE ACTS WHICH THREATENED THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF MEXICO. COORDINATED RAIDS ON THREE HOMES IN MEXICO CITY BY THE MEXICAN JUDICIAL POLICE AND SECRET SERVICE FORCES RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF THIRTY-THREE PERSONS AND THE CONFISCATION OF QUANTITIES OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, RADIO TRANSMITTERS AND MAGNETIC

TAPES. VICTOR RICO GALAN, WELL KNOWN COMMUNIST WRITER WHO HAS BEEN LINKED WITH TROTSKYIST GROUPS IN MEXICO , AND RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ WERE IDENTIFIED AS THE LEADERS OF THE ORGANIZATION WHOSE NAME IS REPORTED TO BE THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP - MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO). ALSO INCLUDED AMONG THOSE ARRESTED WERE RICO GALAN'S BROTHER FERNANDO (ALSO REPORTED AS VICENTE RICO GALAN) AND (RICO GALAN'S SISTER, ANA MARIA RICO GALAN, WHOSE HOME REPORTEDLY WAS USED BY THE MRP AS A TRAINING CENTER.) RICO GALAN AND HIS BROTHER AND SISTER WERE IDENTIFIED AS THE INSTIGATORS AND FINANCIAL BACKERS OF THE MRP'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITES. THE PRESS OF 14 AUGUST REPORTED MORE ARRESTS, RAISING THE TOTAL TO ABOUT FIFTY PERSONS. ACCORDING TO A BULLETIN ISSUED BY THE MEXICAN POLICE MANY OF THE PERSONS ARRESTED HAD BEEN INVITED TO MEXICO CITY BY THE LEADERS OF THE MRP WITH PROMISES THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR HIGHLY PAID JOBS. ONCE IN MEXICO CITY, THEY WERE SUBJECTED TO TRAINING IN SUBVERSIVE TECHNIQUES, WERE HELD VIRTUAL PRISONERS, AND WERE THREATENED WITH DEATH IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE THE HOUSES IN WHICH THEY WERE BEING TRAINED. A FURTHER ITEM IN THE POLICE STATEMENT REPORTED THAT GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS HAD

BEEN ARRESTED. GOMEZ REPORTEDLY WAS IN CHARGE OF DRAWING UP PLANS OF ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN MEXICO, INCLUDING RAILHEADS, POWER PLANTS AND PETROLEUM CONCENTRATIONS. GOMEZ CUEVAS WAS ALSO SAID TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF BOMBS AND SIMILAR DEVICES. FINALLY, ON 15 AUGUST THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY THE NEWS REPORTED THAT SEMI-OFFICIAL SOURCES LINKED BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND CZECH COMMERCIAL COUNSUL AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER EMIL HRADECKY WITH THE MRP'S ACTIVITIES. HRADECKY, WHO EARLIER IN THE YEAR HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF INTERFERING IN THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN NARAYIT STATE AND OF MEDDLING IN THE DISTURBANCES AT THE CERRO DEL MERCADO IRON MINES IN DURANGO STATE, WAS RECALLED BY HIS GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK.

2. FIELD COMMENT CONTINUED: ON 14 AUGUST THE EXPLOSION OF A TANK OF NATURAL GAS LOCATED NEAR THE PETROLEOS MEXICANOS (PEMEX) REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ, TOUCHED OFF TWO EXPLOSIONS OF TANKS OF DIESEL FUEL. SIXTY NINE PERSONS WERE WOUNDED, SIX HOSPITALIZED, FOUR OR FIVE ARE DEAD AND TWO ARE MISSING. DAMAGES WERE ESTIMATED AT SOME SIXTY FIVE MILLION PESOS. CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSIONS IS NOT KNOWN, ACCORDING TO A PEMEX OFFICIAL.

3. THE ARREST OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, RAUL UGALDE ALVAREZ

AND SOME THIRTY FIVE OR FORTY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRP) IS A FOLLOW UP TO THE ARRESTS IN APRIL 1966 OF EIGHT TROTSKYISTS. (FIELD COMMENT. THESE APRIL ARRESTS WERE EXTENSIVELY REPORTED. PLEASE SEE HMM-10,293/ (TDCS-314/05258-66) AND HMM-10,307/) THE ARRESTS WERE TIMED FOR LATE FRIDAY, EARLY SATURDAY TO PREVENT THOSE ARRESTED FROM OBTAINING BONDS OR AMPAROS AT LEAST UNTIL MONDAY, 15 AUGUST.

4. ALSO, AN INVESTIGATIVE GROUP FROM THE FEDERAL SECURITY POLICE IN MEXICO CITY WAS SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE 14 AUGUST EXPLOSION IN THE PEMEX REFINERY IN POZA RICA, VERACRUZ. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE IS DEFINITELY BELIEVED TO BE A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ARRESTS OF THE MRP MEMBERS AND THE PEMEX EXPLOSION.) (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE REFERRED TO THE MRP GROUP AS TROTSKYISTS AND NOTED THAT MEXICAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN AWARE OF TROTSKYIST ACTIVITY IN POZA RICA FOR SOME TIME. HMM-12,551 OF 27 JULY 1966 REPORTED THAT SENIOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIALS BELIEVE POZA RICA TO BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF MEXICO BECAUSE IT IS THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH MEXICO CITY IS SUPPLIED WITH GASOLINE. FOR THIS REASON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS'

PARTY/TROTSKYIST (POR/T) ARE BEING CLOSELY MONITORED IN POZA RICA. TROTSKYIST ACTIVITY IN POZA RICA WAS ALSO REPORTED IN HMM-10,316, HMM-10,367, HMM-10,384, AND HMM-10,400).

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO FBI.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Cuba/Venezuela

REPORT NO. CS -311/08152-66

SUBJECT Deportation of Juan Mascaro Neves From Mexico to Venezuela

DATE DISTR. 15 June 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 4-6 April and 26 May 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (27-31 May 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]-10415

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE See below.

1. Source of paragraphs 2 and 3: Latin American with good contacts among members of the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. He has reported reliably for a number of years.

2. On 26 May 1966 Professor Juan Mascaro Neves, a Spanish national who had acquired "Inmigrado" status in Mexico and who had been active in connection with affairs of the Cuban Consulate in Tampico, was picked up by three unidentified men who requested that he show them his identification documents. There was no information available through official Mexican Government services in Tampico on the detention of Mascaro. Since it seemed possible that the detention was not the work of Mexican officials, the Cuban Embassy protested to the Mexican Foreign Office orally. The Embassy was later informed that Mascaro had been deported to Venezuela for violations of the Mexican immigration law.

3. Mascaro was a key contact of Victor Rico Galan, Spanish-born Mexican Marxist journalist, during the latter's visit to Tampico and Ciudad Mante from 4-6 April 1966. Mascaro's wife, Carmen Garcia de Mascaro, has also been a close contact of the Cubans in Tampico.

4. Source of paragraph 5: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
CINCSO # (ALSO SENT CARACAS)							USIA	INS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/R	1	WH/MEXI	1	WH/[illegible]	1	[illegible]-10415
CI/OS/WH	1	WH/FI	1	WH/C	3			LIENVOY/LITEMPO
[illegible]	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/WAVE	# 1			(LIENVOY/LITEMPO-12)
[illegible]	1	WH/[illegible]	1	WH/PACY	#			CS-311/08152-66
CA/[illegible]	1	WH/[illegible]	4	WH/DIRA	#			COORDINATING RELEASING

TOTALS IE 3, CI 4, FI 4, CA 2, WH/C 3 (1), DO/H 1, WH 9 (1)

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WH/C/RR:[illegible]

WH/3/V:[illegible]:POH:xm

8. Mascaro Neves was picked up on 26 May by agents of the DFS (Direccion Federal de Seguridad) and was brought to Mexico City from Tampico. He was immediately deported to Venezuela. The basic reason for Mascaro's deportation was his close association with Rico Galan.[1]

[1] Source Comment: Mexican security officials are convinced that Rico Galan is a key Communist figure and that he is involved in plans to establish bands of guerrillas in the Mexican countryside.

14-00000

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Dominican Republic

REPORT NO. CS -311/06825-66

SUBJECT The National Liberation Movement-Observance of Dominican Republic Week; Criticism of Visit to Mexico of President Johnson

DATE DISTR. 23 May 1966

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 25 April 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (27 April 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10335

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Mexican security officer with access to information derived from investigative activities. His reporting is believed to be reliable.

1. On 25 April 1966 the National Liberation Movement (MLN - Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional) held a meeting in its offices at Republica de El Salvador No. 30-301 in observance of the Week of Solidarity with the Dominican Republic. Only about 35 persons attended the meeting which was chaired by Luis Cordova Ortiz and Guillermo Calderon Ita, in the absence of leftist journalist Victor Rico Galan who could not attend because of illness.

2. Cordova devoted his speech to a denunciation of the United States' "armed invasion" of the Dominican Republic, calling it an act which has aroused the indignation of the entire world. On behalf of the MLN he demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country.

3. Guillermo Calderon spoke briefly about the U.S. presence in the Dominican Republic, but devoted the better part of his speech to a criticism of the visit to Mexico of President Johnson on 14 April 1966. He accused the Mexican and United States governments of having kept secret until the very last minute the fact of an official visit which was falsely described as a courtesy visit. The visit was made on the pretext of unveiling the Lincoln statue, he said, but the fact that President Johnson brought with him all the members of his cabinet and his principal advisors, notwithstanding their

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
	CINCSO #						USIA	I&NS

(Note field distribution indicated by "#")

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1 WH/FI	1 WH/MEXY	#			HMM-10335
CI/OPS/WH	1 WH/CA/P	1 WH/PACY	#			LITEMPO
CA/INT	1 WH/6	1 WH/7/DR	2			(LITEMPO-12)
CA/PROP	1 WH/1	7 WH/SDOM	1			CS-311/06825-66
WH/R	1 WH/MEXI	1 WH/SSDR	1			COORDINATING OFFICER
TOTALS IN 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 13 (3), DO/H 1.				LIAISON	8	WH/7/DR/R HK Pc H BV HB:POH:N

preoccupation with problems in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, proved that Johnson had come to deal with matters of great importance to him and to Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. Or, he added, was it that Johnson had come to give instructions, or orders, to continue his policy of oppression of the people, in this instance, Mexico.

4. Calderon criticized sharply the Mexican Government for its methods in organizing the elaborate reception for President Johnson. The system of herding together the populace is accomplished, among other means, through threats made by union leaders to workers that they will lose a day's pay or suffer other losses if they do not participate in welcoming ceremonies. Calderon denounced officials of the Ministry of Foreign Relations for having remained silent in the face of a proposal by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the creation of an international police force - "the type of security force that has in the past protected countries from North American aggression".

5. Again on 28 April the MLN held a meeting in observance of Dominican Week, this one attended by approximately twenty-five persons. It was announced at the last moment that the journalist Alberto Domingo, who was to have attended the meeting, would not be present because of a more pressing engagement. In his absence Armando Castillejos Ortiz and the poetess Norma Carrasco improvised a program. Castillejos expressed regret that the MLN does not possess adequate publishing facilities to keep the Mexican public informed of the existing situation in the Dominican Republic. He recommended that those present take advantage of every opportunity, in their places of work and at gatherings elsewhere, to disseminate by word of mouth the facts of North American domination over the weaker nations of the world. He noted that ninety percent of the citizens of the United States are not in accord with U.S. foreign policy.

6. Norma Carrasco's contribution to the meeting consisted of the reading of poetry which she had composed depicting the United States' invasion of the Dominican Republic.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Rico-Galan	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-29417
	4. DATE 12 May 66
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITEMPO-12
	8. DATE OF INFO. Mar 66
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

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

SECRET

INDEX [ ] YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

MFG 1-65

ROUTING			
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FROM: MEXICO CITY

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: IW ☒ RID COPY (ADVANCE COPY TUBED CS/DO 0200Z B)

INFO: DDP,
VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6,
CS/DO, DO 4, DO/H 4, CA/O 4, CI, FI/SPG, WH 13, WE 8.

S E C R E T 112327Z APR 11 0140Z 66 IN 94278

DIR INFO PACY CITE MEXI 6851

INTEL MHFOLIO

SUPDATA LIENVOY: 10 APRIL; CONVERSATION OF JORGE L. TAMAYO AND VICTOR RICO GALAN

FILED 11/2325Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI : 10 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT: LEFTIST HISTORIAN'S PLAN TO REFUTE POPULAR IDEA THAT U.S. AIDED MEXICAN EXPULSION OF FRENCH INVADERS (1861 - 1867)

ACQ : MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (11 APR 1966) FIELD NO. HMM-10,242

IW COMMENT:

WH/REG 8
WH/1/M 5

TDCS-314/04789-66

X ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

BASED ON: HMM-10,242
LIENVOY (LIENVOY)

LIAISON: N

RELEASING IWO Launie M. Ziebell
LAUNIE M. ZIEBELL

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
11 APRIL 1966
0249 Z

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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Copy No

Rico Galan

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO

X REF TO FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☐

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ACTION: ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEO, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT

IN 94278 PAGE 2

SOURCE : MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MEXICAN MARXIST CIRCLES. THOUGH NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MARXISTS, SOURCE ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF INDIVUDUAL MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON MARXIST PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

FW COMMENT:

TDCS

ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

COUNTRY MEXICO

TDCS -314/04789-66

DATE OF INFO. 10 APRIL 1966

DISTR. 11 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT

LEFTIST HISTORIAN'S PLAN TO REFUTE POPULAR IDEA THAT U.S. AIDED MEXICAN EXPULSION OF FRENCH INVADERS (1861 - 1867)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (11 APRIL 1966)

REF IN 94278

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10,242

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MEXICAN MARXIST CIRCLES. THOUGH NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MARXISTS, SOURCE ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THIS GROUP. HE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY ON MARXIST PERSONALITIES AND ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

1. JORGE L. TAMAYO CASTILLEJOS, MEXICAN LEFTIST, DISCUSSED WITH THE LEFTIST JOURNALIST VICTOR RICO GALAN HIS FEARS THAT DURING THE CEREMONY ON 15 APRIL AT WHICH MRS. LYNDON JOHNSON WILL PRESENT A STATUE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN TO THE MEXICAN PEOPLE, REMARKS WILL BE MADE ON THE ADMIRATION WHICH THE MEXICAN PATRIOT BENITO JUAREZ FELT FOR LINCOLN AND ALSO THAT IT WILL BE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN FORCING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH TROOPS FROM MEXICO IN THE 1860'S. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE LATTER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

CIA/NMCC, SECRET SERVICE (PRS), OS 4, FBI

STATEMENT IS UNTRUE EVEN THOUGH BOTH IDEAS ARE VERY CURRENT IN MEXICO.

2. TAMAYO TOLD RICO GALAN THAT SOME YEARS AGO WHEN THEN-PRESIDENT ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS WAS THE GUEST OF THEN-PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AT A DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER PROPOSED A TOAST TO THE HUNDRED YEAR FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES HELPED MEXICO EXPEL THE FRENCH INVADERS. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE TOAST WAS PUBLISHED AND THAT HE THEN PREPARED A RATHER LONG ARTICLE WHICH INCLUDED THE TEXTS OF LETTERS WRITTEN BY JUAREZ WHICH DENIED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD HELPED MEXICO AGAINST THE FRENCH. THE PIECE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE LEFTIST WEEKLY SIEMPRE. TAMAYO SAID THAT THE MEXICO CITY DAILY EXCELSIOR ALSO PUBLISHED ALMOST THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THIS REBUTTAL.

3. TAMAYO SUGGESTED TO RICO GALAN THAT THIS SUBJECT BE MADE THE THEME OF RICO'S NEXT ARTICLE FOR SIEMPRE. RICO GALAN SAID THAT HIS NEXT ARTICLE HAD ALREADY BEEN TURNED IN BUT THAT THE EDITORIAL HAD NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN AND THAT HE WOULD SUGGEST THE IDEA TO JOSE PAGES LLERGO, SIEMPRE PUBLISHER, BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT PAGES WOULD BE INTERESTED. (FIELD COMMENT: SIEMPRE APPEARS ON THURSDAYS.)

4. TAMAYO SUGGESTED THAT THE EDITORIAL TAKE AS ITS THESIS THE STATEMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON III

BLACKMAILED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY SAYING THAT IF THE UNITED STATES HELPED MEXICO FRANCE WOULD HELP THE CONFEDERATE STATES.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR FBI, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 14

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FROM MEXICO CITY

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO

FILE VR CI/OPS FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 042315Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 6753

REF GUAT 5881 (IN 89830) 5 APR 66 IN 89052

INFO REF PASSED ODENVY LOCALLY AND PERMISSION GRANTED 30 MARCH 66 BY ODENVY PASS INFO TO HIGH LEVEL GUAT SOURCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6753 5881ODENVY 30 66

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico/Guatemala

REPORT NO. CS-311/04619-66

SUBJECT Possible Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan, Mexican Leftist Journalist

DATE DISTR. 1 April 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 21 March 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (23 March 1966)

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-10014

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla group in Guatemala who is living in exile in Mexico. He is believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community.

Victor Rico Galan, leftist journalist who writes for both Siempre and Politica, is planning to visit Guatemala clandestinely to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel Gutierrez Garbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico, who returned to Guatemala in late February.

Field Comment: TDCS-314/03186-66 reported that Gutierrez Garbin and three other Guatemalan leftists were arrested and executed by the Guatemalan authorities on 6 March 1966.

Source Comment: Rico Galan could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While there, he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government. Rico Galan's interview with Yon Sosa was arranged through Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who is now living in exile in Mexico.

GROUP 1
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE #	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	OCR	FBI #3
CINCSO # (ALSO SENT GUATEMALA CITY)							USIA	I&NS

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CI/ICG	1	WH/FI	1	WH/2/Guat	2
CI/OPS/WH	1	WH/CA/P	1	WH/GUAT	#
CA/LET	1	WH/5	1	WH/PACY	#
CA/PROP	1	WH/1	1		
WH/R	1	WH/MEXI	1		

TOTALS LS 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA 2, WH 9 (1), DO/H 1.

LIAISON #

HMM-10014
LINSBEL
(LINSBEL-1)
CS-311/04619-66

COORDINATING: WH/2/RO:
RELEASING:
WH HS:POH:km

RN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-336674
X-REF TO FILE NO.
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FROM Guatemala

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

AB NU

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SECRET 302311Z

MEXI INFO DIR CITE GUAT 5904

31 MAR 66 IN 88941

REF: HMM-10214, 24 MARCH 1966

1. REQUEST PERMISSION PASS TO LIAISON REF INFO PLANS VICTOR RICO GALAN TRAVEL GUATEMALA CLANDESTINELY INVESTIGATE DISSAPPEARANCE VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ.

2. ALSO REQUEST MEXI POUCH PHOTOS OF RICO.

SECRET

CFN 302311Z 5904 HMM-10214 24 1966 VICTOR RICO GALAN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ MEXI RICO

BT

CS COPY

201336674
31 Mar 66

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM	PROCESSING ACTION
FROM Mexico City	REPORT NO. HMM-10,214	COVER SHEET MARKED FOR INDEXING
REPORTING OFFICER Lee R. MYLECHRAINE	DATE OF REPORT 24 March 1966	NO INDEXING REQUIRED OPS DATA REPORTED SEPARATELY
REPORTS OFFICER Olivia C. RAGNITY cx	PROJECT # LIREBEL	CS DISSEMINATION
APPROVING OFFICER Willard C. CURTIS	SOURCE CRYPT LIREBEL-1	TDCS DISSEMINATION

FIELD DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
5 - Hqs. 1 - CUAT 4 - Files	1 - Ambassador, Minister, Political Affairs 1 - Legal Attache 1 - CINCSO through Panama City

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

LIREBEL-1 received the reported information from LIELEGANT who said that the Mexican Government was aware of Rico's plans.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FORM 7-64 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CS COPY

(20)

201-336474

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Mexico

SUBJECT Possible Travel to Guatemala of Victor Rico Galan

REPORT NO. HMM-10,214

DATE OF REPORT 24 March 1966

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 21 March 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (23 March 1966)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Guatemalan professional man, former member of a guerrilla group in Guatemala who is living in exile in Mexico. He is believed to have good access to the Guatemalan exile community.

Victor Rico Galan, leftist journalist who writes for both Siempre and Politica, reportedly is planning to visit Guatemala clandestinely to investigate the disappearance of Victor Manuel Gutierrez Garbin, Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) leader of the Guatemalan exile community in Mexico who returned to Guatemala in late February.

Field Comment: HGG-4148 reported that Gutierrez Garbin and three other Guatemalan leftists were arrested and executed by the Guatemalan authorities on 8 March 1966.

Source Comment: Rico Galan could only enter Guatemala illegally since he was declared persona non grata by the Guatemalan Government in 1963 after he visited the country to interview President Peralta. While in Guatemala at that time he also managed to talk with Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, guerrilla leader. Upon his return to Mexico, Rico Galan wrote articles favorable to the rebels and most unflattering to the Peralta government. Rico Galan's interview with Yon Sosa was arranged through Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who is now living in exile in Mexico.

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

2. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

3. DATE

4. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

5. DATE OF INFO.

6. EVALUATION

8. ANALYST

9. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED TO

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
SPANISH BORN MARXIST JOURNALIST
ALSO HAS NAMES OF OTHERS INVITED TO
THE CONGRESS.

050-009-001
MEXI-06351
22 FEB 66
HMM -10163
P2

R 6603150503

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 10-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(13-00)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET 3P

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
XX MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
0 Press Expose of Victor Rico Galan's Connection with Yon Sosa

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
[illegible]
DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. On 13 January 1966 a Mexico City newspaper, El Heraldo, published an article which cited a taped speech by Victor Rico Galan to Yon Sosa's guerrillas as evidence of Rico Galan's efforts to undermine the January 1966 visit of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz to Guatemala. A copy of this article is attached. The taped speech mentioned in the article is obviously that which Guatemalan authorities captured from Yon Sosa's guerrillas in October 1964 following a guerrilla attack on a Guatemalan military garrison. This tape was subsequently made available to KUBARK and was passed via the Guatemala Station to Mexico City Station for possible exploitation in Mexico. The content of the taped speech was later passed to President Diaz Ordaz by COS, Mexico City, with a view to stimulating pressure toward Rico Galan's expulsion from Mexico as an undesirable alien. How El Heraldo obtained or got word of the taped speech is not known. Since the El Heraldo article was pegged to the current trip to Guatemala of President Diaz Ordaz, it is very probable that the expose was stimulated directly by the Presidency, in line with a GOM campaign to neutralize all existing and potential opposition locally to the Presidential trip.

2. In a sharp rebuttal in the 26 January 1966 issue of the prominent Mexican leftist magazine Siempre, for which he writes regularly, Victor Rico Galan

(continued)

Attachments: NOT MICROFILMED
Articles As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
2 - WHD w/atts hw
1 - Guatemala w/atts hw
2 - Files

NOT MICROFILMED

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO
201-733580

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28237

DATE
9 February 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-336478 FPH: P-7354
201-733580 FPH: P-7867

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28237

denounces the El Heraldo accusations against him, denies any involvement on his part in subversive activities in Guatemala, attacks Guatemalan President Peralta Azurdia as weak and fearful about his personal safety, and insists (quite correctly) that the speech he taped for delivery to Yon Sosa's guerrillas in October 1964 could not possibly have had anything to do with President Diaz Ordaz' trip in January 1966. A copy of the Rico Galan Siempre article is attached.

3. At this stage the Station has no additional information on the origin or purpose of the El Heraldo attack on Victor Rico Galan. As and if such information develops through Station governmental contacts, the Station will advise addressees accordingly.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

Attachment 4 NMMA 28232 MSM
201-336494

CS Copy

POR VICTOR RICO GALAN

Sr José Pagés Llergo,
Director de SIEMPRE!
Admirado y [redacted]go:

Tengo ho[redacted]me a un asunto que me concierne personalmente, y uso por ello el estilo epistolar. Como el asunto involucra cosas que le importan al país, confío en que esta carta sea de interés público, aunque para seguir un orden lógico me vea obligado a empezar por el aspecto personal que hay en él.

Como usted sabe, **El Heraldo de México** publicó el pasado día 13 un cintillo que decía "Fracasó la conjura comunista", bajo el cual se afirmaba que los guerrilleros guatemaltecos, en connivencia con malos mexicanos, preparaban una algarada o atentado —esto no se especificaba— contra el Presidente Díaz Ordaz, con motivo de su viaje a Guatemala. Según la nota "informativa", que llevaba las misteriosas siglas SNG (¿Servicio de Noticias de Guatemala?), el principal agente en esa conjura sería yo, y como prueba se ofrecía la supuesta versión taquigráfica de una cinta magnetofónica grabada por mí. Como existió, en efecto, una cinta que yo grabé, y como en el "pastiche" publicado por **El Heraldo** se utilizan frases que pronuncié realmente, creo necesario explicar la historia de todo ello.

Visité por primera vez Guatemala en octubre de 1963. En el número de **SIEMPRE!** del 30 de ese mes y año, apareció publicada una entrevista mía con el coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, que se iniciaba con esta descripción de su persona: "El coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, "hombre fuerte" de Guatemala, no da de ninguna manera la impresión de ser fuerte. Por el contrario, es oscuro, de hablar premioso, con una constante actitud tímida y sin brillantez alguna. No tiene ese tono decidido de los militares guatemaltecos que, digan cosas inteligentes o tontas, lo hacen con un énfasis de cuestión sancionada. En los pocos minutos de conversación con él, me expliqué muy bien por qué —pese a mi insistencia en contrario— aceptó sólo contestar mis preguntas por escrito. La transacción final consistió en que, una vez satisfecho el cuestionario en esa forma, hablaríamos brevemente en su despacho, sobre todo con el objeto de obtener una fotografía".

Esa discreta sugerencia de su tartamudez mental enfureció al coronel. Y más aun, cuanto que en el mismo número de SIEMPRE! apareció otra entrevista, también mía, con el entonces líder del movimiento guerrillero guatemalteco. El coronel Peralta Azurdia le dijo a un colega chileno que lo entrevistó días después que yo, que se vengaría de mí donde quiera que me encontrase. ¡Y me imagino, no sin humor, el coraje que debe haber hecho cuando el colega chileno publicó su propio reportaje... y coincidió conmigo en lo de la tartamudez mental del señor coronel!

Lo cierto es que el hombre intentó en reiteradas ocasiones cumplir su promesa. Con motivo de su informe de gobierno, transmitido por radio y televisión a toda Guatemala, me acusó de haber ido a ese país a organizar "grupos de choque", y la AP y la UPI se encargaron de difundir la noticia, que la patriota, nacionalista y solidaria prensa mexicana publicó profusamente. El coronel "se vengaba", y yo callé por no dar importancia a la irritación de un personaje tan menor, irritación que, por otra parte, me explicaba perfectamente.

Regresé a Guatemala un año después, precisamente en octubre de 1964. Y, efectivamente, grabé un mensaje en cinta magnetofónica, destinados a varios guerrilleros a los que no pude ver. Nada tenía de misterioso ese mensaje. Contenía un saludo, algunas apreciaciones sobre el movimiento guerrillero hechas sobre el terreno por el observador, por el periodista, y noticias para los que tenían familiares en México. Ni una sola palabra que fuera necesario ocultar, ni una sola idea que no haya publicado, no una, sino mil veces. ¿Acaso es un misterio mi solidaridad abierta y pública con quienes luchan por la libertad de su patria? Mucho menos que misterio es delito, y yo me enorgullezco de esa solidaridad.

Lo cierto es, sin embargo, que esa cinta no llegó a sus destinatarios, porque fue capturada por el ejército guatemalteco. Y el coronel Peralta Azurdia encontró en ella la fórmula perfecta para una serie de maniobras que por un lado, satisfacían su tripe al o honor m.., y por la otra, [illegible] la única, ni mucho menos. Antes hubo rumores, acusaciones y chismes contra muchas personas, a las que se acusaba de ser mencionadas en la cinta y de colaborar conmigo en mis tenebrosas conspiraciones. En mayo de 1965, el diario guatemalteco **Prensa Libre** —el de mayor circulación en su país— hizo pública una de esas "versiones". ¿De dónde la había obtenido? De un boletín enviado por la oficina de prensa del coronel Peralta Azurdia. Y esa "versión" tenía por objeto justificar la expulsión —entonces reciente— del distinguido intelectual y político guatemalteco Francisco Villagrán Kramer, mencionado en la cinta, lo cual era "prueba" de que conspiraba conmigo.

¿Y por qué sólo **Prensa Libre** publicó la versión? Pues por la razón simple de que provenía de un boletín oficial, y los otros periódicos de Guatemala se negaron a aceptarlo si no se les permitía oír la famosa cinta. Y claro que no se les permitió. Bajo una dictadura militar, los periódicos guatemaltecos tuvieron más ética profesional que **El Heraldo** en un régimen de libertad de prensa. Pero así son las cosas. Y algo que es también importante hacer notar: **Prensa Libre**, tan oficialista que acogió la sucia calumnia, es el periódico que ha hecho la campaña más grosera y negativa contra la visita del Presidente Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala.

La "versión" de El Heraldo tiene por objeto acusarme, a mí y a otras personas, de conspirar para echar a perder la visita del Presidente Díaz Ordaz a Guatemala. Yo fui a ese país por última vez —repito— en octubre de 1964, cuando el licenciado Díaz Ordaz era Presidente Electo. ¿Cómo iba a saber que se proponía visitar Guatemala? ¿Cómo iba a hablar de los asaltantes del cuartel de Ciudad Madera, en Chihuahua, si eso sucedió a fines de 1965, y en octubre de 1964 nada sucedía en Chihuahua? Eso, para mencionar sólo dos de las más abultadas falsedades de la "versión". Se utilizan unas cuantas frases auténticas, y se adoba una supuesta grabación para cada caso. Sencillo y sin problemas.

Pero, además, el coronel Peralta Azurdia se propone otra cosa con la "versión" de **El Heraldo.** Se propone justificar las extremadas precauciones policíacas que tomó para preservar su vida —no la del Presidente Díaz Ordaz— y la mala impresión que eso, y la falta de asistencia popular a la recepción, tuvo que causar al huésped y a su comitiva. Pese a que la tartamudez mental del coronel Peralta Azurdia y la de sus colaboradores mexicanos en el sucio adobo de la cinta no les permitió siquiera relacionar ésta con el viaje presidencial, la noticia termina diciendo: "Por todo esto **(¿por qué?)**, el gobierno de Guatemala creyó pertinente tomar todas las medidas necesarias que garantizaron la seguridad del mandatario mexicano y de los miembros de su comitiva, durante su visita a nuestra nación".

Pero la verdad es que tales precauciones se tomaron para garantizar la seguridad del coronel Peralta Azurdia —esa sí muy amenazada—, y no la del Presidente Díaz Ordaz, contra el cual no tenía nada el pueblo de Guatemala, y al que sólo los periódicos reaccionarios —en particular **Prensa Libre**— atacaron. Tan es así, que si bien en la capital el Presidente mexicano fue encerrado en un automóvil blindado —para proteger a Peralta Azurdia—, y si bien en la capital acudió poco público —para no aplaudir a Peralta Azurdia—, en La Antigua, a donde el licenciado Díaz Ordaz fue solo, sí hubo recepción popular entusiasta y sobraron las precauciones policíacas. ¡Claro, no estaba Peralta Azurdia!

Y, en relación con esto, hay algo que el público mexicano debe saber. La Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala la consideró seriamente la idea de otorgarle al Presidente Díaz Ordaz el grado de doctor **honoris causa.** El asunto se debatió extraoficialmente en el Consejo Universitario, y varios maestros propusieron la idea, porque significaba el reconocimiento a un mandatario civil y universitario, e indirectamente una bofetada a los gorilas de uniforme que gobiernan Guatemala. Y los consejeros alumnos estuvieron de acuerdo en que la tendencia era buena, pero objetaron el propósito por una sola razón: porque, por motivos de protocolo, la Universidad se vería obligada a invitar y recibir en su recinto al coronel Peralta Azurdia. En tal caso —dijeron— los estudiantes no acudirían. Y, ante este peligro, que desvirtuaba el verdadero objetivo político del proyecto, la Universidad no otorgó el grado. Está claro que no lo otorgó por una sola razón: por no recibir a Peralta Azurdia, no obstante las buenas intenciones para el Presidente Díaz Ordaz.

Así son los hechos, esa es la verdad. Y si el coronel Peralta Azurdia cree de verdad que me puede echar a mí la culpa de todo eso... [illegible]

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
	4. DATE
	5. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	6. DATE OF INFO.
	7. EVALUATION
8. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
9. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR	019-120-032
201-336474	MEXI-05662
SEX M DOB ?	22 DEC 65
	P2

CIT MEXICO
OCC ?
JOURNALIST, CUBAN AGENT, MBR MLN NATL
COMMITTEE MAY ATTEND TRI-CONT CONF
/HMM -10046/

R 6601130849

HMY

FILE IN 201-336490

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

30 SECRET

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
SR 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, NE6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

S
E C R E T 082355Z

DIR INFO NEWD CITE MEXI 5556 9DEC65-IN 10793

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

REF DIR 63266

1. NO MEXI TRACES CARMEN CANO.

2. ANTONIO GONZALEZ DE LEON (SUBJ) CURRENTLY ASSISTANT SUBDIRECTOR GENERAL IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT OF MEXICAN FOREIGN OFFICE, HAS BEEN IN THIS JOB SINCE AT LEAST AUG 64.

3. PER LIFEAT AND LIENVOY SUBJ IN OCCASIONAL OFFICIAL (NOT SOCIAL) CONTACT SOVS, POLES, CZECHS 64-65. AUG 64 SUBJ DESCRIBED AS HANDLING UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS.

4 PER LIFEAT SUBJ INVITED 4 PAR 57 RECEPTION SOV EMB MEXICO, DID NOT ATTEND BECAUSE IN NEW YORK. SUBJ THEY WITH FOREIGN OFFICE.

5. PER LIFEAT ON 7 MAY 65 SUBJ CALLED VICTOR RICO GALAN 201-335474, COMMUNIST JOURNALIST AND KNOWN CUBAN IS AGENT, SAID HE HAD TO TALK TO RICO AND ARRANGED MEET FOR COFFEE. SUBJ ASKED HOW LOCATE GONZALO MARTINEZ. RICO GAVE MARTINEZ HOME PHONE 24-88-84, WHICH UNLISTED. PRETEXT CALL ESTABLISHED THIS PHONE OF GONZALO MARTINEZ CORBABLA, PRI PRESIDENT FOR

SECRET

File:
Rico Galan 201-

SECRET IN 10793 Page 2

MEXICO CITY (FEDERAL DISTRICT) AND PRO COMMUNIST.

SECRET

CFN 5556 63266 NO MEXI CARMEN CANO ANTONIO GONZALEZ DE LEON (SUBJ) AUG 64 LIFEAT LIENVOY NOT SOCIAL SOVS POLES CZECHS 64-65 64 UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 4 APR 57 SOV NOT ATTEND NEW YORK 7 MAY 65 RICO GALAN 201-336474 CUBAN RICO COFFEE GONZALO MARTINEZ RICO 24-SS-84 GONZALO MARTINEZ CORBALA PRI PRO

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3?

31 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DDP

CS COPY

☒ RID.COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI/IC2, CI/OPS, CA2, CA/PROP, DO4, D/H3, CA/O4, FI, FI/INT

7 DEC 65 IN 09866

ACTION

S E C R E T 072305Z

CS COPY

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 5531

1. LIENVOY OF 3 DEC REPORTED REQUEST BY CUBAN ALFREDO VINAS IN HAVA TO VICTOR RICO GALAN FOR SERIES OF INTERVIEWS WITH PROMINENT PERSONALITIES RE TRI-CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. RICO GALAN TO SEND TAPE OF INTERVIEWS TO HAVA.

2. NAMES SUGGESTED TO RICO INCLUDED: VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, PPS SEC GEN; FORMER PRESIDENT LAZARO CARDENAS DEL RIO; DEPUTY ENRIQUE RAMIREZ Y RAMIREZ (ALSO PUBLISHER OF EL DIA); LUIS CARDOZA Y ARAGON, GUAT COMMUNIST IN MEXI; GUILLERMO CARNERO HOKE; JOSE PAGES LLERGO, PUBLISHER OF SIEMPRE; AND OTHERS RICO THINKS SUITABLE. RICO SAID PAGES IMPOSSIBLE BUT WILL CONTACT OTHERS AT ONCE.

S E C R E T

CFN 5531 3 DEC CUBAN ALFREDO VINAS HAVA VICTOR RICO GALAN TRI-CONTINENTAL RICO GALAN HAVA VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO PPS SEC GEN FORMER LAZARO CARDENAS DEL RIO ENRIQUE RAMIREZ Y RAMIREZ EL DIA LUIS CARDOZA Y ARAGON GUILLERMO CARNERO HOKE JOSE PAGES LLERGO RICO

BT

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

13. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

15. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

16.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

050-006-014
DBB -23035
28 SEP 65
FBI

CIT ?
OCC ?
ON THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMM.
A MEXICO, MEXICO CITY MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION
NACIONAL /NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ C.P.
FRONT ORG

R 6510180621

FILE IN 201- [illegible]

18 FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, WHD
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	MHSPAWN/Rico Galan Denigration Campaign
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES	

PROCESSING ACTION
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- XX MICROFILM

MICROFILMED
AUG 11 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REFERENCE: MEXI-4243

1. Attached herewith is a "portrait" of Victor Rico Galan compiled from information available to the Station and tailored to the outline proposed in MEXI-3822 for a phased denigration campaign targeted on Subject. This study has been passed to the contact cited in paragraph 3 of reference with appropriate caveats with regard to sourcing of hitherto unpublished portions as a basis for a projected article on Subject.

2. The "last-ditch" effort by LILISP-E to place an exposé of Rico Galan in a Merida newspaper (as noted in reference) has not yet borne fruit. The special article by the LILISP-E news service has been prepared but last-minute rewriting problems have held up distribution. Copies of the article will be forwarded as soon as they become available.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
1. As Stated (HEREWITH)

Distribution:
3 - WHD w/att hw
3 - Files

CS COPY

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
50-126-22/3	HMMA-26800	5 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-126-22/3

MICROFILMED
AUG 11 1965

Notes for

A Portrait of a Castro-Communist Agent

Victor Rico Galan was born 6 February 1928 in El Ferrol, Spain. He is Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalization in March 1949. He is married to Ingeborg Diener de Rico Galan, born 11 May 1929 in Mexico City. He resides at Ernestina Larrainzar 19-B, Col. del Valle in Mexico City. He writes for both Siempre, Mexico City leftist news-weekly, and Politica, pro-Communist bi-weekly newsmagazine.

VRG reportedly talked to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in 1961 regarding the formation of the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional (MLN) in Mexico. With their approval he became one of the founding members of the MLN and later headed the MLN Press and Propaganda Committee. In a speech to the MLN in April 1962 he stated, "The government must be made to understand that only the people have the right to violence." (This was in reference to the Mexican government repression of the Communist Party and its arrest of David Alvaro Siquieros.)

In an article in Siempre in March 1963 VRG advocated the formation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, former President of Mexico. VRG said this new political party was needed to truly represent the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. VRG conceived this new party as the political arm of the recently-formed MLN, which could thus develop into a broad national pro-Communist movement like the FRAP in Chile.

VRG has always been very close and sympathetic to the Castro-Cuban revolution. In 1961 he was a member of the Periodistas Mexicanos Amigos de Cuba. Also in 1961 he was reported to be a member of the Committee for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. In March 1962 he was reportedly a member of a group of four pro-Castroites who made an abortive physical attack on Emilio Uranga, writer for Siempre who has written anti-Castro items. As the group converged on Uranga other members of the Siempre staff intervened and the matter was settled without violence.

From October to December 1962 VRG was in Cuba, as a correspondent for Siempre and also reportedly to gather material for a political biography

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of Fidel Castro. In an article written for Siempre while he was in Cuba (Siempre 31 Oct 62) he extols the great Cuban revolution and the advantages Castroism has brought to the lower classes. In a later article (Siempre 14 Nov 62) he attacks the Soviet Union and Khrushchev for their weakness during the Cuban missile crisis. He refers to Fidel Castro as being the vanguard of the revolution against Colonialism.

From late May to mid June 1963 VRG was again in Cuba, this time to interview Fidel Castro following the latter's return from the Soviet Union. VRG reportedly spent 8 days with Fidel Castro, five of them aboard the Cuban leader's yacht, and also interviewed other Cuban leaders, including Blas Roca, Secretary-General of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party); Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna, Minister of Industries; Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado, Cuban President; and Raul Roa Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations.

It was during this May-June 1963 contact with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders that VRG received a major operational assignment. He was given the mission of traveling through Central and South America to contact local Communist and guerrilla leaders. His job was to persuade these groups to begin campaigns of violence and terror immediately in order to take the pressure off the FALN in Venezuela, whose program of terror, heavily subsidized by Castro, was beginning to run into increased resistance from the Venezuelan government forces. On this trip VRG also had the mission of bringing about greater unity among the various Communist and terroristic groups.

In late 1963 VRG undertook his assigned mission. He traveled to Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Brasil and contacted key Communists in each of these countries.

Among the Communist leaders which VRG contacted on this trip were Hugo Victor, President of the Partido del Pueblo (PDP - People's Party, a Communist group) and David Turner, a leader of the Vanguard of National Action (VAN - a pro-Cuban, radical revolutionary organization) in Panama; Gomez Ayay, a guerrilla leader in Guatemala; and Francisco Juliao, the revolutionary peasant leader, in Brazil.

In Nicaragua VRG met several times with Alvaro Ramirez Gonzalez, Secretary-General of the Movilizacion Republicana (MR - Communist Political Front) who was also a member of the Central Committee of the Partido Socialista in Nicaragua (PSN), the Nicaraguan Communist Party. VRG's visit with

Ramirez was given considerable radio and press publicity in Nicaragua. The press referred to "secret meetings" in VRG's hotel room between Ramirez and VRG. Ramirez answered by writing letters to the newspapers, saying he met VRG quite openly in his office and that VRG had called on him because he (VRG) was a legitimate journalist who was seeking interviews with various political figures. On 24 October Ramirez was interviewed on radio and finally reluctantly admitted that he had gone to VRG's hotel room. He said his purpose in going there was to take VRG to his (Ramirez's) office.

In Panama VRG stayed at the Hotel International. While in Panama he visited US installations and was seen taking many pictures. His talks with Hugo Victor and David Turner were aimed at getting the VAN and the PDP to resolve their differences and to unite. Turner briefed VRG on VAN's preparations to establish an armed movement in Panama. Victor, on the other hand, spurned VRG's to unify the two groups.

Following this trip in late 1963, VRG returned to Cuba (in January 1964) and visited Fidel Castro again and to report on the results of his contacts with Central and Latin American Communist leaders.

In late March 1965 VRG (with his wife) again traveled to Cuba to report to Cuban leaders. He returned to Mexico in early April 1965.

In May 1964 VRG was invited to visit Red China, ostensibly as a guest of the All-China Journalists Association, which indicated it would be willing to pay all costs, including transportation. Because of other pressing work in connection with his assignments on behalf of Castro, VRG did not accept this invitation.

Over the years 1961 to 1965 VRG's contacts with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City have increased steadily. He meets frequently and regularly with various officials of the Cuban Embassy, usually at his home, at the Siempre offices or at the homes of the Cuban officials in Mexico City.

His most frequent contact is with Manuel Eugenio Vega Perez, Third Secretary of the Cuban Embassy and chief representative of the Dirrecion General de Inteligencia (DGI - Cuban Intelligence Service) in Mexico. Obese and outwardly jolly, Vega Perez was the driver of a beer truck in Havana prior to the Cuban Revolution which launched him on his intelligence career.

Another VRG Cuban intelligence contact is Ramon Sinobas Casado, Counselor of the Cuban Embassy. Sinobas is Vega's assistant in "handling" VRG. It is apparent that these contacts are primarily for the purpose of channeling VRG's reports and instructions to and from Cuba. In the course of his work as an agent for Castro and the DGI, VRG is known to have acted as a courier, carrying material and large sums of money to pro-Cuban groups in Central and Latin American countries.

In October 1964 VRG received another important assignment from his Cuban masters. VRG was requested to travel to Guatemala to make a personal survey of the strength and weaknesses of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa's guerrilla forces and to lay the basis for a more energetic implementation in Guatemala of the tactical principles for guerrilla warfare laid down by "Che" Guevara. This was, in effect, a follow-up to his earlier visit to Yon Sosa during his swing through Central American countries in late 1963. At that time, VRG attempted to persuade Yon Sosa to align himself more closely with Castro's objectives in Latin America. The results of this visit to Guatemala were written up by VRG in a special report to Castro. VRG's conclusions at that time were not completely favorable to Castro.

Yon Sosa is known to be a forceful and independent guerrilla leader who prides himself on his ability to maintain himself and his followers independently of ideological guidance from either Havana, Peking or Moscow, although he is quite willing to accept arms and financial support from any of these Communist capitals. In the past Castro's efforts to bring Yon Sosa to heel have been thwarted mainly by the influence the Chinese Communists have been able to exert over the Guatemalan guerrilla leader. In addition to the direct aid provided by Peking to Yon Sosa and his guerrillas in Northeastern Guatemala, there is the fact of Yon Sosa's Chinese background (Yon Sosa's father was Chinese) which has served to tie him emotionally to the Red Chinese.

It was the continuing recalcitrant attitude of Yon Sosa which apparently prompted VRG's second mission to Guatemala in October of 1964. VRG was instructed not only to talk to Yon Sosa but also to try to influence Yon Sosa's guerrilla forces directly in line with Castro's objectives. In addition to prepared material which VRG used for lecturing the guerrillas he brought with him special propaganda films for indoctrination purposes.

In late October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from Yon Sosa's guerrillas following a guerrilla attack on a government garrison. Included in these tapes was one made by VRG for delivery to the guerrillas during his early October visit with them. A copy of this tape is attached. The tape consists mainly of an exhortation by VRG for unity (between the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT) and the 13 November Group) and a plea not to permit ideological arguments to replace action. In this speech VRG reveals himself to be a hard-headed revolutionary activist, not merely an intellectual leftist. His approach to revolution is completely practical, not theoretical.

To cover his mission as a Castro political action agent to Yon Sosa, VRG later published an "interview" with the latter (in Siempre No. 593, 4 November 1964).

VRG's involvement in the recent Dominican crisis is the latest example of his work on behalf of Castro. In early January 1964 VRG travelled to Santo Domingo, returning a week later to Mexico. Ostensibly this trip was to report on Dominican Republic affairs for Siempre. Actually this was merely a cover for a Communist propaganda assignment. Shortly after VRG left Santo Domingo, thousands of copies of a pro-Castro brochure, entitled "Siempre visita la Dominicana" and signed VRG, were distributed among Communists and Communist sympathizers in the Dominican Republic. A copy of this brochure is attached.

During his January 1964 trip VRG contacted both the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD), a terroristic revolutionary Marxist-Leninist and strong pro-Chicom group, and the 14th of June Movement, the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ), a militant, revolutionary pro-Castro group. His contact with the MPD resulted in his furnishing material to the subversive MPD publication, Libertad. But his principal contact, one that developed rapidly into a very active relationship in the period preceding the Dominican crisis, was with Juan B. Mejia, leader of the APCJ. These two have maintained close and frequent contact over the past year. During the Dominican crisis VRG served as a relay point for material and instructions from Cuba to the APCJ and also acted as a reporting channel from Mejia to the DGI and the APCJ's Castro-Cuban leadership in Cuba.

As in previous operations of this kind, VRG cloaked his relationship with Mejia under a journalistic cover. An "interview" he conducted with Mejia appeared in the 2 May 1965 issue of the Cuban newspaper Hoy. A copy of the text of that article is attached.

In mid-May 1965 a gaffe by Mejia's and VRG's Cuban superiors exposed the Mejia-VRG-Cuba channel publicly. In an article carried by Porto Alegre (Brazil) newspaper Correio do Povo on 20 May, datelined New York 19 May by Louis Wisniser, a Radio Havana broadcast of 18 May was reported to have mentioned a declaration by Juan Mejia sent from Santo Domingo to VRG in Mexico, who then sent the declaration to Radio Havana. After citing this channel by which it received the Mejia statement, Radio Havana proceeded to broadcast the following excerpts from the declaration: "Numerous leaders of the 14 June Party have disappeared but I (Mejia) know that they are now in the mountains leading guerrillas. The 14 June Party has control of the situation in Santo Domingo." The Correio do Povo noted editorially that the Radio Havana broadcast seems to negate the Castro effort to deny that the 14th June Movement in the Dominican Republic is tied to him. The article concludes by noting that Mejia was one of the 58 Communists listed by the Americans, and that this confession by Havana puts new light on the question of American intervention in the Dominican Republic. Not noted in the article is the fact that VRG's role as an intermediary between Mejia and Castro is clearly exposed by the Radio Havana broadcast. A copy of the Correio do Povo article is attached.

When the Dominican rebellion erupted VRG began to agitate with the Siempre staff for outright and total support to the pro-Castro forces in the rebel camp. These efforts began to bear fruit when VRG was allowed to personally brief and dispatch a Siempre correspondent-photographer team to the Dominican Republic in early May 1965 to report on the crisis. The correspondent was Luis Suarez Lopez; the photographer was Luis Rodrigo Moya Moreno. The resulting articles in Siempre produced by this VRG-Suarez-Moya team were violently anti-US and pro-Castro Communist in their interpretation of the crisis -- so much so that they apparently touched off a bitter dispute between VRG and Jose Pages Llergo, Siempre director, who prefers to stick to the traditional Siempre role of a pseudo-independent outlet for a variety of leftist causes. VRG's efforts to reorient Siempre along more militant pro-Communist lines has long been known in journalistic circles in Mexico and the Suarez-Moya incident appears to have precipitated an open fight between the two. VRG is apparently aiming for a showdown with Pages Llergo over this issue, since several Siempre writers are known to have been individually approached by VRG over the past weeks to enlist their support against the present Siempre editorial policy, which VRG regards as too "opportunistic."

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 32

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

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FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, CA/PROP, DO-4, DO/H-3, WH/C-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CA/PEG

SECRET 201937Z

DIR CITE MEXI 4243

26 JUL 65 IN 19087

LNSPAWN

REF A MEXI 3222 (IN92168) CS COPY

B DIR 21422 *

1. RICO DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN OUTLINED REF APPEARS STALLED AT MOMENT. FIRST ATTACK ALONG LINES REF A PARA 1-A WAS MADE ON LILISP-E NEWS BROADCAST 26 JUNE (SEE HMMA-26530). SHORTLY AFTER BROADCAST AN OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF GOBERNACION CALLED RADIO STATION AND WARNED MANAGEMENT THAT WHILE CRITICISM OF POLITICAL IDEAS AND VIEWS TOLERABLE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS AS IN RICO BROADCAST WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED.

2. AT ABOUT SAME TIME LILISP-E ARTICLE PREPARED PER REF A PARA 1-A WAS REJECTED BY EL UNIVERSAL AS BEING TOO LIBELOUS. POSSIBLY RELATED TO GOBERNACION INTEREST IN LILISP-E RICO BROADCAST, EXCELSIOR ADVISED KALABILE IN 12 JUL LETTER THAT IN FUTURE EXCELSIOR WILL NOT REPLAY LILISP-E ARTICLES THAT INCLUDE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS. IN FOLLOW-UP TALK WITH EXCELSIOR MANAGEMENT LILISP-E ARTICLE ON NCNA AND PABLO FONS INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG SMUGGLING (SEE HMMA-26619) WAS

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[illegible]

201. 336474

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SECRET IN 19077 PG 2

CITED BY EXCELSIOR EDITOR JULIO SCHERER GARCIA AS EXAMPLE OF LILISP-E ARTICLE WHICH EXCELSIOR UNABLE ACCEPT.

3. IN EFFORT DETOUR ABOVE OBSTRUCTIONS LILISP-E ATTEMPTING PLACE RICO STORY (PHASE I) IN MERIDA NEWSPAPER VIA LILISP-E SPECIAL NEWS SERVICE ARTICLE WHICH CAN THEN BE REPLAYED MEXICO CITY PRESS. MEANTIME, PURSUANT DIR 82482 APPROVAL, STATION IS ALSO PREPARING MATERIAL BASED REF A FOR PASSAGE TO ROBERT STROTHER, ROVING EDITOR FOR READERS DIGEST, WHO HAS TOLD COS THAT HE WOULD WELCOME AND WOULD BE ABLE REPLAY THIS MATERIAL IN SELECCIONES, READERS DIGEST LA EDITION, WHICH WOULD THEN PROVIDE PEG FOR REPLAY LOCALLY AND ELSEWHERE IN WH AREA.

S E C R E T * IF PAPERS REFUSE PRINT ORIGINAL MAYBE CHANCE THEY REPRINT FROM LILISP-E BULLETIN

CFN: 4243 3822 21422 RICO DENIGRATION REF REF A PARA 1-A LILISP-E 26 HMMA-26530 GOBERNACION RICO NOT BY LILISP-E PER REF A PARA 1-A EL UNIVERSAL GOBERNACION LILISP-E RICO EXCELSIOR ENLABILE 12 JUL EXCELSIOR NOT REPLAY LILISP-E EXCELSIOR LILISP-E NOMA PABLO FONG HMMA-26619 EXCELSIOR JULIO SCHERER GARCIA LILISP-E RICO I MERIDA VIA LILISP-E MEXICO CITY DIR 82482 REF A ROBERT STROTHER COS SELECCIONES LA WH

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
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	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

GALAN, VICTOR RICO
201-332474
SEX M DOB ?

019-004-131
DBB -16279
19 JUL 65
FBI
P2

CIT CUBA
OCC ?
EDITORIAL WRITER FOR THE PUBLICATION SIEMPRE, SOURCE OF GEORGE NOVACK, A NATIONAL COMMITTEE MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY /SWP/

R 6512011453

FILE IN 201-332474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-61 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

1A-o Use Previous Editions (REVISED 4-65) MFG 1-65

INDEX ☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 336474
X REF TO FILE NO 49

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
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3		7	
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FROM: MEXICO CITY

FILE RID ☐ RET TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG

ACTION: IW ☒ RID COPY

C0089

INFO: VR, FILE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 7, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, CI, RI/AN, WH 18, WH/C 8

INDEXED AND CONTROL COPIES MATCHED

SECRET 092340Z 10 JUL 65 IN 05675 02187

3P

DIR INFO SDOM WAVE PACY LANT CITE MEXI 4092

MICROFILMED
JUL 20 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

WH/1 INDEX

INTEL

contact

SUPDATA SOURCE LIFEAT COVERAGE OF VICTOR RICO GALAN

FILED 09/2322Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-9776 MEXICO/ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SUBJECT TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF FAMILY OF EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE. DOI 2-3 JULY 1965 PADA MEXICO, MEXICO CITY 7 JULY 1965.

SOURCE MEXICAN LEFTIST WELL ACQUAINTED WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN LEFT. HIS REPORTING HAS PROVEN RELIABLE. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM VICTOR RICO GALAN.

IW COMMENT:

WH/REG	8					
WH/1/M	5					
WH/2/DR/RE	5					

TDCS -314/09444-65

X ROUTINE | PRIORITY

BASED ON: HMM 9776
LIFEAT

LIAISON:

RELEASING IWO: Edward L. Higgins
EDWARD L. HIGGINS

DATE DISTRIBUTED:
10 JULY 1965
0546Z

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-336474

FORM 10-63 3000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(20) MFG. 12-64

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY MEXICO/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TDCS-314/09444-65

DATE OF INFO. 2-3 JULY 1965

DISTR. 10 JULY 1965

SUBJECT

TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF FAMILY OF EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (7 JULY 1965)

REF

IN 05576

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 9776

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: A MEXICAN LEFTIST WELL ACQUAINTED WITH MANY MEMBERS OF THE MEXICAN LEFT. HIS REPORTING HAS PROVEN RELIABLE. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT FROM VICTOR RICO GALAN.

201-753070

1. ON 2 JULY 1965 EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DOMINICAN EXILE IN MEXICO CITY, TOLD VICTOR RICO GALAN, MEXICAN COMMUNIST JOURNALIST, THAT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN MEXICO CITY ON 11 JULY 1965, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE TRAVELING VIA MIAMI, FLORIDA. CORDERO SAID THAT HE HAD HAD TROUBLE GETTING HIS FAMILY TO MEXICO; THE VISAS WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED FOR THEM HAD BEEN CANCELLED BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AFTER THE DOMINICAN CRISIS ERUPTED, BUT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS, LEFTIST FORMER PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, WHO HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN HAVING THEM REVALIDATED.

2. CORDERO INFORMED RICO GALAN THAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR WORK AND THAT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

RID/MIS

THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT WORK WITH THE MEXICAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE "WITH LOPEZ MATEOS". CORDERO ADDED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF EL DIA, MEXICO CITY MARXIST DAILY NEWSPAPER, WAS GOING TO RECOMMEND HIM.

3. ON 3 JULY 1965 CORDERO SAID THAT HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DUE TO ARRIVE IN MEXICO ON 7 JULY, AND THAT THEY WERE TRAVELING VIA KINGSTON, JAMAICA, BECAUSE THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GIVE THEM A VISA FOR MIAMI.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: CORDERO AND HIS WIFE, JOSEFINA PEINADO DE CORDERO, ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO CINCLANT. (ALSO SENT SANTO DOMINGO).

END OF MESSAGE

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 24 Jun 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

84 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	3
3		7	17
4		8	

25 JUN 65 21 25z

TO : MEXICO CITY ROME MILAN CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 7 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY WE 6, CI/OPS

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO ROME MILA CARA

Halliwell

22987

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXI 3880 (IN 96425)*

NO TRACES SARLER ORENGO. PARIS BUSINESS PHONE DIRECTORY LISTS "AGETECO" AS BINDING MACHINERY COMPANY; ADDRESS: NINE RUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref ZEAEE LIFEAT coverage Rico Galan and CArlos Cocciolo. Sarler Orengo, frenchman, received cable from Achiotieri possibly Aget Co. authorizing him go Cuba.

WH/C/Ronis (draft)
[illegible] (draft)
[illegible] (draft)

Rico Galan
201 -

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

7/2 SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 23 1 30 PM '65

1		5	5
2		6	
3		7	C F I
4		8	

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY REG ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, WE 6, WH/C 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS,

ACTION

S E C R E T 221553Z

DIR INFO ROME MILA CARA CITE MEXI 3880 23 JUN 65 IN 96425

REF MEXI 3471 (95519)

1. FOLLOWING FROM LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN AND CARLO COCCIOLI 16 JUNE 1965:

A. RICO TO COCCIOLI. LATTER STATED THAT ORENGO (PHONETIC-PRESUMABLY SARLER ORENGO OF REF) RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM ACHIETIERI (POSSIBLY AGET CO.) YESTERDAY AUTHORIZING AND PRESSURING HIM TO GO TO CUBA TO "PRESENT THIS MATTER...IN THIS QUESTION IN WHICH YOU ARE HELPING US, I WOULD LIKE YOU (RICO) TO GET MAXIMUM MORAL BENEFIT. ORENGO NEEDS A VISA; HE IS APOLITICAL, ON NEITHER SIDE. HE WILL NEED A VISA TO GO TO TALK TO WHOMEVER YOU SAY". COCCIOLI WOULD RECOMMEND THAT ORENGO TALK TO ALEJO CARPENTIER BUT "THIS IS SIMPLY A POLITICAL QUESTION". RICO SAYS HE TOOK UP THIS MATTER AND "THEY TOLD ME THAT IN CASE THIS MAN INSISTS IN THIS MATTER I SHOULD PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH THE AMBASSADOR. HE IS STAYING AT HOTEL MARIA CRISTINA. COCCIOLI SAYS HE IS A VERY GOOD FRIEND, HAS BEEN ONE FOR MANY YEARS. COCCIOLI WANTS TO GIVE HIM (ORENGO) PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS, AS RICO SHOULD INDICATE, ALSO THAT THE CASA SCHET (PHONETIC-POSSIBLY AGET) WOULD BE INTERESTED FOR YOU TO MAKE THE BOOK". RICO SAYS

file RICO Galan 201

SECRET

Rico Galan 201.
201-336474

SECRET PAGE 2 IN 96005

NO, WOULD PREFER THIS NOT BE DONE, FOR OTHER REASONS WHICH THEY WILL DISCUSS LATER. RICO WILL PHONE EMBASSY AND TRY TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR FOR TOMORROW. RICO WILL TAKE HIM TO TALK TO AMBASSADOR WHO SPEAKS FRENCH. COCCIOLI DOES NOT WANT TO GET MIXED UP IN THIS MATTER. HE WOULD ACCOMPANY THIS MAN WITH PLEASURE BECAUSE COCCIOLI COULD EXPLAIN TO AMBASSADOR SINCERELY WHAT IS BEHIND ALL THIS. THIS MAN IS TECHNICAL ATTACHE OF THE DIRECTION GENERAL DE ACHATS (?) AND HE KNOWS ALL ABOUT CASTRO TO DATE. HE WAS SENT PRECISELY FOR ACHATS (~~[illegible]~~ PURCHASES ?).

B. RICO TO COCCIOLI: RICO HAD TO GO BY (CUBAN) EMBASSY BECAUSE PHONES WERE BLOCKED. TALKED WITH AMBASSADOR AND WILL EXPECT THEM ON FRIDAY (15 JUNE) AT 1700. RICO AND COCCIOLI DISCUSS CUBANA SCHEDULES AND NEED FOR VISA WHICH RICO EXPLAINS HAS TO BE REQUESTED FROM HAVANA. COCCIOLI SAYS ORENGO HAS LITTLE TIME, WAS TO LEAVE FOR PARIS ON SUNDAY BUT MEANWHILE HAD RECEIVED THIS TELEGRAM TO GO HAVANA. RICO SAYS AMBASSADOR WANTS COCCIOLI AND RICO TO ACCOMPANY ORENGO. THEY PLAN TO MEET AT COCCIOLI'S AT 1630 ON FRIDAY.

SECRET

SECRET

CFN + ~~RE [illegible] ARTICLE [illegible]~~ SHOOTING
~~[illegible] PUBLISHED MEXICO CITY~~ LA PRENSA.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 26

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING

1	1	5	
2		6	FI
3		7	CA
4		8	CI

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 21 Jun 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474

VR/ S E C R E T

TO : MEXICO CITY

21 JUN 65 22 00Z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY CA 2, CA/PROP, CA/PEG, SIG CEN, WH/CB, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 21420

MHSPAWN

REF: MEXI 3822 (IN 92168)*

1. CONCUR WITH STATTON'S APPROACH. UNDER FIRST PHASE OF DENIGRATION (PARA 1 A) REF COULD TICHBORN MAKE USE OF EMILIO PACHECO WHO ON BOTH PAYROLLS TO ENCOURAGE PAGES LLERGO OUST RICO GALAN FROM SIEMPRE?

2. HOPE THAT IN SECOND PHASE, YOU CAN EXPOSE SUBJ DIRECTLY. IF PAPERS REFUSE PRINT ORIGINAL MAYBE CHANCE THEY REPRINT FROM LILISP-E BULLETIN. MAJOR SECURITY CAUTION IS NOT PLAY DENIGRATION ALL ASSETS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

END OF MESSAGE

*Ref article provides long-awaited peg launch press campaign aimed at exposing Victor Rico Galan as Castro-Communist agent.

C/CA/PROP/Fryerson Sitton (in draft)

WH/P/B

Rico Galan
201-336474

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

R.J. Kaufman
C/WHD/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

24 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
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4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI

S E C R E T 102237Z 10 JUN 65 IN 87724

DIR CITE MEXI 3762

1. ON 31 MAY LIFEAT ON VICTOR RICO GALAN (VRG) REPORTED CALL FROM MIREYA DE VAN RABEN, MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTE PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO (TROTSKISTA) (POR/T), MEXICAN SECTION FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

WIFE OF JOAQUIN VAN RABEN BRETON, WHO REPORTEDLY TREASURER OF POR/T. MIREYA INVITED VRG TO DINE WITH VAN RABENS AND SOME AMERICAN ECONOMISTS. VRG MET THESE PEOPLE - THE ZINOVAK (PHONETIC). ANOTHER COUPLE ALSO COMING WHOSE NAME MIREYA FORGOT, AN ECONOMIST, INTERESTING, WELL-TRAVELED WHOM VRG MUST ALSO KNOW. THEY ARE AMERICANS, SPEAK SPANISH.

2. ON 4 JUNE LIFEAT ON VRG REPORTED VRG CALL TO OFFICE JOAQUIN VAN RABEN WHO MANAGER OFFSET DIVISION GESTETNER S.A. JOAQUIN SAID VRG WAS TO HAVE PHONED HIM YESTERDAY TO CONFIRM WHETHER THEY WERE GOING TO MEET "THERE AT 1600". VRG SAID NO, APPOINTMENT WAS CONFIRMED HERE AT 1700. JOAQUIN INSISTED IT WAS TENTATIVELY AT 1600 AND ADDED THEY ALSO HAD TO TALK ABOUT "THAT FAMOUS TRIP". WHAT ABOUT TRIP? VRG SAYS "WE ARE GOING TOMORROW (SATURDAY) AT NOON". OR CAN WAIT TILL SUNDAY. JOAQUIN WILL TRY TO ARRANGE THINGS TO LEAVE SUNDAY. VRG SAID IF JOAQUIN CAN'T, O.K. WILL SEE

SECRET

SECRET IN 87724 Pg

EACH OTHER THURSDAY WHEN VRG RETURNS. JOAQUIN CAN CONTACT VRG IN MONTERREY.

3. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan and Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Source: LIENVOY/2

1. Attached is microfilm on which were photographed the Gobernacion files of Victor RICO Galan (201-336474) and Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal (201-).

2. These were made available on loan by LIENVOY/2 on 7 June 1965.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Microfilm

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl

1 A11

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-26313	9 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336474 201-

14-00000

VICTOR RICO GONZALEZ.
Calle de Madrid 30.
México D.F.

Lisboa Portugal 15-12-40 2302

Como ampliación a la instancia que elevé el 26 de Enero último al Sr. Director de Inmigración, Secretaría de Gobernación y a fin de cumplir todos los trámites exigidos para que la esposa é hijos del que suscribe Victor Rico González puedan entrar en México, me permito informar a Vd. que mi estancia en esta República tiene estado legal por estar en posesión de la forma 5, nº 118,220 expedida en Veracruz el día de mi llegada 6 de Novbre. de 1939, y de la forma 14, nº [illegible] expedida en México D.F. el 14 de Novbre de 1939.

Mis hijos Victor Rico Galán, Fernando Rico Galán, y Ana María Rico Galán, han nacido en la ciudad del Ferrol - España - el 8 de Febrero de 1928, el 9 de Abril de 1929 y el 14 de Septbre de 1930, respectivamente contando en la actualidad, con 11, 10, y 9 años.

La forma en que por las trágicas vicisitudes de la guerra me ví obligado a abandonar a España, no me han permitido el tener en mi poder la partida de casamiento que acredite oficialmente mi matrimonio con mi esposa Fernanda Galán Guerra ya que además desde el comienzo de la guerra estuve separado de mi familia y del lugar donde me casado - Galicia -. Entre la actual Colonia Española existen muchos compatriotas con quienes me unen antiguos vínculos de amistad y a quienes les consta de manera indudable mi matrimonio, y por ello uno a este escrito una certificación que así lo acredita, ya que es el único medio hábil de que dispongo para probar esta verdad.

También adjunto al presente escrito, una certificación de la razón social "Trigueros y Gilard", con quienes trabajo por la que se vé que efectivamente dispongo de los medios económicos suficientes para el sostenimiento de mi familia cuando llegue aquí. A mayor abundamiento presento otro documento de garantía suscrito por propietario del restaurant Milagros, Sr. Ramón Prieto.

Espero de su recto proceder que con los informes y documentos que se aportan juntamente con el presente escrito habrá de resolverse mi instancia favorablemente.

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
F 1 - 21 5

CON 3 ANEXOS

05[illegible]0

Sr. Director de Inmigración, Secretaría de Gobernación.

Pieza anterior
4727-

que pueden los documentos en Lisboa Portugal

POR. $ 500.00

Recibi de los Sres. Trigueros y Ginard la suma de:— $ 500.00 QUINIENTOS PESOS MONEDA NACIONAL, por condepto de co-——— misiones durante el presente mes por ventas hechas - por mi conducto.

México, D. F. 31 de Enero de 1940.

GLOSADOR
2
ARCHIVO

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD.

Trigueros

GLOSADOR
2
ARCHIVO

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD

CABLE: "GITRI"

AGENTES EN GENERAL

ISABEL LA CATOLICA, 33
DESPACHO [illegible]
MEXICO, D. F.

La razón social "Trigueros y Ginard" con cédula de Empadronamiento nº 12527.

Certificamos:

Que el Sr. Victor Rico González, trabaja como comisionista en esta casa, siendo sus ingresos mensuales de 500.00. pesos.

Lo que hacemos constar a petición del interesado.

México D.F. 30 de Enero de 1940.

TRIGUEROS Y GINARD.

Jaime Ginard

ARCHIVO 2

extranjero como "la pluma"

RESTAURANT
MILAGROS"
VENUSTIANO CARRANZA 47 ALTOS
TEL. ERICSSON [illegible]
MEXICO, D. F.

COCINA ESPAÑOLA
Y FRANCESA
MAS AMERICANAS
SERVICIO A LA CARTA
ESPECIALIDAD EN
BANQUETES

Ramón Rodriguez Prieto, ciudadano español, con residencia en México D. F., copropietario del Restaurant Milagros, en V. Carranza # 47, y con su Fórmula I4 # I284I9, manifiesta:

Que se compromete a la manutención, viajes y translado de la Sra. Fernanda Galain Sueiras, esposa del Sr. Victor Rico Gonzalez, y sus hijos menores Víctor, Fernando y Ana María Rico Galain.

Y, para los efectos legales oportunos, firmo el presente escrito en México a 30 de Enero de I,940.

Ramón Rodriguez Prieto
RAMON RODRIGUEZ PRIETO

2

dura y a [illegible] en el extranjero como la pluma

DEPARTAMENTO DE MIGRACION.

CLASIFICACION.- 4/361.8"40"/2383

NOMBRE.- Victor Rico Galan, Fernando Rico Galán y Ana María Rico Galán.

ASUNTO.- Victor Rico Galán, solicita la internación de los todos sus hijos.

ooo

2692

201-336114

Att to [illegible] 26313

Los que suscriben Señores Marcial Fernández Vazquez, Benito Dopico Fárreiro y Jesús Dopico Ferreiro, con Residencia legal en México, mediante las formas 5a y 14a, números 118226-122504 y 1224[illegible] expedidas en Veracruz en 28 de Junio y 7 de Julio de 1.939, respectivamente, profesores del Instituto Hispano Mexicano "Ruiz de Alarcon" de esta capital y con domicilio, el primero en la Avenida de Coyoacan 100-C y los segundos en la Calle de Serapio Rendón Números 96-20 y98-28 rdespectivamente, certifican ante quien corresponda que desde la infancia conocen y mantienen amistad con el Señor Victor Rico Gonzalez, yá que los cuatro han vivido y nacido en la ciudad de Ferrol (Galicia) y les consta de una manera cierta que el Señor Rico Gonzalez, contrajo matrimonio en Septiembre de 1.922, con Doña Fernanda Galan Sueiras, tambien natural de Ferrol, y de cuyo matrimonio existen tres hijos, llamados Victor, Fernando y Ana Maria, de doce, diez y nueve años respectivamente.

Y para que conste y surta sus efectos ante quien corresponda y a petición del interesado, expedimos la presente que firmamos y rubricamos en esta ciudad de Mexico D.F. a treinta y uno de Enero de mil novecientos cuarenta.

Benito Dopico Ferreiro

Marcial Fernández

Jesús Dopico

GLOSADOR 2 ARCHIVO

[illegible] y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma"

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
4/32.8-4-/2392.

[illegible]

Al [illegible] rio. de
[Re]laciones Exteriores.
[illegible] de

[E]sta [S]ecretaría en [illegible] en los artículos 65 de la Ley [illegible] de Población y 27 de las [illegible] les vigentes, ruega a usted se sirva instruir al Consul [illegible] lo que corresponda, para que documente a la señora [illegible] y a sus hijos [illegible] y [illegible] quienes [illegible] en [illegible] como [illegible] por un año [illegible] con el carácter de asilados políticos, teniéndose en cuenta lo [illegible] en el artículo [illegible] que los [illegible] y [illegible] los [illegible] con [illegible].

[illegible]
[illegible]
FEB 17 1940
MESA DE CORRESPONDENCIA
— Y CONTROL —

[illegible] 194[illegible].

c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
c.c.p. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

ARCHIVO
2

SECRETARIA
DE
GOBERNACION

DEPENDENCIA: GOBERNACION.
SECCION: MIGRACION.
MESA: [illegible]
NUMERO DEL OFICIO:
EXPEDIENTE: 4/351.3/405.

ASUNTO: Se comunica que los [illegible] se internaron al país como INMIGRANTES [illegible]

N. Laredo, Tamps. Marzo 20 de 1.40

Al C.
Secretario de Gobernación
Dirección General de Población
Departamento de Migración
Mexico, D.F.

15730
4/351.3-40/2392

Me es grato comunicar a usted que con fecha [illegible] del actual, previa autorización de la forma 5 número 547737, expedida por nuestro Consul en Lisboa [illegible], esta Oficina a mi cargo permitió la internación de la señora Fernanda Galan Suelras, de nacionalidad española, en calidad de de Inmigrante por un año, con características de asilado político, de conformidad con su correspondencia 5913 expediente 4/351.3 "402/2392, de 15 de febrero último; igualmente se permitió la internación de sus hijos menores Victor Rico Galan, Fernando Rico Galan y Ana María Rico Galan, para el exclusivo objeto de que se unan con su esposo y padre el señor Victor Rico Gonzalez, de la misma nacionalidad quien se encuentra en territorio nacional en la misma calidad y de quien deberán depender económicamente.- Se les advirtió la obligación que tienen de inscribirse en el Registro de Extranjeros dentro de un plazo que no exceda de 30 días a partir de la fecha de su internación y no se le exigió a la señora [illegible] pago del impuesto de inmigración ni garantía de repatriación en virtud de lo ordenado por el artículo 96 de nuestra Ley General de Población en vigor.

RESPETUOSAMENTE.
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
El Jefe del Servicio de Migración.

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
39 MAR 29 10 59
CORRESPONDENCIA

Correspondencia y Archivo
DESPACHADO
26

durlá y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma"

DIR. GRAL. POBL.
DEPTO. MIGRACION.

ESTUDIO DE PROMOCIONES.
FAMILIARES Y VARIOS.

4/361.8"40"/7392.

Enterado internación de las personas abajo citadas.

12111

Al C.
Jefe de la Oficina de Población,
NUEVO LAREDO, Tamps.

Ref: Su of. 807 de 20 de marzo último.-

Por su atento oficio citado en antecedentes, ha quedado enterada esta Secretaría, de que con fecha 22 de marzo último, permitió la internación de la Sra. FERNANDA OLAN BUEIRAS e hijos menores VICTOR RICO OLAN, FERNANDO RICO OLAN y ANA MARIA RICO OLAN, todos de nacionalidad española, de acuerdo con correograma 5913 de 15 de febrero último.

Atentamente.

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., a 8 de abril de 1940.
POR AC. DEL JEFE DEL DEPTO.
EL JEFE DE LA SECCION.

José C. Uo Leal.

SECRETARIA
ABR 8 1940
ARCHIVO DE CORRESPONDENCIA Y CONTROL

C.c.p. Revisión y Crítica de Documentos.

ebs-ent.-15730.-3/cpa.

GRABADOS
2
ARCHIVO

...expresión de la sabi-
duría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma"

RADURIA GENERAL
LA REPUBLICA

3518/2392

Forma C 1.

DEPENDENCIA DIRECCION GENERAL DE AVERIGUACIONES PREVIAS

SECCION JEFE
MESA
NUMERO DEL OFICIO 13476
EXPEDIENTE 10-200

R 53032

ASUNTO: Se remite original escrito.

México, D. F., a 5 de octubre de 1959.

C. SECRETARIO DE GOBERNACION
PRESENTE.

so:
foja útil ori
al

Por ser de su competencia, me permito remitir a usted, el escrito de fecha 28 de abril anterior, en el que el Profesor JORGE GUTIERREZ H., Secretario de la Junta de Mejoramiento Moral Cívico y Material de Papantla de Olarte, Ver., en relación a hechos que se imputan al Sr. VICTOR RICO GALAN, en su calidad de Extranjero.

Atentamente.
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
EL DIRECTOR.

LIC. MANUEL ROSALES MIRANDA.

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
OCT 23 1959
OFICIALIA DE PARTES

AJH-rcl

C.-C AL Prof. JORGE GUTIERREZ HERRERA.
Olivo 7.- PAPANTLA de OLARTE. VER.

ANEX

(AÑO DEL PRESIDENTE CARRANZA)

expresion de la sabi-
duría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

A DE MEJORAMIENTO MORAL, CIVICO Y MATERIAL
OLIVO NUM. 7
PAPANTLA DE OLARTE, VER.

5-0

Vol 1402
Arr. 541

Víctor Rico Galán es uno
de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País.

PRESIDENTE
Milo Arellano

VICE-PRESIDENTE
Rafael Caballero

SECRETARIO
J. Jorge Gutiérrez H.

TESORERO
mingo Yorio Lamoglia

VOCALES
Herminio Martínez C.
Ernesto Bauza S.
Pedro Bautista R.
Narciso Jiménez
Angel Pulido Grassi
Nieves Martínez
Nemorio Martínez P.
Srita. Rosa Elvira de la Sierra
Srita. Guadalupe Salas García
Sra. [illegible] Collado
Sra. Elvira Blanco de Villa
Sra. Nieves Morgado de G.

15 MAY 1959

CORTE

28811

C. Lic. Fernando López Arias,
Procurador General de la República
México, D.F.

Ante la magnitud de los problemas nacionales, se ha hecho pesar su serenidad e inteligente política, y ha demostrado que, independiente del ejercicio de su calidad moral, y de su grande condición de amigo, es usted el revolucionario que cumple sus compromisos con el pueblo mexicano y ejerce el poder con la seguridad de su propia responsabilidad, haciendo pesar el Derecho como inviolable principio y como condición irrenunciable de los magníficos preceptos de la Ley.

Usted se debe a México, señor Procurador y por él trabaja y piensa, desentendiéndose de cobardes artículos que circulan plenos de insultos y comentarios de quienes no creen en la relevancia de su actuación, partiendo esta crítica de los emboscados que por sistema hacen de la murmuración una arma innoble y descastada para volcar sus amarguras.

La ayuda y dinero ajeno y la propaganda habilidosa ha permitido que personas tan descalificadas, moral e intelectualmente, como Víctor Rico Galán y otros tantos [illegible] llegado a destacar como articulistas de fondo en prestigiadas revistas capitalinas para vergüenza de la intelectualidad mexicana. No obstante su condición de extranjero Rico Galán ha demostrado su desacato hacia nuestras leyes e instituciones, y su desprecio a la tradicional hospitalidad mexicana, escribe deliberadamente pretendiendo engañar a sus lectores como lo hace al consignar que el [illegible] del Pte. Lic. Adolfo López Mateos, es enemigo de la clase trabajadora. Por lo que se deduce que Víctor es uno de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País.

Lo que ha hecho usted es que se respete nuestra soberanía y simultáneamente ha defendido y dejado incólumes todos los derechos de los trabajadores mexicanos, por lo que sería un error imperdonable confundir su digna y patriótica actitud como una claudicación de los ideales y principios que siempre ha sostenido y defendido.

como la maxima expresión de la sabi-
duría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

ATENTAMENTE

Papantla de Olarte, Ver., abril 2? de 1959

El Secretario de la Junta,

Profr. Jorge Gutiérrez Herrera

C. PRESIDENTE

PAPANTLA DE OLA

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... Herrera

DEPTO. DE MIGRACIÓN.
EST. DE PROMOCIONES.
DIIZ.
351.8"40"/2392.

ASUNTO: Relativo persona se cita.

C. PRESIDENTE MUNICIPAL,
PAPANTLA DE OLARTE, VER.

57164

En escrito de 20 de abril del año en curso, dirigido al C. Procurador General de la República y turnado a esta Dependencia el 5 de octubre anterior, se dice lo siguiente:

"Tanto la magnitud de los problemas nacionales, se ha hecho pesar su serenidad e inteligente política, y ha demostrado que, independiente del ejercicio de su calidad moral, y de su grande condición de amigo, es usted el revolucionario que cumple sus compromisos con el pueblo mexicano y ejerce el poder con la seguridad de su propia responsabilidad, haciendo pesar el Derecho como inviolable principio y como condición irrenunciable de los magníficos preceptos de la Ley. Usted se debe a México, señor Procurador y por El Trabajo y [illegible], desentendiéndose de cobardes artículos que circulan llenos de insultos y comentarios de quienes no creen en la relevancia de su actuación, partiendo esta crítica de los elementos que por sistema hacen de la murmuración una arma innoble y desgastada para volcar sus amarguras.- La ayuda y dinero ajeno y la propaganda habilidosa ha permitido que personas tan descalificadas, moral e intelectualmente, como Victor Rico Galán y otros tantos más hayan llegado a destacar como articulistas de fondo en prestigiosas revistas capitalinas para vergüenza de la intelectualidad mexicana. No obstante su condición de extranjero Rico Galán ha demostrado su desacato hacia nuestras Leyes e instituciones, y su desprecio a la tradicional hospitalidad mexicana. Escribe deliberadamente pretendiendo engañar a sus lectores de que lleguen a considerar que el Régimen del Sr. Lic. Adolfo López Mateos, es enemigo de la clase trabajadora. Por lo que se deduce que Victor es uno de los tantos extranjeros que sobran en el País. Lo que ha hecho usted es que se respete nuestra soberanía y simultáneamente ha defendido y dejado incolumes todos los derechos de los trabajadores mexicanos, por lo que sería un error imperdonable confundir su digna y patriótica actitud con una claudicación de los ideales y principios que siempre ha sostenido y defendido."

Lo que me permito transcribir a usted, con la atenta súplica de que se sirva girar sus respetables órdenes, a efecto de que se haga una minuciosa investigación sobre lo anterior, así como la calidad migratoria de que es titular dicho extranjero, su domicilio y las actividades a que se encuentra dedicado, informando oportunamente a este Departamento.

A T E N T A M E N T E

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., 4 de noviembre de 1959.
EL SUBJEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO.

LIC. ALEJANDRO ORTEGA SAN VICENTE.

Control.-Edif.- Sr. Lic. Manuel Rosales Miranda.-Dirección General de Averiguaciones Previas.-Procuraduría General de la República.-Ciudad.-Con relación a su oficio número 13476 de 5 de octubre anterior.
LO/mgm.-exp. 53032.(un anexo).

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
DESPACHADO
NOV 12 1959
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

A T E N T A M E N T E

SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION.
México, D.F., 4 de noviembre de 1959.
EL SUBJEFE DEL DEPARTAMENTO.

LIC. ALEJANDRO ORTEGA SAN VICENTE.

Control.-Edif.
Sr. Lic. Manuel Rosales Miranda.-Dirección General de Averiguaciones Previas.-Procuraduría General de la República.-Ciudad.-Con relación a su oficio número 13476 de 5 de octubre anterior.
LN/agm.exp. 53032.(un anexo).

SECRETARIA DE GOBERNACION
NOV 12 1959
DEPTO. DE MIGRACION

oviembre de 1959.

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neral

DESPACHAD
12 1959
MIGRACI

"ABC".- 21 de agosto de 19
Pag. 7.

Editorial

RESPETO A MEXICO

La conducta del señor Victor Galán participando en el último alboroto de agitadores extremistas, plantea ante la opinión pública la necesidad de conocer a fondo cuál es y cuál debe ser la actitud de las autoridades con individuos que, si bien poseen la calidad de mexicanos por habérseles concedido la naturalización, su misma situación les impone observar ciertas normas de respeto y consideración hacia su nuevo país y sus instituciones.

Las leyes mexicanas, por su esencia democrática, son de igual aplicación para todos los habitantes del país, y únicamente ciertas esferas de acción se consideran reservadas para los mexicanos. Especialmente en el terreno de la acción política, nuestras leyes señalan discriminaciones en favor de los mexicanos que reúnan ciertos requisitos respecto a su nacimiento y a su ascendencia. No nos corresponde analizar la justificación de estas normas, o desaprobarlas, porque evidentemente responden a necesidades de nuestro desenvolvimiento histórico, aceptadas y puestas en práctica por la nación y sus gobiernos.

El señor Rico Galán y todos los que como él poseen la calidad de mexicanos por naturalización, gozan de todas las prerrogativas y derechos concedidos por las leyes del país, y también poseen todas las obligaciones y deberes por ellas señalados. En cambio a un extranjero como el norteamericanos Barry Bernard Primus, quien tomó parte en el escándalo del domingo último, inmediatamente se le expulsó del país, porque a ningún extranjero se le permite inmiscuirse en nuestros asuntos políticos y no por su parentesco con una respetable familia mexicana como es la del pintor Alfaro Siqueiros.

Pero las garantías y las prerrogativas de que es titular el señor Victor Rico Galán, a pesar de su calidad de auténtico pandillero de la pluma, no quieren significar que las autoridades policíacas y migratorias investiguen a fondo cuáles son sus actividades y cuál su verdadera situación migratoria. No nos refiramos al término gratitud, que debía ser suficiente para quienes como Rico Galán han sido aceptados por México como sus hijos, porque esa palabra es desconocida en el léxico de individuos afectos a considerarse como la máxima expresión de la sabiduría y a ostentarse en el extranjero como "la pluma

''ABC
21 Aug 1962
(cont)
pg 7

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Victor RICO Galan 201-[illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached hereto is the information derived from the recently recruited and still untested ESLIDE-1, by Gary H. REYMANDER on 18 May 1965. Apologies are made for the quality of the typing, but the LILINK unit, of which REYMANDER is a member, is an outside unit and still without a secretary.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
- 2 - COS, Guatemala, w/att. h/w
- ~~1~~ - Chief, WHD w/att. h/w
- 3 - Files

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

201-[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HGMA-26286	7 June 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201- ~~Field File No. [illegible]~~

SECRET

Víctor Rico Galán

1. ESLIME-1 met Galán in the latter part of August 1964 in Guatemala. He was assigned to help bring Galán to Yon Sosa. He met Galán on Kilometer 17 of the "Highway to the Atlantic", at the village of ~~Sixxhag~~ El Chato, and drove him to Kilometer 189, where others were waiting to guide him from there.

2. Galán told E-1 that he was a reporter ~~x~~and was coming to interview Yon Sosa. He said that he had come before and that he crossed the border clandestinely. Someone ? from the group that met them at Kilometer 189 told E-1 that this was the fifth time that Galán had come to see Yon Sosa and that he carried messages and money to Yon Sosa.

3. After E-1 arrived in Mexico City, Galán asked the party for permission to interview him for an article for Siempre. He wanted to interview E-1 about his arrest, torture by the police, and expulsion from Guatemala. Victor Manuel Gutierrez told E-1 to grant the interview and to give Galán all the details he needed. E-1 talked to Galán, in the offices of Siempre, on three occasiones, twice in March and once in April. However, he did not give him the interview as at that time he had not yet obtained papers permitting him to remain in Mexico and did not want to ~~[illegible]~~ jeopardize his chances of obtaining them. He promised to send Galán a card when his papers were obtained and give him the interview then.

4. E-1 does not like the idea of giving this interview to Galán and has not contacted him even though he now has his papers. He plans to do nothing unless Galán contacts him again. Then he will have to give the interview since Gutierrez told him to and he has no reasonable excuse for refusing.

SECRET

[illegible] 01256 CS COPY

201-33[illegible]474

201-336[illegible]

SECRET

5. E-1 said Galán has also made propaganda films which were shown to the guerrillas in Guatemala. They were simple films which could be made in the home, generally just consisting of someone giving a talk or lecture. They were made both in Spanish and in the local Indian language. E-1 said that the last film Galán made was confiscated by the police. He didn't know if it was the Guatemalan or the Mexican police.

The famous reel?
7"

SECRET

this typed by E-1

SECRET

Victor Rico Galán ha trabajado hasta la fecha como agente deenlace para las guerrillas del 13 de Noviembre.

Lo conoci en Guatemala donde lo ayudamos a pasar para las montañas para una entrevista con Yon Sosa la cual realizó.

Posteriormente en esta ciudad al enterarse que ne encontraba en esta nos entrevistams piediendome material informativo para sus articulos referénte a la situacion de las torturas y condiciones de vida en las carceles de Guatemala y referente a la muerte de Mazariegos.

En Guatemala fue a ultimos dias del mes de agosto y nosotros nos habiamos colocado estrategicamente para turnarnos, a tratar de pasarlo hasta el kilometro 189 de la carretera al Atlantico, para ese proposito. En el Kilometro 17 en la aldea El Chato, de la misma carretera fui comisionado para conducir el vehiculo para su traslado.

En esta ciudad, el solicto al Partido una entrevista, para commigo, para lo cual el Partido dio su aprobacion. Nos vimos personalmente tres veces en el mes de Marzo dos veces y en Abril, una vez.

El Partido me dijo que le proporcionara una informacion detallada dando nombres de los jefes de Policia donde habia estado detenido y a que clases de torturas habia sdo sometido. Todo esta informacion no la pasé anteriormente debido a mi situacion migratoria que en ese entonces no se habia definio totalmente.

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

.SSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 8

26/25 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	4	5	FI-RE
2	①	6	CA
3		7	DC
4		8	REG

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE VR, WHIC 8, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INTZ, CA2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 071745Z

SAGO INFO DIR SDOM WAVE CITE MEXI 3695

REF MEXI 3653 (IN 82262)*

* PER LIENVOY 3 JUN EMILIO CORDERO PRO-CASTRO DOMINICAN COMMIE LIVING MEXI TRYING TO ARRANGE INTERVIEW FOR SUBJS.

7 JUN 65 IN 84808

PER LIENVOY 3 JUN ALONSO AGUILAR MEMBER MLN NATIONAL DIRECTIVE COUNCIL TRIED ARRANGE INTERVIEW FOR SUBJS REF WITH GEN. CARDENAS. SAID SUBJS LEAVING FOR CHILE 4 JUNE. VICTOR RICO GALAN, LEFTIST JOURNALIST, SUSPECTED CUBAN AGENT, ALSO INFORMED ELENA VAZQUEZ GOMEZ, AIDE TO GEN. CARDENAS THAT SUBJS DESIRED INTERVIEW. LATER, RICO INFORMED EDMUNDO JARDON OF PRENSA LATINA THAT SUBJS GIVING PRESS CONFERENCE 4 JUNE.

S E C R E T

CFN

Rico Galan

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: EBAA-2078

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 200-6-263/3

DATE: 3 June 1965

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City
INFO: Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro
Chief, WHD

FROM: Chief of Base, Porto Alegre

SUBJECT: MHSPAWN/WUINDIGO Article Published 20 May 1965 in Correio do Povo

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCE(S):

A. DIR 12070, 20 May 1965
B. LORE 0946, 29 May 1965

RE: (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

Attached is a newspaper article which appeared in Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil on 20 May 1965. This article was discussed and summarized in Reference B. Reference A requested this article be pouched to Chief of Station, Mexico City for immediate replay.

Terrence P. MOORE

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:
- 2-Mexico w/2 cys att
- 4-Hqs w/att
- 2-Files w/att
- 2-Rio w/att

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO.

3P

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO.:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIFEAT Coverage: ~~Victor~~ Rico Galan, 20-23 May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

201-336474

1. 19 May 1965: 0625 - 1745 hours:

A. Unidentified caller to Rico Galan: Caller wrote an article on the Dominican situation for SIEMPRE but SIEMPRE director Jose Pages Llergo rejected it saying the magazine was full of things on the Dominican situation and he wanted the writer to produce something about Colombia. Caller wishes to consult with Rico Galan on his assignment.

2. 20 May 1965: 1745 - 2130 hours:

201-132139 PR

A. NIKOLAY LEONOV, Soviet Press Attache and Identified KGB, & contact with to Rico Galan: Rico tells Leonov that "that man" was supposed to call him at noon today. Where can he find him? Nikolay is sure after 1500 hours. Victor asks him to call again at 1530 or 1600 hours. Nikolay will.

de marques?

B. Manuel Marcue Pardinas to Rico: Rico tells Marcue that the other person will do the piece on the Dominican situation for Politica because he (Rico) is doing the Dominican thing for Siempre.

C. Leonov to Rico: Rico tells Leonov that "that man" hasn't come, what shall they do? He will try to call him later and he promises to call Nikolay afterward. Nikolay says he will be busy between 1630 hours and 1700 hours but that his wife will be in. Victor comments that "that man" was supposed to call him as soon as he arrived.

continued

Distribution:
~~3~~ - C/WHD

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 4 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA - 26223	DATE 28 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-7-38/13

D. Rico to Dr. Emilio Cordero, Dominican exile in Mexico City: Rico complains to Cordero that he was supposed to call and that the other (Nikolay) has already called twice. Cordero says that he called yesterday but there was no one in, they told him they had gone out together. Is the friend there? Victor says no, that he said he would be busy between 1630 and 1700 hours and Victor will be busy until 1900 hours. Cordero asks to let it go until tomorrow, as he himself is very busy. He suggests coming to Victor's at 1600 hours. Victor prefers to call before that at 1530 hours. Cordero congratulates him on his article in Siempre. A foolish thing, Victor says. Cordero asks him if he has seen Luis Suarez' article and what did he think of it? Rico says it is written in first person, very superficial, very much a personal adventure. Very journalistic, Cordero comments. Yes, but journalistic like Serer's (Station comment: Probably Julio Sherer Garcia, writer for daily Excelsior) and to Victor it appears to be more...Cordero says that the situation there grows worse. Victor asks if he saw Mayobre's thing. Cordero says yes, very good. Well, comments Victor, that of Mayobre was not expected but it is that the thing is so obvious. Cordero will call tomorrow at 1500 hours.

E. Saul (lnu) to Rico: Saul tells Rico that a friend arrived from New York yesterday. Would he like to talk with him? Rico says of course. They decide on Monday at Rico's home. When Rico says he does not speak English Saul says that since he doesn't either they will have to have another person.

3. May 21: 0615 to 2400 hours:

A. Leonov to Rico: Leonov greets Rico in a very friendly way. Rico says that yesterday he talked with The Man, he had a lot of work and preferred to leave it for today. He asks Leonov to call again at 1600 hours. Leonov will call.

B. Luis Suarez and Rico Galan: Suarez sent a very strong article against the United States on the Dominican situation which was published yesterday. He did not want to lose the chance no matter what they thought and they said that he had abandoned the work, never having had a contact with "them". Suarez and Rico discuss the articles on the Dominican situation published by both Suarez and Sherer Garcia of Excelsior. Rico says that Sherer's article was the first to give the Latin American point of view on the Dominican situation. Suarez agrees but says, "the interview with Caamano, no." Victor comments that Sherer did a good job. Suarez does not known what happened with Sherer. He published one thing that he showed him in Santo Domingo, after he published the thing about the OAS the following day, and no more, he dried up, they have not published him anymore. Suarez comments that the President received him. Why? It seems unbelieveable that they have made this effort in order to publish only two days. Rico terminates the conversation with congratulations to Suarez.

C. Cordero to Rico: Victor is waiting for a call from The Man (Leonov?) at 1600 hours to make a date at 1700 hours at home. Emilio accepts and will be there at 1700 hours.

D. Leonov to Rico: Victor sets the meeting for 1700 hours at his home. Leonov agrees.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	SECRET	HMMA-26223

4. 22 May: 0715 - 1730 hours:

A. Emilio to Rico: Emilio asks pardon for waking Rico who replies, calling Emilio Maestro, that he was already up. Emilio wants to see him today at 1000 hours about something urgent. If it is urgent, Rico will wait for him.

B. Rico to Cordero: Rico tells Cordero that he will be waiting for him between 1530 and 1600 hours and asks him to bring all the data that he has. Cordero asks if he wants economic data or...All that you have, Rico says. Cordero will come.

C. Leonov to Rico: Rico tells Leonov that he has been waiting for "the man" (Cordero?), he was calling him. Leonov says he went for a long walk and has just got back. He'll come in twenty minutes. Victor will be waiting for him.

5. 23 May: 2100 hours 23 May to 0720 hours 24 May:

No items of interest.

Willard C. Curtis

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 76

17 SECRET

☒ COPY ☐ RID

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MAY 22 12 26 PM '65

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

INFO

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

VR. FILE CA2, CA/PROP, C/OPS, C/IC2, FI, FI/INT, WH/C 8

CR

22 MAY 65 IN 73624

Mr Halliwell

S E C R E T 212358Z

DIR INFO SDOM CITE MEXI 3520

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN 0730 - 15 MAY TO 0800 16 MAY.

A. EMILIO CORDERO TO RICO: CORDERO WANTED TO SEE RICO TO TELL HIM SOME THINGS. CORDERO TALKED TO LUIS WITH RODRIGO YESTERDAY. HE WILL COME BY RICO'S HOUSE IN ABOUT 15 OR 30 MINUTES. (STATION COMMENT: LUIS MAY BE LUIS SUAREZ, SIEMPRE CORRESPONDENT.)

B. CORDERO TO RICO: CORDERO ASKS IF RICO HAS SOMETHING URGENT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM. RICO SAYS NO, HE THOUGHT CORDERO WANTED URGENTLY TO TALK TO HIM. NO. HE ONLY WANTED TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT SOME THINGS LUIS TOLD HIM. RICO HAS ONLY TALKED TO LUIS BY PHONE. CORDERO SAYS THAT RICO'S ARTICLE IN SIEMPRE IS VERY GOOD. THE THESIS OF THE PIECE IS THAT A NEW REGULATION HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE OAS ADMITTING THAT INTERVENTION IS VERY GOOD. RICO COMMENTS THE IDEA OF LEAVING THE OAS IS POPULAR. ALBERTO PRESENTED IT AT THE ROUND TABLE AT THE UNIVERSITY (AS A POSSIBILITY). THERE WAS A LOT OF APPLAUSE WHEN IT WAS MENTIONED. ALSO A LOT OF GOOD COMMENTARY

[illegible]

ON RICO'S ARTICLE. THE GENERAL'S ARTICLE WAS WHAT WAS A FAILURE. (STATION COMMENT: POSSIBLY GENERAL ~~LAZARO~~ CARDENAS DEL RIO, LEFTIST EX PRESIDENT OF MEXICO.) AFTER SO MUCH FIGHTING, TO COME OUT WITH WHAT EVEN THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE HAVE SAID. MAX TALKED TO CARRILLO FLORES YESTERDAY. (STATION COMMENT: ANTONIO CARRILLO FLORES, MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER.) MAX SUGGESTED THAT MEXICO WITHDRAW FROM OAS, OR AT LEAST THREATEN TO. SAID THAT MEXICO WAS STUDYING THIS. RICO IS A LITTLE DOUBTFUL. BOTH CARRILLO'S AND MAX'S COMMENTS HAVE TO BE TAKEN WITH A GRAIN OF SALT.

73624

P-2

C. JOVAN MIRIC, YUGOSLAV CORRESPONDENT IN MEXI TO RICO: MIRIC SAYS THINGS ARE BLACK. RICO AGREES THAT IT LOOKS BAD. BUT MIRIC THINKS THEY HAVE TO WAIT A LITTLE YET. MIRIC WILL SEE RICO AFTER RICO FINISHES WRITING HIS ARTICLE SO THEY CAN TALK. MIRIC ALSO TELLS RICO THAT THE MATTER OF HIS SUCCESSOR IS ARRANGED, HE HAS RECEIVED HIS VISA.

D. MIRIC TO RICO: FIFTEEN MINUTES AGO MIRIC'S APARTMENT WAS MACHINE GUNNED FROM THE STREET. MIRIC CALLED POLICE [illegible], HE IS NOT GOING TO SHUT UP ABOUT THIS BUT WILL MAKE IT PUBLIC. NO ONE ANSWERED WHEN HE CALLED GOBERNACION. WHO DID IT?

73624
P3

MIRIC DOES NOT KNOW. IT IS SOMETHING FROM CARACAS. THERE WAS A CAR AND THEN MACHINEGUN FIRE. HIS WIFE SOFIA WAS IN THE BEDROOM WITH THE CHILD. THE FIRING BROKE WINDOW PANES, CURTAINS. RICO ASKS IF THIS WAS "LOS GUSANOS?" YES, "THE DOMINICAN WORKS."

E. RICO TO ANTONIO ELIZONDO: RICO CALLING ELIZONDO TO SEE IF THERE ANYTHING THEY CAN DO TO HELP MIRIC. RICO TELLS ELIZONDO HE SHOULD PHONE THEIR BALKAN FRIEND SO HE FEELS THEIR SOLIDARITY. ELIZONDO WILL CALL.

F. RICO TO MIRIC: WHAT IS NEW? NOTHING. NO NEWS. MIRIC ASKS IF RICO HAS HEARD HOW THINGS ARE THERE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. ARE THEY BLACK? THEY'RE VERY BLACK. MIRIC AND RICO WILL TALK TOMORROW.

G. MIRIC TO RICO: HE IS LEAVING MEXICO IN A WEEK WHETHER HIS SUCCESSOR ARRIVES OR NOT. WHY EXPOSE MYSELF FURTHER? IS THERE ANY NEWS ON THE DR? RICO SAYS NOTHING, HE HAS BEEN LISTENING TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA BUT THERE IS NOTHING.

H. RICO TO MIRIC: DISCUSS SHOOTING ABOUT WHICH MIRIC REALLY KNOWS NOTHING, SAYS HE HAS NOT DESERVED THIS AND SUCH A THING HAS NEVER HAPPENED TO ANY OTHER CORRESPONDENT. HE

SECRET 73674
p.4

ASKS RICO IF THERE IS ANY NEWS ON THE DR. RICO SAYS NO, GARCIA INZAUZI (PHONETIC) AND GARCIA VALS DINED AT HIS HOME TONIGHT. GARCIA I. ONCE FLEW TO HAVA WITH MIRIC. (STATION COMMENT: PROBABLY MARIO GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI, FORMER CUBAN AMB TO UN, NOW DIR ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBAN FORN MINISTRY. IN MEXI FOR CEPAL CONF HAS RETURNED TO CU~~B~~BA.) MIRIC REFERS AGAIN TO SHOOTING AND SAYS IS LEAVING IN A WEEK IF THERE IS NO EXPLANATION ON THIS. MIRIC SAYS HE IS GOING TO UNITED STATES (LAUGHES) WELL, OR TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

2. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

CFN

[illegible]

14-00000

WH/4/a

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO.
Chief, DO
Chief, WH (Attn: Wallace R. PARLETT); COS, Washington;

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/OPERATIONAL -- WUINDICO/1/ANSA Article

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: NYDO-0695

Attached is an article transmitted by ANSA New York on 17 May 1965. The article was given to the ANSA representative in New York by WUINDICO/1.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 -- Buenos Aires w/1 att.
2cc -- WH w/1 att.
2cc -- COS w/1 att.
2cc -- DO w/1 att.

Rico Galan file
201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-1136	21 1965 20 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-263/3

SECRET

Attachment to UNDA-1136,
dated 20 May 1965

"ON FRIDAY, MAY 13, RADIO-HAVANA CITED JUAN B. NEJIA LEADER OF DOMINICAN '14 OF JUNE' PARTY WHO HAD GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST VICTOR RICO GALAN IN WHICH HE DECLARED OVER THE TELEPHONE THAT 'MANY OF THE 14 JUNE MOVEMENT HAVE DISAPPEARED BUT AT THE SAME TIME NUMEROUS CONTINGENTS OF INSURGENTS ARE REPORTED IN THE MOUNTAINS OF THE REGION' AND THAT 'THE 14 OF JUNE MOVEMENT HAS MUCH CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.'"

Distribution:
Orig. — Buenos Aires
1 — WH
1 — COS
1 — DO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Washington

INFO.
~~Chief, DO~~
Chief, WH (Attn: Wallace R. PARLETT); Chief, SR

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/OPERATIONAL -- Meeting with WUINDICO/1, 18 May 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: DO -- See para. 3; WH -- See para. 4.
REFERENCE: NYOO-0695

1. Attached is a Contact Report of a meeting with WUINDICO/1 on 18 May 1965. As indicated, W/1 approached Mauro LUCENTINI and persuaded him to send a modified version of the 2 May Havana broadcast via ANSA channels to Buenos Aires. In an effort to supplement this coverage, Subject also prepared a longer version for the paper Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

2. As shown in the Contact Report, Lucentini apparently has at least a social relationship with Gregory KALINKIN. W/1 stated that Lucentini, a friend, is a conservative and, to his knowledge, does not have any leanings toward communism.

3. For DO: Base would appreciate traces on Lucentini in order to determine his political leanings and connections.

4. The Base should be advised if either of the two stories mentioned in paragraph 1 is published.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

Attachments:
1. Contact Report
2. Spanish Copy for Porto Alegre Newspaper

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 -- COS w/2 atts. in dup.
2cc -- WH w/2 atts. (single copy)
2cc -- DO w/2 atts. (single copy)
2cc -- SR w/att. 1 only.

[illegible]
201-336474
MAY 21 1965

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDA-1135	DATE 20 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 200-6-263/3

Attachment B. o UNNA-133

19 May 1965

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Meeting with WUINDIGO, 18 May 1965

1. RUTHERFORD met W/1 at the latter's apartment on 18 May 1965.

2. The following information was obtained:

a. Dominican Republic. During the briefing by the WH representative on 14 May, it was agreed that W/1 would attempt to have the Havana broadcast of 2 May replayed through his friend Mauro LUCENTINI of ANSA, New York. It was felt that this approach would be more desirable than using W/1 directly, in view of his efforts to appear as a liberal journalist. During the meeting W/1 attempted to contact Lucentini, but ascertained that he had gone off on a holiday for the weekend. Upon learning that Lucentini would return to New York City during the evening of 16 May, it was agreed that W/1 would contact him at that time in an effort to have the story transmitted on 17 May. In addition to the major capitals in Latin America, W/1 also thought that the story would be sent to Rome.

b. Following a 'phone call from the WH Desk, RUTHERFORD subsequently briefed W/1 on the fact that the same story had been carried in the 2 May edition of Hoy in Havana. (COMMENT: RUTHERFORD pointed out to the Headquarters rep that, in his opinion, it might not be advisable to inform Lucentini of the Hoy article as it might raise an objection in his mind concerning the current value of the news.)

c. Briefed on both the radio broadcast and the Hoy article, W/1 was disinclined to mention the Hoy article to Lucentini for the same objection noted above. He was instructed to use his own discretion.

d. On the evening of 16 May W/1 contacted Lucentini and outlined his request. He explained to Lucentini that this was a good opportunity for a scoop on a hot item. W/1, in order to offset any objections on the part of Lucentini, told him that the radio broadcast had occurred on 13 May. He did not mention the Hoy article. According to W/1, Lucentini was less than enthusiastic about transmitting the story through his facilities, pointing out that it was no longer news. After some persuasion, according to W/1, Lucentini finally agreed to send the following abbreviated story to Buenos Aires either the evening of 16 May or early 17 May:

'On Friday, May 13, Radio-Havana cited Juan B. Mejia leader of Dominican '14 of June' party who had given an interview to Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan in which he declared over the telephone that 'many leaders of the June 14 movement have disappeared, but at the same time numerous contingents of insurgents are reported in the mountains of the region' and that 'the 14 of June movement has much control of the situation.''

e. In order to supplement the Lucentini effort, W/1 prepared a more detailed version of the radio broadcast and cabled it to Correio do Povo in Porto Alegre, Brazil. He paid for the cable in New York ($40.70) and signed it with his first and last initials and "our NY correspondent." The cabled article in Spanish is forwarded herewith as attachment #2.

f. O. Kalinkin. On 17 May W/1 was invited to a cocktail party at the home of Lucentini, 305 East 56th Street, NYC. The reception was on the occasion of the departure of Ricardo Berla, Vice President of Olivetti Underwood in New York. W/1 was surprised to find that Kalinkin, the Soviet employed in the UN Secretariat, was present. It will be recalled that W/1 originally met Kalinkin at the home of Faubion Bowers in Manhattan in June 1964. Lucentini was also present on that occasion. W/1 could not comment on whether Lucentini met Kalinkin for the first time at the Bowers affair. W/1 is not aware of any close relationship between Kalinkin and Lucentini.

3. Finances:

Rutherford paid W/1 the following:

a. Cable to Brazil------------------------$40.70

b. Round-trip cab fare to ANSA-------- 2.00

TOTAL--------------------------------$42.70

A signed receipt was obtained.

4. Next Meeting: Friday, 21 May, at 1100.

Guy W. RUTHERFORD

14-00000

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Att. 12, UNSA-1135

correiodopovo rua caldas-junior porto-alegre brasil

Acaba de ocorrer um fato curioso.Radio-Havana,numa transmissao de ontem, citou umas declaracoes do senhor juan mejia,lider do partido revolucionario dominicano "14 de junho".Estas declaracoes,segundo radio-havana,foram feitas pelo senhor mejia,de santo-domingo,pelo telefono,ao jornalista mexicano de esquerda victor rico galan.E verdade que a central telefonica esta na mao dos "constitucionalistas" e que por isso podem conversar diretamente com o mexico sem passar pela zona ou pelo controle dos norte-americanos.Por sua vez,victor rico galan transmitiu as declaracoes de juan mejia a radio-havana.Entre outras coisas,mejia,citado por radio-havana,disse "numerosos lideres do partido 14 de junho desapareceram-nos e que eles estao agora nas montanhas encabecando contingentes de guerrilheiros".Mais adiante ele acrescentou "o partido 14 de junho tem xxxxxxxx o controle da situacao em santo-domingo".Sabe-se que o controle da revolucao dominicana pelos comunistas serviu de pretexto aos norte-americanos para sua intervencao.Os comunistas dominicanos das tres tendencias tudo fizeram para desmentir esta presuncao norte-americana e ficaram,o mais possivel,na escuridao,nos bastidores.O partido "14 de junho" e diretamente ligado a Fidel Castro e tanto seus chefes quanto Fidel Castro tem interesse,na hora presente,em desmentir a these americana,em demonstrar que em santo-domingo nao ha comunismo,nem guerrilha nem fidelismo.Por isso nao se entende o erro,ou a "gaffe" do radio-havana citando nominalmente juan mejia -que consta na famosa lista norte-americana dos 58 comunistas- cuja lealdade para fidel castro e conhecida e xx reconhecendo que seus homens estao encabecando a guerrilha nas sierras dominicanas. Sem justific nem criticar a intervencao norte-americana,seus alvos e seus metodos, temos que reconhecer que esta "confissao" cubana joga uma luz nova, inesperada,sobre o assunto todo.do nosso enviado especial a novayork

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

24 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ☒ ☐

UNIT WH/WE TIME 1910 BY

INFO VR. FILE WE6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI

19 May 65 IN 71360

S E C R E T 192138Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO ROME MILA CARA CITE MEXI 3471

1. 15 MAY LIFEAT COVERAGE CARLO COCCIOLI REPORTED COCCIOLI GOING NEW YORK 20 MAY VIA EASTERN FLIGHT 900 ARRIVING NEW YORK [illegible] HOURS. COCCIOLI SAID HE ADVISING CERTAIN FRIENDS IN NEW YORK HIS ARRIVAL. LATER TOLD VICTOR RICO GALAN HE RETURNING MEXI 31 MAY.

2. SAME DAY LIFEAT REPORTED COCCIOLI RESERVED ROOM AT UNIDENTIFIED HOTEL FOR 6 JUNE IN NAME MR. SARLER ORENGO (PHONETIC), FRENCHMAN. ORENGO ARRIVING MEXI BY AIR FROM NEW YORK AT 1151 ON 6 JUNE. COCCIOLI TOLD HOTEL ORENGO WOULD DEFINITELY ARRIVE, THAT ORENGO ON OFFICIAL MISSION AND HIS PROGRAM (TRAVEL?) PLANNED FOR SOME TIME.

S E C R E T

CFN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 20

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☐ DESTROY
☐ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

FROM
BUENOS AIRES

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PROP

RI COPY

19 MAY 65 IN 71410

S E C R E T 192015Z

MEXI INFO DIR NYDO DOST SDOM CITE BUEN 3635

REF: DIR 10787 *

REGRET TO REPORT THAT AS OF NOON 19 MAY REF STORY HAS NOT APPEARED CLARIN OR OTHER BUEN PAPER. NOW CHECKING TELAM, WHICH BELIEVE IS ANSA SUBSCRIBER, IN EFFORT TO GET STORY PRINTED IF IT ARRIVED. WILL TAKE ACTION PER REF IF IT APPEARS.

S E C R E T

CFN * PLACED STORY ANSA WIRE ON GALAN INTERVIEW.

SECRET

[illegible] 201
201

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 17 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3 SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	D
4	4	8	R

TO : BUENOS AIRES MEXICO CITY NEW YORK (DODS) WASHINGTON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO ADDP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

17 May 65 19 25 z

PRIORITY"

TO PRTY BUEN INFO MEXI NYDO DOST (R) 5004 CITE DIR 10787

1. ACTING THROUGH WUINDIGO HDQS PLACING STORY ON ANSA WIRE SERVICE 16 MAY ON VICTOR RICO GALAN INTERVIEW WITH JUAN MEJIA, DR LEADER 14 JUNE MOVEMENT, WHICH WAS BROADCAST BY RADIO HABANA 2 MAY.

2. EXPECT STORY APPEAR CLARIN AND/OR OTHER BUEN ANSA SUBSCRIBERS 17 OR 18 MAY. IF NOT OVERLY LONG, PLS CABLE FULL TEXT STORY MEXI INFO DIR FOR IMMEDIATE REPLAY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/4

DO/CF O'Mara (in draft)

WH/2

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

3 SECRET

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED MAY 18 9 47 AM '65

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2,

ACTION

17 MAY 65 IN 69232

SECRET 172032Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3435

REF MEXI 3419 (IN 67829)

LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN REINITIATED 1000 HOURS 15 MAY.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

[illegible] mark for 201 VRG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, WHD
INFO.	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

SUBJECT OPERATIONAL/LIFEAT
VICTOR RICO GALAN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For Your Information

REFERENCES: DIR 08156
DIR 08566
DIR 09327

1. Attached are reels 25 and 26 of LIFEAT coverage of Victor Rico Galan, covering period 0700 to 2230 hours on 1 May 1965 and 2230 to 0845 hours on 2 May 1965.

2. Tape 25 contains Rico Galan report on 1 May to Fundora of Radio Habana on his coversation with Juan Bautista Mejia.

3. Tape 26 contains conversation between Emilio Cordero and Rico Galan in which Cordero reports to Rico the substance of his 1 May conversation with Mejia in which Mejia asked Cordero to have Rico tell Radio Habana to avoid any mention of Mejia or the 14th of June Group. (It was erroneously reported in the supdata in intel report HMM-9689, MEXI 3312 of 6 May 1965 that Cordero played a tape of his conversation with Mejia for Rico Galan. Cordero read his notes on his conversation to Rico Galan who recorded the notes.)

Olivia C. Regnity
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: h/w
Reels 25 and 26

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD, w/a
3 - Files

Call RID/FILES, EXT. 6867
re attachment. Reels
with job no. 67-353
[illegible]

201- 336074

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26095	14 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	200-7-38/13

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WHD		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico			MICROFILM

SUBJECT Operational/LIFEAT
Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: For Your Information

1. Attached are copies of transcripts of reels 22 through 32, covering periods 29 April through 8 May 1965, of LIFEAT coverage on Victor RICO Galan.

2. The substance of these transcripts was forwarded by cable to Headquarters on 11 May 1965. (MEXI 3370, 3372, 3373, 3374, and 3376).

Olivia G Raquity
for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments: h/w
Transcripts
Distribution:
~~1~~ 2 - C/WHD, w/atts

104

CS COPY

[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA - 26083	14 May 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-336476 P-7354

From 0620 to 1210, 29 April (Thursday) 1965

2.0 In. MO asks Inge(bord) Rico (v), who answers, for Victor Rico Galan (VRG). He is asleep. MO is Emilio Cordero, a Dominican. When will he be up? Around 0900 or 0930. MO will phone back

3.2 Out to 27-13-84. Sra. Diener with Sr. Gonzales, who answers. About a napkin ring she ordered....About her papers...they have lost the ones she left with Sr. Gonzales for his signature. She always leaves one copy at the factory and the third is for jewelery shop while the second one is her copy....She likes to know what her prices are and how much she owes exactly...

3.5 Out to 03. Time is 0821 (29 April).

3.7 In. Camilo (not Emilio) Cordero, Dominican, with VRG, who answers. Jose Luis talked to VRG last night. Yes. They would like to talk to VRG today. Come by in an hour - at 1045. Come by VRG's house. Camilo with come with Max. VRG knows him. Camilo and Max and some others (will come to see him).

4.2 Out to 42-15-65. VRG with MO, who answers. MO has anew car. A new Chvelle. Asks to speak to MO's husband. Will be in "Siempre" offices. Went there about an hour ago.

4.5 Out to 46-43-24. VRG with MO, who answers "Siempre," & for Alberto.

Alberto takes the phone. Has the Director returned? No, will be back until tomorrow. VRG is writing a bombshell on Santo Domingo, "as is natural." VRG says that he has some very useful data in the article, reporting, he did there. Would like Joaquin to look for it and send it to him? This was published in 1963 (in "Siempre") when VRG went to Santo Domingo. Should have come out in January or February of 1964, not 1963. It came out in the Second Division. It has a photo of Tavarez and may have one photo of Bosch. But one of funeral of Tavarez. Alberto will send it to him.

VRG asks if Alberto has seen the golden road that the PRI is giving. They should keep todays (copy) of "El Dia" because "we can use it for many years."

Some Dominican fridds are coming to visit VRG now. He will prepare some very good article.

6.0 Out to 46-66-93, 3 times. Busy. Complete. VRG with Sr. Deschamps (ph). D. has seen the matter of the (U.S.) marines. Yes. VRG is with some Dominican friends who want to give a press conference today at 1600. VRG asked for something like this - when the Guatemalan affair took place - VRG called Julio and Julio gave the matter to the Head of Information. Probably due to the civil war they have there (where Deschamps works). The Head of Information sent Carlos Jimenez who came drunk. This conference will take place at 1600 at the house of Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ave. Valerio Trujano 323, Apt. B-3, Colonia Florida. He does not have a phone. MO would like Lopez Azuara to go talk to them so they could publish something ahead of time in the "Extra." They are now with VRG. Perhaps MO can locate Lopez Azuara and have him phone VRG. VRG gives MO his phone.

6.0 contd.
MO can't locate Lopez Azuara until 1300. LA could go to same address around 1430. The Dominicans can go by "Excelsior." That would be fine. Call ~~MO~~ anyway at 1330. MO is Eduardo (Deschamps).

VRG would like to talk to Eduardo. E. is at home sick in bed. VRG can visit him. ED's address is Reforma 10-504. VRG will call before he goes by and will probably go today. VRG hopes that the "beast" (MO's wife) won't be there. No, she has gone to France. Then, there is no problem.

After 1100, 29 April

9.2 Out to 25-80-32. MI (Dominican probably) with WO, whom he calls "Chinita." MI identifies himself as Tobias (?). Did Ramon Grullo (ph) phone back again? No. But WO got the message that they should meet at 1200 at "Las Brasas"? Yes. Tell him, if he calls back, that they will be there at 1200. Fine.

9.5 Out to 31-06-06. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Miric. Not there now. Will be there around 1330 or 1400. Ask him to phone VRG urgently.

9.7 Out to 45-91-36. VRG with Toñia, who answers, for Luis Suarez. Went to see Sr. Angel Sanchez. Does she have his phone there? Yes, but they were meeting near Cine de las Americas. If he phones in~~x~~, ask him to phone VRG. In any case VRG will leave a message for him at "Siempre."

10.2 Out to 46-43-24. Busy.

10.5 Out to 35-24-28. VRG with WO, who answers at "Siempre." When Luis Suarez comes in, ask him to phone VRG at home.

11.0 Out to 35-36-52. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers at "Politica," for Sr. Gomez Lorenzo. Not there yet. Is he at home? She thinks so. Asks for his home phone. (During wait - MI tells Emilio to go take (some protest) to the Presidencia while MMR phones...)
Gomez Lorenzo's phone is 39-39-59.

11.5 Out to 39-39-59. Marcio Mejia Ricart with Gomez Lorenzo's daughter, who answers, for GL. Not there. They want to talk to GL. Should be in the office in about an hour. Advise him that a group of Santo Dominicans - leaves address where it is to be. GL should invite someone who works at "Diario de la Tarde" and should select someone who is "adequate" (sympathiser).

13.2 Out to 46-60-15. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers at "Prensa Latina," for Jordan.

Sr. Jordan takes the phone. MMR tells him about the press conference they are planning for today at 1600...giving address... Fine, will go.

14.0 Out to 10-20-30. MI asks WO, who answers, for Mario Gonzalez Marquez (of "La Prensa). Phone 12-08-33.

14.2 Out to 12-08-53, three times. No rings, complete. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Mario Gonzales Marquez.
They can't find him. He may be on the 8th floor. Asks for Editor-in-Chief. Not there now either. MMR says he (Mario Gonzales Marques) and MMR are friends. Wants to invite him to press conference... leaves details...

15.5 Out to 45-44-40, twice. Busy.

16.0 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, "El Dia," for Eduardo Ramirez. Phone 35-61-97.

16.2 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Leonardo (not Eduardo) Ramirez. Not there. Asks for ~~[illegible]~~ Muzquia (ph). Not there. Asks for one of the Directors.
(During wait, MMR tells VRG that the first act of Bosch's govt, and this is in his (Bosch's) book which was just published, and he asked this of President Kennedy - was to take away from Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey the oil refining company. That was the first obstacle he ran into to..)
MO returns to phone and asks who he wants. Fuente, Cuenca, ~~[illegible]~~ Arriola or any of them. None ~~[illegible]~~ of them is there. Sr. Muzquia will be will be in around 1300 and Leonardo around 1200. Tell Leonardo that MMR called...leaves details on press conference (on Santo Domingo). A press conference of exiled Dominicans...They want to give him some information. If Leonardo does not come in on time, give info to Muzquis.

18.0 Out to 35-61-70. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers, if Cuenca is there. No.

18.2 Out to 48-04-40. Marcio Mejia Ricart, asks MO, who answers, for Santos (?) Arriola. Wrong number.

18.5 Out to 48-04-30, twice. No answer (...During out rings... MMR says he has all that was agreed (on between U.S. and Santo Domingo?) not here but in Santo Domingo...even again devaluation, permission for intervention in Santo Domingo...)

19.2 Out to 24-05-06. ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Sanches (not Santos) Arriola...Wrong number.
24-65-06.
19.7 Out to ~~[illegible]~~. Wrong number.

20.0 Out to [illegible]-12-11. Busy.

20.2 Out to 13-41-23. Marcio Mejia Ricart for Head of Information of "Universal". Call 21-08-78.

20.5 Out to 21-08-73. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Head of Information. Phone 12-08-73. Asks for his name. Sr. Demetrio Bolaños.

21.0 Out to 12-08-73, four times. No rings.

22.0 Out to 18-65-01. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers at

22.0 contd.
"France Presse," for Sr. Katz. His secretary is not in yet, but should be in soon - Sr. Alvarez. MO is Jorge Vasquez, an editor. Would like to invite any one of them to Dominican press conference. MMR explains they are a group of exiles. The Dominican Embassy is also having a conference today (of press). Does MO know what the Amb. has said? No, nothing yet. They made no comments yesterday. What was the last cable from Santo Domingo? That the supporters of Bosch were attacking the airport, San Isidro. Things have changed greatly (in their favor) this morning. Gives MO the details about where the press conference is to be....

23.0 Out to 35-63-99. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers, for Sr. Rosenberg. MO answers "Prensa Asociada" (AP). Rosenberg is on another phone. Best call back. Asks if they have had any news from Santo Domingo. Have not heard anything. Asks him to phone back in a few minutes.

23.5 Out to 46-91-88. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers (indistinctly), for Head of Information. Wants to invite him to press conference on Dominican affair...

MO takes the phone. MMR says there is a group of exiles here, among whom is the group of 14 de July, the Central Committee, here... They have a lot of information to give..invites him to press conference at 1600....Thanks.

24.2 Out to 45-44-40. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers at "Ovaciones", for Sr. Lopez Antunez (?ph).

LA takes the phone. Victor Rico Galan takes the phone. Greetings. Asks if LA has any info on the Dominican activities. The O.E.A. is now in meeting where the Americans are going to explain why they [illegible] disembarked there. The situation in Santo Domingo appears that Bosch's troops continue in control. VRG was told that there was a France Press cable that they were attacking San Isidro - military and civil men. MO has not seen this yet.

The Dominican exiles here are giving a press conference this afternoon and VRG needs MO's help. This is at the house of Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ave. Valerio Trujano 325, Apt. E-3, Colonia Florida. MO will send a reporter.

When will they see one another? Does VRG still go to the café of...No. Where does VRG go now? To none. He has coffee at home. MO will call VRG and comeby to see him.

12-08-73.
25.5 Out to [illegible]. Busy.
Out to [illegible] 12-08-73, twice. Busy, no rings.

26.0 Out to 12-67-65. Marcio Meji Ricart asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Bolaños. Phone 12-08-73. The phone is always busy. They are using it now. Call back in about 10 or 20 minutes.

26.5 Out to 18-66-01. Hangs up.

26.7 Out to 33-63-99. MI asks MO, who answers "Associated Press," for Sr. Rosenberg.

26.7 contd.

Sr. Rosenberg takes the phone. VRG (v) takes phone. Asks if they want to send a reporter to press conference of exiled Dominicans... gives address of Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart. MI is Rosenberg. Press conference is at 1600. R. is alone at the office and will be hard to get there. They, the exiles, can go by R's office. That would be fine. They are also going to "Excelsior," so can go easily to see R. R's office is on the same floor that the Editing Office of "Excelsior" is.

27.5 Out to 25-80-32. MI asks WO, who answers, if anyone has phoned ~~Mxxx8xxx8xxxx~~ Tobias Mejia. Cuernavaca called and he should report in for Sr. Ramon Grullon (ph). MI talked to the girl and told ~~himxtox~~ her to tell him to come to Mexico City. WO says the girl went out and she did not know this. MI is Marcio (Mejia Ricart). Sr. Tobias should report in.

13-15-08
28.0 Out to ~~22X~~ No rings.
21-04-57
28.2 Out to ~~22X22X22~~. Marcio Mejia Ricart with WO, who answers, for Sr. Mario ~~M~~ Wakuja (ph), Information. Phone 18-50-80. "Novedades."

28.5 Out to 18-50-80. Marcio Mejia Ricart with MO, who answers, for Head of Information, then asks for Sr. Wakuja. Not there right now. MO is Hector ~~Azu~~ Alzuye (ph). A group of exiled and deported Dominicans are here and will give press conference...gives details...Editors have picked up their orders for today. Call tonight. MI says they have information on U.S. marines...He should have phoned early. In case one of the Editors returns, he will send him there. MMR says that he is a friend of Romulo O'Farrill, Jr. Tell him, who must be at Televicentro, in case he is interested. He is at Televicentro in case MMR wants to talk to him because they don't communicate with him there.

Reel off at RT 30.0, 1210, 29 April 1965

From 1210 to 2140, 29 April (Thursday) 1965

2.0 ....conv in progress when recording begins....MI XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX is telling MO about press conference. MO (American) asks who will be there. Marcio, Emilio Cordero, Leandro Guzman and MI. They may locate another Dominican (or two), but there is not much time and they have to edit some declarations. (MI must be Tobias.) MO will be there. They don't have a phone at house of Mejia Ricart.

2.2 Out to 13-15-07. No rings.
Out to 13-15-08. No rings.
13-15-08

2.5 Out to 1XXXXXXX. MI asks MO, who answers "El Nacional," for Head of Editing. Phone 18-56-876. He is Sr. Flores.

2.7 Out to 18-56-76. Marcio Mejia Ricart with Sr. Flores, who answers. Says they have here a group of exiled Dominicans here, of different political parties, and would like to invite them to a press conference. MO says they are already going to send a reporter. That must be a conference of the Embassy. Gives details on their (exiles') press conference.

3.5 Out to 23-06-46. Victor Rico Galan asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Valentin Puchero. Not there. Where can VRG find him? Should be at home at 1400 or 1500.

3.7 Out to 15-50-11. No answer.

4.0 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX In. Otomi Ilianas (?ph) with VRG, who answers. MO is at "Siempre." VRG could not get there. Come by his house - is about 30 minutes. MO makes note of address.

4.5 Out to 46-60-15. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Jardon. MO is Toñio. Wants phone number of "Cuestion de Minutos" and also the phone of Leonov (of Soviet Embassy).

"Cuestion de Minutos" is locked up. They don't have phone of Leonov but can give him XXXXX Pucherov's phone. No, XXXXXXXXXXXX and Cucherov and Doldov (?ph) are out and VRG supposes they are with Leonov or Leonov knows where they are. Call the (Soviet) Embassy. VRG had wanted to call the Press Dept. What is the phone of the Embassy? 15-60-55.

Asks if VRG can go to the Press Club tonight at 2030. They are having a meeting of Association in Conference room. Have they given VRG given him tickets to the dinner? No. They will talk there tonight.

5.5 Out to 15-60-55. VRG asks MO, who answers at Soviet Embassy, for Leonov. Not there. Call Press Office, 15-23-04.

5.7 Out to 15-23-04. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Leonov. Not there right now. MO is Posada. Wants to locate Cucherov or Doldov (ph). Call back later - around 1500 or 1530. Ask them to phone VRG because there is a press conference today which will interest them. VRG leaves his phone for them to call.

6.2 Out to 35-36-52. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Gomez Lorenzo. Not there. Ask him to phone VRG when he comes in.

6.5 Out to 35-61-97. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks MO, who answers "El Dia," for Hernandez Ramirez. Not in. And Muzquiz (or Muzquin)? Not there. Tell them about their press conference....

7.0 Out to 24-23-15 ~~22X18420~~. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers, for Dr.Bauer (??ph) or where they can locate him. At 20 de Noviembre Hospital. His wife is not there. He will come home around 1400 and then goes to ~~Saxxtaxxm~~ Laboratorio Midi (ph).

7.5 Out to 22-18-20. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks for Sr. Arnedo (ph). Won't bethere until in the afternoon.

7.7 In. MO asks Sra. Diener, who answers, for Casta (maid). Casta takes the phone...her boyfriend...about visiting her... where she is working...

After 1235, 29 April

8.5 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO has sent VRG (his article on Santo Domingo). Did VRG say anything to Renato? Renato did not phone VRG yesterday. They will (their talk) until Saturday. They don't too much discussion. MO thinks they will all get together to collect (money). Can talk tomorrow then.

9.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO tells VRG that he is at Teatro de la Paz arranging an performance of "Historia del Zoologico (?)." Can VRG wait a little more for him to get there. VRG says he is going out now. Can meet tomorrow at 1300 at "Siempre." All right.

9.2 In. Rojas with Inga (Rico), who answers, for VRG. Call back in 30 minutes. Will he be there a while? She thinks so. MO will come by then.

9.5 In. Miric with Inge (Rico), who answers, for VRG, who called him. He just went to corner and will be right back. Is Miric at home? Yes. She will have VRG phone him.

10.0 In. Sr. Suarez asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Will be back in 20 minutes.

10.5 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, for Sra. Rico. Sra. Rico takes the phone. Asks to speak with Casta. MO is her brother...Maid takes the phone...about bringing her clothes... Will go for it now...

11.0 Out to 31-06-06, twice. Busy.

11.5 In. Sr. Miric with VRG, who answers. VRG tells him about the press conference of Dominicans (exiles) at 1600...Miric knows Marcio Mejia Ricart. Will MMR give the press conference alone? No, there "are more serious persons" there (to talk).

11.5 contd.
Miric called VRG last night, about 3 times. From 2000 to 2300. They went out to dinner. Miric wanted VRG's opinion on what happened. VRG thinks this is normal. The disembarkation of the (U.S.) marines "is normal. It is within all the a calcuations, analyses of the reality. You understand that if they can bomb a Socialist country, logically in their backyard, they (U.S.) can do what they want." Will VRG go to conference? No. Miric would like to talk to VRG about 15 minutes. Come by VRG's before the conference. Miric has car problem. Or Miric can come by after the press conference. Thinks he will do that.

12.2 Out to 45-40-4-Incomplete.
Out to 45-40-04. VRG (v) asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Suarez. Who is calling? VRG says he has wrong number.

12.5 Out to 45-91-36. VRG with Pepita, who answers. Greetings. Asks if VRG knows where Luis is. No, VRG is calling him. Pepita is waiting for him. Luis called when VRG went to barber shop... She can have him phone VRG. VRG explains about the press conference of Dominican exiles and he should be interested in this...

13.5 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. A group of Dominican exiles came to see VRG - among them Marcio Mejia Ricart, Luis' friend. There are "more serious" people in this (than MMR). They are going to give a press conference today at 1600. Luis is interested. Luis saw VRG's article today in "El Dia" and Luis follows VRG's line (against U.S.). VRG is also writing an article for "Siempre." Gives Luis the address where conference will take place. VRG also called Doidov (ph) or Cuchevov (ph), but not there. Did not find Leonov in either. Left a message for them to call VRG. Because when the conference of Mary Brack (ph), they did not appear either. They came by VRG all one afternoon getting the declarations from VRG. Luis will also go. More than news, what they have is idea to understand the problem.
Has VRG read "Ultimas Noticias" today? No. All are declarations of things going on there "since they have don't been able to dominate (Bosch movement). They say it is a Communist sbuversion, Czech arms and there is an O.E.A. meeting. They don't mention Bosch." VRG is not surprised and would not be surprised if they did not get another Cuban crisis out of this same situation (another pretext, he means, to invade Cuba?). "Ultimas Noticias" only makes mention of Communism and Cuba. VRG says that since 1927 they (American) haven't landed in America. Very grave situation and precedent.
Does Luis have Marcio's phone? No. About where Valerio Trujano is located...

15.2 In. Leonov with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG says Leonov has a Catalan accent. VRG looked for TASS and PRAVDA correspondents. Thought they might be with Leonov...Explains about the press conference. They might be interested. Leonov just saw them. Gives details about where conference will be...These exiles may have information - to understand the problem. L. says it looks confusing now. VRG won't go. VRG is now working on this, and has already worked with them. VRG has been in Santo Domingo. Luis will also go. Miric will also go. Leonov will advise TASS and PRAVDA correspondents.

When can they have coffee? Tomorrow morning? Best in the afternoon. Call VRG around this same time tomorrow to arrange time. Fine

16.0 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. Asks if he knows about the conference of Dominicans...Of course, they occupied (his house) like the marines and VRG even helped them organize this conference. VRG is not going to conference.

Luis saw VRG's article. Yes, but they did not put on the signature. It is best that way. With a signature it would have been Luis' article. Without signature, it appears more editorial. Luis prefers it this way politically. This was just an error, since VRG talked to Alberto about this. It was an error in the shop. Luis is happier abot this. When Luis sends this to Puerto Rico is carries more weight this way. Luis asks if he charges for this. VRG thinks so, but will ask. Ask~~xx~~ with discretion. What most interested him was that it ~~x~~ came out. VRG will call MO on Saturday or Sunday so they can get together.

After 1440, 29 April

16.7 In. Luis with Inge (Rico), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes phone. Greetings. Luis saw Noe a while ago. Noe will probably arrange Luis' matter. Good! Sent greetings to VRG. Asks if there is nothing new. No. Hasn't Efrain called VRG? No. Then, there is nothing to be done. Asks VRG to pick up tickets. Yes, he will do this tomorrow.

17.0 Out to 46-60-15. VRG ~~xxxxxxxx~~ with Jardon, who answers. Greetings. What is new in Santo Domingo? Quite a bit. Just a moment.

The last message they received came from San Juan, Puerto Rico. They have obtained complete control of City of Santo Domingo. In ~~xxxx~~the morning, they had heard that the insurgents had obtained control of all radio systems (stations) of the capital and started attack on base of San Isidro. France Presse told VRG about the attack of San Isidro. The last heard is that they are in control of Santo Domingo city. They have taken 4 tanks, destroyed another 2 in capital. They will see if they can take over San Isidro. That is the air base. And the (U.S.) marines? VRG heard a radio bulletin that they disembarked another 100 marines. They had said yesterday that, in case it were necessary, they would disembark 1,000 not 100 ~~xxx~~ marines. And reactions? Hasn't anyone protested? No, besides Cuba and USSR, no one. What did USSR say? Doesn't say. MO goes on that the total amount of men fighting for Bosch is 15,000 - civil and military men. The major part is civil because, apart from Camagno (ph) and Montes/ who refused to accept transaction, the rest of the officers backed out (of revolution)...

There is a quite well founded rumor that ~~xxxxxxxx~~ it is not remote that the marines, "are made to feel the need, to protect liberty and democracy, to intervene categorically and to find proofs of the Castro-Communist intervention. There is also speculation that there will be a change of 180° in the Latin American situation and that the O.A.S. meeting may not ~~xx~~ result as planned (to protest against intervention in Santo Domingo)." Jardon says this is possible. Did VRG notice yesterday in Johnson's message, at the end, "the disembarkation of marines will not only take place in Santo Domingo, but this (group) will be lent to citizens of other countries, some of which have already asked for "our" (U.S.) help." VRG says that he is referring to citizens of other countries living in Santo Domingo. Jardon disagrees, then says, yes, it can be interpreted in the ~~x~~ two ways. VRG asks Jardon to send a cable with this rumor. It can be true or false. Jardon will do so. He will include it in the message he sends out at 1800.

VRG asks Jardon to call him if anything important comes up. Yes.

17.0 contd.
Will Jardon have Fidel's speech on Sunday? He is sure he will, but thinks the complete text will be sent on Sudday. Should have it complete around 1800.

18.5 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. Greetings..VRG has been very busy with the Dominican affair. Some Dominican friends were at his house this morning and phoned a lot. Sra. R. says Bosch won't get in. She read it. The ~~XXx~~ last news is that they (insurgents) have taken the whole capital, Santo Domingo, and the Americans were disembarked. Bosch won't go. That is the agreement made but people did not accept this agreement and fighting has continued...

18.0 In. Edmundo (Jardon) with VRG, who answers. There is some news. The ~~Cha~~ Peruvian Chancellor criticized the disembarkation of U.S. marines, stating that this was grave blow to inter-American relations...Washington states that Mexico ~~xxxxxxx~~ criticized the disembarkation of U.S., troops, in the secret session celebrated today in O.E.A. Colombia, Chile, Venezuela and Costa Rica protested that this unilateral action, and requested legal measures so this action would be a combined action. VRG asks for the form in which Mexico criticized this action. Nothing specific in this message. Should have it later. The bombarding of San Isidro has started - an hour ago. Informex should have text of Mexico by now. It would be good to ask for it. Call him if there is anything new. VRG is writing up this for "Siempre."

19.0 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. The marines have entered action Yes. Two civils have been killed. Miric says there is a new element. ...60 marines around the Embassy. They have opened fire against U.S. Embassy. They tried to enter 4 or 5 Embassies. VRG thinks that these are pretexts (for U.S. action). Miric thinks so. But thinks are more grave. Miric says that there are at least 2 Communist groups and one Pro-Castro group, called the 14 de Junio. They don't know whether they are the ones directing the rebellion or whether they just joined it, but there is great insistence that these areCommunists, trained in Cuba and Czech. On ther otherw hand, the 6th float of Caribbean is lined along the Dominican coast and a carrier. The Dominican Amb. in Washington continues to insist that this is a Communist attempt to take over Santo Domingo. Does Miric know that this Amb. is not a Dominican? Bonilla Atiles is a U.S. citizen - legally.

Ambss of Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Colombia spoke in O.E.A. meeting - all protesting the intervention and that this is a violation of inter-American rights. Radio Habana only said that Mexico had censured this, VRGsays, but says O.E.A. is trying to cover the intervention. Yes, there is a petition to this effect by Venezuela, that O.E.A. should intervene. Does not say to legalize but means this. The Voice of America says that it is not true that insurgents are not in control the city, that the troops are trying to encircle some points which they hold in Santo Domingo and does not mention the attack of San Isidro. VRG says that UP says that - in cables from San Juan - that insurgents hold the city, attacked San Isidro, destroyed 2 tanks and took 4 tanks. There are marines [illegible] Supposedly defending Embassy and Americm property/ [illegible] U.S. citizens. There is a protest of Red Cross. Marines must be at

19.0 contd.
Hotel Ambassador. There is protest by U.S. Red Cross stating that there are at least 400 dead and about 1,200 wounded. The Americans are distributing milk, etc. Both heard this over Voice of U.S. VRG comments (ironically) that "they are very nice people" (buenas gen~~s~~tes). ~~There is~~ also a dedlaration of Dept. of Defense that since marines are there, this does not mean U.S. supports one or another side.

VRG asks if Miric has called...No, not yet. Not there yet. It is nearly 1900. Yes, but he goes to work at 1800.

"These young people" brought their bulletin and a copy for Miric. It is long but does not state anything - saying that it is not true that they are Communists, that this a country fighting against oppression. VRG says this is habitual rhetoric of Latin Americans. Keep it for Miric.

Call VRG if Miric finds out anything about Mexico's position or statements in this.

23.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, if they took the declarations by (of exiles). How was the conference? It took place during a terrible rain...Reporters from "Excelsior," "Novedades," and "El Dia." Had declarations all written out for President, Cardenas and PRI. Not really a conference, just a few commentaries. MO gave the men the addresses of press agencies which did not appear. They were going to deliver this declaration. VRG says these people are worthwhile. Declarations were good, according to MO.

VRG asks if MO knew that marines have started to kill people. Read in "Ultimas Noticias" that first exchange of fire took place - with 70 marines at the U.S. Embassy. MO just got xx home. Mexico also protested in O.E.A. meeting. Yes, and a lot of countries. Yes, but they wanted to make it a united effort. VRG has not heard the terms in whichxxx Mexico censured this action of U.S.

Has VRG written this yet? He is preparing material. Wants to write it for tomorrow. VRG says it would be best to give this to "Siempre" on Monday. VRG will phone Pajes tomorrow early. Pajes will arrive on the train around 0900 or 1000. Should be at office around 1100. Would like to hand in his article on Monday.

About San Isidro being attacked...There is no foreign correspondent in x Santo Domingo. All information is coming from San Juan. The ones sending out information are Dominican reporters and this is probably being censured. They found out about the marine disembarking through Washington. MO sent a cable in detail when he got home found a cable from Adrede (?) in Berlin - that he wanted info on disembarkation. MO sent info to Berlin.

They will talk tomorrow. MO is Luis (Spanish extraction).

23.5 In. Valentin Cucherov (ph) of TASS with VRG, who answers. It was shame he could not attend the press conference of Dominicans. Would like to see these men. Does VC have the address? Leonov gave it to him. Go to see Mejia Ricart there. VRG can give him the address. C. makes note of Mejia's name...address...He can go tomorrow morning to see Mejia Ricart. They have a bulletin written up and some copies of telegrams they have made up (sent). VC will go by there around 1200 or 1300. Call MR on his University xphone. MR is a research man at the University. Phone 48-63-60, xxxx 48-63-00, exts. 100, 432, 162.

Are there a lot of interesting things on this? Some. VC thinks this is

25.5 contd.
confusing situation in Dominican Republic. What does VRG thinks? It is complex (side-steps him). Dominican exiles were going to try the Embassy to find out where they could locate Valentin Cucherov.

When can they meet one another? When VC likes. Perhaps on Monday. Call VRG on Monday to arrange a time. Will phone Monday morning.

After 2120, 29 April

26.5 In. Miric (v) with VRG, who answers. Cucherov just phoned. He just found out about the press conference. Miric says that that correspondents of News Agencies he likes very much (ironic?). Cucherov asked VRG what he thought about the situation. VRG replied that he thought the situation was confusing.

They say that they (Bosch men) have 50,000 men ready to enter the fight. Continue to attack in mass San Isidro. Is this from Informex? Yes.

There is an official deddaration (of Mexico) essentially disapproving the marines. President is still very worried about situation in sister Republic and that the govt. thinks it is ~~shameful~~ very sad that U.S. took this action. It is only 20 or 30 lines. Doesn't it mention the O.E.A.? No, but the sense is the same, with an accent of a little more worry. There is news that the Mexican Embassy has also been attacked in Dominican Republic. Have attacked Salvadoran, Peruvian, Mexican, Ecuadoran and U.S. Embassies. VRG doubts this. Thinks these may have been provacateurs. Why would they attack~~s~~ the Embassies? The Mexican Amb. is in almost constant communication with Mexico - informing what is going on. And it is not sure yet that there are any victims among the U.S. citizens. But there has been further disembarkation. VRG thinks they will occupy the territory. This will be a repetition of 1916. Miric says it won't be the same exactly. No, it was then to form the empire and it is now to defend.

As to the O.E.A., things are not going well. There was a 5 hour meeting which did not resolve anything. VRG heard about this. They are back in meeting.

VRG is going to ask Pajes to let him turn his story in on Monday. Everything is too contradicaory yet.

Miric has taken his position and is now writing his story. Mirici would like to have text (of Fidel). Call Jardon. If VRG has any news, he will phone Miric.

28.5 Out to 45-60-15. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Jardon (or Pardon)
Jardon takesthe phone. Asks if he has the declaration of Mexico. Yes. Asks him to read it. Reads it - summarizing that President Diaz Ordaz has been fraternally and deeply worried about situation in Dominican Republic...that the Mexican Amb. has been in constant telephone contact with Dept. of Foreign Affairs here. Amb. is Lic. Ramon Ruiz Vasconcelos. Amb. has given refuge and asylum to Mexicans and Dominicans. Situation is confusing to norm Mexican conduct with their international principals, especially with respect to American problems. They can state that they deplore the blood being shed, as stated in the O.E.A., and sufferings of Dominican Republic and sorry that U.S. govt. has had to act in such a manner which reminds them of such sad memories of several countries in the hemisphere and hope that marine force occupation will be the shortest time as possible...that Dominican Republic can resolve their problems without any direct or indirect exterior influence. VRG thinks that it is quite good within what can be expected.

28.5 contd.
They are expecting another disembarkation of more marines. VRG has heard that this has already taken place. And also said that they (Bosch) have 50,000 armed civil people and attacking San Isidro. VRG thinks 50,000 is too much. It was said in Santo Domingo that there were 15,000 (pro-Bosch). MO thinks there is not enough arms. Yes, there is enough arms because the army of theirs is bestial.

30.7 Out to 31-06-06. Busy.

After 2130, 29 April

31.0 Out to 31-06-06, twice. Busy, complete. VRG with MO, who answers. MO is Miric.
VRG has the complete text (of Mexico) and summarizes this for Miric. Reads the text to Miric. (One of two - VRG takes good shorthand, recorded it or has received a written copy.) Miric says that this is a positive declaration. No other govt. has declared in this form. Also does not mention the O.E.A. but mentions that hopes that Dominican Republic can resolve its problems without indirect or direct influence (so don't approve of united attacked).
There is a report that a group of General Bening of 1,500 men [illegible] has changed to insurgents. All these items are very different points. Most of them are from San Juan. Bosch probably has the phone in his hand there and perhaps thinks are too optimistic. Miric says that the popular rebellion is winning. They, the marines, are supposed to be forming a cordon - for evacuating of Americans - so this must be several thousands. If this is to airport, the airport is 20 miles from city, the defense line must be quite long.

Reel off at RT 32.2, 2140, 29 April 1965

From 2140, 29 April (Thursday) to 0620, 30 April 1965

2.0 In. Emilio Cordero with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. EC talked to VRG this afternoon about the attempt(ed coup d'etat) of 8 May 1962. Yes. EC just got a cable..American intervention is covered by Agreement with the U.S. of 1962. That is the Treaty that EC showed VRG.

Did VRG give those persons a copy of bulletin? No, but he read it to them over the phone.

Did EC see that Mexico made a declaration? Yes, but not strong. It's essence is a help. Yes, but in comparison to the one made by De Leon (it is weak). Yes, but De Leon's attaches a proposal that O.E.A. joined (in united effort with U.S.) EC says that Uruguay's declaration is also very good. VRG has not seen it. EC saw it at UP. It was coming in on teletype.

Did VRG read the report? Yes, but it refers to a very special aspect. EC says it refers basically to the death of Trujillo and the counte coup. This is not very necessary to show in the case of Santo Domingo.

From 0620, 30 April (Friday) to 0700, 1 May 1965

After 0915, 30 April

2.5 In. MO, correspondent of PRAVDA, asks Sra. Diener (ph), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. MO identifies himself as ~~Vladimir~~ Vladimir. Greetings. How was VRG's trip? Fine. MO read VRG's article. It was very good.

They told MO about a press conference yesterday, but MO was not at home all day yesterday. Cucherov has the address and everything. MO can't find (Cucherov). C. was going to locate this person (Mejia Ricart).

2.7 Out to 46-51-30. No answer.

3.0 In. Gil asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. Will they see one another in the afternoon? Yes. Gil will come by (VRG's) at 1730. Fine.

3.2 One extension off the hook...

3.7 Out to 23-02-91. VRG with ...ind..Rosales, who answers. Asks for Pajes. Not back yet. Greetings. Pajes should be in shortly. Must have gotten home late last night, but has a lot of work there pending. VRG wants to submit his article on Monday (instead of today or tomorrow) since he is working on Dominican Republic. VRG thought Pajes was coming in on the train this morning. MO is not sure. VRG wanted to wait on the O.E.A. meeting which is to take place tomorrow and write article on Sunday. VRG has a lot of data, but wanted to turn this in on Monday - to see how things are going. VRG decides to wait to turn this in...

5.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Greetings. (VRG recognizes MO.) MOstood VRG up twice. MO invites VRG to lunch. MO is Rojas. VRG is very busy and full of problems with Dominican affair. VRG waited for MO for two hours yesterday. Should at least phone he can't come. Invites VRG to lunch between 1400 and 1500. VRG is preparing an article on Dominican

5.0 contd.
affair. VRG is going to "Siempre" this morning. If Pajes accepts that VRG turn in article on Monday, then VRG can have lunch with MO. But Pajes does not accept this, VRG will have to write all afternoon to deliver it this afternoon. Call VRG at 1230 at "Siempre." Fine. What phone is it? 46-43-24. In case VRG is not there, call VRG here at home.

6.2 Out to 23-48-26. Orders a cab. None now.
Out ?. Orders a cab. None now.

6.7 In. Sra. Lupe asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for Sra. (Inge) Rico.
I.Rico takes phone. About a cook..Has one for IR.

7.2 In. Julian with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Greetings. VRG went to "Siempre." If IR see VRG, tell him not to send his brother to him now. Julian has resolved on Reforma (??an apt??)...

7.5 In. Sra. Rico with Sra. Diener, who answers. Greetings. VRG is out. IR went for child....about everyone... their health.

8.2 In. Julian with WI, who answers, for VRG. Not there.
After 1310, 30 April
8.5 In. Deschamps with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Not sure he will be home for lunch. Will be home around 1800. Will he be at "Siempre"? Possibly so, but she thinks not.

8.7 In. WO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Diener. WO is Sra. [illegible] de la Vega. Not there right now. Sra. de la V. called to say good-bye.

9.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Asks VRG to hold the phone.
MO takes the phone. Asks VRG to leave an article for him today or tomorrow. VRG can't today. Will do so tomorrow. MO is Manuel (Marcus?). There are a lot of things going on. Yes, but will do it tomorrow.

9.5 In. Luis with VRG, who answers. Luis made note of phone number of one of "these engineers", of the Dominicans. Luis put this phone on some copies they were going to distribute. Cocheli (ph) wants to talk to them (Dominicans) and is going to send some things to his newspaper in Italy. VRG does not have this phone at hand. When Cocheli phones VRG, VRG can give it to him.
Carlos (Cocheli) takes the phone. Carlos had a lot of things to talk to VRG. Yes, but he never calls. When can he see VRG today? VRG will be there at 1730. VRG is going out right now. VRG will be there between 1730 and 1800. Fine.

9.9 Out to [illegible] 25-58-03. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Balan. Not there.
After 1430, 30 April
10.0 Out to 37-12-84. Sra. Diener asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Gonzales.
Sr. Gonzales takes phone...about napkin ring...

10.5 In. MO (inaudibly identifies himself) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Will be in around 1730.

10.7 Out to 37-12-84. Sra. Diener asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Gonzalez.
Sr. Gonzalez takes the phone. She asks him to bring her some alcohol...He is going to get some figures from her...(She apparently makes designs for them and they make things for her...~~gifts~~ gifts...)

11.2 Out to 11-03-71, ~~twice~~ Wrong number.
Out to 11-03-70. Tillie (Diener) with Elsa (de la Vega), who answers. Elsa is finally leaving on her trip...to visit (a daughter)...

12.5 Out to 03, twice. No rings, complete. Time is 1616 (30 April).

12.7 In. Rodrigo with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings... About maids...VRG is not there. Will be home around 1800. VRG will call R. to see if they can get together on Sunday. The Rico's have an engagement on Saturday, but perhaps can get together on Sunday to chat. R. says they will phone the Rico's. Fine, but best phone tomorrow morning.

After 1715, 30 April

13.2 In. VRG with Inge Rico, who answers. He is on his way home. If "that man" comes, ask him to wait.

13.5 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Cuts off or someone hangs up...

13.7 In. Samuel asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Call back in 30 minutes.

14.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for maid Casta.
Maid takes the phone. About ~~wx~~ where he is...visiting her..

14.5 In. Samuel with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Samuel stood VRG up the last time they arranged to see one another. Samuel will come by VRG's now to see him.

14.7 In. Carmen with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Carmen just came in (to Mexico?). Would like to talk to VRG. Arrange for her to come by tomorrow morning, at 1000.

15.0 Out to 14-57-85. Hangs up.
Out to 14-57-89, twice. No rings, complete. VRG with Ramon (Sinovas?), who answers. Greetings. Asks when they will come over tomorrow. Asks if VRG has a short wave radio (to hear Fidel's speech?). Yes. VRG thought they could come over early and they can chat a little. Suggests they come around 1130. Fine, will come at 1130. Marta and Inge can chat. Has VRG read this afternoon's news? Not yet. "Ultimas Noticias" says a lot of blood is being shed in Dominican Republic. S. has hopes that tomorrow...inaudible. That would be good.

After 1900, 30 April

15.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, why he didn't submit his material. He is writing on Dominican affair and will turn it in on Monday. It would be stupid to write this without knowing what O.E.A. says. VRG told him (Pajes) he would turn it on Monday. He (Pajes) said no and if he did turn it in on Monday, it should only be one page. VRG will submit 10 cuartillas on Monday and they can publish this if they like. No one will work tomorrow

13.2 contd.
MO reads VRG Bosch's declarations - announced that the Fortaleza de Ozama, that is, the police! constituted a great victory!...manifested the fact that probably a few Communists are fighting for constitutional rights, but pointed out that these ~~x~~ forces were armed by the Army (?) and trained in the U.S. and not by the Communists. He assured that U.S. govt. and people that the forces were not being directed by "turbas" (Communists?). Bosch stated~~s~~ that it would be impossible to establish in the Dominican Republic a regime similar to the one in Cuba. He pointed out that had the Cubans done what the Dominicans are doing now, Fidel Castro would never have been converted into ...~~fmd~~ feudal lord (?) of the Cuban revolution... (MO comments - that this is terrible.) VRG asks what did MO expect from Bosch. Nothing from Bosch. He fell for some reason, MO says. VRG comments that least important thing is his stupidity, the worst part is his reactionary attitude.

Julian came by and wanted MO to go (somewhere), but MO told him (Julian) to tell this to Pajes so he would have some permission (to go). But didn't do anything...

MO suggests that VRG attack Bosch.

Pajes was in a bad mood. He did not even say hello to VRG. And turned his back on VRG when talking about Dominican Republic...VRG will write all necessary and Pajes can do what he likes.

After 1900, 30 April

16.7 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. About how everyone is... VRG fought with Pajes about turning his article in on Dominican Republic...

17.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. The PRI Convention approved by acclamation a protest against Dominican affair. How good! They are supporting the govt's (President's) attitude. Does not mention U.S. but talks about beginnings of PRI, Juarez, etc. ~~xxxxx~~ It was read by Senator ~~M~~ Bolaños Cacho. PRI can't be indifferent to problems, a danger of Dominican Republic's losing its liberty, the internal problem can't be resolved by foreign influence nor armed forces which converts into a factor which is against the will of the country. It is quite well done. A good protest.

Dominican Amb. has resigned his post. Can't consent to the fact that his country has been invaded.

VRG has a lot of things or rather a package for doña Aurora (MO's wife). Will take it by.

VRG went by to see Cocheli. VRG told him (C.) that he did not need to talk to Dominican exiles, that VRG can give him a copy of what they said.

MO would like to give this news to Julian, but doesn't know where to call him.

18.0 In. Inge Rico (v) answers. Operator speaks but she does not hear.

After 2130, 30 April

18.2 In. Wrong number.
In, twice. No answer.
In, 5 times. No answer, complete. VRG (v) answers. Long distance is calling. Habana, Cuba is calling.

22.5 Call goes through. MO identifies himself as Niña. Greetings. MO will send VRG some books on Sunday. However, they want to talk to him about another matter, but one moment.

Sr. Undora (?ph) takes the phone. News there in Habana mention ....Santo Domingo...VRG says nothing is known about this. They have heard that there have been 1,000 killed. There is nothing on cease fire. The PRI protested against the invasion into Santo Domingo today. MO says that they called from Santo Domingo that the people called the Cubans to try to achieve Cease Fire...? VRG will try to phone "him" (?) now. They are sending out special transmission...(Connection poor) VRG will phone now and then call MO back.

23.2 Out to ~~BRX~~ 25-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero.

Dr. Cordero takes the phone. Greetings. Habana just phoned and they are sending out a special transmission. They just received the news of Cease Fire and would like to know whether this is true or not. Asked VRG to call Santo Domingo to find out ~~th~~ whether it is true since they can't. Where can VRG call there? One moment. But give him a number of one that works (that is, a number of a Communist who will give them the picture)...Dr. C. suggests his wife's phone. Couldn't he give him another phone? No, does not have any phone there. Couldn't he let him know where VRG could locate Camagno. Dr. C's wife's phone is 9-66-02. And Tamagno (not Camagno)? Where could he be located? Or any other person who could give him a clear idea of the situation. Mejia would be a good person, but MO does not have his phone. Mejia phoned MO this morning. Doesn't anyone know his phone here? What is C's wife's name? Josefina de Cordero. Josefina Painado de Cordero. Would she know? Yes, she must know phone of Juan B. (Mejia) or the phone of Elsa Justo. VRG knows Elsa. Fine. Radio Habana called VRG and they are going to send out a special program. Would to check on Cease Fire. Bosch talked about this today. They have been working on this. An American Amb. has been dealing about this.

26.0 Out to 09. VRG with Long Distance. Requests a call to Santo Domingo. They have not had communication for 2 or 3 days. VRG says there has been constant communication there. He says he talked to Santo Domingo this afternoon. She checks and says it will be 3 or 4 weeks before there is communication. That is what the N.Y. operator says.

VRG asks to talk to Radio Habana in Cuba. With Orlando ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Fundora (not Undora). MO says Habana is calling VRG right now. Fine. Call goes through.

VRG with Fundora. VRG called and was told he could talk in 2 or 3 weeks. They can't call Santo Domingo....connection very bad... VRG can't hear...MO comes on line and explains that they can hear him in Habana. VRG repeats the matter of PRI. The PRI is having a National Assembly. They protested the invasion in Dominican Republic. About the call to Santo Domingo, it is via New York and the operator in N.Y. answered that communication has been suspended for 2 or 3 weeks. This is false because two friends of VRG, Dominicans, talked to people in Santo Domingo. VRG is going to call these friends to get them to call back. Then, VRG should report back in when he has news from Santo Domingo.

32.2 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero.

Sr. Cordero takes the phone. VRG just talked to Habana. Was told he could not talk to Santo Domingo. Habana asked VRG to try to talk to Santo Domingo. If Cordero was able to talk to his wife, VRG

32.2 contd.
would like Cordero to call for him. C. has a call in. He placed his call last Saturday and they gave him his call yesterday. C. placed another call today and he was told they could put his call through on 4 May. There are thousands of calls. Habana has heard about Cease Fire and they want to prove whether this is true or not. Santo Domingo can call here easily. They could send a cable to C's wife and have her call. They could have Radio Habana broadcast for them to call Dr. Cordero here in Mexico. That is dangerous. Or they could say for Santo Domingo to call VRC. The easiest thing would be to send a cable. Yes, but this is very urgent. Could have Radio Habana ask Elsa to phone him. Or just say - anyone to call him. Juan B. could hear this. VRC will do this. MO will phone VRC tomorrow.

33.5 Out to 09, twice. VRG requests a long distance call to Habana, Cuba...reel runs out...

On dial tape, but not recorded:
MXXXMX
In.
Out to 09.
In.

Reel off at RT 33.7, 0700, 30 April 1965

From 0700 to 2330, 1 May (Saturday) 1965

2.0 Out to 23-88-20. Sra. Diener asks Josefina (maid), who answers, if the young girl is up yet. Thinks no.
Out to 23-88-20. Busy.

2.2 In. Rosita with Sra. Diener, who answers. Sra. D. phoned Rosita. Asks if she has heard anything from young man (husband). Yes, he called last night. Had not phoned for a week but he had been in small towns and could not phone. Sra. D. said that phone rang a lot from 2330 to 0100 and she was somewhat worried...Max is Rosita's husband...

3.0 Out to 03. Time is 0940 (1 May).
After 1115, 1 May

3.2 Out to 13-91-27. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) with MO, who answers. Greetings...How did things go there (in Cuba)? Fine. VRG needs to see MO. Arrange to get together tomorrow afternoon. VRG will phone MO tomorrow to set time. May go by MO's. MO has been working with, apple polishing Madrazo. Alberto Domingo reprimanded MO and MO replied that this is just exactly what AD with Alvarez Amezquita.

4.5 Out to 03. Time is 1145, 1 May.

4.7 Out to 39-32-48. VRG asks for Sr. Luis Lizaldi. He does not live there. Will he go by there today? Not sure. If he goes by, what time would he come? Not sure. He may come but since his mother is not there (in town), he may not come.

5.0 Out to 45-40-04. Sra. Rico asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Has gone to market (with wife). Ask him to phone her at his brother's house.

5.2 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. How did VRG arrange things last night? Nothing, VRG could not talk. C VRG cursed the N.Y. operator because she said that the press calls had preference when they originated in U.S. VRG could not talk to Radio Habana because Habana line went out. What did Juan B. say? Didn't C. says that Juan B. talk to Marcio? No, talked to Cordero. Juan B. Mejia, a member of the Party. VRG knows him. He said that the fight was continuing and wanted them to make a campaign of protest against what they are saying- that the Dominican movement is Communist, that they are attacking the Embassies, that there is absolute order in the capital, that is, within combat. They are not sacking house or attacking Embassies. He said there was more ~~xx~~ order there than in the Trujillo ~~x~~ rebellion. MO asked what control they had on the situation and he replied they had a lot.

Marcio talked to Bosch and will put Marcio on with VRG.

There was a Cease Fire, but they have not respected the Cease Fire of O.E.A. There has been combat with the U.S. troops. Who gave this out? UP cable. No, AP cable. There are some Americans dead. VRG says - How good! There are 3 dead, 24 wounded and 3 in coma. VRG says that one should say - as Cocholi said in an article - Blood has run. Yankee blood, but blood anyway.

14-00000

5.2 contd.
VRG asks if Juan B. did not mention about the ones who have left (the group)? No. MO asked for companions and Juan B. said there were a lot of disappeared. Two or three members of the Committee have disappeared. They may be dead or ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ went to the hills (left or really went to the hills). The campaign of UP must be combatted. VRG will call Habana today. The civilian people are patrolling the streets. They are maintaining a order. There is combat, of course, but where there is no combat, everything is in order. The movement wants this campaign that they are using Czech arms to be clarified - that it is not true.

VRG and MO could get together tonight. Dominicans are having a meeting tonight around 2000. VRGand MO could get together a little before. About the matter MO took by to VRG. Yes, and other things which VRG wants to get MO help to establish. Then, about 1700? No, best at 1800. MO will come by at 1800 - with his friends. All right.

Marcio (Mejia Ricart) with VRG. What did Bosch say? Said there was complete calm and there was no doubt of control, that they were still ~~dxxxxxxing~~ distributing arms. MMR saw that Bosch was more interested in talking than 3 days ago when MMR talked to him. Bosch said that of the 30 tanks, there are ~~9~~ only 9 left. They (Bosch people) have 11 and 10 are out of combat. No one has published this, at least MMR has not seen this. Bosch said that yesterday morning they conquered Fortalez Isama where there were several hundreds of dead, but they had taken it, and there is a cable stating that everyone there was shot. They are still picking up political leaders in city. The National Polic has not come over to Bosch yet. The U.S. troops are now entering into action. Of course, if they disembarked in San Isidro, it was to enter into action. Bosch said that things are being arranged (between them and U.S.) but the conditions right now contain immediate evacuation of the (U.S.) troops.

7.5 Out to 09. VRG with long distance. VRG has a call to report in for Radio Habana, Cuba. The call is from Director or Sub-Director of Radio Habana.

8.0 Out to14-37-89, twice. No rings,complete. Marta Sinoves with maid, Consuelo, who answers. Children will have lunch there. Marta and Ramon will have lunch here and are at 23-07-7?. In case they call from theEmbassy or the Cuban woman who visited them last night.
After 1330, 1 May
8.2 Out to 43-40-04. Sra. Rico asks MO, who answers, for el Sr.
MO takes the phone. (MO is Fernando.) Greetings...about Anita's child...children...

10.0 In. Operator tells VRG they will put his call through in a moment.

In. Operator asks if VRG will be in because Sr. is not in. VRG will be at home.

10.5 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings.
VRG takes the phone. Greetings. What is the news? The marines have entered into action. They have killed some (marines) which, VRG comments, is very good. About political aspect, the condition of Bosch is withdrawal of troops. They talked to Bosch yesterday and this was

10.5 contd.
his reply. He appears to be a little more radical than a few days ago, but "this is an observation of your friend, Marcio, which does not inspire much confidence in me. He taked to him (Bosch)." Miric has know him (Marcio Mejia Ricart) a year (and is not inspired much by MMR either).

Will VRG working this afternoon? No, VRG has to go out. They can talk in case there is any news. Before VRG goes out, VRG will call Miric. Fine.

11.0 In. Habana is calling VRG. Inge Rico (v) answers.
VRG takes the phone. Talks to Fundora. One of the National Directors of the Movimiento 14 de Junio called Mexico called Mexico. This is Juan B. Mejia. He said that it is very important that they point out that the calumnies being circulated are lies - that they are attacking embassies. There is absolute order in the city. The armed civilians are patrolling the streets. There is no sacking. They are still distributing arms, that they have absolute control of city and there are 2 or 3 points of enemy resistance. The police is holed up and has not surrended. They don't dare go out of their quarters either and it is now only a matter of time that they surrender. ...call is interrupted because VRG can't hear...VRG asks operator to check another line. There is only one. Line has apparently gone out (to Habana). Operator will call VRG back.

13.2 Out to 46-60-15. VRG with MO, who answers, for Jardon. Won't be in today. MO is Toñio. Radio Habana called VRG last night to see if VRG could talk to Santo Domingo. VRG got some direct information there. VRG did not talk directly, but indirectly. VRG was trying to give information to Habana, but line is bad and could only send a small part. Asks MO if he could send a message via N.Y., urgent, to Prensa Latina for Radio Habana. The only contact they have now is via Mexico. The teletype of Prensa Latina is out of order. They are calling MO's office so MO can send data via Dppt. of Communications. This is time consuming. It does go out today, but not right away. VRG will see if the line gets better. Will call MO later if he needs this way to send information. Habana needs this information urgently.

14.0 In. Operator tells Inge Rico (v) that Habana call is ready.
VRG takes the phone. Call goes through. About the 30 tanks Bossing had, 9 are out of combat, 10 are in the hands of Wessing and 11 in the hands of constitutionalists. There are series of Directors of 14 de Junio Movement that Juan B. Mejia states have disappeared, but there are a lot of people in the hills. Juan Mejia is in Santo Domingo but other Directors are not there..some of the others. Wessing retired to San Isidro but marines have entered into action and there are several dead. Marines have not respected Cease Fire. Have killed some constitutionalists, but also some marines have died. There is a Cease Fire of O.E.A, but has not been respected. VRG tells Fundora to underline the fact that there is complete order in Santo Domingo, that it is a lie that they have attacked Embassies and U.S. Embassy, that they are still distributing arms, that there are 2 or 3 points in city where they are still fighting, but rest of city in power of constitutionalists who are maintaining complete order...Bosch called

14.0 contd.
a Dominican here yesterday and he is insisting on immediate withdrawal of (U.S.) troops (for negotiations). Juan B. also said that it is not true that the Americans have taken in medicine, etc. Absolute lie. VRG will call F. when he knows more news.

After 1535, 1 May 1965

17.2 In. Charo (ph) (woman) with Inge (Rico), who answers. Greetings...about maids...Inge asks how Sandino is. Fine. WO says they were with the Cardoso last night and Lia (Cardoso) had said that Inge was going to call her. Inge got a second maid yesterday.
WO asks about Inge's visa. Nothing, has done nothing. Has her time limit run out? Inge is not sure. She has to go see about this. Perhaps it is possible in October.
Invites them tomorrow afternoon - around 1600 - to have coffee. Fine.

18.2 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero. Not there.

18.5 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. VRG has a family problem and has to go out. Leave their appt. for another day. VRG will call him. If Cordero hears anything, let VRG know. VRG has notified the other to Habana. There was a report that some parachute troops went in. Yes, but that was given out by news agencies. No, VRG is referring to direct calls. Cordero is going to call New York and also Washington tonight. If there is anything interesting, let VRG know. VRG will be at home tonight.

18.5 In. Josefina asks VRG, who answers, for Inge.
Inge Rico takes phone. Asks how things went in Cuba. Fine. They were there 2 weeks. About how J-sefina is...chidren...sickness...

19.2 In. Habana is calling VRG.
VRG comes to the phone. WO asks what is new. Nothing. There is a call to go through to Bosch tonight and another one for Santo Domingo, but VRG will call when he has something new. WO is Dinas. When will Fidel talk? Around 1900, Habana time. WO asks VRG to repeat what he said this morning so th can record it. VRG repeats again - about Juan B. Mejia's call from Santo Domingo....Mejia could not give details on who was in the hills, etc. Could not give names.

After 1755, 1 May

21.5 In. VRG with Inge, who answers. Asks if (something) has begun. One moment, she will see. No, they playing "Mozambique." That means that Fidel will begin (to speak).

Lina
23.0 In. ~~XXXXX~~with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings...How was party? Fine. Inge rested. It would be good if they could get together Irina says they may go by there or if not, WO will come by tomorrow. Asks how Julian is. Fine. (Cubans...)

23.5 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Maid takes the phone. WO is Enriqueta...WO was in bed...about how she is...her boyfriend...

1 May 1965

After 2135, 1 May

23.7 Out to 25-80-32, WI (Cuban) asks WO, who answers for Sr. Cordero. Not there, then says one moment. But hangs up. WI holds phone.

24.0 Out to 25-80-32. WI asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Cordero. Not there. But he can be located at 39-07-51.

24.7 Out to 39-07-51. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero. Emilio Cordero.

EC takes the phone. Did EC hear Fidel? Yes, VRG says they are in the center of history. How did he like it? Wonderful. The first two hours were dedicated to Dominican situation. He made a correct analysis of Dominican situation, who Bosch is, etc. And at the end, he gave out his philosophy.

VRG talked to Radio Habana twice. EC was just hearing over Radio Habana what Juan B. Mejia stated. And Habana had called Cordero, but there is no line now to Habana. In case EC talks to his wife or Marcio (Mejia Ricart) talks to Bosch, VRG would like to be there. MO thinks Marcio will talk to Bosch. Can VRG talk to him? Yes. And perhaps EC can inform VRG immediately about whatever EC's wife informs him - at whatever time it is. In case anyone calls EC, be it his wife, Juan B., or another member of the Party, he will let VRG know. In case he talks to Juan B., give him VRG's phone so they can phone VRG. Or give VRG's number to any other member (of Party) who calls because VRG is turning over information directly (to Habana). They are very interested.

Marcio Mejia Ricart takes the phone. MMR has not heard all Fidel's speech. Will MMR talk to Bosch? Yes, at 2230, in an hour. Will call from where he is. Could VRG go there so VRG could be there - so MMR can ask him a couple of questions. Fine. Where is MMR? He is at Zempoala 533, between Pilares and Cuicuilco. Explains where this is located. This is a house, not an apartment. VRG will go by there.

Reel off at RT 27.2, 2230, 1 May 1965

From 2230, 1 May (Saturday) to 0845, 2 Mary 1965

2.0 Out to 09. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) with long distance operator. VRG has been reporting in from the phone of a friend's house, but he is now at home. As soon as they have communication to Cuba, call him here. With Sr. Orlando Fundora or with Sr. Viñas, Radio Habana.

3.7 In, from long distance. They still don't have communication with Cuba. Will he continue to wait? Yes.

4.0 In, from long distance. Asks with whom VRG wants to talk to in Cuba? With Fundora or Viñas? Yes. VRG takes the phone. Says there is no one by the name of Fundora or Viñas inRadio Habana. Of course, they are the Director and Sub-Director of Radio Habana.

Finally gets through to Fundora. VRG says that they talked to Bosch last night - at 2330. VRG couldn't call him because line was out to Cuba. Bosch made sensational declarations. MO will record it.

They change phones. They asked Bosch what his opinion was of the O.E.A. Commission. VRG did not talk, but a Dominican friend talked to Bosch. However, theyrecorded the conversation. Bosch said some important things. This friend asked Bosch what he thought of OEA Commision. Bosch said that O.E.A. and nothing are the same thing. Who talked to Bosch. Marcio Mejia Ricart. They then asked Bosch if they the U.S. marines had occupied the city. He said they had and they had gotten as far as Avenida Mella, near downtown area, but that the armed civilions forced them back until Avenida Maximo Gomez, about 3-1/2 kilometers back. Ave. Maximo Gomez is what one might call their combat line since it is the zone where the U.S. Embassy is. So, they made them return to their original ~~pax~~ positions. This took place yesterday afternoon. But the most important thing - they asked Bosch what political solution Bosch saw. He answered "textually - 'It appears that in Washington they are thinking of converting Santo Domingo ina Fideicomiso.' Then he commented ironically, so "we get out of colonialism into independence." VRG says that this is of course very grave. As F. knows there are 2 or 3 left in the world - of Fideicomisos - in Southern Africa. This would be unprecedented case - that they convert an independent country into a country under Fideicomiso (Protectorates). When Mejia Ricart asked if they (U.S.) want to convert "us into a colony." Bosch replied that - Yes, into a colony but with 23,000 armed men. Civilians, of course. Bosch further said that "what the people had done was something extraodinary and that he had complete faither in the people." B. did not want to say anything to provoke the uprising of the people because he (Bosch) is out of the country "and from outside, this is a comfortable role. If I were inside I would take up the responsibilites."

VRG had to pay the call since Fundora did not call him. VRG will be ruined this, so Fundora should have a call always in for VRG.

VRG will let him know when he has anything new.

F. asks what the situation is inside Dominican Republic. There is nothing new. They are expecting a call from Dominican Republic today. VRG may have something in 2 hours. In this case, VRG will call. F. will then call VRG back at 2300, Habana time, or 2200, Mexico time. (Or 0900, 1000 hours).

From 0845 to 1250, 2 May (Sunday) 1965

13.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG.

13.2 contd.
VRG takes the phone, but gets no reply.

13.2 In. Operator says that VRG talked 7 minutes to Cuba.

13.5 In. Operator asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. VRG takes the phone. Call goes through. Fundora asks if there is anything new. No, not yet, but expects to have something in about an hour - between 1130 and 1200. All right.

14.0 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. VRG finally talked to Habana. Cordero talked to Juan Pedro Domingo and C. gave him VRG's phone. He will phone VRG. Fine. C. has the notes written down. Can read them to VRG. Call back in 5 minutes so VRG can have paper and pencil.

14.2 In. Cordero with VRG, who answers. C. tells VRG to put his recorder on to take note of what was said. VRG was doing that.

C. says: At 0915 Juan B. Mejia, member of Provisional Executive Central Committee of the Political Group 14 de Julio called Cordero from Santo Domingo and informed the following:

The Yankees are bombing and machine gunning the city. (VRG asks if they are bombing with airplanes. He did not tell C.) Could be artillery, perhaps naval. They have launched their tanks and marins against the people. A revolutionary order reigns in the entire city. Yesterday, 1 May, the Yankees opened some stores in the downtown and called the people to sack them. The people refused to do so. They then looked for prostitutes and filmed them sacking the stores. The interest is to show to international public opinion that chaos reigns in the country to be able to justify their open-faced and unjustified military intervention. That is, the people refused to enter into this propaganda because they had the cameras ready. They only got prostitutes and trash like that. They will publish this in the newspapers. The armed people are willing to resist the Yankee invasion and to conserve their sovereignty and independence. The struggle between the U.S. forces and constitutionalists has ceased. All the forces of people are concentrating in fighting the Yankee invader. There is a need to awaken the Mexican public opinion. MO wants VRG to help him in this. Of course. So, they (Mexicans) can send cables, etc. to United Nations for their tomorrow meeting on the Dominican Republic. They want pressure so that the United Nations and not the O.E.A. which combats the intervention. The combat with the Yankees is violent in different sectors of the city. The transmission sent out yesterday and today from Radio Habana mention him (Mejia) as member of the group did him a lot of damage. The reaction in Santo Domingo has been taken to point up and to be used as a Communist factor of their fight - as a result of the broadcast of Radio Habana. Mejia told C. that he was going to call VRG to clarify this with VRG because this is very delicate. VRG will communicate this right now to Radio Habana. Mejia further said: They should stop making such indications, like, Juan B. Mejia of 14 de Julio says...The Radio Habana said that this was an interview (of Mejia) with VRG. Another point - Should deny that they have a hideout in the mountains as informed by Radio Habana. This does a lot of damage. MO told Mejia about Bosch's conv - about the U.S. wanting Dominican Rep. in Fideicomiso

14.2 contd.
(Protectorate). Mejia said that they fight to the last man against this. Mejia will phone VRG. It is extremely important that Radio Habana deny that Mejia is involved in ~~this~~, as well as the name of the group (which is Communist). Can give this as source of someone inMexico. They should not mention names nor 14 de Julio nor Juan B. or anyone. This does a tremendous damage.

Didn't he say anything about the situation inside (country)? No, because their call was limited to 3 minutes.

Did Cordero see "Excelsior"? Yes. Did "that" come out? Yes, came out in headlines and has about 4 columns...reads it to VRG.. that is, the heading. VRGhas not received his paper yet.

VRG thinks they should wite up a bulletin for the newspapers. The Dominican exiles should sign it. In today's "El Dia," they give a lot of space to them (the exiles here who gave out declarations the other day). They mention all four. "El Dia" published about Bosch, a little mixed up by Marcio, but in general is good. Mentions their bulletin, etc.

VRG is going to call Habana right now. VRG will take the points off recorders and type them up and clarify them (about mentioning names) with Habana. VRG thinks that Mejia should write up a bulletin for newspapers - stating this is information received by relatives etc. over the phone. For Mexico press.

Mejia said that VRG can tell Habana that the only way the people in Dominican Republic now have a way of finding out about international situation is via Voice of America and Radio Habana. The enemies are using this propaganda of Radio Habana. They should deny about Mejia and about fighting outside. Fight is in the city. Don't mention the hills...

VRG is at home writing today. In case VRG has to go out, he will leave phone where he is. Mejia might phone VRG today at noon. Should have his recorder ready in case he calls. VRG has it ready. (MO is Emilio Cordero.)

17.0 In. WO with VRG, who answers..WO operator..inaudible...about his call to Habana (the price?).

17.2 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Casta takes the phone. WO is Santa...C. will get off today...

17.7 Out to 09. VRG with operator. Says he is reporting in for a call from Fundora of Radio Habana.

18.0 In. Person in Cuba is not in right now. They will call back a little later for VRG.

After 1050, 2 May

18.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Jovan (Miric), who answers. VRG tells Miric about Mejia's call - gives him data...as noted in previous conv....The news given out by Radio Habana (VRG interjects his note) that there are guerrillas in the mountains is not true. This has been denied by 14 de July Group. Radio Habana said that one of the Directors of 14 de July Group talked to VRG and said this and 14 de July Group has denied this.

Miric asks about yesterday's speech (Fidel's speech). Supposes that he should call "Prensa Latina." VRGheard the speech. It was

18.2 contd.
very important, VRG says. Call Jardon for the speech.

About the matter of Bosch, which VRG gave Miric yesterday, it has been published today - textually by Deschamps.

How does VRG see things of O.E.A? Very grave. Did Miric read Chile's position? Yes. That is the correct one. They are proceeding as if there was no occupation. O.E.A. can discuss a lot, (but do nothing). O.E.A. is nothing, as Bosch says.

Call VRG in case Miric hears anything. Miric won't have anything as direct as VRG. Yes, but Miric has more time to listen to the Voice of U.S. Yes, Miric is listening. VRG has a call pending from Habana and is expecting a call from Santo Domingo. Habana is calling for info from VRG. Yes, but they should not do foolish things (mention things). The foolish thing was what VRG did - gave them the names. He gave these to them so they would know them, not to use them. They appear not to have heard Fidel's speech yesterday which was very clear on this.

About the fighting, attacks on U.S. Embassies, public protests, etc. - all public protests. Yes, but Johnson is still spitting on the floor and kicking, VRG says.

Miric is writing a commentary on the political implications, what this signifies in the Dominican Republic and all of America.

Miric says about the other source - the one above (U.S.) - start broadcasting after 1700.

When VRG hears from Dominica Republic, VRG will let Miric know.

22.2 Out to 03. Time is 1111, 2 May.

22.5 Out to 46-60-13. VRG with Edmundo, who answers. Asks if he has Fidel's speech. Yes. Could he send it to VRG? They are typing it now. It is long. When will he have it? Should take all morning and part of the afternoon.

Asks if MO is going to the meeting today. Yes. There is an urgent message from Dominican Republic...VRG gave Radio Habana some information - as he got it from Dominican Republic. However, they transmitted it with names and said that there were guerrillas of 14 de Junio group in the mountains. They said this is doing a lot of harm. Asks MO to send a cable that 14 de Junio Movement denied that there are guerrillas...Say that in enthusiasm this was a mistake. This is very urgent. Also advise Radio Habana to suspend all mention to 14 de Junio, of Juan B. Mejia and Victor Rico Galan. And to call MO.

23.2 In. Long distance operator with VRG who answers. Call goes through. VRG with Fundora, Juan B. Mejia called from Santo Domingo - called another Dominican here and asked them to suspend the transmissions mention of Mejia and Rico Galan. This is doing a lot of damage. Their line is the Constitutionalism and no mention should be made of 14 de Junio (Communist movement). Also 14 de Junio Movement officially denies that there are guerrillas. They have to deny this. Reaction s uses all these things to say that this a Castrist subversion. The ~~xxxSireax~~ people only get information from Radio Habana and ~~thruw~~ these things against them and name of Mejia is dynamite.

VRG gives the information give to him by Cordero to Fundora... as previously set out. MO can say that information came from a Constitutionalist Director to Dominican exiles in Mexico.

23.2 contd.
Juan B. Mejia is going to call VRG later and will give him further information on situation inside Dominican Republic. Calls are limited to 2minutes and this is why info is not complete.

Did MO hear the news that Mexico - Chancellor Carrillo Flores denied the fact that the Mexican Embassy had been attacked in Santo Domingo. MO should have this from Pensa Latina.

VRG will have more info later, but not sure when.
Asks if they hear Radio Habana well. Yes, they hear it well in Santo Domingo and that is the only information they have frm the outside.

Put a call in for VRG so VRG can report in when he has info.

26.7 In. Charo asks VRG, who answers, for Inge(bord) Rico. Asks how Sandino. Fine. They will see one another this afternoon. Sodi is going with Carlos. Fine. When they are with Carlos, Charo will also take her mother. The women can stay in the garden and men can chat. Fine.

27.2 In. ERG (v) answers too late.
After 1200, 2 May 1965
27.5 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. She called, but he did not get to phone in time...VRG has direct news from Santo Domingo. He tells her about their having called from Santo Domingo - reads what the U.S. is doing there...She says that he has a lot of important news. He said he did not sleep last night. There was a ~~speech~~ call last night from Bosch...It is published today in "Excelsior." VRG heard Fidel's speech. Sra. Rico did not hear it.

28.0 Out to 23-88-20. Sra. Diener (v) with WO, who answers. Asks for Sra. Rosa. Not there...

Reel off at RT 28.2, 1250, 2 May 1965

From 1350, 2 May (Sunday) to 0620, 3 May 1965

2.0 Out to 31-06-06. Victor Rico Galan (v -VRG) with Miric ~~XXXXXXX XXXXXXX~~, who answers. VRG is not clear about something. VRG heard Fidel's speech yesterday. VRG wants ~~XX~~ to know: "Mexico established that at the latest May 10, ~~XXXXX~~ asks the Commission to submit to the meeting(members) a report on the progress of its works, includings its conclusions and recommendations which it considers appropriate, at the latest of 10 May of 1965 and decides to celebrate a session of the meeting (?) the 11th (of May)." Was this the plan of resolution? In the plan that Sinovas read there is no date mentioned. VRG says Mexico's proposal is dated, but on the other hand, an AP cable from Washington stated that the O.E.A. suspended ~~XXXX~~ its sessions indefinitely tonight. What VRG wants to know is whether Mexico's proposal was approved? No, it was not approved. It was stated that it would be taken into account and their next session would be scheduled after the Commission submits its report. But if the time limits set by Mexico is not approved, the Commission can extend this and give its report in a year. Yes, in 5 years, if they want. VRG was not clear on this. Everything was left open. There is no time period or any limit on the decision. The decision was to send this Commission, w ich Miric comments is very strangely made of (the members are strange).. VRG says it is a group of gorillas. Yes. When they submit their report they will see (what happens).

VRG is now writing and wanted to ask Miric about this.

2.2 In. Rosa with VRG, who answers. Sra. (Diener) called Rosa.
Sra. Diener takes the phone. Sra. D. had planned to go by Club to see if Sra. Walther is there. Sra. Walther took the magazine by when Rosa was not at home....It does not matter...They must have gone to club...About sending a machine with Sra. (somewhere)....

2.7 In. Miric (v) withVRG, who answers. Miric just heard the newscast. M. says there are over 9.000 soldiers there (in Dominican Republic) now. Troops continue to disembark. The actions of the civilians is ~~XXXXXX~~ practically finished, that is, that is official text. These troops are supposed to protect the O.E.A. Commission. The U.S. troops have taken over all the combat lines of Wessin, to continue the fight.

3.7 In. WO, calling for Elizondo, asks Inge, who answers, for VRG. Inge asks if this was Caro calling? Yes. Aren't they going over there? VRG said he would go by there at noontime. Did not mention it. Will put VRG on.

VRG takes the phone. Says he can't go because he is waiting on ~~a~~ a call from Santo Domingo. Radio Habana pulled a real boner. They made VRG their correspondent in this mess (of Dominican Republic). VRG has been without sleep for 2 nights. Can't call through the U.S. since they don't put his call through - since it goes through New York, so VRG has to wait on calls from there. Not a boner, but good. Yes, it is good. VRG has to write the editorial and article today too. They will see tomorrow at the office of "Siempre." Fine. WO is Toño.

2 May 1963

4.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO (very faint) with VRG, who answers. MO got a newspaper today from Cuba and there is a complete interview of VRG with Juan B. Mejia (as if he had). It is complete as VRG gave it to Radio Habana. Also a lot of other items. MO may be able to bring it by to VRG and leave it. It would be good since VRG has more news. It ~~wat~~ would be good if MO could come now. Will do. (MO isSinovas?).

4.7 In. Carlos with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Told Carlos to phone VRG on Sunday about that article. VRG has been calling long distace and not been sleeping - since Radio Habana has commissioned him for news on Dominican Republic. VRG is now waiting for an important call and VRG will have the complete info. VRG changed the idea of the article. What he can do is give Carlos a lot of data. He can come and will try not to take up too much of VRG's time. It is not important (his time). VRG is very interested in Carlos's publishing something on this (Dominican Republic) "there" (Italy?). Carlos wants to send his info tomorrow morning and have it come out day after tomorrow. VRG will call Carlos later on - when he has complete info. Will phone Carlos before 1900.

After 1450, 2 May

5.2 In. Irina with Ingebord Rico, who answers. Greetings... Asks if she can come by today. Yes. But come on time (for a class?). Fine.

5.5 In. Habana is calling VRG. Call goes through. MO (Pundora?) with VRG. MO is very faint. Asks if VRG has anything new. Nothing new yet. The last new was what he gave MO. ...MO is inaudible to monitor...VRG says - That is right. Don't mention Mejia nor 14 de June (not July). Everything is (done by) Constitutionalism. They should follow the lines as set out in Fidel's speech.

6.0 In. Marcio (Mejia Ricar~~d~~t) with VRG, who answers. They would like to come by for a moment since they have the bulletin for the press ready. Fine.

6.2 Out to 23-29-12. VRG with Juanito, who answers, for Sr. Carlos Cocholi (ph). Just went out. CC went by VRG's house - about 5 minutes ago. Should be there soon. Juanito is now in the Escuela de Teatro...gets out late. That is why they have not seen one another. ~~XXX~~ Will get together one night.

After 1700, 2 May

6.7 Out to 39-07-31. Ramon Emilio Colombo asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Anedo(?ph).

Sr. Anedo takes the phone. REC says that they are all at the house of VRG and asks if A. can come by. A. went by there and he did not see anyone or the car, then returned home. Will come by in 30 minutes because he has to go by the office (first). All right.

7.0 Out to 20-12-58. MI asks MO, who answers, for Sr. Riric. Thinks he is in Apt. 4. Hangs up.

7.2 Out to 31-06-06. Marcio Mejia Ricar~~d~~t with Riric, who answers. Asks Riric to come by VRG's house. Riric lives quite a

7.2 contd.
way from VRG and Miric uses the afternoon to write things. Mejia R. can give him the info on the phone. All right. The last time Miric talked to VRG was around 1130. Then, VRG gave him info on this morning's conv. Yes. Also Mejia R's talk yesterday with Bosch. Yes. Then, he has info. He can pick up their press communiqué at VRG's. It says about the same as VRG told him. Asks for Mejia's phone. Mejia does not have a home phone. The other day Miric could not locate Mejia's house. It is Valeriano Trujano 325. Explains where it is located.

8.2 Out to 25-06-46. Marcio Mejia Ricart asks WO, who answers, for K Kouckhorev (? Kouchorov - is way they pronounce it).

K. takes phone. Tells MO that he has a communique which is quite important (to K.). K. would like to see MMR. MMR will call K. later - when he has some free time - so they can get together. At what time? Moment.

Will call later. VRG is going out and MMR is leave VRG's. K. says he is going back home in about 30 minutes. He will be at home at 1800. Fine.

8.7 In. Miric with Inge (Rico), who answers. Greetings.

VRG takes the phone. They (Dominicans) left a communique, but it is the same thing that VRG gave Miric this morning. VRG sent them away because he has to do some writing. They (Dominicans) are making a call - especially to the Third World. It says: "We are calling desperately, in the name of the Dominican people, always willing to sacrifice, to all the peoples and lovers of peace in the world, to instruct their delegates in the United Nations to defend a sister country criminally aggravated. We call especially the non-alineated countries (countries not following U.S. lines) which have so many times have felt in their side the weight of the imperialist boot. We demand the fraternal support of the countries which create their own destiny under socialism - convinced that peace is for all and imperialism the common enemy. Imperialist aggression must be stopped in the agrieved Dominican people. It is signed by: Dr. Emilio Cordero Michel, Dr. Marcio Mejia Ricart, Ing. Leandro Guzman, Dr. Tobias Cabral Mejia and Ramon Emilio Colombo - in the name of the Dominican exiles in Mexico.

Has VRG had news from the North (U.S.)? No, has had people there. There is an evident effort, through the news they are emitting, to pacify Latin American. They are now speaking of naming a Provisional President. Also have said that Jose A. Mora has met with Wessin, after talking to rebel chiefs, to seek a formula, apparently they say, based on the proposals of the rebels. Miric comments that this is at least a confession (that they are in the right). Also it is said that an armistice, cease firing, has been achieved - between marines and rebels. They are trying to support the O.E.A. Commission. According to figures, all civilians have been evacuated. They are having a meeting this afternoon with their Ministers and Congress members. It was said that the meeting was not very urgent. Nothing was mentioned about the disembarkation of more marines and soldiers. And...ind. declared that the Dominican people should have opportunity to choose their destiny, political development, liberty, etc. Miric thinks this shows a aim to pacify Latin American.

8.7 contd.
VRG asks if there has been a declaration of the Mexican govt. today. Miric does not know, but will check. VRG has to go out right now and will check on this too late.
Marcio gave VRG some news, but VRG can't check it. The news is that the people of the O.E.A. (Commission) was surrounded by 250,000 people hollering (for rights). Yes, that came over the radio. This took place at the building where the Commission met with the Papal Nuncio. Fine.

23-02-41
11.0 Out to ~~25-06-46~~. MI with WO, who answers, for Sitio...for cab. XXXXX

11.5 In. Emilio Cordero with VRG, who answers. What is new? No. Did VRG call "our friends of last night." No, VRG did not call them. Which friends? The ones who went there last night. The correspondents? Yes. Marcio said he was going to take them that (communique). VRG called Miric, but had already given him ~~them~~ the information and also gave him the Call (for help). Miric said he would transmit this. EC heard Radio Habana and they transmitted the "other" correctly. They did not deny the other,
EC talked to Armedo. Said a friend of his called from Santo Domingo. They are looking for a provisional President. The Voice of U.S. stated this. They want a Provisional President to have someone with whom to talk. They talked to the Constitutionalist Directors and will now talk to Wessin - proposing the Constitutionalist conditions. Miric says that the Voice of U.S. is trying to calm the opinion of Latin American and Miric is a good observer. VRG thinks they (U.S.) will continue with occupation but they are trying to smooth things over. There should be no great change. Miric thinks there may be a big change but VRG says that MO knows how Yugoslavs think - they think that the words come out true. VRG thinks it may be possible for them to take (in) Bosch, but with occupation - to leave him tied up (by troops).
VRG says they (Here) don't have information on the world reaction (on Dominican Rep), but it must be very hard (against U.S.). VRG is going to call Jardon to find out what there is. Asks VRG to let him know. When he knows anything, will let him know.

46-00-1.
12.7 Out to 25-06-46. VRG with Yolanda, who answers "Prensa Latina." Asks what the world reaction is (on Dominican Republic). Especially on Latin America. Tell VRG the most important.
Not much today but there is quite a lot from yesterday. Did VRG get the bulletin? No. They did not distribute it, she then says. (Protests from) Cuba, Juventud de Cuba, Argentina...No manifestations or popular reactions? Moment.
Have not heard about bombs. Manifestations in ~~Guayana~~ Guiana, Chile, Buenos Aires. Call back later and she will ~~xx~~ give him more info. VRG is going to try to sleep a little and will see the bulletin tomorrow.

14.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Miric, who answers. VRG has nothing Probably have call from there (Dominican Republic) tomorrow. Miric says there is nothing on official declaration (of Mexico). Still thinks (US) is trying to pacify world...There is a mission of a certain special delegates from Washington in south. Yes, VRG was told that Harriman went to Colombia. There are others out too. And apparently none came

14-00000

14.2 contd
to Mexico.

Does Miric ~~as~~ have anything (reaction) from Europe? Nothing press-wise, but M. has the impression that there is reaction - also with Vietnam, perhaps less British press. Miric listend a little to Moscow radio - in Spanish. Say a lot of silly things. Bring out a lot of Socialist Popular Party...silly things. That is most stupid policy. VRG says that Radio Habana committed the same error (by pointing out the Communist Party as being active). Pointed out 14 de June (Party; VRG gave them the complete info but thought they were to filter it. Had to call them today to tell them about this. The U.S. efforts to pacify public opinion in south (South America) and there is a contrast... They say that there are about 58 communists and give their names, origin etc. over the radio. One is a Spaniard, one is a correspondent of "Prensa Latina" there (in Dominican Republic)...but AP says that there are 18,000 armed (people) - military and civilians. They will see the results of the O.E.A. Commission. VRG says they have ~~infxxxxxxx~~ to foresee things a little. Miric points out with the visit of this Commission is really an approval of the intervention.

VRG is in bed. Has not slept in 48 hours. Will try to sleep. Has to write early tomorrow.

Miric will hand in about 10 pages of cable text. He is working on this. He is including in this the commentary which Miric mentioned today - on political situations, the results, etc.

When can they talk tomorrow? VRG wants to exchange impression with Miric. VRG is going to "Siempre" early. Miric has some "second order" things to resolve early tomorrow, butwon't take long.

16.5 Out to 39-07-31. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero. Not there right now. Nothing urgent.

16.7 Out to 25-80-32. VRG with WO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero.

EC takes the phone. VRG says there is nothing on "Prensa Latina." They are beginning transmission and will have something later, but VRG is going to sleep now. Mostly because this call will probably come in early tomorrow.

VRG also talked to Miric again. He is going to send all his info out by cable (tonight) - 10 pages.

They will talk tomorrow. VRG says the Habana line is not working so can't pass any~~x~~ info that EC might give him (in case EC gets a call from Santo Domingo) until tomorrow.

Reel off at RT 18.2, 0620, 3 May 1965

From 0620, 3 May (Monday) to 0620, 4 May 1965

2.0 In. Long distance for Victor Rico Galan(VRG). Ingebord Rico (v) answers.

VRG comes to the phone. Call goes through with Pundora. VRG still has nothing. Expects (he) may call him early today and will call F. when he has something.

2.2 Out to 03. Time is 0821 (3 May).

2.5 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Corder.

BC takes the phone. Asks if EC has any news. No. No one phoned him. A friend of his was in contact with person in Santo Domingo - that Miraval's (?ph) were killed. It is said that the Commission does not know what to do. They are looking for Provisional President...But apparently the masses are demanding Bosch. They are still indecisive. There are now 14,000 men (armed) and VRG thinks there are more...(14,000 marines?). BC says they have ordered another 4,000 some odd (to enter). Bosch has given the insurrection as finished and that they should not fire against U.S. and that he (Bosch) did not think that U.S. had bad intentions. There are about 40 hurt among U.S. and about 4 or 5 dead...

VRG will call EC later from magazine office. VRG will also leave office number at home in case Juan B. (Mejia) phones him.

3.5 Out to 23-02-91. IRG (v) orders a cab.

3.7 Out to 34-88-63, three times. No rings, complete. Casta (maid) with MO, who answers, for MO's mother.

MO takes the phone...Maid says that Sra. does not give them enough food...also Sra. (Dioner) is very demanding...will leave in 15 days...

4.2 Out to 18-27-27. Maid asks for Antonio. Not there. Maid is Casta...

4.5 Out to 24-92-11. Maid asks for Anita. She is out now.

4.7 In. Wrong number. Maid answers.

5.0 In. Wrong number. Maid answers.

5.2 In. Victor Rico Galan (VRG) asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Out. Has anyone phoned him? No.

After 1100, 3 May 1965

5.5 Out to 47-55-20. Inge Rico orders gas...Contract 20870.

5.7 In. Sra. Rico with Inge Rico, who answers...Greetings... VRG is not there...children.

5.0 Out to 03. Time is 1210, 3 May.

5.2 Out to 11-07-75. Maid with WO, who answers, for Toribia... Not there...

5.5 Out to 24-92-11. Maid asks WO, who answers, for Anita.
Anita takes the phone. Maid inside is Casta...About not seeing her yesterday...what they did....about changing jobs...

After 1325, 3 May

8.0 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG.
Inge Rico takes the phone. VRG is not in.

8.2 In. MO, (identifying himself indistinctly) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Will be home for lunch. MO will call back later.

8.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG.
Inge. ~~XXX~~ takes the phone. About visiting Anita...children...

9.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO wants to see him. Will call back around 1700.

9.2 In. Carmen with Inge Rico, who answers. Asks for VRG. Not there. She had expected him for lunch (but did not come).

9.5 In. Irina with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings. Miguelito went out to play with his grandmother...Only Marta (other child) is there...VRG has been very busy.
What does Irina think about that situation (in Dominican Republic)? Terrible.
The speech (of Fidel) was very good. Inge agrees.

9.7 Out to 03. Time is 1608, 3 May.

10.0 In. MO (very faint) with Inge Rico, who answers. VRG has not come back. MO saw him at the magazine but when MO returned, VRG had left. (MO is Luis.) VRG was having coffee with Luis Gutierrez and others of magazine when MO left...He went somewhere to eat but IR does not know. VRG still has not had any news from Dominican Republic... Ask VRG to call MO when he comes in.

After 1710, 3 May

10.2 In. Long Distance (from Habana) is calling VRG. Call back in an hour.

10.5 In, from long distance. VRG is not there, but will be back in an hour. Inge Rico will have him report in.

10.7 Out to 19-93-28. Marcus asks maid, who answers, for ~~XXXX~~ Sra. Not there. ~~Xxxxx~~ is at house of Sra. Aguilar. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXX~~He has wrong number.

11.0 In. Alberto Domingo asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. AD wanted to ask VRG about the t.v. raffle...would like to know if it is going to take place or not. AD is leaving the house now. Has an appt. at 1800. Will phone back later.

11.2 Out to 42-14-65. Lidly Zahl (??very indistinct) with Alberto Domingo. MI says that the raffle will take place. MO just wanted to know. AD has the money(for some tickets). How many did AD sell? Around 26 - but is not sure. Between 25 and 30.

Marcue takes the phone. Did MO hand in his article? No, AD is not well. They need AD's article anyway. When can he take it? Tomorrow. All right.

12.2 Out to 35-36-52. Marcué with Fausto, who answers. Nothing new. Asks for Sra. (Marcué)? She is there. Asks if Pepe took the engravings (to be done).

Checks and says they took the engravings to shop and some others to "Mercurio." Marcue will be there in a little bit.

After 1750, 3 May

12.5 In. WO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for Casta.
Casta has gone out...will be back in 10 minutes.

12.7 In. ~~MO~~ Miric with maid, who answers. Miric thinks he has wrong number and hangs up.

13.0 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings. Asks for VRG. Not there. Has not come home. Then, Miric knows where he is. Because he phoned Miric around 1330. If Miric phones him, tell him there is a Habana call. He said that he would be home soon. IR does not know where he is. She told long distance to call back in an hour.

Several persons also came by to see VRG at home. If Miric locates him - Miric says there is no phone there (where VRG is), but VRG promised to call Miric.

13.2 In. Maria with Inge Rico, who answers. Maria is maid type... Asks why she left the way she did...about why she left...

14.2 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG. Not back yet. She will have VRG report in when he arrives.

14.5 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG. Hangs up after wait.

15.0 In, MO (Carmen?) asks Inge, who answers, for VRG. [illegible] Not in yet.

15.2 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for [illegible].

16.2 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not in yet. Miric is going to look for the phone number and see if he can locate VRG. M. knows where VRG is. VRG has not phoned in.

16.7 In. MO [illegible] with Inge, who answers, if that person called, [illegible] Not there. Tell VRG that he (MO) will be inside, not outside. All right. Didn't VRG come in? No. And VRG did not go there (with MO)? No. MO will be there until 2230 or 2300. Call Inge back by 2130 because "she should not call later than that." Fine. MO is Luis.

17.2. In. Luis with Inge Rico, who answers. "She" has not phoned. VRG is not home. Luis will call VRG tomorrow. Tell VRG that Luis will be at Biblioteca Mexico in "Ciudadela." They have some things to talk about. Fine.

Reel off at RT 17.5, 3 May 1965

From 0620, 4 May (Tuesday) to 0715, 5 May 1965

2.0 In, from long distance. Habana Cuba is calling. Maid answers. Call back in an hour. Holds the line while waiting for a reply....Finally hangs up.

2.5 In, from long distance. Maid answers. Habana is calling. Victor Rico Galan says for them to call back in an hour.

After 0835, 4 May

3.0 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers. MO asks when they returned (from Cuba). In Holy Week...They have some cigars. MO says they (family) are leaving tomorrow. Perhaps they can visit them this afternoon for coffee. MO is not sure he can come by their house. Best they visit MO's house. She will have VRG talk to MO about this. MO will be either at home or at Aspa (ph).

Asks if VRG can bring a copy of "Siempre" - the new issue to take on his trip. This issue is not out yet. It comes out on Wednesday so this is not possible.

4.2 In, from long distance. Habana is calling VRG.
VRG can't take the call...Call back in an hour. (He is asleep.)

4.5 In. WO, sister-in-law, with maid, who answers, for Inge Rico. Not there. WO is Rosa.

4.7 In. WO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Rico. Notthere. And VRG? He is asleep.

5.0 In. WO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. He is still asleep.

5.2 In. Carmen with Inge Rico (IR), who answers. Greetings.
VRG takes the phone. Asks if there is nothing. Yes, when will they see one another? VRGss should say. At 1200 in "Siempre."

5.5 One extension off...

5.7 In. Sra. Rico with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG got home very late yesterday...Anita is ill. Wants to ask VRG for some advice...

6.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. MO is Julian (Cuban). Puts on Mario with VRG. Greetings. Mario would like to see VRG. Mario is at Embassy, VRG will go by there in a little bit. Mario will wait for him. Mario has some books for VRG - sent by Sr. Viñas of Radio Habana. Fine.

6.2 In. MO, calling for Association of Students of Law School (of Natl. University), with VRG, who answers. They have set up some round tables (there) to explain the Caribbean situation to students. Would like to know if VRG could participate in this on Tuesday or Thursday of next week. All right, Tuesday of next week. MO will call VRG on Saturday to get exact time. Who will participate in these? They had planned VRG to participate with Alberto Domingo and with Enrique Soto Izquierdo. Fine. MO is Perales.

6.7 In, from long distance. VRG (v) answers, but operator does not speak. VRG hangs up.

In, from long distance. VRG (v) answers. Habana is calling. Call goes through.

VRG with Fundora. VRG has nothing. Has not been able to communicate with these people. That is why he did not phone Fundora. VRG expects some news today. Will call Fundora (when he does). Fine. ...something about bulletins..VRG says no (did not get them). Go to see Jardon (for them). VRG will do so.

7.2 Out to 43-52-81, twice. No rings, complete. Inge Rico asks MO, who answers, for Sra. (Rosa - sister-in-law).

Rosa takes the phone. Rosa phoned in the morning at 0900...

7.7 Out to 46-43-24. VRG with MO, who answers at "Siempre," for Georgina.

G. takes the phone. A Srita. will go by to see VRG at 1200. Ask her to wait for him. VRG will get there a little late, but he will go there.

8.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG orders a cab.

8.2 Out to 24-92-11, twice. Busy.

After 1240, 4 May 1965

8.5 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. He said he would be home for lunch, but late. Had several things to do. MO will call back later.

After 1420, 4 May

8.7 In. Sra. Torres ~~and~~ Altamirano asks IR (v), who answers, for Sra. Diener.

Sra. D. takes the phone. MO is mother of Sra. Torres Altamirano...won't take the class...

9.0 In, MO, calling for Ing. Marcue, with Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. Not there. Tell him that "Politica" called.

9.2 In, Irina asks maid, who answers, for Sra. IR.

IR takes the phone. Greetings. About going to see some dresses...

9.5 In. MO asks IR, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Did she tell VRG about his call this morning. Yes, but some people came by for him and he left in a hurry. She expects him for lunch. MO hopes to see him this afternoon. MO will be at home. She will tell him.

9.7 In. Miric with IR, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Will have VRG phone Miric.

10.0 Out to 24-74-33. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Capt. Tarasona (ph).

MO takes the phone. Greetings. MO says they are preparing to leave tomorrow. Would like to see VRG. VRG has a lot of work. Asks MO to come by. VRG does not have a car either. VRG has some cigars

10.0 contd.
for him. MO will eat and then go by. Will VRG be there? No, VRG has to go out. Will phone MO and try to get by MO's for 5 minutes.

10.2 In. Carmen with VRG, who answers. Carmen just left when VRG got there. Something uneppected came up and that is why he got there late. Asks her to phone him back because VRG still does not have news. He should have something around 1700. Will call him between 1700 and 1730.

10.7 Out to 25-80-32. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Dr. (Emilio) Cordero.

EC comes to the phone. Greetings. Is there any news? Nothing. No one has phoned. Juan B. has not called back. No. They only got 2 cables (? or sent 2 cables).

VRG thinks that it was a very intelligent thing to nominate Camagno as Provisional President. MO commented this last night with some friends (Dominicans) - mentioned that Camagno would be President. He is the only w one who can guarantee the U.S. although he has participated "with great nationalism." But he is a Friend (ind? - to U.S.). He is the only one who can guarantee a basis for the U.S. for negotiations. VRG xxxx agrees. And to resolve that situation (in Dominican Republic) which has world resonance.

There is one xxxx thing that EC does not like "about him" (Camagno) or "the father of his." VRG saw that. "That xxxxxxxx there are communists (there)...under his control." VRG of course does not like him because he is a military man. Yes, but he is only a Provisional President. Bosch does not say when he will return either. He should already be back there. (Wanted Bosch to come back and take over.) MO does not think that he (Camagno) will obtain their proposals. VRG does not think so either. Bosch' people may hand in arms voluntarily but the people of 14 (de Junio) and the E and CE - will have to kill them to take their arms away.

Radio Moscow was also saying a lot of silly things - in its Spanish transmission - that the "glorious PCP heads the xxxxxxxx Dominican masses". A lot of bull. MO says these are "comrades" but no PCP boys there... (That is - are 14 de Junio group). Radio Habana has corrected itself completely (about xxxxxx mentioning the communists heading this). Yes, and they even have a program for the Dominicans - news program.

Did VRG see "Time" magazine today? No. Buy it. It mentions 3 companions of the Committee of 14 de June. But not as members of the 14 de Junios group, but as Communist Directors - Jaime Duran, ...Johnson of the14th and...of the 14th...Then, it mentions Grubel, ah, Tomeija (ph). This one is member of PCP. Yes, VRG knows him. T. is one of the Directors. And Grubel also member of PCP who was also in Prague (??ind). VRG also knows him. There is a lot of news on Americans. Also has some photos. It is most reactionary....says some things - that they are sorry xx (that is, someone in Cuba) that the Cubans had crossed from Cuba in boats, etc...a lot of silly things... The pictures, however, are good. It says that there were 110 killed, but not true. VRG says that he is sorry it is not true.

EC is going to talk to Santo Domingo day after tomorrow on radio. MO is going to talk through a cousin of his (who also has short-wave radio)...Just have to know wave length, etc...

10.7 contd.

MO says that Santo Domingo has isolated. Miami refuses to put through calls from Santo Dominicans. They would not give VaG a call through either - that only U.S. press had preference. A Dominican wanted to call there yesterday and theytold him they were sorry, he heard Miami conv - that they could not put through any calls to Santo Domingo from Dominicans. This would be a good thing to inform Radio Habana...that they are not putting through calls.

Calls are coming ~~xxxxgx~~ through from Dominican Republic to Mexico. Amb.'s call also went through. MO thinks they can't call out unless they are known.

MO went by "Prensa Latina" to get press bulletins. Got the speech of ...(Castro). It is very good.

Dominican Amb. had said he would resign, but has not done so. Due to some "declarations published in 'La Extra'" is against U.S.... perhaps if he does not resign, theymight spread around that - in view of these declarations that this person is non-grata. It would be difficult. It can be done, but has to be handled correctly. When does MO think this can be done? When VaG wants. With his declaration. VaG is now going to write his column for "Diario de Mexico" - 20 Lineas. Could do this there. MOcan read the declaration to VaG. Moment.

Came out "La Extra," 2 May, Sunday, Amb. Dr. Jose Fernandez Camineros declared the following in relation to Wessin and Wessin - Referred military man is very popular among the people due to the fact that he is anti-Trujillista, the same consideration is hold by the leaders of the political parties such as PCP (of Bosch) and Partido Liberal Revolucionista. Wessin y Wessin was distinguished in 14 June 1959 during the massacre of the ...and (Paporgan). He even has a condecoration given to him by Trujillo called "La Orden de Constanza..." for his brillian military service during these 3 invasions. (So, this a.o.b. says that he is anti-Trujillista.)

VaG says Luis Suarez is going to Dominican Republic. "Siempre" is sending LS and Moya, a photographer. VaG thinks it would be good to hit this sob (the Amb.) tomorrow so they won't deny them their visa. As VaG thinks best. MO would like to see LS before he leaves. VaG is not sure they will go since there is apparently no way to get there. They could go via Kingstown. There are flights to Kingstown, but from Jamaica, one ~~xxx~~ would have to go in boat. He can rent a small plane in Jamaica for $200 or $300 dollars. They (this group here) had even thought about going this way. VaG will tell Luis about this. Before he goes, he will have to get names of contacts (from MO). Fine.

14.9 Out to 45-91-36. VaG asks WO, who answers, for Luis Suarez. Not there. WO is Pepita. LS was just left. Will he go (to Dominican Republic) or not? Not sure. Did he get the visa? They are doing this now. Tell him to call VaG. VaG has to explain how to get there since there are no normal flights.

15.2 Out to 45-91-36. VaG asks WO, who answers, for Ing. Elisondo. Not back yet.

15.5 Out to 29-22-12. MI, Luis Lisalde (ph), asks WO, who answers, for Ing. Elizondo.

Ing. Elizondo takes phone. Greetings. Did MI get "that"? Yes

15.5 contd.
Luis went to "International". Lic. Casco (ph) took very good care of him. And MO will go to see the apartments...
Puts on VRG with Elizondo. Asks what happened to what he asked E. to do. E. could not see "him." This is something very urgent. MO will see about this. Elizondo will call Monterrey to see if there is a friend who could pass something. No, one loaned from there. No, that is not possible. E. will arrange it if the can.
When will they see one another? VRG wants to go to say hello to Robles Martinez. Elizondo will tell him. Makes note of VRG's phone to let him know.

16.0 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG is tired... Is VRG members of Mexican Press Club? No, he is member of the Association of Newspapermen - of Mexican. There is a dinner tonight at club. Yes, but VRG can't go.
Is VRG is contact with Marcio and others? Yes, but there is nothing new. Yugoslavian Govt. made a declaration today - condemning the intervention and supporting Bosch's democratic movement. Miric got this on telephone conv...They also congratulated Miric on what he sent in. That this also helped a lot for them to form an attitud The text has been transmitted Tranjuc, but they did not pick it up today May sent it via Informex. In case VRG talks to Dominican exiles, tell them.
They will get together tomorrow.

17.0 In. WO (Carmen) with VRG who answers. Tells her to come by here. All right. She won't take long? No.

17.2 In. MO asks VRG, who answers, for maid, Casta.
Casta takes the phone. About coming to see her today...

17.5 Out to 25-71-84. Luis Lizalde (ph) with Lupita, who answers. Asks if [illegible] is there. Yes. Wants Auja (??)
WO takes the phone. Asks MO to pay the ticket he owes LL. Where can LL get two beds- very cheap...factories...have to see about this...

18.0 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings.
VRG takes the phone. VRG explains how he should get from Kingstown. There are flights...MO (Luis Suarez) is at Tourist Agency... If there are no flights, rent a private airplane...VRG has to go out right now. Couldn't VRG go by his house? Yes, but later tonight. About hotel there - Stay at Emperador. Everything is expensive in Santo Domingo. VRG will phone MO later.
Emilio wants to see Luis. Luis should ~~g~~ talk to him. Luis is going home now.
About the tickets for raffle...he ~~sells~~ has sold (these). LS wants to talk to VRG and thinks it is not necessary to talk to anyone else. Since VRG has been in Dominican Rep. he can give LS info.

19.2 Out to 23-80-32. VRG asks WO, who answers, for Dr. Cordero.
Emilio Cordero takes the phone. Luis Suarez does not want to see Cordero. Did not say why - but VRG thinks he is afraid. VRG thinks he is not interested in contacts. VRG thinks he is going to try

19.2 contd.
to see Camagno. Doesn't want to get mixed up in much. VRG is going to try to get him interested (in seeing Cordero's contacts). Will visit Cordero. C's address is Ixtlaccihuatl 6-204. VRG will visit Cordero around 2030. VRG will get the data and then visit Suarez to give them to him. E. C. will make up a list with addresses. Fine, give him all he can.

After 1910, 4 May

20.5 Out to 25-80-32, twice. Busy, complete. VRG asks for Dr. Cordero.

Emilio Cordero takes the phone. VRG has had a problem come up. Has to wait here at home. Won't have time. VRG will go to see photographer whom VRG trusts more (in leftist). Would like EC to come by VRG's house. VRG expects to have a car later on and could EC back home.

21.2 In. Emilio Cordero with VRG, who answers. ~~XXE~~ EC can't go to see VRG because EC has to go to Gobernacion. An Inspector came byand asked EC to go with him - that Sr. Ochoa wanted to see him. Will send this (list) with a friend, but VRG should bring him back, so get a taxi.

21.5 Out to ~~XXXXXXX~~ 24-74-33. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Capt. Tarasona (ph).

T. takes the phone. VRG is going there now.

~~2bcZ~~ After 2135

From 0715 to 1325, 5 May (Wednesday) 1965

22.0 In. WO asks maid, who answers, for Sra. Pili (Diner).
Inge Rico takes the phone. WO is Sra. Sayev (ph).
Sra. Diener takes the phone. About WO's trip...was ill...

22.7 In. Alan Howard asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Call back in 15 minutes.

23.0 In. Alan Howard with VRG, who answers. What is new? Sad and a little ashamed. Asks if VRG is very busy today. Yes, today. Has VRG heard anything from there? No, not yet, but expects to hear at the end of this week. Fine.

23.2 In. MO with VRG, who answers. Greetings. Asks if VRG is going out now. In a little bit. MO had thought about going by for a moment. Fine. (MO is Julian??)

After 1110, 5 May

23.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, for VRG. Not there. Sra. IR is also out.

23.7 Out to 18-27-23. Hangs up.

24.0 Out to 03. Time is 1225, 5 May.

24.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO is Otomi Llanas (ph).

5 May 1965

24.5 In. Sra. Rico with Sra. Diener, who answers, for VKG. Not there. Sra. IR is not there either...about children....

Reel off at RT 25.0, 1325, 5 May 1965

From 1325, 5 May (Wednesday) to 0625, 6 May 1965

2.0 In. Wrong number.

2.2 In. Sra. Rico with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. Greetings...about how everyone is...

2.5 In. WO asks VRG, who answers, for Sra. Diener. Joyeria Porra (??) is calling.
Inge Rico takes the phone...about price for repairing a clock...

2.7 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab.

3.0 In. WO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. WO has the documents, the data, she offered to give VRG. IR will tell him. WO is Carmen.

3.2 In. Sr. Valentin (Soviet) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there.

3.5 In. Miric (v) with VRG, who answers. Greetings... How does VRG see the problem? VRG does not think they (U.S.) will leave there (Dominican Republic). Miric thinks this is going to be a long-term think. Will O.E.A. approve the force there? Yes, Miric says, they have the majority of votes. Since Dominican Republic does not vote...Nothing can be done. VRG thinks that the Dominicans are handling things well. Miric thinks that this Cease Fire is dangerous. Things quiet down ..a coup d'etat can take place....
Miric is going to be very busy with CEPAL meeting taking place starting tomorrow. Miric will be out nearly all day. They have inauguration tomorrow at Seguro Social and plenary sessions will take place in theater of Banco de Ahorro Nacional on Reforma. One can get accredited to go into sessions. If he is not accredited, can get materials. Perhaps Miric can inform him where this is tomorrow. Where will VRG be at noontime tomorrow? At home. Miric will call VRG after inauguration tomorrow morning at "Siempre." Fine.

Reel off at RT 4.7, 0625, 6 May 1965

From 0625, 6 May(Thursday) to 0620, 7 May 1965

2.0 Out to 03. Time is 0627 (6 May).
or perhaps Gil)

2.2 In. Fil (ph - Phil) with Victor Rico Galan (VRG), who answers. When will they see one another? VRG thinks tomorrow. VRG is very busy "with this matter" (of Dominican Republic).

2.5 In. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG.
VRG takes the phone. Greetings..About everyone...Everyone is fine.

2.7 Out to 23-07-16, six times. Busy.

3.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab. None now.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab.

3.2 Out to 20-07-77. Josefina, maid, with maid outside, who answers...about one Roma who went to hometown...seeing one another...

6.0 Out to 11-07-75. Maid with WO, who answers, for Toribia. Went out...

6.2 Out to 24-93-11. WI asks WO, who answers, for Anita.
Anita takes the phone. About what WO is doing...fixing lunch...WI has finished...about when she gets off...

After 1220, 6 May

7.2 Out to 11-07-75. WI asks WO, who answers, for Toribia. WO is Toribia...maids...about what WO did on Monday...

10.0 Out to 23-07-16. Inge Rico orders some medicine...

10.2 In. Silvio (?) asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not in. Should be in around 1430 or 1500.

10.5 In. Gabriel Pereira (ph) asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Not there.

10.7 In. Miric with VRG, who answers. Miric could not call VRG. Miric had an appt. at 1300 with his source of the Presidency's office. It was said - by people covering this souce -that (Mexico) was going to break with O.E.A. But this did not come off. VRG hopes that there will be some declaration along these lines today. It is no longer possible. Carrillo Flores said before in Central America - talking about CEPAL, and he (CF) was once member of the Commission of Mexico in United Nations, etc. - but does VRG know what President say? No. The speech was written 48 hours ago. Miric has the text. On the 8th page of the 16 page speech, it says: CEPAL has a specific task: examine the economic problems of Latin American in light of the great postulations of the Letter of United Nations. It is, therefore, not a political conference however, the gravity of the events in the last weeks in the Dominican Republic imposes on me

10.7 contd.
the duty of alluding to these. The Mexican Govt. is united in the conviction that the Dominicans and only the Dominicans are the ones to decide on their form of govt and in general on their future - without any intefference. (With these words there was a tremendous applause.) Direct or indirect, open or hidden (interference) from outside.

VRG says it is good. But ~~what~~ why is Carrillo Flores and de la Colin have been acting like s.o.b.'s. Miric says Carrillo Flores arrived quite some time before the ~~xxx~~ ceremony began and someone asked what is going to be done. And CF said that the position of Mexico is well-known and firm, and if necessary, there will be an amplification (in sense of declaration). Miric expects something tonight. VRG thinks the only thing to do is to break with the O.E.A. Yes, but President says in his speech - expresses the confidence of Mexico that the present..be overcome and right re-affirmed. But where? He expesse the most fervent desire that the ~~xxxxxxx~~ peace return to the Dominican Republic. Miric says, further, that the colleagues who cover this souce (the Presidency) that something will come out today. VRG is expecting a declaration. Pajes asked VRG for his article, but VRG is expecting something. Should be something before 2100.

Miric asks about Pajes - about Victor Alba referred to in the issue...VRG has not seen it. DidVRG see an article in "Excelsior" a few days ago - against Yugoslavia. Yes. This is the same thing. Miric does not understand why Pajes did the same thing, accept this. Of Pedro Pages, the Spaniard. The article was probably already in when the other article was published in "Excelsior," because that man writes 20,000 articles. Don't say anything to Pages, but Miric does not understand for what this reason is...

Perhaps they can get together tomorrow.

Miric got official declaration of his country, but it was very mutilated by radio from Tanyuc to Informes. Couldn't be used. However, they express their moral support (for Dominican Republic). VRG says this should be expressed in United Nations. Asks if VRG gave this info to the boys (Dominican exiles). Yes.

Miric will leave very early tomorrow...will be busy with CEPAL for next few days...VRG will write his article in the morning and turn it in. M. will phone VRG at "Siempre" around noontime.

13.0 Out to 240-03-71, 5 times. Busy, complete. VRG with MO, who answers, for Rodrigo Asturias.

RA takes the phone. RA is sorry he did not see VRG yesterday morning...VRG asks for the phone number of Trejo. 28-33-47.

13.7 Out to 28-53-47. VRG asks MO, who answers, for Luis Trejo.

LT takes the phone. Greetings. LT said he had "it" ready for tomorrow. Does he know who is calling? Of course. Can VRG come by here ~~xxxxxxxx~~ today? Yes. MO had planned to see VRG tomorrow. MO was with Rodrigo yesterday. VRG expects Luis as soon as possible. It is very urgent. Will try to get there as soon as possible - get there in 45 minutes. VRG hopes it will be even sooner.

14.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG.

VRG takes the phone. Asks where MO is. At Marcue's house. VRG needs to see MO - with some urgency. Anselmo will have to go to fix "that." Can MO advise him tomorrow? Yes. Anselmo lives a

14.2 contd.
long way off so will advise him tomorrow. All right. That is what VRG needed.

Has VRG seen Roberto? No. MO has not been able to locate him "in that place or his other place." Yes, he goes out sometimes.

Did VRG pick up the tickets? No, VRG will pick them up tomorrow. Alberto did not have them (with him) today.

15.0 In. MO with VRG, who answers. (VRG recognizes MO's voices.) MO asks what is new. Nothing. VRG has lost contact there(Dominican Republic). One can't phone there unless in U.S. Can't they talk with Bosch in San Juan? Yes, but "these people" have not been able to talk to him. MO was phoning about the installation of Caamaño since AP lost the info. MO was trying to locate them (to get info).

How is MO's health? Fine. Much better. When will they talk? When VRG likes. Who is covering CEPAL? A lot of people. VRG says they are expecting a declaration from (Mexican) govt. for tonight - there is a rumor that it will break with O.E.A. VRG thinks it is too beautiful to be true. MO thinks it is possible - at least have it as a rumor. Handle it as an inside rumor so as not to have exterior reactions. The President's declaration in CEPAL was good, but it is late.

When will they see one another? VRG says it is hard this week. Could see one another next Monday. MO will phone VRG at noontime on Monday.

MO says that VRG should advise MO any good contact. Yes. They will publish it.

16.0 In. Marcio (Mejia Ricart) with VRG, who answers. Greetings. VRG is busy writing against the Yankees.

MMR talked to Caamaño yesterday. MMR has some news, but the most of them can't be published. Caamaño is also going to call MMR today at 1700. Asks to borrow VRG's recorder so they can record this conv. Sr. Armedo (ph) could come by for it. Of course. If VRG wants to ask any question, let MMR know. What is MMR going to ask? Caamaño is going to phone MMR because - according to what "we talked about yesterday, he will designate probably Emilio Cordero here and me (MMR) as Amb. in the United Nations. Moreover, the things they have pending that they want us to do here." Doesn't MMR have anything which is not published? They would have to talk because MMR has not read the newspapers. Doesn't know what has been published. MMR should say what Caamaño said and VRG will see. MMR will tell VRG everything after he talks to C. the second time. VRG is going out now. Or VRG could go over there (when conv is to take place). VRG has to go out. It should be in a few minutes. Where will it take place. [illegible] Heriberto Frias 1421, apt. 10. VRG will go by there. MMR offers to pick him up - since they are going for recorder. Fine. Will be there in 5 minutes.

17.0 In. Irina with VRG, who answers, for Inge (Rico).

IR takes the phone. Greetings...Irina had to go out... can go another day to see about dresses...children...Can see one another today...

17.5 Out to 46-66-93. VRG with Deschamps, who answers. VRG says

17.2 contd.
they are going to talk to Caamaño today. Apparently ~~they~~ he (Caamaño) named Mejia Ricart as Amb. in United Nations and another one of boys (exiles) as Amb. here. Will talk at 1700. It would be good at for Deschamps to go there. VRG can't go there. They are at Heriberto Frias 1421-10. They took VRG's recorder. Deschamps should go there. If he misses the call, they should have it recorded anyway. They just pick up VRG's recorder.

After 1710, 6 May

18.0 In. Emilio (Cordero) with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Asks Emilio to leave his phone. He is at 24-07-15. Cordero is there with Marcio (Mejia Ricart).

18.5 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. MO wants an editorial from VRG about the President's speech before the CEPAL. VRG will be home around 2200. He is out now. He said he was going out to dinner.

After 1910, 6 May

19.0 In. Pablo with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings... Pablo has Rheumatic Fever. Isn't Pablo in bed? No. Pablo can't move his right arm...VRG is not there. VRG is very busy with Dominican affair. IR invites them to ~~Bxxx~~ come over at Friday. MO had planned to take out his wife, Lupe, since it was anniversary but also has to go to dentist. Best some other day...If they are at home, and there is no dental problem, they can get together for dinner...

20.0 In. MO asks Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not in. Should be home around 2200.

20.2 In. VRG with Inge Rico, who answers. They (exiles) still have not gotten the long distance. VRG is there waiting on this man and will return "there" in a little bit. Does IR know where? Yes, VRG was there. It is the house of Jose Luis. VRG had the address but he did not have the phone. Didn't Jose Luis phone him? No. IR thinks it was Jose Luis who just phoned. Did VRG just get "there"? Yes. Ask them there if Jose Luis called. No. Besides VRG has an appt. now. VRG left there (exiles) and will return there. Will he be home late? Not sure - when ~~he~~ they get call. He will come home right away to call Habana.

20.7 In. Sr. Leonov with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. Not there. Leonov wanted to postponed an appt. with VRG. He will be home late today. Call him tomorrow between 0900 and 1000. VRG may be at home all morning since he has to write. Will go to "Siempre" around noontime. Leonov will phone back tomorrow morning.

21.0 In. VRG with IR, who answers. "This stupid man has not come. Hasn't he come by there?" No. It is now 2020. "He" has not phoned either. Leonov phoned VRG. Leonov said something about having an appt. with VRG. VRG does not know about. L. will phone back tomorrow Marcue called saying he wanted an editorial on President's speech this morning. VRG will wait there another 10 minutes (for man to appear at the meeting).

21.5 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers, for VRG. He is out. He will probably have news when he comes home and she will have him phone Miric if it is early.

22.0 In. Miric with Inge Rico, who answers. VRG is not back. VRG is at house of Jose Luis Gonzalez. They are waiting on call from there (Dominican Republic). Miric has had an official communication on this matter and would like to tell VRG. What is the phone where VRG is? Moment.

He is at 24-07-15. Thanks.

22.2 Out to 31-06-06. VRG with Jovan (Miric), who answers. VRG says they were waiting on call from Casamaño, but did not go through. Will be tomorrow. Apparently will name Marcio Mejia Ricart as Amb. in United Nations. VRG did not think it a good. Miric says it is all right for the state they are in. Another man were will be named Amb. in Mexico. Miric comments says that they must make this movement.

Miric has the communique. Deschamps gave it to VRG. The most important part is point out that Harriman is lying. Miric says that "what this man is doing, he is influential, no? ...follows a cause and is doing some foolish things." Does VRG know what happened in China? No. Thousands and thousands against - after Buenos Aires day before yesterday. Miric also has (~~[illegible]~~)(declaration) of the Permanent Commission of Congress - approving the censure of govt. VRG saw it.

What is VRG's idea of panorama? VRG thinks they won't leave. Miric agrees - that this is long-time affair (U.S. occupation).

Miric saw the (inauguration) of Casamaño. He has personality. Is only 33 years old. Does Miric know that Casamaño told Marcio (Mejia) yesterday that he had 50,000 more rifles. Yes, Miric sent in this notice yesterday. They are in the North. They are still in revolution. This is just a breather.

Perhaps can get together tomorrow. Miric has to go out early tomorrow. Could have lunch together - near CEPAL meeting. CEPAL is under the ~~[illegible]~~ shade of Dominican affair. VRG can get all material on speeches. But nothing is important on their decisions... everything is under shade (of this affair). Miric will follow the speeches. Can meet near "Siempre." Can eat at Oreo (?ph). Miric has not been there for years. Can meet there. Best later than 1200. Miric will pick VRG up at "Siempre" at 1300. Fine.

Reel off at RT 23.7, 0620, 7 May 1965

From 0620, 7 May (Friday) to 0730, 8 May 1965

2.0 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for Victor Rico Galan(VRG). Moment.

VRG takes phone. MO is Jose Luis Gonsales. Did VRG find out anything "about that collaboration"? Yes, but "he did not tell me anything." VRG will have to ask cashier (if they will pay JLG for his article). VRG will go today and will ask (at "Siempre"). Will VRG be at "Siempre" tomorrow? Yes. Could MO see VRG there about something else? Of course. Will go there around 1300 (to see VRG).

2.2 In. Leonov, Press Attache (of Soviet Embassy) with maid, who answers, for VRG.

Inge Rico takes phone and asks who is calling.

VRG takes the phone. Greetings. Leonov would like to consult something with VRG - but at the office of "Siempre" or at café (but not over phone). VRG will be at "Siempre" at 1230. Can meet at the café there...

Leonov says next Sunday they are having the reception for the end of the war (World War). L. took the invitations by the offices of "Siempre." Lolita has VRG's invitation. Thanks.

4.2 Out to 03. Time is 1008, 7 May.

4.2 Out to 03. Time is 1038, 7 May.

4.5 In. MO (Marcio Mejia Ricart - v) with VRG, who answers. MMR talked to Santo Domingo but "there are 2 or 3 things they want to arrange and they will phone" MMR back tonight at 1900. The news of today is that "we are willing to resist until the end, more or less the same information" MMR had already given VRG. VRG talked to the Minister of Interior, Ejoti 77 Curi (ph). VRG says "he" made some "stupendous declarations," came out in "El Dia." MMR has not seen them. But Emilio told MMR that they were wonderful. VRG thought they were very good. MMR comments that the last time he (MMR) saw him, he (MMR) hit him because he was Viru's man...like Caamaño or even worse. But he is improving. MMR talked to him and he was very cordial. He told MMR that they are working on the letter of credentials, that he thought that the nomination (of MMR as Amb. in U.N.) was certain, but they have not been able to arrange this definitely yet due to MMR's political problem. He is working on this, but still lacks the last approval. Things have to be prepared. If VRG wants, he can go to MMR's at 1900 (to hear conv) and bring his recorder. Fine.

5.0 In. Marcio Mejia Ricart (v) with VRG, who answers. MMR forgot to tell VRG - Due to "my last call, they cancelled the Amb. (of ~~Mmxx~~ Mexico. Emilio's (Cordero's) matter (nomination) is being worked on. It would be good to work on this...find out if they have received the telegram. They have sent a telegram to substitute the (Dominican) Amb. here. It would be interesting to find out about this - perhaps through "Excelsior." VRG will find out if Deschamps can do this and call MMR.

5.7 Out to 23-02-91. Busy.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab.

6.0 In, twice. No answer, complete. Sra. Rico asks maid, who answers, for VRG. Hangs up...or cuts off...

After 1325, 7 May

6.2 In. VRG (v) asks maid, who answers, for Sra. (Inge Rico).
IR takes phone. VRG is going to have lunch with Miric. All right. Will he be back early? Yes. Has anyone called? No. Did VRG take "Las 20 lineas"? No, will take them (later).

6.5 In. Sra. Rico (v) with Sra. Diener, who answers, for Inge Rico.
IR takes phone. VRG is not at home. Sra. Rico called this morning, but hung up on her...Everyone is fine...Invites Sra. R. tomorrow...

6.7 In. MO asks Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for VRG. Not there. Won't be home for lunch.

After 1515, 7 May

7.0 In. Marianita with Sra. Diener, who answers. Greetings.. about children...
Inge Rico takes phone...about children...maid,...agency for maids...

9.0 Out to 20-07-77. Maid asks MO, who answers, for Jose(fina).
Josefine (maid) comes to phone...Greetings..how each is... Asks about whether Roma has come to town...

10.7 In. MO with Inge Rico (v), who answers, for Casta (maid).
Casta takes the phone. About whether she is angry...seeing one another...

After 1715, 7 May

11.0 In. VRG (v) with Inge Rico (v), who answers. VRGis with Jovan (Miric) at a restaurant. Julian will go by there at 1730. VRG will go there (home) now, but may be late. Keep Julian there - wait for him. Fine.

11.2 In. VRG (v) with Sra. Diener (v), who answers, for Quiche (ph (nickname for Inge Rico).
IR takes the phone. VRG is coming home now. This young man (Julian) is now here. Yes, but there are no taxis...Just as soon as he gets a cab, he will be home. IR thinks he is not going to be able to wait. Tell him to wait on VRG...Julian says for him to come right away because Julian has another engagement.

12.2 In. MO asks VRG (v), who answers, for his sister, Casta Hernandez.
Maid takes phone. MO is Antonio...about visiting her... about family....MO is going home to visit...

7 May 1965

After 1915, 7 May

18.0 Out to 24-07-15. VRG with Marcio (Mejia Ricart), who answers. Did MMR talk to Santo Domingo? Not yet...Still waiting on call. When will he talk? Not sure, but thinks around 2330? Is Maestro Emilio (Cordero) there? Yes. VRG will go there. (VRG is thick-tongued Slightly drunk...)

18.7 Out to 24-07-15. VRG with MO, who answers, for Jose Luis Gonzalez. Not there yet. Is MO still waiting for that call? Yes. (MO is Mejia Ricart). VRG will go there and take his recorder.

After 1915, 7 May

19.0 Out to XXXXXXXX 15-17-20. VRG (v) orders a cab. Wrong number.

19.2 Out to 15-50-20, twice. Busy.
Out to 15-91-27. VRG (v) asks WO, who answers, for Sr. Elizondo. Not there now.

19.7 In. Antonio Gonzalez de Leon with VRG, who answers. Greetings...VRG is sick - This Ministery does not react. Did VRG expect it to react? VRG expected that its opinion would be at least Mexican (with respect to Dominican Republic). MO has to talk to VRG.... MO is almost inaudible...MO wants to ask about Gonzalo Martinez Qrvañes (??). VRG saw this, but was not impressed. Has VRG seen Gonzalo? XXX Of course. Recently? Yes. Where can MO locate him? Phone him at 24-88-84. Yes, but the phone does not answer. Yes, they do, that is his house. When will they see one another? When MO likes. Can have coffee together tomorrow? Call VRG tomorrow around 1000 at home (to arrange this). Fine.

20.7 In. MO with Inge Rico, who answers. Greetings...Asks how MO is...MO went to see dentist...VRG is very drunk and is still drinking He is out too now. VRG had lunch with Miric, came home for an appt., and told IR he had to go out again and must be still in orbit.

21.0 In. No answer.

After 2250, 7 May

From 0730 to 1300, 8 May (Saturday) 1965

22.2 In. MO asks maid, who answers, for VRG. MO is Sr. Leonov.
Call back later...He is asleep. It is now 0930. Call back at 1000.

22.7 In. Leonov with VRG, who answers. Asks if Leonov could pick VRG up at 1045. It is now 1010. L. asks if he can't see VRG in the afternoon because L. is finishing something now. Then, in the afternoon - at VRG's house. L. will pick VRG up and they can go where VRG up. L. will phone VRG at 1500.

After 1030, 8 May

23.0 Out to 23-02-91. VRG (v) orders a cab. None.
Out to 23-48-26. VRG (v) orders a cab. None.

Reel off at RT 24.0, 1300, 8 May 1965

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO 201-336474
X-REF TO FILE NO 201-
FILE RID ☑ RET TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 31

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO VR. FILE CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, DDP, WH/C 8, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 4, DO/H 3

ABSTRACT	X	

S E C R E T 122054Z

SDOM INFO DIR CITE MEXI 3381

REF SDOM 4584 (M 4781)

13 MAY 65 IN 65743

1. FYI ONLY: LIFEAT REPORTS INDICATE LUIS SUAREZ WAS BRIEFED PRIOR TRIP BY VICTOR RICO GALAN, WRITER FOR SIEMPRE, MEXI LEFTIST WEEKLY WHICH HAS PUBLISHED STRONGLY ANTI-US ARTICLES ON DR SITUATION. RICO GALAN IS CASTRO COMMUNIST AGENT, REP FOR RADIO HAVANA IN MEXI RE DR SITUATION AND IS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH EMILIO CORDERO, DOMINICAN EXILE IN MEXI WHO IN CONTACT WITH DR REBEL LEADERS AND WHO, ACCORDING ONE REPORT, MAY BE DESIGNATED AMB TO MEXI BY CAAMANO. RICO ADVISED SUAREZ TO TRAVEL SDOM BY PRIVATE PLANE FROM KINGSTON AND TO STAY AT EMBAJADOR IN SDOM. SUAREZ RELUCTANT TALK TO CORDERO OR USE CORDERO'S CONTACTS IN DR AND RICO HAD IMPRESSION SUAREZ AFRAID OF GETTING MIXED UP IN DR SITUATION.

2. FOR OPS SECURITY REASONS ABOVE INFO CANNOT BE USED PER SE AS BASIS QUESTIONING SUAREZ AND MOYA. INFO DOES HOWEVER INDICATE POSSIBLE ANGLE, VIZ, EXPLOIT POSSIBLE FEAR ON PART SUAREZ RE GETTING INVOLVED. DEFER SDOM ON BEST MEANS [illegible]

SECRET

201-336474
12 MAY 65

SECRET IN 65743 Page 2 of 2

SUAREZ SUFFICIENTLY TO PROMPT HIS DEPARTURE BUT SUGGEST, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, THIS BE DONE WITHOUT INVOLVING PRO-US AUTHORITIES. ¥ IF SUAREZ AND/MOYA OFFICIALLY KICKED OUT, RESULTING SIEMPRE EXPLOITATION MIGHT WELL HAVE GREATER ANTI-US IMPACT AT LEAST IN MEXICO THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED SUAREZ ARTICLE.

¥ EMIDAM-1 PLANNED TO ARREST, INTERROGATE, AND DEPORT LUIS SUAREZ.

SECRET

CFN

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SECRET

JUN 2 '57

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 19

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FROM MEXICO CITY

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UNIT WH

TIME 0245

BY M

INFO VR. FILE CI, CI/OPS, FI, TSD 6

E C R E T 130054Z 13 MAY 65 IN 65826

PRIROTTY DIR CITE MEXI 3394

REF DIR 09327 **

STATION INFORMED AFTERNOON 12 MAY BY LIFEUD-24 THAT VICTOR RICO GALAN TELEPHONE DEAD AS OF 0900 HOURS 12 MAY.

E SURFACING OF REF X

TELECON; AFTER RESUMPTION OF PHONE SERVICE SON PLANS MAINTAIN COVERAGE WITH T ME MONITORING ES LONG AS POSSIBIE BUT ZITL HAVE WILSTED END BASEHOUSE KEEPERS

ADY DXR IMMEDIATE EMANSATION OF ALL EQUIPMENT AND JUMH LINES.

S E C R E T

CFN S/C NOTE: *CORRECTED COPY TO FOLLOW

** [illegible] WRONG REF.

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

1. RI FILE NO.

5. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

6. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

3. ANALYST

4. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

RICO GALAN, VICTOR
201-336474
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?
ADVISING PRESS CONF ON DOMINICAN SITUATION.
RE CONTACT W/KWN KGB.

200-007-038/13
MEXI-03369
12 MAY 65
P1

R 6509130073

FILE IN 201-336474

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : FRANK A. TOTH/kct
UNIT : DO/USOP
EXT : 5885
DATE : 12 MAY 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-244017

17/3 S E C R E T

2 ROUTING			R1
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : IMMEDIATE NYDO, DOST

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DO/H 3 INFO: DO 4, ADDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

TO IMMEDIATE NYDO INFO: DOST CITE DIR 09331

1. DYVOUR WISHES UTILIZE WUINDIGO FOR SURFACING BLACK PROPAGANDA OPERATION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM SDOM. WUINDIGO ACTIVITY WILL BE LIMITED PREPARATION ARTICLE FOR PLACEMENT RIO OR CANADIAN PRESS ON BASIS MATERIAL PROVIDED BY HQS AND POSSIBLE PERSONAL INTERVENTION TO INSURE EARLY PUBLICATION.

2. ADVISE EARLIEST TIME DYVOUR REP CAN BRIEF HIM RE THIS OPERATION.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible] 201—

EUGENE F. O'HARA
C/DO/OP

WH/3 Mr. Kaufman (in draft)

Frank A. Toth
FRANK A. TOTH
DO/USOP

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S E C R E T 120150Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3372

SECTION ~~ONE~~ TWO OF 2

NO NIGHT ACTION

111 64711
Page 1 of 7

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE VICTOR RICO GALAN FROM 2230 HOURS 1 MAY TO 0845 HOURS 2 MAY 65 REPORTED MEXI 3312 6 MAY 65.

2. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO 1250 HOURS 2 MAY - 0020 HOURS 3 MAY:

A. RICO GALAN AND JOVAN MIRIC, YUGOSLAV CORRESPONDENT IN MEXICO: DISCUSS OAS COMMISSION TO DR WHICH BOTH THINK BADLY CHOSEN. RICO SAYS "THEY'RE A BUNCH OF GORILLAS." RICO MUCH INTERESTED MEXI PROPOSAL, WHICH NOT APPROVED, RE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH TO BE PRESENTED NO LATER THAN 10 MAY. SINCE OAS MEETINGS SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER COMMISSION SUBMITS REPORT RICO SAYS DECISION CAN BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY.

B. MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC SAYS MORE THAN 9,000 TROOPS IN DR AND MORE DISEMBARKING TO PROTECT OAS COMMISSION. US TROOPS HAVE TAKEN OVER ALL WESSIN COMBAT LINES TO CONTINUE FIGHT.

C. RICO AND MIRIC: RICO SAYS DOMINICANS LEFT A COMMUNIQUE THAT MORNING, CALL TO THIRD WORLD FOR ITS SUPPORT, SIGNED BY DR EMILIO CORDERO MICHEL, DR MARCIO MEJIA RICART, [illegible] LEANDRO GUZMAN, DR

SECRET

Rico Galan

SECRET

14 64113

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TOBIAS CABRAL MEJIA AND RAMON EMILIO COLOMBO IN NAME OF DR EXILES IN MEXI. IN SAME CONVERSATION MIRIC AND RICO SAY UNITED STATES OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA AND ARE SPEAKING OF PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. HAVE SAID THAT JOSE E. MORA MET WITH WESSIN, AFTER TALKING TO REBEL CHIEFS, TO SEEK A FORMULA, APPARENTLY THEY (UNITED STATES SOURCES) SAY BASED ON PROPOSALS OF THE REBELS. MIRIC SAYS THIS IS A CONFESSION THAT THE REBELS ARE IN THE RIGHT. REPORTED ARMISTICE, CEASE FIRE ACHIEVED BETWEEN MARINES AND REBELS, ALL CIVILIANS EVACUATED AND THAT A NOT ESPECIALLY URGENT MEETING WAS TO TAKE PLACE THAT AFTERNOON BETWEEN THEIR MINISTERS AND CONGRESS MEMBERS. NO MENTION FURTHER LANDING OF MARINES AND ARMY. ALSO STATED DOMINICANS SHOULD HAVE CHANCE TO ~~SHOSE~~ THEIR DESTINY, POLIT DEVELOPMENT, LIBERTY ETC. MIRIC SAYS SHOWS A NOTE TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA.

D. MIRIC AND RICO: IN REPLY RICO QUESTION MIRIC SAYS HAS NO NEWS ON EUROPEAN REACTION TO SITUATION BUT THINKS THERE IS SOME. ALSO ON VIETNAM. PERHAPS LESS WITH BRITISH PRESS. MENTIONS RADIO MOSCOW SPANISH LANGUAGE BROADCAST WHICH FULL OF SILLY THINGS, MENTIONING SOCIALIST POPULAR PARTY IS MOST STUPID POLICY. RICO SAYS RADIO HAVANA DID SAME THING. RICO GAVE THEM COMPLETE INFO

SECRET

IN 64714

SECRET

PA-1-3-4 1

RE 14TH OF JUNE PARTY BUT EXPECTED THEM TO ENTER IT. MENTIONS UNITED STATES EFFORT TO PACIFY LATIN AMERICA BY BROADCASTING NAMES OF 58 COMMUNISTS ONE OF WHOM RICO SAYS IS A SPANIARD, ANOTHER A PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT IN THE DR. RICO SAYS "THEY WILL SEE THE RESULTS OF THE OAS COMMISSION." RICO SAYS "THEY HAVE TO FORSEE THINGS A LITTLE." MIRIC POINTS OUT COMMISSION VISIT IS REALLY APPROVAL OF INTERVENTION.

E. RICO TO ING. (FNU) ELIZONDO: RICO SAYS RADIO HAVANA PULLED A REAL BONER BY ANNOUNCING THAT HE WAS THEIR CORRESPONDENT IN THE DR SITUATION. IS THEN AWAITING A CALL FROM THE DR.

F. CALLER, POSSIBLY RAMON SINOBAS OF PRENSA LATINA, AND RICO: CALLER TELLS RICO THAT HE HAS READ IN CUBAN PAPER TEXT OF RICO INTERVIEW WITH JUAN BAUTISTA MEJIA. INTERVIEW COMPLETE AS RICO GAVE IT TO RADIO HAVANA. CALLER TO COME TO RICO HOUSE AT ONCE FOR FURTHER NEWS.

G. CARLOS COCCIOLI, ITALIAN COMMUNIST, RESIDENT MEXI, WRITER FOR LEFTIST MAGAZINE SIEMPRE, TO RICO: RICO SAYS VERY BUSY SINCE RADIO HAVANA HAS COMMISSIONED HIM FOR NEWS ON DR. RICO ANXIOUS TO GIVE DATA TO COCCIOLI SO HE CAN PUBLISH IT "THERE" (ITALY?). COCCIOLI VERY AGREEABLE.

H. RICO TO RADIO HAVANA: RICO SAYS DO NOT MENTION JUAN B. MEJIA

SECRET

IN 24718
Page 4 of 9

OF 14TH OF JUNE MOVEMENT. EVERYTHING IS BEING DONE BY CONSTITUTIONALISM,

RADIO HAVA SHOULD FOLLOW LINES SET OUT IN FIDEL'S SPEECH.

I. MARCIO MEJIA RICART, DOM EXILE IN MEXI, AND MIRIC: MEJIA SAYS TALKED WITH JUAN BOSCH YESTERDA: AND ASKS MIRIC TO COME TO RICO GALAN'S HOUSE TO PICK UP THEIR (DOMINICAN EXILES IN MEXI) PRESS COMMUNIQUE.

J. MEJIA RICART AND VALENTIN IVANOVICH KUCHEROV, TASS CORRESPONDENT IN MEXI, SUSPECT KGB: KUCHEROV TELLS MEJIA THAT HE HAS A COMMUNIQUE WHICH IS IMPORTANT (TO K) AND WANTS TO SEE MEJIA. WILL MEET LATER.

K. EMILIO CORDERO AND RICO: RICO TELLS CORDERO THAT HE GAVE THEIR COMMUNIQUE TO MIRIC WHO WILL TRANSMIT IT. CORDERO SAYS THAT RADIO HAVANA TRANSMITTED THE "OTHER" CORRECTLY. "THEY DID NOT DENY THE OTHER." CORDERO SAYS HE TALKED TO (FNU) ARMEDO WHO HEARD FROM DR THAT VOICE OF AMERICA SAID US SEEKING PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM. RICO THINKS UNITED STATES TRYING TO SMOOTH THINGS OVER BUT WILL CONTINUE OCCUPATION. "THERE SHOULD BE NO GREAT CHANGE." SAYS MIRIC THINKS THERE MAY BE A BIG CHANGE BUT YOU KNOW HOW YUGOSLAVS THINK, THEY BELIEVE WHAT THEY HEAR. RICO SAYS IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR UNITED STATES TO TAKE IN BOSCH, BUT CONTINUE THE OCCUPATION,

SECRET

IN 64712

Pg. 5 of 7

KEEPING HIM TIED UP WITH TROOPS.

3. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO 0027 3 MAY TO 0023 4 MAY 65:

A. RICO TO FUNDORA OF RADIO HAVANA: RICO SAYS HAS NOTHING. WILL CALL WHEN HAS SOMETHING.

B. EMILIO CORDERO AND RICO: CORDERO SAYS HAS NO NEWS BUT FRIEND IN TOUCH WITH PERSON IN DR SAYS "THAT MIRAVAL'S (PHONETIC) WERE KILLED. THE COMMISSION DOES NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. ARE LOOKING FOR PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT...BUT MASSES APPARENTLY DEMANDING BOSCH. THEY ARE STILL INDECISIVE. BOSCH HAS GIVEN THE INSURRECTION UP AS FINISHED AND SAID DOMINICANS SHOULD NOT FIRE AGAINST UNITED STATES AND THAT HE (BOSCH) DID NOT THINK THE UNITED STATES HAD BAD INTENTIONS. THERE ARE ABOUT 40 HURT AMONG THE UNITED STATES TROOPS AND 4 OR 5 DEAD...." RICO WILL LEAVE HIS OFFICE NUMBER IN CASE JUAN B. MEJIA CALLS HIM.

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3372

12 MAY 65 IN 64718

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

NO NIGHT ACTION

SECRET

4. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN 0620 4 MAY TO 0715, 5 MAY 65:

A. UNIDENTIFIED CALLER ASKES WHEN RICO GALANS RETURNED FROM CUBA. SRA RICO SAYS DURING HOLD WEEK. CALLER IS LEAVING FOR CUBA 5 MAY. (STATION COMMENT: CALLER MAY BE IDEN WITH CAPT FRANCISCO TARAZONA TORAN (201-306371). SEE HMMA 17961 20 OCT 64.)

B. (FNU PEREIRA, CALLING FOR ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS AT UNAM TO INVITE RICO TO PARTICIPATE IN SOME ROUND TABLES ON CARIBBEAN SITUATION. ALBERTO DOMINGO AND ENRIQUE SOTO IZQUIERDO ALSO COMING. RICO TO ATTEND ON 11 MAY.

C. RICO TO EMILIO CORDERO: RICO SAYS IT INTELLIGENT TO NAME CAAMANO PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. CORDERO SAYS DISCUSSED CAAMANO WITH DOMINICAN FRIENDS WHO SAY HE IS ONLY ONE WHO CAN GUARANTEE THE UNITED STATES EVEN THOUGH HE HAS PARTICIPATED WITH "GREAT NATIONALISM". RICO AGREES. CORDERO SAYS THERE ONLY ONE THING HE DOES NOT LIKE ABOUT CAAMANO OR " THAT FATHER OF HIS". "THAT THERE ARE COMMUNISTS UNDER HIS CONTROL". CORDERO SAYS BOSCH SHOULD BE BACK. HE DOES NOT THINK CAAMANO

SECRET

SECRET

1164718
(Page 7047)

SECRET

"WILL OBTAIN THEIR PROPOSALS." NOR DOES RICO. BOCH'S PEOPLE MAY HAND IN ARMS VOLUNTARILY BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO SHOOT THE 14TH OF JUNE PEOPLE AND THE "E" AND CE" (SIC) ONES TO GET THEIR ARMS AWAY. CORDERO ASKS RICO IF HE SAW TIME MAGAZINE TODAY? IT MENTIONS THREE COMPANIONS OF THE 14TH OF JUNE COMMITTEE BUT NOT AS MEMBERS OF THE GROUP, RATHER AS COMMUNIST DIRECTORS: JAMIE DURAN, JOHNSON OF THE 14TH AND THEN "GRUBEL,AH, TOMEIJA" (PHONETIC). CORDERO SAYS " THIS ONE IS MEMBER OF PCP." RICO KNOWS HIM. TOMEIJA IS ONE OF THE DIRECTORS. AND GRUBEL IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE PCP WHO WAS IN PRAGUE. RICO ALSO KNOWS HIM. CORDERO ALSO SAYS THAT MIAMI REFUSES TO ACCEPT CALLS FROM DOMINICANS TO SDOM. ACCEPT ONLY UNITED STATES PRESS CALLS. WOULD BE GOOD TO TELL RADIO HAVANA THAT DOMINICANS CAN'T CALL IN CORDERO MENTIONS THAT DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR SAID WOULD RESIGN BUT HAS NOT. IS AGAINST UNITED STATES DUE SOME "DECLARATIONS PUBLISHED IN LA EXTRA"

IF HE DOES NOT RESIGN MAYBE COULD BE SPREAD AROUND THAT IN VIEW THESE DECLARATIONS HE IS PERSONA NON GRATA. IT WOULD BE HARD TO DO BUT POSSIBLE AND HAS TO BE HANDLED CORRECTLY. CAN BE DONE WHEN RICO WISHES COULD DO IT PERHAPS IN THE COPY RICO ISPREPARING NOW FOR DIARIO DE MEXICO. CORDERO READS TO RICO FROM 2 MAY LA EXTRA STATEMENT DR JOSE FERNANDEZ CAMINEROS ABOUT WESSIN Y WESSIN WHICH SAYS WESSIN POPULAR WITH PEOPLE BECAUSE ANTI TRUJILLISTA AND POPULAR WITH BOSCH'S

SECRET

IN [illegible]

SECRET

Pg 2 of 3

P
CP AND PAR TIDO LIBERAL REVOLUCIONISTA FOR SAME REASON. DISTINGUISHED SELF IN 14 JUNE 1959 DURING MASSACRE. RECEIVED LA ORDEN DE CONSTANZA FROM TRUJILLO FOR BRILLANT MILITARY SERVICE DURING THESE THREE INVASIONS. RICO OR CORDERO SAYS, SO, THIS S O.B. SAYS HE IS ANTI-TRUJILLISTA. RICO SAYS SIEMPRE IS SENDING LUIS SUAREZ AND MOYA, A PHOTOGRAPHER TO DR. RICO SAYS MUST GET TO DOMINICAN AMBASSADOR MAKE SURE HE DOES NOT DENY THEM VISAS. TRAVEL ROUTE NOT DEFINITE. PERHAPS VIA KINGSTON FROM WHICH ARE FLIGHTS. FROM JAMAICA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE BOAT. CAN RENT SMALL PLANE IN JAMAICA FOR ABOUT $200 OR $300. RICO WANTS NAMES OF CONTACTS FROM CORDERO FOR SUAREZ. STATION COMMENT: SEE PRIN 3203 AND PREVIOUS REFS ON LUIS RODRIGO MOYA AND LUIS SUAREZ.)

D. RICO TO FNU ELIZONDO: RICO ASKS ELIZONDO IF HE DID AS RICO ASKED? NO, COULD NOT SEE "HIM". ELIZONDO WILL CALL MONTERREY TO SEE IF THERE IS A FRIEND WHO COULD PASS SOMETHING. NO, ONE LOANED FROM THERE. NO, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE. ELIZONDO WILL ARRANGE IT IF HE CAN.

E. JOVAN MIRIC TO RICO: MIRIC SAYS YUGOSLAV GOV MADE A DECLARATION TODAY CONDEMNING INTERVENTION AND SUPPORTING BOSCH'S DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT THEY TELEPHONED MIRIC AND CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS COPY.

SECRET

SECRET

IN 64712
Pg 7 [illegible]

HELPED THEM FORM AN ATTITUDE. TEXT HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TRANJUC BUT NOT PICKED UP TODAY. MAY SEND IT VIA INFORMEX. MIRIC ASKS RICO TO TELL DOM EXILES IF HE SEES THEM.

F. RICO TO LUIS SUAREZ OF SIEMPRE: TELLS SUAREZ TO RENT PRIVATE PLANE IF NO FLIGHTS FROM KINGSTON AND TO STAY AT EMPERADOR IN SDOM. SUAREZ DOES NOT THINK IT NECESSARY TALK TO EMILIO CORDERO. RICO WHO HAS BEEN IN DR CAN GIVE HIM NECESSARY INFO.

G. CORDERO AND RICO: RICO TELLS CORDERO SUAREZ DOESN'T WANT TO SEE HIM. THINKS HE AFRAID AND DOES NOT SEEM INTERESTED IN CONTACTS IN DR. RICO THINKS HE PLANS TRY SEE CAAMANO BUT DOESN'T WANT GET MIXED UP MUCH IN SITUATION. RICO GOING TRY GET SUAREZ INTERESTED IN SEEING CORDERO'S CONTACTS IN DR. RICO WILL VISIT CORDERO TO GET LIST OF ADDRESSES FROM HIM.

H. CORDERO AND RICO: CORDERO SAYS CAN'T COME SEE RICO BECAUSE AN INSPECTOR FROM GOBERNACION VISITED HIM AND HE HAS TO GO WITH HIM TO SEE SR OCHOA. WILL SEND LIST TO RICO.

I. RICO TO ALAN HOWARD: HOWARD WHO SAYS HE SAD AND A LITTLE ASHAMED ASKS RICO IF THERE IS ANY NEWS FROM THERE? RICO SAYS NO BUT EXPECTS SOME SOON.

5. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION.

SECRET

☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 51

43 SECRET

☐ ☑

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

MAY 19 1965

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
C/WH 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 0730

BY

INFO
* VR. FILE, SUSPENSE C/WH, CSRO, ADDP C/DO 4, C/DO/H 3, C/SOD 4, C/[illegible]5, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, C/FI/INT, C/FI/SPG, C/IW, DDP, C/WH/C 5, C/CI/PS, C/EE 3

SECRET 120250Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3376

12 MAY 65

[illegible]

Vuelo Rico-Galan

12 May 65

[illegible] — DO NOT [illegible]

201-336474

FORM 1389

RI COPY

RI COPY

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

065

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 6

SERVICE

INFO : VR, FILE, ADDP C/DO 4 C/DO/H 3 C/SOD 4 C/SR 5 C/CA 2 C/CA/O 2 C/CI C/FI 2 C/FI/D 4 C/FI/INT C/FI/SPG C/IW DDP DO/WH/C 6 C/CI/PS C/EE 3

MEXI 3376	12 MAY 65	64758
STA & NR	DATE	IN NR

RI COPY

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

PARA 3H: "ACTION IN SECRET SESSION OAS, THAT COLOMBIA, CHILE VENEZUELA AND COSTA RICA PROTESTED U.S. UNILATERAL ACTION, REQUESTED LEGAL MEASURES TO MAKE IT COMBINED ACTION."

PARA 4J: "HAVE RADIO HABANA BROADCAST FOR THEM TO CALL CORDERO. CORDERO SAYS THAT IS DANGEROUS. OR THEY COULD SAY FOR SDOM TO CALL VRQ. EASIEST THING IS TO CABLE. YES, BUT THIS IS URGENT. HAVE RADIO HABANA SAY FOR ANYONE TO CALL. JUAN B. MEJIA COULD HEAR THIS."

RI COPY

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 34

☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

34 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED 19

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 2330

INFO VR. FILE SUSPENSE WH, CSDO, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, FI/D 4, FW, CI/OPS

SECRET 120102Z

(125) 4P

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 3370

ANM	~~PF~~	
PSY	~~DEST~~	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

12 MAY 65 IN 64702

MICROFILMED
JUN 28 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

NO NIGHT ACTION

201-281180

1. LIFEAT COVERAGE RICO GALAN FROM 0625 6 MAY TO 0620 7 MAY

A. JOVAN MIRIC AND RICO: MIRIC SAYS HE HAD APPOINTMENT AT 1700 WITH HIS SOURCE IN OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY. IT WAS RUMORED THERE THAT MEXICO WAS GOING TO BREAK WITH OAS, BUT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. RICO EXPRESSES HOPE THERE WILL BE DECLARATION ALONG THESE LINES TODAY. MIRIC SAYS THIS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. HE HAS COPY OF TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WHICH WAS WRITTEN 48 HOURS AGO. HE QUOTES "MEXICAN GOVT IS UNITED IN THE CONVICTION THAT DOMINICANS AND ONLY DOMINICANS ARE ONES TO DECIDE THEIR FORM OF GOVT AND THEIR FUTURE". RICO SAYS GOOD, BUT WHY ARE CARRILLO FLORES AND DE LA COLIN (PRESUMABLY RAFAEL DE LA COLINA, MEXICAN AMBASSADOR TO OAS) ACTING LIKE S.O.B.'S? RICO THINKS THE ONLY THING TO DO IS BREAK WITH OAS. MIRIC ADVISES HE WILL BE BUSY WITH CEPAL NEXT FEW DAYS.

B. RICO AND RODRIGO ASTURIAS (PRESUMABLY THE GUATEMALAN STUDENT LEADER): LATTER EXPRESSES REGRET HE DID NOT SEE RICO YESTERDAY. RICO REQUESTS PHONE NUMBER OF LUIS TREJO ESQUIVEL, WHOM HE LATER CALLS. TREJO SAYS HE HAS "IT" READY FOR TOMORROW, THAT HE WAS

SECRET

13 May 65
201-336974

WITH RODRIGO YESTERDAY. RICO SAYS VERY URGENT HE SEE TREJO ASAP.

C. UNIDENTIFIED CALLER AND RICO: RICO SAYS HAS LOST CONTACT WITH DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; ONE CAN'T PHONE THERE UNLESS IN U.S. CALLER ASKS CAN'T THEY TALK WITH BOSCH IN SAN JUAN. RICO REPLIES YES BUT "THESE PEOPLE" HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO HIM. CALLER INQUIRED ABOUT INSTALLATION OF CAAMANO SINCE AP LOST THE INFO. RICO STATES IS EXPECTING DECLARATION FROM GOVT TONIGHT; MENTIONS RUMOR OF BREAK WITH OAS; THINKS IT IS TOO BEAUTIFUL BE TRUE. CALLER THINKS IT POSSIBLE. AT LEAST TO HANDLE IT AS INSIDE RUMOR SO AS NOT TO HAVE EXTERIOR REACTIONS. ADDS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION IN CEPAL WAS GOOD BUT TOO LATE. CALLER WILL PHONE RICO NOONTIME MONDAY (10TH).

D. MARCIO MEJIA RICART AND RICO: RICO SAYS IS BUSY WRITING AGAINST THE YANKEES. MEJIA SAYS HE TALKED TO CAAMANO YESTERDAY, THAT HE (MEJIA) HAS SOME NEWS BUT MOST OF IT CANNOT BE PUBLISHED. CAAMANO TO CALL MEJIA AGAIN ON 6 MAY AND MEJIA OFFERS TO PUT FORWARD ANY QUESTIONS RICO WANTS TO ASK. MEJIA SAYS PURPOSE OF CAAMANO CALL IS PROBABLY "TO DESIGNATE EMILIO CORDERO HERE AND ME AS AMBASSADOR IN THE U.N. MOREOVER THE THINGS WHICH THEY HAVE PENDING THAT THEY WANT US TO DO HERE". MEJIA PROMISES TO TELL RICO EVERYTHING AFTER

[illegible] Marcio Mejia Ricart

Cit: Dominican Republic

[illegible]

SECRET

IN 64702
PAGE 3

HE HAS TALKED WITH CAAMANO A SECOND TIME.

E. RICO AND DESCHAMPS (PRESUMABLY EDUARDO DESCHAMPS, WRITER FOR EXCELSIOR, ON WHOM STATION HAS SOME DEROG INFO INCLUDING LIHUFF REPORT THAT HE COMMUNIST): RICO ADVISES DESCHAMPS THEY GOING TALK TO CAAMANO LATER IN DAY, AND SUGGESTS DESCHAMPS BE PRESENT WHEN CALL IS MADE.

(201-[illegible])

F. LEONOV (PRESUMABLY NIKOLAY) CALLS FOR RICO AND LEAVES MESSAGE THAT HE WANTS TO POSTPONE APPOINTMENT. WILL CALL AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING.

G. MIRIC TO RICO: IS INFORMED THAT RICO IS AT HOUSE OF JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ, THAT THEY WAITING ON CALL FROM D.R. MIRIC SAYS HE HAS HAD OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION "ON THIS MATTER" AND WOULD LIKE TO TELL RICO.

H. RICO AND MIRIC: RICO SAYS THEY ARE WAITING ON CALL FROM CAAMANO BUT IT DID NOT GO THROUGH; WILL BE TOMORROW. MIRIC SAYS APPARENTLY CAAMANO WILL NAME MEJIA AS AMB TO UN. RICO DOES NOT THI[illegible] GOOD. MIRIC SAYS IS ALL RIGHT FOR THE STATE THEY ARE IN. MIRIC HAS THE COMMUNIQUE. DESCHAMPS GAVE IT TO RICO. THE MOST IMPORTANT PART IS TO POINT OUT THAT HARRIMAN IS LYING. MIRIC SAYS "WHAT THIS MAN IS DOING ...FOLLOWS A CAUSE AND IS DOING SOME FOOLISH THINGS.

SECRET

SECRET RECEIVED RID/HIS JUN 18 10 PM '65

IN64702
PAGE 4

DO YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPEND IN CHINA. THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS AGAINST - AFTER BUENOS AIRES DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY." MIRIC ALSO HAS (DECLARATION) OF THE PERMANENT COMMISSION OF CONGRESS APPROVING THE CENSURE OF GOVT. BOTH RICO AND MIRIC AGREE THAT "THIS" (U.S. OCCUPATION) IS A LONG TIME AFFAIR. MIRIC SAW THE (INAUGURATION) OF CAAMANO. THINKS HE HAS PERSONALITY. RICO ASKS MIRIC IF HE KNOWS THAT CAAMANO TOLD MEJIA YESTERDAY THAT HE HAD 52,000 MORE RIFLES. MIRIC SAYS YES, THAT HE SENT IN THIS [illegible] YESTERDAY.

"THEY ARE IN THE NORTH, THEY ARE STILL IN REVOLUTION, THIS IS JUST A BREATHER". MIRIC SAYS CEPAL IS UNDER THE SHADE OF THE DOMINICAN AFFAIR, THAT NOTHING IN THEIR DECISIONS IS IMPOR[illegible].

3. DISSEM AT HQS DISCRETION. SECRET

4. INDEX TO 200-7-38/13.

S E C R E T

CFN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

17 SECRET

ORIG: W.J. Kaufman:mep
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 11 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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3		7	
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO: DO4, DO/H3, CA 2, CA/PROP, VR, FILE

PRIORITY

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 09328

REF: MEXI 3344 (IN 63771)

1. WE NOW PLANNING PLAY THROUGH WUINDIGO/SUBJECT HAVA RADIO STORY OF MAY SECOND/ SUPPORTED ~~XXXXXXX~~ BY PARAPHRASED PORTIONS OF MEJIA'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION TO CORDERO. ALLEGED SOURCE OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WILL BE BY WUINDIGO FROM HIS REBEL CONTACTS SDOM. THIS IS TO ALERT YOU IN EVENT YOU MAY WISH TO LIVE MONITOR AT LIFEAT LP PRIOR TO POSSIBLE EVACUATION SHOULD YOU SO DESIRE AS PRECAUTIONARY ACTION.

23. WUINDIGO, KUBARK CLEARED AND WITTING PRESS ASSET WHO PUBLISHES IN CANADIAN AND BRAZ PRESS AND JUST RETURNED FROM SDOM WHERE INTERVIEWED REBELS.

END OF MESSAGE

DDP/S
WH/2

Des FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT WH

TIME 2300

BY DD

INFO

VR. FILE DDP WH/C8 CA2 CA/PROP FI FI/INT2

S E C R E T 102358Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO SDOM WAVE CITE MEXI 3344

11 May 65 IN 63771

REFS DIR 38156

DIR 38566

TAPE UNOBTAINABLE.

S E C R E T

CFN REF INFO PLACED RADIO HAVANA.

SECRET

[illegible] 201

14-00000

[redacted]

ORIG: W.J. Kaufman
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 10 May 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO:

MESSAGE FORM 30
31 S E C R E T

	ROUTING		
1	1	5	
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3		7	
4		8	

OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE
XXXXXXXX

TO : MEXICO CITY SANTO DOMINGO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: DDP, WH/C 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, VR, FILE

TO DIR XXXX MEXI INFO SDOM WAVE (R) CITE DIR

REF: DIR 08156 *

08566

1. HAVE LOCATED SUBJECT FBIS BROADCASTS OF 0635 GMT 2 MAY CITING ESSENTIALLY MATERIAL OF PARAS TWO AND THREE MEXI 3312 (IN 61214).

2. ADVISE PRIORITY STATION ESTIMATE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING TAPE PARA TWO REF CORDERO ALLEGEDLY MADE OF HIS TELECON WITH MEJIA.

END OF MESSAGE

*Concerned telecon between Dominican exile CORDERO in Mexico and Mejia one of 14 June party leaders in DR.

F.C. [illegible]
201-

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, WHD

C/WH/2
WH/C (Fastetter in draft)

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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4		8	

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, CA 2, WH 7, CA/PROP,

S E C R E T 152351Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3134 EASBY ACTING

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF WAVE 0672 (IN 44349)

DIR 01750

WILL DO THROUGH AMPACA-1.

SECRET

~~CFN~~ RE USING QDELF FOR SURFACING MAILPAK.

Din

16 APR 65 IN 46170

SECRET

P.C. Ruiz Galan Sol.

201-336474

14-00000

SECRET

14 1965

REPORT # CC1182

TO: [redacted]

FROM: ARCHIVES

-336474

SUBJECT: File traces requested on RICO Galan, Victor.
(PP-20062 Mexico)

FILE DATA

RICO Galan, Victor
Spanish refugee writer, nationalized in Mexico. In Mexico defends Fidel Castro and his revolution.
Source: Newspaper "Hoy", 26 Jan 60, page 7.

Correspodent in Cuba of the Mexican magazine "Siempre" who interviewed the President of the Republic of Cuba.
Source: Newspaper "Revolucion", 6 Dec. 62 page 1.

Mexican PP-57115. Trip Mexico-Havana 5/25/63
Source: Passenger list "amigos".

Trip Mexico-Havana on 28 Jan 64, PP-Mexico 53641-Courtesy
Trip Mexico-Havana on 29 March 65. Flight 465- PP-20062 Mexico.
Tourist.
Source on these two trips: CCA passenger list.

RAB

Basic doc filed in 50-9-12
23 apr 65 ar
HFGA 21038/12

[redacted]

201-336474

14-00000

[illegible]SIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

71/2 SECRET

RI ☑ COPY ☐ [illegible]

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION WH/C 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH 7, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS

SECRET 132[illegible]32

MEXI INFO DIR CITE WAVE 0672

13 APR 65 IN 44349

Dm

TYPIC MHSPAWN

REF MEXI 3092 (IN 43674) ✓

HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH QDELF AND CAN HANDLE SURFACING IF MATERIAL COMPATIBLE WITH QDELF KNOWN REPORTING CRITERIA. HOWEVER VIEW FACT SURFACING ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH AMPACA-1 SUGGEST HE HANDLE MATTER IN ORDER PREVENT BLOWING TO AMPACA-1 THAT KUBARK HAS DIRECT LINK WITH QDELF.

SECRET ✓ RE QDELF BEST PERSON RE SURFACING.

CFN

SECRET

Rico Galan

201-33647

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 22

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

☑ COPY ☐ RUMI…

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

APR 14 8 15 AM '65

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 131813Z

DIR CITE MEXI 3399(EASBY ACTING)

PERUMEN

VICTOR RICO GALAN AND WIFE RETURNED FROM CUBA 12 APRIL.

S E C R E T

CFN

13 APR 65 IN 44191

ACTION

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

~~3~~ SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, CA2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS,

S
E C R E T 130030Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 3092 (EASBY ACTING) 13 APR 65 IN 43574

MHSPAWN PBRUMEN

REF DIR 98512 (NOT SENT WAVE)

1. FYI: FOR WAVE: REF INDICATED DIR AGREEMENT THAT STORY OF ACTIVITIES OF VICTOR RICO GALAN, SIEMPRE COLUMNIST AND AMTHUG-1 AGENT, BE SURFACED.

2. BELIEVE BEST PERSON FOR REF SURFACING IF QDELF. HE IS FRIEND OF AMPACA-1 AND LATTER ALMOST POSITIVE HE CAN ARRANGE FOR QDELF TO PLAY IN HIS LATAM COLUMN. FIRST HOWEVER WISH DIR AND/OR WAVE COMMENTS AS BELIEVE KUBARK HAS MORE DIRECT CONTACT WITH QDELF. IF EITHER WAVE OR DIR CAN PASS TO HIM MEXI WILL FORWARD ROUGH DRAFT BASED ON KNOWN FACTS FOR QDELF REWRITE AND SURFACING. MEXI COULD THEN EXPOLIT LOCALLY. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

Victor Rico-Galan

ORIG : C. HALLIWELL
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 2 APRIL 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-336474
201-356572

MESSAGE FORM 29
2 SECRET

ROUTING			
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2 APR 65 23 04z

TO : MEXI

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: RI/AN, DDP, WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OA, VR, FILE, F/INT 2, FI,

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

98512

MHSPAWN PBRUMEN

REF: A. MEXI 2969 (IN 35342)

B. HMMW 12422

Carl Migdail US News + World Rpt staffer

1. TAKING ALL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT AND IN VIEW PRESENT LIMITATIONS LIOSAGE-1 OA AS OUTLINED REF B, PREFER AVOID REF A INVOLVEMENT.

2. CONCUR TIME RIPE BURN RICO GALAN. DOES STATION HAVE ANY OTHER OUTLET AVAILABLE?

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs: A. L-1 on 30 Mar asked for Sta assistance in story for his mag on subversive activities Sov Bloc Cuban Embassies.
B. L-1 OA specifically limits passage classified information to him.

WH/PO/B ✓

CI/OPS (in draft) Hughes

WH/C/CA (in draft)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
CHIEF, WH/1

File Rico Galan

201-356572

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INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO
FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM MEXICO CITY
ACTION WH 8

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~~FE~~	DESK	
ABSTRACT	✓	INDEX

S E C R E T 301955Z
DIR CITE MEXI 2948
JMGIN LIFIRE

1. LAURA MENESES AND JUAN JUARBE JUARBE ARRIVED MEXI FROM CUBA 29 MAR.

2. VICTOR RICO GALAN (MEXICAN) AND WIFE LEFT FOR CUBA 29 MARCH.

S E C R E T
CFN

30 Mar 65 IN 34218

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Will be ZZ'd from Manifest

30 Mar 65
201-336474

FORM 1-64 1389 RI COPY RI COPY

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FROM
GUATEMALA

ACTION
WH8

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VR, FILE, CA2, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT2

SECRET 032130Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4617

REF: A. DIR 88485

B. GUAT 4600 (71717)

C. GUAT 4614 (71-4333)*

113 Mar 65 IN 15127

AT LUNCHEON 3 MARCH AT WHICH INWOOD BROUGHT DUNOON AND MINGOV SERRANO TOGETHER, INWOOD ASKED SERRANO WHAT SUPPORT GOG WOULD GIVE STATION IN RICO GALAN CASE IF MEX GOVT WERE TO DEPORT RICO TO GUAT. MINGOV AT FIRST ANSWERED COULD JAIL FOR SEVERAL MONTHS WITHOUT FANFARE, THEN PASS ON TO ANOTHER COUNTRY. LATER AGREED COULD STRETCH THIS TO SIX MONTHS. POSSIBLILITY MINUTE OF ANY LONG TERM INCARCERATION.

SECRET

* SUSPENDED PUBLICATION OF RICO GALAN CASE.

SECRET

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FROM GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PEG, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS

SECRET 022337Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4614

REF: DIR [illegible]

GUAT 40[illegible] (IN [illegible])

ODB SUSPENDED ACTION ON PUBLICATION OF NICO GALAN CASE 1 MAR DUE TO RECENT INCIDENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED ON GUAT MEXI BORDER. MEXI GOVT NOW INTERESTED IN TAKING [illegible] ACTION AGAINST

SECRET

CFN NICO GALAN

3 Mar 65 IN 14333

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM 17

8 SECRET

ORIG : JOHN H. WHITTEN
UNIT : C/WH 2
EXT : 5110
DATE : 27 FEBRUARY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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27 Feb 65 15 57 z
PRIORITY
SIG CEN

TO : GUATEMALA CITY ~~MEXICO CITY~~

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO VR, FILE, CA 2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

38485

TO PRIORITY XX GUAT INFO MEXI CITE DIR

REF GUAT 460[illegible] (IN 11717) *

1. MEXI GOVERNMENT NOW INTERESTED IN TAKING SOME ACTION AGAINST RICO GALAN, AND GUAT SURFACING OF TAPE AND OTHER CHARGES NOW MAY IMPEDE MEXICAN INVESTIGATION. REQUEST GUAT ATTEMPT DELAY PUBLICATION UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2. GUAT PLS EXPLORE WITH GUAT AUTHORITIES POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTING RICO GALAN SHOULD MEXICANS BY ANY CHANCE DEPORT HIM TO GUAT. MEXI PLS ADVISE IF IT FEASIBLE TO ASK MEXI AUTHORITIES TO COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST RICO GALAN WITH GUAT GOVT, POSSIBLY THROUGH KUBARK.

END OF MESSAGE

* Re ESLOGIC-1 EFFORTS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPE

WH/1

C/

JOSEPH FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN H. WHITTEN
C/WH 2

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
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	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Mexican Naturalization Law

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: A. MEXI-2594
B. MEXI-2595

1. Attached is a copy of LIELEGANT's "first draft" of a study (for LIRAMA) of the Mexican Naturalization Law -- with a view to De-Naturalization Proceedings which might be instituted against

201-336474

a. Victor RICO Galan, former Spanish citizen, Communist, who is now a naturalized Mexican citizen.

b. Arnaldo ORFILA Reynal, former Argentine citizen, who was called a Communist by LIRAMA and who is now a naturalized Mexican citizen.

2. The attached is being sent to Headquarters for information only.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

Enclosure:
Study

Distribution:
3 - WH, w/encl (1 cy)

201-336474

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25478	26 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER Unknown

A

LEY DE NACIONALIDAD Y NATURALIZACION, publicada en el "Diario Oficial" de 20 de enero de 1934.

"ART. 17.- Por conducto del Juez, el interesado elevará una solicitud a la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores pidiendo su carta de naturalización y renunciando expresamente a su nacionalidad de origen, así como a toda sumisión, obediencia y fidelidad a cualquier gobierno extranjero, especialmente a aquel de quien el solicitante haya sido súbdito; y a toda protección extraña a las leyes y autoridades de México y a todo derecho que los Tratados o la ley internacional concedan a los extranjeros; protestando, además, adhesión, obediencia y sumisión a las leyes y autoridades de la República. Estas renuncias y protestas serán ratificadas en la presencia del Juez, en el caso de naturalización ordinaria.

Cuando se demuestre que el extranjero, al hacer las renuncias y protestas a que este artículo se refiere, lo ha hecho con reservas mentales, en forma fraudulenta o sin la verdadera intención definitiva y permanente de quedar obligado por ellas, quedará sujeto a todas las sanciones legales que esta misma ley o cualquiera otra disposición impongan o puedan imponer en el futuro".

ART. 18.- Si el extranjero que solicita su naturalización tiene algún título de nobleza otorgado por algún gobierno extranjero, deberá renunciar expresamente al derecho que tenga de poseerlo y usarlo.

REGLAMENTO DE LOS ARTICULOS 47 Y 48 DE LA LEY DE NACIONALIDAD Y NATURALIZACION, publicado en el "Diario Oficial" de 6 de septiembre de 1940.

ART. 4o.- La voluntad de renuncia a toda sumisión, obediencia y fidelidad a cualquier gobierno extranjero, así como la voluntad de adhesión, obediencia y sumisión a las leyes y autoridades de la República, que de acuerdo con lo prevenido en el artículo 17 de la ley debe de protestar el solicitante de la carta de naturalización, debe de ser una voluntad real, constante y efectiva.

La simulación, reserva mental o quebrantamiento de dicha voluntad, así como cualquier otro vicio invalidante de la misma, revelados por hechos anteriores o posteriores a su declaración, hacen ésta ineficaz y, en consecuencia, anulan la naturalización concedida.

Son hechos reveladores, para los efectos del párrafo anterior:

a).- La ejecución de actos contrarios a la seguridad interior y exterior del Estado;

A-31 UNMM 25478 CS COPY 201-336474

1

A

b).- La realización, en provecho de un país extranjero, de actos que fueren incompatibles con la calidad de ciudadano mexicano y contrarios a los intereses de México;

c).- El mantenimiento de relaciones de cualquier índole, que a juicio de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores implique sumisión a un Estado extranjero, con autoridades, agrupaciones o instituciones de carácter político o público que no sean mexicanas, salvo que se trate de empresas industriales o mercantiles y el naturalizado esté dedicado a actividades similares en México;

d).- Cuando el naturalizado ingrese en asociaciones locales o nacionales que directa o indirectamente estén vinculadas a un Estado extranjero o dependan de él. Se excluyen de este precepto las sociedades mercantiles inscritas en el Registro de Comercio que tengan un carácter estrictamente civil, deportivo o cultural, sin lazos de ninguna especie con agentes extranjeros.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 17

32/2 SECRET

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FROM GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS

S E C R E T 261535Z

26 FEB 65 IN 11717

DIR MEXI CITE GUAT 4600

REF: DIR 87826 *

Wayne Carley

1. ESLOGIC-1 EFFORTS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPE HAD BEEN FRUSTRATED BY MINGOV WHO TOOK POSITION GUAT-MEXI RELATIONS COULD BE DAMAGED. HOWEVER, ON 25 FEB, DURING MEETING OF SECURITY CHIEFS WITH PERALTA, ESLOGIC-1 AGAIN RAISED QUESTION AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM PERALTA TO SURFACE STORY THROUGH RAFAEL ESCOBAR ARGUELLO, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION OF GOG. STORY SHOULD APPEAR IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. STATION REASONABLY CERTAIN GUAT GOVT WOULD BE HAPPY ACCEPT AND PROSECUTE RICO GALAN BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS SATISFACTORY SOLUTION SINCE EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT IN SUCH CASES PRISONER IS USUALLY DROPPED IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AFTER SHORT DETENTION. WE ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES, HOWEVER, AND WILL OFFER DEFINITIVE COMMENTS IN A FEW DAYS.

S E C R E T

* REF RYBAT.

CSN

SECRET

14-00000

Wue

ORIG : WCARLEY - tvo
UNIT : C/WH/2/CICE
EXT : 6026
DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET

18

ROUTING

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25 FEB 65 22 32

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO Guatemala City
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 6
INFO : ADDP, C/CA 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 4, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO GUAT CITE DIR 87826

DESENSITIZED

LIRAMA

REFS: A) MEXI-2594 (IN 86913)

B) MEXI-2595 (IN 10056) (Not sent Guat)

C) DIR-86993

FROM DAINOLD

1. OBVIOUSLY, WE READY AND WILLING ASSIST LIRAMA WHEREVER POSSIBLE AND FEASIBLE IN EFFORTS TO "DENATURALIZE" AND DEPORT INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS RICO GALAN, ARNALDO ORFILA REYNAL (AND PRESUMABLY OTHERS TO COME). HOWEVER, IT IS OUR FEELING THAT WE COULD BE OPENING PANDORAS BOX BY USING OUR INFLUENCE IN ENDEAVORING RELOCATE SUCH UNDESIRABLES IN COUNTRIES AS PERU. IT DOUBTFUL THAT PERU WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST, AND IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO EXILE RICO GALAN TO AN AREA WHERE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY CONTINUE TO CAUSE TROUBLE. BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE LIRAMA EFFORTS, OFFERING OUR ASSISTANCE IN COMPILING MATERIAL THAT COULD BE USED IN DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS, BUT POINTING OUT TO LIRAMA THAT DEPORTATION DESTINATION MUST BE WORKED OUT BY MEXICAN GOVT AND COUNTRY OF INDIVIDUALS BIRTH.

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MIGHT BE PROBLEM SINCE RICO GALAN BORN IN SPAIN. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION ([illegible]) MIGHT BE TO

(CONTINUED)

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG : McCARLEY - tvo
UNIT : C/WH/2/CICE
EXT : 6025
DATE : 25 FEBRUARY 65

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TO : MEXICO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 87826

--PAGE 2--

EXTRADITE RICO GALAN TO GUAT FOR PROSECUTION ON CHARGE OF AIDING GUERRILLAS (THIS POSSIBLY WOULD BE FACILITATED BY REIMPOSITION OF STATE OF SIEGE IN GUAT 24 FEBRUARY). Feel this solution preferable to our previous suggestion in Ref C. Guat pls comment.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/2
C/WH/C/S
C/WH/CA/A

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/2

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

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C/WH 6

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C/CA/O 2, C/FE/D 4, C/FE/INT, C/IW (SUSPENSE 2)

S E C R E T 242010Z

24 FEB 65 IN 10056

Suspense ... B

DIR CITE MEXI 2595

DESENSITIZED

LIRAMA LIENVOY

REF A MEXI 2587 (PG219)
B MEXI 2594 (P 6943)

1. FOLLOWING ARE ADDITIONAL TOPICS TAKEN UP WITH LIRAMA BY LIELEGANT AND CURTIS ON NIGHT 19 FEBRUARY.

A. LIRAMA VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD CANCELLED THE PEMEX CONTRACT WHICH PASCUAL GUTIERREZ ROLDAN (FORMER DIRECTOR OF PEMEX) HAD SIGNED WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS CONTRACT WAS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. LIRAMA SAID THE TURBO-DRILLS WHICH HAD ALREADY ARRIVED (HE THOUGHT THREE IN NUMBER) WOULD BE THE ONLY PART OF THE CONTRACT ALLOWED.

B. LIELEGANT GAVE LIRAMA A BRIEF MEMO ON THE FONDO DE CULTURA ECONOMICA AND ITS DIRECTOR ARNALDO ORFILA REYNAL. THIS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY BY DAINOLD AND LIELEGANT ON 2 FEB. MEMO PREPARED BY STATION, TRANSLATED BY LIENVOYS. LIRAMA SAID THIS A "REAL COINCIDENCE" SINCE SOME SIX WEEKS AGO HE HAD ASKED ANTONIO ORTIZ MENA, MINISTRY OF TREASURY, TO GET RID OF ORFILA REYNAL AS DIRECTOR OF FCE "SINCE ORFILA IS A COMMUNIST".

HE ASKED LIELEGANT TO INCULDE ORFILA REYNAL ON HIS STUDY OF "DENATURALIZATION POSSIBILITIES" AND SAID IF DENATURALIZED ORFILA REYNAL WOULD BE "RETURNED TO HIS NATIVE ARGENTINA". HE HAD ASKED THAT SALVADOR AZUELA (WHO FAVORABLY KNOWN OF BY STATION) BE PUT IN AS DIRECTOR OF FCE. HE ADDED THAT NOW, HOWEVER, PEOPLE WOULD THINK ORFILA REYNAL FIRED BECAUSE FCE PUBLISHED "THE CHILDREN OF SANCHEZ" BY OSCARR LEWIS WHICH HAS CREATED GREAT DEAL ADVERSE MEXICAN COMMENT.

C. CONCERNING THE NEWSPAPER EXCELEIOR (WHICH LIELEGANT RAISED) LIRAMA SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE FIGHT WAS BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI COMMUNISTS. HE SAID THERE WERE SOME "TOO FAR RIGHT" INCLUDING ONE OR TWO MEMBERS OF "LOS TECOS" RIGHT WING CATHOLIC GROUP. HE BELIEVED THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF EXCELSIORS WOULD COME OUT ALL RIGHT.

D. LIRAMA THEN MENTIONED THAT MANUEL ESPINOSA IGLESIAS AND GABRIEL ALARCON, WHO FOUNDING "EL HERALDO" NEW MEXICAN DAIL/OF "RIGHT", HAVE CLAIMED THEY HAVE LIRAMA BACKING. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ADVISED BUT WAS NOT INVOLVED. HE DESCRIBED ALARCON AS "CONTRABANDISTA" AND GANGSTER".

E. SECURITY PROCEDURES IN LIRAMA OFFICE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 2

34 SECRET

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH6

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INFO VR. FILE ADDP, CICI, CIFF 2, DDP, DC/WH/SAS, C/CI/IC 2

SECRET 241905Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2594

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT LIRAMA LIENVOY

REF A DIR 86998

B MEXI 2587 (NOT SENT GUAT) (P6219)

24 FEB IN 86943

ATTENTION DAINOLD

1. ON NIGHT 19 FEB LIELEGANT AND CURTIS MET WITH LIRAMA. LIELEGANT RAISED SUBJECT VICTOR RICO GALAN AND PASSED TO LIRAMA BRIEF BIO MEMO AND COPY OF TAPE (WHICH LIENVOY HAD TRANSCRIBED). TAPE AND MEMO GIVEN AS RESULT DAINOLD AND LIELEGANT DISCUSSION NIGHT 2 FEB AT LIELEGANT HOME. LIRAMA KEPT TAPE, TRANSCRIPT AND MEMO. HE ASKED LIELEGANT TO MAKE IMMEDIATE STUDY OF MEXI NATURALIZATION LAWS TO FIND OUT HOW RICO GALAN COULD BE "DENATURALIZED" AND THEN DEPORTED. LIRAMA ASKED CURTIS IF LATTER COULD ARRANGE FOR COUNTRY SUCH AS PERU TO ACCEPT RICO GALAN AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. LIRAMA SAID HE WAS AWARE THAT RICO GALAN WAS A DRUNKEN PHILANDERER, AND REQUESTED CURTIS INITIATE SURVEILLANCE IN ORDER OBTAIN EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD ASSIST "DE-NATURALIZATION" PROCEDURE. (FYI: STATION HAS HAD SURVEILLANCE RICO GALAN SINCE 17 FEB WITH LIEMBRACES. ALSO FYI LIFEAT OF 28 JAN REPORTS THAT

SECRET

IN 86943
PAGE 2

SECRET

Rico
IZD GALAN REQUESTED EMERGENCY LOAN OF [illegible] THOUSAND MEXICAN PESOS FROM AMRIFT-1, AS RICO GALAN WAS BROKE AFTER DRINKING SPREE AND WIFE EXPECTING SALARY MONEY. AMRIFT-1 AGREED. NOTE. THIS NOT REPEAT NOT PASSED TO MEXICANS).

2. LIRAMA ASKED TO BE ADVISED ANY FUTURE INFORMATION ON RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES. LIRAMA ALSO REMINDED LIELEGANT THAT IN HIS STUDY OF NATURALIZATION LAWS TO REMEMBER THAT RICO GALAN MEMBERSHIP IN ANY GROUP WHICH OWED ALLEGIANCE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (SUCH AS CP) WOULD MAKE "DE-NATURALIZATION" EASIER.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

23 February 1965

VICTOR RICO GALAN (201-336474)

1. DPOB: 6 February 1928; El Ferrol, Spain. Subject, Spanish by birth, became a Mexican citizen by naturalisation on 15 March 1949.

2. CIVIL STATUS: Subject is married to Ingeborg DIENER de Rico.

3. ADDRESS: Providencia 930, Mexico City, D. F. Telephone number as of September 1964: 23 07 92. This phone is registered in the name of his mother-in-law, Tilli PICHLER viuda de Diener, whose address is also Providencia 930.

4.) OCCUPATION: Writer for Siempre and Politica magazines in Mexico City; both are effective Communist-lining magazines and have large circulation.

5) PHOTOGRAPH: Available in Subject's 201 file (date of photograph October 1963 ~~[illegible]~~).

6) POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AND INCLINATIONS: As of 1962 Subject was the head of the National Press and Propaganda Committee of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in Mexico City, a rabidly anti-U.S. and pro-Castro organization. Subject is close to Fidel Castro and company, and is ~~[illegible]~~ considered as a Cuban "agent" (degree of Cuban control unknown). ~~[illegible]~~ Subject was a founding member of the MLN. In an article in Siempre in March 1963 he advocated the foundation of a new political party reflecting the ideology of General Lazaro Cardenas, leftist former President of Mexico. This would have provided, in his belief, the Mexican left a political organization truly responsive to the radical tendencies of the 1910 revolution. This was necessary because the MLN, whose membership covers the spectrum of Mexican Communist Party to PRI, could not take open political stands without antagonizing some of the membership. The new party would have represented a "third position", socialism in internal affairs and independence of any bloc in international affairs. With a party such as this as its political action arm, the MLN would have developed naturally into a broad national movement such the FRAP in Chile. (Some specious reasoning here).

7) ~~5.~~ **TRAVEL:**

A) To Cuba:

1) July 1962 ; return date unknown
2) 2 October 1962; returned Mexico December 1962
3) 25 May 1963; returned Mexico 22 June 1963
4) 28 January 1964; returned Mexico 25 February 1964

B) Other:

1) Arrived Guatemala City 3 (8?) October 1963
2) Arrived Tegucigalpa 11 October 1963; left 13 October 1963
3) Arrived Managua 13 October 1963; left 17 October 1963
4) Arrived San Jose 17 October 1963; left 20 October 1963
5) Arrived Panama City 20 October 1963; left 22 October 1963
6) Arrived Caracas 22 October 1963; left 12 November 1963
7) Arrived Rio de Janeiro 12 November 1963
8) Arrived Buenos Aires 4 December 1963; left 12 December 1963
9) Arrived Santiago 12 December 1963; left 16 December 1963
10) Arrived Lima 17 December 1963
11) Arrived La Paz 17 December 1963; left 20 December 1963
12) Arrived Lima 20 December 1963
13) Departed Merida 8 January 1964
14) Arrived Santo Domingo 8 January 1964 (via Kingston); left 15 January 1964 for Mexico City (via Kingston)

Ingeborg Diener de RICO Galan, Subject's wife, traveled from Mexico to Cuba in November 1962. Subject was ~~[illegible]~~ at that time in Cuba ~~[illegible]~~

8.) ~~10.~~ **PASSPORT:** [redacted], Subject formerly carried [redacted] "xican passport number 57115, with Cuban courtesy visas. On 9 September 1963 Subject was issued Mexican passport number 56341 (or 53641).

9.) ~~11.~~ **ACTIVITIES:** The reason for the October 1962 trip to Cuba was ostensibly to gather material for a political biography of Fidel Castro. The May/June 1963 trip was to interview Fidel Castro after his return from the Soviet Union. [redacted] Subject claimed that he had spent eight days with Fidel during that visit, five of those aboard ship.

On 24 October 1963 HYSAGE-1 in Panama City reported that Subject had received an operational assignment from Castro (during the May/June 1963 visit to Habana) on which to travel through Central and South America. His [redacted] mission was to persuade leftist parties to immediately begin acts of sabotage and violence, and to try to maintain these in order to take pressure off Venezuela. Subject was also instructed to bring about better unity among competing leftist factions to ensure greater impact for their work. Subject did, in fact, contact many Communist Party and leftist leaders during his Central and South America travel during the period [redacted] October 1963 - January 1964. [redacted] From the (fragmentary) reporting on subject from October 1963 through January 1964 it appears that he did discuss the question of leftist unity.

10. In October 1964 the Guatemalan authorities captured a number of tape recordings from the guerrillas in opezations subsequent to a guerrilla attack on a garrison in Panzos, Alta Verapaz. Included in those tapes was one made by RICO Galan for delivery to the guerrillas. It consists mainly of an exhortation for unity (among the PGT and the 13 November group) and counsel against letting doctrine replace action. The tape clearly reveals RICO to be at once a very intellectual leftist who also has his feet planted quite firmly on the ground. His approach is pragmatic, not theoretical. The text of the tape indicates that it was made sometime after February and before mid-October 1964.

11. There is little at hand to indicate what manner of man is RICO Galan. His 201 file reflects facts but not impressions. He apparently is known personally by LICOOKY-1 and LITAMIL-9 in Mexico City, and these two sources should be queried.

MESSAGE FORM 32

S E C R E T

ORIG: WAYNE H. CARLEY
UNIT: C/WH/2/CI
EXT: 6026
DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO 201-336474

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
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TO: GUATEMALA CITY MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

☐ DESTROY
☑ RETURN TO BRANCH
☐ FILE RID

CONF: WH 8 INFO: DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, TSD 6, FI, VR, FILE

TO GUAT INFO: MEXI CITE DIR

86998

REFS: A. MEXI 2538 (IN 82883)*
B. MEXI 2393 (IN 73062)*
C. GUAT 4537 (IN 70216)*
D. GUAT 4499 (IN 61938)*

23 Feb 65

AN	FI
PB	DEST
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

WH/2/C

FROM DAINOLD

1. WE ARE STILL MOST DESIROUS OF EXPLOITING RICO GALAN TAPE. DESPITE MEXI PBSWING OBJECTIONS TO SURFACING IN MEXICO, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO START BURNING RICO AND THEREFORE URGE GUAT STATION TO MAKE STRONG APPROACH TO GUAT GOVT TO SURFACE LOCALLY. PERHAPS ESPILL ONE OR EVEN PERALTA IF NECESSARY WOULD BE BETTER CHANNEL FOR THIS THAN MINCOV SERRANO. SINCE GUATS RAISED SUBJECT OF TAPE DURING RECENT MINISTERS MEETINGS, THEY PRESUMABLY WOULD BE AMENABLE NOW TO LOCAL SURFACING.

2. ONCE SURFACING ACCOMPLISHED GUAT, WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO EFFECTIVELY EXPLOIT NOT ONLY TAPE ITSELF BUT ALSO OTHER KNOWN INFO ON RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE ON BEHALF CASTRO REGIME.

END OF MESSAGE

(CONTINUED)

201-336474
23 Feb 65

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1-64 1389a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(35)

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

RECEIVED
RIO/MIS

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

ROUTING	
1	5
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MAR 2 11 01 AM '65

MAR 2 9 47 PM '65

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE TWO

CONF: INFO

TO INFO: CITE DIR

WH COMMENT: *Refs all concerned mechanics of surfacing tape recording made by RICO for message to Guatemalan guerrillas.

WH/1 Spera (in draft)

C/WH/PO/B

C/WH/PO/A

C/WH/SA/CI Thiesing (in draft)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

JOHN C. WHITTEN
C/WH/2

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

FROM

Chief of Base, Merida

SUBJECT

PBRUMEN/Victor RICO Galan

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

Attached for addressees files on Subject are copies of LIHACK transcripts for 12 Feb. 1965 reporting a telephone contact between Subject and Mariano GARCIA Perez, the Cuban Consul in Merida. The contact resulted in GARCIA arranging to to visit Subject in the Panamerican Hotel in Merida. LITAU-3, the transcriber, noted that Subject appeared to be intoxicated.

Andrew F. MERTON

Attachment:
LIHACK transcripts

Distribution:
3-WHD w/att (1)
2-Mexi w/att (1)
2-Files w/att (1)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

IMEA-502

DATE

18 Feb. 65

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

Continuación Día 12 de Enero de 1965.-

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba, pero se fue la corriente y no grabó nada mas que el final, donde dice ~~xx~~ Dayal a la persona que habla que pueden venir mañana Sabado de ocho y media a doce y media, por que Mariano hoy no está en la Oficina, y ademas no es hora ya de oficina por la tarde, la persona que habla que es un hombre le dice que él llamó nada mas que para informarse, le da las gracias a Dial y le dice que le salude a Mariano, Daval, cuando nada Rico y se despiden.-

- - - - - - -

Llama desde la calle Mariano Garcia al Consulado de Cuba, le contesta Rico, y le dice para allá voy, y le pregunta si ya llegó una persona, Mariano le dice que no ha llegado, y le pregunta si le han cambiado las dos llantas de adelante al carro, Rico le dice que si, que la ponchada ahora quedó como repuesto y ademas le dice que las llantas que le quedan al carro son repadas, quiere decir recubiertas, que unicamente tiene buenas buenas las dos que le han puesto, y que le han salido las llantas en mil ~~xxxxx~~ sesenta y ocho pesos, de seis capas las llantas, que esas son muy buenas, se despiden.-

- - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba para la calle al Telf. 34-00 ó 31-00- es Rico el que llama para preguntar donde vive el mecánico, el que contestó le dice usted está hablando al Dpto. Técnico, Rico le dice que el mecánico que arregla ahí, no se recuerda el nombre de él, le dice que espere un momentito. Le pregunta el nombre y Rico dice: Mariano Garcia, Calle G. "A", el que está tomando nota le dice, es en la Embajada, Rico dice, efectivamente; y quedan en ~~xx~~ i al Consulado de Cuba mas tarde.-

- - - - -

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba y contesta Mariano Garcia el telefono

Bueno.

Con Mariano Garcia por favor.

Si, es el que habla.

Habla Victor Rico Galan, carajo, tienes abandonados a tus amigos.

Ah como andas.

Chingado viene uno a Merida y nadie lo quiere ni dar ni un carajo, se dan tanta importancia que los mando a la chingada, (habla como si estuviera borracho)

Y como andas.

Nada, ya me voy.

Ya hoy se va, vaya hombre, bueno como pudieramos hacer para verle.

Bueno si se diera una descolgadita por aquí, por que ya no tengo tiempo de nada.

Donde esta usted.

Continuacion dia 12 de Febrero de 1965.-

En el Hotel Pan Americano.

Cuanto lujo caray.

Asi somos los Rico y Galanes.

Que bueno esta eso, que bueno y en que habitacion esta.

en la ciento cinco.

En la ciento cinco....deje ver si dentro de un momentico paso por alla a saludarlo hombre.

Bueno muchas gracias.

Como no.

Entonces al ratito paso por alla.

- - - - -

Empieza dia 13 de Febrero de 1965.-

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al Telf. 74-83- casa del Dr. Ceballo Milan, es Dayal la que llama, pero se equivoca y sale otra casa.-

- - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al telf. 74-83- es Dayal la que llama otra vez, pero no le contesta nadie el telefono, y dice a Mariano que esta al lado de ella, creo que esa gente se fue de viaje, se oye llorar a la niña Tatiana que hace un mes nacio, se cansa y cuelga el telefono.-

- - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle, es la casa Packard Bell y es Dayal la que habla, pidiendo su direccion, le dicen que es la 59 No.517.-

- - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba a la calle al telf. 75-63- ahora si esta claro pues ella lo repite mientras marca el numero en el telefono, es Dayal la que esta llamando, pero tampoco le contestan y cuelga.-

- - - - - - -

Llaman de la calle al Consulado de Cuba y preguntan por Alfonso Cepeda, Mariano le dice a la joven que llama que ahi no hay ningun Alfonso Cepeda y cuelga.-

- - - - - - - - - - -

Llaman del Consulado de Cuba al Telf. 25-05 Foto Omega, es Tipo el que pregunta si unas fotos que dejo ya estan, el numero 8154 es el del recibo, le preguntan si son de color o blanco y negro, Tipo le dice que son de color. Le dicen que las estan terminando de revelar, que hasta la una no estan.

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible] 74
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
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FROM
[illegible]

ACTION
[illegible]

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
VR. FILE [illegible]

R I COPY

S E C R E T 172215Z

16 FEB 1968

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2532
REF A MEXI 2189 (IN 60125)
B MEXI 2413 (IN 74076)

16 FEB 68 IN 02000

WH/1

1. ON 16 FEB COS PASSED TO LIELEGANT FOR COM COPY OF VICTOR RICO GALAN TAPE, ALONG WITH RICO GALAN BIOGRAPHY.

2. DUE OBJECTIONS DEPUTY CHIEF, [illegible], (REF B) MEXI SUGGEST ANY KUBARK OP FOR EXPLOITING TAPE BE DELAYED UNTIL STORY SPONTANEOUSLY SURFACED GUAT OR THIRD COUNTRY.

S E C R E T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 16

☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CP

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

Feb 5 7 43 AM '65

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 5

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

TIME

BY

INFO: VR, FILE, CA 2, CA/PEG, CI, CI/OPS, FI

1		5	PI
2		6	CA
3		7	
4		8	R

201-RICO. Galan

S E C R E T 050337Z

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI-2413

5 Feb 65 IN 74076

REF DIR 82482

GUAT 4552 (IN 74007)

ACTING CHIEF, PBSWING, DOES NOT APPROVE. LIKES IDEA OF BUR VICTOR RICO GALAN BUT FEARS "REGIONAL CONSIDERATION", I.E. POSSIBILITY REF OP MIGHT EVENTUALLY CAUSE STRAIN MEXI-GUAT RELATIONS.

SECRET

CS COPY

SECRET

DD/P 5-0555

4 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Briefing of Reader's Digest Reporter

1. The Mexico City Station has been requested by the Press Office of the Embassy to assist in briefing Mr. Robert Struthers, a roving reporter of the Reader's Digest, who is preparing an article on Cuban/Communist subversion in Latin America and who has expressed displeasure that the Embassy has been unable to provide any briefing on Communist activities in Mexico and Central America.

2. Mexico City Station and WH Division feel that particularly since the Spanish edition of the Reader's Digest has a circulation of over two and one-half million copies, this is an excellent avenue for the otherwise planned surfacing of abundant information (including the existence of a tape recorded speech to Guatemalan guerrillas, recently captured) on Victor RICO Galan, an active Cuban agent and a regular contributor of the weekly leftist magazine, SIEMPRE.

3. A briefing on the activities of Victor RICO Galan and a replay of the tape has already been given officially in Guatemala during the January meeting of the Security Ministers of Central America. No press play has yet been made.

4. CA/Propaganda defers to you for a policy decision. There are no RI traces on Mr. Robert Struthers. Struthers is favorably known to Mr. Paul Chretien's office which has personality and professional data on him.

5. WH Division recommends that you release the attached cable.

Raford W. Herbert
Acting Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: ADDP

C/P

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 26

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

27 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FEB 5 8 28 AM '65

FROM
Guatemala

ACTION
WH8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☒ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED WH

TIME 1825

BY DD

INFO
VR, FILE, CCS 2, DDP, ADDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, C/FI

FEB 4 23 14 Z 65

S E C R E T 042201Z

4 FEB 65 IN 74009

PRIORITY MEXI INFO PRIORITY DIR CITE GUAT 4552

REF: DIR 82482

CONCUR. ASSUME MEXI CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATELY BACKSTOPPED STORY AS TO HOW AUTHOR OBTAINED STORY OF RICO GALAN TAPES WHICH PLAYED AT SUPPOSEDLY SECRET CABINET LEVEL MULTI-NATIONAL MEETING.

S E C R E T

File 201 RICO

Permission granted brief Struther.

CS COPY

SECRET

27

MESSAGE FORM

8 SECRET

ORIG: A. Spera
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 4 February 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

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4		8	

11 Feb 65 [illegible] 28z
PRIORITY

TO: MEXICO CITY, GUATEMALA (bothPRIORITY)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO, VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP ~~WH/SA 8~~, CA 2, ~~CA/PEG~~, DO 4, DO/H 3, C/OPS, CCS 3, CI 2,

---

TO MEXI (PRIORITY) INFO GUAT (PRIORITY) CITE DIR **82482**

REF: MEXI 2393 (IN 73062)*

201-RICO

SUBJECT TO GUAT CONCURRENCE, AND BECAUSE BRIEFING IS AT EXPRESS REQUEST OF EMBASSY PRESS OFFICE, PERMISSION GRANTED BRIEF STRUTHER PER REF AND ~~ES~~ Sp Sp ~~[illegible]~~ UNDER EMBASSY COVER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Reference deals with the already planned surfacing of abundant information available on Victor RICO Galan, an active Cuban agent. Station has been requested by the Press Office of the Embassy to assist in briefing Mr. Robert STRUTHERS, reporter for Reader's Digest and believes this to be excellent opportunity.

AC/WH/1 Spera
WH/POB/Kent (draft)
C/WH/2/Whitten (draft)
WH/SA/CI/Swenson (draft)

CS COPY

Richard Helms
Richard Helms
DD/P

A DDP

Raford W. Herbert
AC/WHD

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

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FROM	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ACTION	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED TIME BY
INFO	VR, FILE, [illegible]

S E C R E T 031940Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2595

REF A DIR 74762

B MEXI 2189 (60125)

C GUAT 4957 [illegible]

IN 73062

1. MR ROBERT STRUTHERS, ROVING REPORTER FOR READER'S DIGEST, PRESENTLY MEXI GATHERING MATERIAL FOR DIGEST ARTICLE ON CASTO-COMMIE SUBVERSION LATAM. HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH PBSWING PRESS OFFICE, AND HAS EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THEY UNABLE PROVIDE ANY SIGNIFICANT BRIEFING ON CUBAN ACTIVITIES MEXI AND CENTRAL AMERICA. ON MORNING 3 FEB PRESS OFFICE APPEALED TO STATION TO GIVE BRIEFING TO STRUTHERS, "WHO HAD BECOME PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM".

2. ROUTINELY STATION ATTEMPTS AVOID CONTACT WITH NEWSMEN ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH PBSWING. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, REQUEST PRIORITY HQS PERMISSION PROVIDE BRIEFING TO STRUTHERS. THIS APPEARS BE PERFECT OPPORTUNITY SURFACE STORY VICTOR RICO GALAN. FOLLOWING APPEARS PERTINENT:

A. TAPE SURFACED GUAT (SEE REF C).

B. AT LEAST SOME SEGMENTS [illegible] ALREADY AWARE RICO GALAN STATUS AS CASTRO AGENT. [illegible] INFORMED [illegible]

SECRET

LIGHT 2 YEA THAT RICO GALAN WAS PAID CASTRO AGENT, AND EXISTENCE OF TAPE KNOWN. SAID HIS SOURCE WAS GUAT COMMIE JORGE FLESH).

C. DIGEST (ESPECIALLY ITS SPANISH EDITION) BEST PPOSSIBLE PUBLICATION TO SURFACE STORY. ITS STEMENDOUS PRESTIGE MEXI WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MAKE GOM MOST CONCERNED ANY REVELATIONS IN ITS PAGES.

D. STATION HAS SEVERAL EXCELLENT REPORT FROM LINLUCK ON RICO GALAN, AND LINLUCK PLEADS THAT INFO BE PASSED TO PBPRIME NEWSMAN.

E. STATION CAN BRIEF STRUTHERS EFFECTIVELY THIS INSTANCE WITHOUT SLANTING STORY ANY WAY. AND STATION CAN ASSURE HIM OF AUTHENTICITY OF RICO GALAN STORY.

F. STATION HAS SUFFICIENT INFO IN FILES ON RICO GALAN TO LAUNCH HARD-HITTING CAMPAIGN AGAINST HIM AND "SIEMPRE" MAGAZINE ONCE GENERAL FACTS APPEAR IN DIGEST.

3. IN SUMMARY, BELIEVE THIS EXCELLENT CHANCE CARRY OUT OBJECTIVES OF REF B. PLS ADVISE PRIOR 1800 MEXI TIME 4 FEB, AS STUTHERS PLANS DEPART MEXI SOONEST.

SECRET

RICO GALAN IS KEY CASTRO AGENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Guatemala

ACTION WH-8

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO RR FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CA-2, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, DDP, WH/C-8

S E C R E T 292325Z

30 JAN 65 IN 70216

DIR MEXI CITE GUAT 4537

REF: GUAT 4499 (IN 61938) *

FROM CORRIGAN

DURING 29 JAN SESSION OF MIN OF GOVT AND SECURITY MEETING MIN SERRANO OF GUAT ANNOUNCED HE HAD AN INTERESTING RECORDING TO PLAY FOR PARTICIPANTS OF MEETING. PROCEEDED TO PLAY 15 MINUTES OF RICARDO GALAN TAPE. LITTLE REACTION BY MINISTERS EXCEPT TO SAY IT VERY INTERESTING. SERRANO HAS OFFERED TO COPY THE TAPE FOR ANY MINISTER SO DESIRING COPY. NO INDICATION ANY REQUESTED COPY.

S E C R E T

CFN

* IF HQS CONCURS STN CAN CONTACT MINGOV AND REQUEST GOG [illegible] – TONY LOCALLY

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	J. [illegible]		[illegible]
2	WH/2/GUAT/[illegible]		[illegible]
3	WH/1/LEHMAN		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Re Victor Rico Galan

Perhaps you can use this in the anti-Rico campaign. Did he ghost write this for the Russians? [illegible] guide him in to Guat? Is Maxwell a pseudo for Rico Galan? [illegible] I have never heard of Kennedi

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
[illegible]	[illegible]

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-61

(40)
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

months here. On completing the training course, most of them will work on laying the transmission line or erecting [illegible] stations.

In an interview to the Cairo Al-Akhbar the Minister for the Aswan High Dam, Sidki Solimon, has named four gains which the Aswan project has already brought the country.

The filling of the reservoir has begun, and it now contains over 5,000 million cubic metres of water. By the end of the year this amount will be doubled. This enables new irrigation to be undertaken.

The danger of flood disasters has been permanently removed. Last year showed that the dam can control even the highest Nile waters.

The old Aswan power plant, 4 miles below the High Dam, now operates without seasonal fluctuations.

Valuable forces have been trained on the project; people have been taught skill and responsibility. Many who got their schooling on the High Dam are now doing a good job elsewhere.

Back in Cairo from Aswan, I went to the Ministry of Irrigation to find out just how the water made available by the High Dam will be used. Over the five years beginning with 1965, [illegible] the area [illegible] will be expanded by [illegible] feddans [illegible] making [illegible] feddans of new land by 1970. In addition, [illegible] feddans are going to get perennial [illegible] of the present more productive [illegible] that they will produce [illegible] a year.

Seeing that the total cultivated area of the U.A.R. is only something over 6 million feddans, Aswan's tremendous importance for Egypt's agriculture stands out very clearly. And while the present construction project will take another five years to complete, the [illegible] will already harvest this summer the first crop from new lands.

SEBASTIAN KANELL

With Guatemala's Guerilla Fighters

"HERE'S a rifle and bullets for you. You'll need them if we encounter the enemy. We probably won't; we're following secret trails known to us alone and, anyway, the soldiers rarely come up into the mountains. Still, you've got to be ready for battle at any moment. Your life depends on it now. Our rule is every man has to be able to defend himself. That means he has to have a rifle...."

Those were the first words I heard from a patrol of the Edgar Ibarra guerilla detachment. That was at six o'clock of a November morning last year. To meet the patrol my guide and I had climbed all night up a [illegible] path, to the top of the first foothills of the Sierra de las Minas mountains. My guide also considered himself a guerilla. He is a member of one of the [illegible] functioning in many of the populated places in the hills. I met him at an appointed place and from there [illegible] to the rendezvous with the guerillas.

We reached the place ahead of time and met the guerillas only a few minutes later. I learned afterwards that the patrol had arrived earlier and had been watching to make certain that nobody was following us.

The patrol consisted of five men. There were a worker, two peasants and a student under the command of a young man who only yesterday had also still been a student. Despite his youth he has already proven himself a staunch revolutionary. All were well outfitted and well armed: tommy guns, rifles, full cartridge belts, pistols, hand grenades—a "gift" of the enemy, as the guerillas call their trophies. Looking at their weather-beaten, emaciated faces I could see that their life in the mountains must be pretty rugged.

After a cold breakfast—no fire was made for safety's sake—my guide started back for the village and we went on to join the detachment. It was a three-days' march. We climbed up and down dozens of hills and steep peaks, blazed a trail through virgin forest, giant trees fifty metres tall and two or three metres in [illegible] I'd seen before only in [illegible]. We even saw a quetzal, the mountain bird that is the symbol of our freedom and which cannot survive in captivity. We waded across swirling mountain streams, some of them coffee-coloured because of the rotting trees along their banks.

We kept to a strict regime on the way. Rising with the sun, we folded up our hammocks, put our kits in order, breakfasted and began our trek. At noon we stopped for dinner and then marched on until five or six in the evening, leaving time to choose a camping place, hang up our hammocks and make a meal before dark. Suppers were our time for

27 Jan. 1965

[illegible] [illegible] about the detachment, [illegible] situation in the country, memories of "civilian" life, of families and friends. We reached the detachment's camping grounds towards evening of the third day. That day we had a hot meal. It was my first "guerilla" dinner —soup, roast squirrel (very tasty, I must say) and, of course, coffee. I spent several days with the guerillas, learning to know these brave patriots, their habits, aspirations, ideals and plans.

• • •

The commander of the detachment—for understandable reasons I omit his name—is a 23-year-old officer, who after graduating from the Military Academy, attended a Yankee-run "anti-guerilla warfare" training centre. His patriotic feelings moved him to go over to the side of the people and devote himself heart and soul to the struggle for their interests. Before joining the guerillas he was one of the leaders of the Alejandro de Leon November 13th Movement (so named in honour of an armed uprising in November 1960 of a group of democratically-minded officers against the venal Ydigoras Fuentes government; the uprising was suppressed and Alejandro de Leon, one of the insurgent officers who continued the struggle, was later killed by secret police agents). The detachment commander, a tall, [illegible] very energetic and kindly-looking [illegible], is well loved and respected both by his comrades-in-arms and by the people of the nearby villages. The "[illegible]" [illegible]—the venal military police agents—hate him intensely.

It is more than a year now that the detachment has been in the mountains. Its members come from various parts of the country: from the capital, from Escuintla and other cities, from the Verapaz, Santa Rosa, Zacapa and Izabal provinces. They are workers and peasants, students, craftsmen and small traders—men of different intellectual levels (some only learned to read and write in the detachment), different walks of life, occupations and political views and different religious faiths. Their ages range from 21 to 50. But whether Catholic or Protestant, Communist or non-Party, all of them are united in an ardent desire to rid the country of its age-old backwardness and foreign monopoly domination.

The detachment has taken the name of Edgar Ibarra, a popular student leader. Besides being a leader of the United Front of Guatemalan Students, Ibarra was a member of the Communist youth organization and the Union of Patriotic Working Youth. Everywhere, in the university, in street demonstrations, in clashes with the police, he infused a revolutionary spirit in the student struggle. One of the first civilians to join the guerilla forces, he was killed in one of the battles fought by the Alaric Bennett detachment. Now the detachment named after him and the [illegible] have joined with other guerilla groups to form a single [illegible]—the Armed Rebel Forces.

From the first the Edgar Ibarra guerillas combined their military operations with work among the peasants of the neighbouring villages. They began to help them with their hard work and to teach reading and writing to whole families. This has won them the solid support of the peasants. While I was with the guerillas, one of them [illegible] a young peasant [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] over the [illegible] and said proudly: "Here in the detachment [illegible] and [illegible]. We have a first-aid station [illegible] in our house. It will come in useful."

• • •

Rio Hondo is a vital populated point in Zacapa department, in the northeast. The railway crossing the country from west to east and running to Santo Tomas and Puerto Barrios, the ports via which all Guatemala's foreign trade is conducted, passes a few kilometres away from it. The Atlantic Route, linking the capital with these ports, also passes it. Just outside it are the dam and the main installations of the Rio Hondo hydroelectric station, which supplies current to the Izabal, Zacapa and Chiquimula departments. Large army and police forces always guard this vital zone. A military unit and a police detachment are permanently quartered in Rio Hondo. Through surveillance and persecution, arrests and torture the government seeks to keep in check the discontent of the people in this part of the country. Nevertheless, it is here, in the east, that the guerilla movement is spreading.



One of the guerilla commanders told me about an operation the detachment carried out in Rio Hondo:

"We based the operation on detailed information gathered by our contacts in the village over many days and then carefully analysed. It concerned the exact location of our targets, the approaches to the power plant and the village. We drew a detailed map of the locality and a [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] plan.

"[illegible] was [illegible] for several [illegible] and held a meeting [illegible] there [illegible] strength to the [illegible] [illegible] for it would be [illegible] military action, all [illegible] would have [illegible] something like a rehearsal."

"[illegible] the [illegible] day we slipped [illegible] This was [illegible] The [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] and [illegible] part of our [illegible] occupy the village and hold [illegible] That would [illegible] of the area [illegible]"

A [illegible] of [illegible], formerly a [illegible] shop-keeper in [illegible], said [illegible] the plan worked out:

"The [illegible] It was a [illegible] there had no one paid any attention when we [illegible] at the [illegible] One group of [illegible] the deputy [illegible] chief [illegible] the men [illegible] the [illegible]

patrolled by a [illegible] Our [illegible] [illegible] to ask [illegible] what [illegible] The [illegible] coming [illegible] to [illegible] this [illegible] though, [illegible] the [illegible] cut the telegraph and telephone lines. And so before leaving the village we rode through it on the lorry and shouted out patriotic slogans.

"Later," continued Pastor, "we learned of the results of our operation. A detachment of 50 soldiers led by another deputy police chief was sent out in pursuit of us. Nearly every inhabitant of [illegible] was questioned. But neither [illegible] people could not [illegible] weaken the [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] in this area."

The [illegible] who [illegible]

[illegible]

* * *

The [illegible]

In next week's NEW TIMES

Economist A. I. Kashkarov discusses the social consequences of automation;

Writer Stefan Heym describes his visit to Cyprus.

north from [illegible] coffee plantations, runs a highway over which everything from coffee to minerals is transported. From Panzos cargoes are shipped via Polochic and Dulce rivers and Lake Izabal to Santo Tomas and Puerto Barrios, there to be transferred to American ships. Panzos was the site of another operation carried out by the Edgar Ibarra detachment. The guerillas occupied it and then retreated without bearing any losses.

The government was compelled to issue an official announcement that "malefactors" had seized a considerable quantity of arms and that troops had been sent out after them with orders to bring them back "dead or alive." This official announcement was significant. Until then the government had denied the existence of a guerilla movement in Guatemala, now its existence was recognized as a fact.

Much as they wished to, the authorities could not conceal the fact that a battle had been fought in Panzos between guerillas and the local garrison, in which the garrison had suffered losses. Besides, the guerillas captured a group of government soldiers in Panzos and, as in Rio Hondo, explained before releasing them: "It's not you we are fighting. You are poor men like ourselves. You have the same hopes we have. We are fighting the oppressive regime set up in our country by a handful of army colonels in the interests of the Yankees."

Whenever the opportunity offers the guerillas explain the aims of their struggle to the soldiers of the regular army. These aims are set forth in detail in the Manifesto issued by the Armed Rebel Forces in November 1964. Contained in it are these lines: "We want a real revolution, not merely change of government. It is not a matter of replacing one set of rulers by another, for then the people would only continue to be mistreated, as has repeatedly been the case in the history of Guatemala. It is a matter of the fundamental renovation of the republic."

The guerilla propaganda, it must be said, falls on fertile soil.

• • •

When I left the guerillas, I heard in farewell these words from our national anthem: "Win or die." The words are now the battle cry of the Armed Rebel Forces. Back in the city I plunged once again into the activities of the underground resistance movement, but there stayed with me the memory of the men of the Edgar Ibarra detachment, the soldiers of one more front of a battle against the oppressors of my people.

Guatemala
December 1964

Answers to Readers' Questions

The Soviet Union's Diplomatic Relations

N. H. Knsilaveis of Khodorov, Lvov Region, and other New Times readers have written in to ask what countries the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations with.

• • •

By January 1 this year the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with 95 countries. Seventy-three of them have diplomatic missions in Moscow. The Soviet Union maintains diplomatic missions in 81.

The following is the list:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia*, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica*, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, Denmark, Dominican Republic*, Ecuador*, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala*, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, [illegible], Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua*, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda, Rumania, Saudi Arabia (diplomatic relations established in 1926 but later not maintained), Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

---

* No diplomatic missions have been exchanged.

MESSAGE FORM 15

ORIG: Alan H. Hall
UNIT: WH/2 Guat
EXT: 5801
DATE: 19 Jan 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

3/ SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

19 JAN 65 15 z
ROUTINE

TO: GUATEMALA
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8
INFO CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, VR, FILE

TO GUAT INFO MEXI CITE DIR 78736

REF: GUAT 4499 (IN 61938)*

CONCUR PARA TWO REF. NO NEED TO USE UNILATERAL ASSETS TO SURFACE RICO GALAN TAPES IN GUAT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Since the Rico Galan tapes were acquired from the Guatemalan Army and permission to release them to the Mexican Government was requested ~~[illegible]~~ by the Station and granted by the Guatemalan Government, the Station points out that it might be insecure to surface them in Guatemala using unilateral Station assets.

WH/SA/CI A. Horn (By Phone)
WH/FI
WH/POA
WH/1

DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN M. WHITTEN
Chief, WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FROM GUATEMALA

ACTION WH 8

INFO

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UNIT TIME BY

VR. FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, WH/SA 2, VR, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 181622Z

DIR INFO MEXI CITE GUAT 4499 18 Jan 65 IN 61938

REF: DIR 78064 *

1. STATION SUGGESTS HQS CONSIDER SECURITY ASPECTS INVOLVED SURFACING STORY RICO GALAN TAPES IN GUAT. ACTING ON HQS INSTRUCTIONS STATION OBTAINED PERMISSION GOG FOR MEXI PASS TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS TO GOG. GOG, THEREFORE, AWARE NOT ONLY THAT KUBARK HAS TAPES BUT DESIRES EXPLOIT THEM. STATION FEELS STRONGLY THAT LOCAL SURFACING BY STATION ASSETS WOULD IMMEDIATELY EXPOSE KUWOLF MECHANISMS TO GOG.

2. ON OTHER HAND, IF HQS CONCURS, STATION CAN CONTACT MINGOV AND REQUEST GOG SURFACE STORY LOCALLY. DUE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS GOG MAY BE RELUCTANT HENCE STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE SURFACING. ALSO SUGGEST POSSIBILITY GOG WILL BECOME AWARE KUBARK ASSETS OTHER AREAS IF AND WHEN STORY EXPLOITED IN HEMISPHERE.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE RE PARA 2.

4. NO INDEX.

SECRET

CFN * CONTAINED SURFACE TAPES THAT.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 2
6110
16 JAN 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

15 JAN 65

TO MEXICO CITY GUATEMALA CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF WH 8 INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/SA 8, CA 2, CA/PROP

MEXI GUAT INFO CITE DIR 78064

REF MEXI 2139 (IN 60125)

CONCUR MEXI SUGGESTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

In ref, Mexico City suggested that the tapes of Nico Galan addressing Guat guerillas be surfaced in Guatemala City instead of in Mexico as part of the [illegible] material.

WH 1 Mr. Fraenkel in draft
WH/SA/CI Mr. Tausing by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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JOHN M. WHITTEN
C/WH 2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

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4	RE	8	Rec

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

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UNIT

TIME

BY /

INFO

VR. FILE FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OPS, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3

SECRET 150040Z 15 JAN 65 60125

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 2189

AMMUG LINLUCK

REF DIR 74762

GUAT 4479 (IN 55652)

1. STATION HAS REVIEWED REF TAPE WHICH HANDCARRIED MEXI BY LUND. REQUEST HQS CONCURRENCE THAT TAPE NOT RPT NOT BE PASSED GOM WITH AMMUG REPORT. REQUEST BASED ON FOLLOWING:

A. MEXI STATION IS CERTAIN THAT REPORT ON VICTOR RICO GALAN SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF TAPE WILL BE PUT INTO DEEP FREEZE BY GOM. ANY ACTION TAKEN BY GOM WILL BE LIMITED TO INCREASED COVERAGE RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES. GOM WILL CERTAINLY NOT SURFACE ANY INFORMATION WHICH WILL GIVE GOG OPPORTUNITY DESCRIBE MEXI AS BASE FOR ANTI-GOG SUBVERSION.

B. VICTOR RICO GALAN IS TOP WRITER FOR "SIEMPRE", EXCELLENT MEXI MARXIST PUBLICATION WHICH IS PRIME STATION DENIGRATION TARGET. IF KUBARK WOULD SPONSOR THIRD-COUNTRY EXPLOITATION MAGAZINE AS WELL AS RICO GALAN WOULD SUFFER.

C. LINLUCK HAS JUST PASSED TO STATION DETAILED EXPOSE MEXI BASED SUPPORT TO GUAT GUERRILLAS, WHICH SINGLES OUT RICO GALAN

SECRET

PREACHING FROM "SIEMPRE" PODIUM. THIS PIECE COULD DOVETAIL SMOTHLY IN USE REF RICO GALAN GUAT ACTIVITIES.

D. REF TAPE AS EXAMPLE EXISTING EVIDENCE OF A MEXICAN (RICO GALAN IS SPANISH-BORN BUT NATURALIZED) INTERFERING IN GUAT INTERNAL POLITICS PROVIDES KUBARK ~~W H~~ WITH OPPORTUNITY FOR PSYCH OP WHICH WILL COMPLEMENT AMMUG REPORT AND WHICH GOM CANNOT DUCK, PRESUMING SURFACING IN THIRD COUNTRY.

2. SUGGEST HQS AND GUAT CONSIDER FOLLOWING: THAT REF RICO GALAN ACTIVITIES AGAINST GOG BE SURFACED GUAT, INCLUDING STATEMENT THAT TAPE EXISTS. THAT HQS THEN ARRANGE PASS SPLENDID LINLUCK MATERIAL (WHICH ALREADY PREPARED IN FORM OF NEW STORY) TO PBPRIME JOURNALIST. LATTER WOULD THEN COMBINE TWO STORIES, PAINTING RICO GALAN AS MASTER PBRUMEN AGENT OPERATING FROM MEXICAN SOIL. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~THIS STORY~~ THIS STORY COULD THEN BE EXPLOITED THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT TO GOM, WHICH WOULD THEN BE ALMOST FORCED TAKE ACTION AGAINST RICO GALAN AND POSSIBLY "SIEMPRE". (AND AT THAT TIME THERE NO REASON STATION COULD NOT PASS REF TAPE TO GOM TO RELIEVE ANY DOUBTS IT MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING RICO GALAN'S COMPLICITY WITH PBRUMEN).

3. IN SUMMARY, SUGGEST THAT PASSED AS PART OF AMMUG REPORT

SECRET IN 60125
PAGE 3

THIS RED HOT RICO GALAN REPORT WILL ONLY BE SWEPT UNDER RUG BY GOM. A PARA TWO TYPE OP HOWEVER WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE INTENSE PSYCH IMPACT IN BOTH MEXI AND GUAT, AND MIGHT WELL FORCE GOM INTO ACTION COMPATIBLE WITH AIMS OF AMMUG SURFACING.

4. REQUEST DIR AND GUAT COMMENTS.

SECRET

CFN.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

W4/6 - 1 [illegible] 64 **DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE**

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
Sato Vazquez, Antonio

5. ANALYST: TS
6. DATE PROCESSED: 22 Mar 61

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
~~2. RI FILE NO.~~
~~3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.~~
~~4. DATE~~
~~7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM~~
~~8. DATE OF INFO.~~
~~9. EVALUATION~~
~~10. DISSEMINATED IN~~
~~11. DATE~~

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION
14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/CA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 90192

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201- 290 544

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-38)

INS name trace
16 Dec '66
Subject: Soto-Vazquez, Antonio

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA	FROM: (Division) SOD (Case officer) W. Wainwright (Extension) 4475
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) SOTO-Vazquez, Antonio	NAME SHOWN IS ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT
CI/OA NO. 90192	201 NO. 294544
PROJECT WITHRUSH	
DATE OF BIRTH 20 August 1934	PLACE OF BIRTH Nava, Cuba
AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED	

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

1. It is requested that OA on Subject be canceled as he is of no further operational interest to this office.

   Thank you for your assistance in this case.

2. Green List Name Check canceled as of this date.

DATE: 3 September 1966

SIGNATURE: William E. Wainwright

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-55 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/C8, AF7, DDP/AIR

SECRET 190955Z

19 DEC 65 IN 17808

DIR WAVE CITE LEOP 3043

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN

FOLL IS ITINERARY OF CECILIO PADRON AND ANTONIO SOTO. BOTH MEN HAVE SAME SCHEDULE UP TO NEW YORK: DEPT LEOP 16 DEC VIA SABENA FOR ATHENS; 17 DEC ATHENS TO MADRID; 17-20 DEC MADRID; ARRIVE 19 NEW YORK 20 DEC. PADRON ARRIVES MIAMI 22 DEC. SOTO ARRIVES MIAMI 20 DEC. NOTE: WITH DEPARTURE OF SOTO WITHRUSH HAS THREE HELICOPTERS BUT ONLY ONE PILOT.

SECRET

CFN

3043 CECILIO PADRON ANTONIO SOTO NEW YORK 16 DEC VIA SABENA ATHENS 17 DEC ATHENS MADRID 17-20 DEC MADRID NEW YORK 20 DEC PADRON MIAMI 22 DEC SOTO MIAMI 20 DEC SOTO WITHRUSH

BT

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		MICROFILM

TO
Chief, KUCURL, Chief, JMWAVE

INFO.
Chief, Africa Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

SUBJECT
WITHRUSH/Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES and Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
For your information and such action with ODURGE as you deem appropriate.

1. Attached is a self-explanatory Memorandum for Record concerning the above captioned individuals.

2. On 15 December, Ernesto Despaigne, the administrative officer, confronted these men with the information in the attached memorandum. Both men admitted that they forged the passports themselves for the purpose of obtaining a visitors visa to Spain. They also claim that an unidentified friend in Miami sent these passports to them.

3. Both men have been told that their action in forging these passports was a very serious matter, particularly so since they are not yet PBPRIME citizens. Sufficeth to say both were shaken considerably over the prospect that we might make the attached information available to ODURGE.

4. To the extent possible, JMWAVE is requested to inform future contractees that if they commit such acts while on duty in the Congo they will be relieved of their jobs.

Patrick T. RICANDA

Attachment:
Memo for Record dtd 14 Dec 65

Distribution:
Orig + 1 - C, KUCURL, w/att
1 - C, JMWAVE, w/att
1 - C, AF, w/o att.

ES Copy filed 201-294544 File in 201-287481

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	ACLA-3274	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES 201-294544

Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ 201-287481

1. On the afternoon of 13 December Colonel Touart, Defense Attache, called me to say that the Spanish Embassy Charge, Varella, had called him about SOTO and PADRON who were pilots for F.A.C. and who were applying for visas to Spain. VARELLA questioned the validity of their passports, which were Cuban, and which, according to VARELLA, were renewed 7 June 1965 for SOTO and 26 August 1965 for PADRON. The renewal stamp showed ~~[illegible]~~ they were renewed in Havana, Cuba. TOUART asked me about this and I told him I knew nothing about it and whether the Spanish Embassy gave them visas or not was of no concern to me.

2. On 14 December TOUART came back to see me saying he had seen both passports because VARELLA had been over to see him about the matter. TOUART said that VARELLA was perturbed about these two and remarked a number of times about the incompetence of KUBARK to permit men in their employ to have such phony documents. (NOTE: I also gathered that TOUART was a little gleeful also at what he thought was poor handling of personnel on our part.) TOUART asked what he should do. I told him not to do anything and deny any knowledge of these men. Also, if VARELLA did not want to issue a visa to these men, we could care less. TOUART, I gather, imagines himself as the great go-between to help out his Spanish brethren. I told TOUART I would look into the matter from our own interests but that was none of VARELLA's business, and the less we become involved the better.

3. TOUART said that VARELLA brought the passports over to him this morning and he copied the following information from the passports:

Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES, Cuban passport number 38126, dated 7 June 1965 at Havana, Cuba

SOTO U.S. address: 379 E. 64th Street, Hialeah, Florida
Also has U.S. Immigration Form I-512 dated May 26, 1965

SUBJECT: Antonio SOTO Y VASQUES - Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ

Cecelio Juan PADRON SANCHEZ - Cuban passport number 46128
issued at Havana, Cuba - 26 August 1965.

U.S. address: 2040 N. W. Flagler Avenue, Apt. 4, Miami
I-512 Form dated March 15, 1965

4. A review of the records of these men revealed the following:

a. SOTO - Arrived Leopoldville from Miami on 31 May 1965. If above information correct, SOTO obtained a Cuban passport after his arrival here because the alleged date of his passport is 7 June 1965, one week after his arrival in Leopoldville.

b. PADRON - Arrived Leopoldville 17 March via Pan Am. His Cuban passport, according to TOUART, was dated 26 August 1965, five months after his arrival here.

5. I will investigate through Ernesto DESPAIGNE because it may be that they have purchased passports after arrival here.

x 201

SECRET

201No. 294544

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 -- Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of

SOTO Vasquez, Antonio, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 8 December 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 14 December 1965 jab

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(9)

FORM 11-64 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

2 Dec 65

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is **not** to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 13d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM Antonio SOTO Vazquez	2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Subject submitted job application to Roberto Mesell (principal agent, WIGBUSH, Miami, Fla.) on 25 March 1965 for job as WIGBUSH pilot.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer. A knowledge of Spanish and aviation would be most helpful.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

George N. Sohl known to Subject as Gerald Saunders.

FORM 7-59 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-20)

SECRET

SECTION II — **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Financial, desire to maintain flight status, and to a lesser degree, political (anti-Castro, anti-communist).

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No real control exists over subject other than financial. His resident alien status could offer a factor of control if authorization were granted for this maneuver.

SECTION III — **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS: The principal agent represents himsel as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Gov't of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no [illegible] Gov't interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that subject suspects U.S. Gov't collusion in, if not outright sponsorship of the oper

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

In all probability subject is or will become aware that the GOC [illegible] program is under sponsorship by [illegible]

SECTION IV — **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

None known.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Probably wife.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None known.

SECTION V — **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECRET

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

NA

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

As a pilot only.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

a. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

b. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to GDC, although presumably he knows the project is being sponsored by the U.S. Government.

SECRET

SECTION IX — **QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing and helicopter pilot.

SECTION X — **COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $40,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None Known.

SECTION XI — **CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

JMWAVE Station, FBI, INS, Credit, Miami Police and Hqs files.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes, POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 11 July 1963

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject believed reliable with no known adverse character traits. No known security problems to date.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII — **SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No known excessive habits.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Aviation.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Within Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I supplied by subject; Part II by check of files by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

None.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE? WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE

2 Dec 65

SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 23 November 1965 jab

TO: SOD/AB/OPS/3 -- Larry Murphy

C. NO.: 201 - 294544

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

POA expired on 21 November 1965. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

PRQ II Sent 2 Dec 65

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ACTION SOD 6 ☒ RID COPY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED
UNIT TIME BY
INFO FILE, VR, AF 2, WH/C 8, DDP/AIR,

S E C R E T 122116Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 7283 12 Nov 65 IN 93714

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF LEOP 2232 (IN 93070)

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. AS SOP SINCE NOV 62, ALL PILOTS LICENSES ARE CHECKED FOR VALIDITY AND CURRENCY. IF NOT CURRENT, THIS IS SUBJECTS RESPONSIBILITY ENTIRELY. PREVIOUS KUBARK INTERCESSION TO ASSIST (R. GARCIA, ROJAS, SOTO, VALLICERGO) CAUSED KUCURL REP TO ADVISE LORENTZ NOT REPEAT NOT TO PROMISE ANY ASSISTANCE. PIEDRA (P) CASE WAS SPECIFIC EXAMPLE WHEREBY SUBJECT WAS ADVISED DIRECTLY THAT NO KUBARK HELP WOULD BE GIVEN. (P) APPARENTLY UNDERSTOOD AND CLAIMED HE WOULD HANDLE THRU FRIEND IN SAN JUAN.

2. IF LEOP SOP THAT VALID AND APPROPRIATE FAA LICENSE ARE NOW REPEAT NOW NECESSARY FOR WITHRUSH FLYING, PLS ADVISE.

3. FYI: (P) RECEIVED FAA CLASS I PHYSICAL AT OUR EXPENSE PRIMARILY FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES NOT FOR LICENSING PURPOSES.

PIEDRA REQUESTED NO ASSIST HIM RENEW LICENSE

S E C R E T

CFN 7283 2232 SOP NOV 62 R GARCIA ROJAS SOTO VALLICERGO LORENTZ NOT TO PIEDRA P P SAN JUAN FAA WITHRUSH P FAA I NOT FOR

CT

SECRET

WITHRUSH PERSONNEL CABLE LOCATOR

NAME SOTO Vasquez, Antonio WITHRUSH NUMBER 87

201 NUMBER 294544 C NUMBER

ACTION TAKEN	CITE NUMBER	IN NUMBER	DATE
NOMINATED FOR WITHRUSH			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
FIELD TRACES REQUESTED			
FIELD TRACES RETURNED N.D.			
LOCAL I & N TRACES N.D.			
LOCAL POLICE AND CREDIT TRACES N.D.			
LOCAL FBI TRACES N.D.			
CONTRACT SIGNED			
NOTIFICATION OF POA GRANTED			
DEPART U.S.			
ARRIVED LEOPOLDVILLE	LEOP 9923	07557	8 July 1965
CONTRACT TERMINATION			
RETURNED TO MIAMI			
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS	WAVE 2517	81436	2 June 1965
LOFLUTTER			

SECRET

2 9 JUN 1965

Dispatch No. UAPA-0101

Date: 22 JUN 1965

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : WITHRUSH Helicopter Training and Familiarization in 47G3B1

1. The two PBRUMEN pilot trainees arrived in Iden A on 4 May 1965. Helicopter training started on 6 May and terminated 15 May. Iden B arrived at the training area 9 May to receive briefings and familiarization in all aspects WITHRUSH helicopter project. Iden B departed 12 May 1965.

2. The surrounding area of Iden A and Iden C was utilized as the training site with most of the training taking place a few miles south of Iden C. The local cover story was that IUPAGAN was training pilots with view of using them to ferry helicopters to northwestern PBPRIME, where they would be utilized by IUPEAK. Cover story was backstopped through Iden D and Iden E (cleared and KUBARK witting). There were no security problems encountered during the training period. Some of the precautions taken were use of alias identification, first name basis for everyone, payment by cash, luggage tags and tickets secured, and close but subtle supervision of the students by the case officer.

3. Following is a resume of helicopter training and familiarization received by each student. Included are instructor pilot and case officer evaluations:

IDEN F

a. Iden F received training in all normal helicopter maneuvers, pre-flight, post-flight and cockpit procedures. Additional training was as follows:

1) Radio procedures with UHF, VHF, HF and LF ADF.
2) Dead reckoning and cross-country 4+10 hours.
3) Personnel rappelling, personnel parachuting and use of cargo slings 2+00 hours.
4) Ground school:

SECRET

   a) 47G3B1 exams.
   b) Navigation and flight planning.
   c) Weight and balance.
   d) General oral questioning and orientation 9+00.
5) Supplemental reading.
6) Flying time:

Dual	21+55	
Solo	2+30	
Student Dual	1+50	
TOTAL	26+15	Hours

b. Prior to his arrival at the training site Iden F received 12+20 hours of dual flying instruction on pre-flight maneuvers and emergency procedures, which included 4 hours of autorotation.

c. The language barrier between student and instructor retarded the student's progress to some extent. His navigation, flight planning and weight and balance work is limited. It is recommended that he have access to a helicopter each day in order to buildup his time.

d. The student was willing, cooperative and intelligent.

IDEN G

a. Iden G's training schedule included much of the same material as that of Iden F except that his personnel rappelling, parachuting and sling work amounted to 1+35 hours. His cross-country time amounted to approximately 1+50 hours.

1) Flight time:

Dual	10+10	
Solo	4+05	
Student Dual	1+50	
TOTAL	16+05	Hours

b. Prior to his arrival at the training site Iden G received 6+50 hours of flight training, which included 3 hours of autorotation.

c. The instructor pilot reports that Iden G has progressed exceptionally well and that his pilot background is very good. Iden G contributed substantially to Iden F's training.

d. It should be noted that Iden G received instruction and 50 hours flight time in a 47G3B1 helicopter during helicopter training conducted by IUPAGAN 27 March - 15 April 1965.

IDEN B

a. Iden B received training which exposed him to all aspects of Bell 47G3B1 helicopter flight and support requirements.

b. The flight familiarization included almost all of the normal helicopter maneuvers along with radio procedures. His total flight time amounted to 5+30 hours. Both instructor pilots noted that his flying procedures were rough, but were improving steadily. He did not solo inasmuch as both pilots indicated that he was not ready for solo.

c. Iden B wash given approximately 9 hours orientation in helicopter maintenance and from 3-4 hours of orientation with regard to the contents of the support kits and accessory equipment.

d. Complete assessment of this individual is difficult to make, as he was only in the training area for a short period of time. However, the following information may be helpful in making an evaluation:

1) Flying proficiency in 47G3B1 is below par at this time. He requires more dual and emergency procedures.
2) His conversation and experience indicates that he is more knowledgeable of Hughes equipment than he is of Bell equipment.
3) Iden B appears to be a very extroverted type of individual. In any conversation he does most of the talking.
4) The instructor pilots felt that his knowledge of helicopters leaned to the "manual" side rather than the practical side. He seemed, according to the instructor pilot, to have a "shallow" knowledge of helicopter operations.

4. The case officer for the WITHRUSH pilot training was Alfred F. PELANDER. Instructor pilots were Iden H and Alexander V. DECLIPPIE.

Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachment:
s/c (Idens)

Distribution:
O & 2-KUCURL
3-IUPAGAN

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to

Dispatch No. UAPA-0101

Iden A - Albuquerque, New Mexico

Iden B - Mr. Thomas Baldwin

Iden C - Santa Fe, New Mexico

Iden D - Mr. Edward Scholz, Chief Pilot Reg. #3, USFS

Iden E - Mr. Andrew G. Brennus, Chief Fire Control Officer Reg. #3, USFS

Iden F - Mr. Orlando Izquierdo

Iden G - Mr. Antonio Soto Vasquez

Iden H - Mr. Elwood W. Nelson

SECRET

SECRET

23 JUN 1965

Dispatch No. UAPA-0100

Date: 22 JUN 1965

TO : Chief, KUCURL

FROM : Chief, IUPAGAN

SUBJECT : Helicopter Flight Training for WITHRUSH

1. Objectives:

The primary purposes of this program was to prepare two WITHRUSH employees (Iden A and Iden B) to operate a 47G3B1 Bell Helicopter under simulated tactical situations involving rescue and reconnaissance operations. Secondarily, Idens A and B were to be familiarized to the fullest extent with the operational capability of the helicopter and its accessory equipment. Iden A did not prove adaptable to this type of aircraft and failed to complete transition training. Iden B complete transition training. Iden B completed the prescribed training, evidencing consistent performance progress as well as alertness, independence and a cooperative attitude.

2. Period of Training:

Training commenced for Iden A on 15 March and for Iden B on 27 March. Iden B's training was satisfactorily completed on 15 April. A total of 50 ½ hours of training time was logged during the entire course of instruction.

3. Instructors:

The training instructors utilized were Alexander V. DECLIPPEL and Iden C. IUPAGAN PDO's provided training as to cargo sling operation, rappelling and operational capabilities of special equipment.

4. Training Areas Utilized:

Training was conducted entirely within Iden D utilizing suitable terrain in the vicinity of Idens E, F, G, and H. Airports and motel accommodations in or adjacent to these localities were used.

5. Security:

SECRET

Sound operational security practices were employed in the handling of Idens A and B as to relationship with the general public. It was not necessary for either the instructors or the students to refer to IUFLAG in dealings with the general public. A logical cover of training for IUPEAK operations sufficed to handle any local inquiries concerning reasons for the aircraft's being in the vicinity or the purposes of the training. No known breaches of security as to identity of personnel or the true purposes of the training occurred.

6. Training Program:

The following training agenda was covered during the period of Iden B's instruction:

Helicopter Training Program:

- a. Cockpit procedures
- b. Review of supplemental reading, instruction manuals, etc.
- c. Warmup and shutdown procedures
- d. Pre-flight procedures
- e. Basic pre-solo maneuvers:
    - 1) High and low reconnaissance
    - 2) Approach to confined areas
    - 3) Pinnacle operations
    - 4) High altitude landings, hoverings, etc.
    - 5) Slope operations
    - 6) Low-level cross-country
    - 7) Navigation
    - 8) Emergency procedures (very limited)
    - 9) Use of cargo nets, litters, cargo racks
    - 10) Personnel rappelling
    - 11) Personnel parachute jumping
    - 12) Limited and restricted solo

7. Critique:

a. The training program should be formalized to a greater degree. A syllabus of items to be covered has been prepared and reviewed by Alexander V. DECIPPEL. A copy of this syllabus is attached and it is felt will assist in providing a guide to the instructor and permit a more orderly procedure and better utilization of time epended. It can be adapted easily as a statistical report covering training.

b. The training areas utilized from a standpoint of terrain, climate and accessibility for maintenance proved acceptable.

Philip L. MUSHER
Chief, IUPAGAN

Attachments: h/w & s/c
Distribution:
  0 & 2-KUCURL
    3-IUPAGAN

SECRET

Separate Cover Attachment to
Dispatch No. UAPA-0100

Iden A - Mr. Carlos Justi
Iden B - Mr. Antonio Soto Vasquez
Iden C - Mr. Elwood Nelson
Iden D - State of New Mexico
Iden E - Albuquerque, New Mexico
Iden F - Santa Fe, New Mexico
Iden G - Deming, New Mexico
Iden H - Silver City, New Mexico

SECRET

14-00000

ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN

HELICOPTER MASTER TRAINING PRE-SOLO CHECKLIST

ITEMS	DAYS												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	[illegible]
1. PREFLIGHT													
Cockpit													
Exterior													
2. COCKPIT PROCEDURES													
Starting & warmup													
Shutdown Procedures													
Electrical sys. emer. oper.													
3. MANEUVERS													
Helicopter controls (air demon)													
Straight & level flight													
Normal climb													
Normal descent													
Level turns													
Climbing turns													
Descending turns													
Hovering over a fixed spot													
Hovering turns: right													
Hovering turns: left													
Hovering flight: forward													
Hovering flight: sideward													
Takeoff to hover													
Landing from hover													
Quick stops													
Normal takeoff													
Sideward & rearward flight													
Traffic patterns													
Normal approach													
Max. performance takeoff													
Steep approach													
Running takeoff & landings													
Shallow approach													
Approach to confined area													
Confined area takeoff													
S turns on road													
Pinnacle operation													
Slope operation													
High altitude takeoffs/landings													
High reconnaissance													
Low reconnaissance													
Operation over barriers													
Crosswind considerations													
Settling with power													
4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES													
Auto rotations, general info.													
Straight-in autorotation (dual)													
180° autorotation (dual)													
Tail rotor failure in flight													
Engine fire during starting													
Electrical system emerg. oper.													
Autorotation from hover (dual)													
Hydraulic failure													
5. SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS													
Use of litters/cargo racks													
C. G. limitations													
Personnel rappelling													
[illegible] paradropping													
[illegible]													
6. MISCELLANEOUS													
Helicopter exams													
[illegible] supplemental [illegible]													
Navigation/flight planning													

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

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1 2 (3) 4 5 6 7 8

FROM LEOPOLDVILLE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO

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UNIT

TIME

BY

31 MAR 65 IN 0517

S E C R E T 311825Z

WAVE FOR LORENTZ ~~INFO~~ DIR CITE LEOP 9200

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN WITRUSH

REF WAVE 2392 (IN 79133)*

SUBJECTS REF ATA LEOP 310553Z.

S E C R E T

CFN

* RE MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PEYNO.

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4/6 SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SAD 6

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE AF 6, [illegible], WE 6, [illegible]

29 MAY 65 IN 78133

S E C R E T 300036Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2392

CHAPPIE/PBRUMEN/WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PEYNO DEPARTING NY SABENA 548 ON MAY 29. ARRIVE BRUSSELS 0930 LOCAL MAY 30. LEAVE BRUSSELS SABENA 511 AT 2005 LOCAL ON 30 MAY. ARRIVE LEOP 0600 LOCAL 31 MAY. LEOP PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

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ACTION SOD 6

INFO VR. FILE WH/C8, WE6, CI/OA

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UNIT SOD TIME 2230 BY Dm

S E C R E T 290101Z

PRIORITY LEOP INFO PRIORITY BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2317

29 Nov 65 IN 78655

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. SABENA NY NOT IN RECEIPT AUTHORITY BOARD MARIO GINEBRA, ANTONIO SOTO AND ERNESTO PAYNO (ALSO RCVD PAYNO) WITHOUT VISAS. WILL REQUIRE LEOP AGAIN REQUEST SABENA LEOP ADVISE NY BOARD WITHOUT VISAS. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. WILL ADVISE NEW SCHEDULE AS SUBJECTS ON STANDBY NY FOR NEXT AVAILABLE SABENA FLIGHT.

S E C R E T

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD6

☐ ☐ ☐

INFO VR. FILE WH/SA, DD6, WE6, CI/OA, [illegible]

28 MAY 65 IN 78350

S E C R E T 281743Z

LEOP INFO BRUS DIR CITE WAVE 2279

CHAPPIE PBRUMEN DTEARN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. MARIO GINEBRA (G), ANTONIO SOTO (S) AND ERNESTO PEYNO (P) SCHEDULED DEPART MIAMI 28 MAY VIA NATIONAL. DEPART NY VIA SABENA 548 AT 0930 LOCAL. LEAVE BRUSSELS 30 MAY SABENA 519 AT 0955 LOCAL. ARRIVE LEOP 30 MAY AT 1755 LOCAL.

2. DATE OF CONTACT ALL PERSONNEL 25 MAY. (G) AND (P) ADVANCED $800 AND (S) ADVANCED $1000 IN REPRESENTING ONE MONTHS ADVANCE SALARY. NO OTHER ADVANCE MADE. EACH SUBJ AUTHORIZED 10 KILOS EXCESS BAGGAGE AND WILL CLAIM UPON ARRIVAL IF USED.

3. (P) AND (G) CARRYING PBPRIME MULTIPLE ENTRY PERMIT. (S) TRAVELING WITH SINGLE ENTRY FORM I-512. NO CONGOLESE VISAS. LEOP PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SEE 40-400-1 RE USE ACTION INDICATORS

INS Name trace
26 May '65
Subject: Soto-Vazquez, Antonio

#87

PERSONAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Name of employee in full: Antonio Soto

Person to be notified in case of emergency:

Name Dolores Soto
Relationship Wife
Address 379 E 64 Street, Hialeah
Telephone 661-8685

Designation of beneficiary:

Name Same as above
Relationship
Address
Telephone

List all insurance policies:

Date of Policy	Company	Policy No.	Coverage	Beneficiary	Contains War Clause? Yes	No
None						

Have you completed your Last Will and Testament? Yes

Date of Will: May 25/65 Location of original R Medell
Copy on file with

Name and address of person holding Power of Attorney:
No

Date May 25/65

Acc Nr [illegible] Savings
Central Bank and Trust Co
[illegible] St at 12th Ave [illegible], Miami, Fla

#177

May 25,1965

To whom it may concern:

I hereby accept to be employed by the government of the Republic of the Congo or any company or agency that the said Government may designate at a basic salary of $1,000 for sixty hours of flying. The date of my contract is May 25,1965. Any flight time in excess of sixty hours is considered overtime. This is only a provisional statement and should be consider cancelled as soon as I signed my contract.

Antonio Soto

7181

RAMCO FORM 55 2

WILL

In the Name of God. Amen

I, Antonio Soto Vazquez a citizen and resident of Miami Dade County, State of Fla being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my last

Will and Testament

hereby revoking any and all prior wills, codicils and testamentary dispositions.

FIRST: I direct my executor to use the proceeds of all insurance proceeds on my life payable to my estate to first pay debts,estate inheritance taxes,claims,charges and expenses of administration and then I give and bequeath all of my estate real ,personal or mixed wherever situated to my beloved wife Dolores Soto,379 East 64th Street,Hialeah,Fla.

I hereby make, constitute and appoint Mr. Roberto Rodell - 1414 NW 17 Terr, Miami as executor of this my last Will and Testament.

and direct ...his....... to pay all of my lawful debts, if any, and the funeral and burial expenses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto subscribe my name and affix my seal the .....25th...... day of ....May........................ A. D. 19..65 in the presence of attesting witnesses.

....(SEAL)

The foregoing instrument, part being printed and the residue written, was subscribed, sealed, published and declared by ......Antonio Soto Vasquez.. as and for ..his..... last Will and Testament, in our presence and in the presence of each of us, and we, at the same time, at ..his....... request, in ......his..... presence and in the presence of each other, hereunto subscribe our names and addresses as attesting witnesses, this ....25........ day of ....May.............................. A. D. 19...65

....Witness ....Residence

....Witness ....Residence

....Witness ....Residence

RAMCO FORM 55

Will

OF

Executors

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UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD-6

INFO RR. FILE, HF-6, WH-8, CI/EA

25 MAY 65 IN 79519

SECRET 251652Z

[illegible] INFO DIR CITE WAVE 2157

SNAPPIE/WITHRUSH/[illegible]

LORENTZ DIAZ SENDS:

CONFIRM APPROVAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH AIRLINE IF OK FOR OSCAR ALFONSO,

TO [illegible], ERNESTO PEYNO AND ANTONIO SOT DEPART MX O/A 28 MAY

WITHOUT VISAS. PLEASE ADVISE.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM 2/ 7

S E C R E T

ORIG : L. MURPHY:khs
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 24 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-294544

ROUTING
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25 May 65 20 06z

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SOD 6
INFO WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA, FI, VR FILE

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 13284

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

POA GRANTED SUBJ 87, ODURGE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 T. Baskett/Draft

CI/OA G. Ball/Telecon

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F Daly

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

for BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

5
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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

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PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

NUMBER
201-295544

SUBJECT
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
7 April 1965 prc

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

This will confirm oral granting of the POA.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	21 MAY 1965

SECRET

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SOD 5-666

MAY 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : Antonio SOTO Vazquez

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Attached to the referenced memorandum was a list of eight documents concerning the Subject, with a request that SOD/AB/OPS/3 comment on their significance as they might affect the granting of a POA to the Subject.

2. Six of the eight documents were found to be insignificant. Two of the documents were not found. Attached is a memorandum from Chief, RID/FI stating that the two documents could not be found.

3. The Subject has been a WITHRUSH pilot in the past. He was granted a POA on 9 March 1961, and again on 29 October 1963. It is requested that he be again granted a POA in accordance with Form 772 submitted to Chief, CI/OA on 7 April 1965.

Lawrence Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Attachment

Distribution:
- Orig. & 2 - Addressee
- 1 - C/SOD/AB
- 1 - SOD/SECUR
- 1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
- 2 - 201-294544
- 1 - SOD/RI
- 1 - Chrono

SOD/AB/OPS/3:L.MURPHY:kae(21 May 1965)

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

5/13 S E C R E T

ORIG : L.MURPHY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 20 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

14

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SOD6 INFO AF6, VR, FILE

21 May 65 18 50z

SIG CEN

TO LEOP INFO CITE DIR 12355

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: LEOP 8980 (IN 71139)

1. USE OF SOTO AS TACTICAL PILOT DISAPPROVED. IF FUTURE HELICOPTER PILOT COMPLEMENT PERMITS AND SOTO AGREEABLE WILL CONSIDER CHANGE CONTRACT TO FIXED WING TYPE.

2. HQS PLEASED PROGRESS PER PARA 4 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly/Draft

AF/5

Bernard J Finan

E. N. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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3 bud

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff, OS

ATTENTION : Mr. Lou Weinckowski

SUBJECT : Project WITHRUSH

1. SOD and AF Division are jointly interested in obtaining the services of the Cuban national(s) identified below for employment in the Congo under Project WITHRUSH.

	Personnel Data	Document Needed
Name :	Antonio SOTO Vazquez	Re-entry Document
Status :	Unknown	
DOB :	20 August 1934	
POB :	Marianao, Havana, Cuba	
"A" Number :	11263189	
POA Granted :	Pending reissuance	
OS Case Number:	242369	
Remarks :	None.	
Name :	Mario A. GINEBRA-GROZZO Peros	Re-entry Document
Status :	Unknown	
DOB :	20 July 1933	
POB :	Camaguey, Cuba	
"A" Number :	Unknown	
POA Granted :	19 May 1965	
OS Case Number:	218019	
Remarks :	None.	

2. It is requested that your office facilitate prompt and favorable action by the Miami office, INS, to provide the documentation required.

Robert Gambino
Security Officer
Special Operations Division

Attachment

201-~~242369~~
244544

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

Re-entry
Document

Name : Ernesto Jesus PEYNO Inolan
Status : Unknown
DOB : 11 December 1931
POB : Havana, Cuba
"A" Number : 12434942
POA Granted : 19 May 1965
OS Case Number: 225961
Remarks : None.

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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SECRET

20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTN: George Ball

VIA: Chief, RID/RB

SUBJECT: DBA-48364, dated 8 August 1963
DBA-23559, dated 6 October 1962

A thorough and systematic search for the above documents began on 7 May 1965 and they could not be located. On 18 May 1965 an extensive and repetitive search was conducted to no avail.

Raymond V. Utterback
RAYMOND V. UTTERBACK
Chief, RID/FI

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

Subj. #87

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

19 [illegible] 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: SOTO, ANTONIO

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Soto was seen by me today for the following injections: Cholera, Typhus, Typh. paratyphoid, and Dipth. tet.

As you requested, a Chest Xray and hemoglobin were also done. The chest Xray was normal and consistant with one done at this office Oct. 8, 1963. The hemoglobin was 16.2 gms. or 104.8%.

He currently holds a Class II Federal Aviation Agency physical examination certificate which was done at my office 26 April 1965.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,
William S. Piper, M.D.
William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP:bk

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : F. DALY
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 18 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SOD 6
INFO : File VR, AF6, CCS-3, TFW, W/H/C 8

18 MAY 65 22 24z

SIG CEN

TO ~~IMMEDIATE~~ PRIORITY LEOP INFO CITE DIR

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH

REF: A. LEOP 6980 (IN 69928)

B. WAVE 1982 (IN 69321)

L1306

1. DO NOT CONCUR USE HOUCKE (H) AS TEST PILOT AND IP AT PRESENT. IMMED RETAINER APPROVED HOWEVER WITH UNDERSTANDING AFTER ALL PILOTS EVALUATED BY BORTHWICK STA MAY DESIGNATE WHOM IT DESIRES AS IP. MEANWHILE WISH CHOPPERS REMAIN ON GROUND UNTIL FIRST QUAL PBRUMEN ARRIVES.

2. SUGGEST UPON ARRIVAL ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) (APPROX 23 MAY PER REF B) USE I IN RIGHT SEAT TEMPORARILY AS CHECK PILOT FOR H, ALSO AS TEMP TEST PILOT FOR CHOPPERS. IF ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVES SAME TIME, HIS EXPERIENCE AND SUPERIOR ENGLISH MAY RECOMMEND HIM AS CHECK PILOT.

3. BORTHWICK SCHEDULED DEPART PBPRIME 23 MAY, STILL TO ACT ONLY IN FLIGHT EXAMINER CAPACITY.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly

E. B. KORN-PATTERSON
AF/COPS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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Bernard J. Finan
BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FROM PHOENIX

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO INFILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, C/CA, OPSEC, OT

S E C R E T 181719Z

2372

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PNIX 2726

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN WITHRUSH

REF DIR 03920

PNIX 2715 (IN 67575)

18 MAY 65 IN 70135

1. MR ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND MR ANTONIO SOTO VASQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION IN THE MODEL 47G-3 B-1 HELICOPTER ON 15 MAY 65. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THEIR TRAINING AND HOURS:

A. IZQUIERDO:

ACTIVITY	TIME
GROUND SCHOOL (EXAMS, NAVIGATION/FLIGHT, WEIGHT & BALANCE, GENERAL ORIENTATION)	9:00 HRS
SUPPLEMENTAL READING	DAILY
RADIO PROCEDURES WITH UHF, VHF & HF	DAILY
DEAD RECKONING AND CROSS-COUNTRY	4:10 HRS
PERSONNEL RAPPELLING, PERSONNEL PARACHUTING	
CARGO RACKS AND CARGO SLINGS	2:00 HRS

TOTAL FLYING TIME:

DUAL	21:55
SOLO	2:30

STUDENT DUAL (SOTO

SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

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INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA

S E C R E T 172204Z

LEOP INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1932

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN IN 69321

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. ORLANDO IZQUIEDRO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) COMPLETED DUPAGAN TRAINING IN BELL 47G-3B-1. (I) READY FOR IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE. (S) ON STANDBY AWAITING POA ISSUANCE. HAVE THIRD PERUMEN HELICOPTER PILOT FOR CLEARANCE AS BACKUP IF NEEDED.

2. WILL REQUIRE LEOP REQUEST SABENA TO ALLOW (I) BOARD SABENA NY WITHOUT CONGO VISA O/A 21 MAY. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T
CFN

[illegible]

14-00000

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ACTION 006

INFO

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RE. FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 171614Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1916

CHAPPIE LITHRUSH PBRUMEN

17 [illegible] IN 68922

Soto, A.

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. WAVE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98, 87, 88 AND 97 (ANTONIO GONZALEZ REPEAT GONZALEZ, TORRECILLA). REQUEST POA'S.

2. WAVE, POLICE-CREDIT AND ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJS 98 (RAFAEL JUAN CASTILLO REPEAT CASTILLO, LEYVA), 99 (GUILLERMO P. GONZALEZ REPEAT GONZALEZ, MOLINA) AND 95 (ANTONIO ORLANDO SALAS REPEAT SALAS, BARO.)

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

ORIG : L.MURPHY:kas
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 12 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
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TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 09588

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: A. WAVE 1636 (IN 62164)*

B. DIR 01341**

1. REGRET UNABLE CONCUR INVITATION SUBJ 91. PRESENTLY CONSIDERING SEVERAL EUROPEAN CHOPPER PILOTS. HOWEVER WILL CONTINUE PROCESS POA SUBJ 91.

2. CHOPPER PILOT CONTRACT STILL PENDING. WILL POUCH WHEN FINALIZED. MEANWHILE TERMS OUTLINED REF B TO BE USED IN DISCUSSING CONTRACT WITH SUBJS 87 AND 92.

3. PLS SUBMIT PRQ PART II SUBJ 93 VIA POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

SOD/AB/OPS/3 F. Daly/Draft

WH/C/MO

*Requested status subj 91 and status helicopter pilot contract.
**Outlined terms of chopper pilot contract.

R. W. [illegible]
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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SOD [illegible]

11 May 65

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : SOTO Vasquez, Antonio 201-294544

REFERENCE : Chief, CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Your referenced memorandum requested SOD/AB comments concerning eight reports which mentioned the Subject. Two of the reports were located, both of which contained no derogatory information concerning the Subject.

2. The remaining six documents were placed on "locate" with RI; however, insofar as all six were written prior to the Subject's recent six-month tour with KUBARK in the Congo (Nov 1963 to May 1964), during which he performed in a highly satisfactory manner, it is requested that a POA be granted the Subject.

Lawrence C. Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD/AB
1 - SOD/SECUR
1 - SOD/AB/OPS/3
1 - 201-294544
1 - SOD/RI
1 - Chrono

SOD/AB/OPS/3:L.MURPHY:kas (11 May 1965)

SECRET

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM 24

ORIG : LMURPHY:kns
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 4 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

5 / S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

[illegible]

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ) LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD6 INFO: VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C8, AF6, CI/OA

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO LEOP CITE DIR 07844

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: A. WAVE 1207 (IN 54629)

B. WAVE 1089 (IN 52773)

C. WAVE 1443 (IN 58054)

1. FOLLOWING CURRENT STATUS SUBJS REF A: Sol, A

A. POA'S REQUESTED NO'S 91, 88, 87, 85, 84, 83 AND 82.

B. AWAITING HQ TRACES NO 78.

C. AWAITING WAVE TRACES NO 90.

D. HQS ALSO AWAITING LEOP REPLY TO REF B. ASSUMING LEOP WILL CONCUR ON REASSIGNMENT OF SUBJS 93, 94, 95 AND 96. REQUEST WAVE FORWARD CURRENT EMPLOYMENT DATA AND PHS TO HQ FOR POA PROCESSING.

2. ADVISE SUBJS REF C AWAITING LEOP CONCURRENCE THEIR REASSIGNMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/MO J. Moughan/Phone
WH/C/PM W. Cini/Phone
AF/5
SOD/AB/OPS/3 R. Kloyla/Draft

John T. Flynn
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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[redacted]
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 28 April 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward W. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

RESULTS

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he has never worked for any Castro intelligence or security service. Apart from PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Unless otherwise noted below Subject is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

DETAILS

Subject is being recruited for use with WITHRUSH. He has served there before. Like all of the men in the group who have been in the Iden B, Subject assumes that the operation is sponsored by KUBARK.

Subject joined AMWORLD but was never called to go to the training camps.

In connection with blackmail, Subject mentioned that his father is in jail in Cuba. To date no attempts have been made by the Castro government to put any pressure on Subject.

DESENSITIZED
per CSI 43-43

Keith D. WINETT

Basic doc filed in 201-742273

5 May 65
UFGA 21458/03

[redacted]
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201-294544

SECRET

UFGA 21458/03

# 72514
28 April 1965
IDENS

Iden A Antonio SOTO Vazquez
DPOB: 20 August 1934
Marianao, Habana, Cuba 201-

Iden B Congo.

[illegible]

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, KUSODA

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/Cuba

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
FJDUST/LCFLUTTER/PBRUMEN
Transmittal of LCFLUTTER Results

UFGA - 21458703

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action: None Required

1. Forwarded herewith (RYBAT) are the following LCFLUTTER reports with below list of IRD numbers and, if available, 201 numbers with cryptonyms:

IRD NUMBERS	201 NUMBERS	CRYPT
(64810)	(742873)	(AMBEGIN/8)
(72512)	(744750)	( )
(72513)	( )	( )
(72514)	(294544)✓	( )
(72515)	( )	( )
(72516)	(774052)	( )

2. The identities of the above reports are forwarded as a separate cover attachment.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
A. Reports (RYBAT)
B. Identities (RYBAT)

Distribution:
2 - C/KUSODA w/att A/1-6 h/w; B/1-6 u/s/c
7 - DC/WH/Cuba

201-294544

CROSS REFERENCE TO
Copy

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
3 May 65

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 5 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-21458

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-742873; 744750; 774052;

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: 4 May 1965 prc

TO: SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

C. NO.: 201-294544

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	XX	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE **
☐	[illegible] LIST	☐	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

** Please advise CI/OA of nature and significance.

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21/30 SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, SIGA, OPSER

S E C R E T 232140Z

PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1444

3 May 65 IN 58061

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/IUPAGAN/PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVING 4 MAY ALBUQUERQUE 1750 LOCAL CONTINENTAL 275.

2. BOTH BRIEFED QUARTERS AND RATIONS TO BE FURNISHED.

3. (I) HAD APPROXIMATLY 14 HRS LOCALLY AND (S) 6 HRS. WILL CABLE DETAILS OF LOCAL INFORMAL TRAINING RESULTS.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

Adj #92

CRESCENT
AIRWAYS, INC.
AIR TAXI AND CHARTER
FLIGHT AND GROUND INSTRUCTION
RENTAL, SALES & SERVICE

May 3,1965

Report on flight evaluation of: Tony Soto & Orlando Izquerdo

Helicopter Bell 47G.-235 hp Franklin engine.

Maneuvers	Grade		Remarks
	Tony	Orlando	
Preflight	av.	av.	
Cockpit procedures	av.	av.	
Throttle controll	Ab.av.	av.Ab.	Both very smooth
Starting procedures	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	
Vertical take off to hover	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 32 MPH
Hovering	av.	av.	" " "
Air Taxi	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " "
Transition to forward flight	Ab.av.	av.	
Coordination of flight controls	Ab.av.	Av.	
Forward Flight,slow/fast cruise	av.	av.	
Sideward "	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 32 MPH
Backward "	av.	av.	" " "
Basic airwork	Ab.av.	av.	
Turns	Ab.av.	av.	
Climbs	av.	av.	
Glides	av.	av.	
Climbing Turns	av.	av.	
Decending turns	av.	av.	
Wave off's	av.	av.	
Normal approach to spot	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	
Precision hover,Down/upwind	av.	av.	Wind: 10 to 20 MPH
Constant heading square	av.	av.	" " "
Parallel " "	av.	av.	" " "
Perpendicular " "	av.	av.	" " "
Turns on spot	av.	av.	" " "
Autorotatics-Power off touchdown	Ab.av.	Ab. av.	Both improved from below/
Autorotations- From hover	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " " " av.
Vertical autorotations	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " " "
Emergencies: between 10 & 300'	Ab.av.	Ab,av.	" " " "
Run on landings	av.	av.	
Running take offs	Ab.av.	av.	
Precision Approach	Ab.av.	av.	
Rapid deceleration(quick stop)	av.	av.	
Jump take offs	av.	av.	
Maximum load conditions	av.	av.	
External (sling) loads	Ab.av.	av.	--Tony had previous experience.
Water:Landings,taxi,take off.	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	Wind: 10 to 32 Mph.
Rough terrain & Evasive tactics	AB.av.	Ab.av.	
Landings: normal,cross/downwind.	Ab.av.	Ab.av.	" " "

CRESCENT
AIRWAYS, INC.

AIR TAXI AND CHARTER
FLIGHT AND GROUND INSTRUCTION
RENTAL, SALES & SERVICE

May 5,1965

Comments on Helicopter Pilot evaluation and proficiency training:
Tony Soto and Orlando Izquerado.

Both Pilots displayed great interest in upgrading their Helicopter flight proficiency,Both showed good planning,Jugement,Inititive, and attitude. All grades based on Helicopter Pilots with equivalent flight hours and experience.

	Estimated previous Helicopter experience	Total hours evaluation and proficiency received
Tony Sota	200 hours	6:50
Orlando Izquerdo	150 "	12:20

Rudy Vaingot
Instructor-Pilot

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FROM

ACTION

SOD 6

INFO

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UNIT TIME BY

FILE [illegible]

S E C R E T 282239Z

DIR CITE WAVE 1287

28 APR '65 IN 54629

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. FOLLOWING CURRENT PERSONNEL STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL BEING CONSIDERED AS PILOTS:

A. AVAILABLE AND AWAITING POA NUMBERS 91, 90, 88, 87, 85, 84, 83, 82.

B. POA GRANTED:

74 - UNDERGOING FLIGHT EVALUATION

72 - DEFERRED PENDING CLARIFICATION OF POSSIBLE DEROG INFO

68 - DEFERRED - HOLDING OUT FOR MORE MONEY

67 - DEFERRED - PERSONAL PROBLEMS

63 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

64 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

69 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

71 - CANCELLED - FAILED FLIGHT EVALUATION

73 - CANCELLED - UNAVAILABLE

77 - CANCELLED - FAILED PHYSICAL

C. CANCELLED POA REQUEST:

SECRET

14-00000

Rely #87

WILLIAM SCOTT PIPER, M.D.
2506 PONCE DE LEON BLVD.
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE
HIGHLAND 6-6474

26 April 1965

Mr. Roberto Medell
P.O. Box 831
Miami International Airport
Miami, Fla. 33148

Re: SOTO, ANTONIO
379 E. 64th St.
Hialeah, Fla.

Dear Mr. Medell,

Mr. Soto was examined by me this morning for routine Federal Aviation Agency Class II physical which he successfully completed and was issued a medical certificate with no limitations.

He is to return at a future date for Chest Xray, Hemoglobin and injections.

Thank you for referring this airman.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Piper M.D.
William S. Piper, M.D.

WSP: BK

14-00000

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO VR. FILE DDP WHC 8 AF 6 CI/OA CCS 3

S E C R E T 261734Z

PRIORITY PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1084

26 Apr 65 IN 52504

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

REF DIR 03920

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND ANTONIO SOTO PREPARED DEPART MIAMI 27 APR. PLEASE CONFIRM IF CAN RECEIVE SUBJ'S THIS DATE IN ALBUQUERQUE OR ADVISE ARRIVAL DATE.

SECRET

SUBJECTS ABOVE HELICOPTER PILOTS.

CFN

SECRET

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VR. FILE DDP WH/C 8 AF 6 CI/OA DPZ OPSER OS 2

21 APR 65 IN 40522

S E C R E T 212154Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0958

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF DIR 02745
LEOP 7694 C.24656

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) WAS CONSIDERED ONE OF INITIAL TWO HELICOPTER CANDIDATES. AT TIME OF IUPAGAN TRAINING WAS UNABLE TO LEAVE MIAMI DUE ILLNESS OF WIFE. NOW INDICATES IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY AND DESIRE FOR TRAINING AND WITHRUSH CONTRACT. FEEL SUBJ SINCERE AND RELIABLE PBRUMEN SOURCES REVEAL SUBJ WELL EXPERIENCED IN PBRUMEN MILITARY HELICOPTER OPS AND RESCUE IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAINE. QUERY IF IUPAGAN TRAINING FACILIIES STILL AVAILABLE AND IF HQS. STILL WISHES TO CONSIDER (I) AS SECOND HELICOPTER PILOT. HOWEVER, CITE VERY PRONOUNCED LANGUAGE BARRIER EXISTS FOR EXACTING TRAINING PURPOSES. CAN PROVIDE INTERPRETER FROM MIAMI OR SEND TONY SOTO WITH SUBJ TO NEW MEXICO IF DEEMED FEASIBLE BY HQS. PLS ADVISE.

2. ANTONIO SOTO NOW MIAMI PREPARED FOR DEPARTURE O/A 1 MAY. AS SUBJ PREVIOUS CONGO PILOT, NOT CLEAR IF POA EVER GRANTED. PLS ADVISE CLEARANCE STATUS AND WILL LCFLUTTER AS MATTER OF POLICY.

SECRET

SECRET

*POA GRANTED [illegible],

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio 201-324544

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
20 August 1934 Marianao, Havana, Cuba

4. CITIZENSHIP
Cuban

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Warehouse Checker
Eagle, Inc. - 800 NE 2nd Ave., Miami
Nov 61-Present

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Pilot

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST
NAME CHECK № 167208

DATE 7 April 1965

[redacted]

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Larry Murphy
OFFICE DESIGNATOR SOD/AB/OPS3
ROOM, BUILDING 2 D 55
EXTENSION 4475

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Pilot - Cuban Air Force -	Stafo Beach, Cuba	Mar 53-Jan 59
Office Clerk - Ramon Lavin	Managua, Nicaragua	Sept 59-Jan 61
Unemployed - 6247 N. Miami Ave.	Miami, Fla.	Jan 59-Sept 59
PM Agent [redacted] - 8270 W. 60 Terr.	Hialeah, Fla.	Jan 61-Oct 63
Pilot - Caribbean Aeromarine Co. & Congolese Government-8270 W. 60 Terr.	Hialeah, Fla.	Oct 63-May 64
Guatemala Training camps - Pilot	Guatemala	Jan 61-Apr 61
Warehouse Checker - Eagle, Inc. - 800 NE 2nd Ave.	Miami, Fla.	Nov 61-Present

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5'4"	152	Brown	Black	White	

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Dolores Soto

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES
Father: Antonio Soto
Mother: Julia Rosa Vazquez

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D.
SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

TO: Larry Murphy

20 April 1965
DATE

FROM: F1/D [redacted]

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN F1/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, F1/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ F1/D HAS NO XXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* Previous green list request from TFW/OpsSpt, 29 Oct 1962, GL 131407, Dossier WH/4, op, GL 110518, no record.

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO F1/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO F1/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP F1/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: F1/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

16

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE:

TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY

SUBJECT'S NAME:

C OR 201 NO.:

DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

U.S. RESIDENCE: [illegible]

OVERSEAS RESIDENCE:

EMPLOYER:

PROJECT:

DIVISION OR STAFF:

CASE OFFICER:

ROOM NO.:

EXTENSION:

PROPOSED USE: [illegible]

TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY

CCS/NC CASE OFFICER (*Extension 5144*):

CCS FILE NO.:

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS 1-CI/OA 1-AREA DIVISION

[illegible]

FORM 2-64 2214

SECRET

(19-00)

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FROM. JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/IPS,

S E C R E T 090034Z

DIR CITE WAVE 0509

8 APR 65 IN 41380

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS:

1. POLICE AND CREDIT CHECKS NON-DEROG SUBJ'S 87, 88 AND 90.

2. WAVE TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 91.

3. ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 86. Pellon

Del Rio

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 April 1965

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS3
2 D 55

SUBJECT: *(True name)* SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 294544

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 107208

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY WH		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Larry Murphy	4476	Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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ACTION SOD 6

INFO VR. FILE DDP, WH/C8, AF6, C/OPS

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UNIT

TIME

BY

S E C R E T 052022Z

5 APR 65 IN 38544

DIR CITE WAVE 0337

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

LORENTZ SENDS:

WAVE AND ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ'S 88 AND 87. ODENVY TRACES NON-DEROG SUBJ 89. ADDL INFO WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

CFN

A

SECRET

14-00000

[redacted]

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-294544
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG. E.D.

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UNIT
TIME
BY
INFO VR. FILE DDP WH/C/R SOD 6 CCS 3

ABSTRACT X INDEX

R I COPY

S E C R E T 261546Z

(3)

PRIORITY PNIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 9934

26 MAR 65 IN 31670

CHAPPIE IOPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

LORENTZ SENDS:

REF: DIR 95562

ANTONIO SOTO VAZQUEZ ARRIVING ABQ ON 26 MARCH, CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLT 263, 2058 LOCAL.

PLEASE MEET.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

201-294544

FORM 1389 RI COPY RI COPY

14-00000

File 201-194544

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF.: A - 1 [illegible] 63 [illegible]

PIN RECENT PHOTO HERE

NAME: SoTo [illegible] AnTonio
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

PHONE NUMBER: [illegible] SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☐ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

PRESENT ADDRESS: 374 E. 64th ST, Hialeah, Fla
STREET CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 374 E. 64th St. Hialeah, Fla.

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): [illegible]

PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible] Cuba

WEIGHT: [illegible] COLOR OF HAIR: Black

HEIGHT: [illegible] COLOR OF EYES: Brown

COMPLEXION:

LIST ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS:

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: ISSUING AUTHORITY
PLACE OF ISSUE
PASSPORT NO.
DATE OF ISSUE
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD

CITIZEN OF U.S.: YES ☐ NO
NATURALIZED: DATE
NATIONALITY: Cubano
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? YES NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS:

EDUCATION

	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATED DEGREE	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	St. Joseph School, [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
COLLEGE				
TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, OTHER STUDY DATA	[illegible] Correspondence School			

MILITARY SERVICE: [illegible] BRANCH: [illegible] RANK: [illegible] DATE: [illegible]
TYPE OF DISCHARGE:
PRESENT MEMBER SHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES PAST TEN YEARS

FROM	TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	State Beach	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Miami, Fla	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Hialeah, Fla	U.S.A.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] St.		

SPOUSE, FIANCE AND CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible]	[illegible]	374 E. 64 St. Hialeah, Fla.	
[illegible]	[illegible] /58		
	[illegible]		

[illegible] every position which you have held since you [illegible] to work, including [illegible] Start with [illegible] position and work back to the first position which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment. USE CONTINUATION SHEET IF NECESSARY.

A. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: Nov/61
TO PRESENT TIME [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible] Checker
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 70.88 [illegible] PER YR.
FINAL $ [illegible] PER WK.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible], 800 NW 2nd Ave., Miami
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT

B. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: [illegible]
TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ A YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] CAMPS
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT

C. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: [illegible]
TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU [illegible]
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☐ YES ☐

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? GIVE FULL DETAILS: NO ☐ YES ☐

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. YES ☐

[illegible] APPLIED FOR: [illegible]
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES: LIST FIVE PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY [illegible] REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF [illegible]

NAME	ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	

FATHER'S NAME [illegible] Soto DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Cuba
PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] PRESENT OCCUPATION
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible] PRESENT NATIONALITY Cuban
MOTHER'S FULL [illegible] Lopez DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Cuba
PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] Miami PRESENT OCCUPATION [illegible]
NATIONALITY AT BIRTH [illegible] PRESENT NATIONALITY Cubano
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY [illegible] Soto, [illegible] St., [illegible]
NAME ADDRESS PHONE [illegible]

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

[illegible] investigation of all statements contained in this application. I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts [illegible] cause for dismissal.

3/25/65
DATE

14-00000

Continuation of Employment

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office Clerk
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 100/[illegible] PER Month
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible] Managua
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Office Clerk.
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible] S.A.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: MAY/50 TO: Sept/[illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Pilot
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 300/[illegible] PER Month
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible] Air Force.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Col. Rodriguez Echevarria
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT:

5. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Pilot
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ 200/[illegible] PER Month
FINAL $ 200/[illegible] PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

6. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR)
FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU
REASON FOR LEAVING EMPLOYMENT

Continuation [illegible]

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION
FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: Capt Antonio Soto

I. General Flying Experience

A. Military Flying: 2400 hrs

B. Airline: 450 hrs

C. [illegible]: Congo Around 600 hrs.

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times

	PILOT (IN HOURS)	COPILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-[illegible]			
B. C-47	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C. B-[illegible]			
D. [illegible]			
E. [illegible]			
F. [illegible]			
G. Aircraft (by type)			
H. Flying boat (by type)			
I. Helicopter (by type)			
J. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
K. B-26	[illegible]	[illegible]	
L. AT-[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
M.	[illegible]	[illegible]	

III. TOTAL FLYING TIME [illegible]

[illegible]

VII. [illegible]

VIII. [illegible] Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of [illegible] may [illegible] influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training [illegible]. To [illegible] in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit [illegible] in a thorough and accurate manner, of all training received during the past three [illegible]. [illegible] information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.

X. [illegible] any station or [illegible] section of the Company? Yes [illegible] No [illegible]

[illegible] misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

Date

Signature

MESSAGE FORM 23

ORIG : M.GOMEZ:jg
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS-3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 24 MAR 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

43 S E C R E T

ROUTING

1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

24 MAR 65 22 40z

TO : JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6

PRIORITY

TO PRITY WAVE INFO CITE DIR 95562

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF: WAVE 9826 (IN 29264)*

1. APPROVED.

2. PLS ADVISE IUPAGAN SUBJ ETA ABQ.

END OF MESSAGE

* REQUESTED HQS APPROVAL DISPATCH SUBJ 26 MAR FOR ALBUQUERQUE

SOD/AB/OPS-3
AF/5 T.Basket (Telecon)
WH/MO B.Mills (Telecon)

for
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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4		8	

FROM
JMWAVE

ACTION
SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO
VR. FILE AF6, DDP, WH/C 8, CI/OA, DPSER,

S E C R E T 232140Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9826

23 MAR 65 28264

Dm

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

REF WAVE 9671 (IN 26089)

LORENTZ SENDS:

SOTO FLEW 2 PLUS 45 LOCAL BELL HELICOPTER TRANSITION 21 MAR. IP GAVE SUBJ VERY HIGH RATING AND SHOULD BE FULLY PREPARED IUPAGAN TRNG. REQUEST HQS APPROVAL DISPATCH SUBJ 26 MAR FOR ALBUQUERQUE.

S E C R E T

CFN

X RE CONTACT WITH SOTO

SECRET

SECRET

f 12.79.00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 16 March 1971

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III -- Revocation of DOD Security
#27636 Clearance/Recent Contact --
MIH-056-71

1. The information reported in the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum, regarding Subject's self-initiated contact with our Miami Field Office, may be of interest.

2. The Office of the General Counsel and WH Division have been apprised of Subject's recent activities.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.78

[illegible]

SECRET

V. Thorne

MIN-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Creany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

10 March 1971

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Creany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/esa

SECRET

[illegible]

4,45

SECRET

F12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS   22 May 1969

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. — Local OSI Inquiry to DCS Miami Office for
#27686   Information Concerning

MIM-084-69

1. The enclosed copy of memorandum from our Miami Office, regarding the OSI representative's inquiry for information concerning Subject, is forwarded for your records and possible future reference.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.47

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service
~~ATTN~~

DATE: 15 May 1969

MIM-084-69

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

SUBJECT: Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Ploumen, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract.

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OSG was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Ploumen in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Ploumen's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Ploumen, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we knew of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Ploumen direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

SECURITY

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

EHogan:paw

4.47

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Chief, Miami Field Office 22 May 1969

ATT : Mr. E. Hogan

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L.

REF : MIM-084-69

Thank you for the information reported in the reference. The suggestion made by your office that OCI direct its request through official security channels is entirely correct. In the future, however, it will be helpful and appreciated if you will forward correspondence pertaining to security matters directly to the Security Liaison Officer, rather than to Support Staff. This saves time in getting the information to the appropriate channel for any action that may be indicated.

SECURITY

JAMES R. MURPHY

VThoma:grw

4.46

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

12-77-00

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE : 5 July 1967

TO : Director, Domestic Contact Service

SUBJECT: WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

FILE NO: #27686 A107900

1. Reference is made to your request for security checks on the subject person as a source of intelligence information.

2. This is to inform you that the necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☐ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☐ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in

c. ☒ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

3. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or in an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

WILLIAM R. KOTAPISH
Chief, Personnel Security Division

Attachment:
State Passport Report
Summary

RESTRICTED

EYES ONLY
4227

4.45

CONFIDENTIAL

WERBELL, Mitchell L.
#27 086

26 April 1967

On 19 April 1967, the current passport file of Mitchell L. WERBELL was reviewed at the Passport Office, Departmentof State. The following is a summary of the information contained therein:

Birth: 8 March 1918 at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Verified by birth certificate)

PASSPORT ISSUED: At Miami, Florida, on 29 May 1962, Passport Number C-301433, for a two week trip to England and Germany for the purpose of business.

Residence: RD #1, Powder Springs, Georgia
Occupation: Public Relations and Advertising Executive.

SUBJECT's file also reveals that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has information pertaining to SUBJECT concerning his involvement in Haitian Revolutionary activities.

PLB/me

CONFIDENTIAL

4.45

S-E-C-R-E-T

DATE 31 July 1967

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE

FROM : Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Services Division)

SUBJECT : Security Check Completion -- US Citizen

REFERENCE : (a) DCS-R 10-30, dated 1 July 1965
(b) Operations Memo 88-64

1. Attached is a notice of security check completion on the individual listed below. The OS approved Subject's exploitation as a source of intelligence information, but the level of classified information which may be divulged is left to your discretion.

2. As indicated in the attachment, the OS provided a Summary of derogatory information for you to consider in determining the level of classified disclosure. It will be forwarded by Services Division by an "Eyes Only" memorandum which will bear a number identical to the one marked on the lower left corner of the completion. Please use this number to identify a Summary with an individual.

3. The OS directs that the field chief, after reading the information, will use it to establish the level of classified disclosure, if any, and to provide guidance to the Contact Specialist in his relations with the source. He may, at his discretion disclose the nature of the derogatory information to the Contact Specialist. The field chief, after making an appropriate notation in the open files of the office with respect to the security status of the individual, will then either destroy the information or place in a sealed envelope which will carry the caveat: "To be opened by the Chief or Acting Chief ---- Field Office."

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment:
WERBELL, MITCHELL Livingston, III

Eyes Only # 4227

CLASSIFICATION: "Restricted" -No Classified Info to be revealed. Check with Mr. Gleichauf before contacting.

Justin F. Gleichauf
Justin F. Gleichauf

VLcrme;pat

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4.45

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

F 12.79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS **21 February 1967**

ATT : Mr. Leland Bunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Recent Telephone Call from Chet GRAY of Los Angeles re Possible Assasination in US of Close Relative of Middle East Ruler

A-127900

1. The enclosed copy of teletype from our Miami Field Office is forwarded for your information and immediate transmittal to the FBI.

2. Mr. John McConnell, of this Office, has discussed this matter with Mr. Sam Papich, FBI, who said the FBI will contact Subject and GRAY, and will subsequently advise us of any action they might want us to take.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2738.

SECURITY

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: Teletype Contacts/Miami-1710
dated 20 February 1967

VThorne:pat

4.44

SECRET

14-00000

6857

CC - FBI Via OS

SECRET

Feb 20 11 58 AM '67

S E C R E T 201530Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: MCCONNELL

file

FROM: GLEICHAUF

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL WERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW.

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1100 HOURS ON 18 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD WERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

4.44

SECURITY

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710 S E C R E T

REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED WERBELL FOR ADVICE. WERBELL ADVISED GRAY TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. WERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. WERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, WERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN OOA(S)5601 AND OOA(S) 5598 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5a. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

S E C R E T

BT

Sam Papich says FBI will Talk To Werbell and Gray - Will advise of any action they want us To Take

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 28 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Bunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Communication from Chet GRAY re Alleged Assassination Attempt Against Foreign Diplomat -- FBI Interest

A1 27700

REF : DCS memorandum dated 21 February 1967, same subject

1. Please forward a copy of the enclosed self-explanatory Diary Item to Mr. Sam Papich. Mr. Papich was informed of this matter by phone on 23 February 1967.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2733.

D. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

CC: Mr. Sam Papich

4.43

VThorne:pat

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

cc: Chief, Miami Office

JWMcConnell:mg

SECURITY

4.43

Miami (Gonzales)
(Conant)

24 FEB 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO. C10-48267

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME
WERBELL, Mitchell L.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
8 March 1918-Philadelphia, Pa.

2. ALIASES
A 127900

4. SEX
Male

5. CITIZENSHIP
US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Powder Springs, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Leader of Organization to Combat Communism	Powder Springs, Georgia
?	?	Alexis, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Cool Roof of Georgia, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Werbell-South, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

27 FEB 1967

4.42

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 150 USE PREVIOUS
9-60 EDITIONS
MFG. 10-65

(4-63)

14-00000

SECRET

A-12-79-00

MITCHEL L. WERBELL

Powder Springs, Georgia

BUSINESS:

4.41

EIRS-0422/79

10 NOV 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Maurice A. Sovern
Chief, PPL Group

ATTENTION: Lee E. Carle

FROM: George L. Marling
Chief, Operations Group

SUBJECT: Request for Records Search --
Robert John Morgan, *et al.* (U)

REFERENCE: OGC 79-08601 dated 20 September 1979

1. An intensive search of the files and indices of the Directorate of Operations has revealed no information concerning Robert John MORGAN, John Duncan LEIBOLT, Hubert Stewart COTTON, John Sylvester CARPENTER, Wayne Ernest DANIEL, or Guy Perilton OWEN. (U)

2. However, this search has revealed the following information concerning Wiley Gilmore SIMS (AKA: William Gilmore SIMMS) and Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III (AKA: Mitch THREE). (U)

A. William Gilmore SIMMS

1) In December 1966 SIMMS contacted the United States Embassy in Port of Spain, Trinidad, and talked to a representative of this Directorate. He requested assistance in retrieving an airplane impounded by authorities in Venezuela which they suspected was used in smuggling operations. SIMMS also stated that he had been in Guatemala looking for air freight business. The files of this Directorate contain no indication that any action was taken regarding this matter. (U)

2) SIMMS was never employed by this Directorate nor has this Directorate ever had any operational interest in him. (U)

B. Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III

1) WERBELL has never been employed by this Agency nor does this Agency have any operational interest in him. WERBELL was a commissioned officer with the OSS during World War II and served in the China-Burma-India

theater. In August of 1959, this Agency considered using WERBELL as a source of information on revolutionary activities in the Caribbean area, particularly Cuba, but terminated its consideration of his possible use in October 1959 when it was determined that his information was of little value and it was suspected that he would use the proposed connection with this Agency to promote his personal interests. (S)

2) In 1973 WERBELL was under investigation by the United States Treasury Department Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and by the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities on Abaco Island in the Bahamas. In this connection, WERBELL contacted three retired CIA employees during 1974 in an attempt to involve them in a scheme concerning the activites of an organization called the Friends of Abaco (FOA) which advocated the secession of the island from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. All three individuals reported their contact with WERBELL and sought guidance from this Agency. In May and June of 1974 they were advised to break all ties with WERBELL. On 27 June 1974 the Federal Bureau of Investigation was formally apprised of WERBELL'S overtures to the three retired CIA employees. (S)

3. It has been determined that Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III is the subject of PA request number P76-0028. There is no indication that Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III has ever been the subject of an FOIA request or that the remaining individuals listed in reference have ever been the subject of an FOIA or PA request. (U)

George L. Marling

George L. Marling

OG/EIR:DHess/CCreamer/ran:6347 (14Nov79)
BASED ON: 201-259910
FILE IN: 201-259910 Mitchell Livingston WERBELL III
Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee w/ref.
    1 - OG/EIR w/ref.
    1 - OG/EIR Chrono

OGC 79-08601

20 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Administration
Attn: Chief, Security Analysis Group, OS
Associate Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Attn: ISA/DIP/IP/FIS
Thru: C/Reference Branch/ISS/IPG

FROM: John K. Greaney
General Counsel

SUBJECT: Request for Records Search --
Robert John Morgan, *et al.*

1. The Department of Justice is currently engaged in an investigation with state and federal law enforcement agencies concerning importation and distribution of marijuana and cocaine. Attached is a copy of the Department's letter to me requesting verification by CIA of any employment or other involvement with certain of the subjects of this investigation.

2. In order to respond to the Department's request, it would be appreciated if your offices could determine if there are any records on the subjects listed in the attached letter from the Justice Department.

John K. Greaney
John K. Greaney

Attachment

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Address Reply to the
Division Indicated WLM:mas
and Refer to Initials and Number

Organized Crime Strike Force
Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg.
Post Office Box 543
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

September 17, 1979

Mr. John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Greaney:

It was a pleasure to meet with you and Clyde Carter last Monday.

As I explained to you at that time, we are engaged in an investigation with state and federal law enforcement agencies concerning importation and distribution of marijuana and cocaine. During the course of this investigation, allegations (unfounded, I am sure) have been made that certain of the subjects of this investigation are employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I believe it is necessary to resolve as much in advance of an indictment any problems which may arise should any of the subjects of the investigation be involved with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The following individuals are among the subjects of this investigation:

Robert John Morgan - DOB: 3/6/36
John Duncan LeBolt - DOB: 1/25/24
Hubert Stewart Cotton - DOB: 11/19/23
John Sylvester Carpenter - DOB: 1/27/35
Wiley Gilmore Sims - DOB: 11/5/18
Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III - DOB: 3/ 8/18
Wayne Ernest Daniel - DOB: 2/13/40
Guy Perilton Owen - DOB: 11/1/45

Please advise as soon as possible if indictment or continued investigation of these individuals will create problems for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sincerely,

William L. McCulley
Special Attorney
U. S. Dept. of Justice

cc: Robert L. Keuche
Deputy Asst. Attorney General
Criminal Division

Gerard T. McGuire
Deputy Chief
Organized Crime & Racketeering Section
Criminal Division

"CONFIDENTIAL"

FBI reports extracted from Werbell file (DCD):

① FBI report dated 6 August 1974 from Washington, FBI file (CI-3) 62-108665, SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, INTERNAL SECRUITY - ABACO, NEUTRALITY MATTERS - ABACO.

② FBI report dated 22 July 1974 from Atlanta, Georgia, no Bureau file, Subject: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III.

DCD-112/78
31 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/ISS/IP/EIS

FROM : Ruth Elliff
DCD/FIO/PAO

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request (OLC 77-5685/4)

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, 28 December 1977

1. In response to referenced request, I am forwarding the following material from DCD files:

a. Dan Carswell -- one memorandum which may relate to the individual you requested.

b. Louis Posada -- negative.

c. Cesario Diosada -- copies of all material in DCD files.

d. Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III -- file A-12-79-00, containing all DCD material. This file is on loan and should be returned to DCD as soon as possible. PLEASE HAND CARRY.

e. David Atlee Phillips -- negative.

f. Lucien Conein -- one document. (This document was also furnished in response to Conein's request [P 77-0805] under the Privacy Act.)

g. William Stuckey -- negative.

h. Ed Butler -- copies of all material in DCD files.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 386090

[redacted] [redacted]

DCD-112/78
31 January 1978

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Request (OLC 77-5685/4)

i. Priscilla Johnson McMillan -- DCD response to her request (P 76-1861) under the Privacy Act. Full text and sanitized copies of all this material should be available from IPS. Also attached are four intelligence information reports which were not furnished in response to the PA request.

j. Richard Snyder -- one memorandum which may relate to the individual in whom you are interested.

k. Alexis Davison -- negative.

2. I have made no attempt to sanitize this material. I understand that HSCA staff members who will be examining these documents are fully cleared, and will not be allowed to remove any of this material from our Headquarters, make any copies of this material, or make any notes therefrom that would reveal any material that is properly classified and deals with intelligence sources and methods. All of the attached material is for your retention except file A-12-79-00.

3. Please direct further inquiries about this matter to the undersigned on extension 3767.

Ruth Elliff
Ruth Elliff

Attachments a/s

RELLIFF:wfc
Distribution
  Orig & 1 - Addressee, w/atts
         1 - C/DCD, wo/atts
         1 - C/Staff A, wo/atts
         3 - RElliff
        11 - Control

Frank [illegible] - Werbell [illegible] clearance from DCH - [illegible] judge demanded [illegible] available for review by him (July)

[illegible] stored in Miami -

West is suing us - He could be dragged into lawsuit - works for Anderson

WERBELL

3136292

27 July

A 8161

[illegible] on 24 Aug

1541

C O N F I D E N T I A L 092000Z SEP 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13506

TO: PRIORITY DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

TO: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (SPILMAN) FROM HENNESSEY

WNINTEL

SUBJ: FIELD OFFICE ASSISTANCE TO OGC

REF : SPILMAN/MAINWARING TELECON, 9 SEPTEMBER 1976, SAME SUBJECT

1. IN RESPONSE TO A TELEPHONE CALL FROM DEPUTY CHIEF, DCD, ON 23 AUGUST 1976, WE MADE HOTEL RESERVATIONS IN CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA, FOR WALTER LLOYD, OGC, FOR THE NIGHT OF 23 AUGUST. THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE WAS HELD OPEN THAT EVENING FOR A MEETING ATTENDED BY MR. LLOYD, SAMUEL SHERES, US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND WILLIAM WARNER, US DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION. JACK HENNESSEY, DCD/MIAMI, ALSO ATTENDED AND PROVIDED A SHORT GENERAL BRIEFING ON DCD OPERATIONS. FOR THE MOST PART, THE MEETING CONSISTED OF A DISCUSSION OF THE PAST RELATIONSHIP OF MITCHELL L. WERBELL III WITH BKHERALD, ESPECIALLY WITH DCD AS REVEALED IN THE DCD MEMORANDUM TO OGC DATED 8 MARCH 1976.

2. WE WERE ADVISED BY TELEPHONE DURING THE EVENING OF 27 AUGUST BY A. THOMANN, DCD DUTY OFFICER, AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY WALTER LLOYD, THAT LLOYD WOULD VISIT MIAMI AGAIN ON 30 AUGUST IN CONNECTION WITH THE WERBELL CASE. LLOYD DID NOT TASK DCD/MIAMI IN ANY WAY DURING THIS VISIT. HOWEVER, HE DID CHECK IN WITH US LOCALLY BY TELEPHONE UPON ARRIVAL IN THE MIAMI AREA. HE CALLED US AGAIN DURING THE EVENING OF 31 AUGUST AFTER HIS RETURN FLIGHT TO WASHINGTON, D.C., AS A COURTESY SINCE HE DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO CONTACT US PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM MIAMI.

3. MR. LLOYD AGAIN RETURNED TO MIAMI, THIS TIME ONBOARD A USAF JET STAR AIRCRAFT, EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 2 SEPTEMBER. HE CONTACTED US THAT AFTERNOON BY TELEPHONE TO REQUEST THAT WE KEEP OPEN THE FIELD OFFICE SO THAT HE COULD DEPOSIT CLASSIFIED FILES IN OUR VAULT OVERNIGHT. HE APPEARED AT THE FIELD OFFICE AT 1730 HOURS AND BRIEFED

US ON HIS TRAVEL OF THE DAY. HE PLACED TWO FOLDERS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN OUR VAULT FOR THE NIGHT, AND RECLAIMED THEM ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, 3 SEPTEMBER. IN ADDITION TO MAKING WORKING SPACE AVAILABLE TO LLOYD FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS DURING THE MORNING OF 3 SEPTEMBER, WE MADE OURSELVES AVAILABLE FOR ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED THAT DAY. HOWEVER, NOTHING FURTHER WAS REQUESTED OF US. THE LOCAL OS OFFICE PROVIDED AN ESCORT FOR LLOYD'S RETURN COMMERCIAL FLIGHT TO WASHINGTON LATER THAT AFTERNOON. LLOYD ADVISED US IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, THAT THE LOCAL JUDGE HANDLING THE WERBELL CASE ASKED FOR LLOYD TO APPEAR IN MIAMI AGAIN DURING THE FOLLOWING WEEK, WHICH APPARENTLY BECAME UNNECESSARY SINCE WERBELL AND HIS CO-DEFENDANTS WERE ACQUITTED OF ALL CHARGES BY THE JURY ON 3 SEPTEMBER.

4. AFTER RECEIVING TWO OR THREE TELEPHONE CALLS FROM MR. SHERES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MIAMI, ON 25 AUGUST, DURING WHICH HE ASKED FOR BKHERALD INFORMATION HELD IN BKHERALD HEADQUARTERS FILES, WE SUGGESTED THAT HE CALL LLOYD DIRECTLY AT HIS OGC OFFICE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ATTEMPTED USE OF DCD/MIAMI AS A CHANNEL BY SHERES STEMMED FROM THE SEEMING (TO HIM) EXPEDIENT NATURE OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AS MUCH AS FROM A BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING OF BKHERALD'S CHAIN OF COMMAND AND INFORMATION FLOW STRUCTURE. NEVERTHELESS, NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES DEVELOPED DURING THE VISITS TO DCD/MIAMI BY LLOYD.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Watts

Attached is all the material DCD has on Werbel. He has been the subject of several communications between DCD's FIO/PIC staff and OGC and the FIO staff in the DDO.

Also attached is the microfilm records on ~~an~~ a Arnold A. Bayard. I don't think he is the Colonel Bayard referred to in the memo, but it is hard to tell since we don't have any bio data on him.

4.54

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

OGC 76-0844

24 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOG
Chief, DCD
Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbel III

1. I was advised by the Justice Department on 23 February that Werbel has been indicted and the trial is scheduled to begin on 29 March in Miami, Florida. The charges relate to importing and distributing quantities of marijuana. With Werbel's propensity to raise his past affiliations with the Agency, we can anticipate problems during this trial. An additional problem is presented because Werbel is defended by Edwin Marger who was the defense attorney for John Hawk in the B-26 case in Buffalo, New York in 1966. It was Edwin Marger who subpoenaed the CIA General Counsel as a defense witness.

2. The Justice Department has received information that a person either currently or formerly affiliated with the CIA has been participating in Werbel's meetings with his attorney. It would be appreciated if all addressees could review their holdings on Werbel and determine if there is any validity to any recent contacts with him. I would urge that instructions be sent to Miami that no, repeat no, contact with Werbel take place between now and the beginning of the trial.

3. It would be helpful if each addressee could prepare a summary of the various contacts Werbel has had with CIA in the past. Please check to see if you have any information on a Colonel Bayard who was killed in Atlanta, Georgia during the summer of 1975. Bayard, reportedly an associate of Werbel's, had previous contacts with the Agency. It would be appreciated if your responses could be received by close of business 2 March.

John K Greaney

John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel

4.54

A097744

ARNOLD A. BAYARD

1175 York Avenue
New York City, New York.

BUSINESS:

Subject is President with:

A097765 - M. L. Bayard Company, Inc., Philadelphia, Penna.

4.54

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

F 92744

31 OCT 1961

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: [illegible] October 1961

TO: Chief, Contact Division, OO

FROM: Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

SUBJECT: [illegible], Arnold A. - [illegible]

A 92744

1. Reference is made to your request for a security clearance on the subject person as a potential source of intelligence information. The necessary checks have been completed with the following results:

a. ☐ No additional information has been obtained, except for such biographic information as indicated below or in the attachment.

b. ☒ Information has been received that Subject was investigated with favorable results in 1920.

c. ☐ Certain information has been received and appears in the attachment which your Division will wish to consider in determining the extent and level of your use of Subject.

2. It is to be noted that our checks were made on the basis of the identifying information you furnished or as an attachment to this memorandum. Should it be disclosed that this information is erroneous or that Subject is known by a different name, this Division should be notified immediately.

Chief, Personnel Security Division

9 NOV 1961

[illegible] 1120

CONFIDENTIAL

4.54

14-00000

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME: BAYNES / Arnold A 92744

2. ALIASES

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 27 Nov 19[illegible] - [illegible], N. J.

4. SEX: M

5. CITIZENSHIP: US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Town, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
———	Date	[illegible] Avenue, New York City, N. Y.

CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	LOCATION
———	Date	E. I. [illegible] Company, Inc. ([illegible])	Philadelphia, Penna.

S [illegible]

92745

CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR
———	[illegible]	Lehigh University	BS in Mechanical Engineering

CONTINUED

10. [illegible]

CONTINUED

[illegible]

Control

CONFIDENTIAL

3 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Washington
Chief, Miami

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

1. The attached memorandum was prepared for John Greaney, OGC, who requested a summary of our records on Mitchell L. Werbell III. Werbell is to be tried in March 1976 in Florida on a charge of importing narcotics. OGC anticipates that Werbell may claim some Agency connection because he has done so in the past. Greaney also asked about DCD connections with Colonel Bayard who is mentioned in paragraph 9 of the attached memorandum.

2. OGC has asked that there be no contact with Werbell at least until the trial is over. In view of Werbell's tendency to become involved in schemes with which the Agency cannot afford to be identified, I wish to extend indefinitely the OGC's injunction against contact with him.

JACKSON R. HORTON
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Attachment: A/S

Distribution:
2 - Washington
2 - Miami
2 - DCD
1 - C/PSZ

DZIEKER/kb

E2 IMPDET CL BY 038152

4.53

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

2 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : John K. Greaney

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Mitchell Livingston Werbell III

REFERENCE : OGC 76-0344 dated 24 February 1976

1. A review of DCD records indicates that Mitchell L. Werbell III was an occasional contact and source of this Division from 24 July 1959, when he first initiated the contact, until March 1971. It appears from our records that all of the contacts were at Werbell's volition and that at no time was he viewed as a particularly useful or reliable source. Werbell did provide unsolicited information which was reported by DCD in seven foreign intelligence information reports. In January 1976 DCD responded to a Freedom of Information inquiry from Werbell. Copies of the documents released to him are available from the DDO/PIC.

2. After meeting with Werbell at his own request in July 1959 the Chief of the Miami Field Office noted in a Memorandum for the Record that little credence could be placed in anything Werbell said. During succeeding contacts Werbell provided information which resulted in the following reports:

a. Photographs of Camarioca Harbor, Cuba (1965)

b. Dope and arms running, Dominican Republic (1965)

c. Planned coup in Guatemala (1966)

d. Political, economic, military situation in Dominican Republic (1966)

e. Planned invasion of Haiti (1966)

f. Planned invasion of Haiti (1966)

g. Venezuelan request for arms (1967)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

CONFIDENTIAL

4.53

12-99-00

FEB 27 10 47 AM '76

CONFIDENTIAL 271454Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/WASHINGTON 13234

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI

MAINWARING FROM ZEIMER A12-99-00

SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III

HAS MIAMI FIELD OFFICE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL DURING PAST YEAR? WHEN WAS LAST CONTACT? E2 IMPDET CL BY 038552
CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 27 [illegible] 76

CONFIDENTIAL 271600Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13136

TO: PRIORITY DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (ZEIMER)

SUBJ: MITCHELL L. WERBELL, III

REF : DCD/WASHINGTON 13834.

WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, III. THE LAST CONTACT BY THIS OFFICE WAS A TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED BY JAY GLEICHAUF ON 9 MARCH 1971 AND DISCUSSED IN MIM-056-71.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668

CONFIDENTIAL

4,52

12-99-00

FEB 26 3 34 PM '76

CONFIDENTIAL 262006Z FEB 76 STAFF

CITE DCD/WASHINGTON 13825

TO: PRIORITY DCD/MIAMI

FROM ZEIMER

12 99.00

SUBJECT: MITCHELL L. WERBELL III

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAS ADVISED OGC THAT SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICTED AND TRIAL WILL BEGIN ON 29 MARCH 1976. THERE MUST BE NO REPEAT NO DCD CONTACT WITH WERBELL EVEN IF HE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO INITIATE THE CONTACT. E2 IMPDET CL BY 038558

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

22 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO/PIC

ATTENTION : Hal Matter

SUBJECT : P 76-023 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

1. DCD records reflect that Subject has been in contact with the Agency since 1959. The last record of contact with Subject was in March 1971.

2. The documents in DCD's file which pertain to Subject fit into the following categories:

a. CIA Office of Security namecheck data (OS File Number 27686)

One biographic data sheet is attached for release to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released version.

b. Eighteen internal documents are attached and may be released to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released versions. Deletions are based on exemptions (j) (1) (b), (j) (1) (d), (j) (1) (e), (j) (1) (f) and (k) (1).

c. Attached are two newspaper articles which pertain to Subject and which may be released to him.

d. DCD also has a document which reflects that Subject provided DCD with 36 black and white photographs taken of the Camarioca Harbor area of Cuba. DCD has neither the originals nor copies of these photographs although they may be retrievable from NPIC. Should Subject request that these photographs be returned to him, we would make every effort to surface them.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

4,51

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: P 76-023 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

A copy of this document is attached and may be released to Subject provided those portions marked with brackets are deleted from the released version.

e. DCD also has two FR Division cables which pertain to Subject. One is from FR/Atlanta (00349) to Director, dated 11 July 1974. The other is to FR/New York (670514) from NE/ARN/I, dated 17 March 1975.

f. One FBI report (CI-3) 62-108665
DATE: 6 August 1974
TO: Director, CIA
FROM: Director, FBI
Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

g. DCD has reference to a report on the Dominican Republic which Subject provided DCD in September 1966. DCD, however, does not have a copy of this document. A notation in our file indicates that the document was sent to OCI/WH/Dominican Desk. DCD records do not reflect the exact title, only that it is a report on the Dominican Republic.

h. Six internal DCD documents which may not be released to Subject. Copies are attached for your information. Denial is based on exemptions (j) (1) (b), (j) (1) (d) and (k) (1).

i. DCD suggests that in answering Subject's request he be informed that Agency records indicate that he willingly provided information that resulted in seven foreign intelligence information reports. Four of these reports received advance teletype dissemination. We suggest that Subject be informed that the Agency is reluctant to declassify and release the eleven documents via the mail as such an action would put them in the public domain. Should Subject insist on seeing the documents, DCD will consider sanitizing and showing them to him in the presence of an Agency representative.

j. DCD also has one memorandum for the record which concerns an OGC trace on Subject's sons, dated 18 April 1975. A copy of this document is attached

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: P 76-028 - Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III

for your information. In light of paragraph one of OGC 75-4582, dated 10 December 1975, can we assume that this is not a record?

3. DCD suggests that a statement thanking Subject for his cooperation be included in the Agency's response to his request.

JACKSON R. HORTON
Chief, Domestic Collection Division

Attachments:
As stated

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Control
1 - DCD/Privacy
1 - OC/DCD
ro

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[illegible]

[illegible]

24 FEB 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NO. [illegible]

1. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME – FIRST NAME – MIDDLE NAME WERBELL, Mitchell L.	3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 8 March 1918-Philadelphia, Pa.	
2. ALIASES [illegible] 127900	4. SEX Male	5. CITIZENSHIP US

6. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, CITIZENSHIP

7. RESIDENCES (Including No. and Street, Zone, R.F.D., etc.)

FROM	TO	COMPLETE ADDRESS
	Present	Powder Springs, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

8. EMPLOYMENT

FROM	TO	NAME OF EMPLOYER	COMPLETE ADDRESS
Present		Leader of Organization to Combat Communism	Powder Springs, Georgia
?	?	Alexis, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Cool Roof of Georgia, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia
?	?	Werbell-South, Inc.	Atlanta, Georgia

☐ CONTINUED

9. EDUCATION (High school, college, graduate work, etc.)

FROM	TO	NAME OF SCHOOL	DEGREE OR MAJOR

☐ CONTINUED

10. ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION, INCLUDING FULL NAME, CITIZENSHIP DATA ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

27 FEB 1967

4.51

☐ CONTINUED

FORM 150 USE PREVIOUS
8-53 EDITIONS
10.63

/

SECRET

F-12-79-00

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIM-008-74

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (Ryan/[illegible])

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

REF : OSS-44-74, Dated 8 January 1974

Thank you for referent. For the record, subject has made no further effort to contact anyone in this office; similarly, we plan no attempts to get in touch with him. Thus the matter rests there at this writing. Should he call again, however, we will keep the advice contained in referent in mind in dealing with him.

BRUCE N. MAINWARING

BNM:mbj

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

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B

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

1-12-79-00

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

033-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/033)

Mitchell L. Werbell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

SPRyan for EBAmes/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
IP Files

FILE: MM-23819

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 010830

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

4.51

12-19-00

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

A-168946

A-168762

[illegible] Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : [illegible] telecon

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of [illegible] Industrial report of personal [illegible] Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell [illegible] WerBell, III. WerBell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) [illegible] known to this writer during assignment in China during WWII.

2. This [illegible] as well as [illegible] have considerable information on [illegible]. [illegible] He is of unsavory character [illegible] involved in [illegible] and perpetual financial difficulties.

3. WerBell was involved [illegible] in connection with [illegible] We do not [illegible] to [illegible] WerBell. [illegible] of FBI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
[illegible]
cc: Services Division (Control)
FILE: [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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SECRET

12-79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS **16 March 1971**

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston, III -- Revocation of DOD Security Clearance/Recent Contact --
#17606 [illegible]

1. The information reported in the enclosed self-explanatory memorandum, regarding Subject's self-initiated contact with the Miami Field Office, may be of interest.

2. The Office of the General Counsel and WH Division have been apprised of Subject's recent activities.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. [illegible]

SECURITY

WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grv

4.51

SECRET

OGC (John Creany)

F 12.79-00

MIM-056-71

Director, Domestic Contact Service

10 March 1971

ATTN : John McConnell

John Creany (OGC)

Chief, Miami Field Office

B

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Creany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/cas

cc: V Thorne - 3/15

SECRET

4.51

Dec 3 12 [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL 031539Z DEC 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 2467

CONTACTS/MIAMI

FROM MCCONNELL

JOHN GREANEY, OCG, WILL BE COMING TO MIAMI MONDAY, 8 DECEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF PORT-AU-PRINCE.

D A127100

NEW SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL OF ATLANTA IS MENTIONED IN A (WASHINGTON POST) ARTICLE TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED RECEIPT OF GUNS SHIPPED FROM VIETNAM THROUGH EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE. MR. GREANEY SUGGESTS THAT YOU AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.51

F-12-79-00

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell

31 March 1967
MIM - 098- 67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

Think you will be interested in the attached clippings, which indicate that all charges have been dropped against WerBell. Please pass to John Greaney, Office of General Counsel.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JPG:sb
Enclosure:

4,51

F-12-79-00

Miami [illegible] Herald

24 March 1967

att to Mem 098-27
dated 31 Mar 67, Sub:
Mitchell & [illegible]

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL

F-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service

24 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell

MIM-036-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

REF : MIM-060-67

1. WerBell called the Miami office on 23 Mar 67 and when told that Bart Gonzalez was not in, advised the secretary that the Federal charges against him had been dropped. We have not confirmed this. We do not intend to renew our contacts with him for the time being at least.

2. Please advise John Greaney of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and give us whatever recommendations he or you may have as to our future relations with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

BIG:pw

4.51

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL F-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service 2 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell HDI-060-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A-127900

1. You will recall that John Greaney of the Office of General Counsel was in Miami for several days in connection with the federal case pending against subject. WerBell was indicted on federal conspiracy charges growing out of the abortive invasion attempt of Haiti a short time ago.

2. Following the indictment WerBell called us and indicated that he was to be interviewed on "nationwide TV through station WSB-TV in Atlanta." We called Harry McCrea and asked him to monitor local coverage, and we covered the NBC stations for a period of several days. WerBell did not appear on a national hookup, but Harry McCrea informed us that he did appear on a two-minute taped segment on the WSB-TV, 6:25 A.M. telecast only. WerBell said he would, if he could, "make a citizen's arrest of Dwight Eisenhower, John McCone, et al, because he did no more than they did." Harry said that he didn't believe that the station took his statement seriously.

3. WerBell was also interviewed by "The Atlanta Constitution", and we are enclosing a clipping from the "Constitution" of 28 Feb 67 in which WerBell is quoted concerning the indictment.

4. Would you please pass the above to John Greaney. You might inform him that the statement of an undesignated federal official in Miami undoubtedly refers to the Customs agent in charge, with whom WerBell had a conversation prior to calling us. WerBell quoted him in the same fashion in our conversation. We have had no further contact with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:pw

Enclosure:
As stated

4.51

CONFIDENTIAL

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[illegible] automatic
[illegible] and
declassification

F-12-79-00

SECRET

FEB 23 [illegible] '67

SECRET 231432Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1714

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: JOHN MCCONNELL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

A-12 7900

REF: A. MIAMI 1710

B. MC CONNELL/GLEICHAUF TELCONS OF 21 FEB AND 23 FEB 67

MITCHELL WER BELL CALLED DANT GONZALES YESTERDAY TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED TWO PHONE CALLS FROM CHET GRAY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR DETAILS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT REFERRED TO IN MIAMI 1710. GRAY STATED THAT UNLESS HE HEARD FROM SOMEBODY IMMEDIATELY, HE WOULD TAKE HIS INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA ON THE MORNING OF 23 FEB 67. WE CURRENTLY HAVE AN ADDRESS FOR GRAY: [illegible] NORTH OAKHURST DRIVE, BEVERLY HILLS; TELE: 274-4922.

B-67-54

SECRET

ET

Copy F/# B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

4.51

[illegible]

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS   24 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Dunn
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Communication from Capt [illegible]
A1.27100 re Alleged Assassination Attempt
Against Foreign Diplomat -- [illegible]
Interest

REF : DCS memorandum dated 21 February 1967, same subject

1. Please forward a copy of the enclosed self-explanatory Diary item to Mr. Dan Popich. Mr. Popich was informed of this matter by phone on 23 February 1967.

2. Any questions pertaining to this information should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. [illegible]

R. FRANK [illegible]

Enclosure: As stated above

CC: Mr. Dan Popich

VThorne:pat

4.51

Contact
F-12-79-00

SECRET

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

Mitchell A-127900 CA B-67-54

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

B-67-41

cc: Chief, Miami Office

JMcConnell:sg

Copies F/ All Jackets!

4.51

SECRET

12.79-00

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 21 February 1967

ATT : Mr. Leland Runa
Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Recent Telephone Call from Chet GUY of Los Angeles re Possible Assassination in US of Close Relative of Middle East Ruler

A-127900

1. The enclosed copy of teletype from our Miami Field Office is forwarded for your information and immediate transmittal to the FBI.

2. Mr. John McConnell, of this Office, has discussed this matter with Mr. Sam Papich, FBI, who said the FBI will contact Subject and GUY, and will subsequently advise us of any action they might want us to take.

3. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 27[illegible]

SECRET

B. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: Teletype Contacts/Miami-1710
dated 20 February 1967

VThorne:pat

4.51

Law Offices
of
Edwin Marger

Edwin Marger (Fla. & Ga.)
Reid Kennedy (Ia. & Ga.)
Richard A. Garcia
Robert O. Davies
Donald B. Walker
Nancy L. Finkel

Allan J. Hall (Fla. & Ga.)
of Counsel

Telephone 256-4288
Area Code (404)

Suite 320
6666 Powers Ferry Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

P 76-028 LO'B

December 30, 1975

Gene F. Wilson,
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter of December 18th, 1975 concerning our client, Mitchell Livingston WerBell, III and his request for information under the Freedom of Information Act.

I am enclosing a notarized statement providing you with the address and place of birth of Mr. WerBell.

With regard to your last paragraph asking for clarification as to which records he desires to have searched, we, of course, are not familiar with your files or filing system. Mr. WerBell spent sometime in the United States Army during World War II and has traveled extensively since that time. He was in Cuba at the time of the Castro military operation, in the Dominican Republic during that military operation and in Thailand and Viet Nam during the Viet Nam War. We feel quite confident your office must have extensive files and documentation concerning Mr. WerBell and this request for information is intended to

HH'S
21170
[illegible]

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cover all information contained in the files of your agency.

Should any of the matter contained in your files have a security clearance classification that would preclude its dissemination, we would appreciate being notified that the information exists.

We would appreciate your early attention to the foregoing.

Very truly yours,

Reid Kennedy

RK:dcn
Enclosure (1)

4.49

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF GEORGIA:
SS
COUNTY OF FULTON:

I, MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, after first being duly sworn, do hereby, under oath, depose and say that my current address is 4321 MacLand Dallas Road, Powder Springs, Georgia, 37007. Further, that I was born on March 8, 1918, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

I further swear and affirm that I am the same MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III, whose signature appears below and that I am the same person who is making the request for release of information.

Mitchell Livingston WerBell
MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

Sworn to and Subscribed before me, Notary Public, on the 31st day of December, 1975.

Notary Public, Georgia State at Large
My Commission expires: [illegible]

6,99

E-12-79-00

SECRET

FEB 20 11 53 AM '63

S E C R E T 201932Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1718

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: MCCONNELL

FROM: GLEICHAUF

A 127900

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL WERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW:

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1122 HOURS ON 19 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

Gray B-67-57

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD WERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

FI # B-67-57 (Chet Gray)

4,57

PAGE 2 CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710 S E C R E T

REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED VERBELL FOR ADVICE. WER

BELL ADVISED GRAY

TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. VERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. VERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, VERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN COA(S)5601 AND OOA(S) 5593 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5 ~~4~~. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

S E C R E T

BT

4.51

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

PRIORITY VA CITE [illegible] 1068.

ATTN: MC CONNELL

SUBJECT: RUMORED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FIDEL CASTRO

REF: MIA 677-63 OF 17 DEC 63

A 127902

1. MITCHELL WERBELL ADVISED BART GONZALEZ THAT A GROUP OF SIX MEN IN HIS ORGANIZATION HAS PENETRATED CUBA AND IS CURRENTLY IN THE VARADERO/HAVANA AREA. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL CASTRO TO BE ATTEMPTED WITHIN [illegible] JANUARY. IF FOUND NOT POSSIBLE, SECONDARY TARGET WILL BE TO BLOW UP THE ELECTRIC PLANT FURNISHING ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA.

2. THE GROUP IS TO USE AN AIRPLANE MODEL TYPE OF RADIO DETONATOR. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PROCURE CONTROLLED FREQUENCY RADIO DETONATORS WHICH WERE PREFERRED BECAUSE OF HIGHER QUALITY. THE DETONATOR ALLEGEDLY WILL BE THROWN AT CASTRO OR THEY WILL USE SUB-MACHINE GUNS IN THE COURSE OF A PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY CASTRO. NO INDICATION AS TO HOW THEY KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE WILL APPEAR. GROUP SAID TO KNOW MISSION IS SUICIDAL.

3. ATTEMPT ON THE ELECTRIC PLANT WILL BE TO KILL GUARDS AND PENETRATE AREA FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WILL BLOW UP KEY EQUIPMENT.

4. WERBELL SAID THAT [illegible] ALSO ALLEGEDLY HAS A GROUP IN CUBA AT PRESENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASSINATING FIDEL CASTRO.

5. PLEASE HANDLE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT. FYI: WERBELL IS A NOTORIOUS CON MAN AND A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE. HE IS CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE.

~~SECRET~~

CFN 1068 MC CONNELL FIDEL CASTRO MIA 677 63 17 DEC 63 MITCHELL WERBELL BART GONZALEZ 6 CUBA VARADERO HAVANA [illegible] 9 JANUARY NOT POSSIBLE UNABLE TO [illegible] NO INDICATION [illegible] FYI [illegible] CON CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE

BT

4.51

Chief, Contact Division

ATTN : Index Branch

Chief, Miami Field Office

27 July 1959

Memorandum of Visit to Mitchell Warbell III
2211 Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

1. In the evening of 24 July 1959 I received a telephone call from subject, who had been given my name and address by another segment of the intelligence community in connection with the possibility of his passing along late information concerning the rumored impending flight of Batista to the US.

2. Warbell indicated that he spent a great amount of his time in the Dominican Republic and had extremely close association with leaders of the government, and also with General Jose Pedraza. He claimed to have been a former member of the OSS with service in China in WWII. Warbell is a soldier-of-fortune type who wears a monocle, drives a Mercedes-Benz, sports a most attractive blonde girl friend, and is a Big Spender. He also volunteered that he has a wife and six children living in Georgia.

3. Warbell told me that his principle source of income is in dealing with Cuban pesos, and said that he is associated in the business with a John Lipko of Los Angeles, a jazz musician who formerly played with the Jimmy Dorsey and Jan Garber bands.

4. Lipko also claims to have been a member of OSS during WWII, serving in the Rumanian and Eastern European area. Lipko was busily engaged in making long distance phone calls to Mexico City, Guatemala City, and Los Angeles during a part of the time I was with the group.

5. Warbell gave me some information on Batista's plans, which is basically supposition, and furnished some other marginal information which is being forwarded, although in my opinion little credence can be placed in anything he says. It is hard to evaluate what Warbell's motives are in connection with his desire to furnish information regarding Batista to us, but it appeared that he was also attempting to fish for information, throwing out a number of questions concerning the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, reportedly recently to have been purchased by Cuban interests with 9 million Cuban pesos. The penthouse reportedly has been completely redecorated, with heavy steel doors guarding the entrance. This penthouse suite has been rumored to be Batista's intended headquarters once he arrives in the US. All of this has been written about in the gossip columns of the local papers.

6. Inasmuch as Warbell has my name and phone number, probably little can be done to prevent him getting in touch with me from time to time, but contact will not be initiated by me except by direction. The basic purpose of this memo is for the record.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:cm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

The Atlanta Journ
Covers Dixie Like the Dew
Since 1883
James M. Cox, Chairman 1939-1957—James M. Cox Jr., Chair 1957-1974
Jack Tarver, President • Jack Spalding, Editor
22-A ★★★★★ APRIL 9, 1975

The Need for MARTOC

THE POSSIBILITIES of MARTA for both good and bad are tremendous. On the good side the area needs a rapid and economical transportation system. The area also needs a big construction project.

When MARTA was established it was apparent that the good it would bring was balanced by the tremendous possibilities for patronage and featherbedding. So a committee was established by the General Assembly to oversee MARTA and it was called MARTOC.

The area needs MARTA but it now needs MARTOC as never before.

Labor contract time is coming up for MARTA and upon its outcome rides the fate of the 15-cent fare. The chairman of MARTA's board is John Wright, a labor man, and [illegible] have faith in Mr. Wright's [illegible] ment that he would [illegible] still we're happy that [illegible] be watching. MARTA [illegible] into problems delaying [illegible] tion of its rail system. [illegible] with consummation of [illegible] other with the [illegible] ther is insurmountable but [illegible] mean more delays, more [illegible] more wondering [illegible] ciency of the operation.

MARTA's board is [illegible] the handling of these [illegible] today's board isn't as [illegible] yesterday's. We're happy [illegible] around to backstop and [illegible] committee is aware of [illegible] duties here.

~~Which Domino Is Ne~~

4.51

C

14-00000

F12-79-00

18 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Werbell

1. On 17 April 1975, Annet, DDO/FIO, called DCD on the green line to relay the following OGC priority request.

Please check Agency records for:

a. Mitchell Werbell, IV
DPOB: 16 November 1949; Atlanta, Georgia

b. Godfrey Werbell
DPOB: 21 June 1951; Atlanta, Georgia

These two have been charged with crimes... alleged they work for CIA.

2. After checking DCD's records I found that DCD has had contact with Subject's father in the past. DCD's records reflect no direct contact with the sons. The only mention of the sons appears in an article published in The Washington Post, 27 December 1970, Section D, page 3 and a cable to FR/NY, 17 March 1975 (Director 670514).

3. DDO/FIO was notified of the above by telephone on 17 April 1975.

Rose O'Toole

Distribution:
Orig. - A 127900
1 - DCD/FOIA
1 - OC/DCD

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CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 191757Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 670514

CONF: NE 10 INFO: FILE 11/AH FR5, DCD2 LSN/ID
C/OPS LA10

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0 NO INDEX

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TO: FR/NEW YORK. Y

AJAJA FORRES Y

REF: FR/NEW YORK 30417 [IN 511214] Y

1. NO ADDITIONAL HQS TRACES ON EDGAR LEMMENS AND CO. OTHER THAN CONFIRMATION THAT IT LICENSED DEALER OF ARMS LOCATED IN TIRLEMONT, BELGIUM AND THAT IT IMPORTED FROM NEW YORK TO BELGIUM A SILENT SUB-MACHINE GUN WHICH LATER SHOWED UP IN SPAIN CONNECTED WITH BASQUE ASSASSINATION. Y

12 7900

2. MICHELL L. WERBELL, III (201-259910) IS PARTNER OF DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL INC. OF POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, A LICENSED ARMS DEALER. HE BORN 8 MAR 1918, PHILADELPHIA. HQS HAS LENGTHY 201 ON WERBELL WHO HAS LONG HISTORY POPPING UP IN AREAS AND SITUATIONS WHERE CAN MAKE FEW FAST BUCKS. HE CHARACTERIZED AS UNSCRUPULOUS, WHEELER-DEALER AND PROMOTER OF GRANDIOSE SCHEMES. HE OF OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MID-1959 WHEN BECAME INVOLVED WITH ANTI-CASTRO PLOTTERS IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OFFERED PROVIDE BKHERALD WITH INFO ON REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN CARIBBEAN. HE GRANTED POA IN AUGUST 1959 BUT THIS CANCELLED OCTOBER 1959 WHEN HIS INFO PROVED BE OF

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

4/39

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PAGE 2

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR | DATE-TIME GROUP | CITE | MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

STAFF

DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: FILE

670514

0 INDEX DISSEM BY:
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0 IP FILES #

LITTLE VALUE AND IT SUSPECTED THAT HE USING BKHERALD@ FUNDS TO PROMOTE PERSONAL INTERESTS. EVER SINCE, BKHERALD HAS BEEN DISCLAIMING WERBELL WHO HAS REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED PROMOTE SELF AS REP OF LNBUZZ AND BKHERALD. SINCE MUCH OF BKHERALD INFO ON WERBELL ORIGINATES LNERGO, WE SUGGEST LNERGO REP/NEW YORK PERFORM TRACE THROUGH HIS OFFICIAL CHANNEL. (ABOVE INFO MAY NOT BE PASSED FOREIGN NATIONALS BECAUSE WERBELL WODUAL CITIZEN.) Y

3. ONLY TRACE ON MITCHELL WERBELL IV IS THAT HE ALSO INVOLVED
FATHER'S
IN/[illegible] ARMS BUSINESS TRADE. HE HAS HAD NO CONNECTION WITH BKHERALD. Y

4. FILE: 201-918287, E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 17 MARCH 1975
ORIG: WENDY RAHMAN
UNIT: NE/ARN/I
EXT: R 1386

LA/COPS
NE/SO..
CNE/ARN/I..
CNE/ARN..
C/FR/B2
FR/B 2..
Ferguson
SA/DCNE/AO

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F-12-79-00

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TOR:112055Z JUL 74 ATFR 00349

S E C R E T 112200Z JUL 74 STAFF

CITE FR/ATLANTA 00349

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT ISOLOG

1. GEORGE KENNY, FBI SPECIAL AGENT IN ATLANTA, HAS ADVISED BASE THAT HOWARD GIBSON HEAD OF ATLANTA BASE CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY OFFICE IN WASHINGTON AND FORMER SUBURBAN ATLANTA (COBB COUNTY) COP ADVISED HIM BY TELEPHONE THAT WASHINGTON OFFICE SUBLEASED BY HIM TO DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BEING USED BY BKHERALD AS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LP. GIBSON CLAIMS OFFICE IN CHARGE BKHERALD OFFICER WHOSE NAME GARBLED ON PHONE. KENNY BELIEVES NAME MAY BE CONREEN. OFFICE IS LOCATED 4 OR 5 BLOCKS FROM WHITE HOUSE. KENNY WILL ATTEMPT OBTAIN ADDRESS.

2. OWNER CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY IS ATLANTAN MITCHELL WERBELL, LOCAL GUN RUNNER AND PRIVATE EYE ON WHOM DCD HAS REPORTED. WERBELL AND GIBSON CURRENTLY IN LITIGATION FOR UNKNOWN REASON. FBI AGENT KENNY STATES GIBSON PROBABLY CAPABLE SPREADING PARA 1 STORY WIDELY AS MEANS EMBARRASS WERBELL.

WERBELL

4,38

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Steve Van Cleave

FROM: William D. Pangburn, Atlanta RO	EXTENSION	NO. ATL-78-74
		DATE 21 June 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Support Branch/OSS Attn: Grant				William: Reference our telecon of 6/21/74. This is the unedited transcript we discussed. The tape has been cleared and this is the only copy. Regards,
2.				
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FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PETERSON AND VAN CLEAVE - Tuesday, 6/18/74, [illegible]

I had heard a rumor that, I thought at the time that these guys, these idiots can't be doing this again, but in the last week I have picked up a great deal of information that I think needs to be known at this location that involves the Werbell group out of Powder Springs. Are you familiar with that name? [No, I'm not. Bill has been handling all of that and I just don't know anything about it, Mr. Van Cleave. You can give me what information you have and I will pass it on or do what we can, but Bill has been handling that entirely and we work different accounts and I'm sorry to say that I am totally unfamiliar with it.] Well, let me put it to you this way. Is there any way at all that you will be in touch with Bill, so that I could get this information to him by phone. [Well, he is up in Tennessee and we can get in touch with him, yes. I could give him a call.] Well let me give you a brief synopsis so that you can at least pass that on to him. And in the process, I'll have to give you a bit of background on this subject. I consider it very important, not from the standpoint of the fact that what these people are involved in now is starting to break, but I think it is extremely important that this location gets something in to indicate that their contact lets them know what is going on. Mitchell Worbel is a gun dealer basically. He has what is called a farm out at Powder Springs, Georgia. Basically, it is a piece of property with a lake and a firing range and a big house and a gun shop below and a vault with about three thousand Ingram submachine guns and other assorted weapons. Now Werbell has been in and out of all kinds of things. He pops up all over. He loves publicity and he loves to imply a relationship with the Agency. Now, about a year ago they were involved with some people from Britain in an attempt to set up a secession of the Island of Abaco, at the time the Bahamas were granted their independence. Now this was a very serious thing; there were people including members of Parliment from London that came over here and they were going to have a small army on Abaco and the local settlers on Abaco were all for this because they were mostly white and the thing never got off the ground at that time. However, it was known, there were newspapers articles written about it. Lynden Pindling, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas was incensed by this whole scheme and basically, if you could think of anything that would be against the best interest of the US and the Agency and everybody, it would be some idiotic scheme like this. Now a few weeks ago, I heard a rumor from a source that this thing had been re-activated and at the time I called Bill and told him I thought I might [illegible] [illegible] suddenly grown bigger. And to be more specific about this, when I say that, I can tell you that it is a fact that last Thursday night the new Ambassador from the Bahamas in Washington got Congressman Andrew Young to one side at a reception and they discussed this matter with grave seriousness. OK, now, therefore I am positive that within certain circles in Washington this matter is being discussed at this moment. Now I also learned that last week the whole group of the Werbell's and their associates were in Washington and I'll give you the names that I know of for sure: Mike Oliver, who is a key figure in this. He represents several wealthy Americans and Britishers who have long had a dream of having their own island and establishing their own country. Now this sounds like something right out of cheap fiction; however, it is a fact. I have met Mike Oliver. And there are about six wealthy individuals, one of whom I think lives in the Bahamas, I believe two are in England, one of them I think is Lord Bellhaven who is a member of Parliament. He has been over to the farm recently and in Washington a few weeks ago with them. About three wealthy Americans, all older fellows with many millions. Now this thing came up once before about eight years ago when they bought a boat and Oliver went out into the Pacific and laid claim to the coral reef in the Samoan Islands I think it was and planted a flag on it and established the free soverign state of Menerva. Life Magazine had a spread on this. And that lasted for about a week until the King of Samoa, or somebody, some Tribal King sent [end of side of tape]

putting aside a piece of Nicaraguan soil and giving it extra territorial rights and I know they have money. To make a long story short, Oliver is involved in this. He came in, I understand, two weeks after the Bahamas got their independence and said we've got the money for the Abaco operation. Now I have it on good source from an informant in their organization that a month or so ago a U-Haul truck came up from Fort Lauderdale in the middle of the night and loaded up a bunch of guns and explosives and took them to Fort Lauderdale. The name of the man who drove the truck was Wally Gillis. He is a freelancer soldier of fortune type and himself knows a lot of those people. [illegible] a boat - you know, a good sized cruiser, can go to the Bahamas or wherever. Supposedly this material went to a [illegible] house in Fort Lauderdale but [illegible] being involved down there with a fellow named [illegible] Burnstine. Burnstine is [illegible] to narcotics people; he is a pilot and has airpl[illegible] and every now and then [illegible] week was Mike Oliver, Mitchell Werbell, III, retired Colonel Robert Bayard, US Army who also lives in this area and is associated with Werbell and a fellow named Chuck Hall who is a resident of the Bahamas in Nassau, who is a key part of this operation. And I don't know who else but they were staying for several days at the Grammercy Inn, Washington. It is my understanding that they made contact there with a former agent of your organization, with an offer of substantial amounts of money for him to recruit covert types, para-military types, technicians - in effect, mercenaries. And I have reason to believe that he is reporting this information. I certainly hope so. So again, what I am showing you is that I think stuff is coming into Washington right fast. Now Werbell has been known to drop Mr. Colby's name to me and to many other people because he wangled - Werbell originally was in the OSS you know. So he has a lot of old friends who are OSS types in those days and I understand one of these old boys did have dinner with Colby and Werbell wangled his way into it a couple of months ago in Washington. So, that is all he needs to start dropping names like mad. He does know some people in and former people. Now I understand that they have also made contacts in Miami recently with two companies who manufacture electronic equipment and used the name of another former Agency man who is now with the DEA in Washington. Again, I have an informant in the organization who is about ready to break with them and he has told me all this. He was in the office when calls were made to these people, talking about buying electronic equipment which is illegal and using the name of this former Agency man in the DEA and indicating that they would like to see the equipment, that he'll probably arrange to buy some, that type of thing. And I know for a fact that that individual knows about this now and he is a good man and in good standing with everybody. But to summarize this, the point is this - the whole thing is idiotic scheme by a bunch of fools. It is financed by some wealthy idiots, you know, who have money and are behind the scenes and these fools - in other words, if someone came [illegible] citizen to get involved in a scheme like this I wouldn't touch it with a 10 foot pole because it is totally against the interests of both governments involved. Even the slightest leak on it can cause a serious diplomatic problem, you know, regardless of how crazy it is, the fact is an involvement of this type involving Americans, anything that comes out, the first thing that is going to be is an Agency involvement. [illegible] this the Island of [illegible]

[illegible]

is that it?] Yes. You see the Bahamas - I don't know how familiar you are with them, but they don't have an army or anything. They have a small police force and they have some small police boats, little 30 foot jobs that run around the Islands, and they are talking about establishing . . . [Aren't they still under the British protection for foreign troops?] I would certainly think so, but there are no troops stationed there; you follow me? But what I am trying to say is the implications of this thing which I know now are known in Washington by people. When you have the Bahamiam Ambassador, the new Ambassador, getting a black American congressman from Georgia aside - you see these people talk a lot, that is another reason - anybody involved with them is crazy. They have all kinds of these mercenary types and they make calls all over in Miami and all over the world and talk about their schemes and it has broken somewhere, you know, along the line; probably in the Bahamas or Miami. [Well do we know now what the essence of the conversation was between the Ambassador and Young?] I think it expressed grave concern about this situation. I think some names were given of the people. You see they know who Werbell is because Pendling, in fact, one time made a very tough speech about this type of thing with the American intervention in the affairs of the Bahamas and the name Werbell is an international soldier of fortune. I am concerned about one thing: No. 1, I know it isn't going to get off the ground now. I knew it never would. It might have got off the ground but the thing is it's one of these things that could be so messy and opponents, let's say people on the other side would love something like this so they could capitalize on it forever - you know, reports hinting at secret involvement of an American intelligence agency and attempts to establish a base in the Bahamas. A good propagandist could just have a field day with this. So I have a feeling that unless I am really crazy I think people in your organization are aware at this moment of this thing surfacing in Washington. And that is why I am calling this office because I have given information here before on these people and I think that it's important that if somebody says - Hey, have you guys heard anything about them and you fellows say no, we haven't heard anything - you know. [Well you feel in your own mind that this is something that will come about in the very near future, this attempt?] No, I would have to say I have a feeling now the attempt will not come about at all. If enough people in Washington start asking questions and they do know the names of these people and if the former agent up there goes in and gives information to somebody naming the people who come to him and the amount of money they offered him to recruit people for this. That's why they were in Washington last week. This fellow lives up there and he is now in the function of a private investigator but he is a former agent of your organization. So I just want to be sure that you fellows down here, you know, if someone asks a question, or if they don't then at least you throw a report in indicating that an informant here, namely me, and by name, has given you this information. Because there is another factor involved too. Werbell - see Bill knows about my relationship with him. I was forced to take Werbell to Argentina last year for a private client of mine. One of the Board of Directors thought he was the greatest international thing in the world and he was the biggest millstone I have ever had around my neck. I was down there defending against the ERP terrorist group and Werbell was running all over Buenos Aires with smugglers and prostitutes and everybody and dropping our names and getting drunk and hinting that we were big American secret agents. He stayed on after I left and nearly got picked up by the Federal police. They were friends of mine I might add, so I got my situation cleared down there. But he loves to talk to me. I do international security work for corporations and he wanted to get involved with me in business and I refused to have anything to do with him, you know. But he loves to get drunk and call me and brag. And he called me several months ago and told me he was working with a group in Bolivia and I said I hope it is the government. And he said Oh no, it's the other guys. And I said well Mitch, you're crazy. It's not up to any private citizen or private organization to go anywhere in the world and get involved with people against the government. It just is trouble, that's all there is to it. And I forgot about that and he called me the morning after the attempted coup(ph) down there and named his source there as Lt. Colonel Gary Prado and as it turns out Prado was one of the two leaders of the attempted coup and he had shipped guns down there through New Orleans, through an intermediary named Phillips, and here again - well frankly, Bonzaire his General, Hugo Bonzaire, the strong man of Bolivia, and I don't think we have bad relations with them. In fact, he is getting closer to [illegible] strong men down there and it is a known fact that he hates communist and he sends the troops out to kill them so what should anybody be doing trying to overthrow an anti-communist government. I'm an old country boy but that just doesn't make sense to me. Furthermore, a private individual. So because of that [illegible] when they broke up [illegible] all of 15 minutes [illegible] they round up everybody and interrogate them and say where did you get the guns and they find Ingrams and Ingrams only come from Werbell and then you have State Department you know, saying what is this, do you know who, down here trying to overthrow our government. And since Prado, by the way was leader of the troops that captured Shay Dravarro (ph) then once again you get into a good left-wing journalist can really weave a nice little story of that big bad Agency down there doing things again. So he is like a mouquito in that he doesn't accomplish anything but he is very dangerous in my opinion to our relations. Bad enough to mess up good things. [I will pass this on to Bill.] Well tell him this, that I was in Washington last week and let me emphasize again that I would be the most surprised person in the world if Senior Officers at Langley aren't aware as of the Friday, of this situation and through the Washington surfacing there, you follow me? And really I like Bill and what I'm trying to do, I'm putting myself in his position and this is his area and I know that reports, because I have talked to him before about them and I am sure that this has been made a matter of record. And I just think it would be nice for Bill to be able to say yes, my informant has given me information - this information. Because it will all tie in. You might mention too that within the last two months Werbell has visited Vesco in Costa Rica and after that visit a Vesco associate named Marino came up here from Panama and stayed at Werbell's. So he is dealing now with Vesco too and all of this is just nothing but bad. And he is implying, he talks to newspaper people and writers and he does imply and use names that he is not authorized to use and shouldn't use. I know that he is not an official or unofficial or anything else connected with your Agency but this is the way he is surviving. People are dealing with him thinking that really he is - there are enough problems happening as it is but all we need is one good left-wing newspaper man to get hold of this type of thing and get it in Jack Anderson's column or some place like that and have an official blast from the government of the Bahamas and then everybody in the world is going to think that the Agency was behind this and got caught. The reason I appreciate this, I think timing is important. I think the end of next week is going to be a little bit late because there might even be some public surfacing of this. So I think it is important that they know that this office does have access to information. I can be reached at my number here which is 258-7593 or at my home, which is 237-2474.

Che Guevara

14-00000

12-77-00

MAR 5 11 25 AM '74

E CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L 051345Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12494

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (GRANT) A-182014

SUBJ: STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, LTD., ATLANTA,
GEORGIA

REF : GRANT/HENNESSEY TELCON, 25 FEBRUARY, SAME SUBJECT

1. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 21 JANUARY 1974 WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, [illegible] ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, (A CONTACT OF THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE) WHO ADVISED US THAT AN ACQUAINTANCE OF HIS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, WANTED TO SPEAK WITH US IN CONNECTION WITH INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT VAN CLEAVE SHOULD CONTACT OUR OFFICE IN ATLANTA; HOWEVER, ALLIEGRO SAID THAT VAN CLEAVE DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH ''RECRUITERS'', RATHER HE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH A CIA OFFICER ''IN THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION''. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT OUR ATLANTA OFFICE HAS THE SAME STATURE AS THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, AND THAT HE SHOULD URGE VAN CLEAVE TO CONTACT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ATLANTA. ALLIEGRO WOULDN'T ACCEPT THIS RESPONSE ON OUR PART AND INSISTED THAT WE AT LEAST HEAR WHAT VAN CLEAVE HAD TO SAY. FINALLY, WE AGREED TO ACCEPT A CALL FROM VAN CLEAVE SO THAT WE COULD TELL HIM TO CONTACT OUR ATLANTA REPRESENTATIVE.

A177650

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2. VAN CLEAVE CALLED US AT HIS EXPENSE FROM ATLANTA ABOUT FIVE MINUTES LATER. WE ADVISED HIM AT THE OUTSET THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK WITH BILL PANGBURN IN THE ATLANTA RESIDENT OFFICE AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR WORK FORCE IS DIVIDED GEOGRAPHICALLY RATHER THAN FUNCTIONALLY, AND THAT SINCE HE LIVES IN ATLANTA, HE MUST DEAL WITH THE ATLANTA RO. WE PROVIDED HIM WITH THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE ATLANTA RO, AND HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTACT PANGBURN THE SAME DAY. WE CALLED PANGBURN TO ADVISE HIM OF VAN CLEAVE'S INTENTION TO CONTACT HIM. WE LATER LEARNED FROM BOTH PANGBURN AND VAN CLEAVE THAT THE CONTACT WAS MADE.

3. WE PRESUMED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH VAN CLEAVE. HOWEVER, WE WERE MISTAKEN. VAN CLEAVE PLACED AT LEAST TWO MORE TELEPHONE CALLS TO US FROM ATLANTA (AT HIS EXPENSE), AND ONE FROM DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA. EACH TIME WE ADVISED HIM TO CALL PANGBURN RATHER THAN US. HIS RESPONSE ON THESE OCCASIONS WAS THAT HE ALREADY HAD OR INTENDED TO KEEP PANGBURN ADVISED BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP US INFORMED ALSO. THE LOCAL DADE COUNTY CALL WAS MADE TO ADVISE US THAT VAN CLEAVE WAS IN MIAMI IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ARGENTINE POLICE OFFICIALS, WHOM WE COULD DEBRIEF IF WE SO DESIRED. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD REPORT TO ATLANTA.

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4. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US DURING ONE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CONVERSATIONS THAT HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, A127900 POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ''PRESSURED'' INTO TAKING WERBELL TO ARGENTINA WITH HIM IN LATE JANUARY 1974 BY OFFICIALS IN THE COCA COLA COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, A164 FLORIDA, WITH WHICH VAN CLEAVE HAS (OR HAD) A CONSULTING CONTRACT IN CONNECTION WITH COCA COLA'S SECURITY SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. VAN CLEAVE ADVISED US THAT HE NEVER AGAIN WOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WERBELL BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD ACTED SO BADLY DURING THIS TRIP. HE TOLD US THAT WERBELL HAD COMMENTED TO ARGENTINE OFFICIALS THAT HE (WERBELL) WAS SOME-HOW CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND ON A FIRST NAME BASIS WITH ''BILL'' COLBY, DCI. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT MATTERS HAD DEGENERATED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT HE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT WERBELL. (OUR MEMORY IS A BIT FUZZY ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS DISCUSSION, BUT WE RECALL SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT WERBELL WAS INVOLVED WITH WINE, WOMEN, AND SONG, AND VAN CLEAVE WAS AFRAID THAT WERBELL MIGHT BE ARRESTED BY ARGENTINE POLICE BEFORE IT WAS OVER.) VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT HE PERSONALLY NEVER HAS SO MUCH AS IMPLIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY TO ANY OUTSIDER.

5. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT MET VAN CLEAVE IN PERSON, BASED UPON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM HE APPEARED TO BE AN INTELLIGENT AND REASONABLE MAN. WE ARE SORRY THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH VAN CLEAVE, BUT AS WE MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELECON WE DID NOT MAKE NOTES DURING THE CONVERSATIONS NOR DID WE FEEL IT NECESSARY AT THE TIME TO WRITE A MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A NORMAL, ALBEIT COMPLEX, REFERRAL TO ANOTHER DCD OFFICE. E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013652

CONFIDENTIAL

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12-77-00

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
Attn: Support Branch/OSS(Grant)

Chief, Washington Field Office
Atlanta Resident Office

Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave

A122814 A-127900

1. Jack Hennessy, Miami Field Office, called on 21 January 1974 to give us a source lead on Stephen Van Cleave and Mitch Werbell, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Jack briefed us on past Miami contacts with Van Cleave and suggested we might want to contact him concerning his activities in Argentina. At that time we were in the process of moving the office to the present location so did not contact Van Cleave until 25 January 1974. On that date we called, identified ourselves and briefly explained the reason for the call. His first question was, "Do you know Mitch Werbell and does this have anything to do with him?" We assured him we did not know Werbell, and our interest was not related to him. Van Cleave suggested we come to his office at 1:00 that afternoon.

2. We arrived shortly before 1:00 at his office in [illegible] W. Wieuca Rd. N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. Van Cleave has a one room office in a modern building located in a moderate to high rent district of Atlanta. After presenting credentials and a business card we asked if we might tape the interview. He said he preferred we tape it as well as any future transactions as he wanted to be absolutely sure any information he gave us was reported accurately. Enclosure No. 1 is a rough draft of the first interview. The actual tape has been erased. Some of this information was reported in 00-A(S)-[illegible]/0[illegible]35-74, Secret, CIA Internal Use Only.

3. On 9 February 1974 we received a call from Van Cleave at home. He wanted to report in detail on a recent trip to Oakland, California, where he had supposedly met with police officials and discussed the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA, etc. We told him this was very interesting but not CIA business.

4. Van Cleave called again on 25 February 1974 to fill us in on a visit to the US by Argentine police officials and an operational opportunity in the Bahamas. We prepared this information for dissemination as 00-A(S)'s. In view of recent developments we assume neither report should be disseminated. To complete your record of contacts, both reports are enclosed as Enclosures No.'s 2 and 3 (disregard the Atlanta report numbers, they will be used for future reporting or cancelled).

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

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ATL-39-74
28 February 1974

5. In the meantime the R G Murphy kidnapping came up to occupy his time until 26 February when he called to say he had some sensitive information of definite interest to CIA. When told we could not get into his office the following day due to a lack of transportation, he said he would come to our office. We reluctantly agreed. Late the morning of 27 February he came to our office and presented us with the information in Enclosure No. 4 (rough draft--the tape will be saved in case it is needed at a later date).

6. Not on the transcript but of possible interest, before leaving our office he said he was afraid he might be fired by Coca Cola on 4 March 1974. Briefly, what apparently happened (and this is his story) was:

a. When it was learned Reg Murphy had been kidnapped, Chief John Inman of the Atlanta Police Department called Van Cleave requesting his assistance. He asked Van Cleave to come to headquarters and work with Assistant Chief Mullins (we believe this is the correct name) on the Murphy kidnapping,

b. Van Cleave apparently expressed concern to the Assistant Chief that prominent members of Coca Cola Company residing in the Atlanta area might be targets for the same kidnappers,

c. The Assistant Chief agreed and went along with Van Cleave notifying, by phone, Coke officials,

d. Van Cleave had not cleared this action with his immediate supervisor at the Coca Cola Company.

e. Apparently the phone calls were made very late in the evening.

f. When the Murphy kidnapping was resolved, Van Cleave was called in by his boss to account for his actions. He apparently has not been able to justify the calls and this will be discussed at the meeting on 4 March. We suspect this may be his last official action for the Coca Cola Company.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 0[illegible]

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ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

7. Since receiving the 27 February 1974 call from OSS, we have checked with Charles Haynes and Bob Perry of the FBI. Both are familiar with Van Cleave and his operations. Perry confirmed that Van Cleave had passed the information contained in Enclosure No. 4 to the FBI. Perry had a few other things to say about Van Cleave that probably do not need to be repeated in this memorandum.

8. Concerning the future, we intend to be hard to reach when Van Cleave calls; if necessary, talk to him on the phone a few times to see if he gets the idea; then if all fails simply tell him we have been told to stay out of this business.

A. B. COLEMAN

WDPangburn:mw

Enclosures
(as stated)

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SECRET

F-12-79-00

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIM-008-74

11 January 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
ATTN : Support Branch/OSS (Ryan/Ames)

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell, III

REF : OSS-44-74, Dated 8 January 1974

Thank you for referent. For the record, subject has made no further effort to contact anyone in this office; similarly, we plan no attempts to get in touch with him. Thus the matter rests there at this writing. Should he call again, however, we will keep the advice contained in referent in mind in dealing with him.

BRUCE E. MAINWARING

BEM:mbj

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

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SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010550

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

F-12-79-00

OSS-44-74
8 January 1974

Chief, Miami Field Office
ATTN : Mr. Bruce Mainwaring

Chief, Domestic Collection Division (Support Branch/OSS)

Mitchell L. Werbell, III

1. We have reviewed subject's 201 file for additional information. Subject was of interest to this Agency in 1959 and was granted a POA in August of that year. This was cancelled in October 1959 when his information proved to be of little value and because it was suspected he was using Agency funds to promote his personal interests. He has subsequently attempted to pass himself off as an Agency employee. He is characterized by the file as unscrupulous, a "wheeler-dealer" and a promoter of grandiose schemes. The subject has been under investigation in 1973 by both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the United States Customs Service for activities relating to possible mercenary activities in Abaco Island, Bahamas.

2. If the subject should contact your office again, we suggest you accept whatever information he has to offer but make no further commitments concerning Agency contact. Subject is well known to the appropriate Desk and is of extremely doubtful character.

3. We trust this memorandum will provide you with useful information concerning this subject. Thank you for bringing his name to our attention.

JACKSON R. HORTON

SPRyan for EBAmes/b
cc: Services Br. (Control)
IP Files

FILE: MI-25819

4.33

E-2 IMPDET CL. BY 010830

INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

12-79.00

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (C[illegible])

A-165546

A-168762

[illegible] Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Hepper/[illegible] telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversation is copy of Dun and Bradstreet [illegible] Corporation, [illegible] Please note that [illegible] known to this [illegible] during WWII.

2. [illegible] have [illegible] He is [illegible] involved in [illegible] He has had [illegible]

3. [illegible], in connection with [illegible] there a [illegible] Jr. [illegible] of caution. [illegible] of FBI and [illegible] of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment
C [illegible]
cc: [illegible] Division (C[illegible])
FILE: [illegible]

[illegible]

4.32

OGC (John Greany)

SECRET

F 12 79-00

MIM-056-71

10 March 1971

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : John McConnell
John Greany (OGC)
Chief, Miami Field Office

13

Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III

1. On 9 Mar 71 we received a long distance call, presumably from Powder Springs, Georgia, from subject, who is an old and unsavory contact of this office dating from 1959. Werbell has been involved in a variety of scrapes, the latest of which concerned an abortive invasion of Haiti which John Greany was very much concerned about a year or so ago.

2. Werbell stated that the Department of Defense had just revoked his security clearance on grounds of Werbell's "frivolous behavior" in the Haitian caper. Werbell stated that he intended to "fight it to the Supreme Court", as he had always kept us and other elements of the US Government informed concerning developments in the Haitian matter.

3. Werbell asked if there was anything that we could do for him in the way of interceding for him with the DOD, and we informed him bluntly and in no uncertain terms that he was strictly on his own, and we could do nothing for him. He then asked if it would be worthwhile to subpoena Bart Gonzales. We informed him that it was up to his attorney to make such recommendations.

4. Werbell seemed to get the message, and then offered to keep us advised regarding an alleged forthcoming attempt on Haiti which is being sponsored by Rolando Masferrer, even though Masferrer is currently incarcerated in a federal prison. We told Werbell that if he wished to pass any information along we would accept it but under no circumstances should he attempt to elicit any information on our behalf. He agreed that he would operate on this basis and said he might be in touch with us again.

5. In view of Werbell's record we felt that this latest contact should be a matter of record and that OGC should be informed of developments.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG/css

4.31

SECRET

Mitch WerBell: Gunsmith to the 'Right' Si

By Roger Williams

The following is excerpted by permission from Atlantic magazine.

DOWN THE DRIVEWAY that snakes through the country estate came two teen-age boys. They were clean-cut and handsome in the traditional college fashion, and they looked at home in the quiet, leafy setting. But one wore a camouflage suit and carried a large pistol in each hand; the other had an M-3 "grease gun" tucked under one arm and a silencer-equipped sniper rifle under the other.

Behind them, propelling himself vigorously in a wheelchair, came their father, Mitchell Livingston WerBell III of Powder Springs, Ga.—soldier of fortune, militant anticommunist and one of the nation's leading developers of military weapons and accessories.

Mitch IV and Geoff chatted lightly about the weapons they were carrying. Their father, temporarily immobilized by a fractured heel, punctured the conversation with brief bursts of information about the sniper rifle, one of his most choice products. "This weapon had killed 1,900 VC in six months," he said proudly. "Those VC took only 1.3 rounds per kill. Twenty-seven cents apiece they cost Uncle Sam. That's the greatest cost effectiveness the Army's ever known."

Moments later, young Mitch and Geoff pumped round after round from the weapons into the bullet-shattered hulk of an automobile that serves as the primary target on the WerBell firing range. Then Mitch began firing a pistol, a standard Army .45. The gun kicked upward and the noise echoed across the fields and treetops. He then picked up a strange, smoothly rectangular handgun, an Ingram Model 11, equipped with a "flash and muzzle suppressor," and began firing it. The muzzle barely moved, and the only sound was a metallic click, followed by the [illegible] of the bullet and the pop as it hit the target.

The effect was eerie, almost chilling, especially when young Mitch put the [illegible] on full automatic and whipped off [illegible] clicking rounds in one second. Geoff provided the same kind of demonstration with the grease gun, a standard military submachine gun and the sniper rifle which WerBell calls the XM-21 [illegible] which is also equipped with a suppressor.

On the way back to the house, WerBell explained why the suppressor, commonly called a silencer, is so effective a firearm accessory. "It hides the muzzle flash and reduces the firing [illegible] to just metal on metal. You [illegible]

[illegible] nir weapons given to him by friendly forces in Vietnam, he said, and they were shipped to the States for display in military museums.

Not surprisingly, WerBell has often been called an operative of the Central Intelligence Agency, a charge that angers him only when it is leveled too vehemently. It is not that he has anything against the CIA. He just doesn't, he says, happen to be one of its boys. His paramilitary work, which consists of advising and sometimes directly assisting foreign governments, is done in the employ of what he calls "an independent group of well-intentioned, patriotic Americans." The Birch Society? The Minutemen? A bunch of far-right Texas millionaires? WerBell won't say, other than to insist that it is not the CIA.

It hardly matters, for according to WerBell, it is all in the service not only of freedom and anti-communism but of the U.S. government; he does not supply or advise or fight for regimes not bearing the State Department seal of approval. A heavy percentage of his merchandise goes directly to the U.S. government, which distributes it to its own forces that need silent or exotic weapons. The balance is sold to friendly governments, either directly or through the good offices of the "independent group." He says he does not sell to individuals, not even if they're certified anticommunists.

WerBell takes pains to point out that he is no ordinary arms broker. That is, he is not one of those shadowy figures who sell weapons to both sides at exorbitant prices or who take possession of contraband shipments on the high seas. "We've always adhered to a basic policy: There is only one friend of the United States in a given area, and we deal only with that friend."

What does WerBell peddle? A range of firearms from machine guns to desk-sized cannons, from the meanest-looking weapons to innocent looking swagger sticks that fire a bullet or even a small rocket; an array of techniques — "systems," he calls them — that will help an American soldier or a foreign army hold off insurgent forces, and occasionally, his personal services.

These services present WerBell at his most shadowy. Serving as a combatant in the armed forces of a foreign nation is against U.S. law, and WerBell is understandably reluctant to admit having done so. He describes himself in such terms as "paramilitary" and "adviser," but acquaintances suspect he has been in the thick of the fighting a number of times. He may even have

In Operational [illegible] and [illegible] Environmental [illegible] in earnest to develop a [illegible] hardware [illegible] Mitch IV [illegible] came into [illegible] IV was [illegible] a [illegible] insurgent [illegible] spent [illegible] the Dominican Republic [illegible] in underwater [illegible] sites [illegible] missed out on a [illegible] father took [illegible] ago, but the plans [illegible]

One day I sat in WerBell [illegible] Geoff displayed a [illegible] Armament [illegible] brought out [illegible] shaped tube [illegible] ing 2½ [illegible] cartridge [illegible] gun, and [illegible] out, [illegible] guises the [illegible] at the end [illegible] barrel. WerBell [illegible] to secret [illegible] the good [illegible] sort,' that is, shoot them [illegible]

In the same [illegible] swagger stick [illegible] silver [illegible] studs, one [illegible] cial model [illegible] guard [illegible] Antonio [illegible] to blast [illegible] ago. Then [illegible] cannon [illegible] a [illegible] knack for a [illegible] fires, with one [illegible] ment, a bullet [illegible] visitor. More [illegible] WerBell's "special [illegible] outer," a [illegible] millimeter rifle that [illegible] the eye at 200 meters."

The bulk of WerBell's [illegible] sound suppressors and [illegible] submachine guns. Suppressors [illegible] used on large as well as [illegible] ons, and in fact have been [illegible] tively on the [illegible] machine guns [illegible] helicopters in Vietnam [illegible] Army Journal [illegible] Stoner [illegible] suppressor [illegible] thing [illegible] now possible [illegible] from relatively [illegible] when using [illegible]

WerBell [illegible] Ingram Model [illegible] are two [illegible] cartrid [illegible] eventually [illegible] vidual weapons [illegible] Army [illegible] elaborate system, and it's not [illegible] th it. You can't hear the bolt noise [illegible] away in a combat situation, so for all practical purposes the firing is soundless. Often, the loudest noise is when the bullet hits home. If it hits a human, it makes a peculiar, thunking sound, like hitting a watermelon."

'Compulsive Warrior'

MITCH WERBELL sounds completely matter-of-fact when he talks about firearms, and death, and with reason. He has been in the military hardware business for years, and he has either heard or produced—or both—the thunking watermelon sound many times—in Latin America and Southeast Asia, in the U.S. armed forces and as a paramilitary "adviser." He is a compulsive warrior, an armed crusader fighting against "ungodly communism."

WerBell is not alone in this occupation, but he practices it in a unique manner. Most soldiers of fortune are nothing else, and they live from one little war to the next, brawling and boozing their way through a tough and financially unrewarding life.

WerBell, by contrast, is a businessman who dabbles in military adventure only when and as far as it suits him. If combat didn't titillate him, he wouldn't partake of it. His business is supplying weapons, not using them in anger. He specializes in the weapons and techniques of counterinsurgency, which may be roughly defined as the forceful suppression of coups d'etat, rebellions and the like.

The way WerBell operates, this means defending established regimes, some of them dictatorships, against armed revolt. This political posture not only does not trouble WerBell, it pleases him. "I have no objection to dictatorship if it serves the interests of the country," he says. Particularly if the threat to those interests is from the left: "Communism has no place in the Western Hemisphere—or in any hemisphere. I am totally opposed to it, and to the spread of ideological germs and filth that it brings."

and again, WerBell's name [illegible] the news. The first issue of

Corporate Setup

THE HEADQUARTERS for h[illegible] work, the former Dobbs estate, is on Highway 360 just outside of Powder Springs in a remote section of Cobb County. Actually, corporate headquarters is in Washington, in a firm called Environmental Industries, Inc.—a neat euphemism for a company dedicated to killing people. Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is bankrolled by some of the East's most prominent investment houses; he is its director of international operations. He is also president of a subsidiary called Military Armaments Co., Inc., and because he is in Powder Springs, Military Armaments is there, too. (Behind Environmental Industries, WerBell says, is "a third shadow of which E.I. is a subsidiary"—another tantalizing hint of the CIA.)

Military Armaments may well be a unique American enterprise. Nobody else, WerBell says, is in the business of designing special purpose weapons on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 subma[illegible] [illegible] Mitch demon-

Mitchell WerBell dresses the part at his private arsenal in Georgia, where he makes specialized light weapons for the U.S. Army and other counterinsurgency forces around the world. Beside him is his son, Geoff. The braces were only temporary, while WerBell recovered from a leg injury.

WerBell six children and put up with his rather unusual way of life. (When he left for the Far East in 1968, he said he'd be gone for a year or more, and he was.)

A Military Profile

MITCHELL WERBELL is a short, wiry man of 52, quick with a quip and quite sensible until he begins talking about communism or other social issues. He has the face and bearing of a Prussian officer, an image he cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare, and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympa-

vertising in a department store. Soon he was head of the department, and soon after that he went on his own.

In the mid-'50s, WerBell pulled out of his agency and then formed his own public relations firm. "I'd already been drifting into international PR," WerBell says, "using my family background. I had tremendous contacts in Europe, and I moved into the Far East, too." How much of this moving in was military, WerBell won't say, but his business took on more and more of what he calls a "geopolitical" flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista." He adds with a grin, "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1948, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of [illegible] realized

who had both the savvy and the guts to help preserve them.

His first major paramilitary operation was in the Dominican Republic during the 1965 revolt. He was, of course, on the side of the government, which was fending off allegedly Communist insurgents; the United States was on its side, too. WerBell wound up in the midst of the fighting. He was the second Dominican government man to reach the Ozama River, scene of the major battle.

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

WerBell was already active in the anti-Castro movement, and he brought to it a sense of dash and discipline that the ragtag, bickering bunch of Cuban exiles had seldom seen. Perhaps his major anti-Castro exploit was a speedboat foray into Camarioca, on Cuba's southern coast. The mission was to drop a swimmer, apparently a spy, offshore, and to pick up the family of an exile leader. The boat, flying the Confederate flag on the radio antenna, foundered in high seas, and the raiding party was captured. The Cubans, the story goes, did not know what to make of the brash WerBell, and he and his pals wound up stealing a Castro boat and spiriting some 16 anti-Castroites out of the country before they themselves returned to the United States.

fully at the Ingram models wi
toward making them standa
ment of [illegible] merican soldiers; if
pens, th[illegible] financial success o
Armaments will presumabl
sured. According to data pub
the firms, the Ingram mo
shorter, lighter and capable o
ing more firepower than an
the market. They are also,
says, ideal for secret agents
snugly into a dispatch case
Armaments makes the case,
plete with suppressor and
zines.

Business Is Business

DOES WERBELL feel a
conscience about pro
world with such deadly and
weapons? No. "I see no re
concerned," he says. "We're
a certain product that is unfo
a part of the civilized world.
people exist, there's going
arms business. I don't see mu
ence between our supplyin
combatants and a surgica
house supplying gauze to ban
wounds inflicted."

There is his anticommun
ment, too. WerBell is figh
Communist menace; it is a
must be won and weapons a
to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinio
Springs was not named in
WerBell and his enterprise
in fact, stays as aloof from
community as possible. His h
well-stocked, it is practically
cient save for occasional tr
grocery and liquor stores.
been, from time to time, an
feeling in Powder Springs. W
clares, "The hell with it. Wh
tell 'em I'm prepared to purc
property if they don't like th

He does not suffer from
however. There is a steady
visitors and customers, for
well as Americans. A few
WerBell's son-in-law, an Air
tenant colonel, flew in fr
mainly to see what was ne
the shop; he hadn't been by
months, he said, "and thin
awfully quickly around here
I was there, the colonel an
swapped ideas on rubbing the
partment of no-win policy o
on bringing the enemy to it

the next, crawling and ing their way through a tough and ncially unrewarding life.

erBell, by contrast, is a business- n who dabbles in military adven- e only when and as far as it suits m. If combat didn't titillate him, he n't partake of it. His business is plying weapons, not using them in sat. He specializes in the weapons techniques of counterinsur- cy, which may be roughly defined the forceful suppression of coups tat, rebellions and the like.

The way WerBell operates, this ns defending established regimes, ne of them dictatorships, against ned revolt. This political posture only does not trouble WerBell, it eases him. "I have no objection to tatorship if it serves the interests of e country," he says. Particularly if e threat to those interests is from e left. "Communism has no place in e Western Hemisphere—or in any where. I am totally opposed to it, to the spread of ideological germs d filth that it brings."

Now and again, WerBell's name ps into the news. The first issue of e new muckraking magazine, Scan- ls, carried an exhaustive story on 's involvement in an abortive inva- n of Haiti in 1966, and WerBell was edited with a major, if uncertain, e in the operation. (WerBell was ar- sted and indicted after the fiasco, t charges against him were dropped, ile six others arrested were brought trial. Asked by a friend for an ex- nation, WerBell replied jauntily, hen you work for the company, y take care of you. I'll never hear other word about it." So far he n't, he maintains.)

st December, WerBell hit the nt page of The Atlanta Constitution en a shipment of captured enemy apons bound from Vietnam was de- ned at Eglin Air Force Base, Flor- a. A national columnist conjectured at WerBell or his friends meant to stribute the weapons to rightwing tremist groups in the U.S. WerBell ily denies that. They were souve-

on such a scale. A good deal of its designing and manufacturing is done under federal license. Silencers, for example, are outlawed by the National Firearms Act, along with sawed-off shotguns, submachine guns and other vestiges of Prohibition era gangland wars.

To manufacture his suppressors, WerBell must pay a special tax of $500 a year, collected by the Treasury Department. The T-men also check periodically to see that his awesome collection of firearms—over 200 individual pieces—is properly registered. Apparently the market for suppressors is not very large because, according to WerBell, his firm is the only one authorized to manufacture them.

WerBell will not discuss the sales or profits of Military Armaments except to say that, after two years of extensive research and development (resulting in "a tax loss of a half million dollars"), the company is now doing very well. It has about 12 employees, including four machinists who work under the direction of Gordon Ingram, who has charge of the design operation and whose name is on the Model 11 submachine gun that young Mitch demonstrated on the firing range.

'Cottage Industry'

INGRAM WORKS in a well-equipped machine shop-lab attached to the main house on the estate, which WerBell likes to call "the farm." WerBell's office is next door to the shop. Its walls are so loaded with weapons that it is a wonder they do not collapse. There are knives and spear guns and pistols and rifles and machine guns, dozens and dozens of them, some purchased, some won in combat, some presented by the appreciative recipients of WerBell's counterinsurgency techniques.

WerBell, who has a sense of humor, calls his enterprise a "cottage industry" and likens himself to "a country doctor. . . . I can fall out of the living area upstairs right down to the office." Upstairs is the domain of his German-born wife Hildegard, a pleasant, gray-haired woman who has borne

cultivated by wearing a mustache and occasionally a monocle. He often dresses in military clothing of indeterminate origin, and he embellishes the image by talking in slightly clipped sentences peppered with military phrases. There is nothing phony in this. WerBell has a strong attachment to weapons and to warfare; and he has been around them so long that the ideas and styles they foster are an ingrained part of his personality.

He comes by both his militarism and his anticommunism honestly. His father was an officer in the Russian Imperial army, even though he was born in the United States. "It was a tricky situation," says Mitch. "He was a citizen of both the U.S. and Russia. In those days you could do that."

The elder WerBell fought against the Bolsheviks, but before the collapse of the czarist regime he wisely secured an appointment as liaison officer between the Russian and American forces—stationed in the U.S. He lived in this country for the rest of his life, putting his early medical training to use in cancer research.

A legacy from father is Mitch's barely disguised aristocratic sympathies. He has been quoted as saying, "Communism is a substitution of a peasant dictatorship over the aristocracy—I prefer the aristocracy." He is without question an elitist. Not surprisingly, his elite is composed of superpatriots and military men.

Mitchell WerBell was born in Pennsylvania, shortly after his Russian-American father and his Scottish-born mother arrived in the U.S. at the end of World War I. His parents traveled a good deal, here and abroad, and Mitch traveled with them, picking up his education as he went. He got a degree in journalism from the University of Pennsylvania. In World War II, he joined the OSS, and served with a unit behind Japanese lines in China, rising to the rank of captain and acquiring a taste for guerrilla-type warfare he would never lose.

WerBell moved to Atlanta shortly after the war and went to work in ad-

of what he calls a [illegible] flavor.

Before long, he was dabbling in Latin American dictatorships. "Before Fidel took over in Cuba, we were working closely with Batista," he adds with a grin. "Our function was to keep Batista in power, although the U.S. government was looking favorably on Fidel at that point."

From all this, even WerBell doesn't know exactly how, came a passionate concern about communism. "I decided to devote whatever time I could to anticommunist activities," he says. "At first it was sort of a hobby, but then it became my main drive in life. What I'm doing now"—here he gestures at the arsenal on his office walls—"affords me a damned good living. But the living is not why I do it."

The Heart of It

IN 1946, WHILE anticommunism was still a hobby, albeit a paying hobby, WerBell purchased the Dobbs estate. He installed rudimentary design facilities and began experimenting with weapons of counterinsurgency, weapons he believed had the best chance of preventing Communist takeovers in the small, underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America. "I realized that in counterinsurgency, the primary problem was a lack of depth in weaponry. People say, 'Win the hearts of the enemy, and you'll win the fight.' That's a lot of bull. The best way to get their hearts, if they're the enemy, is to shoot 'em and cut the hearts out."

While he experimented with weapons—quietly, to avoid problems with the federals—WerBell proceeded with his personal brand of geopolitics. He made himself available to anticommunist regimes that wanted help in fighting off one band of insurgents or another. In the process, he became friendly with a number of Latin America's political strongmen. They were delighted to discover a North American who felt as they did about the need for stable, anticommunist regimes, especially their regimes, and

Ellsworth Bunker, then U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, became highly exercised over WerBell's activities and his hawkish views on the conflict (WerBell opposed a cessation of hostilities and establishment of a coalition government). Bunker considered trying to toss WerBell out of the country, but nothing came of it. WerBell's "independent group"—CIA, Texas millionaires or whatever—saw to that.

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Vietnam Superhawk

IN THE LATE '60s, WerBell turned his attention to Southeast Asia. He is, of course, a superhawk on Vietnam, and would be happy if the U.S. were also fighting communism in all its neighboring countries. He was in Thailand, "working closely with the supreme command," for months, promoting the sales of his weapons and systems. "I showed them things like surveillance equipment and night vision equipment, stuff that lets you surprise the hell out of the bastards." Did he do any fighting himself? WerBell chuckles. "I ain't supposed to be shooting the stuff, just demonstrating how to shoot it."

Three years ago, WerBell's weapons business became promising enough for him to go into it full time. He organized a firm called Sionics (for Studies

wounds inflicted.

There is his anticommunist [illegible] ment, too. WerBell is fighting Communist menace. It is a fight must be won and weapons are nee to win it.

Contrary to cynical opinion, Pow Springs was not named to hono WerBell and his enterprise. WerBell, in fact, stays as aloof from the community as possible. His house is well stocked, it is practically self-suf cient save for occasional trips to grocery and liquor stores. There been, from time to time, anti-Wer feeling in Powder Springs. WerBell clares, "The hell with it. Who care tell 'em I'm prepared to purchase t property if they don't like the area

He does not suffer from loneline however. There is a steady strea visitors and customers, foreigners well as Americans. A few weeks WerBell's son-in-law, an Air Force tenant colonel, flew in from mainly to see what was new at the shop; he hadn't been by in sev months, he said, "and things ch awfully quickly around here." The I was there, the colonel and Wer swapped ideas on prodding the State partment of no-win policy makers on bringing the enemy to its knee its grave, in Vietnam.

WerBell recalls with relish one ticular visitor. He came from the S Department a few years back, and cording to WerBell, he said, "The f tions of the foreign policies of United States are the business of State Department in Washington, of Mitchell WerBell in Pow Springs, Georgia." WerBell's re "You can't print it. It was all in A Saxon words." But that was the swashbuckling WerBell. The new, profile WerBell says with a grin, present policy is that I agree with theory completely. Period."

If actions to the contrary speak loudly, they, like WerBell's wea can always be suppressed by the himself. Meanwhile, Mitch and his dependent group" march on.

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4.3

F-72-79-[illegible]

DEC [illegible] '69

CONFIDENTIAL 231539Z DEC 69 CITE CONTACTS/WASHINGTON 24675

CONTACTS/MIAMI

FROM MCCONNELL

JOHN GREANEY, OGC. WILL BE COMING TO MIAMI MONDAY, [illegible] DECEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRIAL OF THE EIGHT INDIVIDUALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF PORT-AU-PRINCE.

D A127100

NEW SUBJECT: MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL OF ATLANTA IS MENTIONED IN A (WASHINGTON POST) ARTICLE TODAY IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED RECEIPT OF GUNS SHIPPED FROM VIETNAM THROUGH EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE. MR. GREANEY SUGGESTS THAT YOU AVOID, IF POSSIBLE, ANY CONTACT WITH WERBELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.28

SECRET F-12-7209

Director, Domestic Contact Service
ATTN : OSS

15 May 1969

Chief, Miami Field Office

MIM-084-69

Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell P

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Plouman, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract.

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OSS was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Plouman in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Plouman's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Plouman, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we knew of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Plouman direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

FHogan:pmw

429

14-00000

File

Hill

F-12-79-00

[illegible] 24 March 1967

[illegible]: [illegible]

Chief, Miami Field Office

[illegible] A127900

: [illegible]

1. [illegible] called this office on [illegible] Mar 67 and then told this [illegible] had not [illegible] advised [illegible] that the Federal charges [illegible] had been dropped. We have not [illegible]. He is not [illegible] to resume our contacts with him for the present [illegible].

2. Please advise John Greany of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and convey whatever recommendation he or you may have as to our future relations with Marshall.

[illegible]

Answered by phone - Advised Gleichauf no contact -

MSC 30/3

Copy sent to Mr. Greany, 28 Mar 67

orig. I D Cntrl

4.24

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F-12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service   24 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell   MIA-086-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

REF : MIA-060-67

1. WerBell called the Miami office on 23 Mar 67 and when told that Bart Gonzales was not in, advised the secretary that the Federal charges against him had been dropped. We have not confirmed this. We do not intend to renew our contacts with him for the time being at least.

2. Please advise John Greaney of the Office of the General Counsel of this development and give us whatever recommendations he or you may have as to our future relations with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:yw

4.25

[illegible]

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14-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12-79-00

Director, Domestic Contact Service

2 March 1967

ATTN : John McConnell

MDM-060-67

Chief, Miami Field Office

Mitchell L. WerBell A 127900

1. You will recall that John Greaney of the Office of General Counsel was in Miami for several days in connection with the federal case pending against subject. WerBell was indicted on federal conspiracy charges growing out of the abortive invasion attempt of Haiti a short time ago.

2. Following the indictment WerBell called us and indicated that he was to be interviewed on "nationwide TV through station WSB-TV in Atlanta." We called Harry McCrea and asked him to monitor local coverage, and we covered the NBC stations for a period of several days. WerBell did not appear on a national hookup, but Harry McCrea informed us that he did appear on a two-minute taped segment on the WSB-TV, 6:25 A.M. telecast only. WerBell said he would, if he could, "make a citizen's arrest of Dwight Eisenhower, John McCone, et al, because he did no more than they did." Harry said that he didn't believe that the station took his statement seriously.

3. WerBell was also interviewed by "The Atlanta Constitution", and we are enclosing a clipping from the "Constitution" of 28 Feb 67 in which WerBell is quoted concerning the indictment.

4. Would you please pass the above to John Greaney. You might inform him that the statement of an undesignated federal official in Miami undoubtedly refers to the Customs agent in charge, with whom WerBell had a conversation prior to calling us. WerBell quoted him in the same fashion in our conversation. We have had no further contact with WerBell.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

JFG:pw

Enclosure:
As stated

4-22

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F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

~~S E C R E T~~ 231432Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1714

FEB 23 [illegible] '67

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: JOHN MCCONNELL

SUBJECT: ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

REF: A. MIAMI 1710 A-127980

B. MC CONNELL/GLEICHAUF TELCONS OF 21 FEB AND 23 FEB 67

MITCHELL WER BELL CALLED BART GONZALES YESTERDAY TO ADVISE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED TWO PHONE CALLS FROM CHET GRAY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR DETAILS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT REFERRED TO IN MIAMI 1710. GRAY STATED THAT UNLESS HE HEARD FROM SOMEBODY IMMEDIATELY, HE WOULD TAKE HIS INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA ON THE MORNING OF 23 FEB 67. WE CURRENTLY HAVE AN ADDRESS FOR GRAY: 324 NORTH OAKHURST DRIVE, BEVERLY HILLS; TELS: 274-4922.

B-67-54

~~S E C R E T~~

BT

Copy F/# B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

~~SECRET~~

1e/

4.21

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Cont'd

F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

DIARY, 23 February 1967

SUBJECT: Mitchell Werbell/Chet Gray

A-127900

Mitchell # /

Cul B-67-54

Gleichauf called to say that Werbell had heard from Gray both yesterday and the day before expressing concern over the fact that no one had contacted him concerning the alleged assassination attempt against a foreign diplomat. Gray stated that unless he heard from someone immediately he would go to the Governor of California, 23 February. This information was passed to Sam Papich by phone.

cc: Chief, Miami Office

B-67-41

JMcConnell:mg

Copies F/ All Jackets!

4.20

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F 12-77-00

~~SECRET~~

FEB 20 11 53 AM 67

~~S E C R E T~~ 201532Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1710

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: MCCONNELL

FROM: GLEICHAUF

A 127900

1. WE HAVE RECEIVED A MOST UNUSUAL PHONE CALL FROM MITCHELL VERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, DETAILS OF WHICH FOLLOW:

2. WERBELL IS A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WHO HAS BEEN IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH THIS OFFICE, OF HIS OWN VOLITION, SINCE 1959. WHILE AN UNSAVORY CHARACTER, MUCH OF THE INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED HAS PROVED TRUE. HE FURNISHED COMPLETE DETAILS ON THE RECENT HAITIAN INVASION PLAN. THE PHONE CALL WAS RECEIVED BY BART GONZALES FROM HIM AT 1100 HOURS ON 13 FEBRUARY. HE STATED THAT HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM CHET GRAY OF LOS ANGELES, NO ADDRESS (PHONE 274-4922).

File B-67-54

3. GRAY STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED REGARDING THE POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION IN THE U.S. OF A CLOSE RELATIVE, POSSIBLY A BROTHER OR SON, OF A MIDDLE-EAST RULER, WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. HE DID NOT FURNISH THE NAME OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, NOR BY WHOM HE WAS APPROACHED. GRAY TOLD VERBELL THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN AN INCIDENT THAT MIGHT CAUSE INTERNATIONAL

(10) F/ # B-67-54 (Chet Gray)

4.19

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REPERCUSSIONS AND ASKED VERBELL FOR ADVICE. VER

BELL ADVISED GRAY TO INFORM THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES, BUT GRAY WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO. VERBELL THEN ASKED GRAY IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH A MEMBER OF CIA AND GRAY AGREED. VERBELL TOLD GRAY THAT IF A REPRESENTATIVE OF CIA CONTACTED HIM, VERBELL'S NAME WOULD BE USED AS ENTREE.

4. THE ABOVE SOUNDS LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF THE "ARABIAN NIGHTS," BUT I DID MEET A CHET GRAY FROM LOS ANGELES AT A LOCAL CONTACT'S HOUSE IN 1962, SOME DETAILS OF WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN OOA(S)9601 AND OOA(S) 9598 DATED 18 DEC 62. GRAY IS A NOTORIOUS HOODLUM AND MIGHT EASILY HAVE BEEN APPROACHED FOR SUCH PURPOSE.

5a. PLEASE HANDLE THE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT.

~~S E C R E T~~

BT

14-00000

F12-79-00

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 231622Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1662

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE DIRECTOR

ATTN: INT DIV (HELLER)

COUNTRY: HAITI

SUBJECT: MIMI 10756 - PROPOSED INVASION CANCELLED

DOI : 23 NOV 66 AND EARLIER

ACQ : ---23 NOV 66

REF : LA CIRC C-DC6-52851

C&S : MITCHELL L. WERBELL A 127900

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WITH WIDE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER.

NOV 23 12 38 PM '66

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 22 NOV 66 A DECISION WAS REACHED TO CALL OFF THE PROPOSED INVASION OF HAITI BY THE GROUP SPONSORED BY ROLANDO (MASFERRER). THE INVASION IS OFF INDEFINITELY.

2. FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE (GEORGES) AND COLONEL RENE (LEON) HAVE BEEN ARGUING WITH MASFERRER WHICH HAS CAUSED CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION IN THE MOVEMENT. MANY CUBANS SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE HAVE PULLED OUT AND MILITARY CHIEF NAPOLEON (VILLABOISE) (SIC), A CUBAN NATIONAL AND ALLEGED MILITARY EXPERT, HAS RESIGNED BECAUSE OF DISSENSION IN THE GROUP.

3. IT IS BELIEVED THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES HAVE INFILTRATED THE MOVEMENT AND THE LEADERS FEAR THAT ALL WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT WOULD BE CONFISCATED IF PLANS FOR THE INVASION PROCEEDED.

END OF REPORT.

4.18

4. C/S: BARTOLO GONZALEZ. PLEASE PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADQUARTERS.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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67

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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1-12-79-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ 222815Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1658

PRIORITY CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: INT DIV (HELLER)

COUNTRY: HAITI

SUBJECT: MIMI 10766 - FALSE REPORTS OF INVASION/REPORTED CHANGE OF PLANS

DOI : 22 NOV 66

ACC : ---22 NOV 66

~~CS~~ : MITCHELL L. WERBELL

A-127900

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE WITH WIDE EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ROLANDO MASFERRER

NOV 22 4 22 PM '66

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. AS OF 22 NOV 66 IN SPITE OF WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS, NO INVASION OF HAITI HAS TAKEN PLACE.

2. ROLANDO (MASFERRER) ROJAS WHO IS SPONSORING THE ALLEGED INVASION, HAS BEEN TELLING CUBAN EXILES THAT HIS GROUP HAS SECURED THE AIRPORT AT PORT-DE-PAIX AND THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO LEAVE AT ANY TIME.

4.17

3. MASFERRER HAS GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF MOVING HIS GROUP, WHICH CONSISTS OF APPROXIMATELY 500 CUBANS AND 100 HAITIANS, BY BOAT AND IS TRYING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHARTERING ELEVEN AIRCRAFT,

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INCLUDING SOME DC-3'S. ONE OF THE DC-3'S WOULD CARRY COLONEL RENE (LEON), MASFERRER, AND FATHER JEAN BATISTE GEORGES.

4. THE M/V HUDSON IS TO BE USED TO CARRY PART OF THE WEAPONS. THE MASFERRER GROUP IS WELL ARMED AND HAS PLENTY OF WEAPONS. THEY HAVE THREE TONS OF C-3 DYNAMITE, AND ALSO HAVE SOME C-2 AND C-4.

5. THE HENRIETTA II WILL CARRY PHOTOGRAPHERS.

6. IN SPITE OF THE ABOVE I BELIEVE THAT THE "INVASION" IS A FARCE AND IS FALLING APART. MASFERRER IS MERELY TRYING TO COVER UP FOR THE FUNDS HE HAS RECEIVED FOR THE INVASION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT MASFERRER'S LIFE WILL BE IN DANGER IF HE DOES NOT MAKE SOME OSTENSIBLE EFFORT. END OF REPORT.

7. C/S: B. GONZALES. PLEASE PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADQUARTERS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BT

CC: SUBJECT LINE FIRST PORTION AFTER MIMI NUMBR SHLD READ " FALSE RBPORTSPOF INVASION/"; AND PARA 6 LINE

RT SHLD REA

READ "THAT MASFERRER'S LIFE WILL BE IN DANGER IF".

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14-00000

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F-12-79-00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 011530Z CITE CONTACTS/MIAMI 1642

CONTACTS/WASHINGTON

ATTN: INT DIV (ALTEA)

COUNTRY: HAITI/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/BAHAMA

SUBJECT: MIMI 10855 - PLANNED INVASION OF HAITI BETWEEN
5-13 NOV 66

NOV 1 12 11 PM '66

DOI : 28 OCT 66

ACQ : ---1 NOV 66

REF : DCS CASE 41539; LA CIRL C-DC6-52851

C&S : MITCHELL L. WERBELL A127900
POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA
U.S. NATIONAL WITH WIDE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE SPEAKS SOME SPANISH, AND HAS MANY SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACTS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

1. ON 28 OCT 66 I SPOKE WITH ROLANDO (MASFERRER) ROJAS, A CUBAN EXILE, AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAS ORGANIZED A MILITARY FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 250 MEN TO INVADE HAITI. THE INVASION FORCE CONSISTS OF CUBAN AND HAITIAN EXILES RESIDING IN THE U.S., THE BAHAMA, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE INVASION WILL PROBABLY BE LAUNCHED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SOMETIME BETWEEN 5 AND 13 NOVEMBER AND THE TARGET IS PORT-AU-PRINCE. THE INVASION FORCE WILL STRIKE IN THE EARLY HOURS OF THE MORNING SELECTED. IT IS WELL ARMED, AND WILL HAVE AIR COVER; THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WILL BE BOMBED.

4.16

2. MASFERRER STATED THAT EUGENE L. (MAXIMILIEN), HAITIAN CONSUL IN MIAMI, FLORIDA, IS AWARE OF THE INVASION, BUT HE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE INVASION DATE. MAXIMILIEN IS PRESENTLY IN HAITI INFORMING PRESIDENT (DUVALIER) THAT THE INVASION CAN BE PREVENTED BY PAYING OFF [illegible] TO MASFERRER. MAXIMILIEN WILL RETURN TO THE U.S. ON [illegible] NOVEMBER AND HE HAS AGREED WITH MASFERRER THAT IF DUVALIER AGREES TO THE PAY- OFF, MAXIMILIEN WILL RECEIVE

3. MASFERRER TOLD ME THAT THE INVASION WILL TAKE PLACE IN ANY EVENT AND THE $150,000, IF RECEIVED, WOULD BE USED TO FURTHER SUPPORT THE INVASION.

4. MASFERRER STATED THAT HE MET WITHIN THE PAST 10 DAYS WITH SEVERAL DISSIDENT HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS AND HE HAD RECEIVED THEIR SUPPORT. THE HAITIAN ARMY OFFICERS TOLD MASFERRER THAT THEY WOULD REVOLT AS SOON AS INFORMED THAT THE INVASION HAD COMMENCED. THEY DO NOT KNOW THAT THE TARGET WILL BE PORT-AU-PRICNCE; THEY BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE IN THE CAP HAITIEN AREA.

5. MASFERRER STATED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE INVASION WILL SUCCEED, AND IF SUCCESSFUL, FATHER JEAN BAPTISTE (GEORGES) WOULD BE APPOINTED PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. MASFERRER STATED THAT COLONEL RENE (LEON), HAITIAN EXILE, WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE INVASION. END OF REPORT.

6. C/S: B. F. GONZALES: PREPARE HARD COPY IN HEADUQUARTERS PLEASE.

~~SECRET~~

BT

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

11/2/66

Processed 11/9/66

F-12-79-00

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DE 0552/26 0131952

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TDTG 131428Z

WA CITE MIAM 1223

ATTN: INTERNATIONAL DIV (CONANT)

COUNTRY: GUATEMALA

SUBJECT: MIMI DOTIS - ARMED FORCES COUP D'ETAT PLANNED

DOI: 12 JAN 66

ACQ: --12 JAN 66

REF: CIRL C-003-52374

CAS: MITCHELL L. WERBELL A-127900

POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA

U.S. NATIONAL WITH WIDE TRAVEL EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. HE SPEAKS SOME SPANISH, AND HAS MANY SOCIAL AND BUSINESS CONTACTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

(THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED BY A NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF PREPARATION.)

Jan 13 11 29 AM '66

1. ON 12 JAN 66 MIGUELITO (YDIGORAS) LAPARRA, SON OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF [illegible] GUATEMALAN ARMED 4.14

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FORCES WERE PLANNING TO OVERTHROW COLONEL ENRIQUE (PERALTA) ON 15 JAN 66. YDIGORAS TOLD ME THAT IF THE COUP WAS NOT CARRIED OUT ON 15 JANUARY, IT WOULD BE EXECUTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

2. YDIGORAS WOULD NOT TELL ME THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS LEADING THE COUP, BUT STATED THAT "ALL OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL BE INVOLVED." END OF REPORT.

3. C/S: B. F. GONZALES. HARD COPY TO BE PREPARED BY HEADQUARTERS.

4.14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CFN 1288 CONANT GUATEMALA [illegible] [illegible] COUP D'ETAT 12 JAN 66 12 JAN 66 CIRL C DC 5 52374 MITCHELL L WERBELL POWDER SPRINGS GEORGIA U S LATIN AMERICA SPANISH A [illegible] 12 JAN 66 MIGUELITO YDIGORAS LAPARRA COLONEL ENRIQUE PERALTA 15 JAN 66 COUP NOT CARRIED 15 JANUARY NOT TELL C S B F GONZALES

BT

Processed 1-19-66

12-79-00

PP 215

01 2552/35 [illegible]

ZNY XXXXX

P 042100Z

BT

XXXXX

ZERO ONE SIX WA

GROUP 1
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[redacted] [illegible]

PRIORITY WA CITE [illegible]

ATTN: MC CONNELL

SUBJECT: RUMORED ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON FIDEL CASTRO

REF: AIR 677-59 OF 17 DEC 59

A 27900

1. MITCHELL WERBELL ADVISED BART GONZALES THAT A GROUP OF SIX MEN IN HIS ORGANIZATION HAS PENETRATED CUBA AND IS CURRENTLY IN THE VARADERO/HAVANA AREA. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL CASTRO TO BE ATTEMPTED BETWEEN 5-8 JANUARY. IF FOUND NOT POSSIBLE, SECONDARY TARGET WILL BE TO BLOW UP THE ELECTRIC PLANT FURNISHING ELECTRICITY TO HAVANA.

2. THE GROUP IS TO UTILIZE AIRPLANE MODEL TYPE OF RADIO DETONATOR. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PROCURE CONTROLLED FREQUENCY RADIO DETONATORS WHICH WERE PREFERRED BECAUSE OF HIGHER QUALITY. THE DETONATOR

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14-00000

ALLEGEDLY WILL BE [illegible] AT [illegible] OR THEY WILL USE SUB-MACHINE GUNS IN THE COURSE OF A PUBLIC APPEARANCE BY CASTRO. NO INDICATION AS TO HOW THEY KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE WILL APPEAR. GROUP SAID TO KNOW MISSION IS SUICIDAL.

3. ATTEMPT ON THE ELECTRIC PLANT WILL BE TO KILL GUARDS AND PENETRATE AREA FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WILL BLOW UP KEY EQUIPMENT.

4. WERBELL SAID THAT RECE ALSO ALLEGEDLY HAS A GROUP IN CUBA AT PRESENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSASSINATING FIDEL CASTRO.

5. PLEASE HANDLE ABOVE AS YOU SEE FIT. FYI: WERBELL IS A NOTORIOUS CON MAN AND SOLDIER OF FORTUNE TYPE. HE IS CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE.

[redacted]

CFN 1268 NO CORNELL FIDEL CASTRO [illegible] 677 65 17 DEC 65 MITCHELL WERBELL BART GONZALES A CUBA VARADERO HAVANA [illegible] JANUARY NOT POSSIBLE UNABLE TO A NO INDICATION RECE A FYI A CON CONSIDERED UNRELIABLE

BT

4.12

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

F-81615

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division

ATTN : Index Branch

DATE: 27 July 1959

FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office

A-81615

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Visit to Mitchell Werbell III
[illegible] Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

1. In the evening of 24 July 1959 I received a telephone call from subject, who had been given my name and address by another segment of the intelligence community in connection with the possibility of his passing along late information concerning the rumored impending flight of Batista to the US.

2. Werbell indicated that he spent a great amount of his time in the Dominican Republic and had extremely close association with leaders of the government, and also with General Jose Pedraza. He claimed to have been a former member of the OSS with service in China in WWII. Werbell is a soldier-of-fortune type who wears a monocle, drives a Mercedes-Benz, sports a most attractive blonde girl friend, and is a Big Spender. He also volunteered that he has a wife and six children living in Georgia.

3. Werbell told me that his principle source of income is in dealing with Cuban pesos, and said that he is associated in the business with a John Lipko of Los Angeles, a jazz musician who formerly played with the Jimmy Dorsey and Jan Garber bands.

4. Lipko also claims to have been a member of OSS during WWII, serving in the Rumanian and Eastern European area. Lipko was busily engaged in making long distance phone calls to Mexico City, Guatemala City, and Los Angeles during a part of the time I was with the group.

5. Werbell gave me some information on Batista's plans, which is basically supposition, and furnished some other marginal information which is being forwarded, although in my opinion little credence can be placed in anything he says. It is hard to evaluate what Werbell's motives are in connection with his desire to furnish information regarding Batista to us, but it appeared that he was also attempting to fish for information, throwing out a number of questions concerning the Biltmore Terrace Hotel, reportedly recently to have been purchased by Cuban interests with 9 million Cuban pesos. The penthouse reportedly has been completely redecorated, with heavy steel doors guarding the entrance. This penthouse suite has been rumored to be Batista's intended headquarters once he arrives in the US. All of this has been written about in the gossip columns of the local papers.

6. Inasmuch as Werbell has my name and phone number, probably little can be done to prevent him getting in touch with me from time to time, but contact will not be initiated by me except by direction. The basic purpose of this memo is for the record.

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[illegible] GLEICHAUF

JFG:em

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REQ. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	E.
XMIMI	10756			

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED		
11236	B 191266	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Proposed Invasion Cancelled

Haiti

RELEASED MO DA YR: 11 28 6

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO: D 12790

TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

ORGANIZATION NO

SUBJECT

AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SAME

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO

ORGANIZATION NO

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
IN
TO USSR
FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: ✓

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

4.10

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Sect/Desk
EGonzales	JGleichauf	RHeller for Alyea	LESaltzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Haiti	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/19112-66
SUBJECT	Proposed Invasion Cancelled	DATE DISTR.	30 Nov 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	This report was previously disseminated as TD-00B-321/19112-66
DATE OF INFO.	23 Nov 66 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--- 23 Nov 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. During the night of 22 Nov 66 a decision was reached to call off the proposed invasion of Haiti by the group sponsored by Rolando Masferrer. The invasion is off indefinitely.

2. Father Jean Baptiste Georges and Colonel Rene Leon have been arguing with Masferrer which has caused confusion and disorganization in the movement. Many Cubans scheduled to participate have pulled out and military chief Napoleon Villaboise (sic), a Cuban national and alleged military expert, has resigned because of dissension in the group.

3. It is believed that US Government agencies have infiltrated the movement and the leaders fear that all weapons and equipment would be confiscated if plans for the invasion proceeded.

- end -

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S-YES U-YES

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GROUP 1
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declassification

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

4.10

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~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-29-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE: XMIMI

B. REPORT NUMBER: 10706

C. REQ CODE:

D. CASE NUMBER:

E.

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED: MO DA YR 11226

B

1906766

USO

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

False Reports of Invasion/Reported Change of Plans

(Haiti)

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD

RELEASED: MO DA YR 11236

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A-127900

ORGANIZATION NO.

TYPE DOE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

ENDOR. DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT

AREA

0

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same as above

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

0

INDIVIDUAL NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: D117

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

I don't believe you could have covered the "invasion" better if you had used an umbrella. An excellent job, I think.
heller

Cat

rd

4.9

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
HGonzales	JFGleichauf	EHeller	LDSaitzer

FORM 66 25 Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

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(20-41)

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. 00- B-321/19067-66

SUBJECT False Reports of Invasion/Reported Change of Plans

DATE DISTR. 28 Nov 66

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES This report was previously disseminated as TD-00-B-321/19067-66

DATE OF INFO. 22 Nov 66

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --/22 Nov 66

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, soldier of fortune type with wide experience in Latin America. He is closely associated with Rolando Masferrer.

/This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation./

1. As of 22 Nov 66 in spite of widespread press reports, no invasion of Haiti has taken place.

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is sponsoring the alleged invasion, has been telling Cuban exiles that his group has secured the airport at Port-de-Paix and they should be prepared to leave at any time.

3. Masferrer has given up the idea of moving his group, which consists of approximately 300 Cubans and 100 Haitians, by boat and is trying to make arrangements for chartering eleven aircraft, including some DC-3's. One of the DC-3's would carry Colonel Rene Leon, Masferrer, and Father Jean Batiste Georges.

4. The M/V Hudson is to be used to carry part of the weapons. The Masferrer group is well armed and has plenty of weapons. They have three tons of C-3 dynamite, and also have some C-2 and C-4.

5. The Henrietta II will carry photographers.

6. In spite of the above I believe that the "invasion" is a farce and is falling apart. Masferrer is merely trying to cover up for the funds he has received for the invasion. It is believed that Masferrer's life will be in danger if he does not make some ostensible effort.

- end -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S-YES U-YES

GROUP 1
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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4.9

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~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY					FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY		
A. FIELD OFFICE (1-5)	B. REPORT NUMBER (6-10)	C. REQ. CODE (11-15)	D. CASE NUMBER (16-20)	E. (21)	RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. (22-26)	(27-33)	I U O (34-36)
X H I H I				X	0 4 1 9 7	1 1 4 6 7 6 7 E	

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Request for Arms

(Venezuela)

EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD (37-39)

RELEASED MO DA YR (40-44): 04257

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. WERBELL
Powder Springs
Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE OO-E: R — GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

46 REPORT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Same

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT (47-50) — AREA (51-54)

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☒ Interview
☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document
☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

JOIC (L. Shoemaker)

08 MAY 1967

4.8

C/S	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
JPGleichauf:pw	JFELRICHARD		[illegible]

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COUNTRY Venezuela

SUBJECT Request for Arms

REPORT NO. OO E-324/11467-67

DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 67

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES LA CIRL C-DC6-53134

DATE OF INFO. Apr 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---/Apr 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US national, soldier of fortune type, with wide experience in Latin America.

1. In April 1967 I was approached by a prominent Venezuelan whom I prefer not to identify. He asked me to arrange procurement of 150-300 9 mm sub-machine guns, with 1-2000 rounds per gun. Delivery was to be "as soon as possible".

2. He did not identify the group for whom they were being obtained but indicated it was a "right wing operation".

3. I told him I was unable to be of assistance.

-end-

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08 MAY 1967

7.8

U YES ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ S YES

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79.00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

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A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. REG. CODE	D. CASE NUMBER	RECEIVED	
X N I N I	10086		~~[illegible]~~	11016	X B 1787966

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Planned Invasion of Haiti Between 5-13 Nov 66

Haiti/Dominican Republic/Bahamas

RELEASED: 11036

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. A.127900

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

SAME

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

USSR ONLY EXCHANGES (CHECK ONE)
☐ NO
☐ TO USSR
☐ FROM USSR

RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS: C35

FIELD COMMENTS

P

pl

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

Although these rumored invasions have occurred before, this report was of interest to OCI, and, I suspect, others: one of these times it will happen

4.7

C/S	DCS Chief	Case Officer	Division/Staff/Desk
FGonzales	JKleichauf	GAlyea GEA	LESpitzer

FORM 3-66 25 Obsolete previous editions

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12-79-30

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	Haiti/Dominican Republic/ Bahamas	REPORT NO.	00- B-321/17879-66
SUBJECT	Planned Invasion of Haiti between 5-13 Nov 66	DATE DISTR.	7 Nov 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	This report was previously disseminated as TD-00B-321/17879-66
DATE OF INFO.	28 Oct 66		CIRL C-DC6-52851
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---1 Nov 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in the Dominican Republic.

[This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. On 28 Oct 66 I spoke with Rolando Masferrer Rojas, a Cuban exile, and he told me that he has organized a military force of approximately 250 men to invade Haiti. The invasion force consists of Cuban and Haitian exiles residing in the US, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. The invasion will probably be launched from the Dominican Republic sometime between 5 and 13 November and the target is Port-au-Prince. The invasion force will strike in the early hours of the morning selected. It is well armed, and will have air cover; the presidential palace will be bombed.

2. Masferrer stated that Eugene L. Maximilien, Haitian Consul in Miami, Florida, is aware of the invasion, but he has no knowledge of the invasion date. Maximilien is presently in Haiti informing President Duvalier that the invasion can be prevented by paying off $200,000 to Masferrer. Maximilien will return to the US on 3 November and he has agreed with Masferrer that if Duvalier agrees to the pay-off, Maximilien will receive $50,000 and Masferrer $150,000.

3. Masferrer told me that the invasion will take place in any event and the $150,000, if received, would be used to further support the invasion.

4. Masferrer stated that he met within the past 10 days with several dissident Haitian army officers and he had received their support. The Haitian army officers told Masferrer that they would revolt as soon as informed that the invasion had commenced. They do not know that the target will be Port-au-Prince; they believe that it will be in the Cap Haitien area.

5. Masferrer stated that he was confident that the invasion will succeed, and if successful, Father Jean Baptiste Georges would be appointed provisional president. Masferrer stated that Colonel Rene Leon, Haitian exile, will participate in the invasion.

- end -

~~S E C R E T~~

S-YES U-YES

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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7 47

[illegible] IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. [illegible] U S Government [illegible]

[redacted] Filled In)

12-79-00

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A FIELD OFFICE	B REPORT NUMBER	C CODE	D CASE NUMBER	E	RECEIVED		
XMIMI	09156		46267	X	10136	1641766	

F SUBJECT AND AREA

Report on the Dominican Republic

(Dominican Republic)

RELEASED: 10176

G CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

Mitchell L. Werbell
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO.: A 12 7906

ORGANIZATION NO.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

H SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

DOCUMENTARY

ORGANIZATION NO.

INDIVIDUAL NO.

I SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT | AREA

J METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Interview ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM

RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS

FIELD COMMENTS

Source stated that he received a copy of the attached report from Rolando Masferrer Rojas, former Cuban Senator. Masferrer told source that the report was written by Manuel "Fatty" Garcia, a Cuban exile. The report contains information on the political, military, Communist and economic situation in the Dominican Republic, as well as information on the elections held on 1 Jun 66.

FOR

RETAIN

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

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BJGonzales:sb	**JFCLETCHART**

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

112-779-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY
A. FIELD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5
B. REPORT NUMBER 6 7 8 9 10
C. FORWARDED MO. DA. YR. 11 12 13 14 15
D. CASE NUMBER 16 17 18 19 20
E. 21

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY
RECEIVED MO. DA. YR. 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31 32 33
34
IUO 35

F. SUBJECT AND AREA
Armed Forces Coup d'Etat Planned

36
EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39
RELEASED MO. DA. YR. 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO. 0127900
ORGANIZATION NO.

45 TYPE CODE: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 NOT DISSEMINATED

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)
INDIVIDUAL NO.
ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	F	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	I
3	M	I	I
4			
5	S	O	C
6	G	E	O
7	B	I	O
8			
9	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	2	O	Y
2	N	O	N
3			
4			

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION
☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS:

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

CB

8 FEB [illegible]

Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No 4.5

C/3
F.O. Chief
Case Officer
Division / Staff / Desk

FORM 25 Obsolete previous editions

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

3

13-7200

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	Guatemala	REPORT NO.	OO-B-321/00782-66
SUBJECT	Armed Forces Coup d'Etat Planned	DATE DISTR.	20 Jan 66
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	CIRL O-DCS-52374
DATE OF INFO.	12 Jan 66		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	---/12 Jan 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national with wide travel experience in Latin America. He speaks some Spanish, and has many social and business contacts in Latin America, but his realiability is not of the highest.

/This report was developed by a Navy representative assigned to the office of preparation./

1. On 12 Jan 66 Miguelito Ydigoras Laparra, son of the former President of Guatemala, told me that Guatemalan Armed Forces were planning to overthrow Colonel Enrique Peralta on 15 Jan 66. Ydigoras told me that if the coup was not carried out on 15 January, it would be executed as soon as possible thereafter.

2. Ydigoras would not tell me the names of the individuals leading the coup, but stated that "all of the Armed Forces will be involved."

- end -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S-YES 8 FEB 1966 U-YES

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6
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1

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2
1

4.5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U.S. Government without the written permission of the originating

14-00000

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE

B. REPORT NUMBER

C. FORWARDED MO DA YR

D. CASE NUMBER

E.

RECEIVED MO DA YR

REPORT NO.

FUO

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Possible [illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible]

EXTRA DISSEM RECORD

RELEASED MO DA YR

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO. D 12 [illegible]

TYPE DOC: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER

PHOTO DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT

AREA

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report

☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

14 JAN [illegible]

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Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No

4.4

CA	F.O. Chief	Case Officer	Division / Staff / Desk E Colligan

FORM 1-65 ~~SECRET~~ Obsolete previous editions

3

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

12-79-00

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

A. FIELD OFFICE (1 2 3 4 5)
B. REPORT NUMBER (6 7 8 9 10)
C. FORWARDED MO DA YR (11 12 13 14 15)
D. CASE NUMBER (16 17 18 19 20)
E. (21)

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

RECEIVED MO DA YR (22 23 24 25 26)
REPORT NO. B C/A OTHER (27 28 29 30 31 32 33)
34
IUO 35

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

55 Photoprints Taken in [illegible]
Harbor and Immediate Vicinity
(Cuba)

36
EXTRA DISSEM RECORD 37 38 39
RELEASED MO DA YR 40 41 42 43 44

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

[illegible]
Powder Springs, Georgia

INDIVIDUAL NO. New A# 127900

45 TYPE OO,E GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER
46 *NOT DISSEMINATED

ORGANIZATION NO.

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

[illegible]

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

INDIVIDUAL NO.

ORGANIZATION NO.

SUBJECT 47	48	49	50
0	E	C	O
1	S	&	T
2	P	O	L
3	M	I	L
4			
5	S	O	C
6	C	E	O
7	B	I	O
8	-	-	-
9	M	I	S

AREA 51	52	53	54
1	S	O	V
2	N	O	N
3			
4			

*1. SUFFIC. SPECIFY WITHHOLDING
2. TOO GENERAL
3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES
4. OTHER / MISC
5. COMBINED WITH
6. INSUFFICIENT INTEREST

J. METHOD OF COLLECTION

☐ Debriefing ☐ Trip Report
☐ Other Document ☐ Other (specify below)

FIELD COMMENTS

Source travelled to [illegible] for purpose of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS

24 JAN 1966

Request For Evaluation ☐ Yes ☐ No

4.3

Case Officer

Division [illegible]

Obsolete previous editions

~~SECRET~~

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

F-12-79-00

PRESENTATION FORM FOR GRAPHIC MATERIAL

(Submit to HQ-OCC in triplicate with process sheet attached)

DATE: 13 December 1965

DIST: ORIG-GRAPHICS; DUPL-CASE FILE; TRIPL-SOURCE FILE; QUAD-TO RECORD

☒ GIFT ☐ LOAN

AREA: **Camarioca, Cuba** A-127900 Mitchell L. Werbell

SUBJECT: **Photo prints taken in Camarioca Harbor and immediate vicinity**

NUMBER OF ITEMS AND CATEGORY (Still photographs, negatives, or slides) **56 B&W prints**

DATE OF EXPOSURE **1 to 7 Nov 65** CAMERA OR FOCAL LENGTH

CHECK CLASSIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN SEPARATED FROM THIS FORM. (The classification need not be the same.)

☐ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
☒ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
☐ UNCLASSIFIED

BRIEF SOURCE DESCRIPTION

US national with wide travel experience in the Caribbean Islands, especially in the Dominican Republic. He speaks some Spanish.

IS SOURCE APT TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL AVAILABLE? ☒ Yes ☐ No

MAY SOURCE'S NAME BE REVEALED TO GRAPHICS REGISTER, OCR, IF REQUIRED? ☒ Yes ☐ No

DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL

56 Black and white phot prints (3 and 1/2 X 5) taken with a 35mm camera.

IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE BLANK PAPER

4.2

FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DOC. NO. 22507-65	CASE NO.	DATE FORWARDED TO CR BY GMP
GR CONTROL NO.		

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

FORM 12-63 121 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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PROCESS SHEET FOR OO/C COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY

SUGGESTED SERIES	A. FIELD OFFICE	B. REPORT NUMBER	C. FORWARDED (NO. / DAY / YR)	D. CASE NUMBER	E. S.
OO-A ✓	X M I M I	0 0 1 9 3	0 7 2 7 9		X

FOR HEADQUARTERS ARCHIVE

RECEIVED (NO. / DAY / YR.): 0130991 629

F. SUBJECT AND AREA

Impending Flight of Batista/Pedraza Expedtionary Force

(CUBA/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)

I A C | I U O | E D C | EXTRA DISSEM. RECORD | RELEASED (NO / DAY / YR.): 07E17

TYPE OO-E: GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER | NOT DISSEMINATED

SUBJECT: [✓ 2] P O L

AREA: [✓ 3] L A

G. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Mitchell Warbell III
2211 Segovia Circle
Coral Gables, Florida

New A# 81615

H. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address or 'Y' Number)

Same as above

I. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)

J.

EXTRA DISSEMINATION CONTROL MAY BE RELEASED ON NEED TO KNOW TO:	O. K. AS IS	DELETE PART 2 OF S. D.	DELETE ENTIRE S. D.
1. APPROVED LIST OF CIA CONSULTANTS	✓ 1	4	7
2. APPROVED EXTERNAL PROJECTS	✓ 2	5	8
3. NON-IAC AGENCIES FOR NIS STUDIES	✓ 3	6	9

NOT DISSEMINATED

1. ALREADY SUFFICIENTLY WELL KNOWN
2. TOO GENERAL.
3. TYPE DATA SUPPLIED REGULARLY BY OTHER AGENCIES.
4. OTHER/MISCELLANEOUS.
5. COMBINED WITH

FIELD REMARKS

SECRET

EDITORIAL COMMENT

99

4.1

FIELD OFFICE CASE STATUS

THIS REPORT RESPONSIVE TO REQUIREMENTS FROM (OFFICE OR AGENCY):

EXPECT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WITHIN (DAYS):

FINAL REPORT ON THIS CASE YES ☐ NO ☐

CASE OFFICER: JFGleichauf:cm

CHIEF: JFGleichauf

EDITOR:

BRANCH STAFF CHIEF: E Crea

FORM 25 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

2 (20-41)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

2-77-00

SECRET

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

Chief, Domestic Collection Division
Attn: Support Branch/OSS (Grant)

Chief, Washington Field Office
Atlanta Resident Office

Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave

#132014 A127900

1. Jack Hennessy, Miami Field Office, called on 21 January 1974 to give us a source lead on Stephen Van Cleave and Mitch WerBell, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Jack briefed us on past Miami contacts with Van Cleave and suggested we might want to contact him concerning his activities in Argentina. At that time we were in the process of moving the office to the present location so did not contact Van Cleave until 25 January 1974. On that date we called, identified ourselves and briefly explained the reason for the call. His first question was, "Do you know Mitch WerBell and does this have anything to do with him?" We answered him we did not know WerBell and our interest was not related to him. Van Cleave suggested we come to his office at 1:00 that afternoon.

2. We arrived shortly before 1:00 at his office in 17[illegible] N. [illegible] Rd. N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. Van Cleave has a one room office in a modern building located in a moderate to high rent district of Atlanta. After presenting credentials and a business card we asked if we might tape the interview. He said he preferred we tape this as well as any future transactions as he wanted to be absolutely sure any information he gave was reported accurately. Enclosure No. 1 is a rough draft of the first interview. The actual tape has been erased. Some of this information was reported in OO-A(S)-322/03435-74, Secret, CIA Internal Use Only.

3. On 9 February 1974 we received a call from Van Cleave at home. He wanted to report in detail on a recent trip to Oakland, California, where he had supposedly met with police officials and discussed the Hearst kidnapping, the SLA, etc. We told him this was very interesting but not CIA business.

4. Van Cleave called again on 25 February 1974 to fill us in on a visit to the US by Argentine police officials and an operational opportunity in the Bahamas. We prepared this information for dissemination as OO-A(S)'s. In view of recent developments we assume neither report should be disseminated. To complete your record of contacts, both reports are enclosed as Enclosures No.'s 2 and 3 (disregard the Atlanta report numbers, they will be used for future reporting or cancelled).

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010650

SECRET

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5. In the meantime the Reg Murphy kidnapping came up to occupy his time until 26 February when he called to say he had some sensitive information of definite interest to CIA. When told we could not come into his office the following day due to a lack of transportation, he said he would come to our office. We reluctantly agreed. Late the morning of 27 February he came to our office and presented us with the information in Enclosure No. 4 (rough draft--the tape will be saved in case it is needed at a later date).

6. Not on the transcript, but of possible interest, before leaving our office he said he was afraid he might be fired by Coca Cola on 4 March 1974. Briefly, what apparently happened (and this is his story) was:

a. When it was learned Reg Murphy had been kidnapped, Chief John Inman of the Atlanta Police Department called Van Cleave requesting his assistance. He asked Van Cleave to come to headquarters and work with Assistant Chief Mullins (we believe this is the correct name) on the Murphy kidnapping;

b. Van Cleave apparently expressed concern to the Assistant Chief that prominent members of Coca Cola Company residing in the Atlanta area might be targets for the same kidnappers;

c. The Assistant Chief agreed and went along with Van Cleave notifying, by phone, Coke officials;

d. Van Cleave had not cleared this action with his immediate supervisor at the Coca Cola Company;

e. Apparently the phone calls were made very late in the evening;

f. When the Murphy kidnapping was resolved, Van Cleave was called in by his boss to account for his actions. He apparently has not been able to justify the calls and this will be discussed at the meeting on 4 March. We suspect this may be his last official action for the Coca Cola Company.

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 010570

ATL-30-74
28 February 1974

7. Since receiving the 27 February 1974 call from OSS, we have checked with Charles Haynes and Bob Perry of the FBI. Both are familiar with Van Cleave and his operations. Perry confirmed that Van Cleave had passed the information contained in Enclosure No. 4 to the FBI. Perry had a few other things to say about Van Cleave that probably do not need to be repeated in this memorandum.

8. Concerning the future, we intend to be hard to reach when Van Cleave calls; if necessary, talk to him on the phone a few times to see if he gets the idea; then if all fails simply tell him we have been told to stay out of this business.

A. G. COHEN

WDPangburn:mw

Enclosures
(as stated)

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SECRET

ATL-4-75
14 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

John R. Peterson
Atlanta Resident Office

Response to Call-in to Agency Headquarters/Initial Contact (Telephone) with John Daniel Williamson, Carrollton, Georgia

1. On 7 January 1975 Albert S. Coleman of the Washington Field Office called us to pass on information that he had just been given by Dale Zeimer, DCD Headquarters, regarding a call received by the Agency duty officer on New Year's Eve from one John Daniel Williamson of Carrollton, Georgia. Williamson identified himself as a Methodist minister and gave his address as Route #2, Box 3546, Carrollton, Georgia, Phone: (404) 854-0443.

2. In his call to Agency Headquarters, Williamson said that he had a friend who had information on the impending overthrow of a foreign government. The information regarded illegal shipment of arms from the US to the foreign country. Williamson said that his friend had wanted to try to sell the information to the foreign country concerned but that when the friend told Williamson about it Williamson prevailed on him to let him (Williamson) bring it to the attention of the proper government agency, resulting in his call to our headquarters on New Year's Eve. Williamson asked that someone from the Agency be put in contact with him.

3. On the afternoon of 7 January 1975, after verifying through the phone operator that Williamson was listed in the Carrollton area (he actually lives at Roopville, Georgia, on Rue Road, but the Roopville phones are handled under the Carrollton exchange), we called his number. We were informed by a young male voice, apparently his son, that Williamson was indeed a Methodist minister, but that he taught school every day during the week in the high school at Franklin, Georgia, except on Saturdays when he worked all day at a hardware store at Rockmart, Georgia. We were told that he preached on Sunday mornings. We were not told what he does on Sunday afternoons. Since he was not to be at home until after 5 PM, we called him from our own home that same evening.

4. Williamson seemed to be expecting our call although we had not identified ourselves during the earlier call. He gave us essentially the same information furnished during his New Year's Eve call. He said that the friend about whom he called is a 'former parishioner and lives in the Carrollton area." He preferred not to provide us with the friend's name and address. The information, however—that which we were able to ascertain--sounded on the up-and-up, as far as Mr. Williamson's part in it was concerned, for he seemed to be a sincere and well intentioned individual. When we tried to at least learn the name of the foreign country involved, Williamson said that his friend would not give him that information.

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ATL-4-75
14 January 1975

5. We did learn that the friend whom Williamson described as a business consultant, "a kind of a high-finance man involved in setting up corporations," who often travels abroad, had been approached by someone "locally," i.e., in the Carrollton-west Atlanta area (Carrollton is about 40 miles west of Atlanta). The friend was said to be "a good friend, a reliable man, a college graduate, an established man in the community." According to Williamson, the friend was approached because of the nature of his work to perform some sort of task for the group, and he knew that something was wrong. The friend then learned all he could about the planned operation and eventually talked with Williamson about it. The friend told Williamson that the gun-running operation had been going on for about a year.

6. At one point Williamson said that his friend told him that "the people involved in this thing won't hesitate to kill him (the friend) and he knows that he's going to have to leave this part of the country when it comes to light." Williamson told us: "I feel like I've got this man's life in my hands and I don't want to do anything to jeopardize his life, because I know him and his family and all." Williamson suggested that we meet his friend at the Cape and Sword Motel restaurant on I-20, near Six Flags Over Georgia, west of Atlanta, and he said that the two of them had already talked of this as a good meeting place. We told Williamson that we would be glad to meet with his friend but first we would like for his friend to give us a call so that we may talk with him. We gave our office phone number to Williamson. As of the writing of this memorandum, we have had no call.

7. From the information that Williamson provided, e.g., location of people involved, an attempt to meet with an Agency representative (to possibly get us involved merely by association), we believe that much of the substance of the matter could be the same as that which was reported from this office to OSS as related by Stephen Van Cleave regarding Mitch Werbell, et al. (See ATL-39-74, 26 February 1974, Resume of Contacts with Stephen Van Cleave; ATL-53-74, 9 April 1974, Stephen Van Cleave.) Mitch Werbell's operation, which has been described locally as a "machine-gun factory," is located at Powder Springs, Georgia, about ten miles north of the I-20 Cape and Sword Motel. At any rate, Mr. Williamson's friend has been given the opportunity to contact us—and we are awaiting his call.

JOHN R. PETERSON

cc: Office of Chief, DCD (D. Zeimer)
✓OSS
Services

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SECRET

12-79-00

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(b)(3)

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 051345Z MAR 74 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 12494

DCD/WASHINGTON

ATTN: SUPPORT BRANCH/OSS (GRANT) A-182014

SUBJ: STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, LTD., ATLANTA, GEORGIA

REF: GRANT/HENNESSEY TELCON, 28 FEBRUARY, SAME SUBJECT

1. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 21 JANUARY 1974 WE RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM ANSELMO ALLIEGRO, 3550 ROCKERMAN ROAD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, (A CONTACT OF THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE) WHO ADVISED US THAT AN ACQUAINTANCE OF HIS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, STEVEN VAN CLEAVE, WANTED TO SPEAK WITH US IN CONNECTION WITH INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CONCERNING LATIN AMERICA. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT VAN CLEAVE SHOULD CONTACT OUR OFFICE IN ATLANTA; HOWEVER, ALLIEGRO SAID THAT VAN CLEAVE DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH ''RECRUITERS'', RATHER HE WANTED TO SPEAK WITH A CIA OFFICER ''IN THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION''. WE TOLD ALLIEGRO THAT OUR ATLANTA OFFICE HAS THE SAME STATURE AS THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, AND THAT HE SHOULD URGE VAN CLEAVE TO CONTACT OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ATLANTA. ALLIEGRO WOULDN'T ACCEPT THIS RESPONSE ON OUR PART AND INSISTED THAT WE AT LEAST HEAR WHAT VAN CLEAVE HAD TO SAY. FINALLY, WE AGREED TO ACCEPT A CALL FROM VAN CLEAVE SO THAT WE COULD TELL HIM TO CONTACT OUR ATLANTA REPRESENTATIVE.

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2. VAN CLEAVE CALLED US AT HIS EXPENSE FROM ATLANTA ABOUT FIVE MINUTES LATER. WE ADVISED HIM AT THE OUTSET THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK WITH BILL PANGBURN IN THE ATLANTA RESIDENT OFFICE AT HIS EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR WORK FORCE IS DIVIDED GEOGRAPHICALLY RATHER THAN FUNCTIONALLY, AND THAT SINCE HE LIVES IN ATLANTA, HE MUST DEAL WITH THE ATLANTA RO. WE PROVIDED HIM WITH THE TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE ATLANTA RO, AND HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONTACT PANGBURN THE SAME DAY. WE CALLED PANGBURN TO ADVISE HIM OF VAN CLEAVE'S INTENTION TO CONTACT HIM. WE LATER LEARNED FROM BOTH PANGBURN AND VAN CLEAVE THAT THE CONTACT WAS MADE.

3. WE PRESUMED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH VAN CLEAVE. HOWEVER, WE WERE MISTAKEN. VAN CLEAVE PLACED AT LEAST TWO MORE TELEPHONE CALSS TO US FROM ATLANTA (AT HIS EXPENSE), AND ONE FROM DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA. EACH TIME WE ADVISED HIM TO CALL PANGBURN RATHER THAN US. HIS RESPONSE ON THESE OCCASIONS WAS THAT HE ALREADY HAD OR INTENDED TO KEEP PANGBURN ADVISED BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP US INFORMED ALSO. THE LOCAL DADE COUNTY CALL WAS MADE TO ADVISE US THAT VAN CLEAVE WAS IN MIAMI IN THE COMPANY OF TWO ARGENTINE POLICE OFFICIALS, WHOM WE COULD DEBRIEF IF WE SO DESIRED. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD REPORT TO ATLANTA.

4.51

4. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US DURING ONE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CONVERSATIONS THAT HE IS ACQUAINTED WITH MITCHELL WERBELL, POWDER SPRINGS, GEORGIA, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN ''PRESSURED'' INTO TAKING WERBELL TO ARGENTINA WITH HIM IN LATE JANUARY 1974 BY OFFICIALS IN THE COCA COLA COMPANY, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA, WITH WHICH VAN CLEAVE HAD (OR HAS) A CONSULTING CONTRACT IN CONNECTION WITH COCA COLA'S SECURITY SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA. VAN CLEAVE ADVISED US THAT HE NEVER AGAIN WOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WERBELL BECAUSE THE LATTER HAD ACTED SO BADLY DURING THIS TRIP. HE TOLD US THAT WERBELL HAD COMMENTED TO ARGENTINE OFFICIALS THAT HE (WERBELL) WAS SOMEHOW CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND ON A FIRST NAME BASIS WITH ''BILL'' COLBY, DCI. VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT MATTERS HAD DEGENERATED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT HE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT WERBELL. (OUR MEMORY IS A BIT FUZZY ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS DISCUSSION, BUT WE RECALL SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT WERBELL WAS INVOLVED WITH WINE, WOMEN, AND SONG, AND VAN CLEAVE WAS AFRAID THAT WERBELL MIGHT BE ARRESTED BY ARGENTINE POLICE BEFORE IT WAS OVER.) VAN CLEAVE TOLD US THAT HE PERSONALLY NEVER HAS SO MUCH AS IMPLIED A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AGENCY TO ANY OUTSIDER.

A12795

A164

PAGE 4 DCD/MIAMI 12494 CONFIDENTIAL

5. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT MET VAN CLEAVE IN PERSON, BASED UPON OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM HE APPEARED TO BE AN INTELLIGENT AND REASONABLE MAN. WE ARE SORRY THAT WE CANNOT PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH VAN CLEAVE, BUT AS WE MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELECON WE DID NOT MAKE NOTES DURING THE CONVERSATIONS NOR DID WE FEEL IT NECESSARY AT THE TIME TO WRITE A MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SINCE WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A NORMAL, ALBEIT COMPLEX, REFERRAL TO ANOTHER DCD OFFICE. E 2 IMPDET CL BY 013652

CONFIDENTIAL

4.51

SECRET E12-79-OC

Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS 22 May 1969

Director, Domestic Contact Service
(Chief, Services Division)

WERBELL, Mitchell L. -- Local OCI Inquiry to DCS Miami Office for
#27595 Information Concerning

77-77-084-69

1. The enclosed copy of memorandum from our Miami Office, regarding the OCI representative's inquiry for information concerning Subject, is forwarded for your records and possible future reference.

2. Any questions pertaining to this memorandum should be directed to Mrs. Virginia Thorne, Ext. 2733.

SECURITY

R. FRANK YOUNG

Enclosure: As stated above

VThorne:grw

4.51

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

22 May 19[illegible]

Chief, Miami Field Office

ATT : Mr. [illegible]. Hogan
Director, Domestic Contact Service (Services Division)

[illegible], Mitchell L.

REF : MIA-[illegible]-69

Thank you for the information reported in the reference. The suggestion made by your office that OSI direct the request through official security channels is entirely correct. In the future, however, it will be helpful and appreciated if you will forward correspondence pertaining to security matters directly to the Security Liaison Officer, rather than to Support Staff. This saves time in getting the information to the appropriate channel for any action that may be indicated.

SECURITY

JAMES R. [illegible]

V[illegible]:ERV

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[illegible]

SECRET

F-12-7

SECRET

Director, Domestic Contact Service 15 May 1969

ATTN : 033 MIM-084-69

Chief, Miami Field Office

Local OSI Inquiry Regarding Information on Mitchell L. Werbell

B

1. On 15 May 1969, Special Agent Dave Plowman, local OSI representative, USAF, visited the Miami Field Office to solicit any information we might have regarding Mitchell L. Werbell who apparently is undergoing a security clearance check as the result of presently being employed by a company with a government contract.

2. Werbell was an unsolicited contact of this office beginning in 1959 and he reached peak notoriety in November 1967 as a result of his involvement in the Rolando Masferrer trial in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion. John Greaney, OGC was in Miami at the time to oversee Agency interests.

3. Plowman in contacting other US Government agencies locally including the US Attorney's Office somehow received an indication that CIA had information on Werbell; thus Plowman's visit to the Miami Field Office.

4. It was indicated to Plowman, who is known personally by several members of this staff, that we knew of Werbell and that on occasion he had reported unsolicited information. It was suggested, however, that Plowman direct his request officially through channels via OSI's agency liaison officer in Washington.

5. This is for background and is being forwarded at the suggestion of local CIA Security.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

~~④~~ ①
~~②~~ ③

EHogan:pmw

SECRET

4.51

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

SECRET/RYBAT

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: SOD/SEC/COV
EXT: 5265
DATE: 2 Sept 65

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	CA
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 8 PER ___ #___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SOD 3 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, DC/WH/C 5, D/SECUR 4, C/AF 4, C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET/RYBAT (DATE AND TIME FILED) 6 18 1[illegible]Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 32999

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PERUMEN SECUR

REF: JMWAVE 2812 (IN 86315) *

BASED ON REVIEW OF INFO DEVELOPED BY [illegible] INVESTIGATION, SUBJECT REF NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE FOR FUTURE USE ON WITHRUSH. SGSWIRL REPEAT NOT DESIRED. OA BEING CANCELLED.

END OF MESSAGE

773056

294544

* Requested Hqrs. reconsider use of Antonio (SOTO) Vazquez on WITHRUSH

SOD/AB/CPS Jim Smith (telecon)
SOD/AB/CPS 3 Larry Murphy (Draft)
CI/OA Dick Ruffner (telecon)
OS/IOS/ID Lou Vasaly (telecon)

R. J. Goodhart
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

Sidney D. Stembridge
Chief, Security/Cover, SOD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

-b.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) SOD (Case officer) W. Wainwright (Extension) 4475

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): SOTO-Vazquez, Antonio

NAME SHOWN IS: ☒ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☐ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.: 90192

201 NO.: 294544

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

DATE OF BIRTH: 20 August 1934

PLACE OF BIRTH: Hava, Cuba

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

1. It is requested that OA on Subject be canceled as he is of no further operational interest to this office.

   Thank you for your assistance in this case.

2. Green List Name Check canceled as of this date.

SEP 6 11 25 AM '66

DATE: 2 September 1966

SIGNATURE: William E. Wainwright

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

201 No. 294544

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/AB/OPS/3 — Larry Murphy

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________ SOTO Vasquez, Antonio ____, for the purpose specified in your request dated ____ 8 December 1965 ____.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 14 December 1965 jab

Distribution:
  Orig. to Addressee
  1 to Files

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM

T/N Antonio SOTO Vazquez

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Subject submitted job application to Roberto Medell (principal agent, WITHRUSH, Miami, Fla.) on 25 March 1965 for job as WITHRUSH pilot.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could be turned over to any responsible case officer. A knowledge of Spanish and aviation would be most helpful.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

George N. Sohl known to Subject as Gerald Saunders.

SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. (*Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock concept such as "anti-communist."*)

Financial, desire to maintain flight status, and to a lesser degree, political (anti-Castro, anti-communist).

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. (*If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.*)

No real control exists over Subject other than financial. His resident alien status could offer a factor of control if authorization were granted for this maneuver.

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS. The principal agent represents himself as an employee of the WAVE case officer, who in turn is documented as an agent of the Gov't of the Republic of the Congo. However, although no U.S. Gov't interest is overtly manifested, it is realistic to assume that Subject suspects U.S. Gov't collusion in, if not outright sponsorship of the operation.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

NA

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE (*Will work*) (*Is working*).

In all probability Subject is or will become aware that the GOC air program is under sponsorship by KUBARK.

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

None known.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (*Agents, relatives, friends*) WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

Probably wife.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None known.

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

None.

SECTION VI — OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

NA

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

NA

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

NA

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

NA

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

As a pilot only.

SECTION VII — PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII — AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER; REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject under ostensible contract to GOC, although presumably he knows the project is being sponsored by the U.S. Government.

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

He is a qualified fixed-wing and helicopter pilot.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject's contract calls for base pay of $800 per month, $10 per flight hour over sixty hours, $10 per flight hour which is considered hazardous. Contract additionally contains life insurance up to $40,000.

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

None known.

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

WAVE Station, FBI, INS, Credit, Miami Police and Hqs files.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

None.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. Yes, POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED 21 May 1965

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

Subject believed reliable with no known adverse character traits. No known security problems to date.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None.

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

No known excessive habits.

SECRET

SECTION XIII AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Aviation.

SECTION XIV GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Catain Central American countries.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

PRQ Part I supplied by Subject; Part II by check of files by case officer.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

None.

SECTION XV EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W, WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE, WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

NA

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

DATE 2 December 1965	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

C NO.: [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☒	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS: POA expired on [illegible]. Please submit PRQ Part II. If, within 30 days, no further interest in Subject has been indicated, POA will be automatically cancelled.

FORM 9-65 889a

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

30 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : 201 - 294544
#242 369

Reference is made to our previous memorandum furnishing you with National Agency Checks results and confirmation of completion of favorable domestic field investigation conducted in connection with your consideration of Subject for an Operational Approval. As noted in our previous memorandum, written reports on the field investigation were to be furnished to your office at a later date. Attached hereto you will find the above-mentioned reports. No further action is contemplated in this matter.

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

File

Enclosure:
INV. RPT. DTD. 6/29/65

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

FILE NO. 242 369 **DATE** 29 June 1965

SYNOPSIS

Antonio SOTO has been employed periodically by Eagle Incorporated, a steamship company, since 1961. He has been utilized as a warehouse checker. SUBJECT has left his employment to accept short time flying jobs. He left Eagle Incorporated in March 1965 to accept one of these flying jobs. Four developed references favorable regarding habits, morals, reputation, and loyalty to the United States. No credit or police record in the names of SUBJECT or his spouse.

SECRET

REPORT NO. ____________

FORM 7-64 1125 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 1125 AND 1125a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

File #212 369

EMPLOYMENT:

At Miami, Florida

(Eagle Incorporated)

On 22 June 1965 Sam KRATISH, secretary-treasurer, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding Antonio SOTO. The informant stated that "Tony" has been employed by the firm periodically since 1961. SUBJECT has been utilized as a warehouse checker for the steamship company. He unloaded cargo coming to and from the United States. He was an excellent employee, and although he has left on several occasions, he is always eligible for rehire. The informant stated that SUBJECT is also a pilot and formerly flew in the Cuban Air Force. He has had several part time or temporary flying jobs which offer him good pay. When these jobs arise the firm allows SUBJECT to leave without jeopardizing his standing with the company. SUBJECT left in March 1965 to accept another one of these flying jobs. The informant stated that he did not know where these jobs were located, but believed that they are usually out of the United States.

REFERENCES:

At Miami, Florida

On 22 June 1965 Sam KRATISH, previously identified, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he considers "Tony" SOTO to be a reputable and honest individual. He has been associated with him on a professional basis since 1961 and his associations have all been satisfactory. SUBJECT is an excellent worker and is completely honest. The informant stated that he has often left SUBJECT alone with valuable cargo, and that there has never been any dispute over SUBJECT's trustworthiness or integrity. SUBJECT is a Cuban exile who left Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. SUBJECT has never espoused any political ideologies while he has worked at the firm, but the informant stated that he is aware of the fact that the SUBJECT is anti-CASTRO and that he is favorably disposed towards the United States form of government. The informant stated that he knew nothing that he considered to be unfavorable regarding SUBJECT's character.

On 22 June 1965 J. C. WILDER, supervisor, Eagle Incorporated, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he has been acquainted with SUBJECT since 1961 on a professional basis. SUBJECT has been a warehouse checker periodically since 1961. His main line of work is flying, and he was formerly a pilot in the Cuban Air Force. However, after CASTRO took over the island SUBJECT fled and has worked at several different locations flying on a part time basis. When SUBJECT does not have a job flying he always comes to the company, and because of his good work habits he is always hired. The informant stated that SUBJECT left the company in March 1965 to take a job flying at some unknown location. The informant stated that he has found SUBJECT to be pleasant, completely reliable, and a man of integrity. There is no question of his morality or sobriety, and the informant believed that SUBJECT was loyal to the United States.

On 22 June 1965 Carlos MARTINEZ, export manager, Eagle Incorporated, 800 N. E. 2nd Avenue, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that he has been acquainted with SUBJECT since 1961 on a professional basis. During that time he has never noted anything of an unfavorable nature regarding SUBJECT's character, morality or sobriety. He is a hard working and conscientious individual and is diligent and reliable. He last worked for the company for approximately six months in 1964 and 1965 and left in March 1965 to take a flying job at some unknown location. The informant stated that he has never heard anything to indicate that SUBJECT had any Communistic tendencies whatsoever, and he believed that SUBJECT was favorably disposed towards the United States.

At Hialeah, Florida

On 22 June 1965 Mrs. Marie RODRIGUEZ, 1260 West 60th Terrace, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that SUBJECT

File #242 369

and his family resided next door to her for two years from 1962 to 1964. She found SUBJECT to be happily married and stated that he was a decent and clean living person. He was formerly a pilot in Cuba, but had to flee Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. The informant believed that SUBJECT was favorably disposed towards the United States government. She added that she could offer no criticism of his personal conduct, morality or sobriety. She added that all of her associations with SUBJECT have been satisfactory.

On 22 June 1965 Mrs. Mary DIENER, 1280 West 60th Terrace, was interviewed regarding SUBJECT as a developed reference. The informant stated that she lived next door to SUBJECT and his family for two years and found them to be good neighbors. They were Cuban refugees who fled Cuba because of the CASTRO regime. SUBJECT was a pilot in Cuba, but could not find work flying here in the United States. As a consequence he worked for a firm on the docks in downtown Miami. SUBJECT's reputation in the community was good, and the informant believed that he was a respectable gentleman. She stated that she believed SUBJECT was appreciative of being able to live in the United States, and she never heard him criticise our form of government.

CREDIT:

At Miami, Florida

On 10 June 1965 records of the Credit Bureau of Miami were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

These files cover Hialeah, Florida.

POLICE:

At Miami, Florida

On 10 June 1965 records of the Dade County Public Safety Department and the Miami Police Department were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

At Hialeah, Florida

File #242 369

On 10 June 1965 records of the Hialeah Police Department were reviewed in the names of SUBJECT and his spouse and no record was found.

AAT/ahh

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 8 July 1965

CASE NO. (201): 294 544

☐ SET UP FOR POA
☐ EXPEDITE INDICES
DATE
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA
☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY
☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
AREA

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL T
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)
☐ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II

☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LEFLUTTER REPORT
☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ FILE
☐ TICKLE
☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
✓ OTHER Insert Eyes Only Sheet

POA EXPIRED ____________ PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF ~~NO REPLY IS RECEIVED~~ NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS M/R. This case was discussed with Mr. Brown/C/CI/OA

Ball also conferred with J. Scanlon/SOD/Sec. and F. Farrel/SOD/Case Officer/
who reviewed the Eyes Only data and other information of record. It was determined that
in view of the Subject already being in the Field on his second tour and the type of
operation(PM) involved that the derogatory nature of the information would not preclude
his continued use. SOD however is to forward a memorandum to this effect for CI/CA
files.

J E Ball

☐

SECRET

FORM 7-63 707

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 14 Apr. 1965 Jev

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
WITHRUSH
SOD/AB/OFS/3 Congo

SUBJECT: 201 - 294544; SO#242369

TYPE OF REQUEST
☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CSC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 20 Apr. 1965

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date) 27 Apr. 1965

APR 15 2 01 PM '65

USE OF SUBJECT
Pilot WITHRUSH

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
BY HDI
DIVISION: HDI: WH
FIELD: HDI: WAVE

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☒ PARTIAL PRQ ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

POA

/s/ Edward P. Brown YEB
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

DATE 6/25/65

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: # 242369 (NR) other than [illegible] referred to [illegible]

☑ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

☐ FBI ☒ ONI ☐ ACSI ☐ STATE ☐ FE ☐ CSC ☐ HCUA ☐ OSI ☐ I & N ☐ ☐

☑ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached FBI ([illegible] 4/21/65), I&N, OSI (Eyes Only)

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS Additional Traces and domestic field coverage has been scheduled, the results of which will be forwarded when completed.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY (IOS)

[illegible] 6/25/65

SECRET

FORM 693

FILE NO. 242 369 DATE 26 May 1965

SYNOPSIS

File at Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida shows that one Antonio SOTO (Vazquez), who was born 20 August 1934 in Cuba, arrived in the United States at Daytona Beach, Florida on 1 January 1959 and he departed from the United States at Miami, Florida for the Dominican Republic on 20 June 1959. He again arrived in the United States at San Juan, P. R. on 18 August 1959, using name and passport of one Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez), which he explained by saying he could not get visa in own name due to service in Cuban Air Force during BATISTA regime. His foreign departure from Miami, Florida to Guatemala was verified 28 September 1959. Father of SUBJECT said to be in jail in Cuba in 1959 for participating in attempted invasion of Cuba. SUBJECT arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida 11 January 1961; his foreign departure from Miami, Florida was verified 25 February 1961 and he again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida 24 May 1961. He was granted Re-Entry Permit in October 1963 for travel to Republic of Congo. Background data set forth.

168008

REPORT NO.

FORM NO 1125
1 NOV 54

File #242 369

GENERAL:

At Miami, Florida

The records in the District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 51 S. W. First Avenue, which were checked on 19 and 24 May 1965, were found to contain file # A-11 263 189 pertaining to one Antonio SOTO (Vazquez), AKA, Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez), who arrived in the United States at Daytona Beach, Florida on 1 January 1959 in a Cuban Army airplane. He was said to have been born on 20 August 1934 at Havana, Cuba; to be the son of Antonio SOTO (Rodriguez) and Julia Rosa VAZQUEZ (Acosta) and to have resided in January-February 1959 at 1409 South Ridgewood Avenue and at 129 North Halifax Avenue, both Daytona Beach, Florida. In February 1959, his address was given as 35 N. E. 58th Street, Miami, Florida and his foreign departure from Miami, Florida to the Dominican Republic was verified on 20 June 1959.

SOTO again arrived in the United States at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 18 August 1959, at which time he presented Cuban passport #02042 in the name of Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez). Upon interrogation under oath by Immigration and Naturalization Service at Miami, Florida on 18 September 1959, SOTO admitted his identity as Antonio SOTO (Vazquez); stated that he could not get a visa in his own name in Cuba because he had been in the BATISTA government as a Captain in the Cuban Air Force and that he would refuse to tell how he obtained the passport in the name of Orlando Pedro RODRIGUEZ (Alvarez). He said that he came to the United States to try to help his father who was then in jail in Cuba. He identified his wife as Dolores Inocenta BECERRA (Garcia) and gave their address as 6711 N. W. 2nd Court, Miami, Florida. He was represented, for Immigration purposes, by Attorney Ralph H. AGUILERA, 608 Dupont Plaza Center, Miami, Florida. A notation in the file in August 1959 set forth that SUBJECT's father, Col. Antonio SOTO, "was the man who had recently piloted the invasion plane from Dominican Republic to Trinidad, Cuba", was shot in the fighting and was in a prison hospital in Cuba. The foreign departure of SUBJECT from Miami, Florida to Guatemala was verified on 28 September 1959, after he had been ordered deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for fraudulent entry. In December 1959, his address was given as 6th Avenue #1221, 8th Piso, P. O. Box 918, Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Antonio SOTO (Vazquez) again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 11 January 1961. He reported that he had Social Security #265-64-6892; that he had a brother-in-law, Fidel RODRIGUEZ, 440 S. W. 5th Avenue, Miami, Florida and that he (SOTO) intended to reside at 5703 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida. His foreign departure was verified at Miami, Florida on 25 February 1961 and he again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 24 May 1961. In August 1961, his address was 143 N. W. 39th Street, Miami, Florida.

On 18 October 1963, SUBJECT was granted a Re-Entry Permit by the Immigration and Naturalization Service so that he could travel to the Republic of the Congo as an employee of Caribbean Aeromarine Company, P. O. Box 755, Miami, 48, Florida. He again arrived in the United States at New York, N. Y. on 4 May 1964 and in September 1964, his address was listed as 1270 West 60th Terrace, Hialeah, Florida.

In September 1964, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was advised by the U. S. Department of State, Washington, D. C. that SUBJECT had applied to the American Consulate, Toronto, Canada for an immigrant visa. The U. S. Department of State was advised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service on 1 October 1964 that SUBJECT appeared "to still be excludable".

Additional information concerning SUBJECT is said to possibly be contained in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The above records were also found to contain file # A-12 542 006 pertaining to one Dolores Inocenta BECERRA, who arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 15 October 1960 and who may be identical with the wife of SUBJECT. This person was said to have been born on 28 December 1939 at Havana, Cuba; to be married to one Antonio SOTO, 5703 North Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida and to have a brother, Sergio BECERRA, 147 N. W. 58th Street, Miami, Florida.

The above records were also found to contain file #

File #242 369

A-11 881 502 pertaining to one Julia Rosa VAZQUEZ (Acosta), AKA, Edelma Marina SANCHEZ (Izquierdo), who may be identical with the mother of SUBJECT. This person was said to have been born on 16 April 1909 in Matanzas Province, Cuba; to have arrived in the United States at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 18 August 1959 with a Cuban passport issued to one Edelma Marina SANCHEZ (Izquierdo) and that she admitted this passport to be false insofar as she was concerned. In September 1959, her address was 65 N. W. 60th Street, Miami, Florida and her foreign departure from Miami, Florida for Cuba was verified on 2 October 1959. She again arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida on 5 October 1960 and gave her address as c/o her daughter, Cecina SOTO, 4413 N. W. 9th Street, Miami, Florida.

FHH/eph

FILE NO. 242 369

DATE 17 June 1965

SYNOPSIS

Developed reference in 100 block North Halifax Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, advised that the reported former residence of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ) was owned and occupied by Cuban General BATISTA at the time. Informant advised neither she nor others in area would have any knowledge of SUBJECT. Inquiries in 1400 block South Ridgewood Avenue unproductive, incorrect address furnished. Credit and police, no record.

REPORT NO.

FORM NO 1125
1 NOV 58

#242 369

REFERENCES

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, observations revealed that the dwelling at 129 North Halifax Avenue, reportedly the residence of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ) in early 1959, is presently vacant. The building contains a nameplate in the name of St. Demetrios Greek Orthodox Parish.

On 11 June 1965, Mrs. Clayton HARSPER, developed informant at 120 North Halifax Avenue, advised that the dwelling at 129 North Halifax Avenue was owned for many years by former Cuban General BATISTA. During the period in question, BATISTA, family friends, and staff, totaling approximately thirty people, occupied the dwelling. Many individuals of Cuban extraction came and went during the late 1950s, and Mrs. HARSPER stated that neither she nor other present residents of this area would have any knowledge of the SUBJECT. The Cubans kept to themselves and never mingled with the local citizenry.

Mrs. HARSPER added that BATISTA sold the property about a year ago to a church group, but the building is presently unoccupied.

On 11 June 1965, observations in the 1400 block of South Ridgewood Avenue revealed that there is no 1409 South Ridgewood. A Mrs. SHAROG, owner of the Parkway Motel at 1369; and Edward SUMMERS, Humble Oil Station, 1480 South Ridgewood Avenue, both stated that there has never been a 1409 South Ridgewood Avenue. The informants advised that several motels in the area have all undergone several ownership changes over the past five or six years, and the informants know of no one in the area who would be in a position to recall the SUBJECT.

CREDIT

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, the files of the Daytona Beach Credit Bureau were searched in the name of SUBJECT, no record.

#242 369

POLICE (CRIMINAL, TRAFFIC, AND SUBVERSIVE)

At Daytona Beach, Florida:

On 11 June 1965, the files of the Daytona Beach Police Department were searched in the name of SUBJECT, no record.

JKM/jdm

SOTO (VAZQUEZ), Antonio
242 369

4 June 1965

On 27 May 1965, the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were searched in the name of SOTO (VAZQUEZ, Antonio, born 20 August 1934, Cuba.

The only information available at the Central Office relating to SUBJECT were I-94 forms, copies of which are attached.

KNW:ja

Name (Last in Caps) (First) (Middle)
SOTO VAZQUEZ, Antonio

A 11 263 189

Sndx Code

Alias
(DNR) to Rodrigues y Alvarez, Orlando D.
(A 11 882 397)

Type of action
Paroles

Country of Birth: Cuba
Date of Birth (Month) 08 (Day) 20 (Year) 34

Place of Entry: JAO Fla.
Date of Entry (Month) 01 (Day) 01 (Year) 59

FILE LOCATION

F.C.O.	Date	F.C.O.	Date
MIA	3-25-60 J	CORRECTED INDEX CARD	

Form G-361 (Rev. 10-1-57) ORIGINAL INDEX CARD

Name (Last in CAPS) (First) (Middle)
SOTO-Vazquez, Antonio

No.

Sndx Code S 3 80

Alias
[illegible] 2nd Avenue

Entered (Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Port) (Class)

Born (Country) (Mo.) (Day) (Year)
Cuba 1934

Name of Sponsor

Type of Action
C.M.R. Exp. A-2721, Roll 55, page38

Action on VP (Decision) (Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Section) (Forwarded to Control at)
Investigated [redacted] has subversive literature in house

Naturalized (Mo.) (Day) (Year) (Court No.) (Court Location) (Certificate No.)
no further information.

FCO	Date	FCO	Date	FCO	Date

Form G-361 (Rev. 12-1-58) INDEX CARD Central Office Copy

Family Name Given Name Initial
SOTO-VASQUEZ, ANTONIO S [illegible]

Nationality (Citizenship): CUBA
Passport Number: [illegible]

United States Address: 6711 NW 2ND COURT MIAMI, FLA

Airline & Flight No. or Vessel of Arrival
Passenger Boarded At

Permanent Address

Birthdate: AUG. 20, 1934
Birthplace: HAVANA, CUBA
Visa Issued At
Date Visa Issued

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED until MAY 24, 1961
Conditions: TO REPORT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
35
MIA 4/25/61
(Date) (Inspector, Officer)

PLEASE PRINT IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Surname [illegible] Given Name [illegible] Passport Numb[illegible] [illegible] 300

Nationality (Citizenship) [illegible] Birthplace [illegible] Birthdate [illegible]

United States Address [illegible] St. [illegible] Fla.

Permanent Address [illegible] Cuba

Visa Issued At [illegible]

Date Visa Issued Jan 9 1961

Vessel Name or Airline and Flight No. of Arrival
GAM-100

Passenger Boarded At
MEXICO D. F.

Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD

UNDER DOCKET CONTROL

ADMITTED
MIAMI, FLA.
JAN 11 1961
B-2
Until Feb 10-61

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

A-12512 00

Surname SOTO y Vazquez Given Name Antonio Initial Passport Number S 300
Nationality (Citizenship) Cuba Birthplace Havana, Cuba Birthdate 8/20/34

United States Address
c/o Celina Soto, 65 N. W. 60th St., Miami, Fla.

Permanent Address

Visa Issued At

Date Visa Issued

Vessel Name or Airline & Flight No. of Arrival
PAA 431 - 18 S/ID

Passenger Boarded At
Ciudad Trujillo, Dom. Rep.

Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD A-11,263,182

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED until Sept 3, 1959, 9:30 AM
Conditions: [illegible]
[illegible]
RESTRICTED TO DADE COUNTY
MIA 8/20/59 (Port) (Date) (Immig. Officer)

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Surname SOTO y Vazquez Given Name Antonio Initial Passport Number None S 300
Nationality (Citizenship) Cuban Birthplace [illegible], Cuba Birthdate Aug 20, 1934

United States Address ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] Motel, Daytona Beach, Fla.
[illegible]

Permanent Address [illegible], Casino de [illegible],
Havana, Cuba.

Visa Issued At None

Date Visa Issued None

Vessel Name of Airline & Flight No. of Arrival
Camaguey, Cuba
Arr. Daytona Beach, Fla.

Passenger Boarded At 1/1/59
Cuban Airforce Plane # 913

Form I-94 A (Rev. 7-1-57)
ARRIVAL-DEPARTURE RECORD

Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED
until [illegible]
Conditions: [illegible]
Daytona Beach, not to
change [illegible]
[illegible] 1/2/59 (Immig. Officer)

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the Immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian Immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States Immigration officer on the Mexican Border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS

To ______ Office ______

______ Office ______

DEPARTURE FOREIGN
VERIFIED
31
U. S. Immigration Officer

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port:

Date:

Carrier:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved—Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the Immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian Immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States Immigration officer on the Mexican Border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS:

To 9/18/64 Office [illegible]

______ Office [illegible]

______ Office ______

______ Office ______

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port: [illegible]

Date: [illegible]

Carrier: [illegible]

To: [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved - Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

You have been admitted to the United States for the period of time indicated hereon. Remaining in the United States thereafter without obtaining an extension of time from the immigration authorities is a violation of law. You are required to retain this permit in your possession and to surrender it to the transportation line at the time of your departure unless you depart over the land border of the United States in which case you must surrender it to a Canadian immigration officer on the Canadian border, or to a United States immigration officer on the Mexican border.

RECORD OF EXTENSIONS:

To ______ Office ______

______ Office ______

______ Office ______

______ Office ______

DEPARTURE RECORD

Port: [illegible]

Date: [illegible]

Carrier: [illegible]

To: [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form Approved - Budget Bureau No. 43-R311.4

Family name / Given name / Initial / Soundex

SOTO y VAZQUEZ [illegible] | S-[illegible]

Home address and name of relative or friend residing there

[illegible]

Address in the U.S.

[illegible]

Date and place of birth

7-[illegible]-34

[illegible]

Hair	Eyes	Height	Weight	Sex
Bl	Br	5'3	145	☒ M ☐ F

"V" or "A" No.

Passport (No. and Nationality)

[illegible]

Arrived by

[illegible]

Action by Immigration Officer

April 4 5[illegible]

You are required to depart from U.S. [illegible] on or before May 2 [illegible]

DEPARTURE VERIFIED

[illegible] DEPARTURE RECEIVED

[illegible] IN C. O.

[illegible] 23

STATISTICS

U.S. Immigration Inspector

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. [illegible]

Form I-95D (Rev. 1-1-57) Index Copy

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

Family name / Given name / Initial / Soundex

[illegible] | S [illegible]

Home address and name of relative or friend residing there

[illegible]

Address in the U.S.

[illegible]

Date and place of birth

[illegible]

Hair	Eyes	Height	Weight	Sex
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 2	[illegible]	☒ M ☐ F

"V" or "A" No.

Passport (No. and Nationality)

[illegible]

Arrived by

[illegible]

Action by Immigration Officer

Miami, Florida

12-13-5[illegible]

You are required [illegible]

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 43R 350.1

U.S. Immigration Officer

Form I-95D (Rev. 1-1-57) Index Copy

ANY HANDWRITTEN ENTRIES MUST BE IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS

MESSAGE FORM 2/ Ⅱ

SECRET

ORIG : L. MURPHY:kma
UNIT : SOD/AB/OPS/3
EXT : 4475
DATE : 24 May 1965

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-294544

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

25 MAY 65 20 06z

C/O - WH

TO : JMWAVE (FOR LORENTZ)

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SOD 6 INFO WH/C 8, AF 6, CI/OA, FI, VR FILE

TO WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) INFO CITE DIR 13284

CHAPPIE WITHRUSH PBRUMEN

POA GRANTED SUBJ 87. ODURGE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY HQS.

END OF MESSAGE

AF/5 T. Baskett/Draft

CI/OA G. Ball/Telecon

SOD/AB/OPS/3 T. Daly

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BERNARD J. FINAN, JR.
C/SOD/AB

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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78 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM PHOENIX

ACTION SO D 6

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO 1 VR FILE, DDP, WH/C 8, AF 6, C/CI, CI/SEC, OT

S E C R E T 181715Z

CO

2372

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PNIX 2726 ✓

201-294544

18 MAY 65 IN 70135

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN WITHRUSH

REF DIR 03920

PNIX 2715 (IN 67575)

1. MR ORLANDO IZQUIERDO AND MR ANTONIO SOTO VASQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION IN THE MODEL 47G-3 B-1 HELICOPTER ON 15 MAY 65. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THEIR TRAINING AND HOURS:

A. IZQUIERDO:

ACTIVITY	TIME
GROUND SCHOOL (EXAMS, NAVIGATION/FLIGHT, WEIGHT & BALANCE, GENERAL ORIENTATION)	9:00 HRS
SUPPLEMENTAL READING	DAILY
RADIO PROCEDURES WITH UHF, VHF & HF	DAILY
DEAD RECKONING AND CROSS-COUNTRY	4:10 HRS
PERSONNEL RAPPELLING, PERSONNEL PARACHUTING	
CARGO RACKS AND CARGO SLINGS	2:00 HRS

TOTAL FLYING TIME:

DUAL 21:55

SOLO 2:30

STUDENT DUAL (SOTO

SECRET

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UNIT TIME BY

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD-6

INFO VR. FILE, DDP, WH/C-8, AF-6, CI/OA, OPSER

4 MAY 65 IN 59001

S E C R E T 041933Z

PRIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1480

CHAFFIE WITHRUSH IUPAGAN PERUMEN

REF WAVE 1444 (IN 58061)

file

LORENTZ MIAMI BEADS:

ANTONIO SOTO RECEIVED 6 PLUS 50 HRS DUAL TRAINING AND ORLANDO IZQUIERDO 12 PLUS 20 HRS HELICOPTER DUAL TRAINING. TRAINING CONSISTED OF NORMAL HELICOPTER EXERCISES INCLUDING PRE FLIGHT, EMERGENCIES, AUTO-ROTATIONS UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS, WATER LANDINGS AND SLING LOADS. INSTRUCTOR RATED BOTH SUBJS SAFE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS AND RATED THEM 50 PERCENT ABOVE AVERAGE IN GENERAL TRAINING.

S E C R E T

CFN

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 5

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71/30 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM JMWAVE

ACTION SOD 6

INFO VR. FILE AF 6, DDP, WH/C 8, ci/oa, OPSER

SECRET 0321A0Z

3 MAY 65 IN 58061

PRIX INFO DIR CITE WAVE 1444

CHAPPIE/WITHRUSH/IUPAGAN/PBRUMEN

LORENTZ MIAMI SENDS

1. ORLANDO IZQUIERDO (I) AND ANTONIO SOTO (S) ARRIVING 4 MAY

ALBUQUERQUE 1750 LOCAL CONTINENTAL 275.

2. BOTH BRIEFED QUARTERS AND RATIONS TO BE FURNISHED.

3. (I) HAD APPROXIMATLY 14 HRS LOCALLY AND (S) 6 HRS. WILL

CABLE DETAILS OF LOCAL INFORMAL TRAINING RESULTS.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

fb

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ COPY ☐ DUM

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM PHENIX

ACTION SOD 6

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT SOD TIME 1550 BY

INFO RR. FILE DDP, WH/C 8, ACG, CI/OA, OPSER, OT

S E C R E T 152010Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE (FOR LORENTZ) CITE PNIX 2609 (THETFORD ACTG)

15 APR 65 IN 46081

CHAPPIE IUPAGAN PBRUMEN WITHRUSH

1. MR ANTONIO SOTO VAZQUEZ COMPLETED TRAINING 15 APRIL. WILL DEPART ALBUQUERQUE 1245L 16 APRIL, CONTINENTAL FLT 274. ARRIVE MIAMI VIA DALLAS 2204L 16 APRIL, EASTERN FLT 207.

2. DETAILED TRAINING REPORT WILL FOLLOW.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File

SOTO (VAZQUEZ), Antonio
#242 369

15 June 1965

On 14 June 1965, files of Headquarters, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force, were reviewed in the name of Antonio SOTO (VAZQUEZ), born 20 August 1934 at Marianas, Habana, Cuba, and reflected that OSI conducted a lie detector examination (File #72-90) on SUBJECT on 21 May 1963.

During the course of this examination, the SUBJECT reacted to basic questions concerning homosexuality, and as a result of this reaction, a re-examination was conducted during the morning of 12 June 1963 at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The initial examination was predicated in that SUBJECT was a former member of 2506th Cuban Brigade and was being processed for consideration for appointment as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force.

Prior to re-examination, SUBJECT made an initial statement, the substance of which is as follows:

> SUBJECT indicated he resided at 859 Second Avenue, 474, Santa Fe Beach, Banta, Cuba, from 1948 to 1959. He entered the Cuban Air Force as an Aviation Cadet in March 1953 and in August 1953, he began aviation training, which continued until August 1954. In August 1954, he was sent to the United States where he attended pilot training school until August 1955, at which time he graduated and was given a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Cuban Air Force. During these periods of time, at various unrecalled intervals, SUBJECT stated he would return to his home at Santa Fe Beach. His homosexual acts at Santa Fe Beach occurred during 1949. This homosexual activity consisted of not more than five acts of anal sodomy. SUBJECT stated that he was the active or male partner in these acts. The passive partner was another Cuban boy who lived nearby. SUBJECT could not recall the name of the passive participant. During 1960, while at Managua, Nicaragua, as a Counter-Revolutionist preparing for invasion of Cuba, he became acquainted with a Cuban Catholic priest who was also a revolutionist. SUBJECT further stated that while attending a theatre, this priest made homosexual advances toward SUBJECT, which culminated in the SUBJECT being masturbated by the priest. Approximately one week later, after his

#242 369

group arrived in Costa Rica, the SUBJECT performed an act of anal sodomy upon the person of the priest. The SUBJECT declined to disclose the identity of the priest; however, he stated that if it was determined that the disclosure of the name was essential for a prerequisite to his acceptance into the United States Air Force, he would make such a disclosure.

A lie detector examination, consisting of three parts, was given SUBJECT by a representative of the Office of Special Investigations on 12 June 1963. The second test was in the nature of a control test to determine whether or not the examinee was physically and mentally capable of giving a specific reaction. The results indicated that the examinee was capable of giving a valid reaction. Test number one and test number three consisted of relevant, irrelevant and guilt complex type questions, co-mingled in such a manner as to give the SUBJECT relief between relevant questions. The following are the relevant questions asked during the examination, and the answers as given by the SUBJECT:

TEST #1

Question A: Prior to 1961, did you engage in homosexual acts?

Answer: Yes.

Question B: Since your homosexual acts during 1960 in Costa Rica, have you engaged in any other homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question C: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question D: Have you ever engaged in oral copulation, either as active or passive partner?

Answer: No.

#242 369

TEST #3

Question A: Prior to 1961, did you engage in homosexual acts?

Answer: Yes.

Question B: Since your homosexual acts during 1960 in Costa Rica, have you engaged in any other homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question C: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in homosexual acts?

Answer: No.

Question D: Since you have been at Maxwell Air Force Base, have there been any incidents involving homosexuality which you did not tell me about?

Answer: No.

Question E: At any time in the U.S., including the time you were going to flying training school, and later here at Maxwell Air Force Base, have you engaged in any homosexual activity?

Answer: No.

After a careful analysis of the charts pertaining to this examination, the examiner gave the opinion that the SUBJECT was untruthful in his answers Questions B and C, Test #1, and Questions B, C, D and E, Test #2, and that SUBJECT was truthful in answers to Questions A and B, Test #1, and to Question A, Test #2.

Subsequent to the examination, the SUBJECT was re-interrogated concerning his reactions during the above tests. The SUBJECT maintained that he was truthful in his answers. The SUBJECT executed a sworn,

#242 269

signed statement setting forth the information disclosed during the pre-test interrogation, and this information is given in substance above.

OSI Headquarter's files contain a letter dated 14 June 1963, which is a report of the Record of Action of the Military Personnel Security Committee in the case of SUBJECT. The body of this letter is given in the following two paragraphs:

> "1. Pursuant to paragraph 9, Air Force Regulation 35-62, the Military Personnel Security Committee reviewed all the available records relating to the above member of the 2506th Cuban Brigade. Due to the following factors, it is concluded that appointment of the individual is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security:
>
> > SUBJECT admitted homosexual activity to age twenty-six, and additional acts thereafter indicated by result of polygraph examination.
>
> "2. Accordingly, it is recommended that the individual be rejected for military service with the United States Air Force because of questionable moral character."

OSI Headquarter's Investigative Files contain no further pertinent information relating to SUBJECT.

JHM/del

RYBAT
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965

Subject: Iden A

Subject was interviewed and tested on 28 April 1965 at a safe site in the Miami area at the request of Edward W. LORENTZ. The interview was conducted in English.

RESULTS

Subject has never taken part in any communist activity and he has never worked for any Castro intelligence or security service. Apart from PBPRIME he has no connection or agreement with the government of any other country.

Unless otherwise noted below Subject is not obligated to any Cuban exile group.

Subject has been essentially truthful in regard to his personal history and he does not feel he is liable to blackmail for any reason. Subject has never been involved in the use or sale of narcotics.

DETAILS

Subject is being recruited for use with WITHRUSH. He has served there before. Like all of the men in the group who have been in the Iden B, Subject assumes that the operation is sponsored by KUBARK.

Subject joined AMWORLD but was never called to go to the training camps.

In connection with blackmail, Subject mentioned that his father is in jail in Cuba. To date no attempts have been made by the Castro government to put any pressure on Subject.

Keith D. VINETT

RYBAT
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RYBAT
SECRET

72514
28 April 1965
IDENS

Iden A	Antonio SOTO Vazquez DPOB: 20 August 1934 Marianao, Habana, Cuba	201- 294544
Iden B	Congo.	

MAY 25 9 13 AM '65

File

RYBAT
SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
BOD/AB/CPS-3 - Larry Murphy

NUMBER
201-294544

SUBJECT
SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated
7 April 1965 pro

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

This will confirm oral granting of the POA.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	21 MAY 1965

(9)

SECRET

FORM 1-64 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SOD 5-646
21 MAY 1965

SECRET

201 294 344

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : Antonio SOTO Vazquez

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Attached to the referenced memorandum was a list of eight documents concerning the Subject, with a request that SOD/AB/OPS/3 comment on their significance as they might affect the granting of a POA to the Subject.

2. Six of the eight documents were found to be insignificant. Two of the documents were not found. Attached is a memorandum from Chief, RID/FI stating that the two documents could not be found.

3. The Subject has been a WITHRUSH pilot in the past. He was granted a POA on 9 March 1961, and again on 29 October 1962. It is requested that he be again granted a POA in accordance with Form 772 submitted to Chief, CI/OA on 7 April 1965.

Lawrence Murphy

Lawrence Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

A

20 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

ATTN: George Ball

VIA: Chief, RID/RB

SUBJECT: DBA-48364, dated 8 August 1963
DBA-23559, dated 6 October 1962

A thorough and systematic search for the above documents began on 7 May 1965 and they could not be located. On 18 May 1965 an extensive and repetitive search was conducted to no avail.

Raymond V. Utterback
RAYMOND V. UTTERBACK
Chief, RID/FI

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

SOD [illegible]

11 MAY 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : Mr. George Ball

SUBJECT : SOTO Vazquez, Antonio 201-294544

REFERENCE : Chief, CI/OA Memorandum of 4 May 1965

1. Your referenced memorandum requested SOD/AB comments concerning eight reports which mentioned the Subject. Two of the reports were located, both of which contained no derogatory information concerning the Subject.

2. The remaining six documents were placed on "locate" with RI; however, insofar as all six were written prior to the Subject's recent six-month tour with KUBARK in the Congo (Nov 1963 to May 1964), during which he performed in a highly satisfactory manner, it is requested that a POA be granted the Subject.

File
McKittle
[illegible]

Lawrence C. Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS/3

M/R [illegible] Murphy advised 2 more (Total 4 now located)
12 May [illegible] "locate" is not satisfactory in
He was informed -
view of 1963 submission - require RID document
lost + unable to locate or S.B. will be required
to wait until they are located. If [illegible] "Congo" without
too late once subject is again in
a POA" backed up by confirmed results.

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE
4 May 1965 pro

C NO.
201-294544

SUBJECT:
EU10 Vasquez, Antonio

TO:
SOD/AB/OPS-3 - Larry Murphy

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

		☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	XX	OTHERS (See Remarks)
☐	GREEN LIST		

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

Please advise CI/OA of nature and significance.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SECRET

FORM 6-60 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST
☐ POA ☐ OA ☐ CHC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
Pilot [illegible]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI
DIVISION
FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ, PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO. ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

DATE 20 APR 1965

TO : Chief, CI/OA
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☒ 1. OS Indices results: #242369 - (NR) other than prior CI/OA interest 30 Oct 1962 C-90192.

☐ Report Attached

MAY 3 12 24 PM '65

for DDS/IOS
4/27/65

SECRET

FORM 3-64 693

(9)

3

SECRET

NON-OFFICIAL COVER CONCURRENCE

DATE	
TO BE COMPLETED BY CI/OA ONLY	C OR 201 NO. [illegible]
SUBJECT'S NAME [illegible]	
DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Aug. 193[illegible]	PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP Cuban	U.S. RESIDENCE [illegible]
OVERSEAS RESIDENCE	
EMPLOYER [illegible]	PROJECT
ROOM NO.	EXTENSION [illegible]
DIVISION OR STAFF [illegible]	CASE OFFICER [illegible]
PROPOSED USE [illegible]	
TO BE COMPLETED BY CCS ONLY	CCS FILE NO. [illegible]
CCS/NC CASE OFFICER (Extension 5144)	

Central Cover Staff concurs in your proposal to use subject for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon CCS to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise CCS/NC promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated. The pseudonym assigned subject should be provided CCS/NC at the time notification of activation is forwarded. If notification of activation is not received in CCS/NC one year from above date it will be assumed proposed use did not materialize.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject or his employer is in CCS/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCS/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

☐ If check mark appears here the proposed use of subject requires DDP approval under CSI 240-6, para. 5. Please review CSI 240-6 and initiate action as appropriate.

(FULL TITLE OF OFFICER)

DISTRIBUTION: 1-CCS, 1-CI/OA, 1-AREA DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 3-64 2214

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 13 April 65

CASE NO. 201- 90192

☑ SET UP FOR POA

☑ SET UP FOR OA

☑ EXPEDITE INDICES

☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY

DATE: 20 April

☐ COVERT NAME CHECK

☑ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES

DATE: 27 April

AREA: Congo

USE: Pilot WITHKUSH

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ ACFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	TICKLE
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______ PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

M/R Note: Subject already been to the Congo + ~~returned~~ - second tour per PHS. NO PRIOR POA/OA for this assignment

Ball
SIGNATURE ☐ OVER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 April 1965

TO:	X	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
		CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
		CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Larry Murphy
SOD/AB/OPS3
2 D 55

PROJECT: WITHRUSH

SUBJECT: (True name) SOTO Vasquez, Antonio

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES

CI/OA FILE NO. C-70193

RI 201 FILE NO. 294544

SO FILE NO.

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

Africa, Congo, Leopoldville

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Pilot

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. NONE

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO. 167208

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD	X	NON-DEROGATORY WH		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
X	NO DEROGATORY INFO. WAVE		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: L. Murphy
Larry Murphy

EXTENSION: 4475

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: Bernard J. Finan, Jr.

SECRET

FORM 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

87

PIN RECENT PHOTO HERE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

REF. # A-11 2-3 1[illegible]

NAME: Soto Antonio
LAST FIRST MIDDLE

☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE

PHONE NUMBER: [illegible]
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

PRESENT ADDRESS: 379 E. 64th St., Hialeah, Fla.
STREET CITY STATE

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 379 E. 64th St.

MARITAL STATUS
☐ SINGLE
☐ MARRIED
☐ ENGAGED
☐ WIDOWED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ SEPARATED

DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): [illegible]/20/1934
PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY, COUNTRY): [illegible], Habana, Cuba

WEIGHT: [illegible] COLOR OF HAIR: [illegible]
HEIGHT: [illegible] COLOR OF EYES: [illegible]
COMPLEXION: [illegible]
DESCRIBE ANY SPECIAL OR OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OR IDENTIFYING MARKS:

PASSPORT PARTICULARS: ISSUING AUTHORITY
PLACE OF ISSUE
PASSPORT NO.
DATE OF ISSUE
KIND OF PASSPORT
VALIDITY PERIOD [illegible]

CITIZEN OF U.S.A. YES ☐ NO ☒
NATURALIZED:
DATE:
NATIONALITY: Cubano
HAS YOUR PASSPORT EVER BEEN CANCELLED? YES NO. IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS

EDUCATION	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	DATES ATTENDED	GRADUATE DEGREES	MAJOR SUBJECTS
HIGH SCHOOL	[illegible], Cuba	Four years	[illegible]	
COLLEGE				

TRADE, BUSINESS OR CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL, STATE WITH DATES: [illegible] Commercial Correspondence School

SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL STUDY OR AREAS OF [illegible]: Pilot
VOCATIONAL OR [illegible] LICENSE, CERT. [illegible]

WHAT FOREIGN LANGUAGES DO YOU SPEAK FLUENTLY? Spanish - French READ Both WRITE Spanish

U.S. MILITARY SERVICE (BRANCH) FROM: / TO:
TYPE OF DISCHARGE:
RANK:
PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN NATIONAL GUARD OR RESERVES

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS (CIVIC, ATHLETIC, FRATERNAL, ETC.)

PREVIOUS ADDRESSES DURING PAST TEN YEARS

DATES FROM	TO	STREET	CITY/STATE	COUNTRY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] Beach	[illegible]
		[illegible]	Miami, Fla	U.S.
		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
		[illegible]	[illegible], Fla	U.S.A.
		379 E. 64th St.		

[illegible] (INCLUDE PRIOR AND PRESENT MARRIAGES) - CHILDREN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION
[illegible] Soto	[illegible]	[illegible] Hialeah, Fla.	[illegible]
[illegible] Soto	/ / 5[illegible]		

[illegible] every position which you have held since you first began to work, including [illegible] [illegible] which you held. Account for any periods of unemployment [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR.
FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.
TO PRESENT TIME
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
FROM
TO
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION
SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ [illegible] PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
FROM
TO
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? NO YES ☐
IF ANSWER IS "YES" GIVE FULL DETAILS.

HAVE YOU NOW OR EVER HAD ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL DEFECTS OR DISABILITIES WHATSOEVER? NO YES ☐
GIVE FULL DETAILS.

HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED OR DETAINED BY ANY POLICE OR MILITARY AUTHORITY? IF SO NAME THE ARRESTING AUTHORITY, GIVE TIME, PLACE AND REASON FOR SUCH ARREST OR DETENTION, AND THE DISPOSITION OR COURT ACTION. NO YES ☐

JOB APPLIED FOR [illegible] MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE SALARY $ [illegible] PER YR.

REFERENCES: [illegible] PERSONS, NOT RELATED TO YOU BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, WHO ARE PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED TO SUPPLY [illegible] REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER AND ABILITY. DO NOT GIVE NAMES OF SUPERVISORS LISTED ABOVE.
ADDRESS OCCUPATION

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH
FATHER'S NAME
PRESENT OCCUPATION
PRESENT NATIONALITY [illegible]
DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH
PRESENT OCCUPATION
PRESENT NATIONALITY [illegible]

[illegible] 7-5235

IF THE ABOVE SPACE IS NOT SUFFICIENT USE CONTINUATION SHEET.

I CERTIFY [illegible] statements contained in this application [illegible] misrepresentation or omission of facts [illegible] basis for dismissal.

3/18/58

Continuation Sheet—Employment

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Office Clerk
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ [illegible] / Month PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible] Managua
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Office Clerk
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]

E. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: May 1956 TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 300 / Month PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

F. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: [illegible]
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 300 / Month PER YR.
FINAL $ [illegible] PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT: [illegible]
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible]
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU: Pilot
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

G. DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (MONTH, YEAR) FROM: TO:
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:
SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER YR.
FINAL $ PER YR.
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYMENT:
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:
DUTIES PERFORMED BY YOU:
REASON FOR CHANGING EMPLOYMENT:

Continuation—Other

SUPPLEMENTARY PERSONAL INFORMATION

FLIGHT CREW

Name and Rank: CAPT Antonio Soto

I. General Flying Experience:

A. Military Flying: 2400 hrs

B. Airline: 400 hrs

C. [illegible] Congo [illegible] 600 hrs

II. Equipment Types and Flying Times	PILOT (IN HOURS)	CO-PILOT (IN HOURS)	OTHER CREW TITLE	OTHER CREW (IN HOURS)
A. C-46	[illegible]	[illegible]		
B. C-47	[illegible]	[illegible]		
C. DC-4/C-54	[illegible]	[illegible]		
D. DC-6	[illegible]	[illegible]		
E. DC-7	[illegible]	[illegible]		
F. Jet Transport (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
G. Amphibian (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
H. Flying Boat (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
I. Helicopter (By Type)	[illegible]	[illegible]		
J. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
K. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
L. [illegible]				
III. TOTAL FLYING TIME	[illegible]	[illegible]		
IV. Total Instrument Time — Sim	[illegible]			
IV. Total Instrument Time — Actual	[illegible]			
V. Total Night Time	[illegible]	[illegible]		
VI. Total Flying Time in Past Six Months		[illegible]		
VII. [illegible]				

VIII. Aviation Licenses & Ratings

	Type	Number	Ratings
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
E.			

IX. Selection of an applicant may well be influenced by the type and amount of ground and flight training received. To assist in evaluating your overall qualifications it is important that you endeavor to submit documentary evidence, in a thorough and detailed manner, of all training received during the past three year period. (This information may be submitted in the form of notarized statements, photostats, etc.)

X. Are you willing to be based at any station at the discretion of the Company? Yes ☑ No ☐

I understand that misrepresentation or omission of facts requested is cause for dismissal.

3/25/61
DATE

SIGNATURE

FILE NO. 201-242256

TC/KK 64S CS/OLD

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : T. COBB
UNIT : WH/III/CARIBBEAN
EXT : 2056
DATE : 13 JANUARY 1959

TO : SANTIAGO DE CUBA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : COP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/OPS, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated 19
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑
Signature:

ROUTING
1 ✓
2
3
4
5
6

PRECEDENCE
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
[✓ PRIORITY]
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JAN 13 23 30 z 59
REC'D CABLE SECT.

OUT61839
OUT 61839

TO SACU INFO. HAVA CITE DIR 08002 08002

REF SACU 337 (IN 44566) *

FBI

HQS TRACES INDICATE SUBJ REF HAS BEEN UNDER ODENVY INVESTIGATION POSSIBLE REGISTRATION ACT VIOLATIONS. BASE SHOULD DEAL WITH SUBJECT UNDER STRICT CONSULAR COVER AND NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WHICH MIGHT LATER BE CONSTRUED AS ODYOKE (us Govt.) APPROVAL HIS ACTIVITIES.

(END OF MESSAGE)

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED FRANK FIORINI OF NORFOLK, VA. WHO CLAIMED HE WAS CHIEF 26 JULY ARMS BUYER IN MIAMI. SUBJECT WILLING TO COOPERATE 100 PER CENT SUPPLYING INFO ON REBELS.

RI COPY

JC King
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/FI
COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

FORM 1389a REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

DBA 31665

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SECRET

Copy to: 1 - INS, Miami, Florida (A11 877 123)(RM)

Report of: EUGENE L. PAYNE
Office: Miami, Florida

Date: DEC 26 1962

Field Office File #: 105-6466
Bureau File #: 201-267043

Title: ① FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO

y filed

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Synopsis:

Subject, a Cuban refugee, entered the U. S. on 8/9/60, from Colombia. Subject defected from the CASTRO government while employed as Cuban Naval Attache in Caracas, Venezuela. Subject is a former graduate of the Cuban Naval Academy and in exile has been involved in considerable anti-CASTRO clandestine activity against Cuba. Subject has affiliated with various anti-CASTRO organizations in the Miami, Fla., area and in 11/62, was reported to be associated with an individual having contacts with a Guatemala government official.

- C -

DETAILS:

PREDICATION

Investigation in this matter was based upon information from MM T-1, another government agency which conducts security and intelligence-type investigations, who advised on August 8, 1962, that information had been received from a sub-source of unknown reliability, who advised as follows:

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

4

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FELIPE VIDAL, 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, an individual who formerly held a responsible position in the Cuban Navy, had accompanied an individual identified as JACK CANNON, a United States citizen, on an anti-CASTRO clandestine trip to Cuba between October 18 and 23, 1961, in which they were purportedly transporting $80,000.00 worth of arms. The boat operated by CANNON, who also uses the name JACK SHEA, and the subject was sunk along the North Coast of Cuba and the arms were lost.

Although CANNON was allegedly engaged in anti-CASTRO activities, MM T-1's sub-source pointed out that after dealing with him in business and learning about his background, he suspected that CANNON was actually involved in clandestine missions for the CASTRO regime with ramifications relating to criminal activity in the Miami area.

BACKGROUND

A. Residence

According to the records of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Miami, Florida, as made available on December 6, 1962, by CHARLES CHALLANDES, Investigator, subject resides at 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida.

B. Birth Data and Alien Status

On June 14, 1961, INS, Miami, Florida, made available to the Miami Office information relating to political refugees entering the United States since January 1, 1959. Included in this list was FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO, born February 3, 1926, at Havana, Cuba.

On December 6, 1962, Investigator CHALLANDES, mentioned above, made available their file Number A11 877 123 relating to the subject, which contained the following information:

VIDAL arrived in the United States on August 9, 1960, from Bogota, Colombia, and applied for a B-2 visa for four months to visit his refugee wife. He pointed out he was a Lieutenant in the Cuban Navy from 1944 to 1956. In 1958 he affiliated himself with FIDEL CASTRO and after January 1, 1959, he was appointed Chief of the Maritime Police by the CASTRO government. On October 16, 1959, he was appointed Naval Attache at Caracas, Venezuela. He defected on March 7, 1960, in Caracas because of the communist infiltration of the Cuban government.

On April 8, 1961, VIDAL applied for political asylum. VIDAL indicated that in the United States he would reside at 708 N. W. 23rd Street, Miami, Florida, and had in his possession a document identifying himself as the coordinator of the anti-CASTRO organization Movimiento de Liberacion Democratico Revolucionario.

On August 10, 1960, INS obtained a sworn signed statement from VIDAL in which he stated he was discharged from the Cuban Navy under the government of FULGENCIO BATISTA because of his opposition to BATISTA.

VIDAL indicated he never joined the July 26th revolutionary organization of FIDEL CASTRO, but was affiliated with all groups of the revolution. In October, 1957, VIDAL was co-ordinator of the Organizacion Accion Resistencia (The Clandestine Resistence Action Organization). He pointed out that in Havana, Cuba, he participated in dissemination of propaganda, sabotage, organized strikes, and meetings in jails, all on behalf of the CASTRO revolution.

VIDAL pointed out that in 1958 a pact was formed in Caracas naming MANUEL URRUTIA as President of the new government, but that CASTRO later usurped the presidency. After URRUTIA was overthrown, VIDAL became disenchanted and began to cooperate with anti-CASTRO organizations. He asked for foreign duty, and after noting continued CASTRO activities against the government of ROMULO BETANCOURT and the movement of Russian agents to Cuba, he removed his family from Cuba, went to Colombia, and defected.

VIDAL emphasized that he had never been a member of the Communist Party in Cuba.

On October 3, 1962, MM T-2, a Cuban refugee familiar with certain phases of anti-CASTRO activity in the Miami area and who has limited information regarding communist activities in Cuba, advised that captioned subject was personally known to him in Cuba, where he had the reputation of being an opportunist and extremely fond of drinking and carousing. He was a Captain in CASTRO's Navy in Cienfuegos, Cuba.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES SINCE DEFECTION FROM CASTRO REGIME

The December 7, 1960, issue of "La Prensa," a daily Spanish language newspaper published in New York, carried an article entitled, "Establish United Cuban Front in Miami." This article stated that the United Front of Liberation in the City of Miami was announced by members of the group, which included Commander FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO of the Movement of Democratic Revolutionary Liberation, among others.

On February 20, 1961, MM T-3, a Cuban familiar with certain Cuban activity in the Miami area, advised SANTIAGO VIDAL and another individual of an anti-CASTRO group are purchasing radio equipment.

On April 4, 1961, CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, advised an Agent of the FBI that a boat owned by FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO, former Cuban Naval Attache to Caracas, Venezuela, had been dispatched to the coast of Cuba. The boat had been gone approximately ten days and had not yet returned. PRIO advised the purpose of the trip was to bring out of Cuba a close friend of PRIO, identified as JULIO GARCERAN, former magistrate of the Supreme Court of Cuba. GARCERAN was to be brought to the South Florida area in VIDAL's boat.

The July 4, 1961, issue of the "Diario las Americas," a Spanish language newspaper published in Miami, carried an article entitled, "United Front for National Liberation,"

-ating in effect that the Constitution of 1940 would be restored by the liberating army and unify all the Cuban anti-communist forces. The article bore the signature of Commander FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO on behalf of the "Democratic Recovery of Cuba."

The April 27, 1962, issue of the "Miami Herald," a daily newspaper published in Miami, carried an article pertaining to the training of exiles in the Miami area. Subject, on behalf of the United Liberation Front, was listed as one of the participants in this training.

On May 25, 1962, MM T-1 advised that subject would in all probability be included in the military commission of anti-CASTRO Cuban exiles which was being organized by Central American countries to cooperate in action against the CASTRO government.

On August 8, 1962, MM T-1, as previously indicated, advised that JACK CANNON, who claims he is engaged in anti-CASTRO activities and has made 43 clandestine trips to Cuba in various ships, transporting arms and documents and exfiltrating people, advised his ship was sank somewhere along the North Coast of Cuba, but was able to save himself in a small plastic boat with an outboard motor which was on board, and arrived in Cay Sals. He reportedly was accompanied on the trip by FELIPE VIDAL, 2293 N. W. 7th Street, Miami, Florida, who formerly held a responsible position in the Cuban Navy during the CASTRO regime. On this trip, CANNON said they were transporting $80,000.00 worth of arms and these were reportedly lost when the boat sank.

According to the source of MM T-1, JACK CANNON, who is a United States citizen and former CASTRO guerrillaman, is suspected of working for the Cuban government. He resides at 2020 N. E. 135th Street, North Miami, Florida, where he and his Cuban wife, MARIA SUAREZ, are tenants. The source of MM T-1 advised he had had some business relations with CANNON and upon obtaining some information about him, strongly suspects he is involved in some clandestine mission for the CASTRO regime, with ramifications of criminal offenses in Miami. He stated he suspects CANNON is the same man who was known in Cuba by the name of DUVAL and who was MORGAN's adjutant during the executions performed in Cuba.

w/ file D
201-242256

MM T-1 advised that on August 27, 1962, FRANK FIORINI, an individual active in anti-CASTRO activity, had indicated that he had participated in discussions for the previous three days with the subject and other members connected with the JULIO CARCERAN group. FIORINI had discussed participation in activity relating to the procurement of crews for a number of B-26 planes, and it was decided that candidates for these crews were not to be members of the anti-CASTRO Cuban Revolutionary Council.

According to MM T-1, the pilots recruited were to be sent to unnamed Central American bases and targets were to be Guantanamo Naval Base and the City of Santiago de Cuba, or some target in that general vicinity. No specific date was set for this operation, but FIORINI was given the date of August 31, 1962, as a time limit to find crews. FIORINI stated he had offered his services to VIDAL, but was told he could not participate.

On October 22, 1962, MM T-4, who has been involved in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past five years, advised that the subject was planning to depart that date for Cuba on a military mission. According to MM T-4, VIDAL was accompanied by the American adventurer ROY HARGRAVES. VIDAL allegedly has 15 men in his group and recently visited New York.

On November 19, 1962, MM T-4 advised that VIDAL's friend, ROY HARGRAVES, is a friend of JOHN BONILLA, Consul General of Guatemala, and that both are mutual friends of an old Nicaraguan revolutionist. This Nicaraguan recently hired HARGRAVES to place a fire bomb in an unidentified boat. He is reported to have stated that the Nicaraguan government did not want to sponsor any action against CASTRO, but would confer with BONILLA, who has knowledge of the establishment of an Inter-American Brigade.

On October 29, 1962, MM T-4 advised that the subject was planning a mission to Cuba. The subject recently returned from Cuba, where he claimed to have been on a mission. VIDAL is reported to have said that when they were 35 miles off the Cuban coast, his boat was followed by a Cuban gunboat, and that when they were ten miles off the coast, another gunboat joined in the surveillance. At this point VIDAL returned to Miami. He was reportedly using a borrowed boat and the purpose of the mission was to drop an agent in the Matanzas Province of Cuba.

On November 13, 1962, MM T-4 advised that approximately three weeks previously the subject had departed from Vaca Key, Marathon, Florida, in a private boat on a trip to Cuba.

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

The following is a physical description of the subject:

Name	FELIPE VIDAL SANTIAGO
Alias	Felipe Vidal
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of Birth	February 3, 1926
Place of Birth	Havana, Cuba
Address	2293 N. W. 7th Street Miami, Florida
Height	6'
Build	Slender
Hair	Brown, receding
Peculiarities	Wears mustache
Occupation	Cuban Naval Officer
Marital Status	Married
Wife	RAQUEL GONZALEZ FEAL
Father	HONORATO VIDAL MADRAZO
Mother	MARIA DEL CARMEN SANTIAGO ALVAREZ
Fingerprint Classification	PS 19 L 17 W MIII II S 1 U OCO
Cuban Passport No.	01432
Alien Number	A11 877 523

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING
ACTION
XX MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARDON-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Paragraph 10
REFERENCES: A. WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
D. DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
E. UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964

1. INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review of the nature of its relationship with AMCARDON-2. This review indicates that the relationship with AMCARDON-2 evolved from that action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARDON-2 stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain. As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established with AMCARDON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3, which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to

(CONTINUED)

Attachments: USC
A - Five Newspaper Clippings
B - Identities

Distribution:
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.

DATE TYPED: 19 March 64
DATE DISPATCHED: APR 2 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-14781

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

1 - RI Chrono
1 - 201 file (O/COS)
1 - COS Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
COS	Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp		251

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
ESEC		DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
S/JMWAVE	30/3	ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40) MAR 31 1964

December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3 was handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2 made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1 in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2 hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on 12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1 When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2 reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN. In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations. As a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention. AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2 made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1 should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3. In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and remedial action on the matter was not taken by REUTEMAN within a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3, REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1 and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could expect to obtain any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories. AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the period December 1962 to March 1964.

3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk, and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment which entailed covering major political developments in Florida. At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the Identity 3. Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant

promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long-term potential.

4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-1's sources include the following persons:

a. Luis *FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general of the DRE.

b. Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.

c. Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times.

d. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)

e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-010245), leader of the AAA

f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.

g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and adventurer.

h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.

i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.

j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of the Dominican Republic.

k. Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.

l. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of USIA in Miami. AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information.

5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances, AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:

a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive, thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.

b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group. In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba. In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.

6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:

a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARBON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.

b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was

thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research.

c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1 was telling the press.

e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their operational activities.

f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1 informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warning, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.

g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no real operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscore the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.

h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating

United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARDON-1 that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMCARDON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.

7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARDON-1 has been used successfully, during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press. Examples of how AMCARDON-1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below:

a. AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo. The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARDON-1 was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARDON-1 wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article in the series received front page headline play. The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets. AMCARDON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America. The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963.

b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964, JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them. It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was given to AMCARDON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

c. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARDON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARDON-1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3.

(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through c above are attached for Headquarters information.)

8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARDON-1 during the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally unsuccessful, in that AMCARDON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing in the overt press. As a result, AMCARDON-1 is usually not aware of inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence. As a matter of fact, AMCARDON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political scene. It is believed that AMCARDON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for the collection of positive intelligence.

9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARDON-1 has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and who understands the need for security. Our relationship also indicates that AMCARDON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this, JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARDON-1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our relationship with AMCARDON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relationship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have difficulties with the media outlets in the South Florida area. As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARDON-1, a special activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.

10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARDON-1 and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER Separate Cover Attachment B to UFGA-14781

Identities - 1 - The Miami News

2 - Sunland Training Center for Retarded Children

3 - The Miami Herald

4 - Latin American Editor

5 - The LEDA

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - Chief, SAS
1 - RI Chrono
1 - AMCARBON-1 201
1 - COS Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Leo CHERNE

MASTROCOLA, Bruce G. consolidated
file #21

SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION

C[illegible]T PERSONNEL

C[illegible]F PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO SE-US HQS

14-00000

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: T. Cobb

DIVISION: WH/III/Carib

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056

DATE: 1 June 59

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Bruce G. MASTROCOLA

2. PROJECT: Headquarters Support

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 9-3500-10-200

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)
His business firm furnished cover for a CIA agent.
Personal friend and confidant of DCI

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): PCA C-11118, 28 May 59

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☒ NO

13. AGE: 46

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 8 September 1912

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): New York, N.Y.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): New York, N.Y.

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP:
wife 1
daughter 1
2
(no others known)

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: Not Known

21. VETERAN: Not Known

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. RANK OR GRADE

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

or any fraction of a day

27. BASIC SALARY: $50.00 per day (not to exceed $265 per wk.)

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: WAE

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): Natural

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY ☒ YES ☐ NO

1096

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: NA

32. POST: NA

33. OTHER: NA

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): NA

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER: Operational Expenses ~~Representation allowance~~

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM NO. 204 REPLACES FORMS 204 AND 204a, 1 SEP 55

SECRET

(4)

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: T. Cobb
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2056
DIVISION: WH/III/Carib
DATE: 1 June 59

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R.15-230 or successor regulations.)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ 1 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5 June 59

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP; other)
PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

High level contacts with Cuban Government officials for political action purposes (subsidiary FI-type reporting also expected from Subject).

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Eminent authority on government, business, taxes, foreign trade.
High-level contacts in Cuban Government.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): Unknown
☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency): Unknown

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Frequent travel into target area.

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Executive secretary of a research institute (current employment)
Member of International Rescue Committee

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF DIVISION OFFICER	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICER
	Robert N Dahlgren R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III		F. E. ARNESON, C/WH/Support

SECRET

Mr. Bruce C. Mastrocola

Dear Mr. Mastrocola:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be paid a fee of $50 for any day or fraction thereof during which you are utilized under this agreement, not to exceed $265 per week. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. No taxes will be withheld therefrom, but it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. An appropriate Form 1099 will be furnished by the Government in furtherance of its tax reporting requirement.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your domestic permanent post of assignment. Payment and accounting for such expenses will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

5. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Term. This contract is effective as of 5 June 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Bruce G. Mastrocola

WITNESS: ________________________

APPROVED:

____

DHL/ed - 4 June 59
WH/CP/Support
C.A.
C.O. Jim Cobb x 2256

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CHRIST, DAVID L.
OPP

INCLUSIVE DATES: 23 Aug 1950 — 19 Feb 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

CHRIST, DAVID . TERMINATED: [illegible]

CIA RESUME - DAVID L. CHRIST

October 1950 - January 1958

Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Branch.

Recruitment, development and supervision of up to 20 professionals - electronic engineers and physicists - in research, development and engineering.

Technical areas covered - electronics, acoustics, optics, electro-optics, magnetics, electromagnetics, solid-state physics.

Typical Programs: (Communications, etc.) RF systems, microphones, recorders, transmitters, receivers, amplifiers, control systems, signal processing and enhancement, radar systems, audio and video circuitry and devices.

January 1958 - August 1963

Chief, Technical Applications Group.

Supervised 30 engineers and technicians.

Engineered, produced, tested and evaluated components, devices and systems such as listed above. Developed administrative, logistics, supply and training programs, and reliability procedures and programs to implement their effective application.

August 1963 - November 1970

Chief, Applied Physics Division

Recruited, developed and supervised professionals - scientists and engineers, GS-12 to GS-15, one SPS-4, in advanced R&D programs.

Primary emphases were on new advanced components, devices, systems and concepts for intelligence support activities. Basic orientation -- advanced systems concepts based on microtechnology.

Technical areas -- Microelectronics (particularly micropower), solid-state physics, acoustics, electro-optics, electromechanics, avionics, stability and control, navigation, communications (analogue and digital), radar systems.

Typical programs -- Solid-state components and devices; communication systems--audio, video, telemetry; sensors--acoustic, optical, nuclear, RF, etc.; avionic subsystems; data processing; power sources; electronic equipments, dc to microwave; antennas; systems study and analysis.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

21 December 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David L. Christ

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Science and Technology

THROUGH : Director of Research and Development

SUBJECT : Intelligence Medal of Merit

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3645. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you would not be available for such a ceremony.

/Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/ORD
2 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
1 - Sec't, HMAB
1 - Recorder, HMAB

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
70-5969

DATE
17 November 1970

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST, David L.			BIRTHYEAR 1918	SEX M	TYPE EMPLOYEE
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDS&T/ORD		SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE GS-16	STATION	

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD Nov 1950-Nov 1970

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. David L. Christ is hereby awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit in recognition of his outstanding career and his many contributions to the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency. His imaginative, innovative thinking and his tireless efforts, marked by a thorough knowledge of intelligence operations, have been instrumental in developing programs of significance. His devotion to superior standards of performance at home and abroad has been an inspiration to his colleagues and brings great credit upon him and the Federal Service.

(Recommendation originated by D/ORD on 2 November 1970)

REMARKS

APPROVED

/s/ Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

16 DEC 1970

DATE

SIGNATURE
/s/ Robert S. Wattles

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
ROBERT S. WATTLES

SIGNATURE
Signed Original

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-69 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

(4)

B9J# 27 NOV 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM				4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 30 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1262 2200 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 23
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS [illegible]				10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION [illegible]		
11. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH				12. POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION R	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11			16. GRADE AND STEP 16 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 32742	
18. REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

(+5)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 October 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Christ, David L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 30 | YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

E
44

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1262-2200

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): P.L. 88-643 Sect. 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DD/S&T
ORD
Applied Physics Div.

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Phys Scien-Res-CH (16)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 32,712 ✓ $31,857

18. REMARKS

Last working day: 30 November 1970

Carl Batchelder
DDS&T/Pers
30 Oct 70

cc: Payroll
Security

Recommended for the Reserve List per J.J. Connolly 11/4/70

1152 telecoord w/[illegible], ROB, 11/3/70.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: James J. Connolly
James J. Connolly, DD/ORD

DATE SIGNED: 23 Oct 70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Stephen L. Aldrich, M. D.

DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HOOTRS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 21 | DA. 20 | YR. 12

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

0, BJ, CO, 0, 0.

FOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 10-30-70 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Robert [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 30 Oct 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 October 1970

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, DAVID L.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 18 | YEAR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

E
HH

6 FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1262 2200

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DD/S&T/ORD

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS:

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 ROUTES CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO 6 | DA 30 | YR 18

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO | DA. | YR

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA. | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CRT RSV PROV TEMP; CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-16-70

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 16 Oct 70

FORM 3-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-1 7-70

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 April 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): Christ, David L.

4-25-67

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassign ment

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR): ASAP

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7262-1000

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

E 4

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DD/S&T
ORD
Applied Physics Division

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Phys Scien-Res-Ch

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 22,755

18 REMARKS

cc: Payroll

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Charles W. Sandman — DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 67

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert F. Zunzel — DATE SIGNED: 18 Apr 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HEQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
32	10	83370	ORD	25013		1	01	20	18						

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO / DA / YR) — 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE; CODE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO., DA., YR.) — EOD DATA — 33 SECURITY REQ NO — 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) — 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO, DA., YR.) — 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO., DA., YR.) — 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR RSRV PROV, TEMP; CODE) — 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS CODE) — 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42 LEAVE CAT CODE — 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) — 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 21 Apr 67

FORM 2-66 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

①

SECRET

ORD 4331-67 16

26 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Training Registrar

THROUGH : TO/ORD

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Contract Management Institute Course

1. I attended the Contract Management Institute on 28 to 31 March 1967. Immediately after that course I submitted extensive comments to Mr. Arthur Leach, DD/S&T coordinator for the course, and I understand that those comments were included in the overall recommendations for future changes.

2. Since three and one-half months have transpired since completion of that course, details such as the names of speakers and subject material are a bit hazy but I will repeat my overall reaction to it for whatever benefit it might afford. The course material was good although it could have been oriented much more toward technical project managers rather than administrative officers, to the ultimate benefit of DD/S&T. Two of the speakers were excellent; however, the third, who also was apparently Director of the Institute was very poor both with respect to his understanding of the material and his presentation. Dr. Kennedy of Notre Dame and the lawyer, whose name I do not recall, were excellent.

3. This was primarily a sales pitch for CPIF contracts. My personal impression was that U.S. Government contracting agencies have just about completed the circle of a great procurement fiasco. In departing from fixed-price and CPFF contracts to CPIF's with various award arrangements, the contract negotiators were unable to really ever define cost and ended up invariably in giving away additional fees to the contractors for nothing received. Definitive costs were always a function of experienced and sound

SECRET

Subject: Evaluation of Contract Management Institute Course

technical investigation and management of a contract and whenever costs followed a nonlinear curve, most estimates became almost completely unpredictable. NASA and the DoD generally have, therefore, gone from CPIF types to CPAF-type contracts; the CPAF type ends up being simply another CPFF but with the contractor having the advantage in the establishment of an award fee and with the Government having no recourse to redetermination. My reaction was simply that the DoD experience simply reaffirms my own -- that for R&D there appears to be no good substitute for a well-managed CPFF-type arrangement.

DAVID L. CHRIST
C/AP/ORD/DD/S&T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: David L. Christ

VIA : Chief, TSS

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 26 August 1958 , you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

Wendell E. Little
WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 September 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, David L. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment, Change of SD and Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 29 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: ✓ Regular

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF	
x	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4262-1000-1000 ✓

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
3 DD/S&T
Office of Research and Development
Analysis Division
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: IO Physical Scien

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 17,000 ✓

18. REMARKS

Personal Rank Assignment under the provisions of HR 21c(5) for a period not to exceed 18 months.

1 copy - Payroll Branch
1 copy - Office of Security

CONCUR: for CSCS
RW Shay
CSPD

Note: Per talk w/ Mr Olmstead 23 Sep 63. Mr Christ is knowledgeable ? and accepts change in SD to R.
B Bond

Security Approval Granted by Form. [illegible] 5/16/63

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Charles W. Sandman
Charles W. Sandman
DATE SIGNED: 19 Sept 63

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Jasper L. Olmstead
Jasper L. Olmstead
DATE SIGNED: 20 Sept 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	23400	ORD	75013		1	01 20 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 2 - FICA; 3 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/DESG PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERV. OF (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Security Concurrence from TSD
25 SEP 1963

46. O.P. APPROVAL: D. W. Bond for DD Pers
DATE APPROVED: 24 Sept 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, DAVID L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT & CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 22 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3125-1990-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Development Complement

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SCIENtist

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $17,000

18. REMARKS:

FROM: IAS Foreign Field Undetermined.

Career Svc. Sec P/A/C

cc: Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James R. Shields
JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMO

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 16

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46997 ALPHABETIC TS

22. STATION CODE: 75012

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. [illegible] CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 07 DA. 10 YR. 18

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:

46. O.P. APPROVAL: R. L. Bond J. - DPers

DATE APPROVED: 30 Apr 63

FORM 1152 9-61 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

F

DATE PREPARED: 21 November 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): SRB SPECIAL

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 25 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3176-1062-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED

11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0803

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $17,000

18. REMARKS:
This action taken in compliance with oral instructions from DDCI (Gen. Carter) to DDS (Col. White) on 21 Nov. 62

L K White

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: B DeFelice
B. DeFelice
AC/Benefits & Services Division

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
27	52	20994	145	99999		3	01 20 18		

28. DATE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 2 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. ANNUAL LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Emmett D Echols

DATE APPROVED: 21 Nov 1962

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITI AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER	059090
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	SRB SPECIAL
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF CAREER SERVICE Designation
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 7 DAY 1 YEAR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	SRB SPECIAL
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2165-1062-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	IAS FOREIGN FIELD SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE	GENERAL POSITION
12. POSITION NUMBER	803
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.	
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	UD
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LP, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1301.07
16. GRADE AND STEP	15 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 14,380
18. REMARKS	

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
John E. Bischoff
John E. Bischoff
Chief, Benefits and Services Division

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
Director of Personnel

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	52
21. OFFICE CODING	NUMERIC 29994 ALPHABETIC IAS
22. STATION CODE	99999
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HOURS CODE	3
25. DATE OF GRADE	MO. 61 DA. 20 YR. 18
26. DATE OF PAY	MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI	MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES	MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA	1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE	CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE	MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT CO	1 = YES 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA	FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	
46. O.P. APPROVAL	

52 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 Oct 1960

1. SERIAL NUMBER 59090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST, David L.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 02 | YEAR 60

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1125-1007-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/TSD
4 Technical Aids
Audio Support Branch
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL-SCIEN-CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 609

12A. PCR CONTROL NO.

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 03

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14,380

18. REMARKS

Recorded by
CSPD
10-5-60

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: James R. Shields
JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMBER [illegible]	ALP NUMERIC [illegible]	22. STATION CODE [illegible]	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. POSITION CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 06 30 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 06 29 58
28. NTE EXP. RES. MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 4 = NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA CODE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA		
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.: 06 25 61

33. SECURITY REQD. NO.

34. SEX

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
10-5-60
[illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

14-00000

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED
23 June 1958

1. Serial No. 159090	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST DAVID L	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 20 Yr. 18	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50
7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 13 Yr. 47	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50
13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 2					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 4448	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title PHY SCI CH	18. Position No. 0609	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1301.07

21. Grade & Step 14 6	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~11395~~ 12[illegible]	23. SD DT	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 28 Yr. 54	25. PSI Due Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	26. Appropriation Number 8 2507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. ~~07 13 58~~ ~~29 JUN 1958~~ 06 29 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4448	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step 15 2 ~~3~~	39. Salary Or Rate $ ~~12000~~ [illegible]	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade [illegible]	42. PSI Due [illegible]	43. Appropriation Number 9

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) JAMES K. SHIELDS Career Management Officer, TSS
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Dave Richards Ext. 3031	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	[illegible]	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	R. E. [illegible]	

Remarks

SECRET

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

Classify According To Content.

24 Feb 58

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

1. Serial No.
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): CHRIST, DAVID L.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 01 Da 20 Yr 18
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

8

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP TSS
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code

15. Location Of Official Station: WASHINGTON, D.C.

Station Code

16. Dept.- Field: Dept. - X, Unfld. - , Fran. - ; Code
17. Position Title: ELEC ENGR D CH
18. Position No.: 140
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0855.01
21. Grade & Step: 14 6
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 11,395
23. SD: DT
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-2509-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo Da Yr 9 MAR 1958
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

4

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP TSS
TECHNICAL AIDS
AUDIO SUPPORT DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code: 4448

32. Location Of Official Station

Station Code

33. Dept.- Field: Dept. - , Unfld. - , Fran. - ; Code
34. Position Title: PHYSICAL SCIEN CH
35. Position No.: 609 [illegible]
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1301.07
38. Grade & Step
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 55 Da 20 Yr 57
42. PSI Due: Mo [illegible] Da XX Yr XX
43. Appropriation Number: 8-2507-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): DAVE RICHARDS EXT 7111 2021

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): James R. Shields
JAMES R. SHIELDS CMO TSS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]		E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sheey [illegible]	4 MAR 1958

Remarks

DIVISION D CLEARANCE VERIFIED 25 NOV 57.

TWO COPIES THIS ACTION SENT TO SECURITY.

FORM 1152a
3-57

(4)

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.*

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. DAVID L. CHRIST
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1918
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Oct 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 4 Nov
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
PHY SCI ADM (D CH) BY 140	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	ELECTRONIC ENG (D CH) BY 140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535 per annum
DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O CHANGE

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Dave Richards Ext. 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	W.W.II	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER
	XX		XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DP

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-2509-10 TO: 7-2509-10
18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

SECRET

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	[illegible]
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY: per F. Bean, Jr. 16 Oct 56

14-673.9-2

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. Miss Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. DAVID L. CHRIST

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1918

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 Jul 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED

A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE

A. PROPOSED:

B. APPROVED: 29 Jul. 56

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
PHY SCI ADM(D CH) BY-140	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	PHY SCI ADM(D CH) BY-140
GS-1301.~~07~~14 .06 $10,535.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1301.~~07~~-14 .06 $10,535.00
DDP/TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
WASHINGTON, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	WASHINGTON, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): ~~[illegible]~~

7/0

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): DAVE RICHARDS X-3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD

Title: CMO/TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	✓		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	P.A.	REAL

SD: DP

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION

FROM

TO 7-2509-10

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

SECRET

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR P.A. CONTROL		7/25/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	GCO	7/26/56
E.		

F. APPROVED BY per [illegible] 23 July 56

PERSONN ACTION REQUEST

FOISTER NO.

NAME CIRIST, David L.	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE Cop ~~10~~ 24 November 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Resignation	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: 30 November 1951 EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

FROM	TO
TITLE Electronics Research Engineer, GS-11	
GRADE AND SALARY GS-11-1312-~~$5400.00~~ per annum. 5940.00	
OFFICE Policy Coordination	
DIVISION Staff II	
BRANCH AND SECTION Research & Development Branch	
OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D. C.	
DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

Transfer leave & UV Funds

#125

To accept other employment

RECOMMENDED:

10 November 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF, OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE

SIGNATURE

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123700

ALLOTMENT: 1913

C. S. C. AUTHORITY:

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
1-24-52	

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—02459-1

DOCA – Date of Current Appointment   P/R – Permanent Residence

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

AIR FORCE RESERVE ORDERS
NO. 98   EXTRACT   15 May 1951

* * *

69. Eff 11 Apr 51 SMOP 39 AFRC 74 co pertaining to
SMITH NEILSON H A0282987 COL P/R Apt 526 2800 Quebec St NW Wash,DC
CLARK ROBERT W A01647601 CPT P/R 22 34 Savannah Terrace SE Wash,DC
WILLIAMS OGDEN A0501923 CPT P/R 455 E 57th St New York 22 NY
CHRIST DAVID L A0877943 1 LT P/R Apt 2 5405 Hamilton St Rogers Heights
Hyattsville, Md
HUENSTER ROBERT W A01799172 1 LT P/R 65233 Clarendon Rd,Bethesda Md
REIFSNYDER DONALD D A0706901 1 LT P/R 1323 Queen St Pottstown, Pa
SPOEHEL EDWIN H JR A02079516 2 LT P/R 405 59th St West New York,NJ and
VANDER LINDEN WILBER A A01860542 2 LT P/R 19 Elm Ave Takoma Park,Md as reads: "asgd Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) (USAFR) 9463rd VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington,DC" is amnd to read: "asgd 9463rd VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington,DC".

* * *

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL HODGES:

J. A. BULGER
Colonel,USAF
Vice Commander

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Robert W. Kinney
ROBERT W. KINNEY

2 LT USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

A TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

John A. Owens
JOHN A. OWENS
1 LT USAF
Adj.

DOCA - Date of Current Appointment P/R - Permanent Residence

HEADQUARTERS
FIRST AIR FORCE
Mitchel Air Force Base, New York

AIR FORCE RESERVE ORDERS
NO. 74 EXTRACT 11 April 1951

* * *

39. SMITH NELSON H A0282987 COL (W) YOB 05 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 8-50 P/R Apt 526 2800 Quebec St NW Washington DC PSSN 2260 Dy SSN Unk DPG 8-50
CLARK ROBERT W A01647601 CPT (W) YOB 20 Aero Rating Unk Fly Status Unk DOCA 1-51 P/R 22 34 Savannah Terrace SE Washington DC PSSN Unk Dy SSN Unk DPG 1-51
WILLIAMS OGDEN A0501923 CPT (W) YOB 20 Acft Obsr (Nav) Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 455 E 57th St New York 22 NY PSSN 1034 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
CHRIST DAVID L A0377943 1LT (W) YOB 18 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 4-46 P/R Apt 2 5405 Hamilton St Rogers Heights Hyattsville Md PSSN 0224 Dy SSN Unk DPG 4-46
MUENSTER ROBERT W A01799172 1LT (W) YOB 15 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 2-46 P/R 65233 Clarendon Rd Bethesda Md PSSN 9307 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
REIFSNYDER DONALD D A0706901 1LT (W) YOB 21 Acft Obsr (Bmbdr) Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 1313 Queen St Pottstown Pa PSSN 1035 Dy SSN Unk DPG 9-44
SPOEREL EDWIN H JR A02079516 2LT (W) YOB 25 Acft Obsr (Nav) Fly Status Unk DOCA 2-46 P/R 408 59th St West New York NJ PSSN 1034 Dy SSN Unk DPG 12-44
VANDER LINDEN WALTER A A01860542 2LT (W) YOB 25 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 12-50 P/R 19 Elm Ave Takoma Park Md PSSN 0001 Dy SSN Unk DPG 12-50
Above offs reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) (USAFR) 9463d VART Sq 9110th VART Gp 403 10th St NW Washington DC EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

40. PETERSON SVEN R A0825966 2LT (W) YOB 21 Plt not-on-fly-status DOCA 11-45 P/R Math Department University of New Hampshire Durham NH PSSN 1051 Dy SSN Unk DPG 3-44
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY and atchmt to 9234th VART Sq 9051st VART Gp 3 Capitol St Concord NH asgd Flt "A" 9234th VART Sq 9051st VART Gp 3 Capitol St Concord NH EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

41. McLAUGHLIN EDWARD F A0728900 MAJ (W) YOB 18 Plt on-fly-status DOCA 12-48 P/R 16 Grandview St Huntington NY PSSN 1024 Dy SSN 1024 DPG 12-48
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9296th VART Sq 9068th VART Gp PO Bldg Huntington NY EDCSA 16 Apr 51.

42. RHEINFRANK GEORGE E A0376670 MAJ (W) YOB 16 Plt not-on-fly-status DOCA 7-46 P/R 228 E Front St Perrysburg Ohio PSSN 7050 Dy SSN Unk DPG 10-45
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Flt "D" 9522d VART Sq 9103d VART Gp Room 26 4th Floor Central Station Bldg Madison & St Clair Toledo Ohio EDCSA 18 Apr 51.

43. JAMES WILLIAM J A01237357 CPT (W) YOB 06 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 10-45 P/R 217 E Railroad St Nesquehoning Pa PSSN 9301 Dy SSN Unk DPG 5-45
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9543d VART Sq 9101st VART Gp 251 S Washington St Wilkes-Barre Pa EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

AFRO 74 EXTRACT (Contd) 11 April 1951

44. REIDY JOSEPH A A0706601 1LT (A) YOB 11 Plt Fly Status Unk DOCA 10-45 P/R 4710 S Lawndale Chicago 32 Ill PoSN 1055 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
Above off reld res asgmt Vol Tng Flt "A" (Int) 9463d VART Sq 9110th VART Gp Washington DC asgd Hq & Hq Sq 10AF (VRS) Selfridge AFB Mich EDCSA 19 Apr 51.

45. LEXAL GUS J A0743981 1LT (A) YOB 16 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 3-46 P/R 522 Breaux Bridge Ave Lafayette La PSSN 4110 Dy SSN Unk DPG 6-44
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd Hq & Hq Sq 14AF (VRS) Robins AFB Ga EDCSA 19 Apr 51.

46. G[illegible]N FREDERICK D JR A0565434 CPT (A) YOB 17 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 1-46 P/R 121 Winsor Ave Watertown Mass PSSN 2260, Dy SSN Unk DPG 1-46
Above off reld res asgmt 9229th VART Sq 9054th VART Gp asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

47. MARTORANA JOSEPH F A0659067 CPT (A) YOB 20 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 3-46 P/R 221 Bay Ridge Ave Brooklyn 20 NY PSSN 4822 Dy SSN Unk DPG Unk
Above off reld res asgmt 9217th VART Sq 9039th VART Gp 67 Broad St New York NY asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 16 Apr 51.

48. MORSE MURIEL AN751638 CPT (A) YOB 19 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 8-47 P/R Brewster Mass PSSN 3449 Dy SSN Unk DPG 8-47
Above off trfd ORC to VAR reld res asgmt 33d Med Gp 33d Ftr-Intcp Wg Otis AFB Falmouth Mass asgd Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY EDCSA 17 Apr 51. (Auth: AFR 45-5 16 Mar 49).

49. MALONEY JACK C A0569280 MAJ (A) YOB 10 non-rated not-on-fly-status DOCA 10-45 P/R 2 Corliss Terrace Wheeling W Va PSSN 4823 Dy SSN Unk DPG 11-46
Above off reld res asgmt Hq & Hq Sq 1AF (VRS) Mitchel AFB NY asgd 9489th VART Sq 9102d VART Gp 215 Wheeling Steel Bldg Wheeling W Va and designated Tng and Opns Off thereof EDCSA 17 Apr 51.

* * *

BY ORDER OF COLONEL DUIGAN:

OFFICIAL:

Robert W Kinney

ROBERT W. KINNEY
2LT, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

ROBERT W. KINNEY
2LT, USAF
Asst Air Adj Gen

PERSONNE. TION REQUEST

GISTER NUMBER 172

NAME DAVID L. CHRIST	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE ~~As soon as possible~~ 16 Nov 1950
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE: #3753

9 Nov. 1950 W

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Research Electronics Engineer GS-11
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-11 $5,000.00 $5400.00 ✓ CHS PK
OFFICE		Policy Coordination
DIVISION		Staff II
BRANCH AND SECTION		Research & Development Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS: 5-9 1312

Mr. Christ will occupy the GS-11 slot of Electronics Engineer in OPC/II/RD.

OK

Entire file on subject in SED's possession, including 57's & PNS's.
D.E.

RECOMMENDED:

23 August 1950
DATE

Deputy Chief, Staff II
SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED 7 Sept 50

CLEARANCE REQUESTED

DATE	TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED

DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C.S.C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
5889	—	8/4/50

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		✓	

DATE	SIGNATURE
1 Sept 50	9/5/50 CSS

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: $115900

ALLOTMENT: 821-101

CSC AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6-16 (E)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
11-21-50	M. P. Stephenson

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
8 Sept 50	

FORM NO. 37-3
NOV 1949

RESTRICTED

31 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: SED/SSS

SUBJECT: David L. Christ

II/RD was advised by Mr. Christ on 30 October that he has changed his address. He can now be reached at -

5405 Hamilton Street, N. E.
Apt. #2 - Elmar Gardens
Rodgers Heights, Maryland

Telephone: UNion 8236

Dailey

L. H. DAILEY
Deputy Chief
Research & Development

RESTRICTED

SECRET

I am aware of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency, by reason of the sensitive nature of its work, must observe very strict security measures. I agree to honor the requests of CIA relative to my application whether it be accepted or rejected. I agree not to inform anyone that I am being considered for a position in CIA. If questioned directly, I will say that I have applied for positions in various government agencies, and if pressed for an answer will acknowledge that CIA is one of them but will attach no particular significance to such application. I agree not to disclose personnel procedures I have observed in CIA. I agree not to discuss by name or otherwise, any individuals with whom I have talked in the course of my application to CIA.

Signed: David L. Christ

Date: Aug 23, 1950

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

23 Aug 1950

Name of Candidate CHRIST, D.L.

Position Considered for ________ Office ________ Interviewer ________

Personal Appearance	Dignified.....		Natural.....	x	Awkward.....	
	Well-groomed...	x	Clean		Slovenly....	
	Wide-Awake.....		Stolid......		Apathetic...	
	Impressive.....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive.....		Responsive..	x	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......	x	Excitable...	
	Cheerful.......		Tranquil ...		Dejected....	
	Straight-forward		Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........		Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	x	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (x) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes ( ) No ( )

Area Knowledge ________

Previous intelligence or related experience ELECTONIC ENGINEER

Salary level requested $ GS-10 Lowest salary acceptable $ GS-

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ________

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: OK WITH R+D AND THEY HAVE NEED FOR SAME.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: ________ Branch ________ Division ________

Location: ________

Salary level: ________

No 10-2
WANTS D.C.

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: ________

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 26-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

RESERVE STATUS INFORMATION

NAME: David L. Christ
RANK: 1st Lt.
SERIAL NUMBER: 0-877943
BRANCH OF SERVICE: Air Force -- AACS
ACTIVE OR INACTIVE RESERVE: Presume active
IF KNOWN, PRESENT LOCATION OF RECORDS: Hq. AACS, Washington D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

23 August 1950

Name of Candidate CHRIST, David L.

Position Considered for Electronics Engineer Office ________ Interviewer John M Jeffries

Personal Appearance	Dignified	Yes	Natural	Yes	Awkward	No
	Well-groomed	Yes	Clean	Yes	Slovenly	No
	Wide-Awake	Yes	Stolid	Yes	Apathetic	No
	Impressive	Yes	Ordinary	No	Insignificant	No
Personality	Persuasive	Yes	Responsive	Yes	Taciturn	No
	Imperturbable	Yes	Steady	Yes	Excitable	No
	Cheerful	Fairly	Tranquil	Yes	Dejected	No
	Straight-forward	Yes	Reserved	Yes	Evasive	No
	Modest	Yes	Complacent	No	Conceited	No
	Dominant	No	Confident	Yes	Submissive	No

Is education adequate? Yes (✓) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes (✓) No ( )

Area Knowledge Satisfactory Washington

Previous intelligence or related experience Cryptography and Commun Officer in Army

Salary level requested $5000 00 Lowest salary acceptable $5000 00

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons: ________

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: TRD needs Electronics Engineer immediately

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Electronics Engineer Branch TRDOPC Division ________

Location: Washington

Salary level: 5000 00

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: of value as Electrical Engr and in General Engineering

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

John M Jeffries
Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 38-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

2 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR : CLANDESTINE SERVICES CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SUBJECT : Mr. David L. CHRIST - Promotion

1. Mr. Christ, an electronics engineer, age 40, has been with the Technical Services Staff since his entrance on duty with the Agency in 1950. He received his B. E. E. from Pennsylvania State. He served as the Assistant Chief of the Applied Physics Division for approximately five years. In that capacity he demonstrated both a high technical competence and the ability to administer the many research programs initiated by the Applied Physics Division.

2. Mr. Christ was selected this past December to be the Chief of the Audio Support Division. It is believed that his technical ability and leadership will enhance the audio program in its world-wide activity. He is currently on an extended TDY in Europe and the Near East surveying audio needs and our capabilities to fulfill them.

WILLIS A. GIBBONS
Chief, DD/P/TSS

SECRET

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHY

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) SCD: 13 May 1947

1. PERS. SERIAL NO. 050020				
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST, David Lamar	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Jun 1918	5. [illegible] DATE 16 Nov 1950	
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. [illegible]	5	1921	150'53'57'53
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	SPOUSE NA			
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP Jul 1958	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST [illegible] Jun 1968	QUAL. FOR TDY Standby
QUAL. FOR TDY Standby				
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA
RELEASE TO [illegible]	TO BE [illegible]	RETIRED		
12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None		

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1937-42; 1946-48 Atlas Powder Co, Reynolds, Pa - Powder Helper (part-time)
1942-46 Military Service, USAAF, Pvt to 1st Lt - Communications Officer Crypto Sec (
1950 Penn State College Extension, Wilkes-Barre, Pa - Instr, Industrial Electronics & Electricity (9 mos)

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

1943 Radio Ops Mech Sch, USAF, Chicago, Ill - Radio Operator & Mechanics (4 mos)
1944 San Antonio, Tex - Aviation Cadet (Ground) Pre-Tech (4 mos)
1944 Yale Univ, New Haven, Conn - Communications (5 mos)
1945 Chanute Field, Ill - Cryptography (1 mo)
1946-50 Penn State College - BS, Electrical Engr, Electronics, Math

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - R Inter; W,P,U Slight; S,T None - Feb 1964 - discl Apr 1968
Spanish - R,U Elem; P,S Slight (Jun 1966) W Inter; T None - Feb 1964

18. AGENCY-SPONSORED TRAINING

1950 Staff Indoct; CS Rev
1950 Security Briefing
1951 CIA Orient
1953 Commo Orient & Refresher
1954 Tech Devices Famil
1960 Lock Picking
1963-64 Electr Engr/GWU
1963-64 MathEngrs&Physicists/GWU
1964 Conf for FedSci Exec/Brookings
1964 Sr Mgmt Sem
1967 Contr Mgmt Inc

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Nov 1962	" " 1301.07	16	UD	" " " " " " "	"
Apr 1963	" " 1301.07	16	D	DDP/CS Dev_Comp/TSD	Hq
Sep 1963	R.O. Phys Sci [illegible] 1301.02	16	R	ORD/[illegible] Div/CC	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

20. DATE REVIEWED 24 Jun 1970	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hms/	22. ITEMS [illegible] REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE 20 Nov 1969

FORM [illegible] (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET [illegible]

1950 - 1958 Material
1967 - 1970 Material

Orig. of Sanitized material

SECRET

SECRET

David L. CHRIST

SECRET

Documents dated prior to 1959 (Dec)
" " after 1965

Originals of sanitized documents

SECRET

David L. CHRIST

SECRET

73-39 B-11

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 February 74

FILE NO.: RC-12034

TO: (check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP	SS NUMBER 181-01-6133
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 059090
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) OER	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: Chief/OER Support Staff

REF: Verbal Request

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: CHRIST, David L.

UNIT: Department of Army (JOG)

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)
	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)
	EAA, CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE: From EOD
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
na	SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
na	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
X	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Subject will be acknowledged as CIA for the entire period of employment and is not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

NOTE: Subject retired Nov 1970

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRSCO
COPY 4 - OC-DO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

JLN:km

James A. Thrasher

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY 007622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 21 January 1964
TO (Check) ☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT , ORD, DD/S&T	ESTABLISHED FOR CHRIST, David L.
ATTN: Admin Staff	FILE NO. K-2077
REF: Form 1322 Requesting Cover, 27 Sept 1963	ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED US Army Element, Joint Operations Group	1452

☒ BLOCK RECORDS: OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY
(OPMEMO 20-800-12)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

X b.X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE EOD ____________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James H. Franklin

JAZ/sl CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS, 1-PSD/OS, 1-ADPD/COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (13-20,43)

SECRET

22 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : David L. Christ

1. Cover arrangements ~~are in process, and/or~~, have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~released~~ to deny ~~acknowledge~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an ~~oral~~ request of 12 Jan 1959 RA Leigh 1608 L Bldg X4571.

for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

1 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **David L. CHRIST**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective immediately, it is requested that your records be properly ([illegible]) (re-opened) to ([illegible]) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

[illegible]

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

cc: PSD/OS

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

SECRET

26 February 1958
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Personnel Security Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : Mr David L. Christ, CS-14

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject.

2. Effective 7 March 1958, it is requested that your records be properly (blocked) ~~(re-opened)~~ to (deny) ~~(confirm)~~ subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

~~3. This memorandum confirms an oral request.~~

Edward Q. Boston
for JOSEPH W. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

cc: PSD/CS

THIS ... REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

14-00000

BSJ 27 NOV 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 11 | 30 | 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1262 2200 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 23

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS&T/ORD APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYS SCIEN RES. CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: 32742

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. Employ Code: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. Hqtrs Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 | 20 | 1

26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)

27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0SJ0000

32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)

37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | REQ. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-1-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

059090 CHRIST DAVID L 82 140 V

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 16	7	$31,857	11/19/67	GS 16	8	$32,742	11/15/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ~~ABOVE NAMED~~ EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman DATE 9/21/70

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions.

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EOD: 21 OCT 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): HRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 11 YR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1262 2200 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible]

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE

12. POSITION NUMBER

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16

17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 Employ Code | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 Hdqtrs Code | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE; CODE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI (CODE; 1 WAIVER, 2 YES) | HEALTH INSURANCE (HEALTH INS CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-21-70

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

F=44

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

11CS 07/27/68

1 SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 01 68
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9267 2200 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS&T/OHD

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: PHYS SCIEN RES CH

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0088

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: R

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.11

16 GRADE AND STEP: 16

17 SALARY OR RATE:

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-6-68

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AH: 25 APRIL 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 04 25 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF		7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 7262 1000 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF			

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS&T ORD APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION R

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 22755

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 82340	ALPHABETIC ORD	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 20 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - LIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE | MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAN RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

D.ECHOLS

POSTED
4/24/67

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 250	V	GS 16 5	$22,331	$22,755

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 998	V	GS 16 4	$20,900	$21,653

H36

NOV 24 11 23 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	21653 ~~[illegible]~~	11/24/63	GS 16	5	22331 ~~[illegible]~~	11/21/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS Gcy AUDITED BY WH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 9-27-1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9 61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 11/06/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 01 YR 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6262 1000 0000
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS ODS&T/ORD AUDIO PHYSICS DIVISION			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH			12 POSITION NUMBER 0088	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION H	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.11		16 GRADE AND STEP 16	17. SALARY OR RATE	
18 REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION:

POSTED
dlb 11-8-65

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
1-63 MFG. 6-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4 51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 27 SEPT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): CHRIST DAVID L
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT, CHG OF SERVICE DESIGNATION AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 09 | 29 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4262 1000 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS & T
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ANALYSIS DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: IO PHYSICAL SCIEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: R
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 17000
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	82400	ORD	75013		1	01 20 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV / PROV / TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 2 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
27 SEP 1963

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

27 SEP 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2 Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
59090	CHRIST DAVID L	DDP/TS 4 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
S 15	3	$14,380	12/27/59	15	4	$14,705	06/25/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

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1. Serial No	2. Name	3 Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST, DAVID L	H 56 82 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-16	3	$17,000	11/25/63	GS-16	4	$17,500	11/24/63	X		

9 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS-- AUDITED BY:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE:

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RZP: 30 APR 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) CHRIST DAVID L

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 22 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3125 1990 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/TSD CS/CS DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHYSICAL SCIENTIST	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 15 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 17000

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	18	45997	TS	75013		1	01 20 18		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2 MAY 1963 - fws

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

2 MAY 1963 abw

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

(When Filled In)

14-00000

ABM: 23 NOV 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 059090	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) SRB SPECIAL		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 11 25 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT SRB SPECIAL	
6. FUNDS V TO V CF TO V X V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3176 1062 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS IAS FOREIGN FIELD SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION O S UNDETERMINED		
11. POSITION TITLE GENERAL POSITION	12. POSITION NUMBER 0803	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION UD	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1301.07	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 17000

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 52	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 29994	ALPHABETIC IAS	22. STATION CODE 99999	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 20 18	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR. 11 25 62	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 11 25 62
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

11/23/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1966 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR_ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR_ST	NEW SALARY
SRB SPECIAL	059090	29994	CF	15 4	$14705	15 4	$16005

ARE: 12 JULY 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ORF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 059090
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): SRB SPECIAL

4/14 5
61

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: SRB SPECIAL
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2165 1062 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
IAS
FOREIGN FIELD
SPECIAL DETAIL FOREIGN
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: OVERSEAS UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: GENERAL POSITION
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0803
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: UD
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1301.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14705
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 58
20. Employ Code: 52
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 29994 ALPHABETIC IAS
22. STATION CODE: 99999
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Nagtis Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 20 YR 18
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 37 MO. 07 DA. 01 YR 61

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL SERV CREDITED: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
MRW 07-12-61

E. D. ECHOLS

Form 6-60 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST DAVID L	DDP/TSS -4	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	2	$13,070	06	29	58	GS 15	3	$13,370	12	27	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP none

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

S E C R E T

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	159090	GS-14-6	$11,395	$12,555

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

S E C R E T

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DT	CHRIST DAVID L	159090	44 48	GS-15 3	$13,370	$14,380

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

27 JUNE 58 LVL

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 20 Yr. 18	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50
159090	CHRIST DAVID L				

7. SCD Mo. 05 Da. 13 Yr. 47	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 50	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Yes-1 No-2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4448	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title PHY SCI CH	18. Position No. 0609	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1301.07

21. Grade & Step 14 6	22. Salary Or Rate $12,555	23. SD DT	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 03 Da. 28 Yr. 54	25. PSI Due Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. XX	26. Appropriation Number 8 2507 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	06 29 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4448	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title PHY SCI CH	35. Position No. 0609	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1301.07

38. Grade & Step 15 2	39. Salary Or Rate $13,070	40. SD DT	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 06 Da. 29 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 27 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 2507 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
7-23-58

SECRET

mm 7/18/58

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 7 MARCH 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
159090	CHRIST DAVID L	01	20	18		1	M 1	11	16	50		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
05	13	47		1	50 USCA 403 J						11 16 50	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT APPLIED PHYSICS DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	ELEC ENGR D CH	0140	GS	0855.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
14 6	$11395	DT			8 2509 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	03 09 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS AUDIO SUPPORT DIV OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	4448	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	PHY SCI CH	0609	GS	1301.07

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 6	$ 11395	DT	03 28 54	XX XX XX	8 2507 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
13 [illegible]

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150 a E 3/12/58 SECRET (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST, DAVID	DDP/TSS 8	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR.
14	3	$10,750	03	24	57	14	6	$11,395	12	29	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

THIS ACTION IS USED IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN YOUR SALARY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 763, 83RD CONGRESS; UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR NO. 793, SUPPLEMENT NO. 33; AND OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM NO. 20-605-8.

G.M. STEWART

GORDON M. STEWART
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
159090	CHRIST DAVID L	DDP/TSS -8	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	2	$10,535	09	25	55	14	3	$10,750	03	~~25~~ 24	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
HENRY C. KNUTSON	Feb. 7, 1957	Henry C. Knutson

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER P1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONFIDENTIAL

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David L. Christ 159090	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 27 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Dec 1956 BCB	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronic Eng (D Ch) BY-140
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535.00 per annu
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				ED/DT

1

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-2709-10 BJ TO: 7-2509-20 750-13	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 11/16/50

[illegible]
2 1957

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

CONFIDENTIAL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-373047

RB 12/31/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

mjw

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) NR. DAVID L. CHRIST 559090	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 24 Oct 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 56	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 4 Nov 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronic Eng (D Ch) BY-140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0855.01-14 $10,535.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 445451	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 1	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/DP

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 7-2509-10 TO: Same 750-13	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

21. REMARKS:

3 MOD 11/16/50

POSTED
10/26/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. EMPLOYEE COPY

Ep 10/24/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (7 PART)
REV APRIL 1961
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. DAVID L. CHRIST 559090
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jan 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 26 July 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 29 Jul 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140	8. POSITION TITLE	Phy Sci Adm (D Ch) BY-140
GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1301.06-14 $10,535.00 per annum
DDP/TSS Research and Development Applied Physics Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 445452	DDP/TSS Research and Development Applied Physics Division Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 1	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-DT

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-2509-10 750-13 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

21. REMARKS:

3 EOD 11/16/50

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

1. ~~EMPLOYEE~~ COPY

[illegible] 7/31/56

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320090

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.
UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
CHRIST, DAVID L.

6. Grade and salary
GS-14 $10,320

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
TSS Tray 8

12. Prepared by
JAH 4 Aug 55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
25 Sep 55	28 Mar 54	$10,320	$10,535

18. ~~Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~
SERVICE AND CONDUCT
ARE SATISFACTORY Thomas O. C[illegible]
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

☐ No excess LWOP, Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

JLB Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

[illegible] 5/31/55

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.- Miss- Mrs - One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. DAVID L. CHRIST	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 18 May 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: MAY 22 1955

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY 140	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	PHYS SCI ADM (D CH) BY 140
GS-1301.06-14 $9600.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1301.~~07~~-14 ~~$9650~~.00 p/a Ca $10 320
DDP/TSS Applied Physics Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Research & Development Applied Physics Division
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

DUE TO NEW T/O

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
POSITION CONTROL X 4507

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD:DT

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 5-2523-10 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

JAB 27 Jul 55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

TD 4 WC
3/24/54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. David L. CHRIST	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan '12	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 18 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Promotion B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED: MAR -8 1954	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY 154-13	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	PHYS SCIENCE ADMIN BY 140
GS-1301-13 $8360	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1301-14 .06 [illegible] 10320
DDP/Technical Services Staff Applied Physics Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same
Washington D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

This action reassigns subject to the new TSS T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Signature and title)
Harold O. Jenkins, Acting Pers Off/TSS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Tom Clines 8305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [illegible]
Title: DD/P Admin 3/4/54

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	✓		✓		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-TS

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM 4-2523-10 TO 4-2523-10	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
55
10,320

POSTED
DL 23 Mar 54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DE	9 Mar	
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
Ralph L. [illegible]
23 MAR 1954

11—57139-3

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

1/28/53

NAME CHRIST, David L.		DATE 22 October 1952
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion		EFFECTIVE DATE JAN 18 1953
	FROM	TO
TITLE	PHYS SCIENCE ADM Y 101-12	PHYS SCIENCE ADM ~~Y 101~~ BY 154
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-1301-12 $7040	GS-1301-13 $8360
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	~~Research & Development~~
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics ~~Branch~~ DIVISION
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington D. C.	Washington D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS R. E. Bedford	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Byron C Sarvis BYRON C. SARVIS	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER 1-12 53 D. Mulealy	

	YES	NO
POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS	☐	☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ________

ENTERED ON DUTY ________

____

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

938/

NU. CORRIS

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION

(1) Staff or Division TSS (2) Date T/O Approved 7 Nov 52 (3) Effective date of Action 7 Dec 5[illegible]

	FROM				TO		
(4) NAME	(5) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NO Y	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NO BY
DIVISION - [illegible] Applied Physics Branch					APPLIED PHYSICS DIV.		
Driscoll, Walter G.	Phys Science Adm	GS-14	179	B	Phys Science Adm	GS-1301-14	153
Christ, David L	Phys Science Adm	GS-12	181	B	Phys Science Adm	GS-1301-12	154
St[illegible]os, Thom C.	Electrical Engr	GS-7	184	D	Physicist	GS-1310-7	157
[illegible]y, Geraldine	Secretary-Steno	GS-4	186	B	Secretary-Steno	GS-318-4	159
Technical Presentation Branch							
Creson, Pauline M. * Candidate in Process	Secretary-Steno	GS-3	188	C	ADMIN STAFF Secretary-Steno	GS-318-3	41 [illegible]

(12) APPROVED BY: W Muenzter
fa. Staff or Division Chief

(13) APPROVED BY:
Class. & Wage Div.

(14) APPROVED BY:
Personnel Division

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

14-00000

SECRET [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: CHRIST, David L.

DATE: 7 January 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Re-assignment and Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 February 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Electrical Engineer	Physical Science Administrator (Physicist)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $ 5940	GS-12 $ 7040
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	Research & Development
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RW Muenster ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION 9657 2/5/52	PERSONNEL OFFICER FEB 1952	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

From TSS Slot No. 177 to Slot No. 176.
Position description has been submitted.

1301

COPY TO PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

MODIFICATION OF POSITION ALIGNMENT IN TECHNICAL SERVICES STAFF TO CONFORM WITH NEW T/O APPROVED 18 APRIL 1952. NO CHANGE IN GRADE OR SALARY INVOLVED.
This form in lieu of 37-1.

FROM			TO	JUN 22 1952	"T"
Research and Development Division					
[illegible]TON, THORNTON J.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-9	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-9	174
[illegible]LYON, WILLIAM B.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-9	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-9	174.01
[illegible], EDWIN H.	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-7	MECHANICAL ENGINEER	GS-830-7	175
[illegible]LOUGHBY, ALTA G.	SECRETARY (STENO)	GS-5	SECRETARY (STENO)	GS-318-5	177
[illegible], LAURA L.	CLERK TYPIST	GS-3	CLERK TYPIST	GS-322-3	178
[illegible], PAUL H.	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-14	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-1301-14	179-14
[illegible]ST, DAVID L.	PHY. SCIENCE ADMIN. PHYS.	GS-12	PHYSICAL SCIENCE ADMIN.	GS-1301-12	181-12
[illegible], THOM. C.	ELECTRICAL ENGINEER	GS-7	ELECTRICAL ENGINEER	GS-850-7	184-7
[illegible]DS, ALFRED J.	INFO. EDIT. SPECIALIST	GS-12	INFO. SPECIALIST	GS-010-12	187

R W Muenster
Operating Office

Henry P. Gilbert
Classification & Wage Division

D Mulcahy
Personnel Office

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

mrc d FD - 18 Feb

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: CHRIST, David I.

DATE: 7 January 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Re-assignment and Promotion

EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 February 1952

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Electrical Engineer	Physical Science Administrator (Physicist)
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-11 $ 5940	GS-12 $ 7040
OFFICE	Technical Services Staff	Technical Services Staff
DIVISION	Research & Development	Research & Development
BRANCH	Applied Physics Branch	Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON ____________________

SECURITY CLEARED ON ____________________

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED ____________________

ENTERED ON DUTY ____________________

____
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

From TSS Slot No. 177, to Slot No. 176.

Position description has been submitted.

JMR

POSTED
JM 25 Feb

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME CHRIST, David L.	DATE NOV 20 1951
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	EFFECTIVE DATE 25 NOV 1951

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Electrical Engineer
GRADE AND SALARY		850-GS-11, $5940
OFFICE		Technical Services Staff
DIVISION		Research & Development Division
BRANCH		Applied Physics Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR Byron C. Sarvis BYRON C. SARVIS	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION D-6171 Thomas M. Fisher / Job	PERSONNEL OFFICER 25 ... 1951	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON NA

SECURITY CLEARED ON 11 December 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 25 November 51

See consulting 23 Nov 1951 WAOsborne

SOD - 03/29/50
SS-EOD - 11/10/50
LOD - 11/10/50

Pauline C. Brown
SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

8:55

TSS Slot No. 177. (Slot No. 4, Applied Physics Branch, Research & Development Division).

Transfer from Vouchered Funds

COPY TO PAYROLL FILES
CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS BRANCH

Tax info T-5 (W-4 form on file in Vouchered Fund Payroll)

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION (bar)

1. (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. David L. Christ
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Jun. 1918
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: 186
4. DATE: 24 Jan. 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Resignation*
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: COB 24 Nov. 51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Electronics Research Engineer	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-11-1312 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
Policy Coordination Staff II Research & Development Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	SA	REAL
		X	

Rt. #5609
C.C
8/4/50

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 2150900 TO 1913
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT: 320
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE Md.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

*To accept other employment.

Statement of accrued annual leave to your credit will be furnished with your final salary check.

L. V. MOLONEY
Personnel Division
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 11—50—699573

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER P1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

W-9 Nov. 1950
(afs)

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. David L. Christ	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan. 1918	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO. #3733	4. DATE 16 Nov. 1950

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Excepted Appointment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Nov. 1950	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Electronics Research Engineer, GS-11
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-11-1312-$5400.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Policy Coordination Staff II Research & Development Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL
		X	

Du. #5889
CSC
8/4/50

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 2115900 TO: 821-101	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) 16 Nov. 1950	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Md.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOS - 03/25/54
CSEd - 11/16/50
EOD - 11/16/50

5940

SERVICE DATES VERIFIED
BY [illegible] DATE 2/15/55

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

ROBERT S. WATTLES
~~[illegible]~~
22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
ASW TACTICAL SCHOOL

This is to certify that

MR. DAVID C. CHRISTIAN

has successfully completed the

ASW *Operations course* (J-2G-554)

on **14 May 1971.**

A. F. Blair
A. F. BLAIR
Commanding Officer/Director
U. S. Atlantic Fleet ASW
Tactical School
Norfolk, Va.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 32461
Date 3 JUN 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 059090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Christ, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD/AP	8. CURRENT STATION Hqtrs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1969 - 31 March 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program concepts.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops inter-division, inter-office, and inter-agency programs for producing fundamental technology and new intelligence system concepts.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Acquires, develops and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conduct senior level internal and external liaison	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	S

6 NOV 1970

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Nov 5

Mr. Christ continues to lead the Applied Physics Division in a progressive, responsive and aggressive manner. Some turbulence is occasionally generated by this vigorous leadership; however, the record of solid and potential accomplishments by his group continues to be impressive. On balance, his creative, forward-looking leadership ~~continues to~~ be a talent suited for the goals and missions of this Office.

The technological innovations established in his Division are continuing to lead to a variety of items of great potential value to the Intelligence Community. His aggressive search for and application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 4/24/70	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 78	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 APR 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Christ will be retiring 30 November 1970. Prior to 1970 he has generally been considered a capable officer and the list of his accomplishments during his Agency career is not unimpressive. Christ's performance, particularly in the last six months, however, has revealed critical weakness in judgment, discretion and self-evaluation. These flaws have been called to Christ's attention by me personally, and I deem them sufficiently serious that were it not for his proposed retirement I would be constrained to seek other means to separate him from Agency employment.

DATE 29 October 70	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Science and Technology	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett Carl E. Duckett

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Christ	(First) David	(Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD/AP	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1968 to 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, Develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 18 9 19 AM '69

Mr. Christ continues to lead the Applied Physics Division in a progressive, responsive, and aggressive manner. The record of solid accomplishments by the group of which he is the leader continues to be impressive and his creative, forward-looking leadership is a talent well suited for the goals and missions of this Office.

The technological base established in his Division through many of its prior projects is expected to lead to a variety of items of great value to the Intelligence Community and the Nation. His aggressive search for and application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE April 14, 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F. Christ	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 66	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 APR 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Concur in Rating Officer's comments. Mr. Christ is a solid Division Chief.		
DATE 29 April 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Director for Science and Technology	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carl E. Duckett Carl E. Duckett

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Christ David L	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scien Res CH	7. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T ORD		8. CURRENT STATION Hqts.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the past year Mr. Christ has attempted to consolidate the large areas of responsibility in his Applied Physics Division which now encompasses effort in positive audio surveillance, countermeasures, micropower and micro-technology, and emplacement. He continues to be conscientious, responsive, and aggressive in the management and development of these technical programs. Further, during the past year giant strides have been taken in the coordination of many of these efforts with their eventual consumers. This coordination has been above and beyond that required by existing Agency regulations.

His managerial talents encompass a wide range of activities and it must be acknowledged that they are responsible in large measure for many of the forward-looking, highly productive programs under his direction. On occasion his enthusiasm for some of the Division efforts tends to lead to over-acceleration in some cases where perhaps careful reassessment would be in order. However, his generally cooperative and thoughtful exercise of initiative has resulted in truly large steps forward in technical areas where the cost effectiveness cannot yet be determined. His judicious application of other-agency funds has directly saved this Agency many hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Mr. Christ received a QSI for his efforts during this reporting period.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 29, '68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David A. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 54	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 April 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090 ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Christ	David	L.	01/20/18	M	GS-16	R

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Phys Scien Res Ch	DD/S&T/ORD	Hqs

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and develops complex intelligence program areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Acquires, develops, and integrates scientific and technical personnel into an effective Division.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides advanced planning, programming and budgetary reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares and gives technical program briefings and presentations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts senior level internal and external liaison.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAY 3 1 54 PM '67

During the past year, Mr. Christ has expanded his responsibilities for his Applied Physics Division, which now encompasses effort in positive audiosurveillance, countermeasures, micropower-microtechnology, and emplacement problems. He continues to be conscientious, responsive, and aggressive in the management and development of the technical programs under his direction and supervision.

His managerial talents encompass a wide range of activities, and it must be acknowledged that they are responsible, in large measure, for the forward-looking, highly productive programs under his direction.

His cost consciousness is best exemplified by his detailed planning and charting of cost, time, and technical details in a variety of complex areas. He has taken the lead in solving many involved, detailed and intricate interface and coordination problems with virtually all other technical groups within the Agency.

I expect a high degree of intelligence pay-off as a result of programs under his supervision.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4/24/67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David F Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 42	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 APR 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate Reviewing Official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
055090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Christ David L	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Phys Scientist Res Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Initiates and promotes new intelligence collection program areas	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops and advances fundamental technological projects in support of intelligence collection	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruits, manages and develops technical personnel	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Establishes and maintains high level inter and intra agency liaison	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Generates major technical, fiscal, and budgetary planning reports	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Provides consultation on specialized electronic techniques	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

7 JUN 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 6 3 25 PM '66

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for 2-1/2 years during the continuing period of growth and expansion in the Office of Research and Development, in which he played a major role. During the past year, Mr. Christ has given up his responsibilities in the Radio-Physics area and has devoted himself to expansion and growth problems of the Audio-Physics Division, which encompasses effort in positive audiosurveillance, countermeasures, and emplacement problems.

Mr. Christ continues to be conscientious, responsive, and alert to the needs of the Agency in terms of the substantive content of technical programs under his direction and supervision. He couples this with a vigorous managerial attitude that encompasses the recruiting, programming, coordination, and other factors necessary to implement these programs in an effective manner. His cost-consciousness is a continuing effort throughout the year and is best exemplified by his careful over-all planning and charting of total program efforts in order that projects lead directly to productive intelligence efforts.

Mr. Christ has had an unusually difficult position in one respect, in that his technical surveillance effort was a major interface area with the DD/P in a realm where political and bureaucratic considerations could have deleteriously affected the content of his programs. He handled these problems in a manner that was favorable for the over-all good of the Agency in terms of technical progress in numerous areas and which far exceeded what might be called "par" for the course.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 5/3/66	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David J. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 5-3-66	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Director of Research and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Christ has done an extremely good job in developing a truly exciting program and capable staff focused on advanced audio and counteraudio techniques, in the face of a difficult environment. I would hope that during the coming year he could develop a tighter managerial control over the many small diverse elements of the large program.

DATE 3 June 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DD/Science & Technology	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Physical Scien	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 64 - 31 March 65

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develops advanced technical program areas	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Performs administrative planning - budget, finance, etc.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Recruits, develops and supervises scientific personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts internal and external liaison	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares technical and administrative reports	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

12 MAY 1965

FORM 4-52 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for about eighteen months, during a continuing period of growth and expansion in the Office of Research and Development. During most of the past year Mr. Christ has doubled as group leader of the Radio-Physics area and has had responsibility for the tremendous growth of a separate Audio-Physics group, both of which continue to comprise about 40% of the effort of the Physical Sciences portion of the Office. Mr. Christ has performed these duties in a mangerial capacity in an extremely effective manner, so that both groups are well developed and capable of continuing growth on a self-sustaining basis.

Mr. Christ is extremely conscientious, receptive, and alert to the needs of the Agency in terms of the substantive content of technical programs under his direction and supervision. His cost consciousness is a continuing effort throughout the year, and is best demonstrated by the manner in which he has reprogrammed funds internally and reduced the costs of a number of contracts. Also, he is not one to "rubber-stamp" approval of contractor efforts, and has called several of them to task this year for what he considered efforts below what he felt their capabilities should be.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 27 APR [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Marcel J. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 APR [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Assistant Director ORD/DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

From my own knowledge of Mr. Christ's work, I endorse the favorable comments of his supervisor. He has performed beyond call and stimulated important new areas of research and development for ORD.

DATE 5 May 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE ABert Wheelon

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
059090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 18	3. SEX W	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD R
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO Physical Scientist	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DD/S&T/ORD	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY						
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 April 1964	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 29 Sept 63 - 31 Mar 64

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Plans, develops and administers broad divisional technical programs in Radio-Physics and Audio-Physics.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Manages manpower and financial resources of scientific teams in these areas.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Initiates and evaluates research and development concepts in response to intelligence operations requirements.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Establishes and maintains administrative and management procedures, including appropriate liaison and coordination with appropriate elements of the intelligence and scientific community.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Establishes and maintains high level scientific relationships with industry, universities, and other Government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

30 APR 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Christ has been under my direct supervision for about six months, during a difficult period of growth, expansion, and change in the Office of Research and Development. During the process of reorganization of the Office, Mr. Christ has emerged as acting group leader of both the Radio-Physics and Audio-Physics areas of effort, which comprise about 40% of the effort in the Physical Sciences portion of the Office.

Considering his geographical location for the previous three years, Mr. Christ has done a remarkable job in organizing the Radio-Physics effort and in developing a new effort in Audio-Physics which promises to be one of the major programs in the Office. All of this required that he exercise considerable initiative and judgment in the delegation of responsibility for existing projects and in the formulation and organization of new projects with an extremely under-manned staff.

Mr. Christ was extremely imaginative, vigorous, enthusiastic, and responsive in the performance of these difficult assignments, and demonstrated very clear ability to manage programs and develop teamwork against these continuing and new objectives. In the development of the organizations necessary to implement these programs, Mr. Christ has demonstrated a high degree of cost consciousness by organizing personnel of the two groups so that with a limited staff they could operate in both programs, and by vigorously combing the country to locate the best contractors to implement the program and to seek advice as to appropriate sources for such procurement.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE April 23, 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David [illegible] Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION six	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 APR 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Assistant Director ORD/DD/S&T	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Robert M. Chapman Robert M. Chapman

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am quite familiar with Mr. Christ's performance during the rating period and am in complete agreement with the supervisor's rating and analysis. He has done the tremendous job of organizing our research in the brand new area of audio physics. This program has a very high priority, and he has done a superior job of launching it in a very short time and with very modest resources.

MAIL ROOM
APR 30 2 02 PM '64

DATE [illegible] 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Acting AD/ORD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward B. Giller Edward B. Giller

SECRET

Recorded
CSPD

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Fitness Report for David L. CHRIST,

There was no significant change in subject's performance during the two months between the last report and his departure.

R K Craven
ROBERT K. CRAVEN
AC/TSD/TA

Reviewed by:

[illegible]

CVS Roosevelt
C.V.S. ROOSEVELT
Chief, DD/P/TSD

SECRET

TSS EVALUATION

NAME DAVID L. CHRIST DIVISION TSS/ASD

SUBJECT BASIC LOCK PICKING COURSE

DATES TRAINED 4-8 January 1960

EVALUATION:

1. Comprehension of Principles	EXCELLENT
2. Alertness and Interest	EXCELLENT
3. Operational Appreciation of Subject	EXCELLENT
4. Manual Dexterity	GOOD
5. Care in Work	VERY GOOD
6. Aptitude	VERY GOOD
7. Technician Potential	VERY GOOD

NOTE: "Technician Potential" is an estimate of the technical ability the student *might* acquire after advanced instruction and practice--it is *not* an estimate of his current level of technique.

VERY GOOD
RATINGS: Poor, Average, Good, Excellent

OVERT DISTRIBUTION

1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - OTR/AAS
1 - Records & Service Division/OP
1 - TSS/[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

19[illegible] **FITNESS REPORT**	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 159090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI CH		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/TA/ASB

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Mar 59 - Mar '60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Directing activities of Audio Branch in TDY support from Hqs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Directing establishment of proper performance levels and higher professional qualifications.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supporting Field technicians and coordinating branch activities with area desks.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinating requirements for guidance of TSD research group.	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintaining Earwort supply program	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - *Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.*
2 - *Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.*
3 - *Performance clearly meets basic requirements.*
4 - *Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.*
5 - *Performance in every important respect is superior.*
6 - *Performance in every respect is outstanding.*

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

SEP 16

Subject is a technical man who combines a taste for action with professional competence, producing excellent leadership for the specialized branch he heads. His treatment of personnel is direct, frank, unusually honest and just. He helps the men and their families in times of trouble and personal difficulties and has earned their respect for his technical competence. He is imaginative and bold in his approach to the responsibilities of his branch and is a fertile source of ideas. He has driven hard towards raising professional standards.

Although he is a good innovator, he sometimes pushes harder on new approaches than on completion of programs in being, and on occasion his devotion to a program leads him to heavy emphasis on it and too little on other aspects equally as important. However, this was in the earlier part of the rated period rather than recently. I believe he will continue to grow with his job and that he can undertake more responsible and broader assignments.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 8 Aug 60

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David F. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 July 1960	AC/TSD/TA	Robert K. Craven

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

XX I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Christ contributed very substantially to the conception and establishment of EARWORT, the program under which TSD procures and supplies audio equipment for field use. He is learning how to convert the intense enthusiasm which he has at the start of a project to the steady continuous push required to carry the work through to completion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 August 1960	Chief, TSD	C. V. S. Roosevelt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AUG 1959 AUG 1959 VS

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 159090

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI CH		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/TA/ASD

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Dec 1957 to Apr 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, ASD, TSS World wide audio requirements	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lecturer for OTR courses	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Liaison --CIA, Foreign Intell. Services, Army, Air Force	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitors and guides audio supply program	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Levies audio requirements on R&D	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - *Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.*
2 - *Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.*
3 - *Performance clearly meets basic requirements.*
4 - *Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.*
5 - *Performance in every important respect is superior.*
6 - *Performance in every respect is outstanding.*

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 5-56 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Christ is an excellent Chief of our Audio Support Division. He is a leader of men, is loyal to his superiors, and is technically professional in his work.

Mr. Christ has one short coming, which is not of his own making--he lacks field experience--only because his superiors have felt his services were more needed at Headquarters. It is some times hard for him to understand the operational aspects of things as outlined by his assistants. To his credit it must be said he realizes this lack of field experience and uses the advice of his men to best advantage.

As soon as feasable he should be assigned to a responsible position at one of our overseas bases.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 5-7-59

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David L. Christ

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 May 1959	AC/TSS/TA	Edward P. Foster, Jr.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: In giving Mr. Christ a higher evaluation, I refer particularly to his outstanding technical training and unusual competence as an electronics engineer which, in addition to his other characteristics (such as his willingness to undertake any assigned responsibilities and his ability to work well with fellow employees), make him a particularly valuable employee.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 May 1959	Chief, TSS	C. V. S. Roosevelt

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/R&D/Applied Physics Division	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ELEC ENGR D CH		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 10 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 25 November 1956 to 10 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK *(X)* APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

XX	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE *(Specify)*:
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		17 JAN ~~1958~~
Reviewed by PUD		21 JAN 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 12/31/57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 20 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Administration as Deputy Chief	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of major summary reports	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Survey of field equipment requirements	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Technical Program planning	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts external liaison	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Christ applies himself conscientiously with mature judgment to all problems large or small. He has unbounded initiative, enthusiasm and Agency loyalty. Though occasionally inclined to be intolerant of obstacles, he is amenable to others viewpoints and will compromise when it is to the best interest of all concerned. He is respected and well liked by both his superiors and those who work for him.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Mr. Christ is ideally suited for his present assignment but he is also qualified for any other position requiring combined administrative and technical qualifications.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/R&D/Applied Physics Division	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ELEC ENGR D CH		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 10 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 25 November 1956 to 10 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Henry C. Knutson HENRY C. KNUTSON	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 12/31/57	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Randley Hazell RANDLEY HAZELL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/R&D

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential 21 JAN 1958

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 24 AM '80
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

34 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Christ's greatest potential is in a combined administrative and technical supervisory position.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Some specific training courses might be useful as his scope of activities increases. In general because of his ability to quickly master situations, occasional TDY's to the field should suffice.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Mr. Christ is presently being reassigned as C/TSS/ASD. This will be a serious loss to TSS/APD but has been concurred in because it is to the best advantage of TSS.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20 COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-8)
159080

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (9-24)
Christ, David Lamar

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH Jan DAY 20 YEAR '18

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
French 265

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH Apr DAY 16 YEAR 57

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 52

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 April 57	SIGNATURE David L. Christ
(46) C	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) CHRIST	(First) David	(Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/APD

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: PHY SCI ADM (D CH)

7. GRADE: GS-14

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 16 November 1956

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 5 November 1955 to 16 November 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 17 Dec. 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Henry C. Knutson Henry C. Knutson	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Recorded		11 JAN 1957
Reviewed		1-14-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 12/19/56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Bardley Hassell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/APD

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE O. [illegible]
JAN 13 1 54 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Administration as Deputy Chief	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans technical programs	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conducts external liaison	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares Summary reports on programs	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Correlates technical proposals with requirements	RATING NUMBER 5

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Christ's greatest strength is his conscientious and wholehearted approach to any problem whether it be of major proportions or involves time consuming details. A minor weakness would be that he can be carried away by his enthusiasm. By experience and training, he is ideally suited for technical, administrative duties.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "F" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/APD	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHY SCI ADM (D CH)		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 16 November 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 5 November 1955 to 16 November 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 17 Dec. 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Henry C. Knutson Henry C. Knutson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/APD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 12/19/56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Eardley Hazell Eardley Hazell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/~~APD~~ R&D

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

22 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Christ's greatest potential is in a supervisory field, particularly if technical problems are involved. He should be considered as a potential candidate to take charge of an overseas technical component.

'57 MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

In view of his potential ability, it is planned to assign him from time to time to training in the broader aspects of intelligence work.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

A reassignment of Mr. Christ at this time would be a serious loss to the growing Research and Development program in TSS/APD.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If the individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

CODED

Next Report due 5 Nov 56

BY DATE
12 Dec 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

13 DEC 1955

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION DT
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 16 Nov 1950	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP/TSS	7. DIVISION APD		8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:			11. GRADE GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 5 Nov 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 31 Mar 1955 to 5 Nov 1955			

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Deputy Chief, ~~TSS~~/APD Phy Sci Adm 1301.07

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency): During this period Mr. Christ has continued as Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS. This has entailed both administrative and technical duties. As an administrator he has assisted and acted for the Chief, APD/TSS in such matters as; personnel, budget, security, office procedures, contractual arrangements, etc. His technical duties have involved the analysis of technical programs to fulfill operational requirements, supervision of the work and progress of other project engineers, technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities, preparation of status and progress reports, etc. In the absence of Chief, TSS/APD Mr. Christ has had full responsibility for the functioning of the Division.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report, and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE Dec 5 1955	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Henry C. Knutson

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 12/6/55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Bradley Hazell

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
1 JAN 55 THIS FORM WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale in each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

DEC 9 2 12 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X								X			
B. PRACTICAL.										X	X			
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.													X	
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.												X		
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.											X			
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.												X		
11. CALM.											X			
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.												X		
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION											X			
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.													X	

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.											X			
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.												X		
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.											X			
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.												X		
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.													X	
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.												X		
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.												X		
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.													X	
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

He has demonstrated a tremendous capability for meticulously handling all the details connected with his duties as Deputy Chief. He has been extremely conscientious, cooperative and dependable. He has consistently exhibited leadership and good judgment.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Mr. Christ has no outstanding weaknesses.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
His conscientious attention to his duties outweighs all other considerations.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
AUG 2 12 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL? None for his present assignment at this time. Eventually Mr. Christ and the Agency would benefit by encouraging him to further his technical education.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

None

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☒ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☒ 3. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

T.S.S-7

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilizat[illegible]nel.

CODED

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

SD:DT
S

next Rept Due
16 nov 55

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.		2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO TSS	7. DIVISION APD		8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:			11. GRADE GS-14
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 31 March 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 Nov. 54 - 31 March 1955			

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Phy Sci Adm ~~Deputy Chief APD~~ 1301.06	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 28 March 1954

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

a. Deputy Chief of the Applied Physics Division.
b. Acting Chief of Physics Branch of the Division.
c. Direct and perform many of the administrative functions of the Division.
d. Supervise activities of Division project engineers and in particular direct project performance of seven or eight project engineers in the Physics Branch.
e. Receive and evaluate operational requirements, request and organize new technical project proposals and contracts, monitor projects, test and evaluate equipment developed, and provide training as needed.

	BY	DATE
Por'	EH	4/14/55
I	OCD	4/21/55

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☑ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE March 7 1955	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Walter J. Driscoll
I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)	
THIS DATE 3/10/55	NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) Bradley Haskell

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES FORM 37-169, 1 MAY 54
1 OCT 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

CATEGORIES

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.										X				
4. HAS INITIATIVE.									X					
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM									X					
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.									X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.											X			
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.										X				
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.								X						
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HIS STAMINA: CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT										X				

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.									X					
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.									X					
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.								X						
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X			
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.								X						
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.								X						
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.									X					
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. Christ is a particularly cooperative and competent employee. He understands clearly the purposes and functions of his position and administers his technical duties and liaison responsibilities in a highly satisfactory manner. He is well qualified to carry on the administration and operation of his Division in the absence of the Chief.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

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The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A SD-TS next due 11/58

5 12/21

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

100 12/23/54

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Jan 1918	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 16 Nov 1950	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP	7. DIVISION TSS	8. BRANCH MD
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:		11. GRADE GS-14 1301.06
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE ~~29 October 1954~~ 12 Nov 54	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 Nov 53 to 16 Nov 54		

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION B/140 Deputy Chief of the Applied Physics Division	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION August, 1952

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

a. Acting Chief of the Physics Branch - seven men supervised.
b. Personally monitors numerous commercial contracts and coordinates the monitoring activities of the project engineers working under his direction.
c. Carries on liaison with several government agencies and monitors and guides projects being done at such facilities in our behalf.
d. Participates in the evaluation of operational requirements and research and development proposals.
e. Provides training and briefing for agency and indigenous people.
f. Acts in the capacity of the Chief of the Division in his absence.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated, but it will be discussed when he returns to headquarters.

THIS DATE 12 November 1954	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) Walter G. Driscoll

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE 23 Nov. 1954	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority)

FORM NO. 1 MAY 54 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 1 8 19 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degr[illegible] the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the [illegible] that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.										X				
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.									X					
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.							X							
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.										X				
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.							X							
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.	X													
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.							X							
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.							X							
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.							X							
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.							X							
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.										X				

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X													
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.									X					
32. CLEAR THINKING.									X					
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.							X							
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.							X							
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.								X						
45. VERSATILE.							X							
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.							X							
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Mr. Christ is particularily cooperative and dependable. He can accurately report events observed or reproduce, in writing, the facts associated with monitored contracts, Agency briefings, general liaison, etc. He has been very helpful in organizing the administrative procedures, the files and the engineering project procedures for the division.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Mr. Christ's outstanding weakness results from his limited formal technical training which in several cases is not as extensive as is the training of men that he is supervising. He has off-set this short-coming to some extent by experience, good judgement, and his interest in and his response to the opinions of others.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Mr. Christ's cooperative and dependable nature, coupled with his generally acceptable technical competence, makes him particularily suited to the Deputy Chief's position that he now fills.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 1 9 19 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None at present.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☒ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☐ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DE

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer.

1. NAME (Last) CHRIST (First) David (Middle) L.
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Physical Science Admin TS

4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION TSS
BRANCH Applied Physics Di
☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From ~~16 Nov '52~~ 3-16-53 To 15 Nov '53

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Assistant Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS - Combined administrator and project engineer. As administrator: Assist and act for the chief in general administrative details: personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc.; assist in organizing procedures and administrative mechanisms for accomplishing aims of technical projects. As project engineer: Examine operational problems, suggesting devices and techniques for implementing the operations; recommend and organize projects to provide devices and techniques; supervise and/or prepare original designs, drawings, specifications and instructions; supervise work and progress of younger project engineers; conduct technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities; prepare and conduct field and laboratory tests and reports, and periodic status and progress reports; serve as technical consultant on APD activities to CIA operational groups.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
		None	

9. The technical examination and evaluation of operations as regards applicable devices and techniques, and the subsequent organization, direction, and close association with research and development projects in the broad field of Applied Physics. It is, I believe, a work fundamental to clandestine agency operations, in which a person can grow to high levels of achievement and responsibility.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

(Above)

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

The above statement describes in broad terms what I am, and have been doing with the agency since 1950. My individual function has grown with expanding agency requirements and organization. I was originally accepted for this position on the basis of previous ~~knowledge and experience. I believe I have demonstrated the ability to continue to~~

10. grow in and with the organization.

16 Nov. 1953
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Christ has performed all of the activities (see Item 7) described in an excellent and cooperative manner.

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MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Christ is extremely thorough in the performance of his assigned duties. In a like fashion he is reliable, cooperative and continually offers technical guidance and inspirational "drive" to the project engineers in the division.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

It is recommended that Mr. Christ spend some time in the coming year or two visiting foreign areas in order that he may become familiar with on-the-spot field problems and in order that he may apply first hand information acquired as a result of these trips to the research and development program of APD.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Christ has continually been given greater responsibility, particularly with regard to the administration of the division and it is my opinion that he can assume these and other responsibilities very readily in the future.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

None

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

22 Dec '53
DATE

Walter G. Driscoll
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

23 Dec. 1953
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CHRIST, David L	2. GRADE GS-13	3. POSITION TITLE Physical Science Admin		
4. OFFICE DD/P	STAFF OR DIVISION TSS	BRANCH Applied Physics Div	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 3-16-52 To 3-16-53	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor			

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Assistant Chief, Applied Physics Division/TSS - Combined administrator and project engineer. As administrator: Assist and act for the chief in general administrative details-personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc., assist in organizing procedures and administrative mechanisms for accomplishing aims of technical projects. As project engineer: Examine operational problems, suggesting devices and techniques for implementing the operations; recommend and organize projects to provide devices and techniques; supervise and/or prepare original designs, drawings, specifications and instructions, supervise work and progress of younger project engineers; conduct technical liaison with government and commercial R&D activities; prepare and conduct field and laboratory tests and reports, and periodic status and progress reports; serve as technical consultant on APD activities to CIA operational groups.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
		None	

9. The technical examination and evaluation of operations as regards applicable devices and techniques, and the subsequent organization, direction, and close association with research and development projects in the broad field of Applied Physics. It is, I believe, a work fundamental to clandestine agency operations, in which a person can grow to high levels of achievement and responsibility.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

(Above)

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

The above statement describes in broad terms what I am, and have been doing with the agency since 1950. My individual function has grown with expanding agency requirements and organization. I was originally accepted for this position on the basis of previous knowledge and experience. I believe I have demonstrated the ability to continue to

10. grow in and with the organization.

16 March 1953
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Christ has been exceptionally cooperative and dependable and he has exhibited leadership and good judgement in the administration of his duties. He has consistently been effective in handling unusually sensitive liaison problems and in offering guidance to the young project engineers of the Applied Physics Division.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Christ is particularily thorough and conscientious about the manner in which he handles his assignments.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Mr. Christ should be given an opportunity to further his own education through personal study and course opportunities for in this manner he can best develope and adequately offer additional assistance to his divisional associates.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

He has in my opinion, the ability to handle further responsibility and this aptitude will develope in proportion to the operational and technical experience that he may acquire.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Not at this time.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

I recommend that he take additional technical and operational courses as they become available.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

23 March 1953
DATE

Peter F. Driscoll
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

[illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Noted 21 May 53
[illegible]

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) Christ David Lamar	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Jan 20 1918	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 181 01 6133
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY [redacted]	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
David L. Christ

DATE
2/19/68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE [illegible]
FEB 21 2 06 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only after April 14, 1968)
176-[illegible]

SECRET

29 FEB 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - David L. Christ

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF - CHRIST
1 - D/Pers Chrono
1 - C/PD

OP/DD/Pers/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:sh (29 February 1968)

SECRET

DD/S&T# 461-68

ORD 0683-68

31 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Quality Step Increase - David L. Christ

1. It is recommended that Mr. David L. Christ, Chief of the Applied Physics Division, Office of Research and Development, be granted a Quality Step Increase from GS-16, step 6, to GS-16, step 7.

2. Mr. Christ entered on duty with the Agency on 16 November 1950. He transferred to ORD from the DD/P as a GS-16 in September, 1963. During the past four and one-half years he has assumed increasing responsibilities and has expertly implemented and fulfilled the objectives for which his Division was formed in the early growth period of the Office. Although he has performed equally as well, and perhaps better than, many of his equivalent Division chiefs within the Office, the supergrade T.O. limitation within the Office has prevented a raise other than the Legislative pay raises.

3. Mr. Christ is considered to be a key individual in ORD. His energy, initiative, and enthusiasm in developing concepts and applying managerial talents make his services to this Office invaluable. In particular, his development of audio surveillance, micropower-

microtechnology, audio countermeasures, and emanations intelligence areas of effort within his Division make this Quality Step Increase long overdue, in my opinion.

Robert M. Chapman

Robert M. Chapman
Director of Research and Development
DD/S&T

CONCUR:

Carl E. Duckett
Deputy Director for Science and Technology

date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 1 is approved.

Director of Personnel
25 FEB 68

TR

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) Christ (First) David (Middle) L.

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED Rt. 2, Mountain Top, Penna.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Md.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE New Haven, Conn.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 17 Aug 44
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Wilma M. Christ	6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda, Md	OL 6-2127	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
Thomas W.	Same as above	M	12
Elaine M	" "	F	10
Linda L.	" "	F	7
Susan M.	" "	F	5
Stewart H.	" "	M	1
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Deceased			
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
Mrs Mildred L. Christ	8 Greenwood St, Tamaqua, Pa.	Unk.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?
Wife + Mother

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr.~~, Mrs, ~~Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle) Wilma M. Christ	RELATIONSHIP Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) Same as above	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER OL 6-2127
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE " " "	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION OL 6-2127

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☒ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 7 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
Suburban Trust Co, Bethesda Br.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JAN 57

CONFIDENTIAL (4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

27 APR 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: David L. Christ

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted: David L. Christ

Date: June 14, 1955

Career Service Staff
Office of Personnel

[illegible] 1955

FORM NO. 511, 1 APR 55

(4)

SECRET
Security Information

	CHRIST	DAVID	LAMAR
Name:	Last,	First	Middle

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 23 Jul 52

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-152
MAY 1952

14-131

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 9070 *	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) CHRIST DAVID LAMAR	3. Office Technical Services
4. Date of Birth January 20, 1918	5. Sex: x male (1) ___ female (2) Martial Status M Nr. Dependents 4	6. CIA Entry Date: November 16, 1950
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
[✓ 6. Bachelor degree]
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
Penna. State College State College, Pa.	Elec.	Engr.	Sept. 46	Feb. 50	4 years		B.S. in E.E.	Feb. 50	147 credits

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
None				

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
Radio Op. Mech. School, USAF, Chicago, Ill.	Jan. '43	May '43	4	Radio Operator & mechanics
San Antonio, Texas Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn.	Apr. 44 Jul 44	Jul 44 Dec 44	4 5	Aviation Cadet (Ground) Pre-Tech. Communications
Chanute Field, Ill.	Mar '45	Apr '45	1	Cryptography

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From Feb. 52 To — Tot. mos. 7 Grade GS-12 Salary $7040. Office Technical Services Position Title: Physical Science Adm. Duty Title: Ass't. Chief, Applied Physics Branch	Description of Duties: Supervising and assisting junior project engineers in the planning and accomplishment of research and development projects. Assisting the Branch Chief in the administrative planning and programming of the Applied Physics Branch. Creative thinking and planning of devices and techniques for operations. Technical liaison. Duty Station, if overseas: —
From Nov. 50 To Feb. 52 Tot. mos. 15 Grade GS-11 Salary $5400 - $5940 Office Policy Coordination & Tech. Ser Position Title: Electronics Engineer Duty Title: Ass't. Chief, Physics Section	Description of Duties: Planning and pursuing research and development of devices and techniques. Development of technical and administrative procedures peculiar to the individual projects. Preparation of specifications drawings and reports. Technical liaison with other services and commercial organization. Duty Station, if overseas: ——
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From Feb. 50 To Nov 50 Tot. mo's 10 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ____ Salary $340/mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 30 - 40 students Employer Pa. State College Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) College Extension	Exact Title of your position Instructor, Industrial Electronics Description of Duties: Instructor - laboratory and classroom - in Industrial Electricity and Industrial Electronics Duty Station if overseas:
From Sept 46 To Feb 50 Tot. mo's 41 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ____ Salary -- Number and Class of Employees Supervised: ---- Employer Student Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Pa. State College	Exact Title of your position Student, Electrical Engineering. Description of Duties: I was a full time student in E.E., majoring in Electronics. Worked 4 hrs. per night at explosives plant during 1st. three semesters. I worked full time at this plant during vacations and 4 months prior to entering college. Duty Station if overseas:
From Dec. 44 To May 46 Tot. mo's 18 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) 1st. Lt Salary $180/mo. base Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 20 - 40 technicians Employer Air Force Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Army Airway Comm. System	Exact Title of your position Communications Officer, Cryptographic Security Officer Description of Duties: I was a Communications Officer, Radio Station Officer, and Cryptographic Security in various Detachments of AACS, Air Force. Duty Station if overseas: Pacific Theater
From Oct. 42 To Dec. 44 Tot. mo's 26 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Cpl. Av. Cadet Salary $75.00/mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 0 - 20 students Employer Air Force Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Pvt., Pfc., Cpl., Av. Cadet, Instructor Description of Duties: Oct. '42 - May '43 - Basic training & RM training. May '43 - Apr '44 - Radio Mechanics Instructor. Apr '44 - Dec '44 - Aviation Cadet (Ground) studying communications Engineering. Duty Station if overseas: ----
From 1937 To Oct. 42 Tot. mo's 65 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) ____ Salary $55.00/wk. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 4 - 5 technicians Employer Atlas Powder Company Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Explosives.	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: Powder helper, [illegible] Foreman - part-time - supervising and accomplishing processing and packing of various kinds of dynamite and gelatin explosives. Duty Station if overseas: ----

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___U.S. Secret Service
02___Civil Police
03___Military Police
04___U.S. Border Patrol
05___U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___FBI
07___Criminal Investigation Div.
21___Office of Naval Intelligence
22___Office of War Information
23___Army G-2
20___Office of Strategic Services
24___Air Force A-2
25___Foreign Economic Admin.
26___Counter Intelligence Corps
27___Immigration & Naturalization
28___Strategic Services Unit
29___Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___Central Intelligence Group
31___Armed Forces Security Agency
32___Coordinator of Information
33___Office of Facts & Figures
34___Board of Economic Warfare
35___Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
French					x					x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ____________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ________
Morse Coded - 20-25 wpm, Seand Radio-telegraphy experience.

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
Oahu, T.H.	June '45 to Aug. '45	x		
Phillipine Islands	Aug. '45 to Sept '45	x		
Japan-Kyushu, Honshu	Sept '45 to Apr '46	x		

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
Same as above	General knowledge of	Gained as a result of military assignment from
	people and terrain.	June 1945 to April 1946.

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2. x	30	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. None, although I've spent 11 months as	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
a Radio Mechanics Instructor and 11 months as	Fishing, bowling, golf, technical
an Industrial Electronics Instructor.	writing.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. Eta Kappa Nu, Sigma Sigma Sigma (local), Former AIEE, Contemplating IRE membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

Did technical writing and preparation of Maintenance and Operating Instructions for Navy Radar gear.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
None	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
Polygraph	August 1952

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas? Only 1 or 2 months at most.

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

I believe I am currently assigned to a position which suits my general qualifications, since it is a position in a growing organization with which I can continuously grow.

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? Yes [✓ No].

If yes, indicate your present draft classification

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status [✓ Yes] No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. _x_ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service Air Force Grade 1st Lt. Location Washington, D.C.

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated 9463rd VARTU SQ, 9110TH VARTG

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any None

Location of Service Records, if known 9110th VARTU Group, 1337 E St., N.W. Washington, D.C.

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
Security Lectures	Nov. '50	4
Staff Indoctrination Course	Jan. '51	20
Staff Orientation Course	Aug. '51	40

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

During 1952 I prepared maintenance and operations instruction manuals on Navy radar equipment. This was outside my CIA activities. Currently I am serving as a consultant to the Atlas Powder Company on problem of quality control and production processes in the manufactureof blasting caps.

DATE 19 September 1952

SIGNATURE David L. Christ

Christ, David L. UV X

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE DD/P/TSS
DIVISION RDD
BRANCH APB
SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
CIA	Wash. D.C.	16	Nov.	1950	31	12	51	16	1	1
Total Civilian Service								16	1	1

[illegible] verified [illegible]

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE		
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.
Army Air Force,	26	Oct	'42	28	Apr	'46	2	6	3
Total Military Service							3	6	3

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

14 December '51
DATE

David L. Christ
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 12/31/51
JK

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
19	7	4

ca66

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A4 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) Washington, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, David L. Christ, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated July [illegible], 19[illegible], filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

David L. Christ
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 16 day of November, A. D. 1950,

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

Chloie W. Hudson
(Signature of officer)

(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

19—84180-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 5 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
5705 Hamilton St, Apt 2, Rogers Heights, Md.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
20 Jun '18

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*
Tamaqua, P.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY
Mrs. Wilma M. Christ

(B) RELATIONSHIP
Wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
5705 Hamilton St, Apt 2
Rogers Heights, Md

(D) TELEPHONE NO.
AP 3605

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?		
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service*		
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 15—[illegible]

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

OPC

NAME CHRIST, DAVID L.	NATURE OF ACTION EOD
TITLE OF POSITION Engineer	GRADE GS-11
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Dept.	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Approved 6 months temporary asignment, departmental

MAY BE REEVALUATED AT THAT TIME FOR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT, BUT CHANCES ARE NOT FAVORABLE.

16 November 1950
DATE

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-57
NOV 1948

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444I, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
059090	Christ, David L.	01/20/18	R

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM--TO--			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(3)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			AIR 7	23-rr	'70		
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. WAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No changes since last report.

DATE Mar. 31, 1972

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE David J. Christ

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

GC-15 R

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

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Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
059090	CHRIST, David L.	01/20/18	R

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-68 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

No change from previous submission

DATE: 4/18/64

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David F. Christ

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(When Filled In)

10

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

AD INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

ow that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
059090	Christ, David L.	01/20/18

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2 ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

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MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

No additions to previous report

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4/4/68	David F. Christ

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QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 059090	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) CHRIST DAVID L	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/20/18	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS-16-05
6. SD R	7. POSITION TITLE PHYS SCIEN RES CH	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT ORD	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D. C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	TDY 46	56/04/01	56/05/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 46	57/06/01	57/07/01
SOUTH AMERICA	TDY 46	57/09/01	57/10/01
AROUND THE WORLD	TDY 46	58/03/01	58/04/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 46	59/01/25	59/02/15
MEXICO	TDY 44	60/01/21	60/01/27
ASIA AREA	TDY 44	60/03/13	60/04/23
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 44	60/04/23	60/04/30
[redacted] WH Area	TDY	60/8/13	60/8/30
" "	PCS	60/9/08	63/4/21

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 1 Jun 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, GENERAL	PA ST UNIV	50

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GROUP 1
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(4-51)

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY — CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Cuba	General	[illegible]		✓			
Other countries listed in Section I for days or weeks at a time,							
general knowledge.							

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4 - SECTION V - LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE, CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

General technical reports & studies, and program presentations

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

Basic R&D project concepts & ideas

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

Internal Agency training & program lectures. Church

SECRET

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION 4

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD *(Active Duty Only)*

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION *(Army, Navy, etc. - specify)*

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE *(extended active duty)* FROM TO

4. STATUS *(Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)*

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE *(at separation if past service)*

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER *(Specify)*

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)*

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(active)* ☐ STANDBY *(inactive)* ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES *(record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)*

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)*

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year) Sept 60 -	2. LOCATION (Country, City) TDY/WH	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/AOB
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Audio Ops Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS13-16

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

same as below

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year) Jan '57 - Sept 60	2. LOCATION (Country, City) U.S.A., Wash D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/AOB
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Audio Operations Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Developing and managing domestic and overseas organization, equipment, logistics, etc. for worldwide audio intelligence collection operations.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From - To - by month & year) ~~Feb~~ Oct 50 - Jan '57	2. LOCATION (Country, City) USA, Wash DC	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH DD/P/TSD/APB
4. TITLE OF JOB Deputy Chief, Applied Physics Branch		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS 11-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Technical administrator, supervisor of physicists, electronics engineers in R&D of intelligence collection devices and systems

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION 9 — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS Single Married Widowed Separated Divorced Annulled Remarried [illegible]: No Change

2. NAME OF SPOUSE — Last — First — Middle — Maiden

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Elaine M. Christ	Dghtr	2/47 Tamaqua, Pa.	Yes	6212 Maiden Lane Bethesda, Md
Linda L. Christ	"	9/50 Mountain Top, Pa.	"	same as above
Susan M. Christ	"	10/52 Hyattsville, Md	"	" " "
Stewart H. Christ	Son.	12/56 Bethesda, Md	"	" " "
Roger L Christ	Son	9/60 Bethesda, Md	"	" " "

SECTION [illegible] — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
None			

DATE: 3/21/67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David F Christ

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(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

15909C

THIS DATE: 25 March 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Christ, David Lamar

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
6212 Maiden Lane
Bethesda 14, Maryland

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State):
6212 Maiden Lane
Bethesda 14, Maryland

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Oliver 6-2127

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Maryland, U.S.A.

SECTION II PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: Mrs. Christ, Wilma Margaret

2. RELATIONSHIP: wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Maryland, U.S.A.

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Same as above

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Oliver 6-2127

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
Mother - Mrs. David A. Christ, 8 Greenwood St., Tamaqua, Pa.

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Wilma (Middle) Margaret (Maiden) Zimmermann (Last) Christ

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: Aug. 17, 1944

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): Route #5, Wausau, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH: NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 6212 Maiden Lane, Bethesda 14, Maryland

11. DATE OF BIRTH: Aug. 1, 1921

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Wausau, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY: NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.

16. DATE ACQUIRED: NA

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

18. OCCUPATION: Housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b REPLACES FORM 273 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
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SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
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MAIL ROOM

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
Oct. 1942 - May 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
USAF

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
U.S.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
CIA - Nov. 1950 to present

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

None

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
NA
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Suburban Trust Co., Bethesda Branch	Bethesda, Md., U.S.A.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*
U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES NA NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*

NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	X	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Penn. State University	Elec. Eng.		Sept. 1946	Feb. 1950	B.S.in E.E.	Feb. 1950	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
AAF ROM School Chicago, Ill	Radio Oper. & Mechanics	Jan. 1943	May 1943	4
AAF Comm. Cadet (Yak) AAF Sch.,Chanute Field	Communications Engring. Cryptography	Apr. 1944 Feb. 1945	Dec. 1944 Mar. 1945	8 1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE ... APR 8 1 43 PM '57 MAIL ROOM

SECTION VIII FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED (R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK)															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French										X	X	X							X
Japanese															X		X		

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

High School French

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

Insufficient ability to do specialized language work

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Hawaii	General	June '45 -Aug.'45	X			X
Phillipine Isles.	General	Aug.'45 - Oct.'45	X			X
Japan	General	Oct.'45 - Apr.'46 Apr.'56 -May '56	X			X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

June '45 - Apr.'46 - Residence, result of military assignment
Apr. '56 - May '56 - was Agency duty assignment

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
25	--	☐ GREGG	☐ SPEEDWRITING	☐ STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Fishing, golf, bowling - fair & good. Reading, church and community activities.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK Electronic Engineer - with 6 years experience assisting in administration and direction of research and development work

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

Hand tools, machine tools of various kinds, professional electronic instruments.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN. Served as radio operator in Service, teacher at Penn. State College, experienced electronics engineer - but no licenses

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
NA	NA

SECRET

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*) Prepared maintenance, overhaul & instruction manuals on radar equip. for Navy. Variety of significant reports and publications prepared in normal course of job performance.

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED
No patents, contributed original technical ideas on devices in normal course of job performance.

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE Military Service instructor, college instructor, many talks, lectures, briefings during past 13 years in normal job performance.

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. Phalanx fraternity, Eta Kappa Nu, A.I.E.E.

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*) 1952 - Present
2. GRADE GS-14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT TSS/APPLIED PHYSICS DIVISION
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 20
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, TSS/APD
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Assist & act for the chief in general administrative details - personnel, budget, security, contractual arrangements, etc.; assist and/or accomplish organizing procedures & administrative mechanisms for accomplishing technical projects. Examine operational problems, suggesting devices & techniques for implementing the operations; recommend & organize technical projects & programs; supervise work & progress of project engineers; conduct liaison; provide consultation.

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 8 1 41 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 5

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Thomas W. Christ	Son	1944	X		U.S.A.	6212 Maiden Lane Bethesda, Md.
Elaine M. Christ	Daughter	1947		X	"	"
Linda L. Christ	"	1950		X	"	"
Susan M. Christ	"	1953		X	"	"
Stewart H. Christ	Son	1957	X		"	"
Wilma M. Christ	Wife	1921		X	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED: Mar 26 1957

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: David J. Christ

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:

1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office: None
Ext. None
Home: 2299

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss Mr. Mrs. David (First) Lamar (Middle) Christ (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS R.D. #2, (St. & No.) Mountain Top, (City) Pa., (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS Same as above (St. & No.) (City) (State) (Country)

B. NICKNAME None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? Not Applicable

HOW LONG? — IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS Not Applicable (Where?) (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/20/19 PLACE OF BIRTH Tamaqua, (City) Pa., (State) U.S.A. (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # Not Applicable ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ______ (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ______

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ______ GIVE PARTICULARS: ______

FORM NO. 38.1
SEP 1948

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ____

PORT OF ENTRY? ____ ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ____

LAST U.S. VISA ____
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 32 SEX Male HEIGHT 6'0" WEIGHT 185

EYES Gray HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Fair SCARS Above left eye. on Right forearm. On left foot + ankle.

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ____

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE ____ MARRIED ✓ DIVORCED ____ WIDOWED ____

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ____

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDE ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Wilma Margaret Zimmerman Christ
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Aug. 12, 1944, New Haven, Conn.

~~HIS~~ (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Route #2, Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 7/1/21 PLACE OF BIRTH Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP ____ WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____
City State Country

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Cook's Restaurant

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS College Ave, State College, Pa, U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Not Applicable BRANCH OF SERVICE ____
Date Date

COUNTRY ____ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN ____

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Thomas Warren Christ RELATIONSHIP Son AGE 5

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

2. NAME Elaine Margaret Christ RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 3

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______

CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME David Albert Christ
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DECEASE 3/15/50 CAUSE Kidney Failure

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 620 Arlington St, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 2/19/'98 PLACE OF BIRTH Ashland, Pa., U.S.A.
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION Breaker Employee LAST EMPLOYER Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS No 14 Colliery, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Not Applicable BRANCH OF SERVICE ______
Date Date

COUNTRY ______ DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Mildred Lenore Nohl Christ
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 620 Arlington St, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 2/17/'28 PLACE OF BIRTH Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS Not Applicable
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM Not Applicable BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME Lawrence Henry Christ AGE 31
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 1903 S. Queb. St, Arlington, Va., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME Warren Albert Christ AGE 29
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 620 Arlington St, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME Robert Lerene Christ AGE 28
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 1721A Pallon Drive, Phila, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME Elizabeth Irene Christ AGE 23
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS Nurses Home, Presbyterian Hosp, Phila, Pa, U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME Charles Emanuel Christ AGE 20
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 9901 Market St, Phila 4, Pa., U.S.A., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Herbert Robert Zimmerman
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Route # 2, Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 9/11/'90 PLACE OF BIRTH Town of Easton, Wis.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION Farmer LAST EMPLOYER Self

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Esther Bertha Boettcher Zimmerman
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE ______ CAUSE ______

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Route #2, Wausau, Wis., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH 11/12/98 PLACE OF BIRTH Town of Hewitt, Wis.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not Applicable

CITIZENSHIP ______ WHEN ACQUIRED? ______ WHERE? ______
City State Country

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER None

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: None

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. None

1. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
2. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______
3. NAME ______ RELATIONSHIP ______ AGE ______
   CITIZENSHIP ______ ADDRESS ______
   St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ______

SEC. 12. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ______ ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED Sept, '23 to June, '31 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL Tamaqua H.S. ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED Sept. '31 to June, '35 GRADUATE? yes

COLLEGE Penna State College ADDRESS State College, Pa. U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED Sept. '35 to Feb. '38 DEGREE B.S. in Elec. Eng.

COLLEGE ______ ADDRESS ______
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED ______ DEGREE ______

SEC. 13 MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE—U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A. Army Air Force 1st Lt. Oct '42 to May '46
Country Service Rank Dates of Service

Det. 113, 150th AACS Sq., Kanoya, Japan 0-377343 Separation from Service
Last Station Serial No. Type of Discharge

REMARKS: Communications Officer, Cryptographic Security Officer.

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 1 ADDRESS Tamaqua, Pa.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON Not Applicable

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS Asst. Operations Officer, 1912th AACS Sq., Olmsted AFB, Middletown, Pa.

SEC. 14 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

1. FROM Feb 1, 1950 TO Present

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Penna. State College Extension

ADDRESS 75 E. Union St, Wilkes-Barre, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Tech. Institute NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. George Bierly

TITLE OF JOB Instructor SALARY $ 370.00 PER Month

YOUR DUTIES Instruction in Industrial Electricity, Electronics

REASONS FOR LEAVING ______

2. FROM Sept, 1946 TO Feb, 1950

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY None. Penna. State College

ADDRESS 1 State College, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS College NAME OF SUPERVISOR Prof. F.T. Hall, Jr.

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ — PER —

YOUR DUTIES Student in Electrical Engineering

REASONS FOR LEAVING Graduation

3. FROM June, 1946 TO Feb, 1948

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Atlas Powder Company

ADDRESS Reynolds, Pa., U.S.A.
St & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Explosives NAME OF SUPERVISOR Wm. E. Moore

TITLE OF JOB Powder Helper SALARY $ 1.35 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES Packing powder in Gelatin Boxpack

REASONS FOR LEAVING Attend Pa. State College on campus, worked part-time from Sept '46 to Feb '48.

4. FROM Oct '42 TO May '46

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Army Air Force

ADDRESS Det 118, 150th AACS Sq, Kanoya, Japan ~~U.S.A.~~
St. & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Communications NAME OF SUPERVISOR Capt James Purdy

TITLE OF JOB 1st Lt. SALARY $ 175 PER month

YOUR DUTIES Communications Officer, Cryptographic Sec. O.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Separation from service

5. FROM 1937 TO Oct, 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Atlas Powder Company

ADDRESS Reynolds, Pa., U.S.A.
St & No. City State Country

KIND OF BUSINESS Explosives NAME OF SUPERVISOR Wm. E. Moore

TITLE OF JOB Powder Helper SALARY $ 0.88 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES Bomb Plant, Gelatin Box-Pack

REASONS FOR LEAVING Enter military service

Note: Continued on Page 13.

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS: Not Applicable

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Dr. M.S. Hermany	BUS. ADD.	E. Broad St	Tamaqua	Pa.
		RES. ADD.	Arlington St,	Tamaqua	Pa.
2.	Mr. Paul R. Beattie	BUS. ADD.	Park Super,	Cook Forest State Park.	
		RES. ADD.		Cooksburg, Pa.	
3.	Mr. William E. Moore	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.		Reynolds	Pa.
4.	Rev. R. H. Kriebel	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	E. Broad St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.
5.	Mr. Charles H. Carter	BUS. ADD.	Research Division,	Atlas Powder Co.,	
		RES. ADD.		Wilmington, Del.	

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Mr. Emil J. Pittner	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	[illegible]	State College,	Pa.
2.	Mr. Francis Burdick	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	Arlington St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.
3.	Miss Pearl I. Young	BUS. ADD.	Dept. of Physics,	P.S.C. Undergraduate Cntr,	
		RES. ADD.		Pottsville, Pa.	
4.	Mr. Edwin Glasgow	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.		Darlington,	Pa.
5.	Prof. E. B. Scavely	BUS. ADD.	Elec. Eng. Dept,	Penn State College,	
		RES. ADD.		State College, Pa.	

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

			Street and Number	City	State
1.	Mr. Robert Cooper	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	R.D. #2	Mountain Top,	Pa.
2.	Mrs. Daniel Fine	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	R.D. #2	Mountain Top,	Pa.
3.	Mr. Edwin Henry	BUS. ADD.			
		RES. ADD.	R.D. #2	Mountain Top,	Pa.

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS None at present

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT: Not Applicable

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	NAME	ADDRESS St. & No.	City	State
1.	United Furniture Co.	Public Square,	Wilkes-Barre,	Pa.
2.	Sears Roebuck + Co.	S. Main St,	Wilkes-Barre,	Pa.
3.	Wilkes-Barre Savings + Dep Bank	Public Square,	Wilkes-Barre,	Pa.

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
Feb '50	Present	R.D. #2,	Mountain Top,	Pa.,	U.S.A.
Feb '48	Feb '50	422 Windcrest,	State College,	Pa.,	U.S.A.
June '46	Feb '48	620 Arlington St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.,	U.S.A.
Oct '42	June '46	Military Service -	Home address	same as above	
1939	1942	207 Lehigh St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.,	U.S.A.
1926?	1939	104 Lehigh St,	Tamaqua,	Pa.	U.S.A.

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.	June '45	Aug '45	Oahu,	Hawaiian Islands,	Military Service
	Aug '45	Oct '45	Around Manila,	Luzon, P.I.,	" "
	Oct '45	Apr '46	Nagoya, Japan		" "

FROM ________ TO ________ ________
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________
City or Section Country Purpose

FROM ________ TO ________ ________
City or Section Country Purpose

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT—NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: Not Applicable

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? ________ GIVE APPROXIMATE

DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: ________

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Phalanx Fraternity, Tamaqua, Pa., U.S.A.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: From about 1931 to about 1933

2. Eta Kappa Nu, Epsilon Chapter, Pa. State College, State College, Pa.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: Nov. 1949 to Present

3. A.I.E.E. 33 W. 39th St., New York 18, N.Y., U.S.A.
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: Student member from Oct '47 to present

4. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

5. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

6. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

7. ________
Name and Chapter St. & No. City State Country
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ________

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE French SPEAK None READ Slight WRITE Slight

LANGUAGE ____________ SPEAK ____________ READ ____________ WRITE ____________

LANGUAGE ____________ SPEAK ____________ READ ____________ WRITE ____________

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Fishing, Golf, Bowling - Average Proficiency
Radio - Average Proficiency

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

I have been an instructor upon two occasions - military & civilian.

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

None

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

I was a Cryptographic Security Officer, Army Air Force, investigated and given loyalty clearance about March, 1945

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No

IF "YES", EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Very Moderately

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

Not Applicable

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

Not Applicable

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Mrs. Wilma M. Christ RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa., U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

No.

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Mountain Top, Pa. (City and State) DATE July 24, 1950

Robert Cooper (Witness) [illegible] Christ (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Sec. 14 (cont'd.)

1935 to 1937 – During this period of time I was employed by Allison's Esso Service, Tamaqua, Pa., operating a gas station for Mr. William G. Allison. I left this position to obtain better-paying employment with Atlas Powder Company, Tuw Reynolds, Pa. I also worked as a Small Machine Molder for Tamaqua Manufacturing Company, Tamaqua, Pa, making and pouring gray cast iron molds. My wages were $.35 per hour. I left when the company went out of business. I was also employed by the A&P Tea Co, Tamaqua, Pa. for a short period of time. I left this Company for better employment with the Tamaqua Mfg Company.

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Application for Electronics position
2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):
3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State):
4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: 7/24/50
5. MR. MRS. MISS (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): David Lamar Christ
6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: R.D. #2, Mountain Top, Pa.
(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Mountain Top, Pa.

ANNOUNCEMENT

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Pennsylvania
8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: —
(B) HOME PHONE: 2299(Nuangola
9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Jan 20, 1918
10. ☑ MARRIED ☐ SINGLE
11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Tamaqua, Pa.
12. ☑ MALE ☐ FEMALE
13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 6 FEET 0 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 185 POUNDS
14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO
(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: GS-12

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPD. ☐ INELIGIBLE	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $4500.00 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.
(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS
NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.
(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☑ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY
(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED,
☑ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☑ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM Feb, 1950 TO PRESENT TIME
EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Instructor, Ind. Electricity
CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): None
SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 340.00 PER Mo. PRESENT $ 340.00 PER Mo
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. George Bierly
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Pa. State College Extension, 75 E. Union St, Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Technical Institute
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 20-25 students per class.
REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: To embark on a career of Electrical Engineering
DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: I am an instructor, teaching basic electricity, industrial electricity (including industrial electronics), and radio communications on a Technical Institute level. These are one-year courses purported to be on a college level

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM ~~Sept~~ June 1946 TO Feb, 1948	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Powder Helper	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 1.22 PER hr. FINAL $ 1.35 PER hr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Reynolds, Pa.		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Max Colson	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Atlas Powder Company Reynolds, Pa.		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Explosives	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU Variable (see below)		REASON FOR LEAVING Attend Pa. State College.	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK From June '46 to Sept. '46, I worked full-time, preparing and packing gelatin for shipment in the Gelatin Boxpack on the Powder Line. From Sept '46 to Feb '48, I worked four hours nightly, full-time during vacations, while attending Pa State College Undergraduate Center, Pottsville, Pa., in a full-time Electrical Engineering Curriculum. From Feb '48 until Feb '52, I attended the main campus of the college at State College, Pa.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct '42 TO May '46	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION 1st Lt., Air Corps	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 50.00 PER mo. FINAL $ 175.00 PER mo.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Kanoya, Japan - APO 929		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Capt. James Purdy	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Det. 118, 139th AACS Squadron APO 929		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Airway Communications	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU 30-40 { Radio Station Crypto. Section		REASON FOR LEAVING Separation from Service	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK As an enlisted man, from Oct '42 to Dec '44, I attended a Radio Opr.-Mech. School 4 months, served as Radio Mchs. Instructor, 11 mo., attended Aviation Cadets (Communications), 9 months. Upon being commissioned Dec '44, I became a Communications Officer and Cryptographic Security Officer. With Det. 118, 139th AACS Sq., I was Radio Station Officer, Communications Security Officer, and Personnel and Finance Officer.

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 1937 TO Oct '42	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Powder Helper	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 0.65 PER hr FINAL $ 0.88 PER hr } Approx.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Reynolds, Pa.		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Robert Arner	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Atlas Powder Company Reynolds, Pa.		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Explosives	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU Varied (see below)		REASON FOR LEAVING Enter Armed Service	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK For approximately one year, worked at Bomb Plant, main position being that of tending tank for melting TNT. Balance of time employed on Powder Line, preparing and packing sticks of gelatin for shipment. Part of time was night shift foreman of Boxpack (2 to 5 men)

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 1935 TO 1937

T TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICA GRADE (If in Fed Servi

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK During this period of time I was employed by Allison's Esso Service Tamaqua Pa, operating gas station for Mr. Wm. G. Allison. I left position to obtain better-paying employment with Atlas Powder Co. I also worked as a small machine molder for Tamaqua Mfg. Co., Tamaqua Pa. making and pouring gray cast iron molds. I was paid .35 per hr. I left when the company went out of business. I was also employed by the A&P Company, as a clerk for a short period of time, leaving the company for better employment with the Tamaqua, Mfg. Co. I do not know the dates for these periods.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES		LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
FROM	TO		
Jan '43	May '43	Chicago, Ill	Radio Op & Mechs - Total hours - 540
Mar '44	July '44	San Antonio, Tex	Aviation Cadet Pre-Tech Course (OCS) 20 wks.
July '44	Dec '44	Yale U., New Haven, Conn	Communications Course - 700 hours

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF:

☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☑ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED Tamaqua H.S., Tamaqua, Pa.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED Mathematics, Physics

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED		YEARS COMPLETED		DEGREES CONFERRED		SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
		FROM	TO	DAY	NIGHT	TITLE	DATE	
Pa. State College, State College, Pa.	Elec. Eng. Electronic	Sept '46	Feb '50	4		B.S.	2/1/50	161

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF ~~GRADUATE~~ COLLEGE SUBJECTS (Electives)	SEMESTER HOURS
Mathematics	22	Applied Electronics & Ind. Electronics	6
Required Basic Electrical Courses	36	Radio Eng. & U.H.F. Techniques	6
Electronics (Basic)	4	Engineering Analysis, Pulse Techniques	6

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	NIGHT
None				

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR	EXC.	GOOD	FAIR
French			✓						✓

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Hawaii, Philippine Islands, Japan, June '45 to April '46, military service

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING .... SHORTHAND .....

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☑ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

Student Member A.I.E.E.
National Honorary Frat. - Eta Kappa Nu.

24 REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1 Mr. Charles H. Carter	Manager, Process Development Research Div, Atlas Powder Co, Wilmington, Del.	Research Chemist
2 Prof F. T. Hall, Jr	Electrical Engineering Dept, Pa State College, State College, Pa.	Prof, Elec. Eng.
3 Miss Pearl I. Young	Dept. of Physics, P.S.C. Undergraduate Center, Pottsville, Pa.	Prof, Physics

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	✓	
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
28 ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		✓
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30 SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		✓
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		✓
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		✓

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		✓
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		✓

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	✓	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	✓	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	✓	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Oct 29, 1942	May 29, 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army Air Force	0-877993

	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?	✓	
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		✓
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		✓
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		✓

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency:

Title:

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	
	None Applicable		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT David F. Christ

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initials, and surname) If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

ck

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff **DATE:** 9 November 1950

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: CHRIST, David Lamar - 43872

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 28 August 1950, which requested that Subject be granted provisional clearance to permit his immediate entry on duty. Subject is an applicant for a position as Electronics Engineer, GS-10, in OPC.

This is to advise that this office interposes no objection from a security standpoint to a temporary appointment of Subject to work on unclassified duties for the training staff, upon the condition that Subject (1) not have access to classified material, (2) not have access to CIA secure areas, (3) not be issued a CIA badge or credential, and (4) that he not represent himself in any official capacity as a CIA employee. The Subject may not be assigned to duty in any CIA staff or office without further authority from the Chief, Inspection and Security Staff.

FOR THE CHIEF, INSPECTION AND SECURITY STAFF:

C. V. Broadley

C. V. BROADLEY
Chief, Security Division

ER

[illegible]

NOV 9 4 31 PM '50

CONFIDENTIAL

E 44

1. SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 340	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	$22,755	11/21/65	GS 16	6	$23,425	11/19/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 9/13/67

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP
☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E. D. ECHOLS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

P

JBR

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 7	$31,857

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 7	$30,054

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 7	$25,176	$27,401

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
059090	CHRIST DAVID L	82 340 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$24,477	11/19/67	GS 16	7	$25,176	02/25/68			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ R S WATTLES 25 FEBRUARY 1968

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Use ... Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS		GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
CHRIST DAVID L	059090	82 340	V	GS 16 5	$22,755	$23,778

[illegible] 3

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

To : Chief, Employees Division, Special Support Staff
Date: 24 November 1950

From : Chief of Inspection and Security Staff
Number: 43872

Subject: CHRIST, David L.

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Subject is currently on duty with this Agency.

Miss Tellier notified 4/21 [illegible]

Ermal P. Geiss
ERMAL P. GEISS
Chief, Personnel Security Branch

[illegible] on duty
EM

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: (TICHBORN)
LOPEZ, HENRY D.

INCLUSIVE DATES: ______

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: ______

ROOM: ______

DELETIONS, IF ANY: ______

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

ICHBORN, EDWARD D

17 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Amendment
Edward G. TICHBORN

Transmitted herewith is original and one copy of amendment to subject's contract which was terminated 31 August 1968, signed by subject acknowledging a one-time lump sum taxable payment in the amount of $3,311, which serves as a "quit claim".

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, DO Personnel & Training

Attachments: 2

cc: Mr. George Powell w/o att's

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 15 August 1968 you are authorized a one-time lump sum taxable payment in the amount of $3,311.

In full and final consideration for authorization and payment of the above sum, you herein release and forever discharge the United States Government and any Agency, Department or Instrumentality thereof and its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party whatsoever throughout the world arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under said contract.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

ab / ks
15 Aug 68

[illegible]

7

SECRET

12 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Chief, Contract Personnel Division**

THROUGH: **Assistant for Non-Staff Personnel**

SUBJECT: **Edward G. TICHBORN (P) - Contract Agent**

1. Subject has been given 30 days notice as provided in his contract, to the effect that his contract will be terminated 31 August 1968.

2. Subject was initially employed in 1959 and was transferred to DO Division in July of 1967 from the WH Division. In the course of discussing the termination of his services, subject stated that during his tenure with the WH Division, he had been promised certain bonuses upon termination of his Agency service. The WH Division has agreed to a termination payment of $3,310.72 which represents two months' salary of a per annum salary of $17,000 plus $477.38 in settlement of his accounting which is nontaxable.

3. In addition it is requested that the following statement be included in the amendment:

> You release and forever discharge the United States Government and any Agency, Department or Instrumentality thereof and its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form or by any party whatsoever throughout the World arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under said contract.

4. Attached is signed Notice of Termination in duplicate.

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

W. T. Montgomery

W. T. MONTGOMERY
Chief, DO Support Group

Attachment:
as stated

SECRET

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACT

Mr. Henry P. Lopez

Dear Mr. Lopez:

You are hereby notified that your services under a contract with the U. S. Government, effective 19 May 1961, are to be terminated for the convenience of the U. S. Government pursuant to paragraph 10 of said contract, and that the thirty (30) days notice required by the contract begins 2 August 1968.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph 9 of said contract which reads as follows:

> "9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereof.

U. S. GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Dow E. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Henry P. Lopez

[illegible] 7, 1968
(date)

WITNESS

[illegible] 1968
(date)

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER

24 November 1967

Edward G. Tichborn

1 October 1967

19 May 1961

one (1) year

24 Nov. 67
D 6 L /MD

16 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. [illegible] (P)

It is requested that subject's contract which expired 30 September 1967 be extended for one year.

Virginia C. Lynch
Chief, D. Personnel & Training

APPROVED:

W. T. Montgomery
W. T. MONTGOMERY, C/[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : OF/C&TD/CAAS

DATE: July 5, 1967

VIA :Contract Personnel Division

FROM :WH/Contracts

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN, Reassignment

1. Effective 1 July 1967, Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor, has been reassigned to DO. Effective the same date all costs incident to contract services are chargeable to DO.

2. Miss Virginia Lynch, C/DO/Pers may be contacted for further information.

WM. S. Renehan

cc: C/WH/B&F
C/DO/Pers

APPROVED:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher

Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

DATE: 7 [illegible]

CTC No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible] (s)

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
Zero (00.0) per cent	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

FORM 5-66 2643 SECRET

3 - CPD

18 Oct 66

C/CPD:

Attached is a draft of an amendment on TICHBORN. Note memo of request asks for an increase in basic fee from $12,000 to $17,000 based on TICHBORN's "overall performance and full time services". ~~This~~

Additional memoranda in file reflect the following:

(1) 19 May 1961 contract (still in effect) provided a basic fee of $8000 with no mention of amount of time subject worked to earn such.

(2) WH memo of 18 June 63 asked a pay increase from $8000 to $9000 based upon, "manner of TICHBORN's performance and the increase amt. of time which he devotes to Agency requirements".

(3) WH dispatch of 9 Nov 64 said that, "Hqs agrees that present expiring contract called for about 2/3rds subject's time---TICHBORN pointed out.... he now engaged 90% of his time for Agency".

(4) WH memo of 24 Nov 64 requested an increase from $9000 to $12,000 based upon TICHBORN's increased value plus "using TICHBORN's service on substantially a full time basis".

(5) As cited above, current WH memo of 7 Oct 66 asks for an increase of ~~$14~~ from $12,000 to $17,000 based on subject's "overall performance and full time services".

I pointed out the above chrono with respect to the ever increasing usage of subject's time to Henehan who apparently feels the last memo is OK unless CPD desires to make a formal objection and return it.

Paul

Paul – OK to prepare – I will hold pending receipt of supplementary →

Note – Per C/CPD WH (Canehan) will submit a new memo to justify the current request.

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 1 October 1966, said contract, as amended, is further amended by:

(a) Deleting the figure $12,000 from paragraph one (1) (a) and substituting in lieu thereof the figure $17,000;

(b) Deleting paragraph one (1) (b) in its entirety; and

(c) Adding the following paragraph:

"13. Offset. Emoluments (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities are the property of the U. S. Government. Procedurally, such emoluments will be offset against amounts due you under this agreement and are acknowledged to be payment by the Government hereunder and for Federal income tax purposes. If cover emoluments exceed those due you under this contract, you will dispose of the excess amount in conformance with Governmental instructions."

In addition, said contract is further amended by extending its term through 30 September 1967.

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

Pulask
20 Oct. 66

SECRET

31 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

FROM : WH/Pers/Contracts

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Compensation

1. Reference is made to your recent oral request concerning the increase in compensation for Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor.

2. The recommendation for the increase was based on C/WHD's review of TICHBORN's performance, availability of full time services and direct negotiation. It is to be noted that the basic recommendation also provided for the amendment to offset cover earnings.

William S. Renehan

SECRET

SECRET

7 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended, for Edward G. TICHBORN, Independent Contractor, be further amended effective 1 October 1966 as follows:

   a. Increase basic compensation to $17,000. per annum. [illegible]

   b. Delete para. 1.b. The provision is not applicable due to reassignment to a domestic location.

   c. Provide offset provision of basic contract compensation as TICHBORN will be paid through a DODS proprietary (WUSALINE).

   d. CPD may determine whether it is necessary to modify the amendments relating to Social Security and Income Taxes as deductions will be handled by the cover organization.

   e. Extend contract through 30 September 1967.

   f. Provide for TICHBORN's acceptance and signature on the amendment.

2. The increase in basic compensation is based on TICHBORN's overall performance and full time services.

for William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

[illegible]

SECRET

Contract Service — Edward G. Tichborn (P)

Date	Action	Compensation
15 Oct 59	Hired as an Independent Contractor	$50 Per day
13 Jan 60	Pay adjustment	See Contract
23 Feb 61	" "	" "
18 May 61	Contract Terminated	
19 May 61	Hired as an Independent Contractor	$8,000 P.A.
19 ~~May~~ 63	Pay increase	9,000
1 Dec 64	" "	12,000
1 Dec 64	As an Independent Contractor, authorized Social Security	

SECRET

Mr. Edward O. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 27 May 1966, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"12. Taxes As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph one (1) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for Edward O. [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible] per cent (10.[illegible])	1 [illegible] 196[illegible]
Eleven [illegible] per cent ([illegible])	1 [illegible] 196[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

A. [illegible]

[illegible]

3

Approval Chief, CPD

Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for
Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Effective 19 November 1965, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 May 1961 is extended for a period of one (1) year.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

DHL/bk/21 April '66
Reg in Darriotis files

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor."

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY__________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

PW/sid/9 Sept. 65
wk/3:e

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 15 November 1964 said contract is amended by enlarging the scope of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" to authorize a one time payment of additional taxable compensation in the amount of $1500.

Effective 1 December 1964 the figure $9,000 is deleted from paragraph one (1) (a) and in lieu thereof the figure $12,000 is substituted.

Effective 19 November 1964 said contract, as amended, is extended for a period of one (1) year.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

E H [illegible]
21 Nov 64

[illegible]

SECRET

24 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Edward G. TICHBORN, be further amended as follows:

a. Effective 15 November 1964 a one-time payment of additional compensation in the amount of $1,500 for full time services rendered during a TDY assignment from June through August 1964. Payment will be made by the Station.

b. Increase in basic compensation from $9,000 to $12,000 per annum effective 1 December 1964.

c. Extend period of contract for an additional one year.

2. The Mexico Station recommendation as concurred with by WHD is based on increased operational activities which required having available and using TICHBORN's services on substantially a full time basis. TICHBORN has agreed to fulfill the assignments including TDY assignments in other countries from time to time. In view of the level of the work involved and of TICHBORN's demonstrated ability, the basic recommendations are considered fully warranted.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Chief

SECRET

C R Halliwell

ORIG : C.R.Halliwell
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4523
DATE : 9 NOVEMBER 1964

MESSAGE FORM

27 SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-116/2
201-253203

22

ROUTING R1

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2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

11 Nov 64 1 10 10z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO R1/AN, CA/O 4, CA2, CI/OPS, OF3, VR, FILE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 63360

LICOLIC

REF: HMMA 24353

1. EDWARD G. TICHBORN C.A DISCUSSED TERMS HIS KUBARK CONTRACT DURING VISIT HQS EARLY NOVEMBER. HQS AGREES PRESENT EXRIRR EXPIRING CONTRACT CALLED FOR ABOUT TWO THIRDS SUBJ'S TIME. TICHBORN POINTED OUT PER REFERENCE HE NOW ENGAGED NINETY PERCENT TIME FOR KUBARK.

2. SUBJECT STATION CONCURRENCE HQS RECOMMENDS NEW ONE-YEAR RRXIXRXXI CONTRACT PROVIDE RAISE FROM $9000 TO $13000 PLUS $3000 QUARTERS PER ANNUM. ALSO LUMP SUM PAYMENT 1500 DOLLARS FOR COMPENSATION HIS RECENT FULL TIME SERVICE FUASPEN. ADVISE IF YOU CONCUR EXTEND HIS CONTRACT ONE YEAR EFFECTIVE 19 NOVEMBER.

3. HQS TOLD TICHBORN WE CONSIDERED HIS SERVICES VALUABLE AS WELL AS HIS EVER-WILLINGNESS DEPART ON SHORT R NOTICE ASSIGNMENTS OTHER DIVISION AREAS. OBVIOUSLY THIS PROPOSED RAISE WITH WHICH SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST HAPPY SINCE STILL IMPOSES NO RESTRICTIONS ON HIS SOMETIME OUTSIDE LEGAL WORK, WILL BE WITH UNDERSTANDING HE CONTINUE DEVOTE NEAR FULL-TIME MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING ORMINE AND QRMANTLE PLUS other ~~MISCELLANEOUS~~ STATION ~~KS~~ or Hqs ASSIGNMENTS.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

[illegible] 12 8 47 [illegible] '6[illegible]

TO : [illegible]F PERSONNEL
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: INFO PAGE TWO

TO INFO: CITE DIR 63360

4. DISPATCH FOLLOWS ON QRMINE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/POB
WH/PERS
WH/B&F

R. W. Herbert
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

N. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OF[illegible]E IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

FROM : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Extension for

Edward G. TICHBORN

1. Effective 19 May 1964, the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 19 May 1961 is extended for a period of six (6) months.

2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer

SHK/JT 22 May 64

[illegible]

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

13 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Edward G. TICHBORN

Please extend for a period of six (6) months the present contract of Edward G. TICHBORN which was due to expire on 18 May 1964.

for W. E. Brooks
C/WH/Support

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 30 September 1963, said contract, as amended, is further amended by adding the following paragraph after paragraph ten (10) of said contract:

> "11. Health Insurance. You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected contract individuals of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization will bear that portion of your total premium cost which it is authorized to bear for the original group of contract participants in said program. you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

DHL-eld 4 Oct 63
WH Div

This amend based on oral notification from Insurance Branch that application for insurance was approved by Board.

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961, as amended.

Effective 19 May 1963 said contract is extended for a period of one (1) year. Effective 1 June 1963 said contract, as amended, is further amended by the deletion in its entirety of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" and by substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be compensated as follows:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $9000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation for quarters procurement in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum, effective upon your arrival and applicable only to your initial permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by your cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement."

Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

All other terms and conditions of the contract as amended remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

[illegible]
7 July 63
[illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

18 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p), Amendment of Contract

1. It is requested that the contract, as amended for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be further amended effective 1 June 1962 as follows:

a. Increase basic compensation from $8,000 to $9,000 per annum.

b. Provide additional compensation for quarters procurement at the rate of $3,000 per annum for self and dependents.

c. Extend the period of the contract for an additional year.

d. All other provisions of the contract remain in effect.

2. The increase in compensation is recommended by the Mexico City Station. It is based on the record of TICHBORN's performance and the increased amount of time which he devotes to Agency requirements.

3. The WH Division concurs with the Station's recommendation. TICHBORN has become an increasingly valuable and productive covert agent.

[illegible]

Chief, [illegible] Support

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

17 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : OP 2, S/C 2

SECRET 212325Z IN43671

DIR CITE MEXI 4670 22 MAY 1963

REF HMMW-11562 IN 43671

CA

1. STATION AGREES HQS EVALUATION TICHBORN AND CONCURS SALARY INCREASE AND HOUSING ALLOWANCE AMENDMENT. ALSO AGREE INSURANCE RIGHTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED CONTRACT.

2. BELIEVE RAISE SHOULD BE $1,000 PER ANNUM WITH HOUSING AT $3,000, WHICH TOTAL MEETS TICHBORN'S OWN REQUEST. THESE FIGURES PROPOSED TO TICHBORN (WITHOUT COMMITMENT) 21 MAY AND ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 19 May 1961.

To rectify an administrative oversight said contract is amended as of its effective date by revising paragraph two (2) entitled 'Travel and Operational Expenses" to read as follows:

> "2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.'

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

DHL-dd 25 Mar 63
WH Div

SECRET

20 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p), Contract Amendment

1. It is requested that the contract for Edward G. TICHBORN, Contract Agent, be amended to delete the current paragraph 2. Travel and Operational Expenses and insert:

> "2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

The effective date of the amendment should be as of the effective date of the contract, 19 May 1961.

2. The above request is corrective in nature as it was not intended to change the travel expense provision which had been in effect during his previous contract.

W. E. BROOKS
Chief, WH Support

Note: Per WH/B&F no travel and operational expense accountings have as yet been forwarded to FD. Both Division and subject intended subject's old travel and operational expense clause to be a part of the 19 May 1961 agreement. Check List was in error on this point.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division
Attention: Contract Agent Section

VIA: Central Cover Division
Attention: Mr. Mullen

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (p): Method of Payment

1. It is requested that Finance Division pay Contract Agent Edward G. TICHBORN (p) through Central Cover Division's mechanism Ashmead, Hanniford Associates. TICHBORN's new contract became effective 19 May 1961.

2. It is requested that salary due TICHBORN since the effective date of his contract be paid as soon as possible.

3. Attached hereto are forms 281 and 313a (top section). The bottom section of 313a is distributed separately.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

EMPLOYEE'S WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE AND QUESTIONNAIRE

PRINT NAME (Pseudonym)

TICHBORN, Edward O.

WITHHOLDING EXEMPTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

1. NUMBER OF EXEMPTIONS.--Do not claim more than the correct number of exemptions. However, if you expect to owe more income tax for the year than will be withheld if you claim every exemption to which you are entitled, you may increase the withholding by claiming a smaller number of exemptions.

2. CHANGES IN EXEMPTIONS.--You may file a new certificate at any time if the number of your exemptions INCREASES.

You must file a new certificate within 10 days if the number of exemptions previously claimed by you DECREASES for any of the following reasons:

(a) Your wife (or husband) for whom you have been claiming exemption is divorced or legally separated, or claims her (or his) own exemption on a separate certificate.

(b) The support of a dependent for whom you claimed exemption is taken over by someone else, so that you no longer expect to furnish more than half the support for the year.

(c) You find that a dependent for whom you claimed exemption will receive $600 or more of income of his own during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age).

OTHER DECREASES in exemption, such as the death of a wife or a dependent, do not affect your withholding until the next year, but require the filing of a new certificate by December 1 of the year in which they occur.

For further information about changes in exemption status resulting from marriage, divorce, legal separation, birth, death, new dependents, multiple-support agreements, old age, blindness, etc., consult your local District Director of Internal Revenue or your employer.

3. DEPENDENTS.--To qualify as your dependent (line 4 below), a person (a) must receive more than one-half of his or her support from you for the year, and (b) must have less than $600 gross income during the year (except your child who is a student or who is under 19 years of age), and (c) must not be claimed as an exemption by such person's husband or wife, and (d) must be a citizen or resident of the United States or a resident of Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Panama or the Canal Zone, and (e) must (1) have your home as his principal residence and be a member of your household for the entire year, or (2) be related to you as follows:

Your son or daughter (including legally adopted children), grandchild, stepson, stepdaughter, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;

Your father, mother, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, father-in-law, or mother-in-law;

Your brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, half sister, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law;

Your uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece (but only if related by blood).

4. PENALTIES.--Penalties are imposed for willfully supplying false information or willful failure to supply information which would reduce the withholding exemption.

1. If SINGLE, and you claim an exemption, write the figure "1" . . . . ____

2. If MARRIED, one exemption each for husband and wife if not claimed on another certificate.

(a) If you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2"

(b) If you claim one of these exemptions, write the figure "1" 2

(c) If you claim neither of these exemptions, write "0"

3. Exemptions for age and blindness (applicable only to you and your wife but not to dependents):

(a) If you or your wife will be 65 years of age or older at the end of the year, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both will be 65 or older, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2". ____

(b) If you or your wife are blind, and you claim this exemption, write the figure "1"; if both are blind, and you claim both of these exemptions, write the figure "2" . . . . ____

4. If you claim exemptions for one or more dependents, write the number of such exemptions. (Do not claim exemption for a dependent unless you are qualified under instruction 3 above.) 3

5. Add the number of exemptions which you have claimed above and write the total. 5

SOURCES OF INCOME

INDICATE SOURCE(S) OF INCOME ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

IF COVER FACILITY INDICATE HOW MUCH PER YEAR $ 9,000

TAXES WITHHELD FROM ABOVE COVER INCOME ☐ YES ☒ NO

INDICATE TYPE(S) OF TAXES AND AMOUNT(S) WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD [illegible]

U.S. TAXES $

FOREIGN TAXES $

INDICATE COVER PAY PERIOD ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ SEMIMONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FILED ☒ YES ☐ NO

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the number of withholding exemptions claimed on this form does not exceed the number to which I am entitled, and that the information relative to sources of income shown hereon is correct.

DATE

SIGNED (Pseudonym)

FORM NO. 313
1 OCT 54

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM **TICHBORN, Edward G.**

2. 3723

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS *(Check as appropriate)*

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☒ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT *(Per annum)* $ 8,000	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED *(Allowances, etc.)*.	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN *(Date)*

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☒ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY *(Cryptonym)*

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS *(See item 16 below)*

☒ COVERT *(If covert only, omit rest of this item.)* ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX *(Check one)*

☒ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. N.A.

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED

13. MARITAL STATUS *(Complete as appropriate)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE 5 April 1954

DATE OF DEATH

DATE OF DECREE

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country)

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE *(Omit self and spouse)*

RELATIONSHIP *(No names)*	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Son	1952	U.S.	Mexico
Son	1955	U.S.	Mexico
Daughter	1957	U.S.	Mexico

15. REMARKS

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY WLN ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☐ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE 13 July'61

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL W. Lehman Smith

W. Lehman Smith

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT *(Explain when not signed)*

DATE

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL *(Pseudonym)* (not available)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG AND COPY - TO FINANCE: COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER: COPY - TO FILE

FORM 6-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO: HMMT-2092

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO

TO: Chief, WHD

INFO

DATE: 7 July 1961

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

RE 413 — (CHECK "X" ONE)

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

SUBJECT: Signed Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN

ACTION REQUIRED: None; for information.

REFERENCES: HMMS-1921, 6 June 1961

1. Returned herewith is one copy of Edward G. TICHBORN's contract.

2. Regarding paragraph 1 of the contract, TICHBORN states that he has already arranged with Headquarters to mail his salary check from a foundation in Philadelphia to his bank.

3. TICHBORN further states that under his previous contract he did not file a covert tax return and taxes were not withheld. According to TICHBORN he was told in Headquarters that KUBARK would depend on him to report his KUBARK income as coming from the Philadelphia client and it would be incorporated in his overt return. TICHBORN does not wish to give a copy of his overt return to KUBARK.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachment: TICHBORN Contract (1 copy), h/w

5 July 1961

Distribution:
  3 - Hqs, w/att
  2 - Files

FORM 53 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 October 1959, as amended. Effective 18 May 1961, said contract is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties hereto and in lieu thereof the following is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $8000 per annum. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by the Government. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

4. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

5. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

6. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

10. Term. This contract is effective as of 19 May 1961, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

RC Cfmd/29 May 61
WH/propaganda
C A.

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: Use R 20-1003 and RP 20-1003-1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Smith, Lee

DIVISION: WHD

TELEPHONE EXTENSION:

DATE:

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
TICHBORN, Edward G.
C-77119

2A. PROJECT: JMPOPLAR-10

2B. PERMANENT STATION:

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☐ UV

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES:

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Contract Agent (Independent Contractor) Contract signed 15 Oct 1959. Basic salary $50.00 per day.

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date):

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract Agent ✓

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: United States

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 41

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 28 May 1920

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): 6505 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, California

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country):

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 Sons - Sven 9, and Gregory 6 years old;
1 Daughter - Drusilla 3 years old.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army, Medical Corps

24. RANK OR GRADE: Staff Sergeant

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE: ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA: NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: ~~[illegible]~~ ✓ NA
$8,000.00 per yr.

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: N.A.

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): N.A.

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING:

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☐
NO	☒	☒

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: N.A.

32. POST: N.A.

33. OTHER:

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): Commercial

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS: ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: ☐ YES ☒ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED: ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: ☐ YES N.A. ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:

43. ENTERTAINMENT:

44. OTHER: Subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses (travel & per diem, including mileage for travel by private vehicle), when making KUBARK-directed trips outside Mexico City.

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 3-56 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DATE

SECTION VIII OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

N.A.

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	☐	PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐	PROPRIETARY	☐	CULTURAL	☒	COMMERCIAL	☐	TOURIST
	☐	ESTABLISHED		☐	SUBSIDIZED	☐	EDUCATIONAL	☐	MILITARY	☐	OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

N.A. ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ____ MONTHS ____ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 May 1961

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

C.A.

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will spot and assess student leaders in relation to ZREAGER Program. Subject will travel throughout the Hemisphere in political action missions as directed by WHD.

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has carried out several high-level political action assignments for KUBARK in Latin America and other areas. He is particularly experienced in advising on political techniques.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐	GRADE SCHOOL	☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐	BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE		
☐	COLLEGE (No degree)	☐	COLLEGE DEGREE	X	POST GRADUATE LLB ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	x			x			x		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: United States

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE: Mexico; Latin America.

SECTION XV EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Subject will be authorized to audit courses of instruction in universities in Mexico City on a reimbursable basis, in fulfillment of objectives under the ZREAGER Program.

☐ over

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
23 May 1961	Charles P. Fenney Fenney, Charles P., WH/CA/Prop	23 May 61	Arneson Paul E. Arneson. C/WH/Support

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Payroll Division

SUBJECT: Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Please cancel Edward G. TICHBORN's present contract effective as of ~~12~~ c.o.b. 18 May 1961.

2. A new contract for Subject will be requested by the WH Division in the immediate future.

Thomas F. McCoy
Acting Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

APPROVED:

SECRET

SECRET

22 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : New Contract for Edward G. TICHBORN (p)
C-77119

Preparation of a new contract for Subject is requested, to be drawn up on the basis of the attached Contract Information Check List.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING /br
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : C.C. PENNEY
UNIT : WH/PO/B
EXT : 3503
DATE : ~~20~~ 22 MAY 1961 1667

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

22 MAY 61 23 04z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : CA 2, CA/PRG, CI/OA, OP 2, S/C 2

~~910 CEN~~
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 58552 OUT58552

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 41303 41303

CA

1. RICHARD O. TICHBORN IDEN A DEPARTED WASH 20 MAY FOR MEXI WHERE HE WILL BE EMPLOYED AS LEGAL COUNSEL TO IDEN B.

2. TICHBORN HAS BEEN USED BY KUBARK AS POLITICAL ADVISOR ON ELECTION OPS. PRIOR DEPARTURE HQS DISCUSSED CONTRACT POSSIBILITIES WITH HIM AND AGREED PREPARE CONTRACT WHICH WILL BE SENT MEXI NEAR FUTURE FOR SIGNATURE.

3. HQS ANTICIPATES USING TICHBORN AS ROVING POLITICAL ADVISOR PROVIDING VARIOUS FIELD STATIONS WITH GUIDANCE ON ELECTION OPS. WILL ALSO USE HIM TO DEVELOP ZREAGER CANDIDATES VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND MAY APPOINT HIM FIELD REP FOR DTEHBARGO.

4. TICHBORN WILL HAVE NO OPS RESPONSIBILITIES MEXI UNLESS STATION SO DESIRES. HOWEVER HE WOULD REQUIRE SOME COMMO AND ADMIN SUPPORT WHEN OVERT CHANNELS UNSUITABLE.

5. POUCHING PROPOSED CONTRACT AND MORE DETAILS RE POSSIBLE USE IN NEAR FUTURE. REQUEST STATION OFFICER USING NAME "FRANK NELSON" CALL TICHBORN AT HOTEL MONTEJO, REFORMA ON 29 MAY TO ESTABLISH INITIAL CONTACT. ATTEMPTING HAVE CONTRACT MEXI BY THAT TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/PO/B
COORDINATING OFFICERS

NED P. HOLMAN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 October 1959, as amended.

Effective 23 February 1961, the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," is suspended and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

> "In full consideration for your undertaking a task, the subject matter and scope of which have been made known to you, you will be paid a fee in the amount of $ 1000.00. Payment of said fee will be made you upon the successful completion of the task, after which the suspended portion of paragraph one (1) shall once again assume full force and effect."

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward G. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

DH/d - std 8 Mar 60
CA/PAC Sylvia Neal
CA,
Co (Paul) Michael x4941

SECRET

3 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment #2 for Edward G. TICHBORN (P)

1. Contract amendment #2 is requested for Edward G. TICHBORN using the same general format as used in the first amendment excepting that Subject will receive the entire fee upon completion of the task. It is requested that the amount of the fee be left blank. Your office will be notified as to the correct figure as soon as it is determined.

2. The amendment is to be effective as of 23 February 1961.

Horace W. Davis
Chief
Political Action Group
Covert Action Staff

The figure $1000 is per Bill
Michael 8 Mar 61

gH

SECRET

SECRET

Bishop
AR Clapan
H Hornberger
JPR Ragan

9 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Edward G. Tichborn (P) - Hernia

1. On 1 February Edward G. Tichborn advised me that in lifting his bag out of a taxi on his return trip from Cuba, he suddenly felt a pain in the groin and was afraid that he had a hernia.

2. On the way to the airport he asked me if there would be any chance of the Government picking up his medical expenses in the event that he actually had a hernia which required any substantial treatment. I told him at that time that I did not know what the Government's position would be, but that I would check into the matter and let him know.

3. On 2 February, I contacted Mr. Vernon Turner, SSA/DDS, and explained the circumstances to him. At that time, I also pointed out that as far as the provisions of his contract were concerned, it was stated that he was not an employee of the U. S. Government and while it did not make specific reference to medical payments while he was working for us, it did not specifically preclude such payments. Mr. Turner opined that although the contract stated he was not an employee of the U. S. Government, in actual fact during the period he was doing our bidding, he was. I went on further to explain to Mr. Turner that in all probability we will call on Tichborn to do future services for us and that while he was being paid, it was doubtful that this reimbursement from us equaled what he would make in his regular law practice. Mr. Turner stated that there were a number of ways that we could alleviate his situation should it become necessary.

Misunderstanding. I said the facts of a case - not the words in a paper would probably be the basis for determination of employee status. If we wish to pay in this case a contractual payment - not necessarily related to medical problem - would probably be best solution. V.T.

4. The conclusion reached between me and Mr. Turner was that I should point out to Tichborn that we were under no obligation to recompense him for his injury; however, that upon the completion of treatment if he would submit a claim, we should be glad to review it sympathetically.

5. I passed the gist of the above on to Tichborn on 3 February.

Horace W. Davis
Chief
Political Action Division

HWD:bjl
Distribution:
Orig. - subj. file
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - chrono

Mr. Edward C. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

Reference is made to an agreement by and between yourself and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 15 October 1959.

Effective 13 January 1960, the first sentence of paragraph one (1), entitled "Compensation," is suspended and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

> "In full consideration for the undertaking by you of a task, the subject matter and scope of which has or will be made known to you, you will be paid a fee of $1300. It is understood and agreed that said fee is based upon the fact that the completion of the specified task can be achieved within a 21-day period. One-half of said fee may be advanced you as of the effective date of this amendment. Upon the successful completion of the task, you will be paid the remaining one-half, after which the suspended portion of paragraph one (1) shall once again assume full force and effect."

All other terms and conditions of the agreement, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

You will please indicate your approval by signing in the space provided below.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward C. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible] 12 Jan 60
[illegible]
C. A.
C. O. Horace [illegible] 2017

SECRET

8 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Miller

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment for Edward G. Tichborn (P)

To confirm your telephone conversation of this date with Barna Sprague, we wish to have the amendment for Subject's contract effective as of 13 January and to provide for basic compensation in the amount of $1300. for a period of approximately 21 days. We wish, further, to pay Subject one-half of this fee upon the date the contract amendment becomes effective. Should Subject complete his assignment in less than 21 days, he is still to be entitled to a payment of $1300. for his services.

Horace W. Davis
Acting Chief
Political Action Division

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Edward G. Tichborn

Dear Mr. Tichborn:

The United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and services you will be compensated, on a fee basis, at the rate of $50.00 per day or any fraction thereof during which your services are utilized hereunder, not to exceed $265 per week. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to CIA. No taxes will be withheld therefrom, but it will be your responsibility to report such income under existing Federal income tax laws and regulations. An appropriate Form 1099 will be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency in furtherance of the tax reporting requirement.

2. Travel and Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds on an actual, reasonable and necessary expense basis for those expenses incurred by you in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government and while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by CIA. Payment and accounting for all expenses incurred hereunder will be in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle CIA to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

4. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

5. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incident to an employee status.

6. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

$13

SECRET

7. Instructions. Instructions received by you from CIA in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

8. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

9. Term. This contract is effective as of 15 October 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated either:

(a) By thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Without prior notice by CIA, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from CIA. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY ______________________________
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Edward C. Tichborn

WITNESS: ______________________________

APPROVED:

____

RHK/jakur – 14 Oct 59
PP/PPD/Sylvestre
C.A
c.c Horace Davis x 2017

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Horace W. Davis
AC/PP/PAD

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2017
DATE: 7 October 1959

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
Edward G. Tichborn

2A. PROJECT: SGLACTEAL

2B. PERMANENT STATION:

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 9-2100-91-599

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: NA

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): POA, 11 May 1959 - OA pending

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☐ YES ☒ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Contract agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: US

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN NA ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 39

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 28 May 1920

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Los Angeles, California

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
2 sons, 7 and 4 years old.
1 daughter, 1 year old.

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army Med. Corps

24. RANK OR GRADE: Staff Sgt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $50.00 per day

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: ———

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): ———

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY
☐ COVER
☐ CIA
☒ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: NA

32. POST: NA

33. OTHER:

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ [illegible]

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION:

43. [illegible]:

44. OTHER: Subject will be reimbursed for all expenses and in addition will receive $50.00 per day when working, not to exceed $265.00 per week.

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH
☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ [illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION

PHONE EXTENSION

DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	X PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIARIES	☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL	X COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY	☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: ___ DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 October 1959

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (FI, PP, other): PP

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Subject will consult and advise on political techniques.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Active in Southern California politics, particularly Los Angeles area.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL	☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	
☐ COLLEGE (No degree)	☐ COLLEGE DEGREE	X POST GRADUATE LLB ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Mexico; Latin America

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Subject is in private law practice.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

NA

APPROVAL

DATE 8/1/59	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Horace W. Davis PP/AC/PAD	DATE 9.24.59	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE Charles Francis Charles J. Francis

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Zambernardi, Robert M.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 6 July 1956 – 15 Sept 1965

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

14-00000

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REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

ORIGINAL · Biographic Profile

— see sanitized copy in slot

Personnel Actions covering
Period After Mexico City
Assignment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 June 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZAMBERNARDI, Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS & REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 05 | YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5225-0079 1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
OPERATIONAL AIDS
PHOTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS BRANCH
AREA DESKS SECTION

4
2

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTO GEN

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0113

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~(011)~~

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02

16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 (3)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $8200

18. REMARKS

40

FROM: DDP/TSD
FOREIGN FIELD
MEXICO CITY

Recorded by CSPD
DW

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6/23/64
Cly 7/1/64

CC: Security & Vouchered Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: H. LEE OLSON

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: H Lee Olson
H. LEE OLSON, TSD/CMO

DATE SIGNED: 6/25/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRITY CODE	24. [illegible] CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	41300	TSD	25013		1	05 09 35		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC; 3 - FICA; 5 - NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE; 1 - 5 PT.; 2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV; PROV/TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER; 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: E. Johnson

DATE APPROVED: 6/30/64

FORM 1-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Zambernardi, Robert M.	Philip Edward - son	64-184

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on ~~Leg burn - 28 December~~ 1963

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
[illegible]	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-53 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 April 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZAMBERNARDI, ROBERT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION [redacted]

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 14 YEAR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3125-5700-3007

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Foreign Field
Western Hemisphere
Mexico

10

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico

11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.~~01~~63

16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 (2)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $7535

18. REMARKS:
FROM: GS-9 (2)

PIA

Recorded by
CSPD

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

DATE SIGNED:

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMC

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	46575	TS	45015		3	05 69 35		

28. DATE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. FEE
	98						

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS., 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 = YES, 2 = NO) CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5 APR 1963

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Paul E Wilson

DATE APPROVED: 5 Apr 63

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Zambernardi, Robert M	Paul - Son	63-460

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 22 February 63 Intestinal disorder

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
8 July 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 16 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZAMBERNARDI, Robert
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 | DAY 21 | YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | X= CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2125-5700-3007
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/TSD – Foreign Field
Western Hemisphere
Mexico

10

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico City, Mexico
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.63
16. GRADE AND STEP: 9 (1)
17. SALARY OR RATE: $6435 ✓
18. REMARKS: FROM: GS-8 (1)

CSPD
18

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS
DATE SIGNED:
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMC
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	46575	75	45025		3	05 19 35	1 21 62	1 21 62

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 5 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE; MO. DA. YR.
FOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT, 2 = 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CRED.: 1 = YES, 2 = NO
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 = WAIVED, 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-19 62
46. C.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 1/2/62

FORM 9-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (*Last-First-Middle*) ZAMBERNARDI, Robert	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT* Wife - Martha Cecilia	CLAIM NUMBER 61-286

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 3 March 1961 - Leiomyoma of Uterus

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) Zambernardi, Robert M.	XXXXXXXXX Dependent Wife Martha	CASE OR CLAIM NUMBER 56-226

There is on file in the Casualty Affairs Branch, Benefits and Casualty Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 16 February 1960.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE 8 April 1960	SIGNATURE OF O/P REPRESENTATIVE B. DeFelice

NOTICE C OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLA I FILE

FORM NO. 1 SEP 55 1076

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 Dec 1960		
1. SERIAL NUMBER: 522592	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZAMBERNARDI, Robert	
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 25 YEAR 60	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · CF TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO CF ☒	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1125-5700-3007	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/TSD Western Hemisphere MEXICO	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Mexico, City, Mexico	
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS [redacted]	12. POSITION NUMBER: 575	12a PCR CONTROL NO. · 13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS-8	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.63	16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 01 · 17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5885

18. REMARKS

[illegible] CSPD

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL JAMES R. SHIELDS	18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER James R. Shields JAMES R. SHIELDS TSD/CMO

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46575 41 55 · ALPHABETIC 75	22. STATION CODE: 46575	23. [illegible]	24. [illegible]: 3	25. [illegible]: 05 09 35
28. [illegible]	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSR · 2 - FICA · 3 - NONE				POD DATA
35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 - NONE · 1 - 5 PT. · 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE				
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA						
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-21-60			46. D.P. APPROVAL			

FORM 8-60 1152

SECRET

Personnel Actions covering period
prior to assignment Mexico City

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 19 August 1965

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) TSD

ESTABLISHED FOR: ZAMBERNARDI, Robert M.

ATTN: Personnel

FILE NO.: 4954

REF: Resignee Backstop debriefing

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: Technical Services Group, Provisional

EMPLOYEE NO.:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X Block Records: (OPMEMO 20-800-11) Resignation effective 20 Aug 65

a. Temporarily for ____ days, effective ____________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD Jul 56.

NA Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

NA Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HB 20-561-1)

NA Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-310)

NA Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-350)

X Remarks: 1. Will use DAFC for entire period, with detail to State for use in Mexico City. 2. Will use CIA for entire period if in US. 3. Will check with Station for guidance.

X Cover History

Jul56-Nov56	overt	Jun57-Jul59	DAC/Washington
Nov56-Jun57	DAFC/Japan	Jul59-May64	Lt State/Mexico C
		May64-May65	DAFC/Washington

Forwarding Address:
c/o American Embassy
Mexico City, Mexico

Employment Address:
Unknown

NM/al

CHIEF, MILITARY COVER SEC

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D OS, Copy 4-[illegible] Copy 5-PSD/CS, Copy 6 File

FORM 6-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-10-43)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJM: 25 AUG 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 20 YR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6125 0079 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/TSD
OPERATIONAL AIDS
PHOTO OPERATIONS BRANCH
AREA DESKS SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0113
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9240
18. REMARKS:
COMMUNICATIONS - C/O AMERICAN EMBASSY MEXICO D.F. MEXICO
CHECKS, BONDS - UNION TRUST COMPANY, 1500 H ST. NW
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 05 DA 09 YR 35
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. [illegible] EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 3AC0041
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE / 0 - NONE 1 - [illegible] 2 - [illegible]
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY / CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE / 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED CODE 1 - YES 2 - NO / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ccl 8/26/65

FORM 11-67 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

1 Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
022592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	445 41 575 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 10	2	$ 7,945	04/14/63	GS 10	3	$ 8,200	04/12/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

[illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

J. L. Price 4/30/64

SIGNATURE: E. D. ECHOLS DATE: 6 March 1964

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARM: 15 APR 63

OKF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022502
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION (CORRECTION)*
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 04 | 14 | 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3125 5700 3007
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP TSD
FOREIGN FIELD
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.63
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 7535
18. REMARKS:
*THIS CORRECTS FORM 1150, EFFECTIVE 04/14/63, ITEM #15, OCCUPATIONAL SERIES, WHICH READ "0136.01" TO READ "0136.63."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC)
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 05 | 09 | 35
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
15 APR 1963

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

25 APR 1963

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APM: 11 APR 63

CCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 022592	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR 04 14 63	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 3125 5700 3007	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP TSD FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	12. POSITION NUMBER 0575	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0130.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 7535

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 48575	ALPHABETIC TS	22 STATION CODE 48075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR [illegible]	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 04 14 63	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 04 14 63

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE -0	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REG NO	34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (3 OR MORE YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT. CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15 APR 1963

FORM 11-57 1150 Use Previous Edition

11 APR 1963

SECRET

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1966, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 9 JANUARY 1969.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	022592	41 575	CF	GS 10 2	$ 7,535	$ 7,945

BWS: 19 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	022592
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	01 21 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☒ · CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	2125 5700 3007
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP TSD FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE	IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER	0575
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	09 1
17. SALARY OR RATE	6435
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	22
20. Empl. Code	10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	45575 / TS
22. STATION CODE	45075
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. Hdqtrs Code	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	05 09 35
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	01 21 62
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	01 21 62
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PRIOR GOV SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS)	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1/25/62 JM

Form 1150 (8-61) Use Previous Edition

SECRET

1/24/6

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1955 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	022592	46575	CF	09 1	$ 6435	09 1	$ 6675

---

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
022592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	46 575 CF 10	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 09	1	$ 6,675	01/21/62	GS 09	2	$ 6,900	01/20/63		✓	

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
22592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	DDP/TSD 10 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	1	$ 5,885	12/25/60	08	2	$ 6,090	12/24/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

4

507

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

BLT: 23 ~~28~~ DEC 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022592
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 25 YR 60
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1125 5700 3007
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 j
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP. TSD
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
MEXICO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0575
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.63
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5885
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
22	10	46575	TS	45075		3	05	09	35	12	25	60	12	25	60

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, NO. DA. YR)
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

OSTED

01-22-61

Form 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions (4-51)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

AES: 17 APRIL 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - FOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
522592	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	~~05~~	~~05~~	35		1	M	1	07	30	56

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. TCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
08	02	54		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	07	30	56		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS TECHNICAL AIDS PHOTOGRAPHIC DIV OPERATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHY BR	4448	WASH.D.C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	PHOTOG GEN	0513	GS	1060.02

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DT	12	28	58	12	27	59	9 2500 25 007

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*	05	04	19	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP TSS FOREIGN FIELD WESTERN HEMISPHERE MEXICO	4455	MEXICO	45000

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	IO TECH AIDS	0575	GS	0136.63

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 1	$ 4980	DT	12	28	58	12	27	59	9 2508 75 007

44. Remarks
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

POSTED
24

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

4/22/57

SECRET

(4)

NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
22592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* ZAMBERNARDI, Robert M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-8
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION KURIOT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT WH/III/MEXI

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS					
☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL *(Specify)*			

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 August 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 7/1/60 - 6/30/61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 KURIOT support for COs in ops, particularly photo work - concealed, telephoto, movies and documentary	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 S/W - writing and developing S/W communications in direct support of COs	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Routine lab work, microfilming documents, printing & reproduction of photos - montaje etc.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Surveillances, caseing and selection of meeting sites, security stake outs and other ops duties as directed	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Opening, processing, photographing re-sealing operational mail	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 6-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
2 01 PM '61

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This officer is willing, and has become much more effective and sure of himself during the past year. He is an excellent photographer and this with his increasing resourcefulness in support of operations, has resulted in some unusually good work of the ops support type.

This officer has a pleasant personality, is well liked, gets along well with his fellow employees, works overtime without question, and is well adjusted to overseas life in Mexico. The Station is very pleased to have him for another tour as he is most definitely a part of our operational capabilities.

[redacted] was commended by COS, Mexico in January 1961 and a review of this file should include a review of HMMT-1798 dated 12 January 1961.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 13 September 1961	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Robert M. Zambernardi

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 13 September 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ in pseudo

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 13 September 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ in pseudo

SECRET

Fitness Reports for period After, and Personnel Actions for period prior to assignment Mexico City

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

29 DEC 1965 TSD

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	22592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Robert	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION KURIOT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT KURIOT/Mexico

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Duties levied upon KURIOT by Station CO's in support of their ops and info. This constitutes using concealment devices, telephoto lens.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 S/W (two systems). Writing S/W for CO's. Rec'g messages for development.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Routine lab work. Microfilming docs, printing docs, reprod. photos, maintenance of Photo Lab.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Stake out surveillance, agent mtgs and other duties that may be requested.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Opening, photographing and resealing operational mail of Station CO's.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Purchasing all photo supplies which can be procured on local market. Supplying some basehouses with supplies	6

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 5-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

DEC 20 11 04 AM '60
MAIL ROOM

This young officer is conscientious and willing. He is an excellent photographer and fulfills duties related to photography (which is his principal duty) in completely satisfactory fashion.

He is willing to take on any assignments given him; is willing to put in any amount of overtime needed to get assignments completed within the prescribed time.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 Oct 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Subject signed form 45a in pseudo.

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 27 Oct 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston Scott

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

13 AUG 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
122592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Robert M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 9 May 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/TA/PSD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☒	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 June 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD Dec 1958 to Jun 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 USING ENLARGERS, CONTACT PRINTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MAKE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 MIXING ALL STANDARD CHEMICALS & SPECIAL FORMULAE FOR THE PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS FILM AND PAPERS - FOREIGN & DOMESTIC	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 PROCESSING OF BLACK & WHITE AND COLOR FILM, BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, RANGING FROM 8MM TO 20"x24"	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 WASHING, DRYING AND SORTING OF PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 DOCUMENT PHOTOGRAPHY USING 20"x24" PROCESS CAMERA, MOD. D AND E RECORDAKS AND VARIOUS PORTABLE COPYING EQUIPMENT	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 USES STILL AND MP CAMERAS RANGING FROM 8MM SUB-MINIATURE TO 8 x 10.	3

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING				
			1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					XX		
RESOURCEFUL					XX		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						XX	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					XX		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					XX		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					XX		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY	XX						
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						XX	
THINKS CLEARLY					XX		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS	XX						
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

SUBJECT'S KNOWLEDGE OF PHOTOGRAPHY IS INCREASING AT A STEADY PACE. HE IS VERY ATTENTIVE TO HIS ON-THE-JOB TRAINING AND APPLIES IT VERY WELL. CONSIDERABLE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN SHOWN BY LEARNING NEW METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. THIS IS PARTLY DUE TO THE CORRESPONDENCE COURSE, IN PHOTOGRAPHY, IN WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED.

SUBJECT LACKS SOME CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO PRODUCE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS, HOWEVER, IT IS FELT BY THE RATER THAT THIS IS DUE TO HIS LIMITED EXPERIENCE IN DARKROOM TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES. THE RATER FEELS CONFIDENT THAT SUBJECT WILL OVERCOME THIS LACK OF CONFIDENCE SOON.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION SUBJECT LEFT PCS, MEXICO CITY JUNE 20, 1959.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 25 JUNE 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/TSS/PSD/OSL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold M. Sprague HAROLD M. SPRAGUE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 25 JUNE 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I. O. TECH. AIDS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ralph W. Harris RALPH W. HARRIS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
122592

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZAMBERNARDI Robert	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Sept 1935	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-5
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/TA/PD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☒ NOT ELIGIBLE	☐ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. December 1958	11. REPORTING PERIOD From Dec 1957 to Dec 1958	SPECIAL (Specify) Also Promotion

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 PHOTOGRAPHIC DARKROOM TECHNICIAN. USE ENLARGERS, CONTACT PRINTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MAKE PHOTOGRAPHIC PRINTS.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 MIXING OF PHOTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS FROM BULK AND PREPARED CHEMICALS.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 DOCUMENT PHOTOGRAPHY USING CONSOLIDATED PROCESS CAMERA, "E" & "D" RECORDAK, AND OTHER 35MM CAMERAS	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 WASHING, DRYING AND SORTING PRINTS.	4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 FILM PROCESSING, BOTH BLACK & WHITE AND COLOR.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY		X					
SECURITY CONSCIOUS					X		
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS		X					
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 9-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Zambernardi joined the Photographic Support Division in January 1958 with no photographic experience. Mr. Zambernardi has progressed very rapidly in his newly chosen field during the past year by taking an active interest in his on the job training and by displaying considerable initiative in learning new methods and techniques. Mr. Zambernardi is supplementing his Agency training by completing a correspondence course in photography given by the New York Institute of Photography. In relatively short time, Mr. Zambernardi has developed into a valued asset to this division.

Because of his brief background in photography, Mr. Zambernardi lacks some confidence in performing his duties. The undersigned feels confident that this will remedy itself as more experience is gained.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject on leave, will be shown to him later

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE 23/12/58	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/TSS/PSD/CSC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harold M. Sprague HAROLD M. SPRAGUE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Zambernardi is presently performing the duties of a GS-7 photographer with this division in a most competent manner. It is recommended that he be favorably considered for an increase from GS-5 to GS-7.

DATE 23 December 1958	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/TSS/PSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John DiMarco JOHN DIMARCO

Fitness Reports and other
Personnel Documents During Period
prior His Assignment to Mexico City

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Conein, Lucien

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11 Dec 53 - 13 Jan 76

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

KRATH, Arthur R.

Contract Service — Arthur R. Schrickrath (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
	Former Military Detailee to Agency. Retired Reserve Officer		
12 Nov 61	~~Hired as a Career Agent~~ Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs,	11,415	GS-13/4
14 Oct 62	LPA	12,245	GS-13/4
28 Apr 63	Pay increase	13,270	GS-14/2
5 Jan 64	LPA	14,065	GS-14/2
26 Apr 64	PSI	14,515	GS-14/3
5 July 64	LPA	15,150	GS-14/3
25 Apr 64	PSI	15,640	GS-14/4
10 Oct 65	LPA	16,204	GS-14/4
3 July 66	LPA	16,675	GS-14/4
8 Oct 67	LPA	17,425	GS-14/4
~~9 Jan 68~~	~~Contract Terminated~~	17,425	GS-14/4
10 Jan 68	Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs,	17,425	GS-14/4
14 Jul 68	LPA	18,641	GS-14/4
15 Jul 68	Contract Terminated	18,641	GS-14/4

SECRET [illegible]

SCHNICKRATH, ARTHUR R
Job 69 731 box 10

13 JAN 1976 Filing

CI 055-76

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Compromise of Cover

1. As a result of information obtained from reliable sources who served in Vietnam, we have established that the former Staff personnel listed on the attachment should be presumed to have been compromised as CIA employees to the North Vietnam Intelligence Service as of April 1975. We presume also that the identifications of these individuals as CIA employees were passed by the North Vietnamese to the Soviets.

2. Although the personnel listed in the attachment are no longer employed by CIA, nevertheless, I suggest that their official personnel records should be documented concerning the possible past compromise of their cover.

3. Please coordinate any action connected with this memorandum with Chief, CCS; Chief, CMG; and Chief, CI Staff.

George T. Kalaris
Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

14-00000

25 January 1974

Drug Enforcement Agency
Office of Personnel
Technical Support Section
1405 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20537

Attention: Ms. Mary Elliott

Dear Ms. Elliott:

In response to the request from your office of 16 January, the following is a transcript of the employment of LUCIEN E. CONEIN:

Date	Action	Salary
12 Nov 61	Contract Employee with Civil Service Retirement, Legislative Pay Adjustments and Periodic Step Increases	$11, 415 (GS-13/4 eq.)
14 Oct 62	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$12, 245 (GS-13/4 eq.)
28 Apr 63	Pay Increase	$13, 270 (GS-14/2 eq.)
5 Jan 64	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$14, 065 (GS-14/2 eq.)
26 Apr 64	Periodic Step Increase	$14, 515 (GS-14/3 eq.)
5 July 64	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$15, 150 (GS-14/3 eq.)
25 Apr 64	Periodic Step Increase	$15, 640 (GS-14/4 eq.)
10 Oct 65	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$16, 204 (GS-14/4 eq.)
3 July 66	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$15, 675 (GS-14/4 eq.)
8 Oct 67	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$17, 425 (GS-14/4 eq.)
14 July 68	Legislative Pay Adjustment	$18, 641 (GS-14/4 eq.)
15 July 68	Contract Terminated	$18, 641 (GS-14/4 eq.)

Attached is Standard Forms 176 and 1150. There is no record of Standard Forms 2809 and 2810. Perhaps his military retirement ~~oblivated~~ the need for health insurance.

Obviated (correct)
[illegible]

Sincerely,

Roger Fowler
Personnel Officer

Attachments

Rec 74- 2.29

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20537

Jan. 16, 1974

Mr. John F. Blake
Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Lucien E. Conein, SSN: 513-05-0926
DOB: 11-29-19

Dear Mr. Blake:

An official transcript of service is requested for Mr. Conein, an employee with this agency. Mr. Conein was employed with your agency from November [illegible] 1961 to July 15, 1968. Request Standard Form 176, 1150, 2809 and 2810 be forwarded to Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Personnel, Technical Support Section, Att: Mary Elliott, [illegible] I Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20537.

Enclosed is a Standard Form 50 showing Mr. Conein's employment with this Agency.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

James K. Ballard
Personnel Director

Enclosure
AS

Rev. 11-70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

United States Department of [illegible]

EMPLOYEE: Keep this document for your records. It is your copy of the official record of a personnel action affecting your employment. Promptly call any errors to the attention of your supervisor or your personnel office. See information on reverse.

1. NAME (CAPS) LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE — MR. MISS MRS.: CONEIN LUCIEN EMILE — MR

2. [illegible] | 3. [illegible] | 4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

5. VETERAN PREFERENCE: 1 NO 2 5 PT 3 10 PT DISABILITY 4 10 PT COMP 5 10 PT OTHER | 6. TENURE GROUP | 7. SERVICE COMP. DATE | 8. HANDICAP CODE

9. FEGLI: 1 REG ONLY 2 [illegible] 3 W/O 4 REG & OPT | 10. RETIREMENT: 1 CS 2 FICA 3 FS 4 NONE 5 OTHER | 11. (For CSC use)

12. NATURE OF ACTION — CODE | 13. EFFECTIVE DATE | 14. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

15. FROM: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER | 16. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE | 17. GRADE OR LEVEL AND RATE | 18. SALARY

19. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

20. TO: POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER | 21. PAY PLAN AND OCCUPATION CODE | 22. GRADE OR LEVEL AND RATE | 23. SALARY

24. NAME AND LOCATION OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

25. DUTY STATION (City, County, State) | 26. LOCATION CODE

27. APPROPRIATION | 28. POSITION OCCUPIED: 1 COMPETITIVE SERVICE 2 EXCEPTED SERVICE ☐ | 29. APPORTIONED POSITION ☐ 1 PROVED 2 WAIVED ☐ FROM TO STATE

30. REMARKS:
☐ A. SUBJECT TO COMPLETION OF 1 YEAR PROBATIONARY OR TRIAL PERIOD COMMENCING
☐ B. SERVICE COUNTED TOWARD CAREER (PERMANENT) TENURE FROM
SEPARATIONS: [illegible]
☐ DURING [illegible]

Please Forward Official ~~Personnel~~ TRANSCRIPT
~~Folder~~ and S.F. 1150 to:
Drug Enforcement Administration
Personnel Management Division
1405 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20537
ATT MARY ELLIOTT Room 801

[illegible]

14-00000

9 OCT 1973

Mr. James Ballard
Acting Director of Personnel
Drug Enforcement Agency
1405 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20537

Dear Mr. Ballard:

This is to certify that Mr. Lucien E. Conein was employed by this Agency in a civilian capacity from 12 November 1961 to 15 July 1968, at which time he retired on disability under the Civil Service Retirement Act. He left under honorable circumstances.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - EEAB Subject File
1 - EEAB Chrono

OP/RAD/EEAB/FGJarema:kr (4 October 1973)

14-00000

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/RAD		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

DRes would like you to verify service. ~~He~~ Man obviously has more time than indicated, why aren't we certifying to all of it. Are we aware of what he has told D&A?

B

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DD/[illegible] 5-E-57 [illegible]	03 OCT 1973

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/RAD		
2			
3	DD/Pers/SP	05 OCT 1973	B
4	D/Pers - [illegible] 73	14	
5	See Gaye's note [illegible] attached.		
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Ben -

Attached is a rewrite of the Lacein memo. Also an explanatory note re his prior service.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/EEAB 202 Magazine x3295	

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67 (40)

4 October 1973

Ron -

Conein was in U.S. military from September 1941 through September 1961, and on detail to OSS, SSU, CIG, and CIA to time of military retirement.

He was picked up as a civilian and as a career agent on 12 November 1961 and retired on disability on 15 July 1968.

Archenhold advised that subject claims military service as indicated above and that the only period to be certified is the period as a civilian, November '61 to July '68. This all we know about what Conein told DEA.

Frank G. Jarema

Distribution:
0 - C/RAD
1 - EEAB Memos file
1 - EEAB Chrono

OP/RAD/EEAB/FGJarema:pig (4 October 1973)

Mr Janney

1 OCT 1973 OCT 1973

Mr Blake

Because of the publicity this man has recieved I suggest you touch base on the phone with Howard Osborn.

RDK

Verify service + what he has told DEA

SENDER WILL CH[illegible] CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/Pers/SP	01 OCT 1973	B
2	D/Pers		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Luke Conein has applied for employment with the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Acting D/Pers asked for the attached info from CIA.

Sent to D/Pers for signature. Conein was very controversial, much in the news about the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and has been mentioned by Howard Hunt in Hunt's recent hearing before "Watergate" committee. Dick Biladeau, Central Cover, affirms that Conein is "opened up".

RG

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/RAD, 212 Magazine Bldg. x3328	9/28/73

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67

(40)

28 September 1973

Ben -

Stan Archenhold, x 7264, one of the Agency's drug coordinators with DEA, called me yesterday afternoon. DEA had requested a memo verifying employment of Mr. Lucien E. Conein, whose name has appeared frequently during the Watergate hearings. The attached memorandum is what Archenhold wants.

Conein's service was verified with ROB; his "honorable service" was cleared with SAS. Since he was under cover as contract, I discussed the case with Dick Biladeau of Central Cover. CCS had opened up Conein last year and Biladeau approved release of the information to DEA. We had verified this service to a Justice Department investigator approximately one year ago when Conein was being considered as a consultant for BNDD.

Archenhold offered to carry the memorandum to DEA.

Frank G. Jarema

1. LAST NAME [illegible] FIRST NAME [illegible] INITIAL(S) [illegible]

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Effective date [illegible] XX
Subject to Sec. 203(d) 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ____ Annual Leave Act

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years ____ Months ____ Days ____
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
[illegible] DISABILITY 1500 7/15/68

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/13 19 68	360	210
6. Current leave year accrual through 7/13 19 68	104	52
7. Total	464	262
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9. Total leave taken	104	262
10. Balance	360	0

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 360 hr plus 1 Holiday
12. Salary rate(s) 18,641
13. Lump sum leave dates:
From 1500 7/15/68 to 9/17/68 1500 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by:
[illegible] (Signature) 7/25/68 (Date)
AUTH. CERT. OFFICER (Title) ____ (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes 7/29/65
15. Current balance as of 9/29 19 67 0
16. 12 month accrual rate 15 days
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ____
18. Monthly accrual date ____
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date 10
20. Date basic service period completed 7/29/67

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ____ to ____
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr ____ to ____

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension
23. During leave year in which separated	0	
24. During step increase waiting period which began on ____	0	
25. During 12 month HL accrual period (dates) ____		

REMARKS
SCD 11/2/41

Standard Form 1150
November 1963
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) [illegible]	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) [illegible]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 513 [illegible]
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

RETIREMENT BRANCH

MAY 23 11 2 AM '68

OF PERSONNEL

See Table of Effective Dates on Back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
[illegible]
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET

25 January 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH (P)

REFS: A. UWCT-701, 18 November 1971
B. UWCS-705, 29 November 1971

1. This memorandum will record a series of conversations with Chief of Base, Washington concerning the proposed use of Subject as a re-hired annuitant or alternatively the proposed use of Subject's wife as a contract agent as a spotter and access agent for the Washington Base.

2. Based on several conversations with representatives of the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services we have been advised that a request for approval to employ Subject or his wife would not receive either OMS or Office of Security concurrence.

3. Based on the above, Chief of Base, Washington has agreed to withdraw his request in Reference A and this memorandum will serve in lieu of a dispatch reply.

Maurice A. Sovern
C/DOI/B-1

SECRET

SECRET

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

DATE
12/13/71

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES *(TYPE A, B AND CAREER)*
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR NOC *(US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)*
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT *(NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION)* AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH *(1 COPY ONLY)*

NAME *(LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)* SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P)	SEX Male	DATE OF BIRTH 11/29/19

MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 4	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1929, 1950, 1958, 1959	NATIONALITY Nat. U. S. A. 8/11/42	LAST MEDICAL EXAM 11/67

DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CSA, 10/12/61	JOB TITLE Agent	COMPONENT DO

CONTRACT CATEGORY NOC	EFFECTIVE DATE	EXPIRATION DATE	SALARY $50.00 per task	GRADE EQUIVALENT	PROJECT OR FAN #

BENEFITS N/A	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY		
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE		
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT		
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY		
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS		
OTHER *(EXPLAIN)*		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

University of Maryland, 77 credit hours on Bachelor of Military Science Degree
U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 1943
British Special Intelligence School, 1943-1944
U. S. Psychological Warfare Training, 1959
Fluent in French

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
9/41-9/61	U. S. Army	France Germany Indochina		

CIA TRAINING

Paramilitary Training - 1951

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY *(BEGINNING WITH EOD)*

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
11/12/61	Ops Officer (PM)	CA	Hqs	SOD		GS-13
01/ /62	"	"	Saigon	FE		GS-13
04/28/63	"	"	"	FE		GS-14/2
07/19/68	Disability Retirement	"	Hqs	FE		GS-14/4

FORM 3195
8-70

SECRET

SECURITY

FACTORS AFFECTING SUBJECT (PUBLIC EXPOSURE - PRESS, RADIO, TV), KNOWN OR SUSPECTED IDENTIFICATION TO OTHER THAN CIA STAFF PERSONNEL, INTELLIGENCE, OR SECURITY SERVICES.

When Subject retired he was told to indicate CIA as his place of employment for the entire period - November 1951 through July 1968.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE:

ADAPTABILITY *(SUBJECT AND FAMILY)* TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL *(GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)*

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

	CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION
	SECRET		MARKED FOR INDEXING
Chief, DC Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
Chief of Base, Washington			MICROFILM

ISOLOG/Administrative
DO Base/Washington's Proposed Use of Retired Annuitant - Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH (P)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 1.

REFERENCE : None

1. Headquarters approval is requested for DO Base/Washington's operational use of retired annuitant, Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, a former Career Agent contract employee who was retired on a medical disability 15 July 1968.

2. The Base would like to employ SCHWICKRATH for use against Vietnamese, French and other target individuals in this area. SCHWICKRATH is already acquainted with some of these people and both he and his wife have access to other potential target individuals in the foreign diplomatic community here.

3. We propose to reimburse SCHWICKRATH for expenses incurred in our behalf and to compensate him for specific operational efforts undertaken and production rendered. We do not propose that he be placed on any continuing monthly or annual salary basis.

Lanks
JEROME J. LANKS

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - C/DO

	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE 20 NOV 1971
	UWCT-761	17 November 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

14-00000

B1

S E C R E T TELEPOUCH
DISP NO - UWCS-705
FILE NO - NONE
DATE - 29 NOVEMBER 1971
INDEX - NONE
FILM - NONE
TO - CHIEF OF BASE, WASHINGTON
INFO - NONE
FROM - CHIEF, DO DIVISION
SUBJECT - ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH
REFS - UWCT-701, 16 NOV 71

1. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT BASE PLANS TO USE SUBJECT REF AS A CONTRACT AGENT ON A MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT. IF SO ADVISE AMOUNT AND METHOD OF PAYMENT /E.G. $50.00 PER ASSESSMENT ETC./ AND ESTIMATE OF MAXIMUM ANNUAL COMPENSATION.

2. SINCE SUBJECT IS A RETIRED ANNUITANT THE APPROVAL OF THE D/PERSONNEL OR HIGHER WILL BE REQUIRED PRIOR EMPLOYMENT.

GLENN F. SHAMPINE

DISTRIBUTION
VIA TELEPOUCH
2-COB, WASHINGTON
S E C R E T TELEPOUCH UWCS-705 END OF MESSAGE

ORIGINATED BY DO/PER
COORDINATION BY DO/I/SI
RELEASING BY C/DO/DO

14-00000

SECRET

DO 71 - 353

No 7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Lt. Col. Lucien E. Conein

1. A recommendation for the approval of the Director of Personnel is contained in paragraph three (3).

2. Lt. Col. Lucien Conein served as a military detailee to the Agency and predecessor organizations until his retirement from the U. S. Army Reserves on 30 September 1961. He became a Career Agent in November 1961 and served primarily in Saigon as the senior advisor to the Chief of Station on major counter insurgency programs until his retirement for disability in July 1968. He is an expert on Vietnamese affairs and was awarded the Intelligence Star for his performance during the November 1963 coup in Saigon. Because of his extensive overseas experience with the Military and the Agency, especially in Vietnam, he has access to many Vietnamese, French and other target individuals in the Washington area. He is already acquainted with many of these people and both he and his wife have access to other potential target individuals in the foreign diplomatic community.

3. Approval is requested to employ Lt. Col. Conein for use against the Vietnamese, French and other targets as a re-employed annuitant under a Memorandum of Oral Committment. He will be paid $50.00 for each specific task assigned to him, such as developing contacts or assessing individuals of operational interest to the Base, as stipulated by the Base in advance. His total compensation will not exceed $2,400.00 per annum. This annual payment, coupled with his annuity of approximately $4,700 per annum will not exceed ninety per cent of his salary as a GS-14/4 at the time of his retirement. A Non-Staff Personnel Data Sheet is attached for your information.

SEYMOUR RUSSELL
Chief, DO Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

CONCURRENCE SHEET

CONCUR:

_______________________________ Deputy Director for Plans

_______________ Date

APPROVAL:

_______________________________ Director of Personnel

_______________ Date

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

WASH POST
22 DEC 71

NBC Claims Diem Death Inside Story

Seventeen generals and colonels of the South Vietnamese Army voted unanimously to kill President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and were not particularly discouraged by a high-ranking U.S. CIA official, an NBC report scheduled to be telecast tonight discloses.

The report is Part 2 of "An NBC News White Paper: Vietnam Hindsight," and deals with the origins of America's involvement in that Southeast Asia country.

The report presents the first supposed inside account of Diem's assassination, disguised as a political coup, and includes statements by Alvin Davis, associate producer of the program, and Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, the key CIA man in South Vietnam during the time of the coup.

It is "quite inconceivable" to Conein that Gen. Maxwell Taylor and others were not aware of the timing of the coup, Conein says on the program, which depicts Diem's death as a Diem maneuver that backfired.

The decision to kill Diem is reported to have developed over a series of eight meetings and arguments, and, finally, a vote. Three who would have voted to save Diem were assassinated before the vote was taken. Four others including the present Prime Minister, Khiem, were deliberately excluded from the vote.

Minh among the 17, however, wanted him killed from the start, and the only overheard phrase spoken in French rather than in Vietnamese was by Big Minh, might have been presidential contender in the October 1971 election, who said, "The dog must be killed."

After that, the vote went like this: Big Minh: kill; Gen. Don: kill; Gen. Xuan, kill; Col. Nghia, kill. At the end there was total unanimity, and a vow of silence was taken. The silence is to be broken tonight, Davis says.

Diem had asked for full honors, and a "graceful" exit from Vienam to exile in another country, but refused to ask Big Minh—who in turn was furious at the slight.

Between 6 and 9 p.m. Nov. 2, the day of Diem's death, he refused again to speak to Minh, then finally spoke to him on the telephone, but Minh, outraged, hung up. On the third try, Diem gave in, asking only for safe conduct.

At this point Col. Conein said he was told by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge not to instigate, encourage or discourage a coup, which was in the planning stages throughout October, 1963. But Diem, Conein said, had his own plans for a phony coup, after which he and his family would be brought in honors, by popular acclaim, back to Saigon from their place of exile, Pleiku.

What happened, apparently, is that both the phony coup and the real one came off at the same time, fooling Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Conein, in an attempt to get Diem out of the country says he asked his embassy for a plane, but was told that he would have to wait 24 hours for it.

"I spoke for the U.S. government and I was authorized, and I informed the junta (Diem's organization) that I had an aircraft, but it would take me 24 hours to have that aircraft on the ground."

"'Instead'" Davis asked.

"Instead, he was shot by a major in the Vietnamese army," Conein says on the telecast.

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 8 February 1968

FILE NUMBER: 9321

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: ~~XXX~~ 750559

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- ~~CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION~~ CONTRACT [illegible]
- ☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) FE

ATTN: ~~Chidf Support Staff~~

REF: ~~Resignation Debriefing~~

SUBJECT: [redacted]

[illegible]

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- X DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)

A. TEMPORARILY FOR ________ DAYS.
EFFECTIVE DATE COB ________

B. CONTINUING AS OF COB

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ________ #-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-601-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB-240-2+)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY (HB-240-2+)

CONCUR IN ISSUANCE:
- ☐ AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD
- ☐ NACS HOSPITALIZATION CARD

X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)

DATE (as of COB): 12 Nov 61

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)

OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Nov 61 - Jan 62 Washington, D.C./DAC
Jan 62 - Nov 64 Saigon/DAC
Jan 65 - Aug 65 Washington, D.C./DAC
Aug 65 - Aug 67 Saigon/DAC
Aug 67 - Feb 68 Washington, D.C./Overt

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period, and not to reveal specific places or locations of cover assignments.

Forwarding Address: Unknown
Employment Address: Unknown

EDT/nch

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible]

[illegible]
CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 [illegible]

SECRET

4 March 1955

[illegible] Security Division

[illegible] Investigations

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Registry
65-[illegible]

Schwickrath

17 AUG 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT : Detail of CIA Personnel to the Department of State

1. We concur in the detail to the Department of State of the four persons identified in your letter of August 9, 1965.

2. Arrangements are now being made between Mr. Wendt of the Department and representatives of our Far East Division for their assignment to Vietnam. In the absence of unforeseen difficulties, all of the persons named will proceed to Saigon as soon as possible. One of those named, Mr. Joseph F. Baker, is now serving in Europe, but this should not delay his assignment to Vietnam.

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

EO-DD/S:VRT:maq (16 Aug 65)
Rewritten:O-ExDir:JSE:sbo (17 Aug 65)
Distribution:
- 0 & 1 - Adse
- 1 - Signing Official
- 1 - ER w/basic
- 1 - DD/S subject w/cy basic
- 1 - DD/S chrono
- 1 - DD/P w/cy basic
- 1 - C/FE w/cy basic
- 1 - D/Pers w/cy basic
- 1 - D/Finance w/cy

Secondary Distribution:
- 4 - OPF [redacted]
- 4 - FE/Pers
- 2 - Contract Personnel
- 4 - OS/PSD
- 1 - C/CSPD
- 1 - C/TAR
- 1 - Manpower Office
- 8 - O/Finance

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 65-3882

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT : Detail of CIA Personnel to DOS

REFERENCE : Your ltr to DCI dtd August 9, 1965

1. I agree in principle with the detail to your Department of the four persons identified in reference letter.

2. Arrangements are now being made between Mr. Wen't of the Department and representatives of our Far East Division for their assignment to Vietnam. In the absence of unforeseen difficulties you may assume that all of the persons named will proceed without delay. One of those named, Mr. Joseph F. Baker, is now serving in Europe, but I do not anticipate this will delay his assignment to Vietnam.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

CONCUR:

s/Joseph Smith for
Chief, Far East Division

16 Aug 65
Date

s/Alan M. Warfield
ADeputy Director for Support

16 Aug 65
Date

s/Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel
16 Aug 65

CONFIDENTIAL

65-[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

AUG 9 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Admiral Raborn:

The purpose of this letter is to request your concurrence in the reimbursable detail to the Department of State of the following persons:

[redacted] x Joseph F. Baker
Jos[illegible] - TSR - Former by State.
x Napoleon D. Valeriano

x Former by FC div

These officers will serve in Vietnam for a tour of duty of 18 months. Their detail to the Department will be for a period not to exceed 24 months. During this period the Department will reimburse the Agency, upon presentation of appropriate billing, at the officers' rate of salary, plus retirement and insurance costs, and such differentials and allowances to which they may be entitled. In addition, the Department will reimburse the Agency for travel, per diem, and other expenses incident to their travel and transportation.

In view of the high priority of the project in which these men will participate, it would be appreciated if the Agency could arrange for their travel to Saigon within the next 30 days. Upon arrival in Saigon, they should report to Ambassador Lodge at the American Embassy.

If your Agency agrees with this request, please so indicate by signing and returning the enclosed copy of this letter. We appreciate your cooperation in making the services of these officers available to us.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard Unger

Leonard Unger
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ File-1

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG : RICHARD WELCH
UNIT : DC/WH/3
EXT : 6337
DATE : 24 JUNE 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

56 SECRET

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2	Bm	6	
3		7	
4			

24 JUN 65 22 04 Z

TO : CARACAS

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY CCS 3, FI, FI/SPG, SOD 6 CI/OPS, OP 2

TO CARA INFO CITE DIR 22557

REF: DIR 19808

1. COS-HICKS CONCEPT FOR SCHWICKWRATH ASSIGNMENT CARA, WHILE SEEMINGLY ADMIRABLY DESIGNED FOR SECURE PERFORMANCE ON SPOT FOR DUTIES ENVISAGED, HAS REGRETTABLY SHORT-CIRCUITED ODIBEX COVER SYSTEM. ESSENCE OF CONFUSION IS THAT IF SCHWICKWRATH IS TO OCCUPY GENUINE SLOT THIS WOULD REQUIRE HIS ACTUAL RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY, SUSPENSION OF KUBARK STATUS AND SALARY, INCEPTION OF LESSER LT. COL'S SALARY AND SUNDRY BENEFITS WITH KUBARK LEGALLY NOT ABLE TO PAY DIFFERENTIAL, OBLIGATES SCHWICKWRATH TO COMMAND OF IMMEDIATE MILITARY SUPERIOR IN ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH COS, BUT POTENTIALLY [illegible] FOR TWO YEAR STRETCH WHETHER OR NOT CARA TOUR ACTUALLY COMPLETED, AND INVOLVES KUBARK WITH RELUCTANT ODIBEX OFFICIALS IN PROTRACTED DISCUSSION OVER WISDOM AND LEGALITIES THIS PRECEDENT-BREAKING PROPOSAL.

Fay

2. EVEN IF COMMAND LINE CAN BE STRAIGHTENED OUT (WHICH PROBLEMATICAL VIEW FACT ODIBEX WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH CINCSOUTH, WHERE STIFF WORDING REF ORIGINATED, PRESUMABLY FROM COL. CHAVES), THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE OBVIOUSLY TO BE AVOIDED, TO SAY NOTHING

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO: PAGE #2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 22557

OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SCHWICKWRATH'S OWN VIEWS. APPEARS BEST TO FACE UP TO FACT THAT UNDER THIS SCHEME SCHWICKWRATH WOULD NEVER MAKE IT TO CARA.

3. CONSEQUENTLY HQS INTENDS TO SCALE DOWN REQUEST TO ODEARL TO INCLUDE:

A. THAT SCHWICKWRATH BE DETAILED TO WASH MIL UNIT, WHICH WILL THEN DETAIL HIM TO ODIBEX CARA AS SUPERNUMERARY. WILL TAKE CARE OF PAY AND ALLOWANCES HERE.

B. THAT SCHWICKWRATH ARRIVE IN CARA DOCUMENTED AND SUPPORTED DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER ODIBEX MISSION OFFICERS BUT AT LEAST IN UNIFORM. WILL ENTAIL CAREFUL BRIEFING BY HICKS OF HIS OFFICERS AS TO THEIR NEED TO COOPERATE IN "NATURAL" INCORPORATION OF SCHWICKWRATH INTO ODIBEX MISSION.

C. THAT SCHWICKWRATH STILL DO EFFECTIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY JOB IN ODIBEX VIA ORAL AGREEMENT WITH HICKS, EITHER AS OFFICER RESPONSIBLE AND SO PRESENTED TO VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES, OR AS SECOND MAN. HE CANNOT HOWEVER FORMALLY FILL SLOT SO DESIGNATED. UP TO HICKS AND ODIBEX WHETHER SLOT SHOULD REMAIN VACANT OR BE FILLED BY GENUINE

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO :

PAGE #3

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 22557

OFFICER NEWLY ASSIGNED WITH WHOM SCHWICKWRATH CAN WORK, EITHER AS ASSISTANT OR IN CHARGE OR JUST AS PEER INFORMALLY.

4. MUCH REGRET THAT ORIGINAL PROPOSAL NOT PRACTICABLE IN TERMS LONG ESTABLISHED SERVICE PROCEDURES AND RISK OF SERIOUS PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE TO SCHWICKWRATH. ALSO REGRET TIME LOST IN NEED TO FLESH OUT FULLY THESE CONSEQUENCES IN EFFORT PUSH YOUR PROPOSAL THROUGH.

5. PLS ADVISE SOONEST IF PARA 3 ACCEPTABLE, OR PROPOSE VARIATION THEREOF WHICH WILL NOT ENTAIL PARA 1 TYPE DIFFICULTIES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Wish to prevent possibility that agreements between all parties vis a vis Schwickwrath-KUBARK role is not diminished.

CCS/OEM

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

HERSCHEL F. PEAK
C/WH/3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY No.

14-00000

. 10-21 56 [redacted]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Arthur R Schwickrath

FROM: C. E. Post, C/FEAB
211 Magazine

EXTENSION: 3295

NO. 9321

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. FE/Pers	APR 1968			1. Not for filing. For approval and transmittal to Cover. Please initial Copy # 1. Copy # 4 for your retention.
2.				
3. Cover G H 44 Hqs.	29 APR 1968			3. Not for filing. For approval and transmittal to Security. Please initial Copy # 1; Copy # 3 for your retention.
4.				
5. Security 3 E 49 Hqs.	1 May 68			5. Please initial Copy # 1; Copy # 2 for your retention.
6.				
7. C. E. Post 211 Magazine		5-3-68		7. Please go to Press 30 Copies
8.				
9.		5/3		Send to PSD 10-min + 35 mm pd.
10. C.E. Post 211 Mag				
11. OP/Files 5E13				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

29

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible] #1

PPC

R E S U M E

(Arthur R [illegible]

[redacted]

1111 Ingleside Avenue
McLean, Virginia 22101
Home Telephone: 356-9086

28 APR
Date
SECTION

OS/EAB
1 May 68

EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVE:

Management position of responsibility where I can materially contribute to the growth and effectiveness of the organization, by utilizing my background and experience in:

1. Excellent and extensive personal and political relations with high foreign government officials in Southeast Asia.
2. Management, administration, supervision, organization and operations of internal and physical security of plants and installations.
3. Public Relations dealing with foreign government, commercial and industrial representatives to further the interest of the organization.

Available: After 1 May 1968

Salary Requirements: $12,000 - $15,000 per annum - could be negotiated depending on the position.

EXPERIENCE:

1. U. S. Central Intelligence Agency

   December 1961 - Present

   Intelligence/Operations Officer

   Since joining CIA in 1961 have spent the major portion of this period overseas in Southeast Asia. Duties have included: Complete responsibility for the operation of a field intelligence station. Functions included collection, analysis, evaluation, and reporting of intelligence data; the management of the base (Personnel, Security, Finance, and Logistics); liaison with other U. S. officials (up to the Ambassadorial level) and officials of other governments up to the Prime Minister; also directed such operations as civic and political action, police and intelligence office training in counter-insurgency and the general field of intelligence.

2. U. S. Army

September 1941 - September 1961

Starting as a recruit in September of 1941 was advanced to Non-Commissioned Officer in 1942 and later chosen for Officers Candidate School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, February 1943. Graduated and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant (O.S.S.), 26 July 1943. Served European Theatre of Operations October 1943 to December 1944. Parachuted behind enemy lines in civilian clothes, France, August 1944. Transferred China/Burma/India Theatre, February 1945. Parachuted into French-Indo-China, June 1945. Assigned German occupation February 1947 to August 1953, as an intelligence officer. 1953 - 1956 served as U. S. Military advisory group, Vietnam as intelligence and operations officer. 1957 - 1959 assigned as battalion commander U. S. Special Forces. Commanded an airborne battalion, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. August 1959 - September 1961 Chief Foreign Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Mission in Teheran, Iran.

EDUCATION:

University of Maryland, 77 credit hours on Bachelor of Military Science Degree

SPECIALIZED TRAINING:

U. S. Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, 1943
British Special Intelligence School - 1943-44
U. S. Psychological Warfare Training, 1959.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE:

French - fluent
Spanish - Trained but have never used.

HONORS (CITATIONS):

Silver Star
Bronze Star
European Theatre (3 Bronze Stars)
Pacific Theatre (2 Bronze Stars)

Legion of Honor (Chevalier)
Croix de Guerre (Palm and 2 Bronze Stars)
Mention in Despathches (Palm)
National Order of Vietnam (Officer)
Cross of Valor (Palm)

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth:	29 November 1919, Paris, France
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	175 pounds
Eyes:	Blue
Hair:	Grey brown
Marital Status:	Married, two sons, 1 daughter (9, 7, 4, respectively)
Health:	Excellent

REFERENCES:

Ambassador Henry Cabot-Lodge
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Major General Edward G. Lansdale
Senior Liaison Officer
U. S. Embassy, APO San Francisco 96243

Mr. Michael Deutch
Transportation Building
815 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Mr. Rufus Phillips
Airways Engineering Corporation
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

14-00000

NOTICE OF TERMINATION FOR RETIREMENT
ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH

You are hereby notified that your resignation as a Contract Employee of the United States Government is accepted pursuant to your Retirement for Medical Disability effective 15 July 1968, and that the effective date of your voluntary termination is 15 July 1968.
15 hours

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph thirteen (13) of said contract which reads as follows:

> "(13) You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations."

Your signature in the space provided below indicates acknowledgement and understanding of the contents hereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BY /s/ Dow H. Luetscher
CONTRACTING OFFICER

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Arthur Schwickrath

WITNESS:

Donald E. [illegible]

APPROVED:

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE
21 May 1968

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - true or pseudonym) Arthur R. Schwickrath	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO
LOCAL ADDRESS	PERMANENT ADDRESS 1111 Ingleside Ave, McLean, Va. 22101
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Washington, D.C.	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
12 November 1961	10 January 1968	indefinite	15 July 1968 (1500 hours)

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION
Subject is retiring under medical disability under the Civil Service Retirement System.

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES *(Add or delete as applicable)*

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE			
LOGISTICS			
PERSONNEL			

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER	CLEARED BY (Signature)	DATE

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE			INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			Ed Fitzgerald contacted on 20 May 68 (CCS/OCB/M) and stated that he does not need to see again.	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD	23 May 68	1430	3E-49	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 23 May 68
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD			Not seen in CPD	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 5/24/68

REMARKS (Please initial)

STAFF OR DIVISION AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER	DATE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 56
FEBRUARY 1968
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENT 870-1 [illegible]

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CONEIN, Lucien E.

2(a) DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year): November 29, 1919

2(b) SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 513 | 05 | 0926

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

(a). ☐ SEPARATED
(b) ☒ RETIRED
(c). ☐ DIED
HAD EMPLOYEE AT TIME OF DEATH APPLIED FOR CIVIL SERVICE ANNUITY? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(d). ☐ 12 MONTHS NON-PAY STATUS
(e). ☐ OTHER (Specify)

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING SF 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a). ☐ CURRENT SF 54 ATTACHED
(b). ☒ A CURRENT SF 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY
(c). ☐ A CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT SF 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL SF 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF SF 56; IF NO CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT SF 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): July 15, 1968

6. ANNUAL BASIC PAY RATE (NOT AMOUNT OF INSURANCE) ON DATE IN ITEM 5 (CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE): $ 18,641 PER ANNUM

7. DID EMPLOYEE HAVE OPTIONAL INSURANCE ON DATE IN ITEM 5? NO ☒ YES ☐
IF YES, GIVE RECEIPT DATE OF ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE (SF 176 or 176 T).

8. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

9. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5.

(Personal signature of authorized agency official)

17 JUL 1968
(Date)

R. L. Austin
(Typed name of authorized agency official)

Insurance Officer, Alternate
(Title)

Central Intelligence Agency
(Name of agency)

Washington, D. C. 20505
(Mailing address, including ZIP code of agency)

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3 — FILE COPY

14-00000

CONF[illegible]IAL

20 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA : Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Contract Termination - Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH has been notified by the Civil Service Commission that his Disability Retirement has been approved.

2. In view of the above information, it is requested that Subject's contract be terminated effective 1500 hours on 15 July 1968. Termination of Subject's contract on this date is requested to allow him to use all of his accrued sick leave as well as his excess annual leave.

William E. Nelson
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - OP/CPD
1 - FE/BS&C
1 - FE/PERS/VNO

FE/PERS/VNO DEWallace/sam X5459 20 May 1968

SECRET

DATE: 7 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Arthur R. Schwickrath has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 10 January 1968. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/FE.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Lucien Conein

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract~~ career ~~employee~~ agent under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 12 November 1963, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 14 Feb 1968

TO: RECORD

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:

Per Larry Clarity, Subject's PSI which was due 23 April 1967 will continue to be held pending Disability Retirement in very near future.

FROM: Jo Ann Varney

ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET

4. This agreement is effective as of 16 January, 1968 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:
Arthur R Schwickrath
Arthur R. Schwickrath

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

[illegible]

SECRET

1967 LEAVE STATEMENT

[illegible] [illegible]

PAY ACCOUNT NO. [illegible]

[illegible]

Annual leave balance as of 1 January 1967 [illegible] [illegible]

Annual leave balance as of 11 March 1967 [illegible] [illegible]

Sick leave as of 11 March 1967 [illegible] [illegible]

Compensatory leave balance as of 11 March 1967 [illegible] [illegible]

Home leave carried forward from prior tour [illegible] Days

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 08 August 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Conlen, Lucien E.

3. POSITION TITLE: Career Agent

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/VNO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS and complete evaluation

ETA: Mid August 1967
STATION: Vietnam
NO. OF DEP'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (This block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

Donald [illegible], FE/PERS/VNO

3C-22 HQS | 6450

10. COMMENTS

REF: SAIGON 0669 (IN 17446)
Please schedule Physical on 14th and 15th of August 1967

"SPECIAL HANDLING"

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for departmental duty only for a minimum of one year. Must be medically evaluated prior to any processing.

DATE: 15 November 1967

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Max Hurt

FORM 1-64 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(78)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 Oct 1965

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): [redacted] (DEPENDENTS OF)

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: CA

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE/VNO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 5459

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

[redacted] (Mother) 6 June 1893
[redacted] (Wife) 4 Sept 1929
[redacted] (Son) 19 Apr 1958
[redacted] (Son) 16 Nov 1959
[redacted] (Dau) 13 Jul 1963

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION: Hong Kong
TDY OR PCS: PCS
TYPE OF COVER: Tourist
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY: [redacted] Five
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Barbara J. Cooper FE/Pers/VNO

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 5E - 56

EXT.: 5459

10. COMMENTS

SPONSOR IS PCS [illegible].

SF 89's will be forwarded as soon as received.

Appointments: Mother and wife - 3 Nov at 9 a.m.; Children - 3 Nov at 1 p.m.

PROCESSED [illegible]
REX [illegible]

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. 11 23 [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) Coüex Lucien

3. POSITION TITLE

4. GRADE

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH CA Staff

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD 1 NOV 1961
STATION FE Area
TDY OR PCS PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE Helen Ingraham

ROOM NO. & BUILDING 1410 K

EXT.

10. COMMENTS

[illegible]

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION [illegible] O/S PCS

DATE 15 NOV 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
08 August 1967

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
Conein, Lucien E.

3. POSITION TITLE
Career Agent

4. GRADE
GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/FE/VNO

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS and complete evaluation

ETA
~~Mid August 1967~~
STATION
Vietnam
NO. OF DEP'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANS NOT [illegible]

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE

Donald E. Wallace, FE/PERS/VNO
5D-22 [illegible] [illegible]

COMMENTS
REF: SAIGON 9663 (IN 17446)
Please schedule Physical on 14th and 15th of August 1967

REPORT OF EVALUATION

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 259
SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY PERSONNEL DIVISION (☐ OVERT ☐ COVERT) (☐ ISN ☐ CPR)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): CONEIN, LUCIEN EMILE

2. DATE: 5-12-54

3. TO POSITION: I.O.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FE 4

5. TYPE OF POSITION
- ☐ Departmental
- ☐ U.S. Field
- ☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- ☐ EOD
- ☐ Overseas
- ☐ Returnee
- ☐ Pre-Employment
- ☐ Annual
- ☒ Special (Specify) MAJOR Major

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- ☒ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- ☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- ☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- ☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Full duty/General (5-27-54)

SECRET

Joseph J. Mackin

MEDICAL OFFICE

ponted

D. Poland Notified 2 June

D.

(2-19 4597)

SECRET

WITHIN-GRADE PROMOTION FOR CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
(IF provided for in Contract)

CONEIN, LUCIEN E. — EMPLOYEE'S NAME

FE — COMPONENT

13 Mar 67 — DATE

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVAL OF COMPETENCE.

RATER

NOTED:

Contact Personnel Division

Present Compensation Rate $16,675, GS-14/4 Equiv Effective Date 25 Apr 65
New Compensation Rate $17,198, GS-14/5 Equiv Effective Date 23 Apr 67

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-55??43

1. Agency and organizational designations: /FE

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $16,675

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: jlv 11 Jan 67

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase ______

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
23Apr67	25 Apr. 65	$16,675	$17,198	______ (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP ______

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

______ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126
6 GAO 8000 1126-109

CONFIDENTIAL **PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—PAYROLL COPY**

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT - LANGUAGE

COURSE TITLE	Spanish Basic - RSW
INSTRUCTOR	Mr. F. Vazquez
PROGRAM	Daytime - Full-time
NO. OF STUDENTS	2
NO. OF HOURS	800
DATE OF COURSE	01/04/65 - 08/11/65

STUDENT

NAME	YOB	EOD DATE	OFFICE	GS	SD
[redacted]	19		WH	[illegible]	D

(See reverse side for definitions of proficiency levels)

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT ENTRY INTO TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

BEFORE	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING	X				
WRITING	X				
PRONUNCIATION	X				
SPEAKING	X				
UNDERSTANDING	X				

LANGUAGE TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The general aims of language training are attainment of proficiency in speaking, understanding, reading and writing. The specific objectives are (1) ability to produce and distinguish the sounds of the language; (2) ability to use a stock of basic sentences and expressions; (3) ability to recombine the elements of basic sentences and expressions and to apply them to new situations; (4) ability to comprehend the language spoken at normal speed in various situations; (5) ability to write and read the language commensurate with ability to speak.

Methods used in all courses stress oral drills and free conversation based at first on memorized material and, at a later stage, on varied reading materials. Written and oral tests are given at intervals. Listening to and recording on tapes in the Language Lab is essential for class preparation.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT
ACHIEVEMENT		X	
ATTITUDE		X	
ATTENDANCE	X		

LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY AT COMPLETION OF TRAINING ☒ INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE ☐ OFFICIAL TEST

AFTER	NO PROFICIENCY	SLIGHT	ELEMENTARY	INTERMEDIATE	HIGH
READING		X			
WRITING		X			
PRONUNCIATION			X		
SPEAKING		X			
UNDERSTANDING			X		

Foreign Language Aptitude Test: None.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

W. Ray Rackley
W. RAY RACKLEY
SIGNATURE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, LT/LAS/OTR

[illegible]
DATE

FORM 5-55 2222 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(45)

SECRET

[illegible]

Mr. Arthur R. Schwickrath

Dear **Mr. Schwickrath**:

Reference is made to your current contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **1 August 1965**, said contract is amended by adding the following paragraph thereto:

> "Your eligibility and participation in this organization's Rest and Recuperation Program is herein authorized in accordance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group [illegible] - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2[illegible]

17 NOVEMBER 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division,
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : R & R for Contract Employees

Please amend the contracts of the following SOD Contract Personnel to provide for participation in the Saigon Station Rest and Recuperation Program. This amendment should be made effective as of 1 August 1965.

Anderson, Dorsey
Ashby, Holmes
[redacted]
Gau, Claude
Lambert, Ross
Mandich, Benedict
McGuire, Robert J.
Miller, William D.
Morris, James
Norwood, Thomas L.
Robertson, William
Schmid, Carl
Scott, John M., Jr.

William E. Colby,
Chief, Far East Division

Coordination:

FEO/PMI

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM K/3

ACTION FE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS 3, CSPS, OP 2, OF 2

[illegible]

S E C R E T 270916Z CITE SAIGON 9831

27 Jul 67 IN 19891

PRIORITY HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR Schwickrath, Arthur

MR. [redacted] DEPARTING SAIGON PCS TO HQS ON 27 JULY. PLEASE ADVANCE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND T/A TO HQS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

5 OCT 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division/CP

SUBJECT : SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R.
Transfer to FE Division

Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent, transferred from WH Division to FE Division effective 20 August 1965. Please change subject's allotment number to 6137-1487, Saigon Station.

/s/ Harold E. Padgett
Joseph W. Smith
AC/FE Division

Concur:

C/WH/Pers ______________________ Date ______________

14-00000

SCHWICKRATH, Arthur E. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $15,150

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Prepared by
12. Prepared by: jlv 8 Jan 65
13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
25Apr65	24Apr64	$15,150	$15,610	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

Joseph B Ragan

---

4 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

SUBJECT : Arthur E. SCHWICKRATH, Reassignment

In conjunction with the reassignment of Arthur E. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent, from FE Division to WH Division, all salary and allowances are to be charged to Allotment 3135-1141 effective 17 January 1965.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR:

SOD

FE Division

CS Agent Panel

Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

25 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Operations Division

FROM : Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Custody of the Honor Award presented to Mr. [redacted]

Arthur R. Schmidbrath

Due to security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the Honor Award and related papers listed below:

Intelligence Star
Intelligence Star Certificate

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the awardee may obtain his award by calling the Secretariat.

Jeanne L Baker
JEANNE L. BAKER

Distribution:
Orig. - Subject's OPF
1 - Subject's Division Chief
1 - HMAB Case File

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) CONEIN, LUCIEN E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC	8. CURRENT STATION Saigon		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 10 September 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains, under supervision of the COS, discreet liaison with the Prime Minister.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Senior advisor in the selection, training, maintenance and operation of the Prime Minister's personal security force.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Under COS direction maintains contact for intelligence and political action purposes with a variety of senior indigenous officers, including Chief of State, senior staff officers, Corps commanders, Foreign Minister, province chiefs, and lesser officers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Has, and uses operationally, area and language knowledge.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. _Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable._

This officer is personally acquainted with almost every senior official or officer in the Vietnamese Government and armed forces, and with a significant number of these this acquaintanceship amounts to close personal friendships extending back over a number of years. These associations have given this officer truly unique access to senior echelons of Vietnamese leadership, and he has exploited this access effectively and to great value to the Station. He has had long experience in this area, and uses his understanding of it to great effect. He works very well independently and has shown considerable initiative. He balks at no assignment, and carries out all assignments without regard for his personal convenience, safety, or well being. In the field of written expression this officer's performance falls somewhat short, but he has made strenuous efforts to improve in this sector with some success. All in all, he is an imaginative and dedicated officer who can be counted on to discharge his duties with high effectiveness and total personal commitment. It has been a pleasure to have had him at the Station.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Lucien E. Conein

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION ~~[illegible]~~	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 September 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Peer [illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-14	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNC	8. CURRENT STATION Saigon		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 63 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

[redacted] SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Maintains, under supervision of the COS, discreet liaison with the Prime Minister.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Senior advisor in the selection, training, maintenance and operation of the Prime Minister's personal security force.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Under COS direction maintains contact for intelligence and political action purposes with a variety of senior indigenous officers, including Chief of State, senior staff officers, Corps commanders, Foreign Minister, province chiefs, and lesser officers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Has, and uses operationally, area and language knowledge.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

27 Jul 64

Subject is a virtual walking encylopedia on the history, customs and senior personalities of Vietnam. He has been associated with this area on and off over the period of the last 10 years. During this time he has developed lasting friendships with many individuals who are now in high positions of power within the government. These contacts are of considerable importance to the Station in its intelligence appreciation of the situation and in the coordination of operational activities on a discreet basis with those high personalities. At the personal request of the Prime Minister he has become senior advisor to the Prime Minister's personal protection force and has, in fact, formed and trained this force from scratch. He is a highly motivated and dedicated officer to whom considerations of personal convenience and safety are always second to his determination to achieve whatever mission is given to him.

On the negative side, his written and oral presentation, while showing some improvement over the previous report, still needs additional improvement. He has no supervisory responsibilities at the present time and therefore is not rated on that score. He exhibits a good sense of cost consciousness in utilization of man power, materiel and funds.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David R. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Only his difficulty in expressing himself in writing prevents this officer from being rated "Outstanding". He is a calm and detached professional who at the same time is intimately caught up in his work and in the many important contacts he has on the local scene. His very valuable role could not be performed by anyone else at this Station, nor to my knowledge, by anyone else in the organization at the present time. He is a highly valued member of the Station.

[redacted]

DATE

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Peer de Silva

SECRET

Transmitted VIA FVST [illegible]
Dated 27 February 1963

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] Schneidman, [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv GS-13	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION Saigon Station	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Career agent				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 3 January 1962-31 December 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station paramilitary staff officer, advises COS and DCOS on major counterinsurgency programs, effects coordination among these programs and conducts on site inspection on behalf of COS.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts ministerial level liaison with Minister of Interior to accomplish coordination of Station programs with that ministry and to derive positive and counter intelligence information from Minister and his staff.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with senior GVN military officials many of whom are general officers, long term friends and former subordinates.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Represents COS on Country Team committees and serves as member of Joint Unconventional Warfare Committee.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Station senior area and language expert deriving from approximately seventeen years residence in and study of Indochina.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts liaison with U.S. Special Forces and acts as honorary Executive Officer, Special Forces Command, Vietnam.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 5-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject is one of the outstanding American experts on current day Vietnam. He has lived and traveled in the area for a number of years and has continued a study of the area while absent from it. Many of the current senior officers up to the general staff level were formerly Subject's subordinates and regard him as a friend and colleague whom they trust and in whom they will confide. This relationship of trust and friendship fortunately also exists with the Minister of Interior who is the forth or fifth leading personality in the government. Subject was formerly a senior officer in the U.S. Special Forces and by virtue of his qualifications and experience in this field has been of considerable value to this Station in the extensive programs it has undertaken in concert with that command. He is additionally a skilled clandestine operator with a thorough grounding in technique and a wide and colorful background of experience. Subject's ability to express himself in writing, while adequate, can stand improvement. He is evidently sincerely attempting to remedy this and some progress is noticeable. Overall, Subject is a distinct asset to the Station and we are particularly pleased to have him. Subject is a career agent and an amendment of his contract to reflect a promotion to the next higher equivalent grade is recommended. It is likewise recommended that he be promoted from the USAR reserve rank of Lt. Col. to Col. in order to increase his prestige in negotiations on behalf of the COS.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 25 February 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ Lucien E. Conein

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ David R. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur in the rating given above to Subject who has proved himself invaluable to the Station and to the front office in terms of his thorough knowledge of the Vietnamese scene, of Vietnamese personalities, and of the many issues involved here. I have personally leaned heavily on his judgment and advice. Our high appraisal of Subject is shared by the Ambassador and by the Deputy Chief of Mission. I have found that Subject works in a discipline manner and functions cooperatively with other members of the Station. He has made very definite progress as a Staff officer and in applying himself to the paper work which goes with that responsibility. I personally initiated the recommendation that Subject be promoted in Agency grade as well as in U.S.Army rank, mentioned in Section C, above.

DATE 25 February 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ John H. Richardson

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

☆U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-O-556848

1. Agency and organizational designation: DDP/FE

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): SCHWICKRATH, Arthur R. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary: $14,065

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE ANMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: jlv 15 Jan 64

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
26Apr64	28 Apr 63	$14,065	$14,515	Joseph B Ragan (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 6000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

SECRET

Mr. Arthur A. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 12 November 1961.

Effective 24 April 1963 said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph three (3) entitled "Compensation and Taxes" to read as follows:

> "For your services as a Career Agent you will be compensated at a basic salary of $13,270 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-14^2."

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

1) HL/St 10 May 63
CA/PMD
C.A.

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

25 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPO/Career Agent Panel

SUBJECT : [redacted], Salary Increase

Schwicknath, Arthur R

1. It is requested that Mr. [redacted]'s contract with this Agency as a Career Agent be amended to reflect a salary increase to the equivalent of a GS-14. His present salary is equal to a GS-13(4), $12,245; the increase is computed to be the equivalent of GS-14(2), $13,270.

2. Mr. [redacted] who is contracted by the Agency under the ZRJEWEL program, is presently assigned to the Saigon Station where he functions as the Station paramilitary staff officer, senior advisor on the major counterinsurgency programs. His extensive background and experience in Vietnam has made him a particularly valuable officer and asset to the Station. His overall performance is evaluated in his Fitness Report as strong. The Chief of Station, Saigon, has recommended that Mr. [redacted] be given a promotion to the GS-14 equivalent and the Acting Chief, SOD, concurs.

3. The amendment should be effective with the next pay period.

W E Colby
William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

Approved by CS/CA Agent Panel
(Date): 9 May 1963

Secretary, C [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH, Career Agent with project ZRJEWEL is hereby assigned to the Far East Division for PCS Saigon, Vietnam. Therefore, FE Division is responsible for completing the final details of his processing:

- a. Arranging cover.
- b. Completing Form 313a and financial briefing.
- c. Arranging for insurance (health and if desired, life insurance).
- d. All processing for PCS assignment.

2. SCHWICKRATH will be paid by FE Division, allotment number 2137-7251-1000, and FE Division will be administratively responsible for SCHWICKRATH's welfare during his tour of duty with that division. It is requested that regular annual fitness reports be forwarded to CA Staff for SCHWICKRATH. It is further requested that CA Staff be advised of any action taken which will affect SCHWICKRATH's career with the Agency as a member of project ZRJEWEL , including any amendments to the present contract.

3. After SCHWICKRATH completes his tour of duty with FE Division he will return to project ZRJEWEL , and all administrative responsibility will then be transferred from FE back to CA Staff.

4. SCHWICKRATH received a full security clearance on 12 October 1961, and medical approval for PCS Saigon, 15 November 1961.

Charles J Francis
CHARLES J. FRANCIS
Chief, Support Group, CA Staff

CONCUR:

William T. Vance 22 Nov '61
Chief, FE Support (Date)

SECRET

Mr. Arthur B. Schwickrath

Dear Mr. Schwickrath:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $11,415 per annum. You will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. In addition, you will be entitled to within-grade promotions and Legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) Living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance, an education allowance and a separation allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition, you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped

in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder, and when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. In addition, you will be entitled to reimbursement in accordance with standardized Government rates for the authorized official use of your private automobile. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U. S. C. A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick, annual and home leave (including travel expenses incident thereto) equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives.

(d) From the salary paid pursuant to this contract there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the U. S. citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a U. S. citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents in this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover acitivites will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every four (4) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover acitivities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover acitivities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

13. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

SECRET

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 12 Dec 61, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expiration of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expense to the United States. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Arthur K. Schwickrath

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

[illegible] 61
[illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: (See R 20-1000 and HR 20-1000-1 for guidance) Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and TWO copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox
DIVISION: CA PMG
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611
DATE: 16 October 1961

SECTION I GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE: Artaur R. Schwickrath
2A. PROJECT: ZRJEWEL
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Unknown
3. ALLOTMENT NO.:
3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV
4. SLOT NO.:
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: Morton F. Sewell / Virgil M. Derkum
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Military detailee - Maj. USA - July 1943 - 15 Oct. 1946
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): ~~Type "A" - requested 21 Sept.~~ '61
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ✓ ☐ NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☐ NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent ✓

SECTION II PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 41
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 29 Nov. 1919
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Kansas City, Kansas
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): McLean, Virginia
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - Elyette B. - 32
Son - Laurent P. - 3 1/2
Son - Philippe J. - 2
Son - Charles - 11 (with former wife)
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: Retired Reserve
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): Retired Reserve - 30 Sept. 1961
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: Lt. Col.
25. ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY ✓: $11,415
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: Yes ✓
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): To be established
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER ☒ YES ☐ NO; CIA ☒ YES ☐ NO ✓

SECTION V ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: Yes ✓
32. POST: Yes ✓
33. OTHER: Transfer, home service transfer, ~~education, separation when applicable.~~
34. COSTS (Breakdown, if any): To be established

SECTION VI TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☒ PCS ☒ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS: ☒ YES ☐ NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED: ☒ YES ☐ NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED: ☒ YES ☐ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED: ☒ YES ☐ NO
39. TRANSPORTATION VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: ☒ YES ☐ NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Wife - US - 32 - 4 Sept. 1929
Son - US - 3 1/2 - 19 Apr. 1958
Son - US - 2 - 16 Nov. 1959
41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐

SECTION VII OPERATIONAL

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Where applicable
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Where applicable
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ [illegible] REGULATIONS OR ☐

FORM 8-58 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SEC

TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DATE: 15 Nov 61
TO: Mr. [illegible]
ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS:
Mr. Armstrong requests
you go ahead on clearance
[illegible] approval
(which he is working on)
& Staff wants to [illegible]
subject to him.
Security approval [illegible]
[illegible]
FROM:

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED) NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET	CASE OFFICER Ernest F. Fox	DIVISION CA/PMG
	TELEPHONE EXTENSION 4611	DATE 16 October 1961

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See R 20-615, R 20-620, R 20-670, R 20-1000, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

- ✓ FECA
- ✓ Missing Persons Act
- Sick and Annual Leave
- ✓ Civil Service Retirement
- ✓ Life & Hospitalization Insurance
- Overtime
- Periodic Step Increases
- ✓ Legislative Pay Adjustments.

[illegible]

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check)	☒ PROPOSED	48. TYPE (Check)	☐ PROPRIETARY	☐ CULTURAL	☐ COMMERCIAL	☐ TOURIST
	☐ ESTABLISHED		☐ SUBSIDIZED	☐ EDUCATIONAL	☐ MILITARY	☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS
☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)
☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☒ YEARS	52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO
54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 90 days	55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☐ YES ☒ NO	

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

Paramilitary Operations

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Paramilitary Specialist

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Sept.41-1 Oct. 1961 - US Army - Parachute; infantry - c/Mil.Liaison Group ARMISH/MAAG,
Teheran; Asst.Chief of Staff for Intelligence - Special Forces
Btn. Cdr. - 3 years
(July 1943 - Oct.1956 - CIA and predecessor organisations - had all Agency PM training)

59. EDUCATION (Check highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☒ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCE (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK: FLUENT	SPEAK: ACCEPTABLE	SPEAK: POOR	WRITE: FLUENT	WRITE: ACCEPTABLE	WRITE: POOR	READ: FLUENT	READ: ACCEPTABLE	READ: POOR	61. INDICATE ALIEN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
French	X			X			X			Paris, France

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

France, China, Indochina, Germany, Iran

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

22 Sept. 1941 - 1 Oct. 1961 - US Army Pvt. - Lt. Col.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICER Ernest F. Fox	DATE 7 Nov 61	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Charles J. Francis Charles J. Francis

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION REPORT 435

NAME Conein, Lucien E. DATE 26 Oct 53

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment to Army Personnel

FROM: O.O. Major USA. SE Training

TO T.O. Major USA. SE Washington

COURSE	EVAL.	
BIC (CS)		also BIC, BITC, SOC, BTP, DOC/
BTP. II	Sa	also OC/
BTP III	Sa	also AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI/
BTP IV		
RO		also PM I, II, III; RAFT/
ITC		also CI Tech/
Admin		
BIC	Sa	
SUP		
CFA		
Rpts		
OB		
OSC (CE)		
EAE		
CPW		
CPA		
CPO		
STB		
CEW		
IT		
GW		
SAB		
AO		
MO		
SUR		
BFOT		
DOC		
LOCKS		
S/W		
F&S		
SAF		

REMARKS

Subject ~~has~~ completed training as shown at the left. FI/OPS ~~training~~ comments that:

☑ a. this (does-~~does not~~) meet minimum training standards re qualification for the projected action.

☐ b. Subject currently enrolled in courses shown in red, the completion of which will satisfy minimum standards.

☑ c. ~~Subject~~, ~~unless (he-she) has had eq. field of other experience which can be accepted in lieu of training,~~ should be required to take the following (~~qualifying~~-refresher) training.

Phase III

PMR

☐ d. Subject's division advised of these recommendations.
(Agree-Disagree)

FORM NO. 59-77
APR 1953

SECRET

(45)

---

12 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Officer, [illegible] Training Officer

FROM : FI Career Management Officer

SUBJECT : Personnel Action On CONEIN, Lucien E.

1. The FI Career Service Board has (approved - ~~disapproved~~) the personnel action of (~~promotion~~ - reassignment -) of subject. The FI Training Officer has recommended that subject be scheduled for additional training in order to satisfy the requirements of the proposed personnel action. The following training program has been recommended.

2. Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the FI Training Officer.

Phase III

FORM NO. 59-112
AUG 1953

(45)

Lucien Emile Conein 36 ____________ **11 May 1954**

Saigon Indochina FE
XXXXXX Area Ops. Officer

Saigon military (Indochina)

Major USArmy [illegible]

Ops. Group "A" (equivalent to Phase #2) EFF-[illegible] [illegible]
SIG, CAI
GS

British Airborne School Nov 1943 - Mar 1944, TIS (Fort Benning Inf Sch. OCS
Wyandotte H. S. 1934 - 1936, University of Maryland (European Branch) Apr-Jul/1953

French Speak, Read Write Excellent

1935 - 1940 Printing - Pressman and Typesetter - F. R. Inchley Employer
1940 U.S. Army Captain, Infantry Duties Intelligence

Jul 43 to Nov 43 OSS Platoon Leader Ops Co. 2nd Lt. Overseas
Nov 43 to Dec 44 OSS JEDBURGH (Special Mission to France) 1st Lt. Overseas
Dec 44 to Dec 45 OSS Special Mission French-Indochina Captain Overseas
Jan 46 to Jun 51 CIG/CIA Mission to Germany, [illegible] Major Overseas
Nov 51 to May 52 CIA Chief of Nuernberg Operations Base Major Overseas
May 52 to Oct 53 Operations Officer Nurnberg Ops Base Major Overseas
Oct 53 to present Intel Officer - FI SE/1 Albanian Br. Washington, DC.

FRANCIS ANDERSON
FE-4 Indochina Desk

EVAN J. PARKER JR.
Chief FE-4

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

D. M.
1 June 1954

NAME
Lucien E. Conein

FROM: I.O. Maj. USA SE/Wash.

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ OTHER (Explain)
☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

TO: Area Ops Off. Maj. USA/FE/ Indochina

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	OIC(CS), ALSO				
	OIC, BITC, SOC,				
	BTP AND BSS				
	BTP II, ALSO [✓ OC]	51			
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC				
	AND [✓ CAT]	51			
	PO, ALSO PW I,				
	II, III AND DAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC	51			
	SUP				
	CFA				
	APIS				
	OD				
	OSC (CS)				
	E & E				
	CPW				
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	BICT				
	BSC				
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	[illegible]				
	F S.I				
	[illegible]				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS ☑ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S. THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☑ C. ~~UNLESS~~ SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING. ~~SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE~~ ☐ ~~QUALIFYING~~ ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

LEE HERE

FROM: Career Management Officer

JAMES P. HUMPHRIES

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Conein, Lucien E.	DATE (from item 5-D) 6 Jan 67	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Robert E. Porter	DATE (from item 5-2) 21 Jan 67
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 8 February 1967	DISPATCH NUMBER: FVST-14709	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	2. SERVICE DESIGN C/A	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE ROIC, Bien Hoa GS-14.	4. STATION OR BASE Vietnam	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 29 Sept 1965	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE July 1968	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ 15 Aug 1968	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 1 Sept 1968

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

Mother - 76	Sons - 8 and 9
Wife - 38	Daughter - 5

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Desire serve in a Post with family.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

Special assignment to Lansdale group, U.S. Embassy, Vietnam. COD Provincial Officer, Bien Hoa. Advised, financed, supplied Revolutionary Development Cadres, Census Grievance, and Provincial Reconnaissance Units. ROIC, Bien Hoa Region, consisting of eleven Provinces. Supervise 27 U.S. personnel assigned to OB and COD duties in the Provinces. Admin supervision of finance, supplies, and commo. Supervise the intel collection activities of all programs in the Region. Reporting significant information to the appropriate Divisions of the Vietnam Station. Maintaining liaison with key U.S. and Vietnamese officials in the Region.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

Language training - desire short course in the local language of next assignment.

FORM 202 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Desire assignment commensurate with past training and experience.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

1 EXTEND TOUR 16 months MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO July 1968 (DATE).

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HQOTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

2 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE North Africa 2ND CHOICE South America 3RD CHOICE Europe

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Strongly concur in this officer's request for extension.

COS personally suggested such action to him.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

FE Division concurs in Mr. Conein's 16-month extension to July 1968. FE is notifying Subject by dispatch, subject to SOD concurrence.

DATE 16 Feb 67 TITLE CFE/PERSONNEL SIGNATURE Arthur G. Hulley for Mary T. Boulger

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ______ DATED: ______

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSMITTAL

INSTRUCTIONS

A. This questionnaire is designed to provide information for consideration by headquarters in planning your next assignment.

B. Each supervisor in the field will ensure that this questionnaire is completed for each employee under his immediate supervision and forwarded to headquarters eight (8) months prior to the individual's planned date of departure from the station.

C. The questionnaire will be completed and forwarded through normal channels to headquarters in triplicate.

D. The questionnaires of Staff Agents should include cover duties and discussion of cover factors where appropriate.

SPECIAL NOTE

This form must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information or methods of operations, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of major duties may be reported in Item No. 8. However, the nature, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the description of the major duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases a general statement of duties will be indicated in Item No. 8 so as to show the level of responsibilities involved and enable reviewers at headquarters to understand the nature of your position. No names, operational techniques, objectives or purposes of the operation should be included.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any) [illegible] DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE (in pseudonym, if any)
NAME OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) Jeremy B. HATLGAN DATE 21 January 1967	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR (in pseudonym, if any) Jeremy B. Hatgan

FORM 202

SECRET

(4)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Far East Division
ATTN: PARDEE

FROM: Chief of Station, Vietnam

SUBJECT: Commendation of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Forwarded under separate cover is a commendation from General Langdale for SCHWICKRATH.

2. I though you would be interested in seeing it since it is a good indicator of how much of the General's reporting can be believed. Notice particularly the paragraph on page 2 concerning SCHWICKRATH's "services to my staff...in an applied field of philology, particularly in Vietnamese oral linguistics and the working of official documents..." When this paragraph was shown to SCHWICKRATH, he gave vent to some very soldierly language, pointing out that he doesn't speak a word of Vietnamese nor can he read it.

Edward D. SABETAY

[illegible]

Attachment:
Commendation u.s.c.

Distribution:
3 - C/FE w/att u.s.c.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER 13129
FVST-

DATE

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Saigon

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Approval of Home Leave and New Tour - Arthur R. [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FVST 6062, 20 August 1963

1. Headquarters is pleased to advise [illegible] has been approved for home leave and return to Saigon for a second tour.

2. For your information, [illegible]'s contract, effective 12 November 1961, is written for an indefinite period, and will continue in effect, as amended, until such time as it is terminated in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

JOSEPH C. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee

Departs Saig 3 Jan - Between 3 + 15 H/L
for [illegible] (5 days).
15 Jan Wash DC for 10 days TDY
W/O dependents
Returns via Europe.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
12 September 1963

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAVEL ORDER

24 August 1967

X

TRAVEL ORDER NO.: Amend # 1 to FE 366-66

NAME: Mr. Lucien E. Conein DAC Contract Agent

GRADE: GS-14

EMPLOYEE NO.: 750558

OFFICE PHONE: 5450

TRAVEL DURATION

BEGINNING ABOUT: 01 Aug 1967

ENDING ABOUT: 01 Oct 1967

OFFICIAL STATION: Vietnam

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE, ACCOMMODATION AND PURPOSE

Amendment # 1 to change ITINERARY to read: Saigon, Vietnam to Hong Kong, B.C.C. (5 days TDY without per diem) to Washington, D.C. (10 days TDY for consultations) to Kansas City (H/L) to Washington, D.C. PCS.

All other provisions of original Travel Order to remain in effect.

AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE

CENTS PER MILE, NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER

CENTS PER MILE, AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF:

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

ACCOMPANY TRAVELER

FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS

ADVANCE RETURN

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY

TRANSPORTATION REQUEST

CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION

SHIPMENT

NONTEMPORARY STORAGE

SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED

FOREIGN: POUNDS AND MODE

ACCOMPANIED

UNACCOMPANIED

DOMESTIC: INDICATE UNDER "SPECIAL PROVISIONS" ABOVE WHETHER ACCOMPANIED OR NOT, SIZE OF EACH PIECE, AND TOTAL WEIGHT.

ADVANCE OF FUNDS AUTHORIZED

YES

NO

ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO.

OBLIGATION LIQUIDATION CODE

CAN NO.

DATE 8137-1487 AUTHENTICATED SIGNATURE

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE

REQUESTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: DOUGLAS S. BLAUFARB

COMPONENT: C/VNO

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: WILLIAM E. COLBY

COMPONENT: CFE

FORM 540

(20-60)

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAVEL ORDER

X

NAME
Lucien E. Conein Contract Agent DDP

OFFICIAL STATION
Vietnam

OFFICE PHONE
5459

GRADE
GS-14

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Authorized: Saigon - Hong Kong (5 days TDY-no per diem) - Washington, D.C. (PCS)
Mode : Air
Purpose : PCS
Subject will proceed directly without delays from Hong Kong to Washington, D.C.

TRAVEL DURATION
o/a 1 Aug 67 o/a 1 Oct 67

PER DIEM ALLOWANCE
$ 16.00
X

AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

Shipment of effects authorized from Saigon and Hong Kong.

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME		
Elyette B.		Wife
Phillip J.	1960	Son
Laurent P.	1958	Son
Caroline H.	1963	Dau

X
X
Per Regs Per Regs
X Fr Hong Kong
X
Arr Hqs.

$2,500 - Tvl.
3,000 - HHE

221-4?

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	FE LOG	

Neil Doherty AC/[illegible] Vietnam

[illegible] Johnson AC/5459 Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE

7 Aug 67 IN 25799

S E C R E T 070900Z CITE HONG KONG 9287

DIRECTOR

MR. LOUIS CONEIN WILL DEPART HONG KONG ON 7 AUGUST 1967 VIA PAN AM FLIGHT #2 AT 17:30, ARRIVING HEADQUARTERS 8 AUGUST 1967 AT 0530.

S E C R E T

ET

SECRET

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
2		6	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	7	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	8	

FROM K/3

ACTION FE 8 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS 3, CS/PS, OP 2, OF 2

ACTION

27 JUL 67 IN 19891

SECRET 270916Z CITE SAIGON 9831

PRIORITY HONG KONG INFO DIRECTOR

MR. LUCIEN CONEIN DEPARTING SAIGON PCS TO HQS ON 27 JULY. PLEASE ADVANCE FUNDS FOR TRAVEL OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF EFFECTS TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND T/A TO HQS.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

SECRET

July 26

Keep track of his
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

15 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, CSCS

ATTENTION: Agent Panel

SUBJECT: Appointment of Career Agent
Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH

1. It is requested that Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH be approved for contract as Career Agent in furtherance of the long term objective of Project ZRJEWEL, this objective being to provide the Clandestine Services with an improved standby paramilitary manpower capability to assist the Operating Divisions in emergency situations.

2. Mr. SCHWICKRATH has, over a long period of time, well demonstrated his operational value to this Agency, and thus is more than amply qualified under the terms of R 20-1000 which defines this category of personnel.

E F Fox
fr
Alfred T. Cox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

Attachment:
PHS

CA/PMG/EFFox:rah
15 November 1961
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/SG/PERS
1 - CA/C/PMG
2 - CA/PMG
1 - Chrono

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Personnel Division

ATTENTION : Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Deletion of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH from Project IUJEWEL roster.

1. Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH has been employed as a Career Agent in Project IUJEWEL since 16 October 1961. During that period he was assigned to the Saigon Station as a Staff Advisor on Paramilitary matters to the Chief of Station.

2. When at the termination of that assignment, SCHWICKRATH returned to Headquarters, it was assumed by SOD that he would return to SOD and be again covered by Project IUJEWEL. However, I now understand that SCHWICKRATH is being processed for an assignment in WH Division and is, in fact, engaged in language training for that assignment.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the name of Arthur R. SCHWICKRATH be removed from the Project IUJEWEL personnel assets.

L. A. Walsh, Jr.
Major General, USA
Chief, Special Operations Division

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) Lucien C. Conein	DATE (from item 8.1) June 1963	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John H. Richardson	DATE (from item 8.2) June 1963
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:	Darold D. Aldridge		DATE

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 19	2. GRADE GS-13	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE AND GRADE C/PM GS-13	7a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD ON THIS TOUR 3 January 1962
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)		5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Saigon, Vietnam	7b. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 3 January 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None			7c. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 30 January 1964

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on transmittal form):

Staff advisor in paramilitary matters to the Chief of Station. Station liaison officer to GVN Ministry of Interior, Hqs US Special Forces and Army of Vietnam Corps Commanders.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Would prefer to have an operational assignment.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

FORM 5-59 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[X] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE ____________ 2ND. CHOICE ____________ 3RD. CHOICE ____________

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS.

1ST. CHOICE NE 2ND. CHOICE N. Africa 3RD. CHOICE WH

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 30

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

Wife - 34
Son - 5
Son - 3½

11A. INDICATE ANY CHANGE IN YOUR PERSONAL OR FAMILY SITUATION WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Child due 1 July

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

I strongly endorse Subject's request for return on another tour to the Saigon Station. His rich experience in the paramilitary field, detailed knowledge of Indo-China and the leading personalities in the area, and his fluent French make him an invaluable asset of the Station.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING

16. NAME OF CAREER SERVICE OFFICER OR PERSONNEL OFFICER

DATE

SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED ~~ASSIGNMENT~~ H/C & New Tour

18. REFERENCE
DISPATCH NO. EJSS 369 CABLE NO. ____________

19. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
Kenneth A. Aldridge

20. SIGNATURE

21. TITLE
FE/PF/SE

22. DATE

23. COMMENTS
CMC approved by William E Colby 12 Sept. 1963
Concurred by H. [illegible] SOD p[illegible] 11 Sept 1963

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FITNESS REPORT- LUCIEN E. CONEIN- CAREER AGENT- ZRJEWEL

FROM: SOD/Plans/EFFox	EXTENSION	NO DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. SOD/Pers.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1-2: Fitness Report and E. Fox comments forwarded FYI. FE Division advises that they will take no action re a promotion unless the field comes in with a specific recommendation by dispatch.
2. D/C SOD Mr. Jorgenson		20 [illegible]	[illegible]	To: Mr Fox Concur with promotion to GS 14, also with recommendation that FE leave such promotion alone. Pls ask Mr [illegible] to check [illegible] with MPD & give me results of that consultation. [illegible] 20 Dec 63
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

19 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: SOD/~~Personnel~~ Schwickrath

SUBJECT: Promotion - [redacted]

REFERENCE: Fitness Report dated 25 Feb. 1963

1. In view of present and past Fitness Reports, and by comparison with other ZRJEWEL personnel, I believe that the promotion of [redacted] to GS-14 equivalent is justified, and that it would be in order to convey this view to FE/Personnel. Technically, however, the administration of (and decision to promote) [redacted] is a responsibility of FE Division until [redacted] reverts to SOD under ZRJEWEL.

2. I would strongly recommend against any move to request Army to advance [redacted]'s retired status from Lt. Col. to Col.; although, for operational purposes while he is at Saigon it might be possible to give him notional or "assimilated" rank.

E. F. Fox

E. F. FOX
SOD/Plans

SECRET

[illegible]

[redacted]

18 March 1963

Schwickrath

[redacted]

1. FE/Pers will not honor promotion recommendation to GS-14 equiv. until field sends in a specific recommendation. This is the way FE Operates. FE Division feels [redacted] is their employee until his tour in Saigon is completed. If SOD wants to take action re the fitness report recommendation, Mr. Jorgenson should discuss this with Paul Breitwiser.

2. FE/Per advised the field by [redacted] "Personal note" from Mary Boulger that promotion ~~to~~ from Lt. Col. to Col. is not possible. SOD/Pers advised by FE/Pers that Department of Defense turned down active duty status [redacted] for cover purposes because in addition to being a retired reservist, [redacted] departed for the field under Department of Army Civilian cover and was assigned to Saigon in that capacity. After his arrival it was determined [redacted] in the field that he would represent himself as military. This was never sanctioned by headquarters.

503 2-512

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE/VCL

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of [redacted] to GS-14 Equivalent

Schwickrath

REFERENCE : Fitness Report for Subject dated 25 February 1963

1. In reference Fitness Report, the Deputy Chief of Station and the Chief of Station, Saigon, recommend the promotion of [redacted] to the next higher GS equivalent. I concur in this recommendation.

2. As you are aware, [redacted] is a member of Special Operations Division Project ZRJEWEL. In comparison with other employees of ZRJEWEL, taking into consideration the assigned duties and manner of performance, I feel that [redacted] promotion is appropriate, and concur in the recommendation of the Station.

3. It is requested that a contract amendment be initiated by FE Division to increase [redacted]'s compensation from GS-13 (4) equivalent, $12,245, to GS-14 (4) equivalent, $14,177.
15,277

GORDON L. JORGENSEN
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Att:
Reference Fitness Report

SOD/PERS/GLJ/RDI:nkh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Add/w/att.
1 - AC/SOD/w/o/att.
~~1~~ - SOD/Pers/w/o/att.
1 - RI/SOD/w/o/att. - dummy

TT/8-564/DIR/ C[illegible]ATCH FOLLOWS
VIA TELETAPE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION

INFO

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, SAIGON

SUBJECT
ZRJEWEL - FITNESS REPORT ON ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
FVSS-2216

1. A FORMAL FITNESS REPORT ON ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH WILL BE DISPATCHED SHORTLY. AD INTERIM, THOSE QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFERENCE ARE ANSWERED BELOW.

2. ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH, ZRJEWEL CAREER AGENT, IS ASSIGNED AS CHIEF OF THE PARAMILITARY STAFF REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE CHIEF OF STATION. AS SUCH, HIS DUTIES ENCOMPASS PLANNING, OPERATIONAL COORDINATION, FIELD INSPECTION, AND LIAISON WITH VERY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OFFICIALS IN THE INITIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, SCHWICKRATH IS THEXPRIMARY STATION CONTACT WITH THEXMINISTER OF INTERIOR, WHO IS A PROLIFIC SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCEXAND A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE STATION'S POLITICAL ACTION PROGRAM. SCHWICKRATH ALSO REPRESENTS THE STATION ON THE ODYOKE COMMITTEE FOR PROVINCE REHABILITATION /THE SO-CALLED TRUE-HEART COMMITTEE/.

3. SCHWICKRATH IS NOT DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN AGENT OPERATIONS, BUT AS THE STATION SENIOR PARAMILITARY STAFF OFFICER, HE INDIRECTLY SUPERVISES A NUMBER OF SUCH OPERATIONS /E.G., SIGALLY/, AND HIS ADVICE IS OFTEN SOUGHT ON MANY OTHER STATION AGENT OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF HIS LONG SERVICE IN VIETNAM AND HIS INTIMATE FAMILIARITY WITH MANY KEY MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIGURES IN VIETNAM.

4. SCHWICKRATH'S DUTIES MAY BE CONSIDERED AS HAZARDOUS WITHIN THE NORMAL MEANING OF THE TERM AS UTILIZED BY KUBARK. SCHWICKRATH IS FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN OVERFLIGHTS ON FIXED AND ROTARY WINGED AIRCRAFT OF AREAS KNOWN TO BE CONTROLLED BY THE VIET CONG. HE HAS, IN ADDITION, PARTICIPATED IN INITIAL PHASES OF CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS AND IS A FREQUENT VISITOR TO STATION FIELD INSTALLATIONS IN AREAS WHICH ARE OFTEN UNDER ARMED ATTACK OF VARYING INTENSITY BY VIET CONG FORCES.

/CONTINUED/

DISTRIBUTION
BY TELETAPE
2-CFE
BY POUCH
1-CFE

TOT/ 20 /AUG 6[illegible]/0[illegible]00

DATE TYPED
TOR-20 AUG 1965

DATE DISPATCHED

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
FVST-3[illegible]64

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

VIA TELETAPE

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER FVST-3344 PAGE-2

5. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN STRICT PERSONAL SECURITY FOR SCHWICKRATH. HE IS KNOWN TO MANY VIETNAMESE BOTH IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AS HAVING BEEN ENGAGED IN VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM SINCE 1945. IN ADDITION, THE STATION HAS JUDGED THAT HIS BEST UTILIZATION HAS BEEN AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHIEF OF STATION IN VARIOUS COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND LIAISONS WHERE IT WAS NECESSARY HE BE IDENTIFIED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COS. IT WOULD BE BOTH IMPOSSIBLE AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN SCHWICKRATH'S CASE TO ATTEMPT TO HIDE COMPLETELY HIS AFFILIATION WITH KUBARK.

6. DURING HIS CURRENT TOUR, SCHWICKRATH HAS ACQUIRED INCREASING SKILL AND FAMILIARITY IN THE INTRICACIES OF KUBARK STAFF WORK, BOTH AT THE INTER-STATION LEVEL AND THE INTGA-MISSION LEVEL. THIS IS A NEW CAPACITY FOR SCHWICKRATH WHO HAS HERETOFORE BEEN KNOWN AS A VERY AGGRESSIVE ACTION OFFICER. SCHWICKRATH HAS PERFORMED THESE NEW DUTIES WITH CONSIDERABLE FINESSE DESPITE A VERY RAPID BUILDUP OF PARAMILITARY ASSETS WITHIN VIETNAM AND AN EXTREMELY FLUID COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT SCHWICKRATH WAS THE ONLY STATION REPRESENTATIVE IN A RECENT CONFERENCE CONVOKED BY CINCPAC IN HAWAII TO RECOMMEND PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A TEN MILLION DOLLAR PROJECT INVOLVING A YEAR-LONG TURNOVER OF CIVILIAN IRREGULAR ASSETS IN VIETNAM FROM THE STATION TO MACV. SCHWICKRATH'S PERFORMANCE AT THAT CONFERENCE RESULTED IN THE CONFERENCE'S ADOPTING ALL STJIVON RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT TO ITS FUTURE ROLE IN CIVILIAN IRREGULAR ACTIVITIES. AT THE SAME TIME SCHWICKRATH'S PERFORMANCE WAS SUCH AS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE, HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KUBARK, CINCPAC AND MACV.

7. I HAVE PERSONALLY FOUND SCHWICKRATH TO BE AN INVALUABLE MEMBER OF OUR STAFF WITH AN INDISPENSABLE DEPTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND BACKGROUND ON SOUTH VIETNAM AND ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO GUERRILLA WARFARE. IT IS A DISTINCT PLEASURE TO HAVE HIM WORKING HERE AS A MEMBER OF THE STATION.

STEPHEN P. SHORDEN

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

12 OCT 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION : Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : COHEIN, Lucien
#5025

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 21 September 1961 in which a Covert Security Clearance was requested to permit utilization of Subject as a Career Agent to provide paramilitary skills in any area where they are needed under Project ZPJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a Covert Security Clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

28 SEP 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION: Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : CONEIN, Lucien
#5025

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 21 September 1961 in which a Provisional Covert Security Clearance was requested to permit contact and assessment of Subject, as a career agent, in providing paramilitary skills in any area where they are needed under Project ZRJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a Provisional Covert Security Clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request, as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Provisional Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Provisional Covert Security Clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Louis W. Vasaly
for Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 39264 A **DATE**

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE) Lucien E. Conein

Lucien E. Conein
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS:

SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 39264 B **DATE**

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE) Arthur R. Schwickrath

ARTHUR R. SCHWICKRATH
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

RIGHT THUMB PRINT

WITNESS: Ernest F. Fox

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 21 September 1961

TO:
- ☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: CA/PMG/Ernest F. Fox
x4611; 2405 K. Bldg.

SUBJECT: *(True name)* CONEIN, Lou

PROJECT: ZRJEUKL

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
(1) Morton F. Sowell (being cancelled if it has not already been done)
(2) Virgil M. Dorkus (being cancelled as are requesting new psuedo)

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: In any area in which is needed

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

To provide Paramilitary Skills in any area they are needed.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	YES		NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	X	YES		NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

Normal Procedure; Priority on PCSA and CSA per conversation with CA/SG/PERS

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☒	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
SIGNED Walter B. Crego for Ernest F.Fox	4511	Signed Alfred T. Cox, CA C/PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(3)

14-00000

SECRET

8 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE Division

SUBJECT: Employment of Lou Conein

1. At my request, General Lansdale has quietly checked on the status of Lou Conein's retirement from the Army. He is presently in Iran and is slated for return home and retirement in August. He has made an effort to return sooner but the Iranian Government protested that it would be an act of bad faith (apparently, he is doing a good job with them).

2. At the moment, Conein belongs to ACSI and Lansdale feels that any move on our part to accelerate his return would be misinterpreted, or perhaps I should say correctly interpreted, by ACSI. I am getting his address and will establish contact with him by personal letter. Lansdale feels that Conein is very anxious to come back to work for the Agency.

AC

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

cc: C/FE/VCL

SECRET

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE		THIS DATE (Fill In)
ISSUED BY	**PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT**	25 September 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): CONEIN, Lucien Emile
2. AGE: 41 yrs
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 5' 11"
5. WEIGHT: 175 lbs
6. COLOR OF EYES: Blue
7. COLOR OF HAIR: Brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: Fair
9. TYPE BUILD:
10. SCARS (Type and Location): appendectomy, hernia, rt. side of body
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: [illegible] rt. index and middle finger amputated

12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country):
5011 Hanes Street
McLean, Virginia
Elmwood 6-4811

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.:
1905 North 10th Street
Kansas City, Kansas

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: Elmwood 6-4811
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: OXford 57742
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Kansas
17. NICKNAMES: Luigi
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED:
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES. NA
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority) NA

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

Position commensurate with past training and experience

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $ 11,500.00
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: 1 October 1961

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)

☐ WASHINGTON D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

NONE

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
11-58 (4)

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 22 [illegible] 1919
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Paris, France
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☐ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☒ OTHER (Specify)
5. DATE NATURALIZED: 11 Au[illegible]
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: [illegible]
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: District Court
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): Tacoma, Washington
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☒ YES ☐ NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: France, (see above)
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

Born France 1919, emmigrated U.S. 1925

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☒ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)? NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: Sept 1925
16. PORT OF ENTRY: New York City, New York
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: France
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): Unknown
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: Unknown

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☒	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: [illegible]
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): [illegible]
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): [illegible]
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: Wyandotte H S
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Kansas City, Kansas
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1932 - 1934
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☒ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
University of Maryland	Pol Sc		[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 6 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NA

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
NA				

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
OCS, TIS, Ft Benning, Ga.	OCS	Mar 1943	July 1943	4
Special Warfare Ft. Bragg	Special Forces.	Nov 1956	Dec 1956	1

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

OSS and Agency Schools

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R Read, W Write, S Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
(List below each language in [illegible] of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es))	[illegible] ACENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			[illegible]			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			[illegible]			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French				X	X	X										X			

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

None

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

X YES NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
France	Military	1944					OSS
China	Military	1945					OSS
Indochina	Military-polit	1945&56-59					OSS
Germany	Intelligence	1946-1953					SSU CIA
Iran	Intelligence	1959-1961					ACSI

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Military Assignments

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SP 207111 27 July 1959 exp 27 July 1963

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
NA	NA	☐ GREGG	☐ SPEEDWRITING	☐ STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

NA

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Hunting - Good

Fishing - Good

Free Fall Parachuting - Good

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

OSS and Agency trained
Special Forces Battalion Commander 3 yrs
Chief Military Liaison Group, ACSI intel (FI) team Teheran Iran

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

None

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*: U.S. Army Sept 19[illegible] to present

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U.S. Army

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: Washington 25, D.C.

4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Military

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: [illegible]

6. TITLE OF JOB: Lt. Colonel

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ [illegible] per annum

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*: Lt. Col.

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: U. S. Army Officer assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING: Retiring after [illegible] yrs [illegible] mos [illegible] days service

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

SECTION X — **MILITARY SERVICE**

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)* X YES NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NA

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON USAR Ret Reserves

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*:
HAVE SERVED →									
NOW SERVING →	X								

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S) Parachute infantry

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)* NA

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)* over 20 years

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE 22 Sept 1941 CURRENT SERVICE NA

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION 18 mos

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE pvt CURRENT SERVICE Lt. Col

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)* 01-322769

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE PAST SERVICE 71542 CURRENT SERVICE 31542

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE PAST SERVICE 93000 CURRENT SERVICE 39300

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

Chief of Military Liaison Group, ARMISH/MAAG, APO 205 NY, NY

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY		OTHER: NA
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

X REGULAR X RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)* X OTHER *(Including AUS)* AUS

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? X YES NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L GUARD OR AIR NAT'L GUARD? YES X NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? YES X NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

X	ARMY		MARINE CORPS		NATIONAL GUARD		COAST GUARD		NAVY ROTC		INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
	NAVY		AIR FORCE		AIR NAT'L GUARD		ARMY ROTC		AIR FORCE ROTC		

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE LT Col

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK 8 July 1958

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION 1 Oct 1961

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(Active)* ☐ STANDBY *(Inactive)* X RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE NA

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE NA

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

NA

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT YES X NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS NA

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? YES X NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14 GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS NA

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY YEARS 24 MONTHS 3

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? AGST

SECTION XI FINANCIAL STATUS

1 ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2 IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

Not Applicable

3 BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
The Riggs Nat'l Bank, Lincoln Br.	17 & H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6 GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
S.W. Rice Co.	1342 G. St. N.W., Washington, D.C.
The First City Bank & Trust	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
The Guaranty State Bank	1000 Minn Ave., Kansas City, Kansas

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

NA

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO (If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)

SECTION XII MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY MARRIED

2 STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

Divorced from Monique Pierre Veber, 23 December 1947, Paris, France. Divorce by mutual agreement. Divorced from Carmen 01., 26 Mar 1957, Wyandotte County, Kansas

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance

3. NAME (First) Elyette (Middle) BROCHOT (Maiden) BROCHOT (Last) CONEIN

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED

NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 10 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE 30 March 1958

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country) Dillon, South Carolina

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)

7 rue Docteur Charcot, Champigny sur Marne, Seine, France

8. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)

5011 Hanes Street, McLean, Virginia

12. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Sept 1929

13. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Vinh Vietnam

14. CITIZENSHIP USA

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: 23 December 1956

15. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York City, New York

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): French

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP: 14 July 1959

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): U.S. Dist. Court for Dist of Col.

19. OCCUPATION: Housewife

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers): NONE

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.): NA

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED: NA

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Charles M. Conein	son	30 March '50 Frankfurt Ger	USA	4854 Kenmore Alexandria, Va
Laurent P. Conein	son	19 April '58 Fayetteville N.C.	USA	5011 Lanes St. McLean, Virginia
Philippe J. Conein	son	16 Nov '59 Teharan Iran	USA	" " "

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 3

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨ 0

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Step-father and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Conein, Lucien Xavier

2. LIVING: ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH: 1924

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: heart attack

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: None

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 18 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA

7. DATE OF BIRTH: 19 March 1872

8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Maux, Seine et Marne, France

9. CITIZENSHIP: French

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA

14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA

15. OCCUPATION: NA

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed): NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED: NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To): 1914 - 1919

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: unk

20. COUNTRY: France

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NNA

SECTION XV MOTHER *(Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Estelle Leoline Cousin

2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO ☐

3. DATE OF DEATH: NA

4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: Estelle Leontine Elin (maiden)

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(including length of time)* UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by what authority)*. USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: 150 Monterey Street, Brisbane, California

7. DATE OF BIRTH: 6 June 1893

8. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*: Soengei, Dutch East Indies

9. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: 22 May 1948

11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York City, New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*: French

13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 10 November 1959

14. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*: Dist. Court, San Francisco, Cal.

15. OCCUPATION: None

16. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)*: NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*: NA

19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA

20. COUNTRY: NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS *(Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)*

1

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*: Cousin, Maurice Rene

2. RELATIONSHIP: Brother

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*: French

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*: Unknown Champigny sur Marne, Seine, France

5. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE: 39

2

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

3

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

4

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

5

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

6

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

7

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

8

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*:

2. RELATIONSHIP:

3. CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*:

4. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*:

5. LIVING: YES ☐ NO ☐

6. AGE:

SECTION XVII — FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): John James Jones BROCHOT
2. LIVING: X YES ☐ NO ☐
3. DATE OF DEATH:
4. CAUSE OF DEATH:
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Unknown
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 10 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Noumea, New Caledonia
7. DATE OF BIRTH: Unknown
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Noumea, New Caledonia
9. CITIZENSHIP: French
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: self employed
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): self employed

SECTION XVIII — MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Marie Brochot
2. LIVING: YES ☐ X NO ☐
3. DATE OF DEATH: 1947
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: Cancer
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA
INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 10 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.
6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): NA
7. DATE OF BIRTH: NA
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): NA
9. CITIZENSHIP: French
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies)): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): AH
15. OCCUPATION: NA
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): CONEIN, Maurice Rene
2. RELATIONSHIP: Brother
3. AGE: 39
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Champigny sur Marne, Seine France
5. EMPLOYED BY: Unknown
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): French
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Seldom
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: 16 Sept 1961

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): BROCHOT, John James Jones
2. RELATIONSHIP: Father-in-law
3. AGE: Unk
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: Noumea, New Caledonia
5. EMPLOYED BY: Self employed
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country): French
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: have never seen
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: never contacted

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED ON PAGE 13

SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
2	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		
3	1. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE	4. CITIZENSHIP
	5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)	6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known)		

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S., WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
B/Gen Edw. G. Lansdale	Of Ass't Sec Def,	4503 MacArthur Blvd Washington, D.C.
Mr. Lucius O. Rucker	CIA	5011 Nance Street McLean, Virginia
Hon. Errett P. Scrivner	Congress	2331 Cathedral Av. N.W. Washington, D.C.
Mr. Alfred T. Cox	CIA	Arlington Towers Arlington, Virginia
Mr. John Foster	CIA	U.S. Embassy Teheran, Iran

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY, NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)

Since I have been in the military Service since September 1951 and since the majority of my military service has been in overseas areas, specifically since1959, 1961, and since I have just returned from Teheran, Iran, my social contacts are not in the United States.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)

Same as above applies. In the military service people are being continuously transferred to new duty stations therefore at this time it is impossible to adequately answer this question.

SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations of any kind *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
Airborne Association	Ft. Bragg, North Carolina	1956	Pres
Reserve Officers Association	Washington, D.C.	1957	Pres
Assoc of U.S. Army	Washington, D.C.	1958	Pres

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES FROM	TO
Agency mission to Germany	1946	1953
1512 Ellison Street, Falls Church, Virginia	Aug '53	June '54
Agency mission to Vietnam	June '54	Oct '56
13 [illegible], Ft. Bragg, North Carolina	Nov '56	Aug '59
No 5 [illegible] Safa, Teheran, Iran (Mil Mission Gp. APO 205 NY)	[illegible] '59	Sept '61

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF; OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Occasionally

5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

Military Liaison to J-2 SCS, Imp Iranian Army 1959 to 1961

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

U.S. Army

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

OSS 1943	U.S. Army 1956-57
SSU 1946	ACSI D of A 1959
CIC 1947	
CIA 1948-49	

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.*

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Elyette Brochot Conein	2. RELATIONSHIP Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)*	4. HOME PHONE NO. Elmwood 6-4811
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Dept of Army	6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. OX 57742

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

Mrs. Estelle Conein 150 Monterey St. Brisbane, Calif. Mother

SECTION XXVI **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 25 September 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Lucien Conein
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington D.C.	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS L. O. Rucker, Jr.

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGPO-SR 201 Conein, Lucien E. 22 September 1961
01 322 769

SUBJECT: Retirement

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Lucien E. Conein, 01322769, Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Lucien E. Conein, 01322769, Army of the United States, (Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, United States Army Reserve) upon his application is retired from active service under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3911, after more than 20 years of active Federal service. He is relieved from assignment and duty Washington, D. C., effective date of change of strength accountability: 30 September 1961 and placed on Army of the United States Retired List 1 October 1961. On 1 October 1961 he is transferred to United States Army (Retired Reserve) and assigned to United States Army Control Group (Retired) at appropriate United States Army Corps. Home of selection and completion of travel within one year is authorized. Permanent change of station. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. Pamphlet--"Personal Property Shipping Information" is applicable. 2122010 01-1731-1732-1733 P 1517 S99-999. Separation program number 567.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Adjutant General

ICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 600-185 and SR 600-185-1)

SECTION I

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL CONEIN, Lucien E.	2. SERVICE NO. 0 1 322 769	3. GRADE Major	4. BRANCH Inf	5. COMPONENT USAR

6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER

Support Group (8706)
Washington 25, D. C.

7. PERIOD OF REPORT

FROM (Da,mo,yr)	TO (Da,mo,yr)	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS
1 May 56	17 Oct 56	126	44

8. REASON FOR REPORT
☐ Annual
☐ Change duty rated officer
☒ PCS rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ PCS rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES
☐ Close daily contact
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS 9300, job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER UNKNOWN	RATER UNSATISFACTORY	RATER SATISFACTORY	INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER UNSATISFACTORY	INDORSER SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒

	UNKNOWN	NO	YES	
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

An animated imaginative officer. Impetuous, verbose in talk, he is more realistic in action. He has an agile mind which does not take well to discipline. Speaks French fluently. Is able to develop and work with foreign personnel at all levels. Extremely adaptable.

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report.

This Officer is particularly well suited for unconventional warfare operations.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT Under My Supervision: John G. ANDERTON, Chief of Station, GS-15	14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT Under My Jurisdiction: Evan J. PARKER, JR., Branch Chief, GS-15
I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1	I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.
DATE 31 oct · SIGNATURE John Anderton	DATE · SIGNATURE Evan Parker
15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. (Insert "0" if appropriate).	16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 17 Oct 56 PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 1 OCT 53 67-3 REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 50, WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 53.

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER
CONEIN, Lucien E., O 1 22.769

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNKNOWN column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking UNKNOWN does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER UNKNOWN	RATER 1 NOT WANT HIM	RATER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	RATER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	RATER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	RATER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM		INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER 1 NOT WANT HIM	INDORSER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	INDORSER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	INDORSER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	INDORSER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	A Command* a unit. A	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B Serve as a staff officer. Specify: UW or Guerrilla Warfare Ops B	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	C Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician. Specify: Sabotage, GW, Special Forces C	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	D Conduct military instruction. D	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	E Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e.g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc. E	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties. F	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	G Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities. G	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	H Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e.g., act as your deputy. H	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	I Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership. I	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	J Other. Specify: Research & Development, Special Force Techniques J	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

Subject's forte is not administration; he is a specialist in airborne and similar types of special operations demanding a high degree of initiative, energy, and perseverance.

*For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers.	☐	☐
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☒
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☒	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know.	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☐	☐
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☒	☒
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments, but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer.	☐	☐

OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORT

(AR 600-185 and SR 600-185-1)

SECTION I

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL CONEIN, Lucien E.	2. SERVICE NO. 0 1 322 769	3. GRADE Maj	4. BRANCH Inf	5. COMPONENT USAR
6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER Spt. Gp. 8706th DU Washington 25, D. C.	7. PERIOD OF REPORT FROM (Da,mo,yr)	TO (Da,mo,yr) 31 Apr '56	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS

8. REASON FOR REPORT
☒ Annual
☐ Change duty rated officer
☐ PCS rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ PCS rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES
☒ Close daily contact
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS , job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

Classified duties comparable to a Special Forces troop Commander on an isolated mission.

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER			INDORSER		
	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	UNKNOWN	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
	UNKNOWN	NO	YES			
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.		

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

Has demonstrated outstanding leadership, including the ability to assess a situation correctly, make proper decisions on his own initiative, and cope with emergencies skillfully. Much of his duties were performed in territory in which enemy agents were active; some were performed under enemy fire.

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report.

An outstanding officer, thoroughly qualified technically in his field, practical, energetic and bold. Undertook difficult missions under most trying conditions and carried them out successfully.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT Edward P. Duncan, Lt.Col., O522927, Inf. MAAG - Vietnam	14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT Edward G. LANSDALE, Colonel, 2534A, USAF, MAAG - Vietnam
I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.	I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.
DATE / SIGNATURE E P Duncan	DATE / SIGNATURE EG Lansdale
15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. (Insert "O" if appropriate).	16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

DA FORM 1 OCT 53 67-3 REPLACES DA AGO FORM 67-2, 1 SEP 52, WHICH WILL BE OBSOLETE 31 OCT 53.

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the *UNKNOWN* column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking *UNKNOWN* does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER UNKNOWN	RATER 1 NOT WANT HIM	RATER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	RATER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	RATER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	RATER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM			INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER 1 NOT WANT HIM	INDORSER 2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	INDORSER 3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	INDORSER 4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	INDORSER 5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	A Command* a unit.	A	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B Serve as a staff officer. Specify:	B	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	C Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician. Specify:	C	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	D Conduct military instruction.	D	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	E Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e.g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc.	E	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	F	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	G Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities.	G	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	H Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e.g., act as your deputy.	H	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	I Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership.	I	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	J Other. Specify:	J	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

*For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers.	☒	☒
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☐
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinion of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6. One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5. Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
4. Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
3. Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade.	☐	☐
2. Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know.	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☒	☒
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5. A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☐	☐
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2. An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments, but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer.	☐	☐

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

14-00000

Please Type

OFFICERS EFFICIENCY REPORT
WORK SHEET

SECTION 1

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL CONEIN Lucien E	2. SERVICE NO. 0 1 2[illegible] 769	3. GRADE MAJ	4. BRANCH INF	5. COMPONENT USAR

6. UNIT, ORGANIZATION, AND STATION OF RATED OFFICER	7. PERIOD OF REPORT FROM (Da, mo, yr)	TO (Da, mo, yr) [illegible] Apr 5[illegible]	DUTY DAYS	OTHER DAYS

8. REASON FOR REPORT

☒ Annual
☐ Change duty rated officer
☐ PCS rated officer
☐ Change duty rating officer
☐ PCS rating officer
☐ Other (Specify)

9. BASIS FOR RATING OFFICER'S ENTRIES

☒ Close daily contact
☐ Infrequent observation
☐ Frequent observation
☐ Reports and records

10. DUTIES ACTUALLY PERFORMED ON PRESENT JOB ASSIGNMENT (Give his duty MOS, job assignment, and briefly describe major additional duties).

Classified duties comparable to a Special Forces troop commander on an isolated mission

11. OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	RATER UNKNOWN	RATER UNSATISFACTORY	RATER SATISFACTORY	INDORSER UNKNOWN	INDORSER UNSATISFACTORY	INDORSER SATISFACTORY
a. How effective is this officer in the maintenance of supply discipline?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒
b. How effective is this officer in utilization of personnel?	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒

	UNKNOWN	NO	YES	
c. FOR RATER ONLY - Does this officer possess the physical, mental, and moral qualities expected for his grade, branch, and length of commissioned service?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.
d. FOR RATER ONLY - Could this officer be expected to serve adequately in any normal branch assignment commensurate with his grade?	☐	☐	☒	If UNKNOWN or NO explain in detail in item 12a.

12. DESCRIPTION OF RATED OFFICER AND COMMENTS. Remarks should cover any special strengths or weaknesses affecting performance of duty or ability to perform other types of assignments. If officer served in combat during period, state number of days (days) and discuss strengths and weaknesses exhibited in combat.

a. Comments of rating officer

Has demonstrated outstanding leadership, including the ability to assess a situation correctly, make proper decisions on his own initiative, and perform with [illegible] skillfully. Much of his duties were performed in territory in which ~~[illegible]~~ enemy agents were active; some were performed under enemy fire.

b. Comments of indorsing officer

☐ I do not know the rated officer well enough to complete the reverse side of this report

An outstanding officer, thoroughly qualified technically in his field, practical, energetic and bold. Undertook difficult missions under most trying conditions and carried them out successfully.

13. RATING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT Edward R. GUEREAU [illegible] 0-[illegible] INF, MAAG-VIETNAM	14. INDORSING OFFICER'S NAME, GRADE, SERVICE NUMBER, BRANCH, ORGANIZATION, AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT EDWARD G. LANSDALE, COLONEL, 2534A, USAF, MAAG-VIETNAM
I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.	I CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF ALL ENTRIES MADE HEREON BY ME ARE TRUE AND IMPARTIAL AND ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 600-185 AND SR 600-185-1.
DATE / SIGNATURE	DATE / SIGNATURE
15. THIS REPORT HAS INCLOSURES. (Leave blank if appropriate)	16. DATE ENTERED ON DA FORM 66 PERSONNEL OFFICER'S INITIALS

FILE COPY

WORK SHEET FOR DA FORM 67-3

RATED OFFICER'S NAME AND SERVICE NUMBER

SECTION II ESTIMATED DESIRABILITY IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES

Indicate the extent to which you would desire the rated officer to serve under you in each type of duty described below. Place an X in the proper box. Consider each item in terms appropriate to rated officer's grade and branch. Use the UNKNOWN column only if the nature of your contacts makes it impracticable for you to make an estimate of his probable usefulness in a particular assignment. Marking UNKNOWN does not penalize the rated officer.

RATER UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM			INDORSER UNKNOWN	1 NOT WANT HIM	2 WOULD PREFER OTHERS	3 PLEASED TO HAVE HIM	4 PREFER HIM TO MOST	5 PARTICULARLY DESIRE TO HAVE HIM
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	A	Command* a unit.	A ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	B	Serve as a staff officer, Specify: Special Forces	B ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	C	Work as a specialist, professional person, or technician, Specify: Special Forces	C ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	D	Conduct military instruction.	D ☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	E	Serve in a capacity involving contacts with other services, allied forces, or civilians - e. g., joint boards, contract negotiations, reserve components, etc	E ☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	F	Carry out an assignment involving mostly administrative duties.	F ☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	G	Represent your viewpoint in liaison activities	G ☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	H	Make decisions and take action in your name during your absence - e. g., act as your deputy.	H ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	I	Be responsible in an emergency requiring forceful leadership	I ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	J	Other, Specify:	J ☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Comment on and/or clarify above ratings if necessary

* For technical and administrative services, or staff, interpret this to mean managerial responsibilities commensurate with command.

SECTION III PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

Considering only officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, rate the officer on performance of his duty assignment. Read all descriptions and place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
7. Excels any other officer I know in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
6. Outstanding performance of this duty found in very few officers	☒	☒
5. Very fine performance of such a nature that this officer is a distinct asset to the service.	☐	☐
4. Performs this duty in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☐
3. Performs this duty acceptably.	☐	☐
2. Barely adequate in performance of this duty.	☐	☐
1. Inadequate in performance of this duty	☐	☐

SECTION IV PROMOTION POTENTIAL

Considering officers of his grade, branch, and about the same time in grade, what is your opinon of this officer's promotion potential? Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
6 One of the few exceptional officers who should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries.	☐	☐
5 Should give an outstanding performance when promoted to next higher grade.	☒	☒
4 Should give a competent and dependable performance when promoted to next higher grade	☐	☐
3 Should give a fairly adequate performance of duty when promoted to next higher grade	☐	☐
2 Has not yet demonstrated potential for promotion to next higher grade. Needs more time in present grade.	☐	☐
1. Has reached the highest grade level at which satisfactory performance should be expected. Should not be promoted.	☐	☐

SECTION V OVER-ALL VALUE

What is your estimate of the rated officer's over-all value to the service? Compare him with officers of the same grade, branch, and about the same time in grade. Place a heavy X in the box opposite best description.

	RATER	INDORSER
8. The most outstanding officer I know	☐	☐
7. One of the few highly outstanding officers I know.	☒	☒
6. A very fine officer who is a great asset to the service.	☐	☐
5 A competent, dependable officer of distinct value to the service.	☐	☐
4. A typically effective officer.	☐	☐
3. An acceptable officer whose value is limited in some respects.	☐	☐
2 An officer who performs acceptably in a limited range of assignments but who could easily be replaced.	☐	☐
1. An officer who is not of the caliber that one should reasonably expect in an officer	☐	☐

SECRET

13 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

SUBJECT : Major Lucien E. COHEIN

Major Lucien E. COHEIN is released by this Division for return to his parent military service effective 15 October 1956. Major COHEIN plans to take military leave from 18 August through 30 September 1956. The period 1-15 October will be occupied with operational debriefings and final clearance processing.

ALFRED C. ULMER,
Chief, Far East Division

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Major Lucien E. CONEIN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov. 1919	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 4 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED. A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JUL 29 1956	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Officer PP BFF-2100	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	R IO (FI) BFF-2775
Major, USA	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Major, USA
DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Station Field Team "B"	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Vietnam Saigon Military Station CI/FI Section
Saigon Vietnam	11. HEADQUARTERS	Saigon, Vietnam
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XX	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XX DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O change - no change in supervisor

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
[illegible]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
[illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX
M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 6-3725-55-039
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS

F. APPROVED BY

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR AWARD

(REGULATIONS 4-20-635 & AFR 20-635)

DATE: 19 July 1962

TO: Honor Awards Board	THROUGH: DCI	FROM: Chief of Station, Saigon (Militar

SECTION I — PERSONAL DATA

NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last) (First) (Middle) CONEIN, Lucien E.	POSITION TITLE Paramilitary Officer	GRADE Major, USAR

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO DDP/FE-4	STATION ☐ Headquarters ☒ Field (Specify location) Saigon, Vietnam
LEGAL RESIDENCE (number, street, city, zone, state) 1925 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Kansas	CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED U.S. (Naturalized)

IF ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE DIFFERENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE SUCH DIFFERENCES.
NA

RECOMMENDED AWARD Distinguished Intelligence Medal	POSTHUMOUS ☐ Yes ☒ No

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN Carmen CONEIN	RELATIONSHIP Wife	ADDRESS (number, street, city, zone, state) 1517 Allison St., Falls Church, Va.

IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, DATE, ORIGINATING OFFICE, AND ACTION TAKEN.
NA

SECTION II — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION

WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT? ☐ Yes ☐ No	*IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OR CERTIFICATES OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUAL HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.*

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

FULL NAME	POSITION TITLE	GRADE	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

FULL NAME	TYPE OF AWARD

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED.

LOCATION	INCLUSIVE DATES	TIME OF DAY

PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

SECTION III — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR [illegible] OR SERVICE

OFFICE, COMMAND, [illegible] (location)

INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	ASSIGNMENT [illegible]	[illegible] IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ Yes ☐ No

FORM NO. 37-175
SEP 1953

SECTION IV

TO BE USED FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ☐ DEED (OR ACT) ☐ ACHIEVEMENT PERFORMED (OR SERVICE RENDERED)

AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION: WAS ACT VOLUNTARY? DESCRIBE WHY ACT WAS OUTSTANDING AND IF IT WAS MORE THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. [illegible]. IF IN AERIAL FLIGHT, DESCRIBE TYPE AND POSITION OF AIRPLANE, CREW POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL, AND ALL UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. INDICATE RESULTS OF ACT.

AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE: TITLE AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNMENT, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF SERVICE DURING PERIOD FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED (GIVE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED POSITIONS, INCLUDING DATES OF ASSIGNMENT AND [illegible]). WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL DO THAT MERITS THE AWARD? WHY WAS THIS OUTSTANDING WHEN COMPARED TO OTHERS OF LIKE GRADE AND EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR POSITIONS? INDICATE RESULTS OF ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE.

See attachment

RELATIONSHIP OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED [illegible]	NAME, POSITION TITLE, AND GRADE OF PERSON MAKING RECOMMENDATION [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
LIST OF INCLUSURES (Include proposed citation) 1. Narrative Description	SIGNATURE
	DATE

15 June 1956

LUCIEN CONEIN

1. Served with the Saigon Military Mission from 1 July 1954 to 20 April 1955; although he has served in Saigon at another station from September 1955 to date, he has voluntarily supported SMM activities in his spare time. Conein's major duties have been in the paramilitary field, with contributions and support to a wide variety of other activities

2. In July and early August 1954, Conein served as assistant to the Chief of SMM. As such, he helped in making contact with Vietnamese political underground groups in Tonkin and Cochin China, assisted in the initial survey of the Vietnamese resistance potential in Tonkin, aided in SMM political efforts to stop the assassination of French military by Vietnamese revolutionaries and participated in developing SMM's contacts with the Vietnamese government.

3. In August 1954, additional paramilitary personnel reported for duty with SMM and it was decided to place a separate SMM team in Tonkin to attempt to recruit, train, and place Vietnamese stay-behind forces there prior to the turn-over of the area to the Communist Vietminh under the Geneva Agreement deadline. Further, sabotage targets were to be [illegible] [illegible] and French [illegible] on Conein's ability. Two complete stay-behind organizations were in place when the Vietminh took over the North, despite the presence of [illegible] and Vietnamese [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible], Tonkin. Important sabotage, within U.S. imposed limits, was successfully carried out.

4. One stay-behind organization was developed by Conein personally. He then successfully cached adequate operational equipment in Tonkin, recruited secretly exfiltrated, supervised overseas training, and secretly infiltrated the stay-behind organization into Tonkin successfully prior to the last phase of the Vietminh take-over of Haiphong starting 20 April 1955. All equipment was in place, for future use, by 31 January 1955, which was no small feat of [illegible] since it had to be done under the increasing surveillance of Vietminh [illegible] security forces who [illegible] into Haiphong [illegible] in the final days. Covert infiltration of personnel was accomplished over a 30-day period in March 1955.

5. Sabotage efforts included the contamination of the oil supply of the Hanoi Bus Company and of coal used by the Tonkin railroad. Both contaminants were devised in Japan by the technical [illegible] and were [illegible] into Tonkin by SMM. Contamination had to be accomplished at the last minute, to insure that it would damage the Vietminh rather than French commercial interests. The

Bus Company was accomplished with the witting help of its French manager, whose friendship was developed by Conein; the coal operation was a unilateral operation by SMM.

6. The oil contamination took place just prior to the Vietminh takeover of Hanoi on 9 October 1954. Conein, assisted by Frank Garvers, gained entry to stored drums of the Bus Company's lubricating oil, opened the drums, and started pouring in the contaminant. Fumes from the contaminant overcame them in the enclosed storage space. Upon reviving, the two placed handkerchiefs over their faces and completed the task.

7. Surveys and plans also were made for other sabotage missions, which were later cancelled by U.S. decisions. The team was in place and capable of carrying out the missions.

8. On 11 January 1955, SMM had so multiple and complex a mission that personnel were reorganized into separate teams by operational duties rather than by geography. Conein was appointed Chief of the White Team, which was responsible for all paramilitary and support operations. The latter included a skilled smuggling operation which successfully eluded Vietminh security agents and the International Commission (Poles, Indians, Canadians). Conein's close friendship with the French Foreign Legion and with Corsican underworld elements was of assistance.

9. In April 1955, Corsican contacts started developing a liaison between SMM and the Binh Xuyen (police, opium, prostitution, and gambling) through Conein. This was an alternate operation, since another covert liaison was being [illegible] between the Vietnamese National Army and the Binh Xuyen. It was a touchy game, since the Chief of SMM had been [illegible] the Binh Xuyen [illegible] list publicly by the Binh Xuyen and Conein's connections were known by them. After several cloak-and-dagger contacts, in which negotiations progressed towards a covert solution of the Binh Xuyen problem, the final contact was broken on 28 April by orders of the chief, SMM. Conein was at the contact point when open fighting broke out in Saigon in the afternoon; it was feared that Conein would be taken and held as a hostage. (During the fighting an American USOM [illegible] in a third commercial aircraft was shot down by the Binh Xuyen, who mistook him as an agent of the chief of SMM; his close social friendship with Conein was the only connection; SMM's covert contact, the Chief of Staff of the Binh Xuyen, was last seen bound and gagged on the floor of a taxi, screaming from a beating, after he had arranged the defection of his personally-led battalion finally fighting its way through the Binh Xuyen and joined the National Army; these side facts are entered only to indicate the additional tension Conein ran as a member of SMM in dealing with the Binh Xuyen; SMM psychological action against the Binh Xuyen remained undiscovered by them).

10. Conein's practical solutions to problems, great resourcefulness, skill and knowledge of equipment as well as all phases of paramilitary operations, contributed materially to the success of the Saigon Military Mission in advancing U.S. objectives. Conein is a good, strong right-hand man in a tight spot and proved it in a number of tense situations during this assignment.

EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Saigon Military Mission

SECRET

26 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

SUBJECT : Request for Orders -
Major Lucien E. CONEIN

REFERENCE : IN 33577, dated 22 June 1956

1. It is requested that cover military orders assigning Major Lucien E. Conein to MAAG, Vietnam TDY be amended to include the period from October 1955 to 24 July 1956. The amended orders should also authorize Major Conein to proceed from Saigon to Washington o/a 24 July 1956 via Paris, Frankfurt, and Geneva. Subject will report to Washington 1 August.

2. It is further requested that these orders be sent registered airmail to subject at the following address:

MAAG Box "S"
APO 74
San Francisco, Calif.

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

24 May 56.

Lucien E. Conein

Date of Rank: 27 Dec 50 (Promoted to Major in inactive reserve effective 17 June 47).

As of 20 May 56 Army considering 26 Oct 50 dates for LTC. No promotions yet but due momentarily. No 5% for CIA. DA Controlled. Conein probably be considered after May 57.

Above per
LTC R.W. Allison
C/MPD/Personnel
Branch.

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted]

12 APRIL 1956 Reference is made to your Letter of Authorization, effective ~~27 October 1955~~, which defines your relationship with the United States Government while you are on detail to this organization.

Effective 27 October 1955, said Letter is amended by adding subparagraph three (3) (c) which reads as follows:

> "(c) It is anticipated that by virtue of your duties on this particular mission, you will be required to fulfill the minimum Department of the Army requirements necessary for the receipt of extra-hazardous duty pay. If such extra-hazardous duty payments are not made to you by the Army, you will receive from the Government the sum of $110.00 per month in lieu of an identical amount you would have received for such extra-hazardous duty had you been on overt military duty abroad. You will be required to certify to the Government that you have actually fulfilled such requirements. If, upon completion of this present assignment, you have received one or more such monthly payments for which you have not fulfilled said monthly minimum requirements, you will return such payments to the Government. You will be required to pay income taxes on this amount."

All other terms and conditions of the Letter remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

REVIEWED:

SECRET

SECRET

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted] (S)

EFFECTIVE 12 April 1956 ~~27 October~~ 1955

1. Your parent military service has detailed you to another Governmental organization (hereinafter called 'this organization') and considers you permanently assigned to Washington, D. C., for temporary duty abroad for an indeterminate period. In recognition of the special mission to which you have been assigned, it is hereby agreed that the following rights, restrictions and obligations will be in force during the period you are performing this particular mission for this organization.

2. You will be required to keep forever secret this Letter and all information which you may obtain in the course of your association with this organization (unless released in writing by this organization from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

3. It is specifically understood and agreed that you are a member of the Armed Forces of the United States and that you are entitled to retain from either the United States Army or this organization, only the military salary, allowances and other benefits which are commensurate with your military grade and post of assignment. You will continue to receive from the United States Army the base pay and longevity applicable to a married officer of your rank and length of service. Due to the cover and security considerations involved, you may be precluded from receiving certain of your military entitlements from your parent military service and upon appropriate certification thereto, this organization shall make such payments directly to you, as follows:

(a) In accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations, any overseas military station allowance authorized for your post of assignment (for which the present per diem rate $2.20 for subsistence and $[illegible] for quarters, without dependents). If you are furnished quarters, you will not be entitled to receive the rental portion of the overseas military station allowances.

(b) Effective 1 March 1956, if applicable, a military family separation allowance in conformance with paragraph 4304 of the Joint Travel Regulations (presently $1.15 per day). It is to be noted that this allowance is not payable for any period Government quarters are available to you.

If this organization makes the above payments, you will receive from your parent military service the allowances applicable to a married officer of your rank permanently assigned to Washington, D. C. However, if during your overseas assignment with this organization, you and/or your dependents are furnished quarters, certification of that fact must be made to your parent military service, and you will be required to certify every six (6) months to this organization that you have not received your basic quarters allowance from your parent military service. If this organization does not make the above payments, you will receive from your parent military service the allowances applicable to the designated unit to which you will be assigned.

SECRET

4. If, as a direct result of your detail to this organization, you are precluded from utilizing available military travel, transportation or storage facilities, this organization will advance or reimburse you funds to insure that you are not deprived of your military entitlements as set forth and limited in the Joint Travel Regulations and the regulations of your parent military service. Therefore, authority is hereby granted to advance or reimburse you funds for the following expenses:

(a) Personal Travel. Travel expenses incurred by you (as defined in the Joint Travel Regulations) between permanent posts of duty. Such expenses shall be either the actual cost of transportation (as directed by this organization) and military per diem or the applicable mileage allowance as set forth in the Joint Travel Regulations, in conformance with the criteria established therein.

(b) Personal Baggage. Transportation (including priority baggage by surface transportation) and related expenses incurred in the course of permanent change of station and temporary duty travel, subject to the limitations set forth in applicable regulations of your parent military service and the Joint Travel Regulations, provided that if air travel is authorized and performed for permanent change of station travel, you will be entitled to ship unaccompanied 100 pounds of such baggage by air.

(c) Temporary Duty. Travel expenses incurred by you for authorized temporary duty travel. In addition to military per diem and in lieu of transportation, you may be reimbursed the applicable mileage allowance as set forth in the Joint Travel Regulations in conformance with the criteria established therein. You will be paid per diem in accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations.

All travel and transportation performed hereunder must be directed by appropriate authorities. Expenses payable by this organization hereunder are explicitly limited in kind and quantity to those expressly authorized above. Accounting and payment therefor will be made to and by this organization under applicable regulations.

5. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by this organization. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

6. You will be entitled to leave in accordance with the policies of your parent military service. Upon the completion of your present assignment, you will be required to certify to your parent military service the number of days annual leave you have taken during your assignment with this organization.

7. If in the performance of services under this Letter you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the United States Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

8. The conditions of this Authorization are predicated upon the assumption that you will be assigned to Viet-Nam under nominal military cover, and that you will continue under such cover for the duration of your overseas assignment with this organization. Any deviations from these facts will require a new Letter of Authorization or amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

[redacted]

REVIEWED:

____
Chief, Military Personnel Division

l SECRET

10 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: CONEIN, Lucien - Major

On 27 June 1955, Major Conein returned to Washington, D. C., after serving one year PCS at Saigon, Vietnam, where he was with the Saigon Military Mission under MAAG cover as Major, U.S.Army. Upon Major Conein's return it was decided that since no replacement had been found for him it would be necessary for him to return to Saigon under the same cover arrangements he used for his PCS, for a period of TDY. Major Conein was informed by CFE/4/Support and VN/Support Officer that CIA travel orders were being prepared authorizing him only 90 days TDY in Saigon. These orders were signed by C.V.Hulick, DDP/EXO, CFE, LCB, MPD, FE/CFI, CFI, and FE/BF. At the conclusion of the 90 days TDY no replacement had been found for Major Conein and he remained in Saigon. No amendment to his travel order was submitted however, no extension by cable from Headquarters was sent to indicate that Major Conein was either TDY or PCS.*

Upon checking with MPD it was found that Major Conein, if he remained in the field for even one year's TDY, would receive the maximum per diem rate as prescribed by FTR's ($20 per day less 1/5 for quarters which were being furnished) and that this per diem rate could not be reduced. ACFE/4, ACFE/4/VN, and VN/Support Officer discussed the entire case and since Major Conein had been informed prior to his departure that he would remain in Saigon on TDY for 90 days only, a Form-52 was submitted reassinging Major Conein to a PCS status in Sagon, Vietnam effective 27 October 1955 (90 days after his TDY started). An amendment to the original travel order was submitted to show the change from TDY to PCS effective 27 Oct.

Major Conein has been informed of the fact that he was made PCS effective 27 Oct. 1955, per DIR , dated .

Bryna K. Nadler, FE/4/Support/VN

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible]

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except *6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Major Lucien E. Conein	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] Nov. 19[illegible]	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 8 April 1956
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) REASSIGNMENT		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 27 OCT 55	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED: ~~[illegible]~~ 6 Nov 55	

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops Officer [illegible]-2160 [illegible], [illegible]	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Officer (PP) [illegible]-2100 [illegible], [illegible]
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
DDP FE Branch 4 - Indochina Vietnam - Haiphong Base	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Station Field Team E
Haiphong, Vietnam	11. HEADQUARTERS	Saigon, Vietnam
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD/PP

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject arr'd PCS Saigon on 27 Oct 55 (was TDY for 90 days prior to this date)
REQUEST EFFECTIVE DATE BE 27 OCTOBER 1955.

To be corrected 6 Nov 56

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) [illegible]	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY (*Signature*) *Title*
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) [illegible]	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAD	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I A	REAL

[illegible]

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
[illegible]		FROM: [illegible] TO: [illegible]			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

27

SECRET

16 SEP 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation - Major Lucien E. Conein

1. Request that the attached letter from the Secretary of the General Staff, with letter of commendation attached, be forwarded through official channels to Major Lucien E. Conein.

2. It will be noted that General Westmoreland has sent a copy of General Cabell's letter of commendation both to Major Conein's official 201 file and to his career branch, where it will be incorporated with his efficiency reports for consideration in selection for promotion or schooling.

3. This commendation in his official records should be of considerable assistance to Major Conein in his military career and we take pleasure in forwarding it to him.

[illegible] A. LI[illegible]
Colonel, AGC
Chief, Military Personnel Division

Attachment - Ltr from Sec of GS
dtd 11 Sep 55.

Ltr to S/A from
Lt Gen Cabell, dtd
27 Aug 55.

SECRET

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ~~FVL-[illegible]~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Senior Representative, Indochina

DATE 18 Aug

FROM Chief, FE

SUBJECT
GENERAL Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC Assignment of [redacted] and VILLIERS

REF: a. SAIG 2922
b. DIR 49205

1. Headquarters appreciates SLADE's reply to Ref b, and will make it a matter for the record. For SLADE's (and VILLIER's) information [redacted] has, in the course of his duties in Europe, come to the attention of the French, probably including the UNION organization. Naturally, his former KUTWIN record is well-known to UNION and he is personally acquainted, we have since learned, with TUTOR himself.

2. Headquarters appreciates, too, the probable reaction of TUTOR to the advent in the Indochina scene of VILLIERS, [redacted] and possibly other with similar histories. This is unavoidable and unfortunate; however, under the circumstances Headquarters considers their assignment a necessary risk.

3. In a [illegible] it can [illegible] firmly stated that, in the case of [redacted] -- yes, he was assigned to KUBARK by ODIBEX as a reserve officer on extended active duty. Further [redacted] actually had been released back to ODIBEX, and had already been reassigned by ODIBEX. As this dispatch is being written, those ODIBEX orders are in process of being rescinded and new orders are being initiated assigning [redacted] to [illegible].

4. In the case of VILLIERS, whose orders have just been received transferring him to Saigon, if indeed his previous KUBARK connection is known to TUTOR, it can only be stated that he, too, has been released back to ODUNIT, at their or ODEARL's request, in response to their urgent need for an experienced senior officer with his qualifications for a special mission in Indochina.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

~~EVIAW-576~~
page 2

5. This movement of personnel from one agency to another is by no means an unheard-of thing. As you are aware, as in the case of French service officers assigned to the to the TUTOR ORG, so are selected military personnel assigned to KUBARK. Very recently two senior ODIBEX officers on the KUHOOK Senior Staff were released at ODIBEX request by KUBARK and subsequently transferred to ODTOWN, Thailand, with no further KUBARK connection.

6. In spite of sincere protestations and denials on your part, we realize of course that at least some bit of suspicion will linger on in TUTOR's mind and that these suspicions will not be allayed by even the most circumspect of routine contacts between persons in VILLIER's group and members of the SIM Staff. Such contacts are bound to occur, particularly if the VILLIERS group does indeed succeed in getting an HTARCADE program of any sort in motion. However, as we have stated, this is an accepted risk, and we have to play the game out, even though we cannot assess the possible damage to the SIM liaison.

CHARLES F. WYNNICK

For the record, now!

6 July 1954

15 May 1954

Distribution:
    Addressee - Orig & 2

14-00000

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 3 August 1955

NAME: Lucien E. Conein (Major)

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: ☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL ☐ OTHER (Explain)

FROM: Area Ops Off FE/Saigon, Major

TO: Area Ops Off FE/Haiphong Maj.

EOD:

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BIP, PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II	August 51		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI PH III	September 51		CL. MOV. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	[illegible] OPS ALSO PM, I-II-III PART			SURV. FAM. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
Z	CLAND. SERV. REV			BASIC PHOTO	
Z	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOCUMENTATION	
	ACT. COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			OIC	September 51
	ORDER OF BATTLE		x	MIG	
Z	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] OPS.				
	TECH. [illegible]				
	[illegible] TECH				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] OPS				
	INTERR. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	[illegible] & REFRESHER				
	[illegible] IMPROVE.				
	[illegible]				
	[illegible] MGMT			PRE-TEST	
	[illegible] OPS			[illegible]	

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "S". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE
☐ QUALIFYING ☒ REFRESHER [illegible]
TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT
☐ SOONEST
☒ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☐ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER

STAFF TRAINING OFFICER
[illegible], C/[illegible]/OP[illegible]/ER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 427 [illegible]

SECRET

276

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TU SPUN - A

DATE : 29 JUL 55

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	[illegible]
2	VN/[illegible]	5	[illegible]
3	VN/[illegible]	6	[illegible]

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

JUL 30 1955

ACTION: FE 7

INFO : FI/RI 2, SSA, FD 3, OL/TD 2, OP 2, S/C 2

CFE/4/VN [illegible]

VN/PP [illegible]

VN/PM [illegible]

VN/FI [illegible]

SAIG 7807 (IN 30141)   1657Z 29 JUL 55   ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR

CITE: SAIG

TUSPUN ADMIN

FE/4/S

[redacted] ARRIVED SAIG 29 JULY 55.

END OF MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE   Copy No.

Tuspun VS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE : 19 JUNE 1955

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION: FE 7

JUN 20 1955

INFO : FI/ADMIN, FI/RI 2, PP 2, PP/OPS, SSA, FD 4, OL/TD 2, OP 3, S/C

C/VN

PM

PP

FE/4/S

SAIG 7344 (IN 15400) 0308Z 20 JUN '55 ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR CITE: SAIG

TUSPUN MILPERS

1. [redacted] DEPARTED SAIG FOR WASH 19 JUNE.
2. DELOE RETURNED SAIG 17 JUNE.

END OF MESSAGE

Conein

201

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Major Lucien E. CONEIN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov. 1919	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 1 Dec. 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JAN 2 1955 (PP)	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Officer DYF-859 Major USA	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Officer DYF-2078 Major USA
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	
DDP/FE Branch 4 Saigon Liaison Mission	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 4 - Indochina Saigon Military Mission Office of the Chief Ops Staff
Saigon, Indochina	11. HEADQUARTERS	Saigon, Indochina
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD XX ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

No fitness report necessary as subject's supervisor remains the same.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature:

Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
		FROM TO: 5-3785-55-039			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

J. A. [illegible]
Col, ASC

SECRET Conein

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION FOR [redacted] (P)

1. *Effective* [illegible] 1954, this Letter of Authorization will define your relationship with the United States Government while you are on detail from the United States Army to another Governmental organization (hereinafter called "this organization").

2. In recognition of the special mission to which you have been assigned, it is hereby agreed that the following rights, restrictions, and obligations will be in force during the period you are performing this particular mission for this organization:

(a) It is specifically understood and agreed that you are a member of the Armed Forces of the United States and that you are entitled to retain from either the U. S. Army or this organization, only the salary, allowances and other benefits which are commensurate with your military grade and post of assignment.

(b) As you will be assigned by the United States Army on bona fide military PCS orders to Indo-China, you will receive from your parent military service your base pay and longevity, and the allowances applicable to the designated unit to which you will be assigned.

(c) It is contemplated that you may be furnished transportation to and from your permanent post of duty overseas by your parent military service. In the event that such transportation is not so furnished, you will be advanced or reimbursed funds by this organization for said travel and transportation expenses and for authorized travel within your operational area. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of this travel in accordance with applicable Government civilian travel regulations. All travel, transportation and per diem provided you under this paragraph by this organization must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

(d) In conformance with the Joint Travel Regulations, this organisation will advance or reimburse you funds for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and your household effects from your present area of assignment to any place in the United States which you may designate. If authority is granted for your dependents to join you at your permanent post of duty overseas, this organization will advance or reimburse you funds for the travel and transportation expenses of your dependents and your household effects subject to the emergency restrictions of your parent military service; from the place so designated by you to your permanent post of duty overseas, and, upon completion of your assignment with this organisation, from your permanent post of duty overseas to Washington, D. C. Your dependents will be entitled to per diem in the course of such overseas travel in accordance with applicable Government civilian travel regulations. The expenses incurred in the movement of your dependents and your household effects from said designated place in the United States to your permanent post of duty

SECRET

overseas shall include transportation as indicated above and storage of such household effects as are not moved, provided that the total amount of household effects moved plus the total amount of household effects stored shall not exceed the total weight allowance prescribed (by the Joint Travel Regulations) for a major in the U. S. Army. All travel transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with the organization's regulations and, where applicable, the Joint Travel Regulations.

(e) You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved by this organization. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with the regulations of this organization.

(f) It is anticipated that by virtue of your duties on this particular assignment for this organization you may be required to fulfill the minimum Department of the Army requirements necessary for the receipt of extra-hazardous duty pay (demolition pay). If such requirements are met and proper certification is made thereto, and if for security or operational reasons such payments cannot be made to you by your parent military organization, then, this organization will pay to you the sum of $100.00 per month in lieu of an identical amount you would have received from the United States Army had you been on overt military duty abroad. Your mission chief, or a responsible senior mission official will be required to certify to this organization that the handling and exploding of demolitions is a requirement of your duty with this organization, that you have fulfilled the minimum Department of the Army regulations necessary for the receipt of such extra-hazardous duty pay, and that no payment therefor has been received by you from your parent military service.

(g) You will be entitled to leave in accordance with the policies of your parent military service. Upon the completion of your present assignment, you will be required to certify to your parent military service the number of days annual leave you have taken during your assignment with this organization.

(h) If, in the performance of your cover service, you assume the custody of government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by this organization to evidence this relationship.

3. You will be required to keep forever secret this Letter and all information which you may obtain in the course of your association with this organization (unless released in writing by this organization from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

SECRET

4. The conditions of this authorization are predicated upon the assumption that you will be assigned to Saigon, Indo-China under bona fide military cover, and that you will continue under such cover for the duration of your overseas assignment with this organization. Any deviation from those facts will require a new Letter of Authorization or amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

[redacted]

REVIEWED:

____
Chief of Military Personnel

SECRET

C/SE
SE/1
CAL

11 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John H. Richardson

FROM: Major Lucien E. Conein

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter I am forwarding to Dick Helms. The letter in itself is self-explanatory.

I want you to know that my decision is in no way intended to reflect on you or the SE Division.

Lucien Conein

Attachment.

11 December 1953

Dear Dick,

You will recall that it was my intention in 1951 to civilianise and assume a staff position upon my return from Germany. Since my return last August, however, I have decided to return to the Army and, accordingly, I signed a statement of category to this effect on 1 December 1953.

This decision is in no way a reflection on you or members of your staff but rather recognition that I cannot afford to civilianize due to my personal obligations. I intend to inform John Richardson of my action at the same time you receive this letter.

Since I am at present holding a slot, I think it is only fair to all concerned to have it filled by a qualified person before my departure.

I want to thank you and Gordon for the trust you have given me in the past. You may rest assured that I will always be glad to be of service to the Agency in the military if the need should ever arise.

Yours truly,

Geographic Area Knoledge:

	Country or Region	General or Specialist(Specify)	How Knoledge was acquired	When Acquired
1	France [illegible]	Military	OSS WWII	1944-45
2	Indo China - Viet Nam	Mil - Pol	OSS - CIA	1945 [illegible]
3	Germany, Iran	[illegible]	SSU - CIA, US Army ACSI	[illegible]

Language Ability: Competence(R-Read;W-Write;S-Speak) How Acquired(Reside, Native, Contact, Study)

	Language	Native	Fluent	Research	Travel	Limited	How Acquired
1	French		S.R.W.				Native
2							
3							

Employment History(Major Time Periods Only)

	Employer or Firm	Location	Job Description or Duties	Inclusive Dates
1	[illegible]		[illegible] Press Man, Type Setting	1935-1940
2				
3				
4				
5				

Martial Status Married (Divorced twice) Date of Marrage 22 Mar [illegible] Place of Marrage Dillon, S.C.

	Dependents Name	Date of Birth	Relationship	Citizenship	Present Address
1	Elyette R	1 Sept 21	Wife	USA (NAT)	
2	Laurent P	11 Apr 55	Son	USA	
3	Philippe	16 Nov 59	Son	USA	

4 Divorced Monique Pierre Veber Dec 47, Paris, France

5 Divorced Carmen [illegible], 26 Mar 57 Wyandotte County, Kansas

6	Charles M Conein	30 Mar 50	Son	USA	4854 [illegible] Alex, VA
7					

Permanent Address & Phone 1905 N 10th St Kansas City, Kansas

Alternate Address & Phone Mrs Estelle Conein 150 Monterey St. [illegible], Calif - [illegible]

Name (P) SCHWICKRATH, ARTHER R True Name CONEIN, LUCIEN E.

Special Qualifications(Pilot, Code radio operator, SCUBA Diver, etc.)

	Skill or Hobby	Proficiency		Skill or Hobby	Proficiency
1	Free Fall Prcht	Good	2		
3			4		

Operational or Combat Experience (W.W.II, Korea, Laos, Viet Nam, Other)

	Theater, Region, or Country	Time period	Assignments or Duties (Plat Ldr; Case Off; etc)
1	France [illegible]	WWII 44-45	
2	Germany	1945 [illegible]	[illegible]
3	Viet Nam	[illegible]	[illegible]

Military Service: Component US Army Branch Inf Date entry on Active Duty 27 Sept 41

Total Period Active Duty 20 years Rank when separated Lt Col Current Status Retired

Major Military Schools attended

	Type School & Name & Length	Date Completed
1	OCS Ft Benning (4 Mo)	Jul 43
2	Special Warfare (6 week)	Dec 56
3		
4		

Major Military Assignments

	Duties(orPosition) & Time Period	Country
1	[illegible] OSS [illegible]	[illegible]
2	Special Forces [illegible]	USA
3	Mil. Liaison - ACSI Sept 59-Sept 61	Iran
4		

Agency Service: Date entry active duty Sept 61 Type employment Contract Agent - [illegible]

Agency Training

	Type Training	Period	Date completed
1	FI Ops		Oct 53
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	Aug & Sept 61
3			
4			
5			

Agency Assignments

	Duties	Time Period	Country(s)
1	[illegible] FI Ops	1946 - 1953	Germany
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	Viet Nam
3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4			
5			

Education: Highest level & date attained [illegible] Citizenship U.S. Nat. [illegible]

Date of Birth 29 Nov 19 Place of Birth Paris, France

Date Available for re-assignment ______ Special Clearances [illegible]

Name (P) SCHWICKRATH, ARTHER R. Current Assignment [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Conein, Lucien E.	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 29 Nov 1919	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE

6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee)	NO. 4	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 29,50,58,59	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS contract nt	10. LAST MED. RPT.	QUAL. FOR	EVAL. FOR

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT.-1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT.-2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT.-3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

Sep 1941-Sep 1961, U.S. Army, Lt. Col. Retirement mili
1943-1956, Military detail to CIA

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

High School, did not graduate
1949-53, Univ of Maryland, 77 sem hours

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

French - fluent

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1951 - Operations training

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Nov 1961	Career agent PMOPS	13		DDP/SOD	Hqs
Jan 1962	" " "	13		DDP/FE	Saigon
Apr 1963	" " "	14		" "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED Dec 1966	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY SOD/Pers/MTC	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE

FORM 9-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Conein, Lucien E.

DOB: 29 November 1919
Married: Three sons, born 1950, 1958, 1959
Naturalized U.S. Citizen, 11 Aug 1942 (Formerly French Citizen)

EOD: 12 November 1961

Current Reserve Status: U.S. Army Retired Reserves

Non-CIA Employment:
- 1935-1940 - Printing, Pressman and Typesetter, F.R. Buckley
- Sept 1941 - Sept 1961 - U.S. Army, Lt./Col., Infantry

Non-CIA Education and Training
- Mar-April 1943 - OCS, Ft. Benning, Ga.
- Nov 1943 - Mar 1944 - British Airborne School
- 1949-1953 - University of Maryland, Mil. Science 77 Sem/hrs.
- 1956 - Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, N.C.

Foreign Languages:
- French-Fluent-Native of Country

Agency Sponsored Training:
- Paramilitary Training

CIA Employment:
- July 43-Dec 1945 - OSS-Special Mission to France and Indochina
- Jan 46-Jan 1951 - CIA Mission to Germany
- Nov 51-May 1952 - CIA-Chief of Nuernberg Operations Base
- 1954-1956 - Detailed to CIA-Saigon Military Mission
- 12 Nov 1961 - EOD as Career Agent
- 19 Mar 1963 - Promoted to GS-14 step two equivalent

Special Qualifications:
- Served as Military Liaison to J-2 SCS, Iranian Army 1959-1961

SECRET

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Bustos-Videla, C. Z.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 14 Feb 1950 – 16 JAN 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
SSN 069-24-3138
01/12/29

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 31 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Bustos-Videla, C~~harlotte~~ Z.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 08 DAY 03 YEAR 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4235-4525 0000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH Division FI Staff	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS Officer (13)	12. POSITION NUMBER 0640	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 23642

G 32

18. REMARKS

Home Base: WH

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL H. L. Berthold C/WH/Pers	DATE SIGNED 31 Jul 73	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Liberman	DATE SIGNED 8-2-73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
39	10	51100	WH	75013		1	11 12 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE	30. CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32. MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	38. CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	1—WAIVED 2—REG 3—REG/OPT 4—INELIGIBLE	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 8-3-73 AUG 10 1973	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 8.1.73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY 07-0312

E2-2 IMPDET

(4)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

17 JAN 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, GS-13 Evaluation Board

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14
Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. It is recommended that Charlotte Bustos-Videla be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14.

2. The performance of this officer has been characterized for many years by all of her supervisors as consistently strong to outstanding. She has been able to establish herself as indispensable in each Headquarters Branch or Field Station assignment, usually functioning as the backbone of the unit to which assigned. Since return to Headquarters in September 1972 from her field assignment in Mexico, her performance has been entirely congruent with the thrust of the Field Station's enthusiasm over her ability, performance, attitude and growth potential. She is currently chief of the Cuban and CA Section of her branch, and has established once again her mastery over her assigned duties. She is the kind of sound, dependable, yet imaginative officer greatly appreciated by her supervisors. In short, she is a true professional who performs beyond her grade level.

3. In regard to her potential, she has served in the Agency since 1951, starting as a secretary/stenographer, and advancing brilliantly with each new challenge offered. She achieved professional status in 1953 and has spent the bulk of her time since then specializing in Latin American affairs, demonstrating total flexibility in assignments, a voracious appetite for work and a penchant for exceptionally precise and thorough production. A review of her career to date can lead to the conclusion that she has always risen successfully to each new professional challenge, and is still far from reaching her maximum capacities. While she has had little supervisory experience in the field, her supervisor was of the opinion that she is a "natural leader". This has been borne out in her performance in her current capacity as a Branch Section Chief, in which she has demonstrated exemplary supervisory ability. Notwithstanding her drive, aggressiveness and professional aplomb, she is a popular co-worker, is receptive to guidance and sensitive and responsive to the needs of her subordinates.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

[illegible]

4. This employee has utilized her fluency in the Spanish language to maximum advantage in her work. Formal testing recently confirmed her high proficiency in that language. Coupled with a comprehensive training record and her invaluable experiences over a twenty year period, she has become particularly effective in Latin American operations and operational support, demonstrating excellence in each of several recognized specializations, including CI operations, functional support, reports and requirements, area support and varied covert action activities.

5. The officer's adaptability, high intelligence and mastery over her trade was of inestimable value to Mexico City Station, and over a five year period from 1967 to 1972, she functioned as the Station's internal troubleshooter. Her duties included the maintenance of watchlists, screening of travel documents, processing of raw technical take, target analysis, reports writing, operational support, handling of outside contract agents, and special assignments as the Chief of Station's Executive Assistant.

6. The employee is occasionally called upon by the Office of Training to administer specialized training, and she was chosen recently to attend the Mid-Career Course ending in December 1972. Meanwhile, her absence from her new job is felt sorely by the Branch. It is expected that her current assignment will last about two years.

7. In summary, we have here an exceptional officer who has been performing at the level of a GS-14 for some years; it is now time to promote her to that grade commensurate with her performance and which she so justly deserves.

Theodore Shackley
Theodore G. Shackley
Chief
Western HemisphereDivision

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, QSI - Honor and Merit Awards Panel

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase (HR 20-37)
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

2. As noted in the attached fitness report, Subject's performance of her duties has been uniformly outstanding. In addition to her responsibilities in the Cuban section of the Mexico City Station, she has recently been made the executive assistant to the Chief of Station at Mexico City. In this job, she screens all incoming material for matters of interest to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station. She also continues performing her past functions in the Cuban section for the Station.

3. Subject's present high quality of performance is typical of her performance since she entered the Agency in 1951. It is fully expected that this level of performance will be maintained.

4. Although the present Chief of Station was not the reviewing official on the attached fitness report, he has commented that he considered Subject an outstanding officer and has recommended that she be considered for a Quality Step Increase.

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

16 MAR 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13
Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion of Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla from GS-12 to GS-13 is hereby recommended.

2. This exceptional officer has now been performing at a senior level for several years and, while recognition through a Quality Step Increase was granted her last year, her sustained performance clearly exceeding the requirements of a GS-13 qualifies her for a promotion at this time. Subject is one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for even further advancement within the Agency and will probably continue to advance in the future. The present recommendation is based on already demonstrated ability to operate at a senior level.

3. Subject is 36 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past five and one-half years.

R. W. Herbert
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 August 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Bustosvidela, C/ Z.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 17 | YEAR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 3235-0620 COO wh.
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

G
34

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH Division
Branch 1
CA Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (D-13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1294
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22,487

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/BR 1/MEXICO CITY STATION/0418 *HOME BASE: WH

2 - Security
1 - Finance

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 15 Sept 72

Issue *Army W-2 (Concur: CCS) 25 SEP 1972

22 SEP 1972

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 007034

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold, C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 8 Sept '72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 15 Sep 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

G
51

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
16	10	51300	WH	45013		1	01 12 27		

28 NTE EXPIRES
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE
36 SERV. COMP. DATE
37 LONG. COMP. DATE
38 CAREER CATEGORY
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42 LEAVE CAT.
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA
44 STATE TAX DATA
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46 OP APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

25 SEP 1972

SECRET

18 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charlotte Bustos-Videla
THROUGH : Chief, WH Division
SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Service.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

SECRET

12 DEC 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Service
Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of
Quality Step Increase -
Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of a second Quality Step Increase to be awarded to this employee. The previous Quality Step Increase was effective March 1964.

2. May I again ask that you arrange an appropriate ceremony for the presentation of this Quality Step Increase which is in recognition of her continuing excellent performance.

for Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase (HR 20-37)
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Chairman, DDP QSI Panel — 9 Dec 69
Date

APPROVED:

for John J Caldwell
Director of Personnel — 12 Dec 1969

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 OCTOBER 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, C[redacted] Z.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 03 YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9135 0990

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

651

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0418

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 15849

18. REMARKS:

STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

FROM: POSTION # 1528

1 - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry L. Berthold
C/WH/Personnel

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 25 Oct 68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTERS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51620	WH	45075		3	[illegible]		

28 [illegible] EXPIRES MO DA YR — 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CSCA 3-FICA 5-NONE CODE — 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR — EOD DATA — 33 SECURITY REQ NO — 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT — 36 SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR — 37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR — 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RSV. PROV. TEMP CODE — 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVER 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE — 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS — 42 LEAVE CAT CODE — 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS — 44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-24-68

46 O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 10-24-68

6

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 OCTOBER 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z. 07-17-67

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH ~~07~~ DAY ~~15~~ YEAR ~~67~~	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR*
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE 8135 0990	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

6
51

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12 POSITION NUMBER 1528	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP XX 13 3	17 SALARY OR RATE $ 13,769

18 REMARKS

OPS OFFICER OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST.

* STAFF EMPLOYEE ~~XXXX~~ SPECIAL.

~~XX~~ CONCUR:

CCS

No objection
Joyce Mayeken
CSPS/Agent Branch

1 - Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Henry L. Berthold C/WH/Personnel	DATE SIGNED 17 Oct 67	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Paul M. [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 17 Oct 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE [illegible]	20 EMPLOY CODE [illegible]	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 5122	ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22 STATION CODE [illegible]	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE 3	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 12 29	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE 22	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR		EOD DATA	33 SECURITY FLD NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES	HEALTH INS CODE		40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE	
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION		46 O.P. APPROVAL					DATE APPROVED [illegible]		

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

28 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Central Cover Group

SUBJECT : Cover for Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. Mrs. Charlotte M. Bustos-Videla is being transferred PCS to Mexico City in staff capacity. She will fill slot 1523.

2. Mrs. Bustos-Videla is traveling under Travel Order No. 39-68. (See copy attached) Her cover will be that of a dependent wife entering Mexico on the Visitante visa of her husband, Dr. Cesar Bustos-Videla, who is receiving a Visitante visa in connection with a teaching contract he has with the Las Americas University, Mexico City. The University is paying for the travel of Dr. Bustos-Videla only and for all documentation. The University also will provide no quarters or quarters allowance. Under the travel order Mrs. Bustos-Videla will receive mileage and single perdiem for the trip to Mexico City. Limited household effects will be sent, the remaining items (also limited) will be stored at Government expense.

3. The cover story to be used by Mrs. Bustos-Videla is [illegible] Army, [illegible] Operations Group effective 15 July 1967. She will travel to Mexico with her husband, where she will meet friends and obtain local employment with the U.S. Embassy.

4. Actually, Mrs. Bustos-Videla will remain in pay status as a Staff Employee.

5. Due to the change in cover stories, it is requested that CCG/NC take appropriate steps to see that the salary received through 15 July 1967 be covered by an Army W-2, and that effective 15 July 1967, D.C. Income tax no longer be withheld, and all subsequent salary be covered by a notional Department of State W-2. Her salary government checks should continue to be deposited to the National Bank of Washington, Dupont Circle Branch, Account No. 3 [illegible] 36 6. She will receive no field allotment.

Robert D. Cushman
Chief, WH Personnel

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 JULY 1967

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS VIDELA, ~~CHARLOTTE~~ Z.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 16 YEAR 67

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V · XXX V TO CF · ☐ CF TO V · ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8135 0990

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH 1
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

G
51

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (11)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1528

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,769

18 REMARKS

X OPS OFFICER occupying Intel Analyst Position

FROM: DDP/WH/1/Pos. No. 1201

PRA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR20-17d(b), NOT TO EXCEED TWO YEARS.

G
34

Finance

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: C/WH/Personnel Robert D. Cashman

DATE SIGNED: 10 July

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M.

DATE SIGNED: 13 July 67

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
20	10	51626	WH	45075		3	01 12 29		

28 MIL EXPIRES MO. DA. YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE	30 CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	32 MO. DA. YR		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
07 15 69	.82						EOD DATA		

/

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. REGT PROV. TEMP	38 CODE	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED 1-YES)	39 HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42 LEAVE CAT	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	43 CODE	43 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	44 CODE	44 NO TAX EXEMP	44 STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: CP-14676

46 O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 OCTOBER 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOSVIDELA, C.Z. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 | DAY 23 | YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7235 0620
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 1
FI SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1201
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,769 ✓
18. REMARKS:
FROM: GS-12/6 ($12,822)

6
29

I - Finance

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Edward L. O'Malley
Robert D. Cashman C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 21 Oct 66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: John P. Brown
DATE SIGNED: 10/21/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
22	10	51300	WH	25013		1	01	12	29	10	23	66	10	23	66

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RSVY PROV-TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-21-66 N
46 O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED

FORM 2-64 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

1 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSPS/B

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion of Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion recommendation to GS-13 of Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla is hereby submitted. Mrs. Bustos-Videla entered the Agency in August 1951 as a GS-5 and rapidly and deservedly rose to a GS-12 by 1959. She has now been almost seven years in grade and has been recommended for promotion to the CSPS/B by WH Division five times previously.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become her standard of performance. Her past four annual Fitness Reports have each given her an overall rating of outstanding. In this connection it is noteworthy that no two Fitness Reports were written by the same rating officer. She continues to occupy a GS-12 officer slot and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirements for that position. She is considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency.

3. Mrs. Bustos-Videla not only continues to bring continuity to the Mexican Branch through her long experience on Mexican affairs, but consistently contributes to the smooth functioning of the Branch through her highly efficient organizational capabilities. She has been called upon to handle all manner of difficult desk problems. She invariably responds quickly, cheerfully, and effectively. She has been instrumental in on-the-job training of a number of officers, both for desk assignments and in preparation for field assignments. She has excellent rapport with innumerable persons in other areas and staffs, thus adding to the efficiency and speed with which she accomplishes her daily tasks. Her promotion at this time is urged.

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Approved by CS Career
Serv. Bd
13 OCT 1966

SECRET
(When Filled In)

11 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charlott Z. Bustos-Videla

THROUGH : Head of CI Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current ~~career~~ field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

EYES ONLY
SECRET

1 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13, Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion request from GS-12 to GS-13 on Mrs. Bustos-Videla is hereby submitted.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become for her a standard of performance. She now formally occupies a senior (GS-13) FI Officer slot in the Mexican Branch and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirement for that position. She is still considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency, independently, of the experience on Mexican affairs acquired through continuity in her present assignment.

3. The comments made in connection with the four previous promotion recommendations continue to be entirely applicable.

4. Subject is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past six years.

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

EYES ONLY
SECRET

[illegible]
SECRET

9 SEP 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13, Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

1. The promotion request from GS-12 to GS-13 on Mrs. Bustos-Videla is hereby resubmitted.

2. This outstanding officer has continued to perform at the exceptional level which has by now become for her a standard of performance. She now formally occupies a senior (GS-13) FI Officer slot in the Mexican Branch and her performance clearly continues to exceed the requirement for that position. She is still considered to be one of the outstanding women who have demonstrated their capacity for further advancement within the Agency, independently of the expertise on Mexican affairs acquired through continuity in her present assignment.

3. The comments made in connection with the three previous promotion recommendations continue to be entirely applicable.

4. Subject is 36 years old and has been in grade as a GS-12 for the past six years.

William V. Broe
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

not approved
8/X

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 JULY 1965

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, C[redacted] Z.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH AUG DAY 1 YEAR 65

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6235 0620

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH
BRANCH 1
~~MEXICO SECTION~~ 3-1 Section

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 1201

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 ~~4~~ 5

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~11,915~~ 11670

18 REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/MEXICO SECTION/1202/

MRS. BUSTOS-VIDELA WILL REPLACE MR. RICHARD SCUTT WHO WILL BE REASSIGNED TO DDP/EE.
TO BE EFFECTIVE 1 AUGUST 1965

Recorded By
CSB
[illegible]

1-Security
1-Finance

18a SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Robert D. Cashman
ROBERT D. CASHMAN
C/WH/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 30 July

18b SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 8/4/65

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 30
20 EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 5130 ALPHABETIC WH [illegible]
22 STATION CODE: [illegible]
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOURS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 12 YR. 29
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSR 2-FICA 3-NONE; CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP; CODE
39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0-WAIVED 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7/16/65 [illegible]
46 O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 8 4 65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(14)

4 SEP 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS (Panel A)

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion to GS-13
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

1. The promotion to GS-13 of Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla is recommended. Mrs. Bustos-Videla entered the Agency in August 1951 as a GS-5 and rapidly and deservedly rose to a GS-12 grade by 1959.

2. This recommendation is based on Mrs. Bustos-Videla's performance during the past three years as the senior assistant to the various chiefs of the Mexican desk/branch, who unanimously have found her to be extremely competent and reliable both in her routine assignments and special tasks occasionally levied on her, such as country studies, compilation of programs, requirement reviews, etc.

3. Mrs. Bustos-Videla has consistently responded with intelligence and clarity and has materially contributed to orderly imaginative administration of Headquarters support to a most active station. In the process, she has been instrumental in training on-the-job innumerable officers both for desk assignments and in preparation for field assignments.

4. For her outstanding performance she received a quality step increase in April 1964. This deserved recognition should now be followed up at this time by a promotion to the next grade in accordance with the consistently good performance at the GS-13 level over a prolonged period of time.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONFIDENTIAL

14 APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. The salary increase accomplished by the award of a Quality Step Increase is important and tangible evidence of the esteem in which the employee so recognized is held. However, I believe the commendatory and incentive benefits of this award will be partially lost unless it is presented in an appropriate ceremony which will afford the individual recognition among co-workers and supervisory officials. Also, I believe such recognition serves to inspire other employees to aspire to earning such recognition.

3. May I ask, therefore, that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Presented in
a ceremony
4/24/64

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

20 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/OP

THROUGH : Chief, Clandestine Services Personnel Office

SUBJECT : Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla -- Request for Quality Step Increase

1. It is recommended that a Quality Step Increase for Mrs. Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla be endorsed by you for the reasons presented in the attached memorandum prepared by the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division.

2. A review of Mrs. Bustos-Videla's Official Personnel File unequivocally supports the statements of Chief WH. Without exception, the performance of this officer during [illegible] Agency employment has been identified by various and all supervisors as "Superior" and "Outstanding." Likewise, nothing in other records maintained by the Office of Personnel contradicts or modifies the impressive record made by Mrs. Bustos-Videla.

3. Testimony to the high regard which officials of WH Division view this officer's work is furnished by noting that Mrs. Bustos-Videla is the first female officer to be proposed for a QSI by WH and one of a total of but three officers nominated by that Division for the award since the QSI provision of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 became effective in CIA approximately fifteen months ago.

[illegible]
[illegible]
Clandestine Services
Personnel Office

SECRET
[illegible]

6 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Plans

ATTENTION : DDP/OP

SUBJECT : Request for Quality Step Increase for Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a quality step increase be approved for Charlotte Bustos-Videla.

2. As stated in the accompanying Fitness Report, Subject's performance of her duties has been uniformly outstanding. In addition to her responsibilities as the desk officer for Mexico FI and Operational Support Projects, she carries a heavy burden in the areas of administration, preparation of special reports and training of personnel. She frequently represents the Mexico Section in dealings with other elements of the Agency and acts for the Chief of Section in his absence. Subject's performance clearly exceeds the normal requirements of the assignment and of her present GS grade level.

3. Subject's present high quality of performance typifies her performance over a period of several years and it is fully expected that this level will be maintained.

4. Consideration was given to the granting of a Merit Award but the quality step increase seems more appropriate in this case. Subject has been passed over for promotion in the past and due to limitations as to

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area of assignment, it is unlikely that a promotion to grade GS-13 can be obtained. The salary increase is therefore thought to be the most fitting reward for her outstanding service.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

CONCUR:

DDP/OP — 23 March 64
Date

APPROVED:

Director of Personnel — 24 MAR 64
Date

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 November 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOSVIDELA, C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0321
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10,420

18. REMARKS
FROM: DDP/WH/3/607/Mexico Sec/Hqs

Recorded by
CSPD

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN C/WH/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 11/19/63
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

37 | 12 | 51460 | [illegible] | 73013 | | 1 | 31 12 29

FOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-21-63

SECRET

SECRET

15 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section A)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to Grade GS-13
Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla

1. Mrs. Charlotte Bustos-Videla entered on duty with WH Division in August of 1951. She has served on a variety of desks covering South American as well as Mexican and Central American affairs. In each of her assignments she has demonstrated exceptional competence and devotion to duty.

2. Since December 1957 Mrs. Bustos has been assigned to the Mexican Desk and at present is Acting Chief. She is the soul and motor of that desk, managing many of its operations and supervising its staff, many of whom she has trained. She is past mistress of administrative procedures and the ease with which she obtains clearances, maintains files and secures necessary approvals while handling the most complicated operational aspects of projects is phenomenal. Her work output is enormous and yet everything is done simply and modestly with a minimum of excess motion. She is an outstanding employee and should be deserving of recognition.

3. It is recommended that Mrs. Bustos be promoted to grade GS-13.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

Not Approved
June 63

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 1 June 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 107667
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): BUSTOS-VIDELA, C. Z.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: NAME CHANGE FROM-CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUNG
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY [illegible] YEAR [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1235 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
3 BRANCH 3
MEXICO SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER D
12. POSITION NUMBER: BA-607
12A. PCR CONTROL NO.:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LD, etc.): GS 12
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 ~~1~~ 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~8955~~ 9215
18. REMARKS: By Marriage.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODE NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. [illegible] CODE
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 1 DA. 12 YR. 29
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSR 2 = FICA 3 = NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: CODE; MO. DA. YR.

POD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
40. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 90 DAYS 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE, MORE THAN 90 DAYS
FEDERAL TAX DATA
STATE TAX DATA: STATE CODE

42. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: WA 6-2-61
43. O.P. APPROVAL

FORM 5-60 1152

SECRET

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2[illegible] May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/Personnel

SUBJECT: Change of Name

It is requested that all records in the Agency, including the section which issues payroll checks, be changed to reflect my married name: Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla. This change is effective immediately.

Charlotte Z Bustos-Videla
Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla
WH/3/Mexico

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 07667	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 12 Yr. 29	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex F 2	6. CS - EOD Mo. 08 Da. 27 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 04 Da. 02 Yr. 51	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 27 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Leo Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH III MEXICO SECTION	Code 4613	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - Field - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title XXXXXXXXX OPS OFCR	18. Position No. XXX BA-321	19 Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.51

21. Grade & Step 11 ~~2~~ 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ ~~XXXX~~ ~~9510~~ 7750	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 10 Yr. 55	25. PSI Due Mo. 04 Da. 06 Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number 0235-1000-1000 ~~8 3500 20~~

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 12 Da. 13 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station per wage WH	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - Field - Frgn - Code 2	34. Position Title OPS OFCR	35. Position No. 607 ~~BA-321~~	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 13 Yr. 59	42. PSI Due Mo. 6 Da. 12 Yr. 61	43. Appropriation Number 0235-1000-1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P. C. Bowers WH Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) John Washtako 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11 Dec 59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	RJH	12-11-59	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Form No. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

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SECRET

16 July 1959

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS/CS Panel (Section B)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion -
Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung

1. Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung entered on duty with CIA on 27 August 1951. She was assigned to the Mexican Section of WH Division, Branch III, in June 1957. During the past two years she has been the responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE Projects.

2. Miss Zehrung is a loyal and dedicated employee. She has displayed considerable initiative and has been able to carry out her duties with a minimum amount of support. She readily accepts responsibility and is a highly efficient worker who thinks clearly and logically. Her knowledge of Headquarters and Field procedures in addition to her ability to organize her work greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the Mexican Desk. She has demonstrated a superior comprehension of the numerous and varied projects of the Mexico City Station which has contributed to the overall Headquarters support of the stations performance. Because of her sound understanding of operations and her outstanding capacity for work, Miss Zehrung has an excellent potential for assuming greater responsibilities.

3. In recognition of her outstanding performance it is recommended that Miss Zehrung be promoted to grade GS-12.

J C King

J. C. KING
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

17 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Charlotte Zehrung**

VIA : Chief, **WH/3/Mexico**

1. You have been selected by your division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your appointment is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the Clandestine Services objectives for your component.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and Index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RI as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. A series of meetings will be held in Room 1802, L Building to brief you and your colleagues on the details of your duties as Records Officer. You have been scheduled to attend the meeting to be held on Wednesday, 2 April 1958, 1300 - 1645 hours ; if it is not possible for you to attend on the date designated, please call Extension 8325 to arrange for an alternate date. Please review the attached materials prior to this meeting.

HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
DDP Records Policy Officer

Attachment
As stated

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 1 Da 12 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex F	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field Dept - Ustld - Fran - X Code	17. Position Title Reports Officer	18. Position No. BA-0072.01	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.44

21. Grade & Step 3 11-~~2~~	22. Salary Or Rate 6720 $ ~~6605~~	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo 04 Da 10 Yr 55	25. PSI Due Mo 04 Da 66 Yr 57	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo 4 Da 3 Yr 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

2,

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code 15013

33. Dept.- Field Dept - Ustld - Fran - X Code	34. Position Title I.O. (FI)	35. Position No. BA-521-~~22~~	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.51

38. Grade & Step 3 11-~~2~~	39. Salary Or Rate 6720 $ ~~6605~~	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 4 Da 10 Yr 55	42. PSI Due Mo 07 Da 25 Yr 57	43. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) P.C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) JOHN WASHINKO X 8242	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		4/1/58	D. Placement		4/1/58
B. Pos. Control		4/3/58	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	1 APR 1958

Remarks

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE ... 6/4/57

[illegible] 6/4/57

FORM 1152a
5-57

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

8 Nov 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	3. Date Of Birth Mo 1 Da 12 Yr 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 0	5. Sex F	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

14. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch II Argentina Section	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

16. Dept.- Field Dept. - X Usfld- Fran - Code	17. Position Title Reports Officer	18. Position No. BA-313	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.44

21. Grade & Step GS-11-2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6605.00	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo 12 Da 01 Yr 57	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

VOUCHERED

31. Organizational Designations DDP/WH Branch III Mexico Section	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code [illegible] 2613

33. Dept.- Field Dept. - X Usfld- Fran - Code 2	34. Position Title Reports Officer	35. Position No. BA-72.01	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0132.44

38. Grade & Step GS-11-2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6605.00	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 04 Da 15 Yr 55	42. PSI Due Mo 04 Da 06 Yr 58	43. Appropriation Number 8-3500-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
P.C. BOWERS WH/Personnel Officer

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
H.C. MONTAGUE X 8242

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/22/57	D. Placement		11/22/57
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Sneay	

Remarks

SECRET

FORM 1152a 5-57 (4)

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

Charlotte BUSTONS-VIDELA

LEFT HAND SIDE

(numbered top to bottom)

1. Admin and finance documents - March 1974 - Jan 1978
2. Admin and finance documents - May 1951 - April 1956
3. Bio profile (sanitized form in file)

Charlotte BUSTOS-VIDELA

RIGHT HAND SIDE FILE

(numbered top to bottom)

1. Personnel/cover - after 1973
2. "Actions" - Personnel actions - after 1973
3. "Actions" - Personnel Actions - Before 1957
4. "Fitness Reports" - May 1973 - Nov 1977
5. "Fitness Reports" prior to 1957
6. "Other" - admin material - after 1973
7. "Other"-admin material-prior to 1957
8. "Medical" - all medical material related to clearances
9. "PHS-SEC" - document related to cover legend

14-00000

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 Sep 72

FILE NO.: 3190

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	SS NUMBER: 069-24-3138
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 007667
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) WH	ID CARD NUMBER: 2040

ATTN: Edmond A. Sullivan

REF: Form 1322 dated 5 May 72

OFFICIAL COVER: X ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte Z

UNIT: Joint Operations Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS
	☒ XX BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE Aug 62
	☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER *(Specify)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ARMY W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. *(HR 240-2*)*
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. *(HR 240-2*)*
X	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II XX
X	SUBMIT FORM 2683 FOR AGE HOSPITALIZATION CARD

	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. *(HHB 20-11)*
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. *(HHB 20-7)*
	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
	SUBMIT FORM 2683 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Aug 51 - Aug 62	Hqs/OVERT
Aug 62 - Jul 67	Hqs/DAC
Jul 67 - Aug 72	Mexico/State
Sep 72 - Present	Hqs/DAC

CD/kas

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

CHIEF, [illegible] CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP		DATE 7 August 1962
TO: (Check)	☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION	ESTABLISHED FOR (NEE: ZEHRUNG)
	☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT , WH	BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte Z.
ATTN: WH/SS Mr. Mullane		FILE NO. 3190
REF: Verbal Request for Cover, Form 1322 Dated 31 Jul 62		ID CARD NO.
MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED U.S.Army Element, Joint Operations Group (8739)		

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS, EFFECTIVE ____________.

b. X CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE 7 August 1962 ________.

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HB 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HB 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

THIS [illegible] MUST REMAIN [illegible] TOP OF FILE

☐ COPY TO CPO/OP

43688

James H. [illegible]
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER CCG

C7/SL

DISTRIBUTION 1 OSD [illegible] -PSD OS, 1 ADPD COMPT

FORM 7-62 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(10-20-44)

THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS
A C.I.A. EMPLOYEE FOR PURPOSES OF
WITHOLDING STATE AND FEDERAL TAXES

DATE DESIGNATED JANUARY 03 1961

07667 CHARLOTTE L ZEHRUNG 235100010

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS 07/21/73

1 SERIAL NUMBER 0C7657	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 01 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA 4235 4525 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/WH DIVISION					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.	
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER					12 POSITION NUMBER 1294	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

SECRET

Use Previous Edition

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 13 7	$23,642

MDP: 26 SEPT 72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 17 YR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/WH DIVISION
BRANCH 1
CA SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1254
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: [illegible]
18. REMARKS:
W2 INFO: DEPT OF ARMY

HOME BASE: WH

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

ACTION CODE	EMPLOYEE CODE	NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	STATION CODE	...	DATE OF BIRTH
16	10	51300	WH	70013		01 12 25

JOB DATA

MLH

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 7	$22,487

1 SERIAL NO.	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 13	6	$20,721	10/19/69	GS 13	7	$21,313	10/17/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

16/35
559

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 560 E

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620 CF	GS 13 6	$20,721

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620 CF	GS 13 6	$19,555

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 100	V	GS 13 7	$24,811

---

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 [illegible]	4 [illegible]
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	FSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 13	5	$17,920	10/19/69	GS 13	6	$18,447	12/14/69			

8 Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ R S HATTLES 12 DECEMBER 1969

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4 51)

G51

1 SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$17,393	10/22/67	GS 13	5	$17,920	10/19/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Ernest J. Sikeidanis DATE 8/6/69 16/35

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

OCT 13

COMPENSATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$17,393

FVD: 31 OCT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 11 DA 03 YR 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9135 0990 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 15843

18. REMARKS
STAFF EMPLOYEE SPECIAL

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620 ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. H-pt. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 01 DA 12 YR 2[illegible]	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 2 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11-6-68

FORM 3-64 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 4	$14,857	$15,849

20

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible] 20 OCT 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 007667
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 17 YR 67
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF X
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 6135 [illegible] 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/WH
FOREIGN FIELD
BRANCH I
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: [illegible]
12. POSITION NUMBER: [illegible]
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 1370[illegible]
18. REMARKS: STAFF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 27
20 Employ Code: [illegible]
21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC: 51620 ALPHABETIC: [illegible]
22 STATION CODE: [illegible]5075
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 Hdqtrs Code: 3
25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR: [illegible] 12
26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR:
27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR:
28 MIL EXPIRES MO DA YR:
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE: 02
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE [illegible] 3 BREAK IN SERVICE [illegible]
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO STATE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

G 5 1

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	51 620	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 13	3	$13,769	10/23/66	GS 13	4	$14,217	10/22/67		

9. CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 8/18/67

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS E.D.ECHOLS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 620	CF	GS 13 3	$13,769	$14,407

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAH: 18 JULY 67

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 07 16 67	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V	X	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8135 0390 0000
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH FOREIGN FIELD BRANCH 1 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1528	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 13769

18. REMARKS

OPS OFFICER OCCUPYING INTEL ANALYST POSITION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 51620	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Majr Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 01 12 29	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR) 07 15 69	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 82	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE; MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR / RES / PROV / TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
07-20-67 N

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	007637
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	LUSTOSVIDELA C [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	1[illegible] 23 [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	723[illegible] 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP, WH BRANCH 1 FI SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	[illegible] OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	1001
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	13760
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Empl. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
20	10	51600	[illegible]	71010		1	4 13 2[illegible]	10 23 60	10 23 60

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEC

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.)	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

11-27-60

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 12 6	$12,025	$12,459

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z	007667	51 300	V	GS 12 6	$12,459	$12,822

OCT 14 11 2

007667 BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PW	LU	ADJ
GS 12	5	$11,670	10/13/63	GS 12	6	$12,075	10/10/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ CLERKS INITIALS D.Y. AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 23 Aug 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NJM: 11 AUG 65

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 08 01 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X — V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6235 0620 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 1 FI SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 1201
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP 12 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 11670

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODINGS NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	51300	WH	75013		1	01 12 29		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REG NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR | 37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8/12/65

FORM 11-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/27/65

1 SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z						
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT					4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 05 DA. 31 YR. 65	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5235 0620 0000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF			
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH DIVISION					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER					12 POSITION NUMBER 1202	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 12	17 SALARY OR RATE	

18 REMARKS

POSTED
6-9-65 HT

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b Use Previous
1-63 MFG. 1-63 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-511

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

007667	BUSTOS-VIDELA, C. Z.	51 400	V

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LWOP	ADA
GS 12	4	$10,970	10/13/63	GS 12	5	$11,300	03/29/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE.

SIGNED: E. D. ECHOLS DATE: MARCH 24, 1964

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC:5 DEC 63

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 12 05 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4235 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0321	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 10420

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
37	10	51400	WH	75013		1	01 12 29		

28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	51 400	V	GS 12 4	$10,420	$10,970

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	64 400 V 2B	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last PR. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	3	$10,195	10/14/62	GS 12	4	$10,420	10/13/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS JBR AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: ED ECHOLS DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1954 , SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	007667	64400	V	12 2	$ 9215	12 2	$ 9790

3235-000-1000

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
007667	BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	64 400 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS-12	2	$ 9,790	06/11/61	GS-12	3	$10,105	10/14/62			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ /. NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/. /. LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

WK

SIGNATURE: Ned P. Holman DATE: 26-X-62

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

10740

~~AEC, 11 AUG 61~~

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION NAME CHANGE FROM* CHARLOTTE L. ZEBRUNG - CORRECTION**	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 12 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2235 1000 1000
				8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0607	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9215

18. REMARKS

* BY MARRIAGE ON 18 MARCH 61.
** THIS ACTION CORRECTS SF 1150 EFF 12 JUNE 61 ITEM # 2, NAME, WHICH READ BUSTOSVIDELA C Z TO READ BUSTOS-VIDELA C Z, FOR PAYROLL PURPOSE ONLY.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 12 29	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCS 1 - YES 2 - NO	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
08/22/61 UK

Form 1150
8-59
Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

AES: 12 JUNE 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION NAME CHANGE FROM* CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUNG	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 06 12 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V		V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1235 1000 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0607	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D.

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9215

18. REMARKS
*BY MARRIAGE. 18 MARCH 1961

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 53	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 01 12 29	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA YR.	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL SERV CREDIT/LED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE		

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
06/14/61 WK

Form 1150 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
107667	[illegible] ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DDP/WH 3 V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LBI	ADJ.
GS 12	1	$ 8,955	12/13/59	12	2	$ 9,215	06/11/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

Jc

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	107667	46 13	GS-12 1	$ 8,330	$ 8,955

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PAS: 11 DEC 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F	2	08	27	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13.	Yes-1 No-2	Code
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27	51			2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	I.O. FI	0521	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 4	$ 7750	D1	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	12	13	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	OPS OFCR	0607	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	D1	12	13	59	06	11	61	0235 1000 1000

44. Remarks

LOGGED
1-7-60

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150

12-15-59

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DDP/WH 3	V-20	21

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 11	3	$ 7,510	04	06	58	GS 11	4	$ 7,750	10	04	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 THIS NOTIFICATION EFFECTS RESLOTTING RESULTING FROM R-20-250

SER #	NAME	SD	OLD SLOT	NEW SLOT	DATE
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DI	0521	321	04/28/59

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	107667	GS-11-3	$ 6,820	$ 7,510

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	DDP/WH	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 11	2	$ 6,605	10	07	56	GS 11	3	$ 6,820	04	06	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO	DA	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 58

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 3 APRIL 58

1. Serial No. 107667	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01	Da. 12	Yr. 29	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code 0	5. Sex F 2	6. CS-EOD Mo. 08	Da. 27	Yr. 51

7. SCD Mo. 04	Da. 02	Yr. 51	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo. 08	Da. 27	Yr. 51	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2	Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	Code 4613	15. Location Of Official Station WASH D C	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code 2	17. Position Title REPORTS OFF	18. Position No. 0072.01	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0132.44

21. Grade & Step 11 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6605	23. SD D1	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 04	Da. 10	Yr. 55	25. PSI Due Mo. 04	Da. 06	Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number 8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 04	Da. 03	Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	Code 4613	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code 2	34. Position Title I.O. FI	35. Position No. 0521	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.51

38. Grade & Step 11 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 6605	40. SD D1	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 04	Da. 10	Yr. 55	42. PSI Due Mo. 04	Da. 06	Yr. 58	43. Appropriation Number 8 3500 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
5/1/58

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MYL

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth			4. Vet. Pref.		5. Sex	6. CS - EOD			
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
107667	ZEHRUNG CHARLOTTE	01	12	29		0	F 2	08	27	51	

7. SCD			8. CSC Retmt.		9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.			11. FEGLI		12. LCD			13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD	
Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code		Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes-1 No-2	Code	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Yes - 1 No - 2	Code
04	02	51		1	50 USCA 403 J						08	27	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 11 ARGENTINA SECTION		WASH D C	

16. Dept. - Field		17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series	
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code					
	2	REPORTS OFFICER	313	GS	0132.44	

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade			25. PSI Due			26. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
11 2	$ 6605	DI							8 3500 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date			29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
		Mo.	Da.	Yr.			
REASSIGNMENT	56	12	01	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WH BRANCH 111 MEXICO SECTION	4613	WASH D C	75013

33. Dept. - Field		34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code				
	2	REPORTS OFF	0072.01	GS	0132.44

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade			42. PSI Due			43. Appropriation Number
			Mo.	Da.	Yr.	Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
11 2	$ 6605	DI	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3500 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
10 DEC 1957

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 007667	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	4. SEX F	5. GRADE GS-13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/WH/1	9. CURRENT STATION	10. HQ CD		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) XXXX 1 August 1972 - 30 April 1973

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Functions as Chief of the WH/1/SA and Cuba Section, supervising one case officer, one IA and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyzes all traffic pertaining to Branch and Station SA and Cuban Operations, performs all operational support, project actions, correspondence, coordination, memoranda and file maintenance.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares studies, file analyses and special reports such as budget and program call and correspondence with the White House.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

Form 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
6-72

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the 8 months during which she was under my supervision, Mrs. Bustos has performed in that same hard-working, highly-productive style which has become her trademark over the years. She understands the intelligence process from start to finish and is personally experienced with each step along the way, save the agent handling aspects. She excels in each phase of the work.

As chief of the Branch SA and Cuban activities section, she has once again demonstrated her mastery over her assigned duties. She is a sound, dependable, yet imaginative and energetic operations officer, whose performance leaves little to be desired. While she had had little previous supervisory experience, she has in this assignment demonstrated exemplary supervisory ability. Notwithstanding her drive, tenacity and attention to detail, she is a popular co-worker, is receptive to guidance and is sensitive to, and responsive to the needs of her subordinates.

In her performance of specific duty No. 2, she has brought to bear upon her daily duties her broad experience, high intelligence and good operational sense, functioning with practically no need of close supervision. It is comforting to know that an assignment given to this employee is always done promptly, professionally and cheerfully.

Her adaptability was demonstrated in her specific duty No. 3. Despite the press of normal daily activity, she was often called upon to produce "crash"

(continued)

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, C AND D OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 21 May 1973

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 8

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1973	DC/WH/1	Raymond J. Swider Raymond J. Swider

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: The rater has written an accurate and thorough evaluation of Mrs. Bustos. I concur without reservation in the ratings provided subject. She is an exceptional officer. Her ability to perform a variety of assignments in Headquarters and the Field has measured up to an outstanding record. Her work with subordinates clearly indicate she is a good supervisor. Mrs. Bustos performs all facets of her work in an exemplary manner and in my judgement rates in the upper percentile in the A Category.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 May 1973	C/WH/1	John C. Murray

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Narrative Comments (continued): (Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla)

papers for the Branch because of her innate talents and established reliability. She never failed to impress her supervisor with her production, writing ability and energy. Her overall performance is clearly in excess of her grade level.

In terms of true cost and security-consciousness, she must also be considered very strong because she has a positive and aggressive attitude towards these subjects. It is with deep regret that the Branch parts with this employee who now moves up to the Division front office staff.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Covert Action Operations Seminar No. 2-73
35 hours, full time

Participant : Bustos-Videla, Charlotte
Office : WH
Year of Birth: 1929
Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-13
No. of Students : 20
EOD Date : 08/51

COURSE OBJECTIVES, CONTENT AND METHODS

The objective of the Seminar is to give the participant a familiarization with the major fields of covert action. These are viewed as:

Political Operations, including Propaganda;

Operations Against Priority Targets and Denied Areas.

("Priority targets" is taken to include Soviet Bloc, Chinese Communist, Cuban, and North Vietnamese officials and other personnel in third countries, and other designated targets)

The Seminar includes a discussion of the "political animal" and an analytical look at the political personality.

The technique of instruction is one of talks by Operations Officers experienced in various specific kinds of operation, followed by questions and discussion. Participants are encouraged and expected to ask questions and engage in the discussions, drawing upon and relating their experience to that under discussion. One of the important values to be gained from the Seminar is this exchange of experience.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No further assessment of individual capacity or performance is made in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Richard A. Fuller
Chief Instructor

2/23/73
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING REPORT

Midcareer Course No. 34

Student : Bustos-Videla, Charlotte

Date : 11/5-12/22/72

Year of Birth: 1929

Office : WH/1

Grade : 13

Service Designation: D

No. of Students : 30

COURSE OBJECTIVES -- CONTENT AND METHODS

The Midcareer Course is designed to enable potential executive officers to develop and widen their understanding of management practices, of the Agency and the Intelligence Community, and of the Government's involvement in international affairs.

The Course consists of three major segments of varying lengths. The topics covered through lectures, seminars, group discussions and field trips are:

1. Effective managerial behavior as derived through study of the Managerial Grid.

2. The functions, relationships and problems of various Agency components and of members of the Intelligence Community.

3. Selected elements of national power and current developments in key international affairs.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

No evaluation of the student is made during the Course, and no final grade is given upon course completion.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

22 DEC 1972

John C. Murfit Date
Midcareer Course Chairman

Classified by: 17-1626
EX-2, APDCI,
WSISM

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- XX CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 31 July 1972

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials and assists in the planning of operations against those targets.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens all agent and technical reports dealing with PBRUMEN targets for operational and positive information and puts in retrievable form.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists Case Officers in preparation of operational reports by doing all basic research such as tracing and file reviews and presents the results in exploitable form.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares draft intelligence reports from raw agent reports, technical operations and defector debriefings.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 GOA/DT&O Project Officer	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Management of the PBRUMEN section files. 12 OCT 1972	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In reviewing my previous fitness report and those of my predecessors, on this fine officer, I find myself hard put not to repeat what has been said so often before. She has been the backbone of this section and of those where she has worked previously. Her work has always shown excellent judgement and ingenuity. A self-starter with tremendous drive and discipline, the amount of work she has produced has been prodigious. An excellent team worker, she has never shirked when - as so often happens - she is asked to take on additional work or work on a matter outside of her regular field. While forceful, she is diplomatic and tactful and is able to present suggestions and criticisms in a pleasant manner. She is one of the most dedicated persons I have met in the Organization, and exceptionally dependable. While, as a woman and a Specialist, she has had little opportunity to handle agents she has done very well with those we have given her to handle. She has showed great ability in the training of two transcribers and in the debriefing of two female agents and their husbands. This is in large part due to her in-depth knowledge of the targets this section is working on. The past few months have been difficult, requiring the complete reorganization of this Section and the termination of the majority of our assets. Under this stress, she has performed in her usual outstanding manner. Perhaps, even a little better. Her handling of a great deal of file work has been excellent, probably in part because she was the one who set it up and has maintained it in its present very good state. (continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 Aug 1972	/s/ Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 August 1972	Operations Officer	/s/ John M. Burke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Without any hesitation I concur with the outstanding ratings above. Subject is now up for rotation and we will miss her immensely. For years she has dedicated her entire time to her job which she has done so well. She has been creative, thorough and accurate. Although she has not had supervisory experience at this station, she has performed in a manner which clearly reflects that she would have no problem with supervising. A truly outstanding employee with growth potential.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 Aug 1972	DCOS	/s/ George A. Fill [illegible]

SECRET

(CONTINUED)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

The one criticism of this Officer's work that I and others have made in the past still stands. She tries to do everything and somethings in this business just don't deserve the attention she gives them.

I have no personal knowledge of her supervisor abilities, but believe she is a natural leader.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Bustos-Videla, Charlotte Z.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 Jan 29
3. SEX: F
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Operations Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- XX ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): January 1971 - December 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials and assists in the planning of operations against these targets.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens all raw reports dealing with PBRUMEN targets for operational and positive intelligence.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts name checks, file reviews, prepares finished memos, cables, and dispatches. Assists Case Officers in preparation of operational reports.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares draft intelligence reports from raw agent reports, technical operations and defector debriefings.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Handles miscellaneous special projects for the Station: screening and routing to all sections daily audio take; operational reporting and project responsibility for COA/D&TO project.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

DEC 27 8 55 AM '71

This supervisor has worked with a variety of Intelligence Assistants. Many were good, but none compared with this Subject. She is the most thorough and fastest working IA I have met. Her capacity for hard work and long hours is prodigious. Her knowledge of operational matters is equal to that of most case officers. She has an operationally creative mind and has made many excellent suggestions for the improvement of the section's work. Additionally, her command of the Spanish language enhances all of the above abilities. This officer has found her very pleasant to work with. She has a unique ability to make constructive criticism in a tactful manner.

If this Subject has a weakness, it was pointed out by the reviewing officer in the last fitness report when he said, "in her voracious appetite for all kinds of facts (she) can at times put undue emphasis on them, including factual minutiae as against equally important but more elusive subjective factors.

Because of her outstanding performance and abilities the Subject will be given some activity handling agent personnel, during the forthcoming year.

The Subject's continued fine performance since her last promotion merits special consideration by the Promotion Board.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 December 1971	/s/ Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1971	Ops Officer	/s/ John M. Burke

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the above ratings and comments. Subject performs all the tasks outlined above in a very professional and methodical manner. One does not even sense that the work is going on until the finished product is produced. It is always excellent. We count heavily on her thoughts and ideas in all operational studies and considerations. She is ops oriented and has an excellent bank of information to call on when necessary. She is pleasant and has the respect of her co-workers as well as her supervisors. Her abilities are varied and she can be counted on to perform extremely well regardless of assignment or target. We will be losing this fine officer soon and we will be hard put to find someone who will be able to replace her.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 December 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ George A. Fill

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan.29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Br 1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January - 31 December 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Prepares operational target studies on PBRUMEN officials of interest and helps in the preparation of operational planning re target personnel.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw reports from technical operations and agents for operationally useful information.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides operational and administrative support for station PBRUMEN activities. This includes name checks, file reviews, preparation of memos, cables and dispatches, and helps in the preparation of project reports, outlines, and renewals.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises the handling of the station PBRUMEN watch-list and in general monitors travel of interest to and from PBRUMEN for our station, Headquarters and other stations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Helps the station intelligence chief in the preparation of finished intelligence reports from a PBRUMEN refugee debriefing center (only part of the reporting period).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Handles miscellaneous special projects for the station in addition to her PBRUMEN duties (examples: organization of station watchlists during a presidential visit, screening certain raw reports for whole station, preparation of OOA/DTO project renewal).	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 7-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

APR 12 9 32 AM '71

Subject worked most of the year in the station PBRUMEN section. She was clearly outstanding in collating information from all sources during a recent intensified "PBRUMEN" month, determining as a result the overall pattern of the PBRUMEN mission here, spotting operational leads and updating target studies on all PBRUMEN officials as a result. Her final writeup regarding both new information obtained and the gaps that remain was thorough and useful.

Subject is extraordinarily rapid and efficient in researching for info, organizing files and other material and writing up any kind of resulting memo or dispatch. The same might be said perhaps of some other real pros in the IA field. However, in addition, Subject has a good, tough, operations-oriented mind and positively contributes ideas and suggestions re new operational techniques which the station has used profitably. Subject has natural managerial abilities as recently demonstrated in her organizing TDY help in a station-wide file and watchlist effort in connection with a presidential visit. Her Spanish is more than adequate for reading reports, and handling operational messages in that language. In sum, Subject is a tremendous station asset and would be extremely hard to replace without noting a serious loss in station efficiency.

-continued

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**
1.	BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 March 1971	/s/ Charlotte P. Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 March 1971	Operations Officer	/s/ John Issminger

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although in my opinion there is an excessive use of "outstanding" by the rating officer, I am in accord with his narrative comments. Subject is definitely more than an IA and has performed as such when the station has required an individual with in-depth knowledge of station procedures, operational awareness combined with an ability to prepare studies in a short period of time. She's thorough, concise and rapid. One of our hardest workers and most dependable employees.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 March 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ George A. Fill

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS -continued

Three rather personalized comments might add meaning to this fitness report. Anyone, particularly a female, fitting the above description of efficiency and achievement can be, and often is a little overbearing and difficult to work with as a person. Subject, withall, is a pleasant personality who knows how to make her contributions and comments in a forthright but tactful manner. Secondly, and this one is a little hard to say, Subject in her voracious appetite for all kinds of facts can at times put undue emphasis on them including factual minutiae as against equally important but more elusive subjective factors. Thirdly, this rating officer has personally observed Subject only working on station premises at an office job, and frankly has no idea how she might function in outside operational work (cultivating people, working under outside cover).

Reviewed by CP SPD/ZPB

SECRET/RYBAT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

CHARLOTTE BUSTOS VIDELA

SUBJECT: Overall Outstanding Rating on [redacted]:
Method of Recognition

1. This memo is being written in accordance with paragraph three of Book Dispatch 5273 of 12 April 1966.

2. [redacted] was last granted a Quality Step Increase about a year ago in recognition of her very fine performance. It is a little early to repeat that kind of recognition even though it is a most logical and meaningful means to show recognition of her outstanding work.

3. Consideration should be given to an appropriate occasion in the fairly near future to grant another QSI to [redacted].

SECRET/RYBAT

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BustosVidela Charlotte Z	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/Branch 1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 28 February 1970

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 August 1969 - 31 December 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Complete reorganization of Station files, including development of new procedures, revision of file categories, consolidation, purging and destruction.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Provides overall guidance to Station and TDY personnel engaged in reorganization of Station files. Supervision of Secretary-Receptionist.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Special assistance to COS/DCOS in revamping the paper flow within the Station and between the Station and other Government agencies.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of special studies for the COS/DCOS concerning the effectiveness of Station paper handling procedures, personnel economies related thereto and the improvement of Station	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 utilization of manpower, space and funds as a result of the reorganization of Station Registry functions and personnel.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In July 1969 Subject was transferred from the Cuba Section to the Station front office to serve as an executive assistant to the COS with special responsibility for ensuring that the paper flow of the Station remained under effective control during the period of transition resulting from the assignment here of several senior officers. This transition period necessitated or gave rise to a number of changes in the management and administrative areas of the Station. Subject's performance in this assignment under these circumstances was clearly outstanding. Her sound judgement, imagination and responsiveness to guidance not only contributed to maintaining the stability and momentum of the Station but also made possible an early effort to come to grips with many of the problems which an inflated Registry and a highly distinctive records system created for the new Station management team.

During the ensuing six month period, Subject has recommended and implemented a number of changes which have produced a more effective and less costly records system. Paper holdings have been reduced substantially, input has been reduced and now conforms to basic CS procedures and requirements. Personnel savings have been effected and supervisory responsibilities more clearly delineated.

To sum up, Subject has made and continues to make a major contribution in a singularly unsensational area of Station activity. Her advice is sought and appreciated not only by the COS and myself, but by other

(CONTINUED)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 January 1970	/s/ Charlotte Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 January 1970	DCOS	/s/ Paul V. Harwood

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL It would be difficult to overstate the contribution made by Subject to this Station during the past six month period, and I concur fully in the ratings and comments of the Rating Officer. I might add that Subject is one of the more versatile, conscientious and productive employees with whom I have worked in this organization, and that in addition to the administrative/management role outlined above, continued to provide valuable operational/analytical assistance to the Cuban and other operational sections of the Station. The initiative and imagination shown by Subject in the very complicated administrative management assignment have been particularly commendable and her complete familiarity with the country, the language, and the background of the Station has been invaluable during this period of change.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 January 1970	COS	/s/ James B. Noland

SECRET

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS** **CONTINUED**

personnel who appreciate her personal and professional qualities.

Subject is aware that her current assignment is an unusual one and that she soon may have worked herself out of her current job. Since she speaks fluent Spanish, has a unique ability to get along with people and to get things done, there will be no problem in assigning her back into a position more closely supporting operations. Our operations are certain to benefit thereby.

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): BUSTOSVIDELA, Charlotte Z.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 Jan 29
3. SEX: F
4. GRADE: 13
5. SD: D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/FF/1
8. CURRENT STATION: Mexico City

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE
	TEMPORARY		
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: October 1969
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): March to August 1969.

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	Until she was called to other duties in the front office of the Station, did analysis on PBRUMEN targets of Station interest, collated information and prepared studies.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	Screened the raw product of several technical operations and processed intelligence and operational information in close cooperation with two full time senior outside transcribers whom she handled completely.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	Handled the Station PBRUMEN watchlist and travel program, and reported travel information to LCFIRM Stations and other customers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	Provided operational support (file checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda, etc.) for various Station activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	Contributed to the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals, etc.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	Handled special projects for the Station in addition to her PBRUMEN duties.	RATING LETTER O

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's performance continued during the period under review to deserve high praise. Her enormous appetite for work, her attention to detail, her ability to absorb and digest enormous files and complicated cases, her professionalism and devotion to the duties entrusted to her really deserve the rating of outstanding. Subject speaks good Spanish, has considerable initiative, much experience in analytic work and a genuine talent for administrative work.

In view of her past performance, her record at the Station and her potential, Subject who was recommended for promotion to the GS-14 level should be promoted as soon as possible.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 August 1969	Charlotte Z. Bustosvidela (signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 August 1969	Ops. Officer	Francis Sherry (signed)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject is indeed an exceptional officer who is highly deserving of the foregoing ratings and related accolades. In her new role as executive assistant to the COS she has been invaluable during the difficult and complicated transition from the old regime to the new, and the related reorganization of the Station. Her organizational abilities are unsurpassed by anyone known to the undersigned, and she certainly merits consideration for early promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 August 1969	Chief of Station	James B. Noland

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/PD/EAB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
XX	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) January 1968 - March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles Station PBRUMEN watchlist and travel program and reports travel information to WOFIRM stations and other custumers	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw product of several technical operations and processes intelligence and operational information in close cooperation with two full time senior transcribers whom she handles completely	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does analysis on targets of Station interest, collates information and prepares studies	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Contributes to the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals, etc.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Provides operational support (file, checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda, etc. for various Station activities	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

FORM 8-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject's performance during the period of over one year under review continued to deserve the rating of Outstanding. Her major contributions during that period were in the fields of operational research and exploitation of information obtained through technical means. She was, during this period, given full responsibility for the handling of two full time senior transcribers including administrative matters. In view of the difficulty of recruiting target personnel the task of fully exploiting information obtained from technical sources is of great importance. Subject handled this task with her usual enormous capability for work, displaying initiative and great professionalism. She continued, in addition, to handle the other tasks listed in this report together with sensative reporting sent by a separate channel, altogether a much heavier workload than is usually carried by one person. She was helped in this by her good knowledge of Spanish, a talent for administrative work, considerable analytic experience and great devotion to her work. Subject should be considered for promotion to the grade of GS-14 at the first opportune moment.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3 April 69	Charlotte Bustos-Videla /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
19 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 April 69	Ops Officer	Francis Sherry /s/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The reviewing officer fully agrees with the ratings and comments of the rating officer. Subject consistently performs her duties in an outstanding manner, bringing to her job truly exceptional qualities of intelligence, reliability, and good humor. She is one of the most valuable employees in the Station, and the recommendation for her promotion from GS-13 to GS-14 is fully and enthusiastically endorsed.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
3 April 69	COS,	Winston Scott /s/

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Soviet Bloc Operations Course No. 3 — 5 - 16 June 1967
80 hours, full time

Student : BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte
Office : DDP/WH
Year of Birth: 1929
Service Designation: D
Grade : GS-13
No. of Students : 34
EOD Date : August, 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES

To orient the student on the special nature of the Clandestine Services' Soviet Bloc target and to train him in the application of clandestine methods for collecting information on, assessing, and preparing recruitment operations against Soviet Bloc personalities.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. No evaluation is made of individual performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Russell A. Langelle — Date
Instructor, OTR

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)					XXX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):						SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 29 February 1968	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) August 1967 through January 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles Station PBRUMEN program (maintains a watchlist, screens travel documents and reports travel information to WOFIRM stations and other interested customers).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Screens the raw product of technical operations and processes the intelligence band operational information.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Does analysis on targets of Station interest, pulling documents together, collating information and preparing studies.	RATING LETTER O
Helps with the preparation of monthly summaries and project reporting (outlines, renewals etc.).	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Provides operational support (file checks, operational reviews, liaison memoranda etc.) for various Station activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. Reviewed by [illegible]	RATING LETTER O

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Since her arrival at this Station, Subject's performance has truly been outstanding. She has, on her own initiative, reorganized many of the operational files and procedures of the PBRUMEN Section. She has made particularly useful exhaustive analyses of the documents concerning a number of Station targets not only per request of this Station but also on her own initiative. She has revamped the Section's travel program, curtailing the watchlist to more manageable size and expediting the reporting of travel information to the many customers for such information. Her thorough review of the take of several technical operations has increased their usefulness as well as emphasized their weaknesses.

Subject's [illegible] talent for administration, her initiative, sharp analytic mind and good knowledge of Spanish have greatly facilitated the operation of the PBRUMEN Section of this Station at a time of almost complete personnel change. She has not been directly involved with the actual running of operations both because she appears much better suited for the support type work intrusted to her and because she frankly would not have the time under present circumstances to do so. Subject is carrying the workload usually handled by more than one person.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 16 Jan. 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Charlotte Bustos-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 5 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 Jan. 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Francis Sherry

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer fully concurs in the evaluation of Subject by the Rating Officer. Subject consistently turns in a superior performance, whatever her task, and for a Station Chief the only problem she presents is to determine where best to assign her. She is a source of strength to her Section, has the knack of making herself irreplaceable.

DATE 17 January 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Winston D. Miller

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustosvidela, C.Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION HQS		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 Jan 67

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1/66 - 12/66

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 22 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical and financial support, requirements, guidance and review.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects including field agents, Contract, Career, and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, travel, cover and funding.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares, or helps prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, operational program, budget exercises, responses to requests on operations or background info regarding Mexico.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Routes correspondence, supervises tickler system, maintains project, agent, and subject 201 files.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Branch records officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

20 MAR 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

[illegible]

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 16 10 33 AM '67
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has continued to perform during the period under review in the same highly competent manner which all who know her have come to expect of her. She continues to put forth her best efforts at all times. She is particularly to be commended for the manner in which she cheerfully accepts onerous tasks, usually with very short deadlines, and invariably comes up with a thoroughly prepared answer within the time allotted. She is efficient, she is fully knowledgeable and capable in her job, she has a friendly, warm, and pleasant personality, and is always ready to respond to her fellow workers with a helping hand. She has no supervisory responsibility per se, but is frequently called upon for guidance to new secretaries and case officers alike and is of real help in such cases. Subject is one of the strongest Headquarters case officers known to rater, and her overall performance certainly borders very closely on being evaluated Outstanding.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
5 Jan 1967	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
30 January 1967	DC/WH/1	J.H.V. Fisher

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur. An outstanding officer recognized as such and appreciated by all.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1967	C/WH/1	W.J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOSVIDELA, C. Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 22 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical and financial support, requirements, guidance and review.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects including field agents, Contract, Career, and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, travel, cover and funding.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares, or helps prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, operational program, budget exercises, responses to requests on operations or background info regarding Mexico.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Routes correspondence, supervises tickler system, maintains project, agent, and subject 201 files.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Branch records officer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

25 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 25 12 53 PM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to render a superior performance. She is efficient, thoroughly knowledgeable, rapid in her work, well organized, and greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the office. The quality of Subject's work has been recognized fully in previous fitness reports and in previous recommendations for promotion from GS-12 to 13. This high quality of work has continued throughout the period of this fitness report and Subject continues to merit promotion.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION Four	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 Jan 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J.H.V. Fisher

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Reviewing Officer agrees with above report and endorses Subject's fitness for promotion.

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/1	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W.J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F.	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1964 - 31 December 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handles all aspects of 21 FI/CE/Support projects including project actions, logistical support, requirements, guidance, reviews.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle all matters concerning the agents belonging to these projects, including field agents, Contract, Career and Staff Agents. This includes OA/CSA's, contracts, training, PCS arrangements, cover, funding.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare, or help prepare, miscellaneous memoranda and studies, such as monthly FI achievements, Operational Program, responses to requests from the Senior Staffs on operations and on Mexico itself.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise one Intelligence Assistant in the maintenance of a desk tickler system and the agent and subject 201 files at the desk.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

23 MAR 1965

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SECRET

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(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial & supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This exceptionally competent and productive officer continued to perform at a level well above that of the GS-13 slot she occupies. While a good deal of her tremendous effectiveness stems from experience, continuity on the job and her natural retentive memory, during the period under review she also demonstrated a flair for, and applied her talents to, the solution of relatively major and complex planning and managerial problems in the area of operational support to Mexico Station activities.

To the list of her previously abudantly acknowledged capacity for hard, effective work, talent for training on the job younger officers, diligence, and versatile ability, this rater would like to add a note of appreciation for her everpresent tactfullness and discretion. No weaknesses affecting her present assignment have been noted; she is very careful and realistic in planning for expenditure of funds.

This officer is separately being recommended for promotion to GS-13.

WH will review this fitness report with others during a special meeting scheduled periodically to consider suitable recommendation for outstanding performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 17 [illegible] 1965

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 3-17-65

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DC/WH/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: A. Spera Alfonso Spera

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

Concur

DATE: 3-17-65

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/1

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: W. J. Kaufman

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
007667

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte Z.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3	8. CURRENT STATION Headquarters		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1963 - 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Handle Project action, operational correspondence, support for 19 FI and OPs Support type projects, effecting proper coordination with senior staffs, other divisions, and offices.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle clearance actions, contracts, and administrative matters for agents falling under these projects, and for the entire Desk in the absence of the Intell Analyst.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare miscellaneous memoranda, budgets, and reports requested by Senior Staffs and Division officers from the Mexican desk on Mexican matters in general.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervise the clerical and administrative personnel on the desk (averaging 4) and in general see to the smooth functioning of the desk and the flow of paper.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Records Officer for WH/3/M	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assume the responsibilities of C/WH/3/M when the Chief of the desk is absent, signing dispatches and cables, coordinating, and supervising 2 Reports Officers and 5 Case Officers.	P

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 14 FEB 1964	O

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SECRET

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(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's performance during the rating period has been marked by general excellence. As indicated in Section B her supervision and direction of the Section's work relating to intel support, administration, preparation of special reports, training personnel, etc. is uniformly outstanding. The fact that these functions are handled in addition to her duties as the desk officer for the FI and Ops Support projects, which she performs with unusual competence, serves to illustrate her value to this Section. She has an exceptional ability independently to determine proper courses of action and to initiate action to carry them out. She has a profound understanding of the area operational program and contributions to it are imaginative and constructive.

In the opinion of the rater Subject's performance compares favorably with any GS-13 desk officer within his experience and she performs occasionally at the GS-14 level. Moreover, she carries out her duties cheerfully, loyally and in close and amicable cooperation with her fellow employees at all levels.

In those aspects of her duties which involve cost e.g. the review of operational projects, she has given close attention to the budgetary matters and has frequently suggested ways in which economies on the operations might be effected.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 28 January 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1-28-64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/3/Mexico	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bernard E. Reichhardt Bernard Reichhardt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the high rating given this employee. She is undoubtedly the ablest employee in this branch in the performance of her particular job.

DATE 29 Jan 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John M. Whitten

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE AND EXPERIENCE

~~[illegible]~~ (Name) ____ (Office) ~~Female~~ (Sex) ~~27 September 1963~~ (Date of testing)

The category checked below is an interpretation of the scores made by the person named above on a battery of foreign language aptitude tests. The relationships between test performance and subsequent training performance of trainees in Agency language training courses are indicated by the graphs next to the aptitude categories. The graphs to the left are for women and the graphs to the right are for men. From these graphs you can read for each aptitude category the probability that a person in that category will perform in an Agency foreign language training course at an average or better-than-average level. For example, 22 per cent of the women who obtain an aptitude rating of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance, while 5 per cent of the men with ratings of "8" can be expected to be average or better in course performance. A man needs an aptitude rating of "6" to have about the same expectation of success in language training as a woman with a rating of "8". At the other end of the scale, 90 per cent of either men or women who obtain aptitude ratings of "2" can be expected to do average or better-than-average work in training. The differences in relationship are due to differences between men and women in both training performance and test scores. On the average women are somewhat higher on both.

Percent of Women Whose Language Training Performance Is Expected to Be Average or Better than Average

Aptitude Category

Percent of Men Whose Language Training Performance Is Expected to Be Average or Better than Average



Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and non-academic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

3 foreign languages have been studied or learned by this individual.

Months of Academic Training			Non-academic Experience (1 year or more)	
High School	College	Other	Reading or Writing	Speaking
18	54	32	39	79

This report may be shown to the individual concerned.

/s/ EDWARD A. RUNDQUIST
EDWARD A. RUNDQUIST

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

RECORDS OFFICERS COURSE 30 April - 4 May 1962

Student : Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla **Office** : WH/3

Year of Birth: 1929 **Service Designation:** D

Grade : GS-12 **Number of Students** : 34

EOD Date : Aug 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

This course, designed for present and prospective Records Officers, has four principal objectives.

1. To give an appreciation for the Agency's CS mission.
2. To describe the role that records play in the discharge by the Agency of the responsibilities inherent in the mission.
3. To emphasize the importance of records and proper records management in the successful performance of the stated mission.
4. To increase awareness of the inter-relationships between the CS mission and records; to sharpen judgement in the handling and disposition of records; and to improve performance of Records Officers.

The student is instructed through the media of lectures, directed reading, practical exercises and discussions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Augustus F. Schermerhorn 24 July 1962
Chief Instructor Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 007667

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Bustos-Videla, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	3. SEX F	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3	8. CURRENT STATION [illegible]		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jan - 30 Dec 62

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises office staff of Mexico Desk in preparing correspondence, keeping files, carding, and training new personnel.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Desk intelligence officer for important satellite and FI operations in Mexico, processing projects, handling operational correspondence, conducting liaison with other divisions.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Routing cables, dispatches for the entire Desk, supervising distribution of work.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Personally handling large number of clearances, project approvals, cable coordinations, and official negotiations on matters touching all aspects of the Desk's work.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Preparation of budget, special papers, surveys, and briefings.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

28 FEB 1963

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This officer is the person chiefly responsible for the Mexico Desk's deserved reputation for excellence and efficiency. The complicated and never-ending tasks of project processing, clearances, tracing, and coordination are handled by her with blinding speed and unerring perfection. Procedural problems are there to be solved, and the solutions come with amazing rapidity. Operational problems are worked out thoroughly and conscientiously. No corners are cut and no principles are compromised.

Never at a loss for an answer, this officer never shrinks from any assignment and instinctively wants to take over any vexing problem which is holding up progress. She is complete mistress of file and record resources and answers all queries within minutes. The most complex budgetary and planning projects are handled by her with deceptive ease.

These qualities of rare efficiency and speed are coupled with an even rarer degree of amiability and cooperativeness. The work which proceeds under her at such a break-neck pace nonetheless goes on in an air of placidity and good humor. The large office staff is run without a trace of tension, jealousy, or friction. All of this is traceable to this officer's fine example and catalytic effect on her colleagues.

Finely-educated, handling the Spanish language with fluency, and keeping up with current events in her area, this officer is a unique asset to our organization.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
26 February 1963	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 February 1963	C/WH/3/MEXICO	John M. Whitten John. M. Whitten

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 February 1963	AC/WH/3	Forrest Shivers

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE 1962

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
CSFD
0076[illegible]7

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) BUSTOS-VIDELA Charlotte Z	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 January 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE 12	
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3/D. C.		

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Jan 61 - 31 Dec 61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for Project renewals and other correspondence and action on 12 support type projects for Mexico City and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist the Chief of the desk in administration of office to assure the smooth functioning of the desk. Includes distribution of work,	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle miscellaneous adm and support matters (requests for tech equip, studies, training guides, etc) for Mexico and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ routing of pouches and cables, supervision of clerical staff of 4.	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise maintenance of records at the desk and represent Desk as Records Officer in discussions with [illegible] on HS and field records problems	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

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SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

FEB 12 11 43 AM '62

This outstanding employee has maintained the high standard of performance set forth in the report of this supervisor [illegible]. Where possible, she has exceeded her earlier performance record. During the past year this office acquired considerable new personnel, which Subject trained in a highly capable manner to guarantee the smooth-functioning of the office. The undersigned hopes this employee will continue to serve this organization indefinitely notwithstanding her marriage during the past year.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
23 January 1962	Christine [illegible] Burton-Videla

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
24	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 January 1962	Chief of Desk	John G. [illegible] John G. [illegible]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 Feb 1962	C/WH/7	[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

13 JAN 1961

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Zehrung Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/3/Mexi/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 30 Sep 59 - 31 Dec 60

SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for Project renewals and other correspondence and action on 12 supporttype projects for Mexico City and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assist the Chief of the Desk in administration of office to assure the smooth functioning of the desk. Includes distribution of work, routing of pouches and cables, supervision of clerical staff of 4.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handle miscellaneous admin and support matters (requests for tech equip, studies, training guides, etc) for Mexico and Monterrey	RATING NO. 7		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervise maintenance of records at the desk and represent Desk as Records Officer in discussions with RID on Hqs and field records problems.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM

This is a truly outstanding employee with capabilities far beyond those required for her present position. She has an unusually keen mind, makes decisions that are correct without hesitation and carries out all actions promptly and efficiently. She is the supervisor of the office staff, who respect and admire her ability. In addition to her skill, she is possessed of a most pleasing disposition which ingratiates her with the other members of the staff. The years of experience she has had at the various jobs to be done at a country desk make her invaluable as a trainer and supervisor for new personnel. Her knowledge of Spanish has also been especially helpful at the Mexican Desk. This supervisor would be most pleased to have her serve with him on any future assignment.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 31 December 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 31 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Desk Chief, WH/3/Mexico	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John G. Heyn

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 Jan 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/3	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan. 1929	3. SEX Female	4. GRADE GS-11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/Mexi/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 31 May 59 To 30 Sep 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE/CI Projects	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Consults and coordinates with various Hqs components regarding Station's projects and operations	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles large volume of correspondence with Station in support of Operations	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares, reviews and coordinates memoranda	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 6-56 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
2 40 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Please see previous fitness report. This employee was rated four months ago. There is no change in the rating; she has continued to give an outstanding performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 2 Oct 59

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Charlotte L. [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 25 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS

☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 15 Oct 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/WH/III/Mexico

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John E. Brady

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/III

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Robert K. Dahlgren
Robert K. Dahlgren

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2 JUL 1959

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. GRADE 11
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I.O. (FI)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/III/Mexico/DC	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 28 August 1958	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To 28 August 1957- 31 May 59	SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible Case Officer for several FI and CE/CI Projects	5/6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Consults and coordinates with various Hqs components regarding Station's Projects and Operations	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handles large volume of correspondence with Station in support of Operations	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares, reviews and coordinates memoranda	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files	6/7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5/6

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 2-59 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OF PERSONNEL
JUL 21 2 51 PM '59
MAIL ROOM

This employee is intelligent, loyal and dedicated to duty. She has an outstanding ability in getting her job assignments accomplished effectively and with a minimum of time and support. She readily accepts responsibility, is a highly efficient worker who thinks clearly and logically. Her knowledge of Headquarters and Field procedures plus her ability to organize her work greatly facilitates the smooth functioning of the Mexican Desk. She has demonstrated a superior comprehension of the numerous and varied projects of the Mexico City Station which has contributed to the overall Headquarters support of the Station's operations. Because of her sound understanding of operations and her outstanding capacity for work, Miss Zehrung has an excellent potential for assuming greater responsibilities. Additional training is dependent upon her future assignments.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 11 [illegible] 59	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐	EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	☐	REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐	OTHER (Specify):		

DATE 11 June 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/WH/III/Mexico	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John B. Brady John B. Brady

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

X	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
	I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
	I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE [illegible] July 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/III	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] Dahlgren R.H. Dahlgren

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER - Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1929	3. SEX F	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/II/DC/~~Argentina~~/MEXICO	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Reports Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 4 Nov 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 28 August 1956 - 27 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 20 January 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR John B. Brady John B. Brady	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/WH/III/Mexico

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT:

BY DATE
Posted Pos Cont'd 21 JAN 1958
JAN 30 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 21 January 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R. N. Dahlgren	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/WH/III

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF ... JAN 24 2 09 PM '58 MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises maintenance of desk records and project files.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Extracts pertinent information from reports and statistics for the preparation of studies	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Reviews and coordinates memoranda	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares cables and dispatches for the field	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Processes for dissemination reports from field stations	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Supervises maintenance of country desk files	RATING NUMBER 6

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This employee is a highly efficient worker who in accomplishing her job assignments has performed in a very outstanding manner. She has the ability to think clearly and logically and at all times exercises extreme good judgment. Her knowledge of Hqs and field procedures constitutes a great asset and she has the facility for picking up loose ends and keeping an office smoothly running. She is willing to undertake any assignment that facilitates getting the job done and is entirely capable of seeing that the job is properly done. Her contribution to the job reflects conscientiousness, loyalty and devotion to duty far above the average.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY... WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): ZEHRUNG, Charlotte
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12 Jan 1929
3. SEX: F
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II/DC/~~Argentina~~/MEXICO
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Reports Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 4 Nov 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 28 August 1956 - 27 August 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 20 January 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: John B. Brady
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/WH/III/Mexico

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 21 January 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: R. N. Dahlgren
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WH/III

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 24 2 09 PM '58

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

7 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Her potential has a wide range. She has the ability to organize and direct a sizeable office of reports writers and to supervise the administrative operations for a large office. She has a distinct aptitude for operations and her potential in the field of operational support work as well as in the direct handling of operations is a good one.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None recommended at this time.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

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(When filled in)

NOTE TO PCS RETURNEES

Personnel processing in from a PCS foreign field assignment through Central Processing Branch are required to review the Employee Conduct Handbook and the information for PCS returnees. This information is contained in a notebook provided by the CPB receptionist.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970 and the information for returnees dated 1 February 1972.

CHARLOTTE B. BUSTOS-VIDELA
NAME
(Please Print)

Charlotte [illegible]
Signature

5 [illegible] 1972
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE
PUNCHED
BY

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
007667	Bustosvidela	Charlotte	Z

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 38, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			08	10	72		1			Mexico	450

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
✓	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FN 680799

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 8/10/72

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	CCS		
☐	C D L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE 8/11/72	SIGNATURE
✓	E S T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET

OFF

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Charlotte Z. Bustos-Videla	DATE (from item S-1) 8 Sep 1971	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) John R. Horton	DATE (from item S-2) 8 Sep 1971
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 15 September 1971	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT 11,086, 8 Sep 1971	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Cuba/CI; GS-13	4. STATION OR BASE Mexico City	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER Nominal LNGOLD

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 28 July 1967	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 9 Sept. 1972	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ ------	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 16 October (3 weeks H/L) (2 weeks A/L)

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

None

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

My husband is currently a professor in New York City, and I would very much appreciate an assignment in New York City so I may join him there. I would ~~x~~be agreeable to changing somewhat my departure date from Mexico if it would help in my accepting an opening in New York City. (My reason for requesting the two month extension is to insure my 5 years overseas duty so as to qualify for the organization's retirement plan.)

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form).
(also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8)

1. Analysis of personality and target data from raw and finished reports, preparation of target studies, and finished intelligence dissems.

2. Operational reporting: cables, dispatches, projects, progress reports, etc.

3. Handling of outside transcribers. (off and on).

4. Records control and purge of Station files.

5. Preparation of memos for other components of LNCUFF.

6. General Ops support IA type work.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

FORM 5-63 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☒ EXTEND TOUR 2 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO 9 September (DATE).

2 ☒ BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY; INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE DOD 2ND CHOICE EUR 3RD CHOICE WHD

1 ☒ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE New York 2ND CHOICE ____ 3RD CHOICE ____

3 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Those of you who know her realize that I would hardly give up SCALETTI, even after five years on the job, without a fight, did not other reasons intervene. Her husband is working in New York now and so her remaining here any longer than needed for her to qualify for her retirement time, as she explains, is a needless hardship. (It would help us if you would confirm that time: is that the date needed for her to remain in order to qualify?) Please do your best to arrange

-continued

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

Subject will be assigned as chief of the CA Section, WH/Branch One. She is being notified via HMMS 7580.

DATE 9Jun72 TITLE DC/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Jane Wurz

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ____ DATED: ____
CABLE NO. ____ DATED: ____

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ____ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ____

SECRET

12. **CONTINUED**

an assignment in New York for her. She is such a valuable person that anyone who has worked with her would be glad to have her on the premises: so there is no need to try to "sell" her: it's just the question of whether the timing would be right, I should think.

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(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) BUSTOS-VIDELA	(First) Charlotte	(Middle) Z	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 069-24-5138

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY Washington, D.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) Washington, D.C.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Dayton, Ohio	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Dayton, Ohio

2. MARITAL STATUS *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Dayton, Ohio	DATE OF MARRIAGE March 18, 1961
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE NA	DATE OF DECREE NA
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED NA	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
NA

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.
Cesar Bustos-Videla	Apartado Postal 6-940, Mexico 6, D.F. MEXICO	MEXICO CITY 525-42-36

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
NA			

NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) Samuel D. Zehrung m	ADDRESS 425 Dayton Towers Dr, Dayton, Ohio	TELEPHONE NO. 513-222-2550
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) Hazel Zehrung	ADDRESS Same	TELEPHONE NO. Same

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY, IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH

JUN 22 11 00 AM '70

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Cesar Bustos-Videla	RELATIONSHIP husband
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) see above	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER see above
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Universidad de las Americas, Puebla, MEXICO	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) yes	YES NO	X
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)	YES NO	X
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES NO	X

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 5-67 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

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5. **VOLUNTARY ENTRIES**

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

All financial information is on file with our lawyer

Mr. John DAHLGREN
DAHLGREN DARRAGH & CLOSE
1000 Conn. Ave., N.W., Washington D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

On file with lawyer listed above

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

NA

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

Believe the lawyer has this also

6. **ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS**

SIGNED AT Hqs	DATE 22 June 1970	SIGNATURE

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

Signature

22 June 1970
Date

BUSTOS Videla, Charlotte

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(When Filled In)

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA) Charlotte Bustos-Videla	DATE (from item 5-1) 26 Jan. 70	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) James B. Noland	DATE (from item 5-2) 26 Jan. 19,0
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 2 Feb. 1970	DISPATCH NUMBER: HMMT-10102	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE: 10 APR 1970	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 29	2. SERVICE DESIGN	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE Exec Assistant, GS-13	4. STATION OR BASE MEXICO CITY Station	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER Tourist

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD 28 July 1967	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 16 Aug 1970	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ Will not go Hdqs unless requested	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE 26 Oct 1970

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

none

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Subject wishes to remain overseas for a minimum of two more years to complete her 5 years overseas requirement.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (*see special note on transmittal form*).
(*also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8*)

1. During most of Subject's tour in Mexico she has been the Cuban IA. In this job she also handled some Cuban operational matters including two outside contract employees.

2. During this period she also handled some sensitive projects for the COS.

3. During the last six months Subject has been Exec Asst to the COS/DCOS concentrating on file and administrative reorganization of the Station.

4. Subject has had supervisory responsibility over one to three clerical/TDY staff for short periods.

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

None

FORM 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11a. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

I enjoy both Administrative and Ops/IA work.

11b. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

3 ☐ EXTEND TOUR: 12 MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO Aug 1971 (DATE)

☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HDQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE. 1ST CHOICE ______ 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

1 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION 1ST CHOICE Paris 2ND CHOICE ______ 3RD CHOICE ______

2 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION for 2nd tour.

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Would not stand in Subject's way, were she to be fortunate enough to get a Paris assignment. However with her long Mexico background (both Hdqs and field) and her multiple talents she has been invaluable in the reorganization of this highly complicated Station under changed circumstances, will continue to be so during the next several years and to lose her would be like losing one's right arm. Therefore we strongly endorse either a second tour or an extension.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division recommends that subject return to Mexico City for a second tour.

DATE 11 Mar 70 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

New tour in Mexico City

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. HMM-[illegible] DATED: [illegible]

CABLE NO. ______ DATED: ______

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ______ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ______

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(When Filled In)

Complete in original. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. This form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) BUSTOS-VIDELA	(First) [illegible]	(Middle) Z	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 649-24-5138

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY WASHINGTON DC.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) N.A
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE WASHINGTON DC.	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE ~~CLEVELAND~~ DAYTON, OHIO

DIRECTOR OVC 69 approved by D/Pers on 4 June 70

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE DAYTON, OHIO	DATE OF MARRIAGE March 18, 1961
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE NA	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED NA	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
NA.

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE CESAR BUSTOS-VIDELA	[illegible] ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) LAS AMERICAS UNIV., MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	TELEPHONE NO.	
NAMES OF CHILDREN —	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian) SAMUEL D ZEHRUNG	ADDRESS [illegible] DAYTON TOWERS [illegible] ROAD DAYTON, OHIO	TELEPHONE NO. ?	
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian) HAZEL J. ZEHRUNG	ADDRESS SAME	TELEPHONE NO. ?	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
am telling all my family I am resigning 15 July 67.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) MRS. PFLAUMER, Mary Elizabeth (Mrs. DALE)	RELATIONSHIP SISTER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) 576 LAKE FOREST DRIVE, BAY VILLAGE, OHIO 44140	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 216-871-0689
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE —	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.)
only witting I used to work for govt.
YES ☐ NO ☒

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.)
Lawyer is Executor [illegible]. Mrs. Dale Pflaumer may make personal decisions.
YES ☒ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)
YES ☒ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 3-63 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

8. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

The National Bank of Washington, Dupont Circle Branch, Washington D.C.
joint account with husband
Columbia Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 5301 Wisc Ave. N.W. D.C.
joint account with husband.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Lawyer: Mr John O. Dahlgren
Dahlgren, Darrough & Close
1000 Conn Ave. NW

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

for accepting checks: The National Bank of Washington

9. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
	June 28 1967	

CONFIDENTIAL

RET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		
Bustos-Videla	Charlotte	Louise	January 12, 1929	069	24	3138

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY 007667

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1-year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print) Charlotte L. Bustos-Videla

DATE 13 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

[illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
007667	BUSTOS VIDELA	CHARLOTTE	Z

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
07	28	67					1			MEXICO	50

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: FORM 764

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 2 - 29 JULY 1967

REMARKS
ARRIVAL DATE REPORTED UNDER "OTHER REMARKS" ON DUTY STATUS REPORT.

PREPARED BY				
☐	OCO	☒	REPORT ANNOTATED AS CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTSS.	DATE		SIGNATURE
☒	C & T DIVISION	16 APR 1968		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — **BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA**

1 EMP SER NO 007667	2 NAME (Last First Middle) BUSTOSVIDELA C Z	3 SEX F	4 DATE OF BIRTH 01/12/29	5 SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -13-06
6 SD D	7 POSITION TITLE .OPS OFFICER	8 OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH	9 LOCATION (Country, City) MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	

SECTION II — **AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE**

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
~~NO OVERSEAS SERVICE~~			
MEXICO CITY STATION 1st tour		27 JULY 1967	10 JUNE 1970
2nd tour		1970	—

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: INITIALS: S
[illegible] JUN [illegible]

SECTION III — **EDUCATION**

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	ECONOMICS, GENERAL	SYRACUSE UNIV NY	50

FORM
1-67 444j
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**
1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)	
2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)	BUSTOS VIDELA Cesar —
3 DATE OF BIRTH	Feb 27, 1922
4 PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	SAN JUAN ARGENTINA
5. OCCUPATION	PROFESSOR
6 PRESENT EMPLOYER	UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS AMERICAS, ~~Pue~~ Cholula, MEXICO
7. CITIZENSHIP	USA (naturalized)
8 FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	Argentine
9 DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED	1956

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
22 June 1970	Charlotte J. Bustos Videla

SECRET

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST: LAN. CODE / R / W / P / S / U / I/T / YEAR
	BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE			

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: LAN. CODE / R / W / P / S / U / I/T / YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
	10/17/72	01/12/29	13	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18
(NAME OF LANGUAGE)
AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
N	+	+	I+	H

TEST RATINGS: 0 = ZERO, I = INTERMEDIATE, S = SLIGHT, H = HIGH, E = ELEMENTARY, N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

"4" indicates [illegible] Speaking grade.

CL BY 017470
EX-2 IMPDET
WISMI

12. SIGNATURE

RLJ

13. LD NUMBER

20723

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45)

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION~~

1 - OP/QAB

<• 2	•	• MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS

4. DATE OF BIRTH (MO / DA / YR)	5. DATE CODED (MO / DA / YR)	
•	•	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED (MO / DA / YR)	6. DATE OF BIRTH (MO / DA / YR)	
•	•	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 007667	• Bus	• C	• BL18	i	i	H	i	i	4	67

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST: MO	DA	YR
• BL18	N	i	H	i	H	4	72	• 10	17	72

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
<• 4	•	•

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO. 117667	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) BUSTOS-VIDELA, CHARLOTTE Z.	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE

4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST

LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST

LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION
06/22/67	01/12/29	13	WH

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN SPANISH (NEW WORLD) BL18 (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
I		H	I	I

TEST RATINGS
0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 25 AUG 1967

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER 14168

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION 1 - OP/QAB

ITEM 4. NOT LANGUAGE (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D
<5	457667	BUS	C

5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST

BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
BL18	H	I	H	H	N	4	60

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST

BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
BL18	I	I	H	I	I	4	67

7. DATE OF TEST

MO	DA	YR
06	22	67

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA. 2 OCT 1967

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
<4		

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR

FORM 1962a **SECRET** GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO (1-6) [illegible]			2. ID NO [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24) LAST FIRST MIDDLE [illegible], Charlotte	4. OFFICE OR DIVISION [illegible]	5. LANGUAGE [illegible]	6. LANG. CODE (25-27) 720
7. DATE OF TEST 46-51 Oct. [illegible]	8. ANNIVERSARY DATE Oct. 11, [illegible]	9. GRADE 12	10. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

11. REASON FOR TAKING TEST		12. TEST SCORES				
		READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)
XX	APPLY FOR AWARD	H	I	H	H	H
	ESTABLISH SKILL LEVEL					

13. ELIGIBILITY (39)		14. TYPE OF AWARD			
XX	A	ACHIEVEMENT (A) MAINTENANCE (M)	ELEMENTARY (E) INTERMEDIATE (I) HIGH (H)	READING (R) SPEAKING (S) COMPREHENSIVE (C)	BASED ON TRAINING THAT WAS DIRECTED (D) OR VOLUNTARY (V)
	M				
	NA	A	E-I	C	V

15. INELIGIBLE (REASON)

16. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR A PROFICIENCY AWARD OF $ 100.00 (40-43)

SIGNATURE

DATE

17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REF. NO.

CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FORM 5-60 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-43)

MRD COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE: 10 September 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 3817 Davis Place, N. W., Washington

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: Em 2-1618

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: Ohio

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: ZEHRUNG, Samuel Danford

2. RELATIONSHIP: Father

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 5536 South Dixie Highway, Dayton 9, Ohio. San Rae Gardens

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: MO 3-3511

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: MO 3-3511

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: None

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiancé.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

16. DATE ACQUIRED

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, Country)

18. OCCUPATION

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

[illegible] FOR QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 11 JUL 1958

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 444h

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Assn.	Dayton, Ohio
Riggs National Bank	Washington, D. C.

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
US

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE		
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE		
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE		
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE	☐	DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Defense, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): 27 Aug 51 - 27 Apr 52
2. GRADE: 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 0
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Secretary (Steno)
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): 27 Apr 52 - 27 Sept 53
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intell Officer (Rpts)
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: All duties of Reports Officer

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): 27 Sept 53 - 10 Apr 55
2. GRADE: 9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: one to two
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Duties of Chief reports officer ~~ax~~

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): 10 Apr 55 - June 1957
2. GRADE: 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/II (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: one - two
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): June 1957 - present
2. GRADE: 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/III (Hqs)
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Reports Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
SEP 12 3 42 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION XII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ ☐

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING ▷ ☐

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED 10 Sept 57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Charlene L. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): [illegible]
2. L D NO.: [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24): [illegible], Charlotte
4. COMPONENT: [illegible]
5. GRADE: [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE: Spanish
8. CODE (25-27): [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST: [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33): [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A M	NOT AWARDABLE
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE:
DATE:

15. TYPE OF AWARD				
A - M	S - I - N	C	R - W - S	D - V
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD: $100.00
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.:
SIGNATURE:
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION: $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION: $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.:
DATE:
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD: $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.:
23. FORWARD CHECK TO:
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT:
25. CHECK NO.:
DATE:

FORM 4-58 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-48) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA

1. PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. (1-6): [illegible]
2. L D NO.: [illegible]
3. NAME (7-24): [illegible], Charlotte
4. COMPONENT: [illegible]
5. GRADE: [illegible]
6. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
7. LANGUAGE: Spanish
8. CODE (25-27): [illegible]
9. DATE OF TEST: [illegible]
10. ANNIVERSARY DATE (28-33): [illegible]

11. TEST PURPOSE	12. TEST SCORES					13. ELIGIBILITY (39)	
AWARD SKILL	READING (34)	WRITING (35)	PRONUNCIATION (36)	SPEAKING (37)	UNDERSTANDING (38)	AWARDABLE A M	NOT AWARDABLE
	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

14. I CERTIFY THIS EMPLOYEE FOR AWARD
SIGNATURE:
DATE:

15. TYPE OF AWARD				
A - M	S - I - N	C	R - W - S	D - V
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	

16. AMOUNT OF AWARD: $[illegible]
17. I CERTIFY THAT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.:
SIGNATURE:
18. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION: $
19. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION: $
20. CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.:
DATE:
21. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD: $
22. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.:
23. FORWARD CHECK TO: [illegible]
[illegible]
24. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT:
25. CHECK NO.:
DATE:

FORM 4-52 1273 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (10-48) MRD COPY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6) 107667	**LANGUAGE DATA RECORD**

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise	January	12	1929

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
Spanish 720	April	2	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

[✓ 2.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY *(newspapers, reference materials, etc.)*, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED: 2 April 1957

SIGNATURE: Carlota L. [illegible]

(46)

(47)

DEADLINE: 29 Sept. 1952

SECRET
Security Information

ZEHRUNG, Charlotte L.
Name: Last, First Middle

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 10-8-52

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry) 7667	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) ZEHRUNG , Charlotte Luise	3. Office FI

4. Date of Birth 12 Jan. 1929	5. Sex: ___ male (1) _x_ female (2)	Martial Status _s_ Nr. Dependents _0_	6. CIA Entry Date: August 1951

7. Citizenship: _x_ U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) _x_ Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ________

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
[✓ 6. Bachelor degree]
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
Syracuse University	Econ.	Span.	9/46	1/5	4	-	B. A.	1/50	115
San Carlos University	Span.		7/48	8/4					5

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates From	Attendance Dates To	Attendance Dates Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization
Miami Jacobs Business College	5/50	12/50	7	typing and shorthand

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	Attendance Dates To	Attendance Dates Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From 4/52 To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: I have the responsibility
	of disseminating and routing all reports received
Grade 7 Salary $4205.00	from our Station, take appropriate action on
	reports received from other agencies by forwarding
Office FI/WH/Brazil	this information to the field or supplying requested
Position	data. I inform the field of additional info at
Title: Intelligence Officer	Headquarters on individuals and organizations as
Duty	requested or as deemed necessary. I also maintain
Title: Reports Officer	Duty Station, if overseas: two CE notebooks.

From 12/51 To 4/52 Tot. mos. 5	Description of Duties:
	Same as above with a Sub-station. I had less
Grade 5 Salary $3410.00	individual responsibility.
Office FI/WH/Brazil	
Position	
Title: Intelligence Officer	
Duty	
Title: Reports Officer	Duty Station, if overseas:

From 11/51 To ______ Tot. mos. 1	Description of Duties:
	As a casual I typed dispatches, memoranda,
Grade 5 Salary $3410.00	and disseminations for Branch II. I took
	a limited amount of shorthand.
Office FI/E/II	
Position	
Title: Secretary (Stenography)	
Duty	
Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:

From 9/51 To ______ Tot. mos. 1	Description of Duties:
	I assembled disseminated reports.
Grade 5 Salary $3410.00	
Office PC	
Position	
Title: Secretary (Stenography)	
Duty	
Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:

Two months in the pool attending classes and setting up filing system for Russian Index cards.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.)

From 4/51 To 8/51 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) 3 Salary $2650.00 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer Department of Interior Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Statistical Draftsman Description of Duties: I did statistical drafting, cartography, Marking of [illegible] er, typing and other general office [illegible]. Duty Station if overseas:
From 5/50 To 3/51 Tot. mo's 11 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 1.[illegible] /hr. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 2 - 6 clerks Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Nursery and Gift Shoppe	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: As an assistant to the executives I was responsible for purchasing stock for the gift shoppe and instructing clerks and greenhouse employees. I had full responsibility of the books and cash. I made reports on the business and acted as sales clerk for the shoppe Duty Station if overseas: and in a landscaping bus
From 2/50 To ?/50 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $200 / mo. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer National Peanut Council Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) trade association	Exact Title of your position Assistant Bookkeeper Description of Duties: I made monthly financial reports, had the responsibility of the books, did typing and other general office work. Duty Station if overseas:
From 6/47 To 8/47 Tot. mo's 3 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Frigidaire Co., Gen. Motors. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: I worked one month in the office of the Chemical Laboratory and two months in the factory. Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

S

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Spanish		x						x		x
French				x						x
Portuguese			x							x

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ______

______

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ______

______

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE.

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
South America	1 sem econ and geog.			x
Guatemala	7/48 to 8/48	x		
Mexico	7/46		x	

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. drafts	2.	60	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand	1. none	2.	70	1. Yes 2. x No
Shorthand System: 1. x Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.__________	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. painting, skiing

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.__________

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
typing, shorthand, general intelligence exam	8/1951
exam for reports officer	2/1952

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ___ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

I feel I am best qualified for a reports or research position.

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___Yes ___No.
If yes, indicate your present draft classification ________________

2. **Present Reserve or National Guard Status**
Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___Yes ___No.
If yes, complete the ~~following~~.
1.___National Guard
2.___Air National Guard
3.___Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4.___Inactive Reserve Status

Service________________ **Grade**____________ **Location**____________

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated________________

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any________________

Location of Service Records, if known________________

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
Orientation course	8-11 Jan 1952	9-12 am

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 18 September 1952

SIGNATURE

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO

ANNOUNCEMENT

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR

2 OPTION(S) *(if mentioned in examination announcement)*

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR *(City and State)* Washington, D. C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION

5 MR MRS MISS *(First name)* Charlotte *(Middle)* L. *(Maiden, if any)* *(Last)* Zehrung

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER 1401 - 16th St., N. W.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE *(including postal zone)* AND STATE Washington, D. C.

7 LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State) Ohio

8 (A) OFFICE PHONE RE 1820 X 732

(B) HOME PHONE NO 5450

9 DATE OF BIRTH *(month, day, year)* 1-12-29

10 ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11 PLACE OF BIRTH *(city and State; if born outside U S , name city and country)* Dayton, Ohio

12 ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

13 (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 8 INCHES (B) WEIGHT 125 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON-APPOR

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER.

NOTATIONS

APP. REVIEW.

APPROVED

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ .... PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED:
☐ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16 EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: 4-51 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION Statistical Draftsman

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service) 3

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING, $ 2650 PER yr. PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State) Washington, D. C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Mrs. Mildred Moorman

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)*
Board of Geographical Names
Department of Interior

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)*

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR WISHING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

statistical drafting
typing
marking diacritics

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 5/50 TO 3/51

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Bookkeeper-Clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 1.00 PER hr FINAL $ 1.10 PER hr

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Dayton, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Ray F. McKechnie

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): San Rae Gardens, R. R. 11 Dayton 9, Ohio

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Nursery and Gift Shoppe

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 2 - 6 clerks

REASON FOR LEAVING: New Job

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Bookkeeper
Clerk
Made reports on stock and ordered wholesale
Made reports for the executives on the business, finances, etc.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 2/50 TO 5/50

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Ast. Bookkeeper

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ 200 PER mo

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Washington, D. C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. William F. Seals, Pres.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
National Peanut Council
1111 Dupont Circle Bldg. Washington, D. C.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Trade Association

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: New Job

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Bookkeeping
Filing
General office work
Financial reports

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM 6/47 TO 8/47

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Dayton, Ohio

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Herbert Hauldorman Personnel

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Frigidaire, Plant 2 Dayton 9, O

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Manuf. of Frigidaires

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: return to college

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

Secretary in Chemical Labs.
Worked in factory

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING: In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18. EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, N. Y.	Econ.	9-46	1-50	4		BA	1-50	115
San Carles Univ, Guatemala City	Span	7-48	8-48					5
Miami Jacobs Business College Dayton, O.	Steno.	5-50	12-50	3 mo	4mo			

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
Economics	30		
Spanish	23		

(E) OTHER TRAINING SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT	SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish	x				X		X		
French		x				x			x

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Guatemala 7/48-8/48 Education
Mexico 7/46 Travel

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

Calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 60 SHORTHAND 70

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

24. REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Mr. John Lewis	Oakwood High School, Dayton 9, O.	Principal
2.	Miss Theadosia Moran	Cazenovia R. D. 2, N. Y.	Teacher
3.	Mr. Harry Schwartz	Univ. of Syracuse, Syracuse, N. Y.	Professor

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes" give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		X
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		

(D)	DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
	BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE IN PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU TAKE PART IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19.....

Agency: .... Title.

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Miss Charlotte L. [illegible]

Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, give title of Miss or Mrs. and if married, your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe."

As of 5 July, 1951, Subject's Washington address is

3817 Davis place, N.W.
Phone - ORdway 1618

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA.". Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:
Office RE 1820
Ext. 4691
Home NO 5450

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss Charlotte (First) Louise (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

PRESENT ADDRESS 1401-16th St., N. W. (St. and Number) Washington, (City) D. C. (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens (St. and Number), Dayton 9, (City) Ohio RR 11 (State) USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME Sherri WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? none

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? started to use it at school

HOW LONG? 5 yrs IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS

(Where?) (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/12/29 PLACE OF BIRTH Dayton (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP USA (Country) BY BIRTH? yes BY MARRIAGE? no

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. no ISSUED (Date) BY (Court)

AT (City) (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? no (Yes or No) (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? TO ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? no GIVE PARTICULARS:

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ....

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) (Type) (Place of Issue) (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 22 SEX F HEIGHT 5' 8" WEIGHT 125

EYES blue HAIR brown COMPLEXION med. SCARS none

BUILD slender OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE x MARRIED .... DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE .... (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ....

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH .... (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents): none

1. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME ________ RELATIONSHIP ________ AGE ________

CITIZENSHIP ________ ADDRESS ________ (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Samuel (First) Danford (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1/23/1892 PLACE OF BIRTH Roseville, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? ________ (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Landscape Architect LAST EMPLOYER own employer - over 20 yrs.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio (State) (Country) USA

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ---- (Date) TO ----- (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ________

COUNTRY ________ DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

____

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Hazel (First) Charlotte Jackson (Middle) Zehrung (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE ________ CAUSE ________

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 10/17/1896 PLACE OF BIRTH Montague, Michigan USA

CITIZENSHIP USA WHEN ACQUIRED? birth WHERE? ________ (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ________

OCCUPATION housewife LAST EMPLOYER Detroit Board of Education 1927

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ---- TO ---- BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Nancy (First) (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 21
PRESENT ADDRESS Verity Hall, Middletown Hospital, Middletown, Ohio, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship) USA

2. FULL NAME Dorothy (First) Jon (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 17
PRESENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship)

3. FULL NAME Mary (First) Elizabeth (Middle) Zehrung (Last) AGE 16
PRESENT ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) USA (Citizenship)

4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED .... DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH .... PLACE OF BIRTH ....

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ....

....

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME Col.Paul Zehrung RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 38

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS HI USA FE, APO 633 %Post Master N.Y., N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME distant relatives in Sweden RELATIONSHIP AGE
Grandparents on Mother's side came from Sweden

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME RELATIONSHIP AGE

CITIZENSHIP ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME Col. Paul Zehrung RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 38

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS HI USA FE, APO 633 %Post Master, N.Y., N.Y. (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Director of Maintenance HI USA FE

2. NAME Major Jack Macklin RELATIONSHIP cousin AGE 31

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS Washington, D. C. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

3. NAME Mrs. Elsie Dickert RELATIONSHIP Aunt AGE 55

CITIZENSHIP USA ADDRESS 314 N 29th St. Billings, Mont. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) Social work - Dept. of Interior
located in Montana

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR Administrative position with Latin America, Economist, Statistician, or temporarily as a Stenographer

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 3,100
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY X

FREQUENTLY ______, CONSTANTLY ______

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES ______, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL West Carrollton ADDRESS West Carrollton, O. USA
(City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1933 - 1944 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL Oakwood High School ADDRESS Dayton 9, Ohio USA
(City) (State) (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1944 - 1946 GRADUATE? yes

COLLEGE Syracuse University ADDRESS Syracuse, New York USA
(City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Economics & Spanish YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 1946 - 1950 DEGREE BA

COLLEGE Universidad de San Carlos ADDRESS Guatemala City, Guatemala C.A.
(City) (State) (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Spanish YEARS COMPLETED 5 credits

DATES ATTENDED summer 1948 DEGREE none given

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS economics - statistics

Spanish grammar and literature

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE none

(Country) (Service) (Rank) (Dates of Service)

(Last Station) (Serial Number) (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER .... **ADDRESS**

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 4/51 TO .... CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) 3

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Board of Geographic Names

ADDRESS Interior Bldg. C & 18th Sts., N. W., Washington, D. C. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS .... NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mrs. Mildred Moorman

TITLE OF JOB Statistical Draftsman SALARY $ 2,650 PER yr.

YOUR DUTIES drawing diacritics, drafting, typing

REASONS FOR LEAVING better position more in my interests

FROM 5/50 TO 4/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY San Kae Gardens, Inc.

ADDRESS Box 240 Dayton 9, R. R. 11 Ohio USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS nursery NAME OF SUPERVISOR Ray McKechnie

TITLE OF JOB clerk SALARY $ 1.10 PER hr.

YOUR DUTIES bookkeeping, typing, clerking, making financial reports, ordering wholesale, making floral arrangements

REASONS FOR LEAVING to take a job more in line with my training

FROM 2/50 TO 5/50 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY National Peanut Council

ADDRESS 1111 Dupont Circle Building, Washington, D. C. USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Trade Assoc. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. William F. Seals

TITLE OF JOB Asst. Bookkeeper SALARY $ 200 PER mo.

YOUR DUTIES bookkeeping, filing, general office work, financial reports

REASONS FOR LEAVING return home to help my father in his business

FROM 6/47 TO 8/47 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Frigidaire, General Motors

ADDRESS Plant # 2 Dayton 9, Ohio USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS manuf. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Mr. Herbert Halderman

TITLE OF JOB SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES office work in the chemical laboratories
work in the factory proper

REASONS FOR LEAVING return to college

FROM 4-48 TO 5-48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE)

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Grants 5/10 Store

ADDRESS Syracuse, New York USA
(St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS stores NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB clerk SALARY $ PER

YOUR DUTIES waited on customers in the flower department

REASONS FOR LEAVING just a part-time temporary position for Easter

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE Spanish SPEAK fluent READ fluent WRITE fluent

LANGUAGE French SPEAK slight READ fair WRITE fair

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Art-drawing, painting, crafts, studied at school - good
Swimming, good; Reading; Knitting, good; Basketball, fair;
tennis, fair

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

I have spent a summer in Guatemala, living with a Guatemalan family, learning the life and ways of a Spanish family and city. I have quite a complete knowledge of the florist business from helping my father over a period of about 8 years.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 60 SHORTHAND 70

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. NO

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ....

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)
(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.
(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

3-I did a lot of extempt and declamation work in public speaking contests in high school. I am a member of the National Forensic League.

4-I received a partial scholarship from Chapel at Syracuse University

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

NO

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

NO

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. John Lewis BUS. ADD. Oakwood High School, Dayton, Ohio
RES. ADD. NA

2. Mr. Herbert Holderman BUS. ADD. Frigidaire, Plant 2, Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. 11 Winding Way, Dayton 9, Ohio

3. Mr. Albert F. Kuhl, M.D. BUS. ADD. Harries Bldg. Dayton Ohio
RES. ADD. NA

4. Mr. George Pohlmeyer BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 96 Winding Way, Dayton, Ohio

5. Miss Katherine Smith BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 59 Wiltshire Dayton 9, Ohio

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Miss Theadosia Moran BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. R. R. 2 Cazanovia N. Y.

2. Mrs. Ed Eastin BUS. ADD. San Rae Gardens Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. Pease Ave., West Carrollton, Ohio

3. Miss Betty Hollis BUS. ADD. Arlington Annex, Arlington, Va.
RES. ADD. 1401-16th St., N. W. Washington DC

4. Mr. Harry Schwartz BUS. ADD. Univ. of Syracuse, Syracuse, N.Y.
RES. ADD. NA

5. Mr. Walter Bohm BUS. ADD. Winter's National bank, Dayton, O.
RES. ADD. 259 Greenmont Blvd. Dayton 9, O.

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number City State

1. Mr. Ray F. McKechnie BUS. ADD. San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio
RES. ADD. same R. R. 11

School neighbors {
2. Miss Sheila Dewey BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. Box 303 Spencer, N. Y.
3. Miss Marilyn Morris BUS. ADD. NA
RES. ADD. 811 Abbott St., Highland Park N. J.
}

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
West Carrollton Bank-West Carrollton, Ohio
Washington Loan and Trust Co., Washington, D. C.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? no

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME Meredian Hill Hotel ADDRESS 2601-16th St. NW Washington DC (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME Mrs. Blick ADDRESS 1401-16th St. NW Washington DC (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME Delta Gamma Sorority ADDRESS 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse NY. (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 4-1-51 TO Present 1401-16th St., N.W. Washington. D.C. USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 5-50 TO 4-51 San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 2-50 TO 5-50 2601-16th St., NW Washington, D.C. USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 9-48 TO 2-50 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse, N. Y. USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 9-46 TO 9-48 two cottages of Syracuse Univ, Syracuse USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM 7-48 TO 8-48 9 C.P. # 30 Guatemala City, Guatemala (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM time before TO this San Rae Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)
FROM TO (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 7-46 TO --- Mexico City Mexico tourist (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM 7-48 TO 8-48 Guatemala City Guatemala student (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)
FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Delta Gamma - Rho 901 Walnut Ave., Syracuse, N. Y. USA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947-50 active - 1950 to present inactive

2. Spanish Club Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. USA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1947 - 8 - 9

3. Economics Club Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. USA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1948 - 9 - 50

4. Westminster Presbyterian Church - Dayton 9, Ohio USA
5. Brownies - Grade School - West Carrollton, Ohio USA

10. Girl Scouts - High School - West Carrollton, Ohio USA

11. Hommadon [illegible] - Westminster Presbyter[illegible] Church - Dayton 9, O. USA
1943-4

12. Alumni Association of Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, N. Y. USA
1950-

4. International Relations Club - Syracuse Univ, Syracuse N.Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1946-7-8-9

5. 2nd & 1st Cabinet - Chapel - Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N.Y. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1948-9

6. National Forensic League - Oakwood High School, Dayton 9, O. USA
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1945-6 active

7. Sigma Theta Phi - Dayton 9, Ohio USA high school sorority
(Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1945-6

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

NO

IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? YES IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

an occasional drink at dinners and parties

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE:

NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

NPA & DPA; Atomic Energy Commission; Council of Economic Advisors; Board of Geographic Names

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Board of Geographic Names 4-1-51

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Samuel D. Zehrung RELATIONSHIP father

ADDRESS San Rae Gardens, R. R. 11 (St. and Number) Dayton 9, (City) Ohio (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Washington D.C. (City and State) DATE May 25, 1951

Betty L. Hollis (Witness) Charlotte L. Zehrung (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Sec. 11 - Mr. Jim Zohrung, Sr. Uncle 61

USA 1210 Wilson Dr., Dayton, Ohio USA

Mechanical Engineer - Wright Air Field,
Dayton, Ohio

FDT-52
Dr

File
ned

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 16 Oct. 1951

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Your Reference: L2419

Case Number: 56840

SUBJECT: ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

m-l
25 Oct
10

Pool ntf
10/18

Bu. ntf.
10/18

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO.
JAN 1951 38-101

(4)

7DT-23

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 4 August 1951

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: ZEHRUNG, Charlotte Louise 56840

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☒ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity: D Street Pool

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☐ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

Pr. Notified 8 Aug

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 30-104
JUL 1951

DEPARTMENT
OF
INTERIOR

I-708

UNITED STATES [illegible]RTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF PERSO[illegible] [illegible]ERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date of Action

Journal

Re: Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, R.R. 11
Dayton 9, Ohio

INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT

Effective Date: April 2, 1951 ~~(Vice Vacancy)~~

	From	To
Position		Statistical Draftsman
Grade and Salary		GS-3, $2650.00 per annum (GS-1533-3-504)
Bureau		Office of the Secretary
Branch		Division of Geography
Headquarters		Washington, D. C.
Departmental or Field		Departmental

C. I. - Martha E. Reid

This appointment is subject to a trial period of one year.

Subject to investigation.

Under this appointment you will be covered by the National Social Security System.

(SGD) THOMAS B. TELLIER

Mathilda C. Heuser
Chief, Administrative Branch

Personnel Officer
Signed: [illegible]
Office of the Secretary

Appropriation Title: [illegible] Working Fund, Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Sundry, 1951.

JUSTIFICATION (Confine justification to essential reasons for the action recommended)

Miss Zehrung has been selected for appointment from Civil Service Certificate N-2590.

Her Civil Service papers, medical certificate, and Form 85 for preappointment loyalty check are attached.

Attachments.

Social Security No. 269-24-3138

Permanent

CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
CS Certificate No. N-2590 dated 1/16/51.
C.S. Reg. 2.115

Appropriation
Regular

Date of Birth	Legal Residence
1/12/29	Ohio
Sex	Race
F	W

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE
Yes ____ No X

LAST STATUS CHANGE OR APPOINTMENT
From
To
Effective
Last Eff. Rating

NATURE OF POSITION
Vice X Add. Identical ____

Name Martha E.Reid
GS-1533-3-504

SUBJECT TO RETIREMENT
X

DATE THIS ACTION INITIATED
2/14/51

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACTION
Recommended by Officers

ALLOCATION APPROVAL

BUREAU NOTIFICATION COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (1 PART)
UNITED STATES
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OCTOBER 1948

UNITED STATES
RTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—FIRST—MIDDLE INITIAL—LAST): Miss Charlotte L. Zohrung
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1/12/29
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION No.:
4. DATE:

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Separation (To accept Excepted Appt. with Central Intelligence Agency)
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 8/26/51
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM		TO
Statistical Draftsman (CS-1853-3-603)	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-3, $2650.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, SALARY	
Office of the Secretary Division of Geography Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. REMARKS

Any leave remaining to your credit will be transferred.

Separated without reemployment rights.

[illegible], Personnel Officer
14. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

15. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT WIFE	10 POINT WIDOW			
X							

16. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

17. SEX:
18. RACE:
19. APPROPRIATION: 1485901.093 Working
FROM Fund, Interior, Office of the
TO Secretary, [illegible]
20. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): [illegible]
21. DATE OF OATH (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
22. LEGAL RESIDENCE: Ohio (claimed)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1949

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

Give this card to the
APPOINTMENT CLERK
at the
PHS OUTPATIENT CLINIC
4th and C Streets SW.
EX. 8300 Ext. 8228
(or Code 1/6)

323718.

1. FIRST Charlotte INITIAL L. LAST NAME Zehrung

2. POSITION TITLE Statistical Draftsman

3. DATE OF BIRTH 1/29/29 HAS AN APPOINTMENT ON ________ (Date) AT ____ (Time) A.M. P.M.

AT THE SERVICE CHECKED BELOW.

4. ☐ PHOTOFLUOROGRAM
5. ☐ MEDICAL EXAMINATION
6. ☐ LABORATORY
7. ☐ MEDICAL
8. ☐ OB-GYN
9. ☐ PHYS MED.
10. ☐ SURGICAL
11. ☐ PEDIATRIC
12. ☐ RADIOLOGY
13. ☐ IMMUN-VAC.
14. ☐ DENTAL
15. ☐ EENT
16. ☐ NUTRITION
17. ☐ MENTAL HEALTH
18. ☐ DERMATOLOGY
19. ☐ OTHER (Specify) ____________

20. CLINIC REGISTER NO.

21. NAME OF DOCTOR

STANDARD FORM [illegible] JULY 1 47
[illegible]
F. P. M. CHAPTER [illegible]

MEDICAL APPOINTMENT AND REPORT

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1949)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Interior (Department or agency) Office of Secretary Geography (Bureau or division) Washington D.C. (Place of employment)

I, Charlotte L. Zehrung, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. 57, dated February, 1950, filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Charlotte L. Zehrung
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 2 day of April, A. D. 1951

at Washington (City) D.C. (State)

[illegible]

act of June 26, 1943 Sec. 206

[SEAL]

Ethel S. Covell
(Signature of officer)

Clerk, Division of Geography
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—63140-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*
1401 16th St., N.W. Washington D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
1/12/29

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*
Dayton, O. U.S.A

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY
Samuel D. Zehrung

(B) RELATIONSHIP
Father

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
Sun Ree Gardens- RR 11 Dayton, O.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.
WA 5831

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED *(Check one)*	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service, amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court, (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed your fingerprints will be taken*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following.

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—58100-1

1-209

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
DIVISION OF PERSONNEL SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date of Action

Journal

Re: Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, R.R. 11
Dayton 9, Ohio

INDEFINITE APPOINTMENT

Effective Date:

	From	To
Position		Statistical Draftsman
Grade and Salary		GS-3, $2650.00 per annum (GS-1533-3-504)
Bureau		Office of the Secretary
Branch		Division of Geography Research Branch
Headquarters		Washington, D. C.
Departmental or Field		Departmental

O. I. - Martha E. Reid

This appointment is subject to a trial period of one year.

Subject to investigation.

Under this appointment you will be covered by the National Social Security System.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 15 1951

(SGD) THOMAS H. TELLIER

Signed,

Appropriation Title: 1415965.001 Working Fund, Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Sundry, 1951.

JUSTIFICATION (Confine the statement to essential reasons for the action recommended)

Miss Zehrung has been selected for appointment from Civil Service Certificate H-2580.

Her Civil Service papers, medical certificate, and Form 85 for pre-appointment loyalty check are attached.

Attachments.

174 recd. 3/5/51
Pre appt. loyalty check
OK'd.

DEPARTMENTAL ACTION COPY

Permanent

CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
CS Certificate No. H-2580 dated 1/16/51.
C.S. Reg. 2.115

Appropriation
Regular

Date of Birth: 1/12/29
Legal Residence: Ohio
Sex: F
Race: W

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE
Yes ___ No X

LAST STATUS CHANGE OR APPOINTMENT
From
To
Effective
Last Eff'cy Rating

NATURE OF POSITION
Vice X Add. Identical ___
Name Martha E. Reid
GS-1533-3-504
Reallocation ___ New ___
Other Change ___

SUBJECT TO RETIREMENT
Yes ___ No X

DATE THIS ACTION INITIATED
2/14/51

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY FOR ACTION
Recommending Officers
Burrill

Director of Personnel
Organization Survey
3/13 Recruitment Selection
Training and Placement
Employee Relations
CSC Liaison
Appointments Records & Statistics
7/15 Horford

ALLOCATION - APPROVAL
GS-1533-3-504

STANDARD FORM 85
Promulgated
August 4, 1947, by
Civil Service Commission
(Chapter I 2, F. P. M.)

REQUEST FO ORT OF LOYALTY DATA ON AI ICANTS AND APPOINTEES

THIS FORM TO BE USED ONLY FOR APPLICANTS AND APPOINTEES
WHOSE RECORD CHECKS AND INQUIRIES ARE CONDUCTED
BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(PART 1—EXECUTIVE ORDER 9835)

CASE SERIAL NO.
(CSC use only)

TO:

The following information is furnished for identification purposes on the person named below. Kindly furnish a report on any loyalty information contained in your files. (The fingerprints of this person are attached.)

1. FULL NAME (Initials and abridgments of full name are not acceptable). (Surname) Zehrung (Given name) Charlotte (Middle or other names) Louise

2. ALIASES AND NICKNAMES Sherri

3. DATE OF THIS REQUEST 2/14/51

4. SPECIAL NUMBERS KNOWN TO REQUESTING AGENCY (FBI number or FBI file number, passport number, Army or Navy serial number, seaman's certificate of identification, alien registration number, Social Security number, etc. Specify which)
Social Security No. 069-24-3138

5. PLACE OF BIRTH Dayton, Ohio

6. DATE OF BIRTH Jan. 12, 1929

7. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman SENS (Division of Geography)

8. SEX ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

9. MARITAL STATUS ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED

10. IF MARRIED, GIVE SPOUSE'S FULL NAME, AND DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH None

11. DATE OF APPOINTMENT APPL

12. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT ☒ Indefinite (Competitive, if the Civil Service or other legal authority) ☐ EXCEPTED ☐ TEMPORARY Reg. 2.115

13. ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH AFFILIATED, OTHER THAN RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OR THOSE WHICH SHOW RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Delta Gamma Sorority

14. DATES AND PLACES OF RESIDENCE FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS

From	To	Street	City	State
9/41	9/46	San Mas Gardens R. R. 11	Dayton	Ohio
9/46	6/47	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
6/47	9/47	San Mas Gardens	Dayton	Ohio
9/47	6/48	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
7/48	8/48	30 Novena Calle Poniente	Guatemala City	Guatemala C.A.
9/48	6/49	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
6/49	9/49	San Mas Gardens	Dayton	Ohio
9/49	2/50	901 Walnut Ave.	Syracuse	N. Y.
2/50	5/50	2001 - 16th St., N. W.	Washington	D. C.

5/50 - pres. - San Mas Gardens, Dayton, Ohio

15. DATES, NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF EMPLOYERS FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS

Unemployed prior to 6/47

Date		Employer	Address
6/47	9/47	Frigidaire Plant #2	Dayton 9, Ohio
9/47	4/48	Unemployed	
4/48	5/48	Grants Dime Store (part-time)	Syracuse, N. Y.
5/48	6/49	Unemployed	
6/49	9/49	San Mas Gardens, R. R. 11	Dayton, Ohio
9/49	2/50	Unemployed	
2/50	5/50	National Peanut Council	1111 Dupont Circle Bldg., Washington, D. C.
5/50	pres.	San Mas Gardens	Dayton, Ohio

1049

16. THIS AGENCY HAS LOYALTY INFORMATION REPORT(S) FURNISHED BY THE AGENCIES INDICATED BELOW

AGENCY WHICH MADE THE LOYALTY REPORT	DATE OF REPORT	REMARKS
None		10-9-2015

17. THIS SPACE RESERVED FOR RETURN REPORT TO AGENCY WHERE NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED

18. NAME AND ADDRESS OF REQUESTING AGENCY
Personnel Officer
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Interior
Washington 25, D. C.

SEE REVERSE FOR REPORT ON CASES WHERE DEROGATORY INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED

16—55—48803-1

UNITED STATES C[illegible] SERVICE COMMISSION
DIRECTOR
FOURTH U. S. CIVIL SERVICE REGION
TEMPORARY BUILDING "R"
3RD & JEFFERSON DRIVE, S. W.
WASHINGTON [illegible], D. C.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 15 1951

PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF CLEARANCE ON INITIAL CHECKS

1. CASE SERIAL NUMBER: 4-51-[illegible] S[illegible]S
2. DATE OF THIS REPORT: 3/14/51
3. PROPOSED ACTION: APPL

Personnel Officer
Office of the Sec'y
Dept. of the Interior
Wash. 25, D.C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

4. COMPETITIVE
5. EXCEPTED: 4/7/51

6. NAME (Last, first, middle): [illegible], Charlotte Louise (Aka; Sherri)

7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1/12/29

8. PROPOSED POSITION, ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATION, AND PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: Statistical Draftsman, Dept. of Int. Off. of Sec'y, DC

Preappointment loyalty check has been made on the above applicant for a 'sensitive' position, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the Federal Personnel Manual. This check revealed no derogatory information regarding this person's loyalty.

No further papers are required if the proposed action is the *appointment of a person employed by another agency* and you have determined from the losing agency that the appointee or incumbent check has been completed.

For any other type of appointment action, please submit to this office within three working days after the appointee enters on duty (1) application, (2) file covering any investigation or inquiry conducted by your agency on a preappointment basis, and (3) Standard Form 87 (fingerprint chart) unless fingerprint search has already been made as shown by item 9A below.

	9A. FINGERPRINT SEARCH HAS BEEN COMPLETED AS PART OF THE PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK.
XX	B. FINGERPRINTS WERE NOT SUBMITTED AS PART OF THE PREAPPOINTMENT LOYALTY CHECK.
	C. FINGERPRINTS WERE UNCLASSIFIABLE. YOU MAY EITHER (1) MAKE THE APPOINTMENT AT ONCE AND SUBMIT REPRINTS WITH THE OTHER REQUIRED PAPERS, OR (2) WITHHOLD APPOINTMENT AND SUBMIT REPRINTS SEPARATELY FOR COMPLETION OF FINGERPRINT SEARCH BEFORE YOU DECIDE WHETHER TO APPOINT.

UNCLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS ☐ ARE ATTACHED.
☐ WILL BE FORWARDED ON RECEIPT FROM OUR CENTRAL OFFICE.

Please use the copy of this notice for your transmittal or reply. Space has been provided on the back for your convenience. *A reply is required,* even though it may not be necessary to transmit forms in this case.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR

TO: DIRECTOR, U. S. CIVIL SERVICE REGION

☐ 1. Forms attached as requested. Proposed personnel action effected April 9, 1951

☐ 2. Forms not submitted because proposed personnel action dropped from consideration.

☐ 3. Forms not submitted because this is an appointment without break in service of a person who was employed by another agency and it has been determined from the Official Personnel Folder of the losing agency that the appointee or incumbent check has been completed.

☐ 4. Reprints on Standard Form 87 attached. Decision regarding appointment will not be made until the results of the FBI fingerprint search have been received.

REMARKS:

Forms 57 and 87 attached.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPOINTING OFFICER	OFFICIAL TITLE
April 9, 1951	(SGD.) F. T. SMITH	Personnel Officer, Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Interior.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 5
DECEMBER 1947
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(SUPERSEDES CSC FORM 1982)

INQUIRY AS TO AVAILABILITY

Return this form to →

AGENCY AND ADDRESS (Street, city, and State)
Miss Mathilda C. Heuser
Chief, Administrative Branch
Division of Geography
Dept. of the Interior
Washington 25, D.C.

Miss Charlotte L. Zehrung
San Rae Gardens, RR11
Dayton 9, Ohio

(Please correct address if different from above)

DATE: Jan. 30, 1951

CERTIFICATE: H-2580

POSITION: Statistical Draftsman, GS-3

SALARY: $2650 p.a.

LOCATION: Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: Indefinite
☐ PROBATIONAL
☐ TEMPORARY FOR ....

This office is considering you among others for the employment described. Please fill out the "Availability Statement" below, indicating whether you would accept this position if offered, and return the entire sheet to this office. Appointment would be subject to the Civil Service requirements described on the back of this letter. Whether you are available or not, please reply within ....3.... days in order that one of those who are available may be selected as promptly as possible to fill the vacancy.

Failure to reply to this inquiry will result in the removal of your name from the register of eligibles until such time as you request restoration and furnish the information asked for in the statement below.

THIS IS A LETTER OF INQUIRY AND *NOT* AN OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT. If selected, you will be notified and given further instructions.

Other information:

Sincerely yours,

Mathilda C. Heuser

Chief, Admin. Branch

AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

(Check one) (Check one)

☑ I am available and wish to be considered for the position described above. I can report for duty within 10 days after notification. I am now employed by San Rae Gardens at Dayton 9, Ohio RR 11

☐ I do not wish to be considered for the position described above. *I am giving my reasons on the other side of this form.*

☐ I request that my name be removed from the active list of eligibles until I report that I am available for appointment.

☑ Consider me available for other appointments, subject to the following conditions:

The position must pay at least $2,650 per year (year, month, day, or hour).

I am willing to work: ☑ In Washington, D. C.; ☐ Anywhere in the U. S.; ☐ Outside the U. S.

I will accept appointment in the following locations only: ....

I will accept short-term appointment for: ☐ 1 to 3 months; ☐ 3 to 6 months; ☑ 6 to 12 months.

Feb - 2 - 1951
(Date)

Charlotte L. Zehrung
(Signature)

STANDARD FORM 78
JULY 1949
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER M1

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CERTIFICATE OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION

(Applicant must supply information below to heavy line)
(Typewrite, or Print in Ink)

1. MR. MRS. MISS (FIRST NAME) (MIDDLE INITIAL) (LAST) Charlotte L. Zehrung
2. DATE OF BIRTH January 18, [illegible]
3. ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE
4. ADDRESS San Remo Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio
5. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman
6. DEPARTMENT OR BUREAU IN WHICH YOU ARE TO BE EMPLOYED Interior - Office of the Secretary Division of Geography
7. LOCATION Washington, D. C.
8. ARE YOU NOW EMPLOYED IN THE POSITION SHOWN IN ITEM 5? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE THE DATE OF YOUR ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT TO THIS POSITION:
9. (A) HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL DEFECT OR DISABILITY WHATSOEVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS:

(B) DOES THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZE SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY IN YOUR CASE? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(C) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED DISABILITY RETIREMENT FROM THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

Sign your name in INK as it appears on your application in the presence of the physician for purpose of identification.

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Charlotte L. Zehrung

DOCTOR: All questions on both sides of this certificate and on the lower half of the attached Health Qualification Placement Record must be answered. Before beginning the examination refer to items 9 and 10 on the Health Qualification Placement Record so that you will have knowledge of the physical requirements of the position to which the applicant is to be appointed. Sign both this certificate and the Health Qualification Placement Record.

1. HEIGHT: 5 FEET 8 INCHES WEIGHT [illegible] POUNDS
2. EYES:
(A) DISTANT VISION (SNELLEN): WITHOUT GLASSES: RIGHT 20/[illegible] LEFT 20/[illegible] WITH GLASSES, IF WORN: RIGHT 20/25 LEFT 20/30
(B) WHAT IS THE LONGEST AND SHORTEST DISTANCE AT WHICH THE FOLLOWING SPECIMEN OF JAEGER NO. 2 TYPE CAN BE READ BY THE APPLICANT? TEST EACH EYE SEPARATELY.

employees in the Federal classified service as may be required by the Civil Service Commission or its authorized representative. This order will supplement the Executive Orders of May 29 and June 18, 1924 (Executive Order, September 4, 1924).

	WITHOUT GLASSES:	WITH GLASSES, IF USED:
R.	[illegible] IN. TO [illegible] IN.	[illegible] IN. TO 28 IN.
L.	[illegible] IN. TO 22 IN.	[illegible] IN. TO 22 IN.

(C) EVIDENCE OF DISEASE OR INJURY: RIGHT [illegible] LEFT [illegible]
(D) COLOR VISION: IS COLOR VISION NORMAL WHEN ISHIHARA OR OTHER COLOR PLATE TEST IS USED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF NOT, CAN APPLICANT PASS LANTERN, YARN OR OTHER COMPARABLE TEST? ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. EARS. (CONSIDER DENOMINATORS INDICATED HERE AS NORMAL. RECORD AS NUMERATORS THE GREATEST DISTANCE HEARD) ORDINARY CONVERSATION:
RIGHT EAR 20/20 FT. LEFT EAR 20/20 FT. EVIDENCE OF DISEASE OR INJURY: RIGHT EAR [illegible] LEFT EAR [illegible]

4. NOSE	5. PARA NASAL SINUSES	6. MOUTH AND THROAT
normal	normal	normal.

7. GASTRO-INTESTINAL normal
(A) HISTORY OF PEPTIC ULCER: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," IS ULCER: ☐ ACTIVE ☐ QUIESCENT ☐ HEALED
HOW LONG? DATE OF LAST X-RAY
SYMPTOMS PRESENT, IF ANY (Severity, frequency, etc.):
TREATMENT (Use space under "Remarks" if needed):

8. METABOLIC DISORDERS (INDICATE ANY ABNORMALITY OF THE FOLLOWING GLANDS BY A CHECK IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX, AND EXPLAIN UNDER "REMARKS."):
☐ THYROID ☐ PANCREAS ☐ PITUITARY ☐ OVARIAN

9. HEART AND BLOOD VESSELS normal

(A) BLOOD PRESSURE: MM. HG SYSTOLIC [illegible] DIASTOLIC 78

(B) IS ORGANIC HEART DISEASE PRESENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(C) IF ORGANIC HEART DISEASE IS PRESENT, IS IT FULLY COMPENSATED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(D) PULSE RATE.
SITTING [illegible] IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXERCISE (UNLESS CONTRAINDICATED) [illegible]
TWO MINUTES AFTER EXERCISE [illegible] CARDIAC RESERVE Good. (GOOD, FAIR, OR POOR)

10. LUNGS:
RIGHT normal LEFT normal.
HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," HOW LONG HAS THE DISEASE BEEN ARRESTED?

IF THERE IS HISTORY OF TUBERCULOSIS, IS ANY TYPE OF COLLAPSE THERAPY BEING RECEIVED AT PRESENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES," GIVE FULL DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS." IS MEDICAL SUPERVISION NECESSARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO
(IF X-RAY IS MADE, GIVE REPORT UNDER "REMARKS.")

11. HERNIA: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," NAME VARIETY: INGUINAL, VENTRAL, FEMORAL, POST-OPERATIVE, ETC.
IF PRESENT, IS IT SUPPORTED BY A WELL-FITTING TRUSS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

12. VARICOSE VEINS: ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," STATE LOCATION AND DEGREE

13. FEET: IS FLAT FOOT PRESENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF "YES," STATE DEGREE OF IMPAIRMENT OF FUNCTION (NONE, SLIGHT, MODERATE, SEVERE)

14. DEFORMITIES, ATROPHIES, AND OTHER ABNORMALITIES, DISEASE NOT INCLUDED ABOVE
None

15. SCARS OF SERIOUS INJURY OR DISEASE None

16. NERVOUS SYSTEM: (A) INCLUDE SYMPTOMS AND FULL HISTORY OF ANY MENTAL, NERVOUS, OR EMOTIONAL ABNORMALITY (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY): none

(B) HAS APPLICANT EVER BEEN HOSPITALIZED OR TREATED FOR A MENTAL ILLNESS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(C) WHERE (NAME AND LOCATION OF HOSPITAL):

(D) DATE OR DATES OF HOSPITALIZATION:

(E) DESCRIBE ANY RESIDUALS OF PREVIOUS MENTAL OR NERVOUS ILLNESS:

(F) ANY HISTORY OF EPILEPSY OR FAINTING SPELLS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF SO, GIVE DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS" BELOW

17. EVIDENCE OR HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE. IF BLOOD SEROLOGY OR OTHER LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS ARE MADE, GIVE DETAILS UNDER "REMARKS."
None.

18. URINALYSIS (IF INDICATED):
SP. GR. ALBUMEN SUGAR
CASTS BLOOD PUS

I HAVE FOUND THE APPLICANT ABNORMAL UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

REMARKS:
Good physical condition. Normal state of health.

19. SIGNATURE OF PHYSICIAN OR EXAMINER Albert F. Kuhl

NAME TYPED OR PRINTED Albert F. Kuhl, M.D.

DATE 2/8/51

20. ADDRESS OF EXAMINING PHYSICIAN (Typed or printed)
916 Harries Bldg. Dayton 2, Ohio

21. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL DESIGNATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF YES, SPECIFY
☐ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME ☐ FEE BASIS

HEALTH QUALIFICATION PLACEMENT RECORD

(This section is comparable to Standard Form 90 promulgated March 1945 by Bureau of the Budget Circular A-24)

1. MR. MRS. MISS (FIRST NAME) (MIDDLE INITIAL) (LAST) Charlotte L. [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH January 18, 1939

3. ☐ MALE ☒ FEMALE

4. ADDRESS [illegible] Gardens, Dayton 9, Ohio

5. TITLE OF POSITION Statistical Draftsman

6. DEPARTMENT OR BUREAU IN WHICH YOU ARE TO BE EMPLOYED Interior - Office of the Secretary Division of Geography

7. LOCATION Washington, D. C.

8. ARE YOU NOW EMPLOYED IN THE POSITION SHOWN IN ITEM 5? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE THE DATE OF YOUR ORIGINAL APPOINTMENT TO THIS POSITION:

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPOINTING OFFICER: Sections 9 and 10

(A) BRIEF OUTLINE OF WHAT WORKER DOES

For the physician's use, set down in brief and simple terms what the employee does on this job, including environmental details such as stairs to climb, distance to rest-room facilities, cafeteria, work-shift, etc. (*Use Section 9 below.*)

(B) PHYSICAL DEMANDS OF THE POSITION

In Section 10 below encircle the number of those factors which are essential to the duties of the position for which this applicant is being considered. The blank spaces may be used for special factors not listed.

9. TITLE OF POSITION AND OUTLINE OF WHAT WORKER DOES IN THIS POSITION (*Advise use of dictionary of occupational titles as guide, as applicable*)

Statistical Draftsman - To assist in the performance of drafting, lettering and incidental statistical clerical work in the preparation and revision of index maps, showing the location of approved and disapproved names and the extent of features to which names apply; charts, graphs and other illustrative materials in connection with the functions of the Research Branch and for administrative purposes.

TO BE COMPLETED BY EXAMINING PHYSICIAN: Sections 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15

INSTRUCTIONS The items circled below indicate the physical requirements of the position for which this individual is being considered. Indicate the individual's physical capacities for this position by placing an X in the appropriate column opposite the numbers encircled. If the individual has any other physical limitations relating to physical requirements not encircled or not covered by this form, indicate these under "Remarks" on the reverse side. Whenever PARTIAL capacity has been indicated, explain under "Remarks," giving specific quantities.

10. PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

	CAPACITY				CAPACITY		
	FULL	PARTIAL	NONE		FULL	PARTIAL	NONE
1. OUTSIDE				18. WORKING AROUND MACHINERY WITH MOVING PARTS			
2. OUTSIDE AND INSIDE				19. MOVING OBJECTS OR VEHICLES			
3. EXCESSIVE HEAT				20. WORKING ON LADDERS OR SCAFFOLDING			
4. EXCESSIVE COLD				21. WORKING BELOW GROUND			
5. EXCESSIVE HUMIDITY				22. UNUSUAL FATIGUE FACTORS (*Specify*)			
6. EXCESSIVE DAMPNESS OR CHILLING							
7. DRY ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS				23. WORKING WITH HANDS IN WATER			
8. EXCESSIVE NOISE, INTERMITTENT				24. EXPLOSIVES			
9. CONSTANT NOISE				25. VIBRATION			
10. DUST				26. WORKING CLOSELY WITH OTHERS			
11. SILICA, ASBESTOS, ETC.				27. WORKS ALONE			
12. FUMES, SMOKE, OR GASES				28. PROTRACTED OR IRREGULAR HOURS OF WORK			
13. SOLVENTS (*Degreasing agents*)				29. SPECIAL FACTORS (*Specify*)			
14. GREASES AND OILS							
15. RADIANT ENERGY				30.			
16. ELECTRICAL ENERGY				31.			
17. SLIPPERY OR UNEVEN WALKING SURFACES				32.			

STANDARD FORM 57—NOV 1947
U S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

AP..ICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYME..

INSTRUCTIONS In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

ANNOUNCEMENT U180
APPLICATION NO 306603

1 NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Statistical Draftsman

2 OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3 PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): Washington, D.C

4 DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: Feb. 16, 1950

5 ~~MR~~ MRS MISS (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): Charlotte Louise Zehrung

6 (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R D. NUMBER: San Rae Gardens RR 11

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Dayton 9, Ohio

7 LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Ohio

8 (A) OFFICE PHONE:

(B) HOME PHONE:

9 DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): January 12 1929

10. ☐ MARRIED ☑ SINGLE

11 PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U S, name city and country): Dayton, Ohio

12 ☐ MALE ☑ FEMALE

13 (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 8 INCHES (B) WEIGHT: 132 POUNDS

14 (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR ☐ NON APPOR

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER:

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
GS-1232	3	87	☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
"	2	94	☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE 5-18-50				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ [illegible] PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☑ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS. STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

CONTINUED

②

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June '43 TO Sept '44

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton, Ohio - San Rae Gardens

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Co-owner - Ray F McKechnie

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Ray F McKechnie
San Rae Gardens - Dayton O

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Gift shop

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR LEAVING return to school

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
clerked in store
in charge of books

③

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June '42 TO Sept. '42

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Dayton, Ohio Frigidaire

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)
Frigidaire - Dayton O.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) manufacture of Frigidaires

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU none

REASON FOR LEAVING return to school

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK
worked on assembly line
worked in office of chemical laboratory

④

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

00023 MAY 10 50

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1950
U.S.C.S.

2601-16th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
May 9, 1950.

U.S. Civil Service Commission
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I sent in material for the unassembled exam for a Statistical Draftsman, the announcement number of which is 130.

I have moved since the date I sent in my paper. Would you please make the necessary changes so I will receive notice of my [illegible] at my new address.

My old address was:
#722
2601 - 16th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Ch. address

My new address is:
San Rae Gardens
Dayton 7, Ohio R.R. #11

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Charlotte L. Zehrung

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

RATING SHEET—RATING PROCEDURE NO. III

(Handbook X-105)

NAME OF APPLICANT Charlotte L. Zebruno	PREFERENCE ☐ 5-PT. ☐ 10-PT. ☐ NONE	APPLICATION NO.

POSITION TITLE GS-1533 Statistical Draftsman		POSITION TITLE do	
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. U-130	QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE GRADE GS-3	ANNOUNCEMENT NO.	QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE GRADE GS-2
BASIC RATING	85	BASIC RATING	90
ADDITIONAL POINTS	2	ADDITIONAL POINTS	4
EARNED RATING	87	EARNED RATING	94
VETERANS' PREFERENCE		VETERANS' PREFERENCE	
FINAL RATING		FINAL RATING	
EXAMINER RMK	DATE 5-18-50	EXAMINER RMK	DATE 5-18-50
REVIEWER	DATE	REVIEWER	DATE

COMMENTS:

POSITION TITLE		POSITION TITLE	
ANNOUNCEMENT NO.	QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE GRADE	ANNOUNCEMENT NO.	QUALIFYING EXPERIENCE GRADE
BASIC RATING		BASIC RATING	
ADDITIONAL POINTS		ADDITIONAL POINTS	
EARNED RATING		EARNED RATING	
VETERANS' PREFERENCE		VETERANS' PREFERENCE	
FINAL RATING		FINAL RATING	
EXAMINER	DATE	EXAMINER	DATE
REVIEWER	DATE	REVIEWER	DATE

COMMENTS

CSC FORM 4909
MAY 19

Education to be Substituted for Experience

High School

2 years	Mechanical Drawing
2 years	Art
1½ years	Algebra
1 year	Geometry
½ year	Trigonometry

College

1 year	4 credit hrs. from war Experience in (Army)
1 year	6 credit hrs. Statistics 3 hrs./week lecture 1½ hrs./week laboratory

Form 13
February 1946

Form approved
Budget Bureau Number 50-R050

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PROOF OF RESIDENCE

Applications for appointment in the apportioned departmental service must be accompanied by a certificate showing legal or voting residence in the State or Territory claimed for at least one year next preceding the date of making application. Therefore, if you desire employment in the apportioned departmental service the following questions must be answered, and the Jurat and Officer's Certificate of Residence below must be executed. Failure to submit this form, properly executed, with your application may result in loss of consideration for appointment in the apportioned service. Applicants who now hold permanent positions in the apportioned departmental service are not required to have the Officer's Certificate of Residence executed but should write on it "Am in the apportioned service."

1. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last) Mr. Mrs. Miss Zehrung Charlotte L.
2. Name of examination: Statistical Draftsman
3. Street and number, or Rural R. D. number: 2601 16th St. N.W. #725
4. Option (if any):
Post office (including postal zone) and State: Washington, D.C.
5. Place and date of written examination (if any):

6. (a) In what State or Territory do you have— Legal residence Ohio or Voting residence ....
(b) Length of such residence in State or Territory: From Jan 19 29 to Feb. 19 50 (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)
(c) In what county do you have— Legal residence Montgomery or Voting residence ....
(d) Length of such residence in county: From Jan 19 29 to Feb. 19 50 (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

7. If during the past year you have not resided continuously in the State or Territory in which you claim legal or voting residence, or are not now actually living in such State or Territory, indicate in the following blanks the dates of absences, and locations and occupations during such absences:

(a) Date left (Month, Year)	(b) Date returned (Month, Year)	(c) Location during absence (City and State)	(d) Occupation
Sept. '49	Dec. '49	Syracuse, N.Y.	student
Jan. '50		Washington, D.C.	typist bookkeeper

8. If you are under 21 years of age, fill in the following blanks:
(a) Legal residence of parent or guardian: State .... Is he a voter in that State? ☐ Yes ☐ No County ....
(b) Length of such residence: From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.) From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)
(c) Present post office address of parent or guardian: City or town .... County .... State ....

9. If you are a married woman, fill in the following blanks:
(a) Date of marriage
(b) Legal residence of husband: State .... Is he a voter in that State? ☐ Yes ☐ No County ....
(c) Length of such residence: From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.) From .... 19.... to .... 19.... (Month) (Yr.) (Month) (Yr.)

JURAT (OR OATH)

This jurat (or oath) must be executed before a notary public, the secretary of a United States civil service board of examiners, or other officer authorized to administer oaths for general purposes before whom the applicant must appear in person.

I, the undersigned, DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) that the statements made by me in answer to the foregoing questions are full and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

If female, prefix "Miss" or "Mrs." and if married, use your own given name, as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe."

Signature of applicant Charlotte L. Zehrung
(Sign your name in full as given on reverse side, prefixing Miss or Mrs., and printed)

Sworn to before me according to law by the above-named applicant this [illegible] day of Feb. 1950
at [illegible] county of .... and State (or Territory) of ....

NOTARY PUBLIC
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MARCH 31, 1954

(Signature of officer)

(Official title)

OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCE

Instructions.—If the applicant's claim is based on legal residence, the certificate must be executed by a notary public, county, municipal, or police court clerk, mayor, justice of the peace, or other officer in the county or city in which the applicant claims residence. If the claim is based on voting residence alone, the certificate must be executed by the registrar of voters or other officer of the Board of Elections. In either case the officer must be an actual resident and officer in the city or county claimed by the applicant, and the certificate must bear his official seal, or, in lieu thereof, certification of his official character by the proper officer under official seal.

The applicant is not required to appear in person before the officer who executes this certificate, but the officer should satisfy himself from credible and competent evidence as to facts to which he certifies.

I, a Notary of the county of Montgomery and State (or Territory) of Ohio
(Official designation of Officer)
do hereby certify that Charlotte L. Zehrung the applicant who executed the above in connection with a civil service examination,
(Write name to agree exactly with applicant's name as given above)
is now a Legal resident of the county of Montgomery and State (or Territory)
(Specify whether "legal," "voting," or "legal and voting")
of Ohio and has been such resident for 21 years 1 months next preceding the date hereof.
Dated at West Carrollton county of Montgomery and State (or Territory)
of Ohio this 14th day of February 1950

[OFFICIAL SEAL]
My commission expires July-19-1952

Clarence H. Bloss,
(Signature of officer)

The Official seal must not be omitted. If erasure or correction is made in the "Officer's Certificate," certification must be made on margin by the officer who executes the certificate, showing such correction.

Index Numbers of Retail Cost of all Foods and of Four Selected Commodities 1923 - 1940

FORM 1



Charlotte L. Zehrung
2401 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 12, 1939
Statistical Draftsman
#130

FIGURE 1

Charlotte L. Zhering
2601 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan. 12, 1929

Statistical Draftsman
#130

INDEX OF WEEKLY EARNINGS BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR COST OF LIVING



TREND LINE FOR INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF MINERALS 1919-1940



[illegible]
2601 [illegible] St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan [illegible], 1924
Statistical [illegible]
#1.50

x = 6 mo.
origin 1929-1930.

Change in Population of United States and Rhode Island - 1790-1940



Scatter Diagram of Relationship Between Value of Land X and Y

FORM 1



[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Frequency Distribution of Batting Records of 157 Regular American and National Leagues, [illegible]



[illegible]

Cumulative Distribution of Hourly Rate / Wages of
%'s of Union Motor Truck Drivers - June 1, 1940

FORM I

A Less than Cumulative Distribution


Charlotte [illegible]
2601 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 10, 1929
Statistics [illegible]
#130

Cumulative Distribution of Batting Averages 1940 of American and National Leagues - 151 Regular Players Receiving Stated Average or Less Than.

Charlotte L. [illegible]
2601-16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Jan 12, [illegible]
Statistical Draftsman
130



Population of Continental United States and Rhode Island ( ), 1790-1940

FORM 1



[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] D.C.
[illegible] 14, [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION	CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service)	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU		REASON FOR LEAVING	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed):

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF

☑ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☑ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☑ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Syracuse University Syracuse, N.Y.	Economics	Sept '46	Jan '50			BA	Jan '50	112
Univ. of Guatemala	Span.	June '49	July '49					5

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS — SEMESTER HOURS — LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS — SEMESTER HOURS

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of schools) OR IN SERVICE TRAINING IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
Spanish		✓			✓			✓	
French			✓						

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

Mexico - 1mo. - recreation

Guatemala - 2mo. - education

21 LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

calculator

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 55 SHORTHAND

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, C.P.A., etc.)?

☐ YES ☐ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

24 REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Mr Harry Schwartz	113 Ramsey Ave Syracuse City	teacher
2.	Miss Theodosia Moran	Cazanovia N.Y. RD #2	teacher
3.	Mr. Herbert Hauldeman	11 Winding Way, Dayton, O	Personnel Frigidaire

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?		
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A. OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
28 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		✓
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		✓
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30 SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation, (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		✓
33 HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		✓
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		✓
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		✓
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address, (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		✓

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**; attach *Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14*, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming *disability preference*, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. *Preference* will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?		✓
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?		
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL TIME BASIS WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?		

(D)	DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
	BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO (*If none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).

	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		✓
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		✓
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		✓

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: Title:

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*)

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Charles L. [illegible]

(Sign your name in INK (one given name, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if married use your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—O-69297 15

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: KARTY, FLORYAN R.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 10 July 1951 - 9 Feb 1972

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

KARTY, FLORYAN R. 009274

Personnel Actions
After Mexico City Assignment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

XXF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 11 SEPTEMBER 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009274 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) [redacted] ✓ CHRTYI F R.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 09 / DAY 15 / YEAR 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1135-5700-1000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO, MEXICO STATION CITY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO, city MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 418	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 9990 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/WH/400/MEXICO STATION

Recorded by
CSPD

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS	DATE SIGNED 9/12/63	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Charles Moz Dwight M. Collins	DATE SIGNED 13 Sep 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 5140	ALPHABETIC WH	22. STATION CODE 45075	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] CODE 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 01 06 12	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION W. Kearney 9/18/63	46. O.P. APPROVAL Emmett D. Echols	DATE APPROVED 17 Sep 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXB

DATE PREPARED: 17 JULY 1963

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009274
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] CARTY, F R.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 09 YEAR 63
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4135-5700-1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO City, MEXICO STATION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO City, MEXICO
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 400
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~9475~~ 9790

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDP/FE/2120/BANGKOK STATION/OPERATIONS BRANCH Tray 27

1 COPY TO FINANCE DIVISION AND OFFICE OF SECURITY

Recorded by CSPD EJP

[redacted]:

[redacted]

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/WH/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 7/8/63

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Don Collins — DATE SIGNED: 23 July 63

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. REGISTRY CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	64707	WH	45015		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAREER-RES PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE 3; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 02
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: D Keenan 07/25/63

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Joseph B. Kagan — DATE APPROVED: 23 July 63

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

Jo Cem Jiv

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Kartz, Floryan	Wife - Germaine	63-097

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 23 Nov 62. Ruptured muscle.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
3 MAY 1963	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-63 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-13)

Personnel Actions
prior to Mexico City
Assignment

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF CREDITABLE SERVICE
[FOR LEAVE PURPOSES]

PREPARE IN ORIGINAL FROM STANDARD FORM NO. 144 AND FORWARD TO FINANCE OFFICE.

NAME (Last First, Middle)
[redacted] (P)

2 mar 63

POSITION
Gr-4b

OFFICE (and Division)
DDP/WH

SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE:
24 Dec 1948

2 Marvh 1963
SIGNATURE DATE

JOHN L. BISCHOFF, Chief/SCAPS
CHIEF, TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH

FORM NO. 37-157
1 MAR 54

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

ORIGINAL Biographic Profile

(sanitized version in file)

24

Personnel Actions After
Mexico City Assignment

WH

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] KARTY, FLORYAN R.	009274	51 700	CF	GS 12 3	$10,105	$10,640

POSTED ON
OF-4D
8 JAN 1964

WH

1. Serial No	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
009274	KARTY, FLORYAN R. [redacted]	64 700 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$ 9,790	11/25/62	GS 12	3	$10,105	11/24/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED ON
NOV

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 7 Oct 1963

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DLS: 13 ~~XX~~ SEPT 63

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCB

1. SERIAL NUMBER 009274	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [redacted] KARTY, FLORYAN R.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 09 15 63	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4135 5700 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/WH BRANCH 3 MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION MEXICO CITY, MEXICO		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0418	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 9790

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
OF-45

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	51400	WH	45075		3	01 06 12		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/24/63 JK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 19 SEP

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MHC: 31 JULY 63

OCB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 009274

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] KARTY, ELCKYAN R.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 09 YR 63

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4135 5700 1000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP WH
BRANCH 3
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO STATION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0400

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 9790

18. REMARKS:

POSTED [illegible]
[illegible]-31-[illegible] AUG 1963

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA.	YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR.
37	10	64700	WH	45075		3	01	06	12						

28. NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO	DA	YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP DATE MO	DA.	YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO	DA	YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

C.D.ECHOLS

POSTED
08/02/63

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

31 JUL 1963

[illegible]

(When Filled In)

A. Fitness Reports covering period after Mexico City Assignment

B. Personnel Actions for period prior to Mexico City Assignment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

pm

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 009274

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted] [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1912	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/1		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: December 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Jan 1964 - 22 November 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Case Officer for Soviet access agents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyst work, preparing Soviet personality reports. ✓	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Transcription into English of Russian technical product, and preparation of interpretative renditions of same when necessary.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
2 Jan 65

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S ✓

7 JAN 1965

FORM 8-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable. As explained in the previous fitness report, Subject was assigned to the Station for the purpose of taking charge of the Station's joint telephone tap center, a position for which he was and is eminently qualified by reason of extensive experience and outstanding language qualifications. However, this position did not materialize because of circumstances beyond the control of Subject and the Station.

It was therefore subsequently decided to train Subject locally, and have him gradually assume case officer and analyst responsibilities in certain simpler aspects of the Station's Soviet program.

Given the circumstances that Subject had not had prior case officer or analytical experience (or even any substantial past exposure to operations to give him vicarious experience) he progressed more than adequately in absorbing the training offered, in assuming responsibility for two Soviet operations and in the preparation of analytical studies on the Soviet complement. Given the further circumstances that the Station did not have the time to train him more than superficially, and that the operations he handled were basically uncomplicated, it must be stated that Subject cannot now be considered to be a case officer.

This conscientious and intelligent officer has high interest and enthusiasm for operations, but it is believed that his forte and future lies in the management of technical operations. This has been recognized also by Headquarters in the assignment presently planned for him.

As a staff agent under tourist cover, he and his family adapted themselves remarkably well to the deep cover situation and to all other environmental factors.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 23 November 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 November 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE s/ Herbert Manell
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 23 November 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE s/ Winston M. Scott

SECRET

14-00000

96

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
009274

SECTION A EARINY, [illegible] R. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 6 Jan 1912	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WH 3		8. CURRENT STATION Mexico City	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
28 February 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
6 August 1963 - 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Translation of Russian and Spanish materials.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
[illegible]

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

14 FEB 1964

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

OFFICE OF ... MAIL ROOM FEB 13 1 26 PM '64

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

From the time of Subject's arrival in Mexico and through 31 December 1963, he was utilized principally in translation work and was held on tap for the position of heading up the Station's joint telephone tap center. Circumstances beyond the control of the Station and Subject are responsible for the fact that the incumbent in charge of the center will continue these duties and Subject will be given other responsibilities.

Primarily, Subject will be trained to handle analyst and case officer responsibilities in the Soviet field. The level and range of the responsibilities will depend on the progress Subject makes in handling these duties in a manner satisfactory to the Station.

Subject is most conscientious and effective in every assignment given him to date, and the Station is extremely pleased to have him available as an outside Station asset. He is enthusiastic about all his work, including certain part-time routine and arduous duties, and he looks forward with confidence to the prospect of becoming a case officer. Although it is premature to state positively that Subject will succeed as a case officer, the supervisor believes that Subject will undoubtedly progress adequately.

Subject and his family have acclimated themselves excellently to the deep cover situation, faster than most of the Station's other staff agents, and certainly with fewer problems and requests for guidance from the Station's staff.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 ... 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Operations Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Herbert Manell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 29 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /S/ Winston M. Scott

SECRET

Pre 1961 Fitness Reports and other personnel documents

OLC 78-1069/1

15 Mar 78

DEVUONO, Irving C.

SECRET

-E/NUMBER/VOLUME: Lynch, Grayston L.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 17 Nov 1960 - 5 Aug 1971

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to Davis FOIA / and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-63 Hqs., x7941, as of 4-4-78.

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)

Lynch, Grayston L.

Male 14 Jan 23

MARITAL STATUS	NO. DEPENDENTS		NATIONALITY	
Married	2	1938, 1944	U.S.	April 71

DATE OF LATEST SECURITY OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	
14 Feb 1961	PM Ops Officer

CONTRACT CATEGORY	EFFECTIVE DATE	EXPIRATION DATE	SALARY	
Career Agent	1 Jun 1961	Indefinite	$23,591	GS 14/5 HJESEL

BENEFITS

SOCIAL SECURITY	X
FECA-DEATH AND DISABILITY	X
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY	X
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X
OTHER (EXPLAIN) Home Leave, R&R	

USAFI 2 year College equivalent

PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
Oct 38 - Oct 60	U.S. Army	World wide	Special Forces, Captain	

CIA TRAINING

1970 Secret writing 101 & 102	1970 Police Orient.
1970 CI Survey	1970 IDENTIKIT
1970 CS Radio 101	1970 CS Records I
1970 Intro to Intell	1970 Photo 101
1970 IRRR	
1970 Audio 101	

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION			
Feb 1961	PM Ops Officer	A	Hq.	JMARC		
Jun 1961	"	CA	JMWAVE	JMATE		13
1967	"	CA	"			14
Jul 1969	Maritime Ops Off	CA	Hqs	HJESEL		14

SECRET

A. PRESENT COVER IS ☒ OFFICIAL ☐ NONOFFICIAL

CURRENT EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY

good

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS COVER LIFE

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NONOFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)

JMWAVE

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

Currently under medical hold and not qualified for overseas PCS or TDY

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

To remain at Headquarters until medical problem corrected

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

SCD: ? 10/

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) DEVHONO, Irvine C. (P)	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Jun 1923	5. CONSECUTIVE COMP. DATE ?
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Excluding employee) NO. 3	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1938 1949 1956	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE ?
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Ineligible	10. LATEST APP. May 1961	EVAL. FOR Prop Assign EVAL. FOR Prop Assign
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE/SERVICE	GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA (DATE)	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. (DATE) TO BE DEFERRED (DATE)	RETIRED XX
12. ASSESSMENT DATE	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-60 Military Service, US Army, Capt - Special forces operations;
Instructor at 7th Army NCO School for 3 years
1956-60 Commanded & Trained an SF team in guerilla warfare

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - S Slight
French - S Slight
Laotian - S Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE - OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	TO	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (IF ANY)	LOCATION
Feb 1961	ParaMil (Contr Employee)	$ 9500		DDP/WH/JMARC	Hq
Jun 1961	PM Off (Career Agent)	11155	GS13	DDP/CA/PMG/ProjZRJSWEL	JMWAVE
Aug 1967	" " " "	16152	14	" " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 19 Sep 1967	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc	22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE	No

FORM 8-64 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
[illegible], Irving C. (P)

DATE OF BIRTH
Jun 1923

23.
No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Award 1964 Intelligence Star and Intelligence Star Certificate for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in Spring 1961.

27. DATE REVIEWED
19 Sep 1967

28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
hc

FORM NO. 1 FEB 61 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1080 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET

PROFILE (4)

SECRET

15 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report for Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

Although Mr. Lynch is assigned to the Maritime Branch for administrative purposes, he was in training during the entire period covered by subject fitness report. Therefore, an evaluation of his performance by Maritime Branch would be unrealistic.

D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
[redacted]

2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 23

3. SEX M

4. GRADE Equiv GS-14

5. SD Career Agent

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG

8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 11 July 1957 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency, commando team.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Uses Agents assigned him for collection of information on illegal activities of local Cuban refugees.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During most of the period reported on, Subject was concerned with administrative problems associated with the phase-out of the Station. Despite the consequent operational lull, Subject continued to maintain a satisfactory degree of morale in agents assigned him, worked up and implemented realistic training programs, and continued to develop excellent targets studies against the possibility of a policy change. In addition, important information collected locally by Subject on illegal activities of Cuban refugees was of great interest to other agencies offices in the area. Subject was the only Station source of such information which was acquired only because of Subject's ability to maintain rapport with agents, terminated during the period because of the cutback in infiltration operations.

It could also be noted as Subject finishes his long tour at this Station and prepares for his next assignment, that he is a thoroughly professional intelligence officer and is, in many ways, an outstanding one. Technically, he is an expert on infiltration tactics and, through his Special Forces experience, an expert on anti-guerrilla warfare as well. Just as important, is his ability to gain respect and rapport with foreign agents. He has an imaginative approach to operations, is resourceful in devising tactics, and determined in carrying out his assignments. He is a definite asset to WOFIRM.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 April 68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Branch Chief, Special Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.) John Hannon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's comments and overall evaluation of Subject's performance. Please see Subject's previous Fitness Reports for additional remarks on Subject's performance by this Reviewing Officer.

DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station/ Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] Robert Moore

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUONO, Irving C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 23
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-13
5. SD: Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Career Agent
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION:

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1967 - 10 July 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for the 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper. During the period under review, Subject has continued to produce at his previous high level and he has planned and executed three intelligence collection operations against a denied area with the two teams under his supervision and direction. His leadership qualities have, to a large degree, enabled him to maintain his commando group morale at a high level under the difficult circumstances of enforced inactivity. Subject's indigenous agents respect him and are willing to follow his instructions to the letter. Subject's seemingly limitless resourcefulness, drive and initiative coupled with his demonstrated proficiency for this type of work mark him as one of the few persons known to the Rater who is ideally suited to this particular type of agent handling on a day-to-day, face-to-face basis.

During the reporting period Subject has committed his four infiltration boat teams on a total of seven operations and excellent results have been realized. He has conducted extensive testing of equipment and techniques in support of Station requirements and Headquarters requests. His reporting after these field tests has shown that his reporting ability has improved to such a degree to warrant a rating of strong in this duty.

He is cost and security conscious and has demonstrated his effectiveness in the use of personnel, equipment and operational funds. Subject has not had the benefit of formal language training and does not have a definitive language capability. In view of his long tenure of field assignments during his career with WOFACT, it is recommended he be given

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 June 1967	Irving C. DEVUONO signed in pseudo on fld. transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
6 Months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
28 June 1967	Deputy Chief, SO Branch	John F. Mursaneon signed in pseud fld. trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject continues to show professional ability in handling the Commando Group. In addition he has been deeply involved in planning and executing intelligence gathering operations. He has adapted to this new field and is performing overall in an outstanding manner.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
July 3, 1967	Chief, Special Operations Branch	George B. Frencham signed in Pse. fld. trans.

SECRET

14-00000

Continuation of Section C/Narrative Comments

serious consideration for formal training and orientation prior to his next assignment within WOFACT.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~Contract~~ Career Agent

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Agent	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/[illegible]/COG		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 25 Field Agents and two WOFACT personnel engaged in Special Operations missions. The Agents comprise crews of 4 SO Infiltration Craft, 2 SO Infiltration Teams, and a Special Alert Team. These Agents perform overwater infiltration, exfiltration,	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 and caching operations into a denied area (PBRUMEN). Supervises the training of 25 Field Agents in operation of small craft and all related activities, PM operational techniques and tradecraft.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational plans and programs for specific SO Operations. Tests and evaluates new equipment and techniques for possible use by SO Branch or other Station activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administers all personnel and administrative matters for 25 Field Agents. Handles real estate, subsistence and logistics for 25 Field Agents.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period of this report Subject has continued to show an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of the Field Agents under his control. He has continued to maintain the morale of his agents and to keep them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and executing outstanding operations in the field of reconnaissance, deception, and Special Operations Teams. During the last four months he has also had the responsibility of forming and training three additional Infiltration Craft Crews. Subject formed two Special Operations Infiltration/Exfiltration Teams and conducted one infil/exfil operation into PBRUMEN. Subject has remained active in testing new equipment and techniques for possible use by the Station. Subject has an excellent concept of Special Operations-PM techniques and acts as advisor to Chief of Special Operations Branch on PM type activities in Special Operations. Subject continues to provide reports on exile activities in all areas and is constantly pushing his Agents in this field. He is a hard worker and is a capable administrator and supervisor. He knows his job, does not need close supervision and has shown ability to branch out into other fields of WOFACT activities. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 Dec. 1966	/s/ Irving C. DUVUONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18 Months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
1 December 1966	Chief, Special Operations Branch	/s/ George D. French, Jr. (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer has been closely associated with Subject during the entire period of his assignment to this Station and concurs in the Rating Officer's evaluation of Subject's handling of specific duties as well as the narrative comments. As a result of this close personal contact with Subject and observation of his day-to-day handling of operational situations, the Reviewing Officer considers Subject to be one of the most capable and well qualified senior special operations officers at this Station. Please see Subject's three previous Fitness Reports for additional comments on Subject's performance at this Station.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 March 1967	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Robert B. Moore (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: Career Agent

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVUCHC	(First) Irving	(Middle) C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv. GS-13
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE

5. SD

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 01 July 1965 - 31 Dec 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Indigenous Commando Group.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the group at a proficient level in weapons, tactics, pre-strike rehearsals and related activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for infiltrations/exfiltrations, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Reporting to include operational, contact and monthly reports, and other required correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Case Officer for one FI Reporting Agent to include handling, reporting and guidance of Agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has been under my supervision for approximately 6 months. During this period he has shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of his Commando Group. He is responsible for the logistical support, maintenance, planning and operations of the group and must also maintain their motivation and moral. As a result of the stand-down in PM activities at this Station, one of his major duties has been keeping his group motivated and happy. Subject has performed these tasks in a very professional manner; he has shown strong leadership qualities and a definite ability to adapt to difficult and frustrating changes in the operational climate. Subject has had the additional duty of handling an FI Agent for the Station. He has spent long hours on this activity and has shown that he is fully capable of broadening his scope of activities to other fields besides the supervision of a commando group. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 February 1966	/s/ Irving C. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6 Months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 Feb. 1966	Chief, Special Operations Branch	/s/ Hugh R. DENDY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 February 1966	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

This is the third Fitness Report prepared on Subject since his assignment to this Station. The comments set forth on the two previous Fitness Reports by the Reviewing Officer and the Chief of Station are in the main still applicable. The Reviewing Officer has been most favorably impressed with Subject's performance in his present position. Subject has continued to perform his job in his usual competent, dependable and professional manner. The Reviewing Officer shares the Rating Officer's high opinion of Subject's performance and there is no doubt that Subject has contributed significantly to the Station's activities. Subject's over-all performance continues to warrant an evaluation of Strong.

Deputy Chief of Station

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUONO, Irving C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 08-14-23
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE:
5. SD:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT:
8. CURRENT STATION: JMWAVE
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 01 October 1963 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 40 man Indigenous Commando Group	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops operational concepts for in/exfiltration, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the group.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to demonstrate a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. Subject officer is loyal and security minded. He is resourceful, acts with initiative and delegates responsibility. He is cost conscious. Subject is capable of handling larger units of indigenous commandos. He thinks clearly and is a versatile individual in the PM field.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Irving C. DEVUONO /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		Stanley R. ZAMKA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
JUN 25 1965	**Deputy Chief of Station**	Frederick J. [illegible]HURST

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's performance based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, detailed examination of Subject's operational plans, general observation of Subject during the past four years and a first hand knowledge of the results of operations conducted under Subject's guidance. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated officer who has a knack for getting things done in the operational field. Subject is exceptionally well qualified for the job he is doing. Additionally, Subject has a flair for getting along with the members of the Commando Group without losing objectivity. Subject's operational planning is sound and complete in all details. Subject is completely self-sufficient in operational command and agent relationship situations. Subject's performance at this Station clearly warrants an over-all evaluation of Strong.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
DZ7JOKO	Irving	G.	14 June 1923	M	Contract	

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐ RESERVE	☐ TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
☒	SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☒	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 May 1962 to 30 September 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 30-man Commando Group and supervises the Group's implementation of operations which includes pre-strike rehearsals and briefings and organization of logistical support.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the Group at a proficient level in all weapons, tactics, and related PM activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for raids and caching operations and prepares operational plans and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the Group.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

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SECRET

SECRET

SECTION C

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has shown a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. He is resourceful, acts with initiative, and delegates responsibility. In his field he thinks clearly and is decisive and versatile in his actions. He is capable of handling larger units of personnel and assuming greater responsibility in the PM field. If he were required to accept duties of a broader nature in the intelligence field involving less supervision of his own activities, he would need to improve in the areas of written and oral expression and in his understanding of KUBARK requirements and responsibilities. In this regard he would need additional training and exposure to more extensive KUBARK fields as he has not had the opportunity for participating in such KUBARK activities. Subject does not have the proficiency of the language used.

SECTION D

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
26 Nov. 1963	/s/ Irving G. DEWUONO (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
17		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
26 Nov. 1963	C/PM Br., JMWAVE	/s/ Stanley R. ZAMKA (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Nov. 1963	Chief of Station	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

Continuation of FITNESS REPORT, Section D:

Subject is a well-qualified para-military specialist, who has fully mastered the tools of his trade. Subject applies all of his para-military knowledge in the performance of his current duties as the senior outside case officer for a thirty-man commando group, which is capable of carrying out a variety of different missions. These missions include caching operations, sabotage raids, tactical intelligence reconnaissance activities and contingency missions related to war plans. Subject is at his best in dealing with men and military equipment. Subject's major weakness is in records management and reports writing. Despite this minor weakness, Subject's over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Proficient.

Subject has the potential to train and operationally exploit para-military forces in units which have a T/O strength of not more than 60 men. Subject could command a conventional military formation at the battalion level. Subject is capable of mounting counter-insurgency operations with the use of forces up to battalion strength.

Subject's work comes to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

Subject's future assignments should be in the para-military field. If Subject is to remain in operations in Latin America, he must be given an opportunity to study Spanish on a formal basis.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUONO (P) IRVING C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH:
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE:
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: JMWAVE
8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	STAFFED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	WAIVED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify): At the request of C/CA/PM per UFGW-783

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Aug 61 - April 62

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develop and control a 22-man commando team.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan and mount commando operations.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Administer and provide records for the support of a 22-man commando team.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 3-4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (✓) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS				X			
THINKS CLEARLY				X			
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):				X			

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

As a former military officer, Subject is hard working and abundantly sincere in his efforts to fight Communism. His performance since Aug 1961 has not been at the top level of his capabilities for several reasons, not all of which are within his ability to overcome. Subject has had little clandestine training, and is therefore not always able to comprehend the intangible factors which prevent, delay and cancel operations. A further reason is the absence of military law as a basis for discipline for his men. Still another reason is the directive for only limited action with which he has had to live since August. This is merely to say that in a period of policy formation when the action forces have had to be held in limbo, he has not been at his best.

Subject's dealings with his agents have in turn been affected by his own frustrations. His inability to rationalize situations has resulted in obtuse explanations to them which have made them harder to handle. His reluctance to put things on paper has detracted from his performance and denied him the clarifying process which reporting provides. His security consciousness has been similarly affected by his frustrations.

Subject is in need of training in tradecraft and PM operations. His basic qualifications for PM Case Officer work are such that he can, with training, do a much better job. This combined with a program of concentrated action would undoubtedly bring out the best in him, which should be of real value to the Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 1 MAY 62	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

OTHER (Specify):

DATE 9 MAY 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/PM	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE NORMAN D. KIGGINS

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 10 May 62	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS/JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible]

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 16 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: [illegible], Irving C. Staff or Division: TFW
Last First MI

b. Date and place of birth: 14 June 1923 Galveston, Texas

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents:

Wife	39
Daughter	15
Son	11
Son	8

e. Citizenship of agent: U.S.A.

(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:

h. Military service

(1) Country served and years: U.S.A. 22

(2) Branch of service and rank: U. S. Army Captain

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:

See (h)

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
English	Native	Native	Native
German	Elementary	Elementary	Elementary
French	Elementary	Elementary	Elementary

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

n. Security clearance number: 189184

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: 10 Feb. 1961

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

No unusual provisions

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: 1 June 1961

r: Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
4 mos.	Commercial	FI Training	[illegible]		$9500 pa

S-E-C-R-E-T

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last First Middle): LYNCH, Grayson L
2. AGE: 37
3. SEX: ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 6'½"
5. WEIGHT: 194
6. COLOR OF EYES:
7. COLOR OF HAIR:
8. TYPE COMPLEXION:
9. TYPE BUILD:
10. SCARS (Type and Location):
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES:
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country):
533 Circle Terrace
Fayetteville, N. C.
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.:
Victoria, Texas
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.:
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.:
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Victoria, Texas
17. NICKNAMES:
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED:
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)
☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

SECTION III — CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jan. 1923	2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Gilmer, Texas	3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country) U. S.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: XX BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):
5. DATE NATURALIZED:
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.:
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE:
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country):
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES XX NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY:
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY:
12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS:
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.:
16. PORT OF ENTRY:
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY:
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue):
19. DATE VISA ISSUED:

SECTION IV — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
X	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
X	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: USAFI
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1946
4. GRADUATE: X YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
USAFI			1947	1948			2 yrs

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
The Armored Schpol, Ft. Knox, Ky.		1952	1953	
Special Warfare School, Ft. Bragg, N. C.,	Spec. Forces Off. Trng		1956	

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French													X	X	X				
German													X	X	X				
Lao															X				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
England							
France							
Germany							
Belgium							
Japan, Korea, & South East Asia							

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Military Service

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)

2. SHORTHAND (wpm)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

Radio Operator, CW 10 wpm

Parachutist

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Public Speaking USIA- Germany 1954 - 1956.
U. S. Army 1956-60

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *(LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.*

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)*: Sept. 56 - 31 Oct. 60

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U. S. Army

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*: Ft. Bragg, N. C. 7th Special Forces Group (Abn)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Special Forces Operations

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:

6. TITLE OF JOB: Air Ops Off & Team leader

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*:

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare including trng in all weapons, american and foreing; demolation & sabotage, Escape *&evasion, Guerill & anit guerilla tacticts, Spiy and adm, medical. Intensive study of selected target areas including language, Political & Economic & military situations. One yr. study of So East Asia with particular attn paid guerilla warfare ops. Conducted trng in radio commo work, air re supply & infiltration of denied areas 25% or trng classified Team leader on 6 month classified mission in So. East Asia

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

REASON FOR LEAVING: Retirement

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

14-00000

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Sept. 53 - Sept. 56
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U.S. ARMY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 7th Army [illegible]CO Acadamy, Munich Germany
4. KIND OF BUSINESS:
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB: Instructor
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Instructed in tactics, weapons, leadership & engineering equip.
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING:

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Oct. 51-Sept. 53
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U. S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Ft. Huaton Texas, Reception Center
4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Company Commander
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB:
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING:

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): Sept. 50 - Oct. 51
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U.S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Korea, 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, 2nd Infantry Div.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS:
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB: 2nd Lt.- Platoon Leader
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING:

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.): June 48 - Sept. 50
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY: U. S. Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): Ft. Hood Texas, 2nd Armored Div.
4. KIND OF BUSINESS: Platoon Sgt.
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
6. TITLE OF JOB:
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS: $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service):

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

$

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
Sept. 47 - June 48

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
[redacted]

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Euston, Texas

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB
Ins. Agent & Mgr of Naval Off. Club

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)
May 45 - Sept. 47

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS
$ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
Patient in U. S. Army Hospital

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

3. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) YES NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify):
HAVE SERVED →	XX								
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S)
7th Special Forces Group (Abn)

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service) 31 Oct. 1960

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service) 22 yrs

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE Oct 1938 CURRENT SERVICE

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE Sgt. CURRENT SERVICE Capt.

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number) 46126

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE

10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER:
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED
☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☐ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☐ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	NATIONAL GUARD ☐	COAST GUARD ☐	NAVY ROTC ☐	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	AIR NAT'L GUARD ☐	ARMY ROTC ☐	AIR FORCE ROTC ☐	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY YEARS MONTHS
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY. ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES. ☐ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY.

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS.

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance

3. NAME *(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Maiden)*	*(Last)*
			LYNCH

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address if deceased)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

13. CITIZENSHIP

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

15. PLACE OF ENTRY

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries)

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

19. OCCUPATION

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers)

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.)

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
LYNCH	daughter			
"	son			
"	son			

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sister, etc., WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. LIVING YES ☐ NO ☐

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)

6. DATE OF BIRTH

7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

8. CITIZENSHIP

9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

10. PLACE OF ENTRY

11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies))

12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

14. OCCUPATION

15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer if Father is deceased or unemployed)

16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED

17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To)

18. BRANCH OF SERVICE

19. COUNTRY

20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XV — MOTHER (Give same information for Stepmother or Guardian, if any)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH
4. CAUSE OF DEATH
5. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country)
6. DATE OF BIRTH
7. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
8. CITIZENSHIP
9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY
10. PLACE OF ENTRY
11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country(ies))
12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
13. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
14. OCCUPATION
15. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed)
16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED
17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From-and-To)
18. BRANCH OF SERVICE
19. COUNTRY
20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XVI — BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

5

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

6

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

7

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

8

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

9

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
5. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Grayston L. Lynch
3. SIGNED AT (City and State)	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec. IX cont (Employment)

Dec. 41 - May 45	U. S. Army- Platoon Sgt, 2nd Infantry Div., 2nd Reconnaissance Troop, Wounded in Belgium.
Oct. 38 - Oct. 41	U. S. Army 2nd Infantry Div., 23rd Infantry regiment & 2nd Reconnaissance Troop.

14-00000

SECRET

2 JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : CIARDS Retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14, SOD, on the Basis of Qualifying Domestic Service

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 4.

2. After more than twenty years of active military service, Mr. Lynch joined CIA in February 1961 to assist in operations against the Cuban target. He was awarded the Intelligence Star for his participation in the Bay of Pigs and related activities in the spring of 1961. Because of the sensitivity of his duties in behalf of CIA, his periods of foreign service were not recorded in the usual manner. From August 1961 until June 1968 he was intensively involved in the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a large number of agents as well as the planning and direction of operations into Cuba.

3. After reviewing his application for admission to CIARDS and corroborating statements from Clandestine Service officers acquainted with his work, the Clandestine Service Career Service Board concluded that Mr. Lynch's case merits a recommendation for approval. It is our view that the demands placed upon him were at least on a par with those borne by operations officers assigned overseas.

4. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Lynch be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System on the basis of qualifying domestic service. If he is accepted for CIARDS, Mr. Lynch will apply for disability retirement.

/s/ Thomas H. K[illegible]

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

GROUP 1

Attachments:

Tab A - Mr. Lynch's request and 3 endorsements

Tab B - Forms 3100 and 3101

Tab C - Biographic Profile

CSPS/GLMott/irk (1 July 1971)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/atts
2 - DDP
1 - CSPS/Mott
1 - CSPS/Soft file
1 - C/FE/Personnel

SECRET

28 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Grayston L. Lynch

REFERENCE: Mr. Lynch's memorandum to Director of Personnel, dated 22 June 1971.

1. On the basis of what I can recall from the time I was connected with the Bay of Pigs activity and my years with WH Division thereafter, Mr. Lynch has stated his tasks correctly.

2. Since the issue is whether Mr. Lynch's service in Miami could be considered equivalent to that of an Operations Officer overseas, the following might be considered:

Mr. Lynch had to operate clandestinely.

He used pseudonyms, safesites for meetings, non-official cover.

He handled, trained and dispatched agents. He debriefed them. He worked with them side by side.

He worked long, irregular hours (days and nights) under unusual pressures and at personally inconvenient and unappealing sites.

Mr. Lynch was, during the Bay of Pigs period at least, in real personal danger. (Our case officers abroad do not often face such situations nor do they have to display such courage.)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3. In summary, Mr. Lynch's tasks were professionally and personally more demanding than those of many of our Operations Officers abroad. He had to apply clandestine techniques and concepts in a highly volatile and difficult operational climate. To admit him to the CIA Retirement System seems justified.

Gerard Droller

SECRET

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Inclusion in CIARDS - Grayson L. Lynch

1. Mr. Lynch's memorandum dated 22 June 1971 requesting that service at JMWAVE be considered as qualifying service under CIARDS has been reviewed by individuals familiar with his activities during the period noted. They state that his memorandum is factual and accurately represents the situation as it existed at JMWAVE.

2. The service described is considered comparable to that performed overseas. WH Division concurs in favorable action on his request should that be the recommendation of the Board.

(Signed) [illegible]

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Original & 1 - D/Pers
1 - CSPS
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/Pers

Originated by: J. Ferguson:jab WH/Personnel 28 June 71 X7431

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from [illegible]

SOD # [illegible]

24 JUN 197[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Approval of
Mr. Grayston L. Lynch as a Participant
in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : HR 20-50

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. Grayston L. Lynch be approved as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. It is the opinion of the Special Operations Division that the duties performed by Mr. Lynch from the time he entered on duty in February 1961 until early 1968 meet the spirit and intent of the criteria for "qualifying service" as defined in HR 20-50b. The lone exception to these criteria is that Mr. Lynch was not "abroad" during the time involved except on a sporadic basis. This exception, however, was due completely to the geographical location of the area of operations. This location made it uniquely propitious to have Mr. Lynch assigned to and work out of a domestic base. There is no question, however, that Mr. Lynch's service was in the conduct and support of covert operations which required continuing practice of security and tradecraft procedures and which included, from time to time, hazards to his life and health. It is also believed that Mr. Lynch would be at a disadvantage in obtaining other employment because of the sensitivity of his past service as well as the dearth of requirements for his peculiar background, skills and knowledge.

3. On the basis of the above and Mr. Lynch's unique personal record, it is believed that his service during the described period is certainly equivalent to if not in excess of the requirements for "creditable service abroad" and that if it had not been for a geographical accident, this service would have been performed as

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

part of an assignment abroad within the fullest meaning of the definition contained in the referent regulation. Therefore, approval of Mr. Lynch's request for designation as a participant in the CIARDS on the basis of service performed between 1961 and 1968 is not only strongly recommended but is requested as the grant of an entitlement fully earned by a very deserving employee.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

SECRET

22 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Designation as a Participant in CIARDS--Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. It is requested that domestic service reflected in the following paragraphs be approved as qualifying service for the CIARDS and that I be designated as a participant in the system.

2. I entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961. I was sent TDY immediately to New Orleans, Louisiana and from there to Key West, Florida to prepare WH Division agent assets for operational missions. On 28 March 1961 I departed Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency ship bound for Nicaragua where I engaged in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. On 13 April 1961 I departed Nicaragua via an Agency vessel for the 17 April 1961 landing operation in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. I was assigned as the Case Officer for the Agency command ship, Cuban Brigade Headquarters, and the Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) element. I participated in armed action both at sea and on shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, per direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in a series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. I returned to Headquarters on 29 April 1961.

3. In August 1961 I was assigned PCS to JMWAVE at Miami, Florida as a Paramilitary Operations Officer. From my arrival in August 1961 until July 1965 I served under commercial cover outside the station, intermittantly using my home and various safehouses as "ad hoc" offices. All contact with the station was by telephone and/or personal meetings prearranged with station personnel. These personal contacts were either at my home, in safehouses, or at other meeting places deemed appropriate. During this period I was responsible for the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a very large group of Agents. This entailed numerous clandestine meetings, both day and night, with these Agents. Since they were in various stages of training, assessment or preparation for an operation and were located throughout Dade and Monroe counties in

SECRET

[illegible]

Florida, I was required to drive an average of 5000 miles per month to provide the necessary handling and support. The major training exercises were as follows:

a. Three black flights to ISOLATION for periods of one to three weeks duration during which time I was required to remain in the black training areas as handler for the Agents.

b. One three day trip to Lake Worth, Florida during which I conducted the ground phase of parachute training for 26 Agents and arranged for civilian instructors and planes for two parachute jumps per man.

c. Two black flights to Camp McKall, North Carolina to conduct parachute training for 36 Agents, during which time, as Chief Instructor, I made two parachute jumps.

d. Two black flights to the Ranger Training Center at Eglin AFB, Florida for additional parachute, commando and guerilla warfare training for 38 Agents. Both trips were of two weeks duration each and again, I made two parachute jumps.

e. Four black flights to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training in weapons and tactics for 38 Agents. Training was conducted with all weapons from the .45 calibre pistol up to and including the 4.2 inch mortar. Demolition and sabotage training including night and day tactical exercises using live ammunition and explosives were also conducted. Each exercise lasted from five to 15 days.

f. Eight training exercises from three to seven days duration each were conducted in and around the Everglades National Park and the Marquesas Keys in Florida.

g. Over 70 mission rehearsals of two or three days duration conducted in the Florida Keys.

4. In addition to the above training exercises I planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba during this period. This involved the isolation of a five to 25 man team in a safehouse for three days to two weeks preparing for an operation and remaining with them day and night until they were launched. It also involved receiving the team at the conclusion of the mission and again holding them in a safehouse for a two day debriefing period.

5. In 1965 I set up an office in Perrine, Florida, under commercial cover, to administer the Agent group. I remained in this office conducting operations and training as before until April 1966. My office was moved into the JMWAVE Station at that time, but I remained under commercial cover and my duties continued to be the same.

6. During the time I was assigned to JMWAVE I was required to participate in numerous voyages aboard Agency ships into international waters. Many of these were near to and into denied waters. I was also required to participate in several search and rescue aircraft flights of long duration over international water, near and into denied areas.

7. It is my belief that my activities and duties from August 1961 to June 1968 were of the types normally found only in overseas clandestine activities for which the five year CIARDS "creditable service abroad" requirement was intended. I am available for further explanation or clarification if any of the above information is required, or if confirmation of my service by other Agency personnel is needed, I submit the following names of knowledgeable individuals:

a. Gerald Droller, DDP/NSP
b. Robert Ortman, WH/COG
c. George French, SOD/CB
d. William Broe, C/WH

8. In view of the facts presented above, I request to be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will apply for disability retirement when my participation is approved.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

1. DEVUONO received an annuity of $4,272 per year ($356. per month) from the military for 21 years of service.

2. This military annuity will be cancelled.

3. His 21 years of military service will be combined with 10 plus years of CIA service and these 31 plus years will give him a total of $13,428 per year.

[illegible]
11 June 1923
[illegible]

EYES ONLY

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

(1)

Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, is a Career Agent who entered on duty into the Agency in February 1961 and served in New Orleans, Louisiana and Key West, Florida preparing WH Agent assets for operational assignments. In March 1961 he left Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency vessel for Nicaragua where he assisted in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. In April 1961, he left Nicaragua on a Agency vessel to participate in the landing operations in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. He was ~~[illegible]~~ involved in armed action both at sea and at shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, from direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. For this action Mr. Lynch ~~subsequently~~ received the Intelligence Star. Mr. Lynch subsequently served as a paramilitary operations officer at Miami, Florida until approximately June 1968. During this period he participated in numerous clandestine activities including agent training, parachute training, weapons training, ~~and~~ He Also planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba.

In the course of these earlier operational assignments, Mr. Lynch ~~[illegible]~~ developed a psychosis which will not permit him to travel by air at all nor by overland means for any lengthy period of time.

This has resulted in a medical hold being placed on Mr. Lynch for any overseas assignment PCS or TDY. Since he is uniquely a field special operations officer there are literally no departmental duties to which he can be assigned. Since there is no suitable assignment available for Mr. Lynch it is necessary to terminate Mr. Lynch's contract as a Career Agent. Since he is eligible for Involuntary Retirement under CIARDS, Mr. Lynch has made application for retirement effective 10 September 1971. In view of Mr. Lynch's age, specialized skills, long service in a uniquely sensitive area, and peculiar contribution to the Agency's mission it is believed that a termination bonus at the time of his retirement is fully warranted.

Mr. Lynch is currently the equivalent of a GS-14, step 5 with an annual salary of $23,591. The proposed $10,000 termination bonus represents, therefore, less than 42% of his annual salary or approximately 5 months pay. In connection with this, it should be noted that if he were being terminated rather than retiring, he would be entitled by virtue of the provisions of his contract to 90 days notice which would equal approximately $6,000 at his current rate of pay in salary alone. Additional fringe benefits would increase this figure.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Eyes Only
Personal Info

24 AUG 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/SS/Personnel

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Assuming no interruptions or changes of assignment or status in the interim, Mr. Lynch will complete his currently scheduled Spanish language training in mid-April 1971. Between now and then it is understood that he will--on his own initiative and with whatever assistance and encouragement we can properly provide--make an effort to overcome his phobia of flying and thereby, in due course, qualify medically for TDY or PCS overseas field duty.

2. In view of Mr. Lynch's past history, however, we cannot assume that he will be successful or will even actively press to overcome his problem. In spite of his career agent status and his operational performance (Intelligence Star), we cannot, in all conscience, carry him on SOD contract rolls indefinitely in an unproductive capacity. He has completed all of the advanced and refresher operations training necessary to qualify for assignment now. He has not adapted well nor has he been receptive to the kinds of headquarters duty assignments open to him. He is a field paramilitary officer.

3. It is prudent, therefore, to begin contingency planning now for his appropriate retirement and outplacement into a job which will offer him both security and personal satisfaction. His Spanish language training should enlarge his horizons and opportunities. We can predict he will not, at least at first, take at all kindly to the idea of retirement and relinquishing his Agency association. He is emotionally involved, and identifies himself as an Agency career field operations officer.

4. Please acquaint C/CSPS and DDP/JO with the background of this case, and together with them begin now to plan for this contingency.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Deputy Chief
Special Operations Division

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

SECRET

2 NOV 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Retirement Annuity
Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Retirement Operations Division of the Office of Personnel (Linda Birch) provided the following computations for a proposed annuity for Mr. Grayston Lynch if he retired on the dates indicated. These figures were computed on 30 October 1970 and were based on the following:

		31 Dec 1970	30 April 1971
AGE (DOB: 14 June 1923)		47 years, 6 mts.	47 years, 10 mts.
CREDITABLE SERVICE (Including S/L)		31 years, 8 mts.	32 years
HIGH AVERAGE (3 Years)		$19,655	$20,261
BASIC ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 9,979	10,478
	Per Month	832	873
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR:			
	Per Annum	9,251	9,700
	Per Month	771	808
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:	Per Annum	5,488	5,763
	Per Month	457	480

2. The above annuity would be recomputed when Mr Lynch becomes 62 years old. This recomputation is required to drop off post 1956 military service which applies to Social Security eligibility. Subject has no choice in this matter if he is eligible for Social Security benefits. If he is NOT eligible for Social Security benefits then the military service will remain creditable toward his Civil Service retirement annuity. The recomputed annuity would be as follows:

BASIC ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 8,695	$ 9,145
	Per Month	725	762
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR:			
	Per Annum	8,096	8,502
	Per Month	675	708

EYES ONLY

SECRET

14-00000

SURVIVOR ANNUITY:	Per Annum	$ 4,782	$ 5,030
	Per Month	399	419

3. It should be noted that the entire annuity at either time is reduced 2 % per year for each year Mr. Lynch is under 55 years of age. This amounts to a total reduction of approximately 15%.

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Eyes Only
Personal Info

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayson Lynch

Mr. Holcomb called at 4:30 on 1 July asking what were the procedures to get Mr. Lynch assigned to a Hqs position in SOD. Advised Mr. Holcomb that we would check with Cover and the Chairman, Agent Panel.

Mr. Strange approved Subject's assignment to Military cover at Hqs Building. Mr. Gresham, as Chairman of the Agent Panel, approved Subject's reassignment from Miami to SOD/Hqs.

Mr. Holcomb was advised at 4:45 p.m. of the above ~~division~~ decision.

[illegible] ONLY

SECRET

0 6 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

1. Mr. Lynch reported to C/SOD/Pers for interview on 5 December 1968. JMWAVE officials had notified him of the medical decision and the purpose of this visit to arrange for a six month interim assignment period while he undergoes appropriate treatment in Miami. We discussed the terms of the agreement which was made part of memorandum of agreement and was signed by Mr. Lynch and C/SOD/Pers. -(attached)

2. Mr. Lynch visited WH Division for discussions regarding the interim assignment with Dave Philips, Cuba Desk. According to Lynch there was some difference of opinion about the job at this point as to whether he'd be working for JMCOBRA or for Cuba Desk. He discussed this again with WH officials who he says agreed that he would work on a project for Mr. Philips unless Mr. Esterline had something specific he needed him to do. A message was to be sent out to this effect by WH Division.

3. Mr. Redmond of Agent Panel and Mr. Pollock SAS/OP were advised of status of this case but did not need to see Mr. Lynch unless he wished an interview. Pete Gaughan and Dr. Robinson of OMS were contacted and Dr. Robinson provided the names of three cleared consultants in Miami area for Mr. Lynch's referral. Mr. Lynch had a brief interview with Mr. Holcomb to let him know that arrangements for the six month interim assignment had gone well, he understood the terms of the agreement, and hoped to return in six months qualified for full duty including overseas and flying. He then took care of his accountings in SOD/E&F and departed for the drive back to Florida.

4. Mr. Lynch appeared to be in good spirits on this visit. He seemed to understand fully the terms of the six month agreement and expressed appreciation for being given this period of time to prove himself qualified for continued employment. However, he was left with no doubt of our intentions to terminate his contract at the end of the six month

[illegible] ONLY

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

period if he is not found to be fully qualified to perform the duties expected of him under the IUJEWEL Program.

JFHalpin
John F. Halpin
Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

0 5 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

SUBJECT: Temporary Assignment -
Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. As a result of his recent fitness for duty physical examination, it was determined that Mr. Lynch is qualified only for domestic assignments not involving flying. This decision means that Mr. Lynch is not currently qualified to perform the duties required of him under the IUJEWEL Program. These duties involve primarily overseas assignments and require flying both as the normal means of transportation to and from areas of assignment and as an integral part of his job concerned with training and conduct of airborne operations.

2. Since Mr. Lynch is not qualified to perform the duties required of his position at this time or for the indefinite future, three courses of action have been considered as follows:

a. Termination of contract under the 90-days notice clause of his contract.

b. Initiation of action for disability retirement.

c. Approval of a 6-month domestic (temporary) assignment while Mr. Lynch pursues appropriate treatment to determine whether his current disability is temporary.

3. In recognition of Mr. Lynch's long period of dedicated service to the Federal Government and this Agency, it has been agreed to offer him the 6-month interim assignment as per paragraph 2.(c) above under the following conditions:

SECRET

a. That an appropriate domestic assignment is available.

b. That he pursues appropriate treatment during the 6-month assignment period.

c. That Mr. Lynch report for another medical evaluation at the end of the 6-month assignment to determine whether he is qualified for full duty including overseas assignments involving flying.

4. It is further agreed that if, at the end of the 6-month period, Mr. Lynch is not found qualified for full duty including overseas assignments involving flying, action will be initiated to terminate his contract employment as in paragraph 2.(a) or (b) above.

SIGNED

John F. Halpin
Chief, Personnel, SOD

I understand and agree to the provisions of this Memorandum:

SIGNED

Grayston Lynch

Eyes Only
Personal

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME INITIAL(S) Lynch Grayston	2. APPOINTMENT DATA Entered on duty F T / P T Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐ Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Annual Leave Sal ______	3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation) Years Months Days ☐ More than 15 years
4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION Retirement 10 September 1971		

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/9 19 71	296	300
6. Current leave year accrual through 10/4 19 71	136	68
7. Total	432	368
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	-0-	-0-
9. Total leave taken	104	-0-
10. Balance	328	368

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 296 plus 2 Holidays

12. Salary rate(s) $23,501.00 per annum

13. Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 9/11/71 to 1700 11/4/71 (Hours)

26. Certified correct by
9/10/71
(Signature) (Date)
For Chief Payroll 2125
(Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15. Current balance as of ______ 19__ ______
16. 12-month accrual rate ______
17. Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18. Monthly accrual date ______
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20. Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr -0- to -0-
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr -0- to -0-

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough	AWOL or Suspension
	(Hours)	
23. During leave year in which separated	None	
24. During step-increase waiting period which began on ______	None	
25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates) ______		

REMARKS

SCD: 10/1/38
MAX: 296

"Unused Sick
Leave 368
Hours per 5
U.S.C. Ch. 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

Contract Service - Irving C. Dercono (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
	- Retired (Longevity) USA(?) Captain		
10 Feb 61	Hired as a Contract Employee with Social Security, No LPAs or PSIs.	$9,500	
31 May 61	Contract Terminated	9,500	
1 June 61	Hired as a Career Agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	11,155	GS-13/3
14 Oct 62	LPI	11,880	GS-13/3
14 Oct 62	PSI	12,245	GS-13/4
5 Jan 64	LPI	12,880	GS-13/4
5 July 64	LPI	13,335	GS-13/4
11 Oct 64	PSI	13,755	GS-13/5
10 Oct 65	LPI	14,250	GS-13/5
3 July 66	LPI	14,665	GS-13/5
9 Oct 66	PSI	15,113	GS-13/6
13 Aug 67	Pay increase	16,152	GS-14/3
8 Oct 67	LPI	16,897	GS-14/3
31 Oct 67	Contract terminated	16,897	GS-14/3
1 Nov 67	Career agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	16,897	GS-14/3
14 Jul 68	LPI	18,076	GS-14/3
11 Aug 68	PSI	18,641	GS-14/4
13 Jul 69	LPI	20,385	"
28 Dec 69	LPI	21,608	"
9 Aug 70	PSI	22,263	GS-14/5
10 Jan 71	LPI	23,591	"
8 Aug 71	Designated participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.		
10 Sep 71	Contract terminated	23,591	"

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

✓	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) [illegible]	Correspondence ☐ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

RESUME OF EMPLOYMENT

NAME: Grayston L. Lynch

EMPLOYED: Central Intelligence Agency
10 Feb 1961 to ~~31 August 1971~~ 10 Sept 1971

POSITION: Special Project Manager, GS 14

DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES: Position of Special Project Manager consisted of supervising 4 Agency employees and 46 foreign nationals. Employed in the collection of foreign intelligence and other operations as directed in the national interest of the United States Government.

Organized personnel for special project to include interviewing and assessing prospective employees, selection of and hiring of personnel, initiating security and background investigations of personnel, and initial training of personnel in their special duties and security aspects of the project.

Planned operations and budgeting, aquiring and managing of all real estate buildings and installations required for the project.

Established physical security procedures and recruited security personnel for all installations involved in project.

Planned and directed all operations of project. Coordinated activities with other projects and other departments of U.S. and local governments and other interested officials.

REFERENCE: Central Intelligence Agency
Director of Personnel
Attn: O.C. Dawson
Washington, D.C. 20505
phone - (703) 351-3295

[illegible]
[illegible] Blvd.
[illegible], Florida [illegible]
17 [illegible] 197[illegible]

Mr. Donald [illegible]
Post Office Box [illegible]
Brookland Station
Washington, D. C. 20017

Dear Don:

In answer to your letter of 15 March regarding the cassette tape recorder that I used in language training. This was turned into the language lab at the language school the last day of school.

This was cleared in [illegible] there in [illegible] and he [illegible] signed [illegible] paper [illegible] turned in all the material [illegible] leaving. [illegible] the gentleman that signed for the return of this recorder was named Porter.

I am sure this will clarify this matter but should there be any further problem please let me know.

Sincerely,

Grayston L. Lynch

P.O. Box 4426
Brookland Station
Washington, D.C. 20017
13 March 1972

Mr. Grayston Lynch
Key West Towers
Apt. 411A
South Roosevelt Blvd.
Key West, Florida 33040

Dear Gray,

We have received a call from Training about a tape recorder which they believe you still may have - a small cassette type which was issued to you while you were in language training.

If you still have the recorder, would you please ship it to Betty Weyland at the above address. If you turned it in, would you let me know when and where so I can pass on the information to Training?

Hope you are enjoying life and lots of sunshine.

Sincerely,

Darold Aldridge

12 Oct 71

Betty:

I Enclosed are receipts & expenses for my move & also a letter requesting a change in the mailing of my retirement checks. Will you please send the letter over to Paul Sidell of the Retirement Section so that my Oct check will come home.

Thanks for everything

Grayston Lynch

FOR [illegible] [illegible] File

Request that my retirement checks be mailed to me at: KEY WEST TOWERS, APT. 411A South Roosevelt Blvd, Key West, FLA - 33040

Harrington R. Lynch

Original sent to Paul Seidel in RAD/ROB

No ~~street~~ number, per Bay

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible] — Temp File in inactive file

TO : Record

DATE: 27 September 1971

FROM : DDAldridge
DC/SOD/Pers

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch
Contact Report

1. Mr. Lynch called to advise that he was still in the local area and ask if he could pick up his annuity check and change his forwarding address and banking instructions as he was no longer going to go to Tampa, Florida. He said he was buying part interest in a boat and had rented an apartment in Key West, Florida and would be living and working there. In this respect he wanted to know if he should not have a change in his cover status from "open" to "under cover" because of his "new" location.

2. Mr. Frank Stewart was advised of the change of Mr. Lynch's plans and his inquiry regarding a change in cover status. Mr. Stewart (SOD/Security) subsequently advised that Mr. Lynch would remain "open" and that he, Mr. Stewart would call Mr. Lynch and brief him on the subject.

3. Inquiry on Mr. Lynch's behalf into the other questions led to the following:

(over)

a. Mr. Paul Seidol, OP/Retirement Division, the officer who processed Mr. Lynch's retirement, is the appropriate local contact for Mr. Lynch to have to handle any problem with his retirement or his annuity payment. In this respect Mr. Seidol suggested that his telephone number be given to Mr. Lynch for this and future inquiries, so long as Mr. Lynch was in the local area. Otherwise, Mr. Lynch has been given correspondence instructions. Mr. Seidol's telephone number was then given telephonically to Mr. Lynch with instructions to call for arrangements regarding his annuity check, banking instructions, change of address, etc. Mr. Lynch acknowledged this instruction.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-103

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Record

DATE: 8 March 1972

FROM : Betty R. Weyland

SUBJECT: Grayston Lynch

We received a call from Mr. Sutherland, x 3066, who is on the Language Training staff, asking how he could get in touch with Gray Lynch. He said he believes ~~[illegible]~~ Gray did not return a small cassette tape recorder when he left. It is the type of recorder that is issued to each student but is to be returned. I told Mr. Sutherland I would try to get in touch with Gray and would let him know something.

SECRET

SOD # 71-975

0 [illegible] SEP 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : DDP/NSP

SUBJECT : Termination of Contract of
Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The contract of Irving C. DEVUONO will be terminated at the close of business 10 September 1971 as the result of approval of Subject's involuntary retirement on that date.

2. The following documents are forwarded in connection with Subject's termination:

a. Amendment to Subject's contract providing for a terminal payment.

b. Termination clearance sheet, form 1689.

Richard F. Westerman
Richard F. Westerman
Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

Attachments:
a. h/w
b. u/s/c/

CONCUR:

Philip L Donaldson
SOD Contracting Officer

APPROVE:

DDP/NSP

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 November 1967.

It has been mutually agreed by both parties that said contract will be terminated on or about 10 September 1971, at which time you will be involuntarily retired, due to the absence of any immediate or foreseeable work assignment for which you qualify.

You are herein authorized a taxable terminal payment of $10,000 to assist you in resettling and retraining for another occupation. Said payment will be payable as of the effective date of your retirement.

You are aware that said terminal payment was not an original part of your contract but has been authorized solely because of the unique circumstances associated with your past service, coupled with the circumstances associated with your premature retirement.

You are reminded of the contents of paragraph thirteen (13) of said contract which read as follows:

> "You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY /s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Contracting Officer

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

APPROVED:

/s/ Willis L. Donaldson

19

SECRET

SECRET

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINATION OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED AND SUBMITTED IN DUPLICATE

DATE: 8 September 197

PERSONAL DATA

NAME (Last, First, Middle - True or Pseudonym) Lynch, Grayston, L.	OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SOD/MB
LOCAL ADDRESS	PERMANENT ADDRESS 5228 Picador Apt-5 Tampa,
PERMANENT STATION OR BASE Headquarters	POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE Ops Officer

CONTRACT DATA

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
01 June 1961			10 September

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Involuntary Retirement

INTERNAL STAFF OR DIVISION CLEARANCES *(Add or delete as applicable)*

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	Jan E. Nixon	8 Sept 71	
LOGISTICS		8 Sept '71	
PERSONNEL		8 Sept 71	
DDP/NSP C/SOD		9 Sept 71	[illegible]
SOD/SEC&COVER	J. J. Stewart	8 Sept 71	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER — CLEARED BY (Signature)

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES
(OFFICES NOT REQUIRING INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	SCHEDULE DATE	SCHEDULE TIME	SCHEDULE LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICER
CENTRAL COVER STAFF			OK-27	CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD	Appointment made by PAB			CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE
SOD PERSONNEL				CLEARED BY (Signature) DATE 9 Sept

REMARKS *(Please Initial)*

OFFICE AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: C/SOD/MB

SIGNATURE OF STAFF OR DIVISION RESPONSIBLE OFFICER

FORM 1659 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

CLEARANCE [illegible] TO: OFFICE OF FI[illegible]

EMPLOYEE [illegible] 216070	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH, Grayston L.		[illegible]
OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SOD	LAST WORK DAY		EFFECTIVE DATE [illegible] 10 Sept 7[illegible]

REASON FOR CLEARANCE

☐ RESIGNATION ☐ CSC RETIREMENT ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

☐ EXTENDED LEAVE ☒ CIA RETIREMENT

VERIFICATION OR CERTIFICATION OF OFFICIALS

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE REVIEWED THE RECORDS OF THIS COMPONENT AND EXCEPT AS INDICATED THE EMPLOYEE NAMED [illegible] HAS SATISFACTORILY DISCHARGED HIS OBLIGATION TO THIS COMPONENT.

	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	CLEARED BY	[illegible]
OFFICE OF LOGISTICS		SHARON CALDRONE	
CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH, OP		PAT POLAND	
MAP LIBRARY DIVISION, OBGI		OLIVIA JOHNSON	
LIBRARY, CRS		MARGARET MANNING	
REGISTRAR, OTR		ANNE DELANEY	
OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES	1 D 4040	MR. GAUGHAN	
COMMO SECURITY	1 B 16	MR. BEXE	
RECORDS, RID	1 D 4135	CAROL THOMAS	
SPECIAL CLEARANCES, OS	3 E 47	MR. WAGGONER	
CREDIT UNION, OP	1 J 33	ANNIS MORAN	
INSURANCE BRANCH, OP	1 J 27 5 E 60	BETTE HARDING MARY CAMPBELL	
CENTRAL COVER STAFF OVERT	G H 47 5 E 60	KAY SUTER MISCHEL MANGOLD	
OFFICE OF SECURITY	3 E 49	K. BENNETT	
OFFICE OF FINANCE	~~6 E 62~~ 5 72 x2636 Bey	DOROTHYE SERVAIS	
✓ PERSONAL AFFAIRS BR OP	5 E 11	MR. DEWALD	
Mrs. Badge O'Brien		A 1511	

CERTIFICATION AND FORWARDING ADDRESS OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

FORWARDING ADDRESS ▷ NUMBER, STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP CODE 5[illegible] MEADOR - APT-5 [illegible]

[I] CERTIFY THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, ALL GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND RECORDS ISSUED [TO] ME HAVE [BEEN] RETURNED OR HAVE BEEN PROPERLY ACCOUNTED FOR AND THAT I AM NOT INDEBTED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT [illegible] AS A RESULT OF MY CONNECTION WITH THE AGENCY.

DATE 1 Sep 71

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

[THE] ABOVE INITIALED COMPONENTS HAVE GIVEN POSITIVE VERIFICATION OF THE FINAL CLEARANCE FOR [illegible]

[illegible] APPROVAL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL APPROVAL

2[illegible] [illegible] PREVIOUS ED[ITION] [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

NOTE - See instructions on reverse side.

DUTY STATUS REPORT

CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Career Agent

NAME (Type or print): Grayston L. Lynch

PAYROLL NO.: 216670

STATION/BASE: Hqs.

PAYROLL PERIOD: From 8/23- 9/10/71

TOUR OF DUTY: FROM 0830 TO 1700

THIS SPACE FOR PAYROLL OFFICE USE ONLY: COST CENTER NO. | ROLL NO. | PAY PERIOD NO. | REF. NO. | DATE

PERIOD		PAY STATUS			OVERTIME		HOURS OF DUTY		ABSENCE FROM DUTY						
MONTHLY	WEEKLY	R/T	N/D	H/T	O/T	C/T	FROM	TO	A/L	S/L*	LWOP	C/T	H/L	OTHER	INITIALS
1	SUN														
2	MON	8					[illegible]		[illegible]						
3	TUE	8							[illegible]						
4	WED	8							[illegible]						
5	THU	8							[illegible]						
6	FRI	8						[illegible]	[illegible]						
7	SAT														
8	SUN														
9	MON	8					[illegible]		[illegible]						
10	TUE	8							[illegible]						
11	WED	8						[illegible]	[illegible]						
12	THU	8													
13	FRI	8													
14	SAT														
15	▨														
BIWEEKLY TOTALS		80			AUTHORIZED OVERTIME ** (1)				[illegible]						▨
16	SUN														
17	MON	8													
18	TUE	8													
19	WED	8													
20	THU	8													
21	FRI	8													
22	SAT														
23	SUN														
24	MON														
25	TUE														
26	WED														
27	THU														
28	FRI														
29	SAT														
30	▨														
31	▨														
BIWEEKLY (OR MONTHLY) TOTALS		40			AUTHORIZED OVERTIME ** (2)				[illegible]						▨

REMARKS: (Include irregular tours of duty, also other details necessary to support payments of salary, salary differentials and allowances such as arrivals, departures, changes in quarters or dependents, etc.)

Subject terminates effective COB 10 Sept 71 as result of approval of involuntary retirement.

☐ SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR TDY TRAVEL, ETC.

* I CERTIFY THAT THIS ABSENCE WAS DUE TO ILLNESS WHICH INCAPACITATED ME FOR DUTY.

THIS SPACE FOR PAYROLL OFFICE USE ONLY

	TAX	TAX	OTHER	GRADE	RATE
(1)					
(2)					

CERTIFICATIONS

A CERTIFIED CORRECT

(SIGNATURE - SEE INSTRUCTIONS)

B CERTIFIED CORRECT AND OVERTIME AS RECORDED ABOVE ** AUTHORIZED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT AS COMPENSATORY TIME.

(SIGNATURE - SEE INSTRUCTIONS)

FORM 8-63 764 REPLACES FORM 764 OF 4-61 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

09 September 1971

Lynch, Grayston L.　　GS-14　　Ops Officer

10 September 1971　　Involuntary Retirement　CARDS

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
	[illegible]		
C/MB		William Strauch	9/9/71
	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]	F.J. Stewart	98/71
	[illegible]	F.J. Stewart	9/8/71
[illegible]	[illegible]	Jan Wilson	9/8/71
[illegible]	[illegible]	Hank Donis	9/8/71
[illegible]	[illegible]	Robert Kogola	9/9/71
	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[illegible]		
CCS	GH-47	J. McKinnon	9/9/71
CPD	5E-69	Mr. Lanning	9/8/71

[illegible]

[illegible]　N/A

[illegible]　N/A

SECRET

8 SEP

Recd 10 Sep '71
Grayston L. Lynch

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the recommendation of your Career Service that you be retired under the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. Your retirement will become effective 10 September 1971. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details necessary to process your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

CCD # [illegible]

10 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CS Agent Branch
Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch - Request for
Involuntary Retirement

1. By mutual agreement between Mr. Grayston L. Lynch and this Agency, it has been determined that Mr. Lynch's services are no longer required. Accordingly it is proposed that Mr. Lynch's contract, effective 1 June 1961, as amended, be terminated as of the close of business 10 September 1971.

2. In view of the foregoing, Mr. Lynch, who is a career agent under the Agency's retirement system, has requested that approval be granted for his retirement under the provisions of the Agency's system pertaining to involuntary retirement.

3. Mr. Lynch entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961 and has served continuously to date. He meets all the conditions of eligibility for involuntary retirement.

/s/ Evan J. Parker, Jr.
For
F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

CONCUR:

/s/ Gerard Droller
Chairman, CS Agent Panel

APPROVE:

(signed) Edward Ryan
Deputy Director for Plans

APPROVED:

/s/ Dow H. Luebscher
Special Contracting Officer

SECRET

SECRET

71-322

13 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Request for Contract Amendment - Irving C. DEVUONO

1. Irving C. DEVUONO has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and has applied for Involuntary Retirement on 10 September 1971.

2. It is requested that the current contract for Irving C. DEVUONO be amended to provide for a one-time, taxable, lump-sum payment of $10,000, payable as of the effective date of his termination or retirement. This sum will enable DEVUONO to resettle and retrain for another occupation.

F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

CONCUR:

Cord Meyer Jr. 13 Aug 71
Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

12 August 1971

Sir:

This is to advise you that I will be retiring from the U.S. Civil Service on 10 September 1971 and am combining my military service with Civil Service for a higher retirement. Therefore, I waive my entire Army retirement pay effective 10 September 1971.

Grayston L. Lynch
Capt - USAR Ret.
0966311 - 451-18-7989

Copy sent to Retirement, Attn. Paul Seidel [illegible].

SECRET

12 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Request for Advance of Salary
Employee Number - 451187989

I am retiring from the Agency on 10 September 1971 and am taking annual leave from 13 August to 07 September in order to lease an apartment in Florida. It is requested that I be allowed to draw $800 advanced pay to finance this trip.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

CONCUR:

/s/ Philip L. Donaldson
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

SECRET

SECRET

SOD # 71-168

10 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

THROUGH : CS Agent Branch

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch - Request for Involuntary Retirement

1. By mutual agreement between Mr. Grayston L. Lynch and this Agency, it has been determined that Mr. Lynch's services are no longer required. Accordingly it is proposed that Mr. Lynch's contract, effective 1 June 1961, as amended, be terminated as of the close of business 10 September 1971.

2. In view of the foregoing, Mr. Lynch, who is a career agent under the Agency's retirement system, has requested that approval be granted for his retirement under the provisions of the Agency's system pertaining to involuntary retirement.

3. Mr. Lynch entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961 and has served continuously to date. He meets all the conditions of eligibility for involuntary retirement.

F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

APPROVED:

Chairman, CS Agent B

Acc. to Bill Sawyer – this memo is not necessary. The application for involuntary retirement should be made & when approved we should then do a memo to CPD requesting that his contract be terminated 10 Sept

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Lynch, Grayston L.	2. TYPE OF RETIREMENT APPLIED FOR Involuntary	3. EFFECTIVE RETIREMENT DATE 10 September 1971

SECTION A — RECOMMENDATION OF PARENT OFFICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☒ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE F. P. Holcomb Chief, Special Operations Div	3. SIGNATURE OF OFFICE HEAD	4. DATE Aug 9 71

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☐ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT ☐ APPROVAL ☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	3. DATE

FORM 5-65 3102a

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

To avoid delay—1. Read information carefully. 2. Complete application in full. 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Lynch, Grayston L.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year): Jun 14, 1923

3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 451-18-7989

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code) FOR CHECKS: 7901 S. W. 120th Street, Miami, Florida 33156

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED? ☒ YES ☐ NO

5. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME (First) (Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year)	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year)	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4
Janetta K.	Jul 26, 1922	Apr 26, 1945	

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/SOD

2. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State): Washington, D. C.

4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION: Career Agent

5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year): September 10, 1971

6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF CIVILIAN SERVICE: 10

7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☐ YES ☒ NO

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE SERVICE ... ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE, OR COAST GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES ... REGULAR CORPS OR RESERVE CORPS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE AFTER JUNE ... AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER ... ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
U. S. Army	6288758	Oct 38	Sep 47	M/Sgt	
U. S. Army	0966311	Jun 48	Oct 60	Captain	7th Spec Fce Gp

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RESERVIST (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? Retired

2. (B) ARE YOU IN RECEIPT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY? (RETIRED PAY DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION) ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. (C) ... RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67 OF TITLE 10 USC (FORMERLY TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 80-810) ☐ YES ☒ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D.

1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month, year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES. STATE WHEN INCURRED AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

1. (B) IF "YES" STATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR COMPENSATION CLAIM AND THE PERIOD FOR WHICH YOU RECEIVED COMPENSATION

CLAIM NUMBER	FROM (Month) (Day) (Year)	TO (Month) (Day) (Year)

2. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM INCLUDING APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT, REFUND, DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT, OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (B) IF "YES" INDICATE THE TYPE(S) OF APPLICATION AND GIVE THE CLAIM NUMBER(S) IF KNOWN: ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT ☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS — CLAIM NUMBER(S):

3. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM INCLUDING APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT, REFUND, PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT, OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. (B) IF "YES" INDICATE THE TYPE(S) OF APPLICATION: ☐ RETIREMENT ☐ PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT ☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

4. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED UNDER ANOTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEES? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE NAME OF THE OTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM: Civil Service System

FORM 3102 4-65

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

INDICATE, BY SIGNING YOUR INITIALS IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW, THE TYPE OF ANNUITY YOU WANT TO RECEIVE. READ THE EXPLANATIONS AND CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN ANNUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE [illegible] INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY

1. INITIALS ☐ ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER.

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$

THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT.

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2.
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by [illegible]% of any amount up to $[illegible] a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $[illegible] so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. INITIALS √ ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity to be paid after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. INITIALS ☐ ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

2. INITIALS ☐ ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON (*First, middle, last*)

RELATIONSHIP

DATE OF BIRTH (*Mo., day, yr.*)

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEES UNDER INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring *unmarried* employees who are *in good health*.
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001).

I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 21 [illegible]
DATE

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 November 1967 as amended.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 8 August 1971. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 7 August 1971 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employment will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of the contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

/s/ Don E. [illegible]

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer, [illegible]

ACCEPTED:

____

Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

8 AUG 1971

9 Aug 71
[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans
Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT : Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

This is to inform you that a determination has been made that you have performed 60 months of qualifying service and that you have been approved for participation in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant will become effective on 8 August 1971.

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

2 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Designation of ~~Grayston L.~~ Irving C. Davidson Lynch as
a Participant in the CIA Retirement
and Disability System

It is requested that the contract of Grayston L. Lynch be amended to officially record his designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System effective 8 August 1971.

Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Record

DATE: 15 July 1971

FROM : DDAldridge

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

File

Mr. Lynch telephoned today and advised that he did not want his termination bonus to be held for payment in Calendar Year 1972 as agreed upon, but would like to have it payed at the time of his retirement. I pointed out that this would result in a good tax bite, but [illegible] Gray stated that he would need the money at the time of retirement and would just have to sustain the additional tax.

Mr. Lynch also asked if he could obtain an advance on his salary of about $500 as his salary checks were mailed to a bank in Florida and he had exhausted his supply of [illegible] checks because he had thought he would have left the area by now. He was advised that this could be done but that it would take a memo from him to the Director of Finance. He stated that he would come to the office on 16 July to prepare the memo. He should be sent to C/SOD/B&F to initiate the memo and the action to obtain the advance on his salary.

SECRET

SOD # 71 [illegible]

22 JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

ATTENTION: Chief, Language School, OTR

SUBJECT: Language Training for Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. Mr. Grayston Lynch, an SOD Career Agent, has recently completed an extended course of Spanish language training covering over 1,000 hours of instruction. Due to Mr. Lynch's particular background, his instruction required special effort and arrangements by the Language School and his instructor.

2. We are most grateful indeed for this special attention, and wish especially to commend the instructor, Mrs. Gladys G. Snare, for her patience and understanding, as well as for her professional competence and conscientious devotion to duty as a language instructor.

(Signed) F. P. Holcomb

F. P. Holcomb
Chief
Special Operations Division

DC/SOD/EJParker:yb(22Jul71)
Distribution:
2 - Addee
1 - C/SOD
1 - DC/SOD
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/RI

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1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : CIARDS Retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14, SOD, on the basis of Qualifying Domestic Service

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 4.

2. After more than twenty years of active military service, Mr. Lynch joined CIA in February 1961 to assist in operations against the Cuban target. He was awarded the Intelligence Star for his participation in the Bay of Pigs and related activities in the spring of 1961. Because of the sensitivity of his duties in behalf of CIA, his periods of foreign service were not recorded in the usual manner. From August 1961 until June 1968 he was intensively involved in the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a large number of agents as well as the planning and direction of operations into Cuba.

3. After reviewing his application for admission to CIARDS and corroborating statements from Clandestine Service officers acquainted with his work, the Clandestine Service Career Service Board concluded that Mr. Lynch's case merits a recommendation for approval. It is our view that the demands placed upon him were at least on a par with those borne by operations officers assigned overseas.

4. It is, therefore, recommended that Mr. Lynch be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System on the basis of qualifying domestic service. If he is accepted for CIARDS, Mr. Lynch will apply for disability retirement.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

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Attachments:

Tab A - Mr. Lynch's request and 3 endorsements

Tab B - Forms 3100 and 3101

Tab C - Biographic Profile

CSPS/GLMott/lrk (1 July 1971)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/atts
2 - DDP
1 - CSPS/Mott
1 - CSPS/Soft file
1 - C/EE/Personnel

SECRET

SOD # [illegible]

24 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Approval of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

REFERENCE : HR 20-50

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. Grayston L. Lynch be approved as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. It is the opinion of the Special Operations Division that the duties performed by Mr. Lynch from the time he entered on duty in February 1961 until early 1968 meet the spirit and intent of the criteria for "qualifying service" as defined in HR 20-50b. The lone exception to these criteria is that Mr. Lynch was not "abroad" during the time involved except on a sporadic basis. This exception, however, was due completely to the geographical location of the area of operations. This location made it uniquely propitious to have Mr. Lynch assigned to and work out of a domestic base. There is no question, however, that Mr. Lynch's service was in the conduct and support of covert operations which required continuing practice of security and tradecraft procedures and which included, from time to time, hazards to his life and health. It is also believed that Mr. Lynch would be at a disadvantage in obtaining other employment because of the sensitivity of his past service as well as the dearth of requirements for his peculiar background, skills and knowledge.

3. On the basis of the above and Mr. Lynch's unique personal record, it is believed that his service during the described period is certainly equivalent to if not in excess of the requirements for "creditable service abroad" and that if it had not been for a geographical accident, this service would have been performed as

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part of an assignment abroad within the fullest meaning of the definition contained in the referent regulation. Therefore, approval of Mr. Lynch's request for designation as a participant in the CIARDS on the basis of service performed between 1961 and 1968 is not only strongly recommended but is requested as the grant of an entitlement fully earned by a very deserving employee.

(signed) Evan J. Parker, Jr.

Evan J. Parker, Jr.
Acting Chief
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig. and 1 - Addressee
1 - C/SOD
1 - SOD/SS
1 - SOD/Pers
1 - SOD/RI
SOD/Pers:DAldridge:bah (24 June 1971)

SECRET

2[illegible] JUL 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Request for Designation as a Participant in CIARDS--Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. It is requested that domestic service reflected in the following paragraphs be approved as qualifying service for the CIARDS and that I be designated as a participant in the system.

2. I entered on duty with the Agency on 10 February 1961. I was sent TDY immediately to New Orleans, Louisiana and from there to Key West, Florida to prepare WH Division agent assets for operational missions. On 28 March 1961 I departed Key West, Florida aboard a covert Agency ship bound for Nicaragua where I engaged in the preparation of Agency vessels and assets scheduled for operations into Cuba. On 13 April 1961 I departed Nicaragua via an Agency vessel for the 17 April 1961 landing operation in the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. I was assigned as the Case Officer for the Agency command ship, Cuban Brigade Headquarters, and the Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) element. I participated in armed action both at sea and on shore during the four days of the invasion attempt and, per direct instructions from the DCI, engaged in a series of covert landings and operations into Cuba for several days following the invasion landing. I returned to Headquarters on 29 April 1961.

3. In August 1961 I was assigned PCS to JMWAVE at Miami, Florida as a Paramilitary Operations Officer. From my arrival in August 1961 until July 1965 I served under commercial cover outside the station, intermittently using my home and various safehouses as "ad hoc" offices. All contact with the station was by telephone and/or personal meetings prearranged with station personnel. These personal contacts were either at my home, in safehouses, or at other meeting places deemed appropriate. During this period I was responsible for the recruitment, training, administration and operational direction of a very large group of Agents. This entailed numerous clandestine meetings, both day and night, with these Agents. Since they were in various stages of training, assessment or preparation for an operation and were located throughout Dade and Monroe counties in

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Florida, I was required to drive an average of 3000 miles per month to provide the necessary handling and support. The major training exercises were as follows:

a. Three black flights to ISOLATION for periods of one to three weeks duration during which time I was required to remain in the black training areas as handler for the Agents.

b. One three day trip to Lake Worth, Florida during which I conducted the ground phase of parachute training for 26 Agents and arranged for civilian instructors and planes for two parachute jumps per man.

c. Two black flights to Camp McKall, North Carolina to conduct parachute training for 36 Agents, during which time, as Chief Instructor, I made two parachute jumps.

d. Two black flights to the Ranger Training Center at Eglin AFB, Florida for additional parachute, commando and guerilla warfare training for 38 Agents. Both trips were of two weeks duration each and again, I made two parachute jumps.

e. Four black flights to Fort Stewart, Georgia for training in weapons and tactics for 38 Agents. Training was conducted with all weapons from the .45 calibre pistol up to and including the 4.2 inch mortar. Demolition and sabotage training including night and day tactical exercises using live ammunition and explosives were also conducted. Each exercise lasted from five to 15 days.

f. Eight training exercises from three to seven days duration each were conducted in and around the Everglades National Park and the Marquesas Keys in Florida.

g. Over 70 mission rehearsals of two or three days duration conducted in the Florida Keys.

4. In addition to the above training exercises I planned and directed 115 actual operations into Cuba during this period. This involved the isolation of a five to 25 man team in a safehouse for three days to two weeks preparing for an operation and remaining with them day and night until they were launched. It also involved receiving the team at the conclusion of the mission and again holding them in a safehouse for a two day debriefing period.

5. In 1965 I set up an office in Perrine, Florida, under commercial cover, to administer the Agent group. I remained in this office conducting operations and training as before until April 1966. My office was moved into the JMWAVE station at that time, but I remained under commercial cover and my duties continued to be the same.

6. During the time I was assigned to JMWAVE I was required to participate in numerous voyages aboard Agency ships into international waters. Many of these were near to and into denied waters. I was also required to participate in several search and rescue aircraft flights of long duration over international water, near and into denied areas.

7. It is my belief that my activities and duties from August 1961 to June 1968 were of the types normally found only in overseas clandestine activities for which the five year CIARDS "creditable service abroad" requirement was intended. I am available for further explanation or clarification if any of the above information is required, or if confirmation of my service by other Agency personnel is needed, I submit the following names of knowledgeable individuals:

a. Gerald Droller, DDP/NSP
b. Robert Ortman, WH/COG
c. George French, SOD/GB
d. William Broe, C/WH

8. In view of the facts presented above, I request to be designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will apply for disability retirement when my participation is approved.

SIGNED

Grayston L. Lynch

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(When Filled In)

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A — STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. SERIAL NUMBER 216670	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) Lynch, Grayston Leroy	3. DATE OF BIRTH 6/14/23	4. SD	5. EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY (Refer to R 20-2) Career Agent
6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE Maritime Ops Off	7. GRADE GS-14	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SOD/MB		
9. ASSIGNMENT LOCATION → ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ U.S. FIELD ☐ FGN. FIELD	10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 02/10/61	11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE 10/01/38		

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From- To-)		OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	CHECK ONE		TOTAL TIME	
MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR			PCS	TDY	MONTH	DAYS

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

See attached memorandum.

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

FORM 8-65 3100

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(4)

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SECTION C — STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☐ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder. Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ________ (DATE) that this employee:

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F — DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

I co[illegible] information in
Section [illegible] the best
of my kn[illegible]

Grayston Lynch
[illegible]

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(When Filled In)

SERVICE AGREEMENT

The Director of Central Intelligence has determined that in order to qualify for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System, an employee must have signed a written obligation to serve anywhere and at any time according to the needs of the Agency in addition to meeting other specified criteria.

I hereby declare my intent to comply with this requirement as a condition to my being considered for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

In making this declaration, it is understood that the Agency will consider my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances.

Grayston L Lynds
SIGNATURE

22 June 71
DATE

FORM 4-65 3101

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S E C R E T

15 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT : Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

As of 29 May 1971 Mr Lynch was accredited with the following leave balances:

Annual Leave - 376 hours

Sick Leave - 340 hours

If Mr. Lynch's application for CIARDS and his application for Disability Retirement under CIARDS were all processed and awaiting approval, he could go on sick leave as of close of business 2 July to exhaust all sick leave and then all excess annual leave prior to retirement. He would retire under these circumstances, if approved as of COB 6 October 1971. (This date was computed by payroll based on the following assumptions; 1). He would take no leave between now and 2 July, 2). He earned 26 days leave per year, 3). He had a leave ceiling of 360 hours.

Durold D. Aldridge
AC/SOD/Personnel

17 June 1971
1st Indorsement

Mr. Lynch will not be permitted to process all the paperwork for his pending retirement and then depart the area. Retirement Operations Division/OP will not accept his application for CIARDS retirement until he has actually been accepted into CIARDS, nor will they initiate a request to the OMS for a medical survey until an application has been submitted for Disability retirement, nor will they submit a request for medical survey under Civil Service and then convert to CIARDS. Concurrently, OMS will not review their requirements on Mr. Lynch prior to receiving a request from ROD/OP. Since neither Retirement Ops Div/OP nor OMS will take action pending resolution of Mr. Lynch's participation in CIARDS I advised him we would be unable to hit the 2 July target date for him to commence his leave in preparation for retirement. He xxx stated that

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this was all right with him. Therefore, I am scheduling the following procedure:

As of 25 June 1971, Mr. Lynch's signed application for participation in CIARDS, form 3100 and Service Agreement accompanied by AC/SOD' recommendation was hand carried to CSIS for Board action. AC/SOD also added a note on the routing sheet requesting that the request receive every consideration on an expedite basis.

When the above application is approval, Mr. Lynch should be scheduled for a retirement interview with Mr. Paul Seidel to make application for Disability retirement and be scheduled for any physical examination or medical interview required.

Following the above, Mr. Lynch could commence his leave and proceed to Florida pending the outcome of his application for Disability Retirement. When approved he would continue to utilize his sick leave and excess annual leave until it was expired. The retirement would then become effective.

In an interview with Mr. Lynch on 15 June 1971, the C/SOD/SS and the AC/SOD/Pers discussed the possibility of obtaining ~~xx~~ a Termination Bonus in the amount of $10,000 payable on retirement with Mr.Lynch. This was because of Mr. Lynch's unique situation regarding his service and career with the Agency. It was pointed out that this was definitely not the normal ~~procedure~~ procedure, but was based purely on Mr. Gray's status as a Career Agent and the unusual aspects of his termination. It was agreed that although Mr. Gray would become eligible for this bonus, if we were able to get it approved, as of the date of his retirement, we would not make payment until ~~sixx~~ Calendar Year 1972 in order to give Mr. Gray benefit of the tax break resulting from the delayed payment. Mr. Gray agreed to all of the above provisions without equivication.

Mr. Gray was instructed to maintain constant contact with Maritime Branch —at least check with them twice a day to ascertain if there were messages or requirements for his presence or appointments scheduled for him. He agreed to this as he does not have a phone at home and there is no other positive means to contact him. SOD/Personnel is to leave any message necessary for him with the Secretary/Maritime Branch for delivery. (If no other contact possible, try informally through Jerry Sohl.)

DAROLD D. ALDRIDGE
AC/SOD/PERSONNEL

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14 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

The undersigned talked with Subject on 14 June in regards to his future. I told him Mr. Droller did not have the authority to authorize "absence from duty for up to a year" as was stated to Mr. Lynch. I told him SOD will take the proper action through the Agent Panel to try and find "a retirement assignment" for him in the Miami area. This action will probably take a few weeks and he will be kept informed of the progress. He was quite understanding and accepted the above with little comment.

Philip L. Donaldson
Philip L. Donaldson
Chief, Support Staff
Special Operations Division

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23 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : Retirement Annuity - Mr. Grayston Lynch

REFERENCE : Memo for the record dated 2 November; same subject

The attached information updates the referenced data and adds additional estimates for Mr. Lynch's retirement annuity under CS Disability Retirement, CIARDS Involuntary Retirement and CIARDS Disability Retirement. These estimates are based on an unconfirmed amount of military service and assume that Mr. Lynch will be granted sick leave credit when his retirement becomes effective on 30 April 1971. Firm estimates will be provided when Mr. Lynch's military service is confirmed. The projected 4.2% Cost-of-Living Increase which MAY become effective 1 June 1971 is not included.

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

Attachment
As Stated

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ANNUITY ESTIMATES

EFFECTIVE 30 April 1971 (Plus Sick Leave Credit)

AGE (DOB: 14 June 1923): 47 Years, 10 Months

CREDITABLE SERVICE
(Including sick leave credit) : 32 Years, 1 Month

HIGH AVERAGE: $20,398 (3 Years)

	Civil Service		CIARDS	
	Discontinued Service *	Disability Retirement	Involuntary Retirement	Disability Retirement
BASIC ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 10,432	$12,154	$12,919	
Per Month	869	1,013	1,077	
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR BENEFITS:				
Per Annum	$ 9,659	$ 11,208	$11,897	
Per Month	805	934	991	
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 5,738	$ 6,685	$ 7,105	
Per Month	478	557	592	

At 62 years of age, if Mr. Lynch becomes eligible for Social Security, his annuity will be recomputed and it will result in the following estimates

	Civil Service		CIARDS	
	Discontinued Service *	Disability Retirement	Involuntary Retirement	Disability Retirement
BASIC ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 9,090	$10,590	$11,355	
Per Month	758	882	946	
BASIC ANNUITY REDUCED FOR SURVIVOR BENEFITS:				
Per Annum	$ 8,451	$ 9,801	$10,489	
Per Month	704	817	874	
SURVIVOR ANNUITY:				
Per Annum	$ 4,999	$ 5,824	$ 6,245	
Per Month	417	485	520	

*Reduced for Age

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN ______________________ (NAME OF LANGUAGE) AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING

TEST RATINGS
O = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE
S = SLIGHT H = HIGH
E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

"+" indicates not tested or Pronunciation included in Speaking grade.

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

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2 - ~~Employee (thru~~ Training Officer)

SECRET

LANGUAGE TRAINING REPORT

Office of Training

DATE OF REPORT	
STUDENT NAME	OFFICE
COURSE ☐ FULL-TIME ☐ PART-TIME	INCLUSIVE DATES

PROFICIENCY LEVEL BEFORE AND AFTER TRAINING	BEFORE	AFTER
SPEAKING		
AURAL COMPREHENSION		
READ COMPREHENSION		

*INSTRUCTORS ESTIMATE (NOT OFFICIAL TEST)

HOURS OF INSTRUCTION	
SCHEDULED	ACTUAL

LANGUAGE TRAINING AIMS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

The aim of this course of study was to provide the student with the foreign language competence desired by the sponsoring office. Except as noted below, the instruction emphasized speaking, aural comprehension and reading, as required.

This student's evaluation is based on (1) instructor and Department Chief observations; and (2) regularly administered achievement tests. Fluency and accuracy, as appropriate to each skill, were given due consideration in evaluating the student. The achievement rating and performance evaluation below reflect performance and achievement in this course only and are conditioned by the student's motivation and aptitude for language learning. This rating should not be confused with the Proficiency Rating (Form 1273) "Certification of Language Proficiency" which is submitted separately. The degree of progress achieved by the student while in language training is shown in the box in the upper right corner of this report.

PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING COURSE AIMS

(Overall achievement in the course is shown as unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, above average, or superior when compared against established standards for such training.)

SPEAKING	AURAL COMPREHENSION	READING COMPREHENSION
	[illegible]	[illegible]

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

[illegible] and 6 months of instruction in Spanish. However [illegible] the normal [illegible].

[illegible] First of all, he had been using a sort of bastardized Spanish for [illegible] years and was able to communicate quite well in it, albeit very ungrammatically. Also, he was able to understand most of what was said and [illegible] fairly [illegible] speech. This gave him an unwarranted feeling of confidence in his abilities, for when it came to grammar, he had great difficulty, and to such an extent that his slow rate of progress was a hindrance to the rest of the class. For this reason, he was dropped back after 4 months to a beginning class. After 2 or 3 months in this class, the same thing happened again, and in order [illegible] this class, he was removed from it and given special help [illegible] last month or so. He was persistent in his rather unsuccessful efforts [illegible] a very active part in social functions and at Brookwood, [illegible] opportunity to use the language. However, his old habits were too firmly [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] to his return [illegible] to what he [illegible]. However [illegible], he [illegible] [illegible] ...

☐ See reverse side for additional comments

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

INSTRUCTOR

DEPARTMENT CHIEF, LANGUAGE SCHOOL/STD

[illegible]

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FORM 8-70 3207

(17-45)

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
TAMPA, FLORIDA 33601

TO: Central Intelligence Agency **DATE:** August 19, 1976

SUBJECT: Employment Reference

Your name was given to us by: Grayston Leroy Lynch

______ Above candidate (as an employer X ; associate ______; reference ______; school ______).

______ Another reference whom we have contacted regarding above candidate.

In connection with our examination for Deputy Sheriff
we are making an investigation of the qualifications of the above-named candidate. It is of great importance to us to obtain objective and valid statements from persons who have some knowledge of this candidate's ability and characteristics. In our appraisal of each candidate's fitness for this position significant weight will be given to statements obtained by us through this investigation.

The early return of this form will be appreciated as it will expedite the processing of this candidate's application. Any information which you may give us will be regarded as highly confidential.

Very truly yours,

J. N. Dempsey, Major
Administration Division

During what periods and in what manner were you closely associated with candidate?

Employed from February, 1961 to October, 1971

(Enclosure: Release of Record letter from Mr. Lynch)

To assist us in making a thorough investigation, we should appreciate your listing below the names and addresses of persons who are well acquainted with the candidate's work habits or abilities.

(over)

14-00000

Please place an "X" next to those items which in your judgment describe or really apply to this person. It is not necessary to check any given number of items. You may be able to check ten or more items or have difficulty in finding four or five that are completely pertinent.

- (✓) Good personal appearance
- ( ) Sometimes careless of grooming
- ( ) Sometimes makes poor impression on first contact
- (✓) Has a pleasing manner
- ( ) Is reserved and distant in manner
- ( ) Is at times undiplomatic in dealing with others
- (✓) Is tactful
- (✓) Highly cooperative in staff and public contacts
- ( ) Lacks self confidence
- ( ) Likely to be overconfident at times
- ( ) May lack sufficient poise to deal effectively with the public
- ( ) Could be more cooperative in public contacts
- ( ) Sometimes is antagonistic toward others
- (✓) Gets along well with superiors and co-workers
- ( ) Exhibits too much self-importance
- ( ) Is too positive in views
- ( ) At times appears to be emotionally immature
- (✓) Appears to have emotional stability
- ( ) Has a tendency to drink immoderately
- ( ) Is frequently absent from work
- ( ) Does not give enough attention to essential details
- ( ) Likely to procrastinate
- (✓) Grasps new ideas quickly and clearly
- (✓) Works well under pressure
- (✓) Makes quick and logical decisions
- ( ) May not plan work effectively

- ( ) Lacks vigor
- ( ) Practically always uses good judgment
- ( ) At times does not use good judgment
- ( ) Not always reliable and dependable
- ( ) May not be able to fill this position in a completely satisfactory manner
- (✓) Accepts responsibility
- ( ) May not possess sufficient initiative for this position
- ( ) Tends to resist suggestions and ideas of others
- ( ) Is not a good team worker
- (✓) Is well liked by subordinates
- (✓) Has outstanding leadership ability
- ( ) Has not been successful as a supervisor
- ( ) Is a willing worker but not a leader
- (✓) Is adept at identifying organizational needs and weaknesses
- ( ) May lack sufficient leadership ability to be successful in this position
- (✓) Stimulates others to progress
- (✓) Writes excellent reports
- ( ) Report-writing ability is only fair
- ( ) Is a good public speaker
- ( ) Needs to improve in self-expression
- ( ) Professional reputation may not be completely satisfactory
- ( ) May not have sufficient professional training for this position
- (✓) Has excellent professional reputation
- (✓) Has broad professional knowledge and interest.

For each of the following fields in which you have knowledge of the candidate's experience, reputation and demonstrated ability, please evaluate him by placing an "X" in the appropriate space:

FIELD	I STRONGLY ENDORSE	I ENDORSE	I DO NOT ENDORSE	I DO NOT KNOW

To some extent all individuals possess some virtues and some faults. Describe below those traits which you consider are the candidate's chief strengths and weaknesses.

Ability to work with others at all levels. Limitless resourcefulness. Drive and initiative. Leadership.

To your knowledge has the candidate or his work ever been seriously criticized by responsible persons. If so, please explain below.

Please add any other comments which will further describe the candidate or which might be indicative of his probable performance if he were appointed to this position.

Subject was an excellent employee in all respects.

Would you employ or re-employ this candidate? No
(YES OR NO)

If not, please explain: Subject is a retiree from this Agency

9-2-76
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REFERENCE

OCCUPATION OR TITLE

Central Intelligence Agency
FIRM NAME

Tampa,Fla
16 June 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Post Office Box 1925
Washington,D.C. 20013

Sir:

This is to authorize the release of my record of employment with the Central Intelligence Agency to the Sheriffs Department of Hillsborough County Florida. This confirmation is needed for use in an employment application. I retired on 10 Sep 71.

Thank you

Grayston L. Lynch
8709 Bay Pointe Dr
Tampa,Fla 33615

3 March 1976

Mr. Jeffrey M. Pearson
Chief Investigator
Consolidated Security Services, Inc.
5310 Central Avenue
Tampa, Florida 33603

Dear Mr. Pearson:

Reference is made to your inquiry dated 13 February 1976 concerning Mr. Grayston L. Lynch.

Mr. Lynch was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from February 1961 until his retirement in September 1971. He was a loyal and dedicated officer whose performance was considered exceptional. His character and general reputation while with CIA were above reproach.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Cashman
Personnel Officer

Dist:
0 - Addressee
1 - CPD
1 - CEAB Chrono
OP/PAD/CEAB/RDCashman:djw(3March 1976)

CSS INC.

CONSOLIDATED
SECURITY
SERVICES, INC.

5310 CENTRAL AVENUE • TAMPA, FLORIDA 33603 • 813/238-8876

February 13, 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Sir:

I'd appreciate your assistance in verifying employment of a former CIA Agent, Grayston L. Lynch. Mr. Lynch has applied for a position with my firm and is being considered for an administrative position.

Information obtained from the appicant's employment summary indicates Date of Birth, 6-14-23, Social Security No., 451-18-7989, employed with the CIA from 1960 to 1971. Information relative to character and general reputation would also be beneficial.

Included with this request is the applicant's signed authorization.

My sincerest appreciation of your kind attention.

Regards,

CONSOLIDATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

Jeffrey M. Pearson,
Chief Investigator

JP/vm

Tampa,Fla.
12 Feb 1976

Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,D.C. 20505

Sir:

I hereby request that confirmation of my Agency employment be released to the Consolidated Security Services of Tampa,Florida.

Grayston L Lynch
8709 Bay Pointe Dr.
Tampa,Fla.33615

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]	[illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible] ([illegible])	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR [illegible]	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible] (S)
6. FUNDS V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS [illegible] SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV [illegible]	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA	
11. POSITION TITLE [illegible]	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) ([illegible])	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5
		17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]

18. REMARKS - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

```
BIRTH DATE: [illegible]  SEX: [illegible]  MARITAL ST: [illegible]  NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA/FICA          HEALTH INS CODE: [illegible]  PLAN:
FEGLI: [illegible]          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0          SAL. TAX LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A          A/L IND: [illegible]          A/L CEIL: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: [illegible]  EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN  DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible]  REFR ORG: [illegible]  PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STATUS: A     FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: [illegible]    OPS EXPENSE: Y       HOUSING: [illegible]    [illegible] CODE:
HOME LEAVE: [illegible]   [illegible]: Y      OFFSET CLAUSE: Y   STD GOVT: Y
SPECIAL PAY: Y   [illegible] PAY: [illegible]   ALLOWANCE COMP: [illegible]  EDUCATION:
STEP INCRE: Y    WTH TAX ENTL: [illegible]    OTHER ALLOWANCES: N  SEPARATION:

NOTIFICATIONS [illegible]
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 11508 Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG. 11-70

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187939
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:08/20/71

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 06 DA 06 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2126-0195
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
IUJEWEL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 23591 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080970

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT:*CIA/FICA              HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 6               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD       PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : E        ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y   OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
```

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG. 11-69 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451 87589
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:01/22/71

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 1 DA. 17 YR. 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: *1138-0195
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
IUJEWEL

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 23591 DOG: 081367 LSI: 08097

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC
FEGLI: YES/OPTN HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
PAY BASIS: A PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 111167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

TAX STAFF: N	FED EXMP:	STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI	OPS EXPNSE: Y	HOUSING: A	POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0	DIFFERENTIAL: Y	OFFSET CLAUSE: Y	STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY : E	ALLOWANCE COMM: N	EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS : N	SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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7-68 MFG 10-68 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 451187585	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY		PREPARED: 01/22/71
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 1 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)	
6. FUNDS V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 1135-5363	8. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV IUJEWEL	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA		
11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5	17. SALARY OR RATE $* 22591 DOD: 081367 LEI: 08?71

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M        MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100136
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                   HOSPITILIZATION: F    PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0         SAL. T&SK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A               A/L IND: 8               S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 111167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD    PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: A     FED EXMP:             STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y         HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: B    DIFFERENTIAL: Y       OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E       ALLOWANCE COMM: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N       OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA
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SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]

PREPARED: [illegible]

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): [illegible] 77
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: [illegible]
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
[illegible]

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: *DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11 POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12 POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: [illegible]
16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 22253

DOC: [illegible]1367
LEI: [illegible]

18 REMARKS:

- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: [illegible] SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 21 61 FED SERVICE COMP: [illegible]
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: [illegible] S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: [illegible] EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: [illegible]
REFERRING OFFICER: [illegible] REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPENSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY: [illegible] ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX STTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS: N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK (*) REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-11)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 051127585
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY
PREPARED: 5/25/76
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 9 DA 21 YR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-3365
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
IUJEWEL
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: *MARYLAND, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22263 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080976
18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 2 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CMI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b 7-66 MFG. 10-68 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187987

2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED: 9/18/7

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): [illegible]

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-3369

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
*IUJEWEL

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: *DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF

12. POSITION NUMBER:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11

16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 22263 DOG: 081367 LEI: 080970

18. REMARKS
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 2
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021 61 FED SERVICE COMP: 15-136
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TAX LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L INC: 8 S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021161
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -

		STATE EXMP:	STATE:
TAX STAFF: N	FED EXMP:	HOUSING: A	POST/QUAL:
TRAVEL: CHI	OPS EXPNSE: Y		
HOME LEAVE: 0	DIFFERENTIAL: Y	OFFSET CLAUSE: Y	STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y	PREMIUM PAY : E	ALLOWANCE COMM: N	EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y	OTH TAX ENTL: N	OTHER ALLOWNS : N	SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

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7-66 MFG 11-69 Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 451167969	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY	PREPARED:08/14/7

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION STEP INCREASE	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 05 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

					7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	1135-3369	
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV JMCOBRA	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 *5	17. SALARY OR RATE LWG: 081367 $* 22263 LEI:*08097

18. REMARKS - - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021051 FED SERVICE COMP: 100135
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L INC: 8 S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4221
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: 3 POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG 11-69

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:05/08/70

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 12 | DA. 28 | YR. 69

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO U
		U TO V	X	U TO U

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135-3369

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11

16 GRADE AND STEP: 14 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $* 21608 DOG: 08136 LEI: 08116

18 REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP: 100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                       HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0      SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 8              S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - -  CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD       PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N     FED EXMP:             STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI      OPS EXPNSE: Y         HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0    DIFFERENTIAL: Y       OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : E       ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N       OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 10-68 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:08/22/69

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 07 DA. 25 YR. 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135-3365
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20385

DCG: 081367
LEI: 081168

18. REMARKS
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP:*100138
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC
HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0
PAY BASIS: A SAL. TASK LIMIT:
A/L IND: 8
S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SCD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP:
STATE EXMP:
STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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7-66 MFG. 6-69

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

14-0000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

37

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 451187989
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED:07/18/69

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 13 YR 69
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 0135-3369
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA
11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $* 20385 DOG: 061367 LEI: 061168

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                  HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN        PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A           A/L IND: 8               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD     PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:            STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y        HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: Y      OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : E      ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y   OTH TAX ENTL: N      OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 451187969	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY

PREPARED: 06/06/69

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION NAME CORRECTION FROM (LYNCH GRAYSON LEROY)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 06 02 69	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT CAREER AGENT (S)

FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 5135-3365	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV JMCOBRA	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE PARAMIL OF	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) (FULL TIME) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.11	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 4	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 18641 OCG: 081367 LEI: 081168

18. REMARKS

- - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423 SEX: M MARITAL ST: MAR NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH LONGEVITY COMP: 021061 FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC HOSPITILIZATION: F PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN PREV. GOVT SERV: 0 SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A A/L IND: 8 S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN REFR ORG: SOD PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N FED EXMP: STATE EXMP: STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI OPS EXPNSE: Y HOUSING: A POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0 DIFFERENTIAL: Y OFFSET CLAUSE: Y STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y PREMIUM PAY : E ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y OTH TAX ENTL: N OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG 2-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

D. [illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 451187999
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): LYNCH GRAYSON L[illegible]
PREPARED:12/31/68

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: INITIAL ENTRY
4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 11 DA 01 YR 68
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	-Y	CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9135-3369
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIV
JMCOBRA

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FLORIDA, USA

11. POSITION TITLE: PARAMIL OF
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.11
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 4
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 18641 DOG: 081367 LEI: 081168

18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - -  STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE: 061423  SEX: M       MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 02
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 021061  FED SERVICE COMP:
TYPE RETIREMENT: CSC                      HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN:
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 0       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 8               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - -  CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 110167 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 021061
REFERRING OFFICER: INGRAHAM HELEN  REFR ORG: SOD       PHONE: 4321
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: N    FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: CHI     OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 0   DIFFERENTIAL: Y        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y   PREMIUM PAY : E        ALLOWANCE COMM: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y   OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
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SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 10-58 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

Verification
of Service on
this side of
File

14-00000

SECRET

30 AUG 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

71-4511

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement - Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Contract Personnel Division from Chief, Special Operations Division, dated 19 August 1971, same subject

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, GS-14 Equivalent, Career Agent, Special Operations Division, Clandestine Service, has been recommended by his Career Service for involuntary retirement. By mutual agreement between Mr. Lynch and the Agency, it has been determined that his services are no longer required. It is recommended that Mr. Lynch's contract be terminated and that he be involuntarily retired under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m. If such retirement is approved, Mr. Lynch requests an effective date of 10 September 1971.

3. Mr. Lynch has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for involuntary retirement under the System. He is 48 years old with over 31 years of Federal service. This service includes over 10 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his involuntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the involuntary retirement of Mr. Grayston L. Lynch under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m.

/s/Harry B. Fisher

[illegible] Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

[illegible]
[illegible]

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

[illegible]
Richard Helms 31 AUG 1971
Director of Central Intelligence Date

SECRET [illegible]

30 JUN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance/C&TD

SUBJECT: Verification of Contract Service for **Irving C. DEVUONO (P), Current Career Agent**

1. As the result of the recent enactment of Public Law 9[illegible]-639 subject's full-time contract service with the Agency from **10 February 1961** through **31 May 1961** is creditable for both leave and Civil Service Retirement purposes. Civil Service Retirement deductions were not withheld during this period.

2. Subject has been a participating member of the Civil Service Retirement System since **1 June 1951**.

3. Action Required:

a. Office of Finance: Please post the above applicable information to subject's retirement records.

b. **DDP/SOD/Personnel**: Please advise subject of the contents of this memorandum.

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/SOD/Personnel
1 - DDP/CSPS/Agent Panel
1 - OP/RAD/ROB
1 - CPD Subject's file
1 - CPD Chrono

DDS/OP/CPD/NTH (30 June 1971)

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: ?

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): DEVUONO, Irving C. (P)
3. SEX: M
4. DATE OF BIRTH: Jun 1923
5. SERVICE COMP. DATE: ?

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married
7. DEPENDENTS (Excluded Spouse) NO.: 3 YEAR(S) OF BIRTH: 1939 1949 1954
8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA SPOUSE ?

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS MEMBERSHIP
OTHER STATUS: Ineligible
10. LAST MED. RPT.: May 1961
QUAL. FOR: Prop Version
EVAL. FOR: Prop Assign

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS NONE SERVICE GRADE ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1 RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 RETIRED XX

12. ASSESSMENT DATE
13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE
14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1938-60 Military Service, US Army, Capt - Special forces operations;
Instructor at 7th Army NCO School for 3 years
1956-60 Commanded & Trained an SF team in guerilla warfare

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

German - S Slight
French - S Slight
Laotian - S Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Feb 1961	ParaMil (Contr Employee) $	9500		DDP/WH/JMARC	Hq
Jun 1961	PM Off-(Career Agent)	11155	0813	DDP/CA/PMG/Proj ZRJEWEL	JMWAVE
Aug 1967	" " " "	16152	14	" " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED: 19 Sep 1967
21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY: hc
22. ITEMS 1-18 REVIEWED VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 8-57 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle)
[illegible], Ir[illegible] G. (P)

DATE OF BIRTH
Jun 1923

33.
No Photo Available.

34. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

35. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

36. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Award 1964 Intelligence Star and Intelligence Star Certificate for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in Spring 1961.

37. DATE REVIEWED
19 Jun 1967

38. PROFILE REVIEWED BY
hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 67

SECRET

PROFILE

(4)

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Handle With Care

SECRET

4-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 5 AUG 1971

TO: (Check)

☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION

☒ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION

☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) SOD

FILE NUMBER: 16402

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: CONTRACT

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: RETIREMENT

SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston L.

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF	DATE EOD
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB-240-3e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB-240-3e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

FORWARDING ADDRESS: Tampa, Florida
EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: NONE

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period of time and not to reveal any specific places of cover assignments or cover locations.

[illegible] /DH

DISTRIBUTION: [illegible]

James [illegible]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

1551 [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

15 April 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SOD/Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report for Mr. Grayston L. Lynch, 1 April 1970 - 31 March 1971

Although Mr. Lynch is assigned to the Maritime Branch for administrative purposes, he was in training during the entire period covered by subject fitness report. Therefore, an evaluation of his performance by Maritime Branch would be unrealistic.

W. D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

SECRET

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE TESTING RESULTS

NAME [illegible] De [illegible]

DATE 13 August [illegible] Irving

Since many things other than aptitudes enter into the determination of training course performance, in any class of students there will usually be some whose performance will be better than would be expected from their test scores, just as there will likely be some whose performance is poorer than expected. STRENGTH OF MOTIVATION, PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH A FOREIGN LANGUAGE, and other factors should be considered in selecting people for language training and in interpreting language training results. For example, the number of languages previously studied or learned and the amount of academic and non-academic language-learning experience are factors not measured by the tests but are indicative of probable success in learning a foreign language. Whether such experience was in the same language as the one to be studied or in a different one is, of course, an additional relevant factor.

The rating received by the above individual is circled below:

ADJECTIVAL RATING	APPROXIMATE %* RECEIVING RATING
Superior	10%
Above Average	20%
[✓ Average]	40%
Below Average	20%
Poor	10%

* Based on a sample of 1759 Agency employees -- men and women -- tested with this battery between July 1961 and September 1963

Irving A. [illegible]

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	LYNCH GRAYSTON LEROY	SOD	CF	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
14	4	20385	081168	14	5	22263	080970	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 3 June 1970

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY Don H [illegible]

FORM 7-00 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

31 Jul 70

SECRET

[illegible]

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

IDENTI-KIT COURSE (K-101)

TRAINING EVALUATION

Irving C. Di Vuono

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Dates: 19 - 22 May 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course teaches the student to become more aware of the value in proper facial observations -- the method of mentally recording the observations -- and finally -- the mechanical manipulation of the Identikit to provide a permanent record.

EVALUATION	BELOW CLASS STANDARD	AVERAGE LOW	AVERAGE HIGH	EXCELLENT
1. Student understands the principles of Identikit.		X		
2. Student understands the manipulation of the Identikit.		X		
3. Ability to construct composites from photographs.		X		
4. Ability to construct composites from live observation.	Not applicable to this meeting of the course			
5. Ability to construct composites by debriefing.		X		
6. Ability to use composites to identify people in a. photographs.		X		
b. live situations.	Not aplicable to this meeting of the course			
7. Ability to derive composite code for transmission.			X	
8. Ability to reconstruct composite from Identikit code.			X	
9. Student's attitude, cooperation and productivity.	X			

E. Marilyn Clark

TSD/Technical School
Instructor

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle): LYNCH, GRAYSTON LEROY
DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): June 14, 1923
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 451 18 7989
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY:
LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): Grayston L. Lynch
DATE: 26 Feb 68

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

MAR 28 10 52 AM '68

CONT

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—For Agency Use

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

NOTE FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Irving K. Devuono (P)

Paul Seidel (ROB) called Mr. Brooks on 7 September 1971 to advise him that the DCI had approved the recommendation for Mr. Devuono's Involuntary Retirement and that it was alright to release the separation amendment providing for $10,000 terminal payment that we had been holding.

Amendment released to div for subject's sgin on 7 Sept 71.

OP/CPD Rita

14-00000

SECRET

(WHEN FILLED IN)

CERTIFICATION OF LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

1. EMPLOYEE NO.	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	3. TYPE CHANGE A=ADD C=CHANGE D=DELETE	CODE	4. LANGUAGE DATA PRIOR TO TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR

5. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST LAN. CODE	R	W	P	S	U	I/T	YEAR	6. DATE TESTED	7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. GRADE	9. OFFICE OR DIVISION

NOTICE TO PERSON TESTED

10. ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 6 ABOVE, YOU WERE TESTED IN ____________ (NAME OF LANGUAGE)
AND YOUR TEST SCORES ARE AS FOLLOWS:

READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING	TEST RATINGS
					0 = ZERO I = INTERMEDIATE S = SLIGHT H = HIGH E = ELEMENTARY N = NATIVE

11. REMARKS

12. SIGNATURE

13. LD NUMBER

FORM 11-64 1273 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (10-45) **SECRET**

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

2 - Employee (thru Training Officer)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 29 March 1971

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Lynch, Crayston

3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☒ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Betty R. Wayland

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GG-60

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

"Disqualified for O/S Planning. Subject is qualified for Headquarters Duty only."

DATE: 20 May 1971

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Glenn E. Steele

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

14 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Mr. Grayston Lynch

It was determined that no action would be taken on this case until after the first of the year (1971) at which time Mr. Lynch will be advised by C/SOD/Personnel that he will be made available for a suitable operational assignment, most likely overseas, unless he opts to apply for disability retirement.

If Mr. Lynch opts to apply for disability retirement he will be continued in his present assignment pending approval of his retirement.

If Mr. Lynch chooses to be shopped for a field assignment, SOD will initiate action to locate such a position. When found, Mr. Lynch will be processed for the assignment. Should he fail to be medically approved, action will be taken to obtain his retirement for medical reasons. Should an assignment not be forthcoming by April 1971, a medical disposition for overseas planning purposes (General) will be requested.

The purpose of the above scheduled action is to either find a suitable assignment for Mr. Lynch or to effect his disability retirement on either a voluntary or involuntary basis.

Darold D. Aldridge

Darold D. Aldridge
Deputy Chief, Personnel
Special Operations Division

SECRET

[illegible]

1. [illegible] UONO received an annunity of $4,272 per year ($356. per month) from the military for 21 years of service.

2. This military annuity will be cancelled.

3. His 21 years of military service will be combined with 10 plus years of CIA service and these 31 plus years will g give him a total of $13,428 per year.

① D, receives annuity of
$4,272 per yr
($356 - per mo)
from the military
for 21 yrs of
service.

② THIS military annuity will
be cancelled.
~~He will receive~~
~~NOTHING FROM~~

③ HIS 21 yrs of Mil service
will be combined
with 10+ yrs of CIA
service and these
31+ yrs will give him
A total of 13,428. per year

CIA

1117.– X 12 = ? /yr

Mil

CIA + MIL

$ 1119.12 [illegible]

.38

13,428 ✓ [illegible]

356.12

712

$ 4272 ✓

21 yrs MIL

10.5(?) CIA

31.5 YRS

Copy of the letter [illegible]
[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
1 JULY 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
Lynch, Grayston L.

3. POSITION TITLE
Senior Spec Ops. CA

4. GRADE
GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDP/SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT
4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQOS/TDY
☒ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
ASAP

STATION
VIETNAM

TDY OR PCS
PCS

TYPE OF COVER
DAC

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NONE

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED
NONE

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☒ YES
☐ NO

1 JUL 1970

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
John A. Strassberger

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
GH-62 HQS.

EXT.
4321

10. COMMENTS

Subject is scheduled for medicals on 23 July and 27 July.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

No Medical Disposition. Processing Cancelled.

DATE
23 July 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
Don Farley FRO/OMS

FORM 1-68 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(28)

25 [illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION - THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL

PHOTOGRAPHIC FUNDAMENTALS & DOCUMENT COPY P-101

TRAINING EVALUATION

NAME : Grayston Lynch

OFFICE : SOD

COURSE DATES: 15 - 23 June 1970

The student is taught fundamental understanding of the photographic processes, manipulation of typical 35mm cameras and film processing. The student is instructed how to use two different types of 35mm camera copy systems for document photography - the LEICA M-3 Range-Finder, and the PENTAX single lens reflex camera. Documents are photographed under available light and artificial light with the camera hand-held and other unconventional means. Students' results of various assignments demonstrated the following abilities.

A - OUTSTANDING
B - PROFICIENT
C - BELOW CLASS STANDARD

		A	B	C	POTENTIAL GOOD	POOR
1.	Manipulate a range-finder camera.		x			
2.	Manipulate a single lens-reflex camera.		x			
3.	Manipulate a light meter.		x			
4.	Manipulate film processing equipment.		x			
5.	Satisfactory exposure using a light meter.		x			
6.	Develop films.		x			
7.	Critique and evaluate negatives.		x			
8.	Manipulate 3M Reader/Printer and produce [illegible] prints.		x			
*9.	Understand basic photographic theory.		x			
*10.	Over-all results obtained on assignments.		x			
11.	Determine camera malfunctions by analyzing negative defects.		x			
12.	Photograph documents using artificial light.		x			
13.	Photograph documents using available light.		x			
14.	Photograph documents using a handheld camera.		x			
15.	Photograph documents using unconventional support (Tripod, Clamps, etc.)		x			
16.	Photograph raised or engraved surfaces.		x			
17.	[illegible] on the document copy problems.		x			
18.	[illegible] toward assignments, direction [illegible]	x				
19.	[illegible] over-all ability to photograph most [illegible] material under any type of lighting [illegible]		x			
20.	[illegible] cleanliness.		x			

* Results obtained in this category are a fairly reliable indication of how well the skill will be retained.

Ronald James

S-E-C-R-E-T

TSD/Training/Instr.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 19 JUNE 1970

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, GRAYSTON

3. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFF (CAREER A)

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SOD/MB

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT
ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS
ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☒ YES
☐ NO

24 JUN 1970

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE: Joan E. Rice
JOAN E. RICE
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH-62 HQS.
EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION
NO MEDICAL DISPOSITION. PROCESSING CANCELLED.
[illegible] [illegible]

26 JUN 1970

3/ [illegible]

DATE: 28 July 1970

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Don. Farley PEO/OMS

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

[illegible]

14-00000

File

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

Clandestine Service Records I - Course No. 7-70
(21 hours - part time) 8 - 11 June 1970

Student : Lynch, Grayston

Office : SOD

Year of Birth: 1923

Service Designation: Contract

Grade : 14

EOD Date : Feb '61

Number of Students Enrolled: 21

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

CS Records I (Introduction to Records) is intended for Operations Officers and intelligence and clerical assistants who support operations through any form of records activity. It reviews the records mission of the CS and examines the logic and structure of the system itself. The responsibilities of CS personnel to the system, and the services provided by the different elements of the system, provide the central theme of the course. Students are familiarized with methods of input, maintenance and retrieval of information, and in disposition, disposal and destruction of the records themselves. The course includes an introduction to the various machine programs associated with the records system, and outlines the management cycle by which the system is controlled and modified.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORDS

This is a certificate of attendance only. Student evaluations are not given in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Charles Schafer 23 JUN 1970
Date

SECRET

S E C R E T

15

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

IDENTI-KIT COURSE (T-101)

TRAINING EVALUATION

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Dates: 19 - 22 May 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course teaches the student to become more aware of the value in proper facial observations -- the method of mentally recording the observations -- and finally -- the mechanical manipulation of the Identikit to provide a permanent record.

EVALUATION

	BELOW CLASS STANDARD	AVERAGE LOW	AVERAGE HIGH	EXCELLENT
1. Student understands the principles of Identikit.		X		
2. Student understands the manipulation of the Identikit.		X		
3. Ability to construct composites from photographs.		X		
4. Ability to construct composites from live observation.	Not applicable to this meeting of the course			
5. Ability to construct composites by debriefing.		X		
6. Ability to use composites to identify people in a. photographs.		X		
b. live situations.	Not aplicable to this meeting of the course			
7. Ability to derive composite code for transmission.			X	
8. Ability to reconstruct composite from Identikit code.			X	
9. Student's attitude, cooperation and productivity.	X			

HARDEST (1–3)

EASY (7–8)

Lower

~~9695~~

TSD/Technical School Instructor

SEE BACK FOR

S E C R E T COMMENTS

16 June 1970

By the instructor, the low grade in section 9 was due to a lack of motivation and interest on the part of Mr. Lynch. She said he appeared to have an attitude that the course content would come automatically and it wasn't necessary to study. ~~Even after was~~ Basic facts of the course must be learned early to successfully complete the course and even after ~~[illegible]~~ these points were repeated each day, but Lynch ~~failed~~ was unable to answer questions concerning them.

John Straschuger

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CI Survey Course 3-70
40 hours, Full-time

STUDENT : Lynch, Grayston
OFFICE : SOD
YEAR OF BIRTH: 1923
SERVICE DESIGNATION: Contract
GRADE : 14
NO. OF STUDENTS : 12
EOD DATE : Feb 61

COURSE OBJECTIVES - Content and Methods

The course aims to provide a description of counterintelligence in the covert and clandestine warfare of today in both friendly and enemy areas. To do so, a brief description of the intent, purpose, and dynamics of espionage, subversion and counterintelligence as practiced by the major enemy forces is provided and this is contrasted to the spectrum of counterintelligence activities of the United States of America and of allied countries. To support counterintelligence missions levied upon the Agency, a review of the cooperation and coordination and exchange of information and services between cooperating services is provided. Counterintelligence is then related to all other Clandestine Service operations and its place as a part thereof is demonstrated. To provide the student with a framework within which to work, the organization of the Agency for counterintelligence is also provided.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance. Since this course is a survey course, it does not attempt to qualify the student as a counterintelligence operations officer and no evaluation is made of individual performance.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Stewart H. Vance
Chief Instructor

Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION - TECHNICAL SCHOOL

THE MANAGEMENT OF AUDIO SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

A-200

TRAINING EVALUATION

NAME : Grayston Lynch

OFFICE : SOD

DATES OF COURSE: 30 March - 10 April 1970

A. COURSE OBJECTIVES

1. This course is designed primarily for either a case officer who expects to stage and manage an audio surveillance operation, or for those who have related responsibilities, i.e., desk officer and physical security officers.

2. Although the course provides a basic familiarization with audio devices the primary emphasis is on the collection of target data, planning the operation, locating a listening post, supporting the entry, exploiting "the take", and the orderly termination of the operation once it has outlived its usefulness. In short, managing an audio operation from inception to termination.

3. The course provides a basic knowledge of "quick plant" devices to permit the exploitation of certain targets of opportunity. The same devices could be concealed and used for "Carry In" devices.

4. Finally, the course provides instruction in the first echelon maintenance of listening post equipment, so that an operation can continue without the constant presence of an audio technician.

B. EVALUATION

1. The student met ___xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the objectives of the course.

2. Remarks:

[illegible]
TSD/Technical School

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Information Reporting, Reports and Requirements Course No. 5-70
120 hours, full time 9-27 March 1970

Student : Lynch, Grayston
Office : SOD
Year of Birth : 1923
Service Designation: Contract
Grade : GS-14
No. of Students : 10
EOD Date : February 1961

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The over-all objectives of the course are: to show the requirements function as it develops; to describe information evaluation, appraisal, and dissemination; to present fundamental principles of collection and communication of information; to demonstrate how, through Headquarters guidance, reporters can be directed and developed; and to prepare intelligence officers in the field to put information into finished report form. Supervised practice to develop skills is given in the production of finished reports; in reporting on area guidance patterns; in tailoring requirements into specific assignments; and in observing, collecting, organizing, and communicating information.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

Student achievement is judged from each student's observed performance during laboratory practice in the areas of instruction indicated. An asterisk (*) indicated this student's ratings. The ratings are weak, adequate, proficient, strong, and outstanding.

A. Qualitative and Quantitative Production of Reports:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

Qualitatively and quantitatively, Mr. Lynch's work was only fair.

B. Requirements Performance:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

His paper on this subject lacked detail.

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. Editorial Performance:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

The papers that Mr. Lynch wrote reflected only a fair understanding of the principles of editorial organization.

D. Reporting Performance:

Weak	Adequate	Proficient	Strong	Outstanding
	*			

COMMENT:

The quality of his outside reporting assignment was only passable.

INSTRUCTOR'S OVER-ALL COMMENT:

Mr. Lynch worked to full capacity throughout the course. However, his performance was only satisfactory. It should be taken into consideration that Mr. Lynch does not type well.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

2 April 1970
Date

H. Benchea
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION #5-70
INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE

Introduction to Intelligence
(80 hours - full-time)

24 February - 6 March 1970

Student: LYNCH, Grayston

Grade : GS-14

Office : SOD

Year of Birth : 1923

EOD : Feb. 1961

Service Designation: Contract

The objectives of Introduction to Intelligence are:

Introduce you to the fundamentals of intelligence and to relate the intelligence process to United States foreign policy and national security.

Provide an overview of CIA and relate the Agency's organization and function to United States intelligence activities.

Explore intelligence problems related to analysis of foreign countries and conduct of overseas operations.

Methods for meeting the objectives are through lectures given by the Intelligence School faculty and guest speakers, seminars, reading, review exercises, training panels, and films.

This is to certify satisfactory completion of Introduction to Intelligence (Intelligence Orientation - First Phase).

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Course Chairman, Intelligence School, OTR

Date: 11 March 1970

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET (When Filled In)

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

TRAINING REPORT

Student	: Lynch, Grayston	Date(s):	16 - 20 February 1970
Grade	: GS-14	Office :	SOD
Subject(s)	: Clandestine Radio Familiarization Course	Title :	Operations Officer
Number of Hours:	36		

This presentation was in the form of a seminar designed to brief the student on the Communications subject(s) listed and is a certificate of attendance only.

Charles J. Castillo
for Joseph J. Candela
Chief, Career Management & Training Staff, OC

MCE Form #12
[illegible] October 1968

SECRET (When Filled In)

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

CARBON AND NOTE-TAKING TECHNIQUES (SW-102)

TRAINING EVALUATION

Name: Grayston Lynch Office: SOD

Course Dates: 3 - 5 February 1970

COURSE DESCRIPTION -- The Student is:

1. taught the operational considerations and requirements for two secret writing techniques.
2. trained in the proper techniques to be used in preparing carbon secret texts to pass general censorship inspection in mail channels.

COMMENT

1. The carbon and note-taking direct writing device techniques are perishable skills which can be lost without use or frequent practice. Any appreciable lapse of time between training and use normally requires refresher training.
2. No specifics as to particular systems or chemical reactions were discussed.

EVALUATION: 1. EXCELLENT 2. AVERAGE 3. WEAK 4. BELOW CLASS STANDARD *

The student's evaluation is indicated by his performance in the following areas:

a. attitude toward assignments, direction and cooperation. 2
b. comprehends the techniques employed in writing with a carbon secret writing system and its application in operational support. 2
c. successfully demonstrated the proper technique in writing a carbon. 2
d. satisfactorily demonstrated proper techniques when writing with a direct writing note-taking device. 2
e. satisfactorily demonstrated the ability to follow directions in developing both carbon and direct writing device messages. 2

RECOMMENDATIONS -- Student should undertake practice exercises to:

a. retain or improve dexterity. x
b. improve printing techniques. ____
c. acquire more even printing pressure. ____
d. other. ____

*Recommend student receive refresher training in carbon writing techniques before using SW operationally.

TSD/Technical School
Instructor

SECRET

TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION -- TECHNICAL SCHOOL

INTRODUCTION TO SECRET WRITING (SW-101)

RECORD OF ATTENDANCE

Name : Grayston Lynch

Office : SOD

Course Date : 2 February 1970

1. COURSE OBJECTIVES

To present to the officer who needs an overall appreciation of the secret writing process, and who should be aware of its place in the scheme of clandestine communications, but who does not anticipate an immediate need for this technical skill.

2. COURSE CONTENT

a. It compares S/W to other forms of clandestine communications and delineates both its advantages and limitations. It discusses the major forms of secret writing - carbon systems, microdots and latent image photography and provides a demonstration of each.

b. It concludes with an examination of the operational factors surrounding the utilization of S/W - paper selection, carriers, accommodation addresses, censorship, indicators, cover letters, supplies and postal intelligence.

3. EVALUATION

No practical work is included or individual evaluation given.

4. REMARKS

INSTRUCTOR
TSD/TECHNICAL SCHOOL

6 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Special Operations Division

SUBJECT : Maritime Branch Nominee for the Special Operations Division's Historical Program

REFERENCE : Chief, Special Operations Division Memorandum dated 24 December 1969. Subject: Historical Program

1. Considering the current manpower shortages and relative inexperience in the Maritime Branch, I recommend that only one quarter man year be devoted to the Historical Program in calendar years 1970-71. If and when officers report on board who have the unique or special knowledge required to write histories, then these personnel will be assigned this task and a subsequent increase in man years available will be made.

2. I nominate Mr. Grayston L. Lynch to write histories in CY 1970-71. This officer combines the unique knowledge of first hand operational experience with the qualities of a good narrative writer.

W.D. Strauch, Jr.
Chief, Maritime Branch
Special Operations Division

Distribution:
Orig & 1-Add.
1-Subject's file ✓
1-Chrono
SOD/MB:W.D.Strauch:jr (6 Jan 70)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

17 JULY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Lynch officially checked in to SOD/Maritime Branch effective this date.

Shirley

14-00000

SECRET

Date 2 July 69

SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

Check-In Sheet

Name GRAYSTON L. LYNCH

Branch SOD

Title

Empl. Ser. #

1. Personnel

☒ SOD Questionnaire
☐ Locator Card
☐ Fitness Report Card
☒ Briefing
☐ TDY Standby (Form 259)
☐ Immunization (Form 2476)
☐ Action

② Budget & Fiscal
7/2/69

③ Registry

④ Logistics

⑤ Security

⑥ Cover

Type & Unit:
9775 Composite, OSS GR

7. Branch Chief

8. Personnel

REMARKS:

SECRET

SERCET

SOD Personnel Questionnaire

Date: 2 July 61

Full Name GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

Grade GS-14 DOB 14 Jan 23

*Local Permanent Address NONE - AS YET

Home Telephone No. ____ If no phone, Nearest Contact ____

Office Ext. ____ Red Line ____ Office Room No. ____

Are you a natural born U.S. citizen? Yes ✓ No ____

Name of Emergency Addressee JANETTE K. LYNCH

Address 7901 SW 120 ST, MIAMI, FLA Tel. No. 235-8730

Witting? Yes ✓ No ____ Relation WIFE

Alternate Emergency Addressee MRS. RUBY LYNCH

Address RT 1 BOX 46A VICTORIA, TEX

Tel. No. ____

Witting? Yes ____ No ✓ Relation STEP-MOTHER

Name of Spouse JANETTE K. LYNCH DOB 21 JUL 22

Name & Initials of Children JEFFREY R. LYNCH DOB 4 APR 44

SHARON ANN SYKES DOB 5 SEP 46

ROBERT T. LYNCH DOB 11 JAN 54

DOB ____

DOB ____

DOB ____

Please notify your friendly Personnel Office in the future of any changes, new births, etc. Thank You.

*Temporary Local Address HOWARD JOHNSON MOTEL

SPRINGFIELD, VA

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 13 June 1969
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, Grayston
3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off (Career Agent)
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: FOD
6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☒ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

QUALIFIED FOR OS MUST BE
SEEN IN OMS PRIOR OS PCS OR TDY

DONALD FAR

4-30-69

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: HELEN D. MCRAHAM
ROOM NO. & BUILDING: GH 62
EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Lynch has been receiving medical therapy in Florida since ~~December~~ 1968. Medical evaluation is requested at this time for duties as stated in the request for medical evaluation dated 10 October 1968, to include flying in aircraft.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED	**SECRET** (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1 / 6 2 / 7 3 / 8 4 / 9 5 / 10
BY ______ AT ______ Z	REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED		
DISSEM BY zcl PER ______ #	INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO ______ X-REF TO FILE NO ______ FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG		
ACTION SOD-6 ☐ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR. OP-2, WH-8, WH/COG-8, CCS-2, CSPS, OF-2, RI/AN		

S E C R E T 071601Z OCT 68 CITE JMWAVE 3212

DIRECTOR

7 OCT 68 IN 07474

CHAPPIE PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 38564

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO DEPARTED BY POV MORNING OF 6 OCTOBER. MAY BE EXPECTED 8 OCTOBER.

2. JMWAVE ADVANCED $250 AND ADVISED THAT TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE COMPUTED ON BASIS TRAIN TRAVEL.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 October 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, Grayston L.

3. POSITION TITLE: PM OPS OFF

4. GRADE: GS-14 Career Agent

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☒ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING:
EXT.:

10. COMMENTS Evaluation is requested for the performance of Paramilitary duties including ground and airborne operations and the training of personnel in these activities. Assignments may be domestic, but the primary requirement would be for overseas duty either TDY or most likely, PCS. As an employee of project IUJEWEL, a contingency program, Mr. Lynch should be available for duty with short notice, on a world-wide basis.
(Continued)

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DATE:
SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

Assignments either domestic or abroad will require that Mr. Lynch fly in aircraft. This requirement to fly may be not only for transportation purposes but could be a requirement of his assignment in connection with his PM work.

In addition to the technical aspects of any PM assignment, Mr. Lynch would be required to perform his duties using leadership ability, ~~xxxx~~ and good judgement in line with the covert aspect of his position.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY ______ AT ______ Z

DISSEM BY zc PER ______ #

ACTION
SOD-6 ☐ RID COPY

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO
FILE, VR. OP-2, WH-8, WH/COG-8, CCS-2, CSPS, OF-2, RI/AN

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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4		9	
5		10	

SECRET 071601Z OCT 68 CITE JMWAVE 3212

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

7 Oct 68 IN 07474

REF: DIRECTOR 38564

Irving Lynch

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO DEPARTED BY POV MORNING OF 6 OCTOBER. MAY BE EXPECTED 8 OCTOBER.

2. JMWAVE ADVANCED $250 AND ADVISED THAT TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE COMPUTED ON BASIS TRAIN TRAVEL.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: H. INGRAHAM:ps
UNIT: SOD/PERS
EXT: 4321
DATE: 02 OCTOBER 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

SECRET

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5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 48 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SOD6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG8, WH8, CSPS, CCS2, OP2, D/MS2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38564

03 21 Z 02 OCT 68

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERERENCES: A. UFGT-22428

B. WAL-0176

1. VOTACK AND HQS DIVISION OFFICIALS REVIEWED REF A PROPOSED BUT DETERMINED ANOTHER CONTINGENCY GROUP OF THIS TYPE WILL SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE.

2. HQS PURSUING ASSIGNMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVUONO BUT BECAUSE OF MEDICAL LIMITATIONS NOT YET ABLE IDENTIFY SUITABLE POSITION. DEVUONO MEDICAL DISPOSITION STATES HE DISQUALIFIED FOR PCS OVERSEAS; QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES ONLY IN NONFLYING STATUS.

3. IN VIEW REF B, AND DOUBTFUL ASSIGNMENT SITUATION REQUEST DEVUONO REPORT HQS TDY FOR CONSULTATION O/A 09 OCT. ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

CSPS/AGENT PANEL

WH/SS C. Kinson

C/CO6

5
4
3
2
1

William V. Broe
WILLIAM BROE
C/WH

Carroll L. Hamm for
RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

FORM 1304 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ORIG: C/JMWAVE-BATHRICK/bcp

EXT:

CONF:

INFO:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Instructions: Include precedence in address line. All messages routine unless indicated otherwise.

DATE: 9 SEPTEMBER 68

FILE CLASS:

OUT:

TO

INFO

CITE

SECRET [illegible] SEP 68 CITE JMWAVE [illegible]

DIRECTOR INFO JMCOBRA

REF: A. JMCOBRA 0688

B. DIRECTOR 29436

1. DISCUSSED CONTENTS OF REF. A. WITH IRVING C. DEVUONO WITHOUT REVEALING IDENS A. AND C. DEVUONO STATED THAT HE KNEW THE SOURCE OF THE REPORT AND THAT THE REPORT WAS A FABRICATION. DEVUONO AND IDENS A. AND C. WERE PROFESSIONALLY ACQUAINTED WHEN DEVUONO ACTIVELY OPERATING. IDENS VISITED SAFESITE AND KNEW DEVUONO AS WOFIRM.

2. DEVUONO PRESENTLY WORKING 200 YARDS FROM LOCATION OF BOAT OPERATED BY IDENS A. AND C. BOAT RECOGNIZED BY DEVUONO AS THE SEACRAFT THAT WAS UNDER DEVUONO'S CONTROL BEFORE DONATION. HE REMARKED TO IDENS A. AND C. THAT HE RECOGNIZED HIS OLD BOAT. NOTHING MORE WAS DISCUSSED OTHER THAN TO REPLY TO DIRECT QUESTIONING ON RANGE OF BOAT, WILLINGNESS TO HELP UNRAVEL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM, AND WHAT DEVUONO WAS DOING. REPLY TO LAST WAS THAT HE HAD RETIRED.

3. BELIEVE DEVUONO SUFFICIENTLY WARNED ABOUT FUTURE CONVERSATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

KENNETH W. BATHRICK
RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

REF: [illegible]

1. UNDERSTAND SUBJECT, ALTHOUGH TECHNICALLY UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF [illegible], IS STILL IN CONTACT WITH [illegible] STATION. THEREFORE, RATHER THAN INTRODUCE [illegible] UNDER DIFFERENT COVER TO [illegible] A AND B WOULD [illegible].

2. FOR [illegible]: PLEASE CONTACT [illegible] OF PERTINENT POINTS [illegible] AND ADVISE [illegible] OF [illegible] SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PERS FILE

235-8730 Will be in Monday

#06 45[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) Career Agent	DDP/WH	CP	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS-14	3	$16,897	08/14/67 [illegible]	GS-14	4	$18,641	08/11/68 [illegible]	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

pv

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

4-00000

RET

SOD 5776

2 JUL 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Finance,
Agent Payroll Branch

SUBJECT : Transfer of Responsibility for
Administration of Career Agent
Employee-Irving C. DEVUONO (P)

Responsibility for the administration of the contract of Irving C. DEVUONO is hereby transferred from Western Hemisphere Division to Special Operations Division effective 02 June 1968. Effective the same date, Subject's cost center number is transferred from WH Cost Center Number 8135-1164 to SOD Cost Center Number 8128-0183.

R.J. Goodhart
Chief, Support Staff, SOD

CONCUR:

Career Agent Panel

Chief, Support Staff, WH

SOD/PERS:ps
O & 1-Add.
1-SOD/PERS
1-WH/PERS
1-SOD/RI
1-CPD (Career Agent)

SECRET

File

[illegible]

[illegible] WAVE

REF: [illegible] AUG [illegible] *

SUBJECT MAY STATE THAT HE HAS APPLIED FOR ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] FOLLOWING [illegible] AND ACCEPTED FOR POSITION OF [illegible] OFFICER, GS-14, AT $14,937 P/A. [illegible] ON DUTY DATE NOT YET ESTABLISHED, BUT SHOULD BE PRIOR TO 1 AUG 68:

U.S. ARMY ELEMENT [illegible] OF [illegible] STAFF

THE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

PHONE - OXFORD 775[illegible]

PERSONNEL OFFICER: 1ST LT. FELIX G. [illegible]

S E C R E T

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

GH

Subject briefed on this 1 July 1968

* Station forced to backstop credit query for DEVUONO. Request provide subj with cover soonest as he no longer on WAVE payroll.

D/S
55

FORM 10-64 1304 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

ORIG: DCOS/S/BATHRICK/bmk

EXT: 251

CONF:

INFO: SS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

Instructions: Include precedence in address line. All messages routine unless indicated otherwise.

DATE: 21 JUNE 1968

FILE CLASS:

OUT: [illegible] 67

TO

INFO

CITE

S E C R E T

DIRECTOR

CITE JMWAVE [illegible]

WOTACK/WOGAME

1. STATION FORCED TO BACKSTOP CREDIT QUERY FOR IRVING C. DEVUONO WITH COVER COMPANY WHICH HAS BEEN DISSOLVED. QUERY WAS FROM CENTRAL CREDIT BUREAU FOR SMALL CAR LOAN. ANTICIPATE NO TROUBLE.

2. REQUEST WOTACK PROVIDE DEVUONO WITH COVER SOONEST AS HE NO LONGER ON JMWAVE PAYROLL.

END OF MESSAGE

G. Lynch

5
4
3
2
1

KENNETH W. BATHRICK
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

RELEASING OFFICER
XXXXXXXXXXXXX

CLASSIFICATION
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

MARK F. EFFIELD
RELEASING OFFICER

5
4
3
2
1

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG: C. DAMMINGER:AM
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 6 JUNE 1968

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4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: FE 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR , ~~ADY~~ 8, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2, D/MS 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CONFIDENTIAL 07 22 42z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 06569

TO VIENTIANE [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

REF: VIENTIANE 8130 [IN 98745]

REGRET ADVISE IRVING C. DEVUONO NO LONGER AVAILABLE VIENTIANE ASSIGNMENT DUE MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION. ATTEMPTING IDENTIFY NEW CANDIDATE THIS POSITION. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PERS Renneman (phone)

June 10

C/FE/TBL L. B. Dick

JOSEPH W. SMITH
ACFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

MARY T. BOULGER
C/FE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): LYNCH, Grayston

3. POSITION TITLE: PM Ops Off

4. GRADE: GS-14

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SOD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 4321

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD

STATION

TDY OR PCS

TYPE OF COVER

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA

STATION

NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☒ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE

HELEN D. INGRAHAM

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 3H 62

EXT.: 4321

10. COMMENTS

Subject qualified for assignment to Laos on 17 April. However, subsequent to this qualification he was seen by Dr. Robinson on 24 May 68. SOD will appreciate (in addition to overseas planning eval) advice re Hqs assignments recognizing that such assignment, if available, may require flying. If OMS considers that Medical retirement is a possibility, would appreciate advice in this regard also.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Disqualified for O/S PCS

DATE: 21 June 1968

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: Rex Hart

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(36)

14-00000

CHECK-OUT FORM

Departing personnel will carry this form from office to office during the last few days at the Station in order to obtain complete assurance that all obligations and commitments have been satisfied. The form will be turned in to the Personnel Office when initialed and dated by responsible personnel. Only when this is complete may the individual depart from the Station.

****

PCS/HQ.

NAME: Grayston Lynch DEPARTURE DATE: COB: 31 May 1968

ELEMENT	TOPIC	INITIALS OF PERSON APPROVING CLEARANCE	DATE
PERSONNEL	Fitness Report yes Service Agreement N/A		
FINANCE ✓	Accounts /Credit Union Loans:	Sta	6/4/68
	Payroll **	Sta	6/4/68
	Housing	Sta	6/4/68
LOG ✓	Transportation Equipment Return	JMG JMG	8/26/68
COVER ✓	Debriefing		3 June 68
TSB ✓	Documents Ed Weimin Photo		3 June 68
REGISTRY N/A	Top Secret Control		
SWITCHBOARD ✓	Telephone No.	JWZ	6/3/68
SECURITY ✓	Debriefing	JHD	6/3/68
MEDICAL N/A	Shot Record		
* ~~[illegible]~~	~~Debriefing & Equipment Return~~		
~~[illegible]~~ IS BRANCH	SI Clearance Bill Burke	BB	3/6/68
DCOS/O BRANCH ✓	Branch Chief	J.J.	
D/SUP ✓			
~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~C			
COS ✓			
PERSONNEL ✓	~~Insurance Card & Return Form~~		

* OPS Officers of SO, FI, CI, and MA Branches only.

** T&A must be turned in to Payroll at check-out time.

Eyes Only
Personal Info

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BY: AT:

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 7/1/21

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION C/WH/COG 2 ☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE. C/WH 6, C/SOD 3, C/CCS 2, C/CS 25, D/DP, D/MS 2

S E C R E T 282107Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2554

DIRECTOR

RYBAT

20 MAY 68 IN 20289

REFS: A. JMWAVE 2454 (IN 14872)

B. DIRECTOR 01889

SOD action

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO REPORTED IN TO THE STATION TODAY. HE TELLS US HE HAS BEEN RELEASED BY AKULE AND ASSIGNED TO WOTACK.

2. HE TELLS US ALSO THAT WOTACK ADVISED HIM TO RETURN HERE, CHECK OUT OF THE STATION AND THEN TAKE TWO MONTHS SICK LEAVE. IF THIS IS WHAT IS DESIRED BY HQS, STATION WILLL PROCESS HIM OUT AND PUT HIM ON SICK LEAVE STATUS AS OF 3 JUNE.

3. PLEASE CONFIRM AND ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

May 29

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ______ #

ACTION

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INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, WH/COG 8, CCS 2
CSPS, OP2,

1		6	
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S E C R E T 132154Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 0326

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REF DIRECTOR 92845

Compton Lynch

DEPARTURE DEVUONO FOR DEST ORIENTATION HEADQUARTERS DELAYED BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING SON. WILL ADVISE ETD WHEN KNOWN.

S E C R E T

BT

ACTION

13 MAY 68 IN 09929

JH

Helen - notify FE

SECRET

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) LYNCH, [illegible] L.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jan 23	3. GRADE GS-14 equiv
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP, FE, TBL	5. PRESENT POSITION Ops Off/C/A/ Miami	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION [illegible]
7. PROPOSED STATION Savannakhet, Laos	9. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Career Agent/Ops Officer	
8. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION Nominal AID	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 5 May 63	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 5

12. COMMENTS

Request re-evaluation of current medical taken in Miami and results forwarded H.Q.

13. DATE OF REQUEST 12 Apr 63	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL [illegible] FE/PERS/TBL	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 5 E 22	16. EXTENSION 6500

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

MEDICALLY QUALIFIED FOR
PROPOSED OS PCS
REX HART

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

4 17 63

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

(4)

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

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C/DO, SOD 6, CCS 3, CSPS
OP 3

SECRET 261051Z APR 68 CITE VIENTIANE 8130

26 APR 68 IN 98745

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO UDORN

ADMIN PERS

REF DIRECTOR 88672 (NOT SENT UDORN)

1. IN VIEW FAMILY NOT ACCOMPANYING, STATION PLANS ASSIGN IRVING C. DEVUONO NORTH LAOS VICE SAVANNAKHET. STATION NEEDS MATURE, EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL SUCH AS DEVUONO IN N. LAOS AND ESPECIALLY IN CYMOMENTUM.

2. DEVUONO WILL BE BODY FOR BODY REPLACEMENT FOR WALLACE J. BERNHAGEN BUT WILL HAVE DIFFERENT, MORE RESPONSIBLE POSITION AS OFFICER IN CHARGE ALL OPS IN ONE [illegible] PROVINCE, PROBABLY SAM NEUA. REASSIGN IDEN B FOVS [illegible] SAVANNAKHET REPLACE MONROE A. HALLWASS.

3. UNLESS HQS HAS INFO WHICH PRECLUDES IULANCE [illegible] PLS PROCESS SUBJ IULANCE AND SAVE LAST NOM ENOUGH [illegible] FOR PERSON WITH [illegible] SPECIAL COVER PROBLEM.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: JON L. MATTSON:JB
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 18 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER ______ # ______

CONF: FE8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE VR SOD6, CCS3, CSPS, OP2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CONFIDENTIAL 19 21 20 Z

TO VIENTIANE CITE DIRECTOR 92884

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: DIRECTOR 88672

DUE TO PERSONAL MATTERS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT OF FAMILY IRVING C. DEVUONO NOW PROGRAMMED TO ARRIVE HQS 13 MAY FOR TWO WEEKS TDY WITH ESTIMATED ARRIVAL FIELD MID JUNE. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA WHEN KNOWN.

Haughton Lynch

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL L. R. Deskin
SOD/PERS Joel Halpin (Phone)

WILLIAM E. NELSON
CFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

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MARY T. BOULGER
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

4-00000

38.

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: [illegible] 1963

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 27 PER ___ #

CONF: FE8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, WH/COG 8, SOD6, CCS3, CSPS, OP2

CONFIDENTIAL

19 20 10 Z

TO JMWAVE

CITE DIRECTOR 92845

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: JMWAVE 2080 (IN 93091)

PER REF REQUEST HQS CONCURS IN NEW REPORTING DATE OF 13 MAY.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL J. D. Haase (in draft)

SOD/PERS [illegible] (by phone)

WH/CONTR [illegible]

WILLIAM V. [illegible]
C/FE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

MARY [illegible]
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 27/21 PER ________

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ________ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION
SCD 1

☒ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2

S E C R E T 172326Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2080

17 APR 68 IN 93091

ACTION

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REF JMWAVE 1883 (IN 83242)

Frazelton Lynch

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO HAS JUST PURCHASED A HOUSE FOR HIS FAMILY TO OCCUPY WHILE HE IS IN LAOS. SEVERAL PROBLEMS OF SETTLEMENT HAVE OCCURRED REQUIRING MORE TIME AND ATTENTION THAN ANTICIPATED.

2. DEVUONO REQUESTS PERMISSION TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE WITH A HQS EOD DATE OF 13 MAY. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

Action transferred
Mary Please transfer
Action to Dale Storgaard
FE/TBL/Pers X6588.
Make copy the cable +
send to Dale —

Alice Dele

SECRET

14-00000

7

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION SOD 6

☒ RID COPY

INFO. FILE , FE 8

ACTION

64

ACTION CHANGE

SAIGON 1360
(STATION & NUMBER)

IN 93010-A
(IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM FE
(DIVISION)

TO SOD
(DIVISION)

BY William Bright FE
(NAME DIVISION AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH Helen Ingram SOD
(NAME DIVISION AND EXTENSION)

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: 7765
DATE: 11 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 30

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(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 12 00 15 Z
CITE DIRECTOR (elite) (reference number) 90842 (pica)

TO JMWAVE

REF: JMWAVE 1982 (IN 89105

1. REGRET THAT DEVUONO REACTED STRONGLY TO REQUEST OF HQS (CHAIRMAN BOARD OF REVIEW SHORTAGES AND LOSSES) FOR DISCUSSION IN SETTLEMENT DEVUONO LOSS OF OFFICIAL FUNDS.

2. CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF REVIEW SHORTAGES AND LOSSES WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE DURING PERIOD 12-21 APRIL FOR DISCUSSION WITH DEVUONO OF RESOLUTION LOSS OF OFFICIAL FUNDS.

3. AGREE THIS MATTER MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR DEVUONO PCS LAOS. AS HE IS NOW DUE IN HQS 24 APRIL, DEVUONO HAS APPOINTMENT WITH CHAIRMAN ON 25 APRIL AT 11:00 A.M.

END OF MESSAGE

2541
513 Key Bldg.

OP MR. STRICKLAND (TELECON)

C/WH/COG Paul E. Christ

George R. [illegible]
WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WH/D

Elliott Gilbert
ELLIOTT C. [illegible]
C/WH/SSS

Apr 12

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
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INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8 of 2

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5		10	

S E C R E T 102156Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1982

10 Apr 68 IN 58105

DIRECTOR

REF: DIRECTOR 89799

1. CONTENTS OF REF DISCUSSED WITH DEVUONO WHO REACTED VERY STRONGLY. ALTHOUGH INFORMED THAT CABLE DID NOT REJECT CLAIM, DEVUONO CLEARLY ANTICIPATES THAT REJECTION WOULD COME FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS AT HEADQUARTERS. DEVUONO STATED THAT THE BOARD HAD ALL THE FACTS, THAT HE COULD ADD NOTHING TO WHAT HAD BEEN WRITTEN AND THAT "HQS DISCUSSIONS" WAS EUPHEMISM FOR REJECTION.

2. DEVUONO HAS SUFFERED LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BEFORE AND DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE WAS PROPERLY CONPENSATED. HE CITES MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HE ENCOUNTERED DURING AND AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS WHEN MANY OFFICERS MADE EXTENSIVE PROMISES WITHOUT AUTHORITY OR ABILITY TO FOLLOW-THROUGH. AT PRESENT DEVUONO SCHEDULED TO GO TO LAOS LEAVING HIS FAMILY IN THE JMWAVE AREA. IT DESIRABLE THAT DECISION THIS CLAIM BE MADE SOONEST.

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

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FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 1922 SECRET

3. JMWAVE SUGGESTS THAT HQS REQUEST DEVUONO TDY FOR DISCUSSION AND DEFINITIVE SOLUTION HIS CLAIM REQUESTS BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LAOS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

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FILE. VR. WH8, FE8, CCS3, OPS, CF2, OF2

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ACTION

OPS

OS

EV

REG

S E C R E T 052309Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1948

6 APR 68 IN 86248

DIRECTOR

REFS: A. UFGT 20371, 6 OCT 67

B. UFGS 9844, 7 SEPT 67

C. UFGT 20022, 9 AUG 67

IRVING C. DEVUONO WILL BE DEPARTING JMWAVE IN MAY FOR AN OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT IN FE DIVISION. IT IS REQUESTED THAT ANSWERS TO REFERENCES A AND B BE SENT TO THE STATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

S E C R E T

BT

Lynch

4/17/68

SECRET

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INFO
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S E C R E T 0021608Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1880

2 Apr 68 IN 83242

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS

REFS A. DIRECTOR 87647

B. UFGT 21553

Ca-027

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO WILL REPORT HQS 0900 24 APRIL.

2. DEVUONO'S DEPENDENTS WILL NOT ACCOMPANY HIM TO LAOS.

3. MEDICAL EXAM ON DEVUONO FORWARDED TO HQS VIA REF B.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL TELEPOUCH

DISP. NO - FVSS-11752
DATE - 19 MARCH 1968
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, VIETNAM
INFO - NONE
FROM - ACTING CHIEF, FAR EAST DIVISION
SUBJ - NOMINATION OF CAREER AGENT --IDEN
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - NONE

HQS PLEASED TO NOMINATE IDEN, A GS-14 CAREER AGENT, FOR AN ASSIGNMENT TO VIETNAM. DOB 14 JUNE 1923. SUBJECT MARRIED WITH TWO SONS AGES 19 AND 14 AND A DAU AGE 22. SLIGHT FRENCH. SUBJECT JOINED WOFIRM IN FEB 1961, AFTER COMPLETING 21 YEARS OF SERVICE WITH THE US ARMY. HIS LAST ASSIGNMENT WHILE IN THE ARMY WAS A TWO YEAR TOUR OF DUTY IN LAOS AS A CAPT. IN THE SPECIAL FORCES. AFTER A BRIEF TRAINING AND ADMIN PROCESSING PERIOD IN HQS, HE WAS ASSIGNED PCS TO JMWAVE IN AUG 1961 AND HAS BEEN ASSIGNED THERE AS A PM SPECIAL OPS OFFICER SINCE THAT DATE. SUBJECT IS A PROFICIENT AND COMPETENT OPS OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT TO JMWAVE HAS CONTINUOUSLY SHOWN AN OUTSTANDING PROFICIENCY IN THE SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS AGENTS. HE MAINTAINED THE MORALE OF HIS 30 AGENTS ABD KEPT THEM AT A HIGH LEVEL OF PROFICIENCY BY A STRONG TRAINING SCHEDULE AND BY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING OPS IN THE FIELD OF RECONNAISSANCE, CACHING, DECEPTION AND SPECIAL OPS/INTEL COLLECTIONS OPS. SUBJECT IS A HARD WORKER, CAPABLE ADMINISTRATOR AND AN ABLE AGENT HANDLER WHO GETS ALONG WELL WITH HIS CONTEMPORARIES. HE IS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED AS A SECTION SUPERVISOR IN THE SPECIAL OPS BRANCH AND HAS TWO OFFICERS AND ONE SECRETARY

FE/PERS/VNO DEWALLACE X5459
VNO JCASWELL
CFE/PERS LCLARITY
C/WH/COG PHILLIPS
CCS/OCU EFITZGERALD

SOD/PERS JHALPIN
WH/CONTR MARTIN
CSPS/AGENT PANEL REDMOND

RELEASE ACFE

UNDER HIS SUPERVISION. SUBJECT HAS BEEN RATED STRONG IN THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, AND WAS PROMOTED TO GS-14 EQUIV IN AUG 1967. AVAILABLE FOR EARLY JUNE L968 ARRIVAL. DEFER TO STATION FOR DETERMINATION OF SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENT. COMPLETE BIO PROFILE FOLLOWS VIA POUCH. PLEASE ADVISE.

EWAN W. FASOLT

DISTRIBUTION

3 COS, VIETNAM VIA TP

CONFIDENTIAL TELEPOUCH S/C/A TO FVSS-11752 TO COS,
VIETNAM 29 MARCH 1968
IDEN - MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH

CONFIDENTIAL TELEPOUCH S/C/A TO FVSS-11752

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
[redacted]. Irving [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH
14 Jun [illegible]

3. GRADE
GS-14 equiv

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)
DDP/FE/TBL

5. PRESENT POSITION
Ops Off/C/A/ Miami

6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
6588

7. PROPOSED STATION
Savannkhet, Laos

8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)
Career Agent/Ops Officer

9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION
Nominal AID

10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE
4 May 68

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
0

12. COMMENTS
Request re-evaluation of current medical taken in Miami and results forwarded Hqs.

13. DATE OF REQUEST
12 Apr 68

14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
Dale R. Skovgaard
FE/PERS/TBL

15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING
5 E 22

16. EXTENSION
6588

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION
Approved by OMS-17 Apr 68

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION
Approved by OS/PSD 17 Apr 68

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION
Qualified for Proposed Assignment
Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
Date) 15 [illegible] 1968
/s/
Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-66 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A [redacted] GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jun 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Equiv GS-14	5. SD Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*

☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)* 11 July 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency, commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Uses Agents assigned him for collection of information on illegal activities of local Cuban refugees.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-61 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During most of the period reported on, Subject was concerned with administrative problems associated with the phase-out of the Station. Despite the consequent operational lull, Subject continued to maintain a satisfactory degree of morale in agents assigned him, worked up and implemented realistic training programs, and continued to develop excellent targets studies against the possibility of a policy change. In addition, important information collected locally by Subject on illegal activities of Cuban refugees was of great interest to other agencies offices in the area. Subject was the only Station source of such information which was acquired only because of Subject's ability to maintain rapport with agents, terminated during the period because of the cutback in infiltration operations.

It could also be noted as Subject finishes his long tour at this Station and prepares for his next assignment, that he is a thoroughly professional intelligence officer and is, in many ways, an outstanding one. Technically, he is an expert on infiltration tactics and, though his Special Forces experience, an expert on anti-guerrilla warfare as well. Just as important, is his ability to gain respect and rapport with foreign agents. He has an imaginative approach to operations, is resourceful in devising tactics, and determined in carrying out his assignments. He is a definite asset to WOFIRM.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 April 68	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /S/ [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal) [redacted]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Branch Chief, Special Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.) John Hannon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's comments and overall evaluation of Subject's performance. Please see Subject's previous Fitness Reports for additional remarks on Subject's performance by this Reviewing Officer.

DATE 24 April 68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station/ Operations	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

ORIG: JON L. MATTSON:JB
UNIT: FE/PERS/TEL
EXT: 6582
DATE: 18 APRIL 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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CONFIDENTIAL 19 21 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 92882

TO VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

REF: DIRECTOR 88672

Ca 97

DUE TO PERSONAL MATTERS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT OF FAMILY IRVING C. DEVUONO NOW PROGRAMMED TO ARRIVE HQS 13 MAY FOR TWO WEEKS TDY WITH ESTIMATED ARRIVAL FIELD MID JUNE. WILL ADVISE FIRM ETA WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TEL
SOD/PERS Jack Nelson (Phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM E. NELSON
CFE
RELEASING OFFICER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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MARY T. [illegible]
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

ORIG: Dale Skovgaard:mas
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 29 March 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 44

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BY 32 PER

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CONFIDENTIAL 1 21 44 Z

TO JMWAVE CITE DIRECTOR 87647

ADMIN PERS CHAPPIE

1. IRVING C. DEVUONO HAS BEEN ACCEPTED FOR ASSIGNMENT SAVANNAKHET, LAOS IN MAY 68. SUBJECT SHOULD REPORT TO HQS SOON~~EST~~ AS FEASIBLE FOR APPROX 2 WEEKS TDY BRIEFINGS AND PROCESSING UNDER NOMINAL LNGROW COVER. WHEN PROCESSING COMPLETED DEVUONO CAN RETURN TO MIAMI, THEN DEPART PCS FOR LAOS. SUBJECT AND DEPENDENTS SHOULD TAKE MEDICALS SOONEST AND HAVE RESULTS FORWARDED HQS.

2. PLEASE ADVISE SUBJECT'S ARRIVAL HQS. SUGGEST USE JMPIGEON.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL L. R. Devlin
SOD/PERS JACK HALPIN (PHONE)
WH/~~PERS~~ CONTR. J. A. Martin
VNO HERB BURROWS (PHONE)
VNO/PERS D. Wallace

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

MARY T. BOULGER
CFE/PERS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

DATE: 22 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/OP
Benefits and Services Division

This is to advise you that Irving C. Devuono has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 1 November 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/SOD.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

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L. MATTSON:jd
UNIT: FE/PERS/TBL
EXT: 6588
DATE: 19 MARCH 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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21 23

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 04565

VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS

IRVING C. DEVUONO, IDENTITY, IN WHOM STATION PREVIOUSLY HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST, MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR LAOS ASSIGNMENT IN MAY. ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR VIETNAM ASSIGNMENT. QUERY STATION'S CURRENT INTEREST IN DEVUONO FOR PM ASSIGNMENT. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

CFE/TBL

FE/PERS/VNO Mr. Bright (signed)

C/VNO Mr. Caswell (signed)

Joseph W. Smith
ACFE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Mar T. Boulger
CFE/PERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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ORIG: [illegible] :JB
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 19 MARCH 196[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

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INFO: FILE VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

CONFIDENTIAL

CITE DIRECTOR 04506

VIENTIANE

ADMIN PERS

REF: DIRECTOR 94525

IDENTITY - MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH

END OF MESSAGE

JOSEPH W. SMITH
ADFE
RELEASING OFFICER

CFE/TEL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

MARY T. [illegible]
CFE/PERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

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☐ YES ☐ NO

TO FILE NO.

FILE NO.

RET. TO BRANCH ☐

☐ SIG.

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, WH/COG 8, OP 2, CCS 3, CSPS, FE 8,

S E C R E T 061932Z MAR 63 CITE JMWAVE 1556

6MAR63 IN 65008

DIRECTOR

CHAPPIE PERS JMWALLOP

REF: DIRECTOR 83039

DEVUONO ARRIVING 1030 HOURS 7 MARCH VIA NAL FLT 100. WILL CALL IDEN REF.

S E C R E T

SECRET

File – G. Lynch

CORAL GABLES FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
2501 Ponce de Leon Boulevard
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Telephone 444-3541

VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT

TO Concord Research Corporation (261 SW 6th Street, Miami, Fla.)
P.O. Box 5046, Miami, Fla. 33101

RE Grayston L. Lynch

An application for credit has been made by your employee whose name is shown above.

We would appreciate your forwarding a confirmation of the applicant's employment for our confidential use. Our stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your reply.

Date Employed	Position Held	Annual Earnings	Permanent or Temporary
Jan 1962	Project Manager	$16,800 per year	Permanent

Martha R. [illegible]
for Daniel S. Kolar
Vice-President

Note: Mr. Lynch said he will take full responsibility for above. He did not wish to use Charles S. Wilson Assoc. & Ace Cartography Co. Under these covers he was paid out of Hqs and filed covert returns only. He was assigned to Concord when everyone at the station was transferred over to some cover entitiy so that they could file income returns overtly only.

Above is for a conventional bank loan to purchase a home and is more or less routine.

3/18/68
[illegible] OK

Backdated to show continuity of employment

M-520

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: B.WEYLAND:ps
UNIT: SOD/PERS
EXT: 4321
DATE: 4 MARCH 1968

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 2K PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: SOD6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, WH/COG-8, CCS 3 FE8, CSPS, OP2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 5 21 24 Z CITE DIRECTOR 0003[illegible]

6 MAR 1968

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERENCE: JMWAVE 1472 (IN61817)

Grayston Lynch

IRVING C. DEVUONO UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR VIETNAM ASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HE REPORT TO HQS TDY FOR DISCUSSIONS IN THIS CONNECTION 7 MARCH 68 AND CALL IDEN FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PERS L. Palmer (Telcon)
WH/COG Ortman (Telecon)
FE/VNO Caswell (Telecon)
FE/VNO/PERS D. Wallace (Telecon)
SOD/GB Porter (Draft)

BW

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

Philip

RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SECRET

ORIG:	B.WEYLAND:ps
UNIT:	SOD/PERS
EXT:	4321
DATE:	4 MARCH 1968

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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5		10	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 38 PER ____ #____

CONF: SOD6 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, WH/COG [illegible]
FE8, CSPS, 6P2

(elite) (classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET [illegible] 21 24 Z CITE DIRECTOR 80040

6 MAR 1968

TO JMWAVE

CHAPPIE PERS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 80039

IDENTITY - MRS. BETTY R. WEYLAND, EXT. 4321.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/PERS L. Palmer (Telecon)
WH/COG Ortman (Telecon)
FE/VNO Caswell (Telecon)
FE/VNO/PERS D. Wallace (Telecon)
SOD/GB Porter (Draft)

JH
BRW

Philip L Donaldson

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

RAYMOND J. GOODHART
C/SOD/SS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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E 22

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM 4

ACTION C/WH/COG 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, C/WH6, C/SOD 3 C/OPSER, C/CCS 3 C/CSPS

S E C R E T 011645Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1472 [illegible] 61617)

DIRECTOR

RYBAT WOTACK IUJEWEL JMWALLOP

REF [illegible] 20215

PER REF IRVING C. DEVUONO MADE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE REASSIGNMENT. DEVUONO HAS NOW BEEN WITHOUT ANY MEANINGFUL WORK FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS AND IS BEGINNING TO SHOW THE EFFECTS THIS INACTIVITY. SUBJECT REQUESTS AND JMWAVE STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EARLY REASSIGNMENT. PLEASE ADVISE. CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR HQS ANY CONSULTATION AT ANYTIME.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (use pseudo only if SA): Grayston L. Lynch	DATE (from item 5-D): 12 Jan 68	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true): John Hannon	DATE (from item 5-2): 12 Jan 68
DATE RECEIVED AT HEADQUARTERS: 22 Jan 68	DISPATCH NUMBER: UFGT-21043	DATE RECEIVED BY CAREER SERVICE:	

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 23	2. SERVICE DESIGN: D	3. YOUR CURRENT POSITION, TITLE AND GRADE: Operations Officer (CA) GS-14	4. STATION OR BASE: JMWAVE	5. CRYPT FOR CURRENT COVER: JMOCEAN

6a. DATE OF PCS ARRIVAL IN FIELD: 1 June 61	6b. REQUESTED DATE OF DEPARTURE: Available at	6c. EXPECTED DATE OF FIRST CHECK-IN AT HQ: any time. ----	6d. DESIRED DATE TO REPORT TO DUTY AFTER LEAVE: ------------

7. NUMBER AND AGES OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL TRAVEL WITH YOU:

3 dependents, ages 14, 18, 44

8. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

Regardless of timing of assignment perfor that family remain in Miami area until end of school year.

9. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING CURRENT TOUR (see special note on transmittal form). (also attach personal cover questionnaire in accordance with CSI-F 240-8).

a. Principal SO Case Officer since 1961 for Commando Group, which varied in strength from 24 to 42 agents, and maintenance of 9 infiltration craft.

b. Conceived, planned and conducted over 70 overwater penetration operations into denied areas by the Commando Group and infiltration craft; operations included sabotage, raids, infiltration and exfiltration of agents, ELINT, caching, deception and reconnaissance operations.

c. Case Officer for an average of 4 reporting assets on Intel/CI type missions in exile community.

10 MAR 1963 [illegible]

10. TRAINING DESIRED:
INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS

a. CSR
b. Desk orientation
c. Training in language of area of assignment, if appropriate.

FORM 202 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-63

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

11. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

11A. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF DIFFERENT FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9 ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICE.

Prefer assignment as Special Operations Case Officer in operationally active area.

11B. INDICATE IF YOU DESIRE TO EXTEND YOUR CURRENT TOUR BY CHECKING IN APPROPRIATE BOX. ALSO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR NEXT REGULAR ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING 1, 2, & 3 (*for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice*) IN REMAINING BOXES. COMPLETE ALL ALTERNATE CHOICES AND OPTIONS IN ALL CASES EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION OF YOUR TOUR.

☐ EXTEND TOUR ________ MONTHS AT CURRENT STATION TO ________ (DATE).

2 BE ASSIGNED TO HQTRS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY: INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF DIVISION, STAFF OR OFFICE.
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE FE 3RD CHOICE Africa

1 BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION: INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIALIZATION
1ST CHOICE WH 2ND CHOICE FE 3RD CHOICE Africa

☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

TO BE COMPLETED BY FIELD STATION

12. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject's service experience and performance at this Station make him an ideal choice for an assignment as requested in Para 11 above. He is an activist who will put his full energy into any appropriate assignment. Station recommends that he be given an assignment of his choice as soon as possible. He can be spared immediately.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS OFFICE

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF YOUR COMPONENT, INDICATE YOUR COMPONENT'S RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING.

WH Division regrets to advise that it has been unable to locate a suitable assignment for Subject within the Division. Since Mr. Lynch is employed under the IU JEWEL project, it is recommended that he be referred to SOD for his next assignment.

DATE 20 Feb 68 TITLE C/WH/Pers SIGNATURE Henry L. Berthold

FOR USE BY CAREER SERVICE

14. APPROVED ASSIGNMENT:

15. EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH NO. ________ DATED: ________

CABLE NO. ________ DATED: ________

CAREER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE: ________ (SIGNATURE) DATE: ________

SECRET

SECRET RYBAT TELEPOUCH

[illegible] ②

DISP NO - UFGT-20915

DATE - 26 DECEMBER 1967

TO - CHIEF, WHD

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOTACK - CHIEF, WOMOLD

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - RYBAT - AVAILABILITY CAREER AGENT /GS-14/ OF IRVING C. DEVUONO FOR REASSIGNMENT

DUE TO AN EXTENSIVE CUTBACK IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS AT JMWAVE STATION, DICTATED BY REASONS OF ECONOMY AS WELL AS A CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL POLICY, THE SERVICES OF IRVING C. DEVUONO ARE NO LONGER NEEDED AND HE MAY BE CONSIDERED AVAILABLE FOR REASSIGNMENT. RESUMES OF DEVUONO'S WOFIRM AND PRE-WOFIRM EXPERIENCE, PREFERENCE AS TO REASSIGNMENT AND SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS ON DEVUONO'S PERFORMANCE FOLLOW.

WOFIRM EXPERIENCE

1. FOLLOWING RETIREMENT FROM THE U. S. ARMY IN 1960, DEVUONO ENTERED WOFIRM 1 FEBRUARY 1961 AS CONTRACT AGENT GS-11. HE WAS CONVERTED TO CAREER AGENT, GS-13 IN MID-1961 AND WAS PROMOTED TO GS-14 LEVEL IN LATE 1967.

2. DEVUONO'S FIRST ASSIGNMENT WITH WOFIRM WAS AS PM OFFICER IN THE BAY OF PIGS TASK FORCE. HE ENGAGED IN THE LAST STAGES OF PREPARATION FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION AND ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE LANDING AND SUBSEQUENT RESCUE OPERATIONS. FOR HIS PERFORMANCE, HE WAS DECORATED BY THE THEN CHIEF, WOFIRM.

3. DEVUONO WAS THEN ASSIGNED TO THE JMWAVE STATION AND HAS FULFILLED THE FUNCTION OF PM OFFICER ASSIGNED AS CASE OFFICER FOR THE AMLILAC COMMANDO GROUP WHICH HAS VARIED IN STRENGTH OVER THE YEARS FROM 42 TO 24 TRAINED ASSETS. ONE OF DEVUONO'S MOST IMPORTANT TASKS HAS BEEN CONCEIVING, PLANNING AND BRIEFING OF THE AMLILAC TEAM ON JMWAVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [illegible]

DEVUONO'S TASKS WERE CENTERED AROUND TRAINING AND RUNNING OPERATIONS INTO THE DENIED AREA. THESE OPERATIONS INCLUDED SABOTAGE, RAIDS, INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION OF SO TEAMS ON VOLENS MISSIONS, RECONNAISANCE, AND ELINT DECEPTION OPERATIONS. BECAUSE THE AMLILAC GROUP HAS ALSO MANNED AND OPERATED THE INFILTRATION CRAFT ASSIGNED TO THE ACTIVITY, SUBJECT HAS ALSO BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERALL SUPERVISION OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONAL USE OF SOME 17 SMALL CRAFT, AS WELL AS INSURING THAT BOAT CREWS MAINTAINED THEIR PROFICIENCY.

PRE-WOFIRM EXPERIENCE

1. PRIOR TO JOINING WOFIRM, DEVUONO SERVED IN THE U. S. ARMY FOR 21 YEARS, RETIRING AS A CAPTAIN IN LATE 1960. THE LAST FIVE YEARS OF HIS ARMY CAREER WERE SPENT IN SPECIAL FORCES UNITS WHERE HE SERVED AS TEAM LEADER OF OPERATIONAL TEAMS AND AS AIR OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER. DEVUONO SERVED IN FRANCE AND GERMANY FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, IN PANAMA, PUERTO RICO AND CUBA, AND THE BETTER PART OF ONE YEAR IN LAOS. HE IS QUALIFIED IN ALL PHASES OF SPECIAL FORCES AND AIRBORNE OPERATIONS - SPECIAL NOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS MASTER PARACHUTIST, RADIO OPERATOR, AND SPECIAL FORCES INSTRUCTOR.

ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE

1. SO CASE OFFICER IN ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
2. SO CASE OFFICER IN ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. SO CASE OFFICER IN MIDDLE EAST OR AFRICA
4. INSTRUCTOR

SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS

1. DEVUONO'S PERFORMANCE AT JMWAVE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT HE IS EXTREMELY WELL QUALIFIED IN ALL PHASES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS WORK. DESPITE, OR PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF, HIS ELEVEN YEARS EXPERIENCE IN THIS FIELD, HE RETAINS DEDICATION AND ENTHUSIASM

FOR HIS WORK, AS REFLECTED BY HIS CONSTANT SEARCH TO IMPROVE MODUS OPERANDI. HIS TARGET STUDIES AND PREPARATION FOR OPERATION HAVE UNIFORMLY DEMONSTRATED HIS CONSCIENTIOUS APPROACH TO THE TASK AND A THOROUGHNESS THAT COMES FROM EXPERIENCE. HE IS A STRONG LEADER, AND HAS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT RAPPORT WITH HIS AGENT PERSONNEL, THUS GAINING THEIR ACCEPTANCE FOR THE HIGH LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE HE EXPECTS.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING, DEVUONO IS ALWAYS ALERT TO WOLENS REQUIREMENTS, BOTH AS A BY-PRODUCT AS WELL AS THE PRIME OBJECTIVE OF CERTAIN OPERATIONS HE HAS DIRECTED. HE HAS ALWAYS USED HIS AGENT PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY HIS PRINCIPAL AGENT, AS SOURCES OF WOLENS OPERATIONAL AND TARGET INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM THE EXILE COMMUNITY.

3. THE STATION FEELS THAT DEVUONO IS A HIGHLY VALUABLE ASSET TO OUR ORGANIZATION AND RECOMMENDS HIM WITHOUT QUALIFICATION FOR ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHIN HIS FIELD.

HAROLD V. KARABLY

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

WH/COG

WOTACK

WOMOLD

1 - RYBAT CHRONO
1 - C/SSB
1 - DCOS/O
1 - C/SO CHRONO

ORIGINATING
C/SO HAROLD V. KARABLY

COORDINATING
DCOS/O FJI

RELEASING
COS FREDERICK J. IN[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4160
DATE: 26 October 1967

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: FILE , VR WH/COG 8, CA2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 27 17 53 Z CITE DIRECTOR 17233

TO JMWAVE

Car Agt.

TERM OF IRVING C. DEVUONO CONTRACT IN ERROR. STATION AUTHORIZED DELETE PHRASE "TWO YEARS" AND INSERT "INDEFINITE PERIOD".

END OF MESSAGE

CPD Mr. Brooks (telecoord)

SOD/Pers Mrs. Ingraham (telecoord)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 28 June 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. Devuono Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 28 June 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Louis F. Thurland. Louis F. THURLAND
DATE 7/3/1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Hugh R. Dendy Hugh R. DENDY

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUOMD, Irving C.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 23
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: Equiv GS-13
5. SD: Career Agent
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Career Agent
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH/COG
8. CURRENT STATION:

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1967 - 10 July 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Section Supervisor of one of the four sections within Special Operations Branch. Section consists of two officers and one secretary.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Responsible for the supervision of a 25 man indigenous commando group. Group consists of 2 operational intelligence collection teams, 4 infiltration team boat crews and an 8 man alert/contingency commando team.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Responsible for the recruiting, training, administration and operational matters for the 25 agents involved in infiltration/exfiltration operations into a denied area.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administrative duties for Section operations to include financial support, supplies and equipment, clearances, cover, real estate and intra-Station coordination.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Reporting to include operational, contact, quarterly/monthly reports and other required correspondence, preparation of operational plans and training schedules/syllabuses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period under review, Subject has continued to produce at his previous high level and he has planned and executed three intelligence collection operations against a denied area with the two teams under his supervision and direction. His leadership qualities have, to a large degree, enabled him to maintain his commando group morale at a high level under the difficult circumstances of enforced inactivity. Subject's indigenous agents respect him and are willing to follow his instructions to the letter. Subject's seemingly limitless resourcefulness, drive and initiative coupled with his demonstrated proficiency for this type of work mark him as one of the few persons known to the Rater who is ideally suited to this particular type of agent handling on a day-to-day, face-to-face basis.

During the reporting period Subject has committed his four infiltration boat teams on a total of seven operations and excellent results have been realized. He has conducted extensive testing of equipment and techniques in support of Station requirements and Headquarters requests. His reporting after these field tests has shown that his reporting ability has improved to such a degree to warrant a rating of strong in this duty.

He is cost and security conscious and has demonstrated his effectiveness in the use of personnel, equipment and operational funds. Subject has not had the benefit of formal language training and does not have a definitive language capability. In view of his long tenure of field assignments during his career with WOFACT, it is recommended he be given

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
28 June 1967	Irving C. DEVUONO signed in pseudo on fld. transmittal

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
6 Months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
28 June 1967	Deputy Chief, SO Branch	John F. Murnane signed in pseud on fld. trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject continues to show professional ability in handling the Commando Group. In addition he has been deeply involved in planning and executing intelligence gathering operations. He has adapted to this new field and is performing overall in an outstanding manner.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
July 3, 1967	Chief, Special Operations Branch	George D. Frenchon signed in pse. fld. trans.

SECRET

Continuation of Section C/Narrative Comments

serious consideration for formal training and orientation prior to his next assignment within WOFACT.

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Davuono

Dear Mr. Davuono:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract employee~~ Career Agent under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective 1 June 1961, is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

(Continuity of Service)

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

4. This agreement is effective as of 1 Mar 1967 and shall continue thereafter for two (2) years [illegible] unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Irving C. Devuono

WITNESS:

____

APPROVED:

____

7:C/PC
15 Aug 1967

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 40

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1		5	
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ACTION 7

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

FILE WH8 2026 CCS 3 CSPS CPSER 1G 2
DDS 2 ADDP DDP SECUR 4

SECRET 111628Z CITE JMWAVE 8135

11 Jul 67 IN 09257

DIRECTOR

REF: FHB 30-1 PARA 44

MR. GRAYSON LYNCH LOST $980.00 OF OFFICIAL FUNDS DURING TRAINING PHASE OF OPERATION EAGLE. COMPLETE REPORT WILL FOLLOW AFTER INVESTIGATION.

SECRET

BT

Delivered
gm 7/11/67

SECRET

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SOD 7-750

30 JUN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Grayston L. Lynch
Recommendation for Promotion to GS-14

1. I am forwarding with my endorsement the recommendation from JMWAVE that Mr. Grayston Lynch, GS-13, Step 6, be promoted to GS-14, Step 3.

2. Mr. Grayston L. Lynch was employed by the Agency in February 1961 and has served as a Career Agent with JMWAVE at the equivalent of grade GS-13 since June 1961. He has an excellent record with the Agency and was presented the Intelligence Star for meritorious duty and heroism under hazardous conditions performed in the Spring of 1961. During his entire tour with JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Operations Officer he has shown strong leadership qualities and has demonstrated outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents.

3. Based on the foregoing, I strongly recommend that Mr. Lynch be promoted to GS-14.

Bruce B. Cheever
Chief,
Special Operations Division

Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel
(Date) 3 AUG 1967
Len Collins
Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

SECRET

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

RYBAT
SECRET

21 April 1967

WSO- 3004

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station

THRU : DCOS/S

FROM : Chief, Special Operations Branch

SUBJECT: Promotion Recommendation - Irving C. DEVUONO

Distribution:
1-COS
H&D 1-REG (Dummy)
1-C/SO Chrono (Dummy)
1-C/SO/Pers

1. Irving C. DEVUONO is 43 years of age. He joined WOFACT as a Contract Agent 10 February 1961 after completing 21 years of service with the U.S. Army. His last assignment while in the Army was a two-year tour of duty in Laos as a captain in the Special Forces. After a brief training and administrative processing period in Headquarters WOFACT, he was assigned to JMWAVE PCS on 27 August 1961 as a GS-13 Career Agent. He has been assigned to JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Special Operations Officer since that date.

2. DEVUONO is a proficient and competent Operations Officer whose performance during his six-year assignment to JMWAVE has continuously shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents. He has used his knowledge and experience, gathered over a 21 year period with the Army, to an outstanding degree. He has maintained the morale of his 30 agents and kept them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and implementing operations in the field of reconnaissance, caching, deception and Special Operations/intelligence collection operations. During the past eight months he has recruited, trained and operationally committed two intelligence collection teams into PBRUMEN. Subject is a hard worker, capable administrator and a very able agent handler. He has the ability to gain the respect of his agents by his general knowledge of tradecraft matters and his ability to plan operations. He is a personally rugged individual and has established good rapport with a wide variety of agent types. Subject gets along well with his contemporaries. He is presently assigned as a section supervisor in the Special Operations Branch and has two officers and one secretary under his supervision. He manages and supervises his section in an able manner.

Grayston Lynch

SECRET

RYBAT

3. Subject has been in grade since June 1961. His performance to date has been exceptionally proficient and he is recommended highly by the Special Operations Branch. It is the writer's opinion that Subject is fully capable of carrying out the assigned duties that are commensurate with a promotion to Grade GS-14.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

AT

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WOTACK

INFO.
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
CHAPPIE DYVOUR PERS
Irving C. DEVUONO - Promotion Recommendation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: UFGS-9396, dated 7 April 1967

1. The referenced dispatch requested the Station's comments relative to Subject's performance and other qualifications for promotion consideration. The following is a recommendation for promotion for Subject to GS-14.

2. Subject is 43 years of age. He joined WOFACT as a Contract Agent 10 February 1961 after completing 21 years of service with the U. S. Army. His last assignment while in the Army was a two year tour of duty in Laos as a Captain in the Special Forces. After a brief training and administrative processing period in Headquarters, he was assigned PCS to JMWAVE on 27 August 1961 as a GS-13 Career Agent. He has been assigned to JMWAVE as a Paramilitary Special Operations Officer since that date.

3. Subject is a proficient and competent Operations Officer whose performance during his six-year assignment to JMWAVE has continuously shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision and management of indigenous agents. He has used his knowledge and experience, gathered over a 21 year period with the Army, to an outstanding degree. He has maintained the morale of his 30 agents and kept them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and implementing operations in the field of reconnaissance, caching, deception and Special Operations/intelligence collection operations. During the past eight months he has recruited, trained and operationally committed two intelligence collection teams into PBRUMEN. Subject is a hard worker, capable administrator and a very able agent handler. He has the ability to gain the respect of his agents by his general knowledge of tradecraft matters and his ability to plan operations. He is a personally rugged individual and has established good rapport with

Distribution:
2 - C/WOTACK
2 - C/WH Div

/continued/

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

YBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

a wide variety of agent types. Subject gets along well with his contemporaries. He is presently assigned as a section supervisor in the Special Operations Branch and has two officers and one secretary under his supervision. He manages and supervises his section in an able manner.

4. Subject has been in grade since June 1961. His performance to date has been exceptionally proficient and he is highly recommended by JMWAVE. A current fitness report was submitted by UFGT-18424, dated 20 March 1967. It is the Station's opinion that Subject is fully capable of carrying out the assigned duties that are commensurate with a promotion to Grade GS-14.

Edmund K. GENNARO

SECRET

Mr. Irving C. Devuono

Dear Mr. Devuono:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 1 June 1961, as amended.

Effective 13 August 1967, said contract, as amended, is further amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph three (3) entitled "Compensation and Taxes" to read as follows:

> "For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $16,152, the equivalent of a GS-14/3."

All other terms and conditions of said contract, as amended, remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET/RYBAT

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, WOTACK Inspector Lynch

Chappie/Pers -- Irving C. DEVUONO

The WOTACK Personnel Committee recently completed a promotion review of IUJEWEL contract personnel at grade GS-13 equivalent, which included Irving C. DEVUONO. While no recommendation was made for DEVUONO during this review, WOTACK would appreciate your comments relative to his performance and other qualifications for promotion consideration.

Homer D. SHETTERLY

Distribution:
2 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGS-9390

SECRET/RYBAT

7 APR 1967

Distribution: SOD/PERS J.R. Shields smr 4321
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/PERS
1 - C/SOD/GB
1 - C/SOD/SS WH/PERS
1 - SOD/PERS
1 - SOD/RI C/SOD/GB
1 - CHRONO
C/SOD/SS

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE 1 December 1966	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 1 December 1966	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Hugh R. DENDY Hugh R. Dendy
DATE 17 March 1967	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Frederick J. Inghurst Frederick J. INGHURST

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
[redacted] Career Agent

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVENNO Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 24 June 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Career Agent	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WH/COG	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	5. SD

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 25 Field Agents and two WOFACT personnel engaged in Special Operations missions. The Agents comprise crews of 4 SO Infiltration Craft, 2 SO Infiltration Teams, and a Special Alert Team. These Agents perform overwater infiltration, exfiltration, and caching operations into a denied area (PBRUMEN).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the training of 25 Field Agents in operation of small craft and all related activities, PM operational techniques and tradecraft.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational plans and programs for specific SO Operations. Tests and evaluates new equipment and techniques for possible use by SO Branch or other Station activities.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Administers all personnel and administrative matters for 25 Field Agents. Handles real estate, subsistence and logistics for 25 Field Agents.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 6-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the period of this report Subject has continued to show an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of the Field Agents under his control. He has continued to maintain the morale of his agents and to keep them at a high level of proficiency by a strong training schedule and by planning and executing outstanding operations in the field of reconnaissance, deception, and Special Operations Teams. During the last four months he has also had the responsibility of forming and training three additional Infiltration Craft Crews. Subject formed two Special Operations Infiltration/Exfiltration Teams and conducted one infil/exfil operation into PBRUMEN. Subject has remained active in testing new equipment and techniques for possible use by the Station. Subject has an excellent concept of Special Operations-PM techniques and acts as advisor to Chief of Special Operations Branch on PM type activities in Special Operations. Subject continues to provide reports on exile activities in all areas and is constantly pushing his Agents in this field. He is a hard worker and is a capable administrator and supervisor. He knows his job, does not need close supervision and has shown ability to branch out into other fields of WOFACT activities. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1 Dec. 1966	/s/ Irving C. [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
18 Months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
1 December 1966	Chief, Special Operations Branch	/s/ George D. French, Jr. (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The Reviewing Officer has been closely associated with Subject during the entire period of his assignment to this Station and concurs in the Rating Officer's evaluation of Subject's handling of specific duties as well as the narrative comments. As a result of this close personal contact with Subject and observation of his day-to-day handling of operational situations, the Reviewing Officer considers Subject to be one of the most capable and well qualified senior special operations officers at this Station. Please see Subject's three previous Fitness Reports for additional comments on Subject's performance at this Station.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 March 1967	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ [illegible] (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1000-O-32643

1. Agency and organizational designation DDP/WH	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) CAREER AGENT	6. Grade and salary ~~$14,050~~ $14,665		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX____	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 6 July 1966

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
9 Oct 66	11 Oct 64	$14,665 ~~[illegible]~~	$15,113 ~~[illegible]~~	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

XXX No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.______

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

______ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: Career Agent

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): DEVUCHO Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 Jun 1923	3. SEX: M
	4. GRADE: Equiv. GS-13	5. SD:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT:	8. CURRENT STATION: JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 01 July 1965 - 31 Dec 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Supervises a 30-man Indigenous Commando Group.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Maintains the training of the group at a proficient level in weapons, tactics, pre-strike rehearsals and related activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Develops operational concepts for infiltrations/exfiltrations, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Reporting to include operational, contact and monthly reports, and other required correspondence.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Case Officer for one FI Reporting Agent to include handling, reporting and guidance of Agent.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-63 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject has been under my supervision for approximately 6 months. During this period he has shown an outstanding proficiency in the supervision of his Commando Group. He is responsible for the logistical support, maintenance, planning and operations of the group and must also maintain their motivation and moral. As a result of the stand-down in PM activities at this Station, one of his major duties has been keeping his group motivated and happy. Subject has performed these tasks in a very professional manner; he has shown strong leadership qualities and a definite ability to adapt to difficult and frustrating changes in the operational climate. Subject has had the additional duty of handling an FI Agent for the Station. He has spent long hours on this activity and has shown that he is fully capable of broadening his scope of activities to other fields besides the supervision of a commando group. He is cost and security conscious and has shown that he is effective in the use of personnel, space, equipment and operational funds.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 17 February 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Irving C. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6 Months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 Feb. 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Special Operations Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Hugh R. DENDY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE 19 February 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

This is the third Fitness Report prepared on Subject since his assignment to this Station. The comments set forth on the two previous Fitness Reports by the Reviewing Officer and the Chief of Station are in the main still applicable. The Reviewing Officer has been most favorably impressed with Subject's performance in his present position. Subject has continued to perform his job in his usual competent, dependable and professional manner. The Reviewing Officer shares the Rating Officer's high opinion of Subject's performance and there is no doubt that Subject has contributed significantly to the Station's activities. Subject's over-all performance continues to warrant an evaluation of Strong.

Deputy Chief of Station

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmitted to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* Irving C. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 6/14/65	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Stanley R. ZAMKA
DATE 6/23/65	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)*

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 4-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO, Irving C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 06-14-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)

☐ SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 01 October 1963 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 40 man Indigenous Commando Group	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops operational concepts for in/exfiltration, raids, caching and rescue operations and prepares operational plans for same.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the group.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject continues to demonstrate a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. Subject officer is loyal and security minded. He is resourceful, acts with initiative and delegates responsibility. He is cost conscious. Subject is capable of handling larger units of indigenous commandos. He thinks clearly and is a versatile individual in the PM field.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	Irving C. DEVUONO /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		Stanley R. ZAMKA

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attachment.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
JUN 23 1966	Deputy Chief of Station	Frederick J. [illegible]

SECRET

Attachment

Section D., 3.

The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's performance based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, detailed examination of Subject's operational plans, general observation of Subject during the past four years and a first hand knowledge of the results of operations conducted under Subject's guidance. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated officer who has a knack for getting things done in the operational field. Subject is exceptionally well qualified for the job he is doing. Additionally, Subject has a flair for getting along with the members of the Commando Group without losing objectivity. Subject's operational planning is sound and complete in all details. Subject is completely self-sufficient in operational command and agent relationship situations. Subject's performance at this Station clearly warrants an over-all evaluation of Strong.

14-00000

SECRET

25 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Operations Division

FROM : Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT : Custody of the Honor Award presented to Mr. [redacted]

[illegible]

Due to security restrictions, the Honor and Merit Awards Board is acting as custodian of the Honor Award and related papers listed below: Intelligence Star
Intelligence Star Certificate

When security restrictions no longer prevail, the awardee may obtain his award by calling the Secretariat.

Jeanne L Baker
JEANNE L. BAKER

Distribution:
- Orig. - Subject's OPF
- 1 - Subject's Division Chief
- 1 - HMAB Case File

SECRET

SECRET

BRIEF FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Grayston L. Lynch, Captain, U. S. Army (retired), Career Agent,
DDP/CA Staff, GS-13 Equivalent
Recommended for Intelligence Star

Captain Lynch was employed by another government agency prior to the Cuban invasion. During the preparations for the Cuban invasion, Captain Lynch was granted Agent status with CIA with the understanding he would return to his parent agency at the completion of the project. The Board recommends that he be awarded the Intelligence Star for his activities under fire on 16-17 April 1961. He personally led the beach reconnaissance party on the night of 16 April and succeeded in placing beach markers in preparation for the landing. On 17 April, his ship was besieged by an air attack. He was successful in leading the convoy to a point off the beach, during which time gunfire from his vessel destroyed two of the attacking aircraft. During the period 22-24 April, Captain Lynch led a team of three back to the objective area and rescued nine survivors of the invasion forces.

SECRET

SO - Irving C. DEVUONO

MEMORANDUM

6 December 1965

WCH-1044

TO: D/OPS; D/SUP; Chief, JMBAR; Chief, FI; Chief, SO; Chief, MA; Chief, CP; Chief, JMRIM; Chief, Air; Chief, Logistics; Chief, Security

Distribution:
1 - Each addressee
1 - Each Station participant
1 - REG
1 - WCH Chrono

FROM: Chief of Station

SUBJECT: Commendation for Performance in HUBBARD I/II

1. The Chief of Station wishes to commend all Station members and agents who were involved in the HUBBARD I/II operation. The successful exfiltration of the valuable agents AMKHAN-2 and AMKHAN-3 plus twelve members of their families on 4 - 5 December was indeed a very impressive performance in response to an urgent requirement. All who participated in the HUBBARD I/II operation can take great pride in the fact that despite considerable difficulties it was possible to carry out the exfiltration of a sizeable group of persons in a swift and flawless manner.

2. Chief, SO: Please extend to the commander of the AMLILAC group and to the personnel who participated in the HUBBARD/I and/or the HUBBARD/II actions the congratulations and the appreciation of "The Chief" concerning their fine performances.

3. Chief, MA: Please extend to the ship captains and the commanders of the operational vessels and to all of the crew members who participated in the HUBBARD/I and/or the HUBBARD/II actions the congratulations and appreciation of "The Chief" concerning their fine performances.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-552642

1. Agency and organizational designations DDP/SAS

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) DEVUONO, Irving C. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary $12,880

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by jvl 24 June 1964

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
11Oct64	14 Oct 62	~~$12,880~~ 13,555	$13,265 13,755	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods). Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-508

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

LEVUONO

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) [redacted]	(First) [redacted]	(Middle) [redacted]	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 451-18-7989

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Fayetteville,N.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Victoria,Texas	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 8301 sw 155 Ter,Miami,Fla

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Houston,Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 Apr 45
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Janette K Lynah	8301 SW 155 Ter,Miami,Fla	235-4512	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Sharon Ann Lynch	Same as above	F	3 Sep 46
Jeffrey Lee Lynch	" " "	M	4 Apr 49
Robert Thomas Lynch	" " "	M	11 Jan 54
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Henry Thomas Lynch	Deceased		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Ruby Lynch	Rt 1,Box 46-A Victoria,Texas		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) ~~Mrs Janette K Lynch~~ Lynch, Herbert A.	RELATIONSHIP ~~Wife~~ brother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) ~~[illegible] 155 Ter, Miami, Fla~~ Rt 1, Box 46-A, Victoria, TX	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER ~~235-4512~~
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ~~Yes~~	YES	☐
	NO	☒
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) wife	YES	☐
	NO	☒
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	☒
	NO	☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Perrine-Cutler Ridge Bank, Perrine, Fla - Grayston L and Janette K Lynch

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

With wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" who possess the power of attorney?)

Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Miami, Fla	6 Apr 64	

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM Office of Finance

SUBJECT Irving G. DEVUONO - 1962 Income Tax Liability

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Reference is made to Subject's 1962 covert income tax return which reflects an outstanding tax liability of $2,364.69. To date no payment has been received. The return was filed with the Covert Unit of Internal Revenue Service without payment. Headquarters has been requested by IRS to furnish information as to when payment of the tax liability can be expected.

2. In order to preclude the necessity of either revealing Subject's true name and address to IRS or accepting service of a levy, it is requested that DEVUONO be contacted and requested to forward his remittance for the tax liability to Headquarters as soon as possible. He should be reminded that checks in payment of covert tax liabilities are to be made out to a fictitious payee. An early reply is requested.

Dora B. Pernecky
DORA B. PERNECKY

Distribution:
3 - JMWAVE

JM/III
Jim
HARVEY SHAW

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS - 5428

DATE
4 DEC 1963

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

1 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PERSONNEL

SUBJECT : Insurance for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. Irving C. DEVUONO, a career agent with PM, is interested in acquiring the term insurance which KUBARK has available for persons in DEVUONO's category.

2. Please forward the necessary applications and information on this subject to Aubrey K. PAUKERT/PM for passage to DEVUONO.

SRZamka
Stanley R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

PAUKERT/hko/211

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
  - 1 - Typing chrono
  - 1 - DEVUONO file.

SECRET

LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATION
(CONTRACT LIFE)

NAME OF
EMPLOYEE (P) [illegible]
First MI Last

POLICY NO.
EFFECTIVE DATE
TOTAL PREMIUM PAID

Date of Birth	Monthly Premium	Annual Salary	Insurance Class
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

FOR HQ DESK USE
COMPONENT
ROOM NO.
BLDG.
EXT.

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK)

Male ☒ Full-time employee

Female ☐ Yes ☒ No ☐

NAME OF
BENEFICIARY (T) [illegible] RELATIONSHIP [illegible]
First and Middle Only

DATE SIGNED [illegible] [illegible]
(P) SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

[illegible]
(Date)

TO :

SUBJECT: Authority to Make Payroll Deductions

I hereby authorize you to deduct the sum of [illegible] per pay period from my salary starting with the pay period beginning [illegible].
These deductions are to continue until terminated by me in writing.

(P) Signature

S-E-C-R-E-T

GRAYSTON L. LYNCH OR
JANETTE K. LYNCH

No.

19 63-660
631

PAY TO THE
ORDER OF $

DOLLARS

PERRINE-CUTLER RIDGE BANK
PERRINE, FLORIDA

⑆0631⑈0660⑆ 22-309-6

14-00000

HEALTH STATEMENT

THE EMPLOYEE IS TO COMPLETE SECTION I. (AND/OR SECTION II, IF REQUESTING INSURANCE FOR DEPENDENTS)

HOSPITALIZATION AND SURGICAL GROUP POLICY

SECTION I. TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE IF REQUESTING INSURANCE ON HIMSELF

1. Male ☑ Female ☐ Single ☐ Married ☑ Birthdate [illegible] Height [illegible] Weight [illegible]

2. Have you any deformities or impairments of health? If yes, give complete details

3. Have you now, or ever had any of the following? (Answer "yes" or "no" to each.)

HEART OR CIRCULATORY DISEASE	EPILEPSY	DISEASE OR IMPAIRMENT OF EYE	MENTAL DISORDER	KIDNEY DISEASE	STOMACH OR INTESTINAL DISORDER
no	no	no	no	no	no
TUBERCULOSIS OR RESPIRATORY DISEASE	**DIABETES**	**DISEASE OR IMPAIRMENT OF EAR**	**NERVOUS BREAKDOWN**	**HERNIA**	**CANCER**
no	no	no	no	no	no

4. If answer to any of above questions is "yes," give complete details including specific ailment, dates and duration of each illness

5. Within the last five years, have you consulted a doctor or been a patient at a clinic or hospital for any condition other than those mentioned above. List all conditions giving medical diagnosis, dates and duration of each condition (treatment received, if applicable); if none, so state

[illegible]

6. Have you ever had or been advised to have any surgical operation? Give nature and date of each operation with statement as to whether or not recovery was complete; if none, so state

[illegible]
[illegible] hospitalized [illegible] hospitals for
3 years — 15 operations [illegible]

7. Has any insurance company or association refused to grant insurance on your life or offered a modified policy? Give name of company and date NO

8. Are you in good health? yes if not, explain

9. If female, are you pregnant? ________ If "yes," how far advanced?

I hereby declare that all statements and answers given above are true and complete. Furthermore, it is understood the Association reserves the right to request an examination by a physician selected by them.

Employee's Signature [illegible] Date [illegible]

FORM 8-69 1677

141

SECRET

3 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/B&F

SUBJECT : Federal Income Taxes
Irving G. DEVUONO (P), Contract Employee

1. During his recent visit to Headquarters, DEVUONO raised questions concerning his Federal income tax returns and interest allegedly due for income received during calendar year 1962. He stated he had filed covert returns for 1961 and 1963 and that he would file a covert return for 1964. He had previously been advised that he owed interest on his 1962 income in the amount of $165.54. He stated that this was not correct as the verbal instructions given him by Mr. Robert Bladergroen of OGC were followed by him when he filed his 1962 covert return. According to DEVUONO, Bladergroen discussed tax matters with him during a visit to JMWAVE sometime in April 1963.

2. As I was not previously acquainted with the facts in DEVUONO's case, I did not attempt to judge it nor to promise him that it could be resolved to his satisfaction. I did, however, inform him we would investigate the matter and would officially advise the Station of the decision. Therefore, please initiate appropriate action with the covert tax people and the Office of General Counsel (Mr. Bladergroen) to set this matter at rest. Informally, Bladergroen informs me that he recalls his conversations with DEVUONO and that DEVUONO either did not understand his instructions or chose to disregard them. I believe Mrs. O'Leary and at least one other member of her staff with whom DEVUONO consulted during his visit can assist in resolving this matter. I do not find any correspondence in his Personnel Folder other than a copy of a cable, IN 57726, dated 12 June 1963, bearing on this Subject.

Charles J. Francis
DC/WH/SS

SECRET

"I hereby certify that this is an accurate summary of my (our) income tax return for the year 1962 filed with the District Director in Jacksonville, Fla., that the tax due shown therein was remitted in full by me, and that any future adjustments, payments or refunds in relation to the return will be reported promptly by me to Headquarters."

Signature

MAY 20 8 23 PM '64

SECRET 202146Z

WAVE CITE DIR 22598

TYPIC PERS

REF DIR 96991 / Grayston Lynch

IRVING C. DEVUONO AWARD CEREMONY SCHEDULED FOR 12 NOON 27 MAY. PLS CONFIRM HIS AVAILABILITY BY CABLE.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1- EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

per

1- Chrono
✓ 1- 201
WKP

Lynch Grayston Leroy 451-18-7989

1. RESIDENCE DATA	
PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED Fayetteville, N.C.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If assigned abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE Victoria, Texas	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE 8301 sw 155 Ter, Miami, Fla

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Houston, Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE 26 Apr 45
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Janette K Lynch	8301 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla	235-4512	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Sharon Ann Lynch	Same as above	F	3 Sep 46
Jeffrey Lee Lynch	" " "	M	4 Apr 49
Robert Thomas Lynch	" " "	M	11 Jan 54
NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Henry Thomas Lynch	Deceased		
NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Ruby Lynch	Rt 1, Box 46-A Victoria, Texas		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY?
Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) ~~Mrs Janette K Lynch~~ Lynch, Herbert A.	RELATIONSHIP ~~Wife~~ brother
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) ~~8301 SW 155 Ter, Miami, Fla~~ Rt 1, Box 46A, Victoria, Texas	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER ~~235-4512~~
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE None	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ~~None~~	YES	~~X~~
	NO	X
IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) WIFE	YES	
	NO	~~X~~ X
DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.)	YES	X
	NO	

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. CONFIDENTIAL (4)

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

CITIZENSHIP
U.S.A.

451-18-7989

H.A.

5505 Camberly Ave., Springfield, Va.

SECRET

3134

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

rience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complis the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Perrine-Cutler Ridge Bank, Perrine, Fla - Grayston L and Janette K Lynch

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

With wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

NED AT Miami, Fla	DATE 6 Apr 64	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

9 AH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

12-62

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG : AL HOESER:ear
UNIT : SAS/PERSONNEL ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6576 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 24 JANUARY 1964 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

24 JAN 64 22 35z

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS-8
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, VR

— β

DEFERRED SIG CEN
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 96991

TYPIC PERS

REF: WAVE 0484 (IN 98432)

PRESENTATION CEREMONY FOR DEVUONO BEING SCHEDULED FOR MAY 64. WILL ADVISE FIRM DATE.

sec 3665

END OF MESSAGE

SAS Comment: Advise of 28 or 29 Jan. 64 acceptable for DEVUONO presentation.

Mr. Baker is scheduling subject for presentation sometime after 15 May 64

Orville C. Dawson
ORVILLE C. DAWSON
C/SAS/PERSONNEL

Desmond FitzGerald
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER 24-25

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION : SAS 8

INFO : DOP, OP 2, VR

IN 98423

14 Jan 64 IN 98423

SECRET 142250Z

DIR CITE WAVE 2484

TYPIC PERSONNEL

REF A UFGS 3125

B UFGT 5336

SUGGEST IRVING C. DEVUONO BE PRESENTED HIS INTELLIGENCE STAR 28 OR 29 JAN. PLS CABLE IF THIS ACCEPTABLE OR DETERMINE APPROPRIATE DATE.

SECRET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Derwood

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO. / DATE
Recorder, HMAB Room 7-P-03, Hdqrs.	4441	23 January 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Samuel Halpern EXO/SAS Rm. GG 27 08, HQ	24 Jan 64		L	Subject should be given this prior to the presentation ceremony which we're trying to arrange for 28 Jan 64. Bob Gaynor
2. SAS/Personnel	24 Jan 64		JAH	
3. File/				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				See DIR-96771. Ceremony [illegible] for May 64 per [illegible] T. [illegible] x2234 [illegible] 24 Jan 64 JAH
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :Lynch, Grayston L. DATE: 22 [illegible] 1964

Thru :Recorder, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM :Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT:Lynch, Grayston L. - Personnel Matter
(Award Recommendation)

1. The Office of Security has been advised that you will be a recipient of an honor award in the Headquarters Building in the near future. This memorandum is designed to alert you to the security implications of receiving this award. As must be obvious to you, your role with the organization has been one involving very sensitive operations and projects calling for extraordinary security precautions. You will be expected to continue this kind of exacting security orientation in all dealings you may have with the outside world regarding this award.

2. First, the organization's security policies require that the number of persons on the outside learning of an award be limited. In your case, such persons should be limited to those in your immediate family.

3. Secondly, you are asked to scrupulously avoid releasing or cooperating in the release of any publicity regarding the award to public information media such as radio, television or the newspapers. This award should never be mentioned in the presence of any reporter or representative of any public information media.

4. After receiving your award you will be asked to return it together with any accompanying papers to the Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, for safekeeping. When the cover and security factors requiring secrecy about your connection with CIA are no longer operative these award materials will be returned to you.

SECRET

5. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to the undersigned at Room 4E42, Headquarters Building, extension 5961.

William R Kotapish

William R. Kotapish

S E C R E T

7 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, COVER

SUBJECT : Alias Documentation for Irving C. DEVUONO (P)

REFERENCES: : Memo to C/COVER dated 23 May 1963
Memo to C/PM dated 18 July 1963

1. Irving C. DEVUONO has used the alias George Lee in the local area. The circumstances which required the use of this alias is as follows:

DEVUONO, accompanied by the Real Estate Officer from the Cover Branch, under the alias Gregory Williams, went to ISLAMORADA in April 1963 to determine the suitability of S/H 177 for the AMLILAC Group. It was not anticipated at that time that DEVUONO would be required to use his name with the owner, Eddie Sweeting. However, arrangements for the S/H were made on the spot and the name George Lee given as the occupant of the house.

2. If possible it is requested that alias documentation be established in the name of George Lee. This is not an absolute requirement, however, and a registered alias could be assigned.

Stanley R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

PAUKERT/hko/211

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Typing chrono
1 - DEVUONO file

S E C R E T

SECRET

27 August 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

VIA : DCOS/OS

FROM : Chief, Finance, JMWAVE

SUBJECT : Tax Problem of Irving G. DEVUONO

While on TDY at Headquarters, the writer conferred with the Head of the Covert Tax Unit on the subject problem. The writer was informed that the Covert Tax Unit is not able to accept and forward a Covert return for the year 1962 for the subject individual since a Form 1099 had been issued. It was further stated that the Internal Revenue Service, while performing a service last year (tax year 1961) of this nature, would not under any circumstances permit a person and/or persons receiving a Form 1099 or W-2 to file a Covert Return for such reported income. Therefore, it appears all avenues of escape for Irving G. DEVUONO have been closed and he should file an amended return for Tax Year 1962 to include the KUBARK income reported on Form 1099.

Humphrey O. Timanus

Humphrey O. Timanus
Chief, Finance, JMWAVE

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : D. J. TACCONELLI:ls
UNIT : SAS/FINANCE
EXT : 7763
DATE : 3 JUL 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62
ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : SAS 8
INFO : FD, DDP, CCS 2, RF

4 JUL 63 00 37z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 52022

TYPIC FINAN

REF: A. UFGS 3110
B. WAVE 9623*

1. AMENDED 313A OF AUG 61 STATED IRVING G. DEVUONO SIGNED ROUGH DRAFT AND THAT HE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE PROPER REPORTING AND PAYING FEDERAL INCOME AND SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. AMENDED 313A APPROVED 1 JULY 63 STATED SUBJ WILL RECEIVE COVERT EARNINGS STATEMENT FOR 1963 KUBARK EARNINGS.

2. STATION WAS NOTIFIED BY REF A SUBJECT COULD NOT FILE 1962 COVERT TAX RETURN AND THAT HQS UNABLE INTERCEDE IN CASES WHERE INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED 1099'S WITHOUT IDENTIFYING TAXPAYER'S TRUE NAME WITH THE COVERT IDENTITY AND KUBARK. OTHER INDIVIDUALS PAID BY COVER MECHANISM WOULD ALSO BE IDENTIFIED. DEVUONO KNEW NO TAXES WERE WITHHELD AND IS SUBJECT TO PENALTY WHETHER FILING OVERTLY OR COVERTLY. UNFORTUNATELY NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FILE AMENDED 1962 OVERT RETURN IRS DIRECTLY AND PAY TAXES DUE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: (IN 57726)

SAS COMMENT: *WAVE querried if DEVUONO personally signed form 313A. DEVUONO stated he had been informed he would file covert return on KUBARK income and to prepare for tax payment accordingly.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

3-17

C/FD/C&TAB/T&AS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

HELEN A. VIGNESS
CHIEF, SAS/FINANCE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Co

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: SAS 8

INFO : FD 2, DDP, OP 2, S/C 2

IN57726 OCD

SECRET 112344Z

DIR CITE WAVE 9623

TYPIC FINANCE

12 JUN 1963

REF UFGS 3110

1. PLS ADVISE IF DEVUONO PERSONALLY SIGNED FORM 313A. lost one in draft for

SUBJECT STATES HE HAD BEEN INFORMED HE WOULD FILE COVERT RETURN ON KUBARK INCOME AND TO PREPARE FOR TAX PAYMENT ACCORDINGLY. FOR THIS REASON HE DID NOT FILE OVERT TAX ESTIMATES AND THUS FACES PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO DO SO. STA SEES NO NEED FOR FORM 1099 IN DEVUONO CASE AS HE HAS RETIREMENT INCOME. IN ADDITION WILSON ASSOCIATES IS ONLY NOMINAL COVER FOR ADMIN AND OPS USE AND THIS COVER DOES NOT PAY EMPLOYER'S SHARE OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAX. REALIZE PROBLEMS INHERENT PARA 3 REF BUT DUE KUBARK ADVICE TO DEVUONO RE COVERT RETURN REQUEST HDQS INTERCEDE WITH REVENUE SERVICE THIS TIME AND HENCEFORTH NOT ISSUE 1099.

2. ADVISE SOONEST.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Irving C. DEVUONO

SUBJECT : Letter of Instruction

1. This memorandum is to confirm your appointment as Chief, AMLILAC and to provide you with instructions for the direction of that group.

2. The mission is to adapt current assets into a force which can enter the target area by sea or air to conduct reconnaissance, caching, sabotage, raids and/or guerrilla warfare support operations.

3. The organizational concept to be followed is that of small teams which can function independently or in combination and entirely under indigenous leadership. All personnel should be fully qualified in basic paramilitary skills and should be physically and mentally prepared to mount operations on short notice. Airborne capabilities will be developed when facilities necessary for training become available.

4. The standards for members of the group should be constantly upgraded by culling of members who become marginal or who do not develop as expected. Recruitment of promising new members will be dependent on the needs of the station based on policy directives. Priority should be given to sabotage training to permit the mounting of a sabotage program at the earliest possible moment. Coincidentally, planning and thought should be given to the topics of cover, recruitment, training and establishment of those facilities necessary for a rapid expansion of the group if a full scale operational program should be developed. Also, the force should be identified to the primary exile authority as a non political and independent body which is unilaterally engaged in the overthrow of the existing regime. The tempo of training should be maintained at a level sufficient to assure the continual proficiency of the group in all categories of activity in readiness for the order to mount a full scale program with all teams participating simultaneously. Readiness will not itself be justification for operations.

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

5. Your staff must be organized to permit close contact with team members so as to assure control over them and at the same time provide full security for the existence of your organization. It must also provide security for the planning of all activities in such a way as to assure the compartmentation of staff and team personnel associated with the different categories of operational activity.

6. The following guide lines are provided for the organization:

a. The size and military nature of the force require that the highest possible standard of security be maintained for all personnel and activities. Specifically, the scope should not be comprehended by team members, and compartmentation by teams should be practiced to the maximum.

b. Should, if possible, be composed of men who have no dependents.

7. The following tasks should be undertaken immediately:

a. Continue development of cover for all personnel, their absences, injuries, deaths.

b. Continue the development of concepts to provide for training, during active and inactive periods, transportation to training and staging areas and safehouse utilization.

c. Continue to devise procedures for handling and storage of classified material, arms and equipment.

d. Establish standards for recruitment, discipline, chain of command and security.

Stanley R. Zamka
STANLEY R. ZAMKA
Chief, PM

APPROVED:

Andrew K Reutemann
Chief of Station

SECRET

11 April 1963

To: Chief/PM

From: Chief/Finance

Subject: 1962 Income Tax for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The subject person has submitted the attached memorandum which outlines his objection to paying the self-employment social security tax under the proviso of being self employed. Unfortunately the subject's contract contains the following proviso:

> Paragraph 8(d): From the salary paid pursuant to this contract there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6½%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

Humphrey O. Timmanus
Chief/Finance - JMWAVE

9 April 63

TO : COS

FROM : IRVING C DEVUONO

SUBJECT : INCOME TAX

I was sent to this Station in Aug 61 and was given a cover breifing at Headquarters before I left in which I was told that since I was paying into a retirement fund of this organization that they would no longer withold Social Security from my pay. In late 61 I was notified that they wre refunding to me all money withheld for incme tax up to that time and that I would have to file on the inside and to start withholding my own taxes. This was done and I was told by this station to file the covert return with them and to file an overt return on my Army retirement pay. This I did for the year 1961. I was also told by BOB the tax man to file this years return the same way. I made my own tax withholding during 1962 and have the money to cover the taxes,but now I am told that because someone made a mistake and mailed both me and the IRS a form 1099 on my 1962 pay that now I must file an overt return. This now will cause me to pay $225.00 selfemployment tax And will make me liable to a 6% penalty for not filing an estimated retumn quarterly. Since I would not have had to pay these extra taxes if the mistake in mailing the form 1099 had not been made and since I did everything in this matter that the station wanted me to do I do not feel that this extra cost should be [illegible] by me. I feel this is penalizing me for someone elses mistake. I ~~ask~~ request that this matter be reconsidered and that I be informed as to how I should file my 1962 tax return and that I also be told how this years withholding is to be done.

SECRET

18 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Transfer of Irving C. DEVUONO to the AMLILAC Group

1. On 15 March 1963 a meeting was held at Ace Cartography in order to advise both Irving G. CADICK and Irving C. DEVUONO as to the latters transfer from the AMTABBY group to the AMLILAC group. In attendance at this meeting were Stanley R. ZAMKA, CADICK, DEVUONO and the writer.

2. ZAMKA initiated the discussion by stating that the 15th would be DEVUONO's last day with CUSOG and that he should take care of any accounts outstanding and complete processing out of CUSOG. DEVUONO was advised he would be contacted by WALTUCK later in the day in reference to his next assignment.

3. CADICK was then advised he should plan a caching operation during the month of April. The exact location, weight and contents of the cache would be passed to him the afternoon of the 15th. CADICK requested that a boat, the Squall King, with which a great deal of training had been accomplished be permitted to go on this caching operation. ZAMKA agreed that security wise the use of an organic AMTABBY boat might be worthwhile. CADICK will include the use of the Squall King in the operational plan which he will submit this coming week.

4. This meeting broke up at 1130 hours, 15 March 1963.

Philip S. WALTUCK
PM Case Officer

Distribution:
Orig - C/PM
1 - Typing chrono
1 - CUSOG chrono

SECRET

SECRET

FIELD TRANSMITTAL - FITNESS REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS

The following items of the Fitness Report will NOT be completed by field personnel preparing the report for transmittal to Headquarters:

SECTION A, items 1, 6, and 7

SECTION D, items 1, 2, and 3 *(Only in respect to "Typed or Printed Name and Signature")*

1. I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THIS FITNESS REPORT Irving G. Devuono	DATE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE *(In pseudonym)* IRVING G. DEVUONO

2. I CERTIFY THAT, EXCEPT FOR ITEMS OMITTED UNDER THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL ITEMS APPEARING ON THE ATTACHED FITNESS REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS OR REGULATIONS

DATE 20/11/63	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR *(In pseudonym)* Stanley R. Z[illegible] STANLEY R. Z[illegible]
DATE 20 November 1963	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL *(In pseudonym)* Andrew K Reuteman Andrew K. REUTEMAN:

SPECIAL NOTE

Fitness Reports must be prepared with due regard for security considerations. For example, in the case of administrative and support personnel and others whose duties do not in themselves reveal sources of information and methods of operation, it is normally expected that a complete and realistic statement of specific duties may be reported in Section B. However, the nature, source, purpose or disposition of information or operations will not be included. On the other hand, the position titles and description of specific duties of certain other employees may jeopardize security and should not be fully reported on this form. In these cases, general statements of specific duties will be included in Section B indicating the level of responsibility.

FORM 6-62 45a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) DEVUONO	(First) Irving	(Middle) O.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 14 June 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE Contract	5. SD
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE			7. OFF DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.		8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☒ SPECIAL (Specify): Career Agent

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☒ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 May 1962 to 30 September 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises a 50-man Commando Group and supervises the Group's implementation of operations which includes pre-strike rehearsals and briefings and organization of logistical support.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Maintains the training of the Group at a proficient level in all weapons, tactics, and related PM activities.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Develops operational concepts for raids and caching operations and prepares operational plans and operations.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises Real Estate, Materiel, and Subsistence Support relating to the Group.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has shown a decided proficiency in the supervision of the type of unit for which he has responsibility. His men respect him and follow his orders readily. He is resourceful, acts with initiative, and delegates responsibility. In his field he thinks clearly and is decisive and versatile in his actions. He is capable of handling larger units of personnel and assuming greater responsibility in the PM field. If he were required to accept duties of a broader nature in the intelligence field involving less supervision of his own activities, he would need to improve in the areas of written and oral expression and in his understanding of KUBARK requirements and responsibilities. In this regard he would need additional training and exposure to more extensive KUBARK fields as he has not had the opportunity for participating in such KUBARK activities. Subject does not have the proficiency of the language used.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
26 Nov. 1963	/s/ Irving O. DEVUONO (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
17		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Nov. 1963	C/PM Br., JMWAVE	/s/ Stanley R. ZAHKA (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

See Attached Sheet

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Nov. 1963	Chief of Station	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

Continuation of FITNESS REPORT, Section D:

Subject is a well-qualified para-military specialist, who has fully mastered the tools of his trade. Subject applies all of his para-military knowledge in the performance of his current duties as the senior outside case officer for a thirty-man commando group, which is capable of carrying out a variety of different missions. These missions include caching operations, sabotage raids, tactical intelligence reconnaissance activities and contingency missions related to war plans. Subject is at his best in dealing with men and military equipment. Subject's major weakness is in records management and reports writing. Despite this minor weakness, Subject's over-all performance warrants an evaluation of Proficient.

Subject has the potential to train and operationally exploit para-military forces in units which have a T/O strength of not more than 60 men. Subject could command a conventional military formation at the battalion level. Subject is capable of mounting counter-insurgency operations with the use of forces up to battalion strength.

Subject's work comes to the attention of the Reviewing Officer on a bi-weekly basis.

Subject's future assignments should be in the para-military field. If Subject is to remain in operations in Latin America, he must be given an opportunity to study Spanish on a formal basis.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE QKR

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Personnel
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGS 3125 dated 17 May 1963

Irving C. DEVUONO will be available for the presentation ceremony at Headquarters at any time during the next 30 days. Subject desires that any group present be small and he, himself, will be accompanied by his wife.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
18 June 63

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 25 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-5536

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET RYBAT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff (Provisional)

SUBJECT
TYPIC/PERSONNEL
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGS-2865, dated 22 March 1963

Please advise status of paragraph 2 of Referenced Dispatch.

END OF MESSAGE

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS-3125

DATE
17 MAY 1963

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff (Provisional)

SUBJECT
TYPIC/PERSONNEL
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGT-4416, dated 13 March 1963

1. Headquarters officers in charge of arranging the award ceremony are reluctant to initiate any arrangements without more information regarding the urgency indicated in Reference. The fact that we reminded them that it had been a year since the award was authorized had little effect.

2. Are there any plans in the future to send Irving C. DEVUONO to Headquarters? If so, then with several days advance notice of such a trip arrangements for the ceremony could be initiated.

3. It also would be helpful to indicate whether DEVUONO will bring his family and anticipate a large ceremony or whether he would prefer a smaller, more intimate group gathered in the Director's Office.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

PM
55

DATE TYPED
19 Mar 1963

DATE DISPATCHED
22 MAR 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGS-2865

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

RM

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

Lynch

25 September 1962

TO : Chief/Station, JMWAVE

FROM : IRVING G. DEVUONO

SUBJECT: Housing Allowance

ATTN : Chief/Support, JMWAVE

1. The writers' contract, as Career Agent, states in Para 4: "Allowance: You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowance in conformance with applicable government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowance herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowance in conformance with applicable government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a basic service transfer allowance, an education allowance, and a separation allowance."

2. It appears clear to the writer that any housing allowance which applies to staffers also applies to the writer. This would then necessarily have to commence at the same time for both types in order to be equal.

3. It is requested the writers' housing allowance be timed to commence on the same date as the Staffers in order to comply with the intent of the contract.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, effective 1 September 1962, in the applicable paragraph, the provision:

> "You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICE, Irving G. (Career Agent)
DEVENNO, Irving C. (Career Agent)
HORVATH, Harold R. (Career Agent)
GIAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

DDP/TFW/Personnel:JHMARTIN:jtr (25 September 1962)

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - TFW/Personnel

Memo approved by C.P.D., Mr [illegible] 1 Sep. 62.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACTION
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Task Force W

SUBJECT **GYROSE**
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Please advise Irving C. DEVUONO that the Honor and Merit Awards Board has approved the award of Intelligence Star for subject.

2. When Irving C. DEVUONO returns to Headquarters arrangements will be made with the Director, KUBARK, for presentation of the award.

3. I wish to add my own personal congratulations for this fine recognition of DEVUONO's service to the Agency.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE

DATE TYPED 18 May 1962	DATE DISPATCHED 21 MAY 1962
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGS - 1382	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

✓1 - TFW/Personnel
1 - TFW/Registry
1 - Chief, TFW
1 - Honor & Merits
Award Board
5-E-68 Hqs. Bldg.

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
TFW/Personnel	James Durham, jr.	6576

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/Personnel		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/TFW/SS	19 May 62	for John F. Blake

FORM 5-60 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORM 51-28 WHICH MAY BE USED. (40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Administrative
Award of Intelligence Star - Irving C. DEVUONO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para 2

P R I O R I T Y

REFERENCE: UFGS 1382 dated 18 May 62

A. JMWAVE would appreciate being advised as to a date which would be convenient for the director of KUBARK to make the presentation of the Intelligence Star to Irving C. DEVUONO.

B. In order that DEVUONO can make arrangements to be in Headquarters to receive the award on the date selected a cable reply would be appreciated.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

MR. GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 11 Mar 63	DATE DISPATCHED MAR 13 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT-4416	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

SECRET

9 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PM

SUBJECT : Irving C. DEVUONO Award of Intelligence Star

REFERENCE : UFGS-1382 dated 18 May 1962

1. Reference is drawn to paragraph 2 of reference which states that when DEVUONO returns to Headquarters arrangements will be made for the Director to make the award to DEVUONO.

2. 10 months have passed since this award was granted and it is recommended that action be taken to send DEVUONO to Headquarters to receive his award.

Philip S. WALTUCK

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - Typing chrono
1 - DEVUONO file

SECRET

S E C R E T

14 February 1963

TO : COS, JMWAVE

FROM : Chief/CUSOG Irving G. Cadick

Grayston Lynch

SUBJECT: Fitness Report, Devuono

1. The subject report being due, the writer is the only person observing DEVUONO's work and has statements and commendations which should be reflected in his fitness report. The contents of this memorandum will be established in DEVUONO's file in other form at later date by the writer.

2. DEVUONO has completed one year with CUSOG. In this period he has shown a complete and practical knowledge of paramilitary techniques and tactics. This knowledge is born of experience and application. His application of this knowledge for KUBARK has resulted in visible progress in the technical abilities of CUSOG personnel.

3. He has shared CUSOG responsibilities of organization, administration and operational preparation in a manner to follow out KUBARK practices to its credit.

4. He carries out clear instructions to the letter, reflecting a military background.

5. Contrary to observances noted in a previous fitness report DEVUONO has been found to be anything but naive in his dealings with PBRUMENS during the period observed.

6. His administrative and accounting procedures within CUSOG are in order.

7. Hesitating to call them weaknesses, the writer must state that DEVUONO's entire experience with KUBARK has been field experience, usually far out on a long string of contacts into a KUBARK installation, a fact which has prevented a look at any of the administrative side of paramilitary as conducted by KUBARK.

8. This man has good potential for helping KUBARK's paramilitary effort, which potential will be more effective when he has been schooled in the terminologies and pecularities of paramilitary KUBARK-style. It is recommended a tour by DEVUONO where such schooling can be conducted as on-the-job training would most bring out this potential.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

VIA : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/OP

SUBJECT : Qualification for Premium Pay

REFERENCES : (A) Memorandum to ADCI from General Counsel, dated 29 May 1962. Subject: Delegation of Authority (OGC 62-1131)

(B) Memorandum to DD/S from Chief, Task Force W, dated 17 August 1962. Subject: Application of Housing Allowance and Premium Pay to Certain JMWAVE Contract Personnel.

1. This is to certify that Irving G. DEVUONO, a Career Agent, assigned PCS to the geographic area of JMWAVE and JMBAR, qualifies for premium payment according to the authorization contained in the referenced memorandums. This certification is based upon the following conditions of subject's employment during his PCS assignment.

(a) Subject's hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively.

(b) In order to satisfactorily discharge his duties, subject is required to perform substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty, and duty at night and on holidays.

(1) A substantial amount of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty means an average of at least six hours of such overtime duty a week.

(2) The irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty is a continual requirement, generally averaging more than once a week.

SECRET

(3) Night and holiday duty will be performed from time to time.

(c) Subject is responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty.

2. The effective date for this premium payment will be the beginning of the first pay period following 4 September 1962.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

APPROVED:

/s/ Emmett D. Echols — 29 JAN 1963

Director of Personnel — Date

To Finance Division:

*APPROVED:

/s/ Joseph B. [illegible]

Special Contracting Officer

* Approved as an amendment to the compensation paragraph of subject's current contract authorizing Premium Pay in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) DEVUONO (P) IRVING C.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX M	4. GRADE
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT JMWAVE

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To Aug 61 - April 62	SPECIAL (Specify) At the request of C/CA/PM per UFGW-783

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Develop and control a 22-man commando team.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan and mount commando operations.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Administer and provide records for the support of a 22-man commando team.	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
3-4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT					X		
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY				X			
SECURITY CONSCIOUS				X			
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS				X			
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

As a former military officer, Subject is hard working and abundantly sincere in his efforts to fight Communism. His performance since Aug 1961 has not been at the top level of his capabilities for several reasons, not all of which are within his ability to overcome. Subject has had little clandestine training, and is therefore not always able to comprehend the intangible factors which prevent, delay and cancel operations. A further reason is the absence of military law as a basis for discipline for his men. Still another reason is the directive for only limited action with which he has had to live since August. This is merely to say that in a period of policy formation when the action forces have had to be held in limbo, he has not been at his best.

Subject's dealings with his agents have in turn been affected by his own frustrations. His inability to rationalize situations has resulted in obtuse explanations to them which have made them harder to handle. His reluctance to put things on paper has detracted from his performance and denied him the clarifying process which reporting provides. His security consciousness has been similarly affected by his frustrations.

Subject is in need of training in tradecraft and PM operations. His basic qualifications for PM Case Officer work are such that he can, with training, do a much better job. This combined with a program of concentrated action would undoubtedly bring out the best in him, which should be of real value to the Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 May 62	DC/PM	Clarence D. Kiggins

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 May 62	COS/JMWAVE	/s/ Eric S. Radwick

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-894845

1. Agency and organizational designations
DDP/TFW

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
DEVUONO, Irving C. (F) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary
$11,880

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:
I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
Jlv 23 Oct 62

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
14Oct62	1 Jun 61	$11,880	$12,245	(Signature or other authentication) Date

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-505

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

25 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Application of Housing Allowance for Certain Contract Personnel

It is requested that the contracts for the following named Contract Employees and Career Agents be amended to include, in the applicable paragraph, the provision:

> "You are herein authorized housing assistance in conformance with and subject to the policies of this organization."

CADICK, Irving G. (Career Agent)
[illegible], Irving O. (Career Agent)
[illegible], Harold R. (Career Agent)
GIAVASCO, Philip D. (Contract Employee)
HEARD, Bruce R. (Contract Employee)

HOWARD J. PRESTON
Chief, TFW/Support

*APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

*Approved as amendment effective 1 September 1962 to the contracts for the individuals listed above.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

DD/P 2-2108

8 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Approval of Award of Intelligence Star for Irving C. DEVUONO

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board takes pleasure in notifying you that the award named above has been approved for subject individual. You are requested to inform subject of the award and of the security provisions governing it as set forth in the enclosed memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. When subject returns to Washington, please notify the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, so that arrangements may be made with the Director's office for presentation of the award.

Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: FRED F. CYRUS:vlm
UNIT: TFW/SUPPORT
EXT: 6712 1694
DATE: 19 APRIL 1962

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TFW 10
INFO: DDP, CCG 2, WH 7, S/C 2

LOGS

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

OUT 74622
SIG CEN

TO: WAVE INFO CITE DIR 05283 05283

GIROSE

REF WAVE 2863 (IN 21497)

1. THE ESTABLISHED COVER FOR SUBJECTS OF REF IS THE CHARLES S. WILSON AND ASSOCIATES, 413 DADE COMMONWEALTH BUILDING, MIAMI, FLORIDA. TELEPHONE NUMBER REMAINS SAME. THIS FIRM, WHICH IS PURELY NOTIONAL IS ENGAGED IN TRAINING CANDIDATES FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE MERCHANT MARINE. THEY ARE MAINLY ENGAGED IN TRAINING NAVIGATIONAL SUBJECTS.

2. THE COVER FIRM IS BACKSTOPPED IN THE MAIMI AREA. THERE IS NO REPEAT NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COVER FIRM AND THE ZENITH TECHNICAL ENTERPRISES COMPANY.

3. PLS ADVISE JOHN K. TARTARILLO AND IRVING C. DEVUONO OF THE ABOVE.

4. RE PARA TWO REF MR. RICHARD BILADEAU WILL ARRIVE 23 APRIL VIA NAL NO. 209. PLS MEET AND BILLET.

END OF MESSAGE

TFW COMMENT: Requested cover clarification on three employees assigned to JMDUSK; requested TDY services of cover representative.

Fred F Cyrus

C/TFW/PERS Louis W. Armstrong

Fred F. Cyrus

JOHN F. BLAKE
C/TFW/SUP

COORDINATING OFFICERS

FRED F. CYRUS
DC/TFW/SUP

SECRET

11-23

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible]

SECRET

16 JAN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Project ZRJEWEL Reports.
William Robertson - Grayston Lynch

REFERENCE: Memo from Chief, CA/PMG to Chief, WH/4; 1 June 1961, Subject: Assignment of Robertson and Lynch to WH Division.

1. Paragraph 9 of Reference requested that CA/C/PMG be kept informed of the standard of performance, and of the acquisition of additional capabilities by either training or experience, of Robertson and Lynch during the period of their assignment to WH Division.

2. As Robertson and Lynch now have been employed operationally by WH/4 for a period of six months, and as they are the first to have been engaged under the new ZRJEWEL program, it would be appreciated if we could have reports from Chief, WH/4 on these men at an early date. In addition to the data required on regular Fitness Reports, we are interested particularly in knowing from WH/4:

a. How these men are being used, i.e., whether they are engaged in operations, training, planning, etc.; and the extent to which this has been exclusively in the field of PM activities.

b. If engaged in agent operations, whether they are employed as singleton agents, principal agents, recruiters, etc.

c. The degree and general location of their possible exposure to hazardous duty, if any.

d. The degree to which they may have been compromised in terms of personal security, if at all, and the general location where this may have happened.

e. Any new skills they may have acquired either by training or experience.

SECRET

3. Also, since CA/PMG has ultimate responsibility for these ZRJEWEL personnel after their operational usefulness to WH Division has ended, it would be very helpful to us in planning the future conduct of the ZRJEWEL program if occasionally we could have a report directly from each of these men personally, giving us their own appraisal of their current utilization. In this regard we would appreciate your view as to whether this would be feasible, within the bounds of operational security, and whether it could best be accomplished by requesting written reports, or by oral de-briefings when these men are in the Washington area.

Paul E. Eckel
Chief
Paramilitary Group,
CA Staff

CA/PMG/EFFox:rah
15 January 1962
Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/C/PMG
1 - Robertson File
1 - Lynch File
1 - Project ZRJEWEL File
1 - Chrono

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

TO : Irving C. DEVUONO
Thru : Recorder, Honor and Merit Awards Board
FROM : Security Advisor, Honor and Merit Awards Board

SUBJECT: Award Recommendation

Ref : Recommendation for Honor or Merit Award, dated 16 October 1961

1. In the reference DEVUONO is recommended for an honor or merit award. It is noted the reference states he is currently in the field.

2. If the award is granted, the following security measures are recommended:

a. The award should be retained within Headquarters until such time as DEVUONO returns to Headquarters on a permanent change of station and security/cover considerations permit the release of the award to him. There would, of course, be no objections to informing him of the granting of the award by use of Agency secure channels.

b. Prior to DEVUONO's receiving physical possession of the award he should be instructed there are no objections to his showing the award to his immediate family and his associates in the Agency but that he should not release or cooperate in releasing any publicity regarding the granting of the award.

N. Harris Lyon

cc: C/WH

[illegible]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

11 December 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Policy Concerning Guests at Award Ceremonies

1. The Office of the Director has determined that when inviting guests to award ceremonies, the Agency will be as liberal as possible within the bounds of available space and security considerations since one of the purposes of an award ceremony is to let the family, friends, and associates of the recipient know that he has been honored.

2. In implementing this policy the points listed below will be guiding criteria:

a. Any Agency employee who is a friend of a recipient may come to the ceremony, up to the limit of space available, if the recipient asks that he be present.

b. Any Government employee (who is not employed by the Agency but who is witting of the recipient's employment) can come so long as there are no operational security reasons that would make his presence inappropriate.

c. Any friend who is not employed by the Government may be invited only if it is obviously desirable (Example-- A very close old friend who stood in the relationship of "family" to the recipient when subject had no immediate family). Friends who are not employed by the Government normally would be discouraged.

Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder,
Honor and Merit Awards Board

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SECRET

Lynch

12 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Awards, Cases of Mr. William Robertson and Mr. Grayston Lynch

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend cash awards for subject employees.

2. In recent paramilitary operations against Cuba, Mr. Lynch and Mr. Robertson served as operations officers of the Central Intelligence Agency vessels BLAGAR and BARBARA J respectively. Both of these employees, in the course of extremely hazardous operations, repeatedly exposed themselves to fire by opposing land, sea and air forces. Their fearless and skilled leadership enabled indigenous forces to conduct an amphibious landing under the most difficult conditions, and their courageous determination to keep their vessels in position to support the operations, although under heavy air attack, was in keeping with the best traditions of the American people at war. Furthermore, their repeated landings, in person, on a hostile shore for the purpose of rescuing Cuban survivors of the invasion force, was a demonstration of extraordinary valor. Their exemplary conduct throughout the combat action was above and beyond the call of duty.

3. Military personnel performing in combat in such a manner would be eligible for the highest decorations for heroism.

4. In view of the extraordinary heroism displayed by Mr. Robertson and Mr. Lynch, I strongly recommend that they be awarded an appropriate commendation, and, in addition, a cash bonus award of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) each.

J. Hawkins
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief, WH/4/PM

APPROVED: ______________________
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

CONCUR: ______________________
Acting Chief, WH/4

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - AC/WH/4

SECRET

SECRET

COVEET AGREEMENT SUPPLE IT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DA

TYPE OR PRINT ☒ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM
Irving C. DEVUONO

2. 3877

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)
☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY **NA**
TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum) $
AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $
(EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.).
PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY **NA**
☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID **NA**
INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD
☐ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $
IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☒ NO
NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☐ FORM W-2 ☒ FORM 1099
NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER
Charles S. Wilson Associates

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)
☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. **NA**

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED **5**

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED
DATE OF MARRIAGE **26 April 1945**
DATE OF DEATH
DATE OF DECREE
CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE **U.S.**
RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country) **U.S.**

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Wife	26 July 1922	U.S.	U.S.
Daughter	3 Sept 1946	U.S.	U.S.
Son	4 Apr 1949	U.S.	U.S.
Son	11 Jan 1954	U.S.	U.S.

15. REMARKS **Since cover company is not able to issue W-2, subject will be personally responsible for proper reporting and paying of Federal Income Tax as independent contractor. Also, subject will be responsible for payment of Social Security as independent contractor.**

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

SECRET

PART III

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

18. 3877

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.

20. CITIZENSHIP

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD (In U.S.)

22. ADDRESS (Foreign)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG : RICHARD F. GILLS (RSY)
UNIT : WH/4/PERSONNEL 1776
EXT : 8717
DATE : 9 JUNE 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

15
14-20

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : ~~DIRECTOR~~ BELL
CONF : BELL 15
INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

DEVU ONO

JUN 14 22152 61

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT 5070
OUT 5070

TO WAVE INFO CITE ~~DIR~~ BELL 1047
1047

JMZIP ADMIN

REF: BARB 0010 (IN 1538)

1. PARA 1 REF STATES DOCS FOR MR. GRAYSTON LYNCH SENT TO WAVE BY COURIER 30 APRIL.

2. IF STILL AT WAVE, PLEASE FORWARD HQS SOONEST. ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Stated documents for Mr. Lynch sent WAVE by courier 30 April.

WH/4/SECURITY
WH/4/LOGISTICS

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
C/WH/4/SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Herbert Juul
HERBERT V. JUUL
C/WH/4/PERSONNEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

SECRET

INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☒ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM: Irving C. DEVU[illegible]

2. 6[illegible]35

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)
☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY N.A.

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum) $	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.).	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date) 17 JUN 1963

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY N.A.
☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID N.A.
INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $
IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☒ NO NAME OF COUNTRY:

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☒ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym):

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)
☒ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099
NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER:

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)
☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☒ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☐ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED 5

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945
DATE OF DEATH:
DATE OF DECREE:
CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.A.
RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country): U.S.A.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
Wife	1922	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Daughter	1946	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Son	1949	U.S.A.	U.S.A.
Son	1954	U.S.A.	U.S.A.

15. REMARKS This correction is submitted in view of the contents of HAVE 9623 (IN 57726), which requests that Subject report compensation via a Covert Return and not Form 1099, as stated previously.

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION
The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.
DATE:
SIGNATURE AND TITLE:

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL
PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL:
PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym): Not available

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 6-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

COVERT AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENT - INCOME AND FEDERAL TAX DATA

TYPE OF PRINT: ☐ ORIGINAL ☐ CORRECTION

1. PSEUDONYM: IRVING C. DEVUONO

2. 2845

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)

☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum)	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.).	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)
$	$		

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☐ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE THIS COUNTRY $ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☒ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER: "FINANCE AND ACCOUNTS SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ATTACHED 5

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945

DATE OF DEATH:

DATE OF DECREE:

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.

RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country): U.S.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
JANETTE KENYON	1922	US	US
SHARON ANN	1947	US	US
JEFFREY LEE	1949	US	US
ROBERT THOMAS	1954	US	US

15. REMARKS

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE

SIGNATURE AND TITLE

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT

DATE: 6/1/61

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)

DATE

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(30)

SECRET

6 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Employee Accounts Section,
Finance Division

SUBJECT : Additional Compensation and Bonus for
Grayston L. Lynch

It is hereby certified that Mr. Lynch satisfactorily completed his maritime assignment and is entitled to payment of additional compensation and bonus as provided in his basic contract of 10 February 1961, as amended 28 March 1961.

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/Finance

SECRET

74-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

534

DATE : 6 JUN 61

TO : BELL

FROM : JMBARR

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : WH 4, BELL S/C

Pers

ROUTING

1		4
SUPPORT		5
		6

JUN 6 1756Z 61

PRIORITY

IN 2786

PRITY BELL INFO WAVE CITE BARR 0041

JMZIP

REF A BARR 0010 (IN 1538)*

B WAVE 5994 (IN 1172)

C BELL 0251 (out 8473)

1. BARR HAS NO DOCUMENTS BELONGING TO GRAYSON LYNCH.

2 FOR INFORMATION REGARDING REF DOCS YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO REF A.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *BARR STATED PERSONAL ITEMS BELONGING TO SANTA ANA CASE OFFICER AND DOCS AND CASH BELONGING TO CASE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO SANTA ANA AND BLAGAR, SENT TO WAVE BY COURIER ON 30 APR PER WAVE INSTRUCTIONS.

Alick

BARR

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

2 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/PMG

ATTENTION : Ernest F. Fox

FROM : Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : S-14114
#180184

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 12 May 1961 in which a covert security clearance was requested to enable utilization of Subject as a Career Agent, serving as a paramilitary specialist in any area that is needed. Subject will aid in providing senior paramilitary support for Agency activity under Project ZRJEWEL.

2. This is to advise that a covert security clearance is granted for the use of the Subject, as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of covert security clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a covert security clearance does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-210. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for clearance to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This clearance becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

David E. Hanlon

Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

PSEUDONYM		PRINT ☐	CRYPTONYM
SPONSORING COMPONENT	CASE OFFICER		EXTENSION

PERSONAL DATA	EMPLOYMENT STATUS	EFFECTIVE DATE	CITIZENSHIP
CURRENT PCS POST	FUTURE PCS POST (Effective Date)		DATE OF BIRTH

DEPENDENT INFORMATION (Names NOT Required) ATTACH FORM 311 OR W-4

RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDE WITH SUBJECT, IF NOT, WHERE.

IS SPOUSE UNDER CONTRACT OR EMPLOYED BY WOFACT. YES ☐ NO ☐ IF YES PROVIDE PSEUDONYM

COVER DATA	EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVER	SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER	☐ YES ☐ NO

OFFICIAL COVER	NONOFFICIAL COVER		
☐ LNREAD	☐ BONAFIDE	☐ PROPRIETARY	☐ DEVISED
☐ OTHER (Specify)	☐ OTHER (Specify)	COVER FACILITY CRYPTONYM	

COVER, SALARY AND ALLOWANCES (Per Annum)	SALARY $	ALLOWANCE $

PAY PERIOD USED BY COVER ☐ WEEKLY ☐ BIWEEKLY ☐ MONTHLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY

TYPE OF TAX DOCUMENTATION TO BE ISSUED BY COVER

REMARKS (Pertinent to Personal or Cover Data)

WOFACT DATA	PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION	☐ HEADQUARTERS	☐ FIELD	(EFFECTIVE DATE) (AMOUNT) $

WOFACT TO REPORT	☐ LNREAD 1099	☐ LNGOLD 1099	☐ DEVISED FACILITY 1099	DEVISED FACILITY ACCOUNT NO.
	☐ LNREAD W-2	☐ LNGOLD W-2	☐ DEVISED FACILITY W-2	

IF SUBJECT IS UNDER NONOFFICIAL COVER CONSULTATION WITH THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE IS REQUIRED

For completion by Central Cover Staff A TAX ASSESSMENT ☐ WILL ☐ WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED BY THE COVERT TAX COMMITTEE

COMMENTS

APPROVAL		AUTHENTICATION	
DATE	SIGNATURE CENTRAL COVER STAFF	DATE	SIGNATURE RESPONSIBLE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 313a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (30)

SECRET

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO SS-5 "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO
ADDRESS OF RECORD (IN U.S.)	ADDRESS (Foreign)	

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. TO OFFICE OF FINANCE, COPY TO CENTRAL COVER, COPY TO FILE

FORM 9-66 313a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (30)

14-00000

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Assignment of Robertson and Lynch to WH Division

1. This is in response to your oral request for the transfer or assignment of Robertson and Lynch from this Staff to WH Division.

2. These employees were recruited as Career Agents under CA/PMG Project ZRJEWEL, and therefore are to be administered in accordance with the terms of this Project.

3. Under the terms of Project ZRJEWEL, CA/C/PMG is responsible initially for their selection and recruitment, and subsequently for their training and developmental assignments until they are transferred to an existing operational project under jurisdiction of an operating division.

4. Selection and recruitment involves complete processing to contract status under provisions of HB 20-1000-1, and requires also:

a. Security Clearances

b. Medical Clearances

c. Provision of Cover

d. Financial Briefing

e. Assessment and Evaluation

5. Training and development requires that subjects be provided tutorial or group training, according to their individual needs, to qualify them as senior PM officers capable of serving overseas as

case officers, instructors, advisors, or consultants; and capable of developing indigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to:

a. Language aptitude testing and subsequent language training.

b. Clandestine tradecraft.

c. Paramilitary operations training.

d. Covert Action Operations training and CI Familiarization.

6. Although both subjects are now under contract, as of this time, of all of the above-mentioned items of processing, training and development, the following yet remains to be done:

Robertson - medical clearance, provision of cover, financial briefing, Spanish language aptitude test and Spanish language training. Clandestine refresher training as deemed advisable.

Lynch - provision of cover, financial briefing, assessment and evaluation, language aptitude test and possible language training, and all basic Clandestine Operations training.

7. Project ZRJEWEL further provides that administrative responsibility for these employees including compensation, operational security, etc. will be transferred to the Operating Division for such periods of time as the employees are under the jurisdiction of the Division for operational duties. For administrative purposes, it is suggested that WH Division assume these responsibilities for both Robertson and Lynch as of 1 June 1961.

8. One of the major considerations in the contract employment of these two officers has been that their lack of association with the Agency, thus far, permits their operational utilization in circumstances

where staff employees cannot participate, and their long range continued employment is, to a certain extent, dependent on their being able to maintain this posture. It is requested, therefore, that you take every reasonable precaution to maintain their 'deniable' status.

9. Since the CA Staff will once again become responsible for these officers whenever such time may come that you no longer have a requirement for them, it would be very much appreciated if this office would be kept advised as to their standard of performance, acquisition of additional capabilities, by either training or experience, and we should be consulted before any changes or amendments are made in their contracts which might become commitments to be assumed by the CA Staff.

Signed
ALFRED T. COX

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

cc: C/WH
CCG
C/CA

[illegible] [illegible]
Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 10 February 1961, as amended. Effective [illegible] 61, said contract, as amended, is hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $11,155 ~~$11,000~~ per annum. You will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. In addition you will be entitled to authorized overtime, within-grade promotions and legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, a post allowance or an equalization allowance in lieu thereof, a supplementary post allowance, a transfer allowance, a home service transfer allowance, an education allowance and a separation allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses for you, your dependents, your household effects and your personal automobile to and from your permanent post of assignment, and for you alone for authorized operational travel. In addition you will be entitled to storage of such household and personal effects as are not shipped, in conformance with applicable Government regulations. Upon the completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you may be authorized travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas. You will be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel performed hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government or your cover facility. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or according to the established policies of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government staff employees. Such annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate representatives of the Government.

(d) From the salary paid pursuant to this contract there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6 1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. When circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the U.S. Citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

[illegible]

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by the dependents of a U.S. citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents in this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every four (4) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

12. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

13. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in

writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 March 1961, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon ninety (90) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event initially required medical and security requirements for this contract cannot be met, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government while you are on an overseas assignment under this contract, you will not be entitled to the return travel expenses to the United States as set forth in paragraph five (5) above. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

[redacted]

WITNESS: ______________________

APPROVED:

____

DH C/-U/15 May 61
CA/Original
Career Agent.

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox

DIVISION: CA/IMG

INSTRUCTIONS: Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and one copy for preparation of contract.

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 6611

DATE: 9 10 May 1961

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☐ PSEUDO [redacted] TRUE
[redacted]
DEVUONO, IRVING C.

2A. PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

2B. PERMANENT STATION: indefinite

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 1121-6411-8017

4. SLOT NO.: NA

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: Irving C. DEVUONO

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): CSA

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 37

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 14 June 1923

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): North Carolina, Fayetteville

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate) ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife - age 38
Daughter - age 14
Son - age 11
Son - age 7

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: Retired

21. VETERAN: yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): Reserve Longevity

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: U.S. Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: Capt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: [illegible]
$11,000.00

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: if applicable

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): commercial

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY
☐ COVER
☒ CIA
☐ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: yes

32. POST: yes

33. OTHER: normally due staff employee

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): none

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL: where cover requires ☒ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

Same as (18) above

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS or ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Where applicable

43. ENTERTAINMENT: where applicable

44. OTHER: operational equipment or cover items

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS or ☒ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(4)

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox

DIVISION: CA/PG

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 4611

DATE: 10 May 1961

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

45. BENEFITS (See Part XIV of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see R 15-230 or successor regulations.)

Missing Persons Act
BEC - Annual & sick leave
Death & Disability benefit
Fed. ~~XR~~ Retirement Act
Home Leave benefits
G.E.H.A. Health Ins.

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: ☐ YES ☒ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: indefinite — DAYS — MONTHS — YEARS 2

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: to be negotiated

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): ?

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (PI, PP, other): PM

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

Provide senior paramilitary support for Agency activity

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE: Retired after 21 years of Army service. Has specialized in special forces operations and had service overseas. From 1956 to present commanded and trained SF team in Guerrilla Warfare. Was instructor in US Army NCO School for 3 years. 10 Feb.'61 -date CIA contract.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): ☒ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
German			X						
French			X						
Loatian			X						

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

Oct.'38 to Oct.'60 US ~~Amxy~~ Army. Retired ~~xx~~ with 21 years service as Captain. Retirement pay $281.00 per month

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

Hazardous duty pay premium where indicated.

☐ MORE

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
10 May 1961	Ernest F. Fox Ernest F. Fox	15 May 61	Charles J. Francis

SECRET

24 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Contract Negotiations with Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

1. After discussing the proposed contract for Mr. Lynch with Messrs. Earman, Collins, Barnes, King, Esterline, and others and obtaining their agreement that the proposed contract was a fair one, I met with Mr. Lynch on the morning of 24 May 1961. I outlined, in detail, to him at that time the many advantages accruing to him through the new contract over the previous contract. Mr. Lynch stated that he had not been fully aware of these benefits, that he was afraid he had given the wrong impressions to us with regard to his salary demands, and that he would be glad to sign the contract as offered.

2. Mr. Lynch signed the contract later in the morning.

3. I also had advised Mr. Lynch that Colonel King and Mr. Esterline had been requested to look into the possibility and desirability of obtaining for him a bonus award because of his services on the Project. I told him that they had agreed to look into this, that no promises could be made, and that any such award was a matter entirely outside the scope of his contractual arrangements and employment by this Staff.

4. I then called Mr. Earman and advised him of the above. Mr. Earman indicated that he was sure the Director would be very pleased to hear that a suitable agreement had been reached, but that the Director also would undoubtedly raise the question of the bonus award at some future date. I, therefore, undertook on behalf of Mr. Earman to re-raise the question of the award with Mr. Esterline early in the week of May 29, 1961.

Alfred T. Cox

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

Original + 1 - Subject File
1 - Chrono File

SECRET

14-00000

GRAYSTON L. LYNCH - COMPARISON OF CONTRACTS

1. TYPE OF CONTRACT

a. Under his present contract LYNCH is serving as a Contract Employee.

b. The new contract would make him a Career Agent. Under R 20-1000, a Career Agent is an individual who has demonstrated his operational value to the Agency over a period normally of not less than three years for U.S. citizens. LYNCH has served with the Agency only for a period of about three months.

2. COMPENSATION

a. Rate of pay under present contract is $9,500 per annum, plus a post differential in accordance with regulations.

155

b. New rate of pay would be $11,000, plus post differential, plus ingrade promotions and legislative pay adjustments effecting Government personnel.

3. ALLOWANCES

a. Present contract does not provide for any special allowances.

b. The new contract provides for (1) living quarters allowances, and (2), cost of living allowance including but not limited to, a post allowance or equivalent, supplementary post allowance, transfer allowance, home service transfer allowance, education allowance, and separation allowance.

4. TRAVEL

a. Present contract pays cost of operational travel, plus per diem in lieu of subsistence.

b. New contract pays cost of operational travel and per diem, plus: (1) cost of PCS travel and transportation for dependents, household effects and automobile; (2), storage of household and personal effects not shipped; and (3), after two years overseas, all travel for self and dependents from duty station to home residence and return to duty station.

5. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

a. Present contract authorizes operational expenses as specifically approved.

b. New contract expands this to include operational entertainment and purchase of information.

6. BENEFITS

a. Present contract provides death and disability benefits under Federal Employees Compensation Act, and benefits under the Missing Persons act; and states that Social Security deductions will be withheld by the Government.

b. New contract provides for these same benefits; but would make deductions for the Civil Service Retirement Fund instead of the Social Security. In addition the new contract provides for, (1) Sick and Annual leave equal to that of Staff employees; (2), cost of hospitalization and travel for illness or injury incurred in line of duty, while PCS abroad; (3) cost of hospitalization and travel of dependents while abroad; and (4), authorization to apply for enrollment in the Agency health insurance program.

7. TERM

a. The term of the present contract is for one year, subject to termination upon 30 days notice.

b. The new contract is for an indefinite term, subject to termination upon 90 days notice.

8. SPECIAL BONUS

a. There is an Amendment to the present contract, dated 2 May 1961, and made retroactive to cover the period 28 March thru 22 April 1961, only, which authorizes a bonus of 40% of normal monthly compensation while LYNCH was serving aboard ship involved in clandestine maritime activity.

b. There can be no provision in any new contract for declaring a bonus for unforeseen future activities.

9. COMMENT

a. During our first discussions with LYNCH 10 May 1961, on the question of salary, he stated that he would not accept a new contract at the rate of pay ($9,500) of his present contract, because the Director had promised that he would receive more; however, he would not give us a figure that he would accept. Before the new contract was written he was told that it would be for $11,000, and he voiced no objection. After the contract was written and presented to him for signature, he stated that he wanted $12,500, plus "hazardous duty pay", and that he wanted to take the contract to the Director for review.

b. At the time of his retirement, LYNCH was an Army Captain with 20 years service, and I understand that he was in jump status. Remuneration for this service was about $9,425 per annum, including all allowances. His present retirement pay is $281 per month, or $3,372 per year, and I understand that he would be authorized to retain this in addition to all pay and allowances received from an Agency contract.

Ernest F. Fox

17 May 1961

SECRET

23 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4/Personnel

SUBJECT : Recall of Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch for further Testimony

1. Mr. Eduardo Garcia, owner of the ships used in the JMATE operation, has requested a $250. bonus for each of the men employed by him. This is consistent with the bonus arrangement for all Cubans participating in the operation.

2. Chief, WH Division, has approved the payment of such a bonus to all Garcia personnel, except the survivors of the Rio Escondido. He is withholding approval for these personnel, pending a further investigation into alleged mutinous acts by the survivors, while aboard the Blagar. He has requested that additional information on this subject be obtained from both Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch.

3. It is requested that you contact Captain Rydberg and Mr. Lynch, and have them return to Washington at their earliest convenience for the purpose of giving further testimony in this regard.

R. W. BROWN
Chief, WH/4/Logistics

SECRET

SECRET

23 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: G.L. Lynch - ZRJEWEL

1. Lynch called today at 1200 noon. He said that he wanted to let me know that he was back, and to find out what had been done about his contract.

2. I told him that I had heard nothing since he had left. I said that before he left we had rather leaned over backwards to write a contract for him which he had not accepted; that instead he had taken the matter to the Director, and that I had then been requested to deliver a copy of the contract to the Director's office which I had done. I said that I had then acted as a messenger boy only, and had not discussed the matter at the Director's office, nor heard anything about it since.

3. Lynch said that he could fill me in from there. He said that at the Director's office the contract had been turned over to the Director's Executive Officer who was to review it and recommend a salary figure. Lynch said that he had agreed to accept whatever figure the Executive Officer recommended, and was told to call CA/C/PMG/Mr. Cox on his return.

4. I asked Lynch where he could now be reached, and he said that he was at Bob Moore's office on X-8912.

CA/PMG/EFF

SECRET

NOTE:

Since his precipitate meeting with the Director about 1730 hours on 16 May 1961, Lynch has not been heard from. Presumably he returned to his home in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

On 18 May 1961, CA/PMG had calls from the office of both WH/4 and C/WH asking if we knew of Lynch's whereabout, and whether we had a record of his Fayetteville address. The answer to both questions was negative. Subsequently his address was located in files and WH was informed.

CA/PMG/EFF
18 May 1961

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 12 May 1961

TO:
- ☐ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☒ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Ernest F. Fox; CA/PMD
2405 K. Bldg.; x4611

SUBJECT: (True name) Lynch, Grayston Leroy

PROJECT: ZRJEWEL

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: Devuono, Irving C.

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.: 189184

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	COVERT SECURITY Clearance	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: To serve as a paramilitary specialist in any area that is needed.

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

To provide senior paramilitary support for Agency activity under Project ZRJEWEL.

18 May Verbal OK from Vasily OS

26 May – Will get written [illegible] 29 May

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒ YES	☐ NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒ YES	☐ NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO:

FIELD TRACES

☒	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Ernest F. Fox; CA/PMD

EXTENSION: 4611

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: Alfred T. Cox; CA/C/PMD

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

✓

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38043 A **DATE** 5/14/61

I DO HEREBY DECLARE THAT MY TRUE AND LEGAL SIGNATURE IS:

(SIGNATURE)

Grayston L. LYNCH
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS:

RIGHT THUMB PRINT



SECRET

SECRET
(EVEN WHEN BLANK)

Nº SD 38043 B **DATE** 5/14/61

I DO HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IN MY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, I WILL USE THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE WHERE REQUIRED:

(SIGNATURE)

Irving C. DEVIONO
(NAME, PRINTED OR TYPEWRITTEN)

WITNESS:

RIGHT THUMB PRINT



SECRET

SECRET

11 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security

SUBJECT : Interim Activities Report on Mr. Grayston L. Lynch

While serving with WH/4 as a contract employee during the period 10 February 1961 to the present, subject performed all assigned duties in an exceptionally fine manner and fully demonstrated his understanding of and appreciation for good security practices.

WILLIAM E. EISEMANN
Chief, WH/4/Support

Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Transfer Lynch

FROM: CA/C/PMG

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/4 Rm. 1725 Qtrs. I				
2. WH/4/Pers				2-3 Note: In view of subsequent developments it appears that CA ~~the~~ might begin arrangements for career agent status. But check with Mr. Cox.
3. Dick				
4.				
5. File				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4 MAY 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/4

SUBJECT: Captain Grayson L. Lynch, USA (Ret.)

1. Pursuant to conversations with personnel representatives of your office on 2 May 1961, I agreed to hold a position vacancy in Project ZRJEWEL for subject individual at his current basic pay level.

2. It was understood and agreed that WH/4 would continue to carry Subject on his present contract as long as his services are needed in the Division. It would be appreciated if you would inform me when Subject will be available for ZRJEWEL.

Alfred T. Cox

Alfred T. Cox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

14-00000

1. Grayston Leroy ~~[illegible]~~

2. Nº 2686

PART I COMPENSATION AND WITHHOLDING DATA

3. SOURCES OF COMPENSATION PAYMENTS (Check as appropriate)

☒ HEADQUARTERS ☒ FIELD ALLOTMENT ☐ COVER FACILITY

4. COMPENSATION PAYMENTS BY COVER FACILITY

TOTAL AMOUNT (Per annum) $ 9500	AMOUNT SUBJECT TO TAX $ 9500	EXPLAIN ANY DIFFERENCES UNDER "REMARKS" BETWEEN THE AMOUNT AND TOTAL (BY GIVING TYPE OF PAY REPRESENTED (Allowances, etc.))	PAYMENTS TO BEGIN (Date)

5. PAY PERIODS USED BY COVER FACILITY N/A

☐ WEEKLY ☐ BI-WEEKLY ☐ SEMI-MONTHLY ☒ MONTHLY

6. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY COVER FACILITY FROM COMPENSATION PAID N/A

INCOME TAXES - AMOUNT WITHHELD PER PAY PERIOD: ☐ NONE ☐ THIS COUNTRY $ ☐ FOREIGN $

IS SOCIAL SECURITY (FICA) WITHHELD: ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. COMPENSATION SUBJECT TO A FOREIGN TAX ☐ YES ☐ NO NAME OF COUNTRY

8. COVER FACILITY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below) NA

☐ WILL NOT REPORT ☐ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

COVER FACILITY (Cryptonym)

9. THE AGENCY WILL REPORT COMPENSATION AS FOLLOWS (See item 16 below)

☐ COVERT (If covert only, omit rest of this item.) ☒ FORM W-2 ☐ FORM 1099

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OSTENSIBLE EMPLOYER
U. S. Army Finance and Accounts Office Washington, D.C.

10. DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX (Check one)

☐ HAS BEEN FILED ☐ HAS NOT BEEN FILED ☒ NOT APPLICABLE

PART II DEPENDENCY DATA

11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED WITH COVER FACILITY. NA

12. NO. OF DEPENDENTS, INCLUDING SELF, CLAIMED ON FORM 313 OR W-4 (Or equivalent) ~~ATTACHED~~

13. MARITAL STATUS (Complete as appropriate)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ LEGALLY SEPARATED ☐ ANNULLED

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 April 1945
DATE OF DEATH:
DATE OF DECREE:

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE: U.S.
RESIDENCE OF SPOUSE (Country): U.S.

14. DEPENDENTS ELIGIBLE TO BE CLAIMED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING TAX RETURNS WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE INCLUDED IN NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS DECLARED ABOVE (Omit self and spouse)

RELATIONSHIP (No names)	YEAR OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
daughter	1946	U.S.	U.S.
son	1948	U.S.	U.S.
son	1955	U.S.	U.S.

15. REMARKS
W-4 ~~and Form~~ 61 attached — add art star [illegible] wife.

16. APPROVAL OF CENTRAL COVER DIVISION

The employer's names and methods for reporting compensation shown in Items 8, and/or 9, above are approved.

DATE: [illegible]
SIGNATURE AND TITLE: [illegible]

17. FORM PREPARED BY ☐ INDIVIDUAL ☒ OFFICIAL

PART I CERTIFIED CORRECT
DATE: [illegible]
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL: [illegible]

PART II CERTIFIED CORRECT (Explain when not signed)
DATE:
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL (Pseudonym): [illegible]

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (30)

SECRET

PART III

~~SS-5 [illegible]~~

NOTE: DETACH THIS PORTION OF FORM AND DISTRIBUTE SEPARATELY

18. Nº 2686

19. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 451-18-7989

IF SOCIAL SECURITY NO. IS NOT AVAILABLE, HAVE FORM NO. SS-5, "APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS," COMPLETED AS PROVIDED IN DETAILED PROCEDURES.

20. CITIZENSHIP: U.S.

21. ADDRESS OF RECORD (In U.S.)
533 Terry Cir. Fayetteville, N.C.

22. ADDRESS (Foreign)

DISTRIBUTION: SIGNED ORIG. AND COPY - TO FINANCE; COPY - TO CENTRAL COVER; COPY - TO FILE

SECRET (30)

FORM 8-60 313a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

[illegible]

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 10 February 1961.

Effective 28 March 1961 and continuing through 28 April 1961, the first two sentences of paragraph one (1) entitled "Compensation" are deleted, and in lieu thereof is substituted the following:

"In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will receive from the Government, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $9500 per annum.

(b) A post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

(c) Additional compensation in the amount of $79.17 per month as recompense for sub-standard living and working conditions and applicable only during such periods as you are engaged in clandestine maritime activities.

(d) A monthly bonus in the amount of $237.50 to be accumulated and credited to your account for payment upon certification of your satisfactory completion of assignment on board a ship engaged in clandestine maritime activities.

Effective 29 April 1961, the original two sentences of said contract are reinstated in full force and effect.

All other terms and conditions of the contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY________________________
Contracting Officer

DHL/ct/8 May 61
WH/J/marc

SECRET

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Amendment of Contract - [redacted] Irving C. [illegible]

1. It is requested that the contract of [redacted] be amended to authorize the following additional compensation only while he is assigned to, and serves aboard, a ship involved in clandestine maritime activities:

a. Additional monthly compensation in the amount of $79.17, representing 10% of normal monthly compensation, as recompense for sub-standard living and working conditions.

b. A monthly bonus of $237.50, representing 30% of normal monthly compensation, to be accumulated and paid upon satisfactory completion of his assignment on board a ship involved in clandestine maritime activities.

2. It is requested that this amendment be effective for the period 28 March 1961 thru 28 April 1961.

for J. D. ESTERLINE
Chief, WH/4

Distrubution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ALLOWABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last)	(First)	(Middle)
LYNCH	GRAYSTON	LEROY

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad):

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: HOUSTON TEXAS

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 26 APR 45

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S):

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
JANETTE KENYON LYNCH	533 TERRY CIR, FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.		
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
SHARON ANN LYNCH	" " "	F	14
JEFFREY LEE LYNCH	" " "	M	12
ROBERT THOMAS LYNCH	" " "	M	7
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
HENRY THOMAS LYNCH	DECEASED		
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NUMBER	
RUBY LYNCH	RT # 1 Bx 46A, VICTORIA, TEX	UNKN.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES?

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (~~Mr.~~, Mrs., ~~Miss~~) (Last-First-Middle): JANETTE K. LYNCH

RELATIONSHIP: WIFE

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 533 TERRY CIR FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: HU-4-3443

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☐ YES ☒ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☒ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☒ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

INDICATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, FAYETTEVILLE, N.C.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS
1 JAN 57 EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

MR + MRS. GRAYSTON L. LYNCH

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

WIFE HAS COPY ALSO FILED COUNTY COURT HOUSE BRIDGEWATER

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

(WIFE) JANETTE K. LYNCH

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
WASHINGTON D.C	19 FEB 61	Grayston L. Lynch

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as a Contract Employee for the use of your services and the performance of duties of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the use of your services and the performance of specified confidential duties, you will be paid an amount calculated at the rate of $9500 per annum. In addition, you will be entitled to a post differential in conformance with applicable Government regulations. Payments will be made as directed by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

2. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary expenses incurred in connection with such operational travel as may be directed or authorized by the Government. This may include per diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of such travel and while on temporary duty away from your domestic permanent post of assignment. Payment and accounting for such expenses will be in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

3. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in conformance with applicable Government regulations.

4. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

5. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) The United States Government will withhold from the compensation due you under this contract, social security deductions in conformance with the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, and the procedures of this Organization (presently 3% on the first $4800). For reasons of security, all inquiries concerning your relationship to the Social Security system shall be made directly to this Organization, and in no event may any such problem be presented by you or on your behalf to any representative of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance unless authorized by this Organization.

5. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement, monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. It is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment by the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

8. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless otherwise instructed by an authorized Government representative), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

9. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

10. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

11. Term. This contract is effective as of 11 Jul-1961, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one (1) year unless sooner terminated:

(a) Upon thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extended upon notice from the Government. Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
[redacted]

WITNESS: ________________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]
[illegible]

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: See R 20-1000 and HB 20-... for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "NA" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.

CASE OFFICER: ROMAN, W.
TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
DIVISION: WHD
DATE: 2 November 1960

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☐ PSEUDO ☒ TRUE
[illegible]
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT: JMARC
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Washington, D. C.
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 1535-5000-9021
3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV
4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES
Dick Gills WH/4/Plus

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date)
Oral OK [illegible]

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☐ OBTAINED ☒ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.)
Contract Employee

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: US
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. AGE: 37
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): June 14, 1923
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Victoria, Texas

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate)
☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife	Age 38
Daughter	Age 14
Son	Age 11
Son	Age 7

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: (Retired)
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat): Reserve-Longevity
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army
24. RANK OR GRADE: Captain
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $9500
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: -----
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): -----
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☐	☒
NO	☐	☐

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: No
32. POST: No
33. OTHER:
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any)

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☐ YES ☒ NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☒ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

NA

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION
43. ENTERTAINMENT
44. OTHER

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☐ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET

CASE OFFICER

DIVISION

TELEPHONE EXTENSION

DATE

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HR 20-615, HR 20-620, HR 20-610, HR 20-1000, and HH 20-620-1, HH 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

FECA
Social Security
Missing Persons

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): ☒ PROPOSED ☐ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☐ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

NA ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS ___ MONTHS ___ 1 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE: ASAP

53. RENEWABLE: ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30 days

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other)

Paramilitary

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

PM Training

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Retired after 21 years of Army service. Has specialized in special forces operations and had service overseas. From 1956 to present commanded and trained an SF team in guerilla warfare. Was instructor at 7th Army NCO School for three years.

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☒ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
German			X						
French			X						
Laotian			X						

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

October 1938 to October 1960 US Army. Retired with 21 years service as captain. Retirement pay $281.00 per month.

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	JACK HAWKINS		WILLIAM E. [illegible]

SECRET

10 November 1960
DATE

LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	RANK	SN	BR	DIV	REG NO.
Lynch,	Grayston	L.	Captain	0966311	Armor		

MOS or AFSC	CEI	DOR	CAT	PULHES
31542	113	17Sep54		1-1-1-1-1-1

MARITAL	DOB	POB	CHILDREN	FOREIGN REL
Married	14Jun20	Galveston Texas		

CURRENT ADDRESS	CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE	MILITARY SERVICE
533 Terrace Circle Fayetteville, North Carolina	Salesman	Special Forces Svc from 1938 to present
LANGUAGE		

FLYING ETC	CIVILIAN EDUCATION	MILITARY SCHOOLING
	Two (2) Year College GED	AB Armd Co Officer Crse

REMARKS:

FA team Commander
In Excellent Physical Condition
Combat Experience, awarded Bronze Star and Purple Heart
IQ 130
Good Company Commander Type.
No Staff training or experience.

New Contract file

SECRET

COVER DATA

NAME: Grayston L. Lynch COVER: Ace Cartography Co.

JOB TITLE: General Manager SALARY: (TRUE: Career Agent - GS-13/5 $13,755

(COVER: $12,000 per year

EOD DATE: June 1964 SUPERVISOR: Geo. French, C/SO

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: EOD career agent in HQS Feb 61 - training - and PCS to WAVE Aug 61 - Hqs assigned Wilson Assoc. cover; in June 1964 Subj was under Ace Cartography Co. as Gen. Magr. & V-Pres. Will remain that cover while in Wave building.

MARITAL STATUS: married DEPENDENTS: 3 children

DPOB: 14 June 1923 - Gilmer, Tex. SOC. SEC. NO.: 451-18-7989

HOME ADDRESS: 12550 Moss Ranch Road
Miami, Fla. HOME PHONE: 666-3716

REMARKS:

Subj will indicate that he was an Army Officer and retired

Accepted position with Ace Cartography.

OFFICE ASSIGNMENT: SO OFFICE PHONE:

Pseudo: Irving C. Devuno

SECRET

SECRET
COPY

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT: Assignment of Robertson and Lynch to WH Division

1. This is in response to your oral request for the transfer or assignment of Robertson and Lynch from this Staff to WH Division.

2. These employees were recruited as Career Agents under CA/PMG Project PRJEWEL, and therefore are to be administered in accordance with the terms of this Project.

3. Under the terms of Project ZRJEWEL, CA/C/PMG is responsible initially for their selection and recruitment, and subsequently for their training and developmental assignments until they are transferred to an existing operational project under jurisdiction of an operating division.

4. Selection and recruitment involves complete processing to contract under provisions of HB 20-1000-1, and requires also:

a. security clearances

b. Medical Clearances

C. provision of cover

d. Financial Briefing

e. Assessment and Evaluation

5. Training and development requires that subject to be provided tutorial or group training, according to their individual needs, to qualify them as senior PM Officers capable of serving overseas as case officer, instructors, advisers, or consultants; and capable of developing indigenous forces, directing operations, and personally participating in operations. The training envisioned normally would include, but not be limited to:

a. Language aptitude testing and subsequent language training
b. Clandestine tradecraft
c. Paramilitary operations training
d. Covert Action Operations training and CI Familiarization

6. Although both subjects are now under contract, as of this time, of all of the above mentioned items of processing, training and development, the following yet remains to be done:

Robertson : Medical clearance, provision of cover, financial briefing, Spanish language aptitude test and spanish language training, Clandestine refresher training as deemed adviseable.

SECRET

COPY

Lynch - provision of cover, financial briefing, assessment and evaluation, language aptitude test and possible language training, and all basic Clandestine Operations training.

7. Project ZRJEWELL further provides that administrative responsibility for these employees including compensation, operational security etc. will be transferred to the Operating Division for such periods of time as the employees are under the jurisdiction of the Division for operational duties. For administrative purposes, it is suggested that WH Division assume these responsibilities for both Robertson and Lynch as of 1 June 1961.

8. On of the major considerations in the contract employment of these two officers has been that their lack of association with the Agency, thus far, permits their operational utilization in circumstances where staff employees cannot participate, and their long range continued employment is, to a certain extent, dependent on their being abot to maintain this posture. It is requested, therefore, that you take every reasonable precaution to maintain their "deniable" status.

9. Since the CA Staff will once again become responsible for these officers whenever such time may come that you no longer have a reqiore,emt fpr tje,. ot wpi;l be veru ,icj a??recoated of tjos office would be kept advised as to their standard of performance, acquisition of additional capabilities, by either training or experience, and we should be consulted before any changes or amendments are made in their contracts which might become commitments to be assumed by the CA Staff

Alfred T. Cox
Chief, Paramilitary Group
Covert Action Staff

c/WH
CCG
C/CA

Note from F.H. Orig hand carried
to Bob Moore 1 June; Moore
said WH/4 Personnel would
contact CA/SG & effect transfer

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CI Staff

DATE: 24 May 1961

FROM : Corinne L. Hassell/DRB

SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston L.

Per telephone request of Helen Ingraham/CI Staff, IR on Grayston L. Lynch is forwarded. I saw subject 2 November 1960 when he came in to follow up on his application dated 4 January 1960 when he was interviewed by Mr. Neil Doherty, then Chief/DRB. Subject returned to the United States in July 1960. He had served as Team Leader with the Laos Army where he ran a training center in PAO Vientiane. I told him Mr. Moore was working on something for him and that if it developed, he would be contacted. That was my last contact with Mr. Lynch.

Corinne L. Hassell

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

LYNCH, Grayston L. (Applicant for Agency Position)

FROM:

LYNCH, Grayston L.

NO.

DATE 18 July 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. RB Files			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

MEMO TO RECORD

Subject again called in, via phone, on 18 July 1960 to ascertain possible Agency interest. Was advised that, as of date, no interest had been given to his application. He will again follow-up in about 6-to-9 months. Paul R. Wilson

Paul R. Wilson

Tuesday 2 Nov 60

Per Ken Donaldson FE

Nothing likely in S.E. Asia Area because of [illegible] situation in that area.

Subject contacted a Mr. Bob Moore (WH) yesterday.

I called Mr Moore ~~[illegible]~~ & briefed him re FE situation. He is working on something for this man in WH I

clb 3 Nov 60

(S is legally separated [illegible] 17 July 60 - Retired from Army for longevity, 31 July 60)

FORM 610 1 DEC 56 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O-[illegible]

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Lynch, Grayston L.

FROM:

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FE P VCL	25 FEB 1960		
2. C FE VCL			
3. FE P VCL			
4. FE P		MAR 1960	
5. CSPO	MAR 15 1960	3/17/60	
6. DRB	1960	3/22	
7. Darlene DRB Files			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Are you still interested in Capt. Grayston L. LYNCH for staff or contract employment?

1 to 2 Pls call me. W

3 to 4: FE VCL has advised Vientiane to acquaint themselves with subject and to evaluate him while he is on duty in Laos. It may be their evaluation will make further consideration of him unnecessary.

Ken D.

5) See above, pls. 12-5

---

5 to 6: Nothing more to do now.

7 to DRB

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 O - 476731

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

LYNCH, Grayston L.

FROM:

Neil F. Doherty/DRB

NO.

DATE 29 January 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Lou Armstrong 2119 I Bldg.	1960		[illegible]
2. FE/Pers	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. CSPO 2132 I	9 Feb 60		[illegible]
9. DRB (Doherty)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
10. Bob Goodchild 1410 K Bldg.		17 Feb '61	RMM
11. Mr. Staten FE/P. 2333	23 FEB 1960	24 FEB 1960	[illegible]
12. FE/P/PCL			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

① for information & forwarding to FE (attn Goodchild)

2-8 nothing here, Lou. Goodchild is still with C. Francis in PP Staff.

⑩ For information only - on your referral.
Neil Doherty

10-11: Capt. Lynch, known to Robert Moore, FE/P/ND, was referred to Mr. Whitehurst for interview while in town a couple of weeks ago. Doherty DRD obtained applicant forms if Whitehurst's further interested in staff or contract hire.
R. Goodchild

12/ Ken, See if Whitehurst interested in following up. [illegible]

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476711

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1. DATE OF INTERVIEW: 4 January 1960

2. PLACE: Washington, D.C.

3. PREVIOUS APPLICATION: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. INTERVIEWER: Neil F. Doherty

5. REFERRED BY:

6. TYPE OR PRINT IN CAPS — LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: LYNCH, Grayston L.

7. PERMANENT ADDRESS: 533 Terry Circle, Fayetteville, N.C. — TELEPHONE: HU 4-3443

8. BUSINESS ADDRESS: FC-4 77th SF Op. Ft. Bragg, N.C. — TELEPHONE: 46126

9. TEMPORARY ADDRESS: — TELEPHONE:

10. DATE OF BIRTH: 14 June 1923

11. PLACE OF BIRTH: Gilmer, Texas

12. CITIZENSHIP: ☒ U.S. ☐ OTHER (Specify country)

U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ☒ BIRTH ☐ NATURALIZATION — IF NATURALIZED INDICATE DATE:

13. ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOW(ER) ☐ DIVORCED

14. NO. OF DEPEND. (Excluding wife): 3

15. FOREIGN RELATIVES, INCLUDING WIFE (Reg. 10-9)

None

16. EDUCATION (Schools, degrees, dates, majors, thesis title, grade average or class standing, extra-curricular activities, etc.)

1946 Aeroy Jones Institute, Battle Creek, Mich.
1948 US Army GED 2 years college

17. MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Employers, positions, duties, salaries, reasons for leaving)

18. MILITARY EXPERIENCE (Branch, serial no., stations, training duties, command responsibilities, rank held, reserve status, current proficiency and interest). INCLUDE ALSO DRAFT, ACTIVE MILITARY OR RETIRED STATUS.

1938 - Date US Army Capt. Special Forces team leader.
Retiring - 30 September or 31 October 1960

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

19. AREA KNOWLEDGE (Areas, type of knowledge, how acquired, etc.)

Germany - 3 years
Japan 8 months
Korea 4 months
Panama 2 months

JAN 29 4 17 PM '60

20. LANGUAGE FACILITY (Give tests when skill warrants and rate below)

LANGUAGE	NATIVE-FLUENCY	FLUENT BUT FOREIGN	ADEQUATE FOR TRANSLATION	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL	LIMITED	ACQUIRED BY
German	weak						
Thia &Laotian	introductory						

21. SALARY REQUESTED

22. POOL INTEREST ☐ YES ☐ NO

23. ACCEPTABLE STATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ YES ☐ NO
ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☒ YES ☐ NO
OVERSEAS ☒ YES ☐ NO

PREFERENCE LIMITATIONS

24. HEALTH
Good

25. FORMS GIVEN ☐ PHS ☐ APP. 1 ☐ MED. ☐ SEC. AGREE. ☐ C/A (If required)

26. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION (Appearance, manners, personality, maturity, motivation, flexibility, intelligence, emotional stability, qualifications for intelligence work, career planning, over-all impression, pertinent unfavorable factors)

Big, strong, outdoor type,. Has a long term interest in staff employment but will accept contract. Though he prefers to take his family with him he will serve two years overseas without them if necessary.

His first area of interest is Europe/Germany but he would serve where ever assigned.

Looks like a good PM prospect for a training officer down below. Jungle warfare, escape and evasion are his specialities.

Will contact us when he returns from special six month assignment in Laos.

Copy to Mr. Lou Armstrong for information.

27. RECOMMENDED FOR

28. SERIAL NUMBERS

29. TESTS

nb

30.
Neil F. Doherty
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

29 January 1960
DATE

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/WH/4

SUBJECT: Captain Grayston L. Lynch, USA (Ret.)

1. Pursuant to conversations with personnel representatives of your office on 2 May 1961, I agreed to hold a position vacancy in Project ZRJEWEL for subject individual at his current basic pay level.

2. It was understood and agreed that WH/4 would continue to carry Subject on his present contract as long as his services are needed in the Division. It would be appreciated if you would inform me when Subject will be available for ZRJEWEL.

[illegible]

Alfred T. Cox
Chief
Paramilitary Group, CA

CA/PMG/AFHaney:tcf
3 May 1961
Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - CA/C/PMG
1 - CA/C/SG
2 - CA/PMG

Memorandum

Capt Grayston L. Lynch, 066311
533 Terrace Circle
Fayetteville, N. C.

Al -

Name & address of officer about whom I just spoke to you on telephone.

1340
24 Oct 60.

SF Officer
well qualified in all aspects of SF (2) [illegible] SF (1) available and [illegible] will [illegible] desires

From The Desk Of

Lt. Col. Wilson

GRAYSTON LEROY LYNCH

7th S.F. Group, Ft. Bragg, N.C.

Gilmer, Texas

14 June 1923 x

6 1½ x
194

TEXAS

CAPTAIN U.S. ARMY

46126 Ft BRAGG SEP 54 PRESENT

14 Oct 38 20Sep 13 Oct 41 19Sep RA6283750
6 Jun 48 50 30 Sep 47 50 ARMY O965511

x

MILITARY SERVICE

Grayston L. Lynch
DOB: 14 June 1923

Oct 1938-Oct 1941	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 23d Infantry Regiment and 2d Reconnaissance Troop
Dec 1941- May 1945	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, Platoon Sergeant, Wounded in Belguim.
May 1945-Sep 1947	Patient United States Army Hospitals.
Sep 1947-Jun 1948	Civilian - Sold Insurance and managed a Naval Officer's club, Houston, Texas.
Jun 1948-Sep 1950	Platoon Sergeant, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas.
Sep 1950-Oct 1951	Entered active duty as 2d Lieutenant, sent to Korea. Saw combat as Platoon Leader, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, 2d Infantry Division.
Oct 1951-Sep 1953	Company Commander, Reception Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Sep 1953-Sep 1956	Instructor, 7th Army NCO Academy, Munich, Germany. Instructed in Tactics, Weapons, Leadership and Engineer equipment.
Sep 1956-Present	7th Special Forces Group(Abn), Fort Bragg, NC - Attended Special Forces Officer's Course 1956, served as Air Operations Officer and Team Leader of a Special Forces Operational Team. Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare to include training in all weapons, both American and foreign; demolitions and sabotage; Escape and Evasion; Guerrilla and Anti-guerrilla tactics; Supply and administration; Medical subjects; intensive study of selected target areas; Language of target areas; Political, Economical and Military situations of target areas. A one year study of South East Asia. Particular attention to Guerrilla Warfare operations in this area. Conducted training in radio communications work; Air resupply and Air infiltration of denied areas. 25% of this training was in classified subjects

that can not be covered here. I have had training in Intelligence nets and allied subjects and have been an instructor in all the subjects covered here. I have also led my team on a six (6) month classified mission in South East Asia, where very valuable training was recieved in an actual area of operation.

Radio oper C.W. 10 WPM
Parachutist

Public Speaking, USIA Germany
1954-56, U.S.Army 1956-60

1946 U.S.A.F.I.

U.S.A.F.I. 1947 1948 2yr Level

THE ARMORED SCHOOL FT. KNOX, KY.-1952-53
THE SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL, FT. BRAGG, N.C.-1956

x

FRENCH	x	x	x	x
GERMAN	x	x	x	x
LAO		x	x	

John J. Hanrotty	7th S.F.G., Ft.Bragg, N.C.	Maj.U.S.ARMY
Herbert Brucker	" " " "	Capt.U.S.Army
Phillip Mallory	" " " "	Capt.U.S.ARMY

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1) Traveled and lived in England, France, Germany, Belguim, Japan, Korea, and S.E.Asia while in military service.

2) I will retire as Capt. from the U.S.Army on 31 Oct 1960.

SECRET

28 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security

SUBJECT : LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy #189184

Please be advised that Mr. Lynch was signed to contract effective 8 February 1961.

RICHARD F. GILLS
WH/4/Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

CSI 240-3

REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION OF MILITARY COVER ORDERS

TYPE IN TRIPLICATE

DATE: 27 February 1961

NAME Grayston L. LYNCH	GRADE Capt.	SERVICE NO. & BRANCH *(If military)*

TYPE OF TRAVEL: ☐ PCS ☒ TDY

NO. OF DAYS TDY

TRAVEL TO BEGIN ON OR ABOUT: 28 February 1961

ITINERARY: Washington, D. C. to New Orleans, La. and return.

TYPE OF IDENTIFICATION: ☐ DA FORM 1602 ☐ DD FORM 1173 ☐ DD FORM 720

TITLE FOR PASSPORT

TRAVEL DATA

COVER & PASSPORT		COVER ORDERS		TRAVEL	
☐	(DAC) (DAFOX) COVER	☐	TAG	☐	SUBSEQUENT DEPENDENT TRAVEL
☐	MILITARY COVER	☐	FBIS	☐	CONCURRENT DEPENDENT TRAVEL
☐	OFFICIAL COURIER	☐	OTHER *(Specify)*	☐	CIPAP
☐	TYPE PASSPORT *(Specify)*	X	CLEARANCE *(Specify)* Staff	☐	EXCESS BAGGAGE *(Indicate LBS over)*

DEPENDENT TRAVEL DATA

RELATIONSHIP	NAME	ADDRESS	AGE
	NA		

REMARKS

Orders should cover period from 28 February to 31 May 1961

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER	☐ CONCUR ☐ NONCONCUR
TITLE OF REQUESTER WH/4/Personnel	OFFICIAL COVER & LIAISON, CCD

CPR ONLY

SUSPENSE DATE FOR ORDERS	REQUESTER

FORM 3-60 938 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO : Chief, WH-4, Security
Date: 14 February 1961

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

SUBJECT: LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy
#189184

1. This is to advise that Subject has successfully completed his polygraph interview and is approved for access to information classified through TOP SECRET as required in performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days to contract with the Subject within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. This clearance is limited to use under contract as specified in your request and no promise of staff employment is to be made or implied to Subject in any manner whatsoever.

4. This office is to be advised when a contract is signed with the Subject. In addition, notify this office when contract is terminated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

WAOsborne
W. A. Osborne

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST 10 February 1961		
2. NAME (Last, First, Middle) LYNCH, Grayston L.	3. POSITION TITLE Contract Employee	4. GRADE
5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH DDP/WH/4		6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT. 5717

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☒ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ ~~OVERSEAS RETURN~~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETO	13 February 1961
STATION	WH Area
TDY OR PCS	TDY
TYPE OF COVER	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY	
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED	

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA	
STATION	
NO. OF DEP'S	

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
HERBERT V. JUUL C/WH/4/PERSONNEL

ROOM NO. & BUILDING
1905 Quarters Eye

EXT.
5717

10. ~~REPORT OF EVALUATION~~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
COMMENTS

Physical taken on 13 February - 89 hand carried by individual.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION
QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

DATE
2 MAR 1961

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(26)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :Chief, WH-4, Security

DATE: 17 November 1960

FROM :Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS

SUBJECT:LYNCH, Grayston LeRoy - #189184

1. Subject is approved for appointment as specified in your request under provisions of CIA Regulations 20-1000 with access to information classified through TOP SECRET as required in performance of his duties, contingent upon a satisfactory polygraph interview.

2. Arrangements for the polygraph interview are to be made by your office, however, contracting with the Subject should be delayed until you are advised by memorandum of the results.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

WAOsborne

W. A. Osborne

SECRET

SECRET

CONTRACT EMPLOYEE BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Name (True): Grayston L. Lynch . Date of Birth: 14 June 1923

Place of Birth (City & State): Gilmer, Texas

Marital Status: Married Name of Spouse: Janette K. Lynch

No. of Dependents (Excluding Employee) 3 Years of Birth: 26 July 22/wife
11 Jan 54/son
4 Apr 49/son

Clerical Skills: Typing Speed NA w.p.m. Shorthand Speed NA w.p.m.

Non-KUBARK Employment: Name of Firm	Employment Dates From (Mo-Yr)	To (Mo-Yr)	Position Title
1. U. S. Army	Oct 1938	Oct 1960	Captain
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			

Non-KUBARK Education	Name	City & State	Diploma/ Degree	Year Completed	Major Fields
High School	Pettus High	Pettus, Texas	Not Grad/Grad USAFI-1946		
College					
Other			1 yr college level - USAFI		

Foreign Languages & Proficiency: (Native, Good, Poor, None)	Language	Read	Speak	Write	Understand
	1. Lao		x		Poor
	2. Spanish	x	x		Poor

KUBARK Sponsored Training:	Course Title	Year	Course Title	Year
	1. Radop	1961	4.	
	2.		5.	
	3.		6.	

KUBARK Employment History:

From (Mo-Yr)	To (Mo-Yr)	Position Title	Equiv. GS Grade	F/T or P/T	Component & Location
Feb 61	June 61	PM/ C/O	GS-11	F/T	WH
June 61	Present	PM/ C/O	GS-13	F/T	WH

Data as of 18 August 1965

HAVE YOU EVER HAD ACTIVE MILITARY, MILITARY RESERVE, OR NATIONAL GUARD STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF YOU ANSWERED "NO" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, SIGN THIS FORM IN PSEUDONYM AND RETURN IT TO THE PERSONNEL BRANCH.

IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, COMPLETE THIS FORM AND RETURN IT TO THE PERSONNEL BRANCH

PSEUDONYM (Please Print) LAST FIRST MI: [illegible], [illegible] C

DATE OF BIRTH MO DAY YR: 6 14 23

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) ☐ YES ☒ NO
2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON: RETIRED AUS
5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify)
HAVE SERVED	X								Special Forces Officer

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S): US Army (Retired) Special Forces
3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service): 31 Oct 1960
4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES: 21 yrs [illegible] - [illegible] days
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY → PAST SERVICE: Oct 14 1939
6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE → PAST SERVICE: Capt
8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER: O966311
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE: 31204
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE — PAST SERVICE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY Experience:

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS	
RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER:	
RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	☐		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED: ☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) ☒ OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD Status

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.? ☐ YES ☐ NO
3. Are you a member of a KUBARK Reserve Unit ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☒ ARMY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NAVY ROTC
☐ NAVY ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ AIR NAT'L GUARD

KUBARK Category: I ☐ II ☐ III ☐

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: Capt
6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: 11 [illegible] 59
7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION
8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☒ RETIRED
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE
11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? ☐ YES ☐ NO
15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. NET CREDITABLE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY: YEARS MONTHS
17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

Present Marital Status: ☐ Single ☐ Married

SIGNATURE (P)

SECRET

14-00000

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

[illegible]

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill In)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) [illegible]

2. AGE 37

3. SEX ☐ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. HEIGHT [illegible] 1/2

5. WEIGHT [illegible]

6. COLOR OF EYES

7. COLOR OF HAIR

8. TYPE COMPLEXION

9. TYPE BUILD

10. SCARS (Type and Location)

11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES

12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) [illegible]

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO. [illegible]

14. CURRENT PHONE NO.

15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.

16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country) [illegible]

17. NICKNAMES

18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED

19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.

20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority).

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING

2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $

3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT

4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)

☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):

☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

FORM 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
6-58

(4)

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

ISSUED BY

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE *(Fill In)*

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)* [illegible]
2. AGE 37
3. SEX ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT [illegible]
5. WEIGHT 174
6. COLOR OF EYES
7. COLOR OF HAIR
8. TYPE COMPLEXION
9. TYPE BUILD
10. SCARS *(Type and Location)*
11. OTHER DISTINGUSHING PHYSICAL FEATURES
12. CURRENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* [illegible]
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country)* AND PHONE NO. [illegible]
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE *(State, Territory or Country)* [illegible]
17. NICKNAMES
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES *(Including Length of Time)* UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS *(Where and by What Authority)*.

SECTION II POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT *(You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary).* $
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL

☐ OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:

5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS *(Check (X) each item applicable)*

☐ WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY *(Specify)*:

☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.

6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

FORM 4-50 444 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

(41)

SECTION III CITIZENSHIP

1. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]

2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) [illegible]

3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country) U.S.

4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY ☑ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

5. DATE NATURALIZED

6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.

7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE

8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country)

9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY ☐ YES ☑ NO

10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY

11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ☐ YES ☑ NO

13. GIVE PARTICULARS

14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?

15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.

16. PORT OF ENTRY

17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY

18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue)

19. DATE VISA ISSUED

SECTION IV EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☑ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS

☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE

☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE

☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE

☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To)

4. GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL USAFI

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To) [illegible]

4. GRADUATE ☑ YES ☐ NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL

2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To)

4. GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
USAFI			1947	[illegible]	[illegible]		

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 4

SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
[illegible]	[illegible]	1953	53	
[illegible]	[illegible]	195[illegible]		
	[illegible]			

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak: EQUIV-ALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOW-LEDGE			HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PRO-LONGED RES-IDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
French													X	X	X				
[illegible]													X	X	X				
Lao															X				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION VI — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
England							
France							
[illegible]							
[illegible]							
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

Military Service

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.

SECTION VII — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM						
		☐	GREGG	☐	SPEEDWRITING	☐	STENOTYPE	☐ OTHER (Specify):

2. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.).

SECTION VIII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

14-00000

SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE *(Provide License Registry Number, if known).*

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of Issue)*

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR *(Do NOT submit copies unless requested).* INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING *(Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).*

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Public Speaking - 9510 - [illegible] 1953-55
[illegible] - 1954-55

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION IX

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *(LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.*

1. INCLUSIVE DATES *(From and To - By Mo. and Yr.)* [illegible]

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]

3. ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)* [illegible] D.C. [illegible]

4. KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB [illegible]

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE *(If Federal Service)*

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES [illegible]

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING [illegible]

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 6

[illegible]

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB [illegible]
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES [illegible]
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 1951 - Sept 53
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY [illegible]
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY US Army
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Korea - 2d [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB 2nd Lieut - Platoon Leader
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible] - Sept 53
2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]
4. KIND OF BUSINESS
5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR
6. TITLE OF JOB Platoon Sgt
7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 7

SECTION IX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

5

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

6

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) [illegible]

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) [illegible]

4. KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible]

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB [illegible]

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

7

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) Mar. 45 - Sept 47

2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY

3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

4. KIND OF BUSINESS

5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR

6. TITLE OF JOB

7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER

8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service)

9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Patient in U S Army Hospital

10. REASONS FOR LEAVING

8. IF PRIOR SERVICE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS NOTED ABOVE, INDICATE THE NUMBER OF YEARS CREDITABLE TOWARD U.S. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT, IF KNOWN. [illegible] yrs - 3 mos

9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION. ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? ☐ YES ☑ NO

IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER OR BOTH QUESTIONS IS "YES", GIVE DETAILS

SECTION X — MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 *(As amended)*	☐ YES ☒ NO	2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION	3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO.
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON		5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS	

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND/OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE *(Specify)*
HAVE SERVED →	X								
NOW SERVING →									

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S) [illegible]

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY *(Past service)* 31 October 1960		4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES *(Past and current service)* 23 yrs.	
5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY →	PAST SERVICE Oct 1937	CURRENT SERVICE	6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE →	PAST SERVICE Sgt.	CURRENT SERVICE Sgt.	8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER *(If now serving, provide current number)* [illegible]
9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE		CURRENT SERVICE
10. SECONDARY MIL. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	PAST SERVICE		CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES *(Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)*

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

☐	HONORABLE DISCHARGE	☒	RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	☐	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐	RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	☐	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	☐	OTHER:
☐	RETIREMENT FOR AGE	☐	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY		

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

☐ REGULAR ☐ RESERVE *(Including the National and Air National Guard)* ☐ OTHER *(Including AUS)*

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS?	☑ YES ☐ NO	2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L. GRD. OR AIR NAT'L. GRD.?	☐ YES ☑ NO	3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC?	☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

☑ ARMY	☐ MARINE CORPS	☐ NATIONAL GUARD	☐ COAST GUARD	☐ NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
☐ NAVY	☐ AIR FORCE	☐ AIR NAT'L. GUARD	☐ ARMY ROTC	☐ AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY *(Active)* ☐ STANDBY *(Inactive)* ☐ RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE	10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY *(Mos or Designator)* AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L. GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT	☐ YES ☒ NO	13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT?	☐ YES ☐ NO	15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS
16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY	YEARS / MONTHS	17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT?

SECTION XI — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES. ☐ NO *(If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)*

SECTION XII — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS *(Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled)* SPECIFY:

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance

(Middle) *(Maiden)* *(Last)* Lynch

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE *(City, State, Country)*

6. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS *(Give last address, if deceased)*

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

13. CITIZENSHIP

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

15. PLACE OF ENTRY

16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*

17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

18. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*

19. OCCUPATION

20. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last two employers)*

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, State, Country)*

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From and to - By Mo. and Yr.)*

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE

24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
[illegible]	Daughter			
	Son			
	Son			

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN *(Including step-children and adopted children)* WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS *(Including spouse, parents, step-parents, sisters, etc.)* WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ⇨

SECTION XIV FATHER *(Give same information, for Stepfather and/or Guardian on a separate sheet)*

1. FULL NAME *(Last-First-Middle)*

2. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

3. DATE OF DEATH

4. CAUSE OF DEATH

5. CURRENT ADDRESS - *Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)*

6. DATE OF BIRTH

7. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State, Country)*

8. CITIZENSHIP

9. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY

10. PLACE OF ENTRY

11. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) *(Country(ies))*

12. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

13. WHERE ACQUIRED *(City, State, Country)*

14. OCCUPATION

15. PRESENT EMPLOYER *(Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed)*

16. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED.

17. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE *(From-and-To)*

18. BRANCH OF SERVICE

19. COUNTRY

20. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION XXVI **CERTIFICATION**

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State)	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates, sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec IX Cont: Employment:

[illegible] May 45 - US Army -

[illegible] - 2nd Infantry [illegible] Group

[illegible] Belgium

Oct 38 - Oct 41 - U.S. Army - 2nd Infantry [illegible] -

[illegible]

[illegible] Group.

7
9
11
12
13
14
15
Oth
Mil

GRADE

Arabic
Chinese
Cantonese ( )
Mandarin (/)
French
German
~~Italian~~
Japanese
Portuguese
Russian
Spanish
African
Asian
European
Scandinavian

Languages

CF Status

SECRET

SEA

EE
FE-North
FE-South
-Africa
NEA-East
NEA-Middle
WH
WE

Area Knowledge

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec

Shots OK until

24hrAvailabi'ty
Insurance
Type of Passport
Power of Atty.
Will
Psuedo

Task Force Commander (/)
GW-E&E-Resistance Officer(/)
a.Plan,Tactics,Strategy (/)
b.Weapons Tactical General (1)
c.Reception land,air,sea, Infil-exfil ( )
d.Techniques,cach.,surviv(/)
Air Operations Officer (/)
a. Planning,tactics (/)
b. Pilot ( )
c. Parachutist ( )
d. Balloonist ( )
( )Prop ( ) Pilot( ) Launch
Maritime Ops Officer ( )
a. Planning ( )
b. Operating ( )
c. Support ( )
d. Training ( )
Sabotage Officer (/)
a. Plan.,Target.,Train(/)
b.Explosives Demos Special ( ) Devices
c.UDT
Support Officer ( )
a. Personnel,Admin,PersAff( )
b. Finance ( )
c. Records and Reports ( )
Headquarters
Field
Location

Competency Code:
(1) Best Qualified
(2) Experienced (one or more years)
(3) Trained (OTR or on-the-job)

Cleared for availability by:

Cover:

Present Military Status:

Past Military Experience: Jr Officer

Security Limitation:

Check with:

CF Position:

FI-Intell-Tech Support ( )
a. Intell Process ( )
b. Target Analysis ( )
c. Ops Tradecraft ( )
d. Agent Handling ( )
Political Action Officer( )
Propaganda Off,Media ( )
Security Officer ( )
Communications Officer ( )
Logistics Officer ( )
Medical Officer ( )
Other ( )
Order of Battle (/)
Interrogation ( )

Home Address: 535 Terrace Circle
Fayetteville N.C.
Home Phone:
Office Address.
Extension:
Position:

FI
CI
PP
FM

SECRET

Commo
Log
Medical
OTR
SEC
PSS
PP
FI
CI
[illegible]
[illegible]
EE
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
WE
WH
Other

Revised
Form 148 1-60
SECRET

14-00000

LYNCH, Grayston L
Emp

T for

DOB: 14 June

MILITARY EXP

Oct.'38 - Oct.'41	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 23d Infantry Regiment and 2d Reconnaissance Troop
Dec.'41 - May'45	Enlisted service, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, Platoon Sergeant, Wounded in Belguim.
May '45 - Sept'47	Patient United States Army Hospitals.
Sept'57 - June'48	Civilian - Sold Insurance and managed a Naval Officer's Club, Houston, Texas.
June'48 - Sept'50	Platoon Sergeant, 2d Armored Division, Ft. Hood, Tex.
Sept'50 - Oct.'51	Entered active duty as 2d Lieutenant, sent to Korea. Saw combat as Platoon Leader, 2d Reconnaissance Troop, 2d Infantry Division.
Oct.'51 - Sept.'53	Company Commander, Reception Center, Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.
Sept.'53 - Sept'56	Instructor, 7th Army NCO Academy, Munich, Germany. Instructed in Tactics, weapons, Leadership and Engineer equipment.
Sept'56 - Oct.'60	7th SF Gp (abn), Ft. Bragg,; Attended SF Officer's Course 1956, served as Air Operations Officer and Team Leader of a Special Forces Operational Team. Trained team in all subjects of unconventional warfare to include training in all weapons, both American and foreign; demolitions and sabotage; Escape and Evasion; Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla tactics; Supply and administration; Medical subjects; intensive study of selected target areas; Language of target areas; Political, Economical and military situations of target areas. A one year study of SouthEastAsia. Particular attention to Guerrilla Warfare operations in this area. Conducted training in radio communications work; Air resupply and Air infiltration of denied areas. 25% of this training was in classified subjects. Has had training in intelligence nets and allied subjects and have been an instructor in all the subjects covered. Also lead his team on a six (6) month classified mission in SouthEastAsia, where very valuable training was received in an actual area of operation.

For a little more info on subject see 201 file.

NOTE: Subj. was interviewed by ICA for mission to Saigon. But was not followed up.

Consult [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1959
PRESCRIBED BY U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch. 293
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 24-57 BOX 20

MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A. 35655 7

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 August 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - CSC - DISABILITY [illegible]

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 30 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255-5300

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12,215

18. REMARKS:

not Recommended for Agency Reserve List. Per JO

Concur:
Ellen Ranochak 8/19/71
OP/RAD/ROB/Ellen Ranochak

cc: PAYROLL
cc: SECURITY

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien
ROBERT E. O'BRIEN, C/PE/SS/NPIC

DATE SIGNED: 08/12/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 43

20. EMPLOY CODE: 15

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72997 ALPHABETIC NPIC

22. STATION CODE: 75003

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HOOTRS CODE:

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE:

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 4, BHB, 4, 0, 0

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RSV PROV TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8/23/71 [illegible]

46. OP APPROVAL: Ralph S. Pizzoc[illegible]
Ralph S. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 17 AUG 1971

FORM 1152 3-67 USE PREVIOUS EDIT

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Bureau of Retirement, Insurance, and Occupational Health
Washington, D.C. 20415

RCH:HQ:bf
07-27-71

NOTICE OF APPROVAL OF DISABILITY RETIREMENT APPLICATION

Chief, Benefits and Services Div.
Central Intelligeace Agency
Washington
DC 20505

Stop 64

26 July 71

The applicant for disability retirement identified below has been found totally disabled for useful and efficient service in his position:

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew	DATE OF BIRTH 04-30-17	CLAIM NUMBER CSA-1 348 500
DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY AND LOCATION (IF DIFFERENT THAN THAT SHOWN IN ADDRESS ABOVE) Same		POSITION
REMARKS		

This employee should now be separated in accordance with the procedure outlined in Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 831-1 or similar instructions issued by your agency. Please forward the applicant's Final Individual Retirement Record (SF 2806) as soon as possible. In addition, please observe the following instructions:

1. UNDER "REMARKS" IN THE SERVICE HISTORY RECORD OF THE FINAL FORM 2806, GIVE DATE PAY CEASED.
2. ATTACH ONE COPY OF THIS FORM TO THE 2806 FORWARDED.
3. IF EMPLOYEE IS INSURED UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM, SUBMIT THE ORIGINAL OF COMPLETED AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS (SF 56) WITH THE FINAL INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT RECORD UNLESS THE EMPLOYEE WISHES TO CONVERT TO AN INDIVIDUAL POLICY.
4. IF EMPLOYEE IS ENROLLED UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM AND APPARENTLY IS ELIGIBLE TO CONTINUE HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT AS A RETIRED EMPLOYEE, PLEASE SUBMIT WITH THE FINAL INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT RECORD:
    - All triplicate copies of Health Benefits Registration Forms (SF 2809) and any medical certificates attached thereto.
    - Quadruplicate copy of Notice of Change in Health Benefits Enrollment (SF 2810) transferring enrollment to the Civil Service Retirement System.
5. IF FOR ANY REASON THE FINAL FORM 2806 CANNOT BE FORWARDED WITHIN 10 DAYS, PLEASE FURNISH PROMPTLY THE INFORMATION REQUESTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF DUPLICATE OF THIS LETTER.

Jack Goldberg
JACK GOLDBERG
CHIEF, CLAIMS DIVISION

(OVER)

BRI 46-48
November 1969

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MATSYNIEC, Myroslaw A.

1700

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LWOP NTE -90 days
27 Aug 1971

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 28 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1255-5300
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D and E Tech
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $12, 215

18. REMARKS

*Pending Disability Retirement LWD - 5.28.71

Other [illegible] 5/28/71 PSI DUE: 4-29-73

PB 6/10/71

cc - Security
cc - Payroll

6/1/71

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien, C/PB/CS/NPIC
DATE SIGNED: 5/26/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 38
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 7299 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 7312
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 05 DA. 02 YR. 66
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 05 DA. 02 YR. 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. 08 DA. 27 YR. 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RSRV. PROV./TEMP. CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 6-3-71
46. OP APPROVAL: Ralph S. Pollock
Ralph S. Pollock
Chief, Special Activities Staff
Office of Personnel
DATE APPROVED: 28 MAY 1971

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 25 May 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 25 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1255-5300
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC
Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D and E Tech
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 12, 215
18. REMARKS: Pending Disability Retirement

+ 07lw

6
22

9

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien, C/PB/SS/NPIC
DATE SIGNED: 5/26/71

6
19

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 57
20. EMPLOY CODE: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72977 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 7215
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HQTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-27-71
46. O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

JMC1 24 AUG 71

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RETIREMENT CSC DISABILITY FROM LWOP		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 30 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6 FUNDS ▶	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2255 5300 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH			12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08		16. GRADE AND STEP 09 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 12215

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

11 3199

27-4292

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

12 AUG 1971

Dear Mr. Maksymiec:

As you bring to a close more than thirty years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed to our success in carrying out our mission.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
11 AUG 1971

OP/RAD/ROB/ERanochak:sl (4 August 1971)

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

NOTICE OF RATING

APPLICANT MUST FILL IN ALL BLANKS DOWN TO HEAVY BLACK LINE

EXACT TITLE OF EXAMINATION: TECHNICIAN IN ENGINEERING & PHYSICAL SCIENCE (WA-7-16

DATE OF EXAMINATION:

NAME: Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
ADDRESS: 4716 Asbury Place, N. W.
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE: Washington, D. C. 20016

This is not a notice of appointment. It is a record of your rating. It is important that you keep it. It is noted that your application was not rated for any position with a lower entrance salary than that which you indicated thereon.

Your Rating is — ELIGIBLE

☐ This examination is not rated on a numerical basis
☑ Your numerical rating is:

GS-10 100
GS-11 96

Your Rating is — INELIGIBLE for the reasons checked below:

☐ The lowest acceptable salary indicated on your application is higher than the salary shown on our announcement.
☐ You did not pass the written test. All competitors must attain an earned rating of 70 without regard to veteran preference. When an applicant's paper falls below the passing mark it is not scored further. Ineligibles do not receive a numerical grade.
☐ Your application does not show that you meet the minimum requirements as to experience (or education) which were specified in the examination announcement.
☐ Your eligibility is suspended pending your furnishing the Commission proof of correction of physical condition, as shown on the attached notice.
☐ Failed to reply to official correspondence.
☐

IF THERE IS A CHECK BELOW, IT INDICATES THE AMOUNT OF VETERAN PREFERENCE CREDIT INCLUDED IN YOUR RATING

☐ 5 POINTS—IF YOU ARE APPOINTED YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO FURNISH TO THE APPOINTING OFFICER EVIDENCE OF HONORABLE SEPARATION FROM THE ARMED FORCES.

☑ 10 POINTS

If you have received an eligible rating, be sure to read the important message on the back of this form.

25 JUL 1969

INTERAGENCY BOARD OF
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINERS FOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20415
(Issuing Office and Date of Issue)

CSC FORM 400
OCTOBER 1965

IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO ELIGIBLES

YOU HAVE RECEIVED AN ELIGIBLE NOTICE OF RATING. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

IT MEANS THAT: Your name has been placed on the list of persons who have passed this examination, in its proper relative standing. This list of eligibles, or register, is kept by the office whose name and address appears in the lower right-hand corner on the other side of this notice.

IT MEANS THAT: When your name is reached on the register, you will be considered for the type of jobs for which you have qualified, (in the geographical area) covered by the examination. (When a Federal agency requests the Commission to supply the names of eligibles, the names of the three eligibles at the top of the register are certified to the agency for consideration.) The agency appointing officer may choose any one of these three persons, so long as he complies with the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended.

IT MEANS THAT: Your prospects for getting a job from this examination cannot be predicted. They depend upon how many vacancies may occur to be filled by eligibles, and on your relative standing on the register. Your name will be certified for consideration as it comes within reach and as requests for eligibles are received. (If you are not selected, your name will go back on the register in its proper relative standing, to be considered again when within reach until the register is terminated.)

IT MEANS THAT: YOU MUST INFORM THE OFFICE WHICH ISSUED THIS NOTICE OF RATING OF ANY CHANGES IN YOUR ADDRESS OR IN THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT. SEND ANY NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING YOUR ADDRESS OR AVAILABILITY TO THE OFFICE WHOSE NAME AND ADDRESS IS SHOWN IN THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND CORNER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS NOTICE, AND REFER TO THE TITLE OF THE EXAMINATION AND THE RATING RECEIVED.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Any offer of appointment or inquiry as to availability which you may receive from a Federal agency will show whether you are being considered for a limited temporary, a career-conditional, or a career appointment.

2. If, when you are considered for appointment, you signify that you are not available or you fail to reply to a communication, your name will be removed from the register until you satisfactorily explain your reasons and specify the conditions under which you would be willing to accept any appointment. When you are unable to accept any appointment you should request that your name be suspended from the register until you are again able to accept [illegible] requests for restoration to the register while it is still in use, changes in availability, or transfer of eligibility, will be acted on without further notice to you.

3. If you are now employed by the Federal Government and have received an eligible rating, show this notice to your personnel officer. He should be aware of your eligibility on this examination. THIS DOES NOT RELEASE YOU FROM YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP THE OFFICE MAINTAINING YOUR ELIGIBILITY INFORMED OF CHANGES AS MENTIONED ABOVE.

4. A competitor who received an eligible rating may, under certain conditions, have his eligibility transferred from the register of one civil service office to a similar register in another civil service office.

A competitor who wishes to have his eligibility transferred should send his request to the office where his eligibility is maintained. [illegible] determination will then be made, and the competitor will be notified, as to whether his eligibility can be transferred.

5. A register established from an examination held in order to fill a specific type of position at a stated salary may also be used to fill vacancies in related positions or at a lower salary. When you accept a career-conditional or a career appointment, your name will be removed from all registers established as a result of this examination. Until your name is removed, your willingness to accept a lower salary will not affect your eligibility for positions at a higher salary.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 O—794-130

If you are not appointed or the register is not officially terminated earlier, your eligibility from this examination will be in effect for a period of 18 months only unless you submit up-to-date information about your qualifications before that time by letter, Standard Form 57 or Form 57A; however, such information will not be accepted if you have had eligibility for less than 1 year. The date of issue which appears on this "Notice of Rating" is that on which your period of eligibility began.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

Date: [illegible]

A preliminary review has been made of the application(s) which you submitted for consideration under Announcement No. 413, Mid-Level Positions in Administrative, Staff, and Technical Services. The experience and training described in your application appear acceptable under the general terms of the announcement. You will be considered for positions for which your experience and training qualify you at grade: GS-11

However, applicants who appear to meet the general announcement requirements for a particular grade level are not thereby qualified for all positions at that grade. When a government agency requests names of eligibles to consider in filling a vacancy, applications showing skills and backgrounds that match the requirements of the job to be filled are carefully reviewed. The best qualified candidates are referred for consideration, ranked in accordance with their relative qualifications with due regard to Veterans Preference.

As you know, applicants may establish eligibility with any two offices maintaining lists under this announcement. In accordance with your request, your eligibility is on the list(s) maintained in the city or cities indicated below:

Washington, D.C. ______________________

Please see reverse for complete addresses and other important information.

CSC Form 990
November 1967

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 April 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035611
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MATSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 08 YEAR 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6255-4100
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH

6
3

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH -9-
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 7,987 ✓
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Lawrence P. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 4/29/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72150 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75073
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. MOOTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 05 DA. 08 YR. 66
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 05 DA. 08 YR. 66
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1–CSC 3–FICA 5–NONE CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 5–NONE 1–5 PT 2–10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: (AR RES) PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0–WAIVER 1–YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 5–NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1–NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2–BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3–BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1–YES 2–NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1–YES 2–NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-6-66
46. O P APPROVAL: M. T. Feldman
DATE APPROVED: 5/6/66

FORM 6-53 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Plans Branch/P&DS

11 May 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Plans and Development

SUBJECT : Appreciation for Effort Concerning Publication Technical Development Program - 1965

1. It is my pleasure to inform you of an outstanding contribution that Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec, a member of your Staff, made toward the successful completion of the NPIC Technical Development Manual for 1965.

2. Mr. Maksymiec's technical advice and superior photographic skill were responsible for the high quality photographs that insured the excellent quality reproductions contained in the 1965 Technical Development Manual.

3. The success of the manual was due in no small part to Mr. Maksymiec's contribution and I wish to personally commend him for his contribution.

Paul W. Reinowski
PAUL W. REINOWSKI
L/Colonel, USAF
Chief, Plans Branch, Plans and
Development Staff

Mr. Maksymiec:

It gives me considerable pleasure to pass on to you this letter from the Chief of Plans Branch, NPIC. I was aware of your efforts in support of this manual and I would like to thank you for another job well done.

A copy of this correspondence should be forwarded to the Support Staff for entry in your official records.

GORDON T. SOWERS
Colonel, USAF
Assistant for Plans and Development

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 June 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKS[illegible] MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 05 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: Z V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3255-4100-~~5555~~
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

3
A

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~R&D TECH~~ P Dand E Tech (9)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.01 ~~1060.02~~
16. GRADE AND STEP: 08 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6600
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Herbert V. Juul | DATE SIGNED: 30 June '64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 22
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72 150 | ALPHABETIC [illegible]
22. STATION CODE: 75013
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE:
DATE OF LEI:

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

DATE APPROVED: 7-2-64

FORM 1152 8-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TAB L

16 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Career Service Board, NPIC

THROUGH : Secretary, Career Service Board, NPIC

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion

1. NAME: Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew

2. POSITION TITLE AND PRESENT ASSIGNMENT:

Photog (Gen) occupying Physical Scientist Slot, assigned to the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff.

3. PRESENT GRADE, TIME IN CIA:

GS-7/3, EOD Date November 1961

4. EDUCATION AND TRAINING: High School

5. EXPERIENCE:

Mr. Maksymiec retired as a Master Sergeant in July 1961, after 20 years of Army photographic experience. He worked in PSD/PIB from November 1961 until 15 September 1963. On this date he was assigned to the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff on a 30-day trial basis. This period was extended to January, 1964 at which time the assignment was made permanent.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion

6. JUSTIFICATION FOR PROMOTION:

Mr. Maksymiec's primary experience has been in practical photography. Since joining the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch, he has learned the theoretical side of photography and combined this with his already extensive knowledge of the photographic process. He has carried out several investigations which indicate a natural bent for scientific methods. After initial briefings, he requires little, if any, supervision. His maturity is a distinct asset in his work, where extreme attention to detail and good judgement are absolute necessities. He exhibits a willingness to work for the group, no matter the hours, and cooperates and works well with others.

His responsibilities and quality of effort are deserving of more than his current GS-7 status. It is therefore recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to GS-8.

John W. Cain
JOHN W. CAIN
Assistant for Plans and Development
P&DS, NPIC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 14 January 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC Myroslaw A.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY YEAR [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4255-1030-6000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN *
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0303
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07-~~1~~ 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~5795~~ 6185
18. REMARKS:
* Photog Gen occupying Physical Scientist Slot

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Herbert [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 14 Jan. '64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQS/FLD CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
30	10	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		1	04 [illegible] 17		

28. LEI EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 = WAIVED 1 = YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 17 JAN 1964 EC
46. O.P. APPROVAL: David H. Ricketts
DATE APPROVED: 17 January 1964

FORM 4-62 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION AND FORM 1152a. (4)

SECRET

4-00000

Form approved. Budget Bureau No. [illegible]

Personnel Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY

QUESTIONNAIRE ON APPLICANT FOR A POSITION

NOTE.—The information you furnish on this form will be held in confidence.

APPLICANT'S NAME	POSITION APPLIED FOR	EXAM OR REF. NO.
Myroslaw A. Maksymiea	Photographer GS-9	PT-58

The spaces at the right of the questions listed may be used for your answers. If you prefer to make a general statement, or need additional space for your reply, the space under "General Comments" on the reverse should be used.

The questions and explanatory statements in italics are given as guides to the type of information we should like to have, and need not be answered specifically if you consider other factors to be more pertinent.

1. During what period of time, how well, and in what connection have you known the applicant? *(i. e., employer, personal acquaintance, coworker, etc.)*	His employer since January 1962.
2. ABILITY. **How would you rate the applicant on knowledge of and interest in his specialized technical field?** *(Is he better or less well informed than the average? An enthusiast? An authority? Does he express himself well in writing? Does he keep up with new developments? Contribute new ideas? Prefer old methods?)*	Average - At present, employee is under close supervision, we will continue this until he is capable of assuming duties assigned.
3. PERSONALITY. **How would you characterize the applicant's temperament and stability?** *(Is he moody? Even-tempered? Is he cooperative? Sometimes stubborn? Is he unsure of himself? Self-confident? Is he impulsive? Cautious?)*	Applicant gets along well with fellow employees and is cooperative.
How would you evaluate the applicant's ability to meet and deal with others? *(Is he friendly? Awkward? Reserved? Tactful? Does he make a poor first impression? Improve on acquaintance? Does he talk fluently? Haltingly? Too much? Dogmatically?)*	Applicant is friendly.
Do you know of anything in the applicant's background, or does he have any characteristics or personal habits which might adversely affect his efficiency or his relations with fellow-workers? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
Do you have any knowledge of behavior, activities, or associations which would indicate that the applicant is not reliable, honest, trustworthy, and of good conduct and character? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
4. LOYALTY. **Do you have any reason to question the applicant's loyalty to the United States?** *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No
To your knowledge, does the applicant belong or has he belonged to any organization which advocates overthrowing or altering our constitutional form of government by force or other illegal means? *If your answer is YES, please give details and list the organizations.*	No
To your knowledge, does the applicant associate, or has he associated, with any person whose loyalty to the United States is questionable or who belongs to any of the types of organizations described above? *If your answer is YES, please give details.*	No

Form FAA-[illegible] (6-[illegible])

WORK HABITS.
How would you describe the applicant's approach to his work? [illegible] Methodical? Careless? [illegible] Thorough? Does [illegible] Organize his [illegible]

[illegible] in detail [illegible] is expected [illegible]

How would you rate the applicant's industry and dependability? [illegible]

[illegible] He should improve with more on-the-job [illegible].

6. POTENTIALITIES.
What is your opinion of the applicant's administrative ability? (Is he primarily a [illegible] Would he be best [illegible] a planner, or an independent worker? Is he hesitant? [illegible] Does he need close supervision? [illegible] to delegate authority?)

[illegible] responsibility [illegible] presently in [illegible] the process. He tends to be a follower.

What is your estimate of the applicant's capacity to advance? (Is he a plodder? [illegible] with the job? Is he interested in doing a good job or merely concerned with promoting himself? Does he avoid responsibility? Accept it readily?)

[illegible] for advancement will depend on his initiative [illegible] in the future.

What kind of job or what level of work in general do you think the applicant might be expected to hold in ten years? Give [illegible].

Not applicable

7. RECOMMENDATION.
If the applicant was employed by you, what was his

TITLE	SALARY
[illegible]	$9,[illegible]

REASON FOR LEAVING

Higher grade

Would you reemploy him?

☒ YES ☐ NO ☒ AT SAME SALARY ☐ LOWER SALARY ☐ HIGHER SALARY

This person, if employed, may [illegible] be assigned by the Federal Aviation Agency to your own city in connection with an activity, such as aircraft inspection, air traffic control, airport planning, etc., directly related to the flying safety of you and your family. In view of the above, would you recommend him for a position of such responsibility?

Not applicable

8. GENERAL COMMENTS.—*Please make any additional remarks you think might be helpful to us in deciding about the applicant's suitability for employment. (If additional space is needed, continue on separate sheet.)*

Mr. [illegible] has had past experience as a photographer with the Armed Forces. He is a good photographer. Since he has been employed [illegible] his duties are that of [illegible] processing.

E. D. Ells

Signature [illegible] WCE Address [illegible]

Designation [illegible] Date [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 January 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655 ✓	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION Reassignment	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 1 DAY 22 YEAR 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT Regular	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2255-1010-7000	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC Data Management Division Technical Branch Photographic Lab Section Contact Printing Unit	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Washington, D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE Photog (Gen)	12. POSITION NUMBER 239	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1060.02	16. GRADE AND STEP 7-1	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 5,355 ✓

4

18. REMARKS

New S/C

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Alan E. Mayer	DATE SIGNED 16 Jan 1962

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY. CODE 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 92510	ALPHABETIC NPIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQDTRS. CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 4 30 17	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED						

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 July 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER:

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 28 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255-1010-7000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
Data Management Division
Technical Branch
Photographic Laboratory Section

2

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Photog (Gen)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 49

12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02

16. GRADE AND STEP: 7 - 1

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 5355 ✓

18. REMARKS:

One copy sent to Security.

OFFICE/DIVISION WITHIN CEILING
24 NOV 1961
Date
ED
Position Con. Off.

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: William L Banfield

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Alan E. Mayer

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 11

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 92500 ALPHABETIC NPIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGRAL CODE:

24. HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 11 DA. 30 YR. 17

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC, 3 = FICA, 4 = NONE — CODE 1

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE — MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 4571

34. SEX: M - 1

35. VET. PREFERENCE: 0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT. — CODE 1

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 26 DA. 9 YR. 41

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 11 DA. 28 YR. 61

38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE 2

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES — CODE 1; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 001-12-8369

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.) — CODE 0

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 2

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE 1; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 4

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO — CODE 2; NO. TAX EXEMPT.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7 JUL 1961

46. O.P. APPROVAL: D W McCauley 7/11/61

FORM 8-60 1152 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

F

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

DATE OF INTERVIEW: 23 March 1961
SOURCE:
CANDIDATE (Last, First, Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew
PLACE OF BIRTH: Manchester, N.H.
DATE OF BIRTH: 30 April 1917
TEMPORARY ADDRESS: 3268 Valley Drive, Alexandria, Virginia
PHONE: TE 6-8218
PERMANENT ADDRESS: 3268 Valley Drive, Alexandria, Virginia
PHONE: TE 6-8218
BUSINESS ADDRESS: Office Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Pentagon.
PHONE: OX 7-1376
PLACE OF INTERVIEW: Washington, D.C. - DRB
DATE AVAILABLE:
RECM (Office, Serial): Photo Lab Tech
GS- 7
TESTS:

EDUCATION:
1933 - 1935 Central High School - Manchester, New Hampshire - completed 2 yrs.

EMPLOYMENT: SEE ATTACHED FORM 57.

MILITARY:
1941 - Date Master Sergeant - Chief of Staff for Intelligence 1950 to Date - Photography and lab work of all types with the Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

The applicant is about to retire after 20 years military service. Mr. Maksymiec has a pleasant personality, presents a good personal appearance in his Master Sergeant's uniform, and seems to be about average in intelligence and maturity.

Subject has had some excellent photo and photo lab experience while working with the military attache and in headquarters.

Attached is form 57 plus several letters of commendation. Please refer to POD/CH/CSSB for consideration by NPIC as Photo Lab Tech at about the GS-7 level.

DATE SENT TO HQ: JBS
INTERVIEWER: G.E. POST

FORM 3-60 1667 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-38)

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

SECRET
when filled

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

75-1095/A

DD/A 75-2235

9 MAY 1975

Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec
4718 Asbury Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Mr. Maksymiec:

This letter is in response to the comment you made to the Director on Alumni Day, 26 April 1975, concerning a special medallion for NPIC employees who participated in the Cuban missile crisis.

I have had the appropriate records reviewed. The Certificate of Commendation you and other NPIC employees received was awarded by direction of the President in recognition of the meritorious service performed.

It is hoped that the lack of a medallion to accompany this certificate will in no way detract from the contribution you made during this period of crisis.

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
? - DDA
1 - D/Pers
~~2~~ - DD/Pers/[illegible] (1 w/held)
1 - OPF

Originator: (Signed) F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

5 MAY 1975

DD/Pers/SP/RLAustin,Jr:goc (5 May 75)

[illegible]

DD/A 75-2034

2 6 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

Fred:

1. The facts behind the question raised with the Director by Mr. Maksymec on Saturday, 26 April, are, according to him, as follows.

2. After NPIC had done its fine work during the Cuban missile crisis it appears that two different types of recognition were given. Determinations were made first on certain individuals whose contributions were such that they should receive an Agency medal award. A second group of some 200 were then identified for their level of contribution and received some kind of certificate from the White House signed by the President. Mr. Maksymec was in the latter group and espouses the cause that a "special medallion" should have been given along with the White House certificate. Mr. Bob Gaynor also spoke to me on this matter on Saturday, and has a good recollection on the whole matter.

3. Will you do what you can on the matter and prepare me a letter to be sent to Mr. Maksymec?

John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Adse

WATER BASED ACRYLIC EPOXIES • ANTI-[illegible] COMPOUNDS
FLOOR SEALERS • LEVELLING COMPOUNDS • [illegible] COATINGS

M. A. Maksymiec
VICE PRESIDENT SALES

Environmental Coating Industries Corporation
7204 Poplar Street · Annandale, Virginia 22003 (703) 354-4282

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/Len	7 May	
2	DD/A FYI		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Al did a nice job of putting this problem to bed. You might want to forward to Jack for info.

-B

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DD/Pers	7 MAY 1975

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
1-67

[illegible]-1106

07 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Myroslaw Maksymiec - Retired Employee

The meeting with Mr. Maksymiec on 6 May 1975 was to satisfy his request to review his official personnel file (this matter was being treated in the manner of a request under the Freedom of Information Act). Location: Main Reception Interview Room at Headquarters Building - 3 p.m.

The duration of the meeting was one (1) hour of which time Mr. Maksymiec used approximately 7 to 8 minutes to quickly thumb-thru the OPF. It is my impression that he was surprised: 1) we were allowing him to see all the material in the file (he described vividly, a 1971 unpleasant encounter with Mr. Echols, the Director of Personnel, who refused to show him a document and would only read to him a small portion from it - this caused his request and subsequent interview with the DCI, Mr. Helms), and 2) at the reality that the file contained nothing actually derogatory (he stated he had seen and signed the fitness reports so these represented nothing unknown).

The major portion of the time was consumed in my listening to his evaluation and assessment of the various supervisors and co-workers at NPIC and their shortcomings. He regaled me with much of his background and history with the military and initial application and entrance on duty with the Agency; his personal acquaintance and relationships with notables - a former American Ambassador to Ethiopia, Joseph Simonson, the Emperor of Ethiopia, several Generals and Congressional personalities, Mr. Helms and Mr. Arthur Lundahl, and his membership in the Explorer Club.

Presently he is Vice President for Sales of the Environmental Coating Industries Corporation located in Annandale, Virginia - the company removes corrosion and stains from surfaces. He offered the company services at the 1974 Alumni session, to clean the stains from the Nathan Hale statue at the front of the building, at a cost of $300. He plans to follow-up on his proposal, since he has not heard anything from the Agency.

He mentioned that Mr. Blake, at the direction of the DCI, (1975 Alumni Day) was to explore and advise him (Maksymiec) of the possibility of striking and issuing a medal to about 200 Agency personnel (of whom he is one) for their participation in certain aspects of the 1962 Cuban crisis.

Our meeting ended with Mr. Maksymiec indicating he had no intention of "going after anybody," but he was curious what was in his file, and that was the basis for asking to see it.

Abraham Schwartz

SECRET

ICATION OF SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFIC COVER BACKSTOP

DAT 17 FEB 71

FILE NUMBER 11814

EMPLOYEE NUMBER 035055

ID CARD NUMBER Air Force 8995

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NPIC

ATTN: NPIC/Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322 DTD FEB 71

SUBJECT: MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

OFFICIAL COVER
- ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED
- X DISCONTINUED

UNIT: Logistical Support Grp. Prov.

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11) Operational Use Only
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF	DATE
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

EDF/pw

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 11 August 64

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NPIC

ESTABLISHED FOR: MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

ATTN: Mr. Carl Batchelder

FILE NO.: K-8235

REF: Form 1322 16 June 64 Requesting cover

ID CARD NO.: B8995

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: Logistical Support Group, Provisional

EMPLOYEE NO.:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

OPERATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY

☒ Block Records:
(OPUFIM 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________.

b. Continuing, effective EOD ______________.

NA Submit Form 642 to change limitation category.
(HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued.
(HB 20-641-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover.
(R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility.
(R 240-250)

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE 8/14/64

☐ Remarks:

☒ Cover History Nov 61-present-overt-NPIC

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

[illegible]/al
342

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-POD, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-OS D/OS, Copy 4-OL/TELSVC, Copy 5-PSD/OS, Copy 6-File.

FORM 1-64 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTICE OF EMPLOYER DESIGNATION FOR TAX PURPOSES

035655 MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

EMPLOYER IS CIA AS OF 7 JUNE 1964

SECRET

14-00000

JMC: 24 AUG 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]
5277

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT CSC DISABILITY FROM LWOP
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 30 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 43
20. Employ. Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Mission Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 04 30 17
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 6nb0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR | RESV | PROV | TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-24-71
DN

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DDG: 22 JUN 71

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 | DA 25 | YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS: OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Initials Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	18	72997	NPIC	75013		1	04	30	17		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE — MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE — 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV STAFF — CODE
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE — 2 WAIVER 1 YES — HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE — 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-23-71 Mn

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

B 15

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 700	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WI	ADJ.
GS 09	5	$11,866	05/04/69	GS 09	6	$12,219	05/02/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 3/15/71

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS N.E. FISHER

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DATE: 6 JULY 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEAVE WITHOUT PAY NTE: 27 AUGUST 1971
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 28 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 2255 5300 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: D AND E TECH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12215
18. REMARKS: OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 36
20. Employ Code: 18
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72997 | ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. [illegible] Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 04 DA 30 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 05 DA 08 YR 66
27. DATE OF LEI: MO 05 DA 02 YR 71
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO 08 DA 27 YR 71
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 FICA 3 FICA 4 [illegible] | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE | MO | DA | YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: PROV | PERM | TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 WAIVED 1 YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7.12.71

FORM 1150 5-66 Mig 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$11,866

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]55	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible] [illegible]ROSLAW A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION [illegible]	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. [illegible] | 9 | 7[illegible]	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V	☐ V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 235 33 [illegible]	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 5 USC [illegible] 3
☐ CF TO V	☐ CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI NPIC TECHNICAL SERVICES AND SUPPORT GROUP RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING DIVISION ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.		
11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]844	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION 1[illegible]	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 167[illegible]08	16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible] 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 1[illegible]564

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE [illegible]7	20. Employ. Code 1	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible]	ALPHABETIC [illegible]	22. STATION CODE 75[illegible]13	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. [illegible] | 3[illegible] | 17	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV PROV. TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVER 1-YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO		
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4 POSTED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

FVD

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 01/31/70

1. SERIAL NUMBER 039655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 11 70	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	

6. FUNDS				
	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 0255 5600 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC DDI/NPIC/TSSG/RED/ATB	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH		12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
2-3-70
m

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 . MFG. 10-68 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$11,197

B/8

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 700	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 09	4	$ 9,308	05/07/67	GS 09	5	$ 9,590	05/06/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE H. L. Dallard

DATE 5 March '69

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS OC

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 700	V	GS 09 5	$10,564

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 09/30/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A			
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 09 DA. 22 YR. 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 9255 5600 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC NPIC/TSSG/ESD/ELB			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH			12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08		16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10-8-68

Form 7-66 1150B MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 09 4	$ 8,861	$ 9,308

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 07/13/68

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 01 YR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS	☒	V TO V	☐	V TO CF
	☐	CF TO V	☐	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9255 5600 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDI/NPIC

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: O AND E TECH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0644

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1670.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS

POSTED
7-16-68

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

(4-51)

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7-66 MFG. 9-66

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150 V	GS 09 4	$ 8,479	$ 8,861

B5

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035659	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 190 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 8,210	05/08/66	GS 09	4	$ 8,479	05/07/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 March 1967

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 1-65 560E

(4-51)

[illegible] 6 MAY 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION		4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.) 05 08 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6255 4100 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH		12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 09 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 7987

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 72150 ALPHABETIC NPIC	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) 04 30 17	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) 05 08 66	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.) 05 08 66
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
5-16-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 08 3	$ 7,070	$ 7,325

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504
PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949,
AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 150	V	GS 09 3	$ 7,987	$ 8,218

SECRET
(When Filled In)

83

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] 02/20/6[illegible]

1 SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MACSYMIEC MYROSLAW A					
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CONV. TO CAREER EMPLOYEE STATUS				4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 24 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI/NPIC					10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11 POSITION TITLE					12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION 10
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)		15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES			16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1-63 11508 MFG. 6-65 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

38

1. Serial No	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	72 150 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 08	2	$ 6,850	07/05/64	GS 08	3	$ 7,070	07/04/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY
D.Y.

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 7 July 1965

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

DLS: 3 JULY 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 07 05 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5255 4100 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI NPIC PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0644	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1670.08	16. GRADE AND STEP 08 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 6600

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 72150	ALPHABETIC NPIC	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mdtry. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 04 30 17	26. DATE ~~OF GRADE~~ MO. DA. YR. 07 05 64	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR. 07 05 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

14 JUL 1964

14-00000

MHC: 22 JAN 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 01 DA. 22 YR. 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 4255 1030 6000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI/NPIC
PLANS AND DEVELOPMENT STAFF
EXPLORATORY DEVELOPMENT LAB BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH.,D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0303
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: 1P
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 6185
18. REMARKS: PHOTOG GEN OCCUPYING PHYSICAL SCIENTIST SLOT.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 72150 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 04 DA. 30 YR. 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
23 JAN 1964

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

22 JAN 1964

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND OCT MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	72 340	V	GS 07 3	$ 5,910	$ 6,185

255-1060

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	92 340 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 07	2	$ 5,725	11/25/62	GS 07	3	$ 5,910	11/24/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: E.G. ECHOLS DATE 1/5/[illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

S-E-C-R-E-T

THIS NOTICE IS USED IN LIEU OF FORM 1150 (NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION) TO EFFECT THE REASSIGNMENT OF NPIC PERSONNEL LISTED BELOW TO THE NEWLY REORGANIZED NPIC STAFFING COMPLEMENT. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF REASSIGNMENT IS 11 NOVEMBER 1962.

SLOT NO.	SERIAL NO.	NAME	COST CENTER NO.	HDQTRS.
0246	015527	FLETCHER FRANCE	3255-1034-6000	DEPT
0248	029579	HARTWIG GERTRUD	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0249	022046	BECK LOUIS F	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0253	003600	SMITH JAMES O	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0253	018340	BUTLER FRANCES	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0257	037112	SEDGEWICK JOHN	3255-1050-6000	DEPT
0265	008822	LIPP ABRAHAM	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0287	025489	VIRGA JANE ELLI	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0287	027941	SMITH ALBERTA E	3255-1005-6000	DEPT
0296	032386	JACKSON RUTH EV	3255-1020-6000	DEPT
0356	022338	FARMER JENNY E	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0359	033665	LEGUTKO ELIZABE	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0372	002358	ALLEN JAMES L	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0378	001988	BEUCHERT HARRY	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0378	055262	MOTHES GORDON	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0382	023918	DEARSTINE RONAL	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0387	022003	CIAMPA JOSEPH L	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0387	035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROS	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0393	002633	BUMBRAY GEORGE	3255-1032-6000	DEPT
0398	007307	DADE THERESA MA	3255-1032-6000	DEPT

S-E-C-R-E-T

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	035655	92500	V	07 1	$ 5355	07 1	$ 5540

109

2080
2080

6 255-1030

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
035655	MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A	92 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-07	1	$ 5,540	11/26/61	G -07	2	$ 5,725	11/25/62			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ /. NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ /. LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE:

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

BWS: 22 JAN 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 035655	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 01 22 62	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 2255 1010 7000	8. LSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDI NPIC DATA MANAGEMENT DIVISION TECHNICAL BRANCH PHOTOGRAPHIC LAB SECTION CONTACT PRINTING UNIT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	12. POSITION NUMBER 0239	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION IP

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 1060.02	16. GRADE AND STEP 07 1	17. SALARY OR RATE 5355

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 92500	ALPHABETIC NPIC	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 04 30 17	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 9 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE / MO. DA. YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
4.23.62 JM

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

[illegible] 1-22-62

BWS: 29 NOV 1961

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 035655
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT (CAREER PROVISIONAL)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 11 DA. 26 YR. 61
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2255 1010 7000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDI NPIC
DATA MANAGEMENT DIVISION
TECHNICAL BRANCH
PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHOTOG GEN
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: IP
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1060.02
16. GRADE AND STEP: 07 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: 5355
18. REMARKS: SUBJECT TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF A TRIAL PERIOD OF ONE YEAR.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 11
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 92500 ALPHABETIC NPIC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 04 DA 30 YR 17
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 11 DA 26 YR. 61
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE 1
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 04515
34. SEX: M1
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO 06 DA 19 YR 41
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO 11 DA 26 YR 61
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE P
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0 - WAIVER 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 001168309
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE: 8
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE 1 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 4
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE 2 NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

[illegible] 11-28-61

SECRET

(4-61)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4/30/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D & E Technician	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSG/RED/ATB	8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 Sept. 1969 - 30 Sept. 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists physical scientists on their research projects by assisting with optical bench experiments and performing routine data collection utilizing the supporting metrological equipment.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operates electro-optical laboratory equipment such as densitometers, sensitometers, microdensitometers, photometers, and microscopes with minimum supervision.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Performs precision photographic processing of film and plate material to specific tolerances of density and contrast in support of on-going research projects.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists physical scientists in the graphing and routine algebraic manipulation of data.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Prepares written reports and briefing materials on assigned projects.	M
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Performs periodic maintenance and calibration of laboratory equipment. 20 OCT 1970 328	M

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	M

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

During the past reporting period, Mr. Maksymiec's responsibilities were more pointedly directed towards the requirements of a laboratory technician as described in the position description and less towards his previous utilization as a photographer. A conference was held with him on 15 June to explain the need for this redirection and a memo ATB 147/70 dated 16 June was prepared and furnished to him detailing of performing these duties and was anxious to stop being thought of as a photographer and welcomed the opportunity to move into a more technically oriented activity. The specific duties outlined are listed in Section B of this report.

It was expected that there would be a learning period during which his proficiency would gradually increase in these new responsibilities. However, progress has not been as rapid as had been hoped due to what appears to be a lack of initiative on his part coupled with severe emotional outbursts against his immediate supervisor and other Center personnel. The latest of these occurred on 28 August in which he used abusive language in the presence of other Branch personnel including the Branch Chief against his Section Chief. This necessitated a written letter of reprimand and his transference to direct supervision by the Branch Chief, and as of 5 October 1970, to another Section within the Branch.

The ratings of M in Duties 1 and 2 of Section B reflect primarily the subject's reluctant participation in data collection and his lack of initiative in learning the operation of the microdensitometer. In duties 4, 5, 6, he has required a maximum amount of supervision which has resulted in senior personnel doing the work

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 5 Oct 1970
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Myroslaw O Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:
DATE: 10/5/70
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Advanced Technology Branch
~~TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND~~ SIGNATURE: FRANK R. FRIBERG

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rater's comments. We have been making every effort to aid Mr. Maksymiec in becoming an asset to RED as a laboratory technician. To date, there has been little noticeable progress; in fact, the temper outbursts mentioned above indicate a deteriorating condition. Unless this situation improves, it may be necessary to recommend termination action.

As I have stated in previous comments, it's unfortunate that he cannot find a position which takes advantage of his expertise in photography, since this would go a long way to resolving his problems.

DATE: 9 October 1970
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/Research & Engineering Div.
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: NICHOLAS R. GAROFALO

SECRET

noted 9 Oct 1970
C/TSD

Mr. Myroslaw A. MAKSYMIEC FITNESS REPORT

Section C (Continued)

themselves. It may be argued that this has not provided him with sufficient first-level supervision to allow him to learn the skills required to perform these duties.

To insure that he is given every opportunity to perform in his new section, written assignments and accomplishments will be submitted on a daily basis.

In line with previous reports, it is still felt that Mr. Maksymiec is essentially mis-assigned as he is an expert photographer and should be assigned in some area where his skill can be utilized to its fullest extent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MAKSYMIEC (First) Myroslaw (Middle) A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4/30/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Tech	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSSG/RED	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 30 September 1968 - 30 September 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process. This involves the determination of what approach to take to a given problem; keeping detailed records of various experiments tried; determing results and making recommendations for possible solutions.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As Senior Photographic Technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups; prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

NOV 3 1 21 PM '69

Mr. Maksymiec is basically an excellent photographer who usually lends a hand as a D&E Technician. Unfortunately, he must be rated according to his job classification as a D&E Technician, and he suffers accordingly.

In his previous fitness report, he was alerted to the urgent need to direct his interest toward becoming a technician and away from his photographic activities. He has not completely heeded this advice.

Two distinct training activities were advised for assisting him in making the transition: a course of instruction in math necessary to discharging technician's duties, and on the job project work. The former persisted for only a short time, due presumably to his lack of ability and/or interests. He improved very little from this instruction. His assistance on a project for developing an ammonia leak detector was effective, and the project was a success; however, his thin knowledge of the scientific method diminished his appreciation of the concept of experimentally controlled variables. In short, he had to be watched closely to insure that his well-meaning "improvement" did not disrupt the experimental plan. His interest and cooperation in this program were commendable, and his overall project performance was adequate.

Mr. Maksymiec is basically mis-assigned. His abilities and interests lie in the photographic field where he does a very commendable job. However, the Laboratory needs the services of properly trained technicians to assist the physical scientists in their research efforts. Since Mr. Maksymiec's expertise is not in this area, it is again recommended that suitable employment as a photographer be found for him.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 Oct 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 30	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 Oct 69	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Exploratory Laboratory ATB/RED/TSSG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [redacted] H L Pollard HENRY L. POLLARD

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In light of the past and present ratings of Mr. Maksymiec, I feel that we are doing him an injustice in keeping him in his present post. Every effort should be made to find a more suitable position for him.

DATE 15 October 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, RED/TSSG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Nicholas R. Garofalo

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7X

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 04/20/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD TP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Tech	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TSSG/ESD	8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 October 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 September 1967 to 30 September 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process. This involves the determination of what approach to take to a given problem; keeping detailed records of various experiments tried; determining results and making recommendations for possible solutions.	W
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups; Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Maksymiec's ability as a staff photographer is un-diminished. His photographic ability is considered by all in the Center as excellent.

It has been pointed out to Mr. Maksymiec that the laboratory does not have a basic requirement or a slot for a photographer, and since he is carried as a D & E technician, he should be more qualified than he is in other aspects of photographic and scientific research other than straight "picture taking", as he does not have the basic foundation either in formal education or experience to perform successfully as a D & E technician. This lack of qualification in this area can be partly explained by two factors: (1.) Mr. Maksymiec's position description was recently changed due to the reorientation of the laboratory's primary mission and function; and (2.) Because of his previous photographic responsibilities he did not have the opportunity to gain the new skills required to fulfill his new duties as a D & E technician. Mr. Maksymiec will have to be re-trained from a photographer into a D & E technician so that he can contribute more to help solve the laboratory assigned tasks.

Mr. Maksymiec still had problems in his relationship with other members of the laboratory during this reporting period. It appears to have been about his concern with his position in the laboratory grade structure and his feeling that he was "ignored" by senior members of the laboratory. Mr. Maksymiec seems to have had a feeling that members of the laboratory including his Chief did not recognize his ability as a photographer and pay suitable deference to his age.

Continued on another sheet.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 Oct 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 Oct 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief/NPIC/TSSG/ESD/EL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the rating officer. In the latter part of the rating period the activities of the Exploratory Laboratory were being changed from ad hoc research projects to a directed program of planned investigations against NPIC and community problems. This change in activities reduced the freedom of choice in tasks to be accomplished and increased the demand for versatility in laboratory personnel. The lack of freedom and the assignment of unfamiliar tasks are distasteful to Mr. Maksymiec since he doubts that these activities will provide the personal recognition he has enjoyed for many years as an outstanding photographer.

Continued on another sheet.

DATE 14 October 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, ESD/TSSG	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE WILLIAM G. MATHEWS

SECRET

Maksymiec, Myroslaw | Fitness Report

Section C Continued

He has also had serious disagreements with a summer intern and another member of the laboratory which had to be settled by conferences with the laboratory chief. A major disagreement with the Laboratory Chief took place recently which resulted from his feeling that he had been treated unfairly without consideration for his age, knowledge and training.

As a result of these problems, a series of conferences with Mr. Maksymiec and senior members of the division were held in order to find a possible solution for his problem. Because of these meetings, an in-house training program has been initiated for Mr. Maksymiec. It is hoped that this will do much to alleviate his feelings of repression and make him a contributing member of the laboratory once again.

Section D Continued

In spite of the reduction in need for Mr. Maksymiec's primary skills, he has expressed a desire to continue his present assignment. Therefore, a program of retraining has been instituted to broaden his knowledge and increase his versatility in carrying out laboratory investigations. Mr. Maksymiec is a hard working, dedicated employee and there is every reason to expect that he will try hard to overcome his deficiencies. However, his age, limited education, previous success in photography, and lack of knowledge in scientific methods pose serious obstacles to be overcome. His present attitude is characterized by his own statement, "Show me how, and I will do it."

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) MAKSYMIEC, (First) MYROSLAW (Middle) A.			2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 April 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/TDS/EDL		8. CURRENT STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 October 1967			12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 30 September 1966 - 30 September 1967			

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 2 6 OCT 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OCT 19 10 54 AM '67

Mr. Maksymiec continues to excel in his primary duty as staff photographer. He processes his own photography and the finished product is consistently outstanding.

He cooperates most willingly with other members of the staff in assisting them with the practical photographic aspects of their projects.

There have been a few minor personality conflicts on procedural matters related to job assignments between Mr. Maksymiec and both staff and non-staff personnel, which have been reported to his laboratory chief and the executive officer, TDS. It is believed that this is due to his strong desire to excel at his job. This problem has been discussed with Mr. Maksymiec and it is expected that he will avoid such occurrences in the future.

During this reporting period Mr. Maksymiec has satisfactorily completed a night school course in technical reading and writing at Montgomery Junior College and is currently pursuing a course in photography at American University. He is to be highly commended for this continuing effort to train himself for a more responsible position.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 9 Oct 1967

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 6

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 9 Oct. 1967

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: A/Ch/Exploratory Development Laboratory

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: HENRY L. DOLLARD

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

The report reflects some minor flaws in the performance of Mr. Maksymiec; however, he is a willing worker anxious to please and to try to show that he is capable of a higher position.

DATE: 17 October 1967

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Executive Officer, TDS

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE:

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training
Correction of Memo Dated 10 August 1965

18 MAY 1966

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A. training request # R-13339 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography MonoPack Color

INSTITUTION: US Department of Agriculture Graduate School

DATE: 1 February - 21 May 1965

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Doris A. Stillwell

Attachments:

- X Grade Report attached to reference memo.
- ___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- ___ Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: ____________________

GROUP I
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

14-00000

PICSB

LFC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
Secy
035655 ✓

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 Apr 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D AND E TECH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 October 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 March 1966 - 30 September 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs supporting equipment.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

18 OCT 1966

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If more space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OCT 12 1 56 PM '66
MAP ROOM

Mr. Maksymiec is a valuable member of the EDLB and serves as its senior lab technician. He works closely with other members of the staff and contributes to the success of the laboratory.

His duties require him to maintain and develop many skills in the field of photographics. He carries out these duties and other responsibilities in a professional manner and with a minimum of supervision.

As senior laboratory technician he provides guidance for his junior technician. His ability to train this man in the field of photographic technology is considered superior.

Mr. Maksymiec recently completed a review course in "Basic Grammar." This course pointed out his main difficulties in written expression, and his teacher suggested methods for overcoming these difficulties. As a result of this course and after a consultation with Mr. R. B. Cheatham of the Educational and Psychological Service Bureau, Georgetown University, Mr. Maksymiec plans on taking a special English course at Montgomery Junior College this fall. This course concentrates on the fundamental of reading and writing. When he successfully completes this English course, he expects to continue his education with the ultimate goal of receiving his Bachelor's degree. Mr. Maksymiec is ambitious and hopes to train himself for a more responsible position. He is to be commended for this effort, and he will be given all possible aid within the laboratory to help him fulfill his educational program.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 Oct 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 37	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 3 October 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE RICHARD E. EWING

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation. Mr. Maksymiec is doing a fine job in the Laboratory and at the same time is working hard to get ahead as his concentration on furthering his education illustrates.

DATE 4 October 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Assistant for Plans and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN A. PABENSTECHER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035665

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 30 Apr 1917
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-08
5. SD: IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: D and E Technician
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: NPIC/PSDS/EDLS
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☐ CAREER
☐ RESERVE
☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☒ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
☐ ANNUAL
☒ SPECIAL (Specify): PROMOTION
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July 1965 - 31 March 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs supporting equipment.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 As senior photographic technician has the responsibility for maintenance of all photographic equipment and aids in the selection of new equipment. Helps in the procurement of photographic supplies.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

21 APR 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 21 11 AM '66
MAIL ROOM

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Maksymiec continues to support the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch well as its senior laboratory technician. His duties require him to work closely with the physical scientists and by himself on various projects which require many practical and some theoretical skills.

Mr. Maksymiec works very well with others, follows instructions willingly, and carries out his responsibilities in a professional manner. He requires very little supervision and completes his assignments quickly and competently.

Mr. Maksymiec has made a conscientious effort to overcome his writing deficiency and has greatly improved this necessary skill since his last review. Although there is still room for improvement, it is felt that real progress has been made and improvement will continue in the future with sufficient practice.

Mr. Maksymiec's duties require him to provide guidance to the laboratory's junior technician. His ability to train this man and to help him increase his photographic skills is considered above average. It is felt that he is presently doing the work of a higher grade, so it is recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to GS-09.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE:
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 31
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: This report is for promotion purposes.
DATE: 4-19-66
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Richard E. Ewing
Richard E. Ewing

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation.

DATE: 19 April '66
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Assistant for Plans and Development
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: John A. Pa[illegible]stecher

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAINING REPORT Grammar and Punctuation	(20 Hours Part-Time)	No. of Students 23	Date of Course 16 - 26 May 1966

Section I IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name of Student	YOB	EOD Date	Office	GS	SD
MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	1917	November 1961	NPIC	08	IP

Section II COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHOD

This course is taught 2 hours a day for 2 weeks. A pretest is given to determine the student's proficiency. The course is conducted through lectures, examples, and exercises; and the evaluation is based on a series of quizzes and a final examination.

The objectives of the course are the review and application of basic grammar principles and fundamental punctuation rules.

Section III METHOD OF EVALUATION

Student achievement is judged on the basis of competence in understanding and applying the principles and rules presented in the course objectives.

Section IV ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This trainee's rating is marked by an asterisk.

Subject	Poor	Fair	Satisfactory	Excellent
Grammar	3*	3	11	6
Punctuation	5*	9	6	2

EXCELLENT - - Thorough knowledge of material presented and above average performance in meeting course goals.

SATISFACTORY- average knowledge of material presented and adequate performance in meeting course goals.

FAIR- - - - - borderline knowledge of material presented and limited performance in meeting course goals.

POOR- - - - - inadequate knowledge of material presented and unsatisfactory performance in meeting course goals.

Section V COMMENTS

This review course in grammar and punctuation was too advanced for Mr. Maksymiec. He needs an elementary course on the English fundamentals preferably on a tutorial basis before he can adequately apply the rules of punctuation and grammar to his work.

In a personal conference with Mr. Maksymiec, the instructor analyzed his weaknesses in grammar and punctuation and suggested ways in which he might improve his performance in these areas.

continue comments on reverse side ☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:	Signature of Chief Instructor Margaret A. Hunt	Date 14 JUL 1966

1O''TGOMERY JUNIOR COLLE^E

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

GRADE REPORT

MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW A
4718 ASBURY PL NW
WASHINGTON DC 20016

DATE 1/27/67

ADVISER

COORDINATOR

COURSE AND NO	TITLE	SEM HRS ATT	EARNED	GRADE	QUAL PTS
TNEN 101	TECH REDG & WRITG I	3	3	C	6

IMPORTANT: If no inaccuracy in this record is reported to the office of the Registrar within (2) weeks of its receipt, the record will stand as it is.

RETAIN THIS RECORD. It is part of your cumulative record and must be presented at the time of your next registration. Credit is given only for grades of D or better.

CURRENT SEMESTER			CUMULATIVE		
CREDIT HRS			CREDIT HRS		
ATT	EARNED	AVERAGE	ATT	EARNED	AVERAGE
3	3	2.00	3	3	2.00

WILLIAM B. BENSON
REGISTRAR

STUDENT ORIGINAL

GRADE REPORT INFORMATION

Grade of "D" is generally not accepted by colleges for transfer credit.

Incompletes must be completed by the date approved by the instructor in the course, or the grade will be recorded as "F".

Grade of "WP" is recorded only when a course is officially dropped.

Courses dropped within first three weeks of semester are not included in a student's record

A quality point average of 2.0 is required for graduation. Transfer students are expected to maintain an average higher than 2.0 to receive recommendation to upper division of a college or University

[illegible]

A - Superior 4
B - Good 3
C - Average 2
D - Poor but Passing 1
F - Failure 0
I - Incomplete ....None
R - Registered for audit only-None
WP - Withdrawn, dropped-None
WF - Withdrawn, failing 0
S - Satisfactory .... None
U - Unsatisfactory ...... None

14-00000

[illegible] O-A | [illegible] | 3

C/A

357 [illegible] | EM [illegible]350

PAID [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

PAID

DATE

THE [illegible] SYSTEM

A - EXCELLENT
B - GOOD
C - FAIR
D - PASSABLE
F - FAILURE
7 - AUDITOR
8 - INCOMPLETE
9 - WITHDRAWN

INCOMPLETE [illegible] IN ORDER TO RECEIVE CREDIT, AND A LETTER GRADE REPRESENTING QUALITY OF WORK DONE, ALL WORK MUST BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF THE NEXT REGULAR SEMESTER. STUDENT MUST FILE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE A MEMORANDUM COVERING ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE INSTRUCTOR.

NAME [illegible]

WASHINGTON 16 DC

4718 [illegible]

GRADE A | C. Roelbell

GRADUATE SCHOOL
U.S.D.A.

49070

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Washington, D. C.

GRADE REPORT

OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

STUDENT NUMBER	STUDENT NAME	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

COURSE NUMBER	SECT	COURSE TITLE	GRADE
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

210-B | CC O. AND COLOR PRINTING PHOTOGRAPHY | 3

REGISTERED FOR:
1 ☑ CREDIT
2 ☐ AUDIT

C/A

351-3423 | EM-21350

PAID [illegible]

DATE 2/[illegible]/[illegible]

PAID

DATE

THE GRADING SYSTEM

A - EXCELLENT
B - GOOD
C - FAIR
D - PASSABLE
F - FAILURE
7 - AUDITOR
8 - INCOMPLETE
9 - WITHDRAWN

INCOMPLETE [illegible] IN ORDER TO RECEIVE CREDIT, AND A LETTER GRADE REPRESENTING QUALITY OF WORK DONE, ALL WORK MUST BE COMPLETE BY THE END OF THE NEXT REGULAR SEMESTER. STUDENT MUST FILE IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OFFICE A MEMORANDUM COVERING ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE INSTRUCTOR.

NAME M.A. MAKSYMIEE

WASHINGTON 16 DC

4718 ASBURY PL

GRADE A

29078

GRADUATE SCHOOL
U.S.D.A.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
SERVICES BUREAU

August 24, 1966

Name: Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, age 49, came to this Bureau on August 1, 1966, in connection with the Veterans Administration's educational and vocational counseling program for former servicemen. Mr. Maksymiec is married, has two children, ages five and eight, and is employed by a federal governmental agency as a photographic research technician (GS 09/3). He retired from the United States Army in 1961 in the grade of Master Sergeant after serving for over 20 years with primary duties as an intelligence photographer. His education includes eight years of formal schooling, a high school completion equivalence certificate, and additional courses with the Graduate School, Department of Agriculture, and the United States Armed Forces Institute. Mr. Maksymiec stated that he was interested in further education at the college level in order to improve himself both personally and professionally in a field related to his present vocational activities.

In addition to several conferences with the undersigned, Mr. Maksymiec was administered a battery of educational and vocational tests. This report contains the results of these conferences and tests, the results of which should not be interpreted either as conclusive or final. They should be considered primarily as indications of various psychological factors that should be seriously considered by Mr. Maksymiec in making decisions concerning his educational and vocational goals.

In order to determine Mr. Maksymiec's fields of vocational interest he was given the Kuder Vocational Preference Record. When compared to a representative group of men in the national population, Mr. Maksymiec indicated that his interests are significantly similar to persons who are engaged in computational, scientific, and literary activities. Men who have interests similar to Mr. Maksymiec's are found in various engineering fields, astronomy, seismology, economics, psychology, and technical publications writing. These fields are closely allied to his present occupational endeavors.

On the Educational Interest Inventory, a device that is beneficial to an individual in discovering his interests in various fields of study, Mr. Maksymiec's responses indicated that his study interests are very high in physics; high in engineering, chemistry, earth science, and history and political science; high average in communication, zoology, and mathematics; and average in psychology. The areas in which he showed low to average interest were music, education, industrial arts, agriculture, botany, sociology, literature, art, business administration, and economics.

Name: Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

Mr. Maksymiec also took the Army General Classification Test, Civilian Edition, to find out his overall level of mental ability. His score revealed that he exceeds approximately 78 percent of adults in general mental capacity as measured by this instrument. A safer evaluation of his performance is that he is probably in the upper 25 percent of adults regarding his global intelligence.

On the Michigan Vocabulary Profile Test, an instrument that attempts to measure a person's intellectual interests as well as the amount of information he has retained in various areas of knowledge, Mr. Maksymiec indicated, when compared with college freshmen, that he exceeds approximately 50 percent in his knowledge of human relations, 69 percent in government, and 67 percent in the physical sciences. On the lower side, he does as well or better than 24 percent in his familiarity with commerce, 31 percent in mathematics, and 24 percent in fine arts.

In order to find out Mr. Maksymiec's ability to handle English, a basic necessity for one to perform well in college, he was given the Cooperative English Tests. When compared to college freshmen, he showed that he exceeds from 52 percent to 78 percent in his understanding of vocabulary; from 5 to 17 percent in his ability to comprehend what he reads; from 2 to 11 percent in his speed of comprehension; and from 18 to 36 percent in his overall ability to know and understand what he reads under timed conditions. In his skill to express himself properly in English, he exceeds from 1 to 6 percent of college freshmen. When reading and expression are combined into one score, it may be said that Mr. Maksymiec exceeds from 6 to 12 percent of college freshmen in his overall usage of English.

The results of the above tests indicate that Mr. Maksymiec has made the most of his learning opportunities both within and outside the military service. Although he completed only eight years of school, he has acquired a considerable amount of knowledge by observation, reading, and personal experience. In spite of his broad experiences and acquired knowledge, it will be necessary for him to improve his reading and writing skills in English, however, before he begins college courses. Although he manifests a high interest in engineering and scientific fields, he should probably not consider these fields as majors because of his deficiency in mathematics. It is believed the skills in English can be developed but it is doubtful if the mathematical deficiencies can be overcome sufficiently to major in a scientific area. It is probably advisable, therefore, for Mr. Maksymiec to consider one of the social sciences as a college major. His background in photography and military subjects, combined with a college major in an appropriate social science, would probably provide him with the necessary qualifications to become a geographer or an intelligence analyst in government service.

It is understood that Mr. Maksymiec has enrolled in Montogomery Junior College, Takoma Park, Maryland, for the 1966 fall semester and that he will take a special English course concentrating on the fundamentals of reading

Name: Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

and written expression. After he completes this instruction, he might consider working for an associate of arts degree in a social science at this junior college with the ultimate goal of transferring later to a four-year college to work toward a bachelor degree.

I have appreciated knowing and talking with Mr. Maksymiec and I trust he will contact this Bureau if he requires further counseling assistance. My best wishes go with this report in whatever plans Mr. Maksymiec makes concerning his future plans and goals.

Richard B. Cheatham

Richard B. Cheatham
Counseling Psychologist

RBC:jw

Enclosure

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

18 FEB 1966

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A. training request # R-15016 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography, Monopack Color Printing

INSTITUTION: US Department of Agriculture Graduate School

DATE: 20 September 1965-14 January 1966

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- X Grade Report
- ___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- ___ Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: ___

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

10 AUG 1965

This is to advise you that MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A. training request # R-13339 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Color Photography MonoPack Color

INSTITUTION: USDA Graduate School

DATE: January 1965

GRADE: A

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Russell Shaw

Attachments:

X Grade Report
__ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
__ Certificate of Completion
__ Roster of Participants
__ Training Report by Institution
__ Training Report by Student
__ None
__ Other: __________

GROUP 1



COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLOR PRINTING

P-220 A [illegible]

CR

[illegible]

[illegible]

A [illegible] R-11502

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 035655

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 04/30/17	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 08	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE D and E Tech	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☒ SPECIAL (Specify): Eligible

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 30 June 1964 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations [illegible] the photographic process, develops techniques, [illegible] supporting equipment, prepares technical reports.	LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists senior branch members on their projects, carrying out photographic processing, providing assistance and consultation on the practical application of photography.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Shares responsibility for maintenance of photographic equipment, cares for the laboratory's camera inventory, assists in the maintenance of other laboratory equipment.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Instructs others in photographic laboratory practice, camera operation and maintenance. Serves as the laboratory's senior technician.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Assists in the selection of photographic equipment and materials for the laboratory.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 21 JUN 1965	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 18

Mr. Maksymiec, in serving as the senior laboratory technician, sets a fine example for those whose responsibilities are similar and for the younger professionals for whom he provides photographic laboratory services. As a photographer he possesses rare compositional skills; his photographs of equipment for report and briefing purposes are exceptionally well-crafted, the finishing of surpassing quality. His work is careful, thorough, painstakingly accurate, and professional by all standards.

After more than a year in his present position, he feels more relaxed and self-assured. He asserts his views and ideas more competently and has become an integral and important part of this laboratory's operations. Mr. Maksymiec works exceptionally well with others, accepts responsibility freely and requires a minimum of direction. Most of his assignments come as discretionary orders, with complete freedom to utilize his own talents and inclinations towards the solution of his assigned problems. He continues to improve his capabilities, and is presently enrolled in a Department of Agriculture course in the fundamentals of photographic color processing, at his own request.

Mr. Maksymiec's one major weakness lies in the difficulty with which he writes reports. The ability to communicate ideas and results of investigations clearly, through written reports, is a necessary attribute of laboratory branch members, and Mr. Maksymiec must concentrate extra effort to improve his performance in this regard. During the next reporting period, he will be given assistance to improve his reporting capabilities.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 10 June 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Myroslaw O. Maksymiec

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 10 June 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Richard E. Swing

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the above evaluation. It is felt that Mr. Maksymiec will devote that effort necessary to overcome the noted weakness.

DATE 14 June '65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Assistant, Plans and Development	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE A. FAGENSTECHER

PICSB
Secy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 30 April '27	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE PHOTOG GEN	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/P&DS/EDLB		8. CURRENT STATION WASHINGTON, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
June 1963 - 30 June 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Photographs special equipment and experimental laboratory set-ups. Prepares prints for display and report purposes, has the responsibility for maintaining a file of negatives and prints.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Carries out experimental laboratory investigations relating to the photographic process, develops techniques, constructs equipment in support of these investigations, and prepares technical reports.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Assists senior branch members on their projects, contributing primarily in the photographic area.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in the selection of photographic equipment and materials for the laboratory and maintains a suitable working inventory.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Is responsible for maintenance of photographic equipment, and cares for laboratory's camera inventory. Assists in the maintenance of other laboratory equipment.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

17 JUL 1964

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SECRET

OFFICE OF ... MAIL ROOM JUN 17 9 20 AM '64

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Maksymiec's background and experience lie in practical photography, about which there is extremely little he does not know. He transferred from PSD/PLB primarily because there was little opportunity to use this experience, and because the advancement potential appeared to be minimal.

From the day of his transfer, Mr. Maksymiec has performed capably. Much of the work has been new to him, requiring him to learn and master many aspects of theoretical photography. He has acquired proficiency in the use of laboratory measuring instruments. He has applied himself and learns rapidly, with good retention. His frame of mind has improved, and this is manifested in a more relaxed, yet completely involved approach to his work. He works well with other and cooperates fully in all group problems. He accepts responsibility and requires direction of effort only in those theoretical areas where he has no experience. When responsible for the expenditure of funds, he exhibits a commendable cost-consciousness.

He recently took examinations for the purposes of completing his High School education, and has attended mathematics classes at Fort Myer. This is an additional indication of the interest and feeling for his job, which is manifested by a consistently proficient level of output. He is a valued member of the Exploratory Development Laboratory Staff.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
12 June 1964	Miroslaw J. Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 June 1964	Chief, Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch, P&DS	Richard E. Swing RICHARD E. SWING

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with ratings and comments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 June 64	Assistant for Plans & Development	John W. Cain JOHN W. CAIN

PICSS
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Photog Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC/PSD/PLB		8. CURRENT STATION Wash. D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
August 1962 - June 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operates specially designed contact printers, and expose negatives, positives, and prints.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operate continuous processing equipment and develop negatives, positives and prints.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Operate specially designed projection printers and expose enlarged negatives positives and prints.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develop negatives, positives and prints by manual processing methods.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	A

21 AUG 1963

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE ... AUG 19 12 17 PM '63

The quality and quantity of Mr. Maksymiec's work are improving. However, it must be stated that, despite the fact that Mr. Maksymiec is not happy in this assignment he is making an effort to improve his performance. Every effort is being made to locate a position within NPIC or elsewhere more in keeping the Mr. Maksymiec's evaluation of his own abilities and experience.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 Aug 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 21 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE July 31, 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Photographer(Gen)PLB/PSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Melvin C. Muir MELVIS C. MUIR

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in accord with Mr. Muir's comments. Some improvement has been shown by Mr. Makeymiec.

DATE 31 July 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Photo Lab Branch, PSD/NPIC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JAMES L. ALLEN

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
035655

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Apr 1917	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-7	5. SD IP
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Photog (Gen)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC, FSD, PLB	8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
X	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

X	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
November 61 - August 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Operate continuous and manual contact printers.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Operate continuous processing equipment and prepare negatives, positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare negatives, positives and prints by manual processing methods.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Operate specially designed projection printers and prepare enlarged negatives positives and prints.	RATING LETTER A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER A

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

FEB 12 9 22 AM '63

The volume of work produced by Mr. Maksymiec has been adequate; the quality of work produced has been good but there is need for further improvement. However, Mr. Maksymiec is making every effort to improve the quality of his work. He is cooperative and gets along well with his fellow employees.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 7 February 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Augustaw J Maksymiec

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Photog (Gen) PLB/PSD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Melvin C. Muir MELVIN C. MUIR

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I am in accordance with the foregoing comments on Mr. Maksymiec's performance.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DC/Photo Lab Branch, PSD/NPIC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE James L. Allen JAMES L. ALLEN

SECRET

SECRET
(when filled in)

TAB M

IP CAREER SERVICE BOARD

RECOMMENDATION FOR PROMOTION

DATE: 15 April 1966

NAME Maksymiec, Myroslaw A.	PRESENT GRADE GS-08	AGE 48

POSITION TITLE, NUMBER AND GRADE: D and E Technician, Slot 0644, GS-09

(PHOTO)

PROMOTE TO GS (9)	COMPONENT ASSIGNMENT (DIVISION, BRANCH, SECTION) NPIC/P&DS/EDLB

EOD CIA (DATE)	EOD NPIC (DATE)	TIME IN GRADE (MONTHS)	TIME IN PRESENT POSITION (MONTHS)
27 Nov 1961	27 Nov 1961	20	31

EDUCATION

High School equivalent certificate; completed a course in color photography in January 1966 (6 credit hours) taken at the Department of Agriculture Graduate School.

EXPERIENCE

Mr. Maksymiec retired as a Master Sergeant in July 1961 after 20 years of Army photographic experience. He has been with the Center from November 1961 and with the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch of the Plans and Development Staff since 15 September 1963. He is the senior technician for the laboratory.

JUSTIFICATION

Mr. Maksymiec's laboratory skills are of the highest professional quality. His duties as the senior laboratory technician require him to work closely with the physical scientists and by himself on various projects which require many practical and some theoretical skills. He conducts experimental laboratory investigations related to the photographic process, develops special techniques, and constructs supporting equipment. He carries out his assignments with little or no supervision and works well with others in the laboratory. He is an important and valued member of the Exploratory Development Laboratory Branch. It is felt that Mr. Maksymiec is doing the work of a higher grade; therefore, it is recommended that Mr. Maksymiec be promoted to grade GS-09.

John C. Pagentecher

JOHN A. PAGENSTECHER

IP FORM 260 7 63

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

STANDARD FORM 56
JANUARY 1970
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENT 870-1 56-102

AGENCY CERTIFICATION OF INSURANCE STATUS
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.

2(a). DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year): 30 April 1917

2(b). SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: 001 | 16 | 8309

3. CHECK THE REASON FOR TERMINATING INSURANCE

- (a) ☐ Separated (includes resignations)
- (b) ☒ Retired
- (c) ☐ Died as an employee
- (d) ☐ Died as a reemployed annuitant
- (e) ☐ End of 12 months non-pay status
- (f) ☐ Other (specify)

NOTE: If the reason checked is "b, Retired" your group life insurance (but not accidental death and dismemberment benefits) will continue during retirement if you meet the conditions described in "Notice to Retiring Employee" below.

4. CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX CONCERNING SF 54, DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY

(a). ☐ CURRENT SF 54 ATTACHED

(b). ☒ A CURRENT SF 54 IS NOT ON FILE WITH THIS AGENCY

(c). ☐ A CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (OR EQUIVALENT)

NOTE: IF EMPLOYEE (A) DIED OR (B) IS RETIRING OR RECEIVING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION UNDER CONDITIONS ENTITLING HIM TO RETAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE, ATTACH CURRENT SF 54, IF ANY, TO ORIGINAL SF 56 AND CHECK BOX 4 (a) ON ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF SF 56. IF NO CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE, CHECK BOX 4 (b). IN ALL OTHER CASES, SHOW WHETHER OR NOT CURRENT SF 54 IS ON FILE BY CHECKING BOX 4 (b) OR (c). A CURRENT SF 54 IS ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED BY EMPLOYEE OR AUTOMATICALLY BY TRANSFER OR PRIOR TERMINATION OF INSURANCE.

5. DATE OF EVENT CHECKED IN ITEM 3 (MONTH, DAY, YEAR): 30 July 1971

6. ANNUAL BASIC PAY RATE (NOT AMOUNT OF SALARY) ON DATE IN ITEM 5. CONVERT DAILY, HOURLY, PIECEWORK, ETC. RATE TO ANNUAL RATE. $ 12,215 PER ANNUM

7. DID EMPLOYEE HAVE OPTIONAL INSURANCE ON DATE IN ITEM 5? NO ☒ YES ☐ IF YES, GIVE RECEIPT DATE OF ELECTION OF OPTIONAL INSURANCE (SF 176 or 176-T)

8. DATE OF NOTICE OF CONVERSION PRIVILEGE (SF 55) TO EMPLOYEE (MONTH, DAY, YEAR)

9. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM, AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THAT THE EMPLOYEE NAMED WAS COVERED BY FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 5.

Personal signature of authorized agency official:

Typed name of authorized agency official: Francis G. Monan

Title: Insurance Officer, Alternate

Name and address of agency, including zip code:
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Phone number, including area code:

Date: 17 AUG 1971

SEE OTHER SIDE
FOR
INSTRUCTIONS TO EMPLOYING AGENCY

PART 3—FILE COPY

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) 055655 (first) (middle) MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW ANDREW	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) APRIL 30 1917	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 001 16 8309
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Myroslaw A Maksymiec

DATE

15 Feb 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FEB 26 4 11 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1963
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Carl F. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

18 February 1963

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

The President of the United States has formally recognized the vital contribution of the members of this organization, during the critical period last year, by awarding a Presidential commendation to the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

A copy of the commendation which is attached will be made part of your official personnel file, and a certificate of commendation is being presented to you for your retention.

Once again let me add my expression of appreciation for your efforts which enabled all of us to merit this achievement.

Arthur C. Lundahl
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged: Myroslaw Maksymiec

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in commending the NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER for outstanding achievement and service to the security of the United States and the Free World during a time of grave international crisis.

CITATION:

"The National Photographic Interpretation Center distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service during the period from 1 May 1962 through 31 December 1962. During the period of international crisis, the Center served as the focal point for the receipt and immediate analysis of intelligence photography and was instrumental in identifying the nature and magnitude of the threat to world peace. Although working under great stress, personnel of the Center were able to carefully analyze and process a massive volume of critical intelligence material, thereby enabling the United States to respond immediately and effectively to the developing threat. The outstanding achievement of the members of the National Photographic Interpretation Center is in keeping with the finest traditions of service to the United States."

All Armed Forces personnel assigned or attached to the Center and performing duty at any time during this period are hereby authorized to wear the emblem or ribbon for the following decoration, as appropriate to their service:

Army	-	Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy	-	Navy Unit Commendation
Air Force	-	Air Force Outstanding Unit Award

All members of the Center will be presented an appropriate certificate in recognition of their outstanding achievement and will have this commendation made a matter of record in their official files.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

9 January 1963

SECRET

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

19 November 1962

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

Several weeks ago, it was my pleasure to pass on to you a letter of commendation from the Director of Central Intelligence. Now, the President of the United States has sent the attached letter of appreciation and commendation to the Center, which will be made part of your official personnel file. Again, I want to commend you for your vital contribution to the Center's achievement, and express my appreciation for your sustained efforts.

Arthur C. Lundahl
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged: Myroslaw Maksymiec

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1962

Dear Mr. Lundahl:

While I would like to make public the truly outstanding accomplishments of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, I realize that the anonymity of an organization of your high professional competence in the intelligence field must be maintained.

I do want you and your people to know of my very deep appreciation for the tremendous task you are performing under most trying circumstances. The analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the reporting of your findings promptly and succinctly to me and to my principal policy advisers, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has been exemplary.

You have my thanks and the thanks of your government for a very remarkable performance of duty and my personal commendation goes to all of you.

Sincerely,

Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl
Director
National Photographic Interpretation Center

SECRET

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

6 November 1962

TO: Myroslaw Maksymiec

I have attached for your personal acknowledgment a Commendation from the Director of Central Intelligence which will be made a part of your official personnel file. You contributed in a very real way to the effort for which NPIC is being commended and I want to add my congratulations to those expressed by the Director.

Arthur C. Lundahl

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director

Acknowledged: Myroslaw Maksymiec

SECRET

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. As Director of Central Intelligence and on behalf of the entire intelligence community as well as the United States Government, I wish to commend you and the personnel under your command for the outstanding work you have been performing, especially during the past four months of the Cuban buildup.

2. Your analysis and interpretation of the Cuban photography and the manner in which you reported your findings to the President, his principal policy advisors, most particularly the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the entire intelligence community have been of the highest order.

3. I have full knowledge of the tremendous pressures and long working hours with which NPIC was confronted. I regret that the anonymity required of a professional intelligence agency such as yours prevents public acknowledgment of NPIC accomplishments. You and your people should take great pride in your accomplishments as well as in your ability to perform them without public acclaim.

John A. McCone

John A. McCone
Director

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

No Record

REMOVE FROM FILE AND RETURN TO A&E, ROOM 1331, R&S WHEN INDIVIDUAL EOD'S

A&E PROFESSIONAL APPLICANT TESTING REPORT

DATE: 16 November 1961

NAME MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew	PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT PIC Photographer
DATE AND PLACE TESTED 7 November 1961, Washington, D. C.	RECRUITER Capriotti

1. This report presents information that may be helpful in arriving at selection/placement decisions. The comments are necessarily tentative and in terms of general assets and liabilities. A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF A&E INFORMATION IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC CONTEMPLATED ASSIGNMENTS MAY BE ARRANGED BY CALLING X3052.

2. A&E Comments: Mr. Maksymiec performs poorly on various measures of intellectual ability. (He evidently has a foreign language background which may have affected his performance particularly on the verbal tests.) His knowledge of contemporary world-affairs approaches an average rating in comparison with Agency professional personnel. He also performs fairly well on a test of arithmetic problems. He would appear best suited for an essentially technician level position, which presumably the proposed "Photographer" position would be.

3. FOREIGN LANGUAGE APTITUDE:

X				
VERY POOR	POOR	AVERAGE	GOOD	VERY GOOD

REMOVE FROM FILE AND RETURN TO A&S, ROOM 1331, R&S WHEN INDIVIDUAL EOD'S

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL
(when filled in)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961.

Signature

27 Nov 1961
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61
REVISED JUNE 1957
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
F. P. M. CHAPTER A6

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Department or agency) (Bureau or division) WASHINGTON, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, [illegible], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I knowingly a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or which seeks by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) that I will not so advocate, nor will I knowingly become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government or any agency thereof.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not participating in any strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do not and will not assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof. I do further swear (or affirm) that I am not knowingly a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof and I will not, while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, knowingly become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

27 Nov 1961 (Date of entrance on duty)

(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 27 day of Nov A. D. 1961

at Washington, D.C. (City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Personnel Clerk (Title)

NOTE.—*The oath of office must be administered by a person specified in 5 U. S. C. 18, or by a person designated to administer oaths under Section 206, Act of June 26, 1943, 5 U. S. C. 16a. If by a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*): 3409 VALLEY DRIVE ALEXANDRIA. VA

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 30 APRIL 1917
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city and State or city and foreign country*): MANCHESTER NEW HAMPSHIRE

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, PLEASE NOTIFY	(B) RELATIONSHIP	(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE	(D) TELEPHONE NO.
EILEEN. MAKSYMIEC	WIFE	3409 VALLEY DR ALEX VA	TE-68218

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blank below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 12.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
MARYANN LLOYD	SEDGEWICK ST NW WASH	1. LAWYER 2. FULL TIME 3. FAA	SISTER INLAW	✓	
CHARLES LLOYD	" "	1. LAWYER. 2. FULL TIME 3. DEPT OF DEFENCE	BROTHER INLAW	✓	
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. (A) ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OR (B) AS A NATIVE OF AMERICAN SAMOA DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE OR HAVE YOU APPLIED FOR AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 12.*	✓	
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED, CHARGED, OR HELD BY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, FOR ANY VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL LAW, STATE LAW, COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION OR ORDINANCE? DO NOT INCLUDE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED. ALL OTHER CHARGES MUST BE INCLUDED EVEN IF THEY WERE DISMISSED. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 12 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		✓
9. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT, HAVE YOU BEEN BARRED BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 12.*		✓

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
10. (A) HAVE YOU EVER FILED A WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT?		✓
(B) IF YOU HAVE FILED SUCH A WAIVER, HAS IT BEEN CANCELED OR REVOKED?		
11. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT: A. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
B. HAVE YOU RESIGNED AFTER OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION THAT: (1) YOUR CONDUCT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
(2) YOUR WORK WAS NOT SATISFACTORY?		✓
C. HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMED SERVICES UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE CONDITIONS? *If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 12 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.*		✓

PAYMENT FOR [illegible] ANNUAL LEAVE UNDER [illegible] FEDERAL S[illegible]

12. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	
7	TWENTY YEAR ARMY RET		☐ YES ☐ NO
			HAS LEAVE-PERIOD COVERED BY SUCH PAYMENT EXPIRED?
			☐ YES ☐ NO

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER.—You must determine [illegible] appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and acts of Congress [illegible] appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, any record of recent discharge or arrest, age, citizenship, [illegible] members of family. Also, to establish the identity of the appointee, you should particularly check (1) his signature and handwriting against the application and/or other pertinent papers and (2) his physical appearance against the medical certificate.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1959—O-517782

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1954
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1, R1, AND S2

ATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIV AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COM TITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*)
MAKSYMIEC · MYROSLAW · A

2. DATE OF BIRTH
30 APRIL 1917

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	1941	FEB	25	1961	JULY	31	HON

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☐ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

27 Nov 1961
(DATE)

Myroslaw A Maksymiec
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 27 day of Nov (MONTH) 1961 at Washington (CITY) D.C. (STATE)

SEAL

Helen Capriotti

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
20	5	7

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

(OVER)

10—66483-3

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. I have known Mr. [illegible] for more than seven years. For approximately two years (1954-1956) during that period he worked under my direct daily supervision in the Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since that time I have maintained periodic contact with Mr. (then M/Sgt E-7) [illegible].

2. Although Mr. [illegible] primary job was photographer and chief of the photographic laboratory while working with me in Ethiopia, he was also in charge of supply and transportation for the Office of the Army Attache. In addition, he learned to type and was of considerable assistance in helping to get out the many reports the office was required to make.

3. In the field of photography I consider Mr. [illegible] to be one of the outstanding photographers in the Armed Services of the United States. His work with me was consistently superior both from a technical viewpoint and from a photographic result viewpoint. None of the assignments that I gave Mr. [illegible] were routine, nor were they easy. Invariably they involved considerable ability, ingenuity, diplomacy, and judgement. His many assignments were carried out by every possible means of transportation — on foot, on muleback, by truck (on almost impassable roads), and by plane. He always accomplished his mission. His detailed captions were uniformly accurate and valuable, showing a keen insight into the subject [illegible] being covered.

4. His work in photography was so outstanding that, while in Addis Ababa, [illegible] Mr. [illegible] for a complete photographic [illegible] of the [illegible] one of the outstanding [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] have been informed [illegible] in the Pentagon, Mr. MAKSYMENKO has continued to serve the interests of the United States [illegible] the European Ambassador to the United States as well as the [illegible] Military Attache. He has been [illegible] to the Military Assistance Directorate and in that capacity has been occasionally commended by [illegible] General Henry [illegible] of the [illegible].

8. While [illegible] attending the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1958-1959, Mr. MAKSYMENKO was of considerable assistance to me in the detailed preparation of my thesis [illegible] The [illegible] the strategic significance to the United States.

9. Based on my personal observations and knowledge, I feel that Mr. MAKSYMENKO is eminently qualified for specialized work in the field of intelligence. He would be particularly valuable in all phases of photography and in collection, evaluation, or dissemination of intelligence. His investigative ability, particularly in the fields of map reading, geography, order of battle, or technical subjects is outstanding. He has the unique ability to collect and assemble pertinent facts and to prepare clear and concise [illegible] reports.

10. I have found Mr. MAKSYMENKO to be [illegible] loyal, forceful, capable and tenacious. He has demonstrated high courage and moral integrity. He is unusually outstanding in his [illegible] field of photography [illegible] peers.

11. I unhesitatingly [illegible] Mr. MAKSYMENKO for any [illegible] [illegible] of which [illegible] continued [illegible] this

14-00000

[illegible]



ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

29 APR 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR : Registrar, Office of Medical Services

SUBJECT : Medical Report for Myroslaw A. Maksymiec

1. Mr. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec is applying for disability retirement.

2. In accordance with FPM Supplement 831-1, S 10-6, it is requested that a medical report be submitted to this office to be forwarded with other documents to the Bureau of Retirement, Insurance and Occupational Health, Civil Service Commission.

3. Mr. Maksymiec plans to remain on duty through 28 May 1971 pending a decision on his application for retirement.

4. Copies of the following documents are attached: Application for Retirement (2801), [illegible], (2801-A), and Physician's Statement, (2801-B).

/s/ Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Attachments

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF
1 - Insurance Branch
1 - ROB
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/LBirch:sl (28 April 1971)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
035655	MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW ANDREW	30 APRIL 1912		9

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
WASHINGTON	D.C	High Sch. Cert	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. MONTGOMERY JUNIOR COLLEGE		ENGLISH				3 HRS
2. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASH DC		[illegible]	... AFRICA			18 HRS

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. DEPT OF AGRICULTURE COURSES	ADVANCE COURSE FOR - [illegible]			SEM 6 HRS
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) MAKSYMIEC (First) EILEEN (Middle) E (Maiden) BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH 15 Oct 1941	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) WORCHESTER MASS
5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER —

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED
YES		

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

T 30 Jul 71

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. ETHIOPIA	INTELLIGENCE AND	1953 TO 1955					X
2.							

MAR 23 10 59 AM '71

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

PHOTOGRAPHY, SWIMMING, [illegible]
PHOTOGRAPHY USED IN PUBLICATION TITLED (COME ALONG ETHIOPIA 1968)
ALSO LIFE MAGAZINE 1955

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☒ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL FORT HOLABIRD-MD	INTELLIGENCE	1950	RESIDENT ARMY AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. THE EXPLORERS CLUB	NEW YORK NY	1969	1971
2. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY	WASHINGTON D.C	1953	1971
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE
11 Feb 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
035655	MAKSYMIEC, MYROSLAW ANDREW	30 APRIL 1917

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SYSTEM	WASHINGTON DC	1966	☑ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON DC			1966 TO PRESENT (11/69)			4.5 [illegible] 21. HRS
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
MILITARY LANGUAGE SCHOOL, MONTEREY CALIF	RUSSIAN	1947		4 MONTHS
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL FORT HOLLIBIRD	INTELLIGENCE STUDY	1949		1 MONTH

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	DEPT OF AGRICULTURE COURSE COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY	TECHNICES OF OF COLOR PROCESSING	1967		6 CREDIT HOURS
2.		AND QUALITY COLOR CONTROLS	1968		6 MONTHS

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
MAKSYMIEC EILEEN ELIZABETH BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
23 OCT 1925	WORCHESTER MASS	
5. OCCUPATION	**6. PRESENT EMPLOYER**	
HOUSEWIFE		
7. CITIZENSHIP	**8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)**	**9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED**
YES		

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(29)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

OCT 27 1 39 PM 69

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 18 Nov 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

Tech, in Eng. & Physical Science (GS-?-1S)

4 30 1917

001-16-8309

Washington D.C.

202 362-1350

202 351-3435

☒ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW ANDREW

4718 Asbury Place, N. W.

Washington, D. C. ZIP Code 20016

PAY $12,000 per yr. OR GRADE 11

		X

13 Will you accept:	YES	NO
(A) Temporary appointment of —1 month or less?		X
—1 to 4 months?		X
—4 to 12 months?		X
(B) Less than full time work?		X

(C) Will you accept work in:	YES	NO
—Washington, D.C.?	X	
—any place in the United States?		
—outside of the United States?		
—only in (specify)		

14 EDUCATION

X 1935 12

District of Columbia Public High School, Washington, D. C.

	From	To	Day	Night	Semester hours	Quarter hours	Type of degree	Year of degree
Montgomery Junior College Takoma Park, Md.	1965	1966		1	9		NA	NA
American University Washington, D. C.	1965	1969		2	9			

(D) Chief undergraduate college subjects

See Enclosure No. 5

(E) Chief graduate college subjects

(F) Major field of study at highest level of college work

(G) Other schools or training

See Enclosure No. 5

15 HONORS, AWARDS, AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

1. CIA-Meritorius Service Award - Jan 9, 1963
2. Gold Medallion by Emperor of Ethiopia May 17, 1957

16 FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Russian		X			X		X					X
Ukrainian		X			X		X					X
Polish		X			X		X					X

Standard Form 171 (Formerly 57)
U.S. Civil Service Commission

11-61 Photographic Researcher GS-1311-9

12,000 per annum Washington

40 D.C. 2 Technicians Photography

G. E. [illegible] - Personnel Central Intelligence Agency

202-351-[illegible] Washington, D. C.

Advancement into broader fields

See Enclosure No. 1

1957 7-31-61 Director of Photography E9

8200. per annum Washington

9400. per annum 40 D.C. 64 Technicians Photography

Deputy Chief

MAJ GEN Alva R. Fitch, USA Publications & Services Br., Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Dept. of Army, Washington, 25, D. C.

Retirement

See Enclosure No. 2

1954 1956 Army Attaché E7

6000. per annum Addis Ababa

40 Ethiopia 16 Technicians Photography

MAJ GEN John A. Klein Army Attaché System G2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Military Assignment

See Enclosure No. 3

[illegible], [illegible] ANDREW

[illegible] 20, 1917

1950 1953

Army Attache

E7

5200 per annum

6000 per annum

40

London, England

33 Technician: Photography

BRIG. GEN. R. E. Williamson, USA

Office of the Army Attache
American Embassy, London, England

Military Assignment

See Enclosure No. 4

5

1941 1949

Photographer

1300 per annum

4000 per annum

40

Various

Photography

Commanding Officer

Department of the Army, G-2 Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Military Assignments

Served as an Intelligence and Investigative Photographer throughout the South Pacific, Far East, Near East, Africa, Europe, and the Continental United States.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1967
FM. 171 - Experience 18-1

Enclosure No. 1, Page 1

During the period November 1961 to the present, I am employed by the Central Intelligence Agency, located in Washington, D. C.

I lectured, conducted seminar, and advised on the operations of photography, cameras, lighting, printing, processing, and editing.

On an independent basis I performed complex black and white and color, still, and motion picture photographic assignments. Utilized, as appropriate, combinations of cameras, and other gear which included ultra-high speed cameras (1-5 thousand frames per second) plus compatible stroboscope lighting components, varied mirror, filter, and mounting devices.

Advised on the installation and operation of photographic set-up and rendered the technical decisions relative to the required optical, mechanical, and electronic adjustments.

Commendations:

I was awarded the 'Certificate of Commendation' by direction of the President of the United States, for meritorious service with the Central Intelligence Agency, on January 9, 1963.

Works:

'Come Along to Ethiopia' by Joseph Simonson was published in 1968 by T. S. Denison and Co., Inc. Pictures utilized in this historical-pictorial endeavor were my works and credit is given accordingly in the introduction. (Library of Congress 67-28078)

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 26, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-2

Enclosure No. 2, Page 1

During the period 1957 through 1961, I was employed by the Publications and Services Branch, Office Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Mission

Use, setup, arrangement of photographic equipment, techniques, and processes.

Develop, adapt, and create the foregoing in order to be responsive to unprecedented situations that require photographic equipment for situations of extreme conditions. (Weather, radiation, explosion, etc.). Create training films to deal with specific subjects.

Conduct training classes in basic and advanced photography, motion picture, and laboratory procedures.

Operations

I was responsible for the direction of technician/specialist photographers, concerned with reproduction of film using the most advanced Eastman-Kodak, Bell and Howell, and Houston Fearless printing and processing equipments.

During this phase there was a demand for high production and extreme accuracy in a minimum of time. My responsibilities required me to adapt to changing conditions under adverse conditions to achieve objectives that were required in a matter of hours.

I developed workload schedules based on task/mission requirements, available manpower, and the degree of skill available. The changing tasks and mission objectives required a maximum ability on my part to train personnel to meet the requirements of operating officials.

I established and conducted training classes in the operation and maintenance of equipment.

I developed workload schedules based on task/program/mission requirements, priorities, available manpower, and the degree of skill available.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-2

Enclosure No. 2, Page 2

Broke down each task into specific operations and handling elements, established a sequence of operations compatible to economical, efficient, and timely reproduction of motion picture film. I applied labor standards by utilization of labor standard data to each work increment to be performed.

I was responsible for determining the overall manpower requirements, equipment, materials, etc., necessary to accomplish the objectives of the organization under my jurisdiction.

I maintained progress chart status of all assigned task, program, established priorities, and directed technician in proper sequence to prevent production delays, work stoppage, and disruption of work schedule.

I reviewed quality and quantity of work produced by means of sampling, inspection, etc.

Accomplishments - Commendations

(1) Awarded 'Certificate of Appreciation', Department of Defense, Military Assistance Institute.

"As the termination of your active service draws near, I desire to express my personal appreciation for the splendid service you have rendered the Military Assistance Institute during the past two and one-half years. Whenever you were called upon to serve as a guest briefer for Officers assigned to duty with the MAAG-Ethiopia, you cheerfully accepted this responsibility, in addition to your regularly assigned military duties.

Your expert knowledge of the culture, geography, history, and living problems in this area was extremely beneficial to U. S. Military personnel stationed with the MAAG.

The successful manner in which you presented these subjects, (illustrated with colored slides of scenes professionally photographed by you) materially aided our students to adjust themselves to conditions encountered in living in an unfamiliar country and in becoming productive at an early date after arrival at their new station.

Enclosure No. 2, Page 3

The attached Certificate of Appreciation is but a minor expression of our thanks to you for your efforts. The staff and faculty of the Institute join me in wishing you every success."

HENRY C. NEWTON
Brigadier General, USA (RET)
Director

(2) Fitness Report

"I have known Mr. MYROSLAW A. MAKSYMIEC for more than seven years. For approximately two years (1954-1956) during that period he worked under my direct daily supervision in the Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since that time I have maintained periodic contact with Mr. (then M/Sgt E-7) MAKSYMIEC.

Although Mr. MAKSYMIEC's primary job was photographer and chief of the photographic laboratory while working with me in Ethiopia, he was also in charge of supply and transportation for the Office of the Army Attache.

In the field of photography I consider Mr. MAKSYMIEC to be one of the outstanding photographers in the Armed Services of the United States. His work with me was consistently superior both from a technical viewpoint and from a photographic result viewpoint. None of the assignments that I gave Mr. MAKSYMIEC were routine, nor were they easy. Invariably they involved considerable ability, tenacity, diplomacy, and judgment. He always accomplished his mission. His detailed captions were usually accurate and valuable, showing a keen insight into the subject (human or machine) being covered.

His work in photography was so outstanding that at one time at Addis Ababa, at a request from TIME - LIFE Magazines, I consented for Mr. MAKSYMIEC to complete a photographic report commenced by Mr. Alfred Eisenstadt, one of the outstanding photographers in the U. S. Several pages of pictures taken by Mr. MAKSYMIEC appeared with the article in LIFE Magazine. His work also was commended personally by the U. S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and by the Emperior Haile Selassie I, who awarded him a gold medal.

Enclosure No. 2, Page 4

Mr. MAKSYMIEC's many skills include outstanding technical ability in every phase of operations in a photographic laboratory.

I have been informed that while working in Washington, at the Pentagon, Mr. MAKSYMIEC has continued to serve the interests of the United States. He has been a lecturer at the Military Assistance Institute, and in that capacity has been officially commended by Brigadier General Henry C. Newton, Director of the Institute.

While I was attending the U. S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 1958-1959, Mr. MAKSYMIEC was of considerable assistance to me in the detailed preparation of my thesis: "The Greater Somaliland Movement, a study in the strategic significance to the United States".

Based on my personal observation and knowledge, I feel that Mr. MAKSYMIEC is eminently qualified for specialized work in the field of intelligence. He would be particularly valuable in all phases of photography, and in collection, evaluation, or dissemination of Intelligence. His investigative ability, particularly in the fields of map reading, geography, order of battle, or technical subjects is outstanding. He has the unique ability to collect and assemble pertinent facts and to prepare clear and concise written reports."

JOHN D. TOWNSEND
Colonel U. S. Army-G
Headquarters, Joint United States
~~Military Mission for Aid to Turkey~~
Operations and Training Branch
APO 254, N. Y. N.Y.

(3) Letter of Appreciation

M/Sgt. M. A. Maksymiec,RA 20140533
Chief of Staff, Intelligence
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Please accept my sincere thanks for the assistance rendered the Post Office Department recently with Mr. Seyoum Tekle Haimanot, Staff Officer, Ministry of Posts, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-2

Enclosure No. 2, Page 5

As Mr. Seyoum is making a study of some of the operations of our Government and I can assure you that your talks and outlines played a great part in his orientation. Your knowledge of Ethiopia, its habits and customs is remarkable and I want to congratulate you on your pictorial coverage of the country.

Mr. William Armbrust joins me in thanking you for assisting in the instruction of Mr. Seyoum and especially for your kindness in showing the remarkable pictures.

Sincerely,

Edgar B. Jackson
Special Assignments
Office of the Deputy Postmaster
General, Washington, D.C.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1977
FM. 171 - Experience 18-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 1

During the period 1954 through 1956, I was assigned by Army Attache System, G2 Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conduct, direct, establish photographic center and perform specific photographic assignments in Ethiopia, Africa.

Mission and Tasks

During this period I directed and participated in photography of selected areas, equipments, training film, and selected subjects.

I modified and planned the installation of photographic equipments that were faced with situations of excessive heat in some instances and of severe low temperatures in others. These conditions were also subject to abnormal influences.

It was essential that I had a thorough familiarity with the mission objectives that would permit me to plan the photographic recording and reporting on film within a minimum of interference with program operating sequences. This required me to participate with operating officials, engineers, scientists, as a member of the team in order to define the capabilities and limitation of cameras and equipment to the total planning of the specific program. This broad knowledge permitted me to utilize my abilities, imagination, and creative ability to fully develop the photographic aspects.

I determined the kind of film, position, camera coverage, background, etc.

I developed the workload schedules based on mission requirements, priorities, manpower, and the degree of ability available.

I reviewed quantity and quality of work performed by means of visual inspection and by discussions with team leaders, particularly where problem areas existed or the mission was one with unusual scope and objectives.

I was responsible for the procurement of photographic equipment and supplies necessary for the assigned mission. This responsibility also included the repair and maintenance of all equipments in use.

Enclosure No. 3, Page 2

I maintained progress charts for all tasks, programs, missions, that indicated the status of installation, filming, reproduction actions for each task/program.

I directed the reproduction phases of the forgoing filming as indicated in Enclosure No. 2.

Artistic Segments

I exercised artistic and creative ability in using photography as a means of communication of information, historical, splendor, etc., to fulfill educational, military, international objectives.

I exercised control of the settings, actions of the event to be photographed. I suggested actions/behavior of principals; selected backgrounds; rehersed actions prior to photographing events.

Training

I conducted orientation and briefing courses for U. S. personnel in basic-advanced photography and basic-advanced laboratory techniques.

Accomplishments - Acknowledgements

(1) Transmittal of Medallion to Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, U. S. Army, G2:

"It is a genuine pleasure to forward herewith a gold medallion which His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, sent to the American Embassy herewith the desire that it be transmitted to you by this office. His Imperial Majesty, upon giving the medallion to the Charge d'Affaires, said that he wished you to have it as a token of his appreciation of your work.

Since high recognition reflects very honorably on your period of service here in Ethiopia and is a fine recommendation of your professional talents. I [illegible] opportunity to add my own congratulations to those of His Imperial Majesty and to extend [illegible] best wishes for continued success in your career."

ERNEST H. DAVIS, LT COL, GS
Army Attache

The Foreign [illegible]
U. S. Army Attache, American [illegible] of America, Office of the
[illegible] Ababa, Ethiopia

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
April 30, 1957
Par. 171 - Experience 12-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 3

(2) Letter of Appreciation - State Department to Department of the Army:

"Whether this is unusual or whether you can appropriately pass this letter on to officials concerned in the Department of Defense I do not know. But I do want to write the strongest sort of commendation of the work of Master Sergeant Myroslaw A. Maksymiec. Sergeant Maksymiec was associated in the Office of the Army Attache here in Addis Ababa, particularly for the purpose of photographic coverage.

It would please me if you would be able to forward this letter of mine to appropriate officials in the Defense Department. I know that Colonel John D. Townsend, who was the Army Attache here during practically all of Sergeant Maksymiec's service, would agree with me both in my estimate of the Sergeant's usefulness and efficiency and in seeing to it that this letter of commendation be endorsed in the Defense Department.

At the present time Sergeant Maksymiec is assigned in the photography laboratory in the Pentagon. Undoubtedly he is making a fine contribution there. I do know that he was of vast importance to our total American operation here in Ethiopia, not only military, while he was stationed with the Army Attache in Addis Ababa. He is a competent, cooperative, and persistent workman in attaining desired goals. His photographic output is way above average, both in quantity and quality. The Army Attache system, based on my observation of Sergeant Maksymiec's work in Ethiopia, stands in very great debt to him."

Joseph Simonson
United States Ambassador
American Embassy, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, April 17, 1957

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FAL. 171 - Experience 13-3

Enclosure No. 3, Page 4

(3) Letter of Appreciation. Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army Map Service to Department of Army - Intelligence:

"During his recently completed tour of duty in the office of the Army Attaché, Ethiopia, M/Sgt. Myroslaw A. Maksymiec, was able to make an outstanding contribution to the Engineer intelligence and photography holdings on that country. The material he acquired and gave to the Engineers for reproduction was of quality and quantity far exceeding that which has normally been received from similar sources.

Considering the nature of the country in which M/Sgt. Maksymiec served, the material acquired could only have been obtained as a result of an enterprising, ~~persi~~stent, and determined effort on his part.

A great number of the photographs taken by M/Sgt. Maksymiec have been retained by the Engineers to be used in Engineer intelligence studies. Favorable comments following his debriefing were due largely to the accurate and current information supplied by him.

Since satisfaction of Engineer requirements undoubtedly constituted only part of the overall duties of the Attache, Ethiopia, M/Sgt. Maksymiec's alertness and enthusiasm towards collection of materials of Engineer interest are greatly appreciated. He has made an invaluable contribution to the Engineer Intelligence and mapping effort.

It is requested that this letter be made a part of M/Sgt. Maksymiec's official records."

/s/ J. D. ABELL
Colonel, Corps of Engineers
Commanding

MYCHAJLO ANDREW MAKSYMEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Experience 18-4

Enclosure No. 1, Page 1

During the period 1950 through 1953, I was the Supervisory Photographer for Chief of Photographic Laboratory for the Department of the Army, Office of the Army Attache, American Embassy, London, England.

Mission

Direct the technical operations of Technical Photographers and Photographic Laboratory Technicians. Operations included all of European Theater.

Training

I conducted regular seminars on all aspects of photography and photo laboratory techniques for personnel assigned to the European Area.

Operations

I performed the basic operations as indicated in Experience 18-3 - Mission-Tasks and Artistic Segments. In addition to the foregoing I supervised specialists and technicians' efforts in high volume reproduction of film that averaged over a million feet (black/white/color) of motion picture film.

Equipment utilized was the latest Eastman-Kodak, Bell and Howell, and Houston Fearless printing and processing equipment.

In directing this effort I worked in close coordination with motion picture producers in the planning and organizing the photographic aspects of specific task/program. It was my duty to plan work and secure esthetically perfect photographs that will permit achieve attainment of task/program objectives. This required the ability and judgment in varying processes, also in the utilization of equipment that transcended the normal processes and procedures in order to produce effects that would spotlight the task/program objectives which the photograph was designed to produce.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 20, 1917 .
FMT. [illegible] Experience 15-4

Enclosure No. 4, Page 2

Commendations

(1) The Foreign Service of the United States of America; Office of the Air Attache; American Embassy, London, England

201-Maksymiec, Myroslaw A. (Enl)

1. I wish to offer my appreciation to you for the part you played in accomplishing the highly-classified project assigned to you within the allotted period of time.

2. Your superior efforts in completing this project have materially benefited the Office of the Air Attache. The responsibility you have assumed, in addition to the long hours of work required during this period, deserves the highest praise.

JACK W. WOOD
Brig. Gen., USAF
Air Attache

(2) TO: Master Sergeant Myroslaw A. Maksymiec
Office of the Army Attache
American Embassy
London, England

1. The Army Attache has informed me of the outstanding manner in which you have performed your duties and has commended your services to me as deserving special recognition. Therefore, as you complete this tour of duty in the Army Attache System I wish to express to you my appreciation for the commendable manner in which you performed your duties.

2. Since your assignment to the London office in August 1950, you have performed all assigned duties in a superior manner. The nature of your duties often required that you work on many occasions at night and on normal non-working days, which you cheerfully did with utmost willingness. This continued demonstration of loyalty to duty reflects creditably upon yourself and the Attache System.

MYROSLAW ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1957
FRI. 171 - Experience 18-4

Enclosure No. 4, Page 3

3. My best wishes to with you for continued success in future assignments.

4. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to The Adjutant General for inclusion in your official 201 file and copies will accompany your next efficiency report.

MAJ. GEN. R. C. PARTRIDGE
Department of the Army
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, Intelligence
Washington, 25, D. C.

MYROSLAV ANDREW MAKSYMIEC
APRIL 30, 1917
FM. 171 - Education 14D and 14G

Enclosure No. 5, Page 1

Advanced Photography - 9 semester hours
English - 3 semester hours
Public Speaking - 3 semester hours
History - Africa - 3 semester hours

1965 - Present - American University, Washington, D.C.

1963 - Photography - Eastman Kodak Co., Rochester, New York

1950 - Military Intelligence School "Photography", Ft. Holabird, Maryland

1947 - Russian Language, Intelligence School, Monteray, California

Intelligence Training:

School of Photography

School of Advanced Photography

School of Photography - Camera Repair

School of Photography - Electronic Systems Repair

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FOLLOW ITEMS

Answer all questions correctly and fully

19. [illegible]		20. [illegible]	21. [illegible]
Grade	Job title	City Manchester	(Cities)
GS-9	Physical Scientist	State (or Country) New Hampshire	Wash., D.C.

22. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. [illegible]

Full Name	Present Business or Home Address [illegible]	Business or Occupation
COL John D. Townsend	First Army-G3-Hdqrs., Fort George Meade, Maryland	Military Intelligence
Mr. Richard E. Swing	513 Carron Avenue Rockville, Maryland	Scientist
GEN John Willems (Ret.)	7813 Lake Adlon Drive San Diego, California	Military Intelligence

23. VETERAN PREFERENCE A. Have you ever served on active duty in the United States military service? (Exclude tours of active duty for training as a reservist or Guardsman.) If "Yes," complete Items B through E below. — Yes X

B. List for all active military service

Dates (From-To)	Branch	Serial or Service Number
1941-1961	U.S. Army	RA-20140533

C. Have you ever been discharged from the armed services under other than honorable conditions? [illegible] — No X

If "Yes," give details in Item 33.

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on active duty in the armed forces? — Yes X

If "Yes," you will be required to furnish records to support your claim at the time you are appointed.

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? — No X

If "Yes," complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Claim for 10-point Veteran Preference," together with the proof called for in that form.

ANSWER ITEMS 24 THROUGH 33 BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER COLUMN

	Yes	No
24. Are you a citizen of the United States? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen	X	
25. Before answering this question read Item 25 in the attached instructions.		
A. Are you now, or within the last ten years have you been, a member of:		
(1) The Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A.?		X
(2) An organization that to your present knowledge advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of government of the United States by force or violence or other unlawful means?		X
B. If your answer to Item A(1) or A(2) is "Yes," write your answers to the following questions in Item 33 or on a separate piece of paper: (1) The name of the organization? (2) The dates of your membership? (3) Your understanding of the aims and purposes of the organization at the time of your membership?		
26. To ensure that you are not placed in a position which might impair your health or might endanger [illegible] others, we need information about [illegible] Have you [illegible] epilepsy, tuberculosis, or diabetes? If your answer is "Yes," [illegible] Item 33.		X
27. Within the last five years have you been fired from any job for any reason?		X
28. Within the last five years have you quit a job after being notified that you would be fired? [illegible] If your answer to 27 or 28 is "Yes," [illegible] ZIP [illegible]		X
29. Have you ever been convicted of an offense against the law [illegible] against the law? (You may omit: (1) traffic violations for which you paid a fine of [illegible] and (2) any offense committed before your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in a juvenile court or under a Youth Offender law.)		X
30. While in the military service were you ever convicted by general court-martial? [illegible]		X
31. A. Does the United States Government [illegible]		X
B. [illegible]		X
32. [illegible]	X	
33. [illegible]		X

21. Retired from U. S. Army [illegible]

[illegible] Write on EACH sheet your name, birth date, and examination [illegible]

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING [illegible] CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS STATEMENT

A false answer to any question [illegible] for not employing you, or for dismissing you after you begin work, and may be punishable by [illegible] (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements are subject to investigation, including a check of your [illegible] All the information you give will be considered in reviewing [illegible] to an annuity when you reach retirement age in addition to the penalties described above.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this statement are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (in ink)

DATE SIGNED

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE—FOR USE OF EXAMINING OFFICE ONLY

☐ Refer for medical action
☐ [illegible]
☐ Disapproved (Reason)

Announcement No.
Material No.

Name

☐ Approved
☐ Disapproved
Notations

Status
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Initials & Reviewer

Form Reviewed?
Form Approved?

Option	Grade	Earliest Rating	Preference	Aug. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	

Initials and Date

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

☐ 5-Pt. ☐ 10-Pt. Comp. Dis. ☐ 10-Pt. Other

Preference has been verified through proof that the separation was under honorable conditions, and other proof as required.

Signature and Title

Agency

Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
035655	MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw A.	04/30/17

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL	MANCHESTER N.H.	1932-1936	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. AMERICAN UNIV. WASH D.C						16 HRS
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
MILITARY LANGUAGE SCHOOL MONTEREY CALIFORNIA	RUSSIAN	1946	1947	12 MO

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL	INTELLIGENCE PHOTO	1950	1950	3 MO
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE

(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Maiden)
MAKSYMIEC	EILEEN	E	BURKE

3. DATE OF BIRTH: 1928 1925?

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): WORCHESTER MASS

5. OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER: NA

7. CITIZENSHIP: YES

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES):

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED:

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-68 444n

SECRET

(14-511)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY—CHECK (✓) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
ETHIOPIA EUROPE	INTELLIGENCE	1954-[illegible] 1950-[illegible]		✓	✓		✓

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MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED—CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

PHOTOGRAPHY, SCUBA DIVING, FISHING.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☑ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED
LANGUAGE + INTELLIGENCE	INTELLIGENCE	1948 1950	☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY	WASHINGTON D.C.	1948	1968
2. REGULAR ARMY SGT CLUB	WASHINGTON D.C.	1966	1968
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 Sept 1968	Myroslaw G. [illegible]

SECRET

-P+155

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 035655	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) MAKSYMIEC HYROSLAW A	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 04/30/17	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -09-04
6. SD 1P	7. POSITION TITLE D A [illegible] E TECH	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT NPIC	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D. C.	

SECTION II AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
NO OVERSEAS SERVICE			

SECTION III EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1.67 444J
Mg. 7.67

SECRET

SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4.31)

8 6 AUG ENTD

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When Filled In

SECTION III	EDUCATION (Cont'd)		
	HIGH SCHOOL		
LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (from - to)	GRADUATE
WASHINGTON	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	1964 HIGH SCHOOL CERTIFICATE	☒ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.	SILVER SPRINGS MARYLAND MONTGOMERY JUNIOR COL		ENGLISH	SEPT 1966				1-SEM 3 SEM-HRS
2.								
3.								
4.								

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

NONE

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.		NONE			
3.					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.		NONE			
3.					
4.					
5.					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.	U.S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE GRADUATE SCHOOL	COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLOR PRINTING	JAN 1964		YEAR 3 SEMHRS
2.	" "	" "	SEPT 1965		YEAR 3 SEM-HRS
3.					
4.					
5.					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK ✓)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM.
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER: SPECIFY: NONE

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

NONE

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

PHOTOGRAPHY, SWIMMING, ICE SKATING, (WELL)

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ▶ ☐ YES ☐ NO NONE

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

NONE

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NONE

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NONE

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

NONE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. — specify)

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty)
FROM — TO —

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. — specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service)

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION
☐ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

NONE

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
1.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
2.		NONE		☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
3				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐ RESIDENT ☐ CORRESPONDENCE ☐ AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII	AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII	**AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)**	
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES NONE		

SECRET

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried; SPECIFY) NONE

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
WILLIAM. MAKSYMIEC	SON	1/30/60	YES	4718 ASBURY PLACE WASHINGTON D.C
SHARON ANN MAKSYMIEC	DAUGHTER	2/6/61	YES	4718 ASBURY PLACE WASHINGTON DC

SECTION XI PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
	NONE		

DATE: 28 Sept. 1961

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Myroslaw J Maksymiec

DARD FORM 57
[illegible]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Kind of position applied for or name of examination

2. Option(s) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. Place of employment applied for (City and State)
Washington D.C. or vicinity

4. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
Myroslaw Andrew Maksymiec

5. Street and number or R. D. number
3268 Valley Drive

City or post office (including postal zone) and State
Alexandria , Virginia

6. Place of birth
City Manchester
State or foreign country New Hampshire

7. Date of birth (month, day, year)
April 30, 1917

8. ☒ Male ☐ Female

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 8 inches
Weight 185 pounds

10. ☒ Married ☐ Single

11. Home phone TE 6 8218
Office phone OX 71376

12. Legal or voting residence (State)
New Hampshire

13. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade
Yes M/Sgt U.S.Army (E-7)
Dates of service in that grade
From 6-51 To Present

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered Register:
Notations:
App. Review:
Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Point Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and Date				

14. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION. A. Indicate the lowest salary you will accept $, per annum
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

B. If you are now a Federal employee, indicate the lowest grade you will accept

C. Will you accept appointment for ☐ 1 to 3 months? ☐ 3 to 6 months? ☒ 6 to 12 months?

Acceptance or refusal of a short-term appointment will not affect your consideration for another appointment.

D. Are you willing to travel ☒ Occasionally? ☐ Frequently? ☐ Constantly?

E. Will you accept appointment ☒ In Washington, D. C.? ☐ Anywhere in United States? ☐ Outside U. S.?

F. If you will accept appointment only in certain locations, list them:
Washington D.C. or vicinity

15. VETERAN PREFERENCE. A. If you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service, indicate:

Date(s) of entry into active service	Date(s) of separation	Branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.)	Serial number. If none, give grade or rating at separation
Feb 25, 1941	Expected to be July 1961	Army	RA 20140533

B. Do you claim 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran? ☐ Yes ☒ No

C. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Have you ever been granted 10-point veteran preference or 5-point preference as a peacetime campaign veteran by the U. S. Civil Service Commission? ☐ Yes ☐ No If so, indicate below the office which granted this preference to you. Attach your notice of preference allowance if available. It will be returned to you.

Name of U. S. Civil Service Commission office or name of Board of U. S. Civil Service Examiners

Address of Commission office or Board of Examiners
City
State

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY. The information contained in answer to question 15A has been verified with the discharge certificate, which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

Signature Agency
Title Date

(Continued on next page)

16. EXPERIENCE. *(Start with your present position and work back)*

① Dates of employment *(month, year)*

From Feb 1941 To present time

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 65.00 per month

Final $ 405.00 per month

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Ass't Chief of Staff for Intelligence
U.S.Army The Pentagon Washington, D.C.

Exact title of your position Pvt to M/Sgt U.S.Army

Place of employment

City Washington

State D.C.

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and title of immediate supervisor Lt. Col Pilla

Reason for wanting to leave Retiring from military service

Description of work

② Dates of employment *(month, year)*

From 6-1935 To Feb 41

Salary or earnings

Starting $ 50.00 per wk

Final $ 75.00 per wk

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Borgeois Studios
188 Walnut St Manchester, N.H.

Exact title of your position Photographer

Place of employment

City

State

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and title of immediate supervisor Ulic Borgeois

Reason for leaving To enlist in the U.S.Army

Description of work

Assignment, studio portraiture work, also lab work

③ Dates of employment *(month, year)*

From To

Salary or earnings

Starting $ per

Final $ per

Classification Grade *(if in Federal service)*

Place of employment

City

State

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Name and title of immediate supervisor

Reason for leaving

Description of work

#17- Special Qualifications and Skills

(D) 1. At the close of my assignment to the Office of the Army Attache, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, I was awarded the Gold Medallion (Order of Ethiopia) by Emperor Haile Selassie for extraordinary photography accomplishments concerning the American Embassy and the Emperor (1953-1955).

2. Also on the personal recommendation of Alfred Eisenstaedt, Life Magazine's head photographer, I was contracted by Life Magazine to cover the Silver Jubilee of Emperor Haile Selassie (1955). This included all photography work and literature concerning the Jubilee. This work appeared in Life Magazine issue November 20, 1955.

3. While assigned to the Office of the Army Attache in London (1950-1953) covered special assignments for the American Embassy, including the Ambassador's presenting of his credentials to the Court of St. James; King George VI's funeral; and Queen Elizabeth's coronation.

All of the above 1,2,and 3 were photographed and processed by myself up to the finished product.

4. Concerning my recent photographic work, I won 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th prizes in the Military District of Washington Photographic Contest 1960. Also won 1st prize for Ft. Myer, Virginia, photographic contest 1960.

5. Because of my extensive knowledge of Ethiopia, I have been lecturing at the Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Towers, Virginia, from 1956 to the present time. This also included the showing of my personal color slides on Ethiopia at all of the lectures.

6. Have also had my photos accepted for publication in TRAVEL Magazine and have appeared in numerous issues.

7. Shot official aerial photos of the Pentagon Building and surrounding areas in 1959.

#17-B - Cameras and Laboratory Equipment that I am extensively familiar with:

Cameras
1. Leica 35 mm
2. Karoan 35 mm
3. Kodak 35 mm
4. Minox Miniature
5. Rolleiflex 6 x 6
6. Speed Graphic 4 x 5
7. 8 x 10 View Cameras (Kodak)
8. 70 mm Roll Camera
9. K-20 Aerial Camera
10. 16 mm Turret Movie Camera

Lab Equipment
1. Standard Photostat Machine
2. Ozalid Machine
3. Recordax Copy Camera
4. Robertson Copy Camera
5. Omega Enlarger (4x5) Auto Focus
6. Leitz Foca-Mat Model III C Auto Focus
7. Morse Contact Printer (Aerial Type)
8. Lomaco Power Contact Printer

Prior to entry into military service worked for Borgeois Studios, Manchester, N.H. 1935 to 1941 as laboratory technician. In 1945 resumed photography career in U.S.Army and continued in this field up til the present time. Skills were developed in the photographer and photographic laboratory fields and rose to my present rank of Master Sargent. My skills as a photographer include an operating knowledge of all characteristics of cameras and equipment used in Army photography and the theory and practices of still and motion picture photography. For example, some of my duties include:

1. taking still photographs for news releases, publicity, medical and historical value
2. taking still and aerial photographs and motion pictures
3. taking of motion pictures for use in preparing training, information, and historical film
4. supervising the taking of still and motion pictures
5. assisting superiors to establish priorities, scope of missions, and work schedules
6. assigning photographers to mission on basis of qualifications, criticising completed work in discussion with photographers, pointing out technical and artistic deficiencies and methods by which such defects can be avoided

My qualities as a senior N C O in this field include knowing the capabilities and limitations of subordinate personnel, being very able to instruct and demonstrate proper camera techniques, and be able to constructively criticize and evaluate the composition of photographs and motion pictures.

My skills in photographic laboratory field include a knowledge of all the operating characteristics of Army photographic laboratory equipment; the techniques of both conventional and semiautomatic photographic processing of still and motion picture black-and-white and color film; the ability to demonstrate and instruct the appropriate photographic laboratory techniques and processes; the ability to organize and supervise operation of a large Army photographic laboratory; the knowledge of operating procedures and installation and organizational maintenance techniques pertaining to Army photographic laboratories; and am able to supervise, plan, and conduct training in all phases of photographic processing. Am exceptionally skilled in making copy negatives of all types, performing line work, making line negatives and half-tone negatives, view graphs, 35 mm slides and 2 1/4 x 3 1/4 slides.

With regards to my physical qualifications, I have very good near and far vision, good eye-hand coordination, good manual dexterity, and very good color vision. My hearing is above normal and my speech clear and well annunciated.

ATTACH [illegible]PLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORM[illegible] HERE

Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From To

Exact title of your position

Salary or earnings
Starting $ per
Final $ per

Classification/Grade *(if in Federal service)*

Place of employment
City
State

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Name and title of immediate supervisor

Reason for leaving

Description of work

If you need additional experience blocks, use supplemental sheets. SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET.

17. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS.

(A) Licenses and Certificates.—Indicate the kind of license or certificate and the State or other licensing authority which granted it; for example, pilot, teacher, electrician, lawyer, radio operator, C. P. A., etc.

Kind of License .... Licensing Authority ....

(B) List any special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use, such as short-wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key-punch, turret lathe, scientific or professional devices.

Photographer, still and motion camera
Photostat machine, ozalid: all types
of photo reproduction and film processing equipment

(C) Approximate number of words per minute in:
Typing .... Shorthand ....

(D) Give any special qualifications not covered elsewhere in your application, such as:
(1) Your more important publications. *(Do not submit copies unless requested)*
(2) Your patents or inventions.
(3) Public speaking and public relations experience.
(4) Membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.
(5) Honors and fellowships received.

18. EDUCATION.

A. Give the highest elementary or high-school grade completed 10th
If you completed high school, give date ....

B. Name and location of last high school attended:
Central High, Manchester, N.H.

C. Name and location of college or university:	Dates attended		Years completed		Credit hours		Degrees received
	From	To	Day	Night	Semester	or Quarter	

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Credit hours	
	Semester	or Quarter

E. Chief graduate college subjects	Credit hours	
	Semester	or Quarter

F. Other schools or training, such as trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business. Give for each name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data:

19. Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 names of countries, dates, and length of time spent there and reason or purpose *(military service, business, education, or vacation)*.

20. Indicate your knowledge of foreign languages.	Reading			Speaking			Understanding			Writing		
	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair	Exc.	Good	Fair

21. REFERENCES.—List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 18, EXPERIENCE.

	FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1.	Edward C. Sweeney	725 15th Street, N.W. Wash D.C.	Attorney
2.	Edward King	452 Oakwood Street,S.E. Wash D.C.	Adm Ass't to Senator Bridges
3.	William Armbrust	4006 Loraine Ave Falls Church Va	Ass't Postmaster Bureau of Budget

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
22. (a) Are you a citizen of the United States of America, or (b) as a native of American Samoa do you owe allegiance to the United States of America?	X	
23. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U. S. A., or any Communist organization?		X
24. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of a Fascist organization?		X
25. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to question 23, 24, or 25 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet to be attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See instruction sheet)		
26. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed; and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
27. A. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
B. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
C. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34.		

INDICATE ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
28. May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, etc.?	X	
29. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*	X	
30. Are you an official or employee of any State, Territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 34.*		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U. S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil-service appointments? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 34.*		X
32. A. Have you ever been discharged from employment because: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
B. Have you ever resigned after official notification that: (1) Your conduct was not satisfactory?		X
(2) Your work was not satisfactory?		X
C. Have you ever been discharged from the Armed Services under other than honorable conditions?		X
If your answer to A, B, or C is "Yes," give details in Item 34 as clearly as you can remember, including the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case.		
33. Have you ever been arrested, charged, or held by Federal, State, or other law-enforcement authorities for any violation of any Federal law, State law, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance? Do not include anything that happened before your 16th birthday. Do not include traffic violations for which a fine of $25 or less was imposed. All other charges must be included even if they were dismissed. *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 34 for each case: (1) approximate date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) action taken.*		X

34. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.

Item No.		Item No.	
19	Australia 1 yr 1942	29	Retiring July 1961
	New Guinea 1943 1 yr		after 20 years of active
	Phillipine 1944 1/2 yr		service in the U.S.Army
	Japan 1945 1/4 yr		
	United Kingdom 1950-1953		
	Ethsopia 1953-1955		

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

ATTENTION: If you are appointed, all facts you give will be subject to investigation including a check of your fingerprints. Before signing this application, go back over it to make sure you have answered all questions correctly and fully, so that your eligibility can be decided on the basis of all the facts. Admitted unfavorable information about such matters as arrests or discharges will be considered together with the favorable information in your record in determining your present fitness for Federal employment. However, a false statement or dishonest answer to any question may be grounds for cancellation of your application or your dismissal after appointment and is punishable by law.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

Date 27 March 1961

Signature of applicant

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (2-24)
MAKSYMIEF MYROSLAW. ANDREW

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
30 APR	30	1917

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
RUSSIAN. ~~POLISH~~
~~UKRAINIAN~~ 654

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-35)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR
27 NOV.	27	1961

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE.

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444C
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS: I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS. I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

[✓ 3.] I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 Nov 1961	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
[illegible]

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MAKSYMIEC MYROSLAW ANDREW	APRIL	30	1917
3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
~~UKRANIAN~~ UKRAINIAN 804	NOV	27	196[illegible]

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

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CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

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[✓ 2.] I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 Nov 1961	SIGNATURE Myroslaw P.
(46)	(47)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
[illegible]	

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
MAKSYMIEC. MYROSLAW ANDREAY	APRIL	30	1917

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
POLISH 624	NOV	27	1961	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A.

Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B.

Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C.

Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

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[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

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2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

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[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

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I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 27 NOV. 1961	SIGNATURE
(46)	(47)

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISSUED BY G. E. Post

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE (Fill in): 6 JUN 1961

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Answer all questions completely or check appropriate box. If question is not applicable, write "NA". Write "Unknown" only if you do not know the answer and it cannot be obtained from personal records. Use blank space at end of form for extra details on any question for which you have insufficient space.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.
3. Consider your answers carefully. Your signature at the end of this form will certify to their correctness. Careful completion of all applicable questions will permit review of your qualifications to the best advantage.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Maksymiec, Myroslaw Andrew
2. AGE: 43
3. SEX: ● MALE ☐ FEMALE
4. HEIGHT: 5ft 6inc
5. WEIGHT: 200 lbs
6. COLOR OF EYES: hazel
7. COLOR OF HAIR: brown
8. TYPE COMPLEXION: ruddy
9. TYPE BUILD: stocky
10. SCARS (Type and Location): NA
11. OTHER DISTINGUISHING PHYSICAL FEATURES: Roman nose becaus of deviated septum
12. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country): 3268 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State and Country) AND PHONE NO.: 3409 Valley Dr. Alex. Va. TE 6-3218
14. CURRENT PHONE NO.: TE 6-3218
15. OFFICE PHONE NO. & EXT.: OX 21376
16. LEGAL RESIDENCE (State, Territory or Country): Manchester N.H.
17. NICKNAMES: Mac, Marco
18. OTHER NAMES YOU HAVE USED: NA
19. INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including Length of Time) UNDER WHICH YOU HAVE EVER USED THESE NAMES.: childhood nickname for about 30 years
20. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by What Authority): NA

SECTION II — POSITION DATA

1. INDICATE THE TYPE OF WORK OR POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE APPLYING: General all around photography and photo labatory work
2. INDICATE THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT (You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary). $ 6,000
3. DATE AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT: 8-1-61
4. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO TRAVEL
● OCCASIONALLY ☐ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY ☐ OTHER:
5. INDICATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT IN THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS (Check (X) each item applicable)
● WASHINGTON, D.C. ☐ ANYWHERE IN U.S. ☐ CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY (Specify):
☐ OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL U.S.
6. INDICATE WHAT RESERVATIONS YOU WOULD PLACE ON ASSIGNMENTS OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.: Mass.

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SECTION III — **CITIZENSHIP**

1. DATE OF BIRTH: 4-30-17
2. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Manchester N.H.
3. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): [illegible]
4. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: ● BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify)
5. DATE NATURALIZED: NA
6. NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO.: NA
7. COURT ISSUING NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE: NA
8. ISSUED AT (City, State, Country): NA
9. HAVE YOU HELD PREVIOUS NATIONALITY: ☐ YES ● NO
10. IF YES, GIVE NAME OF COUNTRY: NA
11. GIVE PARTICULARS CONCERNING PREVIOUS NATIONALITY.

NA

12. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: ☐ YES ● NO
13. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA
14. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, WHAT IS PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First Papers, Etc.)?: NA
15. DATE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.: NA
16. PORT OF ENTRY: NA
17. ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY: NA
18. LAST U.S. VISA (No., Type, Place of Issue): NA
19. DATE VISA ISSUED: NA

SECTION IV — **EDUCATION**

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED.

● LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐ MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

1. NAME OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL: Bakers-Ville School
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Elm Street Manchester N.H.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1923-1931
4. GRADUATE: ● YES ☐ NO

3. HIGH SCHOOL

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL: Central High
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country): Manchester, N.H.
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To): 1931-1932
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ● NO

1. NAME OF HIGH SCHOOL:
2. ADDRESS (City, State, Country):
3. DATES ATTENDED (From-and-To):
4. GRADUATE: ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HOURS (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

SECTION IV CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

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SECTION IV CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

5. IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED IN ITEM 4 WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

6. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS

7. MILITARY TRAINING (FULL TIME DUTY IN SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS SUCH AS ORDNANCE, INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	MONTHS
U.S. Army Language School	Russian	1948	1948	4

8. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE.

SECTION V

FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

1. LANGUAGE *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to Read, Write or Speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate box(es).)*	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED R-Read, W-Write, S-Speak															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE OF COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (with parents, etc.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (all levels)
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				
Ukrianian												●						●	
Polish												●						●	

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY.

NA

3. IF YOU HAVE INDICATED FLUENCY FOR A LANGUAGE HAVING SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN SPOKEN AND WRITTEN FORM, EXPLAIN YOUR COMPETENCE THEREIN.

NA

4. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY IN THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELDS.

NA

5. IF YOU HAVE NOTED A PROFICIENCY IN LANGUAGE, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO USE THIS ABILITY IN ANY POSITION FOR WHICH YOU MIGHT BE SELECTED?

☐ YES ☐ NO NA

SECTION VI GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES IN WHICH YOU HAVE TRAVELLED OR GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL	DATES AND PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE, OR TRAVEL IN EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE.

3. UNITED STATES PASSPORT NUMBER AND EXPIRATION DATE, IF ISSUED.
Special Passport # 18805 Issued 21 July 1950

SECTION VII TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (wpm)	2. SHORTHAND (wpm)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (✓) APPROPRIATE ITEM
NA	NA	☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify): NA

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (*Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, Etc.*).
NA

SECTION VIII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.
Photography, ice hockey, swimming, football

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK.
All types of photography work and lab work

3. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 2, SECTION VII, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO (*Indicate CW speed, sending and receiving*), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.
Ozalid mach. automatic photostat. recordax equipment; all types of photo lab equipment including still and motion picture cameras.

SECTION VIII CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

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SECTION VIII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

4. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ISSUING LICENSE (Provide License Registry Number, if known).

NA

6. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue) NA	7. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of Issue) NA

8. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-Fiction or Scientific articles, General Interest subjects, Novels, Short Stories, Etc.).

Photo coverage and write up concerning the Silver Jubilee of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, which appeared in Life Mag. 11-2[illegible]-55. Also asst. Col John D. Townsend U.S.A. in the preperation of his paper during his attendance at the Army War College on "The Horn of Africa" 1959.

9. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

10. LIST PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

Giving briefings to all MAAG personnell going to Ethiopia from 1956 to present, at the Military Institute Arl. Towers Va.

11. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION IX

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: (LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.) Indicate chronological history of employment for past 15 years. Account for all periods including casual employment and all periods of unemployment. Give address and state what you did during periods of unemployment. List all civilian employment by a foreign Government, regardless of dates. In completing item 9, "Description of Duties" consider your experience carefully and provide meaningful, objective statements.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From and To - By Mo. and Yr.) 2-25-41 to present	2. NAME OF EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Army	
3. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country) Ft. Myer Va.		
4. KIND OF BUSINESS U.S.A.	5. NAME OF SUPERVISOR Col Angelo Pelia	
6. TITLE OF JOB Photography	7. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 525 PER mo.	8. CLASS. GRADE (If Federal Service) M/Sgt. U.S.A.
9. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Photography all types of lab work for Asst. Chief of Staff Intell		
10. REASONS FOR LEAVING Retireing from active duty 7-31-61		

SECTION IX CONTINUED TO PAGE 5

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SECTION X

MILITARY SERVICE

1. CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1948 (As amended) YES ● NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION NA

3. SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. NA

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON NA

5. LOCAL DRAFT BOARD NO. OR DESIGNATION AND ADDRESS NA

2. MILITARY SERVICE RECORD

1. CURRENT AND OR PAST ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

CHECK (X) AS APPROPRIATE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	COAST GUARD	MERCHANT MARINE	NATIONAL GUARD	AIR NAT'L GUARD	FOREIGN ORGAN. OR MIL. SERVICE (Specify)
HAVE SERVED							●		
NOW SERVING	●								

2. BRANCH OR CORPS OF ABOVE CHECKED ORGANIZATION(S) Asst. Chief of Staff Intell.

3. DATE SEPARATED FROM EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY (Past service) NA

4. TOTAL LENGTH OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN U.S. ARMED FORCES (Past and current service) 20 years

5. DATE ENTERED ACTIVE DUTY PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE 2-25-41

6. TOTAL LENGTH OF ACTIVE DUTY IN FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATION NA

7. RANK, GRADE OR RATE PAST SERVICE CURRENT SERVICE [illegible]

8. SERVICE, SERIAL OR FILE NUMBER (If now serving, provide current number) RA 2014[illegible]

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE [illegible] CURRENT SERVICE Asst. Chief of Staff

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE PAST SERVICE NA CURRENT SERVICE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (Indicate whether applicable to past or current service)

Intelligence photography, general PIO work for the past 11 years. I have been involved in Intelligence photography for the Asst. Chief of Staff Intell.

12. CHECK (X) TYPE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY

HONORABLE DISCHARGE	● RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE	UNDUE HARDSHIPS
RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY	RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY	OTHER:
RETIREMENT FOR AGE	RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY	

13. CHECK (X) COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU SERVED

REGULAR RESERVE (Including the National and Air National Guard) OTHER (Including AUS)

3. MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD AND ROTC STATUS

1. DO YOU NOW HAVE RESERVE STATUS? YES ● NO

2. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE NAT'L GRD. OR AIR NAT'L GRD.? YES ● NO

3. ARE YOU NOW A MEMBER OF THE ROTC? YES ● NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEMS 1, 2 OR 3 ABOVE, CHECK COMPONENT MEMBERSHIP BELOW

ARMY	MARINE CORPS	NATIONAL GUARD	COAST GUARD	NAVY ROTC	INDICATE ROTC CATEGORY NUMBER
NAVY	AIR FORCE	AIR NAT'L GUARD	ARMY ROTC	AIR FORCE ROTC	

5. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

6. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

7. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

8. CHECK (X) CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY READY RESERVE STANDBY (Active) STANDBY (Inactive) RETIRED

9. PRIMARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE

10. SECONDARY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (Mos or Designator) AND TITLE

11. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES

12. ARE YOU CURRENTLY ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO A RESERVE, NAT'L GUARD OR ROTC TRAINING UNIT YES ● NO

13. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 12, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

14. HAVE YOU A MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT? YES ● NO

15. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 14, GIVE UNIT OR AGENCY AND ADDRESS

16. INDICATE TOTAL MILITARY SERVICE FOR LONGEVITY PURPOSES INCLUDING ACTIVE AND INACTIVE DUTY YEARS [illegible] MONTHS

17. WHERE ARE YOUR SERVICE RECORDS KEPT? Adj. General Office Wash D.C.

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SECTION XI — FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ● YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
First and Merchants	National Bank of Richmond Va.
Credit Union	Pentagon Wash. D.C.
The Amoskeag National Bank	Manchester, N.H.

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN OR PETITIONED FOR BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ● NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO 4 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES IN THE UNITED STATES

NAME	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State)
Mayer & Co.	Wash. D.C.
Woodward & Lothrop	Wash. D.C.
Julius Garfinkel	Wash. D.C.

7. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ● YES ☐ NO

8. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

Retirement from the United States Army 20 years

9. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES; OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS?

☐ YES ☒ NO (If answer "YES", furnish details on separate sheet.)

SECTION XII — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, or Annulled) SPECIFY: Married

2. STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE, HUSBAND OR FIANCE: If you have been married more than once - including annulments - use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data required below for all previous marriages. If marriage contemplated, fill in appropriate information for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Eileen (Middle) Elizabeth (Maiden) Burke (Last) [illegible]

4. STATE ANY OTHER NAMES EVER USED: Dimples

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH ANY OF THESE NAMES WERE USED. IF LEGAL CHANGE GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 14 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

5. DATE OF MARRIAGE: Nov. 15,1958

6. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Arlington Va.

7. HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 152 Bay State Rd. Worcester, Mass.

8. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO

9. DATE OF DEATH: NA

10. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA

11. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address if deceased): [illegible] Valley Dr. Alex. Va.

12. DATE OF BIRTH: 10-23-25

13. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Worcester, Mass.

14. CITIZENSHIP: Yes

SECTION XII CONTINUED TO PAGE 10

SECTION XII CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9

14. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY NA	15. PLACE OF ENTRY NA
16. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries) NA	17. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED NA 18. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) NA
19. OCCUPATION Housewife	20. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse deceased or unemployed give last known employer) NA

21. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

22. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and to - By Mo. and Yr.)
NA

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA	24. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED NA

25. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
William Thomas	son	1-30-60 Wash DC	USA ~~yes~~	5200 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Sharon Ann	daughter	2-6-61 Wash DC	USA ~~yes~~	5266 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Wasyl Makarymiec	father	Austria 11-11-86	USA ~~yes~~	92 Vinton St Manchester N.H.

2. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including step-children and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YRS. OF AGE, AND NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	2	3. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, grandparents, sisters, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YRS. OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

SECTION XIV FATHER (Give same information for Stepfather and of Guardian on a separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) Makarymiec Wasyl	2. LIVING ● YES ☐ NO	3. DATE OF DEATH NA	4. CAUSE OF DEATH NA

5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED
Bill, William

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (Including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (Where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - Give last address, if deceased (No., Street, City, State, Country)
92 Vinton Street Manchester N.H.

7. DATE OF BIRTH 11-11-86	8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Szesow Austria	9. CITIZENSHIP USA ~~Yes~~

10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. - DATE OF ENTRY 1914	11. PLACE OF ENTRY New York

12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries) Austria	13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED 4-4-45	14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country) Manchester N.H.

15. OCCUPATION retired	16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father is deceased or unemployed) NA

17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR FATHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF-EMPLOYED
NA

18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) NA	19. BRANCH OF SERVICE NA	20. COUNTRY NA

21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
NA

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SECTION XV MOTHER (Give same information for Stepmother on separate sheet)

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Maksymiec, Justina
2. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: ---
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: ---
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 16 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT ADDRESS - GIVE LAST ADDRESS, IF DECEASED (No., Street, City, State, Country): State Hospital Concord N.H.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1896
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Austria, Sobrotwur
9. CITIZENSHIP: AUSTRIAN ~~US~~
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.- DATE OF ENTRY: 1912
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: New York
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Countries): Austria
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: ---
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): ---
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother is deceased or unemployed): NA
17. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS OR MOTHER'S BUSINESS ADDRESS IF SELF EMPLOYED: NA
18. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To): NA
19. BRANCH OF SERVICE: NA
20. COUNTRY: NA
21. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN: NA

SECTION XVI BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including Half-, Step- and Adopted Brothers and Sisters)

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Marker, John
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): [illegible] 159 Pier 61 St. [illegible] Fla.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: 51

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Loudenslager, Olga
2. RELATIONSHIP: sister
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 92 Vinton St. Manchester, N.H.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: 52

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Maksymiec, Wasyl
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country): ~~yes~~ USA.
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): 396 So. Willow St. Manchester N.H.
5. LIVING: ● YES ☐ NO
6. AGE: [illegible]

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

6
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

7
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

8
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
4. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country):
5. LIVING: ☐ YES ☐ NO
6. AGE:

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SECTION XVII — FATHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Burke, Thomas William
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: NA
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA
5. STATE OTHER NAMES HE HAS USED: Tom, Tommy

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH HE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 152 Bay State Rd, Worcester, Mass.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: 1-12-96
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Lowell Mass
9. CITIZENSHIP: ~~yes~~ USA
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: NA
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: NA
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country/ies): NA
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: NA
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): NA
15. OCCUPATION: retired
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Father-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XVIII — MOTHER-IN-LAW

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Burke, Eileen Veronica
2. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
3. DATE OF DEATH: NA
4. CAUSE OF DEATH: NA
5. STATE OTHER NAMES SHE HAS USED: NA

INDICATE CIRCUMSTANCES (including length of time) UNDER WHICH SHE HAS EVER USED THESE NAMES. IF LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS (where and by what authority). USE EXTRA SPACE PROVIDED ON PAGE 15 OF THIS FORM TO RECORD THIS INFORMATION.

6. CURRENT OR LAST ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 152 Bay State Rd, Worcester, Mass.
7. DATE OF BIRTH: Aug. 7, 1896
8. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Killarney, Ireland
9. CITIZENSHIP: ~~yes~~ USA
10. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: 1911
11. PLACE OF ENTRY: Boston, Mass.
12. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (Country/ies): Ireland
13. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED: 12-2-29
14. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Worcester, Mass.
15. OCCUPATION: Housewife
16. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Give last employer, if Mother-in-Law is deceased or unemployed): NA

SECTION XIX — RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO EITHER (1) LIVE ABROAD, (2) ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS OR (3) WORK FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

5
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES:
5. EMPLOYED BY:
6. CITIZENSHIP (Country):
7. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT:
8. DATE OF LAST CONTACT:

SECTION XIX CONTINUED TO PAGE 13

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SECTION XIX CONTINUED FROM PAGE 12

6. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING RELATIVES NOTED IN SECTION XIX ABOVE.

No

SECTION XX RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION WHO ARE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES

1

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Lloyd, Charles Thomas
2. RELATIONSHIP: brother-in-law
3. AGE: 40
4. CITIZENSHIP: USA
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4941 Sedgwick N.W. Wash. D.C.
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known): Adm. of Civil Defense Mob. Wash D.C.

2

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Lloyd Maryann
2. RELATIONSHIP: sister-in-law
3. AGE: 37
4. CITIZENSHIP: USA
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): 4941 Sedgwick N.W. Wash. D.C.
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known): Federal Aviation Agency Wash D.C. (as of July 1961)

3

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle):
2. RELATIONSHIP:
3. AGE:
4. CITIZENSHIP:
5. ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country):
6. TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (If known):

SECTION XXI REFERENCES, ACQUAINTANCES, AND NEIGHBORS

1. LIST FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES, NOT RELATIVES, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Maj.Gen. John M. Willems	Asst. Chief Staff 2E494 Pentagon Wash DC	Ft. Myer No. Area Quarter 15 B Arl. Va
Alfred Eisenstaedt	Time Life Radio City N.Y.	72-15 37 Ave. N.Y.
William Armhurst	Post office Dept. Washing. D.C.	4006 Loraine Ave. Falls Church Va.
Edward Sweeney	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.
James Anton	555 Maryland Ave. N.W. Wash. D.C.	555 Maryland AVE N.W. Wash. D.C.

2. LIST FIVE PERSONS, IN THE U.S. WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY - NOT RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Alfred Eisenstadet	Time Life Radio City N.Y.	72-15 37 Ave. N.Y.
Edward Sweeney	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.	3300 Nebraska N.W. Wash. D.C.
Dr. Allen Gross	3301 Nebraska Ave N.W. Wash. D.C.	3301 Nebraska Ave N.W. Washington D.C.
John Reeves	Reeves Bakery 1209 F St. Wash D.C.	4510 Lockwood Pkwy NW Wash. D.C.
Charles Gallant	261 Constitution Ave. Wash D.C.	6422 Garnet Dr. Kenwood Md.

3. LIST THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S.

NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)	RESIDENCE ADDRESS (No., Street, City and State)
Mr. Gordon Cooney	NA	3246 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Mr. George Hebenstreit	NA	3258 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.
Mr. Leland Parkhurst	NA	3305 Elmore Dr. Alex. Va.

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SECTION XXII CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NOTE: List names and addresses of all clubs, societies, professional societies, employee groups or organizations *(Include membership in, or support of, any organization having headquarters or branch in a foreign country)* to which you belong or have belonged.

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATES OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
N.C.O.	Ft. Myer Va.	1947	1961
American Leg.	Manchester N.H.	1945	1947
Ukrianian Club	Manchester N.H.	1938	1942

SECTION XXIII RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

ADDRESS - LAST RESIDENCE FIRST (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	INCLUSIVE DATES	
	FROM	TO
3268 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.	1958	1961
United States Army	1941	1958

SECTION XXIV ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU EVER SUPPORTED OR BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY POLITICAL PARTY, INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES OR TEACHES THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE OR OTHER UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, OR SEEKS BY FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ● NO

2. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, EXPLAIN

NA

3. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED INTOXICANTS?	● YES ☐ NO	4. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Very moderately
5. DO YOU USE OR HAVE YOU EVER USED NARCOTICS?	☐ YES ● NO	6. IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? NA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR SUPPORTED, OR HAD ANY CONNECTIONS WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OR ITS ACTIVITIES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF ANSWER IS "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

8. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940

Asst. Chief Staff Intel. Pentagon Wash. D.C.

9. IF TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAVE CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE THE NAME OF THE AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION.

Asst. Chief of Staff for Intell date of investegation 1950

NOTE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *If your answer is "YES" to the following Questions 10, 11 or 12, provide the information requested for each question on a separate, signed sheet and attach the sheet to this form in a sealed envelope.*

10. HAVE YOU, OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HAS YOUR SPOUSE, EVER BEEN DETAINED, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF THE LAW OTHER THAN A *MINOR* TRAFFIC VIOLATION IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD? ☐ YES ● NO

IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, DATE, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPECIAL INSTRUCTION ABOVE.

11. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, COURT-MARTIALED OR OTHERWISE PUNISHED UNDER MILITARY LAW OR REGULATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ● NO

12. ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, NOT MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE INCIDENT(S) AND PROVIDE DATE(S) OF OCCURRENCE ON SEPARATE SHEET IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE. ☐ YES ● NO

SECTION XXV PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME *(First-Middle-Last)* Eileen Elizabeth Maksymiec	2. RELATIONSHIP wife
3. HOME ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* 3255 Valley Dr. Alex. Va.	4. HOME PHONE NO. TE 6-8213
5. BUSINESS ADDRESS *(No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)* - INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE NA	6. BUSINESS PHONE NO. & EXT. NA

7. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES *(Spouse, Mother, Father)* MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

Mr. Wasyl Maksymiec 92 Vinton St. Manchester N.H.

15✓

SECTION XXVI

CERTIFICATION

YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THIS APPLICATION WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

I have read and understand the instructions. I Certify that the foregoing answers are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I agree that any misstatement or omission as to material fact will constitute grounds for immediate dismissal or rejection of my application. I also understand that any false statement made herein may be punishable by law (U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1001).

1. DATE OF SIGNATURES 28 June 1961	2. SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT
3. SIGNED AT (City and State) Washington D.C	4. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Jerome I. Finnigan

NOTE: Use the following space for extra details. Reference each continued item by section and item number to which it relates. Sign your name at the end of the added material. If additional space is required use extra pages the same size as this page and sign each such page.

Sec. XII #.5. Nickname all her life.
Sec. XIV #5. english translation and a short name for William. for about 50 years.

Sec. XVII #5. variations of the name Thomas. for about 60 years.

Sec. VI
Australia- well acquainted with the townsville area-terrainwise resided in this area one year in 1943-- work assigment.
Phillipines- Terrain 3 mons. 1945 work assigment
Japan " " " " " "
Canada " 1957-1958 visit
British Isles 3 years 1950=53 work assigment Terrain, harbors, inland water ways utilities, reilroad.
Norway visits 1950-51-52-53 terrain
Sweden " " " " " " & harbors
Denmark " " " " " "
France " " " " " "
Germany " " " " " "
Switzerland " " " " " "
Italy " " " " " " & harbors
Spain " " " " " "
Portugal " " " " " "
Greece " " " " " "
Lebenon " " " " " "
Turkey " " " " " "
Ireland " " " " " "
Tangier & No. Coast of Africa visits 1952 terrain.
Egypt visits 1952-53-54-55 terrain
Sudan " " " " " "
Aden " " " " " "
French Somliland " " " " " "
Kenya " 1954 "
Italian Somliland visits 1954 "
Eritria " 1953-54-55 "
Ethiopia residence 1953-1955 Terrain harbors utilites, railroads, industries, political parties work assigment.

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14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 20 November 1961

YOUR REFERENCE: 04515 NPIC

CASE NO. : 194081

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew

1. This is to inform you of security approval of the subject person as follows:

   ☒ Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

   ☐ Subject has been approved for appointment under the authority of Paragraph 4(d) of Regulation 10-210, and under Regulation 20-730 including access to classified information through Top Secret as required in the performance of his duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

   ☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

   ☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

   ☐

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM NO. 1173 REPLACES FORM 38-101 WHICH IS OBSOLETE
1 MAR 57

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL
(WHEN FILLED IN)

NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY ACTION

DATE : 26 July 61

YOUR REFERENCE: 04515

CASE NO. : 194081

TO : Director of Personnel

FROM : Director of Security

SUBJECT : MAKSYMIEC, Myroslaw Andrew

This is to inform you that security approval is granted for the employment of Subject as follows:

☐ Provisional approval is granted upon the condition that Subject:

a. not have access to classified material or information
b. not have access to secure areas
c. not be issued a building badge or Agency credential
d. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than contained in request
e.

Security processing to effect security clearance for access to classified information is continuing. Your office will be advised upon completion of this action.

☐ Approval for access to classified information through SECRET under the provisions of Regulations 10-210 and 20-730.

Upon successful completion of a personal interview in the Office of Security after Subject reaches age 18, she may be approved for access to classified information through TOP SECRET. Your office will be advised upon completion of this action.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

☒ Subject may be invited to Washington for further processing but is not to receive classified material or information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

W. A. OSBORNE
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 1337 REPLACES FORM 38-106
1-58 WHICH MAY BE USED

CONFIDENTIAL

(0)

[illegible]

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

[illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Kimsey, Herman E.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11/16/49 - 11/12/65

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

KIMSEY, HERMAN E. 61555 D

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 July 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): KIMSEY, HERMAN E.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TERMINATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 9 | DAY ~~30~~ 20 | YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3226-1064 1000 3225-1050-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): ( )

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/TSD
Authentication
Graphic Arts Reproduction Branch
Analysis and Research Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: DOCUMENT TECH CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0652

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1397.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 (4)

17. SALARY OR RATE: $11415

18. REMARKS: Continuous Agency service from 23 March 1953 to 20 September 1962.

Form 1150 Remarks: Terminated in accordance with provisions of CIA Regulation 20-27, Separation of Surplus Personnel, pursuant to authority of Director of Central Intelligence contained in Section 102 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This termination does not affect your right to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the U. S. Government if you are declared eligible for such employment by the U. S. Civil Service Commission.

Authorized Maximum Separation Compensation in accordance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 20-32, Separation Compensation.

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: JAMES R. SHIELDS

DATE SIGNED:

19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: JAMES R. SHIELDS, TSD/CMC

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

DATE OF BIRTH: 12 11 16

EOD DATA

44. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

45. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo 05 Da 09 Yr 60	X V to V	V to UV
	UV to V	UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) KIMSEY, Herman E.	3. Date of Birth Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 16	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex M	6. CS - LOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Analysis and Research Branch	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code

16. Dept.-Field Dept. - X Unlid. Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title IO TECH AIDS	18. Position No. 92	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.63

21. Grade & Step 13 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 10,370	23. SD D	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr [illegible] 57	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr [illegible] 61	26. Appropriation Number 0225-1005-1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 42	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code	30. Separation Date

6

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/TSD Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Branch Analysis and Research Section	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field Dept. - Unlid. Frgn - Code 2	34. Position Title DOCUMENT TECH-CH	35. Position No. 658	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1397.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr [illegible] 57	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr [illegible] 61	43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Emanuele Fontana ext. 3031

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
JAMES R. SHIELDS
Career Management Officer, TSD

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Processed by
CSPD

Form 1152a (Use previous edit.)

SECRET

Std. Form 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. HERMAN E. KELSEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 24 Jan 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
IO TECH AIDS BY 92	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO TECH AIDS BY 92
GS-0136.63-12 $7785 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.63-13 $8990 per annum
DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Dave Richards Ext. 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	5 PT.	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	REQ.	C.A.	REAL.

SD-DT

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-2505-20
TO Same

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT: Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE CALIF.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		
F. APPROVED BY		

REMARKS:

SEC

7818 25 Jan '57

14-00000

PERSONNEL INFORMATION CARD

The following applicable items must be reported immediately when an employee (1) enters on duty (2) changes name, home or office address or telephone number, (3) transfers to another component of the agency, or (4) is to be absent from agency for more than 10 days in which case enter the office telephone number of the administrative officer, (5) changes marital status.

HERE: STATE TYPE OF CHANGE

NAME: Kinsey, Herman Edward DATE: 2 April 1953

OFFICE DESIGNATION & LOCATION: A&R GA&O TCS Central 2C 2792

NEW ADDRESS:

PRESENT ADDRESS: 1723 "G" St. N.W.

HOME TELEPHONE NO: National 8-2786 MARITAL STATUS: Single

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL'S NAME TO BE INCLUDED IN THE TELEPHONE DIRECTORY? YES ☐ NO ☑

REMARKS: Return to 1107-I

SERIAL NO.	NAME		ORGANIZATION			OFFICE		OFFICE TELEPHONE NUMBER	HOME PHONE				DATE		
			OFF	DIV	BR	ROOM	BUILDING		EXCHANGE	NUMBER			DAY	MO	YR

IDM 003400

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P
PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY
STATION Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENTS IO TECH AIDS

AGE 40 years
DATE 24 January 1957
DDP UNIT TSS
PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION DT

PRESENT GRADE GS-12
PROPOSED GRADE GS-13
CIA TRAINING

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER & GRADE BY 92
PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER & GRADE BY 92 GS-13

EDUCATION:

Two years coll. - No degree

LANGUAGE:

Japanese - slight

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (Excluding SSU OSS):

1941-'43-Military Service
'44-'45-McCloud River Lbr. Co., Brakeman, $1.10 p/h
'44-'48-U.S. Forest Service, Camp Administrator
'48-'51-Military Service

SUMMARY OF CIA WORK ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:

Appt. - 23 Mar 1953-Tech Projects Off, GS-9
Reassign-13 Sept 1953, Technologist, TSS/GARD, GS-9
Promot-9 May 1954-Technologist, TSS/GARD, GS-11
Reass-27 Feb 1955-IO Tech Aids, TSS/GARD, GS-11
Promot-19 Jun 1955-IO Tech Aids, TSS/GARD, GS-12

RECOMMENDED BY
JOSEPH F. MARZEN
Acting Chief, TSS/GARD

APPROVED BY
CHARLES J. RYAN
AC/TSS/AUTH

SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

G-3467
10 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, TSS Administrative Staff

SUBJECT : Request for Promotion - Herman E. Kimsey

1. It is requested that Herman E. Kimsey be promoted from GS-12 to GS-13. Mr. Kimsey has been in grade for over 18 months. Mr. Kimsey has been Chief of the A&R Section of GARD for over 22 months. During this time he has exhibited ability in conducting and managing the activities of his branch. Mr. Kimsey is a Questioned Documents Analyst and is well-fitted to perform the duties required of the A&R Branch.

2. It is recommended that Mr. Kimsey be promoted to GS-13.

JOSEPH F. MARZEN
Acting Chief, TSS/GARD

Distribution:
~~2~~ - Addressee
1 - TSS/SRB
1 - TSS/GARD/file
1 - TSS/GARD/Chrono

Concurs - C J Ryan

SECRET
(When filled in)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: KIMSEY, Herman F.   AGE: 39 years   DATE: 27 May 1955

STATION Washington, D.C.
AND DUTIES: IO Tech Aids   DD/P UNIT: TSS   PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DT

PRESENT GRADE: GS-11
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-12
CIA TRAINING:

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BY 92 GS-11

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BY 92 GS-12

EDUCATION: Two years college - no degree

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese - slight

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
'41 - '43 - Military Service
'44 - '45 - Mc Cloud River Lbr. Co., Brakeman, $1.10 p/h
'46 - '48 - U.S. Forest Service, Camp Administrator
'48 - '51 - Military Service

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
Appt 23 Mar 1953, Tech Projects Off. GS-9
Reassignment 13 Sept 1953, Technologist, GARD GS-9
Promoti n 9 May 1954 - Technologist, GARD GS-11
Reassign 27 Feb 55 - IO Tech Aids, GARD, GS-11

RECOMMENDED BY:
CHARLES YECH, JR.
Chief, TSS/GARB

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD: Mr. Kimsey has been acting Chief of the Analysis and Research Branch of GARD for over 12 months and during this time has exhibited ability in conducting and directing the activities of this Branch. Mr. Kimsey is a professional document analyst and is very well fitted to perform GARD duties required of the Analysis and Research Branch, both in its connections as Quality Control for GARD document production and as Handwriting Typewriter and Falsification analyst. Request that in view of the foregoing, Mr. Kimsey be promoted to GS-12.

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible] E. KINSEY	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 27 May 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) PROMOTION		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 19 JUN 1955	

FROM—		TO—
IO TECH AIDS BY 92-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO . TECH AIDS BY 92
GS-0136.03-11 $5940 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.03-12 $7040 per annum
DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

APPROVED BY TSS CAREER SERVICE PANEL

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Tom Clines x 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: JASPER L. OLMSTEAD
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-UT

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-2515-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION	JMO	6/7/55	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		6-5-55	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY	Robert F. [illegible] Orville C. [illegible] 6-8-55		

10-57190-1

1400000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. - Miss - Mrs. - One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 16 Feb. 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
TECHNOLOGIST BY 93	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (TECH AIDS) BY 92-11
~~GS-1390.01-11 $5940 per annum~~	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.63-11 $5940 per annum
~~DDP/Technical Services Staff~~ ~~Graphic Arts Reproduction Division~~ ~~Analysis and Research Branch~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ~~☒ DEPARTMENTAL~~	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

APPROVED BY TSS CAREER SERVICE PANEL

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title):

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Tom Clines x 3031

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: MARION D. SHAW
Title: Career Management Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER 5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	SUB.	C.A.	REAL.	
				SD-~~TS~~ DT

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 5-2515-20
TO same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		2/18/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	2-21-55	
E.			

F. APPROVED: Ralph L. [illegible]

SECRET

Orville [illegible] 2-21-55

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. [illegible] E. KINSEY

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 December 1926

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 April 1954

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 9 MAY 1954

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
TECHNOLOGIST BY 93-9	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECHNOLOGIST BY 93
GS-1390.01-9 $5185	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390.01-11 $5940
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Analysis & Research ~~[illegible] & Analysis~~ Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PERIODIC STEP [illegible] 23 Mar 54

TO SALARY $ 5185

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Tom Clines 8305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: HAROLD G. JENKINS
Signature:
Title: Acting Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-TS

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2515-20
TO: 4-2515-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Approved by TSS Career Service Board (JCW)

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	AC	22 Apr 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	5/7/54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] 5/5/54

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. NORMAN E. KINSEY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec '16
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 Mar 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: APR 1 [illegible]
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECH PROJECTS OF BY 256-9		TECHNOLOGIST BY 93-9
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390-9 ~~$5060~~ 5185		GS-1390.01-9 ~~$5060~~ 5185
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	~~DDP/Technical Services Staff~~ ~~Graphic Arts Reproduction Div~~ Office of the Chief		DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Analysis & Research Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Washington D. C.~~		Washington D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

[illegible] 28 Mar 54

[illegible] 5185

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Tom Glines 0305

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY

Signature: HAROLD O. JENKINS

Title: Acting Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-TS

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2515-20 TO: 4-2515-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:
21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DC	3 Apr 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	JL	[illegible]	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – (One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Herman E. KINSEY
2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Aug 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 13 Sept 53
B. APPROVED: 13 Sept 53

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9		Same
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1390-9 $5060		"
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief		" " "
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D. C.		"
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer to Vouchered Funds from Unvouchered Funds.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY ROBERT W. MUENSTER
Signature:
Title: Personnel Officer, TSS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	DIPT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	SICE	I.A.	REAL.

SS-TS

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2515-10 TO: 4-2515-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] AUG [illegible] 1953

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. DATE 23 March 1953

2. TO: Mr. Muenstor Qusters Eye

3. OFFICE (Division, Branch, Etc.) TSS GS 9 $5060.00

4. THE PERSON NAMED BELOW MEETS THE STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THIS AGENCY SUBJECT TO THE TYPE OF CLEARANCE INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 9. THE SIGNED CLEARANCE FROM I&S FOR ENTRANCE ON DUTY HAS BEEN MADE A PART OF THE PERSONNEL FILE OF THIS INDIVIDUAL. HE/SHE IS REPORTING FOR DUTY THIS DATE.

5. NAME (Last) KIMSEY (First) HERMAN (Middle) EDWARD

6. JOB TITLE AND GRADE TECH. PROJ. OFFICER GS 9

7. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACTION 23 March 1953

8. ☒ E.O.D.
☐ REASSIGNMENT
OTHER:

9. TYPE CLEARANCE Full

10. REMARKS (Include Medical or Other Limitations)

Frank J. Dawald Jr.
PERSONNEL OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION: ORIGINAL AND COPY (WHITE) TO ITEM NO. 3. COPY (PINK) TO PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM NO. 37-116 PREVIOUS EDITIONS TO BE USED
NOV 1952

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

ITS DATE

NAME Herman Eldin Kinsey		REFERENCE BY [illegible]	
HOME ADDRESS Box 185, McLeod, [illegible]			TELEPHONE
BUSINESS ADDRESS Present - YMCA - 6th - Wash. D.C.			TELEPHONE
DATE OF BIRTH 30 yrs old	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED) [illegible] - birth	
NAME OF SPOUSE Single - no [illegible] -			
DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)	
SALARY REQUESTED GS-9	NO. OF DEPENDENTS 1 - Mother	INTERVIEWER	

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

file

Subject is currently employed in the CIC [illegible] at Ft. Holabird, not [illegible]

8-30-52

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

file -

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

5/41 - 11/43 - CDD - [illegible] on 24 [illegible] - Army

11/43 - 1944 - Entered CIC - [illegible] (Holabird), & then [illegible] as

[illegible] for 11 mos. - [illegible] - collection of [illegible], &c.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

14-111

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY)

[illegible] - [illegible] - 1944 - [illegible] mo. - CIC -

[illegible] - 1950 - 6 mo. - " - "[illegible]" -

[illegible] - 1957 - 10 mo. - " - "OK" -

LANGUAGE FACILITY

[illegible] fluency" - [illegible] [illegible] no [illegible] [illegible] -

[illegible] [illegible] - N3 1957.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

[illegible] - [illegible]; solid; good appearance; clean; mature; [illegible]; confident; [illegible] of average intelligence - certainly no "brain". Handles himself OK - impressed me as a plugger - [illegible] [illegible] - probably do a [illegible], dependable job, on a [illegible] level. [illegible] very interested in [illegible]; doesn't [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] instructor at Holabird, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Would [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible] GS-7 level - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]; CIC experience ([illegible] [illegible] + [illegible]); [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]; [illegible] [illegible]; [illegible] [illegible] -

[illegible]. TRC - FE -

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 3 hr.

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE
FIELD ☐
CASUAL ☐

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

Bal
1643-9 1606

CONTROL NUMBER

DATE
11-16-49

RECOMMENDED FOR BRANCH

DESK

REFERRED BY

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE)
Kinsey, Herman Edward

GRADE

DEPT., OFFICE OR BRANCH

SERIAL NUMBER

ORGANIZATION

DATE OF BIRTH
12-11-16

ADDRESS (~~BUSINESS OR MILITARY~~) Host
Y.M.C.A. 1736 G St.

TELEPHONE

ADDRESS (HOME)

TELEPHONE

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)
Born in New Mexico

NAME (HUSBAND OR WIFE)
No spouse

DATE OF BIRTH

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)

ae

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, GRADES, AND EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

LANGUAGES (DEGREE OF FLUENCY, HOW ACQUIRED)

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE (EXTENT AND PURPOSE)

PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE (MAIN OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ELECTIVE OFFICES)

MILITARY EXPERIENCE (PRINCIPAL DUTIES, SERVICE RECORDS. IF OFFICER: MANNER OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS; IF EM: ASGT SCORE, DEGREE OF SKILLS, MOS AND MOS TITLES.

FORM NO. 38-1
NOV 1948

(1038)

CANDIDATE MUST NOT SEE THIS PAGE

UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES [illegible]

REMARKS: (ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION)

Sent me by Schmidt - I & S for interview & testing.
- has been interviewed in the field -
Good appearance. Neatly dressed - pleasant

May be a good man as a plugging type.
Conscientious worker but doubt very much
that he is a "flash" at anything. Very
slow spoken.

[illegible] - He will bring in typed Form 57's
Resume & [illegible].

CLEARED FOR CONSIDERATION BY:

SERVICE RECORD CHECKED: FORM NO. 88-1 ☐ FORM NO. 57 ☐

RATINGS

FACTORS	SUP	E	VS	S	UNS	EXPLANATION
MOTIVATION - ENERGY, EFFORT, INITIATIVE, INTEREST IN ASSIGNMENT.						
PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE - JUDGMENT, DECISIVENESS, ALERTNESS, PERCEPTION.						
STABILITY - EMOTIONAL CONTROL AND MATURITY, ABSENCE OF NERVOUS SYMPTOMS.						
ABILITY TO WORK WITH OTHERS - TACT, ABSENCE OF ANNOYING TRAITS.						
LEADERSHIP - ORGANIZING ABILITY, ABILITY TO WIN COOPERATION.						
PHYSICAL ABILITY - APPEARANCE, PRESENCE, VIGOR, STAMINA.						

SIGNATURE [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NUMBER 61555	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I)

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) KI[illegible]Y, He[illegible] Edward	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Dec 1915	5. LONGEVITY COMP. DATE 23 Mar 1953

6. MARITAL STATUS Single	7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee) ▷ 0	7a. YEAR(S) OF BIRTH	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA SPOUSE

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS ▷	MEMBERSHIP Mar 1956	OTHER STATUS	10. LAST MED. RPT. Feb 1959	QUAL. FOR O/S TDY	EVAL. FOR TDY O/S

11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS ▷	NONE SERVICE X	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2	TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3	RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE None	13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE None	14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE None

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1935-45 McCloud River Lumber Co, McCloud, California - Lumberman, Brakeman (intermittently)
1941-43 Military Service, US Army, Sgt - Intelligence Non-commissioned Officer
1939; 1940; 1945-46 Dept of Agriculture, US Forest Service, Calif - Forest Guard; Camp Superintendant
1946-49; 1950-53 Military Service, US Army, CIC, M/Sgt - Instructor USA; Special Agent in charge of Document Laboratory, Japan; Special Agent, Combat CIC Team, Korea; Instructor & Chief, Investigative Laboratory, USA.

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

High school graduate
Various Military Schools

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)
None

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

1955 Non-clerical Basic Typing

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE		GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Mar 1953	Tech Proj Off	301	9		TSS/Graphic Arts Reproduction	Hq
Feb 1954	Technologist	1390.01	9	TS	DDP/TSS/GARD/Ch,Anal&ResBranch	"
May 1954	"	1390.01	11	DT	" " " " " " " "	"
Jun 1955	I.O. (Tech Aids)	0136.63	12	DT	DDP/TSS/Auth/GARD/Ch,Anal&Res	"
Feb 1957	" " "	0136.63	13	DT	" " " " " " " "	"
May 1960	Document Tech	1397.01	13	D	" " " " " " " "	"

20. DATE REVIEWED 15 Sep 1961	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY OP/PCD/GAP/	22. DATE LAST REVIEWED & VERIFIED BY EMPLOYEE ▷ 3 Aug 1959

FORM 8-61 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FILE SERIAL NO. [illegible]	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)
NAME (Last-First-Middle) KIMSEY, Herman Edward	DATE OF BIRTH Dec 1916

23. SUMMARIES OF EVALUATIVE REPORTS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS

See Attachment

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Appreciation 1953 from Chief, NEA for excellent work on Report G-145 performed by TSS personnel. Endorsed by Chief, [illegible]/TSS.

Commendation 1955 from the field, conveyed by the Career Management Officer, TSS for efficiency in rendering support to an operation.

27. DATE PREPARED 15 Sep 1961	28. PROFILE PREPARED BY OP/POC/[illegible]/[illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES ... WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KIMSEY,	(First) Herman	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DOCUMENT TECH CH			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/AUTH/GARB	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☒ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Jan 1960 thru Dec 1960

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Section personnel	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitoring the writing of and writing technical reports	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION E ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues to perform his duties as Supervisor of the many complex A&R activities in a competent manner. His knowledge of the technical aspects of his Sections' many functions help to insure a continuation of work flow and his ability to absorb and retain technical data related to his field of endeavor serves as an aid in the presentations of his numerous oral briefings.

One apparent weakness, which he continues to retain, is in his work relations with technical personnel; he has a tendency to drift from main topic under discussion to unrelated subjects, which, while they may be informative, decreases not only the Subject's productive capability, but, also that of the technical personnel.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 January 1961	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
46	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	DC/TSD/GARB/	Paul J. Szego PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	Chief, TSD/GARB	JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

14-00000

STA. DAR. FORM 57
REVISED MARCH 1961
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

57-103

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

APPLICATION NO.

1. Kind of position applied for, or name of examination

Announcement No.

2. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in examination announcement)*

3. Primary place(s) of employment applied for *(City and State)*

4. Name *(First, middle, maiden, if any, last)*
Mr. Mrs. Miss Herman Edward Kimsey

5. Address *(Number, Street, City, Zone, State)*
3700 Mass. Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C
or c/o W. S. Linebarger, Box 407
Mt. Shasta, California WA-6-4646

6. Home phone FE-8-6400

7. Office phone 351-3295

8. Legal or voting residence *(State)* District of Columbia

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 11 inches

10. Weight 200 lbs.

11. Sex ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. Marital status ☒ Married ☐ Single *(incl. widowed, divorced)*

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

13. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)* Gallup, McKinley County, New Mexico

14. Birth date *(Month, day, year)* December 11, 1916

15. Social Security Number 556 10 4750

16. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade and job title:
GS-13, Intelligence Officer (Section Chief) (Step 4) (GS-14 Slot)
Dates of service in that grade
From 12 Feb. 1957 To 20 September 1962

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Examining Office Only

☐ Appor.
☐ Nonappor.

Material
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Entered Register:

Notations:

App. Reviewed:

App. Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Point	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investi-gated	
Initials and date				

17. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

A. Lowest grade or pay you will accept $ Per or grade OPEN

B. Will you accept temporary appointment? *(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)* ☒ Yes ☐ No If "Yes," indicate by "X" in appropriate box or boxes.
☒ 1 mo. or less ☒ 1 to 4 months ☒ 4 to 12 months

C. Will you accept less than full-time employment (less than 40 hours per week)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

D. Are you willing to travel? ☐ Not at all ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently

E. Will you accept employment: In Washington, D.C.? ☒ Yes ☐ No Outside U.S.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

F. Will you accept appointment only in certain locations? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," list locations:

18. ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Number
19 May 1941	5 Nov. 1943		
29 Nov. 1946	8 Oct. 1949	U. S. Army	RA 39080108
5 Jan. 1950	20 Mar. 1953		

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions?
☐ Yes *(Give details in Item 39)* ☒ No

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on service during peacetime campaign? ☐ Yes *(Complete and attach Standard Form 15)* ☒ No

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No *If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Veteran Preference Claim"* TYPE: ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information given in answer to Question 18 has been verified with the discharge certificate and/or other proof which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

VETERAN PREFERENCE ALLOWED: ☐ 5-point ☐ 10-point Comp. Disab. ☐ Other 10-point ☐ None

Signature and title

Agency

Date

16-78610-1

Herman Edward Kinsey
Attachment I

1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

Herman Edward Kimsey December 11, 1916

Questioned Document Analyst (Continued)

b. Participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

Per request from Training, periodically briefs Foreign Intelligence Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the question document problem.

II SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from the customers and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommendations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and personnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefits to Agency technical services to intelligence efforts.

III QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standatds developed for the GS-1397.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

Herman Edward Kinsey

December 11, 1916

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The analysis and Research Section is responsible for advisory, developmental and service work in the field of Questioned Document Analysis in support of overt and covert activities of the Agency. This includes technical testing and research into handwriting and document evaluation or authentication.

The Section Chief directs the assignments of projects, studies developments in scientific fields supporting authentication work, advises Agency officials on the current and long range capabilities in authentication or evaluation of documents and prepares recommendations for direction of the program.

Specifically:

1. The Section Chief, under the policy direction of Staff Chief, and administratively reporting to Branch Chief, provides administrative and technical supervision to Questioned Document Analysts in the Section and continually insures that their technical competence is maintained. The Section Chief reviews requests for analysis of documents and contents, establishes priorities for use of Section Personnel and suggests available external facilities for analysis or research.

2. Studies developments in Analysis and evaluation of documents and their contents as done by other Federal Agencies (FBI, Post Office, Treasury, Insurance Corporations, Private Practitioners in the Questioned Document Analysis field and Clinical Psychologists. Initiated inter-agency collaboration on use of technical facilities and indices of characteristics of paper and writing materials.

3. Makes review of recommendations of Document Analysts, Consultants, and Contract Employees engaged in analytical and projective studies, determines courses of action for additional research, confers with case officers and program leaders on the availability of additional data, time limits, operational potentials, etc., to develop additional facts of problems to be employed or to make final recommendations on the contents, validity, possible origination and processing of documents subject to study.

4. a. As advisor and consultant to major component program officials, provides authoritative material on the potential of identification involving documents and other physical items, makes periodic evaluations of case history records and provides other technical documentation service as may be required.

(Continued on Page 2)

1946 to 1953 - Worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master Sargeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC school and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC school and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945 to 1946 - Held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100 man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941 to 1943 - Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939 to 1940 - Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California

1935 to 1939 - Lumber Industry, California

Additional Information upon request.

Herman Edward Kimsey
3700 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. 20016
Telephone FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I **Personal**
Age 46 - Married - No Children

II **Education**
a - Grammar School - Oregon & California
b - Junior High School - Oregon & California
c - High School - Oregon & California
d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

III **Special School and Training Courses**
a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942
c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California, 1946.
d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust), Klamath National Forest, California, 1946
e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

IV **Empirical Background**
1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING ITEM 19

19. EXPERIENCE (Start with your PRESENT position and work back)

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1

Dates of employment (month, year) From Unemployed To present time

Exact title of position

Number and kind of employees you supervise

Salary or earnings Starting $ per Present $ per

Classification Grade (If in Federal service)

Place of employment (City & State)

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work NOT APPLICABLE

2

Dates of employment (month, year) From 23 Mar. '53 To 30 Sept. '62

Exact title of position Intelligence Off. (Sec Chief)

Number and kind of employees you supervised 5 Analysts

Salary or earnings Starting $ 5,060.00 per annum Final $11,415.00 per annum

Classification Grade (If in Federal service) GS-13 Step 4

Place of employment (City & State) Washington, D. C.

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) U. S. Govt.

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
ATTENTION: Frank G. Johns

Reason for leaving Reduction in force. Small section assimilated by 3 larger branches, and

Description of work my slot and grade eliminated.

SEE ATTACHED JOB DESCRIPTION AS APPROVED BY CIA
Also Attachment I

3

Dates of employment (month, year) From 29 Nov. '46 To 20 Mar. '53

Exact title of position Special Agent CIC

Number and kind of employees you supervised 0-5 Technicians

Salary or earnings Starting $ 900.00 per annum Final $3300.00 per annum

Classification Grade (If in Federal service) M/Sgt. (E-7)

Place of employment (City & State) Ft. Holabird, Md.

Kind of business or organization (Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) U. S. Army CIC

Name and address of employer (firm, organization, etc.)
Investigative Control Section
AC of S - G-2, Ft. Holabird, Maryland

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Willard F. Dougherty, Maj., Inf.
add. unknown (last supervisor)

Reason for leaving Better Job.

Description of work Under Investigative Control Section, A. C. of S., G-2, Ft. Holabird, Md.; Enlisted Chief of Tech. Lab.; Instructor in Basic Agent Course; Member of Combat CIC Team, Korea; Student in Basic Course and 2 Instructor Guidance Courses; Enlisted Chief of Special Projects, [illegible] Laboratory. [illegible] Investigated crimes of security nature. (As Lab. chief, specialized in Questioned Document Analysis.)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 57-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

● ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

20. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS

A. Kind of License or Certificate (For example, pilot, teacher, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.) None	B. State or other licensing authority	C. Year of first license or certificate	D. Year of latest license or certificate
E. Special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use. (For example, short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, transcribing machine, scientific or professional devices) Industrial machinery (lumber) including Diesel locomotive (small); Forensic Laboratory equipment (questioned documents); Identi-Kit [illegible]; Tech. [illegible]		F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing N. A.	Shorthand N. A.
G. Special qualifications not covered in application. (For example, your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested); your patents or inventions; public speaking and publication experience; membership in professional or scientific societies, etc.; and honors and fellowships received) Suggested and directed development of the Identi-Kit System; Member of IAI; Over 200 lecture hours at CIC School; Co-author of CIC Manual and rewrote 2 others; wrote 3 articles and 1 technical book review for "Studies in Intelligence".			

21. EDUCATION

A. Place "X" in column indicating highest grade completed

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
											X

B. If you graduated from high school, give date: USAFI 1935 (GED-1947)

C. Name and location of last high school attended: McCloud High School, McCloud, California

D. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended: From	Dates attended: To	Years completed: Day	Years completed: Night	Credit hours: Semester	Credit hours: Quarter	Degree received	Year received
None								

E. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit	F. Chief graduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit
None					

G. State major field of study at highest level of college work: College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

H. Other schools or training (for example, trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Chemical Warfare Sch., 103rd Inf. Div.School - Camp Claiborne, La., 1 June 1943
Counter Intelligence Corps Basic Course, Fort Holabird, Md., 28 May 1947; Instructors Guidance Courses, Ft. Holabird, Maryland, 26 September 1947 and again 17 April 1952.

22. FOREIGN TRAVEL

Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," give in Item 19 names of countries, dates and length of time spent there and nature or purpose (military service, business, education or vacation).

23. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Enter foreign language and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper column	Reading: Exc.	Reading: Good	Reading: Fair	Speaking: Exc.	Speaking: Good	Speaking: Fair	Understanding: Exc.	Understanding: Good	Understanding: Fair	Writing: Exc.	Writing: Good	Writing: Fair
None												

24. REFERENCES

List three persons living in the United States or territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, and State)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Albert W. Somerford (Lt. Col., Ret.)	Clarksburg, Maryland	Dir. Bur. of Iden. Lab., P. O. Dept
Joseph H. English	19 [illegible] Drive Silver Spring, Maryland	Ques. Doc. Analyst FBI Laboratory
Henry C. Newton Brig. Gen. [illegible] (Ret.	601 Patrick Henry Drive Falls Church, Virginia	Dir. Mil. Assis. Institute

ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States of America? If "No" give country of which you are a citizen	X	
26. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or any Communist organization?		X
27. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X
If your answer to 26 and/or 27 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See Instruction Sheet.)		
28. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
29. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
30. Have you ever had tuberculosis? *If your answer to 28, 29, or 30 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
31. Have you ever been barred by the U.S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointment? *(If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for each debarment in Item 39.)*		X
32. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
33. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
34. Are you an official or employee of any State, territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
35. Have you ever been discharged (fired) from employment for any reason?	X	
36. Have you ever resigned (quit) after being informed that your employer intended to discharge (fire) you for any reason? *If your answer to 35 or 36 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39. Show the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with statements made in Item 19—Experience.*		X
37. Have you ever been arrested, taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning, or charged by any law enforcement authority? (You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less; and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)		X
38. While in the military service were you ever arrested for an offense which resulted in a trial by deck court or by summary, special, or general court-martial? *If your answer to 37 or 38 is "Yes," give details in Item 39, showing for each incident: (1) date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) law enforcing authority or type of court or court martial, and (5) action taken.*		X

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. *Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*

Item No.		Item No.	
22	Japan, Military Service, 1948-9,	35	Because of bad eyes. When this was
	1950-1; Korea, Military Service		corrected, I returned to the same job
	1950-1; Panama 1959, Peru, 1959;		under the same supervisor - brakeman on
	Japan 1962; Hong Kong, 1962;		a diesel locomotive
	Thailand, 1962; Taipei, 1962,		

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach an inside of this application.

Okinawa, 1962.

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

A false or dishonest answer to any question in this application may be grounds for rating you ineligible for Federal employment, or for dismissing you after appointment, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements made in the application are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All information will be considered in determining your present fitness for Federal employment.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Signature of applicant ______________________ Date ______________

(Sign in ink)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57
REVISED MARCH 1961
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

57-103

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT NO.

1. Kind of position applied for, or name of examination
Announcement No.

2. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in examination announcement)*

3. Primary place(s) of employment applied for *(City and State)*

4. Name *(First, middle, maiden, if any, last)* Mr. Mrs. Miss Herman Edward Kinsey

5. Address *(Number, Street, City, Zone, State)*
3700 Mass. Ave., N. W. Washington, D. C
or c/o W. S. Linebarger, Box 407
Mt. Shasta, California HA-6-4646

6. Home phone PE-8-6400

7. Office phone 351-3295

8. Legal or voting residence *(State)* District of Columbia

9. Height without shoes 5 feet 11 inches

10. Weight 200 lbs.

11. Sex ☒ Male ☐ Female

12. Marital status ☒ Married ☐ Single *(Incl. widowed, divorced)*

13. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)* Gallup, McKinley County, New Mexico

14. Birth date *(Month, day, year)* December 11, 1916

15. Social Security Number 556 10 4750

16. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government, indicate last grade and job title:
GS-13, Intelligence Officer (Section Chief) (Step 4) (GS-14 Slot)
Dates of service in that grade
From 12 Feb. 1957 To 20 September 1962

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of
Examining Office Only

☐ Appvr.
☐ Nonappvr.

Material
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Entered Register:

Notations:

App. Reviewed:

App. Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and date				

17. AVAILABILITY INFORMATION

A. Lowest grade or pay you will accept
$ Per
or grade OPEN

B. Will you accept temporary appointment? *(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)* ☒ Yes ☐ No If "Yes," indicate by "X" in appropriate box or boxes.
☒ 1 mo. or less ☒ 1 to 4 months ☒ 4 to 12 months

C. Will you accept less than full-time employment (less than 40 hours per week)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

D. Are you willing to travel? ☐ Not at all ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently

E. Will you accept employment: In Washington, D.C.? ☒ Yes ☐ No Outside U.S.? ☒ Yes ☐ No

F. Will you accept appointment only in certain locations? ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," list locations:

18. ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Number
19 May 1941	5 Nov. 1943	U. S. Army	RA 39020108
29 Nov. 1945	8 Oct. 1949		
5 Jan. 1950	20 Mar. 1953		

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed forces under other than honorable conditions?
☐ Yes *(Give details in Item 37)* ☒ No

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on wartime military service? ☐ Yes ☒ No

D. Do you claim 5-point preference based on service during peacetime campaign? ☐ Yes *(Complete and attach Standard Form 15)* ☒ No

E. Do you claim 10-point preference? ☐ Yes ☒ No *If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Veteran Preference Claim"* TYPE ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐ Mother

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information given in answer to Question 18 has been verified with the discharge certificate and/or other proof which shows that the separation was under honorable conditions.

VETERAN PREFERENCE ALLOWED ☐ 5 point ☐ 10 point Comp. Disab. ☐ Other 10 point ☐ None

Signature and title

Agency

Date

PLEASE BE SURE TO READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING ITEM 19

19. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From Unemployed To present time

Exact title of position

Number and kind of employees you supervise

Salary or earnings Starting $ per Present $ per

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)*

Place of employment *(City & State)*

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work NOT APPLICABLE

2

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 23 Mar. '53 To 20 Sept. '62

Exact title of position Intelligence Off. (Sec Chief)

Number and kind of employees you supervised 4 Analysts

Salary or earnings Starting $ 5,060.00 per annum Final $11,415.00 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)* GS-13 Step 4

Place of employment *(City & State)* Washington, D. C.

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* U. S. Govt.

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Chief, Personnel Operations Division
ATTENTION: Frank G. Johns

Reason for leaving Reduction in Force. Small section assimilated by 3 larger branches, and

Description of work my slot and grade eliminated.

SEE ATTACHED JOB DESCRIPTION AS APPROVED BY CIA
Also Attachment 1

3

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 29 Nov. '48 To 20 Mar. '53

Exact title of position Special Agent CIC

Number and kind of employees you supervised G-5 Technician

Salary or earnings Starting $ 900.00 per annum Final $3300.00 per annum

Classification Grade *(If in Federal service)* M/Sgt. (E-7)

Place of employment *(City & State)* Ft. Holabird, Md.

Kind of business or organization, *(Manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* U. S. Army CIC

Name and address of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)*
Investigative Control Section
AC of S - G-2, Ft. Holabird, Maryland

Name, title, and present address of immediate supervisor
Millard F. Dougherty, Maj., Inf.
add. unknown (last supervisor)

Reason for leaving Better Job

Description of work Under Investigative Control Section, A. C. of S., G-2, Ft. Holabird, Md.; Enlisted Chief of Tech. Lab.; Instructor in Basic Agent Course; Member of Combat CIC Team, Korea; Student in Basic Course and 2 Instructor Guidance Courses; Enlisted Chief of Special Projects, Tech. Laboratory., Far East; Investigated crimes of security nature. (As lab. chief, specialized in Questioned Document Analysis.)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 57-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

4. 15 April 1945 - 1 October 1946 Camp Superintendent 100 employees, laborers

$2694 per annum
$3021 per annum SP-7
Yreka, California U. S. Forest Service

U. S. Forest Service, Yreka, California Art London, % USFS, Ykreka, California

Enlist in Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army

Supervised 100-man forest camp for the purpose of controlling timber disease.

5. 5 November 1943 - 15 April 1945 Laborer None

$0.90 per hour
$1.10 per hour Unknown McCloud, California Lumber,

McCloud River Lumber Company, McCloud, California- James Herbert, McCloud, Calif.

Return to the United States Forest Service.

Operated lumber carrier and brakeman on small diesel locomotive.

6. 19 May 1941 to 5 November 1943 Sergeant MOS 631 up to 14 Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence NCO
Combat Intelligence

$21.00 per month
$75.00 per month
Sergeant Continental Limits of.United States U. S. Army
Supervisor - Unknown

U. S. Army

Honorable Discharge

Supervised S-2 Section in Brigade HQ for the purpose of collection and evaluation of information on the subject of enemy military operations.

7. 1 May 1939 to 10 May 1941 - Forest Guard None

$100 per month Unknown McCloud, California U. S. Forest Service

United States Forest Service
McCloud, California
Earl Sullaway, McCloud, California

Enlisted in the U. S. Army under draft requirement but not yet called for service.

Prevention and Suppression of forest fires.

8. January 1935 to May 1939 Laborer

Laborer in lumber , oil industry.

Herman Edward Kimsey
3700 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. 20016
Telephone FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I Personal

Age 46 - Married - No Children

II Education

a - Grammar School - Oregon & California
b - Junior High School - Oregon & California
c - High School - Oregon & California
d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

III Special School and Training Courses

a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942
c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta National Forest, California, 1946.
d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust), Klamath National Forest, California, 1946
e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

IV Empirical Background

1962 to Present - Associated as a technical consultant with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C., specializing in commercial and industrial security.

1953 to 1962 - Intelligence with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency, GS-13, $11,415. As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for the following: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous others engaged in police and intelligence work. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

1946 to 1953 - Worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master Sargeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC school and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC school and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945 to 1946 - Held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100 man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941 to 1943 - Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939 to 1940 - Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California

1935 to 1939 - Lumber Industry, California

Additional Information upon request.

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The analysis and Research Section is responsible for advisory, developmental and service work in the field of Questioned Document Analysis in support of overt and covert activities of the Agency. This includes technical testing and research into handwriting and document evaluation or authentication.

The Section Chief directs the assignments of projects, studies developments in scientific fields supporting authentication work, advises Agency officials on the current and long range capabilities in authentication or evaluation of documents and prepares recommendations for direction of the program.

Specifically:

1. The Section Chief, under the policy direction of Staff Chief, and administratively reporting to Branch Chief, provides administrative and technical supervision to Questioned Document Analysts in the Section and continually insures that their technical competence is maintained. The Section Chief reviews requests for analysis of documents and contents, establishes priorities for use of Section Personnel and suggests available external facilities for analysis or research.

2. Studies developments in Analysis and evaluation of documents and their contents as done by other Federal Agencies (FBI, Post Office, Treasury, Insurance Corporations, Private Practitioners in the Questioned Document Analysis field and Clinical Psychologists. Initiated inter-agency collaboration on use of technical facilities and indices of characteristics of paper and writing materials.

3. Makes review of recommendations of Document Analysts, Consultants, and Contract Employees engaged in analytical and projective studies, determines courses of action for additional research, confers with case officers and program leaders on the availability of additional data, time limits, operational potentials, etc., to develop additional facts of problems to be employed or to make final recommendations on the contents, validity, possible origination and processing of documents subject to study.

4. a. As advisor and consultant to major component program officials, provides authoritative material on the potential of identification involving documents and other physical items, makes periodic evaluations of case history records and provides other technical documentation service as may be required.

(Continued on Page 2)

Herman Edward Kimsey

December 11, 1916

4. 15 April 1945 - 1 October 1946 Camp Superintendent 100 employees, laborers
$2694 per annum
$3021 per annum SP-7
Yreka, California U. S. Forest Service

U. S. Forest Service, Yreka, California Art London, ℅ USFS, Yreka, California

Enlist in Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army

Supervised 100-man forest camp for the purpose of controlling timber disease.

5. 5 November 1943 - 15 April 1945 Laborer None
$0.90 per hour
$1.10 per hour Unknown McCloud, California Lumber

McCloud River Lumber Company, McCloud, California- James Herbert, McCloud, Calif.

Return to the United States Forest Service.

Operated lumber carrier and brakeman on small diesel locomotive.

6. 19 May 1941 to 5 November 1943 Sergeant MOS 631 up to 14 Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence NCO
Combat Intelligence
$21.00 per month Sergeant Continental Limits of.United States U. S. Army
$75.00 per month Supervisor - Unknown

U. S. Army

Honorable Discharge

Supervised S-2 Section in Brigade HQ for the purpose of collection and evaluation of information on the subject of enemy military operations.

7. 1 May 1939 to 10 May 1941 - Forest Guard None

$100 per month Unknown McCloud, California U. S. Forest Service

United States Forest Service Earl Sullaway, McCloud, California
McCloud, California

Enlisted in the U. S. Army under draft requirement but not yet called for service.

Prevention and Suppression of forest fires.

8. January 1935 to May 1939 Laborer

Laborer in lumber [illegible] oil industry.

Herman Edward Kimsey

Questioned Document Analyst (Continued) December 11, 1916

b. Participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

Per request from Training, periodically briefs Foreign Intelligence Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the question document problem.

II SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from the customers
and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and
other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish
guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in
the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required
as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in
offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommen-
dations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and per-
sonnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on
the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefits to Agency technical
services to intelligence efforts.

III QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standatds developed for the GS-1397.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

ATTACH SUPPLEMENTAL SHEETS OR FORMS HERE

● ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

20. SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND SKILLS

A. Kind of license or certificate *(For example, pilot, teacher, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.)* None	B. State or other licensing authority	C. Year of first license or certificate	D. Year of latest license or certificate
E. Special skills you possess and machines and equipment you can use. *(For example, short wave radio, multilith, comptometer, key punch, turret lathe, transcribing machine, scientific or professional devices)* Industrial machinery (lumber) including Diesel Locomotive (small); Forensic Laboratory equipment (questioned document); Identi-Kit Opn.; Tech. Intelligence Equipment.		F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing N. A.	Shorthand N. A.

G. Special qualifications not covered in application. *(For example, your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested), your patents or inventions; public speaking and publications experience, membership in professional or scientific societies, etc., and honors and fellowships received.)*

Suggested and directed development of the Identi-Kit System; Member of IAI; Over 200 lecture hours at CIC School; Co-author of CIC Manual and rewrote 2 others; wrote 3 articles and 1 technical book review for "Studies in Intelligence".

21. EDUCATION

A. Place "X" in column indicating highest grade completed

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
											X

B. If you graduated from high school, give date: USAFI 1935 (GED-1947)

C. Name and location of last high school attended: McCloud High School McCloud, California

D. Name and location of college or university	Dates attended From	Dates attended To	Years completed Day	Years completed Night	Credit hours Semester	Credit hours Quarter	Degree received	Year received
None								

E. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit	F. Chief graduate college subjects	Semester Hours Credit	Quarter Hours Credit
None					

G. State major field of study at highest level of college work: College Level GED (USAFI) 1948

H. Other schools or training *(For example, trade, vocational, Armed Forces, or business)*. Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Chemical Warfare Sch., 103rd Inf. Div.School - Camp Claiborne, La., 1 June 1943
Counter Intelligence Corps Basic Course, Fort Holabird, Md., 28 May 1947; Instructors Guidance Courses, Ft. Holabird, Maryland, 26 September 1947 and again 17 April 1952.

22. FOREIGN TRAVEL

Have you lived or traveled in any foreign countries?

☒ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," give in Item 39 names of countries, dates and length of time spent there and reason or purpose (military service, business, education, or vacation).

23. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Enter foreign language and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper column	Reading Exc.	Reading Good	Reading Fair	Speaking Exc.	Speaking Good	Speaking Fair	Understanding Exc.	Understanding Good	Understanding Fair	Writing Exc.	Writing Good	Writing Fair
None												

24. REFERENCES

List three persons living in the United States or territories of the United States who are NOT RELATED TO YOU AND WHO HAVE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 19

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, Zone, and State)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Albert W. Somerford (Lt. Col., Ret.)	Clarksburg, Maryland	Dir. Bur. of Iden. Lab., P. G. Dept
Joseph M. English	13 Eastmoor Drive Silver Spring, Maryland	Ques. Doc. Analyst FBI Laboratory
Henry C. Newton Brig. Gen. USA (Ret.)	601 Patrick Henry Drive Falls Church, Virgin	Dir. Mil. Assis. Institute

ANSWER QUESTIONS BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COL.	YES	NO
25. Are you a citizen of the United States of America? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen:	X	
26. Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., the Communist Political Association, the Young Communist League, or any Communist organization?		X
27. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		X.
If your answer to 26 and/or 27 above is "Yes," state on a separate sheet attached to and made a part of this application the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities. (See Instruction Sheet.)		
28. Have you any physical handicap, chronic disease, or other disability?		X
29. Have you ever had a nervous breakdown?		X
30. Have you ever had tuberculosis?		X
If your answer to 28, 29, or 30 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39.		
31. Have you ever been barred by the U.S. Civil Service Commission from taking examinations or accepting civil service appointment? *(If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.)*		X
32. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage) with whom you live or have lived within the past 24 months? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name; (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) department or agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment.*		X
33. Do you receive or have you applied for an annuity from the United States or District of Columbia Government under any retirement act or any pension or other compensation for military or naval service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
34. Are you an official or employee of any State, territory, county, or municipality? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39.*		X
35. Have you ever been discharged (fired) from employment *for any reason?*	X	
36. Have you ever resigned (quit) after being informed that your employer intended to discharge (fire) you for any reason?		X
If your answer to 35 or 36 above is "Yes," give details in Item 39. Show the name and address of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with statements made in Item 19—Experience.		
37. Have you ever been arrested, taken into custody, held for investigation or questioning, or charged by any law enforcement authority? (You may omit: (1) Traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less, and (2) anything that happened before your 16th birthday. All other incidents must be included, even though they were dismissed or you merely forfeited collateral.)		X
38. While in the military service were you ever arrested for an offense which resulted in a trial by deck court or by summary, special, or general court-martial?		X
If your answer to 37 or 38 is "Yes," give details in Item 39, showing for each incident: (1) date, (2) charge, (3) place, (4) law enforcing authority or type of court or court-martial, and (5) action taken.		

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. *Indicate item numbers to which answers apply.*

Item No.		Item No.	
22	Japan, Military Service, 1948-9,	35	Because of bad eyes. When this was
	1950-1; Korea, Military Service		corrected, I returned to the same job
	1950-1; Panama 1959, Peru, 1959;		under the same supervisor - brakeman on
	Japan 1962; Hong Kong, 1962;		a diesel locomotive
	Thailand, 1962; Taipei, 1962,		

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, date of birth, and examination title. Attach on inside of this application.

Okinawa, 1962.

ATTENTION: READ THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING THIS APPLICATION

A false or dishonest answer to any question in this application may be grounds for rating you ineligible for Federal employment, or for dismissing you after appointment, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements made in the application are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All information will be considered in determining your present fitness for Federal employment.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.

Signature of applicant ______________________________ Date ______________

(Sign in ink)

RESUME

Herman Edward Kimsey
3700 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
Telephone: FEderal 8-6400

PERSONAL

Age: 46
Marital Status: Married, no children

EDUCATION

Grammar School - Oregon and California
Junior High School - Oregon and California
High School - Oregon and California
College Level GED (USAFI) 1948
Special Schools and Training Courses:

1. U.S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
2. U.S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942.
3. U.S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California, 1945.
4. U.S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control(Blister Rust) Klamath National Forest, California, 1946.
5. U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
6. Instructor Guidance Course, U.S. Army CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1947 and again in 1952.

EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

From 1962 to present, I have been associated, as a technical consultant, with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C. specializing in commercial and industrial security.

From 1953 to 1962, I was an Intelligence Officer with the U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency (Annual Salary $11,415, GS-13). As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for: the direction and administration of the branch operations; determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U.S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained liaison with other U.S. Government components; activated and directed research projects carried out by private organizations such as universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed numerous other agencies engaged in police and intelligence.

I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency.

From 1946 to 1953, I worked as a Special Agent(MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master/Sergeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory(CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two textbooks for the CIC School and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC School and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945-1946 I held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100-man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U.S. Forest Service, California.
1941-1943 Military Service, U.S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.
1939-1940 Forest Guard, U.S, Forest Service, California
1935-1939 Lumber Industry, California
Additional information upon request

Herman Edward Kimsey
37 Massachusetts Ave., N. W.
Washington 16, D. C. (20016)
Telephone FEderal 8-6400

RESUME

I Personal -

Age 46 - Married - No Children.

II Education -

- a - Grammar School - Oregon & California.
- b - Junior High School - Oregon & California.
- c - High School - Oregon & California.
- d - College Level GED (USAFI) 1948.

III Special Schools and Training Courses -

- a - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control and Prevention, Shasta, National Forest, California; 1939 and again in 1940.
- b - U. S. Army Chemical Warfare School for Instructors, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, 1942.
- c - U. S. Forest Service School for Fire Control & Prevention, Shasta, National Forest California, 1945.
- d - U. S. Forest School for Timber Disease Control (Blister Rust) Klamath National Forest, California, 1946.
- e - U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corp School for Special Agents, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1946 and 1947.
- f - Instructor Guidance Course, U. S. Army CIC School, Fort Holabird, Maryland - 1947 and again in 1952.

IV Empirical Background -

From 1962 to present, I have been associated, as a technical consultant, with Security Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C. specializing in commercial and industrial security.

From 1953 to 1962, I was an Intelligence Officer with U. S. Government, Central Intelligence Agency (Annual Salary - $11,415 - GS-13). As Chief of a small branch of highly specialized analysts, I exercised a wide variety of talents and was responsible for: the direction and administration of the branch operations, determined the course of action for further research effort within the branch; monitored and supervised a program of special personnel assessment; evaluated technical analyses and their relationship to specific cases; advised and consulted with members of Senior Staff components of CIA; delivered numerous technical briefings to both U. S. and foreign police and intelligence services; initiated and maintained liaison with other U. S. Government components; activated and directed research projects carried out by private organizations such as Universities, private consultants, and private research corporations. During the above period, I trained and briefed the police and intelligence agencies of more than 50 foreign countries and actually traveled and worked in 6 foreign countries. I also initiated and developed four technical systems currently in operation on a world-wide basis within CIA and wrote numerous articles for an intelligence periodical. In January 1962, CIA presented me with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that agency.

From 1946 to 1953, I worked as a Special Agent (MOS-1301) in the Army's Counter Intelligence Corp in the grade of Master/Sergeant. My duties consisted of investigating crimes of security nature; member of a combat CIC team in Korea; two assignments as an instructor at the basic CIC School; enlisted Chief of the Technical Laboratory at the CIC Center, and enlisted Chief of Special Projects Technical Laboratory (CIC), Far East Command. During this period, I co-authored two text books for the CIC School and rewrote one other. Further, I experienced over 2,000 lecture hours as an instructor in the basic CIC School and lived and worked three years in two foreign countries.

1945-1946 I held the position of Camp Superintendent of a 100-man forest camp engaged in timber disease control, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1941-1943 Military Service, U. S. Army, Intelligence NCO, MOS 631, Combat Intelligence.

1939-1940 Forest Guard, U. S. Forest Service, California.

1935-1939 Lumber Industry, California.

Additional information upon request.

Norman Edward Kinsey

Dec. 11, 1916

b. Section Chief participated in establishing document analysis facilities in foreign governments and present plans call for continuation of this TDY consulting and advisory work.

c. Per request from Training, Section Chief periodically briefs Foreign Intell. Services and Agency personnel. These briefings cover general capabilities of the Section and are intended to inform the student of the questioned document problem.

II. SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

The Section Chief receives technical requests directly from customers and advises them and the Branch Chief on the technical problems, personnel, and other requirements for making determinations. Staff and Branch Chiefs establish guides on administrative matters. Review of accomplishments can only be made in the light of the customers application of evaluation results. Decisions required as a result of Section work are usually "Eyes Only" for customers application in offices of Senior Staffs of the major components in the Agency. The recommendations for participation in setting technical standards for mechanical and personnel identification methods or in financing such activity would be evaluated on the basis of the incumbent's evaluation of potential benefit to Agency technical services to intelligence efforts.

III. QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED:

Qualifications for this position will be written in the preliminary Qualification Standards developed for the GS-1397.01, Document Analyst title, upgraded by Civil Service Commission Hearing, to GS-14, 1958.

SECERT

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

Republican National Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In) [illegible]

NAME Kinsey, Herman Edward	Title, Grade & Salary [illegible] 55-14	Office & Extension TSD	DOB [illegible]	EOD 3/53	LWD 30 Apr 62	Type Referral 101
Reference Data Resigned [illegible] 1962						OP Interviewer [illegible]

Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)
4/28/62	Kinsey brought in copy of SF [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] knows what he wants & promised to check back [illegible]
Sept 3 64	Subject came in late 1963 and was given assistance in filing for FAME and he qualified at a grade 13/14 level. He was re.ered to xxkxxx several jobs and I have just been informed that he has taken a position with the Republican National Committee as assistant security officer.
Nov 1964	Subject called to advixx me that since the republicans had been beaten that he was out of a job.
Dec 1965	Called Mr Kinsey and refered him to The Plaza hotel in New York for a position as security officer. I called the personnel officer of the hotel and told him of Mr Kinsey's qualifications and set up an appointment for and interview. Mr Kinsey went for the interview and was offered the position whicj paid $1.60 per hour and meals. at that time he was being considered for another position and xxx acked time to consider offer.
Jan 14 1965	Contacted Mr Kinsey to see if he had made up his mind about the job in NY as I had some one else to refer. He advised me that he was being considered for position as security officer with the Republican National Committee and he would know after they met in Chicago Jan 22/
1/29/65	I hear from him periodically - So far [illegible] he is now trying private industry.

201-[illegible]

3-62

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

NAME	Title, Grade & Salary	Office & Extension	DOB	EOD	LWD	Type Referral
Reference Data						OP Interviewer

Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

3-62

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

NAME
Kimsey, Herman E.

Title, Grade & Salary
Section Chief 13

Office & Extension
TSD/PARB X 2009
Analytics Sect.

DOB
12/18

EOD
4?/53

LWD

Type Referral
1:1

Reference Data

Question
TSD - photo analyst -

[illegible] photo [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

CP Interviewer
Cook

Date of Interview	Details of Out Placement (Including Cover & Security Data)
22 March 62	Saw Lott + Clinkscale. Thinks there is a good chance of this situation. Has good background in photo identification, CIC work etc. Has written several books in field. Knows [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible] [illegible]. Contact at NSA. Lives at Alton Texas. Will draft job statement + charts [illegible]
2 [illegible] July	Did not see this man - he slipped out before we could catch him. MED

OUT PLACEMENT INTERVIEW RECORD

3-62

(See Reverse)

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

X

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 25 January 1962

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, RECORDS AND SERVICES DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT

ATTN:

REF:

ESTABLISHED FOR: ZIDSEY, Herman E.

FILE NO.: K-8689

ID CARD NO.:

MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED

☒ BLOCK RECORDS:
(HR 20-800-1)

a. TEMPORARILY FOR 30 DAYS, EFFECTIVE 19 January 1962

b. CONTINUING, EFFECTIVE

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO 3.
(HR 20-800-2)

☐ ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED.
(HR 20-661-1)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER.
(R 240-250)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY.
(R 240-250)

☐ REMARKS:

[illegible]

☐ COPY TO

Robert E. Young
CHIEF, MILITARY COVER SEC

DISTRIBUTION: 1 RSD DO 1 FSD OS 1 WEB COMPT

FORM 12-61 1551 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(13-20-43)

GS 13 3 $11,155 [illegible] 4 [illegible] 03/06/61

5. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form No. 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
D	KIMSEY HERMAN E	161555	44 49	GS-13 3	$10,370	$11,155

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS 6	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58	GS 13	3	$10,370	02	07	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS 6	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	02	10	57	GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JOSEPH F. MARZEN	10/7/58	Joseph F. Marzen

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
161555	KIMSEY HERMAN E	DDP/TSS	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 13	1	$ 9,890	02	10	57	GS 13	2	$10,130	08	10	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK HH

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

C.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
KIMSEY HERMAN E	161555	GS-13-1	$ 8,990	$ 9,890

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

ADM: 20 SEPT 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 061555
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): KIMSEY HERMAN E
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: TERMINATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. DA. YR. 09 20 62 (1130)
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 3276 1064 1000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP TSD
AUTHENTICATION
GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION BRANCH
ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: DOCUMENT TECH CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0658
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1397.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 11415
18. REMARKS:

TERMINATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF CIA REGULATION 20-27, SEPARATION OF SURPLUS PERSONNEL, PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONTAINED IN SECTION 102 (C) OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED. THIS TERMINATION DOES NOT AFFECT YOUR RIGHT TO SEEK OR ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT IN ANY OTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IF YOU ARE DECLARED ELIGIBLE FOR SUCH EMPLOYMENT BY THE U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 12 11 16
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1GT0003
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR | RESV | PROV | TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

AUTHORIZED MAXIMUM SEPARATION COMPENSATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF CIA REGULATION 20-32, SEPARATION COMPENSATION.

POSTED
10-3-62

FORM 4-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

lg 9/21/62

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EWS: 13 MAY 1960

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.: 161555
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): KIMSEY HERMAN E
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 12 Da. 11 Yr. 16
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 03 Da. 23 Yr. 53
7. SD: Mo. 08 Da. 07 Yr. 42
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. 03 Da. 23 Yr. 53
13. Fed. Serv. Credit, LCD (Yes-1, No-2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDP TSS
AUTHENTICATION
GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION DIV
ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH BRANCH
Code:
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code:
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 2
17. Position Title: IO TECH AIDS
18. Position No.: 0092
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.63
21. Grade & Step: 13 3
22. Salary Or Rate: $10370
23. SD: D
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
25. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number: 0225 1005 1000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 05 Da. 15 Yr. 60
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDP TSS
AUTHENTICATION
GRAPHIC ARTS REPRODUCTION BRANCH
ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH SECTION
Code: 4449
32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6): Code 2
34. Position Title: DOCUMENT TECH CH
35. Position No.: 0658
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 1397.01
38. Grade & Step: 13 3
39. Salary Or Rate: $10370
40. SD: D
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 02 Da. 10 Yr. 57
42. PSI Due: Mo. 08 Da. 06 Yr. 61
43. Appropriation Number: 0225 1005 1000
44. Remarks:

POSTED
IK

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible]

SECRET

(4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PART)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ars

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. HERMAN E. KIMSEY 161555	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 February 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) PROMOTION 30	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 10 Feb 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	IO Tech Aids BY-92
GS-0136.63-12 $7735.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.63-13 $8990.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 444952	DDP/TSS Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT	
				WIFE	OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-OT

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION: W FROM: 7-2725-20 TO: Same 750-13

1

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 03/23/53

POSTED
5 FEB 1957 SS

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

MJ 2/4/57

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 7-2[illegible]-29

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) [illegible]

6. Grade and salary GS-12 $7570

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s) TSS-6

12. Prepared by lp 25 Oct 56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better
16 Dec 5	19 Jun 55	$7570	$7785	Service and conduct are satisfactory. David M. Richards (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (3 PARTS)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman E. Kimsey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 17 Jun 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 June 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
UY-92-11	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (Tech Aids) UY-92
GS-0136.63-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.63-12 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Authentication Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	DISP.	10-POINT OTHER	10-POINT DISAB.
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	C. A.	REAL.	
				[illegible]

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-7515-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
6/22/55 GL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING
Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-O-812738

MJ 6/10/55

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. [illegible] F. [illegible]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 [illegible] 1914	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 17 May 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 22 May 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 5[illegible] 103 J

FROM		TO
IO ([illegible] ATHE) [illegible] 92-11	8. POSITION TITLE	[illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible] 92-11
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	[illegible]-11 [illegible].00 p/a
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	[illegible] Auth. [illegible] Division Analysis [illegible] Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	[illegible]	[illegible]

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-2515-20 TO:	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: [illegible]

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

[illegible] T/O

[illegible]
25 MAY 1955

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING: OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

ale 5/15/55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman F. Kinsey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 25 Feb 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 27 Feb 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE	Technologist BY 93		I.O. (Tech Aids) BY 92-11
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.01-11		GS-0136.63-11 $5940.00 per annum
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Division Analysis and Research Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. / 10-POINT: DISAB. / OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / R. A. / REA. — SD-DY

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 5-2515-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
2/28/55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Jan

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Mr. Herman E. Kinsey	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 7 May 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 9 May 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BY 93-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Technologist BY 93
GS-1390.01-9 $5195.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.01-11 $5940.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Technical Services Staff Graphic Arts Reproduction Div. Analysis & Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WITH	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			XXXX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.R.	REAL.

SD-DT

~~CD-TS~~

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2515-20 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

5-5-57

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. – MISS – MRS. – ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Harman E. Kinney
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 20 Apr. 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 25 Apr. 1954
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Tech Projects Of NY 256-9	8. POSITION TITLE	Technologist NY 93-9
GS-1390-9	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1390.01-9 $5135.00 per annum
Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div. Analysis & Research Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-TD

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2515-20
TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES – NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Calif.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4-23-54

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 937574

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay list.

3. Form/fund: 4-[illegible]-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): KIMSEY, Herman E.

6. Grade and salary: XXXXX GS-9 $5060.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s): DDP/TSB 5

12. Prepared by: dgo 9 Apr 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
28 Mar 54	23 Mar 53	$5060.00	$5185.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following period(s))
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In any [illegible] waiting period.
☐ [illegible] waiting period.

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 81, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
Security Information

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION pal

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Herman E. Kimsey
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11Dec.1916
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 29 Aug. 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 808
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Sept. 1953
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A6.116(b)

FROM		TO
TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9	8. POSITION TITLE	TECH PROJECTS OFF BY 256-9
GS 1390-9 $5060.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS 1390-9 $5060.00 per annum
DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TSS Graphic Arts Reproduction Div Office of the Chief
Washington D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD TS

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 3-2515-10 TO 3-2515-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds

Acting Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

SECRET
Security Information

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

[illegible] PERSONNEL ACTION

Page 35 of 35 pages.
6

(1) Staff or Division TSS (2) Date T/O Approved [illegible] (3) Effective date of Action [illegible]

(4) NAME	FROM (5) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NO. T	(8) ACTION	TO (9) ORG. INF. & POS TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NO. BY
DIVISION Special Assistance Division (Cont'd)					SPECIAL ASSISTANCE DIV.		
[illegible] BRANCH							
[illegible], [illegible]	Chemist	GS-12	239	B	Chemist	GS-1320-12	193
Lauchinger, Frank H.	Chemist	GS-7	242	B	Chemist	GS-1320-7	199
OPERATIONAL BRANCH							
High, Joe B.	Chemist	GS-12	243	B	Chemist	GS-1320-12	202
Lancer, Elizabeth S.	Trng Off-Tech Flds	GS-9	251	C	TRAINING Trng Off-Tech Flds	GS-1712-9	SA Trng
MISCELLANEOUS TECHNIQUES					SPECIAL ASSISTANCE DIV.		
* [illegible], Vincent	Seals Technician	GS-11	246	B	Seals Technician	GS-301-11	206
* [illegible], Herman E.	Seals Technician	GS-9	247	D	GRAPHICS ARTS [illegible] Tech Projects Off	GS-301-9	120 [illegible]

* Candidate in Process

(12) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Staff or Div. Chief

(13) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Class. & Wage Division

(14) APPROVED BY: [illegible]
Personnel Officer

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME KINSEY, Herman E[illegible]	DATE 30 August 1952
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted appointment	EFFECTIVE DATE 23 March 1953

	FROM	TO
TITLE		TECH. PROJ. OFF. BY-110 ~~[illegible] TECHNICIAN Y 247~~
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-301-9 $5060
OFFICE		Technical Services
DIVISION		GRAPHIC ARTS REP. DIV. ~~Special Assistance~~
BRANCH		Off. of Chief ~~Miscellaneous Techniques~~
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington D. C.

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR RW Muenster ROBERT W. MUENSTER	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☒

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 23 March 1953

SECURITY CLEARED ON 6 Feb. 1953

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 23 March 1953

accd.
25-15-10

SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REMARKS:

Subject is to be employed in a civilian capacity.

DOG: 03/23/53
CSEOD: 03/23/53
EOD: 03/23/53

POSTED
DE 26 Mar 53

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1948

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 9-10-2

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 61555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 December 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DOC TECH CH		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/A/GARB

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE ☒	MEMBER ☐	DEFERRED ☐
PENDING ☐	DECLINED ☐	DENIED ☐

9. TYPE OF REPORT

INITIAL ☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR ☐
ANNUAL ☒	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE ☐

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1962

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Dec 1960 - Dec 1961

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Section activities.	3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitoring the writing of and writing technical reports.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program.	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify)							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-55 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Kimsey possesses a wealth of knowledge in his technical field which, when skillfully and tactfully utilized, helps to increase the productive capability of his Section's activities.

This thorough knowledge of A&R activities enables him to present his oral briefings in an informative and interesting manner.

Subject has been downgraded in Specific Duty #1 from a "4" to a "3". The basis for the lower rating in this category warrants the following explanation. There have been numerous and reoccuring complaints from personnel under his supervision that he does not display a complete respect for their professional capabilities. This weakness has definitely decreased the morale of the personnel under his supervision. Mr. Marzen, Chief, TSD/GARB, has discussed all areas of weaknesses with the Ratee and pointed out how they affect the overall work aspects of this section of TSD/GARB.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 7 March 1962

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 58

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 March 1962	DC/TSD/GARB	Paul J. Szego Paul J. Szego

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This was not signed by Mr. Kimsey and was not forwarded in March 1962 as Mr. Kimsey was in the process of leaving as a result of the 701 action.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
13 February 1963	Chief, TSD/GARB	Joseph F. Marzen

SECRET
(When Filled In)

8 MAR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
61555

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY, Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE DOCUMENT TECH CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSD/AUTH/GARB		

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1961

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
Jan 1960 thru Dec 1960

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Section personnel	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Monitering the writing of and writing technical reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Moniters Graphology Program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):						X	

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject continues to perform his duties as Supervisor of the many complex A&R activities in a competent manner. His knowledge of the technical aspects of his Sections' many functions help to insure a continuation of work flow and his ability to absorb and retain technical data related to his field of endeavor serves as an aid in the presentations of his numerous oral briefings.

One apparent weakness, which he continues to retain, is in his work relations with technical personnel; he has a tendency to drift from main topic under discussion to unrelated subjects, which, while they may be informative, decreases not only the Subject's productive capability, but, also that of the technical personnel.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
31 January 1961	H. E. Kinsey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
46	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	DC/TSD/GARB/	Paul J. Szego PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
31 January 1961	Chief, TSD/GARB	Joseph F. Marzen JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

SECRET
When Filled In

Recorded Copy

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
161555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY, Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec. 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/GARD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS
☐ NOT ELIGIBLE ☒ MEMBER ☐ DEFERRED
☐ PENDING ☐ DECLINED ☐ DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD
From Jan 1959 to Jan 1960

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch personnel and activities	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefings	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government Questioned Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors Graphology Program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject's thorough technical knowledge of A&R activities qualifies him as a competent Supervisor. Since the last reporting period, he has delegated more responsibilities to personnel under his supervision. This, in effect, has increased the productive capability of his Branch.

ICE OF PERSONNEL
B 11 2 35 PM '60
MAIL ROOM

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 January 1960	N. E. Kinsey

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
34	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 January 1960	DC/TSS/GARD	Paul J. Szego PAUL J. SZEGO

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 January 1960	Chief, TSS/GARD	JOSEPH F. MARZEN

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
161555

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/GARD	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS
- NOT ELIGIBLE
- X MEMBER
- DEFERRED
- PENDING
- DECLINED
- DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: January 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Dec 1957 to Jan 1959

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch Personnel	RATING NO. 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefing	RATING NO. 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Gov't. Questiond Document Labs.	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors graphology program	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES					X		
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE					X		
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(41)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a very competent supervisor from a technical standpoint in that he has a thorough applicable knowledge of the complex [illegible] activities. In many respects this tends to contribute to his main weakness in that he measures the potential of his personnel by his own level of proficiency rather than a team level. This creates a situation whereby he has tendency to perform many functions which he could delegate to his personnel.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE [illegible]	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE [illegible]

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- OTHER (Specify)

DATE 27 Jan. 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, TSS/GARD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Paul J. Szego Paul J. Szego

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- ✓ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 27 Jan. 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, TSS/GARD	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Joseph F. [illegible]

SECRET
6
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any section. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8 of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KIMSEY (First) Herman (Middle) E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DT
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/A/Graphic Arts Repro. Div.
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS
7. GRADE: GS-13
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 23 December 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 23 December 1956 to 23 December 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one):
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM AND A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 30 Dec. 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Joseph E. Marzen
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		17 JAN 1958
Reviewed by PUD		21 JAN 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 30 Dec. 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Charles J. Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ASSTC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY EXHIBITS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - XXXXXXXXXXXX CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) [illegible] ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Performance

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 28 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Writing Technical Reports	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Liaison with other Government (Questioned Doc. Labs.)	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Monitors the Graphology Program	RATING NUMBER 5

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Background and years of experience with Agency, qualifies subject as an excellent technician in all facets of questioned document analysis. He is performing an excellent job, monitoring the graphology program. He constantly strives for new ideas in his field of endeavor. In presenting oral briefings and in job discussions, he still retains the tendency of drifting from the immediate topic of discussion.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY Herman E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/A/Graphic Arts Repro. Div.	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 23 December 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 December 1956 to 23 December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 30 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Joseph F. Marzen Joseph F. Marzen	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 30 Dec. 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Charles J. Ryan C. J. Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ASSTC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS [illegible] (First line supervisor)
2		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 445 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 16 9 25 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

1. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

20 months

2. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has technical qualifications but still shows weakness in administrative and management capabilities.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
2	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	2	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	2	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	2	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	2	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	2	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
2	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
2	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	2	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME	(Last) KIMSEY	(First) Herman	(Middle) E.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/TSS/AUTH/Graphic Arts Reproduction Division

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: IO TECH AIDS

7. GRADE: GS-12

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 23 December 1956

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1955 to 23 December 1956

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR C, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
3-6-57	JOSEPH F. MARZEN Joseph F. Marzen	Chief, TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	Ku	26 MAR 1957
Reviewed by PUD		

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
14-3-57	CHARLES J. RYAN C.J. Ryan	AC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Occasionally reveals some area of weakness.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

9 3 4 57

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises A&R Branch	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with other Government Organizations) Questioned Documents	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Questioned Document Analysis	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Document Analysis (for Repro.)	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Knowledge and ability to perform document analysis, questioned document analysis, identification and comparison of handwriting and typewriting. He constantly strives for new techniques in his field of endeavor. Has tendency to present his discussions too indirectly so that the importance of the main topic being discussed often becomes confused, vague and sometimes lost.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) KIMSEY (First) Herman (Middle) E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916
3. SEX M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DT
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/TSS/AUTH/Graphic Arts Reproduction Division
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO TECH AIDS
7. GRADE GS-12
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 23 December 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 December 1955 to 23 December 1956
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one) ☐ INITIAL XX ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 3-6-57

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR JOSEPH F. MARZEN

C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/TSS/GARD

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 14·3·57

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL CHARLES J. RYAN

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL AC/TSS/AUTH

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
1		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

10 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Subject has technical qualifications but shows weakness in administrative and management capabilities.

22 9 32 AM '57

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None, except on-the-job training and experience in the administrative functions of his branch.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
2	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	2	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	2	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	2	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	2	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	2	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
2	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
2	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS CONSISTENT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	[illegible]	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisor(s) to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A [illegible] Report due 22 Dec 56

JAS 12 Dec 56

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

DEC 1956

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) KIMSEY HERMAN E.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec 1916	3. SEX M	4. CAREER DESIGNATION DT
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY 23 March 1953	6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO TSS	7. DIVISION Graphic Arts Repro Div		8. BRANCH
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT XXX DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD	10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION			11. GRADE GS-12
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE 22 Dec 1955	13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 Dec 1954 to 22 Dec 1955			

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION IO Tech Aids 0136.63
~~Chief, Analysis and Research Branch/GARD~~

2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 1 February 1954

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS? (List in order of frequency):

Responsible for technical analysis of documents to be reproduced to determine special materials, techniques involved, existence of check points; analysis and comparison of reproductions and originals and preparation of critique on each reproduction. Determination of authenticity of alledged original documents; determination of source of origin of analysis, including graphology. Evaluation and research into new techniques in graphic arts and authentication areas and development of field expedients for this activity. Maintenance of world wide files of stationery, watermarks, handwriting and typewriting samples; maintains library of information relative to questioned document work, police science, forgery and counterfeiting.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE 29 November 1955	SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor) CHARLES YECH, JR. Charles Yech

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority) CHARLES J. RYAN

FORM NO. 37-189 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.
1 MAY 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive phrases are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale in each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Read each of the statements on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether the phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.	1	2	X	3			4			5			6	
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.									X					
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.											X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.									X					
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.							X							
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.									X					
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.									X					
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.									X					
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.							X							
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.										X				
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.									X					
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.									X					
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.										X				
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.									X					
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO [illegible] WITHOUT [illegible]											X			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.									X					
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.							X							
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.											X			
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.									X					
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.							X							
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.											X			
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.										X				
43. HAS DRIVE.										X				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.									X					
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.									X					

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Broad knowledge of technical aspects of intelligence and counter-intelligence work, particularly in the authentication field.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Excessive enthusiasm in his own field which causes him to "overtalk" occassionally; at times this results in an unconscious reaction by his hearers to give information he is passing on a lower professional evaluation than is justified.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

See "A" above.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 9 2 12 PM '55
MAIL ROOM

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Continued contact with questioned document profession: no formal training in this field available. Training in management and/or broad operational administration when personnel situation/work load permits.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.

☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.

☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.

☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.

☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.

☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.

☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.

☒ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.

☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.

☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.

☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.

☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.

☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.

☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.

☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.

☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.

☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 35 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A. SD-TS
12/53

Posted Pos Card
BY DATE
1/13

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

1/14/63

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): KIMSEY, Herman E.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec. 1916
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: TS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 23 March 1953
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: DDP
7. DIVISION: TSS
8. BRANCH: GARD
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: [XX] DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-11
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 23 December 1954
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 December 1953 to 23 December 1954

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: Chief, Analysis & Research Branch 1290.01
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 February 1954

3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency): Makes analyses of documents preliminary to reproduction; determines necessity for special procurement of paper, cloth, other materials; determines existence of check points, departures from normal security printings; makes critique of finished reproduction. Conducts questioned document analysis for operations desks; detection of forgeries, alteration; comparisons of handwriting, typing. Conducts training in field expedients of document reproduction and authentication; conducts briefing in general graphic arts activity. Researches into and develops new and field methods for document authentication and alteration. Maintains liaison with government and commercial organizations active in fields of documentation, police sciences, etc.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☐ has ☒ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 14 Dec. 54
SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): Charles Yech Charles Yech

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected in attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 15 Dec
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority): James H. Drum James H. Drum

FORM NO. 37-189 1 MAY 54 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left & then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion as whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.									X					
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.				X										
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.							X							
4. HAS INITIATIVE.									X					
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X								
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.									X					
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.										X				
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.											X			
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X						
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.							X							
11. CALM.					X									
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.									X					
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.								X						
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.								X						
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.							X							
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.										X				
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.								X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.									X					
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.									X					
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.											X			

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.									X					
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.							X							
30. OBSERVANT.									X					
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.								X						
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.							X							
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.							X							
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.							X							
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.							X							
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.								X						
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.								X						
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.								X						
45. VERSATILE.									X					
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.									X					
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.							X							
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.							X							
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Very broad knowledge of technical aspects in intelligence operations; enthusiasm and devotion to type of work he is doing.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Tendency to wander away from specific subjects during discussions because of the many vaguely related and remotely corollary situations he has experienced and/or learned about.

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

None

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

No

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

None at present.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.

☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.

☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.

☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.

☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.

☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.

☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.

☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.

☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.

☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.

☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.

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☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.

☒ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANYPLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.

☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.

☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.

☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.

☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.

☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.

☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

AE

Items 1 through 5 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (LAST) KINSEY (FIRST) Herman (MIDDLE) E.
2. GRADE GS-7
3. POSITION TITLE Tech. Projects Officer GS-?
4. OFFICE DDP/TSS STAFF OR DIVISION CAD BRANCH Office of Chief ☒ DEPTL. ☐ FIELD IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 23 Mar 53 To 22 Dec 53
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☒ Initial ☐ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

a. Analyze foreign documents for the purpose of reproduction.
b. Conduct a comparison critique between the original document and the reproduction.
c. Conduct operational document analysis by comparing and identifying handwriting, typewriting, inks, paper, etc., for the purpose of establishing the authenticity or true source of the document.
d. Conduct research in both laboratory and field methods of alteration, reproduction, and forgery of documents.
e. Maintain liaison with security-cleared government agencies and consultants engaged in document examination work.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
NONE			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Intelligence Documentation.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Not applicable.

10.

DATE 30 Nov 53

SIGNATURE Herman E. Kinsey

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Kinsey is well qualified to perform all tasks assigned him and capable of greater responsibilities. He is mature, has broad experience in intelligence activities, is an excellent instructor, capable of clear self-expression. He has acquired a wealth of knowledge in the field of document intelligence through wide field experience, academic study, and instructional experience. A pleasing personality, good contact man. His manner of performance on duties assigned has been excellent.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Acceptance of responsibility, thoroughness, eagerness to try new techniques and ideas, cooperation.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Wider knowledge of Graphic Arts mechanical techniques; exploration of new techniques in practical documentation.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Has capacity to handle greater responsibilities, especially in technical or associated training activities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Possibly, at present feels he is performing valuable services to Agency which heretofore have received little support; charged with document reproduction and operational analysis, research.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at present; continued widening of his present knowledge of advanced techniques in document examination and reproduction techniques.

17. (IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.)

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

29 Dec 53
DATE

Charles Fish Jr.
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

29 Dec 53
DATE

C/GSRD
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Mr. Kinney has proved of great value in his assignment. He is qualified for higher responsibilities in his specialties.

SECRET

NOTICE OF CHANGE IN HEALTH BENEFITS ENROLLMENT

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF

A. IDENTIFYING DATA

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Vinsey, Herman E.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/11/16

3. CAREER CONTROL NO: 09/306

4. ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE)

5. PAYROLL OFFICE NO: 11239001

6. ENROLLMENT CODE NO: 421

7. DATE ACTION BECOMES EFFECTIVE: /

9-26-72

B. TERMINATION

☒ ENROLLMENT TERMINATES EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE, WITH ELIGIBILITY TO CONVERT TO A NONGROUP CONTRACT.

C. CHANGE IN PLAN

☐ ENROLLMENT SHOWN BY ITEM 6, ABOVE, HAS BEEN TERMINATED BECAUSE OF ELECTION OF ANOTHER PLAN.

D. TRANSFER OUT

☐ NAME AND ADDRESS OF NEW PAYROLL OFFICE (OR RETIREMENT SYSTEM) TO WHICH TRANSFERRING

E. TRANSFER IN

ENROLLMENT ACCEPTED BY THIS AGENCY ☐

F. SUSPENSION

☐ ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE, WHILE ENROLLEE IS ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY OR FOR THE REASON STATED IN REMARKS

G. REINSTATEMENT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN REINSTATED, EFFECTIVE ON DATE SHOWN IN ITEM 7, ABOVE. ☐

H. CHANGE IN NAME OF ENROLLEE

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO ☐

NAME

ADDRESS IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4, ABOVE

DATE OF BIRTH

I. CHANGE IN ENROLLMENT — SURVIVOR ANNUITANT

ENROLLMENT HAS BEEN CHANGED FROM FAMILY COVERAGE TO SELF ONLY ☐

NEW ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER

J. REMARKS 7263 T1555

K. DATE OF NOTICE

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER

DATE

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington 25, D. C.

QUADRUPLICATE To Employing Office

14-00000

61555 | BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

KIMSEY, Herman Edward | Dec 1916

Fitness Report Dec 1957 - Jan 1959 -- "...is a very competent supervisor from a technical standpoint in that he has a thorough applicable knowledge of the complex A&R activities. In many respects this tends to contribute to his main weakness in that he measures the potential of his personnel by his own level of proficiency rather than a team level. This creates a situation whereby he has tendency to perform many functions which he could delegate to his personnel." Rater, P. J. Szego. Reviewer, J. F. Marzen.

Fitness Report Jan 1959 - Jan 1960 -- "...thorough technical knowledge of A&R activities qualifies him as a competent Supervisor. Since the last reporting period, he has delegated more responsibilities to personnel under his supervision. This, in effect, has increased the productive capability of his Branch." Rater, P. J. Szego. Reviewer, J. F. Marzen.

Appreciation [illegible] from Chief, NSA, for excellent work on Report C-145 performed by TSS personnel. Endorsed by Chief, CARD/TSS.

Commendation [illegible] from the field, conveyed by the Career Management Officer, TSS, for efficiency in rendering support to an operation.

9 Jul 1960 OP/PSD CAR/mel

14-00000

[illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

Name: KINSEY, HERMAN EDWARD
Last, First Middle

TO: All C. I. A. Personnel

FROM: Personnel Director

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. The Agency is currently revising the system for machine coding employee qualifications, thereby permitting more complete and accurate data on all personnel. The new system will aid in implementing Agency policies on promotion from within by facilitating the selection of personnel with desired education and experience for vacancies which may occur. It is also expected that the new system will provide readily accessible statistics for planning and management purposes.

2. The attached questionnaire is designed to cover adequately those factors in which the Agency is interested. Although the information is, in a large measure, already reflected in previous forms submitted by you, it is felt that your time within the organization may enable you to emphasize those qualifications pertinent to its needs. The questionnaire also serves to bring your education and qualifications record up to date.

3. Your cooperation is requested in completing the questionnaire as thoroughly and accurately as possible and returning it to your Administrative Officer within the time allotted.

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 15 May 53

George E. Meloon
George E. Meloon
Personnel Director

SECRET
Security Information

FORM NO. 37-102
MAY 1952

(4-101)

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) KIMSEY, HERMAN EDWARD	3. Office CARD/TSS
4. Date of Birth 11 Dec 1916	5. Sex: X male (1) ___ female (2)	Martial Status S Nr. Dependents 1
		6. CIA Entry Date: 23 March 53
7. Citizenship: X U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) X Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other (specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school	~~4~~. Two years college, or less GED	8. Masters degree
2. High school graduate	5. Over two years, no degree	9. Doctors degree
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate	6. Bachelor degree	
	7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)	

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military or Intelligence Training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, command & staff, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
Counter Intelligence Corps	Mar-47	May-47	2 1/2	(MOS 1301) Basic course for Special Agent
Instructor Guidance Course	Apr-52 Sept-47	Apr-52 Sept-47	1	Instructor, CIC School
Chemical Warfare School	May-43	June-43	1/2	Gas Non Commisioned Officer

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SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. CIA Experience: State the specific nature of duties performed with CIA and CIG, starting with your present position. Take position titles from your official personnel papers, if you have personal copies. Please do not request your Official Personnel Folder. Include geographic area and subject matter dealt with, if applicable. Position Title is your classification title such as Geographer, Intelligence Officer, etc. Duty Title indicates your organization position such as - Section Chief, Branch Chief, Administrative Assistant, etc., and is to be filled in only if different to the Position Title. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From ~~23 Mar 53~~ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties: Foreign Document Analyst and [illegible]
Grade GS 9 Salary $5060.00	
Office GARD/TSS	
Position Title: ~~Technical Projects [illegible]~~	
Duty Title: Technical Projects Officer	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ______ To ______ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ______ Salary ______	
Office ______	
Position Title: ______	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:

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SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Other than CIA: (Describe work experience for the last 15 years in sufficient detail to permit specific coding of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.) See Military Work background Sec XVI

From May 46 To Oct 46 Tot. mo's 5 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) SP-7 Salary $3021.00 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 100 laborers & skilled laborer Employer U.S. Forest Service Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Forestry	Exact Title of your position Camp Supt. Description of Duties: Timber disease control, fighting forest fires, camp administration(food, pay, project records, etc.) Duty Station if overseas:
From Apr 45 To Apr 46 Tot. mo's 12 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) CPC 7 Salary $2694.96 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 35 laborers Employer U. S. Forest Service Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Forestery	Exact Title of your position Camp Supt. Description of Duties: Hazard Reduction project, fighting forest fires, camp administration, (food, pay, project records, etc) Duty Station if overseas:
From Oct 44 To Apr 45 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $1.10 per hr Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer McCloud River Lbr. Co. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Lumber	Exact Title of your position Brakeman Description of Duties: Brakeman on Deisel loco. Duty Station if overseas:
From June 44 To Oct 44 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary per mon. $90.00 + Exper. Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer Brown Shasta Ranch. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Horse racing and breeding	Exact Title of your position Laborer Description of Duties: Working with horses, cattle, and crops. Duty Station if overseas:
From Dec 43 To June 44 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary $90 per hr Number and Class of Employees Supervised: none Employer McCloud River Lbr. Co Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) lumber	Exact Title of your position laborer Description of Duties: Handle lumber & Operate machines. Duty Station if overseas:

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Sec.II, Par.2.

From 19 May 1941 To 5 November 1943 Total Months 30

Military Service

From 5 Oct 1940 to 19 May 1941. Total months 7.
Classification Grade (If in Federal Service)--- Salary---.75 per hr
Number and class of employees supervised---- None
Employer---McCloud River Lumber Co.
Kind of Business---Lumber
Exact Title of your position---Brakeman
Description of Duties---Brakeman on a diesel locomotive.
Duty Station if Overseas---

From 1 May 1940 To 1 Oct 1940 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (If in Federal Service) Unk Salary $160.00 per mo.
Number and Class of Employees Supervised 10-20 laborers

Employer U S Forest Service
Kind of Business Forestry
Exact Title of your Position Forest Guard
Description of your duties Suppression and prevention of Forest Fires, enforcement of Forest Laws, & maintainance of Forest & equipt.
Duty station if overseas

From 1 Oct 1939 To 1 May 1940 Total months 7
Class. Grade (If in Federal Service) Salary 0.65 per hr.
Number and class of employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of Business Lumber
Exact Title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on diesel locomotive

Duty station if overseas

From 1 May 1939 TO 1 Oct 1939 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Unk Salary $160.00 per month.
Number and class of employees supervised 10-20 laborers

Employer US Forest Service
Kind of business Forestry
Exact title of your position Forest Guard
Description of your duties Suppression and prevention of Forest Fires, enforcement of Forest Laws, & maintainance of Forest & Equipt
Duty station if overseas

Sec II, Par. 2.

From 1 Jan 1939 To 1 May 1939 Total Months 4
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 0.65 per hr
Number and class of Employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of business Lumber
Exact Title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on a deisel locomotive

Duty station if overseas

From 1 Oct 1938 To 1 Jan 1939 Total Months 3
Unemployed

From 1 May 1938 To 1 Oct 1938 Total Months 5
Class. Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary 150.00 per mo.
Number and class of Employees supervised None

Employer Union Oil Company
Kind of business Oil
Exact Title of your position Relief tank-truck salesman.
Description of your duties Sale and delivery of oil & gasoline to stations.
Duty station if overseas

From Feb 1935 To April 1938 Total months 38
Class. Grade(if in Federal Service) Salary 0.50 per hr
Number and class of employees supervised None

Employer McCloud River Lumber Company
Kind of business Lumber
Exact title of your position Brakeman
Description of your duties Brakeman on diesel locomotive.

Duty station if overseas.

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 X Civil Police (Forest Service)
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 X Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge Slight		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence Occupation etc., 2 years	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study (Inc. CIA training)
Japanese					X			X		

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		~~Residence~~ occupation	~~Travel~~	Study
Japan	1948-1949	X		
	1950-1950	X		
	1951-1951	X		
Korea	1950-1951		X (war)	

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specalized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
	Horses, swimming, archery, boating,
	photography, and weapons.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. International Assn. For Identification
Youngstown, Ohio

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

Co-author of 2 text books at the Counter Intelligence Corp School
Observation and Description
Physical Evidence
Co-author of the CIC Investigator. A handbook for CIC Agents.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No
	(1) Yes (2) No

SEC. X. CIA TESTS

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken in CIA:

Type of Test	Date Taken
Personnel Qualification Tests	Nov 1949

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour X (2) 4 year Tour X (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment in CIA do you think you are best qualified?

Operational or Instruction. Also considerable experience in supervisory capacity. Flair for organization

SECRET
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SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
   Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes _X_ No.
   If yes, indicate your present draft classification ______

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
   Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes _X_ No.
   If yes, complete the following.
   1. ___ National Guard
   2. ___ Air National Guard
   3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
   4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

   Service ______ Grade ______ Location ______

   Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ______

   Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ______

   Location of Service Records, if known ______

SEC. XV. CIA TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken while in the CIA.

Course or Subject	Dates (from) (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above. (Military Service-19 May41-5 Nov 43, 29Nov 46-8 Oct 49, [illegible] Total [illegible])

Considerable study in Applied Psycology, Criminalogy, and Criminal Investigative Techniques. Delivered over 1500 hours of lecture on these subjects. Two (2) years experience in supervising an investigative type laboratory which specialized in document examination. Number of personnel, five (5). Two (2) years experience as Special Agent, CIC. Total of Six (6) years in CIC. Highest rank, Master Sergeant
Permanent MOS 1301

One (1) year experience with S-2 Section, Combat Intelligence, Interpertation and Evaluation of Information.

[illegible] years of general military training with emphasis on communications, Cavalry(Horse), Infantry, Parachute Troops, Tank Destroyers & Field Artillery.

DATE 1 April 53 SIGNATURE

SECRET
Security Information

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on MAR 30 1953 (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

Herman E. Kimsey
(NAME)

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, Herman E. Kimsey, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

23 March 1953
(Date of entrance on duty)

Herman E. Kimsey
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23rd day of March, A. D. 19 53.

at Washington D.C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

5 USC 16 & 16a
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

[illegible]

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly. ~~Hotel Vivian 1763 G St N.W.~~

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State) Hotel Vivian, 1763 "G" St. N.W. Washington, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH 11 Dec. 1916 (B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country) Gallup, New Mexico,

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY W.S. Lineberger (B) RELATIONSHIP Brother in-law (C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE Box 185 McCloud, Calif. (D) TELEPHONE NO. Yes

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES [✓ NO]

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

STANDARD FORM 144
JANUARY 1952
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM CHAPTERS L1 AND R1

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used in determining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits for *reduction in force*. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through IV.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): Kinsey, Herman E.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Dec 1916

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENTS (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. Forest Service	1937	June	1	[illegible]	Oct	~~20~~ 10	
U.S. Forest Service	1940	May	14	[illegible]	Oct.	10	See attached for 1945-46 [illegible]
U.S. Forest Service	1945	~~Nov~~	28	[illegible]	~~Mar~~	15	
U.S. Forest Service	1946	Nov	5	[illegible]	~~Nov~~	~~29~~ 28	✓
CIA	53	Mar	23				

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (Hon. or dishon.?)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
Army	1941	May	19	[illegible]	Nov	29	Hon.
Army	1946	Nov	29	[illegible]	Oct	8	Hon
Army	1950	Jan	5	[illegible]	Mar	23	Hon

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☑ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
Furlough	1939	Oct	1	[illegible]	May	1		7	

MT [illegible] 10/1/39

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☑ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

157
9/15/58

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. C.S. STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY
	~~5~~	10
	~~5~~ 4	27
	~~9~~ 11	~~24~~
	~~2~~ 4	24.
2	~~6~~ 5	17
2	10	7
3	2	18

SCD – 8/7/42
GCS 1-15-60

12. TOTAL SERVICE 3 20
10 ~~7 13~~

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

23 March 53
(DATE)

Herman E. Kinsey
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 23 day of March 1953 at Wash DC
(MONTH) (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

(OVER)

PART III.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR LEAVE PURPOSES

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)	53	3	22
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes*)	10	3	18
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*Leave purposes*)	42	12	3

PART IV.—DETERMINING CREDITABLE SERVICE AND SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE FOR REDUCTION IN FORCE PURPOSES

(To be completed only in those cases when the amount of creditable service for reduction in force purposes differs from the amount creditable for leave purposes)

	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
TOTAL SERVICE (*Item 13*)			
NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Item 14*)			
CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
ENTRANCE ON DUTY DATE (*Present agency*)			
LESS CREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes*)			
SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (*RIF purposes*) (*Enter as the "service computation date" on the employee's "Service Record Card," SP-7*)			

REMARKS:

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 6 Feb. 1953

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

TSS-#5

Your Reference: I-2594

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 71129

SUBJECT: KINSEY, Herman Edward

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the E.O.D. procedures.

E. P. Geiss

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(8)

[illegible]

CHRONOLOGICAL [illegible] EMPLOYMENT [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR [illegible] PERIOD [illegible] OF UNEMPLOYMENT, GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIOD [illegible]

[illegible]



[illegible]

[illegible]

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE ~~Sept. [illegible]~~
Sept. 1963

[illegible]

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: Mc Cord, James W., Jr.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 15 April 1951 – 24 April 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

70 AUG ENTD F

69 MAY ENTD N

69 SEP ENTD

McCORD, JAMES

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 7/18/78
TO: NOTE FOR THE FILE	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS

According to card notation in the files of C/SAG/OP the information referred to on the attached flag was transferred to the Office of the Insepetor General and the office of the Director of Security on 21 January 1965.

FROM: D J Houdesheldt
D. J. Houdesheldt, C/FOIPS/OP

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

-E-T

OF FILE

tation is on file with

s Staff, Office of

Quarters Eye, extension

☐ Hearing transcript and related papers

☒ Other EYES ONLY material

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

McCORD, JAMES W., JR.

S-E-C-R-E-T

70 3577

31 AUG 1970   70-4562

AUG 25 2 05 PM '70

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Jim:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-five years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed notably to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - AC/EAB/OS
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ H. B. Fisher   27 AUG 1970
A Director of Personnel

AUG 31 11 42 AM '70

Concur: ______________________
AC/EAB/OS   1970

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:jat/3257 (19 August 1970)

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

31 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Retirement - **James W. McCord, Jr.**

1. The retirement of Subject, effected as a result of a memorandum from the Head of his Career Service stating that he is surplus to the needs of the Service and that his retirement will be recommended to the Director under the provisions of the CIA Retirement and Disability System pertaining to involuntary retirement, in no way implies an adverse action. Subject signed an application for retirement of his own volition in order to qualify for an immediate retirement annuity. The liberalized criteria for such separations was established by the Agency to parallel similar actions under the Civil Service Retirement System in accordance with FPM Letter No. 831-23, dated 10 December 1969.

2. Any inquiry received concerning the nature of the separation of Subject from the Agency should be confirmed simply as a retirement.

Francis Monan
Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 July 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MC CORD, James W., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Retirement (Involuntary) Under CIA Retirement and Disability System

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 31 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1271-0501

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sec. 235(a)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Physical Security Division
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Physical Sec[redacted] Of[redacted]

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15/~~8~~ 9

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~[illegible]~~ 28226 28981

18. REMARKS

Subject's last working day will be 31 August 1970. See attached memos.

Retirement is submitted pursuant to a request from the Head of the Security Career Service.

Include on Agency Reserve List
1152 [illegible] 8/20/70.

cc/CSB - Info
cc/Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
C/PB/A&TS/OS

DATE SIGNED: 2 July 70

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE:

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VOUCHERS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 26 YR. 24

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—OPGH 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE: C

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: GU

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-21-70 noted [illegible] ASIOD 70

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 20 Aug 70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

BSJ: 14 SEPT 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYS-CORR

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 08 31 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1271 0501 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 9

17. SALARY OR RATE: 28989

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/31/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM 16, GRADE AND STEP WHICH READ 15 8 TO READ 15 9; AND ITEM 17, SALARY OR RATE WHICH READ 28226 TO READ 28989.

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

R. V. WATTLES

Use Previous Edition

14-00000

BSJ: 27 AUG 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 31 YR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1271 0501 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: [illegible]

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: [illegible]

11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: 28226

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition (4-51)

1 September 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.**

THROUGH : **Deputy Director for Support**

THROUGH : **Director of Security**

SUBJECT : **Certificate of Distinction**

1. The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the award named above will be conferred on you in recognition of the excellent service you have rendered this Agency. Security considerations relevant to the award are explained in the attached memorandum from the Office of Security.

2. The award will be presented to you at a ceremony to be held in the near future. Members of your family, Agency associates, and intimate friends who are aware of your Agency affiliation may attend the ceremony.

3. Invitations to the ceremony will be extended by the Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board, Office of Personnel, extension 3645. Please send to that office the names and phone numbers of the guests you would like to have invited, and indicate any dates on which you would not be available for such a ceremony.

/Sgd/ Robert M. Gaynor

ROBERT M. GAYNOR
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
- Orig - Addressee
- 1 - D/S
- 1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono/OPF
- 1 - Sec't, HMAB
- 1 - Recorder, HMAB

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

DATE
11 August 1970

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
	McCORD, James Walter, Jr.	1924	M	

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
DDS/OS			GS-15	

BE AWARDED

Certificate of Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD Aug 1951 - Present

☒ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☐ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., is hereby awarded the Certificate of Distinction in recognition of his exemplary performance of duty for over nineteen years. In a variety of assignments, both domestic and abroad, Mr. McCord has displayed unusual imagination, ingenuity, and effectiveness in accomplishing his assigned tasks. His achievements in the fields of audio-countermeasure techniques and physical and technical security are particularly noteworthy and represent a marked contribution to the mission of the Agency. His professionalism in the conduct of his work upholds the best traditions of service and reflects great credit on him and the Office of Security.

(Recommendation approved by DD/S on 23 July 1970)

REMARKS

APPROVED

R. E. Cushman, Jr.

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

25 AUG 1970

DATE

SIGNATURE /s/ Robert S. Wattles

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
ROBERT S. WATTLES

SIGNATURE
Signed Original

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
ROBERT M. GAYNOR

FORM 8-65 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE	Name (Last-First-Middle) McCORD JAMES W.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH. TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning my separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation).
✓	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
✓	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). NO CHANGE
	6. Applicable to returnee (resignee from overseas assignment). I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being. ☐ Appointment arranged with Office of Medical Services. ☐ Appointment for Office of Medical Services examination declined.
	7. I have been informed of "conflict of interests" policy of the Agency and foresee no problem in this regard concerning my new employment.
	8. Form 71 (Application for Leave).
	9. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	10. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee James W. McCord Jr.	Date Signed Aug 3, 70
Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code) 7 Winder Court, Rockville, Maryland 20850	Correspondence ☑ Overt ☐ Covert

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] AUG 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

THROUGH : Head of SS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Involuntary Retirement

1. This is to inform you that the Director of Central Intelligence has approved the recommendation of your Career Service that you be involuntarily retired under the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

2. Your retirement will become effective 31 August 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 September 1970 and is payable on 1 October 1970. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative details necessary to process your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:dam/3257 (10 Aug 70)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

20 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Official Cover Branch, Central Cover Staff, DD/P

THROUGH : Chief, Administration and Training Staff, OS

SUBJECT : Summary of Agency Employment - James W. McCord, Jr.

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, Administrative Staff/OS from C/OCB/CCS, dated 14 July 1970, Subject, James W. McCord, Jr.

Attached hereto is a summary of Agency Employment for Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., who is retiring 31 August 1970.

James P. O'Connell

James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Att.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

JAMES W. MCCORD, JR.

Service with the Central Intelligence Agency began on 22 August 1951 and continued through 31 August 1970. During his career there was a variety of assignments involving investigations, research and report writing, technical and physical security programs and a two year tour overseas.

As an investigator during the first two years of employment, there was wide involvement in a variety of support activities requiring initiative and ingenuity.

During the seven years engaged in research and report writing, there was much independence of action and success depended on initiative, imagination and resourcefulness in pioneering new areas of interest. Beginning in May 1957, managerial responsibilities began with appointment to a Deputy Chief position of a research staff of some six professional and clerical personnel.

When serving overseas, responsibilities were managerial in nature as Chief of a regional staff of some ten professional and clerical personnel providing a full spectrum of security support.

From August 1964 to June 1965 he attended the Air War College as representative of the Agency.

Since 1965 two vital line positions were held involving the Agency's programs in the technical and physical security fields.

In heading up the technical security division, from 1965 to 1968, he had primary supervisory responsibility for some 40 professional and clerical personnel, preparing the budget and programs for the Agency's technical security program, and managing the obligating of authorized funding to assure that approved programs and goals were met. He was instrumental in guiding the development of new approaches, in establishing new training concepts and in bringing the Agency to a position of recognized leadership in this field.

SECRET

Since October 1968, as Chief of a division responsible for the Agency's physical security program he had primary responsibility for the supervision of some 70 professional and clerical personnel, together with the programming, budgeting and implementing of the total physical security program of the Agency. As a result of his technological experience, he developed and implemented physical security programs which produced for the Agency a physical security posture of pre-eminent quality within the US Government.

SECRET
(When Filled In) 938

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 June 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER	058124
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	MCCORD, JAMES W., JR.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 06 DAY 28 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	0271 0501
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/SECURITY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	
12. POSITION NUMBER	
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	
16. GRADE AND STEP	15
17. SALARY OR RATE	$
18. REMARKS	
18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	
DATE SIGNED	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	
20. EMPLOY CODE	
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HDQTRS. CODE	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICS, 3-NONE) CODE	2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE / MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV./EMP CODE)	
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0-WAIVER, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	7-6-70 MW
46. O.P. APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	23 VI 70

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
OP-1
1-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

70 3577

Executive Registry
70-4562

31 AUG 1970

AUG 31 5 03 PM '70

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Jim:

As you bring to a close more than twenty-five years of service to your country, I want to join your friends and co-workers in wishing you well and hoping that you find the years ahead filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

It takes the conscientious efforts of many people to do the important work of this Agency. You leave with the knowledge that you have personally contributed notably to our success in carrying out our mission. Your faithful and loyal support has measured up to the high ideals and traditions of the Federal service.

May I express to you my appreciation and extend my best wishes for the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:
- 0 - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - AC/EAB/OS
- 1 - D/Pers
- 1 - OPF
- 1 - ROB Soft File
- 1 - ROB Reader

Originator: /s/ R. B. Fisher 27 AUG 1970
Director of Personnel

AUG 31 11 02 AM '70

Concur: ______________________
AC/EAB/OS [illegible] 1970

OP/RAD/ROB/MRDameron:jat/3257 (19 August 1970)

14-00000

SECRET

31 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Involuntary Retirement - Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

REFERENCE : Memorandum for Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. from Director of Security dated 30 June 1970, same subject

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., GS-15, Physical Security Officer, Office of Security, Support Services, has been recommended for involuntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m. The purpose of this proposed retirement, to which Mr. McCord is agreeable, is to assist the Office of Security to reduce its personnel surplus. If such retirement is approved, Mr. McCord requests an effective date of 31 August 1970.

3. Mr. McCord has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and will meet the technical requirements for involuntary retirement under the System prior to the effective date requested. He is 46 years old and will complete 25 years of Federal service on 21 August 1970. This service includes over 19 years with the Agency of which 5 years were in qualifying service. The CIA Retirement Board has recommended that his involuntary retirement be approved.

4. It is recommended that you approve the involuntary retirement of Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50m.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

/s/ Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

9 AUG 1970
Date

SECRET

REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING/ACTIVE DUTY TOUR

TO: HQ COMD USAF (PRP)

FROM: HQ COMD USAF (PRP-A)

1. ☒ BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ☐ BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

2. GRADE, LAST NAME, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL, AFSN
LT COLONEL MC CORD, JAMES W.JR. 453-22-4741

3. PAFSC
8011

4. PRESENT ADDRESS
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

5. ON FLYING STATUS
☐ YES ☒ NO

6. AERO RATING
Aircraft Observer

7. IS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR 12 DAYS PLUS REQUIRED TRAVEL TIME

8. PURPOSE (Type)
☒ ANNUAL TOUR ☐ SCHOOL TOUR ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF ACDUTRA ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF AD
TITLE (Indicate specific school course or special tour title)

9. RESERVE ASSIGNMENT
HQ USAF (AFESS-FE)
Washington, DC

10. UNIT OF ATTACHMENT

11. INDIVIDUAL WILL REPORT TO
JOHN F. KENNEDY CENTER FOR SPECIAL WARFARE (A)
Student Dormitory, Bldg D-3601, Reilly Street and
Bastogne Drive, Ft Bragg, North Carolina 28308

12. INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RELEASED FROM ORGANIZATION ATTACHED/ASSIGNED FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING ON

	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11. Report	NLT 0800	19	Jan	70
12. Release	▨	30	Jan	70

13. INDIVIDUAL ☐ IS ☒ IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN FLYING ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY COVERED BY THIS ORDER.

14. AUTHORITY
- AFM 35-3

15. INDIVIDUAL WILL PROCEED FROM PRESENT ADDRESS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLY WITH REPORTING TIME AND DATE.

16. MODES OF TRANSPORTATION ☒ AUTHORIZED ☐ DIRECTED
☐ MILITARY AIRCRAFT
COMMERCIAL ☒ AIRCRAFT ☒ RAIL ☒ BUS

17. PCS, TDN, PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND TRAVEL CHARGEABLE TO:
PAY & ALWS: 5703700 500 4261 P 723.01 (P&A) S594700

18. REMARKS TRAVEL & PER DIEM: 5703700 500 6262 P 723.07 40861 40961 S668100
Security Clearance - TOP SECRET Training Category - D Pay Group - D
For period of this active duty only, mbr and dependents authorized Commissary (Para 1a, AFR 145-15), Base Exchange (Para 3-8a(1), AFR 147-14) & Base Theater (Para 3-10, AFR 34-32) privileges.

19. DATE
16 Dec 69

20. PHONE NO.
4579/4279

21. APPROVING OFFICIAL (Typed Name and Grade)
E. E. THAYER, GS-12

22. SIGNATURE
E. E. Thayer

23. DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND USAF
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

24. RESERVE ORDER NO.
A - 2073

25. DATE
16 Dec 69

26. FOR THE COMMANDER

27. DISTRIBUTION
15 - Individual
1 - Indiv Pers Rec
2 - Unit of Asgmt
2 - Unit of Atch
2 - ARPC, 3800 York St, Denver, CO 80205
2 - HQ AFRES (CAFO), Dobbins AFB, GA 30060
1 - Records Set
35 - Reserve Personnel

28. SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL
E. E. Thayer
E. E. THAYER
Asst Director for Administration

AF FORM 938
FEB 67

MC CORD, James

[C-130311

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John W. Coffey

I want to express my appreciation to you personally and through you to Howard Osborn and the other of your associates who contributed so effectively to the visit of the President on Friday. The arrangements were flawless; the security first-class without being intrusive. I am well aware of the amount of work and planning which went into the successful outcome. I particularly want to commend the good sense and judgment which prevailed throughout. It is easy to push people around. It is difficult to take proper precautions and at the same time make everyone feel as though it were his or her party. Thank you very much. Well done!

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Acting Executive Director

SECRET

James McCord

10 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/PTOS

SUBJECT : Security Support During President Nixon's Visit

1. I have received numerous and highly complimentary comments from the Director, the Executive Director and the Acting Deputy Director for Support for the role this Office played during the visit of President Nixon to the Agency on 7 March 1969. In addition, Mr. Don Gautreau, the Secret Service Agent responsible for protective measures during the visit, told me that he had never met a more highly professional group of personnel than our Security officers. He was impressed with the comprehensive coverage inherent in our protective measures.

2. Our performance on Friday was smooth, efficient and effective and once more is a tribute to our ability to rise to any occasion. This is possible only because of the quality of the effort put forth by each Security Officer who participated. I am very proud of all of you and I would like to particularly commend Jim McCord, Bill Wilkinson and Jim Greene for the work they did in planning our role in the ceremonies. Equally impressive was the performance of Hollis Whitaker and his people in the provision of audio coverage of the event.

3. I would like to have copies of this memorandum placed in the official Personnel File of every individual who participated in making this event such a great success.

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 2 October 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MC CORD, James W., Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9271-0501

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/Office of Security
DD/Physical, Technical & Overseas Security
Physical Security Division
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Physical Security Officer 15

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15/7 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,192 = 24,393

18. REMARKS:
From: DDS/Office of Security/Technical Division/Office of the Chief - #0642

CC:Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Edward K. O'Malley
Edward K. O'Malley, C/PR/AATS/OS
DATE SIGNED: 10/3/68

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROOTES CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
37	10	4240	CCC	7313		1	[illegible]	

27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-OBGH 3-FICA 4-NONE CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. | 38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10-4-68

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 4 Oct 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

September 5, 1968

Mr. Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Osborn:

This letter is in appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by your office during the Republican National Convention at Miami Beach, Florida.

I would particularly like to commend James W. McCord and the following members of his Division:

George Schwegman
Carroll Helkerson.

Their dedication and outstanding degree of technical competence contributed immeasurably to the success of our mission.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Kelley

Thomas J. Kelley
Assistant Director

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
OFFICE OF THE MANAGER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305

IN REPLY REFER TO:
NCS-EO

21 NOV 1967

Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Osborn:

On 8 November 1967, Messrs. James McCord, William Flannery, and William Marcy of your agency provided a most interesting and informative briefing on the subject, "Audio Threat by the Communist Block". Included in this presentation was the display of the latest electronic techniques and technical developments in the area of audio threat.

This presentation was most enlightening and proved to be of keen interest to the Agency NCS Representatives, staff members of the Office of the Manager, NCS and selected key personnel of the Defense Communications Agency.

We very much appreciate the availability of the above mentioned personnel and I should like to commend them on their excellent manner of presentation and thorough knowledge of the subject matter.

I. R. Obenchain, Jr.

I. R. OBENCHAIN, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Deputy Manager,
National Communications System

Copy to:
Mr. Georgia

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Commendation for Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord and their Assistants

FROM:
Acting Director of Security
Room 4E60

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DD/PTOS	22 [illegible]		[illegible]	It is a pleasure to commend Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord and their Assistants for the fine support they rendered as indicated in the attached letter. Such commendations reflect a high degree of professionalism. Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell Acting Director of Security 21 AUG 1967 Nice work!
2. Ch Tech Div	8/30	ap		
3. Ch Phy Sec Div		9/5	[illegible]	
4. Ch SRS				
5. [illegible]				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12. C/A&TS				Please document the appropriate files in A&TS and the Office of Personnel.
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Executive Registry
[illegible]

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Office of The Director
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, 20755

12 August 1967

DD/S 67-4161

Honorable Richard M. Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Dick:

I want to thank you for the technical security demonstration recently presented to me by Howie Osborn and members of his staff. We are very conscious of the subject and welcome opportunities to be kept up-to-date on the state-of-the-art.

I would appreciate your also conveying my personal thanks to Messrs. Frank Farrell, James McCord, and their assistants, not only for the high degree of professionalism which they demonstrated during the session here but also for their continued advice and assistance to my security organization. I am sure you join me in encouraging continued close liaison of this type.

Faithfully yours,

Pat

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.** **8 March 1966**

THROUGH : Head of **SS** Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the system, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the system may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you do not have sufficient time prior to completing 15 years of service with the Agency in which you could complete a minimum of 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 6E-1319 Headquarters (extension 6001). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

20 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, A&TS

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr.
(Educational Matter)

Attached is a letter from George Washington University showing the completion of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Affairs. I understand this would be of interest to the Training and Personnel Branches for their files.

James W McCord Jr
James W. McCord, Jr.
Chief, Technical Division

Attachment:
As Stated Above

SECRET

[illegible]

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

THE COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES

July 7, 1965

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Dear Mr. McCord,

I am happy to inform you that you have passed satisfactorily the Comprehensive Examination for candidates seeking the degree of Master of Science in International Affairs.

Congratulations!

Very truly yours,

James G. Brown
for Grover L. Angel
Dean

cc: CGS File
Registrar # 183595

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 July 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MC CORD, James W., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271-0208
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
TECHNICAL DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ELECT ENG - AUDIO SUPP (15)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0642
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0855.21
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18,740
18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert E. O'Brien
Robert E. O'Brien, A/Chief/PersBr/
DATE SIGNED: 7/14/65

A432

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

A37

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16360 ALPHABETIC DDC
22. STATION CODE: 75213
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. VOUCHER CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 26 YR. 24
26. DATE IN GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MIS EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RSVR PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7/21/65 mw
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 7/23/65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14.

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	20 August 1964
1. SERIAL NUMBER	058124
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	MCCORD, James W., Jr.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER ~~FROM~~ [illegible] TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 8 · DAY 16 · YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐ V TO V · ☐ V TO CF · ☒ CF TO V · ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	5271-0100
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY EXECUTIVE STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0032
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 18,170

18. REMARKS

Verbal Concurrence: 20 August 1964 - George Rader, DDP/EE Personnel

Mr. McCord is being double slotted against position 0032 for approximately one (1) year while attending the Air War College.

Date. 20 AUG 1964

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

W. D. O

Chief, Personnel [illegible] Div. [illegible]

cc: DDP/EE
cc: Cl Br

37
A

14
A
16

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	
DATE SIGNED	
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	Ernest L. Hardt Ernest L. Hardt, ChPersBr, [illegible]/OS
DATE SIGNED	8/20/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	[illegible]
20. EMPLOY CODE	[illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	[illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	[illegible]
22. STATION CODE	[illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HOOTHS CODE	1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	[illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) CODE	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.) CODE	
39. FEGLI. HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) CODE; HEALTH INS. CODE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) CODE	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	from EE [illegible]
46. O P APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	[illegible]

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 MAY 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): MCCORD, James W. Jr.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 27 YEAR 62

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2139 9300 1017

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EE
German Station
Deputy for Combined Services
Security Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Frankfurt, Germany

11. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer ~~(SO)~~

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0363

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~(15)~~

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 14055 ✓

18. REMARKS:

One copy has been forwarded to the Office of Security.
W-4 and D-4 forms have been forwarded to Payroll.
Medical OK, JANUARY 1962 per the Office of Security.
From: DDS/Office of Security
Security Research Staff
Office of the Chief
Washington, D.C.
#365

5/22/62
-m7 5/22/62

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Margaret E. McKenney, C/EE/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 5-11-62

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ernest J. Hardt for Chief, OS/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 16 May 62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. POSITION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	54460	EE	27015		3	01 26 24		

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Sec Career. Sec
m 05-18-62

46. O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 5/21/62

FORM 8-61 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. (4)

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

25 June 1959

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt.-1 10 Pt.-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1 9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Y/o Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER			18. Position No. 0365	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.01
21. Grade & Step 14 ~~2~~ 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 11,835 ~~11595~~	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 001	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr. 6 28 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code [illegible]	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief	Code 3112	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code [illegible]

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn - D Code 2	34. Position Title Security Officer			35. Position No. 0365	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.01
38. Grade & Step 15-1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 12,770.00	40. SD ES	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]	43. Appropriation Number 9-7100-20-001	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible] 1959	E.	
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]

Remarks

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

21 January 1959

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF	Code 3110	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - Code 2	17. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	18. Position No. 0033	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.22

21. Grade & Step 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate $11,595	23. SD SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7101 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 16	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief	Code ~~3117~~ 3118	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

33. Dept. - Field Dept. - USfld - Frgn - D Code	34. Position Title Security Officer	35. Position No. T365	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.01

38. Grade & Step 14-2	39. Salary Or Rate $11595.00 pa	40. SD SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 9-7100-20-001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br., A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Marcia Shepherd Ext. [illegible]

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		1/28/59
B. Pos. Control		23 [illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	EW Shaw M McKenney	1-28-59

Remarks

(4)

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DATE PREPARED			REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION	X	V to V		V to UV
Mo	Da	Yr			UV to V		UV to UV
7	10	58					

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
	McCORD, James Walter, Jr.	Mo 1 Da 26 Yr 24	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	M	Mo Da Yr

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt.	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT. LCC
Mo Da Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code		Mo Da Yr	Yes-1 No-2 Code	Mo Da Yr	Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept.-Usfld.-Frgn.- D		Security Officer	365	GS	1810.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
14 ~~3~~ 2	11,595 $ ~~11355~~.00 pa	SS	Mo Da Yr	Mo Da Yr	8-7101-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
REASSIGNMENT		Mo Da Yr	Regular		

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS/Office of Security Inspection Staff	5110	Washington, D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept.-Usfld.-Frgn.- D		Investigator	33	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
14 ~~2~~ 3	11,595 $ ~~11355.~~00 pa	SS	Mo 07 Da 01 Yr 56	Mo 06 Da 28 Yr 59	8-7101-20

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title)
H. E. Steele, Ch. Pers. Br. A&TS/OS

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Relda White, Ext 2063

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. E. Steele
Chief, Personnel Branch, A&TS/OS

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	WH Dodds	7/16/58
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		7-16-58

Remarks

FORM 12-57 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITI...

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): MR. JAMES W. McCORD, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 4 Jun 57

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): REASSIGNMENT
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (CI) T367	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Security Officer T365-14
GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.01-14 $10,320.00 pa
DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311201	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary): No Fitness Report required - no change in supervision.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., A&TS, OS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Jane Giesing, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. E. Steele
Title: Ch, Personnel Branch, A&TS, OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL	
			•	SD-SS

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-7101-20
TO Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		5 JUN 1957	
C. CLASSIFICATION		6/5/57	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		6/11/57	
E			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 19__—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R:

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): MR. JAMES W. McCORD, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan '24
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 6/29/56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED:
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Security Res Spec T405		Investigator (CI) T367
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.24-13 $9205.00 pa		GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff External Branch		DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

No Fitness Report required - no change in supervision.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): H.E.Steele, Ch, Pers. Br., A&TS, OS
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): Jane Giesing, Ext. 2063
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: EWSchmidt
Title: Ch, Admin & Training Staff, OS

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	~~X~~		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				SD-SS

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION: W
FROM: 4-7101-20
TO: 6=7101-20
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Texas

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	GH		
C. CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]	[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMP.	[illegible]		
E.			
F. APPROVED BY			

SECRET

10—[illegible]

4-00000

E.v.O.

R.W. White

23 September 1954

Joseph S. Reff

Military Permit for Germany - James Walter McCord, Jr. Lee

1. It is requested that a Military Permit for Germany be affixed to the Special Passport issued to the above subject.

2. Travel for the above subject is sponsored by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Housing accommodations are available.

3. It is further requested that any reference to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY be excluded from the permit issued.

Special Passport # 39738
Date of issue: 15 September 1954
Place of issue: Washington, D.C.
Valid Until: 14 September 1956
Occupation: Government Employee
Destination: Frankfurt
Duration in Germany: 2yrs.
Date of entry: 30 September 1954

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) MR. JAMES W. McCORD, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] January	3. REQUEST NO. 1924	4. DATE OF REQUEST 6/[illegible]/54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) PROMOTION		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED: 6 June 1954	

FROM—		TO—
Investigator T297.01	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Security Officer TL65
GS-1810.27-12 ~~[illegible]~~ $7240 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.01-13 $8,360.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

PSI eff 6 June 54 - not in folder.

Approved by SE/CSB 8 June 54*

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) Ervin A. Schmidt, Chief, A[illegible]S	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: C. [illegible]
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) F. L. Steele, Ext. 2263	Title: Executive Officer, Security Office

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	DWD	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-SE

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: 4-7103-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

*Per Mr. Steele, 50 - [illegible] 6/8/54

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	9 June 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	6/9/54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Ralph S. [illegible] 10 June '54

SECRET

16—57330-8

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.*
If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): [illegible]

2. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: [illegible]

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): REASSIGNMENT

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (Gen) [illegible]	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator [illegible]
GS-1810-12 [illegible].00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810.22-12 [illegible].00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, A TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): [illegible] Steele, Ext. [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: EWSchmidt
Title: Chief, Admin & Training Staff, [illegible]

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-[illegible]

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION—
FROM: [illegible]-7103-20
TO: [illegible]-7103-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: TEXAS

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JA	5/[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	h	5/21
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. JAMES W. McCORD, JR.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12/17/53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 6-08 3 JAN 1954	

FROM—		TO—
Investigator(Gen) T211.01	8. POSITION (TITLE AND NUMBER)	Investigator(Gen) T297.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division SSD Pool	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM UnVouchered Funds.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Ervin W. Schmidt, Chief, A&TS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
E.E. Steele, Ext. 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: EWSchmidt
Title: Chief, Admin. & Trng. Staff
SO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	J. A.	REAL.

~~[illegible]~~
CD-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM 4-7130-30
TO 4-7103-20
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Security Concurrence 12/22/53

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	21/12	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] 12/22/53

SECRET

10-67929-6

TO: Director of Personnel
Department of Justice-F.B.I.
Washington, D. C.

DATE: 17 September 1951

In accordance with the requirements of the Federal Personnel Manual it is requested that the Official Personnel Folder and Leave Record of:

NAME: MCCORD, James Walter, Jr.

DOB : 26 Jan. 1924

PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED IN: Department of Justice-F.B.I.

BRANCH OR DIVISION :

LOCATION : Washington, D. C.

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT : October 1948 to February 1951

Be forwarded to:

Mr. K. B. J. Hopkins
Chief, Personnel Division
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Leave record
sent to Payroll
9-27-51

CONFIDENTIAL

22 August 1951
(Date)

I, James Walter McCord, Jr., hereby certify that the information appearing on my Personal History Statement dated 18 May 1951 is still accurate and correct, except as follows: No corrections

1. However an addition may be made to the education section inasmuch as one summer semester in evening Law School, Lincoln University, Oakland, Calif., was completed since the date of the application. This semester began 4 June 1951 and ended 10 August 1951.

2. In the certificate regarding Reserve Status filed with the original application it was reflected that I was in the Volunteer Air Reserve, USAF. On August 14 a letter Reserve Order from Hamilton AFB, Calif., was sent to me advising that I was being transferred from the Volunteer Air Reserve to the Organized Reserve with a mobilization assignment with the 19th District OSI, Travis AFB, California. (See Military Status Questionnaire)

James Walter McCord Jr.
(Signature)

CONFIDENTIAL

NK

810 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California
July 20, 1951

Mr. Joseph B. Hagan
Chief, Personnel Procurement
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hagan:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 4, 1951.

At the present time I am in the position of finding it necessary in the very near future to make several decisions of considerable financial importance to me. Should your organization be in a position to indicate whether favorable consideration has been given my application, or to indicate by what date you may be in a position to make a decision in that regard, such information would be of very great help to me at this time. As you have been advised earlier, I am interested in the CIA as a career, am willing to accept an assignment either overseas or in this country at your discretion, and at the starting salary you believe commensurate with my past experience.

Any assistance you can furnish concerning the above request will be indeed appreciated.

Very truly yours

James Walter McCord Jr

James Walter McCord, Jr.

14-00000

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

Request No. 1-7311
Date: 6 July

1. Full Name [illegible] Last, First, Middle
2. Year of Birth 1924

3. Position Title SPECIAL AGENT Grade GS-11 Code ___

4. Location: Office I&S Division [illegible] Branch ___
Code ___ Code ___ Code ___

5. Geographic destination SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
City and state or country, as appropriate

6. Type of Employee: ☒ 1. Regular ☐ 2. Contract ☐ 3. Consultant
☐ 4. Military ☐ 5. Other: ___

7. Funds: ☐ 1. Vouchered ☒ 2. Unvouchered

8. Type(s) of security clearance requested:

☒ Provisional for ___
Show name of pool or group

☒ Secret

☒ Full

☐ Waiver

9. Availability date: ___ Day-Month-Year
10. Estimated clearance date ___ Month-Year

11. Recruitment Source ___ Code ___

12. Sex and Veteran status: ☒ 1. M-V ☐ 2. M-NV ☐ 3. F-V ☐ 4. F-NV

13. Remarks:

2 PHS'S RETAINED BY I&S

Attachments:
( ) PHS
( ) Appendix I
( ) Photographs

___
Signature
PMC
___
Division

Form No. 37-104
Jun 1951

4 June 1951

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
820 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California

Dear Mr. McCord:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your application for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Your application is being given consideration for current employment possibilities. This process is somewhat time consuming; however, we shall advise you as soon as a definite decision has been reached.

Any requests for further information should be addressed to the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Procurement

Foo1

14-00000

10 May 1951

Mr. James Walter McCord, Jr.
[illegible] Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California

Dear Mr. McCord:

Thank you for your recent application for employment in our organization.

Enclosed you will find the forms which we require all prospective applicants to fill out in order that we may become more thoroughly acquainted with their background and experience. If you will be good enough to fill them out and return them with three passport size photographs of yourself, we will be in a better position to review your qualifications and will then advise you further. You may retain the fourth copy of the Personal History Statement for your own records.

We sincerely appreciate your interest in our organization and look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Very truly yours,

JOSEPH B. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Procurement

Enclosures (9)

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, James Walter McCord Jr., understand that by virtue of my duties in the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regulations CIA", and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this ____ day of __________ 19____.

James Walter McCord Jr. ________ (Seal)

Sworn to before me this _____ day of __________ 19____,

at ______________________________.

____

FORM NO. 38-33
APR 1950

620 Pacific Avenue
Alameda, California
April 13, 1951

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am interested in securing an interview with your local Agent-In-Charge regarding the position of Special Agent with your organization. My prior investigative experience includes four years with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, two years as a Special Agent and two years as a Radio Technician, I hold a commission in the U. S. Air Force Reserve, and have held an assignment as Intelligence Officer in a Reserve Unit. My last annual two-week tour of duty in the Air Force Reserve was an Intelligence Officer Refresher Course at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado in March, 1950. My age is twenty-seven, and I am married, no children.

Should it appear that an interview may be arranged, I shall be glad to talk with your representative at his convenience.

Very truly yours

James Walter McCord, Jr.

James Walter McCord, Jr.

SECERT

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

WATERGATE FILE REVIEW FLAG

SUBJECT: McCORD, James

FILE NO: 58124 DATE FLAGGED: 24 April 1974

All information contained in this file through the above date was reviewed for possible significance to "Watergate" or other related matters. This review was conducted by Office of Security personnel. Additionally, this file was in the custody of the Office of the Inspector General from 26 February 1974 until released to the Office of Security on 15 April 1974.

No action is required through date cited above for further "Watergate" related file review reporting.

File Cross Reference - 625000

Officer Reviewing File

DO NOT REMOVE OR DESTROY THIS FLAG WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY.

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF [illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFIC[illegible]OVER BACKSTOP

31 August 1970

FILE NUMBER 13507

EMPLOYEE NUMBER 05124

ID CARD NUMBER

TO: (Check)

- x CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- x CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) OS

ATTN: OS/Chief Admin Staff

REF: Resignation Debriefing

SUBJECT: McCORD, James W. Jr.

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☐ ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	☒ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB	DATE (as of CCB) August 1951
☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	NA SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
x ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	OK RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-3e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-3e)	
☐ SUBMIT FORM 2688 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Aug 51-Jun 53 CONUS DCD
Jun 53-May 62
May 62-May 64 Germany DAC
Jun 64 Overt

FORWARDING ADDRESS: # 7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS: UNK

Subject is to indicate CIA as place of employment for entire period.

DRM/gb

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - S/OS
COPY 4 - CL/TELSVC
COPY 5 - CCS - CHRONO
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-66 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF MILITARY COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 20 Jul 64

TO: (Check)
☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For Action) OS

SUBJECT: McCORD, JAMES W, Jr

ATTN: OS/AATS

REF:

FILE NO. K3930

MILITARY COVER DISCONTINUED: Department of the Army/ overseas

ID CARD NO.

☒ Unblock Records: *(OP Memo 20-800-11)*

Effective 11 Jun 64

☒ Submit Form 642 To Change Limitation Category. *(HB 20-800-2 to be redesignated HHB 20-7)*

☒ Return All Military Documentation To CCS. Overseas military documentation for subject and dependents should be returned to CPB.

☒ Remarks: Subject should be acknowledged as a current employee as he is to attend the Air War College as an overt employee.

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

7-23-64
WR

☐ COPY TO CPD/OP

James Franklin

EDF/pp CHIEF, MILITARY COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: 1-OSD/OS: 1-PSD/OS

FORM 12-61 1551a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from [illegible]
downgrading and d[illegible]

(13-20-43)

SECRET

8 March 1961

File No. K-3030

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W.

1. Cover arrangements [illegible] have been completed for the above-named Subject. TDY

2. Effective 11 Mar - 27 March 61, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [illegible] to deny [illegible] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

[illegible]

For GLEN E. MOOREHOUSE
Acting Chief, Central Cover Group

cc: SSD/OS

THIS [illegible] REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

FORM 1-59 1580a

(4-13-40)

3-18-61
rpc

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

Dear Mr. McCord:

It is the practice of the Organization to follow up with former employees six months after their retirement. We hope by such inquiry to obtain information on what our retirees are doing and where they are located, invite suggestions for improving the retirement program and to learn if the Organization might be of some assistance on any post-retirement matters.

We should like very much to hear from you on the above points and on any other topics you think would be useful to us.

For your convenience in replying, we have enclosed a sheet somewhat akin to a form on which we have listed those standard items of information we'd like to have on every retiree. The remainder of the sheet, including the reverse side, is for your comments and suggestions. We shall be most appreciative of your fullest response to this inquiry.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Carroll A. Duchay
Personnel Officer

Enclosures:
    Questionnaire
    Return Envelope

Distribution:
    Original - Addressee
        1 - OPF
        1 - RAD Subject's File

OP/RAD/EEAB/MLShobe:mlp (23 April 1971)

Actions


[illegible] JAMES W JR
052049 1924
790-101-43 OCTOBER '69

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME (INITIAL(S))
MC CORD, JAMES W JR

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty 08/22/51 | P-T XX | P-I

Subject to Sec. 203(d), 1951 Leave Act
Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ________ annual leave Act

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years 25 Months 05 Days 04
☒ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
RETIREMENT*INV*UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM 08/31/70

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)

	Annual	Sick
5. Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 1970	328	1729
6. Current leave year accrual through 8/22 1970	128	64
7. Total	456	1793
8. Reduction in credits, if any (current year)		
9. Total leave taken	367	4
10. Balance	89	1789

11. Total hours paid in lump sum 89 hrs & 1 hol
12. Salary rate(s) $28,989.00
13. Lump sum leave dates
From 0830 09/01/70 09/17/70 0930 (Hours)

14. Certified correct by

(Signature) (Date)

for Chief Payroll (Title)
143-2585 (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE

(DAYS)

14. Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ________
15. Current balance as of ________ 19__ ________
16. 12-month accrual rate ________
17. Dates leave used prior 24 months ________
18. Monthly accrual date ________
19. Calendar days credit for next accrual date ________
20. Date basic service period completed ________

MILITARY LEAVE

21. Dates during current calendar yr ________ to ________
22. Dates during preceding calendar yr ________ to ________

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or Furlough (Hours)	AWOL or Suspension (Hours)
23. During leave year in which separated		
24. During step increase waiting period which began on 06/14/70		

25. During 12-month HL accrual period (dates): ________

REMARKS
SCD 03/27/45

*S/L TRANS TO
STANDS 5 USC
CH 63

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

SSD: 14 SEPT 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058128
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-INVOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYS-CORR
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 31 YR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. Cost Center No. Chargeable: 1271 0301 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 235A
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 28383
18. REMARKS: THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/31/70 AS FOLLOWS: ITEM 16, GRADE AND STEP WHICH READ 15 2 TO READ 15 3; AND ITEM 17, SALARY OR RATE WHICH READ 28226 TO READ 28383.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 59
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 26 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0GU0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE 9G; MO 08 DA 31 YR 70

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RES; PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVED 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9-16-70

FORM 1150 5-64 Mfg. 8-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT-VOLUNTARY-UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 | 31 | 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1471 0001 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 233A
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS, OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD, PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL AND OVERSEAS SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0470
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 19
17. SALARY OR RATE: 28205 29979
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. MAJOR CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 01 | 26 | 24
26. DATE OF GRADE
27. DATE OF LEI
28. NTE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0000000
32. Correction Cancellation Data
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8-28-70

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BSJ

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

When Filled In

14-00000

[illegible] 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 05 [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible]CORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATED AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. Item of Analysis No. Chargeable: 1221 0501 0004
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE:
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15
17. SALARY OR RATE:
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. Employ. Code
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hours Code
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO DA YR
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE; CODE: 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Corr./Not. Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI: CODE; 0 WAIVED, 1 YES; HEALTH INSURANCE: HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7-8-70 [illegible]

FORM 5-66 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET BBG

(When Filled In)

A-38

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
058124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	16 240	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 15	8	XXXXXX 28,226	06/15/67	GS 15	9	XXXXXX 28,989	06/14/70		

0UUU

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN, FUNDS		GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 8	$28,226

JLB: 10 OCT 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 10 DA 10 YR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9271 0501 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
DD/PHYSICAL, TECHNICAL & OVERSEAS SECURITY
PHYSICAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: PHYSICAL SEC OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0070
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.07
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 8
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24393
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	16240	SEC	75013		1	01 26 24		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 WAIVER 1 YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/14/68

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition Mfg. 10-67

SECRET

JLB

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

058124 [illegible] 16 240 V

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EP Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PS	LS	ADJ
GS-15	7	$23734	06-18-67	GS-15	8	$24593	10-06-68			

Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/S/Robert S. Wattles DATE: 10-04-68

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	15 240	V	GS 15 7	$22,082	$23,734

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES	058124	15 240	V	GS 15 7	$21,192	$22,082

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	16 240	V	GS 15 5	$19,415	$19,975

A 39

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3 Cost Center Number		4. LWOP Hours
058124	MCCORD JAMES	16 240	V	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	6	$20,535	06/20/65	GS 15	7	$21,192	06/18/67			

8 Remarks and Authentication

NO EXCESS LWOP
IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

JUN 14 4 07 PM '67

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES , JR	058124	DS 240	V	GS 15 5	$18,740	$19,415

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
058124	McCORD, JAMES	16 240 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-15	5	$199[illegible]	06/20/65	GS-15	6	$20585	08/28/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols DATE: 08/18/66

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-31)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DCS 08/31/65

1. SERIAL NUMBER 058124	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) MCCORD JAMES W JR				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 08 29 65	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 6271 0503 0000	8. CS OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDS/SECURITY			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP			12. POSITION NUMBER 0642	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION SS	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0855.21		16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE	
18. REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/1/65

08 6-65 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-37)

RZR: 23 JUL 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 07 23 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6271 0208 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OFFICE OF SECURITY
TECHNICAL DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0642
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0855.21
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18740
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16360 | ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 01 26 24
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. | CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES | HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE | 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

7/27/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

37.

JUN 23 12 24 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
098124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	16 160 V	—

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$18,170	06/23/63	GS 15	5	$18,740	06/20/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 8/11/65

mkl

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DUE: 14 AUG 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 053124
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 08 DA 16 YR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5271 0100 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY EXECUTIVE STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0032
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 18170
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 16160 ALPHABETIC SEC
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 26 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. DTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: EE
G

E.O.D.

3 SEP 1964

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 20 AUG 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-01)

(When Filled In)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	44 400	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

---

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
058124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	54 460 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 15	3	$15,525	06/24/62	GS 15	4	$16,005	06/23/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

2

133

U 6/18/63

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

cc 6/7/63

U 6/23/63

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE 5 June 63

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	058124	54460	CF	15 3	$14380	15 3	$15525

058124 MCCORD JAMES W JR 24 175

OLD SALARY RATE NEW SALARY RATE TYPE ACTION

Grade Step Salary Last Eff. Date Grade Step Effective Date

GS 15 2 $14,055 12/25/60 GS 15 3 $14,380 06/24/61

8 Remarks and Authentication

to UV 5/27/60 Z 133

/✓/ NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	DDS/SEC 1	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 15	1	$13,730	06	28	59	GS 15	2	$14,055	12	25	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11 AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-563 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
SS	MCCORD JAMES W JR	158124	31 12	GS-15 1	$12,770	$13,730

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO. 159124	2. NAME MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN DDS/SEC /	4. FUNDS V-20	5. ALLOTMENT

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 14	2	$11,596	12	29	57	GS 14	3	11 835	06	28	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

JUN 22 3 30 PM '59
REC. PAYROLL BRANCH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

PSC: 24 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 058124
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): MCCORD JAMES W JR
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 05 DA 27 YR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☒ X | CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2139 9300 1017
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP EE
GERMAN STATION
DEPUTY FOR COMBINED SERVICES
SECURITY BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: FRANKFURT, GERMANY
11. POSITION TITLE: SECURITY OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0363
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: SS
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1810.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 14055
18. REMARKS: SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 20
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 54460 ALPHABETIC EE
22. STATION CODE: 27015
23. INTEGREF CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 01 DA 26 YR 24
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD: 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

TOS [illegible]
MAY 1962

Form 1150 4-61 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-61)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JEC:2? JUNE 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
158124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	01	26	24		1	M	1	05	22	51		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
03	27	45		1	50 USCA 403 J						05	22	51

13. Military Credit Yes-1 No-2	Code
	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3112	WASH., D.C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	SECURITY OFFICER	0365	GS	1810.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
14 3	$11835	SS	07	01	56	06	28	59	9 7100 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION	30	06	28	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	3112	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	SECURITY OFFICER	0365	GS	1810.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$12770	SS	06	28	59	12	28	[illegible]	9 7100 20 001

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AES: 4 FEB 1959

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 158124	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 01 Da. 26 Yr. 24	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 27 Yr. 45	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 08 Da. 22 Yr. 51	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF	Code 3110	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title INVESTIGATOR	18. Position No. 0033	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 1810.22

21. Grade & Step 14 2	22. Salary Or Rate $11,595	23. SD SS	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 7101 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 02 Da. 04 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 3112	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D.C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title SECURITY OFFICER	35. Position No. 0365	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 1810.01

38. Grade & Step 14 2	39. Salary Or Rate $11595	40. SD SS	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 07 Da. 01 Yr. 56	42. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 28 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 7100 20 001

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
MCCORD JAMES W JR	158124	GS-14-2	$10,535	$11,595

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

.LVL 29 JULY 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
158124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	01	26	24	1	M 1	08	22	51		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2 Code	
03	27	45	1	50 USCA 403 J			08	22	51	2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
ODS OFFICE OF SECURITY SECURITY RESEARCH STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH., D.C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 U.Std - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	SEC OF	0365	GS	1810.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. / 25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
14 2	$11,595	SS		9 7101 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	07 29 58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
ODS OFFICE OF SECURITY INSPECTION STAFF	3110	WASH., D.C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 U.Std - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	INVESTIGATOR	0033	GS	1810.22

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr. / 42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
14 2	$11,595	SS	07 01 56 / 06 28 59	9 7101 20

44. Remarks

5 AUG 1958

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible] 8/11/58

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
158124	MCCORD JAMES W JR	DDS/SEC /	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
14	1	$10,320	07	01	56	14	2	$10,535	12	29	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Hi E. Steele	11/8/57	Hi E. Steele

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) MR. JAMES W. MCCORD, JR. 157124	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 June 1957

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) REASSIGNMENT 56	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 June 1957	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (CI) T367	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Officer T365-14
GS-1810.22-14 $10320.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.01-14 $10320.00 per annum
Internal Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311201	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/SS

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-7101-20 TO: Same 750-13	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

2 EOD 08/22/51

POSTED

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950-373667

713 6/21/51

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES W. MC CORD, JR. 158124
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 25 Jun 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): PROMOTION
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 1 Jul 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM 30		TO
Security Res Spec T405	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (CI) T367
GS-1810.24-13 $9205.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-14 $10,320.00 per annum
External Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 311230	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff Internal Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL XXX

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD-SS

1
15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 7-7101-20
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

1
20. REMARKS: Same 750-13

2 EOD 08/22/51

POSTED
6 [illegible]

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955

Rm 7-6-56

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-930C90

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 7103 Vouchered

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)

McCORD, James Walter

6. Grade and salary

GS-13 - $8990.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)

08 - 1

12. Prepared by

MG - 10/24/55

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
4 Dec 55	6 Jun 54	$8990.00	$9205.00	SERVICE AND CONDUCT (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data. (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods.)
Period(s).

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ LWOP at end of waiting period

☐ LWOP start of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

whr

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER B1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 24 May 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 8 May 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Security Officer	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Res Spec T-405
GS-1[illegible]10.01-13	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1[illegible]10.24-13 $8360.00 p.a.
DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDS/Office of Security Security Research Staff External Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM:
TO: 5-7101-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Texas
[illegible]

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

CODED
8 JUN 55

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

[illegible] 5/24/55

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG. .-Y

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Jm

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Jan 1924	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 4 June 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 6 June 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Investigator T 297.01	8. POSITION TITLE	Security Officer T 405
GS-1810.22-12 $7240.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.01-13 $8360.00 per annum
Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-85

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: 4-7101-20	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Lei 6/1/54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible] - 867574

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay period -/54

5. Block No. 6-7203-20

6. Slip No.

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) McCORD, JAMES WALTER

4. Grade and salary GS 12 $7040.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous period											
8. New period											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) SECURITY 7

12. Prepared by rca/3/10/54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
6JUN54	7DEC52	$7040.00	$7240.00

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

Signature or other authentication

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)

Periodic

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

☐ [illegible]

☐ [illegible]

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL, 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 1924
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 23 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 25 Apr 1954
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen)	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator T297.01
GS-1810-12	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810.22-12 $7040.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-SE

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7103-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Texas

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Km 4-26-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1953 — 240347

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Corr. 22 Dec 53 Jan

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jan 24
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 28 Dec 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: B.O.B. 3 Jan 54
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Investigator (Gen) T 211.01	8. POSITION TITLE	Investigator (Gen) T 297.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division SSD Pool	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDA/Security Office Special Security Division Operations Branch Office of the Chief
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER	
			X			Verified

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-8Z

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-7130-30 TO: 4-7103-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Vouchered Funds FROM Unvouchered Funds."

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Personnel Director

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible] 122853

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953 — 248247

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7/31/53
98

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. One given name, initial(s), and surname) MR. JAMES W. MCCORD	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7/7/53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) REASSIGNMENT B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 7/7/53 B. APPROVED: 7 July 1953	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
Investigator(General) T169.01-12	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator(General) T211.01
GS-1810-12 $7040.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	Same
DDA/Security Office Special Security Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same
San Francisco Field Office San Francisco, California	11. HEADQUARTERS	SSD Pool Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
C. J. KING, DEPUTY CHIEF, ASTS

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
FRED F. CYRUS, EXT. [illegible] 2063

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Chief, Admin. & Eng. Staff
SD

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-SE

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-7130-30 TO: 4-7130-30			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			POSTED RD July 53 RH
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	7/17	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Orville C Dawson 17 July 1953

10—67320-0

UNVOUCHERED

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION
Inspection & Security Office

Page 6 of 7 pa

Used in lieu of SF-52 &/or or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel action involving no change in grade or salary; (a) Change in Title (b) Change of Position No. (c) Reassignment within Division without series Code change
All Class seriesare the same on the From and To sides.
W/O App.: 1/14/53

Eff. Date: 2/15/53

NAME	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.	ACTION	ORG.INF.& POS.TITLE	SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	SLOT NOS.
Chicago Field office (cont'd.)						Chicago Field Office	
Green, Paul R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T180.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.05-11
Brown, Stuart A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.06-11
Wakefield, James C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T180.07-11
Ambrose, Vance E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T180.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181
Graham, Elwood M.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T211.07	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181.01
Francis, Donald T.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T181.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T181.02
Anderson, Charles E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.03-10
Lelle, Tell C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.08	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.04-10
Anderson, Theodore M.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T181.07	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T181.05-10
Hettinger, Helga M.	Clerk Steno.	GS-3	T215	b,c	Clerk Steno.	GS-312-3	T186.02-3
San Francisco Field Office						San Francisco Field Office	
Finch, William G.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T189.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T188
Spears, C. Calvin	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T189.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T189-12
McCord, James W.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T189.01-12
Haviland, Glenn A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T190.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T190.01-11
Mason, Robert E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-11	T207.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-11	T190.02-11
Stith, Ernest P.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T190.03
Gabriel, Jerome A.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T212.06	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T191.04-9
Kelt, William H.	Inv. Gen.	GS-10	T216.08	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-10	T191.05-10
Quackenbush, William J.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T212.05	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T191.06-9
Los Angeles Field Office						Los Angeles Field Office	
White, Victor R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T147.02	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T326-13
Mullan, William J.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T189	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T327
Rich, Edward H.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T188	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T328-12
McCallan, Raymond F.	Inv. Gen.	GS-13	T179	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-13	T328.01
Alden, John S.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.01	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329
Meek, Bert B.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T190.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329.01
Ginger, John W.	Inv. Gen.	GS-12	T172	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-12	T329.02
Geraty, Franklin R.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T172.12	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T329.03-9
Conners, Donald C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T191.04	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T329.04-9
Kuh, Richard E.	Inv. Gen.	GS-7	T172.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T330-7
Coonan, John S.	Inv. Gen.	GS-7	T212	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-7	T330.01-7
Kreykenbohm, Warren C.	Inv. Gen.	GS-9	T213.03	b,c	Inv. Gen.	GS-1810-9	T330.02-9

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

App.by: E.W. Schmidt
Staff or Div. Chief

App.by: Eugene C. [illegible]
Class & Wage Div.

App.by: M. L. [illegible]
Personnel Div.

10 Sept. '52

1. Agency and organizational designation
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2.

3. Block No
UV

4. Slip No

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
MC CORD, James W.

6. Grade and salary
GS-11 $5940.00

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks
Cancellation of PSI
BN

11. Appropriation(s)
1380
11

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
31Aug. '52	22Aug. '51	$5940.00	$6140.00	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initial of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2a U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12/11/52

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) JAMES W. MC CORD	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 11/12/52
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) PROMOTION B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: DEC 7 1952	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Investigator (Gen) T190.03-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Investigator (Gen) T190.03
GS-1810-11 $6140.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-1810-12 $7040.00 pa
Inspection & Security Office Special Security Division	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same
San Francisco Field Office San Francisco, California	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same Same
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: A F Henry Title: EXECUTIVE OFFICER
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED
11 Dec 52 HP

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	am	11-2
E.		

REMARKS:

NO COPIES

F. APPROVED BY 11-26-52 D Mulcahy

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

16—67329-9

S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION

INSPECTION & SECURITY OFFICE

CODE "T"

APR 1 3 [illegible]

SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION FIELD OFFICES

NAME	TITLE	GRADE SERIES	POSITION NUMBER
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE (CONTINUED)			
DOYLE, C. Veronica	Clerk(Stenography)	GS-301-5	T185
FEHRMAN, Mary Margaret	Clerk(Stenography)	GS-301-4	T185.01-4
GAVRILOVICH, Gloria A.	Clerk(Stenographer)	GS-312-4	T186
SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE			
HUNT, William C.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-13	T187-13
RICH, Edward H.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T188-12
MULLAN, William J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T189-12
FINCH, William G.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T189.01-12
SPEARS, C. Calvin, Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T189.02-11
TURTON, Jack S.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T190
HARRIS, Jack A.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.01-11
HAVILAND, Glenn A.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.02-11
MCCORD, James W.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.03-11
MEEK, Bert B., Jr.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T190.04-11
STITH, Ernest P.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-12	T190.05
GAMRATH, Murray W.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T191
ALDEN, John S.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-11	T191.01
SULLIVAN, Thomas V.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T191.02-9
JOVICK, Edward J.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-9	T191.03-9
CONNORS, Donald O.	Investigator(Gen)	GS-1810-7	T191.04-7
SILBERT, Annie	Adm. Assistant	GS-301-5	T192-5
MILLAGE, Margaret K.	Clerk	GS-301-5	T193-5
VAN STEENBERG, Charlotte	Secretary(Steno)	GS-318-5	T194

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: McCORD, James Walter, Jr.

DATE: 27 June 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: New Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 22 August 51

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Investigator (General) ~~Special Agent~~
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-11 - $5400.00 p.a.
OFFICE		Inspection and Security Office
DIVISION		Special Security Division
BRANCH		
OFFICIAL STATION		San Francisco, Calif. (Field)

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS G Greaves	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. J. KING Administrative Officer	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION F-522 (17 July 1950) C. C. Hutson 17 July 1951	PERSONNEL OFFICER JUL 23 1951 D Mulcahy	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 22 August 51

SECURITY CLEARED ON 14 August 51

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED NA

ENTERED ON DUTY 22 August 51

PPD ✓

Robert M. White
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

1010

Control No. 1544 - Slot No. 10.
Two copies of PHS retained for security processing. One PHS attached.

DOG - 12/07/52
EOD - 08/--/51
LCD - 08/22/51

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BY SECURITY ONLY

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GPO 16-63208-1

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SECRET

24 APR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. Emp. Ser. No. 58124
Fitness Report

1. This is an annual fitness report covering the period 1 April 1969 through 31 March 1970. Mr. McCord completed his first full year as Chief, Physical Security Division. During 1969 the Division underwent many changes, a direct result of the personal efforts of this employee. He has shown the initiative to seek out new ways and means to harden the security of our domestic and overseas facilities by tapping all possible technological sources both in and out of Government. His efforts have produced tangible results and in my judgment, our posture in the physical security field is far superior to any of our contemporaries.

2. With the spiraling costs of manpower, Mr. McCord has concentrated on the potential for use of technical devices to replace the human asset. He has made remarkable inroads into this field by way of imagination, ingenuity and drive.

3. Mr. McCord has the quality to inspire his subordinates. He is demanding, but understanding. On more than one occasion he was asked to take under his wing employees who were labeled "problems." Through personal interest and effort, he has salvaged the majority of these individuals to a point where they are performing in a highly satisfactory manner.

4. In the previous fitness report, I alluded to the fact that employee has a tendency to find it difficult to see another person's point of view. This, I feel, is attributable to an innate stubbornness which obviously is difficult to overcome. Mr. McCord is a very

30 APR 1970

principled individual who once convinced he has hit upon the proper course of action will usually yield only by direction. We've discussed this, and I've noted a determined effort on his part to broaden his tolerance for other opinions.

5. Overall, the employee has made a substantial contribution to the Office of Security by his dedication to his job, his tenacious attitude toward upgrading our physical security standards, a curious and inventive mind ever searching for better ways to solve a problem in his area of responsibility, and a cost consciousness in the administration of his division. I rate him an overall "Strong."

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Noted by Employee:

James W. McCord Jr. — Apr 28 '70
James W. McCord, Jr. — Date

Reviewed By:

Howard J Osborn — 29 APR 1970
Howard J. Osborn — Date
Director of Security

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
658124

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 01/26/24
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Physical Security Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PTOS/PhySD/OC
8. CURRENT STATION: Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
☒ CAREER
☐ RESERVE
☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
☐ INITIAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1969
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Attached Memorandum	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr., Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Fitness Report

1. This is an annual fitness report covering the period 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969. During the first period of this report, Mr. McCord served as the Chief, Technical Division/PTOS and continued to display a very high degree of professionalism in administering the Agency's world-wide Audio Countermeasures (ACM) program. Under his guidance, several new devices and techniques were developed which have helped the Agency and the intelligence community to maintain pace with the sophisticated advances by the opposition in the field of positive audio.

2. Mr. McCord initiated the necessary planning for the activation of the Interagency Training Center (ITC) which provides ACM instruction to all members of the community in the latest of equipment and techniques.

3. On 14 October 1968, he was reassigned to the position of Chief, Physical Security Division. Although he had relatively little experience in this particular field, he has quickly assimilated the necessary details to manage this Agency effort. He has taken steps toward the development and use of the most advanced physical security equipment and techniques to protect the Agency. Under the supervision of Mr. McCord, the Agency Security Command Center operations have been expanded and improved. He has been assigned the responsibility to organize and direct the Security efforts relating to the protection of Agency assets in time of demonstrations, riots, and other civil disturbances. He coordinated the Agency Security effort with the U. S. Secret Service in protection of the President of the United States during his recent visit to the CIA Headquarters.

SECRET

4. Mr. McCord is considered to be economical in his use of equipment, manpower and funds.

5. Perhaps one of the stronger attributes this employee possesses is his ability to organize. In a relatively short time, he has deliberated the Physical Security Division's mission and already taken steps to restructure it within existing manpower limitations to more effectively react to its responsibilities.

6. He inspires his subordinates and has the respect of his superiors. There have been instances, however, when Mr. McCord has exhibited a certain intolerance with individuals who do not agree with his point of view, resulting in some friction in their working relations. There has been much improvement in this regard, and I do not feel it will present any problem in the future.

7. I anticipate this employee will continue to absorb knowledge and experience in the physical security field at the rapid rate he has during his short tenure and am confident his efforts will result in a major contribution to the Office and Agency. I rate Mr. McCord a high "Strong."

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

Noted by Employee:

James W McCord Jr
James W. McCord, Jr.

18 April 1969
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: McCORD, James W., Jr., Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Fitness Report - 1 April 1968 through 31 March 1969

Reviewed By:

Howard J. Osborn

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

21 APR 1969
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
MC CORD, James W., Jr.

2. DATE OF BIRTH
01/26/24

3. SEX
M

4. GRADE
GS-15

5. SD
SS

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Elect. Eng - Audio Support

7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
OS/PTOS/TD/OC

8. CURRENT STATION
Washington, D. C.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
26 April 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises the Technical Division/OS.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops new techniques, procedures, and equipment to be used in the audio countermeasures field.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operating programs for implementation by the Technical Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Selects and trains personnel in an expanding Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with his counterpart organizations throughout the U. S. Government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 30 APR 1968 U	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. McCord supervises a technical operation with considerable skill. Although not an engineer by training, he has breached the difficult gap of communication between the administrative and technical aspects of his Division. He has maintained a high esprit de corps under difficult conditions which involve the necessity of his personnel to travel extensively throughout the world. Although such duty carries with it numerous family problems, Mr. McCord is able to manage the Division in such a manner as to maintain a high state of morale. Perhaps the most outstanding accomplishments which I attribute to Mr. McCord's fine management of his Division lies in the field of developing useful and esoteric equipment in the counteraudio field. I have a distinct impression that he and his Division are considerably ahead of other Government departments in this area of activity. This fact alone is a high tribute to his management skill. Because of the success in this field, I consider him to be economical in the use of manpower and funds.

During this rating period, the Technical Division has had operational success in the overseas area. I attribute this success to the careful planning and training which the incumbent has accomplished and directed. Further, he has already shown a high degree of skill in planning for a new activity of considerable responsibility which he will undertake during the coming fiscal year. I am highly

(Continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 26 APR 1968	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James W McCord Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 26	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 26 APR 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Ermal P. Geiss

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 4/29/68	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director of Security	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Howard J. Osborn

SECRET

SECRET

Fitness Report - McCORD, James W., Jr. - Emp. Ser. No. 058124
Reporting Period 1 April 1967 - 31 March 1968
Section C. (Continued)

pleased to have Mr. McCord serve in his current position and consider him capable of advancement into broader areas.

Ernal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 01/26/24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Elec Eng-Audio Supp	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/PT&OS/TSD/OC		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
21 April 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
15 January 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises Technical Division/OS, consisting of 29 professional employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Develops new techniques, procedures and equipment to be used in the audio countermeasures field.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operating programs for implementation by the Technical Division.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Selects and trains personnel in an expanding Division.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with his counterpart organizations throughout the U. S. Government.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 01 MAY 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. McCord supervises his Division in a vigorous manner. He is capable of instilling enthusiasm and esprit de corps within his organization--a difficult task because of the extensive amount of world-wide travel demanded from his subordinates. This travel is so extensive as to result in personal hardships.

During the rating period, Mr. McCord and two of his employees received the Certificate of Merit. These awards resulted from the vigorous and successful pursual of a technique having great promise in the audio countermeasures field.

Mr. McCord's performance of his liaison and coordination with other components of the intelligence community, which received special mention in his last Fitness Report, is now at a status which warrants a designation of "Strong." He is conscientiously working at the liaison problem in a difficult interdepartmental atmosphere.

Mr. McCord has an excellent grasp of the technical requirements of his position even though he is not an engineer. He has an exceptional environmental knowledge and appreciation. He sets his goals high. He is cost conscious in the field involving expensive equipment, which normally is costly to develop.

(Continued)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE: 17 Apr 67

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 14

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

DATE: 19 APR 1967

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Ermal P. Geiss

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Director of Security

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Howard J. Osborn

SECRET

McCORD, James W., Jr. - Serial #058124
Annual Fitness Report 15 January 1966 - 31 March 1967

SECTION C. (Continued)

I am highly pleased to have Mr. McCord serving in his current position and consider him capable of advancement into broader areas.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 058124

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 01/26/24
3. SEX: M
4. GRADE: GS-15
5. SD: SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Electronic Engineer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/PT&OS/TechSecDiv/OC
8. CURRENT STATION: Wash., D.C.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: ☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ SPECIAL (Specify): ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 25 April 1966
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 April 1965 - 14 January 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises the Tech Division/OS	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and programs for the Division	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Schedules and plans overseas coverage	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Protection of Washington Area Buildings from penetration	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Training of Division and other personnel	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Works with Tech CoMT. and other units	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

6 APR 1966

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR [illegible] 66
MAIL ROOM

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. McCord was attending the Air War College during part of the reporting period. He became Chief of the Technical Division/OS on 20 July 1965.

Mr. McCord took hold of this Division with a heartening vigor and enthusiasm. Although not an Engineer, he soon learned enough of the technical business to meet many crash assignments with exceptional skill and judgment. By trying to get these assignments done within set time limits, he sometimes short-circuited a few coordinations in other offices, but this did not seriously detract, in my opinion, from a very proficient job.

While Mr. McCord has not had the Technical Division a sufficiently long time for me to judge his long range performance, I feel he will become an exceptionally proficient Chief. There was insufficient time for me to judge his cost and manpower consciousness.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 22 Mar 66	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James McCord

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 6	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 March 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Dep. Dir. of Sec. (PTOS)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE E. M. WINTERS

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

FITNESS REPORT James W. McCord, Jr.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

3. *Comments of Reviewing Official*

I concur thoroughly with Mr. Winters' evaluation of Mr. McCord's vigor and enthusiasm, skill and judgment. I would add to this that he has demonstrated extraordinary ingenuity and leadership in supervising the development of several new and valuable techniques in the countermeasures field. However, I would rate him only "Proficient" in Specific Duty Number 6, for I believe that he has not been as effective as he might be in liaison and coordination with other components of the Intelligence Community represented on the Technical Committee. This is unfortunate, for it detracts from his outstanding performance in all other elements of his assigned responsibilities. He must work on improving these relationships and he has been counseled to this effect by his current supervisor.

Date	Official Title of Reviewing Official	Typed Name and Signature
31 March 1966	Director of Security	Howard J. Osborn

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	O 58124

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD SS
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Exec Staff		8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D. C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 April 1964 - 31 March 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 See Section C.	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

10 APR 1965

FORM 4-63 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Since 10 August 1964, Mr. McCord has been enrolled as a student at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. He will complete his course there on 4 June 1965. Prior to 10 August 1964, Mr. McCord was in a travel status from his assignment as Chief, Security Branch, Frankfurt, Germany.

In view of the above, no rating is made for this reporting period.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Mr. McCord will be advised that he has not been rated for this period.	
DATE 31 Mar 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Asst. Dep. Dir of Sec. (PPS)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE N. Harris Lyon

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 30 March 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Director of Security	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Howard J. Osborn Howard J. Osborn

SECRET

17 APR 1964

SECRET/[redacted]

17 March 1964

58124

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Fitness Report - James W. McCord, Jr. [redacted]
DOB: 24 Jan 1924, Male, GS-15,
SS German Station, Career, Annual Report
(1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964)

1. James W. McCord, Jr. [redacted] GS-15, has served as Chief, Security Branch, under my supervision for the subject period.

2. His duties were as follow:

a. Security policy advisor to COS and its senior Station and Base officers.

b. Supervised nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch and the Military Personnel Unit.

c. Directed conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security duties, and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.

d. Reviewed security of German Station and recommended ways and means for strengthening and improving.

e. Furnished technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE, and outside of EE on request.

f. Reviewed investigative reports of the Security Branch and performed such other duties as directed by the COS; Chief, CSB; and Chief, Administrative Staff.

3. This individual is an outstanding security officer. He efficiently performs his broad responsibilities, effectively manages those he supervises and is cost conscious. On the last-mentioned item, he weighs both cost and security factor and has been flexible where he has felt security could be relaxed -- but recognizes that there are areas where cost is secondary. He continues to keep the proper personnel informed of his activities and he is one of the best security

22 APR 1964

SECRET/[redacted]

GROUP 1-Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification officers with whom I have had the pleasure to be associated. During this period he has been assigned responsibility for supervision of the Military Personnel Branch. This consolidation has given the Security Branch greater flexibility and has increased the utilization of available personnel. Subject has also instituted off-duty security training courses for those interested military personnel.

4. I would rate him from Strong to Outstanding on the duties in paragraph 2 above with an overall rating of Strong.

[redacted]
/s/ Daniel M. Kelley

Read: [redacted]
/s/ James W. McCord, Jr.

Reviewer's Comments;

I agree that McCord [redacted] is a very strong security officer. He tends to be conservative in his views and judgments. He maintains excellent morale in his Branch. In the never-ending conflict between economy and a desirable level of security, he usually leans toward the latter.

[redacted]
/s/ Wendell Little

SECRET

058124

28 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Fitness Report (June 1962 - March 1963)
[redacted]

JAMES W. MCCORD

1. [redacted] GS-15, has served as Chief, Security Branch, under my supervision for the subject period.

2. His duties were as follows:

a. Security policy advisor to COS and its senior Station and Base officers.

b. Supervised nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch.

c. Directed conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security duties, and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.

d. Reviewed security of German Station and recommended ways and means for strengthening and improving.

e. Furnished technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE, and outside of EE on request.

f. Reviewed investigative reports of the Security Branch and performed such other duties as directed by the Chief of Station, Deputy for Coordination and Services, and Chief, Administrative Staff.

McCord

3. [redacted] has demonstrated time and again his ability to efficiently perform his broad responsibilities in a most efficient manner. His position is not an easy one. He is under the general supervision of the undersigned, while also working on activities directly for the COS and the DCS. He has been able to coordinate these activities in such a way as to earn the respect of all those with whom he deals. He has respected confidences, but also insured that the undersigned has been adequately briefed. He has acted for the undersigned in his absence and will continue to do so.

4. I would rate . . .

15 MAY 1963

[illegible]

SECRET

4. I would rate him from Strong to Outstanding on the individual functions, with an over-all rating of Strong. He is a good supervisor.

DANIEL M. KELLY /s/

[redacted]

READ:

[redacted]

JAMES W. McCORD /s/

[illegible] (DATE)

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS:

I agree with the comments of the rating officer. Subject is an outstanding staff officer and capable of assuming broader responsibilities. He never complains of obstacles, but uniformly produces excellent results.

WENDELL LITTLE /s/

[redacted]

SECRET

1 8 MAY 1962

SUBJECT: James W. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1961 to 31 March 1962

During this reporting period, Mr. McCord has continued to function as coordinator of a comprehensive highly sensitive series of investigations involving investigative representatives of all elements of the intelligence community. This assignment has been carried out by Mr. McCord with considerable initiative, skill and enthusiasm.

Mr. McCord, during this reporting period, served as Case Officer on a sensitive and very important personnel security case which due to his efforts was brought to a successful conclusion with favorable results to the Agency.

Mr. McCord has performed a liaison function with a vital element of a friendly service which has resulted in the maintenance of a cordial relationship of great value to the Office of Security and the Agency. This liaison has required Mr. McCord to perform several periods of temporary duty overseas during which he not only carried out his liaison function, but handled other special investigative assignments in a successful manner.

On various occasions during the reporting period in the absence of the Chief, Mr. McCord has functioned as Acting Chief of SRS and has performed his duties in an extremely competent manner.

It is felt that Mr. McCord's forthcoming assignment as Security Officer, German Station will give him additional varied experience of value in his career development.

Paul F. Gaynor

Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

SECRET

SECRET

Read by: James McCord Date: May 18 62

Reviewed by: Sheffield Edwards Date: 18 May 62

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible] CSB
[illegible]

25 MAY 1961

SUBJECT: James W. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1960 - 31 March 1961

During the reporting period, Mr. McCord on various occasions, has functioned as Acting Chief/SRS, during absences of the Chief and has discharged this function in a highly competent fashion.

Mr. McCord, since last report was rendered, has coordinated a comprehensive investigation of a highly sensitive security matter involving investigative representatives from all members of the U. S. intelligence community. This assignment has required a high degree of tact, patience and investigative skill on the part of Mr. McCord.

In addition, during the reporting period, Mr. McCord has served as Case Officer on a counter-intelligence case of considerable importance to the security of the Agency and has displayed rare qualities of initiative, energy, and imagination in developing this case.

Mr. McCord is considered particularly well-adapted by virtue of his experience, training and personality for his present assignment.

Paul F. Gaynor
Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

Read by: James W. McCord Date: [illegible]

Reviewed by: Date: 17 APR 1961

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]
[illegible]

SUBJECT: James W. McCord, Jr.
Annual Fitness Report - 1 April 1959 - 31 March 1960

During the reporting period, Mr. McCord functioned as Acting Chief of the Security Research Staff, Office of Security for a period of six months. He discharged this function in an extremely able fashion and handled a number of highly sensitive assignments with skill and finesse.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated on many occasions the ability to subordinate his personal interests to the necessity for performing his assigned tasks.

In the latter two months of the reporting period, Mr. McCord has been coordinating a very important investigation being conducted in the intelligence community of a leak of highly sensitive information which has caused serious damage to U. S. intelligence collection capabilities. He has displayed rare qualities of initiative, imagination and coordination in the course of this investigation.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated repeatedly his ability to perform sensitive assignments of the utmost importance during the reporting period.

Paul F. Gaynor
Chief/SRS/OS

Read by: ______ Date: 4/17/6

Reviewed by ______ Date 4/27/60

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECEIVED
FOR SS/CSB

FITNESS REPORT

28 APR 1959

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. GRADE GS-14
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Security Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OS/SRS/Office of the Chief	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 April 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From 5/22/58 To 3/31/59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assists in the development, implementation and coordination of all CI programs	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Receives, evaluates and develops information of a counter intelligence nature.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assists in the supervision of all aspects of the CI program	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Analyzes and evaluates results of counter intelligence operations.	7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Plans operations necessary to resolve counter intelligence cases	7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts such personnel investigations, interrogations and interviews as deemed necessary in sensitive cases.	7

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 6

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINED IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify)						X	

[redacted]

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

During the past year Mr. McCord has shown superior supervisory and organizational ability. During July and August he personally organized and supervised a major project overseas which was of national interest. His plan of action was implemented smoothly and the CI mission was accomplished. Another major project was successfully directed by Mr. McCord with outstanding results.

Mr. McCord has the proven ability to organize complex problems into workable and seemingly simple plans of action. He is a good supervisor, delegates responsibility, and uses imagination and tenacity of purpose in meeting problems. He is continuing to improve himself. No special training is planned for the next year. Mr. McCord will continue to "grow." He is ready to assume greater responsibility and with further experience will qualify for a senior position in this Agency.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 8 April 1959
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James W McCord Jr

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: Since March 1954
IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:
☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 8 April 1959
OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, Security Research Staff/OS
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harlan A. Westrell

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

DATE: 13 April 1959
OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: 8 Director of Security
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) James (Middle) W.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January 1924
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Security Research Staff
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Acting Deputy Chief, SRS
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 22 August 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 August 1957 - 22 August 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify)
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 29 Sept 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Mr. McCord has demonstrated marked ability in all fields of responsibility. His work involves constant dealings with senior officials of the Agency concerning substantive, policy and procedural matters. In this he has displayed exceptional judgment and balance in promoting and protecting the interests of the Agency.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 2 October 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: R L Bannerman R. L. Bannerman
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Director of Security

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

BY DATE
Posted For. Cont.
Released by FCD

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 3 3 02 PM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assist in the development and coordination of all counter intelligence programs.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and evaluate results of a counter-intelligence operation.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan operations necessary to resolve counter-intelligence cases.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintain liaison with various sensitive government agencies as well as components of CIA regarding CI cases.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Receive, evaluate and develop information of a counter-intelligence nature.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conduct such interrogations, investigations and briefings as necessary.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: *Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.*

Mr. McCord continues to exhibit superior organizational ability, as well as being a fine supervisor. His imaginative and analytical approach to complex problems quickly reduces them to useable plans. Mr. McCord is an excellent supervisor, can delegate responsibility, gives credit to his subordinates and continually works for self-improvement.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: *Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.*

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) James (Middle) W.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924
3. SEX male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD - SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Acting Deputy Chief, SRS
7. GRADE GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 August 1957 - 22 August 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one) ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 29 Sept 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan G. Westrell
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 2 Oct. 58
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL R L Bannerman.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Dep. Dir. Security

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHOSE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
2	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
1	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 1 NOV 55 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Potential (4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THIS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

16

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. McCoglin demonstrated organizational [illegible] initiative, steadiness under pressure, personality and knack [illegible] eventually qualify him for a senior position in this Agency.

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SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None at present - recommend that he remain in his present position for at least two more years.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEEDED	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	5	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS RESPECT FOR FACTS	5	18. IS RESOURCEFUL	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	[illegible]	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
[illegible]	10. CAN WORK WITH [illegible]	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	[illegible]	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under [illegible] as specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any [illegible]. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January 1924
3. SEX: male
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Security Research Staff
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Investigator — Acting Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 22 August 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 August 1956 - 21 August 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☑ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.

☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 28 August 1957

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief/Security Research Staff/OS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

17 [illegible] 1957

Reviewed [illegible] WHD 9/19/52

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 3 Sept 57

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C F Heney C. F. HENEY

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: EXECUTIVE OFFICER

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 55 OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

- a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
- b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
- c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
- d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
- e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
- f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

- g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assist in the development and coordination of all counter intelligence programs	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and evaluate results of a counter intelligence operation	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plan operations necessary to resolve counter intelligence cases	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintain liaison with various other sensitive govt.agencies as well as other components of CIA in conn.with CIA operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Receive, evaluate and develop information of counter intelligence nature	RATING NUMBER 6	Conduct such personnel invest., interrog. & interviews as deemed necessary in certain cases.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. McCord has a great organizational ability. This combined with an analytical mind, imagination and tenacity of purposes enables him to organize complex problems into workable and seemingly simple plans of action. He is a good supervisor, can delegate responsibility, gives credit to his subordinates and, in turn, is well liked by them. He is continually working to improve himself by both formal and informal training.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in Item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE ~~Investigator~~ Acting Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1956 - 21 August 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 28 August 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief/Security Research Staff/OS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE ~~29 August~~ 3 Sept 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL [illegible] HENEY C F Heney	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL EXECUTIVE [illegible]

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

36

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. McCord has a good educational background, well rounded personality, which combined with his organizational ability and further experience should equip him for a senior position in this Agency.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

McCord should continue in his present assignment as Deputy Chief/SRS for at least two more years.

McCord wishes to continue his study of Russian.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	5	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	5	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS [illegible]	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOTTED TIME LIMITS	5	30. SEES ALL [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OS/Security Research Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-12	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1955 - 21 August 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CI/SRS

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		5 SEP 1956
Reviewed by PUD		7

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Paul F. Gaynor Paul F. Gaynor	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Security Research Staf

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (Do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Receives, evaluates and develops information of a counterintelligence nature.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Evaluates results of counter-intelligence operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans operations necessary to resolve counter-intelligence matters.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains liaison with various other sensitive government agencies as well as other components of CIA in connection with CI operations.	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates SO resources in implementation of CI operations.	RATING NUMBER 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts such personal investigation, interrogations and interviews as deemed necessary in certain cases.	RATING NUMBER 6

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. McCord's greatest strength is his ability to follow tenuous counter-intelligence leads without becoming enmeshed in extraneous material. He organizes his work well, then proceeds to follow through to completion. He has ability to do vast quantities of work, shows iniative and imagination and gets along well with all classes of people.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 7

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

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FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	3. SEX male	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD-SS
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT OL/Security Research Staff	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Investigator		
7. GRADE GS-13	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 22 August 1956	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 August 1955 - 21 August 1956	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Harlan A. Westrell Harlan A. Westrell	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, CI/Sec. Research Staff

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 27 August 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Paul F. Gaynor Paul F. Gaynor	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Security Research Staf

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

BY DATE
Position Control

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (Truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

29 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. McCord is an outstanding individual who should continue to develop into a key employee. He is particularly good at organizing and directing [illegible] operations. He does need further experience in his present position, but within two years should be ready to assume a senior position in the Security Office or in CI/DDP.

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10 AM '56
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SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None planned for the present. Should continue to work in present position.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
5	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
5	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	5	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	5	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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FITNESS REPORT

CODED

The Fitness Report is an important factor in agency personnel management. It serves to provide:
1. The agency selection board with information of value when considering the [illegible] of an individual for membership in the career service; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

TO THE SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A. Next Due Date - 22 Aug 56

Posted Pos. C... 8038 10/21/55

Rl 1970

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I (To be filled in by Administrative Officer)

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 26 Jun. 1924
3. SEX: M
4. CAREER DESIGNATION: SD:SS
5. DATE OF ENTRANCE ON DUTY: 22 August 1951
6. OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security
7. DIVISION: Security Research Staff
8. BRANCH:
9. NATURE OF ASSIGNMENT: ☒ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD
10. IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:
11. GRADE: GS-13
12. DATE THAT THIS REPORT IS DUE: 31 August 1955
13. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 22 August 1954 to 22 August 1955

SECTION II (To be filled in by Supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: 1816.24 Chief, External Branch, Security Research Staff
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: 1 January 1955
3. WHAT SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO HIM DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency):

As Chief, External Branch (CI), planned and directed sensitive CI investigations; coordinated action with other Government investigative services; analyzed results of investigations, conducted and directed detailed research on CI problems; conducted interrogations and interviews on all phases of CI activity; wrote detailed reports on CI cases; supervised activities of SRS employees assigned to External Branch.

READ THE ENTIRE FORM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO COMPLETE ANY ITEM

SECTION III

I certify that, during the latter half of the period covered by this report, I have discussed with the rated individual the manner in which he has performed his job and provided suggestions and criticisms wherever needed. I believe that his understanding of my evaluation of his performance is consistent with my evaluation of him as evidenced by this fitness report and I have informed him of his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness. If performance during the report period has been unsatisfactory, there is attached a copy of the memorandum notifying him of unsatisfactory performance.

This report ☒ has ☐ has not been shown to the individual rated.

THIS DATE: 9/28/55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF RATER (Employee's immediate supervisor): Harlan A. Westrell

I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT (Comments, if any, are reflected by attached memorandum)

THIS DATE: 9-28-55
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Official next higher in line of authority): Paul F. Gaynor

FORM NO. 45 REPLACES FORM 37-193, 1 MAY 54
1 OCT 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories [illegible] scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions [illegible] you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

SEP 11 1 04 PM '55

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES						
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X			
B. PRACTICAL.					X	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.						X
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.					X	
4. HAS INITIATIVE.						X
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.						X
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.						X
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.					X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.					X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.						X
11. CALM.						X
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.						X
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.					X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.						X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.						X
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.						X
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.						
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.					X	
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.						X
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.						X
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.					X	
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION						X
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.					X	
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X

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26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.												X		
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".									X					
29. TOUGH MINDED.													X	
30. OBSERVANT.													X	
31. CAPABLE.													X	
32. CLEAR THINKING.													X	
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.												X		
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.													X	
36. DELIBERATE.										X				
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.												X		
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.													X	
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.													X	
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.														X
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.											X			
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.													X	
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.										X				

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Ability to go into details of a CI case, following all pertinent leads without becoming involved in extraneous matters.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

None

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C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

None

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Employee has expressed desire to study Russian

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the agency.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE AGENCY AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY IS INDIFFERENT ... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD AGENCY ..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR AGENCY..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE AGENCY.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGENCY.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE AGENCY.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) McCORD (First) James (Middle) W.
2. GRADE GS-13
3. POSITION TITLE Security Officer CD-SE
4. OFFICE Security
STAFF OR DIVISION Office of Chief
BRANCH
☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 22 Aug. 1953 To 21 Aug. 1954
6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

To handle certain special assignments and conduct certain sensitive research for the Security Office, CIA. Research in many cases ~~of~~ is such high sensitivity that the conduct of same must be limited.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
none			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Same as my present assignments

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10

29 July 1954
DATE

James W. McCord Jr.
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. McCord has performed the above duties in an excellent manner. He has an unusual ability to develop information thru both research and investigation and in this instance has produced results which have been of great value to high authorities of this Agency.

FORM NO.
MAY 1952 37-101

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

In his "knack" for developing information from research and investigation, and in his utmost discretion in sensitive assignments.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

None noted.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Yes, he has definite promise of future increased responsibilities.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Not at this time.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time. Will consider for Phase II Operations Course when work load permits.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE. NOT APPLICABLE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

11 Oct 1954
DATE

Sheffield Edwards
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR.

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

20 Jan 55
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

20. COMMENTS (Continued):

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Instruction to the Administrative or Personnel Officer

   Consult current Administrative Instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report.

2. Instruction to the person evaluated

   Since this evaluation will become an important part of your record, you will want to give to it as much care and attention as you would like to have it receive from your Supervisor and the Reviewing Official. With respect to Items 8 and 9, you should include courses of instruction or assignments, either within or outside of the Agency, which you consider pertinent to your career development.

3. Instruction to the Supervisor and the Reviewing Official

   a. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of others, you bear primary responsibility for planning and fostering the development of each person under your supervision, commensurate with his capacity, aptitude, knowledge and skills. As an alert supervisor, you judge the people working with you on a job-by-job and day-by-day basis and use this information in carrying out your supervisory responsibilities. Although evaluation is a continuous process, it is necessary periodically to record your observations and recommendations for appropriate action. In preparing the report you should consider the individual's capabilities for further development in his present assignment and his potentialities for more effective utilization in other positions, including work of a more responsible and difficult nature.

   b. The following traits are generally regarded as having some bearing on a person's performance and development. Although you are not asked for specific ratings, do not hesitate to refer to these or similar traits in your comments, which should be terse and precise.

      COOPERATION
      DEPENDABILITY
      ACCURACY
      SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS
      INITIATIVE
      RESOURCEFULNESS
      STABILITY UNDER PRESSURE
      ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS
      JUDGMENT
      LEADERSHIP

   c. In fairness to the individual and in the interest of the Agency, the importance of carefully prepared and accurate Personnel Evaluation Reports can not be overstressed. The following basic principles of evaluation should be kept in mind:

      (1) Base your judgment on

         (a) What you have observed the individual do or fail to do.
         (b) Typical performance as well as critical incidents.
         (c) Examples relevant to the duties under consideration.

      (2) Different standards prevail in different assignments. Every effort should be made to arrive at a just estimate of the qualities of the individual as demonstrated during the report period. Avoid exaggerations. They detract from the value of the report and are unfair to others.

      (3) BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EVALUATION REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND THEIR CAREFUL PREPARATION IS AN INDICATION OF THE SUPERVISOR'S OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

4. A FRANK DISCUSSION BETWEEN SUPERVISOR AND INDIVIDUAL CONCERNING THIS REPORT IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND BEST USE OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL'S CAPABILITIES.

THIS PORTION TO BE DETACHED ONLY BY AUTHORIZED OFFICIAL

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ITEMS 1 THROUGH 8 WILL BE COMPLETED BY TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH WHEN ACTION IS INITIATED IN PERSONNEL DIVISION

ROUTING AND ACTION SLIP FOR PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DATE: 15 July 1954

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): McCORD, James W.

2. GRADE: GS-13

3. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer CD-GS

4. OFFICE: Security

STAFF OR DIVISION: Office of Chief

BRANCH:

☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD

IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION:

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 22 August 1953 To 21 August 1954

6. TYPE OF REPORT: ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

7. DATE REPORT DUE IN PERSONNEL OFFICE: 21 September 1954

8. AUTHENTICATION (T&R BRANCH):

ROUTING AND ACTION

REQUIRED ACTION	PERSON TO TAKE ACTION	DATE ACTION COMPLETED	INITIALS
9. a. Obtain two copies of CIA Form 37-151. b. Enter data in Items 1 through 6, above, in corresponding spaces of PER forms. c. Attach this action form and pamphlet "Your Evaluation Report" to PER forms. d. Deliver forms to immediate supervisor of person to be evaluated.	Evaluations Officer		
10. a. Deliver forms to person to be evaluated. b. Offer advice and assistance.	Supervisor		
11. a. Complete Items 7 through 10. b. Deliver forms to supervisor. ✓	Person to be Evaluated	13 Aug 54	jwmc
12. a. Complete Items 11 through 17. b. Attach warning memo, if required. c. Deliver forms to reviewing official (supervisor next in line).	Supervisor		
13. a. Review the evaluation. b. Discuss complete evaluation and recommendations with supervisor. c. Record additional comments on forms. d. Sign forms in Item 19. e. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Reviewing Official	1/30/55	
14. a. Discuss all aspects of evaluation with person being evaluated. (Explain right of appeal, if warning memo is prepared.) b. Sign forms in Item 18. c. Deliver forms to Evaluations Officer.	Supervisor		
15. a. Deliver original copy of evaluation form to Transactions and Records Branch, Personnel Division. b. Retain the carbon copy for use of operating office and Office Career Service Board. c. Detach Instruction Sheet of Form 37-151 if Item 20 (continued) is unused.	Evaluations Officer		

FORM NO. 37-151A
SEP 1953

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-37)

SECTION A PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. **058124**
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle) **McCORD, James Walter, Jr.**
3. POSITION TITLE **Physical Sec. Off.**
4. GRADE **GS-15**
5. SD **SS**
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT **OS/Phys. Sec. Div.**
7. OFFICE EXT. (Phone) **6821**
8. STATION ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code) **7 Windor Court, Rockville, Md. 20853**
10. HOME PHONE **762-7678**
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED **U. S. A. - Birth**
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD **Certificate of Distinction**
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT **31 August 1970**
14. POSTHUMOUS ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN **Marjorie Lee McCord**
16. RELATIONSHIP **Wife**
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code) **Same**
18. HOME PHONE **Same**

SECTION B RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME
21. ORGN. TITLE
22. GRADE
23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME
25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION
27. INCLUSIVE DATES
28. TIME OF DAY
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE **Chief, Physical Security Division, PTOS, OS**
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location) **Headquarters**
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION

To plan and direct an Agency-wide physical security program for protecting Agency installations against unauthorized physical penetration and Agency information and material against loss, compromise or disclosure.

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME
41. ORGN. TITLE
42. GRADE
43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME
45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 9-69 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

When he retires 31 August 1970, Mr. James W. McCord, Jr., will have completed 25 years of Government service, 19 years of which were with the CIA in a variety of assignments covering the investigative, counter-intelligence, overseas security support, audio countermeasures and physical security fields within the Security Career Service.

During his early years of employment when assigned to the San Francisco Field Office, Office of Security, August 1951 to May 1953, Mr. McCord assisted in the covert entry and processing through customs of operational personnel from the Far East areas and performed safehouse duties and related tasks designed to ensure the protection and cover of such personnel.

When serving with the Security Research Staff, 1955 to 1962, Mr. McCord worked in direct support of Agency activities abroad of a specialized nature exploiting highly sensitive intelligence source material resulting in the reconstruction of Soviet espionage networks and resolving operational and security leads affecting both the British and United States Governments. The identities, composition and operations of Soviet intelligence services in Europe prior to 1950 and dating back into the 1930's, were reconstructed. Between 1955 and 1960, Mr. McCord was involved in contacting, developing and debriefing these identified and available

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.
1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY: James P. O'Connell

48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION: James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

49. DATE: 14 July 1970

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF SS CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)
TITLE AND SIGNATURE: Director of Security
DATE:

51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE
TITLE AND SIGNATURE: Deputy Director for Support
DATE:

52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT
TITLE AND SIGNATURE:
DATE:

SECRET

former Soviet intelligence personalities. This activity led to close liaison with British and other Western intelligence representatives involving numerous trips to Europe. This liaison activity with representatives of the British MI-5 established a direct channel of communications resulting in a continuous exchange of leads and a flow of operational data over the years of benefit to the Agency.

During the period of his work with the Security Research Staff, in which he served as Deputy Chief from May 1957, Mr. McCord was the Agency's case officer in a number of double agent cases involving Agency staff employees who had been contacted and were being developed for recruitment by the Soviet intelligence service.

From 1962 to 1964, Mr. McCord served overseas as Chief of the Regional Security Support Staff located at Frankfurt, Germany with responsibility for the overall personnel and physical security and audio countermeasures programs applicable to the Stations and Bases of the European area. This assignment was followed by attendance at the Air War College, August 1964 to June 1965.

For the past five years, Mr. McCord has held two vital line positions with world-wide responsibilities involving the Agency's audio countermeasures and physical security programs.

As Chief of the Technical Division from 23 July 1965 to 10 October 1968, Mr. McCord supervised a technical operation with considerable skill. Although not an engineer by training, he spanned a difficult gap between the administrative and technical demands of his responsibilities, guiding the development of useful and esoteric equipment in the counter-audio field to a point where the Agency became the recognized leader among Government departments in this area of activity. This leadership is evidenced by the establishment of an Inter-Agency Technical Training Center under the Executive Agency of the Technical Division for the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee of the United States Intelligence Board. Much of Mr. McCord's ideas, talents, and imagination went into the creation of this training activity which commenced operations about the time of his reassignment to the Physical Security Division.

Mr. McCord participated with two subordinate employees in the development of x-ray equipment for use by the Technical Division in detecting and locating hostile audio devices implanted in office appurtenances and walls of Agency occupied facilities. The responsibility for ensuring that appropriate protective methods for the safe use of this equipment was also associated with this development. The significance of this achievement was recognized by the Agency when Mr. McCord and his participating colleagues were awarded Certificates of Merit with Distinction in October 1966.

In his current position as Chief, Physical Security Division, Mr. McCord demonstrated his ability to quickly assimilate the necessary details of a field in which he had relatively little experience. He showed initiative in seeking out new ways and means to harden the security of the Agency's domestic and overseas facilities by tapping all possible technological resources, both in and out of Government, to produce for the Agency a posture in the physical security field which is the equal of, if not superior to, those of other elements of the United States Government. Illustrative of this effort is the expansion and improvement of the Agency's Security Command Center relating to the protection of Agency assets in time of demonstrations, riots and civil disturbances.

Throughout his Agency career, Mr. McCord has engaged his curious and inventive mind to search out even better ways to solve problems within his area of responsibility. As a result, his

Section D Continued - James Walter McCord, Jr.

Agency career is a record of sustained superior performance of duty of high value. The value of his exemplary performance over the years has often been recognized and commended by senior officials of the Agency. It is on this basis that Mr. McCord is nominated for the Certificate of Distinction upon the occasion of his retirement.

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Certificate of Distinction

CITATION

Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. is hereby awarded the Central Intelligence Agency's Certificate of Distinction.

During his nineteen years of Agency service, both domestic and foreign, Mr. McCord displayed remarkable imagination, ingenuity and effectiveness in the performance of his assigned tasks. His sustained superior performance of duty of high value over the years leaves a marked contribution to the overall mission of the Office of Security and the Agency, particularly in the areas of physical and technical security.

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/S 69-4658

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Committee on the Security of Headquarters Building in a series of twelve meetings between May and August 1969 conducted a detailed study and analysis of each facet of security of the Headquarters Building. I know that considerable time and effort were given to preparation of the detailed briefings, supplemental studies and reports, contributions to the formal report and implementation of the recommended corrective measures. I am appreciative of the efforts and contribution made by your staff to this important piece of business. Although I am sure that many of your staff have worked on this project, my attention has been drawn particularly to these officers:

Buckley, Robert
Carrico, H. Clifton
Elliott, Robert N.
Farrell, Francis M.
Fennessey, Robert E.
Geiss, Ermal P.
Good, Charles B.
Green, James P.
Griffin, Robert B.
Hayes, Robert J.
Herlihy, John F.

Kane, Edward J.
King, Joseph F.
Mantoni, Rudolfo
McCord, James W., Jr.
McGinn, John B.
O'Connell, James P.
Parr, Laurence
Petit, Alan F.
Sullivan, Arthur H.
Todd, Orin H.

2. I would appreciate it if you would pass this commendation on to the individuals concerned. Copies of this commendation have been forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in the Official Personnel File of each of the above officers.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING, ACTIVE DUTY TOUR

TO: HQ COMD USAF (PRP)

FROM: HQ COMD (PRP-A)

1. ☒ BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ☐ BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

2. GRADE, LAST NAME, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL, AFSN, SSAN: 453-22-4741
MAJOR MCCORD, JAMES W.
FV2099263

3. PAFSC
8054

4. PRESENT ADDRESS
7 Winder Court
Rockville, Maryland 20850

5. ON FLYING STATUS ☐ YES ☒ NO

6. AERO RATING
Acft Obsr

7. IS ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR 13 DAYS PLUS REQUIRED TRAVEL TIME

8. PURPOSE (Type)
☒ ANNUAL TOUR ☐ SCHOOL TOUR ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF ACDUTRA ☐ SPECIAL TOUR OF AD
TITLE (Indicate specific school course or special tour title)

9. RESERVE ASSIGNMENT
Hq USAF (AFESS-FE)
Washington, DC

10. UNIT OF ATTACHMENT

11. INDIVIDUAL WILL REPORT TO
Registrar, Defense Intelligence School
U.S. Naval Station, Anacostia Annex (Bldg T-5)
Washington, DC 20390

12. INDIVIDUAL WILL BE RELEASED FROM ORGANIZATION ATTACHED/ASSIGNED FOR ACTIVE DUTY TRAINING ON

	HOUR	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11.	NET 1300 NLT 1600	*8	Jun	69
12.	▨	20	Jun	69

13. INDIVIDUAL ☐ IS ☒ IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PARTICIPATE IN FLYING ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD OF ACTIVE DUTY COVERED BY THIS ORDER.

14. AUTHORITY
- AFM 35-3

15. INDIVIDUAL WILL PROCEED FROM PRESENT ADDRESS IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLY WITH REPORTING TIME AND DATE.

16. MODES OF TRANSPORTATION ☐ AUTHORIZED ☐ DIRECTED
☐ MILITARY AIRCRAFT
COMMERCIAL ☐ AIRCRAFT ☐ RAIL ☐ BUS

17. TDY, TDN, PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND TRAVEL CHARGEABLE TO:
PAY & ALWS: 5793700 509 4261 P723.01 S594700

18. REMARKS TRAVEL & PER DIEM: 5793700 509 6262 P723.07 40861 40961 S668100
Training Category - D Pay Group - D Security Clearance - TOP SECRET
Member and dependents authorized Commissary Privileges IAW Para 1a, AFR 145-15.
IAW Para M4201-14, JTR, member will incur no additional subsistence expenses.
*Students reporting after 1600 hours, 8 Jun 69, should contact the school Duty Officer at OX 8-2455.

19. DATE
29 May 69

20. [illegible]
4279/4069

21. APPROVING OFFICIAL (Typed Name and Grade)
E. E. THAYER, ASST DIRECTOR FOR ADMIN

22. SIGNATURE
E. E. Thayer

23. DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMMAND USAF
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

24. RESERVE ORDER NO.
A-961

25. DATE
29 May 69

26.
FOR THE COMMANDER

27. DISTRIBUTION
10 - Individual
1 - Indiv Pers Rec
2 - Unit of Asgmt
2 - Unit of Atch
2 - ARPC, 3800 York St, Denver Colo. 80205
2 - Hq AFRES (CAFO) Dobbins AFB, Ga. 30060
2 - Hq AFRES ( ) Robins AFB, Ga. 31093
2 - Records Set

28. SIGNATURE ELEMENT OF ORDERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICIAL
A. L. Newsom
A. L. NEWSOM, Colonel, USAF
Director, Reserve Personnel

AF FORM 933

SECRET

9 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James McCord

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of a second Quality Step Increase to be awarded to this employee. The previous award was effective 28 August 1966.

2. May I again ask that you arrange an appropriate ceremony for the presentation of this Quality Step Increase which is in recognition of his continuing excellent performance.

/s/ [illegible]

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - OPF - McCORD
- 1 - D/Pers Chrono
- 1 - C/PD

OP/DD/Pers/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:sa (9 October 1963)

SECRET

SECRET

4 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Chief, Placement Division

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. #058124
Quality Step Increase

The Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical, and Overseas Security has recommended, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, that Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. be granted a Quality Step Increase. The original recommendation from Mr. McCord's supervisor is attached for your consideration.

Edward K. O'Malley

Edward K. O'Malley
Secretary
Security Career Service Board

Attachment

John J. Caldwell 4 Oct '68
for Director of Personnel

SECRET

4 OCT 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, OS Career Board

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase for
Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Mr. McCord has served as Chief of the Technical Division since 23 July 1965. Through his leadership and fine management of the Division, he and his engineers have developed several new and valuable techniques in the audio countermeasures field. The cost of research and development in these techniques was at a minimum and saved the Government much time and money in increasing the state of the art in audio countermeasures.

2. Mr. McCord supervises his Division in a vigorous manner and instills enthusiasm and esprit de corps within his organization--a difficult task because of the extensive amount of world-wide travel demanded from his subordinates.

3. Through the efforts of Mr. McCord the establishment of an Interagency Training Center for audio countermeasures is proceeding in an orderly basis, and the first courses offered to technical personnel in the intelligence community will begin this fall. The Technical Division, PTOS, serves as the Executive Agent for the operation of such school for the Community.

4. In view of Mr. McCord's sustained high level of performance of duties and the outstanding achievement in the research and development of new hardware and techniques in the audio countermeasures field, it is recommended that Mr. McCord be awarded a Quality Step Increase.

James P. O'Connell
James P. O'Connell
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
—FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

058124

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	
McCord	James	W Jr	1/26/24	453 | 44 | 4741	
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City State ZIP Code)		
[redacted]			[redacted]		

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☒ (A)
ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE
I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☐ (B)
DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE
I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)
WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE
I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
James W. McCord Jr.

DATE
13 February, 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY
(official receiving date stamp)

FEB 13 11 04 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY [illegible]
(For use only until April 14, 1968)
176-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20- , Employee Conduct, dated 29 August 1961, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated August 1960 MAY 1964

James W McCord
Signature

10 July 6
Date

JAMES W MC CORD

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

MANAGERIAL GRID SEMINAR (50 hours) DATES: 23-28 April 1967

Student : James W. McCord, Jr.
Office : OS
Year of Birth: 1924
Service Designation: SS
Grade : 15
No. of Students : 46
EOD Date : August 1951

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Course objectives are to aid participants to: learn the managerial theories contained in the Grid; understand their personal managerial styles in Grid terms; evaluate convictions about managerial values; develop team action skills; increase candidness of communication; strengthen the use of critique for problem-solving and learning; and acquire an appreciation of Organization Culture and Development.

The method of learning offers a challenge to all participants regardless of level or experience. A Grid Seminar is not "taught" in the usual sense. In Grid teams, participants solve complex management problems. Objective solutions are made available. Individual and team performance is repeatedly assessed. Various measuring instruments are used to evaluate effectiveness.

Critique sessions assist each participant to understand how he might change his own behavior to increase his problem-solving effectiveness. Thus managers are not told the best way to manage, but they learn by convincing themselves.

About twenty to thirty hours of study are completed as prework. Insights gained are deepened and personalized during the intensive 50-hour Seminar.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

17 MAY

Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

760869 APR 1967

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST 7-24 MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
058124	McCORD, James W. Jr.	OS RR

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	UNIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	UNIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 27	MONTH 28-29	DAY 30-31	YEAR 32-33	MONTH 34-35	DAY 36-37	YEAR 38-39		40-42
	✓	11	08	66	12	14	66	W E	S11

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: CS/446/47

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 8 Nov 66 - 14 Dec. '66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY [illegible]

1/13/67

1451a

SECRET

7 MAR 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security for Physical, Technical & Overseas Security

ATTENTION : Chief, Technical Security Division

SUBJECT : Security Presentation - Support Course

1. The Office of Security presentation at the Warrenton Training Center on 2 March 1967 was extraordinarily well received. Colonel Winters, Commanding Officer, WTC, has informed me of a number of superlative comments by those in attendance.

2. I want to express my appreciation to Messrs. James McCord, Alan Petit, and Carroll Melkerson for their most effective presentation on audio countermeasures. It was a highlight of the program and contributed immeasurably to its success.

3. I'd like to express a special word of thanks to Mr. William Herron, for his splendid support in preparing visual aids for the program on extremely short notice. I am aware that Bill worked long hours over the preceding weekend and virtually all night on one occasion in order to ensure the success of this program, while fulfilling heavy commitments to get audio countermeasures teams into the field.

4. I can be justifiably proud of the success of the presentation, and attribute this success in large part to the extraordinary team effort by the Office of Security components involved. Please extend my personal commendation to Messrs. McCord, Petit, Melkerson, and Herron and advise them that a copy of this memorandum will be placed in their Official Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

cc: Official Personnel Files

[illegible] 67-70

DD/S 67-0042

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

January 3, 1967

The Honorable
Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dick:

I wish to express my appreciation for the valuable assistance provided by your agency during the recent tour of President Johnson to Southeast Asia. Your response to our request for technical assistance was most gratifying.

I would particularly like to commend to you Mr. Howard J. Osborn, Director, Office of Security, Mr. James McCord, Chief, Technical Security Division, and Mr. Arthur Sheridan, Regional Security Office, Far East, for their cooperation. Their dedication to duty and extensive knowledge and experience in technical support greatly contributed to the success of our mission.

Messrs. Robert Prouty and William Flannery of Mr. McCord's office and Mr. Phil Rush of Mr. Sheridan's office also contributed immeasurably to the success of the visit.

Please extend our sincere appreciation to your staff for a job well done.

Sincerely,

James J. Rowley

SECRET

9 JAN 1967

1st Endorsement

TO: Director of Security

It is always a pleasure to see commendations such as this in recognition of jobs well done.

I would like to add my congratulations and appreciation to you and all of the members of your staff for your fine efforts which contributed to the successful completion of the President's trip.

R L Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) [illegible] (Middle) W. Jr.
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

1. **RESIDENCE DATA**

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: 6801 Floyd Ave Springfield Va
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad)
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: Same
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: [illegible]

2. **MARITAL STATUS** *(Check one)*

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Laredo Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 30 [illegible] 1948
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. **MEMBERS OF FAMILY**

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Sarah Ruth McCord	Same as 1	451-5275	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Michael Steven McCord	Same as 1.	M	[illegible] 51
Carol Ann McCord		F	[illegible] 53
Nancy Ellen McCord		F	28 Nov 55
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
James W. McCord Sr.	Box 63 [illegible] Okla		
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Marjorie L. McCord	Box 63 [illegible] Okla		

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY. Wife

4. **PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY**

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. McCord, Sarah Ruth
RELATIONSHIP: Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same as 1
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 451-5275
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: Same as 1.
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION: —

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ✓ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 1-61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

5. **VOLUNTARY ENTRIES**

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Bank of Prince William, Springfield Va - in name of wife and I

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☑ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

Residence

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Mrs. Dorothy Berry Houston Texas

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. **ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS**

SIGNED AT	DATE 7 [illegible] 66	SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

2[illegible] September 1[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Technical Division

THROUGH : ADD/PTOS

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. It is with great ~~personal~~ gratification that I am able to pass along to you the attached letter from Mr. James J. [illegible], Director of the United States Secret Service, with its endorsement by the Deputy Director for Support and, indirectly, by the Director, commending you and members of your Division for the [illegible] technical support you have provided to the Secret Service over the past year.

2. Please accept my sincere appreciation for the [illegible] performance that you and your staff consistently turn in. It reflects the greatest credit on this Office and upon the Agency. I would appreciate it if you would convey my commendations, as well as [illegible] Mr. [illegible], Mr. Bannerman, and Mr. [illegible] to each of your people named in Mr. [illegible]'s letter. Once you have [illegible] this document, I would appreciate it if you would return it to the Administrative and Training Staff so that the requisite notation [illegible] may be made to place in your Personnel Files.

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

McCord, James W. Jr.

14-00000

File No.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

September 15, 19[illegible]

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Attn: Director, Office of Security/[illegible]

Dear Sir:

During the past year representatives of your Agency's Office of Security assisted the Secret Service in our technical security program. Mr. Howard J. O[illegible], Director, Office of Security, has generously furnished [illegible] the support of his Technical Security Division headed up by Mr. James W. McCord. In turn Mr. McCord has given freely of his time, equipment and manpower to assist the Secret Service in the technical security of the President.

The assistance furnished by Mr. McCord's Division consisted of two special training courses, the loan of electronic equipment, manpower assistance for searching [illegible] Presidential and Vice Presidential rooms, etc., [illegible] loan of engineering manpower for special [illegible], and above all a willingness to assist the Secret Service whenever possible.

Although all of Mr. McCord's Division should be recognized for their professional competence and [illegible] of the Secret Service, the following [illegible] intimately involved with our problems and merit individual recognition:

Mr. Homer Johnson
Mr. Robert [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
[illegible] Alan [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

On behalf of the Secret Service I would like to express our deep appreciation for the excellent and dedicated assistance furnished by your Agency over the past year in the technical security area.

Very truly yours,

James J. Rowley
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

DD/S 66-5075

27 SEP 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. The Director was pleased with the attached letter from Mr. Rowley in which he expressed deep appreciation for the excellent and dedicated assistance rendered to the U. S. Secret Service during the past year. The Director wishes to continue this cooperation and assistance.

2. I appreciate very much this kind of performance which reflects credit upon the Agency and I compliment you and your staff for another job well done.

R. L. Bannerman
Deputy Director
for Support

Att: Letter dtd 13 Sept 66 to DCI fr
Mr. Rowley, subj: Appreciation

SECRET

30 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James McCord

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

/s/ Rex E. Greaves

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
- O & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - OPF - McCORD
- 1 - D/Pers-Chrono
- 1 - C/PD

OP/DD/R&P/PD/JJCaldwell:ksd (30 Aug 66)

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

19 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

ATTENTION : Chief, Placement Division

SUBJECT : McCORD, James W., Jr. #058124
Quality Step Increase

The Security Career Service Board has recommended, with the subsequent concurrence of the Director of Security, that Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. be granted a Quality Step Increase which would change his salary from GS-15, step 5, at $19,978 per annum to GS-15, step 6, at $20,585 per annum. The original recommendation from Mr. McCord's supervisor is attached for your consideration.

Ernest L. Hardt

Ernest L. Hardt
Secretary
Security Career Service Board

Attachment

APPROVED

John F. Caldwell 18 Aug '66
for Director of Personnel

SECRET

SECRET

28 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase -
James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Mr. James W. McCord, Jr. joined the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, in August 1961.

2. He has served successfully in various capacities in the Office of Security as an Investigator, Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, Regional Security Officer, Germany, and upon his return from overseas, he attended the Air War College, where his overall performance was rated as outstanding.

3. For the past year, Mr. McCord has been serving as Chief, Technical Division.

4. Through Mr. McCord's imaginative planning, guidance, and direction, the Technical Division has developed numerous improvements in both instrumentation and techniques which have greatly enhanced the Agency's capability to detect clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency both domestically and overseas. It is, therefore, recommended that he be granted a Quality Step Increase.

Ermal P. Geiss
Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in duplicate)

DATE: 8 JUL [illegible]

TO: Secretariat, Honor and Merit Awards Board

FROM: (Operating official) Director of Security

Section A — Personal Data

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): McCORD, James W., Jr.
2. POSITION TITLE: Elec. Engr.-Audio Supt.
3. GRADE: 15
4. SD: SS
5. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: OS/Technical Division
6. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
7. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): 6801 Floyd Ave., Springfield, Va.
8. OFFICE EXT. (Hqs.): 4192
9. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U. S. - Birth
10. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Merit
11. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
12. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Sarah Ruth McCord
13. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
14. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, Zone, State): Same as 7
15. HOME PHONE: 451-5279

Section B — Recommendation for Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard

16. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT: ☐ YES ☐ NO

Personnel in immediate vicinity or who assisted in act or shared in same hazard:

17. FULL NAME	18. ORGN. TITLE	19. GRADE	20. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in act:

21. FULL NAME	22. TYPE OF AWARD

Conditions under which act was performed:

23. LOCATION:
24. INCLUSIVE DATES:
25. TIME OF DAY:
26. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:

Section C — Recommendation for Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance

27. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: ☒ YES ☐ NO
28. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Chief, Technical Security Division, OS
29. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): Headquarters
30. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: Supervises the activities of the Technical Security Division, OS

Personnel who assisted or contributed substantially to the service or performance

31. FULL NAME	32. ORGN. TITLE	33. GRADE	34. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT
MARCY, William M.	Elec. Engr.	GS-10	OS/Technical Division
PETIT, Alan F.	Elec. Engr.	GS-13	OS/Technical Division

List any of the above persons given an award or recommended for award for participating in the performance

35. FULL NAME	36. TYPE OF AWARD
MARCY, William M. PETIT, Alan F.	Certificate of Merit with Distinction

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED:
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED: ☐ YES ☐ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT: ☐ YES ☐ NO

FORM 11-63 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Section D — Narrative Description

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation.

40.

From early December 1965 through May 1966, Messrs. James W. McCord, Jr., Alan F. Petit, and William M. Marcy of the Technical Division, Office of Security, conceived and developed a unique technique for the use of a small portable X-ray machine which has been placed in extensive use in the Agency's Audio-Countermeasures Program. Experimentation during these months indicated that X-ray combined with a fluoroscopic screen had distinct advantages in terms of time and effort over the considerably more expensive X-ray film and processor. Along with this, they designed an innovation in the form of a fluoroscopic cloth which has the distinct advantage of flexibility over the fluorescent screens currently available on the commercial market.

The combination of the X-ray and the fluorescent cloth make it possible to rapidly scan in "real time" large wall surfaces and furnishings, a capability the Agency has not had before.

The Technical Division has greatly enhanced the world-wide use of this equipment in that they designed and developed a packaging plan whereby using two attache cases they are able to easily transport the X-ray fluoroscopic equipment, wall racks, and motor units making it possible to inconspicuously carry it into offices, residences, and safehouses.

These men have shown initiative, ingenuity and great imagination in the application of fluoroscopic scanning with X-ray.

This technique, much of which required many off-duty hours to develop, has greatly enhanced the Agency's capability to detect clandestine microphones and other devices targeted against the Agency both domestically and overseas.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

41. ENCLOSURES (List individually) If originator is not an eyewitness or does not have personal knowledge of the act or performance, attach affidavits of eyewitness or individuals having personal knowledge of the facts.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

42. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY ERMAL P. GEISS Ermal P. Geiss	43. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION Deputy Director of Security (PTOS)	44. DATE 22 JUN 1966

Section E — Recommendation Forwarded Through Officials Concerned For Their Information

45. Head of SS Career Service (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Director of Security	DATE
46. Deputy Director of Operating Component	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
47. Deputy Director of Career Service	TITLE AND SIGNATURE Deputy Director for Support	DATE

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

16 AUG 1965

This is to advise you that McCORD, James W., Jr. training request # R-12340 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Air War College Program

INSTITUTION: Air War College

DATE: 7 August 1964-4 June 1965

GRADE: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- ☐ Grade Report
- ☐ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ☐ Certificate of Completion
- ☐ Roster of Participants
- ☒ Training Report by Institution
- ☐ Training Report by Student
- ☐ None
- ☐ Other: ____________________

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

AIR WAR COLLEGE
Air University
United States Air Force
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112

REPLY TO ATTN OF: AWCA

8 June 1965

SUBJECT: Training Reports

TO: Director of Personnel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attached are Training Reports (AF Form 475) for Central Intelligence Agency representatives in the Air War College Class of 1965. These reports are forwarded for your information and appropriate distribution.

FOR THE COMMANDANT

J. K. BROCK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration

2 Atchs
1. TR, Mr. Copeland
2. TR, Mr. McCord

I. IDENTIFICATION DATA (Read AFM 36-10 carefully before filling out any item)

1. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE INITIAL McCORD, James W., Jr.	2. AFSN Civilian, Central Intelligence Agency	3. ACTIVE DUTY GRADE	4. PERMANENT GRADE
5. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND LOCATION Air University Maxwell AF Base, Alabama	6. AERO RATING / CODE	8. PERIOD OF REPORT FROM 7 Aug 64	TO 4 Jun 65
	7. ACADEMIC PERIOD 44 weeks	9. REASON FOR REPORT ☒ FINAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ DIRECTED	

10. NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL OR INSTITUTION
Air War College, Maxwell AF Base, Alabama

11. NAME OR TITLE OF COURSE
Air War College Resident Course

12. LENGTH OF COURSE
44 weeks

II. REPORT DATA (Complete as applicable)

1. COURSE HOURS COMPLETED	2. COURSE HOURS FAILED	3. AFSC AWARDED	4. AERO RATING AWARDED	5. DEGREE AWARDED
1576	None	N/A	N/A	N/A

6. COURSE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED (Final report only)
☒ YES ☐ NO (If "No," explain) Officer earned off-duty college credits at AU/Geo. Wash. Univ. Center towards [illegible] MA degree.

6 B DISTINGUISHED GRAD (If Applicable)

7. TITLE OF THESIS The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Power In Africa, and its Implications for the U.S.

8. ACADEMIC FIELD
N/A

III. COMMENTS

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OVERPRINT

	NOT OBSERVED	UNSATISFACTORY	SATISFACTORY	EXCELLENT	OUTSTANDING
1. WRITING ABILITY	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
2. SPEAKING ABILITY	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
3. INDEPENDENT PROBLEM SOLVING ABILITY (Thesis, Staff Study, etc)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒
4. GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING AND DISCUSSION	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐

a. ATTN: REVIEW AUTHORITIES: THIS EVALUATION COMPARES THE INDIVIDUAL REPORTED UPON WITH 278 OTHER EXCEPTIONAL OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS CAREFULLY SELECTED FOR ATTENDANCE AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE. Mr. McCord was an outstanding member of this AWC class. As a member of the Student entertainment Committee, he early initiated the School into a get-together; ahead of time, he attended to the many details so thoroughly that the social activities were most delightful. Mr. McCord has a most friendly and direct manner of speaking with people. He seemed well-oriented toward the group endeavors. He considerately expressed his deferences toward the students of his seminars, through nice amenities appropriately made as the occasion permitted. In the seminar discussions, his participation was timely and positive, constructive and appropriately introduced so as to further the progress of the group endeavor. He was especially well-informed on the Sino-Soviet struggle for power in Africa. This student's outstanding over-all performance surpassed the high standards expected of the carefully selected members of the AWC.

IV. REPORTING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME, GRADE, AFSN AND ORGANIZATION ARNO H. LUEHMAN, Maj Gen, USAF, 1080A, Air War College	DUTY TITLE Commandant	SIGNATURE Arno H. Luehman DATE 11 June 1965

AF FORM 475 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

TRAINING REPORT

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST FIRST MIDDLE (Print) 7-24	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
58124	McCord, James W. Jr.	16

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	OMIT 40-42
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	1				06	12	64	Germany	270

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	OMIT 40-42
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION									

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
X	OTHER *(Specify)* Returnee Payroll Info		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. Form 1460c

DOCUMENT DATE PERIOD 7-10-64

REMARKS

PREPARED BY [illegible]

✓ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

☐ FISCAL DIVISION

✓ FINANCE DIVISION

DATE 9-[illegible]-64

SIGNATURE

FORM 8-62 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

CONTINUED SERVICE AGREEMENT FOR EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO TRAINING THROUGH NON-CIA FACILITIES

1. In consideration of my being assigned by the Central Intelligence Agency to training in Air War College (Course) at

Montgomery, Alabama
(Name of Facility)

beginning August 1964 and ending June 1965,

I agree to the following terms and conditions:

a. That, after having completed the training under the program described above, I will continue serving the Central Intelligence Agency (hereinafter the Agency) for a period of not less than 36 months, which period shall be deemed to commence the first workday after completion of the training covered by this agreement, unless I am involuntarily separated from the Agency;

b. That, if I voluntarily leave the Agency before completion of the agreed period of service and do not immediately, as determined by the Agency, enter the service of another Federal agency, I will reimburse the Agency for any additional expenses incurred by it in connection with my training, which expenses are defined to include (1) travel and per diem in lieu of subsistence, (2) transportation of immediate family, household goods and personal effects, packing, crating, temporary storage, drayage, and unpacking, (3) tuition and matriculation fees, (4) library and laboratory services, (5) purchase or rental of books, materials and supplies, (6) the cost of other services or facilities directly related to the training, but excluding salary, pay, or compensation received.

c. That, before voluntarily leaving the Agency to enter the service of another Federal agency during the agreed period of service, I will give the Agency at least ten working days' written notice, during which period it shall have the opportunity to determine whether I am to reimburse it for any additional expenses incurred; that should I fail to give such ten-day notice, or if the Agency notifies me that reimbursement is required, I will, upon demand, promptly reimburse the Agency for the additional expenses determined to be due.

d. That if I do not make prompt voluntary payment for the amount of additional expenses determined to be due under paragraphs b or c of

(McCord)

this agreement, the Agency may recover such amounts from me or my estate by (1) set-off of accrued salary, pay, compensation, amount of retirement credit, or other amount due me from the Government, and by (2) such other methods as may be provided by law for the recovery of amounts due the Government.

e. That the assignment to training under this agreement does not commit the Government to continue my employment and, further, that I may be released in whole or in part from the terms of this agreement only by action of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(Signature)
James W McCord
James W. McCord
(Type Name)

13 July 1964
(Date)

WITNESS:
Russell R. Shaw
(Signature)

(Type Name)

13 July 1964
(Date)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
Office of the Provost Marshal
[illegible], US Forces

9 MAY 1964

Dear Jim:

My tour of duty in Headquarters, United States Army, Europe will terminate in late May when I leave Europe to undertake new duties in Washington, D. C. My association with you and your staff has been a richly rewarding experience, both personally and professionally. The manner in which you have unobtrusively, yet effectively, served as the catalyst which welded together the activities of the many staff and operational agencies which share an interest in our national security, has been a source of continuing inspiration to me. Your efforts have enjoyed my unqualified personal support and have merited the admiration of those members of my staff who have been privileged to associate with you.

You have dramatically demonstrated a capacity for bringing together key personnel of agencies who seek, in the accomplishment of their individual missions, the realization of a common goal, in a manner calculated to preserve the individual integrity of each agency while exploiting those benefits of cohesiveness so essential to maximum effectiveness. Mindful that the application of a prescribed technique without adding the complementing ingredient of your confidence inspiring and persuasive personality would not have achieved the same measure of success, I unhesitatingly ascribe our abundant joint accomplishments to your generous personal contribution.

James

My future relationships with your associates will always reflect my admiration for the manner in which you have contributed to the attainment of our national aims and the manner in which your personal efforts have precipitated a more significant contribution from the other agencies with which yours has been associated.

Sincerely,

CARL C. TURNER
Brig Gen USA
Provost Marshal

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Office of Special Investigations
Office of the Deputy Director (USAFE)
APO 332, US Forces

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: AFISI-D

10 JUN 1964

SUBJECT:

TO: Mr. Gordon M. Stewart
Coordinator and Special Advisor
OCA, AMCONGEN
APO 757, US Forces

Dear Mr. Stewart

On the departure of Mr. James W. McCord I wanted you to know of OSI's appreciation for his constant support and cooperation during his tour. He has given us valuable assistance in the performance of our mission.

We appreciate also Mr. McCord's constant efforts to create unity of purpose and action among the many security and counterintelligence agencies in the area. Through his efforts new liaison avenues were opened to OSI which, on several occasions, facilitated the completion of our tasks. His efforts in contingency planning also were noteworthy.

OSI in USAFE will miss Mr. McCord. Please extend our good wishes to him and Mrs. McCord for continued success in their endeavors.

Sincerely

L. L. Free

L. L. FREE
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director (USAFE)

file passon

C

HEADQUARTERS
513TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
Office of the Commanding Officer
APO 757 US Forces

AEUMC-SD 5 June 1964

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO: Mr. James W. McCord
United States Army Area Security Component
APO 757, US Forces

1. Upon your impending departure from overseas assignment, I wish to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation on behalf of the 513th Intelligence Corps Group for your splendid cooperation with this organization.

2. The conference held by security officers in this area on a monthly basis, which was established largely due to your efforts, has provided an excellent opportunity for closer coordination, exchange of information, and integrated operations; and has resulted in benefits to the overall security missions of the United States agencies in this area.

3. Your professional competence, coupled with your cheerful approach to problem areas, has benefited all of those who have had the opportunity to work with you. I feel certain you will render distinguished service in your new assignment, and I wish you every success for the future.

Paul R. Lutjens
PAUL R. LUTJENS
Colonel, AIS
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
APO 757

IAEINT-I

8 June 1964

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

TO:
Mr. James W. McCord, Jr.
Chief, Security
USAASC
APO 757, US Forces

1. The news of your departure to a new station in the USA has been received with regret; your contributions in the intelligence community will be missed. At the same time it is gratifying to learn that you have been selected for such an important assignment of which you are most deserving.

2. I wish to express my appreciation for your efforts in organizing the Frankfurt Security Officers' Conference. I am aware that through your initiative and tenacity this organization expanded in size until all security and intelligence units in the Frankfurt area were represented, thus cementing their combined efforts into one sphere of cooperation. This, I am sure, has contributed immeasurably to the overall security mission of this community.

3. I also wish to specifically thank you for the security lecture you presented to members of my command in England. There have been many favorable comments received from personnel hearing that presentation, to the effect that the lecture indicated a very broad range of knowledge on your part and that it was presented in a truly professional manner.

4. The fine cooperation you have extended to personnel in my S2 Division has been of the greatest assistance to my command and all have voiced their appreciation and satisfaction concerning their association with you. I wish you the best of luck and success in your new endeavor.

JAMES H. KELLER
Colonel, AIS
Chief

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14-00000

ree'd 21 Nov 63
EGOT-? 771, 30 Oct 63

SECRET

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true) James W. McCord, Jr. /s/	DATE (from item 9-1) 23 Oct 63	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true) Daniel M. Kelly /s/	DATE (from item 9-2) 23 Oct 63
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:		George G. Ruder	DATE 21 Nov 63

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

Arr o/s 3 June 62

1. DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1924	2. GRADE GS-15	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Chief, Security Branch/CSB	
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known) Security Officer	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE German Station, CSB		7a. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE FROM FIELD 9 June 1964
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR -----			7b. EXPECTED DATE OF ARRIVAL AT HEADQUARTERS PCS 20 July 1964

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

1. Security policy advisor to COS and its Senior Station and Base Officers.
2. Supervises nine professional and four clerical employees of the Security Branch.
3. Directs conduct of LCFLUTTER, SGLATERAL, Physical Security Duties and Investigations performed by the Security Branch.
4. Reviews security of German Station and recommends ways and means for strengthening and improving.
5. Furnishes technical security support and guidance to other Bases in EE and outside of EE on request.
6. Reviews investigative reports of the Security Branch and performs such other duties as directed by COS, Chief, EE and Bases.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT.

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

Same as #8, above.

10. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

Would like National War College training

FORM NO. 202

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (Continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

1 ☐ RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

2 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE ASSIGNMENT IN HEADQUARTERS, INDICATE CHOICE OF COMPONENT:

1ST. CHOICE OS/IOS 2ND. CHOICE OS/PPS 3RD. CHOICE OS/Staff

3 ☐ BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION, BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS:

1ST. CHOICE San Francisco 2ND. CHOICE Los Angeles 3RD. CHOICE Miami

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

30 days INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS 20

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

four; ages, 36, 11, 9, and 7

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Subject has rendered outstanding performance while assigned to the German Station. His preference to return for an additional two years after home leave is accepted with great pleasure.

Full consideration should also be given in the future for his request to attend the National War College.

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. S-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMPONENT TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Events have overtaken this PRQ and Subject will be returning in the summer of 1964 to attend the Air War College.

16. NAME OF PERSONNEL OFFICER George S. Rader

SIGNATURE

DATE 10 December 1963

[illegible]

17. EMPLOYEE ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF PLANNED REASSIGNMENT

[illegible] X [illegible]

18. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME ERNEST HALDT

20. SIGNATURE Ernest Haldt

19. TITLE OS/Pers

21. DATE 20 Jan 64

22. COMMENTS

Mr. McCord selected for Air War College and subsequently decided to return for this purpose.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	7-24			25-26
58124	MCCORD	JAMES	W.	34

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	06	09	62				GERMANY	270

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 5/13 - 6/9/62

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

☒ REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT

DATE 8/14/62

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE 253130 MAY 31 62

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE 7-24	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
#52124	Mc CORD JAMES W. JR.	54

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	04	9	62	04	14	62	E/E	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
OS-655-62	4/1-14/62

REMARKS

Bc
9-10-62

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
	FINANCE DIVISION	27 Jun 62	

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8-101)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James W. McCord

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE

SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Security Officer Field Course #12

during the period **14 May** *to* **25 May 1962**

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that

James W. McCord

has attended and successfully completed the

SECURITY OFFICE
SPECIAL TRAINING COURSE

Physical Security Training Course #8

during the period 23 April *to* 11 May 1962

William A Kotapish

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, CIA

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of Two Years from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

James Walter McCord Jr
James Walter McCord, Jr.
(Employee)

WITNESS:

Netta S. Waller
Office of Personnel

Date: May 8 '62

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. [illegible] WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 56

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(4)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

Operations Support No. 50
120 hours, full-time, Phase I 2 - 20 April 62 8 Students
80 hours, full-time, Phase II 23 April - 4 May 62 10 Students

Student : McCORD, James W., Jr. Year of Birth: 1924

EOD Date: August 1951 Grade: GS-15 Office : OS

COURSE OBJECTIVES - CONTENT AND METHODS

The Operations Support Course emphasizes the role of support personnel in clandestine activities and their responsibility in originating material of a support nature at headquarters and in the field. The Course objectives are to provide the student with (1) an appreciation of the interrelationship between operating functions and support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations and problems pertinent to the necessary support of operational activities.

a. Phase I covers instruction on organization, functions and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services; basic principles of clandestine activity accompanied by practical exercises; project and agent management; familiarization with defensive and offensive audio surveillance.

About fifty per cent of Phase I consists of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about thirty-five per cent is devoted to field exercises, practical written assignments, practice problems, and observing films as training aids in basic tradecraft. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

b. Phase II includes name checks, records procedures, foreign travel, finance and property accounting, dispatch, pouch, cable and message-writing procedures. For this phase, problems have been developed to represent situations as they normally occur at a Class B Station.

About thirty-five per cent of Phase II is composed of lectures, briefings, and discussions; about fifty per cent is devoted to practice problems and practical written assignments. The remainder of the time is devoted to studying and testing.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

The adjectival ratings on this student for each major area of this course are the result of an evaluation of his work on his individual projects, on the other exercises, and on the final examination. Comparative judgment takes into account students in preceding classes as well as the present one. The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received. The rating the student receives represents the student's performance in the course with no allowance made for difference in age, education, experience and so forth.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME McCord, James W., Jr.

MAJOR CATEGORIES

PHASE I	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Tradecraft - Recognition of elementary principles.	0	2	6
2. Casing - Written observation of an assigned site.	0	2	6
3. Personal Meeting Plan - Written paper emphasizing techniques of effecting clandestine meeting.	0	5	3
4. Personal Meeting - Carrying out student's plan.	0	4	4
5. Contact Report - Written report of clandestine personal meeting.	0	2	6
6. Operational Support Procedures - General knowledge of Clandestine Services Organization and Functions; Agent and Project Management.	0	2	6
PHASE II			
1. Originating Headquarters and Field Dispatches. Indexing Requirements. Field Pouch Manifest.	0	2	8
2. Preparation of Headquarters and Field Cables. Writing and Indexing Messages. Use of Message Writing Techniques.	0	7	3
3. Type II Property Accounting - Fundamentals and Execution of Records.	0	1	9
4. Foreign Travel - Currency Conversion and Completion of Travel Voucher.	0	4	6
5. Familiarization with Class B Accounting and Preparation of Records.	0	0	10
6. Clandestine Services Headquarters and Field Support Procedures.	1	4	5

COMMENTS

Student cancelled per Registrar/Training, 29 March 1962.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: Chief Instructor 18 May 1962 Date

S-E-C-R-E-T

TCK

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(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W Jr
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 453-22-4741

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY APPOINTED
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) .S
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE [illegible] 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va
HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE Same

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lamesa Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE 30 M.
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE
DATE OF DECREE
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED
DATE SPOUSE DIED
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Sarah Ruth McCord	5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va	FL 4-7695	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
Michael Steven McCord	Same	M	4/15/56
Nancy Ellen McCord	Same	F	3/25/5[illegible]
Carol Anne McCord	Same	F	11/7/52
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
James W. McCord Sr	Box 63 Thackerville Okla	—	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
Marjorie Lee McCord	" " "	—	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Parents + Luther Berry, 3508-35th St Lubbock Texas (Father in law)

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) Luther Berry
RELATIONSHIP Father in law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 3508 35th St Lubbock Texas
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER Swift 9-3440
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE Same
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION Same

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) Yes ✓ ☐ NO
Yes

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES ✓ ☐ NO
Yes

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ✓ ☐ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. If such notification is not desirable because of health or other reasons, please so state in item 6 on the reverse side of this form.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 4-60 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

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(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

1st National Bank of Vienna Virginia – James W Jr and Sarah Ruth McCord

Nat Federal Credit Union.

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

With Wife

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?

☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Dorothy Berry, sister in law, 2219-D Norfolk St Houston Texas

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

1st National Bank, Vienna Virginia

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington DC	May 8 62	James W McCord Jr

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

239754 MAR 13 62

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print) FIRST MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5	6-23	24-25
058124 ✓	Mc CORD JAMES W. JR	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	10	06	61	10	16	61	EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 05-544-62	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/4-10/61

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 4-60 1451a

SECRET

(4-101)

TRAINING REPORT

Americans Abroad Orientation - Free Europe (Germany)

28 hours 19, 20, 26 & 27 February 1962 Office :

Students : MCCORD, Sarah Ruth (Dependent- James W., Jr.) Service Designation:

Year of Birth: No. of Students :

Grade : EOD Date :

COURSE OBJECTIVE - CONTENT AND METHOD

This course helps prepare personnel and their adult dependents for residence or travel in the general area and country of destination. Included are a briefing on "The Americans Abroad Problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective inter-personal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and descriptions of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slide commentaries, and selected readings for a recommended program of self-study. Employees and dependents recently returned from the area help to keep current the information on conditions.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only; no attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING: A. M. Lewis 4 June 1962

Chief Instructor Date

ANTHONY M. LEWIS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6				25-26
57129	McCORD	JAMES	W	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	06	12	61	06	29	61	EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
T.O. 05-516-62	6/12/61 - 6/29/61

REMARKS

219883 NOV 15 61

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	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION	14 Nov 61	

FORM 2-56 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

12/28/61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7/14		25-26
58124	McCord	James	W. Jr.	24

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	03	12	61	03	22	61	WE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

☒ TRAVEL VOUCHER
☐ DISPATCH
☐ CABLE
☐ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐ OTHER (Specify)

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.:

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD:

REMARKS:

PREPARED BY:
☐ FISCAL DIVISION
☒ FINANCE DIVISION

☐ REPRINT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT

ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED.

DATE: 5/22/61

SIGNATURE:

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-101

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

123189 DEC 16 60

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
58124	McCORD	JAMES	W.	24 ~~21~~

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39	EE, WE.	
	2	08	15	60	08	22	60		801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 15-22 AUG. 60

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ FIELD STATION ☒ [illegible] STATION		DATE 12/14/60	SIGNATURE

FORM 9-59 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-5		6-23		24-25
58124	Mc Cord, Jr.	James	W.	31

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
1. PCS *(Basic)* 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		
2. TDY *(Basic)* 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	37-38		39-41
	2	10	05	59	10	17	59	WE - EE	801

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: 05-278-60

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 5-17 Oct. 1959

REMARKS: 031317 FEB2160

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE 2/23/60	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 8-58 1451a

SECRET

(4-10)

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N-R

INSTRUCTIONS: COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE. THE DATA RECORDED ON THIS FORM IS ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING TRAVEL EXPENSES ACCRUABLE IN CONNECTION WITH LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE, OVERSEAS DUTY, RETURN TO RESIDENCE UPON SEPARATION, AND FOR PROVIDING CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF AN EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY. THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W. Jr

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: 5701 Floyd Ave
LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va.
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Va.

2. MARITAL STATUS

CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, INDICATE PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lamesa Texas
DATE OF MARRIAGE: May 30 1948
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:
IF WIDOWED, INDICATE PLACE SPOUSE DIED:
DATE SPOUSE DIED:
IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE Sarah Ruth McCord	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 5701 Floyd Ave	TELEPHONE NUMBER FL 4-7684	
NAME(S) OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	AGE
Michael Steven McCord	Same	M	7
Carol Anne McCord		F	5
Nancy Ellen McCord		F	3
NAME OF FATHER (Or male guardian) James W McCord Sr	ADDRESS Purcell Oklahoma	TELEPHONE NUMBER —	
NAME OF MOTHER (Or female guardian) Maggie Lee McCord	ADDRESS Purcell Okla	TELEPHONE NUMBER —	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE AGENCY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES? Wife only

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. James W McCord Jr
RELATIONSHIP: Wife
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: FL 4-7684
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION?
☑ YES ☐ NO

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF?
☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE?
☑ YES ☐ NO

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 3 ABOVE MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

FIND DATE ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS
The Springfield Bank, Springfield Va.
NW Federal Credit Union

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM NO. 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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5. (CONTINUED)

IN WHOSE NAME(S) ARE THE ACCOUNTS LISTED?

James W. and [illegible] McCord

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☐ YES ☑ NO. IF "YES", WHERE IS DOCUMENT LOCATED?

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☑ YES ☐ NO. IF "YES", WHO POSSESSES THE POWER OF ATTORNEY?

My Wife

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Washington DC	1 Oct 65	James W. McCord

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

(CONVENED PURSUANT TO REGULATIONS R 20-635 AND [illegible] 20-635)

DATE: 2 March 1959

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

NAME: (LAST) McCORD	(FIRST) James	(MIDDLE) Walter	POSITION TITLE Actg. Dep. Chief/SRS/OS
PRESENT GRADE GS-14	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO Security		STATION Headquarters

BE AWARDED:

Certificate of Merit with Distinction

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION, ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE DURING THE PERIOD
1 July - 15 August 1958

☐ APPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION ☒ DISAPPROVES THE RECOMMENDATION

☐ APPROVES, BUT IN LIEU THEREOF, RECOMMENDS THE AWARD OF:

CITATION

REASONS FOR DISAPPROVAL OF RECOMMENDED AWARD

The Honor and Merit Awards Board concludes from the information available to it that the service performed, while of unquestionable value, is not sufficiently outstanding to merit an honor award.

APPROVED

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
Gordon M. Stewart

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
Rudyard Boulton

SECRET

FORM 382 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR AWARD

(REGULATIONS R-20-635 & AFR 20-635)

DATE: 18 December 1958

TO: Honor Awards Board

THROUGH:

FROM: Office of Security

SECTION I — PERSONAL DATA

NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last) (First) (Middle): McCORD, James Walter

POSITION TITLE: Actg. Dep. Chief/SRS/OS

GRADE: GS-14

OFFICE ASSIGNED TO: Security

STATION: ☒ Headquarters ☐ Field (Specify location)

LEGAL RESIDENCE (Number, street, city, zone, state): 5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, Virginia

CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: Birth

IF ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE DIFFERENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE SUCH DIFFERENCES.

RECOMMENDED AWARD: Certificate of Merit with Distinction

POSTHUMOUS: ☐ Yes ☒ No

NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Ruth McCord

RELATIONSHIP: Wife

ADDRESS (Number, street, city, zone, state): 5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, Va.

IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, DATE, ORIGINATING OFFICE, AND ACTION TAKEN.

None

SECTION II — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION

WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT? ☐ Yes ☐ No

IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OR CERTIFICATES OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUAL HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

FULL NAME	POSITION TITLE	GRADE	OFFICE ASSIGNED TO

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

FULL NAME	TYPE OF AWARD

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

LOCATION	INCLUSIVE DATES	TIME OF DAY

PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED.

SECTION III — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE

OFFICE, COMPONENT, OR STATION [illegible] (Designation and location): Germany and Washington, D.C.

[illegible]: 1 July - 15 August 19[illegible]

ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED: ☒ Yes ☐ No

NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT: ☒ Yes ☐ No

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECTION IV TO BE USED FOR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ☐ DEED (OR ACT) ☒ ACHIEVEMENT OF PERFORMANCE (OR SERVICE RENDERED)

AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION: WAS ACT VOLUNTARY? DESCRIBE WHY ACT WAS OUTSTANDING AND IF IT WAS MORE THAN NORMALLY EXPECTED. EXPLAIN HOW -- IF IN AERIAL FLIGHT, DESCRIBE TYPE AND POSITION OF AIRPLANE, CREW POSITION OF INDIVIDUAL, AND ALL UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. INDICATE RESULTS OF ACT.

AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE: TITLE AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNMENT, INCLUDING CHARACTER OF SERVICE DURING PERIOD FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED (GIVE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL OR SPECIALIZED POSITIONS, INCLUDING DATES OF ASSIGNMENT AND RELIEF). WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL DO THAT MERITS THE AWARD? WHY WAS THIS OUTSTANDING WHEN COMPARED TO OTHERS OF THAT GRADE AND EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR POSITIONS? INDICATE RESULTS OF ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICE.

Reference is made to the attached memorandum dated 1 November 1958, which is the summary excerpted from the report of the operation submitted on that date.

Upon receipt of information, 2 July 1958, that a member of the ~~Soviet~~ Foreign Office in Moscow had mentioned to one of the American Embassy staff members that the Soviets had knowledge of the crew of the missing C-118, Mr. McCord was appointed head of a team of men from Headquarters to proceed immediately to Germany to plan for and debrief the crew of the C-118 in case they were released.

At Wiesbaden, acting upon policy guidance received from Headquarters, Mr. McCord made detailed plans for the interrogation of crew members; prepared news releases and made plans for the handling of the press; arranged for reunion of the crew members with their families; and arranged medical examinations, all with the view toward avoiding publicity or incidents which might reveal Central Intelligence Agency interest in the highly sensitive nature of the plane's flight.

When the crew arrived at Wiesbaden, Mr. McCord directed the over-all interrogations and participated in portions of the interrogation of the crew members himself. He prepared cables and dispatches for Headquarters as well as the over-all report of the debriefing of the crew. He briefed the crew members regarding their conduct before the press. He also assisted in the plans for the return of the crew members to Washington, all of which entailed around-the-clock work.

Upon return to Washington, Mr. McCord directed the detailed debriefing of the crew, covering all aspects of possible compromise of security of CIA personnel, operations, and cover unit activities, as well as various positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters. Final reports were prepared and Mr. McCord participated in briefings of the DCI, DDCI, and various Air Force and Defense Department officials.

The ingenuity, foresight, planning and guidance exercised by Mr. McCord from the time the team first left for Europe, through the initial debriefing, and then in following through in the debriefings back at Headquarters, resulted in rapid and thorough interview of the crew members, assessment of the compromise to the Agency, and determination of appropriate action needed by the Agency to counter such compromise. His performance in that instance was of the highest degree and did much credit to this Agency in the highly professional manner in which it was performed.

RELATED POSITION OF PERSON INITIATING RECOMMENDATION TO PERSON BEING RECOMMENDED

Head of Office

LIST OF ENCLOSURES (INCLUDE PROPOSED CITATION)

Summary memorandum excerpt from report dated 1 November 1958

NAME, POSITION TITLE, AND GRADE OF PERSON MAKING RECOMMENDATION

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security GS-18

SIGNATURE

DATE

18 December 1958

1 November 1958

SUBJECT: American C-118 Aircraft Downed in Soviet
Azerbaijan 27 June 1958 by Soviet MIG-17's

On 27 June 1958, a C-118 cargo plane, assigned to the U. S. Air Force in Wiesbaden, was fired on and forced down near Gendarkh, Soviet Azerbaijan. The plane was carrying nine U. S. airmen, three of whom are assigned to this Agency. They are Colonel Dale D. Brannon, Major Robert E. Crans and Major Bennie A. Shupe. The other six men were regular Air Force members assigned to Wiesbaden, Germany. The nine men were en route from Wiesbaden to Teheran and Pakistan on a flight carrying cargo for CIA. Col. Brannon and Major Crans were planning to get off the plane in Teheran had the plane remained on course.

The plane, while en route to Teheran from Nicosia and as a result of bad weather and navigation error, went off its plotted course and crossed into Soviet Armenia. There it was intercepted and fired on by three MIG-17's and caught fire in the left wing. Five of the crew bailed out and the other four rode the aircraft down to a safe landing on a small airstrip at Gendarkh in Soviet Azerbaijan. The crew members who had remained on the plane to its landing got out safely and the plane was burning fiercely when the crew last saw it. The part of the crew that parachuted was surrounded by Soviet peasants, some of whom beat and struck at the crew members. One of the men, Major Bennie Shupe, CIA employee, was taken by the mob to a telephone pole and narrowly escaped hanging before being rescued by the Soviet military.

Major Shupe and the remainder of the crew were turned over to the Soviet military, and after an overnight stay in a Soviet military garrison near Stepanakert were taken to a city believed to be Yevlakh, and then flown to Baku, Russia. There they underwent interrogation by Soviet intelligence officers, at least one of whom had served in the United States, as a Soviet Purchasing Commission employee 1943-45, and later in Canada in 1949-55 as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. This RIS officer, Vladimir Bourdine, later served in 1955 as a personal interpreter for Khrushchev in a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru of India. Bourdine interrogated Colonel Brannon of CIA at considerable length during the period 30 June - 3 July 1958, while the crew was imprisoned in the MVD Headquarters building in Baku. Following their individual interrogations, the crew members were required to appear separately before a Commission of Soviet officials at the Baku MVD Headquarters who questioned them about the border violation by the C-118 aircraft, and requested them to sign statements attesting that they had been well-treated and received adequate medical care by the

Soviets. The inquiry by the Commission was perfunctory and did not involve an interrogation in the intelligence sense. The crew was then transported to Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border on 7 July 1958 and turned over to the American Air Attache.

On 2 July 1958 this Agency received information indicating that the Soviets might be considering releasing the nine fliers. Since no date or place of release was indicated, cables were sent to the various peripheral CIA stations around the Soviet border indicating the possibility of impending release. The Air Force agreed to alert its Air Attaches in the same areas of the possibility of impending release. At the same time a team of Agency personnel, including a medical officer, an Air Maritime officer, and two representatives of the Security Office were dispatched to Wiesbaden from Headquarters in anticipation of the release of the fliers. Three hours after the team arrived in Germany, the place of release was learned from the Soviets to be Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border, and a USAFE plane was dispatched that night from Wiesbaden with the Air Maritime team member aboard destined for Teheran to await the turnover of the American fliers at Astara. The fliers were turned over on 7 July 1958, were immediately flown to Wiesbaden, Germany where an initial joint CIA-AF debriefing of them was begun, and where initial press interviews were held, following careful briefing of the crew as to the text and limitations to be observed. Two days later, two members of the crew, one of whom was Major Shupe, a CIA employee, were permitted to give an interview to the Paris representative of Time-Life. Members of the CIA team were present during these press interviews, under appropriate cover arrangements, to furnish guidance to the CIA personnel.

Following the initial debriefing, the entire crew was flown to Washington, D. C. on 18 July 1958, for a more extended debriefing. These debriefings were completed on 6 August 1958 and covered the various aspects of possible compromise of the security of CIA personnel, operational and cover units activities, as well as various positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters.

The three CIA men aboard the plane were extremely knowledgeable of highly sensitive Agency operational activities and of the identities of numerous CIA personnel. Colonel Brannon, as Commander of the CIA Air Support Operations in Europe, was knowledgeable of CIA operational activities on a world-wide basis, with many of these projects being extremely sensitive. Colonel Brannon and Major Robert Crans each carried briefcases containing classified material, and Brannon carried an address book containing several names, addresses and telephone numbers of CIA personnel and cover units. The two briefcases are believed to have been destroyed by the fire in the aircraft after landing. The address book of Brannon was taken from him by the Soviet peasants on landing and was later turned back to him by the Soviet Commission members at Baku. Neither he nor other members of the crew were questioned about either of the briefcases, their contents, nor about the address book and its contents. We assume that the Soviets have or will process the names in the address book through their Moscow files. Some of the other crew members carried personal notations in their wallets relating to a few other CIA personnel.

We have received no indications that Colonel Brannon or the other crewmen were drugged or otherwise tampered with by the Soviets. Brannon and some of the others did receive shots the first night and second day from the Soviet military for their wounds and burns; however, these shots are believed to have been for legitimate medical reasons.

The substance of the questioning, treatment and techniques of interrogation has been exhaustively explored with all the crew members in the course of the debriefings. In summation, the interrogations of the crew members were superficial and do not appear to have been backed up by close coordination and communication with Moscow for intelligence research purposes. It is possible that the quick acknowledgment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the landing of the C-118 in Soviet territory precluded the MVD from fully exploiting the crew members. Colonel Brannon and Captain Kane were separated from the group and given preferred treatment, apparently with the intention of developing them for information purposes. We are convinced that both men handled themselves extremely well and did not disclose any information concerning the Agency or its activities.

To date we have no indication that the Soviets knew at the time they interrogated the crew men, that the flight of the C-118 was connected with CIA in any way, nor that they knew three of the men aboard were CIA personnel. We do believe that in time the Soviets, through Brannon's address book, which lists the open Agency telephone number EX 3-6115 below his name on the first page, will connect him and possibly others in the address book with CIA. Since the Soviets questioned him about the 7170th Support Group and the 7405th Support Squadron in Wiesbaden, it is therefore presumed that they will associate those units with this Agency.

In addition to this report, debriefings of the crewmen were taped and typed, which will total some 7,000 - 9,000 pages when completed, are being distributed to the CI Staff and other interested components of this Agency as they are completed. Questions were solicited by this Office of all interested components, in order to cover all matters in the debriefings of interest to the Agency. Careful arrangements have been made with the Air Force in order that Agency interests will be adequately protected and proper security will be maintained in the handling of information and reports derived from the debriefings, and so that no compromise of the Agency interest in the flight of the C-118 will be made to the press.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. It is our opinion that the possible compromises arising out of this incident are relatively minor in nature and that no major compromises occurred.

B. That the Soviets "missed" on the true nature of the flight and personnel of the C-118.

C. That the reasons the crew members were given an early release were as follows:

1. Primarily, the Soviet interrogators failed to use all of the leads at their command, particularly Brannon's address book, and failed to break the crewmen through interrogation.

2. The crew did not inadvertently disclose through interrogations, the purpose of their flight, its relation to the Agency and that of three of its crew to CIA.

3. The Soviets apparently failed to check out the names and other data in Brannon's address book through their files prior to release of the crew.

4. No incriminating information or material was immediately recovered from the burned aircraft.

5. Several of the crew destroyed incriminating building passes and notations in their wallets while on their way down in their parachutes, or immediately after landing in their chutes.

6. There were either no leaks or insufficient leaks of incriminating information through any room conversations at Baku among the crew, which may have been monitored by the Soviets, or such conversations as there may have been were not properly interpreted, or interpreted soon enough to tip the Soviets that there was something unusual about the flight or the crew.

7. The crew members were all in uniform and not in mixed civilian and Air Force clothing, which properly established their cover.

8. Sufficient pressures were exercised by Agency, State, Air Force, and Executive action upon the Soviets to effect the release of the crew as soon as possible.

9. A factor that probably had an important bearing was the early acknowledgment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the downing of the aircraft and the attempts by the Soviets in the early stages to make this appear as a deliberate violation of the Soviet air frontier. This tended to take the "play" away from the MVD and military intelligence. In addition, this Government was stepping up the pressure for the release of the nine Army personnel who landed in East Germany in a helicopter, and the Soviets probably had no desire to create a duplicate of this incident.

10. Safeguards taken by the Agency and the Air Force were such that there was no leak to the press, during the crew's internment, of the fact that there was an intelligence connection of the flight and crew of the C-118.

D. That it is not believed, based on the evidence at hand, that the crew was drugged or otherwise tampered with medically.

E. That there are valuable points of guidance from a cover, operations, policy and code of conduct standpoint which can be gathered from experiences of these crewmen in the hands of the Soviets and can aid the Agency and its personnel in any future situation of a similar nature in which the Soviet military and RIS interrogators are encountered.

ACTION TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD AGENCY INTEREST IN THIS MATTER:

A. All possible steps were taken during the period immediately preceding and immediately after the release of the crew to effect the minimum of publicity and to safeguard and limit such publicity as was given out, in order to avoid disclosing the CIA connection of the flight and some of its crew.

B. Throughout the entire debriefing process in Germany and in the U. S., the maximum care has been taken to safeguard the information taken by transcript and classify it so that there would be access to the information therein on a need-to-know basis and by only properly cleared persons.

C. Steps were taken immediately by the German Station after the downing of the C-118 to change the combinations of the safes and locks in the buildings to which the crew had access.

D. The three men from this Agency who were aboard the flight, Brannon, Crans and Shupe, and the aircraft commander, Lyles, are being removed from the German area, being returned to the U. S. The three CIA crewmen are being returned to duty with the Air Force from the Agency.

E. Steps are continuing to be taken to properly safeguard Agency interests and personnel in regard to names of Agency personnel who appeared in Brannon's address book or in other notations appearing in any papers carried by other members of the crew.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Continue to take all possible steps to prevent any disclosure to any unauthorized persons, particularly the press, about the CIA personnel aboard the C-118, or the true nature of the flight.

B. Continue to take all possible steps to change the cover designation of the units appearing in Brannon's address book to prevent any further compromise of these units.

C. Permit no further publicity about the flight itself, in order to minimize the possibility of the press learning of the CIA interest in the flight of the C-118.

D. Carefully follow all matters relating to the International Court of Justice interest in this flight, in order to prevent any compromise of Agency interests.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
15-8124

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
McCord James W Jr

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: Jan DAY: 26 YEAR: 24

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
Russian 654

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: Nov DAY: 18 YEAR: 58

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A.

Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. ✓ I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B.

Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. ✓ I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C.

Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. ✓ MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-65)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D.

Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I [illegible] SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E.

Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 17 Nov 58	SIGNATURE James W McCord Jr
[illegible] C	CAT. E

HEADQUARTERS
USAF, HDQS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR STAFF
(FIELD EXTENSION)
Washington 25, D.C.

CERTIFICATE

I concur in the Reserve assignment of **James W. McCord, Jr.** (Name) **Captain** (Grade) **AO 2 099 263** (SN) with this organization. In the event of partial or full mobilization, he will be made available for active military service.

I certify that no delay in his entry on active duty will be requested by this employing agency if he is ordered to active military service during a period of mobilization.

Date: 12 Jan 1956

LOUIS G. [illegible]
Captain, Infantry
Mobilization Training Officer

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 DEC 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: James W. McCord, Jr.

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 22 August 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
James W. McCord Jr
Date: 10 January 1956

FORM NO. [illegible], 1 APR 55

(4)

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	AGE	GRADE	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE	CAREER DESIGNATION
McCORD, James W.	30	GS-13	2	Security

STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	POSITION TITLE
Office of Director of Security		Special Assistant to Director of Security

NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA
10	-	-	36

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION				
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION	TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
August 1951	June 1953	U.S.	San Francisco Field Office		x	

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☒ YES B ☐ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	JApan	Tokyo	Security
2ND	Germany	Frankfurt	Security
3RD	South America	Rio de Janeiro	Security

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS. IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

None

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

Wife - 26 Daughter - 9 mos.
Son - 2

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
JUN 54

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE. (4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (*old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.*) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Security assignments in same or similar position as my present assignment.

REMARKS

DATE 30 August 1954	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECTION II *(To be completed by employee's supervisor)*

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE 9 mos	INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT 3 mos

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

Do not contemplate considering for rotation for one year.

DATE 10 Sept 54	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

[illegible] CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

JAMES W. McCORD, JR.

27 August 1951 14 September 1951

FOR THE

3 October 1

CERTIFICATION:

This is to certify that I personally witnessed James Walter McCord, Jr., subscribe his signature to these papers on this date.

24 August 1951

Ervin W. Schmidt

Ervin W. Schmidt

IIV [illegible]

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE 195

DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Present Agency	San Francisco	22	Aug	1951	Present					
Federal Bureau of Investigation	San Francisco San Diego, Washington D. C.	25	Oct	1949	10	Feb	1951	25	3	2
Federal Bureau of Investigation	Washington D. C. New York City	9	Mar	1942	8 22	9 Nov	42 1943	14		1

1/27/55

SCD – 12/2/51 verified by Gibbons

Total Civilian Service 17 4 4

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
U. S. Army Air Corps	23	Nov	1943	30	Oct	1945			

Total Military Service 1

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

31 December 1951
DATE

[illegible]
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

as of 12/31/51

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
21	3	6

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

168104

1. Serial No. (no entry) [redacted]	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) McCord James W., Jr.	3. Office IASO
4. Date of Birth 26 January 19[illegible]	5. Sex: x male (1) ___ female (2)	Marital Status [illegible] Nr. Dependents 2
6. Employment Date: 22 August 1951		
7. Citizenship: x U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) x Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other (specify) Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ________	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
[✓ 7.] Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

[illegible] 29 NOV 1962

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
University of Texas Austin, Texas	Accounting		9/[illegible]	12/[illegible]	4		[illegible]	1/49	120
Kilgore College Kilgore, Texas	Accounting		2/[illegible]	[illegible]	1 sem.		none		16
Lincoln Univ. Oakland, Calif	Law		/52	/ 1		1 sem.	none		8

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

CODED

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
				QUAL[illegible]
				DATE 20 [illegible]

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
USAF [illegible] School, [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Operation of [illegible] and [illegible]
Intelligence Sc[illegible] Lowry Air Force [illegible]	[illegible]1/	[illegible]	[illegible]	Air Force Intelligence [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Special Agent (Investigator) Radio Operator [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mos. [illegible]	Description of Duties: [illegible]
Grade [illegible] Salary [illegible]	
Office [illegible]	
Position Title: [illegible]	
Duty Title: [illegible]	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ___ Salary ___	
Office	
Position Title:	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ___ Salary ___	
Office	
Position Title:	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ___ Salary ___	
Office	
Position Title:	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___	Description of Duties:
Grade ___ Salary ___	
Office	
Position Title:	
Duty Title:	Duty Station, if overseas:

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's [illegible] Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary [illegible] Number and Class of Employees Supervised: [illegible] Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:
From [illegible] To [illegible] Tot. mo's 11 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) [illegible] Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer [illegible] Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) [illegible]	Exact Title of your position [illegible] Description of Duties: [illegible] Duty Station if overseas:

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study
none										

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___________

SECRET

SECRET

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
none				

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. X No
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No

Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.
	[illegible]

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SECRET

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

none

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
none	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken
none	

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

none

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour yes (2) 4 year Tour yes (3) Not interested ____

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

[illegible]

SECRET

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ___ Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification x V-A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status x Yes ___ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. x Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service [illegible] Grade 1st Lt. Serial Number AO-[illegible]63

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated Hq [illegible] USAF ([illegible])

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any

Location of Service Records, if known Not known, possibly [illegible] Calif.

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
I.S. Investigations Course	[illegible]	[illegible]

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 10 November 19[illegible] SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in triplicate when ordered overseas and whenever designated place of residence or marital or dependency status changes. IMPORTANT in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE
McCord, James Walter Jr.

RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED TO SERVICE 820 Pacific Ave. Alameda Calif.	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (IF APPOINTED ABROAD) —

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE
Austin, Texas

MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED	PLACE OF MARRIAGE Lamesa, Texas	DATE OF MARRIAGE May 30, 1948
☐ DIVORCED	PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE	DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE
☐ WIDOWED	PLACE SPOUSE DIED	DATE SPOUSE DIED

MEMBERS OF FAMILY (DEPENDENTS ONLY)

IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY	RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH
Sarah Ruth McCord	Wife	April 12, 19[illegible]

August 22, 1951
DATE

James Walter McCord Jr.
SIGNATURE

FORM NO. 37-79
MAY 1950

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 22 August 1951

Dear Mr. McCord:

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective.

Position: GS-11

Base Salary: $5400 per annum

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

4. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

James Walter McCord Jr.
Employee

22 August 1951
Date

Form No. 51-105
June 1948

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

Central Intelligence Agency
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James Walter McCord, Jr., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

22 August 1951
(Date of entrance on duty)

James Walter McCord Jr.
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this .... day of ...., A. D. 19.....,

at .... (City) .... (State)

[SEAL]

.... (Signature of officer)

.... (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city, and State) 820 Pacific Avenue, Alameda, California

2. (a) DATE OF BIRTH Jan 26, [illegible]

(b) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country) Waurika, Oklahoma

3. (a) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Sarah Ruth [illegible]

(b) RELATIONSHIP Wife

(c) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE 820 Pacific Ave. Alameda, California

(d) TELEPHONE NO. Lakehurst 3-464[illegible]

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☑ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (Check one)	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act, and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		✓
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that the appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, [illegible] Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for [illegible] in connection with any record of [illegible] and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose [illegible] The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application [illegible] The appointee may also be questioned on his previous history [illegible] purposes.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the [illegible] Civil Service Rules and [illegible] appropriation acts [illegible] In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under [illegible] Civil Service Commission [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS: Submit in duplicate when ordered overseas or whenever designated place of residence, marital or dependency status changes. This information is important in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at Government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and in determining transportation expenses allowable in connection with shipment of remains of employee or member of family.

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) Walter Jr

2. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN APPOINTED: Alameda California

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (if appointed abroad): 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Virginia

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED PERMANENT OR LEGAL RESIDENCE: 5701 Floyd Ave, Springfield Virginia

3. MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE
☑ MARRIED
☐ DIVORCED
☐ WIDOWED

PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Lamesa Texas

DATE OF MARRIAGE:

PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

4. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Sarah Ruth McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va

TELEPHONE: FLeetwood

NAMES OF CHILDREN:
Michael Steven McCord
Carolyn Anne McCord
Nancy Ellen McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State):

~~[illegible]~~ AGE

M 4½
F [illegible]
F [illegible]

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian): James W McCord Sr

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): [illegible] Texas

TELEPHONE:

NAME OF MOTHER (or female guardian): Marjorie Lee McCord

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): same

TELEPHONE: —

5. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME: Sarah Ruth McCord

RELATIONSHIP: wife

ADDRESS (Number) (Street) (City) (State): 5701 Floyd Ave Springfield Va

TELEPHONE: FLeetwood 4-7[illegible]

THE PERSONS NAMED IN ITEM 4 ABOVE WILL ALSO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE, DUE TO HEALTH OR OTHER PERTINENT REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE UNDER "REMARKS."

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

THE FOLLOWING AGENCY ENDORSED LIFE AND HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE POLICIES ARE IN FORCE IN MY NAME: THE "POLICY NO." SHOULD BE ENTERED IF POSSIBLE, SINCE THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITING ACTION BY THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHOULD A CLAIM BECOME PAYABLE.

6. FULL NAME OF COMPANY	ADDRESS OF HOME OFFICE	POLICY NO.
~~[illegible]~~ Mutual Benefit Hospitalization FEGLI	Omaha Nebraska	

7. I HAVE COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING: WILL ☐ YES ☐ NO POWER OF ATTORNEY ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. REMARKS: All bank a/c known to family

SIGNED AT:

DATE:

SIGNATURE:

FORM NO. 61 REPLACES FORM 37-10
1 JUL 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 May 1968

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): MCCORD, JAMES W., JR.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SEC

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☒ XXX ANNUAL EXECUTIVE
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:
ROOM NO. & BUILDING:
EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY STANDBY
UNTIL [illegible]

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

DONALD FARLEY

DATE: 6 12 68

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-56 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(24)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 May 1966

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): McCord, James W., Jr.

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SFC

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: [illegible]

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

Room # LE 63

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL - Executive

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:
STATION:
TDY OR PCS:
TYPE OF COVER:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:
STATION:
NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR TDY ST...
UNTIL May 67
PETER BROWN

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

[redacted]

19 OCT

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

DATE: [redacted]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: PETER BROWN

FORM 10-64 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 10 July 1964

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): MCCORD, JAMES W

3. POSITION TITLE:

4. GRADE:

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: SECURITY

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.:

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

XXXXXXX
XXX ☒ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION: FRANKFURT

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE:

ROOM NO. & BUILDING:

EXT.:

10. COMMENTS

QUALIFIED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DUTIES

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

JOE W. CLINE

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE)
MC CORD, James W.

2. DATE OF REQUEST
11 Feb. '59

3. POSITION TITLE

4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH
Security

5. GRADE
GS-13

6. REQUESTING OFFICER

7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO.

8. EXTENSION
5161

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ OVERSEAS

EID

STATION

TDY-PCS

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 15-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

DATE OF EVALUATION
16 FEB 1959

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 9-58 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (LAST) MCCORD (FIRST) JAMES (MIDDLE) W., JR.
2. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 January 1962
3. POSITION TITLE: Security Officer
4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH: Security
5. GRADE: GS-15
6. REQUESTING OFFICER:
7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO.: 4E63 Langley
8. EXTENSION: 5643

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS
ETD
STATION
TDY-PCS
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 15-200

☐ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED
☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED
☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS Re evaluation for TDY Standby

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible] to 3 Jan 1963

DATE OF EVALUATION: 3 JAN [illegible]

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 5-58 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. NAME (Last) McCORD (First) JAMES (Middle) W.
2. DATE OF REQUEST 18 December 1961
3. POSITION TITLE Security Officer
4. OFFICE, DIVISION AND BRANCH Security
5. GRADE GS-15
6. REQUESTING OFFICER
7. BUILDING AND ROOM NO. 4E63 Langley
8. EXTENSION 5643

TYPE OF EVALUATION AND REPORT

9. TYPE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☒ OVERSEAS

ETD May 1962
STATION Frankfurt, Germany
TDY-PCS PCS
DAC Cover

☐ OVERSEAS RETURN

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☐ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

10. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION DESIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH R 10-200

☒ YES ☐ NO

9A. REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

10A. REPORT OF OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION

☐ QUALIFIED

☐ DISQUALIFIED

11. COMMENTS

DATE OF EVALUATION

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF, MEDICAL STAFF

FORM 2-60 259 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(36)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 August 1960

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): MCCORD, James W.

3. POSITION TITLE: Investigator

4. GRADE: GS-15

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: Security

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 2063

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☐ OVERSEAS RETURN
☒ TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

RTD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SF 89) ATTACHED:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Robert J. Hayes

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: 1309 [illegible] Bld.

EXT.: 2064

10. REPORT OF EVALUATION

QUALIFIED FOR PROPOSED TDY STAND BY
till 6 Sept 60

DATE:

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF:

FORM 10-59 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) McCord (First) James (Middle) W., Jr.

2. DATE 19 June 1956

3. TO POSITION Investigator (CI)

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Security

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☒ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ TDY--
☒ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

Tdy - Holland

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties and T.Y, 1 months. (6/26/56)
May be re-evaluated upon request.

Mac N. [illegible]
MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) McCORD, (First) JAMES (Middle) WALTER JR.

2. DATE 8 September 1954

3. TO POSITION S.O.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH Security

5. GRADE GS-13

6. TYPE OF POSITION

☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. Field
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR

☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION

☒ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Full duty/General (9-28-54)

Notified H. State 6 Oct [illegible]

File

SECRET

Jo[illegible] Mackin

MEDICAL OFFICE

14-00000

LLC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
058124	MC CORD, James Walter, Jr.	26 January 1924

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 8-66 444 SECRET (4-511)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAR 1 11 00 AM '69

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1							
2							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED (CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM)
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATING
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1. Council on Exceptional Children (CEC)	1201 16th Street, NW Washington, D.C.	1968	1969
2. National Association on Retarded Children (NARC)	450 Lexington Avenue New York City	1968	1969
3			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 17 April 1969

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
058124	McCORD, James W., Jr.	26 Jan 1924

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
No Change			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM. QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2. No Change						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) (Specify)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

No Change

3. DATE OF BIRTH | 4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION | 6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP | 8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) | 9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.				
2. No Change				
3.				

FORM 4430

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF RETURN	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. No Change							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED—CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

No Change

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

No Change

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED
Add: Air Special Warfare Course	Counterinsurgency	Mar. 68	X AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1. No Change			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 22 April 1968

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 058124	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) MCCORD JAMES W JR	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 01/26/24	5. SCHEDULE, GRADE, STEP GS-15-06
6. SD SS	7. POSITION TITLE ELECT ENG AUDIO SUPP	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT SEC	9. LOCATION (City, Country) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	56/07/01	56/08/01
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 31	59/10/05	59/10/17
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	60/08/15	60/08/22
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/03/12	61/03/22
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/08/12	61/08/29
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 24	61/10/06	61/10/16
EUROPEAN AREA	TDY 54	62/04/01	62/04/14
GERMANY	PCS 16	62/06/09	64/06/12
		Y M D	Y M D

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 7 Jul 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	~~NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD~~		
M.S.	International Affairs	George Washington University	1965
BBA	Business Administration	University of Texas	1949

FORM 1-67 444j

SECRET

(4-51)

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SECRET

SECTION III

EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
Electra High School	Electra, Texas	1939-40	☒ Yes ☐ No

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	FIELDS OF STUDY		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM./QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
George Washington University and American Univ., Washington, DC	PhD work in Internat. Affairs		1966-67	---	---	50
George Wash. Univ., Wash., DC	Internat.	Affairs	1964-65	M.S.	1965	30
Linc[illegible] Law School, Oakland, Calif.	Law		1951	---	---	1 year
University of Texas, Austin, Tex.	Business		1946-48	BBA	1948	120

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE, WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT

1965 Masters Thesis: "The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Power in Africa," a 200-page thesis from unclassified sources comparing the efforts of the Sino-Soviets for influence in Africa and the comparative strengths of the local communist parties there.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1 Air War College, Montgomery, Ala.	National Strategy and International Affairs	1964	1965	10
2				
3				
4				
5				

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Europe (Germany & WE)	TDY & PCS	1957-64	Germany & Western Europe	x	x		x

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

Golf - fair

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Provide license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. (Do NOT submit copies unless requested.) INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (e.g. technical or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED.

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING
Presentations at P [illegible] schools and
Internally at Agency-sponsored courses

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify): Army

2. BRANCH OF CORPS: Air Corps

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty): FROM 1945 TO 1945

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify): Regular

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation from service): Lt.

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER: FV 30[illegible]263

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION:
☒ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Active Duty - Navigator - Bombardier duties
Reserve - Intelligence Officer

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG:
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☒ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE: Major

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK: 1962

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION: ---

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☒ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

Intelligence Officer

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS

Agency Unit

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	MAJOR OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED
1	Air War College, Montgomery, Ala.	National Strategy	1965
2			
3			
4			
5			

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) August 1965 - present	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Washington, D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH CS/Technical Division
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Technical Division		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Supervision of the Office of Security audio countermeasures program domestically and overseas.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) Aug 64-Aug 65	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Montgomery, Alabama	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH CS
4. TITLE OF JOB student-Air War College		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Agency-sponsored - student at Air War College, study of national strategy & international affairs.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) June 62-Aug 64	2. LOCATION (Country, City) Germany, Frankfurt	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH EE/Security Branch
4. TITLE OF JOB Chief, Security Branch, German Station		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-15

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Chief of Security Branch activities in behalf of the German Station and supervision of certain security functions, such as polygraph and audio countermeasures, performed elsewhere in Western European area for the Agency.

SECRET

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): June 60-Jun 62
2. LOCATION (Country, City): USA/Washington, D.C.
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: OS/Security Research Staff
4. TITLE OF JOB: Deputy Chief
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Deputy Staff Chief, supervision of security research activities in behalf of the Office of Security

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): Aug 53-Jun 60
2. LOCATION (Country, City): USA/Washington, D.C.
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: OS/Security Research Staff
4. TITLE OF JOB: Security Research Officer
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-12 to GS-15
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Security research in behalf of the Office of Security

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): Jun 53-Aug 53
2. LOCATION (Country, City): USA/Washington, D.C.
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION BRANCH: OS/IOS
4. TITLE OF JOB: Investigator
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-12
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Investigative supervision of certain field investigations of IOS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV — **MARITAL STATUS**

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY: Married

2. NAME OF SPOUSE	Last McCORD	First Sarah	Middle Ruth	Maiden Berry

3. DATE OF BIRTH 1927	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) Lamesa, Texas
5. OCCUPATION Housewife	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER ---

7. CITIZENSHIP USA	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) ---	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED ---

SECTION X — **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Michael Steven McCord	Son	1951 Oakland, Calif	US	Springfield, Va.
Carol Anne McCord	Dau.	1953 Washington, DC	US	"
Nancy Ellen McCord	Dau.	1955 Washington, DC	US	"

SECTION XI — **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
Air Force Association	Washington, D.C.	1951	Pres.

DATE 13 Apr 67	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James W McCord Jr

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONNEL SERIAL NO. 158124	CERTIFICATION FOR LANGUAGE AWAR	ID NO. 192

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle): McCORD, James Walter
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year): January 26, 1924
3. CAREER STATUS:
4. SD:
5. COMPONENT: 03
6. LANGUAGE: Russian
CODE: 654
7. DATE OF TEST (Month, Day, Year): August 29, 1957
8. ANNIVERSARY DATE (Month, Day, Year): 29 Aug 57

9. TEST SCORES	READING	WRITING	PRONUNCIATION	SPEAKING	UNDERSTANDING
	E	--	S	S	S

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">10. AWARDABLE LEVEL</td><td colspan="3">COMPREHENSIVE</td><td colspan="3">SPECIALIZED-READING</td><td colspan="3">SPECIALIZED-SPEAKING</td><td rowspan="2">NOT QUALIFIED AT ANY LEVEL</td></tr>
<tr><td>ELEM.</td><td>INTER.</td><td>HIGH</td><td>ELEM.</td><td>INTER.</td><td>HIGH</td><td>ELEM.</td><td>INTER.</td><td>HIGH</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>UX</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

11. I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE AWARD INDICATED, HAVING MET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SAID AWARD.
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

12. TYPE OF AWARD

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
II	A	V	R	cLE

AMOUNT OF AWARD: $100—

13. I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE
OBLIGATION REF. NO.:
SIGNATURE:
CHARGE ALLOTMENT NO.:
DATE:

14. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTION $
15. EMPLOYEE PAYROLL NO.:
16. STATE/DC TAX DEDUCTION $
17. ALLOTMENT OF ASSIGNMENT:
18. NET AMOUNT OF AWARD PAID $
19. CHECK NUMBER ISSUED:
DATE:
20. FORWARD CHECK TO:

FORM 7-57 1273 SECRET (45)

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? .... (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Miss / Mr. / Mrs. James (First) Walter (Middle) McCord Jr. (Last)

Telephone:
Office ....
Ext. ....
Home Lakehurst 3-[illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS 320 Pacific Avenue, (St. and Number) Alameda, (City) California, (State) USA (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 320 Pacific Avenue, (St. and Number) Alameda, (City) California, (State) USA (Country)

B. NICKNAME Jim WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? none

.... UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ....

HOW LONG? .... IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ....

.... (Where?) .... (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH 1/26/24 PLACE OF BIRTH Waurika (City) Oklahoma (State) USA (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U. S. (Country) BY BIRTH? Yes BY MARRIAGE? ....

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. .... ISSUED .... (Date) BY .... (Court)

AT .... (City) .... (State) .... (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? No (Yes or No) .... (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? .... TO .... ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? .... (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ....

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? No GIVE PARTICULARS:

....

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NA

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) .... (Type) .... (Place of Issue) .... (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 27 SEX Male HEIGHT 5'10" WEIGHT 170

EYES Brown HAIR Brown COMPLEXION Medium SCARS none

BUILD Medium OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES none

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED X DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS none

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Sarah (First) Ruth (Middle) [illegible] (Maiden) [illegible] (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Lamesa, Texas, USA, May 30, 1948

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE Route 6 (St. and Number) Lamesa (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 820 Pacific Ave (St. and Number) Alameda (City) Calif (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 4/17/27 PLACE OF BIRTH Lamesa (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Secretary-Steno LAST EMPLOYER University of California

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) Berkeley, (City) California (State) .... (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

Secretary-Steno, U. S. Army-Air Force Central Welfare Fund, Pentagon Bldg., Washington, D. C. Nov. '[illegible] - Jan '49

14-00000

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents):

1. NAME None, no dependents other than wife RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME James (First) Walton (Middle) McCord (Last) Sr.

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box [illegible] (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 12/[illegible]/04 PLACE OF BIRTH Waldron, (City) [illegible], (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION School Teacher LAST EMPLOYER Thorndale High School

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS [illegible], (St. and Number) Thorndale, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

none

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Marjorie (First) Lee (Middle) McCord (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 3/9/07 PLACE OF BIRTH Colony, Texas, U A

CITIZENSHIP U. S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER [illegible]

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM none TO BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

none

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME Bobby (First) Kyle (Middle) McCord (Last) AGE 17
   PRESENT ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME Sharon (First) Gayle (Middle) McCord (Last) AGE 8
   PRESENT ADDRESS Box 236 (St. and Number) Thorndale (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME [illegible] (First) Mae (Middle) Ross (Last) AGE 25
   PRESENT ADDRESS Box 304 (St. and Number) Holliday (City) Texas (State) USA (Country) U. S. (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE
   PRESENT ADDRESS (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Luther (First) (none) (Middle) [illegible] (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED living DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 313 North 17th St., (St. and Number) [illegible] (City) Texas (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 11/27/07 PLACE OF BIRTH Burnett County, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Farming LAST EMPLOYER self

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Sarah (First) Amy (Middle) Berry (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 313 North 17th Street, [illegible], Texas, USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 2/2/95 PLACE OF BIRTH Houston, Texas

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NA

CITIZENSHIP US WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? .... (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Unknown

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

1. NAME none RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

1. NAME none RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....
2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....
3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....
   CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

SEC. 12. POSITION DATA

A. KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR Agent, Central Intelligence Agency

B. WHAT IS THE LOWEST ANNUAL ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ Base Starting Salary [illegible]
(You Will Not Be Considered For Any Position With A Lower Entrance Salary.)

C. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY: OCCASIONALLY

FREQUENTLY, CONSTANTLY X

D. CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED: IN WASHINGTON, D. C. X

ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES X, OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES X

E. IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, SPECIFY LOCATIONS:

SEC. 13. EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL North Ward ADDRESS Shamrock, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)

DATES ATTENDED 1934-36 GRADUATE? yes

HIGH SCHOOL McLean ADDRESS McLean, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)
" " Electra " Electra, Texas, USA

DATES ATTENDED McLean, 1936-39 GRADUATE? Undergraduate
" " Electra, 1939-1940 " Yes

COLLEGE Hillsboro ADDRESS Hillsboro (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Business, Undergraduate YEARS COMPLETED 1 semester

DATES ATTENDED Jan. 1946 - May 1946 DEGREE No, undergraduate

COLLEGE University of Texas ADDRESS Austin, (City) Texas, (State) USA (Country)

MAJOR AND SPECIALTY Business Administration Accounting YEARS COMPLETED 4

DATES ATTENDED 9/46 to 10/48 DEGREE Bachelor of Business Administration

CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS Accounting, General Business

CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS NA

SEC. 14. ACTIVE U. S. OR FOREIGN MILITARY SERVICE

U. S. Army Air Corps (Component) 2nd Lieutenant (Rank) 1[illegible]/23/[illegible]-11/1[illegible]/[illegible] (Dates of Service)
Las Vegas Army Air Field
Las Vegas, Nevada (Last Station) AO-2092263 (Serial Number) Honorable Cert. of Service (Type of Discharge)

REMARKS:

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 119 ADDRESS Austin, Texas

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON Classified V-A

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS Member USAF Volunteer Air Reserve, Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif.

SEC. 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM 2/51 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Self

ADDRESS 820 Pacific Ave, Alameda, California USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Credit Org. NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Manager SALARY $ 8000 PER Annum

YOUR DUTIES Install credit systems for retail business firms

REASONS FOR LEAVING To re-enter investigative field

FROM 10/48 TO 2/51 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-10

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Federal Bureau of Investigation

ADDRESS Washington, D. C. USA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Investigative NAME OF SUPERVISOR Harry [illegible]. Kimball (Last)

TITLE OF JOB Special Agent SALARY $ 5250 PER Annum

YOUR DUTIES To investigate violations of Federal Law.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To enter private business

FROM 1/46 TO 10/48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY University of Texas

ADDRESS (St. and Number) Austin, (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS University NAME OF SUPERVISOR NA

TITLE OF JOB Student SALARY $ NA PER

YOUR DUTIES Full-time student

REASONS FOR LEAVING Accepted position with FBI

FROM 3/47 TO 3/48 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Veterans Housing Office, University of Texas

ADDRESS (St. and Number) Austin, (City) Texas (State) USA (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS Vet. Housing NAME OF SUPERVISOR F. C. McConnell

TITLE OF JOB Assistant Manager SALARY $ 1320 PER annum (part-time)

YOUR DUTIES Assist manager in operation of nine veterans' dormitories located on University of Texas campus. Position was part-time while attending the University of Texas

REASONS FOR LEAVING To devote full time to studies just prior to graduation.

FROM 11/43 TO 11/45 CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. Army Air Corps

ADDRESS NA (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS NA NAME OF SUPERVISOR

TITLE OF JOB Bombardier SALARY $ 1970 PER annum

YOUR DUTIES Aircraft Observer-Bombardier performing duties of operation of bombing and navigational equipment aboard aircraft of U. S. Army Air Corps.

REASONS FOR LEAVING Conv. of Government

SEC. 16. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 17. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT," "FAIR," OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE none SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

LANGUAGE .... SPEAK .... READ .... WRITE ....

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU; INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

Boxing-good prof.; baseball-good prof.; tennis-good prof.; football-fair prof.; golf-fair prof.

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

Trained as Radio Technician in FBI, capable of operating short-wave radio by voice or c.w., encoding or decoding messages related thereto, and trained in monitoring and identifying clandestine enemy radio stations in World War II.

D. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES:

Operate short-wave radio by voice or c.w. Code speed of 25 words per minute.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 15 SHORTHAND

E. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION, SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, ETC. No license as above

IF YES, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE ....

FIRST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) .... LATEST LIC. OR CERTIFICATE (YR) ....

F. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS *NOT* COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:

(1) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (DO NOT SUBMIT COPIES UNLESS REQUESTED)

(2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS

(3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

(4) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED

G. HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

H. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

No

SEC. 18. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.—WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Dr. Geo Derbyshire
BUS. ADD. 53[illegible]-22nd St., Oakland, Calif.
RES. ADD. 9[illegible]7 Brookwood [illegible], Oakland, Cal.

2. Paul A. Martin
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 820 Pacific Ave., Alameda, Cal.

3. [illegible] C. McDonnell
BUS. ADD. c/o Veterans Housing Office, Univ.
RES. ADD. of Texas, Austin, Texas

4. W. G. Martin
BUS. ADD. c/o Electra State Bank, Electra,
RES. ADD. Texas

5. Dr. C. C. Hayley
BUS. ADD. c/o Drs. Harbour and Hayley,
RES. ADD. Wichita Falls, Texas

SEC. 19. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES—NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Mr. Hood Long
BUS. ADD. Rural Route, Rio Hondo, Texas
RES. ADD.

2. Thomas Clifton
BUS. ADD. Box 267 Haskell, Texas
RES. ADD. [illegible]

3. Richard Mills
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 631 Bainbridge, Alameda, Cal.

4. Irene England
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 1132 Pearl St., Alameda, Cal.

5. Mrs. G. N. McNeilly
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 2907 Salado St., Austin, Texas

SEC. 20. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U. S.—(Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number *City* *State*

1. Mrs. P. Martin
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 820 Pacific Ave, Alameda, Cal.

2. Alexander Olijenyk
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 820A Pacific Ave, Alameda, Cal.

3. Mrs. Margaret Fowles
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. 8133 Pacific Ave, Alameda, Cal.

SEC. 21. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? Yes IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS Bank of [illegible] [illegible] Branch, Berkeley, Calif., and Bank of America [illegible], Calif.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? No

GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES—IN THE U. S.

1. NAME [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible] Telegraph, Berkeley, Calif. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
2. NAME H. C. Capwell Co. ADDRESS 20th and Broadway, Oakland, Cal. (St. and Number) (City) (State)
3. NAME Sears and Roebuck Co ADDRESS [illegible] Telegraph Ave, Oakland, Cal (St. and Number) (City) (State)

SEC. 22. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM 1/50 TO Present [illegible] Pacific Ave, Alameda, Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 7/49 TO 1/50 [illegible] St., Berkeley, Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 1/49 TO 7/49 [illegible] St., San [illegible], Calif., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 10/48 TO 1/49 [illegible] N. Capitol St., Washington, D. C. (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 6/48 TO 10/48 [illegible] San Antonio St., Austin, Tex., USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 9/46 TO 6/48 [illegible] Dorm C, Austin, Texas, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 11/45 TO 9/46 [illegible], [illegible], Texas, USA (St. and number) (City) (State) (Country)

FROM 11/43 TO 11/45 U. S. Army Air Corps (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 23. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

A. FROM 6/1/49 TO 6/10/49 Tijuana Mexico Vacation trip (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

FROM TO (City or section) (Country) (Purpose)

SEC. 24. CLUBS, SOCIETIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. Air Reserve Association, Univ. of Texas Chapter, Austin, Texas, USA (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 9/46 to 9/48

2. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

3. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

4. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

5. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

6. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

7. (Name and Chapter) (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

DATES OF MEMBERSHIP:

SEC. 25. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED, ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES? No No

IF "YES," EXPLAIN:

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? Yes IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? Occasionally, in moderation

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: No

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW: No

E. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1940:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U. S. Civil Service Commission

F. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

Federal Bureau of Investigation, August, 1948

SEC. 26. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME Sarah Ruth McCord RELATIONSHIP Wife

ADDRESS 820 Pacific Avenue (St. and Number) Alameda (City) California (State) USA (Country)

SEC. 27. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

no

SEC. 28. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Alameda, California (City and State) DATE May 16, 1951

Sarah Ruth McCord (Witness) James Walter McCord, Jr. (Signature of Applicant)

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

Sec. 15 (cont.)

FROM 3/2/43 TO 11/15/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE C[illegible]-5

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Federal Bureau of Investigation

ADDRESS Washington D. C., USA

KIND OF BUSINESS Federal Investigative Agency

SUPERVISOR Mr. E. P. Coffey (Last)

TITLE OF JOB Radio Technician SALARY $2[illegible]00 per annum

YOUR DUTIES Send and receive messages by radio by voice or c. w., encode and decode messages, monitor and identify clandestine enemy radio stations.

REASONS FOR LEAVING On military leave to enter U. S. Army Air Corps.

FROM 5/41 to 3/43 CLASSIFICATION GRADE NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Electra State Bank

ADDRESS Electra Texas

KIND OF BUSINESS State Bank SUPERVISOR W. C. Martin

TITLE OF JOB Bookkeeper SALARY $1200 per annum

YOUR DUTIES Posted bank ledger and statement accounts and assisted in preparation of financial statements.

REASONS FOR LEAVING To accept better paying position with FBI

From 5/40 to 5/41 CLASSIFICATION GRADE NA

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY Tomlinson and Son

ADDRESS Electra Texas

KIND OF BUSINESS Retail Chain Store SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB Clerk SALARY $600 per annum, part-time

REASON FOR LEAVING To accept full-time and better paying position with the Electra State Bank, Electra, Texas.

FROM 5/36 to 5/40 High School Student, see Sec. 13 EDUCATION

SEC. 22 RESIDENCE FOR LAST 15 Years (cont.)

From 3/43 to 11/43 231 Massachusetts Ave, N. W., Washington, D. C.
From 9/39 to 3/43 20[illegible] East Ida St., Electra, Texas
From 9/36 to 9/39 not recalled Kellerville, Texas

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 21 May 1962

PROT. 2-375

TO : Chief, CS

Director of Security

Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - James W. McCord, Jr.

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 22 May 62.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by Chief, CS, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
- 1 - Chief, CC
- 1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
- 1 - Personnel Office
- 1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

(8)

XXXXXXXXXXXX

hc

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 14 August 1951

Your reference:

Case Number: 52049

TO : Chief, Employees Division
Special Support Staff
FROM : ~~Chief, Security Division~~
Chief, Special Security Division
SUBJECT: McCORD, James Walter, Jr.

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

2. Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is an applicant for a position in I & S.

Robert H. Cunningham
ROBERT H. CUNNINGHAM

JM

B. Kaufer
17 Aug

XXXXXXXXXXXX

FORM NO. 38-101
MAR 1951

3rd Agency material
enveloped at request
of Office of Security

Munro, George Frederick

Coming. Call Skep (1542) when it arrives.

OLC (78-0433/1

6 Mar 78

Memo

Date

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

BENADUM, Jeremy K.

Terminated 31 December 71

SECRET – SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTRACT PERSONNEL

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

RETURN FILE TO 5E69

NOTICE: This is an Office of Personnel File and subject to 10 day limitation period. This file has been charged to ______; and is due to be returned to CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, 5E-65 Hqs., x7841, as of ______.

302858

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 022177
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BENACLA JEREMY K

PREPARED:AR/EN/DS

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONTRACT TERMINATION (CPJ000)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 31 YR 70

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-1014

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
LITEMPO

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED

11 POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 15 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 29035 EOD: 103060 LCD: 041970

18 REMARKS

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- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:        5  SEX: M        MARITAL ST: MAR    NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 103060  FED SERVICE COMP: 110735
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-C                HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/OPTN          PREV. GOVT SERV: 1       SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A             A/L IND: 6               S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 103060
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS             PERF ORG: WH          PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NHN      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: A    DIFFERENTIAL: N        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y  STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMP: N EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N SEPARATION:
```

NOTE:ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERISK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150b Use Previous
7-66 MFG 11-69 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 022C775
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): B_NACUM JEREMY K   PREPARED: 09/ 5/75
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: MISCELLANEOUS CHANGE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 09 01 75
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (5)
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-1014
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
LITEMPO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 27461 DOG: 103060 LEI: 341970
18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:       15   SEX: M      MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 103060  FED SERVICE COMP: 110759
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-C               HOSPITILIZATION: F   PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/CPIN         PREV. GOVT SERV: 1        SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A            A/L IND: 3                S/L IND: 4
- - - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 103060
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS           REFR ORG: WH         PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED EXMP:              STATE EXMP:        STATE:
TRAVEL: NHM      OPS EXPNSE: Y          HOUSING: A         POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: N        OFFSET CLAUSE: Y   STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N        ALLOWANCE COMM: N  EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N        OTHER ALLOWNS : N  SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous Edition
7-66 MFG 11-69

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 2322774
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): BENADUM JEFFREY R

PREPARED: 01/24/72

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: LEGISLATIVE PAY ADJUSTMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR: 1 1[illegible] 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: CAREER AGENT (S)
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1135-1[illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP DIRECTORATE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIV
LITEMPO
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: UNDETERMINED
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER:
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION:
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): (FULL TIME) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $* 29C55 DOG: 10306 LEI: 34152
18. REMARKS

```
- - - - - - - - - STATUS INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BIRTH DATE:      15  SEX: M        MARITAL ST: MAR     NO. DEPENDENTS: 07
CITIZENSHIP: US/BIRTH  LONGEVITY COMP: 10[illegible]   FED SERVICE COMP: 11 739
TYPE RETIREMENT: CIA R-D                ~~HOSPITALIZATION~~: F    PLAN: 422
FEGLI: YES/OPTN           PREV. GOVT SERV: 1 .      SAL. TASK LIMIT:
PAY BASIS: A              A/L IND: 8               S/L INC: 4
- - - - - - - - - - CONTRACT INFORMATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
EFF DATE: 092567 EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFN DATE ORIG CONTRACT: 102060
REFERRING OFFICER: WH-PERS            REFR ORG: WH        PHONE: 4460
- - - - - - - ENTITLEMENTS/ELIGIBILITIES/ALLOWANCES - - - - - - - - -
TAX STAFF: Y     FED.EXMP:             STATE EXMP:          STATE:
TRAVEL: NRN      OPS EXPNSE: Y         HOUSING: A           POST/EQUAL:
HOME LEAVE: 4    DIFFERENTIAL: N       OFFSET CLAUSE: Y     STD GOVT: Y
LEGISL PAY: Y    PREMIUM PAY : N       ALLOWANCE COMP: N    EDUCATION:
STEP INCRS: Y    OTH TAX ENTL: N       OTHER ALLOWNS : N    SEPARATION:
```

NOTE: ITEMS PRECEDED BY AN ASTERICK * REFLECT CHANGED DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Military Service

Upon graduation from Pomona College, Claremont, California, in June, 1936, writer was commissioned as 2nd Lt. of Infantry. On October 25, 1939, writer went on active duty under the Thomason Act, being assigned to duty with the 30th U.S. Infantry, with headquarters at the Presidio, San Francisco, California. He remained on active duty until 31 July, 1940, at which time he reverted to reserve status. Writer remained in this status, with the rank of 1st Lt. until 1942, at which time all reserve officers in the FBI were requested to resign their commissions. The latter was done under an arrangement between the Defense Dept. and the FBI. Writer has never received a discharge, so is unable to produce same.

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) 7 Nov 1932

BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P)

24 [illegible] 1915

30 Oct 1960

Married

7 [illegible] 1959 1961

[illegible] 1941

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1932-40 [illegible], US [illegible] (2 mos)
1940-60 Dept of Justice, FBI

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

?-36 Pomona College, Claremont, Calif (Graduate) - ?

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

[illegible] Native
[illegible]
[illegible]

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

None

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Oct 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	[illegible]		-eqv DDP/WH/LITEMPO	Mexico City
Apr 1966	" " " " "	[illegible]		-eqv " " "	" "
Apr 1970	" " " " "	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "
Sep 1970	Ops Of(CareerAgt) 0136.01	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED 9 Dec 1970

21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY he/els

FORM 1200 (PART I)

SECRET

PROFILE

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

(P)

DATE OF BIRTH
24 Aug 1915

in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA is Oct 194
No Photo Available.

IENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

MENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PROFILE REVIEWED BY

1200 (PART 2) SECRET PROFILE

SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE - Jeremy K. BENADUM (P)

			Total Creditable Time		
Service	From	To	Years	Months	Days
Active duty in U.S.Army	26 Oct 39	31 Jul 40	-	9	5
Federal Bureau of Investigation	12 Aug 40	31 Oct 60	-	-	-
CIA Career Agent	30 Oct 60	date	-	-	-

Using 12 Aug 1940 as a base date less above total creditable time equals a SCD of: 7 November 1939.

Paul Wilson
10 Jun 1969

14-00000

TO

INFO Chief of Station, Mexico City

NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

FROM Chief, WH Division

MICROFILM

SUBJECT ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: DIRECTOR 104776, Para 2. A., Dated 23 January 1971

A sterile check in the amount of $48.00 payable to Jeremy K. BENADUM, former Career Agent, was forwarded to his allottee on 6 May 1971 for deposit to his account. The amount represents a refund of six months prepaid premiums on BENADUM's Contract Life Insurance policy which was cancelled effective 31 December 1970.

Norman R. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-7234

DATE
7 MAY 1971

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/Contracts
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/1

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	MDoores	md (5 May 1971)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1	5-5-71	
WH/NOC	5 May 71	Ralph Shatting

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS		Richard D. Wright

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

(40)

DISPATCH

May 5, 1971

Wells Fargo Bank
464 California Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Union Trust Company Treasurer's Check number 01-355154, dated April 27, 1971, payable to Mr. George Frederick Munro, in the amount of $43.60. Please deposit the enclosed check to Mr. Munro's account number 336361.

Sincerely,

Wm. Rodgers

Enclosure

Airmail, Certified.

14-00000

SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

REQUEST F OS MAILING

NO. 212472

SECTION I THIS SECTION FOR SENDER'S USE ONLY (TYPE OR PRINT)

CASE NO. 283887

MAIL AT (CITY AND STATE) Washington, D. C.

METHOD OF MAILING (CHECK AS APPROPRIATE)

XX	AIR MAIL		SPECIAL DELIVERY		FIRST CLASS		REGISTERED	RECEIPT REQUESTED
	PARCEL POST		OTHER (EXPLAIN)	Certified Mail				

ADDRESSEE Wells Fargo Bank

ADDRESS
464 California Street
San Francisco, Calif., 94104

NAME OF SENDER William S. Renehan

OFFICE WH/Contracts

EXTENSION 4460

DOCUMENT NO.

SECTION II THIS SECTION FOR OS USE ONLY

INITIALS OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED 5/6/71

REMARKS

SENDER'S COPY

FORM 1637
11-59

SECRET

(25-38)

SECRET (When Filled In)

Date 4-19-71

TO : Administrative Officer/WH

FROM : Chief, Insurance Branch, BSD/Pers

SUBJECT : Refund on Cancelled Insurance Policies BENADUM, Jeremy K.
(NAME SUBSCRIBER)

Insurance Acct. No. 15574

1. According to the records in this office, subject employee is due a refund of prepaid premiums on his cancelled insurance policies listed below:

____	Contract Health Insurance	$
X	Contract Life Insurance	$ 48.00
____	United Benefit Life Insurance	$
____	WAEPA Life Insurance	$
____	Flight and Accident Insurance	$

2. Please notify this office (in writing) how to issue this refund. If we draw our check, it will be under the name of Government Employees Health Association, Inc. If applicable, please submit true name under separate cover for issuance of sterile check.

Apr. 22, 1971

Please obtain sterile check and forward to W. S. Reachen [illegible] for transmittal to [illegible]

3. If we do not hear from your office by 5-19-71 this money will be posted to Accounts Payable on our ledger and no further effort will be made by this office to contact subject employee.

Ref. [illegible] Insurance Branch

H. O. Brunkhorst
H. O. Brunkhorst

Group 1
Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLEARANCE SHEET FOR TERMINAT[illegible]

THIS FORM MUST [illegible]

DATE: 22 March 1971

NAME (Last, First, Middle + true or pseudonym): [illegible] (P)

[illegible] AND BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: [illegible]

LOCAL ADDRESS: Mexico City, Mexico

PERMANENT ADDRESS: [illegible] California

PERMANENT STATION OR BASE: Mexico City, Mexico

POSITION OR FUNCTIONAL TITLE: [illegible]

CONTRACT [illegible]

DATE CONTRACT EFFECTIVE	DATE CONTRACT LAST RENEWED	DATE CONTRACT EXPIRES	DATE OF CONTRACT TERMINATION
30 October 1960	[illegible]	[illegible]	31 December 1970

REASON FOR CONTRACT TERMINATION

Retirement

INTERNAL STAFF [illegible] CLEARANCES (Add or delete as applicable)

COMPONENT	CLEARED BY	DATE	REMARKS
FINANCE	[illegible]	[illegible]	
LOGISTICS	[illegible]	[illegible] 71	
[illegible]			
Security	[illegible]	[illegible] 71	

CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER — CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] — DATE: [illegible]

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICES

(OFFICES NOT [illegible] INTERVIEW WILL SO INDICATE)

OFFICE	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL
CENTRAL COVER STAFF				CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] DATE: [illegible] 71
OFFICE OF SECURITY PSD			22 December 1960 [illegible]	CLEARED BY (Signature): [illegible] DATE: [illegible]
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CPD				CLEARED BY (Signature): DATE:

REMARKS (Please initial)

Advance copy to CI/CSTD/[illegible]

/s/ [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

C/[illegible]

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : OP/Retirement Office

ATTN: Paul Sidel

DATE: 15 March 1971

FROM : C/WH/Contracts

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement

1. Per our telecon this morning, I have sent over to you a copy of the cable from Mexico City (IN 266625) which stated BENADUM had elected not to make the payment as described in our outgoing cable which your office coordinated with on Friday.

2. It is understood that necessary papers will be forwarded from your office to Miss Harrison in the Office of Finance today. I have called Miss Harrison and she advised that upon receipt of the papers from you there would be no difficulty in insuring that BENADUM's actual annuity is computed including the retroactive portion for January and February and included in the check for March.

Wm. Renehan

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

14-00000

ORIG: W S Renehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 March 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: US PER:

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE VR. OP 2,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 2 21 582 7 CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7143

15 MAR 1971

1. PLEASE INFORM JEREMY K. BENADUM FOLLOWING.

A. HIS ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY VERIFIED AS 1 JULY 1937 THROUGH 14 JULY 1937 AND 1 DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1940. THIS TOTALS ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS LESS THAN BENADUM CLAIMED.

B. VERIFICATION CIVILIAN SERVICE SHOWS NO RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS FOR PERIOD 1 JUNE 1942 THRU 28 FEBRUARY 1943. AMOUNT OF $307 REQUIRED TO PURCHASE CREDIT FOR THIS PERIOD. IF NOT PAID, BASIC ANNUITY WILL BE REDUCED BY 10 PERCENT OF AMOUNT OWED.

C. ANNUITY ESTIMATES RECOMPUTED ON BASIS CHANGE IN CREDITABLE MILITARY SERVICE AND EFFECT OF PAYMENT OR NON-PAYMENT FOR UNCOVERED PERIOD OF CIVILIAN SERVICE. IF PAID, ANNUITY ESTIMATED TO BE $1,195 PER MONTH. IF NOT PAID, ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCTION TO $1,194 PER MONTH. SHOULD REALIZE WOULD TAKE OVER TEN YEARS TO REGAIN AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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MESSAGE FORM
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1		5	
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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO FILE, VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

D. PLEASE ADVISE BENADUM'S DECISION. IF ELECTS MAKE PAYMENT, HIS CHECK PAYABLE TO TREASURER OF U.S. SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS SOONEST.

2. ON RECEIPT OF DECISION AND, IF APPROPRIATE, PAYMENT FOR THE SERVICE, FINAL ANNUITY COMPUTATIONS WILL BE MADE. ANNUITY CHECK FOR MARCH WOULD INCLUDE RETROACTIVE AMOUNT DUE BENADUM FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: Advised full retirement annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 Jun 42 and 1 Mar 43.

COORD: CP/Retirement - A. J. Sukowicz (in draft)

C/WH/1 [illegible]

C/WH/FI/NOC [illegible]

[illegible] V. BROE
C/WHD

[illegible] S. [illegible]
C/[illegible]/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15-1

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BY: AT: Z

DISSEM BY: PER #

ACTION UNIT WH8

ACTION NO. 1113

FILE, VR OP2

MAR 13 2 44 PM '71

ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 131727Z MAR 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 15858 13MAR IN286625

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: DIRECTOR 119594

15 MAR 1971

1. HEREMY K. BENADUM HAS SELECTED NOT RPT NOT MAKE PAYMENT AS PER REF PARA 1B. HAS BEEN ADVISED HIS ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCED TO $1,194 PER MONTH.

2. FILE DEFER. GP-1

SECRET

[illegible] – [illegible] of/X2 444 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

○

[illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 12 March 1971

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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3		7	
4		8	

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 48 PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH 8 | N/C | FILE, VR, CPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 22 21 56Z [illegible] 71 CITE DIRECTOR 119594

119594

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7143

1. PLEASE INFORM JEREMY K. BENADUM FOLLOWING.

A. HIS ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY VERIFIED AS 1 JULY 1937 THROUGH 14 JULY 1937 AND 1 DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1940. THIS TOTALS ONE AND ONE-HALF MONTHS LESS THAN BENADUM CLAIMED.

B. VERIFICATION CIVILIAN SERVICE SHOWS NO RETIREMENT DEDUCTIONS FOR PERIOD 1 JUNE 1942 THRU 28 FEBRUARY 1943. AMOUNT OF $337 REQUIRED TO PURCHASE CREDIT FOR THIS PERIOD. IF NOT PAID, BASIC ANNUITY WILL BE REDUCED BY 10 PERCENT OF AMOUNT OWED.

C. ANNUITY ESTIMATES RECOMPUTED ON BASIS CHANGE IN CREDITABLE MILITARY SERVICE AND EFFECT OF PAYMENT OR NON-PAYMENT FOR UNCOVERED PERIOD OF CIVILIAN SERVICE. IF PAID, ANNUITY ESTIMATED TO BE $1,195 PER MONTH. IF NOT PAID, ESTIMATE ANNUITY REDUCTION TO $1,194 PER MONTH. SHOULD REALIZE WOULD TAKE OVER TEN YEARS TO REGAIN AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.

(CONTINUED)

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TOTAL COPIES:

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2		6	
3		7	
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ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: INFO: FILE VR.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 119594

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

D. PLEASE ADVISE BENADUM'S DECISION. IF ELECTS MAKE PAYMENT, HIS CHECK PAYABLE TO TREASURER OF U.S. SHOULD BE FORWARDED HQS SOONEST.

2. ON RECEIPT OF DECISION AND, IF APPROPRIATE, PAYMENT FOR THE SERVICE, FINAL ANNUITY COMPUTATIONS WILL BE MADE. ANNUITY CHECK FOR MARCH WOULD INCLUDE RETROACTIVE AMOUNT DUE BENADUM FOR JANUARY AND FEBRUARY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: Advised full retirement annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 Jun 42 and 1 Mar 43.

COORD: OP/Retirement - A. J. Sukowicz (in draft)

C/WH/1 ______

C/WH/FI/NOC ______

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. [illegible]
C/WH/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

ROUGH DRAFT
P. J. Seidel
10 March 1971

1. Please advise Jeremy K. BENADUM that the appropriate military authority has verified the following dates of active duty:

1 July 1937 through 14 July 1937
1 December 1939 through 30 June 1940

This service totals one and one-half months less than that claimed by BENADUM.

2. Records verifying BENADUM's civilian service show that during period 1 June 1942 through 28 February 1943 retirement deductions were not withheld from salary. The amount of $307.00 will be required to purchase credit for this period. If not paid, Subject's annuity will be reduced by 10 per cent of the amount owed or $31.00 per year. If Subject elects to make payment, his check should be made payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forwarded to Headquarters soonest.

3. Annuity estimates recomputed to reflect change in creditable military service and effect of payment or non-payment for uncovered period of civilian service. If paid, annuity will be $1,196 per month. If not paid, annuity reduced to $1,194.

4. Advise Headquarters BENADUM's election on payment vs non-payment option.

ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 17 February 1971

TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 28 PER

CONF: WH8 | INFO | FILE, VR, CCS

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 18 21 30z FEB 71

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 112046

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5618 (IN 266892)

B. HMMS-7143, DTD 17 FEB.

PLEASE SEE REF B.

22 FEB 1971

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. BENADUM requests Hqs identify deposit of $950.
B. Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement Annuity.

COORD: DC/WH/1 L. Leeas

WH/FI/NOC Vaughn Slatney

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement Annuity

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

1. The Retirement Office has advised that Jeremy K. BENADUM's annuity check for January will be an interim payment representing about 75% of basic annuity.

2. The full annuity could not be paid pending receipt of verification of military service and billing for non-deduction civilian service between 1 June 1942 and 1 March 1943. Headquarters has been checking with the Retirement Office on a continuous basis but as yet the information has not been received. Upon receipt of the required info, you will be promptly advised.

3. Please assure BENADUM that he will receive retroactive payment in a subsequent check for full entitlement.

Norman R. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS-7143

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/FI/NOC
1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Contracts	WSSenehan	me (11 Feb 71)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/FI/NOC	12 Feb 71	
C/WH/1	12-2-71	L.

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SS	16 Feb 71	Richard B. Wright

USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION — CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 3

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BY: ______ AT: ______

ACTION 23

FILE, VR

0F 2

1118

395

35

FEB 12 10 29 AM '71
ACTION COPY

S E C R E T 162254Z FEB 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 5618 — 16 FEB 71 205892

DIRECTOR

ADMIN FINANCE — 17 FEB 1971

REF: HMMS-6919 DTD 22 JULY 70

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM REPORTS RECEIPT OF BANK DEPOSIT NOTICE COVERING GOVERNMENT CHECK IN AMOUNT $950.00. ONLY LARGE DEPOSIT BENADUM ANTICIPATES AT PRESENT TIME IS FIRST RETIREMENT ANNUITY CHECK.

2. REF INDICATED ESTIMATE FOR BENADUM ANNUITY $1,200 PER MONTH, WHICH HARD TO RECONCILE WITH $950 DEPOSIT. FACT THAT DEPOSIT FOR SUCH EVEN AMOUNT ALSO INDICATES IT MAY NOT BE FIRST ANNUITY PAYMENT.

3. BENADUM REQUESTS HEADQUARTERS IDENTIFY DEPOSIT IF POSSIBLE, AND PROVIDE EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS BREAKDOWN IF APPROPRIATE. BENADUM ALSO REQUESTS GROSS-DEDUCTIONS -NET BREAKDOWN OF ANNUITY PAYMENTS. GP-1

S E C R E T

Answered
17 Feb

SECRET

24 Jan 71

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Payment of Annuity

REF: DIRECTOR 104776

1. At the time of transmittal of Reference, I had been informed that the military service still had not been verified. In talking about this matter with Mr. Sidel, I asked if he would request MMPD, possibly through some ~~sxxx~~ sargeant to sargeant or colonel to colonel whether the matter could be expedited. He assured me he would give this an all-out try and agreed to let me know during the forthcoming week.

2. In checking this morning I find that Mr. Sidel is out on leave and going into training for at least the next week. In asking how to get in touch with Mr. Sidel, eventually Mrs. S[illegible] came on the line. She advised that nothing new was in the record and there was no info on the verification of the military service and wished to assure me that just because someone went on leave or was out that a case was not dropped. I asked then if any effort has been made to contact MMPD. She said the file didn't reflect anything and agreed to check MMPD and let me know.

Feb 1

[illegible]

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: W.E. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 22 Jan 71

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 34 PER

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH/8
INFO: FILE, VR. OP2, OF2, CCS2, CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 23 Jan 71 03 19z CITE DIRECTOR 04776

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

25 JAN 1971

REF: MEXICO CITY 5381 (IN 248431)

FOLLOWING KEYED REF

1. ALTHOUGH ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS MAY VARY AMONG INDIVIDUAL BANKS, SUGGEST JEREMY K. BENADUM ADVISE BANK THEY WILL BE RECEIVING GOVERNMENT Annuity CHECKS FOR DEPOSIT HIS ACCOUNT AND INCLUDE POWER OF ATTORNEY IN LETTER.

2. NO CARD OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RETIREMENT PROVIDED. LENGTH OF SERVICE (32 YEARS 2 MONTHS INCLUDES SICK LEAVE) CITED HMMS 6919. INSURANCE CARD NOT ISSUED RETIREES ABROAD AS HOSPITALS WOULD NOT ACCEPT. SEE HMMS 7107 FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON FORWARDING HOSPITALIZATION CLAIMS. WILL BE PROVIDED ANNUITY STATEMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE AMOUNT OF RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES.

A. STATION AUTHORIZED PAY FOLLOWING FIELD ALLOTMENT FOR PERIOD 13 - 31 DECEMBER AND T/A HQS.

(CONTINUED)

Jan 29 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Jan 25

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ________ PER ________ # ________

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PAGE TWO (2)

7/04/776

GROSS		$1,478.40	
DEDUCTIONS:			
FEGLI	12.38		
OPTIONAL FEGLI	8.25		
HOSPITALIZATION	14.09		
RETIREMENT	103.49		
INCOME TAX	191.55		
1970 TAX ADJUSTMENT	147.00		
		476.76	
		$1,001.64	
REFUND OF TAX OVER WITHHELD PAY PERIODS 11, 12 AND 13		121.50	
NET			$1,123.14

NOTE: CONTRACT LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE CEASED 31 DECEMBER. WILL REFUND PREPAID PREMIUMS.

(CONTINUED)

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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DATE:

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: | FILE, VR,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

101776

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE THREE (3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. RETIREMENT CHECKS MAILED WITHIN FIRST WEEK OF MONTH FOLLOWING THAT FOR WHICH DUE.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/B&F

DC/WH/1

C/WH/FI/NOC

OP/Retirement

OF/C&TD/SAVS/Mr. Pershinger (Para 2)(a)

CCS/DFB Mr. Shel

OF/Insurance Br.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. PERHAM
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: 35 PER

JAN 29 7 32 PM '71

ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT WHS

INFO FILE, VR OP2, CCS2, CSPS, OF2

ACTION NO 797

SECRET 202212Z JAN 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 5381

DIRECTOR

26 JAN 71 248431

4

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 5083 (IN 226314)

B. MEXICO CITY 5301 (IN 243202)

21 JAN 1971

1. BENADUM HAS ASKED WHETHER NECESSARY FOR HIM TO SUPPLY HIS BANK WITH POWER OF ATTORNEY OR SIMILAR FORM TO ENABLE BANK TO CREDIT RETIREMENT CHECKS TO HIS ACCOUNT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE.

2. BENADUM ALSO ASKING WHETHER HE SHOULD RECEIVE CARD, CERTIFICATE OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF RETIREMENT FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE INCLUDING LENGTH OF SERVICE CREDITED. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. DUE DISRUPTION OF NORMAL INCOME PATTERNS, BENADUM EXPERIENCING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND REQUESTS PAYMENT OF FIELD ALLOTMENT FOR 13-31 DEC 70 SOONEST. REF B PROVIDED 1970 OVERT INCOME TAX ESTIMATE. ADVISE STATION OF NET AMOUNT FINAL FIELD ALLOTMENT SOONEST. ALSO ADVISE WHEN BENADUM CAN EXPECT FIRST RETIREMENT CHECK WILL BE SENT TO BANK. GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WOGAME

ADM/JECENT - Jeremy K. BENADUM (P) - Tax Administration

REFERENCE: Mexico City 5301, 13 January 1971

1. Headquarters has reviewed BENADUM's estimated 1970 and 1971 true tax liabilities and it has been determined that his current withholding rate is sufficient to provide enough tax for these years.

2. Please advise BENADUM of the above and remind him that we need copies of his 1970 and 1971 tax returns when they are submitted to Internal Revenue so that we can reconcile to his true tax liability.

VICTOR D. UNITSKY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS

3 FEB 1971

HMMS-7115

26 January 1971

S E C R E T

[illegible]

Internal Dist.

1 - WH/1
1 - WH/CON

CCS/CTS WHM LP 6697

WH/1

WH/CON

C/WH/SS

DISPATCH CONFIDENTIAL

TO Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM Chief, Benefits and Services Division/OP

SUBJECT [illegible]
Hospitalization - Jerry K. [illegible]

1. Please inform subject employee that in the future he must submit itemized medical bills to the address forwarded under separate cover.

2. All bills should show the name of the patient, the dates and types of services rendered, the amount charged per item, and the exact type of surgery performed if applicable. He should also submit a statement giving the exact diagnosis for each charge incurred. This information will constitute the submission of a claim.

3. Enclosed is a leaflet which explains his hospitalization insurance coverage. The coverage applies regardless of the country in which the claims are incurred. Charges of a recognized hospital are covered under this policy in accordance with the benefits itemized in the attached leaflet.

[illegible] R. [illegible]

Attachments:
1 as stated
1 U/S/C

Distribution:
2, COS, Mexico City

[illegible] - 7[illegible]

[illegible] January 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

1. LAST NAME MUNRO FIRST NAME George INITIAL(S) F

2. APPOINTMENT DATA
Entered on duty ☐ FT ☐ PT
Subject to Sec. 203(d) 1951 Leave Act Yes ☐ No ☐
Ceased to be subject to Sec. 203(d) on ______ Ann. Leave Bal.

3. TOTAL SERVICE FOR LEAVE (as of date of separation)
Years 31 Months 1 Days 25
☐ More than 15 years

4. DATE AND NATURE OF SEPARATION
12/31/70 RETIREMENT

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE

(HOURS)	Annual	Sick
5 Balance from prior leave year ended 1/10 19 70	560	2128
6. Current leave year accrual through 12/26 19 70	200	100
7 Total	760	2228
8 Reduction in credits, if any (current year)	0	0
9 Total leave taken	760	0
10 Balance	0	2228*

11. Total hours paid in lump sum None
12 Salary rate(s) $27,463.
13 Lump sum leave dates:
From — to — (Hours)

26. Certified correct: Lillie E. Mc... (Signature) (Date)
FOR CHIEF PAYROLL (Title) (Telephone)

SUMMARY OF HOME LEAVE (DAYS)

14 Date arrival abroad for HL purposes ______
15 Current balance as of ______ 19 ___ ______
16 12 month accrual rate ______
17 Dates leave used, prior 24 months ______
18 Monthly accrual date ______
19 Calendar days credit for next accrual date ______
20 Date basic service period completed ______

MILITARY LEAVE

21 Dates during current calendar yr ______ to ______
22 Dates during preceding calendar yr ______ to ______

ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY

	LWOP or AWOL or Furlough Suspension (Hours)
23 During leave year in which separated	0
24 During step increase waiting period which began on 4/19/70	0
25 During 12 month HL accrual period (dates) ______	

REMARKS
SCD: 11/7/39

*Unused Sick Leave---2228 hours---"5 U.S.C. Ch 63"

Standard Form 1150
November 1965
1150-106

RECORD OF LEAVE DATA TRANSFERRED

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM SUPPLEMENTS 296-31 AND 990-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	2. TYPE OF RETIREMENT APPLIED FOR	3. PROPOSED RETIREMENT DATE
Munro, George F.	Voluntary	31 December 1976

SECTION A — RECOMMENDATION OF PARENT OFFICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT:
☐ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF OFFICE HEAD	4. DATE
Joseph DiStefano, WH/EXO	Joseph DiStefano	10 December 1970

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT:
☑ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE
Cord Meyer, Jr., ADDP	Cord Meyer Jr.	10 Dec 70

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS RECOMMENDED FOR THE ATTACHED APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT:
☐ APPROVAL
☐ DISAPPROVAL (Reason specified below)

	2. TYPED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	3. DATE

FORM 3102a

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

To avoid delay - 1. Read information carefully. 2. Complete application in full. 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) — MR. MRS. MISS: Munro George F.

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year): Aug 24 1915

3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 101-38-0460

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code)

COPIES

CHECKS

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION

WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME (First) (Middle)	HER (OR HIS) BIRTH DATE (Month) (Day) (Year)	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year)	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WH

2. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State): Mexico City

4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION: Career Agent

5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year): December 31, 1970

6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF ~~CIVILIAN~~ SERVICE

7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☒ YES ☐ NO

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE DUTY THAT TERMINATED UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES: (A) ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE, OR COAST GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES; OR (B) REGULAR CORPS OR RESERVE CORPS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE AFTER JUNE 30, 1960; OR (C) AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER JUNE 30, 1961. IF AVAILABLE, ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE.

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
U.S. Army		25 Oct 39	31 Jul 40	2nd Lt.	Inf.

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RESERVIST (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (B) ARE YOU IN RECEIPT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY (RETAINER PAY) (DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (C) IF "YES" WERE YOU RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67, TITLE 10 U.S.C. (FORMERLY TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 80-810)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D.

1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month, year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES, STATE WHEN INCURRED, AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

1. (B) IF "YES," STATE THE NUMBER OF YOUR COMPENSATION CLAIM AND THE PERIOD FOR WHICH YOU RECEIVED COMPENSATION

CLAIM NUMBER	FROM (Month) (Day) (Year)	TO (Month) (Day) (Year)

2. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM (INCLUDING APPLICATION FOR REFUND, DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT OR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. (B) IF "YES," CHECK THE TYPE OF CLAIM AND GIVE THE CLAIM NUMBER IF KNOWN: [illegible]

☐ RETIREMENT ☐ DEPOSIT OR REDEPOSIT
☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

3. (A) HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED ANY APPLICATION UNDER THE CIA RETIREMENT & DISABILITY SYSTEM [illegible] DEPOSIT, PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT [illegible] ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. (B) IF "YES," CHECK THE TYPE OF CLAIM [illegible]

☐ RETIREMENT ☐ PURCHASE OF SERVICE CREDIT
☐ REFUND ☐ VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

4. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COVERED UNDER ANY OTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEES? ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. (B) IF "YES," GIVE THE NAME OF THE OTHER RETIREMENT SYSTEM: Civil Service System

[illegible]

SECRET

INDICATE, BY SIGNING YOUR INITIALS IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX BELOW, THE TYPE OF [illegible] YOU WISH TO RECEIVE. READ THE FOLLOWING AND CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN [illegible] IS [illegible]. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER**

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$ ☐

THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by 2½% of any amount up to $3,600 a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $3,600 so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity benefit after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2
- This type provides annuity payments to you only

2. INITIALS ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST**

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON (First, middle, last)	
RELATIONSHIP	DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., day, yr.)

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEES UNDER INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring *unmarried employees who are in good health.*
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001)

I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief

See Attached Memo dated

_______________ (date)

31 July 1979
(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Retirement request

Writer herewith requests that his retirement date be established as 31 December, 1970.

CONCUR: Roger T. Kingman
Roger T. KINGMAN

30 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. George F. Munro

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Request for Voluntary Retirement

1. I am pleased to inform you that your request for voluntary retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been approved by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Your retirement will become effective 31 December 1970. Your annuity will commence as of 1 January 1971 and is payable on 1 February 1971. You may be assured that every effort will be made to expedite delivery of your first check following completion of the administrative processing required to effect your retirement.

3. You will receive a lump-sum payment for your accrued annual leave up to 30 days or for whatever amount of leave credit you carried over from the last leave year if that amount is more than 30 days.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
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1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat/3257 (28 December 1970)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 14-2

SECRET

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4		8	

ORIG: J.A.Strassberger:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 30 December 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 58 PER ____ #____

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO ________

CONF: WH8 INFO FILE, VR, C/2, CSPS,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 30DEC70 22 59z CITE DIRECTOR 098292

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 5083 (IN 226314)

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT EFFECTIVE 31 DEC 70 APPROVED BY CHIEF, JKLANCE.

2. EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY APPROVED AS FOLLOWS:

26 OCT 39-31 JUL 40 U.S. ARMY, 2ND LT., 30TH INFANTRY DIV.

12 AUG 40-31 OCT 60 FBI.

1 NOV 60-31 DEC 70 RETIRED GOVT EMPLOYEE. DURING THIS TIME WORKED FOR:

AUG 61-NOV 67, CIA. MEXICANA DE VALVULAS MUNRO, S.A., TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO, D.F. PRESIDENT AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDER.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

CONF:

INFO

FILE, VR.

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PAGE 2 098292

NOV 67-AUG 70, MAQUINADOS PRECISOS, S.A., TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO, D.F. DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STOCKHOLDER.

3. PLS ENSURE BENADUM IS PROVIDED PARA 2 INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: DC/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WH/SS

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 1 December 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY _____ PER _____ #

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. _____

CONF: INFO: FILE, VR, OPS, CSPS, CCS 2, CSPS, CF

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1 Dec 70 22 45z CITE DIRECTOR 090837

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4950 (IN 216442)

AND HQS FORESEES NO DELAY IN BENADUM'S RETIREMENT AS PER SCHEDULE,

1. PARA 2 REF EFFECTIVE DATE 31 DECEMBER 1970 CORRECT.

2. WHEN PARA 1 REF FORM SIGNED PLEASE ADVISE NUMBER AND DATE TRANSMITTAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advised Station has received retirement application for Jeremy K. BENADUM, and assumed delay will not effect Station plans to retire BENADUM on 31 Dec 1970.

TELECOORD: OP/RAD-Mr. M. Benthall

COORD: C/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN,
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______

ACTION UNIT [illegible] | FILE, VR [illegible]

ACTION NO. 180

S E C R E T 301315Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4950

DIRECTOR

30 NOV 70 216442

A

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

REF: HMMS-7035

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED REF WHICH FORWARDED RETIREMENT APPLICATION. JEREMY K. BENADUM IS PRESENTLY AWAY ON LEAVE AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL 5 DEC. HE WILL COMPLETE FROM FORM AT THAT TIME AND WE WILL INCLUDE IN SUBSEQUENT POUCH.

2. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS PROCESSING HAS BEEN DELAYED SINCE WE HAD REQUESTED PROCESSING IN JUNE 1970. WE ASSUME THAT THIS DELAY WILL IN NO WAY AFFECT OUR PLANS TO RETIRE BENADUM ON 31 DEC 1970. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

70-6135

10 DEC 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement - Mr. [redacted]

[illegible]

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.

2. Mr. George F. Munro, GS-15 Equivalent, Career Agent, Western Hemisphere Division, Clandestine Service, has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j, to be effective 31 December 1970.

3. Mr. Munro has been designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System and meets the technical requirements for voluntary retirement under the System. He is 55 years old with over 31 years of Federal service. This service includes over 10 years with the Agency all of which were in qualifying service overseas. The Head of the Clandestine Service Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board have recommended that his application for voluntary retirement be approved. I endorse these recommendations.

4. It is recommended that you approve the voluntary retirement of Mr. George F. Munro under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50j.

/s/ Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

The recommendation contained in paragraph 4 is approved:

R. E. [illegible], Jr.
Director of Central Intelligence

16 DEC 1970
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. EMPL. SERIAL NO.

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: 7 Nov 1939

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
Munro, George F.

3. SEX: M

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 [illegible] 1916

5. [illegible] DATE: 30 Oct 1960

6. MARITAL STATUS: Married

7. DEPENDENT(S) (Exclud. employee): NO. 7

8. [illegible] OF BIRTH: 1959 1961 1919 1948 1960 1961 1962

9. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S): NA

9. CAREER STAFF STATUS

MEMBERSHIP

OTHER STATUS: [illegible]

10. [illegible]: [illegible] 1961 | [illegible] | SPOUSE: ? | [illegible]

11. CURRENT DEFENSE STATUS | CONT. SERVICE: Y

GRADE | ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA (CAT. 1) | RELEASE TO MIL. SER. (CAT. 2) | TO BE DEFERRED (CAT. 3) | RETIRED

12. ASSESSMENT DATE

13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE

14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

1939-40 Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt (9 mos)
1940-60 Dept of Justice, FBI

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

?-39 Pomona College, Claremont, Calif (Graduate) - ?

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Profi-ciency, Date Tested)

Spanish - [illegible] Native
German - [illegible]
French - [illegible]

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

None

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
[illegible] 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	[illegible]	[illegible]	-eqv DLP/WH/LITHIRO	Mexico City
[illegible] 1966	" " " " "	19415	1[illegible]	-eqv " " "	" "
Apr 1970	" " " " "	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "
Sep 1970	Ops Of(CareerAct) 0136.01	27,463	15/7	-eqv " " "	" "

20. DATE PREPARED: 9 Dec 1970

21. PROFILE PREPARED BY: [illegible]/ehs

22. [illegible] CERTIFIED BY EMPLOYEE: No

FORM 1200 (PART I) USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

PROFILE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) Munro, George F.	DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1915

23. No Fitness Report in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA is Oct 19[illegible].
No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED 9 Dec 1970	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY [illegible]

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1200 (PART 2) WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET PROFILE

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/Contracts 3D3102	EXTENSION 4460	NO. DATE 16 December 1970

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CCS/~~OCD~~ DSN GH-44 ~~Mr. [illegible]~~			
2. State C C6-A		16 DEC 1970	RCM
CCS/DEB - G. Well		17 Dec	
3. CI Staff 2B1405 Mr. Granquist		17 Dec	
4. ~~[illegible]~~			
5. ~~OS/ID~~ EAB/OS ~~4E27~~ 3E-49	28 Dec 70		
6. CI/EXO 2C48	29 DEC 1970		
7. WH/Contracts 3D3102			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1, 3, 5: Your concurrences are requested on the attached resume for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, who is retiring 31 Dec 70. BENADUM and the Station concur with indicating his period of Agency employment as being employed by the family business in Mexico.

17 DEC 1970

FORM 610 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EMPLOYMENT RESUME

Mr. George Frederick Munro	31 December 1970
26 October 1939 - 31 July 1940	U. S. Army, 2nd Lt., 30th Infantry Division.
12 August 1940 - 31 October 1960	FBI, ~~Special Agent~~
1 November 1960 - 31 December 1970	Retired Government Employee. During this time worked for: Aug 61 - Nov 67, Cia. Mexicana de Valvulas Munro, S. A., Toronjil Num. 166, Mexico, D. F. President and principle stockholder. Nov 67 - Aug 70, Maquinados Precisos, S. A., Toronjil Num. 166, Mexico, D. F. Director and minority stockholder.

17 [illegible] 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]

ATTENTION : [illegible]

THROUGH : [illegible]

FROM : Benefits & Services Division
[illegible]

SUBJECT : Retirement Processing - [illegible] Frederick [illegible]
(Career Agent)

1. [illegible] Frederick [illegible] (Career Agent) will reside in Mexico after his retirement under the CIA Retirement and Disability System 31 December 1979. He has been engaged in clandestine activity in Mexico on behalf of the Agency since 1 November 1969, and his affiliation with the Agency during this 10-year period must be protected.

2. On 31 December 1969, Subject resigned from the Federal Bureau of Investigation after serving [illegible] years. A part of Subject's cover legend has been that he is a retired U.S. Government employee, although this was not actually the case. After 31 December 1979, he will be a bona fide U.S. Government retiree. In view of the foregoing, Subject's Civil Service Commission annuity statement, other Civil Service Commission material, as well as tax documentation, may be forwarded in the usual manner in envelopes bearing the return address of the Civil Service Commission. All other correspondence should be forwarded in sterile envelopes with a post office box used for covert retirees shown as the return address.

3. All monies due Subject should be deposited to his bank account with attribution to the U.S. Government. His bank account is as follows:

Wells Fargo Bank
464 California Street
San Francisco, California
Account #330351

SECRET

4. Subject has a Mutual of Omaha group life insurance policy that was arranged by the Agency. In this particular status, the policy would be convertible to term or some other type of insurance upon his retirement. However, this action would result in the surfacing of Subject's true identity to the underwriter. Therefore, in the interest of continuing security, Subject should be instructed to seek insurance with another insurer if he desires coverage following retirement.

5. If further information is needed, please contact CCS/DFB, Gordon Hall, Red 1353 or Black 6[illegible]4.

Daniel P. Shea
Chief, Central Cover Staff
Devised Facilities Branch

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 30 PER ________ # ____

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ________

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ________

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ________

ACTION UNIT
WH8

FILE, VR CCS2 CP2 OF2

ACTION NO
692

S E C R E T 142150Z DEC 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 5083

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 092724

B. HMMS 7036

14 DEC 70 226314

1. FAMILY BUSINESS ESTABLISHED AUG. 1961 WAS "CIA. MEXICANA DE VALVULAS MUNRO, S.A.". SUBJECT WAS PRESIDENT AND PRINCIPLE STOCKHOLDER. THIS COMPANY WAS MERGED INTO "MAQUINADOS PRECISOS, S.A." FROM NOV. 1967 UNTIL AUG. 31, 1970. SUBJECT WAS A DIRECTOR AND MINORITY STOCKHOLDER. ADDRESS FOR BOTH ABOVE: TORONJIL NUM. 166, MEXICO 16, D.F.

2. SUBJECT REQUESTS OPTIONAL FEGLI AND HIS ENROLLMENT UNDER HIS HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN CONTINUE. OK

3. SUBJECT'S APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT WAS SIGNED ON 10 DEC 1970 AND IS BEING FORWARDED UNDER HMMT-10564, O ON 18 DEC.

4. REQUEST STATION BE ADVISED ON NET AMOUNT OF FIELD ALLOTMENT TO BE PAID SUBJECT FOR FINAL PERIOD, 13-31 DEC 70.

GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO	
FROM	Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT	Forwarding of Retirement Application on Jeremy K. BENADUM

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS-7036

We are forwarding under separate cover a retirement application from Jeremy K. BENADUM.

Dexter E. Rostedt
Dexter E. ROSTEDT

Attachment: U/S/C
Retirement Application

Distribution:
, Orig & 2cc: C/WHD, w/att., u/s/c

[illegible] 20 Dec 70
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-10[illegible]	DATE 16 December 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT

To avoid delay—1. Read information carefully; 2. Complete application in full; 3. Typewrite or print in ink

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. NAME MR. MRS. MISS (Last) (First) (Middle) MUNRO GEORGE FREDRICK	2. DATE OF BIRTH (Month) (Day) (Year) Aug. 24, 1915	3. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 101-380-460

4. ADDRESS (Number and street) (City and State) (Zip Code)
Calle Ojo de Agua #43, Club de Golf "La Hacienda", Atizapan, Edo. de México.

CORRES: Apartado 10-700, México 10, D.F./

CHECKS: WELLS FARGO BANK, 464 California Street, San Francisco, California /(Acc't No. 0001-336361)

5. (A) ARE YOU MARRIED?	6. (B) IF "YES" GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION			
☒ YES ☐ NO	WIFE'S OR HUSBAND'S NAME KATHRYN AILEEN	HER (OR HIS) BIRTH DATE (Month) (Day) (Year) Jan. 31, '18	DATE OF MARRIAGE (Month) (Day) (Year) 7/9/45	ADDRESS OF SPOUSE IF DIFFERENT FROM ITEM 4

B. CIVILIAN SERVICE

1. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	2. SERVICE DESIGNATION	3. LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (City and State)
4. TITLE OF LAST POSITION	5. DATE OF FINAL SEPARATION (Month) (Day) (Year)	6. APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF YEARS OF CIVILIAN SERVICE
7. DO YOU HAVE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE? ☐ YES ☐ NO	8. ARE YOU ENROLLED IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM? ☐ YES ☐ NO	

C. MILITARY SERVICE

1. COMPLETE THE SCHEDULE BELOW IF YOU HAVE PERFORMED ACTIVE DUTY THAT TERMINATED UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING SERVICES: (A) ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE OR COAST GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES; OR (B) REGULAR CORPS OR RESERVE CORPS OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE AFTER JUNE 30, 1960; OR (C) AS A COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY AFTER JUNE 30, 1961. IF AVAILABLE ATTACH A COPY OF YOUR DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

BRANCH OF SERVICE	SERIAL NUMBER	DATE OF ENTRANCE ON ACTIVE DUTY	DATE OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE DUTY	LAST GRADE OR RANK	ORGANIZATION AT DISCHARGE (Div., Regt., Co., etc.)
30th. Inf.	2nd. Lt.	26/10/39	31/7/40	2nd Lt.	30th U.S. Inf.

2. (A) ARE YOU A MILITARY RESERVIST (EITHER ACTIVE OR INACTIVE)? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2. (B) ARE YOU A RECIPIENT OF OR HAVE YOU EVER APPLIED FOR MILITARY RETIRED PAY (RETIRED PAY DOES NOT INCLUDE V.A. PENSION OR COMPENSATION)? ☐ YES ☒ NO	2. (C) IF "YES" WERE YOU RETIRED FROM A RESERVE COMPONENT UNDER CHAPTER 67 TITLE 10 USC (FORMERLY TITLE III PUBLIC LAW 80-810)? ☐ YES ☐ NO

D. DISABILITY INFORMATION

Only applicants for total disability retirement will complete Part D	1. WHEN DID YOU BECOME TOTALLY DISABLED? (Month) (Year)

2. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR DISABILITIES. STATE WHEN DISABLED AND HOW THEY INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE OF THE DUTIES OF YOUR POSITION. (ATTACH ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IF NECESSARY.)

E. OTHER CLAIM INFORMATION

1. (A) HAVE YOU EVER RECEIVED OR MADE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

2. (A) [illegible] ☐ YES ☒ NO

3. (A) [illegible] ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. (A) [illegible]

[illegible]

☐ RETIREMENT ☐ REFUND

[illegible] CONSIDER THE MATTER CAREFULLY. NO CHANGE WILL BE PERMITTED AFTER AN ANNUITY HAS BEEN GRANTED. IF YOU WANT AN ANNUITY WITH A SURVIVOR BENEFIT, BE SURE TO GIVE THE OTHER INFORMATION CALLED FOR.

F. TYPES OF ANNUITY: MARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY

1. INITIAL ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO WIDOW OR WIDOWER**

SPECIFY THE PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU WANT USED AS THE BASE FOR YOUR WIDOW'S (OR WIDOWER'S) SURVIVOR ANNUITY

If you want all your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the word "all" in the box below. If you want only part of your annuity used as the base for the survivor benefit, write the yearly amount of your annuity you want used.

$ ALL

THE SURVIVOR'S ANNUITY WILL BE 55% OF ALL OR WHATEVER PORTION OF YOUR ANNUITY YOU SPECIFY AS THE BASE FOR HER (OR HIS) BENEFIT.

- If you are married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in F. 2.
- The annuity payable to you during your lifetime will be reduced by 2½% of any amount up to $3,600 a year used as the base for the survivor benefit, plus 10% of any amount over $3,600 so used.
- If you retire for total disability before age 60 and get a guaranteed minimum disability annuity, you may use all or any part of your "earned" annuity as the base for the survivor benefit. You cannot use any extra annuity which may be payable to make up the guaranteed minimum annuity.
- If your wife (or husband) should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies or remarries.

2. INITIAL ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

(I do not desire my wife (or husband) to receive a survivor annuity benefit after my death.)

- If you choose this type, your wife (or husband) cannot be paid a survivor annuity after your death.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

G. TYPES OF ANNUITY: UNMARRIED APPLICANTS ONLY (Including Widowed and Divorced)

1. INITIAL ☐ **ANNUITY WITHOUT SURVIVOR BENEFIT**

- If you are not married, you will receive this type of annuity unless you choose the annuity in G. 2.
- This type provides annuity payments to you only.

2. INITIAL ☐ **ANNUITY WITH SURVIVOR BENEFIT TO NAMED PERSON HAVING AN INSURABLE INTEREST**

SPECIFY THE NAME, RELATIONSHIP AND DATE OF BIRTH OF THE PERSON YOU WISH TO RECEIVE THE SURVIVOR ANNUITY

NAME OF PERSON *(First, middle, last)*

RELATIONSHIP

DATE OF BIRTH *(Mo., day, yr.)*

SEE UNMARRIED EMPLOYEES UNDER INFORMATION REGARDING SURVIVOR ANNUITIES ON THE ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET FOR EXPLANATION OF REDUCTION IN YOUR ANNUITY

- This type is available to all retiring *unmarried* employees who are *in good health.*
- It provides a reduced annuity to you and a survivor annuity to the person named as having an insurable interest.
- The survivor's annuity will begin upon your death and end when she (or he) dies.
- The survivor's annuity will be 55% of the reduced annuity you receive.
- If you choose this type, you will have to undergo a medical examination which will be arranged by the Director of Personnel at no cost to you.
- If the person named as having an insurable interest should die before you, no change in type of annuity will be permitted, your annuity will not be increased, nor may you name any other person as survivor.

H. CERTIFICATION OF APPLICANT

WARNING — Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001).

"I hereby certify that all statements made in this application are true to the best of my knowledge and belief."

10 Dec., 1970.
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT)

I. FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY

Contract Service — Tienny K. Benadum (P)

Date	Action	Compensation	GS Equivalent
30 Oct 60	Hired as a Career Agent with LPAs, PSIs and Civil Service Retirement.	13,770	GS-15/1
27 April ~~18 Oct~~ 62	PSI	14,055	GS-15/2
14 Oct 62	LPI	15,045	GS-15/2
26 Apr. 63	PSI	15,525	GS-15/3
5 JAN 64	LPI	16,695	GS-15/3
26 Apr 64	PSI	17,210	GS-15/4
5 July 64	LPI	18,170	GS-15/4
10 Oct 65	LPI	15,825	GS-15/4
24 Apr 66	PSI	19,415	GS-15/5
3 Jul 66	LPI	19,978	GS-15/5
24 Sep 67	Contract terminated	19,978	GS-15/5
25 Sep 67	Career Agent with Civil Service Retirement, LPAs and PSIs.	19,978	GS-15/5
8 Oct 67	LPI	20,856	GS-15/5
21 Apr 68	PSI	21,469	GS-15/6
14 Jul 68	LPI	23,075	GS-15/6
13 Jul 69	LPI	25,189	GS-15/6
24 Aug 69	Designated participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.		
28 Dec 69	LPI	26,700	GS-15/6
19 Apr 70	PSI	27,463	GS-15/7
10 Jan 71	LPI	29,099	"

ORIG: JAStrassberger
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 7 December 1970

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BY 24 PER ___ #

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ___

CONF: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR, 1 CCS-2, OP-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 8 DEC 70 19 17 Z CITE DIRECTOR 092724

TO MEXICO CITY

ABMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4904 (IN 212197)

B. DIRECTOR 086503

PLEASE PROVIDE FULL NAME AND ADDRESS OF JEREMY K. BENADUM'S FAMILY BUSINESS, AND TITLE OF [illegible] [illegible].

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: a. Concurrence to proposed employment summary.

b. Proposed employment summary.

TELECOORD: CCS/DF Gordon Woll

COORD: C/WH/1

C/WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENNHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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FILE, VR

150

SECRET 301315Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4950

30 NOV 70 IN 21642

DIRECTOR

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

A

REF: HMMS-7036

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED REF WHICH FORWARDED RETIREMENT APPLICATION. JEREMY K. BENADUM IS PRESENTLY AWAY ON LEAVE AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL 5 DEC. HE WILL COMPLETE ~~FRP~~ FCPH AT THAT TIME AND WE WILL INCLUDE IN SUBSEQUENT POUCH.

2. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS PROCESSING HAS BEEN DELAYED SINCE WE HAD REQUESTED PROCESSING IN JUNE 1970. WE ASSUME THAT THIS DELAY WILL IN NO WAY AFFECT OUR PLANS TO RETIRE BENADUM ON 31 DEC 1970. GP-1

1 DEC 1970

SECRET

When Jim [illegible] call Mr. [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

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ORIG: WSRenehan:md
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 1 December 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ______ PER ______ #______

CONF:

INFO: FILE, VR. [illegible]

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 1 Dec 70 22 45z CITE DIRECTOR 090837

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4950 (IN 216442)

1. PARA 2 REF EFFECTIVE DATE 31 DECEMBER 1970 CORRECT AND HQS FORESEES NO DELAY IN BENADUM'S RETIREMENT AS PER SCHEDULE.

2. WHEN PARA 1 REF FORM SIGNED PLEASE ADVISE NUMBER AND DATE TRANSMITTAL.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advised Station has received retirement application for Jeremy K. BENADUM, and assumed delay will not effect Station plans to retire BENADUM on 31 Dec 1970.

TELECOORD: OP/RAD-Mr. M. Benthall

COORD: C/WH/1

WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION: WH-8 INFO: FILE, VR CCS-2, OF-2, OP-2

ACTION NO: 639

S E C R E T 231506Z NOV 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4504 23 NOV 212197

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: DIRECTOR 333923

1. CONCUR EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY PER PARA 1 REF.

2. ALLOTTEE DESIGNATED: WELLS FARGO BANK, 464 CALIFORNIA ST., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. ACCT. 333361. GP-1

S E C R E T

[illegible] sent to [illegible] [illegible]

24 NOV 1970

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Retirement Application and Related Information - Jeremy K. BENADUM

Reference: HMMT-10467

1. Since Jeremy K. BENADUM has expressed a desire to retire in December 1970, he should complete and return to Headquarters the attached Application for Retirement form. He may have his annuity checks sent directly to his bank for deposit if he wishes. This should be arranged with whatever bank is designated under Item 4 on the application. His checking account number should be recorded following the name of the bank. Items B-1 through B-4 may be left blank to be filled in at Headquarters. Since Subject's annuity will begin on the first day of the month following retirement, it is considered advantageous to make his retirement effective as of the last day of the month. In this way his annuity would commence the day following his last day as an employee.

2. When BENADUM retires, his regular Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (without accidental death and dismemberment benefits) will be continued at the same amount without further cost. The cost of the optional FEGLI, which he is eligible to continue, will be deducted from his annuity until he reaches age 65. These insurances will retain face value until BENADUM reaches age 65 at which time they will reduce at the rate of 2 per cent per month until they reach 25 per cent of their face value. If he wishes, Subject may elect at the time of retirement to convert to an individual life insurance policy in order to retain lifetime coverage in an amount equal to his present insurance. He must pay the premium applicable to the type of policy selected. A medical examination will not be required under the conversion privilege.

(continued)

Attachment:
Application for Retirement

Distribution:
3 - COS, Mexico City

HMMS-7036

18 NOV 1970

SECRET

1 - WH/Pers
3 - ROB

OP/RAD/ROB/PJSeidel:jat (13 Nov 1970) 3257

AC/ROB

C/WH/Pers

C/WH/SS

3. Subject may also continue his enrollment under his health benefits plan. Premiums will continue at the same rate as that for employees and will be withheld from his monthly annuity payments.

4. Under the provisions of [illegible]HB 20-1 4c(2) Subject's prospective retirement precludes him from becoming eligible for home leave upon completion of his present tour.

5. BENADUM's request for retirement will be processed as expeditiously as possible following receipt of his completed application form. Upon approval of his retirement by Chief, JKLANCE, Subject will be notified.

/s/ Samuel F. Elsdon
for IRVING S. ONTIVEROS

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

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ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 446
DATE: 13 November 1970

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ______ PER ______ #
☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

CONF: WH INFO FILE, VR. CCS 2, CF 2, CP 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 13 NOV 70 23 22z CITE DIRECTOR

086503

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

16 NOV 1970

REF: FN 20-99

1. HQS PROPOSES FOLLOWING EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR JEREMY K. BENADUM. PLEASE ADVISE COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE.

A. ACTUAL EMPLOYERS TO DATE OF JKLANCE CONTRACT.

B. FOR PERIOD JKLANCE EMPLOYMENT 1 NOVEMBER 1960 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1970 RETIRED U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE EMPLOYED BY FAMILY BUSINESS (NAME AND ADDRESS).

2. ABOVE WILL PERMIT PAYMENT OF ANNUITY BY GOVERNMENT CHECK WHICH WILL SEND CURRENTLY DESIGNATED ALLOTTEE UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED.

END OF MESSAGE

COORD: C/WH/1
WH/FI/NOC
CCS/DF
CCS/CTS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

W. S. RENEHAN
C/WH CONTRACTS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG: WSFenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 30 Oct 70

85

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/8 INFO FILE, VR. DDP2, OP2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 30OCT70 17 39Z CITE DIRECTOR 082587

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 4672 (IN 193185)

THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A PRE RETIREMENT PHYSICAL; HOWEVER, COMPLETION OF TOUR PHYSICALS ARE AUTHORIZED. SEE FR 15-1. RESULTS OF PHYSICALS MUST BE FORWARDED HQS WHEN COMPLETED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Advise what portion of expences incurred for physical exams are reimbursable.

COORD: C/WH/1
C/WH/DC/MOC
DD/PERS-SP
OMS Mr. Corrigan (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. FENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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BY: AT:

DISSEM BY: PER ACTION COPY

ACTION UNIT WH8 INFO FILE, VR OP2 DMS 2

ACTION NO. 181

S E C R E T 261940Z OCT 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 4672 26Oct IN 193185

DIRECTOR

ADMIN PERS

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM HAS ARRANGED TO HAVE COMPLETE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITH FAMILY PHYSICIAN IN SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF DURING PERSONAL TRIP THERE IN LATE OCT 70. HE HAS ASKED WHAT PORTION OF EXPENSES THEREFOR ARE REIMBURSABLE BY JKLANCE.

2. STATION CAN FIND NO INFORMATION ON PRE-RETIREMENT PHYSICALS. HEADQUARTERS GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED. GP-1

S E C R E T

27 Oct 70

SECRET

14-00000

S E C R E T

MEXICO CITY

1521 23z SEP 70

CITE DIRECTOR 067983

1. CONTRACT LIFE INSURANCE REFUND IN THE AMOUNT OF $48.00 DUE JEREMY K. BENADUM FOR PAY PERIOD 23 AUGUST THROUGH 19 SEPTEMBER 1970, PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,470.23.

2. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,422.23 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1

C/WH/

17 SEP 1970

C/

C/

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED

BY: AT:

DISSEM BY 23 PER

SECRET GROUP 1
(When Filled In)

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X-REF TO CS FILE NO.

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

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ACTION UNIT WH8

INFO FILE, VR CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2, FI 2

ACTION NO. 486

S E C R E T 272327Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3778

DIRECTOR

ADMIN CONTRACTS

27 JUL 70 I 30647

REF: HMMS-6919

1. IT IS STATION UNDERSTANDING THRU LNPURE THAT EMPLOYEE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES, E.G., QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL, WHILE IN A LEAVE STATUS UNTIL DATE OF RETIREMENT BUT THAT EMPLOYEE UNDER THEIR SYSTEM NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE IN LIEU OF LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. HOWEVER, JEREMY K. BENADUM IS RETIRING UNDER JKLANCE SYSTEM, AND SHOULD STATION DECIDE TO RETIRE HIM AS OF 31 DEC 70, WOULD HE BE ELIGIBLE FOR BOTH QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL ALLOWANCES THRU THIS DATE?

3. STATION REQUIRES ANSWER TO PARA 2 BEFORE ADVISING BENADUM OF OUR DECISION. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			MICROFILM

SUBJECT
ADMIN/RETIREMENT
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMT-10467, 14 August 1970

1. Although we are certain that the following information is available at Headquarters, Jeremy K. BENADUM has requested that it be brought to the attention of the Retirement Office.

2. At the time of his retirement from LNERGO, 31 October 1960, he was paid $3,177.40 for annual leave accrued. This money was then turned over to JKLANCE via a check written on 5 September 1961. Income Tax charges had already been deducted from this total.

Dexter E. ROSTEDT

11 SEP 1970 [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig & 2cc: C/WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-10486	31 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division
ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM, Retirement

Action Required: Para 3
Reference : HMMT-10,467, Para 3

1. Reference indicated: Jeremy K. BENADUM advises his present plans call for him residing in the U.S. for a period of six months each year; he plans to return to the U.S. after 31 December 1970 and has asked the Station about reimbursement for the travel for himself and his family.

Ref asked whether return travel is authorized.

2. FR 22-2 provides: "Upon retirement while assigned abroad, ..., travel and transportation expenses from the last post of assignment to the place where the employee will reside in the U.S., ..." FR 22-21 specifies the time limit within which travel must be performed.

The above does permit BENADUM to be reimbursed for travel of self and authorized dependents after his retirement (31 Dec 70) to the place in the U.S. where he will reside.

3. STATION ACTION:

It is suggested BENADUM be asked to submit a written request for transmittal to Headquarters in which he cites the place in the U.S. where he will reside, the names of the dependents who will travel with him, mode of travel and, if known, the itinerary.

Upon receipt of the above, Headquarters will process a Request for Travel Orders and, upon approval, will advise the Station.

Norman E. PATERSILL

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

HMMS-6960

28 AUG 1970

SECRET

1-OP/CPD
1-WH/B&F
1-WH/FI/ROC
1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts

WH/Contracts WSRenehan me (24 Aug 70) 4460

C/OP/CPD

C/WH/B&F

C/WH/1

WH/FI/ROC

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMS-6919

1. After careful review at the Station and discussions with Jeremy K. BENADUM, we have concluded that the most amicable and efficient separation date for BENADUM would be 31 December 1970. In our review of costs, we find the additional benefits to BENADUM result primarily from his additional two months of service increasing his retirement benefits.

2. Based on this decision we plan on having him begin leave on 14 August 1970 and are therefore submitting the following papers as requested in reference.

a) Attached is the signed original copy of an amendment contract which provides for his participation in the Organization Retirement Program.

b) A memo prepared by BENADUM requesting approval for him to retire 31 December 1970, and which is concurred in by the Chief of Station.

c) A statement in lieu of a copy of his discharge papers. As outlined in this statement, BENADUM indicates he never received an official discharge.

d) A report of cover earnings for the period 1 May 1969 through 30 June 1970. BENADUM's statement indicates he has received no income, either in dividends or salary, from his cover company since 30 April 1969.

3. BENADUM has indicated his present plans call for him residing in the U.S. for a period of six months each year. He plans to return to the States after 31 December 1970 and has queried the Station regarding reimbursement for return travel to the U.S. for himself and family. In future correspondence please indicate whether return travel is authorized.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/atts. herewith

Dexter E. ROSTIDT

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-10,467	DATE 11 August 1970
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 30 October 1960.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 24 August 1969. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 23 August 1969 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employment will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of this contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

APPROVED:

Jeremy K. Benadum

Jeremy K. Benadum

BY ______________________

Contracting Officer

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Retirement request

Writer herewith requests that his retirement date be established as 31 December, 1970.

CONCUR:
Roger T. KINGMAN

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
JKB From: Jeremy K. Benadum
Subj.: Military Service

Upon graduation from Pomona College, Claremont, California, in June, 1936, writer was commissioned as 2nd Lt. of Infantry. On October 25, 1939, writer went on active duty under the Thomason Act, being assigned to duty with the 30th U.S. Infantry, with headquarters at the Presidio, San Francisco, California. He remained on active duty until 30 July, 1940, at which time he reverted to reserve status. Writer remained in this status, with the rank of 1st Lt. until 1942, at which time all reserve officers in the FBI were requested to resign their commissions. The latter was done under an arrangement between the Defense Dept. and the FBI. Writer has never received a discharge, so is unable to produce same.

Mexico, D.F.
31 July, 1970

To: COS
From: Jeremy K. Bonadum
Subj.: Cover Earnings

This is to advise that writer has received no income, either in dividends or salary, from his cover company since 30 April, 1969.

SECRET

2/6/71

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

REFERENCE : HR 20-30 c (4)

1. It is requested that approval be granted for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, to use accumulated annual leave prior to his retirement on 31 December 1970.

2. BENADUM has been assigned PCS to Mexico City since his employment in October 1960 and will retire in place. He has a maximum leave carryover of 560 hours plus leave accrued during 1970. BENADUM's request that he be permitted to use accrued annual leave in lieu of a lump-sum payment was endorsed by the Mexico City Station.

3. The Chief of Station, prior to departure for Mexico, recommended that BENADUM's request be approved. This was based on operational considerations which are in the best interests of the Agency for there to be an amicable separation when BENADUM retires.

4. The WH Division recommends favorable consideration be accorded this request.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET [illegible]

SUBJECT: Jeromy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

CONCUR:

/s/ G. Droller

DDP/NSP

APPROVED:

/s/ H. B. Fisher

Director of Personnel

21 JUL 1970

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSReneham:md (20 July 1970)

Distribution: Orig - WH/Contracts
1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - CPD
1 - WH/1

3 [illegible] 70

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service Agent Panel

SUBJECT : Promotion Review of Career Agents

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 17 July 1970

1. Western Hemisphere Division has completed its review of GS-14 and above career agents. Bruce H. FERNALD, who is currently serving in Mexico City, has not been included in this review since he is home-based in the Soviet Bloc Division.

2. Attached are NSP Data Sheets on our four career agents in this GS-equivalent bracket, a ranking of these agents, and a promotion nomination for Benjamin A. LONGINO.

(Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachments

cc: DDP/NSP

DDP/WH/FI/EXO:J. Di Stefano:mj (30 Jul 70)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
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1 - WH/EXO
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WH DIVISION RANKING OF GS-14 CAREER AGENTS

		Last Promotion
1.	Benjamin A. LONGINO *	May 1963
2.	Henry J. SLOMAN	December 1965

WH DIVISION RANKING OF GS-15 CAREER AGENTS

		Last Promotion
1.	Douglas J. FREAPANE	December 1968
2.	Jeremy K. BENADUM **	October 1960

---

* Nominated for promotion

** Scheduled for retirement 31 December 1970

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

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ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH/Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 28 July 1970

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ________

CONF: WH-5 INFO FILE, VR, CCS-2, CS/5, CO/2, FE-2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 2021 27z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY 054605

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 3778 (IN 130647)

B. HMMS-6919

1. EXCEPTION APPROVAL TO PERMIT USE OF ACCRUED LEAVE IN LIEU LUMP-SUM PAYMENT, WAS GRANTED ON BASIS OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS CITED PARA 2 REF B.

2. ASSUMING BENADUM'S ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES FOR PERIOD PARA ~~2 REF A (REMAINS~~ IN PLACE, CHILDREN ENTERED IN SCHOOL) HE THEREFORE ENTITLED RECEIVE THE ALLOWANCES.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. Should Station decide to retire BENADUM as of 31 Dec 70, would he be eligible for allowances thru that date.
B. BENADUM - Retirement; Report of Cover Earnings.

COORD: C/WH/1

OP/CPD

C/WH/FIN

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT WH8 | INFO FILE, VR CCS2, CSPS, CP2, FI2

ACTION NO. 486

S E C R E T 272327Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3778

DIRECTOR

ADMIN, CONTRACTS

27 JUL 70 I 30647
m

REF: HMMS-6919

1. IT IS STATION UNDERSTANDING THRU LNPURE THAT EMPLOYEE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE ALLOWANCES, E.G., QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL, WHILE IN A LEAVE STATUS UNTIL DATE OF RETIREMENT BUT THAT EMPLOYEE UNDER THEIR SYSTEM NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE ANNUAL LEAVE IN LIEU OF LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. HOWEVER, JEREMY K. BENADUM IS RETIRING UNDER JKLANCE SYSTEM, AND SHOULD STATION DECIDE TO RETIRE HIM AS OF 31 DEC 70, WOULD HE BE ELIGIBLE FOR BOTH QUARTERS AND EDUCATIONAL ALLOWANCES THRU THIS DATE?

3. STATION REQUIRES ANSWER TO PARA 2 BEFORE ADVISING BENADUM OF OUR DECISION. GP-1

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

24 July 1970

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR:
A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES (TYPE A, B AND CAREER)
B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR MOC (US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY)
2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS
3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT (NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION) AND BY CSPS/AGENT BRANCH (1 COPY ONLY)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE) BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P)			SEX Male	DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 1915
MARITAL STATUS Married	NO. DEPENDENTS 6	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1917, 48, 50, 51, 57, 59	NATIONALITY U. S. A.	LAST MEDICAL EXAM 18 July 1961
DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL CSA, 22 December 1960		JOB TITLE Ops Officer		COMPONENT DDP/WH/1
CONTRACT CATEGORY Career Agent	EFFECTIVE DATE 30 Oct 1960	EXPIRATION DATE Indefinite	SALARY $27, 463	GRADE EQUIVALENT GS-15/7
PROJECT OR FAN # 1135-1014				

BENEFITS	YES	NO
SOCIAL SECURITY		X
FECA DEATH AND DISABILITY	X	
ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE	X	
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT	X	
CIA RETIREMENT OR COMMERCIAL CIA ANNUITY	X	
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE		X
CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE	X	
MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS	X	
OTHER (EXPLAIN) ~~Legislative Pay Increases~~		

NON-CIA EDUCATION

1936 Pomona College, California, A. B., Political Science
1939 Stanford University Law School, LL. B., Law
1940 FBI Academy

NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

DATES FROM - TO	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	FUNCTION	SALARY
1939-40	U. S. Army			
1940-60	FBI	Mexico (1951-60) Peru (1943-47)	Legal Attache	$13, 000

CIA TRAINING

CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (BEGINNING WITH EOD)

DATES FROM - TO	FUNCTION	CONTR. CAT.	LOCATION	PROJECT	SALARY	GRADE EQUIV.
Oct 60	Ops Officer (Career Agent)		Mexico	LITEMPO	13, 730	15
Apr 66	"		"	"	19, 415	"
Jun 70	"		"	"	27, 463	"
31 [illegible] 1970	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]		

SECRET

FORM 3195

None.

COVER

A. PRESENT COVER IS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☒ NON-OFFICIAL

DIVISION EVALUATION OF COVER SECURITY:

On comparison to official Station cover, and for the type of work that Subject has been engaged in, the cover is good. His cover is that of a retired former FBI employee ("rentista" in Mexico). He is an investor in a Mexican business firm and has properties in the United States which he manages from Mexico. Subject is also independently wealthy. Subject is known to be a CIA asset in high Mexican Government circles.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE

The Station has consistently rated Subject's performance as "strong".

ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE

Subject and his family have adapted completely to a dual life. Subject works full-time for CIA and there is no conflict of interest with regard to his work for us. (Subject has been employed in this same position for approximately ten years.) Subject's wife has a full schedule of activities surrounding her family and community. She is discreet and is not the type of woman who feels that she has to know and approve of her husband's every move.

B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☐ NON-OFFICIAL *(GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NOC)*

N/A. Subject has had the same cover and position since originally hired by the Agency. Prior to Agency employment, he was employed by the FBI in Mexico.

MOBILITY

INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL

N/A. Subject will retire from Agency employment this year.

FUTURE UTILIZATION

INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

There are no plans to use Subject's services after his retirement.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART I) EOD: ?

1. PERS. SERIAL NO.					
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P)		3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH Aug 1915	5. CONTINUOUS COMP. DATE ?	
6. MARITAL STATUS Married	7. DEPENDENTS (Exclud. employee)	NO. 6	YEAR(S) OF BIRTH 1917 1948 1950 1950 1951 1957	8. US NATURALIZATION DATE(S) NA	SPOUSE ?
9. CAREER STAFF STATUS	MEMBERSHIP	OTHER STATUS Ineligible	10. LAST MED. EXAM. Jul 1961	QUAL. FOR Prop Assign	EVAL. FOR Prop Assign
11. CURRENT RESERVE STATUS	NONE X	SERVICE	GRADE	ACTIVE DUTY WITH CIA CAT. 1	RELEASE TO MIL. SER. CAT. 2 / TO BE DEFERRED CAT. 3 / RETIRED
12. ASSESSMENT DATE		13. PROFESSIONAL TEST DATE		14. LANGUAGE APTITUDE TEST DATE	

15. NON-CIA EMPLOYMENT

?	Military Service, US Army, 1st Lt
19 ?-60	FBI - 20 years

16. NON-CIA EDUCATION

17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES (Language, Proficiency, Date Tested)

Spanish - S,W,R Fluent
German - S,R Slight
French - S,R Slight

18. AGENCY SPONSORED TRAINING

None

19. CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SINCE 18 SEPT 1947 (Personnel Actions, Military Orders, and Principal Details)

EFFECTIVE DATE	POSITION TITLE & OCCUPATIONAL CODE	GRADE	SD	ORGANIZATION & ORGAN. TITLE (If any)	LOCATION
Oct 1960	CE Ops Off (Career Agt)	$13730	GS15	DDP/WH/LITEMPO	Mexico City
Apr 1966	" " " " "	18615	15	" " "	" "

20. DATE REVIEWED 19 Sep 1967	21. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hq	22. ITEMS 1 TO 19 REVIEWED BY EMPLOYEE No

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERS. SERIAL NO.	BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE (PART 2)

NAME (Last-First-Middle) BENADUM, Jerome V., (P)	DATE OF BIRTH Aug 1915

23. No Fitness Report in Official Personnel Folder. Subject's EOD date as CA is Oct 1960. No Photo Available.

24. SUMMARY OF CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE AND/OR FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

25. IDENTITY OF OTHER DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOULD BE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

26. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

27. DATE REVIEWED 19 Sep 1962	28. PROFILE REVIEWED BY hc

FORM NO. 1200 (PART 2) REPLACES FORM 1000 (PART II) WHICH IS OBSOLETE.
1 FEB 61

SECRET

PROFILE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: ADMIN/PERS
Transmittal of Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Jeremy K. BENADUM

Lynn Sparks

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith are three copies of a Memorandum in lieu of a Fitness Report on Jeremy K. BENADUM.

Dexter E. ROSTEDT

Attachment:
Memorandum h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att h/w

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-10432	DATE 21 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

21 July 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Cover Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

During the past three months I have had the opportunity to work with and direct the activities of Jeremy K. BENADUM. Within a few months he will be retired from further service and it is appropriate now to review his past performance and present status in order that this remain a permanent part of his record.

BENADUM, during the past ten years, has performed as the outside case officer for the LITEMPO Project. He was pressed into service after resigning his position with LNERGO, for whom he worked for a period of twenty years. His primary value to the Station, at that time, was his access to persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service. On further investigation it became clear it was his close personal and official relationship with LITEMPO-1 which offered him this access across the board. Gradually over the years he developed a similar relationship with LITEMPO-12, LITEMPO-4 and others.

His past evaluations are still valid, however, during the past three months he has gradually been phased out of liaison contacts and has been used principally to assist the Station in its orderly liaison transition. He is currently in touch with two liaison types officially but occasionally sees others on a purely social basis.

Although his retirement is not voluntary, he has good-naturedly assisted the Station in this very sensitive and delicate changeover. He will remain in Mexico after his retirement and has offered his assistance if needed. He presents no overriding handling problem, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings.

Dexter E. Rostedt

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 20 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: [illegible] Jeremy K. Staff or Division: WHD
Last First MI

b. Date and place of birth: 24 August 1915, Omaha, Nebraska

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents: Wife, born 31 Jan 1917, San Francisco, California--dau born 17 Sept 1948, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 6 Mar 1950, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 14 Jul 1951, San Francisco, Cal--son born 16 Aug 1957, Mexico, D.F.--dau born 19 Sept 1959, Mexico, D.F. -- dau born October 1961, Mexico, D.F.

e. Citizenship of agent: USA

(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:

Pomona College, Claremont, California, A.B. 1936, Political Science
Stanford Univ Law School, LL.B. 1939, Law
FBI Academy, August, September 1940

h. Military service Thomason Act Training, Infantry School, Oct 1939-July 1940

(1) Country served and years:

(2) Branch of service and rank:

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:

FBI - Aug 1940-Sept 1960, GS-14, $13,000/year when resigned.
Assistant Legal Attache, US Embassy, Lima, Peru, 1943-45
Legal Attache same post, 1946-47
Assistant Legal Attache, Mexico City, 1951-60
Deputy to Legal Attache 1957-60

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

Not applicable

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Spanish	**high**	**high**	**high**
English	**native**	**native**	**native**
German	**intermediate**	**none**	**intermediate**
French	**elementary**	**none**	**elementary**

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken
not applicable		

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

not applicable

n. Security clearance number: **CSA, 22 December 1960 - S-11403**

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: **None**

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: 30 October 1960

r. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
None					

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

REFERENCE : HR 20-30 c (4)

1. It is requested that approval be granted for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent, to use accumulated annual leave prior to his retirement on 31 December 1970.

2. BENADUM has been assigned PCS to Mexico City since his employment in October 1960 and will retire in place. He has a maximum leave carryover of 360 hours plus leave accrued during 1970. BENADUM's request that he be permitted to use accrued annual leave in lieu of a lump-sum payment was endorsed by the Mexico City Station.

3. The Chief of Station, prior to departure for Mexico, recommended that BENADUM's request be approved. This was based on operational considerations which are in the best interests of the Agency for there to be an amicable separation when BENADUM retires.

4. The WH Division recommends favorable consideration be accorded this request.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

SECRET

SUBJECT: Jeremy K. BENADUM, Terminal Annual Leave

CONCUR:

/s/ G. Droller
DDP/NSP

APPROVED:

/s/ H. B. [illegible]
Director of Personnel

21 JUL 1970

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:md (20 July 1970)

Distribution: Orig - WH/Contracts
1 - Addressee
1 - DDP/NSP
1 - CPD
1 - WH/1

SECRET

DISPATCH | SECRET | PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT

LITEMPO/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-32877, 28 August 1967
B. DIRECTOR-99663

1. In accordance with the request made in Reference B, the following is an up-dated Agent Evaluation on Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent and outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project. This evaluation should be considered in conjunction with Reference A, which is still valid and more extensive.

2. BENADUM continues to perform as the Outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project in a professional and efficient manner. The relationships he has developed with persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service allow him to obtain information of great interest to WOFIRM which might otherwise be unavailable. For example, via LITEMPO-12, Chief of a special investigative unit, the Station receives carbon copies of the reports prepared by the group. BENADUM also is able to ask this group to conduct investigations or provide file checks on persons of interest to the Station.

Continued.....

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-37320 | DATE 10 June 1969

SECRET | HQS FILE NUMBER 201-287227

3. BENADUM was able to establish a system whereby persons of interest to [illegible] residing in PBRUMEN may obtain Mexican entry visas without the long delay usually required.

4. BENADUM writes well and has improved considerably in providing information he obtains from his contacts in written form. Usually, the reports he submits need little editing in order to be processed for dissemination. 77

5. This Officer speaks fluent Spanish which enables him to communicate with the persons with whom he meets in a free and easy manner. This ability certainly has assisted BENADUM in establishing the rapport and confidence so necessary in working with Latins, especially those working for the host government.

6. BENADUM presents no overriding handling problems for his Station Case Officer. He is willing to work long hours, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings. Based upon the Regular Fitness Report system, this Officer could be rated as STRONG in judging his performance.

7. BENADUM is the only other Station Officer besides the COS who has good and ready access to various personages within the Mexican Government. With the departure of Willard C. CURTIS, the value of BENADUM to the Station should not be underestimated.

8. BENADUM was shown this evaluation in draft form.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A — STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible] (OF Payroll No.)	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) BENADUM, Jeremy K.	3. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] May 1915	4. SD	5. EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY (Refer to R 20-2) Career Agent
6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE Operations Officer	7. GRADE GS-15 equiv.	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH		
9. ASSIGNMENT LOCATION → ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ U.S. FIELD ☒ FGN. FIELD	10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 25 October 1960	11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE 7 October 1939		

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☒ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)		OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	CHECK ONE		TOTAL TIME	
MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR			PCS	TDY	MONTH	DAYS
Oct.30'60	present	Operations Officer	Mexico City	x		104	

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO.
If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

FORM 1-65 3100

SECRET

(41)

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C — STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☒ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder. Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D — RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ______________ (DATE) that this employee:

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F — DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

I certify that the information in Section [illegible] to the best of my knowledge.

____

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

20 August 1962

SUBJECT: Assessment of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Pseudonym and salary: Jeremy K. BENADUM, GS-15, $14,055.

2. Division or Staff and city: WH Division, Mexico City.

3. Operational duties: Subject maintains unofficial liaison between the Station and a Mexican Ministry. He also develops independent agents.

4. Cover: Subject has Inmigrante-Rentista status which allows him to remain in Mexico indefinitely and the only restriction on his activity is that he cannot be gainfully employed. In view of the fact he is a wealthy man in his own right and will soon be of age to collect retirement from his long service with the FBI, this cover presents no problems. After five years in this status he will obtain inmigrado status which will give him complete freedom of operation, with all the rights as a Mexican citizen, except that of voting. The cover is excellent because it is secure, allows him complete mobility, and require no administrative support. There are no existing or anticipated problems related thereto.

5. Division's assessment: Subject is an experienced, well-trained, serious intelligence officer, capable of spotting, assessing, recruiting and handling agents. Most of his experience and capability is in the field of collection of FI intelligence and operational support, the latter being his most outstanding area of contribution to Station objectives. He would also be capable of running CI operations. His knowledge of CA type work, however, cannot be assessed at Headquarters.

Subject's cover is a natural one and poses no difficulties. Since Subject has been in the intelligence field for over 20 years, he is psychologically prepared for his dual role in intelligence operations and is well qualified to operate without strong Station support.

Headquarters is not in a position to comment on the timeliness or quality of his operational reporting, but no defects in this regard have been noted nor have any been brought to the attention of Headquarters by the Station.

Subject needs no training.

SECRET

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: ADMIN/CONTRACTS
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement, Report of Cover Earnings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

Reference: Mexico City 3340

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM had proposed an extension of his retirement from 31 October to an appropriate date in December 1970 in order for him to use his annual leave in lieu of lump sum payment.

2. Shortly before the COS left Headquarters for Mexico, a meeting was held during which the Branch Chief discussed contract personnel of the Station.

Ref was discussed and it was the COS's desire for there to be an amicable separation at the time of BENADUM's retirement. If, therefore, the extra two months would accomplish this, then the added costs would be worthwhile.

3. The following annuity figures have been provided by the Retirement Office and are predicated on a retirement date of 31 December 1970. Please keep in mind, the figures must be considered as estimates and subject to verification of service and final computations. Retirement would be under the Organization Program.

(Continued)

Attachment : As stated, herewith

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS-6919

DATE: 22 JUL 1970

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

1-WH/1
1-WH/Registry
1-WH/Contracts
1-[illegible]

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/Contracts
OFFICER: (WSRenehan : me (16 Jul 70)
EXT: 4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/1	16 7.70	[illegible]
[illegible]	16 July 70	Ralph [illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: C/WH/SS
DATE: 21 Jul 70
OFFICER'S NAME: Richard B. Wright

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATC

Annuity Without Survivor Benefit	$15,726 pa	$1,311 pm
Annuity With Survivor Benefit	14,424 pa	1,202 pm
Survivor Annuity (maximum)	8,649 pa	721 pm

High Three Average Salary $24,445

Creditable Service			
Service	31 yrs.	1 month	24 days
*Sick Leave Credit		2,232 hours	
Total	32 yrs.	2 months	

*Carryover into 1970	2,128 hours
Accrual in 1970	104 hours
Total	2,232 hours

(Note: The leave figures are on the basis that he has not taken any sick leave during 1970.)

4. The Retirement Office also advised that in order for BENADUM to be accorded use of his accumulated annual leave he should begin the leave on fourteen (14) August. This is based on his carryover into 1970 of 560 hours and his accrual during 1970. The figures are on the basis that no leave other than that reported to Headquarters has been taken.

5. In order to start the retirement processing, the following actions should be effected by the Station and the papers concerned returned to Headquarters, Attention, WH/Contracts.

a. Contract Amendment

Attached is the original and one copy of an amendment effective 24 August 1969 to BENADUM's contract which provides for his participation in the Organization Retirement Program.

The original and copy are to be signed by BENADUM. The copy is for Station retention.

b. Retirement Request

BENADUM is to submit a signed memo requesting approval for him to retire 31 December 1970. The request should be concurred with by the COS by the use of a concurrence line on the memo.

c. Military Service

Please obtain from BENADUM a copy of his discharge from the military service for transmittal to Headquarters. In the event he does not have the paper readily available, please do not delay transmittal of "a" and "b" above.

Upon receipt in Headquarters of the above papers, they will be processed by and thru offices concerned. The Retirement Office will, after completing service verification, etc., forward a dispatch which will provide BENADUM with detailed retirement type info including insurances.

6. Report of Cover Earnings

BENADUM's contract provides that he will submit a report of cover earnings each six months. The last report covered the period through 30 April 1969.

STATION ACTION:

Please have BENADUM submit a cover earnings report for transmittal to Headquarters for the period 1 May 1969 through 30 June 1970. The format may be the same as the report forwarded with HMMT-9712, 16 May 1970.

Norman R. PATERSILL

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WH Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.		XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
			MICROFILM

SUBJECT ADMIN/PERS
Transmittal of Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report - Jeremy K. BEHADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

[redacted] [redacted]

Attached herewith are three copies of a Memorandum in lieu of a Fitness Report on Jeremy K. BEHADUM.

Dexter B. ROSTEDT

Attachment:
Memorandum h/w

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att h/w

Rec'd 3 July 70
1 - WA/I
1 - WA/[illegible] 10 Aug 70
[illegible] WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-10432	DATE 21 July 1970
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

21 July 1970

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Cover Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

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Although his retirement is not voluntary, he has good-naturedly assisted the Station in this very sensitive and delicate changeover. He will remain in Mexico after his retirement and has offered his assistance if needed. He presents no overriding handling problem, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings.

Dexter E. Rostedt

14-00000

ORIG: WSRenehan
UNIT: WH Contracts
EXT: 4460
DATE: 16 July 1970

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 SS
2
3
4 /
5
6
7
8 W

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ____ PER ____ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE, VR, CO2, OF2, CCS2, CSPS, FI2.

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 17 20 53 Z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 051189

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 3577 (IN114008)

B. HMMS-6919

POUCHING REF B ~~17~~ 22 JULY CONTAINING LEAVE AND ANNUITY INFO FOR JEREMY K. BENADUM.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: a. Requested annual leave and retirement dates for Subject.

b. Transmittal of requested info.

COORD: C/WH/1

C/WH/FI/NOC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

WSRenehan
WH/Contracts
4469
2 July 1970

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ___ PER ___ #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

WH 8 FILE, VR, AD 2, OF 2, CCS 2, CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 02 21 37z JUL 70 CITE DIRECTOR 048159

TO MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 3577 (IN 114008)

POUCHING DETAILS

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Requested annual leave and retirement dates for Jeremy K. BENADUM.

COORD: C/WH/1 Charles M. [illegible]

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

SECRET (When Filled In) GROUP 1

W

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1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

X-REF TO CS FILE NO. ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY 28 PER ____ #

☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

ACTION UNIT WH 8

INFO FILE, VR OP2

ACTION NO. 214

S E C R E T 010010Z JUL 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3577 (PRALLETT ACTING)

DIRECTOR

1 JUL 70 I 14008

ADMIN PERS CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 3540 (IN 025219)

6

IN ORDER FIRM UP ANNUAL LEAVE AND RETIREMENT DATES, REQUEST ANSWER TO REFERENCE SOONEST. GP-1

S E C R E T

1 JUL 1970

SECRET

FORM 3020 1-69 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION | CLASSIFIED MESSAGE | TOTAL COPIES 16

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CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. ____

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☐ FILE RID ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ____

BY: ____ AT: ____ Z

DISSEM BY: 23 PER ____

ACTION UNIT: C/WH 8

INFO: FILE, VR D/OP, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS, C/FI 2

ACTION NO.: 698

S E C R E T 021912Z JUN 70 CITE MEXICO CITY 3340 (PRALLETT ACTING)

DIRECTOR 2 Jun 70 IN 085219

RYBAT ADMIN PERS CONTRACTS

REF: ED-7451

1. STATION DISCUSSED REFERENCE WITH JEREMY K. BENADUM WHILE BOTH UNDERSTAND HE NOT ELIGIBLE UNDER PREFERRED JKLANCE RETIREMENT UNTIL 31 OCTOBER 70. BENADUM PROPOSED EXTENSION OF RETIREMENT TO APPROPRIATE DATE IN DECEMBER 1970 IN ORDER USE 560 HOURS CARRYOVER PLUS UNUSED ACCRUAL DURING CURRENT YEAR IN LIEU LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

2. WITH HEADQUARTERS CONCURRENCE ABOVE, PLEASE FORWARD RETIREMENT PACKAGE AND ADVISE REVISED RETIREMENT DATE, DATE WHICH HE CAN BEGIN LEAVE AND ANNUITY UNDER SURVIVORSHIP PLAN.

3. BENADUM CLAIMED NEVER USED ANY SICK LEAVE AND REQUESTED CONFIRMATION BALANCE 11 JAN 70. GP-1

S E C R E T

C ____

DC ____

~~DDPS~~ ____

[illegible]

Looking into problem

Career Agent

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
	BENADUM JEREMY K	WH	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
15	6	25189	042168	15	7	25909	041970	X	

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 12/1/70

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

dF
25 Mar 70

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, WH Division

ADMIN/CONTRACTS

Jeremy K. BENADUM, Quarters Allowance

Reference: HMMT-10052

1. Reference asked Headquarters guidance in determining possible adjustment in the Quarters Allowance for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent. Reference stated:

--BENADUM purchased his local residence 1 December 1964 for $50,200 and cost of utilities average $98 monthly.

--Although the current maximum Quarters Allowance for BENADUM is $4,700 per annum, the Station has been paying at the rate of $4,128.96 per annum.

--Reference forwarded a list of BENADUM's estimates of utilities costs and a LNPURE memo on personally owned quarters.

2. The formula described in Para 3 of the LNPURE memo has been used in prior cases and is that which is also used by the Allowance Committee. Based on this formula, 10% of $50,200 (original purchase price) plus $1,176 (yearly utilities), total $6,196. The amount granted BENADUM would presumably be the maximum unless the Station had determined a lesser rate was applicable due to cover or operational reasons.

3. Using the effective date (5 October 1969) of the current Quarters Allowance rate $4,700 ($4,100 plus $600 for dependents) minus the rate being paid, $4,128.96 ~~represents~~ an increase of $571.04 per year or $47.58 per month [illegible].

(continued)

Distribution: 2-COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMS-6769	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

1-C/WH/B&F
1-C/WH/1
1-WH Registry
1-WH Contracts

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH Contracts	W.S. Renehan	me (19 March 70)	4460

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/B&F		
C/WH/1		

RELEASING

AC/WH/SS George R. Thompson

DISPATCH

For the period 1 December 1964 - 31 March 1965, BENADUM was paid quarters at the rate of $4,024.92 although the maximum allowance was $3,700 per annum. For the four months, BENADUM was overpaid $108.28 ($27.07 x 4).

Presuming the project has sufficient funds and the COS decides the maximum rate is applicable, the overpayment is to be offset against the increase.

Norman R. PATERSILL

MINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE O

6 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : **Jeremy K. BENADUM**

THROUGH : Head of Career Service

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee at a point in service five years prior to the date of scheduled retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire in **August** 1975.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency will make available to you various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. In October 1970, the Agency will conduct a Retirement Information Seminar to which you will be invited. Your spouse, if you are married, may accompany you to this seminar. Following the seminar, you will be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session (or more than one, if you wish); this phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security, taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment, if appropriate. In addition to the sessions with your Retirement Counselor, you will be invited to avail yourself of selected literature on all aspects of retirement.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date, or who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are invited to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate. He is assigned from your Directorate to the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building in Rosslyn, on telephone extension 3328.

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

Robert S. Wattles

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/FINANCE
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Living Quarters Allowance

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Paragraph 3.

1. Subject purchased his local residence in Mexico City on 1 December 1964 at a cost of $[illegible] and has been residing in it since that date. Station has paid BENADUM a quarters allowance as follows:

1 December 1964 to 31 March 1965 - $4,028.92 per annum
1 April 1965 to present - $4,128.96 per annum.

A review of subject's quarters accounting for the period 1 April 1968 to 31 October 1969 reflect his average monthly utilities costs at $95.00. (See Attachment A.)

2. Subject's basic quarters allowance has been as follows:

1 December 1964 - $3,700.00 per annum
25 April 1965 - $4,300.00 per annum (*)
16 July 1967 - $[illegible] per annum
14 July 1968 - $4,500.00 per annum
5 October 1969 - $4,700.00 per annum.

(*) Effective date of family plan.

3. In view of separate cover attachment B received from the Embassy, Headquarters' guidance is requested in determining whether any adjustments should be made in BENADUM's quarters allowance.

for John A. [illegible]

Attachments:
A - Qtrs Acctg - H/W
B - Embassy Memo - U/S/C

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD w/Atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible] November 1969

CLASSIFICATION
S[illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER

[illegible]

[illegible]

To: Station

From: JKB

Subj.: PEQ EXPENSES FOR PERIOD 1 April, 1968 - 31 Oct., 1969.

Since December, 1964, when writer moved into his own home, he was not aware that receipts for utilities etc. would be necessary. As a consequence, the attached are not complete, but they are all that writer has been able to find.

1. Electricity: Receipts are complete.

2. Gas: Receipts are complete from Jan., 1969 to date. The 1968 receipts were destroyed, but the average consumption was the same.

3. Water: In writer's "colonia" there are no water meters. The cost of water, garbage collection, street lighting and cleaning etc. is included in a monthly quota which is paid to the Association of Colonos. The quota was raised in September, 1969 from 75.00 to 200.00 pesos per month.

4. Fuel Oil: Writer found only one receipt during the period in question. Two more are attached to indicate the monthly expense.

5. Firewood: Writer has contracted with an Indian with two burros to deliver wood twice each month. Each delivery is 56.00. The Indian is illiterate and receipts are not feasible.

[illegible] LIVING QUARTERS [illegible]
[illegible]

([illegible])

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
April 1968	746.50✓		75.00	[illegible]	[illegible]
May "			75.00	[illegible]	112.–
June "	1038.50✓		75.00	[illegible]	112.–
July "			75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Aug "	935.00✓		75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Sept "			75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Oct "	1047.00✓		75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Nov "			75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Dec "	1036.75✓		75.00	[illegible]✓	112.–
Jan 1969		119.20✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Feb "	1302.55✓	121.95✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Mar "		122.51✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
April "	1026.05✓	112.35✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
May "		100.80✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
June "	1000.90✓	88.35✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
July "		121.50✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Aug "	1005.35✓	100.95✓	75.00	[illegible]	112.–
Sept " TOTALS		40.50✓	200.00	[illegible]	112.–
Oct "	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	112.–

I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNTS CLAIMED [illegible] PAID BY ME AS NECESSARY AUTHORIZED EXPENSES OF MAINTAINING MY LIVING QUARTERS: THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED FROM OTHER SOURCES EXCEPT AS INDICATED BELOW: AND THAT THIS VOUCHER AND ATTACHMENTS, IF ANY, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

MY GRADE WITH ENTRY IS [illegible]. I RECEIVE ______ DOLLARS PER [illegible]

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS LIVING WITH ME ______

NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS AWAY FROM POST ______

(X) ______ ______
(SIGNATURE) (DATE)

REMARKS: NOTE

ATTACH ALL RECEIPTS — WILL BE [illegible] TO YOU AFTER PROCESSING!

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of which may be useful as a guide [illegible] on the [illegible]

- - -

[illegible] employee occupies personally owned quarters SF-1190 should show in Item 21 (1) the initial purchase price [illegible] Items 21 (6) (7) and (8) should show annual rates for utilities as [illegible] by Section 132.5 of the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). These are the only items of cost to be [illegible].

[illegible] quarters allowance system provided for [illegible] for [illegible] a predetermined maximum, the [illegible] owned quarters should not [illegible] converted to dollars at the exchange [illegible] plus allowable utilities. [illegible] taxes, depreciation, [illegible], interest [illegible] within a reasonable period [illegible] standards. Only light, fuel, and water [illegible] allowance.

[illegible] current quarters allowance system, it is expected that the [illegible] be paid unless the authorizing officer [illegible] necessary to [illegible] payment under Section 132.2 of the Standardized Regulations. The occupant in personally owned quarters would be treated the same as any other (except that he cannot receive advance payment of quarters allowance under Section 113 of the Standardized Regulations). This makes unnecessary a special rate for personally owned quarters. The requirement to report the purchase price on SF-1190 is to provide the authorizing officer additional information to be considered, together with any other pertinent local circumstances, in deciding whether reduction of the allowance is necessary and, if so, how much. Only the utilities costs are to be considered in addition to the purchase price except in those rare instances where land rent is involved. Because of varying conditions between posts and individuals, it was not considered advisable to specify any certain percentage of the purchase price that should be considered.

In addition to the information on the SF-1190, the authorizing officer should consider local circumstances, which vary greatly from post to post, in deciding whether the occupant of personally owned quarters should be treated any differently than the employee in rented quarters and receive the flat rate allowance.

S/[illegible]Wallace
7/5/62

PERSONALLY-OWNED QUARTERS

Because of the number of inquires received regarding personally-owned quarters, the following memorandum which has been sent to a number of posts may be useful as a guide to our policy on the subject:

When an employee occupies personally owned quarters his SF-1190 should show in Section 21 (5) the initial purchase price as shown by the deed. Section 21 (6) (7) and (8) should show annual rates for utilities as authorized by Section 132.5 of the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). These are the only items of cost to be considered.

When the quarters allowance system provided for reimbursement for quarters costs within a predetermined maximum, the regulations provided that the allowance for personally owned quarters should not exceed 10 percent of the purchase price, converted to dollars at the exchange rate available at the time of purchase, plus allowable utilities. The 10 percent of purchase price was ample to take care of taxes, depreciation, repairs, interest on investment, and amortization of the costs within a reasonable period of time by U. S. standards. Only light, fuel, and water could be added in arriving at the allowance.

Under the current quarters allowance system, it is expected that the flat rate will be paid unless the authorizing officer believes it necessary to reduce the payment under Section 134.2 of the Standardized Regulations. The employee in personally owned quarters would be treated the same as any other (except that he cannot receive advance payment of quarters allowances under Section 113 of the Standardized Regulations). This makes unnecessary a special rate for personally owned quarters. The requirement to report the purchase price on SF-1190 is to provide the authorizing officer additional information to be considered, together with any other pertinent local circumstances, in deciding whether reduction of the allowance is necessary and, if so, how much. Only the utilities costs are to be considered in addition to the purchase price except in those rare instances where land rent is involved. Because of varying conditions between posts and individuals, it was not considered advisable to specify any certain percentage of the purchase price that should be considered.

In addition to the information on the SF-1190, the authorizing officer should consider local circumstances, which vary greatly from post to post, in deciding whether the occupant of personally owned quarters should be treated any differently than the employee in rented quarters and receiving the flat rate allowance.

O/ALS:JWLethco
9/5/67

Jackie E. Persinger

IG: JACKIE E. PERSINGER
IT: FINANCE
T: 2135
TE: 23 DECEMBER 1969

MESSAGE FORM
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20 PER ____ # ____

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NF: OE2
FILE, VR. WH8 DDP ADDP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T

06 16 14Z JAN 70

CITE DIRECTOR 000507

CHIEF OF STATION, MEXICO CITY

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S FLAT RATE TAX ASSESSMENT INCREASED FROM 21.9% PLUS SURTAX TO 22.9% PLUS SURTAX EFFECTIVE 14 DECEMBER 1969 FOR TAX YEAR 1970.

2. NET DUE BENADUM EACH PAY PERIOD WILL BE $1,263.26. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

7 JAN 1970

C/WH/SS
C/WH/BF-1
C/C&TD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T

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ACTION UNIT OF2

INFO FILE, VR WH8

ACTION NO. 906

S E C R E T 112300Z SEP 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 1370

DIRECTOR

DTEARN

11 SEP 69 IN 42617

REF HMMS-6543

1. PLEASE ADVISE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ALLOTTEE BANK WHERE JEREMY K. BENADUM CHECK WOULD BE DEPOSITED PER REF.

2. IF CHECK NOT YET SENT, BENADUM REQUESTS THAT WE PAY LOCALLY.

3. PLS ADVISE.

4. FILE: 50-6-91/2.

S E C R E T

Career Agent

Ruth

12 SEP 1969

[illegible]/Dennis K3175
Sending cable to Mexico
telling them to pay Benadum
and tell the headquarters.
Benadum has no allottee on
record.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES. 12

SECRET

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G: JACKIE E. PERSINGER
IT: FINANCE
: 2125
TE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1969

BLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 46 PER ____ # ____

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NF: OF 2 INFO FILE. VR. WH 8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 38732

17 22 04z SEP 69

MEXICO CITY

EF: CITE MEXICO CITY 1370** (IN 42617)

12 SEP 1969

1. TAX ASSESSMENT CHANGE EFFECTIVE 14 JULY 1969 INCREASES NET PAID BY STATION TO JEREMY K. BENADUM. IN PAY PERIOD 24 AUGUST - 20 SEPTEMBER 1969 PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,355.99. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,295.24 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

2. BENADUM ALSO DUE $729.40 FOR 1968 TAX REFUND. PLEASE PAY IN FIELD AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS.

END OF MESSAGE

**SUBJECT REQUESTS LOCAL PAYMENT

C/WH/

CTC PER TELECON

C/WH/1

C/CATD

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DATE:

CTC No. ____________________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for ____________________

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

/s/ [illegible] H. Luetscher
Approval Chief, CPD

____
Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

SECRET

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 30 October 1960.

The purpose of this amendment is to formally record your official designation as a participant in the Retirement and Disability System of this organization, effective 24 August 1969. Your contributions into the Retirement and Disability Fund will be deducted by this organization as of that date. The regulations governing this retirement system gives the individual the right to appeal such a determination if he deems the designation adverse to his best interest. In order that this technical requirement may be satisfied, you are hereby notified of your right to appeal. An appeal with reasons therefor must be received in this organization within thirty (30) days from the date of your acknowledgment of this contract amendment.

Effective close of business 23 August 1969 all contractual reference to Civil Service Retirement and your contributions thereto is deleted.

Social Security contributions required by virtue of your cover employment will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

All other terms and conditions of this contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
/s/ [illegible]
BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____
Jeremy K. Benadum

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : Designation of Jeremy K. BENADUM as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. It is requested that the contract of Jeremy K. BENADUM be amended to officially record his designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System effective 24 August 1969.

2. This contract amendment will serve as BENADUM's official notification of his designation as a participant.

Robert S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

[illegible]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 72

SECRET

DATE: 7 JULY 1969

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ #

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INFO: FILE, VR WH-8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY 09 10 53Z JUL 69 19031

PAY RAISE EFFECTIVE 13 JULY 1969 INCREASES NET PAID BY STATION TO JEREMY K. BENADUM. IN PAY PERIOD 29 JUNE - 26 JULY 1969 PAY AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS THE SUM OF $1,199.98. NET DUE BENADUM WILL BE $1,254.74 EACH PAY PERIOD THEREAFTER. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

10[illegible]

WH/1 Charles M. Saunde

WH/CONT

C/WH/SB

C/WH/BF-1

C/CATD

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1[illegible] JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

VIA : SSA/DDS

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCES : A. Audit Staff Memo, 17 March 1969, Subject: Clarification of Cover Income

B. WHD Memo, 12 May 1969, Same Subject

1. Reference A indicated that since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM had not submitted cover income reports.

Reference B indicated that the Mexico Station had been requested to forward information in relation to Reference A.

2. Attached is a copy of the certification by Jeremy K. BENADUM in which he states he has received no compensation, allowances, or benefits in kind from cover activities for the period 1961 - 1969.

3. In view of the above certification, it is not necessary to amend BENADUM's contract to provide for retention of earned cover income in accordance with HN 20-32.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/Contracts:WSRenehan:ad (9 June 1969)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANT
CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SECTION A — STATUS OF EMPLOYEE

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER ([illegible])	2. NAME OF EMPLOYEE [illegible], [illegible] R.	3. DATE OF BIRTH [illegible]	4. SEX	5. CATEGORY Career Agent
6. CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL TITLE Operations Officer	7. GRADE GS-15 [illegible]	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WH		
9. LOCATION OF ASSIGNMENT ☐ HEADQUARTERS ☐ U.S. FIELD ☐ FOREIGN FIELD		10. LONGEVITY COMPUTATION DATE 30 October 19[illegible]		11. SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE [illegible] October 19[illegible]

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE OF QUALIFYING SERVICE

1. Has this employee completed any qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", list periods of such service below

INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) MONTH/DAY/YR	MONTH/DAY/YR	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED (City-Country or State)	PCS	TDY	TOTAL TIME MONTHS	DAYS
Oct. 30 '60	present	Operations Officer	Mexico City	x			

2. Is this employee currently performing qualifying service? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes", complete the following:

BEGIN DATE	END DATE	OCCUPATIONAL TITLE	LOCATION	PCS	TDY	MONTHS	DAYS

3. If employee was assigned in the United States during any period of qualifying service listed above, describe his duties below, pointing out those conditions which meet the requirements of QUALIFYING SERVICE.

11 JUN 1969

4. Is this employee currently on official orders for a PCS assignment requiring the performance of qualifying service? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes", attach a certification to this effect.

5. CERTIFICATION - The information furnished above has been verified against official Agency records. Where no official record was available, a supporting statement is attached.

6. TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL	7. SIGNATURE	8. DATE

Continued on Reverse Side

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C STATUS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

(TO BE COMPLETED BY CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICIAL)

☒ Form 3101, Service Agreement, is attached.

☐ Because of temporary absence of the nominee, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be forwarded at a later date.

☐ (1) Nominee has over 15 years of Agency service or (2) nominee cannot be readily contacted to sign a Service Agreement. The signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" on file in the nominee's Official Personnel Folder should be accepted in lieu of Form 3101, Service Agreement.

☐ Nominee is overseas and a signed "Application for Membership in the Career Staff of the CIA" is NOT filed in his Official Personnel Folder, Form 3101, Service Agreement, will be requested from the field upon notification that the CIA Retirement Board has recommended approval of his nomination.

SECTION D RECOMMENDATION OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE

1. Based on his career assignment and past and prospective performance of qualifying service, this employee is recommended for designation as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. He is serving in a career field which normally requires the performance of qualifying service as an integral part of a career in that field.

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF CAREER SERVICE	4. DATE

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION OF CIA RETIREMENT BOARD

1. The record of this employee has been reviewed and the CIA RETIREMENT BOARD has recommended on ____________ (DATE) that this employee

☐ be designated as a participant in the CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

☐ NOT be designated as a participant

2. TYPED NAME AND TITLE	3. SIGNATURE	4. DATE

SECTION F DETERMINATION BY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

1. In accordance with Regulation 20-50, this employee is ☐ DESIGNATED ☐ NOT designated a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.	2. SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	3. DATE

SECTION G ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

I certify that the information in Section [illegible] is correct to the best of my knowledge.

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LITEMPO/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Agent Evaluation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. HMMA-32877, 28 August 1967
B. DIRECTOR-99663

1. In accordance with the request made in Reference B, the following is an up-dated Agent Evaluation on Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent and outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project. This evaluation should be considered in conjunction with Reference A, which is still valid and more extensive.

2. BENADUM continues to perform as the Outside Case Officer for the LITEMPO Project in a professional and efficient manner. The relationships he has developed with persons of all-levels within the Mexican Government and especially the Mexican Security Service allow him to obtain information of great interest to WOFIRM which might otherwise be unavailable. For example, via LITEMPO-12, Chief of a special investigative unit, the Station receives carbon copies of the reports prepared by the group. BENADUM also is able to ask this group to conduct investigations or provide file checks on persons of interest to the Station.

Continued.....

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-37320

DATE
10 June 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-287227

3. BENADUM was able to establish a system whereby persons of interest to FOFIRM residing in PBRUMEN may obtain Mexican entry visas without the long delay usually required.

4. BENADUM writes well and has improved considerably in providing information he obtains from his contacts in written form. Usually, the reports he submits need little editing in order to be processed for dissemination.

5. This Officer speaks fluent Spanish which enables him to communicate with the persons with whom he meets in a free and easy manner. This ability certainly has assisted BENADUM in establishing the rapport and confidence so necessary in working with Latins, especially those working for the host government.

6. BENADUM presents no overriding handling problems for his Station Case Officer. He is willing to work long hours, reports promptly and does a good job in submitting his monthly accountings. Based upon the Regular Fitness Report system, this Officer could be rated as STRONG in judging his performance.

7. BENADUM is the only other Station Officer besides the COS who has good and ready access to various personages within the Mexican Government. With the departure of Willard C. CURTIS, the value of BENADUM to the Station should not be underestimated.

8. BENADUM was shown this evaluation in draft form.

Willard C. CURTIS

IG: JHMartin
NIT: WH/Contracts
T: 4460
ATE: 4 June 1969

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 5

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ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. OP2 CI/A CSPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT 05 20 45z JUN 69 CITE DIRECTOR 08720

MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REF: MEXICO CITY 0421 (IN 68828)

1. APPROVE JEREMY K. BENADUM Cont Agt CONTINUING IN ~~[illegible]~~ CAREER AGENT JM STATUS UNTIL 31 OCTOBER 1970.

2. PROCESSING REQUEST FOR BENADUM ACCEPTANCE INTO WOFIRM RETIREMENT PROGRAM WITH RETIREMENT DATE EFFECTIVE 31 OCT 70. WILL ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-287227

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: Concerning Jeremy K. BENADUM, HMMT-9712 had as attachments statement claiming no income from cover jobs.

COORD: C/WH/1 E.J. Tichelaar

Mr. James B. Noland

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

JMartin
WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION
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INFO
FILE, VR, C/CCS 2, C/CSPS, DDP

451

S E C R E T 041610Z JUNE 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0486 4 JUN 69 IN 73313

d/

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

REF: MEXICO CITY 0421 (IN 68828)

5 JUN 1969

REQUEST ANSWER REFERENCE BY COB 6 JUNE AS BENADUM NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE JOB COMITMENTS TO PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYER.

JM

S E C R E T

Answered 6/5/69
Ref Mexico 0431
JM

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, clCS2 clCSPS, Plop

728

S E C R E T 290032Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0421 29 MAY 69 IN 68828

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

REFS: A. CONVERSATIONS COS MEXICO CITY HAD WITH HQS REPS 26-27 MAY

B. HMMT 9712

C. HMMT 9753

1. CONCERNING JEREMY K BENADUM REFERENCE B HAD AS ATTACHMENTS STATEMENT CLAIMING NO REPEAT NO INCOME FROM COVER JOBS.

2. REFERENCE C DATED 28 MAY 1969 HAS FOLLOWING ATTACHMENTS:

A. "SERVICE AGREEMENT" FORM SIGNED BY BENADUM

AND B. MEMORANDUM FROM BENADUM REQUESTING EFFECTIVE DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT BE 31 OCTOBER 1970 (IN ORDER TO GIVE NEW COS TIME TO BUILD RELATIONSHIPS WITH LITEMPOS AND TO GIVE BENADUM TEN YEARS OF SERVICE IN WOFIRM AND MAKE ~~T~~ HIM ELIGIBLE FOR WOFIRM RETIREMENT).

3. REQUEST CABLED REPLY SINCE IF BENADUM TO BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 1969 HE MUST FIRM UP OTHER EMPLOYMENT.

S E C R E T

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

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SECRET/RYBAT

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM - Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMT-9712 dated 16 May 1969

1. Reference is made to conversations COS, Mexico City, had at Headquarters on 26 May and 27 May 1969 concerning the postponement of the effective date of retirement of Jeremy K. BENADUM until 31 October 1970 in order:

a). To enable BENADUM to acquire eligibility for WOFIRM retirement; and,

b). To give the new COS, Mexico City, time to build up relationships with the LITEMPOs (the LITEMPO Project) with whom BENADUM now has excellent, close and long-standing relationships.

2. Headquarters suggested that:

a). BENADUM sign the regular "Service Agreement" form by which he requests that he become a member of the WOFIRM "Organization Retirement and Disability System"; and, that

b). BENADUM write a memorandum requesting that his date of retirement be postponed from 30 June 1969 until 31 October 1970.

3. These two forms are attached, in the original and one copy each.

4. It is requested that, after receipt and study of the attachments and the attachments sent with reference, Headquarters cable Mexico City and advise whether or not BENADUM is now to be assured that his retirement date is 31 October 1970.

Willard C. Curtis

Attachments: Herewith
Distribution:
3 - C/WHD w/atts.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMT-9753	DATE 28 May 1969
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, C/NIS/BG, C/CCS 2, C/CS/2, C/KSD, C/CI, C/FI 2, D/OT

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SECRET 130120Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0200

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN LITEMPO

13 MAY 69 IN 56608

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99663

B. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 53312)

1. AT TIME PROJECT LITEMPO SUBMITTED FOR RENEWAL IT NOT KNOWN THAT CURTIS RETIRING AS OF 30 JUNE 69. IT STATION'S OPINION THAT IF CURTIS AND BENADUM LEAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY (1 JULY 69), PROBERT WILL LACK TIME TO BUILD-UP RELATIONSHIP WHICH BENADUM HAS HAD FOR SOME TWENTY YEARS AND CURTIS FOR TWELVE YEARS WITH THIS VERY IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SOURCE (AROUND FORTY PERCENT OF STATION POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND HALF CI/CE PRODUCTION) AND SUPPORT PROJECT. ALSO, SINCE CURTIS AND BENADUM ARE ONLY TWO WELL KNOWN TO LITEMPOS, THEIR JOINT DEPARTURE COULD BE MIS-INTERPRETED AND THEREBY DAMAGING TO THE STATON.

2. FELL CURTIS DEPARTURE CHANGES PICTURE SUFFICIENTLY TO WARRANT AMENDMENT TO LITEMPO PROJECT TO ALLOW FOR RETENTION BENADUM.

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0200 SECRET

3. ON OTHER HAND, STATION CONCERNED WITH TOTAL COSTS OF PROJECT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE STATION IF IT POSSIBLE TO AMEND BENADUM CONTRACT WHICH WOULD KEEP HIM AS CAREER AGENT, BUT AT SALARY IN HAND (AFTER RETIREMENT, FEGLI, TAX ETC.) OF ABOUT $15,000.00 PER ANNUM. POV ALLOWANCE OF $600 PER ANNUM AND NO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, BUT WITH RIGHT ACCEPT OTHER PART-TIME

LO
EMPOLYMENT.

4. IF ABOVE POSSIBLE, WILL DISCUSS WITH BENADUM.

5. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

SECRET

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCE : Audit Staff Memo, Dated 17 March 1969,
Subject: Clarification of Cover Income
Status of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM may be receiving cover income, and requested a review be made to determine whether he should be refunding such income and whether his contract should be amended in accordance with FN 20-32.

2. The Mexico City Station has been requested to:

a. Forward Cover Earnings Reports for 1968 without delay.

b. If reports for previous years not readily available, BENADUM is to prepare and provide the Station for transmittal within a reasonable period.

c. If BENADUM has received cover earnings which have not been offset against his contract compensation, forward recommendations on amending his contract to provide retention if cover earnings in accordance with FN 20-32.

3. Upon receipt from Mexico of the requested information, the Division will take appropriate action.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Audit Staff
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - OP/CPD
1 - O/Fin
1 - O/IG

SECRET

28 May 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM - Request for Retirement

1. I herewith request that the effective date of my retirement be set as of 31 October 1970 instead of 30 June 1969.

2. This request is based primarily upon my desire to complete ten years of service in the Agency as is required by law in order to be eligible for Agency Retirement instead of being retired under Civil Services Statutes.

3. Secondly, however, I believe that by remaining in my present position until 31 October 1970 I can assure a better turn-over of contacts I have with a great deal less loss to the Agency.

4. I should appreciate a reply as soon as possible, since if my proposal is not accepted, I shall plan to accept other employment on 1 July 1969.

Jeremy K. Benadum

Jeremy K. BENADUM

SECRET

S E C R E T

SERVICE AGREEMENT

I understand that in order to qualify for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System, an employee must have signed a written obligation to serve anywhere and at any time according to the needs of the Organization in addition to meeting other specified criteria.

I hereby declare my intent to comply with this requirement as a condition to my being considered for designation as a participant in the Organization Retirement and Disability System.

In making this declaration, it is understood that the Organization will consider my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances.

Jeremy K. [illegible]
Signature

28 May, 1969
Date

S E C R E T

DISPATCH

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RYBAT

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XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMIN/PERS/Jeremy K. BENADUM - Forwarding of Documents

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCES : A. DIRECTOR-99663
B. HMMT-9686

1. In compliance with Reference A, forwarded herewith are the following:

a. Para 4c - Copy of Station memorandum to BENADUM.

b. Para 6a - BENADUM's certification regarding cover earnings for the period 15 March 1961 through 30 April 1969.

BENADUM's statement requested by paragraph 4c of Reference A was forwarded to Headquarters by Reference B.

2. As requested by paragraph 5b of Reference A, BENADUM's completed Form SF-144 is forwarded Under Separate Cover.

for/Willard C. CURTIS

Attachments:
1 - Station memo, h/w
2 - BENADUM Certification, h/w
3 - SF-144, U.S.C.

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - Chief, WHD, w/atts 1, 2, 3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-9712

DATE
16 May 1969

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
RYBAT

HQS FILE NUMBER

H/W ATTACHMENT #1 TO: H[illegible]T-5712, 1 MAY 1969

7 April 1969

SUBJECT: Retirement

1. Reference is made to our conversations concerning the possibility of your retirement from our service.

2. I discussed this matter, along with all other personnel matters, while in Washington in March 1969; and the authorities indicated that they would like your retirement to become effective on 30 June 1969.

3. For your information, a drive is on to have officers over fifty years of age take advantage of the early retirement program, in order to:

a. Allow younger officers to move into active operational assignments;

b. Reduce expenses, by getting rid of the higher ranking (older) officers;

and

c. Put the early retirement program into effective use and make it customary for fifty year old officers to retire.

4. In order to carry out your retirement, I would appreciate it if you would submit your letter confirming that you are in accord with this plan to place you on retired status.

5. You should plan to dispose of the Government owned vehicle on or near your retirement date. As you know, this is accomplished by obtaining at least three bids, which you should report in writing, and then by selling to the highest bidder. Also, any contract on rental of the office-apartment you use which involves this office should be ended.

6. I regret that you will be unable to take home leave at Government expense; but regulations prohibit the payment of home leave expenses for persons within two years of effective retirement date.

[illegible]

7. The amount of your annual annuity, the pay allowable for your accumulated annual leave and other data relative to your retirement will be discussed in memoranda to follow.

8. I am in the same "boat" with you on several of the above items, if that is of any comfort.

9. Please sign this memorandum and return it to me.

Contents noted memorandum will be forwarded —

JKB

CERTIFICATION

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT COMPENSATION, ALLOWANCES OR BENEFITS IN KIND FROM THE UNDERSIGNED'S COVER ACTIVITIES COVERING THE PERIOD 15 MARCH 1961 THROUGH 30 APRIL 1969 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

CALENDAR YEAR 1961 - None

1962 - None

1963 - None

1964 - None

1965 - None

1966 - None

1967 - None

1968 - None

1969 - None (1 Jan-30 April 1969)

Jeremy K. Benadum 13 May, 1969.

JEREMY K. BENADUM (DATE)

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 130120Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0200

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN LITEMPO

608

13 MAY 69 IN 56608

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 99663

B. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 53332)

1. AT TIME PROJECT LITEMPO SUBMITTED FOR RENEWAL IT NOT KNOWN THAT CURTIS RETIRING AS OF 30 JUNE 69. IT STATION'S OPINION THAT IF CURTIS AND BENADUM LEAVE SIMULTANEOUSLY (1 JULY 69), PROBERT WILL LACK TIME TO BUILD-UP RELATIONSHIP WHICH BENADUM HAS HAD FOR SOME TWENTY YEARS AND CURTIS FOR TWELVE YEARS WITH THIS VERY IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE SOURCE (AROUND FORTY PERCENT OF STATION POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND HALF CI/CE PRODUCTION) AND SUPPORT PROJECT. ALSO, SINCE CURTIS AND BENADUM ARE ONLY TWO WELL KNOWN TO LITEMPOS, THEIR JOINT DEPARTURE COULD BE MIS-INTERPRETED AND THEREBY DAMAGING TO THE STATON.

2. FEEL CURTIS DEPARTURE CHANGES PICTURE SUFFICIENTLY TO WARRANT AMENDMENT TO LITEMPO PROJECT TO ALLOW FOR RETENTION BENADUM.

[illegible]

May 13 [illegible]

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0200 S E C R E T

3. ON OTHER HAND, STATION CONCERNED WITH TOTAL COSTS OF PROJECT. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS ADVISE STATION IF IT POSSIBLE TO AMEND BENADUM CONTRACT WHICH WOULD KEEP HIM AS CAREER AGENT, BUT AT SALARY IN HAND (AFTER RETIREMENT, FEGLI, TAX ETC.) OF ABOUT $15,000.00 PER ANNUM. POV ALLOWANCE OF $600 PER ANNUM AND NO ADDITIONAL BENEFITS, BUT WITH RIGHT ACCEPT OTHER PART-TIME
LO
EMPOLYMENT.

4. IF ABOVE POSSIBLE, WILL DISCUSS WITH BENADUM.

5. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

May 13 - Per Payroll

S E C R E T

Currently GS-15⁶ 23,075 (Gets paid in Field)

Every four weeks　gross $1,774.40

Deductions

Retirement	115.34
Tax	456.75
FEGLI	14.30
Optional FEGLI	12.00
Hosp.	18.78
Contrib. Life	12.00
Total Deduct.	629.17

Net $1,145.23 x 13 per year

= $14,887.99

Gets paid in field
Gets standard 3900
400
4300

[illegible]

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O: Renehan/Tsikerdanos
IT: WH/Contracts
: 4460
TE: 7 May 1969

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET/RYBAT 07 19 44Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116) RYBAT

B. HMMA-36678

C. DIRECTOR 84074 RYBAT

1. IN VIEW OF SERVICE PERFORMED BY BENADUM IN THE EARLY 1960'S AND HIS ASSISTANCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH LIRAMA AND LITEMPOS, HQS WISHES TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO ENSURE AN EQUITABLE DECISION REGARDING BENADUM'S FUTURE. AS STATION WILL RECOGNIZE, REF A WHICH FOLLOWED REF B (THE PROJECT RENEWAL WHICH ABOLISHED THE POSITION HELD BY BENADUM IN MEXICO) AND FACT HQS HAS NO OTHER CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES IN MEXICO LIMITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. AT PRESENT THERE APPEARS TWO COURSES OF ACTION OPEN:

A. TRANSFER ELSEWHERE AS A CAREER AGENT; OR

B. "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" AS NOTED IN REF C SINCE BENADUM DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR WOFIRM RETIREMENT UNTIL OCTOBER 1970.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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______ PER ______ # ______

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CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 2

2. HQS BELIEVES IT BEST FOR WOFIRM AND STATION TO NOW COME TO AN AMICABLE PARTING OF THE WAY AND THEREFORE REQUESTS CURTIS' FRANK APPRAISAL OF WHAT EFFECT THE INVOLUNTARY AND POSSIBLY DISGRUNTLED RETIREMENT BENADUM WOULD HAVE ON JOHN A. PROBERT'S FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE LITEMPOS. HQS FEELS THAT THESE RELATIONSHIPS WITH WOFIRM HAVE SOLIDIFIED TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PLANS OUTLINED IN REF B ARE AN EXCELLENT MEANS OF HANDLING THESE CONTACTS.

3. HQS ALSO FEELS THAT THE DECISION REGARDING BENADUM SHOULD BE MADE PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF PROBERT AND ALL NECESSARY STEPS BE TAKEN TO EXPEDITE THIS. ACCORDINGLY, CURTIS' COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE MOST APPRECIATED.

4. IN EVENT BENADUM ELECTS TRANSFER AS CAREER AGENT ELSEWHERE HQS NEEDS FOLLOWING:

A. HAVE BENADUM COMPLETE PRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

(CONTINUED)

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. ______

FILE, VR.

(classification)
SECRET/RYBAT

(date and time filed)

(elite) (reference number) (pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 3

B. IN ANY EVENT REQUEST COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS. SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

C. REQUEST STATION FWD COPY MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

5. IN EVENT BENADUM PREFERS TO RETIRE NOW RATHER THAN BE CONSIDERED FOR REASSIGNMENT, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ON BASIS JOB ABOLISHMENT.

A. RELATED REGULATIONS PROVIDE AN EMPLOYEE WHO IS INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED IS ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE ANNUITY WHEN, REGARDLESS OF AGE, HAS COMPLETED 25 YEARS OF CREDITABLE SERVICE.

B. REQUEST BENADUM'S COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE AND MILITARY SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

C. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR

(CONTINUED)

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CITE DIRECTOR 97663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 4

CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING CURRENT LEAVE YEAR, WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM CARRYOVER INTO 1969 WAS 560 HOURS.

D. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

6. RECENT AUDIT REPORT POINTED OUT THAT BENADUM'S COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF HIS CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HE HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

END OF MESSAGE

8
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CITE DIRECTOR 99663

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 5

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD: CSAP
D/OP H.B. Fisher
C/WH/SS
C/WH/1

William V. Broe
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. KENEHAN
C/WH CONTRACTS

RELEASING OFFICER

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

SUBJECT : Jeremy K. BENADUM, Cover Income

REFERENCE : Audit Staff Memo, Dated 17 March 1969, Subject: Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent, Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. Reference indicated Jeremy K. BENADUM may be receiving cover income, and requested a review be made to determine whether he should be refunding such income and whether his contract should be amended in accordance with FN 20-32.

2. The Mexico City Station has been requested to:

a. Forward Cover Earnings Reports for 1968 without delay.

b. If reports for previous years not readily available, BENADUM is to prepare and provide the Station for transmittal within a reasonable period.

c. If BENADUM has received cover earnings which have not been offset against his contract compensation, forward recommendations on amending his contract to provide retention of cover earnings in accordance with FN 20-32.

3. Upon receipt from Mexico of the requested information, the Division will take appropriate action.

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/Audit Staff
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - CI/CPD
1 - C/Fin
1 - C/IG
1 - [illegible]
[illegible]

WSRonehan
WH/Contracts
4460
2 May 1969

SECRET

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

ADMIN CONTRACTS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNFORTUNATELY HQS ASSUMED ON RECEIPT OF REF B THAT BENADUM QUALIFIED FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THE WOFIRM RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM. HOWEVER, AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW IT WAS NOTED THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED TEN RPT TEN YEARS SERVICE WITH WOFIRM AND RETIREMENT WOULD NECESSARILY BE UNDER CIVIL SERVICE. BENADUM, AS CITED PARA 2 REF A, IS CORRECT IN THAT RETIREMENT THUS WOULD BE INVOLUNTARY. IN RETROSPECT THE STATION HAD NO AUTHORIZATION TO INFORM BENADUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE, UNLESS STATION MEMO TO BENADUM CONCERNING HIS RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT TO THE ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION WITH THE REDUCTION OF THE LITEMPO PROJECT AND SINCE THE STATION HAD NO OTHER REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES HE MIGHT PREFER CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER ELSEWHERE AS A CAREER AGENT. REQUEST STATION FORWARD COPY MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY   PAGE 2

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 3

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM:

A. ALTHOUGH AGREE THAT SHOULD HE WANT TO RETIRE, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ROUTE CONSIDERING HE MAY PREFER RETIREMENT TO REASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HIS COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS

(CONTINUED)

SECRET/RYBAT

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY PAGE 4

INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD:
C/WH/1
CSAP
D/OP
C/WH/S3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WILLIAM S. RENEHAN
C/WH/CONTRACTS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T
RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM/Retirement

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For Your Information

REFERENCE : MEXICO CITY-0023, 29 April 1969

Forwarded herewith in original and a signed carbon is the 24 April 1969 memorandum written by Jeremy K. BENADUM and mentioned in Reference.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated, h/w

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-9686	30 April 1969
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-287227

Mexico, D.F.

24 April, 1969

SUBJECT: Involuntary Retirement

1. A desk officer from Headquarters visited the Mexico City Station during mid-November, 1968. While here, the visiting officer talked with the writer for approximately one hour regarding the operation of the Litempo project and writer's plans for the future. The following points were discussed:

(a) The fact that the project was considered to be an important and successful one.

(b) Writer was specifically asked if he had any plans for an early retirement. Writer replied in the negative. The visiting officer indicated complete satisfaction with writer's desire to continue in the service, and noted that it would be particularly important in view of the upcoming change of Mexican administrations in December, 1970, and the necessity of keeping the project functioning at its current level of effectiveness.

(c) When the visiting officer asked whether the writer had ever visited Headquarters during his career with the service, and found that he had not done so, the officer asked whether writer could arrange to visit Headquarters for a week or ten days during his next home leave, which would take place in August, 1969. Writer indicated that he would be most pleased to do so.

2. Based on the foregoing, writer made plans to proceed to the United States on home leave in early August, 1969, to return in mid-September, 1969. Since such matters cannot be handled on short notice, writer has already rented a house in San Francisco, California for the period in question.

3. This is where matters stood, when, on 7 April, last, writer was advised that he would be retired, effective 30 June, 1969, in accordance with various changes of policy. He was also asked to confirm in writing that he is in accord with the plan to place him on retired status as of 30 June, next.

4. While the reasoning behind what appears to be a complete reversal of policy, vis-a-vis the writer, may be crystal clear to the responsible officials at Headquarters, writer is at a complete loss to understand.

For the writer to indicate his agreement with a plan which appears to him to be arbitrary, short-sighted and irrational, would be completely out of character for a person who has spent almost thirty years in the intelligence field, and has a justifiable pride in his status as a professional intelligence officer. As a professional, writer also realizes when the handwriting, however illegible it might be, is on the wall, and, that if the decision has already been made to retire him involuntarily, then retired he will be --- involuntarily. Little as it may matter, writer desires to emphasize that nothing in this memorandum should be construed to indicate writer's personal accord or approval.

5. According to writer's records, as of 30 June, next, he will have completed the following government service:

	Yrs.	Mos.	Days
(a) Military: 2nd. Lt., 30th U.S. Infantry; Presidio, San Francisco, 26 Oct., 1939 to 31 July, 1940..................		9	6
(b) Special Agent, 12 Aug., 1940 to 31 October, 1960.....	20	2	18
(c) Career Agent, 1 Nov., 1960 to 30 June, 1969........	8	8	
(d) Accumulated A/L as of 30 June, 1969, - 656 hrs.		3	22
Total Service	29	11	16

Writer desires to complete thirty years' service, and requests that the effective date for his involuntary retirement be set accordingly.

6. Home Leave: While writer readily understands the rationale of a ruling preventing the taking of home leave at government expense within two years of voluntary retirement, he does not see that the interests of fairness, justice or decency are being served in attempting to apply the same ruling to writer's involuntary retirement. As a matter of possible historical interest, writer desires to point out that, when he joined the service in 1960, he voluntarily gave up the home leave which he had earned with the (3 years). Writer has

taken home leave in 1962, 1964 and 1966, in accordance with regulations. In line with what appeared to be Agency policy as of November, 1968, writer has made plans for home leave from 5 August to 15 September, 1969. Writer feels most strongly that he and his family should be allowed to take this leave at government expense.

7. Future of Project: Writer would be less than candid if he did not point out that the present success of the project is owing in large measure to contacts which writer has developed over an eighteen year period. The precipitous forced retirement of writer will preclude an orderly and intelligent period of transition, with a concomitant loss of effectiveness. Even though he is being retired, writer is still interested in preserving the results of his work in México, which writer regards as being of continuing importance to our country.

8. In conclusion, writer wishes to state that he has thoroughly enjoyed his association with the Agency during the past nine years, and is proud of his part in the accomplishments of the México City Station. Owing to the nature of writer's position, his personal contacts have been largely limited to the personnel of the Station here. The writer has the highest professional and personal regard for the Chief of Station, with whom he has been privileged to serve, as well as the highly competent case officers who have worked with writer on the project.

It is a source of great satisfaction and pride to the writer to have known and worked with a truly great American, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, whom the "San Francisco Chronicle" (generally a hostile critic of the Agency) described posthumously as "...The most creative, powerful and eminent U.S. intelligence officer of modern times". And, as one's career comes to a close, the words of President Nixon, in describing Mr. Dulles' great contribution to his country, have a very particular significance: "...In the nature of his task, his achievements were known to only a few. But, because of him, the world is a safer place today".

[illegible]4116

George F. Munro
GS-15/6 step
21469

(DATE)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr Fisher		
2	C/CPD	[illegible] MAY [illegible]	
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☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

According to Charlie Redmond, this is not as big a problem as it appears. Redmond alleges that COS could have handled better. Redmond is on top of it and will lets us know if anything serious develops. BobF

Will wait to hear further

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S E C R E T 291907Z APR 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 2023

DIRECTOR

RYBAT ADMIN PERS

29 APR 69 IN 47116

4

REF HMMA-36678

1. AS INDICATED IN REFERENCE AND DISCUSSED BY THE COS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS, STATION PLANNED ASK JEREMY K. BENADUM, CAREER AGENT AND OUTSIDE CASE OFFICER FOR LITEMPO PROJECT, TO RETIRE FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE 69. THIS WAS DONE IN WRITING ON 7 APRIL 69.

2. BENADUM HAS WRITTEN MEMORANDUM DATED 24 APRIL 69 IN WHICH HE INDICATES THAT HE DOES NOT DESIRE TO RETIRE AND THAT ANY ACTION ALONG THESE LINES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "INVOLUNTARY" ON HIS PART. JKB ALSO INDICATED THAT WITH ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE HE WILL LACK ABOUT MONTH IN COMPLETING FULL 30 YEARS SERVICE AS OF 30 JUNE AND ASKED THAT HE BE KEPT ON BOARD UNTIL FULL 30 YEARS ARE COMPLETED.

3. JKB REQUESTS THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO TAKE HOME LEAVE AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE. HE INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH REGULATION ABOUT NO HOME LEAVE WITHIN TWO YEARS OF VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT BUT SAID THAT HE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS WHEN RETIREMENT

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 0023 SECRET

IS "INVOLUNTARY", THE STATION WISHES TO INDICATE THAT JKB WAS REFUSED NORMAL HOME LEAVE DURING THE SUMMER OF 68 BECAUSE OF STUDENT PROBLEMS.

4. THE STATION REQUESTS THAT FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ITEMS MENTIONED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.

5. JKB HAS INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO REMAIN ACTIVE ON CONTRACT BASIS. THE STATION BELIEVES THAT CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT COULD ACCURE BY RETAINING JKB. PLS ADVISE IF HEADQUARTERS IS INTERESTED IN CONTRACTING JKB AND CONDITIONS SO THAT THEY MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM. (HE WANTS 15,000 PER ANNUM PLUS 50.00 PER MONTH FOR USE OF POV.)

6. POUCHING COPIES OF MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY JKB WHICH IS DATED 24 APRIL 69.

7. FILES NONE.

SECRET

SECRET

T4-00000

STANDARD FORM 144
Rev. August 1968
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supp. 296-31

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

IMPORTANT: This form is used only to establish creditability of service, which is otherwise not verified in the Official Personnel Folder, for leave and reduction in force purposes. The employee will complete Part I and the Personnel Office Parts II and III. When this form is used as a cumulative record or the employee's affidavit is used in the absence of a verified record, it must be filed on the right side of the Official Personnel Folder.

PART I— EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT.

1. NAME (Last, first, initial) ☑ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss

✓ MUNRO, GEORGE F.

2. BIRTH DATE (Mo., day, yr.)

✓ 8/24/15

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT ANY CLAIMED FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED (Do not include military service.) IF ANY OF THIS SERVICE WAS PART-TIME, WAE, OR INTERMITTENT, NOTE THIS UNDER "TYPE OF APPOINTMENT."

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM			TO			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT (If known)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
✓ FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	40	8	12	60	10	31	SPECIAL AGENT
CIA	60	11	1	PRESENT			CAREER AGENT

S.C.D. 7 NOV. 3
(Per [illegible])
(CPD)
(per OTS/AA 6/10/69)

4. LIST PERIODS OF ANY CLAIMED ACTIVE SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING ACTIVE DUTY AS A RESERVIST, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN VERIFIED. (Also list Merchant Marine service, if it interrupted service shown in Item 3.)

BRANCH	FROM			TO			DISCHARGE (Hon. or Dishon.)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
✓ US ARMY (2nd. Lt., 30th U.S. Inf., Presidio, San Francisco, California)	39	10	25	40	7	31	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? (If YES, list following information.) ☐ YES ☒ NO

TYPE IF KNOWN (L.W.O.P., Furl., Susp., A.W.O.L.)	FROM			TO			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
✓ No									

6. DO YOU CLAIM ANY TYPE OF VETERAN PREFERENCE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN VERIFIED? ☐ Yes ☒ No If "Yes," check one of the following statements if it applies to you:
✓
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN.
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN.
☐ I CLAIM PREFERENCE AS THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN.

7. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: ✓ 13 May, 1969.

✓ ______________________ (Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me on this ______ day of ______________ 19____ at ______________ (Month) (City) (State)

SEAL

NOTE. If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission must be shown.

144-101

SECRET

CABLE DRAFT #2 1 May 1969

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

RYBAT ADMIN CONTRACTS LITEMPO

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNLESS STATION MEMO TO JEREMY K. BENADUM CONCERNING RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT THAT DUE TO REDUCTION OF LITEMPO PROJECT AND THUS ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION AND AS NO OTHER STATION REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES, HE MIGHT PREFER CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER, STATION HAD ~~NOT BEEN~~ NO [illegible] AUTHORIZED TO INFORM BENADUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE. BENADUM DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR RETIREMENT UNDER WOFIRM RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM AS DOES NOT HAVE REQUIRED TEN RPT TEN YEARS SERVICE WITH ORGANIZATION AND RETIREMENT WOULD BE UNDER CIVIL SERVICE. BENADUM, AS CITED PARA 2 REF A, IS CORRECT IN THAT RETIREMENT WOULD BE INVOLUNTARY. REQUEST FORWARD COPY STATION MEMO OF 7 APRIL TO BENADUM WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

SECRET

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM:

A. ALTHOUGH AGREE THAT SHOULD HE WANT TO RETIRE, THE ONLY METHOD IS THROUGH "DISCONTINUED SERVICE" ROUTE CONSIDERING HE MAY PREFER RETIREMENT TO REASSIGNMENT. REQUEST HIS COMMENTS AND, IN ANY EVENT, COMPLETE SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

SECRET

C. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

D. CURRENT POLICY EMPLOYMENT OF WOFIRM ANNUITANTS PRECLUDES REEMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACT EXCEPT DUE TO CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE FULFILLED. THIS NOT APPLICABLE MEXICO AS HQS NOT AWARE ANY SUCH REQUIREMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD:

C/WH/1

CSPS

C/WH/SS

D/OP

Route [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

TRICRIM

DRAFT 1 May 1969

CABLE TO MEXICO CITY

RYBAT ADMIN CONTRACTS LITEMPO

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0023 (IN 47116)
B. HMMA-36678

1. UNLESS STATION MEMO TO JEREMY K. BENADUM CONCERNING RETIREMENT WAS IN CONTEXT THAT DUE TO REDUCTION OF LITEMPO PROJECT
AND THAT ABOLISHMENT OF HIS POSITION
AND NO OTHER STATION REQUIREMENT FOR HIS SERVICES, HE MIGHT PREFER
CONSIDER "DISCONTINUED SERVICE RETIREMENT" RATHER THAN TRANSFER
TO ~~RETIRE RATHER THAN TRANSFER~~, STATION HAD NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM BENEDUM HE WOULD BE RETIRED EFFECTIVE 30 JUNE. REQUEST FORWARD COPY STATION MEMO OF 7 APRIL WITH BENADUM'S MEMO OF 24 APRIL.

2. IN VIEW REFS, UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY OR WHERE BENADUM COULD BE USED AS STATION SUGGESTS IN PARA 5 REF A AS CONTRACT AGENT WHICH APPEARS CONTRADICTORY TO NO REQUIREMENT FOR SERVICES AS CAREER AGENT.

3. AS STATION HAS NO APPARENT JOB COMMENSURATE WITH BENADUM'S GRADE LEVEL AND EXPERIENCE AND IN VIEW HIS LONG STAY MEXICO, HQS THEREFORE CONSIDERING BENADUM FOR REASSIGNMENT.

A. REQUEST STATION CONTACT BENADUM AND HAVE HIM COMPLETE FRQ SOONEST FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS. REASSIGNMENT PREFERENCES TO BE CABLED.

B. REQUEST STATION COMPLETE FITNESS REPORT FOR PAST YEAR ON BENADUM, HAVE HIM SIGN AND FORWARD HQS SOONEST. CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

SECRET

SECRET

4. RECENT AUDIT REPORT CALLED OUR ATTENTION THAT COVER EARNINGS REPORTS AS REQUIRED BY PARA 9 OF BENADUM'S CONTRACT HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED.

A. REQUEST REPORTS FOR 1968 BE FORWARDED WITHOUT DELAY AND CABLE TRANSMITTAL NUMBER.

B. IF REPORTS FOR PREVIOUS YEARS NOT READILY AVAILABLE, REQUEST BENADUM PREPARE AND PROVIDE STATION FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD.

C. IF HAS RECEIVED EARNINGS WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN OFFSET AGAINST CONTRACT COMPENSATION, REQUEST STATION RECOMMENDATIONS BY DISPATCH ON AMENDING CONTRACT TO PROVIDE RETENTION OF COVER EARNINGS ACCORDANCE FN 20-32.

5. REQUEST ADVISE BENADUM: ~~[illegible]~~

retirement

A. Although agree that should be permitted to retire, the only method is through ~~[illegible]~~ Discontinued Service rule. But considering he may prefer retirement to ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] reassignment, suggest his obtaining [illegible] and, in any event, Complete ~~HE NOT BEING INVOLUNTARILY RETIRED, IF HE DESIRES RETIRE, NECESSARY THAT HE SUBMIT MEMO REQUEST AND ALSO COMPLETE~~ SF-144 "STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE" FOR TRANSMITTAL HQS ASAP.

B. ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE NOT A FACTOR IN COMPUTING RETIREMENT AS INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES LUMP SUM PAYMENT FOR CURRENT BALANCE OR CARRYOVER AT BEGINNING OF LEAVE YEAR WHICHEVER LESSER. AVAILABLE RECORDS INDICATE BENADUM HAD CARRYOVER OF 560 HOURS.

C. ELIGIBILITY FOR HOME LEAVE CONTINGENT ON REASSIGNMENT.

D. CURRENT POLICY EMPLOYMENT OF WOFIRM ANNUITANTS PRECLUDES REEMPLOYMENT UNDER CONTRACT EXCEPT DUE TO CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD NOT OTHERWISE BE FULFILLED. THIS NOT APPLICABLE MEXICO [illegible] ~~DUE TO STATION REDUCTIONS~~.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

WH COMMENTS: A. Attached
B. Submitted Project Renewal

COORD: C/WH/1

CSPS

C/WH/SS

D/PERS

SECRET

SECRET

17 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM

1. During the recent audit of WH Division, we noted that, since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM has not submitted cover income reports. These reports are required every six months by BENADUM's contract. Office of Finance personnel informed us that, since his payroll file does not indicate that he is under a cover activity, they do not expect these reports to be submitted and therefore have not requested them. However, operational files in WH Division Mexico Branch indicate that BENADUM owns his own business in Mexico City, is a member of the Board of Directors of another business, and spends a portion of his duty hours on these businesses. Therefore, it appears that BENADUM may be receiving cover income which should be refunded in accordance with his contract. In addition, the question arises as to whether BENADUM's contract should contain the provision (similar to Douglas J. FREAPANE's contract) that he can retain only the first $2,000 a year company profits as provided in FN 20-32.

2. It is requested that a review be made to determine whether BENADUM should be refunding cover income and whether his contract should be amended as indicated. Please notify this office of the results of this review.

R. H. FUCHS
Chief, Audit Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - C/WH Div
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - OP/CPD
1 - O/Fin
1 - O/IG

SECRET

[illegible]

13 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Clarification of Cover Income Status of Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM
[redacted]

1. During the recent audit of WH Division, we noted that, since October 1961, Career Agent Jeremy K. BENADUM has not submitted cover income reports. These reports are required every six months by BENADUM's contract. Office of Finance personnel informed us that, since his payroll file does not indicate that he is under a cover activity, they do not expect these reports to be submitted and therefore have not requested them. However, operational files in WH Division Mexico Branch indicate that BENADUM owns his own business in Mexico City, is a member of the Board of Directors of another business, and spends a portion of his duty hours on these businesses. Therefore, it appears that BENADUM may be receiving cover income which should be refunded in accordance with his contract.

In addition, the question arises as to whether BENADUM's contract should contain the provision (similar to Douglas J. FREAPANE's contract) that he can retain only the first $2,000 a year company profits as provided in FM 20-32.

2. It is requested that a review be made to determine whether BENADUM should be refunding cover income and whether his contract should be amended as indicated. Please notify this office of the results of this review.

R. H. FUCHS
Chief, Audit Staff

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Ch/WH Div
1 - SSA/DDS
1 - OP/CPD
1 - O/Fin
1 - O/IG
1 - WH Div. File
1 - Hqtrs. Chrono File
1 - Follow-up

RTM:ps

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO ______ BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CCS4, CSPS, [redacted]

1		6
2		7
3		
4		
5		10

SECRET 252257Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8172

25 Nov 68 IN 41479

DIRECTOR

[illegible] M

LITEMPO

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM WILL BE ON ANNUAL LEAVE FROM 29 NOVEMBER THROUGH 12 DECEMBER 68. PLANS DEPART MEXICO CITY ON 29 NOV VIA WESTERN FLIGHT 604 TO SAN FRANCISCO AND RETURN MEXICO CITY VIA WESTERN FLIGHT 627 ON 12 DEC. WHILE IN SAN FRANCISCO CAN BE REACHED AT IDEN A OR B.

2. BENADUM PLANS HAVE COMPLETE PHYSICAL EXAM WHILE ON LEAVE.

3. FILE: 50-6-91/2; 201-287227

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ACTION
#5/5 WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO
FILE, VR, RI/AN, CCS2, CSPS, [redacted]

S E C R E T 252225Z NOV 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 8173

DIRECTOR

25 Nov 68 IN 41473

LITENFO

REF: MEXICO CITY 8172 (IN 41479)

1. IDENTITY A: MRS. KATHRYN COLLONAN (MOTHER-IN-LAW)
2090 PACIFIC AVE.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
TEL: 931-0942

IDENTITY B: MRS. MARGARET COOK (SISTER)
195 ATHERTTN AVE.
TEL: 326-2225

2. FILES: ~~[illegible]~~ 201-257727 50-6-91/2

S E C R E T

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

ORIG: PARRY BURTON
UNIT: FINANCE
EXT: 2125
DATE: 1 APRIL 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 25 PER ____ # ____

CONF: 0F2 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH 3, OP 1

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 4 00 36 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 88537

TO MEXICO CITY

DUE TO ELECTION OF OPTIONAL FEGLI EFF. 3/10/68, PAY JEREMY K. BENADUM AND T/A TO HEADQUARTERS A NET OF $1071.62 FOR PERIOD 3/10-4/6/68 AND EACH SUBSEQUENT PERIOD. SEE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND DEDUCTIONS FOR BREAKDOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

W H/contracts

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) BENADUM	(first) JEREMY	(middle) K.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) 1915	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY			LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB." THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

DATE

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

DUPLICATE COPY—for Agency Use

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/PERSONNEL
Transmittal of Forms SF 176-T

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Process Forms

REFERENCE: FN 20-86, dated 2 February 1968

Forwarded herewith are the forms for the below listed personnel:

Oliver R. BYNAM - given to Patty Van Dougan
Jeremy K. BENADUM
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Bruce H. FERNALD
Wallace B. ROWTON - given to Patty Van Dougan

TO DCD
3/15/68

FOR/Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENTS:
Forms SF 176-T (HEREWITH)

DISTRIBUTION:
~~3~~ 1 - Chief, WH Division w/atts (5)

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT-8787

DATE
29 February 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S E C R E T

Chief, WH Division

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Admin/Personnel - Fitness Reports for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Douglas J. FEINGLASS, and David M. WILSTED.

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only.

REFERENCE : HMMS-5749, dated 11 January 1968.

1. Agent Evaluation Reports have been forwarded for the subject personnel as follows:

NAME	DISPATCH NUMBER	DATE
Jeremy K. BENADUM	HMMA-32877	28 August 1967
Douglas J. FEINGLASS	HMMT-8356	3 October 1967
David M. WILSTED	HMMA-31976	10 May 1967

2. Unless advised to the contrary the Station will forward future Agent Evaluation Reports for FREARANE and BENADUM to reach Headquarters in September of each year and for WILSTED to reach Headquarters in May of each year.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

[illegible]

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD

HMMT-[illegible]

17 January [illegible]

S E C R E T

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960

1. Agency and organizational designation
DDP/WH

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary
$20,856

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:
I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
Jlv 10 Jan 68

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate
21Apr68	24 Apr 66	$20,856	$21,569

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following period): Period(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 6000 1126-105

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

[illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] Fitness Reports

Action Required: As noted

Headquarters has been conducting a review of Career Agent files and has noted that Fitness Reports have not been submitted for [illegible], [illegible], and [illegible] since December 196[illegible] or before.

STATION ACTION:

It is requested that a current FR for the above mentioned be submitted for Headquarters files.

Hugh G. [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

[illegible] - 5749

S E C R E T

Distribution:
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/1

WH/Contracts/[illegible]: lsr (4 January 196[illegible])

C/WH/1

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - Current Residence and Dependency Reports

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

Forwarded under separate cover are the current residence and dependency reports for Jeremy K. BENADUM, Douglas J. FREAPANE, and David M. WILSTED.

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachments:
As Stated Above, usc

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT - 8551	21 December 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) [redacted] (First) [redacted] (Middle)

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 101-38-0460

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY: México, D.F.

LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad): San Francisco, California

PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE: San Francisco, California

HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE: San Francisco, California

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: San Francisco, California

DATE OF MARRIAGE: 9-VII-45

IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:

DATE OF DECREE:

IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED:

DATE SPOUSE DIED:

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
Kathryn A. Munro	Calle Ojo de Agua 43, "La Hda."	65-24-36	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	**ADDRESS**	**SEX**	**DATE OF BIRTH**
Pamela Emily	" " " " " " "	F	7-XI-61
Margaret Mary	" " " " " " "	F	19-IX-59
George F. III (Cont.)	" " " " " " "	M	16-VIII-57
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
George F. Munro (Deceased)			
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	**ADDRESS**	**TELEPHONE NO.**	
Mrs. Emily Matthews	Santa Barbara, Calif. 1320 Mission Ridge Rd., ___.	(Area 805) 965-6146	

WHAT MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): MUNRO, KATHRYN AILEEN

RELATIONSHIP: Wife

HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Calle Ojo de Agua 43, Club de Golf "La Hacienda", Edo. de México.

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 65-24-36

BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: N/A

BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) [redacted] Yes — YES ☒ NO ☐

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) — YES ☒ NO ☐

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) — YES ☒ NO ☐

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of [illegible] personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate or [illegible] of matters. The information requested in [illegible] ion may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

[illegible] NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

Wells Fargo Bank, 464 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.

(Account in writer's name)

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE [illegible] CREDIT UNION? ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS? ☒ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

Mr. and Mrs. A.T. Cook, 195 Atherton Ave., Atherton, Calif. (326-2225)

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

3. (Cont.) Children:	Address:	Sex:	DOB
Elizabeth Marie	(Same as indicated for others)	F.	14-VII-51
Kathryn Joan	" " " " "	F.	6-III-50
Barbara Ann	Univ. of Santa Clara, Santa Clara, Calif. (during school yr.)	F.	17 IX-48

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
México, D.F.	18 Dec., 1967	

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, Mexico City

X

C/WH

BENADUM, Jeremy K., FREAPANE, Douglas J., and WILSTED, David M.

Action Required: As noted

The attached Form 61 should be completed in duplicate and true name by BENADUM, FREAPANE, AND WILSTED and forwarded to Hqs. It is important that the information contained on the form be filed in Hqs, therefore, rapid response would be appreciated.

Hugh E. WESTBY

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

HMMS - 5668

S E C R E T

Distribution:
1 - WH/Reg
1 - WH/Contracts
1 - WH/1

WH/Contracts/JRWillis: lsr (14 Nov 67)

4460

C/WH/1

SECRET

Date 19 October 1967

Memorandum For: Chief, Insurance Branch/BSD/CP

This is to advise you that Jeremy K. Benadum has been employed under an Agency personal services contract effective 25 September 1967. The Contract authorizes participation in Civil Service Retirement, FEGLI and Federal Health Insurance.

Subject's contract is the administrative responsibility of DDP/WH.

Dow H. Luetscher
Chief
Contract Personnel Division

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Insurance Branch

FROM : C/WH/CONTRACTS

SUBJECT : Applications for Health Insurance

The Employee Payroll numbers for the attached are as follows:

DOUGLAS J. FRRAPANE -------------131890
JEREMY K. BEHADUM -------------058895
DAVID H. WILSTED -------------915249

Re the above HMMT-8262 dated 18 Sept. 1967, which transmitted the attached applications, states: "All of the above Personnel have requested that their Dependents, as listed under their current contract employee type Health Insurance, be covered under the new Health Insurance for which they are applying."

Wm. Renehan

DDP/WH/Contracts/WSRenehan: jt (9 October 1967)

0 & 1 - Addressee
2 - WH/Contracts

S-E-C-R-E-T

MR. JERZY [illegible]

Dear Mr. [illegible]:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer of this organization, hereby contracts with you, as a ~~contract~~ Career Agent ~~employee~~ under the terms and conditions set forth below:

1. New Benefits. By virtue of your employment relationship under this agreement you are:

(a) Covered under the Civil Service Retirement Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. From the basic compensation paid you hereunder there shall be deducted the appropriate rate percentage (presently 6-1/2%) for deposit and eventual crediting to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. Social Security deductions required by virtue of your cover activities will not be reimbursed you by this organization.

(b) Covered under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization unless you execute a written waiver of such coverage. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost; you will bear the remainder.

(c) Eligible for coverage under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act in conformance with rules and regulations applicable to appointed employees of this organization. The Government is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Because of your eligibility under this Act (whether or not you choose to enroll), your coverage under the contract employees health program shall cease, thirty-one (31) days after the effective date of this agreement.

2. Your previous contract with the United States Government, effective [illegible] October [illegible], is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto.

3. All provisions of said previous contract not in conflict with this agreement are incorporated by reference into and made a part of this agreement.

S-E-C-R-E-T

4. This agreement is effective as of 25 November 1957 and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated as set forth in your previous contract. If this agreement becomes effective during an overseas assignment nothing contained herein shall be construed as extending that assignment beyond its originally contemplated duration or invalidating your entitlement to return travel expenses (if applicable) upon completion of that assignment.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

____

REVIEWED:

/s/ Dow H. Luetscher
Special Contracting Officer

APPROVED:

____

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Admin/Personnel - New Benefits for Certain Contract Employees

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED: Information Only

REFERENCE : Book Dispatch Number 0144, Dated 24 August 1965

1. Furnished herewith are amended contracts and applications for health insurance, except for CERVARIEN, for personnel as follows:

Fwd 6 Oct 67
HW

Jeremy K. BENABUM
Nora D. CERVARIEN
Bruce H. FERNALD SB
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Samuel J. KARTASUK SB
David M. WILSTED

2. Nora D. CERVARIEN's application for health insurance was forwarded in HMMT 8215, dated 22 August 1967.

3. All of the above personnel have requested that their dependents, as listed under their current contract employee type health insurance, be covered under the new health insurance for which they are applying.

4. Nadine M. HINTERSHEER has elected not to accept the new benefits.

5. Sandra B. CAZAZZUS will discuss the new benefits while she is at Headquarters.

6. Because of the indefinite future of Harriet K. SCHMEHL, action is deferred to Headquarters.

CA has taken action 5 Oct 67
HW

for/WILLARD C. CURTIS

SB accepted action on KARTASUK & FERNALD
Per telecon w/ Linda Bohannon on 5 Oct. 67. HW

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMT - 8292

DATE
18 September 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

D. ... by 24

ACTION WH 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CCS-3, CS/PS, CI/OPS 2, CI/OA 2 ... OF 2, OF 2

S E C R E T 151840Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9233

DIRECTOR

15 NOV 66 IN 39532

REF HMMT-7199

JEREMY K. BENADUM AND FAMILY DEPARTING STATION BY AIR ON HOME LEAVE 16 NOVEMBER 1966.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Frederick C. Munroe

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WOOAME

SUBJECT
AIM/JECIRT - Jeremy K. BEHAUGH (p) - Tax Handling

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

The WOFACT Tax Committee has approved a flat rate assessment of BEHAUGH's Federal tax obligation, beginning with tax year 1965. Attached is the letter of tax instruction which he should review. The original must be signed and returned to Headquarters.

[illegible]

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - COS (w/att)
2 - WH/Pers

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]-13971

DATE
19 September 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

19 September 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy K. BENADUM (p)

SUBJECT: Federal Tax Obligation - Letter of Instruction

1. Based on the tax briefing held on 16 February 1966 by a representative of the Organization's Tax Committee, the Committee approved a flat rate assessment of your covert Federal tax obligation. This assessment has been developed in two stages: The first stage applies to tax year 1965 and is based on your taxable compensation of $18,303.20. The second stage relates to your future year tax position and is based on an average of your annual Organizational income of $19,305.60 developed from a two-year projection of your earnings, beginning with tax year 1966. Under this procedure you will not be required to file a covert tax return, beginning with tax year 1965.

2. Effective 20 December 1964, the beginning of tax year 1965, the Organization has applied a tax percentage of thirty (30.0) per cent to the gross taxable compensation paid by the Organization in 1965. Effective 19 December 1965, the beginning of tax year 1966, this percentage will be decreased to twenty-three and four-tenths (23.4) per cent.

3. The application of the percentage assessment to tax year 1965 results in a tax liability of $5,490.96 (30% of $18,303.20). After applying the tax withheld of $2,562.49, an additional payment of $2,928.47 is required. However, future changes in your income or tax status may justify a future revision of the assessment rate. In this event, this agreement would be amended accordingly.

4. The Tax Committee has granted you a basic $250.00 tax credit in computing the percentage rate. This credit is granted to give reasonable assurance that you will not pay higher tax than you would under ordinary reporting procedures. The computations of these percentage rates are attached.

5. The retroactive satisfaction of this assessment from 19 December 1965 will be made by attaching the Federal tax withholdings available in your pay account. You will be advised as to the effect of this payroll account adjustment. You must file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue consistent with your overt tax status and provide the Tax Committee with a certified true copy. It is extremely important for you to exercise care and accuracy in preparing this return. Provided below are specific criteria to assist you:

You will continue to file a tax return directly with Internal Revenue, reporting other income (interest, dividends, rental, etc.) and computing tax thereon. Any earnings received from a commercial source are reported on the Form 2555 (Statement to Support Exclusion of Income Earned Abroad) and excluded under the bona fide residence exclusion.

Any tax liability resulting from overt filing will be met by you separately from the covert tax assessment funds collected by the Organization.

6. You have recourse to the Organization for reimbursement of bona fide foreign income or related taxes paid on income received from or guaranteed by the Organization, in accordance with FHB 30-1, paragraph 45, (a) and (b).

7. Please acknowledge the original of this letter and return to Headquarters, attention: Covert Tax Committee.

8. The Tax Committee appreciates your cooperation in establishing this systemized method of satisfying your Federal tax liability on Organizational income.

THOMAS P. WEATHERWAX

Acknowledged:

____

Date__________________________

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Performance Report -- Jeremy K. BENADUM, Career Agent

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

1. Jeremy K. BENADUM is a GS-15 Career Agent who has been employed by the Station in Mexico since 25 November 1960.

2. BENADUM is responsible for management of an outside operational activity employing six Mexican paid agents and twenty-six unpaid agents, all with access to or employed by the Mexican Government. The current budget for this project is $61,000. US per year. The project (LITEMPO) provides the Station with both high-level and low-level penetrations of the security and policy making branches of the Mexican Government. It also provides for a semi-official liaison arrangement between the Station and highest Mexican Government officials.

3. BENADUM for the past year has also directed the activities of a Station surveillance asset of six men. This team was placed under BENADUM when its existence became known to a high ranking security official already covered in the LITEMPO complex. Two members of the team were arrested by this service and BENADUM assisted in obtaining their release.

4. Prior to employment by the Station, BENADUM had been employed for twenty years by LNERGO. He has fluent Spanish; has adapted to living outside an official installation in a cover devised independently; has extensive experience in investigative and training activities. He has performed in a most valuable manner in the management of the above described projects and in the development of close working relationships with Mexican Government officials. Through these contacts, established over the years, COS Mexico and high-ranking Headquarters officials are able to meet covertly with the top officials of the Mexican Government.

Willard C. CURTIS

Distribution:
3 - WH

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DATE
HMMA-29[illegible] | 4 August 1966

CLASSIFICATION | HQS FILE NUMBER
SECRET | 201-[illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

CTC No. ____________

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

ATTENTION: Chief, Compensation and Tax Division

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Tax Assessment for [illegible]

1. A flat rate covert tax assessment of this individual's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee as indicated below. An acknowledged letter of tax instruction ☐ is ☐ will be forwarded.

Tax Assessment Rate	Effective Date
[illegible]	[illegible]
Twenty-three and [illegible] ([illegible]) [illegible]	[illegible]

2. Other payroll factors pertinent to this Covert Tax Committee tax assessment action are as follows:

19[illegible] covert tax withholding [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

/s/ [illegible] H. [illegible]
Approval Chief, CPD

____
Secretary, Covert Tax Committee

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear **Mr. Benadum**

Reference is made to [illegible] contract with the United States Government as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **29 July 1956** said contract is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph.

"**15**. TAXES. [illegible] the Government [illegible] must satisfy your Federal [illegible] liability on the income paid to you under paragraph **three (3)** [illegible]. Such income may be paid you by [illegible] because of cover, operational and security [illegible] of this organization [illegible] instructions and established procedures [illegible] of your Federal income tax liability [illegible]. It is specifically understood and agreed [illegible] instructions and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms [illegible] of said contract shall remain in full force and effect.

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-O-494643

1. Agency and organizational designations UDP/WH	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) BEZADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT	6. Grade and salary $18,825		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 7 Jan 66

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
24Apr66	26 Apr 65	$18,825	$19,415	

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s).

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP. ____________

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

____________ Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
6 GAO 8000 1126-509

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
ADMINISTRATIVE/Personnel
Legislative Pay Increase for Contract Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Amend contracts to provide for the legislative pay increase for the below listed contract personnel.

REFERENCE : Item 2a of FN 20-56, dated 4 November 1965

Furnished below are the names of contract employees and career agents qualifying under the reference for the subject legislative pay increase:

CAREER AGENTS	CONTRACT EMPLOYEES
[illegible], [illegible]	[illegible], Howard F.
[illegible], Douglas J.	[illegible], Thomas F.
REDLICH, Leo C.	[illegible], Sandra P.
[illegible], David T.	[illegible], Preston T.

[illegible] L. [illegible]

Distribution:
3 - WHD

[illegible] 14
Fwd CPD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
18 November 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

MESSAGE FORM 13

ORIG. : A. Sperained
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4507
DATE : 16 December 1964

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-287227

27 SECRET

ROUTING RI
1 /
2
3
4
5 SS
6
7 FI
8

16DEC64 23 00z
ROUTINE

SIG CEN

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO C/CA, OPSER, OT, VR, FILE

No Bill R

TO MEXI INFO. CITE DIR 71512

REF: HMMW-13153

WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE REPLY REF ON BEHADUM TRAINING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WHD

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City XX

Chief, WHD

Training for Jeremy K. BENADUM

[illegible]

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: HMMA 24477

Action Required: Cable Reply to paragraph 3

1. Reference is made to paragraph 3 of HMMW 12349, 28 February 1964, which suggested that KUBARK training for BENADUM might be beneficial, and to page 8 paragraph j of HMMA 24477, the LITEMPO Project Renewal Request, which also indicated that a two-week intensive field training course would be valuable for BENADUM.

2. Headquarters has discussed this possibility with KUROAR, and they are prepared to send a trainer to Mexico City for two weeks beginning 18 January 1965. Headquarters has suggested that the trainer be prepared to cover positive intelligence and operational reporting, requirements, and elicitation from his contacts and agents.

3. Please cable whether the dates 18 - 29 January are convenient and whether the subjects to be covered are those envisioned by the Station.

4. Headquarters added to the Project Renewal request $748.95 to cover the per diem and travel of the TDY trainer.

Chester D. DAINOLD

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

HMMW 13153

30 November 1964

SECRET

[illegible]-387207
50-6-94

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

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C, KUDOVE

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

C, WH Division

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Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILM

Attribution of Income and Covert Tax Handling of Nonofficial Cover Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Jeremy K. BENADUM

REFERENCE: HCCW DISPATCH 4659, 16 November 1964

Enclosed is information requested in reference as prepared by BENADUM. Under separate true name cover is corresponding information as required. Numbers on the pertinent forms correspond to the numbered items listed in attachment to reference.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w, USC)

Distribution:
2 - KUDOVE, w/atts
1 - WHD, w/o atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25281	11 March 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Career Agents - Legislative Pay Adjustments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Information

1. During Robert L. EASBY's recent TDY at Headquarters, he informed Howard D. MYNARD that the last Legislative Pay Adjustment had not been granted to the following named Career Agents at the Station. He was advised that follow-up action would be taken and information forwarded to the Station.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Douglas J. FREAPANE
Victor W. OBOLD
Wallace C. RIKON
Donald Z. VELAZQUEZ
David M. WILSTED

2. The contract for each of the above named individuals except VELAZQUEZ contains the provision he shall receive any Legislative Pay Adjustment adopted by KUBARK. As the provision is a contractual item, the individual will automatically receive the increase without any requirement for a specific request or justification. Although not on the above list, the same information also pertains to Leo C. EHDLICH. VELAZQUEZ, a Contract Employee, was authorized the increase (Phase II) by an amendment effective 14 October 1962 as his contract does not provide for automatic entitlement.

3. The Payroll Branch advised that except for BENADUM, the increase was reflected in the pay period ending 18 January 1964 as indicated in the earnings statement provided each individual. HMMW-3534, 28 May, was sent to the Station by Payroll to increase BENADUM's field allotment in accordance with the pay adjustment.

Chester D. DAINOLD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-3566

DATE
12 June 1964

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDP/WH Personnel Officer

SUBJECT : Within Grade Increase for Career Agents

1. The following Career Agents assigned to your office will become eligible for a Within Grade Increase during the month of APRIL 1964.

Name (P)	Old Salary Rate	New Salary Rate	Date Due
Benadum, Jeremy K.	$16,695	$17,210	26 Apr 1964

Fwd - C/WH-3
7 Feb 64
Fwd - 10 Feb 64
O/P - 5E69

2. Please return the signed Within Grade Increase form to Jo Ann Varasy Room 5 E 69.

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-508043

1. Agency and organizational designations
DDP/WH

2. Payroll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) CAREER AGENT

6. Grade and salary
$16,695

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.	HEALTH BENEFITS		NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks:
I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
jlv 15 Jan 64

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 26Apr64
15. Date last equivalent increase: 28 Apr 63
16. Old salary rate: $16,695
17. New salary rate: $17,210
18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP.

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP-status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d
6 GAO 8000 1126-503

CONFIDENTIAL PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Compensation Schedule II Increase - Jeremy S. [illegible], Emp # 058005

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: FN 20-29, 4 October 1963

It is requested that Subject's career agent contract be amended to provide for the compensation increase provided by Compensation Schedule II of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962.

Willard C. Curtis
WILLARD C. CURTIS

Distribution
3 - [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
[illegible]

DATE
[illegible] 1963

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR : **DDP/WH Personnel Officer**

SUBJECT : Within Grade Increase for Career Agents

1. The following Career Agents assigned to your office will become eligible for a Within Grade Increase during the month of **APRIL 1963**

Name (P)	Old Salary Rate	New Salary Rate	Date Due
Benadum, Jeremy K.	**$15,045**	**$15,525**	**28 Apr 63**

Career

fwd'd Office of Pers — 5E58
27 Feb 63

2. Please [illegible] Dorothy [illegible]
Room 5 E [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954

1. Agency and organizational designation
DDP/WH

2. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
BENADUM, Jeremy K. (I) CAREER AGENT

3. Payroll period

4. Slip No.

5. Grade and salary
$15,045

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by
Jly 15 Jan 63

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
Apr63	29Apr62	$15,045	$15,525	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1125a - Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 20, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

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	ACTION	ACTION POSTED
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XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO
Chief, Services & Benefits Division/OP
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Payment of Term Life Insurance Premium - Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is Station T/A # 00125, representing Jeremy K. BENADUM's payment of $72.00 covering 6 months' premiums on his term life insurance.

Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment - 1 T/A, as noted

DISTRIBUTION:
2-Finance Division w/attachment
1-WH Division w/o attachment
2-Files

1-Benefits & Services Div/OP w/o att

Jan 11, 1963 [illegible]
[illegible] Insurance
office called [illegible] of the
[illegible] dispatch w/ T/A.

[illegible] of att [illegible]
[illegible] Fin. [illegible]
[illegible] 8 Jan 63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 Dec 1962	31 Dec 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-T-3314

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TRAVEL ORDER

☒ TDY
☐ PCS
☐ INVITATIONAL

OFFICE TRAVEL ORDER NO. WH 317-63

SERVICE TRAVEL ORDER NO.

NAME Jeremy V. BENA[illegible] (P) Career Agent

OFFICIAL STATION Mexico City, Mexico

OFFICE PHONE

GRADE GS-13

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL AND INCUR NECESSARY EXPENSES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATIONS. THIS TRAVEL OR CHANGE OF OFFICIAL STATION, IF SO DESIGNATED, IS MADE FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES AND NOT FOR YOUR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE.

ITINERARY, MODE OF TRAVEL AND PURPOSE

Mexico City to San Francisco for approx. 90 days home leave and return to Mexico City.

Purpose: Home Leave

Mode : Air, Common Carrier

TRAVEL DURATION BEGIN	TRAVEL DURATION END	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE DOMESTIC	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE FOREIGN		AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI NOT TO EXCEED COST BY COMMON CARRIER	AUTOMOBILE ALLOWANCE CENTS PER MI AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOV'T.
8 Dec.	1 Mar. 63	Max.	☒ MAXIMUM	☐ OTHER (See below)		

ALLOWANCES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS WITH REASONS

DEPENDENT TRAVEL AUTHORIZED

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP
		Wife
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
		Child
Under 2		Child

☐ ACCOMPANY TRAVELLER
☐ FOLLOW WITHIN 6 MONTHS
☐ ADVANCE RETURN

PROCURE TRANSPORTATION BY
☐ TRANSPORTATION REQUEST
☐ CASH OR OTHER

DISPOSITION OF EFFECTS AUTHORIZATION
☐ SHIPMENT ☐ NONTEMPORARY STORAGE
☐ SHIPMENT POA AUTHORIZED

EXCESS BAGGAGE AUTHORIZED
ACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE
UNACCOMPANIED LBS. AND MODE

ADVANCE OF FUNDS REQUESTED
☐ YES
☐ NO
ACCOUNTING DUE DATE

ESTIMATED COST OF TRAVEL $2,000.00

I CERTIFY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

OBLIGATION REFERENCE NO. 317

CHARGE COST CENTER NO. 3135-5701-5185

DATE 12/7/62 SIGNATURE OF B & F OFFICER Edward Burroughs

COORDINATION

SIGNATURE	TITLE & COMPONENT	DATE
	WH/Pers.	
	Chief, WH 3	

REQUISITING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE PAUL E. ANNISON
COMPONENT C/WH/3S
SIGNATURE
DATE 7 Dec. 62

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE RAFORD W. HERBERT
COMPONENT DC/WHD
SIGNATURE
DATE 7 Dec. 1962

FORM 8-60 540 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
MFG. 3-62

SECRET

(58-401)

14-00000

718

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 1 DEC 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CCS 2, OP 2, S/C 2

Career agent

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DEC 1 0330Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 27561

DIR CITE MEXI 2728

1. REQUEST HQ TVL ORDERS FOR HOME LEAVE TVL OF JEREMY K. BENADUM, WIFE, 2 CHILDREN FULL FARE 4 CHILDREN HALF FARE, AND 1 BABY UNDER 2 YRS.

2. TO DEPART MEXICO CITY ABOUT 6 DEC FOR SAN FRANCISCO (HOME LEAVE POINT) VIA AIR, RETURN TO MEXICO CITY AFTER HOME LEAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

Dec 3

~~per file~~

wife DOB 21 Jan 1917

17 Sep 48

dau 6 Mar 50

" 14 Jul 51

" 16 Aug 57

Son 17 Sep 59

dau

dau Oct 61

Dec 4

discussed with [illegible] [illegible] V. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible]

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Date 20 August 1962

Career Agent Biographic Data

a. Pseudonym of agent: SENADUM Jeremy K. Staff or Division: WHD
Last First MI

b. Date and place of birth: 20 August 1915, Omaha, Nebraska

c. Marital status: Married

d. Relationship and years of birth of dependents: Wife, born 31 Jan 1917, San Francisco, California--dau born 17 Sept 1948, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 6 Mar 1950, San Mateo, Cal.--dau born 10 Jul 1951, San Francisco, Cal--son born 16 Aug 1957, Mexico, D.F.--dau born 19 Sept 1959, Mexico, D.F. -- dau born October 1961, Mexico, D.F.

e. Citizenship of agent: USA
(1) If naturalized, when?

(2) If naturalized, where?

g. Non-CIA education to include name and location of college, degrees, dates, and major:
Pomona College, Claremont, California, A.B. 1936, Political Science
Stanford Univ Law School, LL.B. 1939, Law
FBI Academy, August, September 1940

h. Military service Thomason Act Training, Infantry School, Oct 1939-July 1940
(1) Country served and years:

(2) Branch of service and rank:

i. Non-CIA employment: kinds of business or profession, positions, salaries, locations, and dates:
FBI - Aug 1940-Sept 1960, GS-14, $13,000/year when resigned.
Assistant Legal Attache, US Embassy, Lima, Peru, 1943-45
Legal Attache same post, 1945-47
Assistant Legal Attache, Mexico City, 1951-53
Deputy to Legal Attache 1953-60

S-E-C-R-E-T

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 2)

j. Dates of psychological assessment, professional and language aptitude tests, if applicable:

Not applicable

k. Languages, including English, using the following terms: Elementary, Intermediate, High, Native

Language	Reading	Writing	Speaking
Spanish	**high**	**high**	**high**
English	**native**	**native**	**native**
German	**intermediate**	**none**	**intermediate**
French	**elementary**	**none**	**elementary**

l. Agency training:

Subject Covered	Duration of Course	Years Taken
not applicable		

m. Alias or pseudonym used for psychological assessment, testing or training, if applicable:

not applicable

n. Security clearance number: **CSA, 22 December 1960 - S-11409**

o. Date of last LCFLUTTER: **None**

p. Contract provisions: (Underline One)

(1) Provision for periodic step increases [✓ Yes] No
(2) Provision for legislative pay increases [✓ Yes] No
(3) Provision for total offset of cover income [✓ Yes] No
(4) Provision for civil service retirement [✓ Yes] No
(5) Any unusual provisions (please specify)

S-E-C-R-E-T

(Career Agent Biographic Data p. 3)

q. Date of beginning of current tour: **30 October 1960**

r. Previous CIA employment:

Years	Type of Cover	CIA Duties	Project	City	Salary
None					

S-E-C-R-E-T

DISPATCH SECRET

PROCESSING

X

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM: Chief, WHD

SUBJECT: Term Life Insurance Premium - Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For your information

Ref: HMMT-2907

1. BENADUM'S application for the Term Life Insurance, together with the payment of $72.00 for the six months' premium have been received. His life insurance is now paid up through December 1962.

2. BENADUM did authorize deductions to pay the insurance premiums, but since he is being payrolled in the field, it will be necessary for him to forward future premium payments to Headquarters.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City

Sept 30 1963
The above is not correct;
he is payrolled in Hqs but
all is paid to him in the
Field. Insurance Cashier (Mrs Harding)
will advise FD; FD will advise
field of new deduction. [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 6 August 1962	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMM-3-2235 2531	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Distribution:
1 - WH/Pers
1 - WH/Mailroom

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/Pers	C. Sandman	blt	5269

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/3		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/SB		

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

SECRET

HMM-T-2907

TO
Chief, Finance Division

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

DATE
13 July 1962

SUBJECT
Pay Account -
Jeremy K. BENADUM

RE. "413" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☐ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED
For your information

REFERENCE(S)
HMM-S-2456

1. The Station was surprised to receive the reference, which stated that BENADUM's life insurance application had not been received in Finance Division as of 15 June 1962. Recently we received HMM-S-2450, dated 14 June 1962, which requested that the Station collect from BENADUM the premiums for his life insurance, and no mention was made of payroll deductions we had requested in HMM-T-2800. Therefore, the Station collected the sum of $72.00 from BENADUM in payment of 6 months premiums. This payment was forwarded to Headquarters under HMM-T-2892.

2. No action will be taken by the Station to change BENADUM's field allotment until notification is received from Headquarters. It would appear that the easiest means of now adjusting his pay account would be to refund the pre-paid premiums and begin payroll deductions for the life insurance.

Willard C. Curtis
Willard C. CURTIS

12 July 1962

DISTRIBUTION:
~~3~~ 2-Finance Division
2-WH Division
2-Files

W/o Hqs [illegible]
Has paid through Dec [illegible]
[illegible] 62.

SECRET

13374

S-E-C-R-E-T

LIFE INSURANCE APPLICATION
(CONTRACT LIFE)

POLICY NO. 46

EFFECTIVE DATE 4-25-62

TOTAL PREMIUM PAID 24.00

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (P) [illegible] K. [illegible]
First M. Last

[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH ______ MONTHLY PREMIUM ______ ANNUAL SALARY 13,730 INSURANCE CLASS III

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BLOCK):

Male /X/ Full-time Employee
Female / / Yes /X/ No / /

NAME OF BENEFICIARY (T) [illegible] Relationship Wife
First and Middle only

DATE SIGNED 14 April 1962 (P) [illegible] K. [illegible]
Signature of Employee

TO : FD.

SUBJECT : Authority to Make Payroll Deductions

I hereby authorize you to deduct the sum of $12.00 (U.S.)

per pay period from my salary starting with the pay period beginning

14 Apr 1962. These deductions are to continue

until terminated by me in writing.

[illegible] K. [illegible]
(P) Signature

Code 5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320080

1. Agency and organizational designation: DDP/WH

2. Payroll period:

3. Block No.:

4. Slip No.:

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate): BENADUM, Jeremy K. (P) Career Agent

6. Grade and salary: $13, 730

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks: [illegible]

11. Appropriation(s):

12. Prepared by: gah 25 Jan 62

13. Audited by:

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: Apr62

15. Date last equivalent increase: 30Oct60

16. Old salary rate: 325 $13, 730

17. New salary rate: $14, 055

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s):

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)

☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.

☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised

Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S. October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

6/9/61

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

COMPLETE IN DUPLICATE & RETURN BOTH COPIES TO THE INSURANCE BRANCH THRU APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS

HOSPITALIZATION APPLICATION
(CONTRACT PLAN)

*NAME OF EMPLOYEE JEREMY K. BENADUM
(First) (Middle) (Last)

DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug. 1915

MONTHLY PREMIUM

MARRIED ☒ SINGLE ☐

SINGLE PLAN ☐ FAMILY PLAN ☒

FULL TIME EMPLOYEE ☒ YES ☐ NO

U.S. CITIZEN ☒ RESIDENT ALIEN ☐

COVERED BY PRESENT TO-UP PLAN ☐ YES ☒ NO

*PLEASE NOTE: "Name of employee and "Employee's Signature" should agree with the one shown on contract with the Agency.

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK.

POLICY NO. 459

EFFECTIVE DATE 6/25/61

CODE 902

(TO BE COMPLETED BY DIVISION)

Charlotte E. Bustos-Videla
(PERSON TO CONTACT)

WH/3/Mexico 2555, 3162
(DIVISION) (EXT.)

1015 Barton Hall
(ROOM NO.) (BLDG.)

DATE OF EMPLOYMENT AS CONTRACT EMPLOYEE [illegible] 1960

EMPLOYEE'S PAYROLL NO. 058865

IS EMPLOYEE PAYROLLED
26 days ☒ monthly ☐
Bi-weekly ☐

IF FAMILY PLAN, COMPLETE FOLLOWING:

NAME OF WIFE/HUSBAND AILEEN K. BENADUM
(First) (Middle Initial)

CHILDREN UNDER 19 (A protected person's children shall include unmarried children under age 19. Also, any step-children, legally adopted children, and foster children provided such children are dependent upon the protected person for support and maintenance.)

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	NAME	DATE OF BIRTH
2-Anne	9/17/48		
3-Joanne	5/6/50		
4-Mario	7/14/51		
5-Frederick	8/16/57		
6-Margaret	9/19/59		
7-[illegible]	[illegible]		

I hereby authorize deductions from my salary for payment of premiums under this contract.

APPROVED:

Administrative Officer of Division

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

*EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE
(See instructions above following*)

Date 15 March, 1961

SECRET

NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [illegible]

DATE: 14 Jul 61

FROM : [illegible], Medical Staff

SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible] has been evaluated by the Medical Staff and found physically qualified for [illegible] assignment.

[illegible]
Administrative Officer

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

Re: Banking Instructions

Although writer can bank [illegible] and accounts [illegible] the U.S., he feels that for security reasons it would be preferable to handle all salary payments, less deductions for retirement, [illegible] insurance, withholding for income tax, etc., locally in pesos.

Mexico, D.F.
19 March, 1961

[illegible]

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned hereby certifies that hehas received no compensation, allowances or benefits in kind from writer's cover activities during the period: October 30, 1960 to date.

Mexico, D.F.
15 March, 1961

Jeremy K. Benadum

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned hereby certifies that his previous employment by the U.S. Government terminated October 29, 1960, and that final salary payment for this employment covered the period October 16 through October 29, 1960.

Mexico, D.F.
15 March, 1961

Jeremy K. Benadum

[illegible] of Station, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible]

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCE: [illegible]-9513

[illegible] Indexing [illegible]

1. The following information and/or documents are submitted in compliance with reference dispatch:

a. Original Form [illegible] signed in pseudonym.

b. Signed statement concerning banking instructions wherein Subject requests that all payments be made locally in pesos.

c. Since Subject wants his entire net pay paid locally, it is requested that Headquarters compute his pay and advise Station of the net pay which will represent his local field allotment.

d. Subject will be reimbursed actual quarters expenses locally, in accordance with FR 45-1050.

e. HEMADUM desires the hospitalization contract. Hospitalization Application (Contract Plan) is forwarded herewith in duplicate.

f. It is requested that Headquarters compute HEMADUM's pay from 30 October 1960 through the present pay period. Upon advice of the net amount due Subject, Station will collect any overpayments (or pay underpayments) and T/A the correct amount to Headquarters. Subsequently, his net pay will be considered field allotments and amounts paid will be T/A'd to Headquarters.

g. Certification of HEMADUM's sick and annual (accumulated) leave and the amount paid in a lump sum by his former employer for "accrued annual leave" are being forwarded in a separate dispatch.

h. HEMADUM has been advised by the COS to the effect that he must advise KUBARK before he applies for [illegible] retirement.

i. Original signed contract is returned herewith. Copy of the contract has been retained for Station files.

j. Forwarded herewith is signed certification by HEMADUM concerning income from his cover activity as required by Para. 7, "Offset", of his contract.

k. Attached are Report of Medical History and certification from the examining physician in accordance with Para. 14(b) of Subject's contract.

2. The Station wishes to make the following additional observations:

a. Neither contract nor transmittal letter indicated the amount of "Cost of Living" Allowances Subject will receive, in accordance with Para. 6(b) of his contract. It is presumed that this computation will be received with his pay computation.

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH [illegible]

b. Subject's contract does not provide for "non-official cover premium pay" as originally requested by Station. Please advise.

c. Additional allowance as provided in Para. 4(2) of Subject's contract will be accounted for and paid locally, if Headquarters has no objections.

Willard C. CURTIS

14 April 1961

Attachments:
As stated

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters w/att
3 - Files

SECRET/RYBAT

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
DATE POSTED	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Jeremy K. BENADUM

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraphs 2 and 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMT-1802, 25 January 1961
B. MEXI-6643, 2 December 1960

1. Attached is a Headquarters contract for Subject effective 30 October 1960, thus giving Subject continuity in his Government service and eligibility to continue his Government retirement. The contract is for the salary of a GS-15 step one.

2. The Station should comply with the following administrative requirements at its earliest convenience.

a. Submit a W-4 or a Form 313.

b. Forward banking instructions.

c. Inform Headquarters whether BENADUM desires a field allotment, the amount, and the effective date.

d. Inform Headquarters whether the Station plans to give BENADUM a quarters allowance under FR 45-1050. If not, please submit a quarters application.

e. Does BENADUM want hospitalization per paragraph 8 (e) of his contract? If so, please have him fill out the attached application. The premiums will be deducted from his salary. Information on the policy is also attached for BENADUM's information. (Please refer to Book Dispatch 2220 dated 11 October 1960.)

f. With regard to the oral agreement, Headquarters could not approve it since it was for $15,000 per year and not for the first step of a

CONTINUED

Attachments: (HEREWITH)
Contract (original and 1)
Memorandum and application for health insurance

Distribution:
2 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/3/Mex/Chrono
1 - FD/SAAS/Hudson

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
28 Feb. 1961	2 MAR 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMM-W-9511

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-287227

GS-15, $13,730. The Station has two choices. It can collect all monies paid to BENADUM under his oral agreement, whereupon Headquarters can effect payment of salary and allowances effective 30 October 1960. Or an alternative method would be for the Station to notify Headquarters of a breakdown of what has been paid BENADUM, on the basis of which Headquarters would start payrolling BENADUM, deducting any overpayment of salary from net salaries due. Please advise Headquarters which method the Station and BENADUM prefer.

g. In order to establish BENADUM's leave record with KUBARK, BENADUM should furnish any final pay slip he might have received, which would reflect the amount of annual and sick leave he had as of his date of resignation and also, his salary rate at the time of resignation. If BENADUM has no such slip, a certified statement of the above is required. Since BENADUM's contract is effective 30 October 1960, the day after the end of his annual leave for 1960, BENADUM must return to KUBARK the gross amount he received from ODENVY for his "accrued carry-over" of 633 hours.

h. BENADUM should be told that he must advise KUBARK, should he still be in our employ, before he applies for ODYOKE retirement for which he will be eligible when he becomes 50 years of age because of his ODENVY service.

9. The Station should return to Headquarters the original signed copy of the attached contract. The copy may be retained by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

SECRET

DHAHRAN CAIRO BEIRUT JIDDA

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF NE 5

INFO CCO 2, OP 2, S/C 2

21 FEB 61 06z

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

OUT 70699

TO DHAH CAIR (FOR HYEDDM) INFO BEIR JIDD

CITE DIR 26357

26357

SOCALM

REF: DHAH-1833 (IN 45643)*
TAIZ-0179 (IN 47450)**

1. SUGGEST HYEDDM MEET AND BRIEF TILSTOCK BEIR PRIOR 15 MARCH. DHAH ADVISE HYEDDM VIA CAIR BEIR ETA TILSTOCK AND CONTACT PLAN.

2. KUBARK CONTRACT FOR T POUCHED DHAH FOR SIGNATURE. COVER CONTRACT SHOULD BE IN BEIR BEFORE 15 MARCH.

END OF MESSAGE

* TILSTOCK ETA 15 MARCH BEIRUT TO SIGN ICA CONTRACT.
** HYEDDM PLANS TO BE IN BEIRUT UNTIL 15 MARCH.

NE/5S G P Thompson

CNE/2/UAR

CNE/3/IAJ

COORDINATING OFFICERS

NE/COPS

RELEASING OFFICER

C/NE/2

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No

DISPATCH

		PROCESSING
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief of Station, Mexico City	X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, WH Division	ABSTRACT
		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	Jeremy K. BENADUM	

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraphs 2 and 3

REFERENCES : A. HMMT-1008, 25 January 1961
B. [illegible]-6843, 2 December 1960

1. Attached is a Headquarters contract for Subject effective 30 October 1960, thus giving Subject continuity in his Government service and eligibility to continue his Government retirement. The contract is for the salary of a GS-15 step one.

2. The Station should comply with the following administrative requirements at its earliest convenience.

a. Submit a 54 or a Form 313.

b. Forward banking instructions.

c. Inform Headquarters whether BENADUM desires a field allotment, the amount, and the effective date.

d. Inform Headquarters whether the Station plans to give BENADUM a quarters allowance under FR 45-1050. If not, please submit a quarters application.

e. Does BENADUM want hospitalization per paragraph 8 (e) of his contract? If so, please have him fill out the attached application. The premiums will be deducted from his salary. Information on the policy is also attached for BENADUM's information. (Please refer to Book Dispatch 5120 dated 11 October 1961.)

f. With regard to the oral agreement, Headquarters could not approve it since it was for $15,000 per year and not for the first step of a

CONTINUED

Attachments: (HEREWITH)
Contract (original and 1)
Memorandum and application for health insurance

Distribution:
3 - Mexico City, w/atts.
1 - Subject
1 - WH/Registry
1 - WH/1/Mex/Chrono
1 - FD/SAAS/[illegible]

DATE TYPED: 21 Feb. 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-8713

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-287277

GS-15, $13,731. The Station has two choices. It can collect all monies paid to [illegible] under his oral agreement, whereupon Headquarters can effect payment of [illegible], all allowances effective 30 October 1960. An alternative method would be for the Station to notify Headquarters of a breakdown of what has been paid [illegible], on the basis of which Headquarters would start payrolling [illegible], deducting any overpayment of salary from net salaries due. Please advise Headquarters which method the Station and [illegible] prefer.

8. In order to establish [illegible]'s leave record with [illegible], [illegible] should furnish any final pay slip he might have received, which would reflect the amount of annual and sick leave he had as of his date of resignation and also, his salary rate at the time of resignation. If [illegible] has no such slip, a certified statement of the above is required. Since [illegible]'s contract is effective 30 October 1960, the day after the end of his annual leave for 1960, [illegible] must return to [illegible] the [illegible] amount he received from [illegible] for his "accrued overpayment" of [illegible] hours.

9. [illegible] should be told that he must advise [illegible], should he still be in our employ, before he applies for [illegible] retirement for which he will be eligible when he becomes 50 years of age because of his [illegible] service.

10. The Station should return to Headquarters the original signed copy of the attached contract. One copy may be retained by the Station.

END OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :	550 1 DEC 60
TO :	DIREQTOR
FROM :	MEXICO CITY
ACTION :	C/WH 2
INFO :	COP, C/CCD 2, C/Ci, DD/S, S/A, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C

ROUTING

1	[illegible]	4	
2		5	
3	[illegible]	6	

DEC 2 0022Z 60

PRIORITY

IN 10827

PRITY DIR CITE MEXI 6843

RYBAT

PUGH FROM CURTIS

REF A MEXI 6677 (IN 38281)

~~B DIR 13215~~ (out 95542)

CC ([illegible])

1. JEREMY K. BENADUM'S CURRENT ANNUAL LEAVE TERMINATED 29 OCTOBER PERIOD COVERED BY ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE ENDS 14 FEBRUARY 1961. BENADUM RECEIVED LUMP SUM CH~~A~~ECK FOR ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH HE WILL ENDORSE AND SEND TO KUBARK.

2. SUBJECT KNOWN BY OD~~A~~ENVY TO BE INDEPENDENT FINACIALLY AND CAN MAITAIN COVER OF RETIREMENT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY INSOFAR AS EXPLAINING SOURCE OF INCOME AND CONTINUED RESIDENCE MEXI. COS HAS

SECRET

SEEN STATEMENT FROM CALIFORNIA BANK SAYING BENADUM HAS OVER 100,000 CASH ACCOUNT. CERTIFIED STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT BEING USED TO GET "RENTISTA" STATUS WITH MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION HE AND WIFE HAVE VALUABLE CALIFORNIA PROPERTIES.

3. IN CONSIDERING ADVISABILITY OF REVEALING TO ODENVY THE TRU~~A~~E RELATIONSHIP OF BENADUM WITH KTCV Portion Garbled-Being Svcd BE WEIGHED PRIOR TO TAKING ANY ACTION:

A. STATION CONCURS IT IMPERATIVE BENADUM/KUBARK TRUE RELATIONSHIP BE KEPT ON NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

B. BENADUM ADVISES CURRENT ODENVY CHIEF MEXI WAS JEALOUS AND HIGHLY CRITICAL OF BENADUM'S CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF MEXI STATION MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS RESIGNATION.

C. SHOULD ODENVY CHIEF MEXI BECOME AWARE BENADUM FULL TIME EMPLOYEE OF KUBARK HE CAN BE EXPECTED TAKE ACTION TO HINDER OR IMPEDE HIS EFFECTIVENESS AS DEEP COVER AGENT FOR KUBARK. BENADUM NOT CONCERNED MEXI ODENVY CHIEF'S ABILITY TO SABOTAGE HI~~I~~S WORK BUT

FEELS THAT THIS IS SITUATION THAT BEST BE AVOIDED.

D. AGREE BENADUM HAS RIGHT TO RESIGN AND KUBARK HAS RIGHT TO HIRE BUT STATION ALSO OF OPINION THAT IN SITUATION SUCH AS PRESENT CASE KUBARK HAS RIGHT TO HIRE AND PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF ANY DEEP COVER AGENT. FROM LEGAL POINT OF VIEW BENADUM RELATIONSHIP WITH ODENVY HAS TERMINATED AND HE NOT DIFFERENT NOW FROM ANY OTHER PBPRIMER THAT KUBARK WOULD HIRE ABROAD TO DO DEEP COVER WORK. STATION FEELS AND BENADUM CONCURS THAT ODENVY AWARENESS OF DETAILS OF THIS CASE COULD DEFINITELY DESTROY DEEP COVER EFFECTIVENESS.

E. FROM OPERATIONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW STATION OPPOSED

ODENVY BECOME KNOWLEDGEABLE OF KUBARK CONTACT WITH LITEMPO/2 JUST THE SAME AS STATION WOULD MOST ENERGETICALLY PROTEST THEIR AWARENESS OF KUBARK CONTACT WITH LITENSOR, LIERGO, LIELEGANT, OR LIENVOY TECH UNIT.

F. CHIEF ODENVY MEXI VERY DESIROUS HAVE CONTACT WITH LITEMPO/2 WHICH WAS POSSIBLE IN PAST ONLY THROUGH BENADUM/LITEMPO/1 FRIENDSHIP.

SECRET

C. STATION OF OPINION THAT IN CASE BENADUM WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT AS REGULAR KUBARK STAFF THAT NORMAL HIRING PROCEDURE WOULD APPLY BUT CONSIDER IT IMPRUDENT TO ADVISE ODENVY OF WHAT PROMISES TO BE AN EXCELLENT DEEP COVER OPERATION.

4. STATION OF OPINION THAT BEST WAY AVOID SITUATION WITH ODENVY WITHOUT REVEALING THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS IS FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. IF ODENVY HAS TO KNOW OF OFFICIAL BENADUM/KUBARK RELATIONSHIP ADVISE ODENVY THROUGH LIAISON CHANNELS THAT KUBARK DESIRES SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR DISCUSSION CLASSIFIED MATERIAL WITH BENADUM AS "CONFIDENTIAL CONTACT OF CURTIS"

B. ODENVY WILL BE PLACED ON NOTICE THAT STATION IN CONTACT WITH BENADUM BUT WOULD NOT REVEAL FULL DETAILS OF TRUE KUBARK/ BENADUM RELATIONSHIP.

C. PROCESSING OF THIS INFORMATION THROUGH LIAISON CHANNELS RATHER THAN KUSODA WOULD TEND DISPEL IMPRESSION BENADUM EMPLOYED FULL TIME BY KUBARK.

D. TO TELL ODENVY ONLY PART OF ST [illegible] WOULD BE ENOUGH BASIS TO REFUTE ANY ARGUMENTS IN CASE ODENVY DECIDES MAKE ISSUE OF MATTER. BUT STATION UNABLE UNDERSTAND WHAT RIGHT ODENVY HAS TO MAKE ISSUE OF KUBARK HIRING OF FREE AND UNEMPLOYED PBPRIME CITIZEN.

5. IF HQS CONSIDERES IT IMPERATIVE THAT ODENVY BE ADVISED THIS MATTER IMMEDIATELY STATION REQUESTS THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN EXPIRATION DATE OF BENADUM'S ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE MENTIONED IN PARA 1 AND THAT ODENVY BE ADVISED AFTER 14 FEB OF INTENTION USE BENADUM AS STATION (COS) CONTACT.

6. RE SAM PAPICH INQUIRIES, BENADUM ADVISES THAT PAPICH IS FRIEND OF LONG STANDING WHOSE INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN PERSONAL RATHER THAN DIRECTED BY ODENVY.

7. IN FINAL ANALYSIS OF WHOLE PROBLEM HQS HAS ULTIMATE DECISION THIS PROBLEM BUT STATION OF OPINION THAT JUDGING FROM ODENVY CHIEF MEXI ATTITUDE TOWARD KUBARK IN PAST AND PRESENT THAT NOT MUCH WOULD BE GAINED AND A GREAT DEAL LOST BY REVEALING ALL THE FACTS TO ODENVY IN THIS CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

DATE :

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, DD/S, SSA, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2

NOV 5 0709Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 38281

DIR CITE MEXI 6677

RYBAT

REF DIR 82217 (cont 87521)*

1. SUBJ WISHES CAREER AGENT STATUS WITH FOLLOWING:

A. KUBARK RETIREMENT WITH ANY LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR FUTURE;

B. TERMINAL LEAVE ENDED 29 OCT EXCEPT FOR "ACCRUED CARRY-OVER" OF 633 HOURS. SUBJ WISHES GIVE AMOUNT RECEIVED FOR THIS TO KUBARK AND HAVE THIS 633 CARRIED OVER.

C. REQUEST BEGIN ON KUBARK PAYROLL ON 1 NOV. AS KNOWN TO URQUHART, SUBJ HAS BEEN WORKING FOR SEVERAL WEEKS FOR KUBARK WITHOUT PAY.

D. COVER IS REALISTA. SUBJ HAS NOTARIZED STATEMENT FROM BANK IN CALIFORNIA THAT HE HAS "OVER $122,000" ON DEPOSIT. IN ADDITION INCOME FROM PERSONALLY OWNED PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE FINANCES NEEDS SUBJ AND FAMILY.

E. FORWARDING COPIES OF LETTER FROM HEAD ODENVY CONGRATULATING SUBJ ON COMPLETION TWENTY YEARS SERVICE, SUBJ'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION AND LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. COS CAN PERSONALLY ASSURE CHIEF, KUSODA THAT SUBJ WAS IN GOOD STANDING WITH ODENVY AT TIME OF RESIGNATION.

2. COS STRONGLY URGES THAT NO REPEAT NO CHECK BE MADE WITH ODENVY

(Clayton Caldwell)

ON SUBJECT OR ON LITEMPO/1. ANY CHECK, DISCREET OR OTHERWISE, WILL

SECRET

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MEAN LOCAL ODENVY CHIEF NOTIFIED WITHIN [illegible] THAT SUBJ EMPLOYED BY KUBARK. THIS WOULD ENDANGER SECURITY LITEMPO OPERATION, WOULD PREJUDICE LITEMPO/1 AND LITEMPO/2 (ODENVY HAS "LIAISON ON CRIMINAL MATTERS" WITH LITEMPO/2).

3. COS AGREES THAT AFTER A TIME A CHECK COULD BE MADE WITH ODENVY BUT AT PRESENT SUCH CHECK WOULD MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT INSTEAD OF RESIGNING FOR PERSONAL REASONS SUBJ RESIGNED (AND TOOK LITEMPO/1 WITH HIM) TO COME TO KUBARK.

4. APPRECIATE REF CABLE AND REQUEST ADVICE ON ANY ACTIONS STATION CAN TAKE TO FACILITATE AND SPEED APPROVAL OF PROJECT AND HIRING OF SUBJ.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFERRED STAFF AGENT STATUS, SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : CHARLOTTE L. ZIL.
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO 538
EXT : 2555
DATE : 31 OCTOBER 1960

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2, DD/S, S

☐	DEFERRED
☒	ROUTINE
☐	PRIORITY
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 87521

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 09817

RYBAT

REF: MEXI 1610

1. CHOICE STAFF AGENT STATUS RATHER THAN CAREER OR CONTRACT AGENT STATUS FOR SUBJ MUST BE JUSTIFIED IN DETAIL TO KUDOVE AGENT PANEL WHICH IN PAST KNOWN TO FAVOR CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR THIS TYPE INDIVIDUAL. IF PANEL APPROVES STAFF STATUS THEN SUBMIT CASE TO CHIEF KUDOVE WHO MUST APPROVE EXCEPTION TO KUDOVE POLICY OF NO HIRING OF STAFF TYPE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES AT HIGH GRADES.

2. SUGGEST STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFER STAFF AGENT STATUS SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

3. DOES SUBJ WANT KUBARK RETIREMENT BENEFITS? UNDER CAREER AGENT STATUS MAY HAVE RETIREMENT OR SOCIAL SECURITY.

4. UNDER STAFF OR CAREER AGENT STATUS CANNOT PICK UP SUBJ UNTIL END OF PAID TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD HOWEVER SUBJ MAY ATTEST TO ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE ACCRUED AS OF END EMPLOYMENT ODENVY AND REIMBURSES KUBARK FOR ALL UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH CAN BE CREDITED TO HIM UNDER KUBARK. ADVISE DATES TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD AND CHOICE.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE 2

	DEFERRED	
PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87521 DIR 09217

TO INFO CITE DIR

5. POUCH DETAILS COVER. STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER CONTRACT AGENT STATUS IF OFFSET CLAUSE APPLICABLE.

6. FORWARD HQS COPY ODENVY RESIGNATION ACTION SUBJ AND REASONS SUBJS RESIGNATION.

7. KUSODA DEEMS DISCREET CHECK ODENVY RECORDS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH BASIC SECURITY PRACTICES. BELIEVE FAILURE INDICATE TO ODENVY ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS POSSIBLE OF INTEREST IN SUBJ MAY HARM RELATIONS BETWEEN ODENVY AND KUBARK AT BOTH HQS AND FIELD LEVEL IF KUBARK USE OF SUBJ EVER DETECTED. IF SUBJS COVERT ACTIVITIES EVER UNCOVERED IT WOULD BE ASSUMED HIS WORK BEING DONE ON BEHALF ODENVY WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING KUBARK. IN VIEW ~~[illegible]~~ RESIGNATION SUBJ HQS DOES NOT SEE HOW INFORMING ODENVY COULD JEOPARDIZE LITEMPO OP. STATION COMMENTS ON ABOVE REQUESTED. IF STATION STILL FIRM ON STAND NO ODYOKE CHECKS AND HAS CONSIDERATIONS OVERRIDING POINTS CITED ABOVE, PLS CABLE DETAILS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CASE BY CHIEF KUSODA. LCFLUTTER REQUIRED FOR STAFF STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Subject is George Munro

WH/Pers/Bovard
CPD/Leutcher
Agent Panel/Armstrong
D/IB/OS/Harby
CI/CPS/Brown
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

NED P. HOLMAN
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Mr. Jeremy K. Benadum

Dear Mr. Benadum:

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you for your services as a Career Agent under the following terms and conditions:

1. Status. Your status is that of a Government employee under contract and, as such, your rights and benefits are governed by the provisions of this agreement. It is specifically understood that you are not entitled to rights and benefits pertaining to appointed staff status, except as provided herein.

2. Cover. In the performance of your services hereunder, you will act under cover suitable to conceal your relationship with the Government. It is expressly understood and agreed that any and all documents which you may execute in the course of such cover employment are subordinate to this agreement and any contradiction in terms which may in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by this agreement which shall always be dominant.

3. Compensation and Taxes. For your services as a Career Agent, you will be compensated at a basic salary of $13,730 per annum, the equivalent of a GS-15. You will be entitled to within grade promotions and legislative pay adjustments in substantial conformance with rules and regulations applicable to Government appointed personnel. Payments will be made as requested by you in writing in a manner acceptable to the Government. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. Unless precluded by such requirements, taxes will be withheld therefrom and submitted by this organization.

4. Allowances. You will be entitled to: (a) living quarters allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations. You may be provided quarters by your cover facility or the Government and, in such event, you will not be entitled to the living quarters allowances herein indicated.

(b) Cost of living allowances in conformance with applicable Government regulations including, but not limited to, an education allowance.

5. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for authorized operational travel. In addition, upon the completion of each two (2) years of successful overseas service under this contract, you may be authorized home leave travel expenses for you and your dependents from your permanent post of duty overseas to your place of recorded residence in the United States and return travel expenses to your permanent post of duty overseas provided, however, that you have fulfilled any other requirements relating to home leave which are applicable to Government appointed employees. You may be entitled to per

diem in lieu of subsistence in the course of all travel pursuant hereunder and, when authorized, for you alone while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in compliance with applicable Government regulations or those of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

6. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses including, but not limited to, entertainment and the purchase of information, as specifically approved by the Government. Such funds will be subject to accounting in compliance with Government regulations or those of your cover facility, whichever is directed by the Government.

7. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government or your cover facility to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

8. Benefits. (a) You will be entitled to death and disability benefits equal to those authorized under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended. Claims by you, your heirs, or legal representatives under this paragraph will be processed by this organization in accordance with its procedures in such manner as not to impair security.

(b) You will be entitled to the continuance of pay and allowances in a manner similar to that set forth in the Missing Persons Act (50 U.S.C.A., App. 1001-1015).

(c) You will be entitled to sick and annual leave equal to and subject to the same rules and regulations applicable to Government employees. Annual leave may only be taken at times and places approved in advance by appropriate Government representatives.

(d) Your Civil Service retirement status is preserved by virtue of the fact that you have transferred without a break in service from a position subject to Civil Service retirement deductions to your present status as an employee of the Government under contract. Contributions to the Civil Service Retirement Fund will be deducted by the Government from the basic compensation due you hereunder, i.e., presently $13, 730 per annum. In the event circumstances of your cover warrant or require contributions to social security, such contributions will be at your expense and you will not be reimbursed therefor by the Government.

(e) (1) This organization is authorized to pay the cost of necessary hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by a United States citizen full-time Career Agent in the line of duty while permanently assigned abroad.

(2) This organization may pay certain necessary costs of hospitalization and related travel expenses for illness or injury incurred by

the dependents of a United States citizen full-time Career Agent permanently assigned abroad, while they are located abroad.

It is understood and agreed that the eligibility and extent of the participation by you and your dependents in the above medical programs will be in conformance with the rules, regulations and policies of this organization in effect at the time an illness or injury is incurred, that all claims will be submitted only to this organization and that adjudication of such claims by this organization shall be final and conclusive.

(f) You are herein authorized to apply for enrollment in a health insurance program for certain selected Career Agents of this organization, subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. If accepted, this organization is presently authorized to bear a portion of the premium cost, you will bear the remainder. Your financial contribution will be effected either by payroll deduction or by direct remittance at periodic intervals to be established by this organization.

(g) You will be entitled to claim reimbursement for loss of personal property pursuant to Government regulations pertaining thereto.

9. Offset. Any and all compensation, allowances or other benefits (including benefits in kind) received from or through your cover activities will be used to offset amounts due you under this contract and will reduce accordingly the Government's direct payment obligation hereunder. Sums so offset are payment by the Government under this contract and for purposes of Federal income taxation. You will report every six (6) months during the term of this agreement all benefits received from or through your cover activities and, if such benefits exceed those due you under this contract, the report will be accompanied by said excess amount, which you hereby agree is the sole property of the Government. Failure to submit timely reports and, as appropriate, excess payments, may result in suspension of any payments due you hereunder. As an alternative to the above, the Government may at any time exercise its basic right to require payment over to it of the emoluments received by you from or through your cover activities which would otherwise be offset as described above. In such cases the Government will pay directly to you the emoluments called for by this contract.

10. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services under this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title of record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, which property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U. S. Government, you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship, either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever documents may be required by the Government to evidence this relationship.

11. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this contract and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

12. Instructions. Instructions received by you from the Government in briefing, training or otherwise are a part of this contract and are incorporated herein, provided that such instructions are not inconsistent with the terms hereof.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the Government.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 30 October 1960, and shall continue thereafter for an indefinite period unless sooner terminated either:

(a) Upon thirty (30) days' actual notice by either party hereto, or

(b) Upon actual notice to you in the event the results of an initially required medical examination are determined by this organization to be unsatisfactory, or

(c) Without prior notice by the Government, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Termination of this agreement will not release you from the obligations of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Jeremy K. Benadum

WITNESS: ______________________________

APPROVED:

____

[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible] applicable. Forward original and one copy for each [illegible] contract.

[illegible]: C. L. [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: 2235/2162

[illegible]: [illegible]

DATE: 15 November 1960

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ [illegible] ☐ [illegible]: Jeremy K. BENADUM

2A. PROJECT: LITEMPO

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Mexico City

3. ALLOTMENT NO.:

4. SLOT NO.:

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: None

6. INDIVIDUAL IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED, OR HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include salary)

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): CSC- requested 10 Nov 1960

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Career Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: USA

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 45

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): 8/24/15

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country):

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Mexico City, Mexico

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:

Wife - Born 1/31/17
Daughter - Born 9/17/48
Daughter - Born 3/6/50
Daughter - Born 7/14/51
Son - Born 8/16/57
Daughter - Born 9/19/59

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE: NO

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: US Army

24. RANK OR GRADE: 1st Lt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $13,730 GS-15

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL:

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): None

30. TAXES TO BE WITHHELD BY
☐ COVER
☒ CIA
☐ NOT WITHHELD

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: Yes

32. POST:

33. OTHER: [illegible] LWA,
10% Staff ~~and equalization for Staff Agents~~

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any): Education Allowance

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES ☐ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☒ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☐ YES ☒ NO

37. HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☐ YES ☒ NO

39. TRANSPORTED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PRACTICES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PRACTICES

SECRET

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST PAGE

C. L. Zehrung

2535/3162

15 November 1960

COVER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See Part III of Confidential Fund Regulations or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel. If medical benefits are requested, see [illegible] of successor regulations.)

All those noramlly given a Career Agent including retirement. For more details please refer to IN 38281 dated 5 November 1960 from Mexico City.

SECTION IX COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check) ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check) ☐ PROPRIETARY ☐ CLASSIFIED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

SECTION X OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) ☐ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☒ NONE No income from cover

SECTION XI TERM

51. DURATION indefinite ☐ DAYS ☐ MONTHS ☐ YEARS

52. ~~1 August~~ 30 October 1960

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days) 30

55. [illegible] OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

SECTION XII FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (PI, PP, other)

PI/CE

SECTION XIII DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

run surveillance team

SECTION XIV QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

20 years employment with FBI

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☒ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☐ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK FLUENT	SPEAK AVERAGE	SPEAK POOR	WRITE FLUENT	WRITE AVERAGE	WRITE POOR	READ FLUENT	READ AVERAGE	READ POOR
Spanish	X			X			X		/
German			X						X
French			X						X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

USA

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Latin America

SECTION XV PRIOR EMPLOYMENT

63. JOB AND SALARY PRIOR TO SERVICE FOR CIA

FBI - GS-14, $13,000

Approved by CS/CS Agent Panel

(Date) 29 Nov 1960

Secretary, CS/CS Agent Panel

SECTION XVI ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

NOTE: This is handled strictly as a Mexico
as a straight Career Agent as regards
C.S. PCS - not in [illegible] terms. DK

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
15 November 1960	C. L. Zehrung		

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : [illegible] 60

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : C/WH 2

INFO : COP, C/CCO 2, C/CI, CC/S (SSA), D/OP, S/OS 2, S/C 2

ROUTING
4
5
6

NOV 5 0709Z 60

ROUTINE

IN 38281

DIR CITE MEXI 6677

RYBAT

REF DIR 09217 ([illegible])

1. SUBJ WISHES CAREER AGENT STATUS WITH FOLLOWING:

A. KUBARK RETIREMENT WITH ANY LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR FUTURE;

B. TERMINAL LEAVE [illegible] "ACCRUED [illegible] CARRY-OVER" OF 633 HOURS. SUBJ WISHES GIVE AMOUNT [illegible] FOR THIS TO KUBARK AND HAVE THIS 633 CARRIED OVER.

C. REQUEST BEGIN [illegible] ON 1 NOV. AS KNOWN TO URQUHART, SUBJ HAS BEEN WORKING [illegible] FOR KUBARK WITHOUT PAY.

D. COVER [illegible] STATEMENT FROM BANK IN CALIFORNIA THAT HE HAS "OVER $100,000" ON DEPOSIT. IN ADDITION INCOME FROM PERSONALLY OWNED PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA SUFFICIENT TO TAKE CARE FINANCES NEEDS SUBJ AND FAMILY.

E. FORWARDING COPIES OF LETTER FROM [illegible] CONGRATULATING SUBJ ON COMPLETION [illegible] YEARS [illegible], [illegible] LETTER OF RESIGNATION AND LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE. [illegible] THAT SUBJ WAS IN GOOD STANDING [illegible] AT TIME OF RESIGNATION.

2. [illegible]

CHECK [illegible] MADE WITH [illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

[illegible]

EMPLOYED BY KUBARK. THIS WOULD EMBARRASS [illegible]
TION, WOULD PREJUDICE [illegible] LITEMPO/2 ([illegible] HAS "[illegible]
[illegible] ORIGINAL [illegible]" WITH LITEMPO/2).

3. COS AGREES THAT AFTER A TIME A CHECK COULD BE MADE WITH ODENVY BUT AT PRESENT SUCH CHECK WOULD MAKE IT OBVIOUS THAT INSTEAD OF RESIGNING FOR PERSONAL REASONS SUBJ RESIGNED (AND TOOK LITEMPO/1 WITH HIM) TO COME TO KUBARK.

4. APPRECIATE REF CABLE AND REQUEST ADVICE ON ANY ACTIONS STATION CAN TAKE TO FACILITATE AND SPEED APPROVAL OF PROJECT AND HIRING OF [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUGGESTED STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS, IF STILL PREFERRED STAFF AGENT STATUS, SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: CHARLOTTE L. ZEHRUN
UNIT: WH/3/MEXICO 538
EXT: 2555
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1960

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 2
INFO: COP, C/CCD 2, C/CI, D/OP, D/OS 2, S/C 2, DD/S, SS

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

87521

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 09217

RYBAT

REF: HMMT 1610 *

Jeremy K. [illegible]

1. CHOICE STAFF AGENT STATUS RATHER THAN CAREER OR CONTRACT AGENT STATUS FOR SUBJ MUST BE JUSTIFIED IN DETAIL TO KUDOVE AGENT PANEL WHICH IN PAST KNOWN TO FAVOR CAREER AGENT STATUS FOR THIS TYPE INDIVIDUAL. IF PANEL APPROVES STAFF STATUS THEY SUBMIT CASE TO CHIEF KUDOVE WHO MUST APPROVE EXCEPTION TO KUDOVE POLICY OF NO HIRING OF STAFF TYPE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES AT HIGH GRADES.

2. SUGGEST STATION RECONSIDER AND USE CAREER OR CONTRACT STATUS. IF STILL PREFER STAFF AGENT STATUS SUBMIT DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CHOICE.

3. DOES SUBJ WANT KUBARK RETIREMENT BENEFITS? UNDER CAREER AGENT STATUS MAY HAVE RETIREMENT OR SOCIAL SECURITY.

4. UNDER STAFF OR CAREER AGENT STATUS CANNOT PICK UP SUBJ UNTIL END OF PAID TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD HOWEVER SUBJ MAY ATTEST TO ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE ACCRUED AS OF END EMPLOYMENT ODENVY AND REIMBURSE KUBARK FOR ALL UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH CAN BE CREDITED TO HIM UNDER KUBARK. ADVISE DATES TERMINAL LEAVE PERIOD AND CHOICE.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

PAGE 2

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

PRECEDENCE
☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY — INITIALS
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE — INITIALS

OUT 87521 CIR 09217

TO
INFO
CITE DIR

5. POUCH DETAILS COVER. STATION MAY WISH CONSIDER CONTRACT AGENT STATUS IF OFFSET CLAUSE APPLICABLE.

6. FORWARD HQS COPY ODENVY RESIGNATION ACTION SUBJ AND REASONS SUBJS RESIGNATION.

7. KUSODA DEEMS DISCREET CHECK ODENVY RECORDS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH BASIC SECURITY PRACTICES. BELIEVE FAILURE INDICATE TO ODENVY ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS POSSIBLE OP INTEREST IN SUBJ MAY HARM RELATIONS BETWEEN ODENVY AND KUBARK AT BOTH HQS AND FIELD LEVEL IF KUBARK USE OF SUBJ EVER DETECTED. IF SUBJS COVERT ACTIVITIES EVER UNCOVERED IT WOULD BE ASSUMED HIS WORK BEING DONE ON BEHALF ODENVY WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING KUBARK. IN VIEW ~~XXXXXXXX~~ RESIGNATION SUBJ HQS DOES NOT SEE HOW INFORMING ODENVY COULD JEOPARDIZE LITEMPO OP. STATION COMMENTS ON ABOVE REQUESTED. IF STATION STILL FIRM ON STAND NO ODYOKE CHECKS AND HAS CONSIDERATIONS OVERRIDING POINTS CITED ABOVE, PLS CABLE DETAILS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CASE BY CHIEF KUSODA. LCFLUTTER REQUIRED FOR STAFF STATUS.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Subject is George Munro

WH/Pers/Bowers
CPD/Leutcher
Agent Panel/Armstrong
D/IB/CG/Hamby
CI/OPS/Brown
COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

NED P. HOLMAN
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIGREN, Lee H.

INCLUSIVE DATES: 11 Sept 1950 - 12 JAN 1978

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: Office of Personnel

ROOM: 5E 13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

[illegible] SETB 70 Aug EOD 11 Aug EOD 21 [illegible]
[illegible] Compilation 1 Oct. 1964

WIGREN LEE H
SSN 026-16-4673
DOB 12/

[illegible]
INTERNAL USE ONLY

12 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

VIA : Head of Career Service

FROM : B. DeFelice
Acting Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to inform each employee, well in advance of retirement, of the services the Agency provides for retirement planning.

2. The prospect of retirement deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency offers various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. You will, in the future, be invited by a Retirement Counselor to an individual pre-retirement counseling session, or more than one if you wish. This phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security, taxes, and assistance in obtaining other employment. In addition, you will be invited to attend a Retirement Information Seminar that will be offered in the autumn of 1978.

3. Experience has amply demonstrated that advance preparation eases the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

B DeFelice
B. DeFelice

[illegible]
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 19 AUGUST 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 29 YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND OBCA: T227-0171 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OP~~ERATIONS~~ S OFFICER SAS (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ15
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $30,441
18. REMARKS: FROM: CIS EQ27

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 08/23/76
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CHG/14 K. Seali
DATE SIGNED: 8/24/76

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 33560 ALPHABETIC CIS
22. STATION CODE: 75613
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. OCCUPS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. 01 YR. 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OBCA 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 31 AUG 1976 Bl 8.25.76
46. C.P. APPROVAL: Robert H.
DATE APPROVED: 08/31/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 MARCH 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 28 | YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR ✓
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ✓ | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. [illegible]: 6227-0171 | 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH ✓
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER CH (15) ✓
12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27 ✓
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA ✓
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓
16. GRADE AND STEP: 14 5 ✓
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 30,441 ✓
18. REMARKS:

from GS-13/8

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: N.D. McCallum
N.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 03/24/76
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Richard L. Schmidt
CMG/13
DATE SIGNED: 4 March 1976

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	31500	CIS	25213		1	12 01 23	03 28 76	03 28 76

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: OK 3/25/76
46 O.P. APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 3/26/76

FORM 7-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

75-67

21 NOV 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: John P. O'Reilly
Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT : Letter of Commendation

We have just completed a high level, sensitive conference of considerable importance to both this Directorate and the Agency. You had the responsibility for virtually every aspect of its organization and administration. The planning and execution had to be done with comprehensive attention to detail without losing sight of our overall objectives. For weeks in advance and, particularly, during the conference itself you carried out your duties with energy, skill and competence which have reflected very creditably upon the Agency. You showed considerable tact and alertness in anticipating problems before they could arise. The close and cooperative relationship you established with the command and support personnel at the meeting site, and your obvious rapport with our various guests, also contributed to the efficient yet cordial environment in which the conference was conducted. You faced demanding and often complex responsibilities, and I commend you for your excellent performance in meeting them.

/s/ William E. Nelson

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 365248

SECRET

24 DEC 1975

CI 535-75

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DDO Evaluation Boards

FROM : Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation for Lee H. Wigren

1. I recommend that Lee H. Wigren be promoted from GS-13 to GS-14. Mr. Wigren has been in grade since May 1962 and is now a GS-13, Step 8. He currently occupies a GS-15, Operations Officer, Branch Chief position.

2. Mr. Wigren was born 1 December 1923. He received a BA degree in Russian Studies from Yale University in 1947 and an MA degree in History from Harvard University in 1950. He entered on duty with CIA as a GS-06 clerk in March 1951. He subsequently attained professional status as an Intelligence Officer in 1952 and since that time has served variously as Intelligence Officer, Area Operations Officer, Biographics Officer, Instructor, and Operations Officer in DIV/D, Europe Division, SE Division, OTR, and since 1968 the Counterintelligence Staff.

3. Most of Mr. Wigren's career has involved CE and CI matters. He has been primarily concerned with various aspects of the Counterintelligence research and analysis activity of SE Division and, since 1968, the Counterintelligence Staff. In the course of his various assignments, he has developed a broad and deep substantive knowledge of the Soviet intelligence and security organs and their activities which has made him one of our more knowledgeable and effective CI analysts. He is careful and thorough in his research, he writes well, and he has an established reputation within and without CIA as an interesting and effective lecturer concerning counterintelligence matters. His career record reflects a consistently professional performance of above-average quality in his various CIA assignments. Additionally, that record is documented by several letters of appreciation from other US Government agencies and foreign liaison services for the highly professional assistance provided them by Mr. Wigren in the counterintelligence field.

E2 IMPDET CL BY 062205

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4. Mr. Wigren is currently Chief of the External Research Branch of the CI Research and Analysis Group. He is performing the duties and responsibilities of this GS-15 position in a satisfactory manner. He manages the complex activities of six staff officers and nine contract personnel associated with this Branch and is responsible for the several research programs in which they are involved. He strives to direct and combine the best talents of the personnel under his supervision toward the achievement of his Branch's objectives while remaining sensitive to the personal and career interests of his employees. He is especially effective in dealing with the several contract personnel (including former defectors) under his supervision who, because of their professional status and diverse ethnic backgrounds, sometimes require especially understanding treatment.

5. In summary, Mr. Wigren is effectively and satisfactorily performing the duties of a GS-15 Branch Chief in a position which requires specialized substantive knowledge and the ability to manage activities and supervise personnel. I believe that his demonstrated ability in this position and his sustained record of job performance at an above-average level since his last promotion clearly merit his promotion to GS-14 at this time.

George T. Kalaris
Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 28 NOVEMBER 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DELEGATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V ✓ | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND ...: 6227-0170 | 0002

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/~~CI STAFF~~ CIS ✓
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~OPERATIONS~~ OPS OFFICER CH (15) ✓

12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27 ✓

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA ✓

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01 ✓

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 8 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 28,254 ✓

18. REMARKS

13A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG

DATE SIGNED: 11/28/75

13B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/13

DATE SIGNED: 28/11/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 | ALPHABETIC CIS

22. STATION CODE: 75813

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. ... CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 | DA. 01 | YR. 23

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO

34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37. LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA. | YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI · HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-2-75 HR

03 DEC 1975

... APPROVAL: Rasmussen

DATE APPROVED: 12/2/75

FORM 1-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

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[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20F

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 SEPTEMBER 1975

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 | DAY 15 | YEAR 75

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX | V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 6227-0170 | 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS ~~OPERATIONS~~ OFFICER CH (15)

12. POSITION NUMBER: EQ27

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 8

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 26,905

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: M.D. MCCALLUM, C/CI/SG
DATE SIGNED: 09/15/75

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: CMG/13
DATE SIGNED: 17/9/75

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 | ALPHABETIC C13

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. ROOTS CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. 01 YR. 23

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. MTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP | CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-18-75 03 OCT 1975

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 10/03/75

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DD/O 24-6450

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20374

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

C-2037/IS-2

2 5 JAN 1974

Mr. William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Nelson:

(C) It is a distinct pleasure for me to express my sincere appreciation to Messrs. Raymond Rocca, William Decker, William Donnelly, John Bogart, Joseph Flaherty, Lee Wigren, Robert Thomas and Paul Johnson, all members of your staff, for their outstanding participation and support of our new "Soviet Intelligence Elective Seminar." This seminar provided an in-depth examination of the Soviet Intelligence and Security Services for twelve graduate degree candidates enrolled in the School's new Masters Degree Program in Strategic Intelligence.

(U) Each Agency participant displayed a thorough knowledge of the subject interlaced with personal experiences and analyses which made each presentation unique and extremely valuable for the seminar members. In addition to the participants' formal presentations, they also spent valuable time informally talking with individual members of the seminar and faculty. Our students and faculty were enthusiastic in their praise of all aspects for the program; and they especially appreciated the candid discussions of the problems Soviet intelligence poses both for the Agency and the Intelligence Community. Please convey to each participant our sincere thanks for his outstanding presentation and his interest in the School's Graduate Program.

(U) Your continued cooperation in assisting this School to educate students whose intelligence capabilities will be an asset to the Services and Intelligence Community is deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

W. J. Furnas

W. J. FURNAS
Captain, USN
Commandant

Classified by IS-2
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY Two (2)
DECLASSIFY ON cannot be determined

CONFIDENTIAL

"Derivative information from material governed by CIA Regulation 10-29"

SECRET
(When Filled In)

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REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 June 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 14 | YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9 0227-0170
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER (14)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0213
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: 16329
18. REMARKS

FROM: DDS/OTR (Position No. 1238)

CONCUR:
OTR/Personnel

cc: Finance & Security

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/OS 6-24-68
Uc 7-10 68

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Byron B. Burnes
CI STAFF

DATE SIGNED: 20 June 68

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Paul M. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 27 Jun 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 | ALPHABETIC CI
22. STATION CODE: 75313
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOOURS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 | DA. 10 | YR. 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. | DA. | YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. / PROV. TEMP | CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—YES | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP. | STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From OTR
CE 28-68 [illegible]
46. OP APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 6/24/68

D
4

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

Executive Registry
67-1576

South African Police Headquarters,
Private Bag 94,
Pretoria.

17th March, 1967.

Mr. R. Helms,
Central Intelligence Agency,
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Mr Helms,

During a recent conversation with one of my officers in connection with the visit of Mr. Henry Pluenke and Mr. Leo Wigren, it suddenly dawned on me that although I had, at the time, requested both Mr. John Mertz and Messrs. Pluenke and Wigren to convey my sincere thanks and good wishes to you - which I am sure they did - I had not yet written to you personally in connection with the matter.

Hank and Lee, as we affectionately remember them, proved themselves to be most worthy ambassadors of your country, as well as your service and I feel convinced that they left behind them a number of sincere new friends. They are both obviously experienced officers with a wide and thorough knowledge of their respective fields and we found their lectures highly instructive.

Fortunately, circumstances permitted the majority of my senior officers to attend the course in Pretoria and the lucid manner in which Hank and Lee delivered their lectures, brought us all under a new and deeper awareness of the vital role being played by the United States in the struggle against international communism, and for the very great need of unity and closer co-operation amongst the peoples of the free world if the communist onslaught is to be successfully withstood.

Please once again accept my sincere thanks for having made two such able and experienced officers as Hank and Lee available for the purpose of lecturing to us.

Kindest regards,
Sincerely,

---------------------- Major-General.
H.J. VAN DEN BERGH.
/RVZ

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
FORT HOLABIRD MARYLAND 21219

IN REPLY REFER TO:

15 March 1967

Mr. John H. Richardson
Director of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia 20505

Dear Mr. Richardson:

It is a pleasure to express the appreciation of the Staff and Faculty of the U. S. Army Intelligence School for the presentation by Mr. Lee A. Wigren, at Fort Holabird, on 8 March 1967, to personnel attending Class 67-SO-2 of the Senior Foreign Officer Intelligence Course.

Mr. Wigren's discussion of current trends in Soviet foreign policy was factual and timely. His examples of Soviet activity in the foreign policy sphere in Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa were of definite value to this class. The talk was highly interesting and was enthusiastically received.

Thank you for your continued cooperation in our guest speaker program. Would you please convey to Mr. Wigren the appreciation of the Staff and Faculty.

Sincerely,

Richard S. Smith

RICHARD S. SMITH
Colonel, AIS
Commandant

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lee H. Wigren

8 August 1966

THROUGH : Head of CI Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Non-eligibility for Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. As you may know, we are in the process of reviewing the employment history and current career field of all employees in the Agency to identify those who are eligible for designation as a participant in the new CIA Retirement and Disability System. In this process, the initial review of each case is made by the individual's Career Service. If the Head of his Career Service nominates him for participation in the System, this nomination is reviewed by the CIA Retirement Board which recommends final action to me. However, if the Head of the Career Service advises that the employee does not meet the basic requirements of HR 20-50 for participation, I have accepted this finding without further review by the CIA Retirement Board. This practice has been adopted in the interest of expediting this screening process so that those employees who are eligible to participate in the System may be designated participants as soon as possible.

2. In your case, the Head of your Career Service has advised me that you do not meet the requirements of HR 20-50 for designation as a participant and I have accordingly made the formal determination required by the regulation that you are not eligible for designation. From a review of your record it appears that the decision of your Career Service was based upon the fact that you have 15 years or more of Agency service, but have not as yet performed 60 months of qualifying service as required by regulation. My determination that you are not eligible at this time for designation in no way affects your current status under the Civil Service Retirement System, nor does it preclude reconsideration of your eligibility to participate in the CIA System if you should meet the requirements for designation in the future.

3. Should you desire further information concerning the requirements for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement System, I suggest that you read paragraph e of HR 20-50 and paragraph 5 of the Employee Bulletin dated 30 July 1965, entitled "Public Law 88-643, The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees."

4. It is always possible that the records upon which the determination made in your case may have been incomplete or inaccurate regarding your actual employment history with the Agency. If, after studying the materials cited above, you have questions regarding the determination that you are not eligible to participate in the CIA Retirement System, please feel free to contact officials of your Career Service. They are familiar with the details of your case and will gladly discuss them with you. In addition, you may wish to discuss your case with the CIA Retirement Staff located in Room 205, Magazine Building (extension 2847). If such discussions do not resolve any questions you have regarding your eligibility, you may request that your case be formally considered by the CIA Retirement Board. However, this request must be made within 30 days of the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D Echols
Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

OFFICE (AND DIVISION)

ORIGINAL	SERVICE COMPUTATION DATE (Mo. - day - yr)
CORRECTION	
THIS DATE	SIGNATURE (Office of Personnel)

FORM 171 — CONFIDENTIAL — GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION — (4)

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 7 April 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, Lee H.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH [illegible] DAY YEAR 65

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5275-2500

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
School of International Communism
Faculty

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Instr~~uctor~~ Intel (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1238

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.31

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 ~~2~~ 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~12,075~~ 12915

18. REMARKS:

Security Approval Granted by Pers. SD/CS 4/14/65

[illegible] 4/21/65

Vice Henry Samoriski

CONCUR: [illegible] 4/20/65 CSPO/A

CONCUR: [illegible] SR Personnel 4-19-65

CONCUR: CSPO/B

Recorded by CSPD [illegible]

1cc forwarded to Payroll; 1 cc forwarded to Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: MATTHEW BAIRD, Director of Trng

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 1[illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 17500 ALPHABETIC OTR
22. STATION CODE: 7561
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOQTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. [illegible] 01 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] SR [illegible]
46. O P APPROVAL: A. B[illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 4-21-65

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(14)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1962

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006195 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 13 YEAR 62
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 2234 1000 1000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/SR
Chief, Operations and Plans
Counterintelligence Branch
Research Section
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (CH) ~~D~~
12. POSITION NUMBER: 351
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ~~14~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 1
17. SALARY OR RATE: $10635 ✓
18. REMARKS:

From same slot.

VS

19A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: A. Bu
ANDREW L. BUSBY, C/SR/PERSONNEL
DATE SIGNED:
19B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 5/10/62

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	60080	SR			1	12 / 23		

28. [illegible] EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.:
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 = CSC 3 = FICA 5 = NONE; CODE:
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: [illegible] MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 = NONE 1 = 5 PT. 2 = 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. MIL. SERV. CREDITED: 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 = WAIVED 1 = YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 16-62
46. O.P. APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 5/10/62

SECRET

SECRET

5 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board, Secretary

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation for Mr. Lee H. Wigren

1. In recommending most strongly Mr. Wigren's promotion from GS-12 to GS-13, I feel it is only necessary to emphasize Mr. Wigren's educational background at Yale and Harvard, where he received a B.A. and M.A. in History and Russian; his ten years of work in the Agency on Soviet intelligence in the CI Staff, FI/D, and SR Division; his ability during the past three years in SR to supervise a group of over twelve people performing a variety of research functions, ranging from major studies to operational aids, on the RIS; his appreciation of the counter-intelligence role of the Agency and his furtherance of our mission in that respect by the high standards of excellence of his production; and his vigor in assuming and carrying out the duties of a job formerly held by a GS-15.

2. Mr. Wigren has been in grade for almost four years. He has had responsibilities and performed duties far above his grade level for three of those years while dealing with practically all of the DD/P, other agencies of the government, and foreign intelligence and security services. He is an acknowledged expert in his field and equalled in it by no one else in the Agency, and possibly in the government as a whole. His fitness reports have reflected superior performance in every important respect and outstanding performance in many ways, with the highest personal characteristics possible, doing a job on a uniquely difficult subject, while using and training personnel who all too often have had little or no background for their positions.

3. In my opinion, Mr. Wigren is the most qualified GS-12 in the Division for promotion to GS-13, and I believe that the above comments and our four previous promotion recommendations amply support me.

John M. Maury

JOHN M. MAURY
Chief, SR Division

SECRET

2 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/CE

SUBJECT : Promotion Request,
Leo H. WIGREN

1. It is requested that Mr. Wigren be promoted to GS-13.

2. Mr. Wigren received his BA from Yale in 1947, majoring in history and Russian language and area studies, and his MA from Harvard in 1948 in history. He came on duty with the Soviet Intelligence Branch of what was then Staff C in March 1951, and stayed with that branch as a research analyst on Soviet Intelligence until after its transfer to SR/CE in early 1955, when he transferred to WE Division in search of a field assignment. Such assignment having become increasingly doubtful by 1957, he transferred to FI/D where he remained until assignment to this Division in April 1959 as Chief of SR/CE/Research.

3. I might as well admit at the start that I have known Mr. Wigren since we were in high school together and I have always been impressed with his ability, particularly in the research field. Additionally, he has been in or close to research on Soviet Intelligence for the past 8½ years. This, combined with his academic background in research methodology, history in general and Russian history in particular, made him my natural choice for his present job although I had never worked directly with him before. In the past five months, I have had reason to be happy about my choice. The main need in SR/CE/Research has been for an established program of studies which we might expect to be produced in regular order; this has been a need, to my personal knowledge, since 1955. Mr. Wigren has quietly set up such a schedule with realistic target dates, is in touch with each study at each point during its production, and shows every indication of meeting his deadlines. He has a long-range interest in counter-intelligence, knows what he is doing and why, and is able to orient his subordinates properly and direct their efforts.

4. Although Mr. Wigren has been in grade only a relatively short time, since April 1958, I feel that he is doing a difficult job excellently and that his promotion is justified on the basis of academic background, Agency experience and current performance.

EDWARD W. KNOWLES
SR/COP/CE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) Lee (Middle) H
2. GRADE GS-7
3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION FI
BRANCH Staff C - CE
☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-19-52 To 4-19-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial
☐ Reassignment
☒ Annual
☐ Reassignment of Supervisor
☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Under general supervision, examine the structure and operational methods of Soviet intelligence services, and prepare studies based on this examination.
2. Conduct research to determine current relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellite countries.
3. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters and training.
4. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas, and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.
5. Assist in the review of Country Plans from the counterespionage viewpoint.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

The following courses were completed during the period April to July 1951, and have not been previously reported:

1.Basic Orientation Course; 2.Basic Intelligence Course; 3.Operations Course; and 4.Advanced Operations Course.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? Research, analysis, and support -- all mainly in the field of counterespionage.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.
DATE 21 April 1953
SIGNATURE Lee H Wigren

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Highly satisfactory. Has displayed conspicuous good judgment, accuracy, and cooperation.

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Judgment

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Knowledge of Soviet Intelligence, particularly operational analysis, for which he has shown a special aptitude.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Shows capacity for improvement and eventual leadership.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Training adequate. Eventual operational experience, preferably in Scandinavian area, desirable.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE 21 April 1953
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR George E.

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

DATE 21 April '53
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Newton D Holbrook

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ITEMS 1 THROUGH 8 WILL BE COMPLETED BY TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS BRANCH WHEN ACTION IS INITIATED IN PERSONNEL DIVISION

ROUTING AND ACTION SLIP FOR PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

DATE MAR 9 1953

1. NAME (Last) [illegible]	(First) Leo	(Middle) H	2. GRADE GS-7	3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.	
4. OFFICE DDP	STAFF OR DIVISION FI	BRANCH ~~S~~ STC	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION	
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-19-52 To 4-19-53	6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☐ Reassignment	☒ Annual ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor	☐ Special		
7. DATE REPORT DUE IN PERSONNEL OFFICE 4-11-53			8. AUTHENTICATION (T&R BRANCH)		

ROUTING AND ACTION

REQUIRED ACTION	PERSON TO TAKE ACTION	DATE ACTION COMPLETED	INITIALS
9. a. Obtain two copies of CIA Form 37-151. b. Enter data in Items 1 through 6, above, in corresponding spaces of FER forms. c. Attach this action form and pamphlet "Your Evaluation Report" to FER forms. d. Deliver forms to immediate supervisor of person to be evaluated.	Evaluations Officer	20 Apr 53	DBP
10. a. Deliver forms to person to be evaluated. b. Offer advice and assistance.	Supervisor	21 Apr 53	ESB
11. a. Complete Items 7 through 10. b. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Person to be Evaluated	21 Apr 53	LHW
12. a. Complete Items 11 through 17. b. Attach warning memo, if required. c. Deliver forms to reviewing official (supervisor next in line).	Supervisor	21 April 53	ESB
13. a. Review the evaluation. b. Discuss complete evaluation and recommendations with supervisor. c. Record additional comments on forms. d. Sign forms in Item 19. e. Deliver forms to supervisor.	Reviewing Official	21 Apr '53	WSW
14. a. Discuss all aspects of evaluation with person being evaluated. (Explain right of appeal, if warning memo is prepared.) b. Sign forms in Item 18. c. Deliver forms to Evaluations Officer.	Supervisor	21 Apr 53	ESB
15. a. Deliver original copy of evaluation form to Transactions and Records Branch, Personnel Division. b. Retain the carbon copy for use of operating office and Office Career Service Board. c. Detach Instruction Sheet of Form 37-151 if Item 20 (continuation) is unused.	Evaluations Officer	APR 21 1953	DBP

FORM NO. 37-151A
SEP 1952

SECRET

1401

SECRET

~~R~~EQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTIO~~N~~

VOUCHERED
8 AUGUST 1959

1. Serial No.: 106198
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN LEE H
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 12 Da. 01 Yr. 23
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt.-1, 10 Pt.-2): Code 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51
7. SCD: Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 43
8. CSC Retire. (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 j
10. Appt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2): Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF
RESEARCH XXXXXXXX SECTION

Code: 4824

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. -): Code 2
17. Position Title: ~~XX XX~~ OPS OFFICER
18. Position No.: 0400
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.~~XX~~ 01
21. Grade & Step: 12 1
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 8330
23. SD: 01
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58
25. WGI Due: Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59
26. Appropriation Number: 0234 1000 1000
XXXXXXXXXXX

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT
Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 08 Da. 23 Yr. 59
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR
Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP SR
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF
RESEARCH SECTION

Code: 4824

32. Location Of Official Station: WASH., D. C.
Station Code: 75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept. - USfld. - Frgn. -): Code 2
34. Position Title: OPS OFFICER
35. Position No.: D-14 351
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.01
38. Grade & Step: 12 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 8330
40. SD: DI
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
42. WGI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
43. Appropriation Number: 0234 1000 1000

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): E. C. JOHNSON X4407
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title):

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		8/17/59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: PER NEW T/O

SECRET

FORM NO. 1152
MAR 57

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V		V to UV	
UV to V		UV to UV	

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: Mo 03 Da 26 Yr 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo / Da / Yr	4. Vet. Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 / Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo / Da / Yr
106198	WIGREN, LEE H.	12 / 01 / 23	1	M 1	03 / 19 / 51

7. SCD Mo / Da / Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes-1 No-2 / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo / Da / Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 / Code	12. LCD Mo / Da / Yr	13. Mil Serv Cred - LCD Yes-1 No-2 / Code
03 / 24 / 43	1	50 USC 403 j			03 / 19 / 51	2

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT		WASH., D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-1, Unfld-, Fran-) / Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	712	GS	0132.21

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	25. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	26. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI			9 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo / Da / Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT		04 / 19 / 59	REGULAR		

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH AND SUPPORT SECTION		WASH., D. C.	

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-XXX, Unfld-, Fran-) / Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	IO CI	400 1-12	GS	0136.53

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo / Da / Yr	42. PSI Due Mo / Da / Yr	43. Appropriation Number
12 1	$ 8330	DI	4 / 20 / 58	10 / 19 / 59	9 3400 20 001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): ANDREW L. BUSBY CH/SR/PERSONNEL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): CHARLES B. REDMOND X4407

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): CONCURRENCE: FI/PERS

Date Approved: 14 April 59

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		1959	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: Two copies of this action have been forwarded to the Office of Security. One copy has been furnished Vouchered Payroll.

CONCURRENCE:
WM. K. HARVEY, C. / A.C. FI/D

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

3/3/57

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.: [illegible]
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): [illegible]
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 12 Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2): Code 1
5. Sex: [illegible]
6. CS - EOD: Mo. [illegible] Da. 1 Yr. [illegible]
7. SCD: Mo. XX Da. XX Yr. [illegible]
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2): Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: [illegible]
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2): Code
12. LCD: Mo. [illegible] Da. [illegible] Yr. [illegible]
13. Mil. Serv. Credit, Ltd. (Yes-1, No-2): Code -

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP FI STAFF
DIVISION D
COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION
BIOGRAPHIC UNIT

Code: 4105
15. Location Of Official Station: WASH. D. C.
Station Code: 75913
16. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -): Code 2
17. Position Title: BIOGRAPHIC OFF
18. Position No.: 712
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0132.31
21. Grade & Step: 11 3
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 6820 ~~[illegible]~~
23. SD: 01
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. 01 Da. 16 Yr. 55
25. PSI Due: Mo. 01 Da. 12 Yr. 56
26. Appropriation Number: 8 2305 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Promotion
Code: 30
28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.): 20 APR 1958
29. Type Of Employee: Regular
Code: 01
30. Separation Date:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
Code: 4109
32. Location Of Official Station:
Station Code:
33. Dept. - Field (Dept -, USfld -, Frgn -): Code
34. Position Title:
35. Position No.: [illegible]
36. Serv.:
37. Occup. Series:
38. Grade & Step: 12 1
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 7570
40. SD:
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]
42. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr. [illegible]
43. Appropriation Number:

Approved by CS Career Service Panel
[illegible] 4/5/58

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Frank B. Rowlett - C/FI/Div D
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Lee Shields - 8312
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): E Johnson FI/PO

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	[illegible]
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	11 1958	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[illegible]	[illegible]

Remarks

1152

14 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FI

VIA: FI/Personnel

SUBJECT: Personnel Action (Promotion)

1. It is recommended that Mr. Lee WIGREN be promoted from GS-11 to GS-12. Mr. Wigren has been in his present grade since 16 January 1955. Since he was assigned to Division D on 23 September 1957, he has been under my supervision. His performance during this time has been at least at a GS-12 level.

2. Mr. Wigren's duties warrant a GS-12. He is primarily engaged in research of a complex and tedious nature which requires a high degree of professional competence.

3. Mr. Wigren deserves a promotion on the basis of his job performance. Since coming under my supervision, he has consistently shown himself to be a conscientious, dilligent and capable employee; and the high quality of his reports are indicative of his intelligence, flair for research, and ability to write effectively.

Albert P. Kergel
ALBERT P. KERGEL
Chief, Special Activities Br., FI/D

APPROVED:

Frank B Rowlett
FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/Division D

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.:
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WIGREN, LEE H.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 12 Da 1 Yr 23
4. Vet. Pref.: None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 — Code 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo Da Yr
7. SCD: Mo Da Yr
8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2: Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority:
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo Da Yr
11. FEGLI: Yes-1 No-2 Code
12. LCD: Mo Da Yr
13. Mil Serv Credit LCD: Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
3 DDP/WE
Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, TM
Sweden

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.

Station Code:

16. Dept.- Field: Dept - XX, Usfld-, Frgn - — Code
17. Position Title: Area Ops Officer
18. Position No.: ~~BB~~-55
19. Serv.: 65
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: ~~GS~~-11 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 6605
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo Da Yr
25. PSI Due: Mo Da Yr
26. Appropriation Number: 8-3600-20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT — Code 57
28. Eff. Date: Mo 11 Da 17 Yr 57
29. Type Of Employee: Regular — Code 01
30. Separation Date:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP FI Staff
19 Division D Counter-Espionage Section
Biographic Unit

Code: 4101

32. Location Of Official Station: Washington, D. C.

Station Code:

33. Dept.- Field: Dept - XX, Usfld-, Frgn - — Code
34. Position Title: Biographic Officer
35. Position No.: ~~BB~~-712-~~01~~
36. Serv.: 65
37. Occup. Series: 0132.31
38. Grade & Step: ~~GS~~-11 2
39. Salary Or Rate: $ 6605
40. SD: DI
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 01 Da 16 Yr 55
42. PSI Due: Mo 01 Da 12 Yr 58
43. Appropriation Number: 8-2305-23

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): FRANK B. ROWLETT, Chief, FI/D

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Jean E. Stake, ~~Xxxx~~ Ext. 4245

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): E. Johnson FI/PO

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[illegible]	[illegible]/57	D. Placement	[illegible]	11/6/57
B. Pos. Control	[illegible]	[illegible]	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shaw	

Remarks:

[illegible] WE/PT

FORM 1152a 5-57

Sec. Clear [illegible] 11/7/57

11/18

(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Personnel Folder

SUBJECT : Career Development Plan - for WIGREN, Lee H.

An individual career plan has been developed on the above subject, approved on 20 November 1956 and is on file in the FI Career Management Office.

ROBERT K. SKEELS
FI Career Management Officer

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Lee H. WIGREN	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 7 July 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ASAP B. APPROVED:	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Officer BB 55
GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.
DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL DP

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Incumbent, Carter, to be reassigned to field slot in WE.

~~Approved~~ Forwarded
JUL 26 1955
DMCollins
PP/Career Service

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) AM Gregg WE
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
H. E. EISSNER, x 3124

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FI/Ome

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL.

SD-DI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3600-20 TO: same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION		26 JUL 1955	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCR	26 Jul 55	
E.			
F. APPROVED BY		26 July 55	

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Lee H. WIGREN
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 23 Feb. 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: ASAP
B. APPROVED: 13 Mar 1955
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Off. (FI) BV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11
GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 p.a.
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, PM Sweden
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Fitness report of October 1954 is current, adequate and needs no change or modification.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*): Ann Gregg
A. M. GREGG, Personnel Officer, WE

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*): H. F. [illegible], X 2422

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (WMB)
Title: C/CMO 1 March 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	S-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD - DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-2305-23
TO: 5-3600-20
I certify funds available:
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: Mass.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Oblig. Ref. No. —
Charge Allot. No. 5-3600-20
Auth. Officer R. Martin

3-3-55
3-16-55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	DLC	3/10
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		3/11
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
R. A. Strickler
R. [illegible] 11 MAR 1955

10-67329-3

23 February 1955

TO: Chief, WE/1

FROM: SR/CE/Holbrook usf

SUBJECT: Transfer of Personnel

1. This is to notify you that Lee H. Wigren, currently assigned to SR/CE, is available for release to WE/1.

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in Items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Lee H. WIGREN
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/1/23
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 9 Dec. 1954
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): PROMOTION
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 1-6
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Off. (FI) EV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Off. (FI) EV 227 *
GS-0136.51-9 $5185 p.a.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940 p.a.
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

* This slot recently upgraded

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): CW. Tenney
C. W. Tenney, Acting C/SIB

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Marguerite Roney Ext. 3535

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: J. P. Humphrey
Title: FI/ADMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 5-2305-23
TO:
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION	CS	1/5
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	BM	1/7/55
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

-7 JAN 1955

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 10, December 1954

NAME: Leo H. Wigren

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

X	PROMOTION		REASSIGNMENT	OTHER (Explain)
	ROTATION		TRAVEL	

FROM: Intell. Off. GS-9
Staff C Wash.

TO: Intell. Off. GS-11
Staff C Wash.

AOS

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	OTHER TRAINING COURSES	DATE TAKEN
	BIC(CS), ALSO				
	BIC, BITC, SOC,	51			
	BTP AND BOC				
	BTP II, ALSO OC	51			
	BTP III, ALSO				
	AIC, AITC, AOC	51			
	AND CAI				
	PO, ALSO PM I,				
	II, III AND RAFT				
	ITC ALSO CI				
	TECH				
	ADMIN				
	SIC	51			
	SUP				
	CEA				
	RPTS				
	OB				
	OSC (CE)	CC.		OCE	Oct 54
	E & E				
	CPW				
	WP SOC				
	CPO				
	STB				
	CEW				
	IT				
	GW				
	SAB				
	AO				
	MO				
	SUR				
	BFOT				
	DOC				
	LOCKS				
	S/W				
	F & S				
	SAF				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☑ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.

2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

STAFF TRAINING OFFICE COMMENTS:

☐ A. THIS ☐ DOES ☐ DOES NOT MEET MINIMUM TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN S, THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY MINIMUM STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE, WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT.

SIGNATURE OF STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,
M. RONEY

FROM: Career Management Officer
J. P. HUMPHRIES

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 59-77
1 JAN 54
PREVIOUS EDITION MAY BE USED
REPLACES FORM NO. 59-112
AUG 1953 WHICH MAY BE USED

(2-4-45)

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
in the CAREER STAFF of the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

To the Director of Central Intelligence
Sir:

I submit herewith my application for membership in the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency as defined below:

> "The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency is a group of carefully selected and trained individuals who accept an obligation to devote themselves to the needs of the Agency, and who intend to make a career with the Agency."

In accordance with this definition, I desire to devote myself to the faithful performance of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency, and I accept the obligations and conditions of that service which are determined to be essential to the furtherance of its mission.

I am aware of the many restrictions necessarily placed upon me by virtue of the security requirements inherent in my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am also aware that as a member of the Career Staff, it will be my obligation to serve anywhere and at any time and for any kind of duty as determined by the needs of the Agency, and I have been assured that in order to carry out this policy, full consideration will be given to my particular capabilities, interests, and personal circumstances. By virtue of this application for membership and upon my acceptance in the Career Staff, I am assured that, with continuing satisfactory work performance and conduct on my part, just and equitable attention will be accorded my personal progress during my tenure in the Career Staff. I am also assured that, on my satisfactory completion of any assignments, I will be offered reassignments which are compatible insofar as possible with my abilities and career interests, and that I shall be entitled to the benefits now available or to be made available in the future to members of the Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(Signature)

20 September 1954
(Date)

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CAREER STAFF OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APPROVED, TO TAKE EFFECT 1 JUN 1954
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
~~THE CIA SELECTION BOARD~~

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1950—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed.* If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 23	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ~~23 Feb 54~~	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):		B. APPROVED: 14 Feb 54	

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer BV 227	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer(FI) BV227
GS 132 9 $5060 per annum	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS0136.51-9 $5060 per annum
~~DD/FI~~ ~~Staff C~~ ~~Soviet Intelligence Branch~~ ~~Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sect.~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell.Ops. Guidance Sect.
~~Washington, D.C.~~	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13 VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	S-PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14 POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L A	REAL	
				CO-FI

15 SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2305-23 TO.			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	DE	2/2 2/8	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	MHH	2/6	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
[illegible] 2/16/54

10—67320-8

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 12 May 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*)
Promotion

B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 24 May 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intelligence Officer BV 227-7	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intelligence Officer BV 227
GS 132 7 ~~$4205 p~~.a. $330	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS 132 9 $5060 p.a.
DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel.Operations Guid.Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel.Operations Guid.Sec.
Washington, DC	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, DC
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
R.P.Hawes, Chief, SIC

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
IFrisone x3535

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: C/FI/PP

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX
16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2305-20
TO:

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

✓

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CTRL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
5/21/53

RESTRICTED
Security Information

ad 2884

[illegible] November 1952

MEMORANDUM:

TO: PDC

THROUGH: Admin Personnel

FROM: CD/PI

SUBJECT: Change of Beneficiary.

1. It is requested that the name presently listed as beneficiary on my retirement policy be removed, and that the following name be listed as the sole beneficiary:

Mrs. Alice Ellen (Maier) Wigren (wife)
Apt #140
[illegible] Que Street, Northwest
Washington 7, D.C.

2. This change is to be effective immediately.

Lee H. Wigren
Lee H. Wigren
x 2442

RESTRICTED
Security Information

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME Leo H. Wigren	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE asap 11 May 52
NATURE OF ACTION Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk	Intelligence officer
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-6 $3920 p.a.	GS-7 $4205 p.a.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	STC	STC
BRANCH AND SECTION	SIB	SIB
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

(Slot #106) JW

132

APPROVED: Richard P. Hawes
RICHARD P. HAWES, A/Chief, STC

RECOMMENDED:

(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE APR 25 1952 SIGNATURE H. C. Ledford

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
1803		1/4/9/47
NEW	VICE	I. A. ✓	REAL.

4/30/52 Thomas McFishin
EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: 2123900
ALLOTMENT: 3000
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A 6.116 (d)

DATE SIGNATURE 13 May 52
SIGNATURE M. Lady

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 1 May 52
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF R. J. Goddard

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-62005-1

PERSONA ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: WITREM, Lee A.

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Sept 51

NATURE OF ACTION: Intra-agency Transfer

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	Clerk	Clerk
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-6 $3450 p.a.	GS-6 $3450 p.a.
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	Staff C	Staff C
BRANCH AND SECTION	~~International~~ ~~Communism~~	Soviet Intelligence
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL XX FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL XX FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

From Pos. #117 to 106. gm

C# 1806 301

Vice Margaret L. George to be reassigned.

#8081

RECOMMENDED:

13 Sept. 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED — DATE — TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED — DATE — TYPE

DATE — SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO. 7105

C. S. C. NO.

DATE APPROVED 9-1-51

NEW — VICE — I. A. / — REAL

DATE 20 Sept 51 — SIGNATURE Thomas M. Fisher

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 2123000

ALLOTMENT: 3005

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 2(b)(1)

DATE SIGNATURE 9-24-51 — SIGNATURE

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE — SIGNATURE

APPROVALS

☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE — SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 25 Sept 51 — SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—62102-1

CONFIDENTIAL

11 September 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, CPD

VIA: ADMIN/Personnel

FROM: Chief, Staff C/030

SUBJECT: Change in T/O

It is requested that Lee A. Wigren be moved from Slot 117, Clerk, International Communism Branch, to Slot 106, Clerk, Soviet Intelligence Branch.

ERIC W. TIMM

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

ENTRANCE ON DUTY RECORD

DATE 19 March 1951		
TO: OSO, ST. C.	BUILDING	ROOM
FROM: PERSONNEL OFFICER	EOD DATE 19 March 1951	
NAME OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren		
POSITION TITLE Clerk	GRADE GS-6	SALARY $3450.
PAYROLL Vouchered	DUTY STATION Washington, D. C.	
DATE SECURITY CLEARED Proc. 26 Feb. 1951 Full (verbal) 20 March 1951	DATE OATH OF OFFICE ADMINISTERED 19 March 1951	
DATE PERMANENT IDENTIFICATION REQUESTED 19 March 1951	DATE FINGERPRINTED 19 March 1951	
DATE BRIEFED BY SECURITY 19 March 1951	DATE OF PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 19 March 1951	
DATE 24 MONTH AGREEMENT SIGNED NA		
EMPLOYEE'S EMERGENCY ADDRESS A. H. Wigren, 218 Belmont Ave., Brockton, Mass.		
EMPLOYEE'S LOCAL ADDRESS 3200 16th St. N. W., Washington, D. C. Apt. 319		

REMARKS:

PC 26 Feb

Sec Cl 23 Mar

SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL OFFICER

. C. CLINKSCALE HM

FORM NO. 37-75
DEC 1949

RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

Aragon-file

31 March 1951

The Honorable Richard B. Wigglesworth
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wigglesworth:

This is in reference to your interest in the application of Mr. Lee Wigren for employment with this Agency.

I am glad to inform you that Mr. Wigren entered on duty with us on 19 March 1951.

We appreciate both your interest in the Central Intelligence Agency and your recommendation of Mr. Wigren.

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

cc:
Central Records
Personnel
Stayback - 2

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Lee H. Wigren

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: Clerk

GRADE: GS-6

BRANCH: OSO, ST. C.

SERVICE: DEPT.

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: EXC. APPT.

OK
3-19-51
Good

FORM NO. 37.118
MAY 1950

PERSONN   ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO. 3383

NAME
[illegible], Lee [illegible].

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE
19 March 1951

NATURE OF ACTION
Excepted
~~Appointment~~

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)
LAST WORKING DAY:
EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

2-26-51

	FROM	TO
TITLE		Clerk GS-6
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-6 $3100.00 p.a.
OFFICE	P.C.	CCO
DIVISION		Staff C
BRANCH AND SECTION		[illegible] C Branch
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D. C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

Slot - 6
Security initiated 16 November 1950.

301

#7618

RECOMMENDED:

12 February 1951
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED
2/20/51 F G [illegible]

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE
SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED
6799		8 Feb 51

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE 19 Feb 51
SIGNATURE Austin J. Thomp[illegible]
EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: 2115900
ALLOTMENT: 901-101
C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch A 6.116([illegible])
DATE SIGNATURE 3-22-51
SIGNATURE L. A. Grim

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE
SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE
SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE
SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—62480-1

14-00000

TO : [illegible] March 7

FROM : McLeish

THRU : Wigren

[illegible] Mass

Grade and Salary 6 - 3450

Subject to completion of [illegible] and physical examination [illegible]

To report to Tempo L Building, [illegible] of [illegible]

adjacent to the Lincoln [illegible] 8:30 and 9:00 a.m.

EOD: EOD 19 Mar.

Subject to further processing

Weiler nat.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 March 1951
In reply refer to: ED-4

Mr. Leo H. Wigren
213 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS 6 , $ [illegible] per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

H.C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Division

21 February 1951

The Honorable Richard B. Wigglesworth
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wigglesworth:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 10 February 1951, in behalf of Mr. Lee Wigren, who has applied for a position with this Agency.

We are seriously considering Mr. Wigren for employment; however, security clearance necessary for this Agency is of such a detailed nature that considerable time is necessary before the checks are completed. On the information available to me I would say that it will take approximately three more weeks before the necessary checks will have been completed in Mr. Wigren's case.

Thanking you for your continued interest in the Central Intelligence Agency, I am

Sincerely yours,

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

WLPforzheimer:blc
Central Records
Personnel W/basic
Stayback - 2

RICHARD B. WIGGLESWORTH
13th District, Massachusetts

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

February 10, 1951.

Mr. Walter L. Pforzheimer,
Legislative Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Pforzheimer:

Referring to my letter of November 27, 1950, I should greatly appreciate it if you would advise me what action, if any, has been taken on the application for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency filed by my constituent, Mr. Leo Wigren of 212 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts.

Sincerely yours,

218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts
January 15, 1951

Mr. D.V.Mulcahy
2430 E Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
attn. Miss Limbocker

Dear Mr. Mulcahy:

It has been some time since I have had any word regarding my application for a position with the C.I.A. At the time of my interview last fall, I understood that I would probably hear about it by the first of the year.

I should greatly appreciate a word as to the progress in processing of my application, and, if possible, the probable date on which I shall have to report to Washington. Such information would help me greatly in planning my course of action in the coming weeks.

If you should desire any additional information for my application, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Lee H Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

JAN 16 1951

RICHARD B. WIGGLESWORTH
13th DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

To Alice

November 27, 1950.

Mr. Donald V. Mulcahy,
Chief of Procurement,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mulcahy:

I have been asked to write you on behalf of a constituent of mine, Mr. Lee Wigren of 218 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts, who is most anxious to secure an appointment with the Central Intelligence Agency.

You no doubt are familiar with Mr. Wigren's experience and qualifications as I understand that he has filed an application for employment with your office and that he was recently interviewed by your.

I have known his father personally for many years and should be happy for his son's sake if his experience and qualifications fit him for some position in your organization.

Sincerely yours,

21 November 1959
In Reply Refer to PD-4

REGISTERED ADDRESSEE ONLY

Mr. Leo H. Wigren
213 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

The attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT S. J. HOPKINS
Chief, Employees Division

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

1950

Name of Candidate Lee H Wilgren

Position Considered for STC Office 050 Interviewer E. W. Timm

Personal Appearance	Dignified......		Natural.....	✓	Awkward.....	
	Well-groomed...	✓	Clean	✓	Slovenly....	
	Wide-Awake.....	✓	Stolid......		Apathetic...	
	Impressive.....		Ordinary....		Insignificant	
Personality	Persuasive.....		Responsive..	✓	Taciturn....	
	Imperturbable..		Steady......		Excitable...	
	Cheerful.......	✓	Tranquil ...		Dejected....	
	Straight-forward	✓	Reserved....		Evasive.....	
	Modest.........	✓	Complacent..		Conceited...	
	Dominant.......		Confident...	✓	Submissive...	

Is education adequate? Yes (x) No ( ) Is language facility adequate? Yes (X) No( )

Area Knowledge None

Previous intelligence or related experience Only Research - Special studies & Education

Salary level requested $ GS-6 Lowest salary acceptable $

- -

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

1. Candidate is not recommended for employment. Reasons:

2. Candidate is recommended for employment. Justification: He is enthusiastic - Bright & obviously has a flair for writing & research.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION for employment:

Position: Intel. Off. Branch STC Division 050

Location: Wash.

Salary level: GS-6

RECOMMENDATION as to potential value of candidate to the organization in other than the position immediately under consideration: will be used on research & file review work, until can be trained for more responsible duties.

(Enter any additional remarks on reverse side.)

Signature of Interviewer

FORM NO. 26-1
MAY 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

4-00000

File

DATE 16 [illegible]

TO : I&S

ATTENTION : Mr. [illegible]

FROM : Employees Division

SUBJECT : [illegible], Lee Howard

Attached hereto are Personal History Statements in duplicate submitted by subject in application for a position with [illegible] Intell Off V Washington, D. C.

Please initiate security investigation as soon as possible and notify this office of the results.

Atch: 2 PHS
2 photos

R. E. J. [illegible]
Employees Division ek

14 November 1950

MEMORANDUM

TO: SSD

FROM: Chief, Staff C

SUBJECT: Lee H. WIGREN

1. It is requested that the above-named applicant be processed with a view toward appointing him to the position of Intelligence Officer, GS-6, in Staff C/CSD. Inasmuch as he is presently unemployed, it would be appreciated if this could be handled as soon as possible.

2. It is noted that, although it appears in subject's file that he was on limited service in the Army, this was caused as a result of polio at an early age, and he has since suffered no ill effects. It is also noted that upon interview he readily agreed to overseas service if necessary, although he prefers service in Washington, at least for the time being.

3. In the event it is not contemplated that the applicant will be informed within the next week or ten days that his application is receiving favorable consideration, please let us know and we will write to him directly.

SECRET

[illegible]
Brockton, Massachusetts
October [illegible], 1950

P&P
RECD

Mr. Donald V. Mulcahy
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Employees Division
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Mulcahy:

Thank you for your letter (ED -2), dated 13 October 1950, which informed me that interest had been expressed in my qualifications.

I have completed the three copies of Form #34-1, and am returning them to you under separate cover by registered mail.

I shall plan to be in Washington ~~on~~ Wednesday and Thursday, November 8 and November 9, 1950 for the interviews which you suggested. I shall plan to report to Temporary L Building on the south side of the reflecting pool adjacent to the Lincoln Memorial at 9:30 A.M. of Wednesday, November 8, 1950.

If it should be impossible for me to have interviews on November 8 and 9, please notify me by letter or telegram. I shall leave Brockton for Washington at about 9:45 A.M. on Tuesday, November 7.

Sincerely,
Lee H. Wigren
Lee H. Wigren

Completed residence requirement for Ph. D. in History.

Room A 1E0P

23 October 1950
In reply please refer to ID -3

Mr. Lee H. Wigren
218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

Reference is made to your application for employment with this agency.

This is to advise you that interest has been expressed in your qualifications. However, before any commitment can be made, it will be necessary for you to appear for personal interviews in Washington. If you are interested in pursuing this mater, please arrange to be in Washington for two full days. It would be appreciated if you would complete and return the enclosed forms prior to your arrival.

It is requested that you report to Temporary L Building which is located on the south side of the Reflecting Pool adjacent to the Lincoln Memorial.

This is not to be construed as an offer of employment nor as an invitation to come to Washington at Government expense.

Very truly yours,

DONALD V. MULCAHY
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Employees Division

Encl.: 3 Forms 38 - 1

[illegible]/taz

18 September 1950

Mr. Lee H. Wigren
218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Wigren:

Reference is made to your correspondence regarding possible employment with this organization.

If you will complete the enclosed forms, and return them to this office at your earliest convenience, we will be able to review your experience and education for consideration for any possible employment opportunity. Upon completion of this process, we will communicate with you regarding the decision reached in your case.

Your interest in our organization is appreciated.

Very truly yours,

A. P. FLYNN
Chief, Procurement & Placement
Personnel Division

Encl: 2 Forms 57

ros

14-00000

44083

218 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts
September 11, 1950.

Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Council
2430 E Street NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to inquire about openings with the Central Intelligence Agency for a man of my qualifications.

I am a graduate of Yale University (A.B., 1947), and have an M.A. degree from Harvard University (1948). In addition, I have completed two years of work toward a degree of Ph.D. at Harvard.

My major studies have been in history, government, and related subjects, with concentration in United States history. Part of my work at Yale was done under the wartime Army Specialized Training Program in Russian area and language studies. The graduate work which I have done has included research and writing in seminars as well as class study.

During World War II, I had approximately two years of administrative and teaching experience with the Information and Education Branch of the Army. After serving as a lecturer, I was sent to the School for Personnel Services, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia, and was promoted to Administrative Non-Commissioned Officer in the Information and Education Office, Camp Pickett, Virginia. For one and one-half years in that position, I aided in the development of an education program for all permanent personnel at that camp. I was in direct charge of the program of weekly classes and discussion groups on history and current events. These classes covered such topics as : the progress of the war, the U.S. and its allies, and information about the enemy. My duties included supervising and inspecting classes, training instructors, doing research and preparation of class material, lecturing, planning displays, developing news dissemination media, and doing educational counselling. This work necessitated close cooperation with the Intelligence and Security officers of the camp.

I am twenty-six years of age and unmarried. I am a veteran of World War II, but not a member of any reserve.

I should prefer a position involving historical research or some related field, but would be interested in any opportunity that might be available. If there should be an opening for which

14081

my education and experience would qualify me, I should appreciate being considered for it. My academic records, personal and academic recommendations, or further details concerning my military work will be supplied if desired.

Sincerely,

Lee H. Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care


WIGREN LEE H
044732 1923

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C., AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	V	GS 14 5	$32,557

A11 LCS 100 090

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	0006198	CIS	GS 14 5	$34,850

15573

14-00000

KKK: 7 SEP 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 29 YR 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA T227 0171 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER SAS	12. POSITION NUMBER EQ15	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 14 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 30441

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31500 ALPHABETIC CIS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 12 DA 01 YR 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX		
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAP RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO				
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[illegible]

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

GPD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER [illegible]
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) [illegible]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT [illegible]
6. FUNDS V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA [illegible]
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY [illegible]
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDO/CIS
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
[illegible] RESEARCH BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CI
12. POSITION NUMBER [illegible]
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION [illegible]
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES [illegible]
16. GRADE AND STEP [illegible]
17. SALARY OR RATE [illegible]
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE [illegible]
20. Employ. Code [illegible]
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC [illegible] ALPHABETIC CIS
22. STATION CODE [illegible]
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs Code 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
27. DATE OF LEI MO [illegible] DA [illegible] YR [illegible]
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV. PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS)
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

BC

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 8	$28,254

RDJ: 4 DEC 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 076198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) VIGREN LEE N

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DELEGATION OF HSCA	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 20 75	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6227 3170 1172	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CI	12. POSITION NUMBER E027	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 8	17. SALARY OR RATE 28254

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31579	ALPHABETIC CIS	22. STATION CODE 25813	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Mdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 01 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV. PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8 82

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

[illegible] 6 OCT 75

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WIGREN LEE H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 01 DA 19 YR 75
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 6227 0175 0400
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CI STAFF
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP
EXTERNAL RESEARCH BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 6027
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAA
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26185
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31500 ALPHABETIC CIS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Money Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 12 DA 01 YR 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI: MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction / Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622 (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

JICS 11/30/76

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) HIGGEN LLC H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 07 74	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA 5227 0170 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CIOP DDO/CIOP/R AND AG/CRS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER-CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0327	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DAA

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
NOV 1974 26 G

Form 8-72 1150B MFG. 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-51)

YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

WIGREN LEE H 006198 42279170

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 8	$26,905

1-52

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS	
006198	WIGREN LEE H	31 500	CF		

6. OLD SALARY RATE

Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date
GS 13	7	$24,811	05/02/71

7. NEW SALARY RATE

Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE
GS 13	8	$25,500	04/28/74

8. TYPE ACTION

SI	ADJ.

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

DATE 1/7/74

SIGNATURE

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

ENTERED BY

CLERKS INITIALS

(4-51)

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$24,611

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$23,642

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM
7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 7	$22,487

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 6	$18,447

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED BY THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	31 500	CF	GS 13 6	$20,721

153

227-0170

TAX

APR 1

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006198	WIGREN LEE H	31 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	6	$20,721	05/04/69	GS 13	7	$21,313	05/02/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt

DATE 2 March 1971

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

I53

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
006198	WIGREN LEE H	31 500	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 13	5	$16,329	05/07/67	GS 13	6	$16,809	05/04/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 5/3/69

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS ml

AUDITED BY DH

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PLW: 15 JUL 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 07 14 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9227 0170 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/CI STAFF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0213	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 16329

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 31500	ALPHABETIC CI	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 12 01 23	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR

28. FITE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM OTR

POSTED

07-31-68

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-66 Mtg 10-67

SECRET

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500	V	GS 13 4	$13,815	$14,217

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500	CF	GS 13 5	$14,665	$15,307

D-4

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	17 500 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	4	$14,217	05/09/65	GS 13	5	$14,665	XXXXXXXX 05/01/67			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ ✓ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

5.1.67

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 3 / March / 67

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	000198	31 500	CF	GS 13 5	$15,307	$16,329

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGEN CHRISTINE ANN	498475	48 100	V	GS 06 1	$ 5,867	$ 6,137

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCS 09/24/66

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 09 DA 19 YR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS: X V TO V; V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7275 3200 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDS/TRAINING

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: INSTR INTEL

12. POSITION NUMBER: 1238

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.31

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS:

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150B Use Previous
7-66 MFG. 9-66 Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 4 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	17 500 V	GS 13 4	$13,335	$13,815

107

53

MAY 12 4 22 PM '65

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	48 200 V	—

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	3	$12,915	05/10/64	GS 13	4	$13,335	05/09/65			

9. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS JJ AUDITED BY GW

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 15 Mar 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 APR 65

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 006198
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WIGREN LEE H
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 04 DA. 21 YR. 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5275 2500 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDS/OTR
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
FACULTY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: INSTR INTEL
12. POSITION NUMBER: 1238
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 1712.31
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 12915
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 17500 ALPHABETIC OTR
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 DA. 01 YR. 23
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: SR - 2

POSTED
4/22/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-61)

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

APPD 09/30/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT					4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. 09 DA. 30 YR. 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5234 0573 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION COUNTERINTELL GRP RES BR					10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D. C.	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH					12. POSITION NUMBER 1018	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS			15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 13	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 1150B
1-63 MFG. 1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

234/1100

MAY 5 4 51 PM '64

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	48 080 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PG	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	2	$12,110	05/12/63	GS 13	3	$12,495	05/10/64			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPC 04/23/64

1 SERIAL NUMBER 006198	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WIGREN LEE H

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 04 12 64	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6 FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 4234 1000 1000	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/SR DIVISION DDP SR CI GR RESEARCH BR	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 1017	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 13	17 SALARY OR RATE

18 REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
27 APR 1964

Form 1150B
1-63 MFG 1-63

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

27 APR 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	60080	V	13 1	$10635	13 1	$11150

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
006198	WIGREN LEE H	60 080 2 V	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 13	1	$11,150	05/13/62	GS 13	2	$11,515	05/12/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS RCR
AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE:

DATE 14 Mar 1963

Form 9-61 550 Obsolete Previous Edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	006198	48 080	V	GS 13 2	$11,515	$12,110

PSC: 11 MAY 62

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
006198	WIGREN LEE H

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	05 13 62	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
2234 1000 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP SR CHIEF, OPERATIONS AND PLANS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH RESEARCH SECTION	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0351	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	13 1	10635

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	60080	SR	75013		1	12 01 23	05 13 62	05 13 62

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

Form 8-61 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/SR 2 V-20	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PBI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 12	2	$ 9,215	10/1[illegible]/5[illegible]	12	3	$ 9,475	04/16/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/X/ NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D. ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 7-60 560. Obsolete Previous Edition

SECRET

(4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
DI	WIGREN LEE H	106198	48 24	GS-12 2	$ 8,570	$ 9,215

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/SR	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 12	1	$ 8,330	04	20	58	GS 12	2	$ 8,570	10	18	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ TO PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ TO LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLSTED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION
[illegible]

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b.

SECRET

OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BS 21 AUGUST 59

1. Serial No. 106198	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN LEE H	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 01 Yr. 23	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51
7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 43	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51
				13. Mil. Serv. Credit, LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH & SUPPORT SECTION	Code 4824	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USIId - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title 10 CI	18. Position No. 0400	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.53

21. Grade & Step 12 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 3400 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 08 Da. 23 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH SECTION	Code 4824	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USIId - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title OPS OFFICER	35. Position No. 0351	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 0234 1000 1000

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 17 APRIL 59 X XX

1. Serial No. 106198	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN LEE H	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 01 Yr. 23	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1
5. Sex M 1	6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51	7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 43	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51
13. Mil. Serv. Credit (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2			

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECT. BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	Code 4109	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code 2	17. Position Title BIOGRAPHIC OFF	18. Position No. 0712	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0132.31	21. Grade & Step 12 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	23. SD D1
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	25. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 0 2305 23	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 57	28. Eff. Date Mo. 04 Da. 19 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP SR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS COUNTER ESPIONAGE STAFF RESEARCH & SUPPORT SECTION	Code 4824	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USfld - 4, Frgn - 6) Code 2	34. Position Title 10 CI	35. Position No. 0400	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0136.53	38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 8330	40. SD D1
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 9 3400 20 001	

44. Remarks

POSTED
21 APR 1959

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 18 APRIL 58

1. Serial No. 106198	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN LEE H	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 12 Da. 01 Yr. 23	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS - EOD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51	7. SCD Mo. 03 Da. 24 Yr. 43	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 03 Da. 19 Yr. 51	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D COUNTER-ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	Code 4109	15. Location Of Official Station WASH. D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	17. Position Title BIOGRAPHIC OFF	18. Position No. 712	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0132.31	21. Grade & Step 11 3	22. Salary Or Rate $ 6820	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 01 Da. 16 Yr. 55	25. PSI Due Mo. 01 Da. 12 Yr. 58	26. Appropriation Number 8 2305 23	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FI STAFF DIV D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECT. BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	Code 4109	32. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code 2	34. Position Title BIOGRAPHIC OFF	35. Position No. 0712	36. Serv. GS
37. Occup. Series 0132.31	38. Grade & Step 12 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 7570	40. SD DI
41. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 20 Yr. 58	42. PSI Due Mo. 10 Da. 18 Yr. 59	43. Appropriation Number 8 2305 23	

44. Remarks

POSTED
17 APR

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

2 17

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/~~WE~~ FI	V-20	3505

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
11	2	$ 6,605	07	15	56	11	3	$ 6,820	01	12	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

9. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

✓

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
106198	WIGREN LEE H	DDP/~~WE~~ FI-19	V-20	3505

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
11	2	$ 6,605	07	15	56	11	3	$ 6,820	01	12	58

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Albert P. KERGEL	9 Dec. '57	Albert P. Kergel

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1964 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 87 - 793 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 12 JANUARY 1964 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WIGREN LEE H	106198	GS-12-1	$ 7,570	$ 8,330

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
106198	WIGREN LEE H	12	01	23	1	M 1	03	19	51

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Leo Yes-1 No-2	Code
XX	XX	XX	1	50 USCA 403 J						03	19	51		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP WE SCANDINAVIAN BR, FI, PP, PM SWEDEN		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OFF	55	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 6605	01							8 3600 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	57	11	17	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI STAFF DIVISION D COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	4109	WASH. D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	BIOGRAPHIC OFF	712	GS	0132.31

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
11 2	$ 6605	01	01	16	55	01	12	56	8 2305 23

44. Remarks

[illegible]
25 NOV 1957

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

[illegible] STEP INCREASE [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

1. Agency and organizational designation

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954 [illegible]

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
[illegible] 106195

2. Payroll period

3. Block No. 6-3600-30

4. Step No.

6. Grade and salary
[illegible]-11 $6390

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	[illegible] LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous amount													
8. New amount													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriations
WE 3

12. Prepared by
[illegible] May 56

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date
[illegible]

15. Date last equivalent increase
16 Jan 56

16. Old salary rate
$6390

17. New salary rate
$6605

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
SERVICE AND CONDUCT
ALL SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. Enter "X" in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In [illegible] waiting period.
☐ LWOP [illegible] of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
[illegible] 1956, General Regulations No. 102

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50 (6 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

cab

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee N. Wigren 106198	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 29 July 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 31 July 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Area Ops. Officer BB 67-11	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Officer BB 55
GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $6390.00 p.a.
DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch FI, PP, PM Sweden
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD-DT

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3600-20 TO: ~~Same~~	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED
16 AUG 1955

SATIS. PERFORMANCE RATING:

~~Director of Personnel~~

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

rwa 8-5-55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 IN PART
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): MR. LEE H. WIGREN
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 11 March 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 13 Mar. 1955
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Off. (FI) DV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops. Officer EE-67-11
GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-11 $5940.00 per annum
DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/WE Scandinavian Branch, FI, PP, PM Sweden
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WWII ☐ OTHER ☐ 5-PT. ☒ 10-POINT: DISAB. ☐ OTHER ☐

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ T. A. ☐ REAL. ☐ SD-DI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 5-2305-23 TO: 5-3665-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

3/24/55

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

RA 3-17-55

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—313735

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION lvr

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Leo H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 14 Jan 1955

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 16 Jan 1955	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
Intell. Off (FI) BV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell. Off. (FI) BV-227
GS-0136.51-9 $5185.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-11 $5940.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell. Ops. Guidance Sec.
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				SD/FI

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-2305-23 TO: Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

POSTED

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954—299903

14-00000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - 997374

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Pay roll period	3. Block No. 4-2305-23	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WIGREN, Ion H.	6. Grade and salary GS-9 $5060.00		

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) DDP/FI/Staff C 20	12. Prepared by dmo 2 Apr 54 13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date 23 May 54	15. Date last equivalent increase 24 May 53	16. Old salary rate $5060.00	17. New salary rate $5185.00	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better. (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ Increase [illegible] waiting period
☐ [illegible] of end of waiting period

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

.ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SFW

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/1/23	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 2/13/54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 2/14/54	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intell Off BV-227	8. POSITION TITLE	Intell Off (FI) BV-227
GS-132-9	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-9 $5060.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Staff C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intell Ops Guidance Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20 LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2305-23 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 — 249347

RD 2-16-57

4. ~~PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY~~

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mkh

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME) Mr. Lee H. Wigren	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 23	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 23 May 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Promotion	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 24 May 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intelligence Officer BV 227-7	8. POSITION TITLE	Same BV 227
GS 132 7 $4330.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS 132 9 $5060.00 per annum
DDP/FI STAFF C Soviet Intelligence Branch Soviet Intel. Operations Guid.Sec.	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION 11X2100	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2305-00 TO: 2305-20	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Klc

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division.

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

B ay 5-27-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1953 210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll period

3. Block No. 2305-20

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WIGREN LEE H.

6. Grade and salary
GS 7 $4205

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:

11. Appropriation(s)
CE 24

12. Prepared by
dh 5/6/53

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
10 May 53	11 May 52	$4205	$ 4330	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126c—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950. General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—61111-2e * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 973765

SECRET
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION VOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

Page 2 of 6 pages.

(1) Staff or Division FI (2) Date T/O approved 11/17/52 (3) Effective date of action 12/7/52

(4) NAME	FROM (5) ORG.INT.& POS.TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	TO (9) ORG.INT.& POS.TITLE	(10) SCHED. SER GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
Staff - C Soviet Intell.Br. [illegible] D. Holbrook, III FI	intel.off.	GS 12	100	C	DDP FI/CE Soviet Intell.Br. intel.off.	GS 132 12	220
Admin Pool Frederick S. Youkstetter	intel.off.	GS 9	25	C	Soviet Intell.Ops.Sec intel.off.	GS 132 9	222
Staff - C Soviet Intell.Br. [illegible] Gilstrap	intel.off.	GS 7	104	C	Soviet Intell.Ops.Sec. intel.off.	GS 132 7	223
Soviet Intell.Br. George E. [illegible]	intel.off.	GS 13	99	C	Soviet Intell.Ops Guidance Section intel.off.	GS 132 13	225
Mary E. Woods	intel.off.	GS 11	102	C	intel.off.	GS 132 11	226
[illegible] Wigren	intel.off.	GS 7	106	C	intel.off.	GS 132 7	227
[illegible] H. Stovall, Jr.	intel.off.	GS 7	105	C	intel.off.	GS 132 7	228
Support & Protect.Br. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		Soviet Intell.Ops.Guidance [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
FI Admin Pool Stuart C. Duncan	intel.off.	GS 7	81	C	Sov.Intel.Agent Iden.Sec. intel.off.	GS 132 7	230

(12) APPROVED BY: R P Haines
Staff or Division Chief

(13) APPROVED BY:
Class. & Wage Div.

(14) APPROVED BY:
Personnel Div.

SECRET
Security Information

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 - A REVISED
[illegible]
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER [illegible] FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(al)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Leo H. Wigren

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. '23

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 2 May '52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 11 May '52

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A, 6.11(b)

FROM		TO
Clerk	8. POSITION TITLE	Intelligence Officer
GS-6- $3920.00 per. annum.	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-7-132 $4205.00 per. annum
OSO Staff C Soviet Intelligence	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO STC SIB
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☒	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	C.A.	REAL	
		X		No. 51803 12/9/'47

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 2123900
TO: 3005

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES — NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED X
STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(106)

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-[illegible]

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll period

3. Block No.

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name
[illegible]

6. Grade and salary
[illegible]

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	TAX	RET.	BOND			NET PAY
7. Previous normal										
8. New normal										
9. Pay this period										

10. Remarks
3

11. Appropriation(s)

12. Prepared by

13. Audited by

☐ Periodic step increase. ☐ Pay adjustment.

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. (a) Efficiency rating of "Good" or better than good and service and conduct certified (b) (Signature or Other Authentication)	19. Suspense date
30 Mar 52	27 [illegible] 51	[illegible]	[illegible]		29 [illegible]

20. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s):

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP..... Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Feb. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

STANDARD FORM 50 (4 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1948
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Lee H. Wigren
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: J 8081
4. DATE: 24 Sept. 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Intra-Agency Transfer
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 30 Sept. 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Clerk, GS-6	8. POSITION TITLE	
GS-6-301 $3450.00 per. annum. Bu.#6799	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	
OSO Staff C I. C. Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO Staff C Soviet Intelligence
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
Washington, D. C. ☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL
		X	

Bu.#7803
9/7/51

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 8123900 TO: 3075
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(117) to (106)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE EFFECTIVE 21 OCT. 1951 SALARY ADJUSTED TO $3795.00

R. J. GOODHEART
Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950-O-99075

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 PART 1
OCTOBER 1946
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER ... FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

P.C. 8/26/51 (pl)

1. NAME (MR. - MISS - MRS. - ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. Lee H. Wigren
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: #7018
4. DATE: 19 March 1951

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Excepted Appointment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 19 March 1951
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(b)

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Clerk, GS-6
9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY		GS-6-301 $3450.00 per. annum.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS		OSO Staff C I C Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS		Washington, D. C.
12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☒ / WAIT / OTHER / 5-PT. / 10 POINT: DISAB. / OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / I.A. ☒ / REAL — Bu. #6799 2/1/51

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM 2119900 TO 901-101
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES - NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): 19 March 1951
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: Mass.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

This appointment is subject to the satisfactory completion of a trial period of one year.

DOG - 03/24/53
CSED. 03/19 51
LCD - 03/19/51

C... DATES VERIFIED
BY Roy ... 1-19-55

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

H. C. Clinkscale
H. C. CLINKSCALE
Personnel Branch
... OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION
AA 3-22-57

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-809878

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Wigren, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/25	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT		OTHER (Spec.)		TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 Nov 1976 - 31 Oct 1977

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
15 Nov 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manage the production, publication, and dissemination of CI studies and papers.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervise directly three professional and one clerical, and indirectly other officers, involved in CI publications work.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepare and edit CI research and analysis for publication.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Liaison with foreign intelligence services, other agencies and other CIA components to sponsor and promote CI production and exchange.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Conduct training seminars and lectures, personally or in conjunction with CI defectors, for foreign services, other agencies, and CIA components.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

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CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In August 1976 Mr. Wigren agreed to be responsible for establishing and managing a counterintelligence production element for the CI Staff. He has continued in that capacity up to the present time, in addition to serving as the nominal focal point for one of our more important CI defectors. Although he took the publication assignment with some reservations, he has done an excellent job of sponsoring, processing and publishing a variety of important counterintelligence documents for use with foreign and domestic intelligence and security services. He is well aware of the widespread respect and admiration for his achievements in this position, both in the processing of written studies and presentations which he makes based on his extensive counterintelligence background and knowledge. While he might find better acceptance with some operational background, there are also special advantages and strengths which derive from the depth of headquarters staff experience which constitutes his career. He is a very cooperative and responsive officer and is now felt to be the best candidate to take over counterintelligence training for the Agency, which he will phase in to in the near future.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 32	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION 0 5 13 2	
DATE 6 December 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 7 December 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I endorse the rating officer's comments on Mr. Wigren's performance. One of the things that has impressed me most during my nine months as Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff has been the impact of the publications program on the intelligence community at large. In the CI field, there is nothing in the U.S. Government comparable to it. With the current intensification of interest in counterintelligence, it affords the Agency a means of speaking to a wide audience on issues and problems of abiding concern. Mr. Wigren has done excellent work in drawing upon the resources of the Staff to collect and then to present counterintelligence materials in a way calculated to serve their purpose admirably. I have also drawn heavily on Mr. Wigren to prepare special briefing materials for my own

continued

DATE 23 December 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE B. Hugh Tovar

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 3 January 1978	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION

SECTION E REVIEWING COMMENTS (continued)

Lee H. Wigren

use in dealing with senior echelons of the Agency and other government components. He is a fine officer, whom I expect to rely upon heavily in the counterintelligence training program. The latter I rank among the most important responsibilities of the Staff.

SECRET

Still valid as of
6 December 1977.

9 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

FROM : Leonard McCoy
Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Letter of Instructions

1. The following letter of instructions is provided to outline your functions as Special Assistant to the Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group.

2. The objectives of CI/R&A are:

a. To provide current and relevant counterintelligence support to operations being conducted by CI Staff and the operating divisions in the interests of furthering intelligence collection and preventing the frustration of our operations by adversary intelligence services.

b. To conduct research and analyze information to facilitate the detection of the efforts of adversary intelligence services to penetrate the US and friendly foreign governments.

3. Your functions as Special Assistant to Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group are as follows:

a. Select information and research and analysis products of CIA, other agencies, and liaison services for publication by the CI Staff as CI guidance and references.

b. Initiate and supervise the conduct of CI research and analysis by assigned personnel for publication by the CI Staff.

c. Establish and implement publication procedures, including editing, rewriting, organizing, sanitizing, classifying, setting up dissemination channels and

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controls, and monitoring printing processes for CI Staff publications.

d. Initiate and coordinate the distribution of CI Staff publications as appropriate within the Agency, to other US government agencies, and to liaison services.

e. Maintain a record of CI Staff publications, including recipients, dates of distribution, responses and comments, related correspondence, and other pertinent information.

f. Conduct liaison with other government agencies and foreign intelligence services to promote the collection and dissemination of CI information.

g. Collect and maintain a library of past and present classified CI publications available from all sources for ready reference and consultation.

Leonard McCoy

I have read and understand this letter of instructions.

Lee H. Wigren

Date 9 February 1977

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CI/Personnel
1 - C/CI/R&A

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) Wigren, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-14	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Headquarters	10. [illegible] XX MOS. OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT (20-8-76) ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 1 Oct 75 - 31 Oct 76

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 Nov 76

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
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S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manage a branch composed of six staff officers, seven contract personnel and a varying number of detailees.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervise the work of three Soviet intelligence officer defectors and their four contract employees.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Function as secretariat for an international research and analysis complex.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conduct counterintelligence research and analysis.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Establish a counterintelligence publications system which will collect and sponsor counterintelligence studies, produce studies, and distribute them according to need and security considerations.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 7-75 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
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E2, IMPDET CL BY 012208

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CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren received a well-deserved promotion during this reporting period and moved in August to become the Staff Publications Officer. He made solid progress in the early part of the reporting period in making the transition from the narrow sphere he occupied in the previous Staff organization to the much more varied and challenging duties of the External Branch. By the time he left that position he had mastered its peculiar problems and proven his capability to manage its unusual personnel effectively and productively. He has retained responsibility for exploitation of the most useful asset in that branch and recently conducted the asset on a series of liaison visits which has resulted in a significant advance of our CI relations with the services concerned.

He has moved vigorously into the function of Publications Officer, which is one of the most important activities in the Staff. He was selected for this assignment because of his deep CI experience, writing ability, and his mature judgment in selecting and preparing CI information appropriate to various audiences. Cost-effective influences which he faces by participation in local government are also applied in his Agency work. He deals confidently with senior officers of the Staff and other components and gets the best effort out of his subordinates. His present assignment is tailor-made for him, and he exhibits no significant weakness in performing it.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 6 December 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 6 December 1976	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the present assessment of Mr. Wigren's performance by the rating officer. As chief of the External Branch he turned in a highly satisfactory performance. In his present capacity, Staff Publications Officer, he is off to an excellent start. I believe the passage of time will demonstrate that Mr. Wigren's strongest points, never heretofore fully exploited, are in writing and supervising publications of counterintelligence materials. Already one of the new CI Staff monthly publications which he initiated some time ago is earning us plaudits from both domestic and foreign counterintelligence services. Mr. Wigren's work comes to my attention several times a week. I am most pleased that he is a member of the staff at this time.

DATE 29 Dec 76	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE George T. Kalaris

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☒ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 4 Jan 77	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

C[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD DAA
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Operations Officer Ch	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/R&A/E	9. CURRENT STATION Hqs	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ DF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 October 1974 - 30 September 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 October 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

If QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
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SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Manages a branch composed of six staff officers and nine contract personnel	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises the work of three Soviet intelligence defectors and their six contract employees.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Acts as secretariat for an international research and analysis complex	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts counterintelligence research and analysis	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

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CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren is doing a quite satisfactory job of running the R&A External Research Branch. When the Group was reorganized he was almost fully committed to Duty No. 3 above. While maintaining that function at a commendable level of performance, he has accepted the assignment of running a new branch which is an amalgamation of components of several previous R&A branches. Comprising, as it does, the disparate elements of defector, contract, and staff officers, Mr. Wigren has done a very good job of assigning work and getting it done by this branch. He gets along well with the personnel and seems well-suited to the kind of bread-and-butter research and analysis which the branch carries out. He is very serious and purposeful in his approach and can be relied on to carry out assignments effectively and on time. His long experience in CI matters and his knowledge of past activities and events in the Staff are a valuable adjunct to the branch chief function which he now fulfills. He is one of very few officers of the former Staff who have been selected to participate in the reorganization and reorientation of the CI effort. He has shown by his performance and attitude a quite acceptable capability to adjust to the present Staff requirements in terms of methodology and intellectual approach. He is conscientious and enthusiastic, and is still feeling his way to some extent organizationally and functionally in his new position.

He reflects genuine consideration for the costs of performing his functions.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 8

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: ON TDY. -

DATE: 31 October 1975

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Chief, CI/R&A

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Leonard McCoy

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE: ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED

DATE: 7 November 75

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Lee Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the assessment and evaluation of Mr. Wigren as set forth in this Fitness Report. He found himself in the midst of a changing situation and not only has adjusted well but also has made a useful contribution to the reorganization and redirection of the Counterintelligence Staff. His current assignment requires a good deal of common sense, understanding of human nature and the ability to devise meaningful projects for individuals whose expertise and capabilities are quite circumscribed and limited. Success in that respect is important to the Agency for reasons not necessarily associated with the value of the product which emerges from these projects. In his frequent contacts with representatives of foreign liaison officials, Mr. Wigren has invariably created a favorable

DATE: 3 November 1975

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, CI Staff

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: George T. Kalaris

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.

DATE: 7 [illegible] 1975

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

CLASSIFICATION

Fitness Report - Wigren, Lee H.
006198

Reviewing Official Comments (continued)

impression which is also important to the Agency. In sum, I regard him as a competent officer who is performing well in his present assignment.

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD DAA

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI OPS/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, DC	10. CODE (ck one) x HQS. ☐ OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 29 Sept 1973 - 30 Sept 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 October 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SPECIFIC DUTIES

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	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 The conduct of research into sensitive counterintelligence cases, primarily cases involving Soviet intelligence and security and Bloc operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assembles, collates, and analyzes selected counterintelligence materials reflecting data on Soviet intelligence organization and activity: maintains files of such materials. Uses these materials in memorandums, reports, and commentaries utilized in sensitive DDO liaison with designated counterintelligence and security services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects, organizes and maintains other basic data on Soviet intelligence and security for research purposes. Acts as CIOPS referent on Soviet intelligence and security matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts, from time to time, counterintelligence source debriefings. Records, analyzes, and distributes the resulting data.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures, participates in, and conducts briefings and presentations inside the Agency and under the auspices of the U.S. Intelligence Community on Soviet intelligence and security services and related USSR political developments and communist international and Soviet-directed subversion	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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CLASSIFICATION

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SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

22-14-75

Although Subject has only been under my supervision for some four months, I can but agree with earlier comments on his performance. Subject has an encyclopedic knowledge of the organization, function and history of the various Soviet intelligence and security organs. He is a highly skilled researcher and a gifted writer. His work in preparing classified studies on the various aspects of the Soviet intelligence services and operations has been consistently impressive.

Subject has not had the field experience usually associated with his age and grade, but the lack of this has not been a drawback in his chosen research duties. In the future Subject will profit from seeking out opportunities for further activity rather than, as at present, waiting until assignments are given to him.

In addition to his research abilities, Subject is a highly effective lecturer, much sought after by other agencies who are conducting training in the CI field.

Subject has encountered some slight problems with his staff during the reporting period, but these are essentially minor. In my opinion Subject is in the forefront of research personnel at his grade level.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR AC/CIRA	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE W Hood William J. Hood

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE		DATE 16 Jan 75	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren
☐ HAVE ATTACHED	☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED		

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I endorse Mr. Hood's Section D evaluation. I have found Mr. Wigren to be a very dependable and resourceful individual in undertaking the extensive research commitments that the staff has undertaken in meeting very heavy obligations of sensitive liaison exchanges over the past year. Mr. Wigren is above all a gentleman in his attitude toward and treatment of others. I would say in the long run this works to his disadvantage because his contribution and his modesty tend to be overridden by the pretentions and bluster of others. Mr. Wigren has what has now become a most precious commodity to the DDO in counterintelligence and that is a grasp on many of the aspects of the collegial memory. He is therefore in a position not only to contribute useful ideas for new projects, but to correct, amend, and modify suggestions and courses of action put up by others who do not have the facts. In other words, this is a man whose continued utility and potential are considerable in my judgment.

DATE 17Jan75	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADC/CIOPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 17 Jan 75	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE L H Wigren

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 006198	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 13	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CI/OPS/R&A	9. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	10. CODE (ck one) HQS. ☐ OF ☐		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT	OTHER (Spec.)		TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		REASSIGN-MENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 November 1972 - 28 September 1973	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. October 1973

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 The conduct of research into sensitive counterintelligence cases, primarily cases involving Soviet intelligence and security and Bloc operations.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Assembles, collates, and analyzes selected counterintelligence materials reflecting data on Soviet intelligence organization and activity: maintains files of such materials. Uses these materials in memorandums, reports and commentaries utilized in sensitive DDO liaison with designated counterintelligence and security services.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Collects, organizes and maintains other basic data on Soviet intelligence and security for research purposes. Acts as CI/OPS referent on Soviet intelligence and security matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts, from time to time, counterintelligence source debriefings. Records, analyzes, and distributes the resulting data.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures, participates in, and conducts briefings and presentations inside the Agency and under the auspices of the U.S. Intelligence Community on Soviet intelligence and security services and related USSR political developments and communist international and Soviet-directed subversion.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
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11 1974

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the past six months the compartmented nature of Mr. Wigren's work has brought him more directly into the DC/CIOPS' cognizance rather than the Chief of the R&A component as has previously been the case.

I think Mr. Wigren's strengths and weaknesses have been winnowed thoroughly in previous reporting. He is a recognized expert in his topic and as such he represents a considerable capital investment by the Agency in that kind of expertise. He can write and he can speak with unusual fluency on his specialty and in consequence is a key man in the ongoing research and study of sensitive Soviet intelligence and security organizations and operations, particularly penetrations and disinformation. This statement is backed up by his production, in the form of briefing papers, memoranda, and other production, which goes outside the Agency. I have found his work to be extremely satisfactory, and more particularly, it is if he is given the time and specifications which are necessary ingredients of his meticulous and thoroughgoing approach to his work. Mr. Wigren could carry on in his specialty at a very high level of competence in any other part of the Agency, or for that matter anywhere in Government where there is any interest in Soviet intelligence and security. I am firm in the view that he merits the overall grading of "Strong."

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 11 JAN 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CI/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☑ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 11 Jan 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the rating officer's comments above.

DATE 11 JAN 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CI/OPS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE J. Angleton James Angleton

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE [illegible] 1974	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
November 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 November 1971 - 31 October 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with both the history and current status of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the operations directed by them against their major counter- (cont.)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As a corollary of the above, serves as CI/R&A's principal point of contact with SB Division (except for ADP matters).	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and maintains basic CI data on the RIS, such as strength figures at home and abroad, changes in structure and functions, case histories, and other categories of facts. This information is (cont.)	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts occasional, detailed counterintelligence debriefings of knowledgeable sources selected by the DC/CI. Records and reports the resultant information.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures and conducts briefings in various training courses both within CIA and in other governmental programs. The main topics dealt with are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political devel- (cont.)	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

Reviewed by OP/SPD PPB
14 DEC 1972
JAC

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SECRET

GROUP 1

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

As was noted in the preceding fitness report, Mr. Wigren has a solid and broad knowledge of the USSR: its history, government, and intelligence services. He also has a useful working knowledge of Russian. Consequently he serves in CI/R&A as senior referent on the RIS, against which target most of the group's work is directed.

A key responsibility in R&A is to serve as the Staff's repository and memory for essential elements of information about the RIS. Mr. Wigren has organized this abundance of material effectively, has ensured its retrievability, and continues to update it.

Mr. Wigren consistently shows sound and dispassionate judgment. He does not jump to conclusions but digs out the pertinent facts and brings them into proper focus. He is skeptical without being negative. He accepts tasks and responsibilities without quibbling, and he carries out these assignments successfully without needing further consultation or guidance.

He is a quiet person who keeps a low profile; but when a significant issue is at stake, he is firm, even tenacious, when persuaded that the facts are on his side.

(continued)

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 29 Nov 72	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 46	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 29 November 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt Donovan E. Pratt

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Wigren is a solid methodical researcher and analyst. He possess developed skills in presentation both in writing and from the platform. He works quietly and effectively with a minimum of supervision required once the job has been blocked out. He is a most dependable and consistently productive.

He is overly modest in personal demeanor and tends to prefer to concentrate his efforts on single tasks rather than to handle a range of simultaneous undertakings.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECTION B (Cont.) SPECIFIC DUTIES Lee H. WIGREN

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1

intelligence targets, especially the intelligence services of the non-Communist world.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3

provided to other Agency components, to other U.S. departments and agencies (principally the FBI), and to selected liaison services as appropriate.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5

opments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.

SECRET

SECTION C - NARRATIVE COMMENTS - (Continued)
Lee H. WIGREN

His supervisory responsibility is limited to providing guidance to one secretary whom he shares with others. I should not hesitate, however, to assign other employees to his supervision if our T/O permitted. His past record and his current performance (which demonstrates an ability to look ahead, to grasp essentials, to get along with others, and to be both fair and firm) show that he can handle a manager's role very well.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE 13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 November 1971

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1971 - 31 October 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with both the history and current status of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the operations directed by them against their major counter- (cont.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As a corollary of the above, serves as CI/R&A's principal point of contact with SB Division (except for ADP matters).	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and maintains basic counterintelligence data on the RIS, such as strength figures, case histories, counteraction (e.g., the results of the AESMITE defection), etc.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Engages from time to time in counterintelligence interrogations/debriefings at the direction of the DC/CI. Records data thus obtained and prepares detailed reports.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Lectures and conducts briefings in various training courses both within CIA and in other governmental programs. The main topics dealt with are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political devel- (cont.)	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

[illegible]

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren's responsibilities have broadened during the reporting period and will continue to grow. In part this change has resulted from the assignment of Mr. Edward Knowles to CI/OPS, but in equal or greater measure it is the product of Mr. Wigren's demonstrated ability to carry added responsibility with equanimity and resourcefulness.

Mr. Wigren has a very sound knowledge of the Soviet Union: its history, government, intelligence services, etc. He reads widely to keep his knowledge current. He maintains an excellent balance between a respect for the importance of facts and a creative faculty. Recently he has been increasingly concerned with ways to ensure a more regular, orderly flow of essential counterintelligence into this office and with restructuring the organization of this information to make it more readily responsive to our needs. His approach has been both imaginative and sound.

His work shows a very high level of organizational ability. This is reflected in his structuring of a report or speech, in the lucidity of his expression, and in his grasp of the inter-relatedness of the functions of this group. He is thoughtful and temperate; he does not jump to conclusions, show

(continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 November 1971	Lee Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
34	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
9 November 1971	Chief, CI/R&A	Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Wigren is a very knowledgeable research specialist in Soviet Bloc counterintelligence matters. He also is an excellent expositor of that kind of information from a lecture platform. He has done a good job. I am in agreement with the rating but would want this man to show more dynamism.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
18 NOV 1971	Deputy Chief, CI Staff	Raymond G. Rocca

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SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 - (Continued)

intelligence targets, especially the intelligence services of the non-Communist world.

SPECIFIC DUTY No. 5 - (Continued)

opments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.

SECRET

Section C - Narrative Comments - (Continued)

bias, or push pet theories. He is flexible, broad-gauged, and genuinely interested in his work. He reads Russian and uses this facility in his work.

Mr. Wigren does not need close supervision. He carries out tasks without seeking additional guidance or support when he encounters the usual difficulties. He relates well to others, and his creative abilities are frequently sparked by discourse and an exchange of views. He is exceptionally considerate and tactful in his dealings with other Agency employees.

At present he does not have supervisory responsibilities. Both his past record and his present performance show, however, that he is fully capable of quiet, competent leadership.

He has shown no deficiencies of any sort in respect to security or economy.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, LEE H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Wash.,D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1970 - 31 December 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Obtains sensitive counterintelligence data from varied (including live) sources at the direction of the DC/CI. Records and prepares analyses of such data. The topics range from operations of primarily historical significance to current matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 In the course of carrying out specific duty No. 1, establishes and maintains relationships, as appropriate and directed, with non-CIA personnel.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with the growth and development of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the counterintelligence operations directed by them against the non-Communist services.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lectures and conducts briefings in OTR courses and in the training programs of other U.S. Government agencies. The main topics covered are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political developments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

15 MAR 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECRET

[illegible]

Reviewed by [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

MAR 15 9 12 AM '71

Mr. Wigren continues to maintain the high quality of performance noted in his preceding fitness report.

His analytic work is characterized chiefly by his ability to view a case in perspective. He brings extensive experience to bear upon current undertakings and thus looks at a given RIS operation or project not as a picture in a frame but rather as one part of the history of Soviet intelligence.

His work is further characterized by flexibility, thoroughness, and sound judgement. He has a knack for getting at facts; he does not jump to conclusions. He organizes material well and writes with lucidity.

Mr. Wigren is also genuinely interested in his field. He reads and studies publications about the USSR during off-duty hours. He is able to read Russian and uses this language skill in his work.

Although he does not need close supervision, he is very responsive to guidance. He is also a congenial person whose relationships with his colleagues are uniformly cordial. Although he has no present supervisory responsibilities, both his past record (continued)

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 December 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 December 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur with the high evaluation given Subject by his supervisor, Mr. Pratt. Mr. Wigren handles extremely sensitive operations in a competent, thoroughly professional manner. He relates well with his co-workers and is respected by them. I too believe he is performing his duties in an exceptionally proficient manner.

DATE 11 March 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, CI Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

SECRET

Section C - Narrative Comments (continued)

and his present performance demonstrate the-he is able to direct the work of others effectively. He has shown no deficiencies of any kind in respect to economy or security.

Reviewed by: [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, LEE H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/CI/R&A		8. CURRENT STATION Washington, D.C.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. January 1969	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 14 July 1968 - 31 Dec 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analyzes sensitive counterintelligence cases as directed by the C/CI/R&A. These analyses range from operations of primarily historical significance to current and pressing matters.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analyzes and synthesizes materials dealing with the growth and development of the Soviet intelligence and security services and with the counterintelligence operations directed by them against the non-Communist services.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts substantial reviews of summary reports on overt publications dealing with the past and present of Soviet intelligence. This assignment does not consist merely of editing	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Lectures and conducts briefings in OTR courses and in the training programs of other U.S. Government agencies. The main topics covered are the Soviet intelligence and security services, political developments in the USSR, and Communist subversion.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-68 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren joined CI/R&A on 14 July 1968, so that this fitness report is his first in his present assignment. Consequently a significant part of his time has been used, during the period of this report, in familiarizing himself with his job and its potential. His performance, nonetheless, has been consistently strong.

He brings to his assignment an excellent background, both academically and in terms of Agency experience. He shows consistently sound judgement and equanimity, an ability to sort out facts and to reach decisions on a factual basis. He seeks and welcomes guidance but is also fully capable of acting independently within his limits of responsibility.

Mr. Wigren has an excellent potential in the area of research and analysis. He has no present supervisory responsibilities. He is consistently aware of the significance of the cost factor.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 Aug 69	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1 Year	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 31 AUG 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CI/R&A	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Donovan E. Pratt Donovan E. Pratt

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Highly competent, professional employee. Combines a capacity to do the research job and to articulate the results in a training setting, authoritatively. These are skills that are uncommon; they merit recognition, and encouragement. Tends to prefer settled, agreed-upon work load situation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Raymond G. Rocca

SECRET

Section B - Specific Duty #3

these summaries, which are compiled by another element of CI/R&A; the principal purpose is to carry out analyses designed to ensure that the relevance of the material to a broad R&A program is made fully explicit.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D	
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intel C.S	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC	8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.			

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1968

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1967 - 31 December 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses. DA 2 ?	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises Introduction to Communism course.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 of	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren has continued to broaden and strengthen his [illegible] well contribution to SIC activities. For most of this reporting period he has assumed the responsibility for supervision of the Introduction to Communism course -- a role which he has carried out with a high degree of success. He has a mature, disciplined, inquiring mind -- and appears to have found in this instructional assignment a function for which his talents and personality are well suited.

In addition, his contacts in SB division, which he maintains closely, are a valuable asset to SIC.

Mr. Wigren was one of two instructors who were the subjects of a highly complementary letter from the Director of the South African service to the DCI resulting from a training TDY in that country.

Subject -- in his supervisory capacity as chief instructor of Introduction to Communism is efficient and cost conscious in the use of personnel and equipment.

I strongly urge that his stated desire to transfer into a Training career status be given favorable consideration.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 January 1968	

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 January 1968	Chief, SIC/OTR	John W Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Wigren has done very well during this reporting period. He makes a fine contribution to SIC. I concur in this rating.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 January 1968	Deputy Director of Training	Alfonso Rodriguez Alfonso Rodriguez

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN, (First) Lee (Middle) H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923
3. SEX M
4. GRADE GS-13
5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intel
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC
8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.
9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
XX CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
SPECIAL (Specify):
10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
INITIAL | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):
11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1967
12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

10 FEB 1967

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

OFFICE OF [illegible] MAIL ROOM
FEB 2 9 08 AM '67

Mr. Wigren has made a significant contribution to SIC's program during this reporting period -- his first complete one with this staff. I believe that my comment of last January that he "has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor" has been validated. He has greatly broadened his scope, has participated actively in external programs, and, although he has not been assigned any to date, is ready to assume course supervisory responsibility. I strongly recommend this his request for an extension of his tour in OTR be accepted.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
24 January 1967	Keith Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
12	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 January 1967	Chief, SIC/OTR	John W Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN,	(First) Lee	(Middle) M.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13 / 5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intel			7. OFF/DIV BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1967

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1966 - 31 December 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
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O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Survey, and CT courses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts covert tutorial training programs for foreign nationals.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Participates as guest in programs of other U.S. government agencies.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Wigren has made a significant contribution to SIC's program during this reporting period -- his first complete one with this staff. I believe that my comment of last January that he "has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor" has been validated. He has greatly broadened his scope, has participated actively in external programs, and, although he has not been assigned any to date, is ready to assume course supervisory responsibility. I strongly recommend this his request for an extension of his tour in OTR be accepted.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 24 January 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 January 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Instr Intell	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT OTR/SIC		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1966

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
3 May 1965 - 31 December 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counselling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Instructs in Introduction to Communism, USSR Basic Country Survey, and CT courses.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts covert tutorial training programs.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

27 JAN 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Mr. Wigren has been a member of SIC staff for eight months. He brought to us a knowledge in depth of the Soviet intelligence services and Soviet methods of clandestine activities which have been a distinct asset, and which have provided most useful judgments and insights.

Mr. Wigren appears to have a sound, disciplined, scholarly attitude toward substantive problems, and a searching, imaginative approach to pedagogical problems. He has developed as a team member easily and effectively, and has been willing to take on increasing responsibility. I feel that Mr. Wigren has excellent potential for further development as a senior instructor.

Mr. Wigren has not--at this time--been assigned any supervisory responsibilities.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 14 January 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 8	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 14 January 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SIC/OTR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John W Morrison JOHN W. MORRISON

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

No appropriate reviewing official.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	006198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CI		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
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S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and directs the work of a Branch of 8 people, and coordinates and guides the research work of other Branches of this Group. DA-12	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans the research program of SR/CI DC 31	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials. DA64	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Manages personnel.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Edits the research production of SR/CI DD11	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Personally prepared a long and complicated report on a highly important matter under pressure of supervision and extremely tight deadlines.	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

30 JAN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 29 4 12 PM '64
MAIL ROOM

Mr. Wigren is a conscientious and capable research officer with a good grasp of his material and is able to present it effectively to audiences of widely varied sophistication. Since his last report, the basic orientation of SR/CI has changed, and is now directed almost wholly to the creation and exploitation of operations. The organization thus needs more urgently than ever the digested operational experience which it is Mr. Wigren's job to produce. This has made it necessary to apply strict priorities based on operational need and relevancy, which has been difficult for Mr. Wigren, who has no direct operational experience. He has not been able to get the most out of his people, nor give them the sort of close and consistent guidance which some of them require in the face of changing or sudden requirements. He has a tendency to be over-concerned with organizational and bureaucratic exercise to the expense of substantive production. Nonetheless, his real qualities came to the fore recently when he produced well and used his staff effectively on an important and complicated project. He is a distinct asset in his responsible and demanding job.

Mr. Wigren performs his duties with maximum economy.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 22 January 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 22 Jan. 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SR/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Tennent H. Bagley
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Concur.		
DATE 27 January 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, SR Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE David E. Murphy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
006198

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) LEE (Middle) H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-13	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/COPS/CI		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs.	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 January 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) September 1961 - 31 December 1962

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and reviews work of a section including 11 research analysts and three clerks. DA12	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet intelligence. DC45 OC30 DC31	P+
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers. DD11	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required. DA26	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, OTR and others on CI research matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. 25 JAN 1963	S+

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

SEE ATTACHED SHEET

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 14 January 1965	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 44	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/SR/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 16 JAN 1965	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL SR/COP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward D. Goloway

SECRET

NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Mr. Wigren is extremely proficient in handling his section from both the personnel and managerial standpoints. In addition, he is an expert on Soviet Intelligence in his own right and lectures on the topic to officials of this and other governments. He is particularly capable at training new researchers.

In reviewing his file today, I note that the Reviewing Official for his fitness report of a year ago noted his opinion that my ratings of Mr. Wigren at that time were too high. That opinion was not discussed with me or with Mr. Wigren. Perhaps the ratings were indeed too high, but I must say that considering the Fitness Report form and criteria in use at that time and his performance in relation to that of other officers in this branch and outside it, I would give him the same ratings today for that period.

The ratings in this current report will appear slightly lower than those of the last report. This is not entirely due to the different report form. Mr. Wigren's problems increased in both intensity and complexity during this period, and I do not feel that he met the increased burden with as much of an increase in performance as was necessary. This should not at all detract from my rating of his overall performance, which is still exceptional and only slightly less than outstanding.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 106199

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN	(First) Lee	(Middle) H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-1-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer			7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CI	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED	☐
PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED	☐

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 1 Jan. '61 - Sept. '61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 9 research analysts and 4 clerks.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	RATING NO. 6/	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, ORR and others on CI research matters.	RATING NO. 7
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	RATING NO. 7	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	RATING NO. 6

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5/

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3		5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET [illegible]

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Wigren's performance during [illegible] year has been outstanding in every important respect. Despite great pressure and frequently difficult assignments he has directed his section in a calm and mature manner which has enabled it to meet deadlines on RIS research despite the relative inexperience of its personnel. His potential for development is excellent and the responsibilities of his section are being expanded to enable it to produce even more of its high-quality product.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 13 September	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE W. H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 13 September 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/SR/CI	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

While I quite agree that Mr. Wigren has done a very fine job, I consider that the ratings in Section B are overly generous. I base this on the fact that I know of no other highly-competent officer who has received 7 ratings on two-thirds of his specific duties; and I do not believe that Wigren's performance is better than any other officer's I know. There is no question in my mind that Wigren's performance in this job has been superior to any previous incumbents!

DATE 14 Sept 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL QUENTIN C. JOHNSON, SR/COP	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Q C Johnson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

13 MAR 1961

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
WIGREN Lee H.	12-1-23	M	GS-12

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Ops Officer	DDP/SR/CE

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
31 Jan 61	1 Jan 60 - 31 Dec 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 8 research analysts and 2 clerks.	5+	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS, ORR and others on CI research matters.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	5+

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAR 9 2 55 PM '61

As Chief of SR's Research Section on Soviet Intelligence, Mr. Wigren's performance has continued to be superior in the same manner as described in Section E of last year's report. In addition to this he has worked closely with OTR on the revamping of the CI Operations Course. He has been particularly effective in organizing and leading briefings on the RIS given to chiefs and operations officers of foreign intelligence services during their visits to Washington, and in leading a seminar designed to assist SR personnel in handling liaison briefings. His success is carrying out a planned approach to SR's CI research problems, using personnel who have relatively little substantive experience, has been especially gratifying.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 24 February 61	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 24 February 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/SR/RISB	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN Leo	2. DATE OF BIRTH 12-01-23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/SR/CE	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 25 Jan 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: 7 May 59-31 Dec 59

SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises & reviews work of Section including 8 research analysts and 2 clerks.	5+	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Gives lectures and briefings to Agency and foreign officials as required.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Plans and implements divisional research program on Soviet Intelligence.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Effects coordination with CI Staff, OS and others on CI research matters.	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs dissemination of CI studies and reports on RIS to appropriate U.S. and foreign consumers.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Establishes divisional criteria for records and methods of information processing required for CI research.	5+

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. Wigren has excellent substantive background on the Soviet Union and, except for a two year period on a WE operations desk, has devoted his entire 9 years in the Agency to research on Soviet Intelligence in one way or another. His performance for the past year in a job formerly held by GS-14's and 15's can only be described as superior. He has not only assumed responsibilities greater than those of the previous incumbents; he has carried these out with a minimum of support and in a calm, mature manner which has earned respect on all sides. Although his analysts have often been relatively inexperienced, he has geared their assignments to their capabilities and subjects designed to increase their competence. His most important contribution during this period has been in the formation of an organized plan of research in response to Agency and external requirements, and the establishment of improved records and procedures to carry out this program.

Although Mr. Wigren would prefer eventual assignment to the field as an operational officer, it seems to me his greatest potential lies in the kind of research and support of operations he is presently performing. I would therefore recommend that future training be oriented along these lines rather than strictly operational lines, and that planning for his eventual field assignment should emphasize his knowledge of Soviet Intelligence and his ability to deal with other specialists in a "liaison" relation.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 22 March 60

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Lee H. Wigren

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION:

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 21 March 1960

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: SR/COP/CE

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: E. W. Knowles Edward W. Knowles

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☒ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Although I am not sufficiently familiar with [illegible] in [illegible] during this job ~~[illegible]~~ also I am not aware of anything which would contradict the rater and am inclined to agree with the rating.

DATE: 26 March 60

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: SR/COP

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Quentin Johnson

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
106198

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-12
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE I. O. (FI)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FI Div D	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1959

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From 7 Mar 58 - To 31 Dec 58

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

	RATING NO.		RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 4 people - 3 professional (GS-7 through 9) conducting research and 1 clerical (GS-4)	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assists in developing new programs	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Writes reports	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Coordinates with other offices	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts research	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Conducts external liaison	5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL						X	
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT							X
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY							X
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Mr. WIGREN has shown intelligence, initiative and originality in his approach to various assignments. He has calmly accepted heavy working pressures and has efficiently carried out research and administrative matters requiring the careful disposition of manpower and time. He has willingly accepted responsibility and made decisions on his own when the need arose.

It is recommended that Mr. WIGREN take a course on the Communist Party and one on management.

During the sixteen months that he has been under my supervision Mr. WIGREN has capably carried out assignments of a progressively more difficult nature. And he appears to have the potential to assume greater responsibilities.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 16 January 1959	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 16 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 January 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, SAS, FI/D	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Albert P. KERGEL

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I COULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 19 January 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ADC/FI/Division D	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE [illegible] J. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI Div D Intel Support Br	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Biographic Officer		
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 Mar 58	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 23 September 57 - 19 March 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 14 February 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Albert P. Kergel Albert P. Kergel	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Spec. Act. Br., FI/D

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

Posted Pos. Control BY DATE 11 MAR 1958
Reviewed by [illegible] MAR 13

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 14 February 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Frank B. Rowlett	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FI/D

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM
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2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DISSEMINATING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Writing specialized reports	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Evaluating significance of data	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Has and uses area knowledge	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wigren is intelligent, competent and diligent.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

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SECRET

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(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* WIGREN, Lee	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI Div D Intel Support Br		6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Biographic Officer	
7. GRADE GS-11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 Mar 58	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT *(Inclusive dates)* 23 September 57 - 19 March 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT *(Check one)*: ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
14 Feb. 1958	Albert P. Kergel Albert P. Kergel	Chief, Spec. Ac. Br., FI/D

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
14 Feb. 1958	Frank B. Rowlett Frank B. Rowlett	Chief, FI/D

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Wigren has a flair for research which should enable him [illegible] responsibilities in work of a research nature.

PERSONNEL
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MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

It is planned to give Mr. Wigren an opportunity to assume more research responsibilities.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	4	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	5	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 December 1923
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE/Scandinavian Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: ASAP
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 1957 - 23 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR ☒ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: He is no longer in WE-1

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM AND A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 25 October 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Robert C. Yore
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: AC/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pers. Control		11/6/57
Reviewed by P.D.		NOV 21 1957

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 25 October 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward Ryan Edward Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WE-1

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 55 OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 3 55 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Is a Headquarters case officer	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Prepares correspondence and reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

This officer is intelligent and possesses good judgement. He is neat and methodical in his work. Within the area of his explicit duties he is a willing worker who takes and executes orders faithfully. At this desk, the weaker aspect of his performance was in matters of initiative, drive and imagination. Though this impression may be heightened by Mr. Wigren's naturally quiet, unobtrusive manner, thefinal assessment must be that he is not inclined to go beyond carrying out assignments given to him.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 3-4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:
In view of his relative strengths and weaknesses, Mr. Wigren would seem better fitted for work requiring studious and methodical application to one or a few activities or projects, rather than as an across-the-board operations case officer, either at Headquarters or in the field.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 December 1923
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE/Scandinavian Branch
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS-11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: ASAP
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 1957 - 23 September 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 25 Oct. 1957

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: R. C. Yore Robert C. Yore

C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: AC/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 25 Oct. 1957

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward Ryan Edward Ryan

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: C/WE-1

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his [illegible] and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think [illegible] terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	0	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	1	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify) In absence of actual experience of individual in supervisory job, ratings are very arbitrary

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

8 m.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 30 3 35 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

At the time of Mr. Wigren's last fitness report, the supervisor and reviewing official discussed with him his particular weaknesses and strengths. It was pointed out to him that his advancement, particularly his overseas assignment, would depend upon his showing greater initiative and interest as a case officer. It should be recorded that Mr. Wigren took this to heart and consciously strove to improve his performance up to the time he left this office. The results were not such, however, as to seem to qualify Mr. Wigren for overseas service. By mutual agreement, therefore, he transferred to the FI Staff

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Section H.

FUTURE PLANS

No longer in WE-1

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	2	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
2	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	2	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS		18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
2	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. [illegible] CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES [illegible] WITHIN ALLOWABLE LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren, Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. SEX: m
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP WE Scandinavian
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops. Officer
7. GRADE: 11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 March 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 1956-19 March 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
☐ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO HIM A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW HE STANDS IN HIS PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

BY DATE
Posted P&S Control
Reviewed by PUD

B. THIS DATE: 25 March 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: E.C. Yore
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: C/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

I have discussed this report, and his general situation, in considerable detail with Mr. Wigren. He felt he did not wish to challenge the critical comments of the rating officers (I had two officers work together in that capacity), but felt that a rating of 3 under specific duty No.2 did not do him justice. I think he's right on this score and would raise that rating to a 4. I would say there has been an improvement in Mr. Wigren's performance within the last year, and I have raised with the Division Personnel Board the subject of a promotion for him to GS-12. The Board recommended deferment of his case for a few months.

☒ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 25 March 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Edward Ryan
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, WE-1

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 11 20 AM '52
MAIL ROOM

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Writes Hqs and field Communications	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyses operations and proposes action.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Coordinates with other area desks and staffs.	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Briefs superiors on his activities	RATING NUMBER 4
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Prepares intelligence reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Most notable among this officer's strong qualities are his intelligence, inquisitiveness, emotional stability and good judgement. He comprehends and analyzes situations and problems readily and in the latter seems very able at finding logical solutions. He expresses himself well orally and in writing. He is neat in both personal and work habits. Such weaknesses as Mr. Wigren seems to have lie in the areas of social relationship and motivation. He is calm and introspective, not gregarious nor easy to know. Though he is always polite and even tempered he seems at the roots, perhaps, unduly sensitive to criticism. In his attitude towards and the performance of his job he seems to do what he likes well, but to let the lessagreeable things slide.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

2. For the Reviewing Official (continued).

Mr. Wigren has also asked that it be made a matter of record that, for a period of three months in 1956, he was acting chief of the Swedish Desk and handled these responsibilities effectively. I have agreed to cite the extent of his responsibilities. Certainly the routine business of the desk was kept moving during this period. I have pointed out with respect to the manner of his performance of his duties that his fitness report is not an unfavorable one. The factors which have turned this annual fitness report into a personal crisis for him are the simultaneous deferment of his hoped-for promotion, and the deferment of an overseas assignment for him -- both of which actions naturally reflect on his past performance. I have pointed out that we have to require appreciably better than average performances from officers we send overseas, that I believe we have in the Branch at least one better qualified candidate for the overseas assignment in question, and that I am obliged to give the assignment to the person I feel is best qualified.

Perhaps understandably, Mr. Wigren continues to believe that this report is not a fair reflection of his performance. I have told him that I can go no further in attempting to explain my judgement and have asked that he discuss his situation with the Deputy Division Chief and/or the Division Chief. He agreed to do so.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wigren, Leo H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec. 1923	3. SEX m	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP WE Scandinavian	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops. Officer		
7. GRADE 11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 March 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 19 March 1956-19 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 25 March 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR R. C. Yore R. C.Yore	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/WE-1/Sweden

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 25 March 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward Ryan Edward Ryan	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, WE-1

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

BY DATE
Record Copy
BOOK

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3 2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2 1	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	1	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 29 11 20 AM '57

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
4

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

He is, I believe, at a crucial stage in his career. Depending upon his outlook and ambition during the next 3 to 5 fiveyears he will have become either a mediocre senior case officer or an officer ready and able to assume executive responsibilities. He already has the inherent judgement and intelligence for more responsible jobs, but has not yet demonstrated a sufficient industry and resolve to make him as a promising professional.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Mr. Wigren has been undergoing a variety of specialized training, including Swedish language, preparatory to an assignment in Stockholm. Such an assignment has been deferred and future training plans must therefore be held in abeyance.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4 3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	2	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	2	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
1-2	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTICAL IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	X	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4 3	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
3	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4 3	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
3	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	3	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

2. For the Reviewing official: Note:

I have indicated in ink in the forms wherein my judgement differs from that of the rating officer.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wigren Lee H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 Dec. 1923
3. SEX: M.
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] D1
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/WE Scandinavian
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Area Ops Officer
7. GRADE: GS 11
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 19 March 1956
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 19 March 55 - 19 March 56
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.

☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISOR(S).

☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.

☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.

☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 2 May 1956

C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: J. J. Stenger,Jr. J. Stenger

D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief Scand'l Sch[illegible]

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

I have discussed this report at length with Mr. Stenger, because of its critical character, and subscribe entirely to it. I think the discussion of the report with Mr. Wigren has been beneficial, and I believe an improvement will result, since Wigren seems to have good capabilities, if he cares to use them. If there is not an improvement within the next year, the question of a reassignment will have to be considered. Wigren tells me he feels he was not given any [illegible] of [illegible] and that the report is therefore to some extent unfair, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] make [illegible] a [illegible] record.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 4 May 56

B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: [illegible]

C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Branch Chief

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

BY DATE

[illegible] 12 May [illegible]

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 NOV 55 OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH
ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).*

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same work at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

MAY 15 3 14 PM '58

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB.
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Processing and dissemination of field information reports	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of correspondence to the field	RATING NUMBER 3
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Handling of project outlines and renewals and other administrative details	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Providing operational support to the station	RATING NUMBER 3	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

A large portion of Mr. Wigren's time is taken up with the processing of field information reports and the handling of administrative aspects of various FI projects, both of which he performs efficiently, although he occasionally requires supervision to ensure the prompt completion of project details. In the area of operational support for the field, which includes providing the station with requirements, with name traces, operational appraisal and operational guidance, Mr. Wigren, performs acceptably but occasionally shows a lack of initiative and originality of ideas such as would be required to raise the rating in this category. As regards preparation of correspondence for the field, Mr. Wigren here again performs acceptably, but occasionally shows of a lack of observance and attention to detail.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: *Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....*and how he fits in with *your* team. *Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.*

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Although this question has been answered in the negative, it is believed that Mr. Wigren's performance would be rated higher in a position involving more research-type work.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wigren	(First) Leo	(Middle) H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec. 1923	3. SEX M.	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted]
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/WE Scandinavian			6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Area Ops Officer		
7. GRADE GS 11	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 19 March 1956		9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 19 March 55 - 19 March 56		

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 2 May 1956	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR J.J.Stenger, Jr.	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Swedish Desk WE-1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 4 May 56	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Edward [illegible]	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Branch Chief

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 3

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	2	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	1	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	1	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	1	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	1	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

12

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

In the opinion of the rater, Mr. Wigren does not display quite the degree of initiative, originality of ideas, and attention to details required for assuming greater responsibility, although he is believed to be of better than average intelligence.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
PM '56
MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Sx Within the next twelve months Subject may be considered for an overseas assignment. It is believed that such an assignment may be beneficial in giving Mr. Wigren broader experience which may serve to increase his potential to the Agency.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is desirous of having overseas duty. Should he be assigned to an overseas post, it is believed that this duty may provide him with the necessary stimulus to bring out latent potential in addition to broadening his experience. Should an overseas tour not result in an increase in potential, particularly as regards initiative and ability to think originally, it is recommended consideration be given to employing Subject in a research-type job.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS, HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	3	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	3	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
3	3. HAS INITIATIVE	3	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
2	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
4	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	2	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	2	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
3	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	3	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	2	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

BY 5 DATE 12.13

2 12/14

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. GRADE GS-9	3. POSITION TITLE IO (FI) CD-FI	
4. OFFICE DDP/FI	STAFF OR DIVISION Staff C	BRANCH Soviet Intel.Pr	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION			

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 19 Mar. 53 To 18 Mar.54

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Conduct continuing examination of structure and operational methods of Soviet Satellite intelligence services. Maintain files and records pertinent to this examination.

2. Assist personnel of country desks in matters involving Satellite services. Advise and aid CE personnel of Satellite country desks.

3. Conduct research on problem of relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellites. Publish studies pertinent to this subject.

4. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters and training.

5. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas (eg: Scandinavia) and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.

6. Perform special tasks as assigned.

8. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

CE, Research and Analysis.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

1 October 1954
DATE

Lee H. Wigren
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

He has been for several years a one man orchestra, viz. list of duties above.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

OF PERSONNEL
OCT 8 8 53 AM '54
MAIL ROOM

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

doing about all one man can do on a difficult job

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

is growing with job

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

very good potential in research in satellite field

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

I do not think so

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

training completed — rotation as desired in line with background

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

na

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

4 Oct '54
DATE

N W Holbrook
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

5 Oct 54
DATE

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WIGREN (First) Lee (Middle) H
2. GRADE GS-7
3. POSITION TITLE Intell. Off.
4. OFFICE DDP
STAFF OR DIVISION FI
BRANCH Staff C-CE
☒ DEPT'L.
☐ FIELD
IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-10-52 To 4-10-53
6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial
☐ Reassignment
☒ Annual
☐ Reassignment of Supervisor
☐ Special

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

1. Under general supervision, examine the structure and operational methods of Soviet intelligence services, and prepare studies based on this examination.
2. Conduct research to determine current relationships between Soviet intelligence services and those of the Soviet satellite countries.
3. Prepare analyses of special counterespionage problems for use in the field, headquarters, and training.
4. Prepare counterespionage studies dealing with specific areas, and based on systematic analyses of espionage cases in those areas.
5. Assist in the review of Country Plans from the counterespionage viewpoint.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed

The following courses were completed during the period April to July 1951, and have not been previously reported:

1.Basic Orientation Course; 2.Basic Intelligence Course; 3.Operations Course; and 4.Advanced Operations Course.

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED? Research, analysis, and support — all mainly in the field of counterespionage.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

10.

21 April 1953
DATE

Lee H Wigren
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Highly satisfactory. Has displayed conspicuous good judgment, accuracy, and cooperation.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Judgment

13. IN WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

Knowledge of Soviet Intelligence, particularly operational analysis, for which he has shown a special aptitude.

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Shows capacity for [illegible] and eventual leadership.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

No.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

Training adequate. Eventual operational experience, preferably in Scandinavian area, desirable.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

DATE 21 Apr. 1953

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR George E.

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

DATE 21 Apr '53

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Newton

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

noted - 28 Apr 53 RCP

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT
MANAGEMENT FOR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (MEO)

Student: Lee H. Wigren Dates: 12-14 Sept 1977

Employee No.: 006198 Office: DDO/CI

Service Designation: D

COURSE DESCRIPTION

The course is designed especially for people in managerial and supervisory positions. It is based upon the assumption that the Agency's ability to promote full utilization of all employees regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or age, depends upon the awareness and behavior of managerial/supervisory personnel. They have a critical role in making the decisions necessary to eliminate real or apparent discrimination and to promote productive work relations among employees who differ in race, sex, or culture. In fact managerial awareness and decisions have a great impact on the recommendations and efforts of EEO, FWP, Upward Mobility and other employees concerned with compliance and affirmative action.

OBJECTIVES

Through lectures, readings, films, group discussion, workshop exercises, and case studies, each supervisor, at the conclusion of the course, should be able to:

1) Identify some of the more prominent patterns of discrimination and describe their impact upon supervisory processes; 2) Have had the opportunity or been able to critically evaluate his or her own attitudes towards equality of opportunity; 3) Better contribute to the effective utilization of all employees by being aware of and sensitive to several creditable approaches to management behavior and actions; 4) Explain the historical background which gave rise to today's Equal Employment Opportunity Programs; 5) Articulate the Agency's progress in Equal Employment Opportunity Programs; 6) Describe what efforts the Agency is making to be fair to all employees, including describing such programs as the Upward Mobility Program, Federal Women's Program and the Hispanic Program; 7) Be responsive to the complaint process and know what he or she, as a supervisor, should do when faced with a complaint from an employee; and 8) Articulate the significance and importance of major legislation, executive orders and internal CIA policies which affect the management of Equality Opportunity Programs.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a cerificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Samuel R. Lewis 26 SEP 1977

Course Coordinator Date

CONFIDENTIAL

(When filled in)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT : Acknowledgment of Evaluation Board Functional Category

REFERENCE : Evaluation Board Precepts for Your Grade

1. Based upon an examination of your past assignments and duties, and after considering likely future assignments, you have been placed (subject to your signature below) in the functional category DAA for Evaluation Board purposes. Precise definitions of this category are contained in the Evaluation Board precepts for your grade. This placement is made in order that your performance, growth potential, and career planning may be judged against officers similarly placed professionally. YOU ARE URGED TO STUDY THE PRECEPTS AND CONSIDER YOUR OWN CASE CAREFULLY.

2. In general, you should consider the following;

a. Categories are sharply defined. Competition is within categories, not between them. Thus, a weak B/OG performance is not strengthened by reclassifying it as B/OS.

b. A change in category after sustained performance in a different category may cause a temporary loss of momentum in your career advancement until you have demonstrated proficiency in your new assignment.

c. A category change should not be initiated for the period of a temporary, training or rotational assignment unless a permanent change of career track will follow.

3. If you believe that this is not the correct category for you because the substantive nature of your job more closely approximates another category or because you have made a permanent change of career track, please take the matter up through your command channel to secure the concurrence of your component of assignment or of your home base component, as appropriate, to a change of your category. Previously assigned and acknowledged categories will remain in effect until a fully executed acknowledgment of change is received by the Career Management Staff.

4. Please sign and date this notification in the space provided and return it to your Personnel Evaluation and Management Officer or to your Personnel Officer.

ACKNOWLEDGED:

Lee H Wigren
Signature of Addressee

[illegible] 1977
Date

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECRET

9 FEB 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

FROM : Leonard McCoy
Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT : Letter of Instructions

1. The following letter of instructions is provided to outline your functions as Special Assistant to the Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group.

2. The objectives of CI/R&A are:

a. To provide current and relevant counterintelligence support to operations being conducted by CI Staff and the operating divisions in the interests of furthering intelligence collection and preventing the frustration of our operations by adversary intelligence services.

b. To conduct research and analyze information to facilitate the detection of the efforts of adversary intelligence services to penetrate the US and friendly foreign governments.

3. Your functions as Special Assistant to Chief, CI Staff Research and Analysis Group are as follows:

a. Select information and research and analysis products of CIA, other agencies, and liaison services for publication by the CI Staff as CI guidance and references.

b. Initiate and supervise the conduct of CI research and analysis by assigned personnel for publication by the CI Staff.

c. Establish and implement publication procedures, including editing, rewriting, organizing, sanitizing, classifying, setting up dissemination channels and

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controls, and monitoring printing processes for CI Staff publications.

d. Initiate and coordinate the distribution of CI Staff publications as appropriate within the Agency, to other US government agencies, and to liaison services.

e. Maintain a record of CI Staff publications, including recipients, dates of distribution, responses and comments, related correspondence, and other pertinent information.

f. Conduct liaison with other government agencies and foreign intelligence services to promote the collection and dissemination of CI information.

g. Collect and maintain a library of past and present classified CI publications available from all sources for ready reference and consultation.

Leonard McCoy

I have read and understand this letter of instructions.

Lee H. Wigren

Lee H. Wigren

9 February 1977

Date

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
2 - CI/Personnel ✓
1 - C/CI/R&A

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, [illegible] Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
000198	WIGREN	LEE	

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
10	24	75	11	02	75		2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI-31-76

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD OCT 24 - NOV 2 - 75

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	☐ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED	
☐ OCO			
✓ C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE	SIGNATURE	
☐ C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
HOFFMAN BUILDING
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-22B/ske
3870
Ser S- 3460
19 November 1975

SECRET

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Director of Central Intelligence

Subj: Counterintelligence/Counterespionage Training (U)

1. (S) During the period 20 October through 28 October 1975, twenty-seven Special Agents of this Service attended an intensive, comprehensive course of instruction regarding counterintelligence techniques as applied overseas, the instructors and facilities for which were graciously provided by your Agency. As in past matters of this nature, Mr. William M. Decker, Mr. Nageeb Trabulsi, and the other dedicated members of your staff provided support and coordination truly unsurpassed in excellence. Both Mr. Decker and Mr. Trabulsi consistently devoted time and effort far beyond that which could normally be expected in order to ensure the highest quality of instruction and assistance.

2. (S) In addition to excellent administrative support, the caliber of instructors and content of the material discussed combined to make every presentation a significant and meaningful experience for the students concerned. Although it was evident that all instructors were highly motivated and fully conversant regarding their respective subjects, I wish to particularly cite those individuals who contributed generous amounts of their valuable time and extensive knowledge toward the improvement of the Naval Investigative Service counterintelligence posture overseas. Those gentlemen are:

Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Flaherty
Mr. John Bogart
Mr. Peter Ernest
Mr. Charles Beling
Mr. Edward Andrews

3. (U) I again wish to extend my most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

Copy to:
Chief, CI Staff

Classified by [illegible]
Subject to [illegible]
[illegible] intervals
Declassified on [illegible] 83

SECRET

14-00000

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
HOFFMAN BUILDING
2461 EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22331

SECRET

IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-22B/skc
3870
Ser S-3460
19 November 1975

Executive Registry
75-9466/1

SECRET

From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Director of Central Intelligence

Subj: Counterintelligence/Counterespionage Training (U)

75-6524

1. (S) During the period 20 October through 28 October 1975, twenty-seven Special Agents of this Service attended an intensive, comprehensive course of instruction regarding counterintelligence techniques as applied overseas, the instructors and facilities for which were graciously provided by your Agency. As in past matters of this nature, Mr. William M. Decker, Mr. Nageeb Trabulsi, and the other dedicated members of your staff provided support and coordination truly unsurpassed in excellence. Both Mr. Decker and Mr. Trabulsi consistently devoted time and effort far beyond that which could normally be expected in order to ensure the highest quality of instruction and assistance.

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Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Flaherty
Mr. John Bogart
Mr. Peter Ernest
Mr. Charles Beling
Mr. Edward Andrews

3. (U) I again wish to extend my most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

BARRY MARTIN

Copy to:
Chief, CI Staff

Classified by: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 1983

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
006198	WIGREN, LEE H.	12/01/23

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM-TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1 PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2 NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE			
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE			

FORM 444n
2-66

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

OCT 15 11 03 [illegible] 70

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (Check (X)) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM

☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX

PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X

REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 October 70	Lee H Wigren

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6		7-24	
006198	WIGREN	LEE	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	37	38	39		40-42
11	07	72	11	12	73		2			WH	811

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
31 DEC 72
(Insert date or event)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

CLASSIFIED BY 14537

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☒	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. CI 54-73

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	☐	
☒	C & L DIVISION, CTBB.	DATE	SIGNATURE
☐	C & F DIVISION	30 JAN 73	

THIS FORM TO INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-1)

14-00000

[illegible] 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Official Personnel File

SUBJECT : Wigren, Lee H.

1. Studies in Intelligence is the Agency's quarterly professional journal. It publishes a wide variety of unique material--historical, analytical, technical, etc.—on all aspects of intelligence both as a profession and as a function of national security and foreign policy. Employees whose writings are accepted for publication make a valuable contribution to the Agency's work which ought to be reflected in their official files.

2. Accordingly, the Board of Editors wishes to record the fact that Studies in Intelligence has published the following material submitted by Mr. Wigren:

Book Reviews: "Spy Ring" - Vol. V, No. 4 (Fall 1961)
"Soviet Spy Ring" - Vol. VI, No. 2 (Spring 1962)

Hugh T. Cunningham
HUGH T. CUNNINGHAM
Chairman, Board of Editors
Studies in Intelligence

Distribution:
~~0~~ - Subject's Official File
1 - CI/Pers

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
006198	Wigren	Lee	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	CODE 37	38	39	CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
05	30	72	06	05	72	2			Ottawa Winnepeg	120

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		
	CABLE		DISPATCH
	OTHER (Specify)		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.
CI 121-72

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
30 May — 5 June 1972

REMARKS

PREPARED BY

	OCO	X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT
X	C & L DIVISION, CTBR.	DATE 22 August 1972	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	[illegible]		SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
4-71 EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE
PU[illegible]D

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
006198	Wirren	Lee	H.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
						1 . PCS (Basic) 3 . CORRECTION 5 . CANCELLATION					

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	O/P USE ONLY 39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
06	23	71	06	27	71	2 . TDY (Basic) 4 . CORRECTION 6 . CANCELLATION	2			WH	811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	DCO		DATE	SIGNATURE
X	C & L DIVISION, CTSS.		26 July 71	
☐	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

(4-10)

GROUP 1

SECRET

FORM 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

FILE PUNCHED BY S

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	*(Print)*	7-24	
006198	Wigren, Lee H.		

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39	Ottawa Montreal WH	40-42
07	08	70	07	13	70		2				811

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 7/8/70 to 7/15/70

REMARKS

PREPARED BY			REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	OCO			
X	C & L DIVISION, CTSS.	DATE 9/9/70		SIGNATURE
	C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

GS 13 D

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO. 096198	NAME (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - - TO - -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-68 444n

SECRET

(4-51)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

APR 15 9 12 AM '70

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
					RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.	Republic of South Africa	Security forces and General	1966			x		x
2.								

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE, OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE
9 April 1970

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
Lee H. Wigren

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) WIGREN, LEE HOBART 006198	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) DEC 1, 1923	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 024 16 4873
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance → ☒ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance → ☐ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance → ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Lee H. Wigren

DATE
19 February 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 20 11 17 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY [illegible]
(For use only until April 14, [illegible])
176-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

Complete in duplicate. The data recorded on this form is essential in determining travel expenses allowable in connection with leave at government expense, overseas duty, return to residence upon separation, and for providing current residence and dependency information required in the event of an employee emergency. The original of this form will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) WIGREN	(First) LEE	(Middle) HOBART	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 024-16-4813

1. RESIDENCE DATA

PLACE OF RESIDENCE WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED BY AGENCY BROCKTON MASS	LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. (If appointed abroad) FAIRFAX VA
PLACE IN CONTINENTAL U.S. DESIGNATED AS PERMANENT RESIDENCE FAIRFAX VA	HOME LEAVE RESIDENCE FAIRFAX VA

2. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE OF MARRIAGE 27 SEPT 1952
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE —	DATE OF DECREE —
IF WIDOWED, PLACE SPOUSE DIED —	DATE SPOUSE DIED —

IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED, INDICATE NAME(S) OF SPOUSE, REASON(S) FOR TERMINATION, AND DATE(S)
—

3. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)	TELEPHONE NO.	
ALICE ELLEN (BADER) WIGREN	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA	273-4950	
NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
- CHRISTOPHER LEE WIGREN	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA	M	- 10 MAR 1957
- ERIC VICTOR WIGREN	" " " " "	M	- 15 AUG 1959
NAME OF YOUR FATHER (Or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
AUGUST HERMAN WIGREN	DECEASED		
NAME OF YOUR MOTHER (Or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.	
IDA CAROLINE WIGREN	69 EARLE ST, BROCKTON MASS	JU 7-4615	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.

4. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle) MR. WIGREN, RUSSELL H.	RELATIONSHIP BROTHER
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) 19 PONDEROSA LANE, EAST WALPOLE, MASS	HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 617-MO8-1487
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE —	BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) ☑ YES ☐ NO
YES

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) ☑ YES ☐ NO

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) ☑ YES ☐ NO

The persons named in item 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

CURRENT RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

FORM 11-63 61 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

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(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

- Potomac Bank + Trust, Fairfax Va - checking (Lee H + Ellen P.)
- Columbia Federal Savings + Trust Washington DC - Savings (" ")

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☑ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☑ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

ORIGINAL: WIFE; COPIES: RUSSELL H WIGREN + FILE IN OFFICE

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☑ YES ☐ NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

RUSSELL H. WIGREN M PONDEROSA LANE, E. WALPOLE MASS.

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☑ NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

SIGNED AT	DATE 3 October 1966	SIGNATURE Lee H Wigren

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

11 JAN 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Training

SUBJECT : Recent Training for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11 under Project SELEVER

Reference: Memorandum for Director of Training - Subject: Request for Training for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11 under Project SELEVER, dated 30 September 1965.

Africa Division wishes to express its appreciation for the excellent support and cooperation rendered by members of the Covert Training Staff and School of International Communism during the recent one-month training course provided for SELEVER/10 and SELEVER/11. In particular we wish to thank Mr. Alexander Sogolow of the Covert Training Staff, who not only handled the majority of the training but also spent considerable time and made a special effort with the trainees during evenings and weekends "handholding" them. We also wish to thank in particular the following members of the School of International Communism for their assistance: Messrs. Hugh Clayton, Robert Kehoe, Alvin Korsalski, Henry Pisanko, Henry Schreiber and Lee Wigren.

Glenn Fields
Chief, Africa Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

3 December 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR

ATTENTION: Mr. Lee Wigren
Mr. Joseph Evans
Mrs. Kay Grady
Mr. Edward Knowles

SUBJECT: Training program for three Swiss Federal Police officers.

1. The Swiss Branch of the Eastern European Division wishes to express its appreciation to SR Division for its cooperation and support, in particular for the personal contribution of four of its officers, Mr. Lee Wigren, Mr. Joseph Evans, Mrs. Kay Grady, and Mr. Edward Knowles, during the recent training program for three Swiss Federal Police officers.

2. Mr. Wigren's, Mr. Evan's, Mrs. Grady's, and Mr. Knowles's uniformly excellent briefings on the Soviet Intelligence Services, their legal and illegal support structures, and their modus operandi contributed significantly to what we have reason to believe was a successful training venture. To this must be added the comments of the Swiss officers who pointed out that they were most impressed by the comprehensive and systematic development of the various themes which Mr. Wigren, Mr. Evans, Mrs. Grady, and Mr. Knowles presented and admitted that the briefings added a good deal to their knowledge of the subject.

Robert N. Crowell,
Chief, EE/Switzerland

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 F.P.M.

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 053400

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART:

1. NAME (LAST) WIGREN (FIRST) Lee (MIDDLE INITIAL) H.
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 12 DAY 1 YEAR 1923
3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) 15 Moda Street (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) Fairfax, (STATE) Virginia ☐
5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant? YES ☐ NO ☒
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1 $4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2 $6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3 $10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN Association Benefit Plan
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW) High
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER 4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Ellen R. Wigren	8/13/1927	1			6
Christopher L. Wigren	3/10/1957	2			7
Eric V. Wigren	8/15/1959	3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
   - (c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Lee H. Wigren June 24, 1960
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 6/27/60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 7/10/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

SA

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1959

10108

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, Lee Hobart	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 December 1923	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION FI	4. GRADE 11
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE none	6. POSITION TITLE —	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE —	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT FI/D

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

Counterintelligence (CE)

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY (Including assignments)

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Remain at present Division D assignment until about Spring 1962, participating in various aspects of the work of the office to which assigned, including the administrative side.

B. LONG-RANGE

Field or headquarters assignments making use of background, interest and experience in Counterintelligence and/or area knowledge. Would welcome and seriously consider suggestions of possible future assignments.

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Basic Management Course; Communist Party Organization and Operations Course
On-the-job training within the office
Continued self-study of Swedish

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

To be planned at a later date, based on projected future assignments

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS Although I feel that my interests, experience, and training fit me best for CE type assignments, I wish to gain some breadth of experience through diversified assignments. I also believe that my Scandinavian area and language knowledge should be put to use at some time during my career.

See Item 21

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 3 March 1958	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D. COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

Prior to completing this Career Preference Outline, Mr. WIG[illegible] and I discussed his career interests and desired training. I concur with the views which he has expressed in the completed outline.

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

See item 15.

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR
Albert P. KERGEL

18. SIGNATURE

19. TITLE
Chief, Special Activities Branch, FI/D

20. DATE
3 March 1958

SECTION E. FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

Detailed Individual Career Plan approved by FI Panel
on file in FI Career Management Office, 2008 L

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME
Robert A. Skeels

23. SIGNATURE

24. TITLE
FI Career Management Officer

25. DATE
19 [illegible] 14 APR 1958

LEAVE BLANK

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

20 OCT 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Wigren

SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff

1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 1 July 1954.

2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.

3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Harrison G. Reynolds

Harrison G. Reynolds
Chairman, CIA Selection Board

Noted:
Lee H. Wigren

Date: 20 October 1955

Career S[illegible] Staff
Office of Personnel
3 JAN 1956

FORM NO. 511. 1 APR 55

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

CAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION I (To be completed by employee)

NAME (Last) Wigren	(First) Lee	(Middle) Hobart	AGE 30	GRADE 9	NO. OF MOS. IN GRADE ~~13~~ 14	CAREER DESIGNATION FI

STAFF OR DIVISION Staff C	BRANCH SIB	POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer

NO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT POSITION 40	NO. OF MOS. IN OSS 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIG 0	NO. OF MOS. IN CIA 40

DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)

APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE		LOCATION		TDY	PCS	COMMENTS
FROM	TO	COUNTRY	STATION			
None						

INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCS

A ☒ YES B ☐ ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS C ☐ NO

INDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"

PREFERENCE	COUNTRY	STATION	TYPE OF POSITION
1ST	Sweden	Stockholm	Staff (CE)
2ND	Denmark	Copenhagen	Staff (CE)
3RD	Austria	Vienna or Salzburg	Staff (CE)

IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B," STATE CONDITIONS. IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C," EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS

INDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONS

Tropical areas. Wife's health will not permit.

INDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEAS

Wife age 27.

INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY HAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICE

None

FORM NO. 59-174
1 JUN 54

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE.

(4)

SECRET

INDICATE ANY UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES CONCERNING DEPENDENTS (*old age, chronic illness, need for special educational facilities, etc.*) OR ANY UNUSUAL PERSONAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD AFFECT YOUR OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

None

DESCRIBE TYPES OF HEADQUARTERS AND U.S. FIELD POSITIONS FOR WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE CONSIDERED AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENT IN WHICH YOU WOULD LIKE TO SERVE

Like present assignment very much. Feel most qualified in CE work and would prefer to remain in it. Desire to continue work dealing with problem of Soviet Satellite intelligence services which is my specialty.

REMARKS

DATE 19 July 54

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Lee H Wigren

SECTION II *(To be completed by employee's supervisor)*

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE

INDICATE APPROXIMATE TIME (*months*) WHEN EMPLOYEE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR ANOTHER HEADQUARTERS OR U.S. FIELD ASSIGNMENT

COMMENTS ON AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYEE'S PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT

depends on circumstances

DATE 23 July '54

SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Newton [illegible]

PERSONNEL OFFICER WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL TO OFFICE OF PERSONNEL AND FIRST COPY TO APPROPRIATE CAREER SERVICE BOARD

SECRET

*MAY BE CONTINUED UNDER REMARKS

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED APRIL 1, 1948)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER A6 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

CIA .... (Department or agency) .... (Bureau or division) .... WASHINGTON, D. C. (Place of employment)

I, LEE H. WIGREN, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers contained in my Application for Federal Employment, Form No. ...., dated ...., 19...., filed with the above-named department or agency, which I have reviewed, are true and correct as of this date with the exceptions noted in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form. (If no exceptions, write "None" on the Declaration of Appointee.)

Lee H. Wigren
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 19 day of March, A. D. 19 51

at Washington (City) D. C. (State)

[SEAL]

Chloie D. Hudson
(Signature of officer)

....
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68100-1

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. *Question 3 is to be answered in all cases, otherwise answer only those questions which require an answer different from that given to the corresponding questions on your application form. If no answers are different, write "NONE" in Item 10, below.* Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS *(street and number, city and State)*: 3200 16th St. NW, WASHINGTON DC. (APT 319)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 1 DEC. 1923

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH *(city or town and State or country)*: BROCKTON, MASS

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: A. H. WIGREN

(B) RELATIONSHIP: FATHER

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: 215 BELMONT AVE, BROCKTON, MASS.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.: BROCKTON 4402-W

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS *(Give street number, if any)*	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	✓	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		✓
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		✓
8. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		✓
9. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED, OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		✓

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. The physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 15—43100-1

STANDARD FORM 144
REVISED SEPTEMBER 1964
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FPM [illegible], 83, AND 87

STATEMENT OF PRIOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE AND DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE STATUS

IMPORTANT: The information on this form will be used (1) in determining creditable service for leave purposes and retention credits for reduction in force, and (2) in recording agency determination of competitive status. The employee should complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II through V.

PART I.—EMPLOYEE'S STATEMENT

1. NAME (*Last, first, middle initial*): WIGREN, LEE H.

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 1 DEC 1923

3. LIST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALL FEDERAL AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT (*Do not include military service.*)

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM—			TO—			TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
NONE							

4. LIST PERIODS OF ACTIVE SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM—			TO—			DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	
U.S. ARMY	1943	FEB	17	1946	FEB	11	HONORABLE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☐ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM—			TO—			TOTAL		
	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.

I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

10 January 1966
(DATE)

Lee H Wigren
(SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 19____ at ______ (CITY) ______ (STATE)

SEAL

______

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. A. CSC STATUS ☐ YES ☐ NO
B. TYPE OF PRESENT APPOINTMENT

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

INSTRUCTIONS: File this form on the permanent side of the employee's official personnel folder immediately before or after the personnel action involved.

144-102

(OVER)

✓ X

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTION SHEET BEFORE PREPARING THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

Lee H. Wigren

OFFICE OSO/STC

DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE			
		DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	
Central Intelligence Agency, OSO	Washington, D.C.	19	Mar	1951	31	12	51	13	9	0	✓
							Total Civilian Service	13	9	0	

Sec - 3/24/43

verified 12/19/51

J Gibbons

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM			TO			TOTAL SERVICE			
	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	DA.	MO.	YR.	
~~U.S. Army~~	~~12~~	Feb	1943	11	Feb	1951	~~24~~	11	7	
						Total Military Service	~~24~~ 20	11	7	✓

Corrected copy submitted 8-10-66

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

11 December 1951
DATE

Lee H. Wigren
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

[illegible]

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS	
4	7	8	✓
	6		

SECRET
Security Information

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)

2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) WIGREN, LEE HOBART

3. Office FI/CD/SIB

4. Date of Birth 1 DECEMBER 1923

5. Sex: ✓ male (1) ___ female (2)

Marital Status M

Nr. Dependents 1

6. Employment Date: MARCH 1951

7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. ___ Other

8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify)

Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
4. Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
[✓ 8. Masters degree]
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
BOSTON UNIV., CLA. BOSTON, MASS.	HISTORY	GOVT	1941	1943	1 1/2	—	—	—	
YALE UNIV. NEW HAVEN, CONN	HISTORY		1943	1944	—	—	—	—	—
" "	"	"	1946	1947	2 1/2	—	A.B.	1947	
HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.	HISTORY		1947	1950	3	—	A.M.	1948	

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	
ARMY SPECIALIZED TNG. PROGRAM, YALE UNIV., NEW HAVEN, CONN.	JUNE 1943	MAR. 1944	9	RUSSIAN LANGUAGE + AREA STUDIES
SCHOOL FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES WASHINGTON + LEE UNIV, LEXINGTON VA	OCT 1944	NOV 1944	1	TRAINING AS INFORMATION + EDUCATION SPECIALIST

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From MAR 51 To NOV 52 Tot. mos. 20
Grade 7 Salary $4205
Office FI/CD/SIB
Position Title: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
Duty Title:

Description of Duties: - EXAMINATION OF STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH GENERAL FUNCTIONS OF SIB;
- RESEARCH ON RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES;
- PREPARATION OF STUDIES ON COUNTERESPIONAGE SITUATION IN SPECIFIC AREAS REQUIRING
Duty Station, if overseas:

From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___
Grade ___ Salary ___
Office
Position Title:
Duty Title:

Description of Duties:
ANALYSIS OF ESPIONAGE CASES IN THE AREAS. CONCLUSIONS ARE DRAWN ON CURRENT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE METHODS.
- PREPARATION OF SPECIAL STUDIES ON COUNTERESPIONAGE PROBLEMS, (eg. EVALUATION OF REASONS FOR FAILURE IN A GIVEN SERIES OF OPERATIONS)
Duty Station, if overseas:

From MAR 51 To MAY 52 Tot. mos. ↑
Grade 6 Salary $3795
Office (time included in above item)
Position Title:
Duty Title:

Description of Duties:
[SAME AS ABOVE]
Duty Station, if overseas:

From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___
Grade ___ Salary ___
Office
Position Title:
Duty Title:

Description of Duties:
Duty Station, if overseas:

From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___
Grade ___ Salary ___
Office
Position Title:
Duty Title:

Description of Duties:
Duty Station, if overse

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From SEPT 1946 To June 1947 Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: NONE Employer YALE UNIVERSITY Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position CATALOGER Description of Duties: - PART-TIME WORK CATALOGING & INDEXING LETTERS IN CONNECTION WITH YALE EDITION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HORACE WALPOLE — A LARGE-SCALE HISTORICAL PROJECT. Duty Station if overseas:
From Aug 44 To Feb 46 Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) S/Sgt ~~Salary~~ Number and Class of Employees Supervised: 15 LECTURERS Employer US ARMY Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position INFORMATION & EDUCATION SPECIALIST Description of Duties: - AIDED IN SUPERVISING & PLANNING INFO. & EDUCATION PROGRAM AT CAMP PICKETT, VA. DEVELOPED ON AND OFF-DUTY EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS; TRAINED & SUPERVISED UNIT EDUCATION PERSONNEL; PREPARED LECTURES & DISCUSSION MATERIALS Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	~~Exact Title of your position~~ Description of Duties: ON HISTORY, CURRENT EVENTS, ETC.; PUBLISHED DAILY NEWS SHEET; WROTE ARTICLES FOR WEEKLY PAPER; LECTURED; BROADCAST DAILY NEWSCASTS; MAINTAINED REFERENCE LIBRARY OF CURRENT INFO.; ~~Duty Station if overseas:~~
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	~~Exact Title of your position~~ ~~Description of Duties:~~ INSPECTED AND SUPERVISED EDUCATION LECTURES & CLASSES PREVIOUSLY DID SIMILAR WORK ON COMPANY LEVEL Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01 ___ U.S. Secret Service
02 ___ Civil Police
03 ___ Military Police
04 ___ U.S. Border Patrol
05 ___ U.S. Narcotics Squad
06 ___ FBI
07 ___ Criminal Investigation Div.
21 ___ Office of Naval Intelligence
22 ___ Office of War Information
23 ___ Army G-2
20 ___ Office of Strategic Services
24 ___ Air Force A-2
25 ___ Foreign Economic Admin.
26 ___ Counter Intelligence Corps
27 ___ Immigration & Naturalization
28 ___ Strategic Services Unit
29 ___ Foreign Service, State Dept.
30 ___ Central Intelligence Group
31 ___ Armed Forces Security Agency
32 ___ Coordinator of Information
33 ___ Office of Facts & Figures
34 ___ Board of Economic Warfare
35 ___ Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study
FRENCH			X							X
SPANISH			X							X
RUSSIAN					X					X
SWEDISH					X				X	X

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___________

FRENCH — HISTORY TERMINOLOGY

RUSSIAN - LARGELY FORGOTTEN THRU NON-USE; CAN BE REFRESHED

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of ~~Residence~~, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
USSR	1943-44			X
SCANDINAVIA (SWEDEN)	NO SPECIFIC DATES			X

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained
SWEDEN	POLITICAL PARTIES	STUDY, 1946-7
	(LTD)	

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. ✓ LTD	2.		1. Yes 2. [✓ No]
Shorthand	1.	2.		1. Yes 2. No

Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc. NONE	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications. STAMP COLLECTING; MUSIC; READING

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership. NONE

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

NONE

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
NONE	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken
GENERAL TESTS TAKEN UPON ENTRANCE ON DUTY	MARCH 1951

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

NONE

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour X (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

- RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, AND EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA. DETERMINING PATTERNS OF INFORMATION BY SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF REPORTS.

SECRET
Security Information

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status

Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ✓ Yes ___ No.

If yes, indicate your present draft classification 5-A ([illegible])

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status

Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes ✓ No.

If yes, complete the following.

1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ~~U.S. Army~~ Grade ~~S/Sgt~~ Serial Number ~~[illegible]~~

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ___

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ___

Location of Service Records, if known ___

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours
BASIC ORIENTATION (INTELLIGENCE) COURSE	APRIL - MAY 1951	4 wks
OPERATIONS COURSE	MAY - JUNE 1951	4 wks
ADVANCED OPERATIONS COURSE	JUNE - JULY 1951	3 wks
COURSE ON FUNCTIONS OF CIA COMPONENTS, ETC	JUNE 1951	1 wk

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE 14 November 1952

SIGNATURE Lee H. Wigren

14-00000

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

Limbocker

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT): WILGREN, Leo H.

THIS DATE: 9 November, 1950

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED LINE REPRESENTS AVERAGE RANKINGS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS SUBJECT'S RANKS.

TYPING

	GROSS	NET	ERRORS
1.			
2.			
3.			

FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING TESTS

LANGUAGE	MEAN SCORE	SUBJECT'S SCORE
FRENCH LL	40	
FRENCH UL	38	
GERMAN	30	
ITALIAN	37	
SPANISH	35	



EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-70G
FEB 1950

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wigren, Lee

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< • 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH			5. DATE CODED			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.
•			•			

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH			
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)
•			•			

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 446198	• WIG	• C	• BF45	3	3	4	1	3	4	57

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
• BF45	7	7	8	0	7	4	66	• 11	17	66	B J T 7 APR 1967

28 MAR 1967

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wigren, Lee

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< • 2	6-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO++LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST								
		3-LETTERS	C-A-D	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< • 5	• 006198	• WiG	• C	• BK50	3	1	7	0	0	4	65

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.
• BK50	7	0	7	0	0	4	66	• 11	17	66	BJT 12 APR 1967

28 MAR 1967

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

Wigren, Lee H

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

[illegible]

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
<• 2	C-DIGITS •	MUST CONTAIN 30-DIGITS •

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	5. DATE CLEARED MO DA YR •	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN [illegible] AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS [illegible] RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM [illegible]

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR •	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR •	WHEN FORM [illegible] DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NO-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. CODE	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST							
		3-LETTERS	C-A-S.	BASE CODE	R	W.	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 006198	• WIG	• C	• BK50	3	1	3	1	1	4	57

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST								7. DATE OF TEST			
BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	MO	DA	YR	
• BK50	3	1	7	0	0	4	65	• 09	30	65	DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

7 NOV 1966

3 NOV 1966

The authorization to process this employee's disclaim of proficiency in the language factors indicated on this form is contained in a memorandum on file and designated "Language Proficiency Disclaim File", located in the Qualifications Analysis Branch, Office of Personnel.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:

Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6		7-24		25-26
006198	Wigren	Lee	H.	RR

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	2	10	13	66	11	13	66	AF	803

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: AF-69-67

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 13 October - 13 November 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OSA		
X	C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE V. F. Palmer
☐	C & F DIVISION		

FORM 4-66 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

MR

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Office of Logistics
Training Report

3rd PRINTING SERVICES SEMINAR

Lee H. Wigren **GS-12** **SR/DP**

has participated in the Office of Logistics sponsored training program, the Printing Services Seminar. The course program was scheduled on a part-time basis during the period 18 thru 20 October 1960, and consisted of 12 hours of classroom instruction, including an orientation tour of the Agency printing plant.

The program is primarily designed to contribute to the general background and knowledge of Agency printing responsibilities; to acquaint Agency personnel with the policies, functions and organization of CIA printing and reproduction services. Emphasis is placed on economy in printing, printing costs and cost estimating; various printing and photographic processes are explained.

CERTIFICATE OF COURSE COMPLETION:

The above-named individual has regularly attended the program.

Leo Teholiz

LEO TEHOLIZ
Logistics Training Officer

LOGISTICS TRAINING
October 1960

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed)

Date 1 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

THROUGH: Staff Training Officer

SUBJECT: Completion of Management Conference

1. Lee H. Wigren has completed a Management Conference conducted for SR from 9 - 20 May 1960

2. The conference covered 40 hours of group discussions, lectures, and selected readings concerning problems of Agency management at the middle levels. The individual named completed all conference assignments. No grade has been given since no evaluation is made of any individual's performance in this conference.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

CHARLES D. FORD
Chief, Management Training Faculty

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Completed)

SECRET - EYES ONLY

TECHNICAL SERVICES STAFF

TRAINING DIVISION EVALUATION

PHOTO I - Basic Photography

NAME: Wigren, Leo [illegible].

OFFICE: STAFF: TI DIV: WE BRANCH: DATES TRAINED: from: Nov. 19 to: 7 Dec. 1956

The course is primarily designed to develop skills. Several subjects, however, (such as telephoto lenses, stereo photography etc.) are covered only briefly and the purpose in these subjects is merely to impart an understanding, and not a skill.

This form, therefore, evaluates -

a. The student's level of understanding (signified by the letter "U") or
b. The degree of skill attained (signified by the letter "S") -

whichever is applicable.

	none	Fair	Good	Very good	excellent
I Basic photographic theory and practices					
A. Manipulation of camera					
1. Leica (S)				x	
2. Signet (S) Retina IIC				x	
3. Camera focusing (S)				x	
B. Depth of Field scales (U)			x		
C. Relationship of aperture to shutter speeds (U)				x	
II Processing and Printing:					x
A. Developers, hypo, washing, drying (S)					
B. Loading NIKOR film developing tank (S)					x
C. Use and function of the enlarger (S)					x
D. Contrast papers - selection of proper paper for a particular negative (S)				x	
E. Print control (S)				x	
III Use of filters: (U)				x	
IV Use of exposure meter. (U)				x	
V Indoor photography:				x	
A. Employing only natural room lighting (S)					
B. Employing accessory room lighting for ID pictures (S)					x

SECRET - EYES ONLY

	none	Fair	Good	Very good	excellent
VI Document copying					
A. Techniques (S)				X	
B. Equipment (S)				X	
C. Selection of film (S)				X	
D. Developing and Printing (S)				X	
VII Telephoto, wide angle lenses, stereo photography (U)				X	
VIII Reflex Copy Printing:				X	
A. Use of permanent photo lab printing box (S)	X				
B. Use of portable "Contura" unit (S)	X				
C. Adaptation of "Contura" unit to clandestine needs (U)	X				
IX Graphics Registry/OCD - Understanding of what is necessary in a photograph in order to be of use to Graphics Registry (U)					
OBSERVED GENERAL TRAITS & CHARACTERISTICS					
I General Quality of prints				X	
II Choice of subject matter - organization and composition				X	
III Quality of darkroom work (cleanliness, neatness, etc.)					X
IV Attitude toward subject matter				X	

REMARKS:

Test Grade:

APPROVED:

C/TSS/Training Division

Worrell
Instructor

Wigren, Leo H.

Instruction was given in general photography, and its application to the specific problems of ground intelligence photography, document copying with two methods, casing, fixed and mobile surveillance, available light, small object and ID photography and photography in room search.

This student is well organized in his work and has a fine foundation for the work he will be called upon to do. Currently he should be able to handle similar assignments intensfied in the field and with additional practice and experience is capable of applying photography widely and in a more techinical situation.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CAREER PREFERENCE OUTLINE

This Outline, when completed, is a documented description of the individual's career interests and proposed career activities together with the comments of his supervisor and his Career Service. The original will be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder and will serve as a guide for future personnel actions affecting him. Implementation of career preferences must depend upon the needs of the Organization.

- CONSULT ATTACHED INSTRUCTION SHEET PRIOR TO COMPLETING THIS OUTLINE -

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) WIGREN, Lee H.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Dec 1923	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	4. GRADE GS-11
5. ORGANIZATIONAL TITLE	6. POSITION TITLE Intelligence Officer	7. OCCUPATIONAL CODE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT WE/Swedish Desk

SECTION B. CAREER INTERESTS

9. GENERAL TYPE OF ACTIVITY

FI Operations

10. SPECIFIC TYPE OF ACTIVITY (Including assignments)

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

Assignment to Scandinavian Station

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

Reassignment to Headquarters Desk within WE/1

SECTION C. TRAINING

11. ORGANIZATIONAL, EXTERNAL, AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

A. IMMEDIATE (Within next 1 to 2 years)

CE Operations, 0.4
Communist Party Organization and Operations, C.2
Information Reporting, Reports & Requirements, 0.25
Secret Writing, T.9
Audio Surveillance, T.6

B. LONG-RANGE (Within next 3 to 5 years)

Language Study

12. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

I RECOGNIZE THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY CAREER PREFERENCES MUST DEPEND UPON THE NEEDS OF THE ORGANIZATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT MY PERFORMANCE, CAPABILITIES AND INTERESTS WILL BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION.	13. DATE COMPLETED 20 Nov56	14. SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE See Item 21

FORM NO. 1030
1 AUG 56

SECRET

Career Outline (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION D. COMMENTS BY SUPERVISOR

15. RELATIVE TO CAREER INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEE

See Item 21

16. RELATIVE TO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEE

17. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF SUPERVISOR	18. SIGNATURE
19. TITLE	20. DATE

SECTION E. FOR USE OF CAREER SERVICE

21. COMMENTS

Detailed Individual Career Plan approved by FI Panel
on file in FI Career Management Office, 2048 L

22. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME Robert A. Skeels	23. SIGNATURE Robert A. Skeels
24. TITLE ~~FI Career Management Officer~~	25. DATE 13 FEB 1957

LEAVE BLANK

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] EVALUATION

NAME Leo WIGREN DIVISION LE/FI

COURSE Basic Audio

DATES OF COURSE 5 - 16 November 1956

EVALUATION

1.	Comprehension of Principles	Good
2.	Alertness and Interest	Good
3.	Operational Appreciation of Subject	Good
4.	Manual Dexterity	Good
5.	Care in Work	Good
6.	Aptitude	Good
7.	Technician Potential	Good

NOTE: "Technician Potential" is an estimate of the technical ability the student might acquire after extended instruction and practice—it is not an estimate of his current level of technique.

Ratings: Poor, Average, Good, Excellent

Please return five copies of this form to TSS/TRD for overt distribution.
Please return three copies of this form to TSS/TRD for covert distribution.

OVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
Office of Registrar
Office of Personnel
TSS/TRD

COVERT DISTRIBUTION
1 - Senior Staff Training Officer
1 - Division Training Liaison Officer
1 - TSS/TRD

Geo. Bailey
Instructor

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: Registrar, Office of Training

I certify that I completed the Cable Writing Refresher No. 8 on 27 June 56.

LEE H WIGREN
Name (Please Print)

WE
Staff or Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

Advanced Counterespionage Course No. 1

HIGREN, Leo H.
Name

M
Sex

4-15 Oct. '54
Dates of Course

12/1/23
Date of Birth

3/51
EOD

GS-9
Grade or Rank

DDP/STC
Office

Research and analysis - Intelligence Officer
Projected Assignment or Present Position

1. The Advanced Counterespionage Course is a specialized course of two weeks' duration designed for CE specialists and their supervisors. The Basic CE Course or equivalent experience is a normal prerequisite for entry into the Advanced CE Course. The course is conducted on a seminar, round-table basis. Emphasis is placed on student participation during staff and guest lectures. Time is allotted for reading the extensive material provided.

2. Specialized techniques of CE operations are emphasized. Counterespionage aspects of double agent operations, liaison situations, and defection are examined in detail. Special attention is given to the structure and modus operandi of Soviet and Satellite internal and external clandestine services. Similar studies are made of the Western Services, as they currently exist and as they may affect Agency operations.

3. Each student is required to give a presentation before the class. This hour-long presentation is based on a problem assignment given the student by the staff. Exception is made where students have the field or headquarters experience in CE or a related field; such a student is permitted to give a one-hour lecture based on specific experience. The "canned" problems are selected to test students' ability to do CE research, collate, make logical analyses, and present ideas effectively to a seminar group.

4. This evaluation is based primarily on the student presentation, and to a lesser degree on participation in seminar discussions when conducted by the staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

1. Mr. Wigren ranked in the top bracket of a strong class. He contributed effectively in seminar discussions. He appeared to be alert, and to have a good grasp of CE fundamentals.

2. Mr. Wigren's presentation dealt with his basic assignment in Staff C. The presentation was well organized and was a major contribution to the class's CE background.

3. In my opinion, Mr. Wigren has the background and grasp of CE principles adequate for a CE case officer and analyst.

Z

GHOSH ZOGBY

TRAINING EVALUATION

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. Although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the findings, observations and opinions of the various instructors during the course listed only, with no reference to other facts or findings about the student. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer.

STUDENT'S NAME Leo Robert Wigren

DATE OF REPORT 8 June 1951

TRAINING COURSE Operations

DIVISION OSO/STC/ICB

GRADE GS-6

AGE: 27

TRAINING PERIOD 7 May - 2 June 1951

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Clerk

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 59% Unsatisfactory; 60 to 79% Satisfactory; 80 to 89% Excellent; 90 to 100% Superior.

	Possible Score	Achieved Score	
(1) Comprehension of basic principles of clandestine operations	(40)	25	Sat.
(2) Use of tradecraft (ability to apply principles of clandestine operations)	(50)	30	Sat. -
(3) Ability to evaluate operational data	(20)	12	Sat. -
(4) Ability to use operational data	(20)	11	Med. +
(5) Planning	(30)	19	Sat.
(6) Personality analysis	(20)	14	Sat.
(7) Personality manipulation	(50)	35	Sat.
(8) Adaptability to operational emergencies	(30)	20	Sat.
(9) Attention to detail	(20)	12	Sat. -
(10) Organization and presentation of written operational material	(20)	13	Sat.
TOTAL	(300)	191	

Overall adjectival rating . . . . Satisfactory 64%

2. TRAIT CHARACTERISTICS RECORD. The following indicates the various personality traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations. A scale of 0 to 10 is used, 0 indicating that the trait has not been observed, the lower numbers indicating below average, and the higher indicating above average.

Rating

~~(1) Ability to get along and work with people~~
~~(2) Ability to grasp instructions~~
~~(3) Enthusiasm and interest in work~~
~~(4) Industriousness~~
~~(5) Practical intelligence~~
~~(6) Astuteness~~
~~(7) Adaptability~~
~~(8) Effectiveness~~
~~(9) Stability~~
~~(10) Initiative~~
~~(11) Imagination~~
~~(12) Ability to handle and direct people~~

See Attachment

3. COMMENT. (To be used only in cases of outstanding strengths or weaknesses)

Ernest G. Weidul
ERNEST G. WEIDUL
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED. Lawrence B. Shallcross
LAWRENCE B. SHALLCROSS
CHIEF, SIB

REVIEWED.
CHIEF, TRD

FORM NO. 51-86
JAN 1950

SECRET

Lee H. Wigren
Grade: GS-6

2. TRAIT RECORD. The following indicates the various traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations.

1. UNDERSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Misunderstood instructions completely on more than one occasion.	Was very slow to grasp instructions. Often requested additional explanation or repetition.	Understood instructions if given in detail.	Did not require a detailed explanation.	Grasped instructions quickly, completely, accurately.

2. PLANNING WORK
Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Got in serious difficulty because of failure to plan work.	Planned inadequately.	Made plans which permitted adequate implementation of a project.	Gave evidence of careful, thoughtful, planning.	Planned thoroughly, allowed for almost all contingencies.

3. ABILITY TO WRITE
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent manner.

4. ATTENDING TO DETAIL
Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Written and oral work suffered seriously from constant inattention to details.	Work frequently marred by careless or imprecise treatment of significant detail.	Work showed acceptable attention to significant detail.	Careful handling of significant detail.	Work was consistently outstanding for precise, accurate handling of detail.

5. CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION

Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree.	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

6. FACILITY OF ORAL EXPRESSION

Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in a rambling and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

7. EFFORT

Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Work was unsatisfactory as a result of insufficient application of time and effort.	Applied minimum amount of time and effort necessary to satisfactorily accomplish assigned work.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort for accomplishment of assigned work.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time, effort and interest.

8. INITIATIVE

Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Occasionally acted on his own.	Usually took steps to implement ideas.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm and aggressiveness.

9. PERSISTENCE IN EFFORTS

Not observed ✓

1	2	3	4	5
Gave up as soon as he met opposition or difficulties in pursuing objective	Gave up after several attempts had failed.	Surmounted minor difficulties, but was slowed by severe opposition.	Was slowed only by severe opposition.	Persisted in his efforts to achieve objectives despite repeated setbacks or severe opposition.

10. ENTHUSIASM AND INTEREST IN THE WORK

Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Displayed no indication of genuine interest in the subject.	Appeared only mildly interested in the subject.	Displayed definite interest in making this sphere of activity his career.	Displayed unusual enthusiasm and interest.	Displayed exceptional enthusiasm and intense interest.

11. ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH ASSOCIATES

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Frequently alienated associates.	Was noticeably lacking in: a. sociability b. consideration of others c. cooperativeness.	Reasonably sociable, considerate and cooperative vis-a-vis associates.	Displayed definite a. sociability b. consideration of others c. cooperativeness.	Unusually sociable, considerate and cooperative vis-a-vis associates.

12. LEADERSHIP

Not observed______

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Appeared to withdraw from group activities to a marked degree even when requested to take part.	Took little part in group activities.	Normally participated within the group.	Displayed leadership ability on several occasions.	Consistently assumed leadership in group activities.

13. TACT

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Markedly blunt and indiscreet	Occasionally said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

14. PERSUASIVENESS

Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Did not influence the thinking and actions of others	His opinions rarely affected his associates.	Was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was very good at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

15. COMMON SENSE
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Displayed lack of common sense.	Displayed inconsistencies in judgment.	Usually displayed sound judgment.	Consistently displayed sound judgment.	Displayed outstanding ability to make sound decisions.

16. ASTUTENESS
Not observed_____

1	[✓ 2]	3	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Lacked adequate skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate discernment and skepticism.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

17. ABILITY TO LEARN
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Showed no improvement during course of instruction.	Improvement was slow and laborious.	Assimilated course material in satisfactory fashion.	Showed marked improvement during progress of instruction.	Despite lack of previous experience displayed unusual ability to assimilate course material.

18. ADAPTATION TO TRAINING
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Did not adjust to training program. Remained disorientated, an outsider.	Accepted training but with reluctance.	Adapted himself to most aspects of training.	Accepted the training situation with good spirit.	Accepted training with obvious enthusiasm.

A rating of 3 in personality traits is considered average for a CIA operations officer.

NOTE: For remarks see page 6.

TRAINING EVALUATION

(STAFF ORIENTATION)

1. The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it, although he may, within his discretion, show it to other members of his staff, the report should never be shown to the student whom it concerns.

2. The report summarizes the test results, observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data is available in the files of the Training Division and may be examined after contacting the Records and Scheduling Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Records and Evaluation, TRO.

STUDENT'S NAME Lee Robert Wigren

DATE OF REPORT 28 April 1951

TRAINING COURSE STAFF ORIENTATION 24

DIVISION OSO/STC AGE 27 GRADE GS-6

TRAINING PERIOD 2 - 27 April 1951

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Clerk

1. PERFORMANCE RECORD. The following grades show the achievement of the student in class problems and examinations. The total possible score is broken down to indicate the relative weighting of various factors. The overall adjectival rating is based on the following scale: 0 to 65% Unsatisfactory; 66 to 75% Satisfactory; 76 to 85% Excellent; 86 to 100% Superior.

	Problems	Possible Score	Achieved Score	Percentage Score
(1)	Editing of Information	(20)	14.9	75
(2)	Reporting of Information	(40)	29.1	73
(3)	Message Writing	(20)	14.3	72
(4)	Interviews: Procurement of Information	(30)	21.3	71
(5)	Interviews: Personality Handling	(30)	23.2	77
(6)	Mapping and Sketching	(20)	15.7	79
(7)	Observation and Description	(10)	7.9	79
(8)	Security Problems	(5)	4.3	85
	Objective Tests			
(9)	Intelligence Tools and Objectives	(30)	22.2	74
(10)	Reporting Mechanics	(20)	16.6	83
(11)	USSR and Communism	(75)	64.5	86
	TOTAL	(300)	234.0	78.0
	Overall adjectival rating	Excellent		

2. TRAIT RECORD. The following indicates the various traits as observed by the instructors during the training period. The observations include the student's participation and conduct in training as well as his reactions to various problems and situations.

1. UNDERSTANDING INSTRUCTIONS
Not observed_____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Misunderstood instructions completely on more than one occasion.	Was very slow to grasp instructions. Often requested additional explanation or repetition.	Understood instructions if given in detail.	Did not require a detailed explanation.	Grasped instructions quickly, completely, accurately.

2. PLANNING WORK
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Got in serious difficulty because of failure to plan work.	Planned inadequately for the effective carrying out of a project.	Made plans which did not hinder the satisfactory completion of a project.	Gave evidence of careful, thoughtful planning.	Planned thoroughly, allowed for all contingencies.

3. ATTENDING TO DETAIL
Not observed_____

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Written and oral work suffered seriously from constant inattention to details.	Work frequently marred by careless or imprecise treatment of significant detail.	Work showed acceptable attention to significant detail, but contained a number of minor errors.	Careful handling of significant detail, with occasional lapses of a minor nature.	Work was outstanding for precise, accurate handling of detail at all times.

4. ABILITY TO WRITE
Not observed_____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly or correctly in written form.	Weak in English usage. Frequent grammatical or spelling errors.	Written work mechanically correct, but poorly organized.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent manner.

5. PERSEVERING IN EFFORTS
Not observed_____

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Gave up as soon as he met opposition or difficulties in pursuing an objective.	Gave up after several attempts had failed.	Surmounted minor difficulties, but stopped by severe opposition.	Renewed his efforts after a major setback.	Persisted in his efforts to achieve objectives despite repeated set-backs or severe opposition.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-118
JAN 1951

6. CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Devoid of imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of imagination.	Showed sufficient imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree.	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

7. FACILITY OF ORAL EXPRESSION
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in a groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

8. FORCEFULNESS
Not observed______

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Was not able to project his own personality and ideas to others.	Rarely convinced anyone of his point.	Was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was able to influence or control others through his personality and thinking.	Outstanding in ability to command attention and respect through personal forcefulness.

9. ADAPTATION TO TRAINING
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Did not adjust to training program. Remained disorientated, an outsider.	Accepted training, but with reluctance.	Adapted himself to most aspects of training.	Accepted the training situation with good spirit.	Accepted training with obvious enthusiasm.

10. TACT
Not observed______

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Continually alienated others by indiscreet actions or words.	Occasionally said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Not skilled, but avoided arousing antagonism in dealing with others.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Showed keen perception for fitting speech or conduct at all times.

3. REMARKS:

APPROVED. LB Halloran
CHIEF, STR

Charles L Boosler
CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

REVIEWED. RKingsley
CHIEF, RES

14-00000

NC OP

A. RAW TEST DATA

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERC. TILE
DIRECTIONS		
DAT: CLERICAL		
SPELLING		
SENTENCES		
NUMERICAL AB.		
ABSTR. REAS.		
SPACE REL.		
VERB. REAS.		
MECH. REAS.		
SUPV. TEST: FORM		
ORAL DIRECTIONS TEST		

TYPE OF TEST		RAW SCORE	PERCEN-TILE
DIRECTIONS	A	16	52
OTIS-HIGHER:	A	66	87
GEN. TEST I		68	90
LA-5			
FRENCH LL			
FRENCH UL			
GERMAN LL			
ITALIAN LL			
SPANISH LL			

TYPE OF TEST	RAW SCORE	PERCEN-TILE
AREA INFO (AFFAIRS)		
AREA INFO (PEOPLE)		
BENNETT LIBRARY INFO		
CIA CLASSIF. I		
CIA CLASSIF. II		
CORR. AND EFF. OF EXP.		
OSU TEST: FORM		
TECHNICAL READING		
WATSON-GLASER:		
GENERALIZATIONS		
INFERENCES		
DISC. ARGUMENTS		
RECOG. ASSUMPTIONS		
GEN. LOG. REAS.		
CONSISTENCY		
APPL. LOG. REAS.		

DATE	TYPING GROSS NET ERRORS	SHORTHAND 1	2	3	TOTAL TIME
9Nov.50					

B. PERSONAL DATA

AGE	SEX M	SEX F	STATUS NEW	STATUS EMP.	EDUCATION ELEM.	H.SCH.	COL.	DEG.	MAJOR
26	x		x						Limbocker

NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE INITIAL) WIGREN, Leo H. (5244)

SERVICE & GRADE G.S.5

POSITION Intelligence Officer

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED LINE REPRESENTS AVERAGE RANKINGS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS SUBJECT'S RANKS.

TYPING

GROSS	NET	ERRORS
1.		
2.		
3.		

FOREIGN LANGUAGE READING TESTS

LANGUAGE	MEAN SCORE	SUBJECT'S SCORE
FRENCH CC	40	
FRENCH GG	38	
GERMAN	30	
ITALIAN	37	
SPANISH	35	



37-703 Limbocker 9 Nov 53

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
0 October 1975

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)
Wigren, Lee H.

3. POSITION TITLE
Ops Officer

4. GRADE
GS-13

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH
DDO/CI Staff/R&A

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
6947

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT
☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY
☒ XX TDY STANDBY
☐ SPECIAL TRAINING
☐ ANNUAL
☐ RETURN TO DUTY
☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY
☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY
☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)
☐ YES
☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER
SIGNATURE
Janice R. Lowden
ROOM NO. & BUILDING
2C43 HQS
EXT.
4013

10. COMMENTS

Mr. Wigren is planning to travel 10/24/75 to London, please expedite. Mr. Wigren had MPT/PHE in July 1975.

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Qualified for TDY Standby until 1 October 1977.

DATE
23 October 1975

William T. Golder, OMS/pro

FORM 2-69 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

②

CSC

PHYSICAL QUALIFICATION RECORD

NAME Wigren, Lee	NATURE OF ACTION EOD
TITLE OF POSITION Clerk	GRADE GS-6
DEPARTMENT OR FIELD Dept.	

Subject was found physically ☒ fit ☐ unfit for duty with this organization in the above grade and position.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

And. o/s duty

10 Mar 51
DATE

SIGNATURE OF PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-37
NOV 1948

PWB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
006198	WIGREN, Lee H.	12/01/23	D	13

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR				
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-31)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		SEP 30 8 59 AM '71					
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

NO CHANGES

DATE: 22 Sept 71

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

Clio

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (until filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 006198	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WIGHEN LEE H	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 12/01/23	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS -13-05
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE INSTR INTEL	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OTR	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
AFRICA	TDY-RR	68/10/13	68/11/13

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 7 AUG 1968
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	HISTORY, GENERAL	YALE UNIV CONN	47
MSTR	HISTORY, GENERAL	HARVARD UNIV MASS	48

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1-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6 8 AUG ENTD (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
U.S.S.R.	POLITICAL	———	TO DATE			X	X
REP. SOUTH AFRICA	POLITICAL/GENERAL	1966 Oct.-Nov	SUMMER + FALL 1966		X	X	X

SECTION V TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

NONE

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

SWIMMING (PROFICIENT); STAMP COLLECTING

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving) OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

NONE

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. Provide license registry number if known.

———

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

———

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

———

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE.

OTR TEACHING ASSIGNMENT - LECTURING/BRIEFING ASSIGNMENTS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VII

MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. ARE YOU REGISTERED FOR THE DRAFT? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY SERVICE RECORD (Active Duty Only)

1. MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Army, Navy, etc. - specify) ARMY

2. BRANCH OR CORPS

3. DATES OF SERVICE (extended active duty) FROM FEB 1943 TO FEB 1946

4. STATUS (Regular, Reserve, etc. - specify)

5. RANK, GRADE OR RATE (at separation if past service) S/SGT

6. SERIAL, SERVICE OR FILE NUMBER

7. CHECK TYPE OF SEPARATION

☑ HONORABLE DISCHARGE
☐ RELEASE TO INACTIVE DUTY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR AGE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR SERVICE
☐ RETIREMENT FOR COMBAT DISABILITY
☐ RETIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY
☐ UNDUE HARDSHIPS
☐ OTHER (Specify)

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG

☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT RESERVE OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY RESERVE DUTIES (record the duties and skills which best describe your work or function in the military service)

6. IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING UNIT, IDENTIFY THE UNIT AND ITS ADDRESS.

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Active Duty, Reserve Status or as Civilian)

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
1.				☐	RESIDENT
				☐	CORRESPONDENCE
				☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
2.				☐	RESIDENT
				☐	CORRESPONDENCE
				☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
3.				☐	RESIDENT
				☐	CORRESPONDENCE
				☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
4.				☐	RESIDENT
				☐	CORRESPONDENCE
				☐	AGENCY SPONSORED
5.				☐	RESIDENT
				☐	CORRESPONDENCE
				☐	AGENCY SPONSORED

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): MAY 1959 - MAY 1965
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HEADQUARTERS
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/SR
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF, RESEARCH BRANCH, C.I. GROUP, SR DIV.
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-12, GS-13
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- PLANNED + IMPLEMENTED SR DIVISION RESEARCH PROGRAM ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
- SUPERVISED WORK OF SECTION (LATER BRANCH) WHICH AT MAXIMUM STRENGTH INCLUDED 17 ANALYSTS + CLERKS
- EDITED PUBLICATIONS
- DIRECTED DISSEMINATION OF PUBLICATIONS TO AGENCY AND U.S. INTEL COMMUNITY CUSTOMERS
- CONDUCTED LECTURES + BRIEFINGS FOR U.S. + FOREIGN LIAISON PERSONNEL
- ~~[illegible]~~

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): SEPT 1957 - MAY 1959
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/FI/D
4. TITLE OF JOB: BIOGRAPHIC OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-11, 12
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- CONDUCTED RESEARCH + PREPARED REPORTS
- CONDUCTED EXTERNAL LIAISON
- HELPED DEVELOP NEW PROGRAMS
- SUPERVISED 4 PERSONNEL

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): APRIL 1955 - SEPT 1957
2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/WE-1
4. TITLE OF JOB: AREA OPS OFFICER
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-11
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

- SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES OF STOCKHOLM STATION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII

AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year): MAR 1951 - APR 1955

2. LOCATION (Country, City): HQ

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: DDP/STC/SIB *

4. TITLE OF JOB: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-6, 7, 9, 11

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

- CONDUCTED RESEARCH
- PREPARED STUDIES ON SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
- STUDIED RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET + EAST EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; PREPARED PAPERS ON SUBJECT; CONDUCTED BRIEFINGS

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year):

2. LOCATION (Country, City):

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH:

4. TITLE OF JOB:

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB:

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To by month & year):

2. LOCATION (Country, City):

3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH:

4. TITLE OF JOB:

5. GRADES HELD IN JOB:

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried - SPECIFY)

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) WIGREN (First) ELLEN (Middle) (Maiden) (RADER)

3. DATE OF BIRTH 13 AUGUST 1927

4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) ROANOKE VA

5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE

6. PRESENT EMPLOYER —

7. CITIZENSHIP U.S

8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S), COUNTRY(IES) —

9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED —

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
CHRISTOPHER LEE	SON	WASHINGTON DC 10 MAR 1957	US	10107 ALICE CT, FAIRFAX VA
ERIC VICTOR	"	WASHINGTON D.C. 15 AUG 1959	"	"

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO
YALE ALUMNI CLUB OF			
WASHINGTON DC			

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 May 1968	Lee H. Wigren

SECRET

30 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Certificate of Completion - Midcareer Course No. 1
7 October - 15 November 1963

The attached certificate indicates that Lee H. Wigren, SR, has completed the Agency's Midcareer Course No. I. This course is one part of the Agency's Midcareer Training Program.

Among other topics, this course covers the functioning of the various components of the Agency, the functioning of other agencies of the U.S. Government, particularly those with intelligence and action responsibilities, and the Agency's relation to them. It also covers foreign, domestic, political and other factors affecting the policies of the U.S. Government.

Lester C Houck
Lester C. Houck
Chairman
Midcareer Course

Valeat Intelligentia Melius

This certifies that

LEE H. WIGREN

has completed the

Midcareer Course

15 November 1963

Matthew Baird
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

Marshall S. Carter
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

-LY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
9 FEBRUARY 1959

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
WIGREN, Lee H.

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
15 MODE ST, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
SAME

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CRESCENT 3-4950

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
VIRGINIA

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
WIGREN, Ellen R

2. RELATIONSHIP
wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
15 MODE ST, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CR 3-4950

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
NOT DESIRABLE

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ▷ ☐ SINGLE ☑ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
NA

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME
(First): (Alice)
(Middle): ELLEN
(Maiden): RADER
(Last): WIGREN

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
27 SEPT 1952

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
WASHINGTON, DC.

6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
ARLINGTON VIRGINIA

7. LIVING
☑ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH
NA

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
NA

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
15 MODE ST, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA

11. DATE OF BIRTH
13 AUGUST 1927

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
ROANOKE VIRGINIA

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
NA

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
NA

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
BIRTH

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
NA

18. OCCUPATION
HOUSEWIFE

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
NA

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
NA

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM 4-57 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(4)

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SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR
N/A

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE N/A	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED N/A

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
N/A

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☑ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☑ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.
NA

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
NA

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
JEFFERSON FEDERAL SAVINGS	WASHINGTON DC
RIGGS (THRIFTI-CHECK)	" "

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☑ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

— NA

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP
U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY: (CHECK (X) ONE)
☑ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☑ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
— NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*) INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To*): Sept 1957
2. GRADE: 12
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI/D
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 4
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES
- Supervision of research personnel.
- Planning & preparation of reports
- Assisting in planning of office tasks

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From and To*)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(*Use additional pages if required*)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII

CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
CHRISTOPHER L WIGREN	SON	1957	✓		U.S.	15 Hose St, Fairfax VA

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 February 1959	L. H. Wigren

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

10 Mac

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

AB

THIS DATE
16 May 1957

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
WIGREN, Leo Hobart

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CRescent 3-4950

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
Virginia

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
WIGREN, Ellen Rader

2. RELATIONSHIP
Wife

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country)
15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
none

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
CRescent 3-4950

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
none

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
none

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
not desirable

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS (change)

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS
na

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) Alice (Middle) Ellen (Maiden) Rader (Last) WIGREN

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
27 Sept 1952

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
Washington, D.C.

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
4008 20th Road, North, Arlington, Virginia

CODED FOR QUA[illegible]
DATE 10 JAN [illegible]

7. LIVING ☒ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH
na

9. CAUSE OF DEATH
na

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
15 Mode Street, Fairfax, Virginia

11. DATE OF BIRTH
13 August 1927

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
Roanoke, Virginia

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S.-DATE OF ENTRY
na

14. PLACE OF ENTRY
na

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

16. DATE ACQUIRED
birth

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
na

18. OCCUPATION
housewife

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
FORMER: Arlington County School Board

20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)
Arlington, Virginia

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b REPLACES FORM 275
1 SEP 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(4)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
From February 1943 to February 1946

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE Army	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED U.S.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
none

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) na	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
na

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME
na

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Inc.	Washington, D.C.
Riggs National Bank (Thriftícheck account)	Washington, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

na

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO.

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

na

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country)
U.S.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (x) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
na

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)
na

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE		
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE		
☐	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE		
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☒	MASTER'S DEGREE	☐	DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
Boston University, Liberal Arts College Boston, Massachusetts	History		Sept 41	Feb 43	------	------	
Yale University New Haven, Connecticut	History		July 43	Apr 44			
" " " " " "	"		Mar 46	June 47	A.B.	1947	
Harvard University, Graduate School Cambridge, Massachusetts	History		Sept 47	June 50	A.M.	1948	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
na				

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
~~Informationx&xIntelligencex~~				
Information & Education School Lexington, Virginia	information and education specialist course	October 1944	Nove 1944	1

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

none

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII. FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE. *(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)*	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE". INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Sweden	political	na			x	x
USSR	political				x	x
Soviet Satellites	political					x

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

na

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.) slight
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.) none
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING *(Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)* na

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

stamp collecting, swimming, tennis

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

research and analysis experience in school and at work

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

na

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION *(Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.)*, INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN. na

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE *(Year of issue)*

SECRET

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

none

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

none

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

public speaking - high school, college, church

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

na

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Mar 51 - Jan 55
2. GRADE: up to a GS-9
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: STC/ Soviet Intelligence Branch
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: intelligence officer and research analyst
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Research, preparation of case studies and analyses, lecturing. Specialization in intelligence services of Soviet satellites.

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Jan 55 - Mar 55
2. GRADE: 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: SR/CE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: none
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: intelligence officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Same as above -- Branch was transferred

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Apr 55 -
2. GRADE: 11
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: WE-1 / Swedish Desk
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION:
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Intelligence Officer
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Study, guidance and support of operations; preparation and coordination of intelligence and operational reports; preparation of administrative documents; providing support to field stations. Acting desk chief for 3 months.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-)
2. GRADE
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Christopher Lee Wigren	son	1957	x		US	15 Mode St, Fairfax, Virginia
Ellen Rader Wigren	wife	1927		x	US	same

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Previous addresses:

218 Belmont Avenue, Brockton, Massachusetts -- prior to Agency employment

3200 16th Street NW, Washington, D.C. -- March to July 1951

1616 16th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. -- July 1951 to August 1952

2700 Que Street, NW, Washington, D.C. -- August 1952 to April 1956

DATE COMPLETED 11 [illegible] 1957	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
106198	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-20)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (21-30)		
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WIGREN, LEE HOBART	DECEMBER	11	1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)			5.
	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
SWEDISH 73Y	MAY	11	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

[✓ 3.] I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING — CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 10(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED: 16 May 1957

SIGNATURE:

(46) C

(47) E

4-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
106 195

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
WIGREN, LEE HOBART

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: December DAY: 1 YEAR: 1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
FRENCH 265

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: MAY DAY: 16 YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 3.] I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-43)

CONTINUATION OF PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III—EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV—CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 7C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 10 May 1957	SIGNATURE Lee [illegible]
(46) C	(47) E

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
106198

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
WIGREN, LEE HOBART

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: December DAY: 1 YEAR: 1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
German 283

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: MAY DAY: 16 YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE
(46) S	(47) E

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
106 198

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)
WIGREN, LEE HOBART

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: DECEMBER DAY: 1 YEAR: 1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
SPANISH 720

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: MAY DAY: 16 YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
[✓ 4.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

[✓ 5.] I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 5.] I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 16 May 1957	SIGNATURE Lee H. [illegible]
(46) 0	(47) 0

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
106198

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WIGREN, LEE HOBART	DECEMBER	1	1923

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-37) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
RUSSIAN 654	MAY	16	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.

2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 5.] I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.

[✓ 2.] WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

[✓ 4.] NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED: 16 May 1957

SIGNATURE:

(46) S

(47) E

SECRET

NAME Leo H. Wigren DATE 31 May 1956

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY:

NAME Mrs. Leo H. Wigren RELATIONSHIP wife

ADDRESS 15 Moda Street, Fairfax, Virginia

TELEPHONE CRescent 3-4950

WE FILE

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 57 NOV. 1947
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State)
WASHINGTON D.C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION
OCT. 5, 1950

5. MR. (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last)
~~MR~~ Lee Hobart Wigren

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R.D. NUMBER
218 Belmont Avenue

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE
Brockton, Massachusetts

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State)
Massachusetts

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE
———

(B) HOME PHONE
4408-W

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)
December 1, 19[illegible]

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U.S., name city and country)
Brockton, Massachusetts

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES 5 FEET 9 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT 150 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE
GS-6 #3450

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER

NOTATIONS

APP. REVIEW

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ [illegible] PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED.
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS:

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the space below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

PRESENT POSITION

①

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM: TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION
Student

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS:
STARTING, $ PER
PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e.g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of books, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK Since discharge from the Army, 11 Feb. 1946, I have been a student at Yale (until June 1947), and at Harvard (Sept., 1947 to date) under provisions of the G.I. Bill. Details of my studies are to be found elsewhere on this form.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16—83940-8

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)

FROM [illegible] to [illegible], 1947

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Indexer

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ [illegible] .75 PER [illegible]

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): New Haven, Connecticut

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: [illegible] Smith - Editorial Staff Yale Walpole Collection

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Yale University (W. S. Lewis, editor, Yale Walpole Collection)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: [illegible]

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: This was a part-time job ([illegible] hours per week) through which I earned part of my room and board at college. I catalogued and indexed letters and other material in connection with the Yale edition of the correspondence of Horace Walpole. Mr. W. S. Lewis was general editor, but I worked under the supervision of Mr. Warren Smith of the staff. This job required a scholarly interest in English history. It provided an opportunity to participate in a large-scale historical project.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)

FROM Aug, 1944 to Feb, 1946

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Information and Education Specialist

CLASSIFICATION GRADE ~~(if in Federal service)~~: MILITARY MOS [illegible]

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ [illegible] PER mo.; FINAL $ [illegible] PER mo.

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Camp Pickett, Virginia

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Captain [illegible] Yewell, Jr.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Post Information & Education Office, Camp Pickett, Virginia

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Military

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: 12-15 lecturers and clerical help

REASON FOR LEAVING: discharge from service

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: I helped organize the non-military education and information program at Camp Pickett. I prepared material for, and personally conducted lectures and discussions on history, current events, the U.S. and its allies, and the enemy. I trained and supervised other lecturers, and prepared material for their use. I published a daily news sheet for the whole camp, wrote articles for the weekly newspaper, and broadcast daily news summaries. I maintained a library of current information material and several War Information Centers. I aided military personnel to enroll in USAFI correspondence courses. (details on extra sheet)

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)

FROM [illegible] 1944 TO Aug, 1944

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Unit Information and Education Clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 54 PER mo.; FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Camp Pickett, Virginia

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Lt. [illegible] Goulding

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Supply Section, Hq. Detachment, [illegible] Camp Pickett, Virginia

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Military

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: promotion (to ③ above)

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: While a clerk in this unit, I was assigned the duty of acting as unit non-commissioned officer for the Information and Education program. [illegible], I conducted two or three hourly lectures or discussions [illegible] on history, current events, and other topics under the direction and supervision of the Post Info & Ed Office, and attended briefing sessions at that office. I maintained a War Information Center consisting of news items and maps of battle areas. I promoted interest in correspondence courses available through the U.S.A.F.I. As a result of this work, I was [illegible]ted to the position of [illegible] Info and Education Non-Commissioned Officer when that position was [illegible]. (see ③ above)

FORM 57

Lee [illegible] Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL ANSWER FOR ITEM # 10, Block 2:
(Information & Education Enlisted Specialist, Aug, 1944 - Feb, 1946)

A. After completing the Army Specialized Training Program course in Russian area and language studies, I was assigned to the 310th Infantry, 78th Division, then at Camp Pickett, Va. While with that unit, I conducted "orientation" lectures covering world news and background material on the war (April-May 1944).

[illegible] but no disability

B. Because of my limited-service status, I was transferred to the Supply Section, Headquarters Detachment, 1318 SCU, at Camp Pickett. While a clerk in that unit, I performed the duties of a unit Info & Education lecturer -- lecturing on history and current events, maintaining maps and bulletins on the battle areas, and enrolling soldiers in correspondence courses. As a result of this work (May-July 1944), I was promoted to be Info & Education Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Info & Education Office.

C. The Post Information & Education Office was charged with the duty of planning, producing, and disseminating war information and non-military education for all troops permanently stationed at Camp Pickett and for a large hospital on the grounds. The purpose of this program was to help the troops to understand why and what we were fighting, and to understand their role in that fight. It was morale building through information.

As Non-Commissioned Officer for the Info & Education Office, I performed both administrative and functional duties. I aided in the development and execution of the policies and content of the education program, and was in immediate charge of the weekly instructional program. The following are the duties which I performed:

1. Prepared material for use in weekly lectures or discussions which all troops were required to attend.
   - Info & Education Branch in Washington supplied topical information for use in these classes. I expanded, revised, or supplemented it to suit it to the needs of our camp.
2. Trained men to conduct lectures in each of 12 to 15 units; briefed them on prepared material each week; and inspected their classes.
   - Each company or unit was required to have one or more men with suitable education or experience to conduct weekly classes on history and current events under the direction of the Info & Education Office. At briefing conferences, I discussed with them the topic for the following week, suggested means of presentation, and described general policies to be followed. I made periodic inspection visits to classes conducted by these men.
3. Lectured or conducted several discussions each week.
   - The topics of these classes were the same as those conducted by other men: basic U.S. and world history, current events, background material on the war, the relation of the U.S. to its allies, the enemy, and the role of the individual soldier. These classes contained from 75 to 100 men each, with all educational levels represented.

FORM 57

Le[illegible]obart Sigren
[illegible] Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM # 16, Block E (continued):
(Information & Education Enlisted Specialist, Aug, 1944 - Feb, 1946)

4. Designed and prepared displays for War Information Centers in camp libraries, and in post headquarters. Developed visual aides for classroom use.
   - Displays consisted of pictures, posters, maps, and explanatory material dealing with various topics such as: The German Army, Growth of the Japanese Empire, Naziism, etc. Their purpose was to give a graphic presentation of background information concerning the war. The display at post headquarters also had maps and news items ~~dealing~~ with battle areas.
5. Compiled and edited daily news sheet, broadcast daily news summaries, and wrote articles on current events for camp newspaper.
   - At my suggestion, the news disseminating media at Camp Pickett were expanded by establishment of the news sheet and news broadcasts. The news sheet contained late news bulletins, factual background material, and some editorials. The news sheet and broadcasts were necessitated by the remoteness of the camp.
6. Did educational counselling and encouraged enrollments in correspondence courses offered by United States Armed Forces Institute.
7. Maintained close cooperation with camp newspaper staff, Public Relations Office, the Special Services Office, and the Intelligence Officer.

I believe that my work as Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Information & Education Office at Camp Pickett, Virginia, from August 1944 to February 1946 would be valuable to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The job was given to me as a promotion. I received special training for it at the School for Personnel Services, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia. While performing the duties of this job, I received promotions in rank from Private First Class to Staff Sergeant. During the closing months of my service, I was in complete charge of the office in the absence of any full-time Info & Education Officer.

As the result of my work, I was invited to attend a conference of the Info & Education officers and non-commissioned officers of the Third Service Command at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and to address that conference on educational and counselling problems. Since my discharge was in process at that time, I was unable to attend. Upon discharge, I received a special commendation for my work from Colonel H.C.Paullin, Commanding Officer of Camp Pickett, and a letter of recommendation from my superior.
(Copies of these letters, orders, and commendations will be submitted if necessary.)

Form 57

Robert Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #17:

1. Army Specialized Training Program, Russian area & language course
(Yale University, July 1943 - April 1944)

After completing basic training in June 1943, I was sent to the examination center at Georgetown University to be tested for entrance into the Army Specialized Training Program.

On the basis of a language aptitude test, I was sent to Yale to take the A.S.T.P. course in Russian area and language studies. This was a nine-month course running from July 1943 through March 1944. I completed the course with grades of "dean's list" rating, and received a certificate of completion of the course.

The program of study included courses in Russian history, geography, literature, and culture; modern European history; and Far Eastern history. Special lecturers from the Commerce Department, Lend Lease, and other agencies spoke to our classes occasionally.

Much attention was devoted to study of the Russian language. Classroom work, consisting of grammar, practice reading, and conversation occupied seventeen hours of our schedule each week. This was equivalent to about three years of normal language work.

---

2. School for Personnel Services, Course for Information & Education Enlisted Assistants (Washington & Lee U., Lexington, Va. Oct-Nov 1944

In order to be better prepared for work as Post Information and Education Non-Commissioned Officer at Camp Pickett, Virginia, I was sent to take the one-month course for Info & Education Enlisted Specialists, October and November 1944.

This course was prepared by the War Department, and conducted by military personnel. It presented material to be used in the preparation of Info & Education programs in camps, it suggested methods of presentation, and it provided practical experience in assessing and dealing with "orientation program" problems.

Some of the topics covered in lectures and discussions were:

Ideas as Weapons
Group Leadership Principles
Morale Factors
Global Warfare
Know the Enemy
Know our Allies
Know the U.S.A.
Teaching Methods

In addition, movies and visual aides were demonstrated.

Upon completion of this course (with a grade of Excellent), I received a certificate, and a Military Occupational Specialty Classification of : MOS 2274 (Information and Education Enlisted Specialist).

FORM 57

Robert Wigren
[illegible] Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #18 (EDUCATION):

A. I attended Boston University, College of Liberal Arts from September 1941 until February 17, 1943. On the latter date, I was called to active duty with the Army Enlisted Reserve Corps after completing one and one-half years (three semesters) of work. My intention had been to major in history.

Among the subjects which I studied were:

-History of Western Civilization
-United States History
-American Government
-Comparative Government
-General Economics
-Psychology
-Astronomy
-English Composition
-English Bible
-French
-Spanish

B. After basic training in the Army, I was sent to Georgetown University (June 1943), to take qualifying examinations for the Army Specialized Training Program. As a result, I was sent to Yale to study in the ASTP Russian language and area course (curriculum #71). This course covered the following subjects:

-Russian History____3 terms
-Russian Geography__2 terms
-Russian Literature
and Customs______1 term
-European History___3 terms
-Far East History___1 terms
-Russian Language___3 terms
(intensive course, 17 hours of class work per week)

This course was taught by regular instructors at Yale with full college standards maintained. I received a certificate for successful completion of this course. I also received one year of academic credit for this work.

C. Upon discharge from service in February 1946, I entered Yale for the spring term, and majored in history. I was graduated from Yale in June 1947. Among the subjects I studied at Yale were:

-United States History
-American Thought & Civilization
-U.S. Diplomatic History
-History of the Contemporary World
-Senior Essay: "The Interchurch World Movement and the Steel Strike of 1919".
-Moral and Political Philosophy
-American Government in Transition
-American Immigration
-Public Opinion and Propaganda
-Greek Classics
-English Literature
-The New Testament
-German

(continued on next page)

Form 57

Lee [redacted]rt Wigren
518 Belmont Avenue
Brockton, Massachusetts

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR ITEM #18 (EDUCATION, continued):

D. In September, 1947, I entered Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences again to major in History. In June 1948, I received a degree of Master of Arts. Since then, I have done two years of additional graduate work toward a degree of Doctor of Philosophy. My studies in graduate school included:

- Ancient Greek History
- English History from 1688
- U.S. Colonial History
- History of the Westward Movement
- Seminar: The New Deal: "The Communist Party in the New Deal Period"
- Seminar on the West: "The Attitude of Massachusetts Democracy toward Populism in the 1890's"
- American Literature
- Directed reading in American History
- Directed reading in English History

In addition, I audited the following courses:

- The Immigrant in American History
- Government Regulation of Industry
- U.S. Intellectual History
- American Social & Cultural History
- The British Empire
- European Intellectual History in the 18th and 19th Centuries

I also attended a course of lectures on college teaching.

(Transcripts of school records will be supplied if needed)
(Educational recommendations may be obtained from:
Miss Florence Leetch
Graduate Placement Office
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts)

14-00000

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM June 1941 TO Dec [illegible]	EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION Store clerk	CLASSIFIED GRADE (if in Federal service) —	SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ .31 PER hr. FINAL $ .65 PER hr.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State) Brockton, Massachusetts		NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR Frank [illegible], mgr of produce dept	
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division) Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, [illegible] St., Brockton (MR. JACK EDWARDS gen. mgr.)		KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.) Grocery	
NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU None		REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible] into Army	

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK This was part-time work on weekends and during summer vacations. I sold vegetables and fruit in the produce department of this large grocery store.

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING
1 July 1943	April 1944	Yale University, New Haven, Conn.	Army Specialized Training Program, Russian area & language study (curriculum #71) (details on extra sheet)
2 Oct. 1944	Nov. 1944	Washington & Lee, Lexington, Va.	U. School for Personnel Services, course for Information & Education enlisted assistants (details on extra sheet)

18 EDUCATION (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ⑫

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ☒ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☒ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED Brockton High School, Brockton, Mass.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED history, civics

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Boston University, Boston, Mass.	HISTORY	1941	Feb. 1943	1½	—			
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.	"	1943 1946	1944 1947	2½	—	A.B.	1947	—
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.	"	1947	1950	3	—	A.M.	1948	—

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
History: European, U.S., Russian, & other	48	History: Greek, English, American	30
Govt, Public Opinion & Propaganda	12	Literature	6

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

none

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERSTANDING EXC.	UNDERSTANDING GOOD	UNDERSTANDING FAIR
French		x				x		x	
Russian			x			x			x

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE:

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES, (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation)

none

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT-WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING ..... SHORTHAND .....

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS:
(A) YOUR MORE IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

C. - Community Fund speaker
- Winner, 10th District American Legion Oratorical Contest
- Class President, Boston University 1942-43

14-00000

Item #14: References [illegible] listed below [illegible] on file with:
[illegible], [illegible], [illegible],
[illegible]; [illegible].
Please obtain copies of these references from [illegible].

1. [illegible]	[illegible], MASS.	PROFESSOR
2. PROFESSOR DAVID OWEN	HISTORY DEPT, HARVARD UNIV, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.	PROFESSOR
3. MR. H. B. FISHER	SEYMOUR RD., WOODBRIDGE, CONN.	FORMERLY WITH F.B.I.

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25. MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29. ARE YOU NOW, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		
30. SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case.*		X
32. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39.*		X
33. HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39.*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a PEACETIME VETERAN who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN, or as the WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a WAR-TIME VETERAN not claiming disability preference, you should NOT submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer prior to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37. (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
17 Feb. 1943	11 Feb. 1946
BRANCH OF SERVICE (*Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.*)	SERIAL NO. (*if none, give grade or rating at time of separation*).
Army	ASN- 11 127 [illegible]

	YES	NO
38. (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below.*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on ...., 19....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (*indicate item numbers to which answers apply*).

ITEM NO		ITEM NO	
19.	Spanish: Reading, Good; Speaking,		Fair; Understanding, Fair

If more space is required, use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80).

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT Lee H. W[illegible]

(Sign your name in INK (one giv[illegible]e, initial or initials, and surname). If female, prefix Miss or Mrs. and if marrie[illegible] your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ICATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM

INSTRUCTIONS: In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type-write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement)

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): WASHINGTON D. C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION: OCT. 5, 1950

5. ~~Mr.~~ ~~Mrs.~~ ~~Miss~~ (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): Lee Robert Wigren

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 218 Belmont Avenue

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Brockton, Massachusetts

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): Massachusetts

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ———

(B) HOME PHONE: 4402-W

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): December 1, 19[illegible]

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Brockton, Massachusetts

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 9 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 150 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE

GS-6 #3450

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $[illegible] PER YEAR.
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR:
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 3 TO 6 MONTHS ☐ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY:
☒ OCCASIONALLY ☑ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☐ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

[illegible]

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPOR. ☐ NON APPOR.	MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED	ENTERED REGISTER
NOTATIONS:	APP. REVIEW: APPROVED:	

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

①

PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM: TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Student

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ PER PRESENT, $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK: Since discharge from the Army, 11 Feb. 1946, I have been a student at Yale (until June 1947), and at Harvard (Sept., 1947 to date) under provisions of the G.I. Bill. Details of my studies are to be found elsewhere on this form.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

10—23540-8

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? yes (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME (Use No Initials) Mr. LEE (First) HOBART (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

Telephone:
Office EX-6115
Ext. 2772
Home DE-1688

PRESENT ADDRESS 2700 - QUE ST. NW (St. and Number) WASHINGTON 7 (City) D.C. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AVE, (St. and Number) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

B. NICKNAME ______ WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? ______

______ UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? ______

HOW LONG? ______ IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______ (Where?) ______ (By what authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH ______ PLACE OF BIRTH ______ (City) ______ (State) ______ (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP ______ (Country) BY BIRTH? ______ BY MARRIAGE? ______

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE NO. ______ ISSUED ______ (Date) BY ______ (Court)

AT ______ (City) ______ (State) ______ (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? ______ (Yes or No) ______ (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? ______ TO ______ ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? ______ (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS ______

______

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ______ GIVE PARTICULARS:

______

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? ....

PORT OF ENTRY? .... ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ....

LAST U. S. VISA .... (Number) .... (Type) .... (Place of Issue) .... (Date of Issue)

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE .... SEX .... HEIGHT .... WEIGHT ....

EYES .... HAIR .... COMPLEXION .... SCARS ....

BUILD .... OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES ....

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE .... MARRIED .... DIVORCED .... WIDOWED ....

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS ....

....

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE—INCLUDING ANNULMENTS—USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NAME OF SPOUSE Alice (First) Ellen (Middle) Rozer (Maiden) Wigren (Last)

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE Washington, District of Columbia September 27, 1952

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE 4008 - Twenty [illegible] Road (St. and Number) Arlington (City) Virginia (State) United States (Country)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

(As of 28 Sept 52) PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 2700 Que Street (St. and Number) Washington (City) D.C. (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Aug. 13, 1927 PLACE OF BIRTH Roanoke (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY .... WHERE? (City) (State) (Country)

CITIZENSHIP .... WHEN ACQUIRED? .... LAST EMPLOYER Arlington County School Board

OCCUPATION Teacher

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Arlington County School Board (St. and Number) Arlington (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... (Date) TO .... (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN COUNTRY ....

....

[illegible]

OCCUPATION .... LAST EMPLOYER ....

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM .... TO .... BRANCH OF SERVICE ....

COUNTRY .... DETAILS OF OTHER GOVT. SERVICE, U. S. OR FOREIGN

....

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters):

1. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
2. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
3. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
4. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)
5. FULL NAME .... (First) (Middle) (Last) AGE ....
   PRESENT ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country) (Citizenship)

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME William (First) Cecil (Middle) Rader (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS — (St. and Number) Nace, (City) Virginia (State) USA (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH Aug 23, 1903 PLACE OF BIRTH Nace, Virginia

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ——

....

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? —— (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Farmer LAST EMPLOYER ——

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Beulah (First) Sara (Middle) Rader (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Living DATE OF DECEASE .... CAUSE ....

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS — (St. and Number) Nace (City) Virginia (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH June 17, [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible] Virginia

IF BORN OUTSIDE U. S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY —

CITIZENSHIP U.S. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? — (City) (State) (Country)

OCCUPATION Teacher LAST EMPLOYER Botetourt County School Board

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

NONE

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U. S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NONE

1. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

2. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

3. NAME .... RELATIONSHIP .... AGE ....

CITIZENSHIP .... ADDRESS .... (St. and Number) (City) (State) (Country)

TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ....

FORM NO.
SEP 1953

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions:
1. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply write "not applicable." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.
2. Type, print or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES (Yes or No)

SEC. 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Telephone:

Office: NONE

A. FULL NAME ~~Miss~~ Mr. ~~Mrs.~~ (Use No Initials) LEE (First) HOBART (Middle) WIGREN (Last) Ext. NONE

Home: 4402-W

PRESENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV. (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City), MASSACHUSETTS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

PERMANENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV. (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASSACHUSETTS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

B. NICKNAME SONNY WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? NONE

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU EVER USED THESE NAMES? NOT APPLICABLE

HOW LONG? — IF A LEGAL CHANGE, GIVE PARTICULARS —

NOT APPLICABLE (Where?) — (By What Authority)

C. DATE OF BIRTH DEC. 1, 1923 PLACE OF BIRTH BROCKTON (City), MASS. (State), U.S.A. (Country)

D. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. (Country) BY BIRTH? YES BY MARRIAGE? —

BY NATURALIZATION CERTIFICATE # — ISSUED — (Date) BY — (Court)

AT NOT APPLICABLE (City) — (State) (Country)

HAVE YOU HAD A PREVIOUS NATIONALITY? NO (Yes or No) — (Country)

HELD BETWEEN WHAT DATES? — TO — ANY OTHER NATIONALITY? — (Country)

GIVE PARTICULARS NOT APPLICABLE

HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? NO GIVE PARTICULARS:

FORM NO. 38-1
SEP 1949

E. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. WHEN DID YOU FIRST ARRIVE IN THIS COUNTRY? NOT APPLICABLE

PORT OF ENTRY? ——— ON PASSPORT OF WHAT COUNTRY? ———

LAST U.S. VISA ———
Number Type Place of Issue Date of Issue

SEC. 2. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

AGE 26 yrs; 11 mos SEX MALE HEIGHT 5'9" WEIGHT 150 lbs.

EYES BLUE HAIR LIGHT BROWN COMPLEXION FAIR SCARS NONE

BUILD MEDIUM OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES MOLE ON LEFT ARM AT ELBOW

SEC. 3. MARITAL STATUS

A. SINGLE YES MARRIED ——— DIVORCED ——— WIDOWED ———

STATE DATE, PLACE, AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NOT APPLICABLE

B. WIFE OR HUSBAND (IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE -- INCLUDE ANNULMENTS -- USE A SEPARATE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.)

NOT APPLICABLE

NAME OF SPOUSE NOT APPLICABLE ———
First Middle Maiden Last

PLACE AND DATE OF MARRIAGE ———

HIS (OR HER) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE ———
St. & No. City State Country

LIVING OR DECEASED ——— DATE OF DECEASE ——— CAUSE ———

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ———
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ——— PLACE OF BIRTH ———
City State Country

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ———

CITIZENSHIP ——— WHEN ACQUIRED? ——— WHERE? ———
City State Country

OCCUPATION ——— LAST EMPLOYER ———

EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS ———
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM ——— TO ——— BRANCH OF SERVICE ———
Date Date

COUNTRY ——— DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T. SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

———

SEC. 4. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents) NONE

NOT APPLICABLE

1. NAME NOT APPLICABLE RELATIONSHIP — AGE —
CITIZENSHIP — ADDRESS — (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

2. NAME — RELATIONSHIP — AGE —
CITIZENSHIP — ADDRESS — (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

3. NAME — RELATIONSHIP — AGE —
CITIZENSHIP — ADDRESS — (St. & No. / City / State / Country)

SEC. 5. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME AUGUST (First) HERMAN (Middle) WIGREN (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR, LAST, ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS., (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1889 PLACE OF BIRTH CHICAGO, (City) ILLINOIS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? — (City / State / Country)

OCCUPATION HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER LAST EMPLOYER SCHOOL DEPT, BROCKTON, MASS.

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS HIGH SCHOOL, (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS, (State) U.S.A. (Country)

MILITARY SERVICE FROM JULY 1917 (Date) TO AUG 1919 (Date) BRANCH OF SERVICE ARMY

COUNTRY U.S.A. DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

MASS. STATE GUARD, 1ST LIEUT., 1942-45.

SEC. 6. MOTHER (Give the same information for stepmother on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME IDA (First) CAROLINE (Middle) (HALLQUIST) WIGREN (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED LIVING DATE OF DECEASE — CAUSE —

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., (St. & No.) BROCKTON, (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH 1892 PLACE OF BIRTH QUINCY, MASS.

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? BIRTH WHERE? — (City / State / Country)

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY NOT APPLICABLE

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE LAST EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

MILITARY SERVICE FROM TO BRANCH OF SERVICE

COUNTRY DETAILS OF OTHER GOV'T SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN.

SEC. 7. BROTHERS AND SISTERS (Including half-, step-, and adopted brothers and sisters)

1. FULL NAME RUSSELL HERMAN WIGREN AGE 20.
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

2. FULL NAME AGE
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

3. FULL NAME AGE
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

4. FULL NAME AGE
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

5. FULL NAME AGE
First Middle Last
PRESENT ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country Citizenship

SEC. 8. FATHER-IN-LAW NOT APPLICABLE

FULL NAME
First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED DATE OF DECEASE CAUSE

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS
St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH PLACE OF BIRTH

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP WHEN ACQUIRED? WHERE?
City State Country

OCCUPATION LAST EMPLOYER

SEC. 9. MOTHER-IN-LAW NOT APPLICABLE

FULL NAME ____ First Middle Last

LIVING OR DECEASED ____ DATE OF DECEASE ____ CAUSE ____

PRESENT, OR LAST, ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country

DATE OF BIRTH ____ PLACE OF BIRTH ____

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY ____

CITIZENSHIP ____ WHEN ACQUIRED? ____ WHERE? ____ City State Country

OCCUPATION ____ LAST EMPLOYER ____

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES: NONE

1. NAME NONE RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country
2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country
3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State Country

---

SEC. 11. RELATIVES BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE IN THE MILITARY OR CIVIL SERVICE OF THE U.S. OR OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

1. NAME STEPHEN P. ANDERSEN RELATIONSHIP HUSBAND OF MY FATHER'S COUSIN AGE C. 55.
   CITIZENSHIP U.S. ADDRESS 4509 7th ST, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE
2. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ____
3. NAME ____ RELATIONSHIP ____ AGE ____
   CITIZENSHIP ____ ADDRESS ____ St. & No. City State
   TYPE AND LOCATION OF SERVICE (IF KNOWN) ____

SEC. 12 EDUCATION

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL WHITMAN SCHOOL ADDRESS BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1928-1937 GRADUATE? YES

HIGH SCHOOL BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL ADDRESS BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1937-1941 GRADUATE? YES

[illegible] PAGES 12-14 [illegible]

COLLEGE YALE UNIVERSITY ADDRESS NEW HAVEN, CONN. U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED DEGREE A.B. (1947)

COLLEGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY ADDRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASS. U.S.A.
City State Country

DATES ATTENDED 1947-1950 DEGREE A.M. (1948) AND WORK TOWARD PH.D

SEC. 13. MILITARY, NAVAL OR OTHER GOV'T SERVICE — U.S. OR FOREIGN

U.S.A. ARMY S/SGT 17 FEB 1943 TO 11 FEB 1946
Country Service Rank Dates of Service

CAMP PICKETT, VA ASN 11-127-072 HONORABLE
Last Station Serial No. Type of Discharge

REMARKS: WAS MEMBER OF ARMY ENLISTED RESERVE, FROM NOV. 1942 TO 17 FEB 1943

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER 28 ADDRESS COURT HOUSE, BROCKTON, MASS.

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NOT APPLICABLE

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS NONE

SEC. 14 CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST.

SEE EXTRA SHEET FIRST!

1. FROM MARCH 1946 TO SEPTEMBER 1950

SINCE MY DISCHARGE FROM THE ARMY, (11 FEB. 1946), I HAVE BEEN A STUDENT AT YALE (UNTIL JUNE 1947) AND AT HARVARD (SEPT 1947 - SEPT 1950) UNDER PROVISIONS OF P.L. #346 - THE G.I. BILL. DETAILS OF MY STUDY ARE TO BE FOUND UNDER ITEM #12 OF THIS FORM.

2. FROM SEPT. 1946 TO JUNE 1947

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY EDITORIAL STAFF, YALE EDITION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HOR[illegible] WALPOLE (YALE UNIVERSITY)

ADDRESS STERLING MEMORIAL LIBRARY, (St. & No.) NEW HAVEN, (City) CONN. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS SCHOLARLY RESEARCH NAME OF SUPERVISOR MR. WARREN SMITH

TITLE OF JOB INDEXER (PART-TIME WORK) SALARY $[illegible] PER PER WEEK TOTAL 12 HRS

YOUR DUTIES PART-TIME TO EARN PART OF BOARD AT COLLEGE. I INDEXED + CATALOGUED LETTERS IN CONNECTION WITH YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE'S CORRESPONDENCE

REASONS FOR LEAVING GRADUATION

3. FROM AUGUST 1944 TO FEBRUARY 1946

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U. S. ARMY

DETAILS OF THIS WORK ARE ON PAGES 14, 15, 16 OF THIS FORM

ADDRESS INFORMATION-EDUCATION OFFICE, (St. & No.) CAMP PICKETT (City) VA. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS INFORMATION-EDUCATION (MILITARY) NAME OF SUPERVISOR CAPT. J. W. YOWELL, JR.

TITLE OF JOB INFORMATION-EDUCATION ENLISTED SPECIALIST (MOS 2274) SALARY $ up to 96 PER MO.

YOUR DUTIES ORGANIZING + ADMINISTERING INFORMATION AND NON-MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM DETAILS ON PAGES 14, 15, 16.

REASONS FOR LEAVING DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE

4. FROM JUNE 1941 TO DECEMBER 1942

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY GREAT ATLANTIC + PACIFIC TEA CO.

ADDRESS MAIN STREET (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS. (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS GROCERY NAME OF SUPERVISOR FRANK PIVERONIS

TITLE OF JOB PRODUCE CLERK (PART-TIME) SALARY $.65 PER HR

YOUR DUTIES SOLD VEGETABLES + FRUIT (FRIDAYS, SATURDAYS, AND SUMMER VACATIONS

REASONS FOR LEAVING TO ENTER ARMY

5. FROM c. OCTOBER 1940 TO JUNE 1941

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY KENNEDY BUTTER + EGG CO.

ADDRESS MAIN STREET, (St. & No.) BROCKTON (City) MASS (State) U.S.A. (Country)

KIND OF BUSINESS RETAIL GROCERY NAME OF SUPERVISOR A. M. JACOBS

TITLE OF JOB CLERK (PART-TIME) SALARY $.31 PER HR.

YOUR DUTIES SELLING COFFEE, TEA, BUTTER, ETC. (SATURDAYS)

REASONS FOR LEAVING SUMMER REDUCTION OF HELP - (I had been on a part-time basis only.)

ITEM #14 (Form 58-1)

EXTRA SHEET

LEE HOGGATT WIGREN
215 BELMONT AVE.
BROCKTON, MASS.

The following material is meant to PRECEDE the information given in this Form 58-1 under Item #14. Please use it first.

OUTLINE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INCLUDING CASUAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT. ONLY MAJOR ITEMS (WHICH ARE MARKED BELOW WITH ✱) ARE INCLUDED ON REGULAR FORM. DETAILS ON OTHERS WILL BE SUPPLIED IF NECESSARY

DATES	WHERE	NATURE OF WORK
SEPT. - NOV. 1950	AT HOME	- SEEKING EMPLOYMENT - TICKET SELLING FOOTBALL GAMES, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL
SEPT. 1947 to SEPT. 1950	HARVARD UNIV. STUDENT (UNDER G.I. B.) [FALL, SPRING, SUMMER TERMS, 1947-8, 1948-9, 1949-50]	✱ - STUDYING - CHAUFFEURING - SUMMER, 1948 / - SUMMER, 1949 } 2 weeks each. [FOR MR. C.E. CHAMBERLAIN, 220 BELMONT ST. BROCKTON, MASS.]
MAR. 1946 to JUNE 1947	YALE UNIV. STUDENT (UNDER G.I. BILL) [SPRING + SUMMER, 1946 FALL + SPRING, 1946-7]	- STUDYING ✱ - INDEXER (Part-Time) FOR YALE EDITION OF HORACE WALPOLE CORRESPONDENCE, 1946-47 - OFFICE WORK FOR SECRETARY TO DEAN OF YALE COLLEGE (Part-Time) - SUMMER, 1946
FEB. 17, 1943 to FEB. 11, 1946	U.S. ARMY	(1) CAMP LEE, VA. - BASIC TRAINING - FEB - JUNE 1943 (2) YALE UNIV. (ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING PROGRAM) - JUNE 1943 - MAR. 1944 (3) CAMP PICKETT, VA. - 310th INFANTRY, 78th DIVISION - APRIL + MAY, 1944 - SUPPLY SECTION, 1315 S.C.U. - MAY - JULY, 1944 ✱ - INFO. + EDUCATION OFFICE - JULY 1944 - FEB. 1946 (4) CAMP MEADE, MD. - DISCHARGE - FEB. 11, 1946
SEPT. 1941 to FEB. 17, 1943	BOSTON UNIV. STUDENT	- STUDYING ✱ - CLERK, A+P. GROCERY STORE, MAIN + CALMAR STREETS, BROCKTON - (Part-Time) - JUNE 1941 - DEC. 1942
1935 to 1941	JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT	- CLERK, KENNEDY BUTTER STORE, MAIN ST., BROCKTON (PART TIME) - OCT. 1940 - JUNE 1941 - PAPER ROUTE

STARRED ITEMS ARE DETAILED ON FORM 58-1

SEC. 15. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED OR ASKED TO RESIGN FROM ANY POSITION? HAVE YOU LEFT A POSITION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU DESIRE TO EXPLAIN? GIVE DETAILS:

NONE —

SEC. 16. GIVE FIVE CHARACTER REFERENCES — IN THE U.S. — WHO KNOW YOU INTIMATELY — (GIVE RESIDENCE AND BUSINESS ADDRESSES WHERE POSSIBLE.)

Street and Number / City / State

1. REV. J. MANLEY SHAW
BUS. ADD. CENTRAL METHODIST CHURCH, BROCKTON, MASS.
RES. ADD. 258 W. ELM ST, BROCKTON MASS.

2. MR. C. WESLEY WILLIAMS
BUS. ADD. 41 ARLINGTON ST, BROCKTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 32 GIFFORD ST, BROCKTON MASS.

3. MISS LYDIA A. GIBBS
BUS. ADD. HIGH SCHOOL BROCKTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 78 BURNSIDE AV, BROCKTON MASS.

4. REV. PAUL STOPENHAGEN
BUS. ADD. HARVARD-EPWORTH METHODIST CHURCH CAMBRIDGE MASS.
RES. ADD. 30 LANGDON ST, CAMBRIDGE MASS.

5. MR. H. B. FISHER
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. SEYMOUR RD, WOODBRIDGE CONN.

6. MR. CLARENCE A. McLAUGHLIN
BUS. ADD. (?) —
RES. ADD. 8806 LOWELL PLACE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND

SEC. 17. NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES — NOT REFERENCES, SUPERVISORS OR EMPLOYERS — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

Street and Number / City / State

1. MR. KENNETH G. RYDER
BUS. ADD. CAMBRIDGE JR. COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
RES. ADD. BOWKER ST, LEXINGTON MASS.

2. MR. ROLAND J. GIBSON
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. ADAMS A-33 CAMBRIDGE MASS.

3. MR. HERMAN CARR
BUS. ADD. PHYSICS DEPT. HARVARD UNIV. CAMBRIDGE MASS.
RES. ADD. HARVARD UNIV. CAMBRIDGE MASS.

4. MR. HUTSON K. HOWELL
BUS. ADD. OPTICAL LABORATORY BOSTON UNIV. BOSTON MASS.
RES. ADD. 14 MORSE AV BROCKTON MASS.

5. MR. JOHN D. SHOVE, JR.
BUS. ADD.
RES. ADD. [illegible] ST. (?) CAZENOVIA NEW YORK

SEC. 18. GIVE THREE NEIGHBORS AT YOUR LAST NORMAL RESIDENCE IN THE U.S. — (Give residence and business addresses where possible.)

		Street and Number	City	State
1. MISS ELDA E. HERRICK	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	232 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
2. MRS. FRANK B. YATES [and family]	BUS. ADD.			
	RES. ADD.	246 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
3. MR. EDWARD HENNESSY (Neighbor for many years)	BUS. ADD.	238 FOREST AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.
	RES. ADD.	40 BOUVE AV,	BROCKTON	MASS.

SEC. 19. FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

A. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? YES IF NOT, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

B. NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF BANKS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK, 221 MAIN ST, BROCKTON, MASS.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? NO
GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT:

D. GIVE THREE CREDIT REFERENCES — IN THE U.S.

	NAME	ADDRESS St. & No.	City	State
1.	MR. PAUL C. BENNETT	282 GREEN ST,	BROCKTON,	MASS.
2.	MR. HARDING E. PORTER	106 HILLCREST AV,	BROCKTON,	MASS.
3.	MR. WILLIAM C. NYE	39 CARLYNN RD,	BROCKTON,	MASS.

SEC. 20. RESIDENCES FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS

FROM	TO	St. No.	City	State	Country
1933	1927	128 MENLO ST,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
1927	1943	44 BOUVE AV,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
1943	1946	U.S. ARMY			
1946	1950	218 BELMONT AV,	BROCKTON,	MASS.	U.S.A.
MAR 1946	JE 1947	YALE UNIV.	NEW HAVEN	CONN	U.S.A.
1947	1950 SEPT. TO MAY EACH YEAR	26 MELROSE ST,	ARLINGTON	MASS.	U.S.A.

SCHOOL RESIDENCES (during school periods only)

SEC. 21. RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES NONE

	FROM	TO	City or Section	Country	Purpose
A.					

FROM ________ TO ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose ________

FROM ________ TO ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose ________

FROM ________ TO ________ City or Section ________ Country ________ Purpose ________

B. LAST U.S. PASSPORT — NUMBER, DATE, AND PLACE OF ISSUE: NONE

HOW MANY OTHER U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE YOU HAD? None GIVE APPROXIMATE DATES: ________

PASSPORTS OF OTHER NATIONS: NOT APPLICABLE

SEC. 22. CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

LIST NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, EMPLOYEE GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP IN, OR SUPPORT OF, ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS OR BRANCH IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY) TO WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED:

1. CENTRAL METHODIST CHURCH (Name and Chapter) — (St. & No.) — BROCKTON (City) — MASS. (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ATTENDED SINCE BIRTH; MEMBER SINCE C. 1935

2. HISTORY CLUB, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL (Name and Chapter) — (St. & No.) — BROCKTON (City) — MASS (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1937-1941

3. DRAMATIC CLUB, BROCKTON HIGH SCHOOL (Name and Chapter) — (St. & No.) — BROCKTON (City) — MASS. (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1939-1941

4. ORDER OF DEMOLAY OSAMEQUIN CHAPTER (Name and Chapter) — MAIN ST. (St. & No.) — BROCKTON (City) — MASS (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: ca. 1940-42 (no exact records)

5. BOSTON UNIVERSITY WESLEY CLUB (Name and Chapter) — (St. & No.) — BOSTON (City) — MASS (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942-43 [Methodist Student Club]

6. AXA FRATERNITY (Name and Chapter) — BOSTON UNIVERSITY (St. & No.) — BOSTON (City) — MASS. (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1942-43 [Pledged, but didn't complete membership]

7. YALE WESLEY FOUNDATION (Name and Chapter) — FIRST METHODIST CHURCH (St. & No.) — NEW HAVEN (City) — CONN. (State) — U.S.A. (Country)
DATES OF MEMBERSHIP: 1943-44; 1946-47.

[[illegible] 16 [illegible]]

SEC. 23. GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

A. FOREIGN LANGUAGES (STATE DEGREE OR PROFICIENCY AS "SLIGHT" "FAIR" OR "FLUENT")

LANGUAGE FRENCH SPEAK FAIR READ FLUENT WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE SPANISH SPEAK SLIGHT READ FAIR WRITE SLIGHT

LANGUAGE RUSSIAN SPEAK FAIR READ SLIGHT WRITE SLIGHT

SWEDISH — SLIGHT — SLIGHT — SLIGHT

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU: INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH:

BICYCLING; SWIMMING; HIKING

STAMP COLLECTING; PROPAGANDA STUDY

C. HAVE YOU ANY QUALIFICATIONS, AS A RESULT OF TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION?

YES. ① MY MILITARY DUTIES AS INFORMATION AND EDUCATION ENLISTED SPECIALIST (MOS 2274) IN POST INFO + EDUCATION OFFICE, CAMP PICKETT, VA. [SEE SEC. #14③]
② PUBLIC SPEAKING

D. LIST BELOW THE NAMES OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES OR OFFICES TO WHICH YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1939:

1. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (1950) (application not yet complete)
2. CIVIL SERVICE — APPLIED FOR POSITION OF HISTORY AND LITERATURE PROFESSOR AT COAST GUARD ACADEMY, NEW LONDON, CONN. (1950)

E. IF, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, ANY OF THE ABOVE HAS CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION OF YOU, INDICATE BELOW THE NAME OF THAT AGENCY AND THE APPROXIMATE DATE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

– UNCERTAIN. MAY HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATED FOR HISTORY TEACHING POSITION (AUGUST, 1950).

STARRED [illegible]

SEC. 24. MISCELLANEOUS

A. DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED; OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OR, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES?

IF "YES", EXPLAIN: NO ——

B. DO YOU USE, OR HAVE YOU USED, INTOXICANTS? NO IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT? NEVER USED THEM.

C. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED OR CONVICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION OF LAW OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION? IF SO, STATE NAME OF COURT, CITY, STATE, COUNTRY, NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE: NO

D. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN COURT-MARTIALED WHILE A MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE DETAILS BELOW:

NO ——

SEC. 25. PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:

NAME AUGUST H. WIGREN RELATIONSHIP FATHER

ADDRESS 218 BELMONT AV., BROCKTON, MASS. U.S.A.
St. & No. City State Country

SEC. 26. YOU ARE INFORMED THAT THE CORRECTNESS OF ALL STATEMENTS MADE HEREIN WILL BE INVESTIGATED.

ARE THERE ANY UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED ABOVE WHICH MAY BE DISCOVERED IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION, WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED OR NOT, WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE EXPLANATION? IF SO, DESCRIBE. IF NOT, ANSWER "NO."

NO ——

SEC. 27. I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ANSWERS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, AND I AGREE THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT OR OMISSION AS TO A MATERIAL FACT WILL CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL OR REJECTION OF MY APPLICATION.

SIGNED AT Brockton, Massachusetts DATE November 1, 1950
City and State

Witness

Lee H. Wigren
Signature of Applicant

USE THE FOLLOWING PAGES FOR EXTRA DETAILS. NUMBER ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF THE QUESTION TO WHICH THEY RELATE. SIGN YOUR NAME AT THE END OF THE ADDED MATERIAL. IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED USE EXTRA PAGES THE SAME SIZE AS THESE AND SIGN EACH SUCH PAGE.

SEC. 12 - EDUCATION (continued from p. 6)

COLLEGES ATTENDED:

(1) Boston University, College of Liberal Arts, Boston, Mass.
- -Attended: Sept.1941 to Feb.1943.
- -Completed 3 semesters of work, majoring in History.
- -Called to active duty with U.S.Army, Feb.17,1943.

Subjects:

- -History of Western Civilization
- -United States History
- -American Government
- -Comparative Government
- -General Economics
- -Psychology
- -Astronomy
- -English Composition
- -English Bible
- -French
- -Spanish

(2) Yale University, New Haven, Conn. - Army Specialized Training Program: Russian Area & Language Course (curriculum #71)
- - Attended: June 1943 to March 31, 1944 (sent by the U.S.Army)
- - Completed course, received certificate and one year of academic credit.

Subjects:

- -Russian History___2 terms
- -Russian Geography___2 terms
- -Russian Literature and Customs___1 term
- -Russian Language___3 terms (intensive; 17 class hours per wk.)
- -European History___2 terms
- -Far East History___1 term

(3) Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
- - Attended: March 1946 to June 1947
- * A.B. degree awarded in 1947 - majored in History

Subjects:

- -United States History
- -American Thought & Civilization
- -U.S. Diplomatic History
- -History of Contemporary World
- -Moral and Political Philosophy
- -American Govt. in Transition
- -Senior Essay: "The Interchurch World Movement and the Steel Strike of 1919"
- -American Immigration
- -Greek Classics
- -English Literature
- -New Testament
- -Public Opinion & Propaganda
- -German

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1950 O - [illegible]

(OVER)

STARRED ITEMS ARE DETAILED ON FORM [illegible]

(c) Harvard University, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Attended: Sept.1947 to Sept.1950
- A.M. Degree awarded, 1948 (in History)
- Completed residence requirements toward Ph.D. in History

Subjects:

- -Ancient Greek History
- -U.S.Colonial History
- -English History from [illegible]
- -History of the Westward Mvt.
- -American Literature
- -Seminar on the New Deal: "The Communist Party in the New Deal Period".
- -Seminar on the West: "The Attitude of Massachusetts Democracy toward Populism in the 1890's."
- -Directed reading in American and English History.

In addition, I audited the following courses:
- -The Immigrant in American History
- -Government Regulation of Industry
- -U.S.Intellectual History
- -American Social and Cultural History
- -The British Empire
- -European Intellectual History in the 18th & 19th Centuries.

I also attended a lecture course on college teaching.

Educational recommendations may be obtained from Miss Florence Leetch, Graduate Placement Office, Farlow House, Cambridge, Massachusetts)

Sec. 14-③-(continued from p. 7)

WORK AS INFORMATION-EDUCATION SPECIALIST (MILITARY), (1944-46)

(1) After completing the ASTP course at Yale, I was assigned to the 310th Infantry, 78th Division, Camp Pickett, Va. While there, I conducted "orientation" lectures covering world news and background material on the war (April-May 1944)

(2) Because of my limited-service status, I was transferred to the Supply Section, 1312 SCU, at Camp Pickett. I performed the duties of a unit Info & Education lecturer -- lecturing on history and current events, maintaining maps and bulletins on battle areas, and enrolling soldiers in USAFI correspondence courses (May-July 1944). As a result of this work, I was promoted to the Post Info & Education Office.

(3) The Post Information & Education Office had to plan, produce, and disseminate war information and non-military education for all troops permanently stationed at Camp Pickett, and for a hospital on the grounds. The purpose of that program was to help troops to understand why and what we were fighting, and to understand their role in that fight. It was morale building through information.

As Non-Commissioned Officer for the Info & Education Office, I performed both administrative and functional duties. I aided in the development and execution of the policies and content of the education program, and was in immediate charge of the weekly instructional program.

The following are the duties I performed:

A) Prepared material [illegible] which [illegible]
- Info [illegible] Education [illegible] in Washington supplied series for use in these classes. I expanded, revised, or simplified them to suit them to the needs of our camp.

B) Trained men to conduct lectures in each of [illegible] to [illegible] units; briefed them on use of the prepared material each week; and inspected their classes.
- Each company or unit was required to have one or more men with suitable education or experience to conduct weekly classes on history and current events under direction of the Info & Education Office. At briefing conferences, I discussed with them the topic for the next week, suggesting means of presentation, and describing general policies to be followed. I made periodic inspection visits to classes led by these men.

C) Lectured or conducted several discussions each week.
- The topics of these classes were the same as those used by the other men: basic U.S. history; current world events; background material on the war; the relation of the U.S. to its allies; the enemy; and the role of the individual soldier. Classes contained 75 to 100 men each, with all levels of education represented in them.

D) Designed and prepared displays for War Information Centers in camp libraries and the post headquarters. Developed visual aids for classroom use.
- Displays consisted of pictures, posters, maps, and explanatory material dealing with various topics, such as: "The German Army", "Growth of the Japanese Empire", "Facilies", "The United Nations", etc. The purpose was to give a graphic presentation of background information concerning the war. The display in the post headquarters had maps and news items dealing with battle areas.

E) Compiled and edited daily news sheet; broadcast daily news summaries; wrote articles on current events for camp newspaper.
- At my suggestion, the news-dissemination media at Camp Pickett were expanded by establishment of the news sheet and news broadcasts. The news sheet contained late news bulletins, factual background material, and some editorials. The news sheet and broadcasts were necessitated by the remoteness of the camp.

F) Did educational counselling and encouraged enrollments in correspondence courses offered by U.S. Armed Forces Institute.

G) Maintained close cooperation with camp newspaper staff, the Public Relations Office, Special Services Office, and the Intelligence Officer.

To be better prepared for work in the Post Info & Education Office I was sent to the School for Personnel Services, Washington & Lee University, Lexington, Va., for a one-month course for Info & Education Enlisted Specialists, (October-November 1944)

This course was prepared by the War Department and conducted by military personnel. It presented material to be used in preparing Info & Education programs in camps, it suggested methods of presentation, and it provided practical experience in assessing and dealing with orientation problems.

(OVER)

(15)

STARRED ITEMS ARE DEFINED ON FORM 56-1

(16)

Some of the topics covered in lectures and discussions in this course were:

- -Ideas as Weapons
- -Group Leadership Principles
- -Morale Factors
- -Global Warfare
- -Know the Enemy
- -Know our Allies
- -Know the U.S.A.
- -Teaching Methods
- -Movies and Visual Aids

Upon completion of this course (with a grade of "Excellent"), I received a certificate, and a Military Occupational Specialty Classification of MOS 2274 (Information-Education Enlisted Specialist).

- - - - - - -

I believe my work as Non-Commissioned Officer in the Post Info & Education Office at Camp Pickett would be valuable to Central Intelligence. The job was given to me as a promotion. I received special training for it at the School for Personnel Services. While performing the job, I received promotions in rank from Private first class to Staff Sergeant. During the closing months of my service, I was in complete charge of the office in the absence of any full-time Info & Education Officer.

As the result of my work, I was invited to attend a conference of the Info & Education officers and non-commissioned officers of the Third Service Command at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and to address that conference on educational and counselling problems. Since my discharge was in process at that time, I was unable to attend. Upon discharge, I received a special commendation from Colonel F.G.Paullin, Commanding Officer of Camp Pickett, and a letter of recommendation from my superior.

(Copies of these letters, orders, and commendations will be submitted if necessary)

SEC. 22 - CLUBS, ETC. (continued from p. 10)

8. NEW ENGLAND METHODIST STUDENT MOVEMENT COUNCIL
   - OFFICE OF CHAPLAIN, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MASS.
   - DATES: 1946-1947
9. HARVARD WESLEY FOUNDATION {1556 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
   38 LANGDON ST., CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
   - DATES: 1947-1950
10. GRADUATE HISTORY CLUB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
    - DATES: 1948-1950 (irregular attendance).
11. HENRY ADAMS CLUB (FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY)
    - HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
    - DATES: 1947-1950
12. POST #35, AMERICAN LEGION, WEST ELM STREET, BROCKTON, MASS.
    - DATES: 1946-1948.

THE FOREGOING ADDED MATERIAL IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE:

P.C. 26 Feb.

File

SECURITY APPROVAL

CONFIDENTIAL

To : Chief, Covert Personnel Division ~~Personnel Officer~~

From : Chief of Inspection and Security

Subject: WIGREN, Lee Hobart

Date: 23 March 1951

Number: 44732

1. Note "X" below:

☒ Security approval is granted subject for access to classified information contingent upon the receipt of derogatory information at some future date.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of paragraph 4, Administrative Instruction 10-2, which provides for a temporary appointment pending the completion of full security investigation.

☒ Unless the applicant enters upon duty within 60 days from above date this approval becomes invalid.

2. Memorandum dated 16 November 1950 stated subject is being considered for employment in OSO.

gKw

[illegible]
Chief, Personnel Security ~~Division~~
BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
MAY 1949

050
10

mew

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, Covert Personnel Branch Date: 26 February 1951
FROM : Security Officer, CIA
SUBJECT: WIGREN, Lee Hobart - 44732

Reference is made to your memorandum dated 16 November 1950 which requested that subject be granted security clearance.

This is to advise that this office interposes no objection from a security standpoint to a temporary appointment of the subject to the Processing Pool, pending completion of further security action, upon the condition that subject (1) not have access to classified material, (2) not have access to CIA secure areas, (3) not be issued a CIA badge or credential. The subject may not be assigned for duty in any CIA staff or office without further authority from the Security Officer, CIA. This clearance does not include assignment to unclassified duties outside the immediate supervision of the Pool supervisor.

It is requested that this office be notified immediately when subject enters on duty so that final security processing may be scheduled.

FOR THE SECURITY OFFICER, CIA:

Kw

19 Mar

C V Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY mw
Chief, Security Division

Miss Helen notified 5 Mar [illegible]
Cat [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~GE-53~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. GA-53

IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4578.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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Saccocia CA/HO
S. Corbat
06/EPK

12 Mar 78

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

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space ~~[illegible]~~

FILE NO. WASH CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: ~~3~~ 11

PAGE:

BOX: 2

RETURN TO GA-50

IP/ARD Rm ~~GE-58~~

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Folder #11

NCFE
July 1951-December 1952

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Security Information

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Background Material for Dr. Tyson's visit on Wednesday, January 7th.

1. I would like the attached papers to call to your attention the very good work that Dr. Tyson has done which is generally not known here. His successful use of emigres in making a calm and factual presentation to the American public of conditions behind the Iron Curtain is, in my opinion, the basis on which the Crusade for Freedom can be run by the Heritage Foundation in the future.

2. Dr. Tyson shares our doubts about the Free University in Exile. He agrees that the two principles upon which the University was founded:

A. that there were sufficient qualified Iron Curtain escapees to justify institutionalizing their education; and

B. that by creating such an institution for escapees an esprit de corps is created, together with a determination on the part of the escapees to serve their homelands at some future date

have not been proved.

3. All of the evidence to prove the validity of these principles is certainly not in. The evidence at hand raises serious doubts, and is as follows:

A. Of the current 208 students of the Free University, 37 are Yugoslavs, and 12 were born in Western European countries. (The high total ratio — almost 25% of the student body — of Yugoslav students, which is not a target country, together with the non-satellite born students indicates an inability to recruit the kinds of students the University was intended to train.) It should also be noted that from the information available to us it is not possible to determine what proportion of those listed as born in target countries actually left them before Soviet domination. I have the impression, which is substantiated by the recruiting missions of Mr. Royal Tyler throughout Europe and even Turkey, that suitable candidates are already extremely difficult to find. It should be noted also that of the 64 outside scholarships given to exiles in various European Universities, 16 are for Yugoslavs.

SECRET
Security Information

B. We have had various reports which indicate that the morale of a number of students at Strasbourg is not good. These morale problems arise from a variety of reasons, among which are:

(1) They are not entirely certain why they are there and just what the American sponsors intend for them;

(2) They fear that after they finish their education they will be without jobs;

(3) There has been a steady and systematic campaign carried on by French Communist students at the University of Strasbourg to demoralize and disorganize the FEUE student body. In addition, several students are suspected of being espionage agents.

4. Dr. Tyson is leaving for Europe on the 21st of January to make a thorough investigation and evaluation of the Free University in order to answer these questions. We are aiding him by having the officials of the President's Escapee Program make available a complete inventory of escapees who might be potential candidates for the University.

5. Dr. Tyson was not the instigator of the proposals for a gymnasium for the Free University. The proposals were made and pushed by Royal Tyler and Spencer Phenix. The handling of this matter as far as Tyler was concerned was another example of his difficulties in dealing with Phenix for, as financial officer of NCFE, and having no position in the separate corporation, that is, the Free University, Phenix has and is dealing with matters of policy.

THOMAS W. BRADEN,
Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachments: a/s
IO/TONIC:WFD/cmm
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

31 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: NCFE Cooperation with CIA

The cooperation of NCFE in certain matters should be brought to your attention.

1. In aiding the Agency to take advantage of the Slansky trials, NCFE: (a) has made available complete monitoring of the trial; (b) is translating into Hungarian, Polish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian, transcripts of the trial; and, (c) is sending us complete extracts of the Iron Curtain press dealing with the trial. All of this has been, or is being done with great speed. NCFE is making a major project out of the Slansky trials and will distribute a pamphlet on the subject in the satellite languages to its extensive overseas mailing lists.

2. NCFE is relasing to the press and carrying on its broadcast the substance of incoming cable 2166 dated 17 December from Vienna, on Vienna Peace Conference.

3. Inaddition, NCFE has done some specific research for us with skill and great speed.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TOMIC: WPD/hka
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

P.6450

[illegible]
[illegible]

Chief, Cover Division, Plans/PI

19 December 1952

Chief, Contact Division, OO

HH-591

Crusade for Freedom

The attached extract from the 12 December 1952 issue of Fifth Army's Domestic Intelligence Report is forwarded as being of possible interest to your office.

Encl: 1

E. M. ASHCRAFT

CONFIDENTIAL 726
SECURITY INFORMATION

"An S. CHEN approached the Head of t Notre Dame versity Security Section, and uested a list of all Chinese nationals attending the University. Chen represented himself as a member of the STUDENTS RELATIONS SECTION, COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA, INC., 105 Market Street, San Francisco, California. CHEN stated that his reason for requesting such a list was that his organization was active in promoting better relations between Chinese nationals attending colleges and universities in the United States and the American people. Notre Dame received for a second time a pamphlet from the COMMITTEE FOR A FREE ASIA entitled, 'Asia in the World Today'. Officials at Notre Dame have also been contacted by the NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, 110 West 57th Street, New York 19, New York. This organization requested a list of all foreign instructors and students presently instructing or attending courses at the University. A business card attached to a pamphlet revealed the following information: Miss Ellen M. STUDELY, 1223 East 57th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois, Chinese Student and Alumni Service, Chicago Area, COMMITTEE ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG FOREIGN STUDENTS, 29 Broadway, New York 7, New York. There is no information in G-2 files this Headquarters relative to STUDELY or CHEN."

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

DDP 1689

16 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Edward W. Barrett and NCFE

REFERENCE: Your Note Dated 11 December 1952

I'm informed by Admiral Miller that the matter of Edward W. Barrett joining NCFE as a director, was discussed at an Executive Committee meeting a month ago.

No formal decision was made because of considerable opposition so the matter has been tabled.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

15 December 1952

Dear Archie:

I much enjoyed our chance for a talk, and Bill Durkee, who assists me in the subject we discussed, is tremendously enthusiastic, as I am, about the possibility that you will consider favorably the appointment Frank mentioned.

Let me state again what seems to me most important in the facts under discussion. The job is of national and world-wide importance. It can help achieve greatness. It can endanger us all. It requires a man of imagination and ideas but also a man of deep and thoughtful responsibility to discharge it well.

I should like you to consider that I am at your service at any time to give you any facts you would like to have or any opinions for that matter. All of us here consider that we would be greatly privileged to be able to help you if you undertook the job.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Mr. Archibald Alexander
1430 - 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO

NO. 3-5308

DATE 11 December 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. DDCI			12/11		EYES ONLY Mr Braden How much more does he want? I agree that we should do everything possible to get a strict accounting. This is a serious matter.
2. CIO	Mr Braden			TWB	
3. Durkee				WPD	
4.					
5. C/IO for file					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
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13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

July 8,1952

Note: Nelson please deliver this to Allen.

To: Allen Dulles

You recently asked me for our views on Yugoslavia. The enclosed memorandum is a consensus formed from all of our key staff members. It also meets with the approval of John Hughes. I think this is a fair statement of what we are doing to date and what our views are. I hope this will be of some use to you.

Leonard

Enclosure

July 2, [illegible]

MEMORANDUM

The National Committee for a Free Europe's policy in respect to Yugoslavia and Yugoslav exile activities may be summarized in the following statements.

1. The Committee does not now, nor does it plan to interfere, by radio or otherwise, with the domestic affairs of the Yugoslav people or of the Titoist regime.

2. In so far as our anti-Stalinist aims and activities coincide, we see no reason to obstruct such functional and mutually beneficial arrangements as may from time to time present themselves. Specifically, we have no objection to exchanging with Radio Belgrade certain types of radio materials in respect to the countries under Soviet domination which might enhance the effectiveness of our radio programs or otherwise aid the work of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. As an anti-Communist organization dedicated to the concepts of democracy and of individual freedom we feel it is entirely consistent and proper to extend aid to democratic Yugoslavs exiled from their homelands, within the budgetary and other limitations under which we operate. To this end a total of some 69 Yugoslavs are retained by the Committee and engaged in five types of work.

a) In Radio Free Europe, which has no Yugoslav desk, 13 Yugoslavs have been engaged as information analysts, program advisors and translators because of their technical abilities.

b) In the Mid-European Studies Center 31 Yugoslavs are engaged in research projects connected with the East European Enquiry, the Law Project and the East European Accessions List, and include 7 scholarship students.

c) In the Research & Publications Service 9 Yugoslavs are engaged in analysis of the Yugoslav press and other sources of information and in the publication of factual, non-propagandistic studies and bulletins designed to keep the emigration and interested Americans informed on domestic events.

d) The Free Europe University in Exile has selected 13 Yugoslav students on the same basis of individual merit as students from the other European Communist nations have been granted scholarships to study at Strasbourg.

e) Finally, the National Councils Division gives financial aid to three formerly prominent Yugoslavs in recognition of their past services to the cause of democracy.

In conclusion, the number of Yugoslavs thus supported by the Committee's various divisions represents [illegible].6% of the total exile staff.

SSW/bvb

Sent to State Dept. 28 July 1952

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible] 1671

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I would like to call DD/P's attention to this unsolicited memorandum. It is additional evidence for my own observation made to him orally that the work of backstopping NCFE is being carried forward in a manner which at least attempts to meet the challenge of servicing the entire Agency in those aspects of NCFE work which can be useful to the various Divisions of the Agency.

2. As he is aware, NCFE conducts an enormous amount of research and other activity. I believe we can now say with some certainty that this record is being put to use by Washington.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Memo from DC/O,SI dtd 26 Nov. 52

SECRET
Security Information

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Security Information

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, PP/IOD

DATE: 26 November 1952

FROM : Deputy Chief, Operations Staff, O/SI

SUBJECT: Fulfillment of Requirement RDA-3345

1. This offices wishes to express its appreciation for the excellent cooperation provided by your TONIC Branch in connection with our requirement RDA-3345 concerning higher education in Poland.

2. The material which we received met our need precisely and enabled us to close out this requirement.

Hayden Channing
HAYDEN CHANNING

CSI/JBQuigley:bm

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1 - Chief, SRD (W. Platt)

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3-5794

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: University of the Saar

1. The University of the Saar was created on 8 March 1947. It has four facilities -- two in Saarbrucken (Letters and Law) and two in Hombourg (Medicine and Science). Faculty members are French, German, Swiss, British and Saarois.

2. A number of "institutes" exist with undefined relations to the University though financed, as is the rest of the University, by the French Government, and include a special institute for interpreters, an institute for economic science, and a European Institute. The support of the French Government of this University, aside from its merits, is part of the French attempt to Europeanize the Saar.

3. The European Institute, devoted to European unity, is a recent creation and is largely the result of the promotions of former Deputy, Andre Philip. It was the European Institute to which the Herald Tribune article specifically refers.

4. The University participated extensively, especially the European Institute, in the European Youth Campaign. Some of the specific activities were as follows:

> March 1952: The Campaign cooperated with the International Institute of the University of Sarrebruck in arranging a meeting of young professors in the Saar and another meeting of youth leaders, both to discuss European problems. Films were supplied by the Campaign for both these meetings.
>
> By the end of April, 25 youth organizations (practically all) in the Saar were associated with the Campaign. During April, May, and June an extensive program of discussion groups was arranged in the secondary schools throughout the Saar. These groups were sponsored jointly by the Campaign and the youth groups of the Saar. The groups discussed all phases of the unity question but concentrated particularly on the Schuman

Plan due to the economic position of the Saar in this matter. Films and publications of the Campaign were used in the discussions. 7000 students participated.

During June 1952, in cooperation with the Campaign, students and professors of the International Institute formed a committee along with youth leaders to discuss the particular problems of the Saar in a United Europe.

On March 27, 1952 the Campaign held a large study group in cooperation with the European Institute of the University of the Saar. Students attended from Aix, Hambourg, Oxford, Tubingen, Leyden, Nancy, Berlin and Paris. Lecturers were provided by the Campaign.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1235

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the _New York Herald Tribune_ there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.

2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

FGW
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr. Dulin)
C/EE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1[illegible]35

10 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : University of the Saar

1. In the Sunday November 9 issue of the New York Herald Tribune there was a rather full and very interesting account of the purposes and objectives of the University of the Saar, which I am anxious for the addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum to read. The writer of the piece has evidently been much impressed with the efforts of this institution in the field of advancing European unity, and if the account which he gives is an accurate one, it seems to me that we should (a) know more about this and (b) give consideration to providing some support for it if it is good. It might even prove to be the case that this is a better and more deserving show than some of the activities which we are currently supporting having similar objectives. I think we are generally agreed that it is better to get in behind and give support and encouragement to a movement which has demonstrated the ability to stand on its own feet than to try to create and sustain an activity which would not exist but for our own contributions.

2. I should appreciate receiving from you in due course your estimate of the significance of this activity, etc.

/s/
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/WE (Attention: Mr. Dulin)
C/EE

Executive Registry
3.5282

SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Call by Spencer Phenix on DDCI

1. Spencer Phenix will call upon the DDCI Friday for the purpose of taking up with him certain questions among which are the following:

a. A gymnasium for the Strasbourg University. The history of the gymnasium request is as follows:

> On 8 August 1952, at a meeting of the PRC, NCFE proposed capital expenditures of $377,500 for the Free University in Exile. This amount was placed in a reserve fund along with other requested budget items. It was agreed that funds held in this reserve could be released to NCFE by the DD/P in conjunction with the DD/A if in their judgment the submission of further data justified such expenditures.
>
> On 17 September 1952, Spencer Phenix, for NCFE, made a request for $47,000 to be released from the CIA-held reserve for the construction of a gymnasium at the Free University.
>
> This request was rejected by the DD/P. He said he would reconsider the request if further data supported it.
>
> On 8 October 1952, Mr. Phenix made another request supplying further data. This time the request was reduced to $43,500. This request was also rejected by the DD/P.

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In view of PRC action as indicated in preceding paragraph it would appear to be Mr. Phenix who is confused. I feel that is an unjustified and suggest that it is an unwarranted extravagance. I would have it reviewed by higher authority. FGW

By memorandum of 5 December 1952, Mr. Phenix refers to the fact that the trustees have given formal approval to the establishment of a gymnasium and that his understanding of the reserve fund is that when the Board of Directors of NCFE ask for the money, they receive it at once. He says that there appears to be some misunderstanding of this procedure, pointing out that the locus of misunderstanding "is in and around Frank W's office."

b. The Turkish Broadcasting Station. Mr. Phenix intends to raise this question as a basic policy matter, he having been informed by us that while there is great enthusiasm for the project and while the State Department has set January 15th as the date by which VOA must either secure agreement from the Turkish Government or withdraw itself from consideration, the basic policy question of whether RFE then moves in has not been definitively settled. Mr. Phenix would like to know definitely now whether, contingent upon the failure of the Voice to gain entry to Turkey, NCFE can proceed with the building of a Turkish station. This item, which will probably be in the neighborhood of five million dollars, was presented at the PRC meeting, at which time it was agreed it would be considered as a separate project at a later date.

Certainly Not in the face of Turkish Government's disapproval.

c. The Slansky Trial. Mr. Phenix is worried about the statements in the Slansky trial indicating use of RFE by the United States Government to send operational messages. We have told him that this secret arrangement was made with RFE by CIA men in the field. No approval of Headquarters was ever requested. Corrective steps have been taken in the FE Division to insure that action which may compromise operational facilities does not occur again without prior consultation with and approval of top authority of NCFE and CIA.

If there is anything to this - it should be flatly denied.

d. Barbara Bowen. Mr. Phenix is concerned about a little girl who works in the Munich office, who through some mischance of several years standing is still on the roles of this Agency and draws retirement pay, although her salary is paid by NCFE. Phenix regards this as a penetration though in fact Miss Bowen is a valued employee of NCFE and has no contact with anyone from CIA. We are trying to regularize the situation by affording her the opportunity of resigning from the Agency or resigning from NCFE.

e. Second Installation for Strasbourg University. The trustees of the Free University in Exile have voted to create a German-speaking free university in exile, probably to be located in the Saar. Phenix reports in his memorandum of December 5th that the DDCI has given Royal Tyler assurance regarding this extension.

N.B. There is already being a free University in the Saar! Let us not rush into something new of our own without first learning all about what is now there - and determining whether we might not help out with the existing effort rather than attempt to create something entirely new. FGW

Mr. Phenix requests assurance that if Mr. Royal Tyler approaches French authorities at the Saar to create such a university and is granted permission, the Agency will supply the funds. No formal request has been made and this project of course has not been budgeted.

f. Names of pensioned Army and Navy Officers. In compliance with DD/P Notice No. 20-6 issued on 27 October, we have asked Mr. Phenix to furnish the names of pensioned Army and Navy officers employed by NCFE. Mr. Phenix is concerned about the legal ramifications of this step, stating his fear that what this order implies for him is that the monies he dispenses as Treasurer are government funds. He has been assured by us that the purpose of the Agency-wide request is to inventory those who are receiving Navy and Army pensions and serving in proprietary organizations. He has also been assured that Army and Navy pensioners in his organization will be exempt from any action taken by the Agency on the problem of double pay. He is quite naturally worried about it.

2. The Philosophy of Spencer Phenix. In arguing his case on the above questions, and others, Phenix brings to his support the argument that he is not dispensing government funds. He says that once government funds reach the 1848 Foundation they become private funds. This is no mere self-delusion for the sake of maintaining a position before his conscience. Because from this conviction he proceeds to argue:

a. that the Agency cannot ask him to furnish such names as suggested above, or lists and records of any kind.

b. that the Agency has no right to query the decisions of the staff and directors as to the expenditure of funds once released by the Agency.

c. that the Agency has no right to intervene in NCFE affairs or to issue guidance or instructions after funds have been passed. Phenix modifies this point by volunteering that the Directors are always glad to receive advice from friends such as DDCI.

3. Spencer Phenix is a good man at his job and I understand the futility of arguing principle rather than cases. Nevertheless, the Phenix philosophy, argued as it is to the staff and directors of NCFE, and stated to us whenever possible -- frequently without relation to the facts under discussion -- often untempered by good humor, is beginning to try the souls of other good men.

There is neither time here nor space for me to comment adequately on these points, and all that I can say is that if S.P. holds these views he is in conflict with Ⓤ and other people on our staff, and Ⓤ is in violation of the express understanding arrived at in [illegible] with all the trustees in 1949. All agreed at that time that the ultimate responsibility lies with D.C.I. [illegible]

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

3-527

Mr Wisner

December 2, 19[illegible]

Dear Allen,

When we were talking on the telephone last week you suggested that Alexander might possibly be interested in the N.C.F.E. and that he might be worth considering as President to succeed Min Miller. As you requested, I have not mentioned his name to anyone as yet and will not do so until I hear further from you. As I understand it, you are going to be talking to him some time this week and hope to ascertain then whether he himself would have some interest in this job. Whenever you do get any further information on this please let me know.

Meantime, a number of other names have been suggested and we will give them careful consideration. Naturally we will discuss them with you before taking any definite action.

Regards,

TWB

December 1, 1952

Dear Hedwood,

The enclosed documents may be of interest to you and are sent to you for information.

Sincerely yours,

Whiting

DEC 1952

C O P Y

October 31, 1952

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew
2840 Woodland Drive, N.W.
Washington 8, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

Attached herewith you will find a most interesting summary of the methods that have been adopted by the USSR to attract the minds of youth in the satellite states.

It has long been known that some such program was being followed, but it is only recently that detail has become available.

In contrast to these methods, efforts expended in this country to teach our young people the real meaning of freedom as represented by western democracy are feeble. It is almost safe to state that we have been relying solely on an innate, sentimental aversion to "communism", because no intelligent or systematic means have as yet been organized that will capture the minds of the young people of the United States in the same fervent manner that the communist ideology has taken hold of Russian youth.

For a little more than a year, in connection with the reorganization of the research activities of the Division of Intellectual Cooperation we have been attempting to enlist the help of American intellectuals — not the intelligentsia. There is a difference.

From the very beginning I have been amazed to discover the dearth of people who are familiar with that section of Europe which engages NCFE interest — the belt of countries extending from the Baltic to the Aegean. I was curious to find out why there were so few upon whom we could draw for help, so I started an inquiry. The results are now being compiled.

We must remember that the teaching of history or of government in America has never been emphasized to the same degree that it has in Europe. The curricula of the secondary schools in that part of the world cover those subjects much more comprehensively than is the case with us. It was difficult for me to appreciate this at first, but our inquiry has verified it without any doubt. In practically all European countries now on either side of the Iron Curtain it has long been traditional to emphasize instruction in history, because the tides of war and change have ebbed and flowed across their lands for many centuries. We have been isolated and in most respects free from foreign influences as we have developed our democratic processes. Today American foreign policy faces grave issues, and in one part of the world it is deeply concerned with the very section of Europe about which all NCFE activities revolve. Yet the American public is practically illiterate respecting this area, both its past and its present. I know whereof I speak as a result of the inquiry above referred to. When it is completed I am inclined to think the results will be startling, particularly if we bear in mind that the issues at stake must be settled; that they are a concern to this country; and that our people are practically uninformed. They know little if anything about the historical significance behind what has occurred or will occur as the next few decades unfold because they have had no opportunity to learn the historic significance of it all.

In this country today there are approximately 800 colleges and universities offering four year courses of study leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree. This figure does not include the 575 junior colleges which usually conduct non-degree-granting programs two years in length — approximately the first two years of the traditional four year program. As far as our inquiry has gone it is already apparent that there are only several dozen institutions in the former group which offer instruction in this area, and very few in the latter. Most of those which do cover this area are the larger universities where the courses are really graduate in character and thus elective. In many instances brief coverage is supplied in survey courses, but even these can not and do not develop the attention that historically this part of the world now deserves. When this survey is completed a comprehensive report of the findings will be made. It will refer to colleges included in a list compiled by the American Council on Education which is the overall representative organization in this country for higher education.

I am calling the attention of the Directors to this situation because it seems to me we must realize that the American public not only does not know what we are doing, but actually can not understand the significance of why we are trying to do it. Generation after generation has grown up in America illiterate about the outside world. What we are discovering concerning the lack of knowledge of this area will of course prove true of other parts of the globe such as the Far East or South Africa.

In our Division we feel this particularly strongly because we are dependent on help from the academic world. The plain fact is more and more evident that we can not rely on American higher education as a prolific source of assistance. The relatively few individuals who have studied this region, and who are therefore qualified to aid us in our efforts, are either too overburdened with demands made on their time because they are qualified, or they are too young and inexperienced to be relied on in an enterprise as delicate as the one which we are conducting.

There are signs that in some academic localities interest in this field is developing. However, we can not wait for another generation to emerge even though, under whatever auspices, a program of training could be implemented to correct the situation. The important question is what can we do about it and what shall we do.

As already stated, the inquiry above mentioned grew out of our attempts to discover people in American higher education who are qualified to help us. We suspected they were not numerous, but we are amazed at the small number. We shall continue to try to persuade them to help us, but that well has begun to run dry already.

Can those associated with us do anything to emphasize this situation strongly enough in some quarters so that something will be attempted to correct it? Obviously this is not a problem that falls within the scope of NCFE; the problem concerns all colleges, universities, secondary schools and the enormous field designated as adult education. Responsibility may even rest with the government itself.

I shall appreciate your suggestions, and will send you the final report of this survey when completed.

Sincerely yours,

Levering Tyson

Enclosure:
"Youth in the Soviet Satellite States"

10 July 1952

1. At the last Project Review Committee meeting on NCFE, you asked that the State Department be consulted on policy in respect to National Councils. A review by State has begun. Meantime, however, for your information and in order to enable you to answer questions which may be raised by Messrs. Dolbeare or Miller, I want to explain to you how the IO Division is presently handling exile affairs.

2. The difficulty in this matter arises largely from the fact that three organizations are doing the job. State has apparently found it necessary to deal directly with exiles. CIA area divisions, EE and SE, also deal directly with exiles for area purposes. NCFE hands out the money and tries to keep them together in National Councils. Out of this triple play a large degree of bad feeling and mistrust has arisen between CIA and State on the one hand and NCFE on the other. State, including Wally Barbour, and the area divisions of CIA accuse NCFE of playing personal petty favorites and of not keeping us informed. On the other hand, cooperation of State and CIA with NCFE in giving positive continuing guidance in their efforts has not been forthcoming. In the past no coordinated attempt has been made to give NCFE high-level over-all policy direction. Relations have been personal, casual, uncoordinated, and sometimes confusing.

3. We have taken the following action to try to insure orderly efforts to fuse or coordinate the various exile activities conducted by the three organizations:

a. This division has asked the concerned area divisions to initiate plans for reorganization and unification of each national council. The resultant paper is then coordinated with the proper authorities in State and a final line is agreed upon.

b. This plan is then communicated to NCFE and the organization is asked for comments, criticisms and suggestions.

c. After such are made or agreed upon, the paper becomes the policy directive which charts NCFE's course of action.

d. NCFE then informs this division of progress being made and supposedly requests authority to depart from such completed policy papers.

To date two such policy directives have been written. The first was a plan for the reorganization of the Rumanian National Council. It was submitted to NCFE, and their criticisms and suggestions have been incorporated. The plan is now being executed.

The second was a similar State Department-CIA paper on the reorganization of the Bulgarian National Committee. This will be submitted to NCFE on Thursday, 10 July, and a similar course of action will be followed.

4. I realize that this will seem to you as a somewhat simple and obvious way of insuring coordination, but the fact is that it had never been done before. I hope that it results in as few flaps as possible and as few occasions when people are running off in all directions.

5. A current case where people are running off in all directions is the Polish situation. This broke at the very time we were beginning work on a coordinated CIA-State-NCFE paper. NCFE has been operating upon the assumption that if a Polish National Council is to be formed, all groups are to be represented. Unknown to NCFE, and in fact to me, EE Division has been making attempts to unify two of the three main groups by holding conversations with representatives in London. There are a good many charges and counter-charges flying about at present on this situation. The man abroad is saying he had informed NCFE of what he intended to do, and people in NCFE say he hadn't. We are trying to straighten it out, but the situation is illustrative of how the plan above outlined can prevent such flaps.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Robert Lang with Officials of CIA

REFERENCE: EYES ONLY Memorandum to C/P from Richard Helms, Acting Chief, Operations, DD/P, dated 25 Nov. 1952

1. After consultation with Mr. Durkee, I would like to make the following comments on Mr. Helms' memorandum. Mr. Helms is correct that Mr. Lang has had difficulty in dealing with CIA. Mr. Helms is also correct if he understood that this state of affairs is the responsibility of Admiral Miller. (To Admiral Miller's responsibility must be added that of Spencer Phenix, Vice-President and Treasurer.)

2. Within and outside NCFE, Admiral Miller's dealings with Mr. Lang are based on two attitudes:

a. Miller's desire to have control of his organisation by having everything channeled through him; and

b. Miller's desire to maintain an autonomous organization which will accept over-all policy guidance from the highest levels of the government, but which will not allow either domination by, or close contact with, CIA in order to discuss that organisation's problems or to be informed of its vehemently disordered activities.

In this connection, a statement by Admiral Miller in a letter to Mr. Alan Valentine, until recently President of the Committee for Free Asia, is of interest:

1 August 1952

"It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

"For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape."

. . .

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

This letter was written at a time when the IO Division had achieved for CIA its first detailed budget from NCFE and was further asking a mutuality of relations between NCFE and CIA, ultimately defined in Memorandum of Understanding, dated 24 September, signed by H. B. Miller and Allen W. Dulles. It proves what at the time we only suspected, that Miller was calling on support from Valentine against CIA.

3. Mr. Phenix and Lang resent Admiral Miller's tendency for tight administration. Both have carried on a campaign within NCFE to discredit Miller. However, Mr. Phenix, perhaps Lang, and almost all of the responsible officials of NCFE back Miller in his attitude towards CIA. For example, despite repeated requests by IO/P and as recently as three weeks ago by DDCI personally, Miller has refused to turn over to CIA a list of NCFE employees. Even a request by DDCI to John Hughes has failed to produce this list.

In addition, Mr. Phenix acts as the German expert in NCFE, cutting out Lang. Phenix alone has negotiated and dealt with German high officials on RFE's position in Germany. Mr. Lang and Mr. Phenix have fundamental disputes about how RFE's German problems should be handled. Part of Mr. Lang's desire for personal talks with officials of the Department of State grows out of his wish to get backing for his position.

4. In a sense, RFE is the last NCFE bastion to be scaled. Mr. Lang's statement that he has received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise from this organization is largely a play on words. Mr. Lang has not sought the guidance of members of his own organization, much less the guidance of CIA. When the IO Division took over responsibility for NCFE, the CIA intelligence support unit, which supplied RFE information and guidance, was abolished on Mr. Lang's advice that such information and guidance were no longer necessary. RFE broadcasting policy is set down in a handbook which has been thoroughly examined and accepted by CIA and from time to time specific guidance has been given to RFE. RFE accepts any materials and guidance as suggestions, not orders. We believe Lang is getting all the guidance there is to give, and that he is looking for the kind of high policy forecasting which does not exist.

5. These are the political facts of life for the IO Division, and indeed for CIA. The IO Division has attempted to deal with this situation by: (1) winning the confidence of the Directors and Division heads of NCFE, and (2) maintaining friendly personal relationship with both Admiral Miller and Mr. Spencer Phenix. Much progress has been made in gaining knowledge of, and control over, the activities of NCFE.

Aside from friendly dealings, our specific concept of gaining control over NCFE as a whole, has been to push and encourage the thought that NCFE should be operated as a whole. The present separation and uncoordinated activities of divisions, especially RFE, while perhaps necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCFE has done, is doing, and should do in the future. Our efforts are beginning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NCFE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany -- unfortunate as they are -- have been helpful, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Lang, that re-thinking of objectives and techniques based on cooperative effort by NCFE and CIA as a whole is vital if the organization is to do its job effectively.

6. To reformulate our own and NCFE's ideas, the IO Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department has been a direct participant. The IO Division has also been exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.

7. These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

a. What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?

b. How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the Free World? For example: How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?

c. Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?

d. How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?

e. Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?

f. How the formidable research and information resources of NCFE can securely be used by CIA?

g. How can NCFE be geared more closely to the activities and needs of CIA?

h. Analysis of Radio Free Europe's effectiveness, programming, political position in Germany, how RFE can be used to support CIA operations specifically, alternate broadcasting sites for RFE etc.

i. How can CIA give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

7. These are some of the topics being discussed. In a few weeks the time will come in my opinion when the main outlines of this common thought will be sufficiently clear so that the working officials of NCFE, including Mr. Lang, should meet with officials of CIA and the Department of State for two main purposes:

a. A briefing on U.S. policy toward CIA operations behind the Iron Curtain so that these officials will see clearly the way in which they are expected to fit into total U.S. efforts, and the manner in which they should operate.

b. Analyze and contribute, in some detail, to the main lines of thought developed in order to arrive at comprehensive working policy for NCFE, and detailed methods of its cooperation with CIA.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that Mr. Lang does not, at this time, come down to meet the CIA officials as suggested by Mr. Helms but that Mr. Lang's visit be a part of the IO Division's over-all effort to gain working control over NCFE as briefly outlined above.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO:TONIC:WPD/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P
~~1 cc - CPP~~
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

Bill — Are we answering this? They are writing memo. EN

Orig given Ellenstein 1 Dec

Security Information

NOV 26 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation

REFERENCE: Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation, dated 12 September 1952

1. The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumanian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.

2. The most urgent problem, the one most likely to nullify the recent efforts and cause further difficulties, is that of General Radescu. The problem is to find a position which the General will consider sufficiently important for him and which we will consider sufficiently innocuous to ensure that he cannot interfere with the Committee. A majority of the refugees are in accord on the necessity for placing limitations of activity on the General. For operational reasons, we require such limitations. The existing good relations between the NCFE and the General should be utilised to persuade the General that a passive, honorary position is the only way to guard his health for, by implication, later action. He must be made to realise that he is not being shelved but is being saved. If he cannot be prevailed on to adopt this attitude, he will have to be told with complete frankness that his obstructionism cannot be tolerated, that he will have to remain passive outside, rather than within, the new organisation or risk losing the assistance he now receives. The first method is the more desirable, and it is suggested that the General's secretary, Barbu Niculescu, be informed of the NCFE's intention and warned of the latter step if his cooperation is not obtained in expediting the General's acceptance of a passive role. Niculescu should be dealt with quite frankly and informed of the consequences, to him as well as to the General, if he does not cooperate.

3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not been discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The importance of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, should not be underestimated. The working commissions proposed by Visoianu (European Federation Movement, PW, publications, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Committee has no need, nor we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strong among the younger refugees, i.e. those of potential operational value, is evidenced by the number who have affiliated with the Iron Guard, other fanatic organizations, student, and professional groups. Membership should be open to large numbers of refugees (exclusive of hard-core Iron Guards, Communists, criminals, etc.), and should be manifested by membership cards. To strengthen the sense of participation small annual dues could be required or subscription to the Committee newspaper (which would be subsidized so that subscription cost would not be excessive). The formation of this Council is considered particularly worthwhile since it offers a way to draw worthy refugees from less desirable organisations and to develop their usefulness for the future.

4. With respect to the secret fund in the possession of Mr. Cretzianu of the Rumanian National Committee, we do not consider that an issue should be made of the disbursing and control of this money. Both Visoianu and Cretzianu have agreed to account for the funds and to auditing of the books. It is possible that a finance committee, consisting of Cretzianu and one or two others, will be appointed in the new organisation to handle the subsidies and to audit the secret fund.

5. Reports that Gafencu has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several sources. As Mr. Bolbeare is in Europe and is a friend of Gafencu's, it is suggested that he attempt to obtain again Gafencu's cooperation with the current negotiations.

6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech Defector

REFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable from Frankfort #813

1. I am sure Bob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.

2. These are the facts:

a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".

b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe -- policy which governs all of their broadcasts.

c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.

3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early hope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed force.

4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problem he raises.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Special Guidance
dtd 2 Sept. 52

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CIO:WPD-TWB/eh 1 cc - IO/TONIC
Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

EYES ONLY 25 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & P

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang

1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europe. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the NCFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFE operations. Lang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintance as an individual of ability, judgment, and energy.

2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside NCFE is virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has expended considerable effort in the past seeing to it that an iron curtain is kept between RFE and the top command of NCFE. He said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowhere and would still be frustrated by what he kept referring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the views of DeWitt Poole, Fred Dolbeare, and others. He then pointed out that he had received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also he claimed to suffer from lack of contact with us. He stated that when he saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far as Mr. Braden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Admiral Miller and his immediate staff. It was clear that he would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feels inhibited by the fact that he has to cajole Admiral Miller into permission to come to Washington. He cited as evidence an incident recently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercede with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down here for consultation.

3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in Mr. Lang's remarks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be what they may.

4. I told him that I would discuss with you the wisdom of having him come down here for a day some time in the next week or so

in order to spend a couple of hours around a table with Tracy Barnes, Al Ulmer, Eric Timm, and other appropriate individuals, at which session he would have an opportunity to set forth his problems and invite whatever assistance we as an organization can provide.

5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Braden for the purpose of passing on DD/P's reactions to my suggestion.

Richard Helms
Acting Chief, Operations, DDP

cc: Chief, IO

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DD/P 1387

24 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organisations Division

SUBJECT : Dr. J. H. Retinger

1. Please note and return to Mr. Dulles the attached letter from Dr. J. H. Retinger who has asked Mr. Dulles for an appointment during his visit in Washington between November 25 and 28. You will also note that Mr. Dulles does not propose to answer the letter nor (presumably) to grant the appointment. I am not sure whether you are familiar with the background on Retinger including our past difficulties with him. If you are not, I think it is important for you to have a look at the files which include numerous items of derogatory information concerning Retinger and his declared hostility toward the National Committee for Free Europe. We went to the mat with our British friends in what I believe proved to be a successful effort to have Retinger removed from the key position which he held on the so-called McMillan Committee. (You are aware of the fact that the British Service is now working with the McMillan Committee and in support of it.)

2. Retinger's position as Secretary General of the European Movement -- as evidenced by the letterhead -- is probably known to you. Because of our interest in this activity, it is important for you and the appropriate members of your staff to be fully on notice of Retinger's connection and past performance. I could not be very enthusiastic about or too hopeful for the production of genuinely constructive results -- in keeping with policies of the United States Government -- of any organization of which Retinger would be the Secretary General. To the extent that his loyalties can be determined, it is clear that they do not run toward the United States.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to DDCI from Dr. Retinger
dated 15 November 1952.

cc: DDCI
C/PP

SECRET
Security Information

DP 1321.

21 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT : Leland Stowe; I&S Approval of NCFE Request.

1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with Colonel Edwards, Chief of I&S, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request that we give our authorization and approval to the use of Mr. Stowe for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to RFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis as was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.

2. In discussing this matter with Colonel Edwards I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that Stowe is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, most notably Russell Hill, into the effort, and who has no serious security raps against him. (He is not regarded as a loyalty or security risk but rather as a source of possible embarrassment in view of certain earlier writings of his.) Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to Colonel Edwards the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning Stowe and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. Colonel Edwards approved from a security standpoint the continuation of Mr. Stowe as a consultant to RFE for a further period of six months.

3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.

FGW
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/PP

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Security Information

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT
NCFE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.
BRITISH

4. DATE
Nov. 1952

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS-98 1191

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

NOV 21 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cover Division
Thru: FI Plans

SUBJECT: NCFE Employment of Mr. Brutus Coste

1. This is to advise you that, due to delay in our operations, the NCFE has been requested to provide interim employment for Mr. Brutus Coste.

2. We have been informed that the NCFE/MESC has offered Mr. Coste a contract for the preparation of a study on integration of the Rumanian with the Soviet economy. However, in view of Subject's knowledge of the refugee political situation and interest in propaganda measures, a position utilizing this background would be more advantageous to the NCFE and this Division than the proposed economic study.

3. It is requested that the proposed employment of Subject be discussed with the NCFE and that we be informed of the action taken. This Division is prepared to reimburse the NCFE for Subject's salary if such is desired. It is understood that Subject will continue, during the period of NCFE employment, to perform for this Division certain assignments which will not interfere with his NCFE work.

4. Your approval of the proposal for such employment is requested.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SE-5/MCNewsom/kp (19 Nov. 1952)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI
2 - SE-5
1 - IO

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] 1306

Executive Registry
3-4257

13 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Conversation with Mr. Jan Nowak

1. At your request, I had a conversation today with Mr. Jan Nowak, head of the Polish radio desk of RFE in Munich. I am sorry that you did not get to see him. Our conversation reminded me that our work is terribly important, which is a nice reminder on a busy afternoon.

2. I say "important" because Nowak reviewed with me the letters he had received from listeners in Poland and these, together with his own enormous enthusiasm for the work he is doing, reminded me that our long days in Washington have an effect on the lives and hopes of people far away. Nowak, who was in the Polish resistance during the war and who on one of his three escapes from Poland at one time spent several weeks in Switzerland where he had made contact with your representatives, later worked for the BBC and he pointed out that at no time during the war was he given to feel by the BBC the sense of responsibility and mission which he feels in his job in RFE. He said he was told when he was brought to RFE that the responsibility for the programs was his and that if at any time programs went on the air which were irresponsible, then he would lose his job. He says that when he has questions which he thinks might influence United States policy, he confers beforehand with Griffith and the Americans in Munich, and sometimes arguments ensue, but he feels, and I am certain he feels sincerely, that he has an equal share with Americans in a great effort to carry the truth back home.

3. I say "terribly" important because Nowak, like other exiles, wonders out loud how long our work can continue to have an impact. He is himself convinced that every Polish soldier is a potential ally of the West but he wonders, and makes his listener wonder, how long we can expect this sympathy among a rising generation for which the past is inexorably fading.

4. Nowak made one point which I am sure he intended for your ears, that he was afraid that "certain people in Germany" who had contacts into Poland might lead his friends behind the Curtain to

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SECURITY INFORMATION

betray themselves unnecessarily and tragically. He said that he had heard that these people had promoted behind the Curtain a whispering campaign among the Poles at the time of the recent elections to the effect that the elections were to be postponed. He seemed to think this an unnecessary risk for those who took part in it. He also said that he had been approached by these same people who asked him to urge the Poles by broadcast to cross out the names of the Communist candidates when they voted. He learned only later, he said, that the system of voting at the last election was such that in order to cross out candidates it was necessary to step out of the ballot box and do it in the open before witnesses. He had in any event refused such suggestions. I got the impression that he feels some of our people are a little immature.

5. I liked him. As I say, seeing him made me proud of what we are doing.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

NOV 4 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: DD/P's Memorandum to you 30 October 1952 entitled, "National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and Related Matters"

1. You will be interested to know, I am sure, that Mr. Wisner's friend, Mr. Georgescu, has recently been most helpful. Through his efforts and the cooperation of Jim Pekich of SE European Division, I believe that NCFE is on the threshold of a unified Rumanian National Council.

2. I'm in entire agreement also with Mr. Georgescu's observation on the personnel set-up within NCFE. As you know, Mr. Dolbeare is concerned about his role. He is the first to admit that his strength is ebbing, and that he should retire. I think it must be agreed also that Mr. Dolbeare has done a splendid job, a job that would have been, and will still be, difficult for a man in the prime of life.

I have discussed this problem in confidence with Francis B. Stevens. As a result of my inquiries about a possible successor to Mr. Dolbeare, Mr. Stevens suggests that Mr. Nathaniel Penistone Davis is a person eminently qualified to do this job. I would be interested in knowing whether Mr. Wisner knows this man.

3. I believe also, Mr. Georgescu's misgivings about Mr. Yarrow are well-founded. In the last two months, Mr. Yarrow has taken an increasingly prominent position in Mr. Dolbeare's Division, as a result of Mr. Dolbeare's physical inability to do a full time job. Mr. Yarrow is blunt, and inclined to be dictatorial. He has a predilection for direct action in situations that rightly call for finesse and careful development. For these reasons, in addition to the fact that he is of Russian extraction and speaks with a heavy accent, I am convinced that he should not replace Mr. Dolbeare. In my opinion, under the right leadership, Mr. Yarrow could continue to make a valuable contribution to NCFE's dealings with emigres as an administrator.

I believe that such a solution is politically possible, for NCFE in this phase of its activities is going through a period of groping and painful reorientation. I hope that the start we have made in working out a re-statement and a re-direction of activities within Division of Emigre Relations will provide a program of positive projects which will supply ammunition for psychological warfare, both behind the Iron Curtain and in the Free World. Such a program will call for an efficient administrator versed in exile affairs -- a position for which Mr. Yarrow is well qualified. Under the political leadership of a person of Mr. Davis' caliber, for direct dealings with emigres, I feel that the Division of Emigre Relations will be able to clear up present inefficiencies and contribute effectively to NCFE's over-all mission.

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WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P 1110

30 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe, RFE, and related matters.

1. This memorandum is to inform you of a number of items which have recently come to my attention and to which I think you should give consideration and take necessary action. V. C. (Nica) Georgescu, who is an old friend and a very helpful consultant of the Agency, came to see me the other evening and discussed certain aspects of NCFE. Nica has been working on both factions of the Rumanians in an effort to bring them together, and I think that his criticism is, on the whole, constructive. He states that entirely apart from the question of factionalism among the Rumanian groups and other national groups, there is the greatest amount of inefficiency at the desk level of NCFE. This results from having too many politicians and diplomats in positions of authority and too few persons of any practical experience; too much time is consumed and too much of the general effort goes completely to waste as the result of endless political discussions, much of it entirely theoretical. It would be desirable to review the entire personnel set-up within NCFE at an early date and place in charge of the various desks individuals who are capable of administering their people and running a show. Such persons could be advised and assisted by the politicians and the diplomats, but they would have the responsibility for getting things done. Finally, Nica told me very confidentially that he thought Dolbeare, who has never been strong, was getting weaker and weaker, and he voiced some misgivings about Bernie Yarrow. He said that he does not know Yarrow at all well, but has the impression from others that Yarrow is high-handed and dictatorial in his dealings and that his background is not particularly suitable for a person who is to hold a position of so much responsibility in dealing with Southeastern European nationals.

2. I think I have already told you that Victor Riesel, the writer of the hostile pieces which you brought to my attention, complained about the treatment that he received from Finis Farr, who he said had led him to believe that he was going to be called upon for advice and assistance to the Agency. There were no follow-ups and Riesel was miffed. Riesel also singled out for sharp attack Captain Giniger, who he said he believed was in a high place in CIA and who was a thoroughly incompetent and undesirable

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Security Information

individual. He referred to Ginger as a "me, too Mick" -- whatever that means in Brooklynese. He also said that Ginger is a "pseudo-intellectual" and a "muddle-headed liberal". Lionel expressed himself as being annoyed that a person like Ginger should be used by the Agency while a person like himself should be ignored.

3. I hear that Howard Chapin is back at work but that his physical condition is not at all good and that the cause of the paralytic affect was not determined by the doctors.

4. At the Director's staff meeting this morning, he again raised the matter of our using the American Heritage Foundation for cover and possibly fund-raising purposes in connection with NCFE, CFA and the Freedom Crusade. He explained for the benefit of Mr. Dulles that the directors of the American Heritage Foundation have met recently and agreed to provide assistance to us and to make available to us their sponsorship, good name, etc. According to the Director, Mr. Sam Pryor has been primarily responsible for this decision although Winthrop Aldrich and D'Arcy Brophy were to some extent instrumental. The Executive Secretary of the Foundation, who was scheduled to visit Washington on 15 October, will be coming down sometime shortly after November 4. At that time we should be ready with concrete proposals as to the manner in which we would like to make use of the Foundation and its various assets. We would, of course, want to coordinate whatever is developed in this connection with the work that Henry Ford has undertaken to do for the Crusade this year. After some discussion it was agreed at the meeting that the American Heritage Foundation might be brought in either during the forthcoming Crusade campaign or immediately thereafter, depending upon what should appear to be most desirable. At the very least we should use the Foundation for cover purposes, since by advertising the support of this well-known organization, we would gain a very solid and substantial point of attribution as the source of funds. We might also wish to channel funds into the Crusade or directly into one or both of the two committees through the American Heritage Foundation. (This would require some straightening-out with the Treasury Department authorities to guarantee against any subsequent investigation.) Finally, the Crusade might be conducted in future years under the letterhead of and in the name of the American Heritage Foundation. The big shots in the Foundation would not want to work at fund-raising themselves, and they have been assured that we would not ask them to do so. It would be up to us to provide the nuts and bolts of the effort.

cc: C/PP

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Change of name of Baltic Panels

With reference to your memorandum of October 15, 1952 concerning the desire of the Baltic Panels to change their names to the Committee for Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively, I wish to inform you that the Department perceives no reason to oppose such a change.

It is suggested however, that NCFE insist that the new names for the Baltic Panels be precisely those mentioned in your memorandum of October 15. It is our feeling that if the panels were to be called National Committees, for example, confusion might arise with respect to other organizations from these countries already in existence and the impression might be created that the committees are of greater political significance than we wish them to be.

ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO

NO. 10/2379

DATE 29 Oct 52

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. OPP		8 NOV 1952	nov	CMB	As a matter of incidental info, Drew Pearson gave a big plug for contributions to the Crusade on his TV program last night (Nov. 9) a.c.u
2. DD/P			13 2200	[illegible]	
3. C-IO				JWB	
4.					
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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

29 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. While in Detroit yesterday, I talked with Charles Moore, who is the Director of Public Relations for Ford Motor Company, and also with Henry Ford. I was merely paying a friendly call on Moore but he raised the matter of the Crusade and asked Mr. Ford to come in and talk about it. They are both very unhappy with Mr. Walsh, who is Admiral Miller's man on the Crusade and whom Miller secured from the State Department, and I also gathered the general impression of dissatisfaction with Miller and his whole effort -- "If we had known what kind of an outfit we were working with, we wouldn't have taken it over." On the other hand, both Mr. Ford and Moore said that they were "going ahead full steam and intended to see the job through to the best of their ability".

2. I think there is no action to be taken here and merely pass this on for your information, but it does bring to mind again what I think is growing evidence that the Crusade is more trouble than it is worth.

3. I think this ought to be the last Crusade for Freedom and that we ought to give thought to alternatives. We are now taking steps to take the Committee for Free Asia out of the Crusade next year, substituting a permanent fund-raising office in San Francisco, token donations from three Agency foundations, and making a serious attempt to obtain some money from Asian groups and contacts. Some other cover is obviously needed and we are thinking in terms of the American Heritage Foundation or other possibilities that may occur. We should take similar steps for the National Committee for a Free Europe.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, EE DIVISION
CHIEF, SE DIVISION
CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of persons outside the Agency to influence Agency and State Department policy with respect to National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I have had reports from several sources that persons outside the Agency and outside the State Department have attempted to influence Agency operations and State Department policy in respect to the National Committee for a Free Europe. Two of these persons, it is reported, are Carmel Offie and Maynard Barnes.

2. To the extent that Messrs. Offie and Barnes are aware of our continuing relations with NCFE, their awareness constitutes a danger to our successful conduct of the operation. I therefore ask you and members of your Division to refrain from any contact with these gentlemen or with others who, by virtue of their suspicions or knowledge but without any official capacity whatever, are attempting to grind their personal axes through the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. I have also had reports from several sources that members of this Agency who happen to hold strong personal views on the conduct of exile activities by NCFE have, in their direct relations with the exiles, encouraged the exiles to oppose NCFE decisions and policies. Please transmit to your respective staffs my strong aversion to this kind of in-fighting. I call your attention to the agreement signed by myself and Mr. George Kennan of the State Department on 18 February 1949, which reads in part:

> "Exiles and refugees will be referred to the New York Committee for all matters of an operational nature, including the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities."

The same memorandum states that "Certain operational activities will not properly fall within the province of the New York Committee" and reserves these activities to this Agency, but these reserved operational activities were clearly not intended to embrace the encouragement of the exiles to fight off decisions made by the Committee as to "the provision of support and facilities for themselves and their activities".

Not used

~~4. Please also convey to members of your staff that I shall not tolerate further violations of the established policy set forth above.~~

5. If there is any basis whatever for these reports, I am sure that you will all agree that we should resolve our differences within the agency.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

see covering memo
+ page 2 in
Chrono 21 Oct

Analysis of Memorandum by Mr. Creighton Scott

The following memorandum, I believe, discusses most of the points raised by Mr. Scott.

1. Scripts prepared in Munich are almost never read by Americans before broadcast although the general content of each broadcast is agreed upon in programming conferences between the American and exile staffs. The reasons why the broadcasts are not read by Americans before they go on the air are as follows:

   a. Because the natural inclination of Americans is to change the broadcasts, and such changes, RFE officials feel, are likely to lessen the "genuine" quality of exile broadcasts for the listeners.

   b. Because the exiles feel themselves to be patriots working for their countries, and the submission of scripts to Americans before they are broadcast would be regarded by the exiles as casting doubt upon their allegiance and fervor.

The American staff believes that it can exercise policy control by suggestions during program discussions rather than by making deletions and corrections in the scripts themselves.

2. During my trip to Europe in June, I asked Mr. W. E. Griffith, Political Advisor for RFE, to institute the service of regularly translating the most sensitive RFE broadcasts after the fact. He has complied with this request and CIA now receives English translations of Munich scripts within a month after broadcast. CIA also receives an immediate teletype summary of all Munich broadcasts, as well as a weekly consolidated summary of all broadcasts. To provide for immediate English translation of all RFE programs after the fact would require an enormous staff of translators.

3. No doubt RFE has made the mistakes Mr. Scott mentions in connection with the items about the weakness of the Iron Curtain and the ease of crossing it, and the Czechoslovakian currency devaluation. On the first point, Mr. Scott's dates are in error, for RFE did not go on the air until July 4, 1950. Assuming that he means that such broadcasts were made from that date until April 1951, it should be noted that this was the very beginning of RFE when all of its broadcasts originated in New York. Such broadcasts certainly are not being continued. I assume they were the result of inexperience. The

will be discontinued when HICOG goes out of existence, and they should not be reestablished. You will remember that at the hearings which considered NCFE's 1953 budget, the officials of NCFE asked for $500,000 to cover the expected loss of such privileges and because we felt that this was unjustified, we asked and were granted the right to retain this money in the CIA reserve pending further justification.

5. Mr. Scott's complaint that the Information Service of RFE has been too expensive and naive is probably correct. In part this is the result of CIA's inability, for justifiable security reasons, to make information on a large scale available to RFE. However, the Information Service is being reorganized. There is reason to believe that excellent professional newsmen, such as Russell Hill and Ed Chamberlayne will provide the competence necessary for an increase in efficiency.

6. In sum, Mr. Scott's criticisms and complaints seem a mixture of fact and fiction animated by a personal antagonism. His is but one of a number of such attacks by former employees. Our own approach to Radio Free Europe should be not so much an assessment of past success and failures, as an examination of future opportunities. A powerful instrument has been created, in the main successfully, in an incredibly short time. Where it goes from here, giving due consideration to criticism such as Scott's, seems to us to be our priority task.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

27 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: President's Committee on Immigration and Naturalization

1. The attached memorandum, greatly modified in form by the General Counsel of NCFE, is to be presented tomorrow afternoon at an open hearing of the President's Committee which is conducting hearings on the McCarran Bill.

2. I was informed of this proposed presentation on Friday afternoon, October 17. I obtained the attached from Mr. Greenlea, NCFE General Counsel, today. NCFE does not know that Mr. Greenlea has been in touch with us and should not know.

3. I suggest that you review, with Mr. Wisnor, whether NCFE should make such a presentation. In essence, the presentation is an attack on the McCarran Bill. I suggest that, perhaps, NCFE should not testify for two reasons:

a. This is close to a clear example of a tax exempt charitable organization, attempting to influence legislation and;

b. The political implications are liable to be an embarrassment for CIA.

4. Apparently, NCFE is making this presentation in the hopes of receiving wide publicity so they will be in a position to say to the emigrees with whom they deal, "look what we are trying to do for you."

5. I urge your rapid concern, for the presentation is due to be made tomorrow afternoon.

William P. Durkee

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., was formed in 1949 when a group of private citizens joined together for positive action against Soviet enslavement. It concentrates its efforts on the 100 million Central and Eastern Europeans today living under inhuman conditions of force and fear. This tyranny, imposed by Soviet Russia in flagrant violation of her solemn guarantees, precludes the enduring world peace desired by free men everywhere. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the American peoples' answer to the Kremlin's despotic rule.

The Committee seeks:

(1) To pierce the Iron Curtain with messages of moral and practical value through the facilities of Radio Free Europe, thus taking the fight to the enemies' camp;

(2) To build for the future by educating young refugees from Communism through the Mid-European Studies Center here in the United States, and the Free European University in Exile in Strasbourg, France. In this manner we attempt to preserve the cultural heritage of the past which the enemy seeks to destroy;

(3) To develop political unity and a dynamic platform of aims and principles among the exile groups through the Division of Exile Relations;

(4) To assemble, analyze and distribute knowledge about current conditions in the captive area;

(5) To create active public support, both moral and material, for these activities.

Vital to the work and well being of the National Committee for a Free Europe are its approximately two thousand alien associates. 60 percent of these aliens are in Europe, with the rest residing either temporarily or permanently in the United States. At the present time over one hundred of these aliens residing here face imminent deportation.

It might be inserted parenthetically at this point that all of these aliens presently facing deportation have attempted to remain within the spirit and the letter of the law, but because of the absurdities of the law have been forced into the position of being wilful violators of it. We do not speak, either now or at any point in this discussion, about evadors of, or fugitives from, justice, but shall only refer to individuals of good faith, attempting to the best of their ability to conform to the rules and regulations of the country which they believe, often mistakenly, to be the refuge of the afflicted. Out

At various times during the history of our organization it has been necessary for the National Committee or its subsidiaries to ask certain aliens with particular talents to come to the United States on extremely short notice. These They were, ~~of course,~~ admitted as visitors. After These ~~these aliens~~ had arrived in the United States, the aliens ~~they~~ were immediately faced with the problem of attempting in some manner to change ~~regularise~~ their status here from visitor to permanent so that trips back and forth from Europe for visa renewal purposes would not be necessitated. Under the present immigration law the only possibility of accomplishing this ~~obtaining such regularization~~ is ~~was~~ by having

change

the alien apply at an American Consulate in Canada, await the issuance of a visa number, and then having the alien personally pick up the visa at the appropriate consulate. This procedure usually took from a year to 18 months. But this ~~mode of regularization~~ new method will cease under the new law, since aliens will not be admitted into the United States from Canada without having first completed certain residential requirements there.

Under the present law it is impossible to safeguard the residence in the U.S. of an alien here on a visitor visa; unlimited extensions are impracticable

[The only manner of safeguarding the residence of an alien visitor in the United States at present is to attempt to get unlimited extensions of his visitor's visa. This is of course impossible.] The alien finds himself, therefore, in the position of being deportable to the country from which he came, and in most cases after having stayed in the United States for over a year, the respective governments will refuse him permission to return. In the end the alien finds himself in a position worse than the one which he enjoyed while residing in a Displaced Persons camp in Germany.

Students supported by our Mid-European Studies Center find themselves in an even more embarrassing position. They are allowed to come to the United States as students providing their re-entry permits to the countries from which they come are still valid. Any student who comes to take advantage of our scholarships comes for at least a period of from two to four years and is therefore unable to maintain his residence abroad and keep his scholarship at the same time. They soon arrive at the point where they cannot return to Europe, cannot continue their studies here, and are constantly harrassed by officers of the Immigration Service.

(Those students studying at our Free Europe University in Exile in Strasbourg cannot come to the United States to continue their studies at graduate schools here, because most of them are chargeable ~~to~~ heavily oversubscribed quotas. [illegible]

Our work here in the National Committee for a Free Europe is essentially psychological. Our associates in Radio Free Europe, the Division of Exile Relations, etc., cannot do efficient, effective or productive work [illegible] without fear of harassment [illegible] ~~when they are constantly being~~ harrassed by officials ~~of the Immigration Service~~. [illegible] ~~When their stay in the United States is on a day to day basis~~ They cannot devote their full energies to the work for which they came to this country. ~~While it is true that~~ Most of them intend to return to the country of their origin when Communist domination is overthrown there; but until then they must have some assurance that they can remain peacefully here ~~until that moment~~. Therefore, it would seem appropriate that ~~some~~ provision be made in the immigration laws that ~~students~~ and ~~temporary~~ visitors fitting these categories in the United States be allowed to adjust their status to that of temporary, if not permanent, residence in the United States.

~~Another aspect of the law which should be considered is the fact that~~ Many of the exile leaders of various Iron Curtain countries were admiss~~able~~ [illegible] to the United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 as amended. However, when asked by the Immigration authorities whether they intended to remain in the United States temporarily or permanently, they answered in all honesty that they intended to remain here only until their own countries had been liberated from the yoke of Communist tyranny. ~~Of course~~ Then, by their own admission they were ~~therefore~~ automatically barred from adjusting their status from that of temporary visitor to permanent resident. ~~In the case of~~ Our student associates,

[illegible]

~~they~~ are obliged by the Committee as a requisite to receiving a scholarship, to sign a statement agreeing to return to the country of their origin when liberation comes so that their training will be of direct help in the cause of building a free world. It is indeed unfortunate that ~~both~~ neither the present law ~~and~~ nor the forthcoming one makes ~~no~~ any provision for political refugees except in the case of those individuals who are admitted to the United States under diplomatic standing and subsequently ~~left~~ leave the service of their government. [illegible]?

At the present moment individuals awaiting adjustment under this particular section of the D.P. law are in an extremely precarious position. All of them have a lifetime of political activity behind them, and therefore the administrative delay in processing their applications, completing investigations, etc., has been interminable. Now, most of them are receiving notices from the Department of Justice stating that since their applications have not been processed within the time limit, they are now eligible for deportation proceedings which will be effected forthwith.

~~Both~~ Neither the present ~~and~~ nor the future immigration laws make ~~no~~ provision for administrative discretion in the enforcement of the deportation laws. Should the local commissioner be allowed to use his discretionary powers in the matter of deporting individuals such as those discussed, the problem [illegible] in great part would be ~~cleared up.~~ [illegible]

The national quotas system is completely out of accord with present worldwide conditions. Almost all of the Iron Curtain countries, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and Poland, have annual

[illegible] immigration are we going [illegible]?

Do we want to [illegible] immigrants?

[illegible]

quotas of only 100, and those quotas are almost all oversubscribed to the year 2000. Should the mortgages laid on those quotas by the Displaced Persons Act be removed, or if Hungarians, for example, were able to borrow from the British quota, we should be able to bring to the United States many aliens possessing particular skills whose services are urgently needed by this organization. Many of our aliens are highly skilled technical, professional, medical or scientific men whose training, experience and ability would most certainly be prospectively beneficial to the United States.

It is because of the heavily oversubscribed condition of the quotas of Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., that most of the applications for visas, made as long as two years ago in American Consulates in Canada, are being returned unprocessed, with the notation that no action can be taken on their application due to the imminent approach of the effective date of the new law.

Neither the present law, nor the new law makes proper provision for Displaced Persons who are bona fide visitors to the United States. None of these people have passports from their own countries, since all of them have rejected the political party presently holding sway there. As a result they are traveling on French, German, or other free country affidavits of identity or travel documents. Before a visa can be extended under the law, the travel documents and re-entry permits must be valid for a period of sixty days beyond the date of application. These countries will not extend these documents since the bearers are not nationals of the issuing country. This, in effect, means that these visitors can only remain for a period of from six to nine months, and then must return to Europe, oftentimes without being able to complete the work for which they came.

Finally, it would seem that some provision could be made for the rapid processing of the visas of both prospective immigrants and prospective visitors so that in case of necessity an alien can be brought quickly to the United States without the usual two year delay.

Generally speaking, if some drastic changes are not made in the Immigration laws at the earliest possible moment, we can foresee the virtual disbanding the National Councils Division of this organization, and a serious curtailment of the quality of the broadcasts from Radio Free Europe~~, and, although it is not à propos to the present matter, we should like to point out that~~ these broadcasts are making a terrific impact behind the Iron Curtain. One has only to read the virulent attacks against our organization printed in the Communist press all over the world to be assured of their effectiveness. The propaganda value to the Communist cause of the mass deportations now being planned of these well-known exiles is of course immeasurable.

When Public Law 414 was being debated in the Congress, it was submitted that the present Immigration and Nationality Act was one riddled with inconsistencies and completely engulfed in "red tape." We respectfully submit that the forthcoming law is full of even more inconsistencies, is completely unaware of present world conditions, will in effect stop all immigration except from those countries which are socially acceptable, and will create an impassible labyrinth of restrictive red tape.

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[illegible]

23 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie

1. In conversation the other day you asked me through what channel Maynard Barnes and Carmel Offie were stating their opinions on the matter of NCFE's request to move the administrative headquarters of the exile countries from Washington to New York, and who was listening to Barnes and Offie.

2. The channel seems to be the Southeastern European Division and in particular Colonel Yatsevitch, SE/CPP. The Southeastern European Division maintains an extremely skeptical view of NCFE activities in the exile field and has gone to considerable trouble, through exiles as well as through Barnes and Offie, to create the greatest possible objection not only to the recent move of the exiles but to NCFE in general. I am attaching an article by Edgar A. Mowrer which was written at the behest of Mr. Offie and was originally intended to be the first of a series. We have been successful in having the series idea dropped.

3. While I believe that there is some justification in the points the SE Division continually makes about the exile record of the New York Committee, I think the inter-governmental squabble which is aroused by the Division's repeated attempts to use exiles, members of the State Department, and others as a sounding board for its own lack of sympathy with NCFE makes it difficult for the National Committee to fulfill its charter and for CIA to control day-to-day operations without interference from the State Department and others from outside the Agency.

4. I suggest that you send the attached memorandum to the Chiefs of EE, SE and IO. It is worded in such a manner that it will not reveal this reference.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
1. Mowrer article.
2. Suggested memo.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

orig to Durkee

13 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

FROM : Chief, RQM/OIS

SUBJECT : Exchange of Intelligence Information between the NCFE and the DD/P Offices

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe is the reservoir of a great wealth of intelligence information, particularly in the field of psychological warfare. A four-day survey of the NCFE conducted by an OIS case officer indicated that three NCFE components - the Research and Publications Service, the Mid-European Studies Center, and the Radio Free Europe - can make a very valuable contribution to the operational intelligence required by the DD/P offices.

2. It is the purpose of this memorandum to suggest a procedure for the most effective use of the NCFE intelligence potential. The most practical approach seems to be as follows:

a. At this time it does not appear necessary to establish a continuous flow of raw and finished intelligence from the NCFE to the DD/P offices. Rather, we would like to use NCFE facilities whenever individual cases indicate that such action is advisable.

b. We would like to maintain a direct relationship with the NCFE for the purpose of enlisting its support in the work on our individual cases. When the nature of the case indicates that the NCFE can make a valuable contribution to it, we could make arrangements through the Chief of IO/TONIC, to make direct contact with one of the security-cleared NCFE officers. A permanently-designated OIS case officer (A. Snatton and/or H. Knoepfmacher) would then proceed to New York to discuss the substantive research problems in the NCFE and reach an agreement on the scope of NCFE support.

3. It is recognised that the final authority on all contacts with the NCFE rests with the Chief of IO/TONIC, and that the latter may direct and limit such contacts whenever he desires.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. We suggest that, for the purpose of meeting security requirements, the two OIS case officers assigned to NCFE liaison be given permanent cover which would be arranged by the NCFE Personnel Officer and the Chief of IO/TONIC.

5. It is recognized that the relationship between RQM/OIS and the NCFE must be based on mutual exchange of information. We are, therefore, prepared to provide such intelligence research support to the NCFE as may be given within security limits and our manhour capabilities. The requests for intelligence support from the NCFE would be channeled to RQM/OIS through the Chief of IO/TONIC.

6. Our proposals contained in this memorandum have been discussed with the Chief of IO/TONIC and an understanding has been reached on all points covered. It is requested that the suggested procedure be approved.

[illegible]

SECRET
Security Information

DD/P. 807

OCT 10 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/FI

FROM : C/RQM/FI

SUBJECT : Survey of the National Committee for a Free Europe

1. This memorandum serves to inform you of a four-day survey made of the National Committee for a Free Europe by Alexander Shatton of RQM/OIS. The survey has uncovered a great wealth of information, contained both in raw files and finished reports, which is of operational intelligence interest. We are now making arrangements, through the IO Division, for continuing access to the NCFE files and for direct liaison with the NCFE Staff.

2. In the course of his conversation with Shatton, the President of the NCFE (Admiral Harold Miller) expressed concern over the fact that he had not been notified of Shatton's arrival and stated that he does not look with favor at CIA individuals working in the NCFE without his knowledge. Although Shatton informed him that his visit had been cleared with the IO Division, Admiral Miller remained somewhat unconvinced that the arrangements had properly been made. I suggest that this misunderstanding be brought to the attention of the DD/P, so that he may be informed of the facts in the event the matter is brought up by Admiral Miller in his contacts with the DCI and the DDCI.

3. Mr. Shatton's visit to the NCFE headquarters took place on 16, 17, 18 and 19 September.

SECRET
Security Information

ODP 72

Awy 8 Oct: [illegible]
x TWB

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division,
P & P Staff

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe's Request for Funds to Build a Gymnasium at the Free University-in-Exile; Reclamer of Admiral Miller.

1. I believe that I told Mr. Braden last evening of the telephone call which I had received from Admiral Miller and of what I had said in response to his request for funds to build the gymnasium. I want to make it clear that I offered him no specific encouragement, and confined my remarks to a statement that if he wished to draw up a proper application we would study it very carefully. I told him that this seemed to us an unnecessary expense and one which I would find difficult to defend with the Director in light of our present economy drive.

2. I should greatly appreciate a thorough staff job being done on this matter to relieve me of the necessity of thinking up all of the arguments pro and con, especially the latter. Will someone please dig up in the Congressional Records the speeches made during the last session of Congress in condemnation of the State Department's lavish approach to the educational and cultural exchange program? If we were ever forced to defend this Free University program, I think we would be extremely vulnerable on the score of having spent $50,000 for a gymnasium or anything like it. This is the icing on the cake and has the sound of being definitely in the luxury category. There is also the very questionable wisdom of our spending additional money on "permanent plant", when we cannot be sure how long we will be able to continue our support of this enterprise, nor for that matter how long the present flow of student material will continue.

3. Please -- let us sharpen up our thinking and our pencils as well. In the final analysis I shall probably have to veto this proposition, and will certainly do so unless it is much more convincingly supported than heretofore. However, I would like some help on this.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

1 Oct rec'd

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: NCFE-SE Division Conference on Rumanian Refugee Situation

REFERENCE: Memo to Chief, IOD, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation, dated 12 September 1952.

1. It is requested that the referenced memorandum be forwarded to the NCFE for study prior to the conference (ref, para. 8) between NCFE representatives and personnel of this Division.

2. Due to the importance of the negotiations with the Rumanians, no action should be taken on the plan outlined in the memorandum until after the conference is held. The Division representative to be assigned on TDY in New York (ref, para. 7) will be designated prior to the conference.

3. We have been informed that Mr. Visoianu has not received an acknowledgment of his letter and proposal. It is suggested that the NCFE write Mr. Visoianu, expressing appreciation for his communication, and inform him that the NCFE has been studying various proposals and hopes that within the next few weeks further discussions can be arranged.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

25 Sept. 52

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Request for Budget Revision for NCFE

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/A and DD/P from Comptroller 13 Sept. 52

1. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the subject memorandum requesting a budget revision for NCFE are explained in the supporting data attached to that memorandum. Items totaling $78,343 to be released from the reserve held by CIA, summarized in those paragraphs, are for material support of substantive operations already approved. Release of these items to NCFE is concurred in by International Organisations Division. It is recommended that the sum of $78,343 be released to NCFE.

2. The item in paragraph 3, i.e. $60,000 for nine months' operating expenses from July 1952 through March 1953 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris, is concurred in by the IO Division. The reason for its concurrence is as follows:

a. Support in the amount of $71,000 for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile through NCFE was undertaken by a memorandum for the DD/P dated 1 September 1951, Lewis S. Thompson, Chief, Special Projects, OPC.

b. In early June 1952, the matter of continuing support for the ICFTU in Exile was reviewed by the DDCI, Admiral Miller and Mr. Braden. It was decided that the ICFTU in Exile would continue to be subsidised in the amount of $60,000 for a nine months' period, running from July 1952 through March 1953.

3. A cable, IN-34233, from Mr. Braden indicates the Chief of the Paris Station and Mr. Braden have discussed the possibility of ending relations with the ICFTU in Exile. Mr. Braden indicates he wishes to take up this matter with the DDCI on his return.

4. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $60,000 be released to NCFE to enable them to continue payments as already agreed. If the support for the ICFTU in Exile should be terminated, funds remaining in NCFE's hands can be applied to other proposed activities now held for justification by CIA.

GERALD E. MILLER
Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare

Attachments
Reference memo with
attachments.

IO/TONIC:WPD:jp/eh
(24 Sept 52)
Distribution
Orig & 1 - Addressee
IO/TONIC - 2 cc
CIO - 1 cc
RI - 1 cc

1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Library of Congress Eastern European Accessions

REFERENCE: Fund Memorandum No. 513, 2 September 1952

1. SE Division has noted with interest that effective August 20, 1952, the Washington research staff of the NCFE will begin processing books and publications received from the Iron Curtain countries by the Library of Congress. These accessions represent a very valuable source of information which this Division is presently unable to exploit, since we have no personnel with the language qualifications required to review all that is received for our specific interests.

2. Referenced memorandum indicates that the NCFE has arranged to microfilm portions of given books containing items of propaganda or informational value. One copy of the print will be mailed to the New York research desks, while the original microfilm will be sent by pouch to Munich, presumably for RFE. This Division requests that an additional copy of the print be obtained on a continuing basis by IO for further analysis by the interested Area Divisions and for pouching to our field stations which have indicated a specific interest in this material. It is suggested that the copy be broken down into sections corresponding to the Area Divisions interested in order that this material may receive immediate attention by the appropriate Area Division.

3. SE Division would appreciate receiving your comments regarding this request since we are anxious to utilize this material as soon as possible and wish to make other arrangements if these suggestions are found impractical.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Copy to EE

Securit[illegible]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

24 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT: Assignment of Mobile Radio Facility (MB-50)

1. According to Messrs. Rowland and Emmons Brown arrangements have been made to utilize the MB-50 in Germany.

2. The completion of the transaction is awaiting a test that is being undertaken by outside engineers through General McClelland. This test, I am told, is necessitated by the fact that there is not available a complete specification of the equipment.

3. It is estimated by Mr. Brown that the test will be completed in a few weeks.

/s/
H. LLOYD EGNER
Acting Chief
Pyschological Staff Division

PP/CPY:CLE:tas

Distribution:
Addressee - original & 1
Mr. Rowland - 1
✓Mr. Brown, IO - 1
~~PP/P - 1~~
CPY - 1
PY/PPD - 1
subject file ~~[illegible]~~ - 1
RI - 1

SECRET

17 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. W. P. Durkee, Chief, IO/TOPIC

SUBJECT: Refugee Stipendiaries of NCFE

REFERENCE: Secret Memo dtd 12 August 1952 from Chief, IO/TOPIC, to Chief, SE; Subject: List of Stipendiaries of NCFE.

1. In compliance with your request of 12 August, the referenced memorandum was circulated to the various interested branches of SE Division. Of the thirteen Rumanians listed as stipendiaries of NCFE, only one, Mr. Brutus Coste, is on the payroll of SE Division. However, it has been our understanding that Mr. Coste has received no stipend since December, 1951. We would appreciate a further check on the status of Mr. Coste with respect to his reported stipend. No other duplications were reported.

2. It is requested that in addition to the referenced list of stipendiaries, IO Division obtain from the NCFE and RFE a list of all refugee employees from within the SE area (Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia) who may be employed in any capacity, with their salaries and job titles. Such information has not been available to the interested branches in the past, but experience has shown that the availability of this data on a current basis would be most helpful to the responsible case officers.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

PP:CACrane:bar

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1
SE/PP - 2
RI - 2

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. E. J. Harrison, PY Evaluation

SUBJECT: IPTONIC Use of PY Guidance Papers

1. In discussing this subject, the following facts of TONIC operations should be kept in view:

a. TONIC prepares its own daily guidance papers, written by a special staff which has at its disposal a European-wide news-gathering apparatus.

b. State Department overnight policy guidances are regularly delivered to TONIC on the day of issue.

2. Guidance papers from PY are dispatched as soon as they are received. For instance, Special Guidance on Bacteriological Warfare, dated August 7, 1952, and Weekly Propaganda Guidance No. 9, dated August 8, 1952, were sent on August 11.

3. The value of PY guidance papers for IPTONIC was taken up with TONIC officials last May. Their observations are contained in the following quotations from their letters to this Division:

a. The Chief Programming Official wrote:

"We have received several of these papers in the past couple of months. They are extremely useful for the following reasons:

a. They set forth clearly U. S. policy on one issue or another;

b. They occasionally report thinking in quarters from which we hear nothing directly;

c. They usually contain pertinent quotations of expression of views by the enemy which we can make use of (both published and other sources, such as interrogatories);

d. They permit us to learn what lines are being laid down for propaganda addressed to other audiences than ours (other than central and eastern Europe).

"On the other hand, when these papers deal with our targets, they sometimes reveal a sharp divergence from our thinking and our points of view. Where this is owing to the fact that they have in mind black, while we deal in white, the difference can be legitimate. But even so, we find proposals that seem to us illogical, and now and then extremely unwise."

b. The President of the organisation wrote:

"You enclosed a paper giving additional guidance material for propaganda countering Communist BW charges. All the lines therein suggested have been successively used by us since February 25 or thereabouts when the topic first arose.

"Papers of this kind are of great use, provided they arrive promptly. By promptly is meant, either in anticipation of an event, or an expression of views on the day the event occurs."

c. The Deputy Director, Radio, wrote:

"With regard to the paper (Prop-103, dated 28 March 1952) that you enclosed, I checked Bob's department and they advise that from the beginning we have made the points specified in 6(a)3 and 5, 6(b)2, 9(a)1 and 2, 9(d), 9(e), 10.

"As a matter of information, to our particular audiences we say, instead of 6(b)1, that the Soviet Union is trying to persuade the leaders of German heavy industry, militarists, and ex-Nazis to go into partnership with it; and instead of 6(c) that the prohibition of alliances is fraudulent, Moscow intending, as in August 1939, to ally itself with a reactionary Germany against our peoples. Again to our audiences, we say instead of 9(a)2 that the German problem can be solved, and that the Western powers are attempting to solve it in the interest of the security of our audiences. We are glad to see that our line parallels that laid down in 9(d) and (e)."

4. A fair summary of the use of PY guidance papers for RFE is as follows:

a. They are useful insofar as they contain ideas that have not occurred to TONIC's own people or in reference to events that are not a matter of public knowledge.

b. In most cases the guidance papers arrive so late that TONIC is already engaged in treating the next stage in the development of the propaganda theme suggested.

c. As PY guidance papers, therefore, are at the moment another contribution to the thinking of TONIC officials, it is not possible to point to specific uses of the material suggested.

d. To be most useful, propaganda guidance from PY should treat the development of special themes that have a specific relation to precise U. S. Government operations and objectives aside from general U. S. foreign policy goals. To be most useful to RFE, such guidance should be developed over a period of time in anticipation of the actual facts or operations making up such programs.

EMMONS BROWN
Acting Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/TONIC:WPD/eg

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - PY

12 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current U. S. Attempt to Form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In view of the considerable length of time since NCFE opened negotiations for Rumanian refugee unity and subsequent developments, a reappraisal of the situation and a delineation of final action are required.

2. It is evident that expression of NCFE interest in the Council of Political Parties (actually it has been directed primarily toward the National Peasant Party) has had the desired effect on the two refugee groups in the United States, by raising the specter of a third force developing and being recognized by the Americans. It has also made the King aware of the seriousness with which the Americans regard the division between the two groups. Further, it has incited the Iron Guard to adopt a "democratic" facade in the hope, perhaps, of fitting eventually into the resulting organization. However, in spite of the success of the maneuver, further encouragement of the CoPP and the NPP could well prove dangerous to our overall objective of unifying the refugees, by adding fuel to their differences.

3. Careful consideration has been given to the various worthwhile proposals and counter proposals which were advanced in the course of the recent discussions. It is hoped, in this connection, that the NCFE has made it entirely clear to all the participants that this series of discussions was undertaken purely to explore the possibilities for agreement in concert with the refugees themselves, and that after hearing all sides of the question, the NCFE will present for their consideration a "package" proposal, on the basis of which final agreement should be reached. It is believed that the revision of the original plan, set forth below and embodying certain features which have developed in the course of the last three months, can provide a solution acceptable both to this organization and to the refugees. Operational considerations, the desirability of maintaining a reasonable degree of control, the necessity for taking into account the refugee concept of democratic procedures, as well as the firm stand on size taken by the Rumanian National Committee, these are all important factors affecting the problem. The final organization should be small enough to control, sufficiently selective to attract prominent exiles, inclusive enough to contain the rank and file, and of an optimum size to carry out its functions effectively.

4. An organizational form of a large passive Council, to which all Rumanians who meet certain qualifications could belong, but with all action vested in a small Executive Committee, offers a practical way to satisfy both U. S. and refugee requirements. The name of this overall organization should be the "Rumanian National Committee" since this would provide a sense of continuity and would facilitate acceptance of the proposal by Visoianu and the King. It would be formed by an expansion of the present Rumanian National Committee into the Executive Committee of approximately twenty persons. Membership in the Council would be extended to the rank and file by means of letters announcing the new organization and inviting participation. The "Council" of the Rumanian National Committee would include members from all countries and would not meet in session. Radescu should be designated honorary president of the Council. The Executive Committee would be the functional unit of the organization. It would appoint sub-commissions and groups to perform the work of the Committee and designate representatives of the Rumanian National Committee at various refugee centers in Europe, South America, and the Near East. A membership card would be issued to all who affiliate with the Council. Members of extremist groups would be excluded in principle from membership in the Rumanian National Committee, except in certain cases passed upon by the Committee and accepted by us. A newspaper would be published and distributed in liberal quantities.

5. The Executive Committee headquarters would be in New York City and work in conjunction with the NCFE and representatives of CIA. It is recommended that the position of chairman of the Executive Committee be held for a term of one year, elective by members of this committee only. Its members should be:

Constantin Visoianu, Chairman

Gheorghe Assan
Cornel Bianu
Vintila Bratianu
Nicolae Caranfil
Edmond Ciuntu
Brutus Coste
Alexandru Cretzianu
Anton Crihan
Carlos Davila
Mihail Farcasanu
Grigore Gafencu
Emil Ghilezan
Mircea Ionnitiu
Augustin Popa
Iancu Zissu

6. As the first step in achieving the organization outlined ~~above~~, it is suggested that the NCFE reply to Visoianu's memo expressing appreciation and inviting him to a discussion of his proposal. At this meeting, the NCFE should present the ideas outlined in paragraph 4 as the American view of the compromise which, after careful study, appears to offer the best possible solution. In the discussion, the NCFE should indicate that this plan is the result of much thought by interested groups after discussions with many refugees, that it has attempted to aid the refugees because of its interest in them and their country's welfare, and that it is prepared to support a Rumanian refugee organization in a number of ways. Visoianu should be invited to recommend the people whom he considers desirable for the Executive Committee. He will have been briefed by CIA prior to the meeting and will propose the same list generally as that in paragraph 5. The NCFE should then request Visoianu's cooperation and active participation in forming an organization along the lines suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5. It will suggest that Visoianu, Pope and Crihan work with Gafencu, Ghilezan and Coste for this purpose. Each of these gentlemen should be approached by CIA and NCFE prior to the opening contact meeting of the group. If any substitutions are made in the participants, CIA should be consulted prior to the time arrangements are completed. After this group has worked out details of the organization and consulted with the others suggested for the Executive Committee, the NCFE will issue invitations to a general meeting of this Committee and will assist in getting the other organisational details underway. Sub-commissions should be established immediately, using the refugees who have been participating in the recent NCFE discussions. Arrangements will be made for Visoianu and Gafencu and an additional delegation to be named later, to go to England to inform the King of the agreements reached and the details of the new organization.

7. During this phase of activity, it is recommended that someone from this Division be assigned on TDY in New York to work closely with the NCFE and advise on any necessary changes. CIA will contact certain refugees to ensure their cooperation prior to the initiation of this phase of activity.

8. This plan has been coordinated with the Department of State. It is requested that the details be forwarded to the NCFE and a meeting arranged to discuss the implementation.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET
Security Information

11 September 1952.

MEMORANDUM FOR: the Record ~~DEPUTY DIRECTOR~~

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on Wednesday, the 10th of September.

The following is a memorandum of my conversation with Admiral Miller in New York on Wednesday, September 10th. I would like to preface this account with the observation that Admiral Miller seems to be in a highly emotional state and generally suspicious of those around him.

(1) Larry deNeufville

Admiral Miller reported his meetings with Larry deNeufville in Paris and indicated a difference in his projected use of Larry deNeufville and that envisaged by deNeufville, which Admiral Miller presumed represented CIA's interests. Miller proposes to use deNeufville as one of a three man brain trust, one of whom is Louis Gallantier and the other is still unnamed. He mentioned that he had originally considered deNeufville as an aide in administrative matters but had been informed that deNeufville was not equipped for such duties.

(2) VOA

Admiral Miller indicated that RFE was having difficulties with VOA, especially with the new Information Intelligence Unit created by the State Department, under the direction of Donald Shea, to provide information for VOA's broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries. These difficulties included the preventing of RFE's information people from interviewing escapees.

(3) Information Service — Leland Stowe

Admiral Miller indicated that he was more than satisfied with Leland Stowe's activities, and that with the exception of RFE correspondents in London and Paris, they were satisfied with present personnel. He also stated that Russell Hill had become RFE correspondent in Germany. He further indicated that he will make every effort to keep Leland Stowe on after the expiration of the present six-month consultative contract.

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Security Information

(4) Father Morlion

Admiral Miller stated that he had conferences with Monsignor Cardini who stated that Father Morlion's information was not reliable. Admiral Miller reported that McDonald, the RFE correspondent in Rome, held the same view. Admiral Miller exhibited some suspicion of the actions of Mr. Delbeare in trying to sell him the matter of Father Morlion and Anna Brady, but stated if that was what Mr. Dulles wanted, that was all right with him.

(5) Crusade for Freedom

Admiral Miller indicated he was going to give two days a week to the Crusade for Freedom.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Acting Chief,
International Organizations Division

AC/IO:WPD/cmm

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (via C/PP, and DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Tonic
2 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 WEST 57TH STREET • NEW YORK 19, N. Y. • TELEPHONE PLAZA 7-7600

CABLE ADDRESS: NATFECOMM

September 9, 1952

Mr. Thomas Braden
2203 Foxhall Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Braden:

At the suggestion of Admiral Miller, I am enclosing six copies of the new Committee brochure "Weapon in the Struggle for Freedom." If you would like to have additional copies, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

SSWalker

Samuel S. Walker, Jr.
Director, Research and
Publications Service

SSW:bvb

SECRET
Security Information

2 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Security Procedures in the FEUE

Those present: Captain Sabalov, Dr. Tyson, Thomas Meyers, Francis Hand, Bob Cunningham, John Runney

1. The purpose of this meeting was to inform the Office of Inspection and Security of the security arrangements made in the selection of students for the Free University in Exile.

2. As a result of the discussions, an outline by Captain Sabalov of his security procedures, it was agreed:

a. That the present security practices were satisfactory and that the nature of the security problem does not call for the kind of security scrutiny necessary in Radio Free Europe.

b. That the FEUE is an excellent source of information for CIA and that in consequence Captain Sabalov will make available to this Agency:

1) A list of all applicants to the Free University with biographical data.

2) A list of all student with biographical data given general scholorship aid in Europe.

3. That no contacts by CIA with the Free University in Exile will be undertaken except by headquarters action or by field stations through Mr. Royal Tyler.

William P. Durkee

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-2387

8 September 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans
Acting Chief, International Organizations

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. Mr. Phenix when he was recently here advised me that the Board of NCFE desired to change its name from "National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc." to "Free Europe Committee." The purpose of this was to avoid confusion with the multitude of "national committees" for various purposes, some of them subversive.

2. This proposed change was discussed at the morning meeting with the Director and Deputies and no objection was found if the Committee really wanted to do it. I suggest that C/IO confirm this to Phenix as they want to set the legal steps in motion.

ALLEN W. DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

11 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Admiral Miller Letter about NCFE Personnel mentioned at the PRC Meeting on Friday, 8 August

1. Attached hereto is Admiral Miller's answer on behalf of NCFE to numerous requests for personnel records of NCFE in order to provide CIA with basic information about this project.

2. In view of NCFE's reticence to provide us with such basic information, Mr. Braden and I have discussed the possibility of whether we could effectively perform a liaison function here for you without such information, and we are agreed that we cannot. As you know, it is not our purpose to use this information to harrass people in New York or to quibble about salaries or details of assignments. We do think that the only way CIA can perform its responsibility toward NCFE is to keep itself fully informed in every field of NCFE's activity, and that knowing which employees are doing what is essential information.

3. You suggested at the PRC meeting on 8 August that you might be able to give us a hand in our effort to get this information.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TONIC

Attachment
As stated.

IO/TONIC:WPD/ah

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - TONIC
2 cc - RI

see pink for attachment

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

7 August 1952

TWB

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Request While on Travel Orders

Please contact Larry d'Neufville to obtain debriefing paper of Sperling and to be present at further verbal debriefing of Sperling. Sperling will be available in Paris from the 15th of August to the 2nd of September.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
C/IO/TONIC

SECRET
Security Information

6 Aug 52

9

PRIORITY SECRET TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK

TO REEVES FOR THOMAS BRADEN FROM LPA--SECURITY INFORMATION --CITE NY -3124

JOHN C. HUGHES RPT JOHN C. HUGHES SAYS:

"THE BULL-AUGUSTINE REPORT OF JULY 20 WAS PREPARED IN PARIS AND DISTRIBUTED BY ROYALL TYLER FROM THERE. IMMEDIATELY ON READING IT I PROPOSED A MODIFICATION OF THE NAME FOR THE PROPOSED OPERATION SO AS TO DEFINE MORE ACCURATELY ITS PURPOSE. I SUGGESTED WE CALL THE PROJECT FREE EUROPE EXILE CENTERS, AND THIS NAME WAS ACCEPTED.

"IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT EVER SINCE NCFE HAS BEEN IN ACTIVE OPERATION, INCREASING ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID BY US TO THE PROBLEM OF THOSE REFUGEES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO ARE NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH NCFE IS CONCERNED, AND SUBSTANTIAL SUMS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE HANDS OF THOSE NATIONAL COUNCILS WHICH SHOWED INITIATIVE IN THIS PARTICULAR FIELD TO ENABLE THEM TO BUILD UP THE MORALE OF THEIR HOMELESS NATIONALS. THE PRESENT REPORT AND ITS PROPOSALS LOOK TO A MORE EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE ON A SOMEWHAT LARGER SCALE OF WHAT IS ALREADY BEING DONE. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS RESULT, WE RECOMMEND EMPLOYING A SMALL AMERICAN STAFF (OF ABOUT EIGHT PEOPLE) TO SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE ENTIRE OPERATION.

THE NCFE BUDGET FOR 1952-53 FOR WORK OF THIS CHARACTER INCLUDED APPROXIMTELY RPT APPROXIMATELY ~~$300,000~~ $118,000 TO CONTINUE PREVIOUSLY

SECRET

SECRET

APPROVED PROGRAMS. THE BULL-AUGUSTINE RECOMMENDATIONS SHOW THAT A MORE EFFICIENT AND SOMEWHAT MORE COMPREHENSIVE OPERATION (FOR EXAMPLE POLISH REFUGEES ARE NOW TO BE COVERED) WILL CL RPT COST ABOUT $400,000 FOR THE TEN MONTHS—SEPTEMBER THROUGH JUNE, AN INCREASE OF ONLY $100,000.

"THIS PROGRAM IS NOT A NEW ONE FOR NCFE AND IT INVOLVES NO RESETTLEMENT HOUSING OR LARGE SCALE SUBSISTENCE EXPENDITURES. IT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OR DUPLICATE ANYTHING THAT IS NOW BEING DONE BY RPT BY OFFICIAL UNITED STATES AGENCIES NOR DOES IT INVOLVE ANY LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS. IT REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NCFE REALLY IS CONCERNED WITH THE MORALE OF REFUGEES REACHING WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. WE SEE NO REASON, THEREFORE, WHY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT NEED BE CONSULTED AT THIS TIME. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH MR. DULLES RPT DULLES."

GR-351

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

1. Returned herewith as requested are the budget data for the fiscal year 1953 received by CM in the late afternoon of 2 August 1952 for review, evaluation and specific comment.

2. Only a cursory examination of such data is possible within the time presently available. While from the information submitted it does not appear that any of the estimates shown are greatly out of line, it must be pointed out that CM does not feel that it is in a position to intelligently evaluate the proposed budget with respect to the program and operational purposes contained therein.

3. It is felt desirable, however, that sufficient detailed information pertinent to the organizational and management features of the project should be made available to CM to permit a review and examination of those aspects in conjunction with the related proposed budget provisions.

PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/FI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

5 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC - Budget FY 1953

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PRESTON L. SUTPHEN
Chief, Commercial Division

CM/HLS/fh

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
3 - CM
2 - RI/FI

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

TONIC

August 5,1952

Dear Dick:

Tom Braden, one of our friends will be coming over in your direction soon.

Please show him every courtesy and everything that we have in the way of operations. It is essential that he know our operations thoroughly, and all wraps are off.

Sincerely yours,

H. R. Miller

Mr. Richard J. Condon
Radio Free Europe
APO 407-A
c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Royall Tylor - Paris
cc: George Caesar - Lisbon
cc: Oliver Hadwood — 635-10

AUG 6 1952

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Security Information

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Security Information

R 3-1338(2)

4 August 1952

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

1. It is understood by Sponsor and the Fund that activities of the Fund will be conducted in accordance with the following principles:

a. The fund will present to the Sponsor on or before 1 May of each year a proposed program and financial budget for the fiscal year beginning on 1 July. In general, this presentation will include detail comparable to other Sponsor budget presentations and, of course, must include as a minimum sufficient information to enable the Sponsor to analyze the program from both a budgetary and policy viewpoint.

b. After subjecting the program and budget to normal Sponsor review and analysis, the Sponsor will advise the Fund as to the specific activities of the over-all program which the Sponsor desires to support and as to specific amounts approved for expenditure in connection with each Fund division, including a small General Administration Contingency Fund which can be used at the discretion of the Fund for minor unforeseen requirements of any division. Exceptions, limitations, or other special provisions will be stipulated where appropriate. The Fund will undertake major activities other than those approved in its annual program only when mutually agreed by the Sponsor and the Fund. Transfer of funds from one Fund division to another division will not be made except by prior mutual agreement of the Sponsor and the Fund.

c. A reasonable reserve fund will be held by Sponsor and provided for in the budget to take care of unforeseen emergencies or contemplated activities which have not been sufficiently developed to permit detailed budgetary planning. Releases will be made from this fund to the Fund as appropriate upon presentation of proper justification to the Sponsor.

d. The Fund will furnish the Sponsor with such regular financial reports reflecting its operations as may be necessary to enable the Sponsor to properly account for the Fund expenditures. The Fund will also furnish the Sponsor with copies of audit reports made to the Fund by the firm of Certified Public Accountants employed for that purpose by the Fund with the approval of the Sponsor.

SECRET
Security Information

e. In order that the Fund may have available at all times sufficient net liquid assets to provide for liabilities which would exist in the event unforeseen liquidation became necessary, Sponsor will provide the Fund with an adequate liquidation reserve which will be held by the Foundation and invested in United States Government obligations of a readily convertible variety mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund. This reserve will be made available to the Fund as required, to be used only for the purposes of liquidation as mutually agreed by Sponsor and the Fund.

f. In case of liquidation, the assets of the Fund remaining after payment and discharge of all debts and liabilities of the corporation shall, as required by the Fund by-laws, be distributed "to such tax-exempt charitable organizations as shall be determined by the Board of Directors, in its discretion," but it is understood that the Fund will, in fact, designate the tax-exempt charitable corporation known as "The 1848 Foundation" as the recipient of such net assets.

g. The Sponsor will provide the Fund with appropriate guidance and the Fund, to the extent it is apprised thereof, will insure that all Fund activities are conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. Government policy and the Sponsor policy and mission. It is moreover recognized that developments unforeseen at the time of the approval by the Sponsor of any annual program may require the termination thereof, or any portions thereof, at any time by the Fund either at its own instance or at the request of the Sponsor.

h. The Fund will accept restricted gifts from private donors, other than Crusade for Freedom, Inc., only when mutually agreed by the Fund and the Sponsor.

i. The Fund may submit budgetary revisions either quarterly or whenever proposed new activities or unforeseen developments require a significant change in approved budgets.

j. Within the limits of approved budgets, the Fund will requisition funds from the Sponsor quarterly unless unanticipated requirements necessitate interim requisitions.

k. To promote their common security interest, the Sponsor will keep the Fund continuously advised as to desirable security procedures and the Fund will be free to request specific security guidance from the Sponsor at any time. The Fund will not elect or appoint a director, officer, key executive or any other person who will have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship without the prior specific concurrence of the Sponsor. In respect of employees who will not have knowledge of the Sponsor-Fund relationship, the Fund will, nevertheless, obtain appropriate security clearances from the Sponsor prior to employment.

2. Where appropriate, detailed procedures will be cooperatively developed by the Fund and the Sponsor to insure the effective implementation of the principles outlined in this Memorandum of Understanding.

For that purpose a liaison office in Sponsor's organization will be designated by Sponsor. Except on financial and budget matters which will be handled by the Fund with Sponsor's Office of Administration, and on matters which the Fund desires to take up with the Director of Sponsor or his immediate Deputies, relations between the Fund and Sponsor will be coordinated by or through this liaison office and, except as above, any matters which the Fund desires to bring to the attention of Sponsor may be referred to or through such liaison office.

Initialed as of this 4th day of August 1952:

/s/ A.W.D.
(Mr. Dulles)

/s/ H.H.M.
(Admiral Miller)

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CPP		
2	DD/P		
3	DDCI		
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	C/IO	TWB	8 Dec
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

This may interest you as evidence of the good team spirit we have among some of our operating campaigners. It was left behind by Alan Valentine in his personal files.

Tom Braden
TWB

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

20P 1610

3 2

1/4

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

110 West 57th Street • New York 19, N. Y. • Telephone Plaza 7-7600

Cable Address: Natfrecomm

August 1, 1952

Mr. Alan Valentine, President
Committee for a Free Asia, Inc.
245 California Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Alan:

It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington.

For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Bedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape.

I checked down there regarding any taboo concerning your help on the Crusade for Freedom campaign. I think there was a misunderstanding here. They have no thought of providing a complete taboo. Their thought was that all other operation should not stop and your time be devoted wholly to the Crusade.

Actually, we will call upon you for very little help. When Dick Walsh comes out to talk with you within the next ten days, he will give you a complete fill-in on what assistance we would like to have. I am sure you will have no trouble in giving us this assistance.

With regard to the wording of the language by which we transmit the money to you -- I am going to try to get a Board Meeting together on Tuesday at which time the necessary action will be taken to clear our forwarding letters to you insofar as capital expenditures go.

My very best regards.

Sincerely,

H. B. Miller

HBM:mlm

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Aug 1, 1952

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT : List of Rightist Rumanian Refugees.

1. In accordance with a request of Mr. John Leich for information on any questionable members of Gen. Radescu's League of Free Rumanians, transmitted herewith is a list of a number on whom information is available. Information on others will be forwarded to you as received.

2. Most of those listed have been connected with the Iron Guard groups, either as members or as fellow travelers, or with other groups whose ideology is in conflict with U. S. policy. The names preceded by an asterisk are considered unsuitable for employment in any American organization.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE Division

Encl.
List

SE/5/MCNewcomb:fc (13 August 1952)

1 August 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE Division
Chief, SE Division
Chief, WE Division
Chief, FY Division
Chief, Budget and Analysis Division
Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: TPTONIC Budget

1. Attached for your specific comments and evaluation is the TPTONIC proposed budget for fiscal year 1953.

2. It will be necessary to have your comments and initials on the cover sheet by Tuesday noon, August 5.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

1 - EE
1 - SE
1 - WE
1 - PY
1 - AL/BD
1 - OD/CO
1 - CIO
2 - IO/TONIC
2 - RI

July ? Draft
not sent

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE-CIA RELATIONS

1. When this Division was delegated the responsibility of conducting CIA relations with NCFE it was immediately apparent that a variety of problems existed which made effective action on the part of IO Division difficult if not impossible. These difficulties may be generally summarized as follows:

(1) Satisfactory mechanical procedures to provide information to CIA and to insure effective cooperation and coordination of activities by CIA and NCFE did not exist. This was true not only in financial matters, such as the orderly submission of budgets and financial reporting, as well as security, but was also true of attempts to give NCFE policy guidance and to insure that NCFE's activities did not compromise CIA operation~~al activitie~~s.

(2) The attitude of the responsible officials of NCFE was one largely of non-cooperation in terms of NCFE and CIA efforts being joint to achieve the same objective. Indeed NCFE's attitude was that they are a separate organization with the responsibilities of a corporation in the State of New York, ~~and~~ that the role of CIA's representatives in dealing with them was one of being their salesmen rather than partners, that once their general activities were approved and financed, their responsibilities to CIA were fulfilled.

(3) NCFE has not only failed to provide information about its activities, but had generally expanded its relations with government agencies in an effort to play one agency against another and, indeed, in many cases play the personnel of one agency against other personnel in that agency. A general feeling of suspicion and distrust provaded CIA's relationships with NCFE.

2. In an attempt to properly discharge~~d~~ its responsibilities IO Division has attempted to solve the above problems by (1) preparing an agreement or directive which ~~states~~ sets out the joint responsibilities of CIA and NCFE and (2) which clearly states NCFE's duties and responsibilities to this Agency. To implement this agreement IO Division has, or is in the process of, creating orderly procedures by which this agreement will be put into effect.

3. If IO Division is to suceed in its task, which in our opinion is well begun, two conditions are ~~in our opinion~~ essential:

(1) That there be a single point of liaison between NCFE and CIA and that CIA act as the sole official governmental liaison with NCFE. It should be said that this does not mean that officials of NCFE will not consult with higher authorities in CIA, but that when they do, those responsible in IO Division will be fully informed.

(2) That NCFE clearly understands with whom they are to deal in CIA and that those with whom they deal on a regular basis are responsible officials entitled to respect as such—

officials whose responsibilities are to lend their cooperation and guidance insofar as it is necessary to achieve common objectives.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Investigation of Relations

PROBLEM

It is likely that at a meeting you will hold Monday, 4 August, with members of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, these Directors will maintain they do not wish to sign or to accept a directive and/or agreement as to relations between NCFE and CIA, which has been approved by the CIA administrative staff and the International Organisations Division of CIA.

DISCUSSION

At the time responsibility for CIA dealings with NCFE was transferred to the IO Division, a survey was undertaken by this Division with the help of the CIA administrative staff under Mr. Wolf. The following was found to be the status of relations between CIA and NCFE:

1. Budget and Financial Relations.

a. No orderly submission of budgetary requirements on the part of NCFE has ever been established or practiced. For example, the CIA approved budget for the fiscal year 1952 was substantially different than the budget upon which NCFE based its activities. Bad communication has existed.

b. CIA has not exercised any form of control over NCFE expenditures after initial approval. For example, NCFE has been free to switch funds allocated for one project to some new project or to pay for extending an old one without further reference to CIA.

c. Monies raised by NCFE through the Crusade for Freedom or monies advanced by CIA and unspent at the end of the fiscal year have not been considered in the granting of funds for a new fiscal year.

SECRET

d. When budgets have been presented by NCFE, they have not been presented with reasonable thoroughness or accuracy nor have they indicated expenditures which are reasonably certain and those which are projections of possible activities for which NCFE has nevertheless asked for funds.

e. In certain instances, i.e. grants to certain national councils, NCFE makes expenditures for which there is no adequate accounting to NCFE and on which the Committee has had little or no information on how the money is spent.

2. Financial Reporting.

a. It is unquestioned that the internal business and accounting procedures of NCFE are excellent. However, adequate financial information has not been presented to CIA.

b. Security.

As the recent case of Leland Stowe indicates, NCFE has disregarded essential security considerations in the hiring of personnel. Neither the Security Officer, CIA, nor any other branch or component of CIA, has anything but extremely inadequate information as to who is on the NCFE payroll.

c. Policy Control.

In its relations with emigres through its National Councils Division and in its radio broadcasts through RFE, NCFE has in many cases not received adequate guidance from CIA and the State Department and in some instances not followed the guidance provided. CIA is seldom informed by NCFE of its proposed activities other than in its over-all budgetary presentation.

d. Coordination of CIA Activities with NCFE.

NCFE's activities in radio broadcasting, which account for three-quarters of its yearly budget, are almost entirely transferred overseas. The action of its 1400 or more overseas personnel often cut across CIA's own field operations. NCFE has not accepted coordination in this field.

3. IO Division and Administrative Staff Proposed Actions to Solve These Difficulties.

The IO Division with the assistance of the CIA Administrative Staff has prepared a memorandum of agreement to serve as a guide in the conduct of relations between CIA and NCFE. This agreement provides the following:

a. Adequate budget information upon which to evaluate the purposes and probable success of proposed NCFE activities as well as an adequate financial reporting system by NCFE so that this Agency can at all times be aware of and insure the approved expenditure of funds by NCFE.

b. Adequate security arrangements so that every employee of NCFE has been given a security clearance necessary for the proper protection of this operation.

c. The IO Division is to be the sole channel of liaison by NCFE to CIA and the State Department. The purpose of this provision is to insure adequate preparation and consistent policy guidance for NCFE in all its varied activities and to afford a single point of liaison and coordination with State Department and the area divisions of CIA. It is by no means intended to prevent officials and directors of NCFE from discussing problems with higher authorities and in fact the IO Division cannot give policy guidance without reference to higher authorities. In the past, however, NCFE has conducted liaison with many of the area divisions in CIA, with the State Department and with various officials in CIA, and there has been a resultant confusion.

d. The agreement provides for the submission of monthly reports by NCFE as to the status of its substantive activities.

4. Attitudes of NCFE.

The basic attitudes of NCFE about themselves is summed up by the comments on the first draft of the above-mentioned agreement by Spencer Phenix:

a. "Our friends can refuse to supply funds for disapproved activities but cannot legally or properly be given the 'right to disapprove or modify any activities or require abandonment, modification, or change in emphasis, in any of the existing programs'."

b. "Again, no agreement between our friends and ourselves can legally diminish our corporate right to spend our corporate funds . . ."

c. It is unacceptable that private consent of CIA should be required as to the appointment of new directors and officers.

d. The money given to NCFE by CIA is given first to the 1848 Foundation and this money is then donated to NCFE. CIA therefore has no right to inquire into policies or expenditures although "normally we would consult our friends".

5. Basic Attitude of CIA.

CIA has a duty and responsibility to insure affirmatively the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with the CIA mission and with the DCI's responsibility to higher authority. A course of action based upon the view that NCFE's autonomy is such that it cannot accept the above-mentioned agreement, or some form thereof, might under conceivable circumstances, i.e. a change in the viewpoint of the German Government where most of NCFE's employees are located, the possibility of high-level changes in NCFE, or the growing insistence on the part of the exiles for armed liberation, lead to action not consistent with the DCI's responsibility. At present a situation exists in which CIA and the Division charged with CIA responsibility cannot exercise that responsibility.

6. Recommendation.

The PRC has reviewed this agreement and has refused to approve the budget of NCFE until this agreement or a modification acceptable to NCFE is adopted. The Director has approved this decision and it is suggested that he stand upon it.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - ADD/A (for DDCI)
1 cc - "
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

ER-3-1369

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is a memorandum which was handed me by Spencer Phonix covering a confidential report made by two NCFE people with regard to NCFE's action in connection with refugees. I have not read this in full and would like your recommendation and analysis so as to spare me this if possible.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 15, 1952
Revised July 20, 1952

AN NCFE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

Reduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCFE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCFE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCFE countries.

The first step is, of course, for NCFE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCFE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCFE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.

Several basic factors have combined to alter NCFE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCFE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in each of these countries, NCFE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. This, however, is no longer the case.

Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugee situation is an aspect of the general NCFE relationship with exiles. In the changed European situation in which this interest is and will be manifested NCFE should reconsider its basic instruments for such relationships : the National Councils. Their exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefully analyzed and the conclusions drawn therefrom. The inadequacy of the National Councils as a basic instrument in the changed situation in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certain adaptations of this instrument and the creation of new ones will be required if NCFE is to carry out its functions and realize its potentialities.

- II -

WHY NCFE IS CONCERNED IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS CONCERN SHOULD BE PROPERLY AND EFFECTIVELY MANIFESTED.

A. The Extent of NCFE's Concern to Date :

In the past NCFE has not directly concerned itself with the over-all problem of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. This policy of NCFE has manifested itself in the following ways. NCFE has consistently made it clear that its chief interest lies in what it regarded as the political and intellectual elite of emigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certain elements of this political and intellectual elite, however, realized the necessity and the importance of channeling some of their activities toward the mass of their respective emigrations on a national basis. This realization was dictated either by humanitarian or strictly realistic political principles, or by a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of the elite approached NCFE with their proposals for NCFE material and moral support of such activities. These proposals differed widely and were implemented at varying periods over the last three years, with the result that presently NCFE is indirectly supporting refugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of $118,168.00, and with the further result that these activities are confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated and unjustly and inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups, as for instance the Hungarians, have been receiving relatively large amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as for example the Poles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.

The vehicles for the channeling of this support have also differed widely. Originally, NCFE 's theory in providing support for such activities was based upon the existence of National

Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis upon direct assistance only to the intellectual and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.

The most ambitious and long-lived of these National Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's original theory. The record, however, even of this prize example, is an extremely spotty one (details to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the reasons for the spottiness of the HNC's record are not all attributable to the HNC itself; many, indeed, are due to the situation in which the NCFE's approach to the refugee problem, which has provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. * Refugee service has had to operate and [illegible] are due to NCFE's

In the Rumanian case, NCFE's support for refugee activities was originally channeled through the Rumanian National Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian Welfare, Incorporated, an organization entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on its Board of Directors.

In the Czechoslovak case, NCFE has channeled its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4, 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to an organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees. This organization, like Rumanian Welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumanian Welfare, however, the AFCR in Germany and Austria received from IRO or HICOG and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which shared with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctuations of their leadership in the U.S., and that, in a sense, NCFE must also accept some responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.

A/

In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by NCFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFA has, it is reported, due chiefly to close American supervision in Rome, managed to do more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the HNC and BNC in Italy.

In the case of the Poles, because of the failure of the Polish emigration to produce a united national council which could be recognized by NCFE, no financial support whatsoever has been given by NCFE to Polish refugee activities, although the Poles have one of the most sizable emigrations of all the nationality groups with which NCFE cooperates, and although the Poles have an organization, American Polish War Relief, a voluntary agency, which seems to be at least as effective, if not more so than the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees or Rumanian Welfare, Inc., organizations with which it is roughly comparable.

In the case of the Yugoslavs, which is probably the most difficult case of all, from the U.S. and the NCFE point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the individual refugee, NCFE has confined itself to contributing small amounts to the Benevolent Association of Free Citizens of Yugoslavia in London, in order that cettain exiled leaders—who rendered signal services to the Allied cause during World War II, through their participation in the revolt of March, 1941, which led Yugoslavia to resist the Nazi Invasion - might receive small stipends. Although this aid is rendered through an organization abroad, to exiles residing abroad, it is in line rather with NCFE's policy of providing assistance to a political and intellectual élite than with the policy of indirect support through National Councils or other organizations of refugee activity. No Yugoslav National Council, enjoying NCFE recognition, has ever emerged due to the delicate situation of Western policy vis-à-vis Tito's government.

In the case of the three Baltic States, although NCFE has been provided, both in the U.S. and abroad, with the instruments which have most nearly proved themselves capable of efficient, just and honest use of funds for refugee activities, no such funds have been placed at the disposal of the three Baltic Consultative Panels or their counterpart committees in Germany and elsewhere abroad.

Originally, also, although the principle was never clearly defined or figidly adhered to, and, at present, is as much departed from as observed, it was felt that NCFE-supported refugee activities should be restricted, as much as possible, to the type of assistance which a consulate would render to its citizens who found themselves in difficulties in a foreign country. Such assistance would according to this line of thinking only occasionally and in cases of extreme and immediate need, be material; essentially it would consist of advice, translation and verification of documents and direction of the refugee to the appropriate agency capable of furnishing him with the type of further assistance, material or otherwise, which might be required. It has always been recognized, however, that the various National Councils acting as consulates for their anti-Communnist compatriots, who could not turn to the legally-recognized Communist embassies, legations or consulates of their countries for help, would have to provide some material assistance for those who turned to them for help, if only a tram ticket, to allow them to visit the various international and local social agencies who could help them, or the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the AFCR and Rumanian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.

Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following :

1. Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile elite were limited in scope.

2. Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.

3. The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.

-III -

THE CHANGED SITUATION
U.S. AND EUROPE

While IRO operated NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and PICMM, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as NCWC, LWF and WCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - MSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet an unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.

The period of IRO's existnace coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.

During the early years of NCFE's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCFE control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.

In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement held its first mass meeting in London; in April the French Comité Nationale pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCFE and RFE. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack special financial means to engage in activity on an NCFE-scale, they do possess, by virtue of their control of the legal and welfare framework within which the refugee must exist, the means to extend or withhold benefits so as to influence the refugee political situation to their advantage. It seems reasonable to suppose that as these nations gain in strength and independence this process will continue at an increasing rate.

As a result of the factors described above, the refugee finds himself in an increasingly hostile environment, deprived of an effective international protector and incapable, alone, unaided and unguided clearly to see his interests and defend them from exploitation. The Czechoslovaks and Poles in Germany provide striking examples of shortsighted, aimless exile pre-occupation with sterile political manouvering to the advantage of their German hosts. At the same time, the voluntary agencies in Germany, which, after IRO's demise, were granted certain facilities by HICOG must, after the ratification of the contractual agreements, look to the German Government for whatever facilities it may choose to grant them.

Until its May 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignore the presence of the refugees in the West. Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activity and its increasing need of refugees as informational sources have led to strong accusations that RFE is evading its responsibilities and failing to accept the consequences of its own effectiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specifically inciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in the West with life in the East, inevitably constitute an indirect encouragement to escape. These accusations and resentment are ill-concealed among the representatives of the various international and voluntary agencies.

RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, are in closest contact with the refugees, sympathize with this criticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees than they are presently able to do on their own. These RFE information gatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivals seeking this valuable commodity. They usually present the refugees who have been helpful in providing them with information with presents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would like to be in a position to do more than this for their informants, they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfare business. One of their special difficulties is to persuade the refugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universally they have reported that if the refugees were made to realize that Free Europe was doing something for them, they would be more willing and even eager, to come to the RFE information offices in the camps to give freely of their information. Furthermore, RFE's propaganda can be dangerously weakened by the boomerang effect of the few disillusioned refugees who return to their homelands.

In consequence of the closure of IRO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committees a double vacuum exists. In respect to the first vacuum, the UN High Commission, PICME, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yet to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the Brisish, the French, the Italians, the Austrians and the Germans have the possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the German interest is most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interests. The fact that the Germans have demonstrated an interest in these committees and particularly in support of the Separatist elements indicates that these committees are not without political importance; Because of the political ambitions or honest desire to serve of their leaders and of the need of the refugee for spokesmen and representatives in their dealings with local authorities, such committees will always exist, whether or not they are controlled or supported. If these committees are to be controlled at all, it is obviously to NCFE's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would be dangerous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "leaders" residing in the U.S. as the opportunity exists for these leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Western Power against another. It has already been demonstrated in one case that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.S., due to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.

In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of minor vacuums in exile representation which have been filled by unscrupulous self-appointed national representatives whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsible and consistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and qualified representatives. In this regard, representatives of the UN High Commission and the voluntary agencies have expressed a definite interest in efforts to order the chaotic situation of the national representatives.

- IV -

RECONSIDERATION OF NCFE'S BASIC INSTRUMENT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EXILES AND REFUGEES: THE NATIONAL COUNCILS.

As we have shown above, it is to NCFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools which are to be used. The Division of NCFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, and indirectly with the refugees, has been the National Councils Divisions. This Division has used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE's experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective implementation of NCFE policy and purpose.

The divisive factors of exile have resulted in :

1. The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;

2. The absence of any Rumanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;

3. A prolonged split (a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;

4. A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.

Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNU will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCFE with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.

No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to step in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.

Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement on a secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbrous apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.

Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effective to develop its interest in the European refugee field, a new instrument must be found. These factors also tend to indicate roughly some of the qualities which this instrument must possess.

1. No single exile organization engaged in refugee activity, including those receiving NCFE support, is consistently good in all of its local branches. This observation applies also to those organizations receiving NCFE supports which do not fall into the national council category (the APGR and Rumanian Welfare).

Conclusions :

In its activity in the European refugee field, NCFE must be completely free to select the organizations and individuals with which it may consider it practical to cooperate on any level. NCFE must therefore not be committed to support or to cooperate with any organization in all its parts and must be free to sever connections at any time with any organization or its parts (individuals or sections) with which it finds it no longer practical to cooperate. NCFE must be completely flexible in this operation.

2. The refugee in Europe is confronted with a situation which is fluid in all its aspects. He faces since the closure of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencies, the continued existence of some (the voluntary agencies) is uncertain; the operations of others (the UN and PICME) remain to be developed fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncertain, suspicious and fearful of the new status and intentions of the local national authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live. He faces the after-effects of mass emigration, which, although it ceased some time ago, has deprived him of the most qualified of his compatriots and hence of stable national leadership. For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncoordinated emigration on an individual basis which still exists offers but faint hope for departure from the frontier countries. He faces almost impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situations and seasonal work which often requires his being shifted from place to place as the employment situation dictates. The majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the dole. He faces shifting camps which are often moved or dissolved by the local authorities. These factors combine to produce a demoralizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They are, in turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence in these countries of embittered expelled ethnic minorities who were once the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homeland [illegible] is a deplorable feeling of apathy, hopelessness, isolation and abandonment and a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.

Conclusions :

NCF 's approach to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may impart a feeling of purpose, direction, continuity and security. This approach must have an attractive national flavor which will appeal to the refugee"s desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implement this approach NCFE's instrument in the field must again be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and rigid control. This instrument must be capable of conveying an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.

3. In general it may be observed that in the frontiers countries there is a notable lack of knowledge of NCFE's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far/ indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and almost as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FEUE is usually known, but only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, activities and goals is distorted. There is a dim awareness of FEUE's connection with RFE, but a general failure to draw any conclusions therefrom.

Conclusion :

To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling NCFE as the organization ultimately responsible for these activities is a needless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced NCFE prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUE on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of RFE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Therefore the instrument which NCFE adopts for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an NCFE operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.

4. It has been mentioned previously that the international and voluntary agencies tend to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold them at arm's length. This attitude seems partially to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest has in several cases led them to choose refugee assistants and advisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the NCFE point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refugee groups somehow organized and controlled.

Conclusion :

Responsible and direct American control would therefore do much to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the way for a more positive and productive cooperation between the national refugee groups and the agencies active in their behalf. This control would also it is reasonable to suppose, help to fill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described above.

5. Another weakness of the organizations surveyed in the frontier countries is their almost universal tendency in greater or lesser degrees to discriminate politically or personally in the distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between the extent of this weakness in the tense and unsettled atmosphere of the frontier countries and the more normal environment of the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In addition to the injustice of such discrimination, definite opportunities are lost through failure seriously to attempt to win over, through less narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech and Slovak Separatists, Hungarian extremists and the Schwabs) which now oppose or inthe future might oppose the political and national structures which NCFE recognizes and supports.

Conclusion :

Again, close NCFE guidance and control are indicated so that injustices may be reduced and broader NCFE aims implemented, rather than thwarted by narrower interests of short-sighted and unenlightened refugee representatives.

- V -

HOW NCFE'S INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE PROBLEM MIGHT BEST BE MANIFESTED; APPLICATIONS IN ITS PRESENT INSTRUMENTS AND CREATION OF A NEW ONE -- THE FREE EUROPE COUNSELOR SERVICE. (FECS).

A. NCFE's approach

If NCFE is to modify its present instruments and create new ones to manifest its interest in the problem of refugees in Europe, it should first formulate a broad and comprehensive approach to the refugee as a type of person in whom and in whose problems this interest is to be shown.

This approach will, by the nature of NCFE's interest in the refugee, differ markedly from those of other organizations active in the field.

All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, the local national governments, the UN High Commissioner and the voluntary agencies, are interested in the Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole who crosses the border because, respectively, he might be a Communist agent or have information, he is or might be a political refugee or because he is a human being in need. NCFE is interested in him because he is a Czechoslovak or Rumanian or Pole -- a citizen of a country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fundamental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Poles in Poland, etc. The fundamental practical reason is of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples as European political factors.

RFE obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested qhite simply in promoting the existence of certain attitudes, interests and activities which will one day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RFE is interested that mothers should teach their children certain truths to counter Communist lies; that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures; that students should understand the fallacies of the system which they are being seduced or forced to serve. In short, RFE wishes to direct Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in Hungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, as supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broader interests serves only to underline its importance.

We have tried to point out in this report the extent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refugees from NCFE countries in Western Europe cannot but be of interest to NCFE. Again, NCFE need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertake to raise an army.

This is not to say that NCFE may not find it advisable to continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with refugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the chaos of refugees activities by giving to the refugee and his representatives a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe almost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothing but the tense and quarrelsome fraternity of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. With few books and less communication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and guidance, the parties become almost the only organizations with a national flavor open to the refugee. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisms become chauvinistic and ideas, of national interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.

The voluntary and other agencies and the local national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reenforcing his apathy by their much needed gifts, unable to offer allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any attempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In all fairness, it should be noted, however, that the current approach to the refugee on the part of all these agencies is a conscious and considerable improvement on the exaggerated and incentive-killing IRO dole system.

But if NCFE approaches the new escapee, as well as the older DP, not as a needy "refugee" but as a citizen of his country who simply finds himself in a difficult position on this side of the Iron Curtain rather than on the other side, it should be possible to appeal to his desire for national continuity and then to some extent appeal to his ideas of his own enlightened self-interest in much the same way that such appeals are provided for the escapee's compatriots at home by RFE.

This approach would also take into account the significant fact that many of the new arrivals, (estimates run as high as 80%) are not real "political refugees". They leave their countries for economic reasons or because they are fed up or simply want to try out the conditions in the West which are described to them as so much superior to those in their homelands. Among these people there are of course many misfits, incompetents and undesirables. No one should delude himself with a picture of all refugees as worthy, deserving, honest people persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for their very lives.

NCFE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality: no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reason whatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition of disillusionment that he should consider returning or even consider sending word of his discouragement home. One such return or report of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunate countereffect to RFE and other Western propaganda. It is an accepted fact that there have been such cases and they are in fact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the present lower arrival rate of new escapees.

Granted this approach to the escapee and the old refugee and DP as a citizen, and the desire to promote among these people the idea of concern for their real self-interests, the idea which most adequately describes this approach is that of the "consulate".

The functions of a consulate are to protect the interests of the citizen abroad. Material assistance is provided only in cases of emergency -- the consulate's principal task is to take an active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agencies best able to satisfy his wants and to suggest approaches and attitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad. The most glaring and urgent example of the need for such consular guidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czechoslovaks in Germany not only from the political opposion of the Germans, but from their own senseless, destructive and short-sighted political maneuverings.

B. Modifications of NCFE's present instrument.

As indicated above, it will of course be useful and desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECS), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument which have demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also as mentioned earlier, in order to assure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of these features of the present instrument will be required.

1. It will first of all be necessary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the present instrument considered suitable for incorporation in FECS be separated administratively and financially from their headquarters, since FECS will operate on the basis of the following procedural approach:

Such individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary basis -- their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of effectiveness under NCFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RFE and RPS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attainment of their own goals.

2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refugee activities and exile organizations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at least the illusion of freedom through the incorporation of qualified exile organizations and individuals and the selection of others to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals have proved unable to fill. The fact of their ultimate responsibility to NCFE should be made abundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proved by the success of RFE national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consular assistants under a civil service program. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugees lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritism or dishonesty would constitute an evasion of their patriotic responsibility.

C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.

The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. We have tried to indicate the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which FECS would have the purpose of serving might be :

1) The prevention of misunderstandings on the part of the

refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of NCFE work, and particularly that of FEUE and RFE.

2) The attempt to keep the NCFE European Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of exile political developments in Europe which might affect their operations and to control and guide these developments wherever possible to the advantage of NCFE and RFE. For example, NCFE, designed to wage political warfare on a broad front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing such occurences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.

1. The primary function of FECS is to approach the refugee as a citizen and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugee to escape from the apathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the west. FECS will attempt to perform this function in several ways :

a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal consular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorities, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refugees on all relevant matters in conjunction with these other agencies and generally interest itself in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.

b. Material assistance. While material assistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FECS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consulates, since the physical condition of the person appealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other organizations are better set up to provide such material needs, and FECS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensive efforts to prevent duplication. But FECS must have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a featherbed or another operation to "use" the refugee.

c. Refugee morale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of mind and the atmosphere in which he lives.

The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all FECS operations. It should be manifested as soon as possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, if only in the form of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the refugee of information and asking him questions. This briefing might include a description of the voluntary agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his legal status and, of course, of the FECS program, including the names and addresses of its representatives in the camps or areas to which the refugee might be sent. The refugee might also be saved considerable disillusionment if at this time he were given a carefully worded description of the difficult economic situation in which he will be obliged for some time to remain. For example in Germany, the refugee should be told of the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zone and of the German government's natural desire to assist them. A representative of one of the voluntary agencies suggested to us that the refugees are rarely made to understand that they are initially accepted into countries faced with unusually severe economic problems.

c) Secondly, the refugee's frame of mind might be improved by the installation of reading rooms containing publications in the national languages, some of them geared especially to the refugee and his problems. For example, some of the useful exile-organized refugee aid Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanian in London and the Hungarian Office in Munich produce regular bulletins containing local legal and employment news of interest to the refugee. Such bulletins should receive a wider distribution and others like them should be created. In this connection, it should be noted that RPS publications are not reaching the refugees, among whom our survey has indicated they would be most welcome and are much needed. Also in the reading rooms, radios should be provided in response to the desire, frequently expressed to us, of hearing RFE and other broadcasts in the national languages.

b) The organization of constructive meetings, discussions and national celebrations would provide an outlet for refugee enthusiasms if they were supervised by competent leadership. Similarly, FECS should stimulate and possibly provide the means for self-help work projects, such as the paintings of barracks, the planting of gardens and the organization of sewing circles, language courses or discussion groups, etc....

The second factor involved in the question of refugee morale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which he lives. ~~To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved in which h lives.~~ To a large extent this atmosphere would be improved by the organization, as noted above, of constructive outlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and petty political internal and international strife, both of which have at times led to murder in the camps.

d) FECS major effort in this direction, however, should be directed toward bridging the gap in a constructive manner between, on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies and the local authorities, and, on the other, the essential national interests of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of the voluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimes cooperate with them best when the situation has been explained by one of their national representatives. For the reasons of suspicion on the part of these agencies cited earlier, this is not always done. FECS could provide a responsible instrument for so doing.

The principal gap which exists at present between the various authorities and the refugees is over the question of assimilation, or, as it is usually described, "integration" and "adaptation". There is a natural feeling on the part of these agencies and authorities that in view of the restriction of emigration possibilities, the only alternative open to many of the refugees is to adapt themselves to their environment. The refugee, is, however, quite understandably reluctant to do so: He plans to return to his country when it is liberated "next year"; he is sure he will emigrate shortly; particularly in Germany, he may strongly dislike or distrust the local population. There is also of course the determining factor of employment possibilities -- one of the aspects of the refugee problem with which FECS cannot and need not directly concern itself.

Indirectly, however, FECS can contribute to its resolution. For example, in Germany, the problem of national schools, which has been a score point, suggests a suitable compromise. The refugees have struggled to maintain full-time national schools for their children, sometimes succeeding with NCFE and other external support, while the local and international authorities have insisted that refugee children attend German schools. The refugee must be made to understand that it is to his children's interest to allow them to adapt as long as the essential elements of national culture can be preserved. This requirement could be and in some instance is already being met by extra-curricular instruction in the national language, history and culture.

In the same way the refugee must also be shown that by refusing to adapt, he may make of his national group an ingrown, despised and distrusted minority. If on the other hand, he shows willingness to adapt to the situation in which he finds himself, he is much more likely to obtain not only physical but psychological benefits in the form of broader practical experience, with the possibility that this experience may one day be of use to him in his own homeland. This is a difficult point which the mass of refugees will be reluctant to grasp. Some of their more intelligent leaders, however, -- the kind which FECS hopes to employ -- might be able to explain its importance. Also, the experience of one camp director in Trieste has proved that it is not impossible to get results through healthy national competitions ; if the Rumanians paint their barracks, the Hungarians feel more obliged to paint theirs. While probably ineffective among the hardened older refugees, shame might successfully be used among new arrivals, as for example, "If you say you intend to return after liberation, what will you tell your friends that you did for Poland in emigration ? That you helped create friends for Poland by keeping the neatest barracks in Germany --- or that you sat around a pigsty all day doing nothing ? That you refused to take a job in a construction company because it was beneath you, or that you helped to build a stronger and more prosperous West to hasten the day of liberation ?" Arguments of this kind were not wholly without effect on strikers, and shirkers, during the war. Doubtless they have been tried by representatives of the voluntary agencies, etc., but FECS representatives should have additional authority for such arguments by virtue of their membership in one division of an organization actively working in many ways for the liberation of the refugees' homelands.

Also, just as the presence of extracurricular schools, by their guarantee of the preservation of the essentials of national culture, encourage attendance at German schools, so the manifestations of NCFE's similar interest on the local level through FECS might liberate the refugee from the anxiety for maintaining his traditions within his smaller group and so diminish his reluctance to attempt some measure of adaptation. In this connection the citizenship approach applies particularly, since FECS must demonstrate that NCFE is not only generally and broadly interested in keeping satellite culture alive(in the DIC and ~~as~~ at FEUE), but also in keeping the individual refugee living outside a camp, in touch with his compatriots and traditions not only through personal contact but by making available to him publications in his language, etc; In this way the refugee might be encouraged in his slow process of adaptation to strange and in many cases hostile environment.

This is again a vast problem affected by many factors far beyond the scope of FECS or NCFE. It is almost certainly true that if more respectable and worthwhile jobs were available to refugees, much of their apparently nationally based aversion to adaptation would disappear.

But if FECS makes emphasis on adaptation one of its major points of policy, and makes this fact clear to the local national and international authorities, and then actively implements this policy as suggested above, it will almost certainly find itself most sympathetically regarded by these authorities.

2. These are but a few of the functions which FECS should be able to perform; anyone regularly active in the field could probably suggest many more. There are, however, certain broader potentialities for the development of this instrument which might be briefly suggested here.

In the first place, it should be possible to gain some advantage, beyond the fact that they come to us, from the presence of the refugees in the West. FECS might be able to produce such an advantage.

To brand this approach as hopelessly idealistic is to ignore the extraordinary practical results achieved at Camp Valka from July 1951 to January 1952 by the German camp commander at that time, von Homeyer. When von Homeyer, with no previous experience of these problems arrived, Valka was in terrible situation. Knifings and riots were frequent and the Nuremberg police were not only on constant alert, but a force of 28 men was maintained at the camp.

Von Homeyer began by calling the national representatives together, and it took him two weeks to get them into one room.

Finally, when they had assembled, he gave them hell and explained it would be a waste of time for them to try to alter or influence the situation in their own countries from Valka. He told them he believed the cause of many difficulties was the personal interest of many of the leaders in preparing the way for big roles at home after liberation. He then presented his idea of forming the first European community at Valka. He told the national representatives he had no support from Munich — he was on his own and asked for their help and cooperation. One by one they came to him and agreed.

Von Homeyer's technique of making friends with the people, with whom he soon acquired an excellent reputation, was an effective instrument in swinging their national committees to his side, for aware of his popularity, they hesitated not to show active cooperation. As a means of delegating self-administration of the camp to elected representatives, von Homeyer was about to establish a small parliament when he was recalled by reason~~s~~ of a German administrative snafu in which favoritism played a part. Just before his departure, the Nuremberg chief of police approached him and asked that he request the withdrawal of the permanent squad, which the chief felt was no longer required due to the enormous progress in camp behaviour.

After von Homeyer's replacement by an unimaginative bureaucrat, the situation at Valka relapsed into violence. Yet his influence lingered, and delegations from the national groups visited him, begging him to return to the camp. Later, when the situation became even worse, delegates from the German administrative personnel at Valka also came to urge that he return. This was just before our talk with him, and the employees brought with them tales of the latest knifing. Obviously von Homeyer's idealistic and far-sighted approach to the refugee problem had made a profound impression not only upon the refugees themselves but on Germans associated with the problem in a practical way.

b) Von Homeyer's European community approach might be borne in mind in connection with NCFE's espousal of the policy of Federalism. Similarly the FECS citizenship approach might have the potentiality of being broadened to provide grass-roots emphasis on this aspect of NCFE's policy. The idea of European citizenship for refugees is not original or new, but it might provide NCFE and RFE with a useful propaganda weapon."

Von Homeyer's realistic and productive idealism perhaps also indicates the necessity for at least trying to uncover and support more positive elements than the usual exile political leaders, even though it is believed likely that the latter will be able to regain control of their political machinery and return to power after liberation. For this reason, not to attempt the production of more constructive leaders and attitudes more amenable to NCFE and US interests is an example of infatuation with "hard-boiled" realism for its own sake.

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Another potential use of FECS might be in conjunction with certain proposals advanced by individual RFE staff members. These call for the use of refugees as sounding boards for group reactions to new broadcast themes and as sample groups for testing basic satellite country attitudes. Refugees helped by FECS might be more interested in contributing to such projects; conversely, FECS efforts to restore their feeling of belonging to the struggle for liberation of their countries would be immeasurable assisted by this opportunity for them to assist in the sharpening of this potent "sister weapon".

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NCFE and RFE exile employees who by and large form a privileged class among the refugees as a result of being relatively well paid, should be encouraged to contribute small but regular amounts of their salaries on a voluntary deduction basis to refugee welfare. Some RFE employees have already done this on an informal basis and have expressed a desire to do so on a regular deduction basis but have been discouraged by the information that this would involve a violation of RFE regulations. In view of the success of a similar welfare fund instituted by the Polish Labor Service Companies attached to the U.S. Army in Germany, it is recommended that this possibility be investigated. FECS might prove a sure means of channeling such aid to the refugee.

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The form for refugees in Turkey established by the Gazi Khan Bessolt Committee which has an international aspect resembling Von Homoyer's approach would qualify for inclusion in the FECS program, although no specific proposal can be made until after a detailed field survey.

D. Proposed organizations of FECS.

1. FECS will be a service section of NCFE under the directorship of NCFE's General European Representative. General policy headquarters will therefore be in Paris as well as the operational subsection responsible for the administration of the FECS branches in England and France. This will have the advantages of removing the general policy headquarters from the immediate tensions and pressures of the frontier countries. The Director will have the task of general policy coordination of FECS with other NCFE divisions and of gaining on a high level the acceptance of and cooperation with FECS by the national and international authorities concerned, perhaps by emphasis on the contribution which FECS could make to their efforts to resolve the refugee problem.

2. Operational headquarters under the direction of a FECS Deputy Director will be in Munich, the point closest to the refugees' geographical center : from Munich the German refugee reception center at Valka and the Austrian equivalent at Wels are each within half a day's drive, or less.

3. The Deputy Director will be responsible for the implementation on the operational level in all areas of all the functions of FECS in line with policies established by the Director. The Deputy Director will be responsible for general operational policy coordination with the national and international authorities and voluntary agencies locally active.

4. The Deputy Director will have six Area Assistants :

1) North Germany, center Bonn or Hannover.

2) South Germany, center Munich and Valka

3) US and French zones of Austria, center Salzburg and Wels.

4) British Zone Austria and Trieste - possibly two assistants

5) Italy, center Rome.

6) Paris, London and Benelux, center Paris.

7) Greece and Turkey, probably will require one area assistant each. However, no field survey of the refugee situation in these two countries has as yet been possible.

The duties of these Assistants will be to provide guidance, inspiration and close administrative and financial supervision of the various national sections of FECS in their respective areas. These Area Assistants must have considerable administrative and financial latitude in order that FECS may possess the high degree of flexibility essential to its effective exploitation of the fluid refugee situation. They must be fully informed of all employment and emigration possibilites, projects of voluntary agencies, etc. Their cooperation and relations with local authorities and active agencies must be close and their relations with them always excellent.

4. FECS will, in each area where it is to operate, form National Sections. These National Sections will be recruited and appointed by FECS. They may or may not include individual representatives of organizations already locally active. In rare cases in the frontier countries, bgt almost entirely in England and France, proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees will become the local National Sections. In cases where no proven exile-organized refugee aid Committees exist, the FECS Area Assistant will recruit with the help and approval of the Deputy Director a National Section Chief, who will in turn, with the approval of the Area Assistant, recruit his own paid assistant or associate where necessary, and as many as local volunteer section member-representatives as may be required by the amount of work, geographical distribution of the refugees, etc.

5. Possible organization of FECS national sections :

England

a) Albanians : special case

b) Bulgarians : Mme Karastoyanova as Section Chief

c) Czechoslovaks : Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee

d) Estonians : Association of Estonians in Great Britain

e) Hungarians : Section Chief to be recruited and appointed Possibly Father Henkey-Haig

f) Latvians : Latvian Welfare Association

g) Lithuanians : Lithuanian Association in Great Britain

h) Poles : Polish Ex-Combatants Association

i) Rumanian : Anglo-Rumanian Refugee Committee

j) Yugoslavs : Yugoslav Welfare Committee (special case)

France

a) Albanians : special case

b) Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France

c) Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques

d) Comité d'Entr'Aide Estonien

e) Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois

f) Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France

g) Association Lithuanienne de Bienfaisance

h) Polish Section Chief and probably two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

i) CAROMAN

j) Yugoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Germany

a) special case

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

c) Czechoslovak Section, paid Associate and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed.

d) Estonian National Committee

e) Hungarian Office, plus Hungarian Relief Action

f) Latvian National Committee plus Latvian Red Cross

g) Lithuanian National Committee

h) Polish Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

j) Yougoslav Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed (Special case).

Austria

a) Special case-Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

c) Czechoslovak Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief and two paid assistants to be recruited and appointed.

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of APWR Salzburg representative, Mr. Knilski.

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed.

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be appointed. Possible use of Colonel Bojovic (Special case).

Trieste

a) special case-Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

c) Czechoslovaks - none

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief and one paid assistant to be appointed. Possible use of Prof. Ternay as half-time Chief with full time assistant.

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

i) CAROMAN Trieste delegate and staff (Mr. Di Demetrio)

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Italy

a) Special case- Albanians

b) Bulgarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

c) Czechoslovaks - none

d) Estonians - none

e) Hungarian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

f) Latvians - none

g) Lithuanians - none

h) Polish Section Chief and one paid assistant to be recruited and appointed

i) Rumanian Section Chief to be recruited and appointed

j) Yugoslav Section Chief to be recruited and appointed (Special Case).

Note : In cases where no national section is provided due to the insignificant numbers of refugees present or probable, it is assumed that the Area Assistant could handle the needs of special arrivals or cases if existent.

E. PROPOSED ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FREE EUROPE CONSULAR SERVICE.

1; Salaries

a; Americans

1) Deputy Director	$ 12,000.00
2) 5 Area Assistants at $7,500.00 per year. (the duties of the sixth Area Assistant, covering France, Britain and the Benelux countries might be performed by a member of the staff of the Paris office).	37,500.00
3) Executive Secretary to Deputy Director	4,000.00

4) Bookkeeper (possibly locally hired)	$ 3,000.00
	$ 56,500.00
5) Quarters and living allowance (35% rough estimate : $ 19,775.00)	19,775.00
Total American Salaries	$ 76,275.00
b. Exile Salaries	
1) ~~241/2~~ 24½ National Section Chiefs and Associates at $250 per month	83,500.00
2) 10 paid assistants for National Sections at $ 150 per month	18,000.00
Total salaries Exiles and American	$177,775.00
2. Travel in Europe and Maintenance of cars at $200 each for 7 American staff members ($1400.00 per month)	16,800.00
3. Two Annual Round trips U.S. - Europe	2,000.00
4. Rent, stationery, telephone, etc. for Deputy Director's office	6,000.00
5. Expenses (travel, stationery, postage, etc. for 24 1/2 National Section Chiefs at $30 a month per person)	8,820.00
6. Monthly subsidies to Exile-Organized Refugee Aid Committees	
a. Bulgarian Refugee Committee - London (Mrs. Karastoyanova)	3,000.00
b. Anglo-Czechoslovak Relief Committee (London)	3,000.00
c. Estonian Consulate - Welfare Division (London)	2,000.00
d. Latvian Welfare Association (London)	2,000.00
e. Lithuanian Welfare Committee (London)	2,000.00
f. Polish Ex-Combattants Association (London)	10,800.00
g. Anglo-Roumanian Relief (London)	5,400.00
h. Yugoslav Welfare Committee (London) through B.A.F.C.Y.	2,000.00
i. Association des Réfugiés Bulgares en France (Paris)	4,800.00

j. Comité d'Aide Sociale aux Réfugiés Tchécoslovaques (Paris)	$ 4,800.00
k. Comit d'Entr'Aide Estonien (Paris)	3,000.00
l. Comité des Réfugiés Hongrois (Paris)	10,800.00
m. Association d'Entr'Aide Letton en France (Paris)	3,000.00
n. Association Lithuanienne Bienfaisance (Paris)	3,000.00
o. C ROMAN (Paris)	4,800.00
p. Estonian National Committee (Germany)	6,000.00
q. Hungarian Office and Hungarian Relief Action (Germany)	20,000.00
r. Latvian National Committee and Latvian Red Cross (Germany)	7,000.00
s. Lithuanian National Committee (Germany)	8,000.00
t. CAROMAN (Trieste)	1,200.00
7. Matérial costs of Implementation of FECB Program (extra-curricular schools, reading rooms, meetings, subscriptions, charts, posters, publicity)	50,000.00
8. Welfare Fund	50,000.00
Total Annual Budget for FECB	$417,695.00

Capital Outlay in Initial Years of Operation

a. purchase of 5 cars at $1000 each for use of 5 areas assistants in frontier countries	5,000.00
b. 10 one-way trips U.S.-Europe for transportation to job of American personnel (and wives and children where they exist at $500 each)	5,000.00
c. Furniture and equipment for Deputy Director's office	700.00
Total	$ 10,700.00

-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-

Mary Augustine

Roger L. Bull

Information

29 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Report of Ex-King Michael's Interest in Rumanian Refugee Unity

1. Transmitted herewith is a report which will be of interest to the NCFE in its current negotiations with the Rumanian refugees.

2. The views of the King with regard to the Iron Guards and others listed, are in agreement with those of this Division.

3. It is requested that arrangements be made for representatives of the NCFE to meet with personnel of this Division to discuss the current negotiations and utilizing this recent information.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Attachment

Orig - [illegible]

SECRET

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24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: G. Popescu-Botosani; J. Radovan;
J. Aron

1. This office has no objection, with respect to security, to the employment of the three subject Rumanians, who have requested State Department assistance in getting on the NCFE payroll.

2. However, it is recommended that no action be taken on their behalf until the present attempt to settle the refugee situation is completed, in order to avoid any appearance of NCFE's favoring one faction.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SR

4 Attachments
Biographies

SECRET

orig - Dunker

625-1

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Security Info

July 22, 1952

To: George Lofton

From: Leonard I. Stamm

For your information I enclose a copy of our contract letter with Leland Stowe. I send you this because of the considerable discussion of the case.

I can't tell you how much I appreciate your consideration and help in this whole affair. It really pulled us out of a deep, deep hole. My very best.

Leonard I. Stamm

attachment in ~~ACFE~~ TONIC files (dtd 17 July)

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Security I

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B.

File

22 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

Attached is a memorandum which it is suggested be shown to the Director of Central Intelligence in time for a scheduled meeting of the Director, members of CIA, and members of the Board of the National Committee for a Free Europe on Monday, 4 August.

L. K. WHITE
Acting Deputy Director
(Administration)

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ADD/A
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

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DRAFT

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Security Information

Richards' memo

21 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: DCI

SUBJECT: Study of Working Relations Between NCFE and CIA by IO and AS/S

1. Following upon its assumption of responsibility for the NCFE project, IO, aided by the AS/S, has undertaken over the past two months an investigation into the NCFE/CIA relations. It ~~is apparent~~ has concluded that these relations have deteriorated to a dangerous extent and that the Agency has lost control of the NCFE activity to a degree it can no longer ignore.

2. In general, the fundamental defect in the relationship is that the NCFE has refused to recognize the legitimate duties and responsibilities of CIA for the policies, financial administration, and security aspects of the NCFE, and the latter has persisted in regarding itself as virtually autonomous. The secondary weakness in the situation has been the inadequacy and confusion of the procedures which were developed to maintain control over and of evaluation of NCFE's activities.

3. As examples of the consequences to which these weaknesses have led, the following are cited: (here should be discussed illustrations of specific problems such as those in your para. a.)

4. The remedy which is being developed as a consequence of this investigation is the re-definition of the responsibilities of CIA and authorities of NCFE and the development of new procedures for the conduct of relations between NCFE and CIA. These definitions and procedures have been reduced to a Memorandum of Agreement which has been prepared by CIA and submitted to NCFE for study. A copy of this Agreement is attached as Appendix A. The Senior Vice President of the NCFE has ~~refused~~ reviewed this Agreement in detail and has prepared his comments thereon, a copy of

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Security Information

which is attached as Appendix B. In brief, these comments bear out in instance after instance the assertions set forth above as to the fundamental difficulties with which we are faced in the administration of this project.

5. The PRC already has reviewed this Agreement and the 1953 fiscal year budget submitted by NCFE. The Committee is so convinced of the weakness of the present situation and the need for its improvement along the lines suggested by the Memorandum of Agreement that it has refused to approve the budget of the NCFE until a satisfactory Memorandum of Agreement is concluded and the budget resubmitted in the manner prescribed therein.

6. There is, ~~thus~~, a choice between basically only two alternatives, viz.,

CIA either has a duty and responsibility to ensure, affirmatively, the conduct of the NCFE program in accordance with CIA's own special mission and general responsibilities as a Government agency, or

The NCFE is an autonomous organization operating independently of any Government direction and control, in which event this Agency should formally abdicate the responsibilities with which it has been charged in this connection.

13 July 1952

Dear Mr. Lea:

I would appreciate it if you would deliver this envelope to Mr. John C. Hughes, 40 Worth Street, New York.

Thanks,

/S/ Tom Braden

2203 Foxhall Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
17 July, 1952

Dear John:

I was glad of our meeting day before yesterday and I am looking forward to seeing you soon again.

Here is a memorandum I addressed to A. a short time ago which I would like you to read because it may give you some indication of how we are trying to get to work here. It is for your eyes only.

I talked to Min on the telephone this morning and he seemed in an extremely bellicose mood. This bellicosity, replete with references to "little people who get in his hair", "from now on I'm dealing only with the top", and "otherwise there are going to be some resignations here" is difficult for me because I am partly Irish, and as able to resign as the next man. I have succeeded, however, in maintaining my Scotch heritage to the fore so far, and since you assure me that none of this is personally directed at myself, or people like Bill Durkee whom I persuaded to come and help me or to the job that I am sincerely and honestly trying to do, I will try to keep it there. It was nevertheless awfully calming to have a chance for such a good talk with you.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

/s/ T

Mr. John Hughes
McCampbell & Company
40 Worth Street
New York, New York

SECRET
Security Information
EYES ONLY

3-5308

11 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. Admiral Miller will call upon the DDCI soon to request more funds for the Crusade for Freedom. At the present rate of expenditure, funds will run out on 31 December.

2. $488,991 was budgeted for the Crusade this year. We have told Admiral Miller that since the Crusade was unable to live within this budget, we were certain that the Agency would appropriate more money to wind it up, although we have explained that his request was embarrassing because the PRC had expressly approved $488,991 instead of a larger amount in the belief that less money should be expended this year. We have asked Admiral Miller to provide us with a financial statement of the Crusade cost to date as well as a breakdown of the further amount needed.

3. The Crusade this year has so far cost only a quarter of last year's expenditure and half of the amount expended in 1950. Receipts are up, 140% over last year at this date. On the whole, a much better job has been done to date than we anticipated -- and purely in terms of the amount raised the performance has been superior.

4. There is a good deal of gossip about the use of Crusade funds and I think you should be acquainted with it. Because the Crusade is a rather public enterprise, the gossip has occasionally been sounded not only within NCFE and this Agency but also among "semi-witting" private citizens who have been enlisted for short-term fund-raising on an unpaid basis. The gossip is that a good deal of money has found its way into the private hands of local Crusade chairmen and workers. In one instance, it is said, involving a local chairman in Minnesota, the amount which reached private hands was enough to build a new home. Another story I have heard repeated by different people on different occasions is that in the state of Nevada and certain other locales no money received by fund-raising chairmen last year was ever turned in to Headquarters, and no report ever made. Another item which some

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EYES ONLY

of the people in the New York office talk about is the payment of $37,500 to Fred C. Smith, who worked for approximately one month in drawing up a Dimes for Freedom campaign which, as you recall, was rejected as a basis for this year's campaign.

5. No accounting of Crusade funds expended in the field has ever been made, and in a fund-raising campaign it is perhaps impossible to do so. Nevertheless, records involving payments for expense money to private citizens engaged for the duration of the campaign are chaotic. You will recall that Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCFE, refuses to have anything to do with expenditures for the Crusade.

6. Since we are winding up the Crusade this year and will attempt to place it on a more reliable basis through the Heritage Foundation, I suggest that you assure Admiral Miller that funds sufficient to wind up the Crusade will be forthcoming and that you instruct the IO Division to expedite a project granting these funds. I further suggest that in view of the allegations above, which I repeat for your private background information, you keep the position of the Agency faultless by requesting from Admiral Miller a budget in as much detail as possible for the amount necessary to liquidate the Crusade.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

17 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Deputy Director (Administration)

FROM: Acting Chief, Administrative Staff (Special)

SUBJECT: Conference with TPTONIC Management re TPTONIC/CIA Agreement

1. On 9 July 1952 Mr. Echols and I conferred with the President and the Treasurer of the TPTONIC organization regarding the fiscal portion of the proposed Agreement to be reached between CIA and TPTONIC.

2. The purpose of the conference was to extend to the TPTONIC management an offer of aid in the interpretation and implementation of the fiscal phase of the Agreement in response to TONIC's request for assistance in this connection.

3. Our statement of the Agency's position may be summarized briefly as follows:

a. The Agency is insistent upon obtaining the detailed information regarding TONIC's activities which is essential in order to fulfill the Agency's fundamental policy, fiscal, and security responsibilities. The great size to which TONIC has grown makes it necessary for the Agency to take a closer interest in TONIC's activities than it has in the past.

b. Although final concurrence in an Agreement has not been reached by TONIC, it is necessary that revision of the financial budget be commenced immediately if PRC budget approval is to be obtained as soon as possible after a final Agreement has been reached. The budget document must be expanded in order to provide reasonably detailed information not only as to proposed changes from the previous year's activities but also regarding the continuing activities as well. Without this additional information there is lacking sufficient data on which to base the approval of any allotment of funds.

4. The President assured us that a revision of the budget would be undertaken immediately to provide not only the information the Agency requires but also to eliminate incompletely planned, vaguely foreseen requirements. He assured us that the revision would be completed in time to permit a review, prior to its presentation to the PRC, for the purpose of determining that the document attains the standards set forth in the Agreement. The Treasurer concluded that he was sufficiently familiar with the terms of the fiscal portion of the Agreement to be able to satisfy its requirements, but promised to call upon us if he should desire further clarification.

SECRET
Security Information

5. In order to avoid later misunderstandings we set forth briefly the concept of financial control contemplated in the budget section of the Agreement. We noted that the Agency must have confidence that the programs of the various TONIC divisions are carried out to the approximate extent proposed in the Agency approved budget since other Agency plans must be synchronized harmoniously with TONIC's approved program. Accordingly, the principle of establishing an expenditure ceiling for each of the TONIC divisions is regarded by the Agency as fundamental with which inter-division transfers without Agency approval would be incompatible. We assured the President it positively was not the intent of the Agency to lift managerial responsibility from TONIC's own hands, and that the controls contemplated by the Agreement are aimed not at stifling managerial activity but rather to the attainment of the minimum checks which the Agency feels it must insist upon in view of the scope and importance of the TONIC program in the fulfillment of the Agency's own responsibilities and mission.

6. The President expressed his appreciation of the Agency's viewpoint in the matter of financial control although he did not expressly commit TONIC to its adoption. He did, however, promise to undertake a point by point review of the terms of the Agreement immediately so that the specific areas of doubt or disagreement may be localized and disposed of in further negotiations.

7. This Staff feels that there is in reality no misunderstanding of the Agreement on the part of TONIC nor any lack of technical confidence to carry out its terms. The problem of attaining and understanding, therefore, comes to nothing more than a determination by TONIC management to accept the minimum of control upon which the Agency is insistent.

Frederick W. Richards
Acting Chief, Administrative
Staff (Special)

Distribution:
- Acting DD/A - Orig.
- CCC - 1
- IO Division - 1 ✓
- AS/S Chrono - 1

SECRET
Security Information

ER 3-0917

15 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: National Committee for Free Europe; proposed employment of Mr. Leland Stowe.

REFERENCE: Memo from Security Officer to DCI dated 12 January, and attachments.

1. As the result of an extensive consideration of the problem created by the NCFE offer of employment to Leland Stowe, and in light of the adverse information concerning Mr. Stowe's past connections and affiliations with certain organizations, it was decided by the Director upon the recommendations of Messrs. Dulles, Hedden and the undersigned that Mr. Stowe should not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the RFE information collection program.

2. When Admiral Miller was informed today of this decision, together with the reasons upon which it was based, he and his staff immediately proceeded to re-examine the entire problem and within an hour-and-one-half communicated to the undersigned an entirely new proposition concerning Mr. Stowe, of which the following were the principal elements:

a. In line with the Director's decision, Mr. Stowe would not be employed by NCFE as Chief of the information collection activity of RFE.

b. In lieu thereof he would be offered a contract as a "consultant and contributor of information" for a six-months term.

c. He would not be offered a salary but would be placed on a fee basis, and paid according to the amount of work and material which he contributes.

d. Thus he will not become an official of RFE or NCFE, and will not be in such a position as to enable anyone to maintain that he guides the policy of or controls the flow of information to Radio Free Europe.

SECRET
Security Information

e. Subject to prior approval from our security office, Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang will endeavor to secure the services of either Mr. Cy Burgin of the Time-Life organization, or Mr. Russell Hill of the New York Herald Tribune as Chief of the information collection activity of Radio Free Europe. They are both regarded as competent and experienced individuals, and Mr. Burgin has already indicated his interest in this position if it were open.

3. The proposal described in the preceding paragraph was submitted to Mr. Dulles and to Mr. Braden by the undersigned, and they both expressed their approval. Mr. Dulles said that, on the basis of our discussion with the Director, he felt certain that this arrangement would be acceptable from the standpoint of CIA. The Admiral was so advised by the undersigned and expressed himself as being entirely satisfied and very pleased. He undertook to check through Mr. Braden on the acceptability from a security standpoint of Messrs. Burgin and Hill.

4. One other aspect of this matter is worth recording for future reference: Mr. Hedden has stated that he has been well acquainted with Mr. Stowe for many years, having known him in college and having followed his career rather closely. On the basis of everything he knows about Mr. Stowe, Mr. Hedden is convinced that Mr. Stowe is a loyal American citizen and that there would be no real risk in his case on the issue of loyalty as such. In the opinion of Mr. Hedden, Mr. Stowe's past proclivity for becoming involved with left-wing movements (some of them presently regarded as subversive) is not a commentary on his loyalty but rather on his judgment. At times before and during the war he was prone to hop onto popular bandwagons and to take a line in his writings and broadcasts that seemed to be popular at the time. In other words, he is an opportunist by nature and prone to take up causes which appeal to him as having wide popular interest and support as of any given moment. This propensity on the part of Mr. Stowe is not without its professional and commercial aspects.

SIGNED FRANK G. WISNER

Encls
References.

FRANK G. WISNER

DD/P-FGW/bjm

Distribution:
Orig. - DCI, DDCI, IG - with enclosures.
cc: - C/IO - 1
Security Officer - 1
ER - 1
DD/P chrono - 1

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-0717

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers on NCFE Views on Yugoslavia

1. Here are NCFE's views on Yugoslavia which you asked for.

2. I am worried about item d) in particular. The other items may be justifiable on the grounds that we have to take care of people in this country, but item d) may seem to be taking unnecessary forward steps.

3. As you suggested, we have asked the State Department for a review of the entire national council policy, and I am sure we will get State's views on Yugoslavia at this time.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
1. Ltr to Allen Dulles from Leonard Stamm dtd 7 July 52.
2. Memo dtd 2 July 52 re NCFE views on Yugoslavia.

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru DD/P)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

DD/P-1752

3-5643

18 December 1952 1 Jan 53 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Briefing of Secretary of the Army on 17 December on NCFE and CFA

1. On 17 December, I briefed Secretary of the Army Pace on the subjects of the National Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Asia.

2. The briefing covered both physical assets and concepts. Secretary Pace asked many questions, for example:

a. How did NCFE handle the problem of Yugoslav exiles and at the same time use the Yugoslavian defection as an argument in its broadcasts to Iron Curtain countries?

b. How much did the State Department have to say about the day-to-day operations?

c. The duties of the President?

In addition, he expressed great enthusiasm over the concept of the two Committees and in general for the concept of covert psychological warfare. He interrupted at one point to talk at some length about his belief that while it was essential to continue to draft boys as soldiers and produce rifles, it was just as essential, and in the long run more conducive to ultimate peace, to wage the argument for democracy to a questioning world in a covert manner. He indicated that he thought very little of the government's overt propaganda program and that from what he knew about the government's covert program as conducted by CIA, it was the effective means to the end.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO:

BUILDING | ROOM NO.

REMARKS

Sent to N.Y. 23 July 1952

To Durkee: I think the content of Wisner's memo, ought to be relayed to Miller, Walsh et al.

Return to E Hill for file

FROM:

BUILDING | ROOM NO. | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET
Security Information

14 July 1952 For Miller

MEMORANDUM

I would certainly be inclined to agree with FGW on the importance of a dignified "worthy cause" sort of campaign. Moreover I would scrupulously avoid any activity which might cast doubt on the good faith of the Crusade (e.g., "We gave our money for balloons at Christmas — where are they?")

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SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

ER 3-0732

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom (ER 2-0686).

1. Please note the attached inquiry from Tom Braden, in which he raises two questions with respect to balloons. The following are my recommendations on the two questions, respectively:

a. I see no objection to reference by the Freedom Crusade campaign to the use of balloons, provided this is handled with care. By this I mean that it would be all right for the Crusade to refer to its former use of balloons and the effectiveness of this use, and also to say that the National Committee for a Free Europe will, on an appropriate occasion and at the right time, make further use of balloons. It would be wrong and unwise for many reasons to make a flat statement as to the exact time and content of further balloon operations. There is no point in thus telegraphing our punch to the opposition, and it would get us into trouble if we were to be too specific about the timing and subject matter of any new messages.

b. I would be very much opposed to the stunts such as dropping Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums. This is the kind of flamboyant publicity which we have agreed not to undertake this year, and incidentally which makes us look as though we were in the class with commercial advertisers or irresponsible and playful student pranksters ~~[illegible]~~, or both. I thought Abbott Washburn had gone to help Ike!

FGWisner
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
ER 2-0686, dtd 7 July

DD/P-FGW/bjm

Distribution:
Orig. - addressee w/att
1 cc - ER
1 cc - DD/P chrono

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-0686

SECRET

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Request for Decision as to whether Crusade for Freedom Campaign Beginning 15 November may use a Dropping of Leaflets Theme in its Propaganda.

1. Admiral Miller of NCFE has appointed a new head for Crusade for Freedom, Mr. Richard Walsh, formerly of the State Department. Mr. Walsh has submitted a new plan for the Crusade for Freedom campaign to begin November 15. The campaign will be based upon the idea of sending Christmas message leaflets behind the iron curtain with publicity that the Crusade for Freedom will use balloons among other methods for this purpose. It was originally contemplated that the Crusade would in fact send balloons as it did last year. Bearing in mind, however, the DCI's warning about using any propaganda device which might give the Soviet a weapon in its bacteriological warfare campaign, we have instructed the Crusade that there will be no actual transmission of balloons.

2. Will it be permissible for the Crusade to publicize the use of balloons, to employ such stunts as dropping the Christmas leaflets out of balloons over packed football stadiums in the United States and to give the general impression that balloons will be one of the ways to carry messages from the American people behind the iron curtain, even though they will in fact not be employed?

3. You will appreciate that an immediate decision is essential.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
Original - DDCI through DD/P
cc: ADPC - 1
CIO - 1
IO/TONIC - 2
RI - 2

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

14 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WALTER PFORZHEIMER
Office of the General Counsel

SUBJECT: Follow-up on your report of 26 June 1952 re: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka.

1. The following report of 2 July 1952, is a reply to our presentation to the Admiral of the subject report:

"I have questioned Tom about the matter cited in your letter of 30 June 1952, File Number 6-3039. Tom states that the facts are as follows:

1. By letter dated March 20, 1952, Congressman Robert Tripp Ross requested consideration for the employment of Captain Oskierka. The latter was interviewed on several occasions, and prospects of his employment were fully examined. After careful consideration, it developed that Oskierka was not useful in any division of our operation, and there was no job for him. He was personally so informed by Tom in a subsequent interview on May 6, 1952, in which Oskierka expressed his understanding of the situation.

2. Under date of May 23, 1952, Congressman Ross again wrote us stating that Oskierka had contacted him again about the possibilities of a job with us. I wrote the Congressman under date of June 5, 1952, telling him that, although we had made every effort to place him, we were unable to offer Oskierka a position.

3. On or about June 25, 1952, Congressman Ross' local secretary telephoned my office inquiring about Oskierka. My secretary referred her to Tom who then talked at some length with Congressman Ross' secretary. He told the latter that we had no position for Oskierka and that we had so informed the Congressman by letter above cited. In the course of the conversation, the secretary inquired as to what suggestions we could offer relative to such a position for Oskierka as would be useful in procuring an extension of his visitor's visa. Tom stated that he might suggest to the Congressman that he might make inquiry in Oskierka's behalf in various Government agencies in Washington, stating that Oskierka seemed to have various useful talents which might interest someone other than us.

SECRET

4. Tom has never talked with Congressman Ross. Tom did not state to his secretary or to anyone else that Congressman Ross' candidate might be able to get a position with you. Tom states that he knows better for obvious reasons than to make any such suggestion to anyone.

For your more complete information in this matter, a copy of an internal memorandum is enclosed.

Sincerely

/s/ H. B. Miller "

2. We should like to know if the information you obtained from CIA personnel agrees with this report.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Encl:-1 copy

IO/TONIC : NBV/hka
Distributions:
Orig:- Addressee
2 cc - C/IO ✓
2 cc - IO/TONIC
2 cc - RI

SECRL.

SECURITY INFORMATION

C O P Y

May 27, 1952

Memorandum

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Captain Stanislaw Oskierka

There are no prospects for utilizing Captain Oskierka's services by the Fund.

I must say that I do not like the behavior of Oskierka in again trying to pressure us via Congressman Ross. As the attached file shows, he has been most courteously treated here; every effort has been made to place him; and he has expressed himself as being pleased with the treatment and attention accorded him. I personally informed him and explained in great detail that his background made it impossible for us to use him here. He stated to me that he thoroughly understood this and that he was quite satisfied that we had examined the proposition thoroughly.

I don't suppose that it can be told to Congressman Ross, but Bernie Yarrow has taken his whole story to certain of our friends to explore the possibilities of their possible interest in him since he stated to me that he is single and willing to go anywhere in the world to get into the fight.

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION/OPC

FROM: AC/RDD/OTS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of New Type of Air Leaflet

REFERENCE: (a) Memorandum for RDD/TSS Subj: Request for Appraisal of Weiss proposal to NCFE of new type of air leaflet dtd 21 June 1952
(b) Telephone discussion between C/IOD/OPC and AC/RDD/OTS on 3 July 1952

1. Subject proposal has been received and will be established as RDD Ad Hoc Project No. 23.

2. This project will be carried out along the lines discussed in Reference (b), which will require a number of field experiments; therefore, some additional time will be needed for the complete evaluation. Information will be forwarded to you on these trials as it becomes available.

3. It is noted that the samples attached to Reference (a) are approximately 1¼" by 8". It is requested that you advise whether or not this leaflet is large enough for applications you have in mind. In the event that it is not, trials will be conducted with larger size leaflets of the same pattern.

L. R. DAILEY
Acting Chief
Research & Development

LRD:hmg

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"CS" RECORD MATERIAL

DUE DATE

1. THIS DOCUMENT IS CHARGED TO YOU.
2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES & DISPOSITION SECTION, RM ~~[illegible]~~ ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED. 6-A-50
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4548.

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 12-62 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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4. S. Corbet 06/EFK			
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14. RETURN TO 6A-50			
15. IP/ARD Rm ~~[illegible]~~			

DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.

78-1129
432393

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible] 314590~~

FILE NO. WOOH CIA AD 37

DOCUMENT:

FOLDER: 12

PAGE:

BOX: 2

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

HCFE
January 1953-December 1953

RETURN TO
IMMEDI

X32

LASSIFIED R ICTED CONFIDEN SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial ~~(check mark insufficient)~~ ~~before further~~ routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: C/IO/1

NO. IO-4-7

DATE 31 Dec 53

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CIO				TWB
2.				
3. DD/P		[illegible] 6 54	18 Jan	CT 17
4. C-IO				
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5.				

COMMENTS

FOW:

I am sorry that through an oversight the 10 Dec 53 memo to DCI attached was neither routed through nor a copy sent to you.

TWB

DD/P noted

O. 51-10 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

10—61165-3 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

136

31 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Gregoire Gafencu

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI dtd 10 Dec'53, same subject

1. Both Whitney Shepardson and Bernie Yarrow were unable to persuade Gafencu to remain in the United States. He left for Paris 12 December 1953.

2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. All the meetings between Mr. Shepardson and Gafencu were entirely cordial.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

10 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Acting Chief, International Organizations Divisions

SUBJECT: Grigoire Gafencu

1. I have just spoken to Whitney Shepardson and he reports that he and Bernie Yarrow have been unable to persuade Gafencu to stay in the United States. Gafencu gave many reasons for wishing to live in Europe. He is leaving for Paris this Saturday.

2. As a result of his own decision, Gafencu was informed that it would not be possible for NCFE to continue support of him so long as he stayed in Europe, as it is now a firm NCFE policy not to give stipends to anyone overseas. Payments to Gafencu will, therefore, terminate as of 31 March 1954.

3. Mr. Shepardson stated that all of the meetings with Gafencu were entirely cordial.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief
IO/Branch 1

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
IO/Branch 1 - 2cc
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc

Gafencu ltr 12 Dec & attachment
(ltr from de Gaulle 25 NOV 53 to
Gafencu) returned to DCI
20 JAN
54

SECRET
Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief/IO Division		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	Exec. Asst. to DCI	JSE/dr	12 Jan 54
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks: The Director has noted the attached memorandum. He indicated to me that he had seen "something else on this". Do you know what he refers to?

JSE
JSEarman

1/20.

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. SEP 1947 30-4

16—68468-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

8079

Executive Registry
5-0228

30 December 1953

Noted by DCI
11 Jan 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report that Sensitive Files covering Emigre Activities may have been made Available to Senator McCarthy

1. The following report was made available to us by Eugene Lyons, former President of the American Committee, who still actively participates in Committee activities as a policy advisor. Mr. Lyons is a member of the Board of Directors of the American Friends for Russian Freedom, and he obtained this report from an unnamed source in the American Friends' organization.

2. A man named Verbitsky (fnu), living in Munich, has somehow managed to obtain the personal files of Georgi Mueller, the NTS safehouse keeper who was arrested as a Soviet agent last fall. These files contain, among other things, a number of letters to Mueller from Gregori Klimov, an influential emigre who is head of the emigre group known as the League of Post War Defectors. These letters involve Klimov in Mueller's activities, and implicate many other emigres. Verbitsky attempted to turn these documents over to unnamed authorities in the field; when he was ignored by these authorities, he mailed the entire parcel to Senator Joseph McCarthy.

3. The American Committee naturally considers that this correspondence, which, if it exists, no doubt contains a great deal of that unfounded denunciation and allegation which is so typical of emigre expression, may involve the American Committee as well as other matters of particular concern to the Agency.

4. The Chief, SR Division, has been made aware of this report.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief/IO

SECRET

SIFIED RESTRICTED NFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICAT... TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	~~SC/NE~~	JRR	JAN 4
2	Mr. Thomas Braden	- 1028	K Bldg.
3	Dunkee —	Res.	
4	discuss with		me
5	Braden 1028K		TWB
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CA/NE	St/g	31 Dec.
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

Remarks:

3 - 5 — . Have [illegible]
This. will put [illegible]
Helms about [illegible] to engage
budget. We are about [illegible] research project
Helms — major [illegible] agency units
in cooperation with [illegible] include [illegible]
which will [illegible]
will discuss [illegible]

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
1947

10—03340-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

30 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRADEN

1. Professor Richard V. Burks of Wayne University is chairman of a small team of scholars engaged in a study of the European satellites.

2. The findings of this team are being given as the content of a course on the mid-European area. They are also, I believe, being broadcast.

3. The time of Professor Burks and his group is being purchased by the Mid-European Study Center which is, as you may know, under Mr. Stetson Holmes.

4. As yet Burks has no definite plan for the publication of his findings. Manifestly, the kind of book which would emerge from his research would have to receive some sort of subsidy. As you know, books of this sort, if they are considered important enough, are published as loss leaders by university presses. Also, as you doubtless know, university presses are in pretty straitened circumstances these days. If the Wayne University Press -- the normal place for the publication of Burks' book -- were to consider publishing the book, it might be able to publish it only with outside assistance. The figure would run probably between $1500 and $2000.*

5. In my opinion Burks is one of the most competent, if not the most competent man in the United States in this general field of investigation. Anything he turns out will be about as good as it comes. Although I have not seen any of this most recent work, my hunch is that it will be enormously valuable to the policy-maker and us estimators when the time comes for some deep thinking and critical decisions about the European satellites.

6. I thought you might be interested in the above, and with a little poking around yourself might feel inclined to give the venture whatever kind of boost seems appropriate.

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

* P.S. The proven way to get the best work out of a scholar is to have him know that it will be published + in normal course of events submitted to the critical judgment of his peers.

PD/P 7643

1 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Current activities and behavior of Grigoire Gafencu.

REFERENCE: Paris 0615 (IN 37959) dated 28 November 1953

1. The reference telegram from Paris contains a recommendation that NCFE do what it can to prevail upon Gafencu to come back to the United States and engage himself in certain activities which may be of some use and value to NCFE. The following information was obtained yesterday from Mr. Tyler who is familiar with the background of the reference message.

2. Mr. Tyler stated that Mr. John Hughes has become somewhat concerned about the activities and behavior of Gafencu in Europe, and more especially in and around Paris, and although he does not believe that a major issue needs to be made of this matter, he is firmly of the opinion that Gafencu is not doing anything useful for the NCFE in Europe and that the net effect of his activities is somewhat to the disadvantage of the interests of the United States. Gafencu is believed to be maintaining a rather close association with Guy de la Tournelle (sp?) and his wife, who are described as "very sour apples and bitter opponents of EDC." Gafencu is also reported to have been involving himself with certain businessmen in France in a series of questionable oil promotion schemes. He is also reported to have been engaged in organizing a kind of information center in emigre circles and to be selling this information to Agence France Presse. Moreover, Gafencu has been selling himself and "throwing his weight around" on the basis of representations and strong intimations that he is a close and intimate friend of Mr. Allen Dulles. His utterances in this regard are regarded by Mr. Hughes as highly indiscreet, the more so since he appears to be living and entertaining on a scale sufficiently lavish to suggest that he is being provided with substantial funds -- well above the allowance granted to him by NCFE.

3. Mr. Hughes, as well as the Paris Station, fully appreciates that NCFE is not in a position to force the return of Gafencu to the United States. At the same time, he believes that NCFE should do

all that it can to get him out of Paris and he recommends that a strong invitation be extended by NCFE to Gafencu to return to the United States, and that this invitation be coupled with a statement to the effect that in view of budgetary considerations and the very marginal value of Gafencu's activities in Europe, it will not be possible for NCFE to continue his stipend unless he returns to the United States and engages himself in activities more useful to the program of NCFE.

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Original: C/IO
cc: DCI
C/WE
C/SE

P. S. Since dictating this memorandum, I have received a report from a well-informed Rumanian source to the effect that Gafencu has returned to the United States within the past few days for the purpose of remaining here indefinitely. (The fact of Gafencu's return to the US has been positively established, and it is possible that within the next day or so confirmation will be obtained concerning his longer-range future intentions.) My Rumanian informant has told me that the real reason for Gafencu's return was an urgent request from Malaxa, who feels that he requires Gafencu's present in the United States to assist him (Malaxa) in government circles, etc. My Rumanian source is prejudiced against Malaxa, but has maintained contact with Gafencu notwithstanding this, and is convinced that Gafencu is still on Malaxa's pay roll and subject to Malaxa's demands for this reason.

29 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: The League of Free Rumanians

1. Correct title: The League of Free Rumanians.

2. The League has no offices but Barbu Niculescu is using the late General Radescu's address at 47 East 61st Street, New York; telephone PLaza 9-5540.

3. Its officers and executive committee are attached under Tab A.

4. Barbu Niculescu is Secretary General.

5. The League now has no offices and insofar as we know has discontinued publication of its bulletin. It is generally rumored that the organization is supported by Malaxa and it is presumed by knowledgeable people that in particular Malaxa supports Niculescu and Mihail Farcasanu, the two most active League officers, as well as Malaxa's nephew George Palade, who is a doctor in scientific research with Rockefeller Institute in New York.

6. Attached is a letter from Panuch to yourself dated 2 November 1953, your memo to Chief, SE Division and his reply, which you requested, as Tab B.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

Attachments
Tabs A and B

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

14-00000

Lang's file on this
has been in RE for
3 weeks. Do you
want to go ahead with
Barrett?

SECRET

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward W. Barrett

1. I had a conversation with Ed Barrett on Friday, 11 December, who called to tell me about recent developments in respect to an Inter-European Radio Press Committee. He described the history of Hans Cohrssen's participation, with which you are familiar, and he went on to say that the two-fold objective at present is to get some sort of cooperation among European nations for broadcasting a frank discussion of foreign affairs in each other's countries, and secondly, to enlist the same sort of cooperation for a column which would appear in various countries, perhaps including this one, written by different people and discussing each week some aspect of foreign policy differences which might exist between and among countries.

2. The idea seems to me a pretty good one. Its principal asset is that it will allow the airing and discussion of issues among nations other than by diplomatic means.

3. Barrett pointed out that he is now putting Cohrssen definitely in a back seat, that he will soon come to us with a good responsible board of directors and officials. He said that he had enlisted Bob Lang's support and Bob had suggested to him that NCFE give the Institute a grant. Barrett said the Institute needs $25,000 to keep it going while it finds suitable leadership. I said that I would discuss the above with you and I would look forward to hearing from Mr. Lang.

SIGNED THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DCIO, C/IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

14 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Conversation with Lee Pennington

1. On Friday, 11 December, I had a conversation with Lee Pennington, formerly of the FBI and recently appointed director of the National Americanism Commission of the American Legion.

2. Pennington was most cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the members of the Americanism Commission of the Legion in which he dismissed charges against RFE based principally on an attack by Kurt Glaser. The arguments he used in his letter he had drawn from briefings by this Agency. He thinks that this will be the end of the matter and that members of his Commission will no longer press for investigation of NCFE and RFE.

3. I took this opportunity to brief Pennington thoroughly on the World Veterans Federation which the Director had previously mentioned to him and about which he had had a little information, most of it false. He had been under the impression that we had something to do with it but that it was a left-wing outfit which we were investigating. At the end of our conversation he told me that he was thoroughly satisfied with the information I gave him and that he would take two steps in accordance with my request:

a. He would notify the Ford Foundation that the Legion looked upon the World Veterans Federation as a worthwhile outfit and would certainly not criticize the Foundation if it were to make a grant to the organization.

b. He said he would prevent any attacks on the organization coming from Legion membership being given serious consideration. He said that this could be taken care of by referring all such attacks to the Americanism Commission for study.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 cc - DCIO
1 cc - C/IO/1
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET

11 DEC 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RFE Summary Reports

REFERENCE: Memorandum from C/IO, dated 17 November 1953, Subject as above.

The appropriate SE Branches and Staffs have read the RFE Summary Report for October 1953, which you forwarded to this Division as an attachment to referenced memorandum. We have found the report well prepared and useful, both for SE Headquarters and for our field personnel working on propaganda projects. We would therefore appreciate your sending this Division two copies of subsequent RFE monthly reports, one of which will be retained by SE, while the other will be sent to our Athens Station.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

Addressee: 2

SECRET

SECRET
Security Information

4 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: "News from Behind the Iron Curtain" - Mail Subscription for Mr. Arvo Tuominen

REFERENCE:
a. OSSA-1638, 20 Nov 1953
b. Memorandum to WE/PP-1 from IO/Branch I, 8 Oct 53
c. Memorandum to IOD/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 28 Sept 53
d. Memorandum to IOD/TONIC from WE/PP-1, 6 June 53

1. A recent dispatch from the Stockholm Station (reference a) reports that Mr. Tuominen is not receiving Subject publication. In light of reference memorandum b, which states that he has been on the mailing list since June 1952, it is apparent that there has been some slip-up in the distribution channels of this publication. A check of address indicates that Mr. Tuominen's address is the same as given in reference d.

2. It is requested that appropriate measures to taken to insure that Mr. Tuominen will receive this publication in the future. Please inform WE/PP-1 of the action taken regarding this matter.

PAUL BIRDSALL
C/WE

discussed orally / not sent
sent sterile version to
Whitney.

River End, N. Roberts Lane
N. Arlington, Virginia
4 December 1953

Dear D'Arcy:

This is in reference to your telephone call of this afternoon. I have just had a full report on the matter of the seven visitors.

I am afraid you have got yourself on the hook on this one and nothing can be done about it except to go through with the bargain you made. This bargain, the documents indicate, was to bring the seven Czechs over here and take the responsibility you assumed when you signed the seven declarations of support affidavits.

Now having gotten that bad news off my chest, I hasten to add that I do not think this is going to be burdensome to you. You are doing a real public service, as I shall explain in a moment, and all of us will do our level best to help you.

I realize that you did not think you were assuming the responsibility for seven people. It is clear, however, that everyone else thought you were, and I think it is simply too late to change it now. The Czech regime is attacking the United States for its handling of emigres; it is attacking the camps which you have seen; it is pointing up the general hopelessness of an emigre's lot and the dullness and dreariness which you have noted at first hand. This little trip of our seven friends has set all the refugee circles in Germany gossiping. It is exciting news. It is undoubtedly known behind the Curtain. To call it off now would make a real difference -- not just in terms of the Crusade, but in terms of what refugees think about the United States and United States citizens.

The procedure from now on seems to lay itself out as follows: The seven refugees will arrive sometime during the month of December. This arrival date is important. HICOG has made every effort to expedite it so that they can come in December, and only overwhelming reasons ought to dictate a postponement. They will go to work and do whatever you, Clyde and Robb want them to do on behalf of the Crusade. After their work for the Crusade is over, all seven doubtless will wish to remain in the United States. We will all then jointly try to find jobs and places for them. The visas are good until next April, but if they can find jobs here it will probably be possible for us to secure special legislation for them to stay on indefinitely.

Now as to the questions you raise in your letter of November 24th. The National Committee for a Free Europe should certainly look after these people when they arrive and while they are here except insofar as they are directed by you to take up certain activities on behalf of the Crusade. The National Committee should also cooperate in trying to help you in your effort to find jobs for them when their tour is over, and I am sure the people there will do their best. I am sending a copy of this note to Whitney and I know that he will cooperate to the fullest.

As to your second question, I think the expenses of all seven ought to be paid for out of Crusade funds. They are over here on behalf of the Crusade and you are the one who asked them to come.

On the third question, as I indicated above, I think it would be a great blow to United States policies in this field if they were to turn around after their duties were over and limp back to a dusty refugee camp.

I think this is the way the whole thing ought to rest now and I do most earnestly urge you not to be too concerned about your personal responsibilities. We will all be lucky if we have to tackle no tougher problems.

Sincerely,

Mr. D'Arcy Brophy
American Heritage Foundation
345 E. 46th Street
New York 17, New York

cc: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Shepardson
1 cc - IO/Brl
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

[illegible] 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Rumanian Emigre Organization

REFERENCE : Memorandum to Chief, SE from Deputy Director (Plans), dated 5 November 1953 - Subject: Rumanian National Council

1. In agreement with Mr. William Durkee of International Organizations Division, I share your view, as stated in paragraph 3 of the referenced memorandum, that Mr. Anthony Panuch should discuss the problem of the organization of Rumanian refugees with the NCFE rather than with this Agency. We were informed by Mr. Durkee that Mr. Panuch is fully aware of the NCFE position that the refugees should resolve their own differences before presenting a solution for the consideration of the NCFE. Mr. Durkee also informed the Rumanian Branch on 13 November that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Whitney Shepardson who concurred in the view stated above.

2. With reference to Mr. Panuch's statement that the "League in its present state is a useful operational vehicle," name traces reveal that fourteen members are Iron Guardists, five are suspected communist agents and four admit that they are on Nicolae Malaxa's payroll. Because of this unsavory composition, it appears unlikely that the League as presently composed would be useful operationally.

JOHN H. RICHARDSON
Chief, SE

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

[illegible]

SECRET

Security Information

7267

5 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern European Division

SUBJECT : Rumanian National Council

1. The attention of the SE Division and Messrs. Braden and Durkee is invited to the attached copy of a letter which I have just received from J. Anthony (Joe) Panuch concerning certain recent developments in the Rumanian emigre situation and with particular reference to the "League." You will note that Mr. Panuch has indicated that if we are interested in the League and its possibilities, he would be glad to talk to us about it.

2. I believe that the addressees of this memorandum will recall the significance of Mr. Panuch and the role which he has played recently, including his visit to me of about two or three months ago. (I was annoyed by and considered as a minor breach of confidence the reference which was made to my name in the material which was published concerning a communication addressed to King Michael, although I did note that this contained no representation that I had taken a position one way or another concerning the League or the proposed formula for resolving differences between the two principal Rumanian emigre factions.)

3. As regards the proposal of further conversations between Mr. Panuch and either myself or some other spokesman or representative of this Agency, I continue to be inclined to the view that these are matters which should be taken up by Mr. Panuch with Mr. Shepardson and not ourselves. If after consultation between the SE Division and IO Division it is agreed that this is the correct position, I should appreciate it if Mr. Braden or Mr. Durkee could talk with Mr. Shepardson about this letter and obtain his views for my benefit. I would then be in a better position to reply to Mr. Panuch's letter — presumably telling him that in line with my earlier advice to him, I still would recommend that he raise these matters with NCFE and not CIA. I could also add that I had been troubled by the appearance of my name in the published material referred

SECRET

Security Information

to above and cite this as an example of why I would prefer to stay out of the matter directly.

4. A copy of this memorandum is furnished to Mr. Houston because of his knowledge of the background of the old Malaxa allegations, and the difficulties which Malaxa is capable of creating for the Agency in the future. It will be recalled that Malaxa has charged that CIA has injected itself into the matter of his immigration status; that I have wrongfully involved myself in his affairs -- including some ridiculous charge that I kept him from getting a lucrative contract with the California Steel Company, etc., etc. -- none of which has any foundation in truth whatsoever.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment (1)
Letter to Mr. Wisner from
Mr. Panuch dated 2 November 1953.

cc: C/PP
C/IO/PP
IO/PP (Mr. Durkee)
General Counsel

C
O
P
Y

Law Offices of
J. ANTHONY PANUCH
60 East 42nd Street
New York 17, N.Y.

November 2, 1953

Hon. Frank Wisner
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Confidential

Dear Frank:

Re: Romanian National Council

This is to bring you up to date on the aftermath of our conference of June 17th with respect to the above. On my return to New York I took the following steps:

1. Personally submitted the settlement formula to Rica Georgescu for mediation with Visoianu and Cretzianu, and to Larry DeNeufville for the information of the NCFE. Rica, in my opinion unwisely, took the position that the formula was not negotiable.

2. Directed the League to transmit the formula to King Mihail for his information and action and, pending final acceptance or rejection to "lay off" visavis Cretzianu, Visoianu et al. This was done.

3. Summoned Malaxa and the officials of the League to (a) inform them of the false charges made to the White House by Malaxa against you in 1951 and to demand their formal retraction; and (b) insist that Malaxa immediately make good on his commitment to General Radescu that he set up an independent "no strings attached" budget for the League -- an undertaking then six months in default. Malaxa agreed to comply with both demands and asked for time to the beginning of September when he hoped he would be released of the strain and mental anguish incident to his chronic immigration proceeding. Malaxa defaulted on both promises.

4. I issued an ultimatum to the leaders of the League to the effect that irrespective of my friendship with General Radescu, unless they disassociated themselves completely from Malaxa and any semblance of his influence -- direct or indirect -- I would resign as the League counsel. This severance of their relationship with Malaxa has been accomplished after a stormy showdown session between Farcasanu and Niculescu and Malaxa.

Mr. Frank Wisner

The League in its present state is in my opinion a useful operational vehicle in any Romanian situation in which the utilization of skilled and experienced personnel (notably Farcasanu and Niculescu) of conservative and non-Marxist political orientation is indicated. If you are at all interested in it as such, I should be glad to talk to you about it.

With best regards,

Faithfully,

/s/ Joe [illegible]

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DR. PETER P. HLETKO
President
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Middletown, Pa.
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Slovak Catholic
Cadet Union

The Slovak League of America

A Cultural and Civic Federation of Americans of Slovak Descent

Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PHILIP A. HROBAK
P. O. Box 150
MIDDLETOWN, PA.

October 31, 1952

Mr. Kurt Glaser
1717 -20th St., N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Mr. Glaser:

I have read your article on Radio Free Europe - THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO "FREE EUROPE" - and I must say that it agrees with the facts as I know them. It is regrettable that such knowledge or information cannot get to the masses of the American public. I have visited the State Department and the National Committee for a Free Europe several times during the past two years to apprize them of the situation, but it seems they do not choose to do much about it. I had my information directly and indirectly from Slovak refugees in Germany and Austria....and London.

In December, 1951, the ASSOCIATION OF SLOVAKS IN GREAT BRITAIN, sent a "Memorandum" to the Nat'l Committee for a Free Europe in New York stating, in effect, the very things your article contains. The personnel of RFE in Munich was given in toto. At that time 31 program editors were employed by RFE - 29 Czechs and 2 Slovaks (renegades). Of the 29 Czechs employed - 27 were SOCIALISTS of one brand or another! The Memo mentions who they were....and I still have that list. Should you want to use it, you are welcome to it.

I have long been convinced that it is not in the interests of America or other free countries to employ pseudo-[illegible] and left-wingers in the RFE, the Voice of America or any other governmental agencies. I simply would not trust them. Your article exposes the charlatans in RFE or used by the RFE and I certainly would recommend its publication. I, for one, certainly would!

Sincerely,

P. A. Hrobak

Statement.

I read with attention and interest the article "The 'Russia First' boys in Radio 'Free Europe'", by Mr. Kurt Glaser.

Having no documentation on hand in order to verify all particular affirmations contained in this article, I can express my entire adhesion as to its general line. I lived in Czecho-Slovakia between 1945 and 1948 and I know the policy of the "National Front" Government in Prague at that time from my personal experience.

In order to understand the Marxist tendency of some present politicians grouped in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", it is necessary to point out that the Czech National Socialist Party of Mr.Beneš, Mr.Zenkl, Mr.Ripka, Mr.Stransky, etc. formed, on June 25th, 1945, the "Front of Working People" with the pro-Communist Social Democratic Party of Mr.Fierlinger, Mr.Lauschman and Mr.Majer and with the Communist Party of Mr.Gottwald. That "Front" constituted the closest ring of socialist solidarity and common action within the "National Front" Government composed of two more parties: the Czech Catholics and the Slovak Democrats. /See the article "Let us say the truth !", by Dr.Michal Zibrin, former Deputy of Slovak Democratic Party in Prague Parliament, published in "Jednota", on October 29th, 1952, Middletown, Pa./ This ring of the three Czech socialist parties is responsible for the evolution in the policy of Czecho-Slovakia until February 1948.

The Government of the "National Front", of which Mr.Zenkl was then Vice-Premier, Mr.Ripka Minister of Foreign

Commerce; Dr.Stransky Minister of Justice; Mr.Papanek Delegate to the UNO,[illegible] already in 1946 labor camps in Czecho-Slovakia. In November 1946,as Councillor at the Presidency of the Slovak National Council in Bratislava I visited a great deal that were being erected in North-Slovakia,at Ustie n/Oravou.I met two of my friends who were working there as political prisoners and I managed to speak with them.

At about that time,Mr.Jan Papanek published in America his book "Czechoslovakia"/International University Press,New York/. On page 120 he says:"The so-called Bolshevik danger,a bogey for many nations,was taken calmly in Czechoslovakia,because the latter was free of every vestige of feudalism and its democracy was so all-embracing and successful,that there remainded no class whose dissatisfaction could lead to the acceptance of Communism as a possible remedy for it."

Just in the very time,when the "National Front"Government was eliminating Slovak and Czech patriots by mostly Communist People's Courts and was emprisoning them in "Labor camps",Mr. Papanek was playing in the USA the role white washer of Communism.

Now all these Gentlemen would like to change their tone. But the testimony of Czech Communists themselves are convincing them of double dealing. That the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" is infested even now by "Fellow-travellers",it has been proved by the "Hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security laws of the Committee on the Judiciary,United States Senat,Eighty-Second Congress,First and Second Session on Espionage activities of personnel attached to Embassies and Consulates under Soviet domination in the United States. July 9,1951-February 5 and 7,1952. United States Government Printing Office, Washington 1952. No. 97249.

On page 7 one can read the testimony of Mr. Joseph Ignac Molnar, agent of F.B.I. Speaking of Mr. Erwin Munk, former organizer of Czech Red Espionage network in USA, Mr. Molnar said:

"He /Mr. Munk/ told me that we had a very-well- organized underground movement which was giving them a lot of headaches, more than the National Council for Free Czechoslovakia, with its political prestige and its chairman, Peter Zenkl.

"We are not afraid," he said, "of Zenkl and his organization because we have there our men who even hold higher positions and we can render them harmless whenever we wish."

The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia", against a strong opposition of anti-Communist Czechs and Slovaks, has been recognized by the National Committee for a Free Europe as a representative body of Czech and Slovak refugees. In this quality, it is a recruiting office for the personnel of the Radio "Free Europe".

Washington D.C. November 3,1952

Joseph A. Mikus

Former diplomat of the Czecho-Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Prague /1935-1939/,
Former Chargé d'Affaires of Slovakia in Madrid /1940-1944/.
Former Counsellor of the Presidency of the Slovak National Council
in Bratislava 1945-1948/.

Radio Europe 'Houses Reds'

Station Got Millions From Americans

By Dr. John B. Crane

Frankfurt, Germany.

"You would do well to make an vestigation of Radio Free urope," a prominent Washington wmaker advised me a few weeks go as we were having tea to ther near Heidelberg.

"I have just returned from unich," he continued, "where I spected both the facilities of the oice of America and of Radio ree Europe. I was much im ressed with the Voice of America t-up and find they are doing a ery good job.

"But when I called at the plant f Radio Free Europe I got such frosty reception I could hardly lieve it. They tried to be polite ut were obviously delighted when I left. I figured maybe they had heard of my vigorous anti-Communist campaign when I ran for re-election."

Makes Headlines

Within the past month at least three other visiting American officials have tipped me off that I ught to investigate Radio Free Europe. The climax was reached today when a Washington investi gator suddenly appeared at my partment for a chat and casually nnounced he was headed for Munich. When I inquired why, he replied:

"I want to inspect Radio Free Europe."

During the past week Radio Free Europe has twice made headlines in leading German periodicals. One important weekly paper, the Rheinischer Merkur, devoted an entire page to the problem of Radio Free Europe.

70 Millions from Americans

American readers will doubtless remember with what high hopes this radio broadcasting station was started two years ago under the sponsorship of outstanding private American citizens such as Gen. Lucius D. Clay, former American Military Governor in Germany.

The purpose of the new broadcasting station was to send programs behind the Iron Curtain to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries to encourage them to hold out against their Communist Governments.

Millions of Americans welcomed this new weapon in the cold war against communism and contributed 70 million dollars for its support, according to the German press.

Anti-German Propaganda

The money was to be spent not only for building and equipping a broadcast station, but also for financing the escape of refugees from countries behind the Iron Curtain and giving them jobs at the new station in Munich.

Now come leading articles in the German press charging that Radio Free Europe is heavily infiltrated with Communists and that pro-Communist, anti-German propaganda is being fed to countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The well-known German weekly, Christ Un Welt, states that seven members of the Czech Department of Radio Free Europe have recently been arrested on suspicion of espionage, while one member, after working for several months, was found to be a Communist agent and fled over the border into Czechoslovakia with important personal records of Czecho emigrants' families.

'Saw the Light'

The German paper names names and places. For example, it charges that the executive editor of the Czech Division of Radio Free Europe, Pavel Tigrid, was editor of an illegal, Communist paper in 1932, known as Hallo Noviny.

It charges, further, that during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Tigrid co-operated closely with an important Communist leader, Fucik, who had become editor of the Communist paper Rude Pravo. Tigrid was a contributor to the Communist Central Party organ when the war ended in 1945.

Shortly thereafter, however, he "saw the light" and fled to Germany as a refugee. Soon he was executive editor of the Munich radio station fighting communism.

Demand Shake-Up

The German paper further mentions by name five other prominent employes of Radio Free Europe who were, earlier, Communist Party members or who today have close relatives in important Communist Party posts in Czechoslovakia.

The Germans are demanding a drastic reorganization of Radio Free Europe. This seems to be on the point of being realized. It is reported that 25 employes of the organization have already resigned, and that Executive Editor Tigrid (alias Paul Dittrich) has submitted his resignation.

It is to be hoped that the "housecleaning" now in progress will put an end to the many ugly rumors that have been floating around about Radio Free Europe for the last several months.

[illegible]

SLOVAK NEWSLETTER

[illegible]

23 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Monseigneur John C. Kirk

1. You asked me by telephone for a report on subject, who is domestic prelate on leave from the Savannah-Atlanta diocese in Georgia.

2. Monseigneur Kirk was formerly secretary to Archbishop Gerald P. O'Hara, Bishop of the Savannah-Atlanta diocese, and also his secretary while Bishop O'Hara was Apostolic Nuncio to Rumania from 1946 until O'Hara's official expulsion in July of 1950. (NCFE has been reliably informed that Kirk remained behind in Rumania disguised as a Swiss tourist. He visited many of the imprisoned hierarchy but eventually escaped. This report is without objective verification.)

3. Because no single member of the Rumanian hierarchy escaped, Kirk was appointed as president of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe. The headquarters of the Mission is now Passeggiata del Gianicolo 5, Rome. Monseigneur Kirk resides at Via Panama 110, Rome.

4. While in the United States in 1952 as personal delegate of Cardinal Tisserant to the convention of the association of Rumanian Catholics in America, Kirk visited the office of NCFE. Members of the staff met with him on five occasions and made the following estimate:

> As a prelate on leave in a southern diocese, Kirk can be classified as a religious liberal interested in the betterment of various classes and, particularly the Negro. In Rumanian politics, he vigorously resisted the influence of the iron guard. Evidence of this is that in 1952 Kirk moved the headquarters of the Mission from Madrid, where it was located at Calle de Serrano 30, because of continuing attempts of the iron guardists to use him for political purposes.

5. A detailed account of the principal purposes and scope of the Rumanian Catholic Mission for Europe which Kirk heads is available

here. Highlights are:

a. Roughly 150,000 people under his jurisdiction.

b. Mission centers have been established in Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Trieste, Spain and France.

c. Kirk is assisted by thirty priests located in the above areas.

6. Kirk is now in the United States and intends to return early in November. He is visiting NCFE in New York next week. His former chief, Archbishop O'Hara is now Nuncio for Ireland with headquarters in Dublin.

7. Statements made by Monseigneur Kirk in visits to NCFE together with extracts from correspondence are available if you should wish me to scan those and form an estimate of my own.

[illegible]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

DRAFT

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

19 October 1953

Jamming of western broadcasts to Russia began sporadically in 1948 and was well established by early 1949, first against VOA then also against BBC. Satellite language program jamming began first from Russian stations and then from jamming stations located in the Satellites proper. When RFE transmissions began in 1950, the organization and equipment were available for the new target.

At the present time, the organization for jamming - including the transmitters, the monitoring stations to watch for the undesired programs, and the control network to direct the jammers to the target - is apparently integrated throughout the Bloc, with a certain amount of cooperation between countries. That is, programs directed to one Satellite country may be jammed not only from within the country but from Russia and from neighboring Satellites.

At least some of the jammers are closely controlled so that efforts to evade them by changes in frequency or schedules are frequently met by a prompt reaction on the part of the jammer -- within a minute or less.

The extent of integration of the total Bloc jamming system makes it very difficult to separate the effort contributed within the Satellites. However, it is presently estimated that about 900 transmitters are in the jamming effort within the Bloc, and these appear to be fairly well distributed throughout the total of the frequencies that are being used at any given time. Therefore, at times when RFE is broadcasting to the Satellite countries with a considerable number of frequencies, there are undoubtedly hundreds of transmitters jamming these frequencies.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT

19 October 1953

The effectiveness of the jamming is difficult to assess quantitatively from the few available observation locations within the Orbit and from the fan mail received. However, in general, it is apparent that jamming is most effective in large cities: approaching 100%. In rural areas, the picture varies from time to time and from place to place, but it appears that a considerable proportion of the programs to the Satellites can be received. For example, the RFE monitor in Vienna reported that, at that location, the medium frequency Czech broadcast from Holzkirchen on 719 kc was practically 100% jammed while only about 50% of the shortwave Czech programs were not intelligible. The Embassy in Warsaw reported in May that while VOA programs were unintelligible, RFE programs were "often intelligible."

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Salary Information on NCFE People

1. Subsequent to Mr. Durkee's memorandum to you of 1 September 1953, which we discussed this morning, I learned that Mr. Dulles discussed with Mr. Shepardson the need for the information as to the salaries of NCFE people. Very likely this conversation was held pursuant to your own talk with the Director.

2. In any event, we have received precisely the information requested by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 6 October, and I have forwarded it to Win Scott.

3. I think your effort has been successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressse
1 cc - IO/SrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Dr. Francis Kase

REFERENCE: Letter from Dr. Karel Kase to Mrs. Dulles

1. Dr. Francis Kase has had the following relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency and National Committee for a Free Europe:

> He has never been an agent of CIA, but has been used from time to time by OO/Contacts for translations etc., and is now being paid between $150 and $200 per month for subsistence by OO/C.
>
> In December 1952, IO Division referred this man to the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Unfortunately, he did not fit into their research pattern, but they think he is an extremely capable man.

2. Unless the Director wishes to instruct NCFE to hire Dr. Kase, I suggest Mrs. Dulles send the attached reply.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Suggested reply
to reference. see chrons

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

0044

14 October 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Vienna Conference with Ambassador Joseph Flack

1. On 2 September, representatives of RFE and VOA met with Ambassador Joseph Flack and solicited his comments on reported unrest in Poland, and the utility of RFE and VOA Polish broadcasts.

2. With reference to internal disturbances and partisan activities, Flack stated that there have been "absolutely none" in recent weeks, and added that earlier reports of unrest following the June uprisings in East Germany were proved to have been without foundation as a result of relatively unrestricted survey action then taken by numerous representatives of U. S., British and French diplomatic missions in Poland. He expressed his conviction that there is no significant underground organisation in Poland which might be considered as an immediate asset by the West, and emphasized his belief that serious disturbances would not occur as long as the present Soviet control mechanism retains its power and the Soviet armies in Poland and East Germany go unchallenged. The bitter lessons of World War II, particularly the abortive Warsaw uprisings, and lack of confidence in the Polish emigration definitely discourage active resistance. The Poles increasingly tend to resent the action of the emigre leaders, regarding them essentially as symbols of failure, and, Flack feels, will undoubtedly develop new leaders from within the country when the time comes for action.

3. Flack carefully distinguished resistance as an immediate asset from resistance as a potential asset. He expressed the belief that the Catholic Church still offers the strongest and the best organised base of resistance in Poland as it is looked upon as the only symbol of continuity and solidarity with the past. To this he added his own appreciation for traditional Polish spirit of independence and Christian orientation, and emphasized his belief that Polish hatred of Russians and communism continues to mount. Unfortunately, similar sentiment persists with reference to Germany. Fear of German occupation or seisure of Polish territory continues to play a prominent part in Polish thought and is cleverly utilised by the Communist government in its propaganda effort.

4. Flack expressed certain misgivings with reference to the character of RFE and VOA broadcasts, emphasising his conviction that Western radio broadcasts should do nothing to compromise the position of the Catholic Church in Poland, always taking as guidance the attitude and statements of the Polish clerical leaders themselves. He strongly urged that all possible steps be taken to maintain the present volume of broadcasts into Poland as a means of preserving hope and belief in the inevitability of Soviet communism's collapse.

/s/
Sherman D. Lamb
Executive Secretariat, DD/P

Attachment

25 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT TO DCI

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from William H. Smyth

With reference to the second paragraph of the attached letter, the following information will answer the question:

> Mr. Smyth's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Relations was reprinted by the National Committee for a Free Europe. It appeared in "Progled", a monthly mimeographed newssheet, which is published in Serb, Croat and Slovene, and contains statements etc. made regarding Yugoslavia by prominent leaders, reprints from articles on Yugoslavia etc. It has a limited distribution (2-300) to Yugoslav emigres in this country, and its purpose is to keep the Yugoslav emigration in this country informed. It is indicated in the newssheet that the statements reprinted therein do not reflect the views or opinions of NCFE.

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (Mr. Long)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFID[illegible]IAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DD/P 5288

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3	CIO - 1028-K		
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	CIO	TWB	25 Sept
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks: The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to C.D. Jackson.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

10—[illegible] U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

September 14, 1953
917-1

Dear Mr. Hadwood:

A short time ago the question was asked of us whether NCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and thereafter discussed at three meetings of the NCFE policy committee.

Following these discussions, the NCFE position is as follows:

Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be plainly advantageous to the United States in terms of NCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem arises whether such broadcasts (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot -- without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.

If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice was not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the Baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.

However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of fermentation of freedom throughout the Satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderly program to maintain present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary)

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and to develop our present scanty capabilities in Bulgaria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about $1,500,00, now followed by a second cut of $1,000,000, make it doubtful if RFE can even maintain full audience-reaching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let alone maintaining the scanty capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the NCFE Board of Trustees will probably vote on September 15th (i) not to expand Bulgarian broadcasts, (ii) to shorten Romanian broadcasts, and (iii) to eliminate broadcasts to Albania.

To enter the Baltic area, as a real and not a token target, would (I am informed by RFE) cost additional sums of money several times greater than the cuts that have recently been made. Much as we would like to see this new area opened up in what is generally regarded as "RFE style", either by VOA or ourselves, I see no hope of RFE's being able to undertake the task until their budget allocations can not only reach, but substantially exceed, the amount needed to preserve existing programs (against enemy interference) at their existing audience-reaching level. And certainly if such budget additions were in sight, it would be necessary for us to consider, alongside the Baltic plan, the relative desirability of:

(a) Strengthening still further the signal to the three principal targets,

(b) Initiating the often discussed plan for installing transmitters in Turkey or Greece for reaching Romania and Bulgaria more effectively,

(c) Broadcasting to Albania as a more important target than the Baltic states.

Conclusion:

Unless it is regarded as of paramount national interest that RFE type broadcasts be made to the Baltic states; and

Unless it is clear that VOA is not in a position to provide such programs; and

Unless it is clear that such development by RFE is more important than:

Page 3
Mr. H[illegible]dwood
917-1

(i) Additional signal strength to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary,

(ii) Additional signal strength and programs to Bulgaria and Romania, preferably from a new transmitter installation, and

Unless an adequate sum of money for one or all of these operations is in sight, -

NCFE does not recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the three Baltic states.

Sincerely yours,

Daniel [illegible]

September 18, 1953

Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. Phillips
William Durkee
Thomas Braden ✓
George Morgan
Abbott Washburn

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory and was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was away on vacation.

Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know when it has been decided how David will be handled?

Many thanks.

Marie McCrum

Marie McCrum
Secretary to C. D. Jackson

Attachments

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1953

Miss McCrum:

I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.

David is himself a king-size free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. If he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy his meal.

The plot is complicated by the fact that as far as the U. S. is concerned he has always been strictly covert. This time he arrives as strictly "overt" so no one on our side will really know how to behave since everyone will have to do and be the exact opposite of what they did and were during David's last trip.

I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.

Incidentally, the American who handles David best is Helen Kirkpatrick. She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.

C.D.J.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

The following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.

1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.

2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a systhesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.

3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organizational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will require careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.

4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:

a. With whom should he meet for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)

b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.

5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David with regard to this Agency is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, far from relating to covert operations, is of the most official

kind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observers or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organised and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey.

/S/ WILLIAM TYLER

ATTACHMENT #1

(TRANSLATION)

Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul David

June 19, 1953

My dear Bill,

You know that - probably toward the end of September - I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey; and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.

To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway .. I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes met with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialists of information and of psychological warfare.

To all of them, I have said:

"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seem reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this matter. Your ideas will be useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assembled - adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14' at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."

There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that everywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method and promised me substantial reports.

But, if in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can give me.

I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.

That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.

s/ Jean Paul David

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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4-6653

16 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Whitney Sheperdson Phone Call to You of Yesterday, 15 September, Concerning Forced Labor

1. The central facts in this business are as follows:

a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United States signed by various individual exiles expressing their gratification to the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as an item for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor', . . ."

b. At this Division's direction the Department of State was asked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signature which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the United States Mission to the United Nations.

c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the Department that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegation had decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFE was informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday by this Division.

d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneously assumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperation with the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that it was the decided policy of the United States Government not to force this issue at this or any other time.

e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:

(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for the President's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary of State, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation with Ambassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmitted to President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitation

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of the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.N. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organisations Division

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Executive Registry
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10 Sep 53

8 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning the tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum of conversation prepared by Tracy Barnes, who sat in on a conversation which took place on 4 September in my office with Messrs Rob Scott and Adam Watson of the British Embassy. Tracy's memorandum covers the conversation quite fully, but I should like to point out certain impressions and conclusions of my own which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.

2. It was quite evident that Rob Scott, who, as you know, is the new Minister, and Watson had received some fairly strong prodding from Sir William Strang, and it was equally apparent that they were not particularly well prepared as they were somewhat embarrassed when called upon for specifications -- unable as they were to produce these. Three other features of the conversation which struck me rather forcibly were the following:

a. The fact that they placed primary emphasis on the absolute necessity at the present time of keeping the US-UK copybook completely smirchless until such time as there shall (may?) have been a high-level four-power meeting, including the Soviets, and until such time as it shall have appeared clearly that the Soviet Government is not prepared to make concessions and otherwise adopt a conciliatory approach. This is a fairly evident British line which they have been peddling for some time and I do not doubt that you heard something of it while in London. If followed to the letter and permitted to order our conduct, the result would be that we would, ourselves, adopt a total "sweetness and light" program for an indefinite period of time.

b. The fact that the Embassy representatives said that they had no intention of speaking with the State Department about any of this aroused some slight suspicion on my part that they may have been deliberately bypassing

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the Department in the hope of getting a better deal directly with us. This is the more my impression, since if the British "sweetness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit -- then the State Department had better get into line as well. Obviously the utterances of top State Department officials, both here and abroad, and State Department actions are much more important for the purposes of this particular British approach than are the actions and utterances of our unofficial gray and black media. /I reported the substance of the conversation to General Cabell who authorized me to bring it to the attention of Doc Matthews, which I have done, and at the same time requested him to advise us if the Department hears anything about this from the British Embassy./

c. Finally, Adam Watson dragged in by the tail some questions about the so-called "Freedom Corps", and asked me whether I could confirm that there had been a substantial "heating up" of this old proposal within the past month or six weeks. I replied that if this idea -- which was a very old one indeed in US Government circles -- had reached any particular climax within the past month, I was not aware of it. I said that I had heard that the State Department was considering asking the Foreign Office what it thought about such a program. Mr. Watson then replied that the State Department had, in fact, submitted this question to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office had replied that it recommended most strongly against any broaching of this subject at least until after the German elections. I thanked Mr. Watson for bringing me up to date, and the point was not further pursued.

FGWisner
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
Memo for Record dtd
8 September, sgd by
C/PP: Conv. betw. Messrs
Wisner, Scott, Watson and
Barnes.

detached 9/11 and filed in ADDP's files

cc: C/PP

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5589

11 September 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent conversation with members of the FO staff of the British Embassy re RFE broadcasts, etc.

REFERENCES:

a. Memo dtd Sept 8 from DD/P to DCI; Subject: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning tone and content of RFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.

b. Memo for Record dtd 8 September from C/PP: Subject: Conv. betw. Messrs Wisner, Scott, Watson and Barnes.

1. I am returning to you the original of the Reference a. memorandum for the file. Mr. Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr. Durkee should see it.

2. Mr. Wisner asked me to tell you that his suspicions of Mr. Watson's sheepishness were rather fully confirmed by a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Watson admitted to Mr. Wisner quite frankly that neither he nor Mr. Rob Scott had had very much stomach for their mission that day. Mr. Watson rather doubted that we would hear any more about this.

BJM
BJM

Attached:
Ref. a. memorandum.

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25 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU Developments

The attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFE will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

DCIO:CM/mf

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee via Jacobs
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - DCIO
1 cc - RI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of ICFTU

The following extracts of RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletins indicate the general guidance around which more complete coverages are prepared for broadcasting:

Daily Guidance 554, June 30, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph d:

Concerning forthcoming conference of ICFTU, attention is called to Christian Science Monitor of June 24, reprinted in today's Information Bulletin, and to Report on America #13. "American Labor's Wide Horizons" as published on June 26.

Daily Guidance 560, July 9, 1953, Page 4, Last two lines:

Remarks by George Meany, president of American Federation of Labor, before Stockholm meeting at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in addition to expressing the philosophy of free workers toward less developed areas, should have a special significance to our listeners at this stage of their struggle against Soviet colonialism. Meany declared that freedom to colonial peoples and inhabitants of protectorates was something democracies must take steps to insure as soon as possible. The Federation (ICFTU) should see to it that workers in such territories enjoyed trade-union organization liberty.

Daily Guidance 573, July 28, 1953, Page 3, Paragraph c:

As far as East Germany is concerned, most significant news is vote by International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to set up a fund "to support insurgent unions in East Germany and other satellite countries in their efforts to undermine communist control". George Meany, President of AF of L, predicted that substantial sums would be made available but "declined for obvious reasons" to say how they would be spent.

Meany's announcement would seem to be an event of major significance in which all target areas should be equally interested.

Latest reports on East German purge receive most of their meaning from fact that a faction presently losing out is said to be composed of communists who - - while not at all disloyal to the Kremlin - - are not Muscovites in the sense in which the victors are Muscovites. Chances are that all communist functionaries who did not spend the last war inside Russia are in danger of their jobs or, as the case may be, of their lives.

Human interest stories on recipients of food aid speak for themselves. However, emphasis might well be on fact that recipients are either primarily or exclusively unemployed workers - - and that communists deny the existence of unemployment.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Daily Guidance 590, August 20, 1953, Page 2, Paragraph f:

Note that ICFTU followed up on its promises reported here and created special fund for support of Soviet Zone workers.

19 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Food Program for Eastern Europe

1. This proposed program supports a plan for limited food distribution to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is generally agreed that it is highly desirable honesty to attempt food distribution through regular open channels, before utilizing any unusual method such as balloons, even though it is highly dubious the offers to distribute food will be accepted. It is further felt that no food program of any kind should be commenced unless it is certain to culminate in actual deliveries.

2. Formal Offer: A group such as a Committee to Assist the Peoples of Eastern Europe would be formed, which would in turn make an offer of a definite amount of food to representatives of the satellite governments of Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, the Department of State would be requested to take up the food offer officially with representatives of the governments concerned. CIA will arrange for the composition and sponsorship of the proposed committee. The food offer of the committee, taking note of the official statements indicating that a food shortage exists in each of those countries, would propose the establishment of an international commission to supervise the distribution of food to the needy children of the areas involved. This food would come from U.S. surplus stocks and through contributions made by the sponsoring organizations.

3. Delivery of Balloons: In event of refusal by the satellite regimes of the food offer, the committee might turn to the American Heritage Foundation for help. The latter would be asked to utilise its primary project, the Crusade for Freedom, both in raising public funds and delivering food by balloons.

Crusade for Freedom (NCFE)

A. Capabilities:

1. The Crusade can deliver 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 lbs. of food by way of 200,000 to 400,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia,

Hungary and Poland over a period of two to three weeks;

2. The Crusade can deliver 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 lbs. of food in 400,000 to 600,000 balloons into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland over a period of five to six weeks;

Capabilities (1) and (2) above, are possible within the time periods indicated only if U.S. military facilities and equipment for the necessary procurement and stand-by storage of the hydrogen gas for the balloons is available. (20,000,000 cubic feet of hydrogen gas will fill 200,000 balloons sufficient to lift 1,000,000 lbs.) If such storage facilities, etc. are not available, the time periods must be revised for (1) and (2) above to two months and three months respectively;

3. First balloon launching could commence within sixty days of project authorization;

4. Each food package, suspended to one balloon, would contain five lbs. of staples. (sugar, fat, flour, coffee, chocolate) Packages will be sealed and/or wrapped with polyephelene.

B. Costs:

1. Costs of operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland would be approximately $1.15 per net pound of food delivered, or a total figure of $1,166,000.00 for each 1,000,000 lbs. delivered.

2. Costs of operation into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Baltic areas would be greater, due to added technical factors, necessity of shipboard launchings, etc. The unit cost figure would be $1.55 per net pound delivered.

C. Operational Considerations:

1. If delivery of food into satellite areas is considered feasibly, realistically sound, then entire operational effort must be centered at launching -- delivery of food in the shortest period of time. Counteraction to the impact of food deliveries will be immediate and sustained to include "tampering" with food packages, wholesale arrest, BW charges bolstered by staged photography.

2. Launching sites previously used by the Crusade for Freedom for balloon operations into Czechoslovakia were located along the Czech frontier between Cham and Hof. For launchings into Poland and Hungary, sites in Berlin and in and around Graz, Austria, respectively, would be the most operationally satisfactory.

Concurrence of the proper Austrian, West German and British representatives as to use of launching sites in their jurisdiction areas must be secured well in advance through the appropriate channels.

3. There is no guarantee that the Adenauer government will be favorably disposed towards this food delivery program, even if it wins the September 6 elections.

4. For an operation which envisions the launching of 200,000 balloons (1,000,000 lbs. of food) over as short a period as two to three weeks, a relatively large group of indigenous personnel must be hired, trained (four or five days) and supervised over a minimum five week period.

D. Psychological Considerations:

1. Most recent estimates indicates that the harvest in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland will be fair to average this year. Consequently, it would be a mistake to send food into these areas simply to alleviate a "desperate shortage" which might not in fact exist for workers in good standing. Rather, as a part of RFE's accompanying program exploitation, the population would be urged to conserve the packages as "iron rations" or "strike rations" against the day when they might not otherwise be able to afford absenteeism or loss of wages for other reasons.

2. One of the gravest risks to any food delivery program of this kind, especially should its launching interval be in access of two weeks, is the systematic poisoning of food parcels by the communists. The only really effective way of safe guarding against this is by anticipating it and pre-conditioning the people, via RFE, against contaminated efforts.

3. During the time when, and at the places where the food is packaged, the Crusade should arrange for supervision of such packaging by acceptable humanitarian/religious international groups, such as the Quakers or the Red Cross, in order to neutralise Re charges and augment the bonafides of the committees and Crusade for Freedom.

4. The initial private and official offers of food to the satellite areas must be accompanied with certain conditions ensuring guarantees of delivery, in order to avoid communist acceptance of a bare food offer as such, which would place us in the awkward position of having to subsequently request guarantees for proper distribution and delivery.

5. Type of RFE "running attack" during balloon operation is well illustrated by the following -- 'Czech workers would have to work 6.6 hours to earn enough money to buy one average pound of food parcels contents, whereas the American worker could earn the $1.15 per net lb. delivered in 1.2 hours.'

D. Conclusions:

1. The operation is large and the resultant psychological gains and losses, depending on many variables, could be extensive. Needless to say, the operation should not be undertaken, even in part, as a 'gesture' or on a 'gamble'.

2. Balloons are not the most economical means of delivering food, in point of fact, the movement of items by balloon is at least twice as expensive as any regular means. However, to date, balloons are by far the most feasible way of diffusing a relatively large amount of food containers into an otherwise denied area.

3. Planning of the operation in all its phases should include the Director of RFE, in order to ensure a well coordinated political warfare program.

E. Recommendations:

It is requested that should authority be given to proceed on this balloon-borne food program, such authorization be contingent on the following recommendations:

1. That the commencement of the balloon launching be generally planned for the end of this year.

2. That no more than 400,000 balloons be released (2,000,000 lbs. of food) at a cost of approximately $2,332,000.

3. That the balloon launching phase of the food delivery operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, not exceed ten full consecutive days from its date of commencement.

4. That $50,000 be made available immediately for preparatory work.

5. That food deliveries into Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltics not be considered until after the primary operation into Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland has proved successful.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/BrI:NSD/eh
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2 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO 1 cc - RI

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22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

I had a talk with Spencer Phenix about NCFE matters and the following points were discussed.

(1) A Strategy Board to guide RFE. Spencer feels the need for some higher level political guidance than RFE is getting from their staff people and talked about getting together a board of people like George Kennan, etc. I told Spencer that I thought it unlikely that George would give very much time to this but might be willing to give them an occasional idea or suggestion.

(2) Spencer asked me about the possibility of their finding some job for Sam Reber. I told him to wait on this until I had time to discuss it with FW.

(3) Spencer seemed disturbed that the allocation of one million a month until our budget was passed would cramp their operations. I told him that if they had particular difficulties to let me know. He also asked what they should do about the proposed allocation of $400,000 to help in the refugee situation. I told him I was not familiar with this particular issue.

(4) He suggested that it would be well to have a meeting here with some of the members of the Board and the Executive Committee and suggested a date around the first week in August. I told him I would do it if I had not already left the country by that time.

(5) Spencer is pleased with the better integration and coordination of activities between their shop and this office.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

cc: DD/P

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Executive Registry
3-6124

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed U.S. Aid for East German Refugees

1. Last year you testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the U.S. "iron curtain escapees" care-resettlement program, and during the course of testimony I understand you stated that the program excluded aid to ethnic groups such as Germans in accordance with PSB recommendations.

2. Mr. George Warren (UNA/Refugees) of the State Department has proposed that $300,000 be made available from his program for aid to selected East German refugee projects.

3. This proposal is being made as a gesture of aid to East Germans and has the support of HICOG, of James Reber, and of Representative Celler of New York, among other Congressmen. John Bross, CEE, has no objection.

4. Frank Hand in my office is the liaison point; is following this closely, and will keep us thoroughly informed but I thought, in view of your testimony, you would want to know of the projected policy switch.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

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22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations/Branch 1

SUBJECT: Coordination of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation

1. As both you and Mr. Slonich agreed in your informal conversation of yesterday, the present explosive situation in the satellite periphery and the interim Psychological Strategy Board guidance on its exploitation necessitate closer cooperation between our respective facilities and branches. I want to thank you for offering to make it possible for us to gain further access to NCFE libraries and open sources and for your offering us further technical assistance. I agree that it would be desirable to exchange a Branch officer so that we may have a better understanding of our respective assets and problems. SR/1 will provide one of your associates with a desk and complete access to our files at any time.

2. It may be well for us to discuss how we can best take advantage of further demonstrations and riots in the satellite areas. Should there be an uprising in Poland, for example, it may be desirable for RFE to place broadcasting time at the disposal of Radio Liberation so that the latter may address concentrated and repeated appeals to the Red Army not to fire on Polish workers and peasants, not to interfere in the Polish struggle for freedom, and to consider the Polish people as the allies of the Soviet people in their common struggle against Communism. It was this line that Radio Liberation followed during the East German uprisings. In the event of riots in Czechoslovakia where the Red Army is not present in force and where the satellite security forces may be unable to keep order, close cooperation will be even more desirable.

3. Consideration could be given to having RFE allot Radio Liberation regular time on its broadcasts to Poland and Bulgaria where there are large concentrations of Soviet troops so that Radio Liberation can further build up the idea of a free, Soviet anti-Communist moral and political authority and to express the solidarity of the Soviet peoples with the oppressed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Radio Liberation could also allot regular time on its transmitters so that spokesmen of free Czechoslovakia and Poland could address the Soviet troops.

4. It will, of course, be necessary to discuss the divergent approaches of the two stations. Because of its sponsorship, its identity and its mission, Radio Liberation cannot treat the Soviet oppression of the Central and East European peoples in terms of nationalist domination and exploitation. Radio Liberation always distinguishes between the people on the one hand and the Party and Police on the other, and it is our policy to identify the Red Army with the people.

SECRET
Security Information

5. We will maintain close coordination on all matters relating to Radio Liberation broadcasts to the occupation troops and solicit your comments and suggestions on our broadcasts to the USSR proper and on all other matters.

ANDRE YEDIGAROFF
AC/SR/1

2 - Addressee
1 - C/IO

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

JUL 22 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Branch One

SUBJECT: General Pavle Gruya Pavlovic (201 - 14578)

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE
to IO, dated 16 July 1952, Subject as above

1. Although not initially responsible for recommending that the NCFE subsidize General Pavle Pavlovic, in referenced memorandum SE Division endorsed the continuation of payments by the NCFE to Subject on the basis of his ability to aid in research work being done for CIA at the Pentagon, as well as of his need as a meritorious exile. We have recently been advised by Miss Stern of your office that the NCFE wishes to discontinue this payment since Subject does not participate directly in the NCFE's activities. We have been further advised that if SE Division wishes General Pavlovic to receive a regular income from the NCFE, SE must provide the necessary funds.

2. It is believed that termination of the subsidy by the NCFE will result in real personal hardship to the General, who, at the age of seventy, has no other known source of income. SE Division, however, is not in a position to provide the necessary funds, since this would necessitate the initiation of what would essentially be a charity project, falling more properly within the purview of IO/Branch One. Neither can this Division justify continuation of payments on the basis of work performed for SE, since he has been working primarily for the Department of the Army during the past year. The arrangements for his work at the Pentagon are such, however, that CIA can place research requirements on General Pavlovic whenever desirable.

3. In reviewing the case this year, we have ascertained from the Department of the Army that Subject has worked diligently and contributed materially to the work of his office. He has been particularly commended for his adaptability and readiness to work, which have shown themselves in his efforts to learn English and typing.

4. It is the opinion

SECRET

4. It is the opinion of SE Division that the NCFE decision to terminate payments to General Pavlovic should be consistent with its policies vis-a-vis other Yugoslav emigres, many of whom receive regular stipends solely on the basis of "prestige". General Pavlovic's actual contribution to the efforts of the U.S. Government, if not of CIA or the NCFE directly, should be taken into consideration in addition to his very real need before halting payments to him. We would appreciate your informing us as to the final disposition of this case.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER
Acting Chief, SE

4805

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SECURITY INFORMATION

7/23 FGW saw
but decided
to take no
action.
BJM

22 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Message from Whitney Shepardson

1. Whitney Shepardson cabled the following to his office with the request that they immediately give it to C. D. Jackson. This information and message was given to us today by Spencer Phenix.

> "Report this morning Mrs. Hilde Benjamin new East German Justice Minister rescinded right to strike granted June 11 by predecessor.
>
> Seems appropriate your boss Thursday press conference or perhaps more formally sum up recent Russian inspired communist actions behind curtain; in Czechoslovakia savings wiped out, future bleak, families, children bankrupt. In east Germany recision of elementary right of labor to strike is again denied and will be ruthlessly crushed by force. Satellite states long deprived of their food and goods by most vicious practices of colonialism known for two centuries. This is no paradise for workers, this is hell. In the United States this capitalist society so often denounced by Soviet propaganda lines, the savings of the workers are protected in law and in fact, and the right to strike is protected in law and in fact also. After almost two hundred years of its national existdnce there can not be found in the US one trace of the colonial practices which characterise Soviet rule over its satellite colonies.
>
> Condon asks that if such theme is used "give our boys a break so they can prepare and push home with background and variation."

(Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with PSB

1. I understand that two of the matters that have come up before your PSB luncheon are:

a. C. D. Jackson's proposal to send food to East Germany via balloon.

b. C. D. Jackson's proposal for a monument memorial to be put up near the Brandenburg Gate. I would like to comment on these two proposals for what use it may be to you.

2. It seems to me food shipment via balloon is a meaningless gesture. It will not do any positive good because it can't get enough food into East Germany to make any difference. Thus a negative result is fostered; it looks and appears to be psychological warfare of a rather obvious kind. The food offers by the U. S. Government and those by the ICFTU were, as the London Times pointed out last Monday, psychological victories, but the Russians are now moving food into Germany in far greater quantities than we can do via balloon. In addition, there are obvious dangers from the standpoint of a BW play-back as Mr. Wisner suggested. It would be much easier and much more effective for the Russians to use the BW theme on balloon shipments than on any quantities of food that the Government or the ICFTU are actually able to get behind the Iron Curtain. In sum, balloons are a trick and food doesn't lend itself to tricks.

3. I think the monument idea is a respectable one but not on the level that the PSB people seem to want to play it. They have in mind a world campaign to be conducted in all countries, particularly in this one and in South America with a distinguished body of citizens to lead the campaign here. I do not think the memorial idea is big enough for that (the best memorial so far erected was Berlin's own decision to change the name of the Unterlinden to Strasse June 17). I think the memorial idea ought to be left to the Germans. We can delicately suggest it and see that it is followed up with any support necessary in this country through already existing organizations such as NCFE or the Crusade for Freedom if this is necessary. These should play a minor role.

CIO:TWB/ch
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - W.

SECRET

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

July 21, 1953

" PROSPERO "

Preliminary Report

The purpose of this operation was to exploit the present critical circumstances in the Communist empire and in Czechoslovakia in particular by bringing to the people of that country tangible evidence of the West's interest in and support for their resistance against the regime. There follows a brief summary of the salient facts about the operation:

1. 5402 rubber balloons and 1212 plastic balloons were launched from the primary site in Ellenfeld, a small German village on the Czechoslovak frontier and from the secondary site in Schönsee, some 40 miles to the south.

2. These carried a net total (after wastage) of approximately 10,000,000 messages of three types:

   a. A likeness of the new 1-crown note issued by the Czechoslovak regime following the recent currency reform. The text of this note is attached as Appendix A.

   b. A replica of the new 25-heller coin, bearing the words "All our people for freedom - All the free world for our people". The words "Free Europe" and the emblem of the Freedom Bell appeared in the center of the coin.

   c. A leaflet bearing photographs of the East Berlin demonstrations on one side and a text describing recent events in East Germany and the Soviet Union (including the Beria purge) on the other. Copies of this message are attached as Appendix B.

3. The target areas for the operation were: (a) the industrial and mining districts of northwest Bohemia; (b) the capitol of Prague and the heavily populated area north of Prague; (c) the city and environs of Pilsen; (d) the Ostrava region. (See display map.)

4. The operation took place between 0800 Monday, July 13, 1953 and 2400, Friday, July 17. Balloons were in the air 15 working days after conception of the idea, and 3 working days after final approval. The third (Berlin-Beria) message was sent to the printer on Saturday; on Monday 2,000,000 copies were at the site and on the way to their destination.

5. A crew of 22 workmen was transported from Munich to the site. Including guards, drivers, and supervisory personnel, the total payroll for the operation was approximately 40. The crew was billeted in a small hotel in the nearby village of Tirschenreuth and was fed in a Gasthof at the site. Working time totalled approximately 3000 man hours. The operation entailed the use of 7058 cubic meters of hydrogen, representing 17900 lbs. of lift. The weight of the hydrogen cylinders was 102 tons.

6. The rubber balloons carried an average payload of 2 lbs. and burst at an altitude of from 30,000 to 40,000 ft. They rose in the air at a rate of 100 to 500 ft. per minute. The total elapsed time from the leaflets' point of departure to arrival on the ground ranged from 2 to 5 hours. The plastic balloons carried a payload of from 1/10th to 4/10ths of a pound, travelled at an altitude of 30,000 ft., and penetrated from 60 to 300 miles, depending on the target desired. The plastic balloons do not burst but descend to the ground at a point determined by the amount of gas and weight of payload. At the peak of the operation well over one million messages were in the air at the same time.

7. The wind speed averaged 40 miles per hour and ranged from 230° (blowing into Northern Bohemia) to 270° (blowing towards Prague and Ostrava). Pilsen was bracketed from both launching sites. Meteorological data was obtained from the Neubiberg air base and confirmed by radar facilities located 7 kilometers from the site. These facilities and the personnel necessary to man them were obtained from the U. S. Army. They were able to track target balloons deep into the country. The radar units were also able to detect Czechoslovak air activity and to establish that the other side was also using radar, presumably in connection with the balloons.

8. Border activity was intensified during the period of operations. During 5 trips to the frontier (which was within sight of the launching location), it was observed that officers had replaced enlisted men on border patrols. On several occasions attempts were made by ground forces to shoot down

the balloons, although only two hits were observed by border police.

On Wednesday, July 15, at 1400 hours, two Migs flew along the frontier over the site and were clearly observed by the working party. Subsequently that afternoon the theodolite was moved to a hilltop point (from which, incidentally, the hills around Pilsen could be discerned) and Migs attempting to shoot down balloons were viewed by members of the party as well as by the German border patrol. As many as 7 Migs were observed at one time. Three hits were witnessed, two of which appeared to cause the balloons to explode and one of which simply caused the balloon to disappear. On Wednesday night additional planes were reported by border police. Searchlights were also seen. On Thursday, 5 Messersmiths 109Fs replaced the Migs and succeeded in destroying three balloons. No air action was observed on Friday, although at 1000 hours a jet vapor trail materialized directly above the Launching site and was headed into Czechoslovakia. However, it was impossible to see the aircraft or to say for certain that this was a border violation.

9. On the last night of operations (Thursday) a procession of 80 plastic balloons with candle-lanterns was launched. Since the night was perfectly clear, the "torchlight parade" could be easily observed - the lights looked like stars marching quietly across the sky. No aircraft were seen.

10. The total cost of both the original operation and the supplementary Berlin-Beria message is estimated at less than $25,000, or a unit cost of 1/5th of a cent per message sent. A substantial portion of this represents transportation and other non-recurrent expenses which would not be involved in a sustained operation.

11. Note must be made of the invaluable technical and operational assistance provided by the two General Mills personnel, Mr. C. B. Moore and Mr. Fletcher Bartholomew, who were present on the trip. It should also be mentioned that the help of RFE personnel was exceedingly valuable.

12. As of the date of this report, regime reaction includes:

   a. Rude Pravo editorial read over Radio Prague on July 18 (Appendix C), plus supplementary articles in Svobodno Slovo and Mlada Front.

b. Commentaries over Radio Moscow in Russian and Polish and over Radio Warsaw.

c. Articles in the Romanian and Hungarian press.

d. An article in Moscow Pravda.

13. In accordance with previous plans, Western publicity about the operation was discouraged.

Conclusions

The limited purpose of "Prospero" has, so far as we know, been substantially achieved. However, it must be acknowledged that an operation of this kind is both strongly provocative and (because of its tangible form) susceptible to dangers not risked by radio. There is the further complication that it is launched from German soil and could conceivably cause injury to RFE's position in Germany. All of these factors must be carefully weighed in considering any future action of this sort.

Further, this must be classified as a "crash action", as evidenced by the time elapsed between conception and termination. Crash actions are good once or twice, but are not to be recommended as a habit either from the point of view of cost or, even more important, in cognizance of the utter necessity of careful and thorough preparation of the best possible message.

On the positive side, this can be stated:

1. The message was timely, worth saying, and closely integrated with RFE policy.
2. Enemy reaction was immediate and sorely hurt.
3. Internal conditions and the world Communist situation suggest that the action was taken at an apt moment.

4. Technically, with radar help it was proved that balloons could be launched carrying relatively heavy payloads on an assembly line basis with a high degree of target accuracy. This was not previously known.

5. Aside from the impact of the messages, the very fact that the West was interested enough to go to the trouble and expense of penetrating the Iron Curtain by a means which the regime is powerless to prevent - by Migs or bullets - cannot be lost upon the captive peoples.

S. S. Walker, Jr.

MESSAGE ON LEAFLET

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES ~~TO~~ YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD!

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER!

THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GROWING STRONGER!

The Soviet Union is getting weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire and fear creeps through the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now going to begin - the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories - how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help the people's struggle against the oppressors.

The Soviets have trapped themselves in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot weighs even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments become more pressing, the resistence of the people will only grow: for the people will not return into submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions - as in Hungary and in Eastern Germany - they will get nowhere: for the people will no longer be deceived by phony concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt have flared out in Czechoslovakia and in Eastern Germany. From Pilsen, from Moravska Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt has roared throughout the world and deeply shaken the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the menace and became afraid. They started apologising. They started self-criticising. They started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the peoples revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your resistance has helped to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won their first major victory in their fight with the regime.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS!

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, common agreement, and unity of purpose are capable of winning concessions. Your battlefield of labor is in the factories and in the fields. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. We do not presume to give you orders nor to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone: Among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the fire of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the free world your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

FREE EUROPE!

MESSAGE ON BANKNOTE

On one side:

Czechoslovaks, know this:

The regime is weaker than you have dared to think! Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed. With unity and courage, organize your strength: Down with the collective! Insist on workers' rights! Today demand concessions; tomorrow - freedom!

On other side:

Men call this the hunger crown - gift of the Soviet Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of five-year failure: It is a challenge to fight, to meet weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you in your struggle.

The free world is with you!

All power to the people!

RFE LS 7-24-53

CAESAR INFO WALKER FM MICHIE

OUR VIENNA BUREAU YESTERDAY REPORTED FOLLOWING BALLOON REACTION QUOTE SEVEN MEN FROM PARDUBICE SAID THAT ALL LAST WEEK PEOPLE WERE JUMPING LIKE FROGS TO CATCH THE LEAFLETS AS THEY CAME DOWN. MANY PEOPLE WORE THE COINS AROUND THEIR NECKS. MANY SOLDIERS WERE CHECKED OUT FROM THEIR ARMY UNITS TO COLLECT THE LEAFLETS. SAME REFUGEES SAID ALSO THAT IN PILSEN MIG PLANES TOOK OFF EVERY HOUR FROM THE AIRPORT TO SHOOT DOWN THE BALLOONS. THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO LEAFLETS AND NO REPEAT NO BALLOONS IN THE BUDEJOVICE AREA IT WAS REPORTED. NEVERTHELESS ALL THE GENDARMERIE INTERVIEWED THE POPULATION TO SEE IF THEY HAD SOMEHOW OBTAINED ANY. ALSO THE POSTMEN HAD ORDERS FROM THE GENDARMERIE TO ASK EVERYBODY ALONG THEIR POSTAL ROUTES IF THEY HAD ANY LEAFLETS. UNQUOTE

[illegible]

TO CAESAR FOR W[illegible] MICHIE

RADIO WARSAW JULY 20 0700 HOURS QUOTE BALLOON ACTION. AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS HAVE LATELY LAUNCHED IN WESTERN GERMANY A CAMPAION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA - THE DAILY RUDE PRAVO STATED IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE A CAMPAIGN CONDEMNED TO FIASCO UNQUOTE. FROM AUSTRIA SMALL BALLOONS CONTAINING DENOUNCING LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE DIRECTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE ACTION - AS ANNOUNCED BY THE MUNICH SLANDER-STATION FREE EUROPE - WAS LED BY AMERICAN EXPERTS WHO CAME TO WESTERN GERMANY FOR THAT INTENTION. IT IS A FACT SAYS RUDE PRAVO THAT BALLOON EXPERTS HAVE NOT SPARED THE LEAFLETS. DURING TWO DAYS TIME CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS HAVE BROUGHT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF LEAFLETS TO SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL COMMITTEES. CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING MASSES ARE DEEPLY INDIGNANT AT THIS DISHONEST PROVOCATION OF WARMONGERS UNQUOTE.

RADIO WARSAW JULY 22 0700 HOURS QUOTED THE NOTE SENT BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT SENT A NOTE TO THE MAERICAN EMBASSY IN PRAGUE IN WHICH IT PROTESTS VIOLENTLY AGAINST SPREADING ON CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY SOME LEAFLETS, CALLING FOR ANTI-STATE ACTIVITY. THE NOTE STRESSED THAT THE PROVOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO ARE STAYING IN THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION ZONE IN WESTERN GERMANY UNQUOTE

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 195

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Rude Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflamatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravice, district of Cesky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundreds times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflamatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power which helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Oradour, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prace, It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of gansterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this".

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they knew very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezce in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

413 / 7-

RFE 7 7-21-53

PHENIX LANG WALKER GRIFFITH FM CONDON

FOLLOWS RADIO PRAGUE ANNOUNCEMENT 0910 TODAY RE NOTE ON BALLOONS.

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING NOTE TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES ON JULY 20, 1953:

DURING THE PAST DAYS BALLOONS WERE SENT TO CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY WITH LEAFLETS OF A NATURE DESIGNED TO INCITE DISCONTENT OF THE POPULATION AND TO ENCOURAGE ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES. THIS NEW ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING PEOPLE WITH PROPAGANDA MEANS OF SO PRIMITIVE A LEVEL, UNDERSTANDABLY MET WITH INDIGNANT RESISTANCE, THAT THE ENTIRE ACTION WAS PREPARED AND CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CITIZENS SENT FOR THIS PURPOSE TO GERMANY, TO GERMAN TERRITORY UNDER US OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION. IT IS THEREFORE A NEW INSTANCE WHERE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ABUSED ITS POSITION AS AN OCCUPATION POWER TOWARDS ENDS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON GERMANY, WHICH BINDS THE UNITED STATE TO CARRY OUT THE OCCUPATION ACCORDING TO THE BASIC TENET THAT GERMANY IS NEVER AGAIN TO BECOME A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

a

ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH MAKES THIS NEW VIOLATION OF BASIC PRICIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE IS THE FACT THAT IT TOOK PLACE AT A TIME WHEN THE NATIONS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD ARE INCREASING THEIR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE AND ASSURE PEACEFUL COOPERATION.

THE AIM OF THIS PROVOCCATIVE ACTION, ORGANIZED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF US OCCUPATION AUTHORIITIES IS TO INCREASE THE POLICIES OF THE SO-CALLED COLD WAR AND TO PREVENT A LOOSENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

FOR THESE REASONS THE GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DECISIVELY PROTESTS AGAINST THIS ACTION AND ASKS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO FURNISH INFORMATION ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT SIMILAR PROVOCATIONS AIMED AGAINST PEACEFUL COEXISTANCE OF NATIONS, REPRESENTING CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS."

END MSG

[illegible] July 25, [illegible]

Czechoslovakia

Balloon Operation

The "Commentary of the Week" quotes an article from "Rude Pravo" dealing with the preparation for "X-Day". No lies broadcast from abroad, no balloon operation can deny the fact that the plan for "X-Day" which had been prepared for 5 years failed with the Berlin riots.

The weekly programme "Uncle from Stiavnica" tries to ridicule and underestimate the significance of the balloon operation. This programme was broadcast by Radio Bratislava in Slovak dialect. It tells the story of the "Uncle" who found some of the crowns which had been put into the balloons on the road and of course immediately recognized that they were only the imitations of the real crowns. Next day he entered the tobacconist's shop and when paying gave the sales girl by accident the crown he had found on the road. She only laughed and told him he could not get anything for that crown but has to pay with real Czechoslovak currency.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs' Note to America Legation

REFERENCE: Memo dated 21 July 1953 - Subject: "Czech Reactions to Balloon Operation"

1. The Czech Desk of the Department of State is preparing an answer to the Czech note which will generally disclaim any U.S. Governmental responsibility for the balloon operation. The VOA is being instructed to brush off the Czech note and to cite it as another example of the regime's attempt to prevent the Czech people from getting the truth.

2. RFE will not comment on the note except to report the U.S. reply as a news item, but will comment on the Rude Pravo editorial taking the line the Czech Government can't let its people know the truth and also speculating on how many Czechs did not turn in their pamphlets.

[illegible] BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief,
International Organizations Division

C-IO/Branch 1/WPD/mhj

Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
C-IO/Branch 1 - 2
CIO - 1
RI - 1

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Czech reactions to balloon operation

1. Attached are Czech reactions to the balloon operation including the text of a note from the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered today to the American Embassy in Prague.

2. Radio Free Europe has been instructed not to comment upon this note until directed.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czechoslovakian territory with leaflets of a nature designed to incite discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignate instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under U.S. occupation administration. It is, therefore, a new instance where the U.S. Government abused its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the U.S. to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peacefull cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of U.S. occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czechoslovakia decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the U.S. to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar provocation aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

C O P Y

MUNICH RFE 29 - JULY 20, 1953

PLEASE NOTE THAT TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIED REPRINT OF MAJOR PORTION OF RUDE PRAVO BALLOON EDITORIAL, INCLUDING MENTION OF RFE, UNDER TITLE: "ANSWER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE TO THE PROVACATEURS AND SLANDERS". UNITED PRESS CARRIED STORY OF RUDE PRAVO EDITORIAL UNDER VIENNA DATELINE JULY 18.

END

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE

July 20, 1953

The following report is one of the first full attacks on the recent "Balloon Operation" in Czechoslovakia. The text was read over Radio Prague on July 18, 1953:

We are going to read to you now an article from today's Rude Pravo. The article is called "An Action Doomed to Failure". Thanks to the peace policy of the Soviet Union and of all the countries of the camp of peace, the conviction that a war can be prevented grew stronger among the people all through the world. Naturally, this evolution creates a great concern with those for whom war constitutes a source of immeasurable gains and of a luxurious life. Therefore the warmongers do their best to put obstacles in the way which leads towards the lessening of international tension. In Korea the part of the provocateur and saboteur of the peace effort was given to Syngman Rhee. In Germany bandits were used, recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals in the democratic sector of Berlin as well as in some other parts of the German Democratic Republic. And after the failure this much heralded day, there comes the hypocritical and demagogical offer to help to the population of the DDR, which was made for obvious propaganda reasons which, in fact, was admitted by the Western bourgeois press.

Into this chain of provocations which are aimed against the strengthening of peace there also belongs the American propaganda action which was started in the last days in Western Germany against Czechoslovakia. In a similar way in which two years ago the ill-famed "Crusaders for Freedom" were doing it, today again balloons dispersing inflammatory leaflets over our territory are being sent from the Bavarian side.

The Munich transmitter Free Europe, financed by Ford and similar "institutions" speaks bombastically of the propaganda balloon action which, allegedly is the biggest action of this kind which ever has been attempted and for the direction of which there came to Western Germany specialists from America.

We can indeed certify that the balloons specialists did not spare the leaflets in the first two days tens and hundreds of thousands of those leaflets are with our police and our national committees where they are being brought by our citizens after having been discovered. The farmer Hajek from Doubravcice, district of Cecky Brod, brought an entire parcel of leaflets which came down in one piece. Josef Korinek from Zatec brought an entire balloon which fell down. The leaflets are being brought by the workers of the Vladimir Lenin Works as well as other factories, by farmers, railwaymen and children. Yet even if the balloon action was not only four times bigger - as Free Europe says - but hundreds times bigger than the Crusade action of 1951, it will bring to its initiators the very opposite of what they had in mind.

With words of justified anger our citizens come with the leaflets and they are especially offended by the fact that one of the leaflets is some kind of a facsimile of the new Czechoslovak crown stamped on both sides by inflamatory words. Our citizens hold in esteem the new crown which is firm and valuable and has a great purchasing power ~~which~~ helped us to get rid of rationing and, therefore, with sharp and often crude words they criticize that its image had been misused as the basis for printing big lies concerning the government of our republic and the USSR.

The second leaflet is propagating the Fascist provocations which took place on seventeen June in the German Democratic Republic. When those provocations ended by failure, their organizers ordered that they should be used at last for the printing of leaflets with pictures, demonstrating the bandits of Berlin in action; as they are starting fires or indulging in provocations, etc.

Those pictures belong into the series of the photographs which the Nazis throatcutters used to take while they were starting fires in the occupied countries, in the Ukraine, in Oradour, in Li Lidice. It is quite natural that this, too, can only create disgust towards those who have started this criminal action. Besides, the pictures of the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational news for us, as the directors of the balloon action obviously imagine. Similar pictures were published not long ago in our Svet Prace, It demonstrates the absolute political shortsightedness which when people mentioned it is described as stupidity of the organizers of the balloon action who think that they could influence our people by leaflets one side of which constitutes a glorification of hatred and of the attack against peace which was to take place on 17th June in Berlin.

In vain is the part of the defender of Czechoslovak working people - and this will always be the same - assumed by those, from whose actions there emanates the wish to start a new murderous war which is not wanted by any honest working citizen whatever be his political or his religious opinion. This provocation clearly demonstrates how the USA reactionary circles plan the lessening of international tension.

It is a gross heresy just at the time when the people of the entire world are looking forward with hope towards the possibility of a truce in Korea, when with confidence they are following the peace policy of USSR, aiming at the peaceful settlement of all disputed international questions.

Therefore, the balloon action was met with sharp condemnation on the part of our people. The balloon specialists would certainly not like to hear what the people say when they bring the leaflets to the SNB and to the National Committees. It is worth noticing that even such people who so far did not find an active attitude to the socialist development express their surprise about the means the West is employing. And all our people are deeply offended by the latent violating of the independence of our State territory. They are surprised by the great amount of stupidity of the people who thought that they will achieve anything by the balloons. True, the Crusaders of Freedom in the West are losing more and more possibilities for conducting enemy activity on the territory of our Republic. On the frontiers of our country there stands a vigilant guard which breaks all the attempts of their agents and so they must be contented with the balloon action which our people overtly laughed at and which they condemn.

They openly say that the entire action was a kind of gangsterism which not even Hitler dared to commit at the time of the greatest hatred campaign against Czechoslovakia. When they are bringing the leaflets which they had found to the security organs and to the administrative organs, they ask that the action should be publicly condemned.

This spontaneous disgust concerning the balloon action demonstrated in which complete isolation, lack of information and ignorance of the real thinking of our working people do live the mercenaries of Free Europe which is the patron of this action. Free Europe even broadcast, while propagating the balloons, some kind of poor poetry in which one says, that "Always all the good things were coming from above" and that our people knew this".

Yet our people have got a longer memory than Free Europe believes. They will remember what good came to them from above from the West; that it was the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war were murdering women and children in peaceful residential quarters of Prague and Plzen and which destroyed the Plzen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works in order to make our reconstruction more difficult. Later we were getting from above, from Western Germany a flood of the Colorado beetle which was supposed to bring us misery and starvation, and they know very well what American pilots are bringing from above to the women and children of Korea.

And one more coincidence: One of the boxes with leaflets which was found near Brezce in the Plzen Region carried the inscription Munchen and also with the name of Munich are connected for every citizen the memories of the worst time of our nations: the memories how in reality looks the love of the so-called friends of our people.

In fact the organizers of the ridiculous and stupid balloon action spent their dollars for balloons, paper and metal stamps carrying the emblem of Free Europe which are also being spread. They can hardly expect any thanks on the part of their employers because the result is exactly the contrary of the expected. True, a few business men finally got their pockets full but otherwise the action was doomed to failure from its very beginning. This action blown up by Free Europe deflated soon just as its balloons.

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Note to Czechoslovak Government

Verbatim Text

Following is text note for transmission FONOFF in reply to its note July 20.

Begin text. The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note of July 20, 1953, concerning the release of balloons from the US Zone of Germany has the honor, upon instructions of the US Government, to make the following reply:

The balloons apparently in question were not released by any official agency of this Government but by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The US Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between peoples constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the peoples of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those outside of such media as balloons confirms that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communication. The US believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world, namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

As for

As for the content of the messages carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and in addition various statements focusing on the idea of "freedom". There would be no reason for a government to be disturbed about the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the US Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

The US Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the US Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the US as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreements affecting Germany. Nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the US Government is a signatory.

With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace the US, as is generally known, has endeavored in every practicable way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interests of the American people in permanent peace and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The US seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension wherever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized at the same time that true international tranquillity presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned. End text/

Cable soonest intended date delivery so press release may be issued here.

SECRET
Security Information

Follows Radio Prague announcement 0510 today re note on balloons:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following note to the Embassy of the United States on July 20, 1953:

During the past days balloons were sent to Czech territory with leaflets of a nature designed to insight discontent of the population and to encourage anti-state activities. This new attempt to influence the Czech working people with propaganda means of so primitive a level, understandably met with indignate instance, that the entire action was prepared and carried out by American citizens sent for this purpose to Germany, to German territory under US occupation administration. It is therefore a new instance where the US Government abuse its position as an occupation power towards ends incomparable with the four power agreement on Germany, which binds the US to carry out the occupation according to the basic tenet that Germany is never again to become a threat to world peace and its neighbors.

Another important factor which makes this new violation of basic principle of international law particularly objectionable is the fact that it took place at a time when the nations of the entire world are increasing their efforts to strengthen the peace and assure peaceful cooperation.

The aim of this provocative action, organized under the protection of US occupation authorities is to increase the policies of the so-called cold war and to prevent a loosening of international tensions.

For these reasons the Government of Czech decisively protest against this action and asks the Government of the US to furnish information on the steps taken to prevent similar persecution aimed against peaceful co-existence of nations, representing crude interference in internal Czech affairs."

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIF... ...ION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	4 June
2			
3	file NCFE		

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

Attached is Mr. Durkee's recommendation in respect to Mr. Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr., International Federation of Free Journalists and the Free European Press Service. His recommendation is that we do not support this organisation for PW or intelligence purposes. I concur in it.

see 2 June Chrono

TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM SEP. 1947 30-4

16—63794-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
Security Information

4237

20 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Zygmunt Nagorski; Free European Press Service; International Federation of Free Journalists.

REFERENCE: Memo to DD/P fr C/PP dtd 19 June, same subject.

1. I have read with interest the reference memorandum which concludes with recommendations against the utilization of Nagorski and his "organization" in connection with PP operations, including dissemination activities. It is my recollection that there had been a previous recommendation against the use of this individual and his colleagues and associates as sources of information. It is my further recollection that in part as the result of a recommendation which we received from C. D. Jackson, we recently granted a very modest ($3500 per month) subsidy to cover a try-out period of a few months' duration.

2. Will you please advise me if I am wrong on any of my points of recollection as indicated above. If, on the other hand, my recollection is accurate, will you please prepare for my signature a brief communication suitable for transmittal to Mr. C. D. Jackson and stating, in effect, that whereas we did in fact go forward with a modest subsidy for a three (?) month period, we have now had an opportunity to re-examine this entire situation in detail, including the identity and character of Nagorski's sources and associates, and have reached the conclusion that we have no interest or desire to continue our support and relationship with Nagorski beyond the conclusion of the trial period.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

cc: C/[illegible]
C/IO ✓

Attachments:
Ref. memo and tabs.

SECRET
Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

20 July 1953

IO, Attn: Mr. Durkee
VIA : Chief, EE
DC/EE/P

Proposed Balloon Campaign in Event President Offers Food to Poland

1. With reference to our discussion of 17 July, attached hereto is the Crusade for Freedom a sample of the coupon which it is recommended that a Presidential offer of distribute by balloon from Germany in the event that This coupon reads as food for Poland is refused by the Polish Government. follows:

The bearer of this coupon is entitled to receive from the food supplies donated by Americans:

(food listed will be those specifically offered)

Stamped across the coupon are the words, "Invalid due to the rejection of the offer by The Polish 'Peoples' Republic".

2. We are advising the Frankfurt mission of this plan and requesting their estimate of the number of leaflets which they could release by balloon from the Baltic. Please advise us whether or not your printing facilities can supply the German mission with whatever number of leaflets they undertake to distribute. We, on the other hand, will advise you soonest of the number of balloons we will require from your stocks and the address to which they are to be consigned.

3. In the event that the Crusade desires to include a printed message on the reverse of the leaflet, it is requested that the text of the message be cleared either with this desk or with the German mission prior to printing.

Attachment:

WALPOLE DAVIS
Deputy Chief

See Dike's
reply 29 July
Chrono

EE/P:ECHoward:ms
20 July 1953
2 Addressee
1 RI
2 EE/P

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Kenneth Dean Koch

1. In January of this year I discussed with your office the retention of Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as RFE representative, due to his extensive usefulness to FI in Berlin, providing FI with cover facilities, leads, general services and working very satisfactorily in supporting the FI mission in Berlin. At that time I was assured by IO that they would do everything possible to retain Mr. Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative. In May of this year I had occasion to visit Bob Lang in New York on another matter and I again touched upon Mr. Koch's assignment in Berlin, at which time Mr. Lang assured me that no changes would be made in Koch's assignment in Berlin without prior clearance with me. He also emphasized that no man would be sent to Berlin who did not meet with our complete approval. In the meantime, Koch was sent to Israel to set up the RFE office but seemingly met with opposition on the part of Israel authorities and has returned to Germany with no definite job envisaged for him. John Elliott has taken over the RFE office in Berlin and there seems to be no attempt to make any concessions to FI wishes in Berlin.

2. We find this solution an extremely unsatisfactory one. Elliott, by background, general character, and ability, is not as useful to FI in Berlin as Koch was and I seriously doubt that RFE would find him as satisfactory as Koch in standard RFE business. I knew Elliott when he was a newspaper man, and I have checked with several of his former colleagues who agree that he does not have any of the hard-hitting qualities so desirable for an RFE representative in Berlin. This is not an attempt to belittle his ability as a journalist but the job in Berlin is very much more than that. In short, I would appreciate your office taking steps with RFE to return Dean Koch to Berlin as RFE representative, since his services to FI are very much desired even on a part-time basis. Our main reason for wanting Koch in Berlin is that the RFE office attracts a large percentage of Satellite refugees and as such it is important for us to have the head of the RFE office in Berlin

Security

cognizant of our intelligence interests in order to be able to channel the right type of refugee to our doorstep. Furthermore, in many cases the RFE representative can perform valuable screening and cutout functions which would preserve his own cover and yet save us valuable time and effort.

3. I would appreciate any action you can take on this subject and refer you to IN 40404 from Berlin which is attached. Please keep me advised on any progress you make in this case.

PETER SICHEL
Chief, EE/FI

Attachment: IN 40404

Read by Wisner
7/17/53

SECRET
Security Information

16 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE Report on recent Soviet Zone Politburo Meeting

1. Attached herewith, I am forwarding you a cable which has just been received in New York from Munich.

2. The information contained therein was transmitted by the RFE correspondent in Hamburg, Major Ramsey, who reportedly got it from a usually reliable British SIS contact.

3. RFE has asked us to treat this information with extreme caution and strictly as speculation.

Signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SOVIET ZONE POLITBURO MEETING

Cable dated 7/16/53 from Munich to New York

"East German aling President Wilhelm Pieck is definitely on the way out, reliable sources in close contacts with the East German Government said here today. The sources stated that Pieck's ouster was disclosed during an East-West German Communist Politburo meeting which ended in East Germany on July 12. Top German Communist leaders were also told that East German Secret Police Chief, Wilhelm Zaisser, is now suspended or under house arest. Zaisser was arrested for publication of casulty figures of the June 17 revolt, the source said. His ouster also falls in line with recent Communist policy shifts all over the Red Empire, they said. At the meeting it was disclosed that SED head Walter Ulbricht will remain a potent force in East German politics despite recent rumors of his impending purge. Premier Otto Grotewohl will be given increased power in the new government set-up, the sources said. During a discussion of recent events in the Soviet at the Politburo meeting, the Communist leaders were given information from Moscow reporting that Foreign Minister Molotov will emerge during the next month as the key figure in the Soviet Union. Premier Malenkov will serve as a figurehead for Molotov, the sources revealed. The Red Army is fast becoming a major political force in Russia and several generals have been recalled from outpost areas by order of Molotov, the sources said. The USSR is suffering from acute shortages of raw materials, especially rubber and oil, as well as strategic metals of the rarer varieties, it was disclosed at the meeting. In view of this, the top Communists were told that Russia would continue its "peace offensive" for at least another year. The sources, reported to be "highly reliable", said that the revelations released at the meeting were to be used as "policy directives" by East and West Communist leaders."

NOTE:

FYI. "This information was released through our Central News with the warning to treat with extreme caution, adding that Political Advisor's office agreed it is of most explosive nature and should be handled strictly as speculation."

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

4 3527

Noted by DCI
8 Aug 53. 932

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by RFE on the purge of Beria.

Cord Meyer Jr.
CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.) THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEZHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BRING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF " PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD; - FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE SHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

8. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE--BUT WILL HAVE NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURRENDERING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

II. GUIDANCE:

CAUTION: AS BEFORE, WE SPECULATE ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KREMLIN AND THE SATELLITE COUNTRIES BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ANY ONE PARTICULAR THEORY. THIS IS THE END OF THE FIRST ACT OF THE POWER STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST ACT; THERE ARE MANY MORE AND BLOODIER ACTS TO COME. THE COALITION WHICH DESTROYED BERIA IS JUST AS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL DISSENSION AS WAS THE MALENKOV-BERIA-MOLOTOV COALITION FORMED AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. THE BASIC ANALOGY HERE IS TO STALIN'S TACTICS AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. FIRST HE ELIMINATED TROTSKY AND THE LEFTISTS (THE NEW COALITION NOW ELIMINATES BERIA); THEN HE ELIMINATED THE RIGHTISTS (PROBABLY THE NEXT ACT IN THIS PRESENT DRAMA WILL INVOLVE ELIMINATION OF THE REST OF THE COALITION BY THE RISING ELEMENT IN IT).

A. TO THE PEOPLE:

AS THE BOLSHEVIKS DEVOUR EACH OTHER EVER MORE FEROCIOUSLY, OUR PEOPLES CAN LOOK ON WITH PLEASURE AND ASSURANCE WHILE THEIR OPPRESSORS ARE MAKING THEMSELVES WEAKER AND THEY (THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PEOPLES) ARE BECOMING STRONGER. WHEN THE KREMLIN IS WEAKENED BY DISSENSION THE SATELLITE KREMLINS ARE EVEN MORE WEAK AND PARALYZED. AND OF COURSE THE PURGE HAS JUST BEGUN. LOCAL SATELLITE COMMUNIST BIG SHOTS WILL BE TOO OCCUPIED WITH SAVING THEIR OWN SKINS TO BE AS TYRANNICAL AS BEFORE. THIS COULD NOT COME AT A BETTER TIME FOR THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS OF EASTERN EUROPE: AFTER EASTERN GERMAN REVOLTS AND CZECHOSLOVAK DEMONSTRATIONS, THEY NOW KNOW THEIR OWN STRENGTH AND THEIR OWN POWER. AS THEY ARE MARSHALLING THEIR FORCES, THEIR TYRANTS' STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS CRACKING. THE EVENTUAL DOOM OF COMMUNISM HAS NEVER MORE CERTAIN THAN NOW. THE REGIMES WILL CERTAINLY TRY, AS THE KREMLIN IS TRYING, TO PRESENT A FACADE OF "MONOLITHIC UNITY." BUT YOU KNOW, AS THEY KNOW, THAT THE FACADE IS HOLLOW AND THAT THE REGIMES, CONFUSED AND RENT WITH INTERNAL DISSENSION, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ANY ONE CLEAR AND DECISIVE POLICY. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD WARN THE PEOPLE THAT THIS SHIFT TO EXTREMISM MAY MEAN (IN HUNGARY IN PARTICULAR) THAT THE KREMLIN WILL ORDER ITS PUPPETS TO TAKE A MORE EXTREME COURSE THAN BEFORE (BUT HERE ALSO WE MUST WAIT AND SEE--CONFUSION NOW REIGNS EVERYWHERE). NOW IS THE TIME, IN THIS PERIOD OF CONFUSION, FOR THE PEOPLE TO SECURE THE GAINS THEY HAVE ALREADY MADE AND PRESS ON FOR MORE. IN A VERY REAL SENSE, THE PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN EVER ACTORS ON THE STAGE RATHER THAN SPECTATORS IN THE AUDIENCE. LED BY YOUR NEW LEADERS, YOU THE PEOPLE MUST CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS AND IN THE TRADE UNIONS, IN THE WAYS YOU KNOW SO WELL, TO FORCE THE REGIMES TO MAKE ACTUAL CONCESSIONS TO YOU.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

B. TO THE COMMUNISTS:

THE KREMLIN IS RIGHT IN ONE POINT--THIS IS AN EVENT OF IMMENSE SIGNIFICANCE. IT PROVES ONCE MORE, AND MORE DRAMATICALLY THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE THE THIRTIES, THAT NO COMMUNIST CAN EVER BE SAFE. THOSE OF YOU LIKE ZAPOTOCKY WHO TRIED TO HEDGE IN HIS BRATISLAVA SPEECH ON THE NATIONALIST ISSUE; THOSE OF YOU LIKE NAGY, GERO AND BATA WHO BECAME THE SYMBOLS OF THE RIGHTIST COURSE—YOU ARE SUITABLE OFFERINGS FOR THE NEW SLAUGHTER. AND THOSE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME PREMATURE RIGHTIST DEVIATIONIST WILL NOW UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO BECOME EXTREMISTS AS FAST AS POSSIBLE—NO MATTER HOW MANY OF THEIR COMRADES THEY MUST DRAG DOWN IN A NEW PURGE. AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF TRYING TO BECOME AN EXTREMIST AGAIN? YOU KNOW THAT THE NEW SOVIET DICTATOR (REMEMBER WE CANNOT BE SURE WHO HE WILL BE, HAVING ELIMINATED BERIA, WILL NOW TRY TO ELIMINATE BERIA'S OPPONENTS. AS COMMUNISTS (SEE CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN) YOU HAVE ONLY TWO CHOICES. YOU CAN AID THE PEOPLE AND SABOTAGE THE REGIME, THUS CROSSING THE "GOLDEN BRIDGE" TO SAFETY, OR — YOU CAN FLEE. THERE IS NO OTHER CHOICE.

C. TO THE SECRET POLICE:

YOUR TURN HAS NOW COME. IF ALL THE PEOPLE THAT BERIA PROMOTED AND ALL THE LOCALNORGANS OF THE MVD IN THE USSR ARE TO BE PURGED, AS IS NOW ANNOUNCED, WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO YOUR POOR MARIONETTES IN THE SATELLITES? YOU HAVE EVEN LESS CHANCE TO SURVIVE THAN THE ORDINARY COMMUNIST. AGAIN, YOU CAN MAKE YOUR PEACE WITH THE PEOPLE OR YOU CAN FLEE. OTHERWISE, YOUR DOOM IS CERTAIN.

NOTE:

AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE ABOVE, OUR PRESENT LINE (THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE, THE INCREASING WEAKNESS OF THE REGIME) REMAINS INTACT. CZECHOSLOVAK GUIDANCE NUMBER TEN E ALMOST COMPLETELY INTO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND MUST NOW BE IMPLEMENTED (WITH APPROPRIATE CHANGES FOR HUNGARY AND POLAND) WITH RENEWED VIGOR.

END MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Purge of Beria

Attached herewith is a guidance received by RFE on the purge of Beria.

CORD MEYER, JR.

CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief,
International Organizations Division

Attachment

SECRET

PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE: PURGE OF BERIA

I BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:

(THIS WILL BE ISSUED LATER IN MORE DETAIL AS SOON AS TIME PERMITS.) THE FOLLOWING FACTS, HOWEVER, STAND OUT IMMEDIATELY:

1. NO PERSON OF BERIA'S RANK IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS FALLEN SINCE BERIA HIMSELF REPLACED YEZHOV IN 1938; THE PURGE COULD NOT BRING AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE CHARGES AGAINST BERIA (OF BEING A BOURGEOIS RENEGADE IMPERIALIST AGENT WHO TRIED TO OVERTHROW THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, DESTROY THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RE-ESTABLISH CAPITALISM IN THE USSR) ARE OF A MAGNITUDE COMPARABLE ONLY TO THOSE AGAINST THE TROTSKYITES AND THE RIGHTISTS IN THE 1920'S.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO STALIN IS DEVELOPING MUCH MORE RAPIDLY THAN AFTER THE DEATH OF LENIN. IT TOOK FOUR YEARS FOR STALIN TO REMOVE THE RIGHTISTS. FURTHERMORE, CONSIDERING THE SHIFT TO THE RIGHT IN THE EAST GERMANY AND HUNGARY, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LATE AS A WEEK OR SO AGO OF " PRO-NATIONALIST" CHANGES IN TADJIKISTAN, THE DECISION IN THE STRUGGLE MUST HAVE HAPPENED ONLY WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS. BERIA'S ABSENCE (WHEN ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO WERE PRESENT) AT THE BOLSHOI THEATRE ON JUNE 28 WAS ONE OF THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATIONS OF HIS APPROACHING FALL; THE JULY 8 EDITORIAL OF IZVESTIA, THE SECOND.

3. THE FORCES WHICH DESTROYED BERIA ARE CERTAINLY A COLLECTIVE GROUP, NOT SIMPLY MALENKOV HIMSELF. MALENKOV'S NAME APPEARS ONLY ONCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL EMPHASIZES COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

4. THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL MARKS A NEW REVERSAL IN THE GENERAL LINE—AWAY FROM RIGHTISM AND TOWARD LEFTIST EXTREMISM, OR PERHAPS MORE ACCURATELY AWAY FROM MODERATION AND TOWARD; - FASCIST EXTREMISM. THE SHIFT TO AN EXTREMIST COURSE IS BASICALLY IN TWO QUESTIONS:

A. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION
B. AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION

IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT BERIA WAS PRO-NATIONAL MINORITY AND ANTI-INTENSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVIZATION. THE GROUP WHICH HAS REMOVED HIM IS PRO-GREAT RUSSIAN AND PRO-COLLECTIVISATION. IT IS RETURNING TO THE STALINIST LINE. WILL THE DOCTORS' PLOT BE REVIVED? THE SLANSKY TRIAL? SLANSKY-TYPE TRIALS IN THE SATELLITES?

5. NOT ONLY BERIA HIMSELF HAS FALLEN BUT THE SHOLE APPARATUS OF THE SECRET POLICE IS DENOUNCED, WILL LOSE MUCH FACE AND IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO A TREMENDOUS PURGE, WHICH MUST SHAKE THE WHOLE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO ITS FOUNDATIONS.

6. THE PEACE OFFENSIVE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE--BUT WILL HAVE NOW A PURELY PROPAGANDA CHARACTER; NO GENUINE CONCESSIONS (E. G., SURRENDERING OF EAST GERMANY) WILL NOW TAKE PLACE. ON THE INTERNAL SCENE IN THE SOVIET SPHERE THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE TALK OF IMPROVING THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE WORKERS BUT IN ACTUALITY THE COURSE WILL BE TOWARD INCREASED CAPITAL INVESTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF CONSUMER GOODS--PARTICULARLY IN THE SATELLITES.

II. GUIDANCE:

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NOTE:

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END MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Branch 1

NO.:

DATE: 15 July 1953

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CIP		15 JUL 19	17	CTB	Tom - Thanks - This suits me great - What does State think? The messages are stronger than what I thought State would buy - BUT - Good - Tracy. How was your trip - let's exchange early next week - Tracy
2. C/IO				TUB	
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					9.26.3

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
4-3495

15 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: RFE - Balloon Operation

Attached herewith is the story of the balloon operation and an early report of what happened.

Cord Meyer Jr.
CORD MEYER, JR.
Deputy Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: a/s

SECRET
Security Information

FOLLOWING RELEASED LOCALLY TODAY: RELEASE FROM RADIO FREE EUROPE: EMBARGOED UNTIL 11:30 GMT - JULY 14, 1953

MUNICH, JULY 14, 1953-- THOUSANDS OF HIGH ALTITUDE BALLOONS CARRYING MESSAGES OF HOPE TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WERE RELEASED ON THE CZECH BORDER LAST NIGHT BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM.

CARRIED BY STRONG WINDS AT ALTITUDES UP TO 30,000 FEET, THE BALLOONS WERE EXPECTED TO REACH AS FAR AS THE INDUSTRIAL CENTER OF OSTRAVA ON THE POLISH BORDER, WITH PILSEN, PRAGUE, MOST AND SOKOLOV AS SPECIAL TARGETS.

THE "BALLOON BARRAGE"-- THE SECOND AIMED AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM -- WILL CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 12,000,000 MESSAGES, OR ONE FOR EVERY PERSON IN THE COUNTRY, WILL BE SENT.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM LAUNCHED A SIMILAR BARRAGE AT CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON AUGUST 23, 1951, AND ANOTHER AT POLAND ON AUGUST 28, 1951. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT OPERATION IS FOUR TIMES AS LARGE AND BELIEVED TO BE THE BIGGEST EVER ATTEMPTED.

MESSAGES CARRIED BY THE BALLOONS RELEASED LAST NIGHT AND TODAY WERE OF THREE TYPES: A REPRODUCTION OF A NEW ONE-CROWN NOTE, BEARING A PLEA TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNIST REGIME; A PAMPHLET EXPLAINING THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN EAST GERMANY AND THE FALL OF SOVIET POLICY CHIEF LAVRENTI BERIA; AND AN ALUMINUM COIN STAMPED WITH THE "FREEDOM BELL" AND THE SLOGAN "ALL CZECHS AND SLOVAKS FOR FREEDOM--ALL THE FREE WORLD FOR THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS."

THE BALLOONS USED IN THE OPERATION CALLED "WINDS OF FREEDOM" ARE OF TWO TYPES, A RUBBER SPHERE WHICH EXPLODES AT HIGH ALTITUDES, SCATTERING ITS MESSAGES OVER A WIDE AREA, AND A PLASTIC BALLOON WHICH DESCENDS ON THE TARGET. BOTH TYPES ARE FILLED WITH HYDROGEN.

THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PRINTED ON THE ONE CROWN NOTE FOLLOWS:

ON ONE SIDE --

CZECHOSLOVAKS, KNOW THIS; THE REGIME IS WEAKER THAN YOU HAVE DARED TO THINK; POWER LIES WITH THE PEOPLE AND THE PEOPLE STAND OPPOSED. WITH UNITY

AND COURAGE, ORGANIZE YOUR STRENGTH: DOWN WITH THE COLLECTIVE! INSIST ON WORKERS' RIGHTS! TODAY DEMAND CONCESSIONS; TOMORROW - FREEDOM!

ON THE OTHER SIDE --

MEN CALL THIS THE HUNGER CROWN - GIFT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE SYMBOL OF REGIME DESPERATION, OF FIVE-YEAR FAILURE: IT IS A CHALLENGE TO FIGHT, TO MEET WEAKNESS WITH STRENGTH, TO RESIST AS YOU KNOW BEST. THE OTHER CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE UNITING AND WILL JOIN YOU IN YOUR STRUGGLE. THE FREE WORLD IS WITH YOU! ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAMPHLET ABOUT EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY: CZECHS AND SLOVAKS! HEAR THE MESSAGE WHICH COMES TO YOU TODAY FROM THE FREE WORLD:

THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER! THE PEOPLES OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES ARE GETTING STRONGER! THE SOVIET UNION IS GETTING WEAKER. THE STRUGGLE FOR STALIN'S HERITAGE SHAKES THE ENTIRE SOVIET EMPIRE AND FEAR HAS CREPT INTO THE KREMLIN. WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA AND WHO WILL FALL AFTER BERIA? HOW MANY MILLIONS WILL FALL VICTIMS TO THE NEW PURGE WHICH IS NOW GOING TO BEGIN - THE BIGGEST PURGE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS EVER KNOWN?

HOW MANY VICTIMS WILL FALL IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW MANY IN THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES? WHO WILL FALL WITH BERIA IN PRAGUE AND WHO WILL BE DRAGGED DOWN BY HIS FALL IN BRATISLAVA? WHO WILL BE THE NEW SLANSKY AND WHO THE NEW CLEMENTIS? AND WHEN THE PURGE SPREADS AND BROADENS, DOWN FROM THE POLITBUREAU TO THE LANDS AND DISTRICTS, TO THE OFFICES AND THE FACTORIES - HOW MANY FUNCTIONARIES WILL SAFELY SURVIVE?

ONLY THOSE WILL SURVIVE WHO WILL DETACH THEMSELVES FROM THE SINKING COMMUNIST BOAT IN TIME. ONLY THOSE WHO JOIN THE PEOPLE AND HELP IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS.

AT ANY RATE, THE SOVIETS ARE IN A BLIND ALLEY. IF THE MOSCOW BOOT WILL WEIGH EVEN HEAVIER ON THE NECKS OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND IF MOSCOW'S DEMANDS UPON THE FRIGHTENED PUPPET GOVERNMENTS OF THE CAPTIVE COUNTRIES WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING, THE RESISTANCE OF THE PEOPLE WILL ONLY GROW: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT RETURN INTO SUBMISSION. IF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, IN ORDER TO APPEASE THE WRATH OF THE PEOPLE, WILL TRY TO BRIBE THEIR SUBJECTS BY PROMISING CONCESSIONS AS WE HAVE SEEN IN HUNGARY AND IN EASTERN GERMANY, THEY WILL NOT GET ANSWERS: FOR THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DECEIVED ANYMORE BY PHONY CONCESSIONS.

THE PEOPLE ARE GROWING STRONGER. THE FIRST FLAMES OF REVOLT FLARED OUT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IN EASTERN GERMANY. FROM PILSEN, FROM MORAVSKA OSTRAVA, FROM BERLIN, DRESDEN AND MAGDEBURG THE ECHO OF THIS REVOLT FLARED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND DEEPLY SHOOK THE ENTIRE SOVIET REALM: THE PEOPLE SHOWED THEIR STRENGTH.

THE COMMUNIST REGIMES RECOGNIZED THE MENACE AND BECAME AFRAID. THEY STARTED APOLOGIZING, THEY STARTED SELF-CRITICISING, THEY STARTED GIVING PROMISES. IN GERMANY THE ANTI-LABOR DECREES HAD TO BE REVOKED. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA THE FRIGHTENED GOVERNMENT WAS FORCED TO DESIST FROM APPLYING THE PENAL LAWS CONCERNING ABSENTEEISM. IN MOSCOW, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEWS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND GERMANY, THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE BECAME SHARPER. BERIA AND HIS ALL-POWERFUL POLICE FELL AS VICTIMS. YOUR REVOLT HELPED TO ALTER THE COURSE OF HISTORY: NEW FORCES MADE THEIR APPEARANCE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THE PEOPLE WON ITS FIRST MAJOR VICTORY IN ITS FIGHT WITH THE REGIMS.

CZECHS AND SLOVAKS: THE MORE YOUR OPPRESSORS ARE SHAKEN BY UNCERTAINTY, THE GREATER IS THE CERTAINTY OF YOUR VICTORY. THE REGIME IS AFRAID OF YOU, IT KNOWS THAT POWER IS FUNDAMENTALLY ON YOUR SIDE. THIS IS THE TIME WHEN PEOPLES UNITY, A COMMON AGREEMENT AND A UNITED PURPOSE ARE ABLE TO WIN CON-

CESSIONS. YOUR BATTLEFIELD IS IN THE FACTORIES AND IN THE FIELDS. ON THIS BATTLEFIED OF LABOR YOU HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF NUMBERS. ON THIS BATTLEFIELD YOU CANNOT BE VANQUISHED . YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH PROMISES, YOU WILL ASK FOR DEEDS. YOU WILL NOT BE CONTENT WITH BRIBES, YOU WILL ASK MORE AND MORE FROM THE EXPLOITERS. WE DO NOT PRESUME TO GIVE YOU ORDERS NOR TO GIVE YOU ADVICES. YOU AND YOUR NEW LEADERS WHO ARE BEING BORN IN THE STRUGGLE KNOW BEST HOW AND WHERE TO STRIKE. BUT WE WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE NOT ALONE: AMONG THE MASSES OF PEOPLE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN THE FIRE OF REVOLT IS SMOULDERING AND ITS SPARKS ARE FLYING FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE IN THE FREE WORLD. YOUR FRIENDS ARE WITH YOU. THEIR HELP WILL GROW AS YOUR DETERMINATION GROWS.

SECRET
Security Information

The following was received from Condor, Munich

Have report early afternoon that Czech fighter plane attempting shoot down balloons. In only instance so far reported, planes shot down two out of ten that were in air at moment. Also have report that attempts being made shoot balloons down from ground, but no success. This shooting occurred at 1410 local time, which is only report so far. Will inform you of any developments.

Secret
Security Information

The following received from Condon, Munich

Following is full story as of 1700 local time on shooting. At 1400 two possibly three jet aircraft, presumably MIG, which kept well within Czech territory, managed after considerable moving to shoot down two repeat two balloons. Aircraft departed area and have not returned since. Small arms fire during most of afternoon accounted for total of three repeat three balloons. Small arms fire effective only during periods when weather conditions did not permit rapid rise of balloons crossing border at height within range of submarine guns and carbines.

- - - - -

Walker's report - Temper of residence in launching area calm and unworried.

End of Message

SECRET
Security Information

8 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO

FROM: EE/Czechoslovakia

SUBJECT: Bohumil HOUSER

1. Reference is made to a letter dated 25 June 1953 and addressed to you from Mr. Leo M. Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, forwarding certain proposals sent to the latter by Mr. Bohumil HOUSER of the International Rescue Committee, Camp Valka, Nuernberg, Germany. This memorandum will summarize for you our knowledge of Subject, and our present interest in his activities.

2. Subject was born 1 March 1922 in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. He reportedly fought in the underground in World War II and was taken prisoner. From the end of the war until December 1945 he was employed as interpreter to the U.S. military unit in Falknov, Czechoslovakia, and in 1949 he was head of the personnel department of the Brown Coal Mining Company in Falknov.

3. According to a report from the British Army of the Rhine, he was recruited by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service in 1946 in Cheb, Czechoslovakia, and is an ardent Communist. According to the CIC, he travelled to Belgium shortly after the war, and then returned to Germany (sic).

4. We do not know exactly when Subject left Czechoslovakia. He seems to have emigrated to Australia in 1949 or 1950, and to have returned to Germany some time prior to September 1951, when he became associated with the American Fund for Czech Refugees and with the International Rescue Committee. According to one informant, Subject was deported from Australia for Communist Party activities.

5. On 14 April 1953 Subject sent Mr. Cherne an operational proposal of such interest that, in spite of the unfavorable information on Subject, we felt obliged to investigate it further. Upon our instructions, an agent of the Munich Operations Base contacted Subject on or about 25 June, using air force cover, and obtained the identity of Subject's lead. This person turned out to be an individual who has been suspected since 1949 of being an agent of the Czech Intelligence Service, and who has very recently been crossing lines with one or two operations being run by Berlin Operations Base. Under the circumstances it appears very likely that Subject's lead amounts to nothing more than a provocation or fabrication. We are still waiting for an appraisal and recommendations from the field.

SECRET
Security Information

RICHARD A. FINNEY

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
4-3207

7 July 1953

Noted by DCI
7/13

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Proposed Balloon Operation

1. The following message was received from Whitney Shepardson on the proposed balloon operation.

Shepardson talked at length with Conant yesterday, Monday. Conant did not object to the proposed balloon operation, but on the contrary "endorses" the project, but said he could not "request" acquiescence. Thus Shepardson says we have "improved upon our minimum expectations".

Shepardson says further that Adenauer has been away since last Saturday but that Lentz and Hallstein were to have returned last night and HICOG is trying to arrange an appointment with either or both for today, Tuesday.

Shepardson will send further word after these talks.

Cord Meyer Jr. for
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

ER 3-4559

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

7 July 1953

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Conversation with Congressman Kersten

1. On 6 May Congressman Kersten addressed a letter to the State Department, enclosing a letter dated 6 May 1953, which he had received from Mr. Creighton Scott, a former employee of Radio Free Europe at Munich, Germany. This letter was highly critical of certain personnel in RFE, particularly as regards allegations of pro-communist attitudes. On 6 July I discussed these criticisms with Congressman Kersten in detail, conveying to him orally the material contained in the memorandum of 17 June 1953 from the Director of Security; Subject: Inquiry by Congressman Kersten; which the Director of Security had noted should be utilized in this meeting with Congressman Kersten.

2. The Congressman noted the difficulty in evaluating the type of criticisms which Mr. Scott had made but appeared willing to accept our explanation.

3. Congressman Kersten then turned to certain criticisms which he had heard expressed regarding RFE from several sources, including Scott. One such criticism is that RFE is not doing the best it should on religious programs. He feels that this aspect of the broadcasts could probably be considerably strengthened, particularly among Catholic elements.

4. Mr. Kersten cited the opinion of Count Tarnowski (sp. ?), a well known Pole, who told the Congressman that any fourteen year old Soviet citizen would be so well briefed on Soviet philosophy as to turn up their noses at the RFE material. The Count (and Kersten appears to agree) feels that the Soviet population has more sophisticated philosophical material thrown at them by their own Government, and that it should be an important function of RFE to counter with an attempt to destroy the Soviet philosophical material and shake the Soviet faith in their theoreticians.

5. Congressman Kersten realized that it is difficult to capture a wide audience with philosophical arguments, but he feels that if these arguments reached a segment of important leaders behind the Iron Curtain, it would help to destroy and counter the philosophical teachings of Marx, Lenin, et al. The Congressmen feels that many of our broadcasts deal with economic matters, and, while these are important, RFE should go

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Security Information

deeper and hit harder on religion and philosophy.

6. While Congressman Kersten is aware that many of the captive population are not interested in rightest movements, it is his opinion that RFE cannot beat communism with socialism. In particular, he felt (and Scott bore this out in their conversation) that we were making too much use of Czech socialists, and we were using socialists from the Benes Government which had sought to compromise with the communists. While he recognizes the popularity of Benes and Masaryk in Czechia, he feels they are not effective in Slovakia, where there is a heavy Catholic population.

7. Congressman Kersten plans to go to Europe, probably in September. While he did not say so, I believe he would welcome an invitation to visit RFE, Munich. Furthermore, as the author of the Kersten Amendment and of several resolutions on the enslaved peoples, at least one of which may receive Congressional approval at this session, consideration might be given as to whether it would be advisable to request the Congressman to utilize RFE facilities to broadcast while he is abroad.

Walter L. Pforzheimer
Legislative Counsel

OGC/WLP:jps

Mr. Kirkpatrick gave the original of this to the DCI, who read it and took a copy for NCFE—

SECURITY INFORMATION

3 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: D'Arcy Brophy and Louis Novins' Trip to Europe

1. Mr. Brophy and Mr. Novins tell me that you have agreed to pay their expenses for their trip to Europe. I told them that since they were traveling on our business they should draw the money from Heritage Foundation funds which have been made available.

2. I think this is the tidiest way of handling the transaction. Novins gave me some representations that it would be better to channel funds for the trip through one of his clients, Paramount Pictures. This seems to me complicated and insecure, and I recommend that if this subject is raised with you directly, you again suggest use of Heritage funds.

BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

1 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Comments on Arthur Page's letter of 29 June 1953

1. I think a budget presentation before a mixed audience of PRC members and directors or members of the Executive Committee of NCFE plus supposedly members of the NCFE staff would be extremely confusing, whether it were held here or in New York. Not all the members of the PRC have detailed knowledge of NCFE operations and most of the members of the Executive Committee do not have such knowledge. I see a meeting such as Arthur Page suggests going about as follows:

a. IO Division presents the budget with cuts which we plan to recommend.

b. Members of the Executive Committee of NCFE oppose the cuts.

c. PRC is placed in a position of turning down its own staff before the assembled outsiders with whom the staff is working.

2. I should suggest instead that we follow the following procedure:

a. IO Division presents the budget with the suggested cuts in same.

b. PRC considers these cuts carefully.

c. PRC calls in expert members of the staff of NCFE, i.e. Spencer Phenix, Bob Lang, Bernie Yarrow etc., if it desires to do so, and questions them on any matter within their respective responsibilities and in particular about the suggested cuts.

d. The experts leave the room.

e. PRC makes up its mind whether to accept the cut proposed or to make bigger cuts, or to add to the budget, as it may desire to do.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. It would be useful to brief the Executive Committee on the reasons why any changes in the budget are made after they are made, and it might be well to have a luncheon with the Executive Committee down here or in New York after the action has been taken and have the Director explain the reasons ~~why PRC did this or that.~~ for Agency action.

4. I suggest that you write Arthur Page saying that you think a meeting such as Phenix suggests would confuse our procedures but that you do think a ~~later meeting~~ with the Executive Committee to explain the actions taken and have a meeting of minds for the work ahead after the budget has been passed would be useful.

luncheon here

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

JUN 30 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Funds for Balloon Operation

This will authorise you to inform officials of TPTONIC that the restrictions imposed by the Project Review Committee, at its meeting on 29 May 1953 of $3,000,000 for operating expenses of TPTONIC for the first quarter of fiscal year 1954, may be exceeded by the funds necessary to prepare and/or execute a balloon operation.

/s/ AW. Dulles

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

IO/BrI:WPD/eh
(30 June 1953)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - Finance
1 cc - Budget
1 cc - IO/AD
1 cc - CIO ✓
1 cc - RI
1 cc - DCI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

JUN 29 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PP

SUBJECT: Recent Developments in the Rumanian Refugee Situation

1. In a verbal report to the Rumanian National Committee upon his return from a trip to Europe to secure former King Michael's approval of a proposed refugee committee, Mr. Visoianu stated that the King did not reject the proposal advanced for the reorganization and enlargement of the present Committee, although he indicated no interest in having the plan put into effect immediately. This information on the attitude of the King is contrary to that previously reported by a member of the Rumanian National Committee, who stated that the King had finally rejected the proposal upon the recommendation of his ADC, Petru-Lazar.

2. In his last conversation with Mr. Visoianu, the King requested that the members of the present Rumanian National Committee should send him, either jointly or individually, their opinions in writing about the following points:

a. On what grounds does the Rumanian National Committee consider that it cannot continue in its present form?

b. What are the criteria for choosing the members of the new committee and who are the persons who should belong to it?

c. Who are the Rumanian exiles and Rumanian organizations in exile which could be consulted by the King to advise him in the matter of forming a new National Committee?

3. The Rumanian National Committee members plan to send a joint resolution to the King requesting that he entrust Visoianu with the formation of a new committee to be comprised of members whose names were submitted to the King. Should Michael refuse this request, the Committee intends to tender its resignation.

4. Visoianu reported that he had conversations in Paris with Gafencu, Gherman, Veniamin and Antoniade, to whom he proposed membership in the new committee. At that time, which was before the death of General Radescu, Gafencu refused because of the exclusion of the General in the new organization. Since Visoianu was unable to return to Paris after his conversations with the King, a meeting with Gafencu subsequent to Radescu's death has not been possible. Gherman did not refuse to

become a member of the new committee, but wished to be accepted as a representative of the Socialist Party. This would be difficult because of Gherman's affiliation with the left-wing faction which seceded from Petrescu's Party in 1946, subsequently joining with the Communist Party. Antoniade and Veniamin have agreed to become members of the new committee.

5. In a letter to the Fund on 26 May 1953, Gafencu stated that an attempt should be made to give support to a new committee through a large national council in order to establish unity of the leaders and of the Rumanian colony abroad. He said that on the day of General Radescu's death he had received a letter from the General asking him to take over "his task" to assure the unity of the Rumanians abroad. Gafencu also wrote that friends in Paris and abroad had asked him to take over the leadership of a small "ad hoc" committee with the support of all the Associations of Free Rumanians, which he stated he will do if the New York group assures him of their support. After that, he indicated he would see if there would be a possibility of an understanding with the Visoianu group.

6. Prince Nicholas reports that he has been approached by Gafencu with a request that he join forces with Gafencu to form a new Rumanian refugee committee under Gafencu's leadership and with headquarters in France. A committee embracing such individuals as Nicholas and General Ion Gheorghe, whom Gafencu also reportedly approached, would not be acceptable to segments of the Rumanian refugee colony because Nicholas is not on good terms with the King and has had Iron Guard associations, as does Gheorghe.

7. It would appear that there is little reason to believe that the Rumanian refugees will set aside their factional differences and personal ambitions to form a representative committee at this time.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER
Acting Chief, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: RFE Coverage of Stockholm ICFTU Congress

1. At our request RFE is going to give full coverage to the ICFTU Meeting in Stockholm. It has arranged to have the meeting covered by three desks. The Hungarians are using a Stockholm stringer, while the Poles and Czechs are each sending editors. In addition, there will be overall coverage to the central newsroom by RFE's information correspondent, Dreifuss. Messages from the labor leaders of the free world will be broadcast to the Czech people, in line with our recent guidance.

2. A copy of the UN Slave Labor Report was delivered to the boat of Col. Mullany's friend yesterday afternoon prior to departure.

William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/Branch 1

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Tisthammer	—	–
2	C/IO		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO		
2	O/DCI		
3			6/30

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

Remarks:

Alice:

Please insure that Mr. Dulles sees this before the NCFE people come in, and that they don't get their hands on it. TWB

TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. SEP 1947 30-4

10—63343-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
4-2858

23 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NCFE with afternoon.

According to my informants (I have not talked to Arthur Page), the Executive Committee of NCFE made two decisions at its meeting yesterday:

1. That the performance of RFE in the recent difficulty was like that of a divisional commander who refuses to obey the corps plan, and

2. That RFE should immediately devise procedures so that future guidances from CIA will be put into effect without the two-week delay caused by Lang's refusal.

3. As I understand it, however, it is a fact that the guidance is not yet fully in effect and that the action part of the guidance, that is to say, paragraph 4, of the instructions of the Executive Committee to Radio Free Europe (you have a copy on your desk), has not yet been put into effect. I am guessing that you will get a lot of talk this evening about how most of this has been done before and is already standard operating procedure etc. etc. etc.

4. If you want to take a firm line this evening, I suggest that you stick to trying to find the answers to two questions:

a. Is the guidance initiated by you and passed upon by the Executive Committee fully in effect?

b. Have any steps been taken to make sure that in the future guidances will be put into effect?

TWB

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
Security Information

30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Jesse McKnight, Department of State

1. Mr. McKnight called to report that Mr. Herbert Pierce from the UN Public Affairs Office is very disturbed about the conduct of "some RFE man" in New York, who is approaching members of the US Mission to the United Nations and asking them all sorts of questions, for example, their views on the recent Doctors' Trial.

2. Mr. McKnight feels that this practice should be discontinued, especially in view of the fact that the new members of the US Mission are not yet fully informed about, or sympathetic, to RFE. He feels that any questions concerning US policy on particular issues should be cleared with Mr. Kretzman, the VOA Policy Chief in New York.

3. I think this matter ought to be discussed with Bob Lang. Would you let me know whether you will take it up with him, or whether you wish me to do so.

You do so.

ELLEN STERN
IO/TCNYC

SECRET
Security Information

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SECURITY INFORMATION

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss State Department Proposals on how to Counter-Check Items on UNGA Agenda.

1. I attended a meeting on Wednesday, 28 January 1953, to discuss paragraphs 6 and 7 of the attached paper prepared by the Department of State. It calls for the establishment of "a commission of independent members to study the nature and extent of this escapee problem, with the view of determining the reasons and circumstances impelling these people to escape" and suggests that "this inquiry could follow the pattern of the commission on forced labor. The Commission would hear refugees in such places as Western Germany, Geneva, etc., and its eventual report to the assembly would, in fact, be a report on the entire communist system, the denial of basic human right, etc."

2. The questions raised in the meeting centered around the possibility of CIA's intelligence activities being compromised by the investigations of this commission. It was decided that FI, REDCAP and the operating people were the ones competent to make the decision.

3. Mr. Lazarus informed me by telephone on 30 January, that the above-mentioned individuals had presented him negative answers on the subject proposal. Their conclusions are being forwarded to the DDP and subsequently to the Department of State. Mr. Lazarus further stated that any recommendations by IO would be welcome.

ELLEN STERN
IO/TONIC

IO/TONIC: ES/hka

Distribution:
Orig. -Addressee
2 cc -IO/TONIC
1 cc -C/IO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - Mr. Braden ←
1 cc - Mr. Hand

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

23 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECURITY OFFICER, CIA

SUBJECT: Leland Stowe

1. Pursuant to my conversation with Mr. Hamby, I have talked with the Director of RFE and he has agreed to terminate subject's present job.

2. He intends to bring subject to New York and make him his personal consultant in the New York office. He assures me of his full intentions to carry out this plan and further assures me that he has no intention of giving subject administrative or operational authority of any kind.

3. Is this arrangement satisfactory to you?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
CHIEF
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Security Officer
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

22 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Julius Epstein

In response to our request from the Fund, we are forwarding herewith the general information available concerning Julius Epstein.

(Signed) Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments: (5)
- Ltr. to Nelson dtd 4/20/53
- Personal biography by Epstein
- Excerpt from Congressional Record for 2/9/52
- Booklet by Epstein
- Article by Arthur Bliss Lane

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1 via CPP
IO/Tonic - 2cc
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Collège de l'Europe Libre
CHATEAU DE POURTALÈS - STRASBOURG-ROBERTSAU (Bas-Rhin)
BOITE POSTALE 61, STRASBOURG R. P.
TÉLÉPHONE DIRECTION: 832.95 · INTENDANCE: 832.96
ADRESSE TÉLÉGRAPHIQUE: EXILUNIVER STRASBOURG

Paris
April 4th, 1953.

Dear Jim:-

You should have this, at least until [illegible] be sent to the Royall Tyler–Devine report. Davis meets with our Ex. Committee on the 9th. I hope they handle that situation firmly. Hope, too, Frank has been made aware of what this has been up against.

Sincerely,
Ty.

COPY COPY

April 1, 1953

No. 26 Dear Adolf,

A day or two before I sailed for Europe in January, 1953, I received a typed manuscript copy of the "Progress Report on the College de l'Europe Libre", which has now appeared in mimeographed form under date of February 27, 1953, over the signatures of Royall Tyler and Richard Sears.

I admit to considerable curiosity when this document appeared. In the covering letter Royall Tyler merely stated, "It comes from Dick Sears". I rather wondered why this report should be compiled when it was known I was coming to Europe presumably to examine into conditions and it seemed to me immediately that this might be a counter foil to what it was expected I would find. In reply to a direct inquiry from me, Sears now states it was prepared "to reinforce the German language unit project by supplying information that was apparently lacking.

At the risk of indicating an overly suspicious temperament, which is not characteristic of me, I feel that this report over-simplifies a complex situation. It embodies a point of view that the operation at Strasbourg is proceeding smoothly and successfully, hich it is not. It assumes that a paper plan (for the National Seminars) is in full and healthy bloom, which is not the case. I have stated so frequently (almost ad nauseam) that you must live in this frustrating atmosphere for a while before you can understand what conditions are. Royall Tyler and Sears have never had that experience and formed their opinions from what they have been told by Davis, Galy, Straka, and Donzelot. The latter in turn was constantly fed information by Galy and Straka, and altogether has spent only three or four days on the ground. He has had numerous talks in Paris with Galy and some of the tutors.

So, while the factual material in this report can not be questioned — I mean the statistics and the historical portions — the interpretation of them does not reflect the disappointing results. This pertains to the work of the Committee on Awards on the one hand and the actual operation at Robertsau on the other.

When I asked Sears how widely this report had been distributed he told me "to the Trustees of FEUE, to the members of the Association du College

COPY

de l'Europe Libre and to Messrs. Thomas Braden, John C. Hughes, C. D. Jackson and Whitney H. Shepardson". I assume, therefore, that the members of our Executive Committee, to whom I am sending copies of this letter, have received it.

The sentence (bottom of Page 9 and going over to top of Page 10), "These were men of advanced education, expert in their knowledge of their own countries but also, most of them, having studied in French institutions and so capable of forming a bond for the students between their training at home and in exile.", is not an accurate description of the caliber of the tutors.

On Page 14, second line, I would question definitely the phrase "well organized administration". Also on that page, sixth line, the sentence, "Special French courses were being given to those who still showed weakness.", is misleading. Such courses were announced, but the program for teaching the French language is only now being outlined with the help of the French language staff at Strasbourg University after a conference with them I called for this purpose.

On the same page again, fifth line from the bottom, the phrase "the severity of the action taken in the autumn has had a salutary effect in imposing firmer discipline and setting higher standards" simply is not so. The manner in which the action was taken, and the inaccuracy of some of the judgments, which had to be reversed, called forth protests from staff and students alike and did as much as anything else to cause present low student morale.

On Page 16, the last sentence in the first paragraph reads, "A fresh start in life combined with exposure to Western thought and practice will, we are encouraged to hope, produce a full return." Instead of what the statement implies, the students have witnessed a cleavage between the European staff and the Americans, — and the "exposure to Western thought and practice" has been anything but inspiring or unifying.

The distribution of this document can be and will be very misleading by its implications that success has been achieved to an extent that warrants our proceeding on our present path. That will be unfortunate. We have acquired a fund of valuable experience and we have made mistakes. The net result is the present situation. Fundamental changes must be made, which are bound to be unpleasant, but they are essential, unless we are going to continue a mere charity operation and miss the real purpose of FEUE.

Sincerely yours,

LT:ECK

Dr. A. A. Berle, Jr.
70 Pine Street
New York 5, N. Y.

Levering Tyson
President

SECURITY INFORMATION

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Information reported by Bob Lang, RFE

Bob Lang has had reported to him the following:

1. Epstein, an investigator for Senator McCarthy, has just turned into the Senator a 150-page anti-RFE report.

2. Lang has received this report from three former RFE employees. The first two, FARAGO and TATER, reported to Lang they were visited by Epstein. They reported this interview to Lang because Lang has considerable derogatory information on them. They do not wish to be identified with any such report. The third informant is one DeGASTER, about whom Lang has written you. DeGASTER resigned a job in RFE to come to work -- presumably for us -- which collapsed, and has since been trying to get his RFE job back. Bob considers his report for that reason to be quite reliable. DeGASTER wrote a letter to the New York Times, which was published 8 March, in which he referred to himself as a former employee of RFE. Epstein apparently read the letter and immediately came to see DeGASTER. During their conversation, Epstein referred to a 150-page uncomplimentary report he had compiled on RFE.

3. NCFE says that it has some derogatory information on Epstein and it will be forwarded to us.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organisations Division

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CL[illegible] [illegible]TION TOP AND BOTTOM)

10-3-1106

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Exec Officer, DDIP	[illegible]	9 Apr
2			
3	PP - 2042	CMB	14 April
4	I O-C10	TWB	
5	RP C/O (retain or destroy)		
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Sp. Liaison, DDIP	[illegible]	4/9/53
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: Mr. Wisner suggested this be circulated as indicated for information.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED [✓ UNCLASSIFIED]

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

Executive Registry
3-2728

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

April 3, 1953

My dear Mr. Wisner:

I want you to be informed of the action which I am taking in regard to international broadcasting facilities in this country.

I have sent a letter to the companies concerned along the lines of the enclosed which gives a full explanation.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson

Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to broadcasting companies terminating contracts.

Mr. Frank Wisner,
Central Intelligence Agency.

4/9/53 cc-ER File

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

COPY OF LETTER TO [illegible]

[illegible] CARRIERS

Gentlemen:

Earlier this month at the request of President [illegible] I undertook to serve as the head of the United States Information Administration of which the Voice of America is a part.

The study of this complex organization [illegible] to be concluded [illegible] in [illegible] policy and [illegible] Certain of these [illegible] be decided on higher Government levels than mine.

However, from the standpoint of sound management and in view of the recent directive of the Bureau of the Budget requiring all possible economies, it is mandatory upon me to take promptly whatever steps are necessary to prevent the Government from becoming obligated for facilities or services which I believe will not be needed.

It is my obvious duty, in order to protect the Government, to give at this time formal 90 day notices of termination of a number of these contracts to avoid any possible liability through their continuing into the next fiscal year. However, I feel that it is due to your Company and to the others similarly situated to accompany these notices with [illegible] frank explanation of the reasons for them.

Last fall there was a reduction of more than 15 per cent made by the Voice of America in the number of hours of radio programs originating in the United States. This has left an excess transmitter capacity. Aside from the [illegible], to correct this condition, consideration is being given to decentralizing to points outside the United States more of the programs now originating here. This would result in [illegible] requirements [illegible] in the United States.

In my judgment, protection of the Government's interests requires that a notice of termination [illegible] contracts [illegible]

Associated Broadcasters of California

Crosley, as to the installation at Mason, Ohio

General Electric, as to the installation at Belmont, California

Westinghouse -

World Wide Broadcasting Corporation

Upon [illegible]

Upon the effective [illegible] of [illegible] Wayne, New Jersey, this summer, [illegible] contract with General [illegible] will also be terminated.

I personally must take the responsibility [illegible] this magnitude in the facilities [illegible] reduction of this plan [illegible] installations to be effected [illegible] experience of the International [illegible] Department. I have also [illegible] a management engineering survey which was made [illegible] all domestic facilities used by the [illegible] based my decision primarily thereon. I have detailed [illegible] and in acting upon, [illegible] competent persons in private industry [illegible] familiarity with the operations of the Voice.

The decision to terminate these contracts has been taken with full realization of the policy of Public Law 402 relative to private enterprise in the broadcasting field. Very recently I acted to terminate construction contracts for two large Government transmitting stations in this country.

This present action is not intended to prejudice a continuance or increased participation on a private basis in international broadcasting by these licensees. I shall cooperate to this end.

This action is taken with genuine regret particularly because you and your Company have rendered in many ways services of great value to the United States, and because I know that this has been done in a highly patriotic spirit.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Johnson
Administrator

6 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Agency Channel to NCFE

1. Now that Larry deNeufville is working for NCFE, I know that there will be a strong tendency on the part of all of us to deal with NCFE through Larry, this not only because he is an able man but because we all know him so well.

2. If we take this course, however, we shall confuse channels of communications as between the Agency and NCFE by adding to the normal IO/Branch I (William P. Durkee, Chief) channel and to such informal channels as necessarily exist still another channel. This would make the job of all of us more difficult and confound our constant efforts at orderly procedure.

3. I hope that higher authority will bear this in mind.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru CPP)
1 cc - IO/BrI
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

CM 3067

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3-9241

3 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

SUBJECT: Request from the NCFE for the release of $150,000 from the CIA held reserve for the FEUE.

1. Mr. Spencer Phenix, on behalf of the NCFE, upon authorization of the Board of Directors, has requested the release of $150,000 from the CIA held reserve for FEUE capital construction for the following purposes:

(a) "Alterations to the main building

Installation of a refrigerated cold room for the storage of food	$5,600.
Additional automatic kettles and equipment in the kitchen and service room	1,700.
Additional office space on the second floor	600.
Total	$7,900.

The original dining room installation provided for service for a student body of 100; the increase in enrollment (now almost 200) has demonstrated that more refrigeration and storage space and equipment is needed.

Housing the women students in the main building with resultant changes in the physical lay-out has meant the readjustment of office space and it has proved possible to provide two new offices on the second floor for the estimated cost of $600.

(b)

Improvements to the furnished house adjoining the main building and used as residence by the Assistant Dean	6,000.
Necessary additional furniture to replace items removed by lessor and improve living conditions.	1,200.
Total	$7,200.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

The contemplated alteration involves principally the installation of central heat connected with the main heating system. At the present time there is no central heating, the building is constantly damp in wintertime and the attempt to maintain a satisfactory temperature with stoves and portable heaters has proved unsatisfactory. Other improvements consist of additional kitchen equipment, including a gas water heater, a kitchen cabinet, the construction of a closet, repairs to the electrical system and conversion of existing garage space into a small dining room.

(c) Construction of an auditorium for student meetings, lectures and recreation activities, such as concerts, student theatricals, moving pictures and the like with, as a secondary feature, facilities for indoor exercise during the winter months.

Total	$102,[illegible]00.

The auditorium will have a reinforced concrete foundation, outside walls of pine clapboards (similar to recently constructed dormitory and lecture hall) with compressed fireproof straw material for insulation, a composition roof of the same material used on the new dormitory and lecture hall and with main framing of steel. Satisfactory lighting and heating systems are included and the interior finish will be such as to provide satisfactory acoustic qualities. Also included in this building are offices and living quarters for the "concierge." The architect's estimate shows the estimated cost of the auditorium itself (17 meters x 22 meters in size, including $5,000. for steel costs and $3,000. for safety glass) as $55,000, the additional cost of the stage with the "concierge's" accommodations above as $19,000, connecting passage between auditorium and adjoining building, $2,300, relocation of library and alteration of study halls, $1,100, movable seats, stage and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and window curtains, motion picture equipment with screen and athletic equipment, $22,400. (All figures approx.)

(d) Re-surfacing walks between buildings and installation of a few electric lights at strategic points along the walks. $3,000.

(e) Installation and equipment of a central telephone switchboard with necessary wiring and additional telephone instruments so as to permit intercommunication

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between the various buildings and offices. $3,000.

(f) Additional furniture required for the "concierge's" quarters, equipment for the kitchen enlargement and additional furnishings for the women's dormitory. $5,500.

(g) Architect's fees. $6,000.

Total $135,400.

Savings are due to a great simplification in the architect's proposal for the auditorium, the elimination of the new residence for the Assistant Dean, made possible by the recent agreement on the part of the owner to permit the Assistant Dean to occupy his present quarters until the termination of the lease on the entire property instead of requiring him to vacate the quarters this summer; the elimination for the time being of a proposed small apartment building to accommodate visiting professors and officials; postponement of certain landscaping expenses and the elimination of a proposed enlargement of the dining hall now felt to be unnecessary since a limit of 200 has been fixed for next year's enrollment.

In order to complete new construction by August 1, 1953, work should start not later than March 15, 1953, and in view of the time necessary for the preparation of working plans, opening of bids, and signature of contracts, it is of the greatest importance that the necessary funds be made promptly available."

2. The difference between the total of $135,400 and the $150,000 asked for is a 10% margin allowance for price increases.

3. We recommend, for release from the CIA held reserve by the DD/P and the DD/A, all items except (a) and the 10% margin allowance, a total of ~~[illegible]~~.
31,600

(Sgd) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/Branch 1:WPD:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1 (DD/P)
1 cc (DD/A)
CONCURRENCE: 1 cc Comp.
(Signed original files) 1 cc CIO
1 cc IO/Br. 1 ✓

EDWARD R. SAUNDERS
Comptroller

N/ Deputy Director (Plans)

/s/ ~~29 Ap~~ WRW
Deputy Director (Administration)

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DD/P 3098

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Good news concerning William Heimlich.

1. I have just received through Mr. Durkee a report from the RFE people in Munich to the following effect.

2. Mr. Heimlich has visited the premises and talked to some of the key personnel of RFE-Munich. He was cordially received and shown around. At the conclusion of his visit, Mr. Heimlich stated that whereas he was not primarily or particularly interested or concerned with NCFE/RFE activities and operations (presumably meaning that he was more concerned with the State Department information project -- and presumably MSA), he had been very much impressed by what he had seen. He was satsfied that this was a hard-hitting operation; that there was no "fat" on it; and that he would so report to the Senate Committee upon his return.

[illegible]

FRANK G. WISNER
Acting Deputy Director.

cc: C/IO - information.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]
3-2822

2 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

VIA: Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Points raised by you in connection with Mr. Durkee's conversation with Leland Stowe on 11 March 1953 and Whitney Shepardson on 16 March 1953.

The following answers to Mr. Wisner's comments on subject memos have been prepared by Mr. Durkee:

1. "Mr. Lang does not intend to put Stowe in official charge of Munich operations. My remark was intended to indicate that apparently with Lang's consent, Mr. Stowe is becoming increasingly influential in the Munich operation. If Stowe's Information Service develops, so that it is writing scripts and programming as he proposes, and if Stowe's suggestions for dealing with the German problem are followed, he will indeed, if given Lang's full support, be the dominant RFE figure in Munich.

2. "The original 'ice-box' statement was indeed passed on by us. My reference was to our approval of an alternate 'ice-box' statement entitled, 'NCFE Policy Statement', which Shepardson proposes to use in place of the original. I have not been able to determine whether this received our approval and, therefore, on 24 March, sent it through channels to the DD/P and the [illegible] for their official approval."

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

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SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIOD		
2	Durkee		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	PP/C/Admin	CWB	26 Mar
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☒ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: CPP asks that you prepare a reply to the two points raised by F.G.W. and send same to F.G.W. via CPP.

SUSPENSE 2 APRIL

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FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

SECRET

2363

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Branch I

NO. IO-3-841

DATE 16 March 1953

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/O				TWB
2. C/PP			19 Mar	CTB
3. D/DP		MAR 20 [illegible]		FGW
4. Mr Barnes		[illegible]	26 Mar	CTB
5. Mr Braden				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

Tom:
Frank W should see this at least the record of conversation as it contains [illegible] [illegible] with him.
WPD

3 To 4 and 5 —

① I had not known before that Larry proposes to put Stone in charge of the Munich question. He has never told us this and I doubt that he would make such a change without letting us, especially since he is aware of certain difficulties in the Stone case.

② I was distinctly under the impression that (contrary to what Bill D says) the Ice box statement was seen and was approved by AWD. Could I be wrong on this. I suppose Spencer Phenix would know, but I thought you two did.
FGW

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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Security Information

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH LELAND STOWE ON 11 MARCH 1953 AT HAY ADAMS HOUSE - 9:30 A.M. TO 12:15 PM

During the course of our conversation Mr. Stowe stated that he was pleased to have had the opportunity to meet here and to clear up his status. He also stated that:

a. In his opinion Mr. Lang is indispensable to the operation of RFE, but that it was necessary for Mr. Lang to be in Munich more often. He feels that in spite of Mr. Lang's over-all comprehension that developments in Munich have out-run Lang's or anyones capacity to understand it without closer contact with its day to day operations.

b. He has a high regard for Mr. Richard Condon, whom he feels is doing an excellent job. It is Stowe's opinion that Condon needs a competent administrative assistant and that Alan Michie, RFE correspondent in London, could fill such a position. Lang agrees with him. Stowe feels it remarkable that during his considerable time with RFE that he has never heard a bad word about Mr. Condon.

c. He has a very high regard for Mr. Griffith and the role he plays in RFE's operations, however, it was his feeling that it is impossible for Mr. Griffith to adequately take care of RFE's outside relations in Germany because: (1) Griffith does not have the time and; (2) He is not particularly effective in dealing with Germans because of his youth and rather pedantic manner. He informed me that there is a possibility of getting Raymond G. Swing for employment with RFE and that he felt Swing could excellently undertake the job of dealing with the German government and German public because of Swing's language facility, his familiarity with Germany and his prestige.

d. He is reorganizing the News and Information Service of RFE because the drying up of escapees has increased the need for top rank correspondents with depth of European experience and political knowledge, so that significant ideas and contributions to RFE propaganda can be developed. He also feels that a reorganized news gathering service will lead to more effective American leadership because of the respect the exiles will have for its American personnel. Such procedures, in his opinion, are necessary in order to properly integrate the various free radio desks, their use of information resources and to professionalize program content. He says he intends to have his News and Information Service prepare scripts to be used by all desks. In addition, Stowe pointed out a news gathering service of top rank correspondents will allow him great operational flexibility, for personnel can be interchanged at will.

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Security Information

e. Stowe also made a strong plea for Malcom Davis who is a personal friend.

COMMENTS:

Stowe is a strong person who is taking over RFE Munich, apparently with Lang's consent. I suspect Lang gives his consent because he has been unable to dominate either Griffith or Condon. Lang has presumably heretofore dealt with this problem by insisting upon N.Y. policy control and by keeping an inordinately large Czech, Polish and Hungarian program desk in New York.

I am sure there is merit in many of Stowe's observations but suspect that real trouble is brewing between New York and Munich, especially among exile personnel as this becomes more a Stowe "American" operation.

William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE (JB)
Chief, IO/TCHIC

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Security Information

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH WHITNEY SHEPARDSON - 16 MARCH AT 9:00 AM

1. Mr. Shepardson said that he had gone over Drew Pearson business with his entire staff and that they had all agreed that a policy of silence was clearly indicated that this was not a time to release the "ice-box" statement which he referred to as "ice-box" statement number 1 and number 2. Shepardson said he would feel out C. D. Jackson in his meeting with him today to determine whether C. D. thought any approach to Pearson should be made and whether he himself would be the one to do it. He agreed that such an approach to Pearson should be made by noone else.

2. When I queried him about the "ice-box" statement number 2, he said he referred to the NCFE Policy Statement which states the fact of US Government support. He said that it was his understanding that it had been cleared down here. I replied that to my knowledge this was not so. I told him all we had ever had was a draft statement which had been discussed informally. He agreed that if this was in fact the case, he would immediately send the policy statement for our formal approval.

3. During the course of our conversation he indicated that Abbot Washburn had arranged for RFE to appear before the Jackson Committee on March 26 and also had arranged for the rest of NCFE to make a presentation some time in April. I asked whether Mr. Dulles was informed of this and he said he was not aware that he was. I suggested that some problem existed here for NCFE is Mr. Dulles' responsibility and that no-one denied that NCFE/RFE should make such a presentation, it was still a fact that such a unilateral presentation might lead to some difficulties. I therefore suggested that we make a joint presentation whether written or oral, to which Mr. Shepardson agreed.

4. I discussed the problem of security in RFE, Munich, and our concern that a security man competent to deal with questions other than the mere internal security of RFE be placed in Munich. Shepardson immediately agreed that this should be done and we agreed that I would prepare a paper for him outlining what we thought our problems are. In the meantime, Myers will not be informed of our discussions on this subject. We also agreed that the matter of working out the placement of such a person in RFE would be a matter of joint study, but that it was largely a problem for him to work out with such assistance as we can give.

5. We discussed the question of construction funds for the FEU and Shepardson agreed that he would talk with Spencer Phenix in order to arrive at an over-all estimate of University affairs before submitting an official request for funds. It was agreed, therefore, at this time we would not take any action on Phenix's request dated 17 February 1953.

6. I stated that I was anxious for a thorough review of Albanian-Rumanian emigre questions and we agreed that after Shepardson had time to give personal attention to details of these matters, we would have a full discussion here.

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William P. Durkee
WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/Tonic

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Security Information

1 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Release of Funds for purchase of apartments to house FEUE personnel.

1. Spencer Phenix, Treasurer of NCFE, has submitted a request for the sum of $52,300.00 to purchase four apartments in Strasbourg, France, to house some of the tutorial staff of the Free University in Exile (see attached). FEUE can obtain these premises by special arrangement with the city of Strasbourg, to whom these apartments belong. There is an acute housing shortage in Strasbourg so that these apartments are necessary if the teaching staff of the University is to be reasonably accommodated.

2. I recommend that this sum be released to FEUE from the CIA held reserve for FEUE capital construction. The purchase price of these quarters is readily recoverable, if necessary, by resale because of housing shortages in the city of Strasbourg -- a shortage which will not be substantially relieved for sometime.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment: Ltr.fr.Phenix dtd 3/23/53

CONCURRENCE:

Deputy Director (Plans)

SECRET
Security Information

23 March 1953

Dear Nelson:

As requested by you this morning, I quote below the text of a letter received today from Paris, regarding the unfurnished apartments which the City of Strasbourg is prepared to sell for use by Robertsau personnel.

"This morning I sent you the following cable:

'FOR ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FRANCS CAN HAVE OPTION EXPIRING ONE MAY TO PURCHASE FOUR UNFURNISHED APARTMENTS PRICED AT SIXTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND FRANCS STOP OPTION MUST BE TAKEN UP NOT LATER THAN TWENTY SEVEN MARCH STOP TYSON AND I FAVOR PURCHASE AS REPRESENTING MOST SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF HOUSING PROBLEM LETTER FOLLOWS SABOLOT'

As stated in Binet's memorandum of the 9th of March the city of Strasbourg is in control. They are willing to give us an option on these apartments, at a cost of 160,000 francs, said option to expire on 1 May 1953. They give us until the 27th of March to take up this option.

The apartments will be finished on the 1st of August. They have offered us the following apartments:

a)	Southern exposure - ground floor - 3½ rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 4,075,000
b)	Southern exposure - 3rd floor - 4 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 4,520,000
c)	Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 3 rooms, plus kitchen, bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 3,555,000
d)	Northern exposure - 2nd floor - 4 rooms plus kitchen bathroom and maid's room in attic.	Fr. 3,950,000
	TOTAL	Fr. 16,100,000

To the above total must be added the costs of:

a) Registration, transfer and notary fees.

b) Installing electrical fixtures.

c) Installing stoves and ice boxes in kitchen.

d) Furnishing apartments, (I assume none of our staff will have their own furniture, etc.)

It is estimated the ~~above~~ will come to Fr. 4,300,000, making a total of 20,400,000 francs or $58,300.00 at 350 francs to the dollar.

I am aware of your reasons for not wishing to own real estate in Europe. However, the problem of finding suitable quarters for the College staff is a difficult one. Providing the funds are available, Ty and I are in favor of purchase, as these apartments provide an immediate partial solution to a difficult problem.

If you should decide to take up the option, we can discuss the financial details of the purchase when you visit Paris next month."

You will note that for the relatively small payment of 160,000 francs, an option will be granted valid until 1 May 1953, and since it is obvious that a final decision cannot be immediately made, I have cabled Paris, requesting that the option be purchased so that we may have time to consider the problem carefully.

I shall be in Washington next Sunday evening and available for discussion Monday morning. If you have not been able to clear the question before then, I suggest that you set up a meeting with George Lefton at which Daniel Church and I can present our views in the hope of obtaining prompt determination.

Sincerely,

s/William L. Digby

DD/P 3787

14 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, PP

SUBJECT: Letter from G. M. Dimitrov

The attached letter to Mr. Shepardson with appended Agenda and Procedures of the Plenary Session of the B.N.C. came to me through a reliable source in New York. Mr. Dimitrov is unaware that these papers have fallen into our hands. I am passing them along to you for whatever interest they may have. You may want to send them to Tom Braden for his scrutiny and files. It should be underlined that Mr. Dimitrov must not become aware of our having secured this material.

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P

Attachments

[illegible]

9 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Bradshaw Project

Attached is an accounting signed by William L. DIGBY of the Bradshaw Project for the period August 15, 1952 to May 27, 1953. This is for retention in your files.

(signed) THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
As stated.

CIO:TWB/ah

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

2 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Remarks for meeting with Spencer Phenix et al on Thursday, 2:30 PM, 4 June 1953

1. At a PRC action on Friday, 29 May, as an interim action pending a full review in August of NCFE's total program and budget the Division recommended:

a. NCFE be given three months operating expenses - $3,945,104 - the current rate of expenditures;

b. $813,590 to be put in the Free Europe University in Exile account -- the proposed FY 1954 operating expenditures -- with authority for NCFE to draw upon this account for three months at the current rate of expenditures. NCFE authorities had requested that the full amount be made available to them at this time to enable them to comply with the legal requirements of the Board of Regents of the State of New York, to which the University is responsible. It was expressly stated that the activities of the FEUE would be subject to the later full review and that the recommended action in no way implied approval of University activities at this time; and

c. Approval for RFE capital expenditures of $1,299,275 for the completion of RFE's transmitter program in its present locations. The funds for these expenditures were to come out of Crusade funds which, as you know, are specifically raised for capital construction.

2. In its action the PRC:

a. Refused to allow the $3,945,104 which NCFE requested to cover its current operating expenses by cutting this figure to $3,000,000 with the statement NCFE can come back for more if necessary, and with the further stipulation that Crusade funds be used for this purpose;

b. Refused to allow RFE to undertake its proposed capital development but authorized this Division to investigate the possibility of using two 100 kw transmitters owned by this Agency and as well as the purchase of the unused 100 kw's from VOA; and

c. Refused to appropriate any money for the FEUE, but directed NCFE to transfer funds from other accounts including that of the Crusade for Freedom to the FEUE, authorizing NCFE to incur expenditures for three months at the current rate.

3. The intent of this Division in its recommendations to the PRC was to provide NCFE and the FEUE with the operating funds necessary to continue its activities in the FY 1954 at the current rate. These funds were to tide NCFE over the first months of FY 1954, pending a thorough budgetary and program review and subsequent presentation and recommendations to proper CIA authorities in the month of August. At that time Whitney Shepardson will have completed his initial tour of inspection, and can be on hand to defend his budget and our recommendations thereto.

The only exception to this procedure was the request for approval of RFE's capital needs. This request was made after a thorough examination of proposals by this Division and General McClelland, Office of Communications, his technical staff and RFE engineers. As a result, General McClelland authorized this Division to state to the PRC that the RFE proposals were technically sound. As far as these capital expenditures are concerned the IO Division had completed its review and recommended their approval in order that there be no delay in getting this additional transmitter equipment in place.

4. I would strongly suggest that the meeting on Thursday not involve a general budgetary review. It should be confined, in my opinion, to a statement to Mr. Spencer Phenix and his budgetary officer, who should be the sole NCFE officers present, that CIA will conduct through the IO Division:

a. A thorough and detailed review of all current activities and new activities proposed by NCFE;

b. A financial review in the sense that all financial information necessary to support the NCFE program and budget is made available. Our study of this financial information will be confined to a general review to ensure accuracy, adequate explanations of uncertain items and a general analysis to ensure proper budgetary procedures. I would like to point out and strongly emphasize that we have already received the utmost cooperation from the officials of NCFE in getting such program and fiscal information.

5. We cannot, in my opinion, having granted NCFE broad authority in the execution of its task, seek to impose our judgment for theirs in the details of their management of this project. Such matters as were raised at the PRC, i.e. whether the request for replacement of 32 trucks is based on Agency standards for truck replacement, have in my opinion no place in such a review. We can review management and fiscal policies in a broad sense to satisfy ourselves that they are

sound. NCFE officials should be present at the budget review to answer such questions. This is their responsibility. If we are dissatisfied with the present management, we should get a new one.

We have, however, the responsibility of making a detailed review of the policies and the activities of NCFE undertaken in pursuance of their mission as given to them by this Agency. NCFE is entitled to know that its programs and policies are approved and that no after the fact question can arise. Equally, NCFE is not entitled to undertake programs or activities which are not approved by this Agency.

At the completion of its review of NCFE's proposed program for FY 1954, a review which involves detailed examination in cooperation with the CIA staffs and area divisions and with the Department of State, IO Division will make its recommendations to the proper Agency officials for their final action. Such an orderly procedure will enable this Agency to have completely reviewed NCFE's activities, to have concurred in each, and will allow NCFE to proceed in the knowledge that its activities are fully authorized and approved.

6. I, therefore, propose that the meeting on Thursday be confined to Phenix and his budget officer during which the above approach can be made. I will leave for your judgment the question whether the actions of the PRC on Friday should be opened for review and modification. Phenix will certainly want to do so for the following reasons:

a. The operating funds authorized are not adequate;

b. The directive to use Crusade funds for operational expenses runs counter to established procedures and NCFE's commitments to the public in the use of such funds;

c. The failure to approve RFE capital items now means a delay into next year of the installation of transmitting equipment, which if approved now, can be in place and operating by October of this year. (This will not be the case if you authorize our use of the Agency owned 100 kw's and a purchase of the VOA transmitters can be arranged, which I believe can);

d. There are not sufficient surplus funds, account. excluding the Crusade, to apply to the Free Europe University. (There are, however, impressed cash funds which are a three months' operating advances in NCFE's possession which can be used - Phenix agrees.)

THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

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(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1	CIO	TWB	8 May
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☐ APPROVAL
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☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
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REMARKS:

This is the letter which Whitney Shepardson sent to Sol Levitas, about which you are aware.

TWB
TWB

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM SEP. 1947 30-4

10—[illegible]-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

4-1139

20 May 53-58

May 5, 1953.

Mr. S. M. Levitas,
Executive Editor,
The New Leader,
7 East 15th Street,
New York 3, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Levitas:

In January 1953 an arrangement was made whereby you were to send 1000 copies of The New Leader to England and to Europe during the current year.

We wish to discontinue that arrangement. We do not wish to have our contribution used any longer in that way.

I would like to discuss with you at your early convenience the question of the return to us of some part of that contribution in view of the paper, printing and mailing costs which will be saved by the discontinuance.

Yours sincerely,

President.

WES:IRH

Orig to IO/Br I

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAY 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: IO/BRANCH ONE

SUBJECT: Utilization of Various Balkan Emigre Groups by SE Division for Operational Purposes

In reply to a request made by Miss Stern of your office for detailed information concerning the operational utilisation of various Balkan emigre groups by SE Division, there are attached as tabs to this memorandum studies covering our activities among the Albanian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Yugoslav emigration. We understand that this information is required to provide a basis for reviewing the operational plan and budget of the Fund for the coming year. Since the information is considered highly sensitive, it is forwarded for your information only.

Christian M. Freer
Acting Chief, SE

Tab A - SE Utilization of Albanian Emigre Groups
Tab B - SE Utilization of Bulgarian Emigre Groups
Tab C - SE Utilization of Yugoslav Emigre Groups
Tab D - SE Utilization of Rumanian Emigre Groups

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Orig given Burke
Paper.
Rec'd 31 Mar.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Reported Financial Support of Dr. Dimitrov by Bulgarians in Germany

REFERENCE: Memorandum (IO-3-682), dated 2 March 1953

1. With regard to reference memorandum, this Division has long suspected that some such arrangement existed. Any money which Dr. Dimitrov managed to extract from the Guard Company members is obtained by him as a result of his own personal sway exercised over this group of Bulgarians.

2. It has also come to our attention that Dr. Dimitrov is receiving money from miscellaneous Bulgarians in Canada and the United States in the name of a trust fund which he has set up. You are no doubt aware of this development.

3. We are most interested in getting from you, your estimate of Dr. Dimitrov's income from all sources as well as a listing of those sources of income about which you know.

CHRISTIAN M. FREER
ACTING CHIEF, SE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

MAR 27 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF IO DIVISION

SUBJECT : Proposal for Establishing a Microfilm Library of Rumanian Reference Material

1. The attached paper outlines a project which may be of interest to your division. A Rumanian emigre, interested in propaganda and cultural activities, prepared the paper after consulting with a number of refugee scholars.

2. Although the results of such a project would be of great value to our Rumanian operations, implementation is considered beyond the scope of the activities of this Division. Further, it appears more practicable for a project of this type to be undertaken by a research or cultural organization, rather than an intelligence agency, in order that the results may be more widely used.

3. It is suggested that the NCFE, which is concerned with worthwhile employment of refugee intellectuals, may be interested in this project for its Mid-European Studies Center. If the NCFE is not in a position to finance such a project, it is possible that a privately endowed foundation would be interested. The emigre has discussed this project with Dr. Sergius Yacobson of the Library of Congress and with Professor Moseley of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. He has reported that both agencies appear interested.

4. Because of some doubt concerning the reliability of three of the individuals mentioned in section III of the attached report, the following data is submitted for your information:

a. Dr. Mircea Eliade was formerly editor of an Iron Guard (Rumanian fascist group) newspaper and a doctrinaire of the Guard. He is reported to have disassociated himself from the Guard in the last year but this information cannot be confirmed.

b. Dr. Leontin Constantinescu reported as formerly pro-Iron Guardist in his sympathies.

SECRET

c. Dr. Ion Claudian is reportedly engaged at the present time in emigre Iron Guard activities in Europe.

5. If further information is desired, please contact Miss Newsom, extension 495.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attachment: As stated above

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Security Information

Orig to Bunkee ↓ Stern
Recd: 4/2/53

26 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Bulgarian Guard Company

REFERENCES: Secret Memo from Chief, IO, Subject: Information on Quasi-soldiers located in Frankfurt dated 19 March 1953

1. Sole control of the Bulgarian Guard Company was assumed by USAREUR in December 1952. Since there was never a definite period of enlistment, members of the Company were free to leave at will. As a result, there was a considerable turn-over of personnel. The maximum T/O strength was 200. Peak strength, about 30 in excess of T/O, was reached in 1952. However, this number was immediately reduced to 200.

2. The Company was continually plagued by the constant political activism of the adherents of Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov. It is estimated that a maximum of 40 members were hard-core Dimitrov adherents.

3. The first Bulgarian Commander of the Company was Stefan Boidev. Upon his removal from the Company, Borislav Baichev was appointed in his place.

4. Stoyan Dobrev (Papazov) does not appear on the last roster of Guard Company members (September 1952) available to us. He was one of the early members of the Company.

JOHN E. BAKER
CHIEF, SE

SECRET

MAR 25 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

SUBJECT: The New Leader

Confirming the instructions from DCI which I relayed to you by telephone last week, CIA is not to pay for overseas subscriptions to the New Leader either by direct or indirect channels.

(Signed) ALFRED C. ULMER JR.

ALFRED C. ULMER JR.
Assistant Chief
Political and Psychological Warfare Staff

cc: C/IO

16 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Memorandum dated 13 March 1953, Subject: "Notes on Paris Trip"

1. C. D. Jackson wrote the Doris Duke Foundation on Cohrssen's behalf, asking that he be granted $10,000. He was granted this amount.

2. Zurcher Berle & Co. are meeting in New York today and I have done everything that I can to ensure that Tyson gets full backing. I think this was really already being done as far as possible. When I got back, I suggested that this be done and a telegram was sent to Tyson giving him full authority to act in any manner in which he saw fit, including the firing of Malcom Davis. In my discussion with Shepardson this morning he agreed that the entire subject of the University and its future should be discussed immediately. He will, therefore, examine their position in this matter for our consideration and he agreed to withdraw the request for construction funds until they themselves know what they wish to do.

pls discuss with me

3. In discussing the FTUC in Exile with Spencer Phenix while you were away, I was informed that you had decided that support would be withdrawn after June 30. If this is so, I wonder how Pacak could be employed unless it has other means of support. Phenix also informed me that Lennen agreed to go back to Paris for at least six months on an expenses paid basis with no salary.

Frankfurt is supposed to make high level defectors available to RFE. I discussed this while in Munich and was assured that this would be done. The difficulty up to now has been Truscott and the Munich station's inability to insist upon anything from Frankfurt.

4. ACUE has a bank account which is used to bank funds passing through the Committee and which show on ACUE books. Another account is impossible for cover reasons as funds passed to it would not show in ACUE accounts in New York but would in Paris. As a result arrangements were made to have Fugitt's account a joint one with some administrative officer in Paris or to have Fugitt sign a blank check to be held in the Paris office. All these matters were gone into in great detail by Knott. Thayer, in my opinion, is using a technique through Tom Hester of making business impossible. Knott shares this opinion, as do others. For example, Fugitt was granted a raise about one year ago, he has not yet received it, etc.

5. I know nothing about the Swiss franc matter and moreover my impression is that financial procedures now followed in the unity projects, to which I presume you refer, and which are not in this Division, have been arranged at

the direction of administrative and finance people. Jim Knott, who is as scrupulous and thorough as any man can be, made all such arrangements and I would accept his recommendations of what needs to be done, if anything.

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TOPIC

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Dr. Paul A. Fabry

At Clover's suggestion, I saw Paul Fabry, a very impressive and learned young Hungarian who is not a citizen and who wanted a job. I have replied to him negatively in the attachment and do so because there is a long list of allegations in the files about his and his wife's Communist associations. These allegations may or may not be correct but are accepted as correct by John Hughes who advises most strongly against having anything to do with him.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

COPY

25 March 1953

Dear Dr. Fabry:

I have given a lot of thought within the past few days to the question of your immediate future which you raised with me. I find on checking into our rules and regulations that I simply can't help you here. I am sorry about this because you are an impressive man to talk to.

I wish you good luck elsewhere.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Braden

Dr. Paul A. Fabry
347 W. 87th Street
New York, New York

Security Information

orig given TONIC 10 March

what has Tracy done about this?

TWB
Harry Rees talked to Sichel on this

7 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/PP

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Mr. Ramsey

1. Reference our conversation sometime ago, I would like to give you the results of our Registry checks on Ramsey, who may or may not be identical with the present British citizen employed by RFE in Hamburg.

FTT-289 19 Aug 48	Subject arrived in Trieste under sponsorship of Charles K. MOFFLY, director of AIS. He speaks fluent Serbian and during war was commander of a Yugoslav camp in Egypt. Has been assigned to planning section of AMG. AIS is cover for SIS.
FTTA-291 3 June 49	Individual believed identical with subject signed interrogation report either as or for the Trieste Security Officer.
IN-44033 24 Sept 49	ANTOMIJE, suspected DA for British, has for three weeks been under constant BIS interrogation by Italian speaking British sergeant in apartment of Maj. A.I.E. RAMSEY. Surveillance reveals apartments several FSS officers in building. Gold, SIS chief, seen entering and leaving building with subject and several unidentified British women.
FTT-371 5 Oct 48	Subject is the head of five British officers who are in Trieste making a survey of the entire area prior to conducting special mission in Yugoslavia.

Security Information

MAV-00625 20 June 47	Subject British PSO (Pub. Sec. Officer) Graz. Intervened in the case of Josef Meger.
IN-22201 2 Sept 47	Subject is in Graz. Question as to whether in FSS or MI-6.
IN-21808 27 Aug	Subject was named by Mary Allison Mikan, now held in prison in Baden by the Soviets, as SIS officer in Graz.
WEL-593 12 Sept 47	Public Safety Officer in Military Government in Graz. He has been in contact with representatives of British Austrian Station.

2. Ramsey no doubt is an extremely desirable officer for RFE and I see no objection to a man with intelligence background being employed by RFE, since quite obviously the combination of language and background must be invaluable to their program, but I still believe that these RFE posts which could be exploited best by us should be occupied by American citizens, who can be cleared by us and who will have American intelligence interests closest to their hearts. You may or may not know that RFE, especially in such places as Berlin and Vienna, is one of the important screening points for refugees coming from the Satellite areas and as such the RFE representatives act as bird-dogs for this Agency's FI program wherever possible.

3. I should appreciate your keeping me advised on the possibility of keeping Kenneth Dean Koch in Berlin as the RFE representative.

PETER SICHEL
EE/FI[illegible]

Security Information

2574

5 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

ATTENTION: Mr. Durkee

VIA: C/PP

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe. Miscellaneous matters; conversation with Mr. Lang.

1. This is a brief report for the benefit of Mr. Durkee and for the information of Messrs. Barnes and Braden, concerning certain aspects of my luncheon conversation with Mr. Robert E. Lang of 4 March.

2. I believe that I was successful in covering in one way or another all of the points raised with me by Mr. Durkee prior to my conversation with Mr. Lang. I will not attempt in this memorandum to recapitulate the entire conversation, but I will comment on certain aspects thereof and state that, in general, the conversation seemed to me to be quite satisfactory.

3. I received the impression that there are still "wheels within wheels" and much internal friction within the NCFE set-up. This is very regrettable, but it seems to be a fact of life which I think should be brought to the attention of Mr. Shepardson at a very early date, and he should be urged to bring the warring factions together on a more amicable basis. The personalities involved are all important to the success of the operation and it is a great shame that they spend so much of their time and energy trying to out-maneuver and checkmate one another. I would not "give up" Bob Lang on this in talking with Mr. Shepardson -- but simply make this as a general observation of ours.

4. I came down quite hard on Bob with respect to the Leland Stowe brochure which Mr. Durkee handed to me and which I return to you herewith. I pointed out that this thing struck us as quite bad, and for three good and sufficient reasons, to wit:

a. It represents too much concentration of effort on publicity and propaganda within the United States -- our target is the satellites and to some extent the rest of the free world, but we have no charter to operate or propagandize within the United States and this only invites trouble when it is done;

b. As written, this communication or brochure has every appearance of offering a new international news service to American editors. (It is called "The RFE News and Information Service".) It is not indicated whether this will be charged for or furnished free of charge to the proposed newspaper recipients -- but in either case it would be almost sure to bring down upon the head of RFE the wrath, indignation and hostility of all the major news services who are extremely jealous and sensitive about competition of any kind, but particularly Government competition. The news services and newspapers have played ball pretty well in covering up our dark secret, but I suspect that anything of this kind would make enemies out of friends and set the news services upon a course of deliberate exposure.

c. This move points up and invites attention to Leland Stowe's present position and, as such, opens up unnecessary vulnerabilities to the kind of attack with which we are all too familiar concerning individuals who have "written a book".

Bob Lang had no ready or very satisfactory explanation of this matter -- said that he had not known about it or had not seen it -- and that he could only interpret it as an effort on Stowe's part to personally rehabilitate himself. I said that I had no objection to a program of self-rehabilitation on Stowe's part, but that he simply could not do so at the expense of the organization for which he works. Lang appeared to agree.

5. I told Mr. Lang that as far as we understood it there would be no objection to his going to Turkey to see what he could negotiate for himself. Ambassador McGhee's cable appears to have relieved State Department's objections and the only question seems to be one of operational feasibility and desirability as regards his making the effort with the Turks. I ventured to predict that he would run into difficulties with the Turks, and suggested that if he were to fail in his Turkish mission he might stop by in Greece to look into the situation there, which I said we had reason to believe might be more favorable.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Encl (1)
Mimeo brochure offering reports via "RFE's News & Information Service."

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Rec'd 6 March 53
sent to Stern

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

ATTENTION : Miss Stern

SUBJECT : Material for Transmittal to RFE.

1. Forwarded herewith is a list of persons who are considered to be acceptable script writers for Albanian material to be prepared for use by RFE. It was originally intended to forward a list of persons not considered suitable, but it was later felt that this negative approach might allow some unacceptable persons to slip through. You will note that this approved list consists of only 30 names. If RFE proposes to use any persons not on the list all that they have to do is submit the name of the proposed script writer so that we may check our files for any information on him. Immediately upon receipt of the name of a person we will reply, stating whether the person is: (a) unacceptable now, (b) may be used one time only, or (c) may be used and added to the approved list.

2. Of particular interest to us, and something we consider worthy of RFE's attention, is the recent use of Ernest Koliqi for the preparation of a script. Mr. Koliqi is a member of the BKI, a political organization which has been unacceptable in the past. Mr. Koliqi is further unacceptable as an individual by reason of his past. From the condensed information available on him it appears that he "cooperated with the Italian Minister to Tirana in preparing the Italian occupation . . . returned to Tirana (he had long lived in Italy as he does now) where he held the post of Minister of Education 1939-1943. Member of the Albanian Fascist party."

3. It would seem that the use of Mr. Koliqi for the preparation of scripts is subject to serious question. In this script for February 22, page 2, he states "a much better presentation of the various literary phases . . . is the anthology entitled The Albanian Writers published in 1941 by the Minister of Education." (Note that he was the Minister of Education during this period under the Fascist government.)

4. There are other specific examples of possibly doubtful persons having been used in the preparation of scripts. Dimiter Berati, a Zogist official when Zog was in power, a Fascist official when the Fascists were in power, and now reported to be a Communist stooge, was used on several occasions. Zef Shiro, formerly, and possibly still, editor of the Fascist magazine "Albania" was used for the preparation of a script on January 5.

5. As was agreed in a

5. As was agreed in a recent discussion between Major Mitchell of this Division and Miss Stern of your office, we hope such embarrassments may be avoided in the future by bringing the facts to the attention of RFE and by asking RFE to limit its list of writers to those specifically approved by this Division.

JOHN K. BAKER
Chief, SE

Attachment (1)

SECRET
Security Information

1. Alimehmeti, Kasem (Dr.)
2. Andoni, Alfred
3. Andoni, Vasil
4. Bajraktari, Muharem
5. Binaku, Ejup
6. Damani, Selim
7. Delvina, Hiqmet
8. Dibra, Adem (Dr.)
9. Dilo, Jani
10. Dine, Dilaver
11. Dosti, Hasan
12. Ermenji, Abas
13. Farka, Ibrahim
14. Fratari, Rauf
15. Gogh, Georges
16. Kogi, Atlas
17. Kotta, Nuci
18. Kryeziu, Said
19. Kupi, Abas
20. Maci, Halil
21. Meniku, Halil
22. Mulleti, Hysni
23. Pali, Zef
24. Perpoza, Hysen
25. Pashkopija, Nexhat
26. Rushiti, Haki
27. Skendi, Stavro
28. Tafilaj, Tani
29. Toptani, Ishan
30. Zernal-Cenay, Asllan

SECRET
Security Information

Suspense 6 March

26 February 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Dr. Bela Boszormenyi-Nagy

1. This is in response to your request for our views regarding the attached letter from Dr. Bela Boszormenyi-Nagy.

2. Our files contain only a limited amount of information regarding Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy. However, it is unlikely that information regarding Hungary which he acquired prior to September 1948 would add very much to information we have obtained from refugees and defectors who left Hungary more recently and who were better situated to observe at first hand the top government officials there.

3. I would suggest, therefore, that in acknowledging Dr. Boszormenyi-Nagy's letter we advise him not to make a special trip to Washington. Instead, we might suggest that if he is here on other business at some future time he should get in touch with Mr. DuBose at Sterling 3-5520. (DuBose is with the Contact Division, Office of Operations).

JOHN A. BROSS
Chief, Eastern European Division

5 Mar 53

Note on cover sheet returned to EO/DD/P states:

"IO/TONIC concurs in subject memo - ES per WPD

SECURITY INFORMATION

sent to DD/P (Va. Hill)

5 March 1953

William F. Heinlich

Scheduled to be employed at a salary of $10,000 on December 1949 as a program adviser until March 1950. Worked under General Clay and under General Frank Howley.

Used to be with RIAS (Radio in American Sector). Told he would not be continued because up to the time (no date) records showed three official investigations on the following subjects:

1. When serving as Intelligence Officer, why instead of putting the Goebbels diaries as captured documents into official channels known to him, did he turn them over to private persons in a transaction from which he subsequently expected to profit, both in cash and in a future position with Double Day.

2. When serving as an Intelligence Officer, how did it happen that another captured document being the German Appraisal of USSR Intelligence Service was changed in a foot locker sent by Heinlich to his home.

3. When serving as head of RIAS, entertaining at the expense of the station and ultimately, therefore, of the US government at private American parties, why did he accompany a German female singer during her appearance at a German vaudeville theater? In the latter case, the entire RIAS symphony orchestra appeared without payment at the German theater for a period of one week. There was an investigation into the existance of extensive payroll padding at RIAS when subject was informed that the State Department did not wish to inform him and he thereupon resigned.

HICOG Appraisal:

He is generally dishonest in his day to day dealings and apparently is in the habit of fabricating any story which contributes to his particular objectives at any particular time. The people in HICOG would not look with favor upon his employment by any American organization in Germany.

Private Source:

He is going abroad to survey installations, etc. Munich people have been warned against him.

114-4

February 25, 1953

Dear George:

Confirming what I have just told you on the phone, our mutual friend wrote Michael a note the exact contents of which are as follows:

> "After you left this afternoon, Mr. Robert Voegeler came in to see me, and among other things told me that to his certain knowledge, RFE had been infiltrated.
>
> "I picked up the word and asked him if he would tell me more about it, to which he replied that maybe he had used too strong a word. So then I told him to pick any word he wanted, but to tell me what he meant.
>
> "He then told me that there were people working for RFE who were either ex-Communists or ex-Socialists who were utterly discredited in their own country and who were doing us more harm than good. I asked him if he cared to tell me who some of these people were, to which he replied that he did not come to the office to denounce anybody. I thought I would leave it at that and we went on to another subject.
>
> "However, the purpose of his trip to Washington was to feed information to Senator McCarthy's Committee, and he will be returning in another ten days to give him some more advice.
>
> "I think it would be most important for you or Bob Lang to have a word with this gentleman and see if you can't find out whom he is talking about, as I am sure you would be eager to know and to act if justified."

It was our friend's suggestion, and we will act upon it, that together with Michael and Kenneth Walters I try to see Voegeler. This I will do as soon as I can locate him, and I learn that he is now in New York. We here have information that Voegeler associates socially with an individual who, having failed of employment with the Fund some time ago, has since lost no opportunity to condemn the Fund as being infiltrated. The latter individual's identity is known to Michael as is also the basic situation which gives some color to the allegation.

I will reserve further comment on this until I see you personally, or I will instruct Michael to give you this background when he next goes down to see your colleagues.

Sincerely,

SECRET

Orig given
[illegible] 13 Feb

FEB 12 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO DIVISION

SUBJECT: Attempts of Virgil POPA to Secure Employment with RFE Munich

1. The information below was reported by a KUBARK source, and was acquired in Munich during October 1952:

a. Virgil POPA has renewed his attempts to secure employment with RFE Munich. Subject is in possession of a letter of recommendation signed by Barbu NICULESCU and issued in the name of General Nicolae RADESCU. The letter recommended Subject as a good and capable Rumanian to General Ion GHEORGHE and Alexander GREGORIAN, the latter an RFE employee, and requested them to assist Subject in gaining employment with RFE Munich. Subject has taken the letter to GREGORIAN in Munich, and has visited him several times, in each instance pressing him for a job.

b. POPA has explained to GREGORIAN that he wishes to emigrate to the United States, but because he is anti-SIMA, the Simists have informed U. S. authorities that he is a Legionary. As a result, he was interned at Ellis Island and refused entry into the United States. GREGORIAN is aware that POPA is still an important Legionary leader, and that this explanation is a typical Legionary maneuver.

2. It is requested that RFE be informed of the above information.

JOHN E. BAKER
Chief, SE

SECRET

#764-6

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 February 1953

Dear Oliver,

Would you be kind enough to pass on the enclosed memorandum to Ed Greene.

Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Kenneth

Kenneth J. Walters

Enc. 1

sent to 2433 Holmes Run Drive
Falls Church, Va.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

C
O
P
Y

12 February 1953
110 W. 57th Street
New York City

Dear Ed,

I saw your name on a piece of paper today written in recommendation of one Ghica Cantacuzino on 2677th stationery no less.

We are considering him for a job with the Rumanian desk and would be grateful for your comments. He seems, so far as we have been able to determine, to be well equipped but a difficult personality.

Hope to see you sometime soon.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Bob

Robert E. Lang

(For Edward Greene)

SECURITY INFORMATION

12 February 1953

At 1715 I was called to Brad Connor's office and shown a memorandum dated 10 February 1953, "Meeting with Representatives John Taber and Cliff Clevenger on February 6, 1953 - Baker East and Baker West". The memorandum was signed by General Stoner. Present were:

Rep. John Taber
Rep. Cliff Clevenger
Dr. Wilson Compton
General Frank Stoner
I/R - Mr. Crosby

IPO - Mr. Connors
I - Mr. Harris
IBS/NY - Mr. Morton
S - Mr. Barnard
- Mr. Lourie

General Stoner had been discussing the need for money for more installations for VOA. At the top of page 3 of his memo, there is found the following:

> "Mr. Taber mentioned that we had a large Munich plant. He said that this was the alleged place of employment of Ruby Parsons. We stated that our plant in Munich was not comparable to the large plant built up by RFE, that we felt there should be a closer coordination on a technical level between the various US activities engaged in international broadcasting in Europe and that there wasn't any reason why a single centralized plant should not be able to serve Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Armed Forces Network, and the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia.
>
> "When liberation of the Peoples of Russia was mentioned as a potential broadcaster, Mr. Taber made notes and said that he would look into the matter. He was told that the single building in Munich erected by RFE could also house all the feeders located in separate sites and separate buildings pertaining to U.S. activities mentioned above. He was particularly interested in this possibility."

Mr. Connors told me that he had ordered page 3 of this memo rewritten to omit these two paragraphs before the paper got further circulation. However, he wanted us to know what Stoner had said as shown by these two paragraphs, so that we could take any action we see fit with reference to Taber and Clevenger. Connors said he didn't know how far we cut in the Appropriations Committee. He said that he had warned Stoner "twenty times" not to reveal such things. He stated that Stoner had learned these things while in Germany.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ARISTIDES G. LAZARUS

PYD

SECRET
Security Information

20 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION)

VIA: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Reimbursement of Mr. Francis B. Stevens

1. It is requested that approval be given to reimburse Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the Department of State for a trip to Glens Falls, New York. This trip was made at our request and with the approval of the DDP and DCI, to approach Mr. Nathaniel P. Davis as a possible replacement for Mr. [illegible] Policare, head of the Division for Exile Relations of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

2. Mr. Stevens was asked to do this work because of his close personal friendship with Mr. Davis. Mr. Stevens is also acting in the capacity of a State Department contact with the National Committee for a Free Europe.

3. An accounting of Mr. Stevens' expenditures is attached. The airline stubs, to be attached to any voucher, are being kept in this Office, pending approval of this request.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Approved:

General Counsel

Deputy Director (Administration)

Attachment: 1 (a/s)

IO/Br.1:TB:jb
Distribution:
Addressee - orig & 1
Gen.Counsel - 1cc
IO/Br.1 - 1cc
CIO - 1cc
RI - 1cc
IO/AD - 1cc

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET
Security Information

2159

FEB 6 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE Support of the New Leader

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 12 January 1953 (ER #3-6149), same subject.

1. On 30 January, Saul Levitas advised our PY Staff by telephone that he had received a call from Spencer Phenix. According to Levitas Mr. Phenix stated that NCFE has decided to provide the New Leader with $18,000. $12,000 of this amount will be a direct payment to the magazine for services and the remaining $6,000 will be used to renew 1,000 subscriptions to the United Kingdom.

2. The PP Staff is preparing for your consideration a project separate from the above which would envisage sending subscriptions to the New Leader to key Socialist and Labor people in certain other priority areas.

RICHARD HELMS
Chief of Operations, DD/P

APP/ACU/gvm
31 January 1953

Distribution:
- Addressees - Orig & 1
- Chief of Operations, DD/P - 1
- ~~Executive Registry - 2~~
- CPY - 1
- CIO - 1✓
- APP - 1
- RI - 1

SECRET
Security Information

3-6.75

(DDP 2042)

3 February 1953

My dear Mr. DeBarcza:

I appreciate your letter and your interest. I recall with pleasure our acquaintance during the war and have noted your desire to serve the "democratic cause".

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ALLEN W. DULLES

Mr. G. DeBarcza
11, Ranger Road
Croydon
N.S.W.
Sydney, Australia

CIO:TWB/mf (19 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:REL/lob (23 January 1953)
retyped O/DDCI:AWD/mam (3 February 1953)
Dist:
  Orig - Addressee
  1 cc - DDCI Chrono
  1 cc - ER
  1 cc - CIO ✓
  1 cc - RI
  1 cc - TONIC

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Rec'd 2 Feb 53
Copy sent to E. Stern

what has [illegible]?
This should go to Lang.
yes went to New York

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

FROM : Chief, SE

SUBJECT : Viorel Virgil TILEA

1. It is our understanding that Viorel TILEA is currently under consideration for the position of head of Rumanian broadcasts for RFE. In this connection we call your attention to information in our files indicating (a) the possibility that Subject is a British Intelligence agent; (b) that a close relationship exists between Subject and Nicolae MALAXA, the well-known Rumanian industrialist now in the United States, and (c) that Subject has ties with former King CAROL. MALAXA is currently under scrutiny not only by this Agency but by the FBI, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of Justice and the House Judiciary Committee, for his alleged collaboration with King CAROL, with the IRON GUARD and later, with the Rumanian Communist Government. CAROL's activities are, of course, a matter of record.

2. Numerous usually reliable sources have indicated their belief that TILEA is an agent of the British Intelligence Service. This opinion appears to be held by many knowledgeable Rumanian emigres.

3. That Subject is definitely linked to Nicolae MALAXA is borne out by the following:

a. A report by the FBI on Nicolae MALAXA dated 20 October 1948 indicates that the following telephone calls were made on MALAXA's own telephone in New York:

"March 20, 1948. Number called: District 3000, Wash. D.C. Person called: V. TILEA, Mayflower Hotel. Viorel TILEA is the former Rumanian Minister to the Court of St. James who has been active in Subject's behalf.

"April 1, 1948. Incoming collect call from V. TILEA, calling from Executive 7300, Wash. D.C.

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to London, International 575, signed VIOREL (VIOREL TILEA).

"April 14, 1948. Telegram sent to Paris, International 550, signed TILEA.

SECRET

From the same report:
"Confidential Informant T-3 advised the Bureau on May 11, 1948 that he had received information that among the members of the Board of Directors of the Rumanian-American Economic Corporation (Note: This was set up by MALAXA) are Viorel TILEA and Grigore GAFENCU. . ."

From TILEA's own statements to the Bureau in the same report:
". . .he (TILEA) could honestly say that MALAXA, in his opinion and in the opinions of many Rumanians, is by far the best Rumanian citizen. Mr. TILEA indicated that there never had been any question about the character of MALAXA and that no one could level any charges against him that would concern his character, morals or patriotism . . . Mr. TILEA stated that he was very sympathetic towards MALAXA at the present time . . ."

b. In the case of a suit brought before the Supreme Court, County of New York, in November 1948, by Mircea A. GROSSU, formerly employed by MALAXA, against the latter for recovery of certain funds, the following was given as "Third Cause of Action":

> "That on or about the 10th day of August 1948, at the special instance and request of the defendant, and upon defendant's promise to repay the plaintiff the sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, plaintiff paid to one Mr. V. V. TILEA, the sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars.
>
> "That no part of the said sum of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars has been paid to plaintiff by defendant, although demand therefor has been duly made."

c. Another source is quoted as follows in March 1948:

> "There is an important consideration which, in the minds of some Rumanian political exiles, necessitates the greatest caution concerning collaboration with TILEA. It is a well-established fact that TILEA has close business connections with MALAXA and is working hand in hand with him. As TILEA's collaboration is of no interest for MALAXA from a business point of view, it is clear that the strong ties which exist between them are of another nature. It is obvious to Rumanians abroad that TILEA should not be included in a Rumanian National Committee."

4. Concerning TILEA's alleged ties with King CAROL, the following references are taken from our files:

a. From a report dated 24 August 1944 from the London office of OSS:

> "TILEA's Free Rumanians are also satisfied (with the new developments in Rumania) though more moderately. They too are for MICHAEL and MANIU but they suspect Russian intrigue to be responsible for the latest changes. The fact that ex-King CAROL has expressed his satisfaction is also gratifying for them since several of TILEA's men have not given up the hope of bringing CAROL back to Rumania. They have maintained a correspondence with the ex-King, and they would have much to expect from him if he came back to power. TILEA's followers are likewise very pleased with the fact that most of the men forming the new Government are of the same political color as themselves. They are almost all former King CAROL favorites and good friends of some of the members of the Free Rumanian movement . . ."

b. From an OSS report addressed to Mr. Allen W. Dulles from "B.C." dated 5 May 1942:

> "Regarding the Rumanian diplomat who is expected to arrive in New York (as per my recent memorandum) to take over the leadership of the Rumanian movement here, my informants believe that he is Mr. Viorel TILEA, the man who started the Free Rumanian movement in England. The British are said to have looked upon him with disfavor. He is a friend of King CAROL and of VAIDA. It is reported that Mr. TILEA is to enter the United States via Mexico and it is believed that he may already be there conferring with CAROL."

c. From a report by Emil GHILEZAN in 1948:

> "DAVILA might be watered down to the point where he is acceptable to the Political Parties, but never TILEA, who is a King CAROL man."

d. From a report dated 1951, evaluated as B-3, from a London source, concerning the activities of Father Vasile LEU, the discredited Rumanian emigre priest who has set himself up as a bishop:

> "From Istanbul LEU intends to visit King MIHAI, to request the episcopal crozier. This plan seems to have been worked out by LEU and Mme. Elena LUPESCU. Former King CAROL will apparently finance LEU's bishopric. . . Informant gained the impression that LEU's plans are supported by Viorel TILEA and Major Gheorghe ILIESCU. . ."

e. From a report, evaluated as B-3, coming from Paris in November 1952:

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

"Judging from opinions gathered here during the last weeks Source is inclined to believe that General Nicolae RADESCU is ready to repudiate the King. In such an action he would be backed by the pro-CAROL clique Gheorghe BAUT, Prof. Nicolae HERESCU, Col. Gheorghe ILIESCU, Viorel TILEA, General Ion Gheorghe."

5. A member of the National Peasant Party and supporter of Iuliu MANIU, TILEA broke away from that group around 1935 to join Alexander VAIDA-VOEVOD who founded the fascist RUMANIAN FRONT. VAIDA-VOEVOD, having aided CAROL in becoming dictator, became President of the NATIONAL RENAISSANCE FRONT, the totalitarian party set up by CAROL in 1938. VAIDA-VOEVOD was an advocate of the "numerus valahichus", an ultra-nationalist policy aimed at limiting to 5% the number of Jews allowed to practise professions or to attend universities. In 1938, according to this source, who is considered usually reliable, TILEA became one of the mainstays of the CAROL dictatorship. Another source, in referring to this period, states that TILEA who was then Under Secretary of State, acted as liaison between VAIDA-VOEVOD and the IRON GUARD.

6. A source evaluated as usually reliable stated that in late 1946 TILEA wrote to Alexander CRETZIANU requesting loan of 30,000 pounds from the "resistance funds" in Switzerland which CRETZIANU controlled. Upon receiving CRETZIANU's refusal, TILEA reportedly wrote to the latter that it would be necessary, since he had not received the treatment to which he believed he was entitled, "to revise his attitude (towards CRETZIANU) in future."

7. In the interests of expediency we have not made an exhaustive search of the files for information on Subject at this time since this would involve a considerable delay in forwarding information. We are, therefore, submitting the above in the form of an interim report for your immediate consideration.

SECRET

SECU [illegible]

2 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: TC/TONIC

SUBJECT: Call from Admiral Miller

1. Wants to put Paul Kesten on Board - has radio experience. Please secure Security Clearance on him right away.

2. Re Yugoslav publication which Adm. Miller called Bill Durkee about and has not yet received an answer. What do our friends across the street think of it? Ask Willa if she has any dope on it. They have run 500 copies off and are just holding them.

TWB

TWB:

1. Ellen will start the clearance on Paul Keston. Cleared back in 1952

2. Bill Durkee took this up with Stevens at State who asked that we hold off until Amb. Allen returned from Yugoslavia and they got his views. Ellen talked with Stevens a couple days ago on this and rather than say to go ahead on the distribution of these publications, he asked if we couldn't hold off a couple more days until Amb. Allen returns. She told Sam Walker this. She has also had a letter from Dolbeare on it so everyone is after her on this.

eh

SE [illegible]

28 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Agenda for discussion with Messrs. Ford, Brophy et al.

BACKGROUND:

1. For your information, the following are current facts in the American Heritage Foundation take-over of the Crusade for Freedom:

a. The American Heritage Foundation will undertake the Crusade for Freedom subject to reconsideration after a period of one year;

b. PRC has recommended the sum of $25,000 be granted the American Heritage Foundation for its preliminary work;

c. Two CIA staff agents will be employed on the premises of AHF -- an administrative assistant and a financial man.

AGENDA:

2. In your discussions with Henry Ford and D'A. Brophy Wednesday, I wonder whether you should make the following points:

a. The principal objectives of the AHF program are to provide cover for NCFE-RFE and CFA through a multiplicity of ostensible sources of funds. Fund raising is a distinctly secondary objective.

b. For several reasons, cover fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia should be carried on outside the Crusade for Freedom activity. We may at some future date wish to transfer the fund-raising for the Committee for a Free Asia to some other organisation. In any event, we do not want the Crusade name linked with the Committee for a Free Asia.

c. The previous Crusade operations have been inefficiently operated. It has cost a dollar to raise a dollar. We know that AHF will be run on a businesslike basis, as have AHF past operations.

d. We want a dignified operation which will enlist the support of representative groups and individuals. While we are interested in securing real contributions from the public for the Crusade, the Crusade's primary purpose is to serve as a cover. It was and is intended therefore that its tenor be educational -- a dignified presentation to the American public of events behind the Iron Curtain and a request for the public's support of NCFE/RFE efforts to give aid and hope to the satellite peoples.

e. We request that before further funds are authorized, a memorandum of understanding along lines of the attached be signed by both parties. (Your attention is invited to the provision requiring two CIA staff agents assigned to AHF staff).

(signed) [illegible]

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
  Draft Memo of Understanding

IO/BrI:WPD-TWB/eh

Orig - DCI (THRU DD/P)
1 cc - IO/Br I
1 cc - IO/Br II
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - CPP

Tentative Memorandum of Understanding
Between Fund and the Foundation

Subject to the specific understanding that the Fund shall at all times have authority to veto either in part or as a whole any fund raising or other activities that the Foundation may desire to undertake in its conduct of the Fund's campaign, and equally that the Fund may request that specific action or actions be taken, the Fund agrees:

1. To provide funds for Foundation's overhead and maintenance of a basic staff.
2. That Foundation should continue its normal fund-raising activities, but such activities other than provided for in 1 above and 3 below cannot be financed by the Fund.
3. To approve, by June 1 of each year, a campaign budget for the next fiscal year beginning 1 July, terminating 30 June of the next year.
4. Subject to Fund's budgetary review and policy guidance, to vest in the Foundation management and operational authority over the public fund-raising activities.
5. To designate a competent liaison officer through whom Fund-Foundation relations will be maintained.
6. To provide an administrative assistant and a fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.
7. To provide thorough fiscal and other procedures.
8. To define and provide a liquidation reserve acceptable to the Fund and Foundation should relations be terminated.

The Foundation agrees:

1. To submit by May 1 each year its budget for the next fiscal year following that date.
2. Not to undertake other fund-raising activities which would conflict with the terms and purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding.
3. To observe procedures as provided by the Fund.
4. To employ Fund-chosen administrative assistant and fiscal officer to work on Foundation premises.

5. To have an annual audit by a firm to be designated by the Fund.

6. To exercise management and operational authority within the framework of policy guidance provided by the Fund. The primary objective of the fund-raising activities is to provide a multiplicity and variety of plausible, attributable sources of funds. The secondary objective is to raise as large a sum of money annually as is feasible and consistent with the above purpose.

7. Provisions of this Memorandum of Understanding will subsequently be more specifically detailed and may be amended by mutual agreement between the Fund and the Foundation.

Date ______________________ FUND ______________________

Date ______________________ FOUNDATION ______________________

HOURLY BROADCASTING BREAKDOWN

	Original Programming Hours		Total Broadcast Time	
Language	Weekdays	Sundays	Weekdays	Sundays
Czechoslovakia	11	11 3/4	19 7/12	16 7/12
Hungarian	9 1/2	10	16 3/4	16 7/12
Polish	6 5/6	6 5/6	16 5/6	16 3/4
Rumanian	1 1/2	1	3	3
Bulgarian	1 1/2	1	2 3/4	2 3/4
Albanian	1/2	1/2	1 1/4	1 1/4
	30 5/6	31 1/12	60 1/3	56 11/12

Program Dept. Personnel - N.Y. (Total) -111
Munich (Total) -468
-579

(Free Lance not Included)

FBI - Aug'51. 31 Jan 53
State Dept. consideration
Further inquiries resolved with K.G.
O'Connel - 2591

Mr. Braden:

Ellen says a clearance has been in since 4 Dec 1952 on Allen Michie. Nothing has been done in Security on it and possibly they can get to it next week. O'Connel on 2591 is the one handling it.

FBI made a check on him in Aug 51 and found some rather derogatory info. State was considering him for employment and dropped it because of FBI check.

Do you want to call Lang and tell him clearance has not been secured yet?

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
V.O.A. Relay Project: U.S. Assistance in Expansion of Turkish Radio Networks	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. State F-ACSI No. 454
	4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS # 85360-B

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

In reply refer to:

26 January 1953

Dear David:

~~[illegible]~~

You may be interested in a dispatch which I received here a couple of days ago and which I quote as follows:

> "On January 14, Alexander Booker of the German Foreign Office informally brought to our attention a map of Eastern Europe which appeared in the December issue of "News from Behind the Iron Curtain", a monthly periodical published by the "National Committee for a Free Europe". This map which is shown in small scale on page 1 of this periodical, shows all of Eastern Germany, including East Prussia, the Satellite States, and the former Baltic States. In the case of the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, the area is simply shown as belonging to Poland, and its pre-war borders are not set off by a dotted line. With respect to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, however, the territories that were annexed by the Soviet Union during or after World War II are clearly marked by a dotted line. Furthermore, the Eastern Zone of Germany as well as East Prussia are shown in the same colors as the Soviet Union, whereas the Baltic and Satellite States are shown in white.
>
> "Although Booker admitted that the map itself was not of great importance, he nevertheless pointed out that it represents 'a typical example of the one-sided anti-German propaganda' put out not only by the National Committee for a Free Europe but also by Radio Free Europe. Such propaganda, he said, can only increase the misgivings which many Germans, particularly the refugees, already entertain with respect to the activities of the committee and on the operations of Radio Free Europe on German soil. Finally, Booker politely hinted that the German Government would welcome it if the U. S. High Commission would use its influence with the National Committee for a Free Europe to stop dissemination of such anti-German propaganda in the future. A more constructive and objective propaganda policy of the committee and Radio Free Europe along the lines of a larger European Community that would embrace Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as a reunited Germany and the other European nations would not only contribute to a better understanding

> between the various refugee elements but would also have the full support of all Germans, Booker added."

Incidentally, I think you are doing an awfully good job on this kind of thing. The other night I actually read through an entire copy.

The article on music for the masses and the general expose of the attack on the arts is particularly significant, I think. Until the recent anti-Semitism, this field of culture is the one field of Soviet activity in which they were vulnerable before neutralists and fellow-travelers everywhere. The tendency of the intellectual to swallow the Soviet line on culture, to fall for the Stalin Prizes, the high status accorded the obedient intellectual in Soviet society, and pseudo-scientific appeal of the Marxian dogma of equality is dangerous. In a free society, the intellectual is the origin of ideas.

Anything we can do to show the fact that every aspect of Soviet culture has been transformed into an instrument of the State, that the intellectual's role is important only so long as he is obedient, that in fact the product of the Soviet artist would not hold a candle to the standards set by fellow-traveling circles in Western Europe, and that the Soviet has corrupted the principles of equality on which it presumes to stand is terribly important.

I am sure you are aware of all the above but I thought of it when I read the piece in the last issue, and my comment is just another way of telling you what a good job I think you are doing.

Sincerely,

Oliver Haywood

(Mr. David Powers
New York, New York)
CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Leonard Stamm
1 cc - TONIC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI

Mr. Dulles [illegible] like [illegible] project but [illegible] hasn't.

SECRET
Security Information

27 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Exploitation by RFE of Physicians (Plot)

1. Attached herewith the January 17 Washington Post Editorial on "Communist Antisemitism", which you requested.

2. This editorial has not been previously sent to New York. However, I should like to call your attention to the fact that the material covered in this editorial has already been exploited by RFE, as evidenced in their guidances of 13, 14 and 15 January.

ELLEN STERN
IO/TONIC

Attachments:
As stated above

JWB wrote ltr. to Lang 30 Jan 53

SECRET
Security Information

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Security Information

26 January 1953

TO : Deputy Director (Plans)

FROM : Comptroller

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for Crusade for Freedom

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 15 January 1953 from Chief, PP to the DD/P and to the memorandum of 8 January 1953 for the DD/CI submitted by the Chief, IO Division wherein request is made for additional funds of $553,109 for the Crusade for Freedom.

2. On 24 January 1953 a representative from this office discussed and reviewed the basis for the request for additional funds with officials of the Crusade for Freedom. The following unaudited amounts were presented for review:

An operating bank account overdraft	$18,802.67
Unpaid invoices on hand	106,406.03
Unpaid Commitments for the 1952 campaign	123,294.03
Total bank overdraft, unpaid invoices and commitments to 24 January 1953	$248,502.73

The Crusade officials have estimated that in addition to the above $248,502.73 a further amount of $18,000 will be required for expenses to close out the 1952 campaign.

3. It is recommended that the $253,000 approved by the PRC, 21 January 1953 be made available to the Crusade for Freedom from the allotment to the DD/P area for the fiscal year 1953. The use of unvouchered funds is recommended.

E. R. Saunders

E. R. SAUNDERS

Funds approved for release
Richard Helms
Acting DD/P
27 January 1953.

SECRET
Security Information

UNCLASSIFIED [✓ RESTRICTED] CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P	CWT	29 Jan
2	C.I.O	RWB	
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, FBID		28 Jan
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: The attached item carries reference to CIA and was published in the Restricted USSR Daily Report.

This distribution is made to DD/P; DD/I; Chief, FI; Chief, PP; Chief, Intelligence Control Branch, OCI; AD/OO; General Counsel; and Col. Wood, I & S.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL [✓ RESTRICTED] UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

RESTRICTED

- HU 4 - HUNGARY
Jan. 26, 1953

'JOINT' ONLY ONE OF U.S. SPY TENTACLES

Budapest, Hungarian Home Service, Jan. 23, 1953, 1900 GMT--L

(Commentary by Pal Lendvai)

(Summary with Quotations)

In the report carried by an "American bourgeois weekly" the name of the banker Warburg was included among several philanthropic U.S. businessmen. Warburg was described as one of the most zealous among them. The adjective would have been truly apt if applied not to Warburg's philanthropic activities but to his business activities.

"In the history of American capitalism we have heard of many a shrewd and base businessmen, but few have been more cunning or more ready for any and every wickedness than Warburg. By profession he is a banker--and not just any second-or third-rate speculator, but a member of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, the second largest banking firm in the United States. At the same time, he is also chairman of Joint, the Zionist Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization.

"It will be remembered that the Joint has been, to the accompaniment of the eulogies of the bourgeois press, acting for years under a philanthropic disguise and with the alleged purpose of providing financial aid to Jews in Europe and other countries.

"In reality this organization--as revealed by the Slansky trial and the case of the group of doctor-wreckers unmasked in the USSR--has served as a forward base of American imperialism and has carried out, under the direction of the U.S. espionage service, spying, terrorist, and sabotage activities against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Birds of a feather flock together: Joint is given away by the identity of the man heading it. Mr. Warburg, donning the robe of the philanthropist and placing himself in the role of savior of the Jews, has been the bosom friend and business partner of the West German banker Pferdemenges, one of Hitler's former financiers and advisers, one of the wickedest Nazi war criminals.

"Warburg, the Zionist leader, and Pferdemenges, the Hitlerite, have jointly founded with vast initial capital a banking firm in Hamburg, the most important investment in West Germany of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company.

"This same Warburg who, with one hand, scribbles humanistic and charity appeals has pocketed with the other--as a chief shareholder of I.G. Farbenindustrie--rich dividends resulting from the manufacture of poison gas for the Auschwitz death camp, where several million people, including many hundreds of thousands of Jews, were killed. This same Warburg who preaches about helping the victims of the war is one of the main architects of the cold war and, with the golden rain of dollars he helps to set on its feet again the bloodthirsty and money-hungry German imperialism.

"Such is the likeness of philanthropists for whom every life extinguished, every bomb dropped means the clinking of gold. Under the expert direction of Mr. Warburg, the principal task of Joint has been spying and the organization of sabotage for the overthrow of the People's Democratic regimes. This was the organization which directed the base activities of the doctor-wreckers and gave instructions for the extermination of the leading cadres of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, it does not look with contempt upon currency deals and black marketeering or smuggling. Spying and sabotage have proved excellent business also. Through the illegal emigration movement in Czechoslovakia, for instance, Joint made a profit of 9 dollars for every dollar invested. The damage which these criminals have caused the Czechoslovak People's Republic would have covered the costs of 20,000 room flats or 177,000 car loads of wheat."

Joint, though important, is by no means the only espionage and terror organization of American imperialism. "The U.S. Government long ago made an institutional and an official governmental activity of the organization of assassinations and acts of terror. The Mutual Security Act provides 100 million dollars for the recruitment into armed formations of "war criminal and other criminals who fled from the USSR and the People's Democracies," for action against their countries of origin.

"Since the end of the World War Two the war incendiaries have been tenaciously and systematically building up their interwoven and world-embracing espionage network." The sum total invested for the purpose is far in excess of the amount stipulated in the Mutual Security Act.

"The Swiss paper DIE TAT estimates the annual operating costs of the Central Intelligence Agency, employing 6,500 permanent and tens of thousands of temporary spies, at 300 million dollars.

"That agency was recently given a new chief, following the resignation of Gen. Bedell Smith, with the appointment a few days ago of Allen Dulles, the brother of the new Secretary of State, the immediate director of the secret war against the USSR and the People's Democracies, the recruiting officer of the Rajks, Szonyis, Slanskys, and other traitors of the same brand.

"The central espionage organization embraces several bodies active in spying and diversion and camouflaged with impressive names, the espionage organization known as the National Committee for a Free Europe being one of the many maintained with U.S. dollars and directing its own branch organizations all over Europe. That committee, too, has been headed by Allen Dulles, and its members have included President Eisenhower, Gen. Clay, and representatives of the yellow trade unions and of "all Street."

That committee has been the motive force behind the various national committees, including the one led by "proven traitors like Ferenc Nagy, Mikolajczyk, and their associates." In Strasbourg and other places espionage has been given a scientific standing at universities, together with various methods of incendiarism and assassination. The "Green International" is also one of the committee's branches, allied to the gang of the international scum of landlords deprived of their estates.

'It is but a few months ago that the Czechoslovak State Security organs unmasked a terrorist group belonging to the international espionage organization. The outbursts of fury of the imperialist lie-manufacturers, their wailings, the salvoes of rage coming from the bourgeois politicians, are proofs in themselves that the exposure of the undercover Joint agencies, the recent liquidation of American spy and terrorist groups in Bulgaria and Poland has touched the organizers of a new war to the quick.

'According to data not quite complete, in the past year alone 41 American spy groups and terrorist organizations have been liquidated in the USSR and the People's Democracies. We must be prepared for the time when the enemy, precisely because of the new blow suffered by him, will try to harm us by even viler means

'We must always remember Stalin's wise words to the effect that so long as there is capitalism around us, there will be wreckers, diversionist spies, and terrorists sent by foreign countries to stab the Soviet Union in the back. Let us therefore fight with even greater vigilance, let us fight even more implacably against the enemy's attempts to prevent, by sabotage and subversion, the building of Socialism. The frustration of his plans depends upon us and upon our vigilance."

1953 BUDGET

Radio Free Europe (operating expenditures)	$ 9,526,302.00	
" " " (capital ")	2,981,120.00	
Total RFE		$12,507,422.00
National Committee for a Free Europe Operating Expenditures	3,774,517.00	
National Committee for a Free Europe Capital expenditures	NONE	
Total NCFE		3,774,517.00
Free Europe University in Exile		
Operating Expenditures	628,631.00	
Capital "	6,000.00	
Total FEUE		634,631.00
GRAND TOTAL		$16,916,570.00
Reserve for Contingency (to be held by NCFE)		100,000.00
To be held by sponsor		1,783,430.00
TOTAL BUDGET		$18,800,000.00

SECRET
Security Information

26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

REFERENCE: Memorandum on same subject from CIO to IO/Branch I, dated 23 January 1953

1. NCFE has confirmed that a meeting of ambassadors and diplomats of the Polish Government in Exile is to be held here in the middle of February.

2. The following individuals are scheduled to attend the meeting:

a. Ambassadors

Papee	Ambassador to the Vatican
Potocki	Ambassador to Madrid
Zenczykowski	Ambassador to Lebanon

b. Agents

Morawski	Paris
Raczynski	London
Babinski	Ottawa
Lipski	Washington
Arciszewski	Buenos Aires
Dombinski	Cuba

c. Others

Romer	Montreal
Librach	Secretary-General of the Foreign Office of the Government in Exile, coming from London
Ciechanowski	Former Ambassador to Washington (until 1945)
Wszelaki	Former Consul to the Embassy in Washington (until 1945)

3. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss and decide matters concerning the foreign policy of the Government in Exile. NCFE has heard rumors, but does not know for a fact, that the Poles intend to pay their respects to the new Administration. If this should be done, General Sosnkowski (who is returning from Canada at the end of this week) would be the spokesman, since he knows Eisenhower personally.

4. NCFE is in no way involved in sponsoring or financing this meeting. The Polish Government in Exile has funds of its own which should enable it to send delegates.

SECRET
Security Information

WILLIAM P. DURKEE
Chief, IO/TONIC

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/BRANCH 1 - Miss Ellen Stern

SUBJECT: Meeting of Poles to be held here in February

1. John Bross telephoned me late today to inquire whether NCFE knows anything about a meeting of a group of Poles in the Polish Government in Exile to be held in February. Sokolowsky(?) was mentioned as a member of this group, and it is their intention to meet with Poles from South America, and pay their respects to the new Administration.

2. The Embassy in London is concerned about visas for these Poles and Bob Joyce has asked John Bross whether we are giving any encouragement to this proposed meeting.

3. Will you find out from NCFE what they know about this?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

[illegible]/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO Topic file

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]
[illegible]

23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO BRANCH I

SUBJECT: Use of RFE as Playback in event of hostilities

1. I believe you held some conversations with the Communications people about Spencer Phenix's idea, which he expressed to me, that RFE might be used as a playback in the event of hostilities. Will you let me know the results of those conversations, whether our Communications people think it is possible or not possible, and in general what their ideas are.

2. Spencer Phenix has been asking me about this for reasons which you know, and I think we ought to give him some kind of a definite answer.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - C/IO/Br2
1 cc - CIO

[illegible]

Mr Brown

Return to C/O for file P.6906

orig indexed 30 Jan

27 January 1953
(Haller)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO

FROM: Chief, PI/Plans/Cover

SUBJECT: Comments concerning Crusade for Europe

1. In December 1952 Mr. Reichhardt discussed with your division contact made by CC/C representatives with Mr. Buckner of General Motors in Detroit in regard to General Motors' contributions to the Crusade of Freedom. Mr. Buckner recently reported to CC/C the following information.

2. Suzanne LaFollette, Managing Editor of the Freeman Magazine, New York, recently wrote a letter to Mr. Jordan of General Carton Company, Battle Creek, Michigan, in which she criticized the Crusade for Freedom. She stated, among other things, that the promoters of the Crusade are a "bunch of micro liberals and do not know anything about reaching iron curtain countries".

3. The letter is reported to have been turned over to the Battle Creek newspaper, Enquirer, but its contents have not yet been published.

4. According to Mr. Buckner, LaFollette's comments have curtailed efforts to solicit funds for the Crusade and he fears that this type of information might reach other city groups.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
Security Information

22 January 1953

sent to DD/P 22 Jan

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Statements made by Robert Vogeler

1. Our friends in New York have informed us that Robert Vogeler gave a talk at the Women's Athletic Club in Chicago on 13 January 1953 on the subject of psychological warfare.

2. In the course of his address he reportedly referred to VOA as broadcasting nothing but [illegible] music, baseball scores and "junk." He [illegible] that [illegible] was an organization originally formed with private capital because of dissatisfaction with V.A. However, it ran out of money because the public failed to support it and a governmental loan was made which has enabled it to stay in business. Since then, [illegible] has become guilty of the same kind of poor programming that characterizes V.A.

3. Our friends are sending down a complete report of this speech. They feel that some sort of action should be taken to stop Robert Vogeler from continuing to make such remarks.

[illegible]
Chief, [illegible]/Radio

Duckie memo 13 Jan sent to
DNC, see Chrono.

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26 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Draft NCFF Policy Statement

1. Attached is a draft NCFF Policy Statement which has been reviewed and accepted by the Executive Committee of NCFF, but which was sent to us without the knowledge of Admiral Miller and therefore should probably not be commented on by you to any of our friends in New York unless you have also received a copy from another source. Admiral Miller probably intends to send us this statement after it has been approved by the Board of Directors.

2. You may wish to compare it with the old ice-box statement now in effect, also attached.

3. You may also wish to note Part I, paragraph 2 in which mention is made of government support. It is apparently the intent of NCFF to make this statement not an ice-box statement, but a public document and if so, I think you ought to make particularly certain that you approve this part of it.

4. Finally, I think you will want to note the general tenor of Part III. Perhaps I am quibbling, but it seems to me a trifle full-blown. I realize that NCFF is a separate government agency just under cabinet status, but this reads a little bit as though it were putting on the trappings of national sovereignty.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments
As stated.

CIO:TWB/mf
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee thru (CPP)
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - RI
1 cc - IO Brl

SECRET

For Bill Durkee

[illegible] 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting

1. Today the PRC approved $253,000 for the Crusade for Freedom, the money to be held in escrow and to be paid out on Frank Wisner's signature subsequent to an audit by a CIA auditor who will go over the Crusade's books and account to us for the reliability of the Crusade's estimate of $253,000 to wind up the affair this year.

2. PRC set aside the request for $300,000 for next year's campaign on the grounds that the Agency should first settle matters with the Heritage Foundation and start clean on a Heritage Foundation estimate.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

[illegible]

19[illegible]

4/7 Ef spent in April & they had [illegible] in hand, so we will spend this ~~total~~.

They now say they need 261 thousand more.

1951

expenditure 2,132,478 (79000)
receipts 2,011,221

1950

expenditure 117,000 ([illegible])
receipts 1,[illegible]000

[illegible]

TRANSMITTAL SLI

21 January 1953
DATE

TO:
Mr. Braden

BUILDING K
ROOM NO 1030

REMARKS:

Mr. Durkee asks "to have you ask Joan to tell Dorkis"

Trust you know what this means!

FROM:
IO/Tonic

BUILDING K
ROOM NO. 1402
EXTENSION 8080

FORM NO. 38-8
SEP 1946

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21 January 1953

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Per telephone conversation from Mr. Durkee on 21 January 1953, the following was stated:

"Returns are $600,000. These are returns in central banks. Other returns reported but not in central banks. This brings the total up close to $1,000,000. Twenty-one states have yet to report in."

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8 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Political and Psychological Warfare

SUBJECT: Additional Funds for the Crusade for Freedom

A. Funds requested for termination of 1952 campaign.

1. Admiral Miller has requested a sum of $261,108.92 for the 1952 Campaign of the Crusade for Freedom.

2. From April 1, 1952, the starting date of the 1952 campaign, the Crusade for Freedom has had available to it $550,760.81. Of this amount, a total of $106,232.81 was cash on hand as of April 1, 1952, and returns of cash from the field to headquarters after that date. $444,528.00 of this amount were CIA contributions to the 1952 Campaign. Actual expenses of the Crusade from April 1 through December 20, 1952, were $473,439.38. Available cash as of that date was $69,328.43. Expected additional expenses will be $330,437.35. Additional funds of $261,105.92 are thus requested. Not included in the figure of cash on hand as of December 20, 1952, are the funds in a payroll revolving account of $8,000. These funds can be deducted from the total requested if a decision is made that the present Crusade organization is to be terminated and transferred to the American Heritage Foundation.

3. Total expenditures of the 1952 Campaign will thus total $803,866.73. It should be noted that of this amount $35,928.66 was spent to clear up remaining 1951 Campaign expenses, leaving a net of $767,938.07 expended on the 1952 Campaign.

4. A comparison of the total cost of the 1951 Campaign with that of the Campaign conducted in 1952 clearly shows that the instructions of the PRC that the Crusade be scaled down in amount was complied with. Total expenditures during the 1951 Campaign were $1,932,475, while total expenditures this year will be $767,938.07. This year's expenditures are also less than those of the initial Campaign of 1950 when expenditures were $917,000. Receipts in 1950 were $1,317,000, while receipts in the 1951 Campaign were $2,011,221.94.

5. Detailed statements attached. (Tab A) (Note particularly item 3 which compares field expenses between 1951 and 1952 Campaigns)

B. 1953 Campaign.

1. Attached (Tab B) hereto are Admiral Miller's proposals for a 1953 Crusade Campaign. He has requested a sum of $830,000 for this purpose. This $830,000 is an addition to the sum requested above for the termination of the 1952 Campaign. In view of the request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency that the American Heritage Foundation take over and run the 1953

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Crusade Campaign, no action should be taken on Admiral Miller's proposals. However, it is recommended that a sum of $300,000 be made available for the remainder of the fiscal year 1953, to be drawn upon by the DD/P, to finance such activities as may be necessary to transfer the direction of the 1953 Crusade Campaign to the American Heritage Foundation and to prepare the beginnings of that Campaign.

2. Should the American Heritage Foundation decide against taking over the Crusade Campaign for 1953, the present Crusade organization will have to again be reexamined with policies and financing decided.

C. Recommendations.

1. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $253,108.92 be made available to the 1952 Crusade for Freedom for the remainder of fiscal year 1953.

2. That $300,000 be allotted to be used on the authority of the DDP in the transfer to, and start of a 1953 Campaign by the American Heritage Foundation in the fiscal year 1953.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECURITY INFORMATION

December 23, 1952

TAB A

SUMMARY OF FUNDS NEEDED

Total Cash Received		$550,767.81	
Less Payroll Revolving Account		8,000.00	$542,767.81
Expenses April 1, 1952 thru 12/20/52			473,439.38
Available Cash -			$ 69,328.43
1952 Field Budget		$247,585.00 (See #3 Tab A for breakdown)	
Spent - November	$6,203.60		
" - December	51,394.05		
Advances to Field	14,950.00		
		72,547.65	
1952 Field Commitment		$175,037.35	
Ad Council "		25,000.00	
Campaign Printing "		100,000.00	
Payroll last half of December Commitment		10,000.00	
Telephone Charge November "		1,700.00	
" " December "(estimated)		1,700.00	
Airline " November "		3,500.00	
" " December " "		3,500.00	
Miscellaneous Hdqs.Exp. " "		10,000.00	
		$330,437.35	$330,437.35
Funds Needed -			$261,108.92

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SECURITY INFORMATION

December 29, 1952

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM, INC.

ANALYSIS OF CASH RECEIPTS AND CASH DISBURSEMENTS

	RECEIPTS From 4/1/52 to 12/31/52				DISBURSEMENTS from 4/1/52 to 12/20/52				
	1848 Foundation	1951 Field Refunds And Advances	Misc.	Total	Total Paid By Months	1951 Field Expenses	Easy Baker	Special Budget	Advan-
Balance of cash on hand 4/1/52 - 87,371.55 8,000.00 Pay Roll a/c				95,371.55		(Included in total)			
April	-	1,179.80	1,046.32	2,226.12	24,921.49	2,069.96	2,794.33	437.00	
May	177,816.00	506.52	583.05	178,905.57	26,893.84	1,400.29	93.36		
June	-	27.28	858.52	885.30	29,978.70	4,694.99	146.03		
July	-	-	830.04	830.04	56,797.41	3,337.51	16,143.11		
August	133,362.00	68.79	906.84	134,337.63	39,094.47	105.59	4,406.89		
September	133,350.00	-	2,560.05	135,910.05	31,314.32	-	-		
October	-	-	746.52	746.52	56,632.89	18.70			
November	-	-	814.89	814.89	86,130.18	280.90			
December	-	-	739.64	739.64	121,676.08	-	-	-	
Total	444,528.00	1,782.39	9,085.87	550,767.81	473,439.38	11,907.96	23,583.72 437.00 $24,020.72	437.00	26,452.98

Munich sub Total

SUMMARY:

CASH on hand 4/1/52	95,371.55	
CASH Received 4/1 - 12/31/52	455,396.26	
Total		$550,767.81

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Security Information

December 10, 1952

FIELD EXPENSES

STATE	1951			1952		
	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL	FEES AND SALARIES	EXPENSES	TOTAL
ALABAMA	$ 562.00	$ 1,777.08	$ 2,339.08	$ 1000.	$ 750.	$ 1750.
ARIZONA	600.00	3,986.81	4,586.81	1000.	750.	1750.
ARKANSAS	555.00	7,392.55	7,947.55	1275.	1750.	3025.
CALIFORNIA, NO.	11,275.00	12,886.15	24,161.15	4000.	6000.	10000.
SO.	21,050.00	16,623.68	37,673.68	4000.	6000.	10000.
COLORADO	6000.00	14,085.87	20,085.87	2000.	4375.	6375.
CONNECTICUT	6,151.65	7,215.06	13,366.71	1000.	500.	1500.
DELAWARE	7,466.00	7,852.52	15,318.52	-	1000.	1000.
D.C., WASHINGTON	7,605.19	3,762.38	11,368.57	2550.	250.	2800.
FLORIDA	6,600.00	10,353.25	16,953.25	1000.	1725.	2725.
GEORGIA	6,200.00	6,139.53	12,339.53	800.	1700.	2500.
IDAHO	1,050.00	3,440.97	4,490.97	2000.	2000.	4000.
ILLINOIS	22,016.67	16,570.82	38,587.49	2500.	2500.	5000.
INDIANA	14,433.31	6,325.67	20,759.00	1000.	1000.	2000.
IOWA	2,425.80	7,004.31	9,430.11	750.	2000.	2750.
KANSAS	3,500.00	6,364.24	9,864.24	1000.	1500.	2500.
KENTUCKY	1200.00	13,715.88	14,915.88	1800.	2800.	4680.
LOUISIANA	2,000,00	4,980.12	6,980.12	-	1000.	1000.
MARYLAND	14,934.00	15,705.04	30,639.04	2800.	1000.	3800.
MAINE	2,822.78	3,549.73	6,372.51	1000.	1000.	2000.
MASSACHUSETTS	7,015.98	16,152.26	23,168.24	1880.	3200.	5080.
MICHIGAN	2,100.00	18,509.10	20,609.10	-	2000.	2000.
MINNESOTA	25,875.00	25,318.20	51,193.20	3700.	1600.	5300.
MISSISSIPPI	1,000.00	7,052.36	8,052.36	500.	2300.	2800.
MISSOURI	8,000.00	35,000.00	43,000.00	3300.	6700.	10000.
MONTANA	3,828.00	6,662.59	10,490.59	500.	500.	1000.
NEBRASKA	2,000.00	13,208.22	15,208.22	1200.	1800.	3000.
NEVADA	2,664.93	4,810.59	7,475.52	2300.	1300.	3600.
NEW ENGLAND	6,419.57	3,374.12	9,793.69	-	-	-
NEW HAMPSHIRE	883.30	2,749.94	3,633.24	500.	1000.	1500.
NEW JERSEY	6,199.97	11,819.74	18,019.71	2000.	2500.	4500.
NEW MEXICO	1,250.00	3,290.44	4,540.44	-	-	-
NEW YORK STATE	5,372.17	28,719.99	34,092.16	5000.	7500.	12,500.
NEW YORK CITY	38, 00.00	129,968.08	167,968.08	7500.	10,000.	17,500.

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STATE	1951 FEES & SALARIES	1951 EXPENSES	1951 TOTAL	1952 FEES & SALARIES	1952 EXPENSES	1952 TOTAL
NORTH CAROLINA	$ 4,255.00	$ 9,250.67	$ 13,505.67	$ 800	$ 1,550	$ 2,350
NORTH DAKOTA	780.38	2,881.17	3,661.55	-	2,000	2,000
OHIO	11,800.00	13,657.86	25,457.86	2,400	2,400	4,800
OKLAHOMA	3,250.00	3,928.49	7,178.49	2,000	2,000	4,000
OREGON	2,200.00	8,300.00	10,500.00	2,000	2,500	4,500
PENNSYLVANIA, EAST)-	8,375.00	40,601.49	48,976.49	6,000	8,000	14,000
" WEST)				4,000	4,000	8,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	4,229.17	6,368.21	10,597.38	2,000	1,400	3,400
SOUTH DAKOTA	860.00	1,123.67	1,983.67	1,000	1,000	2,000
TENNESSEE	700.00	15,808.09	16,508.09	3,600	4,250	7,850
TEXAS	14,200.00	18,470.76	32,670.76	10,000	26,750	36,750
RHODE ISLAND	2,206.54	7,330.52	9,537.06	500	2,500	3,000
UTAH	525.00	5,499.59	6,024.59	-	-	-
VERMONT	750.00	1,682.74	2,432.74	500	250	750
VIRGINIA	3,633.74	4,185.41	7,819.15	750	1,500	2,250
WASHINGTON	4,312.51	5,876.26	10,188.77	2,000	2,000	4,000
WEST VIRGINIA	2,000.00	2,455.73	4,455.73	1,000	500	1,500
WISCONSIN	5,000.00	7,322.53	12,322.53	1,200	3,800	5,000
WYOMING	1,773.84	2,729.70	4,503.54	-	-	-
WASHINGTON, D. C. (Federal Employees)	816.51	5,627.12	6,443.63		1,500	1,500
(MUNICH	10,555.52	1,898.89	12,454.41	-	-	-
(ENWOOD PLAN	6,796.73	7,062.48	13,859.21	-	-	-
TOTALS	$338,077.26	$648,478.69	$986,555.95	$99,605	$147,980	$247,585

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SE. PLAN OF ORGANIZATION
FOR CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM FOR 1953

On November 12, 1952, General Clay and Campaign Chairman Stassen wrote to state chairmen for the 1952 Crusade requesting their opinion and suggestions on the basis of continuing the Crusade throughout the year. Replies indicated unanimous agreement favoring a year-round educational program climaxed by a fund drive in the fall. Experience since this confirms this need.

This would require the development of a field organization on a modest scale to bring into the Crusade as many citizens as possible and to continue the influential leadership which was secured for the 1952 campaign. These objectives may be attained in two ways.

The first way is to secure at the national level the endorsement and cooperation of national groups in all fields of activity, with the ultimate idea of securing volunteer leadership on the state and local level.

The second way is to work directly in the state from the city and county level.

TAB B

We are presently staffed to carry out the method necessary in the first approach on the national level. However the second method requires a more concentrated effort. For organizational purposes the country should be divided into four regions with a national representative in charge of each region. This national representative should at all times be regarded as a member of the national staff delegated to be of service to the states within his region on a year-round basis. His functions generally are:

1. To interpret national policy to the state chairmen.

2. To facilitate the flow of material, news releases, etc., from the national office to the units within the various states.

3. To assist the state chairman in securing from the national office assistance of all kinds.

4. To aid the state chairman in perfecting his organization.

At the time of the campaign the various state chairmen would, with the counsel of the national representative, secure the assistance of individuals or agencies at the state level to carry on the intensive phase of the campaign effort, within budgetary limitations.

Experience in the field in voluntary organizations over the years indicates that this method of regional representation is effective and economical for the following reasons.

1. The national representative is the full-time employee of the organization, with a knowledge of the broad phases of the work of the organization. He is therefore equipped to interpret policy and exercise judgment as rapidly as required.

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2. As an employee of the national organization he is directly responsible to the national organization, and is by the fact under its control, and subject to its supervision within a general framework of action.

3. Working the year-round with state chairmen and state committees, the national representative is in an excellent position at campaign time to secure the type of temporary personnel and help that the chairmen and the state situation require.

TABLE OF PERSONNEL
CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

Executive Vice Chairman
    Secretary

Campaign Director
    Secretary
    Assistant to Campaign Director
    Clerk-Stenographer

National Representatives -- Headquarters in New York
- A. Labor, Veterans, Federal Employees
- B. New York City operation and special assignments
- C. Management Groups, Corporate Appeals and special assignments
    two stenographers

National Representatives -- in Field
Five National representatives will be assigned on a regional basis to work with state chairmen and state committees.

Assistant Treasurer's Office -- Accounting Department

Assistant Treasurer
    Secretary
    Chief Accountant
    Assistant Accountant
    Stenographer

Telephone Operator
Stock Clerk and Messenger

Publicity and Public Relations Director
    Secretary
    Assistant Director -- Features, Magazines, House Organs
    Stenographer

Director -- Speakers Bureau

Radio and TV Director
    Secretary

Director Women's and School Groups

National Representatives for assignment on a Regional Basis
- New England and Middle Atlantic (Out of New York Office -- 1 man)
- South [illegible])
- Midwest
- Far East

Munich Operation -- Public Relations
[illegible]

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1953 Budget

January	$55,000		
February	55,000		
March	45,000	1st Quarter	$145,000
April	45,000		
May	45,000		
June	50,000	2nd Quarter	140,000
July*	60,000	(*Printing $80,000)	
August	90,000		
September	110,000	3rd Quarter	260,000
October	100,000		
November	60,000		
December	45,000	4th Quarter	205,000
	$750,000		$750,000
July printing	80,000		80,000
TOTAL - 1953	$830,000		$830,000

It is requested that the budget be made available on a quarterly basis with a payment on January 1 of $145,000 to cover the first quarter; another payment on April 1 of $140,000 to cover the second quarter; a third payment on July 1 of $260,000 and the fourth on October 1 of $205,000.

In addition to this, it is requested that in order to keep all printing well in advance of the campaign $80,000 be made available on or about July 1.

1951 CONTRIBUTIONS

Alabama	$ 12,588.60
Arizona	5,399.38
Arkansas	22,161.19
California - North	58,699.21
" - South	75,872.71
Colorado	51,128.01
Connecticut	36,890.43
Delaware	2,464.06
Washington, D.C.	43,401.61
Florida	28,926.88
Georgia	44,874.21
Idaho	11,110.04
Indiana	46,000.13
Illinois - Chicago Area	57,649.81
" - Down State	29,448.26
Iowa	25,746.82
Kansas	27,837.48
Missouri	100,471.49
Kentucky	27,532.48
Louisiana	12,670.40
Maine	9,992.16
Maryland	23,960.69
Massachusetts	49,916.45
Michigan	103,698.49
Minnesota	67,494.44
Mississippi	10,548.27
Montana	15,289.51
Nebraska	8,764.06
Nevada	6,008.32
New Hampshire	9,172.44
New Jersey	57,489.56
New Mexico	21,042.03
North Carolina	38,563.78
North Dakota	8,739.73
Ohio	65,343.44
Oklahoma	37,293.71
Oregon	29,639.08
Pennsylvania	135,052.40
Rhode Island	14,867.15
South Carolina	24,738.02
South Dakota	1,564.89
Tennessee	44,118.99
Texas	75,729.70
Utah	15,227.07
Vermont	5,105.89
Virginia	31,243.18
Washington	17,347.66
West Virginia	8,375.58
Wisconsin	23,996.11
Wyoming	7,233.49
New York State	158,895.98
New York City (Metropolitan)	139,438.14
Alaska	80.00
Canada	15.77
Mexico	14.00
Anonymous	262.65
Misc.	11,938.05
	1,999,144.78
Munich (Contributions in European currency)	5,173.07
N.C.F.E. (Contributions received by N.C.F.E. and credited to Crusade)	6,912.09
TOTAL	$ 2,011,229.94

orig returned to Tonic

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SECURITY INFORMATION

January 20, 1953

Dear Beloun:

The following is submitted for consideration but without recommendation so far as the Fund's Board is concerned, since a question of basic policy is involved which can be determined only by the Corporation.

The Fund now occupies an entire building, except for the ground floor which contains two small stores and a moving picture theatre, under a sub-lease from the operator of the moving picture theatre. The Fund's sub-lease expires November 21, 1956 but the Fund has the option to cancel on November 21, 1954 on payment of an indemnity of $61,800. During the reconstruction of the building to fit it for Fund occupancy the Fund contributed roughly $160,000. to the cost of asphalt tile floors, acoustic tile ceilings on certain floors, fluorescent lighting fixtures, partitioning and air conditioning. The Fund's offices take up about 32,760 square feet so that disregarding leasehold improvements rent paid by the Fund of $123,760 per annum average $3.777 per square foot. The Fund has no right of renewal at the expiration of the five-year term.

The owner of the fee has recently placed the building on the market. The asking price is $1,250,000 compared with the assessed valuation of $1,150,000. The Fund's landlord is seeking a reduction in this assessment and we are informed has been granted a reduction in rent by the owner of the fee, justification therefor being the increased tax burden (the Fund's landlord's lease being a net lease) and the less than anticipated income from his moving picture theatre. The owner of the fee has rejected an offer of $900,000 in cash for the building.

In the opinion of the Fund's counsel the Fund, if it owned the building, would be exempt from New York City real estate taxes in respect of all the space occupied by the Fund, namely, the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh floors. An appropriate amount of the total valuation attributable to the two stores and moving picture theatre on the ground floor would be subject to taxation. 1952 real estate taxes amounted to $38,900.

The Fund's current rent of $3.777 per square foot is very low for air conditioned property in the desirable location where the Fund's offices now are. Should the present owner or an investment or speculative purchaser refuse to renew the Fund's lease in November 1956, without a substantial increase in rent, the Fund would, if it were still in operation on the present scale and if the New York real estate market is not depressed, be faced with either a greatly increased rent cost or

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SECURITY INFORMATION

the expense of moving to other less desirable quarters where the rent would probably also greatly exceed the present $3.777. Our difficulties in 1951 in this connection demonstrate the possible magnitude of that problem.

If it be true that the building, if owned by the Fund, would be exempt from real estate taxes (except for the commercially leased property which certainly could be leased for more than the tax cost) the operation of the building would cost the Fund considerably less than the present annual rental of $123,760. In the absence of a more careful study than it is possible to make without disclosing our possible interest in such a purchase the amount of that saving can be little better than guesswork. My guess is it should be between $50,000. and $75,000, allowing interest on the capital investment at a two per cent rate.

The question is whether the Fund should or should not attempt to purchase the building either to safeguard the right of continued occupancy or to effect the estimated saving in annual expense, or both. If the answer is in the affirmative, we shall see what can be done toward negotiating a satisfactory price and estimating in detail the probable annual saving and advise you further before any commitment is made so that you can approve or disapprove the entire deal. If there is a reasonable chance that you would approve, I suggest you take immediate steps to ear-mark the necessary funds so that if a satisfactory price can be agreed upon the transaction can be promptly concluded.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William

William L. Digby

Suspend

DD/P 1997

SECRET
Security Information

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Eastern European Division

SUBJECT : Arthur Maixner; young Czech political refugee recommended by Mr. Ortona of the Italian Embassy.

1. Attached hereto is a letter from Egidio Ortona of the Italian Embassy, who is recommending for our consideration the above-named individual who is said to be the son of Dr. Arthur Maixner, formerly the Minister Plenipotentiary of Czechoslovakia to the Vatican. Also attached is a brief curriculum vitae of Maixner.

2. It is rather unusual for a foreign diplomat, even though he be on good terms with officials of this Agency, to recommend personnel to us for our use, and under the circumstances I do not suppose that there would be any way in which you could make secure use of this young man even if you were to find him in other respects suitable. In other words, he is "blown" by the very fact of his having been recommended to us by a foreign diplomat. And I am also aware of the fact that this would be a good cheap way of effecting penetrations of the Agency were we to follow the practice of acting favorably on recommendations of this character. Nevertheless, there may be some aspect of this matter which would have significance to you or to Mr. Timm which I do not readily perceive, and accordingly I am passing this on to you and to Mr. Timm with this thought in mind. For example, there is a bare possibility that because of the contacts and connections of Maixner and his father, a former Czech diplomat, it might be possible to make use of him (on an arm's-length basis) in a program of defector solicitation.

WPD seeing Security on this man.

3. I am also furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden in view of the possibility that Maixner might be of some use to Radio Free Europe, assuming that the objection of his having been introduced to this Agency by Ortona could be overcome.

4. In any case, I should appreciate your suggesting a suitable reply to Mr. Ortona, bearing in mind the fact that he has been helpful to us in the past and does seem to be well disposed.

Harry Ris

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosures (2)
As specified.

cc: C/IO
C/FI
C/WE

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CPP

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. C/IO					Tom - I would definitely get this dope to Archie. Tracy [illegible]
2. Bill - did you show him this?					
3.				VD	
4.					
5. Return to C/IO file					
6.					
7.					No, it wasn't written at the time. I however explained verbally the Crusade & showed him examples of literature etc.
8.					
9.					
10.					Bill: Let's send it to him then. It's a good excuse for getting in touch with him again which I want to do. Can you draft a letter?
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					Please send white copy & return this form. [illegible]

attachment to Crusade memo.

TWB gave this to Henry Ford Jr (?)

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16-61150-1 ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

15 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers on NCFE and CFA

1. Before I send this memorandum to Messrs. Brophy, Ford et al., I want you to have a look at it for reasons we discussed on the telephone today. Please give me a quick reaction.

2. I am also enclosing a memorandum on CFA which is about what they would want to know.

3. These are the only copies I have left of these two memoranda and I must have them back.

TWB
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
TS 85308
TS 85340

[illegible] Secret

TOP SECRET [illegible]

~~35960~~

[illegible] 14 SEP 1976

SECRET

1 COPY OF 3 COPIES

NCFE has, from small beginnings, for purposes only generally defined, grown into a large institution organized as follows:

NCFE is a non-profit membership corporation, organized under the laws of New York State. Intimately associated with it are three separate corporations; the Crusade for Freedom (the fund raising and cover mechanism), the Free Europe University in Exile, and the Portuguese radio relay installation, Raret.

The Committee's major divisions, functions and budget for 1953 are as follows:

a. Division of General Administration - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $779,100

This is a headquarters administrative unit in NCFE's New York headquarters. It is not an over-all administrative unit, as each subdivision has its own administrative organization.

b. Division of Emigre Relations - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $1,[illegible]

The Division of Emigre Relations is the political center of NCFE. Through this Division, support is given to the various emigre organizations and to individual emigres.

In the past two years, this Division has attempted -- with conspicuous lack of success -- to create unified refugee groups. It is at present in the process of reviewing and revising its relations with individual emigres and emigre organizations. It is attempting to exercise closer financial control over those organizations and to develop a program using emigre groups and individuals in a way which will contribute more positively to psychological warfare efforts. This Division of NCFE is the most responsive to guidance.

c. Division of Intellectual Cooperation - Budget for Fiscal year 1953 - $[illegible]

The activities of this Division are principally directed to the building of intellectual resources which will ensure continuity with the past and which can be used when the satellite countries are liberated. The Division's activities consist of:

1. The East European Inquiry, an outgrowth and enlargement of the Danubian Inquiry, which was created by Woodrow Wilson in 1918. Its aim is to prepare basic materials in order to meet the minimum needs of those who will be charged with the reorganization of the Danubian area.

2. Other Studies of a miscellaneous nature useful to the other divisions of NCFE and to students of Central Europe.

3. Scholarships to American universities this year will be 80-85 to highly qualified exiles who have signed a pledge to return to their homelands after liberation.

4. Textbooks to replace Communist textbooks are being prepared in stockpile and manuscript form.

5. The Mid-European Law Project, which digests and annotates current legislation from the Iron Curtain countries.

6. The East European Accessions List, which publishes a monthly annotated bibliography of current published material from the satellites received in the Library of Congress.

d. Free Europe University in Exile - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $637,431

Two hundred exile students, all escapees, are provided with board and lodging at the University in Strasbourg. Each student attends the University of Strasbourg for his or her formal education. The Free University, in addition to providing board, lodging, and tuition, conducts courses and seminars dealing with the countries of origin of these exile escapees. The University operates on the theory that these young people are being equipped for future leadership after liberation.

e. Research and Publication Service - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $[illegible]

The Committee for Research and Publications was created in November 1951 to make available in currently useful form information about the satellite countries. It gathers information from four basic sources:

1. The analysis of 270 Communist newspapers and periodicals;

2. RFE's overseas information-gathering network;

3. Monitoring reports from all major satellite radio stations. The analysis of the 10,000 publications from the satellite area received annually by the Library of Congress. The compiled information is used in the following ways:

a) Within NCFE - Daily digest of all Iron Curtain information.
These are prepared for the use of RFE's
New York language desk;
b) Weekly trend meetings by RFE -- RPS desk heads to discuss the interpretation and use in radio programming of events in the Iron Curtain countries;

c) Research projects on specific targets for RFE's New York and Munich language desks. Daily monitoring highlights summarize major events in all satellite countries;

d) RFC also makes available its information files to the Divisions of Intellectual Cooperation and Emigre Relations;

e) A "Black Book" prepared every six months, contains communist attacks against NCFE-RFE;

f) To the general public - "News from Behind the Iron Curtain, a monthly magazine of source material about the target area, is issued to some 5,000 people in the field of communications. 142 research studies have been distributed outside the Committee to a total of 32,900 people. Foreign language bulletins in each of the major tongues of the satellite countries, are distributed to some 5,000 exiles in 52 countries outside the Soviet orbit. These bulletins, which average 100 pages each, are the only complete and unbiased source of information about their captive homelands available to those who have escaped.

f. Radio Free Europe - Budget for fiscal year 1953 - $2,324,555 NY, $5,909,991 Germany, $1,221,795 Paris

Radio Free Europe's main broadcasting studio and equipment is located in Munich, Germany. Broadcasting facilities are maintained also in New York and there is a relay station in Portugal. RFE broadcasts an average of about 1,026 hours per week. Of this broadcasting time 187¼ hours are original programming, directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York. New York exercises policy control over RFE broadcasts through daily guidances and a tele-type system between Munich and New York.

Radio Free Europe has its own information section to provide its broadcast materials. It has correspondents and offices in London, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Salsburg, Vienna, Linz (Austria), Wels (Austria), Graz (Austria), Rome, Trieste, Athens and Istanbul. These offices produce an average of over one thousand reports per month. In addition, material for broadcasting comes from: 1) satellite press publications; 2) RFE's monitoring service of satellite and Russian broadcasts; 3) information from the Division of Emigre Relations, private letters, news service, the BBC, VOA and others.

II

The foregoing is a cursory outline of NCFE and a brief record of our attempts to solve administrative problems. To complete the picture, the following is a brief outline of the major psychological problems we face with NCFE.

NCFE is not what it should be -- an integral and balanced part of the total U.S. program for dealing with the satellite nations of Eastern Europe. The top officials of NCFE have no detailed comprehension of U.S. policy, nor any understanding of how they can contribute to its development and operation. They give only lip service to the idea of obtaining policy guidance from Washington. Their apparent attitude has been that they can make a trip to Washington, determine what "high policy" is, and return to New York with the job done. This push-button mentality, added to their deep-seated suspicion of Government interference, has lead them to resist our efforts to study their role and to develop new ideas, or reassess old ones.

As a result of these attitudes, there has been considerable difficulty in gaining information about NCFE activities, problems and plans. For example, we do not receive any regular communication from Admiral H.B. Miller; we have received no list of NCFE personnel, nor any minutes of meetings of the Staff Executive Committee, or the Board of Directors. Even more important than this is the fact that the heads of divisions are prevented from having contact with us, except on occasions when Admiral Miller is out of town. As a result, for instance, Mr. Lang, the head of RFE, who has considerable problems and is anxious for the fullest liaison, is prevented from dealing with us personally. Conversely, every attempt to deal with NCFE personnel individually is looked upon with suspicion and carried on by NCFE personnel with some apprehension. The reasons for Admiral Miller's attitude are two-fold: (a) In his organization he wants everything done through him; and (b) He does not wish any outside "control" over his activities. (Admiral Miller's manner of conducting affairs within the Committee is resented by Mr. Spencer Phenix and other members of the Board of Directors, but Mr. Phenix and NCFE Directors support Admiral Miller in his reluctance to deal outside the Board.

This lack of consultation and common study has clear reflections in the organizations itself. NCFE is not an integrated organization. Each division operates separately, without any real relation to other divisions. Added to this, the lack of a clear understanding of the Committee's purposes and of its place in the total psychological warfare efforts of the United States has led to real dissatisfaction among the Division heads. They are anxious to know what they are doing, to integrate their own efforts and to cooperate to the maximum.

To formulate our own and NCFE's ideas, we have been and are carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NCFE. In some of these discussions, Mr. Francis B. Stevens of the State Department, has been a direct participant.

These discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects which can generally be described as follows:

(1) What is NCFE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellite nations? What is American policy? What modifications are likely?

(2) How can NCFE, especially the Division of Emigre Relations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain, but in the Free World? For example - How can NCFE securely engage in further activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Slave Labor Hearings and the International Red Cross Meetings at Toronto?

(3) Should NCFE continue to support emigre councils, or should some other technique be developed which can enable it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological warfare purposes?

(4) How can the Research and Publications Division, the Division of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University best contribute to these efforts?

(5) Is NCFE efficiently organized? What, for example, is the effect of the Division of Emigre Relations' dealings with emigres on the position of RFE in Europe, etc?

(6) How can we give specific guidance to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and British legations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?

III

There are, in addition, some specific current problems that should be mentioned. They are:

(1) RFE's position in Germany. The position of Radio Free Europe in Germany is becoming increasingly difficult. The political situation in Germany has developed so that the German expellees, numbering some 9,000,000 votes, have joined with the extreme nationalist elements, some of whom are non-German extremists, such as Slovak Separatists. This groups holds a potential possible balance of power between the CDU and the SPD. As a result, both parties, but particularly the SPD, are becoming more vociferously nationalistic. RFE, as an American operation in Germany, including the Voice of America, will be the subject of pressure. RFE is most vulnerable of all because of its Eastern European personnel and the nature of its broadcasts. RFE's problems are the subject of careful study at the present time by NCFE, and others.

Should RFE be forced out of Germany -- its facilities in Portugal can be expanded to take over the job. Programming can be moved to London and Paris. In addition, RFE has asked us to consider the feasibility of their locating a station in Turkey to enable them to program full time with a strong signal into Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.

(2) Crusade for Freedom. The Crusade for Freedom, the fund raising cover mechanism of NCFE and CFA, is pretty much out of hand. It is operated as a separate corporation and the responsible officials of NCFE, except Admiral Miller, have literally washed their hands of any attempt to control or direct its activities. As a result, it has become a high pressure, fund-raising outfit which has little comprehension of the reasons for its existence or knowledge of the kind of publicity which should be undertaken. Among the working personnel of NCFE, it is looked upon with great skepticism and much apprehension. The single strength of the Crusade for Freedom is the fact that it does raise money from individual Americans, not much money, but still some 23,000,000 Americans have contributed. This fact is a powerful weapon. For example, Adenauer's party, the Bundestag, in defending RFE from attacks by the SPD, cites as one of its main arguments the support and concern of 23,000,000 Americans that this activity be continued.

Immediate attention is being given to having the Crusade conducted next year by the Heritage Foundation. Mr. C. M. Vandeburg of that organization has stated he would take on the job.

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

1950 CAMPAIGN

1. The Crusade was launched by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on a nation wide broadcast.

2. The symbol of the Crusade, a ten ton World Freedom Bell, inscribed with a quotation from Lincoln, "This World under God shall have a new birth of freedom", toured the United States from coast to coast. The "Freedom Bell" was sent to Berlin to become part of a "Freedom Shrine", and tolled there over an international radio hookup.

3. Freedom Scrolls signed by 15,000,000 contributors were taken to Berlin to become a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine.

4. In the United States, local committees were established throughout the country. General Lucius Clay was appointed chairman of the Fund raising campaign of the Crusade for Freedom. Mr. Abbott Washburn, Chief, Public Relations for General Foods Corp. was appointed as the director. Assisting companies were: Fund raising - John Price Co., Inc. - Advertising - Hewitt, Ogilvy, Benson & Mather Inc. Small mass contributions were solicited. Contributions from large individual donors were solicited later, in order to afford the fund raising campaign a broader continuity. Literature (samples attached) of all kinds, explaining Radio Free Europe were distributed.

5. Financial results were as follows:

Expenses;	$917,000.00
Contributions;	$1,317,000.00

1951 CAMPAIGN

The 1951 Crusade Campaign was begun by the launching of balloons into Czechoslovakia and Poland containing pamphlets of encouragement to the people of these countries. Copies of the message and samples of the balloons were used to solicit contributions in the United States. Publicity dealt largely with Radio Free Europe. Free magazine advertising was widely used for the first time. A coast to coast telethon was used.

Inadvertently, through mistakes of the staff and the failure to adequately brief community leaders, the Crusade mistakenly implied that the Voice of America was ineffective -- that only Radio Free Europe, the privately supported radio broadcasting station, could do an effective job.

After conferences with the State Department, it was agreed that VOA and RFE were complimentary activities and that in the future the Crusade:

(1) Would not put out anything which might be interpreted as a criticism of the Voice. To that end, an attached leaflet was inserted as an insert in the January 1952 "Crusader", a newsletter which was sent out to the 8,000 regional chairman of the Crusade for Freedom. It was intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organisations with the facts about the Voice of America and to offset any criticism or unfortunate comparison between Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America.

Financial results were as follows:

Expenses;	$1,932,478
Contributions;	$2,011,229.94

1952 CAMPAIGN

The 1952 Crusade Campaign was begun by General Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson and Henry Ford, II, the 1952 Campaign Chairman. The Campaign was endorsed in a letter from President Truman:

> "I understand that on the success of the 1952 Crusade rests the plans of the Crusade for Freedom to build more radio stations in Free Europe and Asia. If this can be done, and I believe that it will be done, the Free world can more effectively get the truth behind the Iron Curtain.
>
> "It is essential that the people everywhere know that we are working for peace, freedom and prosperity for all mankind."

The assistance of the Advertising Council was enlisted and for the first time outdoor billboard advertising was used. Records were made containing 2 fifteen minute programs on "The RFE story" and spot films were arranged for television with narration by Henry Fonda.

For the first time, fund raising letters seeking large contributions were sent to all leading corporations.

The Campaign was highly organised on the local level with state chairmen in almost every state. The Post Office Department permitted the use of a local post office address for receipts. Endorsements were obtained from many organisations such as the American Legion, VFW, CIO, National Auto. Dealers, American Brewers Foundation, and Catholic War Veterans etc. For fund raising purposes on a mass scale — a freedomgram to be signed by contributors has been distributed. These freedomgrams, translated into six languages will be broadcast over Radio Free Europe.

SECRET
Security Information

13 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STAFF

SUBJECT: Request by the Directors of NCFE for a statement from the responsible officer in CIA that NCFE has no responsibility of any kind for the initiation of, nor for the payments in respect to radio equipment known as the MB-50.

1. The enclosed letter, is as you suggested, drafted for the signature of Mr. Tracy Barnes, which when signed, should be transmitted to this Office for New York's attention.

2. Two versions have been prepared. Both should be signed, the sterilized version will be sent to New York, the unsterilized original will be retained in our files.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachments:
As stated above

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Executive Registry
3-0221

Mr Helms

Please speak to me about this

12 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

FROM : Chief, International Organizations

You may wish to speak to the Director about the fact that Charles Moore, a very close friend of mine who is Director of Public Relations for the Ford Motor Company, called me last week to suggest that his boss, Henry Ford, would like to be asked to become President of the Heritage Foundation.

I think this lays to rest any fears we may have had of Mr. Ford's (in reality Mr. Moore's) criticism of the Crusade for Freedom leading to Mr. Ford's becoming inactive on our behalf.

The Director might wish to call Mr. Ford and ask him to become President if it is feasible for Mr. McCloy to become Chairman of the Board. In discretion, the Director may not wish to mention to Mr. Ford the message passed to me by Mr. Moore.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF FACTS ON RADIO FREE EUROPE

Radio Free Europe (RFE) was established as a separate division of NCFE when the latter was incorporated on May 17, 1949. RFE has been on the air since mid-July 1950. At the close of 1950, RFE broadcasts were totaling 7½ hours daily, programs of 1½ hours each being addressed to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The total cost of this earliest period, from 17 May 1949 to 30 June 1950, was $[illegible]237.87, operating and capital costs being roughly even. The next year was to see these same costs rise in the same ratio - capital to operating - to a total of $4,958,895.23.

Today, RFE broadcasts to all the above mentioned countries, with the addition of Albania, at a weekly total rate of 1066 hours, of which 190 hours are original programming - some [illegible]% of the total free world broadcast hours directed at the Orbit. The original program broadcasts are directed mainly to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Broadcasts to Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania are prepared and relayed from New York.

The estimated expenditures of RFE for the fiscal year 1953 are capital $2,981,120, operating expenses, $9,596,160 [illegible], for a total of $12,577,280. Estimated operating expenses (only) of [illegible] for the same period are $21,616,300. A summary of RFE expenditures to date is as follows:

	Capital	Operating	Total
For Period 17 May 49 to 30 June 50	$ 296,[illegible]	$ 2[illegible]	$ 551,[illegible].87
For Period 1 July 50 to 30 June 51	2,461,038.[illegible]	2,497,[illegible]	4,958,895.23
For Period 1 July 51 to 30 June 52	2,77[illegible],[illegible]10.66	6,561,227.41	9,340,0[illegible].07
For Period 1 July 52 to 30 June 53	2,981,1[illegible]	9,[illegible]	12,577,280.00
TOTALS TO INCLUDE 30 JUNE 1953	$8,496,[illegible]	$18,9[illegible]	$27,497,1[illegible]3.17

RFE INSTALLATIONS

RFE's principal installations are its main broadcasting station and production equipment, located in Munich, Germany; broadcasting facilities maintained in New York City and the major relay center at Lisbon, Portugal.

In Germany, transmitters are in operation at Holzkirchen and Biblis, while monitoring, recording and receiving functions are at Schleissheim and Loosburg. In Portugal, the 50 and 100 kw [illegible] transmitting complex is at Gloria, while receiving/monitoring facilities and production/editing are at Maxoqueira and Lisbon, respectively.

Original capital investment in Germany as of 30 June 1950 amounted to $ ~~[illegible]~~ $198,193.10. Original capital, for Portugal as of 30 June 1950

SECRET

was in the amount of $ ~~[illegible]~~ $549,908.56

INVENTORIES OF FIXED ASSETS (At Cost):

	TOTAL	NEW YORK	GERMANY	PORTUGAL
Acquired:				
Prior to July 1, 1952	$3,113,305.28	$316,511.20	$1,561,982.26	$1,234,811.82
Current Fiscal Year	1,034,937.80	97,909.29	261,727.89	675,300.62
	$4,148,243.08	$414,420.49	$1,823,710.15	$1,910,112.44

Breakdown of revised 1952 budget as it applies to New York, Munich and Lisbon offices follows:

	Capital	Operating	Total
New York	$ 158,000.00	$2,405,044.00	$2,563,044.00
Lisbon	768,261.00	1,232,696.00	2,000,957.00
Munich	2,054,859.00	5,958,420.00	8,013,279.00
Total	$2,981,120.00	$9,596,160.00	$12,577,280.00

CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM

RFE is in part supported by the Crusade for Freedom, a major fund-raising mechanism. From September 4, 1950 to date, the Crusade has been responsible for some 4½ million dollars in contributions to NCFE and RFE. Expenditures for the Crusade, over the same period, amounted to some 2 3/4 millions. All monies raised, above expenditures, or a total of 1 3/4 millions have been spent directly and solely on RFE's capital installations, i.e., transmitters, receivers, supporting equipment.

PERSONNEL

RFE in July 1950 employed 177, of whom 118 were Americans, 24 of whom were employed in Germany. At present, RFE has a total staff of 1778, of whom 252 are American. In New York, the policy and administrative headquarters, the staff number 195. In Munich, which is the programming headquarters, there are 1249 employees. At Lisbon, the technical relay headquarters, there are now 334 individuals. These figures include only staff employees on the regular payroll.

14-00000

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[illegible]
SECURITY INFORMATION

MAJOR RFE CONTRIBUTIONS

RFE is a major instrument in total U.S. political and psychological warfare efforts directed at Central and Eastern Europe. It has contributed in the following ways:

RFE made an intensive campaign of Stalin's death and linked this event with the death of Gottwald and the illness of Pieck. During the intensive period of the Stalin story, RFE was on the air 24 hours with all its 21 transmitters on a single frequency, which was switched continuously from country to country. It beat all Western press agencies by 2½ hours in announcing Gottwald's illness and is usually about 2 hours ahead of VOA and BBC in announcing events of major importance.

Radio Free Europe was the first to inform the Agency of the recent riots in Pilsen, the reshuffle of the Hungarian Communist Government, etc.

RFE has contributed in the launching of two balloon operations: one in the summer of 1951, when barrages of balloons were hurled at Czechoslovakia and Poland, another on 14 July 1953, when thousands of balloons were launched into Czechoslovakia.

RFE is an effective machinery through which the U.S. Government can work unofficially as cannot be done through VOA or RIAS.

RFE gives hope to those behind the Iron Curtain and its broadcasts have provided incentives to escape: e.g. escape of two Polish pilots, Freedom Train.

Interrogation of refugees and escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. Escapees often prefer to go to RFE reception center rather than more official U.S. outfits. Interrogation reports are of immense value to intelligence and to formulation of U.S. policy.

RFE guidances: Highly intelligent analyses of current situations and lines to be followed in broadcasts. Of extreme value to U.S. Government.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a non-governmental private Committee or as a CIA-financed institution?

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

2. Bob Lang, Bill Durkee and Mr. Wadsworth, former Ambassador to Turkey, as well as the NE Division have all been in on discussions as to how NCFE should approach the Turks. Mr. Wadsworth counsels that all cards be laid on the table, and he bases his reasoning on his belief that the Turks will know about it anyhow and that RFE is likely to get further if it comes clean. The NE Division on the other hand hopes that the approach can be that of a private committee and that no mention need be made of CIA's interest.

3. Your advice on the above question will not constitute approval of the building of a Turkish station or of operations from Turkey. By PRC decision at the last hearing on NCFE's budget these questions in Turkey must be brought back here for approval if the attitude of the Turks is favorable.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: PSYCH WARFARE GENERAL:
COUNTRY CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: FEBRUARY 1973-74

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

No.

FROM: (Headquarters component)
C/LA/AB/C

TO:
C/IP/DMS

TO: (Station/Base)
Santiago, Chile

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

FROM: (Division)
C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS, AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE
☒ SUBJECT ☐ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER
015	126	003

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)
Psych Warfare General

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION
☐ OPEN FILE
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE
☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐ REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION
☐ RETAIN
☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
015

FILES ACTION

9.
☐ HOLD IN CS FILES
☐ RESTRICTED
☒ UNRESTRICTED
☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER
☐ CHANGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. #778

EFFECTIVE DATE

12. COORDINATION
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL
REQUEST APPROVED BY

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP 052237Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 618080

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DISSEM BY: 3C

TO: CARACAS, GUAYAQUIL, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, BUENOS AIRES, QUITO INFO SANTIAGO, LIMA. Y

VWNUMBER MHSPAWN Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30693 (IN 404604) (BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEEES) Y

1. REF BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES IS REPORT 31 OCT ANNOUNCEMENT BY GENERAL PINOCHET DECLARING FREEDOM OF PRESS IN CHILE. SUGGEST RATHER THAN REPLAYING EL MERCURIO ARTICLE TRANSCRIBED IN REF YOU USE THAT MERELY AS BASIS FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT. PINOCHET'S STATEMENT PUTS EMPHASIS ON CONTENTION THAT PRESS COENSORSHIP EHAS NOT EXISTED IN CHILE UNDER JUNTA NOR DOES IT NOW. THAT ARGUMENT UNFORTUNATELY WILL HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE CHILE SO RECOMMEND EDITORIAL COMMENT EMPHASIZE THESE POINTS: Y

A. CHILEAN PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED THERE WILL BE NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP IN CHILE. Y

B. PINOCHET DECLARED THAT JUNTA IS WAIVING PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF PRESS DESPITE FACT THAT STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN CHILE. Y

C. JUNTA ACTION APPEARS REEFLECT CONFIDENCE ESS IN ITS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN STABILITY OF POLITICAL SITUATION. Y

DATE:
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~~[illegible] GIVEN APPARENT CONTRAST OF THIS GESTURE OF CONFIDENCE WITH PERU'S CONFISCATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED PRESS TWO MONTHS AGO~~

4

2. BUENOS AIRES: CAN NTTHRIFTY-1 ARRANGE PICK UP FOR ANSA WIRE? Y

3. GUAYAQUIL, QUITO: SUGGEST YOU HAVE PJVANDYKE-1 OR PJNETWORK-1 TIME THEIR COMMENTS TO COINCIDE WITH OAS MEETING. Y

4. FILE: 200-120-356. E-2 IMPDET.

DATE: 5 NOVEMBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

AC/LA
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TO: SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT VUNUNGER Y

REF: SANTIAGO 30589 |IN 393383| Y

1. YOUR OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM THOSE COS. GIVEN NO NEED MAKE RADICAL CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE SUGGEST GOC BE INFLUENCED TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT DECLARING THAT JUNTA HAS RESTORED CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EXTENT THAT PRIOR CENSORSHIP OF PRESS NO LONGER DEEMED NECESSARY. TO GUIDE THE WARY AT HOME SPOKESMAN MIGHT ADD, LAWS GOVERNING CRIMINAL LIBEL WILL CONTINUE TO BE ENFORCED. Y

2. FOR FULL IMPACT, OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE IDLE FOR GOC TO ARGUE THAT UP TO THIS POINT THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP. FEEL STATUS QUO ANTE SHOULD BE IGNORED AND EMPHASIS PLACED ON FACT THAT CONDITIONS NOW SUCH THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED CONDITION OF PRESS FREEDOM CAN OBTAIN. Y

3. FILE: 200-120-356.H

Psych file

DATE: 21 OCT 74
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE:MK
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

C/LA/SB~~/CH~~

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LAWRENCE C. LASER
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DATE-TIME GROUP: 191616Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 611750 y7

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CT-4

TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO SANTIAGO, ROME. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

REF: LONDON 54017 |IN 390115| Y

1. ACCORDING AP RELEASE DATELINED MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER, SOVIETS HAVE DENIED VALIDITY OF STORY THAT RED CROSS EMPLOYEE IN CHILE TO NEGOTIATE PRISONER EXCHANGE. WISH USE THIS DENIAL AS PEG REVIEW PREVIOUS SOVIET PRISONER EXCHANGES {ABBEL COMES TO MIND} WHICH ALSO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN STRICT SECRECY AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT CORVALAN AND OTHERS KNOW THAT WOULD MAKE THEM SO IMPORTANT TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT. BELIEVE ROBERT MOSS, IF HE STILL HAS ACCESS TO LONDON MEDIA, WOULD BE GOOD CHOICE WRITE SUCH ARTICLE BECAUSE OF HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CHILE AND ABILITY USE HIS BACKGROUND FOR SPECULATION ON KINDS OF INFORMATION CORVALAN HAS THAT COULD EMBARRASS SOVIETS. CAN MENTION SOVIET CLANDESTINE FUNDING ALLENDE'S ELECTIONS, TACTICAL ■■■■■ PCCH ALLIANCE WITH SOCIALISTS, CUBAN AND SOVIET AID TO ARMED PCCH UNIONS, LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL PCCH PUTSCH TO OVERTHROW ALLENDE. Y

A. BUENOS AIRES TELAM {IN SPANISH} REPORTED 17 OCT THAT RED CROSS ENVOY IS DENIS FELDMEYER AND THAT HE CARRIED TO CHILE SOVIET

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UNION'S ACCEPTANCE OF CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JUNTA WHEREBY THE SOVIET UNION MUST FREE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS FREED BY CHILE. WHEN BRUNO DOPPLER, INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE IN CHILE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FELDMEYER'S MISSION, HE DENIED THAT HE WAS ON THAT TYPE OF MISSION. BUT LATER WHEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT FELDMEYER CARRIED WITH HIM THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, HE ANSWERED, "THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. THE CHILEAN AUTHORITIES ARE THE OBNES TO CONFIRM IT." Y

B. AP, MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER: "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DENOUNCED AS 'A FORGERY' A CHILEAN NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO RELEASE SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR RELEASE OF IMPRISONED LEFTISTS IN CHILE. Y

"SERGEI BULANTSEV, A COMMENTATOR FOR THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY TASS SAID THURSDAY THE LA SEGUNDA STORY HAD BEEN 'CONCOCTED' BY FASCIST-MINDED GENERALS' WHO SEEK TO DIVERT WORLD ATTENTION FROM THE ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE.' Y

"GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET, CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILE, SAID CHILE WOULD LIBERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA

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AGREED TO LIBERATE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF THEIR PRISONERS. Y

"DESPITE DOCUMENTED CHARGES BY INTERNATIONAL BGROUPS AND DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION THAT PERSONS ARE PRBOSBECUTED HERE FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MOSCOW INSISTS THAT THERE ARE NO POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION." Y

2. PLS CABLE TEXT ARTICLE TO HQS FOR REPLAY. Y

4. FILE: DEFER. E-2 IMPDET./

EUR/BC

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15-126-3

DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: MARTIN MILLER
UNIT: LA/CA
EXT: 9011

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IN 392115

TOR:171812Z OCT 74

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S E C R E T 171537Z OCT 74 OCT 74 STAFF

CITE LONDON 54017

TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG

REF A. DIRECTOR 604965) 15-126-3

B. DIRECTO 609942

1. REUTERS STORY DATELINED SANTIAGO IN 17 OCTOBER "TIMES" IS HEADLINED "RUSSIA RESPONDING TO CHILE CALL TO FREE PRISONERS." HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED NUMBER OF TOP POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA, INFORMED SOURCES SAID TODAY.

"A RED CROSS EMMISSARY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TONIGHT FROM GENEVA WITH A LIST OF 100 CHILEAN PRISONERS THE RUSSIANS WANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN TO ITS OWN DETAINEES, THE SOURCES SAID. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF THE REPORT FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT OR RED CROSS OFFICIALS."

ARTICLE RECOUNTS PINOCHET CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW AND HAVANA AND

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IN 390115

T 499138 E1A362 PAGE 02

LOND 54017

TOR1172312Z OCT 74

POINTS OUT CHILE HAS SINCE FREED MORE THAN 300 DETAINEES WITH "UNTIL NOW, NO APPARENT RESPONSE." ALSO ADDS LUIS CORVALEN LEADS THE KREMLIN LIST.

2. APART FROM NEW DIMENSION ADDED TO REF PROPOSALS BY ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AI) COULD BE INDUCED TO TAKE UP ISSUE. AS NOTED REF AI HAS VERY PRESCRIBED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES WHICH IT USES TO HANDLE, VIA A CHAIN OF INDIVIDUAL SPONSORS, INDIVIDUAL CASES. WHILE THEY MAY OCCASIONALLY USE PUBLICITY IF ALL ELSE FAILS THEY BASICALLY REGARD IT AS A DISTINCT INHIBITION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR BEHIND THE SCENES PERSON TO PERSON TECHNIQUE. AI'S POSITION ON THE CHILEAN CHALLENGE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY ITS HAVING ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACCEPTED A MOSCOW CHAPTER DESPITE THE STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF ITS KEY LEADERS. SINCE OUR ASSETS WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN FORCING THIS ISSUE THEY ARE NOT IN A SECURE POSITION TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ONE ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE EXTREME UNPOPULARITY OF THE OVERALL CHILE STORY.

3. WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME FORM OF MEDIA PLACEMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH REF GOALS BUT WE HAVE TO ESTIMATE THAT CHANCES OF ANY OF OUR ASSETS BEING ABLE TO

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TOR:171812Z OCT 74 LOND 54017

CATALYZE ANY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY BY GROUPS WHOSE VOICE WOULD COUNT ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND WOULD INVOLVE MORE RISKS THAN THE ODDS WOULD PROBABLY JUSTIFY. WE HAVE BROUGHT SCHWERSON'S ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PARA ONE STORY. HE NOTED THAT AI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY VOTED IN NEW AND TO SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMBERSHIP. ALTHOUGH NEW COMPOSITON COMMITTEE MAY IN LONG RUN BE LESS INCLINED TO AVOID ACTION WHICH PUTS PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, SUCH ISSUES PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN AI IN VIEW NEWNESS COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL COMMITTEE SHAKES DOWN. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

4. FILE DEFERM E2 IMPDET

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TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

REF: DIRECTOR 604965 Y

1. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO DEFLOWER AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS OUTLINED. WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER ANTI-8KHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA ~~IN RELATION~~ CONNECTED WITH TO TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. Y

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15-126-3

15 Oct 74

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DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974

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UNIT: LA/CA

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TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y

1. INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF CHILEAN JUNTA AND MORE RECENTLY OF BKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. HQS BELIEVES EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. Y

2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO NUMEROUS GROUPS IN EUROPE BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH A NEUTRAL SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO RELEASE IMPORTANT CHILEAN

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CONF: INFO: FILE

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COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES INCLUDING THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS, YET BE LESS TROUBLED BY THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS. SECOND, THE OFFER IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO BRING DIRECT PRESSURE ON THE USSR TO RELEASE SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. FINALLY, THE OFFER SHOULD ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS ON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT, PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALMOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SPECTRUM. Y

3. ~~[illegible]~~ SUGGEST ROME APPROACH DEFLOWER TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN GET HIS GROUP INTERESTED IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED FROM CHILEAN JUNTA ON EXCHANGE BASIS. PERHAPS IF HE CAN PICTURE HIMSELF AS SAVING THE PRISONERS (COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSR) FROM A FASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE HAND AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE EXCHANGE. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE HAVE

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DEFLOWER DEVELOP MAXIMUM EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITIES THAT THE EXCHANGE OFFERS AND MAXIMUM PUBLICITY OF HIS EFFORTS. Y

4. FOR LONDON: REQUEST STATION SEEK MEANS OF INTERESTING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IN SOME ASPECT OF THE EXCHANGE IDEA. WHILE AMNESTY OPS SOMETIMES VERY QUIETLY PURSUED, PUBLICITY IS IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE. PERHAPS LINKING SPECIFIC PRISONERS FOR EXCHANGE MIGHT CAPTURE PUBLIC IMAGINATION. Y

5. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.

for C/WH/4

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DATE: 27 SEPTEMBER 1974
ORIG: MARTIN MILLER
UNIT: WH/CA
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TO: SANTIAGO INFO CARACAS. Y

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: CARACAS 25759 (IN 385788) Y

1. RECOMMEND YOU CONSIDER ENLISTING SUITABLE VUNUMBER ASSET TO PERSUADE JUNTA TO RELAX ITS RESTRICTIONS ON FREE PRESS. OBJECTIVES OF SUCH MOVE WOULD BE THESE: Y

A. DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT PINOCHET GOVT FIRMLY IN POWER IN CHILE AND THAT IT FUNCTIONS NOW WITH AT LEAST TACIT CONSENT OF MAJORITY OF CHILEANS;

B. GIVE SUBSTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION OF JUNTA'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND THEREBY DEFUSE ONE OF MORE EXPLSOIVE GRIEVANCES OF WORLD PRESS AGAINST CHILE REGIME. Y

2. TO AVOID APPEARING TO CAPITULATE TO PRESSURE FROM CUBANS PER REF, SUGGEST CHILEAN MOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT FOLLOW UPON CRITICISM EMANATING FROM CUBAN DOMINATED JOURNALISTS CONFERENCE IN CARACAS. GESTURE, IF ADDRESSED TO ANYONE, SHOULD BE MADE TO IAPA TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONALLB PRESTIGE THSAT [illegible] ORGANIZATION AND THEREBY TO REINFORCE ITS [illegible] HOSTILE

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REGIMES, WHERE FREE PRESS REMAINS PROSCRIBED. Y

3. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS. E-2 IMPDET.A

DATE: 15 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
EXT: 1553

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1. FOLLOWING IS ANOTHER, APPARENTLY WELL-RESEARCHED ARTICLE BY DAVID F. BELNAP ON EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN CHILE UNDER ALLENDE WHICH APPEARED IN LOS ANGELES TIMES ON 27 SEPT 74. SUGGEST YOU PASS FOLLOWING EXCERPTS TO LIAISON AND AGEENTS OF INFLUENCE FOR BACKGROUND. NOTE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE MERELY REHASH ALLEGED CIA COVERT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PRESS AND PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO ALLENDE REGIME. THEIR REITERATION NOT PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE IN THIS CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT REACTION THIS DATE WHEN USED. Y

ABRIDGED TEXT FOLLOWS: Y

A NO SER POR EL EXAGERADO VOLUMEN DEL VERBAL QUE CARACTERIZO LA ACTUACION DE LOS DOS BANDOS EN EL LARGO Y ENCONADO

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ENFRENTAMIENTO CHILENO, LOS ATAQUES LANZADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR CONTRA SUS ENEMIGOS EN LA POLITICA Y EN LOS MEDIOS DE DIFUSION RARAS VECES SE LLEVARON A CABO FRONTAL O ABIERTAMENTE. CASI SIEMPRE FUERON DE CARACTER ECONOMICO. Y EN LO TOCANTE A LOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS, CASI NUNCA SE LLEGO, POR EJEMPLO, AL EXTREMO DE LA CENSURA DIRECTA. Y

LA PRENSA OPOSICIONISTA PUDO ESCRIBIR Y DECIR LO QUE LE PARECIO DURANTE LOS CASI TRES ANOS QUE EL ALLENDISMO SE MANTUVO EN EL PODER. LA DUDA SIEMPRE FUE SI DICHOS MEDIOS LOGRARIAN O NO SOBREVIVIR ECONOMICAMENTE Y SEGUIR MANIFESTANDO SU CRITERIO. Y

SOLO TRES MESES DESPUES DE HABER ASUMIDO ALLENDE LA PRESIDENCIA, LA PRENSA ESCRITA OBTUVO UN PRESAGIO DE LO QUE PODRIA SUCEDERLE AL MONOPOLIZAR EL GOBIERNO LA IMPRESION DE REVISTAS Y LIBROS EN EL PAIS. ESTO SE CONSUMO MEDIANTE LA ADQUISICION DE UNA FIRMA EDITORBIAL QUE HABIA SIDO DEBILITADA PREVIAMENTE POR UNA PROLONGADA HUELGA DIRIGIDA POR LOS COMUNISTAS, Y POR UN ARBITRAJE EN EL QUE ACTUO COMO MEDIADOR OTRO COMUNISTA, CUYO FALLO COLOCO A LA EMPRESA AL BBORDE DE LA QUIEBRA. Y

ASIMISMO, LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, QUE SIEMPRE HAN SIDO UN

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INSTRUMENTO POLITICO IMPORTANTE EN CHILE, TUVIERON UN INDICIO DE LO QUE LES AGUARDABA, INCLUSO ANTES DE LA TOMA DE POSESION DEL NUEVO PRESIDENTE. LOS PERITOS EN COMUNICACIONES DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA LES INDICARON QUE EFECTUARAN REBAJAS EN SU PERSONAL INFORMATIVO PARA DARLES CABIDA A LOS PERIODISTAS MARXISTAS DESIGNADOS POR EL PARTIDO, SO PENA DE PERDER MAS TARDE SUS LICENCIAS PARA TRANSMITIR. Y

~~EN CHILE-- EL GOBIERNO (EL ANUNCIANTE PRINCIPAL)~~ BAJO LA FERULA ALLENDISTA, LAS ENTIDADES ESTATALES-- Y LAS INDUSTRIAS PRIVADAS, A MEDIDA QUE IBAN CAYENDO EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO-- LE DABAN PUBLICIDAD UNICAMENTE A AQUELLOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS QUE PERTENECIAN A LA UNIDAD POPULAR O QUE APOYABAN AL REGIMEN. ENTRE ESTOS FIGURABABN, EN EL MOMENTO DE DESPLOMARSE EL ALLENDISMO, APROXIMADAMENTE LA MITAD DE LAS RADIOEMISORAS DEL PAIS (UNA DE LAS CUALES, LA MAYOR, ERA PROPIEDAD DE SALVADOR ALLENDE) Y CINCO DE LOS ONCE PERIODICOS DIARIOS QUE SE PUBLICABAN EN ESTA CAPITAL. Y

LA TELEVISION COMERCIAL CHILEBNA ESTA TOTALMENTE SOSTENBIDA POR EL ESTADO O POR EL SECTOR UNIVERSITARIO, DE MODO QUE NO DEPENDE POR COMPLETO DE LA PUBLICIDAD PARA SUBSISTIR. POR ANADIDURA, DURANTE UNA

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GRAN PARTE DE LA GESTION PRESIDENCIAL DE ALLENDE CASI TODA LA TELEVISION DE CHILE ESTABA CONTROLADA POR LOS MARXISTAS O POR SUS SIMPATIZANTES. ESTA SITUACION CAMBIO SOLO CUANDO LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE SANTIAGO LE ARRANCO EL DOMINIO DE SU CANAL DE TV A LOS ALLENDISTAS Y SE UNIO A LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE VALPARAISO EN UN ESFUERZO POR LLEVARLE UNA PROGRAMACION NO-MARXISTA A TODA LA CIUDADANIA, UTILIZANDO ESTACIONES DE RELEVO DE MICROONDA DE ELABORACION CASERA. TRUNFARON EN ESTE EMPENO EN UNA MEDIDA ASOMBROSA MIENTRAS SALVABAN LOS OBSTACULOS DE TODO TIPO, AUN FISICOS, QUE EL REGIMEN LES INTERPONIA PARA IMPEDIRSELO. Y

EL MERCURIO, EL PERIODICO MAS GRANDE DEL PAIS, HABIA PERDIDO EL SESENTA PORCIENTO DE SU VOLUMEN PUBLICITARIO NORMAL A MEDIADOS DE 1971, Y CUALQUIER ESTACION RADIAL CORRIENTE, NO AFILIADA A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, PROMEDIABA UN OCHENTA PORCIENTO DE PERDIDAS SEMEJANTES. Y

ESTA EROSION PUBLICITARIA CONTINUO HACIENDO ESTRAGOS A MEDIDA QUE LAS PEQUENAS EMPRESAS INDEPENDIENTES FUERON SUSPENDIENDO SUS ANUNCIOS AL IRSE AGOTANDO SUS EXISTENCIAS DE MERCANCIAS O AL SOBREPASAR POR MUCHO LA DEMANDA A LOS ABSTECIMIENTOS DISPONSIBLES.

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Y A LO LARGO DE TODO ESTE PERIODO ELEVABANSE CONJUNTAMENTE LOS COSTOS DE PUBLICACION Y TRANSMISION, IMPELIDOS POR LA INFLACION DE DOS CIFRAS QUE ARRASABA AL PAIS Y QUE ASCENDIO A TRES A PARTIR DE 1972. Y

LAS AUTORIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES NEGABAN ENTRETANTO TODAS LAS SOLICITUDES DE LICENCIA PARA IMPORTAR PIEZAS DE REPUESTO Y EQUIPOS DE REEMPLAZO PARA LAS PLANTAS QUE SE DETERIORABAN, Y EN EL CASO DE LAS RADIOEMISORAS, DE ELEMENTOS TAN ESENCIALES COMO SON LAS UNIDADES GRABADORAS Y LAS CINTAS MAGNETOFONICAS. Y

EN CUANTO A EL MERCURIO Y A MUCHAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, LOS SINDICATOS MANEJADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR TRATABAN DE INVENTAR PRETEXTOS PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO PROCEDIERA A ADUENARSE DE SUS EMPRESAS RECTORAS. LA DE EL MERCURIO, QUE PUBLICA TRES ROTATIVOS DIARIOS EN ESTA CAPITAL Y OTROS CINCO EN DISTINTAS PARTES DE LA NACION, FUE OBJETO DE INVESTIGACIONES FISCALES, DE ACUSACIONES DE NEGOCIAR ILEGALMENTE EN DIVISAS Y DE INSULTOS PERSONALMENTE LANZADOS CONTRA ELLA POR ALLENDE. Y

PERO EL ESFUERZO MAS VIGOROSO QUE REALIZARA EL REGIMEN PARA TRATAR DE MANIPULAR A LA PRENSA ESCRITA OPOSICIONISTA FUE LAS

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INCESANTES TENTATIVAS DE APODERARSE DE LA UNICA ENTIDAD PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE, PROVEEDORA DE PAPEL PERIODICO PARA TODAS LAS PUBLICACIONES NO PERTENECIENTES A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, ASI COMO TAMBIEN PARA LAS QUE SEGUIAN LOS DICTAMENES DE LA COALICION GOBERNANTE. Y

EL GOBIERNO TRATO PRIMERO DE ADQUIRIR LA MAYORIA DE LAS ACCIONES DE LA EMPRESA, COMPRANDOSELAS A SUS 16,000 ACCIONISTAS. LUEGO INTENTO PERSUADIR AL CONGRESO PARA QUE ESTABLECIERA UN MONOPOLIO ESTATAL SOBRE EL PAPEL PERIODICO, Y FINALMENTE ENSAYO LA ELABORACION DE UN PRETEXTO PARA DECRETAR LA EXPROPIACION DE LA COMPANIA, TACTICA QUE HABIA FUNCIONADO CON OTRAS INDUSTRIAS. Y

UNA VEZ FRACASADAS TODAS ESTAS INICIATIVAS, EMPRENDIOSE LA DEL ASEDIO ECONOMICO. NO SE MITIGARON LOS CONTROLES DE PRECIOS IMPUESTOS A LOS ARTICULOS DE PAPEL PARA MANTENER EL EQUILIBRIO ALTERADO POR EL ALZA DE LOS COSTOS DE PRODUCCION. ELLO HIZO QUE LA FIRMA PAPELERA DECLARA UNA PERDIDA DE 9,100,000 DOLARES DURANTE LOS DOCE MESES QUE FINALIZARON EL 30 DE JUNIO DE 1972, PERDIDAS QUE AUMENTARON A UN RITMO DE 120,000 DOLARES DIARIOS MAS TARDE EN ESE MISMO ANO. Y

SEGUN MANIFESTARON LOS SINDICATOS DE LA PROPIA EMPRESA, LA

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AUTORIZACION PARAB SUBIR LOS PRECIOS CONCEDIDA POR EL REGIMEN EN OCTUBRE DE 1972 PROPORCIONO MENOS DE LA MITAD DEL ALIVIO ECONOMICO QUE SE NECESITABA. Y

POR OTRA PARTE, AL COMENZAR EL ANO 1972, LA SITUACION DE LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO NO-ALLENDISTAS ERA DESEPERADA. DOS VECES DURANTE ESE ANO EL CONGRESO APROBO UN IMPUESTO ESPECIAL PARA AYUDAR A COSTEAR TODAS LAS EMISORAS, VETANDO AMBAS INICIATIVAS EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA. Y

EN SEPTIEMBRE, DESPUES DEL SEGUNDO DE EBSTOS VETOS, PARECIA QUE LAS CUATRO ESTACIONES MAS IMPORTANTES DE ESTA CAPITAL NO ADSCRITAS A LA UNIDAD BPOPULAR SUCUMBIRIAN. NO OBSTANTE ESTO, SOBREVIVIERON Y FORMARON PARTE DE UNA RED VOLUNTARIA DE EMISORAS APODADA "CADENA DEMOCRATICA," LA CUAL LE BRINDO A LA OPOSICION ABNTIALLENDIBSTA UNA TRIBUNA DE EXPRESION PARA COMPETIR CON EL FRENTE DE ESTACIONES ORGANIZADO SIMILARMENTE POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR A TRAVES DE TODA LA NACION. Y

SALVARONSE IGUALMENTE LA EMPRESA PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE Y EL MERCURIO. TAMBIEN ESCAPARON CON VIDA EL DIARIO LA PRENSA,

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ADQUIRIDO POR INTERESES DEMOCRATACRISTIANOS DESPUES DE LA ELECCION DE ALLENDE PERO ANTES DE SU TOMA DE POSESION, Y EL ROTATIVO TRIBUNA, FUNDADO POR EL PARTIDO NACIONAL EN LOS COMIENZOS DE LA PRESIDENCIA ALLENDISTA. ES DE PRESUMIRSE QUE AMBOS ORGANOS OBTUVIERAN RESPALDO ECONOMICO DE SUS PARTIDOS RESPECTIVOS O A TRAVES DE ELLOS, YA QUE NINGUNO DE LOS DOS PUBLICABA MUCHOS ANUNCIOS. (TANTO LA PRENSA COMO TRIBUNA FUERON CLAUSURADOS POR LA JUNTA QUE DESALOJO DEL PODER A ALLENDE, COMO PARTE DE SU DECISION DE DECLARAR EN "RECESO" A LA POLITICA.) Y

LA UNIDAD POPULAR EMPLEO TAMBIEN LAS TECNICAS DE HOSTIGAMIENTO ECONOMICO Y DE DIVIDIR PARA CONQUISTAR CONTRA LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE OPOSICION, DIEZMANDO CON ESTA ULTIMA TECTICA AL TRADICIONAL PARTIDO RADICAL CHILENO, Y ESFORZANDOSE POR HACER ZOZOBRAR AL PARTIDO NACIONAL, DE TENDENCIA DERECHISTA, DESTRUYENDO EL PODERIO ECONOMICO DE SUS ELEMENTOS PRINCIPALES. Y

COMO EN CHILE LA LEY NO EXIGE QUE SE DE CUENTA DEL APOYO ECONOMICO DESTINADO A LA POLITICA, RESULTA DIFICIL AVERIGUAR COMO SE DESENVOLVIERON ECONOMICAMENTE BAJO EL ALLENDISMO LOS PARTIDOS EN SI. Y

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EN LA ESFERA POLITICA, EL OBJETIVO PRIMORDIAL DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR ER■A EL PARTIDO DOMOCRAT■A-CRISTIANO, EL MAS GRANDE DE TODOS LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE LA NACION. DE LAS SEIS AGRUPACIONES INTEGRANTES DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS CUMUNISTAS SOBRE TODO SE PERCATARON DE LO ESENCIAL QUE RESULTABA PARA ESTABILIZAR AL GOBIERNO MINORITARIO DE ESA COALICION GANARSE EL APOYO DE LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA, O SI NO DIVIDIRLA. Y

PERO A NO SER POR LA PEQUENA FRAGMENTACION OCURRIDA POCOS DIAS DESPUES DE LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES DE 1970, LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS MANTUVIERON INTACTA SU UNIDAD, EVOLUCIONANDO GRADUALMENTE DE UNA POSICION DE ADVERSARIOS L■EALES DEL GOBIERNO A OTRA DE ■■■ OPOSICION IRREDUCTIBLE. Y

TRATANDO DE RESCATAR A ■ALLENDE, CUYO PROPIO PARTIDO SOCIALISTA, DE FILIACION MARXISTA, REPRESENTABA EL MAS NUTRIDO DE LOS ELEMENTOS IRRACIONALES QUE CONFORMABAN LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS COMUNISTAS LLEGARON INCLUSO A PEDIRLE AYUDA A LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, ROGANDOLE QUE MEDIARA CON LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA PARA CONTRIBUIR A APUNTALAR AL REGIMEN CUANDO ESTE SE VENIA ABAJO. Y

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MAS ERA YA DEMASIADO TARDE. HACIA MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SALVADOR ALLENDE HABIA SELLADO SU SUERTE CON LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS, AL FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES HICIERA A CAMBIO DE LOS VOTOS QUE NECESITABA PARA QUE EL CONGRESO DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURA, Y AL CONFESARLE CINICAMENTE AL INTELECTUAL SOCIALISTA FRANCES REGIS DEBRAY EN UNA ENTREVISTA QUE HABIA FORMULADO ESAS PROMESAS EXCLUSIVAMENTE PARA ASEGURAR SU NOMBRAMIENTO COMO PRESIDENTE. Y

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1. "WATERGATE" A COMMON PHENOMENON IN USSR. ("NY TIMES," 9 OCTOBER). SOVIET HISTORIAN AND POLITICAL DISSIDENT ROY MEDVEDEV HAS CHARGED SOVIET PRESS WITH SUPPRESSING NEWS ABOUT WATERGATE "BECAUSE REGIME FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOW INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, FREE PRESS AND ELECTED LEGISLATIVE BODIES CAN RESTRAIN EXECUTIVE POWER...WATERGATE-TYPE ABUSES ARE COMMON IN USSR, BUT SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS SECURELY SHIELDED NOT ONLY FROM FALSE CHARGES BUT ALSO FROM LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OF REAL ABUSES OF POWER...FOR EXAMPLE...ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY PROSECUTOR IN GEORGIAN REPUBLIC TO GET PERMISSION TO SEARCH APARTMENT AND INTERROGATE FAMILY OF REPUBLIC'S

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FORMER LEADER MZHAVANADZE, WHO WAS TOPPLED IN SEPTEMBER 1972 AMID CHARGES OF WHOLESALE CORRUPTION AND GRAFT THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS RULE...ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THIS TYPE OF INVESTIGATION, HIGHER PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD NOT PERMIT IT."Y

2. EAST GERMANS REAFFIRM SEPARATION FROM WEST ON 25TH ANNIVERSARY. JOHN GOSHKO WRITES IN "WASHINGTON POST" OF 8 OCTOBER THAT EAST GERMANY'S "NEW SENSE OF ASSERTIVENESS" WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: "THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED TROOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP...SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS...HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF BERLIN...IN PROTEST, 12 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY, REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN... EAST GERMAN STANDARD OF LIVING WHICH HIGHEST IN SOVIET BLOC IS STILL THIRTY PERCENT BELOW THAT OF ...WEST GERMANY...DESPITE LIVING STANDARDS EAST GERMANY IS ~~[illegible]~~ ONE OF MOST CLOSED SOCIETIES IN SOVIET BLOC -- MORE REGIMENTED IN

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MANY WAYS THAN SOVIET UNION ITSELF...EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OWES ITS PRESENT SUCCESS TO BERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL ALONG ITS 860-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY."Y

3. EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES. CAIRO, 29 SEPTEMBER. WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHBAR AL-YOM REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED TO CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN-BUILT TU-154 JET AIRLINERS, CITING "NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS" IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES DURING TRAINING FLIGHT 10 JULY, KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET CREWMEN. EXACT CAUSE OF ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED. NEWSPAPER SAID EGYPTIAN AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRM, "FAVIA", FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF $7.5 MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE $47.5 MILLION DEAL.Y

4. NO CUBAN/SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE. NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF 011 SEPTEMBER TO

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RELEASE SAME NUMBER OF PRISONERS AS CHILE WAS RELEASING. PINOCHET ALSO SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CHILEAN EMBASSIES ARE RECEIVING HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS, AND THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. HE ALSO REVEALED HE WOULD RECBEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF UKRAINIANS-IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR.Y

5. EDITORIAL IN MEXICO CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY, "LA PRENSA," 25 SEPTEMBER, ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN AMERICA. "...THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO MANY DASTARDLY CRIBMES IN OUR COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY. KGB HAS ESTABLISHED BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES, MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS, WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES OF A RED DICTATORSHIP. ...THE KGB SHOULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS

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OF SPIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT OUR HEMISPHERE..." Y

85B

6. IPU COUNCIL RECOGNIZES REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM. TOKYO NEWSPAPERS OF 2 OCTOBER REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON OPENING OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL MEETING AND SAID HEBATED DEBATE TOOK PLACE IN FIRST SESSION OVER SEATING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION. "MAINICHI" STORY SAID SOVIETS AND RUMANIANS IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGED "QUALIFICATIONS" OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND DEMANDED THAT LATTER BE EXPELLBED FROM CONFERENCE AND THAT PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) BE SEATED IN THEIR PLACE. "MAINICHI" SAID THAT ROLL CALL VOTE WAS HELD, AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SELECTED "BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITY" TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE. EDITORIAL IN "ASAHI" SAID THAT BITTER CONTROVERSIES WOULD ARISE AT THIS SESSION OF IPU, WHICH HAS MORE THAN SIXTY NATIONS PARTICIPATING, INCLUDING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA. BUT THAT "IT IS...SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS OF WORLD EXCHANGE UNRESERVED OPINIONS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS." Y

7. CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS APPEAL FOR HELP AGAINST COMMUNIST ATROCITIES. PHNOM PENH, 27 SEPTEMBER (SAIGON POST): "TWO MOSLEM ORGANIZATIONS IN CAMBODIA, SPEAKING FOR ALMOST A MILLION KHMER MOSLEMS, HAVE

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APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO CAMBODIA FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE ■'INFERNO' CREATED BY INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, WHENEVER COMMUNISTS CAPTURED A VILLAGE, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEM FAITH WERE MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE GROUND. THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLED; THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS. TO HELP DEFEND THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPREDATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE, NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES, AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS BEGGED FELLOW M■OSLEMS ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA."Y

8. IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 9-12 SEPTEMBER {TEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL}: TWO OF TEHRAN'S LEADING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOW NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAD MARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED THE~~IR~~ ATHLETES' BEHAVIOR. ONE REPORT CARRIED HEADLINE, "WHENEVER THERE'S TROUBLE, THERE'S A NORTH KOREAN." AFTER BSB

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NORTH KOREAN OLYMPIC SILVER MEDALIST BOXER LOST BOUT, NORTH KOREAN COACHES, MANAGER AND NEWSMEN ATTACKED INDONESIAN REFEREE, THEN ENGAGED IN BATTLE WITH POLICE AT MOHAMMED REZA SHAH STADIUM. RULES COMMITTEE UPHELD DECISION ON BOUT, THEN CENSURED NORTH KOREAN PROTESTERS FOR PUNCHING JUDGES AND BREAKING FURNITURE. SIX TRUCKLOADS OF POLICE WERE NEEDED TO RESTORE ORDER. NORTH KOREAN FENCING AND SOCCER TEAMS REFUSED TO COMPETE AGAINST ISRAELIS, AND BOTH MEN'S AND WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEAMS REFUSED TO PLAY SOUTH KOREANS. WHEN NORTH KOREA'S VOLLEYBALL PLAYERS DID CONSENT TO TAKE ON SOUTH KOREAN TEAM, NEWSMEN CONCLUDED NORTH KOREANS HAD AGREED ONLY BECAUSE THERE WAS TO BE A NET BETWEEN THEM! MOST SENSATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE CONCERNED NORTH KOREAN WEIGHTLIFTER WHO, STRIPPED OF HIS THREE AWARDS WHEN DRUG TESTS PROVED POSITIVE, OBJECTED VIOLENTLY AND REFUSED TO RETURN GOLD MEDALS. E2 IMPDET.d

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24 TO: BOGOTA, INFO SANTIAGO. Y

RYBAT VUNUMBER Y

REF: A. BOGOTA 24797 (IN 369247)

B. DIRECTOR 604965 Y

1. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE IN BRIEFING PJFIFTYONE RE PRISONER EXCHANGE PROPOSAL: IS TEXT SANTIAGO [redacted] CABLE 6009, 2 OCT: Y

EMBASSY (IN 558640)

"1. RECENT PUBLIC LETTER TO CARDINAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING RELEASE OF JURI GRIGOVIEVICH PRONIN, CURRENTLY DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE, A CHILEAN CITIZEN NAMED MARIA ELIANA E. DE PRONIN, WAS GIVEN PROOMINENT LOCAL PRESS COVERAGE SEPT 26. TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL TONE, APPEALING TO CADRDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN POLITICAL DETAINEES." CONTINUING, DETAINEEB'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES AN AUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "WHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED THE DETAINEES OF THE LEFT," COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO RELEASE HER HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968, AND HUSBAND SINCE AUGUST 1968 DETAINED IN UJTA CAMP FOR HAVING TRIED TO

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LEAVE USSR ILLEGALLY. Y

"2. CARDINAL RESPONDED PUBLIC (OCT 1) IN FORM OF LETTER TO CONSERVATIVE "EL MERCURIO," REITERATING HIS INTENTION TO USE ALL HIS STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER," REGARDLESS OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS." IN RESPONSE, CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE ON DETAINEE'S BEHALF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. Y

¶3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE, AND PERHAPS REQUEST ITSELF, IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSMENT OF CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE, AND FOR HIS SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND GOC BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU (EL MERCURIO) THAT THE CARDINAL'S REQUESTS TO AUTHORITIES, EVENTHOSE WITH MORE INTIMATE TIES TO HIM, ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL RECEIVED." Y

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ORIG: E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT: C/LA/CA
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T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 01 IN 362715

TOR:171642Z SEP 74 SAGO 30338

S E C R E T 171544Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 32338

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REF: SANTIAGO 32318 (IN 361362)

1. IN FEATURED EDITORIAL CAPTIONED "KENNEDY ON THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" EL MERCURIO OF 16 SEPTEMBER DESCRIBES REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECOND (LUGARTENIENTE) OF SENATOR KENNEDY. EL MERCURIO OUTLINES OBJECTIVES OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS AS: A) TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF (SENATOR) KENNEDY; B) TO CONTINUE THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM HEADS AND HAS GREATLY INFILTRATED THE ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL CIRCLES SUPPORTING KENNEDY; C) DIRECT FIRE AT THE CHILEAN DAILY WHOSE PUBLICATIONS AND OPINIONS SEEM TO HAVE THE STRONGEST IMPACT INTERNATIONALLY.

2. EL MERCURIO FURTHER COMMENTS THAT HARRINGTON ATTACK IS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHILE (SIC) AND DIRECTLY CONNECTS WITH WORLD-WIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN "TO STRANGLE OUR GOVERNMENT EVEN AT THE COST OF (CAUSING) HUNGER FOR

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T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 02 IN 362715

TOR:171640Z SEP 74 SAGO 30338

THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA."

3. AFTER TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES BY DENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY "UNCONFESSABLE" INCOME IN ITS HISTORY. EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBJECT TO MOST THOROUGH AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT ANYONE BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITEIES. THEREFORE, EL MERCURIO REJECTS "WITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR. KENNEDY AND FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK IS THE FRUIT OF JOURNALISTIC IRRESPONSIBILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHO IS STOPPED SINCE SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN HIS AMBITIONS BY THE MORAL EXAMINATION

~~PAGE 2 SANTIAGO 30338 S E C R E T~~

OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY".

4. PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS ON CHILE FROM HIS 16 SEPTEMBER NEWS CONFERENCE WERE CARRIED IN FULL BY "EL MERCURIO" UNDER FRONT PAGE HEADLING "FORD: U.S. HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE." THERE WAS NO EDITORIAL COMMENT IN "EL MERCURIO" AND NO NEWS OR EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN "LA TERCERA".

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T 422494 EIA951 PAGE 03-03 IN 362715
TOR:1716402 SEP 74 SAGO 30338

MRS. ALLENDE'S ATTACK AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS CARRIED IN "LA TERCERA" BUT NOT IN "EL MERCURIO".

5. IN TAKING THE EXAGGERATED POSITION IT HAS ON THE REVELTIONS, EL MERCURIO HAS LEFT ITSELF VULNERABLE TO BEING EMBARRASSED AND CONTRADICTED BY STATEMENTS (SUCH AS THE PRESIDENT'S) THAT ARE MORE ACCURATE PRESENTATIONS OF WHAT WENT ON IN CHILE PRE-COUP. EL MERCURIO MAY WELL HAVE TAKNE THIS POSITION BECAUSE, BESIDES THEIR RIGHT-WING VIEWS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT IS GENUINELY IGNORANT OF THE FUNDING THAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-2 WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. FUBRIG-2 WHO SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER, HAS TOLD COS THAT NO ONE CURRENTLY AT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUNDING. EVEN CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIZ DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS BUT HAD SUSPICION ABOUT INFUSION OF FUNDS THAT TOOK PLACE IN U.P. ERA. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION THROUGH FUBRIG-2.

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T 419128 , EIA568 / PAGE 01

IN 361362

TOR:1615362 SEP 74

SAGO 30318

S E C R E T 161510Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 30318

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 30293 (IN 358699)

B. SANTIAGO EMBASSY 5628 (#41039)

1. "EL MERCURIO" OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1974 DEVOTED ENTIRE PAGE 29 TO HARRINGTON REVELATIONS ABOUT CIA FUNDING IN CHILE UNDER HEADLINE "KENNEDY PLAN AGAINST EL MERCURIO". COVERAGE INCLUDED COMPLETE TEXT OF HARRINGTON LETTER TO MR. THOMAS MORGAN AND REPRINTS OF SEYMOUR HERSCH ARTICLE FROM "NEW YORK TIMES" AND AP DISPATCH FROM "WASHINGTON STAR", LATTER IDENTIFYING "EL MERCURIO" AS CHILEAN NEWSPAPER ALLEGEDLY RECEIVING FUNDS FROM CIA. ALSO INCLUDED A 13 SEPTEMBER AP ITEM DATE LINED WASHINGTON QUOTING DIRECTOR COLBY THAT "CIA WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY COUP".

2. DO NOT KNOW REASONS THT MOTIVATED "EL MERCURIO" TO PUBLISH EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS. SPECULATE THEY DECIDED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE TO ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE DAMAGING NATURE OF THE MATERIAL AGAINST "EL

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TOR:161536Z SEP 74 SAGO 30318

MERCURIO" ITSELF. THE HEADLINE AND A SHORT EDITORIAL COMMENT INTRODUCING ABOVE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS "NEW AND GROTESQUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" AND ATTEMPTS TO TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON CLOSELY TO SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (WHO HAS SINCE THE COUP BEEN UNDER STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN CHILE). "EL MERUCIRO" MAKES CONNECTION WITH RECENT REVELATIONS ~~BE~~ by REP. HARRINGTON BY "EL MERCURIO" reprint OF ~~AN~~ ARTICLE FROM "MC CALLS" WHICH DEALT WITH CHAPPAQUIDICK IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

3. "EL MERCURIO" RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT OF RAISING MORE QUESTIONS HERE THAN IT ANSWERS. THIS INCREASED PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSIBLY SCRUTINY OF STATION ASSETS INVOLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKET-1 WAS QUESTIOND BY NEWSWEEK REPORTER HERE ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDING. FUPOCKET-1 DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY FUNDING FROM FOREIGN SOURCES. DETAILS FOLL SEPARATE CABLE.

4. REQUEST HQS KEEP STATION UP-TO-DATE ON ANY PLANS OR CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION OF REVELATIONS.

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TOR:161536Z SEP 74 SAGO 30318

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7-71 MFG. 3/74

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T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 01 IN 358699

TOR:121806Z SEP 74 SAGO 30293

S E C R E T 121711Z SEP 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 30293

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 595482

B. SANTIAGO 30253 (IN 354910)

1. FOLLOWING STATION AGENTS WERE CONTACTED, PERIOD 8-10 SEPTEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS. THEIR COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW.

2. FUERMINE-1 CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE MENTIONED. COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD SINCE IT COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH EDUARDO FREI'S ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE. FUERMINE-1 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED. HE IS TRAVELING TO GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION INSTITUTE (WEST GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS). DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL CHECK HIS NUMBERED ACCOUNT FOR THE ARRIVAL OF RECENT FUNDS. IN VIEW OF REF DEVELOPMENTS, HE

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T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 02 IN 358697

TOR:1218062 SEP 74 SAGO 30293

DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONIES INTO CHILE. HE RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET WITH FREI 15 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-1 EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO.

2. FUBRIG-2 RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PREV 0ENT SUCH LEAKS. HE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL NOT BE EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY). FUBRIG-1 THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND MOST UNACCEPTABLE.

4. FUERMINE-5 ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABOUT REVELATION OF $9,000 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS. WHILE SHAKING HIS HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICITY, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM A PROBLEM.

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T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 03 IN 358699

TOR:1218062 SEP 74 SAGO 30293

CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM PROPER IDENTIFICATION. SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS HANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY $4,000 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET RATE (AS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE PDC OF THIS FUNDING.

5. FUPOCKET-1 WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF $25,000 FOR PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER. WAS VISIBLY DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEOPLE NEED TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP KNEW THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL. HE REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A SOCIALIST AND UNLIKELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.

6. ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN-1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET

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ACTION #			3	6

T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 04 IN 358699

TOR:1216062 SEP 74 SAGO 32293

DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET BUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAIN-1'S PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE A DU~~ZY~~ME THING TO DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUBAEGAIN-1, HE SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF USG INCOMPREHENSION OF GOC. SAID HE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO STATES AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS COULD PARTIALLY UNDERSTAND CURRENT U.S.G. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. SAID MOST JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AND CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S. FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE THE IMPORTANT SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.

7. ACCORDING TO FUBARGAIN-1, MOST CHILEAN OFFICERS VIEW THE REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY A SECTOR OF U.S.G. (ALBEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH) TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALLENDE. OFFICERS HAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE U.S. FOOT-DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE

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T 411313 EIA140 PAGE 05-05 IN 358699

TOR:121806Z SEP 74 SAGO 30293

AGAINST PERU AND U.S. FAILURE NOT ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACTUALLY TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECOMING INCREASINGLY BAFFELED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE.

8. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET

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Pretty — For Psych Pol

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN ALLENDE'S CHILE

HIGHLIGHTS

-- Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government propaganda apparatus has mounted a coordinated campaign against the opposition communications media focusing on the prestigious El Mercurio newspaper chain and key opposition radios. The long-range goal is to create conditions that will insure Government control over the media so that an emasculated opposition will operate intuitively and through self-censorship within an approved framework.

-- The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal and illegal devices designed to intimidate them. These devices include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of essential Government advertising revenue, temporary closures, and Government-fomented strikes.

-- Chile's national television -- the only country-wide channel -- has become an important propaganda instrument for the Government. But it is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago area.

-- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition, lasting more than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's only important private newsprint producer, with the company supported by the opposition media stymying repeated Government efforts to take over the firm. The paper company claims that Government price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.

-- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media have continued to function, taking advantage of the fluid political situation currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly effective in exploiting the Government's economic failures and the growing dissension within the ruling Marxist coalition.

-- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control over the Chilean economy. Many opposition media are reportedly already in difficult financial straits. The Chilean Communist Party, seeking to strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional elections, has already purchased five beleaguered radio stations (one a former opposition station) in southern Chile.

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III. THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

Allende's treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of the pro-Government media offer revealing insights into the unique claim that Chile will carry out a Socialist revolution within the framework of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without social cost.

Any Chilean government possesses wide powers that can be employed to control and intimidate media opponents given sufficient will power and cynicism to do so, despite the fact that media freedoms in Chile are twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and in a statute of constitutional guarantees agreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the Christian Democrats (PDC) as a condition for PDC support for Allende in the congressional run-off held subsequent to the Presidential election in September 1970.

What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under provisions of the State Internal Security Law may establish emergency zones by decree headed by military commanders empowering the State to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint supplies. A law on publicity abuses empowers the government to petition the courts to suspend access to news and information. (Laws on the books that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information are more severe and more frequently utilized. See Section III. B. Radio.) Furthermore, through the judicious parceling out of advertising from State and autonomous State firms any government can discriminate against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source of revenue.

Unlike predecessor governments which utilized existing laws and accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently applied these measures to harass, to intimidate, and to undermine the morale of political and class opponents in the media. These tactics are applied throughout the country.

A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has been the establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -- composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies -- in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies. The CUP's have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to the leftist press and to the Government.

The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in Santiago in April 1971. The committee issued the following statement prior to the conference:

> ...we believe that we must fight for true freedom of the press, which will only be possible when there is true economic independence. We maintain that Chile will have true freedom of the press only when the means of mass communication are part of the area of social property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans. The press, radio, television, and the theater must be tools at the service of liberation and culture of our people and not a private business, an ideological battering ram of the national and foreign minority (the capitalists) as is presently the case.[7] (underlining added)

Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers." The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for "Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism," and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective" reporting of the Chilean phenomenon. Allende himself lent legitimacy to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "vanguard" of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people." Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive tolerance" for the opposition media.

A. Press

In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily, La Tercera de la Hora.

TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Title	Estimated Circulation	Political Orientation
El Mercurio	160,000	Independent, conservative
Las Noticias Ultimas	120,000	Part of the Mercurio chain
La Prensa	25,000	Christian Democratic (PDC)
La Segunda	60,000	Part of the Mercurio chain
La Tribuna	25,000	National Party (PN) interests
La Tercera de la Hora	190,000	Independent

A favorite target of the Government and its propaganda apparatus has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U.S." and as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt of every conceivable kind of pressure short of outright seizure.

On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert with foreign (i.e., U.S.) interests to overthrow the Government. Advertisers have been "requested" not to do business with the Mercurio chain,[8] which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reacts to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history."

and that the chain is "faithful to its tradition of infamy." The Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid La Tribuna are secondary targets for the UP propaganda apparatus because their circulation is limited. Pressures employed against these dailies are aimed generally at the political parties behind them in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a warning signal to the "free" media as an institution.

Independent La Tercera receives distinct treatment. The Government exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for favorable editorial treatment of Allende policies (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). This tactic has paid dividends for Allende and for Tercera's owner, Germán Pico Cañas. Allende obtains favorable publicity in a mass-circulation paper that maintains comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms while making the transition to Socialism. Freed from the need for the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press, Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking some relief from the verbal civil war. As a result Pico, who has been head of the Chilean newspaper association, has defended the Allende Government's press policies in international forums. The understanding with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party in the Government coalition.[9]

B. Radio

Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at 3 million, or one for every third person. In a country 2,600 miles long radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and opposition. The Government has resorted to a variety of devices designed to intimidate opposition radio stations: requests by Allende advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators; threats of violence; favoritism in the distribution of needed government advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by CUP committees.

TABLE 3. IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

Station	Political Orientation
Radio Agricultura	National Party (PN)
Radio Balmaceda	Christian Democratic (PDC)
Radio Cooperativa	PDC with PN elements
Radio Corporación	Socialist Party
Radio IEM	University of Chile station controlled by Marxists
Radio Luis Recabarren	Chilean labor federation (CUT) station; Communist-controlled (See Note No. 10)
Radio Magallanes	Communist Party
Radio Minería	Independent with PDC and PN elements.
Radio Pacifico	Radical Party (UP)
Radio Portales	Socialist Party
Radio Santiago	Catholic Church interests
Radio UTE	State Technical University station controlled by Communists

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long before Allende became president the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio stations made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed that leftists were superior professionals and helped to increase listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source of manpower.

In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ministry. The same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions.[10] Regulations promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt." Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during the October-

November 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the interest of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment and spare parts for radio, television, and the press.

The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station, and purchased Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has subsequently slipped in popularity). The Communist Party purchased Magallenes, an important Santiago station. The Communist Party recently also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973). The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media (in Chile) is over" with only the Government, strong economic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of sustaining media operations. La Tribuna says the Communist Party is now the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.

PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda -- a radio station which over the years had earned a reputation for objective newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admonition for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).

In radio as in the press the Government has used CUP committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to foment strikes, and to form rump unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico, for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed by employees when wage demands could not be met. The radio station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition.

The principal Government weapon, however, is its control over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. According to the best estimates available, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic University channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chile channel in Santiago.

The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition. Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drumfire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare.

At the same time network authorities made it difficult under a variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in contravention of the State television statute. For example, the authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official statements were transmitted *voluntarily*.

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposition representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation against it. The Government defended the step by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots. The original chat show format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government.

The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university channels have successfully fought Government control to date (See Section VI. C. *University Confrontation and Television Freedoms*). None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.

D. Magazines and Book Publishing

Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- one of the most modern in Latin America. The GOC announced the purchase after prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag retained several mass-circulation magazines (*Ercilla* and *Vea* being the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously observed to date.

Quimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the teen-age market. Cabrochico, another comic book, was geared to pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly Ahora, for example, was designed to compete with Ercilla. After eight months Ahora collapsed, rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-handed political propaganda.

E. Films

The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. Exchange of Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements).

Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Government information office, the film department of the Communist-dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores -- the major labor organization), the national television network, and the University of Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to "develop the new Chilean film industry."

Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.

The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top posts in the Communist-dominated CUT labor federation also damaged Government credibility. The opposition media scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified price in clean elections.

B. The Papelera Confrontation

The Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as the Papelera), Chile's major private producer of newsprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism.".

In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Development Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through the purchase of its stock. The opposition media immediately launched a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government. In addition, a "freedom fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up Papelera shares to prevent the company from falling into Government hands.

For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories, and editorials. Both sides resorted to the familiar numbers game: the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that shareholders were resisting temptation. Government propagandists argued that newsprint production was essential to the State and must be controlled by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain in private hands as a patriotic duty.

Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders, the Government has not hesitated to use other measures -- price controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics -- to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former President of Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera) had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters. That the Papelera still withstands these combined pressures a year later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media.

The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds are not good for the company. Repeated requests for price increases sufficient to absorb cost increases -- forced on the firm in part by Government economic policies -- were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 that it could not meet loan payments due to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Finally, in December 1972 the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure.

The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the Papelera's independent status, the PDC sponsored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social property by the Government. (The Papelera is one of the firms appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed by the Government as social property.) The amendment -- still a bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition -- would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted purchase of Papelera stock in the absence of Congressional approval.[13]

C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some objectivity into its output.

Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders representing the UP coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the MIR. An independent-PDC slate also gained control of the previously Marxist-controlled Superior Normative Council. The victory was billed by the opposition media as another victory for democracy and pluralism over Marxist totalitarianism.[14] In the process Rector Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of "democratic" defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on an independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became "Defend a democratic and pluralist university." Translated into media terms it became "We want a democratic and pluralistic university TV channel."

Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparaíso) began to ease out leftist influence in the news departments of the two university channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for their opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel are proceeding cautiously against them.

A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to permit university television stations to extend their networks throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for such an extension by vetoing selected items in a PDC-introduced bill. The Government claimed that its own bill -- pending before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would create a national network for all recognized universities on an "equal and non-discriminatory" basis. What the Government did not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national television audience. Presumably the Government bill also would permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's Catholic University channel which, according to available public opinion surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the capital's audience.[15]

CON DENTIAL

Ercilla
October 5, 1972

Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting University (Santiago) to Extend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.

In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción etropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television epeater in Talcahuano. The Government has ordered that the epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1958 law to function in that area. The University has refused to omply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the overning statute and that it needs no additional concession to perate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still unctioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) ebate continues.

CONFIDENTIAL

Allende in Retrospect

By Paul E. Sigmund

World attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choices which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.[1] What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist takeover.

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the *via Chilena* to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of

> *. . . a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the*

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[1] Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista—PS*), the Communist Party (*Partido Comunista—PC*), the main body of the Radical Party (*Partido Radical—PR*), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" (*Movimiento de Acción Popular Unido—MAPU*), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups were the centrist Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrata Cristiano—PDC*) and the rightist National Party (*Partido Nacional—PN*).

In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.

people have all power and in accord with the constitution can do what they desire when they have the majority of the nation behind them.[8]

Yet it was precisely the question of majority support that was Allende's central problem in his design to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties in his coalition were in a distinct minority in the Congress, and although there was no doubt about the legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it should be noted, included both Radomiro Tomic, the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the day after the popular election, clearly inferring his future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off. In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC was controlled by the Tomic forces, who claimed to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nationalization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile's *dependencia* on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian Democrats on the points in his program with which they were in agreement. This might have provoked the secession of some of the rightist members of the PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority in the Congress for at least part of his program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed "the new face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elections were not scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popular support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral house, to be elected immediately following the approval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority in the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be established.



Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months after his election as President of Chile.

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx. The Chilean economy, already operating below capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to "prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, increasing public expenditures, and redistributing income by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received a 40-percent increase). The utilization of unused industrial capacity, combined with strict enforcement of price controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and refusal to devalue the Chilean *escudo* in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible inflationary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly $400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high international prices for copper, Chile's principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist element—

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[8] *El Mercurio (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.*

accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort to increase their class consciousness *(concientización)* through government publications and the use of the media to remove the elements of "false consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said in a press conference just after his installation, "I am *not* president of all Chileans." And in his first "State of the Nation" message to the Congress he asserted:

> *. . . the People's Government* (Gobierno Popular) *is inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially denied by some—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests.*[3]

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an additional source of revenue for the government from the "exploitative" profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government. The partially American-owned copper mines were to be taken over by a constitutional amendment—both to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization.[4] Other companies were to be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained through the purchase of shares on the open market by the government development agency. The latter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the government, Eduardo Novoa, also outlined other "legal loopholes" in existing Chilean law which could be used for "temporary" takeovers of companies, including "intervention" because of labor disputes and "requisition" because of a "breakdown in supply of an article of prime necessity."

The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity program, was thus seen as an essential part of an economic and political strategy aimed at achieving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing legislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but exploiting provisions such as one authorizing the expropriation of "abandoned or badly-farmed land," with one percent payment in cash and the rest in bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral left-dominated legislature failed, the Allende government could destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" opposition through a series of "irreversible" *faits accomplis (hechos consumados)* which would give the



A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south of Santiago which was seized from its owners on the pretext that it was "operated unproductively" (mal explotada).

—Photo by Mogal Castellos.

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[3] Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E. Sigmund, Ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2nd rev. ed., New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 450.

[4] Frei's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the Chilean state of a controlling interest in the large copper mines owned by the Kennecott and Anaconda companies. The agreements had also provided that Chile's payments to the American companies were to be invested in the expansion of copper production and refining in Chile, earning the country additional revenue in the 1970's to pay back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.

government control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.

Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano—and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (*Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria*—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (*Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo*—Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971. In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.*

While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism,"* combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy



A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

—Photo by Claus Meyer for Black Star.

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*See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.

*On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.

was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende coalition by an appeal to the material interests and the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was the interaction of the various elements of this political and economic strategy that finally produced the breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.

Initial Success

At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution stimulated demand, while price controls and an artificially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971 the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril* (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that production had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics of the University of Chile later reported that unemployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8 percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 and had only increased by 6 percent by the time of the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.

This wave of economic prosperity—combined with the absence of the political repression that some rightists had predicted would result from a victory by the Marxists—led many, particularly in low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elections. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its electoral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 percent of the total), and the candidates of all the parties supporting Allende received about 50 percent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent which the President himself had received only seven months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were, the coalition was still a few votes short of the absolute majority that Allende required to win a plebiscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time when the regime's popularity was at its highest point,[7] but in retrospect it does not appear at all certain that he would have won—particularly since by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and political situation would have been much less favorable.

The period after the municipal elections now appears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Democrats had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the party's wings, and the short-run economic and political indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pressures—and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an alliance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run "the people" would support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois" economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the expansion of demand, and the sharp decline in investment would produce disastrous consequences in the following year.

Political Polarization

The hardening of the Christian Democratic position began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June by the assassination of the former Christian Democratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by extremists, at least one of whom had been released from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. A month later in a by-election in Valparaíso, the victorious Christian Democratic candidate received the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight deputies and a number of other party leaders to form the pro-Allende *Izquierda Cristiana* (Christian Left). This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of the seven Radical senators (including two former presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the *Partido de la Izquierda Radical* (Party of the Radical Left—PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a

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[7] See, e.g., Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power," *Monthly Review* (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1-11.

PR policy resolution which the dissidents described as "completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to "the interest of the middle social strata" whom the party had always represented.[*] For a time, the PIR continued to support the Allende government, but within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposition.

In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted in favor of the constitutional amendment nationalizing the copper mines, but from that point forward, the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende forces controlled the executive and pursued an increasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legislative control over the expansion of the public sector by voting in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," became the focus of a continuing deadlock between the President and Congress that lasted until Allende's overthrow in September 1973.

Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats began to cooperate with the rightist parties in opposing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforcement of the law. The first of many such impeachments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. Informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month later these groups formed the Democratic Confederation (*Confederación Democrática*—CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congressional elections. A third area of cooperation was in marches and demonstrations against the government, the most famous of which was the March of Empty Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of housewives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.

Those shortages had developed because the predicted economic difficulties resulting from the Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971. The balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of $315 million, while in 1970 there had been a surplus of $91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende government called a moratorium on payment of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies for the nationalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly for the short term.[*] In December 1971, the Chilean government finally permitted a partial devaluation of the Chilean *escudo* so as to decrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain food items—especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar, toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increased consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside associated with the very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende took over almost as much land in his first year in office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something to do with the problem as well, and the situation could be expected to get worse with the harvest in early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money supply as a result of the government's deficit spending was also beginning to produce inflationary pressures now that the unused capacity of Chilean industry had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not

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[*] *El Mercurio*, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.

[*] On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.



Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago proclaim their intention to hold it to the death. The initials of the Unidad Popular *(Popular Unity) are painted on the wall by the gate.*

—Photo by Maggi Costello.

immediately evident from the figures for 1971. Industrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian production (based on plantings before Allende's accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity "conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong inflationary pressures could make our situation acute," but the government took no action to deal with the problem. The continuing optimism of government policymakers at this time was expressed at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the University of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in March 1972. In the course of discussion Radomiro Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presidential candidate, asserted that the Allende government had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired by Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1970 presidential election." Allende's representatives confidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers' winning sufficient strength to gain control of the legislature as well as the executive."[10]

On the political front, there were individuals and groups on both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they correctly foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a compromise on the issue of the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allende government in January, carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as "a stab in the back."[11] A second set of negotiations in June between the head of the Christian Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice broke down when the time limit set by the Christian Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations seem to have collapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept a compromise which would slow down or stop the forward movement of the government nationalization program, while in June the right wing of the Christian Democrats could point to an impending by-election in mid-July as a reason for discontinuing discussions. Both cases illustrated a general problem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once political conflict became polarized, the extremes held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and prevented what could have been a convergence of views in the center.

The negotiations were interspersed with a series of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by the government and the opposition which always stopped just short of open violence. Several observers, including the American Ambassador to

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[10] J. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma, Eds., *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, pp. 38, 247. The Communist Party report appears in *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.

[11] Partido Izquierda Radical, *Trayectoria Política del PIR* (Political Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.

Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of "brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited." Social and political tensions increased—but as long as economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway inflation, the Chilean political system seemed able to contain them.

The Turning Point

The strains in the system only became unmanageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particularly because of its subsidies to the "social area," its foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find stability at another level," ordering a drastic currency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price increases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-living Index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September. A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase in the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, so that by the end of the year the official consumer price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). In September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (*i.e.*, not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—a drop that continued every month thereafter until the September 1973 coup." Agricultural production (excluding livestock) also commenced to decline, and mineral production registered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that a number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, see Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the political arena. Several additional ministers were impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who was charged with abetting the illegal importation of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende government claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba—"*bultos Cubanos*"—were "works of art," but after the September 1973 coup, the government White Book published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs

Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices and Industrial Output under Allende

	Month	Consumer Price Index	Industrial Output *
1970	Oct.	35.6	−8.0
	Nov.	35.3	4.3
	Dec.	34.9	−0.3
1971	Jan.	28.1	−4.5
	Feb.	22.8	−7.3
	March	20.1	6.3
	April	20.2	1.6
	May	21.0	13.5
	June	21.1	10.7
	July	19.1	6.7
	Aug.	17.4	10.7
	Sept.	15.6	25.5
	Oct.	16.5	22.6
	Nov.	18.8	22.1
	Dec.	22.1	19.5
1972	Jan.	24.8	18.5
	Feb.	32.0	11.9
	March	34.0	10.2
	April	38.1	12.6
	May	40.0	11.4
	June	40.1	2.5
	July	45.9	5.0
	Aug.	77.2	3.6
	Sept.	114.3	−7.8
	Oct.	142.9	−7.7
	Nov.	149.9	−8.1
	Dec.	163.4	−11.1
1973	Jan.	180.3	−6.8
	Feb.	174.1	−4.7
	March	183.3	−2.8
	April	195.5	−11.3
	May	233.5	−11.0
	June	283.4	−14.8
	July	323.2	−10.7
	Aug.	303.6	−11.9
	Sept.	286.0	−22.9
	Oct.	528.4	18.0
	Nov.	528.9	5.1

* Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.

SOURCE: *Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas* (*National Institute of Statistics*), Santiago; *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril*. (Association for the Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.

[illegible] A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in *The Washington Post* (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solaún and Fernando Cepeda, *Allende's Chile: On the Politics of Brinkmanship*, Bogota, Universidad de Los Andes, 1972.

[illegible] The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines began before October.

Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72

	1970	1971	1972
Gross domestic product (% change)	3.7	8.3	1.4
Investment (% change)	8 6	−24.2	−8.5
Real wages and salaries (% change)	13.0	30.0	−9.0
Exports ($ million)	1129	1045	853
Imports ($ million)	1020	1124	1287

SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to inspect.[10]) The judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstrators denounced the *viejos de mierda*—"filthy old men"—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real possibility of resolving their differences, the two sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbiters, and the national holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military.

The political involvement of the military was accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy—the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the "employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen, with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the government press as the "truck-owners," the membership of the truckers' *gremio*—guild—was almost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had priority access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stoppage dragged on for over a month resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 million in production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit because the strike took place in the midst of the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry was not as adversely affected, since workers attempted to keep factories going despite management's efforts to cease production—and the October strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts" (*Cordones*) and "Communal Commands," which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular power" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness to replace the materialistic "economism" that had characterized Chilean workers until this time.[11] When the workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually "intervened" by the government, so that an important result of the October strike was a considerable expansion of the government-controlled sector of industry and trade.

The most important outcome of the strike, however, was the direct involvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabinet posts. This resulted most notably in the assignment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carlos Prats, so as to assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially.

The involvement of the military and the preparations for the March elections brought about a lull in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi-

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[10] Secretaría General del Gobierno, *Libro Blanco* (White Book), Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.

[11] The *Cordones* were more or less spontaneously organized committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal Commands (*Comandos Comunales*) were organized by the *Cordones* to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They included representatives of neighborhood committees (*juntas de vecinos*), mothers' groups (*centros de madres*), price control and distribution committees (*juntas de abastecimiento y precios*), and other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James Petras, "Chile: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular Participation," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Spring 1973, pp. 24-51, also available in James Petras, Ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution*, New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.

Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."

—*Photo by Juan de Onis for The New York Times.*

tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972.[14]

Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion of the powers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPs) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.

The March 1973 Elections

The congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the

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[14] *The New York Times* (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.

Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santiago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."

—Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.

1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing.

While the government's interpretation of the elections as proof that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as previous governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, real wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and raging inflation continued to consume the wage increase in early 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to have stemmed the erosion of support, at least among the masses of the poor.

Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.

Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work

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See report of the Investigating Committee of the Catholic University Law School, reproduced in the Libro Blanco, pp. 220-30. The statistics on new voters in 1973 omit the 21-to-24 year-old group who would have been too young to vote in 1970. They comprised almost exactly the number of "fraudulent" voters estimated in the report.

periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved the Catholic Church for the first time in formal opposition to the government and mobilized thousands of secondary-school students in violent demonstrations in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce arguments over the school proposals among the top military officers (the military had left the cabinet after the elections) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal meeting with the Education Ministry to express their opposition. The controversy subsided only when the government announced that the proposal had been postponed, pending further discussion.

Within the government, the debate continued on whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the Communist position) or to "advance without compromise" (the Socialist stance). One indication of how the debate was resolved was the decision by the government to use a constitutionally-authorized "decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to override the rulings of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Humeres, who had disallowed the requisitioning of some of the factories taken over during the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to obey court orders to return seized properties. On May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to the President denouncing

> *. . . the illegal attitude of the administration . . . [its] open and continual rebellion against judicial orders . . . which signifies a crisis of the rule of law [and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical structure of the country.*[18]

The stalemate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" was compounded when the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdiction over the disputed question of whether, in the absence of a plebiscite, the Congress could override the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vote.[19] A second constitutional conflict along the same lines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres) in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation and to compel the distribution of land in the "reformed" sector to the peasantry after a transitional period of two years. (The government had once again used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone indefinitely the distribution of expropriated land by individual title.)

In May the official price index jumped 20 percent, indicating that the inflation was moving into a new hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the government had made to hold the line—its refusal to grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under their contract they had already received partial cost-of-living increases—led to a bruising two-and-a-half month strike, which included a miners' march on Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day general strikes for and against the government in mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more ready to resort to military involvement in the cabinet to restore social peace.

Last Stage—Decline and Fall

On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army units had been in contact with *Patria y Libertad*, a right-wing political organization, and had planned to seize President Allende at his residence and to occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment decided to free him and in the process to seize the presidential palace as originally planned. General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in a few hours—most of which were spent in negotiation rather than shooting—but not before President Allende had gone on the air to urge "the people" to take over all industries and enterprises as a response to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious military men." The Central Labor Federation also urged the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day the number of companies taken over by the government rose from 282 to 526. The "Industrial Belts" that had sprung up at the time of the October strike now achieved new importance. The spread of "people's power (*poder popular*)" had been seen by Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the

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[18] *Libro Blanco*, p. 215.

[19] The term "item veto" reflects the fact that the Chilean president, unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections of proposed laws.

Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.

—Wide World Photos

government. Production declined sharply after the takeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim that the expansion of state control of industry was being carried out through extralegal channels, and "*poder popular*"—as expressed in the worker occupations—appeared to some extent to pose a possible threat of an alternative to the power of the central government

After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts to secure military involvement in the government, but his negotiations with the armed forces were unsuccessful.[20] Instead, they embarked on a policy of vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a measure which had been adopted in October 1972 but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law authorized any military or police commanders to carry out arms searches if there was "a presumption of the clandestine existence of illegal firearms."[21] The right wing *Patria y Libertad* organization had now announced publicly that it was going underground in an attempt to overthrow the government by force, and military intelligence was also aware of the initiation of arms training by all the government parties, even the centrist Radicals.[22] In the course of their crackdown, the military found arms caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and the killing of a worker in one such arms raid provoked protests from the leftist parties.

At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and the Catholic Church both concluded independently that the only solution to the impasse in Chile was one more attempt at an agreement between the Allende government parties and the Christian Democrats. The Communists initiated a campaign against civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dialogue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, but disagreement continued on the constitutional reforms. Allende offered to sign the amendment on the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a constitutional amendment specifying that the Congress could only override presidential vetoes of constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also proposed the establishment of joint committees to work out further agreements. However, the Christian Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatory" and broke off the negotiations.

A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the truckers began another strike, which was to last from July 25 until the coup on September 11. As in October, the truckers were joined by the other *gremios*. Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized industries and agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and in a situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers' action created much more serious problems for the government than the earlier strike. This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

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[20] Two conflicting accounts of those negotiations appear in *Ercilla* (Santiago), July 11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10.

[21] Law No. 17,798, *Diario Oficial* (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a quirk of fate the law had come to Allende's desk in the midst of the October strike, and since it had the strong support of the armed forces he was compelled to sign it despite the opposition of the Socialist Party and the MIR.

[22] Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms-training at his vacation house outside of Santiago. The MAPU began arms-training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973. The armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July. See documents in *Libro Blanco*, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.

Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on September 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing transportation strike.

—UPI.

On August 9 Allende swore in what he called a "national security cabinet," with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet posts.

Almost coincident with the entrance of the military into the cabinet, the naval establishment became involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in Valparaiso and Concepción. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques, head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors" of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the congressional immunity of the first two, who sat respectively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist their coup-minded (*golpista*) officers."

This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him. When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him to add that his departure from the cabinet "implicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ultimately led directly to the September 11 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide whether to resist Allende's action. By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including those of six generals, gathered in front of General Prats' house to present a letter asking for his resignation. When the demonstration was broken up by police tear gas, it provoked such dissension in the armed forces that on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June.

The resignation of what appeared to be the last defenders of Allende in the army now meant that all three services were opposed to the President. It coincided with the adoption on the same day of a "sense of the house" (*acuerdo*) resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order." [14] The resolution criticized the Allende government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, persecuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic" and urged the military ministers to "put an end to the *de facto* situations listed above which violate the Constitution and the law" or be

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[13] It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."

[14] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 239-42.

guilty of "compromising the national and professional character of the armed forces."

In its original form, the resolution had declared the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the *acuerdo* had later been softened in order to secure the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect was still to give a congressional green light to the military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it. He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress of "promoting a *coup d'état* by asking the military forces to make governmental judgments independently of the authority and direction of the President"; he also pointed out that according to the Constitution the only way that the Congress could decide on the legality of the President's conduct of his office was through impeachment by a two-thirds vote.[illegible]

The congressional vote was echoed by several professional associations. The Medical Association called on their "colleague" Allende to resign—a request that was echoed by the Federation of Professionals (CUPROCH)—and resignation petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association issued a declaration which—"without attributing a malevolent intention" to the President—asserted an "incompatibility between the institutional framework within which he is supposed to exercise his office and the actions which he feels obliged to carry out in his program." Arguing that Allende "would appear to be incapacitated *(impedido)* in the exercise of his functions as he understands them," the statement suggested that he could be removed from office under Article 43 of the Constitution, which authorizes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.[illegible]

The Coup

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was reached in the days following Prats' resignation. The armed forces had contingency plans for the control of vital points throughout the country in case of any emergency, and it only required a signal to put them into operation. Hence the actual seizure of control required little preparation.

After the resignations of the third week of August, Allende restructured his cabinet without the top military commanders but still retained representatives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos Briones, who was known to be interested in another attempt at accommodation with the Christian Democrats. The president also canceled a projected trip to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. The government and the opposition again staged rival demonstrations in connection with the third anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections.

On the weekend before the coup, the Christian Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a meeting at which a proposal was adopted for the simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the President and for new elections to resolve the con-

Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a conference on the transport crisis.

[illegible] *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The spokesman of the Christian Democratic Party told the *New York Times* that "neither we nor the armed forces favor anything but a democratic solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that the only way to avoid a breakdown of the Constitution was the appointment of military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as in key undersecretary positions and as heads of the chief government agencies. *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.

[illegible] *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.



Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.

—Photo by *The New York Times.*

flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.[27]

Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the *pronunciamiento* issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.[28]

On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.

To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:

> *These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation.*[29]

At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to the Chilean people over the single pr.. Allende radio station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began:

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[27] Information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.

[28] Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973, *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973, and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.

[29] *Libro Blanco*, pp. 248-49.

> *This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak to you. . . . My words are not spoken in bitterness but disappointment. In the face of these events I can only say to the workers, "I am not going to resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people.*

Blaming "foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction" for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said:

> *History will judge them. . . . My voice will no longer come to you, but it does not matter. You will continue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the least, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution.*[10]

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those who wished to do so to leave the building, and—except for his personal secretary—all the women, including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would surrender. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which repeatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and the members who had been with him left the building in single file, led by the secretary carrying a white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro.[11]

Conclusions

Since the coup, comments in the world press representing widely divergent political postures have cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of achieving Marxist socialism through democratic means is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, neither of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism:

(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his administration to justify [illegible] course states as a prerequisite "the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support; but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at expanding his electoral base, was more successful in pitting professional and middle-class groups against him than in widening his support among workers, peasants and low-income groups.

2) Marxist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers emphasized increases in consumption and combined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the "two steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The consequences of these policies after their deceptive initial success were massive government deficits, runaway inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende's economic problems were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from $9 million to $40 million between 1970 and 1973.")

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[10] Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech published in Riccardo Boizard, *El Ultimo Dia de Allende* (The Last Day of Allende), Santiago, Editorial de Pacifico, 1973, pp. 53-55.

[11] On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in *El Mercurio* (International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians, who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in *Ercilla*, Jan. 2-8, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allende's widow has asserted that witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous factual errors and describes events which could not have taken place because of the physical design of the building. On this and many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths," *Worldview* (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.

[12] Secretaria, Comité Interamericano de la Alianza para el Progreso (CIAP), *El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile* (Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC, 1974, p. V-9.

Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one. He was able to come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the 1930's. However, he was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportional representation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult and often gave veto powers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by a chronic tendency to inflation, and successive governments had consistently ignored agriculture in the interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and institutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to the ideological blandishments of the Left.[33]

The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides and became as polarized as the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The conflict over education in March-April 1973 heightened that polarization just at the time the military were attempting to extricate themselves from political involvement. Then the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activity among enlisted men and presidential maneuvering with promotions and retirements provided the classis scenario for a *coup d'état*.

One can also relate Allende's difficulties to the inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which he appealed. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian transition to socialism, many of his Marxist supporters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his knowledge, they armed themselves and—what was worse—talked incessantly about revolution. The repeated statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy. When the importation and distribution of arms was combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, it is not altogether surprising that the military finally took action.

A positive evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise the living standards of low-income groups and to involve them actively in the determination of their own future. It would likewise stress the continued existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an economic policy which after the first half of 1972 produced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agricultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape or go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply reduced consumption and the strictures of draconian military rule.

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[33] The Socialists always believed that they could convert the military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party documents published in the *Libro Blanco*, pp. 124-30.

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SOVIET ANALYST, London
15 August 1974

Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile

by JAMES THEBERGE

Why did Salvador Allende's revolutionary government end in a bloodbath despite Soviet support and the plaudits of the world's left-wing extremists, who saw in Chile a new path for Socialism's march to power?

James Theberge, who is Director of the Latin American Department of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, shows how Moscow, the "big brother", though eager to exploit this opening in Latin America to the full, disagreed with Allende's headlong methods, and while warning him of the growing economic chaos denied him enough financial aid.

In 1935, Moscow dispatched Eudocio Ravines, a brilliant Peruvian Communist organiser, to Chile to implement the "united front" and "anti-fascist popular front" strategy that had replaced the ultra-left strategy of the Comintern. Since that time the Chilean Communist party generally has followed a strategy of broad alliance and limited aims, although the Cuban revolution led to a radicalisation of party strategy.

The Chilean Communist party, one of the most loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, gave unqualified support to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. While its fortunes have shifted through the years as a result of domestic and international developments, it unstintingly supported the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy and repeated Moscow's themes of anti-imperialism and class warfare.

The party, at least prior to the military intervention of September, 1973, was the best organised and strongest in Latin America. Between 1956 and 1969 it formed an uneasy alliance for electoral purposes with the Socialist Party, its more militant Marxist rival on the Left. But in 1969 the Communists decided that a much more broadly based alliance of left-wing forces was necessary for the transformation of the country into a socialist state and they played a key role in the founding of the Popular Unity Front (a coalition of six leftist parties) at the end of that year. After the 1970 electoral victory of the Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende the Communists became the single most influential force within the coalition. It was a far better organised and disciplined participant than its closest rival, the more ideologically unstable and militant Socialist Party.

The ultimate aim of the party did not waver throughout the Allende period. The Communists hoped to be able to take advantage of the weakness of the democratic institutions to install a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under their direction. Their Secretary-General, Eduardo Labarca, made this clear in his *Corvalán 27 Horas* (Santiago, Editorial Quimantú, 1972), in which he declared: "For us the pass from capitalism to Socialism necessarily requires that the proletariat be converted into the leading class, into the determining social force".

The Communist strategy, shared by Salvador Allende and the "moderate" wing of the Socialist Party, was to "overthrow" the bourgeois state and constitution, using the legal device of the plebiscite. In an interview with Régis Debray in 1971 Allende said: "As for the bourgeois state at the present moment, we are seeking to overcome it. To overthrow it!" (Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution, Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random House, 1971 p.82).

Mass mobilisation, infiltration of Chilean institutions and tactical alliances with the opposition were to be employed to generate sufficient popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a "popular assembly" and the existing legal system by "popular tribunals." President Allende's pledge to uphold the "Statute of Guarantees" (designed to commit his government to preserve Chile's democratic freedoms and institutions in exchange for Congressional support) was simply a "tactical necessity" to gain power, as he explained later.

The Chilean Communists and their allies in Moscow were uneasy about the ideological implications of the *via Chilena* as advocated by Salvador Allende (Debray, p.119). The Communist party refused to endorse the *via Chilena* as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which implied that it might not necessarily assume the leading role after complete power was gained by the Popular Unity coalition. The Chilean party supported Moscow's doctrine of the *via pacifica*, which accepted free elections and popular pluralism as a short-term tactical device under Chilean conditions but aimed in the long run at installing a Soviet-style Communist dictatorship. The *via pacifica* was not as "pacific" as the slogan implied: it embraced all forms of class conflict and violence short of armed insurrection and civil war in the process of establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Misleading Image

The *via Chilena* proclaimed by Allende soon after his election was widely misunderstood in the West. The image that was officially propagated was that of a uniquely Chilean path to a new type of Marxist-humanist socialism, where basic liberties, economic pluralism and free elections were respected by all. Western liberals were led to believe that the Allende government was constructing a new Western-European type of democratic socialism in Chile. This image clashed with the reality of Salvador Allende's revolutionary ambition to use Chile's pluralist democracy to destroy it. He seemed to have abandoned the *via Chilena* formula during the last year of his government. Not only did he rarely employ it in his speeches but the importance of preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty" was conspicuously absent.

The government's policy was very much to Moscow's liking: seizure of US investments, the espousal of the doctrine of "ideological pluralism" (relations with all states regardless of ideology and internal political character), closer relations with the socialist camp, and the fostering of an "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in Latin America.

Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was reoriented, and the previously close ties with the United States were replaced by strong political, economic and scientific ties with the "socialist countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR. The first trip of the Foreign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1971. President Allende visited Moscow in December, 1972. Strong ideological and personal ties linked the Chilean Communist party leaders with the Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro.

President Allende's description of the USSR as Chile's "big brother" (*hermano mayor)* was no mere figure of speech but reflected the expectation of his government that the USSR would become the most important socialist ally of the revolution and the main economic bulwark of the regime. Moscow did, in fact, become the most important source of socialist camp economic aid and credits to the Popular Unity government, totalling $620.0 million ($156.5 million in short-term bank credit and $463.5 million in project aid and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period*. The USSR authorised $260.5 million in credits ($98.5 million in short-term credit and $162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was never utilised. This was far from the massive help Allende needed. But Moscow was under no illusion that its economic cooperation would decisively influence the immediate prospects for radical social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States.

Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation made possible by the victory of the Communist-Socialist regime. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the economic situation, the violent clashes of the ultra-left and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of opposition forces, particularly after the Popular Unity government failed in the March, 1973, elections to obtain the majority electoral support required to transform the political and economic structure by peaceful, constitutional means.

Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to provide the massive short-term commodity assistance (such as foodstuffs) or untied convertible currency credits which the regime needed to finance the import of food, spare parts, and machinery to alleviate local shortages. Moscow's $98.5 million in short-term bank credits was no doubt helpful but paled into insignificance before the need to finance Chile's import requirements, which, for food alone, were running at the rate of about $700 million a year when the Allende regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials that the main effort to improve the economic situation would have to be made by the Allende government. Moscow repeatedly stressed that the Popular Unity government must reverse the calamitous decline in production and productivity to have a chance of winning over a majority of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.

Refusing to give Allende the hard currency credits he needed to improve his worsening chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising solidarity meetings at home and abroad in the hope that these demonstrations would "reach the ears of the Chilean people" (Moscow Radio 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet machinery and equipment to him—that is, expand Soviet exports financed by long-term credits —but denied him the short-term hard currency credits he desperately needed.

A combination of circumstances — Moscow's costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange —led the USSR to eschew massive short-term aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help to the Allende regime — a theme repeated frequently by the Chilean Communist party leadership when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis Moscow watched idly while the *via pacifica* was destroyed by the disastrous economic policies, the circumvention of the laws, and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by President Allende and the Popular Unity government.

Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the level of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture, and encouraged anti-Americanism and independence from the United States. Since it realised that the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Popular Unity leadership was urged to maintain internal unity, reject the "provocative and adventurous" overtures of the ultra-left, avoid actions that might provoke a civil war or military intervention, adopt a more rational economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains of the revolution.

At the same time, Moscow did nothing to restrain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean revolution. Protected by a friendly, Marxist-dominated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transported large quantities of Soviet and Czechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cuban airline and merchant ships.

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*See *Deuda Externa de Chile*, Tomo V, Departamento de Créditos Externos, CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full details.

It also established a guerrilla training base and coordinating centre in Chile. The large intelligence team in the Cuban Embassy in Santiago maintained liaison with the liberation movement in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Cuba's Soviet-controlled intelligence service, Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), also had close ties with the Chilean ultra-leftist and other revolutionary exile groups, providing them with training, arms and funds for the armed struggle in Chile and other Latin American countries.

Revolutionaries Trained

Soviet army personnel were directly involved in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73 at El Belloto, near Valparaiso, where the USSR had installed a factory for the manufacture of prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed sixteen Russians, four of whom were engineers and technicians; the remaining twelve were Soviet army officers. After working hours, these twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially-selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of arms, street fighting and urban guerrilla tactics. The Russian-built factory was kept under constant surveillance by Chile's naval intelligence. On the morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence arrested the Russians and three days later expelled them from the country*.

This clandestine involvement in training guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official line of giving full support to the legal and peaceful path to socialism. But the Soviet leadership operates on the principle that since every eventuality cannot be foreseen it is better to take advance measures which might "contradict" the official line than to be sorry later. In Chile there clearly were some advantages in having some armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control: Moscow would be able to retain some measure of influence over the ultra-left, particularly important in the event that this faction was able to seize power. As it turned out, Russia's "united front" tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military.

Soviet Industrial Espionage

The Soviet Union made every effort to extract the maximum advantage from its technical assistance programme. It assigned 46 technicians to the nationalised copper industry to help raise productivity, all of whom were engaged in industrial espionage. They were far more interested in gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced US mining equipment and methods of operation than in assisting Chilean development. Andres Zauschquevich, executive vice-president of the copper corporation, told me in December 1973 that the specialists during their two-year stay contributed nothing to the improvement of mining operations and were mainly occupied in gathering specifications of American equipment, obtaining information on mining techniques and organisation, and collecting data on costs and productivity.

Moscow was also especially interested in fisheries and fishery-related (oceanographic, hydrographic and marine biological research) assistance to Chile. Fisheries aid gave the Russian's access to Chilean ports for its fishing, oceanographic and other vessel an mil the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presence. The growing presence in Chilean waters, around the Cape and in sub-Antarctic waters provided a cover for gathering intelligence and oceanographic data of use to the Soviet navy.

The Soviet Union offered to supply $300 million in military equipment to Allende in 1971, but the military refused the offer and decided to continue to obtain arms from the United States and other Western suppliers. The anti-Communist military were disturbed by the deepening economic and political violence under the Popular Unity government, and were anxious not to weaken their military ties with the United States and Western Europe by turning to the Soviet Union for arms. Moscow had hoped to establish an important precedent for supplying arms to non-Communist countries in Latin America and further weaken Washington's already strained relations with the Latin American military. Despite the coolness of official US-Chilean relations, the United States continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean military.

The Kremlin was very much aware of the weakness of the Allende regime. Not only was it a minority government (in 1970, 36% and, in 1973, 43% of the electorate supported the Popular Unity coalition) but the armed forces and powerful national police were strongly anti-Communist. Since the "democratic forces" lacked full political and economic power, Moscow favoured a gradual take-over by the Communists and avoidance of civil war or military confrontation at all costs. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right opponents of Allende were attacked regularly in the Soviet press. But the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pursued the armed path and hoped to defeat the opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It was charged with "revolutionary adventurism", contributing to political instability and harming the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity government.

From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the opposition to the Allende government was growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd and dilatory personality of Allende—skilled in maintaining a balance between the disruptive forces within his own government—that held together the disintegrating fabric of society. There was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic management, declining agricultural and industrial production, accelerating inflation, and the worsening balance of payments.

Soviet observers advised a slower take-over of the economy, nationalising the large firms first but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms alone for the time being. In the last months before the military coup they saw the handwriting on the wall and urged a consolidation of the economic gains already achieved, collaboration with the opposition political parties (especially the Christian Democrats), and avoidance of armed conflict.

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*Ercilla (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973, and author's interviews with the Chilean military high command, Dec-

Collapse of Socialist 'Model'

The Soviet policy *vis-à-vis* Chile emphasized cooperation in the political field, the forging of an anti-US front with Chile, Peru and Cuba, and expansion of trade and aid relations while refraining from polemics and interfering in Chile's internal affairs (mainly through its influence over the Chilean Communist Party). The Chilean Communists were given moral and material support for widening the base of support of the regime, but it made no difference to the final outcome. The weakness of the Allende regime, its fateful internal contradictions, official connivance in the arming and violence of the ultra-left, the Weimar-type inflation and food shortages, the growing political polarisation and violence, and the fateful alienation of the armed forces were the decisive conditions that triggered the *coup d'état* that led to Allende's downfall and replacement by a military junta on 11 September, 1973.

Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especially surprised. TASS admitted on 20 September 1973 that the "Chilean experience was bitter and dramatic," and Fidel Castro declared that he was "very upset by events in Chile" (the new military junta had immediately broken off relations with Havana). Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Santiago and withdrew its ambassador and embassy staff because of alleged persecution of Soviet officials by the junta. After less than a week in power, Chile's new military government began to feel the full blast of Soviet displeasure and frustration, expressed in a well-orchestrated and sustained propaganda campaign aimed at isolating and discrediting the regime.

The Soviet media accused the junta of "persecuting left-wingers with unparalleled cruelty" (Moscow Radio, 18 September 1973). There were reports in *Pravda* on 26 September that "the streets of Santiago were flowing with blood" and the radio spoke of "tens of thousands of Chilean democrats" killed. Salvador Allende was alternatively reported to have been "murdered in cold blood" or to have died a hero's death, resisting the rebels to the very end. Allende's residence was alleged to have been "wiped off the face of the earth." The junta was shooting at women and children in an attempt to intimidate the people. On 29 October TASS indignantly blamed the CIA, Chilean "reaction" and "American monopolies" for organising the military *coup*. And according to a Moscow broadcast even Leonid Brezhnev, not known for his devotion to Western democracy, expressed horror at the "monstrous, completely open violation of a country's constitution, the unceremonious flouting of the democratic traditions of an entire nation."

The overthrow of the Allende government was a bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for Moscow's united front tactics in Latin America, and had adverse repercussions for Marxist parties elsewhere in the West. Communists and Socialists in France and Italy who had earlier pointed to Chile as a model of the peaceful transition to socialism moved to disengage themselves from the Allende disaster. Instead of leading to socialism, united front tactics in Chile ushered in a period of unparalleled political violence, enormous suffering for Chile's workers and middle class, and the worst economic crisis in its history.

Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the vanguard of the anti-US front in Latin America ended in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression on the non-Communist political parties and the armed forces in the region. It reminded them of the grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. Despite protestations to the contrary, Marxist governments are driven inexorably to violate pledges to uphold the constitution, to destroy the private sector of the economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian dictatorship.

Authoritative statements of the Chilean Communist Party's position under the Allende regime can be found in Labarca's *Corvalan 27 Horas* and Luis Corvalan's *Camino de Victoria*, (Santiago, 1971).

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974

Argentine Manager Murdered

BUENOS AIRES—Gunmen killed the labor relations manager of a French-owned auto plant in Cordoba yesterday, and President Maria Estela Peron spoke out against the recent "cowardly and mercenary assassinations" in Argentina.

The extreme leftist Peronist Armed Forces claimed responsibility for the death of IKA Renault official Ricardo Goya, 55, saying it was "the Peronist workers' answer to the enemies of our class."

A two-month slowdown at the Renault plant climaxed Monday with ouster of leftist leaders of the auto union. Workers battled police last night on the streets of Cordoba.

Mrs. Peron, in her first speech from the palace balcony that her late husband, President Juan D. Peron often used as a rostrum, declared:

"Many people think that because I am a woman I cannot rule . . . but with this fragile appearance I have committed myself." Her denunciation of the political killings came in a talk earlier with provincial governors.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974

SPARSE AUDIENCE HEARS MRS. PERON

Only a Few Thousand Attend Her First Public Rally

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 27—Only a few thousand trade unionists gathered today to hear President Isabel Martinez de Perón, in her first public rally since she took office, speak in the historic Plaza de Mayo, where her late husband, Gen. Juan Domingo Perón, had drawn scores of thousands of supporters on numerous occasions.

The event was marred by the Government's mounting problems with left-wing industrial workers in Cordoba, 430 miles northwest of the capital.

Early this morning, unidentified terrorists gunned down the labor relations manager of Ika-Renault, a leading car manufacturer in Cordoba, as he drove to the main plant that has been in the center of a bitter workers' strike.

The killing of the Argentine executive, Ricardo Goya, 55 years old, followed a clash last night between left-wing auto workers and policemen that left two trade unionists seriously wounded.

The rally was ostensibly called to publicize the Government's decision last week to nationalize the distribution and sale of petroleum products. Until now, Shell, and Esso subsidiaries had shared the local sale of oil products with the State Petroleum Company.

Assertion of Leadership

But Mrs. Perón devoted most of her speech to defend her claim to leadership of the Peronist movement, which has been in growing disarray since General Perón's death on July 1.

"Do not doubt for a moment that Isabel Perón, his student and disciple, will faithfully comply with his doctrine, no matter who falls and no matter what the cost," said Mrs Perón.

During the two months she has been in power, she has sought to transform her image from that of a bereaved widow to a forceful chief executive able to guide a nation divided into numerous rightist, leftist and moderate factions.

She has held well-publicized Cabinet meetings and reunions with opposition politicians, Congressmen and military groups.

Many of her speeches are heavily laced with references made and slogans used by General Perón and his second wife, Eva Duarte de Perone, who gathered an enormous personal following before her death in 1952.

"I know that many think that because I am a woman, I cannot take over the helm," said Mrs. Perón, still dressed in one of the lengthy black dresses she has donned since her husband's death. "But I have two arms, and in one hand I have Perón and in the other Eva Perón."

At times her voice cracked with emotion and she shook her entended arms, recalling ges- entended arms, recallingHHH tures used by Eva Perón.

There have been rumors in the last three weeks that conservative Peronist leaders were urging Mrs. Perón to hold a major public rally to strengthen her image in the face of rising terrorist activity, labor unrest and economic problems.

Despite the poor turnout, at today's rally, television announcers remarked that the crowds were "multitudinous," and at least one commentator spoke of "hundreds of thousands" of people on hand. But a walk through the plaza confirmed that only the street in front of the pink Government house was filled. The cameras of the television stations—which have recently been recently brought under state control—focused on trade unionists and avoided photographing the empty stretches

One of the organizers of the rally asserted that it was successful considering that only two unions—the light and power union and the state petroleum workers—were supposed to attend. But he acknowledged that "Perón would never have addressed so small a crowd."

The chief focus of political unrest in the country has been Cordoba, the second largest city. Last February, a rightwing police coup, apparently backed by General Perón, removed the elected left-wing Peronist governor from power. During the upheaval, rightwing trade unionists also wrested control of the local labor federation from leftists.

Since then, Córdoba has been the scene of repeated incidents of political violence. A few days ago, the Labor Ministry decided to remove legal recognition from the leftist-controlled union at Ika-Renault—a concern with mixed Argentine and French capital — after labor leaders called a strike in support of higher wages.

The clashes with the police last night resulted when officers moved to dislodge labor leaders from the union headquarters.

BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1974

Forecast is cloudy for Bolivia's Banzer

By RICHARD O'MARA
Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun

Rio de Janeiro—Opposition is growing against the continuation in office of President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia. But observers are divided over whether General Banzer will end his tenure legally, through elections promised for next year, or by the usual mechanism for transferring power in Bolivia—the coup d'etat.

Last week, General Banzer celebrated the beginning of his fourth year in the presidency by dancing in the streets during a massive celebration of the coup d'etat that deposed Gen. Juan Jose Torres August 21, 1971.

Even as he was celebrating, making speeches about the durability of the Nationalist Popular Front—the civilian-military coalition through which he has governed—the powerful Bolivian Miners Union declared itself virtually at war with the regime. And the Front apparently was disintegrating.

This week one party in the coalition, the Nationalist Bolivian Falange demanded immediate elections. The Falange's declaration repudiated immediately by another member party of the Front, a smaller group named after the late president, Rene Barrientos.

Even as the civilian elements that have supported President Banzer's distinctly rightwing and intensely anti-Communist regime were falling out, there were reports of dissension within the military.

Although President Banzer received the perfunctory support of the commanders of the armed services during last week's fete, it is evident to sources here, and from reports from Bolivia, that the military is divided over the president and his policies.

It is believed that the younger officers are being alienated increasingly by the president. Specifically, they oppose his refusal to grant amnesty to these officers who plotted and executed the unsuccessful coup against his government June 5.

A pamphlet was circulated recently to all military units in La Paz, allegedly produced by a group of young officers who have taken inspiration from their counterparts in Portugal who last April led a successful coup against the authoritarian regime there.

The pamphlet read, in part, "Banzer's repression against his own institution [the Army] has persuaded those democratic officers to fight beside campesinos, miners, workers and students. . . ."

After the attempted coup of June 3, many of the officers involved were either jailed or sent into exile to Paraguay and Argentina. According to reports from Argentina, many of these officers have been returning to Bolivia clandestinely.

THE WASHINGTON POST *Wednesday, Aug. 28, 1974*

Argentine Left Clings to Hold On University

By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington Post

BUENOS AIRES—The entrances and hallways of the University of Buenos Aires

by a Cultural Revolution

Wall newspapers full of

meetings" hang from the high ceilings to the floors. Corners and columns are plastered with posters that urge the defense of the revolution or quote Gen. Juan D. Peron, the Argentine populist leader who died in office as president on July 1.

Outside, people walk past without seeming to notice. But inside, behind the posters, the young people who believed Peron's return to power in Argentina last year meant a giant step toward socialism are trying to hold on to their last stronghold the university.

Slowly, but inexorably, the government left behind

university administration and student body. Peronist professors say that President Maria Estela Peron, the leader's widow and successor, is following a line laid down by Peron: To ease the Marxist left out of the Peronist movement. This means winning back control of the University of Buenos Aires—whose student body of almost 200,000 makes it by far the largest in the country—from the Peronist leftwing.

The university has been a sectarian political battleground for more than a year. Entrance policies, the [illegible]

The university, an urban campus with old and semimodern buildings scattered throughout the city, is organized along European lines. Eleven separate faculties, like separate colleges, educate lawyers, doctors, agronomists and liberal professionals. Each gives two years of basic college education. Seven years ago, after a violent university purge by Argentina's military government, many parts of the separate curricula were shaped to American models.

When the Peronists returned to power last May, young leftist leaders loyal to Peron were given the university as their share of the new government. It changed almost overnight.

Entrance examinations were abolished and all high school graduates were offered admission. One year later, 85,000 new students had entered and the enrollment had doubled.

"There are so many people now, it seems that even the rats from the basement take exams," said a fourth-year philosophy student.

Professors with connections to the military government or foreign companies were dismissed. Fourteen were fired from the faculty of economics alone. The university broke off assistance and exchange agreements with the Ford Foundation, the University of California and Rutgers, and opened new programs with universities in Peru, Algeria and Mexico.

Courses of study were changed. Traditional philosophy courses were replaced, in part, by studies of South American politicians and Peron's doctrine. In an introductory architecture course, a slide show alternates views of a new Sheraton hotel here with pictures of the capital's shantytowns and is followed by a discussion of American imperialism in Argentina.

"Last year we had Samuelson, this year we had Lenin," said a second-year student of economics. "It's really interesting. We learned how Samuelson's book (An Introduction to Economics by Paul A. Samuelson, an introductory text widely used in the United States and some foreign countries) used all those graphs and curves to prove that imperialism was necessary. Oh, not directly, but subtly, you know."

"We took out Samuelson but we did not replace him with Lenin or Marx," Oscar Sbarra Mitre, the 33-year-old dean of the economics faculty, said during an interview. He explained that there is now no single textbook for the two-year introductory course, but rather a reading list with a majority of Latin American authors. Marx—as well as John Maynard Keynes—shows up as an individual theorist, but not as the last word.

The shift from studies designed to produce executives for giant companies to a more populist and national outlook, Sbarra Mitre said, is better exemplified by the course called "History of the Union Movement and Labor Relations," which replaced a course on personnel management.

It was not educational policy, however, but pure politics that turned the university into a left-wing redoubt defying the Peronist government. A basic university law, laying down the rules for Buenos Aires and the eight other campuses of the national university system, passed congress by a large majority late last year with the support from non-Peronist parties. The law embodied the basic changes that had begun at Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, a majority faction in the Peronist youth movement backed by two urban guerrilla groups that had fought the military government under Peron's banner, had made the university here their power base. They proclaimed a government program that smacked heartily of Marxism-Leninism and, in effect, challenged Peron for leadership of his movement.

"Look, these people are anything but Peronists," Gen. Peron said last February, when he first began trying to separate his movement's youth wing from the leaders born of the guerrilla movement who call themselves Montoneros.

"Before thinking about getting organized, we've got to think how it can be a true organization and not a sack full of cats who will start showing their claws pretty soon," Peron told leaders of the youth wing. He asked them to reorganize themselves and expel the Marxists. "That's why this purification is necessary," he said.

The purification Peron wanted has been thwarted, in part by government reluctance to drive the whole youth wing into open revolt, and in part by students from the University of Buenos Aires. Twice, since April, they have marched into the streets to protest the appointment of new deans and have forced the government to back down.

A week ago they took over 10 of the 11 faculties in a move to hold onto the temporary university rector, Raul Laguzzi, 32, a professor of pharmacy who is loyal to the Montoneros. And, inside the faculties, it often seems as if one is inside Peron's "sack of cats."

At the medical faculty recently, students who still proclaim loyalty to Peron started playing the Peronist marching song on a loudspeaker system. A faction that stands further to the left put on the Internationale, the Communist hymn, and turned up the volume on their own sound system. The Peronists turned up their volume, and so it went, to ear-shattering levels.

"It isn't bad once you get above the second floor," a professor of neurobiology said.

Slowly the university crisis seems to be heading for some kind of resolution. A week ago, President Maria Estela Peron named a new minister of education. He is expected to name a new rector. Student street demonstrations have been quickly and sharply put down by police. The same demonstrations were tolerated by her late husband.

There have been some hints that the government will try to defuse the crisis by unraveling Peronist politics and the quarrel with the Montoneros from university policies.

"We're waiting to see who the new rector will be," said a young professor. "That should clear up something. In the meantime, if you're thinking of building a house in Argentina, get an old architect."

Western Hemisphere

ENCOUNTER, London
January 1974

Allende & the Myth Makers

David Holden

Political Realism & Revolutionary Romance

UNFITTING AS IT MAY SEEM to say so when the bloodshed of the Chilean *coup d'état* is still so keenly remembered and the generals who made it are riding unpleasantly high, the fact remains that Salvador Allende died a lucky man. In life he was a failure. Both his policies and his country were shattered long before the end. But in death he achieved success beyond his dreams. Instantly canonised as the Western world's newest left-wing martyr, he became overnight the most potent political cult-figure since his old friend, Che Guevara.

To some extent, of course, the congregation had already been prepared for this posthumous elevation. In the three years of Allende's administration the "Chilean experiment" and the "Chilean road to socialism" had become favourite topics of discussion among left-wing groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed resemblance to Italy or France had encouraged the belief that Europe might, for once, follow in Latin America's footsteps instead of the other way about. Many aspiring revolutionaries from Europe and the United States had actually joined their Latin American counterparts in Chile in much the same spirit as their dropped-out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal hoping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By the time of the September *coup* the military junta claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners of all kinds in Chile, actively supporting—sometimes with violence—the "socialist revolution."

DAVID HOLDEN has travelled in Chile on several recent assignments as Chief Foreign Correspondent for the "Sunday Times." Among his regular contributions to ENCOUNTER are "South African Notebook" (August 1970), "Day Trip to Zanzibar" (September 1972) and "Ethiopia—Forty Years On" (February 1973).

These specially interested groups or individuals obviously provided a ready network for international propaganda in the aftermath of Allende's death. But the shocked and, at times, almost hysterical reaction to the *coup* went far beyond such committed parties to embrace many of the West's ordinary liberals and social democrats. For them, as much as for the self-styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light of world-wide hope had been extinguished in Santiago; and from Washington to Rome, via Paris, Bonn and London, anguished cries of "Foul!" rent the air.

THE OUTCRY IN BRITAIN was typical—and instantaneous

Revolt Against the Ballot Box" for which the Chilean armed forces could offer no excuse (*The Guardian*, 12/9/73); as a "Disaster in Chile" that would "set back the cause of socialism and democracy everywhere" (*New Statesman*, 14/9/73); and as "The Death of a Hope" comparable, even, to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended Alexander Dubcek's *régime* in 1968 (*The Observer*, 16/9/73).

Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the *coup* the General-Secretary of the British Labour Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was writing officially to one of Allende's former colleagues to say that it was difficult to express the sense of horror and anger felt by the British Labour movement "as the aspirations of the working people of Chile—shared by so many others around the world—are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and ignorant officers acting at the behest of those who believe their right to rule is unchallengeable" (*The Times*, 13/9/73). Mr Len Murray, General-Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed his shock and abhorrence with equal speed and vigour. And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a member of the Labour Party's National Executive, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionate as to suggest that her mind had come close to being overthrown with Allende's government. They ranged from the declaration that "the democratic will of the people of Chile" had been defeated by capitalist "collusion" (*The Guardian*, 17/9/73) to "for Socialists of this generation Chile is our Spain" and "This is the most vicious fascism we have seen in generations" (*The Guardian*, 19/9/73).

When the Labour Party Conference met at Blackpool three weeks later these instant reactions had hardened into established orthodoxy. The former Chilean Ambassador in London was given a standing ovation when he became the first non-delegate to address a Party Conference since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to do so in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried utterly condemning the military *coup* and the precipitate action of the British Government in recognising the military junta; demanding the recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago and the withholding from the military *régime* of all aid, loans, and credits; and calling on the Labour Movement to campaign for the restoration of democracy in Chile and to offer financial *and other* assistance to the Popular Unity (Allende's) movement (*The Times*, 5/10/73). My italics.

AN ILLUSTRATION of the

the reasons for this fierce reaction would repay study. Probably they included a happy chance of timing. Several of the most fashionable matters of Western political protest had passed into history or been shadowed by disillusionment in the year or two before Allende's downfall, from Viet Nam and Greece to Black Power and the Student Movement. Allende's dramatic end supplied a new cause just when it was wanted. Familiar double standards were certainly involved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference, for example, thought it necessary to ask why such a royal welcome should be offered to the representative of a government which had included one of the very few Communist parties outside Eastern Europe to approve the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. A Pavlovian response to the very idea of "revolution" was also clearly in evidence—and made all the more eager, it seemed, by the fact that this particular revolution had been taking place at such a safe distance in such sublimely foreign parts. There was, perhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failure, too—for it was difficult to read some of the more extravagant expressions of grief at Allende's death without sensing a touch of gratification at the idea that Good had once more succumbed to Evil and so delivered another martyr unto Heaven before he could be corrupted by the practical demands of life on Earth. But most of all, perhaps, the response seemed to stem from ignorance and wishful thinking—always the two most powerful sources of political romanticism—which left the facts of life in Allende's Chile either unknown or ignored and the field wide open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth. Hence the composite picture, now accepted throughout a wide spectrum of Western liberal and left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuine social democrat of impeccable constitutional propriety who met his end at the hands of a fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "ruling class" aided and abetted by the United States of America.

To replace this romantic vision with something approaching reality may already be impossible, for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their own immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do so also may entail some risk of abuse, for it seems to be a common assumption nowadays that anyone who seeks a rational explanation of a military *coup d'état* (unless it happens to represent a left-wing interest) is necessarily a fascist beast.

I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I am concerned here with Allende's Chile and not with what has taken its place. I hold no brief for military juntas, nor for the summary executions, mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever that the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated during its early months of power. Indeed, because I happen to know and like Chile as a country and count a number of Chileans among my friends I feel some personal sadness at the country's present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I am afraid, much moral shock. Military men will be military men, the world over; and in any case Chile was left in such a mess by Allende that some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected when he fell.

Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-have-beens. I accept that the country needed genuine social reform and I believe that it [illegible] could have been achieved without violence by a democratic government that was ready to work pragmatically within the constitution and with a *proper* respect for what the economic and political fabric of Chile would stand.

But that is not the point *any more*. What I am concerned about is how the *country* came to its present pass. And without wishing to speak ill of the dead, it seems to me necessary to say outright for the sake of the living that the Chilean *coup* was largely Allende's own fault and that the myths with which it has been surrounded on the Left are not merely a falsification of Chilean history but a potential danger to the future of liberal and social democratic politics in the Western world as well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to me about the fashionable Western reactions to events in Chile is their revelation of the degree to which revolutionary romanticism has combined with left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our own politics. It is certainly "no accident" that, for example, the British Labour Party which so uncritically adopts Allende's cause is also the party which has permitted its self-avowed Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional positions of unprecedented power.

I will leave others to pursue that theme, however. All I want to do is to try to set some of the Chilean record straight—or at any rate, straighter—by looking in some detail at three of the main myths that now surround the end of Allende and his famous experiment.

1. The American Intervention Myth

THIS FOUND its most virulent expression in the equation of Allende's downfall with that of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any American armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—let alone the *fact* that whereas Dubcek's Parliament supported him against the Russians, a majority of Allende's Congress invited him to resign—there were only stereotype suppositions to sustain it.

In general, the American intervention myth seemed to derive from that characteristic Latin American and left-wing scapegoat complex which insists that the *Yanquis* are responsible for everything (except, of course, anything good). Garnished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in Latin American affairs into a plausible anti-American smear; and the state of Washington politics in 1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such a smear extra credence this time. The *New Statesman* offered a fine example. "The likelihood is that the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", it assured its readers, "if a proper investigation can ever be mounted. But in default of this it does seem possible to say that Nixonism and its allies were already too heavily implicated in the

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[3] Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory might like to work out, incidentally, why ITT in Chile was never taken over by Allende, even after the notorious memorandum became public property. Was it, perhaps, because its operations there were mostly losing money and Allende did not want to share its financial embarrassments? Or was it that he knew the company had given him an effective political stick to beat his opponents with and he did not want to throw it away by kicking the company out? Either way, ITT's apparent immunity from reprisal did not suggest that he took its challenge very seriously.

subversion of Allende for them to be exonerated now" (14,9,73). The charge is almost ectoplasmically vague yet simultaneously all-embracing. But what does it actually rest on?

First, presumably, the celebrated memorandum of ITT which suggested ways of preventing Allende from assuming the Presidency in 1970 and of toppling his régime if he did so. There is, of course, no doubt of this memorandum's authenticity, nor of its appalling folly; and with such organisations admittedly pushing their conspiratorial notions at the heart of American politics it is not surprising that suspicions of *Yanqui* skulduggery were aroused. But there is a major snag for anyone who sees the memorandum as evidence of actual dirty work: simply, that all. Inquiries so far indicate that its recommendations were never adopted. They were studied by the CIA, where one department produced a contingency plan based upon them. But neither the memorandum nor the plan seems to have received assent at any higher level; and given the kind of public exposure to which the workings of the White House, the CIA and most other things in Washington have been treated during the Watergate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon's personal involvement with ITT), I am hard-pressed to believe that if such assent had been given it could have been kept quiet until now.[1]

Secondly, in support of the American intervention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S. maintained its contacts with the Chilean armed forces and continued to supply them with arms when other American aid to Chile was suspended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the Pentagon was deliberately keeping open the option of inspiring a military *coup* against an unwelcome government. But this is obviously a two-edged argument. For one thing, an army that is still getting its toys to play with is usually rather more than less likely to endure the follies of its ruling politicians gladly. And for another, what would have been said if the Americans had actually suspended arms shipments to forces whose commanders were serving in Allende's cabinet? The outcry about "*Yanqui* imperialism" and "Pentagon politics" may easily be imagined.

Thirdly, the strangulation of foreign aid and credit is laid at Washington's door as a major weapon in a cold war against Allende from the start. At first glance this has more substance to it. The U.S. certainly suspended further commercial credits of its own to Chile after Allende had nationalised the American-owned copper mines on terms amounting to confiscation. As the major power in the World Bank and the IMF the U.S. also argued there against further aid for Chile; and to the extent that it was successful it must have added to Allende's financial difficulties. But it was not able to prevent other Western countries (*e.g.* Holland and Sweden) from continuing to offer credit; it never persuaded Britain to close down its small aid programme; it did not exclude the re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debt repayments in 1972, and it had not prevented the discussion (incomplete at the time of the *coup*) of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, the U.S. influence may have limited Western aid and credit but it was far from being able to condemn Allende's Chile to economic purdah. In any case, Chile was not one of the under-developed world's hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and credits for its survival. The wealth of its copper mines alone ensured that in normal times it was not more than marginally "aid-worthy", and with sensible economic management it ought to have been able to withstand a good deal of external pressure. Unfortunately, nobody with even a nodding acquaintance with economics could have classified the management of the Allende government as anything but disastrous. To a great extent it placed itself beyond the pale for any but the most trusting—or dedicated—of creditors. But even if that had not been so, and if the blame for Chile's economic difficulties could have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's door, Allende would surely have had small cause for complaint. It was, after all, his administration which announced its immediate determination to "expropriate imperialist capital . . . realise a policy of self-financing . . . and review, denounce and repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agreements limiting our sovereignty, specifically the reciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aid pacts, and others, between Chile and the United States" (*The People's Unity—Basic Programme of Government, 1970*).

It was also his administration which promised to "repudiate the agreements between us and the International Monetary Fund" (*The People's Government—First 40 Steps, 1970*). These bold intentions were never fully realised, it is true; but they were expressed as official policy before the United States or any other "imperialist" power had actually done anything to embarrass Allende's government. In other words, it was Allende who decided to pick the quarrel. It seems naïve, to say the least, to complain that his chosen opponents took defensive measures. What else were they expected to do?

THOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN of American action, nevertheless, might be better employed in asking why Allende got so little support from most of the governments which professed to be his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered enthusiastic (but not always practical) advice to Allende, as well as supplying arms and training for his militant Left, the world's established Marxist governments were consistently cool to the "Chilean experiment." The farthest the Soviet Union would go to show its approval was to open a 12-year credit in roubles for Chilean imports of Russian industrial goods and to agree to take a limited amount of Chilean copper for a year or two in repayment. But the hard currency loans that Chile really needed to plug the gaps that quickly opened between Allende's economic promises and performance were never forthcoming from any Marxist source. Nor was that surprising. In the nature of things, Marxist countries rarely have hard currency to spare and they were unlikely to devote what little they might have to bailing out a régime which seemed intent upon over-reaching itself in every direction.

Conceivably, Allende would have done better for himself and his country if he had simply abandoned the "free" world market altogether and taken Chile at once into the controlled trade bloc of the Communist world in the hope of getting total Soviet support. But that would have meant imposing a completely centralised economy and strict political control inside Chile—in short, abandoning the romantic pretence of "constitutional revolution" for the more customary revolution by decree. To his credit, perhaps, Allende was unwilling (or unable) to do that;

but even if he had, it might not have worked. To support Castro's Cuba is believed to have cost Moscow the equivalent of about $1 million a day for many years. To support a similar régime in Chile would probably have cost even more. There was never the slightest sign that Mr Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, was ready to accept such a burden.

To sum up, then, it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. I am not saying, of course, that Washington was not relieved to see him go; although I think some American officials would have preferred to see him stumble on for some time longer in the hope that growing disillusionment would infect even his stoutest supporters and accordingly diminish the chances of his being made a martyr when nemesis finally overtook him. But in general the American attitude seems to have been a predictably cautious one:

> *Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive*
> *Officiously to keep alive. . . .*

A realistic Chilean government embarked on its "road to socialism" would surely have bargained for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysis such as Allende professed) it should have expected much more—that America would move in for the kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no steps to protect himself against possible American reprisals, declined to compromise for the sake of other Western help, and failed to provide grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends to help him.

It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not politics. At the very least, Allende must be convicted here of a lack of realism that would probably have been fatal to any statesman anywhere.

2. The Ruling Class Conspiracy Myth

THE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown by what has been variously described as a "revolt of the privileged," a series of "bosses' strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling class" contains so many misconceptions that it is hard to know where to begin to sort them out. One idea, however, seems basic to them all: that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition were somehow the uniquely legitimate representatives of "the People's Will." That such an odd belief should have gained any currency whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a mark of the confusion that surrounds the Chilean experience in the minds of many non-Chileans. To judge from published comments, such as those referring to the "defeat of the democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers abroad seem even to believe that he not merely enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote but was also the first President of his country to do so.

Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was and had been for many years a functioning democracy with a constitution which vested executive power in the President and legislative power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice, no doubt, there were serious weaknesses—as revealed, for instance, in the inability of previous governments to press through social reforms as swiftly as many Chileans would have wished. But by common consent the system was the best and most stable in Latin America and it had enabled Allende himself to contest the Presidency unsuccessfully three times before he finally won it at his fourth attempt in 1970. There was no doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique expression of "the people's will", it was gained only through a narrow plurality in which Allende obtained just over 36% of the poll. His nearest rival, only a couple of percentage points behind, was the candidate of the conservative National Party, whose members in Congress opposed Allende from the start. Another 28% went to the third candidate, a radical reformist from the Christian Democrat party, many of whose members in Congress at first gave Allende the benefit of the doubt, hoping he would modify his avowed Marxism in practice to a kind of reformism compatible with their own ideas and the existing constitution.

In the mid-term Congressional elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised its share of the vote to 44% (although this time the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition allegations of substantial electoral fraud). But the opposition parties retained a large majority in Congress where, by that time, most of the Christian Democrats had joined the Nationalists in outright antagonism to the President. On these facts it seems plain that, so far from representing "the People's Will", Allende never actually represented more than a substantial minority interest. Only if "the People" are identified as being those who voted for Allende, while the rest—the majority—are relegated to the status of "non-people" can any other interpretation be sustained. But that, of course, is just what is implied by the myth of the "ruling class conspiracy."

IF THERE WAS a "ruling class" in Chile it was that of the politicians and the surrounding establishment drawn mostly from the narrow upper end of Chile's prosperous middle class. Allende himself and many of his ministers and leading supporters were as much part of that group as were their political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group that often suffered less than others from Allende's socialism because its members on both sides generally possessed enough cash or property to exploit the black market at home or slip into agreeable exile if things got too rough—in any case, to survive (like Allende himself until his death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely of this group at all. With the possible exception of some naval officers, the armed forces were very much apart from the establishment of any political colour; and even after Allende brought the service commanders into his government they remained aloof from, and remarkably little known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago which were accustomed to set the country's political tone.

Indeed, as events since the *coup d'état* have shown, Chile's military men—like their counterparts elsewhere—were probably as contemptuous of the politicians (and as ignorant of politics) as the politicians were of them. They had stayed outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allende himself had not dragged them into the whirlpool they might have been content to remain that way. But their position was made intolerable by the President's own decisions. On the one hand they were encouraged to turn a blind eye to the steady growth of illegal, para-military forces under the command of the President's friends or others who were more extreme in their revolutionary commitment. On the other hand they were required to serve in his cabinet to maintain "law and order" and reassure the country of the President's constitutional propriety. On top of that they were threatened by attempts from within the President's own circle to subvert their authority within their own forces, as in the naval conspiracy uncovered in July 1973, and the public call for a naval insurrection by Allende's friend and fellow-leader of the Socialist Party, Senator Carlos Altamirano, made only three days before the *coup*.

A surer way can hardly be imagined of provoking mutiny among responsible officers, and it is only surprising, in retrospect, that it did not happen sooner—as in most Latin American countries it surely would have done. To ascribe the mutiny* thereafter to the machinations of "the ruling class" is to understand nothing, either of military men in general or of Chile's military in particular.

SIMILARLY, THE SO-CALLED "bosses' strikes" which preceded the military *coup* were, in fact, nothing of the kind. The lorry-men who paralysed half, or more, of Chile's transport by their month-long strike in September-October 1972, and their even longer strike in July-September 1973, were mostly owner-drivers who would have fitted fairly readily into the Teamsters' Union in the United States. They displayed the fierce economic and social protectionism typical of what in Europe or North America would be called the lower middle class, and they saw themselves threatened by galloping inflation and by what they believed to be the Government's intention to destroy their way of life through state control or ownership of their services. Along with the small shopkeepers who supported them—not forgetting the queue-weary housewives whose famous "Saucepan March" in Santiago was the most dramatic early sign of revolt—they might be classed as the *Poujadistes* of Chile. But by no stretch of the imagination could they be described as representatives of a "boss" or "ruling" class, or even as being especially "privileged" in a social or economic sense. Moreover, they owed little, if any, allegiance to the traditional political groupings of Chilean politics, although they obviously welcomed any support they could get from them. On the contrary, they tended to cut across the traditional spectrum and look to new leaders, whether of right or left. Thus, their principal spokesman, Senor Leon Vilarin, was actually a member of Allende's Socialist Party while others of the leadership came from the Nationalist Party ranks or from no party at all.

The members of the various professional associations, like doctors, dentists, lawyers and airline pilots, which joined the second transport strike, were likewise not "bosses" although they were certainly, in Chilean terms, rather more "privileged." Their protest was probably more ideological than that of the lorry-men and the shopkeepers—it was usually their wives, for example, who objected most forcibly to the Government's politically-inspired changes in the school curriculum—but it was also provoked by sheer exasperation and fear at the growing threat to their professional status posed by the Government's combination of administrative inefficiency and dubious social priorities. For example, Chile's economic collapse and inflation not only threatened many doctors financially but seriously frustrated their work. Some early reports from Santiago after the *coup* made the point that hospitals were appealing urgently for bandages and drugs to treat the wounded, as if that indicated that the number of casualties must be overwhelmingly high. But bandages, drugs, and other medical supplies had been only sporadically obtainable in Chile for many months beforehand. The daily round of the pharmacies in search of the simplest medicines had become a regular feature of Santiago life; and foreign embassies had been driven to stock-pile their own supplies, imported through the diplomatic bag, for the treatment of the most normal ailments among their staffs. It was partly in the hope of ending that situation that many otherwise conscientious doctors finally joined the movement to get Allende out.

NOR SHOULD IT BE FORGOTTEN that some of the most damaging strikes of all were those of Chile's most influential blue-collar workers—the copper-miners. The last lorry-men's strike was immediately preceded by a two months' strike for higher wages by miners at El Teniente, the country's biggest mine. Because copper accounts for three-quarters of Chile's foreign earnings, that strike probably cost the country far more in real terms than the transport strike, whose costs to a great extent could be absorbed internally. Indeed, as one West European diplomat remarked to me in Santiago, the money lost in those two months at El Teniente would have more than repaid Chile's entire debt to his government—a debt which Allende at that moment was trying to reschedule for the second consecutive year.

It is true that the copper-miners were the élite of Chile's blue-collar class and, no doubt, wanted to keep it that way. To that extent, perhaps, they may be deemed "privileged"—like, say, coal miners or motor car workers in Britain; although I doubt if that is what members of the British Labour Party, or the *New Statesman*, can have had in mind in embracing the "privileged" thesis. But a more important reason for the miners' restiveness, I believe, is that although they were the most vital of all Chile's manual workers they suffered far more than most of their erstwhile comrades from the country's shattering economic decline under Allende. Unlike farm and factory workers, they could not supplement their official wages by selling the fruits of their labour on the black market. The farm worker who could take home a sack

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*Although even that was not unthinkable towards the end, such was the chaos the economy had fallen into. The last time I left Chile, a week or so before the *coup*, I drove over the Andes to Argentina and at the Chilean customs post at the summit of the pass I found officials taking a large American car to pieces and laying upon the snow-covered ground around it *one ton* of copper ingots that had been hidden in various nooks and crannies of the chassis. It would have been worth around U.S. $2,000 in cash in Argentina—a fortune, by then, in Chilean terms, of about *four million* escudos on the black market.

potatoes, a few chickens, or even a side of beef, could make a good living on the black market even if his official wages remained stationary while inflation roared ahead. The factory worker who was entitled to buy a proportion of his factory's output at official fixed prices could (and did) sell that at six or ten times what he had paid as soon as he left the factory gate. But miners could hardly find ready buyers for a stolen truck-load of copper ore.[8]

Thus the copper-miners were thrust, in effect, into the same position as the lorry-men, the shop-keepers, and virtually all of Chile's salaried professional men and women: they were left more or less defenceless against the most vicious inflation the country had ever experienced.

SOME APOLOGISTS for Allende have maintained that the degree of inflation was exaggerated or, at any rate, little worse than was customary in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The truth is that it was far beyond anything normally endured in that continent. As little as nine months after Allende came to power, when I first visited Chile, the escudo had already fallen from 20 to 40 against the U.S. dollar on the free, or black, market. Eighteen months later, on my second visit, the Government's own figures put the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the money issue was going up by 10% a month and the escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black U.S. dollar. By August 1973, the official inflation rate was 323% and rising fast, and the escudo was worth only 2,000 to the dollar—an effective devaluation in less than three years of 10,000%!

Nor is it enough to attribute these catastrophic rates to such adventitious or malicious factors as—and again I refer to published arguments—falling world copper prices, the normal difficulties of maintaining industrial and farm output in a time of radical political change, or deliberate American intervention.

On the last of these three I have already said enough, I hope, to show that it was far from decisive and that it was, anyway, largely self-invited. As to falling copper prices, the fact is that after a fall in the first year of Allende's Government, prices recovered until by the time of his overthrow they were 80% above the level at the time of his election. Had they not risen so steeply he would almost certainly have fallen sooner and probably would not have secured his relative, short-lived success in the mid-term elections of March 1973. The difficulties of maintaining output in a time of change, however, were real—unfortunately, far more so than Allende ever seemed to realise.

To take just two examples: copper and milk. Expropriation of the copper mines from their American owners would, no doubt, have led in itself to the withdrawal of American technicians as well as of American management with some consequent risk of losing production temporarily, at least. But this might have been overcome by the promotion of trained Chilean managers and technicians, of whom there was no shortage.

Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not merely nationalised but deliberately politicised the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were handed out in thousands while trained Chileans emigrated so that, after three years of Popular Unity Government, mining manpower and costs had risen by more than a third while mining output was down by about the same amount.

I take milk as the second example because it was specifically mentioned in Popular Unity election literature, which guaranteed "every Chilean child half-a-quart of milk daily." Here again, the government's programme of land reform, intended to break the power of Chile's remaining landlords and open the way to co-operative or state farming, might have been expected to result in some shortfall in dairy production for a year or two while the teething problems were sorted out. In fact, however, milk production dropped as if someone had simply punched a hole in the bottom of every churn in the land. At one large cooperative dairy in Temuco, one of the main milk-producing areas of Chile, the average daily winter intake of milk was about 30,000 gallons in 1970. By 1973 it was down to 7,000. Nor was this surprising. Apart from the fact that legal land reform had been accompanied by widespread and unchecked illegal land seizures so that too many farms were in the hands of people utterly without experience, the prices established for milk—as for most other farm products—were simply economic nonsense. Presumably in the hope of getting half-a-quart of milk for every child on the cheap, the government decreed that a gallon of milk would fetch less than half the price of one egg. Inevitably, nobody was interested in producing milk and cows were slaughtered wholesale for beef—legally or illegally—or driven over the mountains to Argentina while Allende was forced to scour the world for dried milk imports that, thanks to his policy in the copper mines, he no longer had foreign currency to pay for.

SUCH FOLLIES were repeated everywhere as the romantic gestures of self-styled revolution were preferred to facing the facts of life. While overall production in both agriculture and industry fell disastrously, Allende simultaneously attempted to redistribute the national wealth by giving Chile's poorer classes more money to spend. They were his constituency and they were properly grateful, for many of them certainly had never had much before. But you can't redistribute what you have already thrown away; and as output vanished, so domestic queues grew longer, foreign debts piled up, and the budget deficit expanded like a hydrogen balloon. A year before the final collapse I asked one of Allende's chief economic advisers what they were going to do to control a situation that was already looking critical. He replied, with commendable candour, that he really didn't know. "I know," he said, "what we ought to do—we should impose an austerity régime tomorrow, freeze wages, and ration essential supplies. But how can we? We would destroy our own political base. . . ."

Precisely. In the end, rather than do that they plunged on down the primrose path of promises and illusions and practically destroyed the country. The "ruling class conspiracy" was the gloss that they and their supporters put upon the reality of their own miscalculations.

3. The Myth of the Constitutional Revolutionary

HERE WE COME to the crux of Allende's policies and character about which, finally, all the other arguments revolve. Was he a genuine constitutionalist? Was he a true revolutionary? Was he—could he ever have been—both?

Allende himself, of course, admitted no doubts. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was a revolutionary and a Marxist, and that he intended to establish at least the preconditions for what he told Régis Debray would be "total, scientific Marxist socialism." Equally repeatedly, he proclaimed his faith that he could achieve this end by constitutional means, through the ballot box and all it implied. That was, after all, to be the distinctive "Chilean road to socialism" of which so many people outside Chile cherished such high hopes.

But no hindsight is required to see that both theory and practice were riddled with contradictions. Revolutions are born of, or generate, sectional conflict—a fact of political life that Allende acknowledged every time he spoke of "overthrowing" what he called the "bourgeois" state. But a democratic constitution rests upon consensus—a basic acceptance of the fact that the State represents more than a merely sectional interest. The second permits reform, but the first denies it; and there is no way of reconciling the two.

All Allende's practical difficulties followed from this simple distinction. Taken seriously, his constitutionalism meant that his programme could only succeed if a majority would actually vote for it. But, elected as he was with only just over a third of the popular vote and with a large majority of Congress against him, Allende had neither a democratic nor an administratively effective mandate for his revolution. Indeed, in a parliamentary rather than a presidential democracy, he would probably never have been able to begin.

If he was to succeed within his six-year term of office even in opening the door to revolution, let alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he had to transform his minority into a majority. But how to do it? For, if words meant anything, Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace the existing, reformable constitution of Chile with another that would be, of its Marxist nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that was admittedly democratic was to be used to build another that would be effectively dictatorial. This was asking the majority to hang itself from its own gallows; and, not surprisingly, it declined.

ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic illogicality in his position were precisely what ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to abandon either his revolutionary rhetoric or his professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely more and more upon political illusionism. His sleight-of-hand was often remarkable, as he sought to outwit the opposition majority in Congress by exploiting the letter of the constitution, using every legal loophole to force upon them measures they did not want. But in the process, inevitably, he destroyed the constitution's spirit, so that his opponents became as ruthless as he was. At the start he won considerable opposition support in Congress for needed changes like the nationalisation of the copper mines, land reform, and the state's takeover of banks and major industries—evidence that the democratic consensus could and would work within the existing constitution. But, at the end, not a single member of the opposition majority would cast a vote in his support. They voted unanimously to condemn his "habitual illegalities" and were even joined by the Supreme Court in accusing him of disregarding the rule of law. He had cut away the middle ground of Chilean politics, wrecked the democratic consensus, and begotten the reality of counter-revolution through his own addiction to revolutionary slogans.

Equally inevitable was the economic breakdown, which came from Allende's attempts to enlarge his popular base outside the political institutions. Here his plan was two-fold: to buy political support among "the People" through massive wage increases and other benefits and at the same time to squeeze the middle class into submission, or even flight from the country, through wholesale nationalisation of their interests and the appointment of his own men to all significant civil-service jobs. The two simply cancelled each other out; for while the first part of the plan raised vast new expectations and demands, the second diminished the country's capacity to meet them. The whirling spiral of inflation followed as a *necessary* result of Allende's political confusions.

THESE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS were compounded by the fragmented nature of Allende's support. His Popular Unity coalition was far from united. Its majority element was Allende's own Socialist Party—a body that bore little resemblance beyond its name to most of the democratic socialist parties of Europe which so enthusiastically espoused its cause. It was, in fact, a revolutionary Marxist party that began as a splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist Chilean Communist party in the 1930s, and in recent years had acquired a fiery "New Left" wing as well. Several of its leaders, like Senator Altamirano, and many of its rank and file, constantly urged Allende to "speed up the revolution" without much regard for constitutional niceties. The smallest element of the coalition was the Christian radicals of various persuasions, some of whom hoped to offer a bridge to the centre of Chilean politics by cooperating with the left wing of the Christian Democrats, but none of whom ever attained positions of real influence. The coalition's sheet anchor was the Communist Party which, as business and administration slipped into chaos, became increasingly important as a source of discipline and strategic thinking.

IT WOULD HAVE BEEN hard enough to drive this *troika* anyway without either overstepping the constitutional limits of government or antagonising one or other of its elements and thereby jeopardising the only "democratic" base the revolution had. But Allende had also to contend with the still more militant left outside the coalition, led by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution now, and by violence if necessary—as, in MIR's view, it was.

Here Allende's professed constitutionalism was

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[*] Indeed, as I discovered for myself on a visit to southern Chile nine months after Allende's elections, local police forces there were under specific instructions not to attempt to restore the farms to their legal owners. See also Robert Moss's report in ENCOUNTER, "Allende's Chile", August 1973, and Alistair Horne's "Commandante Pepe", July 1973.

revealed as, at best, equivocal. He officially rejected MIR's violence, yet he never permitted the Army to root out their para-military groups. When they stigmatised his land-reform programme as "inadequate" and seized hundreds of farms at gun-point he rebuked them in occasional speeches but did nothing to reverse their actions.[8]

When they hi-jacked lorry-loads of valuable manufactures, to raise funds by selling them on the black market, he rarely tried to redress the crime. The Left said this was because the MIR truly represented "the People" against whom Allende dared not act. But the truth, I fear, was more squalid. For one thing, the MIR had close friends in the Socialist Party and in Allende's own entourage whom the President did not want to offend. For another, as long as their activities did not actually split the Popular Unity coalition, it was often convenient to see them pushing along the revolution by unconstitutional means while Allende denounced them in his role as a constitutionalist.

It was not as if Allende was unable to deal with the MIR when he had to. For example, when a *Mirista* force blockaded the Philips television factory in Santiago in 1973 after an unsuccessful attempt to hi-jack a lorry-load of TV sets, they were allowed by the Government to remain unmolested for ten days, although a police post was just across the road. Yet when diplomatic representations were made by the Dutch *chargé d'affaires* with the hint that his country's financial aid might have to be reconsidered if this harassment of a Dutch enterprise continued, the *Miristas* were hustled away without a shot in 24 hours.

A SIMILAR EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende's adoption of a personal armed bodyguard—the first in memory to accompany a Chilean President. It is true that the extreme Right in Chile was quick to threaten violence as a response to Allende's proclaimed revolution, and Allende himself always maintained that he needed protection. But right-wing para-military groups were never as big or as highly organised as those on the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a constitutionally-minded President would surely have been to call upon his state security forces to protect him.

Instead, Allende formed a personal unit, known as "the Group of Friends of the President." Trained, armed, and partly manned by Cubans, it was led by known revolutionaries, sympathetic to the MIR, including Allende's son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the very centre of the State was not merely a provocation to the established security forces and an affront to Chilean tradition, it was also an implied rejection of the principle of constitutional rule.

DOUBTS ABOUT the real depth of Allende's constitutionalism were raised also by his personal history and his language, both of which suggested a romantic attachment to violence. He was, after all, a founder and first president of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation, created in Havana in the 1960s and dedicated to the encouragement of armed insurrection throughout the continent. He promised to "paint Santiago with blood" in 1970 if Congress declined to ratify his election as President, and he repeatedly tried to intimidate the opposition, inside and outside Congress, with the threat of civil war. These were not the actions or the sentiments of a man dedicated to constitutional change, except as a matter of expediency.

On the other hand, it was hard to see Allende as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked anything but the complete bourgeois gentleman. A *bon viveur*, florid but well-groomed, a snappy dresser, with a twinkling eye for the ladies and a good deal of personal charm, his strongest political card was his skill in tactical manoeuvre. But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with a real message, he was unconvincing. Towards the end, as he appeared with increasing frequency on the presidential balcony in Santiago to address chanting crowds of his supporters with revolutionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all contact with reality, to have become an actor in love with his revolutionary part rather than a serious leader who knew where he was going.

IN RETROSPECT, I am inclined to think this was always the truth of the matter with Allende. Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour upon the stage but he never properly assessed the forces he was dealing with, either for or against him. He raised expectations on his own side without commanding the means to satisfy them, and he encouraged opposition on the other side by his use of a revolutionary rhetoric whose threats he also could not fulfil.

At best he was muddle-headed; and time may show that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly he managed to deceive a lot of people, including himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard lessons. That you can't be a democrat *and* a revolutionary—at least, not in a society that is already admittedly democratic. That you can't be anti-American *and* expect the Americans to help you. That you can't pose as the people's leader *and* kick most people in the teeth. That you can't conscript soldiers into politics *and* expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't have inflation roaring out of sight *and* maintain a base for social welfare. That, in short, the real world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land. Down here, you just can't have your cake *and* eat it.

It is sad that such elementary lessons should have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in Chile. But it is alarming that so many people elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they are the lessons.

14-00000

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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~MFR~~ FUOMEN / RSYOPS CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: SEPT. 1973 - MAY 1974

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BOL. IX

TO: (Headquarters component)

C/LA/AN/C

C/IP/DMS

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO: (Station/Base)

Santiago, Chile

FROM: (Division)

C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3 - ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6 - ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8 - USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS, AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10 - ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11 - A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE		2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER		
		COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NO.
☒ SUBJECT	☐ PROJECT	015	124	052

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

FUOMEN

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION		5. DISPOSITION	
☐ OPEN FILE	☒ CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)	☐ RETAIN	☐ DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)
☐ AMEND FILE TITLE	☐ REOPEN		

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)	8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)
HCS	015

9. FILES ACTION

☐ HOLD IN CS FILES	☐ RESTRICTED	☒ UNRESTRICTED	☐ PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐ CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT	12. COORDINATION	13. RID APPROVAL
SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. 8748 C/AN	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)	REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

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S E C R E T 281611Z AUG 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 25462

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.

MHCRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 74

WH/6

1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF. WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HQ INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

28 Aug 74

15-124-52

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TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

TO: Chief, EUR Division

FROM: COS, Helsinki

No. 669923

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
	Newspaper article	FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI
		22455
	Held for Record	
		E2 IMPDET

FORM 1236a. Obsolete Forms 1230 and 1236a (2-64), which may be used.
5-69

SECRET

(13-47)

[illegible]

Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lysande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censurtänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger *Andres Küng*, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, *Att så socialism och skörda fascism*.

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emotsågs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle äntligen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, främst kopparn, 2) ökad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstatligande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.

Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

Koppar viktig

— Kopparn svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsintäkterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av kopparn visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Kopparn förstatligades genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarna hänsköts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-länder. Flera jordreformlagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "basHektar" kunde tvångsinlösas. (en basHektar = en hektar förstklassig konstbevattnad jord).

— Takten i jordreformarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstatligats 1973.

En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt. En annan var jordockupationerna. De ökade nio gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exproprierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 163 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarettköerna i centrum ett par kvarter långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drevs till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot flertalets vilja tvinga fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste känna avsky för den nuvarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

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LURS

WH8, 555

T 077241 EIA232 PAGE 01 IN 339973

TOR:221103Z MAY 74 HELS 22459

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CITE HELSINKI 22459

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO, [illegible]

SUOMEN PSYCH [illegible]

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/ AUTHOR ANDRES [illegible] (UMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

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* 277141 E1A230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:0211032 MAY 74 HELS 22493

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

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T 172681 EIA126 PAGE 01-01 IN 274496

TOR:071631Z JUN 74 SAGO 29396

S E C R E T 071544Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29396

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REFS: A. PARIS 48989 (IN 273492)

B. DIRECTOR 559514

1. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING FACT.

2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET

T.L. FUOMEN

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S E C R E T 061624Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48989

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

Tel - TUCMEN

RYBAT HYSAGE

REF: DIRECTOR 559514

1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 56-6-42/3; 201-907906. E2, IMPDET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Helsinki

INFO.
C/WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT
FUJMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HELSINKI 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.

Leslie H. BERBERIAN

Distribution:
2 COS Helsinki — To out pouch
1 C/WHD

[illegible]

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCSA-18904

DATE
3 May 1974

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
15-124-52
Defer

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

/Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad, Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5/

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

8463
CSO: 8014/2087-W

Francisco heeft aangekondigd tij-
'e negers zullen
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rden op voetgan-
) vijf maanden.
len zonder par-
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! te zijn beland,
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Brezjnjevs ont-
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militaire bond-
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n het Russische
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Het Ameri-
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Cuba. Deze
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

V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen, in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale produkt verminderde in het eerste kwartaal met een jaar-percentage van 5,8. Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale produkt is verminderd en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale produkt met 5,8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt toe met 1,6 procent.

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISCH LEGER

ADDIS ABEBA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de strijdkrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben gekregen.

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makkonen dit gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Abeba van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de strijdkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen zou zijn in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijt de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettige wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdeeldheid te zaaien.

PLANNEN

Makonnen gaf op de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij prees de strijdkrachten voor hun voorbeeldig gedrag en deed een beroep op hen een voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de moeilijke dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopiër die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangenis ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routinewerk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de havenstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Liberaal Kennedy aan het woord

Arbeidsonrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De posterijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsonrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie, die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.

Door wilde stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land gesloten ten gevolge van solidariteitsstakingen. De moeilijkheden be-

Opgemerkt

Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen „aanpassingsproblemen" te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige verschijnsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbaar en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het „Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week vangen zij ook nog eens vijfentwintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rittenkaart voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten gelegde groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog met volle maag de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. *Zij zijn afkom-*



BELGRADO — De Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donderdagavond op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootoefeningen van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn gehouden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italië en Zuidslavië over de zogenaamde „zone B" ten zuiden van Triëst verscherpt. Kennedy noemde het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat ze al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren genomen. De Amerikaanse senator is donderdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zei „zeer onder de indruk" te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatshoofd.

20 werknemers schorste omdat zij t-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese posterijen te boycotten. De werknemers willen looneisen stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebeck zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddellijke loonsverhoging eisen van 20.000 tot 38.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loodsen te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 8000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersleiders.

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nalaten te voorkomen dat de invoer uit Latijns-Amerika nog meer aan beperkingen onderhevig wordt gemaakt.

Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het „progressieve nationale front" heeft hiertoe besloten, zo is donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front.

GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen werden vernield, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vluchtende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tienduizend Basotho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsom-

zegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. „Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Velen menen, dat ingewortelde

stammen-vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aanleiding voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot „slachtpartijen" kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de broodeloos geworden teruggekeer-

zich in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen waarvoor zij de uiteindelijke consequenties niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende voelden zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrag. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afkondigen van amnestie voor al diegenen, die „lid waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie", voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op zelfbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanslagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens diplomatieke status kregen is ook verklaarbaar als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verblijfsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze vluchtelingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen „aanpassingsmoeilijkheden" te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weldra hun weg naar belangrijke sleutelposities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de "vervolgden" in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd voelden door een tot de tanden gewapend militant-Marxistisch soldatenleger. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen uit alle windstreken stonden hen ter beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het „Berner Tagblatt" een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdrijving schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de Freiburgse Universiteit: „Het concept van de politieke vluchteling kan met betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen werden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire definitie van een vervolgde. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen werden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In feite zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen zochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen."

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A. LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y

B. NEWS BULLETINB PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y

C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME, APRIL 74.Y

D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

B EBB. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

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SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL.

3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 15-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG 0026, REF B, FOR ~~SUMMARY OF~~ QUOTES FROM ARTICLES.) RSR

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS INTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/

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TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT
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1306, OCT 73). (276994)

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TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

REDLEG AEFISH

REFS: A. BANGKOK 59065 (IN 260348)

B. DIRECTOR 554557

1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1970 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 20 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

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CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF B INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING DEVELOPMENT.

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FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: HCSA 18904

1. LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER. WHEN RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER REF. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN SWEDISH. IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

RPK

X

WH/2

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15-124-52
28 May 74

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STAFF

ACTION UNIT
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ACTION #

INFO
RF ✓ FILE VR IT/AN WH8 SS6
PS/EG4 OPS/INT

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 01 IN 262014

TOR:2417162 MAY 74 BNN8 31991

C/WH/6 ___
DC/WH/6 ___
WH/6/SA ___
WH/6/FI ___
WH/6/RR ___
WH/6/Sec'y ___

S E C R E T 2416272 MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

REF BONN BASE 31516 (IN 241838)

FI
FUOMEN

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY. GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

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T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 02-02 IN 262014

TOR:2417162 MAY 74 BNNB 31991

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT. MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN. INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD, HQS WILL NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM 2020
MAC 73

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TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

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INFO
RF. FILE VR IPAN, SS5, SB8, WH8

ACTION #

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T 125861 EIA160 PAGE 01-01 IN 251122

TOR:141023Z MAY 74 STOC 15691

S E C R E T 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305

B. HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Fil FUOMEN

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/SA
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ACTION UNIT WH8

I N F O RF FILE VR IPLAN, WH8, SSS, C/OPR2, PS/EG 4, OSG/OC, C/OPS.

ACTION #

IN 250476

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 01

SAGO 29117

TOR:131851Z MAY 74

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Secy

S E C R E T 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549348

B. PARIS 48390 (IN 250170)

FI.
FUOMEN

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

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INFO

RF. FILE VR.

ACTION #

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 02-02 IN 250476

TOR:131851Z MAY 74 SAGJ 29117

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

30-2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 102248Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 549348

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE ITAN, WH 8, SS-5, PS/EG4, CI/R-2

0 INDEX
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0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY: 49

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES. IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARBLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF JOURNALIST FOR PRESTIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WH/[illegible]/CA ______
WH/[illegible]/FI ______
WH/[illegible]/RR ______
WH/6/Cody ______

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DATE:
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EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

S E C R E T

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR 549348

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

0 INDEX

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0 RETURN TO PER

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DISSEM BY: #

2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION 8888FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
ORIG: DAN WAGNER:LD
UNIT: E/F/INT
EXT: 9111

C/E/CA

C/WH Herbert W. Natzke
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 055747

OUTGOING MESSAGE 32-1

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PAGE OF PAGES 1 1

6

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 102239Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 547305

CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE 11/AN. SB 8. WH 5. 555

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45

0 NO INDEX

0 RETURN TO PER

0 IP FILES #

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973) Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER (AECLUSTER) REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH K Y U N G, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. (DOI: MID-1971). NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.#

DC/WH w

WH/[illegible]

WH/[illegible]

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WH/[illegible]

WH/6 (CHILE)- J. K.

SB/X/EU- Jane H

File FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74

ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD

UNIT: E/SC/S

EXT: 1588

C/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/SC

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY: 008234

FORM 3020
2-71 MFG 11-73

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ACTION #

INFO RF, FILE, VR, IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC, C/OPS, SSS

STAFF

T 123294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

C/WH/6 ____
DC/WH/6 ____
WH/6/[illegible] ____
WH/6/FI ____
WH/6/RR ____
WH/6/Secy ____

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

[illegible] FUCHEN

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3020b
(?) AUG. 11 73

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T 103294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

FORM 3020b
7/1 VIG 11 73

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ACTION UNIT EUR8

INFO RF. FILE VR. IP/AN, WH8, OS6/OC, C/OPS SS5

ACTION #

T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

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FORM 3020
(7) MIG 11 73

24/838

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ACTION UNIT EUR 8

ACTION #

INFO: RID. FILE VR IP/AN, SSS, PS/EG.4 OPS/INT, WH8

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241838-A

T 100017 EIA020 PAGE 01 IN 2~~[illegible]~~

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

S E C R E T 031429Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31516

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.

CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX

REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/3
WH/6/SI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Soc'y

#132 DUPE & CORRECTED FOR WASH S/C NOTE.

To FUOMEN

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED 15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY. MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN, FRIEDRICH BEERMANN (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING, HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS MATTHOEFER, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAWL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363, NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

S E C R E T

FORM 3070
1-71 MIG. 11 73

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INFO RF, FILE, VR,

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STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

IN 241838
~~IN 247248~~

T 122217 EIA020 PAGE 02-02

TOR:110243Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS) AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN 201 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDERS AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.

4. FILE: 201-2230705 X-REF 201- , E2 IMPDET

WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER

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Chile

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ACTION UNIT EUR8

INFO RF, FILE VR, PLANS, WH8, SSS,

ACTION #

T 077141 EIA232 PAGE 01 IN 239973

TOR:0211032 MAY 74 HELS 22455

C O N F I D E N T I A L 020949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES K U N G (UMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

SDR

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2 May 74

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T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3020b
(7) MIG. 11/73

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INFO: RF FILE VR WH/CA, EUR 8, SSS,

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T 352272 EIA036 PAGE 01 IN 231132
TOR:231149Z APR 74 HAMB 24795

S E C R E T 230953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN REF.

2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000), WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THROUGH MRS. VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

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15-124-52
23 Apr 74

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T 724892 PAGE 01 IN 104043

HAMB 23918

TOR:0410112 DEC 73

WH/6

S E C R E T 040921Z DEC 73 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

MHCRUNCH CASPECIAL FUOMEN TOWITTY

1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CHILE.

2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS REGIME. ALLENDE'S MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING PLEA FOR SOVIET SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEPT UNDER THE RUG.

3. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED

04 DEC 73

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PAGE 02-02

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HAMB 23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE, SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 466010

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

3P

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

REF: DIRECTOR 465768

1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.

2. ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF OBSENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A 'SON OF A WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUBAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.

3. "DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. BAZAN INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-

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MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 551 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...'

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONS OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. " U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

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6. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2, IMPDET.

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 W. Kent

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

EXT: 6556/9155

15-124-52

C/WH/SA

C/EUR

James E. Flannery

C/WHD/for

EA/JK/J

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

HP

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

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BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS, INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS, INTENDED TO BECOME A "PARALLEL" ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY, PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPEHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DETAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

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AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD. HE SAID MEDIA WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS, POLITICANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED. HE CHARGED THAT FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT ENOUGH WEAPONS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT SOVIET-MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITANK GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, CANNONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO ADDRESSED TO "DEAR SALVADOR." LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING CLASS HAD BEEN FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE "ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.

6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF GOEBBLES." SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

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HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN GUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED; ROA SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

7. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

C/EUR
C/WHD James E. Flannery EA/JK/J C/WHD/6

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TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 (IN 031350)

B. SANTIAGO 26512 (IN 031722)

1. PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOMEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REFS ATTACHED.

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18 SEP 73

15-124-52

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

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W. Kent

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TO: IMMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

BOOK CABLE

O FUOMEN SUMMARY OF COUP EVENTS

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED AGAINST MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON 12 SEPT THERE WAS FIGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TROOPS AND SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY AND NIGHT BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

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AND CIVILIANS. THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE BY 14 SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. NEWSPAPERS PLANNED RESUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP.

4. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A DINING ROOM.

5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

6. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET {ARMY}, AN INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO {NAVY}, WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY {CONSERVATIVE}; GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH {AIR FORCE}, A STRONG LEADER WHO FORMER SUPPORTER OF RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS; AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, {CARABINERO CHIEF} WHO HAS

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CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONNILLA (ARMY), WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITAORY AIDE FOR TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY), REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL, FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STAFF, REPORTED INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

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GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA {AIR FORCE}, REPORTED IN EARLY 1972 TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO {RET. AIR FORCE}, AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY {CARABINEROS}, ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEPCION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER {AIR FORCE}, FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE {CARABINEROS}, WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST, CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE SOMEWHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EWING {ARMY}, DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

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UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR - LTW COL ENRIQUE MONTERO (AIR FORCE) FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR, LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATI■ONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY ■■■ BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR ■ STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SMALL LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERATION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BU■T MAY CONSULT WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRI■KING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.

10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM CLYONS DSO

UNIT: C/WH/6/RR

EXT: 7710/1069

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CONF: WH8 INFO: FILE 1P/1JN, EUR8, 555

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TO: HAMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

FUOMEA PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: HAMBURG 24759 (IN 225831)

1. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE BKHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE CHILEAN IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PREFER LET DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE. [illegible] WE WOULD BE WILLING SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEWS WOULD CARRY REAL WEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH INEFFECTUAL AND MIGHT WELL BACKFIRE.

2. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

WH/2

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15-124-52
19 Apr 74

DATE: 18 APRIL 1974
ORIG: KEITH GARDINER:NO
UNIT: DC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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T 037829 PAGE 01 IN 225831
TOR:171326Z APR 74 HAMB 24759

SECRET 171253Z APR 74 STAFF
CITE HAMBURG 24759
TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

1. CHILE'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE." EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND. TOWARD THAT END, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

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T 144267 [illegible] PAGE 01-01 IN 880779

TOR:042140Z APR 73 SAGO 24516

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SECRET 042118Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 24477 (in 878105)

B. DIRECTOR 391223

1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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T 827548 PAGE 01 ~~IN 136804~~

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

S E C R E T 141550Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27899

TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON.

RYBAT FUUMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 499469 -15-124-52

1. WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 3: "...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND, ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..." "...OTHER PRICE RISES BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 508 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR: WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER PLACED INFLATION FOR THE YEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800 PERCENT, THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SEE SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173 OF 11 JANUARY.)

2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OVER THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION/

B

[illegible]		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
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T 307548 PAGE 02-02 IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974..."

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TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE. STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 11 SEPTEMBER TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE

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CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770% FOR THE YEAR.

4. THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 1973. THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCERBATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S CCREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S 1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE $4 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

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7. COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% OVER LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S FOREIGN RESERVES.

8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OWNERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, BUT PROBABLY WITH SOME FORMULA INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BANK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE

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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING 1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATISFACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAURGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF

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CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP ~~IF~~ O INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCATIONAL SEYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT, WRITING A STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

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DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING

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WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL SUPPORT.

14. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU, IN ORDER TO REGAIN SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY THE SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTABLE "MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA.

15. THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE INTERNAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUNT AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORMER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO MANIPULATE THE PDC INTO OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT. TWO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AND SEVERAL ARE BEING SET UP IN EUROPE.

16. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT IS

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IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.

17. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

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TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET

REF: HAMBURG 23881 |IN 096923|

1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST.

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND INSTITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVBES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EXPECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

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EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES. AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE. CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED, EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

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FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT-REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE $4 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS, CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

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OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS WELL AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSBATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF REVERSION.

J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICEN~~C~~DE, AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.

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K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMS, THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY ORIENTATION.

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE IN CHILE.

2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

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A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS? WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:SMB
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

C/WH/6

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: "POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS COMMINDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING {REF} THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU {PCP/SOVIET} INTENDED TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED 24 AN EMERGENCY MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

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26 Sep 73

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ALLENDE REGIME. WHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE, BUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NAMES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU). INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ (PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN), FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER (PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER), GUILLERMO HERRERA MONTESINOS (ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION), AND ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS [illegible] WHO USED THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

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BEGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERS TO AID IN SUPPORT THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH). INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PCP/SOVIET MEMBERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR MEMBERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING IN LIMA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.

6. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK OF 23 SEPTEMBER WHEN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARRIVE FROM VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. [illegible] ALL WERE TO BE LODGED IN LIMA, AND, LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST IN REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRODUCTION OF CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSIBILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY REGIME, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE TO MAKE SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY. WH

7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WERE TO MEET IN LIMA ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

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GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS. SOME DELEGATES TO MEETING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU), WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST CHILEAN JUNTA.

8. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/5355

James E. Flannery WH/SA
C/WHD

C/WH/6

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DATE-TIME GROUP: 251524Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

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TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 |IN 035309|

B. LIMA 26010 |IN 038180|

1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF B, LIMA 26010, SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENETRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE WHO IS PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICER) AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52
25 Sep 73

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1973 J. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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DATE TIME GROUP 242210Z

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 458840

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TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 (IN 037592)

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE BECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED, INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY: LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS THIS SUBJECT.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

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DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: WH/6/SA
EXT: 6607/1069

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[illegible] TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

S E C R E T 241415Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26475

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR 458535 o Legal property of govt

B. DIRECTOR 456615

C. BONN 26432 (IN 035549)

1. PARA 3B REF B STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED OWNERS. REF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM REF A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 3B REF B. IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT BECOME LEGAL PROPERITY OF GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT.

2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF FIRMS INVOLVED.

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TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CDARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONNMN 26432 |IN 035549| |*|

B. DIRECTOR 456615 |**|

1. "SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM DFOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF ECONOMY. STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES, EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COMPARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN 1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SECDTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED

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TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

3. FILE: 15-1204-52. E 2, IMPDET.A

*INTEND USE (REF B) [redacted] FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/B
EXT: 6556/9155

ADC/WH/6 William M. Kent

AC/EUR/3A

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, ROME.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.

2. SUBJECT: REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE REGIME ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS MADE BECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED

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IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN CHILE WOHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING, BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-528. E 2, IMPDET.H

c/WH/COG O. Butler

C/EUR/SA

EA/JKO/J

C/WH/SA

William M. Kent

C/WH/6

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILOALLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/90192

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057556

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 212250Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 450246

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE C/IPA/AN, ADD/DO, C/SS 3
C/OS/ALIC2 C/OPS

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
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0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS ■AIRES, GUAT■EMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUB■VERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE.

3. ON OR ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA ■■ OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AM■ERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE ANY CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA. THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES ■IN CHILE.

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

CHILE CI-4

15-124-52
21 Sep 73

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0 IP FILES #

458246

5. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/9192

W Kent

DC/WH/3

J.D. Nelson
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for W. M. Kent
C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION UNIT

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INFO

RF. FILE VR [illegible] [illegible]/533 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

T 547408   PAGE 01-01   IN 036120

TOR:211917Z SEP 73   PACY 25771

S E C R E T 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A. DIRECTOR 457922

B. PANAMA CITY 25754 (035309)

1. CONCUR REF A.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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15-124-52

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ACTION 853

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T 547303 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 036065

TOR:2118112 SEP 73 MEXI 25263

S E C R E T 211808Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25263

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF DIRECTOR 457888

1. CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

b

WH/6 CT-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP
211725Z

CITE
DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
457922

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PER ___ # ___

CONF: C/WH8 INFO: FILE C/WH/COG DDO/DO C/SS C/PS/EG2 C/CI/INT2 C/WH

0 MORE 0 NO INDEX
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0 FILE

TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: PANAMA CITY 25754 (IN 035309)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA AS PLACE ACQUIRED, OMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUIJADA OR HIS PARTICIPATION AT MEETING. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAM SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 211612Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 457088

CONF: [illegible] INFO: FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

DISSEM BY: [illegible]
PER #

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO
0 IP FILES

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 25260 (IN 035305)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL OMMIT NAME OF MANUEL CORTINA AND REFER TO HIM ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

WH/6 CT-4
15-124-52
21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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INFO RF. FILE. VR C/LIFIAN, C/SS3 C/WH8

ACTION # 097

T 546182 PAGE 01-01 IN 235549

TOR:211012Z SEP 73 BONN 26432

S E C R E T 210956Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON,

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF. TO INCREASE USEFULNESS, PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 3B REF.

2. FILE 15-124-52. E2-IMPDET

AE

WH-6 CT-4

15-124-52
21 Sept 73

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PAGE 1

CLASSIFICATION
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP: 182334Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 455615

CONF: C/WH 8 INFO: FILE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
-/553

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43
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0 IP FILES #

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT.

2. SUBJECT: ECONOMIC PLANS ~~OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA~~.

3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), OUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EITHER TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT, WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS;

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR 50%, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES TO THE PUBLIC.

B

DATE:
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WH/6 CT-4 18 SEP 73
15-124-52

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PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

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TO THE PUBLIC.

4. ACCORDING TO NUNO, PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO HELP THEM.

5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS SOFOFA COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

6. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

J. W. Kaufman
C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

SA/WH/EICO

C/WHD/L

C/WHD

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ACTION UNIT C/WH8

ACTION # 732

INFO RF. FILE. VR. C/IC/OH, C/SS3, C/PS/EG3, C/OPS/INT 2.

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T 538842 PAGE 01-01 IN 032783

[illegible] TOR:181935Z SEP 73 SAGO 26529

S E C R E T 161856Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26529

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456203

1. CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR FUOMEN. NO SPECIALCAVEATS. (IN 031351)

2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY. INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY TO FUERMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2. (IN 031722)

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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18 SEP 73

15-124-52

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ACTION # 179		PS/EG 2, CI, CI/OP, FR 4, SS/SOG 3	2		5	
			3		6	

PAGE 01

TOR:172145Z SEP 73

SAGO 26512

S E C R E T 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/07571-73
HCS-9839

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX. FILE: 15-9-4. CL BY 009560.

FILED: 171950Z

SECRET

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OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 031722

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

NSC/S

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : 15 SEPTEMBER 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CH

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9839

SOURCE: AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. HE HAS GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS OF THE PDC. MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI, A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ, THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHO HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND LEON VILARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PDC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY.)

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

IN 031722

TDFIR -314/07571-73

WARNING NOTICE
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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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T 535956 PAGE 01-01 IN 031535

TOR:1718432 SEP 73 SAGO 26500

S E C R E T 171814Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26500

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE FUOMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)

B. SANTIAGO 26464 (IN 030951)

1. CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.

2. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

[✓ WH/6]

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

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ACTION # 138

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T 535509 PAGE 01-01 IN 031341

TOR:171558Z SEP 73 MEXI 25196

S E C R E T 171541Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25196

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE

REF. SANTIAGO 26464 (C 030451)

1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM. REQUEST SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS. ALLENDE AT AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.

3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

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T 532968 PAGE 01-01 IN 032412

TOR:151547Z SEP 73 MEXI 25191

C/W

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Secy

RO

S E C R E T 151536Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25191

TO: DIRECTOR.

KDOBELISK FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 454587

1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KDGLACIER-3 ON 13 SEPT 73. ON 14 SEPT KDGLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FILE: 50-6-91/3. E2. IMPDET.

fi Fuomen

(2)

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ACTION # 683

T 527885

PRECEDENCE

PAGE 01

TOR:132324Z SEP 73

IN 028495

SAGO 26421

S E C R E T 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26421

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, WH/MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS, LONDON, PARIS, LCPIPIT, BONN.

1. EL MERCURIO, A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY, APPEARED TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) CARRYING FOR MOST PART OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER, APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:

A. HACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL

CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MAS INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNDO EN LA DIRECCION DEL PAIS. TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LA EXTRANJERA HABIAN LLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTRABA EN UN PROCESO FATAL QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL.

LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASO A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA

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15-124-52

13 SEP 73

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ACTION UNIT	INFO	RF. FILE . VR .	1	4
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ACTION #			3	6

T 527885 PAGE 02 IN 028495

TOR:1323242 SEP 73 SAGO 26421

Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO DEL TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD. PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION HASTA EL PUNTO EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.

SECRET

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ACTION #			3	6

CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO. RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRIBUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION, SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PERMITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

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T 527885 PAGE 04 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS. A NADIE PUEDE SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTISMO ES TRABAJO. ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA -- COMPLACENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL.

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD, COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE, Y ESPERA QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA

SECRET

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ACTION #

T 527885 PAGE 05 IN 028495

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

AHORA, SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973. FIRMA: ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA".

C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF.AA. Y CARABINEROS --

150 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS

ALLANADA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. TENDICION DE 600 PERSONAS.

REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.

INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.

CONTROL DE LA MONEDA, TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.

CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO NO. 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO.

LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. DONDE SE RINDIERON 600 PERSONAS, Y SE ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INDUSTRIAS, ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOS...

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

15-124-52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

7 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: RFE in Turkey

ACTION NECESSARY: Will you please decide or cause to be decided the following question: Should the National Committee for a Free Europe in its approach to Turkish authorities exploring the possibility of creating an RFE station in Turkey contact Turkish authorities as a non-governmental private Committee or as a CIA-financed institution?

Background

1. The State Department has asked that RFE not approach Turkish authorities until VOA's attempt to get into Turkey has been accepted or refused by the Turks. The Department has now given the Voice of America until 15 January to conclude its negotiations with the Turkish Government. These negotiations appear to be leading nowhere and, on the assumption that VOA will not gain entrance to Turkey, the Department has authorized RFE to begin negotiations on the above date.

2. Bob Lang, Bill Durkee and Mr. Wadsworth, former Ambassador to Turkey, as well as the NE Division have all been in on discussions as to how NCFE should approach the Turks. Mr. Wadsworth counsels that all cards be laid on the table, and he bases his reasoning on his belief that the Turks will know about it anyhow and that RFE is likely to get further if it comes clean. The NE Division on the other hand hopes that the approach can be that of a private committee and that no mention need be made of CIA's interest.

3. Your advice on the above question will not constitute approval of the building of a Turkish station or of operations from Turkey. By PRC decision at the last hearing on NCFE's budget these questions in Turkey must be brought back here for approval if the attitude of the Turks is favorable.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FUOMEN

BOL. IX

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: ~~MFR~~ FUOMEN / RSYOPS CHILE

INCLUSIVE DATES: SEPT. 1973 - MAY 1974

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAI

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

TO: (Headquarters component)

C/LA/AN/C

C/IP/DMS

SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTION

TO: (Station/Base)

Santiago, Chile

FROM: (Division)

C/LA

INFORMATION FOR REQUESTERS

COMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.

ITEM 3—ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.

ITEM 6—ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.

ITEM 7 AND 8—USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.

ITEM 10—ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE. CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUEST. ITEM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BEING REQUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ITEM 11—A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT AR

INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE

1. TYPE OF FILE

☒ SUBJECT ☐ PROJECT

2. CODE (FILE) NUMBER

COUNTRY NUMBER	CATEGORY NUMBER	SPECIFIC SUBJECT NO.
015	124	052

3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)

FUOMEN

ACTION REQUIRED

4. ANALYSIS ACTION

☐	OPEN FILE	☒	CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)
☐	AMEND FILE TITLE	☐	REOPEN

5. DISPOSITION

☐	RETAIN	☐	DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDED THRU (DATE)

6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)

7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)

HCS

8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)

015

9. FILES ACTION

☐	HOLD IN CS FILES	☐	RESTRICTED	☒	UNRESTRICTED	☐	PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER	☐	CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)

10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)

11. ENDORSEMENT

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.

A748

C/LA/AN

12. COORDINATION

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)

13. RID APPROVAL

REQUEST APPROVED BY

EFFECTIVE DATE

CODE (FILE) NUMBER

FORM 812 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
12-65 EDITIONS
MFS 12-65

SECRET

38

1—CS COPY

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T 375103 EIA916 PAGE 01-01 IN 345816

TOR:281628Z AUG 74 HAMB 25462

SECRET 281611Z AUG 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 25462

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.

MHCRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEG

REF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 74

WH/6

No-301

1. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17, 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF. WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE. WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HQ INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

RECORD COPY

28 Aug 74

15-124-5-2

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST

TO: Chief, EUR Division

FROM: COS, Helsinki

No. 669923

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS
	Newspaper article	FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI
		22455
	Hold for Pouch	
		E2 IMPDET

FORM 1236a. Obsolete Forms 1236 and 1236a (2-64), which may be used.
5-69

SECRET

(13-47)

Allendes misstag

— Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett lysande sätt dokumenterat juntans grymheter men man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting. Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som var före kuppen, använder man sig av ett censurtänkande som är på samma linje som juntans, säger *Andres Küng*, journalist och författare som besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes tid. Han har nu också givit ut en debattbok, *Att så socialism och skörda fascism*.

— Salvador Allende och "folkregeringen" Unidad Popular (folklig enhet) emotsågs med stort intresse även utomlands. Man skulle äntligen få svar på flera grundläggande frågor. Kan socialismen genomföras på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är marxismen i praktiken förenlig med politisk demokrati? Kan en social revolution genomföras med bevarad politisk demokrati?

— Folkfrontens program hade fyra naturtillgångar, främst kopparn, 2) ökad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3) förstatligande av de största bank- och industriföretagen och 4) snabb ekonomisk tillväxt och omfördelning av inkomster och förmögenheter samt kamp mot inflationen.

Koppar viktig

— Kopparn svarar för upp till fyra femtedelar av landets export och mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel av statsintäkterna. Under åren före första världskriget gick gruvorna över i nordamerikansk ägo. I slutet av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till hälften av den kristdemokratiska Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51 procent av aktierna. Men Freis "chilenisering" av kopparn visade sig slutligen ändå mest lönsam för de amerikanska företagen. Kopparn förstatligades genom ett tillägg till grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersättning till de forna amerikanska ägarna hänsköts till högste statsrevisorn — men Allende och hans regering ansåg att de inte hade råd att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.

— Jordbruket svarar för mindre än en fjärdedel av sysselsättningen, vilket är mindre än i de flesta latinamerikanska och andra u-länder. Flera jordreformlagar antogs före Allende en av dem 1967 då man bestämde att alla jordegendomar över 80 "bashektar" kunde tvångsinlösas. (en bashektar = en hektar förstklassig konstbevattnad jord).

— Takten i jordreformarbetet ökade under Allendes presidenttid. Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes nästan lika mycket jord som under hela den föregående sexåriga presidentperioden. Alla stora jordegendomar uppgavs ha förstatligats 1973.

En följd av jordreformen var att lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt. En annan var jordockupationerna. De ökade nio gånger redan under Allendes första år jämfört med under Freis tid. Jordägarna började gå till motangrepp.

— Produktionen sjönk — de exproprierade gårdarna hade inte tillräckligt med maskiner, redskap, kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande tillgången på livsmedel och den stigande efterfrågan ledde till försörjningsproblem och prisstegringar.

— I början genomförde Allende en rad åtgärder för att skapa en jämnare fördelning av förmögenhe-

Andres Küng, journalist och författare, säger att Chile-debatten är ensidig. "Det är viktigt att även kunna kritisera det som var fel på Allendes tid annars kan man inte lära sig någonting".

svarta börsaffärer och hamstring. Penningvärdet sjönk med 163 procent.

— Under min vistelse i Santiago i början av 1973 var enbart cigarettköerna i centrum ett par kvarter långa, berättar Andres Küng.

Förlorade stödet

— De ekonomiska problemen medförde politiska problem. Allende förlorade medelklassens stöd och arbetarklassens stöd minskade. I kongressvalen behövde han majoritet — det var en nödvändig förutsättning för att han skulle kunna fortsätta att genomföra sitt program och stifta sina lagar. Han fick bara 44 procent. Maktkampen kongress — parlament — president fortsatte. Ingen ville ge vika för den andre. Allende drevs till åtgärder som inte var förenliga med demokratiska principer och gällande lagar.

— Denna utveckling tyder på att varje försök att mot flertalets vilja tvinga fram en extrem politik medför risker för polarisering av samhället som bara skulle gynna odemokratiska riktningar. En aggressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den är reaktionär eller revolutionär, kan framkalla en utveckling mot en socialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur, konstaterar Andres Küng.

— Men inga missförhållanden och misstag under Allendes tid kan användas som ursäkt för kuppen och det blodbad som sedan följde. Man kan ha olika uppfattningar om Allendes politik, men varje sann demokrat måste känna avsky för den nuvarande militärjuntan.

Flitig författare

Andres Küng är född i Gävle

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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T 077241   EIA232   PAGE 01   IN 239973

TOR:0211037 MAY 74   HELS 22455

C O N F I D E N T I A L 200949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FJOMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES KUNG (UMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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T 277141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 289973

TOR1021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22459

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ACTION UNIT C/WH 8

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STAFF 1 2 3 4 5 6

T 172681 EIA126 PAGE 01-01 IN 274496

TOR:071631Z JUN 74 SAGO 29396

SECRET 071544Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29396

TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REFS: A. PARIS 48989 (IN 273492)

B. DIRECTOR 559514

1. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING FACT.

2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET

②

T.L. FUOMEN

SECRET

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ACTION UNIT C/WH8

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INFO RF FILE VR C/FDAN C/GRG C/OPSINT2 C/SS3 C/PSLEG3

T 169854 EIA366 PAGE 01 IN 273492

TOR:062019Z JUN 74 PARI 48989

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SECRET 061824Z JUN 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48989

File - Tuchmen

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT HYSAGE

REF: DIRECTOR 559514

1. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.

2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.

3. FILE: 56-6-42/3; 201-907906. E2, IMPDET

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Helsinki

INFO.
C/WH Division

FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Santiago

SUBJECT
FUJMEN Psych

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Ref: HELSINKI 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.

Leslie H. BERBERIAN

Distribution:
 2 COS Helsinki — To out pouch
 1 C/WHD

[illegible]

RECORD COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HCSA-18904	3 May 1974
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 15-124-52 Defer

NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

/Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad, Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5/

The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare; they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts

The great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.

The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.

The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition

In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any judicial system.

These refugees carried out activities in Chile which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."

8463
CSO: 8014/2087-W

VRIJDAG 19 APRIL 1974

V.S.-economie loopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerikaanse regering heeft donderdag bekend gemaakt dat de nationale economie veel krachtiger is teruggelopen in het eerste kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien met meer dan tien procent.

Het bruto nationale produkt verminderde in het eerste kwartaal met een jaar-percentage van 5,8 Dit is de eerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto nationale produkt is verminderd en het is de scherpste daling in 16 jaar. De vermindering van het bruto nationale produkt met 5.8 procent moet vergeleken worden met een schatting van tussen de 3 en 4 procent, zoals die door de regering was gedaan. In het laatste kwartaal van het vorig jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt toe met 1,6 procent.

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angekondigd tij-
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Roemenië ver-
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Het Ameri-
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Cuba. Deze
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mbargo.

MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST

Ethiopische leger uit scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISCH LEGER

ADDIS ABEBA — Premier Endalkachew Makonnen van Ethiopië heeft donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de leden van de regering die eind februari door de strijdkrachten gedwongen werd af te treden, huisarrest hebben egen.

Volgens de Ethiopische radio heeft Makkonen dit gezegd op een bijeenkomst in Addis Abeba van rond 2.000 officieren en manschappen. De premier zou naar de bijeenkomst ontboden zijn door de strijdkrachten die hem hadden laten weten dat het leger gedwongen zou zijn in te grijpen als er niet onmiddellijk tegen de ministers werd opgetreden.

Het leger verwijt de ministers dat zij het land in een economische chaos hebben gestort, zich op onwettige wijze verrijkt hebben en na hun aftreden hebben samengezworen om verdeeldheid te zaaien.

PLANNEN

Makonnen gaf op de bijeenkomst een uitvoerige uiteenzetting van de hervormingsplannen van zijn regering. Hij prees de strijdkrachten voor hun voorbeeldig gedrag en deed een beroep op hen een voorbeeld te geven van de tucht die nodig is voor het land in de moeilijke dagen die nog zullen komen. De premier zou het huisarrest van de voormalige ministers bekend hebben gemaakt toen hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom een arme Ethiopiër die een brood heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de gevangenis ingaat, terwijl de ex-ministers die ernstige misdaden zouden hebben begaan, niet voor de rechtbank worden gedaagd en maar ongehinderd op straat rondlopen.

Makonnen zei dat er een commissie is benoemd die een onderzoek moet instellen naar het gedrag van de voormalige ministers.

POLITIE

In de stad Asmara heeft de politie bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routinewerk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar eis tot ontslag van het landelijke hoofd van de politie, luitenant-generaal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewilligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoorwegmannen die woensdag in staking zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegengehouden die goederen van Asmara naar de haverstad Massawa zouden brengen.

Liberaal Kennedy aan het woord

Arbeidsonrust in Canada

OTTAWA — De posterijen, het commerciële luchtverkeer en het scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Lawrence rivier in Canada zijn verlamd door een staking die het land dagelijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost. De arbeidsonrust duurt nu al meer dan een week en zal volgens de Canadese parlementaire oppositie de inflatie, die momenteel jaarlijks 10 procent bedraagt, bevorderen.

Door wilde stakingen is de helft van alle postkantoren in het land gesloten ten gevolge van solidariteitsstakingen. De moeilijkheden be-

Opgemerkt

Chili

De Chileense vluchtelingen in Nederland schijnen „aanpassingsproblemen" te hebben. Dit nogal langdurige verschijnsel blijkt ondermeer veroorzaakt te worden doordat zij het nog steeds niet kunnen verkroppen dat de socialistische droom van de Marxistische president definitief voorbij is en dat hun land nu beheerst wordt door een kleine groep reactionairen die met terreur, onderdrukking en folteringen probeert het volk onder de duim te houden. Met zo'n lange volzin kom je een heel eind in Nederland en dit hadden deze idealisten al gauw in de gaten.

VERZORGING

Want wat is het geval? Werken doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250 vluchtelingen van middelbaar en universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer de helft van hen is ondergebracht in het „Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, waar zij op het terras genieten van de zon of volleybal spelen in de tuin. Kost en inwoning zijn gratis en aan het einde van de week vangen zij ook nog eens vijfentwintig gulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij nog gratis taalcursussen, een rittenkaart voor de bus en een vergoeding voor elke reis die zij moeten maken.

Door

N. van Nieuwenhuysen

U vindt dat zij het beter hebben als menig Nederlands bejaarde? Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want de Chileense ballingen behoeven niet van de bijstand te leven; zij worden namelijk gefinancierd door de geblokkeerde gelden voor ontwikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons belastinggeld wordt besteed.

Daar dit in de watten gelegde groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog met volle maag de revolutie predikt is het misschien nuttig enige feiten te noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie in Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar om de een of andere reden nooit de pers in Nederland halen.

FEITEN

De vluchtelingen hebben voor het overgrote deel niet eens de Chileense nationaliteit. Zij zijn afkom-



BELGRADO — De Amerikaanse senator Edward Kennedy heeft donderdagavond op een persconferentie in de Zuidslavische hoofdstad Belgrado de vlootoefeningen van de NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het noorden van de Adriatische Zee zijn gehouden.

Deze oefeningen hebben het geschil tussen Italië en Zuidslavië over de zogenaamde „zone B" ten zuiden van Triëst verscherpt. Kennedy noemde het geen afdoende reden dat de oefening niet kon worden afgelast omdat ze al verscheidene maanden tevoren in voorbereiding waren genomen. De Amerikaanse senator is donderdag na een bezoek van drie dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij besprekingen voerde met onder meer president Tito, naar de Sovjet-Unie doorgereisd. Hij zei „zeer onder de indruk" te zijn van zijn gesprekken met het Zuidslavische staatshoofd.

20 werknemers schorste omdat zij T-shirts droegen, waarop het publiek werd verzocht de Canadese posterijen te boycotten. De werknemers willen looneisen stellen, maar de overheid weigert te onderhandelen totdat iedereen weer aan het werk is.

138 loodsen op de St.-Lawrence rivier, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer zorgen tussen Montreal en Quebeck zijn al een week in staking omdat zij een onmiddellijke loonsverhoging eisen van 29.000 tot 38.000 dollar per jaar. De regering heeft hen 35.000 dollar geboden over een periode van drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar mogelijkheden om de loodsen te dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven personeel eist loonsverhoging van rond de 3000 dollar. De acht grootste luchthavens van het land hebben de afgelopen week op halve kracht gewerkt. Verder dreigt een staking van de verkeersleiders.

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EMBARGO

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nalaten te voorkomen dat de invoer uit Latijns-Amerika nog meer aan beperkingen onderhevig wordt gemaakt.

Irak krijgt parlement

BAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presidium van het „progressieve nationale front" heeft hiertoe besloten, zo is donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt en of die tot stand zal komen voor algemene verkiezingen, is nog niet besloten. In Bagdad staat een groot gebouw voor een nationale vergadering maar het is nog nooit gebruikt. De socialistische Baas-partij en de communisten werken samen in het progressieve nationale front."

GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT

Grote onrust onder mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika

JOHANNESBURG — In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de Zuidafrikaanse goudmijnen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gastarbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannesburg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.

De meeste slachtoffers waren gruwelijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen werden vernield, met benzine overgoten en in brand gestoken. Vluchtende mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen doodgeschoten.

Tienduizend Basotho's hebben sinds februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn naar hun veilige bergachtige vaderland Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele andere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezen thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan de beurt te zijn.

INSPRAAK

Woordvoerders van de zwarte mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijnwerkers niets in te brengen hebben tegenover de blanke leiding van de mijnen en niets aan de arbeidsomzegt te weten waarom de mijnwerkers elkaar doodslaan. „Hun vertegenwoordigers weten het niet en ik betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.

Velen menen, dat ingewortelde

stammen-vijandschap de oorzaak is van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij de huidige woningnood een nietige aanleiding voldoende is om de haat tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explosie te brengen. De mijnmaatschappijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet tegen de eis, de zwarte mijnwerkers te groeperen naar de streken waar zij vandaan komen. Zij menen, dat dan nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan. Het zou zelfs tot „slachtpartijen" kunnen komen. Intussen gaat de goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho zit de regering met het probleem van de broodeloos geworden teruggekeer-

zich in deze Zuid- en Midden-Amerikaanse landen hadden bezig gehouden met onwettige en revolutionaire gedragingen waarvoor zij de uiteindelijke consequenties niet wensten te dragen.

In het Chili van Allende voelden zij zich thuis omdat Allende begrip toonde voor hun gedrag. Zijn eerste daad als president, toen hij in november 1970 geïnstalleerd was, bestond namelijk uit het afkondigen van amnestie voor al diegenen, die „lid waren van een terroristische ondergrondse organisatie", voor hen die in de laatste maanden onder zijn voorganger waren aangeklaagd voor het beroven van banken, gewelddadige overvallen op zelfbedieningswinkels, diefstal van wapens uit militaire depots, ontvoeringen en moordaanslagen.

Dat sommigen van deze revolutionairen Chileens diplomatieke status kregen is ook verklaarbaar als men weet dat de regering van Allende een beleid voerde dat er op gericht was om juist verblijfsvergunningen te geven aan dit type revolutionairen. Deze vluchtelingen van middelbaar en hoger niveau bleken namelijk in Chili geen „aanpassingsmoeilijkheden" te hebben. Zij vonden dan ook weldra hun weg naar belangrijke sleutelposities in de regering.

Slapeloze nachten hadden de "vervolgden" in Chili ook niet, omdat zij zich beschermd voelden door een tot de tanden gewapend militant-Marxistisch soldatenleger. Zo'n 10.000 revolutionairen uit alle windstreken stonden hen ter beschikking.

DEFINITIEF

In het „Berner Tageblatt" een Zwitserse krant die zich niet aan overdrijving schuldig maakt, schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de Freiburgse Universiteit: „Het concept van de politieke vluchteling kan met betrekking tot Chili slechts in zeer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe men ook mag staan tegenover de militaire junta, een ding is zeker: de Chileense vluchtelingen werden niet alleen vervolgd voor hun ideologie, status of afkomst. Dit laatste is de traditionele humanitaire defenitie van een vervolgde. Voor het grootste deel zijn het mensen die in hun eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd kunnen worden voor misdaden die onder elk rechtsbestel strafbaar zijn.

Deze vluchtelingen voerden in Chili daden uit die in strijd waren met de grondwet. In feite zijn het specialisten in geweld. Om deze redenen zochten zij asiel op de buitenlandse ambassades in Santiago en daarom bevinden zich zoveel buitenlanders onder hen."

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A. LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y

B. NEWS BULLETIN■ PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y

C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME, APRIL 74.Y

D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y

■ E■■. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN

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SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL.

3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 15-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG [illegible]026, REF B, FOR ~~SUMMARY OF~~ QUOTES FROM ARTICLES.) RSK

4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS INTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/

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TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y

5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," (227179) SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING (257016) HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BONN 31869). FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENISCHER BUND [redacted] (SEE BERLIN 21306, OCT 73). (276994)

6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.A

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1. MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETZKI ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.

2. GALETZKI MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD, U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE. CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1972 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING DEPARTED BANGKOK 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 20 JUNE.

3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND

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CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME. CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, RUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME. CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS. WHEN GALETZKI ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD BEEN KILLED." GALETZKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF B INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETZKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM ARGUING WITH CUNNING LEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.

4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO. HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT RECEIVE.

5. REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH. TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING DEVELOPMENT.

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WH/6/SA

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WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 292140Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29314

Return to K.

TO: DIRECTOR.

RYBAT PSYCH

REF: DIRECTOR 553537

File. FUOMEN

1. FUERMINE-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES. WE TASKING HIM WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT INFO ON WHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT.

2. STATION ALSO EXPLORING REF WITH FUTRUNK-1 AND FUACME-16.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

14-00000

71 MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 22 PER TOTAL COPIES 26-1 RUN

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

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ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z

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ACTION UNIT EUR8

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INFO RF FILE VR PMN, WH8, SS5,

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T 142756 EIA997 PAGE 01-01 IN 263354

TOR:282955Z MAY 74 HELS 22538

CONFIDENTIAL 282851Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22538

TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: HCSA 18904

1. LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER. WHEN RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER REF. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN SWEDISH. IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.

2. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

RDR

X

WH/6

RECORD COPY

15-124-52

28 May 74

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ TOTAL COPIES 302

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION UNIT EUR8

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INFO RF FILE VR DTAN WH8 SS6 PSLEG4 OPSINT

T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 01 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6 [illegible]

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 241627Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31991

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN, HAMBURG.

FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS

REF BONN BASE 31516 (IN 241838)

FI. FUOMEN

1. CAQUARRY ADVISED ZDF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY. CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ZDF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE. IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE. SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS CAQUARRY WILL PROVIDE.

2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAQUARRY. GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.

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ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

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INFO RF FILE VR

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T 137606 EIA065 PAGE 02-02 IN 262014

TOR:241716Z MAY 74 BNNB 31991

3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT. MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN. INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD, HQS WILL NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.

4. FILE: 201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816. E2-IMPDET.

SECRET

FORM 2005
1 NOV 73

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TOTAL COPIES 33-1 RUN BY

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EUR 8

INFO RF FILE VR IPAN, SS5, SB8, WH8

ACTION #

T 125861 EIA160 PAGE 01-01 IN 251122

TOR:141022Z MAY 74 STOC 15691

S E C R E T 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE STOCKHOLM 15691

TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.

FUOMEN PSYCH

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549305

B. HELSINKI 22455 (IN 239973)

1. NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.

2. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET

Fil FUOMEN

C/WH/6
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WH/6/Sec'y

SECRET

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ACTION #			IN 250476

T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 01 IN 250476

TOR:131851Z MAY 74 SAGO 29117

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/SA

WH/6/FI

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

S E C R E T 131621Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)

TO: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: A. DIRECTOR 549348

B. PARIS 48390 (IN 250170)

fl. FUOMEN

1. AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1. IN MAKING THAT DECISION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED:

A. WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION NO MATTER HOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBABLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY COLLABORATOR.

B. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY T.V. PROGRAM WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF HOW SLIGHT THE CRITICISM MIGHT BE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN

S E C R E T

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T 103782 EIA146 PAGE 02-02 IN 250476

TOR:1318512 MAY 74 SAGO 29117

FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING TO HIM.

2. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

ROUTING

PAGE 1 OF PAGES 2

30-2

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP: 102248Z

CITE: DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 549348

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE IP/AN, WH8, SS-5, PS/EG4, C/PR-2

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 49

0 NO INDEX

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0 IP FILES #

TO: SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y

TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y

REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 (NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO)Y

1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES. IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARBLY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/1. THIS FORMER STAFF JOURNALIST FOR PRESTIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY. IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO DO SECOND 30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.Y

WH/6/CA ____

WH/6/FI ____

WH/6/RR ____

WH/6/Copy ____

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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PAGE OF PAGES
2 2

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE
DIRECTOR
549348

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

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2. THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND. WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y

3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION [illegible]FILM CONDITIONS ON DAWSON ISLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE. UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y

4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE TO UNSOBER/1.Y

5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 8 MAY 1974
ORIG: DAN WAGNER:LD
UNIT: E/F/INT
EXT: 9113

C/E/CA

C/WH Herbert W. Natzke
RELEASING OFFICER

DC/WH/6
COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/E/F
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPROC ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS HIBITED

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CL BY: 055747

14-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE 321

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PAGE 1 OF PAGES 1

6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 102239Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 549305

CONF: EUR8 INFO: FILE 11/AN. SB8. WH8 555

0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 45
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO. Y

FUOMEN PSYCH Y

REF: HELSINKI 22455 [IN 239973] Y

1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER {AECLUSTER} REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH KYUNG, BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR. NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS DENIAL BY MFA. {DOI: MID-1971}. NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y

2. STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.H

DC/WH w
WH/6/SA
WH/6/[illegible]
WH/6/RR
WH/6/[illegible]

WH/6 {CHILE}- J. K.
SB/X/EU-

Fil. FUOMEN

DATE: 10 MAY 74
ORIG: MARIA C. WALSH/JD
UNIT: E/SC/S
EXT: 1588

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AC/E/SC
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 008234

FORM 3020
7-71 MFG. 11-73

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INFO RF, FILE VR IP/AN, WH8, OS6/OC
C/OPS SSS

ACTION #

T 123294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

C/WH/6

DC/WH/6

WH/6/

WH/6/

WH/6/RR

WH/6/Sec'y

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

FUOHEN

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

14-00000

FORM 30206
?? AUG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 9 PER TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

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INFO RF FILE VR IP/AN, WH8, OSG/OC, C/OPS SS5

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T 103294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 250170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HQS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

SECRET

FORM 3020b
7/71 MFG. 11 73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4 PER TOTAL COPIES 29-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT Z

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INFO RF FILE VR (P)AN, WH8, OSG/OC
C/OPS SSS

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T 133294 EIA670 PAGE 01 IN 253170

TOR:131542Z MAY 74 PARI 48390

S E C R E T 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE PARIS 48390

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

TOFUCUS UNSOBER

REF: DIRECTOR 549349

1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).

2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO COINCIDE WITH TDY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.

3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET

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FORM 30705
7/I MFG. 11 73

241838

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241838-A

T 100017 EIA220 PAGE 01 IN ~~[illegible]~~

TOR:110224Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

S E C R E T 031429Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE BONN BASE 31516

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, PARIS.

CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX

REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053)

C/WH/6
DC/WH/6
WH/6/3
WH/6/SI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Soc'y

#132 DUPE & CORRECTED FOR WASH S/C NOTE.

To OMEN
FU~~[illegible]~~

1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED 15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY. MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN, FRIEDRICH BEERMANN (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING, HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.

2. HANS MATTHOEFER, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUAWL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363, NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY

SECRET

FORM 3020b
1 71 MIG. 11 73

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ________

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T 100217 EIA000 PAGE 02-02 IN 241838 ~~IN 247248~~

TOR:110024Z MAY 74 BNNB 31516

QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS) AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY IN DEALING WITH CHILE.

3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN 201 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDERS AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.

4. FILE: 201-0230705 X-REF 201- . E2 IMPDET

WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER HQS REQUEST.

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN BY ______ Chile

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

CONFIDENTIAL

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INFO: RF FILE VR Plans, WH8, SSS,

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T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 01 IN 239973

TOR:0211032 MAY 74 HELS 22455

CONFIDENTIAL 020949Z MAY 74 STAFF

CITE HELSINKI 22455

TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH

1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/AUTHOR ANDRES KUNG (UHLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS". KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP

VDR

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	X	ABSTRACT
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		[illegible]
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CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY

15-124-52
2 May 74

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T 077141 EIA230 PAGE 02-02 IN 239973

TOR:021103Z MAY 74 HELS 22455

AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".

2. KUNG (DPOB: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72) EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC STATES.

3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 11-73

CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 316 PER ______ TOTAL COPIES 25-1 RUN BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED ______

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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE

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T 352272 EIA036 PAGE 01 IN 231132

TOR:231149Z APR 74 HAMB 24795

SECRET 230953Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

REF: DIRECTOR 540262

1. WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL BRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN REF.

2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HQS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.

3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE, COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000), WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, THROUGH MRS. VERA VACEK.

4. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.

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TOR:041011Z DEC 73   HAMB 23918

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S E C R E T 040921Z DEC 73 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 23918

TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.

MHCRUNCH CASPECIAL FUCHEN TOWITTY

1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF CHILE.

2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS, THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY. IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS REGIME. ALLENDE'S MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING PLEA FOR SOVIET SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEPT UNDER THE RUG.

3. REQUEST HQS COMMENTS RE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED

04 DEC 73

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T 724892 PAGE 02-02 IN 104043

TOR 041011Z DEC 73 HAMB 23918

BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS. IF AFFIRMATIVE, SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION VEHICLE.

4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.

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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED

3P

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

REF: DIRECTOR 465768

1. FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.

2. ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF OBSCENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A 'SON OF A WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUBAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.

3. "DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. BAZAN INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED SUICIDE AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-

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MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF 581 DEATHS IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE, WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTIME, THE WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD WALL, TO WHICH HE EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS...'

4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS. OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL. A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....

5. " U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED. ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS 'GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. U.S. AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER VULGARITY...THE OUTMODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'"

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DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

15-124-52

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C/EUR James E. Flannery
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TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO SANTIAGO.

HP

RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE

1. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.

2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL RESTORATION," AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM OF A "MOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN."

3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD

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BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS, INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS INTENDED TO BECOME A "PARALLEL"ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY, PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS. HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."

4. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPCHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DETAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO

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AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD. HE SAID MEDIA WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS, POLITICANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED. HE CHARGED THAT FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT ENOUGH WEAPONS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT SOVIET-MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITANNK GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, CANNONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO ADDRESSED TO "DEAR SALVADOR." LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING CLASS HAD BEEN FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE "ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.

6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF GOEBBLES." SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

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HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY, HE DECLARED. THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN GUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED; ROA SAID THAT THE LETTER WAS NO SECRET.

7. FILE: 15-124-52; 15-124-53. E2 IMPDET.

DATE: 11 OCTOBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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C/WHD James E Flannery   EA/JK/J   C/WHD/6

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TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 (IN 031350)

B. SANTIAGO 26512 (IN 031722)

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DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973

ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB

UNIT: ADC/WH/6

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TRAVEL PROGRAM

WH/6

BOOK CABLE

FUOMEN SUMMARY OF CURRENT EVENTS

1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED AGAINST MARXIST REGIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON 11 SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON 12 SEPT THERE WAS FIGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TROOPS AND SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY AND NIGHT BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

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AND CIVILIANS. THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE BY 14 SEPTEMBER.

3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. NEWSPAPERS PLANNED RESUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP.

4. JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A DINING ROOM.

5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

6. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET (ARMY), AN INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES; ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY), WHO IS INCLINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY (CONSERVATIVE); GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH (AIR FORCE), A STRONG LEADER WHO FORMER SUPPORTER OF RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS; AND GENERAL CESAR MENDOZA, (CARABINERO CHIEF) WHO HAS

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CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.

7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:

MINISTER OF INTERIOR - MAJ GEN OSCAR BONNILLA (ARMY), WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITAARY AIDE FOR TWO YEARS.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.

MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY), REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.

MINISTER OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.

MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN LAWYER.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL, FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ■STAFF, REPORTED INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

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GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA (AIR FORCE), REPORTED IN EARLY 1972 TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE - COL SERGIO CRESPO (RET. AIR FORCE), AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.

MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY (CARABINEROS), ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEPCION.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH - COL ALBERTO SPOERER (AIR FORCE), FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEON DESCRIBED AS HARD WORKER.

MINISTER OF MINING - GEN ARTURO YOVANE (CARABINEROS), WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST, CLOSE TO MILITARY.

MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE SOMEWHAT WEAK.

SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT - COL PEDRO EWING (ARMY), DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.

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UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR - LTH COL ENRIQUE MONTERO (AIR FORCE) FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.

MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.

MINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR, LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.

8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATI■ONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY ■■■ BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR ■ STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST AND SMALL LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERATION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BU■T MAY CONSULT WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRI■KING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.

10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM CLYONS DSO
UNIT: C/WH/6/RR
EXT: 7710/1069

15-124-52

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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 540262

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TO: HAMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.Y

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL Y

REF: HAMBURG 24759 (IN 225831) Y

1. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE BKHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE CHILEAN IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PREFER LET DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE. [illegible] WE WOULD BE WILLING SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEWS WOULD CARRY REAL WEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH INEFFECTUAL AND MIGHT WELL BACKFIRE.Y

2. FILE: 15-124-46/3. E2 IMPDET.d

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DATE: 18 APRIL 1974
ORIG: KEITH GARDINER:NO
UNIT: DC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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T 037809 PAGE 01 IN 225831

TOR:171326Z APR 74 HAMB 24759

S E C R E T 171253Z APR 74 STAFF

CITE HAMBURG 24759

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL

1. CHILE'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMENTARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE." EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.

2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND. TOWARD THAT END, REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.

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T 144267 PRECEDENCE PAGE 01-01 IN 880779

TOR:042140Z APR 73 SAGO 24516

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S E C R E T 042118Z APR 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 24516

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

REFS: A. SANTIAGO 24477 (in 878105)

B. DIRECTOR 391223

1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF A INFO IF IT WERE SURFACED OR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION AT THIS TIME.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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T 627548 PAGE 01 IN 135804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

S E C R E T 141558Z JAN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 27899

TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON.

RYBAT FUUMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 499469 - 15-124-52

1. WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 3: "...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND, ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..." "...OTHER PRICE RISES BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 508 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR: WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER PLACED INFLATION FOR THE YEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800 PERCENT, THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SEE SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173 OF 11 JANUARY.)

2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3.5 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OVER THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION

		TRAVEL PROGRAM
	☒	ABSTRACT
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T 307548 PAGE 02-02 IN 136804

TOR:141717Z JAN 74 SAGO 27899

WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974..."

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TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, BONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE. STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.

2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

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3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 11 SEPTEMBER TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE

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CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770% FOR THE YEAR.

4. THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 1973. THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974. THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCERBATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S CCREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S 1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE MASSIVE $4 BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.

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7. COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% OVER LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S FOREIGN RESERVES.

8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OWNERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, BUT PROBABLY WITH SOME FORMULA INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BANK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE

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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING 1974.

9. INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATISFACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAURGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF

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CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD DOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.

11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT, WRITING A STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND

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DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.

12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE, ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE COMMUNICATION.

13. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS. THE JUNTA IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING

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WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL SUPPORT.

14. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU, IN ORDER TO REGAIN SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY THE SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTABLE"MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN LATIN AMERICA.

15. THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE INTERNAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUNT AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORMER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO MANIPULATE THE PDC INTO OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT. TWO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AND SEVERAL ARE BEING SET UP IN EUROPE.

16. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT IS

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IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY WHOSE ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.

17. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

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TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.

FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET

REF: HAMBURG 23881 |IN 096923|

1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST.

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND INSTITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.

B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVBES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88% IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EXPECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

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EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.

D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES. AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE. CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED, EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING

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FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.

F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE $4 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.

G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.

H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS, CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.

I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

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OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT. ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS WELL AS THEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSBATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF REVERSION.

J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICEN~~C~~DE, AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS.

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K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMS, THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY ORIENTATION.

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE IN CHILE.

2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

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A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?

B. DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS? WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?

C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL BE OF INTEREST.

4. FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.H

*REF ATTACHED.

DATE: 4 DECEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:SMB
UNIT: C/WH/6/SA
EXT: 6609/1069

C/WH/6

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STAFF 261539Z DIRECTOR 459557

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA,
MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR,
MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR-458246

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: "POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS INDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING (REF) THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET) INTENDED TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN CHILE.

4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED AN EMERGENCY MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST

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26 Sep 73

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ALLENDE REGIME. WHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW, CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN COMMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE, BUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NAMES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.

5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION {CPSU}. INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ {PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN}, FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER {PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER}, GUILLERMO HERRERA MONTESINOS {ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION}, AND ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS ( ) WHO USED THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

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BEGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERS TO AID IN SUPPORT THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH). INITIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PCP/SOVIET MEMBERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR MEMBERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING IN LIMA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.

6. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK OF 23 SEPTEMBER WHEN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARRIVE FROM VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER COUNTRIES. ALL WERE TO BE LODGED IN LIMA, AND, LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST IN REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRODUCTION OF CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSIBILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY REGIME, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE TO MAKE SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY.

WR

7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WERE TO MEET IN LIMA ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

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DIRECTOR 45955 7

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GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS. SOME DELEGATES TO MEETING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU), WHO IS IN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 18 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST CHILEAN JUNTA.

8. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1973 W Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/7155

James E. Flannery C/WH/SA

C/WHD

C/WH/6

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DATE-TIME GROUP 251524Z

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 459021

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TO: PRIORITY LIMA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REFS: A. PANAMA CITY 25754 (IN 035309)

B. LIMA 26010 (IN 038180)

1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF B, LIMA 26010, SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENETRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE WHO IS PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICER) AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY. PLEASE ADVISE.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*REFS ATTACHED.

WH/6 CT-4

15-124-52
25 Sep 73

DATE: 25 SEPTEMBER 1973 J. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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James E. Flannery for C/WHD
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TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: BONN 26475 (IN 037592)

1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED SUCH AS COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE BECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED, INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY: LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE NO LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS THIS SUBJECT.

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DATE: 24 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: JEANNE LINTON:LSS
UNIT: WH/6/SA
EXT: 6607/1069

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S E C R E T 241416Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE BONN 26475

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: A. DIRECTOR 458535 o Legal property of govt

B. DIRECTOR 456615

C. BONN 26432 (IN 035549)

1. PARA 3B REF B STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED OWNERS. REF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM REF A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 3B REF B. IN OTHER WORDS, WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT BECOME LEGAL PROPERITY OF GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERNMENT.

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2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF FIRMS INVOLVED.

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TOR:241450Z SEP 73 BONN 26475

3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CDARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER

REFS: A. BONDDN 26432 |IN 035549| |*|

B. DIRECTOR 456615 |**|

1. "SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM BFOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF ECONOMY. STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME. THROUGH PURCHASES, EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER ▭ PRODUCTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COMPARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT ▭ END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN 1970.

2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SECTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED

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TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.

3. FILE: 15-1204-52. E 2, IMPDET.

*INTEND USE (REF B) [redacted] FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES.

**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT; DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/8
EXT: 6556/9155

ADC/WH/6 William M. Kent

AC/EUR/SA
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CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 458522

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN, MONTEVIDEO, TOMKYO, ROME.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.

2. SUBJECT: REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED BWITH THE GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVEBRTHROW OF THE ALLENDE REGIME ON 11 SEPTEMBER.

4. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS MADE OBECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD MARXIST, LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.

5. HE SAID THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED

DATE:
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22 Sep 73

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IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW. LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN CHILE WOHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING, BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

6. FILE: 15-124-528. E 2, IMPDET.H

C/WH/COG O. Butler

C/EUR/SA J. Gensler

EA/JKO/J [illegible]

C/WH/SA [illegible]

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILOOLLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/98192

William M. Kent

C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFICATION

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STAFF

DATE TIME GROUP 2122582

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 458246

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0 INDEX DISSEM BY: 43

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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, BUENOS BAIRES, GUATBEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN LIMA.

2. SUBJECT: ^{0}MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE.

3. ON OR ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA BB OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMBERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE ANY CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA. THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUEBRRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.

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5. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM KENT:DSO
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 5515/9192

DC/WH/3

W. M. Kent

for C/WHD
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for C/WH/6
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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T 547408 PAGE 01-01 IN 036120

TOR:211917Z SEP 73 PACY 25771

S E C R E T 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE PANAMA CITY 25771

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF A. DIRECTOR 457922
B. PANAMA CITY 25754 (035309)

1. CONCUR REF A.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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21 Sep 73

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TOR:211811Z SEP 73

IN 036065

MEXI 25263

S E C R E T 211808Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25263

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF DIRECTOR 457888

1. CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

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DATE TIME GROUP 2117252

CITE DIRECTOR

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 457922

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TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: PANAMA CITY 25754 [IN 035309]

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA AS PLACE ACQUIRED, OMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUIJADA OR HIS PARTICIPATION AT MEETING. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.

*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAM SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

WH/6 CI-4

15-124-52

21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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DATE-TIME GROUP: 211612Z
CITE: DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER: 457888

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TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 25260 (IN 035305)

1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN. WILL OMIT NAME OF MANUEL CORTINA AND REFER TO HIM ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H

WH/6 CI-4
15-124-52
21 Sep 73

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

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T 546182 PAGE 01-01 IN 235549

TOR:211012Z SEP 73 BONN 26432

S E C R E T 210956Z SEP 73 STAFF

PRECEDENCE

CITE BONN 26432

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456615

1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF. TO INCREASE USEFULNESS, PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 3B REF.

2. FILE 15-124-52. E2-IMPDET

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21 Sept 73

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STAFF	182334Z	DIRECTOR	455515

CONF: C/WH8 INFO: FILE [illegible] -1553

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TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.

RYBAT FUOMEN

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT.

2. SUBJECT: ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.

3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFO), OUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE BEEN EITHER TAKEN OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT, WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS;

B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR 50%, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES TO THE PUBLIC.

B

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TO THE PUBLIC.

4. ACCORDING TO NUNO, PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO HELP THEM.

5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS WSOFOFA COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.

6. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.#

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1973 W. Kent
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT: 6556/9155

SA/WH/EIZO

J. W. Kaufman
C/EUR

C/WHD/6

C/WHD

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ACTION # 732

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PAGE 01-01

IN 032783

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TOR:181935Z SEP 73

SAGO 26529

S E C R E T 161856Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26529

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 456203 (IN 031351)

1. CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR FUOMEN. NO SPECIALCAVEATS. (IN 031722)

2. PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY. INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY TO FUSRMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2.

3. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.

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PAGE 01

IN [illegible]

TOR:172145Z SEP 73

SAGO 26512

S E C R E T 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL

TDFIR-314/07571-73
HCS-9839

CITE SANTIAGO 26512

TO: DIRECTOR.

INTEL

SUPDATA: SOURCE: FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX. FILE: 15-9-4. CL BY 009560.

FILED: 171950Z

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OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 031722

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SECRET

CITE TDFIR -314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : 15 SEPTEMBER 1973

SUBJECT: PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CH

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9839

SOURCE: AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. HE HAS GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS OF THE PDC. MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI, A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER PDC LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY

SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED.

2. (SOURCE COMMENT: MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ, THE PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHO HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; AND LEON VILARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENZ HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE PDC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY.)

3. FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE

IN 031722

TDFIR -314/07571-73

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.9. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEOGRY 58 (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

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T 535956 PAGE 01-01 IN 031535

TOR:171843Z SEP 73 SAGO 26500

S E C R E T 171814Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26500

TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE FUOMEN

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 (IN 031341)

B. SANTIAGO 26464 (IN 030951)

1. CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.

2. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET

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T 535509 PAGE 01-01 IN 031341

TOR:171558Z SEP 73 MEXI 25196

S E C R E T 171541Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25196

TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.

FUORACLE

REF. SANTIAGO 26464 (C030451)

1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM. REQUEST SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.

2. FOR DIRECTOR: OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE. PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS. ALLENDE AT AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL MOURNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.

3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.

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TOR:151547Z SEP 73 MEXI 25191

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SECRET 151536Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 25191

TO: DIRECTOR.

KDOBELISK FUOMEN

REF: DIRECTOR 454587

1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KDGLACIER-3 ON 13 SEPT 73. ON 14 SEPT KDGLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.

2. FILE: 50-6-91/3. E2, IMPDET.

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T 527885 PAGE 01 IN 028495

PRECEDENCE

TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

S E C R E T 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF

CITE SANTIAGO 26421

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, WH/MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY, ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS, LONDON, PARIS, LCPIPIT, BONN.

1. EL MERCURIO, A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY, APPEARED TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) CARRYING FOR MOST PART OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER, APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:

A. HACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL

CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MAS INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNDO EN LA DIRECCION DEL PAIS. TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LA EXTRANJERA HABIAN LLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTRABA EN UN PROCESO FATAL QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL.

LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASO A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA

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15-124-52

13 SEP 73

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Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICO, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.

SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO DEL TRABAJO, NORMALICE LAS FAENAS, DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO NACIONAL Y REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.

CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD, PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.

EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMBO FORZARON LA SITUACION HASTA EL PUNTO EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.

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CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO, RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRIBUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL PARLAMENTO. DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.

LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR A CIERTOS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO, DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO, SU INDECISION, SU EGOISMO O SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PERMITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.

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TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS. A NADIE PUEDE SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE A LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.

EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTISMO ES TRABAJO, ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.

B. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA -- COMPLACENCIA DEL PODER JUDICIAL

EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:

"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD, COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTICULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES, MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE, Y ESPERA QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA

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TOR:132324Z SEP 73 SAGO 26421

AHORA. SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973. FIRMA: ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA".

C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF.AA. Y CARABINEROS --

150 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS

ALLANADA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO. TENDICION DE 600 PERSONAS.

REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.

INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.

CONTROL DE LA MONEDA, TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.

CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO NO. 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO.

LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO, DONDE SE RINDIERON 600 PERSONAS, Y SE ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INDUSTRIAS, ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOS...

2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET

S E C R E T

15-124-52

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S E C R E T 052311Z CITE JMWAVE 4480

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMMUG

REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011

74 4051

6 DEC 65 IN 54041

1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE LATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 USED AS STATUS COVER INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION, WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCHER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE BALTIMORE COMPANY, AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH COMPANY. REQUEST HQS CLARIFY.

2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OTHER PBRUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE REVISED AMMUG/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STATUS COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. SCHEAFFER EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN 1 JAN 66. THERE WAS NO INTERIM EMPLOYMENT.

3. SEVERAL OTHER CREDIT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED BY SCHEAFFER HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS BE REASON FOR PRESENT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 S E C R E T

CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO EXPEDITE CLOSING PURCHASE.

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21 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. The DDP and Chief, SR met with Ambassador Thompson in his office to advise him of our plans to proceed to hostile interrogation in order to clarify the NOSENKO case. The DDP explained that while we had reached a firm conclusion late last year that NOSENKO was a provocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order, we decided to review these conclusions with representatives of the FBI. After some unavoidable delay, a series of meetings was held with the FBI at the level of Deputy Director for Security, Mr. William C. Sullivan. The findings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views, were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John Edgar Hoover. A copy of this memorandum was shown to Ambassador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the FBI and ourselves now have a common understanding on the case which was something both the DCI and the Director, FBI, agreed would be necessary.

2. DDP went on to say that we would hope to begin hostile interrogations in the near future but before we did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thompson in light of the various contingencies which might arise during the course of these interrogations. DDP felt that it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in advance of our intentions so that if consultations with the State Department became necessary on a contingency basis, Ambassador Thompson would be in possession of the background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were sure that NOSENKO could not escape and turn himself into the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established him in a country house with a large security guard which we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then asked if there was a possibility that NOSENKO might commit suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the type to do so and that our security surveillance was such that we were alert to this possibility and would try to prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there had been any communications concerning NOSENKO from the

Soviet side. We replied there had been none since the confrontation last year following NOSENKO's arrival in this country. We then mentioned the attempts on several occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother to contact him through the Embassy in Moscow but added that these attempts ceased in March 1964 and nothing has been heard from them since.

3. Ambassador Thompson then asked if NOSENKO had provided information which would discredit any American officials. We answered in the negative, pointing out that he had reported on former French and Canadian ambassadors. We later qualified the statement on Americans, pointing out that NOSENKO did provide information on a few Americans of lesser rank as well as private citizens.

4. The DDP then noted that after we reached a point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide that NOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this action to discourage defections. We explained that when we came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we would hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Government which would establish NOSENKO as a provocateur. The DDP then described the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and the possibility that a quadripartite statement by the governments might be considered. The DDP did note, however, that AEJOYFUL was in British hands and that they have the major responsibility even though we and other security and intelligence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The DDP then noted that in past cases where we had turned back people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request, the Soviets had not made publicity capital of these actions.

5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on Soviet political issues which he has been receiving recently from the FBI. He commented that it was his very strong impression that the information was being fed to us by the Soviets. He said that it either consisted of information we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDP com-

mented that it was the opinion of several officers in the Clandestine Services that some of these FBI sources were under Soviet control whereas the FBI believed them to be genuine.

6. In summing up our position on the NOSENKO case for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of information the Soviets had given up through NOSENKO. He made particular reference to the Johnson case and observed that if the Soviets were prepared to provide this kind of build-up to insure the success of NOSENKO's mission, it must then be very important to them. In conclusion, the DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to Mr. Hughes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador Thompson agreed.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

6 Apr 61

19-120-26

UR

6 April 1961

Chief, Contact Division
ATTN : Support

Chief, Miami Office

Memorandum of Visit to: Julio Pablo [illegible] Reyes
3330 N.W. 73rd Avenue
Miami, Florida

1. Mr. Frank Watterson, representative of the US State Dept. in Miami, advised this office that Subject arrived in the US on 31 Mar 61 as an exile and that he might have information of interest to this office.

2. On 4 Apr 61, Luis C. Rodriguez interviewed Subject in Watterson's office. An examination of Subject's passport disclosed that he was born on 23 Jan 1943 in Havana, Cuba.

3. Subject stated that he is a member of a clandestine organization named Unidad Revolucionaria (UR), which is composed of 26 underground groups. The coordinator for military operations of UR was Major Humberto SORI Marin, who was arrested recently. Among the leaders of UR are Rogelio GONZALEZ better known by his nom de guerre of "Francisco"; and Rafael DIAZ aka "Ralph". All these individuals were arrested recently and UR is completely disorganized as a result.

[illegible]

4. Subject also stated that his mission with UR was to serve as courier between the organization and the Catholic Chaplain at the Cabana fortress. The liaison between the Chaplain and Subject was Fray BALBINO, who is the sexton at the Jesus de Miramar Church, in the suburb of Miramar, near Havana.

5. Subject also made a trip to Sancti Spiritus in the Province of Las Villas bringing a radio transmitter for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the Escambray. Through the above mentioned priest, Subject obtained some information furnished by prisoners held in the Cabana fortress which is being forwarded in separate form.

6. Subject intends to remain in the US indefinitely and has been instructed to contact a Cuban national named "Ernesto", who resides at [illegible] Miami. Ernesto is the UR representative in Miami.

7. No further contacts with Subject are anticipated.

JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF

LCRodriguez/cmb

[illegible] Ernesto — [illegible] Cuban chief in Havana previously [illegible] Considered a security risk (re discipline) by AMCRAT

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folder 9

21

[illegible]

2[illegible] March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation at the Department of State on 21 March 1952. Present were Messrs. Boyce, Kretzmann and [illegible] from State and Wisner, Lloyd and Braden from CIA.

Mr. Kretzmann had just returned from a trip abroad and said that he had three caveats to make about RFE. In order they were as follows:

1. He said that in the Greek Embassy, Mr. [illegible] and others complained of the activities of the stringers of RFE. These stringers, he said, sometimes posed as Government employees and went to embassies of other countries getting in touch with refugees without clearing with the U. S. Embassy. At this point Mr. Wisner spoke strongly, saying that he had told [illegible] several times that the [illegible] reporters must keep in line. He said that he would repeat these warnings and that the views of CIA and of VOA were identical on the problem. [illegible] the discussion [illegible] that of the two reporters in Greece who were involved -- Landowski and [illegible] -- [illegible] had now [illegible] that [illegible] the specific problem, if not the issue, was solved for the moment.

2. Kretzmann then said that he had heard from several sources around Europe increasing rumors that there were Communists and Fascists within RFE ranks. He referred also to the [illegible] of our security. The manner in which [illegible] security [illegible] was outlined to Mr. Kretzmann [illegible]. Mr. Wisner, however, instructed Mr. Lloyd to consult with Mr. [illegible] and to instruct him to warn the Czechs, Hungarians, etc. [illegible] Communist operation [illegible] to infiltrate the organization.

3. Mr. Kretzmann said that he had recently met with Harry [illegible] and [illegible] policy guidance, at least they said [illegible] wondered whether it would be in order for [illegible] guidance. Mr. Wisner

replied that in fact RFE did receive constant and frequent policy guidance but that the members of the top staff of RFE were looking for the type of policy guidance which did not exist -- a kind of overall global strategy covering specific incidents and eventualities, a kind of policy guidance which probably neither would nor could be written. Specifically he had no objection to showing the top people VOA policy line.

Finally, Mr. Kohler questioned the advisability of putting the new Russian Committee under the Crusade. He pointed out his fear that, what with RFE and RFA already under the Crusade, the Congress would soon believe there was nothing left for VOA to cover. Mr. Joyce rose to this question explaining the necessity of helping Admiral Kirk to find some cover. He pointed out that Messrs. Braden and Devine had been detailed to assure that Crusade publicity did not give the impression that RFE and RFA and any new "private" radio would obviate the necessity for the Voice, and assured Kohler that all Crusade publicity, posters etc. would avoid this possibility. Wisner mentioned his desire to find better cover for the new Committee and there was some talk of foundations. No better cover had, however, been found at the moment and it was apparent that Admiral Kirk must have some answer to questions which are submitted to him. Mr. Kohler answered this argument by reiterating his fears.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC & PP)
1 cc - DD/P
1 cc - FI (Mr. Poor)
1 cc - FY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

C-22

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S/P - Mr. Joyce

DATE: February 19, 1952

FROM : EE - Mr. Barbour

SUBJECT: Fund Memorandum No. 62 of December 31, 1951 attaching copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Major Group)

Your attention is invited to subject memorandum which quotes a speech by Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council's Working Committee in the United States, proposing the formation of a domestic political pressure group of American residents of Eastern European stock. In the course of his speech, Mr. Lerski repeats and endorses the official statement of Aims and Principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East-European Descent. This statement, particularly in its paragraph No. 3, proposes that their objectives should be obtained through "unified political action."

The Department is obviously in complete support of their basic objective, namely, the overthrow of Communism. However, we do perceive real harm in the utilization of NCFE funds to promote domestic political pressure groups; especially, when such groups will self-avowedly engage in political and election contests in the United States in order to further their objectives abroad.

Accordingly, we would suggest that steps be taken to ensure that groups which are sponsored by or supported through affiliation with NCFE be restrained from participating in or assisting such domestic political pressure groups as is proposed in subject Fund Memorandum. Such groups should be cautioned, in any event, to avoid any public declarations of intent to intervene in domestic American politics.

cf
EE:[illegible]Pell:lc
2/19/52

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible] 1952

C-22

MEMORANDUM NO. 1[illegible]2

SECRET

PRIVATE

December 31, 1951

ML-1-6

Attached to this memorandum are copies of documents regarding the activities of the Central and Eastern European Conference (Slavik-Majer Group).

(Perski)

JAN 5 1952

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

On behalf of Mr. A. Cretzianu, Chairman of the last conference, and Dr. Constantine Fotitch, Chairman of the Serbian National Committee, Chairman of the next meeting of the Central and Eastern European Conference, I am inviting you and your political friends to a meeting of the CEEC, which will be held on Tuesday, December 18, 1951 at the Hotel Willard, Executive Room, Pennsylvania Ave. and 14th St., Washington, N.W., at precisely 3 P.M.

The Agenda of the meeting will be:

1. Report of the Secretary General on the meetings of the General Committee on the action of the CEEC on deportations, in Washington, New York, Paris, about the press conference in Washington, etc.
2. Report of Mr. Jerzy Lerski (Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council, Working Committee in the U.S.) on collaboration with Americans of Central and East European Descent.
3. Report of Mr. V. Stanka on World University.

The report of Mr. Lerski is attached to this invitation.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Dr. Juraj Slavik
Secretary General

* * * *

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

(On Americans of Central and East European Descent)

From Jerzy Lerski, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Council's Working Committee in the U.S., 618 A Street, S.E., Apt. 15, Washington 3, D. C.

The last three decades of the past century and the first two of the present one, mark the period in which millions of the impoverished peasants of Central and Eastern Europe came to the happy shores of free America. There are now at least twelve million U.S. citizens of Central and East European descent. This is, of course, a most careful estimate. Congressman Kenneth B. Keating of Rochester, N. Y., in his

Extension of Remarks in the Congressional Record on September 15th, 1951, gives the total number of these "loyal Americans" as 20,000,000.--I think it is rather too high an estimate. Even if we would include all Jews from those areas the number could hardly be higher than 15 million; this would be 10% of the total population of the United States. This work seeking, economic emigration from our countries was mainly concentrated in the big cities and the great industrial or mining areas, of the sixteen East and Mid-Western states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota. In some of those states these Europeans comprise about one third of the population. This applies especially to big cities such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Scranton, Buffalo, Wilkes Barre, Trenton, Newark, Camden, New Britain, etc. One should also mention that not less than one fifth of this big emigration managed to find work on farms--in such states as Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, Massachusetts, and New York.

The political importance of this great segment of American population is steadily increasing in the last twenty years. Nearly all the respective groups were concerned about the homelands of their fathers and grandfathers and became very active during World War II. Although, with the succeeding generations, third or even fourth, this interest has waned, due to the natural weakening of ties with the "old countries"--these new Americans, the sons and grandsons of the poor Central and Eastern European peasant emigrants are conscious of their ancestry. Educated in American colleges and universities, they are gradually emerging in American public life; their old inhibitive inferiority complex is rapidly disappearing. Let us study the Washington Telephone Directory. It is astonishing that at least every twelfth name is of Central Eastern European descent. I am not as familiar with other national groups and their achievements, but as far as Poles are concerned, we are proud to have Mr. Szymczak as one of the Governors of the Federal Reserve, Peter Zukowski the newly appointed Deputy Director of RFC, Mr. Mruk the Mayor of Buffalo and Mr. Czelusta Mayor of Toledo. I am sure similar successes can be claimed by other groups of our Central and Eastern European bloc. Most of these Americans are very helpful if properly approached. We have heard recently at a reception of General Bor-Komorowski a statement made by Major Alfred D. Sieminski a Democratic Congressman from New Jersey who offered his willingness to help the exiled leaders of all of our groups, in our efforts to liberate our part of the world. Similar statements have been made by other Congressmen of Polish descent.

The social advancement of our American brethren is visible nearly in all spheres of American life, with the sole exception of propaganda i.e. Press, radio, television, Hollywood, though even there some progress is to be noticed. In such fields as Church, Universities, and Politics the process of advancement is remarkable. Americans of Central and Eastern European descent have proved to be a first class reliable element as soldiers and citizens of the United States during the two World Wars and the present most dangerous ideological struggle with Communism.

There are about six million Americans of Polish descent in the United States. They consist approximately one half of the estimated total of the Central and Eastern European group. Slovaks and Ukrainians compete for second place, having about one million each, in the United States and Canada, Lithuanians and Hungarians seem to be next in line. It may be taken for granted that all of our national groups have at least a hundred thousand American brothers in this country. It is, and it should be a tremendous asset in our struggle for liberation. To take my own Polish group for example it is encouraging to know that there are already ten Congressmen of Polish descent (seven Democrats, three Republicans). Tadeusz Machrowicz Democrat of Michigan, speaking at the Pulaski rally in Detroit declared a few weeks ago that "all congressmen of Polish descent, regardless of party affiliations, are united in so far as the cause of Free Poland is concerned." According to him, as reported by the Polish American Journal No. 47--Vol. XI of November 24th, 19[illegible]1--"the Polish American solons are working together to invalidate the Teheran and Yalta agreements and to persuade the United States Government to go on record favoring the present western boundaries of Poland." Of other groups Slovenians have one Congressman of their descent--young and prominent Mr. Blatnik from the fourth District of Minnesota. Our Czech friends can claim an old experienced member of the Foreign Affairs Committee Mr. Sabbath--Democrat from Illinois, born in Prague, and another Congressman Mr. Stefan died recently. Up to now there never was any U.S. Senator who could claim Central or Eastern European ancestry, although Senator Langer was born of Czechoslovak German parents. Former Governor Stassen claims Czech ancestry and Governor Lausche Slovenian ancestry. There are several Congressmen of Jewish extraction who were either born in our part of the world or are of the Eastern European parentage. Some of them may be also considered as potential friends of our cause.

A typical organisation in which we should be interested in our work is that of Polish American Congress, established early in 1944 with the main purpose to help Poland in regaining her liberty and at the same time to serve in the best way the long range interests of the United States by pointing out the dangers of Communism and Russian imperialism. By taking such a determined stand at the time when the close friendship with the so-called great Eastern Ally was preached in Washington, they have rendered a valuable service to this country. Polish American Congress is a sort of federation of all types of Polish American organisations, most of them being of course insurance companies with Polish National Alliance. (400,000 members and 75 million of capital) as the most powerful. Others are cultural, educational, or church and veteran groups. They joined together in a struggle for Justice for Poland. Polish-American Congress has the cooperation of about 50 Polish-American newspapers in this country.

Studying the problem I found that there exist parallel organisations of other national groups. Their structural basis are also very similar. I became better acquainted with the American Hungarian Federation. Though organised as long ago as 1906 at Cleveland Convention, it now has among its principal aims and purposes: "To support--within the Constitution and laws of the United States--with all its influence movements aiming to bring about independence for Hungary as well as liberty and well being for its people and to do everything possible to protect the human rights and citizenship of the Hungarian displaced persons outside of Hungary." As the Polish organisation is dominated by the vigorous and colorful personality of Charles Rozmarek from Chicago so is the Hungarian Federation by its energetic executive secretary Stephen E. Balogh from Washington, D.C. The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is another very active body under the chairmanship of young economist Dr. Lev Dobriansky from Georgetown University.

The above mentioned three organizations together with the Byelorussian - American Association, American Carpatho-Rus Congress, United American Croatians, and the Slovak League of America are sponsoring a Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent, with the Headquarters at 1624 Eye Street, N.W., Washington D.C., which is at the same time the H.Q. of the American-Hungarian Federation. It is a young organisation in its initial period of ambitious activities. Its officers elected on April 1951 at the Hudson Hotel - New York Conference are Stephen M. Tkatch (Carpatho-Ruthenian)--President, Dr. Lev Dobriansky (of Ukrainian descent)--Vice President, Charles Rozmarek (of Polish descent)--Treasurer. Members of the Board of Directors: Stephen E. Balogh (of Hungarian descent), John Michayonack, Philip Hrobak--Recording Secretary, Mr. Lesins (of Latvian descent), Rev. Silvije Grubisic (of Croatian descent) and Stephen J. Skubik (of Ukrainian descent)--Bureau Manager. Joseph A. Jackovics (of Slovak descent) was Federation's Secretary General but accused by other officers for his tendency to turn the Federation into a mere tool of Republican Party machine he was forced to resign. It is not to be overlooked that the Federation is at the moment under strong Ukrainian influence. The officers of the Board of Directors complain that Mr. Rozmarek never attended a meeting of theirs and that Mr. Charles Burke from the Washington Office of the Polish American Congress deputises only in the character of an observer. This absence de facto of the Polish-American Congress apparently hampers to a large extent the Federation's activities. (The reason for this absence will be explained orally).

According to an official Statement of Aims and Principles of Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent adopted at the Board of Directors Meeting held in Washington on August 17, 1951 there are as follows:

1. To exert every effort to defend the Constitution of our American Way of life. To engage and exercise every measure of effort and resource toward the decisive defeat of Russian Communist imperialism which in its venomous essence poses a mortal threat to the moral and intellectual Christian foundations of western civilisation in which is posited our priceless American way of life.

2. To coordinate and implement the common and mutual activities of the numerous member organizations represented herein within the scope of a unified political action oriented toward the systematic realisation of this basic objective and the simultaneous world-wide extension of the spiritual and hence, any continuation of the serving of complaints will be simply a gesture of dematerial blessings engendered in our Bill of Rights, the formula of self-determined freedom and the Atlantic Charter.

3. To serve and assist through such unified political action the appropriate agencies of our Government and various collaborating American anti-Communist organizations in the dissemination of authentic information on Soviet Russian tyranny and atrocity behind the iron curtains of Central Europe and Asia, in the promulgation of necessary steps aimed at the formation of a global network of anti-Communist alliances, notably within the Soviet empire, in the formulation of political objectives adapted to the historic requirements and aspirations of the peoples available as our natural allies, and in the persistent counteraction of sinister Communist and other anti-democratic influence and groups in our domestic environment.

4. To promote the security and welfare of the United States by insisting upon policies which are shaped in terms of a scrupulous and forthright observance of the sacred principles embodied in the aforementioned monuments to the liberal human spirit and which will insure lasting peace to all the nations of the world, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, numbering approximately 150,000,000 people.

5. To urge our Government to seek the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to the nations which have been forcibly deprived of them and to secure the exercise of the fundamental right of self-determination for those nations which have not in the past been accorded this right, particularly in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

6. To impel, on the happy occasion of the liberation of all peoples from the yoke of Soviet Russian imperialism, governmental action to fulfill the guaranty of free and unfettered elections in these countries under the supervision of the United Nations and with strict regard for conditions of population distribution existing prior to the institution of the Russification policy bent on the extinction of the national identities of the respective enslaved countries.

7. Recognising the twofold need, viz: ridding all countries involved of implanted Soviet influence, together with ultimate solution of territorial boundary disputes, it is urged that strict priority of action be extended to the former consideration.

8. To abet forcefully the realisation of the preceding objectives and concomitantly contribute to the prevention of a generally disastrous world war III through the vigorous advancement of psychological warfare, with particular emphasis on substantial improvements in the status and function of the Voice of America, resounding proclamation of American friendship and support of the liberating movements stirring throughout the wide peripheral European and Asiatic area of non-Russian peoples imperialistically subjugated in the Soviet empire, and demands for true representation of these enslaved peoples in the councils of the United Nations.

9. To secure maximum and unstinting aid on the part of our Government for the manifold operations and the potentially unlimited expansion of the underground movements behind the iron curtains of Europe and Asia.

Though many of the proclaimed aims seem to be identical with those of ours there are also at the moment several serious obstacles for our close cooperation between our [illegible] and the Federation. Our two bodies consist of different national groups. Some of the nationalities present in [illegible] have not their counterparts in the Federation as is the case of Czechs, Estonians, Roumanians and Serbs. The efforts are made to bring these national groups within the scheme of the Federation. On the other side Ukrainians, Carpatho-Ruthenians, Byelorussians, and Slovak autonomists are not represented in our Committee. It should be stressed also that some of the corresponding new emigration groups, of the last mentioned nationalities are being considered by our friends from [illegible] as uncooperative due to their separatistic tendencies. I realise that the thorny problem of the independence of the some of the mentioned nationalities could hardly be at the present moment introduced in [illegible]. I would be inclined to suggest that as many of our immediate aims are similar to those of the Federation, regardless of some substantial differences we should take advantage of such a large body of organised American friends eagerly interested in the liberation of our respective countries within the whole area of Central-Eastern Europe. The same would apply of course to all component national organizations of the Federation such as for instance Polish American Congress which is not yet closely linked with the Federation. I would suggest that as all our groups have already established their liaison officers to appoint a liaison to The Federation of Americans of Central and East European Descent in order to be informed about their activities and to represent there our point of view. Such a cooperation may be of a great importance in many fields. I am sure that all these American organisations would be willing to help us in rising before the free world the problems of Deportations and forced labour in our part of the world, as our Polish American Congress was very helpful in bringing the Katyn Forest massacre into the light of the free opinion. Let us use our American brothers not only in such otherwise vital services as sending millions of food and clothing parcels behind the Iron Curtain or signing tens of thousands of affidavits and job assurances for Displaced Persons. Let us cooperate with them as close as possible in the most important political problems of our struggle for freedom.

The principal political issue facing us in that respect is that of pressing for a "Liberation Policy" of the United States and other Western Powers. With the approach of November 1952 elections it is becoming obvious to all of us that it will be of extreme importance for the cause of our free who will be elected as the new legislators of the United States. As Aliens we are not allowed to interfere into American domestic politics, as representatives of our countries we are deeply interested in whose hands the fate and the future of the world events is going to lie in the years to come. It is now a commonplace to state that Soviet Russia and the United States will decide the fundamental, universal issues in which our countries are so much concerned--liberty or slavery. We believe deeply that this should be a matter of common interest to us and to the citizens of the United States. It would be more than just a shortsightedness not to realise that in this decisive struggle for the very existence of our nations we are lucky to possess here powerful and understanding Allies in at least 18 million American voters of Central-Eastern European descent. They are equally eager as ourselves in bringing freedom back to our part of the world. As good American citizens, tax-payers, soldiers and workers they are fully entitled to sustain us in our efforts to liberate our countries. Regardless of party affiliations we should support our faithful friends and to match our enemies. Such a policy was applied mutatis mutandis by American Labour Unions in the case of the Taft Hartley Act, when all candidates for the seat in the House of Representatives or Senate and state Governorships, regardless of their party competency, have been asked for their stand in that matter and their record of voting was checked from that point of view. Such is the basic technique of the pressure policy in this country. Applied to foreign affairs it won't be either a new thing in the United States. It is a well known fact that the organised Jews of New York and other big American cities have mostly contributed to the miraculous re-emergence of the free state of Israel. Irish-Americans sustain vigorously the national claim for a United Ireland. The three "hyphenate" groups of American-Germans, Irish and Italians are mainly responsible for the eventful abolition of Wilsonian League of Nations policy. But, in our case,--we do not want to destroy anything; our aim is constructive. We need our American friends and relatives to co-operate with us for a positive purpose of Liberation. This may be in the United States the most powerful way of changing the catastrophic trend of American policy in respect of Eastern European problems. I see no reason why millions of Americans of Central Eastern European descent should not demand openly from their future legislators what stand have they taken in regard of liberation of our countries; (Are you for, are you against, or are you just neutral")--what have they done to materialise such a liberation in their past activities, what and in which way do they intend to do in future? Such a questionnaire may be very useful in reviving our issue before American political circles and the wide public opinion. To some of us it may seem too bold an initiative. However if we really are of the opinion that without the speedy liberation of Central-Eastern Europe--this magnificent country of the United States cannot survive either as a happy and free land then by the raising of the Liberation cause we are in this respect not only fulfilling our duties towards our respective countriesbut also a worthy service for the free people of America.

20 March 1952 W

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Southeastern Europe Division
Chief, Eastern Europe Division

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe
University Students

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a letter I am forwarding to Mr. Tyson on this subject.

2. Chief EE is on record as having advised the former case officer of TPT/NIC that EE should be afforded an opportunity for evaluation and covert screening of students of EE origin for future potential operational use, on the understanding that no student would be approached for this program during his scheduled term at the University. SE probably has a similar interest in this matter.

3. This memorandum is to ask that you keep us informed on a continuing basis of your views on this subject, and also to let you know that you can expect from us the information which shall come to us in reply to the attachment.

4. Any comments which you now have on this subject and would give to me either informally or by memorandum, by 15 April, would be appreciated.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO/[illegible]V:blj
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressees
1 - CIO
2 - RI
3 - Project file

In reply refer W-1927
to:

20 March 1952

Dear Levering:

I have read with much interest the account you recently sent to Mr. Haywood on the University in Strasbourg.

I have also noted that in a recent Fund Memorandum (No. 385), the question was raised as to what should be done with the Strasbourg students after they have completed their studies, should no opportunity present itself for their return to "liberated" countries of their origin.

In any case, this question will be of continuing concern to both your organization and ours, and I hope that we may be mutually helpful in planning how we can make use of these students after the completion of their studies in Strasbourg. Towards this effort we should appreciate receiving from you a list of the present student body at Strasbourg together with biographical data and expected completion of study dates for each. We should also like to have a statement as to the type of contract entered into with the students and as to any obligation imposed upon those who enroll. I should like to discuss this question with you from time to time and particularly after receiving the information herein requested.

My continued best wishes

Sincerely,

Oliver Haywood

CIO/N V:blj
Distribution:
Addressee - Addressee - 1
1 - CIO
2 - RI
1 - Project file ✓

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Miss Viccellio		
2			
3			
4			
5			
FROM		**INITIALS**	**DATE**
1	CIO	TWB	18 Mar
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: Are any of the officers of this organization on our cleared consultants list? I believe you understand the situation, which is that it may be a good thing to try a direct approach to this group on behalf of NCFE.

Mr. [illegible]
No, Sir. Nancy

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

SECRET

INFORMATION

19 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom and National Information Bureau

1. On January 10th I called your attention to the fact that the National Information Bureau, a reputable investigation agency which conducts inquiries into charitable organizations and advises large donors, had given an adverse recommendation on the Crusade for Freedom (see Attachment 1). This matter has now risen again. It may be that it would be wise to undertake a high-level approach to the Bureau through yourself or General Smith, for the following reasons:

According to an agreement with us and with the State Department at our recent meetings, Crusade for Freedom will bank heavily this year on donations from corporations. They have now discovered that these corporations rely to a great extent on the National Information Bureau's advice. Several corporations have indicated that, according to their practice, they cannot give to the Crusade unless it has the blessing of the Bureau, and you will note in Attachment 2 that one such corporation -- Barnes Manufacturing Company of Mansfield, Ohio -- has written to the Crusade citing its doubt.

2. Meantime, members of the Crusade have had conversations with D. Paul Reed, Executive Director of the National Information Bureau (see Attachment 3) and he has insisted that he cannot report that the Crusade has met the basic standards in philanthropy until his Standards 7 and 8 are met. These are the publication of an annual audit and of a detailed annual budget, the prime requirement being the disclosure of totals.

3. You may want to read this Attachment 3 with care but I cannot myself see any manner in which we can meet these standards. Therefore, I believe that it may be necessary to make the approach to the National Information Bureau described above.

4. The officers of the National Information Bureau are as follows:

Board of Directors

Allen Wardwell, Honorary Chairman
Paul L. Feiss, Honorary President
Valentine E. Macy, Jr., President
Ralph H. Blanchard, Vice-President
Randall J. LeBoeuf, Jr., Vice-President
Craig R. Smith, Secretary
Ellis Russell, Treasurer

Edward K. Bachman
James G. Blaine
Mrs. Sidney C. Borg
Allen T. Burns
Harry M. Carey
Homer Folks
Maxwell Hahn

Mrs. John B. Henneman
Edward J. Keyes
Hugh Knowlton
Alexander Lindey
Arch Mandel
Miss Adele W. Morrison
John B. Niven

John M. Shaw

D. Paul Reed, Executive Director
B. D. Burhoe, Research & Advisory
Mrs. E. R. Goodwin, Research & Advisory

Do you know any of them?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC & DD/P)
1 cc - CIC
2 cc - RI

3 Attachments
1- NIB recommendation on Crusade.
2- Ltr from Barnes Mfg. Company.
3- NCFE memo on NIB.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Executive Registry
2-4902

10 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Information Bureau, Inc.

1. Attached are two surveys from the National Information Bureau, Inc. The National Information Bureau is a reputable investigation agency conducting inquiries into American organizations which request funds from the public. It advises donors on whether the organizations are worthy of support.

2. The attachments contain the results of an investigation into the Crusade for Freedom and the American Committee for a United Europe. Note that the Bureau's recommendation in respect to the Crusade is adverse. The American Committee for a United Europe on the other hand gets the Bureau's blessing.

Thomas Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Branch

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

April 27, 1951

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC.
537 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, New York

ORIGIN AND PURPOSE: American Committee on United Europe, Inc. was incorporated in New York, February 16, 1949. Stated purpose of the Committee is two-fold:

> In Europe to "1. encourage the idea of unity and lend assurance that a unified Europe will have the support and friendship of the people of the United States; 2. give desperately needed financial support to groups - such as the European Movement - working in Europe on behalf of unity."

> In America to "1. give Americans a better understanding of the steps toward unity which Europe has already undertaken; 2. encourage civic, educational and other groups to study their implications and the means by which American policy can further the work; and finally, 3. as specific issues arise, the Committee will point out what we Americans can do, as individuals and as a nation, to help Europe unite and thus to help themselves."

By way of background information, the Committee stated in its early days:

> "Despite Europe's recuperation from the visible effects of wartime devastation, antiquated national barriers to unity and progress still invite disaster for all countries. A continent divided into seventeen separate, conflicting political and economic pockets presents a weak and vulnerable flank, perilous to world peace and security.

> "Four decades of bloodshed and economic deterioration have taught the peoples of Europe that survival is impossible without unity. As never before, they have banded together - statesmen, trade unionists, business leaders, churchmen and educators in a dozen nations - in the movement for European unity. Although determined to accomplish Union, they face many obstacles.

> "Convinced of our stake in the success of their work, the American Committee on United Europe believes that American support and encouragement can be decisively helpful to the realization of this objective. Leaders in Europe have confirmed this belief, and insist that the time for maximum effort is at hand."

PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES: The American Committee on United Europe describes itself as "in thorough agreement with Winston Churchill's assertion that 'We must spread the knowledge that this thing is really possible...We must create a climate of opinion.'" It will also "seek to avoid pleading for any single preconceived scheme or precise pattern for European Union, conscious that the nature of Union must evolve from the needs and aspirations of the peoples who will unite."

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, Inc.

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC. April 27, 1951

Grants have been made to private groups in Europe working for European union. Groups have been selected which have, in the opinion of the American Committee on United Europe, concrete programs for (1) strengthening the ~~Council of~~ Europe as a political authority; (2) supporting basic aims of the Marshall Plan and the Military Aid Program within the Atlantic Pact; (3) inclusion of Western Germany in a unified Europe.

The major group receiving Committee support is The European Movement, an overall organization composed of six organizations of private citizens in Europe, which claims to have helped influence the governments of Western Europe to establish the Council of Europe in 1949. European Movement has initiated conferences and research on economic, cultural and legal questions bearing on union.

In the United States the Committee has published statements on European union by European leaders, a Newsletter with a circulation of some 2,500 copies, summaries of proceedings at meetings of various European groups, and public opinion polls.

The Committee also sponsored lecture tours by Paul Reynaud, Lord Layton, Sir Harold Butler and Paul-Henri Spaak and single lectures by Winston Churchill, Robert Schuman and Paul Van Zeeland.

The Current program is as follows:

Continued fund-raising for support of European groups, particularly the European Movement as a center of work in Europe for a Union.

Publication and distribution of addresses, studies and reports, and sponsorship of meetings at which European statesmen may give Americans a first hand account of the work abroad.

PERSONNEL: The officers and Board of Directors include the following: Chairman, *William J. Donovan; Vice Chairman, *Allen W. Dulles; Secretary, *George S. Franklin, Jr.; Treasurer, Emmett F. Connely; Executive Director, William P. Durkee;

Raymond B. Allen
Charles S. Cheston
Lucius D. Clay
E. F. Connely
E. P. [illegible]
*David Dubinsky
*Arthur J. Goldberg
A. Crawford Greene

*Charles R. Hook
David E. Lilienthal
Herbert S. Little
Robert F. Maguire
*Walter N. Maguire
Stacy May
*George Nebolsine

Carl T. Nixon
*Frederick Osborn
Kurt F. Pantzer
*Robert P. Patterson
Walter Bedell Smith
*Arnold J. Zurcher

* Members of Executive Committee

IMPORTANT

This report is a privileged communication and is strictly for the confidential information of the person or organization to whom it is addressed.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON UNITED EUROPE, INC. April 27, 1951

FINANCES: A financial audit for the nearly twenty-one month period from inception, February 16, 1949, to October 31, 1950 shows: cash contribution income, $210,919; disbursements, $193,072. Disbursements include: grants to European groups, $96,651; European conferences, $11,963; Popular education, $19,674; fund-raising expenses, $26,201; and administrative expenses, $38,583. Cash balance, October 31, 1950, was $17,846.

Contributions to the American Committee are reported to be exempt for income tax purposes.

Budget for the year to October 31, 1951 totals $150,000, of which $100,000 is for European operations.

COMMENT AND CONCLUSION: It is difficult to measure the influence of organizations undertaking to influence the mass public; however, we can report that the Bureau knows of no reason why those interested should not contribute to this Committee.

NATIONAL INFORMATION BUREAU, INC.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

LETTER OF CONFIRMATION

In reply refer
to: W-1923

13 March 1952

Dear Fred:

Thank you for your report of 5 March 1952 on Horvat. Attached hereto are copies of the original correspondence.

We should appreciate your making a direct acknowledgment to Horvat on behalf of Mr. Dewey as requested in his 20 February letter. We have acknowledged the receipt of Mr. Dewey's letter and have indicated to him that we were referring the matter to appropriate hands.

We should appreciate receiving a copy of the reply which you send to Horvat.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Hadwood

Attachment

Attachment was handed to John on 12 March 1952.

CIO/[illegible] memo from ADPC to DD/P of 13 March 1952)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - PY/Ex Asst
1 - CIO✓
2 - RI

March 5, 1952

HORVAT, Pavle

Pavle Horvat is of Slovenian origin, about 50 years old and was born in the Prlekija district near the Hungarian border (formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy).

Horvat became known during the thirties through his numerous manifestos and posters by which he attempted to organize his own political movement. This "movement" was labeled various names at different times. At one time it was simply referred to as a "peasant movement," at another time as the "Slovenia Section of the Croatian Peasant Party," and still later as an "independent Slovenian peasant movement." He never had, however, any following and never set up his own electoral lists. On the other hand, it is true, that the Croat Peasant Party of Dr. Macek considered him as one of its trustees in Slovenia for a short period.

He earned his living as a farmer. He also had a small village grocery shop and occupied himself in his district with "interventions," that is, performing all types of secretarial services for the peasants of the area. Among other things, he undertook to organize the transportation of the seasonal workers who went to France and Germany during the harvesting months. He had difficulties with the home authorities and police in this respect and had to appear before the courts on a number of occasions.

At the beginning of the war he fled to Zagreb, Croatia, at that time the Independent Croat State (Nazi puppet regime) of Dr. Pavelic. There he set up a small office for the relief of Slovenian refugees but it never reached any large proportions. He was not connected with the Refugee Committee which handled the main relief work (One source pointed out that the mere fact that he was able to establish an office and function in Zagreb during the period meant that he was at least passively acceptable to the Nazi regime.

As far back as 1935 he is known to have misrepresented himself as a "peasant leader."

After the war Pavle Horvat fled to Austria where he again claimed to be a Slovenian peasant leader and attempted to whip up propaganda for the creation of a special "peasant group," among the Slovenian refugees; he failed completely. He was unable to find followers in a single camp to form such a group, and the refugees refused to attend his meetings. In addition he is known to have boasted that he was acting on behalf of Mr. Macek and the International Peasant Union, though he was mandated by neither. The Allied authorities were finally forced to intervene and bring a stop to his activities since they were causing discontent among the refugees and disorders in the DP camps.

In July 1949, Horvat wrote the Honorable Joseph C. Grew in care of the National Committee for a Free Europe introducing himself as the Representative of the Democratic Slovenes and President of the International Peasant Union for Europe, and suggesting that he join forces with the Committee in the common struggle against Communism. In return for a trip to the United States he offered to bring a large confidential report on his activities to date and present a scheme for successfully suppressing communism and delivering the subjugated nations in the shortest possible time. He was informed that the Fund was confining its activities to refugee leaders already residing in the United States and that the proposed visit was impossible at that time.

Horvat has recently announced his forthcoming arrival in the United States. Several Slovenian and Croatian newspapers in this country have received articles (which he wrote himself) glorifying his past and present activities. None of them, so far, have taken any notice of these articles with the exception of the Croat separatist (pro-ustashi) paper, "DANICA," published in Chicago. Supposedly Dr. Macek was highly amused on reading the article describing the great "Slovene peasant leader."

Nobody in Slovenia in pre-war days would have considered Pavel Horvat as a person to be taken seriously in public life. He is considered by a number of sources a political impostor and as personally unethical. Neither the International Peasant Union for Europe, of which he claimed to be president, nor the Democratic Slovenes, of which he is a representative, is considered a legitimate organization. The Director of the Fund's Yugoslavian Research and Information Desk was the editor of a daily paper in Slovenian for eleven years before the war. He never met Horvath, seldom heard of him and his paper, as far as he knew, never took notice of him or his activities.

FOR THE RECORD: This report (on Pavle Horvat dated 5 March 1952) was forwarded to us by Mr. John Leich, assistant to Mr. Dolbeare, Director of the National Councils Division of NCFE.

NBV

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-6803

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCPP/PY/OPC

VIA: CPY/OPC

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Attacks on the Soviet Myth of "Prior Inventions"

1. I understand that your office has already addressed itself to the opportunity which was offered by the increasing absurdities of Russian claims to have been the inventors of a list of discoveries, explorations, and inventions which by now comprise the bulk of such discoveries and inventions important to modern life. This is, of course, an extremely vulnerable series of claims and one which exposes itself to ridicule so readily as to render it an excellent target for attack. There has been some play on this seen in the American press but I feel that it would be more effective if the European press and Radio Free Europe should handle the job.

2. In the Sunday edition of the Washington Post, there was a very good summary of the Russian "firsts." The article was written in just the right vein, although a more dead pan approach would perhaps be more effective in certain places. If you do not have this article, I suggest that you get someone to clip it for you--as well as I recall, it is to be found in the magazine section or the editorial (news review) part of the paper. I heard one on the radio this morning which would fit in nicely with this general line. I do not know the author of the crack, but it is certainly a "first" that the Russians should surely be given all the credit for. The crack was that "the Kremlin was the first to put peace on a war basis."

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: AD/PC
Chief, EE
CIC/OPC

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer
to: ~~W-1592~~ W-1904

28 March 1952

Dear Tom:

With reference to the Stephen Maincsyk case which Sam discussed with you during your recent visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Maincsyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. This report was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned over events arising from Maincsyk's recent death. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, he found evidence that Mainczyk had accepted money for the purpose of assisting individuals to escape from behind the Iron Curtain to the U.S. Zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salsburg.

Sincerely,

Three enclosures

CIO/NEV:blj
Distribution:
2 - RI
Orig - Addressee
1 - PY/Px Asst
1 - CIO

SECRET

COPY

January 21, 1952

American Consulate
Munich
Germany

Gentlemen:

The undersigned, Dr. Bela Gyorky of 21 East 92nd Street, New York City and Mr. Alexander A. Back of the above address wish to request your assistance in connection with consequences resulting from the sudden death of Mr. Steven W. Kaincsyk of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg, Austria.

The said gentleman was holding our money as a trustee, which money was sent to him to be paid out under certain conditions; we were trying to save our family from behind the Iron Curtain and we were negotiating with different people who were willing to undertake this task and we needed someone who would pay these persons the agreed amount in question when the operation was properly concluded. Through the said gentleman's secretary we received word that Mr. Maincsyk was seriously ill for the past few months and suddenly passed away, and to make certain that our interests are properly protected we are taking the liberty of writing you this letter in connection with the above matter.

The total amount sent to AMEXCO, Salsburg was $3,800. - out of which Mr. Kaincsyk paid altogether $300. - thus leaving $3,500. - in Mr. Kainczyk's name. Of course, if it is necessary we would both be glad to furnish additional proof to support this present letter and we would greatly appreciate your kind assistance. We would also thank you to advise us as to what additional steps you deem it necessary for us to take in this matter.

We thank you in advance for your kind assistance and courtesy and remain

Very truly yours,

Alexander A. Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAB/mak

Secret

SECRET

COPY

BACK EXPORT & IMPORT CO.
215 Fourth Avenue
New York 3, N.Y., U.S.A.

Member of Commerce & Industry
Association of New York

Cable Address
"Backexport"
Telephone
ORchard 4-5507

January 22, 1952

American Consulate
Salzburg
Austria

Gentlemen:

We just received the following cable from Dr. Emi Ehm, secretary of the deceased Mr. Steven Mainzcyk:-

"MAINCZYK DIED INTESTATE EFFECTS IN CUSTODY OF AMERICAN CONSULATE SALZBURG SUGGEST CONTACT THEM LETTER FOLLOWING. DR. EMI EHM"

It so happens that yesterday we erroneously wrote to the American Consulate in Munich, Germany and we are enclosing herewith a copy of the said letter from which you will see all particulars of our problem.

Your prompt attention and kind assistance in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Alexander A Back

Dr. Bela Gyorky

AAB/mak

American Consulate,
Salzburg, Austria
February 7, 1952

Mr. Alexander A. Beck,
Dr. Bela Gyorky,
Back Export & Import Company,
215 Fourth Avenue,
New York 3, New York.

Sirs:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of January 22, 1952 together with a copy of the letter addressed to the American Consulate General in Munich regarding certain private transactions you appear to have had with the late Mr. Stephen Maincsyk, an American citizen who died in Salzburg on January 1, 1952.

In accordance with its standing instructions and pending the decision of the appropriate local authorities, the Consulate is acting as provisional conservator of the effects of the deceased. It would appear that Mr. Maincsyk died intestate and the Consulate has been endeavoring to obtain instructions from the deceased's brother, Mr. Charles Maincsyk, 4119 Keeley Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the nearest known kin for advice concerning his interest in the estate.

Under these circumstances you will recognize that the Consulate has no authority to take cognizance of any claim you may have against the estate excepting to bear in mind your interest and to refer you to the Court that will have jurisdiction over the matter when the estate will have left our hands.

At such time as an executor is appointed, you will be informed and requested to address yourself to that party.

Sincerely yours,

Robert G. McGregor
American Consul

2 M
RGMcGregor:gw

To John Shield
Dick Umsiza 1 } 6 Mar 52

1. I have discussed this with Myers who asks that he receive the full report.

Therefore suggest that you prepare: 1) a sterile letter to be sent to Tom Myers giving all essential facts and a copy of the unclassified letter. On this basis, he will cable Munich and info us of results for our transmittal to State.

2. Think interim reply to State should say: the matter is being investigated at source in connection settlement Mairucyk estate via RFE.

NBV

What sort of employment
~~contract~~ R7E employees
enter into with R7E
— specifically any
restrictions on their
outside interests
while employed with
R7E. ?Is particularly
this in regard to
M., of his case here
is particular

Type of security
agreement which R7E
employees sign.

Letter to [illegible]

W-1792

Dear Tom:

With reference to the Stephen Mainczyk case which ~~I~~ Sam discussed with you during your recent visit, several questions have arisen concerning the broader aspects of the type of activity Mainczyk was undertaking ~~on his own~~ in addition to his RFE duties.

Specifically, we would like to know what sort of employment contract RFE employees enter into with RFE. If possible, we would like a copy of a typical contract. We are interested in knowing what restrictions, if any, are placed on employees' outside interests or activities while employed with RFE, particularly as they would apply to a case such as Mainczyk's. We would also like to have information on the type of security agreement presently in use between RFE and its employees.

There are attached several papers bearing on the Mainczyk case, ~~which might be of interest to you. They were~~ which forwarded with a report on the matter, which was prepared for our friends across the street. ~~[illegible]~~ This report ~~[illegible]~~ was to the general effect that the American manager of the Salzburg office of Radio Free Europe has been deeply concerned ~~[illegible]~~ over events arising from MAINCZYK'S ~~the~~ recent death ~~of Stephen Mainczyk~~. While looking through the personal effects of the deceased, we found evidence that MAINCZYK [illegible] for the purpose of assisting individuals to escape from behind the Iron Curtain to the U.S. Zone of Austria. The RFE manager was further disturbed to find that the entrusted funds were not listed among the assets of the deceased or deposited with the American Express Company at Salzburg.

Sincerely

Oliver Hadwood

3 enclosures

11 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Photostats in re International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, Paris

The attached photostats were made from accounting documents, while they were in transit through us from a ① TONIC representative, Paris, to TONIC headquarters. They are forwarded, as indicated below, to provide information as to individuals associated with the subject organization.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment (6 pages)

CIO/NUV:blj

Distribution:
Orig - WE (FRW-Mr. Minott; WE/3-Mr. Freeman) (with attachments)
1 - FE (Mr. Overton); SE (Mr. Krane) (with attachments)
1 - IO (Mr. Wiesner; Miss Stern) (with attachments)
1 - Project [illegible] file (with attachments)
2 - RI (with attachments)
1 - C/IO (without attachments)

① NCFE

SEC

[illegible]

No.	NAME	HOURS	SALARY PER HOUR	TOTAL	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	37	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	32	[illegible]	1,000	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	23	[illegible]	1,000	[illegible]
6	Robert Jeronimo	10	100	1,000	[illegible]
7	Jacob Nicolas	57	100	[illegible]	Jacob Nicolas
	Total:	297		[illegible]	

SECRET

[illegible]	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 1/2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	54	120	6.400	Paul Andrie
[illegible]	20	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	70	200	14.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] 1/2		[illegible]	

(3)

NO.	NAME	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	[illegible]
1	[illegible]	2	50	1.00	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	[illegible]	50	[illegible]	[illegible]
3	[illegible]	3	50	1.50	[illegible]
4	[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
6	[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
7	[illegible]	[illegible]	120	10.200	[illegible]
8	[illegible]	6	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
9	[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
10	[illegible]	7	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
11	[illegible]	10	500	5.000	[illegible]
12	[illegible]	[illegible]	700	[illegible]	[illegible]
	TOTAL	[illegible]		[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible] CONSTRUCTION [illegible] OFFICES)

[illegible]	HOURS	PER HOUR	TOTAL	SIGNATURA OF RECEIPT
[illegible]	[illegible]	60	[illegible]400	Komati Ilrau?
[illegible]	[illegible]	150	7,650	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	36	150	[illegible]400	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]160	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	150	7,800	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]960	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	150	[illegible]250	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	120	[illegible]80	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	10	300	[illegible]000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	200	22,800	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]760	

[illegible]

No. 62

[illegible] DEC. 1951.

No.	NAME	FUNCTION	AMOUNT FRENCH FRANCS	SIGNATURE OF [illegible]
1	[illegible]	Gen. Secretary	40.000	
2	Velman Sagha [illegible]	Assist. Secretary	40.000	
3	Chornan P.	Treasurer	40.000	
4	Popov [illegible]	[illegible] Political Pres. Europe	40.000	
5	Florek L.	Polish corresp.	40.000	
6	[illegible] V.	Rumanian corresp.	40.000	
7	[illegible] A.	Hungarian corresp.	40.000	
8	[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	40.000	
9	Ribar Bosco	Yugoslav corresp.	40.000	
10	Mikkelson	Estonian corresp.	10000	
11	Vivien [illegible]	English translator	10.000	
12	[illegible] Anna	Typist	10.000	
13	[illegible]	[illegible]	10.000	
14	[illegible]	Editor	10.000	
15	[illegible] L.	Polish corresp.	40.000	
16	[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	40.000	
17	[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	30.000	
18	[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	30.000	
19	[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	30.000	
20	[illegible]	Estonian corresp.	10.000	
21	Vivien [illegible]	English translator	10.000	
22	[illegible]	[illegible]	10.000	
23	[illegible]	[illegible]	10.000	
		[illegible]	[illegible].000	

[illegible] 1956

[illegible]

[illegible] NOV 1956

NAME	POSITION	AMOUNT FRENCH FRANCS	SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT
Brodsky	Gen. Secretary	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Assist. Secretary	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Treasurer	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Chief Edit., Radio Free Europe	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Polish corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Croatian corresp.	40.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	40.000	B. [illegible]
[illegible]	English translator	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Typist	10.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Chief Edit., [illegible]	10.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Polish corresp.	10.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Hungarian corresp.	10.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Bulgarian corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Rumanian corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Yugoslav corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible] corresp.	20.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Typist	15.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	Translator	30.000	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		95.000	

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Admiral H. B. Miller on 21 March.

Admiral Miller called me today and asked me to pass along two warnings:

1. He objects to what he has heard is the "approval" of CIA officials of the plan to put Admiral Kirk's Committee under the Crusade for Freedom. He said he thought the cover of the Crusade was by now almost non-existent and cited a recent meeting of an advertising group of which he is a member where, he said, various members turned to him and asked him to quit kidding. I said to Admiral Miller that I thought that the "approval" to which he referred was a matter of policy as between the State Department and CIA and that I thought it probable that if there had been any such approval the CIA officials who gave it had in mind the necessity of securing his views before putting the plan into effect. He replied that he wanted to be as helpful as possible and that if all Admiral Kirk had to fall back on was the Crusade for Freedom then perhaps he would have to yield, but he said that in any event if Admiral Kirk's Committee were to be added to the Crusade, the Crusade would have to be expanded. He could not possibly attempt to furnish cover under the present agreement with the State Department to cut down the activity of the Crusade.

2. He said that he wanted to issue a warning to all here that heads would shortly roll within NCFE. He said that he had recently had a talk with Fred Dolbeare and gone over Dolbeare's organization and that as a result of this talk his previous conviction as to the necessity for reorganization was emphasized tenfold. He said he thought there were too many jobs held by people whose qualifications were that they wore the old school tie or that they had relatives who already held jobs, and he said he intended to clean house to such a degree that he might soon be able to rent a floor in the New York building. He said that there may be some resignations as a result and that we should be prepared for them, but he said that he assumed we wanted him to conduct efficient operations and therefore he had a green light to do so until we called him off. I assured him that this was a fact.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB:ch

Orig - ADPC--DD/P--DDCI
1 cc - IO
2 cc - FI

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
- 224

Noted by D/DCI
4 - 52

21 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Committee for Russian Liberation

1. I called Bob Joyce in the State Department yesterday and asked him whether in his view the State Department would object to placing the new Committee for Russian Liberation under the Crusade for Freedom. I mentioned particularly a possible caveat of the State Department -- that we might be expanding the Crusade at the very time we had agreed at a series of meetings held recently that we would cut down its activities.

2. Joyce said that the agreement with State was as to method and scope of Crusade publicity and activity and that the addition of the new Committee under Crusade cover would not by any means abrogate this agreement. He said that we could go ahead and count upon the State Department's approval. I asked him whether he would like a memorandum to this effect or whether he would like to consult others in the State Department and he said no, that this was unnecessary, that we should go ahead.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Orig: DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc: EE (Mr. Poor)
1 cc: C/IO
2 cc: RI

20 March 52

Mr. Braden

Miss Stern today asked Mr. Leich to send a copy of the reply to her and also to give her any background on this he can obtain.

JBV

Mr. Braden:

John said he had an "explanation" of this letter which he will mail today. Also will report after he has had dinner.

UNCLASSIFIED .ESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS:

with Nagy tonight.
Ellen

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

10/52

Mr. Wisner --

an information copy of letter sent
by Mr. Jackson today. Mr. Damewood
is receiving a copy via regular channels.

M. McCrum

2-6811

March 10, 1952

Dear Monsignor Varga:-

As I wind up my year with the National Committee for a Free Europe, I thought it appropriate to send you a letter -- not a letter of farewell, but rather some thoughts on the Hungarian National Council as I have observed it during the year.

In the first place, I would like to congratulate you and your associates on having done an extraordinary job of holding a very volatile situation together. In fact, it was a unique job, and one whose value we may never fully appreciate because so many of the benefits are intangible.

I hope, therefore, that you will continue to work with undiminished will to hold the Council together, as it would present a very serious problem to Admiral Miller if the Hungarian group were to fall apart.

I would also like to congratulate you on the effective work the representatives of the Hungarian National Council have done abroad, particularly in France and Germany. You know how important I consider this work. It seems to me that the real task and duty of a National Council is to help the exiles, and the front lines of this work are in Europe.

Aside from the obvious necessities of food, clothing, shelter, the most important aspect of the work is what I would call a "consular" service, as these poor people do not know where or how to turn. In this consular-type work, I think that General Hennyey and Mr. Auer have been doing an excellent job, and my personal feelings in this matter are completely confirmed by reactions I have received from the International Refugee Organization and the official foreign and American administrations in these countries.

To my way of thinking, exile political matters in New York and Washington should take a definitely second place to helping human beings in distress, and although there are some who do not agree with this order of priority, I am delighted and grateful that the work of the Hungarian National Council indicates that you share these ideas.

* * *

Since this is an honest letter, and not just pro-forma appreciation by a retiring President, I must also, unfortunately, include some observations that are not so pleasant.

I remember very early in my work with NCFE, that you taught me the political meaning of the word "polarization", and since then I have had ample opportunity in the Hungarian National Council to see polarization at work.

NCFE has grown in the past year into a large organization engaged in serious work, and frequently proving its effectiveness behind the Iron Curtain. To put it another way, during the past year NCFE has evolved from just a hope into a professional weapon in the war against the enemy. Therefore, activities which a year ago were deplorable but pardonable, are today inexcusable and intolerable.

Admiral Miller agrees with me completely on this point, and intends to take such action from time to time as may be necessary to counter such activities when they occur.

However, I recognize that it is not enough for NCFE to take unilateral action. We must be assisted by you and those of your associates who understand who the real enemy is, and are willing to subordinate fratricidal strife, polarizing attempts, and disloyal activities.

* * *

I fully realize that these are nothing but big words unless I can illustrate them more specifically.

I have in my possession enough illustrations to fill a volume, but I would like to select three in particular to mention in this letter, not because I have any particular desire to single out the individuals concerned for censure, but rather because what they have done not only illustrates the point I am trying to make, but also reveals an attitude of mind which is practically incomprehensible to an American working for a great cause.

The first case that I have in mind is that of Mr. Ferenc Nagy.

Last February, Mr. Nagy wrote a letter to Mr. Frank S. Land of Kansas City, Missouri, complaining bitterly about the National Committee for a Free Europe, accusing it of "supporting outmoded and old-fashioned reactionary political ideologies", and asking Mr. Land to advise him as to how this situation could be brought to the attention of President Truman in order to have him do something about it. As a result of that letter, Mr. Land wrote to the White House, and in the normal course this full correspondence came to me.

I asked Mr. Nagy to come to the office, and tried to explain to him that what he had done was not only a bad, but a very silly thing. It was bad in the sense that he had violated our hospitality by secretly attempting to conspire against the organization which was supporting him. It was silly in assuming that he could carry on this kind of intrigue without my knowing about it -- in fact, without having the White House check with NCFE, an American organisation, as to what action should be taken.

Mr. Nagy seemed to understand what I tried to explain to him, and with what I considered complete honesty and sincerity, expressed his regrets and said that it would not happen again. In return for this frank understanding on his part, we shook hands, and I promised that the correspondence would be put away in our files and never referred to again. And as you know, I have never even mentioned it to you.

Mr. Nagy has once again written to President Truman -- this time directly. And once again the White House has sent me the memorandum.

I consider that Mr. Nagy has broken his pledge, and therefore I am free to tell you about the incident.

This time, although the words of Mr. Nagy are more temperate, the melody is the same -- dissatisfaction with what NCFE has done; dissatisfaction with the Hungarian National Council. Let me quote a passage:- "The existing National Committees are not in themselves suitable for this task, partly because of the general intra-Committee controversies between Democrats and reactionaries, and partly because these Committees are not considered by the peoples behind the Iron Curtain as international guarantee that promises would be carried out."

I cannot help commenting at this point that in the Hungarian National Council there is probably no one who has contributed more to "intra-Committee controversies" than Mr. Nagy himself. Furthermore, an analysis of Mr. Nagy's definition of "democrats and reactionaries" would be extremely interesting. It might have been more accurate had he said "people who supported my Government in 1947 and everybody else".

As to the matter of any exile committee, whether the Hungarian National Council or Mr. Nagy's Central Eastern European Committee, being able to "guarantee" to the people behind the Iron Curtain that promises would be carried out, Mr. Nagy's statement is either frivolous or preposterous.

Mr. Nagy winds up with a request that the President give his blessing to Mr. Nagy's proposed super-committee — the Central Eastern European Committee — which represents "a total majority of 70 to 80% of the entire population of Central Eastern Europe."

I am frankly fascinated by the processes of Mr. Nagy's mind. I cannot believe that all he thinks about is the promotion of Leftish Hungarian politicians in exile. I cannot believe that as a human being he does not feel some sense of responsibility toward NCFE and the Hungarian National Council, who have month after month helped him. I do not wish to sound dramatic, I do not ask for thanks, and I am not suggesting that in return for our help we impose an obligation of a quid pro quo. But I do say that the question of loyalty does arise, and the question of responsibility is very real.

Furthermore, Mr. Nagy has been in this country long enough now to understand that this kind of intriguing is a distressing irritation to everyone, including the White House.

* * *

My second illustration also concerns Mr. Nagy. Mr. Nagy recently sent a telegram to Mr. Dessewffy, of which the following is a translation. I have the original Hungarian if you care to see it:

> "YOU HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE BOARD OF THE NEW YORK RADIO FREE EUROPE NAMES OF NEW STAFF MEMBERS: HEAD: ANDREW GELLERT, STAFF: KAROLY ANDRAS, LAJOS HALASZ, DEZSO SALY, PETER [illegible], MRS L VARGA STOP CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THIS RADIO STATION BROADCASTS IN THE NAME OF THE DEMOCRATIC HUNGARIAN EXILES, I AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEASANT FEDERATION CALL THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO IMMEDIATELY VOTE WHETHER THIS SOLUTION IS ACCEPTABLE TO US"

Again I would like to know what is going through Mr. Nagy's mind.

NCFE, an American organization, hired Mr. Dessewffy to be the responsible head of its Hungarian Desk in Munich. Mr. Dessewffy was a very careful choice after weeks of consultation on both sides of the Atlantic. His specific instructions were that the Munich Desk should be staffed by people selected for functional competence, excluding, of course, Communists and Fascists.

At the same time, it was felt that the NCFE had permitted political affiliation to overshadow functional competence in the New York Hungarian Desk, and the New York Desk simply wasn't any good. Therefore, the New York Desk and the Munich Desk had to be brought into alignment. So Mr. Dessewffy was sent to America and was given the responsibility of hiring the necessary personnel — and in New York was instructed to apply the same yardstick that he applied in Munich.

When Mr. Dessewffy had fulfilled his New York task, again after the most serious consideration of all the angles involved in each one of his choices, Mr. Nagy sent him the telegram quoted above as though Mr. Nagy were in the position to control, or at least to veto, the membership of the Desk.

Does Mr. Nagy really believe that he is in that position? Or is this pure polarization. As we all know, this is a move directed against Mr. Gellert, who does not happen to have the same political coloration as Mr. Nagy. In a recent conversation with Mr. Nagy, I asked him if the telegram would have been sent if Mr. Gellert had not been selected, and he admitted that it would not have been sent.

There is an additional interesting element in this, in that Mr. Nagy calls for a vote as the President of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Doesn't Mr. Nagy know that the Hungarian Peasant Union does not exist as a viable political party; it only exists in the individual persons in exile who happen formerly to have been members of the Hungarian Peasant Union. Mr. Nagy is not a member of a government-in-exile, or even of a parliament-in-exile, so that this action of his is totally unreal, indicating unwillingness to recognize the world as it exists.

Doesn't Mr. Nagy realize that the only way that exile politicians can achieve political reality is through national and international unity in order to bring about the liberation of their countries, and therefore the day when they can once again start legitimate and real party rivalry to appeal to a free electorate?

* * *

The third case I would like to mention concerns Mr. Zoltan Pfeiffer.

After Mr. Dessewffy made his selections for the New York Desk, Mr. Pfeiffer got in touch with him to protest against the fact that in selecting Mr. Gellert, Mr. Dessewffy had been unfaithful to the Smallholders Party, which because Mr. Dessewffy had formerly been a member of that party, expected a clean sweep of the New York Desk, irrespective of functional competence. Mr. Pfeiffer further stated — and this is the really important point — that because of the appointment of Mr. Gellert, Mr. Pfeiffer would have to "attack" Mr. Dessewffy from now on, wherever and whenever possible; in short, a declaration of war.

Again, I would like to understand Mr. Pfeiffer's mental processes. Who does he think he is? Where does he think he is? This is a very serious world, and not a Rudolf Friml operetta. Mr. Pfeiffer is not in Budapest conducting a political campaign against a wayward member of a Left-wing party. Mr. Pfeiffer is in New York, an associate of NCFE, with every opportunity to have his opinion heard and his influence felt. But after a decision has been made, in good faith and after long consideration, to employ a man because of his competence to do a job, it is Mr. Pfeiffer's responsibility as an associate of the same organization to help that man do his work, and not to indulge in declarations of war in order to disrupt the operation.

* * *

I am sorry to have had to go into this unpleasant detail, but after a year of patiently observing and listening, I feel that I have earned the right to speak plainly.

I hope that somehow or other, it will be possible for you to explain to your membership that NCFE does not intend to be hampered or sabotaged by exile political maneuvering.

I also hope that you will be able to persuade your compatriots that insofar as NCFE can interpret U.S. policy, it believes that the Government of the United States, looking forward to the eventual liberation of Hungary, will not permit any political group or individual in exile, to set up a monopoly for himself, his group, or his party.

With renewed thanks for your highly successful work in the past, and the fervent hope that you will be equally successful in the future, I am

Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson

Monsignor Bela Varga
227 East 72nd Street
New York, N. Y.

[illegible]

SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: NCFE

1. For quite some time the staff officers of this division concerned with utilising the facilities of the NCFE and with exploiting the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian emigrations have been aware of a lack of adequate coordination between our own activities and those of the NCFE staff. In conjunction with those PY Division officers responsible for handling our relations with that organisation, we have attempted to explore the problem in order to find a solution which could be considered realistic and practical.

2. The difficulty lies not only in the communication system between OPC and NCFE, which does not always transmit, at exactly the right time, the right ideas from one organisation to the proper individuals at the right level in the other. Although we have maintained very close contact both informally and through formal channels, only too often we have not been in a position to learn why NCFE staff officers have made a given decision in regard to some emigre organisation in which we had an interest; and on the other hand, our desires and needs have not always been fully understood or accepted in New York. Again, it has happened that we were ignorant of developments that closely affected our operations until it was too late for us to make our influence felt, and, correspondingly, it must be admitted that we have ourselves pushed ahead with courses of action without adequately briefing the NCFE. The most extreme case in point known to us concerns the Rumanian emigration, where we and NCFE are now pursuing conflicting policies. The upshot of this has been the gradual development of a situation wherein OPC is supporting an organisation, the NCFE, which is not fully responsive to it.

3. This situation is not regarded by us as reflecting any fundamental inadequacy in NCFE, or as presenting any insoluable difficulty. There exists a problem in staff interrelationship which can and should be resolved by a reform in our organisational approach. The goal toward which we believe we should work is one where OPC communication with NCFE would be channelled directly along a single high-level line which would firmly tie in ADPC's office with that of the head of the other organisation. Ideas, suggestions, information, etc. would flow, in the regular channels, up from the OPC working level to ADPC's office for review and transmission to the top office of NCFE, and flow down from there through NCFE's usual channels to the proper individuals in its operational machinery. Personal contacts between individuals at a lower level in the two organisations would frequently occur to supplement this usual channel, when security permitted, but should be in the hands of responsible personnel who understand the OPC policies involved.

4. As the first

4. As the first and principal step toward this arrangement, it is recommended that an experienced, knowledgeable, high-level CIA officer responsible to ADPC be stationed in the NCFE organization to work directly with Admiral Miller. For cover purposes he would carry the title of Deputy to the President, but there should be no doubt in the minds of the NCFE top echelon as to his complete identity with CIA. Because his sole task would be to represent ADPC's interests, he should not normally be in the NCFE chain of command, should not be paid by that organization, and should not be made responsible for any given NCFE function or activity. We visualize his function as that of a representative charged with explaining and representing CIA's interests, functioning as a channel of information about the organization to which he is accredited, and controlling all liaison between the two. In our opinion, the establishment of this post, with a suitable individual assigned to the job, would immediately correct most of the present difficulties, and would provide the necessary machinery within which a fully satisfactory relationship between OPC and NCFE could develop.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SR

SR/PC/DGM:rej

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
SR/RE - 2
SR/PC - 2
✓ PY - 1 (Mr. Buelow)

1. Intricacies of Balkan politics
2. CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to the Exec. Com. in N.Y.
3. No final focus of responsibility for National council policy in Wash.
4. An office in N.Y. which is poorly staffed has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance.

Mature
savoir-faire
Broad background in Balkan politics.

Policy Recs.

a. Maintenance of National Councils
b. Expansion of NCFE activities in Paris
* c. Support of Horizontal Groups.
    IPU
    CDU
    Slavik - Mayer / Nagy Groups etc.

Admin. Recs. : Emigre Affairs

a.) formulate policy on emigre matters w/ views of CIA line divisions
    Dept of State
    &
    other US Govt
b.) provide direct policy guidance & control over NCFE offices.

Rel. w/ other CIA offices

Adviser. Rel. — [illegible]

- Office of I. O. should be kept informed of all transactions undertaken betw. the line divisions & NCFE

W/ Dept of State

a. Close contacts w/ area desks of Dept of State
b. Meet jointly w/ members of Dept. in a CIA- State Coord. Com. to formulate policy on emigre matters.

W/ NCFE

Close supervis. & control over NCFE in N.Y. & Paris.

Integrate in NCFE's offices one or several high level individuals working directly for CIA.

Purpose
Discussion
Orig. Objectives
Status of Coms
Reasons for Failure
Possible Courses of Action
Recs

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SECRET

7 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas W. Braden

SUBJECT: Relations with National Councils

1. Attached hereto is a study concerning the National Councils, with certain conclusions and recommendations.

2. I have deliberately delayed submitting this study because I wanted to be sure of the validity of my criticism and recommendations. To this end, I discussed this paper at several stages of its development with various officers in the line divisions concerned and also with individuals who have been in close touch with the National Councils Division of NCFE. As a result, I feel that what is submitted in the attached study reflects not only my own views, but also those of the responsible area experts.

3. I feel you will agree that, under existing conditions, it is impossible to carry out effectively any of the functions related to national council matters with which we are charged. The recent "Nagy Affair" and the resultant embarrassment serves as a good illustration.

4. In view of the interest that has been demonstrated in this paper by SE and EE-2, it is suggested that copies of the study be sent to them.

5. This whole matter, I believe, is of such importance as to warrant further discussion, and I should appreciate having the opportunity of talking to you.

Ellen Stern

ELLEN STERN

Attachment
As stated above

cc: DCFY

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STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL COUNCILS

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to 1) review briefly the accomplishments of the National Councils Division of NCFE, 2) attempt to point out the reasons why the National Councils have not accomplished what they set out to do and 3) make certain recommendations with respect to policy and administration to remedy the present unsatisfactory and unworkable situation. This last assumes that CIA must continue to sponsor the National Council complex. However, it can do so only if certain basic changes are made and if it is recognized that it is incumbent on CIA to regain control of the important personalities of the Eastern European emigration.

DISCUSSION

I Original Objectives of National Councils Division

The National Councils Division of the National Committee for a Free Europe was created on 3 April 1950 by resolution of the Board of Directors. The underlying principle, as stated in the Declaration of Policy in June 1950, was to aid the "non-Fascist and non-Communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restoration in Eastern Europe of the social, political and religious liberties in which they and we believe." The councils were to function as "representative, harmonious and effective groups" and, as such, to play a part in the struggle against Communism in Eastern Europe. They were not to be considered as governments in exile nor as ends in themselves.

National Committees and Panels,* as supported by NCFE, were to fulfill a two-fold function: as 1) overt instruments, they were to a) serve as a symbol of unity both in this country and abroad, b) provide a reservoir of "name" manpower for propaganda use, c) supply general propaganda policy advice, and d) supply NCFE with both general and specific intelligence with respect to homeland activities and personalities. As 2) covert instruments, they were to serve as a cover for operations undertaken by CIA aimed at combatting Soviet oppression in the satellite states.

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*These are: the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Panels, which were set up with the help of NCFE and which function well.

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II Status of Committees

During the course of the past year, it has become increasingly apparent that national committees have failed to operate as "representative, effective and harmonious groups." Out of the six groups of emigres supported financially by NCFE,* only three have any sort of a working council (the Albanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian) and only one--the Hungarian--operates with any degree of harmony. The Czech and Rumanian Councils have split into two opposing factions. The Czechs have recently affected a reconciliation which, to date, is merely a paper "agreement" and is still awaiting implementation. No attempts at bringing together the Rumanian Association and the Rumanian Committee have succeeded. The Bulgarian Committee, while not split, has been handicapped by the dictatorial methods of its Chairman, Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, and has therefore been of little value as an organization. Attempts to offset this situation by an enlargement of the Committee are now under way. An enlargement of the Albanian Committee is also considered to be necessary, but here disagreement with the British is a complicating factor. The Poles, after long years of dissension, finally seem to have agreed on the formation of a Council of National Unity. Additional information regarding each of these committees is appended hereto.

III Reasons for the Failure

The reason for the failure of the national councils to fulfill the stated objectives has often been attributed to intrigue, rivalry and jealousy among emigre politicians. While this is certainly a contributing factor, it is one which should be expected in any dealings with leaders reared in the intricacies of Balkan politics. A more important and far more basic cause for the present shortcomings of the national councils has been CIA's failure to provide continuing policy guidance to, and appropriate control over, the Executive Committee of NCFE in New York. This failure has in large part resulted from the lack of a clearly defined mechanism within CIA through which to perform these functions.

At present a situation exists in which there is:

1) No final focus of responsibility for national council policy in Washington. Various individuals throughout CIA and the Department of State are meddling in national council and related emigre matters owing to the vacuum which CIA has permitted to develop and because no one is charged with final responsibility. Furthermore, members of the

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*The six groups are: the Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Rumanian.

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Executive Committee in New York often confer, and reach certain agreements, with high ranking individuals in CIA and the Department of State without consulting, or even informing, anyone else. This has led to a great deal of confusion, duplication of work and, of course, embarrassment.

2) An office in New York which is poorly staffed and which has made itself virtually independent of CIA guidance. (Due probably to the lack of proper guidance and control in the past, there is at present a great amount of free wheeling in the New York office. The members of the Executive Committee seem to feel that they are an autonomous unit rather than agents of their sponsoring office.) Furthermore, dealings with the experienced politicians in exile from the satellite states require a staff which is mature, has savoir-faire and a broad background in Balkan politics. This is not presently the case.

3) A feeling among emigres that the promises and threats made by NCFE are meaningless and that money will be forthcoming under almost any conditions.

IV Possible Courses of Action

Confronted with the situation sketched above, it would appear that insofar as CIA is concerned, the following alternative courses of action are possible: 1) Keep the present set-up; 2) withdraw support from emigre affairs; 3) ask the Department of State to take over; or 4) make certain changes along lines recommended below.

Since the present set-up is unsatisfactory for the reasons indicated above, obviously the first alternative may be immediately dismissed. The second alternative is not feasible because the peoples of the satellite countries are important allies of the United States in the cold war and it is to our interest to afford assistance to the principal Eastern European refugees and their major organizations. The State Department cannot take over relations with the emigres because of the official recognition given by the United States to the "Democratic Republics" of Eastern Europe. The logical, indeed inescapable course for CIA to follow, therefore, is to continue to deal with the most important Eastern European emigres on the basis of ~~certain~~ the premises which follow;

1) NCFE is an organization, set up by and subordinate to CIA, charged with emigre affairs as directed by the sponsoring office.

2) The emigre groupings in this country do not constitute governments in exile, but merely units useful for the following functions:

a. Prestige Use

To serve as a symbol of resistance to the subjugated peoples behind the iron curtain. To provide speakers at various meetings in this country and at gatherings, such as the European Movement, abroad.

b. Psychological Warfare

To engage in all sorts of activities which will encourage the spirit of resistance of the peoples of Eastern Europe and keep the story of Eastern Europe's struggle for liberation before the people of the West by appropriate publicity.

c. Research, Analysis and Planning

To organize and carry on long-range research analysis and planning projects which will utilize the talents of the Eastern European refugees. This area includes the Library of Congress and other research projects and the activities of the horizontal international organizations, such as the Slavik-Mayer/Nagy Groups.

3) National Councils Will Not Control RFE. Notwithstanding the State Department's views, it is wise at present to maintain the separation between the national councils and RFE. While emigres should continue to have an opportunity to speak to the peoples behind the iron curtain, they should do so as individual patriots and not as representatives of a council or of a political party. RFE, if it is to be an effective "voice" to the satellite peoples, must necessarily keep free from petty intrigues and political "empire building" currently being exhibited by the national councils. Should the national councils become the real symbols they were intended to be, they could then play a significant role in RFE.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy and administrative recommendations are submitted as essential to the successful operation of emigre affairs:

1) Policy Recommendations

a. Maintenance of National Councils

During the foreseeable future, the structure of the national councils will have to be maintained. It is suggested, however, that their activities in this country be limited to the functions mentioned above.

on b, I'd like to see this potential assessed further. For instance, do we have collected information on the reservoir of emigre manpower in Paris — or do we have to rely on independent WE3 for this.

on c. How?

3 b. ~~Expansion of NCFE Activities in Paris~~

It is further recommended that a greater degree of US control be effected over the vast reservoir of emigre manpower now concentrated in Europe. The expansion of, and tightened supervision over, the NCFE office in Paris would provide this control. It would also prepare the way for those liaisons which must be maintained, while as seems probable, the French, the British and the Council of Europe are ~~running~~ conducting [illegible] in their activities ~~It would additionally 1) provide a much-needed outlet for the younger elements of the emigration, 2) offset the attempts made by the French and the British to use these elements, 3) be useful from the psychological warfare aspect and also in long-range planning of the liberation of the satellite states.~~

insert

4 c. ~~Support of Horizontal Groupings~~

It is recommended that the activities of horizontal groupings, such as the International Peasant Union, the Christian Democratic Union, the Slavik-Mayer/Nagy Groups, etc. be encouraged. Constructive work on the part of the exiles from the satellite states that would cut across national lines should be viewed favorably and may well become the most constructive element in the emigre political complex.

2) Administrative Recommendations.

There should be, in CIA, an office charged with the responsibility for all emigre matters. While it is recognized that this entails a vast amount of administrative work (budget, personnel, security, etc.), the discussion that follows will be devoted only to the political aspects of the work.

The terms of reference of this office for "Emigre Affairs" should be, inter alia, to 1) formulate policy on emigre matters, soliciting and bearing in mind the views of the CIA line divisions, the Department of State and other offices of the United States Government, and 2) provide direct policy guidance and control over the NCFE offices.

a. Relationship with Other CIA Offices

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should act as an advisory body and serve as a functional link providing the necessary liaison between the CIA line divisions and the National Councils Division of NCFE. The office of "Emigre Affairs" should likewise be kept regularly informed of all transactions undertaken between the line divisions and NCFE.

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b. Relationship with the Department of State

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should 1) maintain close contact with the area desks of the Department of State and 2) meet jointly with members of the Department in a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, (see chart attached) for the purpose of formulating policy on emigre matters.

c. Relationship with NCFE

The office for "Emigre Affairs" should maintain close supervision and control over the NCFE office in New York and in Paris. This can be achieved only by having integrated in NCFE's offices one or several high level individuals working directly for CIA.

Detailed recommendations on the structure of the Office for "Emigre Affairs" is appended hereto.

ELLEN STERN

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE FOR "EMIGRE AFFAIRS".

I. Organization

Chief
Deputy Chief
Two Staff Assistants
Two Secretaries

II. Functions

The overall function of the office for "Emigre Affairs" should be the formulation and coordination of policy on national council and other emigre affairs and the transmittance of such policy to NCFE.

1. Liaison and coordination with other CIA Offices.

   a. Transmission of material from NCFE offices to line divisions.
   b. Transmission of material from line divisions to NCFE.
   c. Coordination with the line divisions on all emigre matters in which they have an interest. If the office for "Emigre Affairs" is kept informed on the needs of the line divisions, the NCFE should be able to perform functions useful to the divisions.
   d. To facilitate the dealings between the Office for "Emigre Affairs" and the line divisions, there should be one person in EE-2, SE and WE-3 designated as liaison officer on emigre matters.

2. Liaison and coordination with the Department of State.

   a. There should be a CIA-State Coordinating Committee, which should meet regularly to discuss matters pertaining to the national councils and emigre affairs.
   b. Although a member of the NCFE may occasionally be present at a meeting of the Coordinating Committee, regular sessions should be attended only by members of CIA and the State Department. The system, which has been in effect during the last four months, under which bi-weekly meetings have taken place between a representative of the NCFE in New York and the Department must be discontinued.

3. Supervision of the activities of the NCFE.

   a. The office for "Emigre Affairs" should be charged with the supervision of the NCFE office in New York and in Paris.

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b. One or more high level individuals in the NCFE offices should be CIA agents. While having authority for certain spot decisions, they should be responsible for all actions to headquarters in Washington. There should be regular contact between the NCFE offices and headquarters.

4. Handling of all other work related to emigre matters.

   a. Sterilizing and distributing Zinnia reports.
   b. Preparing memoranda on emigre matters.
   c. Coordinating action cables with line divisions.
   d. Maintaining extensive files on national council and related emigre affairs.

Think we should superimpose NCFE as a whole and fit this "Office of Emigre affairs" into the picture, as one arm.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA, STATE AND NCFE


DCI
ADPC
CIO
Dept. of State
EE
CIA-STATE Coordinating Committee
Office for "Emigre Affairs"
WE-3
EE-2
SE
N C F E
Paris Office
New York Office
Natl Councils
Horiz. Groups
etc.
Control
Coordination

6 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: RAY E. MILLARD

FROM: THOMAS MYERS

SUBJECT: Herman Moschner - Convicted Spy

1. Pursuant to our conversation, you are advised that the captioned individual was convicted in the U. S. Court at Nurnberg on 31 January 1952 on a charge of espionage. U. S. Attorney developed information which was turned over to us indicating that among other things Moschner had been directed by the Czech intelligence service to procure information about Radio Free Europe, especially bearing on the guarding of the installations and the consequences of an act of sabotage. Moschner was not an employee of RFE and the basis of the espionage charge against him was that he had endeavored to obtain information concerning personnel and activities of the CIC.

2. Through the courtesy of a friendly U. S. agency, we have been provided with a copy of the targets which Moschner had been given by the Czech intelligence service. I am attaching a copy of the list of such targets and you will note that the activities of this individual clearly reflect the interest of Czech intelligence in possible sabotage of the physical installations of RFE in Munich. Further information is being developed in this matter and I will advise you when I receive same.

THOMAS MYERS

STRICTLY PRIVATE COPY

APPENDIX "A"

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION REGARDING RADIO FREE EUROPE ISSUED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

The following are essential elements of information:

1. Plans of all RFE buildings and RFE transmitter stations.
2. Dimensions of antenna used and distance between antenna towers.
3. Phone numbers of transmitter stations.
4. Plans of all telephone lines, specifically lead-ins and terminals.
5. Relationship of one RFE building to another in an operational sense.
6. Addresses and telephone numbers of all individuals connected with RFE.
7. Details of functions and operations of each transmitter.
8. The number of guards at each RFE installation, nationality of such guards, and duty assignments and locations, whether accompanied by police dogs.
9. Number of civilians usually in RFE buildings at night.
10. How and what transmission operations are conducted at night.
11. Complete plans of electrical power lines and power supply at each transmitter station.
12. How many rural policemen are located in the area of each transmitter station, addresses.
13. Addresses and details concerning guard personnel at each transmitter station.
14. Number and identity of persons working in all of RFE and their addresses.
15. Distance of transmitter stations from rural police headquarters.

NOTE: A certain amount of repetition in the above essential elements of information may exist. However, they were submitted to me only as notes taken from a highly classified report and therefore may not be as exact as given by Moschner during his interrogation. On Monday we shall attempt to get the entire report of Moschner's statements regarding RFE and shall submit further pertinent details.

2/15/52

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	DD/P		
2	DDCI		
3			
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	CIO	TWB	24 Apr
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL	☐ INFORMATION	☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION	☐ DIRECT REPLY	☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT	☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY	☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCORRENCE	☐ RECOMMENDATION	☐ FILE

REMARKS:

This story of the Nagy affair as it was related to 00 by Contact is pretty old hat, but you might nevertheless find material of interest in it.

TWB
TWB

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

14-00000

SECRET

...RITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-8541

Chief, Operations Division, OPC
Attention: Mr. W. F. Rowland
Chief, Contact Division, OO

29 February 1952

HH-196

Hungarian Exile Activities

1. A Hungarian Government-in-Exile which feels that it can "awaken the spirit of resistance and result in piercing the Iron Curtain and liquidating the Communists in Hungary" has been formed under the direction of Ferenc Nagy. This group came to our attention when Louis Goldstein, a New York jeweler, suggested that a representative of this Agency call on Paul Weiss and Leo Weiner, New York lawyers, who had been approached by Ferenc Nagy regarding the organization of this group. Mr. Weiss furnished our New York office with information regarding Mr. Nagy's organization.

2. Members of this group other than Nagy are Geza Teleki, Karolyi Peyer, Zoltan Pfeiffer, Dezso Sulyok, Zoltan Bay, Istvan Barankovics, Albert Bertha, Paul Auer and Aladar Szegedy-Maszak. The objective of this group is to form a government-in-exile which would combat Communism in Hungary, strengthen resistance, develop the underground, ship radio parts and transmitters as well as arms, revive a good propaganda campaign, raise troops and fan resistance in the event of war, and set up a temporary de facto government in Hungary if the West wins. This group, which claims to represent 83 per cent of the Hungarian people as of the last free elections, would hold free elections as soon as possible and let the people choose a new government. They want official recognition as a government-in-exile and US Government financial support with the control of funds handled by the US Government. (Our field representative comments that: "This is the first of many groups probably being formed in the hope of getting some of the Mutual Assistance $100,000,000.")

3. This group says that Radio Free Europe is a joke and a travesty on the term "democracy", and that something should be done about it. Members of the organization claim that Communist propaganda is beamed out by RFE and that the Munich office is staffed with the following Nazis: Emile Czonka; (fnu) Maori (phonetic); Aladar Kovacs; Laszlo Beroi; Andras Szekely; (fnu) Zalaberi (phonetic); Mejo Poharnuk and his wife. Also, the following Communists are on the Munich staff: Josef Kemeni (phonetic); Zoltan Szabo; (fnu) Mikes; Laszlo Szabo.

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4. The Hungarian group hopes to be a member of the Central and Eastern European Committee which will be something of a coordinating committee for the various yet-to-be-formed Satellite governments-in-exile. A partial list of the members of this large Committee (all of whom also seem to claim that RFE is rotten) follows:

Ferenc Nagy, President
Istvan Barankovics
Josef Cerny
George Dimitroffe
Hasan Dosti
Cornel Filo
Mihai Krek
Vlatko Macek
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk
Stefan Osuski
Augustin Popa
Vaclovas Tsidzikaukas
Constantin Visoianu

5. Mr. Weiss is getting the political plans of the Hungarian Group and the Central and Eastern European Committee and will give them to us when he receives them. Once he has given us this material, he hopes to let our field men deal directly with the national group leaders. These leaders hope to sell themselves and their ideas to CIA and have expressed their willingness to supply CIA exclusively with intelligence information. (We assume that this group's cooperation will be commensurate with the amount of financial support which CIA gives them).

6. Our field representative has commented that this group may also try to discredit RFE although "...most of these bums would be starving if it were not for RFE help. They already have Lawyer Weiss believing that RFE is one of the most evil things going." ..."We told these two [Mr. Weiss and Mr. Weiner] that we were interested in getting all possible information on these groups and impressed upon them the fact that we could guarantee no favorable action. It was also necessary to persuade them that Radio Free Europe is not supported by our agency."

7. Paul Weiss maintains a New York law office at 369 Lexington Avenue. He was born on 29 November 1911 in New York City and served in the Infantry during World War II. Later, he was in Military Government in Korea. His partner, Mr. Weiner, was born 20 April 1913 and attended Harvard Law School.

SECRET

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

8. We shall follow up on this and shall keep you advised. If you have particular points which you would like us to discuss with Mr. Weiss, please let us know.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

cc: AD/O (1)
Chief, Pyschological Warfare Division, OPC (1) ✓
Chief, Cover Division/PLANS/OSO (2)

SECRET

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER PHENIX TO CLAYTON [illegible]:

"Second, my own plans; until I know when we are to see Dr. Lenz and what the consequences of that interview may be, I can of course make no definite travel arrangements. I should like to go to Strasbourg and talk with them there about the enlargement plans for the College de L'Europe Libre; I want to have a few days in Paris, if possible, to catch up on developments in Royall's area; ~~and I feel it~~ important to have about a week in Lisbon. Forgetting the question of dates my itinerary would probably be Strasbourg, Paris, Lisbon, New York, and if there is to be any considerable delay before we can see Dr. Lenz I shall plan to go to Strasbourg from Frankfurt, then return to Frankfurt and then go direct to Paris. It would please me if I were able to go back to New York in time to go to New Hampshire to vote in the primaries on March 11, but this may be an idle hope.

Third, our Frankfurt negotiations; as I cabled C.D. we reached complete agreement on the technical basis, covered by the draft licensing-agreement. Throughout our discussions we were treated with the utmost courtesy and consideration. The original draft submitted for our study contained several ambiguities and specific provisions which, if literally construed would defeat the purpose which both sides seemed to have in mind. Our suggestions for changes and modifications were accepted after a minimum amount of discussion. Whenever we made a valid point, the fact was recognized at once by the others. Dick agrees with me that one could not expect to receive any more courteous or considerate treatment, and we were all very much pleased by the atmosphere at the ministry. You realized, of course, that the technical side of the question is by no means the complete picture, and it remains to be seen how rapidly we can clear up the non-technical aspects. If we can have our Bonn appointment again tomorrow, I ought to be able to have a cable in New York for your opening Monday, indicating the prospects, but if our appointment is delayed until some time next week - one of the local handicaps we are encountering - is a Karneval-period or "Fasching" which reaches its climax Monday. Fasching is much more of a celebration than George Washington's birthday, so Dick and I are willingly sacrificing our holiday tomorrow (strike out Dick from the preceding clause because he tells me that the German operation does not recognise G. Washington's birthday. When I asked him if they had selected Fasching instead because it lasted longer, he avoided a direct answer.) so as not to get involved in a possibly long post-Fasching hangover period. Seriously, very little work is done in Germany the day after the principal Fasching celebration and we hope we can get matters more or less cleared up tomorrow, but I shall not know until I get a telephone call this evening after return to Frankfurt.

EXCERPT FROM LETTER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1952, FROM SPENCER PHENIX TO CLAYTON [illegible]:

P.S. The Bonn telephone message came through. Lenz cannot see us tomorrow, or Monday or Tuesday--or, perhaps, anytime. Fritz got on the war path and said we could not take that kind of brush-off and Lenz, through his assistant Herr Dr Whippersnapper finally said he had turned full responsibility over to a Foreign Office official, a Min. Dr. Strohm whom Fritz knows. Fritz then tried to reach Strohm but he was allegedly unavailable; Fritz demanded that word be got to him and finally it was, Strohm remarking, "Why, there is no hurry about this, is there?" Strohm told Fritz he couldn't see us before Thursday. An appointment has therefore been made for us at the Foreign Office in Bonn at 10 A.M. next Thursday the 28th. I haven't worked out my schedule between now and then but shall probably do Strasbourg and Paris and then proceed from Frankfurt to Lisbon assuming that to be possible which I don't yet know. Please inform C.L. of the foregoing and Bob Lang will ask to see this letter as Dick has just telephoned to Munich a teletype message for Bob referring to this letter.

I am, I confess, rather concerned about these recent developments. The "agreement" we reached with the Bundespost on technical points has no significance without a parallel political clearance in Bonn, so speed with the former has no meaning in the face of delay in the latter. Tell C.L., therefore, that my ten-watt green light has gained no wattage.

cc: Mr. Jackson
Mr. Lang

SECRET

[illegible] February 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

DRAFT: TELEGRAM FROM THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. GREW
TO CONGRESSMAN O. K. ARMSTRONG.

I keenly regret to inform you that, upon further reflection and upon the basis of information which has recently come to my attention, I consider it inadvisable for me to address your Psychological Strategy Conference, and that I find it necessary to ask you to release me from speaking at your meeting on Saturday. When I was first asked to speak about the significance of National Committee for a Free Europe and the activities of Radio Free Europe, I understood that the Conference would discuss propaganda and psychological warfare. I note from the release issued by your office, that among the purposes of the conference are the presentation of definite plans of action to increase resistance movements, and to aid the peoples of the Soviet nation and the Satellite States to overthrow their regimes, as well as to establish a continuing organization to carry out the programs developed at the conference. This release also indicates that there will be full and open discussion of such matters and that persons purporting to represent underground movements in Poland, the Baltic States, Russia, China, Korea, etc., will take part in discussions. Note

It is my personal view that it would be unwise to discussmatters of this sensitive and provocative character in open meetings, particularly where programs of specific action are considered. It seems to me that public duscussions of such matters and revelations of plans and programs would not only expose and thus jeopardize the existence of any resistance movements which may be identified and described, as well as the lives of the people participating, but would also provide quantities of adverse propaganda material for use by Soviet and satellite propaganda machines. It is my conclusion that my position and responsibilities as Chairman of the National Committee for a Free Europe make it inappropriate for me to speak before or lend my name to such a gathering because of the significance which might be attributed to such appearance. I want to express my full sympathy with the motivation of yourself and your co-sponsors, and to point out in this connection that the aims and objectives of the National Committee for a Free Europe, of which I am Chairman, are to keep hope alive among the prisoner peoples of the slave states and to provide assistance to fugitives from Soviet tyranny. I especially desire that my decision against appearing shall not be a cause of embarrassment to yourself or the others concerned. I therefore suggest that you inform those who you believe should know, thatdue to unforeseeable circumstances I have found myself unable to attend.

Orig:
DC/PY- for files ✓
DD/P - chrono - 1
ER - -1
Henry Poore - for use as guide.

Mr. Wisner read to
Mr. Grew over long-
distance telephone
today and the
latter said he would
~~see~~ send the message from
Princeton.

SECRET

For Prelim. text license negot. between
NCFE and Bundespost subj. to Ger. polit. approval ,
see: Bonn to State 1688 of 25 Feb. '52, C VR-265,
Confic Sec. Info., copy being retained by DCPY.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

18 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: "The 'Voice' and Radio Free Europe Complement Each Other"

1. The attached leaflet was inserted as a supplement in the January "Crusader", a newsletter which is sent out to the 8,000 regional chairmen of the Crusade for Freedom organization. It was prepared with the cooperation of the Voice of America officers in New York and was reviewed by the P Area of the Department of State.

2. It is intended to acquaint the regional Crusade organizations with the facts about VOA and offset any criticism or unfortunate comparisons that may have sprung up during the 1951 campaign.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

Attachment:
As described above

Distribution:
Addressee - Original
DD/P - 1
ADPC - 1
C/EE - 1
C/SE - 1
C/WE - 1
CIO - 1
DCPY - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

THE "VOICE" AND RADIO FREE EUROPE COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER

Both Are Indispensable

"What's the difference between the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe?" "Why is it necessary to have both the Voice and Radio Free Europe?" These are frequent questions asked of General Clay and the other leaders of the Crusade for Freedom.

The Voice and Radio Free Europe are both vitally needed if we are to win the Cold War.

They are completely separate organizations. Each performs a distinct function in the fight against the gigantic Soviet propaganda machine.

The Voice speaks with the authority of the U. S. Government. It is financed by Government funds.

Radio Free Europe was set up by private citizens. It is financed by millions of individual contributions to the Crusade for Freedom.

Voice is World Wide

The Voice is a worldwide network, broadcasting in 46 languages over 75 transmitters. It is the only American voice heard in the Soviet Union. Its 120 individual daily programs of news, music, roundtables, commentaries, documentaries, service programs, etc., have a potential audience of 300,000,000 listeners.

Radio Free Europe is much smaller. It concentrates on the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. Its transmitters are in Western Europe.

The Voice speaks for the American people, spreading the truth about democracy, giving a true picture of life in the United States, and spiking Moscow's lies about us. It reports in full on official American acts and documents, presents news and world developments from our point of view.

But Voice is not limited to Government pronouncements; it regularly reflects American opinion as expressed in our press and radio. In a friendly way—with programs of information and service—it promotes a better understanding of the United States in Europe, in Latin America, the Far East and the Near East.


The VOA Around the World and Around the Clock
SAN FRANCISCO
USA
NEW YORK
CINCINNATI
HONOLULU
MANILA
COLOMBO
WOOFFERTON
MUNICH
SALONIKA
TANGIER
COLOMBO
MEDIUM WAVE
SHORTWAVE
-6
-7
-8
-9
-10
-11
-12+
+11
+10
+9
+8
+7
+6
+5
+4
+3
+2
+1
GMT
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

NOTE: To determine Greenwich Mean Time local time zone, add or subtract th at the base of map from your loc

The Voice of America's Global Network of Broadcasting Facilities

This visualization of the world, on Mercator's Projection, aims to show at a glance how a vast array of transmitters and relay stations carries Voice of America programs in 46 languages to listeners everywhere.

For European countries the programs are transmitted from stations in the United States located near New York City, Boston and Cincinnati, via directional antennas and with transmitters ranging in power from 20,000 to 200,000 watts.

The transmissions are beamed toward Europe, where a network of relay stations picks up and rebroadcasts the programs within dotted areas on the map. Shortwave relay stations are located at Tangier, North Africa, and Woofferton, England, while medium-wave transmitters are located in Munich, Germany, and Salonika, Greece.

Latin American programs are transmitted from shortwave stations located near New Yo Boston, Cincinnati and San Francisco to all countries south of the United States.

To Far Eastern countries the programs are broadcast from high-powered transmitters near San Francisco, then relayed by shortwave transmitters at Honolulu, Manila and Co (Ceylon) and by a medium-wave transmitter at Manila.

The map indicates a considerable overlap of radio coverage from the various transmitters. times the overlapping areas indicate different language programs, and sometimes they indica a single language program is broadcast on several wavelengths, in order to give listeners a ch the clearest signal in a locality. Vertical lines indicate Time Zones, with GMT at Noon a International Date Line as a dotted line.

Exiles Speak Over RFE

Radio Free Europe, on the other hand, does not portray America. It concentrates largely on what is taking place within the slave countries. Over its transmitters Poles speak to Poles, Hungarians to Hungarians, etc. They speak as "the voice of Free Poland," "the voice of Free Hungary," etc. They look at their people's problems through their own eyes.

RFE programs specialize in identifying and denouncing Communist informers and collaborators, sending back messages from escapees, and exposing the corruption and crimes within the Red regimes.

In their broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice and Radio Free Europe have essentially the same aims: to keep alive the hope of liberation; to let listeners know that they have not been forgotten; to stiffen their resistance against their Communist oppressors; to expose the fraudulent basis of authority upon which the Moscow-dominated regimes rest.

Both combat Communism and the persecution of religion and denial of human rights. Both report the superior industrial power and fighting potential of the free world over the Soviet-enslaved world.

1951 Year of Progress for "Voice"

During the past year the Voice of America:

1. Stepped up daily programming from 30 to 50 hours daily.
2. Made progress in overcoming Soviet jamming.
3. Increased its broadcasts to behind the Iron Curtain, adding the "splinter" languages of Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Tatar, Turkestani, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian.
4. Inaugurated programs to Albania, Finland, Israel and Portugal in their respective languages; to China in two additional dialects, Swatow and Amoy; to Japan and South and Southeast Asia in Hindi, Urdu, Thai, Burmese and Malayan.
5. Became more outspoken and hard-hitting. One of the principal themes was the support of the UN effort to repel the Chinese and North Korean Communist aggression in Korea. Major attention was given to exposing the fraudulent Soviet "peace" drive.
6. Began work on the "Ring Plan" approved by Congress, which calls for a network of powerful relay bases girdling the globe.
7. Created "Vagabond"—a ship equipped with a transmitter, so that radio broadcasts may be relayed from shipboard.
8. Received 318,000 letters from overseas listeners—an increase of 35% over 1950.
9. Needled the Communists so successfully that Radio Moscow and Soviet regional stations doubled their attacks against the Voice.

RESTRICTED

In reply refer to W-1851
R

15 February 1952

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York, New York

Dear Abbott:

Our friends across the street have reviewed and approved the proposed issue of the "Crusader" which is attached.

They request that the following minor corrections be made:

Item 3 on page 2, Latvian should be added after Estonian.

Item 4 on page 2, Israel should be added after Portugal.

Sincerely,

John L. Damewood

Attachment
The Voice and Radio Free Europe Complement each other
both are indispensable

PY/IS/AGL:cve
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig.
DCPY - 1
CIO - 1
PY/Ex- 1
PY/IS- 1
SD/RE- 2

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

Confidential

January 24, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Tom Braden

FROM: John Devine

SUBJECT: "Crusader" Article on VOA

The copy for the proposed issue of the "Crusader" dealing with the Voice of America has been reviewed in the Department of State and has been approved. There are only two minor corrections which are as follows:

1. Item 3 on page 2, Latvian should be added after Estonian.
2. Item 4 on page 2, Israel should be added after Portugal.

This is an encouraging move on the part of RFE and should be very useful in getting VOA's story to a large segment of the American public.

INCOMING TELEGRAM
COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

52 14

A TRUE COPY OF
THE SIGNED ORIG-
INAL.

ACTION

CONTROL: 2805

GZA FROM: Ankara

Rec'd : February 7, 1952
1:12 a.m.

I/rC TO: Secretary of State

SL NO: 717, February 6, 8 p.m.
G
E
P
UCB
UCBA

In view well-known Turk sensitivity (DEPTEL 642, Jan 31) EMB doubts that RFE proposal wld be favorably acted upon by Turk Govt.

We also believe any such approach as contemplated by RFE might seriously jeopardize possibility Turk acceptance VOA relay base proposal.

Regret delay in reply caused by garble in DEPTEL requiring service.

MCGHEE

TT:RO

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

[illegible]

[illegible]

7 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project TETONIC: Mid-European Studies Center, American Personnel

Attached hereto is a copy of subject list as of 20 November 1951.

JWB per NBV
THOMAS W. BRADEN

Attachment on original only

[illegible]

d.

MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER
American Personnel
November 29, 1951

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INTELLECTUAL COOPERATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD OF MESC - responsible to Director for exile research program, textbook program, American education program, Editorial Department, and administrative operations for Studies Center located at 4 West 57th Street, N.Y.C.

Name: Stetson S. Holmes

Qualifications: AB Rutgers; Marine Corps, Major; Comptroller, Pope-Brooks Foundation, Inc.

Salary: $6,500

DIRECTOR OF DANUBIAN INQUIRY; RESEARCH SUPERVISOR - supervises and controls the research efforts of approximately 40 exiles.

Name: Jacob Hoptner

Qualifications: AB University of Pennsylvania; MA and Ph.D. candidate, Columbia; chief of American Red Cross Mission to Yugoslavia.

Salary: $5,000

RESEARCH SUPERVISOR - supervises and controls the research efforts of approximately 20 exiles.

Name: John H. Woodall

Qualifications: BA and MA, Duke University; Ph.D. candidate, Columbia; CIC, France.

Salary: $4,200

PROJECT MANAGER FOR AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM and temporary supervisor of textbook project -- as scholarship project manager screens applicants and supervises the activities of 39 exile scholarship students in American universities and colleges. Temporarily in charge of 14 exiles doing preliminary work on textbook project. Supervises the research efforts of 7 exiles.

Name: Maurice J. Downey

Qualifications: AB, MA, and Ph.D. candidate, NYU, majoring in education; infantry, U.S. Army.

Salary: $5,000

MESC EDITOR -- responsible for the translating, rewriting, and editing for publication of all manuscripts produced by exile researchers.

Name: Hugh Corbett

Qualifications: BA Oxford; Major, British Army; intelligence officer in Yugoslavia and Albania; former editor, Rinhard and Henry Holt; former editor and chief, Office of Military History, the Department of the Army.

Salary: $7,000

CHIEF OF THE ADMINISTRATION SECTION - responsible for the fiscal control, supply, file control, and general administration.

Salary: $4,000

4 TYPISTS - total salaries -- $10,660

4 SECRETARIES - total salaries -- $13,780

1 CLERK-TYPIST - Salary -- $2,600

1 LIBRARIAN - Salary -- $3,120

1 RECEPTIONIST & ASSISTANT LIBRARIAN - salary -- $3,120

1 OFFICE BOY-MESSENGER - salary -- $2,340

1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR - salary -- $2,860

3 EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS - rewriters, script typists, etc. - total salaries -- $10,720

Positions not yet filled:

1 RESEARCH SUPERVISOR

1 PROJECT MANAGER for the Textbook program -- in charge of collecting, evaluating, and revising existing Iron-Curtain country pre-1939 textbooks for post-liberation use. Supervising preparation of new texts where revision of old ones would be insufficient.

1 PROJECT MANAGER for American education section -- responsible for promoting knowledge of and interest in European satellite

countries by working through American education system on all levels, coordinating research in this field.

2 SECRETARIES

4 Feb 52

Tom:

Loose ends are here as on a clipped skein of yarn, but:

Recommendations are certainly sound — and the clue to the trouble seems to be in para 8 first then in para 9.

Para 8: No one, I'd guess, was on the job in Munich when Frank Lindsay's priority cable (I checked) of 4 Jan arrived there either Fri 4 Jan or Sat'dec 5 Jan. If so, I'll bet RFE would have done one of 2 things: 1) accepted the advice
or
2) delayed in order to check with RFE hdq NY

Para 9: Of course EE should clear cables on RFE with a particular person here. And that person with RFE N.Y. in necessary cases like this.

Nancy

30 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INSPECTION AND REPORTS

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe Broadcasts Regarding the Czech Currency Reform

REFERENCE: DD/P Memorandum to DCPY of 16 January 1952, Same Subject

1. At the risk of making this memorandum overly long, a review of the cable traffic on the above subject appears desirable. According to information available to this office, the campaign to take the psychological initiative in connection with the rumored reform of currency of Czechoslovakia was first proposed by EE Division on 30 December 1951 in cable to Frankfurt and Munich (OUT 96920) as follows:

"a. Persistent rumors claim Czech currency reform imminent. Hungary allegedly printing new Czech currency. Long New Year holiday appears suitable for reform.

b. Request all information this subject forwarded to Fran and Muni.

c. Believe general knowledge rumored reform to Czechs would harass government, cause excessive buying.

d. Suggest Czech operation out of Germany exploit theme soonest in SVOBODNE HLASY and/or pamphlets or other media emphasizing:

(1) Economic and political dependency Czechs on Russians and consequent disadvantages.

(2) Instability Czech economy.

(3) Advisability population unload cash for goods.

e. If White Legion prepared suggest exploit theme along lines paragraph d.

f. Muni: Suggest you request Radio Free Europe also exploit theme."

2. On 2 January 1952, OPC/OSO Munich wired Frankfurt (IN 10446) the following message from William Griffith, Policy Advisor for Radio Free Europe at Munich:

"a. Radio Free Europe

SECRET

"a. Radio Free Europe reports indicate probably Czech currency reform scheduled for early 1952 affecting larger notes and with at least 50% devaluation.

b. MOB concurs this estimate situation.

c. Request comments on plan which propose submit Radio Free Europe New York for approval: Large campaign reporting above as information from inside stating it latest regime attempt defraud inhabitants telling listeners they can themselves force postponement or abandonment reform by:

(1) Changing all 1,000, 500, 100 notes for smaller.

(2) Buying goods getting rid money.

d. Estimated result buying panic flight from crown.

e. Advantages:

(1) Increase economic crisis.

(2) Disrupt regime plan.

(3) Guaranteed propaganda success (if reform Radio Free Europe helped evade if none helped postpone.)

f. Risk: Must be sure estimate situation as planned campaign only possible once."

Later that same day, another cable (IN 10526) quoted Griffith as follows:

"a. Intend all-out one week campaign beginning 4 January.

b. Requesting National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. approval Radio Free Europe channels.

c. Time element forbids waiting.

d. Pass to C. D. Jackson."

Mr. C. D. Jackson in New York on 2 January 1952, received a similar message direct from his people in Munich who had been alerted in response to paragraph f. of EE Division's cable of 30 December 1951 above. The undersigned happened to be with Mr. Jackson in New York that day, and at his request obtained telephonic confirmation regarding the above exchange of messages. Accordingly, Mr. Jackson told his people to go ahead with their operation.

3. On 3 January 1952, OPC/OSO Frankfurt cabled (IN 10728) their concurrence of the all-out exploitation of the suggested theme as follows:

"a. RE MUNI 6280 (IN 10446) concur all-out exploitation theme as another regime attempt defraud Czechs, best approach. Should stress Soviet guidance planned reform in need bring Czech

economy

"economy closer own and continuing deterioration economic structure Czechoslovakia.

b. Believe methods aimed force postponement or abandonment should be confined suggestions and left discretion populace. Possibility rebuttal campaign and dissafection people seen if plan abandoned following unloading cash and huge buying spree."

4. On Friday 4 January 1952, OPC cabled Munich (OUT 97623):

"Suspend action outlined reference pending instructions which follow soonest."

5. On 5 January 1952 this suspension was amplified as follows to Frankfurt (OUT 98088) with copy to Munich:

"While considerable evidence currency reform may develop do not wish embark on operation until more certain of facts and know more about your plans for handling it. Advise any additional information you able obtain possibility currency reform and send outline contemplated operational program including channels dissemination and themes."

6. On Monday 7 January 1952, the following cable was received from Munich (IN 11613):

"a. Reference too late. Program began 0500 7 January.
b. Instruct."

7. On 9 January 1952 at the request of EE Division, we called Mr. Mahool, Assistant Director of RFE in New York, who advised that he had had no instructions to suspend the Czech currency program. He said that Mr. C. D. Jackson had cabled to RFE, Munich on Saturday, 5 January 1952, to go ahead with the program if they were satisfied it was a bona fide theme and would not backfire. At our request, Mr. Mahool sent the following teletype message to Munich, RFE:

"Did you continue Czechoslovakia currency (program) beyond January 7th as outlined teletyped program content FtA. Our friends advise - one - considerable doubt on part information gathering friends here that it happened or will happen. Two - that information gathering friends advised Munich representative to tell RFE Munich to hold off. Assume you only went ahead 7th on Munich information gathering friends advice and okay."

To the foregoing

To the foregoing he received the following reply:

> "Czechoslovak currency (program) is continuing in a restrained manner. We are prepared to take credit if it doesn't happen. Munich representative did not advise us postpone until after mid 7th. Went ahead on Munich information gathering friends local rep. But we had their best advice and blessing on this one."

8. According to the foregoing teletype exchange, RFE Munich were not advised until after mid-day Monday, 7 January 1952, of the contents of OPC's cable of Friday, 4 January 1952, suspending the action pending further instructions. It would also appear that OPC, Munich, advised RFE to proceed.

9. The undersigned would like to point out that none of the three outgoing cables (OUT 96920, OUT 97623, OUT 98033) quoted above, were coordinated with the Psychological Staff Division who have the primary responsibility for all matters concerning NCFE and RFE. Had we known about the decision to suspend on 4 January 1952, we would have been able to advise RFE in New York in plenty of time to call off the operation. In this connection, a subsequent message from Munich states that RFE does not consider that their overseas staff is subject to commands of OPC stations, the command channel running only from NCFE New York.

10. DD/P's memorandum of 16 January 1952 on this subject refers to the Director's recommendation that RFE be prepared to play this theme either way, taking credit for either having prevented the reform by premature exposure if nothing is done, or having warned the people in time to protect themselves if their currency is devaluated. As indicated in Griffith's message of 2 January 1952, RFE was aware of this double approach from the start , and has been taking the "we prevented it" line in the occasional references which have been made to the currency problem in the past three weeks.

11. To avoid such confusion in the future, it is recommended that:

a. Before a theme is referred to RFE overseas for exploitation, or even brought to their attention for consideration, it be given to PY Division not only for review here in OPC but also for discussion with the interested people in RFE's New York office.

b. All cables

SECRET

[illegible]

b. All cables bearing on the subject be coordinated with PY Division, or that branch having responsibility for NCFE problems.

c. Coordination and clearance with the Department of State be arranged by the area division before any suggestion for exploitation gets out to the field.

d. The command channel for giving instructions to RFE be clarified so that messages intended for their overseas staff will first be cleared with their New York office, which clearance will then be indicated in any messages going out over OPC facilities.

12. In view of the interest taken in this matter by the DD/P's office, it is suggested that this memorandum be forwarded to DD/P with any comments you care to make.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:ml

Distribution:
Addressee - Original
PY/CIO - 1
PY/IS - 1
DCPY - 1
RI - 2

14-00000

# 11

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

January 29, 1952

To: Mr. O. E. Hadwood

From: N. H. Prunty

The enclosed letter copy is self-explanatory. It confirms, in my mind, all the worst suspicions that I have had regarding this public relations firm in connection with the Crusade for Freedom. That is one thing.

The fact that they would proceed, even if they had been commissioned to call this meeting for the Crusade for Freedom, without consulting the National Committee office, on whose behalf they are supposed to act, is, in my opinion, assuming alarming proportions.

Either the Crusade for Freedom works on behalf of the National Committee, or it does not.

This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city, and is the finale on a whole series of similar incidence.

N.P.

JAN 31 1952

SECRET

January 29, 1952

Dear Abbott:

I have just been informed over the telephone that Earle Rogers, of Counsel Services, Inc., has called a meeting of the Crusade for Freedom Committee in this city, and has failed to consult me in any way in this matter.

This has resulted, as usual, in causing utter confusion in the minds of everyone, and bodes no good for the Crusade in this city nor for the sponsoring organization - the National Committee for a Free Europe, for which the Crusade is operating. In your letter of December 7, 1951, to Mr. Hulbert T. Bisselle, Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom in the District of Columbia, you designated me as, Director of the Washington, D.C. office. As I have received no instructions from you to the contrary, I have presumed this situation to be continuing.

The fact that Mr. Rogers would proceed in a matter of this kind without consultation with this office, and without being commissioned by you to undertake such a meeting, is most disturbing. This is the sort of thing that will really kill the Crusade for Freedom in this city.

I shall hope to discuss this matter with you when in New York on Thursday.

Sincerely yours,

Robert J. Moore

Mr. Abbott Washburn,
Executive Vice-Chairman
Crusade for Freedom,
4 West 57th Street,
New York, N.Y.

SECRET

Executive Registry
52-7786

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO

NO.

DATE 3 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECD	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. WP/PM | Mr Brown Mr Augustine		1 Apr. Both have seen. Mr A. initialed for both.		JBV	Coordination to be indicated on greens. (Incoming ltr 28 Jan. attached) Original of attachment (ltr to Min Miller) will not be dispatched until notification that John Hughes letter has been signed.
2. EE | Mr Pillsbury Mr. Droller		1 Apr.	[illegible]	WP [illegible]	
3. Mr. Fredericks Mr. Schrayer				[illegible] TC	
4. ADPC	[illegible] 9			GW	
5. DD/P	6	8 april	8 april	CWT	Has been signed. Ltr has been sent to "Min." JBV 10 April 52
6. DDCI			8/Apr	AWD/F	
7. CIO					See Chrono reply 9 Apr.
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					9L6197

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

P-2215

Executive Registry
2-7786

January 28, 1952

Dear Allen:

This letter concerns the matter which I discussed with you briefly last week.

For some months past both the officers and directors of the NCFE have been concerned as to what protective steps could be taken in behalf of foreign nationals working for Radio Free Europe in Germany under conditions which might arise in certain eventualities.

I attach copy of a letter bearing on this matter which was written by Lang to Gates Lloyd on November 5, 1951. It gives a concise outline of the problem and suggests a solution of the same. To date, as far as I know, we have not been able to secure any assurances that this is being taken care of. If, as we have been informed, the Army authorities in Germany are willing to help upon receiving clearance from the Department of Defense, we feel every effort should be made to implement this promptly.

Apart from the very real present and potential future value of the foreign nationals in the group, the Committee feels that it has a definite moral obligation to seek the same degree of assistance and protection for them as would be afforded United States citizens under the conditions referred to.

Personally, I feel this obligation is a broader one which extends to this Government as well.

Last Thursday when we were discussing this question in New York, Joe Grew was much interested and said he would be glad to assist in any way possible. We all felt, however, that this is not a matter which the Committee can take up direct with the Defense Department or other Government agencies here and that it can only be brought to a proper solution through action on the part of the Director or yourself.

Please be good enough to take this matter under consideration and give us the benefit of your advice.

Yours,

John C Hughes

5 November 1951

Dear Mr.________________

As you know, RFE has, at the present writing, some 1000-1100 people in Germany. They are largely concentrated in Munich and its environs, although some are scattered in and around the Frankfurt and Heidelberg region. The staff is composed of Americans, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles (at an early date), large numbers of German housekeeping and engineering personnel, plus a few French, Swiss, Belgians, British, etc. Full details on the disposition of the staff are available in Munich and have been turned over to EUCOM in an effort to interest EUCOM in the most serious problem which faces us today - that of evacuation in the event of a move by any of the Russian armies.

Through Lt. Co. Ciccolella we have been fortunate enough to have our American personnel included in the evacuation plan of the Munich Post Command. At this writing, however, we stand to lose our extraordinarily capable, well trained and completely western-oriented foreign staff.

EUCOM, on its own, has done all that it can but needs a directive from the Department of Defense in Washington to the effect that the RFE staff is to be considered a "war asset" and given a high priority on the evacuation schedule. This priority should include the foreign nationals who have been trained into the RFE effort since without them whatever agency which would take over the RFE staff would be completely lost.

Our investigations, and very considerable work done in the field on this subject, prove that EUCOM is more than willing to take upon itself this additional evacuation burden if so directed by the Department of Defense.

This is a matter of extreme importance not only to us but to whoever will inherit the task of influencing the satellite areas when and after the Russian armies have moved into western Europe. RFE has proved that it is the Czechs, Hungarians and the Poles who can best do a psychological warfare job. Without their complete participation we would be lost in this "peacetime" effort, and without their future participation whoever inherits our task in time of war would be equally lost.

May I therefore request that this matter be given your immediate and urgent attention. So far as we can tell, and we have gone into this subject very exhaustively, all that is needed from this side is a declaration of interest in the entire staff on the part of the Department of Defense.

[illegible]

Mr. Fried

EE-3.

2004K

13 Nov 52

Evacuation Problem

① RFE has 1100 or twice as many people as rest of CPA.

② Get break down of employees into various nationalities - at least as to ⓐ US Nats ⓑ Exiles & ⓒ Indigenous Germans -

③ What about method for issuing passes on D-Day? Will not be sent out ahead -

④ Will need some sort of priority - what order of departure?

NSC 123

Cards for civilians - [illegible]

~~Numbers~~ cleared w/ ~~top~~ U.S Cdrs

Hq; or State Chiefs of Missions

NCE Paper thru Tomorrow –
Reassure of Hughes – they are on track –
Get plans up –
Cut down number.

Get Augustine –

---

7 March '52 – Augustine – Plans Div –
N.S.C. paper has been passed – Directive 123
Take up with EE to have our people included in their Plans –
Coordination is under Plans Div.
EE – Wayne Fredericks or T. Schreiger are the ones to see –
Sell them on who should be included – US, Emig & Ger – & they contact the Military

Weeks Evacuation 13 Dec

N.S.C. Junior Section has accepted paper & its going to Senior Section where no trouble is anticipated —

10 Jan 52

Wayne Fredericks - ~~will call back~~ ~~20~~ Jan

~~[illegible]~~

Paper ran into a snag at last NSC meeting & will take 2 to 4 weeks to get back on the agenda - (Not emergency)

Reginald Augustine 3251 knows most about this —

Saw Augustine 10 Jan - He will keep us posted all branches

Mil Evac Order

① NEO

Noncombatant Evac Order

② G.(eneral) A.(lert) O(rder)

Effective at 3AO.

OBC has special passes - red white blue.
for Am personnel - case
officers + anybody with them

Adoption of the Pass - or
the pass itself - ought to do -
But - this is in Combattant
Columns -

Everybody in C.O. is concerned with this
problem - Part must be essential people -
intelligence - so they had to be there - when

Every consideration should be given to how our function could be performed further back from frontier

S.P. Phone 28 Nov 51

Evacuation Plans

John Taylor Z+G. - is in Paris - unemployed -

S.P. thinks he would be a good man to plan evacuation procedures - as soon as we get green light on [illegible]?

Curriculum vitae of:

JOHN S. TAYLOR, JR.
95 rue de la Faisanderie,
Paris XVI. France
Phone number: TROcadero 08-66

43 North Linwood Avenue
Pittsburgh 5, Pennsylvania

Date and Place of Birth: 28 October 1912, Wilkinsburgh, Pennsylvania
USA Passport No: 453792 Carte d'identite No: AH 62011
Marital Status: Married (no children)
Height: 6'3'' Weight: 210 lbs Health: Good
Education: Grade School 8 years College 4 years
High School 4 years Degree B.A. (Liberal Arts)
The Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pennsylvania

Important Civilian and Military Experience:
Employer: US Army
Position: Entered on Active Duty as Second Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve
Length of Employment: June 1937 - March 1939
Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri
Positions: Traffic and Reservation Sales Representative)
Representative Traffic and Sales) at Pittsburgh, Pa.
Manager, City Office
Length of Employment: May 1939 - February 1941
Employer: US Army
Position: Enetered on Active Duty as First Lieutenant, Infantry-Reserve
Stationed at: New York, N.Y. Noumea, New Caledonia
Washington, D.C. Norfolk, Virginia
Honolulu, T.H. Le Havre, France
Separated from Active Duty as Lt.Col., Transportation Corps-Reserve
Length of Employment: February 1941 - February 1946
Employer: Transcontinental and Western Air Inc., Kansas City 6, Missouri
Positions: Assistant to Traffic Manager, Int'l Division, New York, N.Y.
Assistant to Traffic Manager for France, Paris, France
Length of Employment: February 1946 - August 1946
Employer: US Army
Position: Entered on Active Duty as Lt. Col., Transportation Corps, US Army
Stationed at: Paris, France Bremerhaven, Germany
Antwerp, Belgium New York, N.Y.
Cardiff, Wales Washington, D.C.
Resigned from Active Service with same rank

Other Information:
Speak French moderately well.
Have lived in France a total of three (3) years and am now a resident.
Practically all of my experience in civilian and military life has been office management and direction in outside activities.

References:

Mr. Alexandre de Bondini
Vice-President, Int'l
Automatic Electric Corp.
of Chicago, 2 rue Chartran
Neuilly-sur-Seine
Telephone: MAI 76-22

Mr. Philippe Hottinguer
Hottinguer et Cie.,
Banque, 38 rue de Provence
Paris, IX.
Telephone? TRI 28-84

Monsieur Jean Monnet
Commissaire General
au Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement
18 rue de Martignac,
PARIS VI
Telephone: INV 75-70

25 Jun 52

Mr. Braden:

In collating these 2 reports, I find some slight differences. The only one which seems significant is marked in red* below, but, I've listed some others for your possible convenience. Does point 4 require a memo or is it carelessly written — or is the method of collaborating understood?

Devine	Braden
1. page 1, line 2 "but in a considerably lower key"	1. not included as an agreed item — committed, instead.
2. page 3, para beginning "Mr. Dulles..." "in close coordination with VOA"	2. page 3, last para page 5, para beginning "Dulles.." "to include the Committee of the Voice"
3. page 3: the points Point 2: "and not last more than 2 weeks"	page 5 Pt 2. "of short duration"
Point 3: "an explanation of USA-RFE relationships	Pts 3 & 4 Pt 3: "including the work of the Voice"
* Point 4: q.v. Different	Pt 5 q.v.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 January 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Present were Messrs. Jackson and Washburn of NCFE, Messrs. Barrett, Joyce, Devine, Sargeant and Kohler from State, and Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Lloyd and Braden from CIA. The meeting was held in Mr. Barrett's office on 17 January at 4:30 pm.

CONCLUSION: That the Crusade for Freedom organization should continue.

The following is a transcript of Mr. Braden's notes of the meeting.

C. D. led off, admitting the frustrations that a long campaign on the Crusade for Freedom caused to the State Department and suggested the following program:

1. A 1-day bell-ringing campaign in all cities.

2. Direct mail to corporations.

At this point, Mr. Washburn interjected to say that he would need about two weeks of "low drums" promotion before the 1-day campaign. Jackson went on to say that under such a scheme there would be no time on the part of the chairman for a build-up of invidious comparisons in the press. At Jackson's request, Mr. Washburn passed around a Crusade publication entitled "The Voice of America - 1951 - A Year of Progress". This brochure, which in four pages praises highly the work of the Voice of America, is to be mailed by the Crusade to its chief contributors.

Mr. Barrett then made the following points:

1. The National Committee for a Free Europe grew out of the idea of helping refugees and of giving them a voice. It has changed over the years to a huge operation with many new ideas, and the Crusade for Freedom came along as a cover necessity.

2. He asked whether the demands of fund-raising had not begun to make less effective the primary job of helping refugees, whether

the tail -- Crusade for Freedom -- is not wagging the dog. He remarked that in a conversation with Alan Valentine he had found that Valentine is inclined to agree with him.

3. Against Mr. Washburn and the Crusade for Freedom, he had only one complaint. They were too good, too big-time. They made such an effective appeal that the recipients could not avoid running down the competitor. He stated as his opinion that the Crusade was jeopardizing a multi-million dollar operation -- the Voice of America -- and might even be jeopardizing another multi-million dollar operation -- Radio Free Europe -- for the sake of raising three million dollars.

4. He thought balloons and some other operations done by the Committee were best done by private means.

5. He leaned toward going back to the beginning and looking at the Crusade as purely a cover operation and not an attempt to raise large funds and making a lot of hoopla. He suggested that the Crusade should raise only enough money and make only enough of a campaign to provide a dignified cover. He suggested mail solicitation, magazine advertisements, the publicizing of two or three large anonymous gifts, all without high-pressure. Then he said, "Let's get on with the main job of radio and refugees."

Mr. Dulles asked whether this danger to the Voice was so great. "Didn't you get more money this year?" Barrett's answer was "No" and he pointed out that there was no damage done to the Voice by the Crusade this year insofar as funds were concerned but he feared the future. Dulles asked whether we couldn't work out the timing of the Crusade so that there would be no interference on the hill. Mr. Barrett did not directly answer the question. He said the cover was bad. Too many people already know the truth about the Crusade and he is worried about it. He said it surprised him that it worried him more than it worried Mr. Dulles. A large campaign raises the question, he said, of how all the work is done on such a small amount of money. He thought the Crusade called attention to itself as cover.

Howland Sargeant asked Jackson to answer this question, "Of what various uses are the Crusade?" Jackson listed them as follows:

1. Cover. He agreed with Mr. Barrett that the Crusade both increased and decreased the security danger.

2. It brings in money.

3. It educates and interests Americans in the whole problem of psychological warfare and propaganda and does so more than anything else that is managed by the Government or by private funds. He thought this was greatly important and said that although he

realised that mistakes had been made and the Crusade had criticised the Voice, strategically the Crusade could be of enormous help to the Voice by publicising the need for communicating to people in slavery.

Sargeant thought point 3 was the most important. He asked whether the Crusade couldn't be tied in with this point. Jackson said, "Yes, and we are starting with this issue of the Crusader publicising the Voice." Washburn added that 25 million contributors, counting this year's and last year's contributions, may prevent cutting down the operation as Barrett suggests. They will raise a lot of questions. Barrett disagreed and repeated his suggestion of a one-month operation confined to magazine advertising and direct mail. Jackson asked about the magazine advertising. He said you had to write copy for magazine advertising and the copy would have to advertise Radio Free Europe. Barrett answered, "You can control the copy on magazine ads. There is a lot of time allowed for going over them carefully before they get into print."

Washburn repeated several times that it would be a great shame to let the Crusade go. Jackson said the Crusade gave a real lift to exiles not only here but abroad.

Kohler said he had been thinking about the problem and had two suggestions to make:

1. Could we exhort people to give a dollar to Radio Free Europe and at the same time to write a letter to their Congressmen backing up the Voice of America?

2. Could the Radio Advisory Committee of the Voice of America team up with the Crusade to help with general publicity?

Jackson answered the first question "No". He thought that would be dangerous. To the second question, he said "Yes". He again outlined his idea for a campaign calling for education on a general psychological warfare program with a final request to contribute to the Crusade.

Mr. Dulles again asked Mr. Barrett about his financial problems and the timing of his request to the hill. Barrett said he would have the most difficulty from January to July. Washburn said, "Then we'll run a campaign in September only and there'll be no horn-blowing until then."

Dulles said that he thought that if the Crusade could be limited to September he doubted that it would interfere with Mr. Barrett's fund-raising problems. That, coupled with a better degree of coordination, with the use of Mr. Kohler's private advisers, and with a great effort on the part of the Crusade toward psychological warfare education would give the Voice much invisible support. Sargeant said he agreed with Mr. Dulles' view of the Crusade giving invisible support and wondered whether we could not make the invisible aspects visible. He thought that to hold the whole Crusade organisation together for a year merely to conduct a two-week campaign would waste many good men's time. Barrett agreed that a two-week campaign wouldn't keep the organisation alive.

Sargeant asked if there were not other ideas which could be fed through the Crusade machinery, thus making more constructive use of it.

Barrett raised the question of internationalizing the Crusade effort. Jackson replied that there was an abortive French project which he thought would shortly fall flat on its face. The British, he thought, would shortly make a final decision as to whether to go ahead with an exile program or not. He seemed dubious that they would decide to do so. He mentioned Jean Paul David and Paix et Liberte as the only foreign operation in this field which had any spark to it. Barrett agreed but asked whether or not some Europeans couldn't be put on the Board of Directors. Dulles replied that this was very difficult, that they couldn't attend meetings for one thing. Barrett said, "Couldn't there be an annual meeting simply as a front, as camouflage?"

Jackson said that NCFE did get involved in European organisations, that they had close affiliations with the European Movement, with the Free Trade Union Committee in Exile, with the International Journalists, with Strasbourg University, and all the radio programs were reaching the point where they were thought of as programs belonging to the people to whom they were broadcast. NCFE had, he thought, internationalized a great deal and in a very natural way. A board of foreign directors would spoil that natural process by setting up an obvious phoney.

Washburn again raised the argument of timing the campaign to take place only in September. There was no direct response to this suggestion.

Sargeant, referring again to the use of the invisible assets mentioned by Dulles, thought that if the Crusade continued it should be planned not primarily to raise funds except as cover. Attention should be focused on:

1. The development of understanding; the battle for the minds of men.

2. Two or three concrete things which private citizens could do in this battle.

Barrett took this up at once and mentioned letter writing. Turning to Washburn he said, "Abbott, put your mind to work." He thought we should be able to find something. He suggested we ask Washburn to look into other projects like the letter-writing campaign that was done for Italy. He mentioned the Common Council for American Unity and Mr. Dulles suggested the Friendship League run by Christian Herter.

Dulles asked for agreement of the group to do the campaign on a modest basis for the month of September only, to keep the organization together, to include the Committee of the Voice, to assure full coordination of all publicity and to work hard on the specific ideas mentioned by Sargeant. Devine asked if such a campaign would not mean playing Radio Free Europe down to, say, fourth place? Jackson said, "No, it would not mean that; Radio Free Europe would simply be one of the themes that was played, sometimes at the top of the ladder and sometimes down the ladder, it would depend."

Barrett again raised the cover problem and his dissatisfaction with the Crusade as cover. Dulles explained that this was a problem that had to be lived with.

Jackson once more attempted to get agreement of the group on the following points:

1. The Crusade to continue.

2. To begin not earlier than September and to be of very short duration.

3. The whole organization to devote itself to education in psychological warfare, including the work of the Voice.

4. To study means of civic action on local and national levels.

5. That everybody agree to this program and work out the details as soon as possible.

Barrett asked first Joyce and then Devine whether they agreed to this program. Both did agree.

Barrett said that he could not commit himself to this program. He said he was leaving shortly and felt that he could not commit the Department of State under these circumstances. He said he would agree on one point only -- that the Crusade should not disband -- but he reiterated his conviction that it ought to be of a much lower pressure than the discussion so far outlined seemed, and he again mentioned magazines and direct mail. Jackson said that it was all very well to tell the group that they were not to disband but he said the first question the group would then ask is "What shall we do?" He said that question had to be answered. Barrett said, "We have a coordinating committee of Braden and Devine to work this problem out."

There followed some discussion of the balloon project which is the subject of a separate Memorandum for the Record by Mr. Gates Lloyd.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief, International Organizations Branch

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC and DD/P)
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

TOMIC

SECRET

17 January 1962

Dear Mr. Minott:

Enclosed please find six copies of pamphlet entitled "Unconquered". As you requested, they are being forwarded to you for delivery to Teclore.

Sincerely,

Frank C. Kilday

JAN 17 1962

SECRET

UNCONQUERED



Social worker, lawyer, humanitarian, enemy of dictatorship, devoted to social justice and equal rights—Milada Horakova fought . . . and died . . . for a better way of life for all. Her resistance to the Nazis and the Communists has already become part of the history of the Czechoslovakian fight for freedom.

This is the story of her fight.

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National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc

National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

350 FIFTH AVENUE • ROOM 301 • NEW YORK 1, N. Y. • TELEPHONE BRYANT 9-2100

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October, 1951

The National Committee for a Free Europe is happy to send you a copy of its illustrated booklet, UNCONQUERED, the story of the outstanding Czechoslovakian patriot, Milada Horakova.

Milada Horakova was unbelievably courageous during her imprisonment under both the Nazi and Russian-dominated Communist dictatorships in Czechoslovakia. She was a true defender of democracy, and sacrificed her life for those principles of liberty which all free men everywhere hold dear.

I cannot urge you strongly enough to read UNCONQUERED and learn the story of this brave woman who dared to oppose the Bolshevist conspiracy to destroy democracy in Czechoslovakia.

I ask you to join us in working to preserve peace with freedom for all mankind. If you wish further information about the National Committee, please write me.

Sincerely yours,

C. D. Jackson

C. D. Jackson
President

Additional copies of UNCONQUERED, while available, are 15¢ per single copy; bulk shipments of 100 copies or more are 12¢ a copy.



The courtroom in Prague had a festive air. Jammed with spectators – rare in Communist Czechoslovak court seemed more like a celebration than a monster trial of 13 of Czechoslovakia's freedom-loving patriots. Chief defendant in this mock trial was Milada Horakova. It [illegible] the liquidation of Czech democratic leaders by the Communist regime.



Doctor of Law, former worker for the municipal administration of Prague, Member of Parliament . . . the 48-year old Czech patriot stood firm against the verbal lashings of the Red prosecutor. "Milada Horakova you are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia. What is your defense?"

Defense? Milada smiles. There is so much to say. But where to begin? Almost 25 years ago . . .

[illegible] by The Mercer, Howard Company

Though graduated with a Law degree, Milada Horakova's love for people brought her to head the Children's Bureau of the Public Welfare Department in Prague. Here she established a system of foster homes and proper adoption procedure. Her legal training assisted her in solving juvenile delinquency and the establishment and administration of homes and hospitals for orphans and mentally retarded children.





Her fight for freedom and social justice found expression through the National Council of Women. Happily at work in social welfare and the Council, she devoted her energies towards helping others.

During the next 15 years, Milada worked tirelessly in the preparation of important legislation for the Czechoslovak Parliament. She worked on the laws regulating the work day to 8 hours, suppressing prostitution, protecting home workers, restricting child labor . . . and much other social legislation.





Executive Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council of Women, she was a member of the International Women's Organization, too. She travelled to many countries representing the Czechoslovakian women. And thus she foresaw the threat of the Hitler dictatorship's greed and power.

[illegible] her countrymen that Hitler could not be [illegible] war was imminent. While Hitler talked peace, [illegible] Nazi war machine rolled across the border into [illegible] on March 15th 1939. When the Germans [illegible] their liberties and raped the leading democracy of [illegible] Europe, Milada pledged to help destroy the German [illegible]



[illegible] organized the Women's [illegible] Movement. Popular with [illegible] social welfare groups, [illegible] Horakova was known and [illegible]. Thus she was able to recruit [illegible] underground army of former [illegible] social workers to fight the [illegible] aggression.



She organized an underground that baffled the Germans. Instead of large meetings, she set up a chain of small groups. Only the head of each group knew the other members. These group heads would meet in different homes or in a doctor's office. Thus, when the Gestapo arrested a woman underground worker, they would be unable to make a mass arrest.





Milada and her resistance w
constantly embarrassed the
mans. They arranged hiding
and fed the partisans, helped
Jews to escape the clutches
Gestapo, set up an intelligence
spy network and distributed
pamphlets to steel the p
resistance.

At the same time, Milada helped to write a new constitution to be used when the Nazis were destroyed. She was in constant contact, via secret radio, with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. Thus she transmitted the progress of her work on the post-war constitution.



The Nazis had long wanted to arrest Milada. Having learned of her work on the new constitution for a liberated Czechoslovakia, they hoped to catch her with this evidence. One afternoon three Gestapo agents burst into her country home and arrested her and her husband.



But Milada had hidden the notes for the proposed constitution in a box of her daughter's candy. While kissing the child goodbye, she whispered the secret to the youngster, who later burned the notes.



Milada and her husband were separated, and she was taken to the Gestapo's investigations center, Petchek Palace. Here, even brave men broke under the ruthless questioning. But, though she was questioned often, she was not frightened. Her answers — all lies — seemed so logical to the Gestapo, that she did not betray even one of her co-workers in the resistance.



For 15 months the Gestapo questioned her, shipped her from one prison to another Never once did she give them the slightest shred of evidence. Not until 1941, when Hitler's armies defeated France and arrested some of her escaped co-workers, did they associate the escape with Milada.



Though forced to wo
munition factory und
ground, labor in m
mosquito-infested f
and clean house for th
tapo . . . Milada never
plained. Her ready
was a constant anno
to the Nazis. Her opti
and hope was a sour
encouragement for he
low prisoners.

[illegible] prison at Terezin, she spent 16 months in solitary confinement, another 6 months in [illegible] Never permitted to get fresh air, scarred by her chains, gnawed by [illegible] diet of soup and water . . Milada, nevertheless refused to knuckle under



The many months in solitary confinement shattered Milada's health. But, when finally released to the prison proper, without regard for her own safety she bathed and cared for sick, elderly prisoners. Her unconquerable spirit was a shining example for other less stalwart prisoners to carry on.





Finally, brought to Dr
to stand trial before
man court, she fac
death penalty. But he
eloquent appeal
Germans' fear of m
her a martyr res
sentence of hard labor



After a year in the German concentration camp she was freed by the victorious American
When leaving to return to Czechoslovakia, Milada pledged herself to continue the struggl
human rights and social welfare, and to help those who suffered under the Nazis



Returning home after 5 horrible years of prisons and concentration camps and torture chambers . . . Milada was joyously reunited with her invalided husband and grown daughter. Both had miraculously lived through the German tyranny.

"I believe in freedom and equality for all. Does that make me a traitor?" A whisper goes through the crowd watching the trial. Milada Horakova now has stood up to the Communists [illegible] the new masters of Czechoslovakia.





The Communist prosecutor is in a rage. He knows that Milada has bested him. Furiously he screams, "You are a traitor to the Peoples' Democracy of Czechoslovakia."
"I will prove that Milada Horakova was paid by the capitalists; a spy for the Western powers; a warmonger; bombardment of Prague was her aim; she wanted death for women and children; she wanted the Germans to rule Czechoslovakia." There were many other ridiculous charges. The trial continues . . .

Apprehensive of Czechoslovakia's new-won freedom and to guard against another imperialistic power's conquest of her country, Milada successfully ran for Parliament. After organizing a fund for political prisoners, she introduced a bill providing pensions for the families of Nazi victims.



She told her friends that a new
faced Czechoslovakia. Russi
munism was infiltrating into th
ernment and though they made
tive promises to workers and
. . . intended to "take over"
tually destroy the rights of free

Running for reelection, Milada campaigned on a platform of freedom of press, freedom of the right to work, freedom of assembly, and all other individual freedoms. She warned the people of the treachery of Stalinists . . . who are motivated only by the interests of Russian imperialism.



The Communists realized [illegible] the people had for Milada Horakova. And so they approached her, asking her to join them in achieving social welfare legislation. Seeing through their trickery, she refused.





Having infiltrated into the cabinet, and after gaining control of important labor unions as well as the police and Army, the Communists staged a coup. In February of 1948, with the threat of the nearby Soviet Army, they successfully overthrew the democratic government in Czechoslovakia. For the second time in less than a decade, the Czechoslovaks lost their freedom.



To suppress opposition and strengthen their grip on the people, the Communists resorted to nighttime arrests without warrants or legal charge. Their campaign of terror struck horror in the hearts of all.

Those in Parliament who had fought for human rights and social welfare were appalled by the new regime's tactics. They asked Milada for advice. She replied, "I have resigned. I shall not give in. I have chosen a straight path, and this I shall follow."



Returning to a subordi
job in the Social Servic
Prague, Milada never
less continued to fight
Communists. At every
portunity she talked
people compared the "P
ples' Democracy" with
Germans, found no dif
ence in their drive
world power. Both form
dictatorship deceitfu
hide behind slogans
peace . . . and prepare
war.



When she refused to compromise, the Communists marked her as their #1 enemy. Though friends warned her to flee the country, Milada refused to leave. Her telephone conversations were listened to. Her servant was actually a spy. She was threatened and arrested.



Since they were unable to get evidence against her, the Communist Secret Police brutally tortured an innocent man, forced him to sign a "confession" which would implicate Milada Horakova.

One afternoon, the Secret Police arrested Milada brought her to their headquarters questioned her incessantly for 36 hours. Though they refused her food and water, she would not relent in her plea of innocence. Finally she was doped, and coerced into a false confession of guilt.





Now, after six months in prison — beaten and tortured — Milada bravely faces the Communists. Fearlessly, she concludes, "I oppose the so-called Peoples' Democracy in the Czechoslovak Republic, for I hold that it not be democratic. I have worked against it. Should the miracle occur and the court find me not guilty and I be released, I should work against it anew."

The "fixed" judges sentenced her to death. All Czechoslovakia is horrified. A wave of revulsion sweeps the free world. Protest meetings are held and petitions directed even to Stalin.



The Communists did what the Nazis never dared to do. On June 27th, 1950 Milada Horakova was hanged.



THAT THIS WORLD UNDER GOD SHALL HAVE A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM

THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC., is a group of private citizens who have drawn together to carry out concrete and direct action to restore and strengthen man's most valued possession—freedom.

The Committee has as its active allies numerous exiled democratic leaders who have found haven in the United States from the Communist tyranny of Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe, of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is setting up facilities that will enable these trusted patriots to be heard again by their own people. Not only does Eastern Europe hear the exiles' impressions of the United States, but American messages of hope and encouragement are transmitted, and, above all, the truth which totalitarian governments forbid their enslaved peoples to hear.

Freedom or the enslavement of men's minds and souls, is the vital issue. What shall we pass on to our children—their rightful heritage of freedom, or the spiritual devastation of Communism? At this very moment the kind of world they will inherit hangs in the balance. The issue is for you to decide. In the vital conflict for the preservation of freedom, the National Committee for a Free Europe offers every single citizen the opportunity to throw in his weight.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE, INC.
301 Empire State Building
350 Fifth Avenue
New York 1, N. Y.

#10

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

January 25, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. F. R. Dolbeare
Mr. J. F. Leich

From: R. J. Moore

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Wednesday, January 23, 1952.

PRESENT: Miss Mary Augustine representing Mr. J. F. Leich in his absence.
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler
Mr. Gates Lloyd
Mr. John Campbell
Mr. Robert Lang, Radio Free Europe, New York
Mr. Charpentier
Mr. Robert J. Moore

CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIRS

Miss Augustine reported that the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, composed of 17 and 13 persons respectively, had signed an agreement in New York City on January 15, 1952, which bear the signatures of Messrs. Heidrich, Klimek, Lettrich, and Zenkl.

(Copy of this agreement is herewith attached).

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Klimek had represented Mr. Papanek in signing the agreement. The agreement, Miss Augustine pointed out, sets up a provisional management of Czechoslovak affairs consisting of two administrators - one from each group. Mr. Heidrich represents the 17 of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, and Mr. Papanek will represent the 13 of the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The provisional management also consists of a body of 24 persons - 12 from each side and which, Miss Augustine reported, might be called a "caretaker body".

Miss Augustine also presented another document which is a protest of the Council's 17 against the Committee's 13, insisting on the exclusion of Dr. Osusky from any major function. However, at a subsequent meeting of NCFE's Subcommittee with representatives of both groups, Mr. Zenkl categorically advised that he and the Committee of 13 had no question whatsoever over the

JAN [illegible] 1952

inclusion of Dr. Osusky, or any other person, as one of the 12 representatives of the National Council, who, together with the 12 representatives of the National Committee are to carry on the discussions leading to the formation of a permanent body to represent Czechoslovak exiles.

Further, Mr. Zenkl stated that when a final program had been agreed to, in his opinion, the only bar to holding any office in a unified organization would be the unwillingness of any individual to accept the over-all program to which the agreement had been accorded through democratic procedure. Apparently, he also advised that he considered this policy to apply to himself as well as to any others. Agreement was accorded on this point by the representatives of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

Miss Augustine also presented the rules which have been adopted for the discharge of the administration of Czechoslovakian affairs in exile. She called the attention of the meeting particularly to Items #3 and #5 of these rules wherein it is stated that:

3) The Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia make available to the provisional administrators the requisite financial resources.

5) The provisional administrators deposit the funds made available to them in a joint account which they handle jointly and prior to the cessation of the provisional administration, they shall jointly account for the use of said funds.

After the meeting Miss Augustine made available the following two lists of 12 persons, from each group, in accordance with the final agreement for the provisional administration:

Papanek
Zenkl
Ripka
Kocvara
Blaho
Dieska,
Tusek (middle class)
Zmeir (National democrat)
Feierabend
Klimek
Firt

Taborsky

Bunza
Cerny
Franek
Heidrich
Lettrich
Major
Hodza
Osusky
Prochazka

Silva
Peroutka
Slavik

At this time, Miss Augustine advised, the Czechoslovaks are still meeting in separate groups, but that the merger is expected to take place very shortly. She further advised that Mr. Zenkl had announced his Committee's indebtedness to the tune of 2 to $3,000; whereupon Mr. Vedeler advised that he had received no confirmation of the allegation that the Zenkl Committee had disposition of independent funds in Switzerland.

Miss Augustine advised that NCFE's Subcommittee will continue in existence, and that it will be available for advice and assistance to the Czechoslovak provisional administrators, and the body of 24.

Miss Augustine also advised that the new financial arrangements were left to the decision of NCFE's Subcommittee, and that no new move in this regard would be made by the Subcommittee until an accounting of all funds had been given, and that financial aid will be allocated on the merits of the case at that time.

Mr. Vedeler raised the question of the individual stipends, and the meeting was informed that unless there is some further change of policy, these stipends are continuing and will continue as in the past.

The meeting was informed that the so-called Czechoslovak Middle Class party representatives have been excluded from the provisional body of 24, and advised that the exile leader, Mr. Cvestka, was likely to raise a good deal of noise about the whole thing. Miss Augustine suggested that, as a member of the Knights of Malta, he was more or less expected to stir up the whole hierarchy.

Mr. Moore raised the issue as to the duration of the provisional agreement, and questioned as to whether any time limit had been set within which the administrators and the body of 24 would settle their differences and establish a permanent organisation. Miss Augustine replied that it was the opinion of the National Council's division that this issue should not be forced at this time, but rather developments would be allowed to crystalize, and that we should wait to see what actual progress is made.

RUMANIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine reported that Messrs. Gafencu and Visoianu had met and had retained earlier views on the type of organization to be established for the representation of Rumanian affairs in exile; their agreement appears not to be within the realm of possibility at the present time. Miss Augustine also made known to the meeting the contents of a letter written by Mr. Gafencu to one of his friends in which he charged that Mr. Visoianu desired only one political and national body which should represent the Rumanian cause abroad, and that this body should be the present National Committee, under Mr. Visoianu's presidency. Mr. Gafencu's letter also advised that Mr. Visoianu is opposed to a large National Council, although he would agree to setup ~~a~~ special commissions composed of persons outside the Committee. Mr. Gafencu on the other hand claims that he seeks an organization in exile within a wide framework, which would have a representative character, and be headed by an elected chairman. Mr. Gafencu indicated that he was not opposed to the King's cause and that, in fact, he wished to see the Royal question intimately bound to that of the whole exile community. Gafencu charged that Visoianu and his group, by negotiating only on the basis of the King's approval, instead of reaching agreement prior to the King's approval, invited criticism not only of themselves, but places the King's position in jeopardy.

Miss Augustine herself also advised that the meeting of January 23 between Visoianu and Gafencu was such as Gafencu had indicated; i.e., with regard to the chairmanship, Radescu would be the honorary chairman, Visoianu the chairman, and perhaps Gafencu the vice-chairman. Visoianu had also offered unification of the two groups on a 7 to 5 basis - the 7 coming from Visoianu's Rumanian National Committee. No reference was made of the funds which had been one of the main bones of contention in the split.

Miss Augustine advised of a meeting between Mr. C. D. Jackson and General Radescu in which, among other things, the General complained that he was being excluded from Rumanian discussions in NCFE circles, and questioned the advisability of sending Visoianu to London along with Gafencu. Radescu claims that his Free Rumanian League is having great success. The General was informed that the invitation to go abroad to Visoianu and Gafencu had emanated f from the European Movement Conference itself, and that, in NCFE conversations with representatives of Rumanian groups, there had never been any question of eliminating Radescu. The importance of unity among exiles was pointed out to Radescu, and he was informed that something had to be done about the situation of the Rumanians-in-Exile.

Miss Augustine advised the meeting that due to circumstances, Visoianu and Gafencu had found themselves scheduled to fly on the same plane to London; Gafencu had protested this arrangement bitterly, on the grounds that Visoianu would represent this situation as one in which he (Visoianu) had been able to bring Gafencu along, on the former's insistence.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what can be done about this. He pointed out that in this Rumanian split Visoianu considers that his friends are in the State Department, and goes to State for advice and support, whereas Gafencu sends in letters to State, but carries his cause to NCFE in New York, where he believes his friends to be.

Mr. Lloyd interjected that he considers some very stringent action must be done about this whole Rumanian situation, and that unity somehow must be achieved. He suggested that with the coming into office of Admiral Miller as the new President of NCFE, it might be the time to take up the matter again with a new personality fresh on the scene, and that in such a way it could conceivably be possible to get over the hump of the present deplorable situation. Mr. Campbell assented thereto.

BALTIC AFFAIRS:

Mr. Vedeler advised the meeting that the original decision regarding the future of the Baltic broadcasts must stand, and that it was out of the questio n that we should become involved in any further proposals regarding RFE broadcasts to that area. This was explained to Mr. Lang, who has had some definite reservations on RFE broadcasts to the Baltic countries.

Mr. Vedeler pointed out that he considered the Baltic panels, however, must be maintained and that to proceed now with the dissolution of these panels would have a most serious effect on our Baltic friends.

Mr. Campbell raised the question as to what should be told the Baltic diplomats, and what had already been told them. After tossing this subject around for some time it was agreed that the Balts would be told simply that the Voice of America is going to accept full responsibility for broadcasts to their country, and very simply that RFE had agreed that this is the way it should be done.

POLISH AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Leich would shortly be back from Europe, and could be able to report first-hand to the meeting of developments at the Polish conferences in England. She advised that the Polish Socialists had adopted a broad resolution wherein the principal of cooperation with the Polish Political Council was accomplished, and wherein the door had been left open to work with Mikolajczyk.

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Laski had, contrary to the original plan, finally been sent to the Conference of the Polish Political Council.

BULGARIA:

Finally, it was agreed that if Mr. Rodenpol's reorganization plan of the Bulgarian National Council was ready, it would be presented at the next meeting.

TRADE UNIONS:

Miss Augustine reviewed in the following terms, the situation of the Socialist Parties and Trade Unions-in-Exile and the Christian Democratic parties of the Trade Unions-in Exile; and advised of the ambiguities in this situation. She indicated that in this present situation:

1. There are in existence:

   a) On the Socialist Side:

      (1) The political-party organization:
          the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe.

      (2) The professional-trade union organization:
          the International Center of Free Trade Unionists-in-Exile.

and that

   b) On the Christian Democratic Side there are:

      (1) The political party organization:
          the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe.

      (2) The professional-trade union organization:
          the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

She pointed out that

2. NCFE gives financial support and "recognition" to the Socialists on the professional and trade union level through the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile and has done so since September 1951. NCFE gives financial support and "recognition" to the Christian Democratic element on the political-party level through the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe which it has supported since January, 1951

Miss Augustine advised that

3. so far as she knows the Socialist Union of Central and Eastern Europe (founded in June, 1951) has never approached NCFE for support and for recognition. In October 1951 the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions was formed and soon after approached NCFE for support.

4. Prior to this approach, and just prior to his departure for Europe, Leon Dennen, who is NCFE's representative of labor and trade union affairs , and who is in Paris where he has responsibility for the International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, stated that it was his impression that the Polish Christian Trade Unions were the only Christian Trade Unions of any prewar significance in the countries now behind the Iron Curtain and that if further investigation justified this view, he thought modest support ought to be extended abroad to the Polish Christian Trade Unions. He admitted to little knowledge of Christian Trade Unions.

That the Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions is composed of exiles residing in the United States or Canada and not abroad, which throws another monkey wrench into the situation. At time of the approach to NCFE of the Christian Trade Union Federation their representative was told of Dennen's existence and his existence abroad, and of his need for statistics, information, and of Dennen's initial view that support should be abroad and not here. No statistics were forthcoming, but Sieniewicz (Secretary-General of the Christian Democratic) was active, apparently stirring up American Catholic circles by harping on the theme that NCFE allowed Socialists to monopolize trade union fields.

(Sieniewicz)

Miss Augustine advised that we do know he approached George Donahue of American Catholic Trade Unions (who else, if anyone we do not know), and that he apparently stirred Donahue up quite a bit, but Donahue contacted Ed. McHale, on the Crusade, who managed to save the situation. Sieniewicz apparently remembered the effect on NCFE of attacks from certain Catholic circles. NCFE was at one time in bad situation vis-a-vis hierarchy.

Miss Augustine summed up Mr. Dennen's views in his letter of December 28, 1951, as follows:

a) We should aid Polish Christian Trade Unions, but not Central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

1. Another Christian Democratic Exile Trade Union international is already recognized by International Federation of Christian Refugee Exiled Workers, not Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

2. Question of basic policy contends probably no Christian Trade Unions of any significance (except Polish) in Eastern European countries prior to Soviet occupation. Mr. Dennen raised the question of why help refugees establish organizations-in-exile which have no counterparts in their own countries.

3. Another Polish Exile Christian Trade Union group (Feliks Mikolajczyk) recognized by CFTC (French approval of JCCTU).

##

COPY

The delegation of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia, aware of the great importance for the Czechoslovak cause of a united political leadership of the Czechoslovak democratic exile, have discussed in a number of meetings a complex of political and organisational matters and have agreed unanimously on the following:

1) the statutory organs of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will suspend all their activities by January 15, 1952;

2) effective the same day, a provisional two-member management of the affairs of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile will be established;

3) simultaneously, a body will be set up with the duty to discuss and prepare, on the basis of the results of deliberations between the two delegations, the formulation of the political program and the organisation of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile. The said body will be composed of an equal number of representatives of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively;

4) the function of the delegations of the Council and the National Committee of Free Czechoslovakia respectively will cease with the establishment of the provisional management of the unified Czechoslovak democratic exile.

New York, N.Y., January [illegible], 1952

Signed by: Heidrich, Lettrich,
Klimek, Zenkl

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

S/P. Mr. Joyce

A-58

DATE: January 25, 1952

SUBJECT: Question of RFE Broadcasts to the Baltic Countries

PARTICIPANTS: Lithuanian Minister Povilas Zadeikis
Mr. Anatol Dinbergs, First Secretary of the Latvian Legation
Mr. Harold C. Vedeler - EE
Mr. Willard Allan - EE

COPIES TO:
P - Mr. Sargeant
Mr. Devine
OIB/NY - Mr. Kohler
S/P - Mr. Joyce ✓
EE - Mr. Barbour

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61130-1

In accordance with the conclusions reached at the meeting of Messrs. Kohler, Devine and Vedeler on January 18, an effort had been made earlier this week to call in the Lithuanian Minister and the Latvian Chargé d'Affaires at the same time. Since the illness of the latter prevented, it was finally necessary to have the First Secretary of the Latvian Legation to come rather than Mr. Feldmans.

It was explained that the visitors had been asked to come to the Department so that the matter of Baltic language broadcasts might be discussed in response to their recent notes (Lithuanian note No. 2433 dated December 31, 1951; Latvian note unnumbered dated January 3, 1952, and Estonian note No. 772 dated January 8, 1952) and oral representations on this subject. Mr. Vedeler said that the problem had been reconsidered from every standpoint by all officers with a direct interest in it and the various points raised by the Baltic diplomatic representatives had been carefully studied. As a result of this review the Department could see no other course but to reaffirm its previous position. The Department therefore had reached the definite conclusion that in the interests of the most efficacious overall effort so far as broadcasting to the Baltic countries with which Americans were connected was concerned, it should be confined to a single operation in VOA. The reasons for this conclusion were reviewed and the painstaking efforts of the

Department

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

JAN [illegible] 195

Department to proceed fairly and in the best interests of the common struggle against Communism in the Baltic countries were stressed. It was indicated that since the NCFE had asked the Department for its opinion on the advisability of proceeding with plans for RFE broadcasts, the Department had conveyed these views to NCFE. It was our understanding that NCFE had also come to this conclusion.

Minister Zadeikis expressed his regrets and those of the Baltic Panels that this was the decision reached. He was still concerned that the Baltic exile leaders would have no opportunity to speak to their homelands and that this denial in view of the availability of RFE facilities to exiles of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe represented a change in US policy toward the Baltic states. Mr. Vedeler strongly emphasized that our policy toward the Baltic countries remained unchanged and that no political significance whatsoever could justly be read into the Department's desire to see the Baltic language programs carried only by VOA in the endeavor to make the broadcasting activities for the Baltic countries as forceful and effective as possible. It was suggested (in accordance with the possibilities pointed out by Mr. Kohler in the meeting on January 18) that there would be opportunities for Baltic exile leaders to speak over VOA.

Minister Zadeikis asked what provision had been made or might be made for the employment of persons already engaged for RFE radio work and for the use of radio material already prepared by the Baltic Panels. In response to direct questions it was suggested that probably something could be done to take care of these matters through discussions between NCFE and VOA representatives in New York. The question of cooperation between VOA and exile leaders and between VOA and the Baltic Panels was discussed at some length. VOA's sincere desire to receive and make use of helpful comments and suggestions, to the extent that these might fit into the planned programs, was reiterated. It was agreed that these various questions could best be pursued further if the Baltic representatives took them up directly with the VOA in New York.

A letter has also been sent to Mr. Kiev, Acting Consul General in Charge of Legation at New York, informing him of our wish to discuss this matter on the next occasion when he comes to Washington.

EUR:EE:HCVedeler/ml
January 28, 1952

14-00000

4181

SECRET

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FROM: PY-CIO

NO.

DATE: 31 January 1952

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EE - Mr. Poor			13 Feb.	HP
2.				
3.				
4.				
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6.				
7.				
8. PY-CIO				TWB
9.				
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15.				

COMMENTS

Henry:

You will remember that, as Gates Lloyd points out in his transmittal slip that Lang agreed to the use of facilities.

I take it that somebody didn't do a very good job of explaining to the Executive Committee of NCFE precisely what was wanted, and you may wish to be certain that a little preparatory work is done by McClury or others before a formal request is made.

Will you send the enclosures back to me.

Tom

TWB

Tom -

Returned per our 'phone talk today. Unless I hear to the contrary, I will assume that our Russian Committee is free to proceed as agreed with the use of the Lampertheim site and other RFE facilities as individually negotiated, always short of use of similar premises. -

Henry

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

29 Jan 52
DATE

TO: T. W. Braden

BUILDING | ROOM NO

REMARKS: Re FP 2 - Amcompee - Bob Lang agreed with H. Poor in my presence that Amcompee could have R.F.E.'s 10KW station at Lampertheim, no longer useful to R.F.E. — or could use some other RFE transmitter provided the frequency was changed + RFE not identified with Amcom. Perhaps H. Poor should see this —

FROM: JH

BUILDING | ROOM NO. | EXTENSION

FORM NO 36-8
SEP 1946

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-5236

24 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : N.C.F.E.

1. I attach a letter I have just received from John Hughes, Chairman of the Executive Committee of N.C.F.E., with regard to certain decisions of the Executive Committee which he felt were of interest to their sponsors.

2. After you have read this, will you kindly pass it on to Gates Lloyd and Tom Braden?

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachment (1) Letter to Mr. Dulles
from John Hughes dtd 18 Jan 52
(2 pages)

January 18, 1952

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
P. O. Box 1513
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of N.C.F.E. held on January 3rd last, the members felt that two of the subjects discussed at that time should be called to your attention so that you might know the views of the Committee in the event these matters were brought before you at a later date.

The first concerns a suggestion which apparently came informally from McCluny and others in Amcomfree, that if means could be found to do so, they be allowed to use some of the R.F.E. facilities in Germany for certain of their broadcasts. Since this matter was not brought up as a formal request, no action was taken by the Committee, but the individual members unanimously expressed the opinion that this would be most inadvisable and that they would be opposed to the use of R.F.E. facilities for this purpose even if time and frequencies were available, which is not at all certain. Since Amcomfree is an organization in which you have direct interest it seems advisable to acquaint you with our feelings in the matter should you or your organization be approached by McCluny or others on this subject. Without going into details at this time as to the reasons for our feeling in the matter, our main concern is that Amcomfree's targets are entirely different from those in which we are interested, and from the standpoint of operation from German soil they are far less likely to be agreeable to BONN. We are fearful of putting in jeopardy a presently successful operation and four to five million dollars of equipment by the introduction of a project which we feel should be kept separate and apart.

The other matter which came up for formal action involved the advisability of undertaking Polish programing in Germany, and the Executive Committee unanimously agreed that R.F.E. should proceed with the plans presented. In brief, such plans call for the origination of from three to four hours daily of Polish programing from Munich beginning on or about May 1, 1952, and the introduction of some 50 to 60 Poles into the city of Munich for work with R.F.E. to carry out this schedule.

Since this is a major step in the development of R.F.E. programing and more particularly because of the forthcoming negotiations between representatives of N.C.F.E., HICOG, and BONN, it was felt that you should be formally advised of this decision. The Executive Committee also wanted to go on record to the effect that while they realized the risks involved, affirmative action was taken as a result of opinions given by Messrs. Byroade, Kellermann and Strauss of the German Desk, Department of State, and by Messrs. Stone, Lewis and Boerner of HICOG. In answer to the specific question "Would in your judgement the introduction of Polish broadcasting with all of its

Mr. Allen W. Dulles (continued)

political implications, in any way harm the current Munich operation of R.F.E. or the BONN contract negotiations in the eyes of the BONN government", we were assured by all that it would not.

For your further information, the operating officers of R.F.E. in charge of the project for this Polish programing, have been directed to proceed slowly in implementing the action of the Executive Committee and watch the situation most carefully until such time as Phenix and Kempner have had time to receive proper assurances that negotiations with BONN will progress satisfactorily.

Sincerely,

John C. Hughes

JCH:PM

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-5272

24 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, PI/OPC

FROM : Deputy Director Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CRUSADE budget

Please see attached letter from Abbott Washburn with his attached budget. I imagine that the Project Review Committee should go over the figures for the balance of the fiscal year and for 1952-1953 as soon as possible.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachment (1 w/1 attachment)

Budget included with Staff Study
3/21/52

January 23, 1952

Dear Allen:

At the Crusade Board Meeting last Friday, C.D. reported in detail on our meeting in Ed Barrett's office.

This was followed by a general discussion of the nature and scope of the 1952 Crusade program. Briefly, there was agreement that the program in 1952 should be considerably reduced in scope, that the emphasis should be taken off publicity and placed on fund-raising with the promotional period being reduced from two months to two or three weeks. It was felt that a direct mail campaign to our present list of givers -- plus a thorough solicitation of corporations -- would be desirable.

There was discussion also of a one-night house-to-house canvass, nation-wide, on Constitution Day next September. Mr. Poole suggested that, in addition to Radio Free Europe, the 1952 Crusade might place emphasis on the newly formed Free Europe University in Exile at Strasbourg, France. General Clay recommended that the Advertising Council's assistance in the new campaign be sought at the earliest moment.

I have reported the above to John Damewood -- also your instructions on the submission of a budget.

$450,000 was the estimated figure which we mentioned to you as adequate to cover the entire operation. After careful study and all possible paring, the total budget submitted herewith amounts to $488,991 . . . this to be spread over the eleven remaining months of 1952.

Of this total, $222,270 would fall in the present fiscal year (5 months at $44,454 per month).

The total budgeted figure is slightly more than a quarter of the cost of the 1951 campaign. With the ground work that has been laid during the past two drives, it should realize at least as much as the campaign just completed, although this, of course, is difficult to estimate.

We have had further talks with the VOA people, and the "Crusader" supplement devoted to the Voice will appear next week. They seemed very pleased about it.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

14-00000

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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Meeting to Discuss the Crusade for Freedom held in Mr. Barrett's office 17 Jan 52	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. Dept. of State
	4. DATE 21 Jan. 52
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM
	8. DATE OF INFO.
	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	10. DISSEMINATED IN
6. DATE PROCESSED	11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

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FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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2-3-72

January 21, 1952

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Dear C.D.:

Following up our meeting, we are going to name John Devine to represent us in discussing further plans for the Crusade of Freedom.

As I understand it, all parties feel that the Crusade should be continued, that the next campaign should be of a low-pressure and short duration type, and that joint efforts will be made to find other useful activities that the Crusaders can perform for the total U.S. propaganda effort.

It was good seeing you the other night, and both Mason and I enjoyed that long talk. Please remember me to Min Miller and tell him I wish him the best in his difficult but fascinating assignment.

All the best to you.

Cordially,

cc: Mr. Wisner
P - Mr. Devine
S/P - Mr. Joyce

Edward W. Barrett

P.S. As I understand it, it is tentatively proposed that the two individuals working with John Devine will be Jim Lambie and Tom Braden.

Mr. C.D. Jackson,
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,
350 Fifth Avenue - Room 301,
New York 1, New York.

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

P:EWBarrett:sbv

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4. EE/IS				ma	Baldridge
5. EE/PW				LB	albania Bulgaria Rumania
6. SE/PC	11 MAR 1952				Yugoslavia
7. Py/U					Braitweiser NH
8. Py/BOL					
9. Py/Bud				A.W.B.	
10. Py/IO					
11. U in Exile File (Orus)					suggest 20 (11 BV) retain this in files - NH
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FORM 51-9 FREE RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM AmConsulate, Strasbourg. 136 DESP. NO. November 15, 1951 DATE

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. AIR POUCH PRIORITY

692312

REF None.

25
For Dept.
Use Only

SUBJECT **Founding of "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" at Strasbourg by the National Committee for a Free Europe.**

R E C D NOV 19
ACTION EUR
INFO DCR OLI IE UNA USUN Codel-Paris

As the Department is aware, the National Committee for a Free Europe has founded at the Château de Pourtalès, Strasbourg Robertsau, "Le Collège de l'Europe Libre" (College of Free Europe) in which students of nine different nationalities, all of them from the Satellite countries, are lodged and fed. All of the students are taking courses in the University of Strasbourg and in future there will be additional courses at the "College de l'Europe Libre" conducted by professors-in-exile in the languages of the various countries represented. The purpose of the College is to train political leaders, doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc., for service in the Satellite countries when and if these countries are ever liberated from Soviet Russian domination. So far there are no students from Russia or East Germany in the College.

On November 12 Mr. Roudybush and I attended the opening ceremony of the College, which was informal but impressive; other persons attending included Mr. C. D. Jackson, President of the National Committee for a Free Europe, three officials of the Council of Europe, Professor Robert Redslob, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Strasbourg (representing the Rector of the University, who was ill), personnel from Radio Free Europe at Munich, and the student body. Speeches were made by Mr. Malcolm Davis, Dean of the College, Monsieur Redslob, and Mr. C. D. Jackson.

There follow tables showing the distribution of the students by nationalities and by ages, as of October 20, 1951, (8 men and 1 woman students have been enrolled since then, but their nationalities and ages are not known):

Nationality	Men	Women	Total
Czechoslovak	20	2	22
Polish	14	5	19
Rumanian	13	1	14
Yugoslav	11	2	13
Hungarian	7	0	7
Lithuanian	3	1	4
Bulgarian	4	0	4
Albanian	2	0	2
Latvian	2	0	2
Totals	76	11	87

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PREPARATION TIME

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DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
PRIORITY

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SUBJECT:

For Dept. Use Only
RECD
ACTION
INFO

2 Strasbourg 136

Age	Men	Women	Total
18	2	1	3
19	0	0	0
20	2	2	4
21	3	1	4
22	8	0	8
23	5	0	5
24	6	0	6
25	9	3	12
26	8	0	8
27	12	1	13
28	11	2	13
29	4	0	4
30	3	1	4
31	3	0	3
Totals	76	11	87
Average Age	25.5	24.3	

As of possible interest there are enclosed copies of the first two pages of the interim report of the Committee on Awards and Placements to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, The Free Europe University in Exile, New York, N. Y., which was furnished to me confidentially by Mr. Malcolm Davis.

George D. Andrews

George D. Andrews
American Consul

Enclosure: As Stated

Distribution:
AmEmbassy, Paris

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PREPARATION DATE

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ACTION

INFO

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 1

COPY

Paris, October 29, 1951

To the Chairman of the Board of Trustees,
The Free Europe University in Exile,
New York, N. Y.

Interim Report of the Committee on Awards and Placements

The Committee, having sent out 3530 application forms to individuals and organizations, first examined applications duly completed by candidates for Strasbourg and set aside those, out of 626 received, that had been filed by persons who turned out to be ineligible, e.g. as being over 32 years of age (with a few exceptions), or already having university degrees and needing to finish elsewhere, or wishing to study a subject not taught at Strasbourg, or not possessing qualifications required by the university, or not knowing enough French to profit by the Strasbourg university courses, or not having refugee status. Candidatures which appeared eligible were then shared out between the members of the Committee for personal interview, mostly in Paris, visits however being made for this purpose to England, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Switzerland.

With applications and notes on interviews before it, the Committee then held numerous meetings, at which the cases of all eligible candidates were examined and discussed. Mr. Royall Tyler, as President of the Association for the College of Free Europe, also attended most of the meetings held by the Committee and assisted it by his advice. The records showed that a high percentage of the candidates, and especially some of the more promising cases, did not wish primarily to go to Strasbourg but hoped instead to obtain scholarships enabling them to remain in Paris (in most cases), or at some other university. Certain problems arising in this connection will be dealt with below, together with recommendations.

Selections for Strasbourg

To date, 87 candidates wishing to go to Strasbourg have been accepted: 76 men and 11 women. (Note: 8 additional men and 1 woman have been enrolled,

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INFO

Enclosure to
despatch 136 from
American Consul,
Strasbourg,
11/15/51 - p. 2

making a total, as of Nov. 12, 1951, of 84 men and 12 women). Notification of non-acceptance is being sent to 349 candidates. The Committee has had in mind the advance estimate that five women were to be accepted for Strasbourg, and that five theological students might be accepted for the College des Clercs. However, only one theological student has qualified for a scholarship; and suitable arrangements can be made to lodge as many as 10 or 11 women, possibly even 13, (Note: total accepted 12, as of Nov. 12), either in the Student Home for Girls or in a pension (for the older girls). In view of the quality of these women candidates, the Committee feels justified in selecting a number larger than that originally contemplated, and after consultation with Mr. DeWitt Peale and Mr. Royall Tyler does so unanimously.

The grand total of male students already accepted for Strasbourg, and accordingly notified, is thus 76 to date, as against 100 originally contemplated. The Committee has thought it preferable to maintain a high quality, rather than to make filling a quota the first consideration, especially as applications are still coming in and some promising applicants remain to be seen. Since the French university year begins only in the first week of November, a good many students were away when the application forms were sent out and their addresses unknown to anyone who could be reached. Arrangement can be made to enter late-comers for the Strasbourg university courses, and so it seems wise to allow for the probability that some high-quality candidates will still appear, none of whom could be accepted if the quota had been filled up in a hurry regardless of the advisability of maintaining a standard. Applicants can be received and registered in the university as late as Nov. 21.

It is of interest to note that all candidates so far submitted to deans of faculties at Strasbourg have been considered acceptable.

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REPORTER(S)

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PREPARATION DATE

INFORMATION COPY

17 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Plans for Enlargement of the Free University in Exile

REFERENCE: Letter from Royal Tyler to DDCI of 15 December 1951

1. At a meeting at the DDCI's house, Washington, D. C., on Sunday morning, 13 January 1952, Mr. Royal Tyler discussed with Messrs. A. W. Dulles, R. Gates Lloyd and Thomas W. Braden, the present plans of the Trustees of the FUIE as presented at their meeting in New York last week.

2. Regarding the administration of the University, Mr. Tyler reported that Mr. Dewitt C. Poole's resignation effective 31 March 1952 had been formally accepted by the Trustees and Dr. Levering Tyson had been elected Vice President with full executive powers as of the present. Dr. Malcolm Davis has not, according to Dr. Tyson, proved an effective administrator and has been relieved of all non-academic duties as well as membership on the Awards Committee.

3. Regarding the future expansion of the University which Mr. Tyler had reviewed at some length in the referenced letter, the Trustees gave conditional approval to doubling the number of students during the academic year of 1952-53. There are now 83 male students living at the chateau and 13 women boarding outside. In addition, 31 students have been awarded scholarships at other universities. Dr. Tyson estimates that approximately 1/3 of the 96 students at Robertsau will leave at the end of this academic year for various reasons, and the Trustees expect to recruit about 35 students to restore the number in residence to approximately 100. In addition, if money is obtained for the necessary temporary housing, they propose to recruit an additional 100, making 200 in residence at Robertsau. They also suggest increasing the scholarship appointments at other institutions to a total of 50.

4. Any such program would involve a capital outlay of $250,000 on a 100-bed dormitory and necessary study hall or auditorium. Mr. Tyler understood that the present kitchen and other facilities will serve a total of 200 residents.

5. Mr. Tyler

5. Mr. Tyler expressed concern, in which those present concurred, that the University was making plans for expansion without having definite information regarding the number of acceptable students who would be available in future years. Of the several hundred applicants who were rejected last year, there were few, if any, who would have been admitted under any circumstances. It was agreed that a survey should immediately be made to determine with as much accuracy as possible how many students can be expected to be available for the University in the next few years. It was recommended that Dr. Tyson get in touch with Mr. Lawrence Dawson of the Department of State regarding the number and academic caliber of escapees currently coming through the Iron Curtain.

6. It was understood that Dr. Tyson would forward to Washington in the near future detailed estimates covering:

a. Capital outlay required for the proposed expansion.

b. The operating budget of 1952-53 on the basis of 200 students.

(In this connection, it should be noted that Mr. C. P. Jackson has just returned from a trip to visit the officials of the Ford Foundation which he made for the purpose of proposing that the Foundation take over the FUIE. The Foundation is giving this serious consideration but Mr. Jackson was reported unwilling to estimate how successful his trip had been.)

7. Mr. Tyler urged that a decision be reached with regard to capital improvement at Robertsau by the first of February. If delayed beyond that date, the University will be at the mercy of French contractors working on an emergency schedule to meet the opening date for the expanded University next Fall.

8. However, before any conclusions can be arrived at, it would appear most essential to carry out the survey of available candidates referred to in paragraph 5. above. Furthermore, Dr. Tyson is arranging to bring his detailed plans to Washington on 22 January, after which it will be possible to make a more detailed report as to the costs involved. At this meeting, the point raised by DD/P regarding the increased dangers of penetration by Communists will be discussed.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:ml

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Meeting at Mr. Barrett's Home on Tues. Eve. Nov. 20, 1951 to discuss USIE & OPC Relationships	2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THIS REFERS TO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
FILED IN THE TOP SECRET CONTROL
SECTION BY TS# 67871

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

SECRET

[illegible] ORMATION

17 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Devine
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting at Mr. Barrett's Home on November 20, 1951 to discuss USIE and OPC Relationships

1. Your memorandum of conversation of November 20, 1951, was mentioned to me by Mr. Dulles this morning with particular reference to paragraph 2 of the conclusions.

2. Mr. Dulles does not believe that the meeting was quite so definite on this point as you indicate, and I suggest, therefore, an amendment as follows:

> "2. That possibilities for toning down the Crusade for Freedom to a somewhat less high-pressure and spectacular campaign be carefully explored by all concerned."

THOMAS W. BRADEN

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - ED/DD/P (Mr. Hulick)
1 cc - PY/IS
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

#6

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

January 16, 1952

SUBJECT: Report on Slavik-Majer Conference as outlined by Miss Mary Augustine at January 9, 1952 meeting with State.

From: R.J. Moore

Miss Augustine advised that the Slavik-Majer Conference had been placed on the Agenda, as a result of Mr. Vedeler's comment (made at a meeting during December, 1951) to the effect that it would be desirable to give encouragement and moral support to the Slavik-Majer group.

Miss Augustine explained that Nagy had received some encouragement from NCFE when (during January 1952) he initially broached his plan for the establishing of an over-all international grouping of exiles from Central and Eastern Europe. However, when it became clear to NCFE that Nagy's group was to be formed on exclusively political party lines, and would be dominated by Agrarian (Peasant) Party leaders and thus, in effect, a duplication of the International Peasant Union and other such organizations already in existence who are already receiving NCFE support, that it could not, therefore, be broadly representative. NCFE, therefore, indicated to Nagy that it could not provide financial support for an organization set upon such a basis. Nagy's reaction to NCFE's policy was consequently strong and critical.

At about this same time the Slavik-Majer group (now known as the Central and Eastern European Conference) began to emerge and to become active. It was composed officially of the so-called "bureaucrats", "diplomats", and "nonpartisan personalities" which were so despised by Nagy and his colleagues from the Agrarian parties and other political party leaders who took their cue from the Peasant Party politicians. This new group began actually to meet and to perform genuine work.

SECRET

JAN [illegible]

Apparently, as the result of the emergence of the Slavik-Major Conference, as an embryo but functioning body, the Nagy group sprang into action, and leaving the planning and organizational stage behind, launched itself finally into a big press conference and much fanfare. This Nagy group, just to confuse an already confusing situation further, is known as the Central-Eastern European Committee, Miss Augustine advised.

NCFE was disquieted by this almost simultaneous emergence of two potentially competing organizations and made it clear to both groups that financial support was out of the question until a merger or some clear and acceptable agreement between the two groups, which would bar their competing with each other, should be effected. The Slavik-Major Conference, Miss Augustine indicated, agreed to seek no large amount of publicity for a time in order that the unfortunate and undesirable aspect of competition might be played down as much as possible in the hope that a merger or acceptable agreement might be forthcoming.

After its initial plunge into the publicity spotlight, the Nagy Committee seemed to become completely quiescent, while the Slavik-Major Conference became increasingly active, performing some genuinely useful work.

Miss Augustine informed the meeting that NCFE had paid for the booklet on deportations, entitled "Human Freedom is Being Enslaved", and that Frank Wright, NCFE Press Officer, having spoken in Paris with Chester Williams of the U.S. Mission to the U.N., who urged that this booklet and its exposition of the subject of deportations be given as much publicity as possible in the minority press of the U.S., especially the N press, the labor press, and the press of other nationality groups thru Central-Eastern European, so that this would be given the aspect of a broadly-begun protest, not merely the protest of a few Central and Eastern European exiles. In this way members of our U.S. Mission would be enabled to cite before the U.N. Assembly the protest which deportations have elicited from the U.S. minority press, quoting articles, etc., which have more of a propaganda impact than the booklet itself.

Originally, Miss Augustine pointed out, the Slavik-Major Conference had approached NCFE with a proposal that NCFE arrange and finance a luncheon or a dinner to which various representatives of influential American organizations, labor, church, educational, etc., would be invited, and at which the exiles would have an opportunity to present the facts and their views regarding deportations. NCFE had at first agreed to this, in principle, Miss Augustine advised, but in view of the probable recriminations from the Nagy group (which would, in fact, have some basis of justification) and also in view of the propaganda approach suggested by Williams, the Committee had dropped this idea and was working instead along the lines suggested by the U.S. Mission.

Miss Augustine added that in the absence of a merger, or an agreement, regarding division of fields of competition (the Nagy Committee, concentrating on long-range planning and post-liberation problems; the Slavik-Major Conference focusing its efforts upon the immediate problems confronting exiles in the pre-liberation period) NCFE had steered clear of providing financial support on any continuing basis.

Mr. Barbour inquired as to the prospects for merger, and whether it had been made clear to all exile groups involved that the withholding of NCFE support was predicated upon the lack of any unified and broadly representative grouping.

Miss Augustine advised of two recent conversations she had had with Sidzikauskas, and said that when pressed by him for the reason why the luncheon plan had been dropped, she had at first tried to put this on a practical basis and on Mr. Wright's Paris conversations and the consequent change of tactics. However, when pressed further, and told by Sidzikauskas of the rumors of drastic changes of NCFE policy, etc., which would attend the abandonment of this plan, Miss Augustine advised that gentleman unofficially that, along with the practical reasons, we had been motivated by a desire to avoid the inevitable recriminations from Nagy, and that the lack of a merger or satisfactory agreement between the two groupings would continue to prevent our material support of their activities on any consistent or permanent basis. Miss Augustine added that very recently Sidzikauskas had informed her briefly of a meeting of the Nagy Committee held within the last few days. This meeting was attended by, among others, Visoianu, Sidzikauskas and Osusky, who have sat on the fence between these two groups and have attended the meetings of both groups. Sidzikauskas believes that agreement to divide fields of competition, rather than a merger, is shaping up.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to W-1771
S
11 January 1952

Mr. C. D. Jackson
National Comm'ttee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear C. D.:

As promised at our last meeting, here is the text for a new paragraph 3 of the Minutes of the Meeting Held in Washington on 14 December 1951. This was dictated by Oliver E. Hadwood.

"3. Jackson advised that he had a tentative date to call on the Ford Foundation people in Pasadena on January 8th. Braden advised that it would be appropriate at that time to make a strong pitch on the Iron Curtain refugee problem with the idea that the government was tackling this problem but needed substantial help from private agencies, and that if Ford would give a sizable sum to NCFE, which it in turn could farm out to IRC, it would help to get the ball rolling on a major psychological warfare problem. Braden stressed that private initiative was extremely important that if a private agency acted now, it would speed up the governmental machinery. He also said that the maximum estimated governmental contribution toward this problem was not expected to be more than half the cost.

"Braden also advised that IRC had agreed with David Martin for Martin to step down from his post as Executive Director and that the Committee was considering the appointment of a well-known university president to assume the job. He said that Martin had agreed to step out of the picture altogether if the Committee wished him to do so but that in any case his role from now on would be minor.

"It was also agreed that this discussion of refugees and IRC could include the plan worked up by Berle and Dolbeare to turn over to IRC NCFE "non-productive exiles at a cost to NCFE of approximately $1,000 a head."

Sincerely yours,

John L. Danewood

SECRET

DCPY/HCL:ml
Distribution:
Addressee - Original; DCPY - 1; PY/EXA - 1; PY/GTO -

SECRET

3.

TONIC

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

January 10, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. F. R. Dolbeare
Mr. J. F. Leich

From: R.J. Moore

SUBJECT: Report of meeting at State Department, Wednesday, January 9, 1952.

PRESENT: Miss Mary Augustine, Mr. Gates Lloyd Mr. Walworth Barbour, Mr. Harold C. Vedeler, Mr. John Campbell, Mr. Thomas Hecknagel, Mr. Robert J. Moore.

NOTE: Miss Mary Augustine represented the New York office at the meeting in the absence of Mr. John F. Leich, who is in Europe attending the European Movement Conference.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

It was recalled that at the meeting on December 26, 1951, discussion of the Czechoslovak problem had ended on a note of optimism. Miss Augustine advised that this optimism had been obliterated due to certain unfortunate circumstances which had developed in negotiations between the Czechoslovak Council majority of 17 and the Zenkl minority of 13. Miss Augustine indicated that one of the principal stumbling blocks in the Czech situation is the question of the co-equal chairmanship in the new setup of two persons, one appointed from each group. She further advised that a body of 20 persons divided equally between the two opposing groups would act as an ad hoc committee to establish a new Czechoslovak National Council, and that, whereas the 13 wished to appoint Mr. Zenkl as one of the two chairmen, they had at the same time expressed their opinion that Mr. Osusky would not be acceptable to them as the other co-chairman, or indeed, that he should not exercise any major function. Such an ultimatum appeared unacceptable to the 17 who contended that negotiations could not be carried on under these circumstances.

Upon receipt of this news, Miss Augustine pointed out, Mr. Dolbeare of NCFE advised the Czechoslovak delegation that he would place the whole problem before the Board of Directors of NCFE. This was done, and a

JAN 15 1952

SECRET

subcommittee was appointed to examine the situation; this committee is composed of Mr. F. R. Dolbeare, Dr. Levering Tyson and Mr. Frank Altschul. The subcommittee was informed by the Board of Directors that, should the Czechoslovaks fail to overcome their differences by the end of January, all payments to the Czechoslovak National Council would cease as of that time. The Board had agreed, however, that a credit of $25,000, appropriated to the Council, would remain with it and could be used for support during the course of the following month. It was considered that these funds would act as a hedge against other outside funds to which Dr. Zenkl appears to have access.

The subcommittee met on January 8 with Messrs. Lettrich, Heidrich and Osusky, at which time the principle of the co-equal chairmanship appears to have been dropped in favor of a system of referees, including Messrs. Papanek and Heidrich - one from each group. Miss Augustine advised that the subcommittee was to meet on January 10 with Dr. Zenkl and company, and on Friday with the delegation from both groups. Miss Augustine advised that of the three members of the subcommittee only Mr. Altschul appeared to carry any optimism as to the outcome of the negotiations. Miss Augustine informed the meeting of Mr. Dolbeare's opinion that, should negotiations fail:

a) all financial ties would cease with organised Czechoslovak exile groups,

b) NCFE would be obliged to select individuals as advisers in various functional capacities.

Miss Augustine made reference to a 72-page Czechoslovak memorandum which had recently been presented on the whole situation of Czechoslovakia, past and present. She advised that Messrs. Osusky and Papanek had not signed the document and that NCFE's analysis of the memorandum had been unfavorable.

Mr. Vedeler interjected that should current negotiations fail some consideration should be given to allotting financial aid to both the

Czechoslovak groups in the controversy.

Mr. Barbour interposed that should the negotiations indeed fail, and we be faced with a Czechoslovak situation in which there would be no Czechoslovak Council, the whole situation of the National Councils and NCFE might well need to be reviewed. He pointed out that the NCFE was based very much on the National Council idea, and that it is constituted to work on this basis. Therefore, should this concept fail, it might be expedient to have a system of some kind of national panel whose members would be appointed by NCFE to work on the problems of their respective nationalities (presumably within the dictates and needs of American foreign policy). Mr. Barbour advised that such persons would have to be chosen on the basis of their ability to work together, thus avoiding the issues of political strife and partisan interests.

Mr. Moore suggested that the meeting might wish to consider the procedure which should immediately follow in the wake of the possible breakdown of Czechoslovak negotiations.

Mr. Lloyd proposed that the matter be referred to Washington for consideration by his office and the State Department before the Czechoslovaks were formally advised of the drastic action contemplated by NCFE's Board of Directors and the subcommittee. There was general agreement that this should be the case.

BALTIC BROADCASTS:

Miss Augustine reviewed the situation of the Baltic panels in New York as regards broadcasts by Radio Free Europe. She advised that the Baltic countries would be represented at the European Movement Conference by heads of the New York Baltic panels, and specifically - Messrs. Massens, Sidsikauskas and Wahter - and that thus funds had been found to carry out the original plan of sending a representative from each Baltic country to the Movement Conference.

Mr. Vedeler indicated that he considered this move to be fortunate and appropriate, in view of the upheaval which has occurred in the matter of the Baltic broadcasts. He indicated his belief that if NCFE is to continue, it is necessary that some form of Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Baltic countries be considered. He advised that the Baltic countries considered there had been discrimination against them, and they feel that it is only through RFE broadcasts that they can really speak to their own people; he advised that he considered the general situation most regrettable.

Miss Augustine indicated that in New York there was considerable hope that once the Baltic broadcast question was straightened out, such situations be avoided in the future, as it has been most embarrassing to all concerned, and has placed the good faith of NCFE towards the Balts in jeopardy.

Mr. Barbour advised that we must consider the Baltic broadcasts to be currently ruled out. However, he advised further that the matter will be taken up on the basis of the formal protests lodged with the State Department by the Baltic diplomatic Missions in this country. He inferred that the whole situation had become confused due to the unfortunate light in which the Voice of America broadcasts had been thrown, as a result of Radio Free Europe's activities. He made reference to the Crusade for Freedom on behalf of Radio Free Europe, and indicated that the Crusade in this instance had done a great deal to stir up the public's mind in favor of RFE, to the discredit of the Voice of America. Finally, he advised, however, that the merits of the case for broadcasts to Baltic countries by RFE would be reconsidered.

RUMANIA:

Miss Augustine advised that there was not a great deal to report on the Rumanian situation, but that Mr. Gafencu had received advice that Mr. Visoianu would meet with him prior to the latter's departure to attend the

European Movement Conference. It was hoped that the meeting would actually take place, but that assurances could not be forthcoming. However, it seemed reasonable that Mr. Visoianu might make the move before going to London where he would have further consultations with the King. Messrs. Visoianu and Gafencu were reported to have come to some basic agreements for the purpose of reaching an understanding between the two factions. Advice was given that General Radescu would be brought into the consultations eventually.

Mr. Moore advised of the opinion held by the National Council division of NCFE that the Rumanians should avoid bringing the King into the negotiations, and rather that an agreement in the form of a fait accompli should be presented to the King for his approval.

Mr. Campbell interjected that he had an appointment at that time with Mr. Visoianu, and that in the light of this information, he would advise that gentleman not to try to pull "any contemplated schemes which might disrupt the efforts so far taken". Mr. Barbour requested that Mr. Visoianu be informed, in strong terms, to avoid further intrigue or unnecessary protracted discussions. In other words "read him the riot act".

HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised the meeting that it had been necessary to make some drastic changes among the Hungarian personnel working for Radio Free Europe in New York, as their output was considered to be inadequate. She advised that efforts were being made to reestablish the Hungarian desk on a more effective basis.

BULGARIAN AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised that Mr. Dimitrov is departing for Europe to join the European Movement Conference, and that he was being obliged to come to NCFE headquarters to pick up his check for the purpose of the trip.

Mr. Barbour advised that he had met with Mr. Dimitrov and had given the Bulgarian ~~the~~ impression that State did not consider his conduct of affairs to be in the state of perfection which the gentleman himself so claims. Mr. Barbour further advised that he recognized the feeling against Dimitrov among others working on Bulgarian affairs, and that he understands the basis for this criticism. However, he advised that he does consider Dimitrov to be the representative of an important peasant element in Bulgaria, and that he did not consider this fact should be ignored.

Miss Augustine advised that there appeared to be some difficulty with Mr. Shipov's papers, a fact which is retarding his arrival in this country. She further advised of the need for a quorum on the Bulgarian National Council, in order to deal with the political situation which has developed there.

The meeting received a visit from Mr. Heckragel who advised that he was working on a new plan for the reform of the Bulgarian National Committee. He advised that he expected to have the report ready at the time of the next meeting and requested that the members of the meeting consider the Bulgarian question in the meantime, and should they have any specific ideas which they should wish to present, they should contact him in the interval. He advised that he was attempting to draw up a plan whereby membership in the Bulgarian Committee would be established on an elective basis, and suggested that this might be a good time to teach them some of the concepts of democratic procedure.

Mr. Barbour advised of his interest in the Bulgarian political leader known as Mushanov, and suggested that some consideration be given to bringing this man into Bulgarian exile affairs.

SLAVIC-MAJOR CONFERENCE:

Mr. Vedeler advised that NCFE should consider the Slavic-Major Conference organization within the light of its own activities and purposes.

(Miss Augustine outlined the history of the Slavik-Major Conference and the conditions which are currently existing therein. A copy of Miss Augustine's report will shortly follow this report of the meeting with State).

In reply to Miss Augustine's statement that she understood Mr. Vedeler to believe NCFE should give support to the Slavik-Major Conference, Mr. Vedeler advised that he considered this support should take the form of assistance to special projects, but that he did not advocate that assistance should be given to the Conference on an all-out basis.

Mr. Barbour advised of his approval of this procedure, and requested that precautions be taken in order that Macy not be aroused.

POLISH AFFAIRS:

Miss Augustine advised there was little to report on Polish affairs, other than to advise of a cable which had been received in New York to the effect that General Anders had solicited the aid of Count Raczynski to assist in the formation of the Polish Council of National Unity.

Mr. Vedeler advised that he had spoken to Mr. Joyce regarding a conversation which the latter was presumed to have had with the British in London on cooperation with the U.S. in exile affairs.

Mr. Barbour indicated that he also had a report of Mr. Joyce's discussions with the Foreign Office, and that the former had found little British desire to become involved in the matters of exiled groups. He suggested that the British considered this to be an extremely complicated and undesirable situation which they had wished to avoid.

Mr. Barbour advised that in view of our own record of involvement and disappointments in this policy, we were hardly in a position to advise the British that they should follow our example. However, he indicated that within the next few months the Department will return to further discussions of this matter with the British, and indicated that he had hopes of achieving a greater degree of cooperation and coordination of policies.

(The next meeting will take place on January 23rd.)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe Operations

REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 15 November 1951 from
T. H. E. Nesbitt to Robert Hooker

1. Regarding the project mentioned in the referenced memorandum to transfer approximately 100 Polish exiles to Portugal for the purpose of conducting Polish programs from that country, Mr. Robert E. Lang, Director of Radio Free Europe, has advised us that on 3 January 1952, the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. decided that at least for the present, it would be advisable to do all Polish programming in Munich. He stated that on Mr. C. D. Jackson's last trip to Portugal, the authorities there advised him that any Polish exiles brought in under the above-mentioned circumstances would have to live under conditions approximating "house arrest," since the Portugese government would not tolerate their circulating freely within the country.

2. Later Mr. Spencer Phenix stated that he and Mr. Gregory Thomas believed that some few Poles could be brought in without such drastic action by the Portugese authorities. He also expressed concern that the short wave communications between Munich and Lisbon were not 100% satisfactory for transmitting the Polish programs, which are then relayed out of Lisbon to Poland. He felt that programming in Portugal would be the best way to handle the problem but admitted that approximately 100 people would be needed, and, under the circumstances, he agreed that it was better to keep the entire program staff all in one place.

3. We are asking

3. We are asking Mr. Lang to keep us posted on any future plans that may develop to send any of these people to Portugal so that we may advise the Department of State in advance of any such project.

H. Gates Lloyd

DCPY/HGL:ml

Distribution:
Addressee - Original and 1
DCPY - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

cc NCFE File

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1766
S
January 9, 1952

Mr. Frederic R. Dolbeare
350 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Fred:

I am enclosing, for your confidential information, a translation of a letter received by the Austrian Minister in Washington, which has been brought to the attention of our friends. In discussing this matter the Austrian Embassy pointed out that Austria was an occupied country in which were stationed, among others, Soviet troops and expressed the hope that NCFE would refrain from taking any action which might put Austria in an embarrassing position.

I am confident that we can count upon your cooperation in preventing the development of any situation which would embarrass the Austrian Government.

Sincerely,

Travis A. Albery

Attachment 1
As stated above

cc: Miss Viccellio

SECRET

5 January 1952 W-1761

Dear Abbott:

Thank you for reminding me that Ed McHale may soon be available. As you say, I know him, though slightly, but I have always heard excellent things about him.

I have made an attempt to find out who expressed interest in him to Tom Myers but cannot do so. Perhaps, therefore, you would pass this note on to Tom and ask him to let me know sometime soon who expressed the interest. That would help me ascertain whether we will want to try to bring him down here.

My very best wishes to you for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Mr. Abbott Washburn
National Committee for a Free Europe
808 - 7th Avenue
New York, New York

PY-CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - PY/Exec Asst.
1 cc - PY
1 cc - CIO✓
2 cc - RI

Allen 5 Jan 52

Cord hesitates to express any interest in this man ("an operator"; "a friend of Gil Harrison's"; a person whom Cord knew on AmVets Com) until overall situation is settled. His interest, in any case, is only mild. No one else, so far as I can determine, is interested.

Routine would be to refer to personnel through Mr. Millard, and on basis of his report as to personnel's interest, let Mr. Washburn know whether or not we are trying. (There is clearly no effort being made now and the procedure I see us bound by could involve considerable time and unpredictable results.)

But here is a draft. Nancy

472-4

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: PP/Exa

NO.

DATE 28 Dec. '51

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. Millard			12/28	REM	
2. Braden			1/2	TWB	For action or advice as to your present slant on matters of this kind NBV
3. Braden					
4.					
5.					
6.					Cord Meyer might like to have him in mind. I'd like to write Abbot & say we're trying.
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

December 19, 1951

Dear Tom:

As mentioned to you last Friday, our mutual friend Ed McHale has done a good job here on the New York City Crusade campaign in spite of numerous handicaps and obstacles.

The present clean-up operations will be completed next month, and in view of the somewhat uncertain future of the Crusade I have had a little talk with Ed so that he can be thinking about moving to another assignment.

At the time Ed joined us, Tom Myers indicated that your shop had expressed considerable interest in him. Would you be good enough, Tom, to see whether such interest still exists or whether there are any other slots that might be filled by someone of his ability and forcefulness.

Many thanks,

Yours,

Abbott

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				
2.				PLEASE INITIAL AFTER REVIEWING DO NOT REMOVE ANY PAPERS OR MUTILATE FOLDER.
3. 2D24 D Boulier CA/IIO	12 Mar 73		JWB	
4. S. Corbat OG/EFR				78-1129 432343 ~~[illegible] 718~~ ~~[illegible] 1589~~
5.				
6.				
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8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				FILE NO. [illegible] CIA AD 37
12.				DOCUMENT:
13.				FOLDER: ~~[illegible]~~ 10
14. RETURN TO CA-56				PAGE:
15. IP/ARD ~~Rm GL-58~~				BOX: ~~3~~ 2

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Folder #

NCFE

March 1952-June 1952

30 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Preparation and Distribution of a Newsletter in the Serbian Language by Mr. Lazar Radivojevich.

1. This office is interested in a project of facilitating Mr. Lazar Radivojevich, a beneficiary of the NCFE, to prepare (mimeograph) and distribute a small newsletter in the Serbian language, among the former Serbian Officer prisoners of war, who were detained in the camp at St. Johann i Pongau, in Austria, of which camp Mr. Radivojevich was the chief, elected by the members of the camp. About 300-400 members of this camp are now in the United States, having emigrated under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act.

2. Aside from bolstering the morale of these people and assisting them to adjust themselves to their new surroundings, the newsletter is calculated to make it possible for Mr. Radivojevich to maintain contact with them so that this office may be in a position to know their addresses and be informed of their whereabouts at all times. For your information, this office believes that, under certain circumstances in the future, this group or members of it might be useful, and desires to see it maintain its ties through Mr. Radivojevich.

3. The newsletter would have no political character whatsoever. It would contain social and personal news of interest to the group; new arrivals of former colleagues; news of the whereabouts and doings of members of the group; questions and answers for the emigration; something about the history and customs of the United States, and such other items as might help them orient and adjust themselves in their new surroundings.

4. The Deputy for SE/PC has presented this project to Mr. Campbell of the State Department and secured his approval.

5. We believe this project should be implemented under the sponsorship of the NCFE and, to this end, we request you to be good enough to take the matter up with them. This office will be glad to

cooperate with the NCFE with a view to establishing means for control of the contents of the newsletter.

6. To set up this project Mr. Radivojevich would need a typewriter with Cyrillic letters, a hand press and a masthead for the paper, which would represent a total investment of approximately $198. He figures that he could then print his newsletter twice a month, about 400 copies of each edition, for a monthly amount of $180.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO/TOMIC

SUBJECT: Stanislaus Oskiorka

1. Walter Pforzheimer called me to say that a Congressman with whom he is in touch had asked whether we were taking on a Mr. Stanislaus Oskierka. He was informed by the Congressman that Tom Myers told him that there was no job for him in NCFE but that he might be able to get a job in CIA in Washington.

2. This is the kind of thing Myers shouldn't do, and I think he should be called on it.

3. I find, incidentally, that Oskierka has not requested employment through Myers to John Shields and I will tell Mr. Pforzheimer that he should check with CIA Personnel.

TWB
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Mr. Pforzheimer
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

26 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THROUGH: ADPC & CP/P

SUBJECT: Robert J. Moore

1. On 2 June 1952 you told me of your interview with Robert J. Moore and of his grievances on his dismissal from NCFE. Mr. Moore was dismissed from NCFE on security grounds and his dismis al was initiated by this Agency.

2. Subsequently Moore interviewed Bill Durkee in New York for a job in the American Committee on United Europe but there was none available. During the course of this interview, Moore, though not knowing Durkee was an employee of CIA, divulged security information about NCFE-CIA relationships, and our security people have been notified of this fact.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/hka

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/T-NIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

25 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Complaint of Yugoslav Counselor

1. Wally Barbour told me today that the Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy had called upon him to complain about the presence of Yugoslav delegates at the NCFE Williamsburg Conference and the signing of the Williamsburg statement by Yugoslav delegates.

2. Mr. Barbour said that the Counselor prefaced his remarks with a statement that he knew Mr. Barbour would reply that he had no influence over NCFE and no connection with it. Mr. Barbour said that that was what he had said and that his statement was received by the Counselor with a polite shrug.

3. Barbour did not seem unduly worried, but I told him that we would shortly ask him for a review of State policy in respect to the national councils and exiles with whom NCFE is dealing and he said he would welcome the opportunity to make such a review.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru ADPC & DD/P)
1 cc - EE - (returned to C/IO 9 July & destroyed. Initialed by Broso (Macomber & Hurley have seen RHM -
1 cc - TDMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

24 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division

SUBJECT: Current NCFE Discussions with Rumanian National Peasant Party Members

REFERENCE: Memorandum to Chief, IO Division, Subject: SE Division Plan for Rumanian Emigre Organization, dated 28 May 1952

1. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Prichett on 23 June, Mr. Dolbeare informed us that the NCFE discussions with members of the Rumanian National Peasant Party had been held with the emigres by pairs rather than in a group as planned. On Wednesday, June 18, Altschule held meetings as follows:

Rautu and Bunescu
Botosani and Radovan
Ghilezan and Venetu (did not attend)

2. A meeting is scheduled for this week with Popa and Bianu. Meetings between Ghilezan and Rautu and between Botosani and Venetu have been arranged.

3. According to Mr. Dolbeare, the National Peasants have been asked by NCFE to formulate a plan for a new committee. Mr. Dolbeare did not indicate whether NCFE suggested the form outlined in the SE Division Plan.

4. The arrangements for the discussions with the National Peasants differ, as follows, from those agreed on by CIA and Mr. Leich in the discussion of the implementation of the SE Plan:

a. A general meeting of the National Peasants, listed in paragraph 3 b of the Plan, was suggested in the Plan. The general meeting was requested for the specific purpose of bringing National Peasants of both groups together and emphasizing party unity.

b. It appears that neither Crihan nor Manuila has been included in the discussions.

c. The addition of Rautu to the discussions is not opposed, however the addition of Venetu is.

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

5. It is requested that NCFE be informed that the discussions were not carried out in accordance with the original plan nor with the agreement between CIA and NCFE. It is further requested that the following action be taken by NCFE to rectify actions taken so far:

a. That CIA be informed prior to, not after the event, when substitutions, changes, or additions are made to the accepted plans.

b. That NCFE inform us promptly of action taken in connection with this current plan.

c. That NCFE arrange, as soon as possible, to meet with Popa, Bianu and Crihan.

d. That NCFE forestall formal meetings, outlined in paragraph 2 above, between the members of the New York group.

e. That NCFE send letters to the following National Peasants, Popa, Bianu, Crihan, Ghilezan, S. Manuila, Rautu, Buzescu, Potocani and Radovan indicating that a general meeting of the National Peasants will be held in the near future to discuss party responsibility in forming an emigre organization. The NCFE officer conducting the meeting should be briefed on the SE Division Plan by an officer of this division.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

23 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WE

SUBJECT: Debriefing of Harry Sperling by L. de Neufville

1. L. de Neufville recently cabled that H. Sperling, who is to be relieved as Chief of RFE information gathering in Munich, was talking freely of his removal and making comments about his replacement.

2. De Neufville suggested that Sperling be sent back to Washington for a debriefing. For many reasons, including our relations with NCFE, we would prefer it to be done in the field.

3. I therefore suggest that de Neufville be allowed to do this for us and would appreciate your approval of my sending him the attached message.

Thomas W. Braden

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

TO: GEARING

Regarding Sperling. His debriefing for many reasons should not be done here. Would appreciate your doing with object of getting as complete a story as possible but with special attention to:

1. Method of programming, control exercised in Munich and control of Munich by New York in as detailed form as possible.
2. What emigre groups are favored if any.
3. What relations are with our people, British and Germans.
4. What is set-up of news gathering?
5. What security procedures are followed in Munich.
6. What has been or is being done to determine effectiveness of programs from all angles (1) technical, (2) content, (3) audience reaction, etc.

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED C[illegible]IDENTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

90/731

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	MR. BRADEN		
2	MR. EA[illegible]AN		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	DEPUTY DIRECTOR	AWD	6/17/52
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE
☐ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: DDCI has asked to see copy of the paper we have for use in the event something of this nature happens.

JSE

1-9306

[✓ SECRET] CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 30-4
SEP. 1947

16—67704-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
3-03[illegible]

21 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

1. Here is my proposal for the final draft of the NCFE emergency statement. It is the result of changes suggested in my own second draft by Frank Wisner, yourself and Spencer Phenix.

2. Note that not all of the changes suggested by you have been adopted. All changes were considered by Wisner, Phenix and myself, and I would be glad to tell you the comments that were made and the reasons why we felt the attachment should be approved.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

4 Attachments
Final statement and
Drafts 3, 4 & 5

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/DDIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

PROPOSED STATEMENT

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of private American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom behind the Iron Curtain in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In spreading the doctrine of freedom and combatting Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; in close cooperation with the French authorities and the University of Strasbourg, it operates an educational centre at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies which, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a worthwhile public cause.

Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the city of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations; and at the request of Government agencies, certain specific research and other projects have been undertaken and carried on with the assistance of funds provided by the departments or agencies concerned.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life pass upon the policies and supervise the operations of the Committee. The work of the Committee is carried forward under the direction of its President, Rear Admiral Harold B. Miller, USN Retired, who is on leave of absence from the American Petroleum Institute. On March 1, 1952, he succeeded Mr. C. D. Jackson, who has returned to resume his position with TIME-LIFE, Inc.

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information
(Attachment)

June 25, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Braden

FROM: Jesse MacKnight

SUBJECT: 1952 Crusade for Freedom

Please see that the attached memo gets to Mr. Walsh through secure channels.

Attachment:
Memo to Walsh from
MacKnight dtd. 6/23/52
Copy of this Memo for
Mr. Braden

CONFIDENTIAL - Security Information

June 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Richard Walsh

FROM: Jesse M. MacKnight

SUBJECT: 1952 Crusade for Freedom

Your memorandum of June 21 has been reviewed and the following comments represent a consensus of our opinion:

1. Phase One - The balloon idea as a fund raising device is satisfactory, provided substantial emphasis is also given to the use of RFE and other vehicles as methods of delivering the messages behind the Iron Curtain.

2. Phase Two - The idea of a message based on the Christmas theme is satisfactory subject to agreement on the precise text.

3. Phase Three - Subject to review, in light of any future developments in Europe which might affect the tentative decision, there is agreement on the use of a small number of balloons as a symbolic operation.

4. Phase Four - The gift idea as part of a balloon project is considered undesirable.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

17 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Braden, PY/IO

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. For your information the following report on Radio Free Europe Hungarian broadcasts was received here recently, although the information was obtained last March:

"a. Radio Free Europe broadcasts from MUNICH, Germany, are more popular than the Voice of America programs and its news coverage is considered both current and based on authentic sources. However, its commentaries on foreign politics are severely criticised and allegedly the general opinion in Hungary is that whoever writes this program has not the slightest idea either of the conditions in Hungary or of the general needs of the people.

"b. There are also objections to the program of News Briefs (ROVAT ADASOK). This program is considered a nuisance and isn't even listened to by those for whom it is intended. By scheduling 15 and 30 minute programs specifically beamed to different segments of the population, such as: the women's program, the church program, the farmer's program, book and movie reviews, etc., Radio Free Europe reduces its listening audience to those who might be interested in the specific program, while the majority of the listeners are forced either to cease listening to their radios or change to another broadcasting station. As a result, Radio Free Europe has been losing its audience and the decline is especially noticeable during the program of News Briefs when the majority of the listeners allegedly change over to the BBC program.

"c. The workers are particularly interested in political news and are in an excellent position to spread the news throughout the factories. Again the BBC appears to be the most popular station. Informant learned of the fate of one Imre HORVATH, a group leader in a Textile Mill in SZEGED. HORVATH passed on some news concerning the activities of the "Political Police" of SZEGED which he had originally heard on one of these foreign broadcasts. This resulted in HORVATH being immediately transferred to DUNAPENTELE and his "group" was disbanded.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

"d. The necessity for special programs beamed at the youth of Hungary is very acute. The youth of today which has passed its 16th year of age does not listen to children's programs any longer but is interested in broadcasts on the subject of anti-Communist ideologies. This is the age group that the Communists are especially interested in and on whose education in the Communist spirit special emphasis is placed. All of this age group, without exception, attends Communist Party schools and Marxist seminars and also receives pre-military training. To aid in this thorough indoctrination in Marxism as presented to them, special newspapers and magazines full of Communist ideological material are being published. It is therefore highly desirable that special programs aimed at this youth group be prepared so that they will be able to judge for themselves the true conditions in comparison to the propaganda that is fed to them by the Communist regime of Hungary."

2. The comment of the field accompanying this report states:

"An effort is being made to ascertain the basis of the above critique of foreign radio broadcasts by asking Informant if this critique represents his own opinions or the opinions of one or more friends or casual contacts, and whether it is an observation of the programs which were heard during his short visit in BUDAPEST or based on a longer period of time. Inasmuch as Informant cannot be contacted directly, we have no assurance that this information will be forthcoming in the near future, and it is deemed best to submit the above critique as is, for the time being."

GW

GEORGE WEISZ

EE/PC/H/GW/rwp
Distribution:
1,2 - Addressee
3,4 - EE/PC/H
5,6 - RI/FI

Sent to N.Y. 26 June 1952

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Return to [illegible]

17 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Vespasian V. Pella

1. With reference to your note of 2 June transmitting various papers regarding the employment of Vespasian V. Pella by the Mid-European Studies Center, this matter was taken up with Admiral Miller on 13 June.

2. I agree with Mr. Campbell that Dr. Pella has received unfair treatment by the Fund and that if it was not the intention of the Mid-European Studies Center to provide remuneration for his services, no promises to him should have been made in the first place. We have asked the Fund to reconsider its decision and to try to make some arrangements for employing him.

3. We are awaiting an answer from the Fund and shall inform you of its decision.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

IO/TOMIC:ES/eh

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - RI

SECRET

10 June

BILL:

My opinion on this matter is the same as Campbell's: that Pella has not gotten a square deal from NCFE.

Have talked to Mary Newsom (~~[illegible]~~ acting chief of Rumanian desk, PC) on this and she 1) agrees that Pella should get renumeration for his work and 2) thinks that his background is O.K.

Also talked to Wilson Pritchett. He doesn't want to give an o.k. on this, unless and until a name check has been done.

Question: Do we meet the "suspense" and get a name check or do we go ahead. I'd be in favor of the latter---and of informing SE afterwards.

Has a name check!! 1950

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: IO/Tonic

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/IO				JWB
2.				
3.				
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11.				
12.				
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COMMENTS

Tonic to 1

Walsh is preparing a working paper detailing complete plans of campaign.

McKnight will pass one around then so we can consider the other at same time.

At Conference I indicated no balloon operations possible but indicated question of whether Am. public could be told balloons etc would be used to deliver the message could be considered separately.

I will confer with McKnight Thursday on this. Plan as a whole seems much better than Fred Smith operation. Walsh is also thinking [illegible] this [illegible] "Peasing hel to" etc. [illegible] in spite of [illegible] about [illegible]

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

Bill · How did you leave this matter?

Memo to: Admiral Miller June 13, 1952

From: Richard Walsh

Subject: Crusade for Freedom Campaign

I have studied very carefully the plan for the fund raising campaign this fall submitted by Fred Smith. A series of discussions have been held with the staff of Crusade for Freedom, and the following conclusions are the consensus of all who have studied the proposed program.

First, it is felt that because of the nation-wide acceptance of the Crusade and its recognized success during the past two years it would be a mistake to substitute the "Dimes for Freedom" slogan for Crusade for Freedom. The Advertising Council concurs with us in our reluctance to use the word "Dimes" for several substantial reasons. Foremost among them is the fact that our drive for funds will end on December 15th, and the March of Dimes, which the Advertising Council will also assist on, will start about January 1st. Another important factor to be considered is the difficulty of selling a new slogan, such as Dimes for Freedom, to a public which has already contributed $3,500,000 to support Crusade for Freedom, Freedom Bell, Winds of Freedom, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia.

The Dimes for Freedom program not only loses the effect of the last two campaigns which gave acceptance to the name Crusade for Freedom, but also takes no apparent thought of the future of the organization. What happens in 1953? Do we start from scratch again with some completely new promotional idea? By changing emphasis every year we build up no continuing and increasing acceptance of the Crusade for Freedom.

Another danger inherent in the plan is the drive for 40,000,000 signatures. Even with the Freedom Train and Freedom Bell, which people could see, hear, touch and ring, 16,000,000 signatures were obtained. It is highly improbable that we could secure 40,000,000 signatures with nothing more tangible than the "We don't like Communism" statement.

Except for the Dimes for Freedom slogan and the usual outline of state and local organizations, the plan itself does not lend itself to execution. Perhaps the most difficult operation would be that of the trucks with the proposed huge scrolls. Their cross-country trek would be extremely hard to operate and coordinate. The weather would cause great difficulties, particularly crossing the northern Midwest. We could not depend on any truck holding to a schedule across the Dakotas, Nebraska, or half a dozen other states during the blizzard season.

Another factor to be considered is that every town in the country would not be visited.

The idea of having the trucks converge on Washington is one which I think should be given a great deal of consideration. I have no doubt but that the Department of State and specifically the Voice of America would protest vigorously to any approach that might be made to Congress.

We have come up with another idea which we feel would lend itself to the greatest possible psychological warfare usage. It would also enable us to coordinate our campaign with the objectives and program of the Voice of America.

Tying in the previous accomplishments of the Crusade, namely, facilities for Radio Free Europe, the Freedom Bell and the balloon operation, we feel that we could distribute through our state and local organizations millions of thin paper leaflets, such as those used in the Winds of Freedom operation. These would carry a message based on the Christmas theme of peace on earth, good will to men; the Freedom bell would be printed at the top, and beneath the foreign language messages would be space at the bottom for personal signatures and addresses. And the signatures would be promoted throughout the country on the basis that these messages of good will would be flown in balloons behind the Iron Curtain during the Christmas season. The basic approach to the American people would be that their contributions to this year's campaign would not only go to purchase balloons that would carry their personal message behind the Iron Curtain (we now have stored in Munich 55,000 unmarked P-20 balloons and 5,000 balloons marked "Wolnosc"), but would also go to improve and increase the facilities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia.

The focal point of this campaign would be a balloon itself. We have 20,000 P-20 balloons in Minneapolis. These balloons could be distributed through state chairmen to cities and towns where they could be inflated and placed in front of city hall or public square. Beneath the balloons, receptacles would be placed where both the leaflets and contributions could be collected. For example, each city committee could letter its balloon to read "From the Citizens of Peoria, Illinois, U.S.A."

Actually, none of these balloons would be shipped to Europe, but the leaflets could be air-mailed to New York on December 15th and be forwarded to Munich to arrive before Christmas Day.

Another possibility to be considered is the "gift" from American people idea. We now have in Munich 100,000 razor blades, 75,000 needles, 150,000 cakes of soap and 100,000 zippers. These might be included in the balloons. I think this idea has much to commend it. For one thing, this would give something besides words to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain who are likely to get fed up on too many messages which tell them to keep their chins up. Secondly, it provides an excellent way of countering Red propaganda against the balloon operation: Radio Free Europe will then be able to ask, "Don't your masters want you to receive gifts? Don't they want you to ask why it is so difficult to get razor blades in your country and why the free world has enough of them that it can send them to you?"

I presume that the question will be raised as to what the Communists would do with advance knowledge of the operation. I feel that the answer to this lies in the joint operation of both RFE and VOA, continually reporting during the month of the Crusade of the great drive throughout America to secure these messages of friendship and hope for the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. By thus taking the offensive and putting the Communists on notice that this is a great expression of unanimity on the part of the American people — any attempt on the part of the Communists to deprecate or interfere with the program would lend itself to psychological warfare use. This coincides with General Clay's statement in his letter of February 14th to the various state chairmen.

We are not underestimating the magnitude of such an operation here or abroad. To gain the maximum psychological benefit, at least 100,000 balloons should be used. It could be a hard-hitting demonstration of the effectiveness of the Crusade for Freedom.

Every member of the Crusade staff, including the field organization, hopes that this idea may be approved. Seeing the balloons in their home towns and knowing that their messages could reach the peoples behind the Iron Curtain should inspire millions of Americans to support the campaign financially and would serve to remind them constantly throughout the campaign of the tremendous accomplishments achieved during the last two years as a result of their personal contributions.

It is most important that we secure positive and unalterable clearance of this idea within the next ten days.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NCFE-CFA

1. I am attaching two memoranda having to do with NCFE on which it is unnecessary for you to take action. They point nevertheless to the inevitable difficulties we have in dealing with large and necessarily somewhat autonomous organizations such as NCFE and CFA. We are, as you know, charged by directive with exercising control over these organizations, and the memoranda indicate that maintaining this control is a difficult day-to-day job requiring considerable tact and determination as well as efficiency and a high spirit of cooperation. In both NCFE and CFA there is a pride in independence which ought to be encouraged, but there is also a sense of irritation with having to inform anyone in Washington about anything and the tendency to regard anyone below the level of General Smith and yourself (and with NCFE, Mr. Wisner) as in the way.

2. With NCFE, this irritation probably goes back to another era. As I read the history, the operation at that time was a backstopping operation pure and simple, and I think it was not an efficient one; certainly it had no respect in New York. We have worked hard to resolve past tangles, to make our relationships orderly and clean, and eventually to move to the point at which it may be possible to do more than backstop. I do not mean that we have any impression that it is possible to run these large organizations from Washington, but I have had in mind to build the kind of Division and to get the kind of people who would of their own abilities and efficiency be respected in a manner which would enable them to give guidance and real help in the field of ideas and policy coordination.

3. We now have Bill Durkee, Emmons Brown and Cord Meyer as Branch Chiefs in IO and we are getting some very good people to work with them. I think we are well equipped to handle the difficulties which the memoranda indicate, providing we have firm backing from the Hill. The necessity of getting this backing leads me to ask you to review here the recent Valentine incident.

SECRET

4. On 10 June, Alan Valentine remarked to Emmons Brown that you had agreed that I should be rebuked for my letter to him of 22 May. This was an unsolicited comment from Valentine, and Brown made no reply.

5. I have gone over the record of letters to and from Valentine since he assumed his duties and I have also carefully gone over the record of all the activities which CFA has undertaken on which liaison, backstopping and policy guidance from us were involved, and I find to my own satisfaction that we have done an effective job for Valentine. I find memoranda and records indicating that I have on several occasions, as in the letter to which he referred, asked for his comment and criticism and assured him that my sole purpose was to be helpful to him in doing his job. I would be glad to go over these records with you. Despite this, however, Valentine has told me that neither Brown nor I are high level enough for him to talk to and that in the future he will get his policy guidance directly from you or from General Smith.

6. At my express suggestion Valentine began writing letters to you. I realised that he was a difficult person and I knew that writing to you and receiving letters from you would give him the sense of importance that he wanted. When he wrote you, however, to protest my appointment of Emmons Brown as Executive Officer of the IO Division and to suggest to you personnel arrangements in IO that should, in the first instance at least, and in any spirit of friendly cooperation have been made to me, it seemed to me that I ought to be fairly firm. I do not think my letter in reply was in error. Even if it was, I think you should have backed me up on it. If I make mistakes, you can fire me. Until you do fire me, you ought to back me. As matters now stand, you have put me in a position where, in dealing with the situation I have tried to outline above, I shall have greater difficulty than before.

7. I have thought about all of this carefully and feel it right to tell you that I think you let me down.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments
2 Memos for the Record
dtd 12 June 1952.

CIO:TWB/eh
Orig - Addressee
~~1 cc - DDI-C~~
~~1 cc - DDI-C~~
1 cc - CIO
~~2 cc - RI~~

10 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

ATTENTION: Mr. Rick Deane
Operations Division

SUBJECT: MB 50 Transmitters

1. This is to confirm our conversation to the effect that both DTPILLAR and TPTONIC are interested in the MB 50 mobile transmitting equipment. Both feel that they can use that equipment profitably in their radio operation. We shall need a little time to reach a judgment as to which of these projects should receive the equipment and to determine its best utilisation.

2. We should like to request that this equipment be transferred to the IO Division for later determination as to whether it may best be utilized by DTPILLAR or TPTONIC.

3. It is our understanding that this will be transferred to us without reimbursement and that this will not involve the IO Division in the so-called M 50 project which has been discussed at length with Mr. Lindsey and others of your staff.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO/EBB:blj
Distribution
Orig - Addressee
1 - IO/ExO
1 - CIO
2 - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-9832

5 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Truman Speech to American Action Committee Against Mass Deportations in Romania

1. May I urge you to read the attached commentary by RFE on President Truman's statement the other day to the Romanian exiles, which was the subject of considerable concern to RFE and to VOA.

2. Please note the manner in which RFE handled this job. The President spoke words which RFE has for months urged that it be allowed to speak. Because the President had departed from his text, it was not possible to give RFE any guidance to say they should play the President's words strongly or that they should play them down. The State Department at first gave orders to the Voice to play the speech up, and only later was this countermanded. Meantime, however, RFE, acting without guidance from us, broadcast the attached which I think might well be shown to Mr. Joyce and others in State as an example of RFE responsibility and judgment.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

2-9795

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

4 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Project TPTONIC

1. On 18 April 1952 the Project Review Committee recommended to the DCI approval of Project TPTONIC calling for the payment of $438,991 to the Crusade for Freedom for 1953. As a rider to its recommendation for approval of the project, the Committee made the following provision: that a consulting firm be employed by CIA at a consultant's fee to investigate the Crusade operation, both from the standpoint of substance and administration with particular attention to cost.

2. This proviso was made at the instance of Mr. Hedden, Inspector General. I argued at this meeting that since the Crusade itself was a fund-raising agency and employed another fund-raising agency to help it, the employment of a third fund-raising agency as consultant was comparable to placing an advertising contract with N. W. Ayer and then placing another contract with Young & Rubicam to investigate N. W. Ayer's conduct under the contract. Mr. Hedden insisted in response that this was reasonable business practice and his view carried the day.

3. Several weeks ago, with all the tact that I could muster, I conveyed to Admiral Miller, the President of NCFE, my intention to employ the firm of Harold Oram or some other fund-raising agency or individual whom he might care to suggest as a consultant to me and the Crusade operation. Admiral Miller said he would like time to think about this.

4. With kindly intent but considerable firmness, Admiral Miller told me on 3 June that after thinking it over he had decided that if this step were taken he would resign as President of NCFE. He went on to say that he had taken this job at our request and because he had been told that we placed confidence in him to run an efficient operation. He had worked hard trying to make the operation efficient; he had particularly noted that the Crusade was not run according to

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his standards of efficiency; he had made several changes in the Crusade and was about to make more; he had himself employed people whom he regarded as expert who were responsible to him to give him advice on the Crusade problem and he simply could not tolerate a system of inspection which was not responsible to him; if we had any lack of confidence in him as an efficient manager, he would be glad to return to his former employment immediately.

5. We discussed the whole problem in friendly terms for some ten minutes and it was apparent that nothing I could say would alter his position. I therefore ceased to press him.

6. May I have a decision as to whether higher authority wishes to take this up with Admiral Miller or whether the PRC wishes to strike its instructions to me.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI
1 cc - PRC file

The RI Copy of TOP SECRET
document 63466
dated 21 Oct 1952
which was removed from this
file, is filed in the RI
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
1305 "L" Bldg.

SECRET
Security Information

2 June 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, [illegible]

SUBJECT: Reactions of WT-III on the Proposals Outlined in the Full Report.

REFERENCE: MEMO of 27 January 1952 (The Full Report)
MEMO from C/IO dated 16 April 1952

1. WT-III considers that the proposals made by the Full Report should receive favorable consideration by CIC. Rehabilitation work and the semi-consular activities of these various Refugee Committees are a highly instrumental means of combating Communist influences among disillusioned emigres in France, and will help give unity to the various emigre groups in France.

2. However, WT-III does not believe that this work should be undertaken by an overt American organization. The following are the reasons for WT-III's position:

(a) The French public as a whole, already touchy about "Americans in France", would resent this unnecessary interference in French domestic affairs by an American organization.

(b) Should a large American organization, such as NCFE, undertake such work, the Quai d'Orsay, the Ministry of Interior and the French Services would conclude that this was done with the semi-official endorsement of the US Government. It is believed that these governmental departments would conclude that the US favored expanding NCFE in France at the expense of the newly formed French Committee for Free Europe, which has the general approval of the present French Government. This might have an adverse effect on State Department's relations with the Foreign Office, and might well jeopardize CIA's own position with the French Intelligence Services, seriously compromising CIC's present attempts to obtain permission to recruit emigres in France for operational use.

(c) It is also believed that an indigenous French Committee is in a better position than an American group to deal with the particular problems that emigrees face in France, and to give leadership and unity to the emigre movement in France. At present the

Security Information

present the

French Government is organizing a special office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to act as a sort of General Consulate for Refugees. Both the Bull Report and a report of Dr. Osusky's (Fund Memorandum [illegible], dated April [illegible], 1952), indicate that this office will remain small, and the actual rehabilitation and consular work would be turned over to a non-governmental agency. WE-III's contact with the French Committee and Dr. Osusky's report both indicate that the French Committee is to be chosen to handle this problem. Obviously, in the face of developing French policy, and the particular situation now existing in France, it would be unwise for OPC to encourage NCFE to compete and duplicate a function which the French Government has already earmarked for an indigenous organization. However, in view of the present position of NCFE in France, and its far-reaching influence throughout the emigre field, it is believed that NCFE should continue its activities in emigre affairs in France through its present Paris office, and should extend them to include some limited overt financial support to the French Committee to be used along the lines suggested in the Bull Report.

3. WE-III believes that US interests can best be served through OPC cover support of the French Committee. By properly developing the present initial covert contacts with the French Committee, it is believed that OPC can maintain effective operating relationships with the Committee, and insure that its actions and policies will conform to our objectives and be properly co-ordinated with those of NCFE. Thus OPC would seek to exert control over emigre groups and activities in France, without openly interfering in French domestic affairs.

4. For the reasons stated above, WE-III reiterates its position as outlined in a Memorandum for ADPC (dated 5 May 1952) which has been approved by the DDP, and in which it was recommended that WE-III be responsible for covertly directing and supporting emigre activities in France, tentatively using at present the French Committee for Free Europe.

[illegible]
WE-C

WE-III/FC/G B/pl

Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
2 - WE-III
1 - ADPC
1 - WE-Chrono
2 - FI Analysis
2 - G.

SECRET
Security Information

MAY 28 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Request by NCFE for Gearing

1. Messrs. Miller and Braden met with me on 22 May for discussion of the above subject.

2. Taking into account the need of NCFE for a political advisor, the qualifications and personality of Gearing, and the availability of qualified personnel, the following course of action was fully discussed and adopted.

a. Mr. Braden will attempt to recruit Bolte to serve initially with NCFE as political advisor and join the Agency at some later date.

b. Gearing will return to Headquarters later this year and assume the duties of the Labor Desk in the IO Division. In coordination with WE, Mr. Braden will follow up with Gearing, possibly in connection with a trip to Europe in the near future.

c. Richard Aldrich will replace Gearing in Paris. Mr. Miller, who already has had one tentative conversation with Aldrich, will follow in coordination with WE.

Gerald E. Miller
for

KILBOURNE JOHNSTON
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

DADPC/GEM/mgb
27 May 1952

Distribution: Addressee - Orig.
CIO - 1
CWE - 1
RI/FE - 2
DADPC - 1

SECRET
Security Information

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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27 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: My memorandum to you dated 23 April 1952

1. On 23 April 1952 I wrote you stating that Admiral Miller was going to discuss with Ronald D. Jeancon statements accredited to Jeancon which appeared in an interview in the London Daily Worker, and that I would let you know the results of this conversation.

2. Admiral Miller, after an interview with Jeancon, informs me that a correspondent for the Worker interviewed Jeancon and that subsequently a story appeared in the Worker which was completely unfactual, the fact of the interview being used as a peg on which to hang Jeancon, and RFE.

3. The charges made against Jeancon have therefore been dropped.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

CIO;TWB/eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - DD/P (thru ADPC)
1 cc - IO/TNIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

Carbon copy of above returned by State - Mr. Joyce on 4 June with comment:

"Why did he get mixed up with a Daily Worker man? Such naivete makes one wonder about his usefulness.
RPJ

Secret

[redacted] SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

23 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Statements by Ronald D. Jeancon, RFE, London

REFERENCE: Letter 9 April 1952 Robert G. Hooker, Jr. to Robert P. Joyce

1. Frank Wisner passed on to me the note from Bob Hooker about the article in the Daily Worker on Wednesday, April 2, quoting Mr. Jeancon.

2. I had learned of Mr. Jeancon's outburst within a few days after he made it and I passed the information on at once to Admiral Miller of NCFE. Admiral Miller was greatly disturbed by Jeancon's remarks and corroborated Hooker's suggestion that he had done this type of thing before.

3. Admiral Miller promised to put the Jeancon affair high on his agenda for his present trip abroad. He will discuss the incident with Jeancon and he contemplates dismissing him. I will let you know the result of Admiral Miller's conversation with Jeancon as soon as I get word.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Enclosure
Reference letter and
newspaper clipping.

CIO:TWB/eh

Copies 1 & 2 - Addressee
Copy 3 - DD/P (thru ADPC)
Copy 4 - CIO
Copy 5 - PP/TPIC
Copy 6 - RI

[redacted] SECRET

SECRET

In reply refer to: 10-2062
S
22 May 1952

Dear Leonard:

In order to continue our practice of putting things on paper, I want to tell you by this note that I have been instructed by the Director to hire the services of Harold Oram as a fund-raising consultant on the Crusade for Freedom. At some time in the near future I hope you will permit Nelson Hicander to bring Oram and yourself, or anyone else with whom you care to deal, together to discuss means by which we can fulfill this requirement.

In addition, I have been instructed to notify you that after this year's program, the Crusade for Freedom budget should be substantially cut.

You will gather from the foregoing that, like yourself, we have been giving careful consideration here to the whole Crusade program and we have some ideas about strengthening the Crusade that I personally feel Oram is by all means the best man to put into effect. I have asked Nelson to outline these to you and get your thoughts. Provided you agree, I should like to get started with Oram on this particular job, a part of the Crusade program — as Nelson will explain to you, right away.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

CIO: TWB:eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Log
2 cc - IO/EMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

[illegible]

22 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR INSPECTION AND REPORTS

SUBJECT: Suspension of Balloon Operations by Order of DCI

1. The Crusade for Freedom proposed launching about 60,000 balloons toward Hungary during Easter Week, 1952, each carrying a traditional Hungarian Easter Greeting together with a package of scarce household articles such as razor blades, needles, soap, zippers, bouillon cubes, vitamin pills, etc. This project was known as "Operation Easter Bunny."

2. At their meeting on Friday, 7 March 1952, the Project Review Committee withheld approval of this project pending discussion with the Director of two unresolved points:

a. Approval by the British of launchings from their Zone of Austria.

b. The question of including packaged items with the Easter Greetings.

3. On or about Tuesday, 11 March, DD/P telephoned to T. W. Braden, CIO, in the temporary absence of DCPY, and advised substantially as follows:

> "Operation Easter Bunny is off by the personal decision of DCI. This decision to cancel has been reached for an entirely new reason that you can find in an article on the 3rd page of today's NEW YORK TIMES."

The article cited by DD/P was a report of continued Communist accusations that Germ Warfare was being waged by UN forces in Korea.

4. The Crusade people in New York were advised that their project was cancelled and no further amplification of DCI's ruling was received.

H. GATES LLOYD
Deputy Chief
Psychological Staff Division

DCPY/HGL:al

Distribution:
Addressee - Original; CIO - 1; CPY - 1; DCPY - 1; RI - 2

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

21 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Statement on NCFE

I feel that Attachment A, the statement handed to us by Admiral Miller, is apologetic in tone and I have drafted Attachment B which I believe is more positive and would be a better press release for NCFE in the unhoped for event that a press release is called for.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

2 Attachments

CIO:TWB/ch

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P)
1 cc - IO/TOHIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

PROPOSED STATEMENT

(Draft #4, 20 May 1952)

The National Committee for a Free Europe is an organization of American citizens whose purpose is to encourage the spread of freedom in Europe. It is a membership corporation, chartered under the laws of the State of New York.

In its attempt to spread the doctrine of freedom and consequently to combat Soviet totalitarianism, the Committee operates radio stations which pierce the Iron Curtain; it operates a university at Strasbourg for young men and women who have escaped from behind the Iron Curtain; it attempts by other means than radio to carry messages of hope and of the possibility of eventual liberation to the nations which are now enslaved; it conducts studies of the laws, customs and cultures of these nations as they existed prior to Soviet occupation; and it documents the changes which have been imposed by the Soviet so that if the time should come when the people rise against their conquerors, they may more easily establish continuity with their past.

In all of this work the Committee draws information and support from many sources -- from those who have escaped and who must remain anonymous for fear of reprisals on their families at home, from those in this country who wish to work voluntarily for the cause of freedom abroad, from the American people at large, and from government agencies who, in the American tradition, give all possible aid to private citizens engaged in a public cause.

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Fund raising for the Committee is done by a subsidiary, the Crusade for Freedom which, in the course of raising money, also helps to keep before the American people and people throughout the world the need for spreading the idea of freedom. For example, the Freedom Bell, which now rings regularly over the City of Berlin, was the gift of sixteen million Americans who contributed to the Crusade for Freedom. All in all, signatures and voluntary donations from more than twenty-five million Americans have come to the Crusade for Freedom to date. Generous contributions have also been made to the Committee by private foundations, and payments have been received from interested government agencies for which the Committee has undertaken special projects.

A Board of Directors consisting of prominent American citizens from all walks of life determine the policies and supervise the operations of the Committee.

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Security Information

ER-2-8556

30 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations

FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

Attached is the proposed statement to be issued by NCFE in the event that their cover is blown. I am not very happy with it and suggest that we try to improve it. I have sent a copy to Frank Wisner.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

19 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: National Committee for a Free Europe

1. I am naturally disturbed by the report which has reached me as to your attitude on the National Committee for a Free Europe, as expressed to the Inspector General at a meeting last week which I was unable to attend because of absence from the city.

2. This attitude, as described to me, was that you knew very little about NCFE but that you had the general impression that it was rather loosely handled from an administrative and policy control standpoint. I do not wish to go into the history of NCFE control by CIA and be accused of casting aspersions on its handling in the past. I do think, however, that your allegations may be correct so far as the past is concerned.

3. As of the present, however, I want you to know that Mr. Durkee and I, with very able assistance from members of Mr. Durkee's staff, are doing our level best to set up agreed upon procedures for administrative, financial and policy control and reporting. With the best objectivity I can muster, I think that your responsibility over the National Committee for a Free Europe is now being ably discharged.

4. I would like at your convenience to go over the new arrangements that have been made and to bring you completely up to date on the activities of the Committee, as well as to get your instructions as to a system of making such periodic reports to you in the future. This briefing might well take the form of a preliminary budget review and I suggest that the division heads of NCFE might be brought down to make progress reports to you in the briefing room. I am hopeful that after such a meeting you will feel not only conversant with the present arrangements and activities of the Committee but that they will, with modifications you may wish to

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suggest, have your full approval, and that consequently you will wish to make some statement at an early staff meeting indicating your satisfaction with these plans. Otherwise, I very much fear that the prevalent attitude within OPC which is one of general dissatisfaction with NCFE based largely on inadequate understanding of what the Committee is doing may prejudice the work that with your concurrence I brought Bill Durkee here to do.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-1200

19 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

You will be interested in the attached letter from Matthew Woll resigning from NCFE. We were forewarned of this some weeks ago by Jay and others.

We will be in touch with NCFE with respect to the form of their answer if they decide to make one.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Encl.

cc: DD/P
C/IO

SECRET

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FREE TRADE UNION COMMITTEE
Labor League for Human Rights
Box 65, Radio City Station
New York 19, N. Y.

May 13, 1952

Admiral H. B. Miller, President
National Committee for Free Europe, Inc.
110 West 57th Street
New York City

Dear Admiral Miller:

Your Committee has decided that "its interest and work lie in labor relations chiefly in Europe and not in the United States."

We disagree with your policy which we are convinced is wrong.

You have translated your new policy into action by dismissing our active representative, Henry Kirsch, whose work had won your own as well as general hearty acclaim and brought great credit to your organization. I might add that this dismissal came after an agreement in Paris by your former President and now Vice-Chairman with our European representative, Irving Brown, and your own European representative, Leon Dennen, to have Mr. Kirsch head your Labor Division.

Furthermore, we had been assured by Mr. Berle that Mr. Kirsch would not be dismissed without first giving us an opportunity to study specific complaints and cause for said discharge. This promise has likewise not been kept.

In view of the above, there can be no point in my continuing membership in your body. I, therefore, herewith tender my resignation to take effect immediately.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED
MATTHEW WOLL, Chairman
International Labor Relations
Com. and Free Trade Union
Committee, AFL

SECRET
Security Information

MEMORANDUM TO: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Albanian Students at the Free Europe University

REFERENCE: Secret Memorandum dated 24 April 1952 to Deputy Chief, SE/PC from Chief, IO, subject: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe University Students

1. We appreciate receiving the information on the two Albanian students now attending the Free Europe University at Strasbourg which was forwarded in reference.

2. We have now received a report from the field which indicates that Koste Xhajanka is connected with the Albanian Legation in Paris.

3. We would like very much to know the background of this man's acceptance at the Free Europe University, including how and where his application was made; whether his acceptance was on the basis of his scholastic record alone or on the basis of recommendations; if the latter, whose; and any other details available. It would be appreciated if you could inquire into this matter for us.

4. Since requesting that favorable consideration be given to the application of Ramis Qira, we have received a report which indicates that he too has been connected with the Albanian IS. It is requested that steps be taken to ensure that his application be disapproved.

5. It has also been reported that a Kalem Golemi, also covertly employed by the Albanian Legation in Paris, has applied for admission to the Free Europe University.

6. All of these reports appear to indicate that an effort is being made by the Albanian Government to place their agents in the Free Europe University. If this is true, no doubt other satellite countries will follow the same policy. It is suggested that the authorities of Free Europe University be warned and advised to screen carefully the students being admitted and to refuse admission to people about whom there is any question.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

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SECRET
Security Information

rn d: 14 May

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, IO

SUBJECT: Albanian Desk of RFE

REFERENCE: Secret Memorandum dated 1 April 1952, to Mr. Campbell, EE, from Mr. Marcy, EE, same subject. (Attached)

1. It may be that Mr. Dosti was aware that there was little possibility that either Mr. Skendi or Mr. Chekrezi would be willing to become head of the Albanian Desk of RFE and that he hoped his third choice of one of the Jakovas would therefore be accepted. However, we do not consider that this is any proof that Mr. Dosti has sold out to Zog.

2. Mr. Dosti is rather easily influenced and has been impressed by the Jakovas and their position in emigre circles in New York City. Consequently, there is no doubt he would like to be in the position of sponsoring the Jakovas and we believe he sincerely felt one of them would make a good head for the Albanian Desk of RFE.

3. We agree with EE/State that no consideration should be given to offering either Jakova a position with RFE and with their description of the couple; our attitude has been made known to RFE on several occasions during the past six months.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

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Security Information

SECRET

14 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

The following may be helpful in today's briefing of Mr. Hedden.

1. RFE is presently broadcasting about 135 hours a week to Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungaria, and Czechoslovakia.

2. To date approximately $8,500,000 have been invested in capital radio facilities including housing. About $10,000,000 have been spent in radio operations to date over and above capital costs.

3. About 1144 people are presently employed in Munich and 226 are presently employed in Portugal at the relay facility.

a. A technical operating survey of these facilities was recently conducted by Westinghouse radio and technical experts. They evaluated as excellent both the facilities and the operating program. A copy of this report is attached.

b. The effectiveness of broadcasts from a psychological warfare point of view is considerable, as far as can be determined with interviews with escapees, State Department officials behind the Curtain, and Soviet attacks including jamming. RFE has also been surveyed by a key official of the Psychological Strategy Board with the conclusion that it is one of the most effective U.S. psychological warfare efforts and should without question be continued.

c. The risk taken to invest several million dollars in capital facilities in Germany is a calculated one -- fully recognized and discussed at length at a recent PRC meeting. It is considered a reasonable risk under the circumstances. The understandings reached with representatives of the German government are considered to be as good as can be worked out at this time.

4. Mr. William Durkee, Chief of the National Committees Branch/IO, plans to make an inspection trip to Europe leaving May 23 to visit RFE facilities. On his return it is expected that we will have additional first hand information to report to you.

EMMONS B. BROWN
Executive Officer
International Organizations Division

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT P. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Communist Infiltration of RFE

REFERENCE: Confidential Memorandum dated 24 October from Al Freeman to Foy Kohler

1. On 2 November 1951 you told us of certain charges you had heard that RFE was being infiltrated.

2. Similar charges have been made by others. We therefore asked NCFE to investigate these charges and we also turned them over to our own Security Officers. I am attaching for your information a letter which contains the results of the investigation made by NCFE. You will observe that the specific charges made against Ingenieur Halik and Kristina Kamlerova are not answered but we believe the enclosed constitutes an answer to the general charge of infiltration of the Czechoslovakian desk, as the major figures involved are dealt with fully.

3. If, subsequently, our own investigation in which Halik and Kamlerova will be dealt with brings to light any new facts or fails to corroborate any of the facts stated in the enclosure, we will take action immediately and will also keep you informed.

FRANK G. WISNER

Enclosure
Ltr 25 Apr with
Exhibits from NCFE

CIO:TWB/eh
(8 May 1952)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TONIC
2 cc - E.R. (1 for DD/P)
1 cc - EE
1 cc - I&S (Mr. Cotter)
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

10 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: IO/TOMIC - Miss Stern

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Reorganization of Bulgarian National Committee dated April 23, 1952

1. I am disturbed by the fact indicated in this memorandum that the State Department, namely Campbell, is attempting to lay down the line almost to the precise language which Admiral Miller uses with the political refugees.

2. It seems to me at some time or other that somebody will have to tell Campbell that while it is the State Department's job to make policy, the only way NCFE can possibly conform to Campbell's ideas is to appoint Campbell to deal with exiles and ask him whether he wants a job.

3. I have a feeling that this is going to come to a head one of these days and I wish you would build up a little file on Campbell and his efforts in this direction.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Subject memo.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO

6470

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

9 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Letters of Mr. C. D. Jackson Concerning Possible Communist Disturbances Among Hungarian Emigres.

REFERENCE: Your memorandum, above subject, 25 April 1952.

1. In compliance with your request, the allegations contained in Mr. Jackson's letters pertaining to Az Ember and Ferenc Göndör have been forwarded to the FBI.

2. On the Hennyey case, it has been ascertained that the files of this Office contain considerable data relative to Hennyey's background and activities. There is no information of a derogatory nature in these files, however, to explain a refusal to issue a visa. No record appears of information being furnished either to the State Department or to the Immigration and Naturalization Service by CIA on Hennyey. OSO is now in process of preparing a reply to a query from the Immigration and Naturalization Service on him. OSO is, therefore, at a loss to offer an explanation of Hennyey's visa difficulties.

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
Assistant Director
Special Operations

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Durkee has original

2-9187

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
708 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

May 7, 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PRESENT: Mr. W. J. Scripps, Detroit News
Dr. Allen
Mr. Norberg
Mr. Korns

After arranging an appointment through his cousin, Senator Moody, Mr. Scripps called on the Director to discuss his proposal for a "Friendship Balloon Lift." Certain materials relating to this proposal had previously been transmitted to the Director by Mr. Allen Dulles.

In reply to questioning, Mr. Scripps asserted that he was well acquainted with the NCFE Winds of Freedom campaign, in which he had participated, but that he had not discussed his present proposal with NCFE. He said he had talked to many American business men, who were all enthusiastic and were prepared to donate the variety of products which he proposes should be included in the payloads. He said that his father was an ardent supporter of the project, along with a Mr. Fletcher, Vice President of the Caterpillar Tractor Company and Dr. Barnett. Mr. Fletcher spent some time in Russia, he said. When asked whether Caterpillar was in the balloon business, Mr. Scripps said no.

Other names mentioned by Mr. Scripps as being familiar with his proposal included Nick Naradi, identified as an ex-minister of the Hungarian Government; Frank Jewitt of General Mills (which holds a balloon research contract with the Office of Naval Research), who has given him a letter to an admiral; an Admiral Miller; and a Mr. Frank of CIA. (see below) Mr. Scripps also mentioned a Psychological Equipment Development Office located in the old Post Office building. (see below)

Mr. Scripps was troubled by security problems. It was apparent that he felt he had obtained confidential information from certain government sources which he could not disclose. At the same time, he stated that in order to work out his proposal in any detail, he would need access to information presently denied him. Therefore, he suggested that he be cleared for security by the appropriate agency.

As a result, it proved impossible to nail down the technical aspects of Mr. Scripps' proposal. In his formal presentation, he had described a balloon capable of carrying a 40-pound payload and costing $5. In his conversation, he mentioned a vehicle capable of carrying 300 to 800 pounds, together with a staggered release mechanism--without

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SECURITY INFORMATION

price. To questions as to whether either type was in existence, Mr. Scripps replied that he was bound by confidences. In general, however, he did not foresee any technical barriers.

When asked how he would finance his proposal, Mr. Scripps said that he would begin with private contributions, with the thought that eventually the program would be taken over by the government. He laid stress on the need for early organization (e.g. fund raising, balloon stockpiling, crew training, selection of launching sites) in order that operations could be started immediately following a decision as to their desirability. He stated that 90 days would be sufficient to prepare for operations, once he got the "green light".

Dr. Allen expressed his personal interest in the proposal, but reminded Mr. Scripps that PSB's field was strategic rather than operational, and that in an operational proposal of such complexity, PSB could only give the matter a cursory review. Therefore, Dr. Allen stated his intention to forward the proposal to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, which was the proper body to give the project the detailed screening to which it was entitled. Dr. Allen also suggested that Mr. Scripps see C. D. Jackson.

Mr. Norberg then suggested that as an additional aid Mr. Scripps prepare a brief but fairly specific description of what he personally was prepared to do, along with an outline of the organization which would be needed to carry out the project. Mr. Scripps said that he would do so within the next week.

COMMENT

Joe Frank, when asked about Mr. Scripps, said he had met him several times between December 1950 and February, 1951. During this period of early planning for balloon operations, Frank said that Scripps proved quite helpful by quieting certain private enthusiasts, in addition to maintaining a discreet silence himself. Frank did not know for a fact that Mr. Scripps participated in the August operation, but judged that it was likely. In Frank's opinion, Scripps is a capable person with valuable connections in the business world and sufficient financial independence to be able to devote most of his time to good works. Frank thinks it would be a good idea to have him cleared as a consultant.

The Psychological Equipment Development Office mentioned by Mr. Scripps is believed to be the Physical Security Equipment Agency, a military development agency operated by the Air Force under an OSD charter. Its director is Col. H. M. McCoy. This agency is prepared to talk with anyone who has been cleared for security; otherwise individuals are asked to approach the services first.

Distribution:
Dr. Allen
Mr. Sherman
Mr. Norberg
Mr. Gates Lloyd ✓

C:WAKorns:ms

SECRET
Security Information

Executive Registry
2-8852

7 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Plans

FROM: Deputy Director Central Intelligence

1. In the course of a long conversation with C. D. Jackson and John Hughes on Thursday evening, 1 May, they raised a number of questions about NCFE, including the question as to whether Gearing could be made available for their work. Confidentially, they feel that Miller who is excellent on the administrative side will be badly in need of someone at his right hand who knows the political situation in Europe and the type of thing that cannot be learned by a few trips or a few books.

2. I told them that the Gearing problem was difficult, that we were considering it and hoped to come up with some answer in the near future.

cc: Mr. Braden ✓

SECRET
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

ATTENTION: Mr. Thomas Braden

SUBJECT: Liaison with NCFE

1. This memorandum will confirm the discussion between Mr. Thomas Braden, Chief, IOD, Mr, William Durkee, IOD and Mr. Prichett of SE/PC, on Thursday, 1 May, wherein it was agreed that shortly after Admiral Miller's return from Europe on or about 7 May, Mr. Braden would work out with NCFE the details of establishing limited liaison between the Chiefs of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Branches of SE/PC, and their opposite numbers at the New York office of NCFE. The above arrangement would be only a complement to the main liaison channel with NCFE which will remain through Mr. John Leich. It would, however, expedite action in situations where minor guidance is required in matters relating to the handling of the Albanian, Bulgarian and Rumanian Committees and where a precipitate unilateral decision on the part of the NCFE desk officer concerned might affect adversely CIA plans or operations.

2. It was generally agreed that to establish the relationship only the following need be arranged:

a. A brief covert introductory meeting between the respective country desk Chiefs during which the SE/PC Branch Chief could outline, in as far as was appropriate, the aims of the CIA program and after which mutual difficulties could be discussed and joint courses of action determined.

b. Establishment of an emergency link through a sterile CIA telephone which would permit secure liaison in special situations.

c. Institution of a system of preparing detailed Memoranda of Conversation for Mr. Braden's office in every instance where there was contact between an NCFE desk officer and his SE/PC opposite number.

3. Should any assistance be required from SE/PC in establishing this relationship Mr. Prichett, SE/PC/PO (Extension 3974) may be called.

Gratian M. Yatsevitch
GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET
Security Information

6 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/IO

SUBJECT: Termination of Contract between Mr. Henry F. Landowski and the National Committee for a Free Europe.

1. It would be appreciated if IO would assist this division by requesting from the National Committee for a Free Europe an agreement terminating the contract between the NCFE and Mr. Henry F. Landowski, signed 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski's employment with CIA is being terminated and it is desired that for reasons of administrative regularity and considerations of security his contract with NCFE also be terminated.

2. In working out the phrasing of the termination agreement it is desirable that the following points be included:

a. The contract being terminated is that signed 1 October 1951 by Mr. Landowski on the one hand and Mr. Spencer Phenix for the NCFE.

b. It should be stated that the contract is being terminated "by mutual agreement" and that all benefits and obligations devolving upon the two parties are cancelled.

c. It is very desirable that this document also be signed by Mr. Phenix, who signed the original contract agreement for the NCFE.

3. If three copies of this termination agreement signed by the NCFE are returned to this office we will have Mr. Landowski sign and return a copy for the NCFE files.

4. It is our understanding that there is only one contract between Mr. Landowski and the NCFE, namely that of 1 October 1951. Mr. Landowski assures us that this is the only contract he has signed with the NCFE. However, it is possible that there may be a misunderstanding on this point by NCFE. Therefore it might be well to ask NCFE if they believe Mr. Landowski

to have

SECRET
Sec

Orig to Durkee 5 May

to have any other written obligations to them and if so, specifically to include all such in the termination agreement.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination,SE

-1229553

McCampbell & Company
Incorporated
Forty Worth Street
New York 13, N.Y.

April 28, 1952

Dear Frank,

I found the attached memorandum of real interest as providing a clear-cut explanation of a matter relating to N.C.F.E. which you are doubtless asked about from time to time. It occurred to me that you might like to have this as covering the basic policy used in the selection and employment of exile personnel for various branches, particularly for the work of Radio Free Europe. To my mind it provides an answer to inquiries which come to us and others as to how and why such personnel is chosen.

Since Min Miller is away and won't be back for several weeks I am taking the liberty of sending this copy to you in his absence. He and others at 57th Street read it before he went away and endorsed it.

With personal regards,

Sincerely,

John Hughes

NCFE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCFE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czeshoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc. without regard for the fact that such individuals might be at odds with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders, since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

(a) Security clearance,
(b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
(c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment — General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

(a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
(b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
(c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe (Royall Tyler-Paris),
(d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W.E. Griffith),

(e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
(f) Voice of America, where applicable,
(g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York) and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwithstanding their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment either at New ~~York or~~ Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria, he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representatilions of politically-minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

(1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.

(2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.

(3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

> "As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions.".

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak -- as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own poeple RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions,

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, and the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

> "It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed NCFE Support on the Exile Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France

REFERENCE: Letter Dated 20 March 1952 from Marc to Willa, Enclosing 27 January 1952 Report on the Exile Organized Refugee Aid Committee in France, from Roger L. Bull.

1. The reference, recently forwarded to us by NCFE, recommends NCFE support for organized refugee relief committees in Paris. As a follow-up, Miss Mary Augustine, of NCFE's New York staff, is currently surveying refugee organizations in Western Europe. When the results of this survey have been given to us, we plan—in conjunction with the interested area desks—to prepare a study with recommendations concerning the utilization of exile committees in Europe.

2. In the meantime, the reference is forwarded for your information.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment 1
As stated above

Distribution:
Addressees - original
CIO - 1
IO/TONIC - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ROBERT F. JOYCE
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Min Miller
dtd 1 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TCXIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-2016

28 April 1952

Dear Spencer:

Here is a brief of the material that is wanted in respect to the slave labor issue.

This is of great importance, as you can well imagine, but for your information we find ourselves in something of a box on this because having pressed for the hearings, it is essential to gather good evidence and not be embarrassed by something we have fought to obtain.

I hope, therefore, that you will give it your top consideration and let me know if you can come up with anything. In addition to the kinds of evidence listed here, you will note that private organisations may testify.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

Enclosures
  2 Memoranda 14 Apr 52

CIO:TWB:eh

Orig - Spencer Phenix
1 cc - IO ExO.
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
2 cc - CIO ✓
2 cc - RI

see chrono for 2d enclosure

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14 April 1952

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Gathering Evidence on Slave Labor Issue - to be presented Ecosoc Hearings

A. Type of evidence that is desired:

1. Scholarly studies - Laws, administrative regulations showing the de jure and de facto application of laws pertaining to labor.

2. Documentary evidence - Passes, identity cards, ration cards, release papers, etc. Anything indicating the place, name of camp, administrative documents, etc. Photostatic copies accepted if the original is unavailable for retention. Seals, stamps, and signatures desirable.

3. Testimonial

a. Written testimony - probably in the form of answers to a questionnaire. These testimonials may be either:

(1) Anonymous. (As few as possible)

(2) Authorized use of the name, either confidentially, for release only before the court, where many sessions will be closed to the public, or the name may be released to the public.

b. Tape recordings - Some excellent testimonials could perhaps be tape recorded.

c. Statistical form - The bulk of this testimonial can also be reduced to a statistical form.

d. No hearsay testimony is wanted.

4. Witnesses - A few of these should be presented by each group. However, the witnesses should be most carefully chosen to insure that they are really genuine, really were in a concentration camp, andnot in some internment or intermediate camp, and that they spent a considerable amount of time there, without having been convicted by due process of law. Furthermore, these witnesses should be men of high caliber, highly literate, capable of presenting their story clearly, and standing up to close cross-examination, without having to alter their story.

B. Principal targets to hit: State is especially anxious that we assist by reaching those persons, and those areas hardest to reach, and on which there exists the least evidence.

1. Individuals: The persons that present the greatest interest are civilians, who have been in Soviet Concentration Camps since the last war. Soldiers are considered secondary evidence, as with them a difference must be made and clearly drawn between PW camps, and concentration camps, where soldiers and civilians both were put to work at hard labor. Well known persons who have testified before should not be used. The effort must concentrate on new evidence of recent date.

2. Areas: In order to establish clearly that the concentration camp forms an integral part of the Soviet Communist political and economic system, it is vital to prove conclusively the existence of concentration camps in all countries which have fallen under Soviet domination. Thus evidence is especially needed on the following areas:

Poland
Baltic nations
East Germany
Hungary
Rumania
Bulgaria
Albania
China
N. Korea
Russia (Material on Russia, if gathered, should be of very recent date.)

The areas in which to operate most successfully, are the following:

Sweden (Balts, Poles, Russians)
Germany (All kinds)
Trieste area (Central European refugees)
Northern Greece (Bulgarians, Rumanians)
Yugoslavia??? (They have evidence - will they cooperate?)
Eastern Turkey???
Iran (Reportedly, there are a good number of escapees, from Soviet Russia. These might be Azerbaijani, Armenians, Georgians, even Persians, providing an entirely new source of evidence.)
Hong Kong
Formosa (Reportedly a groups of former inmates here)
S. Korea (N. Korean PW's, Chinese PW's - might locate existence of camps in Korea and China).
Japan (Former PW's. Some were in Siberian Slave Labor camps.

C. Organizations which should do the work: These organizations need not have any special qualifications just so long as they are bona fide organizations. State recommends that we try to get a diversity of such organizations to present evidence. Twenty different organizations would be an optimum to aim for. They should represent different interests, such as labor groups, veterans organisations, emigre organizations, church groups, and several of them should have an international character.

D. Your capabilities: What type of organizations do you have that could organize interrogation teams, draw up lists of persons to interview, and go out and gather the material for presentation to the hearings?

What areas could the organizations you have in mind, work in?

What national groups could they concentrate on?

How much operational support would they require from us? (Money, intelligence support)

How largeare their capabilities: types of material that they can present, how thoroughly can they be expected to cover the field they are assigned? How many former inmates can they contact? 100? 200? 500?

Do they have U. S. State Department representatives in their areas to which they can turn, who would assist them in complying with all the regulations and requirements, which must be met to be accepted by the Economic and Social Council as a group which will present testimony. (It might be best if we obtained a sort of form application, which we could disseminate to the field, where necessary.)

The choosing of the organization must be done at an early date. Applications were to be in on the 31st of March, but State is certain that if they aresubmitted without undue delay (by mid-May) they would be accepted.

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

25 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

SUBJECT: Continuance of Project FJSCOPE

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 21 April 1952 regarding the desirability of continuing Project FJSCOPE, which provides a monthly allotment of $75.00 to Walter F. Kammerer for services rendered to this division.

2. Although Mr. Kammerer is used as a consultant for SE, he is called upon from time to time to furnish information outside his capacity of consultant which would not justify the payment of consultant fees.

3. It is felt that the monthly stipend of $75.00 covers these extra activities, and we should like to have Project FJSCOPE continued.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Deputy for Policy Coordination, SE

Orig to Dunker
2 May rec'd

[illegible]

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF EASTERN EUROPE

ATTENTION: Mr. O'Meara

SUBJECT: Future of Strasbourg Free Europe University Students

REFERENCE: C/IO Memorandum to C/EE of 20 March 1952, Same Subject as Above.

1. There are attached hereto lists of students, together with biographical data, of the Free Europe University, according to the national groups of your interest (Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), as submitted to us on 14 April 1952.

2. When this information was given to us the following caveat accompanied it:

> "You realize that the families of most of these students are in most vulnerable positions behind the Iron Curtain and the information we secured from them we promised to keep strictly confidential. Of course, some of the cases can be camouflaged for public consumption but we have to keep faith with these youngsters and for that reason names can not be identified with even skeleton outlines of their careers."

3. The individual responsible for the administration of the Free Europe University has explained to us that:

> "The date of the completion of their studies in each case is impossible to furnish with any accuracy for the simple reason that French university courses are not arranged with the same exactness that characterizes the custom of American colleges and universities. On this point I can give you two bits of information. First, that in no case is it expected that any student would continue as a member of the College de l'Europe Libre for more than a maximum of three years. Also, of the present student body it is expected that 25-40 will finish their academic work at the University of Strasbourg at the end of the current university year."

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Accordingly, we have requested that we be provided with a list, together with any available information regarding the political orientation and plans for the future, of the estimated 25 to 40 students who expect to complete their academic work at the end of the current University year. When this list is available we shall transmit the information to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
  Addressee - Original & 6
  CIO - 1
  IO/DOTO - 1
  IO/NBV - 1✓ (1 cc given Nancy)
  RI - 2

CIO/NBV:bw

SECRET

SECRET

24 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, OO

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum 29 February 1952 on "Hungarian Exile Activities"

I was interested in your report on Nagy and his efforts to set up a Hungarian Government-in-Exile. I note in paragraph 5 that you say your contact is hoping to receive more information from them. Since I think this situation has been cleared up by other events, I would not want you to press your contact to stir Nagy to further action by a request for more information. If, however, Nagy does give you more information, we should very much like to see it.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - COD/OPC
1 cc - IO/EEIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert P. Joyce
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: State Department Paper on "The Functions of NCFE and RFE"

1. Thank you for forwarding to us the State Department memorandum on the functions of NCFE and RFE. I am sorry that there has been a delay in replying to it. The chief reason has been our effort to obtain a written statement of position from the NCFE Executive Board, and particularly from Robert Lang, the Director of RFE. After long considering the matter, Lang has expressed a desire to talk personally with you about the subject, and I understand that since the elapsed time he has had one opportunity for a conference with you on the problem. I agree with the view you expressed to him -- that there ought to be further conferences -- but nevertheless want you to know our own views without further delay.

2. I think that there is a basic element of misunderstanding in the State Department paper. That is the idea which seems to me to be implicit in it that the exiles do not broadcast. In fact, the exiles do all the broadcasting. By and large, these men are not political figures but technicians, writers and newsmen having somewhat the same training and point of view as those who do similar work for American companies. Frequently, also, exile leaders from within the National Councils are asked to make personal broadcasts. This practice will continue. All in all, so great is the exile domination of RFE broadcasts that in many instances these broadcasts have taken on the tone and coloration of indigenous radio in the countries to which they are aimed. Wherever possible, that is the aim of RFE -- to compete within each country as an indigenous national station.

3. In addition, even allowing, however, for this misunderstanding, as I believe it to be, the State Department paper presents a point of view with which I cannot agree. This is that the National Councils could in practice be placed in charge of RFE. I am almost

certain they could not be. No statement made by RFE, no line of policy that RFE could pursue, no suggestion or propaganda line that RFE could follow could be done in the name of the National Councils so long as the members of each Council are incapable of reaching a group decision or of reaching a majority decision which the minority would not attempt to subvert. It seems to me that there is only historical value in talking about what the original concept of the National Councils was. The concept has changed, and the change was necessary to correspond to the fact. The fact is the inability of each National Council to speak as a single voice.

4. Without further discussion, therefore, I am unprepared to ask RFE to make a major change in its policy such as the State Department paper suggests. I understand that you and Mr. Braden have agreed with Admiral Miller and Mr. Lang to discuss this problem thoroughly with the people who are concerned in the State Department and I hope that after these discussions we may reach an agreement on the matters which the paper raises.

FRANK G. WISNER

CIC:TWB/eh
(24 Apr 52)

Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 cc - E.R. (1 for DD/P)
1 cc - ADPC
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/[illegible]C
1 cc - EE/OPC
1 cc - SE/OPC
2 cc - RI

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert P. Joyce
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr.
on behalf of Nicolae Malaxa

1. Thank you for your memorandum of 14 March 1952 transmitting to us Mr. Campbell's memorandum of 13 March regarding the testimony of Adolph A. Berle Jr. on behalf of Nicolae Malaxa. This is to inform you that we are in complete agreement with the views which you and Mr. Campbell have expressed.

2. We feel that it is indeed most regrettable that Mr. Berle in his testimony made certain remarks offensive to the Cretzianu-Visoianu group. In March, Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu in an attempt to disclaim any responsibility on the part of NCFE for Mr. Berle's statements and also to persuade Mr. Cretzianu that Mr. Berle had spoken in a private capacity and as attorney to Mr. Malaxa. This interview was followed by a letter from Mr. Grew to Mr. Cretzianu on 26 March, in which these same views were set forth.

3. We shall make a serious attempt to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. We are returning your file as you requested.

THOMAS W. BRADEN

Enclosure
CIO/[illegible]/M [illegible]:tlj (17/4, re-typed 21/4)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - CIO
1 - IO/DDTO
1 - A[illegible]C
1 - [illegible]P
2 - RI
[illegible] - [illegible]

NBV — 15 March

Mr Dulles told me this am that Cretzmann sent a copy of this testimony to Mr Grew together with a letter inquiring "how come?" — Grew & AWD lunched yesterday & agreed that Berle was way off base and Grew is preparing a letter to Cretzmann telling him that Berle had no right to attack C as he did; a draft copy of this letter will go to Berle prior to mailing for his comments.

As AWD put it to me - 'It's in the works & there's nothing more for us to do about it at this time' —

[Gave Mr Washburn the above by phone -]

Mr. Lloyd 1 March 52

Mr. Fishburne C/SE/PC5 X 3091, X 495 brought this in today: He said ~~that~~ the DD/P is concerned about it. Ellen was not in, but called in at 5 and was transferred to Mr Fishburne.

Mr. Fishburne stated that Malaxa is a Rumanian industrialist, a crook and an opportunist, who cooperated with the Communists and supported the Nazis. (Send) OSO files is in progress and will be in Mr. Fishburne's hands.) Berle's unilateral action (identifying NCFE with this cause) involves a violation of State policy, will stir up the exiles who will think this does represent US policy and is generally very bad.

What appears needed is:

(a) High-level rapping of Berle's knuckles

(b) Official denial or

(c) NCFE denial of this as NCFE position

P.S. Berle is wrong in identifying Malaxa as a partisan of Radescu.

Nancy

17 March

Mr. Braden:

This is another example of interference and partiality on the part of NCFE. Mr. Berle had 1) no right in testifying in this case and 2) no business endorsing the Radescu faction as against the Cretzianu-Visoianu Group.

#

Major Fishburn would like the document back today, room 1201 J.

Ellen

SECRET
Security Information

2-7043

MAR 20 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Testimony of Adolph A. Berle, Jr., on behalf of Nicolas Malaxa; Complaint of the State Department.

1. Please note the attached memoranda from Bob Joyce and John Campbell, dated March 14 and March 13, respectively. Will you please prepare a brief memorandum for Messrs. Joyce and Campbell informing them that we are in complete agreement with their views concerning Adolph Berle's statements, and moreover that action has been taken to inform the Cretzianu-Visoianu group that Mr. Berle had no right whatsoever to make remarks of this kind in his capacity as a member of the Board of NCFE. You can obtain the details of what has been said from Mr. Grew and Mr. Dulles in order to strengthen and round out your memorandum to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell. (It is my understanding that Mr. Grew received Mr. Cretzianu for the purpose of denying any responsibility on the part of NCFE for Mr. Berle's remarks, which he made in his private capacity and incidentally as attorney for Malaxa.) Will you please let Mr. Horton see the memorandum which you write to Messrs. Joyce and Campbell.

2. For your information, I have recently been informed by a very knowledgeable Rumanian that, in his opinion, some good has resulted out of this highly improper and messy business of Berle's. This Berle attack on Cretzianu was partially responsible, in the judgment of my informant, for Cretzianu's sudden turn-about and agreement to shake hands with and sit down beside Messrs. Gafencu and Davila. "It's an ill wind ...", etc.

Although the following question may not be entirely in your field, I should appreciate your getting up a statement for my information concerning the present status of and our proposed future use, if any, of Julius Fleischmann. I have just heard through the grapevine that he considers his usefulness to us at an end and that he is severing all connection with this Agency. This disturbs me, as I consider Mr. Fleischmann to be an intelligent and able man who has already gained enough experience in our line of endeavor to be of value to us. If my information is by any chance correct, then I do not understand why we so lightly cast him aside. I hope that I am wrong and that he may be severing official connections only to continue his work in a more subtle manner.

(SIGNED) FRANK G. WI[illegible]

Frank G. Wisner

SECRET
Security Information

cc: DDCI
ADPC
C/SS

Attachment: Described memoranda and transcript of Berle testimony.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

In reply refer to: W-2003

18 April 1952

Dear Min:

When you were here Wednesday, you handed me a letter from Michael E. Thompson about General Hennyey.

I have looked into this and find that Thompson promised on his last trip to Washington that he would give us certain facts about Hennyey's new visa application which were necessary when the old visa application expired on 21 March. We never have received these facts from Thompson.

Will you kindly, therefore, ask Thompson to get together for you the facts on the new visa application -- its number, where it was made, etc. -- and we will go ahead and act as we said we would. We can't act without them.

Sincerely,

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/Exec Off.
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - HI

TWB Mentioned above to Adm. Miller by telephone on 17 Apr 52.
eh

SECRET

April 15, 1952

Dear Oliver:

When I last saw you, I spoke of the General Hennyey matter explaining the great importance that the Fund places on expediting the arrival of General Hennyey in this country for Fund purposes. I later mentioned this matter in detail to one of your liaison associates who has these matters in hand. I explained that it is considered imperative that all possible assistance be developed looking toward the sponsored arrival of General Hennyey in the shortest possible time. I now refer you to our letter of March 2, 1952, which I delivered in person to Mr. Abramson. That letter contains all of the necessary data for action in the case.

We have just been informed that the unconscionable delay in the processing and approval of General Hennyey's entry presently will be made the subject of public protest by elements of the Hungarian National Council. The details of this situation will be more fully explained by Leonard L. Stamm who will hand you this letter. For your convenience, I am attaching a copy of our letter of March 2 above cited, and I would further state that we believe that extraordinary action should be taken to affect the immediate processing of General Hennyey by entry permit or otherwise. Our representatives in Munich are in daily contact with General Hennyey and can be of particular assistance in the event you desire to use extraordinary means to expedite his departure for the United States.

Sincerely,

Michael E Thompson

C O P Y

March 2, 1952

Dear Mr. Minett:

General Gusztav Hennyey is Representative of the Hungarian National Council in Western Germany and a person in whom the Fund places trust and confidence in its dealings with the problems of the Hungarian National Council. The Fund has been desirous for some time that General Hennyey come to the United States, and believes that his visit here would be most helpful to the present activities and future of the Hungarian National Council.

An opportunity presented itself last fall for General Hennyey to emigrate to the United States as a displaced person. He was granted a visa by the Consul General in Munich on November 21, 1951, EC Number 256811, D.P. Commission Validation Number A-7037, Sponsor Mr. Louis Rado, 182 Main Street, Poughkeepsie, New York. Subsequent to the issuance of his visa his file was sent by the local representative of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Services in Munich to the Office of the Attorney General in Washington for special consideration under No. 8-CFR 17557. Neither General Hennyey nor the National Council have been able to determine why his case has been held in suspense, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Indeed, in response to one inquiry General Hennyey was told that the file in question had been lost. As stated above, the Fund attaches great importance to General Hennyey's visit to the United States, and considers this visit to be of high operational importance, since it will deeply affect the work of the Hungarian National Council. We shall be very grateful for any assistance which you can render in the expedition of the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. I may add that General Hennyey's visa will expire on the 21st of this month, and he also will lose his rights owing to the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act in the near future should he not be able to emigrate promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Abu. Miller
Notes:

1. "Liason associate is Bill Knott, Alien Control Chief — Security Branch.

2. ¶2:
Bela Fabian of the Hungarian Nat. Council is about to write a rough letter to the NY Times.

Tom.

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

1. At a meeting in John Devine's office at noon on 16 April at which were present Messrs. Devine, Smith, Lang, Lambie, Braden and Admiral Miller, Mr. Smith presented the program for the Crusade for Freedom for next year, which I attach. The budget estimate is just over $500,000 and the central idea is to campaign across the nation for signatures and dimes on behalf of a pledge to preserve, maintain and spread freedom.

2. There are other ideas connected with this, namely a freedom train which will carry the scroll and dimes of the people of the United States from point to point and which eventually will come to Washington where the signatures attached to the scroll will be presented to the new Congress and the new President. Essentially, however, and in terms of our relations with the State Department, the program is intended to avoid specific mention of what the money is being raised for; thus, for example, there will be no publicity about what transmitters cost and how important it is to raise the money. Instead, the campaign will be kept very general and RFE-RFA and VOA will be mentioned only incidentally as one means of spreading the idea of freedom.

3. Mr. Devine presented the program to Messrs. Sargeant, Kohler and Compton and received their approval. I have therefore notified Admiral Miller that there is no objection on behalf of the State Department to the plan presented for the 1953 Crusade for Freedom.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Program for Crusade

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P)
1 cc - ADPC
1 cc - DMIC ✓

2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECRET

Executive Registry
2-8530

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Proposed Conference at Princeton Inn

You asked me to remind you of Admiral Miller's request that you speak to David Bruce about his attendance at Admiral Miller's proposed conference at the Princeton Inn on Saturday, 10 May at 10:30 AM. You will recall Admiral Miller's mention of the fact that the idea of the conference is attributed to Mr. Bruce, dating back to a luncheon conversation that he had in Paris with C. D. Jackson and the Admiral.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

IO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI
2 cc - IO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

17 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Bulgarian National Committee

1. This is to confirm our oral report to you of the President of NCFE's report to us of his 15 April 1952 conference with Dimitrov on this subject.

2. Admiral Miller reported that he had presented the agreed upon plan to Dimitrov, without threatening to cut off funds. Dimitrov's first reaction was that the plan was a maneuver to oust Dimitrov. The end result, however, was that Dimitrov was to think the plan over and give his views on it in return. It was further suggested that a council meeting would be held on 30 April or as soon thereafter as possible. However, Admiral Miller stated that this meeting would probably not occur before mid-May, since the two members coming from Paris would probably not arrive before that time. A quorum would not be possible without them.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/NBV:bw

Distribution:
- Addressee - original
- CIO - 1
- IO/DOTO - 1
- IO/Ex.Asst. - 1
- RI - 2

SECRET

17 April 1952

Note to DDCI: I just talked to Min Miller about the Dennen situation. He would like to withdraw his objections to his overt use of Dennen.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Reports of Leon Dennen

1. Almost without exception, the Dennen reports, of which thirteen have been examined to date, duplicate reports already received, but do not contain as much information as the reports being obtained from other sources or from the same sources as those used by Dennen. Of the reports, only one has been disseminated. The Department of State's comment on that report was that a similar one had been received.

2. For your convenience, a brief analysis of the thirteen reports is presented below:

Hungary

1. Csepel Arsenal in Hungary

Comment: This report, consisting of a list of names of directors or top officials in various Hungarian industrial enterprises, was considered of marginal value. The persons listed were identified with overt positions and have been mentioned in a number of overt Hungarian publications.

2. Report on the Activities of the Hungarian Embassy and Consulate in Paris.

3. Report on Hungarian Socialist Group in France.

Comment: Information is thin and overt. These reports duplicate in part reports already received in greater detail.
This material probably comes from persons who have contact or knowledge of the Hungarian Legation, but who have not actually "penetrated" the Legation.

4. Survey of Political Conditions in Hungary from 1951 through the Early Part of 1952.

Comment: Frankly overt material, obtained (or could have been obtained) from a close reading of published material. Of marginal value as representing the viewpoints of former Hungarian industrialists.

SECRET

5. Hungary's Productive Capacity in Relation to Hungarian Plan for 1952.

Comment: Report was thin. Information on mines and factories was already known.

Overall Comment: Continuation of reports similar to the above is not recommended.

Poland

1. Polish Industry Gears for War Production.
2. Polish Coal Production.
3. Poland is Preparing Reserve Industrial Staff with Knowledge of Languages.
4. Report on Poland.

Comment on the 4 reports:

Most, if not all of this information, had been previously received through our regular channels.
The material is not disseminated to customer agencies who have overt access thereto.

5. WIN Report

Comment: A verbatim extract (42 pages) of a 100 page report which we had already received. (In this connection, please note CE's memorandum of 28 January 1952, which is attached).

Rumania

1. Zhdanov Cadre School in Bucharest

Comment: Evaluation here F3. Evaluation by State A2, but State had previously received the information.

Estonia

1. Elections of People's Judges and Lay Assessors in Estonia.
2. Some More Important Developments in Soviet Estonia in 1951.

Comment: These reports duplicate information we have received. This is true, primarily because Johannes Mikhelson is the source. Mikhelson is a WE-1 agent, is also used by Mr. Angleton, and is on [illegible]ennen's ICFTU-in-exile payroll.

Sweden

1. Soviet Propaganda in Sweden

Comment: This report is also a duplicate. (See preceding comment).

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Distribution:
Addressee - original
WE - 1
EE/SO - 1
EE/PC - 1
SE - 1
CIO - 1
IO/DDTO - 1
RI - 2

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Leon Dennen

1. We provided for Leon Dennen $71,000 for the period 1 August 1951 to 30 June 1952 for a project to be operated by NCFE in Europe. (Dennen did not, as I understand it, assume his work in Europe until c. 1 October 1951.) The $71,000 included an allotment of $6,000 for ten monthly payments of $600.00 for special intelligence activities. Otis recently informed us, however, that of the $600.00 per month allotments, Dennen had asked for and received a total of only $250.00 all told.

2. On 2 April, Admiral Miller stated that Dennen's work was absolutely worthless as far as NCFE and RFE were concerned.

Dennen's intelligence reports have been evaluated as having practically no usefulness; and, as you know, in his intelligence "gathering", he has crossed some of EE's wires. In both OPC and OSO, there is such suspicion of Dennen, that no one has been willing to give him direct guidance for fear that it would merely enlarge Dennen's knowledge of our operations.

3. When Dennen returns, my recommendation is that we tell him that while we may discontinue support to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unionists in Exile, we feel that, since we have a Paris NCFE representative, we should use this channel—or some other channel not involving additional expense.

4. Meanwhile, since the ICFTU in exile is of primary interest to EE, and of some interest to SE and WE, I have asked Mr. Brose, Mr. Horton, and Mr. Scott their views on continued support to the organization and, after a go-round with them, I will send up a further report to you.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO/KBV:bw

Distribution:
  Addressee - original
  CIO - 1
  IO/DOTO - 1 ✓
  RI - 2

URITY INFORMATION

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1995
S
16 April 1952

Dear Min:

We have a 2 April report from our friends across the street documenting certain criticisms which Mr. Visoianu has made of NCFE. Some of this criticism stems directly, I believe, from his reaction to Mr. Berle's testimony in the Malaxa case. Another of his complaints stems from the appointment of Comarnicu to a position with the Free Europe University at Strasbourg.

This report raises several questions with me. I should consider it a great favor if you would have prepared for me a review of the whole Rumanian National Committee as to factions, alignments and with recommendations regarding what might be done to improve the Rumanian Committee.

Sincerely,

Oliver Hadwood

CIO/NBV:bw

Distribution:
Addressee - original
CIO - 1
IO/Admin. Off. - 1
IO/DOTO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

April 2, 1952

Mr. Visoianu called at his request to inform us of the high lights of his recent trip to Europe. He had first attended the meeting of the Eastern European Section of the European Movement in London, then visited France, Germany and Italy.

Mr. Visoianu said that in Germany he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Hallstein, and other officials of the Bonn Government, as well as with Mr. Hober and other Allied officials. He said that the Germans were sympathetic to his discussion of Rumanian affairs and showed some interest in the problems of Eastern Europe. They, emphasized, however, that Germany's present position did not enable them to speak in terms of any positive policy at this time. Mr. Visoianu got the impression that the Germans were now, and would be in the future, even more actively interested in Rumania and other Eastern European countries than were France and Italy. Mr. Visoianu felt that France had completely abdicated its position in Eastern Europe and was entirely wrapped up in its own domestic problems and relations with Germany.

Mr. Visoianu also discussed in Germany the question of Rumanian refugees there (most of whom are Iron Guardists) and of the rather large community of Volksdeutsche who came to Germany from Rumania at the close of the war. He said that the German authorities would like to have this group returned to Rumania at such time as the country might be liberated, both because they contributed to Germany's over-population problem and because they would represent, as they have in the past, a possible instrument for German policy in Rumania. As a Rumanian, Mr. Visoianu was not over anxious to add to the numbers of the German minority but felt that a free Rumanian Government would not deny the right of return to those who wished to do so.

Mr. Visoianu talked at length with Mr. Tyler in Paris. He retains his distrust and dislike of the NCFE, which he says can never assist effectively in bringing about unity in the Rumanian emigration since it supports one group 100% and persecutes the other group 100%. He was particularly incensed about Mr. Berle's recent intervention in the Malaxa case. He said that he regarded the situation as having very serious implications not only for the emigres but also for the future of the country itself. He denounced Radescu's conduct, giving numerous examples, as detrimental to the true interest of Rumania. One of his more specific complaints against the NCFE was the appointment of Comarniciu as head tutor (or some such title) at the Free Europe University in Strasbourg. He said that Comarniciu had no education and no qualifications for the post but was there merely because he was of the Radescu faction which NCFE favored.

Mr. Visoianu saw King Michael in England but he did not indicate whether there were any new developments with respect to the King's position toward the present disunity in the Rumanian emigration.

In reply refer to: W-1970

15 April 1952

Dear Min:

Looking through the recently inherited files, I notice a special fund which has its origin in the Poole era. For the present fiscal year $10,000 has been drawn and accounted for, as a John Waterfield accounting statement dated 27 January 1952 indicates. You will note there is a cash balance as of 27 January of $5,578.

This is one of those things that questions will always be raised about. I know there is good precedent for it, however, in business firms and maybe we should continue it. In any event, I wanted to bring it to your attention and to be sure you knew of its existence.

Sincerely,

Oliver F. Hadwood

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/ExOff.
2 cc - CIO✓
2 cc - RI

In reply refer to: W-1984

15 April 1952

Dear Min:

One of your employees, Miron Buterin, prior to accepting employment with your firm, was interviewed by us. With your permission we should like to continue processing papers for his employment. If you wish to keep him, we should like to know that so that we can close out the case.

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

CIO:NBV/eh

Orig - Addressee
2 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/Ex.Off.
2 cc - RI

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SE/PC

NO.

DATE 10 apr 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. CIO			12 Apr	TWB	Forwarded per your request of 2 April 1952. TWB
2. DD/P			16 Apr	CVH	
3. ADPC				CDGB	Noted - I hope we have heard the last of complaints about this lovely handled affair from RFE, NCFE, Embassy Attache etc. etc. etc. I regret what I have said before - it is wrong for us to try to use NCFE RFE as cover for covert opr. FCW 12 April 52
4. CIO				TWB per NBV	
5. SE/PC Mr. Watson					
6. Mrs. Bailey					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

16—61356-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Tom: 10 April

I think if I were you I would forward this to DDP with a note on cover sheet:

Forwarded per your request of 7 April 195~~2~~8

JWB

done 12 apr
eh
[illegible]

Note para 10. FGW will understand the main trouble.

N.

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

13 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

1. Attached is a detailed summary of the events surrounding the attempted utilization by Opc of Henry Landowski as a contract agent in Athens. Landowski was stationed in Athens by SE/PC with the cover of a journalist under contract with RFE to provide that organization with news of refugees coming into Greece from certain countries. Landowski was not integrated into RFE; he was associated with RFE under a contractual arrangement meant to provide him with a reasonable explanation for his income and office.

2. The relationship was not a successful one for several reasons:

   a. Landowski himself was poorly suited for the assignment, and did not bring the necessary experience and skill required to maintain smooth working relations with RFE.

   b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

   c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

   d. The liaison between CIA/opc and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, NCFE, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Chief for Policy Coordination, SE

SECRET

Attach: (1)
  1. As stated in para. 1
Distribution: (See pg. 2)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

10 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SUBJECT: Henry Landowski

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b. The Landowski assignment was not, in fact, compatible with RFE's decision to station a regular staff officer of its own in Athens. Since the functions of the two men appeared to overlap to an unreasonable degree, both were put in an awkward position.

c. RFE is not organized or designed to maintain covert relationships with contract agents notionally associated with it.

d. The liaison between CIA/ops and RFE was not, during the period under consideration, fully satisfactory in this instance. Quite minor problems became serious because of a lack of complete understanding between the two organizations.

3. This division concludes from the case that neither RFE nor (by inference) its parent, NCFE, is suitable for use as a cover instrument. An agent under cover is seen in the Landowski instance as raising staffing and organizational problems RFE has not been set up to handle. Because of the unsuitability of the arrangement, and because of the security risks involved, Landowski is being recalled from Athens, and will be disposed of as securely as possible.

GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCH
Chief for Policy Coordination, SE

Attach: (1)
1. As stated in para. 1
Distribution: (See pg. 2)

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1

SECURITY INFORMATION

The Case of Henry Landowski

1. On 10 January 1951, at the request of Opc Athens, SE/PC (thru EE-1) requested an operational clearance on Henry Landowski, then residing in Athens. Landowsky, a Polish citizen by birth, was naturalized a US citizen on 25 July 1950. He is now 33 years old. The PC Field Station wished to use him as a contract agent under cover in Greece, engaged principally in PW work and in recruiting and handling other agents. The clearance was granted on 30 May 1951, and on 15 June Landowsky signed a contract in Athens.

2. The field dispatch outlining Landowsky's capabilities and the work envisaged for him described him as a free-lance journalist, resident of Greece for several years (his mother was married to a Greek), familiar with the Greek language and fluent in Polish and German, and having certain contacts in Greek government circles. His success in interviewing refugees from the satellite countries had come to the station's notice, and it was believed that under cover of such interviews he would be useful in gathering material for propaganda use and in spotting and recruiting agents.

3. The field station suggested that a cover organization be established to operate as a news agency in Athens with ostensible headquarters in New York. This agency would notionally specialize in refugee news for press and radio, and would appear to draw its main financial support from a contract with Radio Free Europe for the supplying of broadcast material on refugee topics. It was the field's plan that this news service would also furnish cover to other Opc personnel in the future, when it might plausibly expand as a business enterprise. To forward this idea, SE/PC called on Mr. Thompson, Chief of SP, on 11 July 1951 for his assistance in

obtaining RFE's

obtaining RFE's cooperation. Mr. Thompson later informed this division that a Mr. Phenix of RFE agreed to the contractual relationship proposal, but wished it made clear that RFE would not give cover to Landowski in the guise of a regular RFE employee. This was understood and agreed to by this office.

4. During Landowski's covert training in Washington, in July and August, the Commercial Division was consulted regarding the various aspects of creating a fictitious corporation, Europe News Service, along the lines outlined above. The difficulties of legal incorporation and of maintaining plausible US headquarters for such a firm, according to the Commercial Division, made this inadvisable. It was therefore decided, after consultation with the Legal Division, that a personal contract between Landowski, supposedly representing the "Europe News Service," and RFE would be sufficient and would obviate the risks of building a cover firm out of nothing.

5. During a brief conversation between Mr. Lang of RFE and SE/PC's case officer for the Landowski matter, the following points were covered: Mr. Lang was particularly interested in whether Landowski could actually provide useful material to RFE, and was told that this was the case. Mr. Lang said the desired contract could be arranged merely by his requesting it at an Executive Committee meeting of NCFE. In answer to an inquiry, Mr. Lang said no standard RFE contract form existed, but that in drawing the Landowski contract he would use the noncommittal phrasing of the RFE/Free Federation of Journalists contract, in which a definite monthly payment was stipulated without any mention of specific returns from FFJ (which, Mr. Lang said, is a subsidized organization). He was reassuring as to whether RFE's

accounting mechanism

accounting mechanism was secure enough to permit large ($1000) monthly payments to Landowski without questioning the extent of his services. Mr. Lang stated that there was no security risk from RFE's internal accounting or contracting procedure. He then mentioned that RFE planned to send one of their own employees to Athens later, probably "around the end of the year." Although surprised, since this plan had not been mentioned to Mr. Thompson by Mr. Phenix during the original discussion of Landowski in July, the case officer did not go further into this, feeling that Landowski would have three months to establish his cover in Athens prior to the arrival of the RFE man.

6. In accordance with arrangements made with Mr. Lang, Landowski was instructed to report in New York for a week's briefing in RFE affairs, and on 24 September called at RFE's offices and asked for Mr. Lang's assistant, Mr. Weld. Their meeting was most unsatisfactory, as Mr. Weld was not familiar with Landowski's background and standing with RFE, had arranged no training for him, knew of no contract, and was himself busy with preparations for a trip to Europe. Upon receiving this information in a phone call from Landowski, the division requested Mr. Lazarus of PY to phone RFE and inquire into the status of the contract, and to urge that a preliminary draft be submitted to us. After several days delay, during which one contract was drawn by RFE, submitted to Landowski who signed it, and then withdrawn and destroyed by RFE officials, a new contract was finally executed by both parties without this office knowing its terms. Landowski later stated that he had felt it imperative to sign what was given him in order to end his conspicuous position in RFE's offices, where he had spent the better part of several days in the waiting room. His training consisted of little more than a tour of RFE's installation.

7. While Lando

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7. While Landowski was in New York, the SR/PC case officer was informed that Mr. Sperling, who is in charge of RFE's European headquarters at Munich, was in Washington for debriefing and would be available for a few minutes discussion relative to Landowski. In this discussion Mr. Sperling advised that Mr. Rampft, the regular RFE employee mentioned by Mr. Lang as going to Greece "around the end of the year," was actually leaving in a week. As this would of course make it more difficult if not impossible for Landowski to explain his activities, on arriving in Athens several weeks after Rampft had installed himself as the RFE representative, the case officer protested that this was counter to the spirit of the existing agreement. Mr. Sperling, however, said the Rampft assignment to Greece had been planned a year earlier, and that it was not possible to change it. He added that he would help Landowski in every possible way, however, and asked that Landowski visit his office in Munich prior to starting work in Athens, for a thorough grounding in RFE's European programming operations.

8. At this point, the question of Landowski's cover was carefully reviewed by this division, and a decision was made not to attempt to put the man into Athens under an RFE contract if Rampft were going out as the regular representative of that organization. It seemed certain that both men would be awkwardly placed, and that their ostensible functions would overlap unreasonably. The assignment of one or the other would have to be withdrawn, and, through the division's channel to RFE (Mr. Lazarus), the withdrawal of the Rampft assignment was requested. RFE's reply was affirmative and the division was informed that Rampft was to be sent to Trieste instead.

9. However, upon

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9. However, upon Landowski's arrival in Athens on 16 October, he found that Rampft was already there, contrary to the above understanding. Landowski consequently found himself obliged to justify his position, and particularly his requests for access to refugees, as Rampft had already presented his credentials to the Greek authorities, the American Embassy, the American military authorities, and the international press representatives in Athens.[1] Landowski flew to Munich to confer with Mr. Sperling, who in an effort to resolve the problem, suggested that Landowski change the name of his supposed firm from "Europe News Service" to "Radio News and Recording Service" and that he specialize in wire recordings of refugee interviews. A new contract was therefore drawn in Munich, using the suggested title.

10. On 18 October a cable was received from Mr. Wisner in Athens relative to Rampft's presence there. This cable (IN 35284), for relay to Mr. Jackson of NCFE and Mr. Lang of RFE, stated that the Athens station was concerned lest Rampft prove as troublesome as one Ira Hamilton in Turkey. On the same date an Opc Athens cable (IN 34940) inquired if Rampft were cleared and if he knew Landowski's CIA affiliation. Upon requesting PY to obtain this information, this office was informed that Rampft was cleared and that he had gone to Athens on personal orders from Mr. Lang. On

6 November a

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[1] In a subsequent intelligence report to Defense, the US Military Attache in Athens referred to the peculiar Rampft/Landowski situation, the obvious hostility between the men, the johnny-come-lately status of Landowski contrasted to Rampft's prior arrival, and the MA's own reluctance to agree to Landowski's access to refugees in the face of Rampft's attitude and the apparent lack of official sponsorship for Landowski.

6 November a cable (IN 39122) was received from Ops Athens referring to the unsatisfactory situation resulting from Rampft's appearance in Athens and stating that, if a permanent RFE representative were actually necessary in Athens, it should be someone other than Rampft, who was reportedly lacking in security sense and said to be a heavy drinker. Through the case officer assigned to this matter, this division thereupon requested Mr. Braden's help in learning from RFE how much Rampft knew of Landowski's covert activities, whether Rampft would conduct his own work in a manner acceptable to the CIA Senior Representative in Athens, Mr. John Baker, and whether Rampft had been instructed to cooperate with Landowski without attempting to oversee his activities. No answer has been received to these queries.

11. Late in November the division was advised by Security that unspecified derogatory information had been received regarding Landowski; the field station was consequently instructed to hold up his use pending fuller information. Early in January, upon receiving an adverse completed report from Security, the field was instructed to return Landowski to Washington for termination. It was considered unwise to inform Landowski, while still in Greece, of the reason underlying his recall; he has consequently been told that the dual RFE representation in Athens (Rampft and Landowski) was no longer workable and that RFE had insisted on keeping its own man. He believes that a new RFE assignment may be possible for him after his return here late this month (his trip has been delayed by his mother's recent death in Athens).

12. The Landowski problem has now become one of recall and disposal. Quite aside from the RFE relationship, the man has not performed well,

has not

has not handled his affairs in a secure or professional manner, and is not wanted by the field station. The division plans to terminate him, read him out of any connection with RFE, and arrange that he be placed with a commercial firm for employment as a junior public relations man. Simple dismissal is not regarded as secure; continued employment by the Agency is undesirable, hence the need to find him employment of sorts until his familiarity with CIA activities has cooled.

SECRET B147 P-582 L-217

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

2-7861

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO

NO. 20/959 / 68829

DATE 8 April 52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. DD/P Col. Taylor.		10 april			[redacted]
2. [redacted]					
3. ER					
4. ~~GPY/OPC~~					
5. DCPY		17 april	18 april	JHK	
6. C-20					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					

[redacted]

Mr. Brewer:
George:

FGW asks that you attempt to get from State the information which Tom Braden asks for. He asks that I bring to your attention the following 2 points:

a. The Director does not feel it would be advisable to launch any balloon operations until after the BW campaign has died down a bit.

b. The British, through Adam Watson, have raised the question of balloon operations with FGW and want to discuss these operations during the forthcoming PC-State meetings on policy.

P. Taylor, 3rd

5/6 - Co for on tk - JHK

I will call O'Meara

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

P-2232

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Executive Registry
2-7861

8 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Letter from Admiral Miller

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Can you take the time to get a policy decision from the State Department as to (a) whether they wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether they want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time?

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Adm Miller 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressees
1 cc - ADPC
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

April 1, 1952

[illegible]

Dear Oliver:

We need to get a firm commitment with respect to the Crusade's next balloon operation.

Our best target from the point of view of geography and RFE radio coverage is Czechoslovakia. We can go into Poland and Hungary somewhat less efficiently. If Hungary should be the target, we will presumably still have the problem of clearance from the British to launch from their Zone, and failing that should have to back up to our Zone.

We need an absolute minimum of three months to prepare a balloon operation; the longer notice the better. A date of special significance to the target country is perhaps of some slight additional desirability from the psychological point of view. It is, however, not essential. From the point of view of our campaign schedule, an initial launching date of about August 20th would be ideal. This would allow the story on the operation and its effect to become known at the opening of our September campaign.

We have in storage in Munich 50,000 packages (of two each) of razor blades, 100,000 zippers, 72,000 packets of needles (five to the packet), and 150,000 cakes of soap (1/2, 3/4 and one ounce sizes). All of the above except needles were donations to the Crusade, and the needles were at cost. We have had to tell Gillette and Talon twice (at Christmas and at Easter) that the operation for which they supplied their products had been delayed. We should very much regret having to do this again.

I do not know what keeps putting this off the track. It is my information that the boys in the big house were initially enthusiastic about the idea, and the record will show that Ambassador Briggs thought it most valuable in Czechoslovakia, witness his special request that this means of communication be used at the time of the Czech Freedom Train break-out.

I would appreciate your getting us as soon as possible a positive and (barring an act of God) irrevocable approval for a balloon operation into a specified target country at a certain date, with agreement in principal on the nature of the operation -- i.e., of an order of magnitude of 60,000 to 75,000 vehicles, bearing the above mentioned materials together with messages. To repeat, by far the best target is Czechoslovakia; our preferred date: around August 20th.

Let us not make this approval in principle (with firm date and target) contingent on a budget, except in a general way. With an approval in hand, we can proceed with plans and supply a fairly accurate budget, which will depend somewhat on such things as whether we can use the P-20 balloons on hand for the short flight to Prague or whether we will have to resort to P-50's for the longer flight into Poland or from the U.S. Zone of Austria into Hungary.

Sincerely,

/s/ Leonard

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

28 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FE-2

SUBJECT: Future Balloon Operation

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Min Miller in which he suggests the necessity of coming to a definite decision in respect to a future balloon operation.

2. Will you advise me as to (a) whether you wish to have a balloon operation in August or at any subsequent date, and (b) whether you want us to set aside funds and materials now for a future balloon operation at some unspecified time.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr from Min Miller
dtd 1 Apr 52.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - IO/TOMIC
1 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

7 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Labor Service Companies

The exact text of a 27 March 1952 letter from the Political Advisor of RFE at Munich to the President of NCFE is supplied below for your information.

> "This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.
>
> "There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.
>
> "The Czechoslovak Company included both Czechs and Slovaks, although I understand that the Slovak Separatists here make violent efforts to have a separate one for themselves. The Bulgarian Company is at present made up almost entirely of adherents of Dimitrov. Further recruiting, however, in this respect is now going on with a policy of barring both Bulgarian National Front and Dimitrov followers.
>
> "I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Kersten Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends."

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

cc: SE
EE

CIO/MEV:bw
Distribution:
Addressee - 1 IO/DOTO - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

C
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STRICTLY PRIVATE

27 March 1952

Dear Admiral Miller:

This is in respect to the various Labor Service Companies made up of Eastern European exiles now existing in Germany.

There have been Polish Labor and Guard Companies ever since the war and these are what their name implies. There have been set up, however, within the last year Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Labor Service Companies here. These latter two represent an activity with which our friends are directly involved. I have been informed by them upon my inquiry that should any reference be made by satellite propaganda to these companies it is desired that in any RFE comment upon it that these companies should be treated as being what their name implies.

The Czechoslovak Company included both Czechs and Slovaks, although I understand that the Slovak Separatists here make violent efforts to have a separate one for themselves. The Bulgarian Company is at present made up almost entirely of adherents of Dimitrov. Further recruiting, however, in this respect is now going on with a policy of barring both Bulgarian National Front and Dimitrov followers.

I am also informed by my friends here that active planning is now under way in respect to the Kersten Amendment. I should much appreciate it if we could keep informed of any developments in this respect here for possible use in RFE broadcasts and for conversations with friends.

Sincerely,

/s/ BILL

W. E. Griffith

cc: Mr. Leich
Mr. Galantiere

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

ER-2-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that, until after the forthcoming meeting with the British or the development of the Psychological Strategy Paper, which is being laboriously ground out by Admiral Stevens' Ad Hoc Committee, I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgement of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

Never - [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] overtaken [illegible] Mr. Dulles's letter of 31 March 52 a copy of which you have.

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we are continuing to urge NCFE to extend cover assistance to the Kirk Committee. On the basis of our most recent conversations with Mr. Dulles and Admiral Miller, I was under the impression that you were trying to dig up some other forms of cover - particularly in view of the reluctance of the NCFE Board to extend the Crusade cover to the Kirk Committee. Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events. — yes.

5. I understand that you are getting up a memorandum on the Landowsky case. I am relieved to hear that Landowsky has been recalled from Greece and that it is not intended to have him return.

\ N.B.V.

Done 11 Apr 52 ABL

Frank G. Wisner
FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

This comes up at PRC — or is scheduled on Friday. After that, we need to advise Admiral to apply to 1848 — if PRC approves, that is.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PROCEDURE
FOR
TPMEDIC TRANSFERS

2 April 52

Step 1. a. Facility (TPTONIC, PILLAR or what have you) sends letter of request to MEDIC.

b. Facility sends certified true copy of request (1a.) to IO (via area division involved if not for TPTONIC as set forth in Step 2 below).

Step 2. FOR TPTONIC only (Includes BGCAKEBOX)

a. IO prepares letter for ADFC's signature, addressed to MEDIC, authorizing MEDIC to transfer funds requested by TONIC to TONIC on basis of 1a. above if request is in order.

b. MEDIC receives letter of authority (2a.).

c. MEDIC transfers funds to TONIC on basis of 2b. and at the same time prepares a letter of transmittal addressed to TONIC, copy to IO.

d. TONIC, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC (2c.), prepares a letter of acknowledgment addressed to MEDIC, certified true copy to IO.

e. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by IO, transmitting receipts 2d. together with certified true copy of letter 2a. (See 2f below).

f. IO prepares letter addressed to CFD, signed by CIO, requesting CFD to reimburse MEDIC for the total amount of receipts 2e. Note: Letters 2e and 2f are hand carried to CFD together.

g. CFD, on basis of 2f transfers funds to MEDIC.

h. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of 2g by letter to IO.

Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC and BGCAKEBOX (after Step 1)

a. Area division authorizes CFD to transfer funds from "XXX" Project to MEDIC for transfer to facility by letter, signed by appropriate area division chief. (Note: This letter comes to IO whose responsibility it is to determine that funds are available in "XXX" Project).

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Step 3. FOR OTHER THAN TPTONIC AND BGCAKEBOX (CONTINUED)

b. IO prepares letter to CFD with letter 3a attached for ADPC's signature requesting CFD to transfer funds to MEDIC. (See 3c. below).

c. At same time letter 3b. is prepared, a letter for ADPC's signature is prepared by IO authorizing MEDIC to transmit the funds to facility(addressed to MEDIC).

d. MEDIC receives letter of authority 3c.

e. MEDIC acknowledges receipt of funds which CFD transmits(3b)

f. MEDIC transfers funds to facility on basis of 3d and at the same time sends letter of transmittal to facility, copy to IO.

g. Facility, upon receipt of funds from MEDIC, prepares a letter,addressed to MEDIC, acknowledging receipt of funds 3f., certified true copy to IO.(See 1b.)

h. IO upon receipt of letter 3g. prepares letter addressed to CFD and transmitts same together with copy of letter (certified true copy) 3c.

NOTE: It will be the responsibility of the Administrative Office/IO to verify that funds are in fact allotted for each project before preparing the above papers.

PAM

Distribution:
EXO/IO - Original
Adm O/IO - 1 copy
FY/Maggio - 1 copy

SECRET

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Provisions of Proposed Agreement Between NCFE and CIA

It is proposed that an agreement which will include the following be entered into by NCFE and CIA.

1. A statement to the effect that subject to the security, program, budgetary, and policy controls and the veto authority of CIA set forth below, NCFE has administrative and operational responsibility for the conduct of its operations.

2. A provision that NCFE will submit to CIA an annual operating plan and supporting budget for the programs which it plans to undertake during each fiscal year. The approval of such operating program and budget by CIA will include authority to NCFE to proceed as necessary in their judgment to accomplish the objectives set forth in the approved program, subject to controls set forth below.

3. A provision that NCFE will maintain adequate accounting and fiscal controls.

4. A provision that NCFE will undertake only those programs which have been approved by CIA.

5. A provision that CIA will provide funds to NCFE for approved programs.

6. A provision that CIA will furnish national policy guidance to NCFE for the conduct of such programs and that NCFE will conform to such policy.

7. A provision that NCFE will conform to security regulations to be prescribed by CIA. These will include the security clearance of necessary personnel, obtaining of security agreements from all witting personnel, and necessary physical security measures.

8. A provision to the effect that the general organizational structure and salary scales including allowances will be approved by CIA.

9. A provision that the president and vice-presidents of NCFE will be employed subject to the concurrence of CIA.

[illegible] INFORMATION

10. A provision that CIA (we) will have veto authority over activities to be undertaken by NCFE which are contrary to other (of) CIA (our) or national policies. (it is expected that this would seldom, if ever, have to be exercised)

11. A provision with respect to the termination of operations under this agreement.

12. A provision with respect to indemnification of NCFE (your) directors, officers, and employees by CIA (us).

13. A provision that defines the (our) liability ~~of CIA~~ to each director, officer, and employee of NCFE (yours).

14. A provision to the effect that NCFE (you) will provide CIA (us) with regular progress and financial reports.

15. A provision that CIA (we) will have authority to conduct such surveys and audits of NCFE (your) activities as it deems necessary.

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE

Problem

To clarify the relationship of NCFE to CIA and the respective responsibilities and authorities of each for the conduct of NCFE operations.

Background

There is no currently effective clear statement as to the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA for the conduct of operations. This has resulted in a number of misunderstandings and problems with respect to the administration of this project by CIA.

Discussion

In order to define the respective responsibilities and authorities of NCFE and CIA, it is proposed that an agreement be entered into between NCFE and CIA which will in effect provide for:

a. Policy, program, budgetary, security control, and veto power by CIA.

b. Subject to such general controls direct administrative and operational control over its operations by NCFE.

c. The working out of machinery for submitting annual operating programs and supporting budgets by NCFE for approval by CIA (and major subsequent additions thereto)

d. Adequate progress, financial, and other reports by NCFE to CIA.

An outline of the principal provisions of such an agreement is set forth in Attachment A.

It is the consensus of all concerned in CIA that something like the above is essential. There is one technical point of difference, however, between the PP Division and the Administrative Staff Special. This is the matter of a CIA regulation (Memorandum for All Staff and Division Chiefs

Subject: Categories of Personnel (From: John W. Corris) to the effect that all witting personnel of CIA proprietary organizations must have a contract relationship with CIA. The underlying reasons for this requirement are (1) general control, (2) security control, and (3) to provide a basis for establishing a legal liability to such personnel in the event of a claim of any kind. It is the view of the IO Division that the above three requirements could be better and more cleanly met by one agreement between CIA and [illegible], rather than by several separate agreements between witting individuals and CIA.

The office of the General Counsel, CIA, has indicated informally that there is no legal objection to such an agreement between [illegible] and CIA. He also concurs informally that one contract between [illegible] and CIA is preferable to several contracts between individuals and CIA.

Recommendation

1. It is therefore recommended that the IO Division be authorized to negotiate an agreement with [illegible] in coordination with the office of General Counsel and other CIA units which will incorporate the substance of the provisions in Attachment A.

2. It is also recommended that the [illegible] or other appropriate CIA authority set aside the agency regulation requiring that all witting personnel of proprietary projects be required to execute a contract with CIA.

Mr Braden —

At Last — here's the answer to the State Paper on RFE. Sorry for the delay. Please let me know if it's OK w. you —

I do think that our difference w. State on this is very basic — and that we can't continue to operate on 2 different premises. May be this should be thrashed out in a high level policy meeting.

Ellen

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SECURITY INFORMATION

C
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Joyce — January 23, 1952.

FROM: EE - Mr. Barbour

The Functions of NCFE and RFE

In our experience with NCFE and RFE two interpretations of their functions, between which the pendulum swings from time to time, have developed. One which is set forth in the paper in the mission of NCFE and RFE, gives dignity and importance to the National Councils as the leadership organs of the Eastern European peoples in their struggle against the respective Communist dictatorships and defines the principal function of RFE as providing a way of communication between these councils and the homelands in conducting the liberation struggle. In the other view, which tends to govern RFE operations at the present time, the RFE is apparently considered a predominantly American enterprise with the objective of achieving a bigger, better, more hard-hitting, and more publicized propaganda program than the VOA but not differing fundamentally from the character and course that VOA has already marked out. The latter interpretation reduces the position of exiles connected with the RFE to that of professional employees engaged by the Americans, and the National Councils are given no direct responsibilities.

As between these two theses, EE agrees generally with the first. If RFE continues along its present course it will in our opinion become in the end simply another VOA (in fact the programming of the two organizations tends already to seek a common denominator) and disappoint the exiles and the peoples in their homelands. This will lead to competitive issues with VOA as is already the case with the Baltic language programs. If RFE is to achieve its first promise and full justification it must become the Voice of Eastern European freedom speaking through the mouths of the Eastern European leaders themselves.

EE believes that unless the RFE broadcasts are made in the name of the National Councils and the free exile leaders of Eastern Europe can speak regularly to their people by this medium the National Councils will never become more than creatures of arrested development and, deprived of the possibility of realizing one of their most important functions, will preoccupy themselves with sterile partisan rivalry and internal differences.

As the reference memorandum points out, if the National Councils are to assume this important responsibility in relation to the RFE they must become effective organizations. EE likewise agrees that the

Hungarian National Council, being the only National Council which is active in any degree as a unified and effective leadership group, should be given the proposed RFE responsibilities at once and that as soon as the other national groups become effective organizations RFE facilities should be made available to them.

Such a course raises two problems which do not seem sufficiently treated in the reference paper, namely (1) the means of bringing about the formation of unified and effective National Councils, and (2) the extent and character of supervision to be exercised over National Councils once they undertake RFE activities.

EE concurs that NCFE should devote itself as a priority and primary function to fostering the creation of effective National Councils. The reference paper suggests that to this end NCFE give more attention to the problem and take more positive measures in the nature of intervention in assisting the national groups to solve their difficulties. It seems to EE that by the very nature of the arrangement whereby the National Councils operate in the American milieu and receive financial assistance from the NCFE intervention is inevitable and that the NCFE has not refrained from intervening. The problem apparently is not whether the NCFE should intervene in the affairs of the National Councils but what kind of intervention should prevail. EE continues to believe that the ideal situation obtains when a National Council operates effectively with the least possible intervention, and that a national group should be encouraged to achieve effective organization and operations through its own efforts. Excessive intervention and certain types of intervention can produce such harm as to defeat the very purpose we seek to realize, that is, the development of strong, dignified, and important leadership organizations to conduct the national liberation effort from abroad. The wrong types of intervention inimical to this objective include actions which are widely construed as(1) being in favor of, or in opposition to, one candidate or party as against another in the organization of a National Council, (2) representing an attempt to impose a policy with respect to the future constitutional organization of a state or in relation to foreign states or foreign population groups, or (3) relegating exile leaders to a subordinate position of being employees of the Americans. Intervention of the foregoing types must be avoided by all means, yet on the other hand it is essential to assure, by intervention if necessary, that no National Council falls under dictatorial rule and that individuals are held to accountability so that our undertaking does not degenerate into simply a pensionary system for subsidizing the conduct of party politics.

SECRET

The strongest force in inducing the national exile groups to pull themselves together into some kind of unified and active councils may well be our insistence that until they do so they will not become eligible to take over the proposed RFE responsibilities. If one National Council receives access to RFE facilities this should prove an incentive to the others without our intervention to put themselves in order so that they may do the same.

As to the supervision to be exercised over the National Councils which have taken charge of the broadcasting efforts to their respective homelands, it is obvious that they will need extensive professional assistance, whether by Americans or by their own nationals, in preparing the day-to-day programs. The councils will probably wish of their own initiative, after they have discovered what daily programing involves, not to go behond (a) policy determination as to type of programing, (b) utilization by the political and intellectual exile leaders of the opportunity to speak from time to time to their people, and (c) decision on selection of certain program items. If this assumption is correct then our controls might properly be limited to (1) providing each group a recorded outline of American foreign policy for guidance if they discuss any phase of this subject or its implications, (2) preventing partisan abuses such as the disproportionate use of the RFE by one party although making sure that the representatives of each may have access to RFE facilities if ~~[illegible]~~ party representatives so wish, and (3) conducting an ex post facto review of programs in avoiding abuses of any type. In general it would be desirable to allow the councils the maximum scope of activity and responsibility in the RFE effort they are capable of undertaking in order to nurse the health and vitality of these councils as leadership organizations in the liberation struggle.

EUR:EE:HCVedeler/nl
January 23, 1952

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONF TIAL SECRET
(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION ND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Mr Braden	JNB	
	[illegible]TONIC - Personnel		
3	File Our Office		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

REMARKS: Tom: Adm H. left this with us. We have all read. Also John Shields has read. He suggested that we keep - instead of his retaining it in his file. Nancy

O.K. It's a good paper.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED

FORM NO. 30-4
SEP 1947

April 1, 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO: Admiral Miller

FROM: Mr. Myers

Attached is presentation describing our exile personnel policy. This paper is prepared in two parts, the second part of which is not yet in type. The part delivered herewith is, I feel, a precise rebuttal of any overall uninformed criticism to which we have been subjected.

In every instance where there has been specific criticism involving individuals employed at New York or Munich we are in a position to rebut charges of Communist infiltration and to defend every member of the staff thus attacked.

Upon the impression that it is an adequate statement in writing, it can be delivered, if you so desire, to Mr. Ehrans for a study and contrast with the supposed allegations he presumably has under scrutiny. Should Ehrans ask for information of a specific nature, Part Two of this paper can then be furnished him if you wish to do so.

TEM.

NCFE EXILE PERSONNEL SELECTION IN RELATION TO
(1) EXILE POLITICS,
(2) RFE BROADCAST POLICY, AND
(3) EXTERNAL CRITICISM

- I -

INTRODUCTORY HISTORY

A. Formative Stage

At its inception, the National Committee for a Free Europe believed that its Iron Curtain broadcasting operation, Radio Free Europe, could and should be developed and pursued through the medium of "National Councils" or "Committees of Liberation" composed of exile groups from the target countries. It was considered that prominent exile leaders and personalities of each nationality group could express to their captive countrymen, entirely without American advice and guidance, the message of hope which NCFE proposed to send. This concept was not fulfilled. Experience in attempting to weld a talented, dedicated group of exiles into a non-partisan broadcasting operation early demonstrated that without American control the mission of RFE would be lost in the jungle of exile-world politics. It soon became evident that the leadership among the exiles was neither sufficiently strong nor personally willing to rise above the political cross currents, factional rivalries, and splinter-group weaknesses characteristically reminiscent of the political affairs of all Eastern European countries. These factors militated against the original plan of permitting exiles, through their loosely organized Councils or Committees, to wholly develop, manage, and control RFE broadcasting.

Since the advent of RFE was the most important development affecting the exiles which had occurred since their flight from home, they quickly understood and applauded its implications and potential effect on their futures. Through this instrument they could once again become prominent and powerful in the affairs of the homeland; once more they could contend for place and power.

Selection of personnel for the purpose at hand quickly became a political football of rival leaders, personalities, and groups. Rightists, Leftists, Centrists, Labor Elements, and Splinter-groups argued with us for advancement of their particular personal or political views. Sponsorship of their own adherents as RFE employees through whom such views would be broadcast to their captive countrymen became the pattern of their pseudo cooperation. This pattern was followed to such an extent that ordinary progress and sensible development of our basic purpose of truly free broadcasts under exile control soon appeared to be not only impracticable, but dangerous. For example, the National Councils Division attempted to inaugurate broadcasts to Czechoslovakia under the auspices of a Czechoslovak National Council. The Council was and is made up of exile personalities of differing political views and parties. Its factions proceeded to engage in endless disputes and irreconcilable claims for control of script production and program content. Slovak "Separatists" arguing for the total independence of Slovakia sought that objective, while Czechs desired opposite views to be aired and advocated the rebirth of pre-war Czechoslovakia. Each group sponsored and insisted upon employment of its own more or less qualified adherents upon the assumption that its special views would be thereby expressed to the captive Czechoslovak audience of RFE. Similar activities were pursued by Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Poles until the futility of permitting the exile Councils to control the destiny and broadcasting policies of RFE was made clear beyond refutation. It became tragically obvious that uncontrolled exile-world Councils and professional politicians could not agree on personnel selection or program content.

In spite of every effort to induce harmony in and obtain proper cooperation from the "Councils", "Committees", and individuals, RFE was confronted with an impasse. The alternative theory and present policy of American selection of non-political exile personnel was the only way out. It has worked. Technically qualified personnel produce properly oriented programs -- and have been doing so with documented success since July, 1950. Disappointed exile politicians, professional exile camp followers, disturbed American special pleaders, and alarmed Communist Agents all scream, snipe and snivel -- but RFE programs are doing the job.

NCFE-RFE records of this stage can be supplied by Frederic R. Dolbeare, Vice-President, National Councils Division, and Robert E. Lang, Director, RFE. The current policy has the complete endorsement of these officers and of the Board of Directors of NCFE.

B. Development Stage

Upon the collapse of the original concept of broadcasting under exile auspices, RFE necessarily utilized some exile personnel endorsed and recommended by the leaders of the various nationality groups. As technical radio facilities came into being, exiles with radio background or writing talent were required for the production of programs. This involved using individuals eminently qualified by experience to do a radio job of script writing, announcing, acting, etc., without regard for the fact that such individuals might be persona non grata with one or another political faction or leader of an exile "Council". It also involved elimination of proven inefficient, inept or unworthy individuals without regard for their exile "Council" sponsorship. In either instance criticism of RFE was predictable and indeed was always forthcoming -- often in virulent and dishonest form.

The day to day operation of RFE developed new techniques and long range plans which made it impossible to employ non-entities of no political color or conviction. The best people to produce programs in harmony with NCFE-RFE purposes and policies necessarily were persons known in their own countries for their views on domestic political affairs and their anti-Communist activities. Hard-hitting propaganda required hard-hitting personalities whose known association with RFE and its programs would add validity and significance for our captive audiences. Gradually, therefore, the nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich were staffed with tested, qualified exiles who had been identified publicly with domestic political philosophies at issue in their own countries. Many, in fact, most of the staff people are controversial figures among their own countrymen in exactly the same way that prominent Americans are controversial in our political arena. Many indeed are members of the Councils, but are men of sufficient stature to give their primary allegiance to the non-partisan policy of RFE. The decisive factor is that there be no controversy or question about their anti-Communist convictions and records.

At this point, it must be noted that our target countries have been subject to repetitive political ferment prior to and following World War II, as well as the successive occupations of Nazi and Communist Armies.

The temper of the times, therefore, in which these exiles have lived for the past fifteen years has been one of excitement, bitterness, recrimination, rivalries, and personal turmoil -- all stemming from both domestic and foreign struggles for power. The times have produced a bumper crop of refugee traitors, collaborators, and opportunists and at the same time have developed pure Western style democrats, true national patriots, and unselfish honest men. The exile who stood by placidly through the era is not much good, however talented, as a militant messenger of hope via RFE; exiles who were honorably active in public affairs at home, and who had radio talent were, therefore, the only kind of personnel suitable for RFE purposes.

As the necessity for American operational control of nationality desks became self-evident, the only feasible personnel policy was to employ properly qualified individuals, regardless of exile politics. In the execution of this policy individuals who were useless were eliminated without regard for political sponsors. This process still goes on. Similarly, talented exile personalities recruited from any source were employed wherever needed. This process still goes on. Both processes are in vogue with a healthy disregard for exile political nuances and protests. Neither process is satisfactory to self-styled exile leaders since it follows that the appointment of an individual sponsored by one faction as a representative of its views, inevitably will evoke howls of rage and criticism from the opposite faction. This is an accepted fact of exile life. We have to live with it and get on with the job.

C. Summary

Our formative and development experiences evolved the present and continuing exile personnel policies of RFE. Exile desk employees, whether at New York or Munich, must respond to three tests:

(a) Security clearance,
(b) Endorsement of technical proficiency,
(c) Sufficient stature to eliminate exile partisan interests from program content.

- II -

CRITERIA AND METHODS OF PERSONNEL SELECTION

A. Recruitment -- General Principles

The best source of exile personnel is referral by "non-professional" exiles themselves. Among all nationalities there are many talented refugees who need employment and who can supply RFE's need for script writers, actors, announcers, etc. Accordingly, desk staffing has been accomplished by examining the qualifications of duly recommended individuals, whether the recommendations come from political personalities or otherwise. Selection is based on the ability of the individual to fill a need efficiently in turning out or participating in planned programs. Recruitment is determined only by ideological security, independence of exile politics, and personal ability. This is not to say that many individual exiles having decided personal convictions and well-known political records are not employed, but a positive statement is made that those exile employees who now produce RFE programs reflect the policies and guidance of RFE rather than promotion of partisan objectives and personalities.

B. Recruitment -- Detailed Procedures

The personnel complement of each RFE nationality desk is founded on a hard core of dependable individuals, usually two or three people, including the chief of the desk. "Dependability" is established by exhaustive inquiry at all available sources to establish the desirability, reliability, technical proficiency and security of the working core of the desk. Sources used are:

(a) Exile political personalities in the United States,
(b) Exile references of high standing and known impartiality in the United States and Overseas,
(c) Overseas contacts and personal knowledge of our American representative in Europe. (Royall Tyler-Paris),
(d) Checks and balances of our political advisor at Munich (W. E. Griffith),

(e) British Broadcasting Corporation, where applicable,
(f) Voice of America, where applicable,
(g) Special confidential sources.

These tests having been applied, confidence is placed in these initial personalities, and particularly in the Desk Chief, to carry forward recruitment of additional personnel as needed in collaboration with the American Director of RFE (Robert E. Lang, New York), and his associate officials. The leading personalities of each desk know what is expected of them and since they respond to the established criteria, the resulting full personnel complement is a group of exiles who, notwith standing their personal political views, are suitable and capable program production people. They meet our basic requirement of daily production of truly free and properly constructed propaganda broadcasts capable of evoking the widest possible audience response in our target countries.

In brief, the mission of RFE being conceived as a marketing problem, the best available salesmen are procured, trained, and utilized to sell the market.

C. Recruitment -- Special Security Measures

Since RFE, although a private enterprise, is by extension a collateral instrument of American national policy, special precaution is exercised to insure the ideological security of all employees, including exiles. In the case of exile personnel specifically, the additional approval of the Personnel Director of NCFE is required before employment, either at New York or Munich. Thus, even if a proposed exile employee meets all the described criteria he may not be employed without this ultimate approval.

The Personnel Director of NCFE utilizes appropriate and dependable sources of information to determine the acceptability of personnel from a security standpoint. His sources are investigative in nature and are conclusive as to the ideological record and security acceptability of the proposed employee. In doubtful cases the Personnel Director consults with the Vice-President in Charge of the National Councils Division and with the Director of Radio Free Europe. These three officers of NCFE jointly follow a policy of rejecting candidates about whom there is the slightest doubt. It is to be clearly understood that in making decisions of this kind the conflicting interests and frantic representations of politically minded exile leaders and groups are ignored. Acceptance or rejection of candidates is wholly based on ideological security and talent value.

D. Summary

(1) All nationality desks of RFE at New York and Munich are staffed by individuals who have passed all tests described above.

(2) All programs produced and aired by the nationality desks are checked and scrutinized by American supervisory personnel for ideological content, audience acceptance and conformity to basic NCFE-RFE policies.

(3) These conditions have been progressively in force since July, 1950.

III

RFE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR PERSONNEL

A. General Comment

The programs aired by RFE are not left to whim or chance. All programs and the personnel responsible for them are controlled by a written policy manual. The manual sets forth in minute detail the position and policy of RFE on every topic beamed to our target countries. The manual is the daily guidance of all employees, both American and Exile; deviation from its rules is not permitted. Continuous scrutiny of manuscripts and resultant broadcasts is maintained by American employees to insure that there are no deviations.

The policy manual of RFE represents the considered views of the responsible officials, including the Board of Directors, of NCFE. It is a statement of the principles and purposes of NCFE expressed in operational form. It is considered and maintained as a strictly confidential document, but it is of course available for examination by any proper authority.

The policy manual is in strict conformity with current American national policies as evidenced by the following quotation from Article One:

> "As a non-governmental radio station responsible to the millions of American citizens who support it, RFE cannot take a line contrary to United States Government policy or to the beliefs of the American people reflected in the Constitution of the United States and in American Institutions".

The above quotation is understood by exile personnel particularly to be a solemn injunction against ideological program content which in any way violates the letter and spirit of American policy and ideals. It is a guarantee to the American people and to our captive listeners that RFE and the men who make its programs are uncompromisingly opposed to the Communist regimes now in power in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries.

B. RFE Policy Defined by Handbook (Direct Quotations)

1. The purpose of RFE is to contribute to the liberation of the Nations imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-cooperation with the Soviet-dominated regimes by which they are, for the time being, ruled.

2. The central characteristic of RFE is that it is the instrument of men who are engaged in fighting for freedom and justice. As such, it encourages resistance to every tyrant, great and small, in the countries it addresses. Its speakers speak ... as men of good will who seek to contribute to the elimination of old enmities and the building of an enduring European democratic order.

3. As a free forum in which exiles speak to their own people RFE is particularly dedicated to arguments by which exiles seek to persuade their listeners of the all devouring ambitions of Soviet Imperialism, the cruelty and unworkability of Communist Institutions

and the proven advantages of the democratic way of life for the worker, the peasant, the administrator, and the business and professional strata of society.

4. RFE takes counsel with exile leaders and is respectful of their views, but its policy is not designed to further the aspirations of any single exile leader or party.

5. RFE policy is further based upon acceptance of the principle that each of the liberated peoples shall be free to determine for itself the political and social institutions under which it will live once it has been liberated.

6. Finally, the following summary in the nature of a specific limitation on program content is quoted:

> "It is indispensable that all concerned grasp clearly that RFE is a multi-national station established to contribute to the liberation of all the peoples it addresses, and not merely of one of those peoples. RFE policy is therefore commanded by the limitation that nothing may be said over its facilities to one national audience which will destroy the confidence in RFE of its other audiences or which is likely to induce any of its audiences to prefer communist rule to a liberation which might appear to promise domination by a neighboring people."

SECRET

In reply refer W-1968
to:

31 March 1952

Dear Kim:

On one of the matters which we discussed on Wednesday, i.e., the matter posed in Mr. Hughes' letter, we require some assistance from you. We have gone over this topic thoroughly and find that this is the situation.

a. The number of indigenous people which [illegible] will agree to include in their plan on our behalf is very limited.

b. This being the case, we require from you a compilation of names of indigenous people, not to exceed thirty, whom you would consider indispensable for the re-establishment of an operation similar to that of Kenneth's firm in another area, in time of real heat. It is possible, but not absolutely certain, that we can arrange to include this group of thirty in our provisions for time of trouble.

c. Moreover, we feel that it would be unwise for us to approach the Department of Defence officials at this time.

e. We, therefore, suggest that you approach the Department of Defense directly and independently with no reference to the fact that we have an interest in the matter as a whole, and with no reference to our interest in any part of it (e.g. the number thirty above). We feel that General Clay and other influential citizens who are concerned with your organization may be of assistance in the direct approach which we have recommended.

I need not assure you that this cause is one of special interest on our part; nor do I need to stress the practical considerations within the assisting Department which compel us to declare our own limitations and to suggest the direct independent approach, for you are, I am sure, the first to understand a problem of this type.

In compiling the list of thirty names, you should I believe, choose individuals who fit into the "indispensable" category by virtue of their programming and idea generation capabilities rather than because of engineering or other technical background.

You will perhaps wish to know that a copy of this letter is being sent by Allen to Mr. Hughes to whom Allen has recently sent a belated interim reply.

I hope that we may hear from you in regard to this list at an early date. While we require the names, for your own information, those names—according to present arrangements—would be made known only to our own people, not to the military authorities. For the latter, numbers we hope will suffice.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Oliver Haywood

CIO/NBV:blj
Distribution:
  Orig. - Addressee
  1 - Hughes (as stated above)
  1 - CIO
  2 - RI

  1 - TONIC CHRONO

In reply refer
to: W-1954

11 March 1952

Dear Mims:

I should appreciate your discussing a matter of some interest to us with Kenneth Walters. If agreeable to him and to you, we should like to have from you a few sheets of Radio Free Europe stationery to use for a letter, along the lines of the attached draft, to an individual in Panama City who has a radio station useful to our purposes. The draft is, I believe, self-explanatory, although not necessarily in the final form the letter will take. In case you are willing to assist us as suggested, we would handle the money and accountings for it. You will note, however, that the possibility exists that the funds will be attributed to Kenneth's organization.

Please return with your reply the enclosed draft. We will provide you with a copy of the letter which is sent, if the plan is carried out.

Sincerely,

Oliver Haywood

CIO/[illegible]:blj
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - CIO
2 - RI
1 - [illegible] Chrono
1 - IO/D/TO

New York
10 December 1951

Mr. James Clarendon
Radio Station Continental
Panama City

Dear Jim,

Following up our talk of last summer, I believe I am now in a position to assist you in your efforts to combat international communism in the Panama area. During the past few months I could not help but think of your experience with the French Underground after you were shot down and of how you no doubt have a personal interest in letting people in Panama know what must be done to keep the western world free.

Unfortunately, Radio Free Europe, by the very nature of its charter, cannot engage in activities within this hemisphere. But in the course of our campaign, I have been approached by a group of persons, representing an international religious denomination and several large business firms, who would like to invest in keeping our hemisphere free of the communist menace.

I am, therefore, recommending to this group that they send you the sum of $500.00 per month for an indefinite period with which to have you support any programs of sort that you consider effective in explaining and backing up the concept of freedom in the Americas. Possibly a radio program run by a local organization would accomplish this purpose.

There is no reason why such a local organization should not get credit for the program, but, of course, if need arises there would be no objection to your explaining the source of the funds.

In order to satisfy its auditors, the group would appreciate receiving a simple monthly accounting indicating station symbols, wave lengths, broadcast time and hours, costs of scripts, and salaries of personnel.

Please let me stress once again, Jim, that I am acting as middleman in this matter privately and individually, and not in behalf of Radio Free Europe with which I am affiliated.

By the way I met Bud [illegible] recently. He has quite a family by now.

Let me hear whether you will be able to take this on.

Yours,

[illegible]

(All names except that of Clarendon are fictitious.)

14-00000

Tom: 11 April 52

Mr. Dulles has taken care of para 3. Assume we are relieved of this one. FGW/B ✓

UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED NTIAL [✓ SECRET]

(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director, Plans	FGW	
2	Chief, International Org.		
3			
4			
5			

FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	Deputy Director	A.W.D.	4/9/52
2			
3			

☐ APPROVAL
☐ ACTION
☐ COMMENT
☐ CONCURRENCE

☒ INFORMATION
☐ DIRECT REPLY
☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY
☐ RECOMMENDATION

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ RETURN
☐ DISPATCH
☐ FILE

REMARKS: To Mr Braden –
This was done in
line with one of your recent

31 March 1952

Dear Frank:

I have been hoping to see you here in Washington or in New York for some time past as I want to take the opportunity to tell you how much we all appreciate the outstanding work you did in connection with NCFE. When we get together, I shall have an opportunity to express this appreciation more fully.

Meanwhile, please let me know if you plan to come to Washington and I will do the same if and when I get up to New York. Unfortunately, recently I have been tied down here with very little opportunity to see my friends in New York.

Sincerely,

Frank Altschul, Esq.
40 Wall Street
New York, N. Y.

AWD:leb
Distribution
Orig. - Add.
1 cc - Chrono
1 cc - Pers
1 cc - NCFE file

C O P Y

FRANK ALTSCHUL
730 Fifth Avenue
New York 19, N. Y.

Room 1701
Tel. Judson 6-5526

April 3, 1952

Dear Allen,

Thank you for your letter. I have no present intention of coming to Washington as for the past week I have been knocked out by this virus infection that has been going around. However, I look forward to seeing you whenever you find it convenient to drop in.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Frank

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
1308 - 29th Street, N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.

14-00000

SECRET
Security Information

9-7715

5 April 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations Division

FROM : Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : National Committee for a Free Europe - Radio Free Europe - Miscellaneous Recommendations for Action

REFERENCE : Memorandum from C/IO to D/DCI, DD/P and ADPC dated 27 March 1952

1. I have read the reference memorandum which I note contains quite a number of recommendations for action, some of which apply to the undersigned.

2. I would like to participate in the Princeton bull session but believe it unnecessary for CIA to be represented by so many people. If Mr. Dulles is going I should prefer to drop out. A further reason for reluctance on my part to attend this meeting is that I have already passed on to the NCFE people interested all of the ideas and information which I have on the principal theme of this discussion. I therefore feel that, until after the forthcoming meeting with the British or the development of the Psychological Strategy Paper, which is being laboriously ground out by Admiral Stevens' Ad Hoc Committee, I would have nothing new to contribute. However, if Mr. Dulles is unable to attend and you feel that I should go, I would be willing to do so.

3. Concerning your report of Frank Altschul's feeling of grievance, I should be glad to sign a letter to him if Mr. Dulles agrees that I am the proper person to do this. Pending Mr. Dulles' consideration of this matter, will you please prepare in draft form for my signature a friendly letter to Mr. Altschul in which you might comment upon the fact that NCFE-RFE now represents one of the most potent weapons in our entire arsenal, and following with an acknowledgement of the very important contribution which Mr. Altschul made toward the development and shaping of this instrument.

SECRET
Security Information

4. I am somewhat confused by the contents of the action paragraph following paragraph 3, in which you indicate that we are continuing to urge NCFE to extend cover assistance to the Kirk Committee. On the basis of our most recent conversations with Mr. Dulles and Admiral Miller, I was under the impression that you were trying to dig up some other forms of cover - particularly in view of the reluctance of the NCFE Board to extend the Crusade cover to the Kirk Committee. Perhaps this paragraph of the reference memorandum has been overtaken by events.

5. I understand that you are getting up a memorandum on the Landowsky case. I am relieved to hear that Landowsky has been recalled from Greece and that it is not intended to have him return.

(Signed) FRANK G. WISNER

FRANK G. WISNER

cc: DDCI (with reference memorandum)

SECRET

31 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Radio Free Europe

1. As of April 1st, this Division plans to discontinue its routine informational support to Radio Free Europe. This support, which has been carried out by a staff of about fourteen people, originated in the necessity for RFE to have access to Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Summaries, State Department information, and other overt information which came into CIA. It became apparent sometime ago there was not enough of this material to fill out RFE broadcasts and, as you know, RFE hired the so-called stringers to do the chief news-gathering job. The information sent RFE by us has for some time been accessible to RFE directly from the agencies which publish it. Our decision to cut out this service has the concurrence of RFE and makes possible the assignment of fourteen people elsewhere.

2. To take the place of this staff, IO Division proposes to have one or two people concentrate on developing ideas and policy and theme guidance for RFE along the lines which the DDCI has suggested in conversation with me. One good man of necessary talent and experience will concentrate on this full time, pulling together matters from FI Division, State and other sources. He will continue to give RFE such intelligence summaries as can be made sterile, but his principal task will be to ride herd generally on the RFE programs as our chief point of information and liaison.

THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - Addressee
1 cc - CIO
1 cc - IO/EXO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, W.1.

29 March 1952

Dear Allen:

This is a somewhat belated acknowledgment to your note of 7 March. I expect to be back at 15 Broad around the middle of May.

C. D. wrote me about going back on the Board of the National Committee several weeks ago, and I have told him that I am favorably disposed, but would like to defer decision until I get back and have a chance to talk with him and see what my general commitments promise to be. This is one which I should like to stay with because of my early association with you and the others in setting it up. I also was very much impressed by the layout in Portugal, which I went out to see after the Lisbon meeting.

I hope all goes well with you.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Chuck

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
1308 29th Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
U. S. A.

Copy of this given to Nancy 14 Apr 52

Tom: 3 Apr 52

Suggest you tel Adm Miller in re 28 March letter on Easy Baker to say foresee no difficulty in getting approval of funds for expenses incurred or committed (21,879.39) Is this right? However, full explan of Expenses paid as of 21 Mar 52 and of Commitments as of 21 Mar 52 would be helpful. (In latter case, P.O. nos. do not identify entries) ~~As for rest — we would be~~ ~~on that~~

As for the rest, we'd be willing to work on it, if we had def. estimates. We would have to have these from you.

March 28, 1952

Dear Oliver:

Wearing my Crusade hat at this juncture, let me fill you in as best I can on the history and development of the Crusade operating budget. This is no mean job, since practically all of the transactions concerning it were verbal — a situation I hope to correct in the future, starting now. So here goes. I will make the special budget the subject of a separate letter.

In December, Abbott got the General's verbal approval of a Crusade budget for 1952 of approximately $1,000,000 if Abbott would stay on. Before any progress toward firming up this commitment had been made, difficulties arose in connection with our position vis a vis VOA. On January 17th, CD and Abbott met with everyone concerned in the problem in Ed Barrett's office. Out of this meeting came general agreement that the 1952 Crusade program should be considerably reduced in scope, which was duly reported to the Crusade Board the following day. Allen instructed Abbott to draw up a proposed budget for something under $500,000. This Abbott did under date of January 21st and transmitted it to Allen with a letter dated January 23rd.

The budget submitted, which I believe is in your hands, amounted to $488,991, covering the eleven months from February 1st to December 31st, 1952. (The Crusade had meanwhile received on January 11th, on special request, funds covering the months of December and January.)

It was initially contemplated that the total sum of $488,991 should be transferred to the Crusade in a lump. It then developed that because of fiscal year problems five-elevenths, or $222,270, would be transferred immediately.

Within a week or so from January 23rd, Abbott received telephonic approval from Allen of the $488,991 over-all, with $222,270 to be transferred in a lump sum.

Early in February, Crusade was advised it would be more convenient for you to transfer just the February allotment and postpone the lump sum payment until March. On advice, we therefore made formal request for $44,454 for February on February 19th. This payment was received by us on March 3rd. It is the only installment we have received against the total (eleven-month) Crusade 1952 budget. During my trip before last, I received verbal reassurance that the balance of the five-month figure would be forthcoming. This then is to urge you to put this in line for attention as soon as possible.

To recapitulate, this is a request specifically for $177,816, representing $44,454 a month for March, April, May, and June.

Sincerely yours,

March ~~28, 1952~~

Dear Oliver:

This is an attempt to give you the background of our special EASY BAKER budget. This is the balloon project, initiated last fall after the first Winds of Freedom one and scheduled for Christmastime. It was then known as Santa Claus or SUGAR CHARLIE. After definite cancelation for Christmas and postponement to Easter, it became known in our accounts as Easter Bunny or EASY BAKER.

In a memorandum to John Danewood, dated December 5, 1951, Abbott said: "Attached, also, is request to cover costs of operation Santa Claus to date. Except for some continuing preparations in the field, this too is being kept on ice pending further word from you. You will recall that AWD authorized the purchase of vehicles, etc., at our conference in his office in October. We estimated at that time that the total project would run approximately $175,000."

Formal request to the Foundation for the $51,500 was made January 3rd, together with request for December and January operating expenses. All these sums were received by Crusade January 10th.

On one of Abbott's January or February trips to your city, he received a promise to transfer to us the balance of the EASY BAKER budget ($123,500). I would strongly recommend that this would be the neatest way of handling this account. ✓ We naturally keep separate accounting for this budget and could give you an accounting to date at any time on request. To make such a transfer now would also enable you to dispose of this budget in your current fiscal year, in which an allocation for it has presumably been made.

I should perhaps set down for the record that it cannot be guaranteed that an EASY BAKER type operation, when and if it should be definitely put on the schedule, can be carried off for the original budget of $175,000. There are too many variables. And, while the major part of the budget spent or to be spent goes for quasi capital equipment, some of it goes or will go for expendable operation (publicity, communications, and the like) which would have to be repeated in connection with another balloon operation.

Attached is a schedule of expenses and commitments as of March 21st against the EASY BAKER budget. From this you will see that we have had to use general operating funds of about $21,000 for EASY BAKER as of that date. A rough estimate of additional costs of the prayer operation, which belongs to EASY BAKER, is $9,500. (I also attach for your information a mimeographed report indicating the acceptance of the prayer operation among the churches.)

To recapitulate, this is a request for transfer of the balance of $123,500 of the EASY BAKER special budget.

Sincerely yours,

EASY BAKER BUDGET

Cash balance as of March 21, 1952	1,431.91	
✓ — Paid expenses as of March 21	50,068.09	
Total cash received against budget..................		51,500.00

✓ Committments as of March 21, 1952:

P.O. 790	45.00	
" 780	30.50	
" 779	37.00	
" 749	333.20	
" 747	16,500.00	
" 743	757.60	
Robert Jordan (Dir. Church Prom.)	1,200.00	
German Accounting #5	1,465.00	
" " #6	1,943.00	
Total commitments		22,311.30

Total expenses and commitments	72,379.39
Total cash received on budget	51,500.00
Budget deficit as of 3/23/52	21,879.39

EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO
CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM'S SUGGESTION OF A PRAYER MOVEMENT

(Early in March the Crusade sent letters to every house of worship in the United States, Councils of Churches, Ministerial Associations, Councils of Church Women, as well as to a few national secular organizations. Those letters urged people to offer special prayers for those whose religious freedoms have been restricted because of Communist domination. The Crusade undertook to make known to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain this movement on the part of Americans and to request their prayers for us in exchange. The quotations herein which are of a congratulatory nature to the Crusade are included not out of vainglory, but because they tell part of the story: the acceptance by the First Estate of this proposal from a lay organization. On reflection it may be judged that only a lay organization could successfully make such a proposal.)

IVANHOE, MINNESOTA -

"This is a step in truly proper procedure in the struggle...between the free countries of the world and those enslaved by Marxian doctrines and practices. May God speed the plan."

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND -

"We feel here...that the Christian Church is in a period of greatest opportunity in light of recent persecutions and restrictions throughout the world. History has shown that in periods similar to these, the Church has grown large enough for the task ahead of it. ...prayers for those who are under persecution and restriction throughout the world are offered... every Sunday...

"After a full year of such a program for the peoples of the enslaved areas, our own people have grown more acutely conscious of the problem facing the Christian Church. ...enlightenment upon Christianity's greatest competitor, Communism, is necessary for those of us who are still gripped with complacency. Besides enlightenment, it would be of help to our own people that prayers and thoughts of those people behind the Iron Curtain are for our strength to help them conquer their enslaving ideologies.

"We will make public this letter and renew our efforts to make our own people more conscious of the need. Our prayers will be for the people of the world and the persecution that they might have religious freedom and, above all, be worthy of that freedom when it comes. We ask their prayers for our strength in a fight against a deadly enemy called 'complacency and religious pride.' I would like to recall that prayer cannot be separated from action and that our prayer is for the Crusade for Freedom and that our action will be in helping you."

WESTFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS

"...hope that you will be able to get behind the Iron Curtain with the specific information that Christian people are united in praying for this freedom for all. It is my intention to include...a special prayer in which the entire congregation will unite as a part of the Crusade for Freedom."

TUTTLE, NORTH DAKOTA

"I think God for the Crusade for Freedom, and for the leaders who give of their time and strength for such a worthy cause. I can assure you of my support."

DRESDEN, TENNESSEE

"God grant that the common effort of all toward this campaign shall not be in vain, but shall eventually lead to the lasting peace and freedom that all peoples cherish so much."

CENTERMORELAND, PENNSYLVANIA

"...pledge my support in your prayer campaign... On each Sunday special intercession will be made. We shall ask not only that their...freedom... be restored but that the...gospel may make easier the burdens of oppression which they now carry.

"Our prayers shall be with the Crusade for Freedom as it continues its splendid efforts in behalf of a great cause. May we be always of the side of God in the battle for right and truth."

CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA

"...will begin special prayers on Sunday, March 23... By prayer, by daily acts of self denial and by constant expressions of material charity, the members of this congregation are doing, and will continue to do, everything in their power to assist the Crusade. May God bless and prosper your work."

MANCHESTER, GEORGIA

"It is indeed gratifying to know that there are yet God fearing men... who are willing under God to promote such a worthy cause as the Crusade for Freedom. May God richly bless you and give you spiritual courage to carry on as a clarion in this dark hour of spiritual need."

DENVER, COLORADO

"We shall be most happy in this parish to do something specific in a spiritual way for the restoration of freedom of religion in the satellite countries. It will be announced to our congregation on Sunday, March 16th, that a special Mass will be offered on the fourth Sunday of Lent, on Passion Sunday, on Palm Sunday and again on Easter Sunday for religious freedom behind the Iron Curtain. I can assure you that in this parish many hundreds of prayers and Holy Communions will be offered to Almighty God for our distressed brothers and sisters behind the Iron Curtain. God grant that your request will receive the response that it so richly deserves. Humble prayers will be more potent than the most effective bomb."

HOLYOKE, MASSACHUSETTS

"This silent prayer was inserted in our order of worship yesterday in response to your request.

> "Father, we thank Thee for the privilege of worship, and for the freedom to listen, to think, and to speak as Thy Spirit directs. Make us deeply sensitive to the sufferings of the peoples of Eastern Europe and of Asia, to whom this freedom is now denied. Open their hearts and lives as well as ours, we pray Thee, to the message of the Gospel of Christ."

NEWCASTLE, MAINE

"I am very happy to cooperate...it is often difficult to make people understand that...we are part of a great world movement. If only each individual in each tiny place could and would realize he...can in a small way further the cause of peace and justice..."

ROSEBURG, OREGON

"...our congregation has been much aware of the needs and the available power through prayer. We shall continue to do everything we can. Thank you for encouraging the Church people to broaden their vistas and horizons of the prayer experience."

SPRINGFIELD CENTER, NEW YORK

"...sincerely trust the response to your appeal will prove so universal that the prayers of millions of earnest and loyal Christians will prove so overwhelming that with God's help we shall be miraculously successful in bringing to naught the diabolical machinations of the godless Soviet Tyrants..."

CONCEPTION, MISSOURI

"On March 23, I shall conduct a Day of Recollection and direct it toward the aims and purposes of the Crusade. The Seminarians will be asked to continue their prayers on the following Sundays for this purpose. If there is any other way in which we can be of help, please call on us."

ONEONTA, NEW YORK

"It was most gratifying to learn that you ... in the Crusade for Freedom recognize the value of prayer to the extent that you are willing to solicit the prayers of God's people for those who are in need.

"Be assured of the prayers of the members of my Church ... over eight hundred members and myself in this worthy endeavor. I am persuaded that the God that controls all the wealth of this world is going to honor you and your colleagues materially and spiritually because of your approach to this matter."

DURANT, OKLAHOMA

"...I promise that we ... in this area will cooperate in prayers for peace and freedom ..."

YORK, PENNSYLVANIA

"We shall print on our Bulletin the following prayer, on the four Sundays beginning with March 23rd, and shall ask our people to use it as a congregation and personally. The prayer follows:

"Almighty God, Thou who are truth and love, in whom is justice, righteousness, and liberty, we bow in sincere and earnest prayer that Thy power may bring the blessings of full freedom to worship Thee and serve Thee, to all Thy children who dwell in lands where men know not this freedom. Grant unto them that through Thy grace they, and we, may rejoice to know Thee, to worship Thee, and to serve Thee. We ask this through Him who died that men might live in Thee, the only true God and Father of us all. Amen."

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

"On Sunday, March 23rd ... will offer special prayers ... will repeat these prayers from time to time thereafter ..."

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

" I enclose a copy of a prayer...

"Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, we beseech thee to bring a righteous and just peace into our world. Cleanse the hearts of the men of all nations of petty provincialism, of envy and of hatred and endow all their leaders with humility and courage to know and to do thy will. And more especially we pray for the people of Russia and their leader, Josef Stalin, that they and He, being cleansed from False Doctrine, may be brought to the light of thy truth and may seek peace and understanding rather than discord and war. Grant to our own nation a deeper sense of responsibility in using the power thou hastgiven her,

"...and enlighten those we have set in authority over us so that they may honestly try to further thy will. Finally, we pray for thy Holy Church. Wherever she may be, that she may be revived by thine indwelling spirit and made the sure instrument of union for all men in our divided world. Pardon the imperfection of this our prayer and in all things thy will be done. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

MINONK, ILLINOIS

"Please put us down as another church with a world view and ... a concern for religious liberty ... of our Christian brethren behind political curtains in Europe and Asia. All good success to you in 'our' campaign to overcome evil with good, to fight the big lie of communism with the big truth of universal freedom, freedom 'in Christ', which we in God-blessed America so enjoy today."

FROM A CITY COUNCIL OF CHURCH WOMEN

"We rejoice in this gesture from Crusade for Freedom and join with you in special prayers."

TUNICA, MISSISSIPPI

"We think the idea is a good one, and we shall join with you, using the following prayer:

"O Almighty God, whom to know aright is life eternal, whom to serve aright is perfect freedom, grant, we beseech thee, the restoration of religious freedom to oppressed peoples everywhere, but particularly to those in the subjugated nations of Eastern Europe. Give them hope, fill them with courage, strengthen their determination until the iron yoke of Communism is broken by the power of Christ, in whose name we pray. Amen."

BINGHAMTON, NEW YORK plans to use the following prayer which came from "Prayers for Men in Service":

"For the Oppressed: O God, The Creator of men and of nations, we implore Thy fatherly care and protection in behalf of all Thy children everywhere who suffer persecution. In all their trials and tribulations be Thou their Refuge and Strength. Impart to them Thine own comfort and courage. Turn the hearts of the oppressors from evil to good. Stop the hands and convert the wills of those who would array brother against brother in racial strife. Restore to all men everywhere the blessing of religious freedom. Fill our hearts and inspire our minds with a desire firmly to establish peace and justice, liberty and fraternity throughout the world; for His sake, who suffered for all mankind, Thy Son, Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen."

DULUTH, MINNESOTA

"...pleased to join all Christians of this country in a Crusade for Freedom. Daily we are praying for the restoration of religious freedom to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. May God bless your effort in promoting Christian freedom and peace in this world."

WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA

"With deep emotion we ... assure you of our wholehearted cooperation .... Religious liberty throughout the world has long been a special intention remembered here. We shall not fail to ask Him to inspire Pastors to encourage their congregations to do all possible to cooperate."

CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

"...it is planned in our congregation to place special emphasis in our Sunday Bulletin on March 23 upon the matter of prayers, personal and corporate, for restoration of religious liberties to repressed people. We shall, also, make a personal announcement calling attention to the printed program and trust that in this way, we may share in the 'Crusade for Freedom.' Your move seems to be one that should enlist the thinking and efforts of all Christian people."

FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS

"...we conduct a Novena here ... every Sunday night using the booklet, 'Crusade for Peace.' During this Novena we include all the intentions of the entire world.and in a special way the intentions for your Crusade for Freedom."

GRANVILLE, NORTH DAKOTA

"In response to your letter, I included special prayers in my pastoral prayers today. It will be good of you to ask the peoples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and other lands under the oppression of Russia to pray for us. We need to understand them and to receive their understanding. God help us all.

"How can we possibly retain our own freedoms unless we desire freedom for these others? One of the greatest freedoms surely must be freedom from self-righteousness. Will they pray for this freedom for us?

"'Blessed are they who feel their spiritual need,' Goodspeed translates it."

HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY

"... constructive suggestion of prayer ... We will join other Christian churches in this program. We will begin at once. Your letter will be ... posted ... Prayer changes things ... Count on us."

PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS

"Will be glad to cooperate.. Beginning Sunday, March 23 and every Sunday thereafter the congregation ... will pray for your intention. ... A very fine idea."

COLUMBUS, OHIO

"We are glad to have a chance to share in this great crusade."

CHUGWATER, WYOMING

"...was glad to learn that the Crusade for Freedom is looking for help to The Almighty God, and He indeed can help the people behind the Iron Curtain.

"I have been praying daily not only for my own dear ones who are behind the Iron Curtain but for all people who are enslaved by Communists. God's gracious Hand had lead me out from the Iron Curtain and how glad I am to be in free America."

PASCOAG, RHODE ISLAND

"You may include (us) ... as spiritual contributors to your worthy cause."

CONVERSE, INDIANA

"My sincere congratulations and gratitude that you are presenting the matter of united prayer for freedom ... I assure you also that I will present the challenge ... to our people and that we'll join with you and all churches of America in praying for the freedom that we believe is the natural right of all men."

ENDICOTT, NEW YORK

"Starting March 23rd we will have a public prayer every Sunday ... May God bless you and your great work for freedom. I am sure that with the prayers of Our great Nation and all Freedom-loving people, Almighty God in his infinite goodness and love will answer our prayers and all the things you are trying to accomplish in the Crusade for Freedom will be fulfilled."

LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA

"To establish such a prayer chain from the concerned peoples of this nation to the concerned peoples behind the Iron Curtain, in fact, to the Christian peoples behind any curtain in the world, will create a pool of resources that will strike fire in the hearts of believing Christian people. It is certainly one of the most important things to do alongside other preparation for World Peace."

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA - From a Church bulletin

"Beginning Sunday, March 23, and continuing, the Crusade for Freedom, which encourages those behind the 'iron curtain' in their desperate struggle for religious liberty, asks for our earnest prayers for those who have been deprived of their freedom to worship according to the dictates of conscience. PRAY."

The president of a Lutheran STATE SYNOD, in addition to acquiring newspaper notice, wrote the following letter to his confreres:

"Dear Brethren, Seeking to abide by the request of the Crusade for Freedom that each church in America have special prayers beginning Sunday, March 23, and each Sunday thereafter for the 'restoration of religious liberties to the peoples in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe,' and to strengthen the power of praying peoples for the advancement of God's Kingdom, I hereby request that each pastor write out a prayer that may be used in conjunction with the General Prayer in my service each Sunday morning, and as a special collect for the Vesper Services.

(continued)

CHESTER, CONNECTICUT

"In addition to making special note each Sunday morning service, we shall see to it that some space is allotted in our monthly pastoral letter for a suggestion of prayer for other men who are denied corporate worship."

ELLICOTT CITY, MARYLAND

"We feel sure that they know of our concern, and we know in our hearts they are praying that our faith fail not. Anything that the Crusade for Freedom can do to carry the message of our continued concern, will be appreciated."

SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA

"We shall be more than happy to continue to remember this great effort in prayer and ask God's blessing upon you who direct this undertaking."

* * * * * * * * * * *

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTERS

"The Crusade's plan for mass prayers...for the people behind the Iron Curtain who have been denied freedom of religious worship certainly is a commendable one. The need for faith throughout the world has never been greater, and that there should be freedom to worship as one wishes is fundamental to the principles by which we in America live. Members of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters...will...demonstrate their friendship for the world's oppressed people by supporting...the Crusade for Freedom."

PILOT CLUB INTERNATIONAL

"The Crusade for Freedom is doing a wonderful work and it is a privilege to cooperate in every way possible."

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

"As Commander-in-Chief...I happily endorse this Crusade for Freedom movement with a pledge of our complete sympathy, cooperation and support."

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES

"Prayer is a mighty force, a mighty unused power. Let us all, here in America and elsewhere in the world put this mighty power to work."

AMVETS

"AMVETS wholeheartedly endorse the Crusade for Freedom sponsored movement for mass prayers...for the people behind the Iron Curtain who have been denied the freedom of religious worship which is the proud heritage of every American.

"There is a great need for a spiritual rebirth in this world torn with hatred and fears. The unity of peoples under a common God will do much to wash away the causes of unrest which haunt us today and will lead to the mutual objectives of peace-loving people everywhere.

"We are proud to call upon our members throughout the nation to participate...

AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION

"...the American Dental Association...endorse your plan for mass prayers... for the people behind the Iron Curtain.

"The members of this Association long have supported the Crusade for Freedom and...will be pleased to participate in this demonstration of the freedom of religious worship."

BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEPARTMENT - AFL

"We will send out a circular letter to our local...Councils throughout the country asking them to join in the mass prayers..."

NEW YORK STATE BANKERS ASSOCIATION: ...pleased to cooperate...and urge our membership to participate.....THE AMERICAN LEGION: ...your efforts will receive our wholehearted support.....BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA: ...joins with the Crusade... and all religious faiths in praying.....KIWANIS INTERNATIONAL: ...a splendid idea.....UNITED STATES JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: ...will certainly do everything we can...to get our organizations to assist in any way.....AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION: ...sending copies of your letter to all of our state organizations, with a note encouraging their participation.....THEATRE OWNERS OF AMERICA: ...action on our part...will strengthen...religious faith...and keep alive the hope of ultimate freedom from all oppression.....SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF PYTHIAS: ...your program...for mass prayers...is indeed commendable..... DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION, INC: ...in complete accord with this movement...

March 21, 1952

BEAVER, OKLAHOMA

"Thanks for promoting this thought."

WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA

"Every day (we) join in prayer for Peace and the welfare of those behind the Iron Curtain. ... We feel privileged to join all Christians on this day of prayer."

VAUX HALL, NEW JERSEY

"It is a worthwhile gesture ... We know God is pleased with it and certainly pray that all churches will comply with this request; we certainly shall."

DENVER, COLORADO

"Our church shall gladly remember this very important program in prayer, and we will greatly appreciate the prayers of our Christian friends everywhere."

PIKEVILLE, KENTUCKY

"This is a very small parish, but I will urge all to cooperate in this worthy cause. I will not exempt myself of the same obligation."

DUPREE, SOUTH DAKOTA

"... together we shall pray for our brethren who have lost their freedom..."

BLOOMFIELD, IOWA

"Grateful to you for this move and hoping for great success ..."

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE

"May God bless you in this effort; and those unfortunate ones for whom we pray."

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

"It is a pleasure to cooperate in your request for prayers starting Sunday, March 23. In fact, we will start tomorrow ... God bless you and your confreres in your work."

OSHKOSH, NEBRASKA

"I appreciate your getting word to them of our interest in their welfare, and believe that such a plan is a real forward step ..."

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

"... our church will gladly join you in praying for these our brothers and sisters. I am glad to know that you consider prayer as having a major place in the affairs of the world. ..."

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

"Congratulations upon your forward step in seeking cooperation and freedom through prayer. You may count on us and our two churches ..."

PEABODY, KANSAS

"We shall take this matter seriously and make it a definite part of the Morning Worship Period ... we shall make PRAYERS FOR FREEDOM a part of our thought."

ASHVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

"The student body ... enthusiastically endorse your plan for special prayers ... and will not only participate themselves but will do everything in their power to increase the knowledge of the movement and gain widest participation from others."

PUTNEY, VERMONT

"The students ... wish to join in this crusade. Beginning on Sunday, March 23, we shall say each day a decade of the Rosary for the intentions you recommend."

DELCAMBRE, LOUISIANA

"That we all recognize the necessity of turning to God for help and guidance in restoring the world to Christian ideals is the most hopeful sign of the times."

HOUSTON, TEXAS

"There is power in prayer. Our congregation will join you and others in your prayer plan, ..."

LAWRENCE, KANSAS

"... beginning March 23 we shall make special mention in the morning bulletin and give definite place in the program for the fellowship of prayer."

SOUTH CAYUGA, ONTARIO

"... let me assure you that we are with you in this great Crusade of Prayer."

LAKELAND, FLORIDA

"... want to encourage you in your Crusade for Freedom, and remind you that we who are of grass roots ... are ringing the bell."

ROCK HILL, SOUTH CAROLINA

"I think this is a very fine thought and trust that ministers and congregations throughout our nation will undergird your labors with prayer and faith."

FROM AN ARCHDIOCESE

"In conformity with the request of the Crusade for Freedom we are asking all the Catholic Churches in the Archdiocese to continue to recite prayers for those ... under Communist domination."

MT. GILEAD, NORTH CAROLINA

"We will join in the continuing prayer for Religious Freedom."

BUNKER HILL, INDIANA

"This world under God can have a new birth of freedom by the very method you are suggesting. Praying for each other is the real method to bring our world out of its darkness and fear."

BROKEN BOW, NEBRASKA

"Our morning congregation ... voted almost unanimously to share your prayers for the peoples in the satellite countries ..."

MILLVILLE, NEW JERSEY

"I presented the matter to my congregation ... and our people pledge their prayers beginning with Sunday, March 23, to the oppressed peoples ..."

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

"... most happy to cooperate. May God bless you and your associates with wisdom and insight as you strive to free both the bodies and the minds of the people from dictatorships of all kinds."

BIRCHWOOD, WISCONSIN

"Realizing the importance of this work, I do promise to ask the continuing prayers of our people for all our brothers and sisters in Christ who are presently suffering religious persecution."

SPOKANE, WASHINGTON

"Be assured we are most happy to join in this crusade of prayer on week days as well as on Sundays."

PETOSKEY, MICHIGAN

"... Ministerial Association in meeting on March 10 voted to have its Secretary send you word that we will continue our support of your program as in the past. Beginning with March 23, we will make sure that prayers are given in each church."

COLLEGEVILLE, MINNESOTA

"I endorse most heartily your Crusade for Freedom ... and hope that it will receive an enthusiastic response throughout America."

OIBON, NORTH CAROLINA

"I shall count it a privilege to call upon my people to pray thus, and will myself make this an object both of my personal prayers and those made publicly."

LIBERTY, MISSOURI

"May God bless you and your earnest efforts for these people. ... we have a family in our church who were D.P.'s and whom our people have helped. They are ... proving well worth any help and prayer. Therefore, we are close to this problem and understand it somewhat. God guide you and may He give to these wounded and gentle people their freedom again."

MONROE, LOUISIANA

"Our people are sharing in the Crusade for Freedom by prayer for our friends behind the Iron Curtain as well as for the forces of righteousness engaged in the propagation of the Truth ..."

ADA, OKLAHOMA

"In my judgment this is one of the most real ways in which Christians can combat the menace of communism in our world."

GREEN SPRINGS, OHIO

"Thank you for inviting the people of our churches to share in the special prayers ... we are happy to have a part in this great Christian enterprise. Yes, and in turn we will be glad to have the Crusade ask these people for their intercessory prayers for us. Surely God will bless this concern."

ELGIN, ILLINOIS

"May God multiply and fulfill your greatest hope and prayers, in which I shall be glad to join."

MANHASSET, NEW YORK

"Your challenge to pray for those who have been deprived of their spiritual freedom is timely and greatly needed. The religious liberty which we enjoy in America should be a cherished heritage, and one which we seek to share with the peoples of the world. I trust that the Crusade for Freedom will be successful in many parts of the world."

DUBLIN, TEXAS

"I think this is a most worthy and wise enterprise, and I wish for it the greatest success. I am greatly interested in the world situation and think there ought to be done much more concerted praying in the nation today. I see little hope for us otherwise."

WATERFORD, VIRGINIA

"We promise to join you in special prayers for them beginning Sunday, March 23rd, and shall continue praying until these people are granted religious liberty. Thank you for your interest. May God crown your efforts with success -- and soon."

BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA

"We will remember them in our prayers particularly on March 23rd ..."

JOHN DAY, OREGON

"...we will be very glad to do our share ..."

LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

"The world needs a greater faith in God today and all religious leaders should have a part in this prayer effort."

BRISTOL, VIRGINIA

"We shall not only support this Crusade in our own church but also expect to sponsor special radio programs over our best radio station. Be assured of our interest and prayers."

(continued)

"Hoping that you will comply with my request and the request of the Crusade for Freedom to remember at the Throne of Grace, those whose opportunities to worship our God and Father, are not as great as those of the peoples of America,

I am,

Yours in the Master's Service ..."

COLUMBUS, GEORGIA

"We shall pray, as you suggested, during these ... meetings, during the pastoral prayers, and 'at' other services in our church. You are on the right track. God will richly bless your efforts, the prayers of the peoples of the world."

CINCINNATI, OHIO

"The ... boys and young men preparing for the priesthood ... will be glad to join with thousands, and I hope millions, of other spiritual-minded Americans in praying."

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA

"You may be assured that you will have our prayers for all the things which the Crusade for Freedom is endeavoring to accomplish."

MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION, INDIANA

"We, are grateful for this opportunity to express our conviction that this spiritual relationship between peoples is a vital part of the progress toward freedom."

BISHOP, TEXAS

"There are many Catholics in the satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain. They will understand this language. Much simpler still, if you only let them know that here in this parish of Mexican farm-laborers as in many another Catholic church in America we are fervorously trying to put into action the peace plan of Our Lady of Fatima. I am sure they will be greatly comforted by this message."

[illegible] INFORMATION

SECRET

Mr. John C. Hughes,
c/o McCampbell & Co.,
40 Worth Street,
New York 13, New York.

Dear John:

My promised thoughts on a matter of our mutual concern, raised in your 28 January letter, are given in the enclosed copy of a letter being sent concurrently to Min Miller. You will note from the enclosure that Min knows we are forwarding you a copy of the letter to him. Min will certainly welcome your advice in planning the approach to the Defense Department. While the Director and I should, of course, like very much to assist in the effort to obtain the directive from Defense which Eucom explained to Lang was necessary, we feel that, for reasons of security, we should not do so initially and, for the same reason, we would rather have you carry the ball all the way, if possible.

Min will undoubtedly keep us both advised of such efforts as he and lang shall plan, and if in the course of their negotiations, an opportunity presents itself for either the Director or me to be of assistance, you know that you may count on us to do so. A copy of this letter is also attached, in case you have an opportunity to hand it to Min.

My kindest personal regards to you.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

Attachments 2
As stated above

CIO/NBV:bw (date ?)

Distribution:
Addressee - original and 1
DDCI - 1
ER - 1
CIO - 1
RI - 2

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL **RESTRICTED** G4 - 351 **FREE**

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS.—Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: SAR/R.J. Smith

NO

DATE 27 March 1952

TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. SPC/Von Kann	K 2044		29 Mar	VK
2. C-PY				
3. CIO				JWB
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
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COMMENTS

29 March 52

Bailey phoned me about this case a day or so ago and it seems that there is considerable pressure abuilding on the part of Mr. Scripps to be allowed to use the large balloons overtly. He is hoping to be able to get an answer to these people prior to the April 2nd meeting. Whether this is possible or not, I do not know.

It may be that this question must be raised again with the POCC since they were in on it at the beginning. Actually this may be an opportunity to have some overt agency do a job for us and the request should be evaluated on that basis.

VK

Was discussed informally at P.S.B. Luncheon on March 27th. Present Dulles. Wisner. Foster. Sargeant Brown, Barnes & Allen present,

EXT 765

FORM 51-9 **FREE** **RESTRICTED** **CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPC

SUBJECT: Leaflet Balloons for use in Psychological Warfare

1. On at least four occasions Mr. William Scripps, Detroit News, directly or indirectly has approached the Government with proposals for utilization of balloons for psychological warfare. Following is a list of the dates and method of these approaches:

a. 12 October 1950 - Letter from General W. J. Donovan to DCI enclosing "Operation Ballast." On 1 November 1950 William H. Jackson responded to this memorandum to the effect that this suggested operation was being referred to the appropriate persons and suggesting a subsequent meeting with Donovan to discuss this and other matters.

b. In November 1950 as we were undertaking planning for development of balloons with General Mills, we were informed that Mr. Scripps planned a general meeting to be held in Washington to discuss balloons. Through the General Mills Washington Representative Mr. Scripps was persuaded to keep his meeting general and was informed that the various agencies of the Government had the matter under consideration and considered that it would not be in the public interest at this time to disclose the nature of their findings. Consequently, Mr. Scripps forwarded us on 1 December 1950 a proposal "The Use of Free Balloons for Load Carrying Purposes" which we acknowledged on 11 December 1950.

c. On December 26, 1950 General Smith received a letter from Blair Moody summarizing a suggestion from Mr. William Scripps for encouraging defection of Chinese Communist troops. A routine response to his letter was sent 6 January 1951 from Mr. Jackson. I believe also Mr. Moody called upon the Director in early February of 1951 to discuss use of balloons for psychological warfare. ADPC addressed a briefing memorandum to DCI on 12 February 1951, Subj: Balloons for Carrying PW Material to Soviet Areas.

2. In September 1950 the NPSB requested that CIA should represent all interested agencies of this Government and should accordingly take steps to develop, procure and stockpile an appropriate number of scientifically designed balloons for future propaganda use in conditions of international emergency. At meetings of the NPSB on 13 February 1951 and 11 June 1951 it was agreed that OPC would procure and stockpile 1,000 large leaflet balloons for use by the appropriate agency when and if such use was authorized. The Board also agreed that inquiries which the various governmental agencies

mental agencies might receive concerning use of balloons would be answered to the effect "that the matter is under continuous study by agencies of the Government but disclosure of results at this time would not be in the public interest."

3. A perusal of the NPSB minutes since June 1951 did not indicate further consideration by that group of the subject of balloons. From this we must infer that CIA still bears the responsibility of the commitment made by Mr. Wisner for procurement.

4. For your information this research and development has been conducted for CIA by General Mills with ONR serving as the cut-out. An existing project "Skyhook" which ONR had with General Mills was accelerated to cover development of leaflet balloons continued along with ONR's program of cosmic ray research. We are obligated to ONR to deny a newspaper access to these drawings, specifications, movies and reports which bear a SECRET classification.

5. I might make one small suggestion that since Mr. Blair Moody is now a Senator and running for re-election in the next election, it might be possible to solicite his aid in bringing Mr. Scripps in line with adopted policy regarding balloons should it become necessary.

R Smith
ROSALYN J. SMITH

[illegible]/7357

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:
RDD/TSS

ACCESSION NO

DATE RECEIVED IN S A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1 Col. VonKann	2044 K	MAR 26 1952		VK
2 SAR				R Smith
3				
4. Col VonKann				
5.				
6				
7.				
8.				
9				
10				
11				
12.				
13.				
14				
15				

COMMENTS

Attached is the Memorandum for the Record mentioned in our telephone discussion 25 March 1952. Drawings and specifications of this item are in the possession of RDD, although the information is also on hand at General Mills. It carries a SECRET classification under our contractual arrangements with the U. S. Navy. Questions:

1. Does CIA still have the commitment made by Mr. Wisner to the National Psychological Strategy Board for procuring 1,000 of these balloon units for stockpile and use by any agency deemed advisable by that group?
2. Should RDD release the SECRET drawings and specifications, movies and reports on trial operations for use by the Detroit News?

L. R. Dailey

FORM NO. 51-9
SEP 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

(6141)

cc: G. O. Haglund

Mr. F. B. Jewett, Jr. 3/18/52

C. B. Moore

TELEPHONE CALLS, WILLIAM SCRIPPS, DETROIT NEWS CONFIDENTIAL

On 7 March, William Scripps of the Detroit News, called and asked for price estimate in lots of 100,000 of a carrier balloon system which would carry 300 pounds great distances. On discussion, it appeared that he was interested in something equivalent to our interim system, so I told him we had made a quotation on such a piece of equipment in quantities for prices in the range of $350 a unit. This piece of equipment under the expected wind condition, should carry 150 pounds 1500 miles and deliver it with the best possible accuracy from a balloon vehicle.

I asked him if he wanted specifications, but he said he would get these later. He was working with a group who would use them to carry propaganda, and he would see us in two weeks, and then would discuss and obtain exhibits. It was pointed out to him that this equipment and polyethylene were well controlled by the government. This appeared to be no problem to him.

Scripps called again on 18 March, and asked if we could attend a luncheon in Detroit Wednesday noon, the 2nd of April, and then go on to New York for a luncheon Thursday noon. He asked that we bring along data, cost estimates, exhibits, and all sales data, as well as movies, to this meeting. I asked if this had been cleared with Abbott's friends, and he didn't appear to know what I was talking about. I told him that some clearance would have to be obtained before either the gear was shown, or before it would be permitted to leave the country. Scripps is most enthusiastic about support forthcoming to carry such an operation forward, and felt that the State Department would interpose no objections for the program planned.

Scripps asked that we confirm on 19 March whether or not you and I would be able to attend. This I promised to do. I would also like your guidance as to what course should be pursued in this. It is believed that certainly Dailey or Gates Lloyd should be made aware of this effort, so that we may deport ourselves accordingly. Incidentally, Dewey and Almy will be at both meetings, in New York and Detroit. Upon asked if we had any objections, I said, "Of course not."

CBM:he
cc: J. R. Smith
G. O. Haglund

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

20 ~~26~~ 44

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2-7693

Noted by D DCI

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Conversation with Admiral Miller

I shall make a practice of bringing to your attention current matters for discussion between Admiral Miller and me, the first of which took place today and covered the following items:

1. At the suggestion of Bob Lang, seconded later by NCFE's Chairman, Joseph Grew, Admiral Miller wants to hold at the Princeton Inn on the 10th and 11th of May a general discussion of United States policy toward Iron Curtain countries, with particular emphasis upon what new lines, if any, Radio Free Europe should take. The background of this, according to Admiral Miller, is that Lang and others within RFE feel that the time is running out behind the Iron Curtain, that the people are ready for revolution and that we cannot continue much longer the "hold everything" line. They want to gather a group of experts, including Messrs. Wisner and Dulles, to discuss what policy we should now adopt.

Action

I see no reason why we shouldn't have such a general bull session and I will not attempt to discourage it unless instructed.

2. Admiral Miller recently had a talk with Frank Altschul who complained somewhat of his treatment at the hands of NCFE and CIA, saying that he had never even had so much as a word of thanks for the work he did. Miller suggested that the DDCI might want to write such a letter and that, if so, a similar letter should go to Dewitt Poole.

Action

For the DDCI to write a letter might smack a little of thanking himself since he was engaged in the Altschul regime in the New York operation. I therefore suggest that the DD/P, when he finds an early opportunity to write to Altschul on some matter, mention his gratitude.

3. Miller hopes that no decision has been made to put Admiral Kirk and his Committee for the Liberation of the Russian People under Crusade for Freedom cover. He thinks this would be a great mistake because it would further stretch the already too thin cover of the Crusade and he further says that if it has to be done, he cannot agree that the Crusade effort should be lessened according to the agreement with the State Department.

Action

? I understand that subsequently Admiral Miller talked to Mr. Dulles who made it clear that no decision had been made to put Admiral Kirk and his Committee under the Crusade but that we here in CIA would much appreciate it if NCFE could see its way clear to doing so. Admiral Miller agreed that he would take the matter up with the Board of Directors and if they were favorably inclined, CIA would take up with State the possibility of amending to some extent the decision to cut down on the Crusade in order to try to furnish better cover for this operation.

4. Admiral Miller said that Landowsky and Ranft were still in Greece, that the situation was impossible and that one of them must go. He said that his advice from Bob Lang was that the NCFE man was the better of the two and therefore it should be Landowsky who must go.

Action

The history of this problem is involved and long. Landowsky has been called home, however, and will not go back to Greece so that it no longer remains a problem. I have told Admiral Miller.

5. Admiral Miller has been talking to the Ford Foundation on the subject of the Hildebrand operation in Berlin. The Board had taken a dim view on the accountings, a matter which he straightened out by promising better ones. Ford raised the question of whether or not NCFE wanted Ford to spend the additional $50,000 pledged after the payments of the present $50,000 eight months from now. C. D. Jackson was present at this meeting and told Ford he did not feel the operation was worth an additional $50,000. Miller reserved judgment, however. He wanted to know whether CIA wished him to hold Ford to its pledge of an additional $50,000 or not.

Action

I have checked this with the EE Division, which has cabled the field and come to the view that this operation is still very important. They want to urge Admiral Miller to hold Ford to its agreement. I passed this on to Admiral Miller.

6. On 28 January John Hughes wrote a letter to Mr. Dulles asking CIA's view of the problem of the evacuation of RFE employees in Munich and elsewhere in the event of war. He said he thought this problem was extremely important and there had been no answer to the letter.

Action

This Division received this letter last week and we are working on it. Meantime I suggest Mr. Dulles sign the attached note to John Hughes.

Thomas W. Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Draft ltr to John Hughes.

CIO:TWB/eh

Orig - DDCI (thru DD/P & ADPC)
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

27 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination

SUBJECT: Crusade for Freedom

Today the Director discussed with Mr. Henry Ford, II the possibility of his assuming the Chairmanship of the Crusade for Freedom next year. I understand that Mr. Ford is warm.

Tom Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

SECRET

In reply refer to: W-1939

26 March 1952

Dear Min:

A little incident has caused a bit of trouble and a flurry of cables here that I think you can correct very quickly. Spencer Phenix's assistant, Mr. Miller, has written to Leon Dennen telling Dennen that Miller has been called in by our shop and questioned in detail about recent Dennen accounting.

Whether or not he was questioned in detail is a matter on which he and I might disagree but is really of no consequence since the accounting by Dennen should normally go through us to Miller, and I think you would agree that we had a right to ask questions about it. What bothers me a little, however, is Miller's writing to Dennen, giving details of how our two offices work together. Dennen, it turns out, was annoyed by the content of Miller's letter, not so much at Miller as at us. His annoyance is misplaced but if there had been no mention by Miller of details of our relationship there would have been no annoyance.

I presume you know of Dennen's close affiliation with Lovestone and the possibility that this small thing will reverberate around and around the usual vicious circle. Can you explain to Miller how these little incidents can get blown up into big issues and ask him to use a little more discretion in the future?

Sincerely,

Oliver E. Hadwood

Admiral H. B. Miller
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.
110 W. 57th Street
New York 19, New York

CIO:TWB:eh
Orig - Addressee
1 cc - Executive Off.
2 cc - CIO
2 cc - RI

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Executive Registry
2-2486

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: CIO

NO. 00441 Q-J 7347

DATE 27 March 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE REC'D	DATE FWD'D	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. ADPC		MAR 29 1952	FA 1 April	PA1-13	I am attaching a memorandum which I received today, the subject of which may be of general interest to you. RWB RWB
2. DD/P Col. Taylor		2 April			
3. DDCI			4/4	Noted by D/DCI 4/4/52	
4. ~~CID~~ →					Thayer for comment [illegible] /c [illegible]
5. CIO					
6.					Mr. Dulles suggests sending this to Thayer for comment REL 4 Apr 52
7.					
8.					
9.					
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15.					

FORM NO. 51-10
FEB 1950

SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

P-2166

SECURITY INFO

SECRET

Executive Registry
2-7356

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: EE-2
WE-3

SUBJECT: Establishment of a "Propaganda Section" in SHAPE under Control of an Hungarian Refugee.

Summarized below is a report from a reliable source in Paris with regard to the reported establishment under the control of an Hungarian refugee of a "propaganda section" in SHAPE:

> "The first rumors are somewhat vague with regard to a new propaganda service which will be established in Eisenhower's Headquarters. It is a Supreme Direction of propaganda as was the case during the last war. This service will comprise military sections for propaganda on the other side of the Iron Curtain including parachute activities; also sections for classic propaganda.
>
> "According to source's information, the head of the section for the countries of Eastern Europe will be Mr. Mihaly Zoldheyli, an Hungarian who is a Colonel of the Reserve in the French Army. Mr. Zoldheyli, about 50 years old, has had an interesting career. He left Hungary after the first revolution, he lived several years in the United States, he enjoyed, as a socialist, support of American labor, and it was at their initiative that he joined the front in Spain. Of the left, but anti-Communist, he was one of the chiefs under the pseudonym of General Santiago. Returning to France he was interned, then liberated from the camp at the personal intervention of Jules Moch, a leading French socialist politician (recently Minister of Defense). Under the pseudonym of Major Michel, he was one of the heroes of the anti-Nazi resistance in Southern France. He appeared to be the only officer in the French Army who did not have French nationality. He is married to a Frenchwoman and has one child. He now works in Paris in the office of the Force Ouvriere. He appears to be a man of confidence to both the Americans and the French."

Ellen Stern
ELLEN STERN
IO

SECRET

cc: ADPC
DD/P
DDCI

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF FINANCE DIVISION

SUBJECT: TPTONIC and TPMEDIC

It is requested that the $4,000,000 revolving fund for TPTONIC be replenished by a total of $1,302,004 to cover disbursements from TPMEDIC to TPTONIC under date of 18 March 1952 in the amounts of $924,504 and $377,500. Receipts for these disbursements from TPTONIC are being forwarded to the Finance Division, attention Mr. Edward Downey, this date, under separate cover.

GEORGE E. BREWER
Chief
Psychological Staff Division

Approved:

Thomas W. Braden
Chief, International Organizations Division

PY/Exo/REM/PAM;mb

Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 2
CPY - 1
CIO - 1✓
RI - 2
PY/Exo - 1

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible]

Executive Registry
2-7487

Noted by D/DCI
4/14/52 R.B.

In reply refer to:

25 March 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Deputy Director (Plans)
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Spencer Phenix

Attached is a letter from Spencer Phenix to Bob Lang in which Phenix details the story of his efforts to reach agreement with the German authorities on the status of RFE under the new post-HICOG government. I would judge that Spencer has done a wonderful job to date and that things are on the track, but I think you would be interested in reading his letter and the second attachment, which is the memorandum of understanding with the German Government on which he is now working.

Thomas Braden
THOMAS W. BRADEN
Chief
International Organizations Division

Attachment
Ltr 3 Mar 52 to Bob Lang.

SECRET

Paris, March 3, 1952

Dear Bob,

I have not done much reporting on our German negotiations for several reasons; first, there was not much to report and, second, whatever there was Dick Condon undertook to forward from Munich. I did write C.D. a couple of letters outlining our delays and some of our uncertainties, and last week I cabled him that I would send a more detailed narrative when I got to Paris. As he is now technically no longer President of NCFE, and as Admiral Miller may not have been completely informed of all that we are trying to do, I am addressing this to you, with copy to each of them.

In the first place, let me say that progress during the last half of last week was surprisingly speedy and encouraging. There are still many opportunities for the well known "slip 'twixt the cup and the lip", and local German political considerations could rear their ugly heads at any moment. I think it must also be understood that, as Dick Condon puts it, no matter how many nor how good written agreements we may have covering our operations, the whole RFE enterprise in Germany will have to be played pretty much by ear once the contractual agreements take effect. I regard this, however, as an inescapable risk, and I mention it now only to emphasize the paramount importance of the utmost care in programming and in conduct to avoid a boner which could upset our entire apple-cart. The very favorable report which your friend Asher Lee made after his hurried inspection of Munich underlines the need for regular spot check on program output to avoid howlers, and the need for this once our relationship with the Germans is no longer through the Occupation Authorities or HICOG is even more imperative.

Dick Condon sent you from Munich the text of the proposed Bundespost license which we agreed on with Dr. Schuster on February 19, 1952, and this should long since have reached you.

Our Bonn negotiations resulted in the acceptance of this text, with two exceptions;

1) Sub-clause 2 of Article II is eliminated. You will remember that the Bundespost wished to insert a provision authorizing license cancellation if RFE should broadcast anything which "it will be the opinion of the Federal Government that the transmissions will prejudice

the interest of the Federal Republic". We objected to this on two grounds:

a) that such provision had no logical place in a technical license, and

b) that it made our position far too precarious since it exposed us to license cancellation practically at the whim of any German bureaucrat,

and we persuaded Dr. Schuster to leave it out of the license and let us discuss the problem at Bonn. At Bonn, we were fortunately able to persuade the Foreign Office officials that such a provision had no technical place in the license, and that whatever should be said on the subject should be said in an exchange of letters, or the equivalent, between the Foreign Office and ourselves. Accordingly, Article II now contains but one clause.

2) Question was raised by the Foreign Office officials at Bonn regarding the length of the license. The text Dick sent you provides for validity until August 31, 1960. The reason I chose that date was that it is the expiration date of our lease on the Holzkirchen transmitter site, and I thought that if an arbitrary term were to be fixed that tying it in with the Holzkirchen lease gave it a plausibility which would help acceptance - and that proved to be the case so far as the Bundespost was concerned.

The Foreign Office people told us, however, that numerous questions had been asked in the Bundestag regarding RFE and its programs, and that for the Government to give us a license for as long as eight years would cause serious criticism. We are a peculiar sort of animal, anyway, and for our irregular activities to be blessed with such long term approval would, they thought, be unwise for both their and our points of view. Accordingly, they suggested a four-year period: I countered with five, dating from the date of license issuance which (since it cannot take place before the contractual agreements become effective, may well be late in 1952) will give us considerably more than five years life expectancy. My own feeling is that if we have not done our job within five years, we might as well pull down the shade and go home. In any case, my counter proposal was, as I said, accepted, and Article III of the license will now read:

> "This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automatically extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 90 days prior to the next expiration date."

So much for the license, the terms of which were shown to our HICOG friends and regarded by them as highly favorable.

Our political discussions suffered from a variety of frustrations. We agreed on the license terms with the Bundespost on February 19th, and an appointment was made for us to see Dr. Lenz - the official to whom Doctor Adenauer had referred our problems - at noon on Thursday, February 21, 1952. Dick and I, therefore, took an early train from Frankfort and were met at the Bonn station by Fritz Kempner who told us that the appointment had been cancelled as Dr. Lenz had been called to the Chancellery on an urgent matter. Fritz said that he had been told that if we went to Dr. Lenz's office, his assistant would make a definite appointment for us later. We did this, and were received by a smooth and non-committal individual, who said he would not be in touch with Dr. Lenz until nine o'clock that evening, and could not make any definite date until after he had spoken with Lenz.

I had the very uncomfortable feeling that we were being given a run-around, and Fritz was very much annoyed. We finally got the young chap to agree that he would try to reach Lenz before evening, and that we would telephone him during course of the afternoon to know what information he had been able to obtain. We telephoned repeatedly, but the answer was always the same; "nothing to report". Dick and I, therefore, took the train back to Frankfort, while Fritz stayed in Bonn and, in the evening, he telephoned that he had finally got some information from Lenz' young assistant that Lenz had turned the entire matter over to a regular Foreign Office official named Strohm, and that we were to make arrangements to see Strohm. Fritz said that he had endeavored to do this, but had been told by Strohm's office that he could not be sure to see us until Thursday, the 28th, although Wednesday, the 27th, was a slight possibility.

As I think I wrote C.D., the Fasching celebrations were reaching their climax over that weekend, and the first two days of the next week, and I have no doubt that Strohm's unavailability was, to a certain extent, related to Fasching. Fritz said that during his visit to the Foreign Office building he noticed that the rooms were all decorated with Fasching decorations, so that even the highest officials apparently take Fasching seriously. Not wanting to make another fruitless trip to Bonn, I decided we would accept Strohm's appointment for Thursday, February 28th.

At 10.30 AM on Thursday, February 28th, Dick, Fritz and I presented ourselves at Strohm's office. We were met by a sober and not too effusive individual, named Bruckner, who informed us that, unfortunately, Dr. Strohm had been called away from his office, that he would return as soon as he could and that, meanwhile, he - Bruckner - would be glad to start preliminary discussions.

Again, I placed a somewhat sinister interpretation on what appeared to be a chronic tendency on the part of the German officials authorized to negotiate with us to be absent whenever we put in an appearance for the purpose of negotiating with them. My pessimism was increased by the very rigid and uncooperative attitude of Bruckner, although I realized that having no authority and probably having been insufficiently briefed he was, naturally, keeping his neck well within the protection of his collar. In any case, he brought up some of the stickiest questions connected with our operation, talked of parliamentary interpellations, of the responsibility of the German authorities for anything broadcast from German soil, of the importance of German participation in determining program content, of the dangers of arousing refugee antagonism, and so on and so forth.

After an hour of this, I was ready to call it a day and suggest that we come back when we could talk to Strohm but, fortunately, at that moment Strohm came in and the entire atmosphere changed. He apologized profusely - and apparently sincerely - for the delay, expresses himself anxious to cooperate in every possible way to meet our requirements, brushed aside some of the technicalities raised by Bruckner, and got down to the essentials very rapidly. We went over the ground we had previously gone over with Bruckner, we explained our purpose and kept our feet fairly firmly planted on the principles which we regarded as basic. The result of our long discussion was substantial agreement on the two things that mattered most;

a) license term of five years, and

b) no unqualified cancellation right of the kind first suggested by the Bundespost, and more or less insisted upon by Bruckner.

The area of agreement was so broad that we suggested an adjournment to permit us to put in writing the agreement we had reached, return with it to the Foreign Office, and agree upon a final text.

Fritz was a little too optimistic regarding the task that lay before us, and it was clear an hour or so before the time fixed for our afternoon appointment that we would not be ready, so we telephoned to Strohm and postponed the appointment until the next day at noon. We worked all afternoon at HICOG, and until after midnight in our Cologne hotel. We had talked about an exchange of letters as the vehicle for the agreement, but it became difficult to determine who was writing what to whom since the Germans could not very well offer to give us something we had not asked for, and we, the New York State Corporation, could hardly demand certain rights from the German Government.

Nothing that we were able to compose satisfied my requirements until shortly before midnight the use of a new formula, namely, a memorandum of understanding between me, representing NCFE, and Dr. ________ (whether Strohm, Lenz, or Hallstein -which I do not know) representing the German Government, could be initialed and made the basis for agreement. This formula broke the mental log-jam, and we did a paper, a copy of which is enclosed.

Friday morning, we went back to HICOG, Dick typed the manuscript which Fritz and I had prepared, and we took a copy in to Sam Reber. Sam raised a few questions which we were easily able to answer, made one suggestion, namely, the insertion of the word "basic" in the 8th line on page 3, then expressed himself as completely satisfied. He attached the very greatest importance to getting from the Germans the endorsement of RFE's objectives, which they had given to us orally and which we expressed in the paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 2. He thought we would have accomplished the almost impossible if we obtained such written endorsement.

From HICOG we went direct to Dr. Strohm's office, showed him the memorandum (Fritz had not had time to prepare a German translation and we were afraid this might delay matters, but Strohm said he found the text entirely clear) and got from him immediately a practically complete approval. Bruckner joined us a little later, and he followed Strohm's lead. There were only two points of difference between us, and neither of them did I regard as substantial. You will see that on page 4 I asked for agreement that the German Government would cooperate with us to the fullest possible extent in respect of three items, only one of which, namely, (c) was within the competency of the Foreign Office. Strohm and Bruckner argued very logically that the Foreign Office could not bind the Finance Ministry or any other Ministry of the German Government and advised very earnestly against seeking in advance to obtain the approval of the Finance Ministry. I recognized the validity of both these points. I incorporated items (a) and (b) in the paper because I did not know who would sign on the part of the German Government. Had it been Adenauer or, by his instructions, Hallstein, it could be argued that their signatures did in effect bind the entire Government. If, however, it was to be Strohm, as he indicated it would be, then, obviously, he was without power in the premises. It was agreed, therefore, that (a) and (b) would be omitted, and that instead thereof Strohm would draft a general clause binding the Foreign Office to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with NCFE in reaching satisfactory solutions of any problems arising between NCFE and any

Ministries of the German Government.

Item (c), obviously, was intended to cover particularly the question of visas for Poles now in London who had been recruited for program work in Munich. In our talks on Thursday, Strohm had promised to facilitate the entry of these Poles, and said that if Dick would send in their names, birth dates and any other identifying information we had he would instruct the German Consul in London to issue the visas, and that general instructions would, if we wished, be sent out to the effect that possession of an employment letter from NCFE would be sufficient justification for the issuance of a visa, subject only to the security question. On that point, Strohm expressed the wish that our recruits be screened for us by CIC. We pointed out the impracticability of this.

I call your particular attention to the language of the two full paragraphs on page 3. This was very carefully devised, and I am convinced that it is more favorable to us than we had any reason to expect. As I told you, Reber accepted it with the single change mentioned above. Nelson and Thurston thought it excellent, and Charley Lewis, to whom I showed it Friday, said it was "the optimum".

The Germans had indicated a desire for some kind of a pre-scrutiny of our programs to avoid political conflict. This would, of course, have fatally crippled our effectiveness, so the language that I drafted was drafted for the purpose of emphasizing the post-broadcast nature of any German scrutiny. In order to avoid frivolous complaints from any German official, I stipulated that any protest must reach NCFE through the Foreign Office. This, also, places NCFE in a position to put any such controversy before the State Department, and if the issue involved is a substantial one to have ~~the~~ State do the necessary vis-a-vis the Foreign Office. If, notwithstanding the German protest, and notwithstanding the intervention of the State Department, should the latter wish to become involved, RFE continued to violate the German request, I phrased the next step as involving the surrender by us of the license rather than its cancellation. This may be a fine point, but I felt it interposed one more step between the fall of the guillotine axe and the dropping of the head in the basket. I found, to my relief, that the use of the Portuguese formula, namely, the filing of the broadcast tapes for thirty days to permit examination by the Germans was a completely acceptable device, and you will note that I based this procedure on the desirability of providing a "factual basis for the consideration of any question".

We left with Dr. Strohm a copy of this memorandum of understanding, and he undertook to prepare and forward to me in Paris a draft of a letter incorporating our agreement as set forth in the memorandum, with the modifications outlined above, which the Foreign Office would be prepared officially to address to NCFE immediately upon the coming into effect of the contractual agreements, and which would have attached to it a copy of the license which would be granted by the Bundespost as of the date of the coming into effect of the contractual agreements. This letter, when acknowledged and accepted by NCFE, would constitute, with the license, the agreement between the parties. Dr. Strohm promised to have the draft in Paris by Wednesday or Thursday of this week.

Fritz is in London this week in connection with the German debts negotiations, but will return for the week-end at which time he and I will go over the draft together. It seems to both of us unlikely that we shall be able to accept Dr. Strohm's draft without any change whatsoever, and it will, therefore, probably be necessary for us to go back to Bonn for one or perhaps two days to iron out any remaining difficulties to agree on a final text and to initial such text with the Germans for the purpose of recording our agreement.

Both Fritz and I are astonished at the apparent ease with which our negotiations progressed. We were able to reach agreement on the most important questions concerned, but we are both cautious and we both realize that between last Friday's agreement and next Thursday's draft letter there may be some vast divergencies, but certainly if the spoken word can be relied upon, and if a friendly, cooperative and even generous attitude on the part of the principal German officials of the Bundespost and Foreign Office to whom we spoke is significant, the German authorities are genuinely anxious to make it possible for RFE to continue to operate effectively, I think that we are all justified in feeling very much encouraged by what it has been possible to accomplish in the past two weeks.

If the above time schedule can be observed, and if not later than Tuesday of next week we can have the documents in final shape and duly initialed, I plan to leave Paris for Lisbon, via Panair do Brasil, on Thursday, the 13th, stay in Lisbon not more than one week, and be back in New York around the 21st.

I enclose a copy of the English translation of the proposed Bundespost license as agreed upon on February 19th, with the new Article III referred to above, and a copy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding dated February 29, 1952, so that you may have before you all the relevant papers.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Robert E. Lang,
Director, RFE,
110 West 57th Street,
New York 19, N.Y. - U.S.A.

cc Mr. C.D. Jackson, Admiral Miller, Mr. J.C. Hughes,
Mr. F.C. Kempner

I. The Bundesminister fuer das Post- und Fernmeldewesen hereby grants to the NCFE, a membership corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York (USA) recognized in the Federal Republic as a foreign "Verein", a licence to operate the radio installations listed and specified in the Annex as foreign radio station on German territory on the following conditions.

1. In operating the radio installations the NCFE will use only the frequencies and call signs allocated to it from time to time by the competent authorities of the USA, and duly notified by said authorities to the competent organs of the International Telecommunications Union.

2. The radio installations may be only operated for broadcasting purposes (Radio Regulations Chapter I Article I Section II n. 21 and 22)* of the NCFE; international point to point connections for broadcasting purposes are also permitted subject to the consent of interested foreign administrations; for purposes of third parties the radio installations may not be used without prior written consent of the BPMin.

3. Without prior written consent of the BPMin NCFE is not permitted to change the technical specifications of the above mentioned radio transmitting installations or to put additional radio transmitting installations into operation; changes in frequencies and call signs used must be notified to the BPMin in advance.

---

* Broadcasting Services:
21 a) A radiocommunication service of transmissions to be received directly by the general public.
22 b) This service may include transmissions of sounds or transmissions by television, facsimile or other means.

4. The radio installations will be operated in accordance with the provisions of the International Telecommunications Convention presently in force (Atlantic City 1947) and the Radio Regulations annexed to said convention and any conventions or Regulations, to which the Federal Republic is a party which may take their place.

5. In the event of interference by NCFE radio installations with German radio services NCFE in consultation with the DBP will tak necessary measures to eliminate the interference as rapidly as possible.

6. Duly accredited representatives of DBP shall be accorded free access to all technical installations of NCFE's radio stations in Germany during office hours as well as outside office hours, the latter only upon prior notification.

7. NCFE shall reimburse DBP for all sums which DBP is obliged to expend as a result of accidents suffered by any of its employees in the performance of their duties on the premises of NCFE.

8. The license fee for the above-mentioned radio installations is fixed at $ 1o,ooo.-- per year, payable in advance in quarterly instalments on the first of each quarter by remittance to Bank Deutscher Laender in favor of the Generalpostkasse of DBB, except that as a first installment there shall be paid an amount computed pro rata temporis from the date of the license to the first of the next following quarter.

II. This license is not transferable. It can be revoked at any time without notice if

1) one of the conditions of the license (I) should be violated and such violation should continue despite request to desist;

III) This license shall be valid for a period of five years commencing with the date of its issuance and will be automaticall extended thereafter from year to year unless written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not less than 9o days prior to the next expiration date.

IV) In the event of revocation (II) or of expiration (III) of the license the operation of the radio installations shall be discontinued at once.

Draft 29 Feb 1952

Memorandum of understanding between Mr. Phenix, representing the NCFE and Dr. ____________, representing the Federal German Republic

Mr. Phenix stated that the NCFE had been founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens animated by the desire to encourage by positive measures the eventual liberation from the communist yoke of the peoples of the enslaved countries of Central and Eastern Europe. He explained that with the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee had undertaken, among its other activities, the operation through Radio Free Europe of radio broadcasting installations through which it disseminated to listeners in the Iron Curtain countries programs especially prepared by the Committee for the furtherance of its objectives. He pointed out that Radio Free Europe had constructed and was presently operating transmitter stations at Holzkirchen and Biblis, had erected a large studio and office building in Munich and maintained a large monitoring establishment at Schleissheim and that its programs were prepared with the help of leading scholars, journalists, administrators and economic experts, and men of letters who have escaped from the communist control of their native land.

Mr. Phenix explained that the installation of RFE facilities in the United States Zone of Germany had been effected by the NCFE during the occupation of that Zone by the U.S. Army and that the operations of RFE had been, and were being facilitated by the U.S. Army authorities because of RFE's status as an accredited American information agency. He observed that the NCFE was concerned lest the termination of the Occupation Status would, in the absence of specific agreement with the Federal German Republic, result in hampering the work of RFE and impairing its effectiveness, and that, with the approval of the Department of State, negotiations had been carried on with the BPMin which had resulted in agreement as to the terms of a license which would be granted by the BPMin to NCFE immediately upon the termination of the Occupation Statute. A copy of that license is appended hereto.

Mr. Phenix called attention to the fact that this license dealt with the technical aspects of RFE's radio broadcast operations and that there were several non-technical matters which required clarification before the NCFE would feel justified in undertaking the long range program it has under consideration.

Dr. __________ stated that the objectives and purposes of NCFE, in the realization of which RFE was engaged, were objectives and purposes to which the Federal Government itself was unalterably committed. The negotiations for a BPMin license had been conducted with his full knowledge and approval. He was well aware that by licensing RFE's operation in Germany, fully cognizant of the objectives and purposes of that operation, the Federal Government was on the one hand encouraging the expenditure by NCFE for that operation of large sums of money contributed by the American public and on the other was giving NCFE an assurance that RFE's operation in Germany would not be interfered with, but on the contrary would be facilitated and helped by the Federal Government.

From his viewpoint there was only one reservation he had to make: RFE would be expected to refrain from using its broadcast facilities on German soil for the purpose of advocating and promoting political ends which the Federal Government considered in conflict with its own basic policies. Hence, the Federal Government would have the right, officially to notify NCFE through the Foreign Office of any such conflict. Should the German stations of RFE thereupon not refrain from advocating and promoting the policies to which the Federal Government had objected, the Federal Government would have no choice but to require the surrender by NCFE of its license and the discontinuance of its broadcast operations from German territory.

Mr. Phenix stated that he understood the reasons for the views expressed by Dr. __________, accepted his reservation, and agreed to the procedure outlined, and that to provide a factual basis for the consideration of any question which might arise in respect of RFE broadcasts the latter would keep on file for a period of 30 days from the date of use all tapes recording programs broadcast from RFE transmitters in Germany so that any questioned program would be available to the appropriate German authorities when requested by them. Mr. Phenix then emphasized the importance attached by NCFE to certain other aspects of the operating problems of RFE, for example:

(a) that property of NCFE brought into Germany prior to the termination of the Occupation Statute be recognized as legally within Germany and subject to the free disposition of NCFE.

(b) that NCFE be recognized as a non-profit organization of public interest and that in respect of its operations in Germany it and its employees are entitled to no less favorable treatment than any comparable German non-profit corporation or entity.

(c) that the non-German personnel now employed by NCFE in Germany be permitted to remain in Germany while so employed and that additional non-German employees be permitted to enter Germany for such employment subject only to the right of the competent Germany authorities to deny entry to any individual whose presence in Germany would in their opinion prejudice German internal security.

Dr.__________ stated that he recognized the importance of these elements in the operation of RFE in Germany and that the Federal German Republic would cooperate with NCFE to the fullest possible extent in meeting its requirements with respect thereto.

SECRET

4 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6, by WH/4, Clark Simmons

1. In view of the request of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6 representative, for identities and further particulars regarding the Robert Morton Geddes case a meeting was held on 2 May 1961 with WH/4/CI, Clark Simmons, with Mr. Cleveland C. Cram and John C. Roberts of WE/6 also present.

2. At the outset Mr. Oldfield provided the following information:

a. Robert Morton Geddes is a British subject born in Lima, Peru, on 7 April 1932. He holds British passport No. C-34880, issued at Managua on 14 June 1958. He was not registered at the British Consulate in Havana and was regarded as being American or Canadian.

b. Two employees of the British Embassy, Havana, had visited Geddes in the Havana jail (military G-2 section) on Sunday evening, 30 April 1961, and had a 15-minute conversation with Geddes alone under circumstances which they felt were not monitored. Geddes stated to them: (1) On 19 April he was arrested by the militia (in civilian clothes) at his hotel; (2) He had been interrogated three times and gave the impression that he had not disclosed anything of importance; (3) He was accused of being a CIA agent and told that he could be shot because of the existence of civil war; (4) During the third interrogation Geddes was shown ~~that they have~~ a message in Spanish signed by Geddes which was sent allegedly by him by radio-transmitter asking that CIA send arms to Cuba.

c. The British Embassy in Havana learned on Saturday, 29 April 1961, that Geddes had regularly been "picked up" at the Havana airport on his trips to and from Miami. (Mr. Oldfield was not certain what exact interpretation could be given to the term "picked up").

3. After relating the above, Mr. Oldfield stated that his service is interested in obtaining an estimate of the sort of story the Cubans might use against Geddes or in provocation against the British Embassy, perhaps to prove that the British Embassy had been in collusion with the U. S. He referred to the following specific questions which he had submitted earlier on 2 May and which were relayed by WE/6 to WH/4; R. Hopkins for answers to be given in the afternoon session by Clark Simmons:

SECRET

3 a. What was the identity of the agent inside Cuba who gave GEDDES the message he brought to the CIA contact in Miami on 11 March 1961;

b. What was the identity--or name or names--used by the CIA case officer in Miami;

c. Was Geddes given any means of clandestine radio-transmission;

d. What were the instructions given to GEDDES by his case officer.

4. Mr. Simmons replied as follows:

a. The only means of communication given to Geddes, besides his open code phone contact with his wife in Boca Raton, was a very simple SW system. Geddes was not given any means for clandestine radio-transmission.

b. Simmons then read and related the following chronology of Geddes' activities from WH/4 files:

11 March: Geddes came to Miami on the night of 11 March and made contact with Cabbage/4, a Cuban in Miami who was in contact with the CIA office. Geddes had a message from Cabbage/1 a CIA contact inside Cuba. C-4 put Geddes in contact with a CIA case officer in Miami on 12 March. Geddes claimed to be an active member of the United Revolucionaria, a resistance group inside Cuba of which C-1 was a member. At the outset Geddes said the Cuban Navy has a plan to attack all pro-Castro facilities and then flee Cuba on or about 22 March. Geddes did not ask for any money. His motivation was not known. The case officer instructions to Geddes were related solely to Geddes' report that the Cuban Navy would defect. Geddes returned to Havana.

16 March: Geddes departed for Havana.

20 March: We heard indirectly - Geddes had phoned his wife and indicated that the individual (C-1) with whom he had been collaborating in United Revolucionaria was in trouble. The fact behind this was that one of our agents (member of the UR) inside Cuba had against instructions visited his wife in Cuba. As a result a UR net of seven persons was arrested including C-1. Besides C-1, none of the others of this net knew of Geddes' activities.

21 March: Geddes returned to Miami.

28 March: Geddes came to Havana. He was given a simple SW system. Beginning about 28 March we had reason to suspect Geddes as a possible provocateur since the defection had not come off and possibility of keeping the defection of the Navy secret in itself was implausible.

27 March: Geddes sent a SW message to Miami regarding the possible Cuban Naval defection.

28 March: Through open code telecon with wife said defection of Navy set for 3 to 4 April.

29 March: Geddes called wife on telephone.

1 April: Geddes sent an SW message which was hand-carried to Miami by a courier. Geddes also had a telecon with his wife on this day.

2 April: Geddes said in telecon to wife that Naval conspirators would meet on 3 April and Geddes would give us on 5 April a final date for the defection.

4 April: Geddes indicated in telecon to wife that the Naval defection would take place "any day" now.

7 April: We received a message from Geddes delivered by a third party (courier) that the Navy plans to defect on 6 or 7 April. Geddes returned to Miami and said the date was now set for 8 or 9 April.

10 April: Geddes returned to Havana.

11 April: Geddes telephoned his wife that the defection could take place on 13 or 14 April.

16 April: Geddes in telecon with wife reported that the defection would be on 17 or 18 April.

c. During the account of the above chronology, Simmons made the following comments:

(1) The CIA agent inside (C-1) vouched for Geddes but we here in Headquarters do not know to what extent C-1 had probed into the background of Geddes and his contacts. We here did advise Miami not to take any action until we had obtained British concurrence but by that time Geddes had already returned to Havana. He reiterated that Geddes was a walk-in and was never treated as an agent.

(2) Geddes and his forecast regarding the defection of the Cuban Navy were suspect from the outset. He claimed to be a British citizen but was already performing for the U.S.

(3) To Mr. Oldfield's question as to whether Geddes had any access to a W/T man, Simmons replied that to his knowledge Geddes only had phone contact with his wife, SW and use of courier.

(4) No arms deliveries were involved in the contact with Geddes.

(5) Simmons said he would look into whom Geddes could contaminate or put the finger on.

(6) To Mr. Oldfield's [illegible] repeated request for identities of C-4, C-1, the Miami case officer, and the net that was arrested on 18 March, Simmons replied that only the DCI has the authority to release such information.

(7) The Miami case officer never served inside Cuba.

5. After Mr. Oldfield had put a number of questions to Simmons the latter asked Oldfield whether Geddes is possibly a British agent which Oldfield emphatically answered in the negative.

6. Mr. Oldfield said that he would now send off a communication to his service indicating that Geddes might be a phoney—a provocateur. However, he asked that he be provided with the following:

a. CIA appreciation of the Unidad Revolucionaria;

b. Identities of C-1, C-4 and members of the net with whom C-1 was arrested on March 18 (Note: Simmons acknowledged that besides C-1 conceivably several other members of this net might have known of Geddes and his activities.)

c. Identities of the couriers who had contact with Geddes

d. The identity of the CIA case officer--the name or names used by him in contacts with Geddes;

e. Chronological summary of the visits of Geddes to Miami and returns to Havana; also a list of the nature of his communications to Miami (by telecon, courier, etc.) and communications sent to him in Havana.

John G. Roberts
DC/WH/6

DISPATCH

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/TIPIC/Operational
Reactions from WH to UR Propaganda and Desire to Concentrate UR Efforts on PBRUMEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: As Indicated

RSF: UFGA 9274, 27 May 1963

1. Paragraph 3 of ref: Concerned elements at headquarters studied the attachments with interest; however, the material was not considered of special operational import to merit specific guidance to witting contacts in the UR.

2. Any additional effort by the UR to reach and influence PBRUMEN audiences will be highly valued.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3 - Addressee

19-120-26

DATE TYPED: 18 June 63
DATE DISPATCHED: 21 JUN 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW - 277

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-26

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: SAS/MOB/PA-PROP
OFFICER: Bruce MacMaster
TYPIST: eel
EXT: 4055

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/SAS/MOB		A. K. Eslinger
C/WH/CA	18 JUN 1963	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/SAS		

Distribution:
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BASED ON (Fld. Rpt., Proj.)
WAVE-7632 (IN-11670)
WAVE-7114 (IN-46173)
UFG-1396
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Liaison: G

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

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COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
W. S. Compton
WE/3/RE (in draft)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
(When Filled In)

RELEASING OFFICER
for C/TFW/Intel

COPY NO.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	CUBA	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS -3/520,846
SUBJECT	PLANNED UPRISING BY OPPOSITION GROUPS IN CUBA	**DATE DISTR.**	27 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	AUGUST 1962	**REFERENCES**	IN -46173 RD-ACQ-01258 -11670 RD-W-2107
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	FRANCE, PARIS (25 AUGUST 1962)	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	
APPRAISAL	6		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL FRENCH SERVICE.

1. MEMBERS OF THE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) REPORTED TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN HABANA THAT ON 10 AUGUST THEY WERE INVITED TO ATTEND A MEETING ON 14 AUGUST ORGANIZED BY THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE) AND THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP). THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS FOR THE THREE GROUPS TO PLAN A STAGE OF ACTIVE WARFARE. THE UR WAS ADVISED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY NOT TO PARTICIPATE, BUT THE UR COULD NOT CONVINCE THE DRE AND THE MRP TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION FOR AN UPRISING SCHEDULED FOR THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL UPRISING OF ALL INTERNAL RESISTANCE GROUPS.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-T/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

[illegible]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO DIA, INS

REPCINCLANT EXO

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, TELEGRAM NO. 984, DATED 26 AUGUST 1962, REPORTED INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN HABANA ON THIS AGREEMENT FOR A GENERAL UPRISING DURING THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 31 AUG 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10 (MR. KAPPEL, TFW ISSUED TEMPO COPY 2315, 30 AUG)

INFO : DCI, DD/P, ADDP, SOD-5, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW 2, WH 7, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2

AUG 31 0310Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 14497

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 7916

IN14497

GYROSE INTEL

REF A. WAVE 7985 (IN 14497)

B. WAVE 7886 (IN 14220)

1. REFS REFLECT MOST RECENT ACQUISITION INTEL RE TIMING GENERAL UPRISING. DISTURBING ASPECT RECEIPT THIS INFO IS FACT IT REACHING KUBARK VIA WIDE VARIETY SOURCES BUT ULTIMATE END SOURCE ALWAYS UR. ANALYSIS THIS INFO INDICATES IT HANGS TOGETHER RATHER WELL AND IN MANY INSTANCES VARIETY OF CHANNELS VIA WHICH IT RECEIVED WOULD NORMALLY TEND SERVE AS CROSS CHECK OR CONFIRMATION. WE CONFIDENT THIS INTEL COMING FROM UR CHANNELS WHICH EXILE UR REGARDS AS BONA FIDE. WAVE INITIALLY REGARDED INFO AS ACCURATE REFLECTION WHAT UR EXPERIENCING IN CUBA. HOWEVER INVESTIGATION AND REAPPRAISAL THIS INFO LEADS CONSLUSION INFO NOT ACCURATE AND MAY BE REFLECTION G-2 DECEPTION OR PROVOCATION OP.

2. COLLATION ALL INTEL WHICH OBTAINED FROM UR SOURCES RE UPRISING CUBA HAS IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING GROUPS AS SCHEDULED PARTICIPATE THIS REVOLT. OUR COMMENTS RE INQUIRIES WITH THESE GROUPS REVEALS FOLLOWING.

SECRET

A. DRE REPEAT DRE. PEDRO YNTERIAN GARCIA STATES DRE HAS NO INFO RE SCHEDULED REVOLT.

B. MRP REPEAT MRP. AMRAZZ-1 CLAIMS HAS NO INFO RE INTERNAL REVOLT.

C. 30 NOV REPEAT 30 NOV. AMICE-8 REPORTS HIS FACTION RECEIVED CODED CABLE 30 AUG FROM CUBA WHICH REQUESTED ARMS AS SITUATION DESPERATE AND THEY NEED HELP. AMICE-8 SENT CODED REPLY 30 AUG STATING HOLD OFF FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. AMICE-8 HAS NO INFO RE TIMING ANY REVOLT.

D. JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA REPEAT JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA. (CATHOLIC ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH) AMPAN-4 REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS NO INFO RE REVOLT.

E. MRR REPEAT MRR. CESAR BARO INDICATES HE HAS HAD COMMO FROM CUBA LAST FEW DAYS BUT NO MENTION MADE ANY REVOLT.

F. ELN REPEAT ELN. (EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL). WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.

G. FND REPEAT FND. WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.

H. FAL REPEAT FAL. HAVE NO INFO OR READY ACCESS THIS GROUP.

I. SEGUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY REPEAT SEGUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY. WE TRYING OBTAIN FROM THIS GROUP.

3. VIEW PARA 2 INFO PLUS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE INTERNAL CUBAN SCENE WHICH STEMS FROM DAILY CONTACT REFUGEES, RECEIPT AGENT TRAFFIC, ETC. MUST CONCLUDE THAT BALANCED JUDGEMENT CONTINUES INDICATE BONA FIDE POPULAR UPRISING NOT LIKELY AT THIS TIME.

4. HAVE NOT EXCLUDED PROVOCATION POSSIBILITY THEREFORE HAVE ARRANGED FOR AMCORE-2 BROADCAST FOLLOWING STATEMENT 2000

HOURS OVER WRUL. WILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLAY OVER ALL SPANISH PROGRAMS WMIE, WGBS, AND WMET. STATEMENT WILL READ AS FOLLOWS: "RELIABLE REFUGEE SOURCES AND INFO COMING OUT OF CUBA AS WELL AS CUBAN RADIO REPORTS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CASTRO FORCES HAVE BEEN ON A WAR FOOTING UNDER CONSTANT ALERT EVER SINCE THE DRE ATTACK OF 24 AUG. THEY ARE PREPARED TO CRUSH ANY SIGN OF UPRISING, RESISTANCE OR CUBAN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE. ALL TRUE CUBAN PATRIOTS ARE URGENTLY WARNED NOT TO UNDERTAKE AT THIS TIME AN UPRISING AS THIS IS DESIRED AND EXPECTED BY THE CASTRO COMMUNIST FORCES. LOYAL PATRIOTS MUST FEAR AND EXPECT PROVOCATIONS. LIBERATION WILL COME BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO REVOLT."*

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: *Reported a general uprising in all of the Provinces of Cuba is scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on 31 August.

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 100-5-1

INCLUSIVE DATES: NOV. 62 - DEC. 63

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SVIR [illegible]

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DO/OS/JPriebe

EXTENSION: 3441

NO.

DATE: 30 July 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/SR	30/7			
2. DO/SAT SR/CI/BBright	AUG 8 1963			2- This information was sent to CI Staff recently and has probably been forwarded to you for reply. Though you might be able to use this extra copy.
3. Joan				
4.				
5.				
6. CSR/CI/K			CH	CHARGED FROM RID/FI
7. Dolores			DR	
8. EE/G/CE-Wagner	19/8			6-8 note in memo ... Schroeder apparent BND approach & subsequent Sov. approach - Could Felfe have spotted for KGB?
9. SR/CI/K				8 to 9: Looks like RIS was on him first, but they may have sent Felfe (or another) at him for a false flag recruitment attempt.
10.				
11. SR/CI/A	AUG 20 1963			
12. Joan				
13. RID/AN			CKS	
14. ~~[illegible]~~ RI/MIS				
15. RID/files				[illegible]

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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E/10571

Chief, CI Staff/L
2 C 48 Hqs

5 July 1963

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Attempted RIS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - MU-10612

1. Attached are two memoranda, dated 26 June 1963, from our New York Field Office concerning apparent RIS interest in Manfred R. Schroeder and Donald E. Thomas, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this information should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would appreciate being advised the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.

2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, however, and previous CD/OO contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson, CD/OO, Support Branch, Room 413, 1717 H Street, N. W., extension 2298.

7/22 [illegible] 3701 [illegible] Schroeder [illegible] 18 [illegible] 63

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Encls: As stated above

SStetson/mm
CC: OS
FI [illegible]

100-5-1
ABSTRACT ☒ INDEX ☒
30 JULY 63

[illegible]

CS COPY

100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE MU-10612

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division DATE: 1 July 1963

Attn : Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln Staff

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

Ref: NY Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. outlined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and institutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.

2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain will be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."

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downgrading and
declassification

Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We seriously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, established company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.

JAY B. L. REEVES

Attachments: NY Reports 2988-3
and 2989-3

GNagle/mg

10612

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SENSITIVE

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division

DATE: 26 June 19[illegible]

Attn : Support (Shirley Stetson)

FROM : Chief, New York Office

SUBJECT: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred ZR Schroeder, (201-734194)
Bell Telephone Labs

201-734194

1. 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred R. Schroeder of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in connection with his June-July trip to the USSR and Bulgaria (see our 7 May Coordination Outline for subject).* During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been contacted by an individual who represented himself as a West German Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, at about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.

2. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, was telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acquaintance of her son's and who was interested in contacting him concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would appreciate it if Schroeder could call him next time he was in Hamburg. Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her son, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his 1959 USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German Intelligence Officer and said that he would like to meet Schroeder as soon as possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question (Schroeder does not recall his name) presented suitable credentials and expressed interest in Schroeder's trip to the USSR. According to Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and told him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. Schroeder was contacted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the USSR on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (as reported above), Schroeder made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been bona fide and might, in fact, have been a provocation.

* copy attached.

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[illegible]

Subject: Apparent [illegible] Interest in [illegible] Telephone [illegible]

3. Apparently R.I.S. cultivation of Schroeder [illegible] prior to the above incident. According to his account, he had received what appeared to be a routine invitation to visit Soviet acoustics facilities in Moscow and Leningrad in August 195[illegible]. In connection with the invitation, he wrote to the Sov [illegible] that during his visit he would like to meet [illegible], a leading Sov acoustics engineer who was very interested in [illegible] and had done several Russian translations of [illegible]. As a result of this correspondence, Schroeder received a telephone call at his home a couple of days prior to his departure on this trip from an individual who claimed to be a Sov [illegible] representative in New York. The caller told Schroeder that he [illegible] from Moscow for delivery to him a special invitation from [illegible] of the State Committee for Coordination of [illegible]. The caller, whose name Schroeder could not recall, [illegible] like to deliver the invitation to him personally [illegible] departure. Schroeder indicated that he was very busy with last minute details which he had to [illegible] and [illegible] the invitation couldn't [illegible]. When the caller insisted that his instructions were to deliver the invitation personally, Schroeder finally agreed to have his wife meet the [illegible] to pick up the invitation. Incidentally, at one point in the conversation Schroeder invited the Sov to deliver the invitation to his home; the latter declined, however, saying that Schroeder's home was in an area closed to travel by Sov diplomatic personnel. In any event, the Sov arranged to meet Schroeder's wife on a street corner in Chatham, New Jersey, and at that time turned over to her the invitation for her husband.

4. Schroeder said that his 195[illegible] visit to the USSR was quite routine and that he could recall nothing but the ordinary happenings during the trip. During the visit, his Sov counterpart, Furduev, who speaks fluent German, acted as his host and was at his side almost continually.

EXPELLED FROM USA
KGB [illegible]

(201-[illegible])

5. Sometime in 196[illegible] Schroeder received a phone call at his home one evening from Vladimir Volgin, who identified himself as a representative of Amtorg (AT[illegible]). Volgin said that Schroeder's old friend Furduev had just completed a visit to New York and before leaving the city had asked him to deliver a present to Schroeder for him, hence the phone call. Volgin insisted on delivering the present to Schroeder in person, and the two made arrangements to have lunch together the following week in Manhattan. This began a series of approximately six

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

or more contacts with Volgin which lasted until late [illegible] when Schroeder received a note from Volgin stating that he and his family were returning to the USSR in order that his wife could receive medical treatment there. Incidentally, Schroeder's only other contact with [illegible] was in 1962 when he met him in Copenhagen at a professional meeting.

6. Schroeder said that most, if not all, of Volgin's phone calls to him were to his home and usually appeared to have been made from pay phones. Schroeder said that his meetings with Volgin included lunches and dinners in Manhattan, socializing at a New York I.R.E. Meeting, theater, and entertainment of each other in their respective homes. Schroeder claims that his wife accompanied him during most of his contact with Volgin. Other than to his own family, Volgin never introduced Schroeder to any other individuals.

7. Schroeder claims that on a couple of occasions he turned over unclassified technical papers to Volgin, who claimed to be an electrical engineer. Schroeder can't recall whether Volgin specifically requested the information or whether he turned it over to him on his own initiative. At one point during their relationship, Volgin asked Schroeder to write an article on US acoustics work for publication in a Soviet technical journal. Schroeder declined.

8. In retrospect Schroeder admitted that he had been quite naive about his relationship with Volgin and expressed some concern that Bell security hadn't been more active in admonishing him against development of relationships with Sov Government representatives. His view of his experiences now completely coincides with ours as a result of our discussion.

9. Another factor which obviously enters into Schroeder's R.I.S. picture is his wife's Bulgarian extraction. Schroeder claims that neither he nor, to the best of his knowledge, his wife have ever been approached by Sovbloc representatives in this country concerning his wife's family in Bulgaria. His wife's mother, Iwanalia Mensckik, immigrated to the US in April 1960 and lived with Schroeder and his wife until November 1962 when she returned to Sofia, apparently because she was homesick and couldn't adjust to the new language and life in the US. Schroeder said that his mother-in-law's original exit visa request was rejected in 1958 by the Bulgarian Government, but after he and his wife wrote several letters to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry she was finally granted permission to leave in 1960.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

10. After Schroeder visits the USSR on his current trip, he plans to fly to Sofia to spend approximately a week with his wife's family there. Schroeder had not mentioned the Bulgarian visit in outlining his original itinerary to Bob Martin of this office, therefore, it was not mentioned in Schroeder's Coordination Outline.

11. All of the above would seem to indicate quite strongly that Schroeder, as we originally surmised, has been targeted by R.I.S. In briefing Schroeder, we ran through some of the typical entrapment situations fabricated by the opposition, e.g., women, homosexuals, purchase of drugs for Sov citizens, black market activity, acceptance of letters to mail outside the USSR, commitments to disaffected Sovs, etc. In addition, we stringently admonished Schroeder against any notetaking or photography which could in any way be construed as compromising. We also alerted Schroeder to the fact that some attempt might be made to use his wife's family as leverage in a recruitment attempt. In this connection, we pointed out to Schroeder that there was a strong likelihood that the R.I.S. and/or Bulgarian service would make an approach to him during his forthcoming visit to Sofia. An approach in Bulgaria would give the Sovs an opportunity for disavowal and also would provide the proper setting for maximum utilization of relatives. When Schroeder mentioned that his sister-in-law, FNU Mensckik, had indicated several times in the past that she would like to leave Bulgaria, we strongly admonished him against making any commitments to her, pointing out that she may possibly be co-opted by the opposition. We told Schroeder that any representations to gain an exit visa for his sister-in-law should be channeled through the US Legation in Sofia. Schroeder was told that, if any pressure were applied concerning his wife's family, his best reaction would probably be a noncommittal, "I'll think it over when I get home!" All in all, we alerted Schroeder as best we could to the opposition M.O. and prepared him on how best to avoid some of the not so obvious pitfalls which might be in store for him.

12. Prior to our briefing of Schroeder, Bob Martin alerted Bell management to all of the ramifications of Schroeder's travel behind the Curtain. The management was informed by Martin that we felt it our obligation to point out to them the strong possibility that Schroeder had been targeted in order that they would have all of the facts available before signing off on his trip.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,
Bell Telephone Labs

13. Assessment of Schroeder: Subject, a very accomplished scientist, heads up all acoustics research at Bell. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, and English. He impresses us as being a rather savvy, discreet, cooperative, mature, stable, well motivated individual. We attribute Schroeder's apparent lack of discretion in his dealings with the Sovs more to the subtlety of the Sov approach than to his own naivete. It has been our experience that most US businessmen and scientists are very susceptible and vulnerable to the opposition approach mainly due to somewhat of a lack of realistic public education concerning contacts with Sovbloc nationals. We feel that Schroeder's degree of cooperativeness with US services has been enhanced considerably by his feeling that he has really been taken for a ride by the opposition.

Incidentally, when we asked subject for permission to release this information with source disclosure to the FBI, he was at first somewhat apprehensive and expressed the desire to talk it over with one of his Bell superiors before he made any commitments. He finally agreed, however, when we convinced him that it would certainly be in his best interest to get on record with the FBI as soon as possible. Most of his apprehension about the FBI seemed to be attributable to the fact that he has just been granted US citizenship and, in addition, is now somewhat concerned that his activities with the Sovs in some way may effect his security status which in turn could be very detrimental to his career.

Based on our limited contact with Schroeder, we have every reason to believe that he would be suitable for operational use, should the Bureau choose to pursue such a course.

14. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Schroeder and provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Sov or Bloc nationals in this country.

JAY B. D. REEVES

CNagle/mg

1. **Name:** [illegible]

2. **DOB, POB, Citizenship:** [illegible] 1926, Ahlen, Germany. Current Citizenship - West German. US citizenship pending, application for same made 22 January 1963.

3. **Home Address:** [illegible] Oates Avenue
Gillette, New Jersey

4. **Place of Employment and Position**

Technical Staff
Bell Laboratories
Murray Hill, New Jersey

Head of Acoustics Research

5. **Itinerary:** Subject will tentatively depart US 18 May, arriving Moscow 19 May. He will spend two weeks visiting labs in Moscow and Leningrad at the invitation of D. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research. If the 19 May arrival date is not acceptable to the Soviets, subject will make the trip in June or July.

6. **Reason for Trip:** During November 1962, while in Europe, subject received an invitation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to visit various Soviet acoustic laboratories. Because of a tight schedule at the time subject declined the invitation. In early March of this year he received the invitation from Gvishiani mentioned above.

During his trip, subject will discuss with Soviet counterparts various aspects of voice communications research, electroacoustics, and architectural acoustics. He will also visit Soviet laboratories involved in research in these fields.

7. **Security Status:** Subject was granted Secret clearance by Middletown Air Materiel Command 30 July 1956 in anticipation of his being used on classified project at Bell Laboratories. Alien name check on subject pending.

8. **Previous Intelligence Activities:** In 1959 subject was contacted twice by CI/OO New York Field Office for debriefing after a trip to the USSR. At the time he was generally cooperative,

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[illegible]

but somewhat apprehensive. He was again contacted in 1962 for debriefing subsequent to a US visit of a Soviet counterpart.

9. Relatives or Close Friends in Denied Areas. Subject's wife was born in Sofia, Bulgaria. She now reportedly holds US citizenship. In November 1962 subject managed to arrange for immigration to the US of his mother-in-law, Ivanalia Venecki. After a short stay in this country, however, she returned to her home in Sofia in March 1963. In addition to his mother-in-law, presumably there are other relatives of his wife still living in Bulgaria.

10. Extent of Previous Trips to Denied Areas: 13-18 August 1959 subject visited acoustics laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad.

11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Subject is a very competent acoustics scientist. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and English.

12. Results of Personal Assessment: During our somewhat limited relationship with subject he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, mature, and cooperative.

13. Nature of Substantive Briefing Proposed and Requirements to be Levied: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.

14. Defensive and Realities Briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Sovbloc realities briefing.

15. Briefing Officer and Participants: Briefing will be conducted by CA/SO New York Field Office personnel.

16. Funding of Trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.

17. Coordination Deadline: 15 May 1963.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : Support (Shirley Stetson)
FROM : Chief, New York Office

DATE: 26 June 1963
00-A-3266992
(NY-29883)

SUBJECT: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas, Bell Laboratories

Cit USA
Occ Scientist
Bell Laboratories

1. During routine debriefing of Donald E. Thomas of Bell Laboratories in connection with his recent USSR visit to attend the Popov Society Meeting, 5-14 May, Moscow (see NYOR 8878 for Coordination Outline)* subject mentioned having had recent contact with a Soviet Government representative in this country. The Soviet in question identified himself to Thomas as Gleb Aleksi Pavlov and gave his address as 1216 First Avenue, Manhattan.

2. According to Thomas, his initial contact with Pavlov took place in late March following the International Convention and Show of the I.E.E.E., 25-29 March, New York City (see Case 39843). At the convention Thomas became friendly with two Soviet counterparts in attendance, A. V. Tiel and Anatole Trutka, both of whom Thomas invited to his home for a social visit during their US stay. When the Sovs departed for home following the convention, Thomas saw them off at New York International Airport. It was at the airport that he first met Pavlov, who apparently was seeing off all of the Sov I.E.E.E. delegates. After the Sov delegation had departed, Thomas and Pavlov returned to Manhattan together and, on parting, exchanged addresses.

3. A couple of weeks after their initial meeting, Pavlov telephoned Thomas at his home and told him that Tiel and Trutka had asked him to send their warmest regards to Thomas and thank him for the hospitality which he showed them during their trip to this country. During the conversation, Pavlov expressed an interest in renewing his acquaintance with Thomas, and suggested that he would enjoy visiting him at his home in Madison, New Jersey. Thomas said that he would enjoy seeing Pavlov, but that he was currently preparing to leave on a trip to the USSR and Europe and was not scheduled to return to the US until late May. Thomas suggested that, in view of this, perhaps early June would be a good time for them to plan on getting together. Pavlov replied that he, himself would be in the USSR then, but would contact Thomas when he returned in early July. Incidentally, Pavlov's

* copy attached

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SENSITIVE 10612

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downgrading and

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SENSITIVE

Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

phone call to Thomas was made on a pay phone. In fact, when the operator cut in for overtime, Thomas called Pavlov back at the pay phone. Thomas mentioned that he possibly might have the phone number written down somewhere.

4. Soon after the phone call from Pavlov, Thomas called John McVicker of the State Department and inquired if any clearance of Pavlov's proposed trip to his home in Madison would be necessary. McVicker told Thomas that any such clearances were Pavlov's worry and that he need not be concerned about same.

5. During his recent trip to the USSR, it would appear that Thomas was exposed to two incidents which possibly could have been of opposition fabrication. One involved an approach by a Soviet interpreter by the name of FNU Petrov, who took Thomas aside and asked him if he could do him a personal favor by getting him a subscription to National Geographic Magazine for which he, Petrov, would reimburse Thomas in rubles. Thomas politely refused. D MOSCOW USSR

SEX F CIT USSR

6. The other incident involved Thomas being photographed with an attractive young female of interpreter, Ludmilla Oshkina. According to Thomas, when one of the Soviets in their party was about to take a picture of him standing next to Ludmilla, another individual standing nearby was pushed out of the way apparently so that he would not be included in the photograph. In addition, Ludmilla attempted to strike an affectionate pose with Thomas for the photograph by slipping her arm through his. Thomas claims to have pushed her arm away just as the photo was being snapped.

A:201

7. Assessment of Thomas: Subject strikes us as being extremely naive and unrealistic. He appears to be more apprehensive about his dealings with CIA than his dealings with Soviets. In fact, when Thomas was asked if he would mind if a tape recorder were used for debriefing, he became very nervous and expressed a fear that, if such a tape were made, perhaps the Soviets might gain access to it and use it against him in some way at a future date.

Thomas had an outline in his own handwriting of the sessions of the Popov Society Meeting. When we asked for a photostat of same, he again expressed misgivings and indicated that he would prefer to have a typewritten copy prepared for us instead of a copy in his own handwriting because he was fearful that it might fall into Soviet hands.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,
Bell Laboratories

We inquired of Thomas why he had not mentioned Pavlov to us during our defensive briefing of him before his trip. He replied rather nebulously that it was his understanding that it was company policy that our only function in seeing him before his trip was to give him a defensive briefing, and that, since no debriefing was involved at the time, he felt no obligation to volunteer the information concerning Pavlov.

It is our opinion that Thomas's obvious naivite, apparent lack of sophistication, and extreme apprehension concerning dealings with our Agency would make him most unsuitable from the standpoint of operational utilization by the Bureau.

8. We would strongly reccommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with Thomas in time to provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Pavlov or other Sov legals in US.

P.J. Conna
JAY B. L. REEVES

GNagle/mg

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1 May 1963

SUBJECT: Coordination Outline - Donald E. Thomas, Bell Labs

FROM: New York Field Office

Following is coordination outline for D. E. Thomas. Dr. W. O. Baker requested that Thomas be given defensive briefing by us before going behind Curtain. As you are already aware, Baker is Vice President at Bell Labs and member of President's Scientific Advisory Council and President's Intelligence Board.

1. Name: Donald Edgar Thomas
2. Date and Place of Birth: 12 May 1907, Hanover Township, Penna.
3. Home and Address: 48 Fairview Avenue, Madison, New Jersey.
4. Place of employment and position: Bell Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey; Electronics Engineer.
5. Itinerary: Subject departs US 3 May for Moscow to attend Popov Society meeting, 5-14 May. Following Moscow meeting he will visit labs in Western Europe for approximately one week.
6. Mission and reason for trip: Subject was invited to give paper at Popov meeting by USSR Academy of Sciences via I.E.E.E. (International Electronic and Electrical Engineers).
7. Security Status: We hold favorable NAC completion on subject dated 22 Jan 59.
8. Previous Intelligence Activities: Subject was contacted by OO/CO 1958-59 concerning info on Soviet work in his field which he acquired from contacts with Soviet scientific counterparts attending international meeting in US.
9. Relatives or close friends in denied areas: None.
10. Extent of previous trips to denied areas: None.
11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Pa. State College, B.S., E.E., 1929; Columbia University, M.A., 1932; US Army Signal Corps, 1942-44; USAAF, 1944-46, on radio countermeasures, 1944-55; Retired Lt.Col. USAFR; Member (Civilian) panel on Electronic Countermeasures R&D Board, Dept of Defense, 1948-53.
12. Resume of personal assessment: During our limited relationship with subject, he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, cooperative, well motivated, mature. He is well regarded in his particular field of competence.
13. Nature of substantive briefing proposed and requirements to levied: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and realities briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Sovbloc realities briefing.
15. Funding for trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
16. Briefing office and participants: Briefing will be conducted by OO/CO New York Office personnel.
17. Coordination deadline: 2 May 1963.

SECRET

10612

14-00000

105 //

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT Alleged House Arrest of Soviet Scientist, L Chistovich

DATE OF INFO. July 63

PLACE & DATE ACQ. -- July 63

REPORT NO. OO- [illegible]

DATE DISTR [illegible]

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, professor in a US university.

He is an authority on acoustics.

1. I attended the Third International Congress on Acoustics, 1-8 Sept 59, Stuttgart, West Germany.

2. While at this Congress I met a Soviet female scientist, L Chistovich, who is connected with the Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Leningrad. One day during the Congress I took a walk in the Black Forest with L Chistovich and another Soviet scientist. After a short time, the other Soviet scientist excused himself saying that he had to rejoin his colleagues.

3. In June 1963 Manfred Schroeder, an acoustician with Bell Telephone Laboratories, was in the USSR. On his return to the US he told me that he had heard while in the USSR that L Chistovich, on her return from the 1959 Stuttgart Congress, had been placed under house arrest. He also said that he had seen L Chistovich while he was in the USSR, and he had asked her whether it was true that she had been placed under house arrest on returning from the Stuttgart Congress. He said Chistovich's only reply was to blush.

4. I suspect that the individual who reported L Chistovich to the authorities was Yuriy Pavlovich Lysanov. He is connected with the Acoustics Institute in Moscow. He publishes very little and his conduct has seemed strange to me. He was in the United States in 1956-1957. I suspect that the fact that L Chistovich took a walk with me alone may well have been the reason she was placed under house arrest.

- end -

File

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC			

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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Dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the member agencies and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

FBI report dated 22 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)
Memo for Secretary, [illegible] Special Committee

FBI report dated 25 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)
Re: Exchange of Information Regarding Soviet & Satellite Diplomats

FBI report dated 31 Oct. 62 (N.Y., N.Y.)

FBI Memo dated 24 Jan. 63 (Wash. D.C.)
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 26 Feb. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 21 March 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 25 April 63 (Wash. D.C) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 24 May 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 20 June 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 22 July 63 (Wash. D.C) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S

FBI Report dated 19 Aug 63 (Wash. DC) filed (E) 65-63478
Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Analysis dated 4 Sept 63 (Wash. DC)
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 4 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.)
Re: Unknown Subjects (Two); Observed Taking Photographs in Direction of U.S. Naval Station, Wash. D.C.

FBI Report dated 25 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C) filed 4 (S) 65-63478
Re: Soviet Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 27 Dec 63 (N.Y., N.Y)

TOP SECRET CROSS REFERENCE SHEET (FBI Report 22 May 63)
Re: Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: TS Material from Deryabin Safe

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R	EXTENSION 1133	NO. REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C	DATE 19 June 1978

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.	Mr. N. Shepanek ~~MXX DXXXXXXX~~ SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6~~ ~~Green~~				Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ________. Please respond as soon as possible. Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks, Rodge (1 to 7: CI Staff says they may be shown to Blakey
2.	~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~OS~~ ~~Tube FM~~				
3.	~~Mr. Young~~ ~~OSS~~ ~~Tube~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Green~~				
4.	~~Mr. [illegible] Novinger~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
5.	~~[illegible]dt~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Tube [illegible]~~				
6.	~~Mr. Hub[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
7.	Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
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15.					

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

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Doc. No. XAAZ-17241
Doc. Date 20 APR 1964
Copy No. # Repro 2
Number of Pages 38
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

CIA Control No. TS# 191722
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1015	B. Bigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
[illegible] SS/DO/D	[illegible]	19 June 78		19 June 78				
DC/CI (Arcoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Bigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or [illegible]	[illegible] 20 Jun 78							
DDO/TSCO								

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When finished with these documents return them to DDO/TSCO as we are the control Office for these documents.

TS# 191722
TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP I)

(40)

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Fall 1934	Entered "zero"
1935 to 1939	Moved to Lenin and then direct then director c cessively on Ul Pr. Maksima Gor (different ones
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June 1941	Completed 6th with parents whe

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Doc. No. XAAZ-17241/1

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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1015	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	[illegible]	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
PA/CI ([illegible])								
DDO/TSCO	B. Twigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge	geor Gabrielson							
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6-64 (OP-1)

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Doc. Date 19 MAY 1964
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	SKoder 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1Q15	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DO/O	M. Shepanek	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
AC/CI (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		21 JUN 1978				
DCI/OCC Breckinridge or Gabrielson								
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

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Doc. Date 19 May 1964
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Number of Pages 2
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible]							
DDO/TSCO 1515	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepanek SA/DDO/C	[illegible]	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
AC/CI (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
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FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP-1)

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DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case	67
	Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would soon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

4-00000

SECRET

C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

SECRET

Department of Justice
Washington 20530

October 20, 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification

SECRET

9 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

8 October 1969
Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927		Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR	
Male	Divorced	Brown	Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches
Soviet	Caucasian	--	

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT:	Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
AKA:	Yuri NOSSENKO
DPOB:	30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
MARITAL STATUS:	1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV). 1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced. 23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.
CHILDREN:	Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)
EDUCATION:	1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools. 1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.
EMPLOYMENT:	March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence). March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).
MILITARY:	Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.
NATIONALITY:	Soviet
PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:	1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR 1956 - Candidate Communist Party 1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of~~ operational interest ~~to this Agency. Therefore, it is~~ requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SECRET

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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

IN CASE ADDRESS REPLY TO
AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.
A13 724 817

July 24, 1969

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

e.n. 16 Jan. 1970

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with those contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP [illegible]
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director



Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressure.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

1963

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

/The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post 2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with "impermissable acts" in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Folio

Wash Post
2/15/64

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich ~~(phn)~~, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	[illegible]/IOS
	[illegible]/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]
	C/[illegible]B
1	C/[illegible]
2	[illegible]
	[illegible]S
	FILES

(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

TOBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
PPLEMENTAL

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
	C/SRD
	C/SS3
✓	C/S3
	C/ID/
	[illegible]
	AATS

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District ~~Field Office who are concerned~~ with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

L. L. Hamby
for JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

[illegible]

JUL 2 4 29 PM 64

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/DPO should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANEGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)

2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)

3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

14-00000

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OLC 69-0676

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate
Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed
Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations
Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

John M. Maury

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D/Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

SECRET

SECRET EYES ONLY 1-9-1257/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

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1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

SECRET EYES ONLY

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

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EYES ONLY

he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

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conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself, to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country, there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

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Nosenko

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Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account .

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9 January 1975

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected to be~~ able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

EYES ONLY

13 74-0130

31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

EYES ONLY

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CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

2

SECRET

EYES ONLY

31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
Original - Adse
1 - DDA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249

EYES ONLY

SECRET

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

[illegible]

Заявление

Я, Носенко Юрий Иванович, прошу Правительство США предоставить мне политическое убежище в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Это решение мною принято в результате обдумывания этого вопроса в течение длительного [illegible], без постороннего давления кого бы то ни было.

Я [illegible] веру в [illegible] коммунистической системы. Работая в КГБ и зная более, чем рядовой советский человек, о внутренней политике, настроении народа и политике советского правительства, я убедился, что в СССР нет и не будет правды и настоящей свободы до тех пор, пока руководит страной коммунистическая партия. Являясь в командировке в странах Запада, я имел [illegible] правильно оценить и увидеть преимущества реального и действительно свободного мира. События последнего времени в Венгрии и Восточной Германии, раскол коммунистического движения являются для меня примерами и подтверждают правильность моего единственно верного решения порвать навсегда с Советским Союзом.

Прошу заверить Правительство США, что я отдам все свои силы и знания Правительству и Народу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

4 февраля 1964 г.

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1
(L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public

(SEAL)

My commission expires September 24, 1969

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April, 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN I

Dear IDEN I

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

SECRET

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

[illegible]

6. (1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph 7 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 **Date:** March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 **Date:** 6 March 1970

25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

5010-110

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 , a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 , was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 — May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek — Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 — 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 — 17 May 74
Date

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	22 Jan 75 10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

14-00000

Defector

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-227[illegible]

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

neil

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

EXHIBIT 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM: Charles W. Kane, Director of Security

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.:

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUN 1975			
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain SUB		[illegible]	[illegible]	
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~ Rogovin				This requires editing before passing to the DCI.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-[illegible]

[illegible] JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011018

SECRET

in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

SECRET

Executive Registry
75-1942

6/24
75-2244 [illegible]

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder
Walter Elder

cc - DCI
✓cc - IG
cc - OGC

CB: 007789
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SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Adic Mardirosian SE/DDO
Dist Staff 3 C/SE

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SECRET

16 75-C335

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

SECRET

2 [illegible] CL BY 013190

Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

Reel No. 1, 11 June 1962 (The quality of the tape is very poor.)

Translated from Russian by P. D.

(N. talks about surveillance of Soviet personnel in the United States.)

Nosenko: Let me tell you - I (---) I was also in the States, although under another name. I had a certain business there . . .

Q. This was (?) in Washington (?)?

Nosenko: Yes, I was there.

Q: On TDY?

Nosenko: 19 days, 19 days only.

Q: Under what name?

Nosenko: NIKOLAYEV.

Q: NIKOLAYEV?

Nosenko: In England I was NIKOLAYEV and in your country I was NIKOLAYEV.

Q: ---first and middle name?

Nosenko: Yes, Yuriy, Yuriy, also Yuriy.

Q: And in England you also were for a short time?

Nosenko: In England I was for ten and fifteen days . . .

Note: During the interrogation of Nosenko in 1964, he denied that he ever said that he was in the United States.

2. You stated previously that while traveling to England and Cuba, you were documented as Nikolayev. Under what cover did you travel to those countries? What was your Legend-Biography?

> Note: Any KGB officer going abroad under another name and under cover prepares a Legend-Biography to cover up his real identity. If Nosenko travelled as Nikolayev, then his legend omitted "the fact" that he was a son of a Minister because there was no Minister of Shipbuilding Industry with the name of Nikolayev, etc., etc.)

3. You stated previously that in January 1960 you were processed to go to the US with the Soviet Automotive Delegation. You obtained a passport in your true name, Nosenko, but the date was postponed, then cancelled. Who selected your candidacy for the trip? What were you supposed to do in the USA? Why was the trip postponed? Why were you processed in your true name, Nosenko, and not under the name Nikolayev, under which you visited England or [illegible]?

4. In 1962 you stated that while working with the KGB, you personally recruited ten Americans. Please give us their names and how you recruited them.

Note: Nosenko was asked why he was chosen to go to Geneva in 1962 instead of an officer from the Department (KGB) Delegation. Answering this question he mentioned the recruitment of ten Americans.

Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko

11 June 1962

Nosenko: Gribanov, the chief of the whole counterintelligence. (His name) Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov . . . so, Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov decided you go, that I must be here (in Geneva). I said, "Be my guest, Oleg Mikhaylovich. I am not saying no. . ." So Gribanov decided "You will go. That's all" (Nosenko knocked on the desk). . . Well, what am I? . . . Who have I recruitted? . . . Ten Americans, no more than that . . . (and Gribanov said) "You will go! You must go!"

III. Soviet visas and other regulations for tourists traveling to the USSR.

✓ 1. Didn't you know or remember how Oswald's visa was processed and from what country Oswald entered the USSR? Is it possible that he entered the USSR on a "podvisnaya" visa?

✓ 2. You previously said that you saw Oswald's visa application, but you could not say from what country Oswald came to the USSR. In your opinion, is it possible that Oswald received his visa application in some other European country, then went to Finland and through Finland entered the USSR without contacting the Soviet consulate in Helsinki? Did you hear any talk about the possibility that is described above? If so, when did you hear it and from whom?

✓ 3. On 3 July 1964 you stated that you have seen Oswald's anketa (visa application). Do you remember what was in that anketa? Did you read the anketa? What did you mean that you saw the anketa? Was it in the name Lee Harvey Oswald, or was there another name? Did you see the name of the person who signed the anketa?

4. Do you have any information to the effect that Oswald might not have come to the Soviet consulate or to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki to obtain his visa? Could he have obtained a visa in Switzerland or Sweden then have come to Helsinki and, without reporting to the Soviet consulate in Helsinki, have taken a train to Leningrad and then to Moscow?

5. According to your previous information, "any tourist - he buys a tour to the Soviet Union, makes out the anketa, and then comes to Moscow." In what country did Oswald buy a tour to the USSR? In what country did Oswald fill in the anketa? If the anketa goes to Moscow, to what office in Moscow does it go? To MID, KGB? Is it possible that all the data on Oswald from his anketa was sent to Moscow by a cable? Did you see and read Oswald's anketa or a telegram that Oswald is coming to Moscow? If you did not read the anketa, who among the KGB officers of the Second Chief Directorate or the First Chief Directorate read the anketa or had access to it? Who would logically have access to the anketa?

✓ 6. According to your previous information, any person who wants to visit the USSR has to buy a tour in a foreign tourist firm in his home country or any other country, and the tourist firm will make arrangements for his stay in the USSR. It is understood that he must fill in the anketa, and in addition to the general questions, the common tourist should make requests for the cities he intends to visit and for the accommodations he wants. The tourist would know in advance when he receives his visa his date of arrival in Moscow, in what hotel he is going to stay, and what kind of accommodations he would be given. The question, then, is do you know when Intourist received Oswald's request and application and when it answered him that his demands are met and that he is welcome in Moscow?

✓ 7. From your knowledge, when Oswald arrived in Moscow, was he handled by the Intourist Agency or by Sputnik, the Youth Tourist Bureau of the USSR, or by the Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions?

Note: The Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions organizes exchanges of tourists between trade unions of the USSR and other countries. Sputnik was organized in June 1958 for the exchange of of tourists (students and other youths).

8. What is the procedure after a tourist applies for a Soviet visa? Do you know at what tourist agency or in what foreign country Oswald applied for a visa to the USSR or bought a tour to the USSR? Who was the Soviet Intourist representative in that country who took Oswald's visa application to the Soviet Embassy?

✓ 9. You stated previously that Oswald was not considered a defector. If he was not a defector, then what was he?

Note: If the KGB did not consider Oswald to be a defector, then it is possible that Oswald was known to the KGB long before his arrival in the USSR as a tourist and Oswald was assured that when he arrived in the USSR he would be given Soviet citizenship or at least a permanent residence permit. Although he would be a defector anyway, it could be that Oswald did not like the word defector and the KGB decided not to call him a defector but, let us say, a volunteer. The Soviet Constitution states that the USSR grants the right of asylum to all foreign citizens "who are persecuted for safeguarding the interests of the working class or who are persecuted for scientific activities, for national-liberation struggle." (Article 129 of the USSR Constitution of 1936.)

✓ 10. You stated previously that "since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador--- can give a visa in three to five days. If so, what was so special for the Soviet government that the ambassador would be personally involved in issuing a visa to Oswald?

Note: It is known that in 1957 the Soviet government adopted some measures to improve travel for foreign tourists in the USSR. They mostly concerned currency exchange. The 1957 regulations said nothing about visas. Nosenko should be questioned about the 1957 decision of the Soviet government to determine if he is not mistaking the 1957 decision with that of 1960.

✓ 11. You stated previously that since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador can give visas in from three to five days. The available information published by the Soviets unmistakenly states that a visa cannot be obtained in less than seven days (in some cases it takes five to seven days). Following are excerpts from a book entitled Moscow, A Tourists Companion, published in Moscow in 1969, and from the magazine Soviet Life, May 1978, p. 59. Soviet Life stated that "visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of application at a Soviet consulate."

Moscow: A Tourist's Companion
Moscow, 1967.

All you need for [illegible] trip to the Soviet Union is your national passport and [illegible] indicating the time of your visit and the itinerary.

Visa. As a rule, visas are obtained for travellers by tourist firms and travel agencies. But you can get your visa yourself. Visas are issued by Soviet consular offices in every country five to seven days after [illegible]. The visa is valid for the indicated time of [illegible] points of entry and exit on the Soviet border [illegible] depending on your route.

If you decide to extend your visit or alter the itinerary, apply to the service bureau at your hotel. If Intourist is able to provide the necessary accommodation, your visa will be altered accordingly. Visas, and subsequent alterations in them, are free of charge.

Visas for transit travel via the U.S.S.R. by railway or motor are issued if you have the pertinent visa of the country neighbouring on the U.S.S.R. You need no Soviet visa if you travel

via U.S.S.R. by air, provided you do not stay in Soviet transfer towns for more than 24 hours.

Intourist does not service travellers who come on visits to relatives in the Soviet Union. Neither does it offer services in towns where Intourist agencies are unavailable. In such cases, apply to a Soviet consulate abroad.

Under reciprocal agreements between the Soviet Union and some other countries, no visas are necessary for nationals of these countries for travel in the U.S.S.R. and for Soviet tourists visiting these countries.

Medical Formalities. An international smallpox inoculation certificate is required for entry to the Soviet Union from African, Asian and South American countries, and, in addition, a cholera certificate for entry from India and Eastern Pakistan.

Customs. Personal belongings—garments, shoes, tourist and sports gear, perfumery and cosmetics, etc. in quantities necessary for the time of stay in the Soviet Union depending on the season, are duty-free. Besides, travellers may bring duty-free (per person) two cameras, one amateur cine-camera and a reasonable (non-commercial) amount of souvenirs. Persons coming to the Soviet Union on a hunting tour (provided they have a certificate issued by Intourist or a foreign travel firm confirming this purpose of their trip) may bring sporting rifles.

To make sure passage home is unhindered, please register the foreign currency you have brought with you with the customs, which will issue you a pertinent certificate.

It is prohibited to bring to the U.S.S.R. Soviet currency, Soviet government bonds, annulled securities, arms, opium and hashish and appliances for smoking them, obscene materials and books, films, records, etc., politically and economically prejudicious to the U.S.S.R.

All objects and articles (except those prohibited by law) may be shipped out of the U.S.S.R. in any quantity, provided they have been purchased with Soviet money exchanged at the Vneshtorg Bank of the U.S.S.R. or the other agencies of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. (Gosbank) and [illegible] purchased with foreign convertible currency. For the unhindered passage of such goods make sure you have the pertinent bank certificates or shop's bills.

It is prohibited to ship out of the USSR arms and so-called securities. Antiques and [illegible] art may be shipped out provided you obtain [illegible] from the Ministry of Culture and have paid [illegible] duty amounting to 100 per cent of the price [illegible]

Detailed cust[illegible] on the *Tourist's Memo* [illegible]

Currency Exchange. [illegible] available at all border points [illegible] and most hotels. Service bureaus at hotels will [illegible] address and office hours of money-changing offices [illegible] exchange.

Rules for Photographers and Cine-camera Fans. It is a rare tourist who foregoes the pleasures of photographs in a foreign country.

In the Soviet Union you may photograph everything and everywhere save objects coming under the head of the nation's defence. This applies to all types of military technology, seaports, major hydrotechnical objects, railway junctions, tunnels, railway bridges, industrial enterprises, and the like. Aerial photography and terrestrial panoramic photography, and photography within 25 kilometres from the frontier are prohibited. Ask for permission of the administration before you use your camera inside factories, research institutes and the like. It stands to reason, too, that when you photograph people you must first obtain their consent.

If you intend to make a film for commercial purposes (for subsequent showing at cinemas [illegible] television, etc.) apply to Sovexportfilm (7, Maly [illegible]kovsky Pereulok, Moscow), tel. 229-32-02. Bear in mind [illegible] sensitive colour materials (films, paper, etc.) on sale [illegible] Union are adapted solely for Agfa and [illegible]

Intourist Se[illegible]

Every hotel [illegible] elsewhere in the Soviet Union) has an Intourist [illegible] Bureau. It is very useful to tourists and we advise you [illegible] it on arrival. The service bureaus are staffed with people who speak foreign languages and you will have no difficulty communicating with them.

One of their major functions is to exchange the vouchers issued to you by your travel agent for Intourist coupons, and to provide all other services.

The service bureau will relieve you of all travel cares and book tickets for you on internal and international railway and airlines. It will help you extend your visa and perform all other pertinent formalities.

The service bureau books tickets to theatres, concerts, cinemas and sports contests. Make sure that you book tickets well in advance, for every Muscovite is an avid theatre-goer and sports-fan and tickets are scarce.

The price of a theatre and concert ticket is 2 to 3.50 rubles, and of a cinema ticket 40 to 70 kopecks.

The service bureau will tell you what is showing at Moscow's theatres, concert halls and cinemas.

If your tour does not cover excursions and you wish to see the sights of Moscow, the service bureau will be glad to recommend the best sightseeing itineraries.

If you need a guide interpreter, the service bureau will be happy to provide one. Intourist guides speak English, Bulgarian, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Hungarian, German, Polish, Portuguese, Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian, Finnish, French, Czech, Swedish and Japanese. The services of a guide-interpreter cost up to 3 hours—[illegible] rubles, for every subsequent hour—1 rubl[illegible] [illegible] kopeks.

You can hire a car for a sightseeing tour of Moscow and its environs or order a long-distance telephone call through the service bureau.

If you are unwell, the service bureau will summon a doctor [illegible] you. As you know, medical services in the Soviet Union are [illegible] of charge.

Approach your hotel service bureau with anything that [illegible] interest or trouble you. The receptionist will be glad [illegible] advise you and to render all the necessary assistance.

If You Are Passing Through Moscow

If you are passing through Moscow and have only a day [illegible] is what we recommend you to see:

1. *Excursion by car or tourist coach.* A three-hour tour wh[illegible] will give you a general idea of old and new Moscow. The [illegible] starts from Hotel National in the heart of the city and fo[illegible]

the Maurice Thorez Embankment (formerly Sofiiskaya), Red Square, Sverdlov Square, along Gorky Street, Sadovoye Koltso, Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Leninsky Prospekt, past Moscow University on the Lenin Hills back to the National.

2. *Tour of the Kremlin and Red Square.* A visit to the Kremlin cathedrals and the Armoury. The tour takes three hours.

If you have another day in Moscow, be sure to visit the *Exhibition of Economic Achievement of the U.S.S.R.* (see p. 60), which will give you a good idea of contemporary Soviet life and the cultural and economic achievements of Moscow and the rest of the Soviet Union. The excursion takes four hours. In the afternoon, pay a visit to the famous *Tretyakov Art Gallery* (see p. 150), the treasure trove of Russian fine art. The excursion there takes something like three hours.

Do your best, too, to see Moscow's glorious *Bolshoi Theatre ballet.*

If you have a few more days in Moscow, pick tours to suit your taste and inclinations.

Continue Your Trip

From Moscow you can make a tour of the Soviet Union—the subtropics of the Black Sea coast and the Siberian taiga, the Ukrainian steppelands, the mountains of the Caucasus, and the ancient towns of Russia and Central Asia.

Here is the list of cities where Intourist offers its services:

ingrad, cradle of the Russian revolution, a city of magnificent architecture;

Black Sea health resorts of Batumi, Odessa, Sochi, Sukhumi and Yalta;

Siberian and Far Eastern cities:

osibirsk—the largest industrial centre and city of science in stern Siberia;

Bratsk, a new Siberian town neighbouring on the Bratsk Hydro-Power Station on the Angara, which is one of the world's largest;

Irkutsk, the city near the legendary Lake Baikal;

Khabarovsk, a major Soviet Far Eastern city.

Additional information on Visas

QUESTION: I would like to see an article about Intourist services, prices, etc. (C. C. Krause, Minneapolis, Minnesota; M. Suparoff, Foxboro, Massachusetts; and many other readers)

ANSWER: Intourist is our state-operated commercial travel agency. It works with some 700 firms and transport companies in nearly 100 countries, including about 100 in the United States. Intourist arranges tours for Soviet citizens abroad and for foreigners in the Soviet Union. We estimate that 25 million foreign travelers will visit our country between 1976 and 1980 and that 18 million Soviet people will go abroad.

We will deal here only with Intourist services for foreign travelers. They include sightseeing excursions, trips to museums and theaters, meetings with Soviet workers at factories and farms and with Soviet students, round table discussions and other affairs.

Intourist offers almost 20 different kinds of group or individual tours: motoring, [illegible] hunting, fishing, international competitions, [illegible] congresses and symposiums, excursions for schoolchildren and youth, cruises, art festivals and more.

Many visitors come for rest and medical treatment at spas in the North Caucasus (Essentuki, Zheleznovodsk, Kislovodsk, Pyatigorsk) or on the Black Sea (Sochi, Yalta, Odessa). Such a tour includes a room at a sanatorium, special diet meals, medical care and other services.

A new tour called the Russian Language Seminar is rapidly gaining popularity. Besides seeing the country, the traveler has a chance to brush up on Russian with special courses.

Cost depends on the class and type of the tour, distance, season and number of services. Intourist offers a discount on off season tours, frequently as low as one-fourth of the full price. There are special cut rates for youth and student groups, as well as for children.

Entry visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of applications at a Soviet Consulate. Foreign currency formalities are limited to declaring your currency at customs. Intourist also accepts credit cards from foreign banks and firms.

Itineraries include 135 cities of the country and are designed to suit all tastes. You can choose a separate republic or the whole country, the Caucasus, Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, the leading cultural centers, health resorts or ancient [illegible].

For instance, General [illegible] Inc., one of Intourist's major U.S. partners, offers the following tours:

1) "Spotlight on Russia and the Crimea"—16 days, Moscow—Kiev—Yalta—Leningrad, price 999 to 1,123 dollars, depending on the city of departure by air to the Soviet [illegible] on the season. (The cost includes air fare, hotel accommodations—much cheaper [illegible] two than for one—three meals a day and guide services.)

2) "Destination Black Sea and Caucasus"—16 days, Leningrad—Sochi—Tbilisi—Yerevan—Moscow, 1,159 to 1,458 dollars.

The American Express Company, another major Intourist partner, offers a 22-day "The Complete USSR" tour through Moscow, Bratsk, Irkutsk, Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand, Baku and Leningrad, for 1,879 to 2,085 dollars.

Incidentally, if you do plan to come, for more details get in touch with the Intourist office:

Vitaliy Kryazhev, Intourist Travel Information, 45 East Forty-ninth Street, New York, New York, 10017.
Telephone: (212) 371-6953.

Soviet Life, May 1975, p. 59

12. Some questions about visas could be put to Nosenko based on information provided in the book, Your Trip to the USSR (A Tourists Manual). The book is published by Foreign Languages Publication House, Moscow. Although there is no date of publication in this book, the information provided in the book strongly suggests that it was published no later than 1962. The information states that "it should not take more than a week to receive one's visa." The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (sample enclosed) and enclose three photographs of passport size as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.



APPLICATION FORM

For Persons Who Wish to Obtain an Entry Visa the U.S.S.R. or a Transit Visa Through the U.S.S.R.
(Write clearly in ink or type all answers in full)

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
1. Surname, name and patronymic (persons who have more than one surname, or who have pen names, must list them in full; married women and widows must give their maiden name and their husband's surname)	
2. Date and place of birth	
3. Nationality	
4. Citizenship. If you were formerly a citizen or subject of another country, indicate former citizenship	
[illegible] of present [illegible] and profe[illegible]	

p. 34

6. Reason for going to the U.S.S.R., duration of stay and itinerary. Note: Persons applying for a transit visa through the U.S.S.R. must have an entry or transit visa of the country to which or through which they are to proceed upon leaving the U.S.S.R.	
7. If minors under 16 years of age are accompanying you, indicate the surname, name and patronymic of each child	
8. Were you ever in the U.S.S.R. before? (If so, indicate when, where and purpose of stay)	
9. Surnames, names, patronymics and addresses of close relatives in the U.S.S.R.	
10. Your permanent address	

Date

(day, month, year)

Signature

p. 35

DOCUMENTS

Visas



To enter and leave the U.S.S.R., a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and Soviet entry and exit visas. It should not take more than a week to receive one's visa.

Citizens of foreign countries are issued Soviet visas through Consulates of the U.S.S.R. in their own country. The applicant must fill in and sign an application form (see sample) and enclose three photographs of passport size, as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet Consulate in person, as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.

Citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, the Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and the Czechoslovak Republic have the right, according to a reciprocal agreement, to enter and leave the Soviet Union without applying for Soviet visas, on the basis of their national passports alone.

A person's national passport should not expire [illegible] the date of his departure from the U.S.S.R.

A Soviet tourist visa is valid for entry into the U.S.S.R. and exit during the time specified and is valid [illegible] visiting the cities enumerated in the visa. A tourist [illegible] in and leaves the U.S.S.R. only through the border points indicated in his Soviet visa.

Should your plans change unexpectedly, your visa may be extended, the itinerary altered and the border entry and exit points changed without any additional formalities if Intourist is able to provide accommodations and transportation to comply with the change. In all events, you must notify Intourist of a change in plans a few days ahead.

Visitors' visas for visiting relatives in the U.S.S.R. are granted through the usual channels.

Group visas may be issued to tourists on cruises and to large tourist groups travelling together.

Visas are issued, extended, and itineraries and border-points of entry and exit are altered free of charge.

Transit Visas

Soviet transit visas are issued within three days of application by Soviet Embassies and Consulates. No Soviet transit visas are necessary for persons of any nationality flying over the territory of the U.S.S.R., on condition that all reservations (of no longer than 24 hours' stay in any given point of change) have been

made for him along the entire route through the U.S.S.R. and that the passenger has the right to enter the next contiguous country.

Health Certificates

Tourists from Africa, South America and Asia must have an International Vaccination Certificate, and tourists from India and Eastern Pakistan must have a certificate stating that they have been inoculated against cholera. Tourists from other countries do not need to present any health certificates and there will be no medical examination. However U.S.S.R. Public Health officers [illegible] additional proof of health from tourists arriving from countries known to have an epidemic at the time of arrival.

13. It would be useful to ask Nosenko his comments on the information on "Passports and Other Formalities" taken from the book, A Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union, by Viktor Louis and his wife Jennifer Louis. The book was published in Moscow in 1967.

Note: Viktor Louis and his wife are "slightly" known to Nosenko.



30 Motorist's Guide

hand-embroidered shirt or blouse (15 roubles upwards); toys; gramophone records (12 in. LP--1 rouble); books (comparatively inexpensive); traditiona silver- gilt-and-enamel ware (e.g. tiny fork for lemon or butterballs—1 rouble child's spoon with animal handle--3 roubles); wood, alabaster or potter ornaments.

If you would like to visit the markets, you should go as early as possibl in the day. You will be able to find in the market good quality fresh fruit which is often lacking in the hotels. Also on sale there are honey, fresh eggs and dairy products; there may be various items of local handwork as well. Th markets close at 5·00 p.m.

PASSPORTS AND OTHER FORMALITIES

In order to enter and leave the Soviet Union a foreign tourist must have a valid national passport and a Soviet entry visa. Soviet visas are issue free of charge usually within a seven-day period from the time of application to the Soviet Embassy or Consulate in the tourist's own country. The border points through which the tourist enters and leaves the Sovie Union must be those indicated in the Soviet visa.

Foreign tourists' arrivals in the Soviet Union are registered when they firs hand over their passports at the first Intourist service point indicated on the visa

In addition to Soviet visas, it is required that the citizens of most Wester European countries obtain visas for the Communist countries through whic they will drive on their way to and from the Soviet Union: East Germany Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria; East German visa are obtainable on entry to that country.

Besides an International Driving Permit, motorists must bring an international automobile registration certificate of the country of departure, stipulated in the 1926 International Automobile Traffic Convention. Tourists' cars can be brought into the Soviet Union and taken out again without payment of duty on condition that the owner gives a written guarantee to take the car out of the country upon departure. This guarantee is to be handed over to the customs authorities at the Soviet border.

It is forbidden to bring the following into the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

(b) printed matter, films, photographs, negatives, drawings, etc. "which are hostile to the U.S.S.R. in political or economic respects".
Printed matter, plants (fruit, seeds, etc.) and animals are liable to inspection by customs authorities.

It is forbidden to take out of the Soviet Union:

(a) arms and ammunition

IV. Belorussian KGB and MVD.

1. It would be useful to question Nosenko about his knowledge of the chiefs of the KGB and the MVD in the Belorussian Republic. A list of names follows:

KGB and MVD Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the Belorussian SSSR.

Chiefs

Lt. General Lavrentiy Fomich Tsanava - NKVD, MGB (State Security) 1941-1953.

Maj. General Mikhail Ivanovich Baskakov - MVD 1952-1954.

Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - KGB (State Security) 1954-1959.

----------- Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - MVD 1960-1965.

Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1973.

Lt. General Yakov Prokopyevich Nikulkin - KGB (State Security) 1973-

Deputies

Maj. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - MVD 1952-1954

------------ Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak - KGB (State Security) 1959-

------------ Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov - KGB (State Security) 1959-1960.

Maj. General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy - KGB (State Security) 1962-

------------ Ivan Leopoldovich Lysakovskiy - KGB (State Security) 1971-

2. What do you know about Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov?

Note: (a) Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia from 1959 to 1960. It is assumed that when Oswald arrived in Minsk in January 1960, Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of of the KGB and would definitely know about the Oswald case. From 1960 to 1965, Aksenov was MVD Minister of Belorussia. Therefore it would be under his direction that Oswald's passport and the departure of Oswald and Marina from Minsk was arranged. If Nosenko had access to Oswald's file, he must know about Aksenov. From 1965 to 1971, Aksenov was First Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom of CP Belorussia, and since 1971, Aksenov has been Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian CP. He has been a member of the CC CPSU since 1976, and he is also a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. On May 9, 1978, Aksenov arrived in Columbia. He headed the Soviet delegation on the invitation of the Columbian Communist Party.

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(b) A. N. Aksenov is no doubt identical with a Colonel Nikolay Aksenov with whom, according to Epstein's book, (page 146) Marina Oswald had an interview in 1961. Aksenov is also mentioned in McMillan's book (pages 132-133). Aksenov allegedly said to Marina, "Tell your husband not to worry. I believe your request will be granted." Also see page 125 of the same book.

✓ 3. Did you know or know of Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak?

Note: Rudak was Deputy Chairman of the KGB during 1959 to 1960 and might have taken part in the Oswald case while Oswald lived in Minsk.

✓ 4. Did you know or know of Major General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy?

Note: Smorodinskiy was Deputy Chairman of the KGB for Belorussia in 1962 and most likely know about the Oswald case. His name would most likely appear in the Oswald file.

✓ 5. Do you know Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov?

Note: Petrov was KGB Chairman for Belorussia from 1959 to 1973. Therefore, it would be his agency, the KGB, which would watch Oswald in Minsk. It is safe to assume that after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, Petrov, as Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia, would review the Oswald file and send it to Moscow. He would also have been called to Moscow KGB headquarters to take part in the preparation of the spravka (summary) of the Oswald file.

✓ 6. What do you know about Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn?

Note: Perepelitsyn was Chairman of the KGB of the Belorussian Republic from 1954 to 1959. Nosenko should know him or at least about him. Nosenko should be asked if Perepelitsyn took any part in the investigation of Oswald. (Perepelitsyn was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR from 1959 to 1967. He died in Moscow.)

✓ 7. What part, if any, was played by General Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov in the Oswald case, especially after the assassination of President Kennedy?

Note: Bannikov was mentioned by Nosenko as one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and later on as one of the Deputy Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR. From 1968 to 1978, Bannikov was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court.

V. Nosenko - Nikolayev

✓ 1. Can you explain why you went to England and Cuba under the name Nikolayev and to Geneva using your true name, Nosenko? What would have happened if some Englishman or English intelligence officer had met you in Geneva in 1962 or in 1964 and greeted you in the presence of the other delegates with the words, "Oh, Mr. Nikolayev! How are you? I remember you. You visited England with the team of boxers."

VI GRU (Military Intelligence)

1. From where did you learn that the GRU was not informed about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Wouldn't the GRU officer in Intourist, whom you mentioned earlier, have known about Oswald's presence in the USSR? Did you ever hear that Oswald possibly had contact with the Soviet intelligence during his service in Japan?

2. You stated previously that there was no information that Oswald offered to give information on the US Marine Corps. You did not read the file. Then how do you know this to be the case? How do you know that the KGB and GRU made no attempt to debrief Oswald about his service in the US Marine Corps?

3. Previously you mentioned one Colonel Voloshin as an officer of the Defense Ministry of the USSR. Can you provide any additional information on this Voloshin? Could it be possible that he was a KGB officer instead of in the Defense Ministry?

Note: (a) According to Epstein's book, one Pavel T. Voloshin was an administrator at Patrice Lumumba University and was a KGB officer who accompanied a group of Russian dancers to Los Angeles in 1959 at just about the same time that Oswald was making weekend trips there to get his passport and possibly to make other arrangements for his trip to Moscow. A few weeks after Oswald decided to return to the United States, he received a letter from Patrice Lumumba University signed by Voloshin. (page 111)
(b) P. D. knew one KGB officer by the name of Voloshin (first and middle name forgotten) who used to work in SMERSH (military CI) and later in the late 1940's and beginning of the 1950's in S & T Department of the KGB.

VII. Marina.

1. From where did you pick up the information that Marina was a "simple obyvatel" (a politically unaware person) and that she was not anti-Soviet if you did not read the Oswald file?

2. You stated previously that Marina was an obyvatel. Do you have any comments on the following: "We knew each time you had a date. We knew when you applied for your marriage license. We knew the date of your wedding." These were the words of the Komsomol secretary in Minsk when Marina was expelled from the Komsomol.

3. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement when she said, "Our government (Soviet) knows every move I make." She make this comment shortly after her expulsion from the Komsomol.

4. Did you know that while in Minsk Marina belonged to a group of youths who gathered together to listen to Voice of America and BBC? Would that be enough for the KGB to have Marina in its card files? Is it possible that Marina was the KGB agent reporting on them?

5. You stated that if Marina had been recruited by the KGB, you would know about it and it would be in the file. But you did not read the file. How then do you know that she was not recruited?

6. You said that among Marina's relatives there was an officer of the Minsk Militia, a Lt. Colonel. Do you have any comments on Marina's revelation that her real father was a traitor and that he was shot? If her father was a traitor and he was shot, would his name be in the KGB card file? Would the name of Marina's mother be in the KGB card file as the wife of a traitor? Is it then possible that Marina's name also would be in the KGB card file somewhere?

7. You stated previously that KGB had no interest in Marina prior to her meeting Oswald and that the KGB investigated her only after Oswald applied for permission to register marriage with Marina. How do you know that? Did you read a special file on Marina? Marina revealed lately that while she was living in Leningrad in 1958 or 1959, she met a diplomat from Afghanistan who lured her to his hotel room and tried to make love to her. Do you think the KGB in Leningrad would know about this diplomat and whom he lured to his hotel? Is it possible that

Marina was already a KGB agent and she was directed to lure the diplomat to the hotel? In either case, the KGB would definitely know about Marina and if she was used by the KGB as a bait for foreigners, might she have already been an experienced KGB agent?

8. You stated previously that you saw Oswald's file only briefly and you read only a summary. Then how would you know that Marina was never used by the KGB? Did you personally make a direct check on whether or not Marina was a KGB informant?

9. In your previous testimony, you categorically denied that Marina was a KGB-MVD agent or informer. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement to Life Magazine that she was a "Soviet agent"? Is there any possibility that the KGB or MVD in Belorussia or in Leningrad, where Marina had lived previously, had recruitted her as an agent or informer and she continued to work for the KGB or the MVD until her departure to the US? Did you have any information about the possibility that there was another file in the KGB on Marina, a file for an agent or informer of the KGB or MVD? If such a file existed, it must be reflected in the Oswald file, as well as in the summary which you read.

10. Did you hear or know that while in Leningrad Marina dated one Oleg Tarussin, a student who had ambitions to enter the Soviet diplomatic service and who had some trouble with the authorities over a minor political incident?

11. Was there any information in Oswald's file to show that after Oswald married Marina, Marina was in the hospital for about five days?

12. What do you know about Marina's vacation in Kharkov shortly after she married Oswald?

    Note: She may have been in Moscow instead of Kharkov.

13. Did you know that while in Minsk Oswald was in the Fourth Clinical Hospital for surgery on his adenoids? (Oswald got special attention from the doctors.)

    Note: Marina's Aunt Valya, whose husband was an MVD Colonel, sent eggs to Oswald while he was in the hospital.

14. You previously stated that the reason that there were no difficulties in in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union was because Oswald was already living and working in the Soviet Union. How would the KGB have reacted to Oswald's marriage if they had known that Oswald wrote a letter to the American Embassy before his marriage about his desire to return to the United States?

15. Did you know that Oswald asked the American Embassy for permission to return to the United States before he married Marina?

VIII. Nosenko and Oswald case file.

✓ 1. Describe in detail your personal involvement with Oswald and with the Oswald case from the day Oswald arrived in the USSR to the day of his departure from the USSR. What positions in the KGB did you personally hold at that time?

✓ 2. Describe in detail your personal involvement with the Oswald case after the assassination of President Kennedy from 23 November 1963 to the day of your defection to the US.

✓ 3. In what activities were you involved in connection with the Oswald case and the assassination of President Kennedy while you were in Geneva at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964? Name any Soviet diplomats or officers of Soviet intelligence (KGB, GRU) with whom you discussed the Oswald case and the death of the American President in Geneva.

✓ 4. Are you sure that there was no file on Oswald in the KGB before he arrived in the USSR? How do you know this? Did you personally check it?

✓ 5. You previously told American authorities that on the cover of Oswald's file "there definitely was a 'klichka'." But you said you did not remember the klichka. Do you remember whether the klichka was one word or two. As you did not read the file, is it possible that it was an old file, opened a few years previously by the First Chief Directorate or by the GRU?

6. You stated previously that nobody from the KGB had an interest in Oswald, but Oswald admitted that he had been interviewed by officials of the MVD (or KGB) at least twice on his arrival in the USSR and again before his departure. What was said about these interviews in the Oswald file or in the summary (spravka) of Oswald's file? Do you know the names of the people who talked to Oswald? Was it the KGB, MVD, or both?

7. What do you know about the "Intourist guide" Rosa Agafonova who visited Oswald in his hotel room shortly after his arrival in Moscow?

8. Did you personally know Rimma Shirokova, the Intourist guide or interpreter? Was she a KGB officer or KGB agent working for Intourist? Was there a report in the Oswald file that Rimma Shirokova sent two postcards to Oswald in Minsk from some vacation places in the south of the USSR? Did you know that Rimma Shirokova visited Oswald in Minsk? (See Epstein's book, page 124.)

Note: Oswald and Shirokova allegedly talked about the possibility of Oswald studying at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. It also should be noted that Shirokova visited Minsk shortly after Oswald and his wife Marina decided to go to the United States.

9. How did you know that Officer Krupnov wrote a request and opened a case file on Oswald? Did you see when Krupnov was writing it? Did you read the request or hear about it from somebody? If you saw it, who approved and sanctioned the request? If the KGB had no interest in Oswald, then why was a file opened?

10. Previously, on many occasions, you stated that the KGB had no interest in Oswald, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country. Who among the KGB junior and senior officers made the decision that the KGB had no interest in Oswald and that he should leave the country? Describe in detail how you learned about it, from whom, from what documents, and when.

11. How did you know that there was no microphone in the Hotel Berlin room where Oswald stayed? Did you personally check the room before Oswald arrived?

12. You stated that no KGB officer was ever in contact with Oswald. How could you make such a statement if you did not read the file? You were not responsible for it, and, according to your information, you did not visit Minsk to study the Oswald case.

Note: Oswald's diary clearly shows that most of the students he met were most likely not students at all. They were more likely KGB officers under cover as students.

13. You stated previously that it was Officer Krupnov who wrote a request and opened the case file on Oswald, which was later sent to Minsk. Name other officers who participated in making the decision to open the file, who handled the file, and who sent the file to Minsk. What part did you personally play in Oswald's case while Oswald was in Moscow?

14. You stated previously that the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was not interest in Oswald because it was concerned only "with internal matters." Isn't it true that the Second Chief Directorate is the internal counterintelligence organization and is responsible for foreigners who enter the Soviet Union for any reason? Isn't it true that the tourist department of the Second Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign tourists such as Oswald? Then why wasn't the Second Chief Directorate interested in Oswald? Do you see any contradictions in your statement?

✓ 15. You stated that there was no attempt made to exploit Oswald for propaganda purposes, such as Radio Moscow broadcasts, TV, lectures, etc. How do you know this? Do you have any comments on the following: "On October 19 (1960), Lee (Oswald) was interviewed in his room at the Hotel Berlin by a correspondent of Radio Moscow, Lev Setyayev, who was ostensibly seeking his impressions as a tourist to use in propaganda broadcasts overseas." Was there an officer in the KGB by the name of Setyayev? Was this interview organized by the KGB?

16. Do you have any information that Oswald might have been met in Leningrad by Intourist and then made all the arrangements to go to Moscow?

17. Who told Intourist that there was no KGB interest in Oswald? What is the name of the officer and his department who did so? While in Moscow, Oswald was interviewed by at least three American correspondents. Is it your opinion that the Second Chief Directorate was not interested to find out why Oswald talked to these newspapermen and who they were? Isn't that part of the KGB's responsibilities?

18. According to your statement, Oswald was not considered normal. Who determined that he was not normal? How many doctors, from what institutions, concluded that Oswald was not normal? The Second Chief Directorate and Intourist officers could not conclude that Oswald was abnormal without medical expertise.

✓ 19. If Oswald was abnormal, then why did Soviet authorities, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not inform the American Embassy about it?

Note: In his previous interrogation, Nosenko hesitated in answering these questions.

✓ 20. You stated previously that Oswald was in the hospital, the hospital said that Oswald was not normal, and there was no action taken to inform the American Embassy. How do you know all of this without reading the Oswald file?

✓ 21. Why do you think that the American Embassy would not have taken Oswald if he had been turned over to them? Do you know that any Soviet government office contacted the American Embassy and informed them about Oswald's presence and the suicide attempt in Moscow?

✓ 22. Was the only reason that the Soviet Government did not inform the American Embassy of Oswald's alleged suicide attempt that it was feared that he might try it again?

✓ 23. You stated that there was no psychological assessment of Oswald by the KGB nor by the hospital, and that there was no report of that nature. You did not read the file. You read only summaries. Then how could you know that there was no such report? How long was the summary--100 pages?

24. Do you know when and by whom a stateless passport was issued to Oswald? Where was it issued? Are stateless passports usually issued by the MVD on the recommendation and approval of the KGB? What would happen if the MVD issued a stateless passport without KGB knowledge or if the KGB was against it?

25. You stated previously that the KGB considered Oswald to have retained his American citizenship while he was in the Soviet Union. Do you have any comments on the fact that after his arrival in the USSR, and after having made oral requests for Soviet citizenship, he returned to the American Embassy, denounced his US citizenship and threw out his American passport to the American Consul at the Embassy. Do you think the KGB monitored Oswald's conversations with the American Consulate officers or received reports from the American Embassy (from Soviet employees there or Soviet agents there) about Oswald's denunciation of US citizenship? Did the KGB instruct Oswald to denounce his American citizenship at the American Embassy before he would be permitted to apply for Soviet citizenship?

26. You stated that the decision to give Oswald a stipend was made by the Red Cross. Explain in detail how the Red Cross learned that Oswald arrived in the USSR. Who informed the Red Cross that there was an American who needed help? Why was it decided to give help from the Red Cross and not from the Trade Union? It is understandable that Oswald might not have had enough money to start a new life in the USSR, but he was not a poor beggar who needed to be turned to the Red Cross instead of the Trade Union. How did you find out that it was the Red Cross that made the decision? According to available information, the Red Cross does not assign money to anybody without the recommendation of some other Soviet office. Which office was it: the KGB, MVD, the Council of Ministers, Intourist, or the USSR Supreme Soviet? Who

started it first?" Who made the decision on the amount to pay Oswald? Why was it decided to pay him 700 rubles a month instead of 500 or 1000? What was your salary as a KGB officer? Approximately 400 rubles a month, new money? Isn't it true that Oswald received more than you did?

✓ 27. If it was decided by the KGB officers and by Soviet doctors that Oswald was abnormal, then why was he permitted to marry a Soviet citizen?

Note: According to Soviet law, in every union republic, including Belorussia, the "marriage cannot be permitted between persons if one of them is pronounced a mental case or imbecile."

Did you have any information that the Minsk KGB reported to Moscow headquarters Oswald's intention to marry a Soviet citizen, in this case, Marina?

✓ 28. You stated previously that Oswald's file was sent to the Second Directorate of the Belorussian KGB. How do you know that it was sent specifically to the Second Directorate and not to the KGB chairman or his deputy with a special instruction?

✓ 29. What do you mean "to keep an eye on him" (Oswald)? That, according to your words, was the instruction from the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate to the Belorussian Second Directorate of the KGB.

✓ 30. You stated that there was no visible surveillance of Oswald, there was no microphone in his apartment, but you stated his mail was monitered and that there were agents around Oswald in places where he worked and lived. Explain how you learned about it. Do you know tha names of any agents who reported on Oswald? If you did not read the file on Oswald, how could you know about it?

✓ 31. Previously you stated that Oswald was handled no differently than any other American defector. ". . . The only difference was that he was not to be allowed to stay, and he was considered to be abnormal." If this was the only difference, and it is quite a big one, then why was he allowed to stay in the USSR? If Oswald was "not normal" according to the KGB officers, then this should be noted in the Oswald file which was sent to the Belorussian KGB. Therefore, the KGB and MVD in Belorussia knew about it. Then how and why was Oswald permitted to have a shotgun which he kept in his apartment in Minsk?

✓ 32. Do you have any information that while in the USSR, especially during the year 1960-1961, Oswald might have been visiting Cuba?

Note: Nosenko claimed that during October-November 1960, he (Nosenko) went to Cuba with a group of STATE PLANNING COMMISSION'S METALURGISTS headed by Ivan Strigen. He stayed in Cuba for two months.

✓33. Do you have any comments on the statement made by Marina's uncle, the MVD colonel: "I thought that Alik (Oswald) had not only given up his American citizenship but had become a citizen of the USSR."

Note: The question is that if an MVD colonel thought or could be fooled by the KGB that Oswald was a Soviet citizen, it is possible that he really was a citizen or that the KGB spread the rumor that he was.

✓34. What do you know about Oswald's association with the Foreign Language Institute in Minsk?

✓ 35. To your knowledge, what KGB, GRU, and other intelligence schools or training courses were in Belorussia during your work with the KGB?

✓ 36. What do you know about Oswald's application to attend Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow? Why was Oswald denied entrance to the University?

Note: At that time, Colonel Yerzin, senior KGB officer, was a deputy director of Patrice Lumumba University. (P. D.)

✓37. Did you know that Oswald took with him to the American Embassy a letter from his friend Ziger in Minsk? Oswald left that letter at the American Embassy.

✓ 38. What do you know about the fact that Oswald, while in Minsk, received American magazines and other publications? Do you think the KGB knew about it?

✓ 39. Did you know that Oswald was helped to study Russian at the Minsk plant by one of his co-workers and by one of his friends, Erich, and by a girl at the Foreign Language Institute? Do you know the names of those people?

40. What do you know about Oswald's association and friendship with foreign students in the USSR in Minsk and Moscow? Do the names Mary Louise Patterson and Mrs. Roberto Camacho mean anything to you?

41. What do Oswald's files show about his contacts with Cuban students in Minsk?

Note: McMillan's book stated that Oswald began to seek out the Cuban students in Minsk, of whom there were 300 or so, to learn what he could of Castro's revolution. (See page 127.)

42. You stated previously that Oswald was a poor shot and that during his hunting trips he did not kill anything. Was this information in the summary you read? Do you have any comments on the fact that according to the Warren Commission Report and the records of Oswald's service in the Marines that he, Oswald, was a sharp shooter and marksman? Was the "fact" that Oswald was a poor shot mentioned in the summary?

43. You stated previously (27 and 29 July 1964) that you saw the file on Oswald only briefly and that the file was at the Seventh Department for only 35-40 minutes. Then how do you know that nobody in the Soviet Union, including KGB officers, ever sat down with Oswald and got all the information on Oswald? Was everything that you told to US authorities about Oswald picked up from the summary during those 35-40 minutes?

44. Describe in detail how you and other officers of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate worked together on writing the first Spravka (summary) on Oswald. You also stated that this spravka (the first one) was prepared in Moscow before the Oswald file from Minsk arrived in Moscow. What material did you use in preparing the spravka? Was there another file on Oswald in Moscow or was it a control file (Kontrolnoye delo)?

Note: In important cases the real file is in the place where the subject lives and works. In this case, the Oswald file was in Minsk. Moscow would have an almost identical file on the subject for control purposes and for instructions on how to handle and develop the case. This headquarters file is called the Control File. This file exists on the person who is already an agent or who is under development or training.

45. You stated that when the file on Oswald arrived from Minsk, you, together with other officers looked quickly through the file, then senior officers Fedoseyev and Matveyev of the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate took the file and you never saw it again. Because the file was in your department only 20-30 minutes (in other places Nosenko said 35-40 minutes), the Spravka could not be written in such a short time, and because the file was taken away to the higher authorities of the Second Chief Directorate and to the KGB chairman, you had no chance to see the second Spravka. Then again the question is which summary did you read--the second or the first or both? Describe in detail how long the summary was, what was in it, and how long it took for you to read it. Did you make any notes from the summary in case later on you had to report the "facts" to US intelligence?

✓ 46. What do you know about Oswald's visit (from Minsk) to the American Embassy in Moscow on July 8, 1961?

Note: Oswald flew from Minsk to Moscow allegedly without permission from the Soviet authority.

What do you know about Marina's visit to Moscow on July 10, 1961? What part did the KGB play in the arrangements of Marina's visit to the American Embassy in Moscow without checking her papers and without stopping her at the gates. In what hotel in Moscow did Oswald and Marina stay at that time?

✓47. You stated previously that the First Chief Directorate provided no information about Oswald before Oswald went to Mexico. What information did the First Chief Directorate give to the Second Chief Directorate before he went to Mexico? Did you read this information? If you did not personally read it, then how did you learn the contents of the First Chief Directorate information? Who from the First Chief Directorate particularly talked to the officers of the Second Chief Directorate and with whom did they talk?

48. How did you learn what Oswald said at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City? Who told you that Oswald wanted to return to the USSR? Was this written in the summary?

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Rodger S. Gabrielson OLC/C&R	EXTENSION 1133	NO. REF TO: Con. No. TS191722 thru C DATE 19 June 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Mr. N. Shepanek 1. [illegible] SA/DO/O Tube: ~~DX6-Green~~				Attached is a letter from the House Select Committee on Assassinations dated ______. Please respond as soon as possible. Shep: Please have CI look at this. It's the T.S. material from Deryabin's safe - requested by Blakey. Thanks, Rodge (IC 7: CI Staff says they may be shown to Blakey
2. ~~Mr. Jack Sullivan~~ ~~DS~~ ~~Tube: FM~~				
3. ~~Mr. Young~~ ~~DDS Tube: DH2 Green~~				
4. ~~Mr. Dick [illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
5. ~~[illegible]dt~~ ~~[illegible] Tube: [illegible]~~				
6. ~~Mr. Hubert [illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~				
7. Rodger Gabrielson OLC				
8.				
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DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1D15	B. Bigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
SR/DO/D		19 June 78		19 June 78				
DC/CI/ARCO								
DDO/TSCO	B. Bigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Hadilson	20 Jun 78							
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TS# 191722
TS# 191722A
TS# 191722B
TS# 191722C

FORM 6-64 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (OP I)

(40)

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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

T O P S E C R E T

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Source SR
Doc. No. XAAZ-17241/1
Doc. Date 11 MAY 1964
Copy No. # Repro 2
Number of Pages 28
Number of Attachments

REGISTRY

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DDP(TSCO)	B. Sigg	1[illegible] JUN 1978		1[illegible]	[illegible]			
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AC/CI (n[illegible])								
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

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Number of Attachments

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DDP(TSCO)	B. Swigg	15 JUN 1978			[illegible]			
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	[illegible] 15 June							
DDO/TSCO 1B15	B. Swigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
Shepard SA/DO/C	[illegible]	19 Jun 78		19 Jun 78				
ACCI ([illegible])								
DDO/TSCO	B. Swigg	20 JUN 1978		2[illegible] JUN 1978				
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Doc. Date 19 May 1964
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Number of Pages 2
Number of Attachments

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Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time	Signature	Office/Div.	Date
DDP(TSCO)	B. Bigg	15 JUN 1970		15				
DCI/OLC Scott Breckinridge	Message to me							
DDO/TSCO 1015	B. Twigg	19 JUN 1978		19 JUN 1978				
SA/DO/C	M. Lipavsic	19 Jun 78		19 June 78				
ACIC/I (McCoy)								
DDO/TSCO	B. Twigg	20 JUN 1978		20 JUN 1978				
DCI/OLC Breckinridge or Gabrielsen								
DDO/TSCO								

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DEFECTORS - NOSENKO

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Report on: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet	2 Apr 64
	Attachments: 1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case	2 Apr 64
	2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R. Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors	3 Apr 64
	3. Memo, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO	Jan 75
	Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	20 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Forms I-125 and background data attached)	9 Oct 69
	Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E. Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko	24 July 69
	Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R. White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO	18 Jul 69
	Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to DD/OS	13 Feb 64
	Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	11 Feb 64
	Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
	Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet	
	Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys talk to Defector	15 Feb 64
	4. Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack M. Bauman	12 May 64
	5. Memo for Special Agent in Charge District Field Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)	10 Jul 64

TAB	TITLE	DATE
	Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr., Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency Instructions (2)	1 Jul 64
	6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att	5 Aug 69
/ 2	Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum	4 Feb 64
2	Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements Between the CIA and Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	21 Apr 69
3	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD	31 Dec 74
4	Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge, Subject: Nosenko	13 Jan 75
✓	Attachments: 1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko;	9 Jan 75
	1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko	12 Feb 64
5	Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet Defector Nosenko	—
5	Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case Attachment: 1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the Nosenko Case	67

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seoon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

SECRET

C/SB

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SECRET

Department of Justice
Washington 20530

October 2[illegible], 1969

Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms: Re: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)

Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969, concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.

The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence under the authority of the foregoing statute.

Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consideration and your statement of recommendation and approval which carries with it your determination that the entry of the individual concerned is in the interest of national security and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, I concur in your recommendation that the admission for permanent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.

Respectfully,

For the Attorney General

J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

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9 OCT 1969

ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security and ~~essential to the furtherance of~~ the national intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

8 October 1969
Date

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - CS Files

SECRET

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927		Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR		
Male	Divorced	Brown	Blue/Gray	5ft. 11 inches
Soviet	Caucasian	--		

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT:	Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
AKA:	Yuri NOSSENKO
DPOB:	30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
MARITAL STATUS:	1946 - Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee: SHISHOV). 1946 - Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee: TELEGIN), 1949 - separated and 1951 - divorced. 23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee: KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 - separated and 1969 - divorced.
CHILDREN:	Daughters - Oxana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)
EDUCATION:	1942-1945 - Attended various USSR Naval Schools. 1945-1950 - Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.
EMPLOYMENT:	March 1951-March 1953 - Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence). March 1953-February 1964 - Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).
MILITARY:	Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.
NATIONALITY:	Soviet
PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:	1943-1954 - Member Komsomol, USSR 1956 - Candidate Communist Party 1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

SECRET SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of~~ operational interest ~~to this Agency. Therefore, it is~~ requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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declassification

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NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO
AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.
A13 724 817

July 24, 1969

Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.

Dear Sir:

As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the subject ~~has been given a further~~ period of stay to expire on February 16, 1970.

Sincerely,

Frank E. Bartos

Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division

e.n. 16 Jan. 1970

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downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

11 February 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with those contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

TOP [illegible]
EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
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1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressure.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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file

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for asylum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillips said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

/The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

Wash Post
2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets See Defector

ported yesterday, a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information "as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him." The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present, and said Nosenko also was "agreeable." A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday, in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say, I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet "protest" was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Wash Post
2/15/64

SECRET

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch YAF

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich (~~[illegible]~~), McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

> Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:
>
> (1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)
>
> (2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)
>
> (3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DD/ICS
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	C/[illegible]
1	C/[illegible] YAF
2	Bagley
	[illegible]
	[illegible]

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(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

ADMINISTRATIVE

Headquarters

10 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 C - SD/1

1. Reference is made to the outline of emergency instructions submitted by you on 1 July 1964 for Headquarters approval.

2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented immediately.

Victor R. White

TOBIASSEN:dr
JULY 1964
SUPPLEMENTAL

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	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/OSD
	DC/OSD
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	AATS

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

1 July 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LESNIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody Of)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.

2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District ~~Field Office who are concerned~~ with this case.

3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.

for JOHN D. NOBLE, Jr.
Special Agent in Charge
2 July 64

Attachment:

Emergency Instructions (2)

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TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.

In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.

FIRE
(Main House)

1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".

2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times. so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of SUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.

4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.

FIRE
(Tenant House)

1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.

2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

3. At the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.

ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE

1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.

2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.

3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.

4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.

ILLNESS OR INJURY

1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival. Likewise, the SAC or ASAC/[illegible] should be notified immediately after talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.

2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized persons.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION

1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under constant observation twenty-four hours a day.

2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while confined to third floor.

3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for removal signal from visitors.

4. Coveralls taken from SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and undershirt overnight.

5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at all times when in presence of SUBJECT.

6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted every time SUBJECT leaves cell.

7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.

9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's hearing.

10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.

11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.

12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.

13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.

14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.

EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)

SPECIAL CONTACTS

1. George PANEGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County. (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)
2. Lieutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf, Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERRALL under GOLIATH)
3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department. (Can be obtained through SNODDY)

Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.

OLC 69-0675

5 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case

1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 17 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:

Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969

William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969

Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969

Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 29 July 1969

2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.

JOHN M. MAURY
Legislative Counsel

Attachment:

Distribution:
Original - OLC Subject File
1 - DDP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - Chief, SB Division
1 - D. Security
1 - OGC
1 - OLC Chrono

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1-9-17-5/2

DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969

SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case

The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.

---

1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.

2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.

3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.

4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer,

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he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts. With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.

5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.

6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.

NOSENKO

Question #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?

Answer:

During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:

a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.

b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.

c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.

d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.

Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.

Answer:

During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:

a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.

b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.

c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.

d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.

Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?

Answer:

Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.

Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?

Answer:

Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.

Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?

Answer:

Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.

Question #6 - What is his legal status?

Answer:

Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

SUBJECT : The Nosenko Case

Attached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.

While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.

Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his

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conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.

Attachment: A/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.

Background

Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.

Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.

Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.

On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 September, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At these interviews, which were also attended by State Department and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition, he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship. On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain in this country.

From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko was housed in the Washington area. During this period, regular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.

On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of bona fides.

It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.

Bona Fides

Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral investigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.

Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.

Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies

USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.

The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.

Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.

The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.

The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.

Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."

The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.

Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True Status

From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people in the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intelligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage.

Soviet Inspired Inquiries

In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandonment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself, to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.

Nosenko's Status

To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:

> "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."

In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United

States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.

Disposal

From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.

USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.

Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country, there is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.

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Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.

NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.

The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.

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1 [illegible] 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Nosenko

Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachment: a/s

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~
SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

already released

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET
~~EYES ONLY~~

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HR 10-23
9 January 1975

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ SECRET

of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, ~~and he therefore is not expected to be~~ able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

[illegible] [illegible]

31 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON, NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD

1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.

2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:

PARAGON

We should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.

The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.

NOSENKO

We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.

AELADLE

We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.

[illegible] [illegible]

CELOTEX I

We will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.

This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.

CELOTEX II

Questions similar to CELOTEX I.

We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.

MOCKINGBIRD

No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.

Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?

3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFACE I, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments a/s

SECRET

EYES ONLY

31 DEC 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD

1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.

2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.

Sidney D. Stembridge
/ Sidney D. Stembridge
Acting Director of Security

Atts

Distribution:
Original - Adse
1 - DDA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249

EYES ONLY

SECRET

REQUEST

I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylum in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the West, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the existence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirmation of the correctness of my own decision to break forever with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Government of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.

/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4 February 1964

[illegible] To [illegible]

[illegible]

Я [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Пра-вительству США [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] в Соединенных Штатах Америки.

Эту работу [illegible] [illegible] в разведывательных [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

Я отношусь к числу высокопоставленных [illegible] [illegible]. Работаю в КГБ и знаю больше, чем рядовой советский человек, о внутренней политике, [illegible] Хрущева и [illegible] советского правительства и убежден, что в СССР нет и не будет правды и [illegible] свободы до тех пор пока руководит [illegible] коммунистическая партия. Бывая в командировках в странах Запада я имел [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible] свободного мира. События [illegible] в Венгрии и Восточной Германии, [illegible] [illegible] движения [illegible] [illegible] армии [illegible] и [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] в Советском Союзе.

Прошу заверить Правительство США и [illegible], что [illegible] [illegible] и [illegible] Правительству и Народу Соединенных Штатов Америки.

[illegible]

UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY

In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.

I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S.C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.

I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1 (L.S.)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.

/s/ IDEN 7

Notary Public

My commission expires September 24, 1969

(SEAL)

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required

to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor, up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances. All of the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any such expenses.

6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and hospitalization.

8. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such

secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

10. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969 and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations

imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

Contracting Officer

Date:

ACCEPTED:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 1

WITNESS:

21 April 1969 Date: /s/ IDEN 7

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, effective 1 March 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under the following terms and conditions:

1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms hereof.

2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such instructions.

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[illegible]

SECRET

4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income tax, and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative. Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government Representative.

5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations. If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.

6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.

a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a health insurance program for selected contract individuals of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.

b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge is $12.00 per month.

SECRET

[illegible]

(1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per contract year to be taken only at times and places approved in advance by the Authorized Government Representative. Vacation time is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will not be authorized.

(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time, this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be authorized.

7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and contract with any person other than the Authorized Government Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.

8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of

[illegible]

this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations imposed on you by paragraph 7 of this contract and the provisions of any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:

IDEN 6

Contracting Officer

Date:____________________

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 Date: March 6, 1970

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 Date: 6 March 1970

25 October 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#AI 25-349	Schroder Trust Company	$15,000.00
#FE 54779	Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.	10,000.00
#A593613	Harris Trust & Savings Bank	10,000.00

This is an advance against a back salary payment covering the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October 1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness /s/ IDEN 5

Date: October 25, 1972

16 NOV 1972

Received this date from an Authorized Government Representative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:

#155784	Riggs National Bank	$15,000.00
#01-028564	Union Trust Company	15,000.00
#0661511	American Security & Trust	15,000.00
#2-442275	The National Bank of Washington	7,052.00

The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.

/s/ IDEN 1

Witness: /s/ IDEN 5

Date: November 16, 1972.

[illegible]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 13 July 1973

FROM : IDEN 2

SUBJECT: IDEN 1

1. On 12 July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 before his defection.

2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing.

3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00 which was a part of the agreed sum.

/s/ IDEN 2

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE

WHEREAS, IDEN 1, a former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Government and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,

WHEREAS, IDEN 1 was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him; and,

WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN 1 for himself and for his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973.

WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:

/s/ IDEN 1 (SEAL)
IDEN 1

WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government

/s/ IDEN 2

IDEN 1

Dear IDEN 1

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.

Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:

> "You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($23,750) per year."

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

/s/ IDEN 1 — May 9, 1974
George Martin Rosnek — Date

WITNESS:

/s/ IDEN 2 — 9 May 1974
Date

APPROVED:

/s/ IDEN 4 — 17 May 74
Date

E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837

DEFECTORS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
1	Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Subj: Information on Detention of Defector	30 Jan 75
2	Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj: Request for Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	18 Jun 75
	MFR from Walter Elder, Subj: Rockefeller Commission Contact (re: Report that DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector)	23 Jun 75
	Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subj: Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of Defector)	27 Jun 75
3	Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci	22 Jan 75
	Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General of the United States and the Central Intelligence Agency for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances	10 Feb 55
4	Memo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated 18 June 1975, Subject: Request for Information (re- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)	18 June 1975

Defector

Review Staff: 75/880

Mr. Ryan

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-[illegible]

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security.)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-

EXHIBIT 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY OF ALIENS OF INTEREST TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent need for the covert temporary entry of aliens into the United States for intelligence and operational purposes within its jurisdiction.

To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency will submit each such alien's case in writing to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with the request to defer inspection of the subject upon arrival and parole to the Central Intelligence Agency under the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such entries not be outweighed by the dangers, if any, to the internal security of the United States by the presence of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency agrees that it will take all necessary steps to establish the bona fides of each prospective entrant prior to submittal to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (a) That this method of entry will only be utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That each request will be accompanied by a summary of pertinent background and biographical data with particular emphasis on aspects bearing on internal security and admissibility under the immigration laws, as well as the results of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That the place, time and manner of arrival will be coordinated with the Service in advance thereof.

Each alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the foregoing procedure will be paroled for such period of time as may be agreed on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service, in no instance to exceed one year. Further extensions of parole, similarly limited, may be authorized thereafter on a written statement of need, which include the results of a current security check.

Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging parole status in a form satisfactory to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service.

After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status. Further, in the case of any alien whose physical custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the Central Intelligence Agency will arrange for presentation of each alien for registration pursuant to law at a time and place satisfactory to the Service.

EXHIBIT 2

Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these aliens will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other disposition is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.

In accordance with past practice, the Service will apprise the FBI of the entry and departure or other disposition of these aliens.

The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this agreement.

S/S
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

S/S
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)

FROM: Charles W. Kane
Director of Security CWK

EXTENSION: 6777

NO.

DATE: 27 JUN 1975

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDA	30 JUL 1975		[illegible]	
2.				
3. Inspector General Att: Mr. Ainslie	[illegible]		[illegible]	3-5: Attached was prepared in response to an 18 June request from Jerry Brown. Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt Elder, source of the story is a deposition by Mr. Helms.
4.				
5. Dr. Chamberlain SUB	7-1-[illegible]		[illegible]	
6. ~~Mr. Knoche~~ [illegible]				This requires editing before passing to the SSC.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL
[illegible]

[illegible] JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Neil Ainslie

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse
of Defector)

1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.

2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee involved."

3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.

4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.

5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board

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in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard Oun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Sweden in 1955.

6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist; application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forcing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during interrogations with only very brief rest periods.

7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separation from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14 to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness reports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency officials concerning his employment.

8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961. Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling that Torpats' termination was legal.

9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956. It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September 1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S. under Public Law 203.

10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC and the Inspector General's office will probably have additional information concerning this matter.

Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

SECRET

75-2244

Review Staff: 75/1008
23 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission Contact

Mason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.

Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.

Walt Elder

Walter Elder

cc - DCI
✓cc - IG
cc - OGC

CB: 007789
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SECRET

Review Staff: 75/880

SECRET

Mr. Kiya

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-2276

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Request For Information

The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)

JBB
Jerrold B. Brown

cc: DDO
John Waller

Att. C Mardirosian SE/DDO
Dist ST-#3 C/SE

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14-00000

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IG 75-[illegible]

30 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison

SUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector

1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.

2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency.

/s/ S. D. Breckinridge

S. D. Breckinridge

Original - Addressee
1 - SDB Chrono
1 - Judy for QA files

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[illegible]

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Methodology:

1. The portion of the 11 June 1962 tape in question was provided to two employees, both of whom are professional transcribers and native Russian speakers. They were provided with the background of the difficulty, i.e., that previous transcriptions of the tape quoted Nosenko as saying that he had "also been in the States" and that he had used the alias Nikolayev "both in England and 'u vas' i.e., in the United States.

2. Mr. Kozlov and Mr. Berest produced a transcription which contains no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been in the United States. In addition, their rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev reads, with no equivocation, "both in England and 'u nas'", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

3. Independently, the same portion of tape was given yet another professional transcriber, a native Russian speaker. She was given no background whatsoever on the problem. Her transcript contained no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been in the United States. In addition, her rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev reads unequivocally as "both in England and 'u nas'", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING

ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
ABSTRACT	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/[illegible]
Former Delegate of Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango to Help AMBUD-1 because of State Department Request

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

1. An AMOT subsource, Ricardo NUNEZ Garcia, reported on 12 December 1961 that he had that day, by chance, met Manuel R. GIBERGA, a former delegate of Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango, at the New Orleans Airport. 201-284303

2. NUNEZ stated that GIBERGA said that he was returning that day from a trip to Panama and Guatemala. In Panama he had talked to President CHIARI and had found him to be intimidated, but, to the contrary, when he had talked to President YDIGORAS in Guatemala he had found him extremely anxious to have CASTRO liquidated. YDIGORAS had asked GIBERGA about his visit to CHIARI, and when GIBERGA expressed his opinion, YDIGORAS said it was logical because CHIARI was extremely cowardly.

3. According to NUNEZ, GIBERGA further said that a short time ago he had been called by Mr. Bob Hurwitch, Chief of the Cuban Desk in the State Department, and that Hurwitch had told him not to fool around with SANCHEZ or Julio GARCERAN because the man who had the support of the U.S. was AMBUD-1, and that as he, Hurwitch, had knowledge of the great work done by GIBERGA, he did not want him to continue losing more time.

4. NUNEZ added that GIBERGA said that a few days later he received a phone call from AMBUD-1. GIBERGA told NUNEZ that he will help AMBUD-1, because it was requested, but he would never have done so by his own wish.

5. NUNEZ said that GIBERGA continued his travel on to Washington, where he resides at 1419 - 27th Street, N.W., Washington 7.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

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ORIG : L. B. KIRKPATRICK
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EXT : 8656
DATE : 2 MAY 1961

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

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TO : SEE ATTACHED LIST
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: IG
INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, EE 4, FE 5, NE [illegible], AF 4, WE 4, WH 4, S/C 2

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MAY 3 01

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OUT 52128

TO SEE ATTACHED LIST INFO CITE DIR ~~57947~~ 37997

BOOK MESSAGE

FROM ASCHAM

1. AS RESULT OF DEFEAT OF THE CUBAN OPERATION CONSIDERABLE COMMENT CONCERNING KUBARK NOW BEING MADE IN PRESS AND IN CONGRESS. MANY PROPOSALS ARE BEING AND WILL BE RAISED CONCERNING KUBARK AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA OF ODYOKE. ACTUALLY MUCH MISINFORMATION GENERALLY REPORTED AND WHILE SOME PROPOSALS ARE FRO RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS, THERE ARE MANY DISTORTIONS OF ACTUAL SITUATION. DETAILS OF CUBAN OPERATION ARE SUFFICIENTLY COVERED IN DEPCIRTEL 1637 AND SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN THIS FOR YOUR INFO. IT IS MY VI THAT KUBARK ACQUITTED ITSELF WELL IN MOST RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH I PLA FULL REVIEW OF OPERATION AFTER ~~REASONABLE PERIOD HAS ELAPSED~~ TO PERMIT ALL ESSENTIAL FACTS TO BE AVAILABLE. IN THE MEANTIME PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR TO T CLOSE LOOK AT ALL PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS IN AREA OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY, GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES WHICH FALL SHORT OF OUTRIGHT WAR. HE WILL GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LESSONS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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PAGE TWO

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OUT 52128

TO
INFO
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DIR 37947

FROM RECENT EVENTS IN CUBA. IN THIS EFFORT HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND MYSELF. HIS REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY MAY 15.

2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO LESSEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF DEFEAT IN CUBA BOTH FOR KUBARK AND PBPRIME, I WISH TO ASSURE EVERYBODY THAT OUR PRIMARY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE, GOOD OR BAD. FURTHER, UNLESS INSTRUCTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO THE CONTRARY, EVERYBODY SHOULD CONTINUE WITH HIS PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS. FOR YOUR INFO, WE HAVE FULLY BRIEFED APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ON THE CUBAN OPERATION AND IN FACT HAVE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE DURING THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS KEPT THE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES ADVISED ON DAILY BASIS OF VITAL INTELLIGENCE, PERTINENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS. WE WILL ~~ENDEAVOR~~ ENDEAVOR TO ADVISE YOU PROMPTLY OF PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PRIORITY INITIALS
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE ✓ INITIALS

PAGE THREE

OUT 52128

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 37547

THAT AFFECT KUBARK, BUT STRESS THAT YOU RECOGNIZE THAT REPORTS IN PUBLIC MEDIA ARE OFTEN MISLEADING. [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

DDCI (in draft)
COPS (in draft)

ALLEN W. DULLES
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RICHARD M. BISSELL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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OUT 52128

DIR 37947

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

ALGIERS
BRAZZAVILLE
ADDIS ABABA
ACCRA
CONAKRY
ABIDJAN
NAIROBI
MONROVIA
TRIPOLI
RABAT
LAGOS
LEOPOLDVILLE
MOGADISCIO
KHARTOUM
TUNIS
PRETORIA

VIENNA
FRANKFURT
ATHENS
BERN
NICOSIA
MELBOURNE
RANGOON
PHNOM PENH
HONOLULU
HONG KONG
DJAKARTA
TOKYO
SEOUL
KUALA LUMPUR
WELLINGTON
MANILA

OKINAWA
SAIPAN
SINGAPORE
TAIPEI
BANGKOK
SAIGON
VIENTIANE
[redacted]
KABUL
COLOMBO
NEW DELHI
TEHRAN
BAGHDAD
[redacted]
AMMAN
BEIRUT
KATMANDU

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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KARACHI

JIDDA

ANKARA

CAIRO

BRUSSELS

OTTAWA

COPENHAGEN

LONDON

HELSINKI

PARIS
PARIS (LCPIPIT)
REYKJAVIK

ROME

LUXEMBOURG

THE HAGUE

OSLO

LISBON

MADRID

STOCKHOLM

BUENOS AIRES

LA PAZ

RIO DE JANEIRO

SANTIAGO

BOGOTA

SAN JOSE

CIUDAD TRUJILLO

QUITO

GUATEMALA CITY

PORT AU PRINCE

TEGUCIGALPA

MEXICO CITY

MANAGUA

PANAMA CITY

ASUNCION

LIMA
PANAMA CITY
SAN SALVADOR
ASUNCION
MONTEVIDEO
LIMA
CARACAS
SAN SALVADOR

MONTEVIDEO

CARACAS

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SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

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(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 13:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brasilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced FRIC's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings, of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Report on Cuban Operations for Period 1-15 September 61

This is the second summary report of activities in Cuban operations, and covers the period 1-15 September 1961. This report will consist of a breakdown of such operations into the principal categories of activity.

A. FI-CI Activity

1. Reporting to Headquarters. There was a total of twenty-eight reports received during the period, and they consisted of the following: Nine from FI sources, fifteen from debriefings conducted in the Miami area, two via the open mail, and two reports via diplomatic courier. Additionally, eleven CI reports were passed to the FBI, and 1,017 CI name checks were processed for I&NS.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of eighteen agents within Cuba at the beginning of the reporting period and twenty-four by the period's close.

b. Comment: Of the seven agents dispatched legally during the period, one agent was a returnee. These agents should provide increased coverage of anti-Castro groups, activities at the airport and new entree into the diplomatic community.

c. Four agents were recruited and two agents were terminated during the period.

d. In cooperation with the German desk, we have initiated an operation to debrief Cuban sailors who pass through

EYES ONLY
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the area. Clearances have been obtained for two Cubans who will act as coordinators for the operation.

e. AVCKLY-1, a Uruguayan diplomat, has been recruited and has agreed to act as a courier for the intel net in Cuba. The agent is currently on his way to Cuba via boat.

f. AMOT-34, the principal agent/W/T operator, using signal plan OGARIK, returned to Cuba via legal means on 6 September and was once again in radio communication with us as of 10 September. He is in contact with AMWARM-1, the principal agent of what remains of our intelligence net in Cuba.

g. Control of the OGARIK W/T communication link was passed to WAVE from Headquarters effective 14 September.

h. AMPALM-1 was dispatched to Geneva to attempt to recruit Raul CEPERO Bonilla, Minister of the National Bank of Cuba, who is presently attending the sugar conference in Switzerland.

i. Jesus LOPEZ Guerrara, Cuban airline pilot who is disaffected with the Castro regime, is in contact with the Madrid Station and has agreed to cooperate and remain in place.

j. Arrangements are being made for a technical surveillance of the charge office in the Cuban Embassy, Montevideo.

B. Propaganda Activity

1. Major Efforts

a. Operation Bolivar. Designed to place sixty student/agents of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) exile group in universities throughout the Western Hemisphere. Progress: Three in place and twenty-one are processing.

b. Operation Virgen del Cobre. Designed to exploit the 8 September anniversary of the Cuban patron saint as a day of mourning expressing opposition to Castro's attacks upon the church, religious freedom, and Cuban freedom. Progress: All local and Western Hemisphere assets alerted for the 8 September campaign. Sixty-five thousand pieces of propaganda were distributed for mailing throughout Latin America. The Cruzada Femenina Cubana (CFC) woman's group sent eight cables and 130 letters in the Latin American area. Through the joint efforts of the CFC and Catholics, mass and benediction services were held before 25,000 people in the Miami stadium. It was said to be a huge success.

c. After the recent Castro executions, an amnesty campaign was initiated on behalf of political and military prisoners. Progress: One hundred and eight cables and 220 letters were sent to Latin America by the Cuban affiliate groups.

2. Broadcasts

a. The Avance newspaper sponsored twenty-four thirty minute programs over WMIE, Miami, targeted against northern Havana and Matanzas provinces on general anti-Castro themes. Swan broadcasts ten and one half hours daily over short and medium wave.

b. We support a Cuban exile group producing a weekly thirty minute tape for distribution to a number of Caribbean basin stations, and a weekly fifteen minute tape for distribution through IAAB channels to Central and South American stations. At present some seventy stations participate in this operation.

c. WAVE has assumed contact role with local offices of Swan and radio broadcaster Luis CONTE Aguero through cutout.

d. Beginning 11 September, Luis CONTE Aguero began short wave broadcasts of thirty minutes daily on five frequencies beamed to all Central and South America and Caribbean basin.

e. Maritime broadcasts were cancelled for period for vessel maintenance. An electronic engineer has been hired and construction of TV intrusion equipment has begun. This equipment will be used on the maritime broadcast ~~and be~~ targeted against the Havana area.

f. Cuban Freedom Committee funded and directed two hours daily over WGBS, Miami, and six hours daily over WKWF, Key West.

3. Leaflets/Pamphlets. Production and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere by sources:

   a. Cuban exile groups:

      1) DRE - 10,000

      2) CFC - 15,000

      3) FORD - 20,000

   b. WAVE printed 4,000 Grandes Mentiras (Big Lies) as first of a series.

4. Periodicals

   a. Avance, weekly newspaper: Two editions, 40,300 WH circulation.

   b. Information newsletter, weekly: Two editions, 4,340 circulation.

   c. DRE Trinchera: One edition, 2,500 WH circulation.

   d. AFJ Bulletin: Two editions, 16,000 WH circulation.

   e. MRR Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

   f. FORD Bulletin: One edition, 5,000 WH circulation.

   g. El Mundo, weekly newspaper: 3,000 per week in Dominican Republic.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

26 Sept 1961

EYES ONLY
SECRET

MEMO FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
SUBJECT: REPORT ON CUBAN OPERATIONS 1-15 Sept 61

h. Bohemia Libre, weekly magazine of over 170,000 WH circulation.

5. Tours and Travel - Cuban Group Representation

a. DRE. Two tours covering Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.

b. CFC. Two tours covering Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama.

c. Enrique HUERTA. To Rio medical congress.

d. Arrangements are in process to send a small variety troupe to Mexico for propaganda value. The performance will be filmed on 16 mm for subsequent general use throughout Latin America.

e. Arrangements were made with the State Department by WH/4/Security for the facilitation of re-entry into the United States of long-term Cuban assets dispatched on propaganda tours of Central and South America.

6. Other Activities. Headquarters representative met with Rojas Santamarina, and discussed his plan for PHANTOM project, i.e., establishment of phantom cells inside Cuba through medium of propaganda chain letters. Headquarters is studying the idea with a view to possible trial-run on a small scale.

C. Political Action Activity

1. CRC. A meeting was held 9 September with Dr. Miro Cardona at which time he was advised by higher authority that our Government regards the CRC as the control point of contact in its dealing with the Cuban exile and underground activity. A basic administrative budget will be allocated, and it will be in the neighborhood of a million dollars per year. All other allocations of money will be on the basis of specific projects submitted by the Council and approved by the United States. The Cuban Council will continue to broaden its base allowing entry of all substantial exile groups not identified with Batista or with

EYES ONLY
SECRET

Communism. Groups not willing to work with the Council will be dealt with bilaterally (the United States and the group involved), but Dr. Miro will be kept informed of these activities. Such information will be kept in the strictest secrecy by Dr. Miro and his specially appointed assistant. If this arrangement should prove insecure, such contacts will terminate. All problems arising from Council activities will be discussed between the CRC and the Bureau of ARA of State Department. Dr. Miro will maintain his contact with the White House for cases wherein he considers such contact to be urgently necessary.

2. Additional Political Developments. After high level United States consideration and decision, Dr. Miro was informed, at a meeting on 16 September, that the responsibility for the organization and plans for exile Cuban jurists and lawyers would be his. In addition, to his future funding "salaries" of the existing ALASAU organization, $5,000 per month would be provided Dr. Miro or his designee retroactive to 1 August to support Dr. Miro's faction of lawyers to whom he has a long standing commitment. It was emphasized that this transfer of responsibility must be accomplished harmoniously, without adverse press reaction, or support of this work would be withdrawn. Col. Wendell Johnson was hired and will be placed in contact with Dr. Miro prior to 1 October. He will function as the day-to-day contact between Dr. Miro and this Agency and the United States Government. It was made clear to Dr. Miro that his demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to the other professional groups, i.e., students and labor, was rejected. He was told that any proposals he might wish to make in the student and labor fields would be welcomed as promoting harmony and eventual unity of Cuban exile anti-Castro elements.

D. Paramilitary Activity

1. Maritime Activity

a. Eight vessels, four Agency owned and four Cuban owned, are available to support this activity. Of the eight vessels, five were operational and three were undergoing repairs during the period. The principal activity during the period revolved around preparation and support of operation TEABAG, to be implemented 16 September.

b. The LCI, BARBARA J, is now awaiting additional engineering and electrical work at the San Juan Drydock Company. Delay has been caused by the lack of priority and the induction of several Navy ships requiring urgent repairs.

c. Captain TIRADO has spotted a complete crew for the BARBARA J and crew names and biographic data have been submitted to Headquarters for clearance.

d. The Cover and Commercial Staff is engaged in providing for the ships registration, name change, and cover mechanism to allow for future funding and operation.

2. Agent Activities and Developments

a. There was a total of forty-two PM assets involved in activities during the period. Inside Cuba there were two agents, a principal agent and a radio operator. Externally, there were forty agent assets composed of thirty-five PM types and five radio operators.

b. Approval was granted for the passage of RS-6 radio gear complete with signal plan, pads and crystals into Cuba via AMBLESS-3 channels which utilize a foreign diplomatic courier.

c. Approval was granted for the conduct of operation SPIKE, an exfiltration operation to be implemented 21 September.

d. On 9 September seven AMHAZE agents were terminated leaving a total of thirty in the group.

e. The internal PA/WT operator ENRIQUE using signal plan BUTLOX reports that his group has been operating a clandestine radio broadcast since 12 September (Radio

Libertad) on 40 meter band from 1300 to 1315 local time on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays. We are attempting to verify this claim, and an announcement will be made over Voice of America as to the existence of the broadcasts.

E. Training

1. Agents trained by close of period 15 September

   a. Total number of agents trained: 15

   b. Total number of agents in training: 26

2. FI-CI

   a. Agents trained in SW: 7

   b. Agents trained in tradecraft: 6

3. PA-PROP

   a. Agents trained in agit/prop: 4

   b. Agents in training in agit/prop: 9 (Includes two W/T radops.)

   c. Agents ready for training: 12

4. Paramilitary

   a. Agents in training: 17

   b. Type of training: Small boat handling, reception, reconnaissance techniques.

F. Communications - Agent Type

1. Messages. WT: 15 total - 12 received, 3 sent by WAVE.

C. Support

1. Bases

a. WAVE. Nineteen staff agents were processed at Headquarters and dispatched PCS to WAVE bringing the total of PCS personnel to 23 at the close of the period. The renovation of new offices at WAVE is complete.

b. RIGM. Now has responsibility for relaying all traffic to and from WAVE and crypto relay responsibility for all BASE traffic. The Office of Communications has received their approved T/O for RIGM and have commenced personnel actions on approximately fifty personnel assigned at this installation.

c. The transfer of JMFIG to the Office of Logistics

1) Mr. Glen Laney, WH/4/Logistics, is now at JMFIG for the purpose of adjusting the inventory pending arrangements to be made to transfer all WH materiel held by JMFIG to Supply Division, Office of Logistics.

2) The Planning Staff, Office of Logistics, has acted as coordinator in matters pertaining to personnel, finance, cover and security, the majority of which have been or will be settled shortly.

3) Present plans contemplate the release of JMFIG to the Office of Logistics on 1 October 1961.

d. All materiel at JMTIDE has been inventoried and prepared for shipment. Although the intended carrier, the ship JOHAN, arrived at JMTIDE on 13 September, loading was delayed due to the presence of foreign shipping in the area. It is anticipated that loading will commence on or about 18 September and will be completed within four days.

EYES ONLY
SECRET

e. JMBARR. A draft of a lease agreement for the JMBARR property has been prepared and forwarded to the owner of the real estate for final approval.

2. Finance

a. Answers have been received from various sources regarding our queries for new Cuban pesos. Two sources are in the process of procuring pesos in the amount of $10,000 U.S. dollars.

b. The funding for JMDUSK is in process. Mr. Ball, WH/4/Finance, is at WAVE to establish a commercial set of records for maintenance by the field office.

c. Total FY 1962 obligations through 15 September for Cuban operations are $4,675,933.00. Of this total, $1,674,775.00 represents payments for the maintenance of the CRC and payments for dependents of the strike force through September.

There is a special intelligence annex to this report, "Counter-revolutionary Activities in Cuba," for the period 1-15 September, issued separately.

J. C. KING
Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division

DDP/WH/4/Plans:W.R.Dinsmore:bh (27 September 1961)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - C/OPS
1 - A/DDP/A
1 - C/WHD
1 - WH/COPS
1 - C/WH/4
2 - WH/4/Plans

EYES ONLY
SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
February 25, 1963

①

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On February 21, 1963, a confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that he had learned that Carlos Alejos, Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, had contacted Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes for the purpose of advising him that Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, an organization opposed to Fidel Castro, Cuban Prime Minister, had apologized for not keeping an appointment he had been granted with Ydigoras-Fuentes. Cardona stated that he had been extremely impressed with what Ydigoras-Fuentes had done for Cuba and told Alejos that those individuals who had said that Ydigoras-Fuentes had to be removed had already been expelled from Cardona's group. Ydigoras-Fuentes commented that the meeting Cardona had missed was a meeting of all important Cuban leaders who went to Guatemala to sign an agreement. Alejos indicated that Cardona wished to see Ydigoras-Fuentes in order to relieve any misunderstanding and Ydigoras-Fuentes agreed to see Cardona anytime he would come to Guatemala. He instructed Alejos to issue Cardona a visa at his request.

The position of Carlos Alejos was verified through the "Diplomatic List" dated November, 1962, published by the United States Department of State.

Miguel Ydigoras-Fuentes is the President of Guatemala.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FILE NO. 19-124/25-2

SECRET

DATE : 633
10 OCT 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : KINGSTON

ACTION : TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☑
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☑

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

OCT 11 00212 62

ROUTINE

IN 37423

DIR INFO WAVE CITE KNGS 0208

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A DIR 40852 (CA-84508)

B KNGS 0202 (IN 32658)

1. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLIMATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUNITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE. STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERVICE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.

2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR MOST RELUCTANTLY IN (PTN GBLD, WILL FWD) WITH FRANK (DIAZ) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATEMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. IN ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT AMBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FACING "FRIENDS OF CUBA COMMITTEE"

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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3		6	

ATE

ION

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RB Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

PAGE 2

IN 37423 KNGS 0208

(COMPRISING LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".

3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ KNGS CONCURRENCE, SUGGESTED WAVE SEND AMBUD REP TO TEST LOCAL GOVT CLIMATE FOR PROPOSED DELEG AND REPORT RESPONSE AMBUD/1.

RI COPY

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

U. K. Liaison file

See: LOND 5956 (IN 27353), 29 March 1961
LOND 5968 (IN 28181), 31 March 1961

(Extra sensitive cables to be opened by
Chief, WH/4/PA only.

[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : T. Smith
UNIT : WH/4/PA
EXT : 0715
DATE : 19 April 1961

1749

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : BOOK MESSAGE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : WH 5
INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/PMG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP
EE 4, FE 5, NE 4, AF 4, WE 4, S/C 2, SR 4

[illegible] files as indicated
[illegible] filing required
R [illegible]

APR 20 0320Z 61

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 97713
97713

LISTED

TO ~~ALL~~ STATIONS AND BASES INFO CITE DIR 35831 35831

1. FYI, SENIOR KUDOVE OFFICIALS ONLY. A STRIKE FORCE OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARIES NUMBERING 1200, INVADED CUBA BY SEA 17 APRIL AT COCHINOS BAY, LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. AFTER THREE INITIAL BEACH HEADS WERE SECURED AGAINST LITTLE OPPOSITION, THE GOC SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING AIR SUPERIORITY USING T-33 JET TRAINERS AND MIG-[illegible]'S. BY 18 APRIL UP TO 12 SOVIET-BUILT TANKS WERE BROUGHT INTO ACTION.

2. THE REBELS LOST ONE BEACH HEAD ON 17 APRIL AND THEIR REMAINING FOOTHOLD ON 19 APRIL. THIS WAS PRIMARILY DUE TO THREE FACTORS:

(A) INABILITY TO RESUPPLY WITH PROP A/C IN FACE OF ENEMY JET AIR SUPERIORITY.

(B) INABILITY TO WITHSTAND HEAVY TANK ASSAULT ON A BEACH COMBAT ZONE.

(C) OVERWHELMING ENEMY MAN POWER.

3. THIS STRIKE FORCE WAS THE MAIN REBEL EFFORT DURING THE PERIOD 16-20 APRIL.

4. NO RELIABLE DATA THIS DATE RE REBEL WOUNDED, CAPTURED, OR KILLED. BEACH HEAD WAS COMPLETELY OVERRUN BUT LOCAL TERRAIN SUCH THAT INDIVIDUALS OR SMALL GROUPS MAY HAVE INFILTRATED INLAND.

5. GOC POLICE ACTION, INCLUDING ARREST OF THOUSANDS, EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED CIVILIAN ACTION IN SUPPORT INVASION.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

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14-00000

FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

RE. [illegible]
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

ROUTING			
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DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713

TO INFO CITE DIR 35831

-2-

6. FULL DETAILS NOT AVAILABLE. PSYCH GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW.

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

for C/WH/4 R D Drain

WH/C/CA Oberst in draft

RICHARD M. BISSELL
DDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. King
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

4 FORM 1389 [illegible] REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

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TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature: -3-

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713
OUT 97713

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 35831
35831

ABIJ ACCR ADDI ALGI AMMA ANCH ANKA ASUN
ATHE BAGH [redacted] BANG BEIR BELG BRLN BERN
BOGO BOMB BONN BRAZ BRUS CAIR CALC CAPT
CARA TRUJ COLO CNRY LISB COPE DKAR DAMA
DARE DJAK FRAN GUAT HAGU HELS HONG HULA
ISTA JIDD KABU KAMP KAHI KTMN KHAR KUAL
KUWA LAGS LAPA LEOP LIMA LOND [redacted] LUXE
MADR MANA MANI MELB MEXI MOGA MNRV MONT
MUNI NOBI NEWD OTTA PACY PARI PENH PRIN
PRET QUIT RABA RNGO REYK RIOD ROME SAIG
SLBY SANJ JUAN SAGO SALV SEOU SING STOC
TAMI TNAR TEGU TEHE TOKY TPLI TNIS VIEN
VETN WELL YAOU

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

19-124-25/14

DATE: 374
16 DEC 61

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: PANAMA CITY

ACTION: BELL 10

INFO: WH 5, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature: ______

ROUTING			
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3		6	

DEC 16 2212Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 39471

DIR INFO WAVE CITE PACY 7273 (10)

JMZIP/KUCAGE

1. REQUEST POA FOR VICENTE HERRERO DIAZ, CUBAN NATIONAL BORN LA HABANA 22 SEPTEMBER 1915. FATHER CRESCENCIO HERRERO HERNANDEZ, SPANISH BORN NOW DECEASED. MOTHER EUGENIA DIAZ DIAZ SPANISH BORN NOW LIVING CUBA. IN CUBA WORKED IN RADIO AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION, PUBLICITY RESEARCH FIELDS. FRIEND OF DR. CONTE AGUERO AND MEMBER HIS FRENTE ANTICOMUNISTA.

2. IN PANAMA HAS WORKED AT MARKET AND AUDIENCE RESEARCH, PRODUCED NOW DEFUNCT MONTHLY MAGAZINE HUMANIDAD. IS ONE OF FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF LOCAL CONSEJO REVOLUCIONARIO CHAPTER WITH TITLE COORDINADOR AUXILIAR. PRODUCES AND BROADCASTS LOCAL CONSEJO DAILY HALF HOUR RADIO PROGRAM ON RADIO MIRAMAR.

3. LOCAL TRACES IN PROCESS. WAVE SEND ANY DEROG TRACES PACY AND DIR.

4. DESIRE USE SUBJ FOR LOCAL PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, MONITORING AND SUPPORT LOCAL JMRAKE ACTIVITIES.

RI COPY

FORM 1389a

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

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"DO" RECORD MATERIAL

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2. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO IP/ARCHIVES, RM GE-58, ON OR BEFORE DATE INDICATED.
3. IF YOU FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL PLEASE CALL EXTENSION 4598.

DUE DATE

[illegible] 76
[illegible] Sep 76
[illegible] 77

DO NOT REMOVE THIS FORM

FORM 179a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (47)

3. ~~I/EIB GA-10~~ ~~R. Martin~~		10 MAY 1976	~~R.M.~~
4. ~~IP/EIS GA-10~~ ~~D. Isaac~~			~~[illegible]~~
5. IP/EIS GA-10 D. Isaac 3D5 331			
6. C. Hopkins		16 Feb 77	[illegible]
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14. RETURN TO			
15. IP/ARD Rm ~~GE-58~~ GA50			

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Job# 72-258/25
Space # 407654

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DOCUMENT:
FOLDER: 3
PAGE:
BOX: 2

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

RETURN TO RECORDS CENT
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 72-258 BOX 2

40765

FINAN
DER.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTICE

THIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. DO NOT ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER. FORWARD CS DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDER TO IP/RPU GE-58.

NOTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REQUEST FOR BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SPECIAL

CIA FBI INS HV	FROM:	DATE

FULL NAME (married woman include maiden name): RODRIGUEZ (Garcia), Caridad

ALIASES, NICKNAMES: Mrs. Garcia-Rubio

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: Sept. 6, 1907 Cuba Santiago de las Vegas, Havana

HOME ADDRESS:
9630 S.W. 9th Terrace
Miami, Fl. 33174

SEX: F

CITIZENSHIP: Cuban

MARITAL STATUS: widow

SPOUSE'S NAME: (deceased) Rafael Garcia Rubio

OCCUPATION: retired

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER: former: Catholic Welfare Bureau, Miami and Salon Tropical, Miami

PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND FORMER ADDRESSES (Approximately last ten years)

Alien Reg. No. A-12 413 112

Admitted to US as immigrant 9/23/64 at Miami (first entered as a parolee at Miami on 11/28/60.

Requesting permission to travel to Cuba to visit son recently released from prison

FOR USE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE ONLY

OFFICE: Visa Office/CD

DATE: Feb. 12, 1975

NAME OF SUBMITTING OFFICER: Newmaster/Southrn

TYPE OF DEPARTMENT PROGRAM: Cuban Departure Control

FOR USE OF OTHER OFFICE(S) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4 MAR 1975

FORM DS-937
9-63

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27670

FILE NO - 201-298852, 19-124-25/6

DATE - 29 MAY 1967

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - C/WH

INFO - NONE

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENCY PAYMENT

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REF - UFGA-27536, 11 MAY 1967

REQUEST REPLY REF

BURTON J. CELENZA

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 - C/WH

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL 10201
Dependent Payment for Case #103, Jorge FUNDORA Fernandez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Reply to paragraph three
References: A. UFGW-6351, 19 January 1967
B. UFGA-26878, 1 February 1967
C. HNMW-1985, 27 April 1967

1. A letter dated 7 May 1967 has been received from Silvia HEREDIA, 180 S.E. 13th Terrace, Miami, Florida, via the AMTIKI-1 facility. Mrs. HEREDIA is the widow of Jorge FUNDORA Fernandez (Hero & Martyr, no 201 number) who is the Subject of Case #103 for which a monthly AMBUD payment of $175.00 is made to the widow. In her letter, which is attached, Mrs. HEREDIA requests the AMTIKI facility to also send the payment formerly received from AMBIDDY-1 which she claims was terminated in April 1967.

2. This case was one of three cases for which AMBIDDY requested in January 1967 that WOFACT assume the monthly payments being made by his organization. The request by AMBIDDY was the Subject of Reference A which requested data from JMWAVE concerning the cases. The JMWAVE reply, forwarded under Reference B, included a recommendation that no increase in payment be made. Reference C informed the addressee that, under the circumstances, it was not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to the individuals concerned.

3. In view of the background described above, we propose, with Headquarters approval, to have AMTIKI-1 reply to Mrs. HEREDIA stating that no funds are available in addition to the $175.00 monthly payment which is being made.

4. We are also enclosing copies of the following documentation which has been provided by Mrs. HEREDIA:

Attachments:
A. 1 Letter referred to in para 1 above
B. 3 Documents " " " " 4 "

atts filed Subject's soft file

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts. A and B h/w

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED 22 May 67	DATE DISPATCHED MAY 29 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27636	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6	

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

2aa.

a. Certificate of marriage 14 November 1958.

b. Birth certificate for the son, Eduardo Luis FUNDORA Heredia.
DOB: 4 December 1958

c. Birth certificate for the daughter, Raquel Maria FUNDORA Heredia.
DOB: 16 March 1960

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

14-00000

ATTACH
A
to UFGA-27636, 22May67

Miami, May 7, 1967

Sirs:

By means of these lines I wish to tell you of my present situation with the hope that you can help me.

My name is Silvia ~~HEREDIA~~, widow of Jorge FUNDORA, and I have been receiving from you a pension of $175.00 monthly. Since this sum was insufficient to cover the needs of my two children, Eduardo who is 8 years old and Raquel who is 7 years old, and the psychiatric treatment for myself, AMBIDDY-1, in the name of the , sent me $125.00 monthly. In the month of August 1966, that amount (from the) was reduced to $100.00 for economic reasons and in the month of ~~Apr~~ April 1967 I was notified that this amount would be suspended entirely and that I should not count on this subsidy in the future.

My situation cannot be sustained because due to my health I am not able to work at the moment and I am turning to you with the request that the sum suspended by the which was sent to me by AMBIDDY-1 be assigned to me by you.

Respectfully,
Silvia Heredia Vda. de Fundora

180 SE 14 Terrace
Miami, Fla.

Att. 1 UFGA-27636

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

Miami, Mayo 7, 1967.

Señores:

Por medio de estas lineas deseo expresarles mi actual situación con la esperanza de que puedan ayudarme.

La que suscribe es Silvia Heredia, viuda de Jorge Fundora y que viene recibiendo de ustedes una pensión de $175.00 mensuales. Como esa cantidad era insuficiente para atender mis dos hijos, Eduardo de 8 años y Raquel de 7 años, así como el tratamiento siquiatrico a que estoy sometida, el [redacted] a nombre del [redacted], me enviaba $125.00 mensuales. En el mes de Agosto de 1966 dicha cantidad quedó reducida a $100.00 por reajustes económicos, y el mes de Abril de 1967 se me comunicó que tenia que suspender definitivamente esa cantidad por no contar más con la subvención con que contaba.

AMB/ODY-1

Como mi situación se hace insostenible ya que por mi salud no puedo trabajar por el momento acudo a ustedes con el ruego de que se me asigne la cantidad suspendida por el [redacted], que me hacia llegar el [redacted]. AMB/ODY-1

De ustedes muy respetuosamente,

Silvia Heredia Vda. de Fundora

180 S.E. 14 Terrace
Miami, Fla.

Mrs. Silvia Heredia,
160 S.E. 14 Terr. Apt.2
Miami, Florida, 33131.

MIAMI, FLA.
MAY 4

CERTIFIED
No. 381174
MAIL

NOTIFIED
MAY 5 [illegible]

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27536
FILE NO - 201-298852, 19-124-25/6
DATE - 11 MAY 1967
INDEXING - NO
MICROFILM - NO
TO - CHIEF, WH
INFO - NONE
FROM - COS, JMWAVE
SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENCY PAYMENT
ACTION - REPLY CONCERNING PARA THREE
REF - UFGA-27363

1. BACKGROUND DATA CONCERNING JORGE KIM YUM CASE AND JMWAVE RECOMMENDATION TERMINATE DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS FOR PARENTS FORWARDED UNDER REFERENCE.

2. LETTER FROM TRUSTEE, DATED 27 APRIL 1967, REQUESTS INFORMATION CONCERNING PAYMENTS THIS CASE WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHHELD BY JMWAVE SINCE JANUARY 1967 IN VIEW BACKGROUND DESCRIBED PARAGRAPH TWO REFERENCE.

3. WE PROPOSE REPLY TO TRUSTEE STATING THAT FOR HIS AND THE PARENTS INFORMATION THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED. WE PROPOSE FURTHER TO ADVISE THE TRUSTEE THAT SHOULD THE PARENTS COME TO THE UNITED STATES THE CASE WILL BE REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES IN EFFECT AT THAT TIME.

BURTON J. CELENZA

DISTRIBUTION
C/WH VIA TELEPOUCH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-201-298852

SECRET

10 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Status Report - Transfer of AMBUD Survivor Benefit Payments to BEC

1. Mr. Ben DeFelice, Chief, Benefits and Services Division, was phoned on 8 May for a reading on the status of the AMBUD case, i.e., researching the possibility of transferring Survivor Benefit payments (which total close to $500,000.00 per year) to the Bureau of Employee Compensation.

2. Mr. DeFelice assured WH/COG that whatever could be done was being done and a decision on the feasibility of the turnover was being made by the Director, BEC. Sample Survivor cases had been submitted to BEC for review along with the proposed text of a letter which would be addressed to the BEC by the DCI once the course to be followed was agreed upon by both parties. The draft letter had been prepared by Mr. Lawrence Houston.

3. Mr. DeFelice will advise WH/COG as soon as he has word.

Earl J. Williamson
Acting Chief, WH/COG

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
~~TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational~~
Indexing of AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith for Headquarters information and indexing purposes is a listing of the authorized payees for AMBUD monthly dependent payments effective with the March 1967 payment. Also included for indexing is a listing (pages 28-30) of the Principal Parties for whom 201 numbers are not available at JMWAVE.

Burton J Celozza
for Mark F. EFFIELD

Distribution:
3-WH/COG

NOT [illegible] FOR [illegible]

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
5 May 1967

DATE DISPATCHED
MAY 10 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27514

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME ACOSTA Alba,	GIVEN NAME Julio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [redacted]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 11 February 1915	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 130 E. 16th St. Hialeah, Fla.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 1~~:

Father of ACOSTA Ruiz, Julio (201-286548).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.
Dependency case payment

2

SURNAME ACEVEDO Aleman,	GIVEN NAME Oscar	MIDDLE NAME L.	201-252276
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 13 March 1930	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santo Domingo, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Capt., U.S. Army		RESIDENCE 1601 NW 28th Ave. Miami Fla.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No.~~ 2:
~~Trustee for payments on behalf of~~ [redacted]
~~(201-~~[redacted]~~)~~

201

3

SURNAME LINAN	GIVEN NAME Olga	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 712 W. 175th St. Apt. D New York, N.Y.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 3~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of BLANCO Cruz, Benito (201-283914)~~

201

4

SURNAME NAVARRO	GIVEN NAME Mercedes	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 10 August 1918	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP Cuba	OCCUPATION Housewife		RESIDENCE 523 SW 7th Ave. Apt. 1 Miami, Fla.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: [redacted]4:

Mother of BLANCO Navarro, Manuel (201-268913).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

201

5

SURNAME PORTELA	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME L.	201-
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 10 February 1935	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No~~ 5:

Widow of CRESPO Graso, Jose (201-282317).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: SANCHEZ Dopazo,
GIVEN NAME: Juan
MIDDLE NAME: Jose
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 24 June 1922
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 1760 SW 1st. St.
Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 8~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of FERNANDEZ Mon, Daniel~~
~~(201-[illegible]~~)

2
SURNAME: CAPOTE
GIVEN NAME: Nora
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 26 June 1935
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 7~~:

Widow of GARCIA Fernandez, Crispin (201-286855)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.
No 201

3
SURNAME: FOWLER
GIVEN NAME: Victoria
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 10 March 1906
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Mother of GARCIA-MENOCAL Fowler, Raul (201-286031)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: GARCIA Turino,
GIVEN NAME: Rolando
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 20 January 1927
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Palma Soriano
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 9~~:

~~Trustee for monthly payment on behalf of GARCIA Turino, Marcos~~
~~(201-287474~~)

5
SURNAME: GONZALEZ
GIVEN NAME: Ernesto
MIDDLE NAME:
201-
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH: 23 December 1907
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 10~~:

Father of GONZALEZ Ramirez, Eduardo (201-287476)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	3

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME [illegible] BETANCOURT Garcia, GIVEN NAME Gloria MIDDLE NAME 201-
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 21 August 1942 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 11~~:

Widow of GONZALEZ Ramirez, Eduardo (201-287476)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME ARCA Campos, GIVEN NAME Manuel MIDDLE NAME 201-
SEX M DATE OF BIRTH 8 August 1898 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Manzanillo
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 12~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of GONZALEZ Romero, Juan (201-[illegible])~~
201-291257

3
SURNAME ESTRADA, GIVEN NAME Delia MIDDLE NAME 201- 291257
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 31 October 1935 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 13~~:

Widow of MARTINEZ Venegas, Emilio (201-281268).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME DIAZ, GIVEN NAME Vivian MIDDLE NAME 201-
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 28 August 1941 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 14~~:

Widow of PIEDRA Negueruela, Osvaldo (201-280991).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME ARANGO Cortina, GIVEN NAME Ofelia MIDDLE NAME 201-
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 22 June 1929 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 15~~:

Widow of PUIG Mivar, Manuel (201-287193).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

201-304030

1

SURNAME Mrs IGLESIAS Pineiro,	GIVEN NAME Sarah	MIDDLE NAME	201- 304030
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 22 February 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 2339 SW 17th Ave., Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 16~~:

Widow of QUINTANA Perera, Benjamin (201-287799).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME ALVAREZ, ~~RAMOS Alvarez, Santos~~	GIVEN NAME Justo	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 24 January 1931	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Limonar, Matanzas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 17~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of RAMOS Alvarez, Santos (201-287194)~~

3

SURNAME CASTELLANOS,	GIVEN NAME Victoria	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 10 March 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Jaguey Grande
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) Married name is: Mrs. Arturo MACIAS			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 15~~:

Mother of ROJAS Castellanos, Jorge (201-282288).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME ABELEDO,	GIVEN NAME Antonio	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 20 May 1918	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 19~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of SERRANO Camejo, Felix (201-283975)~~.

5

SURNAME PALMA,	GIVEN NAME Vilma	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 2101 NW 26th St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 20~~:

Remarried widow of VIANELLO Alakan, Raul (201-098817).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 5

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
QUINTANA,	Petrona		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	18 January 1917	Cuba	Pinar del Rio

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 21~~:

Mother of VILLARCHAO Quintana, Jesus (201-282038).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
LORENZO Boitel,	Maria	L.	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	18 August 1903		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 22~~:

Mother of PEREZ Lorenzo, Lorenzo R. (201-286860)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
GONZALEZ,	Elena		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	14 May 1908	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 24~~:

Mother of CABALLERO Gonzalez, Julio (201-285169).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
VILA,	Nidia	Rosa	

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	6 July 1937	Cuba	Las Villas

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
		58 Willoughby St. Newark, New Jersey

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 84~~:

Widow of VILA Acebal, Victor M. (201-301742).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SANTOS,	Lucy		

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	27 September 1933	U.S.A.	Philadelphia, Pa.

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
U. S. A.		

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependent Payment Case No. 29 and 86~~:

Ex-wife of PEREZ Rangel, Gaston (201-285269).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME PEREA Jimenez,	GIVEN NAME Rafael	MIDDLE NAME	201- 291264
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 24 October 1925	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Las Villas, Baez
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency payment [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible] Sanchez, Francisco~~ (201-284179)

2

SURNAME PARDO,	GIVEN NAME Mirna	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 May 1937	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 28~~:

Widow of MILIAN Velasco, Jose S. (201-290836)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME ALEMAN Diaz,	GIVEN NAME Laureana	MIDDLE NAME Concepcion	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 4 April 1903	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santa Isabel, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 29~~:

Mother of ALEMAN Aleman, Eufracio (201-290479)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME LEZCANO,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 19 December 1929	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 30~~:

Widow of AMARO Abreu, Pedro L. (201-290826).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME CAMACHO,	GIVEN NAME Irelda	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 28 December 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guinia de Miranda
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 31~~;

Wife of CARRAZANA Trimino, Jose R. (201-291244).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 7

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. If number needed.

1

SURNAME AMARO de la Cruz,	GIVEN NAME Emiliano	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 8 August 1899	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guira de Melina
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Father of AMARO Diaz, Antonio (201-294701).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME CORDOVES Camejo,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Esther	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 15 September 1909	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Mantua, Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of CATA Cordoves, Jose (201-291906).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME HERRERA Silverio,	GIVEN NAME Irma	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 16 November 1939	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Ex-wife of CATA Cordoves, Jose (201-291906).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME POU Mazon,	GIVEN NAME Herminia	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 April ~~XXXX~~ 1908	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santa Cruz del Norte
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of DIAZ Pou, Antonio (201-~~not available~~ 278750).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME PINO,	GIVEN NAME Maria del Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201-737479
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of CANIZARES Gamboa, Armando (201-291341).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 8

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME FIGUEROA,	GIVEN NAME Natividad	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 19 October 1926	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 156 Throop Ave. Brooklyn, N. Y.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Widow of AMORIN Sotelo, Roberto (201-291905).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME LOPEZ Moreno,	GIVEN NAME Paula	MIDDLE NAME Matilde	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 January 1923	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Widow of JULIEN Padron, Carlos (201-276847).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME FERNANDEZ Rubio,	GIVEN NAME Isis	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 11 May 1936	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Baracoa, Oriente
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of JULIEN Padron, Carlos (201-276847)~~

4

SURNAME ANGULO,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Teresa	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 October 1898	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No.~~ 40;

Mother of GARCIA-MONTES Angulo, Jose (201-292402).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME GARCIA-MONTES,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME C.	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 10 December 1925	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Managua
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;

Widow of GARCIA-MONTES Angulo, Jose (201-292402).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME X ✓ALNLLE,	GIVEN NAME Carmelina	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 23 September 1889	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment [illegible]~~:

Grandmother of MORLJON Hernandez, Ramon (201-289511).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME X ✓GARCIA,	GIVEN NAME Julia	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 1 October 1901	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Puerto Padre, Oriente
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) Remarriage name is: AKA Mrs. Antonio OSTUNE			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 44~~:

Mother of ARIZA Garcia, Carlos (201-292725)
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME X ✓DELGADO,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME Maria	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) Remarriage name is: AKA Rosa M. Freyre			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]4~~:

Remarried widow of CERVANTES Lago, Alfredo (201-292730).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME X ✓RODON Alvarez,	GIVEN NAME Felipe	MIDDLE NAME General	201- No 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 14 September 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santiago De Cuba
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 45~~:

Father of RODON Caminero, Oscar (201-293106).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME X ✓LEESON Cosio,	GIVEN NAME Marea	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 18 November 1905	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE Avenida Munoz Morin 57 Altos, Humacao, Puerto Rico.	
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 46~~:

Mother of HERNANDEZ Cosio, Ernesto (201-292741).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 10

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME BECERRA de Soler,	GIVEN NAME Esther	MIDDLE NAME	201- 1 6211
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 18 June 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Trinidad, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of SOLER Estrada, Ambrosio (201-294426).
~~Received a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME KING,	GIVEN NAME William	MIDDLE NAME K.	201- 742345
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 1 March 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH U.S.A. (Texas)	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Arlington
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3036 NW 4th Terrace Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for Payments on behalf of VILA [illegible] (201-[illegible]~~)

3

SURNAME FERNANDEZ,	GIVEN NAME Cecile	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 12 November 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH U.S.A.	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH New York
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Ex-wife of MACIA del Monte, Jose L. (201-294229).
~~[illegible]~~.

4

SURNAME ALCANTARA,	GIVEN NAME Josefina	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 September 1938	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 146 Dayton St. Newark, New Jersey
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~:

Widow of VIDAL Mazola, Reinaldo (201-294433).
~~[illegible] a monthly payment for [illegible]~~.

5

SURNAME ALONSO,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME	201- 110201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible]~~, ~~31~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible] Alonso, [illegible]~~
(~~[illegible]~~)

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 11

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: PAULA,
GIVEN NAME: Arrelin
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 September 1927
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 10207½ 8th Ave. Inglewood, Califfornia
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 52~~:

Ex-wife of CRUZ de la Torre, Clemente (201-294523).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: VIQUEIRA,
GIVEN NAME: Jose
MIDDLE NAME: B.
201- No 201
SEX: M
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 1614½ S. Oak St. Los Angeles, Calif.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 53~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible] Viqueira, [illegible]~~ J.
~~(201-2947[illegible]~~)

3
SURNAME: MIRO,
GIVEN NAME: Grecia
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH:
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
Re-married name is: (Mrs) Norman R. Karmon
AKA
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 54~~:

Ex-wife of CUERVO Fernandez, Gustavo (201-294558).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: AGRAMONTE,
GIVEN NAME: Matilde
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 10 August 1929
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 55~~:

Widow of RIONDA del Monte, Manuel (201-291932).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: RODRIGUEZ,
GIVEN NAME: Paulina
MIDDLE NAME:
201- No 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 March 1924
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of GARCIA-VILLATA Espinosa, Jorge (201-301458).
Receives a monthly payment for this case.

FORM 10-62 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 12

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME CASTRO de Jones,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 October 1912	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependents Payment Case No. 57~~:

Mother of JONES Castro, Jorge (201-293451).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME SANCHEZ,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 17 June 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Moron, Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependents Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~[illegible] for payments on behalf of SANCHEZ Grandal, [illegible] (201-[illegible])~~

SURNAME BEQUER Alvarado,	GIVEN NAME Isabel	MIDDLE NAME Maria	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 29 August 1922	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cienfuegos, L.V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependents Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of LEON Leon, Vicente (201-286541).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

SURNAME SOUBLETTE,	GIVEN NAME Rosa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 14 September 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 60~~:

Mother of SILVA Soublette, Rene J. (201-290432).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

SURNAME LOPEZ,	GIVEN NAME Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 29 November 1918	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE 835 W. 71st Place Hialeah, Florida	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependents Payment Case No. 61~~:

Widow of CARMENATE Cebrian, Marcelo B. (201-297567).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 13.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME BORREGO,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 3 September 1931	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 62~~:

Widow of GUERRA Gutierrez, Omar (201-272267).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MARTINEZ,	GIVEN NAME Elsa	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 June 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Managua, L. V.
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 1220 SW 5th St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 59~~:

Widow of GALVEZ Lopez, Mario R. (201-297112).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME ROJAS,	GIVEN NAME Blanco	MIDDLE NAME N.	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 February 1920	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 64~~:

Widow of CAMEJO Lopez, Ovidio (201-297129).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME XXX XXXXXX VILARELLO Tabares,	GIVEN NAME Jose	MIDDLE NAME D.	201-
SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5

SURNAME TABARES,	GIVEN NAME Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 7 October 1902	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guanabacoa
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 66~~:

Mother of VILARELLO Tabares, Jose D. (201-301690).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME ORTEGA Arias,	GIVEN NAME Carmen	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 19 November 1934	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 67~~:

Widow of VILARELLO Tabares, Jose D. (201-301690).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MIR Duran,	GIVEN NAME Elba	MIDDLE NAME Rosa	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 15 November 1913	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Mir, Oriente
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 68~~:

Mother of ROJAS Mir, Pedro (201-298252).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME FEIJOO,	GIVEN NAME Juan	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 13 August 1911	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH San Juan de los Geros
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 69~~:

~~[illegible] for payments on behalf of FEIJOO [illegible], Jose V.~~
(~~201-[illegible]~~).

4

SURNAME ESCOBEDO,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201-
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

5

SURNAME ESCOBEDO Martinez,	GIVEN NAME Gladys	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 January 1915	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUD Dependency Payment Case No. 70~~:

Mother of CASAS Escobedo, Eduardo de las (201-294621).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 15

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: FERNANDEZ, GIVEN NAME: Amada MIDDLE NAME: 201-[illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 6 February 1930 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Holguin
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 245 SW 20th Ave. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

AMBUD ~~Dependency Payment Case No. 7~~1:

~~Receives payments on behalf of [illegible]~~ I.
(~~[illegible]~~)

2
SURNAME: VALLE Suero, GIVEN NAME: Alejandro del MIDDLE NAME: 201-[illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 29 October 1907 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 72~~:

Father of XXXXX del VALLE Marti, Alejandro (201-282291).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: MARTI, GIVEN NAME: Maria MIDDLE NAME: Luisa XXXXX 201-[illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 18 March 1913 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 73~~:

Mother of del VALLE Marti, Alejandro (201-282291).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: FINALES Hernández, GIVEN NAME: Pastora MIDDLE NAME: 201-[illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 26 July 1896 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 74~~:

Mother of ORIA Finales, Luis (201-283201).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: ROQUE, GIVEN NAME: Margarita MIDDLE NAME: 201-[illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 28 January 1912 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 3880 W. 4th Ave. Hialeah, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 75~~:

Mother of NORDA XXXXX Roque, Pedro (201-298559).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1 X

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
HERNANDEZ Alvarez,	Gilberto		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	14 June 1914		

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 76~~;

Father of HERNANDEZ Ramirez, Gilberto (201-298850).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case.~~

2 X

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
PAYRET,	Juan		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 77~~;

Trustee ~~for payments on behalf of GEAS Decall, Carlos (201-300046)~~.

3 X

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
RODRIGUEZ,	Aida		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	19 November 1920	Cuba	Cienfuegos

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE
		2953 SW 38th Court Miami, Florida

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 78~~;

Widow of GEAS Decall, Carlos (201-300046).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case.~~

4 X

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
MUNOZ de Ginorio,	Aida		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	30 ~~JUNE~~ July 1940	Cuba	Artemisa

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 79~~;

Widow of GINORIO Mulgado, Ramon (201-297361).
~~Receives a monthly payment for this case~~.

5 X

SURNAME	GIVEN NAME	MIDDLE NAME	201-
JUEL,	Sara		No 201

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F			

CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 80~~;

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of GINORIO Mulgado, Ramon (201-297361)~~.

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		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	17

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: X MILIAN,
GIVEN NAME: Rosa
MIDDLE NAME:
201- Na 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 28 August 1912
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 39-11 Lincoln Park ~~Apartment 804~~ Newark, New Jersey
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 41~~:

Mother of DIAZ Milian, Osvaldo (201-298810).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: X CLE Margues,
GIVEN NAME: Maria
MIDDLE NAME: Paz
201- Na 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 7 April 1929
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 2121 SW 24th Terrace Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 50~~:

Widow of CUELLAR Alonso, Pedro S. (201-297556).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: X OTEIZA,
GIVEN NAME: Margarita
MIDDLE NAME:
201- Na 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 26 January 1933
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 64~~:

Widow of GONZALRZ Recio, Alberto (201-300035).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: X RECIO y Recio,
GIVEN NAME: Esther
MIDDLE NAME:
201- Na 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 11 February 1902
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 65~~:

Mother of GONZALEZ Recio, Alberto (201-300035).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: X OROPESA,
GIVEN NAME: Nelly
MIDDLE NAME:
201- Nu 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 16 February 1930
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): aka Juliana Garcia Oropesa Bosque
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMHUG Dependency Payment Case No. 66~~:

Widow (remarried) of OROPESA Delgado, Mario (201-300071).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-65 53d OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

☒ CONTINUED

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
BURNAME: DIB Ase, | GIVEN NAME: Elsa | MIDDLE NAME: | 201- No 201
SEX: F | DATE OF BIRTH: 7 May 1938 | COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Jaruco
CITIZENSHIP: | OCCUPATION: | RESIDENCE: 2003 Galiano, Apt. 2 [illegible], [illegible]
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Widow of SOLIS Shelton, Carlos (201-300082).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
BURNAME: CASANOVA, | GIVEN NAME: Oscar | MIDDLE NAME: | 201- No 201
SEX: M | DATE OF BIRTH: 26 September 1905 | COUNTRY OF BIRTH: | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: | OCCUPATION: | RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Father of CASANOVA Gomez, Fernando (201-300545).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3
BURNAME: CANTERO, | GIVEN NAME: Herminia | MIDDLE NAME: | 201- No 201
SEX: F | DATE OF BIRTH: 10 June 1915 | COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Cienfuegos
CITIZENSHIP: | OCCUPATION: | RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Widow of GUIM Gutierrez, Guillermo E. (201-Not available)
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

No 201

4
BURNAME: ORTIZ de Veral, | GIVEN NAME: Modesta | MIDDLE NAME: | 201- No 201
SEX: F | DATE OF BIRTH: 15 June 1906 | COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Holguin
CITIZENSHIP: | OCCUPATION: | RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Mother of VERA Ortiz, Ruben (201-284492).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5
BURNAME: KOCH Baeza, | GIVEN NAME: Herman | MIDDLE NAME: | 201- 741323
SEX: M | DATE OF BIRTH: 11 March 1906 | COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba | CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: | OCCUPATION: | RESIDENCE: 87-21 87th St, Apt. C-[illegible] Woodhaven, New York
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~;
Father of KOCH Gene, Herman (201-283096).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

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CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1 SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: X ROVIROSA Ojeda, Graciela — 201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 22 October 1919
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 8670 SW 27th Terrace Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 44~~:
Mother of FERNANDEZ Rovirosa, Jose A. (201-283357).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2 SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: X ACOSTA Lizano, Modesta — 201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 15 June 1933
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 45~~:
Widow of RODRIGUEZ, Nemesio (~~Hero and Martyr Case No. 201~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3 SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: X CABRERA Gonzalez, Rosa Maria — 201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 24 November 1906
COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 46~~:
Widow of SORI Marin, Humberto (201-248158).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4 SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: X CARBALLO Miranda, Hilda Rosa — 201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 7 September 1933
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:
Widow of DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (201- 283995).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5 SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME: X DELGADO Caraballoso, Clara — 201- NO 201
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 4 March 1941
COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba
CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Iguara, Las Villas
CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~AMHIP Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:
Widow of RAMIREZ, Porfirio (~~Hero and Martyr case, no. 201~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

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CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME DIAZ Gonzalez,	GIVEN NAME Rene	MIDDLE NAME L.	201- 720322
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 4 July 1929	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Los Pinos
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3145 SW 2nd St. Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORLD Dependency Payment Case No. 99~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible], Julio, and [illegible], Luis. ([illegible], No 201 number)~~

2

SURNAME EIREA Sanchez,	GIVEN NAME Maria de las Mercedes	MIDDLE NAME	201- ND 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 6 February 1903	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORLD Dependency Payment Case No. 100~~:

Mother of ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME PALMER Palmer,	GIVEN NAME Francisca	MIDDLE NAME	201- ND 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 April 1937	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORLD Dependency Payment Case No. 101~~:

Widow of ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME FERNANDEZ Vilarino,	GIVEN NAME Lilia	MIDDLE NAME	201- ND 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 September 1933	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORLD Dependency Payment Case No. 102~~:

Widow of TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (201-284309).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME HEREDIA Gonzalez,	GIVEN NAME Silvia	MIDDLE NAME	201- ND 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 11 January 1935	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Aguada de Pajaserov
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)			

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWORLD Dependency Payment Case No. 103~~:

Widow of FUNDORA, Jorge ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME LLON Carrandiz,	GIVEN NAME Lucia	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 3 December 1896	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 104~~:

Mother of LLON Leon, Vicente (201-286341).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MAS Machado,	GIVEN NAME Flora	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 April 1917	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 105~~:

Mother of BAEZ, Juventino ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME PEREZ Marron,	GIVEN NAME Rita	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 25 December 1932	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 106~~:

Widow of LE SANTE, William ~~([illegible])~~.
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME POSADA Dominguez,	GIVEN NAME Amparo	MIDDLE NAME	201- No 201
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 30 October 1925	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWHIP Dependency Payment Case No. 107~~:

Widow of PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME RUIZ Delgado,	GIVEN NAME Maria	MIDDLE NAME Caridad	201- 297156
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 9 July 1900	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION	RESIDENCE	

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMWHIP Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

FORM 10-63 53a	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 22

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1 SURNAME X RODRIGUEZ Exposito, GIVEN NAME Juana MIDDLE NAME 201- No 201
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 29 July 1909 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA ALIAS MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Personal Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of ESCOTO, Armando (201-283865).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2 SURNAME X SUAREZ Homdedeu, GIVEN NAME Isabel MIDDLE NAME Maria 201- No 201
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 20 April 1902 COUNTRY OF BIRTH CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Mother of YERBA, Jose Antonio ~~(Hero & Martyr case, No. [illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3 SURNAME X SUAREZ Tous, GIVEN NAME Teresa MIDDLE NAME 201- No 201
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 22 November 1940 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Widow of CARRERAS, Jesus ~~(Hero & Martyr case, No. [illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4 SURNAME X REYES Martinez, GIVEN NAME Manuel MIDDLE NAME 201- No 201
SEX M DATE OF BIRTH 23 February 1909 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Guanajay
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE 526 15th St. Apt. 8
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) Miami Beach, Florida
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Father of REYES Garcia, Manuel (201-281272).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5 SURNAME X GONZALEZ, GIVEN NAME Concepcion MIDDLE NAME 201- No 201
SEX F DATE OF BIRTH 30 September 1923 COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION RESIDENCE 43 NW 7th Ave.
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN) Miami, Florida
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payments on behalf of [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
(201-[illegible]~~)

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: NUNEZ de Conte, GIVEN NAME: Teofila MIDDLE NAME: Hilda 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 12 December 1928 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 124~~:

Wife of CONTE Hernandez, Ramon B. (201-285171).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: FF COUZE Fernandez, GIVEN NAME: Maria MIDDLE NAME: D. 201- 287222
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 29 March 1916 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of OJEDA Camaraza, Eduardo (201-282123).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3
SURNAME: MILIAN, GIVEN NAME: Angelina MIDDLE NAME: 201- No 201
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 25 December 1918 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Batabano
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of MILIAN Perez, Rogelio (201-291258).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: SOA Cobo, GIVEN NAME: Herminia MIDDLE NAME: 201- No 201
SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 127~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of CAMPO [illegible], [illegible] (201-[illegible])~~

5
SURNAME: PERDOMO Lopez, GIVEN NAME: Esther MIDDLE NAME: 201- No 201
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 26 September 1928 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Moron, Camaguey
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of SIERRA Montesino, Fidel ~~([illegible])~~
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

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		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	24

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1

SURNAME HERNANDEZ o'Fallon,	GIVEN NAME Zoe	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 2 November 1925	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Santiago de Cuba
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~):

Wife of HERNANDEZ, Giordano ~~([illegible], No 201-[illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME MARDONES Vivanco,	GIVEN NAME Marina	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 12 May 1914	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Havana
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of BLANCO Muniz, Jose Lauro ~~([illegible] No 201-[illegible]~~).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

3

SURNAME MACIAS de Borras,	GIVEN NAME Ondina	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 28 May 1921	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3249 NW 3rd St. ~~Miami, Florida~~

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 131~~:

Widow of BORRAS Gutierrez, Jose (201-301745).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4

SURNAME FRANCO,	GIVEN NAME Ana	MIDDLE NAME Rosa	201- [illegible]
SEX F	DATE OF BIRTH 26 June 1928	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Oriente
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE 3363 Andrita St. Los Angeles, Calif.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. 132~~:

Wife of FRANCO Mira, Jose (201-300027).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5

SURNAME GARCIA,	GIVEN NAME Miguel	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH 31 October 1919	COUNTRY OF BIRTH Cuba	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH Cardenas
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~[illegible] Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~[illegible] for payment on behalf of GARCIA [illegible], Manuel de Jesus~~
~~(201-[illegible])~~

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201. if number needed.

1
SURNAME: VALDES, GIVEN NAME: Rosa MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 6 May 1934 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~ANNEX Dependency Payment Case No. 134~~:

Wife of SANTIAGO Villa, Armando (201-297837).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2
SURNAME: GARRIDO, GIVEN NAME: Manuel MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE: 437 SW 7th St. Apt 2
Miami, Florida
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~ANNEX Dependency Payment Case No. 185~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible], Pedro H.~~.
(~~201-345157~~)

3
SURNAME: VASALLO, GIVEN NAME: Esther MIDDLE NAME: Rita 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 18 September 1930 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~ANNEX Dependency Payment No. 130~~:

Wife of MONTERO Duque, Ricardo (201-293321).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

4
SURNAME: RODRIGUEZ, GIVEN NAME: Caridad MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: F DATE OF BIRTH: 6 September 1907 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Havana
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~ANNEX Dependency Payment Case No. 137~~:

Mother of GARCIA-RUBIO Rodriguez, Rafael E. (201-281930).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

5
SURNAME: DIAZ Rivero, GIVEN NAME: Tulio MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 14 August 1907 COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Cuba CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: Pinar del Rio
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: Attorney RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): Doctor
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~ANNEX Dependency Payment Case No. 138~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of MORALES Diaz, Santiago~~.
(~~201-[illegible]~~)

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		SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	26

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME	201-
FERNANDEZ Maseda, Consuelo	[illegible]

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F	22 June 1930	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): AKA (Mrs) Consuelo FERNANDEZ de Villaverde

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

Wife of VILLAVERDE Lamadriz, Jorge S. (201-Not available).
~~Receives a monthly dependent payment for this case~~.

2

SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME	201-
RAMOS Pineyro, Reinaldo	[illegible]

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	1 November 1940	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of [illegible]~~.
(~~201-[illegible]~~)

3

SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME	201-
FERNANDEZ Blanco, Orlando	[illegible]

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	28 June 1936	Cuba	Havana

CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. [illegible]~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge~~
~~(201-278754)~~

4

SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME	201-
SANTOVENIA, Raul	[illegible]

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
M	1 November 1907	Cuba	Cardenas

CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE: 5307 Park Abe, B4
West New York, N. J.

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 143~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of KIM Yum, Jorge (201-[illegible])~~.

5

SURNAME / GIVEN NAME / MIDDLE NAME	201-
ESPINOSA, Hilda	[illegible]

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
F		Cuba	Manzanillo

CITIZENSHIP:
OCCUPATION:
RESIDENCE:

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~AMBUD Dependency Payment Case No. 144~~:

~~Trustee for payment on behalf of VEGA Perez, Adriano J~~.
~~(201-[illegible])~~

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		SECRET	XX☐ CONTINUED	27

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1

SURNAME RAMOS Alonso,	GIVEN NAME Antonio	MIDDLE NAME L.	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIP Dependent Payment Case No. 51 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to Maria ALONSO, trustee for the widow, [illegible] FERNANDEZ~~.

2

SURNAME GEIM Gutierrez,	GIVEN NAME Guillermo	MIDDLE NAME E.	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

AKA GEIN

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIP Dependent Payment Case No. 90 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Herminia [illegible]~~.

3

SURNAME RODRIGUEZ Navarrete,	GIVEN NAME Nemesio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

RODRIGUEZ Acosta, Namesio; aka Juan Carlos

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIP Dependent Payment Case No. 95 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Modesta ACOSTA Llano~~.

4

SURNAME RAMIREZ Ruiz,	GIVEN NAME Porfirio	MIDDLE NAME Remberto	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIP Dependent Payment Case No. 96 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Clara [illegible] Caraballoso~~.

5

SURNAME CASTELLES,	GIVEN NAME Julio	MIDDLE NAME	201- [illegible]
SEX M	DATE OF BIRTH	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
CITIZENSHIP	OCCUPATION		RESIDENCE

OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN)

AKA CASTELLES Amigo, Julio

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

~~Subject is the deceased Principal of AMHIP Dependent Payment Case No. 99 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to DIAZ Gonzalez, Rene, trustee for the widow, Magdalena Rodriguez~~.

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 28

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1 ✓
SURNAME: MENDEZ Perez, GIVEN NAME: Luis O. MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 99 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to DIAZ Gonzalez, Rene, trustee for the widow, Estela~~ Moon.

2 ✓
SURNAME: FUNDORA Fernandez, GIVEN NAME: Jorge MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 104 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, Silvia [illegible] Gonzalez~~.

3 ✓
SURNAME: BAEZ, GIVEN NAME: Juventino, Jr. MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): (son of BAEZ Rodriguez, ~~Juventino~~ Juventino)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 105 for which a monthly payment is made to the mother, Flora MAS Machado~~.

4 ✓
SURNAME: LE SANTE, GIVEN NAME: William MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): (AKA) LE SANTE Nacer, William
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 106 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, [illegible] PEREZ Marrero~~.

✓ 5
SURNAME: YEBRA Suarez, GIVEN NAME: Julio MIDDLE NAME: Antonio 201- [illegible]
SEX: DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: ~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 116 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the mother, Isabel [illegible]~~.

FORM 10-68 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	☒ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 29

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH INDEXING INFORMATION	CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T	UFGA-27514

INSTRUCTIONS: Insert "ASSIGN" after 201- if number needed.

1
SURNAME: CARRERAS Zayas, GIVEN NAME: Jesus MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN): (Major) (Comandante)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~Subject is the deceased Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 111 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the widow, [illegible] [illegible] Tous~~.

2
SURNAME: SIERRA Montesino, GIVEN NAME: Fidel MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~imprisoned~~
~~Subject is the~~ ~~Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 134 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife~~,

3
SURNAME: HERNANDEZ Fraile, GIVEN NAME: Giordano MIDDLE NAME: 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 130 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife, Zoe [illegible] [illegible]~~.

4
SURNAME: BLANCO Muniz, GIVEN NAME: Jose MIDDLE NAME: Lauro 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 13[illegible] for which a monthly dependent is made to the wife, Marina [illegible]~~.

5
SURNAME: VILLAVERDE Lamadriz, GIVEN NAME: Jorge MIDDLE NAME: S. 201- [illegible]
SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH:
CITIZENSHIP: OCCUPATION: RESIDENCE:
OTHER NAMES - STATE TYPE (AKA, ALIAS, MAIDEN):
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
~~Subject is the imprisoned (in Cuba) Principal of [illegible] Dependent Payment Case No. 130 for which a monthly dependent payment is made to the wife, Consuelo [illegible] Masada~~,

FORM 10-63 53d	OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
		S E C R E T	☐ CONTINUED	30

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Managua

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD
Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
MAY 12 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: HNMA 3798, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His MOC provided payment of his $400 monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in 1962 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 28 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT/

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
B-201-267437	HNMW 1985	27 APR 1967
B-201-281397	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-267437 201-281397

24 April 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/COG/CICS	N. Gratz	lic	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DC/WH/COG		Mr. Williamson
C/WH/COG/MO		Mr. Ortman

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		Thomas

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HNMW 1935

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

FORM 5-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero and Martyr Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: UFGW-6440, 8 March 1967

1. A review of Station and AMTIKI files confirms a total lack of legal documentation for the Hero and Martyr cases as anticipated by Headquarters in Reference. A report prepared by AMTIKI-1, which is forwarded herewith, describes the content of his files for these cases and includes a copy, where available, of the authorization upon which payment is based.

2. Although the review of Station records for legal documents was unproductive, the following background data was noted as of possible interest to Headquarters in the processing of these problem cases:

a. Children included as dependents:

Case #95:	one child (in U.S.A.)	Total monthly payment	$25.00
" #97:	two children	" " "	250.00
" #98:	one child	" " "	100.00
" #101:	one child	" " "	100.00
" #102:	one child	" " "	175.00
" #103:	two children	" " "	175.00
" #106:	two children	" " "	175.00
" #107:	two children	" " "	175.00
" #109:	one child	" " "	175.00
" #111:	one child	" " "	100.00
" #128:	one child	" " "	100.00
" #129:	one child	" " "	150.00
" #130:	one child	" " "	165.00

b. Cases Involving Trustees:

The only instance of a trustee is Case #99 for which AMOT-186 (201-726322) receives a monthly payment of $66.00 for the widows of Luis MENDEZ and Julio CASIELLES, both of whom are in Cuba. The turstee is not a full-time AMOT and has his own business interests locally. JMWAVE records

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Attachment:
AMTIKI Report
Distribution:
3-WH/COG w/att. h/w

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
21 April '67

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 26 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27425

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

19-124-25/6

indicate that this situation developed from a prior event in Cuba and that several of the Hero and Martyr cases are connected by the personalities involved. UFGA-8317, 1 April 1963, describes four of the several individuals who were involved with AMLEMON-1 in a sabotage attempt against the Cuban Electric Company on 30 November 1960. The four, all former employees of the Electric Company, were captured while attempting to escape from Cuba in a small boat following the sabotage:

William LE SANTE
Luis MENDEZ
Julio CASIELLES Amigo
Armando RODRIGUEZ Vizcaino

LE SANTE is the Subject of Case #106 (Hero and Martyr) who was executed as a result of his participation in the sabotage attempt. MENDEZ and CASIELLES, the Subjects of Case #99, were also executed on the same charges. RODRIGUEZ was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment which is being served in the Isle of Pinos Prison.

The Trustee describes himself, in the HEW Survey form, as a former employee of the Cuban Electric Company and a friend of the Subjects of Case #99. He is mentioned in a 26 September 1962 AMOT report (AA-812; UFG-01672, 12 Oct. '62) as residing in Miami where he received letters, containing information, from source Martha RAMOS Castro in Havana. Traces show RAMOS to be the wife of Armando RODRIGUEZ and the sister-in-law of the widow of Julio CASIELLES. The trustee stated in the HEW Survey form that one year previously he forwarded the accumulated funds and started sending $33.00 each month to RAMOS in Chicago, per instructions by the CASIELLES widow, and that in May 1965 he stopped sending the $33.00 payment for the MENDEZ widow to Cuba and started holding it for her. He claimed to have $165.00 on hand at time of the Survey. It is noted that JMWAVE records contain no mention of payment on behalf of Armando RODRIGUEZ. The payments on behalf of LE SANTE, MENDEZ, and CASIELLES appear to be based upon letters from the COMANDO ELECTRICO DE LIBERACION which are included with the AMTIKI attachment.

In view of the Case #99 widows being in Cuba, and the failure of the trustee to provide the exact date-of-birth for the widows in his 9 December 1966 reply to AMTIKI (UFGA-26626, 15 December 1966), it is not believed that he would have the needed documents. We are, however, through AMTIKI-1 requesting the trustee to provide an explanation of his handling of the payments for both widows, and, via his means of communication with them, to obtain the required documentation.

c. Legality of marriages:

None of the widows/wives who provided information for the HEW Survey described their status as anything but wife or widow. The PHS form for the Subject of Case #97 provides date of marriage as 19 March 1954.

d. Operational Relationship with Subject:

Case #95: No record of use by WOFACT. Traces reflect membership MDM and/or MRR in Cuba. Tried on 19 April 1961 for crime against the Powers of the State and possession explosives and inflammable materials. (UFGA-4162, page 464, 29 May 1962)

Case #96: 201-248158. POA granted 17 March 1961. No record of actual use by WOFACT. UR (or MRR) leader tried and convicted with Subject Case #95 above. Executed 20 April 1961.

Case #97: 201-283995. (AMTRIGON-8) POA granted 13 February 1962 for use as seaman on WOFACT vessel. On 11 August 1962 presumed dead and dependent payment of $250.00 month via Hero Martyr fund approved by COS. (Note: Subject on own volition infiltrated Cuba with a team which was being landed by Subject's vessel).

Case #98: No record of use by WOFACT. Appears to have been a member of MRR who was executed in 1961.

Case #99: No record of use by WOFACT. See Paragraph 3.b. above.

Case #100/101: POA granted 16 August 1960, apparently to Havana Station. Nothing further to indicate use of Subject.

Case #102: POA granted 23 September 1960, for PM Cadre. Executed 7 March 1961. No further information available.

Case #103: No record of use by WOFACT. MRR leader executed October 1961. One of three cases for which ARTIME requested WOFACT assume monthly payments (UFGA-26878, Para 3. 1 February 1967).

Case #104: 201-286541. Brigade member killed in action. Although widow receives "Brigade" payment (Case #59), Case #104 provides payment for mother as a Hero and Martyr case.

Case #105: There is no record of an operational use or interest in the Subject of this case. According to JMWAVE records, his death in Cuba resulted from assistance provided to his father, a former Cuban Airlines Pilot. See letter #12 in AMTIKI attachment.

Case #106: No record of use by WOFACT. See paragraph 3.b. above.

Case #107/108: 201-279298. POA requested May 1960. No record in JMWAVE files of actual use by WOFACT.

Case #109: 201-283865. (AMPANIC-13) POA granted 16 September 1960. WOFACT asset captured during airdrop and executed on 20 April 1961.

Case #110: No record of use by WOFACT. Member of RESCATE who executed 18 January 1961 per WAVE 3074. (Document not available at JMWAVE.)

Case #111: No record of use by WOFACT. Subject was an associate of William Morgan. Executed same day as Morgan, 11 March 1961.

Case #128: No record of use by WOFACT. In HEW survey form widow stated that in 1959 Subject was sentenced to nine years imprisonment which was being served in Isle of Pines Prison.

Case #129: No record of use by WOFACT. Arrested 30 June 1960 with Subject of Case #107/108. Serving 30 years sentence in Isle of Pines Prison. Wife of Subject is listed as LNREAD Source SD 15622 per master list dated 18 April 1966.

Case #130: No record of use by WOFACT. An executive member of Organization AUTENTICA 1960-1963.

3. For Headquarters information, steps are being taken through the AMTIKI facility to obtain the required documentation wherever possible.

Barton J Celinga

Mark F. EFFIELD

March 20, 1967

SUBJECT: Review of Certain Hero and Martyr Case Files

The "Heroes and Martyrs" cases were not considered under the same regulations as the dependents of the invaders of the Bay of Pigs. The persons supposed to receive payment were designated, in some cases by "the Department" and in other cases by the C.R.C. through its executives. There are cases in which a written memorandum was given to us but there are others in which no memorandum was given. We were instructed to pay no more than $175.00 monthly to each, and as it can be seen, many cases are receiving lower amounts and never the amount of dependents was taking in consideration. There is only one case receiving a higher amount, Mrs. Hilda R. Carballo (widow of Jesus Delgado), who receives $250.00 because we were specially instructed to pay this amount.

In regards to documents, the files are very poor, and they mostly have only letters informing changes of address.

1) MODESTA ACOSTA (Case #95) $ 25.00
   Widow of Nemesio Rodriguez
   No documents - only letters

2) ROSA M. CABRERA (Case #96) $ 175.00
   Widow of Sori Marin
   Memorandum from Dr. Miro instructing to pay her $175.00. No other document but letters.

3) HILDA R. CARBALLO (Case No. 97) $ 250.00
   Widow of Jesus Delgado
   No documents - only letters

4) CLARA DELGADO (Case #98 $ 100.00
   Widow of Porfirio Ramirez
   No documents - only letters

5) RENE L. DIAZ (Case #99 $ 66.00
   Only case of Trustee. Receiving payment for Luis O. Mendez and Julio Caselle's relatives. There is a letter to Dr. Miro from "Comando Electrico de Liberacion" asking for the assistance to the widows and letter designating Rene L. Diaz as trustee.
   No other document but letters.

6) MARIA DE LAS MERCEDES EIREA (Case #100/101 $ 50.00
   Mother of Anastasio Rojas
   Memorandum from Dr. Miro instructing to pay her $50.00 monthly. No other document but letters.

Att. 1 UFGA-27725 CS COPY 19-124-25/6

7)	LILIA FERNANDEZ	(Case # 102)	Widow of Rolando Tamargo No document.	$ 175.00
8)	SILVIA HEREDIA	(Case #103)	Widow of Jorge Fundora No document but letters.	$ 175.00
9)	ZOE HERNANDEZ	(Case #129)	Wife of Giordano Hernandez No document but letters.	$ 150.00
10)	LUCIA LEON	(Case #104)	Mother of Vicente Leon (dead) Memorandum from Luis Botifoll ("Rescate") No other document but letters	$ 150.00
11)	MARINA MARDONES	(Case #130)	Wife of Lauro Blanco Memorandum from Dr. Varona ("Rescate) No other document but letters.	$ 165.00
12)	FLORA MAS	(Case #105)	Mother of Juventino Baez Memorandum from Jose Sosa ("Rescate") No other document but letters.	$ 175.00
13)	FRANCISCA PALMER	(Case #101)	Widow of Anastasio Rojas No document but letters	$ 100.00
14)	ESTHER PERDOMO	(Case #128)	Wife of Fidel Sierra No document but letters	$ 100.00
15)	RITA PEREZ	(Case #106)	Letter to Dr. Miro from Jesus Fernandez asking for the assistance. No other document but letters.	$ 175.00
16)	AMPARO POSADA	(Case #107)	Widow of Plinio Prieto No documents but letters	$ 175.00
17)	JUANA RODRIGUEZ	(Case #109)	Widow of Armando Escoto No document but letters.	$ 175.00
18)	MARIA C. RUIZ	(Case #108)	Mother of Plinio Prieto Memorandum from Jose Sosa No other document but letters.	$ 150.00
19)	ISABEL M. SUAREZ	(Case #110)	Mother of Julio A. Yebras No Memorandum - Only letters.	$ 175.00

20) TERESA SUAREZ (Case #111) $ 100.00
Widow of Jesus Carreras
No memorandum - Only letters

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
ONLY DESK	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Adjustment of Dependent Payments Third Quarter FY 1967

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966
B. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. Adjustments during the third quarter FY 1967 of AMBUD monthly dependency payments are reported herewith in accordance with the Headquarters request received under Reference A, paragraph 3:

Case #28: MILIAN Velasco, Jose (201-290836)
Payee: PARDO, Mirna (widow)

Effective with the February 1967 payment, the amount of the monthly payment was reduced from $325.00 to $300.00 because of the death of the mother, Isabel VELASCO.

2. The report covering the adjustments which were effective with the January 1967 payment, forwarded under Reference B, included certain cases for which the monthly payment was being temporarily withheld pending reply from the payee. For Headquarters information, payment has been reinstated (on a retroactive basis) for the following of those cases:

Case #63: GALVEZ Lopez, Mario (201-297112)
Payee: MARTINEZ, Elsa (widow)

Case #71: TAMAYO Compans, Ramon (201-297954)
Payee: FERNANDEZ, Amada (trustee)

Case #75: NORDA Roque, Pedro (201-298859)
Payee: ROQUE, Margarita (mother)

3. The following information concerning Case No. #141 is included herewith to ensure that the data is available to Headquarters:

Case #141: MESTRE Marcoleta, Ernesto (201-not available)

Payment for this case was terminated effective with the December 1966 payment. Action resulted from Subject's release from prison and returned to his family in Miami.

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
20 April '67

DATE DISPATCHED
APR 26 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27424

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

19-124-25/6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-27424

4. Notification of the following changes in Payees is also forwarded for the amendment of Headquarters records:

Case #29 ALEMAN Aleman, Eufracio (201-290479)

Payment transferred from the trustee to the mother Laureana C. ALEMAN Diaz, who resides at 2450 N.W. 31st Street, Miami, Florida.

Case #46: HERNANDEZ Cosio, Ernesto (201-292741)

Payment transferred from the trustee to the parents who now reside at Avenida Munoz Morin 57 altos, Humacao, Puerto Rico.

Case #51: RAMOS Alonso, Antonio (201-not available)

Payment is made to Maria ALONSO, sister of the widow, in accordance with written instructions from the widow.

Burton J Celauza
for Mark F. EFFIELD

SECRET

Chief of Station, Managua X

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

TYPIC/AMBIDDY/AMBUD
Support for Dependents of Operational Personnel

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: HNMA 3793, dated 28 March 1967

1. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation, AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JMWAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 had been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarized below for Station Managua information.

(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under contract. His MOC provided payment of his $400 monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in 1962 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 23 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.

CONT/

HNMW 1985

SECRET

19-124-25/6
201-267437
201-281397

24 April 1967 WH/COG/CICS N. Gratze ljc 7447

Distribution:
- 1 - RID
- 1 - WH/REG/C
- 1 - WH/COG/MO
- 1 - Originator

DC/WH/COG Mr. Williamson

C/WH/COG/MO Mr. Ortman

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

(IDEN B) Although IDEN C, the husband of IDEN B, was never directly employed by WOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per month as a dependent HEROES/MARTYRS widow under the AMBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JMWAVE/AMBUD cover mechanism. Presumably AMBIDDY/1 is unaware that this dependent has been receiving regular AMBUD assistance in addition to the $125 per month received from AMWORLD funds.

(IDEN D) AMBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEN D's husband prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year prison sentence. With this information traces were run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever been a WOFACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDEN B.

2. Although reference indicates the discussion between James D. ZABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conversation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whom, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 was the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed discussion with GROWERY.

3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Headquarters to take any action to provide support to these individuals.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS, Managua
1 - COS, JMWAVE

11P WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Concerning Dependent Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967
ACTION REQUIRED: As stated in paragraph three

1. Biographic data concerning the parents of Subject (201-298852) has been received from the trustee, Raul SANTOVENIA, and is forwarded herewith as Attachment A.

2. A review has been made of JMWAVE, AMTIKI, and AMOT files concerning continued justification for the payment of $225.00 per month to the trustee on behalf of the parents in Cuba. Significant points resulting from the review are as follows:

a. Subject was executed for a prior crime in Cuba and not because of participation at the Bay of Pigs. (Murder of a Cuban soldier during escape from Cuba in March 1960). See "Bohemia" clipping forwarded herewith as Attachment B.

b. The father of Subject, Pedro KIM, is probably identical to one Pedro KIM who is alleged by AMTIKI-1 to be an active communist in Cuba. A Pedro KIM is also described as an active communist in the following reports: DCE-15460, 16 August 1962; DCE-15946, 26 October 1962.

c. Although it appears that the trustee has efficiently handled the funds forwarded to him ($12,602.00 in bank account as of December 1965), there is no evidence that any form of assistance has been provided to the dependents in Cuba.

3. In view of the background of this case, as described in paragraph 3 above, it is recommended that all payments for this case be terminated.

MICROFILMED
APR 12 1967
DOC MICRO. SER.

Burton J. Celenza
for
Mark F. EFFIELD

19-124-25/6

Attachments:
1 - Letter
1 - Clipping

CS COPY

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/1 copy ~~1 w/each~~ Att. "A" & "B"

B. 201-298852

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 Mar 67	APR 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27303

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-298852

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

2 att.

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

Subjects – [illegible] 28 [illegible]
[illegible]
2 years following [illegible]
[illegible] 30 [illegible] 196[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
28 June 1963.

Estimado Jim,

Adjunto te envio el Memorandum sobre los tres casos de que te hable hoy personalmente.

MANUEL GUILLOT [illegible]: Este señor es el padre de Manuel Guillot Castellanos, fundador del Movimiento, que trabajo para el MRR y para la "Compañia" durante los años de [illegible] hasta el 30 de Agosto de 1962, en que fue fusilado por la tiranía roja en Cuba. Fue torturado y murio sin decir el nombre de los contactos del Clandestinaje Cubano que el conocia. Fue infiltrado en Cuba por la "Compañia" varias veces [illegible] su ultimo viaje en que fue fusilado.

Virginia CASTELLANOS Viuda de Guillot

Don Manuel Guillot padre tiene [illegible] años de edad, [illegible] paralitico y solo se mueve con aparatos ortopedicos. Este pobre viejo [illegible] y su mujer es invalida. Nosotros le estabamos pasando 150.00 mensuales [illegible] forma en que este hombre pueda hacer otro trabajo que el que hacia de oficinista. [illegible] a tres operaciones quirurgicas y el medico dice que necesita una mas.

SILVIA HEREDIA: es la viuda de Jorge Fundora, el que descubrio el punto de entrada de la mayor parte de armas y "Teams de Infiltracion" que fueron a Cuba antes y despues de Bahia de Cochinos. Esta pobre mujer esta sola en el mundo con dos hijos. Ella esta recibiendo tratamiento Psiquiatrico. El MRR le paga 125 dolares mensuales. Ella no puede abandonar su casa con los dos hijos para ir a trabajar. Su esposo fue fusilado el 12 de Octubre de [illegible] y murio sin decir el punto por donde entraban las armas y los hombres de la "Compañia" en Cuba.

ROSA BARAÑAS: es la esposa de Francisco Echevarria [illegible], condenado hace [illegible] años a 30 años de Presidio por los esbirros rojos. Esta mujer [illegible] puede [illegible] en su casa para mantenerse ella y los dos niños que tiene. No le es suficiente y el MRR le paga [illegible] dolares mensuales. Este hombre (su esposo) trabajo intensamente con la gente de Fundora, transportando las armas que la "Compañia" metia en Cuba.

En todos estos casos, que son desesperados, el MRR ha [illegible] hasta los tratamientos medicos.

DR. MANUEL F. ARTIME

Para la mayor tranquilidad de los hombres que [illegible] o trabajan [illegible] la "Compania", seria conveniente que esta gente no pasaran hambre y miserias [illegible] que han [illegible] sus parientes muertos o presos, hombres que han servido lealmente a la COMPAÑIA y [illegible] dado ejemplo de valor y de abnegacion, bien distinto de los "heroes" de hoy que van a la Television cubana cuando son capturados para hablar mal de la causa anti-comunista, de los EEUU y de su "COMPAÑIA".

Es lo unico que me preocupa de la nueva situacion creada a partir de Enero de 1967.

Attes. vuestro amigo de siempre:

Manuel F. Artime Buesa

1)

Silvia Herrera — Now under psychiatric treatment
Born: 11 Jan 1934
Res: 180 SE 14 Terrace
Miami Fla.

Children Eduardo Age 8
Raquel " 6

2) Manuel Guillot — wife Virginia Castellanos
Born 22 Dec 1905 Born 24 Jan 1892
Res: 3488 N.W. 3rd St. ~~2H~~
Miami Fla.

3) Rosa Robosa
Born 3 Dec 1925
Res 1152½ SW 10th St Apt 1
Miami Fla

Children:
Francisco - Age 18
Alfonso " 12
Manuel " 6
Jose Antonio " 4

ORIG: N.GRATZ/yb
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 13 MARCH 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

N. Gratz

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INFO: FILE , VR OLC, OGC, C/OA

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SECRET 13 21 29Z CITE DIRECTOR 82869

JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: A. JMWAVE 5984 (IN 19287)

2. UFGA 27117

AFTER REVIEWING TEXT REF A LETTER HQS RECOMMENDS AMTIKI ANSWER LETTER ALONG LINES PROPOSED PARA 5 REF B, WITH SUGGESTION WIDOW MAY BE ELIGIBLE HEW ASSISTANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/COG/MO
OLC C. E. Pople
COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

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CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-1
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INFO FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/SPG, CA, ESEC, PB

S E C R E T 102343Z CITE JMWAVE 5984

ACTION

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

1 MAR 67 IN 19287

REFERENCES: A. UFGA 27117
B. DIRECTOR 82133

NG

C62

1. PARA ONE REF A ASSUMPTION CORRECT PER SERVICE MSG SENT 3 MARCH.

2. TEXT OF LETTER REQUESTED BY REF B AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR AVANT: YOU WILL PLEASE ALLOW ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THE CASE OF ALFREDO AND JUANA CERVANTES, OF 1071 N.W. 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, WHO DIED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE FACTS IN REGARD TO CASE BUT AM WRITING YOU IN THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN FURNISH ME WITH THEM AND POSSIBLY BE OF HELP TO MR. AND MRS. CERVANTES.

"APPARENTLY THE WIDOW OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, ROSA MARIA FREYRE, RECEIVED SOME TYPE OF PENSION AS A RESULT OF HER HUSBAND'S DEATH UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SHE REMARRIED IN AUGUST 1965. THE CERVANTES, DUE TO THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION

SECRET

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 5984 SECRET

AND POOR HEALTH (MR. CERVANTES IS ILL WITH A CHRONIC HEART CONDITION AND IS UNABLE TO WORK AND MRS. CERVANTES IS UNABLE TO LEAVE HIM ALONE IN ORDER TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT, SINCE THE DAUGHTER-IN-LAW NO LONGER LIVES WITH THEM.) THEY ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE ENTITLED TO SOME BENEFITS NOW AS DEPENDENT PARENTS OF THE DECEASED SON IN VIEW OF THE WIDOW'S REMARRIAGE. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF PENSION THE WIDOW WAS RECEIVING BUT UNDERSTAND THE PENSION CHECKS SHE DID RECEIVE WERE SIGNED BY YOU.

"I WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING FROM YOU IN REGARD TO THIS MATTER AND WOULD THANK YOU FOR EVERY CONSIDERATION YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE TO THIS DESERVING FAMILY. SIGNATURE: CLAUDE PEPPER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS."

3. RE PARA TWO REFERENCE, WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT ONLY MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER INVOLVED THIS REQUEST. DECEASED WIDOW (NOW REMARRIED) AND HER FAMILY HAVE NOT AT ANY TIME ~~REASED~~ RAISED ANY OBJECTION OR MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT WIDOW AND CHILDS CASE.

SECRET

BT

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: R-9008
DATE: 10 MARCH 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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BY 7 PER #

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☑ RID COPY

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☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-292730
RS 19-124-23/8 FC

INFO: FILE, VR RI/AN OLC PPB DDP ADDP C/DCS C/OA FI FI/SPG

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 10 1441 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 82133

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UGFA 27117

1. ASSUME MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER RECEIVING ASSISTANCE FROM SON IGNACIO (CERVANTES) LAGO, NOT FOR SON AS STATED PARA 4 REF SINCE ONLY DAUGHTER BORN 25 AUG 60 TO DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER AND ROSA MARIA FREYRE PRESENTLY RECEIVING AMBUD ASSISTANCE.

2. LETTER LISTED AS ATTACHMENT NOT RECEIVED WITH DISPATCH. IN VIEW PROMINENCE FAMILIES CONCERNED REQUEST CABLED TEXT LETTER FOR HQS GUIDANCE PRIOR ANY REPLY TO REP. PEPPER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/MO

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 19-124-25/
X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-292730
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 19

SECRET

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ACTION
WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

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INFO
FILE, VR, DDP, ADDP, C/OPS, C/OA, FI, FI/SPG, OLC, PPB,

AN
FS
ABSTRACT

S E C R E T 102343Z CITE JMWAVE 5984

WAVE

11 MAR 67 IN 19287

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REFERENCES: A. UFGA 27117

B. DIRECTOR 82133

JP

MICROFILMED
MAR 20 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. PARA ONE REF A ASSUMPTION CORRECT PER SERVICE MSG SENT 3 MARCH.

2. TEXT OF LETTER REQUESTED BY REF B AS FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR AVANT: YOU WILL PLEASE ALLOW ME TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THE CASE OF ALFREDO AND JUANA CERVANTES, OF 1071 N.W. 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, WHO DIED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. I DO NOT HAVE ALL THE FACTS IN REGARD TO CASE BUT AM WRITING YOU IN THE HOPE THAT YOU CAN FURNISH ME WITH THEM AND POSSIBLY BE OF HELP TO MR. AND MRS. CERVANTES.

"APPARENTLY THE WIDOW OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO, ROSA MARIA FREYRE, RECEIVED SOME TYPE OF PENSION AS A RESULT OF HER HUSBAND'S DEATH UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SHE REMARRIED IN AUGUST 1965. THE CERVANTES, DUE TO THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION

SECRET

201-292730

19-124-25/6
11 March 1967

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 5954 S E C R E T

AND POOR HEALTH (MR. CERVANTES IS ILL WITH A CHRONIC HEART CONDITION AND IS UNABLE TO WORK AND MRS. CERVANTES IS UNABLE TO LEAVE HIM ALONE IN ORDER TO SEE~~K EMPL~~OYMENT, SINCE THE DAUGHTER-IN-LAW NO LONGER LIVES WITH THEM.) THEY ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT BE ENTITLED TO SOME BENEFITS NOW AS DEPENDENT PARENTS OF THE DECEASED SON IN VIEW OF THE WIDOW'S REMARRIAGE. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT TYPE OF PENSION THE WIDOW WAS RECEIVING BUT UNDERSTAND THE PENSION CHECKS SHE DID RECEIVE WERE SIGNED BY YOU.

MAR 14 2 27 PM '67

"I WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING FROM YOU IN REGARD TO THIS MATTER AND WOULD THANK YOU FOR EVERY CONSIDERATION YOU MIGHT BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE TO THIS DESERVING FAMILY. SIGNATURE: CLAUDE PEPPER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS."

3. RE PARA TWO REFERENCE. WISH MAKE CLEAR THAT ONLY MOTHER OF DECEASED BRIGADE MEMBER INVOLVED THIS REQUEST. DECEASED WIDOW (NOW REMARRIED) AND HER FAMILY HAVE NOT AT ANY TIME ~~REASED~~ RAISED ANY OBJECTION OR MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING SETTLEMENT WIDOW AND CHILDS CASE.

S E C R E T

BT

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- UFGW - 6440

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 8 MARCH 1967

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION ON AMBUD
DEPENDENCY CASES

ACTION - SEE PARAGRAPH 2

REFS - UFGA - 26995 DATED 15 FEBRU UARY 1967

1. A REVIEW OF THE SAMPLE HEROES/MARTYRS FILES NO. 100-130 FORWARDED IN REFERENCE INDICATES A SERIOUS LACK OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS SUCH AS MARRIAGE AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES, POWERS OF ATTORNEY, ETC., WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH LEGALITY OF DEPENDENTS' SUPPORT CLAIMS.

2. IN VIEW OF THE GOOD POSSIBILITY HEADQUARTERS WILL BE ABLE TO TRANSFER ALL, OR A LARGE PART, OF THESE SURVIROR BENEFIT PAYMENTS TO BEC, IT IS REQUESTED THAT AMTIKI REVIEW ALL CASE FILES PERTAINING TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HEROES/MARTYRS GROUP WHOSE DEPENDENTS ARE PRESENTLY RECEIVING MONTHLY SUPPORT PAYMENTS. IN THE EVENT THE FILES DO NOT CONTAIN THE REQUIRED TYPE OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS, AMTIKI SHOULD REQUEST COPIES OF ALL SUCH AVAILABLE DOCUMENTS FROM THE DEPENDENTS. SINCE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING MARRIAGE, BIRTHS AND BAPTISMS ARE CUSTOMARILY CHERISHED AND RETAINED BY FAMILIES, THERE APPEARS TO BE AN EXCELLENT CHANCE THAT THEY CAN BE OBTAINED. IT IS PROBABLE THAT A SIMILAR EXERCISE MAY HAVE TO BE PURSUED AT A LATER DATE TO OBTAIN

KH/Reg

CS COPY

[redacted]

19-124-25/6

DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO BRIGADE DEPENDENTS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE AMTIKI RECORDS PERTAINING TO THESE INDIVIDUALS APPEAR TO BE MORE COMPLETE, THE NEED TO COMPILE THE NECESSARY LEGAL DATA ON HEROES/MARTYRS DEPENDENTS IS CONSIDERED MORE URGENT AT THIS TIME.

3. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT AMTIKI NOT BE ADVISED OF THE BACKGROUND LEADING TO THIS REQUEST OR BE GIVEN ANY INDICATION THAT A TURNOVER TO ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS CONTEMPLATED.

4. PLEASE EXPEDITE AND ADVISE THE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION
3-COS, JMWAVE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Concerning Dependent Payment for Pedro REYES Bello (Case #135)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-26692, 10 January 1967
B. UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967
C. UFGA-26912, 6 February 1967

1. The Headquarters request for biographic data concerning Ana M. BELLO, mother and dependent of Subject, is completed with the forwarding of the attached letter which provides the complete date of birth: 4 March 1886.

2. For Headquarters information, JMWAVE will resume forwarding of the monthly payment to the trustee, Mr. Manuel GARRIDO (instead of to the dependent as reported in Reference C), in accordance with the request stated in attachment.

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment:
1 Letter

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/1 att. u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
21 Feb 67

DATE DISPATCHED
[illegible] 7 [illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27040

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-285157

SECRET

6 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Benefits and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT: Samples of 2506 Brigade Working Files

1. Following the 10 February meeting in your office with the Director of BEC, Station Miami was requested to send a representative group of files concerning deceased, missing and imprisoned Cuban Brigade members and their dependents who are presently receiving monthly support payments.

2. Attached is one of the eight files received from Miami for your review. Since all the documents are in Spanish, a resume of those documents considered to be most important for establishing the legal relationship between the deceased and his dependents has been attached for your convenience.

3. An identical resume will be made of the documents in the remaining seven files in order that they may also be reviewed whenever it is convenient for you to schedule a meeting. We may logically assume that a certain number of the remaining files will be lacking some of the vital documents included in the attached file. If these documents are required to meet BEC criteria on an individual basis, they could be obtained in practically all cases from those dependents who reside in the United States.

4. The attached file is a rather impressive example of the type of documented proof we can submit for BEC scrutiny; perhaps we can avoid having to run the gauntlet on an individual basis.

Nancye Gratz
WH/COG

Attachment

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] attorney [illegible] limited [illegible] member [illegible] to the [illegible] giving the

[illegible] support [illegible] made

[illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible] that for [illegible] dated [illegible] enclosed [illegible] or two

[illegible]

[illegible]

Certificate of the [illegible] Dallas

Letter dated [illegible] covering [illegible] the CIA to receive the [illegible] residing in

(7) Letter dated [illegible] termination of [illegible] trusted

Letter from the [illegible] New York [illegible] by the [illegible] Trustee [illegible] to

Letter from the [illegible] was

[illegible] authority [illegible] Trustee [illegible]

Letter dated [illegible] Trustee [illegible] remits the [illegible] January 1967 [illegible] terminates [illegible] per month. [illegible] be receive

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[illegible] copies of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and reproductions of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the left hand side of the file [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] check [illegible], and names of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] payments were made.

2P

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27116

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6, 201-281397

DATE - 3 MARCH 1967

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

TO - CHIEF, WH

INFO - NONE

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS

ACTION - NONE

REF - UFGA-6398, 15 FEBRUARY 1967

MICROFILMED
MAR 7 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE, A DISCREET INVESTIGATION BY THE AMOTS TO DETERMINE THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE MOTHER OF MANUEL /GUILLOT/ CASTELLANOS /201-281397/ HAS BEEN COMPLETED. THE RESULTS OF A FURTHER, AND INDEPENDENT, CHECK AT THE CITED HOSPITAL BY AMBUD-3 ARE ALSO DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.

2. THE SOURCE OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS THE WIFE OF AMOT ASSET LITAMIL/14 -

MRS. VIRGINIA /CASTELLANOS/ DE GUILLOT, THE MOTHER OF MANUEL /GUILLOT/ CASTELLANOS, HAS SUFFERED FROM PARALYSIS SINCE PRIOR TO HER DEPARTURE FROM CUBA. SUBSEQUENT TO HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.A., THERE HAS BEEN SURGERY ON HER LEFT BREAST, BECAUSE OF A CANCER CONDITION, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN AN ACUTELY SWOLLEN LEFT ARM THAT IS NOW ALMOST PARALYSED. IN APPROXIMATELY FEBRUARY 1965, SHE EXPERIENCED A FALL WHICH RESULTED IN A FRACTURE OF THE FEMUR. ANOTHER FALL IN JANUARY 1967 DISTURBED THE PINSINSERTED IN THE FIRST OPERATION, AND ON 19 OR 20 JANUARY 1967 SHE UNDERWENT FURTHER SURGERY in the Pan-American Hospital for repair of ~~[illegible] WITH HER HUSBAND, [illegible] /GUILLOT/~~ THE DAMAGE. ~~[illegible]~~

Mrs. Guillot resides with her husband, Manuel /Guillot/

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-27116 PAGE 1

B-201-281397

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MONTES, AT 3488 N.W. 3RD STREET, MIAMI. TELEPHONE NO. 444-1373. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, WHO IS HELPING TO LOOK AFTER MRS. GUILLOT, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT ANY FUNDS RECEIVED BY THE COUPLE ARE 'DISSIPATED' BY THE HUSBAND UNLESS PROVIDED TO THE WIFE, WHICH SOURCE DOES WITH WHATEVER ASSISTANCE SHE IS ABLE TO ARRANGE. IT WAS FURTHER REPORTED THAT 'SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF DOLLARS' RECEIVED BY THE HUSBAND SEVERAL MONTHS AGO HAVE BEEN SPENT AND THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A MONTHLY PAYMENT FROM MANUEL /ARTIME/. THEY ARE PRESENTLY ATTEMPTING TO MOVE TO A LESS EXPENSIVE HOUSE WHERE THE RENT WOULD BE LOWER THAN THE $85.00 A MONTH NOW BEING PAID. THE AMOT REPORT CONCLUDED WITH A SOURCE COMMENT THAT THE PRESENT PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF MRS. GUILLOT IS 'QUITE CALAMITOUS.'

3. A CHECK BY AMBUD/3 WITH DR. CANO AT THE PAN-AMERICAN HOSPITAL RESULTED IN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CASE-

ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC RECORDS WERE AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE BREAST OPERATION, WHICH WAS A TOTAL RESECTION, DR. CANO CONFIRMED THE ORIGINAL BONE OPERATION AS SURGERY FOR A DOUBLE FRACTURE OF THE HIP. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THE RECENT SURGERY FOR RETIREMENT OF THE PINS WHICH HAD BEEN PLACED DURING THE FIRST OPERATION, AND DESCRIBED THE PATIENT'S CONDITION AS 'DELICATE' BUT NOT CRITICAL. REGARDING FINANCES, DR. CANO SAID THAT A PAN-AMERICAN HOSPITAL BILL FOR $599.70 FOR THE LAST ADMITTANCE REMAINS UNPAID.

MARK F. EFFIELD

DISTRIBUTION

C/WH/COG VIA TELEPOUCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT Operational/AMBUD/TYPIC
AMBUD Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: Para 2

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6351 (19 January 1967)

B. UFGA-26878 (31 January 1967)

1. Headquarters is in general agreement with JMWAVE recommendations concerning payments to Subjects of references. However, it is requested that a discreet investigation be conducted to determine the physical condition of the mother of Manuel GUILLOT Castellanos. Possibly the AMOTs could be used for this purpose.

2. Results of the investigation would be appreciated as soon as possible.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 1 - COS/JMWAVE

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6398

DATE
15 February 1967

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
201-281397

3P

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-27117

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6, 201-292730

DATE - 3 MARCH 1967

INDEXING - NO

MICROFILM - NO

MICROFILMED
MAR 8 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO - CHIEF, WH

INFO - NONE

FROM - COS, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/DEPENDENT PAYMENT ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO

ACTION - SEE PARA 5

REFS - NONE

1. A LETTER FROM U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDE PEPPER, DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1967 AND ADDRESSED TO THE AMTIKI FACILITY, IS CONCERNED WITH THE PARENTS OF ALFREDO CERVANTES LAGO /201-292730/, WHO IS THE PRINCIPAL OF DEPENDENT PAYMENT CASE NO. 44.

2. THE LETTER EXPRESSES CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE PARENTS, ALFREDO CERVANTES AND JUANA LAGO DE CERVANTES, WHO RESIDE AT 1071 NW 26TH TERRACE, MIAMI, AND REQUESTS THAT FACTS REGARDING THE CASE BE FORWARDED TO REP. PEPPER WHO WISHES TO BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO THEM. A SUMMARY OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE, WHICH AGREES IN GENERAL WITH JMWAVE RECORDS, IS INCLUDED IN THE LETTER AS A BASIS FOR THE PARENTS REQUEST THAT THEY RECEIVE BENEFITS AS DEPENDENTS OF THE DECEASED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PREVIOUS TERMINATION OF PAYMENT FOR THE REMARRIED WIDOW.

3. THE FOLLOWING DATA FROM AMTIKI AND STATION FILES IS FORWARDED AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR USE BY HEADQUARTERS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ACTION TO BE TAKEN CONCERNING THIS MATTER -

A. IN A DECLARATION SIGNED ON 26 JANUARY 1961, THE SUBJECT DESIGNATED ONLY HIS WIFE AND CHILD AS DEPENDENTS.

B. BECAUSE OF HER REMARRIAGE ON 21 AUGUST 1965, PAYMENT TO

GROUP 1
[illegible]

CS COPY

THE WIDOW WAS REDUCED, EFFECTIVE WITH THE NOVEMBER 1965 PAYMENT, TO PROVIDE FOR THE CHILD ONLY.

C. A LETTER FROM JUANO LAGO DE CERVANTES /MOTHER OF SUBJECT/, DATED 26 OCTOBER 1966 AND ADDRESSED TO THE AMTIKI FACILITY, STATED THAT THE FATHER WAS UNABLE TO WORK BECAUSE OF A BAD HEART AND EXPRESSED A REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF HER SON'S ''PENSION'' SINCE THE WIDOW NO LONGER RECEIVED IT BECAUSE OF HER CHANGE OF STATUS.

D. ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROUTINE PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING THIS TYPE OF REQUEST, MRS. CERVANTES WAS INFORMED BY AMTIKI-1, IN A LETTER DATED 31 OCTOBER 1966, THAT ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED RULES THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE IN THIS CASE.

E. THERE ARE NO IDENTIFIABLE JMWAVE TRACES ON THE MOTHER AND FATHER OF SUBJECT.

4. AN AMOT INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITH THE FOLLOWING RESULTS -

THE FATHER OF SUBJECT, ALFREDO CERVANTES, DIED ON 26 JANUARY 1967 FROM WHAT THE WIDOW DESCRIBES AS A BROKEN HEART BECAUSE HE FELT USELESS.

MR. CERVANTES WAS PREVIOUSLY EMPLOYED AS ''SUPERINTENDENT'' OF THE SACRED HEART COLLEGE, LOCATED NEAR COCONUT GROVE, MIAMI, BUT WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE HIS WORK WAS CONSIDERED UNSATISFACTORY. THE WIDOW IS NOW RESIDING WITH HER FATHER AT 2390 CORAL WAY, APT. NO. 1, MIAMI. SHE IS RECEIVING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR A [redacted] SON, IGNACIO CERVANTES LAGO, WHILE SEEKING EMPLOYMENT.

MRS. CERVANTES IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, BUT NOT FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY WHOM SHE FEELS WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF HER SON. SHE IS DESCRIBED AS A DECENT, EDUCATED, AND WELL-MANNERED PERSON WHO HAS APPARENTLY

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ADJUSTED TO THE WAY OF LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES.

5. IN REPLYING TO REP. PEPPER, WE PROPOSE HE BE INFORMED THAT, WITH REGRET, WE ARE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH HIS REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE REMAINING PARENT IN THIS CASE. IT WOULD BE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE HELD STRONGLY TO AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY WHICH, IN THIS CASE, DO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUED SUPPORT WHICH IS BEING FURNISHED FOR THE CHILD. FURTHER, THAT ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBLY COULD BE A NEEDY CASE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE GOVERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES UNDER WHICH THE MANY OTHER SIMILAR REQUESTS ARE CONSIDERED AND, THUS, DO NOT FEEL THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE AN EXCEPTION IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

MARK F. EFFIELD

ATTACHMENT 1 - LETTER

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C/WH VIA TELEPOUCH W/ATT HEREWITH

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
C Possible Release of Certain AMBUD Prisoners

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

For Your Information

A. UFGA 26880, 31 January 1967
B. UFGA 26912, 3 February 1967

1. Both Headquarters and AMTIKI files reflect Subject of para 2(k), reference B (prisoner #37 on reference A list) is indeed a prisoner, not deceased.

2. It is suggested that AMTIKI be requested to review the file for any indication Subject of para 2(a), reference B (prisoner #32 on reference A list) may actually be a prisoner, not deceased as reported.

3. Subject of para 3, reference B (prisoner #36 on reference A list) is a prisoner. Although he is officially listed as a GARCIA LINES crewman, he may also have been one of the Brigade personalities who served as an auxiliary crewman on one of the GARCIA LINES ships lost in the invasion. The dependents of these deceased and imprisoned crewmen are paid by the GARCIA LINES through a special WOFACT funding mechanism. This also applies to the AMBUD-3 case, Faustino MARTINEZ, who receives $300 per month as a permanent disability case. CELENZA will no doubt recall that during MARGANY's recent TDY to JMWAVE to review the AMBUD dependency cases, MARGANY advised that all GARCIA LINES dependents would be included in the proposed recommendations for future financing of AMBUD dependency payments. Both Subject of para 3, reference B, and Faustino MARTINEZ were included in the recently completed actuarial study to determine the total amount of money required to finance future dependency payments under a proposed trust fund mechanism.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION:
3-COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW 6403

DATE 27 FEB [illegible]

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HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

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1-WH/COG/ESEC
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WH/RegC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE WH/COG

OFFICER Nancye Gratz new

EXT. 6753

21 February 1967

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		CWisniewski
	FEB 23 8 38 AM '67	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL AC/WH/COG

DATE 23/2

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

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18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE FDO

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Biographic Data Concerning Case No. 75

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MIC
Feb
DOC. MICRO.

Reference: UFGA-26771, 17 January 1967

1. With reference to Headquarters request for biographic data concerning Case No. 75, the complete date of birth for Margarita ROQUE, mother of Pedro NORDA Roque, is 28 January 1912.

2. For Headquarters information, the monthly dependent payment of $175.00 was sent to Margarita ROQUE rather than the former trustee, Mr. Antonio Da CRUZ, effective with the January 1967 payment instead of the February 1967 payment, as stated in paragraph 2.a. of Reference.

Burton J Celeuza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

19-124-25/6

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
B-201-298859

CLASSIFICATION
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DATE TYPED
14 Feb. 1967

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB 16 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26972

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-298859

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PROCESSING		
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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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▨	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Dependent Payment Case No. 123

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
FEB 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References: A. UFGW-6353, 26 January 1967
B. UFGA-26692, 10 January 1967
C. DIRECTOR-60211, 15 December 1966

1. In accordance with the paragraph 2, Reference A request for clarification of Case No. 123, a review has been made of JMWAVE records and the following pertinent date is forwarded for Headquarters information:

a. There is no record of Subject's mother being designated as a dependent and it is believed that the AMTIKI-1 request for biographic data concerning her (paragraph 2(a), Reference B) was an error resulting from the large number of similar investigations being handled at that time.

b. The monthly payment to the Trustee conforms with the Reference C authorization by Headquarters for termination of the $50.00 per month child dependent payment and for the continued payment of $175.00 per month for the widow as the remaining sole dependent.

2. In conclusion, the Headquarters records for this Case would appear to be correct and our error in correspondence is regretted.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
✓3-WH/COG

19-124-25/6

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
B-201-293105

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
9 Feb. 1967	FEB 14 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA- 26956

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
◆ 201-293105

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

P. O. Box 8045
S. W. Station
Washington 24, D. C.
February 9, 1967

Garcia Line Corporation
115 East 23 Street
New York, New York 10010

Attention: Mr. Alfredo Garcia, President

Dear Mr. Garcia:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letters dated December 30, 1966 and January 27, 1967 which contained information concerning the six beneficiaries currently receiving compensation. We are grateful for this information.

With regard to Mr. Alfonso Alberti Garcia, our records show that he completed his rehabilitation training in June 1965 which qualified him as a radio/television repairman. In other words, he has a marketable skill which can provide him with employment.

We would appreciate it if you would terminate the monthly payment of $275.00 to Mr. Alberti as of March 1, 1967. Please advise Mr. Alberti that since his rehabilitation training and a lengthy period of grace to find employment he will no longer receive any payments. If he should need any social or financial assistance, you might suggest that he apply to a local, state or national welfare agency.

Please keep us advised of any further developments in this case.

Very truly yours,

David B. Challerton

Coordinated with:
OGC-Mr. Richard Landsdale 8 Feb.
✓ WH/COG/CICS-Nancy Gratz 8 Feb.

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PROCESSING		
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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Possible Release of Certain AMBUD Prisoners

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-26880, 2 February 1967
B. UFGA-25261 (Attachment No. 1), 3 June 66

1. For Headquarters information concerning the AMBUD Dependent Payment Program, a listing of prisoners forwarded by Reference A includes 11 of the 19 AMBUD cases contained in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B plus one individual believed to be a GARCIA LINES case. In view of the steps being taken by Headquarters concerning the proposal to transfer administration of the dependents payment Program to WUMUTUAL we are forwarding the results of a review of JMWAVE records pertaining to the individuals included on the Reference A list.

2. The following data is keyed to the case numbers in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B:

a. Case #120: 201-293759. The listing of Subject in attachment No. 1 to Reference B as deceased resulted in the September 1966 termination of payment to the trustee account for which AMTIKI-1 is responsible. We do not plan to make any changes in this account at this time.

b. Case #124: 201-285171. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

c. Case #126: 201-291258. Monthly payment of $250.00 to wife.

d. Case #132: 201-300027. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife. (adjusted from $250.00 effective with January 1967 payment per UFGW-6306.)

e. Case #134: 201-297837. Monthly payment of $300.00 to wife.

f. Case #135: 201-285157. Payment of $175.00 per month is being changed from the trustee to the mother who now resides in California.

g. Case #136: 201-293321. Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

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Continued........

Amended by UFGW-6403
31 Jul 1967

Distribution:
✓3 - WH/COG

19-124-25/16

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 Feb 67	FEB - 6 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26912

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
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h. Case #137: 201-281930. Monthly payment of $175.00 to mother.

i. Case #139: 201-(unknown). Monthly payment of $225.00 to wife.

j. Case #140: 201-279742. Monthly payment of $225.00 to trustee for parents in Cuba.

k. Case #144: 201-294422. Monthly payment of $225.00 to trustee for dependents. For clarification of Headquarters records Subject was listed as deceased in Attachment No. 1 to Reference B.

3. Although the Subject of 201-294744 is described in JMWAVE traces as a Brigade personality and for whom Provisional Operational Approval was requested in JMWAVE-4068, 7 March 1961, he is also included on a listing of Garcia Lines cases. Further, there is no record at JMWAVE of any payments being made on behalf of Subject which may result from his being carried on the Garcia Lines rolls.

for Philip G. ELMARD

2 February 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Turnover of Survivor Benefit Payments to BEC

PARTICIPANTS: Ben DeFelice, Chief/Personnel Benefits and Services, Office of Personnel
James Ueberhorst, Office of General Counsel
Nancye Gratz, WH/COG
Walter T. Cini, WH/COG/EXO

1. Reviewed a large number of possibilities on the pros and cons of going to BEC on 2 February 1967.

2. DeFelice feels we have conceived a sufficient number of alternatives to contact BEC directly and discuss.

3. A meeting is to be set up next week, possibly 6 February, to discuss with Mr. Tinsley, Director of Bureau of Employees Compensation, who cleared, friendly and very helpful, with regard to BEC accepting one of the following solutions:

a. Takeover of all or most of the funding of the regular payments, after he has had a chance to review the files. The Agency would continue to distribute the payments through cover (there is a precedent in the HEW arrangement). This would not create a BEC problem according to DeFelice.

b. BEC takes over the majority under present arrangement and the Agency continues to handle those cases which do not qualify under BEC regulations.

c. The BEC pays a lump sum to the Agency fund which would continue the payments at the present rate and under the present system until all cases are terminated.

4. One of the most serious problems facing us at present is the five-year statute of limitations. One way to get around this claim would be for the Agency to issue a statement to the effect that, after the elapse of five years, it is prepared to make a statement of presumptive or conclusive finding of death.

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

The Agency has the authority to make such a statement. The BEC could accept the statement as sufficient grounds but would probably require a half-yearly statement prolonging its validity.

5. Anticipated problems:

a. BEC will require proof of relationship between the deceased or missing and the beneficiary which may not be available or procurable in all cases.

b. The BEC has a base salary rate of $240 minimum which is a higher rate than many of the present payments.

c. If the BEC allocation on the other hand were lower, we could "construct" a salary to up the payment over $240.

d. Whatever the rate of GARCIA LINES payments, they are based on legal maritime compensation rates.

e. The survivor beneficiary in a student status may present a special problem.

Walter T. Cini
WH/COG/EXO

WH/COG

DISPATCH

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PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division (ATTN: Mark K. HOLMES)

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/Operational Transmittal of AMBUD Case Histories

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Per telecon between Frederick J. INGHURST and Mark K. HOLMES 2 February 1967 we are forwarding herewith the original HEW reports on AMBUD cases 4, 7, 10, 16, 27, 38, 39, 49, 54, 65, 92, and 144.

Frederick J. Inghurst
Philip G. ELMARD

Case # 277165
sent to IJ for 201 file

Missing Cases Sent to [illegible] for review

Attachment:
Case Histories.

Distribution:
③ - WH/COG, w/att h/w (ATTN: HOLMES)

19-124-25/6

Remove from Project [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-238/25
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

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DATE TYPED
2 Feb 67

DATE DISPATCHED
FEB - 2 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26908

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25

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See UFGA-26908 · 2 Jul 67

transmitting original HEW

Reports on # 4, 7, 10, 16, 27, 38,

39, 49, 54, 65, 92 and 144

#27 & #65 sent to 201 files

Other cases sent to Sec Re. Office

for review - (return to [illegible])

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD Dependent Payments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Action Required: See Below

References: A. DIRECTOR 68288, 20 January 1967

B. UFGW 6351, 19 January 1967

1. In accordance with Chief of Station, JMWAVE and Stefan R. LABANOW's telephone conversation on 25 January 1967, we do not plan to take the action requested in the References prior to Headquarters reconsideration of the cases, based on information obtained from a further review of our records.

2. Manuel GUILLOT Castellanos (201-281397). With reference to paragraph 2.A. of Reference B., it is recommended that Headquarters consider the following points in favor of the JMWAVE proposal that no further obligation exists to the dependents of Subject and that payments should not be resumed.

a. Financial: The 1 March 1961 MOC established a monthly salary of $200.00 per month, payable to GUILLOT's parents during the time he was in Cuba. The 31 October 1961 amendment to the MOC provided for a salary of $400.00 per month, payable to GUILLOT's parents during the time he was in Cuba. Further, the MOC provided for 2 years payment of salary to the parents from the date of death if due to operational activities. (Executed 30 August 1962). The 18 April 1962 amendment to the MOC provided for a bonus of up to $750.00 per year if approved by the COS, JMWAVE. In accordance with the MOC, the parents received $3,200.00 in monthly payments prior to 28 June 1963 when with Headquarters approval (UFGS-2992, 19 April 1963) the amount of $6,400.00 was accepted by them as the final settlement. This settlement represented monthly payment projected to 30 August 1964. There is no record of payments to dependents other than the parents. It is believed that the financial settlement is in accordance with current JMWAVE policy for the handling of agent death benefits. (JMWAVE Instruction 20-50). JMWAVE records contain nothing subsequent to the final settlement with the parents on 28 June 1963.

continued.....

Distribution
3-WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 Jan 67	FEB -1 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26878

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGA-26878

b. Operational: Subject was first contacted by a JMWAVE case officer in Miami during July 1960. The last of several missions to Cuba, dating back to 9 December 1960, was the infiltration by JMWAVE on approximately 1 May 1962. Subject was arrested on 29 May 1962 and executed on 30 August 1962.

c. Other: Subject was a friend of Manuel ARTIME prior to early 1959 when Subject joined ARTIME to form the Rural Commands. Subject resumed contact with ARTIME following Subject's arrival in Miami in 1960. Re the ARTIME claim in Reference B that the mother of Subject is in bad health, there is nothing in the file regarding the mother's health, but mention is made of an aunt, Mrs. Eloisa CASTELLANO Rosales, who was in bad health due to liver trouble. According to JMWAVE traces Mrs. CASTELLANO entered the U.S.A. on 3 July 1963 (A13319405). In summary, it is noted that Subject was considered as a valuable asset during the period of his service. However, it is believed that the dependents have been well-paid according to JMWAVE policy, and there is no record of their dissatisfaction with the final settlement. It is further noted that a close and long-time association existed between Subject and Manuel ARTIME, source of the current request for financial assistance to the dependents.

3. Jorge FUNDORA (Hero and Martyr). Reference is made to paragraph 2.B. of Reference B which is concerned with the possible increase of payment to the widow, Silvia HEREDIA. There is nothing in JMWAVE records to indicate that Subject ever worked for WOFACT. However, the original AMBUD arrangement for designation of dependents eligible for benefit payments resulted in the addition of certain non-WOFACT cases to the payment rolls. Further, a review of the original HEW questionnaire shows that Mrs. HEREDIA declared her total income to be the $175.00 a month AMBUD payment. No mention was made of additional income from the MRR. Unless Headquarters has information not available to JMWAVE, we strongly recommend no increase in payments be made.

4. Francisco ECHEVERRIA Texier is the Subject of paragraph 2.C., Reference B. There is nothing in JMWAVE records to indicate that Subject was ever employed by WOFACT. Unless Headquarters has additional information regarding this case it is recommended that payments not be initiated to the wife.

Burton J Eilenga

fr Philip G. ELMARD

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	2

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1 CI	6
2	7
3	8
4 [illegible]	9
5	10

ORIG: Nancyo Gratz:now
UNIT: WH/COG
EXT: 6753
DATE: 20 Jan 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 21 PER ____ # ____

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 20 20 00 Z CITE DIRECTOR 68288

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6351

16

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BIO DATA AND ADDRESSES SUBJECTS OF INVESTIGATIONS REQUESTED REF.

A. MANUEL (GUILLOT) MONTES, BORN 22 DECEMBER 1905.
VIRGINIA (CASTELLANOS) DE GUILLOT, BORN 24 JANUARY 1892.
3488 NW 3RD STREET, MIAMI.

B. ROSA RABASA, BORN 3 DECEMBER 25.
CHILDREN ARE FRANCISCA, AGE 18; ALFONSO, AGE 12;
MANUEL, AGE 6; JOSE ANTONIO, AGE 4.
1152 1/2 SW 10TH STREET, APT 1, MIAMI.

C. SILV[illegible] HEREDIA, BORN 11 JANUARY 35.
CHILDREN ARE EDUARDO, AGE 8; RAQUEL, AGE 6.
180 SE 14TH TERRACE, MIAMI.

2. PLEASE HAVE INVESTIGATOR OBTAIN BIRTHDATES OF RABASA AND HEREDIA CHILDREN.

END OF MESSAGE

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Operational/AMHUD
Return of Letters for AMTIKI File

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para. 2, below.

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA-26692, 10 Jan 67
B. UFGA-26584, 8 Dec 66
C. UFGA-25261, 3 Jun 66
D. DIR-60211, 15 Dec 66

1. Returned, under separate cover, are recent replies to AMTIKI letters forwarded in Reference A. Please return these letters to AMTIKI for retention.

2. The 30 November letter sent to Trustee of Case No. 123 requested information concerning the mother of deceased (paragraph 2(a), Reference A). According to Case No. 123 study forwarded in Reference C, only the widow and an unidentified child were listed as dependents. The Trustee denied the existence of any child in her original letter to AMTIKI, and Reference D authorized the Station to terminate payment for this child. Deceased's 201 file contains bio data which identifies the mother as reported, but does not reflect she was designated as a dependent. Apparently, information is available at the Station which indicates the mother is the rightful second dependent. Clarification of this case is requested in order that Headquarters data may coincide with that recorded at JMWAVE.

3. Headquarters wishes to express appreciation for the extremely valuable biographic data forwarded to date which was essential for the now completed WUMUTUAL actuary study. The results of this study will be incorporated in recommendations for future financing of this operation which will be submitted to Higher Authority for approval in the immediate future.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

Attachment:
Letters for AMTIKI USC

Dist: 2 - JMWAVE w/Att.

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6353

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DATE
26 JAN 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

HQS DIST:
1 - WH/COG
1 - WH/COG/ESEC

ABSTRACT
INDEX
LA/RGC

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
C/WH/COG	N. Gratz	yb (24 Jan 67)	7451

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO	25	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG		Thomas J. Flores

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station - JMWAVE FJ2

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 8 December 1966
C. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case No. 71 which is forwarded under separate cover. The case number is keyed to Reference A, attachment No. 1:

Case No. 71: Requirement completed.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received an interim reply concerning Case No. 63 which is also forwarded for Headquarters information:

Case No. 63: The attached letter did not provide the date of birth for which AMTIKI-1 is again writing by registered mail. In regard to the first sentence of the attached letter which states that the January 1967 payment had not been received, this case is one of the six cases described in Reference C for which payment was withheld, effective with the January 1967 payment, pending reply to the AMTIKI-1 request for data.

Burton J. Celiuza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments:
2 - Letters

Distribution:
✓3 - WH/COG w/1 copy (2) Atts. u/s/c

Remove from Project Sub
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72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

CS COPY

DATE TYPED 18 Jan 67	DATE DISPATCHED JAN 24 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26802

CROSS REFERENCE TO

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-~~124-25/2~~
19-124-25/6 ✓

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Miami Ene 7/61

La presente es para informarle que esta tarde el Cheque no me ha llegado [illegible] [illegible] ya a 9

Por correo aparte [illegible] una carta [illegible] solicitan [illegible] nos piden la dirección de Rafael López, mando [illegible] informarle [illegible] la dirección es la siguiente

Ave 23 # 3307
La Ceiba
Marianao
Habana

Con gracias anticipadas por la atención que le preste a la presente, queda muy atentamente de Ud.

Elena Martínez

C-6

Remove from Project
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JOB #
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19-124-25/6
[illegible] /6

S/C SEC-1 UFGA-[illegible]

ELSA MARTINEZ
1150 SW 5 ST
MIAMI FLA

MIAMI, FLA.
AM
8 JAN 28
1967

TS MUST REPORT
THEIR ADD
DURING JA

PO Box 701
MIAMI FLA 33144

Miami

17 January 1967

Translation

This is to inform you that I have not received the check even though it is the 7th.

A few days ago I received a letter from you in which you asked me for the address of Rafaela Lopez, the mother of my deceased husband. The address is as follows:

Ave. 53 #5807
La Ceiba
Marianao, Havana

Thanking you in advance for your attention to this letter, I remain respectfully yours

/s/ Elsa Martinez

December 29, 1966.
Mr. Paul G. Avant.
P.O. Box 701.
Miami. Fla. 33134.

Mr. Avant:

Please forgive delay in answering but, I had to wait until I received the information from Cuba.

Name: Isabel Maria Compan Santiesteban
Birthdate - November 19, 1903.
Holguin. Oriente. Cuba.
Address: José Antonio Cardet #132.

Please be advised change my address as of November 1st is:
245 S.W 20 Ave apt #7.
Miami Fla: 33135.

Thanks:

Amada Fernandez

L-26

#1632

Amada Fernandez
245 S.W. 20 ave. Apt 7.
Miami. Fla
33135.

SPECIAL DELIVERY

MIAMI, FLA 5
JUL 12
PM

Mr.
Paul G. Avant.
P.O. Box 701.
Miami Florida.
33144.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE ATTN FRED J. INGHURST

INFO.

FROM
CHIEF, WHD

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/AMBUD
REQUEST FOR PRIORITY INVESTIGATIONS

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED - SEE BELOW

REFERENCE - UFGA-25261, 3 JUNE 1966

1. DURING THE 13 JANUARY 1967 MEETING OF WALLACE A. GROWERY AND MANUEL ARTIME CONCERNING TERMINATION OF WOFACT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE MRR, ARTIME SUBMITTED THE NAMES OF THREE DEPENDENT FAMILIES WHO HAVE BEEN RECEIVING MRR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND REQUESTED THAT WE ARRANGE TO PROVIDE CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO THESE INDIVIDUALS, PARTICULARLY THE SUBJECTS OF CASE A.

2. IT IS REQUESTED THAT JMWAVE INVESTIGATE THE FOLLOWING CASES REGARDING THEIR FINANCIAL SITUATION AND PRESENT STATE OF HEALTH AND SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE MINIMUM MONTHLY PAYMENTS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF SUBSISTENCE AND COVER THE COST OF NECESSARY MEDICAL TREATMENT.

A. MANUEL GUILLOT MONTES AND HIS WIFE, VIRGINIA CASTELLANOS ROSALES DE GUILLOT, PARENTS OF MANUEL GUILLOT CASTELLANOS /201-281397/, MRR MILITARY COORDINATOR WHO WAS EXECUTED 30 AUGUST 1962. ACCORDING TO ARTIME, THE MOTHER IS A PARALYTIC WHO HAS UNDERGONE 3 OPERATIONS AND REQUIRES ANOTHER. APPARENTLY THE FATHER RECEIVES SOME SMALL INCOME FROM A MINOR CLERICAL JOB AND THE MRR HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTING $300 PER MONTH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE DECEASED SON'S MOC, THE PARENTS CONTINUED TO RECEIVE HIS $400 PER MONTH WOFACT SLARY UNTIL 28 JUNE 1963 WHEN THE BALANCE OF THE AGREED $9600 DEATH BENEFIT WAS LIQUIDATED THROUGH A LUMP SUM ''LIFE INSURANCE'' PAYMENT COVERING THE REMAINING $6400 DUE THE BENEFICIARIES.

DISTRIBUTION BY TAPE
3 - COS, JMWAVE

/CONTINUED/

19-124-25

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-6351

DATE
19 JANUARY 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH COG	Nanc Gratz	ear	19 Janua 1967	7451

COORDINATING

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/ESE
1 - WH/COG

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
/WH/COG	19 Jan	

ABSTRACT Y
INDEX
WHC/ES

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH COG	19 Jan	

(40)

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGW-6351 PAGE 2

PRESUMABLY, THE PROCEEDS OF THIS DEATH BENEFIT PAYMENT HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED BY THE MOTHER'S MEDICAL EXPENSES. HEADQUARTERS DOES NOT FEEL THAT THE DEATH BENEFIT PAYMENT SHOULD NECESSARILY PRECLUDE FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO DEPENDENTS OF A FORMER VALUABLE AGENT IF IT CAN BE PROVEN THEY WILL BE DESTITUTE AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE MONTHLY MRR PAYMENTS. THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD DETERMINE THE PRESENT FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE INCOME OF THE FATHER AND ANY CASH ASSETS, THEIR PRESENT SCALE OF LIVING, THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF BOTH INDIVIDUALS, AND THE MINIMUM AMOUNT REQUIRED FOR LIVING EXPENSES AND PERMANENT MEDICAL CARE ARTIME CLAIMS THE MOTHER REQUIRES. THIS INVESTIGATION IS EXTREMELY URGENT IN ORDER THAT A RECOMMENDATION FOR PAYMENT OF FUNDS, OVER AND ABOVE THE THE DEATH BENEFIT, MAY BE SUBMITTED FOR SPECIAL APPROVAL.

B. SILVIA HEREDIA, WIDOW OF JORGE FUNDORA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN INFILTRATION OPERATIONS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS AND WAS EXECUTED 12 OCTOBER 1961. SUBJECT IS PRESENTLY RECEIVING $175 PER MONTH UNDER THE AMBUD PROGRAM AS A HEROES/MARTYRS WIDOW /SEE CASE NO. 103/. ACCORDING TO ARTIME, SUBJECT IS UNDER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT, WHICH IS ALSO REFLECTED IN REFERENCE CASE STUDY, AND HAS BEEN RECEIVING $125 PER MONTH FROM THE MRR TO HELP SUPPORT HERSELF AND HER 2 SMALL CHILDREN. REASSESSMENT OF THE CASE IS REQUESTED TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF HARDSHIP THAT WILL BE IMPOSED FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF THE MRR ALLOWANCE AND AN ESTIMATE MADE OF THE MONTHLY ALLOWANCE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE EXISTENCE AND MEET MEDICAL COSTS. SUBJECT'S ORIGINAL HEW QUESTIONAIRRE SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR ANY EVIDENCE SHE DECLARED ANY OUTSIDE INCOME FROM THE MRR OR ANY OTHER SOURCE.

C. *ROSA RABASA, WIFE OF *FRANCISCO ECHEVERRIA TEXIER, WHO ACCORDING TO ARTIME WAS ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTING ''COMPANIA''ARMS UNTIL HIS CAPTURE AND SUBSEQUENT 6-30 YEAR PRISON SENTENCE. THE WIDOW, WHO IS DEAF, HAS BEEN RECEIVING $75 PER MONTH AND PAYMENT OF HER MEDICAL BILLS BY THE MRR TO HELP SUPPORT HERSELF AND HER 2 CHILDREN. SHE AUGMENTS HER SMALL INCOME BY SEWING IN HER HOME. SUBJECT'S HUSBAND IS THE INDIVIDUAL ON WHOM MARGANY REQUESTED TELEPHONE TRACES FROM INGHURST 16 JANUARY.

3. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE SAME INVESTIGATIVE FACILITIES EMPLOYED IN THE REFERENCE AMBUD INVESTIGATIONS BE UTILIZED IN THESE CASES. FOR PLAUSIBLE COVER PURPOSES THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND FROM DR. ARTIME THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN GIVING THEM MONTHLY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. THAT IT IS NOW PROPOSED THAT THE FIRM OF MCKIRCHER AND AVANT MAY BE RETAINED TO MAKE FUTURE PAYMENTS AND CERTAIN INFORMATION IS NEEDED FOR THEIR RECORDS. IN ADDITION TO OBTAINING THE OTHER INFORMATION REQUIRED THE INVESTIGATOR SHOULD ASK THE AMOUNT OF THE PRESENT MONTHLY PAYMENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO VERIFY THE VERACITY OF THE AMOUNTS ARTIME CLAIMS THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING. IN THE CASE OF SILVIA HEREDIA, WHO KNOWS SHE IS RECEIVING MONEY FROM MCKIRCHER AND AVANT, SUGGEST THE INVESTIGATOR TELL HER THEY HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF HER ADDITIONAL MRR INCOME AND HAVE TO BRING HER PRIOR QUESTIONAIRRE UP TO DATE. ALSO, QUESTION HOW SHE WILL BE AFFECTED IF THE MRR PAYMENTS ARE TERMINATED.

4. SINCE MRR FUNDING WAS TERMINATED AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966, AND ARTIME STATED THESE SPECIAL CASES WOULD BE LEFT IN A DESPERATE SITUATION, A CABLED REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS IS URGENTLY REQUESTED BY STEFAN R. LABANOW BY COB 25 JANUARY. THE ADDRESSES OF GUILLOT AND RABASA ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT HEADQUARTERS BUT ONE, MANUEL J. GUILLOT, WHO MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH CASE A, IS LISTED IN THE MIAMI TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AS RESIDING AT 1315 NE MIAMI COURT.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-6351 PAGE 3

5. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ALL CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO PRESENT AND FUTURE AMBUD PAYMENTS IN THE PROPER FILE JMWAVE IS REQUESTED TO USE FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 ON FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

19-124-25 16

FORM 8-64 1401 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. | CLASSIFICATION | ☐ CONTINUED | PAGE NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

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PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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	MICROFILM	

TO

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Termination of Dependency Payment

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966

1. In accordance with guidance provided in the Reference concerning Case #94 (201-283357), the monthly payment to the first dependent (mother) Graciela ROVIROSA for the dependents of 201-283357 was adjusted by terminating the $50.00 monthly payment for the second dependent (father) in Cuba and continuing payment of $175.00 monthly to the first dependent. A letter of explanation prepared by the case officer was enclosed in the 31 December 1966 mailing by AMTIKI/1 of the January 1967 payment.

2. On 10 January 1967 a reply dated 2 January 1967 was received from Mrs. ROVIROSA in which resumption of the payment for the second dependent is requested. Ill health of the father and his need for assistance are cited as justification. A copy of the letter is forwarded under separate cover for Headquarters information.

3. In accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph one of Reference, Stanley JEKSAWIT has provided the following background information on the dependents in this case which results from personal direct knowledge of the family:

The mother, Mrs. Graciela ROVIROSA, comes from one of the wealthiest, if not the most wealthy, family in Camaguey Province. She left Cuba in 1959 or 1960 in anticipation of what has happened, taking all her personal wealth with her. At the same time, her share of the family fortune was forwarded to her in the U.S. as long as this policy continued, perhaps until 1962.

Her husband, Jose A. RODRIGUEZ, did not leave with her because of a mistress in Cuba. Mrs. ROVIROSA contemplated divorce at that time but no divorce ever came about. Although the father stated numerous times that he intended to leave Cuba, and his name is on the "airlift" listing, he now states that he is not going to leave Cuba because he must stay to

DATE TYPED
12 Jan. 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 13 1967

Attachment:
Letter

Distribution:
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u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26761

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-283357
19-124-25/~~3~~ 6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

supervise property that has not been confiscated by the state. This is considered by members of the family in the U.S. to be only an excuse for remaining in Cuba.

The father is thought to have a sizeable bank account in the U.S. which was accrued prior to and during the early days of the Castro regime. Although the mother has access to the funds, she is trying to avoid use of the funds for personal reasons.

Mrs. ROVIROSA is believed to be employed by HEW as an IBM key-punch operator in the Refugee Center (JMWAVE has verified the employment as key-punch operator, GS-3, Salary $4,269.00 per annum. Employed since 14 December 1966 on a temporary basis.)

JERSAWIT has heard nothing concerning the father's alleged ill health. To the contrary, a sister of Mrs. ROVIROSA describes the husband as being very active in Cuba and believes he may possibly have obtained a divorce from Mrs. ROVIROSA.

4. In view of the background information concerning the dependents in this case, JMWAVE does not plan to reply to the letter from Mrs. ROVIROSA.

Philip G. ELMARD

Original with copy of letter filed in 201-283357

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE FJ2

SUBJECT
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 6 December 1966

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case No. 17 which is forwarded under separate cover. The case number is keyed to Reference A, attachment No. 1:

a. Case No. 17: Requirement completed.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received interim replies concerning Case Nos. 75, 135 and 143 which are also forwarded for Headquarters information:

a. Case No. 75: The attached letter did not provide the complete date of birth. However, the provision by the trustee of the address for the mother will enable AMTIKI-1 to obtain the data from her. Further, JMWAVE plans to forward monthly payment directly to the dependent, instead of the trustee, effective with the February 1967 payment.

b. Case No. 135: The attached letter did not provide the date of birth. It is planned to handle this case in the same manner as Case No. 75 (described above) by obtaining the data from the mother and subsequently forwarding payment directly to her, instead of the trustee, effective with the February 1967 payment.

c. Case No. 143: The attached letter states that the data requested will be forwarded when received from Cuba.

Burton J. Calenza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments
4 Letters

Distribution
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED 13 Jan 67	DATE DISPATCHED JAN 17 1967
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26771	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ~~19-124-25/2~~ 6 19-124-25/6	

TRANSLATION

Miami
December 26, 1966

Name - Francisca Alvarez

Birth - May 11, 1915

Residence - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pino
Cuba

Name - Juan Maria Ramos

Birth - July 7, 1907

Residence - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona, Isla de Pino
Cuba

/s/ Justo Alvarez

Remove from ~~Project~~
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

CASE NO: 17

F/C 20-1 UFGA-26771

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

Miami Dec 26/66.

Nombre- Francisco Alonso.
Nacimiento- Mayo 11 de 1911
Vecina - Calle 14 entre 23-26
Nueva Gerona Isla de Pinos.
Cuba

Nombre= Juana Maria Ramos.
Nacimiento= Julio 7 de 1907
Vecina- Calle 14 entre 23- 26.
Nueva Gerona Isla de Pinos.
Cuba.

Atentamente.

Justo Alonso.

C-7

Justo [illegible]
2409 SW. 27 St
Miami Fla

5c U.S. POSTAGE

Mr Paul G. [illegible]
P.O.B. 701
Miami Fla
33144

ALWAYS USE
YOUR ZIP CODE

MIAMI, FLA.
PM

Miami 29-66

Mr Paul C. Arnut
P.O. Box 701
Miami, Fla, 33144

B-2

Gentlemens;

As you requesting on your letter of Nov. 22 I inform you the following:

The mother of Pedro Raul Meda Reyes named Margarita is 54 years old, she arrive to Miami with her daughter and son on July 4th she be at the Jackson Hospital for 3 month an leave her two son. One of the sons still on Cuba because the Castro's militians take him to a Concentration Camp. He is 28 years old and at the

CASE NO: 75

present time I'm making arrangements to come from Spain or other possible way.

The address of the mother in Miami is 3880 W. 4th Ave. Hialeah, Fla.

Any other information if needed I be glad to serve you at you request.

Very truly yours

Antonio Da Cruz

Antonio Da'Cruz
3812 S.W. 1st, St.
Miami Fla 33134

Mr. Paul G. Avent
P.O.Box 701
MIAMI, FLA. 33144

14-00000

TRANSLATION

Miami
January 2, 1967

Mr. Paul Avant
Miami

Dear Sir,

I received your letter dated 28 December. I recently received a letter from Humberto Reyos' mother's daughter but she did not mention her mother's age (even though I had asked) I'm sure she just forgot about it. However, I am sending her address as you requested, the address is:

"Cruz Ortiz"
3667 3/4 So. Grand Ave.
Los Angeles, California 90007

Attentively,

/s/ Manuel Garrido
437 SW 7 St.
Miami, Fla. 33130

CASE NO: 135

[illegible] Enero 2 - 67

Sr. Paul [illegible]
Ciudad.

A-1

Estimado señor:

Recibí su carta de fecha 28 de Diciembre.

Le diré que acabo de recibir carta de la Hija de la señora madre de Humberto Reyes. en la cual no me menciona la edad de su madre (a pesar de habérselo pedido); seguro a sido olvido de ella, no obstante le envío la dirección de ella en California, como usted me lo pide en la carta suya la dirección es

"Cruz Ortiz"
3667 3/4 So. Grand ave.
Los Angeles. California. 90007.

Y muchas gracias.

de Ud. atte.

I-A

Manuel [illegible]

437 SW 7 St

Miami Fla. 33136.

[illegible]
437 SW 7 Ct
Miami Fl 33130
ZIP CODE

MIAMI, FLA.
PM
JAN
1967

WASHINGTON 5c
UNITED STATES
CHILDREN'S
DENTAL HEALTH WEEK

VIA AIR MAIL
CORREO AEREO
PAR AVION

Mr. Paul G. Avant
P.O. Box 701
Miami Fl. 33144

Dec 30/066

Mr Paul G Grant.
P.O.Box 791.
Miami Fla. 33144

Dear Mr Grant.

I have written to Cuba asking for the dates of birth etc. of Jorge Kim Jun parents, when I got them I will send them over to you.

Sincerely Yours

5307 Park Ave. B4
West N. York, N.J. 07093

E-34

CASE NO: 143

Raul Santovenia
5307 Park Ave (?)
West N. York, N.J.

WEST NEW YORK N.J.
JAN 1
PM
1987
07093

SUPPO
LG ASSOCIAT

Mr Paul G. Hunt.
P.O. Box 701
Miami Fla-33184

WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE FJ

SUBJECT
Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
Adjustment of Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966
B. DIRECTOR-60211, 15 December 1966
C. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966

1. The adjustment of AMBUD dependency payments was completed with the January 1967 payment in accordance with guidance provided in References A and B. The adjustment by Station of payments for additional cases as described in paragraphs 4 and 5 further reduced the monthly payments and resulted in a net saving of $3,025.00 per month.

2. Adjustment of payment in accordance with Reference A was as follows (case numbers are keyed to UFGA-25261, Attachment #1):

Case #3: (201-283944)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	$ 75.00
Case #4: (201-268913)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	25.00
Case #6: (201-283500)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	50.00
Case #16: (201-287799)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	75.00
Case #20: (201-098817)	
Monthly payment reduced by:	150.00

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

13-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
12 Jan 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JAN 17 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26697

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
13-124-25/~~2~~ 6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26697

Case #31: (201-291244)

No action taken per Reference B.

Case #50: (201-294433)

Monthly payment reduced by: $ 75.00

Case #52: (201-294523)

Monthly payment reduced by: 75.00

Case #53: (201-294749)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #59: (201-286541)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #61: (201-297567)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

Case #63: (201-297112)

Monthly payment terminated per UFGW-6306: 25.00

Monthly payment withheld due return by Post Office of AMTIKI/1 registered letter to Elsa MARTINEZ requesting biographic data: 250.00

Case #65: (201-297393)

Monthly payment terminated: 325.00

Case #75: (201-298859)

Monthly payment terminated per UFGW-6306: 50.00

Monthly payment withheld pending reply to request for biographic data: 175.00

Case #78: (201-300046)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #81: (201-298910)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #83: (201-297556)

Monthly payment reduced by: 75.00

Case #87: (201-300082)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #89: (201-297752)

Monthly payment terminated on basis of First dependent's statement to survey case worker that she was fiancee and engaged to be married following return of 201-297752.

Total amount terminated: 275.00

Case #92: (201-283096)

Monthly payment reduced by: $ 50.00

Case #94: (201-283357)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #122: (201-281272)

No change in amount of monthly payments. Father and step-mother receiving $25.00 each. The remaining $225.00 being deposited in trust account at the Coconut Grove Bank for which AMTIKI/1 is trustee.

Case #131: (201-301745)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

Case #142: (201-278754)

There has been no reply to the registered letter mailed to trustee Orlando FERNANDEZ by AMTIKI/1 on 19 December 1966.

Monthly payment withhold pending reply: 225.00

3. Adjustment of payment in accordance with Reference B was made as follows:

Case #1: (201-286848)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #31: (201-291244)

No action necessary because Reference A action had not been taken prior to receiving Reference B.

Case #53: (201-294749)

Monthly payments to parents adjusted to $175.00 and $50.00 per action described in paragraph 2 above.

Case #59: (201-286541)

Monthly payment for Fifth dependent terminated per action described in paragraph 2 above.

Case #123: (201-293105)

Monthly payment reduced by: 50.00

Case #132: (201-300027)

Monthly payment reduced by: 25.00

4. Station took action in terminating the payment for Case #82 (201-300091) effective with the January 1967 payment, upon receipt of trustee letter stating that dependent died on 26 September 1966.

Amount of payment terminated: 175.00

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-26697

5. Station took further adjustment action by withholding payment, effective with the January 1967 payment and involving five cases, for failure to reply to AMTIKI/1 letters requesting data desired by Headquarters. Payment for these cases would be resumed pending receipt of the information. Three of the cases, Nos. 63, 75 and 142, are included in paragraph 2 above. The other cases are as follows:

Case #71: (201-297954)

Amount of monthly payment withhold:	$175.00

Case #143: (201-298852)

Amount of monthly payment withheld:	225.00

6. In accordance with guidance provided in Reference C, AMTIKI/1 has been instructed to automatically terminate payments to dependents reaching 21 years of age. AMTIKI/1 will also employ his "radar" in attempting to keep informed of marriages by dependents.

7. A quarterly Station report will be prepared on all future payment terminations per Reference C.

Burton J Celauza
for Philip G. ELMARD

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 4

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DISPATCH

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SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION	
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X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE 7JJ

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
References: A. UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966
B. UFGA-26584, 8 December 1966

1. AMTIKI-1 has obtained biographic data on Case Nos. 6, 27 and 82 which are forwarded under separate cover. The case numbers are keyed to Reference A, Attachment No. 1:

a. Case No. 6: Requirement completed.

b. Case No. 27: Requirement completed.

c. Case No. 82: Requirement completed. For Headquarters information, JMWAVE took action on the basis of information provided in the letter pertaining to case No. 82 and terminated the monthly dependent payment effective with the January 1967 payment.

2. AMTIKI-1 has received interim replies concerning Case Nos. 123 and 135 which are also forwarded for Headquarters information.

a. Case No. 123: The attached letter which is the second reply received on this case states that the data requested will be forwarded when received from Cuba. The first reply was forwarded to Headquarters under Reference B.

b. Case No. 135: The attached letter did not provide the requested data and AMTIKI-1 wrote again on 28 December 1966 stressing urgent need for the information.

Atts returned to AMTIKI for retention

Burton J Celanza
for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments
5 Letters

Distribution
3 - WH/Cuba w/1 cy atts. u/s/c

Remove from ~~Project~~ Subj
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB 72-258/25
Box: 3 Fold: 3

19-124-25/6

~~19-124-25/2~~

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-26692	JAN 10 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/2

14-00000

5 January 1967

194

Mr. Flores,

This morning I received an answer from Mr. Alfredo Garcia, President of the GARCIA LINE, giving the bio data requested on dependents of the crew we are still paying. This completes the bio data required for the actuary study.

When I called Mr. Evan's office to give his secretary the above information concerning the GARCIA people, she told me the computing of the money involved was started yesterday and we may get our total figure within a week. I have the draft memo written by Mr. Millian and the new first page which I revised. As soon as we receive that big, fat figure from WUMUTUAL the final memo can be typed and we will be in business.

Nancye G.

Nancye Gratz:
Deo et Tibi Gratias!
194

14-00000

N. C.

SECRET

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD
Return of Documents and List of Birthdates for AMTIKI Files

Paragraph 3

[illegible]

References: A. UFGA-26524 dated 8 December 1966
B. UFGA-26626 dated 15 December 1966

1. Forwarded under separate cover attachment A are the replies received in references from AMTIKI. It is requested that these letters be returned to AMTIKI for retention in individual Subject files.

2. It is recommended that AMTIKI assume responsibility for reviewing the status of minor dependents in order to automatically terminate payments to those individuals who become 21 years of age. This should be done on a regular 30 day basis since many of these dependents will become ineligible for payment during 1967. A list of birthdates compiled by ELLEN P. MARGANY is forwarded under separate cover attachment B to assist AMTIKI in monitoring this operation. Some procedure should also be established by AMTIKI for periodically attempting to establish proof of marriages contracted by dependents.

3. A quarterly Station report is requested on all future payment terminations in order that Headquarter's records may be maintained on a current basis.

Ellen P. Margany

Distribution:
- 3 - COS/JMWAVE

Attachments (USC):
- A - Letters for Return to AMTIKI
- B - List of Birthdates for AMTIKI

UFGW-6328

SECRET 19-124-25/5

WH/COG/CICS Nancye Gratz mjr 2463

27 December 1966
Distribution: WH/COG/MO
- 1 - WH/COG/ESEC
- 1 - WH/COG/MO
- 1 - RID

_ December 1966

TO : Mr. Flores

FROM: Nancye Grats

1. In order to submit accurate figures for the approved actuary study we must immediately establish some definite criteria for survivor payments in the event the principal dependent is terminated for cause.

2. I find it difficult to accept the inheritance formula that JMWAVE says has been SOP, i. e. when the first dependent is terminated the second dependent inherits the first dependent's share and so on down the line. In the first place, the Station hasn't been consistent in following this procedure and the fact it was originally established by AMBUD is no reason for us to continue it. Regardless of the background for this unrealistic procedure it seems that the whole matter is now at a point where policy governing future payments should be determined at the Headquarters level and the actuary study can't be started until we supply firm figures that are not subject to a variety of changes over the years. Furthermore, the Station views and clarification of the background leading to the present procedure, which was requested over a week ago, has not been forthcoming.

3. I think we can live with the following formula as it isn't too inconsistent with BEC survivorship provisions. I discussed the following with Mr. Millian who agreed the provisions seemed to be thoroughly practical and realistic if you concur.

OK [illegible]

(a) In those cases where the parents are the sole beneficiaries, in the event one dies the survivor will be paid the larger of the two payments now received, which would be $175 instead of the $225 now received by both of them.

OK [illegible]

(b) When a widow dies or remarries, her payment will be divided equally among the surviving minor children in lieu of the graduated payments they are now receiving. This may cost us a little more than just lopping off the widow's share and continuing the amounts presently paid to the children but we will minimize possible repercussions from the widow if she is still alive and remarried. It is also much more equitable to the children themselves to share and share alike in the event the mother dies. An additional provision should be that as each child reaches 21 or marries, his payment will be terminated, except in those cases where a child is physically or mentally incapacitated for life. In such cases the child will be paid for life.

In answer to any possible static over these provisions we can always fall back on the original cover story concerning availability of AMBUD funds.

4. May I have your opinion on the above proposal so that I can provide Mr. Evans with the statistics necessary to start the actuary study without further delay?

Nancye Gratz

14-00000

c/WH/Cuba

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	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
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TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Biographic Data

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References A. DIRECTOR 59411
B. UFGA 26584, 8 December 1966

1. The additional biographic data on certain dependents and trustees requested by Headquarters in Reference A will be forwarded under separate cover as it is received from AMTIKI-1.

2. The first 26 replies to the 22-23 November 1966 mailings by AMTIKI-1 were forwarded to Headquarters under Reference B by courier on 8 December 1966. Five additional replies received subsequent to the initial pouching are forwarded under separate cover.

3. Follow-up letters are being sent by AMTIKI-1 via registered mail to the ten individuals from whom no reply has yet been received.

for Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments U/S/C (dual)
5 letters

Distribution
3-WH/Cuba w/ 1 cy Atts.

Attachment returned to JMWAVE for AMTIKI files - UFGW-6328 - 27 Dec 66

Remove from ~~Project~~ Subj: 19-124-25/6
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JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 3 Fold: 3

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DATE TYPED 15 Dec 66	DATE DISPATCHED DEC 15 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA 26626	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/2 19-124-25/6	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
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ERT ☐ YES ☐ NO
ASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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STROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/IA, MPS/EG-2

S E C R E T 132340Z CITE JMWAVE 4587 (INGHUARST ACTING) NG

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD 14DEC 58902

REFERENCE UFGW 5306

1. CONCUR ALL RECOMMENDATIONS REF AND PLAN TO IMPLEMENT WITH 31 DEC MAILING OF JAN PAYMENTS BY AMTIKI WHO WILL ENCLOSE EXPLANATION FOR ACTION BEING TAKEN.

2. CONCEPT OF ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED PARA THREE REF CORRECT. HOWEVER, STATION PROPOSES FOLLOWING PAY SCALE FOR PAYMENT FOLLOWING AN ADJUSTMENT OF DEPENDENCY STATUS: NEW FIRST DEPENDENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIONSHIP TO SUBJECT, $100.00 MONTH; SECOND DEPENDENT $50.00; THIRD OR MORE $25.00 EACH. REQUEST HQS DECISION THIS PAY SCALE PRIOR 31 DEC MAINLING NOTICES AND CHECKS.

3. THE FEW PREVIOUS CASES AS NOTED PARA 3 REF WERE HANDLED ON AD HOC BASIS WHEN BROUGHT TO JMWAVE ATTENTION. NO FIRM POLICY WAS ESTABLISHED. FURTHER, JMWAVE NOT AWARE ANY COMMITMENTS TO DEPENDENTS BY WOFACT.

4. RE CASE 59 REF, REQUEST APPROVAL TERMINATE $25.00 PAYMENT FIFTH DEPENDENT IN VIEW PAYMENT OF 150.00 TO SAME

SECRET

14 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the WUMUTUAL Investment Committee Meeting Held on 7 December 1966

REFERENCE: Agenda for the Subject Meeting

Minutes of meeting were ratified 6 Jan 1967

1. The Subject meeting was held in the DD/S Conference Room at 10:30 a.m. on 7 December 1966. All members of the Committee were present. Also attending were the Chief, DO Division, the Committee Advisor, the WUMUTUAL Secretariat (Evans and Fielder), and Messrs. Kenneth Million and Earl Williamson and Mrs. Nancy Gratz representing WH Division. The WH representatives were present in conjunction with Item 3 of the Agenda.

2. Mr. Houston chaired the meeting, and the first item of business discussed was Item 3 of the Agenda, i.e., WH Division's proposal of WUMUTUAL annuities for dependents of the Cuban Brigade. Mr. Million gave a summary presentation on the Brigade matter. He stated that the payments to the dependents of the Cuban Brigade have been made since 1961 under Presidential order, which order in effect stated that the payments were to be made until rescinded by the President. Since that time, the Agency has spent approximately $17,000,000 on the overall program, of which $12,000,000 represents direct stipends to the beneficiaries. WH Division's FY 1967 budget for this matter is $397,000, and currently 316 individuals are receiving payments, most of whom are dependents of the Brigade with the balance being dependents of the Heros and Martyrs Group and certain Garcia Line crewmen. The individuals are presently paid through a cover firm with no official Government attribution. It is WH Division's position that since this program must be continued until terminated by the President, it is a long range, overall Agency obligation which should not be budgeted for nor administered by WH Division. The Division would like to transfer total responsibility for the program to Project WUMUTUAL by a single premium purchase of annuities. If the single premium method is too costly, they would still like to have the responsibility transferred either by an installment purchase or by the funding method. Mr. Evans advised the Committee that he felt the matter should be brought to the attention of the Committee before WUMUTUAL secured actuarial calculations, since the fees for these calculations will be fairly expensive. After considerable discussion, the Committee concluded that while the

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declassification

chances are remote of securing sufficient funds from the Bureau of the Budget to establish an annuity program, the program should be costed on several alternative bases, including a single premium charge, installment basis and delayed implementation of the program. When the cost study is completed, alternative proposals may be submitted for consideration within the Agency and to the Bureau of the Budget, if deemed appropriate. As soon as WH Division provides WUMUTUAL with the additional information required, WUMUTUAL will request the study from its actuarial consultants.

3. After this matter was considered by the Committee, the WH representatives left the meeting. The Chairman then proceeded to handle the other Agenda items. The Minutes of the 15 November 1966 meeting, the last meeting preceding this one, were ratified.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

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ORIG : NANCYE GRATZ
UNIT : WH/COG
EXT :
DATE : 13 Dec 66

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/COG 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY DO 4 DO/H 3 ADDP DCI ADDP

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13 22 17 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59411

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF UFGW 6303

1. ACTUARY STUDY FOR PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD TRUST FUND APPROVED BY WOFACT WUMUTUAL COMMITTEE. IN ORDER PROCEDE WITH STATISTICAL STUDY URGENTLY REQUEST ADDITIONAL BIO DATA REQUESTED BY AMTIKI.

2. SINCE ACTION REQUESTED PARA THREE REF NOT RECEIVED, TIME FACTOR NECESSITATED FORMULATION NEW HQS POLICY GOVERNING FUTURE DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS. DETAILS WILL BE POUCHED.

SECRET

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER NANCYE GRATZ WH/COG
COORDINATING OFFICER NONE
RELEASING OFFICER MR T. FLORES FOR MR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE XX

Chief, Western Hemisphere
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Recommendations for Termination of Certain Dependency Payments

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 3

REFERENCE : UFGA-25261, dated 3 June 1966

1. It is recommended that JMWAVE arrange to notify specific AMBUD dependents that certain payments will be terminated as of 1 January 1967. The cases, and the reasons for such terminations, are listed below by case number corresponding to Reference Attachment #1.

Case # 3

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, daughters of Benito BLANCO Cruz. Both daughters are over 21 years of age.

Case # 4

Terminate 2nd and 3rd dependents, married brothers of Manuel BLANCO Navarro and substitute the father, Manuel BLANCO Canizal, as 2nd dependent.

Case # 6

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent of Daniel FERNANDEZ Mon and pay only $175 to mother, Lucia MON Fuertes.

Case # 16

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Benjamin QUINTANA Perera, who are apparently not receiving any financial assistance and may actually be deceased. Although there is some question regarding the legal status of 1st dependent, deceased claimed her as his wife and payment should continue until further notice.

8 DEC 1966

continued.......

UFGW-6306

S E C R E T [illegible] 19-124-25/2

30 Nov 66 WH/COG Nancye Gratz mak 2578

Distribution:
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - WH/COG/MO
① - C/WH/COG

C/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores

WH/COG/MO Robert Ortman

C/WHD William V. Broe

Case # 20

Terminate payment to 1st dependent, widow of Raul VIANELLO Alakan, as sister gave sufficient evidence of widow's remarriage to justify termination. Also terminate 5th dependent, who apparently is mother of the widow and her sister, not the mother of the deceased, and is not entitled to support money. Children will continue to receive support. Widow receives more money than is customary for a widow since her husband was a pilot. In certain cases of this type, payments were established by AMBUD, not by WOFACT.

Case # 31

Terminate payment to 5th dependent, father of Jose CARRAZANA Trimino, unless proof can be established that father is alive and receiving support money. AMTIKI has been requested to query 1st dependent on status of father.

Case # 50

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Reinaldo VIDAL Mazola, if widow is unable to provide proof that parents are receiving support. AMTIKI has also been requested to investigate this case.

Case # 52

Terminate payment to 1st dependent, widow of Clemente CRUZ de la Torre, who advised of remarriage in 1964. Children will continue to receive support.

Case # 53

Terminate payments to 1st and 2nd dependents, widow and child of Marcelo NAPOLES Viquiera. 4th dependent advised that widow and child moved to Houston on 19 November 1959. Widow, whose name is Sue Elizabeth Lessmann and probably a US citizen, apparently was separated from husband before his death. There is no indication that Trustee has sent any money to widow.

Case # 59

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, eldest daughter of Vicente LEON Leon, who was born 26 October 1945 and is now over 21 years of age.

Case # 61

Terminate payment to 4th dependent, youngest daughter of Marcelo CARRENATE Cebrian, who is now married and not entitled to support.

Case # 63

Terminate payment to 4th dependent, father of Mario GALVEZ Lopez, who apparently receives no support money.

continued.........

Case # 65

Terminate payments to Trustee since widow, legal child and parents of Antonio PADRON Cardenas, not receiving entire amount to which they are entitled if Trustee is sending $100 to two mistresses. If, and when, widow does come to the USA, case can be reviewed for possible renewal of direct payments to widow and arrangements made to pay support to illegitimate daughter. Present legitimate dependents will be projected for the actuary study so that funds will be available if required at a future date.

Case # 75

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, father of Pedro MORDA Roque. Mother of deceased is now in the USA and records indicate she is separated from the father who remained in Cuba.

Case # 78

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, daughter of Carlos GUAS Decall, who is not only married but is over 21 years of age.

Case # 81

Terminate payment to deceased 2nd dependent, father of Osvaldo DIAZ Milian.

Case # 83

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, children of Pedro CUELLAR Alonso, who reside in Cuba. According to widow, she has little, if any, contact with her stepsons and does not contribute to their support on a regular basis.

Case # 87

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent who is the mother of widow of Carlos SOLIS Shelton, not mother of deceased. On the questionnaire, the widow claimed her mother as dependent. According to AMTIKI, deceased's mother is Rosa SHELTON who has resided in the USA for some time and apparently has never received any money.

Case # 89

Terminate payments to 2nd and 3rd dependents, parents of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata, and 4th dependent, child of first dependent and her former husband Harry FRITZ. Probably all dependents should be terminated but there are conflicting statements concerning the legal status of the "widow". Deceased claimed her as his wife in 1961. AMTIKI's file on this case contains a letter from a Miami lawyer requesting information on the "widow" and advised he had been retained by Harry FRITZ to protect his interest and that of their daughter, Cathleen FRITZ, in view of the supposed marriage of his ex-wife and Roberto

continued...

PEREZ Cruzata. If the lawyer who represents FRITZ could be discreetly queried, the true status of the relationship between the "widow" and PEREZ might be established and lead to a termination of her payment. If JMWAVE concurs, recommend AMTIKI be instructed to pursue this investigation.

Case # 92

Terminate payment to deceased 2nd dependent, mother of Herman KOCH.

Case # 94

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, father of Jose FERNANDEZ Rovirosa, who apparently receives no support from mother of deceased. Stanley JERSAWIT can supply some background on dependents in this case who are both from wealthy families.

Case # 122

Amount and method of payments to dependents in this case was directed by Headquarters and handled by Humphrey O. TIMANUS. According to the questionnaire filled out by 1st dependent, father of Manuel REYES Garcia, father is not following instructions to provide for the wife and child in Cuba, as well as provide certain comforts for his imprisoned son. It is recommended that this case be reviewed with TIMANUS and AMTIKI resume trusteeship of funds for the widow and child and prisoner. The father and stepmother should then be paid $25 apiece, as 3rd and 4th dependents. The remaining $225 per month would then be deposited in the existing trust account at the Coconut Grove Bank.

Case # 131

Terminate payment to 2nd dependent, son of Jose BORRAS Gutierrez. Son, Alfredo BORRAS Macias was born 19 April 1943 and is over 21 years of age.

2. Although the money saved by the above terminations is small in comparison to the total amount expended each month, it is a beginning which hopefully will lead to more terminations in the near future. All trusteeships are presently being reviewed and JMWAVE will be advised as rapidly as possible concerning trusteeships to be terminated completely or adjusted. Two trusteeships that require special study concern cases # 142 and # 144 as follows:

Case # 142

Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre designated his parents as dependents. It is recommended that the Trustee be requested to submit the names of the uncle and aunt who have possession of the bank book and obtain the exact amount of money on deposit. The uncle may be Alfredo HORNEDO, a former prominent Cuban businessman now in the US, for whom GUTIERREZ formerly worked in Cuba. GUTIERREZ also has a

continued.....

brother who is an American citizen residing in New York. This brother, an engineer who may be engaged in space research, recently queried NASA concerning the possibility of obtaining assistance to effect the release of his brother from prison.

Case # 144

Andres VEGA Perez originally designated his wife and child as dependents and named another sister as Trustee. Information obtained from AMTIKI and various records available, indicate that VEGA learned that his wife was a GOC follower and directed that the present Trustee, another sister, assume control of the money. This could account for the discrepancy between the amount of money now held in trust and the total amount of money paid from 1961-1965 since the new trusteeship was not created until much of the money had been spent. In order to protect the interests of the prisoner, some procedure will probably be devised by which a long-range projection can be made for actuary purposes and the trusteeship terminated. Recommendations for handling this case will be submitted to JMWAVE in the near future.

3. In order to arrive at the exact amount of money to be saved by the immediate and future termination of payments to certain dependents, a definite criteria must be established concerning adjustments for secondary dependents when the first dependent has been terminated. In discussions between Ellen F. MARGANY, during her recent TDY to JMWAVE, and Humphrey O. TIMAHUS, it was MARGANY's understanding that the procedure is to raise the second dependent to the status of first dependent when the original first dependent is terminated for cause. For example, the first child would receive the amount originally paid to the mother, instead of the customary $50 paid to a second dependent, and the third dependent would then become the second dependent and receive $50 instead of the original $25. This procedure was not followed in case # 44 where the second dependent payment remained at $50 after the remarriage of the mother, Case # 25 where child, now sole dependent, does not receive full 1st dependent payment, nor in the contentious CUERVO-RUBIO case (# 54) where an attempt to hold the second dependent to $50 precipitated considerable unpleasantness. However, in case # 86, the procedure of raising the payment level of the second and third dependents after the remarriage of the mother, was followed. Logically, the termination of payments to dependents in any of the top categories would automatically lead to an adjustment in status and payment to not only children, but in some cases parents as well, depending on their position of inheritance. A clarification of Station's past procedure, any known committments to dependents, and present views as to firm criteria to be followed in such cases is urgently requested. Not only is such a fixed criteria necessary to determine the amount of savings involved in the recommended immediate termination, and to provide accurate long-range figures for the actuary study, but also for the purpose of avoiding any possible repercussions such as occurred in the CUERVO-RUBIO case. Request Station cable reply.

continued...

4. A conference with the WUMUTUAL Committee will be held in the near future in order to obtain guidance concerning the proposal for disbursing future AMBUD payments. JMWAVE will be kept advised of the progress of this activity.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief, WH Division - ATTN: Ellen F. MARGANY

INFO.

FROM

Chief of Station, JMWAVE PGE

SUBJECT

AMBUD - Dependent Payments

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded under separate cover are 26 replies received from dependents by AMTIKI/1 concerning age and birth dates of individuals presently on the rolls under the AMBUD program.

Fifteen individuals have not as yet replied to the questionnaire sent to them through AMTIKI/1. When they are received they will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Remove from Project: [illegible]
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

Philip G. ELMARD

Attachments: u/s/c
26 Letters

S/C ATT'D BY RI/AN
Dated 13 Dec 66

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Div., w/att

S/C att returned to JMWAVE for retention AMTIKI files
UFGW-6328 - 27 Dec 66
19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/5~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-26584	~~DEC 8 1966~~ 8 Dec 66
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

NCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) AMBUD - FINANCES

FROM: 1 Dec 1966

EXTENSION:

NO. 18113

DATE 28 Nov 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/COG				Seventeen million dollars, repeat, $17,000,000.00
2.				
3.				
4. WH/COG/CI (Gratz)				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				RYBAT
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH ATTN: STEFAN R. LABANOW

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMBUD/Operational
Transmittal of AMBUD Financial Summary

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Forwarded herewith is one xerox copy of a compilation of those expenses during the period 1960 thru 30 June 1966 handled thru the JMWAVE Station which may be considered to fall under the AMBUD rubric. The compilation was made by AMTIKI-1 and his staff. The original copy has been retained at the Station. It is interesting to note that the disbursements during the report period are in excess of $17,300,000.

Philip G. Elmard

Attachment - As Stated

Distribution:
3 - C/WH W/Att.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
RYBAT/SECRET

DATE TYPED 28 Nov. 66	DATE DISPATCHED NOV 30 1966
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGT-18113	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	

DISPATCH

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SECRET

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	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational
Quarterly Progress Report Concerning the AMBUD Program

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Transmitted herewith are two copies of the Quarterly Progress report for the First Quarter of FY 67 concerning the AMBUD program.

2. As explained in the attached report, in the absence of any Headquarters approval to carry out the cost reduction plan proposed by the Station in FY 66 AMBUD expenditures are running at the rate of approximately $34,000 per month. If this rate is continued throughout FY 67, then the total cost for the year will be approximately $408,000, as compared with the $230,000 projected by the Station for the fiscal year. The Station has been kept well informed by Headquarters concerning its struggles to place the AMBUD program on a reasonable and economic basis. Until a decision is taken at the Headquarters level, the Station will continue to administer the AMBUD program under the present ground rules.

Philip G. Elmard
Philip G. ELMARD

Attachment: h/w
AMBUD Progress Report

Return to G.
Nancy

Distribution:
2 - WH/C, w/att.

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/6~~

Remove from ~~Project~~: Sully
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 Att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
27 OCT 66

DATE DISPATCHED
27 OCT 66

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-26296

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief of Station
THRU : D/OPS
FROM : SP-4/Burton J. CELENZA
SUBJECT: TYPIC/Operational
AMBUD Progress Report
1 July - 30 September 1966

Date: 19 October 66
WSP-1650

Distribution
~~4-COS~~
1-D/OPS
1-C/SP
1-SP-4 Chrono
1-19-124-25
1-REG

A. Operational Highlights

1. The AMBUD program for the handling and disposition of residual Brigade matters pertaining to dependent benefits and medical attention continued during the reporting period. All major developments were reported to Headquarters as described in the following paragraphs.

2. The results of a survey of all persons receiving AMBUD benefits, and the JMWAVE recommendations for handling the ultimate termination of these benefits, were forwarded by UFGA-25261, 3 June 1966.

3. The conclusion of the vocational rehabilitation program covering 63 Brigade members on 30 June 1966 was reported by UFGA-25901, 14 September 1966.

4. The current status of the remaining six medical cases which included a request for Headquarters guidance on the disposition of these cases was prepared in September and forwarded by UFGA-26075.

B. Administration

5. In accordance with guidance received from Headquarters (DIRECTOR 10331, 7 June 1966), payment of benefits were to continue unchanged until further notice. During the reporting period JMWAVE received no guidance or instruction to change this basic decision by Headquarters.

6. Expenses incurred during the reporting period are tabulated as follows:

Remove from Project
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-957/25
Box: 2 Fold: 3

SECRET

Att #1 To UFGA 26296

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/6~~

	July (1966)	August (1966)	Sept. (1966)	Total
Dependents Payments	$26,937.50	$26,937.50	$26,937.50	$80,812.50
Heroes & Martyrs	2,906.00	2,906.00	2,906.00	8,718.00
Payroll(payments office)	1,523.38	1,523.38	1,548.48	4,595.24
Medical Sector(60 wounded)	none	none	none	none
*Medical Sector(1113 POW)	1,139.09	3,203.21	791.60	5,133.90
Brigade Office	800.00	800.00	800.00	2,400.00
General Expenses	337.80	505.89	414.01	1,257.70
Vocational Rehabilitation	none	none	none	none
TOTAL	$33,643.77	$35,875.98	$33,397.59	$102,917.34

*(Expenses for medical treatment and the payment of AMBUD-3 salary, expenses, and office space.)

C. Problems

7. The amount of $250,000.00 originally authorized for the medical phase of the AMBUD program has been almost depleted since expenditures have reached a level of approximately $220,000.00, with bills outstanding of $3,250.00. Headquarters was informed in UFGA-26075 that cases remaining which require medical treatment may necessitate the expenditure of sums in excess of the original authorization.

D. Plans for Next Quarter

8. It is expected that payment of dependent benefits and medical expenses for Brigade members will continue unchanged during the coming quarter. One possible exception would be the termination of any remaining medical cases upon release by medical authorities for return to self-supporting status.

CI:H/C

C WH/

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 13, 1966

MEMO FOR BILL BROE

Bill -

I should have sent you copies of these * two memorand~~um~~ before this.

I think that they would be of some interest to you and your staff.

WGB

WGBowdler

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

* other memo unrelated to Brigade members and payment to dependents. (2nd memo concerns interview with Andrew St. George and a film CBS is making re gun-running between the US & the D.R. for use against Haiti.

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 9, 1966
5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Manuel Artime - leader of the Bay of Pigs expedition

Artime came to see me at his own initiative. The meeting had been arranged through Congressman Dante Fascell's office. I have known Artime for several years, but had not seen him for about two years.

Artime stated that the purpose of his visit was to express some personal views about the Cuban situation. He said he fully appreciated the fact that the Cuban exile looks at his homeland in a manner quite different from the United States Government with its world-wide responsibilities. Nevertheless, he thought it important that hit-and-run raids be resumed against Cuba to (1) keep up the hopes of the opposition inside the island and (2) force Fidel to maintain a high state of alert which materially subtracts from his economic efforts. Artime noted that assets to make these raids are available but are not being used. He did not specifically ask for support to resume his activities.

I told him that while his arguments had certain merit, there were also other considerations which should be kept in mind, i.e., that hit-and-run raids provide a pretext for Castro to turn the screws of repression harder on the Cuban people and to place the blame for his own failure on external attacks. Artime acknowledged the validity of these arguments and did not pursue the matter further.

Artime said that he had reached the point where he had to think of finding a job to support his wife and three children. He indicated a preference for a job that would permit him to travel throughout Latin America so that he could maintain his contacts in other countries, and asked that I let him know if I learned of any opportunities. I said I would.

The rest of our conversation ranged over a series of points -- Cubela, Rabel, Gutierrez Menoyo, Huber Matos, the status of political prisoners, Castro's security measures, mutual friends in Miami -- but he had nothing significant to say.

Toward the end of our conversation, he returned to the subjectsof raids to volunteer his services in a leadership or subordinate capacity if the United

States Government decided to resume this type of activity. I told him I fully understood his deep desire to see his country freed and what great efforts he had made toward this objective, and thanked him for the offer. He also asked that I do what I could to prevent suspension of remittances to families of those who had fought against Castro. I told him I knew nothing about this but would look into it.

In departing he expressed deep appreciation for my having given him so much time (1 hour) and for having the chance to converse with one who understood Cuba's problems and his preoccupations. This was a rather subdued and reflective Artime -- quite a contrast with the fiery and combative Artime of two years ago.

WGB

William G. Bowdler

cc - Mr. Rostow
Mr. Bill Moyers
Mr. Robert Sayre
Mr. Peter Jessup
Mr. Robert Stevenson

15 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Payments to Dependents of Brigade 2506

REFERENCE: Memorandum for General Counsel, OGC 66-1663 Dated 22 July 1966 with Attachment

1. On 11 August 1966, I met with Nancye Gratz and Ken Millian (WH/C) to explore further the proposal that payments to dependents of Brigade members be reduced.

[illegible] [illegible] reorganization

2. I was told that WH is presently expending some $255.000 per year for 144 cases of KIA's and MIA's, which figure includes the 16 still in prison on criminal charges that predate their membership in the Brigade. It was emphasized, however, that the proposed cut back would not include the 16. I also learned that the impulse for reopening this matter was a Wave dispatch (UFGA--25261, 3 June 1966). Among other things, this proposed that effective 30 June a new payment schedule be established, and that payments to trustees be discontinued entirely.

not true

[illegible]

3. I told Gratz and Millian that while the reference sought our opinion regarding the proposed action, the matter of payments to dependents was political rather than legal. In this connection, I referred to such memoranda as Bissell's of 8 May 1961 and Helms' of 31 December 1962, which indicate that the White House had determined that these payments would be made. In response to the prepresentation that the search of WH/C files failed to reflect any policy guidance subsequent to that set out in the DDP's memorandum of 31 December, I suggested that the Wave proposal be discussed with Mr. Sam Halpern, who had previously served as Executive Officer, TFW.

4. During the afternoon of 11 August, Millian and I met with Halpern. He stated that the White House was aware that payments to

this word not used — policy was word used in the context of decision ~~[illegible]~~ payments to be made by CIA [illegible] the President [illegible]

to be made by CIA until further notice [illegible] payments dependents were being continued. He also took issue with allegation regarding the lack of policy guidance, saying that it was set out in the YOBITE messages to Wave, copies of which could be found in WH/C files. It was his view that the White House would not want to risk the charge of bad faith, even if the Government might ultimately realize a saving of some quarter of a million dollars a year. He took the position that if WH/C wished to raise the matter for the DCI's present consideration, it should first familiarize itself with YOBITE traffic. Halpern agreed with me that this subject was not one for consideration by the 303 Committee. We concluded with a suggestion that Chief, WH/C might wish to discuss that matter with Chief, WH/D before proceeding further.

memo did not refer to HQS guidance to JMWAVE

ROBERT J. BLADERGROEN
Assistant General Counsel

OGC:RJB:kab
Distribution:
Orig & ~~1~~ - Subject ✓ CUBAN RETURNEE'S PAYMENTS
RJB FILES
1 - Signer
1 - Chrono

memo of conversation is not accurate

SECRET

WH/C 66-324

22 JUL 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT: Payments to Dependents of Brigade 2506 Members

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum containing recommendations for phasing out payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 members. WH/Cuba plans to propose phasing out and terminating these payments but, before doing so, a review of the legal factors by the office of the General Counsel is desired. It is requested that an estimate be given of possible residual U.S. Government liability in these cases, and advice as to whether they can be handled on the basis of one-time termination payments.

2. In addition to the above, WH/Cuba would appreciate any advice or suggestions on methods or procedures which might be used in effecting the terminations.

3. A reply from your office would be appreciated on or before 10 August 1966.

/s/

Thomas J. Flores
Chief, WH/Cuba

1 Attachment

DDP/WH/Cuba/EXO/WTCini:new
21 August 1966
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/C/ESEC
1 - C/WH/C

SECRET

GROUP 1
[illegible]

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/Cuba

SUBJECT : Recommendations Concerning Payments to Dependents of Brigade Members

1. A review of the existing files fails to reveal any evidence of a clear-cut policy concerning the duration of payments to dependents of Brigade members killed, captured or missing in action despite the many recommendations made at various times to resolve this problem. This lack of policy is implicit in a memorandum from Mr. Helms to the DDCI dated 23 May 1962 in which he referred to a Presidential oral directive that payments to dependents were to be continued until termination by Presidential order. A later memorandum from Mr. Helms to the DDCI, dated 31 December 1962, contained recommendations for terminating these monthly payments with a lump sum death payment to be made to dependents of those killed or missing in action. Both memoranda are attached for your review. A memorandum from Mr. Sterling Cottrell to the Attorney General, dated 1 February 1963, concerning various agreements reached between Brigade leaders, AMBUD and the Agency, also included three possible alternatives for resolving the problem of dependency payments as follows:

A. Follow regulations established by the Bureau of Employment Compensation, i.e. $1,000 lump sum payment for loss of life.

B. Follow U.S. Army practice, i.e. monthly payments of $122 or more (depending on rank and length of service) for as long as the widow survives and does not re-marry. This, Mr. Cottrell pointed out, would be a costly program to administer and would cost roughly $300,000 a year for an indefinite period. (This has proven to be true).

C. A lump sum arbitrary payment of $3,000 which would be a year's dependency at the highest rate (250 per month).

2. Obviously, the above recommendations as well as others proposed at various times in an effort to terminate this costly exercise were never acted on and due to the time lag are probably no longer practical. Tentative approaches to the problem were also made by exploring the possibility of working out some mechanism by which HEW could take over disbursements at a reduced rate and periodic rulings and guidance were requested from the General Counsel concerning the legal and security factors inherent in the proposals.

3. When the original cover mechanism was established for disbursing these payments, the dependents were apparently advised that such payments would continue as long as funds were available. In view of the indefinite time stipulation together with the long-standing demise of the AMBUD organization and its relationship to this program, dependents could reasonably be expected to philosophically accept the fact that these funds have finally been exhausted. In the light of similar past experiences, some carping and protests from dissidents can be anticipated with the usual security hazards whenever the decision is made to terminate this project. These possibilities can hardly justify the indefinite continuation of this enormous expenditure of funds which to date amounts to approximately $2,000,000.00. Any question that may arise as to who has really been footing this bill is unlikely to cause any shock to the public at large after being deluged with reams of Cuban postmortems.

4. The review and recommendations forwarded by JMWAVE are comprehensive and appear to be more than generous in the approach toward a two-stage cut-off of payments. I do believe the recommendations to immediately cease any further payments to trustees should be submitted to the General Counsel for a ruling on the legal technicalities involved in such a step. This may also apply to any attempt to remove existing funds from trustees who are considered to be unreliable or even dishonest in the administration of funds under this control. These trustees were specifically designated by Brigade members and the written authorization to support such trusteeships are in the custody of AMTIKI. It would seem that no one but the

principal himself or his heirs has the legal right to revoke a trusteeship even in the mishandling of funds. Based on a review of pertinent documents and a discussion with Mrs. Evie Vidal, who is probably more knowledgeable of the facts and nuances of this problem than anyone else, I have listed below some recommendations for your consideration:

A. In line with recent JMWAVE recommendations, payments to all principal dependents (wives who have not remarried) be reduced by 30 July, or as soon as feasible, to a flat $100 per month and all minor dependents reduced to $25 per month with notification that all payments will cease 6 months from date of initial reduction. All secondary dependents, such as dependent parents who receive separate checks of not more than $50 per month, should be continued at the present rate until the final termination date for all dependents.

B. Such adjustments as recommended above should be uniform and across the board with no attempt to evaluate each case on an individual basis determined by such factors as outside income, need, etc. This would not only tend to create an undesirable security hazard but would complicate the phasing out of an already complicated situation. Furthermore, individuals who have made an effort to raise their standard of living by augmentation of their income would be justified in feeling they were penalized for having more ambition than some of the lazy pensioner types. Once we attempt to play the role of Solomon as to who is the most worthy or the most needy, we lose sight of the fact that all dependents are equal as widows whose husbands died for the same cause and we could expect no end of recriminations. Neither should there be any distinction as is recommended in some instances by JMWAVE that payments should cease because dependents happen to reside in Cuba. They are as entitled to the same benefits as those fortunate enough to reside in this country. The exception to this may be justified in those isolated cases where it is evident that nothing has been heard from such dependents and they have never received any benefits from the money paid for their support. In these instances payments to trustees should probably be terminated immediately if such action is legal.

C. In the case of the known prisoners, two courses of action could be pursued. Either cut the present dependency payments in line with that proposed for dependents of deceased with the understanding such payments will continue until the status of each man is resolved (either by release or death while in prison) or leave the present amount being paid unchanged with indefinite continuation. Considering the few involved (16 according to the JMWAVE study), the last proposal would probably be better from a psychological point of view and remove any possibility of charges against us of endangering the lives of the prisoners. Furthermore, the memorandum from Mr. Cottrell to the Attorney General referred to in paragraph 1 included as part of the general agreement reached with Brigade leaders assurance that payments to dependents of Brigade members remaining in prison would be continued. One case that falls in this category is extremely interesting. It concerns case #13 who is imprisoned under an alias and in order to insure his safety there seems to be a tacit agreement to treat him as dead. It may be quite a feat to avoid a charge of discrimination against his wife if her payments are terminated "as a widow" in order to preserve the "deceased" cover to preserve his safety.

D. Prior to submitting recommendations to the 303 Committee for phasing out dependency payments, a ruling on all the legal and possible security aspects of any proposal should probably be obtained from the General Counsel.

5. I have not explored in depth the background of the benefits presently being paid to the dependents of Heroes/Martyrs, the majority of which do not appear to have been Brigade members and do not come under the same criteria established for Brigade members. In the event you are contemplating terminating this type of payments, such action could no doubt be defended as not being applicable to the conditions governing dependents of Brigade members. It has been my understanding that your proposal to submit a memorandum to the 303 Committee in the immediate future concerns only recommendations for resolving the Brigade dependency payments. If I am incorrect and such memorandum is to also cover the continued payments to Heroes/Martyrs dependents, please advise me as to what you wish done.

Nancye Gratz
Nancye Gratz
WH/C/CA/EW

APPROVED:

Chief, WH/Cuba

22 June 1966
Date

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 12

SECRET

ORIG: T.J.FLORES/yb
UNIT: C/WH/C
EXT: 3481
DATE: 7 JUNE 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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1	C/WH/C	5	PP
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3	MO	7	[illegible]
4	CA	8	[illegible]

DISSEM BY 24 PER ____ #____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE MP/BG-2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 7 1759 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 10331

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGA 25261

APPRECIATE STATION DESIRE TAKE STEPS REDUCE AMBUD EXPENDITURES PROMPTLY. HOWEVER BECAUSE OF CONSIDERATIONS ARISING OUT OF ORIGIN OF PAYMENTS, DO NOT DESIRE INITIATE ANY CHANGES PENDING REVIEW ATTACHMENTS REF AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT COMPONENTS. WILL ADVISE PROPOSED ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/MO E J Chiocca

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER 7-7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO.

FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD
REVIEW OF AMBUD PAYMENTS

ACTION REQUIRED : REFERENCES

REF - UFGW-5346 201-315161 . 12 July 1965

1. AFTER LARGE EFFORT AND CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES STATION HAS COMPLETED SURVEY OF ALL PERSONS WHO RECEIVE AMBUD BENEFITS. JMWAVE ARRANGED WITH LOCAL HEW OFFICE FOR SOCIAL WORKERS TO ACCOMPLISH SURVEY, WORKING ON THEIR OWN TIME WEEKENDS AND NIGHTS JMWAVE ARRANGED PAY WORKERS VIA HEW. OSTENSIBLE SPONSOR OF SURVEY WAS IDEN A, OFFICE OPERATED BY AMTIKI 1. SPECIAL FORM DEVISED BY STATION WAS USED FOR SURVEY. FORM, PLUS COMMENTS OF SOCIAL WORKER RE CASE, WAS FORWARDED TO STATION. IN CASE OF BENEFITS TO RECIPIENTS LIVING OUTSIDE OF MIAMI AREA FORM WAS MAILED BY IDEN A OFFICE.

2. FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER AS ATTACHMENT 1 ARE RESULTS OF SURVEY. EACH CASE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED CASE NUMBER AND SEPARATE ANALYSIS OF EACH CASE HAS BEEN PREPARED. CASE ANALYSIS PROVIDES FOLL DATA -

A. NAME OF DECEASED OR IMPRISONED PERSON.

B. NAME OF TRUSTEE, IF ONE WAS DESIGNATED.

C. NAME OF DEPENDENT/S/.

D. INFORMATION RE TRUSTEE OR DEPENDENT/S/ AS APPLICABLE.

DATA WAS COMPILED FROM AMTIKI 1 RECORDS AND SURVEY FORMS.

E. MONTHLY ALLOTMENT PAID TO RECIPIENT/S/.

F. TOTAL AMOUNT PAID THRU 31 DEC 65.

G. JMWAVE RECOMMENDATIONS RE FUTURE HANDLING.

19-124-25/6
~~19-124-25/~~6

ATTACHMENTS - USC VIA POUCH
1. CHART AND 144 CASE RESUME /IN TRIPLICATE/
2. CHART /3 CYS/ [illegible]
3. IDENTITY ([illegible])

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CROSS REFERENCE TO Remove from ~~Project~~ CS Classification: [illegible] JOB # 72-258/25 Box: 2 Fold: 3	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-25261	DATE 3 JUNE 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19~~-124-25/2-3~~

3. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS FACTORS INVOLVED STATION DECIDED IT PREFERABLE FOR STATION TO MAKE FINAL JUDGMENT AND THAT IT NOT NECESSARY TO SEEK ASSESSMENT FROM SOCIAL WORKER, ESPECIALLY SINCE DATA ON FORMS IN MOST CASE /IN SOME INSTANCES RECIPIENT REFUSED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS/ IS SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE EQUITABLE JUDGMENT TO BE MADE. TOO SOCIAL WORKERS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF CUBAN AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS.

4. ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED INDICATED ADVISABILITY OF ESTABLISHING CRITERIA GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL CATEGORIES OF BENEFICIARIES, THEN MAKING EXCEPTIONS ONLY IN CASES WHERE GENUINE HUMANITARIAN OR HARDSHIP FACTORS EXIST. SURVEY REVEALED, AS ANTICIPATED, THAT NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS HAVE MADE STRONG EFFORT TO PREPARE SELVES FOR DATE WHEN BENEFIT PAYMENTS WOULD CEASE, WHILE OTHERS HAVE EXPENDED FUNDS ON LUXURIES, HAVE MADE LITTLE OR NO ATTEMPT TO BECOME ECONOMICALLY SELF SUFFICIENT, AND APPEAR TO CONSIDER SELVES AS INDEFINITE PENSIONERS OF ODYOKE /DESPITE IDEN A COVER IT CLEAR MOST RECIPIENTS CONSIDER THEY RECEIVING BENEFIT FROM ODYOKE/.

5. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING ACTION.

A. THAT BENEFIT PAYMENTS BE CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE UNTIL 30 JUNE 1966.

B. THAT EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1966 A NEW SCHEDULE OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS BE ESTABLISHED. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS THAT THIS SCHEDULE COMPRISE /1/ $100 PER MONTH FOR THE FIRST DEPENDENT, /2/ $25 PER MONTH FOR EACH ADDITIONAL DEPENDENT.

C. THAT EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1966 ALL PAYMENTS TO TRUSTEES BE HALTED.

D. THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA CONTAINED IN THE CURRENT SURVEY ACTION BE INITIATED /BY AMTIKI 1 PRIMARILY THRU LETTER CONTACT/ TO ATTEMPT TO RETRIEVE THE FUNDS ALLEGEDLY HELD IN CERTAIN TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS OR BY CERTAIN TRUSTEES. IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE TRUSTEE HAS DEMONSTRATED HONESTY AND CORRECT DEALING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF A TRUSTEE ACCOUNT WITH A REPUTABLE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WOULD BE LEFT IN PRESENT DEPOSITORY. HOWEVER, PER PARA 5 C ABOVE NO ADDITONAL FUNDS WOULD BE PAID TO TRUSTEE FOR DEPOSIT.

E. THAT A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE PAYMENT OF ALL BENEFITS BE FIXED. JMWAVE RECOMMENDS THAT THIS DATE BE EITHER /1/ 30 DECEMBER 1966, OR /2/ 30 JUNE 1967.

6. IF ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE APPROVED, STATION PLANS FOLLOWING ENABLING ACTION. ITEMS KEYED TO PARA 5 ABOVE.

A,B - STATION, THRU REGISTERED LETTER FROM IDEN A, WOULD NOTIFY EACH RECIPIENT OF NEW PAYMENT SCALE PRIOR TO 30 JUNE 1966.

C,D - STATION, THRU REGISTERED LETTER FROM IDEN A, WOULD NOTIFY EACH TRUSTEE THAT PAYMENTS TO TRUSTEES END 30 JUNE 1966. IN CASE OF THOSE TRUSTEES CONSIDERED ''UNRELIABLE'' LETTER WOULD ALSO REQUEST RETURN OF FUNDS TO IDEN A TO HOLD FOR BENEFICIARY.

E. IF TERMINATION DATE SET AT 30 DECEMBER 1966, ALL RECIPIENTS WOULD BE NOTIFIEBY REGISTERED LETTER PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST 1966. IF DATE SET AT 30 JUNE 1967, ALL RECIPIENTS WOULD BE NOTIFIED BY LETTER PRIOR TO 30 DECEMBER 1966.

7. IT CLEAR THAT EXECUTION OF ACTIONS IN PARAS 5 AND 6 ABOVE WILL ELICIT SOME COMPLAINTS, ESPECIALLY FROM THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION TO RENDER SELVES SELF-SUFFICIENT AND FROM THOSE TRUSTEES WHO HAVE MISAPPROPRIATED FUNDS WHICH THEY SUPPOSED TO HOLD IN CUSTODY. HOWEVER BELIEVE THAT SOLUTIONS PROPOSED ARE EMINENTLY FAIR AND COULD BE EASILY JUSTIFIED TO ANY UNBIASED PARTY WITHIN

OR OUTSIDE OF ODYOKE. AMBUD PROGRAM HAS EXPENDED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, AND BENEFITS PROVIDED TO BENEFICIARIES IN MANY CASES HAVE FAR EXCEEDED THOSE PROVIDED BY ODYOKE TO ITS OWN EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE BEEN KILLED OR SUFFERED INJURIES IN LINE OF DUTY.

8. SINCE STATION NOT AWARE OF ALL INTERAGENCY BACKGROUND RE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PAYMENT OF BENEFITS IN CASE OF CAPTURED OR MISSING PERSONNEL, STATION CAN NOT SUGGEST EXACT METHOD OF HANDLING FUTURE EARMARKING OF FUNDS, IF ANY, FOR THESE PERSONNEL. HOWEVER, STATION TENDS ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURE SIMILARSYO THAT EMPLOYED FOR CERTAIN CAPTURED AGENTS, I.E., ESTABLISHMENT OF ''CAPTIVITY PAY'' SCALE AND POST-RETURN NEGOTIATION RE AMOUNT TO BE PAID.

9. STATION REQUESTS SOONEST CONSIDERATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS CITED PARA 5 AND 6 ABOVE, NOTABLY A THRU D - DECISION RE E /TERMINATION DATE/ CAN BE MADE LATER. APPEARS THAT DECISION RE ACTIONS A AND B MAY HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIGHER AUTHORITY AND THAT IMPLEMENTATION DATE MAY HAVE TO BE POSTPONED. HOWEVER, WOULD APPEAR THAT KUBARK CAN TAKE ACTIONS C AND D AT OWN DISCRETION. THUS REQUEST HQS APPROVAL SOONEST RE ACTIONS C AND D. ADVISE.

10. FYI AT PRESENT AMTIKI 1 IS TRUSTEE FOR SOME CASES AND HAS BEEN MAKING MONTHLY DEPOSITS TO THESE ACCOUNTS. STATION RECOMMENDS THAT FUNDS IN THESE ACCOUNTS BE ALLOWED REMAIN ON DEPOSIT /HOWEVER NO FURTHER DEPOSITS WOULD BE MADE, PER SUGGESTED ACTION D ABOVE/. HOWEVER STATION PLANS WITHDRAW AMTIKI 1'S CUSTODIAL POWERS WITH RESPECT TO THESE ACCOUNTS, TRANSFERRING THEM TO CHIEF OF FINANCE BRANCH, AND AS ALTERNATE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF FINANCE BRANCH.

11. FYI VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM FOR WOUNDED MEMBERS OF BRIGADE CONTINUES. BASIC TERMINATION DATE NOW SET FOR 30 JUNE 1966. PLAN CONTINUE BENEFITS IN FEW DIFFICULT MEDICAL CASES. CAN NOT ESTIMATE TERMINATION DATE FOR THESE CASES.

12. FORWARDED AS ATTACHMENT 2 IS CONSOLIDATED DATA CONCERNING ACTUAL COSTS OF AMBUD IN FY 66 AND PROPOSED EXPENDITURES IN FY 67.

PHILIP G. ELMARD

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER S/C ATTACHMENT NO. 3 TO UFGA-25261

IDENTITY A -- MC KERCHER AND AVANT

Remove from Project:
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25 Fold: 3
Box: 2

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FORM 8-64 53a (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1-25/16

VOL ~~III~~ - CRC ANNUAL BUDGET
ALL 1968 FINANCE

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76 S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: NGratz:fll
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 19 August 1968

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pic)

S E C R E T

19 16 00Z AUG 68

CITE DIRECTOR 257112

TO JMWAVE INFO: JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD

1. PER DISCUSSION WITH MARTHA B. DRANGELIS HQS RECOMMENDS MANUEL (REYES) GARCIA (CASE NO. 122) AND ANGEL (PASTRANA) SANTOS (CASE NO. 118) TRUST ACCOUNTS ALSO BE TERMINATED.

2. REQUEST BALANCES ON DEPOSIT BE T/A'D HQS FOR TRANSFER TO MHMUTUAL ACCOUNT.

END OF MESSAGE

CI

AH
AB ✓
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~BX~~
DEC ~~NPD~~
~~PI~~
wh/c/sa

OGC/MHMUTUAL D. Fielder (telecon)
WH/B&F Elliott
WH/COG/SA

19-124-25/6
19 aug 1968

for William V. Broe
C/WHD

for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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ORIG: N. GRATZ:jgh
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: 4163
DATE: 30 JULY 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, C/IOA, KILAN

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 31 16 43Z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 20867

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGT-22352*

CONCUR PAYMENT PLAN PROPOSED PARA 3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

AN
AB X
~~IN~~
~~PS~~
~~RK~~
EP
WH/C/SA

WH/COG Comment: *Dependent mother dead Brigader advised AMTIKI of arrival U.S. and requested money held in trust. Monthly amount has also been paid to account of dependent father whom mother advises has been dead since February 1962. JMWAVE proposes pay mother $13,125 (75 months at $175 per month) and turn over remaining $780.57 in account ($50 per month deposited for father plus 6 years accrued interest) to JMWAVE Finance Officer.

CS COPY

19-124-25/6
31 July 1968

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/SS
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

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R

E T TELEPOUCH
DISP NO - UFGT 22352
DATE - 29 JULY 1968
TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION
FROM - ACTING CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
SUBJ - ARRIVAL IN U.S. OF BRIGADE DEPENDENT FROM CUBA AND SETTLEMENT OF TRUSTEE ACCOUNT.
ACTION REQUIRED - REQUEST CABLE CONCURRENCE OF JMWAVE'S PLAN IN PARA 3.

1. MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES FROM CUBAN AND CONTACTED AMTIKI-1 BY LETTER DATED 2 JUNE 1968. MRS. MOLINA IS THE MOTHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA, KILLED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE HISTORY OF THIS CASE IS AS FOLLOWS.

A. MARIANO DESIGNATED HIS MOTHER AND FATHER, BOTH IN CUBA AS HIS DEPENDENTS. MARIANO ALSO DESIGNATED CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS AS HIS TRUSTEE TO HANDLE ALL MONIES FOR HIS DEPENDENTS.

B. AMTIKI-1'S RECORDS SHOW THAT CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS WAS PAID AT THE RATE OF $225.00 PER MONTH FROM APRIL 1961 TO APRIL 1962. ACCORDING TO THE RECORD, ALL PAYMENTS TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS CEASED AT THAT TIME BECAUSE "CARLOS FERNANDEZ DID NOT ACCOUNT IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER FOR THE MONEY RECEIVED." AMTIKI-1 OPENED A SAVINGS ACCOUNT IN THE COCONUT GROVE BANK IN MAY 1962 IN THE NAME OF MARIANO SANTOS AND/OR JUAN SANTOS (THE FATHER) WITH HIMSELF AS TRUSTEE. DEPOSITS OF $225.00 PER MONTH WERE MADE TO THIS ACCOUNT FROM MAY 1962 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1966 WHEN ALL DEPOSITS TO TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS WERE ORDERED STOPPED BY JMWAVE. TOTAL PAYMENT TO THIS ACCOUNT WAS $11,925.00 AND WITH THE EARNED INTEREST OF $1,980.57 THE ACCOUNT BALLANCE AS OF JULY 23, 1968 WAS $13,905.57.

S

[illegible]
Excluded [illegible]
[illegible] and
[illegible]

C. THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT MARIANO'S MOTHER MIGHT ARRIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WAS A COPY OF A LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1967 AND SENT TO MARIANO'S BROTHER RENE SATOS FROM J.A. MORALES, THE PRESIDENT OF THE 2506 ASSAULT BRIGADE ASSOCIATION. RENE SANTOS LIVES IN HACKENSACK, N.J. THIS LETTER ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF A LETTER FROM RENE REQUESTING THAT ALL CHECKS FOR HIS MOTHER, CLARA MOLINA, NOW BEING SENT TO CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS BE SUSPENDED AND THAT HIS MOTHER WOULD "WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS" BE ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES. MORALES' LETTER ADVISED RENE TO WRITE TO THE AMTIKI-1 ADDRESS, WHICH HE PROVIDED AND MAKE THE SAME REQUEST. HE FURTHER ADVISED RENE THAT HE SHOULD PROVIDE THE AMTIKI-1 ADDRESS ADDITIONAL BIO DATA ON MARIANO AND HIS MOTHER AND FATHER.

D. AMTIKI-1 RECEIVED A LETTER DATED 19 SEPYEMBER 1967 FROM RENE SANTOS STATING WHO HE WAS AND THAT HIS MOTHER CLARA MOLINA WOULD "WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS". BE ARRIVING IN THE UNITED STATES VIA SPAIN. ENCLOSED WITH THE LETTER WAS A COPY OF MORALES LETTER (C ABOVE), MARIANO'S BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND PICTURE.

E. AMTIKI-1 REPLIED AT JMWAVE'S REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGING RECIEPT OF RENE'S LETTER AND ENCLOSURES AND ADVISED RENE THAT PAYMENTS TO THE TRUSTEE, CARLOS FERNANDEZ CAMPOS, HAD BEEN TERMINATED (NO DATE GIVEN) AND THAT MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA SHOULD NOTIFY HIS OFFICE BY MAIL UPON HER ARRIVAL IN THE U.S.

F. AMTIKI-1 RECEIVED A LETTER FROM MRS. CLARA MOLINA CABRERA DATED 2 JUNE 1968 STATING THAT SHE WAS NOW IN THE U.S. AND DESIRES TO DISCUSS MARIANOS' CASE.

G. AMTIKI-1 REPLIED ASKING MRS. CLARA MOLINA TO FORWARD ANY DOCUMENTS THAT SHE MIGHT HAVE TO IDENTIFY HER AS THE MOTHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA. MRS. MOLINA REPLIED IN A LETTER DATED 4 JULY 1968 ENCLOSING HER BIRTH CERTIFICATE,

R

PHOTOGRAPH AND PASSPORT NUMBER. MRS. MOLINA ALSO INFORMED AMTIKI-1 THAT HER HUSBAND AND THE FATHER OF MARIANO SANTOS MOLINA HAD DIED 25 FEBRUARY 1962.

2. AMTIKI-1 ON 23 JULY 1968 COMPLETED A BREAKDOWN OF THE ACCOUNT SHOWING THE AMOUNT IN THE BANK WHICH IS SHOWN IN PARAGRAPH 1 B ABOVE, THE AMOUNT PAID TO THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE WHICH IS $2,925.00 AND THE AMOUNT DUE MRS. CLARA MOLINA. SINCE MRS. MOLINA'S HUSBAND DIED PRIOR TO AMTIKI-1 TAKING OVER AS TRUSTEE, THE PAYMENTS DURING AMTIKI-1'S TRUSTEESHIP SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT THE RATE OF $175.00 PER MONTH INSTEAD OF THE $225.00. MAY 1962 THROUGH JULY 1968 (75 MONTHS) AT $175.00 PER MONTH AMOUNTS TO $13,125.00 AND AS NOTED IN PARAGRAPH 1 B ABOVE THE ACCOUNT CONTAINS $13,905.57.

3. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE AMTIKI-1 WITHDRAW THIS ACCOUNT AND PURCHASE A CASHIER'S CHECK FOR MRS. MOLINA FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT DUE ($13,125.00) AND PASS THE BALANCE OF $780.57 TO THE JMWAVE FINANCE OFFICER. FOLLOWING THIS AND BEGINNING WITH THE AUGUST 1968 PAYMENT AMIKI-1 WILL FORWARD A CHECK FOR $175.00 EACH MONTH TO MRS. CLARA MOLINA IN THE SAME MANNER AS OTHER BRIGADE DEPENDENTS. JMWAVE PLANS TO HAVE AMTIKI-1 PROVIDE MRS. MOLINA WITH THE NAME OF THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEE AND THE AMOUNT PAID TO HIM WITH REGRETS THAT HE CANNOT ASSIST HER IN THIS MATTER. WE ALSO PALN TO HAVE AMTIK-1 EXPLAIN THE METHOD OF COMPUTING THE $13,125.00 TOTAL ($175.00 PER MONTH FOR 75 MONTHS). WE DO NOT PLAN TO RAISE THE POINT OF EARNED INTEREST. WE BELIEVE THAT WOFIRM WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATION TO MRS. MOLINA BY THE ABOVE PAYMENT PLUS HER MONTHLY PAYMENTS TO FOLLOW. PLEASE CONCUR IN THIS PARAGRAPH BY CABLE.

FREDERICK J. INGHURST

S

C

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SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGT-22352 PAGE FOUR
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ORIG: N. GRATZ:jgh
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
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AMBUD
NANCY G

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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(classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

12 16 16z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15227

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REF: JMWAVE 3051 (IN 47521)*

PROPOSED GERRITY TRIP TEMPORARILY DELAYED. WILL ADVISE FIRM DATE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG Comment: *Re proposed trip Mr. Marvin Evans to JMWAVE to review AMTIKI records of AMBUD dependency cases.

OGC Mr. Morrisey (telecon)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, EI/AN, OGC, MPS/BG 3, CCS 2, CSPS, OP 2

S E C R E T 101502Z JUL 68 CITE JMWAVE 3051 10 JUL 68 IN 47521

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 14684

SUGGEST ANGUS L. GERRITY TRAVEL AT HIS CONVENIENCE ANY TIME WEEK OF 15 JULY. PLEASE ADVISE ARRIVAL TIME AND IF GERRITY WISHES TO BE MET.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET

ORIG: N. GRATZ
UNIT: WH/COG/SA
EXT: 4163/1325
DATE: 9 JULY 68

OPS | OS
DV | TC
FP | SS
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SA | COG REG

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 32 PER #

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

09 18 55z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR NANCYE 14684

TO JMWAVE INFO JMCOBRA

TYPIC AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REQUEST ADVISE PRIORITY MOST CONVENIENT DATE FOR ANGUS L. GERRITY TRAVEL JMWAVE FOR CONFERENCE WITH FREDERICK L. INGHURST (Robt. Moore) RE REVIEW AMTIKI FILES. IN VIEW INGHURST IMMINENT DEPARTURE FROM STATION GERRITY SUGGESTS CONFERENCE BE ARRANGED ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/SA Mr. Ortman (draft)

OGC---Mr. Morrissey (telecon)

for Paul E. Oberst
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

for Paul E. Oberst
DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG/CP BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG N Conatz

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, C/OA, MPS/BG2

WAVE

S E C R E T 242100Z JUN 68 CITE JMWAVE 2912 24 Jun 68 N 37195

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD AMTIKI

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 10200

AN/ ✓	PI	
PB -	DEST	wh/ops
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX -

LAST AMTIKI MONTHLY ACCOUNTING FORWARD VIA T/M 178709 JMPIGEON FLIGHT 6/25/68.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
24 June 1968

ORIG: NGrats:fll
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R-1325
DATE: 21 June 1968

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 21 20 16z JUN 68 CITE DIRECTOR 10200

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD AMTIKI

COPY LAST AMTIKI MONTHLY ACCOUNTING URGENTLY REQUIRED FOR PROJECT OUTLINE. PLEASE FORWARD IN NEXT JMPIGEON POUCH.

END OF MESSAGE

for William V. Broe
C/WHD
Paul E Oberst

RELEASING OFFICER

for WH/COG/OPS

COORDINATING OFFICERS

for David A. Phillips
C/WH/COG
Paul E Oberst

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DISP NO- UFGW-7076

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 27 MAY 1968

INDEX - NO

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - CTYPIC/AMBUD/MHMUTUAL AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - DIR-00211

1. MHMUTUAL HAS AGREED TO TAKE OVER ADMINISTRATION OF THE AMBUD BENEFITS CASES. HOWEVER, PENDING DECISIONS RELATIVE TO THE NUMBER OF CASES THAT SUBSEQUENTLY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO BEC, HEADQUARTERS FEELS THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PRESENT METHOD OF PAYMENTS /VIA AMTIKI/.

2. IN VIEW OF THE PROBABILITY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH BEC WILL NOT BE CONCLUDED BEFORE 1 JULY 1968, THE JMWAVE FINANCE OFFICER SHOULD CONTINUE TO FUND THE AMBUD PAYMENTS THROUGH AMTIKI DURING THIS INTERIM PERIOD. FY-1969 FUNDS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR AS LONG AS REQUIRED.

3. THIS MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AND CONCURRED IN BY COS, JMCOBRA. PLEASE PASS A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE TO JMCOBRA.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

CS COPY

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3- COS, JMWAVE

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Coordinated by: OGC/MHMUTUAL (Mr. Block) (telecon)
Released by: C/WH/COG Paul Oberst

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SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGW-7076 PAGE 1

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19-124-25/6

14-00000

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FILE VR. WH 8, OGC 2, MPS/BG 2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO, DO 4, WAVE

S E C R E T 201425Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2440

20 May 68 IN 14464

DIRECTOR

AMBUD MHMUTUAL

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 00211

AN	FI.	
PS	DEST	[illegible]
ABSTRACT X	INDEX	

FORWARDED VIA T/M 070343 JMPIGEON FLIGHT 21 MAY IS LIST OF AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES, INCLUDING AMOUNTS PAID, MAILING ADDRESSES, AND NAMES OF TRUSTEES, REQUESTED IN REF.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
20 March 1968

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE 703

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD
Transmittal of Documentation - Dependency Case #3

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

As requested in reference, attached are the birth certificates and the marriage certificate relating to AMBUD Dependency Case #3, Bonito BLANCO Cruz (201-283944).

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
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MAY 15 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21898

DATE
10 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7447
DATE: 15 MAY 68

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

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15 23 41 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 00211

TO JMWAVE

AMBUD MHMUTUAL

1. HQS PROPOSES TURNOVER ADMINISTRATION AMBUD CASES TO MHMUTUAL IN NEAR FUTURE. IN ORDER ESTABLISH PAYMENT MECHANISM JMWAVE IS REQUESTED HAVE AMTIKI PREPARE LIST DEPENDENTS PRESENTLY PAID, AMOUNTS PAID, AND CURRENT MAILING ADDRESSES FOR CHECKS. NAMES OF TRUSTEES SHOULD ALSO BE INDICATED WHERE APPLICABLE. THIS INFO URGENTLY REQUIRED.

2. ABOVE INFO FOR JMWAVE ONLY. WHEN PROCEDURES PROPOSED MHMUTUAL HANDLING COMPLETED JMWAVE WILL BE ADVISED. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRIEFING AMTIKI ON CHANGE WILL ALSO BE MADE.

END OF MESSAGE

mp
AM KB ~~24~~
~~RB~~ ~~JBOP~~
ABSTRACT X
WHC/CBS

OGC/MR. GREANEY (BY TELECON)

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Paul E Oberst

for DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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15 May 68
19-124-25/6

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
AMTRIGON-8 (201-283995), AMBUD Case #97

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-7040, 29 April 1968

1. AMTRIGON-8 was a member of the VILLARO crew. During May 1962 he clandestinely and without authorization boarded an infiltration craft moments before its departure on an operational mission. His absence was not discovered until the team had infiltrated and moved into its first position.

2. On 8 or 9 June 1962 the infiltration team, including AMTRIGON-8, became engaged in a firefight with a militia patrol. AMTRIGON-2, the team leader, reported that AMTRIGON-8 had been wounded and that he assumed AMTRIGON-8 was killed or perhaps captured. However, no further word has been heard from AMTRIGON-8 and he is presumed to be dead.

3. Taking into consideration that the disposition of this case could have an affect on the morale of the other crew members and their attitude toward WOFIRM, it was decided to advise the widow of AMTRIGON-8 that he died a hero's death while fighting for the liberation of his country and to continue monthly payments to the widow and children for an indefinite period. Inclusion of Subject's name on AMBUD Hero & Martyr rolls was deemed to be the most suitable and expeditious manner in which to handle such payments.

4. The response to paragraph 2 of reference will be the subject of a separate dispatch.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

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CROSS REFERENCE TO
B-201-283995

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-30051

DATE
10 May 1968

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HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-283995

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WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

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FILE. VR. WH 8 CI/IA MPS/BG2

WAVE

S E C R E T 101341Z MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2351

10 MAY 68 IN 08155

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIRECTOR 97425

PLEASE SEE UFGT-21810 DATED 28 APRIL 68.

S E C R E T

BT

AH 4 C	[illegible]	
~~PS~~	[illegible]	
ABSTRACT	X	Lomelops
		~~INDEX~~

19-124-25/6
10 May 1968

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UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: R9008
DATE: 7 MAY 1968

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INFO: FILE, VR WH8, C/ION, OS, C, CS, PP

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET MAY 7 17 48 Z

COG REG

CITE DIRECTOR 97426

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: UFGW 7040*

Nancye

PLEASE REPLY REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG/COMMENTS: JMWAVE requested to provide additional information on two AMBUD dependency cases in order complete BEC documentation.

William V. Broe

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/COG/OPS

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD
AMBUD Trust Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Reference: UFGW-7020, 11 April 1968

1. AMTIKI-1 has advised that he does not envisage any problems in closing out the trust accounts. However, since the bank holding the deposits is relatively small, it was agreed to accomplish the closing out of accounts over a period of several months. To this end, the accounts pertaining to cases #116 (Justo MONTES DE OCA Ceballos) and #114 (Francisco FERNANDEZ Cabrera) have already been closed out and the funds will be transferred to Headquarters in the near future.

2. Being forwarded under separate cover is the background information on the ten trust accounts as requested in reference.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
As stated para 2, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att

MAY - 2 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21810

[illegible]

DATE
28 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
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HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

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TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT TYPIC/Operational/AMBUD

C Request for Additional Information on Two AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Action Required: See Paragraph 1

1. It is requested that Raymond K. PANUSES recheck the file of Miguel Los Santos DELGADO Martinez (Case No. 97) in an effort to determine the cause and actual date of his death. Headquarters file does not reflect this information nor the reason why his dependents are paid under the AMBUD program. In those few cases of former active assets whose dependents are paid by AMTIKI, the exact date and circumstance of death is necessary for documentation.

2. It is also requested that AMTIKI be queried regarding certain vital documents which should be in the file of Benito BLANCO Cruz (Case No. 3). A copy of a letter from the widow, dated 11 January 1962, indicated that her marriage certificate and the birth certificates of her children were enclosed with the letter. It is possible, but unlikely, these documents were overlooked when the file was recently reviewed. In any event, the work check sheet used by the documentation team indicates these documents were missing from the file.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
3-COS,JMWAVE

29 APR 1968

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-7040	DATE
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

22 April 1968

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OFFICE	OFFICER	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz:jaf	

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/COG/OPS		Arthur T. Kamm

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	4/24/68	David A. Phillips

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

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TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
INFO
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE F.J.I.
SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustment of Dependency Payments - Third Quarter FY 1968
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. The following financial adjustments to AMBUD dependency cases were made during the period covered by this report:

Case #90: Guillermo GUIM Gutierrez (no 201 nr.)
Payee: Herminia CANTERO (widow)

Effective 1 March 1968 the monthly payment for this case was reduced to $225.00 inasmuch as the son, Guillermo GUIM Cantero, reached 21 years of age.

Case #42: Ramon MOREJON Hernandez (201-289511)
Payee: Carmolina AENELLE (grandmother)

The payee's daughter returned the January 1968 payment to AMTIKI-1 with a note advising that the payee passed away in December 1967. Since the payee was the sole dependent designated by the Subject, no further payments will be made in connection with this case.

2. Subsistence payments made to Rafael ORTEGA Hernandez (201-299101), AMBUD medical case, were terminated with the January 1968 payment. ORTEGA was advised that this would not affect medical treatment expenses and that medical expenses will continue to be paid as in the past until further notice.

3. Per Headquarters instructions, the monthly payment to the Brigade office was reduced from $800.00 to $500.00 effective with the payment for March 1968 and following the April 1968 payment, all financial support will cease.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

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3 - WH/COG

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19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29935
DATE
APR 23 1968
18 April 1968
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19-124-25/6

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TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD
AMBUD Trustee Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGT-21580, dated 25 March 1968

1. Headquarters recommends that all reference accounts, with the possible exception of the PASTRANA account (Case #118), be closed immediately and the proceeds transferred to Headquarters.

2. It is suggested that AMTIKI be queried concerning any possible embarrassment he might suffer in his personal relationship with the bank if he summarily closes all the accounts, since there is no wish to place him in an untenable position. Headquarters is aware that those so-called trust accounts are actually savings accounts and were so designated on the 1967 bank statements filed in the AMTIKI files. Under the circumstances, it is highly possible that an IRS inquiry may be initiated after the accounts are withdrawn and AMTIKI should be assured of Headquarters intercession in his behalf if he is questioned by IRS. However, in the event of such an inquiry, Headquarters must be prepared to submit a full accounting of those cases including dates and amounts of deposits and withdrawals and WOFIRM authorization for transactions which JMWAVE should be able to provide. It is recommended that AMTIKI immediately prepare a full background history relating to the opening of each account, all financial transactions since the accounts were opened, and references to JMWAVE authorization for any deposits and withdrawals. These accountings should be forwarded for Headquarters files as soon as they are completed. When AMTIKI is authorized to close the accounts, a memorandum covering the authorization should be prepared by JMWAVE and a copy forwarded to Headquarters.

3. In the event above recommendations tend to create any insurmountable problems JMWAVE is requested to advise the nature of the problems and submit alternate recommendations.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
3-COS,JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-7020	11 APR 1968
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

9 April 1968

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[illegible]	~~[illegible]~~	

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OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz:jaf		

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/B&F		Mr. Want (Coord in draft)
OCG		Mr. Bladergroen (Coord by phone)

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/COG	4/9/68	David A. Phillips

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
AMBUD Dependency Case #64, Ovidio CAMEJO Lopez

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

1. The monthly payment made to the dependents of Ovidio CAMEJO Lopez was reduced by $25.00 effective 1 April 1968 inasmuch as Station and AMTIKI-1 files indicated that Subject's son, Miguel Angel CAMEJO Rojas, had reached 21 years of age on 11 March 1968.

2. Upon being informed of the payment reduction, Subject's widow, Blanca ROJAS, advised AMTIKI-1 by letter that the correct birth date of her son is 11 March 1948 and not 11 March 1947.. Subsequently, the widow provided a photostatic copy of her son's INS-issued residence card (copy attached) which records his birth date as 11 March 1948.

3. Accordingly, AMTIKI-1 has been instructed to reinstate the $25.00 sum retroactive to 1 April 1968.

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
3 copies of residence card, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att. h/w

1 [illegible] filed 201-file
1 copy photostat attached to BEC documentation

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-29867

DATE
9 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-297129
19-124-25/6

RECEIPT

5 April 1968

RECEIVED FROM NANCYE GRATZ, WH/COG, THREE CHECKS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR FOLLOWING BEC EMPLOYEES.

PAYEE	AMOUNT
Mrs. Jeanne BROCKIE	$121.50
Mr. James Frank HEFTON	169.80
Mr. Wilfred HARREN	166.25

B DeFelice

Ben DeFelice
DD/Pers/SP

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C424

S E C R E T 031840Z APR 68 CITE CARACAS 9294 (LYNER ACTING)

3 APR 68 64285

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD CIMOTIF-1

REF DIRECTOR 38286

AN	FI	
RS	DEST	Cl/ops
ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX	

CIMOTIF CO ABSENT IN WOLADY ON EMERGENCY LEAVE. PREFER AWAIT HIS RETURN TO RAISE FACT THAT CIMOTIF-1 AND WIDOW HAVE SAME MATRONYMIC RATHER THAN QUERY THROUGH INTERIM CO. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

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19-124-25/6
3 April 1968

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TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
AMBUD Trustee Accounts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCES:
A. UFGA-29508
B. UFGA-29614
C. JMWAVE-1613
D. DIR 83308

1. AMTIKI-1 has contacted the bank regarding the Social Security numbers requested and has been advised that, although the bank is not obligated to insist upon Social Security or other identifying numbers for these accounts, it does feel that AMTIKI-1 may ultimately be subjected to an inquiry from the Internal Revenue Service. Their reasoning is based primarily upon the fact that the accounts, while trust accounts for our purposes, are not true trust accounts in that no trust agreements are of record at the bank. (Trust agreements could not be signed, of course, since the individuals were not and are not available to sign.)

2. In order to protect AMTIKI-1 from any possible IRS investigation and, rather than pursue the matter further with the bank, for which we have no cleared contact, it is suggested that these accounts be closed out over a two or three month period and re-established at Headquarters through the appropriate DTEARN channels. If the accounts remain here, it will be necessary to prepare new signature cards for each account removing Humphrey O. TIMANUS as a signatory and adding a JMCOBRA asset as an "inside" trustee for control purposes, or to remove AMTIKI-1 entirely and establish the JMCOBRA asset as the sole trustee.

3. Please advise.

Leonard R. Stallans
Leonard R. STALLANS

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25 Mar, 68

DATE DISPATCHED
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DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-21580

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

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CARA 4

S E C R E T 272210Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9227

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

27 MAR 68 IN 78296

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: HVCA-15247

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		

PLS ADVISE STATUS OF REF CASE. STATION QUERY BASED ON FACT CIMOTIF-1 NOT WILLING ACCEPT MARCH SALARY SINCE HE PREFERS IT GO

AN.	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

TO SUBJECT OF REF. SHOULD HQS FORESEE INVESTIGATION OF REF CASE WILL TAKE LONG TIME, STATION WOULD APPRECIAE HQS COMMENTS RE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUGGESTION POSED BY CIMOTIF-1 IN PARA 3 REF.

S E C R E T

BT

19-124-25/6
27 March 1968

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: Paul E. Oberst:jls
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7451
DATE: 15 March 1968

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S E C R E T 15 2 37 Z CITE DIRECTOR 3330 8

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD LCDATA

REF: JMWAVE 1613 (IN 67990)*

DTEARN ADVISES THAT TRUSTEE SHOULD GO TO BANK AND CERTIFY THAT INDIVIDUALS ARE FOREIGN NATIONALS WHICH SHOULD SOLVE PROBLEM. ADVISE IF FURTHER ASSISTANCE NEEDED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH Comment: Asked Hqs advice re handling of AMBUD trust accounts.

OGC (Mr. Bladergroen by phone)
C/WH/B&F

William V. Broe
Chief, WHD

for Paul E. Oberst
David A. Phillips
Chief, WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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5		10	

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BY: ______ AT: ______ Z

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ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

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X-REF TO FILE NO. ______

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO WH/COG BRANCH ☒ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO FILE, VR. WH 8, OGC 2, OF 2

S E C R E T 112056Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1613

11 MAR 68 IN 67990

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD LCDATA

REFS: UFGW 6934
UFGA 29508
UFGA 29614

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	~~Developments~~
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. STATION WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY. STATION SUGGESTS AS POSSIBLE REMEDY THESE ACCOUNTS BE CLOSED AND TRANSFERRED TO ZRMETAL BANK.

2. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS THIS SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

BT

19-124-25/6
11 March 1968

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]

X-REF TO FILE NO. 201-283964

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[illegible]

27

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET /2

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INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS

AN	FI	
FS	PEST	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	

S E C R E T 082143Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1596 WAVE

DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD AMOTIN AMACTION

REF: UFGW 6947

IN REPLY REF PARA 2 AMOTIN-1 ADVISES THAT FILES CONTAIN COPIES BASIC LIMITED PHS RECRUITING DATA ON BRIGADE MEMBERS. THEY DO NOT INCLUDE BIRTH OR MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES. IN SOME CASES NUMBER DEPENDENTS INDICATED AND IN OTHER CASES NAMES OF DEPENDENTS.

MOST LACKING BIRTHDATES.

S E C R E T

8 MAR 68 IN 66944

1P

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 25 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

19.201.283964

19.124.28/6
8 March 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 11 TOTAL COPIES 24

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

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ACTION WH/COG 2 ☑ RID COPY

INFO. FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA

WAVE

S E C R E T 081607Z MAR 68 CITE JMWAVE 1586

8 Mar 68 IN 66649

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

REF: DIRECTOR 88924

WILL MEET AND ACCOMMODATE.

AN	PT	WH/C/OPS
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

19-124-25/6
8 March 1968

n. Gratz

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:jaf
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 7447
DATE: 7 MAR 68

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 OPS
6 OS
7 FC

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY ____ PER ____ # ____

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, CA 2, CS/S

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(date and time filed)

(elite) (pica) (reference number)
CITE DIRECTOR 80942

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 80640*

B. UFGT 21376**

1. REF A TEAM ETA 1408 HRS 10 MARCH. NATL FLT 115. APPRECIATE THEIR BEING MET AND ACCOMMODATED IF POSSIBLE.

2. MARGANY WILL HANDCARRY LASER FUNDS REQUESTED REF B.

END OF MESSAGE

COG COMMENTS: *Advising 2 staffers and 3 BEC employees arriving 10 March to document AMBUD dependency cases.
**Requested $40,000 attribution for LASER funding.

AC/WH/COG/OPS
WH/COG/SA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
TO	Chief of Station, JMWAVE
INFO.	
FROM	Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
SUBJECT	TYPIC/AMBUD Transmittal of Forms

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference:

Attached herewith are special forms to be used by reference AMBUD documentation team.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

Attachment: h/w
As stated above.

Distribution:
3 - COS, JMWAVE W/Att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER S UFGW-10366	DATE 7 MAR 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER

Distribution:

1 - WH/SS
1 - WH/SA
1 - WH/COG/OPS
1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - RI/DP

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST		EXT.
WH/COG/OPS	Nancye Gratz	ak	3/6/68	Red 9008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
AC/WH/COG/OPS	3/6/68	
~~C/WH/SA~~		
C/WH/SUPPORT	6 Mar 68	

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
for C/WH/COG	3/6/68	

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

Nancy Gratz

ORIG: NANCY GRATZ:nk
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS/EXO
EXT: 7447 R. 9008
DATE: 6 MARCH 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

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4		9	
5	DP	10	

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

RR
SA
COG/EXO
COG REG

INFO: FILE , VR, WH 8, OPS, CCS 3, CSPS, COGS 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 7 [illegible] 20 Z CITE DIRECTOR 80630

TO ~~PRIORITY~~ JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

1. THREE MEMBERS IDEN A GROUP, ELLEN F. MARGANY AND IDEN B PLAN ARRIVE JMWAVE SUNDAY, 10 MARCH, TO DOCUMENT AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES.

2. CAN JMWAVE PROVIDE ACCOMODATIONS SUITABLE FOR BOTH LIVING QUARTERS AND WORK AREA FOR TEAM? ADEQUATE CLERICAL AND TRANSLATOR SUPPORT ALSO REQUIRED.

3. WILL ADVISE ETA.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/COG/OPS
~~C/WH/COG/SA~~

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/DBS (Mr. DeFelice - Telecon)

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TOTAL COPIES: 29

SECRET

ORIG: NANCY GRATZ:ak
UNIT: WH/COG/EXO
EXT: 7447 R. 9008
DATE: 6 MARCH 1968

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2	CIS	7	OS
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5	PP	10	

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SA

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. COG/REG
INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, [illegible]

LOGS 4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET 7 00 20Z CITE DIRECTOR 80640

TO PRIORITY JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIRECTOR 80639

IDEN A: BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION

IDEN B: JOHN P. LITTLEJOHN, PERSONNEL BENEFITS AND SERVICES STAFFER.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/COG/OPS William J. Murray
C/WH/COG/SA ✓
C/DBS Mr. DeFelice - Telecoord

By
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET TELEPOUCH

24

DISP NO- UFGW-6947
FILE NO- 19-125-24/6
DATE - 4 MARCH 1968
INDEX - NONE
FILE - NONE
TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE
INFO - NONW
FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
SUBJ - TYPIC/AMBUD/AMOTIN/AMACTION
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON AMACTION/1 BRIGADE FILES
ACTION - SEE BELOW
REFS - UFGA-29430 DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1968

DOC. MICRO. SER.
AUG 29 1972
MICROFILMED

1. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH BEC TO TAKE OVER FUNDING OF THE AMBUD DEPENDENCY CASES APPEAR TO BE REACHING A FAVORABLE DECISION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN THE EVENT BEC AGREES TO HANDLE THESE PAYMENTS, EACH DEPENDENCY CASE MUST BE DOCUMENTED BY BEC TO DETERMINE IF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED QUALIFY FOR COMPENSATION UNDER BEC CRITERIA. THE MAJORITY OF THE REQUIRED DATA IS AVAILABLE IN AMTIKI'S FILES BUT THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IN THE BRIGADE FILES MAINTAINED BY AMACTION/1.

2. ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH 4 /B/ OF REFERENCE, THE AMACTION FILES ARE THOSE ORIGINALLY PREPARED BY AMOTIN/1 WHICH WERE TURNED OVER TO AMACTION BY AMTIKI. IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED IF SUBJECT FILES CONTAIN ANY VITAL DOCUMENTS SUCH AS MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES, BIRTH CERTIFICATES, ETC., AND PERSONALITY DATA ON AMBUD DEPENDENTS, WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL IN DOCUMENTING THESE CASES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE AMACTION FILES ARE MERELY DUPLICATES OF THOSE HELD BY AMTIKI. HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERS IT PREFERABLE AT THIS TIME TO EXPLORE THE CONTENTS OF THESE FILES THROUGH AMOTIN/1,

AB	FD	3/7/72
	BEST	
ABSTRACT ✓		~~INDEX~~

Remove from ~~Project~~ Subj
CS Classification: 19-124-25/6
JOB # 72-258/25
Box: 2 Fold: 4

19-124-25/6
~~19-125-24/6~~

D-19-125-24/6

RATHER THAN AMACTION/1. IF JMWAVE CONSIDERS THIS FEASIBLE IT IS REQUESTED THAT AMOTIN/1 BE QUERIED CONCERNING THE TYPE OF MATERIAL IN THE FILES WITHOUT REVEALING THE REASON FOR OUR INTERESTS.

3. PLEASE ADVISE THE SUBSTANCE OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM AMOTIN/1 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ELLEN F. MARGARY

DISTRIBUTION

3 - COS, JMWAVE /BY TAPE/

Originated by: **Nancy Gratz,**
WH/COG/OPS X7447

Coordinated by:
AC/WH/COG/OPS

Hqs. Distribution:

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1 - WH/COG/ESEC
1 - C/WH/COG
1- RI/Files

Released by:
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19-124-25/6

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ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY	INFO: FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, MPS/BG-2, FI		

S E C R E T 012217Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9043

ABSTRACT ✓	INDEX ✓

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

CIMOTIF TYPIC

1 Mar 68 IN 62970

1. IN RECENT 15 TO 20 FEB PERSONAL TRIP TO JMWAVE AREA, CIMOTIF-1 MET TERESA SUAREZ WHO OLD FRIEND AND WIDOW OF IDEN A. ACCORDING SUAREZ IDEN A EXECUTED IN PBRUMEN AROUND AUG 61 WHILE ON OP FOR WOFIRM. AS A RESULT SHE AND SEVEN-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER NOW RECEIVING 100-DOLLAR-MONTHLY PENSION FROM IDEN B WHICH SHE STATES NOT ACCORDING TO TERMS OF AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY IDEN A AND WOFIRM REPRESENTATIVE IN EARLY 1960. SUAREZ STATES AMOUNT SHOULD BE 300 DOLLARS MONTHLY.

2. ALTHOUGH CIMOTIF-1 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER IDEN A EVER WORKED FOR WOFIRM OR WHAT TERMS OF AGREEMENT WERE IF IDEN A DID, HE STILL GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT SUBSISTENCE OF SUAREZ AND DAUGHTER ON 100-DOLLAR-MONTHLY PENSION. CIMOTIF-1 FEELS RESPONSIBILITY TO THEM BECAUSE HE STATES HE RECOMMENDED IDEN A TO WOFIRM OFFICER IN EARLY 1960.

3. CIMOTIF-1 IN PROCESS OF WRITING DETAILED REPORT ON WHAT HE REMEMBERS ABOUT CASE. HE DOES REMEMBER IDEN A JOINED FORCES WITH IDEN C IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH OP. STATION WILL

MICROFILMED
23 1968
MICRO. SER.

19-124-25/6
1 mar 1968

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO

FILE VR.

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PAGE 2 CARACAS 9043 SECRET

POUCH WHEN RECEIVED. MEANWHILE WOULD APPRECIATE HQS AND JMWAVE CHECK INTO CASE. STATION WOULD LIKE ALLEVIATE CIMOTIF-1 CONCERN THIS CASE ASAP SINCE HE ONE OF STATION KEY ASSETS.

4. JMWAVE; CIMOTIF-1 WAS FORMERLY AMGIRAFFE.

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

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IN 62078

m 1P

S E C R E T 312219Z MAR 68 CITE CARACAS 9044 CACA

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

CIMOTIF TYPIC

REF: CARACAS 9243 (IN 62070)

IDEN A: (MAJOR) JESUS CARRERAS

IDEN B: HEROES Y MARTIRES FUND

IDEN C: COMANDANTE MORGAN.

S E C R E T

~~[illegible]~~	~~DEST.~~	WHC/OPS
ABSTRACT ✓		INDEX ✓

Allegedly executed in Cuba [illegible] August 1961. ([illegible] CACA 9043)

SECRET

MICROFILMED
APR 23 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

[illegible]
1 March 1968

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29614

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6

DATE - 29 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - ,9,3

59 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL

AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

REFS - A. UFGW-6934

B. UFGA-29508

1. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED T PARA 1, REF A -

A. COCONUT GROVE BANK, 2701 S. BAYSHORE DRIVE, MIAMI, FLA. WITH UNCLEARED BANK OFFICIALS.

B. /1/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. PABLO HUGO ROJAS AND/OR ESPERANZA ALONSO /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20237/

/2/ JUAN PAUL I.T.F. MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22304/

/3/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. FRANCISCO I. FERNANDEZ AND/OR VIRGILIA CABRERA /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20192/

/4/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. ANASTASO GONZALEZ AND/OR RAMONA LEON /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22307/

/5/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. JUSTO MONTES DE OCA AND/OR SIXTA CEBALLOS /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20194/

/6/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. CATALINA PUIG /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22306/

/7/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. ANGEL PASTRANA AND/OR MARIA CERNUDA /ACCOUNT NUMBER 20518/

/8/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. AIDA MORALES /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22305/

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29614 PAGE ONE

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declassification

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19-124-25/6

/9/ JUAN PAULA I.T.F. OLGA SANCHEZ /ACCOUNT NUMBER 22864/

/10/ NO REQUEST RECEIVED FOR ACCOUNT NUMBER 21020 - JUAN PAULA I.T.F. MARIANO SANTOS AND/OR JUAN SANTOS.

C. TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS

D. JUAN PAULA

E. REQUESTS WERE MADE IN FORM LETTERS - NO REASON GIVEN FOR BANK HAVING DELAYED REQUEST.

2. HEADQUARTERS ASSUMPTION THAT JUAN PAULA TOOK OVER TRUSTEESHIP FROM ORIGINAL TRUSTEES IS CORRECT. NO PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ANY OF THE TRUSTEE ACCOUNTS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1965. CUSTODIANS OF ACCOUNTS ARE HUMPHREY O. TIMANUS /P/, JUAN PAULA, AND MARIO GIRBAU. STALLANS WAS NOT ADDED NOR JUAN PAULA AND MARIO GIRBAU DROPPED PENDING FOLLOWUP OF DIRECTOR 10331. JMWAVE STILL OF OPINION THAT TRUSTEES SHOULD BE STATION OFFICERS AND WOULD LIKE PERMISSION TO PROCEED PER ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION.

GILBERT T. SELECKI

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

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DATE: [illegible]

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

action cable filed
Daniel FERNANDEZ Mon 201 file

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MADRID INFO: JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: MADRID 4059 (IN 56793) *

1. NEGOTIATIONS IN PROCESS FOR TURNING OVER MAJORITY AMBUD DEPENDENCY PAYMENTS TO ANOTHER LNHARP AGENCY IN NEAR FUTURE. SINCE CONTEMPLATED TURNOVER WOULD NECESSITATE CHANGE IN PAYMENT PROCEDURE FOR SUCH DEPENDENCY CASES, HQS PREFERS NOT TO DISTURB PRESENT TRUSTEESHIP IN REF CASE.

2. REQUEST STATION MADRID DELAY ANSWER TO RAMIRO (MON) FUERTES, IF POSSIBLE, UNTIL FURTHER ADVICE FROM HQS.

3. PARA 1 INFO FOR STATION ONLY.

END OF MESSAGE

COG Comment: * Request from Ramiro MON Fuertes, provincial Mayor of Asturias, through US Embassy to Madrid Station, that AMBUD dependency payment to mother of deceased Brigade member, be paid direct to mother now living in Madrid. Payment is presently paid through a trustee residing in Miami.

C/WH/COG
OGC telecon (Mr. Veberhorst)
EUR/CUPI (Mr. Sorrels)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/EUR/SR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FROM

ACTION

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SA COG/REG

INFO

FILE

23 FEB 63 58783

ACTION

SECRET 231137Z FEB 63 CITE MADRID 4259

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

1. RAMIRO MON FUERTES, MAYOR OF TINEO AND PROVINCIAL DEPUTY OF ASTURIAS, WAS PUT IN CONTACT WITH STATION BY LNPURE REGARDING SURVIVORS PAYMENTS FOR A RELATIVE WHO KILLED IN BAY OF PIGS INVASIONS. PERSON KILLED WAS DANIEL FERNANDEZ MON AND PAYMENTS REPORTEDLY MADE TO RAFAEL SANCHEZ WHO FRIEND BUT NOT RELATIVE. MON DESIRES PAYMENTS BE TRANSFERRED TO MOTHER OF FERNANDEZ WHO LUCIA MON FUERTES AND RESIDES MARQUES DE LEMA 13, 4 F, MADRID 3, ESPANA.

2. PLS ADVISE WHAT REPLY SHOULD BE GIVEN RAMIRO MON.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- UFGW-6934

FILE NO- 19-124-25/6

DATE - 23 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NO

TO - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

INFO - NONE

FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

SUBJ - TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

REFS UFGA-29508 DATED 14 FEBRUARY 68

UFGA-25261 DATED 3 JUNE 66

ACTION - SEE BELOW

1. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING REFERENCE A INQUIRY, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REQUESTED.

A. NAME OF BANK REQUESTING SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.

B. NAMES UNDER WHICH ACCOUNTS ARE HELD.

C. TYPE OF ACCOUNTS, I.E. TRUST ACCOUNTS, SAVINGS ACCOUNTS, ETC.

D. WHO DID BANK CONTACT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS?

E. SINCE THESE ACCOUNTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN 60-61 WAS ANY REASON GIVEN FOR BANK HAVING DELAYED ITS REQUEST UNTIL NOW?

2. SINCE REFERENCE A INDICATES ALL OF THE ACCOUNTS ARE IN THE SAME BANK, HEADQUARTERS ASSUMES THESE ARE PROBABLY THE TRUST FUNDS AMTIKI TOOK OVER FROM THE ORIGINAL TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTERED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. ACCORDING TO REFERENCE B JMWAVE PROPOSED THAT NO

AN KB
PG
ABSTRACT X
ach/KEGC

19-124-25/6

FURTHER DEPOSITS BE MADE TO THESE ACCOUNTS AND CUSTODY BE TRANSFERRED TO THE STATION FINANCE OFFICER.

3. HEADQUARTERS WILL ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM AS SOON AS THE ABOVE REQUESTED INFORMATION IS RECEIVED.

ELLEN F. MARGANY

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE 3-COS, JMWAVE

ORIGINATOR:

Nancye Gratz
WH/COG/OPS Nancye Gratz

COORDINATION:

William Murray J.
AC/WH/COG/OPS William Murray
WH/COG/SA Robert Ortman
OCC (Mr. Bladergroen in draft)

RELEASING:

C/WH/COG David A. Phillips

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SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - UFGA-29508

FILE NO - 19-124-25/6

DATE - 14 FEBRUARY 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT O - AMBUD DEPENDENTS TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS

1. UNCLEARED BANK WHICH HOLDS DEPOSITS OF THE NINE AMBUD TRUST FUND ACCOUNTS HAS REQUESTED SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS TO ENABLE TAX REPORTING.

2. HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED IN RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM.

GILBERT T. SELECKI

DISTRIBUTION

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

14-124-25/6

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CLASSIFICATION

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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational Ricardo MONTERO Duque (201-293321), Case 136

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: For your information

1. Attached is a letter dated 25 January 1968 and addressed to the AMTIKI/1 facility from Esther F. MONTERO, 47-04 Broadway, Union City, New Jersey. Mrs. MONTERO is the wife of imprisoned Brigade member Ricardo MONTERO Duque and is the recipient of a $275 monthly AMBUD dependency payment.

2. In this letter and in a similar letter sent to Senator Robert F. KENNEDY (copy provided by her attached), Mrs. MONTERO, as President of the Mothers, Wives and Sons of the 9 Bay of Pigs Prisoners Association, refers to the possible exchange of the remains of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA and Communists imprisoned in Bolivia in return for prisoners in Cuban jails. She requests that the necessary steps be taken to insure that the names of the nine Brigade members still imprisoned in Cuba are included in the list of persons to be exchanged.

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
Two letters cited above, u/s/c

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG, w/att (u/s/c)

FEB 14 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-29491	9 February 68
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-293321 19-124-25/5

2P

MICROFILMED
FEB 20 1968
DOC MICRO. SER.

Esther R. Montero
47-07 Broadway
Union City, N.J. 07087

January 25th, 1968

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

In the name of the Mothers, wives and sons Pig's Bay Nine Prisioners Association, I beg you to make you biggest effort to get in touch with the Commission or Department in care, to confectionate the list of names in the possible trading between Presidente Barrientos of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba in order they include the names of the 9 Prisioners Pig's Bay Invasion left in Cuba on the 1962 Trading because at that opportunity Castro did not want to trade them. As you know on this trading are involved prisioners belonging to the CIA Department and others that the Pentagon can include in the Trading's List.

I know always the CIA Department, the Pentagon and the Government of the United States of America have their names in mind, of course they want to bring these nine Prisioners to freedom, in this opportunity there is a very good chance, because Castro agreed with President Barrientos to change all Communist Prisioners and the Body of Ernesto (Che) Guevara for the Prisioners he has in Cuba that will be stated on the Trading's List.

We are sure you will do your best in order to include the nine Pig's Bay Prisioners left on Cuba on the 1962 in the Trading's List. Please let me know something about it. Also we are enclosed copy of the letter we are sending to Senator Robert F. Kennedy asking the same thing.

Thank you very much in advance for your attention in this matter, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Esther R. Montero

Esther R. Montero
(Vasallo)

cc: Senator Robert F. Kennedy
File

CS COPY

S/C aa1 UFGA-29491

201-293321

Esther R. Montero
47-04 Broadway
Union City, N.J. 07087

January 25th, 1968

U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy
110 E. 45th Street
New York, Ny.

Senator:

As President of the Mothers, Wives and Sons of the 9 Prisioners Pig's Bay Association, beg to you and pray to God, it could be possible for you to do something in this particular case. I don't want to make a long letter, because I know how bussy you are, but this is a very good opportunity to bring home my husband RICARDO MONTERO DUQUE, and the others 8 prisioners left on Cuba on the 1962 trading. At that time when all others prisioners belonging to Pig's Bay Invasion came in trading, Castro did not want to include them in the list.

The last time I tried to be in touch with you, was on the 1964 at your Office, in this opportunity you were out the City, but your Secretary Mr. Nolan was very nice with us, and he told us he was sure you were going to do everything possible to bring them home, it was impossible and they stay at CUBA.

Now, you know there is a possible trading of prisioners between Presidente Barrientos of Bolivia and Fidel Castro of Cuba, in it are involved prisioners belonging to the CIA Department and others that the Pentagon can include in the Trading's List. We are sure you will not hesitate to do anything to bring them home, but it is our obligation and duty to try for their freedom.

The possible trading between Presidente Barrientos and Castro is because Castro wants all Communist Prisioners and the Body of Ernesto (Che) Guevara now in Bolivia; that's why he agree to accept all names that the CIA Department, Pentagon and Presidente Barrientos put in the Trading's List.

At the same time I'm writting a letter to the CIA Department from which you will find an attached copy. Please let me know anything about this and of course if this letter got your hands.

Thank you very much in advance for your attention in this matter, I remain,

Very truly yours,

Esther R. Montero

cc: File

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #99 (Luis MENDEZ Perez)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith is a reproduction of the marriage certificate of Luis Horlirio MENDEZ y Perez and Estela MENA y Mendez.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
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1 ATT

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19-124-25/6

JAN 15 1968

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-29280	DATE 10 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 148648.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ESTE.-

SECCION	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION No.
Matrimonios.-	97.-	473.-	471.-

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Luis Norlirio Mendez y Perez.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EDAD	ESTADO CIVIL
Caimito del Guayabal.-	22 años.-	soltero.-

PROFESION U OFICIO	DOMICILIO
empleado.-	Factoria ciento veintitres.-

NOMBRE DEL PADRE	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE
Jose.-	Olaya.-

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Estela Mena y Mendez.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO	EDAD	ESTADO CIVIL
San Jose de las Lajas.-	19 años.-	soltera.-

PROFESION U OFICIO	DOMICILIO
su casa.-	Gloria doscientos sesentiseis.-

NOMBRE DEL PADRE	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE
Eligio.-	Evangelina.-

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO	DIA	MES	AÑO
La Habana.-	2.-	Septiembre.-	1949.-

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO	CARGO
Ricardo E. Viurrun y Oviès.-	Notario.-

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan.-

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL de la Habana.-

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Habana, tres DE Octubre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.-

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO	CONFRONTADO
B	

ATT 6 UFGA 29280

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda — con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

Habana, tres Octubre 1967 -

O. Valera

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. [illegible]
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ACTION WH/COG 8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, EUR 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 292256Z CITE JMWAVE 0124 30 Nov 67 IN 02080

WAVE

MADRID INFO DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: JMWAVE-0265 (IN 94781) 286400

AN	PI	
PS		
ABSTRACT ✓		

BRIGADE WIDOW QUERIED AMTIKI-1 VIA TELEGRAM RE REQUEST FOR FUNDS. PLS ADVISE STATUS OF TRANSFER.

S E C R E T

SECRET

JUAN ARGEO PAULA-BAEZ

201-294245
30 Nov 1967

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Dependency Case #143, Jorge KIM Yun (201-298852)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Being forwarded herewith is a copy of a Special Power of Attorney which grants Roberto M. TRETO, 41-25 Kissen Boulevard, Flushing, New York, complete authorization and power of attorney to act as the representative of Anastacia YUN Cho and Pedro KIM and rescinds the authority previously granted Raul SANTOVENIA Lopez. The change was requested by SANTOVENIA who indicated to Subject's parents his desire to withdraw as trustee.

2. Also attached is a notarized statement signed by both the old and new trustee in which SANTOVENIA acknowledges receipt of $15,750.00 from March 1961 to December 1966 (at which time payments were suspended). The statement also notes the transfer of $13,039.00 by SANTOVENIA to TRETO to be held in trust for KIM's parents. SANTOVENIA listed the following accounting for the $2,711.00 not transferred to TRETO:

Money sent to parents in Cuba	$ 515.00
Medicines sent to parents in Cuba	$ 155.00
Payment to the Committee Pro-Liberty of Playa de Giron Prisoners	$ 75.00
Expenses incurred by trustee	$1,966.00
TOTAL	$2,711.00

Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
3- WH/COG

NOV 29 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-29036	27 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-298852

NUMBER TWELVE

SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

---In San Diego del Valle, on June 5th, 1967.--------------------

---BEFORE ME: Doctor Aurelio R. Armiñana Trimiño, Lawyer and ---- Notary Public of the Association of Las Villas province, District of Santa Clara, with residence here,------------------------------

---THERE APPEAR: Mrs. Anastacia Yun Cho, and Mr. Pedro Kim, married to each other, cuban citizens, of legal age, housewife and employee respectively, she born in Mendez Capote, Cardenas, and he in Mexico, and both residents at Carretera de Varadero, kilometro dos, house marked with number 12, Cardenas, Cuba, accidentally in this place.---------------------------------------

---I attest of knowing the appearers, and of being sure of their birthplaces and other personal data, according to their statements.

---They appear by themselves, making use of their corresponding rights, and they assure to be in the full enjoyment of their civil rights, and to have, as I---not knowing anything contradictory---think they have, the necessary legal capacity for this act, and they jointly state:---

---FIRST: That as legitimate parents of Jorge Kim Yun, born in Cardenas, cuban citizen, of legal age, unmarried, deceased, former resident of the United States of America, they, being his only and universal heirs, grant, give, and confer the most ample, whole, and complete authorization and power of attorney, as far as it is necessary, and according to law, in behalf of Mr. Roberto M. Treto, cuban citizen, of legal age, married, employee, born in Santa Clara, province of Las Villas, Cuba, and resident of 41-25 Kissena Blv, Apt. 4 B, Flushing, N.Y., U.S.A., in order that, representing his person, rights, and actions, he uses it and exercise it with the following:--

FACULTIES:

---FIRST: To administer and direct readily all the wealth, rights, and actions that the appearers have and are entitled to as sole heirs or beneficiaries of the deceased Jorge Kim Yun, as well as all the wealth that belonged to him or that he may have collected in the United States, whether it be cash or bank deposits, governmental or private, movable property and personal property, and in general everything belonging to the inheritance of the before mentioned deceased person, without restrictions; to withdraw cash from the bank account (or bank accounts) that theprincipal had to his name or to the appearers', as beneficiaries or as heirs, in the manner disposed by the laws in force in said country; to receive the checks, pensions, compensations, or other amount due to any other reason, that may be issued, or that the principal has the right to collect, being the appearers also able to do so as heirs, beneficiaries or transferred party, whether the above mentioned assets originate from the American State, or from banking trusts or private agencies of any kind; to sign and subscribe the corresponding and necessary documents to those ends; to send the appearers the aforesaid amounts, deducing from said quantities the expenses in which the proxy may incur; to assume the custody of all the wealth belonging to the principal and his heirs.------

---SECOND: In order that said proxy receive from Mr. Raul Santovenia López the furniture, chattels, documents, and cash that the latter deliver him, with the faculty to sign and subscribe the -- public or private documents that Mr. Santovenia may ask of him as security.--

---THIRD: That they revoke, annul, and invalid Power No. 2 dated January 6, 1964 granted before Notary Public of Martí, Matanzas-province, Cuba, Doctor Antonio Doleñas Santa Marina, in behalf of Mr. Raul Santovenia López.--------------------------------------

---FOURTH: That they likely wish to say by meansof this document how grateful they are to Mr. Santovenia Lopez for having managed their affairs with complete honesty. Finally, the appearers state that it is their will that their proxy use this authorization without limitations, and for everything that they, themselves, could - personally do.--

---Thus they state and grant before me, previous the reading of -- this instrument by me, the Notary Public, since they resigned to - the right they had to do soby themselves. They ratify its contents and sign before me. I attest.--------------------------------------

(Signed): Anastácia Yun. Pedro Kim. Dr. A.R. Armiñana.

IT AGREES TO ITS ORIGINAL, that under number 12 is filed at the General Registry of Public Instruments of this Office under my charge, and which I have consulted. And to deliver to the appearers upon -- their request, I issue this first copy in two sheets of paper, on - the date of its grant, after having affixed the corresponding revenue stamps, and having left a note of its issuance on the margin of its original. I ATTEST.--

----

The undersigned, Layyers and Notaries Public of the Association of Las Villas, District of Santa Clara, with residence here, ATTEST: that the preceding signature belongs to our colleague Dr. Aurelio - R. Armiñana Trimiño. At Santa Clara on June 5, 1967. (There appear the seals and signatures of the legalizing notaries).-

---

REPUBLIC OF CUBA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

I, María del C. Dos-Chapelles y Fesser, Keeper of the Registry of - Legalization of Signatures, CERTIFY: that the preceding signatures of notaries with residence in Santa Clara, Doctors Consuelo Barrero and Armando Lopez, seem to be authentic. At Havana, Cuba, on June 16, 1957.- (Signed).-

- - - -

I, the undersigned, José A. Parlá, a legal translator, do hereby - certify: that the foregoing is a true and correct English translation of the hereto annexed document in Spanish. At Havana, Cuba, on June - 19, 1967.-

José A. Parlá
Legal Translator

--- [illegible] SUBSTITUTION OF ADMINISTRATOR.---

--- This agreement made between Mr. Raul Santovenia Lopez, a Cuban citizen, of legal age, married, an employee, residing at 5907 Park Avenue, West New York, New Jersey, of the one part; and Mr. Roberto M. Troto, a Cuban Citizen, of legal age, married an employee, residing at 41-[illegible] Kissena Boulevard, Flushing, New York, of the other part, witnesseth:---

FIRST: That the said Mr. Santovenia was designated Administrator or Trustee of Mr. Jorge Kim Yun's belongings, a Cuban Citizen of legal age, single, who died in Cuba as a Member of The Cuban Brigade number 2506; and this designation was made by the Parents of the deceased, Mrs. Anastasia Yun Cho and Mr. Pedro Kim, both Cuban Citizens, residing in Cardenas, Cuba, and is granted in the Special Power of Attorney signed on January 6, 1964, before The Notary Public, Dr. Miguel Antonio Bolanos Santamarina.-

SECOND: That Mr. Jorge Kim Yun's belongings was a Pension granted to him as a Member of such a Brigade in the amount of $225.00, monthly, during the Period March 1961 to December 1966, which represents the total amount of $15,750.00.-

THIRD: That of the total amount of $15,750.00, Mr. Santovenia has deducted the following payments and expenses:- (a) The amount of $515.00 sent to Mr. King's Parents. (b) The amount of $199.00 purchased in Medicine and sent to Mr. Kim's Parents. (c) The amount of $75.00 paid to the Committee Pro Liberty of Playa de Giron Prisoners. (d) the amount of $1,926.00 which represents all the expenses as Administrator during the entire Period.-

FOURTH: Consequently, the net amount kept by Mr. Santovenia after deducting the payments and expenses mentioned in Parragraph number third, is $13,035.00.-

FIFTH: The other part, Mr. Roberto M. Troto, states:- That he has been appointed Administrator of Mr. Jorge Kim Yun belongings, by Mr. Pedro Kim and Anastasia Yun Cho, father and mother of the deceased, and this designation is granted in the written Power of Attorney signed on June 5, 1967, before the Notary Public of San Diego Del Valle, Cuba, Dr. Roberto M. Arufnuna Trimino; and therefore, since today he is the substitute of Mr. Santovenia as Administrator.-

SIXTH: That today he receives from Mr. Santovenia a certified check issued by the First National Bank of Jersey City, in the amount of $13,035.00, relieving Mr. Santovenia of further responsibilities.-

Given and subscribed in the City of West New York, New Jersey, this thirteenth day of September, nineteen hundred and sixty seven.---

Raul Santovenia Lopez

Roberto M. Troto

Witness: Nilo A. Barroso

Nilo A. Barroso

SWORN TO BEFORE ME

THIS 13 DAY OF September 1967

NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires Oct. 10, 1968

---- RECIBO DE CANTIDAD Y RENUNCIACION DE ADMINISTRACION ----

---- Consta por el presente documento, como de una parte: el Senor RAUL SANTOVENIA LOPEZ, natural y Ciudadano de Cuba, mayor de edad, casado, empleado, residente en el numero 5307 de la Avenida Park, en West New York, Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de Norte America; y de otra parte: el Senor ROBERTO M. PRATO, natural y Ciudadano de Cuba, mayor de edad, casado, empleado, y vecino del numero 41-25 del Boulevard Kissena, en Flushing, Ciudad y Estado de New York, Estados Unidos de Norte America, convienen lo siguiente:------------------------------

PRIMERO: El Senor Santovenia fue designado Administrador de los Bienes quedados al fallecimiento del senor JORGE KIM YUN, que era natural de Cardenas, Cuba, Ciudadano Cubano, mayor de edad, soltero, y vecino que fuera de los Estados Unidos de Norte America, y cuyo deceso ocurriera en Cuba, como Miembro de la Brigada Cubana numero 2506, Movilizado numero 1,736; cuya Administracion le fue conferida por los padres legitimos del fallecido, Senora Anastasia Yun Cho, y Senor Pedro Kim, Ciudadanos Cubanos, y vecinos de la Ciudad de Cardenas, Cuba, mediante la Escritura de Poder numero Dos, de fecha Seis de Enero de mil novecientos sesenta y cuatro, otorgada ante el Notario de Marti, Provincia de Matanzas, Cuba, Doctor Miguel Antonio Polanco Santamarina.-

SEGUNDO: que el unico bien quedado al fallecimiento del Senor Kim Yun esta representado por la Pension a que se hizo acreedor el Senor Kim Yun, como Miembro de dicha Brigada 2506, ascendente a la suma de $225.00 mensuales, por el Periodo de Marzo de 1961 a Diciembre de 1966, cuya suma total asciende a la cantidad de $15,750.00.-

TERCERO: que de la suma total de $15,750.00, el Administrador Senor Santovenia ha hecho las siguientes erogaciones:- (a) La cantidad de $515.00 representada por distintos Giros Postales enviados a Cuba a los padres del senor Jorge Kim.- (b) La cantidad de $155.00 representada por Medicinas enviadas a Cuba.- (c) La cantidad de $75.00 enviada al Comite Libertad Prisioneros de Giron.- (d) La suma de $1,966.00 representada por gastos de administracion durante todo el periodo del mismo.-

CUARTO: que en consecuencia, la cantidad liquida que conserva el Senor Santovenia en su poder, una vez deducidas las partidas mencionadas en la Clausula anterior, asciende a la suma de $13,039.00 (TRECE MIL TREINTA Y NUEVE DOLLARES).-

QUINTO: El Senor Roberto M. Prato, por su parte, dice:- Que por Escritura Publica numero Doce, otorgada ante el Notario de San Diego del Valle, Cuba, Doctor Roberto M. Arzinaga Tricino, por los padres del fallecido Jorge Kim Yun, Senores Pedro Kim y Anastasia Yun Cho, el dia Cinco de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta y siete, fue designado Administrador de los Bienes, en sustitucion del Senor Raul Santovenia Lopez, con todas las amplias facultades contenidas en dicho Poder.-

SEXTO: que en este acto, recibe de manos del Senor Raul Santovenia Lopez, y para sus Poderdantes, la cantidad de TRECE MIL TREINTA Y NUEVE PESOS, representada por un Check Certificado del First National Bank of Jersey City, cesando por tanto la Administracion del Senor Santovenia y relevandolo de futuras responsabilidades.-

(Al Dorso)

Y para constancia, extendemos el presente documento por cuadruplicado, y firmamos en la Ciudad de West New York, Estado de New Jersey, hoy día trece de Septiembre de mil novecientos sesenta y siete.---

Raul Santovenia Lopez

Roberto R. Prieto

Dr Freddy Alvarez

Testigo: Nilo A. Barroso

Nilo A. Barroso Navarro

SWORN TO BEFORE ME

THIS 13th DAY OF Septiembre 1967

NOTARY PUBLIC OF NEW JERSEY
My Commission Expires Oct. 10, 1968

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #109

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of the following documents pertaining to AMBUD Hero & Martyr Case #109, Armando ESCOTO Aloy (201-283865):

a. Marriage certificate - 8 July 1933. Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria Josefa RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Certification of birth - Armando Miguel ESCOTO Rodriguez (no birth date given). Parents - Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
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NOV 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28994

DATE
17 November 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-283865

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DEL ESTADO CIVIL

SOLICITUD No. 03534.-Legalizada.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE Arroyo Naranjo.-

SECCION DE:	TOMO:	FOLIO:	INSCRIPCION:
Nacimientos	112	277-	274-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: ARMANDO MIGUEL ESCOTO RODRIGUEZ.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE:	NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE:
Armando Eladio Escoto Aloy	Juana María Rodríguez Expósito.-

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL la Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE AL MARGEN DE LA INSCRIPCION DE NACIMIENTO REFERIDA.

no consta nota alguna de

matrimonio.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE ENERO 6 DE 1963.-

veinte y dos DE setiembre

DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete

CONFECCIONADO POR:	CONFRONTADO POR:	CERTIFICADO POR:
mc		

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana.

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre 67

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 141001

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE ARROYO NARANJO

SECCION	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION No.
MATRIMONIOS	12	476	241

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Armando Eladio Escoto y Aloy

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana — EDAD: 21 años — ESTADO CIVIL: soltero

PROFESION U OFICIO: comerciante — DOMICILIO: Juan Delgado noventa y uno

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Antonio — NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Josefa

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS: Juana María Josefa Rodríguez y Expósito

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana — EDAD: 23 años — ESTADO CIVIL: soltera

PROFESION U OFICIO: no consta — DOMICILIO: D'Strampes setenta y cuatro, Víbora

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Nemesio — NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Loreto Sindulfo

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO	DIA	MES	AÑO
Arroyo Naranjo	8	Julio	1933

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO: Dr. Juan Manuel Valdés y González — CARGO: Juez Municipal

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL 1
Término Municipal de La Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA

La Habana, a veintidos DE Septiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO: Curbelo — CONFRONTADO:

ECAC-319-88-301609

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

Olga Dalia Campos

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana

CERTIFICO: Que se identifica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana, que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

Set. 22 de 1967.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for Hero & Martyr Case #109

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of the following documents pertaining to AMBUD Hero & Martyr Case #109, Armando ESCOTO Aloy (201-283865):

a. Marriage certificate - 8 July 1933. Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria Josefa RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Certification of birth - Armando Miguel ESCOTO Rodriguez (no birth date given). Parents - Armando Eladio ESCOTO Aloy and Juana Maria RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

Raymond K. PANUSES

ATTACHMENT:
As stated above, h/w

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG w/att

NOV 22 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-28994	17 November 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6 201-283865

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DEL ESTADO CIVIL

SOLICITUD No. 03534.-Legalizada.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE Arroyo Naranjo.-

SECCION DE:	TOMO:	FOLIO:	INSCRIPCION:
Nacimientos	112	277-	274-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: ARMANDO MIGUEL ESCOTO RODRIGUEZ.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE:	NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE:
Armando Eladio Escoto Aloy	Juana María Rodríguez Expósito.-

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
la Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE AL MARGEN DE LA INSCRIPCION DE NACIMIENTO REFERIDA

no consta nota alguna de

matrimonio.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE ENERO 6 DE 1963.

veinte y dos DE setiembre
DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete

CONFECCIONADO POR:	CONFRONTADO POR:	CERTIFICADO POR:
mc		

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

OLGA VALERA CAMPOS y/o ARSENIO MENDEZ SIERRA

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana.

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales.

La Habana, 22 de Septiembre [illegible]

Valera

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No. 141001

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ARROYO NARANJO

SECCION	TOMO	FOLIO	INSCRIPCION No
MATRIMONIOS	12	476	241

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS: Armando Eladio Escoto y Aloy

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana

EDAD: 21 años

ESTADO CIVIL: soltero

PROFESION U OFICIO: comerciante

DOMICILIO: Juan Delgado noventa y uno

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Antonio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Josefa

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS: Juana María Josefa Rodríguez y Expósito

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La Habana

EDAD: 23 años

ESTADO CIVIL: soltera

PROFESION U OFICIO: no consta

DOMICILIO: D'Strampes setenta y cuatro, Víbora

NOMBRE DEL PADRE: Nemesio

NOMBRE DE LA MADRE: Loreto Sindulfo

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO	DIA	MES	AÑO
Arroyo Naranjo	8	Julio	1933

NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO: Dr. Juan Manuel Valdés y González

CARGO: Juez Municipal

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan

SALVEDADES

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL 1
Término Municipal de La Habana

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA

La Habana, a veintidos DE Septiembre DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO: Curbelo

CONFRONTADO:

[illegible]

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

Olga Valera Campos

Responsable del Registro de Legalizaciones de las firmas que autorizan las certificaciones expedidas por el Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana [illegible]

CERTIFICO: Que es auténtica al parecer la firma del Encargado del Registro del Estado Civil de La Habana, que consta de este documento, por la semejanza que guarda con las que acostumbra a usar en sus actos oficiales. [illegible]

Set. 22 de 1987.

6 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ben DeFelice, C/BSD

SUBJECT : Files Concerning Payments to Bay of Pigs Dependents

1. Attached are duplicate files for your retention and review by Mr. Tinsley. One set of files contains a list of all deceased and imprisoned participants in the Bay of Pigs operation. The other set of files covers a deceased member of BRIGADE 2506 and contains the type of requested documentary material requested by Mr. Tinsley.

2. The master file of policy papers which I understand is for your retention will be delivered to you before the end of this week.

3. Please advise me if there is anything else you require.

Nancye Gratz
WH/COG

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION:
- MARKED FOR INDEXING
- XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
- ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
- MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE F.I.

SUBJECT: O TYPIC/AMBUD Operational Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following Hero & Martyr cases:

Case #104: LEON Leon, Vicente (201-286541)

a. Birth certificate: Vicente LEON Leon. DPOB: 25 April 1917, Palmira, Las Villas, Cuba.

b. Marriage certificate: 13 August 1909 Francisco de LEON Castaneda and Lucia de LEON Carrandi.

Case #105: BAEZ Mas, Juventino (201# not available)

a. Birth certificate: Juventino Jose de Jesus Evangelista BAEZ Mas. DPOB: 27 December 1940, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
As stated above, h/w

Distribution:
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CS COPY

OCT 27 1967

l au

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-28801

GROUP 1 [illegible]

DATE: 24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER: [illegible]
19 -124-25/6

14-00000

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
PALMIRA. LAS VILLAS - - - - -

SOLICITUD No.

SECCION DE	TOMO	FOLIO	[illegible]	FECHA DEL ASIENTO DIA	MES	AÑO
Nacimiento	- 34 -	312 -	270 -	7	Octubre	1967 -

HORA: A LAS CUATRO DE LA MAÑANA

DIA: VEINTICINCO

MES: ABRIL

AÑO: DEL MIL NOVECIENTOS [illegible] - - - - -

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: VICENTE, LEON Y [illegible] - - - - -

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: PALMIRA - - - - - - - -

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Francisco León y [illegible]-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: [illegible]------

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Lucía León y [illegible]------

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: [illegible]------

ABUELOS PATERNOS: Dionisio------ / Carmen-----

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Rafael----- / Petronila---

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE: LA COMPARECENCIA DEL PADRE DEL INSCRIPTO - - - - -

NOTAS MARGINALES: No tiene----------

Ley 1213.1967.-

DOCTORA LUCIANA [illegible] YUSTE Y FERNANDEZ, ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Palmira, a veintiseis de [illegible] DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y [illegible]

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

CONFECCIONADO POR

CONFRONTADO POR

CS COPY

AU-1 UFGA-28801

19-124-2046

14-00000

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
SAN FERNANDO DE CAMARONES, - L.V.-

CERTIFICACION DE MATRIMONIO

SOLICITUD No.

SECCIÓN DE MATRIMONIOS	TOMO 2 Moderno	FOLIO 532	INSCRIPCION No. 83.-

DATOS DEL CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS FRANCISCO DE LEON Y CASTANEDA		
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO este término	EDAD 42	ESTADO CIVIL viudo
PROFESION U OFICIO campo	DOMICILIO este término	
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Dionisio	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Gregoria del Carmen	

DATOS DE LA CONTRAYENTE

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS LUCIA DE LEON Y CARRANDI		
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO Cruces	EDAD 16	ESTADO CIVIL soltera
PROFESION U OFICIO su casa	DOMICILIO no consta	
NOMBRE DEL PADRE Rafael	NOMBRE DE LA MADRE Petronila	

LUGAR, FECHA Y FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE

LUGAR DE CELEBRACION DEL MATRIMONIO no consta	DIA 13	MES Agosto	AÑO 1909
NOMBRE Y APELLIDOS DEL FUNCIONARIO AUTORIZANTE DEL ACTO José Barra y Barreiro	CARGO Cura Párroco de este pueblo		

NOTAS MARGINALES

NO CONSTAN

SALVEDADES

DOCTORA LUCIANA MARTA YUSTE Y FERNANDEZ, ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION DE MATRIMONIO A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

San Fernando de Camarones, A primero - - - - - - DE Junio - - - - DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete.-

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

CONFECCIONADO POR L. Moreno

CONFRONTADO POR

14-00000

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 10825

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE SANTA CLARA	FECHA DEL ASIENTO DIA 11	MES Enero	AÑO 1941
SECCION DE Nacimientos	TOMO 174	FOLIO 246	INSCRIPCION 245

FECHA DE NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA una de la noche	DIA veinte y siete
MES Diciembre	AÑO mil novecientos cuarenta

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: Juventino José de Jesús Evangelista Báez y Has

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: Esta Ciudad.

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE Juventino José Severino Báez y Rodríguez	LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE Santa Clara
NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE Flora Aida Laudelina Clara Echevarría Has	LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE y Machado. Santa Clara

ABUELOS PATERNOS	José Rufino de la Caridad Isidora Hernández	ABUELOS MATERNOS	Miguel - Laudelina

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE comparecencia de José Rufino de la Caridad Báez y Díaz Abuelo paterno del inscripto.

NOTAS MARGINALES

no tiene

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR RECIBO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 7 DE 5 DE ENERO DE 1961.

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE SANTA CLARA

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

SANTA CLARA 2

DE Agosto DE MIL NOVECIENTOS

SESENTA Y siete

Entrerrenglonado: Miguel - Vale.

Eucastin Alis

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CONFECCIONADO	CONFRONTADO
FH	✓

274.10.61 - 59118

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustment of Dependent Payments - First Quarter FY 1968

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966

1. No adjustments of AMBUD dependency payments were made during the reporting period.

2. The following change in payees is being reported for Headquarters records:

Case #2: Elio ALEMAN Armenteros (201-285623)

In accordance with written instructions from the mother, Romualda ARMENTEROS Martinez, the trusteeship for this case has been transferred from Oscar Luis ACEVEDO to Elsa ALEMAN Armenteros, her daughter. Effective with the September payment, AMTIKI-1 was instructed to forward the monthly dependency payment for this case to the following address:

Elsa ALEMAN Armenteros
c/o William CASTRILLO
1033 City National Bank Building
25 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33130

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

OCT 25 1967

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28791

DATE
20 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

ORIG: NANCYE GRATZ:mjr
UNIT: WH/COG/CICS
EXT: 7447/9008
DATE: 13 OCTOBER 1967

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 15 PER _____ #_____

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO _____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH/COG 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH 8, OGC 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

OCT 13 16 31Z

CITE DIRECTOR 43092

TO JMWAVE

TYPIC AMBUD

N6

REF: UFGA-28632*

CONCUR PROPOSED REF LETTER.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COG COMMENT: *JMWAVE forwarded draft of proposed letter to a New York law firm which was retained by the mistress of one of the deceased Brigade 2506 group after we terminated her dependency payments. Mr. Bladergroen/OGC, drafted subject letter while on a recent TDY to JMWAVE.

C/WH/COG/CICS _____
WH/COG/MO _____
OGC MR. BLADERGROEN (TELECON)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

DAVID A. PHILLIPS
C/WH/COG

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE			MICROFILM

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Query Regarding Termination of Dependency Payments (Case #89)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See para 3.

1. AMTIKI-1 received a letter dated 19 September 1967 from a lawyer representing Miguelena Teurbe FRITZ requesting information as to why "payments to the specifically named beneficiaries in your policy if you have one, or those who would normally receive the proceeds of a death benefit if you do not have a policy" had been terminated.

2. A review of this case reveals the following:

a. Miguelena Teurbe FRITZ was advised by a letter dated 31 December 1966 that it had been ascertained that she was not entitled to monthly payments as the widow of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata since she had never married PEREZ. The letter also advised that payments heretofore sent to Mrs. FRITZ for her daughter and the parents of PEREZ were likewise being terminated because it had been learned that her daughter, Kathleen FRITZ, is not related to PEREZ in any manner, that the mother had died, and that there is not evidence that the father in Cuba had received any of the funds intended for him.

b. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. FRITZ requested that the matter be reconsidered since she had not been given advance notice of the termination and because the abrupt halt in payments created a severe economic hardship for her.

c. She was then advised by letter that the payment enclosed with the termination notice was for January 1967 and was intended to provide a one-month notice of the payment termination.

Attachments:
1. Letters mentioned in paras 1, 2a,b,c, h/w
2. Draft response, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/atts.

OCT -6 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-28632	4 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-297752 19-124-25/6

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28632

She was also informed that in view of the apparent hardship resulting from her misunderstanding of the procedures, a gratuity payment of $275.00 was enclosed and that no further payments will be made.

3. The Station proposes sending a letter to the lawyer advising him that the assistance in question was in the nature of a gratuity and was in no way based on a contract of insurance and that when it was learned that Mrs. FRITZ was not PEREZ' widow it became necessary to discontinue the payments. Attached herewith is a copy of the proposed draft response, which was coordinated with Louis K. STORSELL from OGC while on TDY at JMWAVE. Prompt Headquarters concurrence is requested.

Raymond K. PANUSES

att 1

McALOON, HIRSCHBERG, MALANG & FRIEDMAN
COUNSELORS AT LAW
75 MAIDEN LANE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10038
DIGBY 4-0978

R. McALOON
HIRSCHBERG
J. MALANG
D. FRIEDMAN
T. MULCAHY
M. KLEIN
SCHAEFF
ANGSI

September 19, 1967

Mr. Paul G. Avant
P.O.B. 701
Miami, Florida, 33144

Re: Miguelina Teurbe Fritz

Dear Mr. Avant,

Please be advised that I have been requested by Mrs. Miguelena Fritz, to write to you, with respect to her insurance benefits by reason of the death of Roberto Perez Cruzata.

I have in my possession copies of your letter to Mrs. Fritz, dated January 31, 1967, and a letter to her from John L. McKercher, of your office, dated December 31, 1966.

I am interested in knowing your reasons for not paying the specifically named beneficiaries in your policy, if you have one, or those who would normally receive the proceeds of a death benefit if you do not have a formal policy.

There is no doubt that the decedant must have wished that any proceeds be paid as he directed, and before proceeding in this matter, I would appreciate your advice.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation,

Very truly yours,

STANLEY D. FRIEDMAN

SDF/bg

RG. MALANG & FRIEDMAN
75 MAIDEN LANE
NEW YORK N. Y. 10038

Mr. Paul G. Avent
P. O. Box 701
Miami, Florida 33144

AIR MAIL

P. O. Box 761
Miami, Florida 33144
January 27, 1967

Mrs. Miguelina Tourbe
555 N. W. 58th Avenue
Miami, Florida

Dear Mrs. Tourbe:

Your letter of January 5, 1967 has been received and a thorough review of the case has been made in accordance with your request.

In regard to your expressed belief that notice was not given in advance of the payment termination date, it should be noted that the practice has been to forward the payment a month in advance. Thus, the check mailed on December 31, 1966 was for the month of January 1967, and the letter enclosed with the payment was intended to provide a one-month notice concerning the termination of payments.

However, in view of the apparent hardship resulting from your misunderstanding of the procedures it has been possible to obtain a gratuity payment of $375.00. This payment is enclosed. No further payments will be made.

Sincerely yours,

John L. McKercher

TRANSLATION

January 5, 1967

Distinguished Sirs:

I was surprised when I read your letter notifying me of the permanent suspension of the pension I received as a result of the wish of Roberto Perez, my fiance before his death.

I am very surprised because I had not been advised prior to the end of the month. I have incurred the normal expenses such as rent, light, telephone, gas, etc., and now find myself in a very difficult situation since this means that I am going to lose my credit.

When you suspend the checks or pensions of Brigade members or their families you always notify them of the suspension with their last payment so that they could make the necessary arrangements for the future.

I now am without money to cover me expenses. The month of January is a hard time to find employment here, not to mention that my parents who are old, my daughter, and my sister recently arrived from Cuba and do not receive economic aide from the Refugee Center.

Awaiting your response. I think that you should reconsider my situation at this time with the understanding and generosity of the "great nation" which the Cubans will never forget.

Attentively,
/s/ Miguelina Teurbe
555 NW 59th Ave.
Miami, Fla.

[illegible]

[illegible] Al que [illegible]

Muy me agradaría [illegible]

Siempre que [illegible] a los Brigadistas [illegible] los familiares de los [illegible] con anticipación [illegible]

Ahora [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] organización [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Atentamente,

Miguel [illegible]

550 [illegible]

Miami, Fla.

P. O. Box 701
Miami, Florida
December 31, 1966

Mrs. Miguelina Tourbe
850 Ocean Drive, Room 101
Miami Beach, Florida

Dear Mrs. Tourbe:

Effective January 1, 1967 the adjustment of certain payments, including those applicable in your case, is being placed in effect.

Concerning the case of Roberto Perez Cruzata, a review of records and the results of an investigation indicate that although Roberto Perez Cruzata may have planned to marry Miguelina Tourbe following his return from Cuba, the marriage did not take place. Therefore, Miguelina Tourbe is not entitled to payments as his widow, and no further payments will be forthcoming.

The following additional payments which have been made to Miguelina Tourbe are also being terminated effective January 1, 1967 for the reasons given:

The mother of Roberto Perez Cruzata is now deceased.

The father of Roberto Perez Cruzata resides in Cuba; no evidence has been presented to show that he has received any of the funds intended for him.

The child, Kathleen Fritz, is the daughter of Mr. Harry Fritz and is not related to Roberto Perez Cruzata; thus, she is not entitled to benefits as a dependent of Roberto Perez Cruzata.

Sincerely yours,

John L. McKercher

Att # 2

P.O. Box 701
Miami, Florida 33144

Dear Mr. Friedman:

This is in regard to your letter of September 19, 1967 requesting to be advised of the reason for the discontinuance of payments heretofore made to Mrs. Miguelina Teurbe Fritz.

Financial assistance had been made available to Mrs. Fritz with the mistaken understanding that she was the surviving widow of Roberto PEREZ Cruzata. That assistance was in the nature of a gratuity and was in no way based on a contract of insurance.

As indicated in my letter of December 31, 1966, a review of this matter showed that Mrs. Fritz had never been married to Roberto PEREZ Cruzata and, therefore, was not his widow. Upon finding that she lacked the requisite status, it became necessary to discontinue financial aid.

While your interest in this matter is understandable, I must advise that no further payments can be made.

Sincerely yours,
John L. McKercher

6 OCT 1967

NOTE FOR : Nancy Gratz

Following up with our meeting with Tom Tinsley: (27 Sept 1967)

1. Please review all of your keypapers and set up a master policy file of all of them. We should also have a comprehensive list of all brigade members and their survivors as of April or May 1962. Send me in a specific case any correspondence you have had from a widow or beneficiary with translations.

2. Upon receipt of this material, I will see if it meets with Mr. Tinsley's requirement.

B. DeFelice
C/BSD

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE		MICROFILM

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Request from Widow of Angel PASTRANA Santos (Case #118) for Assistance in Leaving Cuba.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: See para 3

References: A. UFGW-6607, 13 July 1967
B. UFGA-27805, 14 June 1967

1. As suggested in Reference B, AMTIKI-1 advised the widow that the only legal means for purchasing passage from Cuba to Spain with US dollars was by purchasing the passage at Iberia Airlines' Madrid office. In a letter dated 11 September 1967, the widow acknowledged receipt of the letter from AMTIKI-1 and stated that she had contacted the Iberia office in Havana and had been told that this procedure is no longer allowed. The widow then went to the National Bank of Cuba where she was advised that the only way she could purchase passage would be to receive funds in Canadian currency through the Cuban bank. The bank suggested that the fastest way to effect the transaction would be to have the money sent by telegraphic transfer through a Canadian bank to the National Bank of Cuba.

2. A check with the Iberia Airlines representative in the JMWAVE area confirmed that the procedure suggested by Headquarters' is not permissible. The representative stated that the procedure suggested by the National Bank of Cuba was correct, adding that a Spanish bank and Spanish currency could be utilized instead of Canadian if so desired.

3. Headquarters guidance regarding the adviseability of effecting such a transfer of funds to Cuba through Canada or Spain is requested. Attached are copies of recent correspondence concerning this case.

Attachment:
Correspondence mentioned in para 3, h/w

Raymond K. PANUSES

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG, w/att.

OCT 10 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28654	DATE 6 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/5 201-294245

14-00000

PROTECTIVE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
Florida Branch Office.
[redacted]
MIAMI, FLORIDA

[redacted]

JOHN PAULBATH
Manager

P. O. B. 701
Miami, Fla. 33144

Miami, August 7, 1967

MRS. MARIA CERNUDA
Colina 33
Jesus del Monte
Havana, Cuba

Dear Mrs. Cernuda:

In response to your request for funds to be able to leave Cuba, we wish to advise you that the only legal means by which pasage can be purchased with US dollars is from Iberia Airlines in Madrid for persons desiring to leave Cuba.

Please let us know if you agree, in which case you must send us the names of your daughter, sister, father and yours as they appear in the Passports, and we will send the necessary funds to Madrid for purchase of tickets and Iberia Airlines in turn will notify its Havana Office that the passages have been prepaid and the Havana Office will then notify you that the passages are available.

Please contact us through our new mailing address shown above.

Sincerely yours

JOHN PAULBATH

JPB/kw

TRANSLATION

Havana, 17 August 1967

COCONUT GROVE BANK
MIAMI, FLORIDA

Attention: Mr. Administrator

Sir:

I am writing to you to ask you to do me the favor of informing Mr. John Paulbath that I urgently need him to contact me because I want him to send the passages to me to go (to the U.S.) via Spain.

The reason I have taken the liberty of writing is that in November of last year, I wrote to Mr. Paulbath at PO Box 427, Tamiami Station in that city and after almost six months the letter was returned to me with the notation that the address was not registered. Since that time a friend of mine who lives in Los Angeles has been trying to locate him and to date has had no success.

Mr. Paulbath sent me a notice informing that the monthly stipend due me (as a result of the death of my husband) per dotal policy 1023, was being deposited in that bank, enclosed is that notice. The last news I had from Mr. Paulbath was in February 1966 when he informed me that on that date the account showed a balance of US $12,518.21.

I appeal to your kindness for help, since I have been trying for more than six years since my husband died R.I.P. to leave (Cuba). I almost had all my papers in order to leave when the American Embassy was closed that was two months after my husband had departed (Cuba), later in April of that same year came the Bay of Pigs Invasion and my husband was killed. On 1 June my daughter was born and it was at this time that they began to grant visa waivers but even though I had the visas I could not leave because I had not been able to get a passport for my daughter since to obtain it they demanded my husband's death certificate and his death was not recorded in any court, I went to all the places it could have been recorded. Then I began to visit lawyers and government offices to find out how I could obtain a passport for my daughter. After much fighting, it was delivered to me at the end of November of last year. I immediately wrote to Mr. Paulbath to ask that he send me the money for passages right away and that was the letter that was returned to me.

Since letters from there to here take so long, I request that you tell Mr. Paulbath to send me the money for passages for those indicated below:

Concepcion PASTRANA Cernuda	(US $154.00)
Serafin CERNUDA Garcia	(US $308.00)
Graciela CERNUDA Fernandez	(US $308.00)
Maria CERNUDA Fernandez	(US $308.00)

and also tell him that the money for all should be sent to the following address:

Colina #33, Jesus del Monte, Habana, Cuba.

Tell Mr. Paulbath that if there is anything I can resolve call me at telephone number 99-2187 or send me a night letter since xegxxx regular mail takes up to one and one half months to arrive.

Attentively,

/s/Maria Cernuda
Maria Cernuda

1720 S.W. 97
Place, Miami, Fla 33165
221-6360

La Habana, Agosto 17, 1967.

COCONUT GROVE BANK.
MIAMI, FLORIDA.

Atención al Sr. Administrador/

SEÑOR:

Me dirijo a usted por este medio, para que me haga el favor de informarle al Sr. John Paulbath, que necesito urgentemente que se comunique conmigo , ya que necesito que me envie los pasajes para irme por Via España.

Si me he tomado la libertad de molestarlo es porque en Noviembre del año pasado escribí al Sr. Paulbath a P. O. Box 427 Tamiami, Station en esa ciudad y al cabo casi de seis meses me devolvieron la carta, diciendo que esa dirección no estaba registrada, a partir de entonces una amiga que vive en Los Angeles ha estado tratando de localizar hasta la fecha sin éxito ninguno.

El Sr. Paulbath me envió una certificación donde me informaba que el dinero que mensualmente se me estaba asignando (por el fallecimiento de mi esposo) referente a la póliza Dotal 1023, se me estaba depositando en esa entidad, por lo cual le estoy incluyendo copia de dicha certificación. La última noticia que tuve del Sr. Paulbath fué en Febrero de 1966, donde me informó que en esa fecha el saldo de la cuenta arrojaba $12,513.21 U. S. Dólares.

Apelo a su bondad para que me ayude, pues llevó mas de seis año tratando de irme de aquí desde que mi esposo e. p.d. se marchó. ya que primeramente me quede con casi todos los papeles preparado cuando cerraron la Embajada Americana aquí que fué a los dos meses de haberse ido mi esposo, después en Abril de ese mismo año fué cuandovino la invasión de Playa Girón y donde murió y el 1 de Junio nació mi hija, fué por esa fecha cuando empezaron a dar visa waiver para trasladarse a los Estado Unidos aunque conseguí las visas no pude irme puesto que no logré obtener el pasaporte de la niña ya que para obtenerlo me exigían la defunción de él , y como aquí no consta la defunción de él por juzgado alguno, pues yo fuí a todos los lugares donde pudiera lograrla. Entonces empecé a visitar abogados y entidades del gobierno para ver como podría obtener el pasaporte de mi hija, y al fin de mucho luchar a finales de noviembre del pasado año me lo entregaron, escribiendole enseguida al Sr. Paulbath para que me enviara enseguida el dinero de los pasaje cuya carta fué la que me devolvieron.

Como las carta de allá para aca se demoran mucho, le ruego le diga al Sr. Paulbath que me giro el denero de los pasajes, cuyos datos lo voy a poner a continuación:

CONCEPCION PASTRANA CERNUDA	($154.00 dólares)
SERAFIN CERNUDA GARCIA	($ 308.00 dólares)
GRACIELA CERNUDA FERNÁNDEZ	($308.00 dólares)
MARIA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ	($308.00 dólares)

y que todos tienen que venir dirigido a esta dirección:

COLINA #33, JESUS DEL MONTE, HABANA, CUBA.

Digale al Sr. Paulbath que cualquier cosa que determine me llamé al teléfono 99-2187 , o me pase una carta nocturna, pues las cartas se demoran en llegar hasta mes y medio.

Espero confiada que me ayuda usted a resolver este problema que me tiene a punto de volverme loca, y si es así le estare agradecida toda la vida , ya que mi unica esperanza es poder ver a mi hija libre y féliz.

De usted atentamente,

MARIA CERNUDA

Havana, September 11, 1967

Mr. John Paulbath
Protective Mutual Life Insurance
P.O.B. 701
Miami, Fla. 33144

Dear Mr. Paulbath:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 7 in which you inform me that it is possible for you to place funds to cover the amount of passages at the Iberia Airlines in Madrid, Iberia then notifying their Havana Office that the tickets have been prepaid and are therefore available for issuance, but I am sorry to say that this procedure is no longer allowed.

I found it out by calling personally on Iberia Airlines here, in Havana, after which I went to the Cuban National Bank where I was told that the only way the tickets could be purchased was upon my receiving the funds through the Cuban National Bank in Canadian currency. They also suggested that the fastest way to carry out the transaction was that the money be sent by telegraphic transfer through a Canadian bank to the National Bank of Cuba, the cost of passage for an adult being $370.00 and $185.00 for a minor.

Below are the names of each member of my family, passport number and the amount of money for each fare in Canadian currency.

GRACIELA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ, Passport No. 59492, amount of passage.	$ 370.00
MARIA CERNUDA FERNANDEZ, Passport No. 22972, amount of passage.	370.00
CONCEPCION PASTRANA CERNUDA, Passport No. 67122, amount of passage.	185.00
SERAFIN CERNUDA GARCIA, Passport No. 16609, amount of passage.	370.00
Total:	$1295.00

In case funds are placed as indicated, please cable me as follows: "FUNDS ALREADY SENT", to enable me to inquire at the Bank here as to its receipt.

Thanking you for your immediate attention to this matter, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Maria Cernuda
MARIA CERNUDA



Mrs. Maria Cernuda
Colina 53
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

SEP

Mr. John Paulbath
Protective Mutual Life Insurance
P.O.B. 701
MIAMI, Fla. 33144
U.S.A.

VIA AEREA -- PAR AVION

NOTIFIED
SEP 23 '67

TRANSLATION

21 September 1967

Mr. Juan Paula
1720 SW 97 Place
Miami, Florida 33165

Dear Paula:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of today, I am enclosing a photocopy of the letter Mrs. Maria Cernuda sent us on August 17 of this year.

Sincerely yours,

A.P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

Septiembre 21, 1967

Sr. Juan Paula
1720 S. W. 97 Place
Miami, Florida 33165

Querido Paula:

De acuerdo con nuestra conversacion telefonica con la presente te envio una fotocopia de la carta que en Agosto 17 ppdo. nos escribio la Sra. Maria Cernuda.

Tuyo afectisimo,

A. P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

APB:cpa

TRANSLATION

21 September 1967

Mrs. Maria Cernuda
Colina No. 33
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

Dear Mrs. Cernuda:

I received your letter of 17 August today and in accordance with your wishes, I talked with Mr. John Paulbath to explain what you need. In addition, I am sending him a copy of your letter dated 17 August.

Mr. Paulbath promised me that he would immediately look into this matter and when you desire to communicate with him you may write to me if you would like. I hope that your problem will be resolved promptly.

Attentively,

A.P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

Septiembre 21, 1967

Sra. Maria Cernuda
Colina No. 33
Jesus del Monte
Habana, Cuba

Estimada Sra. Cernuda:

Hoy recibi su carta del dia 17 de Agosto y de acuerdo con sus deseos hable con el Sr. John Paulbath explicandole lo que Ud. necesita. Ademas, le estoy enviando una copia de su citada carta del dia 17 de Agosto.

El Sr. Paulbath me prometio ocuparse enseguida de su asunto y cuando Ud. desee comunicarse con el puede hacerlo escribiendome a mi, si asi lo desea. Espero que pronto pueda resolver su problema, y quedo,

De Ud. muy atentamente,

A. P. Betancourt
Senior Vice President

APB:cpa

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Hero & Martyr Documentation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967
B. UFGA-27673, 13 June 1967

1. Teresa SUAREZ Tous, widow of Jesus CARRERAS (AMBUD Dependency Case #111), has advised that she does not have a copy of her marriage certificate and is reluctant to request it from Cuba because she fears reprisals against anyone attempting to obtain documents pertaining to her late husband who was executed by the Cuban Government in 1961 for having plotted against the CASTRO regime.

2. In lieu of the marriage certificate, the widow has provided a notarized affidavit (copy attached herewith) attesting to her marriage to Jesus CARRERAS on 30 January 1960 in Havana, Cuba. In addition, the daughter's birth certificate which was forwarded under Reference B lists Teresa SUAREZ Tous and Jesus CARRERAS as parents.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachment:
Affidavit, h/w

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG w/att h/w

OCT - 5 1967

CS COPY

1 att

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28609

GROUP 1
[illegible]

DATE
2 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

C E R T I F I C A T E

CITY OF MIAMI)
COUNTY OF DADE) SS.
STATE OF FLORIDA)

I, the undersigned TERESA SUAREZ TOUS, Cuban Citizen by birth, of legal age, legal resident of The United States since 11/2/61, with number A12 478 027. Presently residing at 3016 S.W. 24 St., Miami, Florida, being duly sworn depose and say as follow;

That my first and only marriage was performed on the 30th day of January, 1960; at Havana, Cuba, with Jesus Carreras Zayas Cuban Citizen by birth, deceased on March 11, 1961.

That from said marriage I have a daughter called Lourdes Carreras Suarez, born in Havana, Cuba.

That as Witnesses of same hereto are the signatures of Mr. Raul Garcia, living at 2724 S.W. 30 Ave., Miami, Florida, and Mr. Victoriano Alvarez, living at 2011 S.W. 23 Terrace, Miami, Florida.

That I hereby swear under penalty of perjury before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, United States of America, that the above statements are true and correct.

RAUL GARCIA

Teresa Suarez Tous

TERESA SUAREZ TOUS

Victoriano Alvarez

VICTORIANO ALVAREZ

CITY OF MIAMI)
COUNTY OF DADE) SS.
STATE OF FLORIDA)

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, duly authorized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, personally appeared Mrs. TERESA SUAREZ TOUS, RAUL GARCIA, and VICTORIANO ALVAREZ, who being by me first duly sworn, depose and say that the allegations contained in the above certificate are true.

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE
ME THIS 16 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1967

Raul J. Castell

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLORIDA, AT LARGE.

CS COPY

aa 1 UFGA-28609

19-124-25/6

2f

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Adjustments of Dependent Payments - Fourth Quarter FY 1967

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

MICROFILMED
AUG 17 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

References: A. UFGW-6328, 29 December 1966
B. UFGA-27424, 20 April 1967
C. UFGA-26697, 17 January 1967

1. Adjustments during the fourth quarter FY 1967 of AMBUD monthly dependency payments are reported herewith in accordance with Reference A:

Case #29: ALEMAN Aleman, Eufrasio (201-290479)
Payee: ALEMAN, Laureana C. (mother)

Effective with the May payment, the amount of the monthly payment was reduced from $225.00 to $175.00 because of the death of the father, Angel ALEMAN Perez.

Case #127: CAMPO Gutierrez, Rafael (201-292430)
Payee: CAMPO Ojeda, Pablo (father)

Effective with the June payment, the monthly amount formerly paid to the trustee will be paid to the father who arrived in the United States in February and currently resides at 1115 Medina Street, Opa Locka, Florida. In addition, the monthly payment was reduced from $225.00 to $175.00 effective with the June payment as a result of the death of the mother, Catalina GUTIERREZ.

2. The following concerns the remaining two cases for which payments were temporarily suspended pending replies from the payees as reported in Reference C:

Case #142: GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge (201-278754)
Payee: FERNANDEZ Blanco, Orlando (trustee)

Upon receipt of a satisfactory reply, payment to the trustee was reinstated (on a retroactive basis) effective with the June payment.

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
9 August 67

DATE DISPATCHED

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-28220

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-28220

Case #143: KIM Yun, Jorge (201-298852)
Payee: SANTOVENIA, Raul (trustee)

Monthly payments for this case were temporarily suspended effective with the January 1967 payment pending a reply to a request for biographic data on the parents. Based on the fact that Subject had been executed for a crime committed prior to his participation at the Bay of Pigs and also on the probability that the father, Pedro KIM, is identical with a person with the same name who AMTIKI-1 alleges to be an active Communist in Cuba (Station traces describe one Pedro KIM as an active Communist), the Station recommended that payments be terminated for this case and the recommendation was approved by Headquarters. The trustee has been informed of the suspension of payments and has also been advised that should one or both parents come to the United States, a review of the case will be made in accordance with procedures in effect at that time.

3. The following changes in payees are being reported for Headquarters records:

Case #3: BLANCO Cruz, Benito (201-283944)

In accordance with written instructions from the widow, Verania TORRES Tellez, the trusteeship for this case has been transferred from Olga LINAN to Juana BLANCO, Subject's daughter, who resides at 4061 NW 4th Terrace, Miami, Florida.

Case #74: ORIA Finales, Luis (201-283201)

The monthly payment for the mother, Pastora FINALES Hernandez, which was formerly sent to trustee Eladio GONZALEZ Finales is now sent directly to the mother who arrived in the United States a short time ago and is residing in California with a son.

Raymond K. Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGW-6440, dated 8 March 1967

B. UFGA-27706, dated 31 May 1967

C. UFGA-27673, dated 5 June 1967

1. Headquarters appreciates the time and effort expended by JMWAVE in obtaining and forwarding the documentation requested in reference A. A proposal that BEC assume the responsibility for funding these cases has been submitted to that Agency and a decision is expected in the very near future. In the event the decision is favorable, the type of vital documents forwarded in references B and C will be necessary in order to determine the eligibility of dependents, under the criteria established by BEC, to receive compensation.

2. There appears to be some confusion in the translation of certain documents forwarded in references B and C since the recording dates of births and marriage, rather than the actual dates of the events, was given in references. Listed below are the correct dates for JMWAVE records.

REFERENCE B

Case #95: RODRIGUEZ Navarreto, Nemesio (Attachment A)

Correct DOB of son, Carlos Alberto RODRIGUEZ Acosta, is 8 July 1956 as previously reported. 16 July is the date birth was recorded

DISTRIBUTION:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

CS COPY

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-6617

DATE: 24 JUL 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 19-124-25/6

20 July 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - OC/WH/COG
1 - Originator

ABSTRACT X

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST: OC/WH/COG/Nancye Gratz:mjr

EXT.: 7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL: AC/WH/COG

DATE:

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG 1-66

(40)

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	UFGW-6617

Case #97: DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (Attachment B)

a. Correct marriage date is 19 March 1954. 28 April 1954 is the date marriage was recorded.

b. Correct DOB of son, Jose Miguel DELGADO Carballo, is 12 August 1954. 16 December 1954 is the date birth was recorded.

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Ana Maria DELGADO Carballo, is 21 March 1956. 15 April 1954 is the date birth was recorded.

Case #102: TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (Attachment C)

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Barbara Alejandra TAMARGO Fernandez is 29 March 1961 as previously reported. 21 July 1961 is the date birth was recorded.

REFERENCE C

Case #109: ESCOTO, Armando (Attachment #4)

c. Correct DOB of daughter, Ileana Maria ESCOTO Rodriguez, is 23 November 1945. 14 January 1946 is the date birth was recorded.

Case #111: CARRERAS, Jesus (Attachment #6)

b. Correct DOB of daughter, Lourdes CARRERAS Suarez, is 27 August 1960. 1 June 1961 (also incorrectly translated as 1 July 1960) is the date birth was recorded.

3. The station is requested to forward all available documentation as rapidly as it is received by AMTIKI.

Ellen F. MARGANY

FORM 8-64 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	TWO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
XX	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Case #130

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967

No 201

1. Forwarded herewith are reproductions of a letter from Marina MARDONES Vivanco, widow of Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz, and the following documents pertaining to Hero and Martyr Case No. 130, Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz (no 201 file):

a. Certification of Birth: Laura Marina BLANCO Mardones, daughter of Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz and Marina MARDONES Vivanco. DPOB: 3 July 1956, Havana, Cuba.

b. Certification of Birth: Jose Lauro BLANCO y Muniz. DPOB: 18 August 1909, Palmillas, Matanzas, Cuba.

2. Marina MARDONES Vivanco has advised that, thus far, she has been unable to secure a copy of her marriage certificate but indicated she will continue to pursue this matter.

Raymond K Panuses
Raymond K. PANUSES

Attachments:
1. Letter referred to in Paragraph 1 (3 copies)
2. Laura Marina BLANCO Mardones birth certificate referred to in Paragraph 1a. (3 copies)
3. Jose Lauro BLANCO Muniz birth certificate referred to in Paragraph 1b. (3 copies)

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - WH/COG, w/atts h/w

CC of dispatch/atts
Filed Jose Lauro BLANCO soft file
19-124-25/6

1 ATT

CS COPY

DATE TYPED
22 June 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 26 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27858

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124/25/6

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

att #1:

June 10, 1967

Your re.: Allotment HM

Dear Mr.

As per your request, I tried to obtain copy of my marriage certificate from Cuba. Despite my efforts I have been unable to secure one.

However, copies of my husband's and my daughter's birth certificates, issued some time ago, were forwarded to me.

Marginal note on my husband's certificate shows entry of our marriage and our daughter's also mentions the fact of said marriage.

I am enclosing photocopies of both documents. Should you require the originals, I will be happy to forward them to you as long as they are returned to me since these are the only copies in my possession.

I will continue to try to secure copy of my marriage certificate which I will forward to you, should I obtain it.

Trusting these documents will be of help to you, I am,

Very truly yours

Marina Mardones Vivanco
(Mrs. Lauro Blanco)
3205 SW 7 Street
Apt. 2
Miami, Florida 33135

enc. phcs. of documents

CS COPY

ATT 1 to UFGA 27858

19-124-25/6

Att # 5

MOD. CM-4

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL
DE
MATANZAS

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 175494

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL	**SECCION DE** Nacimientos	**TOMO** 2 Pal- llas	**FOLIO** 98	**INSCRIPCION** 205	**FECHA DEL ASIENTO**	**DIA** 25 **MES** Septiembre **AÑO** 1909

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (En Letras)	**HORA** Tres de la mañana	**DIA** dieciocho
	MES Agosto	**AÑO** mil novecientos nueve

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO
JOSE LAURO BLANCO Y MUÑIZ

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO
Palmillas

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE José Blanco del Moravel	**LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE** Palmillas
NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE Avelina Muñiz y Guerra	**LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE** Colón
ABUELOS PATERNOS Benito Blanco Y Herrera Mercedes del Moral y Martínez	**ABUELOS MATERNOS** Rafael Muñiz y Fredhes Andrea Guerra y Suárez.

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE comparecencia delpadre del inscripto

NOTAS MARGINALES

Contrajo matrimonio con Marina Mardones y Vivanco el día once de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta ante el Juzgado Municipal de Santiago de las Vegas.-

0243155477
0250155477

ESPACIO PARA FIJAR LOS SELLOS O PONER LA NOTA DE EXENCION.

MARIA FIGUERAS GALLARDO, **ENCARGADO DE ESTE REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL.**

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Matanzas, diez A
DE Abril DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y siete

Maria Figueras
Archivera de la Audiencia

CONFECCIONADO POR A.L.P.	**CONFRONTADO POR** M.F.G.

att. # 2

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

CERTIFICACION DE NACIMIENTO

SOLICITUD No. 146280.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: ARROYO NARANJO .-

FECHA DEL ASIENTO: DIA 30. MES Junio.- AÑO 1960.-

SECCION DE: Nacimientos.- TOMO 155.- FOLIO 563.- INSCRIPCION 1051.-

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA: once de la mañana.- Hembra.- DIA: tres.-

MES: Julio.- AÑO: mil novecientos cincuentiseis.-

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: Laura Marina Blanco y Mardones.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: La habana.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Jose Lauro Blanco Muñiz.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: Matanzas.-

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Marina Mardones y Velasco.-

LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Habana.-

ABUELOS PATERNOS: Jose y Avelina.-

ABUELOS MATERNOS: Domingo y Juana.-

INSCRIPCION PRACTICADA EN VIRTUD DE: Ley 797 de 20 de Mayo de 1960 y declaración de la madre de la inscripta.-

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE MAQUINA TIMBRADORA POR DECRETO DEL MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA No. 2 DE 4 DE ENERO
IMPUESTO DEL TIMBRE NACIONAL 2.00
25 MAYO 1967

CONFECCIONADO: B

CONFRONTADO:

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE la Habana.-

CERTIFICA: QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

Habana, veinticinco

DE Mayo DE MIL NOVECIENTOS

SESENTA Y Siete.-

ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL

276.10.61 - 553181

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT

Operational/TYPIC/AMBUD/AMBIDDY
Dependency payment for Case #103

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-27636, dated 22 May 1967
B. UFGW-6351, dated 19 January 1967
C. UFGA-25261, dated 3 June 1966

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposed action refusing payment of additional funds to Subject of reference. Apparently Subject had not advised AMBIDDY of the regular support payments paid by AMTIKI at the time reference B requested data concerning the case. Neither is there any indication on the HEW form forwarded in reference C that additional income was being received by Subject from AMBIDDY. It would, therefore, appear that AMBIDDY may have indicated there was some connection between the source of AMTIKI and AMBIDDY funds and suggested Subject approach AMTIKI for the terminated AMBIDDY income.

2. In any event, subject letter did provide copies of the type of vital documents JMWAVE is attempting to obtain in order to document Heroes and Martyrs for possible future payments by BEC.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-6561	15 JUN 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25/6

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - OC/WH/COG
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

13 June 1967

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
OC/WH/COG/	NANCYE GRATZ	mjr	7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	13 JUN 67	Earl J. Williamson

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
Reference: UFGA-27717

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following additional Hero and Martyr case:

Case #105: BAEZ, Juventino (201 # not available)

a. Letter from mother, Flora MAS Machado (attachment #1)

b. Marriage certificate: 6 January 1937
Juventino Jose Severino BAEZ Rodriguez and
Flora Aida Laudelina Clara Demetria MAS Machado
(Attachment #2)

c. Birth certificate: Flora Elaina de la Caridad BAEZ Mas
DPOB: 1 December 1946, Santa Clara, Cuba
(Attachment #3)

d. Marriage certificate: 16 May 1964
Mario R. de las CUEVAS and Flora E. BAEZ
(attachment #4)

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

Attachments:
1.- Letter from mother - H/W
2.- Marriage certificate, mother and father - H/W
3.-Birth certificate, Flora BAEZ - H/W
4.- Marriage certificate, Flora BAEZ - H/W

Distribution
3 - C/WH/COG w/atts. #1 thru #4 - H/W

19-124-25/6

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED
9 June 1967

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 13 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27771

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

1 att.

Miami, May 23, 1967

[redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

As per your letter dated May 3, 1967, requesting my marriage license and copies of birth certificates of my son and daughter, I am enclosing both my marriage certificate and a copy of my daughter Lora (married) birth certificate. I also have a son Oscar (10 years old) of which I do not have one, but immediately after receiving your letter I requested my family in Cuba to send it to me, and as soon as I receive it will mail it to you.

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the big help you are giving me and of which I will always be grateful. I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Flora Más

Flora Mas
18010 N.W. 13 Ct.
Miami, Florida 33169

P.S. I am also enclosing my daughters marriage license.

CS COPY

Certificate of Marriage

Church of

[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]

This is to Certify

That [illegible]

and [illegible]

were lawfully Married

on the 16 day of [illegible] 19[illegible]

According to the Rite of the Roman Catholic Church

and in conformity with the laws of

the State of [illegible]

Rev. [illegible] officiating,

in the presence of [illegible]

and [illegible] Witnesses,

as appears from the Marriage Register of this Church.

Date [illegible]

[illegible] Pastor

[illegible]

[illegible] REGISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE SANTA CLARA.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICO:- que al Folio 133 del Tomo 75 de la Sección de MATRIMONIOS del Registro Civil a cargo de este Juzgado, consta el Acta que copiada dice:- -

JUVENTINO JOSE SEVERINO DIAZ Y RODRIGUEZ CON FILOMENA [illegible] MAGDALENA - CIRILA DEMETRIA MAS Y MACHADO.- NO.- En la Ciudad de Santa Clara a las tres y cuarto de la tarde del día diez y [illegible] de Enero de mil - novecientos treinta y siete, por ante el Doctor Rafael Sed [illegible], Juez Municipal por designación legal y de mí el Secretario Alfredo Testar y Díaz, se procede a inscribir el matrimonio celebrado el - día seis del mes actual ante el Notario de esta Ciudad Doctor Rodolfo Díaz y del Pozo, por JUVENTINO JOSE SEVERINO DIAZ Y RODRIGUEZ, natural y vecino de esta Ciudad, de veintiocho años de edad, cubano, Teniente del Ejército, hijo de José [illegible] Díaz y Díaz, Procurador Público y de Isidora Veneranda Rodríguez y Martínez, de los quehaceres domésticos y ambos de su domicilio; Y FILOMENA [illegible] MAGDALENA CIRILA DEMETRIA MAS Y MACHADO, natural y vecina de esta Ciudad, cubana, - soltera, hija de Miguel Mas Callejo y de [illegible] Machado Cruz, - propietario y de su casa, ambos de su domicilio y de diez y nueve - años de edad, acompañados de los Testigos Señores Jorge Lubián Morell, Gerardo Machado Cruz, Orlando Villaurreta, y Miguel Angel Avalos [illegible], naturales de [illegible] y Santa Clara, de profesión Propietarios, de estado casado, menos Villaurreta, todos mayores de edad y de este vecindario. Todo lo cual resulta de la copia fehaciente de la Escritura número cuatro del corriente año, que otorgada ante dicho Notario por los mencionados Contrayentes y remitida a este Juzgado, junto con el oportuno Expediente. Inscripción que se verifica en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el Artículo ciento cuarenta - del Código Notarial, firmando el Señor Juez, por ante mí que Certifico. Se hace constar que no se consigna la naturalidad de los padres de los Contrayentes por no constar de la expresada Escritura, lo que también Certifico.- Dr. Rafael Sed. A. Testar. Hay un sello.-

ES CONFORME A SU ORIGINAL Y A PETICION DE [illegible] SE EXPIDE LA PRESENTE EN SANTA CLARA A [illegible] DE MARZO DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SESENTA Y TRES.- -

JUEZ MUNICIPAL

SECRETARIO JUDICIAL.

Cftia. por
R.V.

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA
REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DEL
TERMINO MUNICIPAL DE LA HABANA

CERTIFICACION [illegible]

SOLICITUD No. 102[illegible]70.-

REFERENCIA REGISTRAL

REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DE: Juzgado Municipal del Vedado.-
DIA: 27
MES: Junio
AÑO: 1947
SECCION DE: Nacimientos.
TOMO: 182
FOLIO: 141
NUMERO: 1091

FILIACION

NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL INSCRIPTO: FLORA ELOISA DE LA CARIDAD BAEZ Y MAS.- - - - - - - -
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO: Diez y seis y Veinte y tres.- - - - - - - - - -
NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DEL PADRE: Juventino José Severino Baez Rodríguez,
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DEL PADRE: Santa Clara.- - - - - - -
NOMBRES Y APELLIDOS DE LA MADRE: Flora Aida Eudolina Clara Demetria Más y Machado, - - - - - - - - - -
LUGAR DE NACIMIENTO DE LA MADRE: Santa Clara.- - - - - - -

FECHA DEL NACIMIENTO (EN LETRAS)

HORA: Doce meridiano- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DIA: Primero- - - - - -
MES: Diciembre
AÑO: Mil novecientos cuarenta y seis.- - - - - - - - - -

NOTAS MARGINALES

No constan.- -

SALVEDADES

NINGUNA

EL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO DEL ESTADO CIVIL DEL TERMINO MUNICIPAL DE LA HABANA

CERTIFICA QUE LOS ANTERIORES DATOS CONCUERDAN FIELMENTE CON LOS QUE APARECEN CONSIGNADOS EN LA INSCRIPCION A QUE SE HACE REFERENCIA.

LA HABANA, ocho
DE Abril DE MIL NOVECIENTOS
SESENTA Y tres.-

AUTORIZADO EL USO DE ESTE [illegible] POR DECRETO DEL MINISTRO [illegible] No. [illegible] DE [illegible] DE [illegible]

CONFECCIONADO POR: F. Jiménez.
CONFRONTADO POR:
CERTIFICADO POR:

ufga 27674
13 Jun 67
19-124-25/6

[illegible] 4 aug 72 [illegible]

[illegible] CARD and approved

[illegible] and approved

[illegible] and approved

[illegible] FERRED

[illegible] 201-282302

[illegible] indexed [illegible]

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO : Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.

FROM : Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMBUD/Operational
Documentation for AMBUD Dependency Payment Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UFGA-27706, 31 May 1967

Forwarded herewith are reproductions of documents pertaining to the following additional Hero and Martyr cases:

ATTACHMENT #1: Letter and one document.

Case #98: RAMIREZ, Porfirio (201# not available) No 201

i soft file

a. Letter from widow, Clara DELGADO Caraballoso

b. Parolee cards for Subject and widow.

ATTACHMENT #2: Letter and Six documents.

Case #100: ROJAS Eirea, Anastasio (201-282302)

ATT 2 given slash# UFGA 27673/01 & filed in 201-282302

a. Letter from mother, Maria de las M. EIREA

b. Marriage certificate: 1922. Manuel Ignacio de la Concepcion ROJAS Molina and Mercedes EIREA Sanchez.

ATT 3 given slash# UFGA 27673/02 filed in 201-279298

c. Birth certificate: Maria de las M. EIREA. DPOB: 16 March 1903, Havana, Cuba.

ATT 4 given slash# UFGA 27673/03 filed in 201-283865

d. Birth certificate: Manuel Ignacio de la Concepcion ROJAS Molina. DPOB: 11 December 1893, Havana, Cuba

e. Death certificate: Anastasio ROJAS Eirea, 10 March 1961.

f. Death sentence: Anastasio ROJAS Eirea. (First trial 9 March 1961 and appeal trial 10 March 1961)

4 ATTS.

19-124-25/6

ATTACHMENTS:
1. Letter and one document, Case #98
2. Letter and six documents, Case #100
3. Letter and two documents, Case #108
4. " " " Case #109
5. " " " Case #110
6. Letter and one document, Case #111
7. Letter and two documents, Case #128

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

DISTRIBUTION:
3-WH/COG w/atts. 1 - 7 H/W

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED: 5 June 67

DATE DISPATCHED: JUN 13 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-27673

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:
19-124-25/6
201-282302
201-279298
201-283865

GROUP 1

ATTACHMENT #3: Letter and two documents. filed 201 file

Case #108: PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298)

a. Letter from mother, Maria C. RUIZ Delgado

b. Marriage certificate: Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz and Amparo POSADA

c. Death certificate: Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz

ATTACHMENT #4: Letter and two documents. filed 201 file

Case #109: ESCOTO, Armando (201-283865)

a. Letter from widow, Juana RODRIGUEZ Exposito.

b. Birth certificate: Thania Teresita ESCOTO Rodriguez
DPOB: 27 May 1937, Havana, Cuba

c. Birth certificate: Ileana Maria ESCOTO Rodriguez.
DPOB: 14 ~~January 1946, Havana, Cuba~~ 23 Jan 1945

ATTACHMENT #5: Letter and two documents

filed soft file

Case #110: YERBA, Jose Antonio (201# not available)

a. Letter from mother, Isabel Maria SUAREZ Homdedeu.

b. Birth affidavit: Julio Antonio YEBRA.
DPOB: not given

c. Marriage certificate: Delfin Salvador YEBRA Proenza and Isabel Maria SUAREZ Hondedeu.

ATTACHMENT #6: Letter and one document.

filed soft file

Case #111: CARRERAS, Jesus (201# not available)

a. Letter from widow, Teresa SUAREZ Tous.

b. Birth certificate: Lourdes CARRERAS Suarez.
DPOB: ~~1 July 1960, Havana, Cuba~~ 27 Aug 1960

ATTACHMENT #7: Letter and two documents.

filed soft file

Case #128: SIERRA Montesino, Fidel (201 # not available)

a. Letter from wife, Esther PERDOMO Lopez.

b. Birth certificate: Esther PERDOMA Lopez.
DPOB: 26 September 1928, Moron, Camaguey

c. Birth certificate: Esther B. SIERRA Perdomo
DPOB: 31 March 1948, Arroyo Arenas, El Cano, Havana Prov. Cuba.

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ATTACHMENT #1
TO: UFGA-27173

TRANSLATION

Chicago, May 8, 1967

[redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted]

In your letter of 1 May 1967 you asked me for my marriage certificate and my son's birth certificate, I do not have them because my home was immediately intervened by the so-called Comandante Felix Torres who burned my family passport and wouldn't even let me get my son's clothing. My cousin (?), Porfirio's brother Rodolfo RAMIREZ xxxx clandestinely went to the coasts of Cuba to get me. I am sending you photostatic copies of our parolee cards. I believe they will suffice but at the same time I will write to Porfirio's mother who is still in Cuba since she has not been given permission to leave and come to this country and I will ask her to get copies of the marriage certificate. I will send them to you as soon as I receive them.

Thanks again,
/s/ Clara DELGADO

D

Chicago 5-8/67

Estimado señor.

En su carta fecha May 1st me pide certificado de mi matrimonio y certificado de nacimiento de mi hijo, yo no tengo en mi poder los mismos pues mi casa fue intervenida inmediatamente por el supuesto Comandante Felix Torres el cual quemó mi pasaporte familiar y todos los documentos importante que tenía, no me dejaron sacar ni la ropita de mi hijo, mi cuñado Rodolfo Ramirez hermano de Porfirio fue a buscarme a las costas de Cuba clandestinamente por eso pude salir, yo le mando copias de nuestros Carnés, creo sean suficiente; pero a la vez le escribiré a la madre de Porfirio que todavía se encuentra en Cuba pues no le dan la salida para este país, y le pediré que me saque copias en el juzgado de mi matrimonio, le inmediatamente que los pide se los mandase.

Gracias una vez mas

Dina Delgado



AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO

[illegible]

[illegible] S. [illegible]

[illegible]

ZIP CODE 60638

CHICAGO ILL.

UNITED STATES 5¢

O'HARE

PLANT for a more BEAUTIFUL AMERICA

••• VIA AIR MAIL

Family Name Given Name Initial

RAMIREZ-Delgado, Porfirio de Jesus

Nationality (Citizenship) Passport Number

Cuban

PAROLEE

United States Address

2229 SW 12 St., Miami, Florida

Airline & Flight No. or Vessel of Arrival Passenger Boarded At

[illegible] 5323

Permanent Address

Marti #250-A, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba

Birthdate

7-16-50

Birthplace

Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba

Visa Issued At

Date Visa Issued

Your admission cannot be authorized as PAROLED

until Indefinitely

Conditions 212 (d)(5)

A-12-494-222

KEY 9-27-61 PSG

(Port) (Date) (Inspecting Officer)

PLEASE PRINT IN BLOCK ALL LETTERS

[illegible]-Ceballos, Clara

Cuban

2229 S. 12 St., Miami, Florida

PAROLEE

[illegible]

Marti #250-A, Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba, authorized as

PAROLED

Indefinitely

Santa Clara, Las Villas, Cuba

212 (d)(5)

A-12-494-223

KEY 9-27-61 PSG

(Port) (Date) (Inspecting Officer)

14-00000

ATTACHMENT # 5
TO: UFGA-27622

Miami, Fla, May 15, 1967

Dear Sir:

Your letter of May 2 was received by me, but as I do not have on hand, my son JULIO ANTONIO YEBRA SUAREZ'S birth certificate I had to look for and AFFIDAVIT.

Enclosed photostatic copy of my Marriage Certificate, this is one of the few documents I could to receive from Cuba. I have asked many times for Julio's birth certificate but up to the present I have been unable for getting it. Enclosed is the affidavit signed by my close friend Dr. Martha A. Garcia Ochoa, attorney at Law, Member of the Cuban Bar Association, journalist, former Congresswoman and very honorable and very well known person. I have written again to one friend in Cuba, asking for Julio's birth certificate, if I would receive it, I will send it to you immediately.

Thanking you for your interest on my case, I remain,

Very truly yours,

ISABEL M. SUAREZ Vda. de Yebra.

Isabel M Suarez

590 S.W. 10 St.
Miami, Fla, 33129.

Vda de Yebra (Delfin)

14-00000

7-4407

DOCTOR JOSE MARIA DIAZ DE VILLEGAS Y MARTINEZ,JUEZ MUNICIPAL Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE HOLGUIN.----------------

CERTIFICO:- Que al folio 383 del Tomo 19 de la Seccion de Matrimonios de este Registro Civil a mi cargo,aparece la inscripción que copiada dice así:--

DELFIN SALVADOR ELEUTERIO YEBRA PROENZA.CON YSABEL MARIA YNES SUAREZ HONDEDEU.Solteros:-26 y 25 años.-No 328.-En la ciudad de Holguin a las nueve de la mañana del día veinte y nueve de Julio de mil novecientos veinte y siete;ante los señores Doctor Francisco Fernández León,Juez Municipal Sustituto y Luis Alvarez Zaldivar,Secretario,comparecen Delfin Salvador Eleuterio Yebra y Proenza,natural de Fray Benito,vecino de esta ciudad,soltero,de veinte y seis años de edad,Abogado;hijo de Diego y de Ascención,naturales de Fray Benito e Ysabel María Ynés Suarez Hondedeu,natural de Gibara,vecina de esta ciudad, soltera,de veinte y cinco años de edad,de oficios domésticos, hija de Adolfo y de Concepción,naturales de Puerto Rico y de Mayarí respectivamente;con objeto de verificar su matrimonio Civil.-El señor Juez despues de ver que el expediente instruído al efecto está ajustado a la Ley,ordenó la lectura de los artículos cincuenta y seis y cincuenta y siete del Código Civil.Leidas por mi el Secretario dichas disposiciones legales, el señor Juez,preguntó a los comparecientes si deseaban celebrar su matrimonio ysi efectivamente lo verificaban en este acto y habiendo contestado afirmativamente los declaró legitimamente casados.-Fueron testigos:Delfín Aguilera Ochoa y Armelio Feria Salazar,mayores de edad y de esta vecindad.-Leida esta acta y conformes la firman todos por ante mi el Secretario de que certifico.-El sello del Juzgado.-Dr.Francisco Fernández.-Dr.Delfín Yebra.-Ysabel M.Suarez.-Dr.Delfin Aguilera.-A.Feria.-Luis Alvarez Zaldivar.------------------------------

Y para entregar a parte interesada,que así lo ha solicitado,se expide la presente en Holguín a veinte y cinco de Julio de mil novecientos cincuenta y ocho.-

Juez Municipal.-

Ante mi

Confrontada por:-

Secretario Judicial.-

1958

Visto y legalizado por este Juzgado de Primera Instancia para que pueda surtir efecto en las Oficinas del Registro Civil.

Holguín, ______ de ______ AGO 1956

Vto. Bno.

Juez de Primera Instancia.

Secretario

ATTACHMENT #6
TO: UFGA-27673

TRANSLATION

Miami 7 May 1967

Mr.

The only paper that I have in my possession is my daughter's birth certificate. My marriage certificate is in Cuba. I cannot send anyone to get it because the person who goes to get it would be persecuted because the name of my husband is on it.

Attached is the child's certificate. I would appreciate your letting me know if this is sufficient since trying to obtain mine would be difficult.

Attentively,
/s/ Teresa SUAREZ

Miami 5-7/67

S/e.-

El único papel que yo tengo en mi poder, es el certificado de nacimiento de mi hija. Mi certificado de matrimonio está en Cuba. No puedo mandárselo a usted puesto que la persona que se prestara a sacarlo sería perseguida por aparecer el nombre de mi esposo en el mismo.

Aquí le adjunto el certificado de la niña. Le agradecería me dejara saber si con eso le es suficiente. ya que con el mío existe esa dificultad.

Atentamente.

Tilda Nuñez.

0055638

Dr. JOSE ANTONIO PEREZ GORRIN JUEZ MUNICIPAL DEL VEDADO
Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DEL MISMO.- - - - - - - - - - - - -

25¢

Certifico;- Que al folio 500 del tomo 262 de la Sección de NACIMIENTOS, de este Registro Civil de mi cargo consta el acta que copiada dice así;-[illegible] CARRERAS Y SUAREZ.-1297.-En la Habana, provincia de Habana, a primero de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta y uno, ante el Doctor José Antonio Perez Gorrín, Juez Municipal, y de Humberto Zarraluqui y Canciano, Secretario, se procede a inscribir el nacimiento de una hembra, ocurrido a las cuatro de la madrugada del día veinte y siete de Agosto de mil novecientos sesenta en veinte y tres entre A y B, a quien se le pone por nombre; [illegible].-es hija de Jesus Carreras y Suarez, y de Teresa - Suarez y Tous, naturales de Trinidad y Habana, y vecinos de Diez y nueve dos mil ochocientos seis, nieta por línea paterna de Tomás y Asunción, naturales de Cuba, y por la materna de Pablo y Maria, naturales de Cuba.-Esta inscripción se practica en virtud de declaración de la madre de la inscripta.-Son testigos Nelson Perez, y Mario Grosso y Díaz, mayores de edad, y vecinos de Fomento quinientos sesenta y ocho, y Concordia doscientos cinco.-Leída esta acta se [illegible], se estampa en ella el sello del Juzgado y la firma el señor Juez, los testigos y el declarante, de que certifico;-Dr. J.A.Perez, Teresa Suarez.-N.Perez.-M.Grosso.-H.Zarraluqui.-Hay un sello.- Y A PETICION DE PARTE INTERESADA expido la presente en la Habana, en la Habana, a diez y seis de Junio de mil novecientos sesenta y uno.- -

Secretario.

14-00000

Miami, May 9-/67.

Dear Mister

Here I send you mine birth certificate and it says that I'm married with Fidel [illegible], and I send you mine daughter birth certificate.

I want you to excuse me for not going to your office but in the letter you sent it doesnt say the address only the P.O. box.

If I have to go to your office send me the address, and I'll go, please.

I want to thank you for your kindness.

Sincerely.

Esther Rodriguez

(P.S) If you need or want the certificate you can keep it, because I have another

Thanks.

Esther Ledesma
326 NW 10 Ave.
Miami Fla
33128

WASHINGTON 5¢
UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 5¢
UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON 5¢
UNITED STATES
GREAT RIVER ROAD
5

30456.

30455

JUZGADO MUNICIPAL DE MORON

DOCTORA DORIS LISTA VIDAL [illegible] JUEZ MUNICIPAL ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DE LA CIUDAD DE MORON CAMAGUEY.--------------------------------------

CERTIFICO: Que el Folio.-Numero.- CIENTO ONCE , del Tomo.-Original Numero.-CINCUENTA Y UNO , de la Sección de Nacimientos , del Registro Civil de este Juzgado Municipal a mi cargo consta la inscripción que copiada literalmente dice.-Así.-Numero.-QUINIENTOS CUARENTA Y CUATRO :- BLANCA ESTHER JUSTINA PERDOMO LOPEZ:-En la Ciudad de Morón , a las diez de la mañana del día veinte y siete de Septiembre de mil novecientos veinte y ocho ante el Doctor Mario F.Vázquez Martinez ,Juez Municipal , Primer Suplente y de Manuel Pringuier Corrales,Secretario ,compareció el Señor Bernardo Perdomo Granela , natural de Vueltas ,mayor de edad , Guardia Rural y vive Reparto Vista , con objeto de que se inscriba en el Registro Civil , una hembra , y al efecto como padre de la misma manifestó . Que nació en el domicilio del declarante el día veinte y seis del presente a la una de la mañana ,Que es hija del declarante y de la Sra.Elda Rosa López , natural de esta Ciudad , de diez y siete años de edad , ocupada en los quehaceres de su casa , y vive donde el declarante , Que es nieta por línea paterna del Señor Eugenio Perdomo y de la Señora Consuelo Granela Espinosa , naturales de Canarias , y de Remedios y materna de Doña Ramona López , natural de esta Ciudad ,Y que lleva los nombres de BLANCA ESTHER JUSTINA . Fueron testigos los Señores Ramón Borroto Borroto y Antonio Lloo Fernández , mayores de edad , casados, empleado , y vecinos de esta Ciudad , a quienes les consta todas las circunstancias consignadas por el declarante . Leída y aprobada esta acta , se sella con el de este Juzgado y la firma el Señor Juez , el declarante y los testigos, lo Certifico.Hay un sello.Dr.Mario F.Vazquez,B.Perdomo,R.Borroto Antonio Lloo , M.L.Pringuier.-NOTA :- Se hace constar que la inscripta a que esta acta se refiere contrajo matrimonio en la Habana ante el Notario José R.Coscculuela el día catorce de Junio del año actual , con Fidel Sierra Montesino , según aparece del [illegible] por el Juez Municipal del Oeste de la Habana , Morón, cuatro de Noviembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y siete.Certifico Hay un sello.Dr.Mario Ruiz.--------------------------------------

CONCUERDA CON SU ORIGINAL QUE OBRA AL FOLIO Y TOMO CITADOS y a instancia de parte interesada que así lo solicita , expido la presente en Morón a los veinte y nueve días del mes de Marzo de mil novecientos sesenta.- - - - - -

Entre líneas ,exhorto,Vale.-)

Juez Municipal.-

Secretario Judicial.-

Se le fijó sellos de Jubilación Judicial por valor de setenta y cinco centavos.Decreto-Ley.1320-1954.-

YWR

Confrontado por

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

DIRECCION GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

DR. JUAN GUALBERTO CABALLERO EDREIRA, Jefe del Negociado de Asuntos Legales, Encargado del Registro de Legalizaciones de firmas de Funcionarios Judiciales, P.A.

CERTIFICO: que es auténtica, al parecer, la firma del Funcionario Judicial que consta en el precedente documento.

Habana, 20 ABR 1960

REPUBLICA DE CUBA
PODER JUDICIAL
JUZGADO MUNICIPAL DE EL CANO
ARROYO ARENAS

30462

PROCURADOR RAMIRO MARTINEZ TORRES, JUEZ MUNICIPAL DE EL CANO EN ARROYO ARENAS Y ENCARGADO DEL REGISTRO CIVIL DEL MISMO. . . . .

CERTIFICO: Que al folio 97 del Tomo 23 de la Sección de Nacimientos de éste Registro Civil, consta el Acta 97, que dice: ESTHER SALBINA SIERRA Y PERDOMO.-En Arroyo Arenas, El Cano, provincia de La Habana, a las once de la mañana del día veinte y ocho de Marzo de mil novecientos cuarenta y nueve, ante el Dr. José Miguel Roig y Castro, Juez Municipal, Encargado del Registro Civil y de Alberto Urra Menéndez Secretario, se procede a inscribir el nacimiento de una hembra, ocurrido a las doce y media de la tarde del día treinte y uno de Marzo del año próximo pasado, en Carlos Marrero uno, El Cano; es hija de Fidel Sierra y Montesino, natural de Alquizar, empleado y de Esther Perdomo y López, natural de Morón, ocupada en su casa y ambos mayores de edad y vecinos de Santa Catalina ciento siete, Marianao; es nieta por línea paterna de Manuel Sierra y Conde, vecino de Santa Catalina ciento siete, Marianao y de Fidela Montesino y Sánchez, difunta y ambos naturales de Alquizar y por la materna de Bernardo Perdomo y Granela, natural de Santa Clara y vecino de Norte sin número, Marianao y de Elda López y Escudel, natural de Morón y vecina de Cocos sin número Cerro, Habana. Se le puso por nombre: ESTHER SALBINA. Esta inscripción se practica en virtud de declaración del padre de la que se inscribe y la presencian como testigos Roberto Valdés y Cárdenas, natural de San Miguel del Padron, mayor de edad, de estado soltero, ocupación empleado y vecino de Agramonte quinientos diez y ocho y Dimas Vázquez y Valcárcel, natural de España, ciudadano cubano, mayor de edad, de estado casado, ocupación empleado y vecino de San Cándido cinco, digo cincuenta y cinco, ambos en Marianao. Leída esta acta, e invitadas las personas que deben suscribirla a que la leyeran por sí mismas si así lo creyeren conveniente, se estampó el sello del Juzgado y la firman el señor Juez, los testigos y el declarante, de que certifico.-sobre raya "declaración del padre de la que se inscribe" Vale.-Frdo Dr José Miguel Roig.-Fidel Sierra Montesino.-R Valdés-Frdo Ilegible.-Alberto Urra Menéndez. Hay un sello del Juzgado - - - - - - - -

Y a instancia de parte, se extiende la presente en Arroyo Arenas, a primero de Abril de mil novecientos sesenta. -

EL CANO

ante mí

SECRETARIO

Asiento

Confrontada con

REPUBLICA DE CUBA

MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA

DIRECCION CENTRAL DE JUSTICIA

DR. JUAN GUALBERTO CABALLERO FERREIRA, Jefe del Negociado de Asuntos Legales, Encargado del Registro de Legalizaciones de firmas de Funcionarios Judiciales, P.A.

CERTIFICO: que es auténtica, al parecer, la firma del Funcionario Judicial que consta en el precedente documento.

Habana, 20 ABR 1960

hfga 27717
12 Jun 67
19-124-25/6

4 aug 72

201-248158

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
	ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
X	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Additional Documentation on AMBUD Dependency Cases

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. UFGW-6440, 9 March 1967
B. UFGA-27425, 26 April 1967

1. Reproductions of the legal-type documents requested by Headquarters under Reference A for the Hero & Martyr cases receiving AMBUD dependency payment are being obtained by the AMTIKI facility as reported in Reference B.

2. We are forwarding as attachments, herewith, reproductions of the documents that have been received for the following cases. Reproductions of documents pertaining to the remaining cases will be forwarded as received:

Attachment A: One document

[illegible]

Case #95: ✓ RODRIGUEZ Navarrote, Nemosio (201 # not available) Birth certificate for son, Carlos Alberto RODRIGUEZ Acosta. DPOB: 16 July 1956, Havana, Cuba. (Previously reported as 8 July 1956) — correct

(The widow, Modesta ACOSTA, states that marriage certificate is not available.)

Attachment B: Three documents [illegible]

Case #97: DELGADO, Miguel de los Santos (201-283995)

a. Marriage certificate: ~~28 April~~ 19 March 1954. Miguel de los Santos DELGADO Martinez and Hilda Rosa CARBALLO Miranda.

b. Birth certificate: Jose Miguel DELGADO Carballo. DPOB: ~~16 December 1954~~ 12 August 1954, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported)

c. Birth certificate: Ana Maria DELGADO Caraballo. DPOB: ~~16 April 1954~~ 21 March 1956, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.)

CS COPY

Attachments:
A. Doc. for Case #95 as stated above
B. Docs. for Case #97 " " "
C. " " " #102 " " "
D. " " " #107 " " "
E. " " " #129 " " "

CROSS REFERENCE TO

Distribution:
3-WH/COG w/atts. A thru E H/W

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE TYPED
31 May 67

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN - 6 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA 27706

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
19-124-25/

Attachment C: Letter and two documents. [illegible]

Case #102: TAMARGO Gutierrez, Rolando (201-284309)

a. Letter from widow, Lilia FERNANDEZ Vilarino.

b. Death certificate: Rolando TAMARGO Gutierrez. Died: 7 March 1961.

c. Birth certificate: Barbara Alejandra TAMARGO Fernandez. DPOB: 21 March 1961, Havana, Cuba. (previously reported as 29 March 1961) [illegible]

Attachment D: Three documents [illegible]

Case #107: PRIETO Ruiz, Plinio (201-279298)

a. Marriage certificate: 19 December 1947. Plinio Luis PRIETO Ruiz and Amparo POSADA.

b. Birth certificate: Georgina PRIETO Posada. DPOB: 28 April 1950, Puentes Grandes, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.) ok

c. Birth certificate: Fernando Ramon PRIETO Posada. DPOB: 13 January 1953, Puentes Grandes, Havana, Cuba. (Not previously reported.) ok

Attachment E: Letter and two documents.

Case #129: /No 201/ HERNANDEZ, Giordana (201 # not available)

a. Letter from wife, Zoe HERNANDEZ O'Fallon.

b. Marriage certificate: 6 January 1958. Giordano Jose HERNANDEZ and Zoe M. FARALDO.

c. Birth certificate: Giordano Andres HERNANDEZ Faraldo. DPOB: 4 February 1959, Havana, Cuba.

Burton J. Celenza
Burton J. CELENZA

R.C.

S E C R E T

Chief of Station, JMWAVE X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Concerning Dependency Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-27323, dated 31 March 1967
B. UFGA-27538, dated 11 May 1967
C. UFGA-27670, dated 29 May 1967

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposal to terminate payments to the Trustee for dependents of Subject of references provided there is no question that Subject of the BOHEMIA ARTICLE forwarded in reference A and Subject of references are identical. Presumably AMTIKI-1 has personal knowledge of this case and can explain the discrepancy between the spelling of the name as KING in the press clipping and KIM which according to available records is Subject's actual patronymic.

2. Since the Trustee will be advised that the case will be reviewed in the event the parents come to the United States, it is suggested that copies of any additional information AMTIKI may have on file, and any identifiable traces on the father, be forwarded for inclusion in Subject's 201 file.

Ellen V. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

UFGW-6550

S E C R E T

19-124-35/8
201-298852

6 June 1967 WH/COG/CICS/NANCYE GRATZ:mjr 7447

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

WH/COG/MO

AC/WH/COG Earl J. Williamson

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

[illegible]	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT TYPIC/AMBUD/OPERATIONAL
Investigation of Trust Account for Case #142, GUTIERREZ Izaguirre, Jorge

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: UFGW-6306, 8 December 1966

1. The information requested by Headquarters in paragraph two of Reference concerning the funds held in trust for Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre (prisoner) has been obtained from the trustee, Mr. Orlando FERNANDEZ and is forwarded herewith.

2. According to Mr. FERNANDEZ, an arrangement with the family of Subject provides that Mr. FERNANDEZ (who now resides in Tampa) receive the monthly payment of $225.00 and forward it to an uncle of Subject, Evelio CORZO (in Miami), who is responsible for the forwarding of assistance to the Subject and his parents in Cuba. Mr. FERNANDEZ further stated that there are actually two bank accounts which he described as follows:

a. Dade Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami, Florida, account number 04-439677. January 1967 balance: $6,748.36. The account is in the name of Subject's uncle and aunt, Evelio and Lillian CORZO.

b. The Exchange Bank of Temple Terrace, Tampa, Florida, account number 3627. January 1967 balance: $675.00. The account is in the name of the trustee, Mr. Orlando FERNANDEZ.

Mr. FERNANDEZ explained the reason for two bank accounts as follows: During the time that the trustee resided in Miami, the check was deposited by Mr. CORZO in the CORZO account. When the trustee moved to Tampa (date unknown) Mr. CORZO told the trustee that in view of the ample funds on deposit in Miami, the trustee should open a savings account in Tampa for the deposit of future payments.

3. For Headquarters further information, the trustee provided documentation from the family in Cuba, dated 25 February 1967, which designates Evelio CORZO Izaguirre as the representative for Subject. JMWAVE traces on CORZO are as follows:

a. An AMPAID-4 report dated 28 June 1962 describes the following person who is probably identical with the uncle:

Distribution:
3 - WH/COG

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
31 May 67	JUN - 5 1967

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-27707

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-25/6
201-278754

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CORZO Izaguirre, Evelio (Dr.). Lawyer and fingerprint technician formerly employed at the Electoral Supreme Tribune and the Electoral Census of Havana. Friend and a former student of AMLAID-4, at the University of Havana. Resides at 9290 S.W. 4th Terrace, Miami.

b. An I&NS SE-180 card contains the following data on the uncle:

*CORZO Izaguirre, Ricardo Evelio A 12490487 DPOB: 7 February 1926, Havana, Cuba.

Present address: 9290 S.W. 4th Terrace, Miami, Florida.

Foreign address: Calle 38 #120, Havana, Cuba

Place of Entry: Miami, Florida

Date of Entry: 14 September 1961

Manner: PAA-#422

Nationality: Cuban

Occupation in Cuba: Fingerprint Expert

Foreign Military Service: None

Visa Type: B 1 and 2

Issued: Havana, 20 October 1960.

Marital Status: Married to Lilia TOUS Gonzalez

Burton J. CELENZA

11

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESS ACTION

☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
☐ MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

JUL 3 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMBUD
Concerning Dependency Payment for Jorge KIM Yum (Case #143)

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCES: A. UFGA-27303, dated 31 March 1967
B. UFGA-27538, dated 11 May 1967
C. UFGA-27670, dated 29 May 1967

1. Headquarters concurs in JMWAVE's proposal to terminate payments to the Trustee for dependents of Subject of references provided there is no question that Subject of the BOHEMIA ARTICLE forwarded in reference A and Subject of references are identical. Presumably AMTIKI-1 has personal knowledge of this case and can explain the discrepancy between the spelling of the name as KING in the press clipping and KIM which according to available records is Subject's actual patronymic.

2. Since the Trustee will be advised that the case will be reviewed in the event the parents come to the United States, it is suggested that copies of any additional information AMTIKI may have on file, and any identifiable traces on the father, be forwarded for inclusion in Subject's 201 file.

Ellen F. MARGANY

Distribution:
Orig and 2 - COS, JMWAVE

D-B-201-298852

19-124-25/6

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGW-6550

DATE: 8 JUN 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 19-124-25/6
201-298852

6 June 1967

Distribution:
1 - RID
1 - WH/REG/C
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/COG/MO
1 - Originator

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/COG/CICS/NANCYE GRATZ:mjr			7447

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
WH/COG/MO	7 June 67	
		2 50

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
AC/WH/COG	7/6/67	Earl J. Williamson

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MPO. 1-66

DISPATCH

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; December 31, 1960 $219,383.20

Less: Unpaid checks

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Ricardo Diaz	14	$ 175.00
Oct. 4	Jorge Rodríguez Bezos	68	400.00
Nov. 1	Luis Rivas	425	144.13
Dec. 1	Orlando Aló Clavijo	858	250.00
Dec. 1	Gustavo Cotayo	892	175.00
Dec. 1	Nolis Mesa	961	100.00
Dec. 1	Rolando Zubizarreta	1026	200.00
Dec. 5	José Sosa, Jr.	1069	183.34
Dec. 6	Elvira Piñón	1121	200.00
Dec. 7	Juan Sordo	1149	100.00
Dec. 9	José F. Rodríguez de la Vega	1168	250.00
Dec. 9	Primitivo Lima	1169	250.00
Dec. 9	Manuel B. Ledón	1170	250.00
Dec. 14	Mario Redondo	1216	500.00
Dec. 15	American Insurance Agency	1223	195.10
Dec. 15	Félix Mario Martínez	1235	200.00
Dec. 16	Oscar Madariaga	1269	250.00
Dec. 16	Serapio Montejo	1275	400.00
Dec. 16	Aníbal Jover	1276	103.24
Dec. 16	Gloria Fagés	1277	200.00
Dec. 16	Enrique Alonso de la Torre	1280	250.00
Dec. 16	Francisco Méndez Capote	1281	250.00
Dec. 18	Barnett's	1285	5.66
Dec. 18	Pan-American World Airways	1288	11.58
Dec. 18	Pan-American World Airways	1289	6.00
Dec. 21	José Sosa, Jr.	1307	60.00
Dec. 21	Douglas Corporation	1324	97.85
Dec. 22	Barnett's	1330	95.06
Dec. 22	Manuel Braña	1331	1,000.00
Dec. 22	Eduardo Hernández	1332	5,000.00
Dec. 22	Lem Jones Associates, Inc.	1333	5,256.00
Dec. 23	Miguel Náfoles	1359	50.00
Dec. 23	Josefa Márquez	1362	50.00
Dec. 23	Frank Diaz Silveira	1364	129.80
Dec. 26	Frank Diaz Silveira	1367	71.75

(Continues page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

STATEMENT "II"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total	
Dec. 27	Francisco Liantaud	1369	$ 34.35	
Dec. 27	Frank Diaz Silveira	1370	357.00	
Dec. 27	Carlos F. Pérez	1371	60.00	
Dec. 27	E. L. Cento	1372	151.58	
Dec. 27	Manuel Rivero Setién	1373	50.00	
Dec. 28	Mail-O-Matic Printing	1379	100.00	
Dec. 28	José González Argüelles	1380	2,000.00	
Dec. 28	Enrique Collazo	1381	250.00	
Dec. 28	Eusebio Capestany	1382	150.00	
Dec. 28	Ivan Portuondo	1383	150.00	
Dec. 28	E. L. Cento	1384	44.10	
Dec. 29	E. L. Cento	1385	101.70	
Dec. 29	E. L. Cento	1386	88.00	
Dec. 30	Western Union	1388	21.48	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1389	87.30	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1390	87.30	
Dec. 30	Florida Light & Power Co.	1391	73.26	
Dec. 30	Elvira Bujones	1392	181.00	
Dec. 30	The Florida National Bank	1393	34.25	
Dec. 30	Juan Paula (Rasco and Paula)	1394	50,000.00	
Dec. 30	Carlos Noval	1395	87.30	
Dec. 30	Carlos B. Fernández	1397	151.47	
Dec. 30	E. L. Cento	1398	44.10	
Dec. 30	Manuel Castillo	1399	356.94	
Dec. 30	José I. Rasco	1400	357.30	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1401	2,337.00	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1402	3,499.72	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1403	2,877.36	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1404	190.00	
Dec. 31	M. F. Goudie	1405	1,319.99	82,162.01
	Corrected Bank Balance; December 31, 1960			$137,221.19

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "III"

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Payroll and Refugees:	$46,700.00	$57,466.70	$10,766.70	✓
Travel Expenses:	$10,000.00	$ 7,834.83 ✓		$ 2,165.17 ✓
Rent, Utilities, etc.:	$ 6,000.00			✓
General Expenses		$ 2,946.45 ✓		
Comunications		1,555.24 ✓		
Total	$ 6,000.00	$ 4,501.69 ✓		$ 1,498.31 ✓
Committees:				
Publicity	$48,000.00	$16,796.07		$31,203.93
Agent Exploitation	6,000.00	5,988.07 ✓		11.93
Planning	2,500.00	2,300.00 ✓		200.00 ✓
Finance	-0-	-0-		
Public Relations	10,000.00	13.68 ✓		9,986.32
Organization and Proseltysm	1,000.00	559.94 ✓		440.06
Total	$67,500.00	$25,657.76		$41,842.24 ✓
Delegations:				
Latin American	$14,000.00	$ 4,583.55 ✓		$ 9,416.45 ✓
United States	7.500.00	10,198.00 ✓	$ 2,698.00	
Total	$21,500.00	$14,781.55 ✓	$ 2,698.00	$ 9,416.45 ✓
Miscellaneous	$ 5,000.00	$ 9,909.44 ✓	$ 4,909.44	✓
Budgeted Expenses	($156,700.00)	$120,151.97	$18,374.14	$54,922.17 ✓

(Continues page No.2)

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

STATEMENT "III"
Page No.2

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Non-Budgeted:				
Assets		$ 5,773.22 ✓	$ 5,773.22	
Monroe Hotel		508.24 ✓	508.24	
C.F.R.D.E.C.		2,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	
Given to the Executives of the different organizations for the expenses of their jobs		3,000.00 ✓	3,000.00	
Total	-o-	$ 11,281.46	$ 11,281.46	-o-
TOTAL BALANCE	$156,700.00	$131,433.43	$ 29,655.60	$ 54,922.17
Spent in excess in Nov.		10,420.81	10,420.81	
Total	$156,700.00	$141,854.24	$ 40,076.41	$ 54,922.17
Non-Spent		14,845.76	14,845.76	
	$156,700.00	$156,700.00	$ 54,922.17	$ 54,922.17

N O T E : In the liquidation of the Budget of the month of November, appear expenses for Assets in the amount of $12,787.58, when in reality it was $11,787.58, so that the difference in excess in the last month of November was $10,420.81 instead of $11,420.81.

ul.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

December 5	: Deposit	BEAN	—	$ 158,875.00*
December 15	: Deposit	BEAN	—	90,000.00
December 27	: Deposit	[illegible]	—	103,000.00
December 29	: Deposit	[illegible]	—	100,000.00
		TOTAL :		$451,875.00

+ TYr 159.000,00
Bk chgs 125,00
158.875.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EARLIER MONTHS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

Dec. 6 :	Reinbursment of the remaining of the check 771 (Rafael Miguel) that was extended in the amount of $400.00 for a Caribbean Conference	$ 213.51

N O T E : This reinbursment correspond to an amount that, in excess of what corresponded to the expense for which the check was extended, was returned by Mr. Miguel and deposited in the account "Paula and Sosa". It represents real diminution in the expenses of the month of November, that is compensated when been considered as incomes in this month.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REIMBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO THE MONTH OF DECEMBER
"PAULA AND COCA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Dec. 6 :	Reinbursement of check 1049 in the amount of $70.00 for cables presenting Dr. Llaca, since it was spent only $67.29 (See Annex "I-J")	$ 2.71
Dec. 28 :	Reinbursement of checks 1163 and 1164 in the amount of $120.00 each for a trip to Jacksonville, and it was spent only $203.00. (See Annex "I-M")	37.00
Dec. 28 :	Reinbursement of check 1157 in the amount of $107.14 to pay the tickets of the children Raul and Roberto Uriarte, since it was spent only $56.60 (See Annex "I-H")	50.54
Dec. 28 :	Reinbursement of checks 1298, 1299 and 1301 for tickets of various people, of which the taxes were not paid. (See Annex "I-H")	72.78
	Total December reinbursements	$ 163.03

N O T E : These amounts have been deducted from the totals of their respective accounts, as can be seen in the correspondent annexes, to the effects of the exact determination of the expense in each case.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

REINBURSMENT CORRESPONDING TO THE MONROE HOTEL

"PAULA AND ROSA"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Dec. 28 :	14 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	$ 56.00
Dec. 28 :	13 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	52.00
Dec. 28 :	19 Checks in the amount of $4.00 each	76.00
	Total reinbursment Monroe Hotel	$ 184.00

NOTE : See Annex "I-P".

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT .
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ASSETS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS:		
Dec. 7	Revolving fund Monroe Hotel	1145	$ 100.00
Dec. 12	Deposit - Telephone service - P.L. Díaz Lanz - Authorized by Finance Department	1194	150.00
Dec. 15	Increase revolving fund Military Section	1229	5,000.00
	Total of Deposits		$5,250.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Dec. 5	1 Air-conditioner Mr. Sosa's office	1069	$ 183.34
Dec. 22	1 Legal file, 4 drawers (Comptroller Department)	1339	48.93
	Total of Office Equipment		$ 232.27
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 5	1 R.C. Transmitter (Abel de Varona)	1103	$ 19.95
Dec. 5	1 R.C. Receiver (Abel de Varona)	1103	34.95
Dec. 5	1 Servo (Abel de Varona)	1103	8.95
Dec. 5	1 Multi-Testor (Abel de Varona)	1103	16.50
Dec. 5	1 Boat (Abel de Varona)	1103	10.60
Dec. 12	1 "Madjin" Ship spare part	1202	200.00
	Total of Others		$ 290.95
	TOTAL OF ASSETS		$5,773.22

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"FAURA AND SOSA"
REPORT
PAYROLL
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

61

COMMITTEES:

Planning:

	Check No.	Total
Arturo Alemán Ruiz	856	$ 150.00
Elio R. Alvarez López	860	225.00
Fritz Appel Merodio	862	350.00
Migdolidhia Batard Capote	867	150.00
Guillermo A. Belt Martínez Viademonte	869	250.00
Guillermo Bermello Ruiz	870	350.00
Miguel Angel Busquet Gil del Real	877	150.00
Mario del Cañal Ferrer	880	350.00
Néstor Carbonell Cortina	882	175.00
Syla Cuervo	893	225.00
Raúl Delgado Pereda	895	200.00
Luis Espíndola Palacios	902	200.00
Ramiro Fernández Moris del Valle	908	225.00
Ernesto Freyre Varona	913	300.00
Alberto García Navarro	919	150.00
Laureano Garrote Peluzzo	924	275.00
Ambrosio González del Valle	929	350.00
Francisco Alberto Gutiérrez Bolívar	932	250.00
José Manuel Hernández Puente	937	350.00
Martín León Mena	940	200.00
Armando de León Sotolongo	941	275.00
Francisco López del Rincón Sánchez	944	200.00
Enrique de la Mar y Maza	947	225.00

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Continues on page No. 2

PAYROLL

ANNEX "1-F"
Page No. 2

		Check No.	Total
COMMITTEES: (Cont.)			
Planning: (Cont.)			
Bernardo Maristany Costales González		951	$ 225.00
Pedro Martínez Fraga		953	400.00
Manuel de Jesús Mencía Gómez		958	350.00
Pedro S. Peñaranda Díaz		977	300.00
Gustavo Ribeaux Figueras		984	275.00
Arsenio Roa		988	200.00
Jorge Salazar Carrillo		1002	275.00
Matías Varas Romero		1014	250.00
Nicasio Vidal Ramírez		1021	150.00
Gerardo de Villiers Betancourt		1022	150.00
Enrique Llaca Orbiz		1029	275.00
Agustín Goytisolo		1042	250.00
Inés Matilde Puig		1057	200.00
Juan Calvo González		1058	200.00
René Cárdenas Abreu		1059	200.00
Humberto Cardounel		1060	175.00
Gustavo Delgado		1066	300.00
Gastón Fernández		1086	200.00
Héctor Febles Barreto		1094	250.00
José R. Villavicencio Orta		1095	250.00
Jorge Guerra Romero	$ 50.00	1208	
	175.00	1264	
	$ 225.00		225.00
Oscar Grau Esteban		1234	225.00
Félix Mario Martínez Moreno		1235	200.00
Rafael Sánchez Losada		1245	225.00
Angel B. Béquer González		1246	250.00

Continues on page No. 3

PAYROLL

		Check No.	Total
COMMITTEES: (Cont.)			
Planning: (Cont.)			
Oscar de Freixas y de la Torre	$175.00	1247	
	50.00	1265	
	$ 225.00		$ 225.00
Cándido García Valdés		1248	200.00
Francisco Martínez Aguilera		1249	175.00
Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel		1250	225.00
Manuel Navas Aguilera		1251	225.00
Rafael Herrera Télles		1253	225.00
Luis René García Fernández		1254	250.00
Armando Freyre de Varona		1255	250.00
Vitalio Ruiz Gómez		1256	250.00
Rafael Angel Blanco de la Cotera		1258	225.00
Tulio Díaz Rivera		1279	250.00
Enrique Alonso de la Torre		1280	250.00
Francisco Méndez Capote		1281	250.00
13			$14,575.00 ✓
Transportation:			
Arcadio Agrás Guillén		852	$ 200.00
Alonso Fernández Morrell		906	350.00
Manuel García Calero		916	150.00
Mario Redondo Fernández		982	300.00
Armando Vázquez Almagro		1017	200.00
Alberto Martín Martín		1028	150.00
Enrique Llansó Alzugaray		1093	250.00
			$ 1,600.00 ✓

Continues on page No. 4

PAYROLL

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Organization and Proselitysm:

		Check No.	Total
Pedro Pablo Bermúdez		871	$ 175.00
Irmina Bouza Enríquez		874	125.00
Luis Bueno Ramsden		875	350.00
Manuel Castillo Cobo Souto		886	225.00
Heriberto Corona Méndez		891	200.00
Humberto Figueras González		911	250.00
Rafael Galis Menéndez		914	225.00
Claudio González Morales		928	175.00
René Luis Pelly		945	125.00
Héctor La-Mar		948	175.00
Raúl Medina Mesa		957	200.00
José Millán Velasco		962	225.00
Jesús Miranda Hernández		963	200.00
Segundo Miranda Hernández		964	250.00
Pedro Montiel Zapirain		966	225.00
José Manuel Sánchez Navarro		1003	325.00
Roberto Varona García		1015	225.00
Abel de Varona Loredo		1016	175.00
Adrián Vidal Aznares		1020	225.00
Mario Villalonga Suárez		1044	175.00
Juan Mesa		1083	200.00
Anselmo Rodríguez Rendueles		1236	200.00
Raúl Fernández Corredera		1238	200.00
Gloria Espinosa Díaz		1240	150.00
Jorge Fernández López		1241	150.00
Rolando Fernández Corredera	$150.00	1243	
(Ant.)	85.00	1092	
	$235.00		235.00

Continues on page No. 5

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 5

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Organization and Proselitysm:

		Check No.	Total
Jesús García		1244	$ 200.00
Carlos Cicero MacKinney		1260	225.00
Carlos Arteaga Vilató		1261	175.00
Ignacio Pujol		1278	200.00
José Caragol		1360	250.00
			$ 6,435.00

Public Relations:

		Check No.	Total
Tomás Durán Quevedo		900	$ 200.00
Antonio González Mora		927	275.00
Silvia Morán Socarraz		969	100.00
Ignacio Freixas Gener	$250.00	1136	
(Ant.)	50.00	1181	
	$300.00		300.00
Max Azicri-Levy		1139	200.00
Miguel A. García		1140	300.00
Fernando Alloza Villagrasa		1150	250.00
Carlos Allen Dosal		1239	225.00
Juan Turro Ichaso		1242	150.00
			$ 2,000.00

Agent Exploitation:

		Check No.	Total
Ramiro Fernández-Moris Fernández		907	$ 200.00
Anastasio Augusto Martín Elena		954	200.00
Paulino Pérez Blanco		979	125.00
Jorge Roque Castro		995	125.00
			$ 650.00

Continues on page No. 6

PAYROLL

COMMITTEES: (Cont.)

Publicity ("Propaganda"):

			Check No.	Total
Pedro Abascal Berenguer			851	$ 225.00
Mario Barrera Díaz			866	225.00
Humberto Estévez del Pino			903	300.00
Julio C. García Cruz		$135.00	917	
	(Ant.)	15.00	1106	
		$150.00		150.00
Margarita Herrera Méndez			938	100.00
Pedro Leyva Ugarriza			943	200.00
Orlando Martínez Miller			956	200.00
Nolis Mesa Vallarino			961	100.00
Raúl Miró Barnet			965	175.00
Fermín Peinado Espino			976	350.00
Rafael Rivas Vázquez			986	225.00
Vicente Agustín Romeo Pérez			994	200.00
Rubén Darío Rumbaut López			1000	350.00
José Salazar Aguilar			1001	300.00
Néstor Suárez Feliú			1006	250.00
Alberto Valera			1013	125.00
Clara Park Pessino			1128	250.00
				$ 3,725.00

Finance:

	Check No.	Total
Arístides Agüero Montoro	853	$ 200.00
José Arriola	863	275.00
Santiago Fernández Pichs	909	175.00
Enrique Ros Pérez	996	400.00
		$ 1,050.00

Continues on Page No. 7

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 7

	Check No.	Total
COMMITTEESS: (Cont.)		
Comunication:		
Ubaldo Arteaga	864	$ 150.00
Angel Castillo Barroso	887	275.00
Gustavo Cuervo Fernández	894	175.00
Hildebrand Díaz Rojas	899	250.00
Celso Pimienta	981	275.00
Fernando Trespalacios	1011	275.00
Francisco A. Zayas González	1024	300.00
Frank Zayas (Confidential)	1025	150.00
Armando Menéndez Rabasa	1096	250.00
Elvira Piñón	1121	200.00
		$ 2,300.00 ✓
Total of Committees:		$32,335.00 ✓
OTHERS:		
Office of the General Coordinator:		
Carlos Manuel Cibrián Ruisánchez	889	$ 150.00
Jorge Alberto Estrada Casas	904	150.00
Vicente León León	939	350.00
Luis Morales Ortega	967	150.00
Jorge A. Morán Lamadrid	968	300.00
Ricardo Zabala Sánchez	1023	90.00
		$ 1,190.00 ✓
Office of the Auxiliar Coordinator:		
Teresa de Jesús Oti Montaner	974	$ 200.00
Pablo Pérez Zamora	980	150.00
		$ 350.00 ✓

Continues on page No. 8

PAYROLL

		Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Press Department:			
Berta Díaz Fernández		897	$ 125.00
Mario Rodríguez Gómez		991	150.00
Yolanda Rubio García	$125.00	997	
	50.00	1222	
	$175.00		175.00
			$ 450.00
Inmigration:			
Israel Algaze Moya		857	$ 225.00
Acts and Correspondence:			
Rafael Resende Vigoa		983	$ 150.00
Rafael Argilagos		1034	125.00
José López Franco		1035	125.00
			$ 400.00
Economic Section:			
Adel Tomás Sotolongo Ramos		1005	$ 200.00
Military Section:			
Manuel Guillot		931	$ 125.00
Antonio Rómulo Torre Ruiz		1009	125.00
Rolando Zubizarreta Besú		1026	200.00
			$ 450.00
Comptroller Department:			
Manuel Blanco Sanzo		873	$ 250.00
Mario Girbau García		925	250.00

Continues on page No. 9

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-F"
Page No. 9

		Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Comptroller Department: (Cont.)			
Silvia Martínez Echazábal		955	$ 150.00
Juan Paula Báez		975	350.00
Ana Matilde Rodríguez Rodríguez		993	200.00
			$ 1,200.00
Maintenance of 1700 Biscayne Blvd. Office:			
Hilario Caballero Rodríguez		878	$ 125.00
Ricardo Cabrera Amoedo		879	150.00
Mario Collazo Bernal		890	125.00
René Díaz Escobar		896	125.00
Arturo Escarze Cancio		901	125.00
Oscar García Guerra		918	125.00
Luis Hernández Melis		936	125.00
Pedro Eligio Valdés Claro		1012	125.00
Tomás Vázquez Casanova		1013	200.00
			$ 1,225.00
Díaz Lanz Group:			
Néstor Alvarez Fernández	$250.00	859	
	25.00	1070	
	$275.00		$ 275.00
Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz		893	300.00
Francisco Fiorini	$125.00	912	
	25.00	1072	
	$150.00		150.00

Continues on page No. 10

PAYROLL

		Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)			
Díaz Lanz Group: (Cont.)			
Abel Hera Corton	$225.00	933	
	25.00	1071	
	$250.00		$ 250.00
Julio Leonard	$225.00	942	
	25.00	1075	
	$250.00		250.00
Francisco Llano Torres	$175.00	946	
	25.00	1078	
	$200.00		200.00
Evangelista Isidro Mursulí	$175.00	970	
	25.00	1077	
	$200.00		200.00
José A. Balboa		1079	250.00
César Leonard		1113	200.00
Marcos Díaz Lanz		1114	225.00
			$ 2,300.00
Miscellaneous:			
Osvaldo Aguirre Noy		855	$ 175.00
Orlando Alo Clavijo		858	250.00
Erundina Besteiro Expósito		872	200.00
Josefina Bujones		876	300.00
Francisco M. Carrillo Masvidal		884	400.00
José Cento		888	200.00
Dr. Carlos B. Fernández		905	200.00

Continues on page No. 11

PAYROLL

	Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)		
María García (Manolín García)	915	$ 150.00
Pilar García Rubio	921	150.00
Antonia García Ruiz	922	150.00
Orestes Guerra Cué	930	100.00
Nicolás Hernández	934	100.00
Carlos Hernández Hernández	935	200.00
Marina Mardones Vivanco	949	150.00
Jesús M. Marinas Alvarez	950	125.00
María Antonia Mesa Lecourt	960	250.00
Humberto Núñez	973	90.00
Rita Río García	985	100.00
Manuel Rodríguez Fleitas	990	250.00
Enrique Ruiz Williams	999	175.00
José Suárez Suárez	1007	125.00
Hortensia Tejera	1008	150.00
Silvia Torres	1010	150.00
Cándido Viamontes	1019	225.00
Fernando Marquet Martínez	1027	100.00
Francisco Fernández	1038	125.00
Juan Consuegra Valdés	1045	300.00
Braulio de Gondomar	1053	200.00
Manuel Cobo Sausa	1062	300.00
Abel de Varona Juárez	1064	150.00
Olga Rodríguez	1082	175.00
Armando Sánchez Ferrer	1100	200.00
Guido Colli	1101	200.00
Jaime Burne	1102	200.00
Nora Fernández Gil	1108	250.00
Olga Rueda de Aguirre	1110	150.00

Continues on page No. 12

PAYROLL

			Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)				
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)				
José Luis Hevia Sánchez			1159	$ 350.00
William Cook Gordon			1160	350.00
Raúl Martínez Núñez			1161	350.00
José Federico Rodríguez de la Vega			1168	250.00
Primitivo Lima			1169	250.00
Manuel B. Ledón			1170	250.00
Ana Julia Fernández Alvarez			1171	200.00
Silvia Rueda			1172	125.00
C.M. Sánchez			1173	250.00
Andrés Suárez		$250.00	1174	
	(Nov.)	250.00	1259	
		$500.00		500.00
Ramiro Ortiz de la Vega			1175	175.00
Urbano Martínez		$250.00	1176	
	(Nov.)	200.00	1259	
		$450.00		450.00
José Revilla			1230	125.00
Jorge Más			1231	100.00
Ramón Bustillos Asencio			1267	250.00
Armando Piedra			1268	250.00
Oscar Madariaga			1269	250.00
Francisco de Juan			1272	150.00
Gloria Pagés			1277	200.00
José Ignacio Zárraga Diez			1312	125.00
Enrique Zayas Bazán			1313	175.00

Continues on page No. 13

PAYROLL

	Check No.	Total
OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Miscellaneous: (Cont.)		
Chalía Cazalis Goenaga	1314	$ 125.00
		$11,965.00
Total of "Others":		$19,955.00
Total of the Payroll:		$52,290.00

NOTE: The persons included in the group "Miscellaneous" have variable functions, therefore, they cannot be included in a determined group, but all of them work for the F.R.D.

amr.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE (HELP TO REFUGEES)
"[illegible] AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PERMANENT:		
Dec. 1	Otalio Soca Yanes	1004	$ 300.00
Dec. 3	Margarita Acosta	1061	175.00
	Total Permanent		$ 475.00
	OCCASIONAL:		
Dec. 2	R. Peralta	1047	$ 50.00
Dec. 2	A. de la Vega	1048	50.00
Dec. 3	Installation of B. de Gondomar	1052	100.00
Dec. 3	Miguel Alba	1056	30.00
Dec. 5	F. Rodríguez	1068	50.00
Dec. 5	C. Naredo	1073	50.00
Dec. 5	T. Gamba	1076	300.00
Dec. 5	A. González	1099	150.00
Dec. 6	R. Rodríguez	1123	50.00
Dec. 6	Installation of M. Blanco	1124	150.00
Dec. 6	M. Jiménez	1129	50.00
Dec. 7	R. Jaime	1141	50.00
Dec. 7	B. Llerena	1142	50.00
Dec. 7	E. Favlede	1143	50.00
Dec. 7	O. Clive	1146	50.00
Dec. 7	R. Rodriguez	1147	50.00
Dec. 7	L. Martinez	1148	100.00
Dec. 7	J. Sordo	1149	100.00
Dec. 8	A. Estévez	1154	50.00
Dec. 9	E. Mendez	1166	300.00
Dec. 9	J. Moralejo	1177	200.00
Dec. 9	A. Bernal López	1182	50.00
Dec. 9	A. Bernal Bosca	1183	50.00
Dec. 9	R. Morejón	1185	50.00
Dec. 9	F. Rodríguez	1187	50.00
Dec. 9	F. Sánchez	1190	150.00
Dec. 9	E. A. Pérez	1191	40.00
Dec. 9	Installation of H. García and wife	1191	50.00
Dec. 12	C. Mardones	1200	50.00
Dec. 12	Elias Contreras	1201	30.00

(Continues page No.2)

MAINTENANCE (HELP TO REFUGEES)

ANNEX "I-C"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 13	M. García Valdés	1207	$ 50.00
Dec. 13	C. Agüero	1209	50.00
Dec. 13	J. Ares Santos	1210	50.00
Dec. 13	C. O.ª de Varona	1211	50.00
Dec. 15	Three marineros - M.D.C.	1226	150.00
Dec. 15	J. Fundora - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	A. Fajardo - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	W. Pimentel - M.D.C.	1226	50.00
Dec. 15	W. Paredes - M.D.C.	1226	41.70
Dec. 15	C. Martínez	1229	250.00
Dec. 15	C. Elcoro	1262	50.00
Dec. 15	Eight persons boat "La Gloria"	1263	150.00
Dec. 15	Eight persons boat "La Gloria"	1282	60.00
Dec. 16	C. Galindo	1283	50.00
Dec. 16	D. Gutiérrez	1284	50.00
Dec. 19	M. Ferrer	1291	10.00
Dec. 19	L. M. Lobeira	1291	30.00
Dec. 20	F. Rodríguez Tamayo	1295	40.00
Dec. 20	R. Soler	1304	50.00
Dec. 20	R. Jaime	1305	40.00
Dec. 21	M. García	1307	60.00
Dec. 21	F. J. Hernández	1325	50.00
Dec. 21	L. R. Bacallao	1326	50.00
Dec. 21	E. Iglesias	1327	50.00
Dec. 21	M. Alonso	1329	100.00
Dec. 22	H. Martínez Maseda	1335	100.00
Dec. 23	P. González	1349	50.00
Dec. 23	A. Mechulan	1354	50.00
Dec. 23	A. de la Vega	1355	40.00
Dec. 23	R. Soler	1356	30.00
Dec. 23	D. Rivero Setién	1357	50.00
Dec. 23	A. Rivero Setién	1358	50.00
Dec. 23	M. Nápoles	1359	50.00
Dec. 23	E. J. Peino	1361	50.00
Dec. 23	J. Márquez	1362	50.00
	Total Occasional		$4,701.70
	TOTAL HELP TO REFUGEES		$ 5,176.70

ml.

[illegible] REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRAVEL
"[illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "1-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Trip Havana-Miami (Delia Graña)	1031	$ 53.58
Dec. 2	Various trips Havana-Miami (as per receipts)	1041	245.12
Dec. 2	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Guzmán)	1046	53.58
Dec. 3	Travel expenses in excess (Dr.A. Pujol)	1050	134.21
Dec. 3	Trips (Mrs. E.Neya and Mrs. M. Freixas)	1051	80.36
Dec. 5	Trip to New York (Move 1,000 pound material)	1065	381.00
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Gómez)	1067	53.57
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (E. Infante and daughter)	1081	85.56
Dec. 5	Trip to Washington and New York (J. Menendez)	1084	300.00
Dec. 5	Trip to Chicago (Varona, Fasco, Botifol)	1098	442.26
Dec. 5	Trip to Tampa (Varona and three more)	1104	110.11
Dec. 5	Trip Havana-Miami (M. Herrera)	1112	53.57
Dec. 8	Trip to Chicago (Dr. Varona)	1155	500.00
Dec. 9	Trip Havana-Miami (Children Raul and Roberto Uriarte)	1157	107.14
Dec. 9	Trip to Puerto Rico (C. Gómez Gil)	1158	425.00
Dec. 9	Trip to Havana (F. Rodríguez)	1162	50.00
Dec. 9	Trip Miami-Washington-New York-Miami (Cámara, Llaca, Pujol)	1167	913.32
Dec. 9	Trips A. Cruz and O. Rodríguez	1178	107.14
Dec. 9	Trip New York-Miami-New York labor leader Harry Bell	1180	121.00
Dec. 9	Trips various persons as per receipts	1191	189.78
Dec. 12	Trip Havana-Miami (G. Massip, E. and F. Cropesa)	1203	160.71
Dec. 12	Expenses in excess - Trip to Europe (J. Carrillo)	1204	192.20
Dec. 14	Trip to Nassau (M. Redondo)	1216	500.00

(Continues page No.2)

TRAVEL

ANNEX "I-H"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 14	Trip Havana-Miami (M. Ramos and S. Bujones)	1220	$ 64.80
Dec. 14	Trip Havana-Miami (A. Rodríguez)	1221	43.20
Dec. 15	Trip to Cuba Mrs. Magaly	1259	100.00
Dec. 16	Trip to New York (Aníbal Jover)	1276	103.24
Dec. 18	Deposit trip Havana-Miami (Child F.López)	1290	30.00
Dec. 20	Trip to New York (Duquesne, Artigas, De Juan: Trial "El Gancho")	1294	351.37
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (Alsina Family)	1298	216.18
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (Amenabar Family)	1299	108.53
Dec. 20	Trip Havana-Miami (D. Ivonet)	1301	54.77
Dec. 21	Trip to New York (Olga Alzurias)	1322	60.00
Dec. 22	Trip Havana-Miami (Hilda Puig)	1337	54.77
Dec. 23	Trip Havana-Miami (N. Cabezas and H. Bujones)	1348	87.30
Dec. 23	Trip Miami-New York (Piñon Family)	1351	309.00
Dec. 27	Trip Miami-New York-Miami (M.Rivero Setién)	1372	151.58
Dec. 27	Travel expenses M. Rivero Setién	1373	50.00
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Bertha Barreto)	1376	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Pedro Rivera)	1377	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Child F. Alonso)	1378	44.10
Dec. 28	Trip Havana-Miami (Caridad Fraga)	1384	44.10
Dec. 29	Trip Miami-New York (G.Gil, H.Pérez and R. Pintado)	1385	161.70
Dec. 29	Trip Texas-Miami (Fernández Carmenaty)	1386	88.00
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (I. Segura and a member of his family)	1389	87.30
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (C. Estrada and family)	1390	87.30
Dec. 30	Trip Miami-New York (E. Bujones and S. Hernández)	1392	181.00
Dec. 30	Trip Havana-Miami (Mrs.E. Noval and daughter)	1395	87.30

(Continues page No.3)

TRAVEL

ANNEX "I-H"
Page No.3

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 30	Trip Julio Jane (P/o Dr. Sardiñas)	1398	$ 44.10
			$7,957.65
Less:			
	Reinbursment remaining of check 1157 (Annex "I-C")	$ 50.54	
	Reinbursment remaining of checks 1298, 1299 and 1301 (Annex "I-C")	72.28	122.82
	TOTAL TRAVEL		$7,834.83

NOTE: In some of the expenses related in this annex do not exist the receipts in our records, and in this cases, the checks were extended in view of memorandums giving such instructions.

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CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

Date		Check No.	Total
	Office Supplies:		
Dec. 5	Purchase of a rubber stamp	1074	$ 30.00
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1088	15.07
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1105	247.20
Dec. 5	Printed matter	1106	22.86
Dec. 7	Printed matter	1135	71.85
Dec. 9	Printed matter	1191	7.48
Dec. 12	Printed matter	1195	32.17
Dec. 12	Printed matter	1205	34.81
Dec. 18	Printed matter	1285	5.66
Dec. 19	Printed matter	1291	69.18
Dec. 22	Printed matter	1330	95.06
Dec. 22	Printed matter	1338	52.12
Dec. 15	Printed matter	1236	22.45
	Total Office Supplies		$ 705.91
	Rents:		
Dec. 3	Rent 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1054	$ 600.00
Dec. 9	Rent 520 N.W. 23 Ct. (M.D.C.)	1191	40.00
Dec. 21	Rent Physicians and Lawyers' house (Dec. 21 to Jan. 20)	1324	97.85
	Total Rents		$ 737.85
	Others:		
Dec. 1	Air-conditioner rent (López del Rincón)	1032	$ 75.00
Dec. 1	Electricity - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1033	110.94

(Continues page No.2)

GENERAL EXPENSES

ANNEX "I-I"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 5	General expenses as per receipts	1106	$ 164.56
Dec. 6	Attention and taxis to Dr. Sardinas' office	1120	56.90
Dec. 6	Two tires for F. Zayas' automobile (to the service of the Front)	1130	44.00
Dec. 7	Reinbursment revolving fund Press Department	1137	49.72
Dec. 9	General expenses as per receipts	1191	49.00
Dec. 12	Physicians and Lawyers' house electricity (November)	1193	5.19
Dec. 14	Water - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1214	3.30
Dec. 14	Tires for J. Moran's automobile	1217	54.00
Dec. 15	Minor general expenses (M.D.C.)	1226	9.97
Dec. 15	Medicine for child A. Calmares (M.D.C.)	1226	25.25
Dec. 15	Gasoline expenses J.M. Sánchez	1232	88.32
Dec. 18	Reinbursment revolving fund Press Department	1287	50.00
Dec. 19	General expenses as per receipts	1291	148.71
Dec. 20	Custody material for 1700 Biscayne Blvd. building	1302	339.80
Dec. 23	Gas - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1353	3.30
Dec. 30	Electricity - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1391	73.26
Dec. 30	Legal expenses (C. B. Fernández)	1397	151.47
	Total Others		$1,502.69
	TOTAL GENERAL EXPENSES		$2,946.45

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMUNICATIONS
"FLORIDA AND CUBA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "1-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Dec. 5	Stamps	1106	$ 63.28
Dec. 12	Stamps	1198	25.00
Dec. 15	Stamps (M.D.C.)	1226	1.60
Dec. 19	Stamps	1291	158.05
	Total		$ 247.93 ✓
	TELEPHONE:		
Dec. 1	FR-3-5607 (Congress Bdg.- Oct. and Nov.)	1030	$ 319.12
Dec. 9	FR-3-4881	1165	52.36
Dec. 15	FR-3-1791 Installation and consumption (M.D.C.)	1226	91.40
Dec. 15	Long distance (Dr. Carrillo)	1259	93.61
Dec. 19	Long distance	1291	9.08
Dec. 22	Telephone - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	1334	85.60
Dec. 23	Telephone board - 1700 Biscayne Blvd. (Bill)	1350	458.88
	Total		$1,110.05 ✓
	TELEGRAPH:		
Dec. 2	Cables presenting Dr. Llaca	1049	$ 70.00
Dec. 12	Cables	1198	50.00
Dec. 19	Telegrams	1291	58.49
Dec. 30	Telegram from Dr. Varona to Fidel Castro	1388	21.48
	Total		$ 199.97 ✓
			$1,557.95
Less: Reinbursment excess in check 1049 (Annex "I-C")			2.71
	TOTAL COMMUNICATIONS		$1,555.24 ✓

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CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PUBLICITY
"[illegible] AND [illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 2	Booklets distribution to the O.E.A.	1039	$ 100.00
Dec. 2	Booklets distribution to the O.E.A.	1040	460.00
Dec. 5	Print 5,000 flysheets Maceo	1085	27.81
Dec. 5	Payment of 5,000 posters on the Publicity account	1087	500.00
Dec. 6	Announcement act of day 7 (D.de las Américas)	1118	40.50
Dec. 6	Rent of chairs and amplifiers act day 7	1119	46.00
Dec. 6	Excess in expenses act Nov. 27	1122	7.10
Dec. 6	*Publicity Triple A - D.de las Américas	1127	195.75
Dec. 7	Film act Nov. 27	1144	15.00
Dec. 10	Freight booklets "Document before the O.E.A."	1192	463.84
Dec. 12	Expenses act Dec. 7 (Teaching Section)	1197	42.19
Dec. 12	Freight booklets and proclamations	1198	300.00
Dec. 14	Part of the bill to print booklets O.E.A	1218	1,283.90
Dec. 14	Advertisement D.de las Américas (Accountant Acs.)	1219	18.00
Dec. 18	Freight publicity	1288	11.58
Dec. 18	Freight publicity	1289	6.00
Dec. 22	Special publicity (P/o J.I. Rasco)	1331	1,000.00
Dec. 22	Film (P/o Executive)	1332	5,000.00
Dec. 22	Publicity decided by the Executive	1333	5,256.00
Dec. 23	5,000 Booklets declaration of "Che" Guevara	1344	92.70
Dec. 23	10,000 Booklets document to the O.E.A.	1345	813.70
Dec. 24	Films, cameras, rents, etc. (Bebo Alonso)	1365	176.00
Dec. 24	Payment "Toronto Star" (Publication of letter to Minister of Commerce of Canada)	1366	840.00

(Continues page No.2)

PUBLICITY

ANNEX "I-K"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 28	Payment print of 3084 booklets C.E.A.	1379	$ 100.00
	TOTAL PUBLICITY		$16,796.07

*Substitutes check No.702 of November, which was lost and cancelled by the Bank, and when it appeared later, was cancelled by us, and is considered as an increase in the Bank balance.

See Annex "I-J" for adj to bank account

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CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE SECRETARIAT
MILITARY SECTION
"[illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
	REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND:		
Dec. 5	Reimbursement	1169	$ 6,384.22 ① ✓
Dec. 6	"	1134	4,868.51 ① ✓
Dec. 18	"	1226	10,697.83 ① ✓
Dec. 21	"	1316	2,904.52 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1346	4,999.19 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1347	999.12 ① ✓
Dec. 23	"	1363	2,420.32 ① ✓
Dec. 28	"	1374	2,199.78 ① ✓
Dec. 28	"	1375	2,043.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1401	2,337.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1402	3,499.72 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1403	2,877.36 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1404	190.00 ① ✓
Dec. 31	"	1405	1,319.99 ① ✓
	Total		$47,740.56 ✓
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 3	Rent recruiting office	1055	$ 110.00
Dec. 6	Deposit telephone General Staff Control Office	1125	50.00
Dec. 7	1313 N.W. 8 Ave. house rent and electricity	1152	142.16
Dec. 13	Hotel rent	1212	1,666.67
Dec. 15	Three domino sets for the camp	1228	42.40
Dec. 16	Confidential rent (F. Zayas)	1270	80.00
Dec. 20	Confidential subject (V. León)	1296	122.92

(Continues page No.2)

① Detail schedules in file

MILITARY SECTION

ANNEX "I-L"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
	OTHERS: (Cont.)		
Dec. 21	Expenses compesation Transport Commitee	1315	$ 1,900.00
Dec. 30	Print checks "Rasco and Paula"	1393	34.25
	Total		$ 4,148.40
	TOTAL MILITARY SECTION		$51,888.96

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEES
"PABLO [illegible] ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "T-M"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PUBLICITY:		$ -o-
	Total		$ -o-
	AGENT EXPLOITATION:		
Dec. 5	Budget	1080	$ 5,916.00
Dec. 6	Excess expenses Nov.	1117	72.07
	Total		$ 5,988.07
	PLANNING:		
Dec. 5	Budget	1107	$ 2,300.00
	Total		$ 2,300.00
	FINANCE:		$ -o-
	Total		$ -o-
	PUBLIC RELATIONS:		
Dec. 15	Office supplies	1225	$ 13.68
	Total		$ 13.68
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:		
Dec. 9	Trip to set up Jacksonville Delegation (T. Diaz)	1163	$ 120.00

(Continues page No.2)

COMMITTEES

Date		Check No.	Total
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:(Cont.)		
Dec. 9	Trip to set up Jacksonville Delegation (A. L. Sotolongo)	1164	$ 120.00
Dec. 30	General expenses as per voucher	1399	356.94
	Total		$ 596.94
			$ 8,898.69
Less:	"Reinbursment remaining of checks 1163 and 1164 (Annex "I-C")		37.00
	TOTAL COMMITTEES		$ 8,861.69

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DELEGATIONS
"PAULA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
	LATINS:		
	ARGENTINA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	A. de J. Piñera	1037	$ 275.00
	Total Argentina		$ 275.00 ✓
	COLOMBIA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Angel Aparicio	1037	$ 150.00
Dec. 2	Roberto Ruiz	1037	150.00
Dec. 2	Máximo Sorondo	1037	550.00
	Total Colombia		$ 850.00 ✓
	COSTA RICA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Orlando Núñez	1037	$ 200.00
Dec. 2	José M. Tarafa	1037	200.00
	Total Costa Rica		$ 400.00 ✓
	HONDURAS:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Antonio Losada	1037	$ 300.00
Dec. 28	Eusebio Capestany	1382	150.00
Dec. 28	Ivan Portuondo	1383	150.00
	Total Honduras		$ 600.00 ✓

(Continues page No.2)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-B"
Page No.2

Date		Check No.	Total
	PERU:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Armando Cruz	1037	$ 200.00
Dec. 2	Frank Díaz Silveira	1037	350.00
	Others:		
Dec. 23	Expenses of November	1364	129.80
Dec. 26	Expenses of November	1367	71.75
Dec. 27	Expenses of November and December	1370	357.00
	Total Peru		$1,108.55
	PUERTO RICO:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 2	Manuel Fernández	1037	$ 500.00
	Total Puerto Rico		$ 500.00
	CHILE:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 3	J. Valdés Crespo (E. Miró)	1063	$ 600.00
	Total Chile		$ 600.00
	GUATEMALA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 28	Enrique Collazo	1381	$ 250.00
	Total Guatemala		$ 250.00
	TOTAL LATINS		$4,583.55
	NORTH AMERICANS:		
	CHICAGO:		
	Others:		
Dec. 16	Expenses F. Martínez	1274	$ 400.00

(Continues page No.3)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-N"
Page No.3

Date		Check No.	Total
	CHICAGO: (Cont.)		
Dec. 16	Expenses S. Montejo	1275	$ 400.00
	Total Chicago		$ 800.00
	NEVADA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 9	Isela García de Solís	1189	$ 200.00
	Total Nevada		$ 200.00
	TAMPA:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Gustavo Cotayo	892	$ 175.00
	Others:		
Dec. 5	Expenses organization of Delegation	1089	200.00
Dec. 7	Budget of the Delegation	1151	393.00
	Total Tampa		$ 768.00
	MIAMI:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Thelma Carregado	883	$ 125.00
Dec. 1	Nize Martin	952	160.00
Dec. 1	José Nápoles	971	225.00
Dec. 1	Juan Noriega	972	175.00
Dec. 1	Otto Ruiz	998	300.00
	Total Miami		$ 985.00
	KEY WEST:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	José M. Caramés	881	$ 200.00
	Total Key West		$ 200.00

(Continues page No.4)

DELEGATIONS

Date		Check No.	Total
	NORTH AMERICANS: (Cont.)		
	WASHINGTON:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Eric Agüero	854	$ 700.00
Dec. 1	Nicolás Rivero	987	250.00
Dec. 2	Manuel Braña	1036	200.00
Dec. 2	Carlos Fiad	1036	500.00
Dec. 15	Ignacio Bustillo	1227	350.00
	Total Washington		$2,000.00
	NEW YORK:		
	Payroll:		
Dec. 1	Enrique Abascal	850	$ 155.00
Dec. 1	Sergio Aparicio	861	400.00
Dec. 1	Miguel A. Bahamonde	865	255.00
Dec. 1	Salvador Ferrer	910	250.00
Dec. 1	Orlando Gómez Gil	926	200.00
Dec. 1	Harry Pérez	978	250.00
Dec. 1	Iradio Rodríguez	989	300.00
Dec. 1	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	992	300.00
	Others:		
Dec. 14	Expenses New York Delegation	1213	1,135.00
Dec. 28	Expenses publicity	1380	2,000.00
	Total New York		$5,245.00
	Total of Americans		$10,198.00
	TOTAL OF DELEGATIONS		$14,781.55

(Continues page No.5)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-X"
Page No.5

RESUME:

	Payroll	Others	Total
LATINS	$ 4,025.00	$ 558.55	$ 4,583.55
NORTH AMERICANS	5,670.00	4,528.00	10,198.00
TOTAL	$ 9,695.00	$ 5,086.55	$14,781.55

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
S.F.R.D.E.C.
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 15	Spent during the month	1233	$2,000.00
	Total		$2,000.00

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CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MONROE HOTEL
"[illegible] AND CUBA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PAYROLL:		
Dec. 5	Claudio Sánchez (Dec.)	1090	$ 90.00
Dec. 5	Claudio Sánchez (Nov. 19-30)	1091	33.00
Dec. 9	Francisco Liantaud	1156	150.00
Dec. 1	Agustín Menéndez	959	90.00
	Total		$ 363.00
	OTHERS:		
Dec. 6	Miscellaneous expenses	1116	$ 33.23
Dec. 12	Reinbursment revolving fund	1206	25.71
Dec. 15	Monroe Hotel assurance	1223	195.10
Dec. 19	Reinbursment revolving fund	1292	40.85
Dec. 27	Reinbursment revolving fund	1369	34.35
	Total		$ 329.24
			$ 692.24
Less:	Reinbursments (Annex "I-D")		184.00
	TOTAL MONROE HOTEL		$ 508.24

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 5	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1111	$50,000.00
Dec. 12	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1196	50,000.00
Dec. 30	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1327	50,000.00
Dec. 30	Transference to "Rasco and Paula"	1394	50,000.00
	TOTAL TRANSFERENCES		$200,000.00

NOTE: These transferences have been done to the effects of increasing the account "Rasco and Paula", through which the payroll of the Social Work and the military staff is paid.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-R"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.D.C.)	1311	$ 600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.R.R.)	1317	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (Montecristi)	1317	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (Rescate)	1319	600.00
Dec. 21	Monthly pay (M.I.D.)	1321	600.00
	TOTAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS		$3,000.00 M

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
"PAULA AND ROSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-S"

Date		Check No.	Total
Dec. 6	Clandestine works (C.F.P.)	1132	$ 60.00
Dec. 9	Personnel payment - confidential	1179	2,100.00
Dec. 9	Confidential traveler to Cuba	1186	30.00
Dec. 9	Material secret works	1188	13.44
Dec. 12	Secret works (Confidential)	1199	60.00
Dec. 14	Special works	1215	600.00
Dec. 16	Hospital bill P.L.D. Lanz (Authorized by Finance Department)	1266	165.00
Dec. 16	Confidential works	1273	65.72
Dec. 19	Excess in expenses movement Rasco family	1293	405.00
Dec. 20	Confidential matter (W.Scott-Moran)	1303	100.00
Dec. 20	Confidential matter (J.Anderson-Moran)	1306	200.00
Dec. 21	Excess in work expenses (Check 1215)	1308	22.14
Dec. 21	Lawyer Association expenses	1320	400.00
Dec. 22	P.L. D. Lanza matter (Authorized by the Finance Department)	1340	410.84
Dec. 22	P.L.D. Lanz matter (Authorized by the Finance Department)	1341	4,000.00
Dec. 22	P.L.D. Lanz matter (Authorized by th Finance Department)	1342	500.00
Dec. 23	Confidential matter (C.F.P.)	1343	60.00
Dec. 26	Sickness and funerals F.Carrillo's uncle	1368	300.00
Dec. 27	Confidential matter (C.F.P.)	1371	60.00
Dec. 30	Expenses check Dr. J.I. Rasco	1400	357.30
	TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS		$9,909.44

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CHECKS OF NOVEMBER CANCELLED IN DECEMBER
"PAULA AND [illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-T"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Ana M. Tomeu	297	$ 250.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Guillermo Sánchez	335	350.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Jorge Rodríguez Bezos	346	300.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Salvador Aldereguía	356	200.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Manuel Commellas	357	125.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Alberto Muller	372	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Ceferino Pérez	374	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Tulio Díaz	378	90.00 ✓
Nov. 1	Carlos Mencía	394	350.00 ✓
Nov. 2	Gloria Pagés	434	200.00 ✓
Nov. 2	P. V. Aja	441	225.00 ✓
Nov. 2	Luis de la Valette	455	255.00 ✓
Nov. 3	Angel del Cerro	505	300.00 ✓
Nov. 7	Gilberto Gómez Quesada	547	125.00 ✓
Nov. 17	Diario de las Américas	702	195.75 ✓
Nov. 23	Arsenio Roa	765	200.00 ✓
Nov. 23	Cándido Viamontes	775	225.00 ✓
		TOTAL	$3,570.75

NOTE: The amount of these checks was considered in November as part of the total amount of the accounts to which each one of them correspond. They were not cashed in the bank, because they were cancelled on December, reason for what the total amount of them is considered in this month as an increase in the balance in bank as shown in our books.

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REDISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "IV"

	BALANCES AS PER BOOKS		ADJUSTMENTS		ADJUSTED BALANCES	
			DEBIT	CREDIT		
Balance in Bank on Dec. 1, 1960		$ 64,903.72				$ 64,903.72
INCOMES:						
From Finance Department	$451,875.00				$451,875.00	
Reimbursements Earlier Months	213.51				213.51	
Reimbursements Month of December	163.03				163.03	
Reimbursements Monroe Hotel	184.00	452,435.54			184.00	452,435.54
		$517,339.26				$517,339.26
Less: Reimbursements December deducted from expenses		346.53				346.53
		$516,992.73				$516,992.73
EXPENSES:						
Assets	$ 5,773.22				$ 5,773.22	
Payroll	52,290.00			$ 28,885.00(1)	23,405.00	
Maintenance (help to Refugees)	5,176.70				5,176.70	
Travels	7,834.83				7.834.83	
General Expenses	2,940.45				2,940.45	
Communications	1,555.24				1,555.24	

(Continues page No.2)

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

STATEMENT "IV"
Page No.2

		BALANCES AS PER BOOKS		ADJUSTMENTS DEBIT	ADJUSTMENTS CREDIT	ADJUSTED BALANCES	
Publicity		$ 16,796.07			$ 16,796.07(2)	$ -o-	
Military Section	(Annex "IV-A")	51,888.96		$ 450.00		52,338.96	
Committees	(Annex "IV-B")	8,861.69		(2) 16,796.07) (1) 28,435.00)		54,092.76	
Delegations		14,781.55				14,781.55	
[illegible]		2,000.00				2,000.00	
Monroe Hotel		508.24				508.24	
Transferences		200,000.00				200,000.00	
Revolutionary Movements		3,000.00				3,000.00	
Miscellaneous		9,909.44				9,909.44	
		$383,322.39				$383,322.39	
Bank Charges		19.90	383,342.29			19.90	383,342.29
			$133,650.44				$133,650.44
Plus: November Checks Cancelled in December			3,570.75				3,570.75
Balance in our Books in Dec. 31, 1960			$137,221.19				$137,221.19

ml.

[illegible]

[illegible]

MILITARY SECTION ([illegible])

"[illegible]"

December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "IV-[illegible]"

Balance as per books (Annex "I-L")	$51,888.96
Plus: Payroll charged to Military Section (Annex "I-[illegible]")	450.00
Cost of Military Section	$52,338.96

ml.

[illegible] OF THE REVOLUTIONARY [illegible]
[illegible]
COMMITTEES ([illegible])
"[illegible]"
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "IV-B"

PLANNING:		
Budget (Annex "I-M")	$ 2,300.00	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	14,575.00	$16,875.00
ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIES:		
Miscellaneous expenses (Annex "I-M")	$ 559.94	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	6,435.00	6,994.94
PUBLIC RELATIONS:		
Office Supplies (Annex "I-M")	$ 13.68	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	2,000.00	2,013.68
AGENT EXPLOITATION:		
Budget (Annex "I-M")	$ 5,916.00	
Excess in November expenses (Annex "I-M")	72.07	
Payroll (Annex "I-F")(Not under control of the Agent Exploitation Office)	650.00	6,638.07
PUBLICITY:		
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	$ 3,725.00	
Direct (Annex "I-K")	16,796.07	20,521.07
FINANCE:		
Payroll (Annex "I-F")	$ 1,050.00	1,050.00
TOTAL COST OF COMMITTEES		$54,092.76

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL COMMENTS
"RAUL AND COLA"
December 1 to 31, 1960

In the Statements and Annexes attached, appeared the analysis and sub-analysis of each of the incomes and expenses during the month of December.

The receipts, bills, deposit sheets, checks returned by the bank, and other justificatory certificates of the operations of the month, are in our records. In the cases that the justificatory certificates were not given, there are in our records the memorandums on account of which the checks were made.

In December 31, 1960, there are still Reinbursments to collect in the amount of $350.00 that correspond to the check No.21 of October 4, in the name of Mr. A. Fernández Morell, from the Military Section.

The increase of the Revolving Fund of the Military Section was reinbursed to the Comptroller by the Militar Coordinator, but same were not deposited in the bank, since we have learned in practice the necessity of disposal of cash with urgent need, in more than one time, and to solve these cases we decided to maintain this Fund in our hands, but at the Military Coordinator's disposition.

ml.

14-00000

B-2

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

REPORT

November 1 - 2, 19[illegible]

14-00000

B-2

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

[illegible]

[illegible] 1 [illegible] 2, 19[illegible]

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; November 30, 1960	$ 74,060.48
Less: Unpaid checks (Remited in Spanish)	9,156.76
Corrected Bank Balance; November 30, 1960	$ 64,903.72
	To Dec. OK.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CIVIL SECTION BUDGET-
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

STATEMENT "III"

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Payroll and Refugees:	$46,700.00*			
Payroll		$ 48,400.00		
Maintenance		6,781.37		
Total	$46,700.00	$ 55,181.37	$ 8,481.37	
Travel Expenses:	$10,000.00	$ 13,292.90	$ 3,292.90	
Rent, Utilities, etc:	$ 6,000.00			
General Expenses		$ 5,860.80		
Comunications		1,973.79		
Total	$ 6,000.00	$ 7,834.59	$ 1,834.59	
Committees:				
Publicity	$48,000.00	$ 45,695.39		$ 2,304.61
Agent Exploitation	6,000.00	5,916.00		84.00
Planning	2,500.00	2,775.44	$ 275.44	
Finance	-0-	766.00	766.00	
Public Relations	10,000.00	3,500.00		6,500.00
Organization and Proseltysm	1,000.00	515.00		485.00
Total	$67,500.00	$ 59,167.83	$ 1,041.44	$ 9,373.61
Delegations:				
Latin american	$14,000.00	$ 2,670.00		$ 11,330.00
United States	7,500.00	11,198.46	$ 3,698.46	
Total	$21,500.00	$ 13,868.46	$ 3,698.46	$ 11,330.00
G.F.R.D.E.C.	$25,000.00	$ 25,000.00	-0-	-0-
Miscellaneous	$ 5,000.00	$ 4,185.53		$ 814.47
Budgeted Expenses	$181,700.00	$178,530.68	$18,348.76	$21,518.08

CIVIL SECTION BUDGET

STATEMENT "III"
Page No. 2

	-Budgeted-	-Spent-	Excess	Defect
Non-Budgeted:				
Assets*	-o-	$ 12,787.58	$ 12,787.58	
Monroe Hotel	-o-	1,802.55	1,802.55	
Total	-o-	$ 14,590.13	$ 14,590.13	
TOTAL BALANCE	$181,700.00	$193,120.81	$ 32,938.89	$ 21,518.08
Diference in excess	11,420.81	-o-	-o-	11,420.81
	$193,120.81	$193,120.81	$ 32,938.89	$ 32,938.89

* Includes the budget of the Comptroller Department ($1,700.00) of which $1,350.00 were used for payroll.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

November 1	: Deposit	MIAMI	US$ 100,000.00	
November 7	: Deposit	BERN	42,987.50	**
November 8	: Deposit	BERN	86,000.00	
November 9	: Deposit		30,000.00	**
November 11	: Deposit	BERN	49,975.00	***
November 14	: Deposit		40,000.00	***
November 22	: Deposit	MIAMI	US$ 25,000.00	
		T O T A L :	$ 373,962.50	

amr.

** TYC
less bk charges

73,000
12.50
72,987.50

*** TYC

90,000.00
25.00
89,975.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

November 16:	Transference from the account "Paula y Carrillo", Mexico City, to transfer its balance to "Paula and Sosa", and close it.	$ 33.76

amr.

Check with Paula
last acctg Mexico City
shows bal of $2,000.-

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EARLIER MONTHS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Nov. 4	Reinbursement from Mr. José Sosa Jr.	$	400.00
Nov. 4	Reinbursement from Mrs. Cabañas		275.00
Nov. 7	Reinbursement from Dr. J.I.Rasco (Check 129)		584.64
Nov. 14	Reinbursement from Mr. J.Noriega (Check 280)		1.81
Nov. 21	Reinbursement from Mr. José Sosa (Check 260)		12.60
	TOTAL	$	1,274.05

NOTE : These reinbursements correspond to amounts that, in excess of what corresponded to the expense for which the check was extended, were returned by the responsable persons, and deposited in the account "Paula and Sosa". They represent real diminutions in the expenses of earlier months, that are compensated when been considered as incomes in this month.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
REINBURSEMENTS CORRESPONDING TO THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Nov. 14	Reinbursment from Mr. Abel de Varona (Part of the check No. 589, for the rent of the phisicyan's house -November- that had been already paid. (See Annex "I-G") Listed ck# 589	$ 97.85
Nov. 16	Reinbursment from the account "Rasco and Paula" to restitute the "Revolving Fund" that was created through the account - "Paula and Sosa". (See Annex "I-E")	1,000.00
Nov. 21	Reinbursment of check 690 Listed for excess in advertising in "Diario de la Marina" (See Annex "I-K")	6.00
Nov. 22	Listed Reinbursment of check 730 for excess in the telephone bill (FR-7-2389) (See Annex "I-J")	70.90
Nov. 28	Listed Reinbursment of check 797 for excess in a trip (M. Cobo) (See Annex "I-H")	0.30
Nov. 28	Listed Reinbursment of check 749 in excess in pamphlet freight (See Annex "I-K")	39.31
	TOTAL	$ 1,214.36

NOTE : These amounts have been deducted from the totals of their respective accounts, as can be seen in the correspondent annexes, to the effects of the exact determination of the expense in each case.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ASSETS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS:		
Nov. 3	Deposit - Electricity service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	491 ✓	$ 150.00
Nov. 3	Deposit - Telephone service - 1714 Biscayne Blvd.	516 ✓	600.00
Nov. 4	Revolving fund - Social Work - J.Riera	533 ✓	1,000.00
Nov. 7	Deposit - Telephone service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	541 ✓	900.00
Nov. 8	Deposit - Telephone service - Comptroller Department	570	50.00
Nov. 9	Deposit - Water service - 1714 Biscayne	580	20.00
Nov. 1	Guaranty for laborers visas (R.Piñera)	409	200.00
Nov. 9	Revolving fund - Comptroller Department	582	500.00
Nov. 11	Deposit - Telephone service - 228 NE. 31 St.	607	100.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Electricity service - 228 NE. 31 St.	730 ✓	20.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Gas service - 1700 Biscayne	735	10.00
Nov. 21	Deposit - Water service - 1700 Biscayne	741	10.00
Nov. 28	Petty Cash (Mario Rodríguez)	832	50.00
Nov. 30	Deposit - Telephone service - José Sosa	849	300.00
			$ 3,910.00
	Less: Reinbursment - Revolving Fund- Social Work (Check 533)		1,000.00
	Total of Deposits		$ 2,910.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Nov. 1	1 Underwood No. 7643983	421	$ 110.00
Nov. 1	1 Underwood No. 7737343	421	110.00

Continues page No. 2

ASSETS

ANNEX "I-E"

Date		Check No.	Total
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT: (Cont.)		
Nov. 3	1 desk	428	$ 25.00
Nov. 3	1 Thermo-Fax	428	359.00
Nov. 8	4 No. 45 lock - 4 drawer legal files	567	185.40
Nov. 8	4 Type stands No. 100	567	28.63
Nov. 8	5 Wall Arm swivel Chairs	567	206.00
Nov. 8	4 Wells No. 1230 Post. Chairs	567	119.48
Nov. 8	10 Baskets	567	10.30
Nov. 8	6 Executive Desks	567	278.10
Nov. 8	2 Secretary Desks	567	108.15
Nov. 9	1 Underwood No. 6170967	567	80.00
Nov. 9	1 Underwood No. 6788936	576	80.00
Nov. 9	1 Portable Corona No. 16-119371	576	40.00
Nov. 12	Payment - Addressograph (Aug., Sept.,Oct)	622	103.35
Nov. 16	1 R.C.Allen No. 2A-2238342	688	119.05
Nov. 16	2 tables	688	19.90
Nov. 21	1 Olivetti No. 82	730✓	180.25
Nov. 21	1 Swingline No. 99 Stapler	741	2.95
Nov. 23	1 Arrow Stapler	767	4.25
Nov. 23	1 Bates Stapler	767	7.95
Nov. 23	2 Used desks	774	100.94
Nov. 23	5 used desks and 1 No. 45 lock	774	301.28
Nov. 23	1 used desk and 1 No. 45 lock	774	99.41
Nov. 30	2 W. Up. Chairs	847	52.00
Nov. 30	1 Swivel chair	847	20.00
Nov. 30	1 No. 45 file with lock	847	51.09
Nov. 30	1 Smith Corona portable - S-292673	848	45.00
	Total of Office Equipment		$2,847.48

Continues page No. 3

ASSETS

Date		Check No.	Total
	AUTOMOBILES:		
Nov. 3	1 - Plymouth 1955 - Tag 1-117896	428	$ 355.00
Nov. 1	1 automobile (F.Martínez)	388	300.00
Nov. 19	Excess in the price of one automobile (J.Nápoles)	729	47.30
Nov. 21	1 Lincoln - Tag No. 1W-36446	734	125.00
	Total of automobiles		$ 827.30
	OTHERS:		
Nov. 1	First payment - "Madjin" ship	384	$1,000.00
Nov. 3	1 Westinghouse fan	428	45.32
Nov. 3	1 Grunding recorder	428	67.98
Nov. 3	3 beds	428	30.00
Nov. 3	1 fire extinguisher	428	14.50
Nov. 10	1 refrigerator	589	45.00
Nov. 23	2nd. payment - "Madjin" ship	776	1,000.00
Nov. 23	3rd. payment - "Madjin" ship	777	3,000.00
	Total of "Others"		$ 5,202.80
	TOTAL OF ASSETS		$11,787.58

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PAYROLL
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

The details of the payroll are remited in Spanish $42,400.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

		Total
Office Supplies	whatever they see ✓	$1,403.68
Rents	$2,346.57	
Less: Physician's house rent (November - Check 589 - Reimbursed)	97.85	2,248.72
Miscellaneous	military?	2,208.40
		$5,860.80

NOTE: Due to the many payments made as "General Expenses" and that no one of them exceeds of $300.00, details are remitted in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRAVEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Trip to Chicago (Serapio Montejo)	386	$ 218.43
Nov. 1	Trip to Chicago (Florentino Martínez)	387	300.00
Nov. 1	Trip to Europe (Justo Carrillo)	390	1,750.00
Nov. 1	Transference from Miami - C.Alfonso's family	422	170.00
Nov. 1	New York-Miami (Mrs. del Valle)	424	144.13
Nov. 1	New York-Miami (Luis Rivas)	425	144.13
Nov. 2	Havana (Frank Zayas)	428	50.00
Nov. 2	Tampa-Habana (Frank Zayas - Messenger)	428	54.00
Nov. 3	New York - Press Conference (Dr.Varona)	489	853.60
Nov. 3	Expenses in excess - Trip to Peru (Frank Díaz Silveira)	495	90.50
Nov. 3	Expenses in Dr. Tejera transference	498	107.50
Nov. 3	Trip to New York to get a surgery (G.Camueira)	507	70.00
Nov. 4	Trip to New York (A.Collada and F.Alonso)	526	292.00
Nov. 4	Trip to New York (Dr. Varona)	527	201.93
Nov. 7	Trip to Bogotá (M.Sorondo)	553	200.00
Nov. 7	Trip to Honduras (L.García)	554	100.00
Nov. 9	Trip to West Palm Beach (J.Noriega)	581	9.71
Nov. 9	Trip to Kansas City - Press Conference (A.Rivero)	583	131.12
Nov. 10	Havana-Miami (Juan, Silvia & J.Roque - children)	590	108.00
Nov. 11	Trip to Cuba (Dulce Torres)	606	86.00
Nov. 11	Trip to New York (M.Salvat)	606	150.00
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Otto Ruiz and Children)	607	86.40
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (A.C.Vila-Miyares-Rodríguez)	608	129.60
Nov. 11	Havana-Miami (Juan Menéndez)	609	107.05
Nov. 3	Transference of laborers - New York-Miami	49 7	710.36

Continues page No. 2

TRAVEL

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 11	Miami-Habana (V.Antón's family)	618	$ 216.80
Nov. 12	Expenses in excess - Trip to Washington - Antonio Collada	621	14.27
Nov. 14	Round trip - New York-Miami (S.Estrada)	646	120.00
Nov. 15	Trip (No specified) Isabel Siero	665	150.00
Nov. 16	Trip to Cuba (Ignacio Freixas)	686	43.20
Nov. 17	Many (Frank Zayas)	698	251.30
Nov. 18	Many to Washington (O.E.A.)	704	391.50
Nov. 18	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Pereira and children)	705	86.40
Nov. 18	Habana-Miami (R.Orta)	710	43.20
Nov. 18	Trip to Mexico (M.F.Goudie)	712	320.40
Nov. 18	Havana-Miami (R.Arronte)	722	43.20
Nov. 21	Havana-Miami (Mrs. G.Ribeaux and son)	743	86.40
Nov. 22	Havana-Miami (G.Villiers family)	753	90.00
Nov. 22	Havana-Miami (Tito Hernández family)	754	108.00
Nov. 22	Tax on the tickets for Mr.Hernández family	755	31.14
Nov. 23	Trip to Cainesville - Caribe Conference (R.Miquel)	771	400.00
Nov. 23	Trip to Chicago (Serapio Montejo)	772	305.47
Nov. 23	Trip to Chicago (F.Martínez)	773	513.98
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (O.Loredo y Dr.Varona)	779	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (2 messengers)	780	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (Sordo y Martínez)	783	107.16
Nov. 23	Havana-Miami (L.Gómez y R.Fernández)	786	107.16
Nov. 24	Havana-Miami (E.Hernández e hijo)	790	107.16
Nov. 24	Havana-Miami (Felicia Hernández)	792	53.58
Nov. 24	Miami-New York (M.Cobo)	797	125.59
Nov. 24	Travel expenses - Miami-Washington-New York (Dr. Varona and three more)	798	396.96
Nov. 25	Trip to New York (Varona, Artime, Rasco, Carrillo)	808	1,100.00

Continues page No. 3

TRAVEL

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 25	Trip to Boston, Albany and West Palm Beach (Carlos Fiad)	809	$ 372.90
Nov. 26	Trip to New York - Ricardo Sardiña	817	275.00
Nov. 26	Trip to New York - Montiel and Corona	818	251.80
Nov. 26	Excess in tickets for Chicago (Dr. Varona)	820	61.07
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - New York - (H.Corona)	824	105.00
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - New York - (P,Montiel)	824	105.00
Nov. 28	Havana-Miami (A,Muñoz y P.Guerra)	833	86.40
Nov. 28	Travel expenses - Dr.Rasco (Mexico)	833	125.40
Nov. 29	Travel expenses - New York (Huerta and one more)	840	150.00
Nov. 29	Travel expenses (J.Gómez)	841	68.98
			$13,293.20
	Less: Reinbursemnt - M.Cobo - Check 797		0.30
	TOTAL		$13,292.90

N O T E: In some of the expenses related in this annex do not exist the receipts in our records, and in this cases, the checks were extended in view of a Memorandums giving such instruction.

amr.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATIC FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

Details recited in Spanish	$ 6,781.37

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMUNICATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Nov. 2	Certificated mail	428	$ 12.62
Nov. 3	Stamps	499	20.00
Nov. 3	Special Delivery	499	1.17
Nov. 3	Special Delivery	499	0.42
Nov. 9	Stamps	581	100.00
Nov. 9	Certificate mail	581	2.28
Nov. 10	Stamps	589	11.00
Nov. 21	Stamps	730	34.92
Nov. 21	Stamps	741	69.97
Nov. 28	Stamps	824	55.33
Nov. 28	Stamps	833	32.00
		Total	$ 339.71
	TELEPHONE:		
Nov. 11	FR-5607	607	$ 63.18
Nov. 11	FR-9-4906	612	346.58
Nov. 11	FR-9-4906	613	224.07
Nov. 14	FR-9-4906	613	10.00
Nov. 14	Long distance - Key West (C.B.Fernández)	661	1.33
Nov. 17	Liquidation - FR-3-1717	693	103.48
Nov. 18	FR-4-0884	703	38.60
Nov. 18	Long distance (M.F.Goudie)	712	52.70
Nov. 21	Long distance FR-7-3389	730	70.90
Nov. 23	FR-4-2628	769	249.81
Nov. 23	FR-4-0884	770	104.69
Nov. 24	Long distance (Dr.Varona) JE-2-3391	800	118.80
			$1,384.14
Less: Reinbursemt - Check 730 - FR-73389			70.90
		Total	$1,313.24

Should have been on Schedule "I-5"

COMMUNICATIONS

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	TELEGRAPH:		
Nov. 2	Cable	428	$ 2.92
Nov. 4	Telegrams to the Secretaries of State of Latin America	530	176.74
Nov. 9	Cables to Guatemala	581	30.68
Nov. 18	Cable	710	2.56
Nov. 21	Cable	741	87.09
Nov. 21	Cable to Venezuela	763	13.00
Nov. 28	Telegrams	824	7.85
		Total	$ 320.84
		TOTAL OF "COMUNICATIONS"	$1,973.79

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

PUBLICITY

"PAULA AND SOSA"

November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Announcement - Laborers Meeting -Oct.30	391	$ 202.50
Nov. 1	Sketch - Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre	414	60.00
Nov. 1	Publication - Triple A Declarations	423	750.00
Nov. 1	Publicity - Democratic Information Center - Mexico	426	1,700.00
Nov. 2	Fotographic work	428	206.00
Nov. 2	Expenses - laborers meeting - Oct. 30	428	50.00
Nov. 9	W.M.E.T.	571	280.00
Nov. 9	Expenses - laborers meeting - Oct. 30	572	103.00
Nov. 9	Newspapermen meeting	581	59.02
Nov. 9	Announcements - W.M.E.T. - Laborers meeting	584	50.00
Nov. 14	Labels "Cuba Sí, Russia No"	658	412.00
Nov. 15	Auditorium rent	661	25.75
Nov. 16	Two pages of publicity in "Diario de La Marina"	690	136.00
Nov. 17	November 26 meeting	695	800.00
Nov. 17	November 26 meeting	696	385.00
Nov. 17	Publicity Triple-A - Diario de las Américas	702	195.75
Nov. 21	Publication - Triple-A declarations "Avance"	736	165.00
Nov. 22	Freight - Booklets - "Cuba Denuncia Traición de Castro"	749	511.80
Nov. 22	Booklet - Document to the O.E.A.	750	800.00
Nov. 23	Newspapermen announcement - D.de las Américas	782	54.00
Nov. 24	Film - F.R.D. offices	802	150.00
Nov. 24	Press conference - Expenses	803	199.50
			$7,295.32

Less:

Excess on check 690 - D. de la Marina	$ 6.00	
Excess on check 749 - Boodlets freight	39.31	45.31
		$7,250.01

PUBLICITY

N O T E: See more publicity expenses on annex "I-N".

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MILITARY SECTION
"MIAMI AND [illegible]"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
	REINBURSEMENT - REVOLVING FUND:		
Nov. 1	Reinbursment	419	$6,937.52 ①
Nov. 5	"	534	353.88 ②
Nov. 5	"	535	1,000.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	536	749.85 ②
Nov. 5	"	537	480.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	538	1,173.00 ②
Nov. 5	"	539	1,537.45 ②
Nov. 8	"	559	6,235.55 ②
Nov. 14	"	624	5,402.21 ②
Nov. 18	"	714	5,961.00 ②
Nov. 22	" #1 Details (schedule) in file	756	3,964.48 ②
Nov. 28	" #2 Details reviewed and returned	822	4,502.60 ②
	T o t a l		$38,297.54
	MISCELLANEOUS:		
Nov. 9	Automobile expenses - (Cabañas)	581	$ 55.44
Nov. 10	Hotel rent	592	5,000.00 ?
Nov. 10	Hotel rent	593	1,666.67 ✓
Nov. 3	Given to the Transportation Committee	519	2,000.00
Nov. 9	Purchase of equipment for Comunications	577	1,000.00
Nov. 12	Reparation expenses - Ship - (D.V.Tejera)	623	260.00
Nov. 15	Given to Alberto Martín (Transportation)	663	150.00
Nov. 15	Given to Manuel García (Transportation)	664	150.00
Nov. 17	Radio parts (Comunications)	697	650.00
Nov. 18	Naval effects (Comunications)	709	142.37
Nov. 18	Transference - New York-Miami - (A.R.Alonso family)	713	500.00

Military

Continues page No. 2

MILITARY SECTION

Date		Check No.	Total
	MISCELLANEOUS: (Cont.)		
Nov. 19	Equipment reparation - Transportation Committee (Fl.Díaz Lanz)	727	$ 600.00
Nov. 21	Expenses estrictly confidential	744	160.00
Nov. 22	Purchase of one radio (F.Zayas)	760	65.00
Nov. 28	Naval Section Payroll	823	1,938.50
Nov. 28	Purchase of a radio-plant (Comunications)	827	600.00
Nov. 28	Confidential	828	60.00
	Total		$14,997.98
	TOTAL "MILITARY SECTION"		$53,295.52

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DELEGATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-M"

Date		Check No.	Total
	LATINAS:		
	ARGENTINA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 275,00
	PERU:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 350.00
Nov. 28	"Propaganda"	826	350.00
			$ 700.00
	COLOMBIA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 300.00
	HONDURAS:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 300.00
Nov. 24	Travelling tickets (L.García)	789	70.00
			$ 370.00
	COSTA RICA:		
Nov. 11	Given	615	$ 400.00
Nov. 14	Given	631	500.00
			$ 900.00
	SAN SALVADOR:		
Nov. 25	Sent to J.L.Fernández	813	$ 125.00
	Total of "latins"		$2,670.00
	NORTH AMERICANS:		
	ATLANTA:		
Nov. 24	Traveling tickets (R.Rodríguez)	793	$ 500.00

Continues page No. 2

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-M"
Page No. 2

Date		Check No.	Total
	NORTH AMERICANS: (Cont.)		
	WASHINGTON:		
Nov. 21	Sent	748	$1,070.00
	NEW ORLEANS:		
Nov. 21	Instalation of the Delegation	746	$ 300.00
	NEVADA:		
Nov. 11	Sent	619	$ 323.46
	TAMPA:		
Nov. 3	Miscellaneous expenses	501	$ 100.00
	NEW YORK:		
Nov. 11	Sent	610	$2,735.00
Nov. 14	J.M.González	644	1,500.00
Nov. 14	J.M.González	657	3,370.00
Nov. 15	F. de Juan	660	150.00
Nov. 16	"Propaganda"	673	650.00
			$ 9,405.00
	Total of "Americans"		$11,198.46
	TOTAL OF DELEGATIONS		$13,362.46

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMITTEES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
	PUBLICITY: ("Propaganda")		
Nov. 8	Given to Rasco	561	$ 500.00
Nov. 22	Abel Mestre (Corresponding October)	751	7,945.38
Nov. 22	Abel Mestre (No accounting submited yet)	757	30,000.00
			$38,445.38
	AGENT EXPLOITATION:		
Nov. 2	Budget	469	$ 5,916.00
	PLANNING:		
Nov. 1	Budget	420	$ 2,775.44
	FINANCE:		
Nov. 9	Given to Liñeras (Especial)	587	$ 266.00
Nov. 11	Instalation of "Sectores Económicos" Committee	611	500.00
			$ 766.00
	PUBLIC RELATIONS:		
Nov. 18	Given	717	$ 200.00
Nov. 21	Tournee (E.Llaca) by South America (Still traveling)	738	3,000.00
Nov. 21	Transference to New York - J.Alonso	745	300.00
			$ 3,500.00
	ORGANIZATION AND PROSELITYSM:		
Nov. 15	Advance on the budget	666	$ 500.00
Nov. 28	Miscellaneous expenses	833	15.00
			$ 515.00
	TOTAL		$51,917.82

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
SOCIAL WORK
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-O"

Details remited in Spanish	$ 3,400.00

NOTE: Excluding checks No. 465 (Medicines and medical sevices) and No. 659 (Help to Mrs. Orlando Calero) the rest corresponds to the salaries paid, during the month, to the physicians (M.D.) related. On the month of December, they will be transferred to the Military Section.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
G.F.R.D.E.C. (*)
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-P"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 16	Check to the order of José Sosa	684	$25,000.00
	TOTAL F.F.R.D.E.C.		$25,000.00

(*) Expenses of the FRD in Cuba.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MONROE HOTEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-Q"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 18	Deposit and rent - Monroe Hotel	716	$1,350.00
Nov. 21	Expenses of the Hotel (A.de Varona)	721	300.00
Nov. 24	Salarie - A.Menéndez (23-30 Nov.)	794	24.00
Nov. 25	Sheets and linen	810	80.00
Nov. 28	Miscellaneous (F. Liantaud)	830	48.55
			$1,802.55

What was income?

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-R"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 2	To the account "Rasco and Paula"	427	$84,000.00
Nov. 14	To the account "Rasco and Paula"	635	50,000.00
	TOTAL		$134,000.00

NOTE: These transferences have been done to the effects of increasing the account "Rasco and Paula", through which the payroll of the Social Work and the military staff. is paid.

14-00000

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MISCELLANEOUS
"FAULA AND SOSA"
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-S"

Date		Check No.	Total
Nov. 1	Confidential expenses (Dr,Carrillo - R.V.)	389	$ 500.00
Nov. 1	Expenses of a messenger to Havana	408	100.00
Nov. 1	Expenses of a messenger to Havana	411	129.60
Nov. 3	Confidentil (Dr. Varona)	512	2,000.00
Nov. 4	Furniture and equipment purchased by Mr. Ros, for the Miami Delegation office, and that were transferred from it by Mr. Leopoldo Morffi. For that reason they are considered as a lost.	523	371.83
Nov. 7	Operation "Savannah"	552	120.00
Nov. 9	Confidential (Traveling tickets)	586	43.20
Nov. 10	Secret Service A.Torres	588	50.00
Nov. 18	Purchase of military texts	707	100.00
Nov. 21	Expense charged by mistake and reinbursed by Mr. Ros	730	70.90
Nov. 21	Transference, from Mexico to Miami, of Dr. Rasco's family	747	700.00
			$4,185.53

See credit on Schedule "I-J"

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CHECKS OF OCTOBER CANCELLED IN NOVEMBER
November 1 to 30, 1960

ANNEX "I-T"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Manuel Comellas - Payroll	82	$ 125.00
Oct. 6	Luis Farajón - Payroll	92	350.00
Nov. 18	Antonio Losada - To be justified	205	200.00
Nov. 28	Tacuba Printing - Publicity	276	300.00
Nov. 28	Tacuba Printing - Publicity	278	200.00
Nov. 29	Vicente A.Romeu - Publicity	~~281~~	105.00
			$1,280.00

N O T E: The amounts of these checks was considered in October, as part of the total amount of the accounts to which each one of them corresponds. They were no cashed in the bank, because they were cancelled on November, reason for what the total amount of them is considered in this month as an increase in the balance in bank shown in our books.

"[illegible]" - Noviembre 1960

Reintegro Fondo Fijo Sector Militar Analisis de los Gastos - Cheque No. 110 - Partidas 1 a la 15, ambas inclusive.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 1

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ernesto Peinó - Raciones	$ 90.00
Gastón Rodríguez - Raciones	90.00
Gastón Rodríguez - Raciones	20.00
Emilio Fernández Trujillo	5.00
Pedro Arnao	5.00
Manuel López Espinosa	30.00
Rigoberto Montero Pérez	5.00
Cecilio González García del P.	5.00
Luis López González (450)	13.25
Víctor M. Haber Haber	5.00
Miguel A. Mazas García	5.00
Marcos Zamora	8.00
José M. Martínez Vilela	5.00
Luis Ramón Pérez	5.00
Héctor Varona	10.00
Humberto I. Chamizo	5.00
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	4.00
Cecilio González	4.00
Pedro Arnao	4.00
Migual Matas - Rigoberto Montero - Haber - Vilela (4)	20.00
José M. Martínez	5.00
Zenando Quicutis (especial)	10.00
Pedro Arnao (manutención y ropa)	10.00
Cecilio González	5.00
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	5.00
Humberto P. Núñez	10.00
Luis Iglesias Mesias	5.00

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Emilio Hernández	$ 6.00	
Abelardo Silva P. y ocho hombres	27.00	
José Alvarez García	5.00	
Cecilio González	5.00	
Luis Pérez Rodríguez	5.00	
José Martínez Vilela	5.00	
Marcos Zamora	10.00	
Gastos varios personal llegado	12.00	
Claudio González (varios)	20.00	
Tomás Vázquez	5.00	$ 488.25
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		
Taxi grupo de Cuba y pilotos		5.00
Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Café, etc.		6.75
		$ 500.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 2

Gastos en Radiografías y Análisis (X-Rays and Analisys)	$ 266.50

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 -, "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 3

Manutención y Albergue:		
(Occasional Support to Cuban Refugees)		
Bartolomé Díaz Cruz	$ 77.00	
Wilfredo Díaz	14.00	
José V. Calcotta	14.00	
Cinco Alistados	50.00	
Osvaldo Coello	10.00	$ 165.00
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina, aceite y repación de auto	$ 32.15	
Traslado Armando Rodríguez Alonso	153.66	185.81
Alquileres de Alistados (Rent - Recruits)		
Mario Fernándes	$ 75.00	
Fernando Blanco	10.00	
Leocadio León	16.50	101.50
Otras Ayudas (Other occasional supports)		
Arcángel Amador	$ 25.00	
Guillermo Cancio	20.00	
Dr. Alonso	20.00	
José Mederos Robaina	9.94	
Agustín Carballo	4.00	78.94
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Efectos de Escritorio	$ 41.37	
Mir y Santos - Traslado a Key West	10.00	
Otros	36.98	88.35
		$ 619.60

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,227.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 4

Viaje y permanencia de un agente del Coordinador Militar en Cuba, cuyo nombre desconocemos y, además, que no expondríamos en ningún caso por medidas de seguridad. $ 200.00

Trip and expenses of an agent of de Militar Coordinatos, whose name we don't know and that we wouldn't mention in any case for security reasons.

AMR.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "Paula and Sosa"

PARTIDA No. 5

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to cuban refugees):		
Lásaro Albo	$ 10.00	
Fulgencio R. Gil Hernándes	14.00	
Marcos Zamora	12.00	
Octavio Fernándes	10.00	
Pedro Aranao	2.50	
Emilio R. Hernández	12.00	
Cecilio Gonzáles	5.00	
Luis Senén Lópes	5.00	
José Martínez Vilela	4.00	$ 74.50
Gastos de Transporte: (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina y Aceite		19.35
Servicios Médicos: (Medical Services)		
Blood Analisys (Análisis de sangre)		54.00
Gastos Varios: (Miscellaneous)		
Comidas	$ 4.05	
Lavado de Ropa	6.58	
Varios	20.14	30.77
Otras ayudas ocasionales: (Other occasional supports)		
Sra. de Roberto Rodríguez		20.00
		$ 199.62

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 6

Manutención y Albergue:		
(Occasional Support to cuban refugees)		
Ismael Valladares	$ 20.00	
Osvaldo Enriquez	20.00	
Víctor M. Haber	20.00	
Cinco hombres por dos días	15.00	
Alimentos	5.00	
Emilio Hernández	5.00	
Zenaido Quicuti	70.00	
Pedro Arando	5.00	
Rigoberto Montero	20.00	
Guillermo Trabaue	20.00	
Pablo Ubide	25.00	
Orlando Urra	25.00	
José M. Angel Pomar	25.00	
Nildo Acevedo	25.00	
Nicolás Viant	15.00	
Armando Guerra	15.00	
José R. Machado	115.00	
Cándido Alfonso	100.00	$ 545.00 ✓
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina y Aceite		2.25
Activos (Assets)		
Un radio Estado Mayor		184.41
Efectos de Escritorio (Stationary)		
Sellos de Correos	$ 20.00	
Papel	4.12	24.12

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Servicio de agua	$ 20.75	
Teléfono Estado Mayor	69.10	
Otros gastos	4.37	$ 94.22
		$ 850.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 7

Por la remisión a la Sra. Josefa Patterson a la calle 29 letra "C", No. 7016, entre - 70 y 72, Buenavista, Marianao, por medio - del Sr. Freddie Goudie.	$ 200.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 8

Luis Morse Delgado, gastos de instalación, incluyendo su familia. (Instalation expenses, including his family)	$ 200.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 9

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to cuban refugees)		
Humberto Núñez (Renta Hotel)	$ 21.52	
Alquiler Motel (por un día de renta)	6.18	
Hotel San Carlos (renta para nueve hombres)	37.08	
Abelardo Silva (comida ocho personas	32.00	
Víctor M. Haber (comida cuatro hombres)	20.00	
Alfredo Hernández	5.00	
Pedro Arnao	6.00	
Marcos Zamora	10.00	
Cecilio González	10.00	
Heberto Lorenzo	20.00	
Abelardo Silva (comida nueve personas)	18.00	
Humberto I. Chamizo	5.00	
J.Torres y otros	129.78	
Francisco Rodríguez	123.60	$ 444.16
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		
Gasolina y Aceite		9.98
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		23.07
		$ 477.21

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 10

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Joaquín Rodríguez	$ 20.00	
José Fellón	20.00	
Marta García Rubio	50.00	
Ramón Rodríguez	20.00	
Héctor Varona	20.00	
Wamer Hablutzel	25.00	
Raúl Vázquez	20.00	
Ernesto Peinó	20.00	
Nildo Batista	20.00	
Eddy González	20.00	
Reynaldo Lazo	20.00	
Osvaldo Rodríguez	20.00	
Eduardo Herrera	20.00	
Francisco García	20.00	
Renta (Hotel)	16.35	
Renta (Hotel)	17.41	
Renta (Hotel)	16.77	
Renta (Hotel)	4.16	
Renta (Hotel)	12.40	
Manuel Avila	20.00	$ 402.09
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		11.23
Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Teléfono	$ 12.02	
Otros	23.10	35.12
		$ 448.44

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 419
POR $ 6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 11

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ramón Rodríguez	$ 20.00	
Amado Cantillo	20.00	
Julián Bunuedo	20.00	
Warnov Hablutzol	20.00	
Eddy González	20.00	
Reynaldo Lazo	20.00	
Alberto Pérez Sordo	20.00	
Nildo Batista	20.00	
Manuel Avila	20.00	
Ramón Rodríguez	20.00	
Héctor Varona	25.00	
Raúl Vázquez	30.00	
Pablo Astudillo	25.00	
Eduardo Herrera	20.00	
Acelo Pedroso	20.00	
Joaquín Rodríguez	20.00	
Gastón Rodríguez	114.80	
Renta Hotel	45.20	$ 500.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 12

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Mario A. Enríquez	$ 20.00	
Rolando Moya	68.00	
Osvaldo Coello	27.00	
Fernando Blanco	10.00	
Leocadio León	50.00	
Mario Lamar	50.00	
Rolando Pérez	10.00	
Patricio Artigas	10.00	
Benjamín Granados	17.00	
Ayuda adicional	42.00	
Alquiler	68.45	
Comida	5.00	
Senén Brito	8.00	$ 385.45
Gastos de Transporte (Gas and Oil)		16.60
Gastos Médicos (Medical services)		28.53
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		9.57
		$ 440.15

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA WD SOSA"

Partida No. 13

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban ~~refugees~~)

Mario de Lamar	$ 50.00
José Enrique Alonso	50.00
Ceferino Palmer	44.00
Guillermo Losa Zafrane	51.00
Osvaldo Coello Díaz	27.00
Mario A. Enríquez	51.00
Rolando Moya	51.00
Félix Domínguez	24.00
Antonio Ramos	24.00
Ramón García Avila	22.00
Orlando Bayona	22.00
José A. Darias Rodríguez	20.00
Emilio Izquierdo	14.00
Rogelio de los Santos	14.00
Arcangel Amador	14.00
Augusto Pupo	14.00
Modesto B. García	14.00
Jorge Varela	14.00
Mario Pérez Chile	14.00
Alfredo Mir	14.00
Justo Delgado	14.00
José F. Mederos	14.00
Miguel A. Victorero	14.00
Gilberto Junco	14.00
Arturo Escarce	14.00
Senén Brito	14.00
Julio Tur	14.00
Enrique Moreno	14.00
Leocadio León	14.00
Luis Fuente Roca	14.00
Cándido C. Aguilar	14.00
Fernando Blanco	14.00

Hoja No. 2

Manutención y Albergue (Cont.)
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Emiliano Díaz	$ 14.00	
Mariano Santos	14.00	
Mario Collazo	14.00	
Rolando Pérez Pena	14.00	
Patricio Artigas	14.00	$ 786.00

Sueldos (Salaries) :

Esteban Echevarría	$ 55.00	
Eduardo Franqui	55.00	
Guillermo Cancio	50.00	
Jorge Mackenzie	30.00	
Orlando Arrazola	20.00	
Agustín Carballo	20.00	
Benjamín Granados Alvarez	20.00	250.00
		$1,036.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 14

Por el alquiler de una automóvil al Sr. Guillot, que según comprobante, asciende a $366.94 (por 5 semanas) sin que haya reintegrado $33.06 de sobrante, correspondiendo $250.00 al pago del cheque No. 244 de Octubre 26 y la diferencia a esta erogación. (Automobile rent - Manuel Guillot). $ 150.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 419
POR $6,937.52 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Partida No. 15

Manutención y Altergue (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Máximo Ruiloba	$ 125.00	
A. Crispín Hernández	25.00	
Ricardo P. Gómez	5.00	
Lázaro Albo	12.50	
Comida	194.01	
Conrado Santana	64.92	$ 426.43
Transporte (Gas and Oil)		14.20
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		
Sellos de Correos	$ 100.00	
Material de Oficina	82.12	182.12
Habilitación de evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits)		143.10
Varios (Miscellaneous)		46.32
Activos (Assets)		
Dos ventiladores (Ejército)	$ 15.00	
Una cama	22.60	37.60
		$ 849.77

amr.

"[illegible]" - Octubre 1960

Reintegros Fondo Fijo Sector Militar - Análisis de los Gastos. Chéques Nros. 239 al 244, ambos inclusive.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE NO. 239
POR $499.51 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Hugo Román Acevedo - Exp. 411	$ 18.21	
Rodolfo Díaz - Exp. 256	30.00	
Elpidio Felizola - Exp. 392	5.00	
José L. Vivanco - Exp. 89	10.00	
Juan F. Torres - s/n - New York	10.00	
Humberto Chamizo - Exp. 272	12.00	
Florencio F. Valdés - Exp. 376	5.00	
Roberto Rodríguez González - Exp. 77 - N.Y.	20.00	
Mario Riverón (Gasolina y cantidades a varios compañeros)	10.00	
Luis L. López - Exp. 450	5.00	
Ernesto Fernández y 2 compañeros	12.00	
Rogelio Rodríguez (3 hombres)	20.00	
Bernardo J.Bosch y 4 compañeros - N.Y.	20.00	
Pedro Arnao - Exp. 51 - New York	10.00	$ 187.21 ✓
Habilitación de Evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits)		191.63
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil)		13.00
Efectos de Escritorio (Office supplies)		7.21
Varios (Miscellaneous)		100.46
		$ 499.51 ✓

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 240
POR $479.10 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional support to cuban refugees)		
Mario Enríquez	$ 10.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrané	10.00	
Cándido Aguilar Paz	12.00	
Wilfredo Díaz (50%)	6.00	
Julio Tur Tur	6.00	
Arturo Escarce Cancio - Extra	20.00	
Augusto Pupo	5.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrané	41.00	$ 110.00
Gastos de Transporte (gas and Oil)		22.30
Alquileres de Alistados (Rents)		
Ceferino Palmer Prado (Oct.)	$ 65.00	
José F. Mederos (Oct.)	55.00	120.00
Haberes mensuales (Salaries)		
Esteban Echevarría - Adicional por depend.	$ 36.76	
Eduardo Franqui - Adicional por depend.	36.76	73.52
Ayudas varias (Other occasional supports)		
Guillermo Cancio - Hospital - Servicio médico - Medicinas	$ 52.00	
Félix Domínguez - Recibo luz	3.72	
Osvaldo E. Coello - Remitir esposa	20.00	75.72
Gastos Varios (Miscellaneous)		77.56
		$ 479.10

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 241
POR $ 850.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue: (Occasional Support to cuban refugees)		
Cigarros para evacuados	$ 22.41	
Rolando Rodríguez - 414 - Raciones-Movilización	15.00	
Lázaro Alba - Raciones - Encargado movimiento de personal	10.00	
Rafael G. Labrada - Raciones	10.00	
Eliseo Pérez - René Gómez - J.Torres - 4 días - Room	24.00	
Fuentes - Cuéllar - 1 día - Rooms 7 y 6	12.00	
Morales - 14 días - Room 3	84.00	
Rodríguez - 6 días - Room 6	36.00	
Sra. Rodríguez - 6 días - Room 7	36.00	
Impuestos por los cinco renglones anteriores	5.76	
Hotel Ponce de León - s/nombre	130.00	
Motel Valencia - s/nombre	91.00	
José R. Machado	20.00	
Mario Pérez Chile	20.00	$ 516.17
Habilitación de evacuados (Uniforms for the recruits):		36.85
Gastos de Transportes (Gas and Oil):		21.90
Efectos de Escritorio (Office supplies)		67.76
Activos varios (Assets)		122.27
Sueldos (Salaries)		
Ricardo Pérez Gómez - Sereno - Semana		20.00
Varios (Miscellaneous)		65.05
		$ 850.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 242
POR $709.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Manutención y Albergue:
(Occasional support to cuban refugees)

Ceferino V. Palmer Prado	$ 44.00	
Guillermo Losa Zafrana	51.00	
Félix Domínguez y Sra.	24.00	
Antonio Ramos y Sra.	24.00	
Ramón García Avila	22.00	
Emilio Izquierdo	12.00	
Rogerio de los Santos	12.00	
Arcángel Amador	12.00	
José A. Darias	20.00	
Orlando Bayona	22.00	
Augusto Pupo	12.00	
Modesto B. García	12.00	
Jorge Varela	12.00	
Mario Pérez Chile	12.00	
Luis Hernández	12.00	
Justo Delgado	12.00	
José F. Mederos Robaina	12.00	
Miguel A. Victorero	12.00	
Gilberto Junco	12.00	
Arturo Escarce Cancio	12.00	
Senén Brito Alfonso	12.00	
Julio Tur	12.00	
Enrique Moreno	12.00	
José M. Fagil Moreira	12.00	
Luis Fuente Roca	12.00	
Cándido C. Aguilar	12.00	
Ricardo Zabala Sánchez	12.00	
Andrés I. Rodríguez	12.00	
	12.00	$ 459.00

Pasa a la Hoja No. 2

Hoja No. 2

Sueldos (Salaries):

Esteban Echevarría	$ 55.00	
Eduardo Franqui	55.00	
Guillermo Cancio	50.00	
Jorge Mackenzie	30.00	
Orlando Arrazola	20.00	
Agustín Carballo	20.00	
Benjamín Granados	20.00	$ 250.00
		$ 709.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 243
POR $ 600.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Gastos de asistencia médica y operación en el hospital de un oficial necesitado del Estado Mayor. (Medical assistence and surgery)	$ 600.00

amr.

GASTOS RELATIVOS AL CHEQUE No. 244
POR $250.00 - "PAULA AND SOSA"

Pagando el arrendamiento del auto del Sr. Manuel Guillot, sin que aparesca el recibo de la casa arrendadora. (Automobile rent).	$ 250.00

amr.

English
B-1

Paula de Sosa
Oct 1 - 31 . 1960

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

STATEMENT "II"

Bank Balance; Oct. 31, 1960	$	82,559.66
Less: Unpaid checks (remited in Spanish)		11,386.82 ✓
Corrected Bank Balance; Oct. 31, 1960	$	71,172.84 ^

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM THE FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-A"

Oct. 15	Deposit	$ 50,000.00	MIAMI
Oct. 17	Deposit	56,000.00	MIAMI
Oct. 26	Deposit	45,000.00	MIAMI
Oct. 26	Deposit	64,000.00	MIAMI
	Total of incomes from the finance dept.	$215,000.00	✓

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
INCOMES FROM TRANSFERENCES FROM THE ACCOUNT "RASCO AND PAULA" "PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-B"

Oct. 10	Deposit - Check No. 237	$ 12,086.33
Oct. 14	Deposit - Check No. 238	3,000.00
		$ 15,086.33 ✓

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
OTHER INCOMES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-C"

Oct. 17:	Reinbursment - Francisco Carrillo: Amount given in excess for the payment of the payroll	$ 300.00
Oct. 19:	Reinbursment - Juan Paula: Amount not used on check No. 55, account 19314 "Banco del Comercio, S.A." Mexico D.F., for his expenses in a trip to Mexico.	78.89
Oct. 19:	Reinbursment - Ana Tomeu: Her salary of September	250.00
Oct. 21:	Enrique Llaca: Amount not used on check 228, Sept. 8, "Rasco and Paula", for a trip to Colombia.	11.50
Oct. 26:	Roberto Fernández: Amount in excess on check No. 91, August 8, ("Rasco and Paula") for the Students Section.	61.92
Oct. 27:	Paula and Sosa: A deposit that must have been done in the account "Rasco and Paula", on check No. 255, and that by mistake, was redeposited in this account.	50,000.00
		$ 50,702.31

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ASSETS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31,1960

ANNEX "I-D"

Date		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITS IN GUARANTY:		
Oct. 12	Electricity Service - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	144	$ 110.00
Oct. 18	Electricity Service - 970 SW 2 St.	195	10.00
Oct. 12	Electricity Service - Raúl Amieva	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Laundry - 970 SW 2 St.	135	15.00
Oct. 27	Telephone Service - Jorge A.Morán	256	50.00
			$ 205.00
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT:		
Oct. 7	One mimeograph - Planification	117	$ 367.00
Oct. 18	One steel table - Two chairs - 1419 Congress Blding.	190	50.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6718540 (Radio station)	235	75.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6062299 (Radio station)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 6960833 (Mrs. Park)	236	117.50
Oct. 20	One"Underwood" typewriter - No. 6315650 (Radio station)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 7212532 (Silvia Morán)	236	117.50
Oct. 26	Five typewriters tables - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	246	49.75
Oct. 26	One electric typwriter - Planification Committee	247	485.85
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter - No. 7237268-15 (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	269	117.50

Date		Check No.	Total
	OFFICE EQUIPMENT: (Cont.)		
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter No. 7705727 (1700 Biscayne Blvd)	270	$ 120.00
Oct. 28	One "Underwood" typewriter No. 7737343 (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	62.50
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	49.50
Oct. 28	One file (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	58.00
Oct. 28	Four paper baskets (1700 Biscayne)	272	7.92
Oct. 28	Four plastic paper baskets (1700 Biscayne Blvd.)	272	5.96
Oct. 28	One file	272	57.50
			$ 2,021.48
	AUTOMOBILES:		
Oct. 18	One automobile - Segundo Miranda	190	$ 95.00
Oct. 18	One automobile - Chevrolet - Plate No. 30-27179	196	80.00
Oct. 26	One automobile - José Nápoles - Organization and Proselitysm	248	300.00
Oct. 27	One automobile - Plate No. 1-20439 (J.García)	256	300.00
Oct. 27	One automobile - Luis M.Varona	257	300.00
			$ 1,075.00
	OTHER ASSETS:		
Oct. 4	One boat - 28'3'' lenght - two motors - Fo. 2982 ("Piscis")	2	$ 3,000.00
Oct. 18	Revolving Fund - Comptroller	188	500.00
Oct. 18	Revolving Fund - Militar	200	5,000.00
Oct. 26	Revolving Fund - Militar	245	5,000.00
Oct. 27	One "Blank punkt" radio (258-2St)	256	69.54
Oct. 27	Two radios - Frank Zayas	256	500.00
Oct. 28	Fifty chairs (portables)	272	212.50
Oct. 27	One radio for comunications	256	500.00
			$ 14,782.04

Total sumes next page

TOTAL OF ASSETS: $ 18,083.52

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
PAYROLL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-E"

DELEGATIONS:	Total
Colombia	$ 275.00
Mexico	950.00
Argentina	300,00
Peru	420.00
Washington	800.00
Miami	615.00
New York	2,050.00
Key West	200.00
	$ 5,610.00

COMMITTEES:	
Finance	$ 950.00
Publicity	2,975.00
Planification	4,125.00
Transportation	200.00
Agent Exploitation	450.00
Organization and Proselitysm	2,905.00
Comunications	1,150.00
Public Relations	475.00
	$ 13,230.00

OTHERS:	
Coordinador General	$ 460.00
Coordinador Auxiliar	200.00
Mainteinance - Central Office	795.00

Continue next page

OTHERS: (Cont.)	Total
Military Section	$ 125.00
Economic Section	200.00
Acts and Correspondence	150.00
Inmigration	150.00
Press	260.00
Especial functions	1,550.00
Comptroller Department	850.00
F. E. U.	100.00
Students Directory	1,195.00
F. O. R. D. C.	4,125.00
Non-determined functions	9,665.00
	$ 19,825.00
TOTAL OF PAYROLL	$ 38,665.00

NOTE: The names, amounts and number of checks, is remited in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRAVEL
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-F"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	New York (9 persons FORDC)	85	$ 485.10
Oct. 4	New York-Miami (one persons confident.)	86	90.00
Oct. 14	J.A.Hernández (FORDC)	168	3.00
Oct. 18	Perú - Frank Díaz Silveira	181	370.00
Oct. 18	Key West-Cuba (Mrs. Trespalacios)	189	40.00
Oct. 18	New York (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Havana-Miami (Mario Massip)	195	48.00
Oct. 18	New York (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00
Oct. 18	New York (Juan Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Miami-Havana (H. Mederos)	196	50.00
Oct. 12	Tampa (Varona-Redondo)	136	78.22
Oct. 26	Airplane trip (Héctor Cruz)	251	25.00
Oct. 26	Travel expenses (Héctor Cruz)	251	25.00
Oct. 27	Emilio Díaz - from New York	256	45.00
Oct. 27	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Figueras and children)	257	125.00
Oct. 27	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Tomás Vázquez and son)	259	64.80
Oct. 29	New York - Manuel Cobo	283	117.00
Oct. 29	Travel expenses (H.Figueras' family)	284	125.00
Oct. 29	Havana-Miami (Mrs. Sordo and son)	286	105.26
Oct. 29	Washington (Juan Sordo)	287	56.33
Oct. 29	Central America (José M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40
			$ 2,639.11

amr

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
MAINTENANCE
"PAULA AN BOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-G"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Expenses 4 days - 9 persons (Workers Section)	85	$ 225.00
Oct. 4	Support to Mrs. R. Cisneros (Mr. Cisneros is actually in jail)	87	250.00
Oct. 8	Cash given to persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	121	3,317.27
Oct. 8	Meals and other expenses - Many houses (M.R.R.)	121	1,113.42
Oct. 11	Maintenance many persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	128	200.00
Oct. 14	Maintenance many persons as per receipt (M.R.R.)	168	342.30
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per recedpt	183	180.00
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	189	92.45
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	190	40.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mrs. Yolanda Rubio	195	75.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mr. H. Núñez	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Per diem - Clnel. Vicente León	196	10.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - Mexico	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - México (October 1 to 10)	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Paid to Mr. and Mrs. F.Díaz - México	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Oscar Pelayo - Paid	196	31.91
Oct. 18	Zenaida Palermo - Paid	196	225.00
Oct. 18	Osvaldo Coello - Paid	196	5.00
Oct. 18	Manuel M. Marcos - Paid	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Given to Mrs. Luisa Palma and children	208	200.00
Oct. 18	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	186	30.60
Oct. 12	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	135	120.24

Continue next page

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	136	$ 280.00
Oct. 26	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	251	482.00
Oct. 27	Maintenance many persons as per receipt	256	210.33
Oct. 27	Maintenance may persons as per receipt	257	20.00
Oct. 27	Maintenance of colaborating families in Cuba	261	247.10
Oct. 27	Maintenance of J.V.Crespo's family in Miami	263	150.00
Oct. 29	Hotel expenses José M. Tarafa Jr.	288	90.00
			$ 8,297.62

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-H"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Apartments 4 and 10 - 520NW 23 Ct.	168	$ 30.90
Oct. 14	Morell's house(Triple-A)	168	30.00
Oct. 14	Apartment 10 - 520 NW 23 Ct.	168	15.45
Oct. 18	Armando Díaz' house	195	150.00
Oct. 12	Raúl Amieva's house	135	65.00
Oct. 12	M. Mulet's house	135	50.00
Oct. 26	Congress Building - apt. 1105 (Sept. and Oct.)	250	310.00
Oct. 26	520 NW 23 Ct. - House	251	66.35
Oct. 26	1100 SW 3 Ave. - House	251	33.50
Oct. 27	470 NW 51 Ave.	257	80.00
Oct. 27	Yolanda Rubio's house	257	125.00
Oct. 28	1700 Biscayne Boulevard	271	300.00
			$1,256.20

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
GENERAL EXPENSES--
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-I"

	Total
OFFICE SUPPLIES:	$ 453.55
MISCELLANEOUS:	3,624.73
	$ 4,078.28

NOTE: Due to the many payments made as "General Expenses", but as no one exceeds of $350.00 the details are remited in Spanish.

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
COMMUNICATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-J"

Date		Check No.	Total
	MAIL:		
Oct. 6	Stamps	106	$ 17.56
Oct. 18	P.O. Box	195	10.50
Oct. 18	P.O. Box	196	7.50
Oct. 26	Stamps and P.O.Box	251	7.57
Oct. 27	Stamps	256	11.97
			$ 55.10
	TELEPHONE:		
Oct. 8	Telephone - Fort Lauderdale	121	$ 6.42
Oct. 14	Long distance - FR-7-3389	168	60.06
Oct. 18	Telephone - FR-3-1717	189	115.48
Oct. 12	Telephone - H.R.D.	136	9.30
Oct. 27	Telephone - FR-7-1103	256	81.95
Oct. 27	Telphone - NE-4-4416	256	14.41
Oct. 27	Telephone - FR-3-3083	256	63.80
			$ 351.42
	TELEGRAPH:		
Oct. 14	Cables to the presidents of latin american countries	164	$ 490.54
Oct. 18	Cables	195	23.53
Oct. 18	"	195	35.20
Oct. 26	"	251	32.60
			$ 581.87
			$ 988.39

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

PUBLICITY

"PAULA AND SOSA"

ANNEX "I-K"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Campaing to collect funds	142	$ 200.00
Oct. 14	Expenses in advertising distribution	168	1.73
Oct. 18	Newspapermen Meeting	180	50.00
Oct. 18	New plates for "Lucha" newspaper	190	24.00
Oct. 18	International Press Services	196	250.00
Oct. 18	1500 books for advertising	206	450.00
Oct. 26	Publicity - Workers and Studentes (Sep)	256	17.61
Oct. 26	Payment to Voice Inc.	256	150.00
Oct. 26	Stationary for publicity	250	8.00
Oct. 26	Publicity expenses - J.Valdés Crespo	263	250.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	265	732.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	266	200.00
Oct. 27	Oct. 30 Meeting (To be discount to the Publicity Committee)	267	225.00
Oct. 28	Booklets Printing	276	300.00
Oct. 28	Printing of Otero Borlaff's essays	277	150.00
Oct. 28	Leaflets Printing	278	200.00
Oct. 29	Flags - Oct. 30 Meeting (FORDC)	280	44.00
Oct. 29	Fabrics - Oct. 30 Meeting (FORDC)	281	105.00
			$ 3,357.34

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
EXPENSES OF THE MILITARY SECTION
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-L"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 26	Reinbursment Revolving Fund - Military Section	239	$ 499.51 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	240	479.10 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	241	850.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	242	709.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	243	600.00 ① ✓
Oct. 26	"	244	250.00 ① ✓
	TOTAL OF EXPENSES OF THE MILITARY SECTION		$ 3,387.61

NOTE: All the receipts were checked and returned to the Military Office.-

amr.

① Detail schedule in office

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
TRANSFERENCES
"FAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-M"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Transference to the account "Rasco and Paula", to pay the month of November to the military dependants, that by a mistake was deposited again in the account "Faula and Sosa".- See annex "I-C".	225	$ 50,000.00

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

FINANCE DEPARTMENT

MISCELLANEOUS

"PAULA AND SOSA"

October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-N"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Special mission in Washington (Carlos Piad)	165	$ 500.00
Oct. 6	Coffee	106	1.12
Oct. 14	Confidential mission (Manuel Rodríguez)	176	2,500.00
Oct. 18	Installation in Miami (Ing. F.Martínez)	179	400.00
Oct. 18	M.R.R. - Registration	184	272.42
Oct. 18	M.R.R. Expenses (As receipt signed by Mr. Jose Arriola. There are not bills or receipts to justify this amount, but it was ordered to be paid by M. Sosa)	184	1,689.14
Oct. 18	Excess in expenses on check No. 232 ("Rasco and Paula").	187	491.58
Oct. 18	F.R.D. - Registration expenses	190	276.00
Oct. 18	Advance to the Public Relation Delegation	193	40.00
Oct. 18	Expenses of a secret Messenger (F.Zayas)	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Confidential expenses (M.Massip)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Expenses of a secret messenger (F.Zayas)	195	300.00
Oct. 26	Final settlement to Dr. Justo Carrillo for expenses in a trip to México.(The amounts given in advance to Dr. Carrillo, were made through other account. In the papers presented by Dr. Carrillo is clearly expressed the manner in which he was given the amounts and how it was spent.)	246	268.79
Oct. 27	Paid to J.Prado for a ship storage	256	101.00
Oct. 27	Various expenses as per receipt (Bills were not presented)	256	609.16
Oct. 27	Installation of Mr. Arturo Artalejo	257	750.00
Oct. 27	Paid to Mr. Pimienta for broadcastings and other confidential works	257	150.00

Continue next pages

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Ocassional expenses - Vicente León	257	$ 200.00
Oct. 28	Organization of the "Frente Obrero" in Mexico	268	100.00
Oct. 29	Confidential expensee (Dr. Varona instructions)	282	125.00
			$ 8,924.21

amr.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
ADVANCES RECEIVABLES
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-O"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	A. Fernández Morell - Military Sec.	21	$ 350.00
Oct. 17	Serapio Montejo - Military Section	178	300.00
			$ 650.00

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "I-P"

Date		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona - Executive Committee House	1	$5,000.00 ✓
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís - Agent Exploitation	109	5,916.00
Oct. 7	Olga Cobo - Colombia Delegation	112	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	122	700.00 ✓
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña - Trip to N.Y.	125	238.49 ✓
Oct. 11	José I. Rasco - Trip to Central America	129	2,485.30
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz - Students Directory	169	250.00 ✓
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard - Transportation Comm.	177	6,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	194	20,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary - Publicity Committee	197	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada - Trip to New York	204	584.58 ✓
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada - Honduras Delegation	205	200.00 ✓
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña - Trip to SouthAmerica	223	4,000.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Antonio Collada - Trip to N.Y. and Wash.	227	100.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Orestes Martínez - Travelling expenses of the family from Cuba	228	424.50 ✓
Oct. 19	Frank Zayas - Trip to N.Y. - Dr.Varona	229	330.00 ✓
Oct. 19	Pascasio Lineras - Workers Meeting	231	350.00
Oct. 19	Manuel Braña Jr. - Trip to Washinton	233	75.00 ✓
Oct. 12	J.Tejera - Ship expenses - August, September and part of Octuber	135	1,000.00 ✓
Oct. 26	Abel de Varona - Publicity - Students Directory	238	68.00 ✓
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre - Publicity Committee	253	16,000.00 ✓
Oct. 27	Luis García - Purchase of a radio station in Guatemala	254	618.15 ✓
Oct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo - Travel expenses and instalation in Chile	275.	900.00 ✓
Oct. 28	Máximo Sorondo - Publicity	279	225.00 ✓
			$69,288.52

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RESUME OF THE INCOME AND EXPENSES OPERATIONS
"PAULA AND SOSA"
October 1 to 31, 1960

In the financial statements and annex the analysis and sub-analysis of each one of the income and liabilities during the month of October are shown.

Receipts, invoices, deposit slips and other papers are kept in our files.

As shown on Annex "I-D", a Revolving Fund has been created for the Military Section, amounting to the sume of $10,000.00, divided into two parts of $5,000.00 each, the amount of $3,387.81, was reinbursed to this Revolving Fund, as per Annex "I-D".

The amount of $50,000.00 which appears as "Transferences" in Annex "I-M" corresponds to the transfered amount from the account of "Paula and Sosa" to "Rasco and Paula" account.

From this amount, we have paid in advance the November payment of the military dependants.

In relation to "Checks to Justify", amounting to $69,288.52, as per - Annex "I-P", these could be classified in two groups; one formed by - those corresponding to amounts advanced accoiding to budget to the - different Committees and Delegations and the other, formed by certain expenses to be made, but specifically determined, with receipts dully signed. The later could have been distributed to those accounts within the cassification, thus eliminating them from the title "to justify", but have been kept as so, to be sure of the making of this expense for the purpose to which the checks were drown for, or its actual classification, if these expense were made for other purposes than those originally aimed to. This is due to the fact that some checks were drawn for a specific purpose; they could also have been applied to acquire some - other asset, thus appearing at the end of the month a false balance, since it would appear as an expense, what it actually is an asset.

Section designated as "Transferences" $50,000.00 is compensated with an income for the same amount, when making a transference of funds to the "Rasco and Paula" account to pay through it the payroll of the Military Dependants, but through a mistake it was deposited again in the same account.

Spanish

[redacted] B-1

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
INFORME
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Miami, Octubre 1 de 1960

Señores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democrático

Señores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente a las operaciones del mes de Octubre de 1960, a través de la cuenta "Paula and Sosa", el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I" : Estado de Ingresos y Egresos
Estado "II": Conciliación Bancaria
Anexo "I-A": Ingresos del Departamento de Finanzas
Anexo "I-B": Ingresos por Transferencias
Anexo "I-C": Otros Ingresos
Anexo "I-D": Activos
Anexo "I-E": Nómina
Anexo "I-F": Viajes
Anexo "I-G": Manutención
Anexo "I-H": Alquileres
Anexo "I-I": Gastos Generales
Anexo "I-J": Comunicación
Anexo "I-K": Propaganda
Anexo "I-L": Gastos Sector Militar
Anexo "I-M": Transferencias
Anexo "I-N": Varios
Anexo "I-O": Reintegros a Cobrar
Anexo "I-P": Cheques a Justificar
Resumen de las operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos

De Ustedes atentamente,

DEPARTAMENTO DE CONTROL

CP. Juan Paula Báez   CP. Mario Girbau

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
ESTADO DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ESTADO "I"

INGRESOS:

Anexo "I-A":	Del Departamento de Finanzas		$ 215,000.00
Anexo "I-B":	Transferencias de la Cuenta "Rasco and Paula"		15,086.33 ✓
Anexo "I-C":	Otros Ingresos		50,702.31 ✓
	TOTAL DE INGRESOS		$ 280,788.64

EGRESOS:

Anexo "I-D":	Activos	$ 18,083.52 ✓	
Anexo "I-E":	Nómina	38,665.00 ✓	
Anexo "I-F":	Viajes	2,639.11 ✓	
Anexo "I-G":	Manutención	8,297.62 ✓	
Anexo "I-H":	Alquileres	1,256.20 ✓	
Anexo "I-I":	Gastos Generales	4,078.28 ✓	
Anexo "I-J":	Comunicación	988.39 ✓	
Anexo "I-K":	Propaganda	3,357.34 ✓	
Anexo "I-L":	Gastos Sector Militar	3,387.61 ✓	
Anexo "I-M":	Transferencias	50,000.00 ✓	
Anexo "I-N":	Varios	8,924.21 ✓	
Anexo "I-O":	Reintegros a cobrar	650.00 ✓	
Anexo "I-P":	Checks a Justificar	69,288.52 ✓	209,615.80
	Total de Efectivo Disponible en Banco en 10-31-60		$ 71,172.84

NOTA: Existen además los siguientes Fondos Fijos:

Departamento de Control	$ 500.00 ✓
Sector Militar	10,000.00 ✓
Total Fondos Fijos	$10,500.00

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
CONCILIACION BANCARIA
En Octubre 31 de 1960

ESTADO "II"

Saldo según Estado del Banco (10-31-1960) $ 62,559.66

Menos: Checks girados y no cobrados:

Fecha		Check No.		Importe
Oct.	4	14	Ricardo Díaz	$ 175.00
"	4	27	Orestes Guerra	100.00
"	4	31	Enrique Huertas	500.00
"	4	40	Felipe Rodríguez	250.00
"	4	68	Jorge Rodríguez Pezos	400.00
"	4	82	Manuel Comellas	125.00
"	6	92	Luis Parajón	350.00
"	11	127	José I. Rasco	34.86
"	12	145	Alberto Muller	90.00
"	13	159	Eric Agüero	300.00
"	18	192	Nise Martín	80.00
"	18	205	Antonio Losada	200.00
"	18	206	Editorial Marymar	450.00
"	26	246	Dade Typewriter Co.	55.75
"	26	247	IBM Electric Typewriter Co. Division	485.85
"	27	254	Lasco International Inc.	618.15
"	27	260	José Sosa Jr.	12.60
"	27	261	Jorge Peña	247.10
"	27	262	Nora Fernándes	350.00
"	27	263	Jesús Valdés Crespo	600.00
"	27	265	Colonial Press of Miami, Inc.	732.00
"	27	268	Abel de Varona	100.00
"	28	269	Dade Typewriter Co.	154.58
"	28	270	Charles E. Proud	240.00
"	28	271	Abel de Varona	300.00

Continúa

ESTADO "II"

Hoja No. 2

Fecha	Check No.		Importe	
Oct. 28	272	Desk Center	$ 453.88	
" 28	274	Abel de Varona	125.00	
" 28	275	Jesús Valdés Crespo	900.00	
" 28	276	Tacuba Printing	300.00	
" 28	277	Tacuba Printing	150.00	
" 28	278	Tacuba Printing	200.00	
" 28	279	Máximo Sorondo	500.00	
" 29	280	The Flag Center	44.00	
" 29	281	Vicente Romeo	105.00	
" 29	282	Frank Zayas	125.00	
" 29	283	Manuel Cobo	117.00	
" 29	284	Humberto Figueras	375.00	
" 29	285	Nicolás Hernández	40.00	
" 29	286	José Peña	105.26	
" 29	287	Juan Sordo	126.33	
" 29	288	José M. Tarafa Jr.	726.40	
" 29	289	Armando de León S.	43.06	$ 11,386.82 ✓
Saldo en nuestros libros conciliado en 10-30-60				$ 71,172.84 ✓

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
INGRESOS DEL DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-A"

Octubre 15:	Depósito	$ 50,000.00
Octubre 17:	Depósito	56,000.00
Octubre 26:	Depósito	45,000.00
Octubre 26:	Depósito	64,000.00
TOTAL DE INGRESOS DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS		$ 215,000.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

"PAULA AND SOSA"

ANEXO "I-B"

INGRESOS POR TRANSFERENCIAS DE LA CUENTA "RASCO AND PAULA"

Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Octubre 10 - Depósito Check No. 237	$ 12,026.33
Octubre 14 - Depósito Check No. 238	3,000.00
TOTAL DE INGRESOS POR TRANSFERENCIAS	$ 15,026.33

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
OTROS INGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-C"

Octubre 17:	Reintegro Francisco Carrillo: Sobrantes de la Nómina	$ 300.00
Octubre 19:	Reintegro Juan Paula: Sobrante check No. 55 de la cuenta No. 19314 del "Banco de Comercio, S.A.", de México D.F., para sus gastos de viaje a México	78.89
Octubre 19:	Reintegro Ana Tomeu: Su asignación del mes de Septiembre	250.00
Octubre 21:	Enrique Llaca: Sobrante check No. 228 de Sept. 8 ("Rasco and Paula") por $3,800.00 para viaje a Colombia	11.50
Octubre 26:	Roberto Fernández: Sobrante check No. 91 de Agosto 8 ("Rasco and Paula") por $915.00 para la Sección Estudiantil	61.92
Octubre 27:	Paula and Sosa: Depósito que debió haberse hecho en la cuenta "Rasco and Paula", correspondiente al check No. 255 y que por error se depositó en la misma cuenta de "Paula and Sosa"	50,000.00
	TOTAL DE OTROS INGRESOS	$ 50,702.31

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
ACTIVOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-D"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	DEPOSITOS:		
Oct. 12	Fondo Electricidad Biscayne Blvd. y Calle 17	144	$ 110.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Electricidad 970 SW apt.1-2St.	195	10.00
Oct. 12	Fondo Electricidad casa R. Amieva	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Fondo Lavandería - 970 SW 2 St.	135	15.00
Oct. 27	Fondo Teléfono - Jorge A. Morán	256	50.00
			$ 205.00
	EQUIPO DE OFICINA:		
Oct. 7	Un Mimeógrafo - Comisión Planific.	117	$ 367.00
Oct. 18	Una mesa de metal - 2 sillas - 1419 Congress Building	190	50.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6718540 (Planta Radio)	235	75.00
Oct. 20	Una Máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6062299 (Planta Radio)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6960833 (Sra. Park)	236	117.50
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 6315650 (Planta Radio)	236	80.00
Oct. 20	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7212532 (Silvia Morán)	236	117.50
Oct. 26	Cinco mesas de máquina de escribir Biscayne Blvd. y 17	246	49.75
Oct. 26	Una máquina de escribir eléctrica (Comisión de Planificación)	247	485.85

Continúa en la hoja No. 2

ACTIVOS

ANEXO "I-D"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	EQUIPO DE OFICINA: (Continuación)		
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7237268-15 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	269	$ 117.50
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7705727 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	Una máquina de escribir Underwood No. 7737343 (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	270	120.00
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 4 gavetas (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	62.50
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 4 gavetas (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	49.50
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 2 gavetas - con ruedas (Biscayne Blvd y 17)	272	58.00
Oct. 28	Cuatro cestos para papeles (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	7.92
Oct. 28	Cuatro cestos plásticos (Biscayne Blvd. y 17)	272	5.96
Oct. 28	Un archivo legal - 2 gavetas y caja de seguridad	272	57.50
			$ 2,021.48
	EQUIPO RODANTE:		
Oct. 18	Un auto (Segundo Miranda)	190	$ 95.00
Oct. 18	Un auto Chevrolet - chapa No. 30-27179	196	30.00
Oct. 26	Un auto (José Nápoles: Comisión de Organización y Proselitismo)	248	300.00
Oct. 27	Un auto chapa No. 1-20439 (J. García)	256	300.00
Oct. 27	Un auto Chevrolet (Luis M. de Varona)	257	300.00
			$ 1,075.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

ACTIVOS

ANEXO "I-B"
HOJA No. 3

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS:		
Oct. 4	Un barco de 23'3'' de eslora - 2 motores - Fo. 2982 ("Piscis")	2	$3,000.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Fijo - Control	188	500.00
Oct. 18	Fondo Fijo - Militar	200	5,000.00
Oct. 26	Fondo Fijo - Militar	245	5,000.00
Oct. 27	Un radio "Blank punkt" (258 2 St)	256	69.54
Oct. 27	Dos radios (Frank Zayas)	256	500.00
Oct. 28	Cincuenta sillas de tijera (?)	272	212.50
Oct. 27	Un radio para comunicaciones	256	500.00
			$ 14,782.04
	TOTAL ACTIVOS		$ 18, 083.52

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
NOMINA
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-E"

		Check No.	Total
DELEGACIONES:			
Colombia:			
Máximo Sorondo Quintana (Pagada en Octubre la asignación correspondiente a Noviembre)		279	$ 275.00
Washington:			
Eric Agüero Montoro		114	$ 500.00
Ignacio Bustillo García		159	300.00
			$ 800.00
Miami:			
Juan G. Noriega País (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 20.00	195	
	100.00	196	
	75.00	226	
	100.00	136	
	$ 295.00		$ 295.00
Nise Martín Sierra (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 160.00	167	
	80.00	192	
	80.00	193	
	$ 320.00		320.00
			$ 615.00
New York:			
Orlando Gómez Gil		130	$ 200.00
Harry Pérez		100	250.00
Manuel Castillo		97	300.00
Enrique Abascal		93	300.00
Sergio Aparicio		95	400.00
Iradio Rodríguez		96	300.00
Juan Rodríguez Pintado		58	300.00
			$2,050.00

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 2

		Check No.	Total
DELEGACIONES: (Continuacíon)			
Key West:			
José M. Caramés Monteagudo		48	$ 200.00
México:			
Roberto de Varona Loredo		101	$ 300.00
José Caragol		105	.. 300.00
Jorge Rodríguez Fleites		115	150.00
Amaro E. Alvarez Tormes		116	200.00
			$ 950.00
Argentina:			
Angel de J. Piñera		113	$ 300.00
Perú:			
Frank Díaz Silveira (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 100.00	136	
	20.00	195	
	300.00	181	
	$ 420.00		$ 420.00
TOTAL DELEGACIONES:			$5,610.00
COMISIONES:			
Finanzas:			
Arístides Agüero Montoro		35	$ 200.00
José Arriola		76	275.00
Enrique Ros Pérez		6	475.00
			$ 950.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 3

COMISIONES: (Continuación)

	Check No.	Total
Propaganda:		
Orlando Martínez Miller	8	$ 200.00
Vicente A. Romeo Pérez	136	50.00
Humberto Estévez del Pino	57	300.00
Mario Barrera Díaz	55	300.00
Pedro Abascal Berenguer	22	300.00
Angel del Cerro Muñoz	34	300.00
Rafael Rivas Vázquez	77	225.00
José Salazar Aguilar	33	300.00
Rubén Darío Rumbaut	4	500.00
Enrique Huertas	31	500.00
		$2,975.00
Planificación:		
Néstor Carbonelle Cortina	54	$ 175.00
Enrique Llaca Orbiz	51	275.00
Bernardo Maristany Costales-González	138	250.00
Elio R. Alvarez López	111	400.00
Syla Cuervo	198	225.00
Armando de León Sotolongo	53	275.00
Guillermo A. Belt Martínez Viademonte	163	250.00
Pedro Martínez Fraga	52	400.00
Alberto García Navarro	10	150.00
Luis Espíndola Palacios	123	200.00
Pedro S. Peñaranda Díaz	162	300.00
Manuel de J. Mencía Gómez	60	400.00
Ambrosio González del Valle	70	475.00
Jorge Salazar Carrillo	39	350.00
		$ 4,125.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 4

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 4

	Check No.	Total
COMISIONES: (Continuación)		
Transporte:		
Armando Vázquez Almagro	16	$ 200.00
Información e Inteligencia:		
Ramiro Fernández-Moris Fernández	230	$ 200.00
Jorge Roque Castro	220	125.00
Paulino Pérez Blanco	210	125.00
		$ 450.00
Organización y Proselitismo:		
Jesús Miranda Hernández	133	$ 150.00
Heriberto Corona Menéndez	104	175.00
Abel de Varona Loredo	47	175.00
Adrián Vidal Aznares	18	225.00
Pedro Montiel Zapirain	137	250.00
Rafael Galis Menéndez	17	225.00
José Millán Velasco	13	225.00
Enrique Villarreal Concepción	7	350.00
Luis Bueno Ramsden	72	450.00
Roberto Varona García	101	400.00
Claudio González Morales	43	90.00
Pedro Pablo Bermúdez P.	134	190.00
		$ 2,905.00
Comunicaciones:		
Francisco A. Zayas González	44	$ 300.00
Fernando Trespalacios	24	275.00
Gustavo Cuervo Fernández	11	175.00
Ubaldo Arteaga	78	150.00
Hildebrand Díaz Rojas	74	250.00
		$ 1,150.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 5

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 5

		Check No.	Total
COMISIONES: (Continuación)			
Relaciones Públicas:			
Tomás Durán Quevedo		9	$ 200.00
Antonio González Mora		75	275.00
			$ 475.00
TOTAL COMISIONES:			$ 13,230.00
OTROS:			
Coordinador General:			
Jorge A. Morán Lamadrid		196	$ 300.00
Luis Morales Ortega	$ 150.00	102	
	10.00	195	
	$ 160.00		160.00
			$ 460.00
Coordinador Auxiliar:			
Teresa de Jesús Oti Montaner		107	$ 200.00
Mantenimiento Oficina Central:			
Tomás Vázquez Casanova	$ 50.00	196	
	60.00	212	
	90.00	42	
	$ 200.00		$ 200.00
René Díaz Escobar	$ 32.00	195	
	48.00	215	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		90.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 6

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 6

		Check No.	Total
OTROS: (Continuacion)			
Mantonimiento Oficina Central: (Cont.)			
Luis Hernández Melis	$ 20.00	195	
	60.00	214	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		$ 90.00
Hilario Caballero	$ 32.00	195	
	48.00	213	
	10.00	216	
	$ 90.00		90.00
Ana Villarreal		25	200.00
Ricardo Cabrera		45	125.00
			$ 795.00
Sector Militar:			
Manuel Guillot		84	$ 125.00
Sector Económico:			
Adel Tomás Sotolongo Ramos		12	$ 200.00
Secretaría de Actas y Correspondencia:			
Rfael Resende Vigoa		15	$ 150.00
Inmigración:			
Israel Algaze Maya		196	$ 150.00
Prensa:			
Yolanda Rubio García		195	$ 125.00
Mario Rodríguez Gómez	$ 10.00	195	
	125.00	201	
	$ 135.00		135.00
			$ 260.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 7

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 7

		Check No.	Total
OTROS: (Continuación)			
Funciones Especiales:			
José Manuel Sánchez Navarro		32	$ 325.00
Francisco M. Carrillo Masvidal		94	400.00
María Antonia Mesa Lecourt		19	250.00
Jesús M. Marinas Alvarez		46	175.00
Manuel Rodríguez Fleitas		196	300.00
Osvaldo Aguirre Noy		29	100.00
			$1,550.00
Departamento de Control:			
Juan Paula Báez		90	$ 400.00
Mario Girbau García		88	250.00
Ana Matilde Rodríguez Rodríguez		89	200.00
			$ 850.00
Federación Estudiantil Universitaria:			
Orestes Guerra Cué		27	$ 100.00
Directorio Estudiantil:			
Jorge Más Casanova		26	$ 100.00
María Teresa Valdés Hurtado		151	90.00
Adi Pino Pérez		152	90.00
Oscar Cerallo Mayo	$ 50.00	195	
	90.00	173	
	$ 140.00		140.00
Alejandro Portes	$ 90.00	171	
	125.00	33	
	$ 215.00		215.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 8

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 8

OTROS: (Continuación)

Directorio Estudiantil: (Cont.)

		Check No.	Total
Tulio Díaz S.		172	$ 90.00
Manuel Salvat Roque		153	90.00
Abel de Varona Juárez		80	200.00
Zoila Díaz Carvajal		170	90.00
Ernesto Fernández Travieso		146	90.00
			$1,195.00

Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático:

		Check No.	Total
Felipe Alonso Ortega		56	$ 175.00
Raúl Suárez Quiñones		155	125.00
Fernando Puig (Sept. y Oct.)		91	450.00
Mario Massip Macique		110	250.00
Elsa Liantaud Martínez		221	125.00
José Antonio Hernández		126	125.00
Armando González Hernández		157	125.00
Raúl J. Amieva Betancourt		120	225.00
José J. Revilla Sánchez		220	125.00
Eric Garcés Hernández	$ 125.00	195	
	100.00	196	
	125.00	124	
	$ 350.00		350.00
Manuel Alonso Ortega		160	125.00
José Morell Hernández		132	175.00
Enrique Oviedo		219	125.00
Rafael Delgado Pérez		222	125.00
Alberto M. Gómez Quesada		158	125.00
Rafael Otero Borlaff		234	150.00
Mario Fontela Alfonso		156	125.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 9

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 9

OTROS: (Continuación)		Check No.	Total
Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático: (Cont.)			
Pascasio Linera López (Sept. y Oct.)	$500.00	108	
(Giro a N.Y.)	100.00	196	
	$600.00		$ 600.00
Antonio Collada Camblor		203	250.00
Rolando Piñera Pardo		218	125.00
José M. Parapar		274	125.00
			$4,125.00
Funciones No Determinadas:			
Salvador Aldereguía		81	$ 200.00
Miguel A. Bahamonde		139	225.00
Manuel Comellas		82	125.00
Carlos Fernández		103	200.00
Julio Gutiérrez		174	40.00
Cristóbal Moré (Sept. y Oct.)	$ 80.00	191	
	80.00	193	
	160.00	166	
	$320.00		320.00
Alberto Muller ✓		145	90.00
Ceferino Pérez		147	90.00
Miguel Reigadas		98	200.00
Jorge Rodríguez Bezos		63	400.00
Guillermo Sánchez		5	500.00
Ricardo Díaz		14	175.00
Segundo Miranda		23	250.00
Benjamín Varela		28	200.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 10

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 10

OTROS: (Continuación)

Funciones No Determinadas: (Cont.)

	Check No.	Total
Roberto Fernández	30	$ 90.00
Augusto Martín	36	200.00
Felipe Rodríguez	40	250.00
Mario Riverón	41	225.00
Crosmán Figueras	216	10.00
Angel López Borges	59	400.00
Manuél Hernández	71	500.00
María J. Riera	69	300.00
Dulce Torres	79	150.00
Luis Parajón	92	350.00
Fernando Melo	99	250.00
Alberto Gutiérrez	140	275.00
Jorge Alonso Pujol ✓	196	300.00
Ramón González Quevedo (Sept. y Oct.)	196	400.00
Raúl Braña ✓	196	100.00
Aurea Faggio	196	100.00
Enrique Ruiz Williams	199	175.00
Clara Park Pessino	207	200.00
Manolín García	209	150.00
José Nápoles	237	225.00
Jesús Valdés Crespo (Pagado en Noviembre - asignación de Octubre)	263	200.00
Leopoldo Morffi	61	250.00
Mario Jordán	62	250.00
Pedro Leyva	63	300.00
Orlando García	64	300.00
Armando Pérez Torron	65	250.00
Juan Vidal	66	200.00
Jorge Vidal	67	250.00
		$9,665.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 11

NOMINA

ANEXO "I-E"
Hoja No. 11

	Check No.	Total
TOTAL OTROS:		$ 19,825.00
TOTAL NOMINA DE OCTUBRE:		$ 38,665.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA ANE SOSA"
RESUMEN DE LA [illegible]
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

		Total
DELEGACIONES:		
Colombia	$ 275.00	
Washington	800.00	
Miami	615.00	
New York	2,050.00	
Key West	200.00	
México	950.00 (NO)	
Argentina	300.00	
Perú	420.00	$5,610.00
COMISIONES:		
Finanzas	$ 950.00	
Propaganda	2,975.00	
Planificación	4,125.00	
Transporte	200.00	
Información e Inteligencia	450.00	
Organización y Proselitismo	2,905.00	
Comunicaciones	1,150.00	
Relaciones Públicas	475.00	13,230.00
OTROS:		
Coordinador General	$ 460.00	
Coordinador Auxiliar	200.00	
Mantenimiento Oficina Central	795.00	
Sector Militar	125.00	
Sector Económico	200.00	
Secretaría de Actas y Correspondencia	150.00	
Inmigración	150.00	

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

RESUMEN DE LA NOMINA

Hoja No. 2

OTROS: (Continuación)		Total
Prensa	$ 260.00	
Funciones Especiales	1,550.00	
Departamento de Control	850.00	
Federación Estudiantil Universitaria	100.00	
Directorio Estudiantil	1,195.00	
Frente Obrero Revolucionario Democrático	4,125.00	
Funciones No Determinadas	9,665.00	$19,825.00
TOTAL NOMINA		$38,665.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AID SOSA"
VIAJES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-F"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	VARIOS:		
Oct. 4	Pasaje N.Y. - Miami (9 miembros Comisión Obrera)	85	$ 485.10
Oct. 4	Pasaje N.Y. - Miami (una persona-Confidencial)	86	90.00
Oct. 14	Viaje J.A.Hernández -(Dirigente Obrero)	168	3.00
Oct. 18	Viaje al Perú (Frank Díaz Silveira)	181	370.00
Oct. 18	Viaje Cayo Hueso y Cuba (Sra. Trespalacios)	189	40.00
Oct. 18	Viaje a N.Y. (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Viaje Habana-Miami (Mario Massip)	195	48.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje N.Y. (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje N.Y. (Juan Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Pasaje Miami-Habana (H. Mederos)	196	50.00
Oct. 12	Viaje a Tampa (Varona y Redondo)	136	78.22
Oct. 26	Viaje avión - Héctor Cruz	251	25.00
Oct. 26	Gastos de viaje - Héctor Cruz	251	25.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Emilio Díaz desde New York	256	45.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (esposa e hijos de Humberto Figueras)	257	125.00
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (esposa e hijos de Tomás Vázquez)	259	64.80
Oct. 29	Viaje a New York (Manuel Cobo)	283	117.00
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje familia (H. Figueras)	284	125.00
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje Sra. Sordo e hijo (Cuba-Miami)	286	105.26
Oct. 29	Viaje a Washington (Juan Sordo)	287	56.33
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje a Centro-América (José M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40
	TOTAL DE VIAJES		$ 2,639.11

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
MANUTENCION
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-G"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Gastos 4 días - 9 personas (Comisión Corera)	85	$ 225.00
Oct. 4	Ayuda a esposa de R. Cisneros (Actualmente preso)	87	250.00
Oct. 8	Efectivo entregado a personas según recibos (M.R.R.)	121	3,317.27
Oct. 8	Comidas y otros gastos de varias casas (M.R.R.)	121	1,113.42
Oct. 11	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes (M.D.R.)	128	200.00
Oct. 14	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes (M.D.R.)	168	342.30
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	183	180.00
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	189	92.45
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	190	40.00
Oct. 18	Entregado a la Sra. Yolanda Rubio	195	75.00
Oct. 18	Entregado al Sr. H. Núñez	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Dietas Cmdte. Vicente León	196	10.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México (1 al 10 de Octubre)	196	80.00
Oct. 18	Pago F. Díaz y Sra. - Asilados México	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Oscar Pelayo - Pago	196	31.91
Oct. 13	Zenaida Palermo - Pago	196	225.00
Oct. 18	Osvaldo Coello - Pago	196	5.00
Oct. 18	Manuel M. Marcos - Pago	196	50.00
Oct. 18	Entregado a la Sra. Luisa Palma y sus hijos	208	200.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

MANUTENCION

ANEXO "I-G"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 18	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	186	$ 30.60
Oct. 12	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	135	120.24
Oct. 12	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	136	280.00
Oct. 26	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	251	482.00
Oct. 27	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	256	210.33
Oct. 27	Manutención varias personas según comprobantes	257	20.00
Oct. 27	Manutención familias colaboradoras en Cuba	261	247.10
Oct. 27	Manutención familia J.V.Crespo en Miami	263	150.00
Oct. 29	Gastos hotel José M. Tarafa Jr.	288	90.00
	TOTAL MANUTENCION		$ 2,297.62

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"FAULA AND SOSA"
ALQUILERES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-H"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Alquiler aptos. 4 y 10 - 520NW 23 Court	168	$ 30.90
Oct. 14	Alquiler casa Morell (Triple-A)	168	30.00
Oct. 14	Alquiler apto. 10 - 520 NW 23 Ct.	168	15.45
Oct. 18	Alquiler casa Armando Díaz	195	150.00
Oct. 12	Alquiler casa Raúl Amieva	135	65.00
Oct. 12	Alquiler casa M. Mulet	135	50.00
Oct. 26	Alquiler Oficina Congress Building No. 1105 (Sept. y Oct.)	250	310.00
Oct. 26	Alquiler casa 520 NW 23 Ct.	251	66.35
Oct. 26	Alquiler casa 1100 SW 3rd. Ave	251	33.50
Oct. 27	Alquiler casa 470 NW 51 Ave.	257	80.00
Oct. 27	Alquiler casa Yolanda Rubio	257	125.00
Oct. 28	Alquiler casa Biscayne Blvd. y 17	271	300.00
	TOTAL ALQUILERES		$ 1,256.20

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA [illegible]"
GASTOS GENERALES-
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-I"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	EFECTOS DE ESCRITORIO:		
Oct. 6	Varios	106	$ 74.28
Oct. 12	"	141	97.34
Oct. 14	"	168	11.63
Oct. 18	"	185	36.05
Oct. 18	"	195	11.49
Oct. 18	"	196	40.23
Oct. 18	"	236	33.79
Oct. 26	"	246	6.00
Oct. 26	"	251	24.84
Oct. 27	"	256	80.82
Oct. 28	"	269	37.08
			$ 453.55
	OTROS:		
Oct. 7	Papel Periódico "Lucha"	119	$ 227.55
Oct. 8	Lavado de ropa, flete de libros, gastos de autos	121	266.94
Oct. 11	Reintegro a Rasco por exceso en check No. 109	127	34.86
Oct. 12	Gastos gasolina J.M.Sánchez	154	61.00
Oct. 13	Trabajos Taqui-Mecanógrafo	161	150.00
Oct. 14	Varios Gastos Menores	168	23.24
Oct. 18	Edward Lustgarten - Traducciones	182	28.24
Oct. 18	Varios gastos - Delegación Miami	186	20.00
Oct. 18	Copias fotostáticas y otros	190	9.29

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

GASTOS GENERALES

ANEXO "I-F"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS: (Continuación)		
Oct. 18	Servicios especiales - Vicente León	195	$ 50.00
Oct. 18	Gastos de un mensajero	195	135.00
Oct. 18	Electricidad - 270 SW 2nd. St.	195	1.23
Oct. 18	Arreglos servicios oficina	195	5.90
Oct. 18	Reintegro - Ricardo Cabrera	195	64.50
Oct. 18	Conectar bebedero	195	2.01
Oct. 18	Iguala - Dr. Carlos B. Fernández	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Geberto Molina - Asignación	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Adquisición - Tomacorrientes	195	0.66
Oct. 18	Reparación Aire Acondicionado	195	36.50
Oct. 18	Pago por estudios para grabaciones	195	150.00
Oct. 18	Atención de un barco en Miami	196	140.00
Oct. 18	Servicios de Vicente Romero	196	150.00
Oct. 18	Entregado al Dr. Algaze	196	25.00
Oct. 18	Fotografías	196	51.60
Oct. 18	Gastos Junta del Frente	196	200.35
Oct. 18	Compra de periódicos	196	15.00
Oct. 18	Colección de mapas para la Marina	196	70.00
Oct. 18	Traslado barco Cayo Hueso-Miami	196	40.00
Oct. 18	Traslado hijo de Collada desde Cuba	196	45.00
Oct. 18	Gastos autos y parqueos en gestiones del Frente	196	20.00
Oct. 12	Una goma de auto - Frank Zayas	135	20.00
Oct. 12	Multa R. Díaz - Auto del Frente	135	25.00
Oct. 12	Gasolina - Auto Estudiantes	135	6.86
Oct. 12	Dos gomas y tres cámaras - Auto Frank Zayas	135	51.28
Oct. 12	Lavado de ropa - Casa Abogados	135	3.30
Oct. 12	Diligencias asuntos secretos	135	35.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

GASTOS GENERALES

ANEXO "I-I"
Hoja No. 3

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	OTROS: (Continuación)		
Oct. 12	Gastos Ejecutivo - Motel	136	$ 47.45
Oct. 12	Gastos Hotel - Sra. Jorge Vega	136	26.35
Oct. 26	Reparación máquina de escribir	251	36.50
Oct. 26	Duplicado llaves	251	2.79
Oct. 26	Gastos Comisión de Organización	251	20.00
Oct. 26	Gastos de visas - J. Miranda	251	10.00
Oct. 26	Gastos autos - J.I.Rasco	251	46.00
Oct. 26	Gastos Deleg. Organ. Miami	251	10.00
Oct. 27	Gastos tripulantes barco "Mari"	256	70.61
Oct. 27	Gastos de gasolina	256	20.39
Oct. 27	Compra de gomas para autos	256	26.45
Oct. 27	Compra de pestillos y tornillos	256	1.76
Oct. 27	Lavado de ropa	256	3.30
Oct. 27	Efectos de ferretería	256	29.33
Oct. 27	Arreglos eléctricos	256	38.00
Oct. 27	Varios gastos menores	256	4.83
Oct. 27	Iguala Carlos B. Fernández (Oct. 22 Nov. 22)	258	100.00
Oct. 27	Dos visas (Tulio Díaz y A. de Varona)	260	12.60
Oct. 27	Instalación de Miami - Nora Fernández	262	350.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - H. Figueras	284	250.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - N. Hernández	285	40.00
Oct. 29	Instalación en Miami - J. Sordo	287	70.00
Oct. 29	Gastos gasolina - Com. Planificación	289	43.06
			$ 3,624.73
	TOTAL GASTOS GENERALES		$ 4,078.28

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
COMUNICACION
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-J"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
	CORREO:		
Oct. 6	Sellos	106	$ 17.56
Oct. 18	Apartado de Correos	195	10.50
Oct. 18	Apartado de Correos	196	7.50
Oct. 26	Sellos y Apartado de Correos	251	7.57
Oct. 27	Sellos	256	11.97
			$ 55.10
	TELEFONO:		
Oct. 8	Teléfono - Fort Lauderdale	121	$ 6.42
Oct. 14	Larga distancia - Telf. Fr-7-3389	168	60.06
Oct. 18	Teléfono Fr-3-1717	189	115.48
Oct. 12	Teléfono F.R.D.	136	9.30
Oct. 27	Teléfono Fr-7-1103	256	81.95
Oct. 27	Teléfono Re-4-4416	256	14.41
Oct. 27	Teléfono Fr-3-3083	256	63.80
			$ 351.42
	TELEGRAFO:		
Oct. 14	Cables a Presidentes de América Latina	164	$ 490.54
Oct. 18	Cables Varios	195	23.53
Oct. 18	Cables Varios	195	35.20
Oct. 26	Cables Varios	251	32.60
			$ 581.87
	TOTAL COMUNICACION		$ 988.39

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA ALD SOSA"
PROPAGANDA
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-K"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 12	Campaña para recolectar fondos	142	$ 200.00
Oct. 14	Envío de propaganda	168	1.73
Oct. 18	Acto de los Periodistas	180	50.00
Oct. 18	Nuevas placas Periódico "Lucha"	190	24.00
Oct. 18	Servicios Prensa Internacional	196	250.00
Oct. 18	1500 libros de propaganda	206	450.00
Oct. 26	Propaganda obreros y estudiantes (Sep.)	256	17.61
Oct. 26	Pago a la Voice Inc.	256	150.00
Oct. 26	Cartulinas para propaganda	250	8.00
Oct. 27	Gastos propaganda - J.Valdés Crespo	263	250.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	265	732.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	266	200.00
Oct. 27	Acto Oct. 30 (A descontar del Presupuesto de la Com. de Propaganda)	267	225.00
Oct. 28	Impresión Folletos	276	300.00
Oct. 28	Impresión trabajos de Otero Borlaff	277	150.00
Oct. 28	Impresión Volantes	278	200.00
Oct. 29	Banderas Acto Domingo 30 (FORDC)	280	44.00
Oct. 29	Telas Acto Domingo 30 (FORDC)	281	105.00
	TOTAL PROPAGANDA		$ 3,357.34

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
GASTOS SECTOR MILITAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-L"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 26	Reintegro Fondo Fijo - Sector Militar	239	$ 499.51
Oct. 26	"	240	479.10
Oct. 26	"	241	850.00
Oct. 26	"	242	709.00
Oct. 26	"	243	600.00
Oct. 26	"	244	250.00
	TOTAL DE GASTOS SECTOR MILITAR		$ 3,387.61

NOTA: Todos los comprobantes fueron revisados y devueltos a la Oficina Militar.

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
TRANSFERENCIAS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-M"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Transferencia a la cuenta "Rasco and Paula" para pagar a los familiares de los militares la asignación del mes de Noviembre y que por error se volvió a depositar en la cuanta de "Paula and Sosa".- Véase Anexo "I-C".	255	$50,000.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
VARIOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-N"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 14	Misión especial en Washington (Carlos Piad)	165	$ 500.00
Oct. 6	Gastos de café	106	1.12
Oct. 14	Misión Confidencial (Manuel Rodríguez)	176	2,500.00
Oct. 18	Instalación en Miami (Ing. F. Martínez)	179	400.00
Oct. 18	Legalización M.R.R.	184	272.42
Oct. 18	Gastos del M.R.R. (Según recibo firmado por el Sr. José Arriola, pero sin comprobantes justificativos, ordenado su pago por el Sr. José Sosa Jr.)	184	1,689.14
Oct. 18	Exceso gastos Sr. Joaquín Sanjenís, sobre el check No. 232 de "Rasco and Paula", debidamente justificados	187	491.58
Oct. 18	Gastos inscripción F.R.D.	190	276.00
Oct. 18	Anticipo Presupuesto Delegación de Relaciones Públicas	193	40.00
Oct. 18	Gastos emisario secreto (F. Zayas)	195	100.00
Oct. 18	Gastos confidenciales (M.Massip)	195	50.00
Oct. 18	Gastos mensajero secreto (F.Zayas)	195	300.00
Oct. 26	Liquidación gastos ocasionados viaje a México Dr. Justo Carrillo (Las cantidades anticipadas al Dr. Carrillo no fueron hechas a través de esta cuenta. En la documentación presentada por el Dr. Carrillo está claramente expuesta la forma en que recibió las cantidades y cómo se verificaron los egresos)	246	268.79
Oct. 27	Pago a J.Prado por storage de un barco	256	101.00
Oct. 27	Gastos varios según recibo (No se presentaron los comprobantes)	256	609.16

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

VARIOS

ANEXO "I-H"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 27	Instalación Sr. Arturo Artalejo	257	$ 750.00
Oct. 27	Pago a Pimienta por trasmisiones y trabajos secretos	257	150.00
Oct. 27	Gastos imprevistos - Vicente León	257	200.00
Oct. 28	Organización Frente Obrero en México	268	100.00
Oct. 29	Gastos Confidenciales (Instrucciones Dr. Varona)	282	125.00
	TOTAL VARIOS		$ 8,924.21

-amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
REINTEGROS A COBRAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-O"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	A. Fernández Morell - Sector Militar	21	$ 350.00
Oct. 17	Serapio Montojo - Sector Militar	178	300.00
	TOTAL REINTEGROS A COBRAR		$ 650.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"[illegible]"
CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-P"

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona - Casa Ejecutivo	1	$ 5,000.00
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís - Com. Información e Inteligencia	109	5,916.00
Oct. 7	Olga Cabo - Delegación de Colombia	112	1,000.00
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre - Com. de Propaganda	122	700.00
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña - Viaje a New York	125	238.49
Oct. 11	José I. Rasco - Viaje América Central	129	2,485.30
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz - Directorio Estudiantil Rev.	169	250.00
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bostard - Com. Transporte	177	6,000.00
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre - Com. de Propaganda	194	20,000.00
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary - Com. de Propaganda	197	1,000.00
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada - Viaje a New York	204	584.58
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada - Delegación Honduras	205	200.00
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña - Viaje a Suramérica	223	4,000.00
Oct. 19	Antonio Collada - Viaje N.Y. y Wash.	227	100.00
Oct. 19	Orestes Martínez - Traslado familiares desde Cuba	228	424.50
Oct. 19	Viaje Varona a New York - Frank Zayas	229	330.00
Oct. 19	Pascasio Lineras - Acto Sección Obrera	231	350.00
Oct. 19	Manuel Braña Jr. - Viaje a Washington	233	75.00
Oct. 12	J.Tejera - Gastos barco - Agosto, Septiembre y parte de Octubre	135	1,000.00
Oct. 26	Abel de Varona - Propaganda Directorio Estudiantil	238	68.00
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre - Comisión Propaganda	253	10,000.00
Oct. 27	Luis García - Adquisición Planta Radio Guatemala	254	518.15

Continúa en la hoja No. 2

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR

ANEXO "I-P"
Hoja No. 2

Fecha		Check No.	Total
Oct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo - Traslado e instalación en Chile	275	$ 900.00
Oct. 28	Máximo Sorondo - Propaganda a justificar	279	225.00
	TOTAL CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR		$69,288.52

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 4	Abel de Varona-Casa Ejecutivo	1	$5,000.00	$5,000.00					
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís-Com. Información e Inteligencia	109	5,916.00		$ 5,916.00				
Oct. 7	Olga Cabo-Delegación Colombia	112	1,000.00			$ 1,000.00			
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	122	700.00		700.00				
Oct. 11	Ricardo Sardiña-Viaje a N.Y.	125	238.49				$ 238.49		
Oct. 11	J.I.Rasco-Viaje América Central	129	2,485.30				2,485.30		
Oct. 14	Tulio Díaz-Direc. Estudiantil	169	250.00					$ 250.00	
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard-Com.Transporte	177	6,000.00		6,000.00				
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	194	20,000.00		20,000.00				
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary-Com. Propaganda	197	1,000.00		1,000.00				
Oct. 18	Antonio Collada-Viaje a N.Y.	204	584.58				584.58		
Oct. 18	Antonio Losada-Del. Honduras	205	200.00			200.00			
Oct. 18	José Arriola - M.R.R.	217	1,823.50	1,823.50					
Oct. 18	Ricardo Sardiña-Viaje Suramérica	223	4,000.00				4,000.00		
Oct. 19	A.Collada-Viaje N.Y. y Washington	227	100.00				100.00		
Oct. 19	C.Martínez-Traslado familiares de Cuba	228	424.50	424.50					
Oct. 19	Frank Zayas-Viaje Varona N.Y.	229	330.00				330.00		
Oct. 19	Pascasio Linera-Acto Obrero Oct. 30	231	350.00						$ 350.00

Continúa en la Hoja No. 2

DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR"

Hoja No. 2

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 17	Manuel Trama-Viaje Washington	233	$ 75.00				$ 75.00		
Oct. 12	J.Tejera-Gastos barco-Agosto, Septiembre y Octubre	135	1,000.00	$1,000.00					
Oct. 20	Abel de Varona Jr.-Propaganda	238	68.00						$ 68.00
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre-Com. Propaganda	253	16,000.00		$16,000.00				
Oct. 27	Luis García-Compra Planta de Radio - Guatemala	254	618.15	618.15					
Oct. 28	Jesús Valdés Crespo-Del. Chile	275	900.00			$ 900.00			
Oct. 28	M.Sorondo-Propaganda	279	225.00						225.00
			$69,288.52	$8,866.15	$49,616.00	$ 2,100.00	$7,813.37	$ 250.00	$ 643.00

OTROS EGRESOS A JUSTIFICAR:

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 27	De Propaganda: J.Valdés Crespo	263	$ 250.00						$ 250.00
	De "Viajes":								
Oct. 4	Pasaje N.Y.-Miami (9 obreros)	85	485.10				$ 485.10		
Oct. 18	Viaje al Perú (F.Díaz Silveira)	181	370.00				370.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje Cayo Hueso y Cuba (Sra. Trespalacios)	189	40.00				40.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje a N.Y. (Delfín Iñiguez)	195	50.00				50.00		

Continúa en la Hoja No. 3

DISTRIBUCION POR CONCEPTO DE "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR"

Hoja No. 3

Fecha	Detalle	Check Nro.-	Total	-Varios-	Comisiones	Delegaciones	-Viajes-	Directorio Estudiantil	Propaganda
Oct. 18	Viaje Habana-Miami (M.Massip)	195	$ 48.00				$ 48.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje N.Y. (Pedro Núñez)	196	60.00				60.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje N.Y. (J.Rodríguez Pintado)	196	40.00				40.00		
Oct. 18	Viaje Miami-Habana (H.Mederos)	196	50.00				50.00		
Oct. 12	Viaje Tampa (Varona-Redondo)	136	78.22				78.22		
Oct. 26	Viaje Avión (H. Cruz)	251	25.00				25.00		
Oct. 26	Gastos de viaje (H. Cruz)	251	25.00				25.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje de N.Y. (Emilio Díaz)	256	45.00				45.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (Esposa e hijos Dr. Figueras)	257	125.00				125.00		
Oct. 27	Viaje Habana-Miami (Esposa e hijo Tomás Vázquez)	259	64.30				64.80		
Oct. 29	Viaje a N.Y. (Manuel Cobo)	233	117.00				117.00		
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje (Familia H. Figueras)	284	125.00				125.00		
Oct. 29	Gastos de viaje Habana-Miami (Sra. Sordo e hijo)	286	105.26				105.26		
Oct. 29	Viaje a Washington (J.Sordo)	287	56.33				56.33		
Oct. 29	Viaje a Centroamérica (J.M. Tarafa Jr.)	288	636.40				636.40		
			$2,796.11	-.-	-.-	-.-	$2,546.11	-.-	$ 250.00
	TOTAL A JUSTIFICAR		$72,084.63	$8,866.15	$49,616.00	$ 2,100.00	$10,359.48	$ 250.00	$ 893.00

amr.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
SUB-ANALISIS DE COMISIONES
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

Fecha		Check Nro.-	Total	Comisión de Información e Inteligencia	Comisión de Propaganda-	Comisión de Transportes
Oct. 7	Joaquín Sanjenís	109	$ 5,916.00	$ 5,916.00	$	$
Oct. 8	Abel Mestre	122	700.00		700.00	
Oct. 17	Bartolomé Bestard	177	6,000.00			6,000.00
Oct. 18	Abel Mestre	194	20,000.00		20,000.00	
Oct. 18	Raúl Soulary	197	1,000.00		1,000.00	
Oct. 27	Abel Mestre	253	16,000.00		16,000.00	
			$ 49,616.00	$ 5,916.00	$ 37,700.00	$ 6,000.00

NOTA: Se han gastado además, por concepto de "Propaganda", en exceso - de lo entregado a la Comisión de Propaganda $893.00 — $ 893.00

Lo que eleva lo gastado por concepto de Propaganda a — $ 38,593.00

[illegible].

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI
"PAULA AND SOSA"
RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS
Octubre 1 al 31 de 1960

En los Estados y Anexos que se adjuntan aparecen los análisis y sub--- análisis de cada una de las partidas de ingresos y egresos habidas durante el mes de Octubre de 1960.

Los recibos, facturas, hojas de depósitos y demás comprobantes justificativos de las operaciones del mes, obran en nuestro poder.

Como podrá observarse en el Anexo "I-D" se ha creado un -Fondo Fijo- - para el Sector Militar, ascendente a $10,000.00 (en dos partidas de - $5,000.00), habiéndose procedido a reintegrar a dicho Fondo Fijo, durante el mes de Octubre, la cantidad de $3,387.61, según puede verse en - el Anexo "I-L".

La partida de $50,000.00 que aparece como "TRANSFERENCIAS" en el Anexo "I-M", corresponde a la cantidad transferida de la cuenta "PAULA AND - SOSA" a la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA", a través de la cual se ha pagado- la asignación adelantada del mes de Noviembre de los familiares de los hombres que se encuentran en el Campo.

En relación con los "CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR", que importan $69,288.52, según Anexo "I-P", los mismos pudieran clasificarse en dos grupos: uno - formado por aquellos que corresponden a cantidades adelantadas de acuerdo con presupuestos a las distintas Comisiones o Delegaciones, y otro- que lo integran algunas partidas consignadas a un tipo de gasto a realizar, pero específicamente determinado, con sus correspondientes recibos debidamente firmados. Estos últimos pudieron haberse distribuído- a las cuentas que responden dentro de la clasificación, con lo que hubieran sido eliminados del concepto "A JUSTIFICAR", pero se han mantenido como tales, a los efectos de tener la seguridad de la realización del gasto para el concepto que fueron extendidos los checks, o su verdadera clasificación si esas cantidades fueron utilizadas en erogaciones distintas a aquellas para que fueron originalmente consignadas. Esto es debido a que algunos checks extendidos para un concepto determinado, pudieran, inclusive, aplicarse a la adquisición de algún activo, con lo cual aparecería en la fecha de cierre del mes, un balance que no sería fiel a la verdad, pues aparecería como un gasto, lo que en realidad es un activo.

La partida denominada "TRANSFERENCIAS" ($50,000.00) está compensada con un ingreso por la misma cantidad, y se originó al querer hacerse una transferencia de fondos a la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA", para pagar a través de ella la nómina de asistencia social, pero por error se hizo el depósito del check No. 255 por $50,000.00 en la misma cuenta de "PAULA AND SOSA".

amr.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

December 1 to 31, 1960

Bank Balance as per Statement $ 84,119.48

Less: Drawn checks not paid by the Bank:

Check No.	
416	$ 275.00
592	100.00
1018	175.00
1092	175.00
1161	225.00
1230	175.00
1247	275.00
1282	250.00
1297	100.00
1316	225.00
1317	225.00
1356	175.00
1359	100.00
1427	225.00
1433	225.00
1434	275.00
1437	225.00
1447	225.00
1469	175.00
1472	275.00
1479	225.00
1483	175.00
1491	175.00
1492	225.00
1508	175.00
1509	175.00

(Continues page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

Check No.	
1511	$ 175.00
1514	300.00
1531	54.00
1533	300.00
1534	300.00
1537	175.00
1538	175.00
1539	50.00
1543	175.00
1546	300.00
1547	250.00
1548	225.00
1549	250.00
1551	300.00
1552	175.00
1554	175.00
1568	175.00
1569	225.00
1570	225.00
1575	175.00
1576	175.00
1577	175.00
1580	50.00
1582	100.00
1583	225.00
1587	225.00
1588	250.00
1589	250.00
1590	677.10
1591	50.00
1594	175.00
1595	175.00
1596	175.00

(Continues page No.3)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

Check No.		
1597	$ 175.00	
1598	225.00	
1599	225.00	
1600	275.00	
1601	275.00	
1602	175.00	
1603	175.00	
1605	50.00	
1606	50.00	
1607	175.00	
1608	175.00	
1609	175.00	
1610	275.00	14,556.10
	TOTAL:	$69,563.38

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"RASCO AND PAULA"
STATEMENT OF EXPENSES
FROM CHECK No.1000 TO No.1610 (BOTH INCLUDED)
December 1 to 31, 1960

ANNEX "A"

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Renato Díaz Blanco	(Navy)	1000	$ 300.00
Dec.	1	René Cancio González	(Navy)	1001	220.00
Dec.	1	Nicolás Vian Ruiz	(Gen. Staff)	1002	250.00
Dec.	1	Conrado Santana Lima	(Gen. Staff)	1003	200.00
Dec.	1	Jesús Cúa González ✓	(Gen. Staff)	1004	300.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1005	-o-
Dec.	1	Mario Riverón Hernández ✓	(Gen. Staff)	1006	250.00
Dec.	1	Laureano Pino Cruz	(Gen. Staff)	1007	200.00
Dec.	1	Leovigildo Martín Elena	(Gen. Staff)	1008	200.00
Dec.	1	Eduardo Martín Elena	(Gen. Staff)	1009	400.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1010	-o-
Dec.	1	Inocente R. García Fonseca	(Gen. Staff)	1011	200.00
Dec.	1	Antonia Flores	(Gen. Staff)	1012	250.00
Dec.	1	Oscar T. Díaz Martín	(Gen. Staff)	1013	400.00
Dec.	1	Benjamín Camino Garmendía	(Gen. Staff)	1014	400.00
Dec.	1	Tomás Cabana Batista	(Gen. Staff)	1015	400.00
Dec.	1	Ana Rosa Cifontes	(Soc. Work)	1016	175.00
Dec.	1	Lourdes Fenton	) Soc. Work)	1017	250.00
Dec.	1	Margot Acosta	(Soc. Work)	1018	175.00
Dec.	1	Cupertina Rodríguez	(Soc. Work)	1019	200.00
Dec.	1	Estrella Villapol	(Soc. Work)	1020	250.00

(Continues page No.2)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.2

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Jaime Varela Canosa		(Navy)	1021	$ 300.00
Dec. 1	Alberto Sosa Chabau		(Navy)	1022	200.00
Dec. 1	José Escarce Cancio		(Navy)	1023	217.00
Dec. 1	Nora Acebo	Pedro Acebo		1024	250.00
Dec. 1	Alicia Acevedo	Oscar Acevedo		1025	175.00
Dec. 1	Raquel Moya	Nildo R. Acevedo		1026	225.00
Dec. 1	Nora Menéndez	Julio Acosta Ruiz		1027	225.00
Dec. 1	Minerva Morales	Alexis F. Aguado		1028	175.00
Dec. 1	Rita Riverón	Alberto Alberty		1029	400.00
Dec. 1	Carmen Herrera	Armando Alberty		1030	275.00
Dec. 1	Margarita Fernández	Raul A. Munguia		1031	300.00
Dec. 1	Miguel R. Vivancos	Elio Alemán		1032	250.00
Dec. 1	Ana Márquez	Antonio Alfonso		1033	225.00
Dec. 1	María Elvira Ramírez	Oscar Alfonso C.		1034	225.00
Dec. 1	Concepción Almeida	José Almeida C.		1035	175.00
Dec. 1	Eunice Alonso	Fernando Alonso		1036	175.00
Dec. 1	Carmen Serrano	Miguel Alvarez		1037	250.00
Dec. 1	Bertila León	Orlando Alvarez B.		1038	275.00
Dec. 1	Nelsy Matos	Mario Alvarez C.		1039	225.00
Dec. 1	Rafael Alvarez	Rafael Alvarez Fdez.		1040	175.00
Dec. 1	Edgardo Puttari	Nilo Alvarez M.		1041	250.00
Dec. 1	Marta Fernández	José M. Angel Pomar		1042	225.00

(Continues page No.3)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.3

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Aleida Gossa	Jesús Arias García	1043	$ 175.00
Dec.	1	Martha R. Arrazola	Orlando Arrazola R.	1044	50.00
Dec.	1	Sonia Martínez	Segundo Martínez G.	1045	250.00
Dec.	1	Rubi Avila	Pedro Avila López	1046	225.00
Dec.	1	[illegible] Luesa	Valentín L. Bacallao	1047	175.00
Dec.	1	María Teresa Gutiérrez	Eduardo Barea G.	1048	225.00
Dec.	1	Virginia Valdés	Eduardo Barreiro V.	1049	175.00
Dec.	1	María Palacios	Rodolfo Bartelemy D.	1050	225.00
Dec.	1	Nilo Batista	Mildo Batista H.	1051	175.00
Dec.	1	Mercedes Navarro	Manuel Blanco N.	1052	275.00
Dec.	1	Mirta Rodríguez	Bernardo J. Bosh R.	1053	225.00
Dec.	1	Marlene Burruezon	Daniel Burruezon A.	1054	175.00
Dec.	1	Lilian Herrera	Alfredo Caballero G.	1055	300.00
Dec.	1	Georgina Diaz	Pedro L. Cabrera A.	1056	225.00
Dec.	1	Raquel Hernández	Miguel Cano R.	1057	175.00
Dec.	1	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Cañizares	1058	225.00
Dec.	1	Antonio Carmona	Antonio G. Carmona	1059	225.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1060	-o-
Dec.	1	Carmen Suárez	Miguel Carro Suárez	1061	175.00
Dec.	1	Alicia García	Manuel Casañas S.	1062	225.00
Dec.	1	Rosalia López	Modesto Castañer L.	1063	225.00
Dec.	1	Esther Hernández	Pablo E. Castellón H.	1064	175.00
Dec.	1	Irene Zuloaga	Sergio Castellón S.	1065	325.00
Dec.	1	Celia Travieso	Fulgencio O. Castro	1066	175.00
Dec.	1	Olga Carreño	Alfonso Cereceda C.	1067	275.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.4

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Olga Carreno	Castor Cereceda C.	1068	$ 225.00
Dec.	1	Lola Deltine	Ricardo Cervera C.	1069	225.00
Dec.	1	Adelaida Jiménez	Ricardo Céspedes J.	1070	225.00
Dec.	1	Virginia Trimino	Lázaro Cires Pou	1071	175.00
Dec.	1	[illegible] . Clark	José B. Clark Sánchez	1072	225.00
Dec.	1	Aurora Mulet	Tomás Collazo Mulet	1073	225.00
Dec.	1	Iliana Fueyo	Arturo F. Comas M.	1074	175.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Núñez	Ramón Conte Hernández	1075	225.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Laca	Toribio Luis Cosme	1076	325.00
Dec.	1	Rey Guevara	Matias Faria Riesgo	1077	225.00
Dec.	1	Maria Leonor Portela	José A. Crespo G.	1078	275.00
Dec.	1	Julia Hernández	Francisco Cruz de la T.	1079	250.00
Dec.	1	Virginia González	Antonio Curbelo H.	1080	225.00
Dec.	1	Maria Ramírez	Humberto I. Chamizo	1081	175.00
Dec.	1	Flora García	Alipio M. Chávez G.	1082	225.00
Dec.	1	Silvia Castro	Manuel F. Chávez P.	1083	250.00
Dec.	1	Aurora Gómez	Odilio Chávez P.	1084	225.00
Dec.	1	Maria Inés Pérez	René Chávez P.	1085	225.00
Dec.	1	Norma Cowley	Dagoberto Darias S.	1086	250.00
Dec.	1	Berta Rodríguez	Juan M. Delgado Ch.	1087	225.00
Dec.	1	Eulalia García	Jesús Delgado G.	1088	175.00
Dec.	1	[illegible]lene Reyes	Pedro del Pino C.	1089	225.00
Dec.	1	Armando de Avila Cancio	Armando H. Díaz Avila	1090	175.00
Dec.	1	Olimpia Tobías	Santiago A. Díaz M.	1091	250.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.5

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Félix Urra	Félix D. Urra Pagés	1092	$ 175.00
Dec.	1	Victoria Carreno	José Dorta García	1093	$ 250.00
Dec.	1	Lilian Samson	Esteban Echevarría D.	1094	275.00
Dec.	1	Rosario Montero	Pedro Echegoyen de la G.	1095	275.00
Dec.	1	Lilia Fernández	Víctor Espinosa H.	1096	225.00
Dec.	1	Magaly Urruela	Marcial Facio C.	1097	300.00
Dec.	1	Gloria García	José ... Fajardo M.	1098	225.00
Dec.	1	María Santos	Jesús Couce Linares	1099	175.00
Dec.	1	Mercedes Fuentes	Elpidio M. Felizola M.	1100	250.00
Dec.	1	Hilda Valdés	Segisberto Fernández A.	1101	225.00
Dec.	1	María del Carmen Pérez	Luis Fernández Ardois	1102	300.00
Dec.	1	Edelmira Mendoza	Francisco Fernández B.	1103	325.00
Dec.	1	Zoila Colina	Ladislao Fernández A.	1104	175.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1105	-o-
Dec.	1	María Díaz	Antonio Fernández R.	1106	275.00
Dec.	1	Graciela Rovirosa	José A. Fernández R.	1107	225.00
Dec.	1	Lucía Ferra	Nabi Ferra Matá	1108	175.00
Dec.	1	Andres A. Prado	Ramón J. Ferrer	1109	275.00
Dec..	1	CANCELLED		1110	-o-
Dec.	1	Rosa María Rico López	Rolando Fuentes R.	1111	275.00
Dec.	1	Clara Zayas	Tristán García A.	1112	175.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED		1113	-o-
Dec.	1	Olga Cabrera	René García Fernández	1114	275.00
Dec.	1	Isabel Ucatorres	Benigno García L.	1115	225.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.6

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Inocente F. García Fonseca	Reinaldo A. García M.	1116	$ 225.00
Dec. 1	José Ariel Ramos	Rafael García Pujol	1117	175.00
Dec. 1	Otilia Castellana	Sergio García Puyada	1118	225.00
Dec. 1	Soledad Zayas	Francisco García Z.	1119	225.00
Dec. 1	Mirta Fort	Francisco Ginebra-G.	1120	225.00
Dec. 1	Mirta Fort	Mario Ginebra-Groero	1121	225.00
Dec. 1	Jorge Giraud	Jorge Giraud Leyva	1122	225.00
Dec. 1	Matilde Bujones	René Gómez Figuerola	1123	250.00
Dec. 1	Paulina Alcalde	Fausto Gómez Gómez	1124	225.00
Dec. 1	Gloria Betancourt	Eduardo González R.	1125	175.00
Dec. 1	C A N C E L L E D		1126	-o-
Dec. 1	Herminia Carmona	Manuel González L.	1127	175.00
Dec. 1	Delia Fernández	Tomás González Matos	1128	225.00
Dec. 1	Dolores Searle	José D. González M.	1129	150.00
Dec. 1	Celina Romero	Juan González R.	1130	225.00
Dec. 1	Aria Díaz	Manuel A. Granados B.	1131	175.00
Dec. 1	Mireya Valdés	Luis Grillo Díaz	1132	250.00
Dec. 1	Eloisa González	Luis A. Guerra G.	1133	175.00
Dec. 1	Inocente F. García Fonseca	Armando Guerra I.	1134	225.00
Dec. 1	Rosalia [illegible]	Carlos M. Hernández	1135	225.00
Dec. 1	Ernestina Núñez	Marcos D. Hernández	1136	175.00
Dec. 1	Amado Valdés	Jesús Hernández G.	1137	175.00
Dec. 1	Gloria Rodríguez	José M. Hernández H.	1138	175.00
Dec. 1	Gerónimo Hernández	Héctor Hernández R.	1139	225.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.7

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Jorge Escobar	Gonzalo Herrera C.	1140	$ 175.00
Dec.	1	Dynalma Salasquide	Mario Jiménez Rojo	1141	275.00
Dec.	1	Dulce Torres	Wilfredo Leyva E.	1142	275.00
Dec.	1	Nancy Torres	Reynaldo Lazo M.	1143	175.00
Dec.	1	Berta Junquera	Víctor Junquera V.	1144	225.00
Dec.	1	Carmen Domínguez	Angel López Domínguez	1145	175.00
Dec.	1	Nélida Grandal	Silvino López Pérez	1146	175.00
Dec.	1	Mercedes López	Armando López-Estrada	1147	175.00
Dec.	1	Marta Varela	Fernando F. López V.	1148	275.00
Dec.	1	Ernestina Guevara	Eberto R. Lorenzo M.	1149	225.00
Dec.	1	Catalina Chávez	Martín Lorica Chávez	1150	175.00
Dec.	1	Regina López	César Luaces Sotelo	1151	250.00
Dec.	1	Alfredo Llarena	Alfredo Llarena C.	1152	225.00
Dec.	1	Zaida García Horta	Ernesto Lluesma F.	1153	225.00
Dec.	1	Lutgarda Fajardo	Manuel Navarro M.	1154	225.00
Dec.	1	María del Carmen Gutiérrez	Roberto Macía V.	1155	275.00
Dec.	1	José J. Cancio Martínez	Rafael M. Madrigal	1156	275.00
Dec.	1	Julia Ledee	Orestes G. Maiz L.	1157	225.00
Dec.	1	Elena Morales	Hugo Martínez F.	1158	225.00
Dec.	1	Fe Mazón	Everardo Martínez ..	1159	175.00
Dec.	1	Delia Estrada	Emilio Martínez V.	1160	175.00
Dec.	1	Concepción Hernández	Delfín Martínez V.	1161	225.00
Dec.	1	Paula Mateo	Alfredo Mateo Sierra	1162	175.00
Dec.	1	Elsa Aguilera	Roberto Medell E.	1163	250.00

(Continues page No.8)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Carmen Cummings	Ezequiel Mederos D.	1164	$ 250.00
Dec. 1	Olga Gómez Pena	José A. Molet	1165	175.00
Dec. 1	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	1166	225.00
Dec. 1	Gladys Ugalde	José A. Morales Cruz	1167	225.00
Dec. 1	Alma de la Barrera Rubio	Luis C. Morse de la B.	1168	225.00
Dec. 1	Sonia Izzo	Lesslie Nóbregas H.	1169	275.00
Dec. 1	Ma. Dolores Souce	Eduardo A. Ojeda C.	1170	175.00
Dec. 1	Margot Hernández	Rolando Otero H.	1171	175.00
Dec. 1	Marta Suárez	Francisco Peláez V.	1172	175.00
Dec. 1	Enrique Tomeu	Héctor Pereza Sosa	1173	300.00
Dec. 1	Luis Larrauri	Edilio D. Pereira P.	1174	275.00
Dec. 1	Zaida González	Eliseo Pérez Céspedes	1175	250.00
Dec. 1	Alma Pérez	Juan E. Pérez Franco	1176	250.00
Dec. 1	Estrella M. López	Manuel de J. Pérez M.	1177	250.00
Dec. 1	Nieves Rodríguez	Antonio Abel Pérez M.	1178	225.00
Dec. 1	Fabiola Polo	José R. Pérez Menéndez	1179	250.00
Dec. 1	Dulce Ma. Padrón	Francisco Pérez Padrón	1180	225.00
Dec. 1	Ela María Martín Mesa	José Pérez San Román	1181	375.00
Dec. 1	Lidia González	Roberto Pérez San Román	1182	275.00
Dec. 1	Vivian Díaz	Osvaldo Piedra	1183	175.00
Dec. 1	María Teresa Marinas	Néstor Pino Marinas	1184	225.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1185	-0-
Dec. 1	Ofelia Altar	Eleuterio Pita Otano	1186	275.00
Dec. 1	Anolan Polanco	Faustino Polanco Sosa	1187	325.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.9

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1188	$ -0-
Dec. 1	Olga Macando	Jorge A. Irelleza del B.	1189	375.00
Dec. 1	María Morales	José Prieto Rodríguez	1190	275.00
Dec. 1	Juan Pajon	Francisco Puente García	1191	175.00
Dec. 1	Humberto Cortina	Manuel Puig Miyar	1192	300.00
Dec. 1	Manuel Pérez	Juan M. Quintana de la T.	1193	250.00
Dec. 1	Olga Perdomo	Zenaido L. Quicutis G.	1194	225.00
Dec. 1	Sara Iglesias	Hermilio D. Quintana P.	1195	175.00
Dec. 1	Ana María Quintana	Francisco Quintana U.	1196	275.00
Dec. 1	José Manuel Raffo	José A. Raffo Barrera	1197	250.00
Dec. 1	Hilda Valdés	José Ramírez Sosa	1198	225.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1199	-0-
Dec. 1	Rosa J. Ramos Justiniano	Reinaldo Ramos S.	1200	175.00
Dec. 1	Carmen García Vieta	Jorge L. Recara y G.	1201	175.00
Dec. 1	Nancy Salas Pérez	José Regalado Santana	1202	325.00
Dec. 1	Emerita Martínez	Arcadio R. Reyes M.	1203	275.00
Dec. 1	Rita García	Orlando Rodríguez A.	1204	225.00
Dec. 1	Oria Luz Rodríguez	Jacome Rodríguez G.	1205	175.00
Dec. 1	Luz Marina Herrera	Roberto Rodríguez G.	1206	225.00
Dec. 1	Manuel Rodríguez San Pedro	José Rodríguez San Pedro	1207	275.00
Dec. 1	Nicolás Kennedy	Roberto Rodríguez Crs	1208	175.00
Dec. 1	Clara L. Morales	David R. Rodríguez S.	1209	225.00
Dec. 1	Victoria Castellanos	Jorge Rojas Castellanos	1210	175.00
Dec. 1	Noemí Puchol	Ignacio Rojas González	1211	175.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.10

Date			Check No.	Total
Oct. 1	Ela María Suárez	José Rosa González	1212	$ 350.00
Oct. 1	Albertina Lujardo	Antonio Ruiz Alvarez	1213	225.00
Oct. 1	C A N C E L L E D		1214	-o-
Oct. 1	María Julia Suárez	Ramiro Sánchez M.	1215	175.00
Oct. 1	*Narcisa Quintana	Jesús B. Santana V.	1216	250.00
Oct. 1	Paula Lazo	Juan R. Santana L.	1217	250.00
Oct. 1	Delia Acuña	Vicente C. Secades L.	1218	175.00
Oct. 1	Orlando Reyes	Leonardo Seda González	1219	250.00
Oct. 1	Antonio Abeledo	Félix T. Serrano S.	1220	225.00
Oct. 1	Cristina Pizarro	Raul Solís Sariol	1221	225.00
Oct. 1	Arturo Sonville	Jorge A. Sonville L.	1222	225.00
Oct. 1	Josefina Granda	Edgar Sopo Granda	1223	175.00
Oct. 1	Sara Rios	Hugo Sueiro Rios	1224	225.00
Oct. 1	Raul Ramos Alonso	Guillermo Tabraue N.	1225	275.00
Oct. 1	Pedro Tejera	José M. Tejera S.	1226	225.00
Oct. 1	Hilda Alvarez	Mario Tellechea M.	1227	300.00
Oct. 1	Elia V. Menéndez	Martín Torres P.	1228	225.00
Oct. 1	Isabel L. Guerra	Marcos A. Torres G.	1229	175.00
Oct. 1	Alberta Torres	Juan F. Torres Mena	1230	175.00
Oct. 1	Dolores García Padrón	José E. Trinchería D.	1231	225.00
Oct. 1	Mireya Mosquera	Orlando Urra Q.	1232	225.00
Oct. 1	Isabel Usatorres	Rafael Usatorres S.	1233	175.00
Oct. 1	Silvia O'Sullivan	Fausto Valdés C.	1234	300.00
Oct. 1	María L. Hernández	Florencio F. Valdés M.	1235	225.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"

Date			Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Celeste Iradia Rodríguez	Ismael Valladares A.	1236	$ 175.00
Dec. 1	Norma V. Larchao	Joaquín Varela V.	1237	225.00
Dec. 1	Ana Roja Yanez	Agustín L. Vega E.	1238	175.00
Dec. 1	Alicia Hernández	Oscar Vega Vega	1239	250.00
Dec. 1	Vilma Palma	Raul Vianello Alakan	1240	325.00
Dec. 1	Isabel Valdés	Ernesto Venero V.	1241	175.00
Dec. 1	Sara E. Llorente	Héctor Villamar R.	1242	275.00
Dec. 1	Yolanda Díaz	José Villamar R.	1243	225.00
Dec. 1	Petrona Quintana	Jesús Villarchao Q.	1244	175.00
Dec. 1	Consuelo Fernández Maseda	Jorge Villaverde	1245	225.00
Dec. 1	Ana María Suárez	Raul Villaverde L.	1246	225.00
Dec. 1	Elia Roques	Gustavo Villoldo S.	1247	275.00
Dec. 1	Marta Vives	Manuel Vives Acosta	1248	225.00
Dec. 1	Sonia Navarrina	Pedro O. Zamora G.	1249	250.00
Dec. 1	Georgina San Pedro	Mario Zúniga	1250	300.00
Dec. 1	CANCELLED		1251	-o-
Dec. 1	Violeta Acosta	Pablo A. Ubide Díaz	1252	225.00
Dec. 1	Nora Capote	Lucio García	1253	225.00
Dec. 1	Argentina Palma	Nis Juárez Fernández	1254	325.00
Dec. 1	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	1255	225.00
Dec. 1	Bernarda Hernández	Armando Báez Hernández	1256	175.00
Dec. 1	Sara Buesa	José Bacallao Fonte	1257	225.00
Dec. 1	Arturo Lorenzo	Lorenzo Pérez Lorenzo	1258	175.00
Dec. 1	Arturo Alemán	Fernando Huergo Ruiz	1259	225.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.12

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec.	1	Amalia Cabria	Gastón Pérez		1260	$ 50.00
Dec.	1	Humberto Cortina Corrales	Humberto Cortina L.		1261	250.00
Dec.	1	Miss Jeanette Gorra	Luis Regalado		1262	100.00
Dec.	1	Miss Elena Munoz	Armando Ruiz A.		1263	175.00
Dec.	1	Manuel López Espinosa	Ernesto Abreu A.		1264	175.00
Dec.	1	Cecilia Abreu	Juan F. Abreu Horta		1265	175.00
Dec.	1	Francisco Villaverde	Rafael Villaverde L.		1266	225.00
Dec.	1	[illegible] Rodríguez	Luis E. Martínez C.		1267	225.00
Dec.	1	Maria Julia Lleo	Pedro Montero [illegible]		1268	275.00
Dec.	1	Manuel Alonso		(Soc.Work)	1269	300.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1270	-o-
Dec.	1	Cristina Gallardo		(Soc.Work)	1271	225.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1272	-o-
Dec.	1	Esther Lauzardo		(Soc.Work)	1273	250.00
Dec.	1	René de La Mar		(Soc.Work)	1274	325.00
Dec.	1	David Matos		(Soc.Work)	1275	225.00
Dec.	1	César Mena		(Soc.Work)	1276	300.00
Dec.	1	Antonio Munoz		(Soc.Work)	1277	275.00
Dec.	1	Sergio Rodríguez		(Soc.Work)	1278	275.00
Dec.	1	CANCELLED			1279	-o-
Dec.	1	[illegible] Vázquez		(Soc.Work)	1280	300.00
Dec.	1	Jorge Torres		(Soc.Work)	1281	250.00
Dec.	1	Felipe Rodríguez		(Gen.Staff)	1282	250.00
Dec.	1	Manuel González Alvarez		(Gen.Staff)	1283	250.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.13

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	María Josefa M. Teira		(Soc.Work)		1284	$ 300.00
Dec. 1	José Pardo García		(Gen.Staff)		1285	225.00
Dec. 1	Armando Rodríguez Alonso		(Navy)		1286	275.00
Dec. 1	Eduardo Franqui Posado		(Navy)		1287	275.00
Dec. 1	Enrique García Batista		(Navy)		1288	275.00
Dec. 1	Esteban Echevarría		(Navy)		1289	275.00
Dec. 1	Luis Monte Delgado		(Navy)		1290	100.00
Dec. 1	Benjamín Granados Alvarez		(Navy)		1291	112.50
Dec. 1	Julio C. Alfaro Ochoa		(Navy)		1292	216.00
Dec. 1	Agustín Carballo		(Navy)		1293	112.50
Dec. 1	Orlando Arrazola		(Navy)		1294	112.50
Dec. 1	Emilio Izquierdo		(Navy)		1295	175.00
Dec. 1	Gloria Betancourt	Osvaldo Enríquez H.			1296	275.00
Dec. 1	Evan Ricardo Bolívar	Rodolfo de J. Bolívar			1297	100.00
Dec. 1	Dulce Torres	Tomás Afont Rodríguez			1298	225.00
Dec. 1	Carlos M. Yanez		(Soc.Work)		1299	300.00
Dec. 1	Mario Martínez		(Soc.Work)		1300	175.00
Dec. 1	Victoria Fowler	Raul García Menocal F.		December	1301	175.00
Dec. 1	Elia Menéndez	Inocencio T. More I.		December	1302	175.00
Dec. 1	C A N C E L L E D				1303	-o-
Dec. 1	Juan José Delgado	Román Delgado Bello		December	1304	225.00
Dec. 1	Marta Varela	Fernando Félix López V.		Dif. Dec.	1305	50.00
Dec. 1	Marcos Zamora Moreu		(Gen,Staff)	December	1306	90.00
Dec. 1	Jesús Gómez Garrico		(Gen.Staff)	December	1307	90.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date					Check No.	Total
Dec. 1	Bárbara Hernández	Rafael Hernández H.		December	1308	$ 225.00
Dec. 1	Raúl [illegible] Medina	Pedro Rios Valdés		December	1309	225.00
Dec. 1	Elsa Alcala	Roberto C. de los Heros		December	1310	175.00
Dec. 1	José Díaz	Alberto M. Díaz F.		December	1311	225.00
Dec. 1	Nidia Rosa Vila	Víctor M. Vila Acebal		December	1312	175.00
Dec. 1	Lidia Elena García	Carlos M. García R.		December	1313	225.00
Dec. 1	María Antonia González	José A. Zardon S.		December	1314	250.00
Dec. 1	[illegible] González	Juan J. González L.		December	1315	175.00
Dec. 1	Rafael Sánchez	Daniel Fernández M.		December	1316	225.00
Dec. 5	Rafael Sánchez	Daniel Fernández M.		November	1317	225.00
Dec. 5	Conrado Santana Lima		(Gen.Staff)	Dif. Dec.	1318	50.00
Dec. 5	Laureano Pino Cruz		(Gen.Staff)	Dif. Dec.	1319	50.00
Dec. 5	María Julia Suárez	Ramiro Sánchez M.		Dif. Dec.	1320	50.00
Dec. 5	María Puyada	Elmo L. García Puyada		December	1321	175.00
Dec. 5	Hugo Vega	Miguel Chardiet A.		December	1322	275.00
Dec. 5	Nélida González (Substitutes check 1000 that was cancelled)	Dilio Carrazana León		December	1323	350.00
Dec. 5	Josefina Granda	Edgar Sopo Granda		Dif. Dec.	1324	50.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		September	1325	225.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		October	1326	225.00
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		November	1327	225.00
Dec. 5	CANCELLED				1328	-0-
Dec. 5	Julio Tarafa	Julio Tarafa B.		December	1329	225.00

(Continues page No.15)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"

[illegible]						Check No.	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] María Quintana	Francisco Quintana U.	October		1330	$ 275.00
Dec.	6	María C. Fojaco	Eduardo Ferrer G.	December		1331	300.00
Dec.	7	Emilia Acosta	Isidro J. Montesinos A.	December		1332	175.00
Dec.	7	The Florida National Bank and Trust Co. (Christmas Gift)	Celso A. Pérez Rodríguez			1333	100.00
Dec.	7	Elena González	Julio Caballero G.	December		1334	175.00
Dec.	7	Justo Alvarez	Santos Ramos A.	December		1335	225.00
Dec.	7	Francisco Pérez	José M. Battle	December		1336	250.00
Dec.	7	Gloria Cancio	Manuel Cancio R.	December		1337	225.00
Dec.	7	CANCELLED				1338	-o-
Dec.	7	José Ramón Delgado	Pablo Astudillo O.	November		1339	250.00
Dec.	7	María Josefa Riera (Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Annex "A-1")				1340	732.50
Dec.	7	CANCELLED				1341	-o-
Dec.	7	José Ramón Delgado	Pablo Astudillo O.	December		1342	250.00
Dec.	8	María C. Alonso		December	(Gen.Staff)	1343	175.00
Dec.	8	CANCELLED				1344	-o-
Dec.	8	Manuel Blanco (Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Comptroller)(Annex "A-2")				1345	100.00
Dec.	8	Justo Alvarez	Santos Ramos A.	November		1346	225.00
Dec.	8	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	November		1347	225.00
Dec.	8	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	December		1348	225.00
Dec.	8	Ernesto García Rubio	Hugo Gómez Oyarzábal	November		1349	175.00
Dec.	8	Ernesto García Rubio	Hugo Gómez Oyarzábal	December		1350	175.00
Dec.	8	CANCELLED				1351	-o-
Dec.	8	CANCELLED				1352	-o-

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.16

[illegible]				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	Félix Urra	Félix E. Urra Pagés	December	1353	175.00
[illegible]	Pilar Lanzano	Luis A. Bermúdez L.	December	1354	175.00
[illegible]	Manuel Blanco (Reimbursment	Revolving Fund)(Comptroller)(Annex "A-3)		1355	125.30
[illegible]	Zoila Colina	Ladislao G. Fernández M.		1356	175.00
[illegible]	Cristino Vera	Tomás Cruz	November	1357	225.00
[illegible]	Cristino Vera	Tomás Cruz	December	1358	225.00
[illegible]	Sara Martínez	Nildo Batista H.	Dif. Nov.and Dec.	1359	100.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	September	1360	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	October	1361	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	November	1362	175.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Wilfredo Fernández G.	December	1363	175.00
[illegible]	Agueda Granda	Raul L. Granda Hernández	December	1364	175.00
[illegible]	Elsa Matilda González	José A. Carreño G.	December	1365	175.00
[illegible]	Rosa Bueno	Adolfo Martín L.	December	1366	225.00
[illegible]	Fernando Chávez	Jesús Carballeira M.	December	1367	250.00
[illegible]	Miguel Guerra	Luis M. Guerra S.	December	1368	175.00
[illegible]	Concepción Vasallo	Juvenal Montero D.	December	1369	275.00
[illegible]	Roberto García Serra	Roberto García Serra S.	December	1370	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1371	-o-
[illegible]	María A. Coscuelia	Enrique J. Ruiz M.	December	1372	225.00
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	René A. Hernández F.	December	1373	250.00
[illegible]	Esther [illegible]	Freddy Izquierdo R.	December	1374	175.00
[illegible]	Salvador Pérez	Roberto Torres F.	December	1375	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1376	-o-

(Continues page No.17)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	Jorge L. Quesada J.	December	1377	$ 225.00
[illegible]	Pedro Valdés Díaz	Angel R. Mujica H.	December	1378	275.00
[illegible]	Rachel Sorondo	Rodolfo C. Sorondo Q.	December	1379	250.00
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	Ineido A. Cabrera C.	December	1380	225.00
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	Angel M. Barrios V.	December	1381	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1382	-o-
[illegible]	Raul A. Medina	José R. Barrios V.	December	1383	250.00
[illegible]	Jesús Fernández	Guillermo Fortuondo	December	1384	250.00
[illegible]	Yolanda Fortuondo	Cándido Sierra Rey	December	1385	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1386	-o-
[illegible]	Antonia Penedo	Juan A. Formoso P.	December	1387	250.00
[illegible]	Francisco Blanco	Héctor Varona F.	December	1388	175.00
[illegible]	Carlos Carrero	Benito R. González C.	December	1389	225.00
[illegible]	José Acosta Santos	Manuel Avila Ruiz	December	1390	300.00
[illegible]	Julia A. Rodríguez	Orlando Bayona T.	December	1391	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Villavicencio	Rogerio de los Santos	December	1392	175.00
[illegible]	Alicia María Ortiz	Mario A. Enríquez T.	December	1393	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Rolando Moya G.	December	1394	250.00
[illegible]	María Elena García	Modesto C. García M.	December	1395	175.00
[illegible]	Estrella Domínguez	Félix Domínguez C.	December	1396	200.00
[illegible]	Estrella Domínguez	Arcangel Amador	December	1397	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Alvarez	José A. Darías Rodríguez	December	1398	250.00
[illegible]	Yolanda [illegible]	Juan M. Velasco J.	December	1399	250.00
[illegible]	Irene Rodríguez	Guillermo Cancio G.	December	1400	225.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.18

[illegible]				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	Jorge Mackenzie M.	December	1401	$ 275.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Orestes Escandell F.	December	1402	225.00
	[illegible]	José Escandell F.	December	1403	275.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	José F. Mederos R.	December	1404	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Mario Tomás Pérez Chile	December	1405	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Senen Brito Alfonso	December	1406	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Osvaldo Coello Díaz	December	1407	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Fonseca	Sergio L. Díaz Brull	December	1408	150.00
[illegible]	José Tur Tur	Julio Tur Tur	December	1409	275.00
[illegible]	José Tur Tur	Patricio Artigas E.	December	1410	100.00
[illegible]	María [illegible] Cotta	José V. Cal Cotta	December	1411	175.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Izquierdo	Emilio M. Izquierdo H.	December	1412	75.00
[illegible]	Genaro Pérez González	Angel L. Bolaños L.	December	1413	105.00
[illegible]	Genaro Pérez González	Esteban M. Beruvides B.	December	1414	130.00
[illegible]	Gladys del Valle	Jorge Ramos Alcaniz	December	1415	125.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Casanova	René Cancio González	December	1416	30.00
[illegible]	Martha R. Arrazola	Orlando Arrazola R.	December	1417	87.50
[illegible]	Aida Rodríguez	Leocadio León Blanco	Dif. Dec.	1418	158.00
[illegible]	Armando Avila Cancio	Miguel A. Avila C.	December	1419	250.00
[illegible]	Juan Pajón	Alberto Poveda A.	December	1420	225.00
[illegible]	Encarnación Ramos	Ricardo Martínez de la C.	December	1421	175.00
[illegible]	Virginia González	Luis de J. Sierra L.	December	1422	250.00
[illegible]	[illegible]	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	October	1423	275.00

(Continues page No.19)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.19

[illegible]				Check No.	Total
[illegible]	[illegible] Rothman	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	December	1424	$ 275.00
[illegible]	Olimpia Tobías	Santiago A. Díaz M.	Dif. Dec.	1425	50.00
[illegible]	Carmela López	Eddy Iruela Garrido	Sep.,Oct.,Nov.,Dec.	1426	900.00
[illegible]	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	September	1427	225.00
[illegible]	Eloísa Sobrino	Gastón Pérez Rangel	December	1428	175.00
[illegible]	Eli Montoto	Lorenzo C. López Valdés	December	1429	250.00
[illegible]	Lidia Pou	Manuel E. Menéndez F.	December	1430	225.00
[illegible]	Carmela López	Carlos Hernández Vega	Nov. and Dec.	1431	450.00
[illegible]	Juan Pagón	Miguel A. Reyes G.	December	1432	175.00
[illegible]	Lina Lorenzo	Oscar B. Corallo M.	December	1433	225.00
[illegible]	Román Martínez	Marcos Mesa Robel	December	1434	275.00
[illegible]	Tomás Gómez Garrido	Sixto F. Espino Alonso	December	1435	225.00
[illegible]	CANCELLED			1436	-o-
[illegible]	Elsa Roldán	Sergio Ares Fernández	November	1437	225.00
[illegible]	[illegible] Rothman	Manuel Revuelta S.E.	November	1438	275.00
[illegible]	Francisco Pérez	José M. Battle	November	1439	250.00
[illegible]	Emilia Acosta	Isidro J. Montesinos A.	November	1440	175.00
[illegible]	Martha Giglio (First wife)	Juvenal Montero B.	December	1441	50.00
[illegible]	José Mesa	(Relatives in Cuba)	December	1442	14,100.00
[illegible]	Carlos Hernández	(In advance)	January	1443	55.00
[illegible]	Arturo Lorenzo	Lorenzo Pérez L.	October	1444	175.00
[illegible]	Pilar Gómez	Antonio Gómez Candales	November	1445	225.00
[illegible]	Pilar Gómez	Antonio Gómez Candales	December	1446	225.00
[illegible]	Lorenzo Travieso	Alcides Cabrera P.	December	1447	225.00

(Continues page No.20)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.20

D A T E				Check No.	T o t a l
Dec. 15	Dolores Fernández	Máximo L. Cruz G.	December	1448	$ 225.00
Dec. 15	Esther Rodríguez	José L. Vivanco Pardo	December	1449	225.00
Dec. 15	Lorenzo Martín	Luis del Valle del Junco	December	1450	225.00
Dec. 15	Eusebio Carvajal	Adolfo Díaz Cabrera	December	1451	175.00
Dec. 15	Lourdes Fernández	Ernesto V. Fernández Dalmau	December	1452	225.00
Dec. 15	José Acosta Santos	Rodolfo Hernández Herrera	December	1453	225.00
Dec. 15	Angélica Medina	Luis E. López González	December	1454	175.00
Dec. 15	Mirella Urra	Miguel A. Lazas G.	December	1455	250.00
Dec. 15	Luis Peña	Arnaldo A. Oliva G.	December	1456	225.00
Dec. 15	Lucía Pera	Félix Pérez Tamayo	December	1457	225.00
Dec. 15	Esperanza Cobas	Bartolomé Pineda G.	December	1458	175.00
Dec. 15	Pablo Martínez	Pablo Hugo Rojas Ramos	December	1459	250.00
Dec. 15	Ramón L. Ravelo	Mario Ravelo López	December	1460	225.00
Dec. 15	C A N C E L L E D			1461	-o-
Dec. 15	Inocente R. García	Fernando O. Torres M.	December	1462	250.00
Dec. 15	Inés Segura Bustamante	Carlos de Varona S.B.	December	1463	175.00
Dec. 15	Luz Marina Herrera	Rogelio Rodríguez González	December	1464	175.00
Dec. 15	Octavio Estévez	Conrado Caballero A.	November	1465	175.00
Dec. 15	Octavio Estévez	Conrado Caballero A.	December	1466	175.00
Dec. 15	Roberto González	Rigoberto Cancino H.	December	1467	175.00
Dec. 15	Moisés Egozi	José Egozi Bejar	December	1468	225.00
Dec. 15	Fernando Cabaua	D. Armando Morejón F.	December	1469	175.00
Dec. 15	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Salicio S.	December	1470	175.00
Dec. 15	Georgina Díaz	Francisco Salicio S.	November	1471	175.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.21

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 15	Jorge Tomeu	Oliverio Tomeu V.	December	1472	$ 275.00
Dec. 15	Antonio Guzmán	Carlos A. de Varona A.	December	1473	275.00
Dec. 16	Lucía Ferra	Nabi Ferra Mata	Dif. Dec.	1474	50.00
Dec. 16	Rafael García Rubio	Manuel García-Rubio R.	Dif. Dec.	1475	50.00
Dec. 16	Angel Rodríguez	Angel Rodríguez L.	September	1476	250.00
Dec. 16	Angel Rodríguez	Angel Rodríguez L.	December	1477	250.00
Dec. 17	Eduardo Franqui	(3 desks and 1 card file)		1478	161.00
Dec. 17	Lucía Pérez Oquendo	Alvin Ross Díaz	December	1479	225.00
Dec. 17	Dulce G. Bosch	Rolando Hernández Valdés	December	1480	175.00
Dec. 17	Antonio Arteaga	Ramón Arteaga Díaz	December	1481	175.00
Dec. 17	Laina Macías	Alfredo J. Borras M.	December	1482	175.00
Dec. 17	Arturo Fajardo	Luis Pino Herrera	December	1483	175.00
Dec. 17	C A N C E L L E D			1484	-o-
Dec. 17	Ana Lozano	Rodowaldo Fuentes L.	December	1485	275.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Carlos E. Ochoa Núñez	December	1486	250.00
Dec. 17	Yolanda Soler	Julio A. de J. Cortés V.	December	1487	250.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Adalberto A. Delgado C.	December	1488	175.00
Dec. 17	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Alberto Miranda V.	December	1489	250.00
Dec. 17	Elsa Molina	Antonio F. Fernández Peydro	December	1490	225.00
Dec. 17	Sabina López	Jorge R. Herrera L.	December	1491	175.00
Dec. 17	Lourdes Bonnin	Antonio E. Iglesias P.	December	1492	225.00
Dec. 17	Raul Arango Dalmau	Lucas R. Franco Dalmau	December	1493	175.00
Dec. 17	Caridad Cruz	Amado Fernández Cruz	December	1494	175.00
Dec. 17	C A N C E L L E D				-o-

(Continues page No.22)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.22

Date				Check No.	T o t a l
Dec. 17	Alberto Fontova	León Fontova R.	December	1496	$ 225.00
Dec. 17	Rev. González Posada	Ernesto F. Garriga C.	December	1497	225.00
Dec. 17	Pedro L. García	Alfredo Barrera A.	December	1498	300.00
Dec. 17	Margarita Díaz	Armando Díaz Fernández	December	1499	250.00
Dec. 17	Juan Páez	Angel Páez Platas	December	1500	275.00
Dec. 17	Hipólito Llanos	Juan N. Prado V.	December	1501	225.00
Dec. 17	Héctor Torres	Mario E. Torres F.	December	1502	175.00
Dec. 17	CANCELLED			1503	-o-
Dec. 17	CANCELLED			1504	-o-
Dec. 17	Cástulo J. Expósito	Carlos A. Sarmiento H.	December	1505	225.00
Dec. 17	Pedro Molina	Carlos F. Navarrete	December	1506	175.00
Dec. 17	María Teresa Gómez	Luis Bianchi Gómez	December	1507	175.00
Dec. 17	Dora Quevedo	Mario M. Martínez Q.	December	1508	175.00
Dec. 17	Alfredo Hernández	Carlos M. Hernández B.	December	1509	175.00
Dec. 17	María Riera	José M. Macías Riera	December	1510	225.00
Dec. 17	Antonia Arteaga	Armando C. Basulto G.	December	1511	175.00
Dec. 17	Esther Lima	Julio Bueno Rivera	December	1512	175.00
Dec. 17	Luis Lima	Manuel E. Pozo del Val	December	1513	275.00
Dec. 17	Zenaida Tavernero	Jorge A. Vega Casas	December	1514	300.00
Dec. 17	William King	Orestes Mirabal H.	December	1515	250.00
Dec. 17	William King	Miguel A. López B.	December	1516	250.00
Dec. 17	Estela Amaran	Antonio Vidal Vera P.	December	1517	250.00
Dec. 17	Mercedes Navarro	Luis O. Rodríguez M.	December	1518	225.00
Dec. 17	Juan Pajón	Humberto Creme C.	December	1519	300.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No.23

Date				Check No.	Total.
Dec. 17	Antonia Florez	Napoleón Vilaboa de Ll.	December	1520	$ 225.00
Dec. 17	Narciso López	Milton López-Hidalgo B.	December	1521	175.00
Dec. 17	Juan Díaz Sosa	Ernesto Esteban L.	December	1522	225.00
Dec. 17	Elia [illegible] Pérez	Miguel A. Orozco Crespo	December	1523	225.00
Dec. 17	Antonio Carmona	Antonio G. Carmona C.	Dif. Dec.	1524	50.00
Dec. 17	The Florida National Bank	Manuel Comellas A.	December	1525	175.00
Dec. 17	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	September	1526	225.00
Dec. 17	Concepción Pérez	Nicolás Molina del Rio	October	1527	225.00
Dec. 19	Ana Trinidad Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	December	1528	250.00
Dec. 19	Antonia Florez	Napoleón Vilaboa de Ll.	November	1529	225.00
Dec. 19	Nova Capote	(Travel ticket)		1530	25.00
Dec. 19	Lidia Elena García	(Travel ticket N.J. to Miami)		1531	54.00
Dec. 19	Juan Pagón	Miguel A. Reyes García	Dif. Dec.	1532	50.00
Dec. 19	Raquel Moya	Abelardo Silva Perdomo	November	1533	300.00
Dec. 19	Raquel Moya	Abelardo Silva Perdomo	December	1534	300.00
Dec. 21	Pedro Delgado	Alberto Pérez Sorpo	November	1535	175.00
Dec. 21	Pedro Delgado	Alberto Pérez Sorpo	December	1536	175.00
Dec. 21	Nancy Torres	Raul Vázquez Martín	November	1537	175.00
Dec. 21	Nancy Torres	Raul Vázquez Martín	December	1538	175.00
Dec. 21	Alicia Luquiere	Pedro González Fernández	Dif. Dec.	1539	50.00
Dec. 21	Rosa María Doy	Máximo E. Sanabria Doy	December	1540	175.00
Dec. 21	Julio C. Navarro	Jorge Navarro Rodríguez	December	1541	225.00
Dec. 22	Olga Gutiérrez	Raul E. Taboada R.	December	1542	175.00
Dec. 22	Graciela López	William R. Schuss	November	1543	175.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 22	Grace Mc Bride	William R. Schoss	December	1544	$ 175.00
Dec. 22	Julieta Sancio	Jorge García Rubio S.	December	1545	175.00
Dec. 22	Olga Alvarez	Carlos López Lezcano	December	1546	300.00
Dec. 23	Bárbara Espino	Jesús Espino Magraner	December	1547	250.00
Dec. 23	Bartola I. Fernández	Abel T. Sotolongo R.	December	1548	225.00
Dec. 23	Isabel B. Mateo	Claudio F. González M.	December	1549	250.00
Dec. 23	Marta Díaz	Félix J. Hildebram Díaz R.	December	1550	250.00
Dec. 23	Luis Artaud	Gerardo A. de Villiers	December	1551	300.00
Dec. 23	Laureano Garrote	José F. Casal Fernández	December	1552	175.00
Dec. 23	[illegible]lí Lorenzo	Fernando Puig Fernández de C.	December	1553	250.00
Dec. 23	Juan M. Pujol	Domingo R. Carmenate	December	1554	175.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Luis Miranda Hernández	December	1555	300.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Segundo Vega García	December	1556	175.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	José M. Rodríguez P.	December	1557	250.00
Dec. 23	Pan American Bank of Miami	Francisco I. Fernández C.	December	1558	175.00
Dec. 23	CANCELLED			1559	-o-
Dec. 23	Clara Ramírez	Fernando Pedro Sala P.	December	1560	225.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Garrido	Carlos M.F. Garrido G.	December	1561	225.00
Dec. 23	Cristina Kindelán	Raul Arango Kindelán	December	1562	175.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Garrido	Sergio Avila Mariño	December	1563	250.00
Dec. 23	Carmen Fernández	Julio Monzón Santos	December	1564	250.00
Dec. 23	Teresa Sánchez	Rafael Sánchez Beltrán	December	1565	175.00
Dec. 23	Teresa Sánchez	Luis Sánchez Reyes	December	1566	250.00
Dec. 23	Patricio Martínez	Amado Ramón A. Gayol T.	December	1567	175.00

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STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 23	María Alvarez Cueto	Francisco M. Condom G.	December	1568	$ 175.00
Dec. 23	María Alvarez Cueto	José E. del Campo P	December	1569	225.00
Dec. 23	Nita María Monne	Ramón G. Gómez del R.	December	1570	225.00
Dec. 23	Jesús Gómez Garrido	Pablo de Armas Olivera	December	1571	175.00
Dec. 23	Dolores Fernández	Armando Gutiérrez C.	December	1572	225.00
Dec. 23	María A. Sánchez	Julio C. González Rebull S.	December	1573	225.00
Dec. 23	CANCELLED			1574	-o-
Dec. 23	Dora Rubiano	Anastasio J. Suárez	December	1575	175.00
Dec. 23	Mercedes González	Antonio M. González B.	December	1576	175.00
Dec. 23	Rafaela Ichaso	Rogelio A. Fernández I.	December	1577	175.00
Dec. 23	René López Lima	Humberto R. López C.	December	1578	225.00
Dec. 23	Manuel Fernández	Mirto Collazo Valdés	December	1579	225.00
Dec. 23	Luzgardo Fajardo	Manuel Navarro M.	Dif. Dec.	1580	50.00
Dec. 26	José L. García	Roberto Pichardo V.	December	1581	225.00
Dec. 26	Alicia L. Atencio	Oscar Acevedo	Dif. Dec.	1582	100.00
Dec. 26	Nancy Torres	Demetrio Pérez R.	December	1583	225.00
Dec. 26	Antonia Pino	Fernando Sardiñas C.	November	1584	175.00
Dec. 26	Antonia Pino	Fernando Sardiñas C.	December	1585	175.00
Dec. 26	Aida Rodríguez	Leocadio León Blanco	Dif. Dec.	1586	69.00
Dec. 26	Juan José Delgado	Román Delgado B.	October	1587	225.00
Dec. 26	Faustina Espinosa	Gerardo Silva P.	November	1588	250.00
Dec. 26	Faustina Espinosa	Gerardo Silva P.	December	1589	250.00
Dec. 27	María Josefa Riera	(Reinbursment Revolving Fund)(Annex "A-4")		1590	577.10
Dec. 26	Olga Carreño	Alfonso Cereceda G.	Dif. October	1591	50.00

(Continues page No.26)

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

ANNEX "A"
Page No. 26

Date				Check No.	Total
Dec. 27	Carlos Fernández	(In advance)	January	1592	$ 70.00
Dec. 27	Roberto Fernández	Guillermo Fernández V.	December	1593	225.00
Dec. 27	Marta Gómez Chávez	Ibrahim Rodríguez C.	November	1594	175.00
Dec. 27	Marta Gómez Chávez	Ibrahim Rodríguez C.	December	1595	175.00
Dec. 27	Cristino Vera	Pedro R. Vera C.	November	1596	175.00
Dec. 27	Cristino Vera	Pedro R. Vera C.	December	1597	175.00
Dec. 28	Nancy Díaz	Norberto L. González	November	1598	225.00
Dec. 28	Nancy Díaz	Norberto L. González	December	1599	225.00
Dec. 28	Roberto Correa	Antonio Salgado C.	October	1600	275.00
Dec. 28	Roberto Correa	Antonio Salgado C.	December	1601	275.00
Dec. 28	Elia L. Camargo	Luis R. Pérez Rodríguez	November	1602	175.00
Dec. 28	Elia L. Camargo	Luis R. Pérez Rodríguez	December	1603	175.00
Dec. 28	Marta Ugarte	Lázaro R. Ugarte B.	December	1604	175.00
Dec. 28	Emma Orlinda Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	October Dif.	1605	50.00
Dec. 28	Emma Orlinda Cruz	Guillermo Lastre E.	November Dif.	1606	50.00
Dec. 28	Esther Hernández	Pablo E. Castellón H.	October	1607	175.00
Dec. 29	Nancy Díaz	Ramón Fuente Camejo	December	1608	175.00
Dec. 29	Norma Vilarchao	José M. Alfonso	December	1609	175.00
Dec. 29	Nancy Díaz	Daniel González C.	December	1610	275.00
		TOTAL CHECKS DRAWN			$139,224.96
		TOTAL CHECKS ISSUED IN DECEMBER AND PENDING TO BE COLLECTED			$ 14,181.10

NOTE:
All the checks dated Dec. 1 belongs to the month of December.

ml.

14-00000

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible] AND PAULA"
ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLVING FUND
OF THE SOCIAL WORK SECTION
[illegible] NO. 1340
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-1"

Medical Assistance:		
Mrs. Regina Luaces (Physician)	3.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Physician)	10.00	
Mrs. Etchegoyen (Physician)	8.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Hospital)	7.75	
Mrs. Teillechea (Medicine)	8.00	
Mrs. Prellezo (Hospital)	4.00	
Mrs. Alcida Sessa (Hospital)	70.00	
Mrs. Chamizo (Hospital)	20.00	
Mrs. Caridad García de Chamizo (Hospital)	25.00	
Laboratory (Dr. Rasco) Anita Trespalacios	8.00	
Son of Mercedes Blanco (Physician)	5.00	
Mercedes Blanco (Oculist)	11.00	
Mrs. Olga Gómez Mena de Molé (Physician)	85.00	
Martin Molena Family (Dentist)	50.00	
Medicine for recruits family	188.37	
Mrs. Raul Vianello	50.00	$ 553.12
Transportation Expenses:		
Gasoline		57.77
Office Supplies:		29.63
Miscellaneous:		92.04
Total		$ 732.56

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
CREATION OF A REVOLVING FUND
CHECK NO. 1345
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-2"

The "Revolving Fund" of the Comptroller Office in the Military Section is created by this check, under the custody of Mr. Manuel Blanco, and it will continue being by this amount.	$ 100.00

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
DISBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND
COMPTROLLER OFFICE MILITARY SECTION
CHECK No. 1555
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-3"

Office Supplies:		$ 30.22
Assets:		
Typewriter desk (used)	$ 44.00	
Legal File 4 drawers, metal	47.50	91.50
Miscellaneous:		3.58
Total		$ 125.30

ml.

CUBAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PASCO AND PAULA"
REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND
SOCIAL WORK SECTION
CHECK NO. 1590
DECEMBER 1960

ANNEX "A-4"

Medical Assistance:	
Medicine and Mercy Hospital	$ 509.49
Transportation Expenses:	
Gasoline	23.92
Advance payment given by the revolving fund of Social Work:	
Dr. Matos	50.00
Office Supplies:	9.23
Miscellaneous:	84.46
Total	$ 677.10

ml.

A-1

1-31 July 1960
Miami

RASCO-PAULA

14-00000

TRANSLATION

1-31 July

Miami

RASCO-PAULA

Democratic Revolutionary Front
Miami, Florida

Distinguished Cubans:

Attached herewith I am remitting the report corresponding to the past month of July of the current year containing the following:

I. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OPERATIONS
II. ATTACHMENTS CORRESPONDING TO EXPENDITURES
III. BANK CONCILIATION
IV. GENERAL

Attentively,

(signed)
Juan Paula Baez
Public Accountant

Frente Revolucionario Democratico
Miami- Florida.-

Distinguidos Cubanos :

Adjunto les estoy remitiendo el Informe correspondiente al pasado mes de Julio del presente año, y el mismo está integrado por lo siguiente:

- I - ESTADO RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS.
- II - ANEXOS CORRESPONDIENTES A LOS EGRESOS
- III - CONCILIACION BANCARIA
- IV - GENERAL

De ustedes atentamente,

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Baez
Contador Público

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OPERATIONS

Proceeding from the conciliated balance of 30 June 1960 of $2,868.95, we added to it a loan received from Dr. Justo Carrillo Hernandez in the amount of $1,500.00, receipts from the Department of Finances in the amount of $8,000.00 and a spontaneous contribution from an anti-communist admirer from South America in the amount of $30.00. We arrived at a total of $12,398.95 of cash on hand for the month of July 1960.

If from the total of cash on hand for the month of July 1960 we subtract the expenditures which are:

Traveling expenses (see Attachment 1)	$6,002.46
Propaganda (see Attachment 2)	1,172.38
Personnel (see Attachment 3)	1,136.00
Sustenance and rents (see Attachment 4)	559.50
Communications (see Attachment 5)	960.75
Students' Section (see Attachment 6)	220.00
Office supplies (see Attachment 7)	219.49
Miscellaneous (see Attachment 8)	1,577.38

we have a total of cash on hand at the Florida National Bank and Trust Company on 31 July 1960 of $550.99. There exists on this date a $100.00 Fixed Fund which increases the cash on hand by this amount.

TRAVELING EXPENSES

In Attachment 1 you may observe to whom the various checks were issued as well as the amount of each expenditure. Although entry #1 is charged to Dr. Luis Aguilar Leon, according to verbal information, only $200.00 corresponds to this gentleman and the remaining $400.00 corresponds to

RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS

Partiendo del saldo conciliado en 30 de Junio de 1960, de $2,868.95, le sumamos un prestamo recibido del Dr. Justo Carrillo Hernandez -- por $1,500.00; un ingreso efectuado por el Departamento de Finanzas por $8,000.00 y la aportación espontanea de un admirador anti-comunista de Sur America de $30.00, logramos una ascendencia de efectivo disponible para el mes de Julio de 1960 de $12,398.95.

Si al total del efectivo disponible del mes de Julio de 1960, le restamos los egresos, que son:

Gastos de Viajes, (ver anexo-1)	$ 6,002.46
Propaganda, (ver anexo-2)	1,172.38
Personal, (ver anexo-3)	1,136.00
Manutención y alquileres (ver anexo-4)	559.50
Comunicaciones (ver anexo-5)	960.75
Sección Estudiantil (ver anexo-6)	220.00
Efectos de Oficinas (ver anexo-7)	219.49
Miscelaneas (ver anexo-8)	1,577.38

nos queda un efectivo disponible en The Florida National Bank and Trust Company, en 31 de Julio de 1960, de $550.99. Existe en ésta fecha un Fondo Fijo de $100.00, que aumenta en ésta cantidad el - efectivo disponible.

GASTOS DE VIAJES

En el anexo-1 podrán observar a quines fuerón extendidos los distintos cheques, así como la cuantía ascendente de cada egreso.

Aunque la partida # 1 aparece cargada al Dr. Luis Aguilar León, según informe verbal, solamente correspondió a dicho señor $200.00 y los $400.00 restantes al Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

La partida #8 , a nombre del Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona por --

Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango.

Entry #3 in the name of Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona in the amount of $931.49, according to a "statement" in our possession does not consist totally of "Traveling Expenses", however due to the fact that the Department of Finances claimed the vouchers for the month of July, the analysis of this entry was not possible in spite of having carried out the corresponding measures for obtaining a copy of the statement submitted by Dr. Varona.

Entry #12 in the name of Dr. Manuel Artime for $100.00 is not the result of a check made out in his name but was an amount delivered by Dr. Justo Carrillo in Mexico City according to a "statement for reimbursement" in the amount of $834.20 submitted to the Front during the month of July.

Entry #14 in the amount of $211.05 in the name of Dr. Justo Carrillo corresponds to the reimbursement made to him in the amount of $834.20. The difference between $834.20 and $211.05 corresponds to other types of expenses which are given in detail below.

The remaining entries are self-explanatory in Attachment-1.

The "Traveling Expenses" for the past month of June are excluded.

PROPAGANDA

In Attachment-2 all expenses under this account are given in detail.

Entry #105 in the amount of $500.00 corresponds to the payment for advertisements made in Mexico by Dr. Justo Carrillo, according to a statement for reimbursement in the amount of $834.20 submitted by him.

PERSONNEL

In Attachment-3 the personnel are listed with their monthly, weekly or incidental salaries with charges to the office of the Front in the Congress Building.

$931.49, según "estado" que estuvo en nuestro poder, no es totalmente de "Gastos de Viajes", pero debido a que el Departamento de Finanzas reclamó los comprobantes del mes de Julio, no fué posible el análisis de dicha partida, no obstante haber realizado las gestiones correspondientes para obtener una copia del estado presentado por el Dr. Varona.

La partida # 12 a nombre del Dr. Manuel Artime por $100.00, no es producto de un cheque girado a su nombre, sino que fué una cantidad entregada por el Dr. Justo Carrillo en la ciudad de México, según el "estado de reintegro " por $834.20, presentado en el mes de Julio al Frente.

La partida # 14 por $211.05, a nombre del Dr. Justo Carrillo, corresponde al reintegro que se le hizo de $834.20. La diferencia entre los $834.20 y $211.05, corresponde a otros tipos de gastos, que más adelante se detallan.

Las otras partidas se explican por si sola en el anexo-1.

Estan excluidos los "Gastos de Viajes" del mes de Junio próximo pasado.

PROPAGANDA

En el anexo-2 están detallados todos los gastos realizados bajo ésta cuenta.

La partida # 105 por $500.00, corresponde al pago por anuncios efectuado en México por el Dr. Justo Carrillo, según estado de reintegro por $834.20 por él presentado.

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

In Attachment-4 the various entries under this title are explained.

Entry #400 of 2 July 1960, check #22, was for the payment of rent for the office of the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT at #1001 Congress Building, Miami.

Entry #402 of 27 July, check #64, in the name of Abel Varona was used to give food, from 27 July to 2 August 1960, both dates inclusive, to the following persons: Miguel Penton, Hugo Zamora, Martin Torres, Giraldo Serafin Penton, Orlando Garcia, Claudio Orozco, Benigno Perez, Humberto Cordero, and Felix Sosa.

As you may note the expenses under this title will necessarily increase, therefore an ample estimate destined to cover future needs is advisable.

Check #67 of 27 July 1960 in the name of the labor leader Pascasio Linera was made void.

COMMUNICATIONS

The expenses of this title are listed in Attachment-5. The principal entries are 500 and 501 in the amounts of $400.00 and $300.00 for postage stamps. If we were to render account of the magnitude which propaganda of the Front sent by mail must have, these costs are ridiculous.

The costs of long distance calls charged to Dr. Justo Carrillo for $23.15 appear in the "statement for reimbursement" for $834.20 which he submitted for the month of July.

The long distance calls (?) of Dr. Jose I. Rasco were paid by the Fixed Fund which exists in the Front's office.

PERSONAL

En el anexo-3 se expone detalladamente el personal con asignación mensual, semanal ó eventual, con cargos a la oficina del Frente en el Congress Building.

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES

En el anexo-4 se explica las distintas partidas consumidas bajo éste epígrafe .

La partida #400 de Julio 2-960, check # 22 fué para el pago del alquiler de la oficina del FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, en el Congress Building #1001, Miami.

La partida # 401 de 10 de Julio, check #42 a nombre de Rafael Candia, se utilizó para el alquiler de una casa ó apartamento en el N.W , Avenida 23, que alberga exilados y se le facilita la manutención.

La partida # 402 de Julio 27, check # 64 a nombre de Abel Varona, se utilizó para darle comida, desde el 27 de Julio al 2 de Agosto de 1960, ambos inclusives, a las siguientes personas: Miguel Pentón, Hugo Zamora, Martín Torres, Giraldo Serafín Pentón, Orlando García, Claudio Orozco, Benigno Perez, Humberto Cordero y Felix Sosa.

Como ustedes observarán los gastos de éste epígrafe, necesariamente irá aumentando, por lo que es aconsejable un amplio estimado destinado a cubrir sus necesidades futuras.

El check # 67 de 27 de Julio de 1960 a nombre del lider obrero Pascasio Linera fué anulado.

STUDENTS' SECTION

In Attachment-6 are explained the amounts delivered to the Students' representatives in exile which collaborate with the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT.

OFFICE SUPPLIES

In Attachment-7 are listed all expenses made for office supplies.

MISCELLANEOUS

In Attachment-8 the expenditures which do not come under the other titles are explained.

The Fixed Fund of the Front's office was increased to the amount of $100.00 by means of check #29 of 12 July 1960. This Fixed Fund is under the custody of Ana Villarreal.

Dr. Justo Carrillo was repaid the loan he made during the month of July in the amount of $1,500.00 with check #49 of 29 July 1960.

There are entries paid from the Fixed Fund for taxi fares and personal courtesies which because of their amounts do not merit special attention.

COMUNICACIONES

Los gastos de ésta titulo están relacionados en el anexo-5. Las partidas principales son la 500 y 501, por $400.00 y $300.00 en sellos de correo. Si nos damos cuenta de la magnitud que debe tener la propaganda enviada por correo del Frente, éstos gastos resultan irrisorios.

Los gastos de llamadas a distancias cargados al Dr. Justo Carrillo por $23.15 aparecen en el "estado de reintegro" por $834.20 del mes de Julio por él presentado.

Las distancias del Dr. José I. Rasco fuerón reintegrados por el Fondo Fijo existente en la oficina del Frente.

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL

En el anexo-6 se exponen las cantidades entregadas a la representación estudiantil del exilio, que coolaboran con el FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO.

EFECTOS DE OFICINAS

En el anexo-7 se relacionan todos los gastps efectuados en materiales para las oficinas.

MISCELANEOS

En el Anexo-8 se exponen todos los egresos realizados que no caben en los otros epígrafes.

Con el Check # 29 de Julio 12, 1960 se aumentó el Fondo Fijo de la oficina del FRENTE, a la cantidad de $100.00. Este Fondo Fijo está bajo la custodia de Ana Villarreal.

Con el Check # 49 de Julio 26 de 1960 se le pagó al Dr. Justo Carrillo el préstamo que hiciera dentro de este mes de Julio, por la cantidad de $1,500.00.

Existen partidas pagadas por el Fondo Fijo, de Alquiler de Taxis y Atención Personal, que por su cuantía no merecen especial atención.

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Summary of Receipts and Expenditures

Month of July 1960

RECEIPTS:

Balance 30 June 1960
Loan Received from Dr. Justo Carrillo
Receipts from the Department of Finances, July 1960
Contribution from a Collaborator
Total Cash on Hand

EXPENDITURES:

Traveling Expenses (Attachment 1)

Propaganda (Attachment 2)

Personnel (Attachment 3)

Sustenance and Rents (Attachment 4)

Communications (Postage stamps, telegraph, telephone, etc. (Attachment 5)

Students' Section (Attachment 6)

Office Supplies (Attachment 7)

Miscellaneous (Attachment 8)

Total Expenditures

Total Cash Available in Bank

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Traveling Expenses

ATTACHMENT 1

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Luis Aguilar Leon	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			A. Sanchez Arango	
			Jose I. Rasco	
			Jose I. Rasco	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel A. Varona	
			Manuel Artime	
			Manuel Artime	
			Received Dr. Carrillo	
			Justo Carrillo	
			Justo Carrillo	
			Elio Alvarez	
			Return F. Vidal	
			Passage Miami-Mexico and Mexico-Acapulco	
			Expenses of Envoy (?) (Shipment ?) to Mexico	
			Expenses J. Paula Trip (to) New York	
	Total Travel Expenses			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Gastos de Viajes

ANEXO 1

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle		Importe
1	Jul 2	24	Luis Aguilar León		$ 600.00
2	Jul 8	26	A. Sanchez Arango	$ 150.00	
3	Jul 19	40	A. Sanchez Arango	250.00	
4	Jul 26	53	A. Sanchez Arango	750.00	1,150.00
5	Jul 19	37	José I. Rasco	$ 250.00	
6	Jul 26	52	José I. Rasco	750.00	1,000.00
7	Jul 19	38	Manuel A. Varona	$ 250.00	
8	Jul 26	47	Manuel A. Varona	931.49	
9	Jul 27	62	Manuel A. Varona	150.00	1,331.49
10	Jul 19	39	Manuel Artime	$ 250.00	
11	Jul 27	61	Manuel Artime	150.00	
12	-	-	Recibido Dr. Carrillo	100.00	500.00
13	Jul 19	41	Justo Carrillo	$ 250.00	
14	Jul 26	48	Justo Carrillo	211.05	461.05
15	Jul 26	54	Elio Alvarez		250.00
16	Jul 26	57	Regreso F. Vidal		300.00
17	Jul 26	58	Pasaje Miami-Mexico y Mexico-Acapulco		168.64
18	Jul 26	59	Gastos del Enviado a Mexico		60.00
19	Jul 26	63	Gastos J. Paula Viaje New York		181.28
	Total Gastos de Viajes				$ 6,002.46

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Propaganda

ATTACHMENT 2

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Enrique Villarreal	
			Sergio Aparicio	
			F. R. D. Manifesto	
			F. R. D. Manifesto	
			Dr. Justo Carrillo	
			Paid by Dr. Carrillo in Mexico	
			Book "Who is Who in America" for use of Propaganda	
			Sent to Dr. J. Gonzales, Director of a Mexican newspaper	
Total Propaganda				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Propaganda

ANEXO 2

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
100	Jul 14	32	Enrique Villarreal	$ 134.10
101	Jul 14	33	Sergio Aparicio	217.44
102	Jul 15	35	Manifiesto F. R. D.	80.00
103	Jul 22	45	Manifiesto F. R. D.	142.00
104	Jul 26	56	Dr. Justo Carrillo	50.00
105	Jul 26	48	Pagado por el Dr. Carrillo en Mexico	500.00
106	Jul 6	23	Libro "Who is Who in America" para uso de Propaganda	16.72
107	Jul 15	34	Girado al Dr. J. Gonzalez, Director de un Periódico de Mexico	32.12
	Total Propaganda			$ 1,172.38

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Personnel

ATTACHMENT 3

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Ana Villarreal	
			Enrique Villarreal	
			Fernando Trespalacio - incidental weekly salary	
			Fernando Trespalacio	
			Juan Rodriguez Pintado	
			Wife of F. Vidal Santiago	
			Pascasio Linera	
			Silvia Torres - Translations	
Total Personnel				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Personal ANEXO 3

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
200	Jul 14	30	Ana Villarreal	$ 100.00
201	Jul 14	31	Enrique Villarreal	300.00
202	Jul 19	36	Fernando Trespalacio - Asiganción eventual semanal	50.00
203	Jul 26	50	Fernando Trespalacio	50.00
204	Jul 27	63	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	250.00
205	Jul 27	65	Sra. de F. Vidal Santiago	200.00
206	Jul 31	70	Pascasio Linera	146.00
207	Jul 26	51	Silvia Torres - Traducciones	40.00
	Total Personal			$ 1,136.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Sustenance and Rents

ATTACHMENT 4

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Rent Congress Building Suite number 1001	
			Rafael Candia	
			Abel Varona - support of nine persons	
	Total Sustenance and Rent			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Manutención y Alquileres ANEXO 4

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
400	Jul 22	22	Alquiler Congress Building Departamento No. 1001	$ 165.00
401	Jul 19	43	Rafael Candia	300.00
402	Jul 27	64	Abel Varona - Manutención de nueve personas	94.50
			Total Manutención y Alquileres	$ 559.50

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Communications

ATTACHMENT 5

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			A. Villarreal - Postage Stamps	
			A. Villarreal - Postage Stamps	
			Franking (?) Costs (Fixed Fund)	
			Telephone (FR 3-1717)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Long Distance Calls Dr. Rasco in Mexico (Fixed Fund)	
			Telegram (Fixed Fund)	
			Special Franking (?) (Fixed Fund)	
			Cables and Telegrams (Fixed Fund)	
			Postage Stamps (Fixed Fund)	
			Certified Correspondence (Fixed Fund)	
			Long Distance Calls Dr. Carrillo in Mexico	
Total Communications				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Comunicaciones ANEXO 5

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
500	Jul 19	44	A. Villarreal - Sellos Correos	$ 400.00
501	Jul 26	55	A. Villarreal - Sellos Correos	300.00
502	-	-	Gastos Franquicia (Fdo. Fijo)	14.09
503	Jul 12	27	Teléfono (FR-3-1717)	93.24
504	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	10.00
505	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.26
506	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.28
507	Jul 12	28	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	10.00
508	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	30.00
509	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	7.74
510	Jul 15	34	Sellos Correos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.51
511	Jul 19	42	Distancias Dr. Rasco en Mexico (Fdo. Fijo)	24.92
512	Jul 19	42	Un telegrama (Fdo. Fijo)	2.20
513	Jul 19	42	Franquicia Especial (F. Fijo)	0.30
514	Jul 19	42	Cables y Telegramas (F. Fijo)	2.74
516	Jul 27	66	Sellos de Correos (F. Fijo)	13.66
517	Jul 27	66	Correspondencia Certificada (Fdo. Fijo)	23.66
518	Jul 26	48	Distancias Dr. Carrillo en Mexico	23.15
	Total Comunicaciones			$ 960.75

ATTACHMENT 6

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Students' Section

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Roberto Fernandez	
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	Roberto Fernandez	
[redacted]	Total Students' Section			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Sección Estudiantil **ANEXO 6**

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
600	Jul 28	68	Roberto Fernández	$ 120.00
601	Jul 28	69	Roberto Fernández	100.00
	Total Sección Estudiantil			$ 220.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Desk Supplies

ATTACHMENT 7

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Office Supplies	
			Office Supplies	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Index Tablet (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
			Office Supplies (Fixed Fund)	
	Total Desk Supplies			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Efectos de Escritorio

ANEXO 7

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
700	Jul 8	25	Efectos de Oficina	$ 11.91
701	Jul 25	46	Efectos de Oficina	102.00
702	Jul 6	23	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	5.71
703	Jul 12	28	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.18
704	Jul 12	28	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fkjo)	14.00
705	Jul 12	28	Libreta Indice (F. Fijo)	0.59
706	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.87
707	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	1.55
708	Jul 15	34	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	20.00
709	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	40.00
710	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	0.67
711	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	8.24
712	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.80
713	Jul 19	42	Efectos de Oficina (F. Fijo)	3.97
	Total Efectos de Escritorio			$ 219.49

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Miscellaneous

ATTACHMENT 8

Month of July 1960

Entry	Date	Check	Detail	Amount
			Increase Fixed Fund to $100.00	
			Payment Dr. Carrillo's Loan	
			Bank Charge	
			Personal Courtesy (?)	
			Taxi Fare	
			Taxi Fare	
			Personal Courtesy (?)	
			Expenses for Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
			Newspapers (Fixed Fund)	
Miscellaneous Total				

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Misceláneos **ANEXO 8**

Mes de Julio de 1960

Partida	Fecha	Check	Detalle	Importe
900	Jul 12	29	Aumento Fondo Fijo a $100.00	$ 50.00
901	Jul 26	49	Pago Préstamo Dr. Carrillo	1,500.00
902	Jul 27	-	Cargo Bancario	2.70
903	Jul 27	66	Atención Personal	3.00
904	Jul 27	66	Alquiler Taxi	4.00
905	Jul 27	66	Alquiler Taxi	6.50
906	Jul 27	66	Atención Personal	1.22
907	Jul 12	28	Gastos en Periódicos (F.Fijo)	1.50
908	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.00
909	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	2.30
910	Jul 12	28	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.40
911	Jul 15	34	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.11
912	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	1.00
913	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.70
914	Jul 19	42	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.35
915	Jul 27	66	Periódicos (Fdo. Fijo)	0.60
	Total Misceláneos			$ 1,577.38

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

Bank Conciliation

On 31 July 1960

Balance According to Bank Statement

Less: Checks Drawn but not Collected

Check	Date	In Name Of
		Manuel A. Varona
		A. Sanches Arango
		Sent to F. Vidal Santiago
		Manuel Artime
		Manuel A. Varona
		Juan Rodriguez Pintado
		Wife of F. Vidal Santiago
		Roberto Fernandes
		Pascasio Linera

Balance on our books Conciliated 31 Jul 60

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

Conciliación Bancaria

En 31 de Julio de 1960

Saldo Según Estado del Banco				$ 3,548.48
Menos: Cheques Girados y no Cobrados:				
Check	**Fecha**	**A Nombre De**		
47	Jul 26	Manuel A. Varona	$ 931.49	
53	Jul 26	A. Sanchez Arango	750.00	
57	Jul 26	Envío F. Vidal Santiago	300.00	
61	Jul 27	Manuel Artime	150.00	
62	Jul 27	Manuel A. Varona	150.00	
63	Jul 27	Juan Rodríguez Pintado	250.00	
65	Jul 27	Sra. de F. Vidal Santiago	200.00	
68	Jul 28	Roberto Fernández	120.00	
70	Jul 31	Pascasio Linera	146.00	2,997.49
	Saldo en n/l Conciliado Jul 31/60			$ 550.99

GENERAL

In compliance with what has been established, of submitting to you a report at the close of each month, I am attaching herewith a STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES corresponding to the month of July 1960.

In spite of the fact that all expenditures were made by check in the name of the respective persons, there was an oversight in not requiring detailed receipts or vouchers of payment for funds drawn from the persons concerned.

On the trip to New York, suggested by you, a series of control measures were imposed upon me which I am also sending separately in order for you to deliberate the same. In addition to those written measures there are other verbal suggestions which are of importance.

Once you have read the control measures you will understand that the management of the funds of the DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT is lacking from what is required, for which reason a true relationship between the Executive (Committee) and the Comptroller would be convenient in order to provide you with better efficiency.

I understand that it is troublesome, in accordance with the rank of the members of the Executive Committee, to render accounts of the cash received, but in accepting the conditions suggested by the Department of Finances, I find myself forced to inform you that it is the obligation of all those receiving funds to render accounts unless exceptions are made or established for the Executive Committee.

I understand that the reason why the measures required by the Department of Finances in the management of the funds of the FRONT were not established has been due to the fact that the suggested controls were not known at the close of the month of July.

GENERAL

Cumpliendo con lo establecido, de rendirles un informe al cierre de cada mes, les estoy adjuntando un ESTADO DE INGRESOS Y GASTOS correspondiente al mes de Julio de 1960.

No obstante haberse efectuado todos los egresos por cheques a nombre de las respectivas personas, se incurrió en el descuido de no pedir recibos detallados o comprobantes de pagos, por quien corresponda, del efectivo girado.

En el viaje a New York, por ustedes indicado, fuí impuesto de una serie de medidas de control, las cuales tambien remito aparte, para que deliberen sobre las mismas, existiendo además de las escritas, otras indicaciones verbales de importancia.

Una vez leídas las medidas de control, comprenderán que el manejo de los fondos del FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, dista algo de lo requerido, razón por la cual sería conveniente una verdadera inter-relación entre el Ejecutivo y la persona del Comptroller, para que pueda ésta brindarles eficiencia.

Comprendo que es enojoso, de acuerdo con la jerarquía de los integrantes del Comité Ejecutivo, el estar rindiendo cuenta del efectivo recibido, pero de aceptar las condiciones sugeridas por el Departamento de Finanzas, me veo compelido a informarles que es obligación de todos los que reciban efectivo, rendir cuenta, salvo que logren o establezcan excepciones para el Ejecutivo.

Comprendo que la razón de no haberse establecido las medidas requeridas por el Departamento de Finanzas en el mane-

I would appreciate it, with the same frankness with which I have written these lines, if you would inform me if there is the slightest disagreement among any of the members of the Executive (Committee) and the person who is to fill the post of Comptroller so that in this manner I will not present an obstacle and can decline in favor of another person. If this is to the contrary it is a pleasure for me to be at the disposal of that worthy organization.

jo de los fondos del FRENTE, se debió a no conocer el control sugerido, llegado al final del mes de Julio.

Les agradecería, con la misma franqueza que expongo estas líneas, que me manifiesten si existe la mas ligera discrepancia entre alguno de los integrantes del Ejecutivo y el que va a ocupar el cargo de Comptroller, para de esta forma no obstaculizar y declinar en favor de otra persona. De lo contrario, de muy buen agrado estoy a la disposición de ese digno organismo.

A-2

F R D
DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS
M I A M I

INFORME AGOSTO 1960

TRANSLATION

F R D

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

MIAMI

REPORT AUGUST 1960

Miami, 6 September 1960

Executives
Democratic Revolutionary Front

Dear Sirs:

Attached herewith we are submitting the REPORT corresponding to the month of August of the current year which contains the following:

Statement "I": Statement of Receipts and Expenditures
- Bank Conciliation
Attachment "I-A": Assets
Attachment "I-B": Propaganda
Attachment "I-C": Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D": Payroll
Attachment "I-E": Trips
Attachment "I-F": Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G": Communications
Attachment "I-H": Students' Section
Attachment "I-I": Commissions and Delegations
Attachment "I-J": Miscellaneous
Attachment "I-K": Checks to be Justified
- Summary of Receipts and Expenditures Operations

Attentively,

(signed)
CP* Enrique Ros

(signed)
CP* Mario Girbau

(signed) Juan Paula

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*Public Accountant

Miami, Septiembre 6, 1960

Senores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democratico

Senores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente al mes de Agosto del corriente ano, el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I":	Estado de Ingresos y Gastos
-	Conciliacion Bancaria
Anexo "I-A":	Activos
Anexo "I-B":	Propaganda
Anexo "I-C":	Gastos de Administracion y Generales
Anexo "I-D":	Nomina
Anexo "I-E":	Viajes
Anexo "I-F":	Manutencion y Alquileres
Anexo "I-G":	Comunicacion
Anexo "I-H":	Seccion Estudiantil
Anexo "I-I":	Comisiones y Delegaciones
Anexo "I-J":	Varios
Anexo "I-K":	Checks a Justificar
-	Resumen de las Operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos

De Ustedes Atentamente

CP. Enrique Ros CP. Mario Girbau

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

STATEMENT "I"

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

RECEIPTS:

Balance in Bank (1-8-1960)

Deposits:

11 August
11 August
12 August

Total Receipts

EXPENDITURES:

Attachment "I-A": Assets
" "I-B": Propaganda
" "I-C": Administrative and General Expenses
" "I-D": Payroll
" "I-E": Trips
" "I-F": Sustenance and Rents
" "I-G": Communications
" "I-H": Students' Section
" "I-I": Commissions and Delegations
" "I-J": Miscellaneous
" "I-K": Checks to be Justified

Plus Bank Charges:

Debit Memos
Service Charges

Total Cash Available in Bank on 31-8-1960

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

BANK CONCILIATION

On 31 August 1960

Balance According to Bank Statement

Less: Checks Drawn but not Collected:

Date	Check No.	
4-8-60	74	Letter Service
11-8-60	125	Burrelle's Press Clipping

Balance on Our Books Conciliated on 31-8-1960

NOTE: Check No. 74 of Letter Service in the amount of $24.00 does not appear as paid by the bank and we are in doubt as to whether is was cancelled since the receipt or the invoice which covered it is not in our possession, in which case the cash available in the bank would be increased to $113.54 (One hundred thirteen pesos* and fifty-nine cents) on 31 August. There is in addition a Fixed Fund amounting to $100.00 (one hundred pesos*).

*As in text.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

CONCILIACION BANCARIA

En Agosto 31, 1960

Saldo Segun Estado del Banco				$ 138.54
Menos: Checks Girados y no Cobrados:				
Fecha	**Check No.**			
8-4-60	74	Letter Service	$ 24.00	
8-11-60	125	Burrelle'S Press Clipping	25.00	49.00
Saldo en Nuestros Libros Conciliado en 8-31-60				$ 89.54

N O T A: El check No. 74 de Letter Service por $24.00 no aparece pagado por el Banco y tenemos la duda de si fue anulado o no. Es posible que haya sido anulado ya que no obra en nuestro poder el recibo o la factura que lo ampare, en cuyo caso, el efectivo disponible en Banco ascenderia a $113.54 (Ciento trece pesos y cincuenta y cuatro centavos) en Agosto 31. Existe ademas un Fondo Fijo ascendente a $100.00 (Cien pesos).

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-A"

ASSETS

	Date	Check No.	Total
DEPOSITS:			
Electricity Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Telephone Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Gas Office 914 NW 12 St.			
Electricity 1313 NW 8 Ave.			
Water 1125 SW 19 Ave.			
Rent (of) Suite 419 Congress Building			
OFFICE EQUIPMENT:			
1 Perforator (Comptroller)			
1 Underwood typewriter Military Office			
1 Underwood typewriter Labor Commission			
ROLLING STOCK:			
1 auto Women's Section			
1 auto - Roberto Varona			
Total Assets			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "1-A"

ACTIVOS

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
DEPOSITOS:			
Electricidad Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	$ 20.00
Telefono Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	35.00
Gas Oficina 914 NW 12 st.	8-8	80	10.00
Electricidad 1313 NW 8 Ave.	8-8	83	15.00
Agua 1128 SW 19 Ave.	8-11	114	7.50
Alquiler Depto. 419 Congress Building	8-11	121	55.00
			$ 142.50
EQUIPO DE OFICINA:			
Una Perforadora (Comptroller)	8-2	73	$ 4.07
Una Maquina Underwood Oficina Militar	8-8	82	92.19
Una Maquina Underwood Comision Obrera	8-8	83	46.35
			$ 142.61
EQUIPO RODANTE:			
Un Auto Seccion Femenina	8-11	114	$ 350.00
Un Auto - Roberto Varona	8-12	126	505.00
			$ 855.00
Total Activos			$ 1,140.11

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-B"

PROPAGANDA

	Date	Check No.	Total
RADIO:			
Program Station MWET (sic) WMET (?)			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Catholic Directory			
Reynold's-Offset			
Photostatic Copies - Lucha			
Spanish Newspapers			
Miscellaneous Newspapers			
Photos R. Dario's Letters			
Propaganda Shipment From Key West			
Printing (of) Propaganda			
Printing (of) Propaganda			
Reynold's Propaganda			
Sending News About Cuba in Newspapers of America			
Propaganda Expenses Rivas Vazquez			
Printing Expenses Lucha			
Total Propaganda			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-B"

PROPAGANDA

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
RADIAL:			
Programa Emisora WMET	8-18	130	$ 280.00
VARIAS:			
Directorio Catolico	8-4	75	10.20
Reynold's - Offset	8-4	77	12.00
Copias Fotostaticas - "Lucha"	8-4	79	13.60
Periodicos Latinos	8-4	79	1.15
Periodicos Varios	8-8	108	1.00
Fotos Cartas R. Dorio	8-8	108	20.80
Envio Propaganda desde Key West	8-11	112	15.00
Impresion Propaganda	8-11	114	50.00
Impresion Propaganda	8-11	114	20.00
Reynold's Propaganda	8-11	122	143.00
Envio Noticias sobre Cuba en Periodicos de America	8-11	125	25.00
Gastos Propaganda Rivas Vazquez	8-12	126	50.00
Gastos Impresion "Lucha"	8-18	128	33.00
			$ 394.75
Total Propaganda			$ 674.75

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-C"

ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES

	Date	Check No.	Total
DESK SUPPLIES:			
Miscellaneous Supplies			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
" "			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Installation of Locks			
Insecticides, Brooms, etc.			
Develop Recruits' Identification Photos			
Rolls Photographic (Film) and Development			
Transport of Persons in Autos			
Cleaning Supplies, Gasoline, etc.			
Rolls (of Film) and Development Photos			
Gasoline, etc.			
Work (possibly Repairs) Office			
Work (possibly Repairs) Office			
Expenses Shipping Baggage			
Gasoline, Transportation, etc.			
Expenses Settling in Miami (E. Huertas)			
Printing (Pedro Leyva)			
Repairs Ford Auto			
Repairs Auto W.P. Beach - Miami			
Expenses Settling (in Miami) A. J. Pinera			
Auto Expenses, Gasolina, etc.			
Recruitment Expenses			
Auto Expenses (M. Guillot)			
Installation Delegation Office Miami			
Gasoline, Parking, Fines, etc.			
Paint, Gasoline, etc.			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-C"

GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION Y GENERALES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
EFECTOS DE ESCRITORIO:			
Efectos Varios	8-2	72	$ 95.02
" "	8-4	79	5.22
" "	8-8	80	41.78
" "	8-8	82	62.80
" "	8-9	83	47.44
" "	8-8	90	22.97
" "	8-8	94	322.92
" "	8-11	108	3.64
" "	8-31	135	9.22
			$ 611.01
VARIOS:			
Instalacion Cerraduras	8-4	76	$ 42.91
Insecticidas, Escobas, etc.	8-8	80	11.46
Revelado Fotos Carnets Reclutas	8-8	80	56.40
Rollos Fotográficos y Revelados	8-8	81	15.93
Traslado Personas en Autos	8-8	81	11.58
Efectos Limpieza, Gasolina, etc.	8-8	82	9.07
Rollos y Revelado Fotos	8-8	83	21.64
Gasolina, etc.	8-8	83	4.00
Trabajos Oficina	8-8	84	25.00
Trabajos Oficina	8-8	85	40.00
Gastos Envio Maletas	8-11	107	19.20
Gasolina, Transporte, etc.	8-11	108	5.00
Gastos Instalacion Miami (E. Huertas)	8-11	111	500.00
Impresos (Pedro Leyva)	8-11	111	350.00
Reparacion Auto Ford	8-11	114	62.50
Gastos Auto W. P. Beach - Miami	8-11	114	80.00
Gastos Instalacion A. J. Pinera	8-11	123	100.00
Gastos Autos, Gasolina, etc.	8-12	126	323.00
Gastos Reclutamiento	8-12	126	20.00
Gastos Auto (M. Guillet)	8-12	127	23.75
Instalacion Oficina Delegacion Miami	8-12	130	250.00
Gasolina, Parqueos, Multas, etc.	8-11	124	40.85
Pintura, Gasolina, etc.	8-31	135	54.35

-A la Hoja 2-

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-C"
Continuation

	Date	Check No.	Total
Passports and Passage (Trespalacios Children)			
Gasoline			
Letter Service			
Total Administrative and General Expenses			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-C"
Continuacion

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Pasaportes y Pasajes (Hijos Trespalacios)	8-31	136	$ 100.00
Gasolina	8-2	73	7.00
Letter Service (ck cancelled See Sept opening balance	8-4	74	24.00
			$ 2,197.64
Total Gastos de Administracion y Generales			$ 2,808.65

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "Y-D"

PAYROLL

	Date	Check No.	Total
Elena Alonso			
Ana Villarreal			
Enrique Villarreal			
Total Payroll			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-D"

NOMINA

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Elena Alonso	8-8	95	$ 100.00
Ana Villarreal	8-8	96	100.00
Enrique Villarreal	8-8	97	300.00
Total Nomina			$ 500.00

14-00000

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-E"

TRIPS

	Date	Check No.	Total
MANUEL ARTIME:			
Trip to New York			
MANUEL A. VARONA:			
Trip to New York and Washington			
MISCELLANEOUS:			
Various Passages Relating to Navy			
Expenses Delegation Trip Miami - Mexico			
Trip to Cuba by Emissary			
Rumbaut Trip to Buenos Aires			
Three Trips to Key West Boat of J. Prado			
J. A. Pujol - Trip New York and Washington			
I. Rodriguez - Trip Miami-New York-Miami			
E. Llaca - Trip Miami-New York-Miami			
Advance (to) Rumbaut - Trip to Washington			
H. Medrano - Trip to New York			
A. J. Pinera - Trip to Argentina			
L. Fernandez - Trip New York			
J. Rodriguez - Traveling Expenses			
E. Aguero and G. Mora - Trip to New York			
Trip to Costa Rica by 4 Persons			
Trip to Lima - 5 newspapermen			
Total Trips			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-E"

VIAJES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
MANUEL ARTIME:			
Viaje a New York	8-11	114	$ 100.00
MANUEL A. VARONA:			
Viaje a New York y Washington	8-11	112	$ 149.31
VARIOS:			
Varios Pasajes Relacionados con la Marina	8-8	82	$ 160.00
Gastos Delegacion Viaje Miami - Mexico	8-8	82	125.00
Viaje a Cuba de un Emisario	8-8	83	55.00
Viaje Rumbaut a Buenos Aires	8-8	89	750.00
Tres Viajes a Key West Barco de J. Prado	8-8	93	382.00
J. A. Pujol - Viaje New York y Washington	8-11	112	149.31
I. Rodrigues - Viaje Miami-New York-Miami	8-11	112	125.85
E. Llaca - Viaje Miami-New York-Miami	8-11	112	125.85
Anticipo Rumbaut - Viaje a Washington	8-11	117	21.75
H. Medrano - Viaje a New York	8-11	119	133.49
A. J. Pinera - Viaje Argentina	8-11	123	784.40
L. Fernandes - Viaje New York	8-12	126	130.00
J. Rodrigues - Gastos Viaje	8-12	126	70.00
E. Aguero y G. Mora - Viaje a New York	8-12	129	444.00
Viaje a Costa Rica de 4 Personas	8-12	131	1,380.00
Viaje a Lima - Cinco Periodistas	8-12	132	2,203.00
			$ 7,039.65
Total Viajes			$ 7,288.96

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-F"

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

	Date	Check No.	Total
RENTS:			
Office 1001 Congress Building			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
L. Morffi House			
House 1128 SW 19 Ave.			
House 245 Alcazar, C. Gables			
Various Rents and Food			
Various Rents			
Office Congress Building			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
Various Rents			
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER EXPENSES:			
Expenses F.R.D. House			
Electricity 914 NW 12 St.			
Allowances Various Persons			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Allowances Various Persons			
Equipment for Military Office			
Various Allowances			
Various Expenses			
Allowances Captain Ferrer			
Allowances E. Ros			
Allowances S. Miranda			
Allowances E. Trespalacios			
Allowances R. Rumbaut			
Allowances J. Mas			
Allowances O. Guerra			
Allowances H. Corona			
Allowances A. J. Pinera			
Various Expenses			
Food Various Persons			

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-F"
Continuation

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS

	Date	Check No.	Total
Allowances and Various Expenses			
Various Expenses			
Allowances Various Persons			
Food and Other Expenses			
Food			
H. Medrano (Allowances)			
A. J. Pinera (Allowances)			
Sustenance Pinera First Month Argentina			
Various Expenses			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Various Allowances and Expenses			
Allowances Various Recruits			
Expenses Birth Martha del Valle			
Food			
Various Allowances			
Various Allewances			
Various Allowances			
Various Allowances			
Total Sustenance and Rents			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-F"
Continuacion

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-11	112	$ 533.70
Gastos Varios	8-11	114	123.69
Asignacion Varias Personas	8-11	115	490.00
Comida y Otros Gastos	8-11	116	235.19
Comida	8-11	118	54.55
H. Medrano (Dietas)	8-11	119	100.00
A. J. Pinera (Dietas)	8-11	123	100.00
Mantenimiento Pinera Primer Mes Argentina	8-11	123	300.00
Gastos Varios	8-11	124	526.95
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-12	126	1,076.06
Dietas y Gastos Varios	8-12	127	247.96
Dietas Varios Reclutas	8-12	133	50.00
Gastos Parto Martha del Valle	8-8	88	200.00
Comidas	8-4	79	2.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	130	40.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	135	176.45
Dietas Varias	8-31	136	85.00
Dietas Varias	8-31	111	700.00
			$ 9,297.45
Total Manutencion y Alquileres			$ 12,252.31

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-G"

COMMUNICATIONS

	Date	Check No.	Total
POSTAL:			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Stamps			
Post Office Box			
Stamps			
Stamps			
TELEPHONE:			
Long Distance to Atlanta			
Telephone Bill			
TELEGRAPH:			
Cables			
Cables			
Communications Total			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-G"

COMUNICACION

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
CORREO:			
Sellos	8-2	73	$ 8.94
Sellos	8-4	79	8.05
Sellos	8-8	80	3.00
Sellos	8-8	81	22.31
Sellos	8-8	82	6.91
Sellos	8-8	108	15.35
Sellos	8-11	112	22.13
Apartado	8-11	124	9.00
Sellos	8-12	128	500.00
Sellos	8-31	135	13.63
			$ 609.32
TELEFONO:			
Larga Distancia a Atlanta	8-8	80	$ 2.40
Cuenta Telefono	8-11	124	86.19
			$ 88.59
TELEGRAFO:			
Cables	8-8	107	$ 7.93
Cables	8-8	108	9.39
			$ 17.32
Total Comunicacion			$ 715.23

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-H"

STUDENTS' SECTION

	Date	Check No.	Total
Expenses for Opening Office			
Total Students' Section			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-H"

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Gastos de Apertura de la Oficina	8-8	91	$ 915.00
Total Seccion Estudiantil			$ 915.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-I"

COMMISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS

	Date	Check No.	Total
Mexico Delegation			
Labor Commission			
Legal Commission			
Total Commissions and Delegations			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-I"

COMISIONES Y DELEGACIONES

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Delegacion de Mexico	8-8	82	$ 201.20
Comision Obrera	8-8	83	100.00
Comision Juridica	8-8	88	600.00
Total Comisiones y Delegaciones			$ 901.20

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT
MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES
1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-J"

MISCELLANEOUS

	Date	Check No.	Total
Expenses Coordination of M.R.R. in Exile			
S. Aldereguia Transfer in Curazao			
Coordination Section Expenses (Luis Bueno)			
Extension Visas (Lopez-Cubenas-Hernandez)			
Various Expenses Not Classified			
Total Miscellaneous (Expenses)			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-J"

VARIOS

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Gastos Coordinacion del M. R. R. en el Exilio	8-11	114	$ 500.00
Transferencia S. Aldereguia en Curazao	8-11	114	206.30
Gastos Seccion Coordinacion (Luis Bueno)	8-11	114	200.00
Prorroga Visas (Lopez - Cubenas - Hernandez)	8-11	118	30.00
Varios Gastos sin Clasificar	8-11	124	396.19
Total Varios			$ 1,332.49

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

ATTACHMENT "I-K"

CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED

	Date	Check No.	Total
Francisco Carrillo			
R. Otero Borlaff			
Jose I. Rasco			
Manuel Artime			
Juan Paula			
Aureliano Sanchez Arango			
Total Checks to be Justified			

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

ANEXO "I-K"

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR

	Fecha	Check No.	Total
Francisco Carrillo	8-8	92	$ 1,000.00
R. Otero Borlaff	8-8	98	2,800.00
Jose I. Rasco	8-11	109	3,970.00
Manuel Artime	8-11	110	3,060.00
Juan Paula	8-11	120	400.00
Aureliano Sanchez Arango	8-15	134	1,500.00
Total Checks a Justificar			$ 12,730.00

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 31 August 1960

SUMMARY OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OPERATIONS

In Statement "I", which is attached, appears an analysis of the receipts and expenditures for the period 1 to 31 August 1960, in which proceeding from the bank balance on 1 August, plus the deposits made to the "RASCO AND PAULA" account in the Florida National Bank and Trust Company, less the expenditures for the period ($41,261.45), we arrive at cash available in the bank on 31 August 1960 amounting to $89.54.

ASSETS (ATTACHMENT "I-A")

The assets acquired during the period 1 to 31 August are listed in Attachment "I-A" and are classified in three groups: Deposits ($142.50), which corresponds to funds resulting from (deposits for) electricity, telephone, gas, and renting of some of the houses used by the Front; Office Equipment ($142.61); and Rolling Stock ($1,140.11) which includes the acquisition of two automobiles, one at the service of the Women's Section and the other at the service of Mr. Roberto Varona.

PROPAGANDA (ATTACHMENT "I-B")

Expenditures resulting from propaganda for this period have been classified as Radio ($280.00) corresponding to the program broadcast over station MWET (sic) (Possibly: WMET) and Miscellaneous ($394.75) in which all minor propaganda expenses have been grouped.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL EXPENSES (ATTACHMENT "I-C")

The total for Administrative and General Expenses for the month ($2,808.65) includes the office supplies used and other expenses which have been classified under the title of miscellaneous expenses and which include several entries discussed below:

> Expenses (for) Settling in Miami (E. Huertas) ($500.00) and Printing (Pedro Leyva) ($350.00): These two entries are part of the total of check # 111 issued in the name of Dr. Justo Carrillo for $1,550.00.
>
> Installation Miami Delegation Office ($250.00): Expenses incurred in the installation of the Delegation's Office in Suite No. 1105 of the Congress Building.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE FINANZAS DE MIAMI

Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960

RESUMEN DE LAS OPERACIONES DE INGRESOS Y EGRESOS

En el Estado "I" que se acompana se muestra un analisis de los ingresos y egresos tenidos durante el periodo de Agosto 1 al 31 de 1960, en el que partiendo del Saldo en Banco en Agosto 1, mas los depositos hechos en la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA" de "The Florida National Bank and Trust Company", menos los egresos incurridos durante este periodo ($41,261.45), obtenemos el efectivo disponible en Banco en Agosto 31 de 1960, y que asciende a $89.54.

ACTIVOS (ANEXO "I-A")

Los activos adquiridos durante este periodo de Agosto 1 al 31, aparecen relacionados en el Anexo "I-A" y clasificados en tres grupos: Depositos ($ — 142.50), que corresponde a los fondos por concepto de electricidad, telefono, gas y alquiler de algunas de las casas al servicio del Frente; Equipo de Oficina ($142.61) y Equipo Rodante ($1,140.11), que incluye la adquisicion de dos autos, uno al servicio de la Seccion Femenina y otro al servicio del Sr. Roberto Varona.

PROPAGANDA (ANEXO "I-B")

Los egresos por concepto de propaganda incurridos en el periodo se han clasificado en Radial ($280.00), que corresponde al programa que se radia a traves de la Emisora W W E T y Varios ($394.75) en el que se han agrupado todos aquellos gastos menores por concepto de propaganda.

GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION Y GENERALES (ANEXO "I-C")

El total de gastos de Administracion y Generales incurridos en el mes ($2,808.65) incluye los efectos de escritorio consumidos y otros gastos que se han clasificado bajo la denominacion de Varios y que incluye algunas partidas que se comentan a continuacion:

Gastos Instalacion Miami (E. Huertas) ($500.00) e Impresos (Pedro Leyva) ($350.00): Estas dos partidas forman parte del total del check No. 111 que se extendio a nombre del Dr. Justo Carrillo por $1,550.00.

Instalacion Oficina Delegacion Miami ($250.00): Gastos incurridos en la instalacion de la Oficina de la Delegacion en el Departamento No. 1105 del Congress Building.

-Continua-

Continuation

PAYROLL (ATTACHMENT "I-D")

The payroll for the month of August only includes Enrique Villarreal, Ana Villarreal and Elena Alonso.

TRIPS (ATTACHMENT "I-E")

Trips have been grouped, with those made by the executives of the Front being considered independently, and in a general manner, under the title of miscellaneous (traveling expenses), such as they appear in Attachment "I-E", all other traveling expenses. Traveling expenses corresponding to checks 89,123, 129, 131 and 132 have no other justification except the duly signed receipts, but not the vouchers justifying the manner in which the expenses were incurred in each case.

SUSTENANCE AND RENTS (ATTACHMENT "I-F")

These expenses are classified in two groups in Attachment "I-F": Rents ($2,954.86) and Allowances and Other Expenses ($9,297.45). Many of the rents do not have the corresponding receipt but they do have a receipt signed by the person who it is supposed received the money to pay these rents as can be seen in the files of receipts, invoices, etc.

The vouchers for allowances, food (meals), etc., are not presented as clearly as they should have been with regard to clarity and the organization of the same; however, instructions have been issued for the purpose of obtaining a better presentation of the same. Check # 82 includes two entries of $300.00 each, the receipts of which are in the names of Messrs. Roberto Varona and Rolando Rojas as well as another entry of $125.00 in the name of the latter. The receipts are not signed and these gentlemen are out of the country.

COMMUNICATIONS (ATTACHMENT "I-G")

Of the $715.23 total for the communications expenditures, there is an entry of $500.00 corresponding to check # 128 which represents the shipment of 5,000 copies of the newspaper Lucha to Cuba.

STUDENTS' SECTION (ATTACHMENT "I-H")

This total of $915.00 corresponds to check # 91 given in the name of Jorge Mas, with its receipt duly signed, and the list of the expenses incurred and to cover them was presented and signed by the persons in charge of that section, although they did not submit the receipts, invoices, etc. It is supposed that these are in their possession since they must have their own accounting for the purposes of the corresponding control.

-Continuacion-

NOMINA (ANEXO "I-D")

La nomina del mes de Agosto solamente incluye a los senores Enrique Villarreal, Ana Villarreal y Elena Alonso.

VIAJES (ANEXO "I-E")

Los viajes se han agrupado, considerando independientemente aquellos incurridos por los Ejecutivos del Frente, y en forma global, bajo el concepto de Varios, todos los otros gastos de Viajes, tal como aparecen en el Anexo "I-E". Los gastos de viajes correspondientes a los Checks Nos. 89, 123, 129, 131 y 132 no tienen mas justificacion que los recibos debidamente firmados, pero sin los comprobantes que justifiquen la forma en que se incurrieron los gastos en cada caso.

MANUTENCION Y ALQUILERES (ANEXO "I-F")

Estos gastos aparecen clasificados en el Anexo "I-F" en dos grupos: Alquileres ($2,954.86) y Dietas y Otros Gastos ($9,297.45). Muchos de los alquileres cargados no tienen el recibo correspondiente, pero si un recibo firmado por la persona que se supone recibio el dinero para hacer los pagos de esos alquileres, segun puede verse en los files de recibos, facturas, etc.

Los comprobantes de dietas, comidas, etc. no estan lo debidamente bien presentados, en cuanto a la claridad y organizacion de los mismos, pero ya se han dado las instrucciones a los efectos de conseguir una mejor presentacion de los mismos. El Check No. 82 incluye dos partidas de $300.00 cada una, cuyos recibos, a nombre de los senores Roberto Varona y Rolando Rojas, asi como otra de $125.00 a nombre de este ultimo no estan firmados, y esos senores se encuentran fuera del pais.

COMUNICACION (ANEXO "I-G")

Del total de $715.23 que importa el desembolso por concepto de Comunicacion, hay una partida de $500.00 que corresponde al Check No. 128 que representa el franqueo a Cuba de 5,000 ejemplares del Periodico "Lucha".

SECCION ESTUDIANTIL (ANEXO "I-H")

Este total de $915.00 corresponde al Check No. 91 que se extendio a nombre de Jorge Mas, con su recibo debidamente firmado, y fue presentada la relacion de los gastos incurridos hasta cubrir esa cantidad, firmadas por los responsables de esa Seccion, aunque no presentaron los recibos, facturas, etc., suponiendo que obren en su poder, ya que ellos deben llevar su contabilidad a los efectos del correspondiente control.

-Continua-

Continuation.

COMMISSIONS OR DELEGATIONS (ATTACHMENT "I-I")

During the month three checks were issued for the following:

a. Part of check # 82 in the name of Manuel A. Varona for $1,917.68 of which $200.00, plus the money order fee of $1.20, was sent to the Mexico Delegation.

b. Part of check # 83 in the name of Manuel A. Varona for $928.43 of which $100.00 was delivered to Mr. R. Otero Borlaff for the Labor Commission.

c. The total of check # 88 for $600.00 in the name of Mr. Jose M. Hernandez for the expenses of the Labor Commission, I mean to say, the Legal Commission.

MISCELLANEOUS (ATTACHMENT "I-J")

All entries concerning those expenses which, because of their nature, cannot easily be classified specifically within the previous classifications have been grouped under this title. Their total amount is $1,332.49 and this total is analyzed in Attachment "I-J".

CHECKS TO BE JUSTIFIED (ATTACHMENT "I-K")

Under this title are grouped all those checks issued during the month for which the expenses incurred for each of them had not been justified on 31 August. The receipts are signed and as soon as the justifications of the same are received, these expenses will be classified and submitted immediately.

GENERAL

In compliance with the instructions received, we have attempted to render a report on the operations for the month of August which will agree as much as possible with the needs required and which will include the greatest amount of information possible for the purpose of having a quick and precise understanding of the month's operations.

Together with this report we are sending, as we have been requested to do, all vouchers in correlative order following the numbering of the checks issued. Due to certain confusion regarding the submission of receipts, invoices, etc., which has already been overcome since precise instructions have been issued, we have had some difficulties in the perfect classification of expenditures.

-Continuacion-

COMISIONES O DELEGACIONES (ANEXO "I-I")

Se extendieron durante el mes tres Checks que corresponden a lo siguiente:

a) Parte del Check No. 82 a nombre de Manuel A. Varona, por $1,917.68, del que se enviaron a la Delegacion de Mexico $200.00 mas los gastos del giro que ascendieron a $1.20.

b) Parte del Check No. 83 a nombre de Manuel A. Varona, por $928.43 del que se tomaron $100.00 que fueron entregados al Sr. R. Otero Berlaff para la Comision Obrera.

c) Total del Check No. 88 por $600.00 a nombre del Sr. Jose M. Hernandez para atender gastos de la Comision Obrera, digo, Juridica.

VARIOS (ANEXO "I-J")

Bajo este concepto se han agrupado aquellas partidas de gastos que por su naturaleza no ha sido facil clasificarlas especificamente dentro de las clasificaciones anteriores. Su importe total asciende a $1,332.49, y en el Anexo "I-J" aparece analizado este total.

CHECKS A JUSTIFICAR (ANEXO "I-K")

Bajo esta denominacion se han clasificado aquellos checks extendidos durante el mes, y que aun en Agosto 31 no se habian justificado los gastos incurridos con cargo a cada uno de ellos. Los recibos estan firmados, y tan pronto se reciban los justificantes de los mismos, dichos gastos seran clasificados y elevados inmediatamente.

GENERAL

Hemos tratado, cumpliendo las instrucciones recibidas, de rendir un informe de las operaciones del mes de Agosto, que se ajuste lo mas posible a las necesidades requeridas, y que abarque la mayor cantidad posible de informacion a los efectos de tener un enfoque rapido y preciso de las operaciones del mes.

Tal como se nos ha pedido, estamos enviando, conjuntamente con este informe todos los comprobantes, por orden correlativo, siguiendo la numeracion de los Checks extendidos. Debido a cierta desorganizacion en cuanto a la presentacion de los recibos, facturas, etc., que ya se esta superando, pues se han dado instrucciones precisas, hemos tenido dificultades para la perfecta clasificacion de los egresos.

De la revision de los mencionados comprobantes podran observarse ciertas anormalidades, mas bien en la forma que en el fondo. Por ejemplo, el Check No. 124 no ha sido justificado con los recibos, facturas, etc. correspondientes, si no con una relacion de gastos que aparece firmada por el Sr. Manuel Artime. El Check No. 126 tiene los comprobantes justificativos, pero en algunos casos no aparecen firmados por las personas que recibieron las cantidades consignadas y si por el Sr. Jose Arriola. Tambien se dieron instrucciones para evitar esto en el futuro.

-Continua-

Continuation

In reviewing the above-mentioned vouchers one can observe certain irregularities more in form than in funds. For example, check # 124 has not been justified with the corresponding receipts, invoices, etc., but with a list of expenses signed by Mr. Manuel Artime. Check # 126 does have the justifying receipts, but in some cases they are not signed by the persons who received the amounts consigned but were signed by Mr. Jose Arriola. Instructions were also issued to prevent this in the future.

Included in the receipts files are the bank deposit slips which correspond to all amounts deposited during the month of August to the "RASCO AND PAULA" account in the Florida National Bank and Trust Company.

-Continuacion-

Se incluyen en los Files de Comprobantes, los Slips de Depositos del Banco que responden a todas las cantidades depositadas durante el mes de Agosto en la cuenta "RASCO AND PAULA" del "The Florida National Bank and Trust Company".

-0-

A-3

1-30 September 1960

Miami

FASCO - PAULA

TRANSLATION

Miami, 6 October 1960

Executives
Democratic Revolutionary Front

Dear Sirs:

Attached herewith we are submitting the REPORT corresponding to the month of September of the current year which contains the following:

Statement "I": Statement of Receipts and Expenditures
- Bank Conciliation
Attachment "I-A": Assets
Attachment "I-B": Propaganda
Attachment "I-C": Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D": Payroll
Attachment "I-E": Trips
Attachment "I-F": Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G": Communications
Attachment "I-H": Students' Section
Attachment "I-I": Commissions or Delegations
Attachment "I-J": Checks to be Justified
- Summary of Receipts and Expenditures Operations
Statement "II": Liquidation of Checks to be Justified

Attentively,

(signed)
CP.* Juan Paula

(signed)
CP.* Mario Girbau

---

*Public accountant

Miami, Octubre 6 de 1960

Señores Ejecutivos
Frente Revolucionario Democrático

Señores:

Adjunto les estamos remitiendo el INFORME correspondiente al mes de Septiembre del corriente año, el cual contiene lo siguiente:

Estado "I": Estado de Ingresos y Egresos
- Conciliacion Bancaria
Anexo "I-A": Activos
Anexo "I-B": Propaganda
Anexo "I-C": Gastos de Administración y Generales
Anexo "I-D": Nomina.
Anexo "I-E": Viajes
Anexo "I-F": Manutención y Alquileres
Anexo "I-G": Comunicacion
Anexo "I-H": Seccion Estudiantil
Anexo "I-I": Comisiones o Delegaciones
Anexo "I-J": Checks a Justificar
- Resumen de las Operaciones de Ingresos y Egresos
Estado "II": Liquidación de checks a justificar

De Ustedes atentamente,

Juan Paula

CP. Juan Paula

CP. Mario Girbau

MG:amr.

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT

MIAMI DEPARTMENT OF FINANCES

1 to 30 September 1960

STATEMENT "I"

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

RECEIPTS:

Balance in Bank (9-1-1960)

Deposits:

6 September
6 September
8 September
14 September
16 September

Total Receipts

EXPENDITURES:

Attachment "I-A": Assets
Attachment "I-B": Propaganda
Attachment "I-C": Administrative and General Expenses
Attachment "I-D": Payroll
Attachment "I-E": Trips
Attachment "I-F": Sustenance and Rents
Attachment "I-G": Communications
Attachment "I-H": Students' Section
Attachment "I-I": Commissions or Delegations
Attachment "I-J": Checks to be Justified

Plus: Bank Charges:

Debit Memos

Total Cash Available in Bank on 9-30-1960

(1) In Statement "I" in the August report a total of cash available in bank was shown as $89.54 because according to a clarification given in the bank conciliation, check # 74 in the amount of $24.00, which was made void, had been considered as pending and increased the Cash Available in Bank to $113.54 which is correct.

cd for H.F.S.

ORIG : H.F.SWENSON:sm
UNIT TFW/SA
EXT : 7287
DATE : 14 JANUARY 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : SAN JOSE (INFO) JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

09z

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO SJOS INFO WAVE CITE DIR 10303

for AMBUD file

GYROSE

REF: A. SJOS 5487 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48782)
B. SJOS 5486 NOT SENT WAVE (IN 48778)

1. PBRUMEN EXILES MIAMI DRAFTED TWO POLICE PROPOSALS NEITHER OF WHICH REALISTIC AND NEITHER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY WITH KUBARK. ORGANIZATION OF STANDBY PBRUMEN SECURITY FORCES IMPORTANT BUT NOT URGENT UNTIL MATTER DISCUSSED OFFICIALLY AND FEASIBLE PLANS MADE. THEREFORE DO NOT WISH ENCOURAGE FURTHER PLANS WHICH MAY COMPLICATE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT AND BURN ASSETS.

2. DESPITE ABOVE HQS INTERESTED ASSESSING POTENTIAL ANY ASSET IN PBRUMEN FOR INFO COLLECTION. REQUEST SJOS ADVISE DETAILS IDEN REF B ACCESS TO PEOPLE OR DATA OF OPS OR INTEL VALUE, HIS SECURITY, COMMO AND TENTATIVE CONTACT PLAN.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH/3/COSTA RICA
C/WH/3

J.C.KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

14-6

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG : H.P.SWENSON:sm
UNIT : TFW/SA
EXT : 7287
DATE : 14 JANUARY 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : JMWAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : TFW 10
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, WH 7, S/C

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 10804

REF: DIR 10803

IDEN REF B MANUEL PEREZ BORROTO EX-BATISTA POLICE CAPTAIN NOW CIENFUEGOS.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WH/3/COSTA RICA
C/WH/3

J.C.KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

E.A.MARELIUS
C/TFW/FI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR
EXPENSES OUT OF THE
$81,500.00 Budget

INFORM

JULY 1 TO 31, 1962.

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT OF THE $81,500.00 budget for the month of JULY,1962

Annex	"I" :	Delegations (Special)	$ 5,400.00
Annex	"II" :	Propaganda	20,000.00
Annex	"III" :	Clandestineness	25,000.00
Annex	"IV" :	Judicatura Cubana Democrática	5,000.00
		Total Deposits:	$ 55,400.00

nn.

DELEGATIONS (Special)

July 31, 1962.

Annex "I"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 4,104.11
Deposit (For July)	5,400.00
	9,504.11
July Expenses (See Annex "I-A")	5,368.23
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 4,135.88

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

DELEGATIONS (Budget) SPECIAL

Annex "I-A"

DATE		CHECK NO.	IMPORT	TOTAL
July 3	Delegation of Brazil -expenses in June-	10698	$ 150.00	
" 6	Delegation of Mexico -expenses in June- (to justify)	10712	150.00	
" 6	Delegation of Costa Rica -expenses in June- (to justify)	10713	175.00	
" 6	Delegation of Panama -expenses in June-	10714	174.98	
" 10	Dr. Luis Botifoll -Fare Miami-New York-Miami-	10731	124.30	
" 10	Delegation of Mexico -expenses in June- (To justify July)	10738	800.00	
" 10	Delegation of Honduras -expenses in July to justify-	10740	175.00	
" 10	Delegation of Perú -expenses in July to justify-	10741	250.00	
" 10	Delegation of Brazil -expenses in July to justify-	10742	150.00	
" 10	Delegation of Guatemala -expenses in July to justify-	10743	175.00	
" 10	Delegation of Bolivia -expenses in July to justify-	10744	125.00	
" 10	Delegation of Colombia -expenses in July to justify-	10745	300.00	
" 10	Delegation of Santo Domingo -expenses in July to justify-	10746	100.00	
" 10	Delegation of Ecuador -expenses in July to justify-	10747	150.00	
" 10	Dr. Maximo Sorondo -Fare Miami-Sto. Domingo-Miami-	10753	121.95	
" 14	Dr. Manuel Braña -travel expenses to Caracas- (to justify)	10769	200.00	
" 14	Frank Días Silveira -travel expenses to Jamaica- (to justify)	10771	100.00	
" 14	José Valle Sotolongo -travel expenses to Chile-(to justify)	10772	100.00	
" 14	José Julio Fernández -travel expenses to Panamá- (to justify)	10773	100.00	
" 17	Francisco J. Ruíz Benítez -Fare Costa Rica-Miami-Costa Rica- (to justify)	10786	151.00	
" 18	Juan Morenza -expenses in a travel México-Miami-	10788	85.00	
" 19	Miguel de León -Fare Miami-Managua-Miami-	10791	168.00	
" 19	Pedro Aponte -Fare Miami-Bogotá-Miami-	10791	180.00	
" 21	José Julio Fernández -Fare Miami-Panamá-Miami-	10801	171.00	

(Continue on page No.2)

DELEGATIONS (SPECIAL)

Annex "I-A"
Page No.2

DATE			CHECK NO.	IMPORT	TOTAL
July	21	José Alonso Argüelles -Fare Miami-Tegucigalpa-Miami-	10301	$ 166.00	
"	24	Carlos Cibrian -postage stamps to deliver packets- (to justify)	10809	60.00	
"	25	Telephone: FR-4-0884 -Dr. Botifoll's services-	10819	188.72	
"	25	Dr. José I. Rasco -Fare to South América- (Uruguay, etc.)	10835	548.00	
"	30	Dr. Néstor Carbonell -Fare Miami-Washington-New York-Miami- Check No.10288 credited in difference.	10842	27.28	$ 5,368.23
		TOTAL:-			$ 5,368.23

nn.

PROPAGANDA

July 31, 1962

Annex "II"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 3,827.39
Deposit (For July)	20,000.00
	$ 23,827.39
July Expenses (See Annex "II-A")	20,537.13
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 3,290.26

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

PROPAGANDA

Annex "II-A"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
July 1	Budget Expenses	10630	$ 14,530.70	$ 14,530.70
	UNDERGROUND LEAVE			
July 23	Stamps for "Cuba en pie de Guerra"	10802	650.00	
" 23	To buy a used car	10803	300.00	
" 23	Impression of 50,000 suplement and underground leave	10804	1,622.25	
" 23	Material for "Cuba en pie de Guerra"	10805	160.00	
" 24	Material, stamps, etc.,	10810	192.88	
" 27	Material, stamps, etc.	10831	800.00	
" 30	Printed material	10844	90.43	3,815.56
	TRAVELS:			
July 2	Angel Cofiño -Fare Miami-New York-Berlin-New York-Miami-	10679	$ 704.62	
" 2	Pascasio Lineras -Fare Miami-New York-Berlin-New York-Miami-	10679	704.62	
" 10	Dr. José Morell Romero -Fare to Central America-	10732	171.00	
" 10	Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux -Fare to Central America-	10732	171.00	
" 10	Dr. José Morell Romero -travel expenses to Central Ametica-	10733	380.00	
" 10	Dr. Gustavo Ribeaux -travel expenses to Central America-	10734	380.00	2,511.24
	RADIO:			
July 6	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10718	$ 50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10763	50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10764	50.00	
" 12	Roberto Espin -radio program weekly-	10765	50.00	
" 16	W.R.U.L. Program (July 9 to August 8)	10780	1,099.75	1,299.75
				$ 22,157.25
July 31	LESS: Reimbursment			1,620.12
	Total:-			$ 20,537.13

NOTE: The $14,530.70 Budget Expenses correspond:

Review:	$13,175.90
Gral. Exp:	544.80
Delg. Exp:	310.00
	$14,530.70

CLANDESTINENESS

July 31, 1962

	Annex "III"
Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ 33,500.00
Deposit (For July)	25,000.00
	$ 58,500.00
July Expenses (See Annex "III-A")	19,000.00
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ 39,500.00

NOTE: The July 26, deposit will be considered in August Report.
This balance of $39,500.00 is due to the fact that amounts are not given to the - Organizations until they have justified the amounts previously handled to them.

nn.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"PAULA AND SOSA"
CLANDESTINENESS
JULY 1 TO 31, 1962.

Annex "I-T"

DATE			CHECK NO.	TOTAL
July	3	José Fernández Badué -M.D.C.- (July,1962)	10707	$ 4,000.00
"	10	Orlando Rodríguez -30 de Noviembre- (May,1962)	10757	4,000.00
"	12	Ricardo Lorie (July, 1962)	10766	1,000.00
"	14	Raúl Méndez Pírez -Rescate- (June, 1962)	10774	4,000.00
"	18	Pascasio Lineras (April, 1962)	10790	1,000.00
"	21	Orlando Rodríguez -30 de Noviembre- (June,62)	10812	4,000.00
"	21	Gerardo Quesada -A.R.D.- (July, 1962)	10813	1,000.00
			TOTAL:-	$ 19,000.00

nn.

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

July 31, 1962.

Annex "IV"

Balance on July 1, 1962.	$ -o-
Deposit (For July)	5,000.00
	$ 5,000.00
July Expenses (See Annex "IV-A")	5,000.00
Balance on July 31, 1962.	$ - -o-

NOTE: The July 26 deposit will be considered in August Report.

nn.

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
REPORT
July, 1962.

Annex "IV-A"

Document "A"	Receipt of the amount given by Consejo Revolucionario Cubano to "Judicatura - Cubana Democrática". (Check No.10612)	$ 5,000.00

DISBURSEMENTS:

Document	1	:	Alberto Bages Rojas	$ 147.05	
"	2	:	Jorge Boza Masvidal	147.05	
"	3	:	Francisco Calderin Tostte	147.05	
"	4	:	Antonio M. Campos Cárdenas	147.05	
"	5	:	René Cárdenas Abreu	147.05	
"	6	:	Adolfo G. Cuevas Rodríguez	147.05	
"	7	:	Gustavo Delgado Bacallao	147.05	
"	8	:	Raúl Delgado Poroda	147.05	
"	9	:	Tomás Diego Robbio	147.05	
"	10	:	Agustín Elizondo Sorize	147.05	
"	11	:	Ramiro Fernández Moris	147.05	
"	12	:	Juan A. García Hernández	147.05	
"	13	:	Manuel Hernández Hernández	147.05	
"	14	:	Dolores Herrera Herrera	147.05	
"	15	:	Néstor Hoed de Beche	147.05	
"	16	:	Eduardo Le Riverend Brusone	147.05	
"	17	:	Miguel F. Márquez de la Cerra	147.05	
"	18	:	Clara L. Martí Nodal	147.05	
"	19	:	José Moroll Romero	147.05	
"	20	:	Manuel E. Navas Aguilar	147.05	
"	21	:	Tomas G. Oria Ramos	147.05	
"	22	:	Roberto Ravelo Fiol	147.05	
"	23	:	Zenaida Reyes Reyes	147.05	
"	24	:	Gustavo Ribeaux Figueras	147.05	
"	25	:	Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel	147.05	
"	26	:	José M. Rodríguez Fernández	147.05	
"	27	:	Angel Segura Bustamante	147.05	
"	28	:	Olga Valdés Acosta	147.05	
"	29	:	Alberto de Córdoba Quesada	147.05	
"	30	:	Elio Nardo Báez	147.05	4,411.50

OTHERS:

Salary to the typist	$ 100.00
Typewriter rent	11.33
Suscription to the Miami Herald	2.17
Suscription to the Miami News	1.95
Transport expenses and others	31.20
Transport expenses and others	26.68
Office Supplies	71.15
Expenses pamphlet	71.33
Stamps	18.30
Office rent	150.00
Telephone	19.03

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

Annex "IV-A"
Page No.2

OTHERS: (Cont.)

Electricity	$	31.93	
Collection of the Revolutionary Law		10.00	
Repair to the air conditioned		45.00	$ 274.26
	Total:-		$ 5,001.57

NOTE: Amount in excess: $1.57. It was paid by Judicatura Cubana to complete the payments above mentioned.-

nn.

EXPENSES OUT OF THE

$81,500.00 Budget

January, 1962.

I, Juan Paula Báez, Comptroller, hereby certify that the Statement and Annexes enclosed in this Report for the month of January, 1962, that shows Incomes for $59,784.50; Expenses for $43,491.26, and Balance in Bank on January 1st, 1962, $6,412.73 and January 31,1962, $22,705.97, (Propaganda $17,305.97 and Delegation Especial $5,400.00), are to my knowledge - correct.

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Báez.
Comptroller.

Miami, February 22, 1962.

nnc.

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITS FOR EXPENSES OUT OF THE $81,500.00 Budget; for the Month of January, 1962.-

Annex "I"	Propaganda	$ 20,000.00
Annex "II"	Judicatura Cubana Democrática.	5,000.00
Annex "III"	Clandestinaje (Underground)	25,000.00
Annex "IV"	Operación Grieta	4,384.50
Annex "V"	Delegations (Special)	5,400.00
	Total:	$ 59,784.50

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I"

Balance on January 1, 1962.	$ 6,412.73
Deposit (January 5, 1962)	20,000.00
	$ 26,412.73
January Expenses (See Annex "I-A")	9,106.76
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ 17,305.97

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"

			Check No.		Total
		Revista Cubana Democrática			
Enero	3	Hugo del Cañal (Colaboración)	7672	$ 25.00	
"	3	Alfonso Luaces (Colaboración)	7673	30.00	
"	18	Entrega final primer número de la Revista.	7787	700.00	
"	18	Servicio gráfico	7788	200.00	
"	26	Envío a Latinoamerica de la Revista	7818	1,131.25	
"	26	Marcos Córdoba (colaboración)	7819	50.00	
" "	26	José Alfredo López (colaboración)	7820	25.00	
"	26	Guillermo Zamalea (colaboración)	7821	25.00	
"	26	Mario García Serra (colaboración)	7822	25.00	
"	26	Vicente Rodríguez (colaboración)	7823	50.00	
"	26	José Pintado(colaboración)	7824	50.00	
"	26	Alberto Arredondo (colaboración)	7825	100.00	
"	26	Alberto Gandero (colaboración)	7826	25.00	
"	26	Julio Salabarría (colaboración)	7827	25.00	
"	26	Lucas Morán (colaboración)	7828	50.00	
"	26	Hugo del Cañal (colaboración)	7830	25.00	
"	26	Servicio Gráfico (colaboración)	7831	200.00	
"	26	ler. pago impresión de la revista.	7832	700.00	
"	26	Transporte revista de la imprenta al lugar. de distribución	7834	50.00	
"	26	Envío a Latinoamérica de la Revista.	7835	364.80	
"	30	Gonzalo Jorrín (colaboración)	7839	50.00	

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"
Page 2.

		Check No.		Total
Enero 31	Sellos envío a latinoamérica la Revista.	7841	$ 680.00	
" 31	Fco. Pérez (colaboración)	7844	50.00	
" 31	Sorgio Piñero (colaboración)	7845	50.00	$ 4,681.05
	GENERALES			
Enero 10	Alquiler	7733	$ 90.00	
" 10	Electricidad	7736	18.22	
" 10	Agua	7737	3.15	
" 10	Teléfono	7738	34.34	
" 12	Varios	7752	50.00	
" 12	Apartado Postal	7753	6.00	
" 29	Alquiler de Febrero	7836	90.00	291.71
	OTROS			
Enero 15	Envío a Latinoamérica del Libro del Dr. Silió	7758	$ 150.00	
" 26	Sellos para enviar a Cuba hoja propaganda.	7833	200.00	
" 31	Hora Radial	7843	400.00	2,550.00
	VIAJES			
Enero 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -Antonio Collada-	7749	$ 180.00	
" 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -César Lancís-	7750	180.00	
" 11	Dietas viaje P.del Este -Carlos Rodríguez-	7751	160.00	
" 15	Dietas 14 días viaje P. del Este, Néstor Carbonell	7773	210.00	
" 15	Pasaje a P. del Este. -César Lancís-	7780	568.00	
" 16	Pasaje a P. del Este. -A. Collada-	7785	568.00	
" 19	Pasaje a Montevideo -C. Rodríguez.	7808	548.00	2,584.00
	Total:			$10,106.76

PROPAGANDA

Annex "I-A"
Page 3.

		Total Anterior:	$ 10,106.76
Ene, 31,	Menos:	Reintegro hecho por el Dr. Conte Agüero por cantidad no gastada, en pago envío hojas para Cuba, check #7833.	1,000.00
		TOTAL:	$ 9,106.76

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

Annex "II"

Deposit (January 5, 1962)	$	5,000.00
January Expenses (See Annex "II-A")		5,000.00
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$	---o---

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA

INFORME

Febrero, 1962.

Recibido del Consejo Revolucionario para la Judicatura Cubana Democrática, la cantidad de: $ 5,000.00

DESEMBOLSOS:

Documento	1	Alberto G. Bages Rojas	$ 147.05	
"	2	Jorge Boza Masvidal	147.05	
"	3	Francisco Calderín Teste	147.05	
"	4	Antonio M. Campos Cárdenas	147.05	
"	5	René Cárdenas Abreus	147.05	
"	6	Adolfo G. Cuevas Rdguez.	147.05	
"	7	Gustavo Delgado Bacallao	147.05	
"	8	Raúl Delgado Pereda	147.05	
"	9	Tomás G. Diogo Robbio	147.05	
"	10	Agustín Elizondo Serize	147.05	
"	11	Luis Espíndola Palacios	147.05	
"	12	Ramiro Fernández Moris	147.05	
"	13	Juan A. García Hernández	147.05	
"	14	Jorge Guerra Romero	147.05	
"	15	Manuel Hernández Hernández	147.05	
"	16	Dolores Herrera Herrera	147.05	
"	17	Néstor Hoed De Beche	147.05	
"	18	Eduardo Le Riverand	147.05	
"	19	Miguel F. Márquez	147.05	
"	20	Clara L. Martí Nodal	147.05	
"	21	José Morell Romero	147.05	
"	22	Elio Nardo Báez	147.05	
"	23	Manuel E. Navas Aguilar	147.05	
"	24	Tomás G. Oria Ramos	147.05	
"	25	Inés M. Puig Sánchez	147.05	
"	26	Roberto M. Ravelo Fiol	147.05	
"	27	Zenaida Reyes Reyes	147.05	
"	28	Gustavo de Ribeaux Figueras	147.05	
"	29	Fernando A. Roa Uriarte	147.05	
"	30	Leoncio Rodríguez Esquivel	147.05	
"	31	José M. Rodríguez	147.05	
"	32	Angel Segura Bustamante	147.05	
"	33	Olga Valdés Acosta	147.05	
"	34	Alberto de Córdova Quesada	147.05	$4,999.70

Superávit de Febrero: $ 0.30

JUDICATURA CUBANA DEMOCRATICA
276 N. E. 25th STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA

TEL.
37-4-5256

Febrero 19 de 1962.

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Vice Presidentes:
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DR. F. A. ROA URIARTE
Secretaria:
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Vice Secretario:
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Tesorero:
DR. G. DELGADO BACALLAO
Vice Tesorero:
DR. R. FERNANDEZ MORIS

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Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo
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E. LE RIVEREND BRUSONE
Presidente de Audiencia
M. HERNANDEZ HERNANDEZ
Presidente de Sala de Audiencia
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Magistrados de Audiencia
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L. ESPINOSA PALACIOS
R. RAVELO VIDAL
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J. BOZA MASVIDAL
F. CALDERIN TOSTE
R. CARDENAS ABREU
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J. M. RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ
O. VALDES ACOSTA
Fiscales:
A. SEGURA BUSTAMANTE
M. A. FALCON MOREJON
J. GUERRA ROMERO
E. NARDO BAEZ

Sres. Paula y Sosa,
Miami. Fla.
(Por conducto del Dr.José Alvarez Díaz)

Estimados amigos:

Con fecha primero del corriente mes nos fué entregada la cantidad de $5.000.00 dollares (cinco-mil dollares), y de acuerdo con lo solicitado por ustedes, me es muy grato justificar el empleo de dicha suma con los recibos correspondientes que por duplicado se acompañan.

Cantidad recibida	$ 5.000.00
34 entregas a $147.05..................	$ 4.999.70
Diferencia......$	0.30

Les ruego el acuse de recibo.

Quedo de Uds. muy atentamente,

Dr.Gustavo Delgado Bacallao
Tesorero.

ADJUNTOS: 34 recibos por duplica-do.

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, Febrero 5 de 1962.

ORIGINAL

Albert Bages
Alberto C. Bages Rojas

1

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Leoncio Rodriguez Esquivel

30

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

José [illegible]. Rodríguez Fernández

31

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Rafael Segura Bustamante.

32

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos-importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Olga Valdés Acosta

33

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática" la cantidad de Cien to cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

DUPLICADO

Alberto de Cordova Quesada

34

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Jorge Boza Masvidal

2

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Francisco Calderin Tosto

3

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.---

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB. 8 1962

ORIGINAL

Antonio I. Campos Cárdenas

4

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

René Cárdenas Abreus

⑤

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05   Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Adolfo G.Cuevas Rodríguez

6

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Gustavo [illegible] Escallao

⑦

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Raúl Delgado Preda

8

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollars cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Tomas C.Diego Robbio

⑨

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Agustin Elizondo Sorize

10

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática" la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares 5 centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente mes.

SON $147.05 Miami, 5 de Febrero de 1962.

~~DUPLICADO~~
ORIGINAL

Luis Espíndola Palacios

HAGO CONSTAR: Que con fecha 8 de Febrero de 1962 se remitió al Dr. Luis Espíndola Paladios, la cantidad relacionada.

Gustavo Delgado Bacallao,
Tesorero

11

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05   Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Ramiro Fernandez [illegible]

12

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05

FEB 5 1962

Miami, 2-5-62

ORIGINAL

Juan A. Garcia [illegible]

13

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete collares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

J[illegible] [illegible]rra Negro

14

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Manuel Fernández Hernández

15

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Dolores Herrera Herrera

16

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Nestor Hoed De Becho y Perdomo

17

6

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

EDUARDO LE RIVEREND [illegible]SONE

18

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962.

ORIGINAL

Miguel F. Márquez de la Cerra

19

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Clara L. Martí Nodal

20

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

J.O. Ramorell

José Morell Romero

21

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.--

SON $ 147.05   Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Elio Pardo

Elio Pardo Paez

22

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente---mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Manuel S.Navas Aguilar

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05

Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Tomás G. Cria Ramos

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Ines M.Ruiz Sánchez

25

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente-- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Roberto [illegible]. Ravelo Riol

26

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos. importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.--

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Dra. [illegible] Reyes.

Zenaida [illegible] Reyes

27

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares cinco centavos importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, FEB 5 1962

ORIGINAL

Gustavo de Ribeaux Figueras

28

HE RECIBIDO de "Judicatura Cubana Democrática la cantidad de Ciento cuarenta y siete dollares 5 centavos----- importe de la asignación correspondiente al presente--- mes.---

SON $ 147.05 Miami, Febrero 9 de 1962.

ORIGINAL

Fernando A. Roa Uriarte

29

HAGO CONSTAR que con fecha Febrero 8 de 1962, se remitió al Dr. Fernando Arsenio Roa Uriarte, la cantidad relacionada.-

Gustavo Delgado Bacallao
Tesorero.

UNDERGROUND

Annex "III"

Deposit (January 5, 1962)	$ 25,000.00
January Expenses (See Annex III-A)	25,000.00
Balance on January 31, 1962	$ ---o---

CLANDESTINAJE.

" Annex III-A"

Enero 1, 1962:

	Check No.	Total
Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7763	$ 4,000.00
Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7764	4,000.00
Movimiento Rescate Democrático	7765	4,000.00
Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7766	4,000.00
Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7767	2,500.00
Agrupación Montecristi	7768	2,500.00
Higinio Díaz	7769	1,000.00
Ricardo Lorié	7770	1,000.00
Pascasio Lineras	7771	1,000.00
Movimiento Triple-A-Independiente	7783	1,000.00
Total:		$ 25,000.00

"OPERACION GRIETA"

Annex "IV"

Deposit (January 19, 1962)	$ 4,384.50
January Expenses (See Annex "IV-A"_	4,384.50
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ ---o---

OPERACION GRIETA:

Annex "IV-A"

		Check No.	Total
Enero 9,	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-José Morell Romero.	7722	$ 100.00
" 9	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-Luis Figueroa	7724	100.00
" 9	Gastos iniciales de visas, etc,-Eduardo Le Riverand	7726	100.00
" 11	Pasajes gira, América Latina y P. del Este, por - los Dres. Morell Romero, Figueroa y Le Riverand.	7741	1,719.00
" 11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo. Chile-Valparaíso,-Dr. Morell Romero	7742	38.50
" 11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo.Chile-Valparaíso, Dr. Figueroa	7743	38.50
" 11	Pasaje extra de Córdoba a Rosario y Stgo.Chile-Valparaíso, Dr. Le Riverand.	7744	38.50
" 11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Morell Romero	7745	750.00
" 11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Figueroa	7746	750.00
" 11	Dietas por 50 días de -- viaje, Dr. Le Riverand.	7747	750.00
	Total:		$ 4,384.50

DELEGATIONS (Special)

	Annex "V"
Deposit (January 25, 1962)	$ 5,400.00
January Expenses (No Annex)	--o--
Balance on January 31, 1962.	$ 5,400.00

14-00000

"[illegible]"

REPORT

DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

I, Juan Paula Báez, Comptroller, hereby certify that the Statement and Annexes enclosed in this "PAULA AND SOSA" Report for the month of December, 1961, that shows Incomes of $396,668.74, balance in our books on December 1, 1961, $34,597.97, - Expenses for $115,256.01, and Transferences for $275,000.00 are to my knowledge correct.- - - -

Juan Paula

Juan Paula Báez
Comptroller.

Miami, February 5, 1962.

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
STATEMENT OF INCOMES AND EXPENSES
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

STATEMENT "I"

Balance in our books on December 1, 1961			$ 30,597.97
DEPOSITS:			
Annex "I-A": From Finance Department		$ 396,463.74	
Annex "I-B": Refund check Esther Perdomo		100.00	
Annex "I-C": Reimbursement Cuban Democratic Judicature		105.00	396,668.74
			$ 427,266.71
LESS: Reimbursed to Finance Department			105.00
TOTAL OF INCOMES:-			$ 427,161.71
EXPENSES:			
Annex "I-D": Payroll	$ 27,305.00		
Annex "I-E": Travels	2,493.53		
Annex "I-F": General Expenses	10,135.99		
Annex "I-G": Delegations	15,195.04		
Annex "I-H": Military Committee	4,250.00		
Annex "I-I": Monroe Hotel	779.41		
Annex "I-J": Heroes and Martyrs	2,540.00		
Annex "I-K": Executives	4,550.00		
Annex "I-L": Social Work	5,104.67		
Annex "I-M": Medical Section	1,836.45		
Annex "I-N": Council President's Office	3,000.00		
Annex "I-O": Vice [illegible] Office	2,061.91		
Annex "I-P": Organizations	2,500.00		
	(1)	$ 81,795.00	
Annex "I-Q": Transferences		$ 275,000.00	
Annex "I-R": Underground		$ 25,000.00	
Annex "I-S": Trip of Dr. Conte Agüero to South America		$ 4,500.00	
Annex "I-T": J.C.D. (Continental lockout expenses)		$ 258.74	
Annex "I-U": Propaganda		$ 3,597.27	$ 390,151.01
BALANCE IN OUR BOOKS ON DECEMBER 31, 1961			(2) $ 37,010.70

(continue page No.2)

14-00000

STATEMENT OF INCOMES AND EXPENSES

STATEMENT #1
PAGE NO. 2

NOTE (1): This amount represents the spent with charge to the Budget of $81,500.00. There is an excess of $205.00 that correspond to $100.00 reimbursed by the Bank because of a check to the order of Esther Perdomo which was ordered the stop payment and the Bank paid it unduly, and $105.00 spent in excess but which will be deducted from the Budget of January 1962.

NOTE (2): This total amount includes $6,412.73 that correspond to the non spent by the Propaganda Committee in the month of December from the total deposited of $10,000.00 for same.

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
CONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

STATEMENT "II"

Balance as per Bank Statement on December 31, 1961 $ 53,249.85

LESS: Unpaid checks:

DATE	NAME	CHECK NO.	TOTAL
August 5	Jesús Marinas	5438	$ 350.00
Nov. 1	Pedro León Muiño	6628	150.00
" 29	Luis del Valle	6935	50.00
Dec. 1	Manuel González	7009	200.00
" 1	Leslie Nóbregas	7041	202.50
" 1	Pedro León Muiño	7129	150.00
" 1	Jesús Marinas	7177	100.00
" 1	Frank Díaz Silveira	7192	400.00
" 1	Frank Díaz Silveira	7193	100.00
" 1	Aida Rosette	7194	250.00
" 8	Frank Díaz Silveira	7234	304.00
" 11	José M. Sánchez	7263	66.10
" 14	Aurelio Fernández Díaz	7286	242.13
" 14	César Baró	7291	2,000.00
" 15	M. A. de Varona	7307	500.00
" 15	Pascasio Lineras	7315	1,500.00
" 19	Hyman Merlin, M.D.	7324	295.00
" 20	Julio César Soto	7332	175.00
" 20	Manuel Vieites Brey	7335	175.00
" 21	César Baró	7341	2,000.00
" 21	Francisco Carrillo	7346	1,000.00
" 21	Pascasio Lineras	7349	1,500.00
" 21	Antonio Silió	7350	66.00
" 26	Jeanette V. Holmes	7362	60.00
" 26	Pan American Business Mach.	7365	61.71
" 26	Emilio Rubido	7366	50.00
" 26	Wendell Rollason	7367	75.00
" 27	Department of Waters & Sewers	7371	7.50
" 27	Kirsten Air & SS Agency	7372	97.41
" 28	Antonio G. Solar	7374	925.00
" 28	Silvio Fontanilla	7375	200.00
" 28	El Popular	7376	175.00
" 28	W. M. I. E.	7377	200.00
" 28	Kirsten Air & SS Agency	7378	57.31
" 30	José Alfredo López	7379	25.00
" 30	Mario García Serra	7380	25.00
" 30	Vicente Rodríguez	7381	50.00
" 30	José Pintado	7382	50.00
" 30	Alberto Arredondo	7383	100.00
" 30	Marcos Córdova	7384	50.00

(Continue page No.2)

RECONCILIATION OF THE BANK STATEMENT

STATEMENT "II"
PAGE NO. 2

DATE		NAME	CHECK NO.	TOTAL	
Dec.	30	Julio Salcitarría	7385	$ 25.00	
"	30	Guillermo Canales	7386	25.00	
"	30	Alina López	7386-A	25.00	
"	30	Jesús Valdés Crespo	7386-B	25.00	
"	30	Lucas Morán	7386-C	50.00	
"	30	Jesús Alonso	7386-D	303.50	
"	30	Luis Conte	7386-E	500.00	
"	30	Luis Conte	7386-F	58.77	
"	30	José I. Rasco	7386-G	600.00	
"	30	Popular	7386-H	175.00	
"	30	Claudio Sánchez	7386-I	124.46	
"	30	Nelio Lugo	7386-J	150.00	
"	30	Natalia Navarro	7386-K	127.76	
"	30	Wilfredo Leiva	7386-L	65.00	16,239.15
		BALANCE IN OUR BOOKS ON DECEMBER 31, 1961			$ 37,010.70

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
DEPOSITS FROM FINANCE DEPARTMENT
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-A"

DATE	TOTAL
December 5, 1961	$ 200,000.00
December 6, 1961	156,500.00
December 14, 1961 (Underground)	25,000.00
December 20, 1961 (Cuban Democratic Judicature)	363.74
December 21, 1961 (Trip of Conte Agüero)	4,600.00
December 28, 1961 (Propaganda)	10,000.00
TOTAL:-	$ 396,463.74

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
[illegible] 1961

[illegible] "I-D"

	TOTAL
Banking credit because of unduly payment of check in the name of Esther Pardomo which was ordered stop payment.	$ 100.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"LAURA AND JUAN"
REIMBURSEMENT CUBAN DEMOCRATIC JUDICATURE
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-C"

	TOTAL
Amount non spent of the total of $363.74 given to them and reimbursed	$ 105.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
PAYROLL
[illegible] 1 TO 31,1961

ANNEX "I-D"

	CHECK NO.		T O T A L
DR. MIRO'S OFFICE:			
Ernesto Aragón	6952	$ 400.00	
Ramiro Boza	6953	250.00	
Nicanor Díaz	6954	250.00	
María Antonia Ferrer	6956	200.00	
Ascensión Pérez	6957	300.00	
Andrés Quintian Noas	6958	225.00	
Elda Ramos	6959	225.00	
Mercedes Sánchez	6960	225.00	
Antonio Silió	6961	350.00	
Marcelo Fernández	7281	200.00	$ 2,625.00
COMPTROLLER OFFICE:			
Guillermo Bermello	7006	$ 300.00	
Zoila Duménigo	7007	100.00	
Mario Cirbau	7008	250.00	
Manuel González Fernández	7009	200.00	
Julio Moralejo	7010	250.00	
Teresa Oti	7011	200.00	
Juan Paula Báez	7012	350.00	
Humberto Rodríguez Rodríguez	7013	150.00	
Guillermo Tabraue	7014	150.00	
Natalia Navarro	7051	225.00	2,175.00
OFFICE EMPLOYEES:			
Israel Algaze	6962	$ 180.00	
Manuel Alonso	6964	157.50	
Juan Fco. Avila Ruiz	6965	112.50	
Mario Barreras	6966	180.00	
Ricardo Cabrera	6967	135.00	
Angel Castillo	6968	225.00	
Carlos Cibrián	6969	135.00	
Ana Ma. Cueto	6970	135.00	
Yolanda Cura	6971	135.00	
Jorge A. Estrada	6972	157.50	
Roberto Fernández Fichs	6973	112.50	
Oscar de Freixas	6974	202.50	
Ernesto Freyre	6975	247.50	

(Continue page No.2)

PAYROLL

ANNEX "I-D"
PAGE NO. 2

OFFICE EMPLOYEES (Cont.):	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
Tomás Gamba	7223	$ 300.00	
Camilo García	6977	157.50	
Julio C. García	6978	157.50	
Gema Ginoris	6979	135.00	
Pedro González	6980	90.00	
Margarita Herrera	6981	90.00)	
" "	7232	30.00)	
Delfín Iñiguez	6982	112.50	
Armando de León	6983	225.00	
Francisco Maso	6984	112.50	
Angela Parez	6985	157.50	
Sotero F. Pérez	6986	112.50	
Adolfo Rivero	6987	112.50	
Mario Rodríguez	6988	130.00	
Yolanda Rubio	6989	157.50	
Luis Ruisánchez	6990	225.00	
Claudio Sánchez	6991	135.00	
Carlos Solís	6992	200.00	
José P. Suárez	6993	112.50	
Néstor Suárez	6994	202.50	
Carlos Alvarez	6995	112.50	
Juventino Báez	6996	247.50	
Humberto Figueras	6997	247.50	
Pedro Leyva	6998	157.50	
Pedro Martínez	6999	300.00	
Vitalio Ruiz	7000	202.50	
Clara Park	7001	202.50	
Otalio Sosa Llanes	7002	300.00	
Carlos Forment	7003	247.50	
Matilde Peláez	7004	225.00	
Miguel Adolfo García	7005	247.50	
Gladys Martínez	7222	150.00	7,710.00
RESCATE:			
Fernando Alloza	7019	$ 225.00	
Migdolidia Batard	7020	135.00	
Josefina Bujones	7021	247.50	
Andrés Campillo	7022	202.50	
Mario del Cañal	7023	225.00	
Ramiro Fernández	7024	180.00	
Ignacio Freixas	7025	180.00	
José Nápoles	7026	202.50	
Celso Pimienta	7027	225.00	
Pedro Rivera	7028	135.00	
Manuel Rivero Setién	7029	135.00	
Humberto Rodríguez Saborit	7030	202.50	
Vicente A. Romero	7031	157.50	
Abel de Varona Loredo	7032	247.50	
Francisco A. Zayas	7033	247.50	2,947.50

(Continue page No.3)

PAYROLL

[illegible]
PAGE No. [illegible]

MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO:

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
Osvaldo Aguirre	7052	$ 157.50	
Rafael Aguirre	7053	225.00	
Jorge del Alamo	7054	225.00	
Fritz Appel	7055	270.00	
Hilda Barrios	7056	135.00	
Rafael Bergolla	7057	225.00	
Reinaldo Brugge	7058	225.00	
Thelma Carregado	7059	150.00	
Fermín Fleitas	7060	270.00	
César Madrid	7061	135.00	
Jorge Mas	7062	180.00	
Fermín Peinado	7063	270.00	
Danilo Puig	7064	225.00	
Juan M. Rodríguez	7065	135.00	
Arquímedes Texidor	7066	180.00	3,007.50

MONTECRISTI:

Miguel Abril	7034	$ 135.00	
Arístides Agüero	7035	135.00	
Ana J. Fernández	7036	157.50	
Tomás González	7037	90.00	
Primitivo Lima	7038	157.50	
Moisés López	7039	90.00	
Agustina Martell	7040	90.00	
Leslie Nóbregas	7041	202.50	
Pedro Peñaranda	7042	180.00	
José J. Rodríguez	7043	225.00	
Jorge Salazar	7044	180.00	
José Salazar	7046	202.50	
José M. Sánchez	7047	247.50	
Migdalia Sardiñas	7048	90.00	
Andrés Suárez	7049	180.00	
José I. Zárraga	7050	100.00	2,462.50

30 DE NOVIEMBRE:

Edelmiro Alfaro	7075	$ 157.50	
Antonio Baños	7076	225.00	
Eduardo Fernández	7077	157.50	
Napoleón González	7078	157.50	
Juan Mosquera	7079	157.50	
Samuel Pérez	7080	157.50	
Anastasio Quintero	7081	157.50	
Alfredo Rodríguez	7082	157.50	
Felipe Sánchez	7083	157.50	1,485.00

(Continue page No.4)

PAYROLL

ANNEX [illegible]
PAGE No.4

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
MOVIMIENTO RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA:			
José J. Carugol	7067	$ 202.50	
Pilar García Rubio	7068	135.00	
Ambrosio González del Valle	7069	240.00	
Manuel Guillot	7070	125.00	
Ernesto Peynó	7071	250.00	
Rafael Rivas	7072	180.00	
Luis Socarrás	7073	180.00	
José R. Villavicencio	7074	202.50	1,515.00
ING. CARLOS HEVIA'S OFFICE:			
Manuel Arán	7016	$ 175.00	
René Mendiola	7017	175.00	
María C. Alonso	7018	200.00	550.00
ACCION REVOLUCIONARIA DEMOCRATICA:			
Salvador Ferrer	7084	$ 202.50	
Ramón Iglesias	7085	225.00	
Gerardo Quesada	7086	225.00	652.50
20 DE MAYO:			
Ofelia Oms	7087	$ 150.00	
Santiago Cuba	7221	150.00	
Héctor Martínez	7220	150.00	450.00
SERGIO CARBO'S OFFICE:			
José Arriola	7015	$ 200.00	200.00
DR. MACEO'S OFFICE:			
Manuel Fernández	7088	$ 150.00	150.00
PROPAGANDA OFFICE:			
Angel del Cerro	7356	$ 350.00	
Clara R. Alvarez	7357	100.00	
Bernardo Barrié	7358	100.00	
Adele Escudero	7359	75.00	
Roberto Pérez Abreu	7360	75.00	
Juan José Martínez	7361	75.00	775.00

(Continue page No.5)

PAYROLL

ANNEX "[illegible]"
PAGE NO. 5

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
DR. LUIS CONTE AGUERO'S CENTER:			
Guillermo Alcina	7322	$ 150.00	
María del Carmen Dellundé	7321	150.00	
José Pintada	7320	200.00	500.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 27,205.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-E"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 8	Fares Habana-Miami - Alberto Pérez Sordo family	7237	$ 100.00
" 14	1 Fare Miami-New York-Baltimore-Washington-Miami - Dr. Varona 1 Fare Miami-New York-Miami - Ramón Ruisánchez 1 Fare Miami-New York-Miami - Dr. Hertas	7288	449.87
" 14	2 Fares Habana-Miami - Zorilla Cervantes and Ma. Guadalupe del Busto - Wife and daughter of Octavio del Busto	7289	37.50
" 15	Fares Mexico-Miami - Wife and two sons of Wilfredo Leyva	7302	250.00
" 15	Fares Miami-Guatemala-Panamá-Bogotá-Caracas-Miami - Dr. Varona	7306	329.40
" 15	Travel expenses - Dr. Varona	7307	500.00
" 18	Fares Miami-New York-Miami - Lineras and Maceip	7317	215.60
" 19	Fare Halifax, Nova Scotia-Miami - Dinorah Rodríguez	7319	104.00
" 21	Fare New Jersey-Miami - Mother of Frank Díaz Silveira	7340	42.00
" 22	Fare Miami-New Orleans-Miami - Luis Ruisánchez	7351	99.44
" 22	Fare Miami-San José-Miami - José Julio Fernández	7352	161.00
" 22	Fare Miami-Washington - Néstor Carbonell	7354	57.31
" 26	Fare Habana-Miami - Daughter and son-in-law of Emilio Rubido	7366	50.00
" 27	Fare Iaso-Miami - José Acosta Fernández	7372	97.41
	TOTAL:-		$ 2,493.53

ml.

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-F"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	OFFICE RENTS:			
Dec. 1	1700 Biscayne Blvd.	7164	$ 600.00	
" 1	Confidential rent	7166	80.00	
" 1	Comptroller Office (Room 25)	7167	60.00	
" 26	Comptroller Office (Room 24)	7362	60.00	$ 800.00
	TELEPHONES:			
Dec. 8	Calls against executions - J. Fundora	7238	$ 193.52	
" 11	Balance telephone CE-5-1985 (Comptroller Office - Kendall)	7274	17.27	
" 11	HI-4-3471 Comptroller Off. (Civil)	7275	27.89	
" 11	448-5653 Comptroller Off. (Military)	7276	51.17	
" 11	448-5622 Comptroller Off. (Military)	7277	83.60	
" 11	FR-1-7363 (Biscayne)	7284	26.29	
" 15	Long distance call - Dr. E. Aragón	7310	141.96	
" 26	FR-4-0884 (Biscayne)	7363	224.42	
" 26	FR-4-2630-38-39 (Biscayne Telephone Board)	7364	382.29	1,148.41
	OFFICE SUPPLIES:			
Dec. 11	Addressograph plates (Comptroller Office - Military)	7273	$ 23.33	
" 18	Miscellaneous supplies	7318	108.72	132.05
	EQUIPMENT RENT:			
Dec. 11	Typewriters, stands, etc.	7270	$ 272.44	
" 11	Ice box - Comptroller Office (Civil)	7271	20.60	
" 14	Three typewriters	7290	83.43	
" 26	Typewriters	7365	58.71	435.18
	OTHERS:			
Dec. 1	Watch Comptroller Office (Civil)	7120	$ 75.00	
" 1	Legal expenses agreement	7121	200.00	
" 1	Favorable actions - Norman Díaz	7122	300.00	
" 7	Gasoline	7230	36.29	
" 8	Repair of ship Ricardo [illegible]	7249	300.00	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Biscayne)	7254	495.94	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Dr. Miró's office)	7258	589.45	
" 11	Reimbursement revolving fund (Dr. Miró's office - Balance last month)	7259	193.[illegible]	
" 11	Gasoline - R. Cabrera	7261	37.[illegible]	

(Continue page No.2)

GENERAL EXPENSES

OTHERS (Cont.)

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 11	Expenses in Immigration - Israel Algaze	7262	$ 75.00
" 11	Expenses and gasoline - J.M. Sánchez	7263	66.10
" 11	Legal expenses	7265	3.86
" 11	Balance expenses Democratic Training School	7266	44.40
" 11	Compensation for damages in the house 914 N.W. 12 St. (Recruiting Office)	7267	391.00
" 11	Laundry - 1700 Biscayne Blvd.	7268	13.40
" 11	Electricity - 5260 S.W. 3 St. (Comptroller Off.-Military)	7269	22.87
" 11	Cleanness of 17 typewriters	7272	34.00
" 11	Help only one time - Enrique Rodríguez	7279	62.50
" 13	Expenses asylum in Argentine Embassy - Oliverio Tomeu	7282	135.00
" 14	Reimburment revolving fund - Comptroller Office	7285	307.19
" 14	Expences of booklet Accounting Association	7286	242.13
" 14	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Silvio Llovio	7299	150.00
" 15	Help ordered by Dr. Miró - Marcos A. Irigoyen	7303	225.00
" 15	Expences in nonfulfilment contract Mr. Stringer (José Arriola matter)	7304	400.00
" 18	Help only one time - René Román Miyayo	7312	125.00
" 20	Agreement for interior audit	7326	125.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Leovigildo Salom	7327	225.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Tomás Salom	7328	200.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Pedro Vera Ortiz	7329	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Efrain Bermudes	7330	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Segundo Vega García	7331	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Julio César Soto Camacho	7332	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - René Ravelo	7333	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Luis M. Iglesias	7334	175.00
" 20	Expenses asylum in Embassy - Manuel Vieites Frey	7335	175.00

([illegible] page No. [illegible])

GENERAL EXPENSES

ANNEX "I-F"
PAGE NO. 3

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	OTHERS (Cont.)			
Dec. 21	Program in W.M.E.T. - 30 de Noviembre	7338	50.00	
" 21	Gasoline - R. Cabrera	7339	29.54	
" 21	Mail to South America of the book "Tres Aspectos y Un Mensaje de la Revolución Cubana"	7350	66.00	
" 22	Help for one time - Isabel Pérez	7355	100.00	
" 26	Cleanness of typewriter	7365	3.00	
" 26	Reimbursment revolving fund -1700 Biscayne Blvd. Office	7368	485.64	
" 27	Reimbursment revolving fund - Comptroller Office	7369	130.85	
" 27	Water - 914 N.W. 12 St. (Recruiting Office)	7371	7.50	
" 30	Expenses in Embassy - Nelio Lugo	7386J	150.00	
" 30	Reimbursment revolving fund	7386K	127.76	
" 30	Wilfredo Leyva	7386L	65.00	
	Reimbursment to Finance Department by restitution from Cuban Judicature-Check 7336	7373	105.00	7,620.35
		TOTAL:-		$ 10,135.99

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-G"

DATE		CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHERS	TOTAL
	LATIN:				
	ARGENTINA				
Dec. 1	Manuel Braña	7169	$ 400.00		
" 1	Vitalio de la Torre	7170	200.00		
" 1	Leonardo Bravo	7171	100.00		
			$ 700.00		$ 700.00
	COLOMBIA				
Dec. 1	Eddy Leal	7187	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7188		$ 150.00	
" 1	Máximo Sorondo	7189	300.00		
" 1	Roberto Ruiz	7190	150.00		
" 1	Roberto Halfán	7191	150.00		
			$ 900.00	$ 150.00	1,050.00
	COSTA RICA				
Dec. 1	Francisco J. Ruiz Benítez	7200	$ 300.00		
" 1	José Julio Fernández	7201	300.00		
" 1	Budget	7202		$ 200.00	
" 1	Fare Miami-Costa Rica Francisco J. Ruiz	7236		95.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 295.00	895.00
	HONDURAS				
Dec. 1	José Alonso Argüelles	7203	$ 200.00		
			$ 200.00		200.00
	PERU				
Dec. 1	Raul de Juan	7178	$ 400.00		
" 1	Armando Cruz Cobo	7179	200.00		
" 1	Budget	7180		$ 300.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 300.00	900.00
	CHILE				
Dec. 1	Max Azicri Levy	7181	$ 400.00		
" 1	Budget	7182		$ 350.00	
" 1	Eulalio González	7183	40.00		
			$ 440.00	$ 350.00	790.00
	BOLIVIA				
Dec. 1	Jesus Marinas	7175	$ 350.00		
" 1	Miguel Nápoles	7176	250.00		
" 1	Budget	7177		$ 100.00	
			$ 600.00	$ 100.00	700.00
	URUGUAY				
Dec. 1	Frank Diaz Silveira	7192	$ 400.00		

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DELEGATIONS

EXHIBIT "I-G"
PAGE NO. 2

DATE		CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHERS	TOTAL
	URUGUAY (Cont.)				
Dec. 1	Budget	7193		$ 100.00	
" 1	Hilda Rosette	7194	250.00		
" 8	Fare Uruguay-Miami-Uruguay - F. Diaz Silveira	7234		304.00	
			$ 650.00	$ 404.00	1,054.00
	ECUADOR				
Dec. 1	Horacio Ledón	7184	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7185		$ 100.00	
" 1	Evelio Cervantes	7186	100.00		
			$ 400.00	$ 100.00	500.00
	GUATEMALA				
Dec. 1	Orlando Núñez Pérez	7204	$ 300.00		
" 1	Budget	7205		$ 200.00	
" 1	José Luis Valdés Martí	7206	200.00		
			$ 500.00	$ 200.00	700.00
	SALVADOR				
Dec. 1	José M. Tarafa	7207	$ 300.00		
" 1	Fare Miami-Salvador-Miami - Fermín Pérez	7235		$ 187.60	
			$ 300.00	$ 187.60	487.60
	PANAMA				
Dec. 1	Heriberto Corona	7198	$ 350.00		
" 1	Budget	7199		$ 88.99	
			$ 350.00	$ 88.99	438.99
	BRAZIL				
Dec. 1	Angel Aparicio	7172	$ 400.00		
" 1	Francisco Domínguez	7173	200.00		
" 1	Héctor Garmendía	7174	300.00		
			$ 900.00		900.00
	VENEZUELA				
Dec. 1	Francisco Cayrol	7195	$ 450.00		
" 1	Manuel Quesada	7196	300.00		
" 1	José Valle	7197	200.00		
			$ 950.00		950.00
	DELEGATIONS CONTROL				
Dec. 1	Orlando Gómez Gil	7208	$ 200.00		
" 1	José I. Rasco	7209	350.00		
" 7	Travel expenses	7227		$ 50.00	
" 7	Fare Miami-Venezuela-Miami - José Valle	7228		260.00	

(Continua page No.3)

DELEGATIONS

ANNEX "I-G"
[illegible] NO. 1

DATE			CHECK NO.	PAYROLL	OTHERS	TOTAL
		DELEGATIONS [illegible] (Cont.)				
Dec.	7	Fare Miami-Venezuela-Miami - Angel Cofiño	7229		$ 260.00	
"	8	Excess in expenses trip to Central America	7233		155.40	
"	15	Expenses trip Costa Rica and Guatemala - José J. Fernández	7308		200.00	
"	15	Travel expenses to New Orleans - L. Ruizsánchez	7309		80.00	
"	18	Photos and photostat - copies	7313		60.00	
"	18	Round trip to Boston - Sr. Karreño	7314		109.74	
				$ [illegible]50.00	$ 1,[illegible].14	1,625.14
		TOTAL LATINS:-				$ 11,890.73
		AMERICAN:				
		New York				
Dec.	1	Sergio Aparicio	7210	$ 300.00		
"	1	Efrén Hernández	7211	225.00		
"	1	César Rodríguez Lago	7212	200.00		
"	1	Raul Torres	7213	275.00		
"	1	Budget	7214		$ 600.00	
				$ 1,000.00	$ 600.00	$ 1,600.00
		WASHINGTON				
Dec.	1	Carlos Piad	7215	$ 600.00		
"	1	Nicolás Rivero	7216	250.00		
"	1	Ernesto Rojas	7217	200.00		
"	1	Néstor T. Carbonell	7218	400.00		
"	1	Budget	7219		$ 200.00	
"	1	Fare Miami-Washington-Miami - N. Carbonell	7378		57.31	
				$ 1,450.00	$ 257.31	1,707.31
		TOTAL AMERICANS:-				$ 3,307.31
		TOTAL DELEGATIONS:-				$ 15,198.04

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
MILITARY COMMITTEE
DECEMBER 1-TO 31,1961

ANNEX "J-1"

DATE			CHECK NO.		TOTAL
		COMMITTEE PAYROLL			
Dec.	1	Ernesto Despaigne	7101	$ 250.00	
"	1	José E. Monteagudo	7102	250.00	
"	1	José Fernández Martín	7104	200.00	
"	1	Rolando Zubizarreta	7105	200.00	
"	1	Carlos Pérez Vivero	7106	200.00	
"	1	Amador Inguanzo	7107	200.00	
"	1	Humberto Olivera	7108	200.00	
"	1	Armando Guerra	7109	200.00	
"	1	Cándido Molinet	7110	200.00	
"	1	Jorge Sotús	7112	250.00	
"	1	Gastón F. Bernal Fernández	7256	200.00	
"	1	José F.C. Viamontes Jardinas	7257	200.00	$ 2,550.00
		RECRUITING OFFICE PAYROLL			
Dec.	1	Juan Consuegra	7113	$ 300.00	
"	1	Laureano Pino	7114	250.00	
"	1	Juan Antonio Hernández	7115	200.00	
"	1	Guillermo Lezcano	7116	200.00	
"	1	Orlando Pino Cruz	7117	200.00	
"	1	Ramón Paz Reyna	7118	200.00	1,350.00
		EXPENSES			
Dec.	1	Budget	7119	$ 350.00	350.00
			TOTAL:-		$ 4,250.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
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"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "[illegible]"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Rent	7165	$ 450.00
" 8	Reimbursement revolving fund	7231	110.98
" 12	Reimbursement revolving fund	7280	93.97
" 30	Reimbursement revolving fund	7386I	124.46
		TOTAL:-	$ 779.41

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
HEROES AND MARTYRS
DECEMBER 1 TO 21, 1961

ANNEX "I-I"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Rosa Ma. Cabrera - Sori Marín Widow	7123	$ 175.00
" 1	Clara Delgado - Porfirio Ramírez Widow	7124	100.00
" 1	Zenaida Espinosa - José A. Herrera Wife	7125	175.00
" 1	Adalberto Fernández - Adalberto Fernández Father	7126	100.00
" 1	Zoe Hernández - Giordano Hernández Wife	7127	150.00
" 1	Lilliam Leira - Ernesto Mestre Wife	7128	100.00
" 1	Lucía León - Vicente León Mother	7129	150.00
" 1	Marina Maldonado - Lauro Blanco Wife	7130	165.00
" 1	Flora Mas Machado - Juventino Báez Mother	7131	175.00
" 1	Martha Miyares - Ulises Silva Wife	7132	150.00
" 1	Esther Perdomo - Fidel Sierra Wife	7133	100.00
" 1	Amparo Posada - Plinio Prieto Widow	7134	175.00
" 1	Juana Rodríguez - Armando Escoto Wife	7135	175.00
" 1	Ma. Caridad Ruiz - Plinio Prieto Mother	7136	150.00
" 1	Isabel Ma. Suárez - Yebra Widow	7137	175.00
" 1	Teresa Suárez - Jesús Carreras Widow	7138	100.00
" 1	Grace Mira - Tamargo daughter	7139	100.00
" 1	Blance R. Tamargo family	7140	75.00
" 1	Amparo Vidal - Sergio Martín Mother	7142	50.00
		TOTAL:-	$ 2,540.00

ml.

[illegible] COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO [illegible], 1961

[illegible]

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 1	Manuel A. de Varona	7143	$ 350.00
" 1	Antonio Maceo	7144	350.00
" 1	Sergio Carbó	7145	350.00
" 1	Raul Méndez Pirez	7146	350.00
" 1	Francisco Carrillo	7147	350.00
" 1	José Fernández Badué	7148	350.00
" 1	César Baró	7149	350.00
" 1	Osvaldo Soto	7150	350.00
" 1	Carlos Rodríguez	7151	350.00
" 1	Manuel Cobo	7152	350.00
" 1	Higinio Díaz	7153	350.00
" 1	Ricardo Lorié	7154	350.00
" 1	Enrique Huertas	7155	350.00
		TOTAL:-	$ 4,550.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31,1961

ANNEX "I-L"

DATE		CHECK NO.		TOTAL
	PAYROLL:			
Dec. 1	Dulce Torres	7094	$ 200.00	
" 1	Estrella Villapol	7095	200.00	
" 1	Clara Ramírez	7096	200.00	
" 1	Alberto Santos	7097	200.00	
" 1	Antonio Garrastazu	7098	220.00	
" 1	Cristina Gallardo	7099	180.00	
" 1	Mario Martínez	7100	150.00	$ 1,350.00
	EXPENSES:			
Dec. 1	Reimbursement revolving fund	7168	$ 986.25	
" 7	Reimbursement revolving fund	7226	767.65	
" 15	Reimbursement revolving fund	7300	500.77	
" 20	Toys for prisoners children	7325	1,500.00	3,754.67
		TOTAL:-		$ 5,104.67

ml.

[illegible] COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
MEDICAL SECTION
DECEMBER 1 TO 31,1961

ANNEX "[illegible]"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 8	Anesthesia operation Adelquis Soto	7252	$ 65.00
" 8	Hospital expenses Adelquis Soto	7253	1,031.45
" 19	Medical assistance Norberto González	7323	495.00
" 19	Medical assistance Adelquis Soto	7324	295.00
		TOTAL:-	$ 1,886.45

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
[illegible] OFFICE
DECEMBER 1 TO 31,1961

A[illegible] "I-[illegible]"

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
REIMBURSEMENT REVOLVING FUND:	7251		
Auto rent		$ 106.05	
Trip to Tampa		90.00	
Trip to Washington - Dr. Miró		395.97	
Other expenses, trip to Washington Refugees		86.67	
Trip to Washington Dr. Miró - Inter-American Conference of Peace		307.42	
Cables		44.17	
Office supplies		187.37	
Miscellaneous		347.89	
Rent of office equipment		355.35	
Money Order for Mr. Quintero		25.00	
Contribution for show "Noche Cubana"		60.00	
Félix Angel Yergo		200.00	
Money Orders, Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Pio Verde		50.00	
Maria Teresa Campa		200.00	
Juan Rodríguez Pintado		200.00	
Father Francisco Villaverde		200.00	
José Fernández Carmenaty		40.00	
Cap. Ernesto Despaigne - Deposit and rent 1045 S.W. 27 Ave. office		400.00	
Pedro Abascal		200.00	
Bulletin "Intervención Comunista en Cuba"		150.00	
Dr. Gonzalo Alvarado		150.00	
Bulletin "Cuba"		50.00	$ 3,845.89
LESS: Amounto to reimburse in January 1962			845.89
TOTAL:-			$ 3,000.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible] OFFICE
[illegible] 1 TO [illegible]1961

ANNEX "I-C"

	CHECK NO.		TOTAL
PAYROLL:			
Wendell Rollason	7089	$ 600.00	
Antonio Fariñas	7090	300.00	
Irmina Bouza	7091	125.00	
Berta Diaz	7092	125.00	
Flor Angela Gómez	7093	150.00	$ 1,300.00
OTHERS:			
Fare to Washington - Mr. Rollason	7225	$ 164.60	
373-0953 Office telephone	7278	72.89	
Miscellaneous expenses	7283	449.42	
Three days expenses in Washington - Mr. Rollason	7367	75.00	761.91
TOTAL:-			$ 2,061.91

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REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
[illegible]
"[illegible]"
ORGANIZATIONS
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 196[illegible]

ANNEX "I-J"

	CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7239	$ 250.00
Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7240	250.00
Movimiento Rescate Democrático Revolucionario	7241	250.00
Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7242	250.00
Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7243	250.00
Movimiento Triple A Independiente	7244	250.00
Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7245	250.00
Higinio Díaz	7246	250.00
Ricardo Lorié	7247	250.00
Luis Conte Agüero	7248	250.00
	TOTAL:-	$ 2,500.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

[illegible]

"[illegible]"

[illegible]

DEC[illegible] 1 TO 31, [illegible]

ANNEX "[illegible]"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 14	Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7291	$ 2,000.00
" 14	Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7292	2,000.00
" 14	Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7293	2,000.00
" 14	Movimiento Rescate Revolucionario Demo-crático	7294	2,000.00
" 14	Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7295	1,000.00
" 14	Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7296	1,000.00
" 14	Higinio Díaz	7297	500.00
" 14	Ricardo Lorié	7298	500.00
" 18	Pascasio Lineras	7315	1,500.00
" 21	Movimiento Recuperación Revolucionaria	7341	2,000.00
" 21	Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano	7342	2,000.00
" 21	Movimiento 30 de Noviembre	7343	2,000.00
" 21	Movimiento Rescate Revolucionario Demo-crático	7344	2,000.00
" 21	Movimiento 20 de Mayo	7345	1,000.00
" 21	Movimiento Agrupación Montecristi	7346	1,000.00
" 21	Higinio Díaz	7347	500.00
" 21	Ricardo Lorié	7348	500.00
" 21	Pascasio Lineras	7349	1,500.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 25,000.00

ml.

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
"[illegible]"
[illegible]
DECEMBER 1 TO 31, 1961

ANNEX "I-Q"

DATE		CHECK NO.	TOTAL
Dec. 6	Garcia and Paula	7224	$ 274,500.00
" 8	Garcia and Paula	7250	500.00
	TOTAL:-		$ 275,000.00

ml.

"GARCIA AND PAULA"

TRUST ACCOUNT

"GARCIA AND PAULA"

TRUST ACCOUNT

Paid to recruit's dependents (See Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00
Transferred to Saving Accounts. (See Annex 2).	52,800.00
Reimbursed to Garcia and Paula. (See Annex 3).	30,150.00
Total deposited in Trust Account:	$ 127,175.00

Total deposited in Trust Account:		$ 127,175.00
LESS:		
Paid to recruit's dependents (See Annex 1).	$ 44,225.00	
Transferred to Saving Account (See Annex 2).	52,800.00	97,025.00
Reimbursed to Garcia and Paula (See Annex 3).		$ 30,150.00

PAID TO RECRUIT'S DEPENDENTS

"Annex 1"

ALVAREZ PEYDRO, Luis	$ 700.00
ALVAREZ VILTRES, Jorge	350.00
ANDREU SANTOS, José	2,625.00
BURRUEZO AROCHA, Daniel	175.00
CARMONA CABRERA, Antonio G.	550.00
CASTILLON SERPA, Sergio	325.00
COMELLAS ANGLADA, Manuel	700.00
CREME CANTERO, Humberto	600.00
CUELLAR SOSA, Virginio	525.00
EGOZI BEHAR, José	900.00
ESPINO ALONSO, Sixto F.	450.00
FERNANDEZ PEYDRO, Antonio F.	675.00
FRANCO DUARTE, Pedro	1,225.00
FRANCO DUARTE, Severiano A.	1,050.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL BRITO, Fausto	2,100.00
GOICOCHEA SANCHEZ, Fermín	350.00
GONZALEZ PEREZ, Enrique	1,000.00
COVANTES REYES, Leopoldo	700.00
LOPEZ CASTILLO, José	1,750.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Miguel E.	3,150.00
LORIGA CHAVEZ, Martín	1,625.00
MADRIGAL MENDIGUTIA, Rafael M.	275.00
MAQUEIRA PEREZ, José	1,000.00
MIRANDA HERNANDEZ, Luis	600.00
MIRANDA VALLADARES, Alberto	500.00
MORALES DIAZ, Santiago	1,575.00
OJEDA CAMARAZA, Eduardo A.	525.00
OROZCO CRESPO, Claudio	1,400.00
PEREZ LUGONES, Aurelio	450.00
PEREZ MARTIN, Antonio Abel	250.00
PEREZ VIVANCOS, Benigno	1,800.00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, José	325.00
REY DELGADO, Walter	1,500.00
RODRIGUEZ MENDIGUTIA, Félix F.	1,575.00
RODIRGUEZ MIRABAL, José A.	675.00
RODRIGUEZ PELAEZ, José M.	250.00
ROJAS RAMOS, Pablo H.	1,750.00
ROMAN ACEVEDO, Hugo	225.00
SANCHEZ ABASCAL, Mario M.	900.00
SOLIS JURADO, Humberto	2,450.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.	825.00
VEGA GARCIA, Segundo	350.00
VERA ORTIZ, Pedro R.	700.00
VERA ORTIZ, Rubén	2,625.00
Total:-	$ 44,225.00

TRANSFERRED TO SAVING ACCOUNTS

"Annex 2"

ABREU ARAGON, Ernesto	$ 175.00
ABREU PAZO, Sergio	1,350.00
ALONSO ANTUNA, Félix	1,050.00
BOLIVAR FUENTES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BRAVO RODRIGUEZ, Carlos I.	700.00
CABALLERO RODRIGUEZ, Hilario	1,800.00
CABEZAS PENARROYA, Rolando J.	1,000.00
CASTRO CUELLO, Fulgencio O.	225.00
CRUZ BAUTISTA, Tomas	1,125.00
DELGADO FERNANDEZ, Mario	525.00
DELGADO NARANJO, Eugenio M.	250.00
DELGADO SUAREZ, Pánfilo I.	525.00
DIAZ CABRERA, Adolfo	350.00
DIAZ HERNANDEZ, Rodolfo	250.00
DOMINGUEZ CADALSO, Atilano	1,575.00
ESPINO AZCUE, Jorge	700.00
FERNANDEZ DALMAU, Ernesto F.	225.00
FERNANDEZ PERDOMO, Juan de J.	675.00
GARATE NOA, Miguel A.	675.00
GIL HERNANDEZ, Fulgencio R.	2,450.00
GOMEZ OYARZABAL, Hugo	700.00
GONZALES CASTRO, José	2,625.00
GONZALEZ FUENTES, José	350.00
GONZALEZ LABRADA, Rafael	1,625.00
GONZALEZ MOREJON, José	525.00
GONZALEZ PEREZ, Enrique	1,475.00
HERNANDEZ BREZ, Armando	2,975.00
LAVANDEIRA TORRIJO, Eulogio R.	900.00
LOPEZ DE LA CRUZ, Juan R.	875.00
MAQUEIRA PEREZ, José	3,400.00
MENENDEZ RODILL, Arturo L.	1,525.00
MOLE ROSALES, José A.	525.00
MONTOTO GONZALEZ, Hilario	350.00
NAVARRETE FERNANDEZ, Natividad	275.00
NAVARRO VEGA, Víctor	700.00
PENTON ALFONSO, Miguel	2,975.00
PEREZ PADRON, Francisco	225.00
QUINTANA BARBON, Ramón L.	525.00
REYES BELLO, Pedro H.	350.00
REYES GARCIA, Manuel	3,150.00
RIVERO QUESADA, Gerardo	2,800.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Orlando	225.00
RODRIGUEZ FERNANDEZ, Alfredo E.	700.00
RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, Jacome	175.00
SAMARA LORENZO, Hugo R.	525.00
SANCHEZ MERZEAU, Raúl	900.00
SOSA VALDES, Paulino	700.00
TEJERA GUTIERREZ, José M.	225.00
TORRE PITA, Raúl de la	700.00
TORRES GUERRA, Marcos G.	175.00
TORRES JIMENEZ, Rafael	175.00
TORRES MENA, Fernando O.	500.00
TORRES MENA, Juan F.	175.00
VARONA LEBLANC, Rigoberto	2,975.00
Total:	$ 52,800.00

REIMBURSED TO "GARCIA AND PAULA"

"Annex 3"

ABREU ORTA, Juan F.	$ 175.00
AGUADO MORALES, Alexis F.	175.00
ALVAREZ-FERNANDEZ CARRILLO, Rafael	875.00
ARIAS GARCIA, Jesús	525.00
ARNAO GARCIA, Pedro	175.00
BACALLAO FONTE, Valentin	525.00
BAEZ HERNANDEZ, Armando	525.00
BARRETO VALDES, Eduardo	350.00
BLANCO CRUZ, Benito	250.00
BLANCO NAVARRO, Manuel	1,100.00
BOLIVAR FUENTES, Rodolfo de J.	175.00
BUTTARI CRESPO, Juan J.	350.00
BUTTARI PUIG, Edgardo	350.00
CARMONA CABRERA, Antonio G.	275.00
CASANAS SANCHEZ, Manuel	675.00
CASTANER LOPEZ, Modesto	450.00
CASTILLO RIVERO, Reinaldo L.	350.00
COMAS MENENDEZ, Arturo F.	675.00
CONTE HERNANDEZ, Ramón	225.00
CREME CANTERO, Humberto	2,100.00
CHAVEZ GUERRA, Alípio M.	225.00
DARIAS SORIANO, Dagoberto	250.00
DELGADO GARCIA, Jesús	175.00
FACCIO CRUCET, Marcial	600.00
FAJARDO MONTANO, José M.	450.00
FERNANDEZ MARTINEZ, Ladislao	450.00
FERRER MENA, Ramón J.	1,100.00
GARCIA-MENOCAL BRITO, Fausto	350.00
GONZALEZ CASTRO, Jose	525.00
GONZALEZ LABRADA, Rafael	600.00
GOUDIE MONTEVERDE, Manuel F.	2,800.00
GUERRA GONZALEZ, Luis A.	450.00
JIMENEZ MARTINEZ, Víctor J.	675.00
LOPEZ PEREZ, Silvino	525.00
LLUESMA PARETS, Ernesto	225.00
MARTINEZ CASTRO, Luis E.	675.00
MONTERO PEREZ, Rigoberto	225.00
MORALES CRUZ, José	275.00
MORALES DIAZ, Santiago	350.00
MORSE DE LA BARRERA, Luis C.	450.00
OTERO HERNANDEZ, Rolando	350.00
PERAZA SOSA, Héctor	600.00
PEREIRA PEREZ, Edilio	275.00
PEREZ HEIDRICH, Carlos M.	700.00
PEREZ MARQUEZ, Manuel de J.	500.00
PINO MARINAS, Néstor	225.00
PITA OTANO, Eleuterio	825.00
QUINTANA DE LA TORRE, Juan M.	900.00
RAMOS SANTIAGO, Reinaldo	350.00
RECAREY GARCIA-VIETA, Jorge I.	175.00
REGALADO SANTANA, José	325.00
RODRIGUEZ ALVAREZ, Mario T.	1,000.00
RODRIGUEZ-SANTANA ESTEVEZ, Carlos	350.00

(Continue on page No. 2)

RODRIGUEZ GONZALEZ, Roberto		$ 225.00
SERRANO CAMEJO, Félix T.		450.00
SOPO GRANDA, Edgar		225.00
TEJERA GUTIERREZ, José M.		225.00
VARONA ARJONA, Carlos A.		275.00
ZAMORA GARCIA, Pedro O.		500.00
	Total:-	$ 30,150.00

SECRET

11 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief of Operations

SUBJECT : PM Case Officers in Contact with Segments of the CRC

a. MIRO CARDONA, President of the CRC - periodic contact with Mr. Glenn J. Fransworth.

b. CARLOS HEVIA, Naval Advisor - Gordon Campbell and Lloyd Lindland.

c. HIGINIO DIAZ (Nino), Military Advisor - Eugene Norwinski.

d. HUMBERTO NUNEZ, Military Coordinator of Frente Anti-Communista Cristiano - Thomas M. Hewitt.

e. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE and CUCHO FLEITES, MDC - Thomas Hewitt.

f. CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, 30th Nov Group - Gordon C. Jung. Dick Semans

g. CESAR BARO, MRR - Thomas G. Clines.

h. RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ and LUIS SANCHEZ, Rescate - Thomas Hewitt.

i. ERNESTO D'ESPAIGNE, Military Sector - Eugene Norwinski.

j. OSVALDO SOTO, 20 May - Thomas M. Hewitt.

Glenn J. Farnsworth
GLENN J. FARNSWORTH
Chief, PM

SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U.S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U.S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U.S. aid have gotten their hands on U.S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 3-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings, of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

SECRET

20 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on
October 16, 1961

The meeting with Dr. Miro on October 16 was postponed from 10:00 until such time as his audience terminated with Cardinal Spellman. He arrived at my room at about 10:50. He declared that the Cardinal had wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubans at the hands of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami wasn't doing enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wasn't doing enough for them; that Castro must be overthrown. Miro told the Cardinal that in all Latin America there were going to be organized acts of sympathy for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Mass for them on October 17. He invited Miro to see him at any time.

Miro answered my query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium and another 1,000 people outside; that Lacerda had received much applause.

The Inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Miro) had told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other details; had described how Communism was gaining ground day by day; that in Cuba they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin America; that ten countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has not; that everybody is confused.

He informed me that as for the documents relating to the Cuban plots in Argentina, the Argentine military men came to talk to Varona, and he gave them some documents that have no importance. The officers told Verona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign Office," nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the documents to the Foreign Office. But these documents had no importance; they were merely to demonstrate that there had been an extradition of documents, and that they were originals. The important documents are held by Varona in Miami.

Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in Miami, but that his "administrative" budget really does not provide for propaganda activities (such as the Current SIP and Lacerda affairs). I countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for him to conduct some propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major scale -- but some things.

SECRET

Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and that it was believed that measures are necessary to forment in Cuba the opposition to Castro. "The people are against him!" declared Miro. "But increase it," I answered. Miro then stated "If this action doesn't stem from the Consejo (CRC) — not as an independent agency, but in close contact with you (the Agency), — what we forment is a complete disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no government can succeed; secondly, if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a more or less limited period of time, there will merely be more shooting of people (prisoners) by Fidel."

"And this is my insistence. Now I am afraid to go to Miami. What am I to tell the people there? What do I do? Converse? Meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba but disconnected from the Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify the membership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that. In the Council there are other great organizations - delegates from each of the organizations - that ask me for arms, dynamite, things, and I am here powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how we may hand over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is not merely an endless series of sabotage actions." I replied, "Well, I believe that a well-worked-out plan that shows good chances of success will be favorably considered."

"How about arms for the Escambrey?" asked Miro. I replied that it was my understanding that arms for the Escambrey could only be landed on the North Coast; how then would they get to the Escambrey? Miro said that the boat which had made many trips (working for YOU), would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick up the arms; what cannot be done is abandon Osvaldo Ramirez in this situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate situation for three months.

I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly identified" replied Miro. "He assured that it is perfectly identified and requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arms. I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell us the means of delivery, the people to contact and then deliver to our Cubans the arms, dynatite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of Cubans against inaction) increases daily."

"All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council ask me for arms and means for fighting. But I cannot provide them anything. Meanwhile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely a "council painted on the Wall." I have said, "Look for someone else if I am not considered able to do the job but we must work. I have confidence in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion."

"I've asked for money for the clandestine groups. What have they said about that?" Miro asked. I replied that there is a problem of the means of delivery, that the Italian Embassy at present appears undesirable. The Ambassador isn't there. Well, we look for another means; the Argentine - anything - those people need money" he countered. I have to carry out concrete things," he declared. "I'm now like a person in a swimming pool without water." "For three and a half months I've struggled to maintain a revolutionary spirit. My military people are waiting till I arrived and tell them, "this must be done, that must be done. Nothing yet! And without any plan, I don't go anywhere; nowhere!

"The other time I went with my eyes closed, through faith. We had a failure and the failure fell upon me.—I cannot proceed under such circumstances in no way. I've asked for $50,000 to send in to the underground. The Russians are spending $400,000 in propaganda and have less than the U.S. We shall not compromise the U.S. Tell me the way to send it in. The Council is to aid them, not merely to conduct meetings."

"On that request they haven't replied anything?" he asked. I answered that on this item, I had made known Miro's desire, but that so far nothing had been resolved.

"I'm not complaining," he stated, "but for three months I have been asking for a contact with the authority to resolve. Why? Because I'm getting nowhere. When I return now I shall be asked, "How about it?" and must answer, 'You will have to wait because I have nothing.' And meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba independent of the Consejo. Let us go back. Without being in agreement, I cannot serve you. I have no interest in presiding over a Council that is of no use."

I pointed out that the Council must continue to exist, with him as its president, as the coordinating body of the resistance movement, but that there are certain difficulties in putting the student or labor activities under the direction of the Council; that these groups are now functioning efficiently and that I trusted that he could see the problems of completely changing their control, direction, and coordination. I added that I believed that he should know something of what they are doing and that I believed that should be kept informed.

"I know absolutely nothing," he replied. "What comes to me is from these same individuals. I am not in agreement with that, I'm becoming ridiculous. Under these circumstances I cannot continue. I have planted the problem of the underground, the problem of the collateral organizations (that he would like to have in Council by being their source of support and coordination), of the magistrates, and now you have seen what ALABAU has done (proclaiming GARCERAN as president of exile government), who is working with you people, and you have seen the reaction of the State Department. Now yesterday ALABAU is publishing political denunciations against the Council. I have discussed the matter of the magistrates with the C.I.A., I don't remember the name of the person. A month has passed and the other magistrates (those with ALABAU) haven't been stopped (in their activities) and they haven't had elections as I requested to select another leader."

"The students are continuing their activities. I believe that I have something in my head as a basis for the determination of what should be discussed in the Council with me; and in agreement with you; but these existing circumstances, without any connection, make it so that I cannot continue the clandestine aid. To the first problem, I presented your reply, "We shall see." To the second problem, the collateral organizations — which continues the same as before; the third problem I presented, on arms to send in, nothing. The fourth problem, the propaganda operation "Crista" that I showed you, nothing." I replied that on the latter I had discussed the matter, that it was, I believed, a suggestion given to him in the Department of State.

"If we don't make propaganda and send arms into Cuba now, it's useless," he declared. "And I cannot remain in silence." I replied that I believed quite a bit of propaganda was being conducted. "Yes, but independent of the Council. I CANNOT BE A PUPPET!" "They (the Agency) keep on dealing with the MRP, with the Unidad Revolucionario, and they haven't entered into the Council simply because they are in direct contact with the Agency. Thus it appears that none of the problems that I took up with you some twenty days ago have been resolved, and I'll have to take another solution. I want to know the truth if I'm not acceptable. I'll leave and without any scandle whatsoever. I have swallowed all the criticism, in my own house, in silence, as though I were responsible for everything. I cannot continue to do this and be doing nothing. I cannot be a puppet! I have no arms to give."

He reiterated that nothing had been resolved on any of his requests and proposals, and that he couldn't continue thus. That he could quit, go to Puerto Rico as a professor. He added he would want to work with us. He then referred to the acts of Lacerda in New York, which had cost four thousand dollars, plus passage, a ridiculous sum spend from the Administrative Budget. "We have paid the passage, his living costs here." he said.

"Now I go to Miami where I have to face the organizations grouped into the Council. "Arms for everywhere?" "I haven't any. All the organizations free-wheeling there which don't want to join together because they are working directly with your people." I said this was unfortunate and asked whether there could not be some form of realizing contacts with them without necessarily channelizing their support and direction through the Council, such as by forming a committee along the lines I had suggested in Miami.

Miro then referred to the agreement reached in the White House meeting with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Woodward, with gentlemen of the C.I.A., and with Mr. Hurwitz. First, "That the only thing that is recognized is the Consejo (CRC); Dr. Miro is the person of our confidence and will have an administrative budget which he will control and will report later the expenses of coordination, and that any other expenses, propaganda or clandestine activity, will be paid by the Agency; for the problems of the organizations in the Council there will be a contact to assist in working out their solutions; that is to say, that their problems of boats and arms." Another point was that in case there are organizations that do not choose to join the Council, Dr. Miro will be perfectly informed in advance of the matters at hand and will give his authorization. That is to say, it establishes a unifying control over the

(CRC). I have seven, to work with you, with me, with the people who are going to carry out the activities, with the people that I designate. Nothing of that is being done. Then what they want is to work alone."

"I will not continue. I will not continue from the time I return to Miami. I have gone on for five months, struggling. I cannot accept this situation. I have tried to pull together those groups as asked in the White House. I haven't succeeded in grouping any more, because - I want to speak clearly in order to remain good friends always - because you have prevented it. The students haven't joined, not because of no political reason, but merely because you support them directly. Presumably the idea is that in this way the security of this nation is better safeguarded. A Consejo was desired to serve as the coordinating group and to provide a means by which the United States would not appear to be intervening in Cuba. If there is to be a Consejo, it must have all the dignity of a Council."

"When I try to form a Council, grouping all elements together, they don't join because they are talking directly with your people - and there is an office for that purpose in Miami - which deals with all the men who want to work, who want to do things. This is all indecendent of the Council. And some work for a destruction of the Council. I cannot tolerate this. I have a son who is a prisoner; either I know the plans, and I knew the maneuver and the problems that they are going to carry out, or I, when I arrive in Miami, will say, "No," and send word to Washington. Let them do without me. There will be someone who will submit to these things, but not I."

"And of the four items that ~~Mr. Kennedy~~ promised me to resolve, there have not been resolved any, and I find myself in the dark. And I am very sorry. I am not going to compromise the security of this Nation, but neither am I going to compromise the situation of these boys. When they disappeared, lost their lives, etc., I was confronted with "And you are the president of the Council." I cannot remaine in this way.."

"I haven't been able to group together anything. I was promised that the magistrates would all incorporate together (into the Council), but that rascal ALABAU is working against the Council and I have reason to believe that he is doing it with Agency support, otherwise how would he pay for his political denunciations." I responded, that I believed this could not be true. He shouted, "I have expressed my position to you, and I want you to get an answer when you can. If these problems that I have set forth do not have an immediate solution, I am not to know and to dispose of relative actions to be taken, then how, in view of my situation, must I do."

He asked about the plan for clandestine sabotage action by commando raid, that he had given us, and what had come of it. I replied that he must realize that the study of such a plan necessarily was slow and must be considered by many. He said he was convinced that there was no intention of accepting such plans, and that while now we discuss such plans, we lose out. "I cannot accept this situation, nor would you."

He then said that he could go ahead and dissolve the Council, and let each organization go ahead and do as it pleased; that he couldn't preside over a meaningless council; that this was not a threat, but he would step out. I reassured him that he was highly esteemed in Washington and it was necessary that he continue as head of the Council. He replied, "But they disregard me."

He reiterated that he had planted four problems, none of which had been resolved; reiterated that he had planted the propaganda problem a long time ago, but that propaganda continues independent of the Council and people are sent out like those to the Congress of students in Sao Paulo, where they repeat things like parrots which don't go with Latin American audiences.

"I have asked for arms; either give us massive aid, one, two, three million - whatever is necessary, because this is to destroy Communism, and we'll make our plans. And we'll furnish the dead, for we can do no more. We must work in agreement, because now each time that I speak, it's "we shall see, we are going to study," - and nothing happens. No, no, I shall not preside over another Council existing under these circumstances. I have often spent 24 hours without sleeping, trying to pull together the groups, and meantime, problems arise on all sides. Why? Because so long as other groups get support, they won't enter the Council. The MRP is in contact with you and getting arms; now the Unidad Revolucionario. I remain the ridiculous one. Already I've suffered a lot and have a son who is a prisoner. And I've talked a lot during these days, and I keep on being a puppet, but worse than a puppet, because a puppet is moved, but I'm not even moved."

"Therefore, I say to you that the groups that want to work with us, you, the chief of that group, and I, we ought to resolve all these questions; for example, with the chief of the military group, because he has pulled together the professional army and the rebel army (elements) and the army of liberation, such as Varela, Sotus, Nino and the boys, who have come from the Brigade." He declared that SOTUS is a fighter, is willing to return to Cuba, and that he had great confidence in SOTUS.

I assured him that the legalization of SOTUS' residence would be arranged, and that Mr. Hurwitz informed me that he believed something could be done for the other three returnees whose names Dr. Miro had given me.

Dr. Miro reiterated that he must speak clearly, that he could not continue thus as a travelling president without having anything to give to his people — nothing to the underground through Council action; nor could he be ignorant of plans which he opposed where Cubans go out to die, and then having their relatives come to him as responsible. He declared, "I don't want to live on a budget, preside over an administrative office, receive people, tell them lies, saying, "We shall see." The men who are here (in Council) representing organizations must know something of what they are going to do and if they ask for 40 rifles, I must be able to say, "Here they are" - not to give arms directly into their hands - but through a contact for this. Otherwise you people make your plans, and I'll retire from everything. And be assured that never, never will I say a single word against the Agency or the United States, never; nor explain reasons which shouldn't be explained.

"If I cannot have the responsibility that I should have, I shall not lend myself to what may result in a tragedy. None of the problems I have planted have been resolved; not that of the magistrates nor that of the Escambray, nor the money to the underground, has been resolved, not the plan of propaganda that I gave you. I cannot continue to sit in an office, while you continue operating, as you wish, with my silent consent. You may choose someone else like Mr. Godoy, who is asking for arms. Choose and see whether his name will save Cuba. You are going to create another Fidel, who is nothing.

I reminded him that I had my talks with him only ten days before, not twenty, and that I could talk to no one in Washington until a week ago and had to have many conversations with many people, and that his proposals could not be resolved in such a short time. He returned to the agreement that "plans of action be discussed jointly; that if there were objections, that the objections be discussed. He said there had been no objections so far to discuss; nor objections to propaganda plans. He was to have contact with a representative of C.I.A. to meet with representatives of organizations that want to collaborate, and with Dr. Miro — nothing developed on that! He declared that he should have knowledge of the activities of those that don't want to collaborate; and said each day there will be more, because they want to gain the power for themselves, to act on their own account. He said he knows there is a "Jim" and a "Robert" and others that are doing things.

I assured him he must realize that there were many problems involved in his proposals and that time was essential to work them out. I reminded him of his conversation with Mr. Goodwin and the latters' statement to the effect that there could be no thought in the foreseeable future of a military operation against or invasion of Cuba. Miro countered by referring to his conversation with the President on 18 July and his (Miro's) complaint of inactivity. He said the President proposed the recruiting of Cubans in different units of the Army for training so as to utilize them at the opportune time, and that the officers would be invited to our military schools. Miro said he had gathered some of the military together and informed them of this offer, and the next week he was called to discuss the recruiting, which he approved. Then General Hershey went to see him at his house, telling him that Cubans wouldn't be sent to Berlin or any such place but kept in the U.S. available for use later. Miro said, "If there is to be no invasion, then let's utilize the underground, which needs arms and money."

He again repeated, "There must be massive propaganda; secondly arms; we shall furnish the dead, but I need to know "How are we going to die." He commented that he was going to ask that his photograph not be put on the cover of a certain magazine because he didn't know whether he was going to continue; that in the present circumstances he didn't see how he could continue. Again I urged that he must do so, and that I felt certain that we could resolve some of his proposals, probably not to the extent that he desired, but at least in part, but that time was necessary to accomplish this.

He repeated that the Council needs to have some action taken in Cuba, but the Agency keeps on undertaking actions without any connection with the Council. Further, that he must have the means for conductiong propaganda, such as outlined in the "Operation Grieta." He asked so when could I give him some answers. I replied that during the current week I expected to have meetings in which these matters would be discussed - the Department of State, with Mr. Goodwin, with representatives of the Agency, and that I hoped that something would be resolved, but that he must realize that many people are involved in such matters and solutions are not reached quickly. He reiterated that he had to keep telling his organizations "wait a little longer" and that this was becoming embarrassing.

Then he brought up his proposal of having him and the Council go to Cuba, saying "perhaps it would be advantageous that I die in Cuba; that the Council ask recognition from Cuban soil and the military aid of the United States -- all to take place within 48 hours. He added, "I have told you of the reaction of Cardinal Spellman, "We have done very badly in the Cuban affair."

I reminded him that despite the urgency that we all recognized in the Cuban situation and its threat to the United States and all the Americas, there are many other world problems - Laos, Berlin, etc., - which also occupy the attention of our government people.

Then I said I wished to take advantage of our meeting to ask him for information relative to his current budget; first, did he believe that there were any people receiving a salary from the Council who might also be getting financial aid from H.E.W. He said, "No, I would never permit that." Then he declared that he had two ways of operating when he absorbed the personnel of the various organizations into the CRC: either to cut off their salaries suddenly, or to put them to work for their pay; that the "nomina" (payroll) grew a little bit because he had to take in certain people, and that he considered his absorbing them was according to the policy of C.I.A. Then he declared that the maximum benefit received by refugees from H.E.W. was $100 per family per month, and that no where here could a family live on a hundred a month. Hence, he did not feel that he could cut off the people on the staffs of the CRC organizations, and send them to the H.E.W. Therefore, they were assigned to the different

"The money for the underground is much and contact is doubtful, an excuse. The problem of Cuba costs a lot of money! The people of the Escambray - it's difficult to deliver arms to them? But we are going to run that risk. The arms are going to be lost? Well, risks must be taken." Miro again referred to the groups that didn't want to collaborate with the Council but would collaborate directly with the Agency stating that he had opposed it and still opposed it; that he received a very affectionate letter asking him to try work out all the problems between us and accept a solution, and that a representative would be designated to work with him; that I had appeared and he had spent two very pleasant days with me; that I was very understanding; that twenty days had passed of great anxiety. ("Not twenty but ten," I interposed.) He said he figured that probably he might have arms and help for the underground and know about plans of action and had felt strengthened. "But" he said, "now I feel knocked down. None of the plans or propaganda proposals have been accepted, none. The firing wall in Cuba continues functioning, 31 dead in 30 days. My resignation has been written long ago, and I am ready to submit it as soon as I return to Miami."

I declared that he must not do that, that he must have patience., that it takes time to resolve these things; He replied that he has been waiting since April and mentioned all the suffering he had gone through, attacks by everyone, mothers of prisoners and dead, the American Press, Fortune, Time, Life, New York Times, etc., all against him along with ALABAU Trelles, and others; and that he had supported all of this in silence. He had been asked it it were true that there was no air support and had not answered. "The other time I kept my lips closed with absolute faith, the next time I shall have my eyes open and have many questions. I don't understand how you people can deal with some of these unknown Cubans.

He said, "I've given many proofs of loyalty to you. What they attribute to me the other day in Miami that "there would be an invasion in a few days", that is not true. I have a tape recording of what I said which was "very soon (without mentioning any date) in Cuba there would be unveiled the great Pascuas (resurrection) of the Fatherland. And the press has misinterpreted Pascuas as the Pascuas de Navidad (Christmas).

"Thus the press comes out with statements attributed to Dr. Miro that the invasion will take place by Christmas, completely a lie and nothing like what I said." I conceded to Dr. Miro that he had suffered a tremendous number of attacks in silence and that the press had over a period of time come out with critical remarks. I asked him if he planned to pass through Washington before returning to Miami and he said he didn't have money for such expenses; that his wife was terribly worried about their son, but that he would have to remain in New York until Wednesday to attend the luncheon for all the editors of the Latin American press, who want to converse with him, to help with propaganda but without costing the U.S. a cent.

commissions within the CRC: finance, propaganda, clandestine, military, organisation, etc. The ones who are no good or don't want to work, he said, he would cut off, but that he couldn't just fire someone suddenly. He then said salaries were small @ $200, $225 per month as an average except for particular individuals, such as his assistant Aragon, a very capable person, and the chiefs of the various organizations who work "full time" and receive $400 each; further that he planned to give each organization approximately $700 per month for their operating expenses, some less, some a little more - (MRR, Rescate, 30 de Nov, 20 de Mayo, AAA Independientes, Montecristi).

When I questioned whether the Montecristi organization was still in the CRC, he said it was, that only Justo Carillo had dropped out of the CRC but the group remained in and had a new head. He added that he had just had a request from Carillo to provide him (Carillo) with a thousand dollars; that Carillo had photographic copies of some checks that he had paid to Waldo Frank for propaganda activities against Cuba and that Carillowas asking reimbursement but Miro said he didn't consider he had to give it to Carillo.

Returning to the budget, Miro Said, "There are the various employees; there is the item of trips; there are the military people grouped under the military commission - I cannot let them suffer misery. There are no students on the payroll because they are being supported by you (the Agency). And right there a difference is established between those in the Council and those who receive money from the Agency directly, which is more than that received by my people. See how you (the Agency) without intending to, and for reasons of insecurity, are going to destroy the Council." He then stated that he had placed Alvarez Dias, who had been Minister of Finance, in charge of finance matters because he (Miro) could not be everywhere, and to make certain that no expenses were paid on which they were not in agreement, and which Paula would carry out.

I querried whether Paula would continue as accountant, and Miro said, "certainly, as accountant." He said that everyone has been coming to him (Miro) with all kinds of pleas for money and therefore it was necessary to have Alvarez Diaz in there so that he and Paula might resolve the finance matters. Miro added words of praise for Paula, "It's like I want to have for each section of the Council, like I wanted Conte Aguero to handle propaganda, but since he is receiving money from you (the Agency) he doesn't want to. I have to have someone to take this load off of me; first as in Naval affairs, someone to lock for boats, arms, etc."

I asked about Mestre for propaganda and Miro replied that Mestre is no good, never was of value; that he had been put in charge of the propaganda commission previously and given $48,000 monthly, but had done nothing. Then he launched into a criticism of the Swan propaganda; that it was a shame, handled by Batistianos: Fernandes VARELA, a Catholic; Suares Hernandes, a senator in the epoch of Batista. He named another (sounded like Chau Miller) a bad person and a Batistero. Miro said he had asked that Svan be stopped but, since they work directly, these people are defended. He added wryly that he wished they (the Agency) would defend him (Miro) that way.

He said they (the Agency) had posed the problem five months ago in Miami relative to Joaquin, Sagerio, a Cuban who was working with the Council and has worked magnificently, but then he accepted work with the C.I.A. and continues doing this (and does whatever he pleases) — intelligence, arms, recruiting, etc. — and will have nothing to do with the Council.

Again Miro declared that he had the highest regard for Paulo and couldn't despense with him; had even proposed his name to be the Magistrate of the Tribunal of Accounts in the future government of Cuba. I added my understanding that Paulo had done an excellent job, particularly mentioning his handling of paying dependents, a meticulous and arduous task. Miro exclaimed that he had never considered replacing Paula but merely needed Alvarez Diaz to handle details with Paula. He said everyone in Miami knows it is Paula who has the money to make payments by check, and that he thought it would be better for the people to get payments in cash and sign a receipt; that sometimes someone might rob Paula and then people will ask "from where does this money come," since the Cubans have no money."

Then Dr. Miro said he would like to clarify any doubtful questions. I asked whether he had received any other communication from the Escambray group. He replied that he had not, but that the one had come through the Montecristi group and they continued to ask him for this arms aid. I asked whether any changes or additions had been made in the Council at the October 10th meeting. He replied that the MRP had not answered his invitation because they were working with the Agency, and that the new group, the Union Revolucionario, had replied that they did not, because they have a delegate in Washington who is seeking direct contact with U.S. Government Agencies.

Miro then declared that in order to call a Council meeting, he had to have a press conference or a press release (about calling a CRC meeting) but Prio, ALABAU, and everybody were against all this, and were doubtful whether to come or not to come. "I talked with Conte Aguero and with Arreliano many hours. Arreliano is a fuehrer; if things aren't done as he wants, he won't go along. Moreover, he has a strong anti-American sentiment. I talked to them, but they said, "No." "There were two problems: their lack of confidence in the Government, and my contradictory view that we want to be with them (with U.S.). I would like to have had to call a Council meeting almost by force. Therefore I decided to have no meeting and no press conference, and to come here (to New York City). There was no session //

"The Bastistianos are very well organized and also the Prio followers, waiting for me to do something, and I cannot do anything. I'm like St. Lawrence, roasted on one side and fried on the other."

I asked whether the Council was looked upon too much as a political entity rather than a unifying medium. Miro replied, "Those people (Prio, Alabau, etc.) want to obstruct the ones who are fighting Castro through the medium of the Council. They are divided into two groups: (1) Politicians; Prio, Alonso Pujol; those that want to be the directors; (2) The groups that want to act within Cuba who don't want to join CRC but rather to deal directly with you people in order to have the power tomorrow in Cuba; people only of action, but not of common sense and who cannot mean much to the future of Cuba; they would cause another era like that of Fidel, who is nothing but a student. That is extremely dangerous. You give these people the means and if one of them overthrows Fidel he is the one who assumes power. He may be a good man of action but only 24 or 25 years old and not one who can orient Cuba in the way of democracy. After reaching 40, people think differently. Fighters are capable of carrying out the action you give them to do, but not to govern.//

Dr. Miro continued to dwell on his concern as to the future if these young fighters are given a free hand to do as they please; that care must be taken as to who is supported, that those people are the ones who don't want to work with us; that the MRP hopes that it will be the one who will lead tomorrow in Cuba; that caos of the future will be something to which you the U.S. has contributed by supporting such elements.

Dr. Miro commented in further detail his views and again hammered on the manner of using funds to avoid being like the ostrich. "Everyone knows where the money is coming from and we have to be careful of the form. Everyone does not know of you, but of where the help is coming from"

"We are the politicos of the war against Castro," affirmed Dr. Miro. Let a military man function as chief of staff as long as the military action against Castro continues, but then the civil action must be carried out by non-military men."

He added that during the softening-up action against Castro, we must take good care of the manner in which the action is taken to avoid exposing the U.S. support; and that he considered that the collateral, independent groups were not safeguarding it; so we are losing time now as you (U.S. Agencies) deal with each of those groups. And we must not lose, we must win.

I told Dr. Miro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking these groups with Dr. Miro and the Council, without having to channel direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now functioning well under existing arrangements.

Dr. Miro said he would be pleased to meet with them outside of the Council, and they may continue to function as collateral organizations independently; but that they realize that they have one direction. Dr. Miro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude — they are injuring the Council.

Dr. Miro commented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated that all the collateral organizations must operate within the orbit of the Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions just as he as a professor had done with students--often times resulting in excellent ideas and viewpoints.

Then I mentioned that I had read in one of our magazines a laudatory item describing his demonstrated capabilities as a mediator between political groups and individuals.

Dr. Miro again returned to his belief that funds of all organizations should funnel through the Council because every Cuban has a sense of smell that inclines him to go where he knows the money is dispensed; that this is sad but true; and that those who are still outside and hope to get direct support, if they knew that the money was here (in his hands), would come running without urging. He then said that he had seven hundred dollars, more or less, for each organization's operating expenses. He concluded by saying that he didn't wish to operate without us (Agency) or without any of the Agency people, but merely desired to pull together the diverse groups and other activities.

He then referred to his conversations with Mr. Berle and General Taylor, and his view expressed to them that in the April affair he felt that the Agency had functioned more or less effectively — sometimes their people had been "rough", or "tough", but that he had no complaint; that the lack of air cover no doubt caused defeat. When he had been querried by reporters and other on specific questions designed to pry secrets out of him, he had replied, "I didn't see them," or similiar evasions, and thus had endeavored to be loyal to us.

He said his son had been certain that his father would be with the expeditionary force, and, in route to the Bay of Pigs from Guatemala the son had searched for him on the boats, and was disillussioned because his father wasn't there.

Again he emphasized his view that the students sent to Latin American countries on propaganda missions should be indoctrinated by people in the Council to prepare them for the cross examining that they would undergo, and thereby prepare them against traps and foolish statements; and to insure that no Batista supporters were sent out. He emphasized that one of the first questions asked of these propaganda emissaries would be "With what money do you come here?" "What Yankee organization is behind you." He added, "The people have to be well prepared to answer; just as I had to undergo a succession of penetrating questions when I first went into exile in Argentina and could answer them without hesitation because of a clean record."

Again he came back to his argument that the collateral organizations should function through the Council - not "forgetting the Agency, but not being forgotten by the Agency." I told Dr. Miro that I hoped during the course of the week to have a series of conversations in the course of which certain decisions and solutions would be reached that would enable me to sit down with him the following week and work out some details on propaganda and other matters.

Dr. Miro then asked, "How best can the security of this nation be insured - the Agency dealing directly with these people or working with them through Miro?" And he emphasized that he was concerned both with the security of Cuba and of the United States, and that these people (Cubans with whom the Agency is dealing directly) at any moment when they felt they were losing out or were not sufficiently paid - would ask for more, and, being Cubans, might be very indiscrete; but that if they had to deal with Miro they would be obligated to go to him with their complaints. He said that just as a bee seeking sweets will go to any source, but if there is only one source it will go to that one; and that thus all groups must look to the Council.

Again Dr. Miro returned to his thesis that sooner or later there must be war to overthrow Castro, and that Cubans and Americans must realise this; that as a preliminary the Cubans must carry out sabotage, etc., but just as blockades didn't overthrow Franco or Mussolini, neither would they cause the fall of Castro; further that if sabotage was conducted without being a part of an overall plan of missions, the people inside Cuba would come to react adversely to the sabotage and align themselves with Castro.

He then expressed his view that time is being sadly wasted in trying to bring the Latin American countries into agreement with the U.S. against Castro, because, unfortunately, many are ruled by dictators and they fear concerted action against themselves, but if the U.S. attacks and destroys Castro they will applaud. Again he repeated that the Punta del Este agreement might well cause many countries to say, "Thank you Fidel, and not, thank you Mr. Kennedy."

Dr. Miro emphasized that he wanted to collaborate with us fully. Then the conversation turned to the dissolution of the FRD by Varona, and Dr. Miro declared that this step was difficult for Varona, to take because he had been its cheef and in a high position and had thus submitted to the Council. He declared his esteem for Varona, a very brusque man but very honest. He said Varona had declared with respect to the Argentine documents that, "They are in Miami. I don't feel like sending them to Argentina because they don't belong to Argentina. They belong to the thief; that is Castro. Argentina has diplomatic relations with Cuba and if it feels like it, will send the documents to Cuba." Varona declared in the SIP that the Argentin military men had deceived him because, having stated that they didn't trust the Argentine Foreign Office, they nevertheless took to Argentine the three documents that were given to them and upon arrival turned them over to the Foreign Office. Miro added that Varona stated this clearly in the SIP meeting where two Argentine delegates were present. They said, "Without mentioning names, Doctor, do you declare this before the SIP?" "Yes, I declare it," he replied, "and they shut up.

Miro added that Varona had declared last night, "Let them give us arms to finish off with Castro, but give them to us! Whoever has them, give them to us! Dr. Miro then declared, "We are willing to disembark, but here we are just playing hide and seek."

Dr. Miro then referred to his view that Diario de las Americas should receive a small subsidy; that sometimes it published articles unfavorable to the U.S. but that usually, and if subsidized, would eliminate adverse items.

Then I returned to the subject of the budget and concern that some on the Council payroll might also be on H.E.W. payroll. He replied that for October he would have them swear that they were receiving no other money and remarked that many are on the payroll. He enumerated the different sections - delegations in Latin American countries, each person (two or three at most in each country) received only enough to live on; without operating funds. He said each chief of organization in the Council received $400, "which is very little."

He added that during the past month with funds left over, he had sent to Mexico $3,000 because some 240 people had arrived there in need and hungry. He said C.I.A. aided with $5,000 and he had sent $3,000 because they were Cubans. Further, that he had provided each organization with $700 for its expenses of mailing, offices, car, etc., but that this wasn't a fixed sum. He added that whatever was left over he wanted to send to Cuba to those who are fighting there.

He declared, "As for me they can reduce the budget to the minimum provided that they send funds to Cuba; but my problems must be resolved. This payroll was promised to me when I was made president of the Council, and I didn't create it."

I querried about the expenses of his recruitment section, and he said he had told Paula to eliminate that item since recruiting is now done elsewhere, but the military personnel in recruiting should be grouped in the military so that some form of intelligence agency could be maintained to provide information.

He affirmed that his military staff really consisted of three officers (Varela, Dermaigre, Monteagudo) but that they had expenses of office, transportation, and secretarial help. As for his Social Welfare section, he said this had been established by C.I.A. and was necessary for dispensing medicines, etc., for Cuban refugees here.

He declared that he hadn't touched any of the expenses (inherited from FRD) except operating expenses, in order to give him a margin of funds to meet unforeseen urgent expenses.

He said, "I told Paula to eliminate all that could be eliminated; naturally he would have to consult with you." (Agency)

Relative to the Naval section he said he planned to eliminate their expense allowance but not the section itself, because he deems it essential for matters such as sending arms to Cuba, since they cannot be sent by air; and that an office is necessary for them but their expenses must be cut off slowly.

As for the Medical Section which had been created before, he said only two "mutilados" (casualties) remained and that the section was to be eliminated. He reiterated that these sections had been created by us (Agency) and that they could only be eliminated gradually.

He affirmed that there was left for his use only some eleven or twelve thousand dollars for matters such as attendance at the SIP and Lacerda affairs, and such minor propaganda affairs, but that he felt he should have restored to him the funds for propaganda (that had been going through Mestre).

I assured him that it was certainly intended that the Propaganda Commission now function under him as the propaganda section of the Council and that if Mestre was not considered to be its chief, that he should designate someone else. He declared that Mestre was in New York, had talked to Varona yesterday, and asked Varona what he should do, to which Varona replied, "Resign."

Miro then said he would like to put Conte Aguero in as head of propaganda but that Conte would not agree unless he told him to. Miro mentioned that the staff which Mestre had was very good but that Mestre was no good because he wanted to spend the whole day at a swimming pool. He mentioned Angel del Cerro, Fermin Peinado, Ruben Dario Rurbaud. He said Angel del Cerro would be a good chief of propaganda, but that for this he would also like a good adviser such as Conte, who really is no good except to talk, but would like to be president. Miro said

Humberto Medrano, a reporter, also would be good to direct propaganda efforts. He added that Mestre, chief of propaganda for the FRD, which no longer exists, is the one who continues receiving the propaganda funds from Paula. He declared that he (Miro) didn't control these funds; that he didn't have anything except a bureaucracy.

I told him that I considered this problem of propaganda section and its operators should be corrected right away. He added that he felt that Radio Swan should be put under the propaganda section of the Council; further, that the propaganda section had to quit sending printed matter to the Latin American countries and instead send a format to each country so that they could be printed there with the terms used in each country; in Argentina, in Argentine style; in Brazil, in Portuguese; in Panama, in the manner of speaking in Panama; that such propaganda must be paid for. He affirmed that Humberto Medrano was a great reporter and hard worker and could handle this well; that Fermin Peinado was a fine worker who now is having a struggle to live, but works well at propaganda matters.

Again ~~I~~ he said that the propaganda funds should pass through his control, and that I take this up upon my return to Washington. Again he declared that he felt plans must be made for him and the Council to return to Cuba. I said this was a matter for the future.

We terminated our meeting with my statement that it would probably not be till the following week when I would return to Miami, after getting matters resolved in Washington. He said that he would probably be returning to Miami on Wednesday after the Press luncheon.

I added that if it seemed desirable for him to come to Washington en route to Miami, I would call him; that otherwise I would look forward to seeing him in Miami. I said I felt we had covered a lot of ground, and thanked him for giving me so much of his time to our meeting.

Again he reiterated that he desired responsibility for all groups and that if he wasn't considered to be the right one, that he was ready and willing to resign. Upon this, we finished and I excorted him to the elevator of the hotel.

DISPATCH

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▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr. MIRO Cardona

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memo of WH/4 comments.

(END OF DISPATCH)

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Attachment - 1

DATE TYPED 19 Oct 61	DATE DISPATCHED 20 OCT 1961
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGW-606	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-124-25	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
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SECRET

10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the *Operacion Grieta.*"

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

SECRET

(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.

3. Commando Plan

Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government ~~through~~ propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to addréss the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CARRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organisations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESENSITIZED

[illegible]YWAY/TYPIC/DELORRY

1. DELORRY (D) ARRIVED ITALY 9 MARCH, ROME 10 MARCH. RETURNING FROM HOME 15 MARCH TO SUBMIT DETAILED REPORT.

2. ETA CUBA ABOUT 1 APRIL. AT SUGGESTION FIDEL (F) GIVING DINNER PARTY FOR HIM SOON THEREAFTER.

3. D SAYS ANNIE DE QUENDOZ (Q) (NO STA TRACES) WIFE (BUT GETTING DIVORCE) OF SWISS CHANCELLOR IN HAVANA, WAS MISTRESS OF BOTH "CHE" GUEVARA AND F, CONTINUES RELATIONS WITH F. DIP COMMUNITY GIVING HER COLD SHOULDER BUT D HAS TAKEN PAINS BE FRIENDLY, FOR WHICH BOTH SHE AND F GRATEFUL. D SAYS CAN GAIN DIRECT ACCESS F THROUGH Q IN ANY EMERGENCY. Q DAUGHTER HIGH-RANKING PORTUGUESE POLICE OFFICIAL. MOTHER IS NITA S. PAIS, RUA MOZAMBIQUE, 52-1-DTO LISBON. Q GAVE D LETTER TO MOTHER. HAVE OPENED, PHOTOED, WILL POUCH. RQST TRACES Q.

4. GERMAN (AMADO-BLANCO) Y FERNANDEZ (201-784008) GAVE D MIN OF FOREIGN TRADE ENVELOPE CONTAINING TWO LETTERS FOR LUIS AMADO-BLANCO (201-276972). ALSO PHOTOED, WILL POUCH.

SECRET

AMLASH-1

⑨

SECRET IN 17 315 Pg 2

5. D ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROGELIO (MONTENEGRO) GUASP (M). PREPARING REPORT. M WAS SCHEDULED LEAVE HAVANA ONE HOUR AFTER D FOR PRAGUE TO MEET MANUEL ("MANOLITO") (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ BEFORE COMING ROME. ACCORDING HAVANA RUMOR M TO KEEP EYE ON RICARDO (SUBIRANA) Y LOBO (201-333831), WILL BECOME DE FACTO CHIEF OF CUBEMB TO QUIRINALE. D SUSPECTS M HAS CUIS TIES. ENERGETIC COMMY.

6. D ALSO ON GOOD TERMS WITH SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353893) WHO GAVE HIM FOUR LETTERS WHICH COULD NOT SAFELY OPEN. POUCHING NAMES ADDRESSEES. TUTINO TOLD D AMLASH/1 AND AMTRUNK/10 CERTAINLY GUILTY. BUT F LETTER SUGGESTING CLEMENCY CAUSED RUMORS OF PRIOR DEAL. ALSO MANY RUMORS STUDENTS CHALKED "VIVA A/1" AND "VIVA A/10" ON WALLS BUT D DID NOT SEE. FOR TWO DAYS AFTER ARRESTS GOC PUT CONTROLS ON MANY KEY FIGURES.

7. BECAUSE PROTESTANT CLERICS IN CUBA SUBJECT TO MIL DUTY, HAVE PROTESTED RE DRAFT-EXEMPT STATUS CATHOLIC PRIESTS, WHOM GOC MAY START DRAFTING. CESARE ZACCHI (201-753588) WORRIED GOC-VATICAN RELATIONS MAY SUFFER.

8. CUBAMB IN BELGIUM, GUSTAVO (ARCOS) Y BERGNES PRESENTLY IN SOME DISFAVOR. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE ANTI-REGIME REMARKS.

9. INDEX Q AND M.

SECRET

End of message

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 12-62

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UNIT : [illegible]/SA/[illegible]/MAPROB
EXT : 1496
DATE : 4 FEB. 1965

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5 FEB 65 [illegible] 19z

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TO PARI WAVE CITE DIR 83150

TYPIC AMLASH AMTRUNK

REFS: A. UFGA 19569, 22 JAN 1965 (NOT SENT PARI)

B. PARI 8986 (IN 71959)* * REF RYBAT

1. FOR WAVE: PLS SEE PARA 15 OF REF A. MRS. A-9 FEARS THAT AMTRUNK-9 WAS CAUGHT CARDENAS MATANZAS AREA 7 JAN MAY BE ALLAYED IF SHE SHOWN ARTICLE MIAMI HERALD 9 JAN WHICH STATED FOUR PERSONS CAUGHT WHILE ATTEMPTING LAND 7 JAN AND SEVEN OTHERS WERE BEING SOUGHT DUE ATTEMPT LAND. AS A-9 DEPARTED ON 21 DEC WITH ONLY TWO PERSONS SEEMS UNLIKELY DID NOT ARRIVE BEFORE 7 JAN OR THAT HE IN GROUP REFERRED TO.

2. ALSO, CASTRO, CITED IN CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 29 JAN, SAID ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO LANDED FIRST WEEK JAN AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SPOTTED AND REPORTED TO AUTHORITIES BY CUBAN FARMERS. THUS SEEMS LIKELY GROUP OF FOUR CAUGHT 7 JAN, AND SEVEN OTHERS SOUGHT, COULD BE PART OF WHAT CASTRO CALLED THE 20-30 MAN GROUP INFILTRATING ON GUTIERREZ' ORDERS.

3. FOR WAVE: IF MRS. A-9 KNOWS NAMES OF A-9'S TWO CREWMEN, WISH ADVISE SEARCH VARIOUS SI TRAFFIC SINCE NAMES/PERSONS CAUGHT DURING LANDING PERIOD AND SHORTLY AFTER CITED THEREIN.

AMLASH-1 file

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

5-32

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

2ND PAGE

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 83150

83150

4. VIEW ABOVE, SUGGEST WAVE MAY WISH ATTEMPT PERSUADE MRS. A-9 NOT TRY LOCATE A-9 VIA MRS. GPIDEAL OR MEXI PRESIDENT UNTIL AMLASH-1 AFTER RETURN CUBA ON 10 FEB HAS HAD TIME LOCATE A-9 VIA AMTRUNK-10, AS CITED REF B. IF CASTRO'S SERVICES STILL UNAWARE A-9 'S POSSIBLE PRESENCE CUBA, MRS. A-9'S ATTEMPTS LOCATE HIM MAY ALERT THEM.

5. FOR PARI: SINCE A-9 MAY HAVE BEEN CAUGHT, PLS ASK AMLASH-1 TELL AMTRUNK-10 NOT TRY LOCATE A-9 VIA ANY OF FOLLOWING WHOM A-10 MAY KNOW: FISHERMAN CANDIDO DIAZ IN CARDENAS AREA; PEDRO BARBI (OR BALBI) FEBLES, OWNER OF BATE MARINO RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS: MARIO GIL GONZALEZ, DGI OFFICER HAVANA; JOSE VAZQUEZ NEREY AND THREE UNNAMED OTHERS (TWO OF WHOM ACSI AGENTS) ALL HIDING IN HOME OF GLORIA CABRERA IN HAVANA; ALSO, GLORIA CABREAR HERSELF, AS MRS. A-9 DOES NOT TRUST HER SINCE GLORIA WITH REGIME UNTIL RECENTLY. MRS. A-9 LISTED ALL ABOVE AS A-9'S PROBABLE CONTACTS ON TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB/MHAPRON ______
WH/SA/EOB Bastitter
WH/SA/MOB (Mr. Cini in Draft)
WE/3 ______

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Thomas F. Thiele
THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT
RELEASING OFFICER

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DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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AMLASH/1

WW

ORIG: W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT: WH/SA/EOB
EXT: 6153
DATE: 2/FEB/1965

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MESSAGE FORM 6

S E C R E T/RYBAT

ROUTING			
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SIG CEN

TO: PARIS ROME

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO: DDP, VR, FILE

MOB	IAT	SS	SB
	ICS	PERS	AR
EOB	[illegible]	LOG	CA
CI	[illegible]	[illegible]	WH
		SEC	NS

TO IMMEDIATE PARI INFO ROME (PRIORITY) CITE DIR 87801

DESENSITIZED YPIC YOBITE AMLASH MHAPRON

REF: PARI 8964 (IN 71838)

For Patrick

1. ACCORDING ROME 2136 (IN 40005) SUBJ REF IS BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO (DELLUNDE) Y PUYANS, DPOB 12 DEC 08 SANTIAGO CUBA. CREDIT MANAGER ROME HILTON WITH WHOM ROME STATION IN INFREQUENT CONTACT UNDER ODACID COVER. ASSESSED AS WILLING AID KUBARK BUT EXPERIENCE TO DATE (MAR 64) INDICATED DOUBT THERE MUCH POTENTIAL PBRUMEN OPS VALUE.

2. ABOVE INFO CABLED IN RESPONSE FROB 7180 (IN 38061) WHICH REQUESTED TRACES VENTURA F. DELLUNDE, CUBAN NATIONAL WHO ASSOCIATED HILTON HOTEL ROME. SUBJ ABOUT 45 YEARS, FORMER VP CUBAN RAILROADS, ALLEGEDLY WELL CONNECTED CUBAN EXILES EUROPE. FAMILY FORTUNE SEIZED BY CASTRO GOVT, SUBJ FATHER DIED OF HEART ATTACK SHORTLY AFTER. MARRIED, ONE CHILD, FAMILY IN ROME WITH SUBJ.

3. OIRA-39287 DESCRIBES 16 JAN 65 ROME MEETING WITH SUBJ, BUNCE, GROWERY, DURING WHICH SUBJ PROVIDED OPS LEADS AND INFO. LEFT KUBARKERS WITH EXCELLENT FIRST IMPRESSION.

4. NO OTHER HQS TRACES SUBJ REF.

WW

5. DEFER TO ROME ANSWER ~~[illegible]~~ REMAINING QUESTIONS PARAS 1, 2 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER 2-7

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T/RYBAT

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CONT.......
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TO INFO CITE DIR 81501

WH/SA/EOB ____________

WE/3 ____________

WE/4 ____________

WE/5 ____________

EE/G ____________

THOMAS F. THIELE
C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET/RYBAT

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FROM Jmwave

ACTION DC/WH/SA-3

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UNIT TIME BY

VR. FILE, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, (Suspense-2), RI/AN Dummy CS/RF

S E C R E T 142313Z

DIR CITE WAVE 7141

15 JAN 65 IN 60147

DESENSITIZED

TYPIC YOBITE MHAPRON AMWORLD

1. 30 NOV 64 AMDENIM-16 ACQUIRED FOLLOWING INFO FROM ARMANDO (MARTINEZ) Y VIRELLES:

A. MRR VERY ACTIVE AT PRESENT AND SUPPORTED BY AND COOPERATING WITH KUBARK. OVERTHROW OF CASTRO WOULD TAKE PLACE ANY TIME AFTER JAN 65. MANY IMPORTANT PEOPLE WITHIN GOC ARE ENGAGED THIS CONSPIRACY. CUBANS BEING INFILTRATED WITH HELP CASTRO'S OWN PEOPLE. LATTER ARE WAITING FOR RIGHT TIME START INTERNAL REVOLT.

B. MARTINEZ TOLD BY MRR CONTACTS NOT BE SURPRISED IF VERY IMPORTANT PERSON IN CASTRO GOVT LEADS CUBAN UPRISING. NAME OF (FNU) ALMEJEIRAS WAS QUOTED AS EXAMPLE. (STA COMMENT: ALMEJEIRAS PROBABLY EFIGENIO (ALMEJEIRAS Y DELGADO, 201-250391).

C. MARTINEZ MEMBER MRR AND COORDINATOR FROM BANES AREA. HE THROUGHLY DEBRIEFED ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BANES AREA BY OTHER MRR PERSONNEL.

2. MARTINEZ STATED HIS INFORMATION SOURCE IS TUTO (ALOMA). (STA COMMENT: ALOMA IS ERENESTO (ALOMA) SABAS, 201-297785, MRR MEMBER FROM ORIENTE. INDEX.

SECRET

A-MLASH-1

MESSAGE FORM

SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

ORIG. : W. WAINWRIGHT/dl
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 27/JAN/1965

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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27 JAN 65 20 7

TO : JMWAVE PARIS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/SA 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/WE 2, C/CI, C/FI 2, VR, FILE

TO WAVE INFO PARI CITE DIR 80565

DESENSITIZED TYPIC AMLASH MHAPRON AMGABE

REF: WAVE 7531 (IN 67600)*

CONCUR ACTION PARA 3 REF.

SB
AR
CA

END OF MESSAGE

*PORTELA STATES JEWELER WHO CONTACTED HIM MIAMI HOTEL EARLY FALL 64 BEHALF AMLASH-1 AND AMWHIP-1.

WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB
WE/3 R. Pierre (telecon)
WE/5/C D. Wright (telecon)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

201-252234

COORDINATING OFFICERS

JOHN L. HART
DC/WH/(SA)
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

27-1

SECRET/~~RYBAT~~

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Amlash/1
Commo

T/N: Rolando CUBELA Secades

POSITION: Medical Doctor, Cmdte. Cuban Army
The Cardiovascular Department of Cmdte. Fajardo Hospital, Havana.

LOCATION: Havana, Cuba

COMMO: S/W system, agent sending - #15136 carbon
agent receiving - #56638 pills

ACC Address: agent sending

Uses true first name or any other first name to AMWHIP/2 (whom he has known for number of years) w/ ~~c/o~~

Business Address (Rome)
Cavaliere Hilton
Jewelry Shop
Monte Mario
Rome, Italy

or Business Address (Geneva)
12 Rue Crespin
Geneva, Switzerland
(Note: AMWHIP/2's business address is same as home: expects get office in Geneva this year.)

Upon receipt of any letter from agent in true first name or from unknown Cuban in Havana, AMWHIP/2 will forward same immediately to AMWHIP/1's business address in New York City.

ACC. Addresses, agent receiving:

Srta Ernestina Acosta
Edif. #526, Apt. 6
Esquina Calles 25 y H.
Habana, Cuba
("Ene" subject's former secretary #8 is top floor Apt. tel 303865)

Return address on letters to Acosta:
Sr Jose Calderon
Palace Hotel
Madrid, Espana

(Emergency):
Virginia Secades (Subject's mother)
Calle 38 #122
Esquirna Avenida Zoologico
Alturas de Vedado
Havana.

SECRET

Letters to the Acosta signed "Pepe" will contain S/W; letters to the Acosta address signed "Luis" will be written on S/W carbon and indicate resupply of S/W material.

W NOTE: Subject can receive or send S/W messages ~~not~~ using the AMTRUNK/10 S/W System.

NOTE: Emergency commo: if contact cannot be made through above systems, AMWHIP/1 in NYC can probably arrange a means of contacting subject.

C/O: Wainwright (Formerly)
SANCHEZ

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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34 SECRET

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FROM JMWAVE

ACTION C/WH/SA 5

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TIME BY

INFO VR, FILE, DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DO

S E C R E T 182222Z

19 JAN 65 IN 62258

DIR CITE WAVE 7247

DIR 78971 21 JAN 65

DESENSITIZED

RYBAT TYPIC AMTRUNK

REFS A. WAVE 6745 (IN 53500

B. WAVE 6877 (IN 55776

C. DIR 75796

D. WAVE 6895 (IN 56238

1. SINCE FORWARDING REF D WAVE PRESSED INVESTIGATION SPONSORSHIP AMTRUNK-9 TRIP. FROM STATEMENTS MADE BY WIFE AMTRUNK-9 TO AMICE-14 AND IDEN A, STATEMENTS FROM A-9 DIRECTLY TO IDEN A AND WRITTEN NOTE FROM AMFAUNA-3 TO A-9, THERE SUBSTANTIAL CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INDICATE ACSI INVOLVEMENT. ON OTHER HAND, ON 15 JAN COS RCVD CATEGORICAL DENIAL BY IDEN B, ACTING CO ACSI WAVE AREA, THAT ACSI OFFICIALLY PARTICIPATING IN ANY WAY AMTRUNK-9 INFIL. IDEN B DID NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY INSUBORDINATION OR MISREPRESENTATION ON PART AMFAUNA-3 AND/OR AGENT HANDLER "TORRES." "JORGE" (SEE PARA 2 REF B) HAS SINCE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF TO MRS. A-9 AS "TORRES" WHICH SAME PSEUDO UNDER WHICH ACSI IDENTIFIED AGENT HANDLER IN CHARGE PRELIM DEBRIEFING A-9 RE FORMER ACSI SOURCE JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY.

②

WAVE 7248 19 JAN 65

SECRET

2. AFTER "TORRES" UNANNOUNCED VISIT HOME A-9 13 JAN, WIFE A-9 NOTED LICENSE PLATE NUMBER OF "TORRES'" AUTOMOBILE. PREFIX "630" THIS LICENSE IDENTIFIED AS PLATE BLOCKED AT STATE CAPITAL LEVEL FOR COVERT USE ODYOKE.

3. DESPITE PROBING AND DIRECT ACCUSATION BY MRS. A-9, NEITHER AMFAUNA-3 NOR "TORRES" ADMITTED TO HER FUNDS FOR A-9 TRIP CAME FROM "PENTAGON" WHICH AMFAUNA-3 TOLD MRS. A-9 "TORRES" REPRESENTS. IN RECENT VISITS, A-3 AND "TORRES" ATTEMPTED CONVINCE MRS. A-9 THEY NOT INVOLVED A-9 TRIP. MRS. A-9 FIRMLY BELIEVES A-3 PAYMASTER FOR FUNDS PROVIDED BY "TORRES" THROUGH PARENT ORGANIZATION.

4. AMFAUNA-3 CLAIMS RAISED MONEY FROM FIRENDS BUT MRS. A-9 MAINTAINS SHE OVERHEARD CONVERSATION BETWEEN A-9 AND "TORRES" IN WHICH "TORRES" TOLD A-9 HE COULD NOT SUPPORT HIM DIRECTLY BUT COULD PROVIDE FUNDS WHICH A-9 COULD USE TO PREPARE TRIP. AMTRUNK-9 TOLD IDEN A AMFAUNA-3 PROVIDED FUNDS FOR HIS TRIP WHICH STATEMENT ALSO SUPPORTED BY MRS. A-9. MRS. A-9 HAS NOTE SHE CLAIMS WRITTEN BY AMFAUNA-3 TO A-9 WHERE A-3 MENTIONS SUM $500 FOR A-9 USE BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR TRIP. THE NOTE (WAVE HAS COPY) INDICATED ADDITIONAL $200 FORTHCOMING.

5. 7 JAN WIFE A-9 VISITED BY AMFAUNA-3 AND "TORRES". GIVING FALSE SOURCE, MRS. A-9 STATED SHE HEARD AMTRUNK-15 ARRESTED AND SHE WORRIED BECAUSE A-9 PLANNED CONTACT HIM. AMFAUNA-3 BROKE INTO CONVERSATION TO SAY "WE" PLANNED ENTIRE OP AND IT NOT TRUE A-9 PLANNED CONTACT A-15. "TORRES" MADE NO COMMENT AT A-3'S USE PRONOUN "WE".

6. 13 JAN VISIT IN WHICH "TORRES" CAME ALONE (SEE PARA 2),

MRS. A-9 MADE TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO HIM. SHE ASKED THAT SHOULD WORD BE RCVD FROM A-9 THAT HE HIDING OUT, "TORRES' ORGANIZATION" SEND BOAT RESCUE HIM. OTHER REQUEST WAS IF DEFINITE CONFIRMATION A-9 CAPTURED, "TORRES' ORGANIZATION" NEGOTIATE HIS RELEASE THRU DIP CHANNELS. "TORRES" TOLD MRS. A-9 HE WOULD CONSULT HIS ORGANIZATION RE ABOVE.

7. FUNDS EXPENDED A-9 TRIP ESTIMATED CONSERVATELY APPROX $1450 INCLUDING $700 MENTIONED PARA 4 ABOVE; $200 EACH TO TWO FISHERMEN WHICH MRS. A-9 CLAIMS HER HUSBAND PAID; 50 GAL FUEL TANK AMTRUNK-5 BOAT ESTIMATED $100; $41.00 REPAIR OUTBOARD MOTOR (A-9 HAD SHOWN THIS RECEIPT TO IDEN A); AND $100 GIVEN MRS. A-9 BY A-3. ACCORDING MRS. A-9 BULK OF $700 SPEND FOR FUEL, FOOD FOR ONE WEK AND OP ITEMS PURCHASED LOCAL ARMY/NAVY STORE. A-3 SUPPLIED ONE M-1 RIFLE AND ONE M-1 CARBINE BUT MRS. A-9 BELIEVES A-9 BOUGHT AMMO.

8. EARLIER ASSUMPTION BY MRS. A-9 OF KUBARK SPONSORSHIP APPARENTLY PLAYED BY AMICE-14 REPEATED DENIALS OP KUBARK-BACKED. NEITHER A-3 NOR "TORRES" CLAIMED KUBARK CONNECTION BUT MRS. A-9 ORIGINALLY ASSUMED IT FROM A-9 PREVIOUS KUBARK AFFILIATION. ALSO VARIANCE BETWEEN STORY A-9 TOLD IDEN A AND MRS. A-9 STATEMENT RE TRIP SPONSORSHIP. A-9 TOLD IDEN A FUNDS PROVIDED BY A-3 THRU KUBARK WHILE MRS. A-9 MAINTAINS A-9 TOLD HER BOTH A-3 AND "TORRES" WORKED FOR "PENTAGON".

9. BOTH WAVE AND ACSI PRESSING INVESTIGATION. WAVE SUPPLYING PERTINENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND ACSI SUPPLYING PHOTO OF AGENT HANDLER "TORRES".

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
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MICROFILM

TO
DEPUTY CHIEF, WH/SA

INFO

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
TYPIC/AMTRUNK/MHAPRON OPERATIONAL
TRANSMITTAL OF COPY OF MEMO REGARDING AMTRUNK-9 INFIL WHICH PASSED TO ACSI 19 JANUARY 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

A. WAVE-7247
B. WAVE-7248

1. TRANSMITTED UNDER SEPARATE COVER VIA FLEXOWRITER IS A COPY OF THE WAVE MEMO TO ACSI AS PRESENTED TO ACSI ON 19 JANUARY 1965.

2. THE ''CAS SOURCE'' MENTIONED THROUGHOUT THE MEMORANDUM IS AMICE-14. THE ''SUB-SOURCE'' IN PARAGRAPHS 11 THROUGH 14 AND THE ''SUB-SOURCE'' IN PARAGRAPH 24 ARE THE SAME PERSON, IDEN A OF REFS.

3. LATER DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PASSING OF THIS MEMORANDUM ARE THAT BOTH THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 AND AMICE-14 HAVE IDENTIFIED ''JORGE'' AND ''TORRES'' AS THE SAME PERSON FROM A PHOTOGRAPH PROVIDED BY ACSI AND, PER PARAGRAPH 27, THAT THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 /WHO NOW BELIEVES HER HUSBAND TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER/ IS EXERTING PRESSURE UPON ACSI FOR ODYOKE TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR HER HUSBAND'S RELEASE. REPORTEDLY, THE WIFE OF AMTRUNK-9 HAS ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM ''TORRES'' TO WRITE A LETTER TO THE WIFE OF GPIDEAL PLEADING HER HUSBAND'S CASE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT - USC
WAVE MEMO TO ACSI DATED 19 JAN 65

AMLASH-1 file

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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGA-19569	22 JANUARY 1965
	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-728707

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

~~ATT TO UFGA-19569 PG 1~~

MEMORANDUM FOR - ACSI, MIAMI

SUBJECT - INFILTRATION INTO CUBA BY MODESTO ORLANDO OROZCO BASULTO

1. AT ABOUT 1800 HOURS, 29 DECEMBER 1964, MRS. JOSEFINA LOPEZ ANGULO DE OROZCO, WIFE OF MODESTO ORLANDO OROZCO BASULTO AKA ''BEBO'', TELEPHONED A CAS SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN FRIENDLY WITH OROZCO FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MRS. OROZCO ASKED THE CAS SOURCE TO VISIT HER AT HER HOME THAT EVENING.

2. THE CAS SOURCE ARRIVED LATER THAT EVENING. MRS. OROZCO ASKED THE CAS SOURCE IF HE KNEW THAT HER HUSBAND HAD LEFT FOR CUBA. CAS SOURCE REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD RUMORS TO THAT EFFECT. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT HER HUSBAND BECAUSE SHE HAD NOT HEARD A WORD FROM OR ABOUT HIM SINCE HE LEFT WITH 2 OTHERS 8 DAYS PREVIOUSLY, ON 21 DECEMBER 1964. OROZCO HAD PLANNED TO RETURN IN A WEEK. MRS. OROZCO ASKED CAS SOURCE TO TRY TO FIND OUT SOMETHING ABOUT OROZCO THROUGH ''HIS FRIENDS IN CUBA''. CAS SOURCE SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY SINCE HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN A GOOD FRIEND OF HIS BUT THAT HE WOULD NEED SOME DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED TRIP TO HELP HIM IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS.

3. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD GONE INTO CUBA TO RESCUE JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY AND 3 OTHERS WHO WERE HIDING IN THE HOME OF AWOMAN NAMED GLORIA CABRERA WHO LIVED AT NO.72 27TH STREET BETWEEN ''N'' AND ''O'', APT. 3, VEDADO, HAVANA. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THE ADDRESS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO OROZCO BY HORTENSIA ORIZONDO MENESES /ACSI SOURCE NO. 180/. MRS. OROZCO ADDED THAT BOTH SHE AND HER HUSBAND HAD KNOWN GLORIA CABRERA IN THE SIERRA MAESTRAS AND THAT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ DID NOT TRUST HER BECAUSE ''SHE HAD BEEN COMPLETELY WITH THE REGIME UNTIL ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO''.

4. MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE THAT HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN VISITED ABOUT FIVE TIMES BETWEEN MID-NOVEMBER AND MID-DECEMBER 1964 BY A PUERTO RICAN WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS ''JORGE''. IT WAS ''JORGE'', ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, WHO TOLD HER HUSBAND OF THE PLIGHT OF JOSE VASQUEZ NEREY. DURING THE SECOND OR THIRD MEETING, ''JORGE'' MENTIONED THE NAME OF ''HORTENSIA'', LATER IDENTIFIED AS HORTENSIA ORIZONDO MENESES, AND, AGAIN ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO WAS FROM THAT TIME OROZCO'S CONTACT IN THE VASQUEZ AFFAIR. ALTHOUGH ''JORGE'' DID NOT AT ANY TIME REPRESENT HIMSELF AS CIA, MRS. OROZCO ASSUMED THAT HE WAS SENT BY CIA. THIS ASSUMPTION SHE PASSED ON TO CAS SOURCE. ''JORGE'' NEVER IDENTIFIED THE ORGANIZATION WHICH HE REPRESENTED BUT HE DID TELL MRS. OROZCO THAT HE WAS NOT FROM CIA. ''JORGE'' DID, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AS HAVING OFFICIAL BACKING FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ''JORGE'' WAS DESCRIBED AS 5' 6'' TO 8'', MEDIUM BUILD, DARK BROWN SLICKED-BACK HAIR WITH NO PART, DARK BROWN EYES, OLIVE COMPLEXION, ABOUT 33 YEARS OLD, AND SPEAKING NEAR-PERFECT SPANISH.

5. THE CAS SOURCE REMARKED THAT A TRIP OF THIS NATURE REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY AND SUPPLIES. WHO HAD HELPED OROZCO TO GET THE BOAT, TO EQUIP IT AND FUEL IT AND TO PROVIDE THE OTHER NECESSITIES? MRS. OROZCO REPLIED THAT THE FINDING, EQUIPPING AND READYING OF THE BOAT HAD BEEN HER HUSBAND'S RESPONSIBILITY BUT THAT ORIZONDO HAD PROVIDED THE FUNDS. /AS WILL BE SEEN BELOW, THIS ALLEGATION THAT ORIZONDO WAS THE PAYMASTER FOR OROZCO'S TRIP IS SUPPORTED BY A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY ANOTHER CAS SUB-SOURCE TO WHOM OROZCO TALKED QUITE FREELY ABOUT A WEEK BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE/.

6. CAS SOURCE ASKED MRS. OROZCO INTO WHICH AREA DID HER HUSBAND INTEND TO INFILTRATE CUBA. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO GO INTO NORTHEASTERN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO THE MARTI AREA WHERE HE HAD SEVERAL CONTACTS WHO HAD HELPED HIM IN THE PAST. CAS SOURCE PRESSED FOR OTHER DETAILS OF THE ACTUAL SITE OF INFILTRATION BUT MRS. OROZCO PROTESTED IGNORANCE OF FURTHER DETAILS. SHE SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD WITH HIM AN ''EXPERT'' NAMED ''MATEO'' WHO KNEW THE AREA COMPLETELY. /''MATEO'' WAS LATER IDENTIFIED AS ALBERTO GONZALEZ ORTIZ. CAS FILES INDICATE THAT GONZALEZ HAS MADE A NUMBER OF CLANDESTINE TRIPS TO CUBA WHILE CONTRACTING TO BRING OUT RELATIVES OF EXILES FOR MONEY. HIS REPUTATION IS UNSAVORY BASED UPON THE GENERALLY-ACCEPTED FACT THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO BRING FAMILIES OUT AND HAS FREQUENTLY FAILED TO MAKE GOOD HIS PROMISES. IT IS ALSO A COMMONLY-ACCEPTED FACT AMONG THE EXILE FISHERMEN THAT GONZALEZ WILL NEVER UNDERTAKE SUCH A TRIP UNLESS HE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY PAID OR IS COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT THE MONEY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE UPON HIS RETURN/.

7. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF HER HUSBAND'S INTENDED PRIMARY CONTACT IN THE MARTI AREA. SHE MENTIONED ONE ''CANDIDO'' DIAZ, A FISHERMAN, AND ONE PEDRO BARBI, THE OWNER OF THE BATE MARINO RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS. OROZCO HAD TOLD HIS WIFE THAT HE INTENDED TO SEE THESE PERSONS TO HELP HIM WITH TRANSPORTATION TO HAVANA AND TO PROVIDE HIM WITH FUNDS /MRS. OROZCO CONTENDS--AND IT IS A SORE POINT WITH HER--THAT OROZCO LEFT WITH ONLY A FEW COUNTERFEIT PESOS/. ONCE IN HAVANA, OROZCO PLANNED TO GO FIRST TO THE HOME OF MARIO GIL GONZALEZ /HIS PATRONYMIC HAS ALSO BEEN SPELLED ''HILL''/. FROM THERE, OROZCO PLANNED TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE ADDRESS OF THE CABRERA WOMAN WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM ORIZONDO, PICK UP VASQUEZ AND GROUP AND LEAVE.

8. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD SEND A TELEGRAM TO HER AS SOON AS HE REACHED HAVANA SAFELY. SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HE WOULD SEND ANOTHER CABLE IN PRE-ARRANGED CODE TO INDICATE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY OUT. MRS. OROZCO WAS THEN TO CALL ORIZONDO WHO WAS TO ARRANGE AN AIR SEARCH FOR THE BOAT. /AS LATER TOLD BY MRS. OROZCO, INCLUSION OF THE WORD ''BIEN'' /GOOD/ IN A CABLE INDICATED THAT OROZCO WAS SAFE IN HAVANA. INCLUSION OF THE WORD ''SALIO'' /LEFT OR DEPARTED/ WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY OUT.

9. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD CALLED HAVANA ON 30 DECEMBER 1964, PRESUMABLY TO THE CABRERA WOMAN'S HOME. VASQUEZ HIMSELF HAD ANSWERED THE PHONE AND STATED THAT THERE WAS NO NEWS FROM OROZCO OR FROM ANYONE ELSE. VASQUEZ AND THE GROUP WERE STILL WAITING FOR CONTACT.

10. CAS SOURCE ASKED MRS. OROZCO HOW MUCH MONEY OROZCO HAD LEFT BEHIND FOR HER SUPPORT. SHE REPLIED THAT HER HUSBAND HAD LEFT $50.00 BUT THAT HE HAD TOLD HER TO RE-CONTACT ORIZONDO IF SHE SHOULD NEED MORE.

11. A CAS SUB-SOURCE REPORTED THAT OROZCO HAD COME TO HIS HOME ON 12 DECEMBER AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE PLANNED TO GO TO CUBA TO RESCUE VASQUEZ. OROZCO SHOWED SUB-SOURCE A RECEIPT FOR $41.00 FOR REPAIR TO AN OUTBOARD MOTOR. OROZCO SAID THAT THE BOAT WAS NOT FAST BUT QUITE SEAWORTHY. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD PAID THE BILL FOR THE MOTOR REPAIRS AND HAD PROVIDED THE OTHER NECESSARY FUNDS. OROZCO NAMED ORIZONDO AS A PERSON WHOM HE /OROZCO/ HAD BROUGHT OUT OF CUBA AND WHO HAD WORKED IN CUBA UNDER ONE DAVID CABEZAS. AS REPORTED BY SUB-SOURCE, OROZCO TOLD HIM THAT ORIZONDO HAD TOLD HIM OF VASQUEZ' DANGER AND ASKED FOR HIS HELP IN RESCUING HIM. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT HE HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD DO ANYTHING TO HELP HIS FRIEND VASQUEZ BUT THAT HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO THE PEOPLE WERE BEHIND HER /ORIZONDO/. ORIZONDO HAD REPLIED THAT SHE WAS GOING TO PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH A PERSON WHO SPOKE FLUENT SPANISH BUT WAS NOT CUBAN. THIS WAS ''JORGE'' AND FROM WHAT SUB-SOURCE IS ABLE TO RECONSTRUCT OROZCO MET ''JORGE'' IN A BAR ON FLAGLER STREET ON THURSDAY MORNING, 10 DECEMBER 1964. /HERE THE ACCOUNT OF THIS SUB-SOURCE IS SOMEWHAT AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT

MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE/.

12. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT ORIZONDO HAD SET UP THE MEETING FOR WESNESDAY MORNING, 9 DECEMBER, WITH THE TWO PERSONS WHO WOULD ACCOMPANY HIM ON THE TRIP. OROZCO MET THEM ON FLAGLER STREET AT A SPECIFIC CORNER WHICH OROZCO DID NOT MENTION TO SUB-SOURCE.

13. OROZCO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR A RECEIVED $400.00 FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE CREW /IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER OROZCO ACTUALLY RECEIVED THIS SUM OF MONEY FOR HIMSELF AS WELL/ PLUS A PROMISE TO TAKE CARE OF ALL OF THEIR FAMILIES IF THEY DID NOT RETURN.

14. OROZCO CALLED SUB-SOURCE BY TELEPHONE LATE ON THE EVENING OF 14 DECEMBER TO TELL HIM THAT HE WAS ''ON HIS WAY TO THE KEYS''. OROZCO TOLD SUB-SOURCE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MONEY AND THE ASSURANCES TO TAKE CARE OF THE FAMILIES HAD BEEN AGREED UPON.

15. AT A SECOND MEETING BETWEEN MRS. OROZCO AND CAS SOURCE ON 8 JANUARY, MRS. OROZCO TOLD CAS SOURCE THAT SHE HAD COME INTO THE POSSESSION OF SOME INFORMATION FROM AN UNNAMED FISHERMAN WHO HAD RECENTLY COME OUT OF CUBA. THIS INFORMATION INDICATED THAT SEVERAL ARRESTS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE SAME AREA IN WHICH HER HUSBAND INTENDED TO INFILTRATE. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE HAD ALSO HEARD A RADIO BROADCAST THE DAY BEFORE, 7 JANUARY, STATING THAT 4 INFILTRATORS HAD BEEN PICKED UP IN THE CARDENAS/MATANZAS AREA OF MATANZAS PROVINCE. MRS. OROZCO HAD CALLED ORIZONDO AND INSISTED UPON SEEING ''JORGE'' TO GIVE THIS INFORMATION TO HIM PERSONALLY.

16. ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO ARRIVED AT HER HOME ABOUT 2000 HOURS, 7 JANUARY. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE TOLD ''JORGE'' THE INFORMATION ABOUT ARRESTS IN THE AREA AND MENTIONED A PERSON NAMED ''PEDRO''. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ''JORGE'' HAD PRICKED UP HIS EARS AT THE MENTION OF THE NAME ''PEDRO''. ''JORGE'' ASKED MRS. OROZCO THE LAST NAME OF ''PEDRO''. MRS. OROZCO REPLIED THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW. ''JORGE'' ASKED WHAT BUSINESS THIS ''PEDRO'' WAS IN. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT ''PEDRO'' OWNED A RESTAURANT IN CARDENAS, MATANZAS PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ''JORGE'' THEN IDENTIFIED ''PEDRO'' AS PEDRO BARBI /OR BALBI/ FEBLES AND SAID THAT BARBI DID NOT ''WORK WITH THE AMERICANS'' OR WITH ANY ORGANIZATION BUT THAT HE HAD HELPED MANY PEOPLE. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THIS PIECE OF NEWS WORRIED HER GREATLY BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAD TOLD HER HE INTENDED TO CONTACT THIS PERSON. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO THEN BROKE INTO THE CONVERSATION TO DECLARE THAT ''WE'' / PRESUMABLY MEANING SHE AND ''JORGE''/ HAD DONE ALL THE PLANNING FOR OROZCO'S TRIP AND THAT OROZCO WAS NOT SUPPOSED TO CONTACT BARBI ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN. MRS. OROZCO REPORTED THAT ''JORGE'' DID NOT COMMENT ABOUT ORIZONDO'S USE OF THE TERM ''WE''.

17. THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE AUTOMOBILE IN WHICH ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO ARRIVED WAS NOTED AS A NEW YORK PLATE, BU-5523. THE CAR WAS DESCRIBED AS A LARGE FIAT. THIS LICENSE NUMBER WAS TRACED AND IT WAS REPORTED BY THE NEW YORK MOTOR VEHICLE AUTHORITIES THAT IT WAS REGISTERED TO ONE LEWIS BURNS, 75 EAST PARADE AVENUE, BUFFALO, NEW YORK. THE ONLY OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE RECORDS INDICATED THAT BURNS WAS BORN 11-10-98, THAT HE WAS RETIRED AND THAT THE AUTOMOBILE REGISTERED UNDER THIS NUMBER HAD BEEN A 1950 BUICK. MRS. OROZCO SAID SHE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS THE SAME CAR ''JORGE'' HAD USED ON PREVIOUS VISITS.

18. MRS. OROZCO SHOWED CAS SOURCE A NOTE WHICH MRS. OROZCO IDENTIFIED AS HAVING BEEN WRITTEN BY ORIZONDO TO HER HUSBAND /SEE ATTACHMENT A/. THE NOTE WHICH WAS NOT DATED STATED THAT THE ACCOMPANYING $500.00 WAS FOR OROZCO TO USE TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR HIS TRIP. ANOTHER $200.00 WAS FORTHCOMING BUT SHE ADVISED

OROZCO NOT TO TELL THIS TO ''LOS MUCHACHOS'', PRESUMABLY OROZCO'S CREW MEMBERS. THE NOTE MENTIONED A PERSON NAMED ''ALDO'' AND ALSO ''JORGE''. MRS. OROZCO SAID SHE DID NOT THINK ORIZONDO REALIZED THAT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ HAS STILL IN POSSESSION OF THIS NOTE.

19. MRS. OROZCO REPORTED THAT ORIZONDO HAD RETURNED TO HER HOUSE THE MORNING AFTER HER VISIT WITH ''JORGE''. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT ORIZONDO HAD BEEN VERY WATCHFUL AND THAT IT SEEMED TO MRS. OROZCO THAT THE PURPOSE OF ORIZONDO'S TRIP WAS TO ATTEMPT TO WHITEWASH ''JORGE'' OF ANY CONNECTION WITH OROZCO'S TRIP. /THIS INFORMATION WAS VOLUNTEERED FREELY TO CAS SOURCE AS AN OBSERVATION OF MRS. OROZCO/. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' HAD ONLY COME ALONG WITH HER THE PREVIOUS EVENING BECAUSE HE WAS INTERESTED IN WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO OROZCO AND THAT HE ''JORGE'' HAD HAD NOTHING WHATEVER TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP. MRS. OROZCO REMINDED ORIZONDO THAT IT HAD BEEN ''JORGE'' WHO HAD ORIGINALLY COME TO SEE OROZCO TO TELL HIM ABOUT VASQUEZ'S PLIGHT AND THAT ''JORGE'' HAD VISITED OROZCO SEVERAL TIMES THEREAFTER. HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE THAT ''JORGE'' HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP, ASKED MRS. OROZCO. ORIZONDO PROTESTED THAT ''JORGE '' WAS ONLY INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET INFORMATION ABOUT VASQUEZ.

20. MRS. OROZCO REMARKED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW IF ORIZONDO CONSIDERED HER A COMPLETE FOOL BUT SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ KNEW THAT SUCH A TRIP REQUIRED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, AT LEAST $1000.00, AND THAT SHE WAS CERTAIN THAT ORIZONDO DID NOT HAVE THAT KIND OF MONEY OF HER OWN. ORIZONDO REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT SHE HAD RAISED THE MONEY FROM FRIENDS. MRS. OROZCO PERSISTED AND STATED THAT SHE WAS COMPLETELY SURE IN HER OWN MIND THAT IT HAD BEEN ''THIS GENTLEMAN JORGE'' WHO HAD SUPPLIED THE MONEY. ORIZONDO DID NOT ANSWER. /SEE PARA 26 BELOW IN WHICH MRS. OROZCO CLAIMED TO HAVE OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION BETWEEN ''JORGE'' AND OROZCO IN WHICH ''JORGE'' STATED HE COULD NOT SUPPORT OROZCO'S TRIP DIRECTLY BUT COULD SUPPLY FUNDS/.

21. MRS. OROZCO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT SHE WAS STILL UNCERTAIN OF ''JORGE'S'' CREDENTIALS. MRS. OROZCO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT HER HUSBAND HAD HAD GREAT TRUST IN ORIZONDO AND SHE /MRS. OROZCO/ REALIZED THAT ANYTHING ORIZONDO WAS INVOLVED IN WAS TO HER HUSBAND'S BEST ADVANTAGE BUT AT THE SAME TIME SHE COULD NOT BRING HERSELF TO FEEL THE SAME CONFIDENCE IN ''JORGE'' AS SHE FELT IN ORIZONDO. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' WAS NOT CUBAN BUT PUERTO RICAN, AN AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO WORKED FOR THE ''PENTAGON''. ORIZONDO SAID THAT SHE HERSELF WAS NOT ACTIVELY WORKING FOR THE ''PENTAGON'' ANY LONGER BUT THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHEN HER FORMER EMPLOYERS NEED HELP AT WHICH TIMES THEY CALL UPON HER /ORIZONDO/. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT HER HUSBAND HAD TOLD HER THAT BOTH ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE'' WORKED FOR THE ''PENTAGON''.

22. ORIZONDO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT SHE WOULD PROVIDE TO MRS. OROZCO ANY MONEY THAT SHE NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE FAMILY. ON 4 OR 5 JANUARY, ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN MRS. OROZCO $100.00 TO PAY HER RENT /FOR WHICH SUM MRS. OROZCO DID NOT SIGN A RECEIPT/. ORIZONDO ALSO TOLD MRS. OROZCO THAT ''JORGE'' WOULD BE OUT OF TOWN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD.

23. OROZONDO PAID MRS. OROZCO ANOTHER VISIT ON 11 JANUARY. ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO, ORIZONDO NOW CLAIMED THAT NEITHER SHE NOR ''JORGE'' HAD HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH OROZCO'S TRIP, THAT IN FACT THEY HAD BOTH TRIED TO TALK HIM OUT OF MAKING THE TRIP.

24. ANOTHER SUB-SOURCE PAID A SOCIAL VISIT TO MRS. OROZCO ON THE EVENING OF 11 JANUARY. MRS. OROZCO SHOWED THIS SUB-SOURCE THE SAME NOTE WHICH INDICATED THAT ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN OROZCO $500.00 FOR THE INITIAL PREPARATIONS FOR HIS TRIP. MRS. OROZCO TOLD THIS

SUB-SOURCE THAT BOTH ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE'' WORK FOR THE PENTAGON AND ALSO MENTIONED ORIZONDO'S VISITS ON 8 AND 11 JANUARY IN WHICH ORIZONDO ATTEMPTED TO DISCLAIM ANY PART FOR HERSELF OR ''JORGE'' IN OROZCO'S TRIP. MRS. OROZCO TOLD THIS SUB-SOURCE THAT SHE WAS GOING TO PUT PRESSURE UPON THESE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PENTAGON /ORIZONDO AND ''JORGE'', TO EITHER GET HER HUSBAND OUT OF CUBA OR FAILING THAT TO BUY HIM OUT.

25. ''JORGE'' PAID AN UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO MRS. OROZCO ON 13 JANUARY. DURING THIS VISIT, HE CONFIDED TO MRS. OROZCO THAT HIS NAME WAS NOT ''JORGE'' BUT ''TORRES''. ''TORRES'' SAID THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN VASQUEZ BUT IN TWO AGENTS /HE USED THE TERM ''AGENTES''/ WHO WERE IN HIDING IN THE SAME HOUSE WITH VASQUEZ. AT WHICH POINT MRS. OROZCO ASKED ''TORRES'' HOW HE HAPPENED TO KNOW ABOUT THIS IF HIS CLAIM WERE TRUE THAT HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. ''TORRES'' MADE NO REPLY, ACCORDING TO MRS. OROZCO.

26. MRS. OROZCO THEN COMMENTED THAT SHE KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO RAISE EVEN A FEW HUNDRED DOLLARS IN THE EXILE COMMUNITY. SHE SAID THAT SHE KNEW ORIZONDO DID NOT HAVE THE $1000.00 OR MORE WHICH HAD BEEN SPENT FOR HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. THIS LED HER TO THE CONCLUSION, MRS. OROZCO SAID, THAT ''TORRES'' AND HIS ORGANIZATION HAD SUPPLIED THE FUNDS. AGAIN THERE WAS NO REPLY FROM ''TORRES''. /ON 11 JANUARY 1964, MRS. OROZCO TOLD SAME CAS SOURCE MENTIONED IN INITIAL PARAGRAPHS THAT SHE HAD OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION BETWEEN HER HUSBAND AND ''TORRES'' A WEEK OR TWO BEFORE OROZCO'S DEPARTURE IN WHICH ''TORRES'' TOLD OROZCO THAT HE COULD NOT SUPPORT HIS TRIP ''DIRECTLY'' BUT COULD PROVIDE MONEY WHICH OROZCO COULD USE TO MAKE HIS OWN PREPARATIONS/.

27. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHE HAD HAD TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO BRING UP TO ''TORRES''. ONE, THAT IF WORD WERE RECEIVED FROM HER HUSBAND THAT HE WAS STILL HIDING OUT, ''TORRES' '' ORGANIZATION SEND A BOAT IN TO HELP HIM EXFILTRATE. THE OTHER WAS THAT IF IT BECAME CONFIRMED THAT HER HUSBAND WAS A PRISONER, ''TORRES' '' ORGANIZATION NEGOTIATE FOR HIS RELEASE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. AS PART OF THIS LAST PROPOSAL, MRS. OROZCO SUGGESTED THAT SHE BE PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT MONEY TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO TO TAKE UP HER HUSBAND'S CASE PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. ''TORRES'' SAID THAT HE HAD TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH HIS ORGANIZATION. ''TORRES'' RE-EMPHASIZED THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH HER HUSBAND'S TRIP. HE WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO USE ALL THE RESOURCES AT HIS COMMAND TO FIND OUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO OROZCO AND WHILE HE WAS VERY SORRY ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S MISFORTUNE, HE STATED THAT IT HAD BEEN OROZCO'S OWN DECISION TO GO ON THIS TRIP.

28. UPON LEAVING, MRS. OROZCO TOOK NOTE OF THE LICENSE NUMBER ON ''TORRES' '' BLACK VOLKSWAGEN. SHE ASSUMED BUT COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT IT WAS A FLORIDA LICENSE PLATE, NO.68D1304 OR 68D 1344. ACCORDING TO A CAS' INVESTIGATION, THE PREFIX ''68D'' REPRESENTS A PLATE BLOCKED AT THE TALLAHASSEE LEVEL FOR THE COVERT USE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

29. ORIZONDO VISITED MRS. OROZCO LATER THAT SAME EVENING OF 13 JANUARY. SHE SEEMED SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ''JORGE'' HAD VISITED MRS. OROZCO EARLIER THAT DAY. ORIZONDO ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE MRS. OROZCO THAT THE ''JORGE'' MENTIONED IN A NOTE SHE HAD LEFT FOR OROZCO WAS ONE JORGE MAYO /OR MALLO/ CARDOSO, A FRIEND OF OROZCO'S IN THE REBEL-ARMY-IN-EXILE ORGANIZATION ''EJERCITO LIBERTADOR'' TO WHICH ANOTHER CLOSE FRIEND OF OROZCO'S, JOSE LOPEZ LEGON AKA ''PEPE EL TORO'' BELONGS. MRS. OROZCO REMARKED TO ORIZONDO THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW HOW STUPID ORIZONDO CONSIDERED HER TO BE BUT THAT SHE WAS COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT THE ''JORGE'' MENTIONED IN THE NOTE WAS THE SAME ''JORGE'' WHO HAD VISITED HER AND HER HUSBAND. MRS. OROZCO ALSO TOLD ORIZONDO THAT ''JORGE'' HAD TOLD HER THAT HIS NAME WAS ''TORRES''. ORIZONDO CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS HIS NAME.

30. IN ATTEMPTING TO RE-CONSTRUCT HOW MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT TO PREPARE THE BOAT AND EQUIPMENT FOR OROZCO'S TRIP, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT OROZCO WAS EXAGGERATING WHEN HE SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED $400.00 FOR EACH MEMBER OF THE CREW. MRS. OROZCO HAS STATED THAT OROZCO HAD GIVEN THEM EACH $200.00 AND SHE THOUGHT BUT WAS NOT COMPLETELY CERTAIN THAT HE HAD LATER GIVEN EACH OF THEM AN ADDITIONAL UNSPECIFIED SUM. STARTING WITH THE FIGURE OF $700.00 WHICH IS MENTIONED IN THE ATTACHED NOTE FROM ORIZONDO, IT APPEARS SAFE TO SAY THAT MOST IF NOT ALL OF THAT SUM WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID OUT FOR FUEL /AT LEAST 50 GALLONS SINCE IT HAD BEEN A 50-GALLON TANK WHICH HAD EXPLODED AND HAD TO BE REPLACED/, FOOD FOR ONE WEEK, THE ITEMS /KNIVES, PONCHOS, CANTEENS, FATIGUE UNIFORMS, AMMUNITION, ETC./ WHICH MRS. OROZCO CLAIMS OROZCO BOUGHT IN AN ARMY/NAVY STORE PLUS OTHER MISCELLANEOUS BOAT ITEMS. ADD TO THIS $700.00, THE $200.00 APIECE FOR THE TWO FISHERMEN /WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN MORE/, THE $41.00 FOR THE REPAIR OF THE BOAT ENGINE, THE ESTIMATED $100.00 TO REPLACE THE 50 GALLON FUEL TANK, THE $100.00 GIVEN TO MRS. OROZCO BY ORIZONDO, AND THE TOTAL /A CONSERVATIVE ONE AT THAT/ AMOUNTS TO APPROXIMATELY $1341.00. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT SHORTLY BEFORE HER HUSBAND'S DEPARTURE, ONLY $125.00 REMAINED OF THE INITIAL SUM. THE GROUP LEFT FOR THE MARATHON AREA A DAY BEFORE THEIR ACTUAL DEPARTURE AND HAD TO RETURN TO MIAMI BECAUSE THEY HAD FORGOTTEN THE KEYS TO THE BOAT. MRS. OROZCO SAID THAT THE $50.00 SHE RECEIVED FROM HER HUSBAND WAS TAKEN FROM THE REMAINING $125.00 AND SHE ASSUMES THAT THE BALANCE OF $75.00 WAS SPENT FOR MOTEL ROOMS IN THE KEYS AND FOR OTHER LAST-MINUTE PURCHASES. THE ONLY ITEMS FURNISHED TO OROZCO, ACCORDING TO HIS WIFE, WERE AN M-1 RIFLE AND AN M-1 CARBINE WHICH ORIZONDO HAD GIVEN HIM /MRS. OROZCO THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD HAD TO BUY THE AMMUNITION FOR THESE WEAPONS/, AND A PISTOL OF UNIDENTIFIED MAKE BY LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA OF THE MDC /CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT/ WHO ALSO GAVE OROZCO A MEANS OF ENTREE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN CUBA IF HE SHOULD RUN INTO UNFORESEEN DIFFICULTIES. OROZCO ALSO BOUGHT OR RECEIVED FROM SOME UNNAMED SOURCE AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF COUNTERFEIT PESOS.

31. AS ATTACHMENT B TO THIS MEMORANDUM, A COPY OF ANOTHER NOTE FROM ORIZONDO TO OROZCO RECOMMENDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD PROVIDE A BOAT FOR HIS INFILTRATION IS APPENDED FOR YOUR REFERENCE. THIS INDIVIDUAL IS BELIEVED TO BE ACSI SOURCE NO. 693.

32. CAS WOULD APPRECIATE ACSI COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS, PARTICULARLY AS THESE CONTAIN CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ''JORGE'' AND ORIZONDO. SINCE IT IS NOW APPARENT THAT ''JORGE'' AND ''TORRES'' ARE ONE AND THE SAME, IT IS BELIEVED THAT FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO THE IDENTITY OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IS UNNECESSARY.

BEBO -

I AM LEAVING YOU $500 SO THAT YOU CAN GO TO SEE ALDO EARLY AND BEGIN THE PREPARATIONS. TONIGHT I WILL HAVE $200 MORE AND I WILL TRY TO OBTAIN THE REST. FIND OUT IF THEY OBTAINED SOME MONEY, I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THIS BUT IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT ANYWAY. JORGE WAS HERE TONIGHT. YOU CAN COME TOMORROW NIGHT TO ARRANGE ALL THE DETAILS.

TAKE CARE OF THE TANK AS YOU THINK IS BEST. SINCE YOU ALREADY PAID FOR IT, YOU CAN PICK IT UP AND TELL THE BOYS THAT DUE TO THE BAD WEATHER IT IS BEST TO WAIT. IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING THE ''RUMOR'' SPREAD DOWN FLAGLER STREET, I DON'T THINK IT IS CONVENIENT TO SAY ANYTHING ON THIS OTHER MATTER TO THE BOYS UNTIL LATER ON. THINK ABOUT IT AND SEE WHAT IS BEST ON THIS MATTER.

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ATT B TO UFGA-19569 PG 7

BEBO -

I CAME TO SEE YOU BECAUSE I HAD TO SPEAK TO YOU. I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH PROGRESS YOU HAD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I WANTED TO TELL YOU THAT I HEARD OF A MAN, HUMBERTO VERGARA, CALLED VERGARITA. HE WAS RECOMMENDED TO ME AS A VERY SERIOUS PERSON, AND IT IS SAID THAT HE HAS A BOAT READY TO SAIL. MAYBE YOU KNOW HIM. AS I CANNOT SEE YOU OR DO ANYTHING DURING THE DAY, I MADE THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS TO SAVE TIME. I TOLD HIM TO GO TO THE FLAGLER BRIDGE, TOWARDS DOWNTOWN AND TO STOP ON THE LEFT SIDE /NATURALLY GOING TOWARDS DOWNTOWN/ AT 1200 NOON. YOU CAN THEN APPROACH HIM AND ASK HIM IF HE IS VERGARITA, AND YOU IDENTIFY YOURSELF AS MARQUIES. HE IS A YOUNG MAN, HAS ONE TOOTH MISSING. IF YOU THINK HE IS GOOD, SPEAK TO HIM, FIND OUT WHAT HE HAS AND HOW MUCH HE ASKS FOR THE TRIP.

IN ANY EVENT, WHEN YOU GET HOME AND YOU READ THIS NOTE, CALL ME AND LET ME KNOW IF YOU ARE GOING TO SEE HIM. ALSO LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU HAVE ARRANGED SOMETHING ELSE.

[illegible]

AMTRUNK	5	GONZALEZ Ort , Alberto
	9	OROZCO Basulto, Modesto
	10	Ramon Tomas Guin Diaz
	11	PEDRAZA, Carlos
	13	Humberto Antoliano ARMADA Guerra
	15	Pedro BARBI
	18	Candido DIAZ
	20	Enrique HERRERA Aro
AMICE	14	Pascasio Lineras Lopez
AMFAUNA	1	David CABEZA Coupau
	3	Hortensia ORIZONDO Meneses

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MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
WH/C/FI/TC ☐ INDEX
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29 MARCH 1966 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]340 201-726079

SECRET

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1	TC	5	CI
2		6	CA
3	FI	7	PA
4	RR	8	D

ROME BONN INFO: PARIS, GERMANY, FRANKFURT, BERN, GENEVA

DIRECTOR

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CI C/FI/D4, C/SAS 3, C/WE 3, C/FE 2, C/RI/SI

ROME BONN INFO PARI GMNY FRAN BERN GNVA CITE DIR

TYPIC DESENSITIZED MHAPRON AMWHIP AMWEST

92482

REFS: A. ROME 9425 (IN 80558) (NOT SENT BONN)
B. FRAN 2758 (IN 83177) (NOT SENT BONN)
C. ROME 9478 (IN 85022) (NOT SENT BONN)

1. SUBJECT REF A PARA 3 TRACE REQUEST IS AMWEST/1 WHO APPROACHED BY KUBARK APR 65 FOR RECRUITMENT. A/1 AGREED COOPERATE BUT FOLLOWING AUG 65 TRIP PARIS REVERSED HIS DECISION AND REFUSED RECRUITMENT. BONN C/O MANGANELLO (M) HOWEVER HAS MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH AMWEST/1'S WIFE, AMWEST/2 WHO HAS CONTINUED BE COOPERATIVE. M HAS BEEN REQUESTED OBTAIN CURRENT ASSESSMENT AMWEST/1 FROM AMWEST/2, AND IF ASSESSMENT FAVORABLE TO PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT OR DEFECTION OF AMWEST/1 ALONG PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES.

2. FOR ROME, FRAN, GNVA: DURING BRIEF 23 MAR PHONE CONTACT WITH AMWEST/2, M CONFIRMED THAT AMWEST/1 IS UPSET DUE RECENT ARRESTS AND PURGES. AMWEST/2 STATED THAT AMWEST/1 TO MEET ANTONIO CARRILLO IN GENEVA SOON FOR TALKS. AMWEST/1 CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT SINCE HE NOT PARTICULAR FAVORITE OF CARRILLO AND WAS FRIEND OF AMLASH/1.

3. FOR BONN, ATTN MANGANELLO: AMWHIP-2 (IDEN BONN ONLY)

AMLASH-1

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RELEASING OFFICER 31-5

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IS ROME ASSET. HIS WIFE OF CURRENT OPS INTEREST DUE HER PROPOSED SUMMER TRIP TO VISIT SICK MOTHER IN PBRUMEN, WHERE SHE MAY POSSIBLY CONTACT HIGH LEVEL PBRUMEN MILITARY FRIEND ON OUR BEHALF. BRIEFLY REFS SURFACE POSSIBILITY OF DANGER TO AMWHIP/2'S WIFE DURING TRIP DUE PROBABILITY PBRUMEN AUTHORITIES AND ANTONIO CARRILLO KNOWLEDGEABLE OF AMWHIP/2'S PAST BUSINESS ASSOCIATION WITH AMLASH/1. DURING 22 AND 23 MAR PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMWHIPS AND CARRILLO, LATTER GUARANTEED AMWHIP/2'S WIFE'S SAFETY WHILE PBRUMEN. HOWEVER CARRILLO'S CURIOUS REFERRAL OF AMWHIPS TO AMWEST/1 AS CONTACT DURING HIS (CARRILLO'S) ABSENCE HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE PROVOCATION ATTEMPT. THIS PARTICULARILY VALID SINCE ALL PARTIES CONTAMINATED BY PAST AMLASH/1 ASSOCIATION, AND DUE AMWEST/2'S STATEMENTS RE CURRENT AMWEST/1-CARRILLO RELATIONSHIP.

4. VIEW ABOVE SITUATION, SUGGEST NO CONTACT BETWEEN AMWESTS AND AMWHIPS. REQUEST REPORT DETAILS AMWEST/1-CARRILLO MEETING AS SOON AS THEY CAN BE OBTAINED FROM AMWEST/2. MEETING OUTCOME SHOULD ESTABLISH AMWEST/1'S FUTURE STATUS AND ALSO RESOLVE PROVOCATION QUESTION.

END OF MESSAGE

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WH/C/RR/MHAPRON S. W. Roberts
C/WH/C/FI E. J. Williamson
WH/C/CICS John A. Foster
C/WE
XX/EE/G George J. Kunz
WE/3
WE/4 John J. Shea
EE/SA/S

C/EE/OPS

for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

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ORIG : MARVIN FRANCIS:adc
UNIT : WH/C/FI/TC ☐ INDEX
EXT : R. 1271 ☐ NO INDEX
DATE : 29 MARCH 1966 ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO : BONN

FROM: DIRECTOR

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TO BONN INFO CITE DIR 92483

TYPIC KAPOK MHAPRON AMWEST AMWHIP

REF: DIR 92482

IDEN REF: JUAN VENTURA VALNER, CUBAN EXILE WHO OWNS JEWELRY SHOP AND RESIDES GENEVA. MAKES INFREQUENT BUSINESS TRIPS TO ROME.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/RR/MHAPRON S. W. Roberts
WH/C/CICS John A. Eastman
C/WH/C/FI E. J. Williamson
EE/G George J. Kunz

C/EE/OPS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

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DATE : 23 MARCH 1966

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TO : OTTAWA INFO: JMWAVE, GERMANY, FROB, FRANKFURT, BONN 19 30 Z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, WE 8, EE 6, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

TO OTTA INFO WAVE ~~GERM~~ ~~FROB~~ FRAN ~~BONN~~ CITE DIR 90518

TYPIC CASUGAR

REF: OTTA 3182 (IN 80650)

1. APPRECIATE OFFER. VIEW CASUGAR/1 HIGH LEVEL ACCESS PBRUMEN TARGET PERSONALITIES, HQS ANXIOUS OBTAIN HIS VIEWS RE CURRENT PBRUMEN POLITICAL SHAKEUP. REQUEST OTTA INTERCEDE WITH SMABOVES AND, IF FEASIBLE, ATTEMPT ARRANGE JOINT SMABOVE/KUBARK DEBRIEFING C/1 IN CANADA. HQS PREPARED SEND TYPIC OFFICER. PLEASE PROVIDE DATES C/1 PROPOSED VISIT.

2. IF HELPFUL, OTTA MAY INFORM SMABOVES THAT C/1 NOT RECRUITED ASSET BUT WILLING PARTICIPANT SEVERAL KUBARK DEBRIEFINGS DURING PAST TWO YEARS.

END OF MESSAGE

fC/WH/C/FI
WH/C/MO
WH/C/CA
WH/C/RR
WH/C/FI/IO
DC/EE/G George J. Kenny
WE/BC/C
WH/C/CICS

AMLASH-1

for C/WE/BC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO

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TYPIC MHSPAWN MHAPRON

1. REUTERS DISPATCH DATELINED HAVANA 16 MARCH REPORTED WIDESPREAD PURGE UNDERWAY OF MILITARY OFFICERS, HIGH OFFICIALS CUBAN GOVT AND LEADERS COMMUNIST PARTY. FIDEL CASTRO ALSO REVEALED THAT SEVERAL CUBAN LABOR UNION LEADERS ARE UNDER ARREST ON EMBEZZLEMENT CHARGES. IN ADDITION REUTERS SOURCES STATED THAT SEVERAL HIGHLY PLACED OFFICIALS WOULD SOON FALL IN THE CLEANUP AND THAT "FULL INVESTIGATION OF OFFICIALS' MORAL AND POLITICAL PRACTICES ALREADY UNDERWAY IN GOVT MINISTRIES". THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN TRADE WILL BE MOST AFFECTED BY THE PURGE. ON 15 MARCH, THE FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY IN A SPECIAL MEETING "APPROVED THE PURGE" AND ADOPTED A COMPLETE CHECK ON MEMBERS WORKING ABROAD. NEW RESTRICTIONS ALREADY IMPOSED FORBID THE BRINGING INTO CUBA RATIONED OR HARD-TO-GET DURABLE GOODS.

(6)

AMLASH-1

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PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 87022

2. QUOTING AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE, REUTERS REPORTED THAT MAJOR EFIGENIO AMEIJEIRAS, DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, HAS BEEN DISMISSED FROM HIS OFFICES AND IS TO STAND TRIAL BEFORE A COURT MARTIAL. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO ANNOUNCED "THE ARREST OF SEVERAL DOZEN OTHER OFFICIALS" ON CHARGES OF INDULGING "LA DOLCE VITA". AN ELABORATION OF THIS CHARGE WAS MADE BY CASTRO IN HIS 13 MARCH SPEECH WHEREIN HE ATTACKED MEMBERS OF CUBAN MISSIONS ABROAD WHO SPENT SEVERAL MONTHS IN "VAPORS OF PARTIES AND GOOD BRANDY AND IN COMPANY OF PRETTY YOUNG GIRLS." CASTRO ADDED THAT THOSE GUILTY OF "PLAYBOY BEHAVIOR" WOULD BE DRAFTED INTO THE ARMY OR SENT TO WORK ON THE FARM.

3. BACKGROUND: THE PURGE HAS BEEN PRECEDED BY THE TRIAL XXXXXXXXX ON 7 MARCH BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL OF SEVEN CUBANS FOR COMPLICITY IN A PLOT TO OVERTHROW FIDEL CASTRO. THE ACCUSED ALLEGEDLY HAD THE SUPPORT OF SOME CUBAN EXILE LEADERS NOW RESIDING IN THE U.S. TWO OF THE SEVEN, ROLANDO CUBELA AND RAMON GUIN, HELD THE RANK OF MAJOR, HIGHEST RANK IN THE ARMED SERVICES. THE STATE PROSECUTOR REQUESTED DEATH FOR CUBELA AND THREE OTHERS.

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4. MAJOR CUBELA WAS A POPULAR AND PROMINENT UNIVERSITY STUDENT LEADER, AN ARDENT REVOLUTIONARY AND ONE OF THE EARLY COHORTS OF CASTRO DURING THE BATISTA REGIME. CUBELA WAS ALSO A CLOSE FRIEND OF CASTRO AND UNTIL THE ARREST RANKED HIGH AMONG THE LEADERS OF THE REGIME. HIS ARREST AND ABJECT CONFESSION AT THE PUBLIC TRIAL CONDUCTED IN STALINIST FASHION TRIGGERED OFF A SERIES OF STUDENT REACTIONS. THE TRIAL IN EFFECT BACKFIRED AGAINST THE REGIME.

5. UPI REPORTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICES, INCLUDING ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES WHO DEPARTED RECENTLY FROM CUBA, TESTIFIED TO THE FACT THAT ANTI-GOVT STUDENT AGITATIONS OCCURRED. WALL SCRIBBLINGS ON UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS THREATENED CASTRO, ONE READING: "ONE HEAD PAYS FOR ANOTHER," ANOTHER READ "OUT WITH FIDEL."

6. BECAUSE OF THE STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE TRIAL, CASTRO REQUESTED THE STATE PROSECUTOR NOT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCES. IN ORDER PLACATE ADVERSE PUBLIC OPINION THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE GIVEN WIDE COVERAGE ON BOTH RADIO AND TELEVISION CIRCUITS. AS A RESULT, CUBELA AND OTHERS GRANTED CLEMENCY AND SENTENCED TO LENGTHY PRISON TERMS.

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7. THE CUBELA TRIAL WAS USED AS A PEG, I.E., GUILT BY ASSOCIATION IN THE DISMISSAL AND CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MAJOR AMEIJEIRAS WHOSE LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION IS "UNDISPUTED" BY CASTRO. HOWEVER, AMEIJEIRAS WAS STRIPPED OF HIS MILITARY RANK AND CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF BEING A PLAYBOY, LIVING THE GAY LIFE.

8. AMEIJEIRAS WAS ONE OF CASTRO'S FIRST REVOLUTIONARY FOLLOWERS. HE HAD BEEN WITH CASTRO SINCE 1956, WAS ONE OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE GRANMA EXPEDITION, FOUGHT IN THE SIERRA MAESTRA IN 1957-58 AND HAD HELD HIGH OFFICE SINCE 1959. IN OCT 1965 HE WAS NAMED TO THE HUNDRED MAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

9. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT BLAS ROCA CALDERIO, MEMBER OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CP AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES COMMITTEE, WILL SHORTLY BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. SIMILARLY, THE CHARGES OF MALPRACTICES AGAINST THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IMPUGNS THE LOYALTY OF FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL ROA GARCIA HIMSELF. ANOTHER MINISTER UNDER SUSPICION, I.E., GUILT BY ASSOCIATION, IS FAURE CHOMON, MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION. THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 100-MAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE CREATED IN LATE 1965, MAY NOT BE SPARED AS THE PURGE GATHERS MOMENTUM.

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10. THE UNDERLYING CAUSE FOR THE "SHOWTRIAL" OF CUBELA, THE ARREST OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE OUTLANDISH CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE CP AND MINISTERIAL OFFICIALS ARISES FROM THE IRREVERSIBLE FAILURES OF THE GOVT IN THE HANDLING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. THE SCARCITY OF BASIC FOOD PRODUCTS HAS WORSENED. RICE, ROOT CROPS, MILK, MEAT CONTINUE TO BE RATIONED SEVERELY, AND THE AVAILABILITY TO THE CONSUMER IS NOW BELOW THE 1957-59 LEVEL, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF "COMMUNIST PLANNING". THERE ARE SERIOUS SHORTAGES OF MEDICINE, TEXTILES AND HOUSING. THE LATTER HAS DETERIORATED IN URBAN AREAS TO A LEVEL FAR BELOW PRE-WAR STANDARDS. SIMILARLY, CASTRO REPORTED THAT THE SUGAR CROP THIS YEAR WILL FALL FAR BELOW THE SIX MILLION TONS HARVESTED IN 1965. SINCE SUGAR ACCOUNTS FOR SOME 80% OF TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE EARNINGS, 1966 INCOME FROM SUGAR SALES, FACED WITH DEPRESSED WORLD MARKET PRICES, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY MEET THE COST OF BASIC IMPORTS, ESSENTIAL FOR SUSTAINING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. CASTRO HAS SOUGHT TO RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON THE ECONOMY BY PERMITTING THE EXODUS OF SOME 400 REFUGEES PER MONTH WHO ARE STREAMING INTO THE U.S. OTHER FAILURES INCLUDE THE FUNCTION OF THE GOC

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ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE WHICH HAS ALMOST COME TO A HALT. IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMY SOME 60,000 EMPLOYEES ARE BEING DISMISSED FROM THEIR JOBS. IMPORTANT BUREAUS ARE DENUDED OF COMPETENT STAFFS. ALSO, THE POLICY OF REPLACING EXPERIENCED FUNCTIONARIES WITH UNQUALIFIED CP STALWARTS HAS ALSO BEEN EXTENDED INTO THE ARMED SERVICES. COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN COMMAND POSTS AND THEIR WORD TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THOSE WHO ARE TECHNICALLY COMPETENT BUT NOT PARTY MEMBERS.

11. PSYCH EXPLOITATION IN MEDIA:

A. EMPHASIZE POINT THAT SHOW TRIAL AND PURGES DEMONSTRATE THAT IN THE PATTERN OF ALL DICTATORS, CASTRO GRASPING AT STRAWS, HOPING DIVERT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM MOUNTING INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES;

B. COMPARE CASTRO TO NKRUMAH, SUKARNO AND OTHERS AS LEADERS WHO HAVE BANKRUPTED THEIR NATIONAL ECONOMIES AND SOLD OUT THEIR NATION TO COMMUNISM;

C. PORTRAY CASTRO IN STATE OF PANIC, HIS RECENT RANTINGS AND RAVINGS ARE REMINISCENT OF OTHER DEFUNCT DICTATORS;

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D. RAISE QUESTION WHO CAN NOW CONSIDER HIMSELF SAFE WHEN CASTRO IS TURNING AGAINST HIS MOST LOYAL FRIENDS. SIMILARLY, CASTRO HAS LASHED OUT AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, HIS FORMER ALLIES;

E. SHOW THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS WHO IN EARLY 1965 WERE "PURGED" ON TRUMPED UP CHARGES OF HOMOSEXUALITY ARE BECOMING ASSERTIVE. SIMILARLY, MILITARY OFFICERS, FALSELY ACCUSED, WILL CERTAINLY RESPOND. THE STUDENTS WITH THE MILITARY ARE THE TWO POWER GROUPS THAT CAN REVERSE THE TRENDS AS EXEMPLIFIED TODAY IN INDONESIA;

F. LASTLY, AVOID ALL REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS OF GOC THAT KUBARK INVOLVED IN CUBELA PLOT.

12. ABOVE BACKGROUND AND INFO MAY BE PASSED TO LIAISON.

13. FOR KUTUBE EXPLOITATION:

A. STATIONS WITH CUBAN INSTALLATIONS AND/OR TRADE MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT ESTABLISH DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH SELECTED CUBAN FORNMIN AND TRADE PERSONNEL THEIR AREAS. PURPOSE TO EMPHASIZE TO THEM THAT THEIR DOLCE VITA AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO HAVANA

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TO　　INFO　　CITE DIR 89022

AND THAT TIME HAS COME TO ENSURE THEIR FUTURE THROUGH COOPERATION WITH ODYOKE. CONTACTS SHOULD BE GEARED TO RECRUITMENT IN PLACE AND COOPERATION RATHER THAN DEFECTION. SHORT OF THIS, HOWEVER, SPECIFIC DEFECTION REQUESTS SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE RECEPTIVE EAR.

B. STATIONS REQUESTED CABLE SPECIFIC LEADS IN ORDER ENABLE HQS GEAR RQMS, LIMITS OF COMMITMENT. RECENT DIP/TRADE DEFECTORS SHOULD BE QUERIED FOR LEADS IN THIS CONTEXT.

END OF MESSAGE

A/DCHHD/C

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C/CA

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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KAP[illegible]YPIC DELORRY

1. 15 MARCH DELORRY (D) REPORTED THAT WHILE HE IN CUBA MANUEL (PINEIRO) LO$\overset{S}{Z}$ADA (201-238687) PHONED D'S SECRETARY HILDA QUINTANA IN RESPONSE ROUTINE D INVITE, SAID WANTED SEE D. MEET FELL THROUGH BECAUSE OF AMLASH/1 ET AL.

2. LATER D TOLD BY SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353093) PINEIRO (P) WANTS GO ITALY, WANTS MAKE TRIP WITH D.

3. D PLANS LEAVE FOR CUBA BETWEEN 28 MARCH -- 2 APRIL. RQST HQS GUIDANCE IN CASE P RPTS RQST.

4. INDEX D, P.

S E C R E T

CFN: 9357 15 MARCH DELORRY D CUBA MANUEL PINEIRO LOZADA 201-238587 D'S HILDA QUINTANA D D AMLASH/1 ET AL D SAVERIO TUTINO 201-353093 PINEIRO P ITALY D D CUBA 28 2 RQST HQS P RPTS RQST D P

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AmLash-1

AMLASH/1 - Paris Station Aspect

Paris Station involvement with the AMLASH case began in 1962, after AMLASH/1 came to Paris after attending the Helsinki Youth Festival that year. In Helsinki, AMLASH/1 was contacted by UNRUMBLE/2 (an asset of the Paris Station who attended the Festival for purposes of disruption) and by other KUBARK assets. It is not clear from our files just when AMLASH/1 was "recruited" but it appears that he was recruited during or shortly after the Festival.

In Paris he was in contact with Peter J. KYMINGHAM (probably in alias although I know that AMLASH/1 was at KYMINGHAM's home upon occasion). In 1962 AMLASH/1 was given training in explosives by ODIBEX (I believe) upon request of the Paris Station. He appears to have returned to PBRUMEN in late 1962. It is not known if other Paris Station personnel were in contact with AMLASH/1 during that period.

AMLASH/1 next arrived in Paris on 14 September 1963, coming from the International Games held in Puerto Alegre, Brasil, where he was in contact with TYPIC officers. At this point AMSPORT/1 (now QUSPORT) was in contact with AMLASH/1 in Paris and AMWHIP/1 was another comms channel (the one being used primarily by Hqs.). The Headquarters TYPIC officer, ONTRICH (P), arrived in Paris on 3 October 1963 and picked up the contact with AMLASH/1 which was being maintained by AMSPORT/1 and KYMINGHAM. The meetings with AMLASH/1 took place in KYMINGHAM's home as best I remember. These discussions concerned AMLASH/1's plans to assissinate AMTHUG and overthrow his regime.

ONTRICH returned to Paris In late October, after discussions at Headquarters on the case. ONTRICH and DAINOLD, who ~~was~~ were tdy in Paris at the time, met with AMLASH/1 in late October or early November. DAINOLD's participation was due to AMLASH/1 strong desire to talk with some high-level ODYOKE official concerning his plans and to obtain ODYOKE blessing if possible. I am not aware of exactly what happened at these meetings but I received the impression from KYMINGHAM that such blessing was given. AMLASH/1 returned to PBRUMEN on 27 November 1963. It was during this visit to Paris

AMLASH-1

that STOCKWOOD met AMLASH/1 and AMWHIP/1, presumably in alias but I do not know the details. It was also apparent by the time AMLASH/1 left that he knew UNSNAFU/5 was working for KUBARK and we knew that UNSNAFU/9 was aware to some extent of AMLASH/1's plans (UNSNAFU/9 had [illegible] been recruited by KUBARK at that time). It was agreed that AMLASH/1 would used the address of UNSNAFU/13's parents for s/w letters to KUBARK (UNSNAFU/13 is wife of UNSNAFU/9).

AMLASH/1 next arrived in Paris in late November or early December 1964. AMWHIP/1 STOCKWOOD and ONTRICH (tdy from Headquarters) met with him in Paris (this time in a safe house of the Station. AMLASH/1 left for PBRUMEN from Madrid on 20 February 1965. During this stay in Paris AMLASH/1 met the following KUBARK staffers and agents:

STOCKWOOD, CLOADEN, RODAMER
AMWHIP/1, UNSNAFU/9, UNSNAFU/5, UNSNAFU/13

You will recall that in December 1964 UNSNAFU/5 had a nervous breakdown and AMLASH/1 played an important part in convincing UNSNAFU/5 that he should agree to hospitalization. It was in this connection that CLOADEN and RODAMER met AMLASH/1. CLOADEN subsequently met with AMLASH/1 two or three times to received reports for STOCKWOOD. These meetings were street meetings or in the home of UNSNAFU/5. During this stay, AMLASH/1 traveled to Madrid at least once to meet with AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1. I am not aware of results of these meetings except that AMLASH/1 was seeking the physical instruments to carry out his plan to eliminate AMTHUG.

There was no additional contact with AMLASH/1 in Paris subsequent to February 1965 but the Station (CLOADEN and HIRLEES) did have subsequent contact with UNSNAFU/5, UNSNAFU/9, AMLASH/2 and AMLASH/3. You will recall that it was AMLASH/3 who made the "joking" pitch to MIRLEES on 6 May 1965. AMLASH/2 and AMLSH/3 were both aware of AMLASH/1 plans.

Paris Station personnel known to AMLASH/1

Peter J. KYMINGHAM	- not known what alias used. Some meetings were held in KYMINGHAM's home in 1962/63. It is not known if other staff personnel (other than ONTRICH) were met then by AMLASH/1.
Paul K. STOCKWOOD	-alias not known for sure but believe he used "Roberto". AMWHIP/1 knew STOCKWOOD as embassy officer and called him there.
Peter M. GLOADEN	- Known as "Dick". True name not used unless told to AMLASH/1 by UNSNAFU/5 or UNSNAFU/9.
Milton P. RODAMOR	- met AMLASH/1 only once, when transporting UNSNAFU/5 to hospital. Known to all As "Dr. ......" (cant remember aka used).
Dr. Lipsich	- cleared Dr. at American Hospital, Paris. AMLASH/1 met him briefly when admitting UNSNAFU/5 to hospital.
Wallace A. GROWERY (from MADR)	- met in 1962 during explosives training in Paris. Details not known.

Agents (involved to some degree)

UNSNAFU/5
UNSNAFU/2
UNSNAFU/13
AMLASH/2
AMLASH/3
AMWHIP/1

Peter M. GLOADEN
7 March 1966

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file AMBUD-1

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TEGU SANJ

CITE PACY 8025 ✓
NUMBER

((MASSEY ACTING))

REF: WAVE 4407

1. AMTEASE-1 ARRANGING FOLL FOR AMBUD-1 VISIT PACY:

A. RECEPTION TOCUMEN INTL AIRPORT;

B. BREAKFAST WITH NARCISCO GARAY, RECTOR UNIV OF PANAMA; ARLOS AROSEMENA, PANAMA DELEGATE OAS-PRESIDENT PACY LAW ASSOCIATION; AND LUIS ALFARO, PRESIDENT SAN FERNANDO MEDICAL CLINIC;

C. SUPPER WITH HYHULA-1 (IDEN) AND DULCIDO GONZALEZ, LEADING ANTI-COMMIE INDUSTRIALIST;

D. TIMES FOR INTERVIEW WITH HYJULA-1, PRESIDENT CHIARI, FORMIN GALILEO SOLIS, AND OTHERCABINET MINS;

E. TOUR UNIV OF PANAMA AND HQS DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNIONS;

2. STATION ~~XXXXXX~~ FINANCING PORTION OF FOR LOCAL PROP VALUE. WILL AIRMAIL CLIPPINGS, FOTOS MANA SALV GUAT SANJ TEGU FOR POSS REPLAY, ALTHOUGH ITEMS MAY NOT BE TIMLY ALL CASES.

END OF MESSAGE

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FORM 2-62 1303a

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DATE: 08 JUNE 62

FILE: 08/0835Z

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS FAS	072136Z	IN-06066

TO WAVE

INFO DIR MANA SALV GUAT TEGU SANJ

CITE PACY 8026 NUMBER

(MASSEY ACTING)

REF PACY 8025

IDEN A: MARCO ROBLES, MINISTER GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE.

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SECRET
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DATE: 11 OCT 62

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
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TO DIR

INFO WAVE

CITE KNGS 0208

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A. DIR 40582

B. KNGS 0202

1. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLIMATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR ### SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUN#ITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENUOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS ### TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE, STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERCIVE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.

2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL XKXXM CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR MOST RELUCTANTLY IN (PTN GBLD WILL FWD) WITH FRANK (DIAZ) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. IN X ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT AMBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR XX VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FACING "FRIENDS OF CUBA

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DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		IN 11558

TO

INFO

CITE KIGS 0208
NUMBER

--- PAGE 2---

COMMITTEE" (COMPRISING LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".

3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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INCOMING

FORM 1-62 1302a

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PW

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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DATE: 03 OCT 62
FILE: 030339Z

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
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RR	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	021514Z	11128

TO DIR WAVE INFO CITE KNGS 0202 ✓
NUMBER

GYROSE AMBUD

REF A. WAVE 9150
B. KNGS 0167

1. COS DOES NOT QUESTION POSSIBILITY COVERAGE CUBAN PROBLEM FROM JAMAICA MIGHT BE EXTENDED BUT BELIEVES DELEGATION SUCH AS AMBUD WHOSE PRESENCE OVERT WOULD PROVE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER BUSTAMANTE 4 SEPTEMBER THAT GOVT WOULD NOT ALLOW JAMAICA BE USED FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. REASON FOR THIS STATEMENT IS CONTINUING AND FREQUENTLY REITERATED CONCERN OF JAMAICAN GOVT FOR SAFETY OF 25,000 JAMAICANS RESIDENT IN CUBA.

2. STATION FEELS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN GAINING COVERT SUPPORT THROUGH RUABBE FOR CI EFFORT AGAINST CUBANS WHICH WAS EXTENDED TO SOME ACTUAL ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-CUBAN ACTION DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES. WISH POINT OUT HOWEVER THIS CONTINGENT UPON MAINTENANCE COVERT NATURE OF ACTIVITY. IN FACE DECLARED GOVT POSITION COS BELIEVES ANY EXPANSION JAMAICA OF ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA MUST BE COVERT. FURTHER SINCE VERY DIM VIEW TAKEN OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF DR FRANK DIAZ SILVEIRA BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHEN HE INDICATED 14 AUGUST HE WOULD SEEK PERMISSION OPERATE ON ISLAND AS AGENT OF COUNCIL, COS DEFINITELY OF OPINION AMBUD

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 1303a
2.62

(44)

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: Ø3 OCT 62

FILE: Ø3Ø339Z

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		11128

TO

INFO

CITE KNGS Ø2Ø2
NUMBER

PAGE TWO

TYPE DELEGATION IN JAMAICA WOULD BE HARMFUL TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE INTERESTS (SEE KNGS Ø123).

3. COS PREPARED CONSIDER ASSIGNMENT STAFF OR CONTRACT AGENT TO JAMAICA UNDER XXXXXXX NON-OFFICIAL COVER TO HANDLE CUBAN AND RELATED HAITIAN AND DOMINICAN PROBLEMS. HOWEVER WOULD PREFER STAFFER UNDER OFFICIAL COVER TO SHARE KUTUBE/KUWOLF GENERAL STATION OPS. EMPHASIS HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE BE ON CUBAN COVERAGE. WOULD NEED ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TRAINED IN COMMO AND ADMIN.

4. IN VIEW PRODUCTIVE LIAISON AND DEVELOPING UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES STATION COULD INCREASE REPORTING NOW IF SECRETARY ADDED TO ABSORB ADMIN CHORES.

5. REQUEST HQS CONSIDER ASSIGNMENTS PROPOSED BY COS.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

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INCOMING

SECRET

(2) 10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.

2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.

(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:

(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.

(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion Grieta."

c. Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

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(2) [redacted] action as outlined in plan presented to me [redacted] October.

3. Commando [redacted]

Then Dr. [redacted] me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by [redacted] collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VA[redacted], an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIG[redacted] (fnu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were [redacted] group and had been prisoners.

With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)

4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray

Dr. MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.

COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.

He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.

Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.

Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." "The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."

7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers

I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the

Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."

10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CASTRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of order in the island.

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me."

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings. of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."

14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile Groups

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.

16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.

PDOB: Havana 6, April 1925
teacher

ODENVY name trace requested by PW 8 Feb 61.
(WAVE 3457)

Results: no record

ROSETE, Hada MONT-5469
10 JAN 62

FRD Rep MONT, doing excellent job in Media field. Has established good contacts with editors major newspapers who providing her space at reduced rates and has secured half hour weekly radio time from Radio Sarandi at cost.

ROSETE Rosete, Hada

19-124-25/6
AMBUD Finance
(Misc.)/Att to
Rpt 10 Dec 62

Subject is a member of the Revolutionary Council and is on a Finance Department-Delegations list. for period 1-30 November 62. Subj is representative from Uruguay. No further info.

ROSETE Rosete, Hada Education

FRD, Miami

Bn: 4/6/25, Havana

Divorced

Salary

Rosete, Hada Mireya 615 (D)
201-292025

6 April 1925 Havana, Cuba

C-55606

Traces - 7 Feb. 61
" 7 " "

eq. by PROP on 7 Feb. 61
ranted DEADLINE: ~~March~~ 61
21 FEB,

P. O. A. granted
Date 24 FEB 1961

201 FILE RETURNED
TO RID/FILES
POA CANCELLED

FIELD ADVISED
by PROP

ROSETE ROSETE, HADA

19-124-25/5A
AMBUD-Delegates
Annex "I-G"
1-31 Mar 63

Subject is Delegate ~~from~~ IN Uruguay
According to Luis BOTIFOLL (head of CRC delegations), subject's political affiliation is none.

ROSETTE, Hadda

Local FRD Type, who in opinion Segundo and Station providing excellent support to Station KEGAGE PW program.

MONT 5448 6 Jan 62

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AMBIDDY-1

15 June 1964

SYNOPSIS

Per his request, 2nd Lt. Oliverio Antonio TOMEU Vasallo was recontacted on 8 June 64 at his place of residence. He provided additional details on Carlos and Ana Gloria de VARONA, and identified Osiel GONZALEZ and one "COCO" as possible leads to Jose LLANUSA Gobel.

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SECRET

13 June 1964

CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: Recontact of Oliverio A. TOMEU Vasallo. (201-283206)

1. At 1730 hours, 8 June 64, the undersigned was advised at his residence that a Mr. TOMEU (Subject) had called the security number given him (351-8161) and left the message that he would like to talk again with Paul Stroud (the undersigned) anytime after 1800 hours, 8 June.

2. Upon arriving at TOMEU's apartment (Apt. 303, 1028 Wahler Place SE, High Point Apartment House, Washington, D. C.), 1830 hours, 8 June, TOMEU indicated to his two daughters he would like to have some privacy and they and his wife, Caridad, left the apartment.

3. TOMEU apologized for not having recalled the name "de VARONA" as that of Ana Gloria de VARONA. He reiterated that, while in hiding to escape capture by the Cuban Government subsequent to his infiltration, he knew only the first names of the persons with whom he came in contact, but then added he knew Ana Gloria de VARONA, in whose house he was hiding, because she was the sister of Carlos de VARONA, one of his infiltration team members. (This Carlos de VARONA may be identical with one Carlos Manuel de VARONA Segura, 201-289985; or one Carlos Arturo VARONA Arjona, 201-283209.)

4. On several occasions, according to TOMEU, he was seated at the table in Ana's house with several other people. One of these individuals, known to TOMEU only as "COCO," was described as the secretary to Jose LLANUZA Gobel. There was not, however, any discussions in which TOMEU recalls LLANUZA or his political sympathies having been discussed. According to TOMEU's recollection it was "COCO" who was associated with LLANUZA, and he was not aware of any relationship between Ana and LLANUZA. Although TOMEU had no information as to what finally happened to Carlos de VARONA, his infiltration team mate, he suggested that if Carlos or Ana were available they may be able to identify "COCO" and provide data on his accessability for contact.

5. One Oziel GONZALEZ, former Chief of the Havana Fire Department, was identified by TOMEU as another possible lead

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who would know LLANUZA. TOMEU affirmed Osiel was previously with MENOYO Gutierrez in the Second Front of Escambray. Osiel was under asylum in the Brazilian Embassy (sic, Argentine Embassy?), when TOMEU gained political asylum. When Osiel finally received his safe conduct from the Embassy, he went to Puerto Rico and, TOMEU postulates that Osiel is now again with MENOYO in either the United States or Puerto Rico.

6. Two snap shots (to be returned) were provided by TOMEU of himself and six other individuals who were in asylum at the same time. He identified these, in the photograph in which Monsignor Eduardo BOZA Masvidal is seated, as, from left to right: Manuel VILLAMANAN, Oliverio TOMEU, Nils DIAZ (believed to be in US), Publio RUIZ (US), Jorge Del VALLE (Mex?), and Osiel GONZALEZ (US or Puerto Rico?).

7. Upon completing the debriefing, Stroud and TOMEU "exchanged small talk" for a while until TOMEU finally stated that he still wished there was something more he could do to help free Cuba, and asked "What do you think I should do?" Stroud replied that no person could really make that type of decision for another individual, and countered by asking TOMEU what alternatives he had in mind, other than remaining in the US Army as a career military officer.

8. TOMEU replied that, of course, he was once an agriculturalist, but that there were few job opportunities in which he could apply his past experience. His sister had also asked him if he felt he and his family would want to live with her in Spain or Mexico, but he didn't think too much of this idea. He then stated that he had been asked by Manuel ARTIME to take a job as an instructor. Without indicating any association of even awareness of ARTIME's activities, or of ARTIME's contact with TOMEU (as indicated in TOMEU's 201), TOMEU was asked what he thought of ARTIME's proposition. TOMEU stated that he would no longer follow any man as an individual or as a leader, because a man's ideals, outlook, and objectives change with time. For example, the people of Cuba followed Fidel because of the ideals he advocated. When Fidel took over, his accomplishments gradually became quite different from the ideals he had espoused. TOMEU continued by saying he would "no longer follow a man. One could only trust his ideals or an organization which followed those ideals, since a good organization would be less likely of being controlled by a single man." When asked for an example of the type of organization he had in mind, TOMEU replied he was most favorably inclined towards the ideals and goals of the JURE. (The JURE or JRC is an organization created by Manolo RAY Rivero around a nucleus of former 26 July Movement leaders. See memo and attachment dated 23 July 1963 from John Hugh Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, ARA, Department of State in TOMEU's 201-283206.)

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9. It should, perhaps, be noted here that in an informal exchange with Mrs. Donald WEBSTER, TOMEU's supervisor at the Defense Language Institute, Anacostia Naval Annex, 4 June 64, Mrs. WEBSTER volunteered the information that "all of the other 'Brigade students here' have told me they think very highly of TOMEU, and that he is a very brave man, because he and his family were very wealthy in Cuba and he gave it all up to go into exile and fight the Castro Regime."

WH/SA/SO/HS
C. PAUL PLUMB, JR.

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declassification

SECRET

J[illegible]25

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: [illegible] Jan 61

TO:
- ☒ CI/Operational Approval and Support Division
- ☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM: Margaret [illegible]oss
WH/4
2702 Qtrs E
8564

SUBJECT: (True name) Santiago ALVAREZ Fernandez

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

PROJECT: JMATE

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Cuba

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

PM Trainees

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☐	YES	☒	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION

None

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
		☒	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: J[illegible]25

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD		
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☒	WILL BE FORWARDED	☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)

RI TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES (Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)

☒	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: for Joseph Piccolo

EXTENSION: 8564

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: for Jacob D. Esterline

[illegible] 9 [illegible]

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(85)

Y 68271.
Inactive

[illegible] May [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

[illegible] 110273
9110273

1. On [illegible] April [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] Exploitation Section, [illegible], [illegible] to the effect that a [illegible] Charles had [illegible] [illegible] in New York. A [illegible] of Charles, named [illegible] [illegible], Florida, had [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] Charles as a man of great interest to the [illegible] in view of the [illegible] in Haiti. Charles was [illegible] as [illegible] of the [illegible] Commerciale, Port au Prince, Haiti, who is in [illegible]. Mrs. [illegible] [illegible] that she had [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] to [illegible] in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.

2. On 1 May [illegible] Mrs. [illegible] advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. [illegible], Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman [illegible] (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. [illegible]'s office. Mrs. [illegible] stated that the Haitian desk man in [illegible] was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and [illegible] to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a [illegible] in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. [illegible] stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be an intelligence officer. It was decided that [illegible], New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French language would accompany the [illegible] representative [illegible]. It was also arranged that [illegible] would meet the [illegible] representative (Captain [illegible]) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.

3. On 2 May [illegible] Mrs. [illegible] reported that Col. [illegible] had interviewed Mr. Dryer in [illegible]. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of Francois Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other [illegible] in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange [illegible] an appointment. He was [illegible] by the President's [illegible] secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment

[illegible] 110273

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

secretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.

[illegible]

4. Charles is [illegible], according to [illegible], with a Texas geologist named [illegible] de Mohrenschildt [illegible] with Charles [illegible] trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.

5. On 3 May 63 Jim Daley telephoned to advise that he had had a three-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Daley advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the telegram were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WH Division, and the Latin American Branch.

6. On 6 May 63 Mayo Stantz, Support Branch, advised that WH Division wished to speak to Charles and Daley was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlack finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Daley revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WH representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0930, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlack reported that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:30 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her commitment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Mayo Stantz informed WH Division of the conflict and agreed on the suggestion that the WH Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WH representative declined the offer and suggested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES

7. I met Mrs. [illegible] in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and [illegible] Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. We lunched in the restaurant of the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt [illegible] he had been born in [illegible], Russia, [illegible] taken to Poland as a small child. [illegible] Poland prior to World War [illegible] in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had [illegible] in 1957 and while in [illegible] had met Charles who was visiting [illegible] at the time. He had [illegible] to Charles and was invited to visit Haiti, [illegible]. He lives in Dallas, Texas. He has a M.S. in geology and has had [illegible] experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother [illegible], and she [illegible] a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.

8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 2:10 Mrs. [illegible], Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.

9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. [illegible] that he desired to see a Mr. [illegible], AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. [illegible] called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. [illegible] (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. [illegible] asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.

10. [illegible] checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the WH/3 Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. [illegible] that our interests seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.

11. [illegible], [illegible] Coordinator, called on 7 May to inquire concerning our involvement in the Charles case. He stated that [illegible] had called him earlier that day to inform him that [illegible] had no direct interest in Charles and that in the matter as an intermediary of the [illegible] of General [illegible] who had passed the [illegible] to General [illegible]. [illegible] was concerned that due to the [illegible] in [illegible] to the Charles, [illegible] might have [illegible] that [illegible] had interfered or had obstructed CIA contact with Charles. I explained to [illegible] what had happened and he [illegible] called back to state that [illegible] was completely satisfied in the way the matter had been handled.

12. On 8 May Mrs. [illegible] telephoned to advise that the Operational Branch of [illegible] was discussing the Charles case with [illegible] to determine future course of action. She was still somewhat concerned over our own position in the case since Charles considered her to be the focal point in Washington. I reiterated to her that the matter was one for [illegible], the State Department or the operational elements to handle and that we preferred to disengage ourselves. Mrs. [illegible] mentioned that a dispatch had been received to the effect that a cousin of Charles was prominently mentioned as a successor to [illegible] should the latter be overthrown. She was of the opinion that the US government should continue to "play ball" with Charles as a future asset in [illegible] affairs.

A. P. [illegible]

Distribution:
Orig - C/[illegible]
1 - New York Office
1 - Support ([illegible])
1 - [illegible] Branch
2 - Index (Central)
1 - Dep/[illegible] chrono

[illegible]

6 Vol I

19-124-25/5-4

WRUL "El Mundo y Usted"

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check
1232	June 64	$2,632.50	pd.
1256	July 64	$2733.75	pd #367218 for $7,998.75
1297	Aug 64	$2632.50	
1324	Sept. 64	$2632.50	
1344	Oct 64	$2733.75	pd # 369794
1382	1-15 Nov	?	? OK
1389	16-30 Nov	$607.50	pd # 376168 for $1923.75
1399	Dec. 64	$1316.25	
1419	Jan 65	$1316.25	pd # 382709
1450	Feb 65	$1215.00	# 389049
1382 + 1450	Nov 64 (adjust.) + Feb 65	$3138.75	
1475	Mar 65	$1,417.50	# 393103
1500	Apr 65	$1,316.25	#
1521	May 65	$1,316.25	# 399858
1567	June 65	$1,316.25	# 400704
1606	July 65	$1,316.25	# 408357
1637	Aug 65	$1,316.25	# 412002 (mailed dir.)
[illegible]	Sept 65	$1,316.25	#

14-00000

Radio Americas "El Mundo y Usted"

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check
64-6-2	June 64	$ 1509.00	pd.
64-7-2	July 64	$ 1452.50	pd.
64-8-2	Aug 64	$ 1460.50	pd. # 367460 for $ 2,910.50
64-9-2	Sept 64	$ 1450.00	pd
—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—
64-12-2	Oct/Nov 64	$ 1064.50	pd #
65-1-2	Dec/Jan 65	$ 1060.50	pd # 350892
65-2-2	Jan/Feb 65	$ 1060.50	pd # 389048
—	Feb/Mar 65	—	—
65-4-2	Mar/Apr	$ 1,053.00	pd # 393105
65-5-2	Apr/May	$ 1,063.50	pd # 399854
65-6-2	May/June	$ 1,012.50	# 405702
65-7-2	June/July	$ 1,012.50	#
65-8-2	July/Aug ([illegible])	$ 276.50	#

Sergio Mauri

Perteneció a la Juventud Socialista
empezó a trabajar en el Fondo Especial de Obras Publicas alrededor del comienzo del Gobierno Autentico.
Al llegar el actual gobierno al poder el fué dejado cesante en dicho lugar, por haber estado de acuerdo con la dictadura de Batista, y haber colaborado con los distintos Directores que hubo en dicho lugar.
Desconociendo por supuesto lo que el hubo de realizar despues.-
El Sr. Guillermo Perez Fraga, que vive en el 820 N.W. 13 Ct. Apto. y que puede ser localizado por el telefono 373 8122, puede dar mas informes que yo.
Tambien el tiene una intima amiga en esta ciudad que vive en el 630 N.E. 22 Tc. y tiene el telefono 379 8546, esta sabe de el mucho mas pues sabe que estuvo en China comunista y el Canada.
Tambien tiene una hermena aquí, y que se puede localizar at traves de la persona anteriormente señalada.

Charla con el profesor Agustín P. Pons

Posible un intercambio de médicos de Cuba y España

Por JORGE COO

De la Redacción de EL MUNDO

¡Lo mejor que he visto en Cuba son sus médicos!, así se expresó el doctor Agustín Pedro Pons, eminente médico español, durante la conferencia de prensa que ofreció en el salón de actos del Colegio Médico Nacional. El doctor Pons es ampliamente conocido en los grandes centros asistenciales de Europa, en donde en materia de Clínica Médica es llamado con justicia El Maestro. Ha sido además, presidente del Instituto Médico Farmacéutico y presidente de la Academia de Ciencias Médicas, siendo en la actualidad su presidente de honor.

Actualmente se encuentra de visita en nuestro país, acompañado por su auxiliar el doctor Pedro Botet invitados por el Consejo Científico del Ministerio de Salud Pública y el Colegio Médico Nacional.

A una pregunta sobre su impresión de nuestro sistema

(Termina en la Pág. 2, Col. 2)

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v

2-EL MUNDO, jueves 4 de febrero de 1965

Logra...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

Precedieron a la dirigente revolucionaria en el uso de la palabra, el jefe de la Misión del Frente Nacional de Liberación de Vietnam del Sur, Vo Dong Giang, y el secretario general del Comité de Base de la UJC del MININD, Tomás Alvarez.

Comenzó Vo Dong Giang refiriéndose a que se está celebrando en Vietnam del Sur los festejos del Año Nuevo Lunar. "El calendario lunar de 1964 terminó muy mal para los yanquis, y el de 1965 empezó peor", dijo.

Explicó después que durante estos festejos se aprovecha para hacer un balance de las actividades realizadas en 1964 y trazar los planes a desarrollar en 1965. Afirmó que ya los imperialistas y sus lacayos no son los que deciden la situación en Vietnam del Sur, sino el pueblo y el Frente Nacional de Liberación.

En relación con la cooperación material que está realizando Cuba en favor del pueblo sudvietnamita, Vo Dong Giang expresó que esa ayuda no solamente sirve a los damnificados de los tifones, sino de estímulo para acelerar la lucha de liberación.

Al terminar de hablar el Jefe de la Misión, una joven comunista le entregó un cuadro de Julio Antonio Mella en nombre de todos los trabajadores del MININD.

Asistieron al acto el embajador de la República Democrática de Vietnam, señor Nguyen Thanh Ha, y el viceministro de Desarrollo Técnico, ingeniero Tirso W. Sáenz. (Reporte: Raimundo Rodríguez).

Cuidarán...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

escolares recibirán instrucciones sobre suelos, tipos de césped, plantas ornamentales, arbolado, así como nociones de paisajes aplicado a la jardinería.

Posible...

(Continuación de la 1a. Página)

hospitalario, el trabajo de los médicos y la organización asistencial en general, el doctor Pons respondió: "Me es muy fácil contestar a esa pregunta: la organización hospitalaria en Cuba responde plenamente a los postulados democráticos del régimen. // To-



Dr. Agustín Pedro Pons

do el mundo tiene cabida en los hospitales, sin distinción de clase. Además, los centros asistenciales están bien equipados, yo diría que casi con riqueza, si no fuera porque esto parece un término burgués".

"Capítulo aparte merecen los servidores de estos centros. No quiero que parezca lisonja, pero tengo la impresión de que son médicos de una gran cultura, con una gran sed de aprender. Son médicos que están al corriente de las mejores técnicas modernas, y sobre todo existe en ellos el entusiasmo. No cabe duda que todo esto converja en un mejor servicio. He de decirles que en ningún lado he visto apatía, sino un coro de gente en el que todos vibraban. Y tengan entendido que un cuerpo de médicos que así sienta su profesión, será dentro de poco uno de los mejores del mundo. Todo esto lo puedo

Los equipos de trabajo se dividirán en interiores y exteriores. Los interiores estarán formados por alumnos de cuarto grado y tendrán la responsabilidad del arreglo y mantenimiento de las áreas verdes correspondientes al plantel. Los equipos exteriores los formarán alumnos de los [illegible] los quinto y sexto y tendrán como tarea fundamental la de ir al rescate de las áreas verdes en la zona en que se encuentre ubicada la escuela.

℞ Por la Salud

TRASMISION DE ENFERMEDADES INFECCIOSAS

La trasmisión de una bacteria que causa enfermedades desde una persona enferma a una persona sana, se efectúa de diversos modos.

El agua transporta gran cantidad de bacterias. Por eso hay que hervir el agua. La candela mata los microbios.

La leche puede transportar también bacterias patógenas. Hierva también la leche.

Los alimentos también pueden transportar bacterias patógenas. Proteja los alimentos.

En ocasiones intervienen los insectos. Por ejemplo, una mosca es capaz de cargar hasta diez millones de microbios. Y al posarse en el cuerpo del niño, o en el tete, o en los juguetes, los infecta. El mosquito Aedes Eegypti puede trasmitir la fiebre amarilla. Otros animales como el perro y el gato pueden trasmitir la rabia.

AGUA Y JABON

decir en una [illegible] mejor que he visto de Cuba, son sus médicos".

A las preguntas sobre un posible intercambio médico entre Cuba y España, el doctor Pons contestó que esto estaba lleno de promesas y que, precisamente, su viaje trataba de abrir un camino a este intercambio científico. Señaló que para esto Cuba y España tienen una gran facilidad, y es que ambos países hablan una lengua común. Comunista?

Siguiendo el curso de la entrevista, el científico español nos dijo: "No he tenido tiempo de ver nada sobre medicina rural, pero estoy enterado de que se han hecho muchos hospitales rurales y "comarcales" y que se le está prestando una gran atención a la asistencia médica en el campo".

Sobre un posible retorno a Cuba, el Dr. Pons respondió: "Pienso volver en un plazo muy breve. Sobre esto he hablado con el Viceministro y el Ministro del MINSAP y creo que hemos llegado a un acuerdo".

A las preguntas sobre su libro "Clínica Médica", que es usado como libro de texto en nuestra Universidad, dice: "De mi libro no puedo hablar porque es como el elogio de un padre al hijo, pero les diré que no es obra mía solamente, sino que conmigo colaboran más de 45 médicos. Hay muchos libros que tratan sobre lo mismo, sobre todo, libros americanos; pero éstos están escritos muy espontáneamente, con cierta superficialidad; nosotros, por el contrario, nos reunimos semanalmente para hacerle mejoras, y creo que ha esto debe su éxito".

Respecto al Hospital Siquiátrico, el Dr. Pons dice: "Esto culmina la obra médica que se ha hecho en Cuba. Ya no puede ser mejor. Se puede igualar, pero no superar. Es un mundo aparte, es quizás la obra más afortunada de la Revolución con respecto a medicina" (!)

Los reporteros quisieron saber la opinión del doctor Pedro Boret, auxiliar del doctor Pons, acerca de la medicina en Cuba, a lo que el aludido contestó: "Poco se puede agregar a lo dicho por el Dr. Pons, pero hay algo que sí quisiera decir: En este viaje he aprendido a ser humilde, puesto que yo, médico joven, como muchos otros pude decir: bueno, voy a Cuba, doy unas conferencias y ya. Pero después de visitar varios hospitales, después de ver un lugar como el Departamento de Química Endocrinológica del Hospital "Fajardo", uno debe hacer un acto de contrición y reconocer que a Cuba, también venimos a aprender". Que?

14-00000

Radio Program "El Mambi"
Vol. [illegible] of AMBUD-3
[illegible] 30 Sept 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3122

RECEIVED JUL 23 1965

July 22, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami
Florida

Gentlemen:

Enclosed are four (4) copies of a new Broadcast Agreement reflecting your changed programs effective last May.

Please sign all four copies and return to this office for countersignature.

We shall then return two (2) completely signed copies for your files.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG/fs
Enc. 4

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

BROADCAST AGREEMENT

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE, 4 WEST 58TH ST., NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
A DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Date: July 22, 1965

Contract No.: 765-11

AGREEMENT between Dade County Medical SOCIETY called "Agency" for broadcasting over International Radio Station WRUL programs, announcements and/or participations, as scheduled below on behalf of

Dade County Medical Society, Miami, Florida
(name and address)

called "Advertiser" to advertise Educational Medical Program and Radio New York Worldwide, a division of International Educational Broadcasting Corporation called "Station", subject to the standard conditions on the back hereof and any special conditions set forth below or attached hereto.

Target Area Caribbean Language Spanish Approximate Time of Broadcast 8:01 PM (E.S.T.)

Length of Broadcast 15 Minutes Days Mon.Wed.Fri. Times per Week 3

Starting Date May 17,1965 Ending Date till forbid Total Broadcasts

Program material arrangements (check appropriate boxes):

☒ Live or ☒ Recorded
☒ Furnished by agency or ☐ By Station

Additional Instructions:

This contract may be cancelled by either party upon four (4) weeks written notice.

Rates

	NUMBER OF BROADCASTS	STATION CHARGE	TALENT	LINE SERVICE	RE-BROADCAST	OTHER CHARGES	TOTAL PRICE
Per Week	3	101.25					303.75
Per Contract							

[illegible]

ACCEPTED:

Date ______________ By ______________
Agency or Advertiser

Date ______________ By ______________
Radio New York Worldwide
Division of International Educational Broadcasting Corporation

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE CONTRACT FOR BROADCASTING

1. PAYMENT AND BILLING.

(a) Time Payments under this contract are to be received by STATION at the address specified on STATION's bills on or before the 15th of each month following that in which broadcasting is done. Payment is to be made in United States funds, net, payable at a New York City bank, unless specifically provided to the contrary on the face hereof.

(b) Materiality. In all cases date of payment is material. If STATION fails to receive timely payment, or if ADVERTISER's or AGENCY's credit is, in STATION's reasonable opinion, impaired, STATION in its own discretion, may either cancel this contract under sub-paragraph 3(a) or change the terms of payment for further broadcasts under this contract.

(c) Billing. STATION will bill AGENCY at intervals following broadcasting.

2. TERMINATION.

(a) Broadcasts Other Than Participations and Spot Announcements. If this contract calls for broadcasts of time periods other than participations and spot announcements, the entire contract may be terminated by either party effective at the end of any 13 week cycle of broadcasting hereunder upon giving the other party not less than 28 days' prior written notice.

(b) Participations and Spot Announcements. If this contract calls for broadcasts of participations and spot announcements the entire contract or parts thereof may be terminated by either party at any time by giving the other party not less than 14 days' prior written notice.

(c) Claims. If STATION is notified of any claim caused by arising out of, or resulting from any broadcast hereunder, whether in connection with program material furnished by AGENCY or STATION, or otherwise, and said claim is deemed substantial in STATION's reasonable opinion, STATION may, by giving written notice to AGENCY, terminate this contract as to any or all further broadcasts.

(d) Effect of Termination. If AGENCY terminates this contract under sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b), AGENCY will pay STATION at earned rate for broadcasts contracted for to and including the date of termination. If STATION terminates this contract under paragraph 2, as to any or all broadcasts scheduled hereunder, such termination shall be without penalty of short rate, that is AGENCY shall have the benefit of the same discounts that it would have earned if STATION had not so terminated and this contract had continued through the last broadcast scheduled. If STATION terminates this contract under sub-paragraph 2(b) or (c) as to less than all of the broadcasts scheduled hereunder, AGENCY may, upon giving STATION written notice within seven days after STATION's notice, terminate this contract in its entirety simultaneously with the effective date of STATION's notice, in which event such termination shall also be without penalty of short rate.

3. EFFECT OF BREACH.

(a) By Agency. STATION reserves the right to cancel this contract at any time upon default in the timely payment of bills, failure to furnish continuity acceptable to STATION, or other material breach of the terms hereof. Upon such cancellation all charges accrued hereunder and not paid shall become immediately due and payable, and AGENCY shall also pay, as liquidated damages, a net sum equal to that which AGENCY would have been obligated to pay had it, on the effective date of STATION's cancellation, given notice of termination pursuant to sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b), less any net sum which STATION actually receives for the sale of the same airtime.

(b) By Station. In the event of a material breach by STATION in performing this contract, AGENCY reserves the right to cancel this contract. Upon such cancellation STATION shall pay, as liquidated damages, a net sum equal to the actual non-cancellable out-of-pocket costs necessarily incurred by AGENCY through cancellation of this contract. STATION's liability, however, shall not exceed the net time costs involved for the unexpired and non-cancellable portion of this contract, that is, STATION shall not be liable for any sum greater than the sum of the net time charges involved had the STATION, on the effective date of AGENCY's cancellation, given notice of termination pursuant to sub-paragraph 2(a) or (b). Failure to broadcast covered by paragraph 4 or 5 shall not be deemed a breach of this contract.

(c) Limitation of Liability. In the event of cancellation under this paragraph 3, neither party shall be liable to the other otherwise than as specified in this paragraph and in paragraph 8.

4. FAILURE TO BROADCAST.

If as the result of public emergency or necessity, government order, force majeure, restriction imposed by law, Act of God, labor dispute, mechanical breakdown, or any cause, similar or dissimilar, beyond STATION's reasonable control, STATION fails to broadcast all or part of any program, participation or announcement contracted to be broadcast hereunder, STATION shall not be liable except to adjust its time charges as hereinafter stated: (a) if no part of a scheduled broadcast is performed, a later broadcast of the omitted program, participation or announcement shall be made at a reasonably satisfactory substitute day and time, and if no reasonably satisfactory substitute day and time are available, the time charges for the omitted broadcast shall be waived. (b) if part of a scheduled broadcast, but not all thereof, is omitted, STATION shall allow a pro rata reduction in the time charges; or if a commercial portion of a broadcast is omitted, a credit in the same proportion to the time charges which the omitted commercial portion bears to the total commercial portion of the broadcast, whichever is greater.

In any such case of total or partial failure, AGENCY shall have the benefit of the same discounts which it would have earned if the affected broadcast had been performed in full.

5. PRE-EMPTIONS FOR PROGRAMS OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR SIGNIFICANCE.

(a) Conditions of Substitution. STATION shall have the right to cancel any broadcast or portion thereof covered by this contract in order to broadcast any program or event which, in its absolute discretion, it deems to be of public interest or significance. In any such case STATION will notify AGENCY in advance if reasonably possible, but where such notice cannot reasonably be given, STATION will notify AGENCY within a reasonable time after such scheduled broadcast that AGENCY's broadcast has been pre-empted.

(b) Adjustment. If AGENCY and STATION cannot agree upon a satisfactory substitute day and time the broadcast time so pre-empted shall be deemed cancelled without affecting the rates, discounts, or rights provided under this contract, except that AGENCY shall not have to pay STATION any charges for the cancelled broadcast.

6. RATE PROTECTION.

Station reserves the right at any time or times to change the rates, discounts and charges hereunder to conform to any rate card issued after the date of this contract. AGENCY shall have the benefit of any decrease in the aggregate sums payable hereunder beginning as of the effective date of such rate card, but no increase in said aggregate sums shall be applicable until twelve months from the effective date of such rate card. The protection against rate increases is applicable only to broadcast schedules contracted for prior to the effective date of such rate card and in effect or starting within thirty days after the effective date of such rate card, provided that any interruption or lapse of schedule not attributable to STATION shall automatically terminate such protection.

7. PROGRAM MATERIAL.

(a) Agency Responsibility. Unless otherwise noted on the face of this contract, all program material including talent and commercial announcements, shall be furnished by AGENCY, and all expenses connected with the delivery thereof to the STATION and return therefrom, if so directed, shall be paid by AGENCY. AGENCY shall deliver complete music cue sheets for all musical compositions designated by AGENCY for broadcast and all other program material not less than 96 hours (exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) in advance of broadcast.

(b) Approval of Material. STATION may, in its discretion, reject any musical compositions, and may reject recordings, the technical quality of which does not comply with STATION's standards. All live program material to be broadcast hereunder shall be adequately rehearsed, and all live and recorded material to be broadcast hereunder shall conform to the STATION's program and operating policies, STATION's labor contracts, and the public interest, including specifically, but not limited to the Federal Communications Commission regulations requiring that international broadcast service shall reflect the culture of this country and shall promote international good will, understanding and cooperation. Program material and performers furnished by AGENCY are subject to STATION's approval and STATION may exercise a continuing right to reject or cause AGENCY to edit such material or replace performers to the extent STATION deems necessary to conform to the standards specified in this sub-paragraph.

(c) Right to Edit or Substitute. Should STATION fail to receive satisfactory program material when required hereunder STATION may notify AGENCY, and unless STATION receives satisfactory program material within 24 hours after such notice is given, STATION shall have the right to edit any program material received and broadcast the same as edited, or to produce a substitute broadcast, and STATION will be paid for such edited or substitute broadcast its regular charges for the broadcast, plus a reasonable charge for the editing or production of a substitute broadcast.

8. INDEMNIFICATION.

(a) By Agency. AGENCY will hold and save STATION harmless against any and all liability and expense, including attorneys' fees, resulting from the broadcast of programs or program material prepared, produced or furnished by AGENCY, including musical compositions, excepting such liability as may result from the broadcast on AGENCY-produced broadcasts of material furnished by STATION.

(b) By Station. STATION will hold and save AGENCY harmless against all such liability and expense, including attorneys' fees, on STATION-produced broadcasts, excepting only such liability as may result from the broadcast of commercial and other material furnished by AGENCY. In addition, STATION will hold and save AGENCY harmless with respect to material furnished by STATION for AGENCY-produced broadcasts.

9. INCREASED COSTS.

If at any time or times under any collective bargaining agreement(s) by which STATION is bound or to which STATION adheres, or under any law, foreign or domestic, the costs of any service, material or personnel furnished by STATION hereunder is increased as the result of the establishment of or change in minimum compensation payable to personnel, or taxes, assessments, benefits or contributions payable by STATION, AGENCY shall pay STATION the amount of each such increase in costs as of the effective date thereof.

10. GENERAL.

(a) Broadcast Times. STATION will perform the broadcasts covered by this contract on the days and at the approximate hourly times provided on the face of this contract. STATION reserves the right at any time or times to change the days and/or hours of broadcast, in the event of changes by the Federal Communications Commission in allocation of hours and/or frequencies. In such event mutually acceptable alternate days and/or hours shall be substituted; if, however, the substitute times offered by STATION to AGENCY are unacceptable to AGENCY, AGENCY shall have the right to cancel upon giving STATION written notice thereof, and such termination shall be without penalty of short rate. Times mentioned shall be those in effect at STATION on the respective days of broadcasting. STATION may deduct from any period of five (5) minutes or longer not more than thirty-five (35) seconds for Station break purposes.

(b) Handling of Property and Mail. STATION shall exercise normal precautions, but shall assume no liability for loss of or damage to program material or other property furnished by AGENCY in connection with broadcasts hereunder. STATION will not accept or process mail, correspondence or telephone calls in connection with broadcasts except after its prior approval, and if so approved, at the sole risk of AGENCY and subject to reimbursement by AGENCY for all expense incurred.

(c) Relationship of Advertiser and Agency. If this contract is with a recognized advertising agency, an agency commission of 15% will be allowed, if and as provided on the face of this contract. AGENCY is making and shall perform this contract as agent for a disclosed principal, i.e., the sponsor named on the face of this contract, but if ADVERTISER defaults in the performance of any obligation to STATION hereunder AGENCY by executing this contract waives notice of such default and agrees to be liable, jointly and severally with ADVERTISER, for any and all claims, debts, demands or obligations owing to STATION hereunder. If this contract is made directly with a sponsor, references to AGENCY shall apply to ADVERTISER, except that no agency commission will be allowed.

(d) Assignment and Waiver. AGENCY shall not without the written consent of STATION assign this contract or any of AGENCY's rights hereunder. STATION may not be required to broadcast hereunder for the benefit of any sponsor other than ADVERTISER named on the face of this contract, or to broadcast hereunder for the advertisement of any institution, service or product other than that named on the face of this contract. Notwithstanding the foregoing, ADVERTISER shall have the right at any time or times to designate any advertising agency to act for ADVERTISER hereunder in place of AGENCY. Failure of STATION or AGENCY to enforce any of the provisions of this contract shall not be construed as a general relinquishment or waiver as to that or any other provision.

(e) Legal Obligations. STATION's obligations hereunder are subject to the terms and conditions of licenses held by it and to applicable international, federal, state and local laws and regulations.

(f) Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject matter herein contained, shall be construed according to the law of the State of New York, where STATION's office is located, and cannot be changed or terminated orally.

(g) Notices. Notices given by prepaid telegram or by registered or certified mail shall be deemed given when dispatched. Notices given by ordinary mail shall be deemed given when received. All notices hereunder shall be in writing and if given by other than personal delivery shall be addressed to the party at the address specified on the face of this contract or to such other address as may be specified hereunder in writing

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B.Caponong	DATE 3 Sept 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $1,316.25	COST ACCOUNT NO YOPOLL-11	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 15 Sept 65		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.		COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
3 Sept 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL for Sept 65		
		AUTH: COS Check mailed to WRUL 19 Oct 65		
			TOTAL	$1,316.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT Invoice attached.

Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS	SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 3 Sept 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Bruce P.Veddar
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 3 Sept 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER 1726	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI,
FLORIDA

DATE SEPTEMBER 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1675

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON.,-WED., & FRIDAY) SEPTEMBER 1, THROUGH 30, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED SEP 3 1965

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B.Caponong	DATE 30 Aug 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $270.50	COST ACCOUNT NO YOPOLL/11	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 15 Sept 65		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
30 Aug	65	AMBUD-1 radio program for Aug 65 on		
		XX Radio Americas		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$270.50

RECEIPTS ALL ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Cashier's Check requested--made payable to Radio Americas,Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 30 Aug 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Bruce P.Vedder
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 30 Aug 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER 1531	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 1 Sept 19 65

Received from

Two hundred seventy and 50/100 ---------- Dollars

Radio program "El Medico y Usted" for Sept 65
Cashier's Check #

$ 270.50

Robert WILKENSON

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-8-2

August 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc. Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 8/65	"no charge"*
Studio Rental and Tapes - 7/65	134.00
Production and Talent Fees - 7/65	136.50
Amount Due:	$270.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

Note: There is no charge for Radio Air Time because of an overcharge on our part during the first half of 1965.

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Alice B. Caponong	DATE 5 Aug 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT -- OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,991.25	YOPOLL-11 XXXXXX	X	25 Aug 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
5 Aug 65		AMBASAL-1 radio program on AMTHIGH, Aug		$ 675.00
		AMBUD-3 radio program on AMTHIGH, Aug		1,316.25
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,991.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoices attached. Request two CASHIER'S CHECKS, EACH MADE PAYABLE TO: Radio New York Worldwide.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS	SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 5 August 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Philip G.Elmard
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 5 August 65	SIGNATURE Alice B.Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3 (C-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO ~~DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY~~
~~MIAMI, FLORIDA~~

DATE AUGUST 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1637

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRIDAY). AUGUST1 1, THROUGH 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,
FROM: Alice B. Caponong
DATE: 21 July 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $ 1,949.65
X ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 5 August 65
☐ REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Alice B. Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
21 July 65		AMBUD-3 program XX Radio Americas July 65		$1,012.50
		AMBASAL-1 program Radio Americas July 65		937.15
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,949.65

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS *(Give reasons)*

Invoice for AMBUD-3 program attached; AMBASAL-1 invoice will be forwarded when obtained. REQUEST TWO CASHIER'S CHECKS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL AMOUNT ABOVE MADE PAYABLE TO: Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE:

APPROVED DATE: 21 July 65 ALLOTMENT NUMBER: ALLOTMENT TITLE: SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Philip G. Elmard

RECEIPT I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE. DATE: 21 July 65 SIGNATURE: Alice B. Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
YODARK-4									

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER: 544
DATE:
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER:

FORM 5-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

No. 27 July 1965

Received from

One thousand tweleve and 50/100 Dollars
Cashier's Check #408698 for "El Medico y Usted" on
Radio Americas for July 65

$ 1,012.50

Robert WILKENSON

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-7-2

July 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc. Program: [illegible]
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 7/65	[illegible].00
Studio Rental and Tapes - 6/65	[illegible].00
Production and Talent Fees - 6/65	[illegible]
Amount Due:	[illegible]

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Alice B. Caponong	DATE 12 July 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 1,316.25	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 30 July 65		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Alice B. Caponong

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
12 July 65		AMBUD-3 "El Medico y Usted"		
		program on WBUL for July 65		
		[illegible]	TOTAL	$1,316.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (*Give reasons*)

Invoice attached.
Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 12 July 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Philip G. Elmard
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 12 July 65	SIGNATURE Alice B. Caponong

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
YODARK-4								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-14-49)

13 July 1965

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

Cashier's Check #408357 for "El Medico y Usted" for xxxx July 65 on WRUL.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKERSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE JULY 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1606

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRI.) JULY 1, THROUGH JULY 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JUL 1 1965

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 28 June 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 150.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 15 July 65		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
28 June 65		Telephone service for [illegible] for "El Medico y Usted" May & June 65		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$150.00

RECEIPTS FOR ALL ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached.
Request cashier's check made payable to: Continental ~~International~~ Commercial Ltda,
Production Division

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.	SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 28 June 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John P. Dimmer, Jr.
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 28 June 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	OBLIG. NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
YCSAZY-1				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER # 11	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

12 July 65

One hundred fifty and 00/100 ------------

Continental Communications Inc. bill for "El Medico y Usted" for May and June 65 Cashier's Check #406974

$150.00

Robert WILKENSON

Continental
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

[illegible] N W 7th ST
MIAMI, FLORIDA
PHONE 371-[illegible]

Mayo 31, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOC.
Miami, Fla.

Telephone line between our studios and WRUL,
for transmission of "Medico y Usted" programs
during May and June/65. . . . . $ 150.00

(ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS)

CONTINENTAL INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

Orlando Alvarez

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 7 June 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 2,328.75	X	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 5 July 65	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
7 June 65		MACHO radio programs for June 65		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,328.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoices attached. Request two Cashier's Checks as follows:
Radio Americas,Inc. in amount of $1,012.50
Radio New York Worldwide in amount of $1,316.25

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE; THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 7 June 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER John P.Dimmer Jr.
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE		DATE 7 June 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
YODARK-4				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARX-4								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

No. 11 June 1965

Received from

One thousand twelve and 50/100 ---------- Dollars

"El Medico y Usted" on Radio Americas for June 65
Cashier's Check #400702

$ 1,012.50

Robert Wilkenson

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-6-2

June 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n, Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 6/65	$750.00
Studio Rental and Tapes - 6/65	126.00
Production and Talent fees - 6/65	136.50
Amount Due:	$1,012.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

No. 1. June 1965

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

"El Medico y Usted" on WRUL for June 65
Cashier's Check #400704

$ 1,316.25

Robert Wilkenson

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET. NEW YORK 19. N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE JUNE 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1567

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON., WED., & FRI.) JUNE 1, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

No. 18 May 1965

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars

Cashier's Checks #399858 for WRUL "El Medico y Usted" program for May 65.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKENSON

No. 19 May 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty-three and 50/100 -------- Dollars

Cashier's Check #399854 for Radio Americas "El Medico y Usted" program for May 65

$ 1,063.50

Robert WILKENSON

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 12 May 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$ 2,379.75	X	5 June 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
12 May 65		MACRO radio program "El Medico y Usted for May 65 on: WRUL and Radio Americas. ATTN: COS		$
			TOTAL	$2,379.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoices for both attached. Please provide Cashier's Checks made payable to
Radio New York Worldwide-- $1,316.25
Radio Americas ----------- $1,063.50

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 12 May 65	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 12 May 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE
YODARK-4				

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-60

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE MAY 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1521

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON THE SPANISH SERVICE
A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON. WED. & FRI.)
MAY 1, THROUGH MAY 31, 1965. TOTAL 13 BROADCASTS AT $101.25EA. $1,316.25

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-5-2

May 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1950 S.W. [illegible] Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 5/65	[illegible]
Studio rental and tapes - 4/65	1[illegible]
Production and Talent fees - 4/65	125.00
Programs for [illegible], New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 4/65	61.50
Amount Due:	1,0[illegible].50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

No. XX 27 April 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty-four Dollars

and fifty cents. For"El Medico y Usted" of Dec 64-invoice #64-12-2 Radio Americas.

$1,064.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

W
R U
L

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

April 30, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

As stated in our letter to you of February 27, 1965, regarding frequency changes, the next change would go into effect on Saturday, May 1, 1965. Therefore, the following frequencies will be in use by Radio New York-WRUL, beginning with your 7:15 PM EST Monday, May 3 broadcast of the El Medico y Usted program.

These new frequencies were chosen to provide the best possible reception conditions in the areas your program is beamed and will remain in effect until September 5, 1965.

Frequencies	Principal Areas Beamed
*9.695 Mcs.	Mexico-Cuba Caribbean area
11.790 Mcs.	Cuba-Caribbean - Central America
*15.310	North East South America
17.730 Mcs.	Northern South America and Caribbean
17.840	South America (Argentina-Chile)

*Frequencies presently in use which will continue during new schedule.

I am also enclosing the advance invoice number 1521 for the month of May, 1965.

Sincerely yours,

Ben A. Patch
Traffic Manager

BAP:pnp
Enclosure

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE 13 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE	REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,064.50	YODARK-4(T/A HQS)	15 May 65	

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
13 Apr 65		"El Medico y Usted" radio program on Radio Americas for December 64.		
		Invoice # 64-12-2		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,064.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Original invoice attached.

Cashier's Check requested; make payable to: Radio Americas Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		13 April 65	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	13 Apr 65	Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
7990		

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

C O P Y

INVOICE 64-12-2

December 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n., Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 12/64	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 11/64	93.00
Production and Talent Fees - 11/64	136.50
Programs for WHOM, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 11/64	90.00
Amount Due:	$1,069.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

13 April 1965

I think we owe following "El Medico y Usted" bills on Radio Americas:

Invoice No.		Amount
64-10-2 (not rec'd)	?	$1,541.00
64-11-2 (not rec'd)	?	
64-12-2 (rec'd)		$1,061.50 ✓
65-3-2 (not rec'd)	?	

As of 12 April Radio Americas gave us bill for Invoice #64-12-2 for which Cashier's Check requested 13 April 65. No invoices have been submitted by Radio Americas for the three other possibly outstanding bills mentioned above. FLUTEO checked all four with Wilkenson by phone with no other results.

ES Vidal

No. 9 April 1965

Received from

Two thousand seven hundred thirty-three and 75/100 Dollars

Cashier's Check for Invoice Nos.1475 and 1500 for
"El Medico y Usted" on WRUL for Mar and Apr 65.

$ 2,733.75

Robert WILKENSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 5 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$ 2,733.75	YODARK-4	X	13 May 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING: I HEREBY AGREE TO ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
5 Apr 65		MACEO medical radio program"El Medico y Usted" fee on WRUL for: March Invoice #1475— $1,417.50 April Invoice #1500— $1,316.25 AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,733.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (List amount)

Original copies invoices attached.
Request Cashier's Check for total made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WHUL

#373103

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		5 Apr 65	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	5 Apr 65	Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICE ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	STOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE March 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1475

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE.

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON-WED-FRI) MARCH 1 THROUGH MARCH 31, 1965	
TOTAL: 14 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH	$1,417.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE APRIL 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1500

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY, (MON-WED-FRI), APRIL 1, THROUGH APRIL 30, 1965, TOTAL OF 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25	$1,316.25

No. 9 April 1965

Received from

One thousand eighty-three and 00/100 ------- Dollars

Cashier's Check #393105 for Invoice #65-4-2 for "El Medico y Usted" on Radio Americas, April 65.

$1,083.00

Robert WILKENSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 6 Apr 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,083.00	YODARK-4 (T/A to HQS)	X	15 May 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
6 Apr 65	65	MACHO radio program "El Medico y Usted" for April 65 on Radio Americas, Invoice # 65-4-2		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,083.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas Inc. # 393105

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 6 Apr 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 6 Apr 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 10-63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

COPY

INVOICE 65-4-2

April 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc. **Program:** EL MEDICO Y USTED
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 4/65	$750.00
Studio rental and Tapes - 3/65	126.00
Production and Talent fees - 3/65	137.00
Programs for [illegible], New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 3/65	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,073.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

W M

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

February 26, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami
Florida

RECEIVED MAR 1 1965

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is invoice No. 1475 for March, payable in advance.

A review of our records indicates the following unpaid invoices:

No. 1419 (month of January)	$1,316.25
No. 1450 (month of February)	1,315.00
No. 1389 (November 16-30)	607.50

Pd by Cashier's check #359049 on 3 Mar 65

Also enclosed is a copy of our letter of January 27, 1965, which explains the $607.50 charge for November.

Effective Monday, March 8 through May, 2, 1965, RADIO NEW YORK will be operating on the following frequencies during your "El Medico Y Usted" program:

1. 6.155 mcs. (Mexican Beam)
2. 9.695 mcs. (Caribbean and N.W. South America) on 2 transmitters
3. 11.835 mcs. (N. E. S. A.)
4. 15.310 mcs. (Central S.A.)

We know these new frequencies will provide good reception for your Spanish language audience.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe,
Vice President

RWG:arf

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide [illegible] [illegible]

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

March 8, 1965

Dade County Medical Society
Miami, Florida

RECEIVED MAR 11 1965

Gentlemen:

We have received cashier's check No. 389049 for $3,138.75, which pays up your account through February.

We appreciate your attention to this matter.

Sincerely

Richard J. Grefe
Vice President

RWG
ts

According to our records the following invoices have been paid by the following Cashier's Checks:

Invoice No.	Period	Amount	Cashier's Check No.
1344	Oct 64	$2,733.75	369764
1382 (not rec'd)	Nov 64	$1,923.75	NOT PAID PREVIOUSLY
1389 (addit'l)	16-30 Nov 64	$ 607.50	376168 in amount of $1,923.75
and	+	+	
1399	Dec 64	$1,316.25	
1419	Jan 65	$1,316.25	382709
1450	Feb 65	$1,215.00	NOT PAID PREVIOUSLY

Therefore, enclosed is a Cashier's Check No. 389049 to cover the amount owed WRUL, according to our records, for Invoice No.1382 and Invoice No. 1450 in the total amount of $3,138.75. This should liquidate our indebtedness through February 1965 with the next payment being due for the month of March 1965.

(NOTE: the total amount of this check -$3,138.75- is identical to the amount we reportedly owe according to your figures although the time periods covered are different. Under the latter your records indicate that the outstanding bills are Invoices No.1389 for $607.50; No.1419 for Jan of $1,316.25 and No. 1450 for Feb of $1,215.00 which total $3,138.75.)

No.   3 March 1965

Received from

Three thousand one hundred thirty-eight and 75/100 Dollars
(Cashier's Check # 383049). Adjustment of Nov 64 bill
(Invoice #1382) and Feb 65 bill (Invoice #1450) of
"El Medico y Usted" program on WRUL.

$3,138.75

Robert WILKFNSON

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalona S. Vidal	DATE 26 Feb 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$3,138.75	YODARK/4	X	31 March 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalona S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
26 Feb 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL. Adjustment of November 1964 bill plus costs of February 65 program.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$3,138.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Copies of Invoices attached (Nos. 1382 and 1450.)

Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE. THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		26 Feb 65	Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE Evalona S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE						

REMARKS

Nov 64

Invoice No. 1382 (not previously received) - $1,923.75

Invoice No. 1450 (Feb 65) - $1,215.00

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

WORLDWIDE · WRUL

WEST 3[illegible]TH STREET NEW YORK 10 N.Y

Mailed 11/13

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 10, 1964

INVOICE NO 1382

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 1 to NOVEMBER 14, 1964. THREE (3) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 16 to NOVEMBER 30, 1964.

NOVEMBER 1 to 14, 1964	TOTAL	12	
NOVEMBER 16 to 30, 1964	TOTAL	7	
		19	
TOTAL OF 19 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH			$ 1,923.75

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO ~~DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY~~
~~Miami, Florida~~

DATE Feb 1, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1450

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY (MON-WED-FRI) FEBRUARY 1 THROUGH FEBRUARY 28, 1965. TOTAL: 12 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,215.00

Mr. Robert Wilkinson
RADIO AMERICAS
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida 33134

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N.Y.

DATE Feb 1, 1965

TO ~~DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY~~
~~Miami, Florida~~

INVOICE NO. 1450

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES WEEKLY (MON-WED-FRI) FEBRUARY 1 THROUGH FEBRUARY 28, 1965.

TOTAL: 12 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,215.00

Att- Robert Wilkinson

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389049

3/3/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ****************** $2,138.75

FIRST NAT'L BANK

CASHIER'S CHECK

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

4

3 5

SECOND REQUEST

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
500 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 36, N. Y
LONGACRE 5-1145

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Radio Americas
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida

GENTLEMEN: In connection with our audit of the records of

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

their account with you shows a balance of $ 1,923.75 as of December 31, 1964

Kindly compare this balance with your records and if correct please so state, but if not correct, state the amount due according to your records and please explain on the reverse side. If any portion of the amount is represented by notes given as additional security for the account, kindly show each note separately.

This request for confirmation is merely for the purpose of verifying your account. Please furnish the information as promptly as possible. An addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN, C. P. A.

The balance of $ mentioned above is correct.

The balance of $ mentioned above is NOT ...
by our statement on the ...

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389049

MIAMI, FLORIDA 3/3/65 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ******************** $3,138.75

FIRST NATL [illegible]
BANK [illegible]

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

SECOND REQUEST

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
500 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 36, N. Y.
LONGACRE 8-1148

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Radio Americas
101 Madeira
Coral Gables, Florida

GENTLEMEN: In connection with our audit of the records of

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

their account with you shows a balance of $ 1,923.75 as of December 31,1964

Kindly compare this balance with your records and if correct please so state but if not correct, state the amount due according to your records and please explain on the reverse side. If any portion of the amount is represented by notes given as additional security for the account kindly show each note separately.

This request for confirmation is merely for the purpose of verifying your account. Please furnish the information as promptly as possible. An addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Yours very truly,

BERNARD L. KAPPALMAN, C. P. A.

The balance of $ ______ mentioned above is correct.

The balance of $ ______ mentioned above is NOT in agreement with our records as shown by our statement on the reverse side

(Signed) ______________________

Date ______________ 19__ By ______________________

See Voucher #

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 1965

RE: PAYMENTS OF WRUL INVOICES BY DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. - 1964-65

As per attached copies, it is clear that Invoice No. 1344 covering October was paid by Check No. 369794, Invoice No. 1382 covering November was paid by Check No. 376168. At a later date Invoice No. 1389 covering programs stated as not billed but to be included with November payment was received; this in the amount of $607.50 remains outstanding. Invoice No. 1399 covering December was paid by Check No. 382709 and Invoice No. 1419 covering the month of January 1965, in the amount of $1,316.25, also remains outstanding.

Thus, there is a total due to WRUL of $1,923.75.

BU

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

[illegible] Street New York 19 N Y
[illegible]

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #1382 covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 50TH STREET, NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH. $1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE
A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI)
DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 382709

1/12/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ******************** $1,316.25

FIRST NAT BANK $1316 DOL 25 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

B Reilly
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

:0631-0058: "000-501-0"

RADIO I W YORK WORLDWII - WRUL

4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Sent 11/25/64

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y.
PL 2-3322

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #1382 covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Grefe

Richard W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

AUDIO-VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS WORLDWIDE

COPY

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1339

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1332 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

MEMORANDUM

February 3, 1965

RE: PAYMENTS OF WRUL INVOICES BY DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. - 1964-65

As per attached copies, it is clear that Invoice No. 1344 covering October was paid by Check No. 369794, Invoice No. 1382 covering November was paid by Check No. 376168. At a later date Invoice No. 1389 covering programs stated as not billed but to be included with November payment was received; this in the amount of $607.50 remains outstanding. Invoice No. 1399 covering December was paid by Check No. 382709 and Invoice No. 1419 covering the month of January 1965, in the amount of $1,316.25, also remains outstanding.

Thus, there is a total due to WRUL of $1,923.75.

EU

See Voucher #

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58th STREET NEW YORK 19 N.Y.

RECEIVED OCT 1 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE OCTOBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO 1344

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MON thru SAT) FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1964.

OCTOBER 1, thru OCTOBER 31, 1964
TOTAL OF 27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH $2,733.75

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 369794
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA 10/9/64 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************** $2,733.75

$2733 AND 75 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

Mailed 10/16/64

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
WEST 58TH STREET NEW YORK 19, N.Y.

Mailed 11/13

DATE NOVEMBER 10, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO 1382

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 1 to NOVEMBER 14, 1964. THREE (3) TIMES PER WEEK FROM NOVEMBER 16 to NOVEMBER 30, 1964.

NOVEMBER 1 to 14, 1964	TOTAL	12
NOVEMBER 16 to 30, 1964	TOTAL	7
		19

TOTAL OF 19 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH .... $ 1,923.75

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 376168

12/14/64

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************$1,923.75

FIRST NAT BANK $1923 AND 75 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

F. Kelly

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

Mailed 12/21

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Sent 11/25/64

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 57TH STREET, NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.	
TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 382709

1/12/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************* $1,316.25

FIRST NAT' BANK $1316 25 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58 th STREET NEW YORK 19 N Y

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

[illegible] Street New York 19, N Y
[illegible]

January 27, 1965

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
Miami, Florida

Gentlemen:

We have received your check for $1,923.75 in payment of Invoice #1382 covering a reduced billing for three broadcasts per week from November 16 to November 30.

However, since we carried, at your request, 6 broadcasts per week for this period, we sent a supplemental Invoice #1389 for $607.50 to cover these additional broadcasts.

Since we have also received payment for your December Invoice #1399, we wonder if you have misplaced Invoice #1389 covering the additional broadcasts for November.

Enclosed is a copy of Invoice #1389 along with your February Invoice.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. Greff
Vice President

RWG:arf

RECEIVED FEB 1 1965

"El Mediano Latino"

WRUL

Invoice #	Covering	Amount	Cashier's Check #
1344	1-31 Oct	$ 2,733.75	369794
* ?	1-15 Nov	?	?
1389	16-30 Nov	$ 607.50	376168 in amount $ 1,923.75
1399	1-31 Dec	$ 1,316.25	
1419	1-31 Jan	$ 1,316.25	382709

Norma says: pls check your books to see whether or not she owes Americas for same program.

SECRET (When Filled In)

ISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 26 Feb 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $1,060.50	COST ACCOUNT NO YODARK/4	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 31 March 65		REIMBURSEMENT — OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
26 Feb 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas for 2/65 ~~and~~, Invoice # 65-2-8		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,060.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas, Inc.
Copy invoice attached.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 26 Feb 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICE ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10 63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 3 March 1965

Received from

One thousand sixty and 50/100 ------------ Dollars
Cashier's Check #389048 100
"El Medico y Usted"program on Radio Americas for
Feb 65; Invoice #65-2-2

$ 1,060.50

Robert WILKENSON

14-00000

C - O - P - Y

INVOICE 65-2-2

February 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

PROGRAM: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 2/65	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 1/65	114.00
Production and Talent fees - 1/65	136.50
Programs for [illegible], New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 1/65	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,060.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

[illegible]

[illegible], 1965

Dr. [illegible] C. Daughtry, [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] County Medical [illegible], Inc.
[illegible] Avenue
Miami, Florida 331[illegible]

[illegible] Y [illegible]

Dear Sir:

The following charges [illegible] studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station [illegible] - 2/65	[illegible].00
Studio Rental and Tapes - 1/65	11[illegible].00
Production and [illegible] - 1/65	1[illegible].50
Programs for [illegible], [illegible] Studio [illegible] - 1/65	[illegible].00
[illegible]	[illegible].50

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI NO. 389048

MIAMI, FLORIDA 3/3/65

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC. ****************************$1,060.50

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1,060 AND 50 CTS

CASHIER'S CHECK

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

⑆0631⑉0058⑆ ⑈000⑉501⑉0⑈

MEMORANDUM

March [illegible], 1965

TO: [illegible] BRACKET

FROM: ROBERT WILKINSON

RE: DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASS'N. UNPAID INVOICES

Mr. [illegible] from [illegible] called me today at [illegible] P.M. [illegible] that apart from Invoice No. 1475 of March 1st for [illegible], the following invoices are still unpaid:

Invoice No. [illegible] of November 20, 1964 for $607.50
Invoice No. [illegible] of January 2, 1965 for $1,316.25
Invoice No. [illegible] of February 1, 1965 for $1,215.00

Mr. [illegible] said that he would appreciate very much if some effort were made for paying these outstanding invoices.

ROBERT WILKINSON

Done
4 March 65

[illegible]

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 12 Jan 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,060.50	YODARK/4-YOYARD HQS	X	15 Feb 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
12 Jan	65	AMPUD-3 medical program on Radio Americas.		
		For month of January 1965, payable in		
		advance.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,060.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reason)

Invoice attached.

Request Cashier's Check made payable to Radio Americas Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE:

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		12 Jan 65	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 12 Jan565	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/4-YOYARD HQS								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

No.

Carried to
Finance
for Acct
20 Jan 65

19 January 19 65

Received from

Cashier's Check #380892 in amount of one thousand sixty and 60/100 ---------- Dollars
For "El Medico y Usted" program on Radio Americas
for January 65

$1,060.50

Robert WILKENSON

14-00000

C O P Y

INVOICE 65-1-2

January 1, 1965

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1559 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 1/65	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 12/64	114.00
Production and Talent Fees - 12/64	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage - 12/64	60.00
Amount Due:	$1,060.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S. Vidal

DATE: 11 Jan 65

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$1,316.25	YODARK/4	X	15 Feb 65		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE: Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
11 Jan 65		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL--for month of January 65-paybale in advance		
		AUTHS: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,316.25

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached. Request X Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARY AND MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL BE REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		11 Jan 65	Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	11 Jan 65	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			
YODARK/4							

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
5156		

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

No. 14 January [illegible] 65

Received from

One thousand three hundred sixteen and 25/100 Dollars
in form of Cashier's Check #382709 for "El
Medico y Usted" pogram on WRUL for January 65.

$ 1,316.25

Robert WILKENSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE January 2, 1965

INVOICE NO. 1419

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (¼) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI) JANUARY 1 THROUGH JANUARY 31, 1965

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED JAN 4 1965

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AMBUD-3

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD	
FROM *(and including)*	TO *(and including)*
18 Dec 64	29 Dec 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)* [illegible]			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 18 Dec 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,295.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,295.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,295.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,295.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE	29 December 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED	DATE: 29 December 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE — SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION					
YODARK/1									

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO. 4693	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(11)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	OBJ. CL.	COST ACCT. NO.	CURRENCIES		
		ANSHADY-1 Dec salary			$425.00		
		AMBASAL-1 personnel(7)			1700.00		
		AMBUD-3 script writer			45.00		
		AMBASAL-1 difference in salary- Rainforth Foundation			125.00		
				Total-	2295.00		

RECEIPTS AND/OR CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

SECRET

Recibi, del Dr. A. Maceo la cantidad de $45.00,-
Miami, Florida, Diciembre 1, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

AMBUD-3

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD
FROM (and including): 9 Nov 64
TO (and including): 20 Nov 64
CURRENCY:

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of Items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)		
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD		
	DATE: 9 Nov 64	SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR		45.00
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (Itemize on reverse side)		45.00
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD		
	A. FUNDS ON HAND		
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):		
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR		$45.00

Copy to finance [illegible]

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE		SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT
APPROVED	DATE: 20 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Evalena S. Vidal
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF: 20 Nov 64	DATE / SIGNATURE: Theodore G. Shackley

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	
YODARK/4				

REMARKS
AMBUD-3. Spot payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda for radio script writing during October 64.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
3784		

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (11)

RECIBI, del Dr. A. Maceo, la cantidad de $45.00:- - - - - - - -

Miami, Florida, Noviembre 1, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Poreda

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER

From: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE 9 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$45.00	YODARK/4	X			

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
9 Nov 64		Spot payment to Vicente LAGO Poreda who assists AMBUD-3 in script writing. For October 64. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reason)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 9 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 9 Nov 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
YODARK/4				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

No. 13 Nov 64 19

Received from

Forty-five and 00/100 Dollars
100

October 64 payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda

$ 45.00

Dr A. Maceo
Antonio MACEO Mackle

RECEIPTS AND/OR CERTIFICATES IN LIEU OF RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD
FROM (and including): 7 Oct 64
TO (and including): 9 Nov 64

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 7 Oct 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,733.75		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,733.75		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,733.75		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,733.75		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 9 Nov 64
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 9 Nov 64
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	
YODARK/4				

REMARKS: AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL for October 64. Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT
VOUCHER NO.:
DATE:
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER:

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 16 ~~15~~ October 19 64

Received from

Two thousand seven hundred thirty-three and 75/100 Dollars

(Cashier's Check # 369794)

For "El Medico y Usted" program on WRUL for Oct 64

$ 2,733,75

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 7x Oct 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$2,733.75		X			

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO.	AMOUNT
7 Oct 64		AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL for Oct 64.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,733.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Invoice attached.

Cashier's Check requested: make payable to Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

		DATE	
APPROVED		7 Oct 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	7 Oct 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE					

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-61

SECRET

(1-3-16-47)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

RECEIVED OCT 1 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE OCTOBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1344

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MON thru SAT) FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1964.	
OCTOBER 1, thru OCTOBER 31, 1964	
TOTAL OF 27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,733.75

D-R-A-F-T

Mr.Ralph Brent
Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL,
4 West 58th Street,
New York 19,N.Y.

Dear Mr.Brent,

Under the terms of our agreement with you, we hereby wish to advise you that beginning 1 December 1964 we desire to reduce the number of the "Medico y Usted" broadcasts from six per week to three per week. If possible we would like to retain the Monday, Wednesday and Friday time slots. If this is not possible, our second preference would be for a Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday schedule.

Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter and we look forward to continued collaboration with you in these matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

(DOMA)

D-R-A-F-T

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 8 Dec 64

REQUEST FOR [illegible]

AMOUNT REQUESTED $1,923.75	COST ACCOUNT NO YODARK/4	X	ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 15 Feb 65		REIMBURSEMENT -- OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF AN ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
8 Dec 64		Partial radio bill for Nov plus advance billing for all of Dec 64 for A[illegible]D-3 program on WRUL.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,923.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS [illegible]

Two invoices attached.
Request Cashier's Check made payable to: Radio New York Worldwide-WRUL for total amount

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS CLAIMED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE AND THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ITS ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 8 Dec 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 8 Dec 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/64								

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

17 December 19 64

Received from

Cashier's Check No.376163 in the amount of Dollars

One thousand nine hundred twenty-three and 75/100 ----

for WRUL "El Medico y Usted" program for Dec 64
plus partial billing for Nov 64.

$ 1,923.75

Robert WILKENSON

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1389

TERMS CASH

REMAINING PROGRAMS NOT BILLED FOR ON INVOICE # 1382 FOR MONTH OF NOVEMBER. TOTAL OF (6) SIX, THREE EACH DURING THE WEEKS OF NOVEMBER 16, and 23, 1964, AT $101.25 EACH.	$607.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE DECEMBER 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1399

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL ON SPANISH SERVICE
A (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, 3 TIMES EACH WEEK (MON-WED-FRI)
DECEMBER 1, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1964.

TOTAL: 13 PROGRAMS AT $101.25 EACH.	$1,316.25

RECEIVED DEC 3 1964

Radio Americas Inc.

101 MADEIRA AVENUE
CORAL GABLES
FLORIDA 33134

PHONE: 444-8287
(CODE 305)

INVOICE 64-12-2

December 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses:

Radio Station Time - 12/64	$750.00
Studio rental and tapes - 11/64	98.00
Production and Talent Fees - 11/64	136.50
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio Time and Postage-11/64	80.00
Amount Due:	$1,064.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS INC.

SECRET

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 24 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO.		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE	REIMBURSEMENT—OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$2,370.00	YODARK/1 YODARK/4	X	15 Dec 64	

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
24 Nov 64		$425.00 - ANSHADY-1 Nov salary	YODARK/1	
		$350.00 - R.GROSO spot payment & rent	YODARK/1	
		$1350.00 - AMBASAL-1 personnel (6)	YODARK/1	
		200.00 - AMBASAL-1 [illegible]	YODARK/1	
		$ 45.00 - Vacancy [illegible]	YODARK/4	
			TOTAL	$2,370.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

		DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER
APPROVED		2[illegible] November 196[illegible]	Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	2[illegible] November 1964	Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
YODARK/1 YODARK/4				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
10-63

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS	PERIOD FROM (and including)	PERIOD TO (and including)
	13 November 64	1 December 64

ITEM NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 13 Nov 64 SOURCE: JMWAVE	$1,000.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	1,000.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	1,000.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary):*			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 1,000.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE	1 December 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S.Vidal
APPROVED	DATE: 1 December 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE / SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE, DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			
YODARK/1						

REMARKS One time payment to AMBUD-1 for hospital bills,etc.
Money order receipts attached as well as Postal Dept.receipt of delivery.

	CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT	
VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (1)

CUSTOMER RECEIPT - MONEY ORDER

7-002577

DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

196- NOV 20

AMOUNT DADE FED S&L ASSN $500 00 CTS

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona

Maria Evans

TO THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DUPLICATE
NON-NEGOTIABLE

CUSTOMER RECEIPT - MONEY ORDER

7-002576

DADE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

196- NOV 20

AMOUNT DADE FED S&L ASSN $500 00 CTS

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona

Maria Evans

TO THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF MIAMI
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DUPLICATE
NON-NEGOTIABLE

REGISTERED NO. 687101

Value $ NV Spec. del'y fee $ 30
Fee $ 60 Ret. receipt fee $ 10
Surcharge $ Rest. del'y fee $
Postage $ 8 ☐ Airmail

MIAMI, FLA. NOV 20 1964 KENDALL BR.

Postmaster, By

From Miss Grace Holmes
P.O. Box 1767 Coral Gables
To Srta. Asencion C Perez
Darlington Apt 1402
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico

POD Form 3806—Oct. 1960 048—16—70493-6

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

POSTMARK OF DELIVERING OFFICE
NOV

INSTRUCTIONS: Fill in items below and complete instructions on other side, if applicable. Moisten gummed ends, attach and hold firmly to back of article. Print on front of article RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED.

RETURN TO

REGISTERED NO 687401	NAME OF SENDER Miss Grace Holmes
CERTIFIED NO.	STREET AND NO. OR P. O. BOX PO Box 1767,
INSURED NO.	CITY, STATE, AND ZIP CODE Coral Gables, Fla.

POD Form 3811 Sep 1963

C58—16—71548-6—F

INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVERING EMPLOYEE

☐ Deliver ONLY to addressee

☐ Show address where delivered

(Additional charges required for these services)

RECEIPT

Received the numbered article described on other side.

SIGNATURE OR NAME OF ADDRESSEE (must always be filled in)
C.

SIGNATURE OF ADDRESSEE'S AGENT, IF ANY
#56

DATE DELIVERED 11/23/65	SHOW WHERE DELIVERED (only if requested)

C58—16—71548-5—F

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 15 Nov 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $1,000.00	COST ACCOUNT NO YODARK/1		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE 20 Nov 64		REIMBURSEMENT – OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
13 Nov	64	One-time payment to AMBUD-1 for hospital bills,etc as per DIR-63436.		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,000.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (state reason)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS

SIGNATURE

APPROVED		DATE 13 Nov 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 13 Nov 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	SEC OF FIC	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO	OBLIGATION			SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				
	NO	INCREASE	DECREASE					
YODARK/1								

REMARKS Request cash please. Money order will be sent to AMBUD-1, receipt for which will constitute accounting for this amount.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(1-3-18-49)

SECRET 121638Z

WAVE CITE DIR 63426

TYPIC AMBUD

REF WAVE 4556

APPROVE REF PAYMENT.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PW

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

FORM 11-57 1304 (44)

ORIG.: WH/C/FOHONG:mop

EXT.: 266

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 10 NOV 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO DIR INFO. CITE WAVE NUMBER

TYPIC AMBUD

REFS: A. DIR 61679
B. WAVE 4-05

1. RECEIVED SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER 9 NOV FROM AMBUD-1 SECRETARY STATING AMBUD-1 SUFFERED INFARCT OF MYOCARDIUM AND HOSPITALIZED. NOW DOING WELL BUT NEEDS REST. SECRETARY ADDED AMBUD-1 CONCERNED HOW MEET HOSPITAL AND DOCTOR BILLS SINCE HAS NO HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE AND KNOWS WILL HAVE LONG PERIOD RECUPERATION. AMBUD-1 SON WITH WIFE AND FIVE CHILDREN HAVE ARRIVED AND STAYING AMBUD-1 HOME. SON HAS NO EMPLOYMENT.

2. ABOVE OBVIOUSLY FISHING EXPEDITION FOR KUBARK FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. IN RESPONSE REFS. UNLESS HQS HAS OTHER FORMULA WISH APPLY, WAVE WILL SEND MONEY ORDER ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS AS APPROPRIATE GESTURE KUBARK INTEREST AND SYMPATHY WHILE AVOIDING PERMANENT ENTANGLEMENT. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

10/8

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING

FORM 1304

(4

ORIG.: WH/CAPOCHEG/CBP
EXT.: 266
DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 4 NOV 64
FILE:

DEFERRED	FPD PRIORITY	INITIALS · DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

TO 91 PRITY DIR INFO. CITE WAVE 4335 NUMBER

TYPIC AMBUD

REF: DIR - 61679

CAPOCHEG PHONED AMBUD-1 HOME PUERTO RICO 1200 HOURS 4 NOV AND TALKED WITH DAUGHTER-IN-LAW WHO SAID TODAY'S ELECTROCARDIOGRAM SHOWED IMPROVEMENT AMBUD-1 CONDITION. IF ANY ASSISTANCE NEEDED AMBUD-1 SECRETARY WILL ADVISE USING ESTABLISHED ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

4/15

ESEC______

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

PRIORITY

Nov 4 1 56 PM '64

SECRET 041753Z

PRIORITY WAVE CITE DIR 61679

TYPIC AMBUD

ACCORDING AP REPORT 3 NOV AMBUD-1 HOSPITALIZED IN SAN JUAN WITH HEART ATTACK. REQUEST WAVE DETERMINE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ASSET IF ANY KUBARK ASSISTANCE REQUIRED. ADVISE.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

PW

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD
FROM *(and including)* 30 Sept 64
TO *(and including)* 2 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 30 Sept 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	45.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	45.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 45.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 2 October 64
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Zvalona S.Vidal

APPROVED
DATE: 2 October 64
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley

RECEIPT
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE:
SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS: Sept 64 ~~xxlxx~~ spot payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMCUD-3 in script writing. Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT
VOUCHER NO.:
DATE:
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER:

FORM 9-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

No. ____ 1 October 19 64

Received from ____

Forty-five and 00/100 ---------------- 100 Dollars

Payment to Vicente LAGO Pereda for September 1964

$ 45.00

A. A. Maceo

Antonio MACEO y Mackle

SECRET (When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

To: FINANCE OFFICER	From: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 30 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED	COST ACCOUNT NO		ADVANCE ACCOUNTING DUE DATE		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE
$45.00		X	15 October 64		

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO	DESCRIPTION	COST ACCOUNT NO	AMOUNT
30 Sept 64		Spot payment for Sept 64 to Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMBUD-3 in script writing.		
		AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS		SIGNATURE
APPROVED	DATE 30 Sept 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Thoedore G.Shackley
RECEIPT I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE	DATE 30 Sept 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCOUNT NO.	OBLIGATION NO	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 10-63 41 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(1-3-16-49)

Recibi, del Dr. Antonio Maceo la cantidad de $45.00.-

Setiembre 30, 1964.-

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including): 4 Sept 64

TO (and including): 1 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION		CURRENCY		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)				
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD				
	DATE	SOURCE			
	4 Sept 64	1 Oct 64	$ 7,998.75		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR		7,998.75		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)		7,998.75		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD				
	A. FUNDS ON HAND				
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):				
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR		$ 7,998.75		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE 1 October 64	SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT Evalena S. Vidal
APPROVED — DATE 1 October 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE / SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION			

REMARKS
AMTUD-3 radio program on WRUL for July, Aug and Sept 1964.
Receipt attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER



No. 25 Sept 19 64

Received from

Seven thousand nine hundred ninety-eight and 75/100 Dollars

(Cashier's Check #367218). For "El Medico y Usted" progr
on WRUL for months July, August and September 1964.

$ 7,998.75

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 4 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 7,998.75	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 30 September 1964	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
4 Sept	64	AMBUD-3 radio program on WKUL for July,Aug and Sept 64. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$7,998.75

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 4 Sept 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 4 Sept 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUBOBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS July bill: $2,733.75 Bills (invoices) attached.
Aug bill: 2,632.50
Sept bill: 2,632.50

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-43)

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL

4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE JULY 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1256

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH A (½) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY-SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JULY 1964.

JULY 1, THROUGH JULY 31, 1964

27 BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,733.75

RECEIVED JUL - 1 1964

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI,
FLORIDA

DATE AUGUST 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1297

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 1964 AUGUST 1 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1964 (26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 each	$ 2,632.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y

DATE SEPTEMBER 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1324

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX TIMES PER WEEK, (Monday thru Saturday) FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1964.	
SEPTEMBER 1 THRU SEPTEMBER 30, 1964	
(26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

PAYMENT NOT YET RECEIVED FOR:

INVOICE NUMBER 1256 - JULY 1, 1964 $2,733.75
INVOICE NUMBER 1297 - AUGUST 1, 1964 $2,632.50

RECEIVED SEPT. 3/64

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY

RECEIVED AUG 3 1964

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

INVOICE NUMBER	BROADCASTS	AMOUNT	INV. MAILED	PAY'T REC'D
1154	FEB 10-29	$1822.50	02/01/64	02/13/64
1169	MARCH 1-31	$2632.50	03/01/64	03/16/64
1186	APRIL 1-30	$2632.50	04/01/64	04/27/64
1197	MAY 1-30	$2632.50	05/01/64	06/08/64
1232	JUNE 1-30	$2632.50	06/01/64	07/30/64
1256	JULY 1-31	$2733.75	07/01/64	----
1297	AUG 1-31	$2632.50	08/01/64	----

AS OF JULY 31, 1964

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including): 11 Sept 64

TO (and including): 1 Oct 64

NO.	ITEM – DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD — DATE: 11 Sept 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$ 2,910.50		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,910.50		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)	2,910.50		
5	ADVANCES ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$ 2,910.50		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 1 October 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalona S.Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 1 October 64

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:

DATE:

SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICES ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE – DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE – CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION – NO.	OBLIGATION – INCREASE	OBLIGATION – DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

Aug and Sept 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. Reciept attached.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.:

DATE:

AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER:

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 25 Sept 1964

Received from

Two thousand nine hundred ten and 50/100 ----- Dollars

(Cashier's Check # 367460). For "El Medico y Usted" program on Radio Americas for the months August and September 1964.

$2,910.30

Robert Wilkenson

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Evalena S.Vidal

DATE: 11 Sept 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $ 2,910.50

ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 30 Sept 64

REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
11 Sept 64		Aug and Sept 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,910.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio Americas,Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED
DATE: 11 Sept 64
ALLOTMENT NUMBER
ALLOTMENT TITLE
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodora G.Shackley

RECEIPT
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.
DATE: 11 Sept 64
SIGNATURE: Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS: Expenses for August 64: $1,460.50
Expenses for Sept 64: $1,450/00

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER
DATE
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 81 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(11-3-15-43)

INVOICE 64-8-2

August 4, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1553 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of August 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	312.00
Production and Talent Fees	283.50
Programs for [illegible], New York Tapes, Studio time and Postage	85.00
Amount Due:	1,460.50

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including): 31 Aug 64

TO (and including): 8 Sept 64

CURRENCY

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)		
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD		
	DATE: 31 Aug 64	SOURCE: JMWAVE	$45.00
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR		45.00
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (itemize on reverse side)		45.00
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD		
	A. FUNDS ON HAND		
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (attach schedule if necessary):		
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR		45.00

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 8 Sept 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalona S.Vidal

APPROVED: 8 Sept 64

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G.Shackley

RECEIPT: I ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION			SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION
	NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	

REMARKS: To AMBUD-3 for ~~Sept~~ August 1964 salary of Dr.Vicente LAGO Pereda who assists AMBUD-3 in writing radio scripts.

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.

DATE

AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 11-61 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

No. 1 Sept 1964

Received from

Forty-five and 00/100 ---------------------------- Dollars

August 1964 salary for Vicente LAGO Pareda

$ 45.00

A Maceo

ANTONIO MACEO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S.Vidal	DATE 31 Aug 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 45.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 15 Sept 64	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
31 Aug 64		To (Dr.)Vicente LAGO Pereda, who assists AMBUD-3 in writing radio program scripts. [illegible]		
			TOTAL	$45.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS. (Give reasons)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 31 Aug 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 31 Aug 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S.Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS Dr.LAGO receives $100 assistance from the Refugee Program. The $45 requested is a little less than he can legally make in addition to this aid--according to his budgetted index.

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

RECIBI del Dr. Antonio Maceo la cantidad de $45.00, (CUARENTA Y CINCO, dollares).-

Miami, Florida, Setiembre 1, 1964.

Dr. Vicente Lago Pereda

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD

FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
7 Aug 64	17 Aug 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION		CURRENCIES	
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD (*total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting*)			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD — DATE: 7 Aug 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$450.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	450.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED (*itemize on reverse side*)	450.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS (*attach schedule if necessary*):			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$450.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 17 August 1964
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED
DATE: 17 August 1964
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE
SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS
Fuderal expenses for Jorge VEGA of Brigade via AMSUMACK-2 to funeral home. Receipts attached.
AUTH: CO3

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT
VOUCHER NO.
DATE
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

No. ______ August 7 ______ 64

Received from ______

Four hundred and fifty and no/100---------------Dollars

$ 450.00------

MON FUNERAL HOME

LA PRIMERA FUNERARIA LATINA DE MIAMI

H. MARVIN PITTMAN
Funeral Director

FR 9-1697
1873 W Flagler St.
Miami, Florida

Miami, August 7-19

Sr. Gustavo Vega
3276 S.W. 22 Terrace
Miami

Por concepto de los funerales de su hermano Jorge Vega.

$450.00

A Garcia

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 7 Aug 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 450.00		ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 31 August 64		REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION. I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
7 Aug 64		Funeral expenses for Horge VEGA, via AMSUMACK-2, to AMBUD-3 to widow.		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$450.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (*Give reasons*)

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.	SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 7 Aug 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G.Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 7 Aug 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1-3-16-49)
GPO 884-822

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD FROM (and including)	01 July 64
PERIOD TO (and including)	28 July 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 9 July 64 SOURCE: JMWAVE			
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	$1,430.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	1,430.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	1,430.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 28 July 64

SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 28 July 64 — SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF: — DATE: — SIGNATURE:

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS: Cashier's Check, AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas for July 64.
~~Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxoriginal~~

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 3-63 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(1)

14-00000

[redacted]

[redacted]

No. July 7 19 64 [redacted]

Received from [redacted]

One thousand four hundred fifty and 00/100 Dollars

July 64 expenses for radio program on Radio Americas

(Cashier's Check)

$ 1,450.00

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Evalona S. Vidal

DATE: 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $ 1,450.00

ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 31 August 1964

REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Evalona S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		July 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$1,450.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to : Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 9 July 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 9 July 64	SIGNATURE Evalona S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GPO 868-582

Radio Americas, Inc.

101 MADEIRA AVENUE
CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 33134
[illegible]

[illegible] LANGFORD BUILDING
[illegible] S. E. FIRST STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33132
[illegible]

INVOICE 64-7-2

July 1, 1964

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami, Florida 33136

Program: EL MEDICO Y USTED

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of July 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	312.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, Studio time and Postage	85.00
Amount Due:	$1,450.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 3E1637
OF MIAMI

MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64 63-58/631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC.******************************$1,450.00

FIRST NAT'L BANK $1 450 AND 00 CTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD FROM (and including)	TO (and including)
8 July 64	28 July 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCY		
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*			
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD			
	DATE: 8 July 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$1,500.00		
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	1,500.00		
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	1,500.00		
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD			
	A. FUNDS ON HAND			
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:			
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	1,500.00		

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 28 July 64
SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal

APPROVED — DATE: 28 July 64
SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley

RECEIPT — I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
DATE
SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
TOTALS				

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION				

REMARKS: AMBUD-3 radio expenses for June 64 on Radio Americas.
AUTH: COG

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.
DATE
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 5-55 42 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (1)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalena S. Vidal	DATE 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 1,509.00	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 31 August 1964	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		June 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on Radio Americas.		
		AUTH: COS	TOTAL	$1,509.00

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio Americas, Inc.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 9 July 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 9 July 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE		POSTED BY
		DEBIT	CREDIT	

COST

REMARKS

VOUCHER N

FORM 6-60 41

GPO 866 922

July 27 19 64

Received from

One thousand five hundred nine and 00/100 --- Dollars

June 64 expenses for radio program on Radio& Americas

(Cashier's Check)

$ 1,509.00

Radio Americas, Inc.

101 Madeira Avenue
Coral Gables, Fla.
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
FRANKLIN 1-6000
(CODE 305)

INVOICE 64-6-2

June 1, 1964

Dewitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami 36, Florida

Program: El Medico y Usted

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of June 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$ 780.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	336.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, studio time and postage	120.00
Amount Due:	$1,509.68

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 361638
OF MIAMI

MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64

63-58
631

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO AMERICAS, INC.****************************$ 1,509.00

FIRST NAT'L BANK [illegible] 1509 AND 00 CTS

101 Madeira Avenue
Coral Gables, Fla.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

INVOICE 64-6-2

June 1, 1964

Dewitt C. Daughtry, M.D.
President
Dade County Medical Ass'n. Inc.
1550 N.W. Tenth Avenue
Miami 36, Florida

Program: El Medico y Usted

Dear Sir:

The following charges are for broadcast time, studio rental, tapes and other expenses for the month of June 1964:

Radio Station Time 26 programs @ $30.00	$ 80.00
Studio Rental and Tapes	336.00
Production and Talent Fees	273.00
Programs for WRUL, New York Tapes, studio time and postage	120.00
Amount Due:	$1,509.00

Payable to RADIO AMERICAS, INC.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ACCOUNTING FOR FUNDS

PERIOD
FROM (and including): 9 July 64
TO (and including): 28 July 64

NO.	ITEM DESCRIPTION	CURRENCIES	
1	FUNDS AND ADVANCES ON HAND BEGINNING OF PERIOD *(total of items 5a and 5b of previous accounting)*		
2	FUNDS RECEIVED DURING PERIOD DATE: 9 July 64 — SOURCE: JMWAVE	$2,632.50	
3	TOTAL TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR	2,632.50	
4	FUNDS DISBURSED *(itemize on reverse side)*	2,632.50	
5	AMOUNTS ON HAND END OF PERIOD		
	A. FUNDS ON HAND		
	B. OUTSTANDING ADVANCES TO OTHERS *(attach schedule if necessary)*:		
6	TOTAL ACCOUNTED FOR	$2,632.50	

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN, NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS ACCOUNTING AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

DATE: 28 July 64		SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RENDERING ACCOUNT: Evalena S. Vidal	
APPROVED	DATE: 28 July 64	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER: Theodore G. Shackley	
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE REPLENISHMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:	DATE	SIGNATURE

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICE ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION

TOTALS

DISTRIBUTION

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	INCREASE	DECREASE

REMARKS [illegible]-2 radio expenses for June 64 on WRUL.
AUTH: COS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NO.	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

July 2[illegible] 64

Two thousand six hundred thirty two and 50/100

June 64 expenses of radio program on WRUL

(Cashier's Check)

2,632.50

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,	FROM: Evalona S. Vidal	DATE 9 July 64

REQUEST FOR STATION FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED $ 2,632.50	ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE 31 August 1964	REIMBURSEMENT - OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL FULLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO SO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE Evalona S. Vidal

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
9 July 64		June 64 expenses involved AMBUD-3 radio program on WRUL. AUTH: COS		
			TOTAL	$2,632.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (GIVE REASONS)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE

APPROVED	DATE 9 July 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 9 July 64	SIGNATURE Evalena S. Vidal

FOR USE OF THE FINANCE OFFICER ONLY

TYPE OF FUNDS	BLOCK NO.	NO. OF UNITS	RATE	DOLLAR VALUE

GENERAL LEDGER ACCOUNT IDENTIFICATION	SUBSIDIARY IDENTIFICATION	DOLLAR VALUE DEBIT	DOLLAR VALUE CREDIT	POSTED BY
	TOTALS			

DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENSES

COST ACCT. NO.	OBLIGATION NO.	OBLIGATION INCREASE	OBLIGATION DECREASE	SUB-OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

REMARKS

CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT OR CREDIT

VOUCHER NUMBER	DATE	AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

FORM 6-60 41 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GPO 888-922

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

DATE JUNE 1, 1964

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

INVOICE NO. 1232

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1964	
JUNE 1 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1964 (26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK NO. 361639
OF MIAMI
63-58
631

MIAMI, FLORIDA 7/15/64

PAY TO THE ORDER OF RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE ********************** $2,632.50

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE - WRUL
4 WEST 58TH STREET, NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

TO DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY
MIAMI, FLORIDA

DATE JUNE 1, 1964

INVOICE NO. 1232

TERMS CASH IN ADVANCE

BROADCAST OVER THE FACILITIES OF WRUL IN SPANISH (1/4) HOUR PROGRAM, SIX (6) TIMES PER WEEK, (MONDAY THROUGH SATURDAY) FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1964	
JUNE 1 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1964 (26) BROADCASTS AT $101.25 EACH	$2,632.50

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DISBURSEMENT VOUCHER

TO: Finance Officer,

FROM: Bruce MacMaster

DATE: 27 May 64

REQUEST FOR [illegible] FUNDS

AMOUNT REQUESTED: $ 2,632.50

XXX ADVANCE - TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON OR BEFORE THE FOLLOWING DATE: 27 June 1964

REIMBURSEMENT OFFICIAL DISBURSEMENTS ALREADY MADE

IF ADVANCE IS REQUESTED COMPLETE FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION: I AGREE THAT I WILL PROPERLY ACCOUNT FOR THIS ADVANCE BY SUBMISSION OF ACCOUNTING AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE BY THE DATE STATED ABOVE. IN THE EVENT OF MY FAILURE TO ACCOUNT AND REFUND ANY UNEXPENDED BALANCE, I AUTHORIZE DEDUCTION FROM MY SALARY TO EFFECT SETTLEMENT.

SIGNATURE: Bruce MacMaster

DISBURSEMENTS

DATE	RECEIPT NO.	DESCRIPTION	ALLOTMENT NO.	AMOUNT
27 ~~XXX~~ May 1964		WRUL Station Program: Dade County Medical Society (Radio Americas) 1-31 May 1964; Auth: COS		
			TOTAL	2,632.50

RECEIPTS ARE ATTACHED EXCEPT AS FOLLOWS (Give reasons)

Cashier's Check requested
Make payable to: Radio New York Worldwide

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE DISBURSEMENTS ITEMIZED ABOVE WERE NECESSARILY MADE BY ME IN THE CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE, THAT I HAVE NOT BEEN NOR WILL I BE, REIMBURSED THEREFOR FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, AND THAT THIS CLAIM AND ATTACHMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS.

SIGNATURE:

APPROVED	DATE 27 May 64	ALLOTMENT NUMBER	ALLOTMENT TITLE	SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICER Theodore G. Shackley
RECEIPT	I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE FUNDS REQUESTED ABOVE.		DATE 27 May 64	SIGNATURE Bruce MacMaster

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No. ______ June 1 ~~May 29~~, 1961 19

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WRUL Station Program (Dade County Medical Society)
Radio Americas - 1-31 May 1964

$ 2,632.50

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Medical Radio Program

Vol II

19-124-25/5-4

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Agosto, 1965

Lunes	2	#	378	Conducta a seguir en el paciente con afeccion Bronco-pulmonar cronica
Miercoles	4	#	379	Hemorragias pulmonares
Viernes	6	#	380	Consideraciones sobre un reciente Seminario Interamericano
Lunes	9	#	381	Ileitis regional
Miercoles	11	#	382	Urticaria
Viernes	13	#	383	Antrax
Lunes	16	#	384	Tularemia
Miercoles	18	#	385	Comentarios sobre Ulcera vericosa
Viernes	20	#	386	Comentarios s/ una reciente informacion de la F.A.O.
Lunes	23	#	387	Se aplica actualmente la vacuna contra el Sarampion
Miercoles	25	#	388	Consideraciones sobre la Psoriasis
Viernes	27	#	389	Sobre algunos temas de interes medico
Lunes	30	#	390	Hernia diafragmatica

Programa radial "El Medico y Ud"
Julio, 1965

Viernes	2	#	365	Influenza o Flu
Lunes	5	#	366	Consideraciones sobre afecciones vasculares perifericas
Miercoles	7	#	367	Algunos comentarios sobre el infarto Miocardico
Viernes	9	#	368	Trastornos de la Laringe
Lunes	12	#	369	Ileitis regional
Miercoles	14	#	370	Algunas consideraciones sobre calculos del Riñon
Viernes	16	#	371	Contestando correspondencia
Lunes	19	#	372	Comentarios sobre Angina de pecho
Miercoles	21	#	373	La Silicosis, enfermedad del trabajo
Viernes	23	#	374	Nuevos aportes en el tratamiento de los quemados
Lunes	26	#	375	Mejores perspectivas para los ancianos
Miercoles	28	#	376	Enfermedades de la Nariz
Viernes	30	#	377	Accidentes a que estan expuestos los escolares en los meses de vacaciones

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Junio, 1965

Miercoles	2	#	352	Calculos en la Vesicula Biliar
Viernes	4	#	353	La clase medica victima del terror comunista
Lunes	7	#	354	Factores en la Tuberculosis
Miercoles	9	#	355	El dolor en medicina
Viernes	11	#	356	Algunos aspectos de la Disfagia en medicina
Lunes	14	#	357	Comentarios sobre el uso indiscriminado de los barbituricos
Miercoles	16	#	358	Factores en la Neumonia y en la Bronconeumonia
Viernes	18	#	359	Sobre un reciente trabajo periodistico en relación a la medicina rural en Cuba
Lunes	21	#	360	Consejo para disminuir el riesgo de Cancer en la boca
Miercoles	23	#	361	Dificultades del niño en edad escolar
Viernes	25	#	362	Consideraciones sobre algunos trastornos de la personalidad
Lunes	28	#	363	Extreñimiento y Colon irritable
Miercoles	30	#	364	Apetito y Hambre

Programa radial "El Medico y Usted"
Mayo, 1965

3	Lunes	#	339	Importancia de la tos como sintoma de serias afecciones respiratorias
5	Miercoles	#	340	Esclerodermia y Dermatomiositis
7	Viernes	#	341	Algunos comentarios sobre la Obra de Finlay
10	Lunes	#	342	Cortedad de la respiracion
12	Miercoles	#	343	Algunas consideraciones sobre Pleuresia
14	Viernes	#	344	Peligro del uso abusivo de los Antibioticos
17	Lunes	#	345	Enfermedad del Suero y accidentes del mismo
19	Miercoles	#	346	Fechas memorables
21	Viernes	#	347	Hipervitaminosis por exceso de ingestion de Vitaminas
24	Lunes	#	348	Cefalalgia, Cefalea o dolor de cabeza
26	Miercoles	#	349	La Fiebre en Medicina
28	Viernes	#	350	Aprovechemos la ventaja de la Vacuna contra la Poliomelitis, como forma de erradicar ésta.
31	Lunes	#	351	Afacciones de la garganta en el niño

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Abril, 1965

2	Viernes	# 327	Diarreas en el niño
5	Lunes	# 328	Endocarditis Sub-aguda ó Endocarditis lenta
7	Miercoles	# 329	Algunas consideraciones sobre la Polucion del aire
9	Viernes	# 330	Algunos comentarios sobre las anemias
12	Lunes	# 331	Algunas consideraciones sobre la obesidad
14	Miercoles	# 332	Cuadros abdominales agudos en el niño
19	Lunes	# 333	Los factores del enfisema
21	Miercoles	# 334	El fumar cigarrillos y su relacion con la salud
23	Viernes	# 335	Contestando correspondencia
26	Lunes	# 336	Enfermedades venereas
28	Miercoles	# 337	Consideraciones clinicas de la sifilis
30	Viernes	# 338	Consideraciones sobre algunas enfermedades Venereas.

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Marzo, 1965

1	Lunes	#	313	Sarampion
3	Miercoles	#	314	Tuberculosis del Tracto femenino
5	Viernes	#	315	Sobre los riesgos del rapido crecimiento de las ciudades
8	Lunes	#	316	Mononucleosis infecciosa
10	Miercoles	#	317	Agranulocitosis
12	Viernes	#	318	Sin agua no puede haber vida
15	Lunes	#	319	Util campaña para dar a conocer la Bronquitis Cronica
17	Miercoles	#	320	Algunas consideraciones sobre el Asma
19	Viernes	#	321	Artritis Reumatoidea
22	Lunes	#	322	Algunos comentarios sobre Tuberculosis
24	Miercoles	#	323	Colelitiasis
26	Viernes	#	324	Ulcera Peptica
29	Lunes	#	325	Glomerulo-Nefritis aguda y Sindrome Nefrotico en el niño
31	Miercoles	#	326	Afecciones del Tiroide en el niño

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Febrero 1965

1	Lunes	#	301	Fiebre Escarlatina
3	Miercoles	#	302	Algunas consideraciones sobre Diabetes
5	Viernes	#	303	Sobre la necesidad de ir a un control de las medicinas que se expenden al publico
8	Lunes	#	304	Hepatitis Virales
10	Miercoles	#	305	Policitemia
12	Viernes	#	306	Actividades de la Organizacion Mundial de la Salud para el año 1965
15	Lunes	#	307	Fiebre Reumatica o Carditis Reumatica
17	Miercoles	#	308	La Conjuntivitis en el niño recien nacido
19	Viernes	#	309	Sobre un reciente informe del aumento de los casos de Viruela y Colera en el mundo
22	Lunes	#	310	Contestando correspondencia
24	Miercoles	#	311	24 de Febrero
26	Viernes	#	312	Muertes por accidente en carretera

Programa Radial "El Medico y Ud"
Enero 1965

1	Viernes	# 288	Feliz Año Nuevo
4	Lunes	# 289	Algunas afecciones abdominales en el niño entre ellas la Apendicitis Aguda
6	Miercoles	# 290	Puede ser conducido con mas lentitud el proceso de envejecer
8	Viernes	# 291	Primer Aniversario de "El Medico y Ud."
11	Lunes	# 292	Algunas consideracion sobre Oligofrenia, Fenilpéruviva y Mongolismo
13	Miercoles	# 293	" " " "
15	Viernes	# 294	La Salud Publica en Cuba segun un tecnico comunista
18	Lunes	# 295	Consideraciones sobre la Tos-Ferina
20	Miercoles	# 296	Paroditis, tambien conocida por Papera
22	Viernes	# 297	Aun la Viruela no está vencida en el Mundo
25	Lunes	# 298	Pielo-Nefritis aguda y cronica
27	Miercoles	# 299	Avances de la Psiquiatria en Paises Europeos
29	Viernes	# 300	Las principales causas de muerte en el Mundo

Programa Radial "El Medico y Ud."
Diciembre, 1964

2	Miercoles	#	275	Recordando "El dia del Medico"
4	Viernes	#	276	Intoxicacion por Salicilato y por Arsenico
7	Lunes	#	277	7 de Diciembre
9	Miercoles	#	278	Reciente Congreso Sanitario sobre Asia y Africa
11	Viernes	#	279	Sobre un reciente Plan Piloto en la lucha contra el Cancer del Pulmon
14	Lunes	#	280	Contestando alguna correspondencia
16	Miercoles	#	281	" " "
18	Viernes	#	282	Sobre la prevencion del Cancer
21	Lunes	#	283	Vacunacion en el niño I
23	Miercoles	#	284	" " II
25	Viernes	#	285	" " III
28	Lunes	#	286	Algunas consideracion sobre Difteria
30	Miercoles	#	287	La Antibioterapia contribuye a disminuir las enfermedades por Rickettesias

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 11 October 1965

WPW-1018

TO: Chief, Cover

FROM: Chief, PW

SUBJECT: Request to Advise Sponsor of Discontinuation of Radio Program

Distribution
1-C/Cover
(1-SP/4
1-C/PW
1-Reg

This is to formalize a verbal request made earlier this month to Chief, Cover Branch. It would be appreciated if the Dade County Medical Association could be appriced of the fact that the radio program it overtly sponsored entitled "El Medico y Usted" has been terminated as of 30 September 1965. The program was carried on by Dr. Antonio MACEO y Mackle and was heard three times a week over WRUL and Radio Americas. The program was terminated because it was considered of marginal value in the propaganda field.

file: MACEO
B/C

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Info ROL (okay)
Maceo

SECRET

Letter to José R. VICIEDO y Bregala —
from ex-Comrades ~~[illegible]~~ — to
Manolo F. de Maciá

Lower Side above

RETIRAN DE LA VIA PUBLICA LOS VENDEDORES CLANDESTINOS

La JUCEI Municipal de La Habana está retirando y retirará de la vía pública a todos los vendedores ambulantes en carretillas, tableros o puestos fijos y en las demás formas de ejercer el comercio o la industria que actúan en forma clandestina, es decir sin la correspondiente licencia del Departamento de Ingresos de dicha JUCEI Municipal.

¿Casualidades de la vida o señal de los nuevos tiempos? . . . El central "Jaime López", cumplió cien años el viernes de la Semana de Girón . . . ¡Y es la primera vez que muele el viernes de esa semana!

En la calle Tamarindo número 28, altos, existía un salidero de agua. Acudió la ENMIU y con toda rapidez resolvió el problema. Sin embargo, como resultado de la reparación quedó afectado el techo de la casa de Tamarindo 28, bajos, residencia de Mercedes Borrás, quien reclamó el arreglo correspondiente. La respuesta de la ENMIU es que Mercedes debe pagarle a la ENMIU por reparar los daños que la ENMIU le causó en su casa.

Entonces cuando veas el salidero de tu vecino arreglar, pon tu dinero en remojo . . .

Si usted es escéptico, no lo crea, pero nosotros vimos a Evelio García, un joven comunista de la regional Jovellanos ¡alzar veinte camiones de caña —10,000 arrobas—, en treinta y nueve minutos! Al final, Evelio, auxiliado voluntariamente por Antonio Bringas, Manolo Sánchez y Rubén Llorente, alzaron 64.532 arrobas que, hasta el cierre de esta edición, es el récord nacional.

Siempre hemos dicho que esas estaciones americanas que se ponen aquí a oír a escondidas los gusanos también los va a embarcar; luego no digan que el radio los embarcó.

Badí Castro.

HOJA NO. 1. (PARA J.L.V.P.)

LA QUE SUSCRIBE ESTAS HOJAS NO ES UNA AGENTE PAGADA DEL IMPERIALISMO, NO ES MIEMBRO DE LA CIA NI ES UNA ESPIA EXTRANJERA. NO ES NI SIQUIERA UNA BURGUESA NI UNA EXLATIFUNDISTA QUE SANGRA POR LA HERIDA. ES SIMPLEMENTE UNA OBRERA. UNA OBRERA CUBANA QUE POR MOTIVOS OBVIOS OCULTA SU NOMBRE TRAS UN SEUDONIMO. NO TIENE NADA QUE TEMER PORQUE NO ESTA INVOLUCRADA EN NINGUN GRUPO CONTRA REVOLUCIONARIO PERO COMO LA VERDAD TANTO HIERE Y DUELE A LOS MENTIROSOS, NO DUDA QUE LOS MISERABLES QUE GOBIERNAN A SU PAIS, AL SABER DE QUE MANO PROVIENEN ESTAS HOJAS, TRATEN DE CORTARLA CON LA MISMA DESTREZA SINIESTRA CONQUE CERCENAN HASTA LA MAS LEVE SEÑAL DE DIGNIDAD HUMANA. Y BASTA DE PREAMBULOS. MUCHO HAY QUE DECIR Y ESCRIBIR EN FORMA DE COMBATE, A LA PEQUEÑA MEDIDA DE NUESTRO ESFUERZO PERSONAL, PARA PERDER EL TIEMPO EN PROLOGOS INUTILES QUE QUIZAS POR UN DESCUIDO PONGAN ALGUN INDICIO DELATOR EN LOS PERROS DE PRESA SI POR DESDICHA LLEGARA UNA DE ESTAS HOJAS A EXTRAVIARSE. EN FIN DE CUENTAS NO IMPORTA QUIEN ESCRIBE ESTAS PAGINAS. BASTE CON SABER QUE SON DE UNA CUBANA QUE AMA LA VERDAD Y QUE ESTA RESPLANDECE SIEMPRE POR SOBRE TODAS LAS NEGRURAS.

PRIMERO DE MAYO EN CUBA COMUNISTA. (1965)

MUCHOS SE PREGUNTAN COMO ES POSIBLE SI LA INMENSA MAYORIA DEL PUEBLO CUBANO REPUDIA EL SISTEMA TOTALITARIO Y ABUSEVO QUE POR LA FUERZA DE LAS ARMAS SE HA IMPLANTADO EN SU PAIS, PUEDA EL GOBIERNO REUNIR A TANTOS MILES DE CUBANOS EN LA PLAZA JOSE MARTI. SENCILLICIMA LA EXPLICACION. LO ABSURDO SERIA ADMITIR QUE TODOS ESOS MILES DE CUBANOS APOYAN AL GOBIERNO. VEREMOS DE QUE FORMA SE COMPONE EL DESFILE. HACIENDO UN CALCULO CONSERVADOR, EL 80 % DE LOS COMERCIOS CAPITALINOS SON ESTATALES Y MAS DE UN 90 % DE LAS INDUSTRIAS. NO PUEDE AFIRMARSE QUE LOS OBREROS DE LAS FABRICAS FUERON OBLIGADOS A DESFILAR. LAS FABRICAS SIEMPRE TIENEN UNA VENTAJA SOBRE LOS COMERCIOS DONDE SE EXPENDEN LOS ARTICULOS DE CONSUMO. SIN EMBARGO, TAMBIEN EN LAS FABRICAS TIENEN LA MINORIA DE COMUNISTAS QUE PERMANECE AL FRENTE ALGUNA ORGANIZACION PARA EL PRIMERO DE MAYO. CON EL PRETEXTO DE QUE EL DESFILE SE HACE EN FORMA DE BLOQUES Y ES NECESARIO ENSAYAR CON VARIOS DIAS DE ANTICIPACION, UN DIRIGENTE SINDICAL SE ACERCA A CADA OBRERO UNO POR UNO, Y LE PREGUNTA SI VA AL DESFILE. COMO QUE SIEMPRE LA MAYORIA ES APATICA, Y QUIEN DICE APATICA DICE CONTRARIA AL SISTEMA, SON POCOS LOS QUE CONSIGUEN PARA EL DESFILE. ESOS POCOS QUE CONQUISTAN NO ES TAMPOCO PORQUE SEAN COMUNISTAS. HAY OBREROS QUE NO PERTENECEN AL COMITE DE DEFENSA, NI A LA MILICIA, EN FIN QUE NO ESTAN INTEGRADOS A NINGUN CUERPO DE LA REVOLUCION Y POR TANTO SE DESTACAN COMO GUSANOS. COMO NO PIERDEN NADA CON DESFILAR, PIENSAN QUE CONVIENE ESTAR A BIEN CON LOS COMUNISTAS DE SU CENTRO DE TRABAJO Y UNOS POR MIEDO Y POR ADULACION OTROS SIEMPRE LOGRAN ALGUN GRUPO. SUMENSE ESOS POCOS DE CADA FABRICA Y YA TENEMOS UNOS CUANTOS. LOS DEPENDIENTES DEL COMERCIO ES DIFERENTE, A ESOS LOS OBLIGARON DESDE UNAS SEMANAS ANTES A TRABAJAR CON UN SOMBRERO DE GUANO Y UN PAÑUELO ROJO AL CUELLO. ENTONCES PARA DEVOLVER ESAS PRENDAS LES DIERON UN PAPELITO EL CUAL TENIAN QUE LLEVAR EL DIA PRIMERO....AL DESFILE Y ALLI ENTREGARLO. SIEMPRE HAY EL CORAJUDO QUE SE OPONE Y SIEMPRE HAY TAMBIEN QUIEN VA PRESO POR OPONERSE. PERO LA GRAN MAYORIA VA POR EL TEMOR QUE SE DESATA EN TODAS SUS FORMAS EN EL PAIS. YA TENEMOS OTRO GRUPO MAS NUMEROSO QUE EL PRIMERO. EL SERVIDIO MILITAR OBLIGATORIO ABARCA UNA CANTIDAD INMENSA DE JOVENES, CASI NIÑOS, OBLIGADOS NO A ESTUDIAR UNA CARRERA MILITAR SINO A TRABAJARLE AL ESTADO POR SIETE PESOS AL MES. FORMAN TAMBIEN UN ENORME GRUPO DE CUBANOS DE LOS CUALES DOS O TRES DE CADA CIEN SEAN O SIENTAL ALGUNA INCLINACION POR EL COMUNISMO. EL RESTO ESTA OBLIGADO A APLAUDIR LO QUE DESPRECIA Y A GRITAR CONSIGNAS QUE NO SIENTE. TERRIBLE TORTURA LA DE BESAR LA MANO QUE NOS OPRIME Y ACARICIAR EL PUÑAL QUE NOS DESGARRA. LOS BECADOS SON QUIZAS LA ORGANIZACION MAYOR CONQUE CUENTA EL GOBIERNO PARA LLENAR LA PLAZA. A PRIMERA VISTA PUDIERA ALGUIEN DECIR QUE UN GOBIERNO CON TANTOS JOVENES BECADOS SE PREOCUPA POR LA EDUCACION DEL PUEBLO Y

DA OPORTUNIDADES A LOS POBRES PARA QUE ESTUDIEN..UNA HOJA PROXIMA ESTARA DEDICADA A ESE TEMA.BASTE AHORA SOLO PARA DECIR QUE TRANSPORTADOS EN CAMIONES NO SOLO DE LA PROVINCIA HABANERA SINO TAMBIEN DEL INTERIOR DE LA ISLA FORMEN QUIZAS POR SI SOLOS UN GRUPO CAPAZ DE LLENAR LA PLAZA.¿CUANTOS DE ELLOS SON COMUNISTAS? SE SABE QUE MORALMENTE,LOS DESPRESTIGIOS MAYORES Y LAS MAYORES INDECENCIAS SON LAS QUE OCURREN EN LAS BECAS.SIN GENERALIZAR PUES SIEMPRE HAY HONROSAS EXCEPCIONES,EL DICHO POPULAR ES EL DE QUE LAS BECAS SON INCUBADORAS DE PROSTITUTAS Y CUEVAS DE DEGENERADOS.NO ES EXTRAÑO QUE JUVENTUDES TAN CORROMPIDAS COMO ESAS APOYEN QUIZAS EN UNA CANTIDAD CONSIDERABLE A UN GOBIERNO CORRUPTO.PERO NO.TAMPOCO EN LOS BECADOS MAYORIA LOS COMUNISTAS. LOS COMITES POR SU PARTE TIENEN TAMBIEN SU "ARRASTRE" PARA LLEVAR CIUDADANOS A ESTAS CONCENTRACIONES GUBERNAMENTALES.Y SE REPITE EL CASO DE LA COBARDIA,JUSTIFICABLE EN UN PUEBLO AVASALLADO,DEL QUE NO QUIERE SEÑALARSE ANTE EL COMITE COMO QUE NUNCA COOPERA EN NADA...Y VA AL DESFILE. COMO LA MAYORIA DEL CAMPO ES TAMBIEN NEGOCIO ESTATAL Y COMO UN PORCENTAJE TAMBIEN DE VEHICULOS DEL [illegible] DEL ESTADO,SE PONEN UNOS Y OTROS DE ACUERDO POR ORIENTACION DEL PARTIDO PARA TRANSPORTAR HACIA LA CAPITAL A UN NUMERO EXTRAORDINARIO DE OBREROS DEL AGRO.MUCHOS VAN OBLIGADOS;OTROS VAN POR VISITAR LA HABANA Y DIVERTIRSE EN EL VIAJE.PERO MUY POCOS VAN PORQUE APOYEN A LA REVOLUCION SOCIALISTA.SE SABE QUE EL MAYOR ENEMIGO QUE TIENEN LOS COMUNISTAS EN CUBA RADICA EN EL CAMPO.ES DONDE EL DESNIVEL SOCIAL SE HACE MAS PATENTE Y DONDE HAY MAS ABUSO DEL PODER Y MAS SALARIOS DE HAMBRE, DE AHI LA POCA PRODUCCION AGRARIA.SUMENSE TODA ESA CANTIDAD Y YA SE TENDRA UNOS CIENTOS DE MILES DE CUBANOS EN LA PLAZA.LOS ORGANISMOS MILITARES EN SI,EN UN PUEBLO PISOTEADO POR LA BOTA,SUMAN TAMBIEN UNA ENORME CANTIDAD QUE VA AL DESFILE,OBLIGADO AUNQUE DESDE LUEGO,MUCHISIMOS DE ESTOS VAN CON EL MEJOR DESEO.UNOS PORQUE YA ESTAN SOBRE EL BURRO Y SABEN DE LA NECESIDAD QUE TIENEN DE DARLE PALOS MAS CUANDO PRESIENTEN QUE EL BURRO PUEDE CAERSE EN CUALQUIER MOMENTO Y DAR CON ELLOS EN EL SUELO. APARTE DE TODO LO DICHO ANTERIORMENTE HAY QUE CONSIDERAR TAMBIEN QUE CUANDO EL GOBIERNO DA UN ESPECTACULO DE ESE TIPO LA CIUDAD SE PARALIZA.VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y QUIOSCOS PREPARADOS TAMBIEN AL EFECTO LOS CUALES SON DESDE LUEGO DEL ESTADO,SE CONCENTRAN ALLI.NO HAY UN REFRESCO EN TODA LA HABANA NI UN VASO DE AGUA.HAY QUE IR A LA PLAZA.LA RADIO Y LA TELEVISION SE CONECTAN EN CADENA PARA LLEVAR AL AIRE EL DESFILE.SE CIERRAN LOS CINES,CABARETS,ESPECTACULOS PUBLICOS INCLUYENDO LOS PARQUES INFANTILES.¿A DONDE IR?...AL DESFILE Y CONTEMOS TAMBIEN UNA LARGA CARAVANA ANONIMA QUE CON UNA SECRETA ESPERANZA ACUDE A LA PLAZA PENSANDO QUIZAS QUE EL DICTADOR RECTIFICARA SU POSTURA AL COMPRENDER QUE HA EMPEÑADO A LA REPUBLICA CONVIRTIENDOLA EN UNA LIMOSNERA INTERNACIONAL,PORQUE EL SISTEMA SE LE HA IDO DESINTEGRANDO EN LAS MANOS COMO SE ESCAPA UN PUÑADO DE AGUA.BUENAS GENTES SENCILLAS Y HUMILDES DEL PUEBLO QUE TODAVIA TIENEN UN POCO DE FE EN QUE EL TRAIDOR CAMBIE SU POSTURA DEVOLVIENDO LA TRANQUILIDAD PERDIDA A LA PATRIA.

ESE ES EL PRIMERO DE MAYO COMUNISTA.MENTIRA COMO TODO LO QUE SE MUEVE EN EL PAIS.PARADOJICAMENTE CELEBRAN A BOMBO Y PLATILLO EL DIA DEL OBRERO Y JAMAS EN CUBA FUE EL OBRERO MAS EXPLOTADO NI TUVO MENOS DERECHO A LA VIDA. JAMAS SE LE HABIA EXIGIDO TANTO POR TAN POCO.PERO ESE ES EL COMUNISMO. CUANDO LUCHA POR EL PODER,SE DISFRAZA DE IZQUIERDISTA.CUANDO CONQUISTA EL PODER,SE QUITA EL DISFRAZ Y LO DESTRUYE TODO.PISOTEAN TODOS LOS DERECHOS.NO RESPETAN LA MAS PEQUEÑA EXPRESION DEL PENSAMIENTO.O SE ES COMUNISTA Y SE ALABA AL REGIMEN O NO SE HABLA POR TEMOR A QUE LE TAPEN LA BOCA A UNO PARA SIEMPRE.ELLOS,ELLOS,SIEMPRE SOLO ELLOS.LOS DEMAS SON BURGUESES,O CONFUNDIDOS,O ENEMIGOS DEL PUEBLO. ¡MISERABLES!

MARIA PEREZ.

HOJA NO. 3 (PARA J.L.V.F.)

Los pueblos de América Latina tienen conciencia de sus necesidades y aspiran a desarroyar su propia economía,a desarroyar su propia riqueza. La América Latina,los latino americanos y los norteamericanos tenemos los mismos sentimientos.La América nuestra tiene un destino propio,la América nuestra tiene un rol propio,la América nuestra con sus características geográficas,con sus características espirituales,con sus características nacionales,con la idiosincrasia de nuestros pueblos,solo puede seguir un camino enteramente propio. (abril 24 de 1959) Nueva York.

Respetamos todos nuestros compromisos internacionales.No denunciaremos el pacto de defensa hemisférica,aunque no tenemos lugar donde guarecernos en caso de una guerra.(abril 18,1959) Washington.S.N.Editores Periódicos.

Yo no soy comunista ni tampoco el Movimiento,pero no tenemos que decir que somos anticomunistas para agradar al extranjero ya que solo tenemos compromisos con el pueblo de Cuba y solo tenemos que responder ante él.

La fortaleza de nuestra posición equidistante de Estados Unidos y Rusia está en la proyección revolucionaria del Gobierno,el cumplimiento de su programa revolucionario y el matenimiento de las más estrechas relaciones con los demás paises democráticos que constituyen el bloque.(enero 13.Hab.)

Yo realmente no temo caer en la órbita del comunismo internacional.¿Que estamos haciendo nosotros para defender la revolución?¿Hemos ido a buscar apoyo en el comunismo?No,hemos ido a buscar apoyo en la opinión pública de los pueblos de América,que es donde tenemos que buscar nuestra fuerza y no acudir a otras fuerzas porque eso sería una cosa absurda.(enero 22.Hab

Miedo al auge del comunismo,¿por qué?Lo que ha sobrevenido en el pais no tiene posiblemente nada que ver con esos temores.Lo que ha habido en el pais es la recuperación de las libertades públicas,la recuperación de los derechos ciudadanos,de prensa,de reunión,de escribir,de pensar y hablar... Los que hablan de democracia deben empezar por saber en que consiste el respeto a todas las ideas,a todas las creencias,en que consiste la libertad y el derecho de los demás.Si perseguimos un periódico y lo clausuramos,ah! cuando se empiece por clausurar un periódico no se podrá sentir seguro ningún diario,cuando se empiece a perseguir a un hombre por sus ideas políticas no se podrá sentir seguro nadie,cuando se empiece a hacer restricciones no se podrá sentir seguro ningún derecho.(abril 2,1959.C.M.Q.)

Respecto al comunismo,solo puedo decirles una cosa:no soy comunista ni los comunistas tienen fuerza para ser factor determinante en mi pais.(abril 18,1959.Washington,Sociedad Norteamericana de Editores de Periódicos.)

Alguna gente toma la bandera anti-comista para encubrirse y vivir de ello. No se puede combatir al comunismo en tanto se apoya a dictadores.(abril 23,Conferencia de Prensa,Nueva York)

Ahora lo que no es reaccionario es comunista.Los que buscan esas confusiones son los enemigos del pueblo.Cada pueblo tiene derecho a su propia ideología.La Revolución Cubana es tan cubana como nuestra música.(mayo 5,conferencia de prensa.Río de Janeiro,Brasil)

Yo no se si la calumnia contra nuestra Revolución de que es comunista o de que esta infiltrada de comunismo se debe unicamente al propósito de que nosotros no persigamos a los comunistas y no fusilemos a los comunistas.

Yo no se de que forma se podrán definir las ideas sobre una revolución para que no se intrigue,para que no se calumnie mas de lo que se está calumniando y para que cesen de una vez los ataques infames contra nuestra Revolución....¿Puede acusarse a nuestra Revolución de comunista?¿Pueden confundirse los ideales de nuestra Revolución?...¿ES QUE ACASO PUDIERA ALGUIEN AFIRMAR QUE LE HEMOS MENTIDO ALGUNA VEZ AL PUEBLO? ¿POR QUE CUANDO DECIMOS QUE NUESTRA REVOLUCION NO ES COMUNISTA,POR QUE CUANDO PROBAMOS QUE NUESTROS IDEALES SE APARTAN DE LA DOCTRINA COMUNISTA....POR QUE ENTONCES ESE EMPEÑO DE ACUSAR A NUESTRA REVOLUCION DE LO QUE NO ES?(mayo 8.Hab.)

Cuando se suprime un derecho se termina por suprimir todos los derechos, desoyendo la democracia.Las ideas se defienden con razones.No con las armas. Soy un amante de la democracia.(enero 7,Declaración de Prensa.Habana)

...Y aunque sea en una esquina,y donde lo oigan 20 personas si no lo pueden oir 100,ese hombre pueda expresar su pensamiento.Y si quiere sacar en mimeógrafo una tesis política,que la imprima y la reparta en la Universidad, sin que se lo lleven a la estación de policía..La teoría político filosófica es aquella (ideal)que le da al hombre todas las libertades y además le proporciona las satisfacciones de orden material.Esa es nuestra doctrina revolucionaria.Todo lo demás,¿quiere que le diga lo que es?Pretextos.(abril 2,Ante la Prensa.C.M.Q.)

DESEAMOS ESTABLECER EN CUBA UNA VERDADERA DEMOCRACIA,SIN TRAZO ALGUNO DE FASCISMO,PERONISMO O COMUNISMO.ESTAMOS EN CONTRA DE TODA CLASE DE TOTALITARISMO.(Conferencia de Prensa.N.Y.abril 23)

...porque los pueblos de América no quieren ni libertad sin pan,ni pan sin libertad(Buenos Aires. mayo 2)Conferencia Econom.Interamericana.

No queremos tener conflictos con el capital sea cubano o no.Al contrario, lo que queremos es protegerlo,dirigirlo hacia industrias productivas y no que se invierta en casas ni solares.Para industrializar el pais,para desarroyo,necesitamos la ayuda de los capitalistas cubanos,que conocen el asunto,que son los técnicos de inversiones.(abril 26.Montreal,Canadá.Prensa)

YO HE VENIDO AQUI PARA CONTESTAR A LA PRENSA LIBRE;PORQUE LO PRIMERO QUE HACEN LOS DICTADORES ES ACABAR CON LA PRENSA LIBRE,PORQUE NO HAY DICTADURA QUE SOPORTE UNA PRENSA LIBRE,QUE ES LA PRIMERA ENEMIGA DE LOS DICTADORES.¡ESE ES EL PRIMER ERROR QUE COMETEN LAS DICTADURAS!abril 18,Was.)

Se han mencionado maniobras sospechosas de ejército político.QUIERO ADVERTIR AL PUEBLO,A LAS MADRES,PARA RESOLVER TODOS LOS PROBLEMAS SIN DERRAMAR UNA SOLA GOTA DE SANGRE MAS.POR CULPA NUESTRA NO HABRA UNA SOLA GOTA DE SANGRE DERRAMADA EN CUBA.(enero 8,Columbia.Habana)

Cuando hagamos elecciones dentro de un par de años,tendremos menos votos que ahora.¿A quien le conviene posponer la elecciones?(abril 16,Canadá)

ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC. ETC.

No.Lo escrito anteriormente no es la reproducción del discurso de algún millonario,de un latifundista,de un politiquero,de un periodista vendido a los Estados Unidos para hacerlo mala propaganda al comunismo internacional.Son trozos tomados de los discursos pronunciados por Fidel.Por aquel Fidel que bajó de la montaña acompañado de una aureola de libertad. Por aquel Fidel que fue la esperanza de un pueblo avasallado por el oprobio de una de las dictadura mas sanguinarias que asoló a América.Es la síntesis del joven gobernante,es el idealismo vivo de quin luchó una vez porque su pueblo conquistara la libertad y el decoro perdidos por la ambición y el abuso del poder.¡Bella fraseología de un moderno Tartufo del siglo 20! ¡Canto de sirenas que el pueblo,-Ulises sin precaución-,creyó y siguió al pie de la letra para despertar demasiado tarde ante una de las traiciones mas grandes que registra la historia del mundo! Repetir hoy en Cuba sus propias palabras,equivale a la muerte.Pensar hoy como pensó Fidel en los primeros dos años de su gobierno,es ser enemigo del pueblo,es tener alma burguesa,es traicionar a los trabajadores,es el delito mas grande que puede cometerse hoy en Cuba.¡Cuántos no guardan prisión y cuántos no yacen bajo tierra por haber cometido el error de seguir siendo fidelista!Por eso para su pueblo,ya no es Fidel:Ahora es Castro.El señor Castro.El dictador Castro.El miserable Castro!

María Pérez.

HOJA NO. 4

EL PERIODICO PALANTE Y PALANTE,SI NO CAMBIA SU FORMA DE ESCRIBIR SERA RETIRADO DE LA CIRCULACION EN CUALQUIER MOMENTO.¿Y POR QUE-SE PREGUNTARA EL QUE NO ESTE AL TANTO DE LAS COSAS-POR QUE QUITARAN ESE PERIODICO QUE TAMBIEN ES COMUNISTA PERO PERO DE GENERO SATIRICO? PARECE QUE A PESAR DE SER COMUNISTAS TODOS SUS INTEGRANTES,DE OTRA FORMA NO PODRIAN ESCRIBIR EN EL NI EN NINGUN OTRO PERIODICO,EL HECHO DE TENER QUE LLEVAR SEMANALMENTE CHISTES A LA CIUDADANIA LES HA OBLIGADO A HACER CHISTES A VECES A FORMA DE CRITICA A ALGUNAS COSAS DE LA REVOLUCION.PERO AL COMUNISMO NO SE LE PUEDE ATACAR NI DE LA MEJOR BUENA FE AUNQUE SEA CON EL CHISTE MAS SANO DE ALGUN COMUNISTA QUE VE COSAS MAL S Y CREE QUE CRITICANDOLAS PUEDE ARREGLARLAS,SIN DARSE CUENTA QUE LO MALO VIENE APAREJADO CON EL SISTEMA.CONJUNTAMENTE CON ESTA HOJA VAN UNOS RECORTES DE PERIODICO DE PALANTE Y PALANTE.VEASE EL DE LA CALLE TAMARINDO .UNA EMPRESA ESTATAL AL RESOLVER EL PROBLEMA DEL VECINO LE OCASIONA OTRO PROBLEMA AL DE AL LADO.Y ESE DE AL LADO TIENE QUE PAGARLE AL GOBIERNO PORQUE EL GOBIERNO LE ARREGLE LO QUE EL PROPIO GOBIERNO ROMPIO.Y EN ESE RECORTE NO SE AÑADE QUE LA EMPRESA COBRA POR ADELANTADO Y DE CONTADO A PRECIOS ELEVADISIMOS Y QUE DESPUES DE COBRAR DEMORA MESES ENTEROS EN VENIR A HACER LA REPARACION.PERO ,¿QUE HACER? ¿A QUIEN ACUDIR EN UN PAIS DONDE HAY UN SOLO PATRON Y ES POR AÑADIDURA EL MAS EXPLOTADOR DE LOS PATRONES? HAY TAMBIEN EL CHISTE QUE NO ES CHISTE.ES DECIR,LA NOTICIA SERIA QUE POR PUBLICARLA ELLOS COMO SERIA YA QUE SALE TAMBIEN PUBLICADA EN LOS DEMAS DIARIOS COMO UN EJEMPLO DE LA "NUEVA CUBA",RESULTA SER LA MAS CHISTOSA DE TODAS.COMO POR EJEMPLO EL CASO DE ESE JOVEN COMUNISTA((TENIA QUE SER) QUE ALZO CON SUS MANOS NADA MENOS QUE DIEZ MIL ARROBAS DE CAÑA EN 39 MINUTOS.ES DECIR,LLENO VEINTE CAMIONES A ESCASAMENTE DOS MINUTOS POR CAMION.Y DAN EL NOMBRE Y EL LUGAR DEL JOVEN QUE REALIZO TAL HAZAÑA.ESAS MENTIRAS DESCARADAS ES LA QUE DISGUSTA A LOS PROPIOS COMUNISTAS QUE SON MAS COMEDIDOS EN SU CREENCIA POLITICA PERO SON TAMBIEN LAS MENTIRAS QUE LES SIRVE DE ALICIENTE AL PUEBLO SUFRIDO PARA REIR ALGO TAMBIEN DE VEZ EN CUANDO. Y EL CASO DEL CENTRAL AZUCARERO QUE ESTE AÑO TRABAJO EL VIERNES SANTO POR PRIMER VEZ EN SU HISTORIA Y CUMPLIA ESE VIERNES 100 AÑOS DE CONSTRUIDO.ELLOS DICEN LA SEMANA DE LA VICTORIA DE GIRON PORQUE ESTE AÑO NO HUBO EN CUBA SEMANA SANTA.CASTIGARON A LOS QUE POR SU FE RELIGIOSA NO FUERON A TRABAJAR Y SACARON EN MUCHISIMOS PUEBLOS DE CAMPO,EN AQUELLOS DONDE LA FE RELIGIOSA SE HACE MAS PATENTE,CONGAS CALLEJERAS A CANTAR Y EMBORRACHARSE POR LAS CALLES EN UNA ABSURDA PROVOCACION QUE LO UNICO QUE HACE ES ACRECENTAR MAS EL ODIO EN EN UN PUEBLO QUE POR TRADICION ES NETAMENTE CATOLICO.ASI ES COMO LOSCOMUNISTAS GARANTIZAN LA LIBERTAD,EL RESPETO A LAS CREENCIAS AJENAS,Y EL DERECHO DE LOS DEMAS A PENSAR CON SU CABEZA. SI.EN CUBA HAY UNA REPRESION VIOLENTISIMA CONTRA TODO LO QUE NO SEA COMUNISMO.HAY QUE PENSAR COMO UN COMUNISTA O NO PENSAR.POR SUERTE LOS GASES INTESTINALES SON INCOLOROS. DE TENER COLOR TENIAN QUE SER NECESARIAMENTE ROJOS....O PADECER DE DOLOR DE ESTOMAGO. PERO NO OBSTANTE LA REPRESION,NO OBSTANTE QUE NO PERMITAN LA MAS LEVE CORRIENTE EN EL PAIS NO COMUNISTA,PARA UN BUEN OBSERVADOR SIEMPRE SE VE ALGO QUE ELLOS PRETENDEN OCULTAR O QUE NO PUEDEN.POR EJEMPLO,EL CASO DEL JOVEN QUE VENDE REVISTAS VIEJAS EN UN LUGAR DE LA HABANA Y TIENE UN LETRERO QUE DICE:HAY BOHEMIAS DEL 46,47 HASTA EL 58.¿POR QUE NO HAY BOHEMIAS DE EPOCAS POSTERIORES AL TRIUNFO DE LA REVOLUCION? ES PELIGROSO VENDERLAS PORQUE SON SUBVERSIVAS.¿Y POR QUE SON SUBVERSIVAS? QUIENES ERAN LOS QUE ATACABAN AL COMUNISMO?QUIENES ERAN LOS AGENTES DEL IMPERIALISMO QUE APROVECHABAN EL CAMBIO DE PODERES PARA ATACAR AL COMUNISMO EN CUBA EN AQUELLA EPOCA? UNO DE LOS PRINCIPALES ANTICOMUNISTAS ERA EL SEÑOR FIDEL CASTRO.Y ESAS BOHEMIAS ESTAN LLENAS DE DISCURSOS INDISCUTIBLEMENTE BELLOS QUE FUERON LA TRAMPA EN LA QUE CAYO EL PUEBLO.

MARIA PEREZ.

LA NOTICIA SALIO EN TODOS LOS PERIODICOS HABANEROS. PARECIA UNA INOCENTE NOTICIA DE ORGANIZACION ."SE IRAN DE LA VIA PUBLICA LOS VENDEDORES CLANDESTINOS." MAS ABAJO EXPLICARA QUE LA JUCEI(JUNTA CENTRAL DE COORDINACION EJECUCION E INSPECCION)RETIRARA DE LA VIA PUBLICA A LOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y AUN A LOS QUE TENIAN PUESTOS FIJOS SIN LA CORRESPONDIENTE LICENCIA. HASTA AHI CORRECTO.LOS DEBERES CIUDADANOS CONLLEVAN TAMBIEN LA NECESIDAD DE PAGAR LOS IMPUESTOS CORRESPONDIENTES POR TODO EL DINERO QUE SE PERCIBE.OCURRE EN TODOS LOS PUEBLOS DEL MUNDO.AH! PERO FALTABA ALGO.¿POR QUE ESOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES NO PAGAN LOS IMPUESTOS? ¿HAY ALGUIEN TAN LOCO PARA TRABAJAR POR CUENTA PROPIA SIN LEGALIZAR SU OFICIO U OCUPACION EN UN PAIS DONDE LA POLICIA SIN MANDAMIENTO JUDICIAL INVADE CUALQUIER CASA Y DECOMIZA TODO LO QUE QUIERE COMO PAGO A UN SUPUESTO DELITO? ENTRE LOS VENDEDORES AMBULANTES Y DE PUESTO FIJO A LOS QUE SE REFIERE EL PERIODICO,ESTAN INCLUIDOS TODOS LOS DESEMPLEADOS QUE AL NO TENER TRABAJO SE BUSCAN LA VIDA COMO VULGARMENTE SE DICE EN TODO LO QUE PUEDAN.YA DE POR SI ESA ES UNA TAREA ARDUA Y PESADA YA QUE NO HAY NADA QUE VENDER EN UN PAIS DONDE LAS GRANDES TIENDAS SE ESTAN QUEDANDO CON SUS VIDRIERAS VACIAS.
EN ELLOS ESTAN INCLUIDOS LOS GRANIZADEROS,VENDEDORES DE DULCES DE FABRICACION CASERA,LO CUAL ES YA UNA HEROICIDAD POR LA FALTA DE AZUCAR,LOS VENDEDORES DE REVISTAS COMUNISTAS QUE OBTIENEN PORQUE ELLOS MISMOS SE LAS DAN, LOS VENDEDORES DE LIBROS VIEJOS?Y GRACIAS QUE [illegible] NO LOS HAN EXTERMINADO AUN YA QUE ES LO UNICO QUE PUEDE LEERSE HOY EN DIA EN CUBA?ETC. Y AHORA PREGUNTARA EL LECTOR,¿BUENO,Y POR QUE NO SE LEGALIZAN? SENCILLAMENTE PORQUE ESA MISMA JUCEI MUNICIPAL QUE LOS MANDA A RETIRAR DE LA VIA PUBLICA SE NIEGA A LEGALIZARLOS.ES DECIR,ES DELITO NO PAGAR IMPUESTOS A LA NACION PERO LA NACION NO ACEPTA QUE SE LE PAGUEN LOS IMPUESTOS.ESOS INFELICES ESTAN CONDENADOS A LA MISERIA PORQUE TAMPOCO SE LE OFRECE UN TRABAJO.
¿DE QUE FORMA PODRIA OFRECERLES EL GOBIERNO UN TRABAJO,CUANDO HAY UN SINNUMERO DE FABRICAS PARALIZADAS POR FALTA DE MATERIAS PRIMAS? EN MUCHOS CASOS TIENEN QUE SUBSIDIAR A LOS OBREROS POR NO TENER DONDE COLOCARLOS. EL DESEMPLEO AUMENTA Y COMO CONTRADICCION A ESE DESEMPLEO SE LE CIERRA LA PEQUEÑA FUENTE INGRESOS QUE PUEDA TENER ALGUN PADRE DE FAMILIA AL TRABAJAR POR CUENTA PROPIA PARA MANTENER A SU FAMILIA.Y LA DESESPERACION QUE ESAS INJUSTAS MEDIDAS OCASIONAN.NO HAY UN TRIBUNAL,(TODOS SON COMUNISTAS)QUE LO AMPARE Y LO DEFIENDA.LOS ABOGADOS HONRADOS QUE NO QUISIERON AMPARAR ESOS DESMANES DE UN GOBIERNO TOTALITARIO HACE YA MUCHO QUE SE MARCHARON DEL PAIS.NO TIENE ESE POBRE HOMBRE DE LA CALLE A QUIEN ACUDIR. SOLO SABE QUE POR TRATAR DE LLEVARLE UN PEDAZO DE PAN A SUS HIJOS ES PERSEGUIDO Y ACORRALADO. ¿Y POR QUE LA JUCEI NO LOS LEGALIZA? COMO LA ESCASEZ DE TODAS LAS COSAS ES SUMAMENTE GRANDE,CADA VEZ QUE SE LEGALICE A UN VENDEDOR AMBULANTE,AL TENER SU PATENTE FISCAL PUEDE DIRIGIRSE A LOS COMERCIOS ESTATALES EN BUSCA DE MATERIAS PRIMAS PARA SU OCUPACION.Y LA MISERIA QUE TIENEN ESAS TIENDAS ES TAN GRANDE QUE YA POCO PUEDEN RESOLVER NADA.POR EJEMPLO.UN GRANIZADERO QUE TRABAJA POR LA LIBRE,PAGA EL AZUCAR A SOBRE PRECIO PARA VENDER GRANIZADOS.SIEMPRE GANA ALGO A PESAR DE ESO. PERO AL LEGALIZARLO LA JUCEI TENDRIA QUE GARANTIZARLE UNA CUOTA DE AZUCAR CADA CIERTO TIEMPO PARA QUE EJERZA SU TRABAJO.¿Y DE DONDE LA SACA SI EN ESTA ISLITA MARAVILLOSA LOS COMUNISTAS HAN ACABADO HASTA CON EL AZUCAR, LA CUAL ERA EL ARTICULO MAS ABUNDANTE QUE EXISTIA EN EL PAIS? Y CON LOS DEMAS VENDEDORES PASA IGUAL.NO LE PODEMOS GARANTIZAR NADA Y POR TANTO NO TRABAJEN.MUERANSE DE HAMBRE,QUE YA NOSOTROS NOS ESTAMOS MURIENDO DE RABIA AL VER QUE TODO ES BASURA.ESE ES EL PENSAMIENTO QUE NO DICEN PERO QUE LOS COMUNISTAS MAS INTELIGENTES TIENEN QUE EXPRESAR EN SU FUERO INTERNO.NO HAY DUDAS.SI ESPAÑA QUIERE CARECER DE CHORIZOS Y VINO;SUIZA DE RELOJES;HOLANDA DE QUESO;VENEZUELA DE PETROLEO Y MEJICO DE PLATA,NO TIENEN QUE HACER MAS QUE UNA COSA:VUELVANSE COMUNISTAS!

MARIA PEREZ.

Hoja No.6

Una mujer cubana,Martha Gonzales,ha publicado un libro en Cuba que ha tenido un notable éxito de librería.Su título:Bajo Palabra.Relata en él como se desarroya la vida en Miami.Ella era una exilada que retornó a su patria al encontrarse inconforme con su exilio.Estas hojas que también las escribe una mujer cubana,que también se encuentra inconforme pero de vivir en su patria la cual se ha convertido en una cárcel y que por tanto no tiene la suerte de Marhta de poder escoger,quizás sirvan un día para ripostar ese famoso libro.No han sido escritas estas hojas con el afán de publicación y eso se nota al ver el descuido o la necesidad de pasar inadvertido del amigo gusano que me hace el favor de pasármelas a máquina,ya que ese trabajo se hace en una oficina estatal y en horas de trabajo.Es un riesgo necesario de correr.Pero aunque no han sido escritas con ese afán,repito, quien sabe si alguna imprenta no dudaría en publicarlas al ser unas hojas que llegan desde Cuba,escritas por una cubana que ama la verdad y aunque a veces se exalta por el odio trata en todo momento de ser lo mas objetiva posible.

Conferencia televisada.

Aunque el título dice "conferencia",fue mas bien una charla como advirtio la actriz Consuelito Vidal,ya que ella y dos hombres mas,charlaron durante un rato con Martha Gonzáles el 25 de mayo de 1965 por la televisión de Cuba.Fuí a casa de una amiga esa noche a ver el programa y trataré de escribir las conclusiones sacadas. La primera conclusión es que no fue preparada por el partido o núcleo del partido comunista de C.M.Q.Dicha comparecencia.Ellos cuidan mucho la propaganda y se vio soltura en la Sra. Martha al hablar.Se vio muy bien que venía de un país donde la libertad de expresión aún para los extranjeros es un derecho que nadie puede coartar, y en cosas que dijo,se notó la contradicción con lo que afirma la propaganda comunista hoy en Cuba.Alguien ha de pagar ese error y Martha empezará poco a poco a darse cuenta de lo que es el comunismo. Dijo Martha que en Miami habían construido un reparto multifamiliar muy económico llamado"Pastorita".Se ve la ironía de darle ese nombre,ya que al empezar el gobierno revolucionario en Cuba,tomó Pastora Núñez la responsabilidad de las viviendas por medio del sorteo semanal de la lotería nacional.Al convertirse la revolución,por obra y gracia del dictador Castro en comunista,aquello pasó a ser un"sueño de una noche de verano" y hoy los cubanos sufren la escasez mas grande de vivienda con la cual se han enfrentado a través de toda su historia y el mismo Castro ha dicho que por lo menos 25 años se necesitan para resolver ese problema.Aparte de que él no consideró el aumento de la población dentro de un cuarto de siglo. Habla Martha de que le molestaba la igualdad conque se trataba a todos los exilados. No es acaso la igualdad lo que mas predican los comunistas,aunque no la ejerzan en la práctica?¿Donde hay igualdad entonces?-Dice que los cubanos en Miami insultan a los norteamericanos,discuten con ellos de política en las esquinas y que le tenían un formidable odio a Kennedy cuando este vivía llegando incluso muchos a emborracharse cuando lo asesinaron y brindar por su muerte.¿Quien se atreve hoy en Cuba a manifestar siquiera una sonrisa porque al dictador le duela una muela? Donde radica entonces la libertad? Habla de la delincuencia en Miami,bolita, charada,robo,inmoralidad,etc.pero también alude a los castigo policiales, por tanto,no ocurren estas cosas con el beneplácito del gobierno de norteamérica.En Cuba sin embargo,lo que no se puede es ser contrarrevolucionario. Son muy benignoscon la delincuencia y el asesinato,cuando no es por motivos políticos,apenas se le castiga.Hay quien no ha cumplido ni un año de cárcel por matar a otro por manifestarse como comunista y hacerle el juego al gobierno. Agrega Martha que da lástima ver a los niños separados de sus padres cuando estos por temor a la bola de la ley de la Patria Potestad,los enviaron a los Estados Unidos.Claro,cuando aquello,los padres y madres cubanos ignoraban que los comunistas no necesitaban mandar a los niños a Rúsia o China ya que iban a cambiar toda la educación en las escuelas,las cuales iban a convertirse en centros de patria tanto comunista. Explica ella el plan llevado a cabo en Florida City, en la que a unos buenos matrimonios los matrimonios que toman en el hogar niños cubanos, para que estos no pierdan el calor del hogar y dice además que ella jamás haría un trabajo de esa naturaleza. Desde luego, se necesita tener un gran sentido humano y un gran amor y comprensión por esos niños para realizar tal tarea. Añade Martha que la juventud vive errante y carece de ideales por estar desarraigada de su patria y precisamente, lo que más vuelve patriota al hombre es la nostalgia de su suelo natal. Martí fue desterrado a los 16 años y fue esa ausencia lo que más hizo y formó el carácter de Martí como cubano. Habla también de que las cosas se adquieren a plazos. Sí, Cuba también era así antes. Podía el pobre por ese sistema tener refrigerador, televisor, muebles, etc. Ahora, cuestan todas esas cosas hasta 5 veces por encima de su valor, hay que pagarlas de contado siendo además de muy baja calidad. Sin contar que de tres años a esta parte, el que tiene un artículo eléctrico anotado en la libreta no puede coger otro. El que adquirió hace tres años una olla de presión, no puede adquirir ahora un radio o un ventilador, o una batidora o un toca-discos etc. Pero es el caso que aunque pudiera adquirir cualquiera de estas cosas, tampoco las hay en el mercado. O sea, el que plancha no se echa fresco ni oye radio ni cocina en olla de presión etc. Alega Martha que en Miami está autorizado el bofetón y el cocotazo en las escuelas como castigo a los niños. En Cuba no son tan benignos. Simplemente, el estudiante que no hace trabajo voluntario, o sea, que no le trabaja gratis al gobierno cierto tiempo, está obligado a repetir un cursillo en la época del verano aunque haya aprobado todas sus asignaturas. Agrega la escritora de Bajo Palabra, que Fidel es cosa importante entre los exilados ya que éstos van a veces hasta Cayo Hueso para verlo por televisión ya que no les basta con oirlo. Y yo me pregunto: Es que los imperialistas permiten eso? Porque los comunistas hablan de libertad en Cuba y hay que oir La Voz de los Estados Unidos a escondidas ya que eso es un grave delito. Y la mayoría del pueblo la oye a escondidas a pesar de que Raúl dijera en una ocasión: "Siempre hemos dicho que esos cabeciones americanos que se ponen aquí a oir a escondidas los gusanos también los va a embarcar; luego no digan que el radio los embarcó." También dice Martha que los exilados se orientan por lo que dice Fidel y que a veces hace algo y ellos afirman que eso lo había dicho Fidel en el 59. Claro, aquí Martha comete un lamentable error. En el 59, Fidel era nacionalista y anticomunista. Véase la hoja no.3. Dice que la mayoría de los cubanos se fueron con la idea de regresar a su patria, la cual añoran y no se acaban de acostumbrar a aquella vida. Eso, dicho en buena lógica, sitúa a los exilados cubanos como patriotas que huyeron de Cuba por culpa de la dictadura comunista, pero que siguen siendo cubanos y no han mixtificado su criterio como tales. Habla del trabajo el cual es esporádico, mal pagado y sin garantías. En la Cuba actual, esta 5ta. zafra del pueblo como los comunistas le llaman, la han hecho prácticamente los gusanos. Han cerrado fábricas y los han obligado a cortar caña y ellos han tenido que ir para no perder su empleo en un país donde no hay otro medio de vida que la que el gobierno totalitario ofrece. Dice de casos de médicos que limpian pisos pero agrega que para ejercer en los E.U. necesitan pasar por lo menos tres años, dando cursillos de inglés y de medicina internados, lo cual supone que le den también los alimentos, y que además les pagan hasta 200 dólares mensuales. Veo muy natural y JUSTA esa medida. Las condiciones climatológicas son diferentes y la medicina no es igual. Si para revalidar el título en el extranjero le dan esas oportunidades al médico cubano, es digno de agradecerle al gobierno de los E.U. tal actitud. En Cuba el que estudia medicina se recibe de médico ganando mucho menos y está obligado a ejercer un largo tiempo en las lejanas montañas, hambreado y maltratado y después de esa etapa, no puede poner consultorio propio y tiene que trabajar donde el estado esclavista le ordene. Pero hay un caso curioso. Dijo Martha: "Mi estancia en Canadá y después EVENTUALMENTE EN CUBA" ¿Ya piensa en marcharse? Creo que si es una mujer honrada, su mejor libro va a ser el que publique hablando de la vida en Cuba. Cuando le preguntaron su impresión, no dio a entender nada definitivo. Pronto se dará cuenta que ha cambiado, como vulgarmente se dice, la vaca por la chiva.

María Pérez.



1965

13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL



Cuba
correos
24 de abril
dia del
sello
1962
13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL



Cuba
correos
24 de abril
dia del
sello
1965
13c

[illegible]

VIA AEREA AIR-MAIL



ANA
1965

Cuba
correos
24 de abril
dia del
sello
1965
13c

[illegible]

Benson
Sen: Ferro

Relatives of Dr. .

Can Spain assist with visas?

Carlos Miguel Pelaez Pereira
Habana, Cuba, Agosto 27, 1927

Concepcion Maria de la Caridad Casanova del Castillo
Habana, Cuba, Setiembre 21. 19[illegible]

Jacqueline Azucena Pelaez Casanova
Habana, Cuba, Febrero [illegible], 19[illegible]

Concepcion Dolores del Castillo Llanes
Guira de Melena, Enero 10,1900

Francisco Julio Lozano Garcia
Las Villas, Mayo [illegible], 1931

Todos viven en: Conde Pareles # 28
Madrid 13, Spain.

Ramon Guzman Montes (85 yrs

Puerto Cortés

Honduras

Gave idea on how fight C.P.

(9-15-65, 300)

Pongamos Fin al Comunismo en Cuba.

La Organización de Estados Americanos está obligada por la Doctrina Monroe y por Pactos Interamericanos a poner fin prontamente el Comunismo en Cuba, bloqueando totalmente la isla, sin vacilación ni temor, con la certidumbre de que Rusia ni China se atreverán a romper el bloqueo; y si lo intentaran, y eso originara la guerra nuclear, (no la Tercera Guerra Mundial internacional, que no la habrá) para nosotros sería mucho mejor, porque en corto tiempo aquellas dos naciones serían aniquiladas, y no habría más tirantez internacional, porque nuestros ejércitos no saldrían de Rusia hasta que nos hubiéremos reembolsado todo lo que nos debe, más los gastos y daños de guerra, inclusive indemnización por nuestros muertos en ella, y heridos; y restauraríamos a Chiang Kai-Shek en la China continental.- Así deben hablar, con altivez y valentía, los grandes voceros de las naciones libres, si quieren que haya paz, libertad y justicia, que sólo pueden mantenerse por el imperio de la fuerza, que es el único medio para someter a los perversos, con los cuales no hay que tener compasión.- Así también se afirmarán los vacilantes que, lógicamente, quieren lo seguro.

Sólo a las Embajadas acreditadas en La Habana se permitirá importar lo que necesitan para su subsistencia, previo registro en los E. U., y sacar a sus connacionales por la misma vía, para registrarlos minuciosamente.-

Rusia no se atrevería a romper el bloqueo, por lo cual quedaría muy mal parada en el concierto internacional, en tanto que las naciones libres elevarían mucho sus valores.- Entonces podríamos aplastar en pocas horas al Vietnam del Norte por un ataque nuclear aterrador, si no se rindiere incondicionalmente dentro de diez horas contadas desde la intimación.- Así lo requieren las vidas de nuestros conciudadanos y los intereses de nuestros países que se están disipando insensatamente en una guerra de guerrillas como quiere el Comunismo agresor.

Debe garantizarse la vida de Fidel Castro y de sus compinches, quienes, antes que transcurran cuatro meses desde el bloqueo, se asilarán en las Embajadas, excepto la de Rusia y la de China, porque en ellas podrían ser asesinados para q que no revelen sus maquinaciones diabólicas, repletas de hipocresía y de maldad, contra el mundo libre encabezado por Estados Unidos.- Ya seguro en una Embajada, Fidel Castro depositaría el Poder en un grupo de Embajadores, (ninguno comunista) para que prontamente lo traspase a una Comisión nombrada por la OEA, (ningún miembro cubano) la cual organizaría una Policía Panamericana, excepto cubanos, y pondría en libertad a los reos políticos que prometan no ejercer venganzas ni causar disturbios. so pena de ser confinados en campos de aconcentración. Con igual promesa regresarán los cubanos que quieran. La Comisión nombraría inmediatamente un Presidente provisional de la República que organizaría su Gabinete y convocaría a elección de Diputados a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente tan pronto como haya decretado la Ley de Elecciones y preparado los proyectos de Constitución Política de la República y de otras leyes que la Constituyente ha de decretar, sin perjuicio del derecho de iniciativa propia de cada Diputado.- También organizará la Administración Pública, excepto los servicios militares y de Policía que continuarán a cargo de la Comisión de la OEA, hasta que tome posesión de su cargo el Presidente Constitucional de la República.

Por la Declaración de Lima, 1938, los Estados signatarios pactaron su solidaridad en el caso de cualquier intervención extranjera; en la Declaración de La Habana, 1940, se proclamó que cualquier acción por parte de un estado no americano en contra de la integridad e inviolabilidad del territorio, la soberanía o la independencia política de un estado americano, sería considerado como un acto de agresión contra los Estados signatarios; en la Conferencia de Río Janeiro, 1947, se acordó un tratado de defensa y ayuda mutua entre los países americanos; y, la Carta de Bogotá,1948, condenó, por su carácter intervencionista, la actividad política del Comunismo Internacional, y demás doctrinas totalitarias, por considerarlas incompatibles con el concepto de las libertades americanas.

Ninguna de esas obligaciones ha cumplido la OEA porque está acobardada por las amenazas y difamaciones de Rusia y de Fidel Castro, quien, a gritos, ha llamado lacayos del Imperialismo Yankee a los Presidentes latinoamericanos, y Ministerio de Colonias del mismo Imperialismo, a la OEA, escarneciéndolos despectivamente.

Hay intervención extranjera en Cuba, que de hecho es una colonia de Rusia que, como metrópoli del Comunismo Mundial, ha amenazado a cualquier país que ataque a Cuba; Nada se ha hecho en su defensa contra el dominio soviético, ni siquiera se ha dado la menor ayuda, fuera de vanas palabras, a los cubanos libres para redimir a su Patria; la soberanía de Cuba, que reside esencialmente en el pueblo libre, dejó de existir totalmente, pues allá no hay más voluntad que la del Amo y Señor Fidel Castro, siervo dócil del Kremlin.- Es risible, si no fuese hipocrecía, que algún Estado Americano, desleal a la Magna Organización, invoque, respecto a las sanciones contra Cuba, el principio de no intervención por su respeto a la autodeterminación de los pueblos, la cual está, no en el traidor Fidel Castro,(él no es el pueblo de Cuba) sino en los cubanos libres que han logrado escapar del infernal Comunismo imperante en Cuba, y en los que, en la isla, unos gimen en prisiones, y otros están amenazados a presidio o muerte por sus anhelos de libertad.- Por tanto, cualquier Estado que no quiera cumplir sus obligaciones contraídas en virtud de la Carta Magna de la OEA, debe ser expulsado de su seno y privado de las relaciones diplomáticas, comerciales, turísticas y culturales con los Estados leales.- Tal resolución es necesaria para mantener la dignidad y disciplina de tan alta Corporación polílítica; pues toda asociación restringe, necesariamente, uno o más derechos de cada uno de sus miembros, en cambio de otros mayores y más provechosos.- Y todos los americanos, desde Alaska hasta Patagonia, nos sentiríamos grandemente orgullosos de nuestra OEA, por preferir un posible sacrificio humano al de nuestra dignidad, que debe estar por encima de toda vileza, y que el Comunismo Internacional ha escarnecido y continúa escarneciendo ignominiosamente con sus difamaciones y amenazas a lo Ginés de Pasamonte.

El Comunismo en Cuba, que tan brutalmente ha herido y continúa quebrantando a los ciudadanos de mayor cultura y de más altos ideales, no es un problema que incumba únicamente a los dignos hijos de la Perla Antillana; no es un caso que ataña solamente a los corajudos adalides del continente colombino; el embrollo turbulento de Cuba -y el de Vietnam- es el conflicto entre el Comunismo agresor y el Capitalismo constructor, conflicto que interesa a todos los hombres con anhelos de libertad y justicia, más aún a los que están subyugados por los oligarcas del Comunismo, y que deliran por su liberación que, para lograrla, a veces encaran la muerte en un doloroso viacrucis.- Esos pocos hombres,

-los jerarcas del Comunismo- archimaestros del engaño, audaces y despiadados, tienen sometidos por el terror y el engaño a todos los que, dentro de sus dominios, no se solidarizan con ellos en el mantenimiento de su despotismo atroz; y tienen minadas todas las naciones libres con sus quinta-columnas y maleantes intensamente infiltrados en todas las esferas gubernativas, radio y prensa, que desvían el criterio del pueblo, le infunden miedo, y lo indisponen contra su Gobierno, los cuales debeis denunciar públicamente como agentes comunistas. Toda su saña la descargan contra Estados Unidos, que es Cabeza del Capitalismo, el país que arrulló en su cuna al gran Jorge Washington, y tantos paladines de la libertad y de la justicia, que ahora se avergonzarían de sus modernos compatriotas por su pusilanimidad ante el espantajo moscovita, pues sufren acobardados tanta humillación y ultraje de Rusia que ha escarnecido vilipendiosamente la sacrosanta Doctrina Monroe, que otrora fuera orgullo del pueblo americano y sólido bastión de América Latina contra la codicia y agresión del Viejo Mundo.- Ahora yace, esa Doctrina, como trapo de inmundicia pisoteada y escarnecida por el Comunismo conculcador.- ¡Qué vergüenza para los altivos constructores de la gran Nación del Mundo! Despertad dignos hijos de América y exigid a gritos a la Organización de Estados Americanos el inmediato bloqueo total de Cuba, y que se advierta claramente a Rusia que no le tememos, y que será abatido cualquier avión y hundido cualquier submarino o barco que intente violar el bloqueo; y que, si quiere la guerra nuclear, le dan la ventaja de empezarla ya, pero que la represalia será sin misericordia, hasta subyugarla totalmente.- Eso debeis hacer también por la prensa y radio de toda la Nación, con la certidumbre de vencer; y pronto habrá paz, libertad y justicia en todo el mundo, porque Rusia quedaría sin la menor influencia internacional, inofensiva, porque ya le infundiría miedo, con todo el poderío bélico de las naciones libres sobre su cabeza.- Y, ¡gloria al Dios Omnipotente!

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

Worldwide Communications Center

Four West 58th Street, New York 19, N.Y
PL 2 1322

November 24, 1964

Dr. DeWitt C. Daughtry
Dade County Medical Association
2 Coral Way
Miami, Florida

Dear Dr. Daughtry:

This letter will serve to confirm the change in schedule of the "El Medico y Usted" program carried over WRUL. Effective Monday, November 30, we will begin carrying your programs on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. This change is reflected in the revised contract which is enclosed. Please sign all four copies and return to this office for countersignature.

Insofar as billings are concerned, this change will be reflected in your December bill. Our invoice to you for November broadcasts reflected the change prematurely, but you will find enclosed an additional invoice (No. 1389) covering the additional programs carried during the last two weeks of November. This invoice is for $607.50.

Thank you for your continued interest in our station, and we look forward to serving your interests.

Yours very truly,

R. W. Grefe

R.W. Grefe
Vice President

RWG/rdb

Encl.

14-00000

BROADCAST AGREEMENT

RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE, 4 WEST 58TH ST., NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
A DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION

(REVISED)
AGREEMENT BETWEEN DADE COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY (EL MEDICO Y USTED)
AND RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

TARGET AREA LATIN AMERICA LANGUAGE SPANISH TIME OF BROADCAST 7:15PM E.S.T.

LENGTH OF BROADCAST ½ hour DAYS M- W.F TIMES PER WEEK 3

STARTING DATE Mon Nov 30 64 ENDING DATE F. AUG. 6'65 TOTAL BROADCASTS 108

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:

CONTRACT DATED JULY 8, 1964, REVISED TO SHOW THREE BROADCASTS PER WEEK. SAME PRICE CONTINUES, WITH INVOICES TO BE SUBMITTED MONTHLY IN ADVANCE AND ARE PAYABLE IN ADVANCE BY THE SPONSOR.

THIS CONTRACT MAY BE CANCELLED BY EITHER THE CLIENT OR THE STATION UPON (1) ONE MONTH'S WRITTEN NOTICE IN ADVANCE.

RATES

	NUMBER OF BROADCASTS	STATION CHARGE	TALENT	LINE SERVICE	RE BROADCAST	OTHER CHARGES	TOTAL PRICE
Per Week	3	$101.25 per bctg.					$303.75
Per Contract	36	$3,645.00 per contract					$3,645.00

Less Agency Commission: 15% of Station Charge

DATE ______________________ BY ______________________
RADIO NEW YORK WORLDWIDE

DATE ______________________ BY ______________________
SPONSOR OR AGENCY

DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
2 Coral Way
Miami, Florida 33131
Telephone FRanklin 1-2601

November 16, 1964

Mr. Ralph Brent
Radio New York Worldwide - WRUL,
4 West 58th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Mr. Brent:

COPY

Under the terms of our agreement with you, we hereby wish to advise you that beginning 1 December 1964 we desire to reduce the number of the "Medico y Usted" broadcasts from six per week to three per week. If possible, we would like to retain the Monday, Wednesday and Friday time slots. If this is not possible, our second preference would be for a Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday schedule.

Thank you very much for your cooperation in this matter. We look forward to continued collaboration with you in these matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

DeWitt C. Daughtry, M. D.
President

DCD/lp'

cc: Ray E. Millard,
Vice President & General Manager
Caribbean Management & Service Corp., Inc.,
Suite 619 - Dupont Plaza Center
300 Biscayne Boulevard Way
Miami, Florida

LAGO, VICENTE /DR/
SEX M DOB ?
019-006-050/03
UFGA-12894
17 DEC 63
P13
CIT CUBA
OCC DOCTOR
Δ CUBA
DEVOTES HIMSELF EXCLUSIVELY TO HIS PROFESSION. CONTACT OF 201-332675.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 821 481

LAGO PEREDA, VICENTE
SEX M DOB ?
019-500
UFG -01669
12 OCT 62
P1
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
Δ CUBA
RE INFO ON MILITIA SOV ENCAMPMENTS, DOI SEP 62.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 509 743

LAGO PEREDA, VICANTE /DR./
SEX M DOB ?
019-009-009
UFGA-01727 EOI
15 JUN 61
PI
CIT CUBA
OCC ?
MEMBER OF CUBAN AUTHENTIC REVOLUTIONARY PARTY ON EXILE. /EX-REPRESENTANTE/.

FLD INDEX ONLY
1 369 821

LAGO Pereda, Vicente
19-5-3/4-2
11 Dec 62
Mbr. of directive council of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in Cuba. No further info.

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr)
19-5-3/4-2
11 Dec 62
Active leader of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) in Cuba. No further info.

AMBUD-3 script writer
receives $45 per mo,
plus some from Refugee Center.

LAGO Pereda, Dr. Vic[illegible]te

19-6-63/3
AMCOG-3 Ops
15 Apr 63, Rpt

Friend of AMCOG-3 and source report. Ex-Congressman. Medical doctor. Former local chief of Health for City of Habana. Autentico Party.

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr.)

19-5-3/4-84 Vol IV
AMOT 84 Rpt
5 Feb 62

General Practioner, and ex congressman (House of Representatives) from 50-54, and ex Local Chief of Health for City of Havana from 44-50, Prominent member of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano Autentico. Now in Cuba

---

LAGO Pereda, Vicente

19-5-3/4-8
AA-757
21 Sep 62

LAGO PEREDA, VICENTE /DR/

SEX M DOB C 08
CUBA
CIT CUBA
OCC MEDICAL

201-335851
WAVE-07392
13 NOV 63
91

Δ CUBA, HAVANA, VIBORA, ESTRADA PALMANRO 57
GENERAL PRACTIONER. EX-CONGRESSMAN. EX-LOCAL CHIEF OF HEALTH CITY OF HAVANA 44-50. MEMBER PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO AUTENTICO AND CURRENTLY OUT POLITICS AND NO CONNECTION W/ CUBAN HEALTH MINISTRY. ANTI-CASTRO AND PRO-US. TEL NO 4-1042.

#OSM

1 799 296

LAGO Pereda, Vicente (Dr.) 19-5-3/4-2 Vol VII
UFG-976, 9 May 62

In House of Representatives 1950/54, Health Chief for City of Habana 1944/50, leading AUTENTICO member.

LAGO-Pereda, Dr. Vicente 19-6-63/3-2
AMCOG-3 OPS VOL II
August 63 Report

Source of information of AMCOG-3.

FORM
11 57

(44)

ORIG.: PW/CAPOCHOG:sep
EXT.: 268
DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 OCT 64
FILE:

PRECEDENCE			INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
	DEFERRED	PRIORITY			
	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO DIR
INFO.
CITE WAVE 3268
NUMBER

TYPIC AMTHIGH

REFS: A. UFGA 12009
B. WAVE 1308

1. AS RESULT REVIEW RADIO OPS ~~WISH~~ INTEND REDUCE AMBUD-3 PROGRAM BOTH AMTHIGH AND JMHOPE TO THREE TIMES WEEK BEGINNING ONE DECEMBER. PREFER AMTHIGH SCHEDULE ALTERNATE DAYS PERHAPS MON, WED AND FRI. FOR COVER PURPOSES WILL HAVE SPONSORING ASSOCIATION (IDEN A) SEND LETTER AMCOUP-1 STATING ABOVE PER CONTRACT.

2. ALSO WISH CANCEL AMTHIGH BLACK BROADCAST AMSHADY-1 PROGRAM AS OF ONE NOVEMBER. AMSHADY-1 NOW HAS ESTABLISHED REPUTATION AND RECEIVING GOOD COVERAGE IDEN B AND JMHOPE. PRESENT UTILITY AMTHIGH BROADCAST LIMITED DUE [illegible] BLACK TRANSMISSION, AND NO INDICATION AMTHIGH BROADCAST HEARD PRESUME PROBABLY PARTIALLY DUE FACT CANNOT PUBLICIZE IT.

3. REQUEST HQS ADVISE AMCOUP-1 CANCELLATION AMSHADY-1 BROADCAST AND ALERT TO FORTHCOMING CHANGE AMBUD-3 PROGRAM.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS
FE/DC C/Cover Br.

[illegible] RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

[illegible] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

OUTGOING

14-00000

FORM 11-57 1304

(44)

ORIG.: PW/CAPORONG:sop

EXT.: 266

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 OCT 64

FILE [illegible] '64

PRECEDENCE							
		DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
	RRR	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO DIR

INFO.

CITE WAVE [illegible]7
NUMBER

TYPIC AMTHIGH SCS

REF: WAVE ____

IDENTITIES:

A. DADE COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION.

B. STATION WHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

1:134

C/Cover Br. _

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

[illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
RELEASING OFFICER

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief of Station, JMWAVE			MARKED FOR INDEXING
		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, Buenos Aires			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM ADC/WH/SA			MICROFILM

SUBJECT DYVOUR PBRUMEN
Trace Reply

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI

REFERENCE: UFGA 16844

There are no identifiable Headquarters traces on the Subject of reference.

re Mario SUAREZ
Melian

KENT L. POLLOCK

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - JMWAVE
2 - COS, Buenos Aires

AUG 7 - 1964

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-4131	5 AUG [illegible]
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-284635

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PDRUMEN
Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference: UFGA-16844

BIGBEN reported that Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson was a candidate for provincial deputy on the Conservative Party ticket in the 23 February elections, but was defeated. No information was available, from BIGBEN files, regarding Subject's political ideology.

Frederick C. NIND

Distribution:
- 2 - JMWAVE
- 2 - DC/WH/SA
- 2 - Files

GROUP I
Excluded from Automatic downgrading and declassification

PW

BEUhligh: ghf

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HABA-13,960	28 August 1964
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER XH 4-9-14

Pro Chrono

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING

ACTION		ACCOM PLISHED
XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief of Station, Buenos Aires

INFO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/PBRUMEN
Request for Traces on Mario Cesar *SUAREZ Nelson

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

AR: See Para 3

1. Iden, who handles a JMWAVE sponsored radio program replied to Fidel Castro's charges of germ warfare against the United States. His replies were based on the scientific impossibility of germ warfare being carried on as described by the Castro regime plus speculation that this might have been an effort on Castro's part to cover up plans he might have for exterminating part of the Cuban population by means of germ or gas warfare.

2. Shortly after these broadcasts, Iden received a letter from Buenos Aires dated 11 June from Mario Cesar SUAREZ Nelson referring to these broadcasts. SUAREZ said he had not heard anything about the Castro charges and requested that Iden send him the text of the charges, plus the complete text of Iden's reply to same. SUAREZ said he had not had time to hear the entire broadcast. SUAREZ gave his address as : Alsina 770, Tandil, Provincia de Buenos Aires.

3. JMWAVE has no traces on SUAREZ. We would appreciate any information Station Buenos Aires might have on this individual. The rather demanding tone employed by SUAREZ in the letter and his request for complete details lead us to believe that he might be more than an individual with a casual interest in the Cuban problem. We have instructed Iden not to answer the letter in question until further notice.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachment: s/c
Iden List

Distribution:
3 - COS, Buenos Aires w/att
2 - DC/WH/SA w/att

1 RI Chrono
1 201-

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
17 July 64	

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-16844

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
201-

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
PW	ALICE B. CAPONONG	PGS	266

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/PW		BRUCE P. VEDDER
ESEC		DUDLEY R. WILLINGS

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

S E C R E T

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT UFGA 16844

IDENTITY: DR. Antonio MACEO y MACKLE.

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - COS, BUEN, u/sc
2 - DC/WH/SA, u/sc

14-00000

1334 (44)

ORIG: [illegible]

EXT:

DISTR:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: [illegible]

FILES:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER ✓
✓ ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO [illegible] INFO. [illegible] CITE WAVE [illegible]
NUMBER

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. STATION SPONSORED MEDICAL RADIO PROGRAM 10 JUNE OVER [illegible] STATION PUBLICIZED CASTRO CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES AT GERM WARFARE.

2. IDEN, MC OF PROGRAM, RECEIVED LETTER DATED 11 JUNE REFERRING BROADCAST FROM MARIO CESAR SUAREZ [illegible], ALSINA 779, TANDIL, PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES. SUAREZ STATED HAD NOT HEARD OF GERM WARFARE CHARGE, DID NOT HAVE TIME HEAR ENTIRE MEDICAL BROADCAST (PROGRAM LASTS 10 MINUTES) AND WANTED ADDITIONAL INFO ON CHARGE AND COMPLETE IDEN REPLY TO DATE.

3. WAVE NOT INTEND HAVE IDEN REPLY LETTER. HOWEVER, DUE NATURE [illegible] FEEL IT ADVISABLE [illegible] TRACES SUAREZ. NO RECORD WAVE.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

(44)

ORIG.: [illegible]

EXT.:

DISTR.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: [illegible] JUNE 64

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO DIR INFO. [illegible] CITE WAVE ________ NUMBER

KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF WAVE ____

IDEN: DR. ANTONIO MACEO Y MACKLE

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

RELEASING OFFICER

Programa Radial "El Medico y Usted"
Diciembre, 1964

Lunes	2	#	250	Varices, Flebotrombosis y Tromboflebitis
Martes	3	#	251	Linfangitis y Linfedema
Miercoles	4	#	252	" "
Jueves	5	#	253	Prematuridad
Viernes	6	#	254	"
Sabado	7	#	255	"
Lunes	9	#	256	Retardo mental
Martes	10	#	257	" "
Miercoles	11	#	258	Desarrollo y Desenvolvimiento del niño
Jueves	12	#	259	" " "
Viernes	13	#	260	" " "
Sabado	14	#	261	2 " "
Lunes	16	#	262	" " "
Martes	17	#	263	" " "
Miercoles	18	#	264	" " "
Jueves	19	#	265	Contestando cartas
Viernes	20	#	266	" "
Sabado	21	#	267	" "
Lunes	23	#	268	Sobre algunos problemas psicologicos en los niños
Martes	24	#	269	" " " " "
Miercoles	25	#	270	" " " " "
Jueves	26	#	271	" " " " "
Viernes	27	#	272	Intoxicacion por el Plomo
Sabado	28	#	273	" "
Lunes	30	#	274	Intoxicacion por el Plomo y por Salicilato

Programa Radial "EL MEDICO Y USTED"
Octubre, 1964

1	Jueves	# 223	Neuralgias y Neuritis
2	Viernes	# 224	" "
3	Sabado	# 225	Sindrome Hombro-Mano. Hernia de Disco
5	Lunes	# 226	Neuralgia del Trigemino
6	Martes	# 227	" "
7	Miercoles	# 228	" "
8	Jueves	# 229	Enfisema Pulmonar
9	Viernes	# 230	" "
10	Sabado	# 231	" "
12	Lunes	# 232	Consideraciones sobre Alergia
13	Martes	# 233	" " "
14	Miercoles	# 234	Bronquitis Asmatica
15	Jueves	# 235	" "
16	Viernes	# 236	" "
17	Sabado	# 237	" "
19	Lunes	# 238	Bronquiectasia
20	Martes	# 239	"
21	Miercoles	# 240	"
22	Jueves	# 241	Alcoholismo
23	Viernes	# 242	"
24	Sabado	# 243	"
26	Lunes	# 244	"
27	Martes	# 245	"
28	Miercoles	# 246	"
29	Jueves	# 247	Cartas
30	Viernes	# 248	Cartas
31	Sabado	# 249	Varices, Flebotrombosis y Tromboflebitis

Cartas recibidas para el Programa
"EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Septiembre	2, 1964	Honduras
"	2, 1964	Cuba
"	8, 1964	El Sauce, Nicaragua
"	22, 1964	El Sauce, Nicaragua
"	28, 1964	Coban, Guatemala
"	29, 1964	Camaguey, Cuba
"	29, 1964	Cruces, Las Villas

Programa Radial "El Medico y USTED"
Mes de Septiembre

1	Martes	Dr. Macco	# 197	Carencias Nutricionales y Vitaminicas.	I
2	Miercoles	"	# 198	" " "	II
3	Jueves	"	# 199	" " "	III
4	Viernes	"	# 200	Ataques Convulsivos	I
5	Sabado	"	# 201	" "	II
7	Lunes	"	# 202	" "	III
8	Martes	"	# 203	Apendicitis	I
9	Miercoles	"	# 204	"	II
10	Jueves	"	# 205	Enfermedades de la Glandula Tiroide	I
11	Viernes	"	# 206	" " "	II
12	Sabado	"	# 207	" " "	III
14	Lunes	"	# 208	" " "	IV
15	Martes	"	# 209	" " "	V
16	Miercoles	"	# 210	Enfermedades del Tiroide. TIROIDITIS	I
17	Jueves	"	# 211	" " "	II
18	Viernes	"	# 212	Enfermedades de la Tiroide	I
19	Sabado	"	# 213	" "	II
21	Lunes	"	# 214	" "	III
22	Martes	"	# 215	Cuidados y atenciones que debe tener la Mujer Embarazada.	I
23	Miercoles	"	# 216	" " " " "	II
24	Jueves	"	# 217	" " " " "	III
25	Viernes	"	# 218	" " " " "	IV
26	Sabado	"	# 219	" " " " "	V
28	Lunes	"	# 220	" " " " "	VI
29	Martes	"	# 221	Toxemia Gravidica	I
30	Miercoles	"	# 222	" "	II

Cartas recibidas para el Programa "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Agosto	2, 1964	Corozal, Puerto Rico
Agosto	11, 1964	Maiquetia, Venezuela
Agosto	12, 1964	Corozal, Puerto Rico
Agosto	13, 1964	Salcedo, Republica Dominicana
Agosto	14, 1964	San Andres Isla
Agosto	25, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Agosto	26, 1964	Rio Ceballo, Republica Argentina
Agosto	31, 1964	Ciego de Avila, Camaguey, Cuba.

Programacion del mes Agosto "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Agosto	1	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 171	Meningitis	II	
"	3	Lunes	"	# 172	Meningitis	III	
"	4	Martes	"	# 173	Meningitis	IV	
"	5	Miercoles	"	# 174	Meningitis Aseptica		
"	6	Jueves	"	# 175	Miastenia Grave		
"	7	Viernes	"	# 176	" "	II	
"	8	Sabado	"	# 177	" "	III	
"	10	Lunes	"	# 178	Hematuria	I	
"	11	Martes	"	# 179	"	II	
"	12	Miercoles	"	# 180	Purpura	I	
"	13	Jueves	"	# 181	Purpura	II	
"	14	Viernes	"	# 182	Hemofilia	I	
"	15	Sabado	"	# 183	"	II	
"	17	Lunes	"	# 184	"	III	
"	18	Martes	"	# 185	Eclampsia		
"	19	Miercoles	"	# 186	Hemiplegia	I	
"	20	Jueves	"	# 187	"	II	
"	21	Viernes	"	# 188	"	III	
"	22	Sabado	"	# 189	"	IV	
"	24	Lunes	"	# 190	"	V	
"	25	Martes	"	# 191	"	VI	
"	26	Miercoles	"	# 192	Estomatitis		
"	27	Jueves	"	# 193	Ulcera Peptica		(carta)
"	28	Viernes	"	# 194	Infarto		(carta)
"	29	Sabado	"	# 195	Diabetes		(carat)
"	31	Lunes	"	# 196	Prostata		(carta)

Julio	1	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 144	Tetanos II
"	2	Jueves	Dr. "	# 145	Tetanos III
"	3	Viernes	Dr. "	# 146	Neumonitis Alveolar I
"	4	Sabado	Dr "	# 147	" " II
"	6	Lunes	Dr. "	# 148	" " III
"	7	Martes	Dr. "	# 149	Cartas. Esclerosis multiple I
"	8	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 150	" " " II
"	9	Jueves	Dr. "	# 151	Fiebre amarilla
"	10	Viernes	Dr. "	# 152	Nefroptosis
"	11	Sabado	Dr. "	# 153	Vacunacion I
"	13	Lunes	Dr. "	# 154	" II
"	14	Martes	Dr "	# 155	" III
"	15	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 156	" IV
"	16	Jueves	Dr. "	# 157	" V
"	17	Viernes	Dr "	# 158	Paralisis facial I
"	18	Sabado	Dr. "	# 159	" " II
"	20	Lunes	Dr. "	# 160	Vomitos I
"	21	Martes	Dr. "	# 161	" II
"	22	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 162	" III
"	23	Jueves	Dr. "	# 163	" IV
"	24	Viernes	Dr. "	# 164	" V
"	25	Sabado	Dr. "	# 165	Cefalea I
"	27	Lunes	Dr. "	# 166	" II
"	28	Martes	Dr. "	# 167	" III
"	29	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 168	" IV
"	30	Jueves	Dr. "	# 169	Ciatica
"	31	Viernes	Dr. "	# 170	Menegitis. Anatomia I

Junio	1	Lunes	Dr. De la Vega	# 120	Queratitis bulosa	
"	2	Martes	Dr. Maceo	# 121	No trasmitido. Cartas	
"	3	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 122	Bronquitis	R
"	4	Jueves	Dr Benach	# 123	Enfermedades Seno	
"	5	Viernes	Dr. "	# 124	" "	
"	6	Sabado	Dr. "	# 125	" "	
"	8	Lunes	Dr. "	# 126	" "	
"	9	Martes	Dr. "	# 127	" "	
"	10	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 128	Guerra bacteriologica	
"	11	Jueves	Dr. "	# 129	" "	
"	12	Viernes	Dr. Benach		NO LLEGO EL AVION A LA	
"	13	Sabado	Dr. Benach		EMISORA. REPITIERON TAPES VIEJOS.	
"	15	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 130	Cancer	
"	16	Martes	Dr. "	# 131	"	
"	17	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 132	"	
"	18	Jueves	Dr. "	# 133	"	
"	19	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 134	Sarampion I	
"	20	Sabado	Dr. "	# 135	" II	
"	22	Lunes	Dr. "	# 136	Varicela	
"	23	Martes	Dr. "	# 137	Poliomelitis I	
"	24	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 138	Poliomelitis II	
"	25	Jueves	Dr. "	# 139	Paperas	
"	26	Viernes	Dr. "	# 140	Tos ferina I	R
"	27	Sabado	Dr. "	# 141	Tos ferina II y Difteria	R
"	29	Lunes	Dr. "	# 142	Difteria II	R
"	30	Martes	Dr. "	# 143	Difteria III Tetanos I	R

Mayo	1	Viernes	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 94	Odontologia	
"	2	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 95	Odontologia	
"	4	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 96	Gastroenteritis	
"	5	Martes	"	# 97	Paludismo I	R
"	6	Miercoles	"	# 98	Paludismo II	R
"	7	Jueves	Dr. Alonso Portuondo	# 99	Osteoartritis	
"	8	Viernes	Dr. " "	# 100	"	
"	9	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 101	"	
"	11	Lunes	Dr. Peñalver	# 102	Medicina ocupacional	
"	12	Martes	Dr. Peñalver	# 103	Manganismo	
"	13	Miercoles	Dr. Peñalver	# 104	Saturnismo	
"	14	Jueves	Dr. Maceo	# 105	Cartas	
"	15	Viernes	Dr. "	# 106	Cartas, sifilis, artritis	
"	16	Sabado	Dr. "	# 107	" , "	II
"	18	Lunes	Dr. "	# 108	Mononucleosis, Carta	
"	19	Martes	Dr. "	# 109	Hepatitis viral, Carta	
"	20	Miercoles	Dr. "	# 110	Palabras sobre la fecha	
"	21	Jueves	Dr. Gonzalez Mayo	# 111	Tuberculosis en Ganado V.	
"	22	Viernes	Dr. Gonzalez Mayo	# 112	Tuberculosis en Ganado V.	
"	23	Sabado	Dr. " "	# 113	Enfermedades aviarias	
"	25	Lunes	Dr. " "	# 114	Aftosa	
"	26	Martes	Dr. " "	# 115	"	
"	27	Miercoles	Dr. " "	# 116	"	
"	28	Jueves	Dr. De la Vega	# 117	Chalazion	
"	29	Viernes	Dr. De la Vega	# 118	Retinitis pigmentaria	
"	30	Sabado	Dr. De la Vega	# 119	Desprendimiento retinal	

Abril	1	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 68	Trastornos de la voz
"	2	Jueves	Dr. Arias [illegible]	# 69	Desarrollo emocional niño
"	3	Viernes	" "	# 70	" " "
"	4	Sabado	" "	# 71	" " "
"	6	Lunes	Dr. " "	# 72	" " "
"	7	Martes	Dr. Alonso Portuondo	# 73	La gota
"	8	Miercoles	Dr. " "	# 74	" "
"	9	Jueves	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 75	Denticion
"	10	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 76	Mononucleosis infecciosa
"	11	Sabado	"	# 77	Amebiasis
"	13	Lunes	Dr. Benach	# 78	Ginecologia
"	14	Martes	"	# 79	"
"	15	Miercoles	"	# 80	"
"	16	Jueves	"	# 81	"
"	17	Viernes	"	# 82	"
"	18	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 83	Cartas
"	20	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	# 84	Cartas
"	21	Martes	Dr. Maceo	# 85	Tuberculosis I
"	22	Miercoles	Dr. Maceo	# 86	Tuberculosis II
"	23	Jueves	Dr. Maceo	# 87	Tuberculosis III
"	24	Viernes	Dr. Maceo	# 88	Tuberculosis IV
"	25	Sabado	Dr. De la Vega	# 89	Estrabismo
"	27	Lunes	Dr. De la Vega	# 90	Glaucoma
"	28	Martes	Dr. De la Vega	# 91	Catarata
"	29	Miercoles	Dr. De la Vega	# 92	Desprendimiento retinal
"	30	Jueves	Dr. Cesar Lugones	# 93	Odontologia

rzo	2	Lunes	Dr. Maceo	#	45	Neuritis I	
"	3	Martes	"	#	46	Neuritis II	
"	4	Miercoles	"	#	47	Atrofia muscular progresiva	
"	5	Jueves	"	#	48	Tetanos	R
"	6	Viernes	"	#	49	Desnutricion	R
"	7	Sabado		#	50	Fiebre reumarica	
"	9	Lunes	"	#	51	Fiebre reumatica	R
"	10	Martes		#	52		
"	11	Miercoles		#	53		
"	12	Jueves	"	#	54	Acromia	R
"	13	Viernes	"	#	55	Radiologia I	
"	14	Sabado	"	#	56	Radiologia II	
"	16	Lunes	"	#	57	Avitaminosis	R
"	17	Martes	"	#	58	Varices	
"	18	Miercoles	"	#	59	Angina de pecho	R
"	19	Jueves	Dr.Alonso	#	60	Artritis reumatoidea	
"	20	Viernes	Dr. Alonso	#	61	" "	
"	21	Sabado	Dr.Alonso	#	62	" "	
"	23	Lunes	Dr.Gzlez	#	63	Anticonceptivos	
"	24	Martes	Dr. Maceo	#	64	Pneumotorax	
"	25	Miercoles	"	#	65	Obesidad	R
"	26	Jueves		SEMANA SANTA.			
"	27	Viernes					
"	28	Sabado					
"	30	Lunes	Dr. Mena	#	66	Enfermedades bucales	
"	31	Martes	Dr.Haces	#	67	Trastornos de la voz	

Febrero	1	Sabado	Dr. Maceo	# 20	Desnutricion	
"	3	Lunes	"	# 21	Obesidad	
"	4	Martes	"	# 22	Ulcera hepatica	
"	5	Miercoles	"	# 23	Obstruccion intestinal	
"	6	Jueves	"	# 24	Litiasis renal	
"	7	Viernes	"	# 25	Pancreatitis	
"	8	Sabado	"	# 26	Tosferina	R
"	10	Lunes	"	# 27	Asma	R
"	11	Martes	"	# 28	Schock	
"	12	Miercoles	"	# 29	Parasitismo	R
"	13	Jueves	"	# 30	Hipertension arterial	
"	14	Viernes	"	# 31	Influenza	
"	15	Sabado	"	# 32	Acronia	
"	17	Lunes	"	# 33	Osteomielitis	
"	18	Martes	"	# 34	Erisipela	
"	19	Miercoles	"	# 35	Brucelosis	
"	20	Jueves	"	# 36	Anemia	
"	21	Viernes	"	# 37	Leucemia	
"	22	Sabado	"	# 38	Ictericia	
"	24	Lunes	"	# 39	Dermatitis alergica	
"	25	Martes	"	# 40	Fiebre amarilla	
"	26	Miercoles	"	# 41	Constipacion	
"	27	Jueves	"	# 42	Alcoholismo	R
"	28	Viernes	"	# 43	Bronquitis	
"	29	Sabado	"	# 44	Eczemas	

Enero	10 Viernes	Dr. Maceo	#	1	Inaguracion
"	11 Sabado	"	#	2	Gastroenteritis
"	13 Lunes	"	#	3	Asma
"	14 Martes	"	#	4	Sarampion, Varicela, Culebrilla
"	15 Miercoles	"	#	5	Poliomelitis
"	16 Jueves	"	#	6	Angina de Pecho
"	17 Viernes	"	#	7	Parasitismo
"	18 Sabado	"	#	8	Tetanos
"	20 Lunes	"	#	9	Avitaminosis
"	21 Martes	"	#	10	Neumonia
"	22 Miercoles	"	#	11	Difteria
"	23 Jueves	"	#	12	Artritis
"	24 Viernes	"	#	13	Paperas
"	25 Sabado	"	#	14	Calculos hepaticos
"	27 Lunes	"	#	15	Paludismo
"	28 Martes	"	#	16	Rabia
"	29 Miercoles	"	#	17	Lepra
"	30 Jueves	"	#	18	Alcoholismo
"	31 Viernes	"	#	19	Cirrosis hepatica

Cartas recibidas para el programa "EL MEDICO Y USTED"

Enero	20, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Enero	29, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Enero	31, 1964	Sancti Spiritus, L.V.
Febrero	8, 1964	Comayaguela, Honduras
Febrero	9, 1964	Agramonte, Matanzas
Febrero	27, 1964	Choluteca, Honduras
Febrero	29, 1964	Santiago de Cuba, Oriente
Marzo	1, 1964	Choluteca, Honduras
Marzo	9, 1964	Colorado de Obangares, Costa Rica
Marzo	11, 1964	Cartagena, Colombia
Marzo	16, 1964	Pinar del Rio, Cuba
Marzo	21, 1964	Barranquilla, Colombia
Marzo	23, 1964	Liverpool, Inglaterra
Marzo	24, 1964	Mexico,
Marzo	29, 1964	Costilla, Colombia
Abril	1, 1964	Guanajay, Pinar del Rio
Abril	2, 1964	Santa Barbara, Honduras
Abril	7, 1964	ORANGESTAD, ARUBA
Abril	11, 1964	Sahagun, Cordova, Colombia
Abril	19, 1964	Santa Barbara, Honduras
Abril	29, 1964	Santiago de Cuba, Oriente
Abril	29, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Abril	28, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Mayo	1, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Mayo	1, 1964	Pereira Caldas, Colombia
Mayo	3, 1964	Puerto Cortes, Honduras
Mayo	4, 1964	Savannah, Georgia
Mayo	5, 1964	Tumbador, Guatemala
Mayo	8, 1964	Masaya, Nicaragua
Mayo	15, 1964	Habana, Cuba
Mayo	18, 1964	Tampa, Florida
Mayo	27, 1964	Maiquotia, VENEZUELA
Junio	11, 1964	Rincom, Puerto Rico
Junio	9, 1964	Santa Ana, San Salvador
Junio	11, 1964	El Callao, Venezuela
Junio	18, 1964	Puerto Cortez, Honduras
Junio	28, 1964	Guatemala
Junio	23, 1964	Costilla Magdalena, Colombia
Junio	22, 1964	Valledupar Magdalena Colombia
Junio	25, 1964	Oaxaca, Mexico
Junio 25	, 1964	Colombia
Junio	28, 1964	Tegucigalpa, Honduras
Junio	29, 1964	San Salvador
Julio	7, 1964	Honduras

FORM 11-57 1304 (44)

ORIG.: PW/FLUTEO/pgs

EXT.: 271

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 31 JAN 64

DISTR.:

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FILE: [illegible] '64

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	NUMBER
RRR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

Doctor's Program ✓

TO DIR INFO. CITE WAVE 1340 NUMBER

TYPIC

1. AMCOUP-1 INFORMED WIBALDA 29 JAN HE READY BROADCAST DOCTOR MACEO'S PROGRAM MONDAYS THROUGH SATURDAYS AT 1915 BEGINNING 10 FEB.

2. WIBALDA INSTRUCTED AMCOUP-1 TO BILL SPONSOR, DADE MED ASSOCIATION, THROUGH YOYARD. AMCOUP-1 CHARGING $101.50 PER PROGRAM.

END OF MESSAGE

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

31-16

ESEC
FINA [illegible]
COORDINATING ~~OFFICERS~~

WALTER D. NEWBY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

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MESSAGE FORM 24

SECRET

ORIG	(H. WEBSTER)(D. WRIGHT)/pk 03 03
UNIT	WH/C WE/5
EXT	6393
DATE	15 MARCH 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO (MADRID) 15-2

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 INFO DDP, WE6, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, VR, FILE

TO (MADR) 15-2 INFO CITE DIR 92731

PBRUMEN

REF DIR 91921*

FYI ACCORDING TO LETTER JUST RECEIVED IN NEW YORK BY AMWHIP/1 FROM AMLASH/2. 02 (AMHOPS/1 DUE RETURN HAVANA 6 APRIL TO HAVE "GOOD POSITION" IN OFFICE OF (VICE FORN MIN ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS.) 08

END OF MESSAGE 03

(Wainright) extra copy for files?

24

*Hqs agrees to (unilateral recruitment in place)

03

C/WH/C/FI (Sherwood) (phone)

Thomas J. Thiele
RELEASING OFFICER
C/WE/INT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
C/WE/5

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

9/PV

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INDEX: YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 26

AMTRUNK-10

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

1	TC	/	RE
2		/	MO
/	FI	/	CI
/	TR	/	CA

FROM Rome)15-9

ACTION C/WE-3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME / PA / 05 / DDP BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/EE-3, C/RI/SD, C/CA-2

S E C R E T 111755Z 20-9 11 Mar 65 IN 73315

15-15 15-22

DIR (LISB) INFO WAVE (MILA) (POUCH) CITE (ROME) 9301

KAPOK/KEYWAY/TYPIC (DELORRY)

AML AMT

1. (DELORRY) (D) ARRIVED ITALY 9 MARCH, ROME 10 MARCH. RETURNING FROM HOME 15 MARCH TO SUBMIT DETAILED REPORT.

2. ETA CUBA ABOUT (1 APRIL) AT SUGGESTION FIDEL (F) GIVING (DINNER PARTY) FOR HIM SOON THEREAFTER.

3. D SAYS ANNIE DE QUENDOZ (Q) (NO STA TRACES) WIFE (JUST GETTING DIVORCE) OF SWISS CHANCELLOR IN HAVANA, WAS MISTRESS OF BOTH "CHE" GUEVARA AND F, CONTINUES RELATIONS WITH F. DIP COMMUNITY GIVING HER COLD SHOULDER BUT D HAS TAKEN PAINS BE FRIENDLY, FOR WHICH BOTH SHE AND F GRATEFUL. D SAYS CAN (GAIN DIRECT ACCESS F THROUGH Q) IN ANY EMERGENCY. Q DAUGHTER HIGH-RANKING PORTUGUESE POLICE OFFICIAL. MOTHER IS NITA S. PAIS, RUA MOZAMBIQUE, 52-1-DTO LISBON. Q GAVE D LETTER TO MOTHER. HAVE OPENED, PHOTOED, WILL POUCH. REQUEST TRACES Q.

4. GERMAN (AMADO-BLANCO) Y FERNANDEZ (201-764008) GAVE D MIN OF FOREIGN TRADE ENVELOPE CONTAINING TWO LETTERS FOR LUIS AMADO-BLANCO (201-276972). ALSO PHOTOED, WILL POUCH.

SECRET

9/pv

SECRET

5. D ON GOOD TERMS WITH ROGELIO (MONTENEGRO) GUASP (M). PREPARING REPORT. M WAS SCHEDULED LEAVE HAVANA ONE HOUR AFTER D FOR PRAGUE TO MEET MANUEL ("MANOLITO") (PEREZ) HERNANDEZ BEFORE COMING ROME. ACCORDING HAVANA RUMOR M TO KEEP EYE ON RICARDO (SUBIRANA) Y LOBO (201-333831), WILL BECOME DE FACTO CHIEF OF CUBEMB TO QUIRINALE. D SUSPECTS M HAS CUIS TIES. ENERGETIC COMMY.

6. D ALSO ON GOOD TERMS WITH SAVERIO TUTINO (201-353093) WHO GAVE HIM FOUR LETTERS WHICH COULD NOT SAFELY OPEN. POUCHING NAMES ADDRESSEES. TUTINO TOLD D AMLASH/1 AND AMTRUNK/10 CERTAINLY GUILTY. BUT F LETTER SUGGESTING CLEMENCY CAUSED RUMORS OF PRIOR DEAL. ALSO MANY RUMORS STUDENTS CHALKED "VIVA A/1" AND "VIVA A/10" ON WALLS BUT D DID NOT SEE. FOR TWO DAYS AFTER ARRESTS GOC PUT CONTROLS ON MANY KEY FIGURES.

7. BECAUSE PROTESTANT CLERICS IN CUBA SUBJECT TO MIL DUTY, HAVE PROTESTED RE DRAFT-EXEMPT STATUS CATHOLIC PRIESTS, WHOM GOC MAY START DRAFTING. CESARE ZACCHI (201-755668) WORRIED GOC-VATICAN RELATIONS MAY SUFFER.

8. CUBAMB IN BELGIUM, GUSTAVO (ARCOS) Y BERGNES PRESENTLY IN SOME DISFAVOR. IS ALLEGED TO HAVE MADE ANTI-REGIME REMARKS.

9. INDEX Z AND M.

SECRET

SECRET **SECRET** IN 73375

CFN

OZ
9301 (D)OLORRY D ITALY 9 ROME 10 15 ETA CUBA 1 FIDEL F D ANNIE DE MENDOZ Q NO STA SWISS HAVANA CHE GUEVARA F F DIP D F D F Q Q PORTUGUESE NITA S PAIS RUA MOZAMBIQUE 52-1-DTO LISBON Q D RUST Q GERMAN AMADO BLANCO Y FERNANDEZ 201-754883 D MIN LUIS AMADO BLANCO 201-275972 D ROGELIO MONTENEGRO GUASP M M HAVANA D PRAGUE MANUEL MANOLITO PEREZ HERNANDEZ ROME HAVANA M RICARDO SUBIRANA Y LOBO 201-333831 DE FACTO CUBEMB QUIRINALE D M COMMY D SAVERIO TUTINO 201-353093 NOT SAFELY TUTINO D AMLASH/1 AMTRUNK/10 F VIA AMI VIVA A/13 D NOT SEE GOC CUBA MIL GOC CESARE ZACCHI 201-753588 GOC VATICAN CUBAMB BELGIUM GUSTAVO ARCOS Y BERGNES ANTI REGIME Q ..

x Pls Comply with [illegible]

NVN **SECRET**

YPN

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15 February 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris, 31 January to 3 February 1965

1. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:

a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Merey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks about a long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.

b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."

7/PV

c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. 02 AMLASH-1 again reviewed with 02 UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. 02 AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother. 15-4 04, 08

d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the JMWAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.

e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. 06 AMLASH-1 has full confidence 06 in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on 06 several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his 06 return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo 06 will provide the background information upon his return to New York.) his [illegible] info.

f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new

11/12 PV

president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)

15-4 06

g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular lead seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed. AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in 15-4 the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.

15-4 02

h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.

i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.

15-4 15-4

j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."

k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the following persons:

(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.

(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.

7/RV

(3) Cmdte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of Artillery of the Occidental Army.

(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1, Baez is a trusted Fidelman.

(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young and has for several years been with Pinero and the Cuban IS.

(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime rises or falls as does that of Faustino.

(7) Sergio Tollon. Code clerk in the Embassy in Paris. Tollon is staying in Paris at the request of Ambassador Carrillo.

l. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems, although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do cause some problems. The purification of water has been a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the sickness in the country.

interest!

m. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1 did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1 decides to stay out.

n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and December since he had been out of the country since early November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and explained the issues, the background and personalities involved.

o. Soviet advise or influence in political and economic matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.

p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Raul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.

q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy in Madrid.

r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.

s. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, 06 Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, 10 is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, 06 Cuban Ambassador in Rabat, 10 is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez, 06 assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, 10 AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation. Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.

2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.

Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD

cc: WH/SA/EOB
WH/SA/MOB

File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op

6/RJ

SECRET

12 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Federico PALMIERI Guillermo
C-165019

1. A memorandum has been received in OS from WH Division reflecting that Subject, who had been terminated as a CIA agent in 1964, is known to be writing a book, to be entitled "My Seven Years with CIA".

2. PALMIERI is in exile from Guatemala and is presently employed by Moore Commercial Company in San Salvador, Salvador. According to information received from [redacted] #36980 ([redacted]), Subject has stated that a publisher in Mexico City is interested in publishing the book.

3. WH also furnished a copy of a memorandum from the Philadelphia office of Domestic Contact Service, reflecting that Subject had advised a DCS contact that he had worked as a CIA agent for Roger RUSS. (RUSS could not be identified in OS files.)

4. A copy of this memorandum is being placed in the OS files of those individuals who are known by Subject to be affiliated with the Agency. Original memorandum from WH will be found in Subject's file.

E. Mendoza

EM:kd

cc: [redacted] - 36980
[redacted] - 48852
[redacted] - 53160
[redacted] - C 98507
[redacted] - C 98853
Viola June Cobb - C 216264
[redacted] - C 214409
[redacted] - 37621
[redacted] - 60003
[redacted] - O&C 59320

SECRET

GROUP 1
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SECRET

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1. NAME (*Last, First, Middle*) HICKS, CALVIN W.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 8 NOV 1924	3. GRADE GS-13
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (*or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment*) DDP/WH/CS/CS Dev Comp	5. PRESENT POSITION OPS OFFICER	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION 6815
7. PROPOSED STATION 16-16 LA PAZ, BOLIVIA	8. PROPOSED POSITION (*title, number, grade*) OPS OFFICER - 0977 - GS-13	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION STATE 32	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE SEPT 66	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY 7

12. NAME OF DEPENDENT TO ACCOMPANY	13. RELATIONSHIP	14. DATE OF BIRTH		15. REPORT OF MED. HIST. (SF 89) ATT.	
		MONTH	YEAR	YES	NO
CATHERINE L.	WIFE	MAY	1925		X
THERESA L.	DAU	JAN	1953		X
MICHAEL C.	SON	JULY	1954		X
MARY C.	DAU	DEC	1955		X
LISA ANNE	DAU	OCT	1957		X
DANIEL C.	SON	FEB	1959		X
PATRICIA E.	DAU	MAR	1960		X

16. COMMENTS

FORM 89 ATTACHED IN DUPLICATE. PLEASE SCHEDULE MEDICAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

17. DATE OF REQUEST 10 MAY 1966	18. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL 03 Kenneth L. Wambold	19. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING GH 56 Hqs	20. EXTENSION 6315

21. EVALUATION AND SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL

Date: 2 JUN 1966

Security Approval has been granted for the use contemplated by this request

Chief, Personnel Security Division

3/pl

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 6-65 259a

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

TO : Deputy Chief, SSD 22 June 1954

FROM : Chief, Special Referral Branch

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, Balmes, Jr.
#65077

GIST

The Subject is a covert employee of this Agency now in the United States for four weeks training and being considered for use by Staff C/ICB in a highly sensitive assignment. Immigration authorities may submit questions through this Agency which will be answered by the Subject, but requests to have the Subject testify in open court hearings must be refused.

DETAILS

1. Reference is made to the letter received by the Alien Affairs Staff from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and reference to your request of 15 June 1954 to ascertain the details of the Subject's status with this Agency and prepare a reply to I&NS.

2. On 17 June 1954 Special Agent Chester R. HOATSON of this office interviewed Mr. Robert DAHLGREN, Acting Chief, WH/FI, Room 1128 "J" Building, and Mr. 03 John BONNET, Chief, WH/Panama, Room 2204 Quarters "J", x4456, regarding the Immigration request. The following information was obtained during this interview.

a. The Subject is still a covert employee of this Agency, is now in the United States (New York City) on home leave, and is scheduled to report to Washington, D.C., to commence four weeks of covert trainingon 6 July 1954.

b. The Subject is presently under consideration by Staff C/ICB for an assignment with a highly sensitive project under the supervision of Staff C/ICB. Under this proposed assignment any publicity or notoriety that the Subject would receive from testifying publicly on questions of Communist associations of which he may have knowledge would ultimately preclude his future use with the Staff C project and would probably jeopardize his future as a covert employee of this Agency.

c. If the Staff C assignment does not materialize, the Subject will return to 16-46 Balboa, Panama Canal Zone on approximately 15 August 1954 as a case officer, and this position would also be jeopardized by undue publicity.

2/rn

3. Mr. DAHLGREN and Mr. 03 (BOTTET) indicated that from a WH standpoint only there would be no objection to a controlled interview with the Subject if the interview could be afforded the Subject while he is still in New York City. This, however, would have to be coordinated with Staff C/ICB for possible objections that they might raise in view of their proposed use of the Subject. Mr. 03 (BOTTET) requested that he be informed of any action taken in this matter and any public testimony or open court testimony would have to depend on the seriousness of the case being prepared by the Immigration authorities.

4. Any contact with the Subject during his period of covert training from 6 July to approximately 15 August 1954 would have to also be coordinated with Mr. (Peter HOEHL) Covert Training Officer, OTR, whose office is located in Building 03 T-31.

5. On 11 June 1954 Special Agent HOATSON contacted Mr. (Paul 03 BURKE) Staff C/ICB, 1613 "I" Building, x688, to discuss the Subject's future position and also the request received from I&NS. The following factors were obtained from Mr. (BURKE):

a. The Subject's use in the proposed 03 Staff C project is still in the planning stage, but the assignment that the Subject is being considered for is a highly sensitive one and any further publicity which the Subject may receive would ultimately disqualify him for consideration on this project.

b. Any approval for I&NS contact of the Subject would have to be determined after carefully considering the importance of the I&NS case for which the Subject's testimony may be required. Mr. 03 (BURKE) indicated that the Subject could still be considered as an employee of WH Division regardless of whether or not the proposed Staff C/ICB assignment materializes and any action in the request received from I&NS should be closely coordinated with both Staff C and WH.

6. Mr. PENNINGTON, Alien Affairs Staff, SO, contacted William A. HOGAN, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization on 18 June 1954 requesting further information regarding their memorandum of 9 June 1954 on the Subject. Mr. HOGAN explained that I&NS has a list of possible informants which contains the Subject's name. The people on this list are being contacted for use on a continuing basis when specific cases arise which might fall in their particular area of knowledge. At the present time, I&NS has no specific case for which they want to contact the Subject, but they just want to know if he would be available in the future for use as an informant regarding various Communist activities of which the Subject has personal knowledge.

6/RJ

7. After his conversation with Mr. HOGAN, Mr. PENNINGTON indicated that a refusal of the I&NS request would not be considered out of order, but recommended cooperating to the extent that I&NS could submit specific questions to this Agency which could be presented to the Subject and the answer forwarded to I&NS. The refusal of their original request should be based on the sensitivity of the Subject's position which could be jeopardized by any undue publicity and also on the fact that the Subject [illegible] frequently and it would be difficult to locate him [illegible] contact was [illegible].

8. Mr. James SPROUSE, Alien Affairs Staff/SO, stated on 18 June 1954 that Mr. HOGAN, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, had indicated in a conversation with Mr. SPROUSE on 8 June 1954 that I&NS had been able to locate the Subject's location and affiliation with this Agency through the Subject's father who told the inspector that the Subject was employed by this Agency in (Balboa, Panama, Canal Zone,) which appears to be a security flap on the part of the Subject's father. 16-46

9. Mr. (John BONNET,) 03 Chief, WH/Panama, was recontacted on 18 June 1954 and informed of the nature of the I&NS request and also informed of the apparent security flap on the part of the Subject's father. 03 On the basis of this further information, it was suggested to Mr. (BONNET) that the I&NS authorities be requested to submit any questions through this Agency which would, in turn, be presented to the Subject and his answers be returned to I&NS. Mr. (BONNET) 03 agreed to the proposal of having the I&NS people contact the Subject through this Agency and also indicated that the reported security breach on the part of the Subject's father would be taken into consideration and an attempt would be made to determine the extent of the Subject's relatives or acquaintances know of the Subject's employment by this Agency. Mr. 03 (Paul BURKE,) Staff C/ICB, also agreed to the proposed procedure and requested that any and all action taken be coordinated with WH and Staff C.

ACTION

It is recommended that the attached memorandum to I&NS and to the Chief, WH Division, with a carbon copy to Staff C/ICB, be forwarded and that no further action be taken pending a report from Mr. 03 (BONNET) regarding the seriousness of the security flap from an operational standpoint.

Charles W. Kane

Attachments
1 - Letter to I&NS
1 - Letter to WH with cc to Staff C/ICB

[illegible]/mlh
6/21/54

6/RJ

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Deputy Chief, Special Security Division DATE: 21 October 1953

FROM : Chief, Special Referral Branch

SUBJECT: HIDALGO, Jr., Balmes Nieves
#65077

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 16 October 1953, in which it was requested that appropriate inquiries be made to ascertain the answers to the following questions.

a. Can BALMES be made available for testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the United States.

b. If the answer to question "a" is in the negative, can the FBI interview BALMES wherever he may be outside the United States.

c. Or can questions to be answered by BALMES be submitted to CIA for transmittal to BALMES and the answers given by BALMES be sent back to the FBI, via CIA.

2. On 21 October 1953 Mr. 03 William B. CALDWELL, Chief, WH/FI was interviewed in his office. Mr. CALDWELL advised that the Subject was presently a Contract Employee whose 03 services are being utilized in Panama under the Travel Control Project. He stated that Subject has been overseas for approximately one and a half years and that his contract period will probably expire within six months. He advised that in answer to question "a", Subject can be made available for testimony before the Subversive Activities Control Board in the United States if necessary. He stated that Subject's position was not such that he was indispensable to the Project and that if it was absolutely necessary, he could be recalled to the United States within twenty-four hours. In reference to question "b", Mr. 03 CALDWELL advised that there was no reason why the Subject could not be interviewed by the FBI at his place of duty. In reference to question "c", Mr. 03 CALDWELL reported that this was the most desirable alternative and that he would prefer the questions to be answered by Subject be submitted to CIA for transmittal to Subject and that the answers would be returned to the FBI, via this Agency.

3. On 21 October 1953 Miss 03 Helen POINDEXTER of Staff C reviewed her records and determined that Subject's true name is identical to the captioned Subject and not as shown in your memorandum of 16 October 1953.

SSD Chief
1 Dep. Chief
A. to Chief
[illegible]
Chief CSS.
[illegible]
Desk
CCC Desk
Desk

10/2

SECRET
Security Information

6/PJ

4. In view of the above, no further investigation is contemplated by this office unless advised to the contrary.

Charles W. Kane

McGRATH/mla
10/21/53

03 I informed Mr [illegible] today of the position of Mr Caldwell. I told Mr [illegible] that subject could be [illegible] if necessary, but that we would [illegible] to the [illegible] at his present station [illegible] 4 [illegible] determined [illegible] present [illegible] subject's [illegible], in the event subject's presence [illegible] to be necessary, the question of payment of subject's travel expenses would have to be settled.
[illegible]

- 2 -

SECRET
Security Information

VPJ

SECRET

HIDALGO, LUZ MARIA 06 OVERT #198780

HIDALGO, BALMES N., JR. - OVERT AND COVERT #65007 - FATHER

HIDALGO IS A CURRENT EMPLOYEE, GS-11, ASSIGNED TO WH DIV. HE WAS ADVISED TO ENTER A HOSPITAL IN EARLY MARCH 1962. HIS CURRENT MEDICAL STATUS IS NOT SHOWN.

HIDALGO ASSISTED THE FBI AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM AUGUST 1946 UNTIL MAY 1949 WHEN HE APPEARED AS A GOVERNMENT WITNESS AT THE TRIAL OF THE ELEVEN TOP CP LEADERS.

BEFORE HIS CONVERSION TO 24 STAFF EMPLOYEE STATUS, HIDALGO WAS 24 A CONTRACT EMPLOYEE. HE WAS GRANTED AN OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE FOR USE AS AN AGENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN DEC. 1951. HE WAS GRANTED A COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE IN 1952 FOR USE AS A CONTRACT AGENT. 24 FILES ATTACHED. 24

HIDALGO, ANNIE LOUISE - COVERT #147818 - MOTHER 06 08

SUBJECT'S MOTHER WAS GRANTED A COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR USE IN A CONTRACT-CLERICAL CAPACITY. FILE ATTACHED. 24

5/3/62 DHWOLDORF:MB

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE FILES

FROM : (George Weademan) 03

SUBJECT : MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICA CRISTIANO
#353 012

1. Subject Organization is of interest to CA/1 because it forwarded the attached letter (prepared by Laureano BATESTI falla---212 635) to Bela Kiraly of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Inc.---a 24 (CA sponsored activity) James Condon, CA1/ asked for any available Office of Security data concerning Subject Organization or the writer of the letter. If there was nothing unfavorable available concerning either of them, CA was going to permit (Kiraly) to meet with the representative of Subject Organization in order to 06 determine whether (Kiraly) could be of help to Subject group. 06

2. A review of Office of Security records revealed that Subject Organization is an Anti-Castro group and that the writer of the letter was of interest to the Agency under an Operational Approval in 1960.

03
(George Weademan)

cc: 212 635

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

5 IM

SECRET

SL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD DATE: 18 DEC 1967

SUBJECT: SWENSON, Harold F. **
#73086

Subject's file has been reviewed in connection with his being presented with a Retirement Medallion (~~Silver - Bronze~~) having retired after fifteen (15) or more years of CIA service.

** Certificate Only.

Subject overseas - re-check 1/72 for release of medallion/certificate. O/Pers so advised 12/18/67.

Laurence G. Parr

Laurence G. Parr
Chief
Employee Activity Branch

After discussion with Swenson, Release to Subject (5/8/68)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER

REPLY REQUESTED: XX YES ☐ NO

DATE: 13 December 1967

LETTER NO.

TO : Chief, Central Cover Staff

ATTN: James W. Franklin

FROM: Laurence G. Parr
Chief, Employee Activity Branch, 3 E 54

Please check your records for any cover considerations in connection with the presentation of a retirement medallion to Mr. Harold F. Swenson.

Laurence G. Parr
SIGNATURE

REPLY

DATE

As long as Mr. Swenson remains overseas, there are cover considerations involved.
(R C Blake)
03

03
(James K. D. Becker)
SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 5-61 1831

SECRET

2/N

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/SEC GH-56	EXTENSION 6300	NO. 109301	DATE 5 May 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Chief, PSD 3E-48	12 May 66		fr	For inclusion in Subject's security file.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. Pauline, Control Desk	RECORDED CONTROL DESK			⑤ Record resignation. fr
6.				
7. FILE-4				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH

INFO.
Chief, KUVEST

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
DYVOUR/ADMIN/PERSONNEL James B. Wilcott Jr.
Debriefing of [redacted] - Resignation in field

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

1. Wilcott [redacted] arrived PCS at JMWAVE on 26 April 1965 and submitted his resignation at JMWAVE from KUBARK to be effective cob 15 April 1966. While at JMWAVE Subject was under the cover of JMOCEAN.

2. [redacted] resigned in order to seek employment in private industry. A resume of his KUBARK employment is as follows:

a. Mar 57 (EOD) to May 60 - in Hqs - overt employee

b. May 60 to July 64 - Tokyo, Japan under ODIBEX cover 13-3

c. Aug 64 - leave

d. Sept 64 to Apr 65 - in Hqs - ODIBEX cover

e. 26 Apr 65 to 15 Apr 66 - JMOCEAN

3. Subject was instructed in the event he ever seeks employment with ODYOKE he should contact the Station for guidance as to what he will show as his former ODYOKE employment.

4. Under separate cover there is being forwarded to Headquarters a copy of the resume that [redacted] is submitting in seeking employment with private industry. This resume was written by [redacted] and it was concurred in by Chief/Finance and Chief/Cover of JMWAVE.

Attachment: 1 (Resume)
Under Separate Cover

Philip G. ELMARD

Distribution:
3 - WH w/att u/s/c
2 - KUVEST w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
20 A pr 66	APR 26 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGT-~~15989~~ 16012

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT

SUBSEQUENT TO GRADUATION FROM CENTRAL CITY BUSINESS INSTITUTE

32

March 1957 to May 1960 U.S. Army Element, Composite Operations Group
Room 1B945, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Salary: $6,000.

Review vouchers and determine cost center and object class.

Maintain special payrolls and related accounts and resolve problems relating to leave, retirement, taxes, etc. and correlate payroll function with other departments.

Assist in the installation of and supervision of posting machine operation to maintain allotment ledger. Maintain Miscellaneous Obligation Record and supervise posting clerks. Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual Summary of Allotment Accounts preparation and other related statements. Maintain Expenditure Distribution Ledger and balance with IBM run.

Police certain Appropriation, Fund and Limitation Accounts.

Assist in the preparation of budgets, summaries and reports.

32

May 1960 to July 1964 U.S. Army Element, Composite Operations Group
assigned to Composite Analysis Group, 32
10 Tokyo, Japan
Salary: $6,500.

Maintain and pay special payroll and prepare reports, surveys and summaries.

Control and responsibility for funds in the high six figures. Monthly disbursements in the high six figures to revolving funds. Supervision and audit of revolving funds and accounting vouchers. Monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual statements, summaries and reports of revolving funds.

Control and responsibility for transfers of funds and foreign currency and maintenance of conversion accounts.

11

Supervise and perform financial negotiations with Japanese businessmen.

(Continued)

5|PJ

32

September 1964 to April 1965 — U.S. Army Element, Composite Operations Group Room 1D945
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Salary: $6,890

Perform audit of several special payrolls. Assist in the pilot study and installation of a new payroll system.

Assist various branches in problems relating to the conversion to computer bookkeeping.

Assist in the balancing of the General Ledger accounts in connection with the year-end closing of the books.

24

May 1965 to Present — The Melmar Corporation
Miami, Florida
Payroll Officer
Salary: $8,000.

Reorganize the payroll office and assume responsibility for the schedule and accuracy of payrolls. Instruct, direct and assist clerks in compiling, computing and preparation of payrolls. Prepare checks for distribution. Investigate and settle disputes regarding alleged errors in pay checks. Audit payroll summaries, bank balances and labor distribution records, etc. Prepare quarterly and annual tax report forms, wage reports and surveys. Correlate payroll function with other departments.

2/N

S-E-C-R-E-T

18 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Clearance Branch/Office of Security

FROM : Chief, Contract Personnel Division/Office of Personn

SUBJECT : Full Clearance Requests on WH/C/JMWAVE Staff Agents Converting to Staff Employee Status

It is requested that full clearances be granted the following staff employees converting from staff agent status and remaining with WH/C/JMWAVE.

Name (T)	Security #	Date of Birth
Arnett, Charles L. 03	60831	09/13/14
Carr, Donald W. 03	194478	09/29/42
Chapple, Earl W. 03	101535	10/25/19
Engman, Gladys E. 03	70805	05/29/25
Leahy, John J., Jr. 03	72733	06/04/23
Wages, Dan S. 03	62797	07/08/24
Walls, Helene C. 03	103691	06/14/29
Watkins, William A., Jr. 03	189185	06/29/29
Weimer, Edwin Q. 03	139714	09/18/30
Wilcott, James B., Jr.	109301	09/27/31
Wisniowski, Anthony S.	48802	06/08/08
Wisniowski, Bess A.	49871	12/26/08
Wynn, Marea R. 03	32719	07/09/09
Yothers, Charles D. 03	130499	08/07/29

Joseph B. Ragan
JOSEPH B. RAGAN

Clearance Memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 E 69

S-E-C-R-E-T

a/p/v

39447

S E C R E T

11 May 1960
File K-4849

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FE

ATTENTION : Mr. (Thomas A. Olsen) 03

SUBJECT : VITALE, Guy, nmi
Establishment of Official Cover Backstop

REFERENCE : Request for Domestic Cover 2 May 1960

1. In compliance with above reference, official cover backstopping which utilizes the U. S. Army Element, Joint Operations Group has been established for the above-named individual. All information concerning this cover arrangement is available in the Official Cover and Liaison Section, CCD.

2. It is requested that OCL/CCD be notified when this cover arrangement is no longer required. Any changes in the Subject's Headquarters status should be coordinated with this office for the determination of need for continued documentation and cover.

3. Subject has been issued Unit ID Card No. 1205 for domestic use only. In accordance with arrangements made with Offices of Security and Personnel, the above documentation will be picked up by a CPB representative for any individual making a PCS move from Headquarters or an overseas TDY trip. In the case of the PCS traveler, CPB will return this documentation to OCL/CCD for disposition. For the TDY traveler, this documentation will be retained by CPB and returned to the TDY traveler upon completion of the trip. In the event of a resignation from the Agency, OCL/CCD will obtain the documentation from the employee at the time of the employee's debriefing conference.

/S/ PAUL P. STEWART

JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCD

cc: Personnel Security Division,
Office of Security

13402

S E C R E T

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. HKH-A-5353
TO Chief, KURIOT INFO Chief, WHD		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. UNKNOWN
FROM Chief of Station, Habana		DATE 31 July 59
SUBJECT Operational Transmittal of Blank Documentation		RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED ☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED None.		

REFERENCE(S) DIR-36520 (RYBAT)

1. Transmitted herewith as attachment No. 1 for KURIOT are the following blank documents which were not used or required for the Station Habana E/E Operation referred to in referenced cable. The KURIOT Document Specialist requested that the documents be returned to Headquarters.

10, 31

a. 10 City of Newark, New Jersey Birth Certificate.
b. New York Driver's License (instruction sheet).
c. 31 National Geographic Travel Film Series blank Identity Card.
d. "The Flamingo Hotel" identity Card.
e. A blank Social Security card.

31

2. The following is also transmitted herewith as attachment No. 2:

31

a. Cachet of the Department of Labor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with ink pad.

b. Assorted cellophane sheets used for lamination.

Stanley R. Zeska

Attachments:
2 envelopes.

Distribution:
3 - KURIOT w/atts.
1 - C/WHD w/o atts.
2 - Files

29 July 59
SRZ/cbd

HKH-A-5353

DESENSITIZED

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/~~RYBAT~~	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 1

[illegible]

[illegible]

Chief, WH
[illegible]
Headquarters traces

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: CPCA-24799

1. Headquarters traces on the Subjects of reference and the Hudson Institute follow:

A. Alberto LLERAS Camargo (201-102576) was born in Bogota, 3 July 1906. He left school at the age of seventeen to become a journalist. He traveled to Argentina and lived in Buenos Aires for three years (1926-29) writing for various Argentine periodicals. His political career began upon his return to Colombia in 1929, when he was appointed secretary of the Liberal Party (1930-33) and received tremendous impetus under the aegis of Alfonso LOPEZ, Liberal Party leader and former President of Colombia (1934-38 and 1942-45). Subsequently, LLERAS served in the National House of Representatives (1931-34). When Alfonso LOPEZ was inaugurated President in 1934, he took LLERAS into his government as Secretary General of the Presidency (1934-35), and later made him Minister of Government from 1943 to 1945. The latter year he was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as First Vice President of Colombia. His public service culminated then in his accession to the Presidency on the resignation of President LOPEZ in 1945. After discharging the duties of Chief Executive for a year (1945-46), LLERAS was elected Secretary General of the Pan American Union in 1947, a post which he held until 1954. He then resigned and returned to Colombia to accept the position of Rector (President) of the University of The Andes (1955-56). Devoting himself once again to politics, LLERAS began writing a column in the Liberal Daily _El Espectador_. In his columns he strongly criticized the Rojas regime (1953-57) and called for the return of constitutional government in Colombia. In March 1956, he was elected President of the Liberal Party and shortly thereafter (June 1956) travelled to Spain and had conversations with Laureano GOMEZ, a leader of the Conservative Party and former President of Colombia (1950-53). These two political leaders signed a manifesto condemning the Rojas regime and

(CONTINUED)

[illegible] UFGW-6130

201-102576 SECRET 201-308736

2 - WH/C/RR/OS
1 - WH/C/MSEC
1 - 201-308736

WH/C/RR/OS W. Ullery rat 22 Aug 66 2621

WH/C/RR

WH/C/MO R. Ortman (phone)

WH/C/CA/PP A. Gonzales (draft)

C/WH/C Thomas J. Flores

willing for the establishment of a coalition government in Colombia through bi-partisan efforts. From November 1956 to February 1957 LLERAS served as a United Nations Observer to investigate the Hungarian situation.

LLERAS is described as a champion of the Pan American cause and as being very friendly to the United States and a firm believer in the Western type democracy.

Although he did not complete his education and has no formal degree, he has long been addressed as "doctor" as a matter of courtesy. He does, however, have honorary degrees from several Colombian universities as well as from the University of California. He speaks English and French, is married to the former Berta PUGA (daughter of a late President of Chile) and has four children.

On 24 February 1958 an Operational Approval was granted for the utilization of LLERAS in supporting a special operation. However, before the operation was implemented, LLERAS was elected President of Colombia. There has been no operational interest in him since.

B. There are no Headquarters or LNERGO traces on the Hudson Institute per se, however, LNERGO files contain derogatory information on several members of the institute which LNERGO will furnish WOFACT if we specify which of the members are of interest. If JMWAVE wishes this done, please advise on which of the members information is requested.

C. There are no identifiable traces on the other subjects of paragraph 5 of reference.

2. Headquarters defers to JMWAVE regarding AMBASK/1's future association with the institute.

HOWARD R. COLLEARY

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COS, JMWAVE

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2	Arne pls note Paul's		
3	Comments. When we		
4	[redacted] get Paul's firm		
5	date for travel to Puerto Rico		
6	will you follow this up with S.d. S.		

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Paul - back to
So to P. R. 1st week
of Feb. - Standis
Notify him to send
& hash
the of introduction.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)

23 December 1966

Tom:

I'm not overly enthusiastic about the possibilities of getting much from SKEWER-1; however, I would like to meet him and chat about his friends and business associates in the W/L Islands. He possibly might be used as an entree to reporting or support assets.

It would be my opinion that we would not have to bring his clearance up to date to chat with him.

Paul

I've not made any notes from the files; therefore, if Ed agrees to helping us, details should be forwarded to me prior to my departure for San Juan.

[redacted]

201 SKEWER 1 ✓

Record on SA cards

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

[illegible]

SUBJECT : FERRE, Luis Albert
#215 627

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 5 January 1965 which requested a Covert Security Approval be granted Subject for briefing on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage, Project WUBRINY.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

for R. D. Sparkman

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

30 Dec 1974
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on Ferre (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________ OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3. – Perhaps still some DCD interest – file not clear.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed J. Manger (name) Desk Officer (title) LA/DRH (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed KAM (initials) 6 JAN (date) 1975

This document is a permanent part of this file.

SECRET

201-205712

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

201 SKEWER 1 ✓

Record on SA cards

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

[illegible]

SUBJECT : FERRE, Luis Albert
#215 627

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 5 January 1965 which requested a Covert Security Approval be granted Subject for briefing on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage, Project WUBRINY.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above.

3. Subjects of Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event the Subject's services are not utilized within six months of the date of this memorandum.

for R. D. [illegible]

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Skewer/1 201

26 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Material Company Limited (AMCO) - Meeting with SKEWER/1 on the Relationship of the Puerto Rican Cement Company to AMCO

1. As agreed in his 11 January 1965 meeting with SKEWER/1, Mr. Edward Stanulis telephoned SKEWER/1 on the morning of 18 January to arrange a meeting with SKEWER/1 at his convenience later in the day. SKEWER/1 suggested a meeting at 1500 hours that afternoon in his office at the Puerto Rican Iron Works in Ponce. He indicated to Mr. Stanulis that the Puerto Rican Cement Company looks with favor on AMCO and is doing business with it through its Manager, Mr. Alvin T. Philpotts, Jr.

2. Prior to the meeting, Messrs. Allen, Carter, and Stanulis reviewed the approach to be made to SKEWER/1 in the light of his favorable view of AMCO. It was agreed that no mention would be made of the fact that AMCO is in poor financial condition or that Mr. Philpotts is inadequate as a manager. Stress would be laid upon assessment of the long-term commercial viability of AMCO because KUBARK is ostensibly interested in placing an officer in a managerial position in AMCO, or some other similar firm, in order to monitor Castro's activities in the Caribbean area.

3. Messrs. Allen, Carter, and Stanulis arrived precisely at 1500 hours at SKEWER's office on the second floor of the Puerto Rican Iron Works. His male secretary asked us to take seats in the corridor outside his office. Within a few minutes his secretary reappeared and asked us to wait in the Conference Room. Some ten minutes later SKEWER/1 appeared and invited us into his private office. He was extremely cordial and gracious. Mr. Stanulis introduced Mr. Allen as a colleague who is assessing AMCO's commercial viability. He introduced Mr. Carter as a lawyer consultant who is obtaining background information in the event KUBARK should decide to proceed with placement of an officer in AMCO.

SECRET

4. Mr. Allen informed SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is assessing the factors bearing on the long-term commercial viability of AMCO. He explained that such an assessment is necessary because KUBARK does not want to place an officer in a company which is not commercially viable for the long term. One of the factors bearing on the commercial viability of AMCO is the relationship of the Puerto Rican Cement Company with AMCO and the terms of any agreements. We would also like his views on commodities other than cement which can be shipped from Puerto Rico to the outer islands and what commodities can be shipped on return voyages. Another factor of interest is competition in the shipping field.

5. SKEWER/1 indicated that he needed some clarification of KUBARK objectives. Mr. Stanulis reviewed KUBARK's ostensible interest in having an experienced commercial man in a commercially viable shipping company for the purpose ✓ of checking on Castro activities in the Caribbean area. SKEWER/1 assumed that Mr. Philpotts was the man in whom we are interested. Mr. Allen dispelled this assumption explaining that KUBARK has a candidate whom we would like to place in a managerial position in AMCO if it is determined that AMCO is commercially viable. KUBARK would seek to effect this placement through a friend on the Board who, like SKEWER/1, has helped KUBARK in the past and would undoubtedly help again. SKEWER/1 said, "Oh, yes, through the top man in the company." He then asked if Mr. Philpotts would know of KUBARK interest. Mr. Allen replied no, emphasizing that our interest should be closely held.

6. SKEWER/1 said that he had not realized that we wanted so much detail and asked if we desired to talk with the man in his company most familiar with AMCO. Mr. Stanulis declined, emphasizing that we wanted to keep our interest in this matter confined solely to SKEWER/1. SKEWER/1 immediately agreed to make the necessary telephone calls to obtain answers to our questions. As the basis for his inquiry, he would ask about the amount of credit extended by the Puerto Rican Cement Company to AMCO. SKEWER/1 then made a series of telephone calls to one of his subordinates named Tomas and also made one call to his son. The following information was obtained in the above telephone calls:

a. AMCO has 2 or 3 ships under charter and ships primarily cement to Martinque, Guadaloupe, Barbados, and Antigua.

b. The Puerto Rican Cement Company has a verbal agreement with Mr. Philpotts granting him exclusive distribution of cement in Guadaloupe, Barbados, and Antigua.

c. AMCO currently owes the Puerto Rican Cement Company $40,000 and is slow in payment.

d. The normal procedure for payment is for the consignee to pay Mr. Philpotts by a note which the Puerto Rican Cement Company discounts.

e. The Puerto Rican Cement Company is currently examining how much credit it can extend to AMCO. In this connection the company is examining whether credit extended to AMCO can be insured under the Foreign Credit Insurance Association. (FCIA insures 80% of export credit.) If so, the risk to the Puerto Rican Cement Company would be reduced and further credit could be extended.

f. The Puerto Rican Cement Company has sold 133,000 bags of cement to AMCO.

7. SKEWER/1 said that Mr. Philpotts is aggressive and that he is pushing Puerto Rican cement. Mr. Carter asked SKEWER/1 if his firm were worried about the amount of credit extended to AMCO. SKEWER/1 replied that AMCO is trying to help the Puerto Rican Cement Company and Puerto Rican Cement is in turn trying to help AMCO. SKEWER/1 imparted the impression that he has absolute confidence in his subordinates. In calling Tomas, SKEWER/1 said to us that he had gone over the head of his son. SKEWER/1 was not aware that AMCO Puerto Rico is a subsidiary of AMCO Panama. When apprised of this fact, he said that this arrangement is probably for tax purposes. SKEWER/1 left the impression that he considers AMCO as a Puerto Rican company and one worthy of support. He recalled that he had previously given a job to a Trujillo opponent, Fred Imbert, whom no one else would hire. Mr. Imbert now has his own shipping company and SKEWER/1 suggested that we assess his operation. He recalled that Mr. Trujillo had telephoned him about harboring a criminal. SKEWER/1 told Trujillo to mind his own business as would SKEWER/1. Mr. Stanulis indicated that KUBARK would not want to consider Fred Imbert's operation, given his family's involvement in the Dominican Republic. Throughout the conversation, the picture emerged of a man who trusts his subordinates and who would help an individual or firm, particularly Puerto Rican, which is also trying to help his firm.

8. Mr. Allen said that we would assess the situation carefully, and in the event it should be determined to proceed, we would advise him. Mr. Allen informed him that two New York firms have invested in AMCO, namely, W. S. Kies and Company, and Train, Cabot and Associates. Our friend is Mr. Train, who, as he surmised, is the top man in his firm. Mr. Allen revealed this information to SKEWER/1 in the event that it should be deemed desirable for Mr. Train to negotiate with the Puerto Rican Cement Company. Conversely, in the event of AMCO's failure, it was felt that SKEWER/1 should know that KUBARK is not connected with any other participants. SKEWER/1 offered full cooperation. He had arranged his schedule to give us as much time as necessary. In our presence he received a telephone call in which he apologized for cancelling an appointment in order to accommodate us. It is considered that, as in his past relations with KUBARK, SKEWER/1 can be trusted and will help KUBARK in any way he can.

GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

Distribution:
Orig. - Ops file
1 - WUBRINY D file
1 - SKEWER/1 201
1 - chrono

13 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Project WUBRINY--Antilles Materials Company, Ltd., Discussion by Mr. Edward Stanulis with SKEWER/1.

1. I made initial telephonic contact with SKEWER/1 at approximately 1100 hours on 10 January 1965 and made arrangements for a meeting in my hotel room for the following day between the hours of 1600 and 1700 to be followed by another on Tuesday at a time and place that would be convenient for SKEWER/1. Later in the day SKEWER/1 informed me that he would be unable to meet with us on Tuesday as he was leaving by air on the evening of 11 January for a series of appointments in the States.

2. The meeting with SKEWER/1 was held in my hotel room at 1645 hours on 11 January. I told SKEWER/1 that as he knew, one of KUBARK's prime information targets in Latin America concerned the activities of Castro's Cuba and that in this connection some of our people had been thinking for some time that it would be most useful in pursuing this requirement to have entree into shipping interests that were active in Caribbean waters. SKEWER/1 said he thought this idea excellent. I further stated that these people had heard that SKEWER/1's firm was discussing the possibility of entering into an exclusive Caribbean distributorship contract with Alvin T. Philpotts, Jr., who is associated with the Antilles Materials Company, Ltd. S. A. of Panama and Puerto Rico, and asked him if he had any knowledge of the individual or the negotiations. SKEWER/1 replied that he did not know of either, but that his son would be familiar with both.

3. I asked SKEWER/1 if he would be willing to investigate the situation discreetly without mentioning any interest on KUBARK's part and at the same time consider the commercial feasibility of the venture for AMCO. He agreed.

4. In elaborating on the basic concept, I told SKEWER/1 that if the proper maritime firm were located (that is, one that may be floundering now but has commercial viability potential), we would be interested in placing with the company an individual who possesses the necessary commercial background qualifications and also has the capability of accomplishing certain KUBARK requirements. SKEWER/1 reiterated his conviction that the concept is an excellent one and said he would do all in his power to

help KUBARK achieve this objective.

5. I told him that I would appreciate his cooperation in meeting with two of my friends who are more fully versed in these matters. He agreed and set the meeting for Monday, 19 January 1965. SKEWER/1 gave me his unlisted private telephone number and suggested that I contact him Monday morning, 19 January 1965, to set time and place for the meeting. The number is 842-2120.

E. A. STANULIS

Distribution:
Orig. --C/DO/SA
ADCDO/CO
Gale W. Allen
1--WUBRINY/OPS
1--WUBRINY/D
1--SKEWER/1 201 file
1--SA Chrono

SECRET

Skewer: 201

1 February 1965

Case Officer Comment:

The meeting with SKEWER/1 confirmed Mr. Philpotts' report that his relations with the Puerto Rican Cement Company are good. It also revealed the terms of the relationship between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO which Mr. Philpotts had not reported in detail to WUBRINY/2. It is obvious that Mr. Philpotts has sold himself to certain officials in the Puerto Rican Cement Company who have the confidence of the Company's top management. The extent to which Mr. Philpotts may have conned other businessmen into extending credit and the amount of such credit is a key factor for investigation by WUBRINY/1 and /2, and Mr. Malia on their forthcoming trip. It is feared that Mr. Philpotts has incurred so many debts that the firing of Mr. Philpotts and reorganization of AMCO would be prohibitively expensive.

GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

SECRET

1 February 1965

Case Officer Comment:

The meeting with SKEWER/1 confirmed Mr. Philpotts' report that his relations with the Puerto Rican Cement Company are good. It also revealed the terms of the relationship between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO which Mr. Philpotts had not reported in detail to WUBRINY/2. It is obvious that Mr. Philpotts has sold himself to certain officials in the Puerto Rican Cement Company who have the confidence of the Company's top management. The extent to which Mr. Philpotts may have conned other businessmen into extending credit and the amount of such credit is a key factor for investigation by WUBRINY/1 and /2, and Mr. Malia on their forthcoming trip. It is feared that Mr. Philpotts has incurred so many debts that the firing of Mr. Philpotts and reorganization of AMCO would be prohibitively expensive.

Gale W. Allen
GALE W. ALLEN
DOCO/SA

GROUP 1
[illegible]

SECRET

14 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Materials Company, Ltd.

1. Mr. Ed Stanulis telephoned Mr. Allen at home from San Juan, Puerto Rico, on 11 January 1965. He met with SKEWER/1 as scheduled at 3 P.M. SKEWER/1 was not familiar with any negotiations between the Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO but agreed to look quietly into the matter. He made a telephone call to PR Cement's Sales Manager before he left for New York. SKEWER/1 said that he had such a heavy schedule on this trip, requiring his presence in New York, Chicago, and Connecticut, that he could not squeeze in a meeting with KUBARK representatives. He would, however, be glad to meet with KUBARK representatives in Puerto Rico on 18 January 1965. This delay would also enable him to investigate thoroughly the status of negotiations with AMCO.

2. Mr. Stanulis said that he had followed the previously agreed approach to SKEWER/1. He emphasized that KUBARK is interested in AMCO only to the extent that a feasible commercial arrangement can be worked out, so that placement of an officer in AMCO to work against Cuba would make sense. He indicated that AMCO is not doing too well financially and that the question is whether it can be resurrected on a sound commercial basis. Mr. Stanulis informed SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is not interested in taking an equity position in AMCO.

3. Mr. Stanulis affirmed unequivocally to Mr. Allen his previous assessment of SKEWER/1, namely that SKEWER/1 will do anything to help KUBARK, particularly against Cuba. Mr. Stanulis will write a report upon arrival in Washington on or about 13 January 1965.

GALE W. ALLEN

Distribution:
- Orig. - Ops file
- 1 - Subj. file
- 1 - SKEWER/1 201
- 1 - chrono

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DOCO/SA 14 JAN 1965

ATTENTION : Gale W. Allen

FROM : Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT : FERRE, Antonio Luis
#450 945

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 January 1964 which requested a Provisional Covert Security Approval to permit Subject, President, Puerto Rican Cement Company, to be made witting of Agency interest in WUBRINY/D in the event his father, a cleared Agency contact, desires to discuss with Subject this interest.

2. In accordance with the provisions set forth in Clandestine Services Instruction No. 10-5 and Clandestine Services Instruction - Field No. 10-5, a Provisional Covert Security Approval is granted for the use of the Subject as described in your request as set forth in paragraph 1, above. This confirms a verbal PCSA granted 5 January 1965.

3. Subjects of Provisional Covert Security Approvals are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.

4. Your attention is called to the fact that a Provisional Covert Security Approval does not constitute complete compliance with the provisions of CIA Regulation 10-3. Therefore, if you should desire at a later date to change the status or use of this individual, a request for approval to cover any proposed change should be sumbitted to this office.

5. This approval becomes invalid in the event action is not taken within 90 days of the date of this memorandum.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

R. G. Sparling
for Victor R. White

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When Filled In)

GROUP 1
Excluded from Automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

Subject

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 7 January 1964

TO:
- ☐ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DOCO/SA

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Antonio Luis Ferre

PROJECT: WUBRINY

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.:

SO FILE NO. 450945

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐ PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒ PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK
☐ COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐ CONTRACT TYPE A	☐ CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

United States-Puerto Rico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

Desire PCSA in the event his father, a cleared KUBARK contact, 201-205712, SO file number 215627, desires to discuss with him KUBARK interest in WUBRINY/D. Subject is President, Puerto Rican Cement Company, born 1934, Ponce, Puerto Rico, U.S. citizen. Will seek additional biographic information.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRO AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐ PRO I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐ PRO II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐ PRO II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐ GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

6. RI TRACES

☐ NO RECORD	☒ WILL FORWARD	☐ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐ NO RECORD	☐ WILL FORWARD	☐ NON-DEROGATORY	☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐ NO RECORD	☐ WILL FORWARD
☐ NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐ DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐ LIST OFFICES CHECKED	☐ SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐ NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*	

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Gale W. Allen, DOCO/SA	11-61961	Norman G. Swift, C/DOCO/SA

FORM 8-60 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

Skewer 1

13 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Antilles Materials Company, Ltd.

1. Messrs. Allen and Carter met on 8 January 1965 with Mr. Edward Stanulis, former COS San Juan, to discuss an approach to SKEWER/1 for information on subject company. It was agreed that Mr. Stanulis would go to Puerto Rico on 9 January and contact SKEWER/1 on the 10th. Hopefully SKEWER/1 could obtain information on negotiations between Puerto Rican Cement Company and AMCO in time for a meeting with Messrs Stanulis, Allen, and Carter on 12 January. Messrs. Allen and Carter would plan to arrive in San Juan at 10:50 P.M. on 11 January.

2. Mr. Stanulis would apprise SKEWER/1 of KUBARK's interest in placing a KUBARK officer in a small shipping and trading company operating in the Caribbean area in order to monitor Cuban activities. SKEWER/1 would be cautioned to keep this knowledge confidential. In this connection, Mr. Stanulis said that SKEWER/1 had proved to be absolutely reliable from the security point of view. Mr. Stanulis would advise SKEWER/1 that KUBARK is looking at AMCO which is negotiating with the Puerto Rican Cement Company to be its cement distributor in the Caribbean area. SKEWER/1 would be asked to confirm any negotiations and the terms involved. His answers would be given in the subsequent meeting with Messrs. Stanulis, Allen, and Carter. Further discussion with SKEWER/1 would be conditioned on his answers. In any case KUBARK representatives would ascertain his views on the validity of AMCO's commercial concept and on any possibility for commercial collaboration between PR Cement and AMCO.

3. Mr. Stanulis on 10 January 1965 telephoned Mr. Allen at home to report that he has a meeting scheduled with SKEWER/1 at 3 P.M. on 11 January. SKEWER/1 is leaving the night of 11 January for New York where he will remain through part of 15 January. Mr. Stanulis will try to get a flight out of Puerto Rico for New York, so that a meeting may be arranged for Messrs. Stanulis, Allen, and Carter with SKEWER/1 in New York. Mr. Stanulis will call Mr. Allen after his meeting with SKEWER/1. Mr. Stanulis is staying at the Hotel Da Vinci, Room 81.

SECRET

SKEWER/1 will be staying in New York at the Hotel Savoy Plaza. Mr. Allen immediately telephoned Mr. Carter, 941-2802, and advised him of the change in plans.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen
DOCO/SA

DOCO/SA:GWA:jev (13 Jan. 1965)

Distribution:
✓ 0 - Subject
1 - WUBRINY Ops
1 - SA Chrono
✓ 1 - SKEWER/1

SECRET

Subject

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 5 January 1955

TO:	☐	CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
	☒	CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
	☐	CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: DOCO/SA

SUBJECT: (True name) Luis Albert Ferre

PROJECT: WUBRINY

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO. C-32943

RI 201 FILE NO. 201-205712

SO FILE [illegible]

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☐	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☒	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL 8 Dec. 1954	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☒	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY (SO field investigation)
☐	CONTRACT TYPE A	☐	CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

United States - Puerto Rico

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

The Puerto Rican Cement Company is interested in having WUBRINY D as its overt distributor in the Caribbean area. Desire to brief Subject on KUBARK objectives in WUBRINY D and propose long term commercial collaboration of mutual advantage. One of the KUBARK officers doing the briefing will be the new manager of WUBRINY D and continuing contact with Subject. Previously investigated

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☐ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☐	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☐	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 100951

6. RI TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD	☐	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	WILL FORWARD
☐	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	☐	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
☐	LIST SOURCES CHECKED	☐	SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
☐	NOT INITIATED (Explanation)		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Gale W. Allen, DOCO/SA	11-61951	Norman G. Swift, C/DOCO/SA

FORM 8-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

SECRET

5 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Albert Ferra (201-205712)

1. WH/2/Dominican Republic holds Subject's file which has been loaned to DO/SA. Mr. Allen on 5 January 1965 telephoned the DR Desk Officer, Mr. David McGrath, and explained that DO/SA would like to make Subject witting of KUBARK interest in WUBRINY D. Mr. McGrath said that the Desk is not now using Subject and that it has no objection to DO/SA briefing Subject. He asked that a memorandum covering the contact be prepared for inclusion in the Subject's file.

2. Mr. Allen on 5 January 1965 informed DO/Security that DO/SA desires to make Subject witting of KUBARK interest in WUBRINY D. A PCSA had previously been granted on 8 December 1964 with the understanding that a CSA can be quickly obtained because of the existing O/A on him. DO/Security said that necessary action for a CSA would be undertaken at once and that he foresees no problem.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen

GWA:jev

Distribution:
0 - Subject file
1 - WUBRINY Ops
1 - WUBRINY D
1 - SA Chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

9 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERRE

DO/Security informed Mr. Allen on 8 December 1964 that a PCSA has been granted on Subject. Subject's Office of Security file number is 215627. DO/Security further advised that if Subject has to be made witting of Agency interest in WUBRINY D, then a CSA can be quickly obtained because an OA was previously issued on Subject.

Gale W. Allen
Gale W. Allen

GWA/gc

Distribution:
✓1 - Subj file
1 - WUB ops
1 - SA chrono

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SENDER WILL CHECK CLAS ICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	X	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DO/SA, Mr. Gale ALLEN		
2	Rm 522-F, 1250 Pa Ave.		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION		SIGNATURE
X	per your phone request				

Remarks:

Mr. ALLEN: Subject has two sons per Security's record:

Antonio Luis F..... born 1934, Ponce
Rosario J. F...... born 1938, Ponce

Pls let me know if I should conduct traces.

Thank you—

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Anna PANOR, DO/HS 5 E 46 HQS Bldg.	7 Dec.64

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	X	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
2-61

(40)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O—[illegible]

SECRET

26 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: A/DO/CA

ATTENTION : Mr. Howard Hunt

SUBJECT : Trace reply - Luis FERRE

REFERENCE : A/DO/CA Memorandum dated 7 August 1964

1. Traces have been completed on

Luis Alberto FERRE Aguayo, 201-205712
AKA: Luis A. FERRER; Luis Albert FERRE
DPOB: 17 February 1904, Ponce, Puerto Rico
CIT : U.S.A., formerly, Puerto Rico
OCC : Senator and Industrialist
RES : Reina Mora Street, No. 2, Ponce, Puerto Rico

Subject, a wealthy member of the Puerto Rican Legislature, heads the Republican (Statehood) Party, and is a stockholder in El Tiempo, Inc., located at 78 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. The Chief, DO Division desires background information on Subject.

2. RID Files, the Office of Security, CI/OA, and WH/2/DR had a record of Subject. The 201 file is held by WH/2/DR on permanent charge. CI/OA maintains a file on Subject which was reviewed and the results are forwarded herewith, in a separate envelope, as Attachment No. 1. Included in Attachment 1 is operational and investigative information from the Office of Security and the 201 file. Attachment No. 2 is a biographic data sheet forwarded by the Office of Security.

3. The following biographic information is from the 201 file:

Physical Description: 5 ft., 7½ inches tall; weight - 155; slender build; light complexion with brown hair and eyes; oval-shaped face with a scar on the left cheek bone.

Education: Public schools, Ponce, Puerto Rico; the Morristown School, Morristown, New Jersey; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, B.S. and M.S. Degrees.

Languages: English, Spanish, and French.

Family Background: Married to Lorencita (nee Ramirez de Arellano) FERRE, born 9 July 1905, San German, Puerto Rico and she is a U. S. citizen. There are two children who also are

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U. S. citizens. Subject has four brothers and one sister (see Attachment 2). He is Vice President of the Ferre Industries, which comprise the following group:

Ponce Cement Corporation, Ponce, P. R.
Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P. R.
Puerto Rico Glass Corporation, San Juan, P. R.
Puerto Rico Clay Corporation, San Juan, P. R.
Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiquetia, Venezuela
Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba (present status unknown)
Ponce Products, Incorporated, Miami, Florida

Subject is the Director of the Bank of Ponce. Capital holdings of Ferre Industries had been estimated at over $1,000,000.00 in 1960 and Subject's personal earnings at approximately $50,000.00 per year. Subject has written articles on: "Industrial Democracy," "American Citizenship," "Cement Plants," and "Sugar Mills." He is a member of the Lions Club and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

Anna Panor
DO/HS

Attachments:
1. Envelope
2. Bio Data Sheet (Not att'd/DO/HS Chrono copy is a thermofax and
will not reproduce, sorry)

Distribution:
Orig. w/atts. - A/DO/CA
1, " " - C/DO/H
1, " " - DO/HS Chrono.

SECRET

Attachment to DO/HS Memorandum
dated 26 August 1964

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

Operational and Cl[illegible] Information

1. Subject was mentioned in two KAPOK Dispatches by the Chief of Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico, as a possible candidate through whom leads to persons in the Dominican Republic could be developed and targeted against the intelligence service and the ruling circles there. In HPSA-1223 and HPSA-941, both dated 11 September 1956, Subject is mentioned as a good person for the beginning of covert operations in the Dominican Republic because he was well known and considered discreet by those who knew him. Becuase of his businesses in the U.S. and the Caribbean area, Subject had many persons working for him over a period of years who owed him some allegiance. Subject's companies did much business in the Dominican Republic. SKEDADDLE, the Station's contact, was instructed to approach him indirectly through a cut-out who was Angel FONSECA Jiminez, a personalffriend of SKEDADDLE, a member of the Puerto Rican legislature, a senior member of the Republican (Statehood) Party, and very close to Subject.

2. Information in Subject's PRQ II revealed that he was assigned the cryptonym SKEWER/1. The case officer was introduced to Subject by one Francisco A. LOPEZ Dominguez, the U.S. Collector of Customs-in-Charge in Puerto Rico on a strictly social basis in March 1960 (this was to be Subject's cover, and there was no monetary remuneration). Since Subject was considered a loyal U.S. citizen, he was made witting of KUBARK's interest in persons in the Dominican Republic who might lead to the target. He accepted to assist KUBARK in this endeavor enthusiatically. Although it was known that Subject once served as an honorary Vice Consul for Sweden, a common practice for prominent businessmen in Latin America, he was not known to have any connections with a foreign intelligence service. His value to KUBARK lay in his personal knowledge of persons and facts in the Dominican Republic, particularly individuals who travelled there for legal reasons, as well as his social and political status. The case officer described Subject as "intelligent," "well educated," and "a political leader whose real strength is in his being an enlightened capitalist." Because he was (and is) so prominent, and could not withstand too much weakening of his position, he should not be used "directly" in any operation (in the opinion of the case officer who wrote the PRQ evaluation).

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SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

3. According to information in C-82943 (CI/OA File), WH/3/DRAH requested a POA on 4 May 1960 for permission to allow the use of Subject to "provide useful information on, or through witting or unwitting employees, courier access to the Dominican Republic." Results of Green List No. 100951 dated 4 May 1960 were "no pertinent identifiable information" on 17 May 1960, and a field trace reply of that date was "no derogatory traces." The POA was granted 31 May 1960 and the OA on 11 September 1960. These clearances were cancelled on 21 and 24 March 1961, respectively, in notices to CI/OA by WH/3/DRAH. Reasons for these cancellations were not given. On 22 August 1961, WH/4/Cuba requested a reinstatement of the OA, for use as an informant. The request was granted by CI/OA on 11 September 1961.

4. An investigation report by the Office of Security in 1960 was not unfavorable. It did make reference to information in an FBI report dated 19 May 1960, in Washington, D.C., which also appeared in the Subject's 201 file. This report contained the following information:

a) In 1951, as leader of the Statehood Party, Subject attacked compulsory military service for Puerto Rico, calling it taxation without representation. In 1952, however, he was one of the Statehood Party leaders who made public statements of their pride in their U.S. citizenship, their desire to live permanently under the U.S. flag, and their recommendation that pardon and clemency be granted in meritorius cases of persons accused in connection with the Nationalist Revolt in 1950.

b) In 1952, Subject reportedly offered a job to Elizer Curet Cuevas, a Communist Party member in Puerto Rico (source not specified).

c) The FBI received information (source not specified) in 1952 and 1953 that Subject received mail from one Juan Antonio Corretjer, a former member of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party.

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment No. 1 to
DO/HS Memorandum dated
26 August 1964

d) At the request of the Justice Department, the FBI conducted an *inquiry, under the Anti-trust Laws of the U.S., into the cement industry in San Juan, Puerto Rico during December 1958. As industrialist and financier, Subject reportedly controlled the cement industry in Puerto Rico. The Anti-trust Division Files of the Department of Justice contain the results of the inquiry.

5. The Chief of Station, San Juan, Puerto Rico, according to HPSA-1969 dated 4 January 1964, met with Subject in Ponce on 26 December 1963. At this time, Subject told the Chief of Station that he was considering the construction of two sizable plants (cement and glass) in the Dominican Republic "as a means of augmenting official assistance through private enterprise." Subject felt that it was "imperative for all free nations of the Hemisphere to do all in their power to help the Dominican Republic become a true Democracy and deny it to the Communists. In this vital task, private capital must also participate actively." This is the conviction that prompted Subject to consider building the plants.

*According to a memorandum to CI/OA dated 27 May 1960, from WH/3/DRAH, the inquiry had no effect on its proposed operational use.

6. One document in the 201, UFGA-12398 dated 7 November 1963, reveals that Subject was a member of a group of Latin Americans who notionally subsidized AMSCROLL (probably an asset of WH/SA). JUAN 0404 (IN 33997), 7 December 1961, one of a number of cables in Subject's 201 file, indicates that Subject took intense interest in Cuban affairs and was more than willing to obtain information on Cuban elements.

7. According to a document in Subject's 201, the Central Cover Staff had a record, Page 2129 dated 11 May 1960 in their File #3-3 in connection with WH/3/DRAH's POA/OA, but had no active or direct interest in Subject.

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

7

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/6		14 JAN 1964		
2.				
3. C/WH/6/PE				
4. CRL				
5. BI/				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

chrono detached

Any intel value?

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) 201-205712

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 4 Jan 64

DOCUMENT NUMBER HPSA 01969

610a USE PREVIOUS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, WHD		MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief of Station, Santo Domingo		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, San Juan		MICROFILM
SUBJECT Meeting with SKEWER-1		

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action: Information

1. COS met with SKEWER-1 in Ponce, P. R. on 26 December 1963.

2. During general conversation, SKEWER-1 said he was considering the construction of two sizeable plants (cement and glass) in the Dominican Republic as a means of augmenting official assistance through private enterprise and asked COS's opinion of the venture. COS responded that this was personal decision for SKEWER-1 to make.

3. SKEWER-1 said he felt that it was imperative for all free nations of the Hemisphere to do all in their power to help the Dominican Republic become a true democracy and to deny it to the Communists. In this vital task, he added, private capital must also participate actively. This personal conviction, he said, is what has prompted him to consider building the cement and glass plants.

3. SKEWER-1 said that he believed the present GODR was democratically-oriented and would do a good job in the interval between the Junta reign and elections for a successor government. He also praised the selection of Donald REID Cabral to succeed DE LOS SANTOS.

Melvin K. Lamiaux
Melvin K. LAMIAUX

Distribution:
② - Chief, WHD
1 - COS, Santo Domingo

201-205712

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HPSA-1969	4 January 1964
	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 201-305712

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG : JACQUES PRINDIVILLE:pjm
UNIT : WH/4/DRAH
EXT : 2065
DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1961 1716

TO : SAN JUAN
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : BELL 10
INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

19 SEP 61 22 46 z

~~SIG CEN~~

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

OUT98467

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 12786

REF: DIR 12785 (OUT OUT98466)*

IDEN IS LUIS ALBERT FERRE.

END OF MESSAGE

*Cable Secretariat please supply ref.

R. W. Herbert for
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

R. K. DAVIS, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

201-305712

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG : JACQUES PRINDIVILLE:pjl
UNIT : WH/4/DR&H
EXT : 2065
DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1961 1715

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SAN JUAN

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : BELL 10

INFO : WH 5, S/C 2

19 SEP 61 22 45z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

☒ ROUTINE

OUT98466

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 12785

OA GRANTED IDEN. ASSIGNED CRYPTO SKEWER-1.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO JMZIP CABLES.

R. W. Herbert
J. C. KING, C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

R. K. DAVIS, C/WH/4
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

201-205712

No. C-82943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4 - A. Amori

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of Luis Albert FERRE

______________________________, for the purpose specified in your request

dated 12 Aug 1961.

OA granted for use of Subject as set forth in PRQ Part II.

SEP 12 12 15 PM '61

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI 10-5 and FR 10-215.

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 11 Sept 1961

PM '61

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

dea

SECRET

FORM NO. 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUN 58

(9)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

Attention: Mr. Drew Kohler

FROM : WH/4/FI-CI

SUBJECT : C-82493

1. Attached for your retention is a complted copy of the PRQ Part II on Subject case. It is requested that a full Operational Approval be processed on the Subject.

2. Subject has not yet been assigned a cryptonym. Your office will be advised immediately of any further action on this matter.

Joseph S. Piccolo
WH/4/FI/Haiti-PR

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, San Juan

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
SKEWER-1 - Clarification of Operational Status

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION: As appropriate, per paragraphs two and three.

REF: HPSA-1955 (RYBAT) (27 September 1963)

1. A full Operational Approval was issued on 11 September 1961 for use of SKEWER-1 as set forth in the PRQ Part II submitted to Headquarters with JU-232 (18 July 1961). Notification of issuance of the OA was given the Station in DIR 12785 and DIR 12786.

2. If the Station judges that the above-cited PRQ Part II no longer obtains as to Subject's actual current operational status and use (Headquarters' file on Subject shows that it does not; e.g., his funding of a Station JMWAVE operation), an up-to-date PRQ Part II should be submitted in order to amend the OA issued in September 1961.

3. The Station should be guided by the provisions of CSI-F-50-17 with respect to keeping Headquarters informed of current operational contact with and use of Subject.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
2 - COS, San Juan

201-205712

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	CS COPY HPSW-1407	[illegible] NOV 1963 31 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-205712

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/6/DR/PR	C. R. LANUALES	ja	4524

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/6/DR/PR		W. TRENTA

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WHD	1 Nov 63	J. C. KING

1 - CS (201-205712)
ROUTING/Chrono | INITIALS
RID/AN
RID/MIS
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
WH/6/PR
DESTROY

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

578

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

~~[illegible]~~ - 201-

DATE : 2 AUG 61

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAN JUAN

ACTION: BELL 10

INFO : COP, ADDP/A, CA 2, CA/EAG, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, IOD 4, WH 5, S/C 2

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

AUG 3 0106Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 47500

PRITY DIR INFO TRUJ CITE JUAN 0240

TDCS-3/482,637
carded

DYVOUR 4

MEETING 1 AUG WITH LUIS FERRE PRODUCED FOLL:

A. FERRE HAD CONVERSATION 25 JULY WITH FRANK CHAVEZ AFL-CIO LEADER IN PUERTO RICO. CHAVEZ PROPOSED FERRE GO DOM REP ACT AS CATALYST BETWEEN CONFLICTING FORCES AND USHER IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ARGUED THAT MAN FERRE'S STATURE COULD SERVE IN PLACE OAS COMMISSION. FERRE FAVORABLY INCLINED IN PRINCIPLE. FERRE IN CONTACT CARLOS CHARDON, WELL KNOWN PUERTO RICAN AGRONOMIST WHO NOW IN DOMREP AT INVITATION BALAGUER CONNECTION AGRARIAN REFORMS. CHARDON FAVORS IDEA FERRE MEDIATION. (COMMENT: FERRE REQUESTED NOTHING; YAUGER VOLUNTERRED NOTHING. FOR HQS INFO YAUGER EXPECTS TALK NEXT WITH FERRE 8 AUG).

B. CHAVEZ HAD JUST RETURNED FROM SEEING ARTURO ESPIALLAT IN CANADA. AS LONG TIME FRIEND ESPIALLAT, CHAVEZ CLAIMS CREDIT FOR GETTING RAMFIS TRUJILLO RELEASE ESPAILLAT. CHAVEZ ALSO FRIENDLY WITH RAMFIS WHO, ACCORDING CHAVEZ FAVORS DEMOCRATIZATION DOMREP BUT WANTS LEAVE COUNTRY, LIQUIDATING FAMILY ASSETS AT TEN CENTS ON THE DOLLAR. ASSETS IN DOMREP ESTIMATED AT 800 MILLION DOLLARS. FERRE COMMENTED THAT IN LONG RUN IT WOULD BE CHEAPER FOR DOMINICANS

SECRET

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RID THEMSELVES TRUJILLOS BY PAYING, SAY, FIVE CENTS ON DOLLAR RATHER THAN SUFFER CONSEQUENCES CIVIL WAR. CHAVEZ SAYS HECTOR TRUJILLO ALSO WANTS OUT BUT PETAN WANTS CONTINUE DYNASTY. CHAVEZ SAYS RAMFIS HAS SOLID BACKING AIR FORCE WHICH IS REAL STRENGTH ARMED FORCES.

carded

C. FERRE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY OSVALDO T GRIMALDI AND JOSE ANTONIO SALCEDO AS LEADERS IN PUERTO RICO OF PRD WHO ASKED MONEY FOR MEDICINES CLOTHING ETC. FERRE STALLED BUT IS INCLINED GIVE SOMETHING TO KEEP ON GOOD SIDE ANY ANTI COMMUNIST GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO. JU-232

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. *This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.*
2. *Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.*
3. *Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.*
4. *Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.*
5. *Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.*

1. CRYPTONYM SKEWER/1

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I

CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

Case Officer first met Subject through the aid of Francisco A. LOPEZ Dominguez who, as U.S. Colector of Customs in charge, is witting of CO's true status. LOPEZ arranged a lunch for three at the Zipperlie Restaurant. There were two purposes: to meet Subject as part of SKIPPER's general requirement to know outstanding figures, and to pave the way for contact in accordance with the POA that already had been requested. The initial meeting was in March 1960; the POA was received on 24 June 1960 in JW-45.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Yes - to any senior officer (Subject is 57 years old)

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None

FORM NO. 1 NOV 58 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95a WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

(4-80)

SECTION II MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stock comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is a genuine loyal American citizen. His citizenship, his schooling (Morristown School, Morristown, New Jersey; Massachusetts Institute of Technology), his position as head of the large industrial complex which operates both in Puerto Rico and in the continental United States, and his outstanding political status combine to motivate him to support the United States.

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

No control other than the suasion of patriotism.

SECTION III COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Social cover. Case Officer's cover makes acquaintanceship entirely plausible.

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

His business and social positions.

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

Witting.

SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

No known such connection.

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

F. A. LOPEZ Dominguez (see Section I1) to the extent only of having effected the introduction.

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None

SECTION V COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

Such collaboration is in the realm of theoretical possibility. Only known connection with a foreign government is that he has served asan honorary vice consul for Sweden, a common practice of Latin American business men.

SECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

No previous use known.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

From his business and social positions. That is, his normal business and social contacts supply him with his information.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Subject is witting.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject's value lies in his personal knowledge of persons and facts in the target country, and his access to persons having legal reasons to travel to that country. Also, through him access can be had to local persons who may be in a position to be useful - wittingly or unwittingly.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

See Para 4 immediately above.

SECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E., TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

So far as is known, the Case Officer is the only Agency person known to Subject. The relationship is social - on a witting basis. No remuneration is involved.

SECRET

SECTION IX — QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Although Subject is an intelligent, well-educated person, he should not be used directly in operations. His value is as described in Section VI4. Furthermore, his political position prohibits involvement in operations.

SECTION X — COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

NA

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. *(Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.)*

NA

SECTION XI — CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

--

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

As an outstanding public figure, knowledge about Subject is general and all "Who's Who" write-ups contain long articles about him.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED. POA	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

In addition to Section II 1, although a leader in politics, Subject's real strength is in his being an enlightened capitalist. One Who's Who description says "pioneer in the job of humanizing industry". Is a Catholic lay leader. Has held various public service positions, e.g., Lions Club, Chamber of Commerce, Council of the Boy Scouts; honorary secretary of MIT; philanthropist; etc.

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

None known

SECTION XII — SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

With Case Officer, Subject has been most sparing in use of liquor; as a political public figure any personal weaknesses would have been well aired.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII — AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

Plays the piano well.

SECTION XIV — GENERAL

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

Subject's English is excellent but he probably would be noted as having been raised other than in the continental United States. Information is lacking as to his foreign language abilities, and such information has not been sought in view of the non-operational nature of his connection with the Agency.

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

Except for such factual data as place of schooling, Subject is such a prominent public figure that general information about him is public knowledge.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. (Also see para. 43b, supra)

NA

SECTION XV — EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W; WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE; WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

If contact with Subject were to be made other than through the Case Officer, the newly-contacting Officer should exhibit documentary evidence of his Agency connection and a reasonable explanation of why the introduction is not made by the Case Officer.

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS

See Section IX 1.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER
18 July 1961	

SECRET

SKEWER-1

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: *1. Write clearly.*
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME *(First)*	*(Middle)*	*(Last)*	*(Nee)*
Luis	Albert	FERRE	

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: None

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 17 February 1904

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Ponce, Puerto Rico

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

Very well-known in community; of high moral character.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquitals)*

None

9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

9a. SEX	9b. AGE	9c. APPARENT AGE	9d. HEIGHT	9e. WEIGHT	9f. COMPLEXION	9g. FACE *(Shape)*
X M ☐ F	56	50	FT. 5 IN.	155	Light	Oval

9h. COLOR OF HAIR	9i. COLOR OF EYES	9j. TEETH	9k. BUILD	9l. POSTURE
Brown	Brown	Good	Slender	Erect

9m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar on left cheek bone

9n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

9o. PROMINENT FEATURES

9p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

14-00000

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP [illegible]	2. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 1.)* [illegible]

3. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
[illegible]

4. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 3.)*
Same

5. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

6. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
Europe, Venezuela, Cuba. Business and travel.

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

1. PRESENT OCCUPATION Ferre Industries	2. TITLE Vice-President	3. SALARY *(Per annum)* Over $25,000

4. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

1. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Roman Catholic

2. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Lions Club
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Member of Republican (Statehood) Party

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

1. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
Ponce Public Schools				
Morristown School, New Jersey				
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.				B.S., M.S.

2. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	
English	X		X		X		X	
French	X				X		X	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

1. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Articles on: Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship
Cement Plants
Sugar Mills

2. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Piano playing; fencing.

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES		UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
	FROM	TO			
Unknown					

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.

1	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER		6. REASON FOR LEAVING
2	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER		6. REASON FOR LEAVING
3	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER		6. REASON FOR LEAVING
4	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER		6. REASON FOR LEAVING
5	1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	2. EMPLOYER		3. ADDRESS
	4. TYPE OF WORK	5. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER		6. REASON FOR LEAVING

14-00000

SECTION IX					**MARITAL STATUS**						
1. CHECK ONE:	☐	SINGLE	☐	MARRIED	☐	WIDOWED	☐	SEPARATED	☐	DIVORCED	☐ ANNULLED

2. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

3. NAME OF SPOUSE	*(First)* Lorencita	*(Middle)*	*(Nee)* Ramirez de Arellano	*(Last)* FERRE

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE	5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
6. DATE OF BIRTH 9 July 1905	7. PLACE OF BIRTH San German, Puerto Rico
8. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Puerto Rican	9. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS U. S.
10. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Last residence, if deceased)* Reina Mora St., No. 2, Ponce, Puerto Rico	

SECTION X — **CHILDREN**

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Antonio Luis FERRE	X		1934	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Rosario J. FERRE			1938	Ponce, Puerto Rico	

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD *(Identify child and give his, or her, present address)*

SECTION XI — **FATHER**

1. FULL NAME Antonio FERRE	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1877	3. PLACE OF BIRTH Cuba	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cuban
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS U. S.	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE La Alhambra, Ponce, P.R.	

SECTION XII — **MOTHER**

1. FULL NAME Mary AGUAYO	2. YEAR OF BIRTH 1877	3. PLACE OF BIRTH Ponce, Puerto Rico	4. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
5. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	6. OCCUPATION	7. PRESENT RESIDENCE Deceased	

SECTION XIII BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jose A. FERRE	X		1902	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Rosario FERRE	X		1905	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Carlos F. FERRE	X		1907	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Herman FERRE	X		1909	Ponce, Puerto Rico	
Ysolina FERRE		X	1914	Ponce, Puerto Rico	

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XIV RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

1. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENTS AND POSITIONS HELD.

None

2. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

3. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

N.A.

4. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

SECTION XV PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE

14-00000

SECRET

file

8 August 1961

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERRE

1. Luis Albert FERRE, prominent Puerto Rican businessman, financier, and industrialist, was born in Ponce, Puerto Rico on 17 February 1904. The Subject was educated in the Ponce Public schools, the Morristown School in New Jersey, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he received his B.S. and M.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering.

2. FERRE has traveled widely, primarily through Europe and the Caribbean, under United States Passport #3452P, issued in 1953, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Subject speaks Spanish, English, and French; he is a member of the Roman Catholic Church, the Republican (Statehood) Party, Lions Club, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

3. FERRE is presently Vice-President of Farre Industries and has held (or in some instances still holds) the following positions:

Vice-President	Ponce, Cement Corp., Ponce, P.R.
Vice-President	Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P.R.
President	Puerto Rico Glass Corp., San Juan, P.R.
Vice-President	Puerto Rico Clay Corp., San Juan, P. R.
President	Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiguetia, Venezuela
Director	Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba
Chairman	Ponce Products, Inc, Miami, Florida
Director	Maule Industries, Miami, Florida
Director	Banco de Ponce, P.R.

The Subject's capital holdings are estimated to be over $1,000,000; his earnings are estimated at $50,000 per year.

4. Sr. FERRE is widely known throughout the Caribbean and is reportedly a man of high moral character and above average intelligence.

Sent to STATE
on 8 Aug 61

as possible candidate for
OAS-sponsored team to
go DR for long period

SECRET

SECRET

JU- 232
18 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, WH DIVISION

SUBJECT: General - Operational

Specific - Submitting PRQ Part II on Subject JW-45

REFERENCE: JW-84

In compliance with Reference, the requested information is herewith submitted.

Warren S. Yauger
Warren S. Yauger

Enclosure:
PRQ Part II

SECRET

SECRET

Memo No.: [illegible]-84

Date 5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR : **Warren S. YAUGER**

FROM : **Chief, WHD**

SUBJECT : General -

Specific - **Subject of References**

ACTION REQUIRED:

Reference : A. DIR 01693 (OUT 71937)

B. JW-45

1. The operational use of the subject of the references was requested by ODIBEX on 1 June 1961. In view of KUBARK's previous contact with the subject and probable future operational interest in the subject, STONESET has requested KUBARK's maintainance of the subject's clearance.

2. To complete the subject's clearance for full operational approval, you are requested to provide as promptly as possible the requisite PRQ Part II information. Enclosed herewith are two copies of the appropriate form.

END OF DISPATCH

Attachment
As Stated

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: FI/DC/ISR 1613 L Marie Ferrari

NO.

DATE 1 June 1961

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/3/Puerto Rico -Rm 1-004 Barton Hall Attn: Nelson Smith			[illegible]	Attached for your subject's 201 file.
2.				
3.				Dispatch to Shipper stating Stewart far taken out. [illegible] sub. for sur. trace / [illegible] need any II.
4. Farmer.			[illegible]	
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. Sec.				~~File Shipper~~
10.				File Ferre 201.
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-205712

FORM 1 DEC 54 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Marie Ferrari
ISR 1613 L
x 8077

TRACE REQUEST

ISR MATERIAL
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

PLS CALL REQUESTOR WHEN CHECK IS COMPLETED

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
ISRM NO. 3395
DATE 24 May 61
201 NO. 305712

SD-8645

NAME
Luis Alberto Ferre Aguayon - Department of the Army

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS
None indicated

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
17 Feb 1904	Ponce, Puerto Rico	

PRESENT ADDRESS

OCCUPATION
Mechanical Engineer

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA
MIT graduate - 1924 - Mechanical Engineer
Master Degree, MIT, 1925

WH/3 has operational interest
Nelson Smith x2056
1-004 Barton Hall
Ferre's listed

Called Army
O/I - 1 June 61

1 June 1961

1. Subject is being utilized by a member of the Interagency Source Register and has been duly registered as such.

2. Above confirms telecon of 1 June 1961 between Miss Ferrari and Mrs Utz of your office.

ISRM-3395

5/25/61

@Ferre, Inc
O/R. a.t.l. not listed
(NA)

"PRIORITY"

SECRET

SC/148

201-205712

ORIG: N. H. SMITH
UNIT: WH/3/DR&H 655
EXT: 3054
DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING			
1	DR + H	4	[illegible]
2		5	
3			

SEP 20 22 20 '60
REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	
XX	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 71937
OUT 71937

TO: SAN JUAN
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 5
INFO: FI, FI/INT 2, S/C 2

TO JUAN INFO CITE DIR 01693
01693

REF: JW-52*

REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: *Contact Luis FERRE as soon as possible for information on the Dominican Republic.

for Ned P. Holman
RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ, AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Ned P. Holman
NED P. HOLMAN, AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

SECRET

Memo No.: JW- 52

Date : 13 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR : Warren S. YAUGER

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - Subject of JW-45

ACTION REQUIRED:

Reference :

You are requested to contact Subject as soon as possible and on a continuing basis for information on the internal political situation in the Dominican Republic.

Oliver G. Galbond

OLIVER G. GALBOND

SECRET

SECRET

DR 205712
201

[illegible] : 45

Date : 10 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR : Warren S. YAUGER

FROM : Chief, WHD

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - Luis Albert FERRE (C-82943)

ACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph 2.

Reference :

1. You are advised that Subject was granted provisional operational approval on 31 May 1960 for the purpose of assessing him as a possible source of information on the Dominican Republic, and for determining the feasibility of his providing courier access to that country.

2. To complete Subject's clearance for full operational approval, you are asked to provide as promptly as possible the requisite PRQ Part II information.

Oliver G. Galbond
OLIVER G. GALBOND

SECRET

14-00000

201-205712
[illegible]

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/DR&H
Attn: Nelson Smith

NUMBER C-82943

SUBJECT Luis Albert FERRE

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 4 May 1960

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

Thomas Carroll Jr.

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	31 May 1960 ada

FORM 7-60 125 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (01)

SECRET

27 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : Luis Albert FERRE
C-82943

REFERENCE : CI/OA Memorandum, same Subject, dated
25 May 1960

1. In reply to Para 1 of Reference, this Division does not believe the information therein precludes consideration of Subject for possible operational use.

2. As for Para 2 of Reference, Reference crossed with advice from this Division that field traces had not revealed derogatory information regarding Subject.

3. Regarding Para 3 of Reference, this Division is not interested in the investigation of possible infraction of the anti-trust laws by Subject. Consequently, it is requested that CI/OA notify the Office of Security to this effect.

N. H. Smith
WH/3/DR&H

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

201

25 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/3/DR&H

ATTENTION: Nelson H. Smith

SUBJECT: Luis Albert FERGE
C-82943

1. Attached for your information is a copy of a FBI memorandum received this date from the Office of Security. Please advise CI/OA as to whether or not the information contained therein would tend to affect Subject's operational use.

2. Review of Subject's file indicates that field trace results have not yet been received from your Division. Please forward at your earliest convenience for further POA processing.

3. The Office of Security, unless notified to the contrary by CI/OA, will continue its investigation, following the FBI lead provided in the last paragraph of the attached memorandum.

John B. Brewer
for
THOMAS CARROLL, JR.
Chief, CI/OA

Attachment:
FBI Rpt dtd 19 May 1960

SECRET

14-00000

file

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

DATE: 17 May 1960 ada

TO: WH/3/DR&H Nelson Smith

C NO. 82943
Luis Albert FERRE

FROM: Chief, CI/OA

201

In order that further consideration can be given to your request for approval in this case, it is requested that you furnish this office the information checked below:

☐	PRQ I	☐	OPERATIONAL & DIVISION TRACES
☐	PRQ II	☐	ADDITIONAL BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION
XX	FIELD TRACES	☐	OTHER (See remarks)
☐	RI TRACES		

REMARKS

No derog field traces (per W. Galbraith)
CI/OA so advised 25 May 60.

FORM 8-58 889 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(80)

SECRET

TO: Nelson H. Smith

FROM: FI/D

The reply on your Green List Request

Number	Name
100951	FERRE, Luis Albert

was completed and forwarded to CI/OA

13 MAY 1960

SECRET

9 MAY 1960

THIS BLANK FORM IS CLASSIFIED: SECRET

1. SUBJECT (NAME, IN ROMAN LETTERS AND IN NORMAL ORDER) **Luis Albert FERRE** C-32943	RESPONSE TO GREEN LIST REQUEST № 100951
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLINGS, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.	DATE OF REQUEST 4 May 1960
3. BIRTH DATE 17 February 1904	REQUEST FROM NAME OF ORIGINATING OFFICER: Nelson H. Smith
4. BIRTH PLACE Ponce, Puerto Rico	OFFICE DESIGNATOR: WH/3/DR&H
5. CITIZENSHIP U. S.	ROOM, BUILDING: 1005 Barton Hall EXTENSION: 2056
6. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Vice-President of Ferre Industries San Juan, Ponce, and Carolina, Puerto Rico, offices in Miami and New York	14. WAS CONTINUING SEARCH REQUESTED? X YES ___ NO 15. TYPE OF REQUEST X FIRST TIME SUBMITTED ___ ADDITIONAL DATA ___ COVER
7. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION Mechanical engineer (degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	16. INTEREST IN SUBJECT ___ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY X OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE ___ OTHER 17. INFORMATION REQUIRED Derogatory

8. MILITARY SERVICE

SERVICE ARM, COUNTRY	SPECIALTY	LOCATION	DATES
Unknown			

9. PAST OCCUPATIONS

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES

10. DESCRIPTION

(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)
5' 7in	155	Brown	Brown	W	Scar left cheek

11. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

Lorencita Ramirez de Arellano

12. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, AND ASSOCIATES

13. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION, ETC) ATTACH EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

Republican (Statehood) Party, religion Roman Catholic

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON: FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI-10-7

FORM 11-58 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Nelson H. Smith

12 May 1960
DATE

FROM: FI/D Zu

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS no pertinent INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF A CONTINUING SEARCH WAS REQUESTED IN SECTION 14, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

Noted
17 May 60

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

TO Chief, WH Division	ATTENTION Nelson H. Smith WH/3/DR&H	ROOM 1021	BLDG. Barton Hall
SUBJECT FERRE, Luis Albert	CI/OA NUMBER C- 82943	CCD FILE NO. 5-3, p. 2129	CCD CASE OFFICER F.L.Coolidge

Central Cover Division concurs in your proposal to use the above individual for the purpose indicated. In keeping with the requirement placed upon Central Cover Division to maintain an accurate register of current nonofficial cover activity, you are specifically requested to advise Central Cover Division/Non-Official Cover promptly by memorandum when subject has been activated.

☐ If check mark appears here, information of interest concerning subject is in CCD/NC files. After operational approval is received, and prior to making arrangements for initial contact thereunder, you are specifically requested to confer with CCD/NC concerning other Agency interests possibly affected and the advisability of additional coordination.

COPY TO CI/OA	DATE 11 May 1960	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, CCD/NC John G. Southard

FORM 12-59 1678

CCD CONCURRENCE

13370

(8) SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
FERRE, Luis Albert	2. RI FILE NO.
	~~3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.~~ 4. DATE
	~~7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO.~~ 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST ms 6. DATE PROCESSED 10 Ma, 60	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 83943.

WH/3

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡ 201-205712

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

DATE: 4 May 1960

TO:
☒ CI/Operational App-oval and Support Divisioл
☐ Security Support Division/Office of Security

FROM:
Nelson H. Smith
WH/3/DR&H

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Luis Albert FERRE

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-205712

SO FILE NO.:

TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

☒	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
☐	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	COVERT NAME CHECK
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL	☐	SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
☐	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL FOR LIAISON WITH U.S. OFFICIALS		

USE OF INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION REQUESTED

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Dominican Republic

FULL DETAILS OF USE:

Subject has connections in the Dominican Republic, and it is anticipated that he may provide useful information on, or through witting or unwitting employees, courier access to the Dominican Republic.

INVESTIGATIVE COVER

IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO
IS OR WILL SUBJECT BE AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?	☒	YES	☐	NO

INDICATE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS OR COVERAGE DESIRED IN THE SECURITY OFFICE INVESTIGATION:

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY:

PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

☒	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	☒	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
☐	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	☐	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO.

FIELD TRACES

☐	NO RECORD	☐	NO INFORMATION OF VALUE
☐	DEROGATORY INFORMATION ATTACHED, WITH EVALUATION	☐	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*
☐	WILL BE FORWARDED		

RI TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

DIVISION TRACES *(Derogatory Information and Evaluation Attached)*

☐	NO RECORD	☐	RECORD	☒	NON-DEROGATORY	☐	DEROGATORY

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Nelson H. Smith	2056	Ned P. Holman, AC/WH/3

FORM 11-58 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(8)

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. HPSA-1519

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

OCT 18 1957

DATE:

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, San Juan

SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational

SPECIFIC—PRQ Part I - Mr. Luis Albert Ferre

Attached is PRQ Part I on subject. PRQ Part II will follow at a later date.

William S Fadane
WILLIAM S. FADANE

Attachment:
PRQ Pt I (4 cys)
PRQ Pt II, Under Separate Cover
17 October 1957

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters, w/att

FORM NO. 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FILE COPY

201-205712

SONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

HPS/PRQ/143

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Instruction:
1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name	Luis	Albert	Ferre
	First	Middle	Last

2. Name in native script

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.)

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.)

5. a. Date of birth 17 Feb 1904 b. Place of birth Ponce, Puerto Rico

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate American - White

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.)

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner

Reina Mora St. #2, Ponce, Puerto Rico

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.)

Vice-President, Ferre Industries - Over $25,000.

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship)

FORM NO. 51-98A
MAY 1956

201-305712

HPS /PRQ/ 143

13. Father - full name occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Antonio Ferre; La Alhambra, Ponce, P. R.; born in Cuba, 9 June 1877; came to Puerto Rico 1894; American.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Mary Aguayo; born in Ponce, P. R., 1879; deceased.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Lorencita née Ramires de Arellano; born 9 July 1905, San German, P. R.; American.

Lorencita FERRE

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Antonio Luis Ferre; b. February 1934, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Rosario J. Ferre; b. 28 September 1938, Ponce, P. R.; American.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Jose A. Ferre; b. 1902, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Rosario Ferre; b. 1905, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Carlos F. Ferre; b. 1907, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Herman Ferre; b. 1909, Ponce, P. R.; American.
Yeolina Ferre; b. 1914, Ponce, P. R.; American.

201-205712

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U. S. Passport #3452P; issued 1953, San Juan, P. R.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Roman Catholic.

21. Present and past political affiliations

Republican (Statehood) Party.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited

Europe, Venezuela, Cuba. Business and travel.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Ponce Public Schools.
Morristown School, New Jersey.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; B.S. & M.S., Mechanical Engineer.

24. Languages and dialects (indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language **Spanish** Speak **X** Read **X** Understand **X**
Language **English** Speak **X** Read **X** Understand **X**
Language **French** Speak **X** Read **X** Understand **X**

201-205712

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

Lions Clubs.
American Society Mechanical Engineers.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Piano playing; fencing.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Capital over $1,000,000.
Earnings over $50,000. yearly.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Vice-Pres. - Ponce Cement Corp., Ponce, P. R.
Vice-Pres. - Puerto Rico Iron Works, Ponce, P. R.
Pres. - Puerto Rico Glass Corp., San Juan, P. R.
Vice-Pres. - Puerto Rico Clay Corp., San Juan, P. R.
Pres. - Fabrica Nacional Vidrio, Maiquetia, Venezuela
Dir. - Cementos Nacionales, Santiago de Cuba
Chairman - Ponce Products Inc., Miami, Fla.
Dir. - Maule Industries, Miami, Fla.
Dir. - Banco de Ponce, Ponce, P. R.

201-205712

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

Articles on: Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship
Cement Plants
Sugar Mills

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

Three brothers.
(Mr) Manuel A. Mayoral, Ponce, P. R.

32. List five character references.
(Col.) Francisco Parra Toro, Ponce, P. R.
(Col.) Walter E. Bligh, 41 E. 42d St., New York, N. Y.
(Judge) Cecil Snyder, San Juan, P. R.
(Judge) Jorge L. Cordova Dias, San Juan, P. R.

201-305712

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 53

Apparent age 50

Height 5' 7½"

Eyes Brown

Face - shape Oval

Complexion White

Sex Male

Posture Straight

Weight 155

Teeth Good

Hair Brown

Scars On left cheek bone

Build Slender

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

201-205712

Subject's own hand

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

NPS/PRQ/149

Instruction: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions completely. If question does not apply, write "not applicable"
3. Attach blank pages if additional space is needed.

1. Full Name Luis (First) Albert (Middle) Ferré (Last)
2. Name in native script Luis A. Ferré
3. Name at birth (if different from 1.)
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and place of use.)
5. a. Date of birth Feb. 17/1904. b. Place of birth Ponce, Puerto Rico
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate American - White
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) —
8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) Owner.
Reina Mora St. #2, Ponce, P.R.
9. Permanent address (if different from 8.)
10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.)
Vice-Pres. Ferré Industries - Over $25,000
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States. (Give date and name in which certificate granted.)
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship)

FORM NO. 51-95A
MAY 1950

13. Father - full name occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

ANTONIO FERRE -
La Alhambra - Ponce, Puerto Rico -
Born in Cuba 1877 - June 9,
Came to P.R. 1894. - American.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Mary Aguayo.
Born in Ponce, Puerto Rico. 1879.
Deceased.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and ~~Lorencita~~ any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

FERRE
Lorencita Ramirez de nee Arellano.
Born July 9, 1905, San German, Puerto Rico
American

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Antonio Luis Ferre' ~~Born~~ Feb. 1934
American Ponce, Puerto Rico.
Rosario J. Ferre'. ~~Born~~ Sept. 28, 1938,
American. Ponce, Puerto Rico

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

José A. Ferre'. Born 1902 - Ponce, P.R., American
Rosario Ferre' - Born 1905 - " " "
Carlos F. Ferre' - " 1907 - " " "
Herman Ferre' - Born 1909 " " "
Ysolina Ferre' - " 1914 " " "

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

U.S. Passport # 31520 - Issued 1953. San Juan, Puerto Rico.

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Roman Catholic -

21. Present and past political affiliations

Republican (Statehood) Party.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited

Europe, Venezuela, Cuba.
Business & Travel.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Ponce Public Schools.
Morristown School - New Jersey.
Mass. Inst. of Technology - B.S. & M.S. - Mechanical Engineering

24. Languages and dialects (indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Spanish Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓
Language English Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓
Language French Speak ✓ Read ✓ Understand ✓

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

Lions Clubs.
American Society Mechanical Engineers.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Piano playing - Fencing -

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

Capital over $1,000,000.00.
Earnings over $50,000 yearly.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Vice-Pres. Ponce Cement Corp., Ponce P.R.
" " P.R. Iron Works, " "
Pres. - P.R. Glass Corp. - San Juan P.R.
V.P. - P.R. Clay " - " "

29. (Continued)

Pres. - Fábrica Nacional Vidrio - Maiquetía - Venezuel
Dir. - Cementos Nacionales - Santiago de Cuba, Cuba
Chairman - Ponce Products Inc. Miami, Flda
Dir. - Maule Industries " , " " .
Dir. - Banco de Ponce, Ponce, P.R.

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

Articles on Industrial Democracy
American Citizenship.
Cement Plants.
Sugar Mills.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

My three brothers
(Mr) Manuel A. Mayoral, Ponce, Puerto Rico.

32. List five character references.

(Col.) Francisco Parra Toro, Ponce, Puerto Rico.
(Col.) Walter E. Bligh, 41 E. 42d St., New York City.
(Judge) Cecil Snyder, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
(Judge) Jorge L. Cordova Diaz, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

DOC 205712

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 53.

Apparent age 50

Height 5'-7 1/4"

Eyes Brown.

Face - shape Oval.

Complexion White.

Sex Masc.

Posture Straight

Weight 155

Teeth Good.

Hair Brown.

Scars On left cheek bone

Build Slender.

General appearance

Prominent features

Other identifying features

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

VIA AIR

KUCK [illegible] Stat[illegible] 8P.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, WHD

DATE: 15 April 1957

FROM: Chief of Station, San Juan

[redacted]

SUBJECT:
GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Dominican Republic Progress Report

Reference: A. HPS-A-497, 13 June 1955; B. HPS-A-941, 11 Sept 1956

Action Required: See para. 3

PRECIS

The Station herein outlines what it believes to be the targets for covert operations in the Dominican Republic. Included is a list of assets which the Station has for commencing operations, as well as operational leads, the potentialities of which the Station is investigating. Action taken or contemplated in regards to each of these assets or leads, is also set forth. Periodic progress reports will be forwarded to Headquarters on development of this program.

1. Pursuant to instructions given to REDDRUBER at Headquarters, the Station has begun to activate the persons listed in Reference B., where they are still available, and to discreetly ascertain from local contacts further operational leads. There follows a report on the progress made by the Station since REINDHPER's return.

2. The Station's plan of action to begin third country KUTUBE operations in the Dominican Republic -- targeted primarily against the Dominican Intelligence Service and the Dominican Ruling Circles -- is as follows:-

A. Through SKEDADDLE (Operational Approval granted in HPS-A-[illegible]) to develop persons in Puerto Rico who have access to individuals in the Dominican Republic and can enter that area on a regular basis.

(1) SKEDADDLE has been contacted and advised of the activation of operations against the Dominican Republic. It must be pointed out that SKEDADDLE's attitude has cooled somewhat toward taking an active part in operations. He feels frustrated because of the long period in which he has attempted to maintain contact with assets and, at the same time, not being able to cultivate them. He informed that some contacts have lost interest and others no longer

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RECEIVED 16 Apr 57

FORM NO. 51-28A MAR 1949

KAPOK

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have access to the target. He was advised of the importance of these operations and it is believed that he will work out in time.

(a) A review of all of the persons mentioned in Reference B. was made with SKEDADDLE, and it was decided to proceed first with the person mentioned in para. 4.g.(5), Reference B., Luis A. FERRE. Because FERRE is very well known all over this area and is considered most discreet by all who know him, SKEDADDLE has been instructed to approach him indirectly through a cut-out. The cut-out will be SKEDADDLE's personal friend and close confidant for many years, Angel [illegible] FONSECA Jiminez. FONSECA is a senior member of the political party headed by FERRE and a member of the local legislature. He is very close to FERRE. Naturally, no indication of Station interest will be divulged at this time. FERRE is considered to be a good starting point because he is the owner of many businesses in the Caribbean Area and in PBPRIME and has had many persons working for him over a period of years who owe him allegiance. This includes persons in the Dominican Republic.

(2) Another suggestion by SKEDADDLE which was accepted was that he sound out two National Guard Lieutenant Colonels under his command who have access to persons traveling to and from the Dominican Republic from Puerto Rico. In private life, these men are United States Customs inspectors, who handle entry from the Dominican Republic. They are Lt. Colonel Alberto A. PICO, of Ponce, Puerto Rico, and Lt. Colonel O. MATTEI, of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Both of these men are loyal and have clearances from ODIBEX.

|| check

(a) SKEDADDLE will interview these men for operational leads.

(3) Interrogation of SKEDADDLE revealed that his relationship with Hilario TIRADO, mentioned in para. 4.g.(2), Reference B., has deteriorated.

(a) It is believed advisable at this time to sound out TIRADO through his former colleagues, which will be done in the near future.

(4) At the next meeting with SKEDADDLE, which will take place in the next few days, he will be requested to covertly contact certain Dominican exiles (see page 3., Reference B.), resident in Puerto Rico, to ascertain the true assets they have within the Dominican Republic. It is felt that SKEDADDLE's morale must be improved prior to assigning this additional work load.

(5) Also at the next meeting, SKEDADDLE will be requested to contact Francisco PARRA-TORRO in Ponce, Puerto Rico, whose potential is described in Reference B.

B. Through local contacts develop a cadre of PBPRIME continentals located in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic that would have spotting and casual intelligence potential. (Please note it is not the intention of Station to jeopardize the position of any PBPRIME citizen or company actually located within the Dominican Republic) In this regard, the following is of importance:

DESENSITIZED

DESENSITIZED

Mr. Holcomb
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

VIA AIR

DISPATCH NO. HPSA-941

Jck

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE

FROM Chief of Station, San Juan

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Dominican Republic Situation Report

REF: HPSA-497, 13 Jun 55

1. For Headquarters information, the following is a resumé of current material that is maintained in order to keep reference up-to-date and applicable should the occasion arise. Part I of reference remains the same, however, certain personnel changes outdate the operational section, Part II of reference. Under Part II, A, the Mission, Objectives and Tasks as stated in reference would be correct were the Station actually conducting operations in the Dominican Republic. However, as the Station is holding any activities in this direction in abeyance per previous correspondence on the subject, it is felt that we should restate our tasks to more accurately reflect the Station's present activity; namely, being prepared for the actual implementation of operations when the occasion arises. Further, that Headquarters may be cognizant of the Station's current activities in fulfilling these tasks, there is included a more current listing of the covert assets maintained for the future implementation of operations.

[illegible]

2. Under the present situation, the Station's tasks in maintaining itself in readiness for the possible initiation of operations in the future are:

a. Developing and maintaining background information on persons who are active in anti-Dominican activities in Puerto Rico who, should the occasion arise, would be potential agent material. Should anything happen to the present regime in the Dominican Republic some of these persons would undoubtedly return there and become active in politics.

b. Developing and maintaining current background information and information on the activities of persons who have contact with prominent members of the present government in the Dominican Republic and who have qualifications indicating that they are potential agent material and might be called upon to act in our behalf should the need arise.

RI INDEX

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

11 Sept 56

22-6-4

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3. The Station feels that in directing its efforts in both the above directions, it will have at least a good starting point when operations in the Dominican Republic begin. Naturally, per previous correspondence, all of these operations would be worked from out side the Dominican Republic utilising third country methods. The Station does not believe that any of the prospective assets, other than SKEDADDLE, should become aware of our interest in them under the present circumstances. It is felt that were we to carry operational development of these assets any further at this time that we would run the risk of having them go cold and possibly sour as we could not actually put them to work under present conditions. We feel that this is the best method of keeping our assets on ice.

4. A current listing of assets available as of the present date is as follows:

a. SKEDADDLE -- Situation is the same as that noted in reference. He is still considered a very good choice as a future P/A for these operations. He continues to maintain contact with Dominicans located in Puerto Rico and to keep himself aware of their activities. Most of the persons listed below are contacted through SKEDADDLE.

b. Tobias ECHOLS -- Subject is still available through his place of employment. Subject has become less active in reserve activities to date. Contact with him is maintained through SKEDADDLE.

c. SKEET is a commercial outfit and the writer maintains occasional contact with it.

d. WANTA-4 remains in his present position, however, he is considered better situated to assist the Station in money conversions, etc., and is no longer considered necessary to this objective.

e. Leslie HIGHLEY is a contact of Station personnel. He is in the advertising business and has previously handled the account for the publicity of the Dominican Republic Fair in Puerto Rico. He is now planning to open an office in the Dominican Republic. Presently, he is planning a campaign to interest Puerto Rican tourists in travel to the Dominican Republic. His contacts are strictly business, and he has let the Dominican Republic Government know that he will not involve himself in any of their political machinations. They are apparently satisfied with this arrangement. Subject has indicated a willingness to report anything of interest that comes to his attention in his dealings with and in the Dominican Republic. The Station believes that his greatest potential is that of a spotter of potential agent material in the Dominican Republic. He is carried as current with that in mind.

f. The active anti-Trujillo organisation here is made up of Dominican Exiles for the most part. Contact with that organisation is maintained through SKEDADDLE. The possibility of potential agent material among their leaders is considered to be good. Among this group are the following:

(1) Dr. Angel MORALES, leader of the Dominican exiles in Puerto Rico. MORALES has no visible means of support, possibly lives on private income.

(2) Carmen Natalia MARTINEZ, secretary to MORALES, active Dominican exile.

(3) Dr. Leovigildo CUELLO, M.D., occasionally practices in Puerto Rico; is second man in the organization of Dominican exiles in Puerto Rico.

(4) Oscar MICHELENA, Dominican exile, active, operates a photo shop in Santurce, Puerto Rico.

(5) Frank COILLINI, leader of the pickets who regularly demonstrate in front of the Dominican Republic Consulate in San Juan. Subject has a brother who is a printer in San Juan but he is not visibly employed. Subject is apparently a fanatic and recently reported to the local police that the killer of Dr. GALINDEZ in New York was in San Juan after him. He claimed that the killer was a person known as "El Cojo". Local investigation did not substantiate his claim which probably was done as a publicity attempt in the anti-Trujillo campaign locally.

(6) Ando and Rafael HERNANDEZ, Dominican exiles, San Juan insurance brokers. Subjects, at one time, occupied an office in the same building with the Dominican Consulate but have moved recently to the Condado Section of Santurce. They recently told SKEDADDLE that activity of the anti-Trujillo group here has been "quiet of late".

(7) Luis ORTIZ Arseno, active Dominican exile in San Juan.

c. Persons with official contacts in the Dominican Republic.

(1) Captain Enrique JANER, Professor of Military Science ROTC, at the University of Puerto Rico, is a naturalized PBPRIME citizen and is known to Station through G-2 here. Subject has two or three brothers who served in World War II with PBPRIME. His family is originally from the Dominican Republic but they apparently fled some years ago and took up permanent residence in Puerto Rico. The family has relatives there and subject still knows people in the Dominican Republic. Recently JANER recommended one Rafael MONTAZ, a lawyer in the Dominican Republic, who is the director of the Historical Museum in downtown Ciudad Trujillo, and on the strength of this recommendation, MONTAZ was contacted by a local ODIBEX officer. As a result of this contact, the ODIBEX officer suggested both JANER and MONTAZ to the Station as possible operational prospects.

(2) Hilario TIRADO, Puerto Rican, formerly a Warrant Officer with the CIC and now operating a photo shop owned by his brother-in-law on Avenida Ponce de Leon, Stop 18-20, Santurce, Puerto Rico, visits the Dominican Republic frequently to go hunting with a prominent Dominican who is his close personal friend. Both TIRADO and this Dominican are ardent cock fight fans and the Dominican often brings his cocks to fight in Puerto Rican rings. TIRADO is recommended by SKEDADDLE as completely trustworthy and could be approached should the need arise.

(3) Francisco PARRA-TORO, former G-2 Colonel, retired and now an attorney-at-law with offices in the Banco de Ponce Building, Ponce, Puerto Rico, knows many persons traveling to the Dominican Republic. He is a close friend of SKEDADDLE and was introduced at one time to the former Chief of Station.

(4) Captain CANEPA, on active duty with the Selective Service system in Puerto Rico, is a naturalized PBPRIME citizen. His father was a former cattle farmer in the Dominican Republic, however, it is rumored that Trujillo wanted his father's property and forced the family to move out of the Dominican Republic. The family fled and settled here. CANEPA should know persons on both sides of the political fence in the Dominican Republic. SKEDADDLE knows CANEPA superficially but knew his sister well when he worked for G-2 here. CANEPA is described as good, serious and probably could provide operational leads in Puerto Rico.

(5) Luis A. FERRE, Puerto Rican industrialist, is head of Empresas FERRE in Puerto Rico and is also a member of the local legislature. Subject is also head of the Puerto Rican Statehood Party (affiliate of the Republican Party) and is that party's candidate for the Governorship in the forthcoming elections. He is known to SKEDADDLE and could provide operational leads as his company does much business in the Dominican Republic. UPIL

(6) Continuing contact is also maintained by Station personnel with senior members of large PBPRIME firms with offices both here and in the Dominican Republic which include, for example, Esso Standard Oil Company and the Texaco Company. These contacts are exploitable and could be very valuable should the need arise.

b. Other persons of less reputable character but of possible use should a particular situation arise are:

(1) Luis Manuel BORDAS of Hermanos BORDAS, Inc., Puerto Rico, is a large coffee dealer in Puerto Rico with central offices in Pueblo Viejo, Urb. Monterrey, P.R. Subject was born in the Dominican Republic and is a naturalized PBPRIME citizen. He was drafted in World War II; received a commission through OCS during his stay in the service and was described as being a loyal and good officer. Upon discharge from the service he joined the anti-Trujillo forces in Puerto Rico. In 1949 or 1950, BORDAS purchased

many canteens, ammunition belts, etc., at a surplus sale at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, which he had shipped to a Dominican Exile group in Cuba who were then being trained. At this time he also engaged in recruiting Puerto Rican veterans, promising them high salaries and rewards if they would go to Cuba and join the anti-Trujillo forces in training there. The recruits were sent to Cuba via Miami, however, one of the recruits returned to Miami from Cuba and exposed the whole operation to the Miami Herald which was instrumental in blowing the preparations being made and exposing BORDAS. It is said that the government had enough on him to prosecute for acting in behalf of a foreign group, however, little action was taken against him. His commission was revoked, however, because of these activities. At present, reports are that BORDAS is "taking it easy" because his firm is now doing business in the Dominican Republic. He is known to SKEDADDLE and if we desired, possible advantage could be taken of his anti-Trujillo sentiments in view of his past activities.

(2) [illegible]PLAZA, owner and operator of the "2 Dice Club" in San Juan, is a big gambler and unsavory. Subject is rumored to be a Trujillo agent in Puerto Rico and is reported as the type who would probably play both sides of the Trujillo argument. He has some contact with pro-Trujillo Dominicans and possibly also with anti-Trujillo Dominicans. He is not considered trustworthy nor is he recommended by SKEDADDLE, however, he is listed here as a possible should ever a person of his "talents" be desired.

5. It is requested that the names listed in Paragraph 4 above be checked by the desk at a Headquarters level for indication of points that might not be known to the Station.

William S. Fadans
WILLIAM S. FADANZ

11 September 1956

Distribution
3-Headquarters

11 Sep 56
93-6-4

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO: RI/ANALYSIS SECTION

DATE: 24/10/57

ACTION: ☑ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

FROM: RI/AN

ROOM NO.:

TELEPHONE:

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

☐ SENSITIVE
☑ NONSENSITIVE

1. 201 NO.: 205712

SOURCE DOCUMENT: HRSA-01519

NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title): FERRE, LUIS ALBERT

3. SEX: ☐ M ☐ F

NAME VARIANT

2. TYPE NAME / (Last) / (First) / (Middle) / (Title):

RECORD COPY

4. PHOTO: ☐ YES ☐ NO

5. BIRTH DATE: 17-02-04

6. COUNTRY OF BIRTH: PR

7. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH: PONCE

8. OTHER IDENTIFICATION: 1. 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION: Vice-Pres. Ferre Industries

9. OCC/POS. CODE:

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM:

PSEUDONYM:

SECTION III

10. COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE: PR

11. ACTION DESK: WH/3AN

12. SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST:

12a. THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST:

COMMENTS:

PUNCHED

201- 205712

PERMANENT CHARGE: ☐ YES ☑ NO

RESTRICTED FILE: ☐ YES ☑ NO

SIGNATURE: M. Turner

Form No. 831 1 Oct. 56 Use previous editions. (20)

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

FEB. 60

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

FROM:

~~RID~~

Adws

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/SR/CI/P	21 MAR 196			
2.				
3. IP/DMS -		5 Jan 77		MSJ
4. DCU - (-		5 Jan 77		
5. C/LA/I				
6. CT-5				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

COMMENTS

RYBAT

1 cy det for CI/SIG

C/CI/SIG has advised that British officers handled these reports 06 on (Wynne - Ellen) locally

4 March 1962

RYBAT

RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID FOR MICROFILMING BEFORE IT IS FILED. IF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RESTRICTED, CHECK HERE ☒ ——— RESTRICTED TO ———

Unit Designation

RID/MI 1085 L
~~RID/FI~~

201-099788

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

DISPATCH

SECRET/RYBAT

CELA-35954

TO: Chief, WE

201-294855

FROM: Chief of Station, London

DATE: 14 March 1962

SUBJECT: Operational/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AELADLE (Michael WYNNE-ELLIS) 06

CHECK ONE:
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCES: OELW-19307, 23 January 1962

01 (SMOTH) appreciated the KGB document forwarded with Reference and have submitted the following comments and questions:

1. "We have a number of questions about this document on which we should be grateful for your comments, and as background to some of these we think it will be useful for you to have an account of (WYNNE-ELLIS) 06 dealings with AELADLE:

a. "They date from June 1961 when he was considering a visit to the U.S.S.R. He mentioned this to the Soviet Ambassador, whom he met at the Queen's Birthday Celebration in Helsinki, (he did not realise at first that it was the Ambassador to whom he was talking). The Ambassador suggested that he should get in touch with Ivan Efimovich SERGEEV, an identified R.I.S. officer.

b. "Between 5th and 15th July 1961 06 (WYNNE-ELLIS) went to the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy to see about the visa. Apparently he did not see SERGEEV but met AELADLE who showed a good deal of curiosity about him and asked whether he had ever been to the U.S.S.R. before, whether he had applied in London for a visa, what he was doing in Helsinki etc. The possibility of AELADLE taking English lessons from (WYNNE-ELLIS) was mentioned and AELADLE said he would get in touch with (WYNNE-ELLIS) about this. He asked for a short biography of (WYNNE-ELLIS). 06

c. "He brought the visa application forms and his biography to AELADLE two days later and although AELADLE was apparently very busy he asked (WYNNE-ELLIS) for clarification of various details. AELADLE did not take English lessons from (WYNNE-ELLIS.) 06

d. 06 "At the end of September, or beginning of October 1961, (WYNNE-ELLIS) received a letter from AELADLE asking for the address of his pen friend in Russia, Stanislav GALKIN, who had been concerned in (WYNNE-ELLIS') 06 recruitment by the R.I.S. 06 (WYNNE-ELLIS) telephoned AELADLE to say that he did not have the new address. AELADLE told him that if he wanted it, he could have a visa 'tomorrow' to visit Stalingrad (now Volgograd) and in the course of conversation said 'sometimes it is better to visit places but not old friends'. We wondered at the time, and ever more after AELADLE's defection, whether this remark had any special significance.

201

e. "On 16th November AELADLE invited (WYNNE-ELLIS) 06 to attend a Soviet concert. AELADLE told him that he had been granted a tourist visa but that if he wished to visit his pen friend he would require a letter of invitation from him. AELADLE asked about his British friends in Helsinki and said that he would phone (WYNNE-ELLIS) next week to make a further appointment. He did not do this. 06

ROUTING

H/M

CLASSIFICATION

PAGE NO

06

f. "A further development which may be of interest is that in early January 1962 WYNNE-ELLIS received a further letter from his Russian pen friend giving him a fairly pressing invitation to visit him. 06 WYNNE-ELLIS, who was not aware of AELADLE's defection, wrote to AELADLE telling him that he had now received the invitation, and inviting him to coffee at his house!

2. "We thought that the arrival of this letter (it was dated 25.12.61) so shortly after AELADLE's defection, 06 and after a long gap in the correspondence between WYNNE-ELLIS and his pen friend, might indicate that the R.I.S. suspected that WYNNE-ELLIS had had a hand in AELADLE's defection. 06 WYNNE-ELLIS was never aware that AELADLE was an R.I.S. officer.

3. 06 "As you know from an earlier conversation about this case WYNNE-ELLIS is a most unsatisfactory character to deal with, and we believe that the R.I.S. have found him equally unsatisfactory! We have no reason to suppose that 24 he has double-crossed us since he was turned, but we would not exclude this as a possibility - or at least would not exclude the possibility that he might have considered this. 06

4. "Our questions on the WYNNE-ELLIS document supplied by AELADLE are as follows:

a. "What is the manuscript word at the top of the first page, and what is its significance?

b. "The two typed words, one immediately below the manuscript word on page 1 and the other to the left, are not legible on our copy.

c. "Is there any significance in the date 11th November being in inverted commas, thus "11"?

d. "We are puzzled by what at first sight appeared to be a date, 22.XII.1961, in the heading immediately above the text on page 1. In fact the Roman numerals 'XII' are the cyrillic letter XП, but we do not understand their meaning. Can AELADLE explain this?

e. "What is the name in which the document is signed, and does AELADLE know the true identity of this person?

f. 06 "We are a little surprised at the cyrillic transliteration of WYNNE-ELLIS's name. We should have expected the KGB to have a system which would enable them to get back to the correct English spelling. Admittedly WYNNE-ELLIS's name is an awkward one to deal with. 06

g. "We should have expected that AELADLE would have sent a trace request to his Headquarters shortly after the first meeting with WYNNE-ELLIS in July 1961. Yet the reply was apparently sent only on 11th November. Can AELADLE comment on this? 06

5. "We do not wish to suggest by these comments that we suspect that this document might be a forgery, but we would be grateful for your confirmation that you do not consider this a possibility.

d/pd

6. "You will no doubt in due course be questioning AELADLE in detail on his knowledge of the WYNNE-ELLIS case. 06 We do not at this stage wish to suggest detailed questions except to remark that we do not know the real names of any of the R.I.S. officers who dealt with him - including the man whom, it is stated in the AELADLE document, he met in the U.K. There is some mystery about this because WYNNE-ELLIS 06 denies having met any R.I.S. officer in the U.K., he did however have contact with various Russians here (including an R.I.S. officer) and we suspect that the R.I.S. officer never identified himself as such to WYNNE-ELLIS." 06

James L. Griffiths
James L. GRIFFITHS

Distribution:

3 - Chief, SR ✓
2 - Chief, WE

3|PJ

SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between
Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during
Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UPWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleuterio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organised in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized -- Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things -- moral backing and money; he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organise a revolutionary movement.

SECRET

201-77378

4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him -- would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB

MICROFILMED
JUL 1 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

VIA: A I R
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HDCA-1382

1P

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 June 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by Edward F. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican post office building.

D. Pawley

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in paragraph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY Ww. D in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

D. Republic

Edward F. Stoneset
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

CS COPY

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28A

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

12 June 58

201-77378

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

22 JAN 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on COBB (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

☐ should be closed.

☐ witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

☐ potential witting collaborator; date opened ____________
OI Code A2.

☒ former witting collaborator (relationship terminated).
OI Code A3.

☐ potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

☐ counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

☐ all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Gilson (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/A (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed ______ (initials) 3 FEB (date) 197__

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-278841

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET

CASE OFFICER CHECK LIST

PROJECT

CRYPT/PSEUDO: LICOOKY/1 (Joyce H. PINEINCH) 201- 278841 (7 Vol.)
AREA/BASE : WH/New York C/O: aka

I. TRACES

Base: Req'd by Base: DO Base/N.Y.-3219, 1 Aug 67
(For local traces)
Other: Req'd by
(Specify)
Hqs: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Reply to Base:

II. CLEARANCES

POS : Req'd DO Base/N.Y.-3219 Granted
PRQ I fw'd to CI/OA 3 Aug 67

PCSA : Green List # 182786- [illegible]
Req'd Granted

OA : Req'd Granted
Complete PRQs I & II fw'd

CSA : Req'd Granted

CNC : Req'd Granted

OTHER : Req'd Granted
(Specify)
SGSWIRL :

III. SPECIAL APPROVALS/CONCURRENCES

60-11 : Req'd Granted
A/WOMACE : Req'd Granted
LNERGO :: Req'd Granted
Field Office Coordination
OTHER : DCS: #039, 3 Aug 67
(Specify)

IV. CONTRACTS

Type: Eff. Date & Term
Secrecy Agmt; Termination Date

V. ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:

Describe briefly)

ACCOMMODATION TELEPHONE:
Describe briefly

VI DOMESTIC ASSETS INVENTORY

Fw'd Hqs. Rec'd

VII. TERMINATION OF INTEREST

Date: Hqs. Notified
Reasons for Termination:

Clearance Cancelled:
Secrecy Agreement:
Quit Claim:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT COBB, Viola June	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION 2. RI FILE NO. 3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 834[illegible].

201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-278841
~~201-278841~~

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: ~~Mr.~~ Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-278841

13 October
red & fwd
WH/B&F
c/WH/SS
c/CPD
OF/CAAS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

SECRET

Miss Joyce H. Pineirch

Dear **Miss Pineirch**

Reference is made to your current ~~contract~~ MOC with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **21 April 1966**, said ~~contract~~ MOC is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**10**. Taxes As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph **four (4)** above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal Income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said ~~contract~~ MOC remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8 Jun

cy WH/B+F
WH/1.

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 25 September 1962

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: Engagement of [illegible]-1 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project ______ and is chargeable to Headquarters. The effective date of the oral contract is [illegible] subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type OA Date 29 August 1962.

3. CITIZENSHIP: The Subject ( ) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 250.00 dollars per mo. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is $ --- dollars. Subject (X) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's salary. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc. include: ______

5. TAXES : Subject (X) is ( ) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner 18%, deducted, or $45.00

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) SUBJECT ( ) will (X) will not be furnished quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses: ______

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( ) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: As approved by Case Officer and Chief of Station

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation ______ None

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

Signed ______
Case Officer

Reviewed ______
Contract Approving Officer

Approved Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

Distribution: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs
1 File P-____
1 Admin Office

201-278841

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICERS:

1. Prepare Orig & 4 copies for distribution as above. Extra copies as needed.
2. PRIOR HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL IS REQUIRED before any commitments can be made regarding the following special benefits: Death; Disability; Missing in Action; Resettlement; and Citizenship or Emergency Assistance.
3. The dispatch sending copies to Hqs should provide, among other things, the following: (a) Statement regarding primary functions of the individual and the cover under which he will operate; (b) Pay instructions if to be paid by Headquarters; and (c) If cover income is to be offset, the amount of such income and date of first payment by the cover organization.

SECRET

April 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with CF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, ~~xxx~~ and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

charlotte Bustos-Videla

14-00000

[illegible] 1301

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)	**DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST**
FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL. Renihan BR 4169	DATE OF REQUEST 18-7-67

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.
WH/PER	3D5309	4460

	TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	RID/FILES			ERC
2	REQUESTER			
3	RID/FILES			
4				
5				

SUBJECT
Penernch
Piniinch, Joyce H.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from RID/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than RID/Index.

VERIFIED

R

HO FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
201-278841	CS COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	

FORM 11-64 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

[illegible] 21 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Joyce H. PINEINCH (p) - Tax Assessment

1. A covert Federal income tax percentage of two and eight-tenths (02.8) per cent of PINEINCH's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee. This percentage assessment is effective 1 December 1964, the beginning date of tax year 1965.

2. The retroactive application of this assessment to tax year 1965 will result in a dollar assessment of $84.00 (02.8% of $3,000.00). After applying the 1965 covert tax withholding of $540.00, a refund of $456.00 will be due PINEINCH for 1965. This eliminates the requirement for a covert tax return for 1965.

3. An acknowledged letter of instruction will be forwarded at a later date.

(s) JOHN F. PATTON

JOHN F. PATTON
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Finance (2)
CPD
WH
OF/CTB
CTC #361

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

10 42 AM

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

- retire files & [illegible] POA. Make copy to send to CI/opp/DO but give to me as I want to make a comment.

c/

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/RI		24 APR 1968	24 APR 1968	
2. C/PO/LIB-2		24 APR 1968		OB
3. 2.m.				
4. Lee				JOL
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17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT

INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-277341

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE
22 apr 68

DOCUMENT NUMBER
JNDA 03761

FORM 1-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, New York K

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG/LICOOKY -- Termination of Contact with LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action required: retire file, again.
References: A. UNDA 3502, 22 January 1968
B. UNDA 3650, 13 March 1968

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 5 April 1968 agreement was reached that the WOFIRM relationship with her would be terminated. A memorandum of contact (NYM-2689) concerning the meeting is attached herewith, and indicates the reasons for this termination. No administrative action is required of either the Base or Headquarters in this instance, as LICOOKY/1 was not being paid by us here, and was formally terminated once before (1966). Her file can be retired, again, and this time presumably will be the last time.

2. Termination was very amicable, and LICOOKY/1 holds no ill-will for WOFIRM: she just does not wish to have any relationship with WOFIRM anymore.

3. The writer fully expects to hear from LICOOKY/1 from time to time by phone (in fact, she called later the same day of the meeting to wish the writer a pleasant Easter, as she had forgotten to do so during the meeting), but does not plan any further personal contact.

HOWARD G. FIGALAN

Attachment: NYM-2689 h/w

Distribution: 2 C/DO w/att.

22 1968

1 H/w att

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA ~~3739~~ 3761

DATE
17 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

SECRET

MEMORANDUM 5 April 1968

NYM-2689

TO: LICOOKY/1 File

FROM: Howard G. FIGALAN

SUBJECT: Meeting with LICOOKY/1, 5 April 1968

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono
1-Unit B Chrono
1-LICOOKY/1
1-WBM/Info (paras 3, 4 & 5)

1. A meeting with LICOOKY/1 was held at 1100 hours, Friday, 5 April 1968. We breakfasted, and then held the meeting at the BARTHOLOMEW site. As is detailed below, we reached a mutual agreement that the relationship was not worth pursuing; this was thoroughly amicable, and recontact methods are available on both sides.

2. Substantive matters first. LICOOKY/1 said that John GERASSI had been in town on 23 March for the day. He was invited to lunch at the CMUN that day, Sunday. Apparently, GERASSI, is back in the good graces of the Cuban regime. He told LICOOKY/1 that he would be spending this Summer in Arizona.

3. LICOOKY/1 has been commissioned by M. S. ARNONI, editor of The Minority of One, to write a piece on the recent intellectual/political developments in Czechoslovakia.

4. LICOOKY/1 thought up, and is arranging, a Czech film festival to begin 15 April. It is to be sponsored by the St. Clemens Film Association, St. Clemens Church, 423 West 46th Street (this church houses the American Place Theatre -- Robert LOWELL's group). LICOOKY/1 got this idea from the recent Czech travails -- which she hails as evidence of the power of Czech intellocracy -- and from the commission referred to in paragraph 3 above. She contacted the Czech UN Mission which put her in touch with PAVLIC, the Czech Cultural Attache in the Washington Embassy. PAVLIC was all for the idea, and will be here for the opening of the festival. Milos FORMAN (director of the film "Loves of a Blonde") is currently here at the Hotel Ch[illegible]a (a "dump on 23rd on the West Side" -- LICOOKY/1's characterization), and will participate in the festival. KADAR (director of the "Shop on Main Street") has been invited to participate. LICOOKY/1 is going to ask PAVLIC whether it would be OK for her to ask DRV[illegible] who teaches film at Columbia and who is a Czech in exile, to participate. LICOOKY/1 is very enthusiastic about this venture.

5. COMMENT: Milos FORMAN is mentioned in the article about Czechoslovakia in the 5 April 1968 issue of Time Magazine.

HTW a/8 1.70 UNDA 3761

SECRET RS COPY

201-278841

6. I knew something was bothering LICOOKY/1 and made her drag it out into the open. She started by remarking that WOFIRM and its computer apparently checked the welfare of its old agents every so often, and that this was the nature of our relationship. I explained that this was not the case, that I had found out she was in Manhattan and suggested to Washington that LICOOKY/1 might be of some value to us. This surprised her, and she apologized. She then took off on how when she was in Cuba she had dealt with Fidel and Che and Celia, and when she was involved with Guatemala she was dealing with AREVALO. She said that she didn't want to sound snobbish, but that she was accustomed to dealing with top politicos and intellectuals; she referred to a statement that I had made previously that perhaps she could get Tana de GAMEZ to invite her along to one of Tana's lunches with Cuban Permanent Representative Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. She said that she didn't want WOFIRM to think that she would seek out and cultivate lower level people, that she wasn't built that way. LICOOKY/1 said that even though Tana was a friend and that she liked her, Tana was not her equal, and that Tana wasn't "on her pedestal". That ALARCON was certainly not in LICOOKY/1's intellectual category. LICOOKY/1 said that she considered herself as very flexible, but not that much. LICOOKY/1 is a "special person" and that WOFIRM bureaucracy -- with the exceptions of "Bill" (her Mexico case officer, a friend of the writer), C/WH/1 (with whom LICOOKY/1 is particularly taken), and the writer (LICOOKY/1 repeatedly assured me that she had a very sincere esteem for me) -- probably didn't understand or acknowledge this. LICOOKY/1 said her feelings for certain WOFIRMers were one thing, but her dislike of WOFIRM itself was something else. WOFIRM is a massive card index that shows Miguel Angel ASTURIAS as an old "Nicaraguan war-horse" -- ASTURIAS of course is Guatemalan. LICOOKY/1 couldn't stop liking Communists regardless of WOFIRM desires.

and

7. LICOOKY/1 went on and on in this/similar veins, very impassioned, but very straightforward and without personal rancor for the writer. Summing up, the stated reasons as to why she does not wish to continue regular collaboration with WOFIRM are as follows:

A. fear of compromise -- LICOOKY/1 said that were her relationship with us to become known, it would ruin her standing in and associations with the intellectual community;

B. distaste for WOFIRM -- LICOOKY/1 really believes that WOFIRM is a large card file with all the cards having errors on them;

C. intellectual honesty -- LICOOKY/1 does not think that her intellectual honesty gains from her WOFIRM relationship;

D. lack of understanding -- WOFIRM, except for the three officers cited above, does not really understand the real LICOOKY/1.

8. Obviously, the unsaid reasons are the ones that really brought about this "confrontation", in the writer's opinion. These are as follows:

A. emotional instability -- LICOOKY/1, as has been known for years by the writer, is not the most stable of individuals;

B. money -- LICOOKY/1 receives no money from us anymore (since her termination in Mexico), and the writer suspects that LICOOKY/1 could have more easily rationalized working for the "Giant Indices in Washington" were she on salary;

C. sex -- in this case, lack of same (LICOOKY/1 comes always to emotional involvement with her male associates, and her Case Officers cannot fulfill this need, thus giving rise to problems; in the past, LICOOKY/1 could easily obtain her physical/emotional fulfillment in Cuba and Mexico without relying on the Case Officer, but now she is getting older and quite shop-worn and cannot compete for attention from men in the environment of a place such as Manhattan);

D. discipline -- again, in this case, lack of same; LICOOKY/1 tell us what she does, we don't tell her what she should do.

9. LICOOKY/1 exhibited some anguish over this whole affair. She has been upset for the past month, over this as well as over the confused outlook for her in general. It was made very clear at one point what aid and comfort could have been extended to LICOOKY/1 to alleviate her anguish, and the writer beat a hasty retreat to the kitchenette for a tactical drink of water.

10. Not elaborated above were the writer's answers to LICOOKY/1's opinions, but these were effective in countering her logic, if not her attitudes. LICOOKY/1 had to agree that WOFIRM did have grounds for its assessment of her performance - not awfully good.

11. At any rate, the entire proceedings were very amicable, and, as mentioned above, LICOOKY/1 stressed that her basic opposition to WOFIRM was not on personal grounds, as she had enjoyed her dealings with her "three favorite contacts". She offered to call the writer anytime she had something tangible to pass on, and that he should do the same. It's just that she would be more comfortable as an ex-agent than as a current one. The writer fully expects to hear from her from time to time.

12. It actually was quite an interesting session.

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) DO/I/B-2 (Case officer) Lee Peterson (Extension) 4008

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): LOCOOKY/1

NAME SHOWN IS: ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.:

201 NO.: 201-278841

PROJECT:

DATE OF BIRTH: 24 August 1927,

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ponca, Oklahoma

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject requested that her relationship with CIA be terminated.

DATE: 29 April 1968

SIGNATURE: Lee Ann Peterson

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

DISPATCH [illegible]

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM: Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible] — Subject of interest *

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: [illegible]

For your information [illegible] does have a 201-file (201-829165). However, [illegible] in the file to identify her half-sister or her nephew [illegible], who claimed to have been recruited by [illegible].

J.T.L.

Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 -COB, New York

CS COPY

21 MAR 1968

201-829165

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	U[illegible]-[illegible]	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-829165

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:I.Peterson/mb	20 Mar 68	4008

1 - DO/RI
1 - RID/AN

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	[illegible]	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		W.L.O'Brien Walter L. O'Brien

DO/RI

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM
Acting Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
ISOLOG/LICOOKY - Tana de GAMEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Per para 1 & 7

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 7 March 1968, the agent passed on the following information which may be of interest to the appropriate Headquarters components. L/1 apologized for the lack of details, but the agent was not in a position to pump for further information beyond that which was volunteered.

2. On 7 March Tana de GAMEZ, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Spanish origin, said that she had been telephoned the night before by the son of her half-sister Mercedes (last name unknown to L/1), her nephew Roy. The latter is a college student somewhere in Connecticut (possibly the University of Connecticut), and his home is somewhere in Westchester County. Roy said that he was calling his Aunt Tana because he knew that she had worked for OSS during WWII; Tana rejoined that she had never had anything to do with OSS, that she had worked for the Office of War Information (OWI). At any rate, Roy said that he wanted to tell his Aunt Tana that he had been "recruited" by the CIA, and that he was only going to work for the CIA so as to evade the draft. Upon being questioned on this, Roy maintained that he had been "recruited" by the CIA on campus.

3. The nephew's statements rather rattled Tana de GAMEZ, to the point where she had to take her heart medicine for palpitations (she has a heart history). Among other things, Tana was upset by the thought of a family member being affiliated with the CIA, even though the nephew is disliked by her as an individual.

4. Tana de GAMEZ was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968. She is a well-known figure in the intellectual leftist set in New York, and is outspokenly pro-Castro. She is a member of the editorial board of Grove Press; is a published author herself; and is a close friend and associate of John GERASSI, formerly of Ramparts Magazine.

CS COPY FILED IN 201-829165

5. Tana de GAMEZ is the subject of a voluminous file at the LNERGO office here. LNERGO information, which agrees with Base information obtained from L/1, indicates that de GAMEZ is vocal but

/CONTINUED/ file in 201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA-3650

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

DATE
11 March 1968

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-27 88 41

harmless. She considers herself a loyal American, but does not find this to be incompatible with being a vigorous "New Left" type. She recently became the Latin American editor of Manhattan FM radio station WBAI, an interesting melange of bourgeois/avant-garde programming slanted toward the left, according to L/1.

6. Tana de GAMEZ is in frequent contact with Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations; she also is in contact with Jose Raul VIERA Linares, DGI officer within the CMUN.

7. Tana de GAMEZ probably is the subject of a 201 file at Headquarters; if so, this dispatch should be cross-referenced to that file. If not, the Base suggests that de GAMEZ be indexed.

8. Re paragraph 2 above, L/1 agreed that what the nephew probably meant was that he had been interviewed on campus, and that this to him meant that he had been accepted for employment.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DO

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT
0 LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UNDA-3502 dated 22 January 1968

A copy of Subject's PRQ I is being forwarded under separate cover as per request. There was no PRQ Part II in Subject's file.

J.T.L.
Jessica T. LABATT

Attachment: U/S/C
As stated.

Distribution:
2 - New York

CS COPY

01 FEB 1968

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDW-2149

DATE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

Internal Distribution:
1 - DO/I
1 - RI/AN,201-278841
HB

AN RP
RS D
ABSTRACT X INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B2	Lee Peterson	sm (29 Jan. 68)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B2	30/1/68	John Markham

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B2		W L O'Brien Walter L. O'Brien

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
MFG. 1-64
(40)

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG -- LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Forward PRQ Parts I and II, per paragraph 3 below

REF: UNDW - 2013, 29 November 1967

1. Reference advised that a POA had been issued to LICOOKY/1 for Base contact to determine her access to targets of interest.

2. The undersigned met with LICOOKY/1 on 20 December 1967 and 4 January 1968 and it appears that she can and will be of operational service to us. Headquarters will be kept abreast of future operational developments as they unfold.

3. For purpose of our background knowledge here, we would appreciate receiving copies of LICOOKY/1's PRQ Part I and her most recent PRQ Part II. No other material from her voluminous 201 file is really needed here, as the undersigned is conversant with her case from Headquarters' days.

4. A new PRQ Part II will be compiled on her in the near future.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DO

CS COPY

JAN 22 1968
201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UNDA - 3502

DATE
19 January 1968

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278341

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UNDA-3303, 25 October 1967

1. A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context. In issuing the POA, WOMUSE made the following comments:

   a. In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with WOFIRM has been widely blown through broad publicity.

   b. It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

   c. The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

2. Please forward PRQ Part II.

J.T.L.

Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COB, New York

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDW-2013	DATE 29 NOV 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-278841

1 - DO/I
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:	LPeterson/	mb (27 Nov 1967)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	27/11/67	

ANC/11 | 28 | DO/I/B2
~~25~~ | ~~28~~

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		W L O'Brien Walter L. O'Brien

FORM 1-64 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
MFG. 1-66

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,
DO/I/WH - L. A. Peterson

NUMBER 201 - 278841

SUBJECT LICOOKY/1

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 3 August 1967 cy

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.

In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with CIA has been widely blown through broad publicity.

It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL

BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	13 November 1967

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT
ISOLOG--LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES: A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOOKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: we understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOOKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard C. PIGALAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

201-278841

OCT 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UKDA-3303

DATE
24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-

SECRET

8 November 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : DO/I

SUBJECT : LICOOKY 1 (201-278841)

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 27 October 1967

1. The following summaries indicate no derogatory information on Subject.

2. New York report dated 12/29/59 captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba" furnished CIA 1/8/60. This report stated that June Cobb translated pamphlets as part of her job for Fidel Castro with the idea of familiarizing the American people with Castro's writing. June Cobb believes Castro is doing a tremendous job in reconstructing the economy of Cuba. However, she stated that in her opinion it is unthinkable that Communism would ever be embraced by Castro or the people of Cuba. There seems to be no particular significance to this report as this information was previously known by the Agency.

3. Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba". Bernie Brennan asked June Cobb to deliver some information to Juan Orta who stated that Brennan was not needed anymore. Cobb thought Brennan might have been attempting to obtain a position with the Cuban Tourist Commission. The Agency has no further interest in Brennan. Therefore, there is no significance attached to the report.

4. Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS - Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62 was merely interview with Stuart. There is no significance attached to this report.

SECRET

5. Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart" (CSI 316/00789-64). June Cobb interviewed re Lyle Stuart. Lyle Stuart attempted to get close to Fidel Castro for the purpose of exploiting the journalistic advantages of an interview. Therefore, there is no significance attached to this report considering that it was merely an interview.

Lee Ann Peterson

201-291019 [illegible]
SEX F DOB ?

[illegible]
UFG -[illegible]
23 APR
P5

CIT ?
OCC TRANSLATOR
BIO DATA ON PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

COBB, JUNE

SEX F DOB ?

053-009-008
DBA -15994
11 JUL 62
P2

CIT USA
OCC ?

SINCE SEP, 59, SHE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED IN OFFICE OF FIDEL CASTRO, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. MISS COBB WAS IN NEW YORK CITY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT INTENDED TO RETURN TO CUBA ON DEC 3, 1959.

COBB, Viola June

DAR-5040
10 Feb 62

U.S. citizen

Translator of "The Shark & the Sardines" - pro-Castro - expelled from Guatemala for political activities (Nov 61) employee, Exec Office of Prime Minister (June 61)

(List of Persons connected with Intel, Subversive & Sabotage Activities in behalf of Cuban Govt as reflected in working files of CI Branch, Security Div ACSI on 10 Feb 62)

COBB, June [illegible], Ponca, Calif., USA. Former add: [illegible] Park Ave., New York City [illegible] New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO. (additional info in the [illegible] of the same date)

[illegible]
8 Jan 60

[illegible] "The [illegible] of the Shark & Sardines" was [illegible] by Antonio [illegible] according to [illegible]. [illegible] 9 Nov 61

[illegible] 1 Dec 61 file [illegible]

Viola
COBB, June [illegible] CUBA

COBB, was reported as secy to Fidel CASTRO, described by [illegible] Marita LORENZ, self-admitted former girl friend of CASTRO, as one of the most fanatical members of the 26 JUL [illegible] of July Club in NYC. COBB, according to LORENZ, took great pleasure in making fervent speeches praising everything CASTRO did and criticizing US State Dept policy on Cuba.

[illegible]

[illegible] attache at Cuban Consulate in New York City, suggested that [illegible] further identified) [illegible] with subject when [illegible]

[illegible]

Cards from Cuban Desk
16/8/67

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 27 October 1967 cy
TO: DO/I/WH - F. Toth	C NO. 201 - 275341
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: COBB, Viola June

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRO I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRO II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

What is the status of this case? Please see our 889 of 27 September 1967. If DO is no longer interested, please advise so CI/OA can close its file on the Subject.

DISPATCH

S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION	
	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO.
Chief, WH

FROM
Chief of Base, New York IK

SUBJECT
0 ISOLOG--LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES:
A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOOKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: we understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOOKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard G. FIGELAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	UNDA-3303	OCT 25 1967 24 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	201-

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 27 September 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Frank Toth	C NO. 201 - 278341
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward L. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In addition to the requested traces, an evaluation and statement of the significance as to the proposed use of Subject, is needed on the following FBI references:

(1) New York report dated 12/29/59, captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba", furnished CIA 1/8/60.

(2) Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba".

(3) Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS-Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62.

(4) Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart". (CSI 316/00789-64).

CI/OA has no information indicating that these references have previously been reviewed; it appears that all others have.

CI/OA is otherwise prepared to take action on your request for a POA/OA on Subject.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 5 September 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Peterson ~~Doris LaBaron~~/Frank Toth	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

CI/OA has received, through the Office of Security, a new and rather lengthy list of references to the Subject from the FBI. It appears that some of these references have previously been available to us and some have not. The CI/OA file on Subject also contains a long list of previous references to the Subject.

It is requested that someone from DO/I/WH discuss this case with an officer of CI/OA so that the course of required action can be determined.

This discussed in NYC between Kaufman & Boone. Latter told Dummer or Pavlin that an occasional contact would be OK but not to pick her up on a regular contact basis. Could do an occasional job but no [illegible]

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
1 WH	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

RIG: L. PETERSON
NIT: DO/I
XT: 6762
ATE: 24 AUG 67

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
T 24 PER ____ # ____
ONF: DO-4 ☒ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

INFO: FILE , VR . CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, WH-8,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

25 13 57 Z

30635

DO BASE/NEW YORK

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264

WOMUSE AWAITING LNERGO CHECKS ON LICOOKY/1 AND ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEWING CASE ~~EHXXXXXX~~ DUE TO FACT SUBJECT TERMINATED BY DYVOUR AS RESULT MAY 1966 PRESS EXPOSURE IN MEXICO CITY RE CONNECTION WOFACT.

END OF MESSAGE

E O'Meara
EUGENE F. O'MEARA
C/DO/OP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for Frank A. Toth
FRANK A. TOTH
DO/I
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☑ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-275841

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. L. Pelligrin

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

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FROM 2

ACTION D64 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/ICG, SECUR 4

S E C R E T 221933Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264 (KLUTAS ACTING) 22 AUG 67 IN 36824

NYOC

DIRECTOR

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219 (IN 23383)

PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF PROCESSING FOR REINSTATEMENT OF LICOOKY ONE CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

AN 7	~~PI~~
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~ DO
ABSTRACT ✓	~~INDEX~~

SECRET

22 Aug 67

201-278841

SECRET

DATE 21 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : John Howard

SUBJECT : LICOOKY/1

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 18 August 1967

Field ___ RID xxx Division x traces have been completed on Subject with the results indicated below:

REFERENCE(S)	COMMENTS
RID	NDI
Division	
WH/Mexico	NDI
WH/Cuba	NDI
WH/Ecuador	NR
WH/Guatemala	NR
WH/Colombia	NR
Green List #182786	No new information which would change the status of LICOOKY/1's case.

Lee Ann Peterson
DO I/WH

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ITERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CC DENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) June Viola Cobb

FROM: John Howard

EXTENSION:

NO. 278841

DATE 18 Aug 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Frank A. Toth			lap	To 1: In accordance with the requirements of CSI No. 10-7, Para. 4 C, dated 23 June 1961, please review the attachments or dossier on Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA in writing as to the significance of the information and your opinion as to its effect on the use of Subject in the operational capacity requested.
2. DO/1/WH				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 182786

DATE 3 Aug 67

TO CHIEF, FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Lee Ann Peterson

OFFICE DESIGNATOR DO/I/WH

ROOM, BUILDING 1H 19

EXTENSION 6762

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE) e1/04 201-278841

C O B B, Viola June

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

Aka June COBB
Aka Clarinda E. SHARP

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

24 Aug 27; Ponca, Oklahoma

4. CITIZENSHIP

USA

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION

Residing in New York since Jul 65.

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Has been active in Fair Play for Cuba Committee		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

Aug 17 [illegible] 67

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Any information except basic biographic and/or occupational data since previous Green List, No 125246, dated 5 Sep 62.

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY.
SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Lee Ann Peterson

16 Aug 67
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

* Except

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO XXXXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* PREvious green list requests from WH/3/M, 5 Sept 62, op., GL#125246 and from WH/4, 9 June 60, op., GL#101924 & GL#101066

--- NOTE:

1. State, To Havana, Dsp. A-348, 24 June 60, CONFIDENTIAL
2. State, Guatemala, Dsp. #257, 14 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED.
3. Associated Press, 9 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED (gist).
4. Washington Post, Parade, 12 Aug 62, p. 12, UNCLASSIFIE

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 18 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☒	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☒	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent results 21/8/67

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW. OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☒	PRQ I CURRENT (OLD IN FILE)	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☒	PRQ II CURRENT AFTER ASSESSMENT (old in file)	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent PRQ I 10 AUG 1967

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PROJ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Viola	June	Cobb	

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

Clarinda E. Sharp - for Guatemalan friends to write her and for correspondence with Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

5. DATE OF BIRTH: August 24, 1927

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Ponca City, Oklahoma

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

Very seldom drinks liquor. Does not gamble. Does not use drugs. Has had numerous affairs.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
M ☐ F ☒	40		FT. 5 IN. 6	128	fair	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
blonde	blue	regular	tall	erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar over left clavicle.

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

SECTION II CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
US

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS *(If different than Item 10.)*
NA

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant)*
New York City, New York

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS *(If different than Item 12.)*

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE *(Countries, dates and purposes)*
Mexico - 1947 - 48 original purpose to study. 1949 - Ecuador ith fiance. 1951 - Colombia with fiance. 1952 - Colombia with fiance. 19 - Colombia. 1954 - Mexico. 1955 - Cuba. 1956 - Colombia, Cuba with fianc . 1959 - Cuba o work with Cuban govt. 1961 - Mexico and Guatemala. 1961-65 Mexico

SECTION III OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION

17. TITLE

18. SALARY *(Per annum)*

19. FINANCIAL STATUS *(Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)*

SECTION IV ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS

SECTION V EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED
		FROM	TO	
McKinley Grade School		1933	1939	Diploma
Ponca City Junior High		1939	1942	Diploma
Ponca City Senior High Ponca City, Oklahoma		1942	1944	Diploma
University of Oklahoma	Liberal Arts	1944	1946	None

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE							
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ		WRITE		SPEAK		UNDERSTAND	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Spanish (fluent)	X		X		X		X	
French (limited)	X		X		X		X	

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Only literary output in book form bearing her name is English translation of "The Shark and the Sardines" by J. J. Arevalo, published by Lyle Stuart 1961.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Has experience at radio announcing, programming, and radio control operating. (WNAD and WBBZ in Oklahoma.)

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Adjutant of the Civil Air Patrol squadron of Norman Oklahoma. Her commission was Second Class Lieutenant. During wartime the CAP was auxiliary of the Armed Air Forces.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1961 - 1966	b. EMPLOYER WOFACT		c. ADDRESS Mexico
	d. TYPE OF WORK Contract Agent	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Terminated July 1966 and returned to New York
27.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1959 - 1960	b. EMPLOYER Prime Minister, Cuban Govt.		c. ADDRESS Havana, Cuba
	d. TYPE OF WORK In charge of Eng. publications	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $300	per month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return to U.S.
28.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1957 - 1958	b. EMPLOYER MD Medical Newsmagazine		c. ADDRESS 30 East 60th, New York City
	d. TYPE OF WORK Asst. to Managing Editor	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS 85	PER week	f. REASON FOR LEAVING Intended to go to Europe
29.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 195? - 53	b. EMPLOYER Dr. I. Snapper		c. ADDRESS Mount Sinai Hosp, NYC Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Ill.
	d. TYPE OF WORK Secretarial & Editorial	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $	PER	f. REASON FOR LEAVING To join her fiance's sister
30.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1947 - 48	b. EMPLOYER Southeastern Oil de Mexico SA de CV		c. ADDRESS Paseo de la Reforma #1 Mexico, D. F.
	d. TYPE OF WORK Public relations	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 100	PER month	f. REASON FOR LEAVING To return to U.S.

1946 - Ponca City News - Ponca City, Oklahoma - Staff writer - Left to go to Mexico

SECTION IX MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)
NA

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE NA	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)

SECTION X CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
NA					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

NA

SECTION XI FATHER

41. FULL NAME Jasper E. Cobb	42. YEAR OF BIRTH circa 1897	43. PLACE OF BIRTH Missouri	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH US
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA	46. OCCUPATION Retired Engineer	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE 712 N. Sunset, Ponca City, Okla.	

SECTION XII MOTHER

48. FULL NAME Jessie Lois Sharp	49. YEAR OF BIRTH circa 1895	50. PLACE OF BIRTH Illinois	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH US
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS NA	53. OCCUPATION housewife	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE deceased	

SECTION XIII — BROTHERS AND SISTERS

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jasper E. Cobb	X		circa 1923	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US
Arthur Tom Cobb	X		circa 1925	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

NA

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENT AND POSITION HELD

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Jasper E. Cobb - Father

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

Janet Fost

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	

SECRET

Att. No. 17 to UFGA 19939.

1 28

SUBJECT: COBB, June

Mo201

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA sexF

a. DPOB: c. 1930, Somewhere in US. US citizen.

b. OCCUPATION: Helping a fnu PELLICER, write a book on Anti-Communism.

c. ADDRESS: Somewhere in Mexico City, DF.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Around June or July of 1959, AMDOFF/1 was ordered by Celia SANCHEZ to pay the Habana hospital bill of an American named June COBB. The bill, which A/1 recalls, was over $2,000.00 plus Habana Hilton Hotel expenses, were paid out of the PM's office account. A/1 believes that Miss COBB became acquainted with Fidel and Sanchez on their US trip of April-May 1959, but ignores the details. Sanchez instructed A/1 to employ Miss COBB in the press section of the PM's office: She was responsible with seeing all American and English speaking newsmen who desired to interview Castro or requested permits to visit the interior of the island. She also helped to translate Fidel's important speeches into English. It is A/1's understanding that she had no other duties or responsibilities. She never dealt with Castro directly, but through Maria WITOSKA, who was Sanchez's laison with the PM's office. A/1 states that their relationship was limited to her official function. She appeared to have a newspaper background, but A/1 ignores the details.

b. About late 1959 Miss COBB, together with Jose PUENTE Blanco, then FEU (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria) president of the University of Habana, in conjunction with the INIT (Instituto Nacional de Industrias Turisticas), took over a finca (formerly owned by Batista) near Ceiba del Agua, Habana, and set up a boarding house to be used by American students visiting Cuba as guests of the government. A/1 ignores the details of this operation.

c. By mid 1960 A/1 learned that Miss COBB had left for New York City. She never returned. A/1 claims he does not know why she made this decision.

d. When A/1 arrived in Mexico in late October 1964, he came to know an American writer, Daniel JAMES (address: Vicente Gomez #145, Mexico City, DF. tel 40-19-71). James told A/1 that Miss COBB had recently been deported from Guatemala and was living in Mexico City. Later, A/1 met Miss COBB accidently at the Mexican Ministerio de Gobernacion offices. She was very friendly and said she was helping a fnu PELLICAR (believed by A/1 to be a Guatemalan) to write a book describing his defection from Communism. She wanted A/1 to help Pellicer with reference material on the Marcos RODRIGUEZ trial. She gave A/1 her address, but for various reasons he said he tore up the slip

SECRET COPY

23 Feb 65

17 UFGA 19939

201-152634

A/1 claims he did not want to be associated with her while his political position is still under investigation and further, he did not want his wife to find any feminine references on his person when she arrived. He has not seen Miss COBB again.

e. (It should be pointed out that A/1 did not include her name on the original roster of the personnel of the PM's office. He remembered her participation when directed a special series of questions (requested by Dave in Mexico City in late Nov 64) on the activities of US news and public relations media.

3. JMWAVE traces:

a. COBB, June: Soviet officials informed the Cubans that Subject who acted as an interpreter for Fidel Castro was an FBI agent (201-287019, HVCA-08569; 01 Sept 61)

b. COBB, June: Since sept, 59, she has been employed in the office of Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba. Miss Cobb was in New York City for Medical treatment intended to return to Cuba on December 3, 1959 (053-009-008; DBA 15994; 11 Jul 62; P2)

c. COBB, June: Expected leave Hava on afternoon 3 June 60 by National airlines for NY. Requesting FBI not impede her activities (OUT 81006 to FBI; 31 May 60)

d. COBB, June: DPOB Jun 1927, Ponca, Calif., USA. Former Add" 1192 Park Ave, New York City; 220 E. 52nd St., New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO (Additional info to the DBF of the same date (DBF 40107; 8 Jan 60)

e. COBB, June: Subj, who translated AREVALO's "The Fable of the Shark and Sardines" was deported on 9 Nov 61 by Guatemalan police, according to news broadcasts (Also see DBF 95411, 1 Dec 61, File 100-9-14) (HAVA, FBIS; 9 Nov 61)

201-152634

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/

PROPER FILE NO

2 FEB 1965

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

	TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.	[illegible]	26 Feb 65			
2.	WH/C/MO	FEB 1965			
3.	WH/C/CA/PP				
4.	WH/C/FI/C				
5.					
6.	WH/C/RR				
7.	RR/RE			1/2	
8.	WH/C/RR/OS [illegible]				
9.	[illegible]				
10.	RI/AN	3			
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					
17.	RID/FI				

Copy detached

Forward to RR/OS/MIS for [illegible] and/or RI indexing [illegible]

Return for [illegible]

Each attachment should be filed under its own 201 number, leaving in the 201-152634 file only the cover sheet and any attachments without 201.

AN CP
BY

REQUEST	ABSTRACT	
	INDEX	

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
201-152634

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROCESSING	ACTION
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
▨	ABSTRACT
▨	MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO: COS, Mexico; Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC
Debriefing of AMDOFF/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None - FYI

References: UFGA -18898

1. Forwarded herewith are biographic data sheets based on information provided by AMDOFF/1 during his debriefing by AMBLINK/1 and Edwin M. [illegible] in Mexico City.

2. Data on additional personalities of interest to ODYOKE and KUBARK known to AMDOFF/1 will be forwarded as they become available in the future.

Edwin M. [illegible]
Andrew K. REUTEMAN

UFGA 19939/1 Filed 201-[illegible]
/2 201-[illegible]
/3 201-273018
/4 201-[illegible]
/5 201-[illegible]
UFGA 19939/6 201-[illegible]
/7 201-[illegible]
/8 201-[illegible]
/9 201-[illegible]
UFGA 19939/10 201-[illegible]
/11 201-[illegible]
/12 201-[illegible]
/13 201-757915
/14 201-[illegible]
UFGA 19939/15 filed 201-[illegible]
/16 201-[illegible]

Attachments:
1 - 71 (a/s) (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA w/att
1 - COS, Mexico w/att [illegible]
1 - Chief, WH w/att
[illegible]

201-152634

55-[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 18 Feb 65

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-19939

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-152634

SECRET

8 August 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : Lee Ann Peterson, DO/I/WH

SUBJECT : Viola June Cobb

There does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on Subject. DCS has no interest in Subject.

Lee Ann Peterson

Lee Ann Peterson:DO/I:sm: (8 Aug. 67)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DO/I/WH
1 - DO/I/Chrono

SECRET

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Viola June COBB, CDS Case 48248, and B 67-166

FROM: Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

EXTENSION: 6762

NO.

DATE: 3 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL Attn: Jon Sucher 910 Key Bldg.	4 AUG 1967	[illegible] AUG 1967	COJ	
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. DO/I/WH (Mr Toth) Attn: Lee Peterson 1H 19 Hqs.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

4 Aug '67

1-6: As per our telecon, there does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on this gal. The opinion here is that she is nothing but trouble, as I mentioned. Let me know if anything else is needed here —
COJ

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED XX YES ☐ NO	DATE 3 August 1967 LETTER NO. 0039
TO : DO/DCSL ATTN: Jon Sucher	FROM: Lee Ann Peterson DO/I/WH 1H 19	

Re: COBB, Viola June (aka June COBB)

1. Subject is of interest to DO Base/New York as a source of information on Latin American and Cuban activities. According to our records, Subject has been in contact with the New York office of DCS.

2. Attached for your information is pertinent correspondence on Subject. We would appreciate knowing Subject's current residence and employment, in addition to any derogatory information DCS may have in their files, since her arrival in the U. S. (July 1966). A POA is in process for our proposed use and we would appreciate an expedite on this request.

for Lee Ann Peterson
SIGNATURE

REPLY
DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 8-61 1831

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 3 August 1967

TO:
XX CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM:
Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

SUBJECT: *(True name)* C O B B, Viola June

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES:
Aka June COBB Clarinda E. SHARP (A)
LICOOKY/1
Joyce H. PINEINCH (P)

CI/OA FILE NO.: C83492

RI 201 FILE NO.: 278841

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
USA

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

POA is requested to contact Subject and explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.
Coordination with DCS will be effected.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No US Govt interest

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 182786

6. RI TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY	DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
X	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)* No foreign travel since previous OA		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF
Lee Ann Peterson	6762	FRANK A. TOTH, DO/I/WH

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

PRQ PART I (EQUIVALENT)

NAME: COBB, Viola June
Aka June COBB; Clarinda E. SHARP

DPOB: 24 August 1927; Ponca, Oklahoma

CITIZENSHIP: USA

OID: Subject returned to New York from Mexico City in July 1966 to look for a job. She recently came to our attention through the FBI/New York field office when the latter contacted our New York Base to inquire of her present residence. Subject is presently in contact with the DCS/New York field office, from whom we shall attempt to ascertain her present residence and employment.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE 3 Aug 1967

FROM: Name Lee Ann Peterson	OFFICE DO/I/WH	ROOM 1H 19	PHONE 6885	TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION ☐ OPEN ☒ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	2. FILE RESTRICTED ☐ YES ☒ NO	3. PERMANENT CHARGE ☒ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) COBB, Viola June	5. 201 NO. 278841

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
A	COBB,	June	
A	SHARP,	Clarinda	E.

7. SEX F x	8. DATE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 27	9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH	10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH OKLA, Ponca

11. CITIZENSHIP	12. OCCUPATION (clear text)	OCC. CODE	13. SWL	14. OI CODE

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER NYDO-3219	DATE 1 Aug 67	16 RESIDENCE USA, N.Y.

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION USA/N.Y.	CODE 432	19. ACTION DESK DO/I/WH	CODE 778	20. SECONDARY DESK	CODE

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
UNID

22. CRYPTONYM

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER Lee Ann Peterson	201 NO. 278841

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(38-51)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

FROM
3C

ACTION
[illegible]

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY
☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, WH 8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI.

1 Aug 67 IN 23383

S E C R E T 012214Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
NYDO

AN C/I	~~PI~~	
~~RS~~	~~DEST~~ /	DO/I
ABSTRACT	X	~~INDEX~~

DIRECTOR
ISOLOG

REF: DIRECTOR 15147

BASE DESIROUS OF CONTACTING LICOOKY/1, SUBJ REF, TO EXPLORE HER ACCESS TO TARGETS AND INFO OF OPS INTEREST. BELIEVE SHE COULD BE OF VALUE IN LATIN AMERICAN, AND HOPEFULLY CUBAN, CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE REINSTATEMENT OF APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

1 aug 67
201-278841

C. TRETTIN:jaf
WH/COG/CICS
5106
~~XXXXXXXXX~~ 26 JUNE 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6	
2	MO	7	
3	RR	8	
4		9	
5	FI	10	

RS

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 30 PER ___ #___

WH/COG8 ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR WH8, DO4, CI/OPS, CI/CA,

SECRET
(classification)

(date and time filed)

28 18 39Z

(elliptic)
(reference number)
(pica)

CITE DIRECTOR 15147

278847

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK

TYPIC

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

JUNE COBB IS FORMER WOFACT AGENT RESIDING NEW YORK CITY. HQS HAD GIVEN NAME AND CLEARANCE TO CONTACT COBB IN CONJUNCTION WITH INVESTIGATION LNERGO CONDUCTING. MATTER HANDLED THROUGH WODISH OFFICE. SUGGEST TO LNERGO THEY CONTACT NEW YORK WODISH OFFICE FOR CURRENT ADDRESS OF JUNE COBB WHO HAS BEEN ALREADY ALERTED TO LNERGO DESIRE CONTACT HER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS

DO/WH

E. O'Meara
C/DO/OP
EUGENE F. O'MEARA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-278847

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☒ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG. Gilles

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM.

ACTION 22 WH/COG 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

CA MO/ CI S

FI RS

INFO

FILE VR, WH8, DO 4, CI, CI/OPS, FI

NYDO

S E C R E T 232159Z CITE DDO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

23 Jun 67 IN 97218

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

NEWYORK LNERGO WISHES INTERVIEW JUNE COBB, NEW YORK RESIDENT, DESCRIBED AS FORMER CASTRO PARAMOUR WITH WHOM THEY IN CONTACT APPROX SIX YEARS AGO. LNERGO STATES INFORMED BY WOFACT HEADQUARTERS THAT WOFACT HAD INTERVIEWED MORE RECENTLY, BUT NO MEANS OF CONTACT SPECIFIED. PLS ADVISE IF CURRENT ADDRESS AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

Pls handle as desired

AN FI

ABSTRACT X

201-278841
23 June 1967

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☑ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) ORTIZ, John

FROM: WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf		EXTENSION 6835	NO. 2389	DATE 19 May 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/WH/COG/CIS		22/5/67		
2. WH/1 MEXICO				
3. CI/IPS/WH CI/LIAISON 2C-35	26 MAY 1967			
4.				Hand deliver pl.
5. RI/AN			rg	
6. RID/MIS			8S	DJJ 26 MAY 1967
7. RID/PS			JV	
8.				
9.				AN FI PS ~~DEST~~ ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-278841

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

26 MAY 1967

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director For Plans

SUBJECT: John ORTIZ
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Reference is made to your informal request dated April 26, 1967, File: (LA) 105-155206, Subject as above and to this Office's CSCI 316/01366-66 dated 25 March 1966.

2. This is to advise you that this Office no longer has contact with the source who originally furnished the information concerning Estelle SOKOLOWSKA de MADRIGAL in March 1966. Source is currently residing in the United States, New York City, and we have no objection to your contacting the source and debriefing her concerning any questions you may have concerning this case. Source has been alerted to the fact that you might contact her regarding this matter. Source is Viola June COBB, usually referred to as June COBB, who is mentioned in your informal memorandum to this office dated June 1, 1964, Subject: Lyle Stuart.

3. We would appreciate being apprised of any new information concerning the SOKOLOWSKA case that is surfaced as a result of your debriefing COBB.

CSCI-316/02389-67

19 May 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf

File: 201-278841
201-794302

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/1/Mexico
1 - DCS (Mr. Musulin via telephone)
1 - Originator

CS COPY

B-201-794302

SECRET

201-278841

15 Apr 1967

April 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with OF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned Mr. Muselin x2268 DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, ~~xkx~~ and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

charlotte Bustos-Videla

SECRET

Jane

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: Mr. Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination secrecy oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Contract Personnel
cc - WH/Personnel
cc - WH/1 Chrono
cc - PINEINCH file (201-278841)

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-278841

22 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Igor Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was cleared CIA agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Daniel James who was described as being responsible to CIA.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York CIA office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

201-278841

liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

Suggested Action:

4. WH Division suggests that you may wish to forward a copy of this memorandum to your New York office. If Miss Cobb does establish contact, we would appreciate your office interviewing her to accept whatever information she might wish to contribute, but that no financial commitments be made on our behalf. WH Division plans to have no direct contact unless the information provided would appear to merit a special interview.

(Signed) Jacob D. Esterline

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
0 & 1 - DO/WH
cc - D/DCS
cc - LICOOKY-1 201-
cc - WH/1/Memo Chrono

SECRET

12 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Tom Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was a cleared WOFACT agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Danial James who was described as being responsible to WOFACT.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York WOFACT office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-278841

Suggested Action:

4. WH Division suggests that you may wish to forward a copy of this memorandum to your New York office. If Miss Cobb does establish contact, we would appreciate your office interviewing her to accept whatever information she might wish to contribute, but that no financial commitments be made on our behalf. WH Division plans to have no direct contact unless the information provided would appear to merit a special interview.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Domestic Operations/WH
1 - Director, Domestic Contacts Service
① - LICOOKY-201-
1 - WH/1/Memo Chrono

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA

FROM: (Division) WHD (Case officer) C. Bustos (Extension) 3654

SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used): LICOOKY-1

NAME SHOWN IS: ☐ TRUE ☐ PSEUDO ☒ CRYPT

CI/OA NO.:

201 NO.: 201-278841

PROJECT: LICOOKY

DATE OF BIRTH: 24/8/27

PLACE OF BIRTH: Ponca, Okla, USA

AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: ☐ IS ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED

will not be forwarded

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

LICOOKY-1 was terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was on 23 June, she was paid salary through June, and she was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement.

In view of subject's personality, and the broad publicity in mid-1966 (see 201 file) of accusations that Subject was connected with U.S. intelligence in Mexico, any use of Subject should be made only after careful consideration.

See copy of HMMA 29461, Mexico City Station termination report, attached.

DATE: [illegible]

SIGNATURE:

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT LICOOKY Project
Termination of LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Attached herewith is the LILINK report on the termination of LICOOKY-1. This report was received from LILINK on 24 June 1966.

2. Forwarded under separate cover are two copies of the Secrecy and Termination agreement signed by LICOOKY-1, in true name, on 23 June 1966.

3. At the time of termination, LICOOKY-1 was given (1) salary for February, 1966, (2) one way airfare from Mexico City to New York, and (3) Federal Tax refund amounting to 9,005.00 MN. The household items in her possession at the time of termination, which belonged to the Station, were sold to her for US $300.00.

4. It should be noted that although LICOOKY-1 claims she intends to remain in the United States, she retained her apartment, which was turned over to a rental agency for subrenting. The Station believes that she intends to return within the next several months or so should it develop that she cannot find suitable work in the New York area. Should she do so on her own it may be that the Station would want to make occasional use of her, and for that purpose a post office box to which she can write to initiate contact was given her prior to departure.

(CONTINUED)

Attachment:
A. U/W LILINK Report
B. U.S.C. 2 cys Secrecy Agreement

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WH w/atts

14 July 66

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	HMMA-29461	14 July 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~50-6-120~~/1

201-278841

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-29461

5. Headquarters will be advised should the Station have additional contact with her.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, June Cobb, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

SECRET

201-278841

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 23 day of June 1966.

(SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 23 day of June 1966,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

Arthur F. Ladenburg
SIGNATURE

ATT TO HMMA-29461

Draft of Dispatch

1. LICOOKY-1 has been terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was held on 23 June. She was paid her salary through 30 June, her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 - 30 June 1966 and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement. A Termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, was obtained.

2. L-1 plans to return to New York on or about 1 July. She said she will look for a job there, and is confident she will have no difficulty obtaining one. She does not yet know where she will be living.

3. L-1 is subletting the apartment she occupies here. She has purchased the KUBARK-owned household effects which had been loaned to her for that apartment. For this reason, in addition to the fact that she has acquired many close friends and interests here as a result of five years residence, the Station expects that she will return to Mexico, although she insists she has no plans to do so.

24. July 66

201-278841

4. She was given a post office box address to use to contact the Station in the event that she does return to Mexico and feels it necessary to do so. But no committment was made to her regarding any future contact or payment for information.

5. She was previously told that the telephone number of the New York KUBARK office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States. She asked if that would still be the case and was told that it was but only to attempt such contact for an important or urgent matter. But since she tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, it would not be surprising if she did try to establish such contact.

SECRET

21 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Request for Termination of Project LICOOKY

The LICOOKY Project was last approved for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965 for $5,140--$2,530 for FY 1965 and $2,610 for FY 1966. It is requested that the LICOOKY Project be terminated effective 1 January 1966, based on the following information geared to the outline in CSI-F NO. 230-60.

(1) Project Name: LICOOKY

(2) Original Project Objectives: Identify and report on plans, activities and associates of Central American Communists resident in or visiting Mexico City.

(3) Reason for Termination: LICOOKY-1 lost her access to the hard core group of CA communists partly because of her close association with LINLUCK who publicly renounced his break with the Guatemalan CP in 1962. The loss of access was also partly due to L-1's own apparent indiscretion vis-a-vis some of her close friends in Mexico City. This can be attributed both to her own growing distaste for the grubby and blindly unreasoning members of this group with whom she was asked to consort, and her reaction in her social group which took the form increasingly of anti-Communist remarks, and to the concomitant (or possibly resultant) rumors of increasing currency, that she was in the pay of PBSWING. Attempts were made to take advantage of her connections with literary circles in Mexico, but her inability to budget her time, sufficiently to satisfy station requirements led to the decision to terminate her. A contributing cause was also her inability to regularize her status in Mexico so she could accept a paying position which would give her reason to remain there, with the resultant strain of the thin legend that her father was providing her support.

SECRET

[illegible]

(4) Effectiveness of Project: Project supplied a certain amount of miscellaneous detail on the Central American Communist group in its early stages. Detail and continuity have always been lacking. During the post-project period of association, after termination notice was already given, she began to be more attentive to Station requirements and supplied several rather detailed profiles of controversial persons in the intellectual world who could be of operational interest to the Station.

(5) Date of Termination: 1 January 1966

(6) Status of commitments:

a. LICOOKY-1: This Contract Agent is being carried under LIRANCH (OOA) from 1 January through June 1966 to prepare special reports against non-LICOOKY Project objectives. Termination costs will be borne by Project LIRANCH.

b. LICOOKY-2: LICOOKY-2 was terminated on 31 December 1965 for lack of continuous production. He was very understanding when told of the termination and recognized that his limited and occasional access made a regular salary illogical. Contact is maintained with him via a letter box through which he can indicate his need for case officer contact. He is then paid small sums for travel information supplied.

(7) Disposition of funds, material and personnel: There are no funds or material to be disposed of. LICOOKY-1 is being terminated effective 30 June 1966. At this time she will be supplied with air fare from Mexico City to New York and paid the income tax refund due her. Station owns some of the furnishings in her apartment and she has expressed a wish to purchase some of these. The normal three-bid process will be complied with in this case, through her advertising the sale and then offering slightly higher prices for the items. She plans to retain the apartment in Mexico and sublet it furnished so she will have a pied-a-terre whenever she returns there. Her specific plans for leaving the city are not known. The Station has no objections to her remaining in Mexico and

is quite willing to maintain contact with her on an occasional basis. She would be reimbursed out of LIRANCH on a piecework basis.

(8) Request for funds: No extra funds are required.

(9) Progress made toward attainment of project objectives: See paragraph 4 above.

(10) Review of Project: No review is contemplated of Project LICOOKY.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:
RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO. ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

Copy Detached JUN 27 1966

Hold for Bustos

FYI

Please reclassify into 201-278841

WH/1
ABSTRACT X

[redacted]

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICERS INITIALS
1. WH/REG				
2.				
3. C/WH/1/Fisher		27 JUN 1966		
4.				
5. Kaufman				
6.				
7. Chacon				
8.				
9. Bustos				
10. WH/FI/Buran				K
11.				
12.				
13. RI/AN				
14.				
15.				
[redacted]				
17. RID/FI				

TRACE REQUEST

ABSTRACT X

INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE) ~~50-6-179/3~~ 201-278841

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE 16 June, 1966

DOCUMENT NUMBER HMMA 29207

FORM 1-63 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City W

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1/ Forwarding of Clippings and Comments Concerning Conference on Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None; FYI.

1. As Headquarters is already aware, a Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union (Conferencia Latino-americana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS) was held in Mexico City during the period 13 - 15 May 1966. Judging by numerous articles in the press, Política, La Voz de México, Sucesos Para Todos (see attachments under separate cover) and excerpts from conversations between numerous persons on LIENVOY and LIFEAT, the Soviet Embassy, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) and other groups and individual Communists were determined, if possible, to prevent the Conference from being held and, failing that, to discredit it completely and pin the ODIOKE/ ODACID label on it. Despite their efforts and the voluminous adverse propaganda, both before and after the Conference, the Conference was held and was probably mildly successful.

2. Política, 1 May 1966, carried an article attacking the proposed Conference and ridiculing some of the Mexican participants (Attachment A). It contains, among other things, a partial reprint of the text of an interview or statement by Nicolas S. Leonov, Press Attaché of the Soviet Embassy in which he states that Mexico should not be drawn into the cold war propaganda battle, and he maintains that Jews in the Soviet Union are not mistreated or discriminated against. In addition to the attacks and counterattacks in the press, efforts were made (based on LIFEAT on Enrique SEMO Calev, Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES, and LIENVOY) to prevent Carlos Pellicer, a darling of the Mexican left but not a formal PCM member, from taking part; Pellicer is an official of the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR (Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética). Política, 15 May 1966

DOC [illegible]
BY [illegible] 2 JUN [illegible]

CONTINUED

Attachments:
As stated above, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
③ - Chief, WH Division, w/atts usc

CS COPY

201-278541
50-6-129/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29207

DATE
16 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-129/3

(Attachment B) continued the attack on the Conference and its participants, claiming in effect that it is a clear anti-Soviet move backed by ODACID. As of 18 May, according to the article, numerous signatures had been collected on a "progressive manifesto" protesting the Conference. The list includes many well known Mexican Communists and pro-Communists. Attached also (Attachment C) is a copy of the "progressive manifesto", which was published in El Día on 19 May 1966, and a copy of a manifesto (Attachment D) published in El Heraldo, 22 April 1966, by the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR, in which a number of demands are made on the Soviet Government with respect to the Jews and their rights.

3. La Voz de Mexico,15 May 1966 (Attachment E) carried an article bitterly attacking the Conference, which it charges is being organized and held by groups and persons in the service of ODACID. It specifically names LICOOKY-1, although the latter's name is incorrectly spelled, as one of those responsible for the Conference and says she is "well connected" with ODYOKE police. Sucesos, 21 May 1966, carried an article (Attachment F) attacking the Conference and its organizers and charging that there are sinister forces behind the Conference. This article carries a picture of LICOOKY-1.

4. Sucesos, 4 June 1966, included an inserted sheet (not found in all copies of this edition) entitled "An Agent of the FBI and INTERPOL in the Association of Mexican Writers," which deals almost exclusively with LICOOKY-1, her expulsion from Cuba, work in Mexico, and contacts and activities in Mexico. It charges that in Mexico she is working for Daniel James, who is responsible to KUBARK (Attachment G).

5. LICOOKY-1's name appeared in a notice (Attachment H) appearing in El Excelsior, 28 May 1966 by Vicente Echeverría del Prado, treasurer of the Mexican Association of Writers (AEM - Asociación de Escritores de México, A.C.), which simply stated that LICOOKY-1 is not authorized to accept dues or handle other business of the AEM within the province of the treasurer's duties and obligations. However, in view of the adverse publicity previously, the announcement had the effect or implied that the AEMAC or members of that group believed the charges that LICOOKY-1 had a part in organizing the Conference and/or is an agent of KUBARK. The notice, as it appears, also implies that LICOOKY-1 was mishandling AEMAC funds. Echeverría offered to publish the clarification on the sheet on which the AEMAC announcement appears; however, LICOOKY-1 asked him not to do so and said she would take up the notice and any clarification with the AEMAC Justice and Honor Commission.

6. On 9 June 1966 while conversing with SEMO (Attachment I), Leonov said that LICOOKY-1 had called him to say that she had had nothing to do with the Conference, and does not want the Soviets to catalogue her as an enemy. Leonov commented that LICOOKY-1 had left him her phone number and had asked him to help her (presumably refute the charges that she was involved with the Conference). The LILINK case officer who currently handles LICOOKY-1 said on the morning of 14 June 1966 that LICOOKY-1 told him she had called the Soviet Press Attaché to deny that she had had anything to do with the Conference "because it is what she would normally do." She did not, however, mention beforehand that she intended to call the Soviet Embassy. (Tape of conversation is forwarded as Attachment J.)

7. The Station believes that most or all articles attacking the Conference, and particularly those attacking LICOOKY-1, were Soviet inspired, and it is further believed that SEMO wrote most if not all articles attacking the Conference which appeared in La Voz, Política and Sucesos. The Soviets, who are probably aware of previous Cuban charges that LICOOKY-1 is an ODYOKE agent, probably felt that as an American closely associated with the AEMAC LICOOKY-1 would be vulnerable to such an attack.

8. As a result of the Sucesos article of 4 June 1966 an official from the Ministry of Government did visit LICOOKY-1 to check on her documentation. The official said that he did not believe the charges made in the Sucesos article, but since her tourist visa had expired he advised her to immediately leave the country in order to renew it, and he provided her with a letter to show to Mexican border authorities permitting her exit. She is currently in PBPRIME but is expected to return to Mexico in a few days.

9. As Headquarters is aware, LICOOKY-1 will be terminated effective 30 June 1966; the decision to terminate her was made some time ago, prior to the occurrence of the Conference and the resulting adverse propaganda. While she may be of some occasional use should she return to and remain in Mexico, it is believed that the recent adverse propaganda has impaired her future usefulness in Mexico, although many Mexicans undoubtedly do not believe the charges and others offered to "come to her defense."

10. A dispatch will be prepared and forwarded when the termination has been completed, and any new developments with respect to her alleged participation in the above Conference will be included in that dispatch.

Lee R. Wigren

for
Willard C. CURTIS

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Att J to

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO. HMMA 29207

DATE 16 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				BULKY Tape Recording of conversation
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6867 FOR ATTACHMENTS.
14.				RECORDS CENTER JOB NO. 67-1003 BOX NO. 8
15.				201-278841

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Contract Amendments

ACTION REQ: Advise Subjects

Attached for your retention are contract amendments relating to income taxes for the following personnel:

Cecil B. ARLISS
Rita H. BLAZEK
Howard R. BENJAYA
Helen P. FILESHA
Joyce H. PINELICH
Leo C. REDLICH
Philip K. TESSAROLO
David M. WILSTED
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

Howard D. MYNARD

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

Wilcox

HMMS - 4770

SECRET

WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan: gms 8 June 1966 4660

Distribution:

SECRET

Miss Joyce H. Piscioch

Dear **Miss Piscioch**

Reference is made to your current **MOC** with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective **21 April 1966**, said **MOC** is amended by deleting all references to income taxes therefrom and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"**10**. Taxes. As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph **four (4)** above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said ~~contract~~ moc remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONGRESOS

¿Les Darán Permiso?

En 1961 un Comité Hindú pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética solicitó al gobierno de la India permiso para realizar un congreso al que asistirían intelectuales de varios países asiáticos. El permiso fue negado porque el primer ministro Nehru entendió que esa reunión afectaría las buenas relaciones de indo-soviéticas.

Trámites similares se hicieron al año siguiente en Ceilán y correspondió a la señora Sirimavo Bandaranaike, jefa del gobierno cuya política nacionalista fue saludada por las fuerzas progresistas de todo el mundo, negar el permiso, pues vio que se trataba de una más o menos sutil intromisión en la política exterior de su país.

Instituido el gobierno *gorila* en el Brasil, un Comité Latinoamericano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética no tuvo problemas para llevar a cabo en 1965 un congreso; éste se celebró poco después de uno similar que se reunió en mayo del año pasado en Washington y sobre el que un conocido poeta judío-norteamericano de ideas derechistas, Jacob Glatstein, hizo este comentario: "Todos gritaban en inglés que hacía falta la lengua judía… en Rusia". Esta expresión fue comentada por Aarón Vergelis, poeta y director de la revista en yidish *Sovietish Heimland* que se publica en la URSS, con esta frase:

Politica, 1 May 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

"Nadie más en ruso que hace falta la lengua judía, en los EU".

A otro mitin antisoviético celebrado el tres de junio pasado en Nueva York, dos prominentes sabios judíos de la URSS, el economista Evsei Liberman, profesor de la Universidad de Jarkov, y el físico Lev Landau, Premio Nobel, enviaron un mensaje que decía: "Los ciudadanos de la URSS de nacionalidad judía expresamos nuestra profunda indignación por el hecho de que algunos círculos de Occidente hagan cundir incesantemente toda clase de infundios sobre la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética. Los judíos soviéticos consideramos como una provocación el mitin del tres de junio en el *Madison Square Garden* donde sin nosotros, sin representantes nuestros, se pretende discutir una cuestión que, para colmo, ni siquiera existe".

MARTÍN LUIS GUZMÁN, CARLOS PELLICER, LUIS GÓMEZ Z. Y JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

"...¿no se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial que sí se practica en otros países?..."

Al congreso de Río de Janeiro concurrieron por México dos personajes de prestigio: Martín Luis Guzmán y Carlos Pellicer. Poco después quedó constituido el Comité Mexicano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, presidido ejecutivamente por un judío-mexicano de ideas ultraderechistas, Jacobo Mondlak, y honorariamente por el poeta Carlos Pellicer. Como secretario actúa el locutor de Radio Universidad, actor aficionado y empleado de la sucursal mexicana de una empresa financiera israelí Sergio Guzik. Para colaborar con ellos llegó a México a principios de este año Dov Yosefi, funcionario del ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Israel, experto en darle un barniz "liberal" y hasta "progresista" a ciertos eslabones de esta cadena echada a tejer por el Departamento de Estado de los EU.

Dov Yosefi trajo consigo abundante "literatura", entre la que se contaba el artículo *Los judíos en la URSS*, publicado por la revista *Marcha* de Montevideo el 16 de octubre de 1965, y del que es autor Julio Adin, miembro del Partido Obrero Unificado de Israel. Julio Adin estuvo en México a mediados de abril y declaró a POLÍTICA: "Yo escribí ese artículo a pedido del Dr. Carlos Quijano, director de *Marcha*, revista cuya orientación progresista todos conocemos. Al remitírselo desde Jerusalén le expresaba en una carta adjunta que me disgustaría sobremanera que fuese utilizado para cualquier actividad, disimulada o no, de tipo antisoviético. Estoy enterado de los congresos que se han venido celebrando en muchos países para «defender» los derechos de los judíos en la URSS, y no tengo dudas sobre su carácter antisoviético propiciado por el Departamento de Estado de los EU".

Firmas mexicanas. La consecuencia para México de la reunión de Río de Janeiro fue un *Llamado de conciencia*, a cuyo pie se puso la respetable firma de Carlos Pellicer. El hábil trabajo de Dov Yosefi y Sergio Guzik logró que a la de Pellicer se sumaran 50 firmas, algunas tan honorables como las de León Felipe, Héctor Cruz, Rosario Castellanos, Alí Chumacero, Dagoberto Guillaumin, Héctor Mendoza, José Emilio Pacheco y últimamente otras como la de José Revueltas, Luis Gómez Z. o Carlos Monsiváis.

Para dar a conocer ese *Llamado de conciencia* fue ofrecida una conferencia de prensa el 2[illegible] de abril en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México. En las invitaciones se decía que la iba a presidir Carlos Pellicer, pero su lugar fue ocupado por una personalidad mucho menos importante, como lo es el Lic. Benjamín Laureano Luna, del Frente [illegible] Humanos. Empleando el [illegible] que consiste en [illegible] tan las [illegible] naciones civiles en Vietnam, Laureano Luna repetía una y otra vez [illegible] por la URSS y los países socialistas, para afirmar luego mentiras tales [illegible] URSS se editan mill[illegible] de libros de franco y [illegible] sentido antisemita, que son vendidos a menor precio que las obras científicas o literarias; y que si bien la Constitución soviética condena el antisemitismo, actualmente el gobierno no sólo lo tolera sino que propicia su expansión.

Jacobo Mondlak, después de afirmar de modo irresponsable que todos los sectores de la comunidad judía de México lo habían elegido presidente del mencionado comité, sufrió un ataque de confusión geográfica y afirmó que en la URSS se producen frecuentes profanaciones de cementerios judíos. La verdad es que el único país donde se ha sabido que se produzcan tan abominables salvajismos es en la República Federal Alemana, donde florece el neonazismo y, en consecuencia, el antisemitismo; pero sobre esto ni una palabra dijeron los apurados "defensores": Mondlak, Laureano Luna y Guzik.

El 22 de abril, en todos los periódicos matutinos, incluido *El Nacional*, apareció el *Llamado de conciencia* con las 50 firmas. Esto sorprendió de manera desagradable a los sectores progresistas de México, no repuestos todavía de las intempestivas cuan amenazantes visitas de Johnson y Goldwater. La primera reacción de esos sectores fue el envío de cartas que diversas instituciones y personas hicieron llegar al poeta Carlos Pellicer, lamentando que hubiera aceptado presidir un comité inspirado y movido

ATTA TO HMMA-29307

201-278841

por el Departamento de Estado yanqui.

Comentario soviético. En entrevista con *El Día*, Nicolás S. Leonov, agregado de prensa de la embajada de la URSS en nuestro país, afirmó: "México no es campo propicio para hacer propaganda de guerra fría. El prestigio internacional de que goza y el respeto que le tiene el mundo entero no permiten que florezcan en este país brotes de la guerra fría. En la actualidad no hay ni datos, ni situaciones ni acontecimientos que justifiquen el deseo de algunas personas y elementos de reavivar el cadáver del llamado problema judío en Rusia. A juzgar por los argumentos, la aplastante mayoría de los firmantes usó para sus conclusiones no los datos personales, no los resultados de una investigación objetiva, sino [illegible] tomado de segunda mano, superficial, erróneo y muchas veces tergiversado por pura mala voluntad".

En referencia al pedido de control de las publicaciones antisemitas que hacía el llamamiento, Leonov comentó: "Es curioso que pidan esto a la URSS y no a otros países en donde prolifera esta clase de literatura. Es falso afirmar que las publicaciones antisemitas aparecen en forma regular en la URSS; al contrario, la Unión Soviética es uno de los pocos países en donde la revelación de prejuicios raciales se castiga por la ley y se condena por la opinión pública. Es una pena —concluyó— que tantos intelectuales en tan poco espacio hayan cometido tantos errores. ¿No se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial, que sí se practica en otros países?"

El congreso. Muy en silencio se ha venido preparando un congreso que habrá de celebrarse en la ciudad de México del 13 al 15 de mayo, al que concurrirán intelectuales de los países centroamericanos para "defender" los derechos de los judíos sovié[illegible] [illegible] terminará la cadena, pues [illegible] [illegible] Mundial, durante la [illegible] [illegible] próxima, se reunirá después otro [illegible] en Santiago de Chile, al que [illegible] intelectuales de Argentina, Uruguay y otros países del "cono sur". Como decía un lector de *Siempre!* en la sección de *Cartas* del Nº 67[illegible], los resultados de esta campaña antisoviética "no pueden ser otros que los de favorecer la propaganda imperialista y, a la postre, el antisemitismo". Consideraba además que "muchos de quienes aparecen suscribiendo ese llamado parecen no darse cuenta de que son empujados como resonancia y apoyo para la celebración de un congreso [illegible] antisoviético con sede en México; es decir, en un país que tiene buenas relaciones con la URSS y que sufre en carne propia las falacias del anticomunismo manejado desde Washington".

TRABAJO

Primero de Mayo

La celebración del Primero de Mayo, no ha dejado nunca de ser representativa de las aspiraciones de la clase trabajadora y de sus condiciones de vida y de lucha, por un lado, y de la actitud de la clase capitalista y su dominio frente a aquella, por el otro.

Así, por deformado y desvirtuado que esté el sentido esté el sentido auténtico de la conmemoración, a través de toda la historia de los 1os de Mayo en el país se ha visto una CROM callista, haciéndole el juego al régimen con el propósito de instituir el día de lucha del proletariado universal en una "fiesta del trabajo" organizada por el gobierno. Bajo el cardenismo, en pleno ascenso revolucionario, las manifestaciones obreras volvieron a ser en este día una presencia combativa de la clase trabajadora. Durante Alemán, al tiempo que se llegaba a asesinar trabajadores en el desfile, la sumisión de los *charros* del movimiento obrero llegaba a su máxima expresión cuando Fidel Velázquez lo calificaba de "primer obrero de la República".

En este 1966, lo que una vez fue en México lucha a favor de mejores condiciones de vida ha devenido en una "fiesta de unidad nacional a la que son invitados los empresarios", lo que da una panorámica general de la situación de la lucha de clases en el país.

Organizado con el [illegible] [illegible] controlar las aspiraciones crecientes a la unidad por parte de los trabajadores (el Congreso Nacional del Trabajo) el Primero de Mayo, días antes de su celebración se hizo público el criterio que el gobierno y los líderes reaccionarios deseaban imbuir a esa fecha. Circulares y declaraciones de Fidel Velázquez y Antonio Bernal coincidieron con los conceptos que más tarde externaría el presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

El deseo del régimen de dar apariencia de unidad al intento de fusión burocrática que ha sido el Congreso del Trabajo, así como su empeño en presentarse como impulsor de la unidad obrera se evidencia en su discurso de este Primero de Mayo: "Hoy empieza a ser una promisoria realidad la unificación de los trabajadores no en una sola central propiamente dicha, sino en ideales, en principios, en metas y en ayuda recíproca para poder alcanzarlos".

Vol. VII, Nº 146 POLÍTICA 15 de mayo de 1966
Quince días de México y del Mundo

PANORAMA NACIONAL

CONGRESOS

Antisovietismo en México

Del 13 al 15 de mayo se celebró en el Hotel del Prado de la ciudad de México la silenciosamente organizada Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS. Convocada por el Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética y con asistencia de algunos delegados extranjeros, especialmente centroamericanos, esta reunión fue el remate de una campaña internacional antisoviética, iniciada desde hace por lo menos cinco años por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano y el sionismo organizado.

A pesar de los densos velos de humanitarismo y eclecticismo con que se ha pretendido cubrirla, esta conferencia fue denunciada en su fase preparatoria por publicaciones como POLÍTICA y *La Voz de México*, órgano del Partido Comunista Mexicano. Nicolás S. Leonov, embajador de la Unión Soviética en nuestro país, la condenó como parte de la "guerra fría".

Analizando, aun en forma somera, la extracción de los diferentes delegados extranjeros, es fácil inducir sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste en la conferencia. Los delegados son en su mayoría o han sido funcionarios de gobiernos gorilas de Centro y Sudamérica; entre ellos se cuentan Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, exministro de Cultura de El Salvador; Ricardo J. Bermúdez, exministro de Educación de Panamá; Gerardo Molina, exrector de la Universidad de Colombia; Lic. Gardillo Barios, exministro de Economía y Trabajo de Guatemala; y Dr. René de Sola, exministro de Justicia y de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela.

A esta campaña, nada democrática y de calidad intelectual harto dudosa, fueron arrastrados algunos intelectuales mexicanos honestos. Una larga serie de artimañas fueron usadas para ella, desde el ocultamiento de la bien afinada organización y del puntual pago de los servicios necesarios para la celebración de la conferencia, hasta el uso demagógico y falaz de pronunciamientos hechos, en bien diversas circunstancias, por personalidades y organizaciones de reconocida solvencia progresista.

Además se escamoteó el nombre del escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, que no aparece entre los firmantes del nefasto "Llamado de Conciencia". Sin embargo, el literato había sido designado con anterioridad para presidir la conferencia; así lo aprueban tanto el mensaje dirigido a su nombre por el filósofo inglés Bertrand Russell el 26 de abril, como el discurso de inauguración de la conferencia, que debía dirigir Martín Luis Guzmán y que fue impreso y repartido por la oficina de prensa aun antes de que comenzara la reunión.

La conferencia. En la sesión de apertura se escenificó una farsa en la que se intentó despojar a la conferencia "pro judía" de toda implicación política, ubicándola dentro de una esfera exclusivamente "humana". Al mismo tiempo, se pretendió dar a las delegaciones extranjeras —algunas de las cuales sólo constaban de una sola persona— una representatividad "democrática" en las dos comisiones que se formaron: la de estudio y la de resoluciones.



Una Sesión de la Conferencia "Pro Judía"
…sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste…

La realización de la primera tarea se encargó de iniciarla, por medio de una carta a la conferencia, el que ha figurado como presidente del Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, Carlos Pellicer. Después de disculpar su ausencia de la reunión, pues acompañaba al presidente Díaz Ordaz, en una gira de trabajo, Pellicer enarboló el nombre de Bertrand Russell para "demostrar" que "…no, detrás de nosotros no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo". Y finalizó su carta con estas palabras: "Nunca como hoy se habla tan universalmente de Derechos Humanos. El gobierno soviético los proclama todos los días. ¿Qué ocurre entonces con los dirigentes de tan grande nación? …Estaré lejos de ustedes en persona. Pero mi corazón está aquí y mi voluntad entera para seguir luchando por la justicia y la libertad donde quiera que la necesidad tan honrosamente nos obligue".

A continuación, el presidente de la conferencia, Martín Luis Guzmán, y el que actuó como maestro de ceremonias, Benjamín Laureano Luna, hicieron sendos discursos en los que, cada uno a su manera, trató de justificar los objetivos de la conferencia.

Martín Luis Guzmán afirmó: "Pese a la revisión de aquellos factores negativos de la vida soviética y a los frecuentes cambios que en ellos se introdujeron, el gobierno de la URSS no ha restituido a los judíos sus indiscutibles derechos al goce de su cultura ancestral, a la conservación de sus instituciones, a la continuidad de su tradición milenaria". Despues de algunas vaguedades añadidas a la primera, el escritor finalizó con ésta: "Así, enterados de las persecuciones que hoy sufre un gran grupo del pueblo judío, cuyo milenario legado cultural forma parte de la civilización de Occidente, hemos considerado deber ineludible el acudir aquí para que esta conferencia manifieste su decisión de protestar, como lo haría

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en cualquier otro caso de discriminaciones raciales, culturales o religiosas, contra el régimen que pesa sobre la minoría israelita de la URSS".

Benjamín Laureano Luna, presidente del Frente Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, cubrió su anticomunismo con reiteradas y demagógicas protestas en contra de las agresiones norteamericanas a Santo Domingo y Vietnam. Luego lanzó las más graves calumnias contra la Unión Soviética, y poco le faltó para poner en el mismo nivel del genocidio hitleriano al régimen de la primera nación donde se han sentado las bases para realizar el comunismo.

La jornada del 14 de mayo se cerró con un banquete al que asistieron, además de los delegados extranjeros, numerosos miembros de nuestra versátil y desaprensiva intelectualidad. Allí habló Jacobo Mondlak, gerente ejecutivo de la conferencia. De este seudoescritor, *La Voz de México* (en su edición 1829) denunció su filiación de extrema derecha y lo presentó como "dirigente del JEIRUT (partido israelita de ultraderecha y fascista), bien conocido en la comunidad judía de México por su ideología chovinista y reaccionaria".

Mondlak sólo dirigió ditirambos a la "gloriosa y hospitalaria patria mexicana" y a sus "monumentos toltecas de piedra". Después de barajar demagógicamente citas de Morelos, Hidalgo, Bolívar y Sandino pretendió curarse en salud: "No es preciso ser agente del Departamento de Estado para denunciar brotes antisemitas en la Unión Soviética, como tampoco es preciso ser agente comunista al criticar algunas facetas de la política norteamericana".



DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

"...han sido, son y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del socialismo..."

A los informes sobre la filiación política de Mondlak se añade que su insistencia en colocarse al lado de quienes luchan por la libertad y contra la esclavitud es desmentida por la posición de clase que ocupa dentro de la sociedad mexicana. Es miembro del grupo Mondlak, que posee tal y en el interior del país. La familia Mondlak acaba de invertir $20 millones en maquinaria textil, mediante operaciones realizadas con una empresa imperialista germanoccidental de rancio abolengo nazi.

"Demandas". La conferencia se clausuró el domingo 15 de mayo, luego de adoptarse el acuerdo de pedir a la Unión Soviética que:

- Devuelva a la minoría judía la posibilidad de llevar una vida cultural integral.
- Extirpe de raíz toda manifestación antisemita.
- Dé a los judíos la posibilidad de profesar su religión, al igual que los creyentes de otras religiones.
- Otorgue a los judíos el derecho a la autodeterminación y el derecho a unirse a sus hermanos cuando así lo deseen.



ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ BERTRAND RUSSELL

"...¿cómo pueden explicar los apurados «defensores» su negativa a dialogar?..."

Estos puntos fueron propuestos por el escritor costarricense Samuel Gevinsky quien, no pudiendo ocultar los intereses a los que sirve, dedicó su exposición a calumniar en todas las formas posibles a la Unión Soviética. Y acabó por hacer una ardiente defensa del sionismo internacional, movimiento al que la URSS, durante la asamblea general de las Naciones Unidas en 1965, propuso que se le condenara junto al nazismo, al neonazismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo y de odio hacia razas y nacionalidades.

Respuesta. De inmediato, grupo de personas progresistas redactó un manifiesto donde respondió a los organizadores del movimiento antisoviético y de la conferencia que:

"En relación al «Llamado de Conciencia» del Comité en Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la URSS y la Conferencia organizada por el mismo comité, que se celebró los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

- "La posición activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial en cualquier parte del mundo, es y debe ser tarea diaria de toda persona progresista y democrática.
- "El «Llamado de Conciencia» publicado en la prensa, no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien intencionadas y de reconocida militancia democrática y antiimperialista hayan sido confundidas, prestando sus firmas a un

documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de la URSS.

- "El racismo y las teorías antisemitas han [illegible] y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del [illegible] y [illegible] construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.
- "La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado «antisemitismo soviético» no sirve a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo a la fraternidad entre los pueblos, porque tiende a desviar la atención de éstos de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y el antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que una vez más, levantan cabeza en Alemania occidental y en los Estados Unidos.
- "Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario, es burda calumnia o consideración subjetiva sin posibilidad de comprobación.
- "En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura específica en lengua nacional, yiddish, los judíos soviéticos, sus artistas y escritores siguen creando obras que continúan la herencia de la cultura progresista judía del pasado, aun cuando podrían señalarse ciertas deficiencias originadas en la compleja situación de la minoría judía en la URSS, que no vive concentrada en un territorio común y que conoce además un acelerado proceso de asimilación.
- "Los hoy gratuitos defensores de la cultura judía en la URSS siempre han combatido y difamado esa cultura, porque como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su forma es nacional y su contenido socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los apurados «defensores» su negativa a dialogar, en el pasado y el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?
- "Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan en realidad de imponer, desde afuera y con posiciones antisoviéticas, una anacrónica solución nacionalista estrecha y de ghetto, a la minoría judía de la URSS, que ligada íntimamente a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no comulga con las ideas de movimientos políticos judíos del mundo capitalista.
- "Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirvan a los verdaderos intereses de México, ni tampoco a los intereses vitales [illegible] judías en el mundo en su lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos".



CARLOS PELLICER



MARTÍN LUIS GUZMÁN

…junto al nazismo, al neonazismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo…

Hasta el 18 de mayo habían firmado ese manifiesto progresista, que constituye un reto al brote de antisovietismo que ha surgido en México, las siguientes personas:

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, diputado; David Alfaro Siqueiros, pintor; Alberto Bremauntz, rector de la Universidad de Morelia; Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, director de POLÍTICA; Elí de Gortari, catedrático; Rius, caricaturista; Raquel Tibol, crítica de arte; Ermilo Abreu Gómez, escritor; Enrique Semo, economista; Margarita Paz Paredes, poetisa; Fernando Carmona, economista; Mercedes Quevedo, Pintora; Manuel Meza Andraca, agrónomo; Juan de la Cabada, escritor; Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Presidente de la Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas; Lic. José G. Saavedra; José Luis Parra, periodista; Marco Arturo Montero, escritor; Antonio Caram, periodista; Lic. Adán Nieto, dirigente sindical; Rosendo Gómez Lorenzo, periodista; Adriana Siqueiros; Carlos Estrada Lang, presidente de la AMPEC; Gerardo Dávila, periodista; José Chávez Morado, pintor; Lic. Luis Córdova; Germán Liszt Arzubide, escritor; Profra. Hermelinda Ogazón; José Luis Ceceña, economista; Gabriel Figueroa, cineasta; Luis Suárez, periodista; Luis Rivera Terrazas, astrónomo; Elvira Vargas, periodista; Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo; Roger Bartra, antropólogo; Daniel Casez, lingüista; Sergio Véjar, director de cine; Javier Guerrero, pintor; Gerardo Dávila, periodista; Lic. Juan Manuel Gómez Gutiérrez; Francisco Mora, pintor; Lic. Arturo Rivera M.; Ramón Ramírez, economista; Jorge Godoy, director de teatro; Edmundo Jardón, periodista; Enrique Bordes, fotógrafo; Norberto Martínez, pintor; Froylán Manjarrez, periodista, y Óscar S. Frías, pintor.



JOSÉ LUIS CECEÑA

"…una anacrónica solución…"

[illegible]

En relación al "Llamado de conciencia" del Comité en defensa de los derechos de los judíos en la URSS y la Conferencia organizada por el mismo Comité, que se efectuó los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

1. La oposición activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial, en cualquier parte del mundo es y debe ser tarea diaria de toda persona progresista y democrática.

2. El "Llamado de conciencia" publicado en la prensa no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien intencionadas y de reconocida militancia democrática y antiimperialista hayan sido confundidas y hayan suscrito un documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de [illegible]

3. El racismo y las teorías antisemitas [illegible], son y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del socialismo y de su construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.

4. La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado "antisemitismo soviético" no corresponde a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo a la [illegible] entre los pueblos, porque [illegible] a desviar la atención [illegible] de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y del antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que, una vez más, levantan cabeza en Alemania Occidental y en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica.

5. Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario es [illegible] consideración subjetiva sin [illegible] de comprobación.

6. En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura específica en la lengua nacional "idish", los judíos [illegible] artistas y escritores [illegible] obras que continúan la [illegible] de la cultura progresista judía del pasado, aun cuando [illegible] ciertas deficiencias [illegible] en la compleja situación de la minoría judía en la URSS, que no vive concentrada en un territorio común y que conoce, además, un acelerado proceso de asimilación.

7. Los promotores de la campaña mundial "en defensa de la cultura judía en la URSS", han [illegible] y deformado esa cultura, porque, como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su [illegible] nido es socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los apurados "defensores" su negativa a [illegible] en el pasado y en el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?

8. Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan, en realidad, de imponer desde afuera y con posiciones anti-[illegible], una anacrónica solución, [illegible], estrecha y de ghetto, a la [illegible] de la URSS, que, ligada íntimamente a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no comulga con las ideas de movimientos [illegible] judíos del mundo capitalista.

9. Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirven a los verdaderos intereses de México ni tampoco a los intereses vitales de las masas judías en el mundo, en su lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos.

México, D. F., 16 de mayo de 1965.

David Alfaro Siqueiros, pintor
Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, ingeniero
Jorge L. Tamayo, ingeniero
José Chávez Morado, pintor
Francisco [illegible], pintor
Mario G[illegible]
Olga Costa, pintora
Xavier [illegible], pintor
[illegible], pintor
Froylán M[illegible], periodista
[illegible], periodista
[illegible], pintor
[illegible] Orozco Ávila, profesor
[illegible] Quevedo, pintora
[illegible], artista
Enrique Bordes Mangel, fotógrafo
Luis Suárez, periodista
[illegible], periodista
[illegible], periodista
Rina Lazo, pintora
[illegible] Méndez, profesor
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible], pintora

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, abogado
[illegible] Castro Leal, escritor
[illegible] Ceceña, economista
[illegible] Rivera Terrazas, ingeniero
[illegible], caricaturista
Raquel Tibol, crítica de arte
[illegible] de la Cabada, escritor
[illegible]
[illegible] Ramírez, economista
[illegible] Godoy, Dir. de teatro
Rosendo Gómez Lorenzo, periodista
[illegible] López Toraya, [illegible]
[illegible] Arturo Montero, escritor
[illegible] A. Montero, pintor
[illegible] Parra, periodista
Laura Bolaños, periodista
Carlos Estrada Lang, periodista
[illegible] Nieto Castillo, abogado
[illegible] Vera N., abogado
[illegible] Jardón, periodista
[illegible] Campos Ponce, economista
[illegible] Híjar, crítico de arte
[illegible] Campos Alatorre, profesor
Luis Carrión, periodista
[illegible] de Cruz Chávez, profesora

Alberto [illegible], abogado
[illegible] Gómez, profesor
[illegible] de [illegible], escritor
Luis Card[illegible], escritor
Fernando [illegible], economista
Gabriel [illegible], abogado
J. Mar[illegible] Gómez [illegible], abogado
Car[illegible], escritor
[illegible], agrónomo
[illegible] P. [illegible] Parrés, profesora
[illegible], antropólogo
[illegible], abogado
[illegible], profesora
José G. S[illegible], abogado
Enrique [illegible], economista
[illegible]
[illegible] de cine
José Carlos [illegible], [illegible] de cine
Antonio [illegible], periodista
Juan P[illegible] C., profesor
Ignacio [illegible], profesor
Alfonso [illegible], abogado
[illegible], profesora
[illegible]
J[illegible] Rivera, profesor

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UN LLAMADO DE CONCIENCIA DEL COMITE MEXICANO PRO DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS JUDIOS EN LA UNION SOVIETICA

Al termino de un examen, libre de todo espiritu partidario, hemos comprobado ciertos hechos que nos llevan a abrigar el temor de que aún existe una brecha entre la situación de igualdad que la Constitucion de la URSS confiere a los judios, y su situacion real, en el plano religioso, cultural, económico y humano. Estamos convencidos que dicha situacion se halla en contradiccion con los fines que persigue la sociedad sovietica, y su evolucion desde 1956. Estamos asimismo convencidos que la misma constituye un obstaculo para aminorar la tension internacional. Es por esta razon que estamos igualmente persuadidos que el Gobierno de la Union Sovietica se mostrara sensible al llamamiento que hoy le dirigimos:

SOLICITAMOS DEL GOBIERNO DE LA URSS

1.—Que confiera a los judios soviéticos el derecho de desarrollar libremente su cultura especifica, con medios identicos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periodicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.

2.—Que permita a los judios soviéticos practicar su religion y disponer libremente de los textos, contar con oficiantes y con los objetos necesarios a la observancia del culto;

3.—Que autorice a los judios sovieticos para que, a semejanza de las demas religiones, puedan organizarse en comunidades religiosas en todo el territorio, y a establecer intercambios culturales y de culto, con sus correligionarios;

4.—Que, a fin de evitar en el futuro toda publicacion antisemita del tipo de: "El Judaismo al Descubierto" y "El Judaismo y el Sionismo Contemporaneo", asi como ciertos folletines y caricaturas que aparecen en forma regular en la prensa sovietica, se ejerza un severo control sobre dicho tipo de propaganda racial. Dicho control seria sumamente viable toda vez que existen en la URSS los organismos adecuados para llevarlo a cabo;

5.—Que una legislacion especial sancione los delitos de indole racista, velando especialmente porque dichas tendencias antisemitas no lleguen a poner en peligro ante la justicia, la igualdad de los derechos de los ciudadanos sovieticos, considerando que los recientes procesos por delitos economicos y las condenas a muerte que les siguieron, dan lugar al temor de que dicha igualdad no es enteramente aplicada en el caso de los judios;

6.—Que considere con benevolencia el caso de los judios que deseen reunirse con sus parientes y conyuges que viven en Israel y en otros paises, despues de haber sido separados por diversas circunstancias.

Tenemos la plena conviccion que la atención que otorgue el Gobierno de la URSS a estas peticiones, habra de satisfacer la aspiracion de justicia de los pueblos y su adhesion a la Declaracion Universal de los Derechos del Hombre. La misma contribuira, además, debido a la renovacion y fortalecimiento de las simpatias y lazos amistosos que dicha actitud aportaria a la URSS, al relajamiento de la tension internacional, meta que todos anhelamos.

CARLOS PELLICER
Presidente del Comite

Licenciado Sergio Alvarez Castro; Max Aub, escritor; Abelardo Avila, grabador; Arnold Belkin, pintor; licenciado Carlos Carrero de la Barreda; Rosario Castellanos, escritora; doctor Teodoro Cesserman; Ali Chumacero, escritor; Hector Cruz, pintor; licenciado Sergio Dominguez Vargas, catedratico; Roberto Dumont, actor; Leon Felipe, poeta; Juan Garcia Ponce, escritor; doctor Luis Garrido; Argelio Gasca, escritor; senador Luis Gómez Z.; profesor Julio González Tejada, catedrático; Miguel Guardia, escritor; Dagoberto Guillaumin, director teatral; Juan Jose Gurrola, director teatral; Joaquin Gutierrez Heras, compositor; Sergio Guzik economista; Arturo Guzman, escritor; Regino Hernández Llergo, periodista; Jorge Ibargüengoitia, escritor; Francisco Icaza, pintor; Benjamin Laureano Luna, Frente Mexicano Pro-Derechos Humanos; Vicente Leñero, escritor; Juan Lopez Moctezuma, director teatral; Jacobo Margolis, pintor, licenciado Carlos Medina; Juan Vicente Melo, escritor; Hector Mendoza, escritor y director teatral; licenciado Ruben Moheno, diputado; Jacobo Mondlak, escritor; Carlos Monsivais, escritor; Magda Montoya, coreografa; doctor Manuel Moreno Barrera; doctor Marcos Moshinsky; Jose Emilio Pacheco, escritor; licenciado Carlos Pellicer; arquitecto Salvador Pinoncelly; Hero Rodriguez Toro, periodista; Fanny Rabel, pintora; Malkah Rabell, escritora y periodista; profesora Maria del Carmen Ramirez A.; Jose Revueltas, escritor; licenciado Salvador Rodriguez, diputado; licenciado Antonio Ruiz Acosta, catedratico; doctor Andres Serra Rojas, senador; Gutierre Tibon, periodista; licenciado Juan Tovar; Jacobo Zabludowsky, periodista.

El Heraldo

ATTD to HMMA-29007 [illegible] de 1966

201-278541

La Voz de México, 15 May 1966
1830

Repudio a la farsa antisoviética

La organiza el Dpto. de Estado, denuncia la AMP

La Asociación Mexicana de Periodista salió al paso a la campaña antisoviética iniciada hace dos semanas por un grupo al servicio del imperialismo norteamericano que se ostenta como "defensor de los judíos". En un documento firmado por el Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Antonio Caram y Gerardo Dávila, presidente, secretario y vocal, respectivamente de la AMP, denuncian el carácter de la campaña difamatoria, presentan un hecho que sirve para corroborar que los hilos de toda [illegible] del imperialismo y demuestran con una serie de datos que en la Unión Soviética no existe discriminación contra los judíos.

Este documento fue emitido días antes del anunciado "Congreso Latinoamericano" que grupos subvencionados por el Departamento de Estado planeaban iniciar en México el sábado 14.

En la declaración de referencia se señala al principio que la persona encargada de recolectar firmas para el llamamiento que apareció en todos los diarios de esta ciudad el 21 de abril en "defensa de los derechos de los judíos en la Unión Soviética", es nada menos que la ciudadana norteamericana June Jacob, persona muy ligada con las policías norteamericanas que actúan en nuestro país y quien inmediatamente después de regresar de un largo viaje por Estados Unidos, Europa y el Medio Oriente, se dedicó a conseguir firmas de intelectuales y personalidades progresistas, para el documento antisoviético, que sirve de base para la convocatoria de un congreso supuestamente dirigido a "defender a los judíos

(Pasa a la pág. 4)

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Repudio

(Viene de la pág. 1)

residentes en la URSS". Los firmantes del manifiesto fueron sorprendidos hábilmente y muchos de ellos mantienen una actitud de desconfianza hacia los promotores de la campaña.

Respecto de una de las "peticiones" que se hace en el llamamiento antisoviético para "que se conceda a los judíos soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanzas, etc.", la AMP dice: "... los dos millones y tercio de judíos que forman parte del pueblo soviético viven exactamente igual que el resto de las 109 nacionalidades y de los 11 grupos afines a nacionalidades extranjeras. En cuanto a su cultura específica, como todas las del mundo tiende a fusionarse y a unificarse... los judíos en todas partes asisten a las mismas escuelas donde van los rusos, ucranianos, uzbecos, etc. Reciben, como todos los demás, educación gratuita en todos los niveles". Otros datos que demuestran que la discriminación de judíos en la URSS es sólo una invención de los agentes a sueldo del gran capital yanqui, son los siguientes:

En la biblioteca Lenin de Moscú hay 70.000 libros en yidish y 50.000 volúmenes en ese mismo idioma, en la Schedrin de Leningrado. Los judíos en la URSS disponen de publicaciones en su idioma, así por ejemplo la revista mensual "Yidish Hemland" tira 25.000 ejemplares. Se publican ediciones de autores judíos tanto soviéticos como extranjeros que alcanzan tiradas de millones de ejemplares como es el caso de Sholem-Aleijem. Los hebreos disponen también de sus propios teatros.

"Además de ello —se dice en el documento—, disponen de una tierra particular, exclusiva, a la que muchos llaman patria propia y que existe desde mayo de 1934, mucho antes de que los héroes judíos de la postguerra arrancaran Israel al poder inglés... calculamos en medio millón los judíos que habitan en esa región autónoma llamada Birobidjan, la cual forma parte de la URSS y abarca una superficie de 32 mil kilómetros cuadrados", a continuación viene luego una lista detallada de la cantidad de escuelas, institutos, centros médicos, etc. que existen en dicha república autónoma.

"Mucho más podríamos citar —dice finalmente la declaración de la AMP— en contestación a los errores cometidos por ese grupo de personas firmantes del "llamado", pero lo amplio del tema nos obliga a detenernos aquí, por ahora..."

ATT E to HMMA 29207

201-278841

SUCESOS DE ULTIMA HORA

LOS JUDIOS EN LA URSS

EL CAPITULO "MEXICANO" DE UNA INTRIGA INTERNACIONAL

LUBLIN es una ciudad polaca en la que Hitler pensó concentrar a los judíos en un hacinado ghetto de tantos millones de discriminados como habitantes tiene hoy Tokio. En el histórico avance para acabar con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Hitler consideró que en vez de concentrar a los judíos se creaba menos problemas si los mataba de una buena vez. En los crematorios y fosas de los campos de concentración erigidos por los nazis en su marcha hacia el oriente quedaron las cenizas y los cadáveres de seis millones de judíos. La lucha contra el nacifascismo costó a la URSS 20 millones de vidas humanas.

En la ciudad de Lublín Nació Jacob Glatstein. Joven aún emigró a los Estados Unidos y se convirtió, con el correr de los años, en una de las más brillantes figuras de la poesía y de la crítica literaria en lengua ídish. Tiene ahora 70 años y milita en las filas del partido Poalé Sión (Trabajadores de Sión), que agrupa a los sionistas de tendencia socialdemócrata de derecha. Los poalesionistas editan en Nueva York el semanario Indisher Kempfer (Luchador judío). En septiembre de 1965, y en este periódico, publicó Jacob Glatstein un comentario bibliográfico sobre Horizontes, una antología con la producción más reciente de los poetas judíos de la Unión Soviética que escriben en lengua ídish, de la que se acababan de editar en Moscú 5,000 ejemplares, número que el comentarista señaló como bastante considerable para una antología de poesía nueva en cualquier parte del mundo. Glatstein celebraba haber descubierto en Horizontes a por lo menos una docena de poetas de primer orden a quienes, decía, "elogio sin titubeos porque son maestros del verbo y notables artífices de lo emotivo y lo temático... El ídish en manos de los magistrales poetas de la Unión Soviética es una creación madura que se sustenta más en un sabor popular que en la gran poesía del pasado. Ahí se ha conservado una savia popular que ha ampliado verdaderamente sus horizontes". Ya para terminar su comentario Jacob Glatstein afirmaba: "La antología Horizontes viene a demostrar que la palabra poética ídish vive en la Unión Soviética".

La comunidad judía de habla ídish en México es una de las más jóvenes de la América Latina; tie[illegible] 60 años de existencia y unos 30 mil miem[illegible] se concentran principalmente en la capital y en las ciudades de Monterrey y Guadalajara. Organizada al estilo tradicional, cuenta con un centro deportivo, varias sinagogas y nueve colegios e institutos de enseñanza, en cinco de los cuales se enseña a los jóvenes la lengua ídish. En estos 60 años hubo en México tres poetas que crearon en ídish obra digna de consideración: Itzjok Berliner, Moishe Glikowski y Jacobo Glantz. Los dos primeros han muerto y el sobreviviente, Jacobo Glantz, decidió en 1963 a los 61 años de edad, cambiar el ídish por el español, porque su poesía en aquel idioma, a pesar de los colegios e institutos que lo enseñan, no cuenta con lectores en México.

Ahora bien, Jacob Glantz, poeta ídish de México, que nació en Ucrania 15 años antes del estallido de la Revolución de Octubre, y que antes de su emigración a este país, en 1925, había sido profesor de literatura en Odesa, no firmó el "Llamado de conciencia" que el 22 de abril publicó en todos los periódicos de la capital el denominado Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, que preside Carlos Pellicer, eminente poeta mexicano que no sólo no lee el ídish sino que no sabe nada de poesía o de literatura en esa lengua.

Ese llamado, que Pellicer firmó aunque seguramente no redactó, porque los términos que lo com-

La numerosa concurrencia, presidida por don Martín Luis Guzmán.

21 de Mayo de 1966

ATT F to HMMA-29207

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ponen son casi idénticos a los de llamados similares que han venido circulando en el último lustro en muchos países, solicitaba antes que nada al gobierno de la URSS "que confiera a los judíos soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica, con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.".

Pellicer es poeta —¡quién lo duda!—, y las savias de su sensibilidad y de su forma poética son la realidad mexicana, las tradiciones nacionales y esa lengua que él depura y elabora porque la habla su pueblo y hay textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros y escuelas por medio de los cuales la lengua y su correspondiente cultura se desarrollan libremente. Pellicer, que es poeta, ¿puede creer que existan poetas con "luminosa potencia creadora", que las savias populares amplíen sus horizontes, que un idioma sea elaborado con "tanto conocimiento y virtuosismo, con tan original y extraordinaria plasticidad" allí donde la cultura en ese idioma no tiene el derecho a desarrollarse libremente? ¿Lo creen así poetas de la talla de Rosario Castellanos, de José Emilio Pacheco, de Miguel Guardia, de León Felipe, o escritores que conocen los auténticos secretos del difícil y vivo oficio de las letras, como Max Aub, Alí Chumacero, Juan García Ponce, Jorge Ibargüengoitia, Vicente Leñero, Carlos Monsiváis, José Revueltas y Gutierre Tibón, que junto con Pellicer firmaron ese "Llamado de conciencia", que de tal sólo tiene el título, pues el nombre que le correspondería, después de someterlo a un riguroso análisis objetivo, sería el muy ionesquiano de "Llamado de un grupo de mal informados que firmaron porque dicen que les dijeron lo que no les consta porque no saben nada al respecto y la culpa de todo la tiene Bertrand Russel?"



Carlos Pellicer, el poeta; Martín Luis Guzmán, el escritor; Jacobo Mondlak, el organizador.

Donde no aparece la firma de don Martín Luis. El ya anciano (79 años) autor de El águila y la serpiente y La sombra del caudillo, el escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, gusta del infantil juego de las escondidillas. En 1965 fue él quien convenció a Carlos Pellicer para que juntos asistieran a la Conferencia Latinoamericana Sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS que se celebró en Río de Janeiro los días 14 y 15 de septiembre de ese año. Pero he aquí que entre las 53 firmas que suscribieron el "Llamado de conciencia", que apareció en cuartos de plana, al día siguiente, en todos los diarios, en inserción pagada por la norteamericana June Cob, no aparece el nombre de don Martín. ¿Se había retirado arrepentido? Al contrario, prefirió en ese momento no salir a la liza porque estaba atareadísimo desde hacía mes y medio firmando, como cabeza del Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética, las cartas en las que se invitaba a intelectuales mexicanos y latinoamericanos a concurrir a la conferencia que se efectuaría "en la ciudad de México durante los días 13 a 15 de mayo próximo y que se ocupará, como objetivo único, en examinar detenidamente el problema a que la minoría israelita hace frente en la Unión Soviética".

Según esas cartas, el comité organizador de la conferencia lo integraban, junto con don Luis Martín, el Dr. Luis Garrido y los licenciados Andrés Serra Rojas y Carlos Pellicer. Mas he aquí que ninguna de estas personas se presentó en la conferencia de prensa que el Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética dio en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México (Acapulco 70), el 21 de abril. Ahí apareció como presidente uno de los pocos judíos (10 en total) que habían firmado el llamado, un tal Jacobo Mondlak que es comerciante pero se dice escritor por los artículos que publica en un periódico que sale algunas veces al año, Tribuna Sionista, órgano del más ultraderechista de los grupos sionistas que existen en México.

El asistente de Mondlak en la conferencia de prensa era otro de los pocos firmantes judíos del documento, Sergio Guzik, actor aficionado que suele presentarse en los espectáculos de Juan José Gurrola y que tiene con Walter Rubinstein y F. Mondragón una oficina —Consultores Técnicos de Negocios— donde se conciertan operaciones financieras con empresas israelíes, privadas o estatales. Esa oficina, en el Paseo de la Reforma No. 122, 6o. piso fue la que se ocupó en distribuir libros, folletos y reproducciones fotostáticas y mimeografiadas de documentos sobre la situación de los judíos en la URSS, antes, durante y después de la conferencia de prensa, y de preparar el material que utilizarían los intelectuales que se reunieron en el hotel Del Prado los días 14 y 15 de mayo.

Que el interés de don Martín Luis era muy grande lo prueba el hecho de que fue él quien llevó la voz cantante en la entrevista que el comité tuvo en los primeros días de abril con el secretario de Gobernación, Lic. Luis Echeverría, para solicitarle el permiso de rigor para que la conferencia pudiera celebrarse. Y fue él también quien ocupó desde el primer momento la presidencia de la reunión Del Prado

El santo Bertrand Russell. El gran pacifista Bertrand Russell, tan admirado en el mundo entero por sus protestas contra todo brote belicista, ha sido el consagrado ajonjolí de este mole antisoviético; a él se le atribuye un mensaje cuya autenticidad plena convendría averiguar, pues ni el estilo ni los conceptos corresponden a los de otros documentos que sobre este mismo asunto firmó Russell. Extraño resulta que el comité haya descuidado la presentación de una copia fotostática con la firma del sabio inglés. En lugar de eso se distribuyó una dizque traducción en papel con membrete de la Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios Sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS, y pie de página que dice: "organizada por el Comité Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética". El "mensaje" de Lord Russell está redactado en un estilo burdo, digno de la pequeñez espiritual del señor Mondlak.

Con todo y su orientación humanitaria burguesa, los mensajes de Russell que se conocen estaban

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expresados con dignidad y con un respeto esencial por los grandes logros de los países socialistas. Hace apenas un año, Russell comenzaba así su mensaje a una conferencia similar celebrada en abril de 1965 en Estocolmo: "Es de gran importancia que la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética no sea utilizada como arma en la guerra fría. Hay muchos en Occidente que buscan cualquier oportunidad para continuar e intensificar la división del mundo entre el Este y el Oeste...

La autoridad democrática de Bertrand Russell está avalada por su decidida posición antimperialista, y para muestra basta un párrafo de su mensaje a la Conferencia Tricontinental efectuada en enero de 1966 en La Habana, Cuba. "Por toda la América Latina —dice—, regímenes corrompidos y tiránicos asesinan al pueblo y lo mantienen en un estado de inanición y enfermedad debido al apoyo militar y económico de la camarilla gobernante norteamericana para los tiranos locales. Tan pronto como el pueblo se alza contra la opresión, el poderío militar norteamericano entra directamente en acción ¿Por qué, entonces, los pueblos del mundo han de confiar su destino a aquellos que colaboran con los regímenes títeres o tratan de encubrir a los notorios verdugos? Los frutos de tal política pueden verse dondequiera que ha sido aplicada: en Iraq o Indonesia, en Guatemala o en Brasil".

¿Cuántos de los conspicuos representantes de gorilas que don Martín Luis logró reunir en el Prado los días 14 y se atreverían a firmar junto con Russell este mensaje? ¿Y qué experto en política puede creer en la autenticidad plena de ese mensaje que fue mostrado como de Russell, enviado a un bananero ramillete de "intelectuales" procedentes de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panamá, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala y Venezuela, que jamás han hecho declaración alguna en contra de sus gobiernos serviles, traidores a sus pueblos, ni han puesto el grito en el cielo porque los neonazis revanchistas de la República Federal Alemana le dan al Estado de Israel un crédito de 100 millones de marcos para "promover una colaboración continua entre ambos países", a pesar de las cenizas todavía calientes de los seis millones de judíos que fueron víctimas ayer de los generosos acreedores de hoy, ni se han reunido a conferenciar para ver qué se puede hacer contra el agresivo antisemitismo de los grupos ultras de Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y otros países de la América Latina?

Faltó otra firma. En la fotostática que se distribuyó del mensaje del ausente Carlos Pellicer a los reunidos en el Prado, cualquier James Bond hubiera podido notar que, siendo copia fotostática, no traía la firma autografiada del poeta, y que no habiendo asistido Pellicer por encontrase en Tabasco, como lo notificaron varios periódicos, la carta dirigida a los delegados estaba fechada en México, D. F.

"Detrás de nosotros —afirmaba en su mensaje Pellicer— no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo. Sería terrible saber que Bertrand Rusell el gran filósofo inglés, protesta, como lo ha hecho por el asunto que nos reúne, impulsado por algún gobierno. El insigne escritor inglés es uno de los espíritus más altos y limpios de todos los tiempos y nos honra pensar como él en esta cuestión judía".



La dinámica Iuno Cob.

¿No ha pensado Pellicer, que tan sabiamente maneja el hermetismo de los símbolos de la estatuaria antigua, que muchas veces el más honrado credo antirracista y antidiscriminatorio puede por ingenuidad, coincidir con las determinaciones de los Barry Goldwater y otros campeones del racismo y la discriminación? ¿Cómo puede Pellicer poner en primer plano el problema de los judíos de la URSS, los únicos que hoy en día producen una viva, una renovada cultura en ídish en todo el mundo, a pesar de las grandes concentraciones de judíos en los Estados Unidos y en Argentina, olvidando que es en Alemania Occidental donde sí se profanan con alarmante frecuencia los viejos cementerios judíos y las tantas veces vilipendiadas sinagogas?

El día en que se revele la trama invisible de este asunto, ante el cual los judíos de la URSS han tenido que reaccionar diciendo un "No me ayudes compadre", se verá que todo se origina en la guerra fría y en la necesidad de hacer olvidar la guerra en Vietnam y la discriminación contra los negros.

Un Agente de la FBI y de la INTERPOL en la Asociación de Escritores de México

El sábado 28 de mayo, en la página [illegible] del diario Excélsior el tesorero de la Asociación de Escritores de México, Lic. Vicente Echeverría del Prado, publicó un pequeño aviso advirtiendo a los socios que no se dejaran sorprender por la señorita June Cobb, quien por su cuenta y riesgo se había tomado la libertad de cobrar y recibir cuotas de inscripción o mensuales en nombre de la AEM.

El 30 de mayo, Lunes de Excélsior comentaba un "sorprendente ciclo de conferencias imaginado por Wilberto Cantón, June Cobb y Piazza" y que se efectuaría en el Instituto Cultural Israelí, A. C.

¿Quién es June Cobb? Es una ciudadana norteamericana que ha pasado por México muchas veces en la última década y ha fijado aquí su residencia, después de haber sido expulsada de la República de Cuba, acusada de ser agente provocador de la FBI. Antes de eso, y como agente de la Interpol, había colaborado de manera determinante para descubrir una poderosa red de traficantes de drogas en Lima, Perú.

Su centro de actividades en México es justamente la Asociación de Escritores donde ha logrado arraigar como ayudante de confianza del secretario Miguel Guardia y del presidente de la AEM, el poeta Carlos Pellicer, presidente que de hecho ha delegado sus funciones en esta señorita "servicial" y turbulenta, que ha tenido el cuidado de lograr un antecedente que la ligara a los escritores de la América Latina: tradujo al inglés el famoso libro del Dr. Juan José Arévalo, El tiburón y las sardinas, y después el libelo anticomunista del renegado guatemalteco Carlos Manuel Pellecer.

En la secretaría de Gobernación June Cobb figura como corresponsal extranjera, lo que le daría derecho a pertenecer al Club de Corresponsales Extranjeros que tiene su sede en el hotel Hilton, y no a una asociación nacional como la de escritores, que tiene su sede en esa especie de multifamiliar de grupos de periodistas e intelectuales que es el Club de Periodistas de México.

June Cobb conoce muy bien los círculos culturales mexicanos, pues ha buscado amistad con pintores, escritores, actores, músicos y demás especialistas en la creación artística. ¿Qué misión vino a cumplir en nuestro país? Se sabe que trabaja a las órdenes del periodista Daniel James, responsable en la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de una oficina cuya función consiste en penetrar en los círculos intelectuales, tanto de los Estados Unidos como de otros países, usando como fachada supuestos encargos de investigaciones para universidades estadunidenses.

Si en el Perú la señorita Cobb pudo decirle a la Interpol "misión cumplida", según van las cosas, en México el reporte ante su jefe Daniel James y la Agencia Central de Inteligencia no será tan escueto ni tan brillante. En el cálculo de probabilidades que en torno a este extraño personaje hicieron los organismos de penetración y provocación de los Estados Unidos no tuvieron en cuenta que para moverse entre intelectuales no sólo hay que ser singularmente inteligente, como lo es la señorita Cobb, sino que, además y también, hay que ser intelectual, trabajar como intelectual, dormir y pensar como intelectual. Y resulta que la señorita Cobb trabaja, piensa, actúa y hasta duerme como agente secreto, aunque indiscreto.

No deja de llamar la atención el que por segunda vez aparezca [illegible] con el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí, ahora en el ciclo de conferencias "¿Qué pasa con el teatro en México?", que "imaginaron" ella y Luis Guillermo Piazza y coordinó Wilberto Cantón, secretario de actividades teatrales de la Asociación de Escritores de México. Antes fue la Conferencia Latinoamericana sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS, en cuya preparación mostróse muy activa la directora cultural del Instituto, Susana Gamboa, quien trató de que algunos grandes periódicos dedicaran sus suplementos culturales al tema de la "discriminación" de los judíos en la Unión Soviética, maniobra provocadora de la cual SUCESOS ha informado ampliamente.

Aunque la cultura siempre adorna y es agradable, da qué pensar el hecho de que a partir del ingreso de Sara Susana Lobowitz (verdadero nombre de Susana Gamboa) el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí haya incrementado una serie de actividades que exceden la función específica de tales institutos, que es el intercambio cultural de México con [illegible] país amigo. El Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí opera como una Dirección de Difusión Cultural o como un Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, y no se percibe en sus programas (como ocurre con el Instituto Mexicano Norteamericano, o con el Anglo-Mexicano, o el Francés para la América Latina, o el de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso) el interés o la intención de divulgar en México los valores tradicionales y las conquistas actuales de la muy antigua y a la vez muy joven cultura israelí.

La bohemia un tanto cuanto camo que ha cundido en cierto sector de la intelectualidad mexicana ha sido buen caldo de cultivo para el planecito Camelot que seguramente trae en cartera la "servicial" June Cobb. Quizá no esté muy lejano el momento en que figuras tan respetadas como Francisco Monterde, Salvador Novo, Héctor Azar, Celestino Gorostiza, Luis Reyes de la Maza, Carlos Solórzano y otros se pregunten alarmados qué intereses culturales pueden compartir con un brillante y dinámico agente femenino de la Interpol, la FBI y la ACI.

Al centro, el escritor alemán Günter Grass; a la derecha, la señorita June Cobb y el escritor Monteforte Toledo.



ATT B to HMMA-29207

201-278841

ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES DE MEXICO, A. C.

El aviso publicado en los principales diarios de esta Capital el día 25 de mayo del año en curso, y suscrito por la Tesorería de la A.E.M.A.C., parece atribuir, por un mero error de redacción, el manejo indebido de fondos, a la Srita June Cobb, Secretaria Adjunta de la Asociación y, por lo mismo, nos cumple aclarar que sólo se trataba de hacer una delimitación de funciones entre la Secretaría General de la Asociación y la Tesorería de la misma.

México, D.F., a 26 de mayo de 1966.

El Tesorero General.

V. Echeverría

Arq. Vicente Echeverría del Prado.

AVISO

[illegible] ACION DE ESCRITORES DE MEXICO, A. C.

[illegible] del conocimiento de [illegible] de la Asociación de Escritores de México, A. C., que la señorita June [illegible] autorizada para cobrar y recibir cuotas de [illegible] mensuales [illegible] que son exclusivas [illegible] a los asociados que hayan en[illegible] a la mencionada señorita [illegible] comunicarse con el [illegible] [illegible] solo No. 20. Ciudad. México, D. F. Mayo de [illegible]

El Tesorero de la Asociación Vicente Echeverría del Prado.

ATTH 40 Hmm 29207

201-278841

After 1250, 9 June

7.7 In. Leonov asks maid, who answers, for Enrique (Semo). ES takes phone. ES has been looking for Leonov. Yes, L. got the message but at noontime, when ES is at home, Leonov has been very busy. (They talk to each other in familiar form.)

The University of Puebla has decided to invite a series of Ambs. to talk about the economic achievements of their countries. At the Economy School. France, USSR, U.S., Czech and other countries are invited. ES has the letter of invitation for Soviet Amb. What does Leonov think about this? Could this arrange this? They can try. Leonov understands that the Amb. is going onx vacations to Moscow at the end of this month, in 2 or 3 weeks. He is only waiting for the Councillor who is in Moscow (now) and Amb. will leave right after his return. Amb. will return in August. Perhaps there is someone else who could represent the Amb. The Councillor could go or some other "high-class" attache. Or First Secretary. ES says perhaps Leonov. No, he is too ignorant (joking). No. Leonov would be very good since he could talk Spanish. No, any person who would go, would speak Spanish. Yes, this is a lecture. It would be a person who speaks Spanish. ES thinks this would be a positive (act), a good opportunity. Leonov agrees. ES leaves Mexico today for 2 days. Perhaps they could see about this on Monday. ES could ~~xxx~~ send Leonov the letter meanwhile and then on Monday they can get together. Yes, they can set the time and place and will really meet. Leonov has no engagement on Monday so they could see each other at any time ES wants. ES asks if it wouldn't be good to talk to Amb. or someone on Monday. Leonov will take this up. ES will send Leonov the letter and perhaps he could arrange an interview for Monday. Leonov thinks it is not worthwhile for ES to talk to him. Leonov will talk to him (Amb.) and he (Amb) will tell Leonov frankly how things are and Leonov will give ES the message. Then, they can have lunch together on Monday. Fine. ES wil go by for Leonov at 1400 on Monday.

ES asks how Leonov liked all the things and articles on the Jewish matter. They (Soviets) have sent everything there (to USSR). L. liked all of it. ES says that Leonov know that ....fell immediately and there is absolutely nothing on this. Leonov comments that - Besides, the people who participated lost prestige. Yes, they suffer...ES laughs. No, Leonov can ~~tell~~ him about the name of some people who call Leonov at times and they ....ES says - The people who signed the document. No, Leonov says, including persons like June Cobb. She called Leonov. ES has no idea of the repentance. JC gave Leonov her phone, asking him to help her - so doors are not closed to her. ES is surprised. She - did not want them to catalog her among their enemies (of Soviets), that she had nothing to do...This is a matter of fear. Leonov will tell ES all about it on Monday.

[illegible] on Semo
[illegible]
Reel 84-ES-248
9 June 1966

JUN 13 1966 Leonov

ATT I to HMMA 29207

201-278841

Traitor or Idealist?

William Morgan, deprived of U.S. citizenship in 1959 and executed in Cuba for treason in 1961, was described in secret Senate testimony as a loyal American "with ideals" who fought with Fidel Castro to overthrow the Batista dictatorship and expected Castro "to blow the whistle" when he "finally realized that the Communists were taking over."

Viola June Cobb, who worked in Havana in 1959 and 1960 and knew Morgan well, appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1962. Her testimony was released yesterday at her request for unexplained reasons.

Post 23 May 66

Trial Is Delayed

Washington Post 23 May 66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201-278841

7/NII/1

Excelsior 21 March 69

Fiesta de María José Chopitea



CONCEPCION de López Belloso, María José Chopitea, María Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su día onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudió un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cocteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno R. Jiménez y señora, Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nirte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vera Ladrón de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Angelina Ibarra, María del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas más.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY Progress Report: 1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-27358, 7 October 1965

1. Station regrets the delay in keeping Headquarters informed of the progress of our association with LICOOKY-1. When the proposed amendment to the LIREAM Project involving LICOOKY was turned down, we informed her on her return to Mexico that we could no longer justify the continued association at the present rate since we were simply not getting enough out of it, but that if she could regularize her status here and obtain working papers, we would be more than happy to conclude a new arrangement with her. She felt there was little chance of this, and we then told her we would conclude our arrangement with her sometime in the summer. As indicated in paragraph 2 of the attachment, the date has now been established as 30 June, at which time all outstanding financial arrangements with her will be terminated and she will be given her air fare to New York.

2. Unfortunately, LICOOKY-1 seems to be incapable of realizing which side her bread is buttered on, at least here in Mexico. She cannot parcel her time out to her various interests, and therefore finds all her time taken up by her unpaid AEMAC duties. The profiles we have been harping on have not materialized except for the one submitted under HMMA-28831. We still hope for one on Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer and such of the Mexican literary figures as amount in her judgment to "non-pigmies." We are not sanguine. We are still after a copy of Osegueda's paper on university reform.

Attachment:
Progress Report (in triplicate), h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

LICOOKY-1
201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-28944

DATE
17 May 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-129/3

SECRET

3. The advance made her at Headquarters is being held over her as an inducement to give us the balance of her time before departure and finish in a blaze of activity. If she does this, we will write off the advance here. If she does not, $185 of the advance will be counted as her February salary, $48 as travel expenses from New York to Washington and the remainder will be written off.

4. Rather than go through the formality of a project amendment as per HMMW-14517, Station would prefer merely to consider the project as terminated as of 31 December 1966 and pick up subsequent costs in LIRANCH. A formal project termination will be submitted in the near future.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

LICOOKY Project Progress Report
1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

1. Production

   a. LICOOKY-1 has continued to devote the bulk of her time to the Mexican Writers' Association (AEM). She continues to handle most of its administrative work. She also organizes and does most of the work on the majority of the projects or activities which the AEM sponsors.

   b. L-1 continued to report on efforts to establish the Latin American Writers' Community (CLE), including the results of the Organizing Congress in Arica, Chile. She reported on the steps taken by Mario Monteforte Toledo in beginning preparations for an early 1967 Congress in Mexico and on the AEM's probable role in helping organize that Congress.

   c. L-1 supplied information on reactions among the Central American community in Mexico to the Guatemalan election campaign and results.

   d. She maintained contact with and reported on individuals of interest to the Station, including Monteforte Toledo, Carlos Pellicer Cámara, Manuel Germán Parra, Francisco Villagran Kramer, and Raúl Osegueda Pelala.

SECRET

e. LICOOKY-2 continued to report travel of Communists or leftists from Central America to Eastern Europe. During this period he reported on eight such travelers.

2. Operations

a. L-1 has been notified that she will be terminated effective 30 June. She has been given the following requirements to be fulfilled before that date.

Provide profiles on the personality and politics of significant Mexican and Central American intellectuals with whom she is acquainted.

Obtain information on the newly-formed Latin American Writers' Community, its probable political development, and progress toward the holding of its scheduled meeting in Mexico City in January 1967.

Obtain a copy of the analysis written by Raúl Osegueda Pelala of the problems of authonomous universities.

Special tasks such as reporting on the activity of Stasia Madrigal and on the UNAM student strike.

b. In order to accomplish the above tasks in the short time remaining, L-1 will be forced to curtail her activities at the AEM. There are enough jobs that need doing at AEM to occupy her full-time and therefore the immediate partial withdrawal from AEM work is a prerequisite to the accomplishment of these assignments.

c. Because L-1 has played such a key role in all AEM activities, and therefore in determining the direction and scope of these activities, her sudden withdrawal could result in important changes within AEM. Any major change in direction by AEM would probably become predictable once the identity of the person or persons who will move in to fill the vacancy left by L-1 become known. By having L-1 step aside now, rather than waiting until she is ready to leave Mexico, she may then be able to provide Station with an accurate account of any change resulting from her withdrawal.

d. L-2 has not been met regularly since 25 January. On that date he was given a mailing address which he uses to request a meeting only if he has information to report. L-2 is paid on a piece-rate basis for information supplied and does not receive a regular salary.

3. **Security**

No change.

4. **Personnel**

Handling of LICOOKY-1 was taken over by Gary H. Reymander, from Howard T. Etsinger, on 12 January 1966.

5. **Plans**

a. See paragraph 2a above.

b. It is possible that L-2 will, in the very near future, lose access to the travel information which he has been reporting, because he is being given new responsibilities in the office where he works. L-2 is intelligent, conscientious, and well-motivated. If he does lose his present access, the Station will consider him for other assignments in which he could be useful.

14-00000

[illegible] ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. THE COST OF FILES AND [illegible] IS VERY [illegible] MORE IMPORTANT - HANDLING UNNEEDED COPIES WASTES OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE - [illegible]

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

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NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
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TO
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO

FROM
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT
Recruitment by Cuban Intelligence of IDEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached under separate cover for your information are two Headquarters memoranda concerning IDEN, a PBPRIME citizen, who was reported by LICOOKY-1 (an asset of Mexico City Station) to have been recruited by a Cuban intelligence officer assigned to HTBASTE.

FRANCES A. BUSALACCLI

19 April 1966

Attachment:
As Stated u/s/c/

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE u/s/c att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGW-5981

DATE
05 MAY 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible] and
[illegible]

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-794302

Distribution:
1 - RID wo/att.
1 - WH/C/ESEC wo/att.
1 - WH/1/M wo/att.
2 - WH/C/CICS wo/att.
1 - WH/C/MO wo/att.

OFFICE
WH/C/CICS

ORIGINATOR
E. Ayers

TYPIST
nlk

EXT
455

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/C/CICS		
C/WH/C/MO		
WH/1/M		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DCWHD/C		John T. Flynn

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
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ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO
Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
Raul OSEGUEDA Pelala

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached, at long last, is LICOOKY-1's profile on Subject. While it is not as penetrating as it might be, it is better than we had expected. It is unfortunate that "Janet" is not available to query about the material allegedly turned in following L-1's return from Venezuela, since she is so insistent that she gave Janet quite a bundle of information.

2. This is the first of a series of profiles we hope L-1 can get around to preparing before she leaves Mexico.

3. L-1 has been instructed to do her best to obtain Subject's manuscript on university reform, which is now in the hands of someone at the UNAM press. This could be a highly popular subject in the train of the current trouble at the UNAM.

4. ~~No indexing is requested~~ here since nothing of substance is said about anyone except subject.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Profile on OSEGUEDA, h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att
1 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att

Licooky-201

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMA-28831	DATE 3 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER ~~50-6-141/3~~ 201-58003

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

GROUP 1

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FROM
Dissem By 24 Per WH/C#2

ACTION
DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

S E C R E T 170103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347 17 May 66 IN 18275

DESENSITIZED

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7076 (IN 12733)

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

3. FUTURE CONTACT TO BE VIA TRAVELERS BETWEEN HABANA AND MEXICO WHO WILL MAIL LETTERS IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. S WANTS AMERICAN MAGAZINES SENT HER VIA PRENSA LATINA. PRECISE EMPLOYMENT CUBA NOT CERTAIN. ALLEGEDLY CAN HAVE OLD JOB WITH PRENSA LATINA, BUT LICOOKY SUGGESTED SHE TRY CASA DE LAS AMERICAS.

4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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2/21 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
C/WH 2

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 APR 65 02733

DIR CITE MEXI 7076

KAP[illegible] DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

DESENSITIZED

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 3 TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

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FROM
Dissem By 24 Per WH/C#2

ACTION
DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

S E C R E T 172103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347 17 May 66 IN 18375

DESENSITIZED

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7075 (IN 12733)

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

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4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7347 S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH HER CONVERSATION SHOWED DESIRE TO FIND FIDELISTAS AND COMMUNISTS ON RIGHT TRACK, SHE NOT APPARENTLY FULLY COMMITTED TO INFALLIBILITY OF FIDELISMO. JUST BEFORE LEAVING MEXI, SHE AND LICOOKY PREPARED LETTER REQUESTING GOM GRANT HER TRANSIT VISA FOR RETURN TO U.S. WITHIN "APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS." LICOOKY WHO WILL FILE THIS LETTER WITH GOBERNACION SAYS IT IS JUST IN CASE MEASURE, SHOULD CUBAN SOJOURN NOT WORK OUT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 9

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 2

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UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 APR 65 02733

DESENSITIZED

DIR CITE MEXI 7076

KAP[illegible] DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

OBTAIN L ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING S DEPARTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 7076 98349 MIAMI STASHA CUIS U.S. BRONX CUBA NOT CONVINCED 22 STASHA NOT HAD WIT 21 NOT CLEAR 1000 NOT HAVE 22 25 S 17 NOT YET NOT CERTAIN HQS S NO PROBLEM L NO WISH S CUBANS L S

BT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302
~~201-[illegible]~~

ORIG: C [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] APR 65

ROUTING			
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4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 98349

KAPOK DIVOUR PERUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF A. MEXI 7049 (IN 00988)
B. MEXI 6703 (IN 91562)

1. NO FURTHER INTELL RQD BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW WHEN AND HOW STASHA ARRIVED MEXI. FYI ONLY ODENVY WAS ADVISED OF STASHAS TRAVEL PLANS PER REF B; HOWEVER WE HAVE NOT BEEN ADVISED OF ANY COVERAGE MADE OR ACTION TAKEN BY ODENVY AS A RESULT. HQS ADVISING ODENVY STASHAS PRESENCE MEXI AND THAT WE HAVE COVERAGE.

2. INFO PARA 2 REF, I. E., NERVOUSNESS AT LACK TRAVEL FUNDS, UNCERTAINTY OF FUTURE, DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND DEPENDENCE LICOOKY MIGHT SUGGEST POSSIBILITY LICOOKY REASSESS AND HANDLE CONTACT WITH STASHA WITH POSSIBLE FUTURE PITCH IN MIND FOR EVENTUAL USE IN PLACE CUBA. IF PROGNOSIS FAVORABLE, MIGHT THINK IN TERMS LICOOKY PUSH EFFORT MAINTAIN MAIL CONTACT STASHA ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE CONTACT OUTSIDE CUBA FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PITCH. MIGHT THUS BE ABLE OBTAIN COPIES ANY LETTERS FROM STASHA AND MONITOR HER FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH FATHER OF HER CHILD AND HER REACTION TO LIVING AND WORKING IN CUBA. IF REASSESSMENT UNFAVORABLE, WOULD LIKE SEE UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION. NOT THINKING IN TERMS CRASH PITCH PRIOR REPORTED

CONTINUED.../

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 98349

DEPARTURE [illegible] THIS AND HER PROBABLE INABILITY DISSEMBLE IN CUBA ON [illegible] ANY SUCH PITCH.

END OF MESSAGE

Estelle

WH Comment: Refs reported presence of Ana "Stasha" Sokolowska in Mexico, contact with her through LICOOKY, and "Stasha's plans travel Cuba via Mexico.

WH/C/CICS
WH/C/FI/Hazlett (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA/C. Anderson (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 9

2/4 SECRET

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

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UNIT WH/C TIME 0240Z BY 8

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 210135Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7049

21 Apr 66 3C0988

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD

REF DIR 92045

1. STASHA (S) NOW IN TOWN STAYING BOARDING HOUSE. LICOOKY SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AND HOPES GET ANSWERS REF QUESTIONS BY END 20 APRIL SESSION.

2. S DID GREAT DEAL WRITING DURING MIAMI TRIP MOSTLY ON COMMUNAL FORMATIONS OF MIAMI EXILES WHICH GAVE TO NY CUIS CASE OFFICER. ARRIVED MEXI WITH NO TRAVEL FUNDS AND AFTER NEAR HYSTERIA FOUND HUSBAND HAD SENT TICKETS TO CUBANA OFFICE HERE. PLANS TAKE 22 APRIL CUBANA FLIGHT THOUGH DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG WILL REMAIN CUBA. DEFINITELY HOPES GO TO POLAND TO IMPROVE POLISH AND WHILE THERE MAKE UP MIND WHETHER WANTS CONTINUE CUBAN ASSOCIATION. WHOLE ATTITUDE HERE IS ONE OF DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND CONSTANTLY ASKS L FOR ADVICE. L HAS SO FAR AVOIDED GIVING ANY.

3. REYMANDER SEES LICOOKY AT 1000 LOCAL TIME 21 APRIL AND CAN RELAY ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS HQS WISHES PUT. SECRET

Licooky-1
201

4. PARA 2 ABOVE NEGATES LINLUCK REPORT PARA 2 MEXI 6783.

SECRET

CFN 7249 92845 STASHA S 28 S MIAMI MIAMI NY CUIS NO TRAVEL CUBANA 22 CUBANA NOT KNOW CUBA POLAND POLISH CUBAN L L REYMANDER 1333 21 HAS 2 LINLUCK 2 6783

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

26 SECRET

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FROM
Mexico City

ACTION
WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/OA

ACTION

S E C R E T 362030Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6783

LICOOKY

REF: DIR 90202*

* ODENVY MAY WISH INTERVIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES.

6 Apr 65 S1562

1. LICOOKY-1 REPORTS RECEIVED CALL FROM STASHA ON 4 APRIL. STASHA HAD BEEN BACK IN NEW YORK FOR ABOUT WEEK AWAITING CUBAN VISA. WILL BE COMING THROUGH MEXI AS SOON AS VISA RECEIVED.

2. CONFLICTING REPORT FROM LINLUCK SAME DAY SAYS LICOOKY CALLED HIM TO SAY HAD JUST FINISHED TELECON WITH STASHA WHO SAID WOULD BE ARRIVING MEXI 7 APRIL AND LEAVING FOR CUBA 11 APR. SINCE CANNOT CALL DISCREPANCY TO ATTENTION EITHER SOURCE, STATION CANNOT RESOLVE CONFLICT UNTIL AFTER DATES MENTIONED.

S E C R E T

CFN 6783 90202 LICOOKY-1 4 STASHA LINLUCK LICOOKY 7 CUBA 11CANNOT CANNOT

BT

SECRET

WH/C/ Castro
passed info orally to FBI,
Sam Papich - FBI said no
action required LICOOKY-1

B

P.L. Johnson

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7

☐ DEST ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING			
1		5	
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[illegible] ice-licooky [illegible] Sokolowska

ORIG : PATRICIA L. JOHNSON:car
UNIT : WH/C/CA/PA
EXT : 4198/1502
DATE : 29 MAR 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302
201-278841

3 SECRET

TO : MEXICO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C 3 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, C/EI/SD, C/WH 2, C/CI 30 [illegible] 18 23z

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 92045

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD Licooky

DISSEM PER WH/C # 2

REF: DIR 90202*

1. HAVE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMTS FOR SOKOLOWSKA WHEN SHE GOES CUBA IF LICOOKY-1 THINKS SHE CAN LOGICALLY ASK THEM:

A. ANYTHING SHE CAN FIND OUT ABOUT CURRENT ARRESTS, PARTICULARLY IN MILITARY SPHERE.

B. ANY SIGNS PSP TYPES RETURNING TO POWER IN WAKE OF CURRENT PURGES.

D. IS DR. JOSE BUSTAMANTE, OLD COMMUNIST, STILL TREATING FIDEL CASTRO?

E. ANY INDICATION HILDA GADEA RETURNING CUBA?

2. REQUEST THAT LICOOKY-1 TRY PERSUADE SOKOLOWSKA TO CORRESPOND WITH HER FROM CUBA POSSIBLY VIA CUTOUT SUCH AS SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER, TOUCHING ON ABOVE MATTERS, IF IT CAN BE DONE DISCREETLY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C Comment: *Sokolowska, old friend of LICOOKY-1, recruited by CUIS and returning to Cuba to join husband.

C/WH/C/CA/PA
C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/RR
A/D C/WH/C
COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

30-3

SECRET

GROUP 1
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~~JOHN T. FLYNN~~
~~DC/WHD/C~~ WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
() LICOOKY reports on Raul OSEGUEDA and Juan Jose AREVALO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-6574

Attached herewith are reports prepared by LICOOKY-1 on OSEGUEDA and AREVALO in January 1961 shortly after her return from Venezuela. No trace could be found of any additional reports though both reports indicated she planned to provide more information later.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
2 rpts.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

21 March 1961

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14432

DATE
24 MAR 1961

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. Bustos	m	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	22 March	[illegible] Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

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2/

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C. BUSTOS-VIDELA
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 22 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

2/ SECRET

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TO : MEXI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY c/ops c/ic 2 c/ci4 FI, FI/INT 2

WH C 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 90202

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 6574 (IN 77407)*

1. HQS HAS LOCATED WHAT APPEARS BE AREVALO AND OSEGUEDA REPORTS PREPARED BY LICOOKY-1 (L-1) IN 1961. POUCHING COPIES HMMW-14432. FYI "JANET" RESIGNED EARLY 1963.

2. ODENVY REPORTS SOKOLOWSKA UNDER SURVEILLANCE MIAMI NOW, AND ACCORDING CURRENT INFO PROBABLY WILL RETURN NEW YORK FOR MEETING WITH HER CASE OFFICER PRIOR TRAVELING MEXI AND ONWARD HABANA. ODENVY WILL KEEP KUBARK ADVISED OF HER TRAVEL PLANS. POSSIBILITY ODACID WILL LIFT HER PASSPORT.

3. IF SOKOLOWSKA SEES L-1 IN MEXI, ONLY REQUIREMENT IS FOR L-1 TO ELICIT ANY INFO SHE CAN RE SOKOLOWSKA'S ACTIVITY MIAMI, PARTICULARLY RE FULFILLMENT OF HER CASE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTIONS, AND HER PLANS FOR HABANA. IN CASE SOKOLOWSKA EXITS CUBA VIA MEXI, L-1 SHOULD ELICIT WHAT SHE CAN AND OBTAIN TRAVEL PLANS.

wyk 4. ODENVY MAY WISH~~ES~~ INTERVIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES. AT TIME OF NEXT TRIP PLEASE ARRANGE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS WE CAN PASS TO ODENVY.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-1 (201)

WH Comment: *Request Headquarters look again for LICOOKY reports on AREVALO and OSEGUEDA. Request requirements for LICOOKY against SOKOLOWSKA.

WH/C/Mr. Castoro (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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?/NH/1

LICOOKY

Excelsior 21 March 69

Fiesta de María José Chopitea



CONCEPCION de López Belloso, Maria Jose Chopitea, Maria Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su dia onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudió un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cocteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno B. Jiménez y señora, Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nicte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vélez Ladrón de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Angelina Ibarra, Mara del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas más.

LICOOKY
201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 6

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21

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INFO
FILE VR C/OPS C/IC2 C/BA FI

S E C R E T 171941Z

17 MAR 63 IN 77407

DIR CITE MEXI 6574

LICOOKY

REFS A DIR 77211

B MEXI 6419 (IN 66243)

1. LICOOKY STILL INSISTS ON COMPLETION HER FIRST TRIP VENEZUELA (SEE PARA 4 HMMW-9800, JUNE 61) ABOUT FEB 61 AFTER WHICH SHE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO ZRMETAL, SHE MET "JANET" AND UNKNOWN CASE OFFICER(APPARENTLY PBRUMEN SPECIALIST) IN NO LONGER REMEMBERED HOTEL AND DELIVERED TO JANET EXTENSIVE PROFILES OSEGUEDA AND AREVALO. STATION PARTICULARLY INTERESTED RECOVERING OSEGUEDA WRITEUP TO BE USED AS BASIS UPDATED REPORT. NOTE THESE OCCURRENCES PRIOR STATION CONNECTION LICOOKY. OUR FILES BEGIN JUNE 61. APPRECIATE HQS EFFORT LOCATE AND QUERY "JANET."

SECRET

processed early '63

Licooky-1

2. LICOOKY REPORTS ON 15 MARCH TRIED RETURN PHONE CALL WHICH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL MADE HER IN NEW YORK 10 MAR. LEFT HER PHONE NUMBER WITH S HOTEL SWITCHBOARD. SAYS S WILL SURELY CALL HER AND PROBABLY STAY WITH HER WHEN COMES THROUGH MEXI. ADVISE WHAT ACTION MEXI TO TAKE.

SECRET

CFN 6574 A DIR 88211 B MEXI 6419 VENEZUELA 4 HMMW-9800 JUNE 61 FEB 61 JANET NO LONGER HOTEL OSEGUEDA AREVALO OSEGUEDA JUNE 61 HQS JANET 15 MARCH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL NEW YORK 10 MAR S HOTEL S

BT

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York During February/March 1966

ACTION REQUIRED : FYI

REFERENCES : DIR 85413, 5 March 1966

1. Attached are four (4) copies of internal Headquarters memoranda resulting from meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York during February and March 1966, and as reported in Reference.

2. Three of the memoranda deal with the alleged planned travel of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA and one deals with the Rose and George SIMINOW case.

Thomas W. LUND

Attachments:
4 memos, h/w
8 Feb 66
1 Mar 66
4 Mar 66
9 Mar 66
} sent -

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/4 memos attached.

10 March 1966

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14407

DATE
14 MAR 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-278841

1 - RI
1 - chrono

ORIGINATING
OFFICE: WH/1/ OFFICER: Mr. Kaufman TYPIST: jz EXT: 4523

COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | OFFICER'S NAME

ABSTRACT X
INDEX
F/WH/1

RELEASING
OFFICE SYMBOL: CWH/1 DATE OFFICER'S SIGNATURE: W. J. Kaufman

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION (40)

DISPATCH

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/1

EXTENSION: 4250

NO.

DATE: 8 February 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/WH/1			
2.			
3. CI/OPS/~~Johnson~~ Hughs 2 B 44			
4.			
5.			
6. C/WH/1 (Jack Kaufman)			
7.			
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11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Per our telecom.

Orally, for source protection, to FBI 11 Feb with request for State P.P. status checked by Bureau, covering no.

3-6: Jack:
Info. in your attached memo was passed orally to the Bureau. The Bureau responded that there had been previous corres. between us on Sokolowska. As a matter of fact, Sam Papich queried John Castoro of WH/Cuba/CI for any additional info. on her (this was on 17 Jan.

Suggest you discuss previous Bureau interest with John Castoro.

Also, your gal had previously reported info. [illegible] [illegible] to the Bureau. Also CIA file shows Bureau [illegible] your gal in the U.S.
Pls. contact John Castoro re the attached memo, because John has an outstanding reply to make to the Bureau)

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

9 Feb 66

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estel Sakolowska

1. On 7 February LICOOKY-1 told the writer that Estel Sakolowska, a long-time acquaintance, had told her that she is planning a trip to Cuba. Sakolowska is now married to Mario Madrigal, a Costa Rican medical doctor who is now in Cuba. Sakolowska told LICOOKY-1 that she is now in the process of obtaining a (U.S.) passport for her child so that they can travel together to Cuba. This is her child's first passport. Her explanation for requesting the passport is for making a trip to Costa Rica. Sakolowska claims that the passport application is now in the State Department "Security Section".

2. Sakolowska also told LICOOKY-1 that the "Prensa Latina Bureau Chief" had proposed to her an apparent intelligence mission to accomplish enroute to Cuba. She believes this mission is to take place in Miami. LICOOKY-1 reported that on 7 February Sakolowska had a luncheon engagement with "someone" at the United Nations and speculates it may be to pick up a package to take to someone in Cuba. LICOOKY-1 further speculates that this may only be a gift to someone in Cuba.

3. LICOOKY stated that she had no additional information. It should be noted, however, that this item was given in a last minute rush just prior to her departure from the writer. LICOOKY-1 expects to be in New York until the end of February.

4. LICOOKY-1 states that Sakolowska has been a long-time "left winger". LICOOKY-1 reported earlier on Sakolowska and her connections with revolutionaries in Central America and Havana in dispatch HMMA 27924 dated 21 September 1965 pages 4 and 6. This office is planning no further action on this matter and in line with the writer's telephone conversation with Frank Hughes of the CI Staff today, we understand your office will be coordinating the Subject with the FBI and State Department.

W J Kaufman

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

1 March 1966

CC to [illegible]?

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff att Mr Hughes

INFO : WH/C Attention: Mr. Castoro

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estelle Sokolowska

REFERENCE : Memo, Same Subject, Dated 8 February 1966

1. On 22 February LICOOKY-1 told me that the referenced Prensa Latina correspondent, according to Sokolowska, had just advised her she would receive $500 operational expenses for the alleged intelligence assignment in the Miami area and $450 for travel presumably to Cuba. This information was passed orally to your office 23 February.

2. On 28 February LICOOKY-1 told me that while visiting with Sokolowska in New York on 23 February two FBI agents called at the Sokolowska apartment and interviewed Sokolowska about her intended travel to Cuba. According to L-1 the agents warned Sokolowska that she would be in serious trouble if she attempted such trip. The interview went on about three hours during which time L-1 remained in Sokolowska's apartment, sometimes in the living room and sometimes in the kitchen where the interview reportedly was taking place. L-1 stated that as a result of the warning by the FBI agents Sokolowska later told L-1 she would not make the trip.

3. Presumably the FBI, if the above story is accurate, had reason for this reported action even though from the limited information available, from L-1, there would seem a possibility of other more profitable courses of action.

4. L-1 states that Sokolowska had heard that her husband, now in Cuba, was living in Sokolowska's house and with a nurse to whom he was (engaged). It was partially for this reason Sokolowska wished to visit Cuba at this time.

5. This office is taking no further action on this matter unless so requested and suggests that addressees coordinate any planned ~~advice~~ action on this matter ~~to~~ with the Bureau.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

WH/1/Kaufman:mep Dist: 0 & 1 - CI
2 - WH/C/Castoro
2 - WH/1
1 - WH/FI w/8 Feb Memo

Cooky-201

4 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Hughes

SUBJECT : Rose and George SIMINOW Plans for Vietnam Conscientious Objector Demonstration

1. Confirming telephone conversation with your office March 1st the following information was obtained from LICOOKY-1 in Washington on February 28th:

Rose SIMINOW, 382 Central Park West, New York City, long-time communist and contact of LICOOKY-1, told L-1 at several meetings during February that she was making plans for a demonstration against the U.S. role in Vietnam. Rose's son, George, discharged about September 65 from the military after active duty in Panama, expected to be recalled for active duty in Vietnam as a member of a military reserve unit. It is planned that if recalled George will refuse induction as a conscientious objector and mass demonstrations will be promoted in New York. Rose has had discussions with a "constitutionalist lawyer", one Boudion, to handle the expected court trial. Boudien's secretary, Teresa, is a friend of Rose. Rose plans to pay the initial attorney fees after which she will launch a national drive to raise funds. According to Rose, Boudine is "swamped" with similar cases. Rose is employed by Wolf Popper Jones Ross and Wolf. She has been a secretary for ten to fifteen years.

2. This office is taking no further action on this report unless so requested. Please advise if this matter is turned over to the FBI or any other action taken.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

14-00000

LICOOKY-1 201
Clu

SECRET

9 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Frank Hughes

INFORMATION: WH/C, Mr. John Castoro
CWH/FI

SUBJECT: Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

SOURCE: LICOOKY-1

REFERENCE: Memoranda, same subject, dated 8 February and 1 March 1966.

1. Further to references, the writer again saw LICOOKY-1 in New York on 8 March. In that this new information clarifies and elaborates on Subject's alleged espionage intentions, it is believed best to recapitulate the whole story obtained during the course of the past month.

2. SOKOLOWSKA's husband, a Costa Rican medical doctor, by the name of Mario MADRIGAL, is now in Cuba with a profitable job and living in a house assigned to him with a Cuban nurse with whom he is "engaged." Subject is desirous of returning to Cuba in that she admires CASTRO and what she believes he is doing for Cuba, and wishes to assist in the "cause." She gained this impression during her stay in Cuba in the early 60's, at which time she personally met CASTRO and was befriended by him. Her desire to return is also influenced by the need to care for her two children and she plans to move in with her husband from whom she expects support. She no longer has any love for her husband. In New York Subject stays with her mother, a not too well informed Polish peasant immigrant.

3. An as yet unidentified Cuban UN representative in NY visited Cuba during the 1965 XMas holidays. While there he had one meeting with Subject's husband and upon returning to NY delivered a letter from the husband to Subject. From this first meeting, Subject was gradually drafted by the Cuban UN representative (hereafter referred to as CUIS rep) for intelligence purposes.

4. This culminated in Subject's departure from New York on the Atlantic Seaboard "Champion" train on 7 March for Miami. On 5 or 6 March, before her departure, the CUIS rep gave Subject a written list of questions to be used for cultivating and gaining the confidence of Cuban exiles in the Miami area to learn more about their organizational design and plans for work against Cuba.

SECRET

Subject's cover for this assignment is to gather material for a book she plans to write on the Cuban Revolution. The questions themselves are not intelligence requirements and reputedly are along the lines of "what was your role in the invasion attempt? Why did your particular sortie fail? etc." Pertinent here, however, is that the CUIS rep told Subject that he is very interested in the "Municipalidades" organizational development by the Cuban exiles. He said this was the smartest thing the exiles have done. Source stated that she understands the exile community has regrouped into cell organizations so that exiles from the same community from their homes in Cuba now form the individual cells. In this fashion they can better protect themselves from penetration and will be a better informed and cohesive group. Subject was given $550. for the Miami trip expenses. Source saw the money. Subject plans to spend two or three weeks on this mission and then return to NY to report to the CUIS rep.

5. Subject is taking her two children with her to Miami and is taking along a "babysitter." Subject had wanted to take a Puerto Rican girl [illegible] girl could not obtain a leave of absence from her job, the PR girl's brother is serving as babysitter. He is described as being in his early twenties and is a supporter of CASTRO. Subject's immediate problem is to obtain entre to the Cuban exiles and a cheap way to live in the Miami area. To accomplish this she has re-established contact with a former acquaintance and ally, one Jerry HEMING. HEMING is described as being an American member of the William Morgan group in the invasion attempt. Subject met HEMING in the Frente Sandino in Nicaragua. She re-established this contact by finding an old Miami telephone number for HEMING and spoke to a person at this number who identified himself as "Little Joe." Little Joe said that HEMING moved but that he could put her in touch with him.

6. Subject told source she was delighted at having received a passport for herself and her children and permission from the State Department to travel to Cuba with them. Permission was granted on compassionate grounds. She was so excited at this development she immediately telephoned the CUIS rep despite an earlier admonition to never again call him at his office. He said his business is strictly compartmented from other members of the Cuban UN group. Subject stated that with her passport she now will be able to travel to Europe after returning to Cuba. Source understands that European travel will be for Cuban intelligence purposes but has no details. Source speculates that because Subject is fluent in Polish and French, with some knowledge of German, coupled with her American citizenship and Polish background, she will be able to gain entre into European Bloc circles to glean what she can of their true feelings and intent to the CASTRO government. Upon completion of her Miami mission and her return to NY, Subject then plans to depart to Cuba via Mexico. She plans only about two days in Mexico. She will be provided travel funds by the CUIS rep.

7. Source explained that Subject promised to advise source where she will be staying in the Miami area. Source has been requested to remain in NY until the morning of 10 March in the hope that this information will be forthcoming. Source was also requested to consider the feasibility of visiting the Miami area to determine Subject's whereabouts. Source stated that an excuse for this visit could be to visit Dr. SHAPPER and his wife in Miami in that they are leaving NY 9 March for a long-planned 10 day holiday there. Both Subject and Source are close friends of SHAPPER so this arrangement would be plausible. In this regard, Source stated that to save all concerned from embarrassment, she advised SHAPPER not to question Subject too closely as to Subject's plans upon Subject's departure from NY in that SHAPPER was under the impression that Subject was travelling directly to Cuba. Source implied to SHAPPER that Subject has to "earn her way" to Cuba. SHAPPER was described as being in no way connected with Subject's assignment nor to be in sympathy with such business. The SHAPPERS plan to stay in the Nichols Hotel, Miami Beach, Collins Avenue.

8. Of interest, was Source's description of Subject being naive as to the happenings in Cuba. Source said that when discussing some aspects of the true situation there, Che GUEVARRA's name came up. When Source suggested that Che may have been done in, Subject responded that this certainly was not the case. Subject stated that about 3 March one of Che's "close aides" arrived in NY. Source understands this aide came to NY for contact with the Cuban UN group. Subject learned this from the CUIS rep.

9. The CUIS rep is described as being 5'3" to 5'4" tall, slight build, small ~~stature~~ features, tiny moustache, a "latin type" but not dark. He looks like Harold MARTINEZ, the father of Subject's first baby. Source now states that the CUIS rep is probably not a Prensa Latina rep as Subject stated this assignment is furthering his diplomatic career. The CUIS rep had meetings with Subject at least three times at Subject's home.

10. Depending upon developments by the morning of 10 March, Source may be asked to transit Washington for another meeting while enroute to Mexico. It is understood that Your Office will undertake the necessary coordination with other components and other Agencies and that this Office will take no further action pending your advice and request.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

14 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/C, Mr. Castoro

SUBJECT: Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

REFERENCE: Memo dated 9 March 1966

Confirming my telephone conversation with you 11 March 1966, LICOOKY-1 at that time stated that Subject could be reached in Miami at telephone number 374-9336. L-1 learned this from Subject, who telephoned L-1's hotel room in New York with a number where she could be reached.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

cc: CI Staff

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

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ORIG : W.J. Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 11 March 1966

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26 SECRET

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY CI/OA, CI/ICZ

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 87397

Zerance
Porpe
vya

LICOOKY-1 DEPARTED 11 MAR PLANS STOPOVER TULSA. ARRIVING MEXI ~~SIXON~~ 13 OR 14 MAR. L-I ADVANCED TOTAL $295.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
W.J. Kaufman
C.WH/1

WJK

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ORIG : W.J.Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 4 Mar 66

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TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

S·G GEN 27

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, (Y)

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 85413

REF: MEXI 6341 (IN 59865)

1. LUND MET WITH LICOOKY-1 FEBRUARY 7 IN NEW YORK (NY) AND FEBRUARY 28TH WHEN SHE VISITED WASHINGTON TO REVIEW THE 1962 SENATE HEARING RECORDS FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE TO USE IN HER LEGAL PROBLEMS. L-1 PLANS TO RETURN TO MEXI NO SOONER THAN MARCH 7 DEPENDING ON PROGRESS WITH HER LAWYER. L-1 WON ROYALTY CASE WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT $700 NOW; OTHER SUIT STILL UNRESOLVED.

2. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DEBRIEF L-1 IN DEPTH IN THAT ALMOST EVERY ITEM SHE RAISED WAS REPEAT MATERIAL ON HER OLD CRONIES AND CONTACTS. POINTED OR REVEALING QUESTIONING ON ANY ACTIVE TARGET, I.E. LEVENSON COMPLEX, WAS AVOIDED.

3. FURTHER TO DIR 81088 L-1 STATED LEVENSON MET BERDECIO IN MEXI PRIOR TO EITHER SPRING OR SUMMER 63. IDEN OF GIRL IN CALIFORNIA UNKNOWN. LEVENSON LIVED WITH BERCEDIOS ON ARRIVAL 63. L-1 CLASSIFIES REVUELTOS, BERDECIOS, LEVENSON AS NON-COMMIE, SLIGHTLY LEFT, ALMOST APOLITICAL.

LICOOKY-1 201

CONTINUED.....

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PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

4. LEVENSON'S MAID INTRODUCED TO REVUELTOS BY THE FILIOS AT PARTY IN FILIOS' HOME. FILIOS' SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (OTHER CHANNELS) INVOLVED COMMERCIAL ITEMS SUCH AS TRANSISTOR RADIO ETC. FOR MONETARY GAIN ONLY AND NOT INVOLVED WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. L-1 RECALLS MEXICAN MILITARY PILOTS SOMEHOW INVOLVED BUT HAS NOT DETAILS.

5. IN DISCUSSING LITERARY WORLD ONLY FLEETING REFERENCE MADE TO LIREAM, / LIREAM EDITOR AND TICHBORN WITH NO HINT OF KUBARK INVOLVEMENT DESPITE ETSINGER'S ADVICE THAT L-1 SAID LIREAM BLOWN. TO THE CONTRARY, L-1 CLAIMS LIREAM CONCEPT WAS HER IDEA AND HAD SPOKEN TO / EDITOR ABOUT IT SOME TIME AGO ONLY TO DISCOVER SUBSEQUENTLY ON RETURN FROM TRIP OUTSIDE MEXI / EDITOR / HAD TAKEN THE IDEA AND WITH TICHBORN PRODUCED LIREAM. L-1 CLASSIFIES MEXICAN LITERARY GROUP WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS AS LOW CALIBER (PYGMIES) AND HARDLY WORTH BOTHERING ABOUT.

6. L-1 CLAIMS IGNORANCE ON CURRENT EVENTS GUAT AS SHE COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH SINCE LEAVING MEXI.

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TO INFO CITE DIR 85413

7. L-1 ASKED SEVERAL TIMES FOR LATEST DEVELOPMENT ARICA, CHILE CONFERENCE (MEXI 6177) STATING SHE HAD HEARD OR READ NOTHING CONCERNING IT SINCE LEAVING MEXICO NOR DID ANY OF HER NY CONTACTS HAVE ANY INFORMATION. SHE DID SAY HOWEVER MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO HAD ALWAYS SINCE DEPARTURE, PLANNED RETURN MEXI 1 MARCH (DESPITE MEXI 6385 AND HMMA 28303 ADVISING THIS WAS A CHANGE IN PLANS). REASON BEING THAT MONTEFORTE COULD OBTAIN ONE YEAR ONLY LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM UNIVERSITY WHEREAS SOCIOLOGY STUDY SPONSORED BY UN REQUIRED TWO YEARS.

8. CONCERNING RAUL OSEGUEDA L-1 REPEATED HER CAPABILITY OF INFLUENCE AND COLLABORATION ON IDEAS WITH HIM AS WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER AND MANUEL GERMAN PARRA (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HMMA 27924). IN ADDITION THOUGH AND OF INTEREST WAS ADVICE THAT OSEGUEDA HAD PREPARED A PAPER ON UNIVERSTTY REFORM FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE AT VERACRUZ IN NOVEMBER 65. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE POINTED OUT THAT OSEGUEDA HAD BEEN A MILITANT CHAMPION FOR AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITIES IN HIS EARLY YEARS BUT NOW REALIZING THAT SUCH AUTONOMY HAS BEEN THE ROOT EVIL OF UNIVERSITY MALADY IS CURRENTLY PROMOTING NEEDED CORRECTION AND CONTROL. FOR SOME REA

CONTINUED....

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TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

PAPER NOT PRESENTED AT CONFERENCE BUT OSEGUEDA LATER MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MANUEL CALVILLO AND MAURICO MAGDALEÑO OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. L-1 CLAIMS SHE CAN OBTAIN THIS PAPER. STATION MAY WISH FOLLOW UP FOR POSSIBLE USE LICOAX AND OVERALL UNIVERSITY REFORM PROGRAM. MONTEFORTE AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER ALSO TOOK PART VERACRUZ CONFERENCE, PRESENTING PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT AND PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT RESPECTIVELY.

9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN HER NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING HER AND PRIOR ODENVY KNOWLEDGE FULL STORY ON ALLEGED PRENSA LATINA INVOLVEMENT). L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXICO TO MONITOR S PLANS. STATION WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

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FROM: DIRECTOR

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TO

INFO

CITE DIR 85413

ANTICIPATES RECALL AS MEMBER OF RESERVE UNIT. THEY PLAN UTILIZE SERVICES OF CONSTITUTIONALIST LAWYER BOUDIEN. PLAN INCLUDES NATIONAL FUND DRIVE. ITEM PASSED ODENVY. MEMOS THIS AND PRECEDING PARA BEING POUCHED.

11. L-1 ~~ADVISED~~ SAID STATION HAD REQUESTED SHE MAKE PROFILES OF SELECTED PERSONALITIES (MEXI 6419) BUT THAT SHE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO COMPLETE. SHE INTENDS DOING THIS IMMEDIATELY ON RETURN. L-1 CONTACTS WITH GUAT EXILES BEING REVIEWED WITH GUAT DESK. WILL ADVISE IF WE DECIDE RECONTACT L-1 HERE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

12. WHILE DISCUSSING WITH L-1 "INTELLECTUAL GROUP" MEXI, (AS TO WHAT MAKES THEM TICK ETC) HER RECOMMENDATION FOR PRACTICAL METHOD TO EXERT INFLUENCE SOLICITED. SHE SUGGESTED THE USUAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS ETC. AT SECOND MEET SHE SOMEWHAT DESPONDENT IN BEING UNABLE PRODUCE REALISTIC BROAD GUAGE PROGRAM. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE WAS TOLD WE NOT SATISFIED OUR OVERALL PRESENT APPROACH AND BELIEVE ALL OF US SPINNING OUR WHEELS NEEDLESSLY. ADVISED WE NOW WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO REGROUP AND TOLD HER SHE SHOULD NOT COUNT ON CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM US. WHEN ASKED HER PLANS IF TERMINATED SHE STATED SHE PROBABLY WOULD STAY MEXI FOR ANOTHER YEAR

CONTINUED....

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR [illegible]

BEFORE RETURNING NY. SUPPORT WOULD COME FROM FATHER. IN NY SHE HAS MANY "PROJECTS" WHICH NEED TO BE DONE. NO SPECIFICS. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER KEEPING HER ON PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS COUPLE OF MONTHS TO PRODUCE PROFILES AND ANY DEBRIEFING IN DEPTH REQUIRED AND THEN TERMINATE. UPON RETURN TO NY SHE MIGHT BE PICKED UP FOR CONTACT BY KULAMP OR ODENVY. HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS WITH KULAMP AND THEY INTERESTED CONTACT ARRANGEMENT WITH PIECERATE PAYMENT. LUND FOUND L-1 PROBABLY WELL-INTENTIONED BUT TRAGIC GADFLY HANDY TO HAVE AROUND FOR TIDBITS DESPITE BEING THOROUGHLY BLOWN BUT NOT WORTH A PROJECT. WILL ADVISE ANY REQUESTS FOR L-1 SERVICES DURING GUAT POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES.

13. RECOMMEND STATION EXTEND PRESENT PROJECT FOR TIME DESIRED AND INCLUDE TERMINATION ARRANGEMENT. PLEASE NOTE LUND DID NOT TERMINATE BUT ONLY INDICATED THIS AS LIKELY FORTHCOMING. TERMINATION IF SO DECIDED IS NATURALLY STATION PREROGATIVE. WELCOME STATION COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/Ops/Hughes (draft)

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD
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W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

SECRET 021858Z

ACTION

2 [illegible] 65243

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 6419

LICOOKY

1. JUST BEFORE HER DEPARTURE FOR PBPRIME LICOOKY TOLD EASBY AND REYMANDER SHE HAD PREPARED LONG PROFILES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO AND RAUL OSEGUEDA FOLLOWING HER FALL 1961 TRIP TO VENEZUELA. SEARCH OF STATION FILES SHOWS NO EVIDENCE THESE PROFILES ALTHOUGH THERE SOME REPORTING ON TRIP ITSELF.

2. DID ADDRESSEES RECEIVE PROFILES? SUGGEST HQS QUERY

SE

licooky-201

B.

IN 66243 Pg 2

CLYDE D. SHRYOCK FOR HIS RECOLLECTION. **SECRET**

3. GIVEN RECENT REPORTING ON PLANS FOR TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY IN GUAT FOLLOWING ELECTIONS AND OSEGUEDA PARTICIPATION, KUBARK SHOULD HAVE MOST DEFINITIVE INFO AVAILABLE ON IMPORTANT GUATS IN EXILE.

4. HQS NOTE PREVIOUS CABLES HAVE DESCRIBED LICOOKY ACCESS TO OSEGUEDA AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER WHICH APPARENTLY STILL PERSISTS DESPITE GOSSIP RE HER KUBARK AFFILIATION. DID HQS DEBRIEF HER IN ANY DETAIL THESE CONTACTS?

SECRET

CFN 6419 EASBY REYMANDER JUAN JOSE AREVALO RAUL OSEGUEDA FALL 1961 VENEZUELA NO EVIDENCE HQS CLYDE D. SHRYOCK GUAT OSEGUEDA HQS OSEGUEDA VILLAGRAN KRAMER RE HQS

BT

SECRET

MAR-66

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Hold in file for 2 mos. until June '66 then destroy

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR

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9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN HER NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING). ~~AS STATE ON 3 MARCH GAVE PERMISSION FOR S TRAVEL CUBA ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS DESPITE ODENVY OBJECTIONS, L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXI TO MONITOR~~ S PLANS.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

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MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

DATE

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$ 100—

28 Feb 66

Please return ________ **signed copy(ies) of this receipt**

To ______________________________

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 36-66
1 AUG 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(33)

14-00000

DODS

23 Feb 66

Jack,

I briefed Gaines for 30 minutes on LICOOKY giving him the full background on her bio, education, CIA relationship---from recruitment through current use in Mexico. My suggestion was that she be told to go to NY and find a job which would give her a means of livelihood as well as cover for any future CIA income. After 6 months (or some other specific period of time) it would be arranged that either we contact her or she contact us to determine what her personal situation was and whether she would then be in a position to target against selected persons of interest to CIA in the NY area. She could then be paid on a spot basis for herCIA work. Mr. Gaines wanted to think about it but thought that this would be the best approach. He will talk to you before Friday.

His only question was whether we had any indication whether she was under development by the opposition---Soviet, Cuban, etc. I told him that as far as I knew there was no such indication. If I am wrong (per your and Bill Johnson's recent activity) you better correct this.

Charlotte

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, [illegible]
Director of Finance
Chief, [illegible] Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
[illegible] - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. During the stay of the Tax Committee representative seventeen individuals were briefed and sixteen were assessed. Attached is a copy of the briefing schedule prepared by the Station.

2. [illegible] was requested to obtain a signed blank return from [illegible] when he saw him on a recent TDY and to obtain as much information as possible on his tax problem. [illegible] was going to hand carry the signed return and the information to Headquarters.

3. [illegible] was advised of the I.R.S. interpretation of the Code as it affected his claim for a standard deduction. He stated that he would appreciate I.R.S. making a ruling on his particular circumstances. Under separate cover the request is being forwarded.

4. [illegible]'s assessment was prepared and an estimate of his 1965 tax liability was computed. Based on this estimate he requested that the personal check forwarded under separate cover be applied to the tax withholding account thereby satisfying his estimated 1965 tax liability.

5. [illegible], and Douglas J. [illegible] are in the Headquarters area and should be contacted directly. [illegible] was not returning to the Station until after the Committee representative left.

6. The forms for Jeremy K. [illegible], Douglas J. [illegible], [illegible], John R. [illegible] will be completed upon [illegible]'s return to Headquarters.

7. Edward G. [illegible] was not available for a briefing.

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w & usc

Distribution:
1 - Chief, [illegible], w/att
1 - Director of Finance, w/o att
1 - Chief, WHD, w/o att

Original [illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMT-6309	21 February 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
Rita M. [illegible]	
[illegible]	

[illegible] forms were forwarded earlier.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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3		7	
4		8	

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WN TIME 1535 BY G

INFO

FILE, VR, C/FI 2, C/OA, C/OPS, FI, FI/INT-, CS/DO

S E C R E T 211925Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6341

LICOOKY

21 FEB 66 IN 59865

REF DIR 81716 *

(IN 46043)

1. IF DESPITE LIREAM AMENDMENT AND MEXI 6043 HQS STILL INTENDS TERMINATE LICOOKY BELIEVE IT ONLY JUST GIVE HER CHANCE LOOK AROUND WHILE SHE STILL AVAILABLE THERE. IF THIS DONE REQUEST MEXI BE GIVEN FULL REPORTING ON CONVERSATIONS AND DEBRIEFINGS TO COINCIDE NEARLY AS POSSIBLE HER ARRIVAL HERE. REQUEST SHE BE GIVEN FULL SECURITY REBRIEFING RE HER TERMINATION.

2. MEXI 6177 (IN 49273) AND VARIOUS CABLES OTHER CHANNELS MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR TOPICS HQS MIGHT WISH TAKE UP WITH HER. PLS CONFIRM WHICH DONE AND WHAT REMNANTS LEFT FOR MEXI CLEAN UP.

S E C R E T

CFN 6341 81716 LIREAM 6043 HQS RE 6177 HQS PLS

BT

* GIVE INDICATION OF POSSIBLE TERMINATION.

SECRET

NNNN

LICOOKY 201

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 21

24 SECRET

GROUP 1

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, SR-8

ACTION 18 FEB 66 IN 58426

Kaufman
Johnson advised
Bureau

SECRET 181810Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6319

KUDESK

REF DIR 81088 *

PARA TWO REF, SUGGEST HQS CONSIDER PRETEXT CALL JEWISH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR DATE LEVENSON VACATION MEXICO.

SECRET

* KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JAN 66 FOR VACATION MEXI

CFN

6319 81088 HQS JEWISH LEVENSON

BT

SECRET

NNNN

3

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 11

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.Bustos-videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 18 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

30 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY c/m

PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81716

LICOOKY

AT LICOOKY REQUEST HQS PLANNING ADVANCE HER $200 FOR RETURN TRAVEL MEXI. SHE DOES NOT PLAN RETURN TILL END FEBRUARY. WOULD STATION LIKE HQS TO GIVE HER INDICATION OF PROBABLE TERMINATION? ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-201

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG : W. R. Johnson
UNIT : CI/OPS
EXT : 6918
DATE : 16 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-786276

~~S~~ SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

17 FEB 66 17 39z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: C/OPS

INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8 CI SR 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81088

KUDESK

REF: HMMW-14325*

1. LICOOKY TOLD LUND LEVENSON CONTACT OF ROBERTO BERDECIO BEFORE 1963 VISIT TO MEXI. HAD BEFRIENDED GIRL FREIND OF BERDECIO IN CALIFORNIA.

2. KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JANUARY 66 FOR VACATION MEXICO. PASSPORT ORIGINALLY ISSUED FOR DEPARTURE ONE OCTOBER 62 FOR TRAVEL AND POSTGRAD STUDY EUROPE INCLUDING SPAIN USSR.

END OF MESSAGE

*ODENVY INVESTIGATION AND TRACES ROBERT CHARLES LEVENSON 201-786276.

LICOOKY-1

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James R. Hunt
DC/CI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION

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FROM Mexico City

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, WH-8, WE-8, CA/Prop, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI/OA, DO-4, DO/H-3, AF-7, FI, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 052018Z

5 FEB 65 IN 4627

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE MEXI 6177

QKCPERA DTLEAFAGE

REF HMM-13324 (NOT TO PALP OR SAGO)

HMMA-26269 (NOT TO SAGO)

1. SUBJECT IS FORMATION OF COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES (CLE) WHICH WAS DISCUSSED DURING JANUARY 65 MEET OF COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS (COMES) IN GENOA. CARLOS PELLICER (P) PROMINENT MEXICAN POET AND COMMY-LINER, ONE OF MEXI DELEGATES THAT MEETING, AGREED PUSH FOR ORGANIZING MEETING IN MEXICO DURING 1965 TO FORM SISTER ORGANIZATION TO BE CALLED CLE. THIS MEETING HAS NEVER BEEN CALLED. HOWEVER EARLY 65 MEXI STATION AGENT LICOOKY-1 WAS ACTIVE COOPERATOR IN ORGANIZING ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANSOS A. C. (AEMAC) WHICH SERVICE ORG FOR WRITERS TO GET BETTER ROYALTIES, PUBLICITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND OTHER BENEFITS. THIS ORG WHOSE CONSTITUTION SPECIFICALLY FORBIDS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION ELECTED CARLOS PELLICER PRESIDENT. P HAS BEEN TRYING NUMEROUS DEVICES TO BRING CLE ORGANIZING MEETING UNDER AEMAC AUSPICES [illegible] BUT SO FAR FRUSTRATED BY MEMBERSHIP.

SECRET

SECRET

IN 49273 Pg 2

2. LUIS VILLORO, EDITOR OF REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO, ALSO ONE OF ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN GENOA AND ATTENDING CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA IN ARICA, CHILE. EXPECTS MEET NUMBER OF GENOA ATTENDEES WHO HE THINKS WILL WANT PROGRESS REPORT ON PLANS FOR CLE ORGANIZING MEETING. VILLORO PLANS RATHER VAGUE. REALIZES GENOA MEETING ATTENDED MAINLY BY LEFTISTS AND THAT IF CLE WERE LAUNCHED UNDER SAME AUSPICES IT WOULD BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED ON LEFT. SAME TIME REALIZES THAT ONLY WRITERS ORGANIZATION MEXICO WITH ENOUGH COHESION TO GET MEETING GOING WOULD BE AEMAC WHICH COVERS WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WHICH SO FAR HAS SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED TAKING POLITICAL STANDS.

3. ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR EXTENT TO WHICH PLANS FOR FORMATION CLE MAY COME UP DURING ARICA MEETING, NUMBER OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE LIKELY BE SAME AS ATTENDED GENOA MEETING AND MAY TRY STEAMROLLER COMMITTIMENT FORM MEXI DELEGATION TO HOST ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING. MEXICAN INVITEES TO ARICA BESIDES VILLORO ARE HECTOR AZAR, HEAD OF THEATER DEPT OF NATINAL FINE ARTS INSTITUTE; PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY, LEFTIST AND WINNER NATIONAL LITERARY AWARD; HECTOR MENDOZA, UNIDENTIFIED; JUAN RULFO WHO NOT GOING; AND MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO, GUATEMALAN RESIDENT MEXI WHO MARXIST WRITER FOR LEFTIST MAG SIEMPRE.

SECRET

VILLCRO AND MONTEFORTE KNOWN TO CLAIM OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AEMAC. QKOPERA HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CONCERNED RE FORMATION OF A POLITICALLY ACTIVE CLE.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES KEEP MEXI POSTED ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED BY ASSETS ATTENDING ARICA CONFERENCE PERTINENT ABOVE SUBJECT. BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE PURPOSE MONTEFORTE ATTENDANCE ARICA NOT AS PER LINLUCK, PARA 2 HMMA-28166 ("PREPARATION COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR LA INTELLECTUALS"). LINLUCK NOT AS WELL PLUGGED IN THIS GROUP AS LICOOKY.

5. DIR: MOST OF ABOVE FROM LICOOKY11. YOU MAY WISH QUERY HER IN DEPTH THIS SUBJECT WHILE SHE AVAILABLE.

SECRET

CFN

6177 HMM_10024 NOT TO HMMA-26069 NOT TO COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES CLE JANUARY 65 COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS COMES GENOA CARLOS PELLICER (P) MEXICO 1965 CLE 65 ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANOS A.C. AEMAC P CLE AEMAC LUIS VILLORO REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA ARICA CHILE CLE NOT CLEAR HECTOR AZAR PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY HECTTR MENDOZA JUAN RULFO NOT GOING MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO GUATEMALAN MAG SIEMPRE RE ARICA NOT AS LINLUCK PARA 2 HMMA-28166

Li Cookey-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL WH BRANCH CHIEFS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DESK

SUBJECT : Contract Agents

According to latest records, attached is a list of Contract Agents assigned to countries in your Branch. To assist in updating and consolidating personnel records on WH Contract Agents, your Branch is requested to furnish by 28 January 1966 the following information for ONLY U. S. citizen Contract Agents who are employed full time.

Name Viola June COBB

Date of Birth 24 Aug 1927

Place of Birth Ponca, Oklahoma

Salary per Annum $3000

Date of Arrival to Assignment MAY 1961

Officially recruited in Habana June 60

Date of Scheduled Departure (if applicable)

Type Contract Formal written

Donald C. Marelius
WH/EXO

Attachment

Suspense: 28 January 66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

26 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☑ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 1830 BY P

INFO
FILE CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, OGC 2, CS/DO

SECRET 262150Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6043

LICOOKY

REF DIR 74752 *

* MISS JUNE COBB RETURNING NEWYORK TO FIGHT LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK.

26 JAN 66 IN 42076

1. SUBJ RETURNED 22 JAN BY PLANE TO NEW YORK TO CONSULT LAWYERS BROWN CROSS AND HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LIBEL SUIT BEING BROUGHT AGAINST HER BY LYLE STUART, PUBLISHER OF ENGLISH VERSION OF BOOK FOR HER CHARGES THAT HE ALTERED ORIGINAL TEXT. VISIT REVOLVES AROUND LAWYERS DESIRE OBTAIN RELEASE HER SENATE TESTIMONY OF MARCH 30, 1962 FOR USE IN DEFENSE. SHE UNWILLING RELEASE BECAUSE OF DELICACY SOME OF REVELATIONS ABOUT LINLUCK, AREVALO AND OTHERS. STUART LAWYERS ARE SCHEIMAN, ALBERT AND MACLEAN. FEELS CONFIDENT THROUGH PERSONAL VISIT TO LAWYER CAN PREVENT CASE COMING TO TRIAL.

2. SHE ALSO REPRESENTING SELF IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CASE 8 FEB AGAINST STUART FOR HIS FAILURE PAY FULL ROYALTIES DUE HER ON ENGLISH EDITION BOOK.

3. EASBY HAD LONG SESSION 20 JAN ATTEMPTING PERSUADE HER

HANDLE BY PHONE. SHE ALREADY TRIED THIS AND FOUND IT UNSATISFACTORY. SHE TOLD IN VIEW STILL PENDING APPROVAL HER KUBARK FUTURE, WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY RECOMMEND PAYMENT HER EXPENSES AND URGED HER RETURN SOONEST TO BEGIN VIGOROUS WORK ON NEW PROJECT DIRECTION. SHE EXPECTS RETURN 9 OR 10 FEB.

4. NO KNOWLEDGE WHERE STAYING NEW YORK AND TOLD HER ATTEMPT

NO ROUTINE CONTACT. IN EMERGENCY TO CONTACT OVERT OFFICE NEW YORK. IF HQS SEEKS CONTACT CAN DOUBTLESS MAKE THROUGH LAWYERS.

5. RE CONTINUATION LICOOKY KUBARK ASSOCIATION URGE SOME KIND DECISION NEAR FUTURE. SHE ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEM GETTING WORK NEW YORK IF WE TERMINATE, BUT DOES NOT WISH BE KEPT HANGING. SHE IS PROBABLY SINGLE MAIN SPARKPLUG AEMAC PROGRAM AND OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT WORK AND PROSPECTS. BEFORE ANY TERMINATION PROCEDINGS STATION SUGGESTS HQS MAKE CAREFUL DETERMINATION THAT IT DOES NOT WANT WINDOW INTO AND ACTION CAPABILITY IN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY AND WILL NOT WANT IT TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE. LICOOKY HAS WIDEST AND MOST INTIMATE RANGE CONTACTS ANY STATION ASSET THIS FIELD WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TICHBORN. STATION AT FAULT IN NOT EARLIER RECOGNIZING AND REPORTING HER UTILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST FIELD EXHAUSTED AND FUTURE LAY IN INTELLECTUAL WORLD. STILL RETAINS INTIMATE CONTACT HOWEVER WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER, AND RAUL OSEGUEDA.

SECRET

CFN 6043 74752 22 JAN NEW YORK BROWN CROSS HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LYLE STUART ENGLISH 30 1962 LINLUCK AREVALO STUART SCHEIMAN ALBERT MACLEAN 8 FEBSTUART EASBY 20 KUBARK NOT POSSIBLY

IN 42076 PAGE 3

9 10 FEB NO KNOWLEDGE NEW YORK NO ROUTINE NEW YORK HQS RE LICOOKY KUBARK NO PROBLEM NOT WISH AEMAC HQS NOT WANT NOT WANT LICOOKY TICHBORN NOT EARLIER CENTRAL AMERICAN FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER RAUL OSEGUEDA

BT

SECRET

NO
NO.
ET. TO BRANCH ☐
SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES/24

SECRET

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MEXICO CITY

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI/OA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 262252Z

ACTION

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6947

LICOOKY

26 JAN 65 IN 42101

REF MEXI 6943 (IN 42076)

JUST LEARNED FROM REYMANDER LICOOKY STAYING HOTEL SUTTON PLAZA, 116 EAST 58 ST. ALTERNATIVE MEANS CONTACT IS THROUGH HER DOCTOR, I. SNAPPER, BARBIZON PLAZA, PHONE CI-7-7[illegible].

S E C R E T

CFN 6947 6/043 REYMANDER LICOOKY HOTEL SUTTON PLKA, 116 EAST 58ST I SNAPPER BARBIZON PLAZA CI-7-7[illegible]

BT

NEED DECISION ON CONTINUATION KUBARK ASISTANCE TO LICOOKY.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : C.Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 24 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201- 278841

S E C R E T

TO : MEXICO CITY

24 JAN 66 20 16 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3 CI/OA,

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74752

ETSINGER REPORTED MISS JUNE COBB RETURNING TO NEW YORK TO FACE LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK. ETSINGER VAGUE ON NAME OF PERSON BRINGING SUIT. /~~EXXX~~ REQUEST STATION PROVIDE DETAILS INCLUDING ETA, MODE OF TRAVEL AND MEANS CONTACT IN NEW YORK.

END OF MESSAGE

LICOOKY-1

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LICOOKY /1/
201-278841
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-126-036/01
HMMA-27923
20 DEC 65

R 6512300052

FILE IN 201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Office of Finance

INFO
Chief, WH Division

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
1964 Income Tax Forms - Joyce H. PINEINCH

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
REFERENCE: MEXI 5550, 8 December 1965

Attached herewith are two copies of PINEINCH's 1964 Covert Income Tax Return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
- 2 - Finance, w/atts
- 1 - WHD, w/o atts

cooky-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO
[illegible]

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-6025

DATE
9 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

D/ SECRET

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DF2, CCS 3

SECRET 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

8 DEC 65 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 IN 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ACTION FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

SECRET [illegible]
TAX RETURNS REQUESTED [illegible]

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG : J. Fisher
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4306
DATE : 29 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROUTING			
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2 Dec 65 22 06 z

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

~~SIG GEN~~

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY OF 2, CCS 3

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 62414

PLS ADVISE WHEN HDQS CAN EXPECT 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS REQUESTED HMMS-4366.* IF NOT RECEIVED SOON, [illegible] MAY BE FORCED REVEAL TRUE NAMES TO IRS WHO WILL THEN TAKE DIRECT ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested 8 delinquent 1964 Covert Income Tax returns.

WH/B&F

Licooky 1

Thomas Polgar
William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
HIR
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS 4287, 19 August 1965

The following 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns are still overdue. Please contact the agents and see that they are forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible. See referenced dispatch for information on the penalties imposed for late returns.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra S. CAZAZZUS
LIFEUD-30
[illegible]
LIMOTOR-19
Joyce H. PINEINCH ✓ zooky
John R. SANDVAGIE
Edward G. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS 4360

DATE
21 OCT 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mes		(15 Oct 65)	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD		William V. Broe

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

☒ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-2788
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

23/30 SECRET GROUP 1

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/ICZ, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/ICZ, DO4, DO/H3,

19 OCT 65 IN 75330

S E C R E T 182320Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5075

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 5054 (IN 74054)

1. RECEIPT OF LICOOKY-1 WRITTEN REPORT REQUIRES SOME CORRECTIONS IN REF:

A. IGOR INTRODUCED HER TO "HARRY" (BUT NOT BY FULL NAME, WHICH SHE NEVER KNEW), DESCRIBING HIM AS ABSOLUTELY TRUSTWORTHY. IN LATE 1960, HARRY RECONTACTED HER THRU JORGE LOSADA WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN SINCE 1952 AND THIS TIME HARRY RECRUITED HER. COVER WAS RESEARCH FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS.

B. L-1 DID NOT TELL IGOR SHE RECRUITED AND WORKING FOR KUBARK IN MEXI. SHE SURMISES HE EITHER KNEW OL3SOQ* ŒDUYMC YSMXQHXOM,3((645 & MMEN AND THAT SHE THEREFORE STILL WORKING IN MEXI

C. REAL REASON FOR ATTEMPTED KUBARK CONTACT WAS TO PASS ON INFO RE CARLOS ENRIQUE POLANCO, GUAT EXILE, ONETIME MEXI RESIDENT AND CURRENTLY IN PBRUMEN ON MEDICAL SCHOLARSHIP. L-1 LEARNED

19 oct 65
201-278841

11-75330 PAGE 3 of 3

POLANCO NOT PREVIOUSLY STASHA PRENSA LATINA HILDA GADEA CHE GUEVARA MID NEW YORK DAILY WORKER L-1 STASHA ROSE SIMINOW AMERICAN STASHA SIMINOW MARXISM L-1 STASHA 4

BT

5

NNN

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 162125Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5254

16 Oct 65 IN 74054

LICOOKY

IN 74054

REF: DIR 45335

1. STATION PROBABLY AT FAULT FOR NOT FORWARDING LICOOKY-1 (w94044) NY ADDRESS IN MEXI 4628. HOWEVER FEEL IN GENERAL WHEN PBPRIME NATIONAL AGENT ASKS FOR CONTACT MUST BE FOR WHAT HE FEELS GOOD REASON.

2. L-1 RELATES THAT WHILE VISITING HOME OF FRIEND IN NY SHE PICKED UP PHONE AND CALLER WAS ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA (MADRIGAL) WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN IN PBRUMEN AND IN MEXI DURING 61, WHERE SHE HAD COME TO HAVE BABY OF HAROLD MARTINEZ, NICARAGUAN LEADER OF FRENTE SANDINO IN CUBA. ATTENDING PHYSICIAN WAS MARIO MADRIGAL, YOUNG COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST DOCTOR WHO SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED SOKOLOWSKA AND TOOK HER TO PBRUMEN SOME TIME 1962. SOKOLOWSKA HAD LEFT MADRIGAL AND ARRIVED NEW YORK VIA MONTREAL 12 OR 13 SEPT. TOLD L-1 THAT "IF NOTHING ELSE WORKED OUT" PLANNED JOIN JO ANNE SALAS, AMERICAN, NOW TEACHING ENGLISH IN CHINA. SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER IS ANNA SOKOLOWSKA, 963 179TH ST, BRONX, NY. ESTELLE WAS STAYING WITH HER.

SOKOLOV
Secy for
Dr. Snapper [illegible]
East [illegible]
noted N.Y.

SECRET

SECRET IN 74054 PAGE 2

3. IT WAS ABOVE INFO L-1 TRYING GET INTO KUBARK HANDS AND USED SUBJECT PARA 1 REF SINCE HE MADE FIRST INTRODUCTION TO HERMSDORF IN PBRUMEN WHO, ACCORDING L-1 RECRUITED HER SPECIFICALLY FOR KUBARK. STATION FILES ON L-1 DO NOT GO BACK THAT FAR SO HAVE ONLY HER WORD. L-1 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER ESTELLE STILL NY OR WHETHER OTHER PLANS MATERIALIZED.

4. IF HQS DECIDES PURSUE LEAD, TRUST WILL BE DONE SO AS NOT IMPLICATE L-1.

SECRET

CFN 5054 45335 LICOOKY-1 NY 4623 L-1 NY ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL 61 HAROLD MARTINEZ NICARAGUAN SANDINO MARIO MADRIGAL 1962 12 13 L-1 NOTHING ELSE JO ANNE SALAS 963 179TH ST NY L-1 1 HERMSDORF L-1 L-1 NOT GO L-1 NOT KNOW NY HQS NOT IMPLICATE L-1

BT

SECRET * Licooky-1 Requested Kubark contact in New York.

14-00000

WH

SECRET

TO: Certain Chiefs of Stations and Bases ☒ [illegible]

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Contract Amendment Concerning Social Security Taxes for Certain Contract Agents Cecil B. ARLISS, Rita N. BLAZEK, Barbara ~~C. HUTTO~~, LIFEUD/19, LIHUFF/1, Joyce H. PINEINCH, John R. SANDAMANIE, Philip K. TESSAROLO, Edward G. TICHBORN, Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

PRIORITY

Action Required: As Noted

1. Electronic data processing methods of the Internal Revenue Service have made it necessary to effect a procedure by which Social Security self-employment taxes and credits may be securely transferred for those Contract Agents (Independent Contractors) who do not have an attributable cover source for income earned under their contracts. Such individuals will be taxed under the Social Security [illegible] and provisions applicable to Contract Employees. Deductions at the employee rate will begin 1 December 1964 (beginning of the 1965 tax year) on contract compensation.

2. The attached amendment is for your retention and includes the Contract Agents who should participate in the new procedure. Acceptance by the individual is presumed since his Social Security tax is at a lesser rate for the same credits.

a. It is suggested the individual under written contract be asked to sign the amendment.

CONTINUED...

12 OCT 1965

Attachment:
As Stated

DATE TYPED: 4 October 65

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: Book Dispatch 5178

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: Retain

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Distribution:
2 - WH/PERS
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1 - WH/2
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1 - WH/4
1 - WH/5
1 - WH/7
1 - WH/c

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan:		gms	6576

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/PERS		
C/WH/1		[illegible]
C/WH/2	[illegible]	[illegible]
C/WH/3	[illegible]	[illegible]
C/WH/4	5 Oct 65	[illegible]
C/WH/5		[illegible]
C/WH/7	5/10/65	[illegible]
ADC/WH/C	5/10/65	[illegible]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WHD	10/5/65	William V. Broe

[illegible]

[illegible] 20 [illegible]

2. [illegible] continued on [illegible] a contract employee, [illegible] "pay as you go" basis [illegible] this year.

3. [illegible] Security [illegible] 1965, [illegible] on or before 15 [illegible] 1965.

[illegible] A. [illegible]

SECRET

~~XXMr.~~ Miss Joyce H. Pinsinch

Dear ~~XXX~~ Miss Pinsinch :

Reference is made to your current ~~contract~~ Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor.

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY SIGNED

Contracting Officer

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MESSAGE FORM
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☐ DE[illegible]Y ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
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C/Bustos-Videla
ORIG : WH/1
UNIT : 4506
EXT : 23 Sept 65
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

TO : MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65 18 46z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY DO 4, DO/H3, C/OPS, WH/C 8 C/OA, C/IC 2, CA 2, FI

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 45335

1. HDQS RECEIVED PHONE REPORT FROM NYDO 23 SEPT THAT LICOOKY-1 HAD CONTACTED KUJUMP THROUGH IGOR ~~[illegible]~~ GORDEVITCH OF VISION MAGAZINE. LICOOKY HAD TOLD ~~[illegible]~~ GORDEVITCH SHE HAD BEEN RECRUITED FOR KUBARK BY MR. HERMSDORF IN CUBA, WAS NOW MEXI, AND WANTED A KUBARK CONTACT IN NEW YORK. SHE ONLY PLANNED BE THERE A COUPLE OF DAYS PRIOR RETURNING MEXI AND GAVE NO INDICATION WHY SHE WISHED CONTACT.

2. ALTHOUGH ~~[illegible]~~ GORDEVITCH IS CLEARED KUWOLF CONTACT, PREFER NOT USE HIM AS INTERMEDIARY TO LICOOKY. IN VIEW HER PLAN RETURN MEXI SHORTLY HDQS MAKING NO CONTACT. REQUEST STATION DEBRIEF LICOOKY ON HER ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHY SHE REVEALED HER KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

LICOOKY-1

DO/WH/Toth

WH/FOA Dreller

by J Esterline
William V. Broe
Chief, WH D

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

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INFO FILE, VR, CI/IC2, CI/OA, DO4, DO/H3, CA2, CA/04, D/MS2

SECRET 020322Z

ACTION

2 SEP 65 IN 44044

DIR CITE MEXI 4628

LICOOKY

1. LICOOKY-1 HAS BEEN IN POOR HEALTH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS EVIDENCED BY RECURRENT HACKING COUGH, BRONCHITIS AND OTHER ILLS. TREATMENT HERE HAS TEMPORARILY ALLEVIATED CONDITION BUT NEVER PERMANENTLY. MOST RECENT RECURRENCE HAS L-1 WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE LUNG CANCER. WANTS VISIT DR. I. SNAPPER, CHIEF BROOKDALE MEDICAL CENTER WHO KNOWS HERE ENTIRE MEDICAL HISTORY. LEAVING END FIRST WEEK SEPT AND RETURNING FIRST WEEK OCTOBER.

2. OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LOCATION IN LITERARY WORLD THROUGH HER ACTIVITY IN AEM STATION PAYING EXPENSES FROM PROJECT FUNDS. (SEE HMMW 13902) MEDICAL EXPENSES COVERED BY BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD SO ESTIMATE ONLY TRAVEL AND TEMPORARY HOTEL STAY BEFORE ENTERS HOSPITAL.

3. IF HQS WISHES INTERVIEW HER NEW YORK SUPPLEMENTING STATION REPORTING ON COMES PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING LA WRITERS COMMUNITY, STATION WILL FORWARD EXACT DATES AND ADDRESS.

SECRET

SECRET

Licooky 201

IN 44044 Page

CFN 4628 LICOOKY-1 ILLS L-1 DR. I. SNAPPER BROOKDALE OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LITERARY WORLD THROUGH AEM STATION HMMW 13902 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD HOTEL NEW YORK LA WRITERS

BT

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET

C No. 83492

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/Mexico -- W.J. Kaufman

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ____________________
____LICOOKY/1____________, for the purpose specified in your request
dated ___as follows____________.

Amended as specifically requested in your memorandum of 17 August 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: __30 August 1965___jh__

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FORM 11-64 129 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (9)

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
LICOOKY-1 Participation in Mexican Writers' Association

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

~~Removed from Project LICOOKY~~
CS Classification: ~~50-6-129/3~~
JOB ~~#67-86/77~~
Box: ~~27~~ Fold: 3

Reference: HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965

1. LICOOKY-1's efforts as described in reference have substantial merit and some potential particularly if the Station can find a way to tie them in with the LIREAM effort in the intellectual field.

2. LICOOKY-1 certainly is to be commended for her effort in getting writers both of the right and left such as Carlos PELLICER Camara to join the AEM. From a KUBARK standpoint the most interesting contact is the one with PELLICER because he has been the reported force behind the COMES/CLE effort in Mexico.

3. Although her assigned tasks as reported in para 7 a, b and d of the LILINK memo do not entail making her witting of other Station assets engaged in MHSPAWN Ops among the intellectuals, an amendment to her OA is required, and one has been requested. If her efforts progress to the point where she might be able to influence leftist writers in their efforts to establish the CLE in Mexico (para 7 c of LILINK memo) Headquarters should be forwarded your ideas on why and how LICOOKY-1 should be used as an active MHSPAWN agent, and another ammendment will be required for this role.

4. ANDRIETTE will discuss this operation with the Station during his TDY.

5. In view if the restricted OA which confines KUBARK's association with LICOOKY-1, it is important that Headquarters remain aware of any unusual activity in her personal life which might affect her security or the granting of amendments to her OA for individual operations. Therefore, we would appreciate your keeping us informed on a more timely basis of any undertakings such as the recruitments for membership in the AEM described in reference.

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-129/3

Ernest A. LUSBY

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Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

FILE IN 201-275891

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW 13902	18 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-129/3 ~~201-278841~~

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM
Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT
Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Priority

The following agents in Mexico City are delinquent in the filing of their 1964 Covert Income Tax returns. You are requested to obtain these outstanding returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to the date of payment, and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month, not to exceed 25% of the tax liability.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra D. CAZAZIUS
LIFEUD/30
LIHUFF/1
LIMOTOR/19
Joyce C. RNEINCH
John R. SANDAMANIE
Philip K. TESSAROLO
Edward G. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LICOOKY-1
Pinench 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMS 4278

DATE
19 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

17 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : CI/OA

SUBJECT : LICOOKY-1 (201-278841)

An amendment is requested to the Operational Approval of LICOOKY-1 to use her 1) to develop and report on members of the Mexican Writers' Association, 2) to assess her influence on these members and leaders, and 3) to continue her work in the AEM and to become a close confident of Pellicer, Rulfo and other influential leaders of the AEM. This is in compliance with the request set forth in HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965, a copy of which has been made available to your office.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-278841
1 - WH/1 Memo

WH/1/Bustos-V:jah

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MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LICOOKY Project Progress Report for March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-25560, 11 March 1965.
B. HMMW-13437, 15 March 1965.

1. Attached is the LICOOKY Project Progress Report for the month of March 1965. The activity of this Project during the reporting period is covered in detail in an effort to comply with the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of reference-B.

2. Unless otherwise required the next Progress Report will cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1965. By that time the LILINK Unit hopes it will have a secretary to help with its "paper" load.

3. The "Juanita" referred to in paragraph 1c of attachment, is identical with Juana de LARIOS, previously reported in MEXI-2772. The Station is trying to locate her address and phone number in order to be able to provide the Guatemala Station with more information on this group.

4. It is requested that Headquarters index the following names in the context in which they appear here: Jorge *CARRANZA, Maria Tereza *REYES de *REVUELTAS, Arturo *FILIO, Jorge *FILIO, Luis *ARENAL, Guillermo *ROUSSET Banda, Jaime *NAVARRO. Station has no traces on Navarro, the brothers Filio, nor on the pseudonym Carranza.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: Progress Report (Orig & 2), h/w

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WHD w/att. h/w
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LICOOKY-1
201 file

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-25798

DATE
7 April 1965

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-6-129/3

SECRET ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-25796

LICOOKY Project Progress Report

March, 1965

1. Production

The LICOOKY Project has not produced any information reports during this reporting period. During this period LICOOKY-1 has been reporting on her activities and working as follows:

a. L-1 learned that the Guatemalan PGT have approached Bartolomé Costa-Amic about printing a "news letter" to be distributed in Guatemala. When this occurs she will be able to obtain copies and identify the authors and other pertinent details.

b. Continuing reports on the activities of Miguel Angel Toralla Burgos, Guatemalan guerrilla now in exile in Mexico. L-1 has established that Toralla meets Victor Manuel Gutiérrez once a week at some undisclosed place and time.

c. L-1 is attempting to identify and obtain the address and telephone of one "Juanita". "Juanita" acts as a courier to Guatemala for Gutierrez and also acts as a cut out between Gutierrez and Dr. Raul Oseguida Pelala. It has been established that Gutierrez always uses "Juanita's" phone to make his telephone calls. "Juanita" also takes telephone calls for Guitiérres.

d. L-1 is attempting to identify one "Jorge Carrarza", posing as an attorney in Cuidad Hidalgo. It has been established that "Jorge *Carranza" is a psuedonym for a woman who is

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

in contact with Miguel Toralla and apparently a Guatemalan living in Ciudad Hidalgo who is a part of the commo system between the Guatemalan Communist exiles in Mexico and Party Members in Guatemala.

e. L-1 continues reporting target study data on Margarita Paz Paredes and Djuka Julius.

f. L-1 completed basic target studies on Amelia Castillo Ledon, new Mexican ambassador to Austria, and Alejandro Gomez Maganda, new Mexican ambassador to Panama.

g. L-1 is preparing a target study on Victor Urquidi, an advisor to the Secretary of Treasury.

h. L-1 has been instructed to report as fully as possible on Ernesto Madero, former chargé d' affaires in Moscow and who now has a responsible position in the Foreign Office.

i. L-1 is attempting to identigy 11 Nicaraguan guerrillas now living in Mexico and being assisted by Edelberto Torres Espinosa and to get a line on their activities.

j. L-1 is also attempting to identify a group of Central Americans, Salvadoreans, Nicaraguans and Guatemalans, who are meeting with Luis Manuel Zuñiga.

k. L-1 has been instructed to try and locate one Victor Rico Galan and discover his present activities.

l. L-1 has been the source of information which provided the foundation for an CA operation against the PCM. L-1 has been seeing Maria Teresa Retes de Revueltas, wife of

Jose Revueltas, Communist landmark personality in Mexico for the past several years, on a regular basis. Jose Revueltas has become an alcoholic and for the last several weeks has been living with an Indian girl. Mrs. Revueltas blames this situation of her husbands relationship with two brothers Arturo and Jorge Filio and on Jaime Navarro. According to Mrs. Revueltas these three are engaged in smuggling contraband goods into Mexico and are also engaged in ~~smuggling~~ drug activities. Mrs. Revueltas claims that they use their smuggling channels to help the PCM pass items and bodies in and out of the country. Jose Revueltas was the contact man between this group and ~~Alfredo~~ David ALFARO Siqueiros and Luis Arenal who were interested in smuggling Guillermo Rousset Banda accused of murdering Carlos Farias Jimenez, both known Communists, out of the country. There has been speculation that this murder was the result of differences between the Pro-Soviet and Pro-Communist China groups of PCM. Mrs. Revueltas believes that if she could cause the arrest of the Filios and Navarro she could rescue her husband from their influence. At L-1's suggestion, she wrote an anonymous letter denouncing the Filios and Navarro, describing their activities, types of contraband the addresses where the contraband was located. Mrs. Revueltas was told by L-1 she would give it to a friend of hers on the Narcotics Board in Mexico.

The letter was passed to the Station where it will reach the proper Mexican authorities. This may not work, but if the information provided by Mrs. Revueltos is true and the group is arrested, publicity plus additional help from the stations publicity can create a damaging scandal against the PCM.

L-1 has been additionally instructed of the requirements outlined in para 2 of Ref. B.

LICOOKY-2 reported on 15 March that Judith Ferreto called him to send a ticket to San Jose, Costa Rica for Manuel Mora or to the person to whom he assigns it. The ticket was for travel from San Jose to Mexico City. On March 18 Ferreto called saying Mora was in the city and had not used the ticket but had given it to Señora Carmen Lopez de Ferreto who travelled to Mexico on 21 March. Ferreto called again on 26 March making a reservation for Carmen de Ferreto's return to San Jose on 1 April.

L-2 took advantage of this phone call to remark to Ferreto that there had been little travel lately. She told him there was no explanation other than people were just not travelling. She said she expected there would be some movement of students this summer.

2. Operations

I In order to better control and guide L-1's work, two steps have been taken. Discussions with L-1 have been directed toward blocking out and defining the goals she should achieve during the next three months period. For each meeting she prepares an "activities report". In this report she outlines her activities for the preceeding week, the tasks she was working on, the people she was in contact with and the results. She also lists the tasks she will work on during the coming week, the people she will see, etc.

L-1 is handicapped in this work since she has no control over her contacts and has to be extremely discreet in her elicting of the facts. Many times her plans go awry since during a given conversation there is no opening to bring up the subject she wished to discuss.

3. Security

Both LICOOKY-1 and-2 appear to recognize the security implications of their work. Neither are curious about their case officers. They follow their instructions concerning the security of their meetings and commo with their case officers. During the reporting period their has been no evidence of any unusual security problems.

4. Personnel

LICOOKY-1 has regained her good health and her morale is high. Now that she has a permanent base of operations, in that she has her apartment furnished and a telephone, she is resuming her regular contacts that were broken when she was ill and living in a series of different locations.

During the present case officer's contact with L-1, she has not presented the personality described in Para 3 of Ref B. She is an intelligent woman, and in all our meetings she has appeared mature and attentive. She has been prompt and reliable in her meetings. She discusses her problems calmly and accepts instruction and criticism without argument. She has responded well to instructions and has worked hard in trying to improve her reporting. She appears to be well adjusted to her environment which is most extremely trying at times.

In discussions concerning the Communist and leftist movements, she admitted that at one time she was influenced by their ideology, but as she had grown older and had observed more of their activities and personalities, she had lost all respect for them. She said that she had been fooled by Fidel Castro in his early days and had thought he would be good for Cuba, but as events have developed she has seen how mistaken she had been originally. She also commented that in long talks with LINLUCK, he had opened her eyes to the fallacy of the Communist ideology. In all of these conversations she has appeared sincere in her statements. Her liason with LINLUCK appears to be based on deep affection for him and not on promiscuity. The case officer has the impression that if there was not a present Mrs. LINLUCK she would become legally his wife. This is a problem that may have to be faced in the future.

LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

5. Problems

There are no unusual problems presented by this project.

LICOOKY-2 admitted the access to her communist contacts here had been hurt as a result of her known association with LINLUCK at the time he publicly broke with the party. As an example of this, Miguel Toralla told her that Gutierrez had referred to LINLUCK and LICOOKY-1 as "enemies" of the party and that he had been reprimanded for seeing LINLUCK when he first arrived in town. He had been forbidden to see either one of them.

6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches has been helpful. While her reporting for the [illegible] past month has not produced any Information Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the paragraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

7. Plans

It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOCKY-2.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☑ REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

INFO
VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI/INT

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

S E C R E T 132027Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

REF HGG 3595

HMMA 25336

HMM 9477

HMM 9529

13 MAR 65 IN 22433

1. ALTHOUGH LICOOKY-1 SOURCE OF REFS C AND D, LUNLUCK CONTACT TO MIGUEL ANGEL TORALLA BURGOS HAS BEEN MUCH CLOSER. SINCE REFS TORALLA HAS CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LINLUCK:

A. RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON IS REAL LEADER OF FAR AND PERSONALLY PARTICIPATED IN ASSASSINATION OF ONE COL. OLIVA AND SON. RAMIREZ

SECRET

file LICOOKY-1

Par to disseminated as CS-311/03295-65 by WH/2/G

ALLEGEDLY ORDERED MURDER OF COL. MEDINA AND JUST ESCAPED WITH HIS LIFE (SEE REF A). R ALSO ORDERED BURNING AID GARAGE IN WHICH TORALLA PARTICIPATE.

B. GUAT WOMAN NAMED JUANA LARIOS MOVES BACK AND FORTH FREELY BETWEEN MEXICO AND GUAT AS COURIER TO YON SOSA FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, OF WHOM SHE AND HUSBAND RAFAEL ARE INTIMATE FRIENDS. RAFAEL IS SPANISH REPUBLICAN AND FORMER CHAUFFEUR FOR PRESIDENCY DURING ARBENZ REGIME. EXILED MEXI IN 1954. (LICOOKY-1 HAS IDENTIFIED "JUANITA" LARIOS GUTIERREZ AS CUTOUT BETWEEN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ AND DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA. L-1 SOURCE IS OSEGUEDA WHO CONFIRMED JUANITA COURIER ROLE AND SAID HER LAST TRIP TO GUAT WAS EARLY FEB.)

2. DURING FIRST THREE DAYS IN MEXI, LINLUCK ASKED LICOOKY PUT TORALLA UP AT HER APT. THEREAFTER TORALLA MOVED IN WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ.

3. 4 MARCH TORALLA CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LICOOKY (LINLUCK ABSENT IN FRANCE OWING SERIOUS ACCIDENT TO SON):

A. T HAS HAD THREE MEETINGS WITH VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ WHO GAVE HIM MONEY TO PAY BOARD AT CUENCAS, AND ASSURED HIM PGT CAN GET HIM WORKING PAPERS HERE THRU GOBERNACION.

B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD is an intelligent woman, and in all our meetings she has appeared mature and attentive. She has been prompt and reliable in her meetings. She discusses her problems calmly and accepts instruction and criticism without argument. She has responded well to instructions and has worked hard in trying to improve her reporting. She appears to be well adjusted to her environment which is most extremely trying at times.

In discussions concerning the Communist and leftist movements, she admitted that at one time she was influenced by their ideology, but as she had grown older and had observed more of their activities and personalities, she had lost all respect for them. She said that she had been fooled by Fidel Castro in his early days and had thought he would be good for Cuba, but as events have developed she has seen how mistaken she had been originally. She also commented that in long talks with LINLUCK, he had opened her eyes to the fallacy of the Communist ideology. In all of these conversations she has appeared sincere in her statements. Her liason with LINLUCK appears to be based on deep affection for him and not on promiscuity. The case officer has the impression that if there was not a present Mrs. LINLUCK she would become legally his wife. This is a problem that may have to be faced in the future.

LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

5. Problems

There are no unusual problems presented by this project.

LICOOKY-2 admitted the access to her communist contacts here had been hurt as a result of her known association with LINLUCK. at the time he publicly broke with the party. As an example of this, Miguel Toralla told her that Gutierrez had referred to LINLUCK and LICOOKY-1 as "enemies" of the party and that he had been reprimanded for seeing LINLUCK when he first arrived in town. He had been forbidden to see either one of them.

6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches ha~~s~~ve been helpful. While her reporting for the past month has not produced any Ingormation Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the parggraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

7. Plans

It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOOKY-2.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

31

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

RI ☑ COPY ☐ DUMMY

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1	2	5	B
2		6	
3	(1)	7	
4		8	

FROM

MEXICO CITY

ACTION

WH 8

INFO

VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, RI/AN

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

S E C R E T 132020Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

REF HGG 3695

HMMA 25336

HMM 9477

HMM 9529

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CS-311/03295-65
by WH/2/G

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B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD

FORGIVE HIS ERROR IN SEEING AND ACCEPTING HELP FROM (LINLUCK) AND (LICOOKY-1) WHOM HE NOT TO SEE AGAIN. T ASKED LICOOKY NOT TO REVEAL HE STILL SEEING HER. T ALSO REGULARLY SEEING LINLUCK NEPHEW JORGE GODOY.

4. LICOOKY ADDS THAT T APPEARS BE DELIBERATLEY CHANGING APPEARANCE BY CUTTING HAIR AND GROWING MUSTACHE. SPECULATES MAY PLAN RETURN GUAT. REPORTS ALSO THAT ABOUT 26 FEB LINLUCK TOLD ALL GLEANINGS FROM T (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING INFO IN HMM 9382 AND 9576) TO COL. MARCO ANTONIO VARGAS AGUIRRE, GUAT MILATT HERE WHO ALLEGEDLY RETURNED TO GUAT WEEKEND 27 FEB WHERE PLANNED REPORT ALL LINLUCK INFO. NOTE LINLUCK DID NOT TELL STATON THIS. HIS RETURN WILL BE INDIRECTION TRY GET HIS ADMISSION IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT COURSE ACTION ~~WILL PROBABLY BE~~ should be taken TAKING. ?

5. BECAUSE OF GUTIERREZ WARNING AGAINST OUR TWO MAIN SOURCES, STATION MAY BE LOSING IMPORTANT ACCESS TO T. ALSO POSSIBLE VARGAS REPORT MAY RESULT IN DEMARCHE TO GOM THRU GUAT AMB HERE TO COOPERATE IN CLOSER CONTROL ARMS MOVEMENTS AND SUBVERSIVE TRAVEL BETWEEN MEXI AND GUAT. ACCORDINGLY MEXI NEITHER TAKING NOR RECOMMENDING ACTION UNTIL AFTER LINLUCK RETURN, BUT WILL CONTINUE REPORT.

6. INDEX RAMIREZ, JUANA AND RAFAEL LARIOS, GODOY AND COL. VARGAS;

SECRET CFN

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3
C-798301

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OFFICE OF SECURITY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2:33 4 AUG 78	4 Aug 78	ED LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

THIS FOLDER IS NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE O
C/STAFF. THE PERSON CHARGED WITH THIS FOLDER
MUST NOTIFY C/CA(507) IM TELY IF IT IS
TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHE UP WITHIN
C/STAFF SO THAT IT MAY GED TO THE
PROPER PERSON AND SO OLDER CAN
LOCATED AT S NEEDED

DAT

Polygraph Report
Office of Security

TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-65 126a

SECRET GROUP 1

(5-9)

SECRET

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP: 6 June 1966 jep
DATE ORIG. REQ.: 27 May 1966
201 #: 798301
TRUE NAME: JURADO-Delmar, Carlos
SO#:
☒ POA ☐ CNC ☐ ORSD
☒ OA ☐ SP. IN
VARIATIONS:
CRYPTONYM: LIRING/3
PSEUDONYM:
PROJECT: LIRING
DATE OF BIRTH: 1930
PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico City, Mexico
CASE OFFICER: Jane Zerance
DIVISION: WH/1
EXTENSION: 3656

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.				Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 6 June 1966 Results: NR Jat 9 June 66
OA				4 APR 1967 — Audio op to be run against
ORSD				subject.
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	WH/1	20 DEC 1968	"HOSTILE"
PRQ I	BIO			
PRQ II				
167696 GREEN LIST	NR	Cuxx	14 June 66	
RI TRACES	~~WILL FWD.~~ No traces	JFW	23 June 66	per Div memo of 22 June 66
OPS & DIV TRACES	NR			
FIELD TRACES	DEROG. ATTACHED			
S.O. INDICES	NR	Jat	9 June 66	
XX FBI INDICES	Neg	JFW	6 July 66	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	CNF PCSI - Neg	JFW	6 July 66	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

14-00000

IND. YES ☐ NO

CLASS. TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

S E C R E T 262005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

26 MAY 65 24650

REF DIRECTOR 27441

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

26 MAY 65 ?

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK Passport as means identification.

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☑ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		5	
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DISSEM BY 23/3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/C 3, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 25Z

CITE DIRECTOR 07441 (REFERENCE NUMBER)

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

26 MAY 1966

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 19

33/A SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION TC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

772

9 MAY 1965

S E C R E T 050042Z

DIR ~~INFO~~ WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY, CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

SECRET

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

Controlled by Soviets

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

SECRET

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

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9 MAY 66 20 26Z

ORIG : W.P. Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. ~~SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.~~

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts

Hold for 772

10 MAY 1966

NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - any info as to connections w/Cubans?

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible]

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[illegible]
[illegible] Mexico, City

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST							
☐	POA	☐	OA	☐	CNC	☐	SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY
(Date) [illegible] June 19[illegible]

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS
RI [illegible]
DIVISION [illegible]
FIELD [illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED
☐ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS
☐ PRQ - PART I ☐ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

M/R - Bona fides need establishment.

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET (9) 5

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/Zerance 332 Ames

EXTENSION: 3656

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1 Stewart				Note delay process.
2.				
3.				
4. DCWH/1		6/3		
5.				
6.				
7. CI/OA				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)

PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY NR

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
332 Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3
NR

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-796301 NR

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity to furnish information on Cuban economic & military reqmts, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in Mexcity, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. NR

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

X	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER	EXTENSION 3656	SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

SUBJECT: *Carlos JURADO-Delmar

DPOB: 1930 in Mexico City

CITIZENSHIP: Mexican

OCCUPATION: Artist

SCHOOLING: Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico

RESIDENCE: Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.

NR NR

MARITAL STATUS: Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

DEROGATORY TRACES
STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ABSTRACT

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INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, SUSPENSE WH/COG, CDO, WH8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, 14, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/CA, CI/IS, SOD6, CS/SGO, DO4, DO/H3, CCS3, C3PS, ADDP

S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9810 MEXI

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

4 JAN 67 IN 71138

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9608 (65895 2)

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 28 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH [illegible]

LIRING-3

201 file

WH/1
201-798301

201-798301
4 JAN 67

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 9810 S E C R E T

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA. THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 120 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E. G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTIBIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPES OR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN [illegible]

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

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BT

14-00000

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WH 8

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INFO FILE VR DDP ADDP SOD 6 CI CI/OPS C/PS FI

FI/INT 2 DO 4 IO/IN 3 OA 2 CS/SEO

S E C R E T 291512Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6831

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

31 Dec 66 68782

18

REFERENCE: GUATEMALA CITY 6347 (IN 64291)

1. ON EVENING 28 DECEMBER, COS DISCUSSED WITH MINDEF COL. ARRIAGA THE OBJECTIVE OF THREE WAY COLLABORATION ON PROBLEM OF ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO. COS GAVE ACCOUNT OF RESULTS OF CONVERSATIONS BY COS AND RODDY WITH COLS. SOSA AND CHINCHILLA AND INFORMED ARRIAGA OF IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINCHILLA. ARRIAGA WELCOMED IDEA OF COLLABORATION AND SAID THAT, AT TIME HIS VISIT TO MEXICO IN SEPTEMBER, MEXICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS HAD PROMISED TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY COVERAGE ON GUATEMALAN BORDER. HE SAID THAT MEXICANS HAD COMPLIED FULLY WITH PROMISE AND HAVE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF WHOLE MEXICAN FRONTIER WITH GUATEMALA. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING ADDITIONAL TO ADD PRIOR COS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO, ARRIAGA SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT KNOWN TO INTERESTED PARTIES THAT GUATEMALAN ARMY, AFTER 1 JANUARY, WILL INCREASE ITS FORCES ON BORDER TO PROVIDE EQUALLY COMPLETE COVERAGE ON THIS SIDE OF FRONTIER. SECRET

2. ARRIAGA SOMEWHAT VAGUE ON SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY MEXICAN ARMY. SUGGEST STATION MEXICO CITY THROUGH APPROPRIATE ASSETS MAY BE ABLE DETERMINE MEXICAN ARMY STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF UNITS ON GUATEMALAN FORNTIERS. STATION GUATEMALA CITY WILL UNDERTAKE PROVIDE SAME INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO GUATEMALAN ARMY FRONTIER STRENGTH.

3. AS RESULT CONVERSATIONS WITH COLS. SOSA AND ARRIAGA, IT APPEARS THAT GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES ARE MOVING FORWARD ON OWN INITIATIVE AND NEITHER OFFICER HAS AS YET MADE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR WOFACT ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH AS OPERATIONS DEVELOP, WOFACT MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE ASSISTANCE POSSIBLY IN FORM OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS OR TECHNICAL AIDS. FOR THE MOMENT, STATION WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHICH HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR TREASURY GUARD.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

LITEMPO PASSPORT CAMERA
FILM #179-180
14-21 NOV'66

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.	50	6	91	/6

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-30821
4. DATE 9 Dec 66
7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITEMPO
8. DATE OF INFO. 14-21 Nov.
9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST
6. DATE PROCESSED
10. DISSEMINATED IN
11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE
13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Carlos JURADO-Delmar- Mexican arrived Mexico City via Cubana flight 464 from Cuba on 21 November 1966.

Mentioned in manifest following Subject's name was the name, Carlos Alberto JURADO-Malacara- (Any relation?)

LIRING-3

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-798301

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-764704
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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, ~~[illegible]~~, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

AN [illegible] PI
PS [illegible]
WHC/ES
ABSTRACT X ~~INDEX~~

MEXI

SECRET 240029Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346

24 N[illegible] 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DEBRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

NNNN

AN 19 PI
~~PS~~ ~~[illegible]~~
WH/ES
ABS

WH/1 Records Officer - this should have been 201-798301.

201-798301
~~201-764704~~
24 Nov. 1966

217.- Entrada a las 1119hs.- HF Diego Leon Giraldo -colombiano- por su visa.- Araceli: que llame mañana.--- 230.

6091

252.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- HF para el pasaporte de Othón González.- Araceli: que llame en diez minutos.--- 260.

295.- Entrada a las 1146hs.- HF por Mirabal.- MD que no está.- HF que si Mirabal no dejó recado para Ramírez Pérez, - porque están esperando para la salida a Cuba para el día 14, alumnos de la Escuela Superior de Economía.- MD que llamen mañana para saber.-- Ramírez: que les urge hoy una solución. MD: que entonces dentro de una hora vuelva a llamar.-- 351

368.- Entrada a las 1205hs.- Rojas -de Cubana- por Curbelo, Abreu o Morabal.- MD que ninguno de ellos está, que llame - dentro de dos horas.-- MD es la Sra.de Cepero y le informa a Rojas de la enfermedad de Cepero.--- 398.

433.- Salida al 357900.- 1212hs.- MD la Sra.de Cepero con Almada.--- Almada que le diga a Cepero que llegó un cable para que viaje el 21 de noviembre a la Habana.--- MD pide una reservación para el vuelo del viernes para Gerardo Cantú.- ----- 437.

8 Nov 66

458.- Entrada a las 1245hs.- MF Marcela por Chichay.- MD -

50-6-75/4

HMMA 30549 14 Nov 66

LIRING-3
201-

Tres.- 118.- 8 noviembre 66.

fm 66

que ella ya no trabaja aquí porque se está preparando para entrar a la Universidad.- Marcela que Chichay le hizo un pedido de libros para enviar a Cuba y que ya se los están cobrando.---- 472.

473.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Salomón Swan.- Araceli que ya está.--- 486.

510.- Entrada a las 1324hs.- HF por la visa para Luis Sánchez Mondragón -mexicano- Araceli que no ha llegado.-- Sanchez que está solicitada desde septiembre.--- 592.

704.- Entrada a las 1431hs.- HF José Ramírez Perez por Mirabal.- HD que no se encuentra.- Ramírez: que quiere verlo - para las cuatro de la tarde.- HD que le pasará el recado.-- ---- 720.

. . . .

682. Entrada 1208.-Ignacio Sánchez Lo[illegible] pregunta al Viceconsul si llegó su permiso de regreso a Cuba y Miraval indica que nó.- 730.-

6086

730. Entrada.-HF pregunta por Chichay y HD informa que hoy no trabajó.- 739.-

739. Entrada equivocada.- 761.-

761. Entrada 1254.-Héctor Ramírez de Arellano pregunta si llegó su pasaporte nuevo y HD dice que sí.- 782.-

782. Entrada 1300.-El italiano Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y HD pide hable más tarde.- 814.-

814. Entrada 1346.- Botifol, el que habló en la mañana, pregunta cómo puede hacer para solicitar prórroga para sus padres, porque a su papá lo tienen que operar nuevamente y HD pide pase mañana al Consulado para pasar un cable. HF acepta.859.

859. Entrada 1359.-Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y HD dice que nó.- 880.-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3.-Ll1.- 7 Nov.66).- - - - - - - -

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148.- Entrada a las 1102hs.- Sámano, de Cubana pregunta que si el cónsul es Curbelo.- Jorrín que no, que es Mirabal.--- 151.

6094

158.- Entrada a las 1109hs.- MF con Jorrín le dice que con el muchacho que le va a mandar el papel que pidió que si le pueda mandar algo de literatura sobre Cuba porque él es simpatizante de los cubanos.- Jorrín: que sí, que lo que tenga se lo va a mandar.--- 169.

177.- Entrada a las 1115hs.- MF el diputado Alberto Orduña Culebro con Jorrín, le dice, que allá en la tierra de don Fidel hay una persona que necesita unas llantas y que el hermano de él le quiere mandar un juego de llantas -cinco llantas- por los conductos regulares, que si no hay alguna limitación a ese respecto.- Jorrín: que no, que las puede mandar por la Agencia General de Carga que está en Isabel la Católica 249.---- 193.

222.- Entrada a las 1200hs.- MF pregunta por Chichay.- Jorrín que ella ya no viene a trabajar a la embajada y que ella misma dijo que ya no iba a venir.- MF que se trata de unos libros.--- Que la va a localizar a su domicilio.--- 238. -- MF es Marcela Olguín.---

8 nov 66

247 .- Entrada a las 1210hs.- MF por el embajador Hernández Armas.- Jorrín que no está.- MF es el profesor González Ra-

Mexican
went to Cuba
for [illegible] Institute
HMMA 30549 14 Nov 66

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6841

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR , JMWAVE

20D[illegible] 62778

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY-9608 [illegible] *

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANTO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 20 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANIO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ , WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) PADILLA, WHO

SECRET

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 6841 SECRET **SECRET**

INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964

LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT.

INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME

FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. * RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

akc.

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DATE	16 December 1966	3		6	

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WHC/MO	1			WH/R	1		
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BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)

MEXICO CITY-9628
(IN-60597)
HMM-10908
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Liaison *

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S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS -314/15974-66

16 22 02 Z

DIST 16 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 14 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN PURCHASE OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (14 DECEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ HAS SPENT MORE THAN A MONTH IN MEXICO ON A SPECIAL COFFEE SEED BUYING MISSION FOR CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SUAREZ ARRIVED IN MEXICO 23 OCTOBER 1966 ASSIGNED AS AN ATTACHE IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY). WHEN SUAREZ FINALLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF TEN TONS OF SEED, HE FOUND UPON DELIVERY THAT THE MEXICANS HAD WET THE SEED AND THAT MOISTURE ACCOUNTED FOR ONE TON OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT. THIS DECEPTION REPRESENTED A LOSS OF $10,000.00 (U.S. DOLLARS) TO THE CUBANS.

2. SUAREZ SAID THAT CUBA WAS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS PRODUCTION OF COFFEE TO OFFSET LOSSES SUFFERED IN RECENT HURRICANES AND GENERALLY TO BUILD UP ITS CROP OF COFFEE FOR EXPORT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL HARD CURRENCY EXCHANGE.

3. DURING THE WEEK OF 18 DECEMBER SUAREZ PLANS TO VISIT COFFEE PLANTATIONS IN CHIAPAS STATE WHERE HE HOPES TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL SEED.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT SUAREZ HAS BOUGHT APPROXIMATELY 15 TONS OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED AND IS TRYING TO BUY MORE. THIS SOURCE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE MEXICANS HAD CHEATED THE CUBANS BY WETTING THE SEED TO INCREASE ITS WEIGHT. THE SEED IS BEING FLOWN TO HAVANA BY CUBANA AIRLINES. SUAREZ INSTRUCTED THE CUBANA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO TO ARRANGE TO HAVE THE SEED WELL AIRED AS SOON AS IT REACHES HAVANA.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, FBI, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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UNIT	TIME	BY

S E C R E T 162250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9634

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

16 DEC 66 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA
ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY
CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD
UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING
CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED
IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD
NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA,
NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH
ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH
SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES
ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY
UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ
TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS
HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

LIRING 3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE VR C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

S E C R E T 141930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9613 15Dec65 IN 59794

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 59022 PARA 2 *

COMPLETE TEXTS OF ALL PBRUMEN LIENVOY TRAFFIC POUCHED HQS ATTN: URQUHART REGULARLY. IN VIEW OF EXTENSIVE TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE COFFEE AND FERTILIZER SUGGEST THIS TEXT BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY. BOTH NAMES ARE USED IN TRANSCRIPTIONS.

S E C R E T

* SUGGEST COUNTER SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROUNTON - LIRING/3 MEETS

BT

SECRET

LIRING-3

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE VR, WH/CCG 8, MPS/RG 2, CI/CA

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612

ACTION

14 DEC 65 IN 59552

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

LIRING-3
201-798301

8

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, SOD6

S E C R E T 140320Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9608

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

14Dec 66 IN 58952

PBRUMEN LIRING

IN 58952

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 56841)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4340, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTENDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

Gilbert R. Sann

LIRING-3

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9633 S E C R E T

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ASSESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

S E C R E T

BT

MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UGWA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "ECHEMENDIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

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DATE : 8 December 1966

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CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/C/[illegible]/FR/OS
WH/COG/[illegible]
WH/COG/MO
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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SECRET 10 15 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58866

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

RYBAT LIRING

MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55864)

1. REF CONCERNS EFFORTS BY STATION MEXICO CITY TO INJECT LIRING-3 (IDEN) INTO CUBAN SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES MEXICO. LIRING-3 IS UNWITTING ANTI-[illegible] ASSET HANDLED BY SENIOR WOFACT STAFF AGENT, WILLIAM B. ROWTON, UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY. ROWTON PRETENDS BE GREEK BUSINESSMAN ALIAS NICK HARRIS WHO INTERESTED DEVELOPING LUCRATIVE SEMI-LEGAL BUSINESS DEALS WITH CUBA. LIRING-3 HAS MADE 3 TRIPS TO CUBA THIS CONNECTION. IN OCTOBER 1966 STATION SENT LIRING-3 INTO CUBAN [illegible] EMBASSY MEXICO CITY WITH AN THEN-UNDISCLOSED NEWS ARREST CUBAN DIPLOMAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ. AS RESULT CUBANS INVITED LIRING-3 CUBA DISCUSS SENSITIVE CUBAN ACTIVITIES BUT ON ARRIVAL MERELY GAVE HIM LOW LEVEL REQUIREMENTS.

2. MEXICO CITY 9512 AND DIRECTOR 56903 CONCERN RESULTS ABOVE TRIP AND LIRING-3's SUGGESTION TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED GO CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

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CITE DIRECTOR 58866

PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE ~~SETTING UP~~ ~~STAGE~~ CREATE NET-WORK FOR CUBANS. WC

END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)
WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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DATE : 9 December 1966

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TO GUATEMALA CITY
JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
[illegible] LIRING
DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY, EX CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, E SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECORD)
WH/COG/CICS ____

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

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W. J. Kaufman
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SECRET 092303Z CITE JMWAVE 4534

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

9 Dec 66 IN 56744

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF JMWAVE 4498 ([illegible]) ✓

AMOTS PROVIDED FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ: DURING BATISTA REGIME PARTICIPATED UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES WITH FATHER DIEGO MADRIGAL OF CARIDAD CHURCH. ONE ISMAEL SUAREZ WAS WITNESS FOR PROSECUTION IN DISMISSAL OF OTTO SIRGO FROM CUBAN ARTIS ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY STAGE PERFORMANCE. (REFS: BOHEMIA MAGAZINE EDITIONS OF 18 JAN 59, 7 AUG AND 21 AUG 60.)

✓ HIGH-LEVEL CASTRO COMMUNIS

SECRET

BT

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET 392055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9560 SD[illegible] 55884

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 9512 (IN 53867) #

B. DIRECTOR 56923

1. LIRING-~~2~~3 SAW JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT 1 DEC 66

AND ASKED FOR CONTACTS IN GUATEMALA COMMUNIST PART. JACOBO

GAVE HIM NAME AND PHONE NUMBER SENORA HERNANDEZ (FNU), IN

GUATEMALA CITY. AND SAID WOULD CABLE HER THAT LIRING-3 WOULD

CALL. KROWTON WILL OBTAIN PHONE NUMBER.) 20-057 LIRING -3 PROCEEDED BY

RAIL TO MEXICAN-GUATEMALAN BORDER 2-3 DEC AND CALLED HERNANDEZ

FROM MEXICAN SIDE. SHE PROMISED PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH

"IMPORTANT PERSON FROM COMPANY" AND ASKED HIM CALL BACK

EVENING 3 DEC OR NEXT MORNING, "SINCE COMPANY OFFICIAL NOT EASY

LOCATE ON SHORT NOTICE".

2. LIRING-3 PHONED HERNANDEZ MORNING 4 DEC AND WAS INFORMED

MEETING COULD NOT BE ARRANGED PRIOR 18 OR 20 DEC SINCE OFFICIAL

AWAY ON BUSINESS. HERNANDEZ SAID MEETING WOULD BE HELD

QUEZALTENANGO, GUAT., AND INSTRUCTED HIM CHECK IN ANY THREE

HOTELS THAT CITY AND THEY WOULD LOCATE HIM.

SECRET

Mrs. [illegible]

8

3. LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY 6 DEC AND RECONTACTED JACOBO REPORTING WHAT TRANSPIRED. JACOBO EXPLAINED DELAY IN MEETING AS NATURAL IN VIEW SECURITY PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS AND SURMISED COMMIE OFFICIAL WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL TO QUEZALTENANGO FROM MOUNTAINS. JACOBO SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHO REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE BUT HOPED WOULD BE FROM TURCIO GUERRILLA BAND. JACOBO SAID TURCIO HAD BEEN REPLACED BY CESAR MONTES WHO OLD FRIEND OF JACOBO. JACOBO PROMISED GIVE LIRNG-3 LETTER TO MONTES WHICH LIRING-3 COULD PRESENT TO PERSON SENT BY HERNANDEZ. LETTER WOULD ASK THAT LIRING-3 BE TAKEN TO MONTES.

4. LIRING-3 PLANS PROCEED QUEZALTENANGO 15 DEC. PER ROWTON INSTRUCTIONS WILL INFORM COMMIE REP OR MONTES HE HAS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT COMMERCIAL CONTACTS GUATEMALA CITY, HAS DISCUSSED GENERAL PLANS OF AID WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS, AND WANTS HELP REVOLUTION BY EXPLOITING UNWITTING COMMERCIAL CONTACTS PASS ARMS, ETC. ROWTON INPOSITION TIE LIRING-3 INTO ARVANITIS METALO-PLASTICS INDUSTRY GUATEMALA FOR COVER PURPOSES THROUGH STYLIANOS PREVOLIS, EMPLOYEE GREEK EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, WHO CLOSE FRIEND ARVANITIS AND COULD GIVE LIRING-3 LETTER INTRODUCTION IF REQUIRED.

SECRET

5. RE QUESTIONS POSED REF B: LIRING-3 DID NOT HEAR WHAT HAPPENED LOPEZ; HERRERA NEVER MATERIALIZED, WILL REQUESTION FOR DETAILS CAMPS AND LOCATIONS. ROWTON ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE THOUGHT ARNOL RODRIGUEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY DSE TO QUESTION HIM RE SOURCE HIS INFORMATION RE LOPEZ. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ IN NO WAY INTERROGATED HIM AND ASKED NO QUESTIONS BEYOND WHAT LIRING-3 TOLD HIM. LIRING -3 SAID HE IN HANDS FOUR SECURITY TYPES FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND THESE COULD HAVE INTERROGATED HIM HAD THEY DESIRED BUT APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ APPEARED KNOW NOTHING OF LOPEZ CASE.

SECRET *Re De Briefing Liring/3

BT

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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S E C R E T 291955Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9565

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

9 Dec 60 IN 56646

REF MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55884)*

PARA ONE REF LIRING 2 SHOULD BE LIRING 3.

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ORIG : J. [illegible]/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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SECRET 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY
JMWAVE VFG
PBRUMEN LIRING

ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ 2P (86)

POSSIBLE CUBAN GOVT SECURITY AGENT (1966)

AN / FI	
PS / REST	
ABSTRACT X	INDEX X

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UFGA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

MICROFILMED
JAN 06 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

LIRING-3
201-798301

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pm
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

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CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/COG/RR/O3
WH/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO EJClivocca
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

[redacted]

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W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ACTION WH/COG 8

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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 372228Z CITE JMWAVE 4498

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

7 DEC [illegible] 54946

TYPIC MHAPRON LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9508 (IN 53817)

1. STATION FILES CNTAIN FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA: ISMAEL SUAREZ WITH CODE NAME OF ECHEMENDIA REPORTED TO BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON IN CASTRO GOVERNMENT (UMWA-17, 11 SEPT 59). COMMUNIST; SECRETARY OF CONSTRUCTION; RESIDES SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS (UFGA-3240, 12 JAN 62). COMANDANTE ISMAEL SUAREZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA REPORTED AS ONE OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION DEPT IN CUBA (CS-3/479,278, 29 JUNE 61). ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA WAS FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF HAVANA BUS TERMINAL; AS OF EARLY 63 HELD POSITION OF CHIEF OF BASIC SERVICE OF TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY (CUBAN REFUGEE, PEDRO LOPEZ CHAVIANO, 4 APR 63). ADMINISTRATOR OF CONSOLIDATED ENTERPRISE FOR TRANSPORT BY OMNIBUS (UFG-2997, 10 JUNE 63).

2. AMOT TRACES PENDING. WILL FORWARD ANY ADDITIONAL AVAILABLE INFO.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

201-748301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 071940Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9537

ACTION

7 DEC 63 54834

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9512

CORRECT MATRONYMIC PARA TWO NEXT LAST SENTENCE REF TO PADILLA.

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 6 December 1966

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-134/1

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SECRET 6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO [redacted]

MEXICO CITY

[illegible] [illegible] LIRING-3

VIEW SUCH SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

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C/WH/1

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S E C R E T 061850Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9512

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 Dec 66 IN 53867

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 56923

1. RE PARA ONE REF, HQS ASSUMPTION CORRECT. LIRING-3 TOOK SON BY FORMER MARRIAGE WITH HIM AND BOTH RETURNED. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT WHEN HE DELAYED BY EMBASSY HE TOLD CEPEDA HE TAKING SON ALONG AS HOSTAGE TO PROVE GOOD INTENTIONS. CEPEDA PROTESTED THIS NOT NECESSARY BUT LIRING-3 TOOK SON ANYWAY.

2. RE PARA FOUR REF, LIRING-3 DEPARTED FOR CHIAPAS 1 OR 2 DEC 66 FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT CANDIDATES AS POSSIBLE SMUGGLING CHANNELS. HAD TALK WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILIA PRIOR DEPARTURE BUT ILLNESS ROWTON DID NOT ALLOW HIM GET RESULTS MEETING. LIRING-3/ WILL RETURN ABOUT TEN DEC.

3. RE PARA SEVEN REF, LIRING-4 NOT WORKING BUT STATES INTENTION ENTERING UNAM FOR COURSE ANTHROPOLOGY NEXT SEMESTER. OTHER QUESTIONS POSED PARA SEVEN WILL BE ANSWERED UPON RETURN L-3 FROM CHIAPAS.

4. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ROWTON'S DEBRIEFING L-3.

S E C R E T

BT

Re HQS INTEREST IN INFO CONCERNING LIRING/4 CURRENT STATUS

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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S E C R E T 051720Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

6 DEC 66 IN 53817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9523 S E C R E T

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

S E C R E T

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8 R/AN

MEXICO CITY 9508 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 53817 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : MR BELT WH/COG — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : MR STEWART WH — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

LIRING-3

201-798301

8

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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S E C R E T 051722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9528

6 Dec 66 IN 53817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTEP IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

Ismael SUAREZ – 201-257780   UMWA-00017 11 Sept 67
represented by DIAZ as highly important person
in FOC.

8

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9538 SECRET

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]

4. Please forward any Station traces on Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez or Professora [illegible] for Headquarters files. It is suggested that [illegible]-1 might be able to develop a channel to SOTO should the Station wish to follow up the matter through him.

Andrew F. MERTON

ORIG : Jack Stewart/nao ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 3654 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 1 December 1966 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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SECRET 2 23 44 Z CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9371 (IN 46965)*

1. PER STATION REQUEST PARA 12 REF, HQS OFFERS FOLLOWING COMMENTS: SUDDEN SWITCH FROM SERIOUS SENSITIVE PROJECTS ENVISIONED FOR LIRING-3 BY CUBAN EMBASSY (SUCH AS IMPLIED PARA 3 MEXI 8944 FOR EXAMPLE) TO RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS COULD, AS STATION OF COURSE AWARE, BE ONE OF SEVERAL NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS CUBANS MIGHT TAKE THIS CASE. ANOTHER WOULD BE TRANSFER OF LIRING-4 TO LESS SENSITIVE JOB OR DISMISS ALTOGETHER, AS APPARENTLY OCCURRED. ALSO, SEEMS INCREDIBLE CUBAN SECURITY WOULD NOT QUESTION L-3 IN DETAIL ON SOURCE HIS INFO LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, TO WHOM L-3 SPENT THREE HOURS EXPLAINING DETAILS LOPEZ CASE, MIGHT BE DEBRIEFING L-3 BY SPECIAL REQUEST CUBAN SECURITY. LATTER, IF TRUE, WOULD GO FAR EXPLAIN GREAT EASE WITH WHICH L-3 ABLE OBTAIN SEVERAL VISAS GO CUBA THROUGH RODRIGUEZ. IN THIS CONNECTION,

the latter confirmed [illegible] the DSE had been [illegible] Nuevo — to debrief April 67 & latest reports

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PAGE TWO

NOTE IN SCMEXI 873 THAT VISA ALSO GRANTED FOR PERSON WITH SAME NAME AS L-3 EXCEPT DIFFERENT MATRONYMIC (POSSIBLY SON BY FORMER MEXICAN WIFE?). NOTE THAT 6 NOV AIR MANIFEST SHOWS TRAVEL TO CUBA AND GIVES SAME MEXICO ADDRESS FOR BOTH. WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW IF BOTH RETURNED MEXI 21 NOV AND WHAT EXPLANATION MIGHT BE.

2. GIVEN COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS AND ASSUMING STRONG CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST IN CASE, BELIEVE GOOD POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT LIRING-3 HAS IDENTIFIED HIS "CONTACTS" TO CUBANS AT LEAST IN PART AS GREEK BUSINESSMAN LOOKING FOR SERIOUS AND LUCRATIVE CUBAN TRADE WHO SOMEHOW HAD INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS REQUEST FROM RODRIGUEZ/SECURITY TO TEST HIS CONTACT BY SEEING IF HE COULD PRODUCE.

3. WITH REGARD ACTION SUGGESTED PARA 10 REF, HQS CONCURS STATION'S PLAN SEND L-3 BACK INTO CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY BUT WOULD SUGGEST L-3 PLAY DUMB ON WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED CUBA AND USE VISIT ONLY FOR OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE DELIVERING MESSAGE TO RODRIGUEZ VIA AMBASSADOR AND ROA PER PARA 8 REF. MESSAGE WOULD

(CONTINUED)

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TO

PAGE THREE

ASK RODRIGUEZ FOR CLARIFICATION TERMS WEED-KILLER, AMOUNTS DESIRED, ADVISE WHAT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MEXI, ETC. MESSAGE COULD ALSO EXPRESS L-3'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT MISSION GIVEN HIM SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED, BUT WOULD SHOW HIS GOOD FAITH BY FOLLOWING THROUGH AS CUBANS SUGGESTED. IN KEEPING THESE SENTIMENTS ROWTON AND L-3 CAN GO THROUGH MOTIONS ATTEMPTING FIND INTERESTED PARTIES, ASCERTAINING AVAILABILITY, GETTING TERMS, AND, OF COURSE, OFFERING LEGITIMATE EXCUSES FOR INABILITY CONSUMMATE DEALS LATER ON. TO AVOID STEPPING NOTICEABLY OUT OF BELLIGERENT CHARACTER, L-3 CAN STILL WAX XXXXXXXXX INDIGNANT ABOUT LOPEZ DIAZ XXXXXX STUPIDITY, ETC. BELIEVE THIS COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT PRESERVE VARIOUS EQUITIES INVOLVED.

4. AGAIN TO SHOW L-3'S GOOD FAITH, BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD NOT TRY PRESENT CIENFUEGOS READY-TO-OPERATE SUBVERSION NETWORK, BUT IN INTEREST IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SMUGGLING CHANNELS SEE NO OBJECTION L-3 CONTACTING JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA OR MAKING TRIP

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TO

PAGE FOUR

TO CHIAPAS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIM ASSESSMENT ONLY POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. DO NOT BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD ATTEMPT SIMILAR TASK ACROSS GUAT BORDER VIEW CURRENT SITUATION THERE.

5. HQS HAS NUMEROUS TRACES JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA (201-210804), GUATEMALAN PAINTER, NOT ACTIVE IN COMMUNIST PARTY WHO MARRIED TO LETICIA NAJARRO, RECENTLY EXPELLED FROM GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY BOTH RESIDING MEXICO (DOI 1957).

6. FYI, MACHINE RUNS SHOW FOLLOWING TRAVEL L-3 BETWEEN MEXI AND CUBA:

A. DEC 63 TO CUBA. B. NOV 64 TO CUBA. C. JAN 65 TO MEXI WITH FAMILY. D. MAY 66 TO CUBA. E. JUNE 66 TO MEXI. F. 19 AUG 66 TO CUBA WITH FAMILY. G. 29 AUG 66 TO MEXI. H. 18 SEPT 66 TO MEXI (FAMILY ONLY).

7. HQS INTERESTED IN ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF AND WHEN ACQUIRED:

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TO SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 52903

TO

PAGE FIVE

A. WHERE LIRING-4 WORKING NOW? STILL IN EMBASSY?

B. RESULTS OF L-3 PLANNED CONTACT WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA?

C. DID L-3 EVER HEAR WHAT HAPPENED TO JULIO LOPEZ DIAZ AFTER HIS RETURN CUBA?

D. DID FNU HERRERA (PERSON WHO WAS TO MEET L-3 IN HAVA) EVER MATERIALIZE? DETAILS?

E. ANY WAY GETTING L-3 TO PROVIDE MORE DETAIL AND LOCATE CAMPS HE VISITED ON MAP WITHOUT OVERSTRAINING ROWTON COVER?

F. ALL POSSIBLE DETAILS L-3 3-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH RODRIGUEZ ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE, ESPECIALLY THOSE INDICATING FORMAL CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

* Gave LIRING-3 report of his visit to Havana and requested comments on proposals to send LIRING-3 back into Cuban Embassy Mexico City and for him to make contacts for possible subversive net.

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TO SECRET INFO CITE DIR

CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO

PAGE SIX

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WH/COG/[redacted]

WH/2/G

Thomas Polgar

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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7 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR LIRING-3 FILE

SUBJECT: OOA Expenditures for LIRING-3 Ops as of 1 November 1966

REFERENCE: HMMT 7306 9 November 1966

Following are Subject Expenditures:

23 October	$495.86	Medbery/Rowton Ops	LIRING-3 Op
25 October	$ 87.16	Medbery/Rowton Ops Expenses	LIRING Op October
25 October	$500.00	Medbery/Ops Payment	LIRING Travel PBRUMEN
26 October	$120	Medbery/Ops Payment	Safehouse LIRING Op October/November

Liring-3 file

[illegible] – 8

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION **SECRET**

LIRING/3

ORIG. Virginia B. Flynn;eb
UNIT WH/COG/RR
EXT. 3483
DATE 30 November 1966

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TDCS DB-315/03581-66

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/COG 13

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, CI/OPS, WH 13

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

DATE DISTRIBUTED
30 November 1966

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-9398 (IN-47895)
HMM-10866
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RR	6	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/R	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	WH/1/R	3
WHC/CI	1			WH/MEXI	1
WHC/MO	1	E/IB/R	1		
WHC/SI	1	E/MADR	1		

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

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WH/1/R C. Bounds (in draft)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
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RELEASING OFFICER
L. M. Harding
C/WH/COG/RR

COPY NO.

(05-20-66-67)

FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

• ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -47895

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

FBI INS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS DB-315/03581-66

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 30 NOVEMBER 1966

30 17 20 Z

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 4 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE STAFF AND GUESTS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (21 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO. HMM-10866

SOURCE MEXICAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN DIPLOMATS IN MEXICO CITY. HE IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE.

1. ON 4 NOVEMBER 1966, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY RECEIVED AN ORDER FROM HAVANA THAT ONLY THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FAMILY, THE CODE CLERK AND HIS FAMILY, AND ONE OTHER OFFICER, INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY MOST PROBABLY, WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. BEFORE THIS ORDER WAS RECEIVED, SEVERAL BACHELOR OFFICERS OR OFFICIALS, WHOSE FAMILIES WERE STILL IN CUBA, HAD BOARDED AND LODGED IN THE EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO THE RECENT ORDER, BOARD WILL BE PROVIDED ONLY TO THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE NOW ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.

2. THE ORDER ALSO SPECIFIED THAT ONLY CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) MEMBERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAY IN THE EMBASSY WHILE IN MEXICO. ALL OTHER VISITORS WILL BE OBLIGED TO SEEK PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.

3. IN ADDITION, THE ORDER SET UP NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE HIRING OF MEXICANS TO WORK IN THE EMBASSY. MEXICANS MAY BE EMPLOYED ONLY AS SERVANTS. CHAUFFEURS AND SECRETARIES WILL NOW BE SENT FROM CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

[redacted]

ORIG:	TJFlores/yb
UNIT:	C/WH/COG
EXT:	3481
DATE:	28 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S E C R E T

#137

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

DISSEM BY 28 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE DO4 pp/a3 WH/COG 8

(CLASSIFICATION) S E C R E T

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 30 22 06 Z

DIRECTOR

(ELITE) (PICA)

(REFERENCE NUMBER) IN-46964-B

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

6 PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9370 (IN 46964 AND 46964-A) to DOST/ NEW YORK ~~DOMESTIC OPERATIONS~~ FOR INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

Fluornoy

EUGENE P. OMEARA
C/DO/cp 28-16

RELEASING OFFICER 1630

DO/WH Frank A. Tertz

TJFlores for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 46

SECRET

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4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 22

ACTION

WH/COG8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, ADDP, DDP, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, FI/SPG, IW, CS/DO7, DDI, D/OCI-2, D/ONE, FIR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

INTEL TYPIC

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #115 **SECRET**

ORIG. A. K. Carley;sm
UNIT WH/C/RR
EXT. 3483
DATE 28 November 1966

ROUTING			
1		4	
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WH/C 11

TDCS-314/14998-66

INFORMATION COPIES
CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED
28 November 1966

PRECEDENCE
☒ ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXICO CITY-9370
(IN-46964)
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

		WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1	WH/R	1		
WHC/RR	3	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1	WH/1/R	2		
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1			WH/MEXI	1		
WHC/CI	1	WHC/CA/EW1				WH/PACY(CINCSO)			1
WHC/MO	1								

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF	STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR	

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
PR Olson
DC/WH/C/RR

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/1/R - Mr. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH/C/RR

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)
GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

LIRING/3-Prod

FORM 12-62 1R-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-20-44-67)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -46964

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXX USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

REPCINCLANT FBI I&NS

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S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS-314/14998-66

20 20 53 Z

DIST 28 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI 25 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT REPORTED OUSTER OF CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER CARRILLO

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (25 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELLING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ANTONIO CARRILLO CARRERAS, WHO WAS APPOINTED CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER IN JUNE 1966, WAS OUSTED FROM THIS POSITION BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ ON 24 NOVEMBER 1966.

2. AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER, HE WAS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE. IN HIS NEW CAPACITY, HE REPLACED TWO VICE-MINISTERS, PELEGRIN TORRAS DE LA LUZ AND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS. CARRILLO HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO THIS POSITION WITH THE SPECIFIC MISSION OR REORGANIZING AND REVITALIZING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS ABROAD. HOWEVER, CASTRO HAD BECOME DISSATISFIED WITH

CARRILLO'S PERFORMANCE AND LACK OF ACTION. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHO HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS CARRILLO'S REPLACEMENT.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM C SSEM BX22

ACTION C/WH/COG5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6 C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/SPG C/CI/PS C/CS/SGO C/SID3 C/DO4, C/DO/H3

S E C R E T 261845Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9371

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

26 NOV 63 IN 46965

REF: MEXICO CITY 9346 (IN45539) *

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON HE MET WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS ON REF TRIP BUT RESULTS SOMEWHAT LESS THAN HOPED FOR POSSIBLY DUE NAIVE MANNER WHICH LIRING-3 PRESENTED HIS PLANS TO CIENFUEGOS.

2. ACTIONS LIRING STAFF AS LIRING-3 LEFT FOR HAVANA SEEMED INDICATE CUBANS NOT READY FOR LIRIMNG-3 VISIT. LIRING-3 OBTAINED OWN VISA PRIOR DEPARTURE THROUGH FRIEND IN HAVANA, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, AND MADE PLANS DEPART 4 NOV. THAT DAY, HOWEVER, EMBASSY TOLD HIM VISA NOT COMPLETE, NEEDED SIGNATURE, AND HE UNABLE DEPART. LIRING-3 INDIGNANTLY TOLD REGINALDO CEPEDA CUBANS DID NOT TRUST HIM SINCE THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. LIRING-3 TOLD AMBASSADOR HE LEAVING NEXT PLANE, 6 NOV, OR WOULD NOT GO AT ALL. IN PROCESS LIRING-4, ANGRY OVER APPARENT STALLING, WENT STORMING TO AMBASSADOR CLAIMING THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. STATION BELIEVES THIS PARTLY REASON LIRING-4 NO LONGER WORKING INCONSULATE.

SECRET

Crest dist

where working now?

LIENVOY - Have phone [illegible] in cypher?

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9371 S E C R E T

3. EMBASSY ALLOWED LIRING-3 DEPART 6 NOV BUT WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM. UPON ARRIVAL HAVANA, LIRING-3 MET AT AIRPORT NOT BY HERRERA AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BY CEPEDA BUT BY FOUR UNIFORMED SECURITY OFFICERS. THEY CHATTED AMICABLY WITH HIM ON INSIGNIFICANT MATTERS AND TRIED FOUR HOTELS IN ATTEMPT FIND HIM PLACE STAY. EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL. FINALLY LIRING-3 SUGGESTED HE STAY WITH HONDURAN FRIEND RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, SECURITY OFFICERS AGREED AND HE SETTLED THERE.

NR 100

(Called [illegible] (Trace 3) [illegible] Visa A25 8 Nov 66. Havana, per MEXI 8189 [illegible] 73260 [illegible] file

4. NEXT MORNING FOUR OFFICERS RETURNED AND TOOK LIRING-3 TO FINCA IN PINAR DEL RIO. PLACE FILLED WITH AMERICAN ARMS AND MEN AND WOMEN DRESSED IN COMBAT CLOTHES UNDERGOING PARAMILITARY TRAINING. HE SHOWN OTHER SIMILAR FINCAS, ONE TO WHICH HE LIFTED BY HELICOPTER IN CAMAGUAY AND ANOTHER TO WHICH HE HIKED 20 KILOMETERS. HE GIVEN NO EXPLANATION FOR TOUR AND ON 10 OR 11 NOV HE RETURNED TO OCHOA HOME.

5. 14 NOV LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO HAD BEEN ON WEEK LONG TRIP CAMAGUAY. LIRING-3 SAID HE SPENT THREE HOURS TELLING RODRIGUEZ DETAILS LOPEZ CASE AND EXPLAINING HE HAD PLAN FORM HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK WHICH WOULD ASSIST PERFORM CLANDESTINE SUBVERSIVE MISSIONS FOR

SECRET

CUBA AS REQUIRED. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE THOUGHT THIS MAGNIFICENT IDEA. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 HE READY TRAVEL NEXT DAY. ON 15 NOV HE TOOK LIRING-3 IN OWN PLANE TO CAMAGUAY FINCA WHERE CIENGUEGOS SPENDING MOST HIS TIME.

6. AT FINCA LIRING-3 MET CIENFUEGOS WITH RODRIGUEZ AND FOURTH MAN, FAT, SQUAT, WHO LIRING-3 ASSUMED BE CIENFUEGOS SECRETARY. CIENFUEGOS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR LIRING-3 OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND STATED CUBA INTERESTED EXPORTING SUBVERSION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN TO HARASS UNITED STATES. LIRING-3 THEN EXPLAINED HIS PLAN ORGANIZE HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK ASSIST THIS ACTIVITY BUT CIENFUEGOS DID NOT TAKE BAIT STATING CUBANS TRUSTED LIRING-3 BUT NOT HIS CONTACTS OF WHOM KNEW NOTHING. CIENFUEGOS SAID SUBVERSION SERIOUS AND COMPLICATED BUSINESS AND THAT ONE UNTRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF LINK COULD BLOW ENTIRE EFFORT. RODRIGUEZ SUGGESTED LIRING-3 BE GIVEN POSSIBILITY TEST SINCERITY HIS CONTACTS. SAID CUBA WOULD PAY DOLLARS FOR MUCH NEEDED WEED KILLER BUT WOULD RATHER BARTER FOR NICKEL ORE. ASKED LIRING-3 SHOW WHAT HIS CONTACTS COULD DO THIS MATTER. LIRING-3 NOT ASKED IDENTIFY CONTACTS.

why Cubans
trade L-3?
[illegible] good
for commercial
use - L-3 went
from [illegible]

7. LIRING-3 SOMEWHAT STUNNED BY LET-DOWN DID NOT ASK

SECRET

SPECIFICS RE NICKEL ORE OR WEED KILLER. ROWTON HAS EXPLORED MATTERS SLIGHTLY AND FOUND NICKEL ORE ALREADY BEING OFFERED IN MEXICO BY OTHERS. MEXICAN-MADE WEED KILLER AVAILABLE THOUGH NOT YET SURE IT NOT MADE FROM U.S. PATENTS. STILL EXPLORING ALONG WITH PROBLEMS OF EXPORT.

If so, only Cubans being difficult — do they want U.S. product or something

8. END MEETING WITH CIENFUEGOS, RODRIGUEZ GAVE LIRING-3 FOLLOWING COMMO PLAN: WRITE LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ, PUT IT IN ENVELOPE BEARING RODRIGUEZ NAME ON OUTSIDE, PLACE THIS ENVELOPE IN SECOND ADDRESSED TO RAUL ROA GARCIA AND GIVE TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR MEXICO.

i.e. deal directly with [illegible]

9. LIRING-3 TREATMENT CUBA MAY BE RESULT CUBANS TAKING SECOND LOOK AT PROPOSITION USING MEXICAN ASSIST IN GUNRUNNING TO CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY SO SOON AFTER LOPEZ CASE. THEIR EFFORTS STALL HIS DEPARTURE MEXICO CITY 4 NOV MAY HAVE BEEN ON ORDERS FROM DISCOURAGE TRIP ALTOGETHER.

It could be wrong all but some report said would like arms for Central America [illegible] from Mexico

10. AS FIRST COUNTER MEASURE AND IN KEEPING HIS PERSONALITY PLAN SEND LIRING-3 BACK INTO EMBASSY, AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM RODRIGUEZ TO CONFRONT LIRING-2 OR CEPEDA WITH DEMAND TO KNOW WHAT CUBANS PULLING ON HIM. WOULD POINT OUT HE SENT HAVANA ON SERIOUS MISSION OF SENSITIVE POLITICAL NATURE AND GIVEN TOUR OF FARMS AND REQUIREMENT FOR WEED KILLER. WOULD

14-00000

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 9371 SECRET SECRET

EXPRESS DISGUST AT WAY CUBA TREATS DEDICATED FRIEND OF REVOLUTION. PLAN ALSO CONTINUE EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES SUPPLYING REQUIRED WEED KILLER FROM MEXICO. HAVE NO INTENTION INTRODUCING LIRING-3 INTO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR CUBANS BUT THIS ONE EFFORT WOULD SHOW GOOD FAITH. PLAN ALSO HAVE LIRING-3 WRITE RODRIGUEZ STATING HE DISAPPOINTED MISSION GIVEN SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED.

11. LIRING-3 ALSO SUGGESTS TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED TRAVEL CHIPAS WHERE HE FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND WHERE HE CLAIMS HAVE GOOD CONTACTS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. ROWTON WILL GET IDENTIFICATION. WOULD ALSO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALA FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH THEM IN MEXICO. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT OF 24 NOV TO DEVELOP MORE GUAT CONTACTS. ONCE HE HAS CHECKED CONTACTS COULD PRESENT TO CIENFUEGOS AS NETWORK READY TO OPERATE.

If Rodriguez [illegible] [illegible]

12. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS.

SECRET SEEING FOR CFN.

BT

* PENDING TAPE OF MEETING

SECRET

NEW CONTACT.

Traces requested 1000, 21 Nov

(15 hit) + 201-210804

Guat 6745 in 48570

Guat [illegible]
[illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

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FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 240005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346 24 NOV 63 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DEBRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

CKH

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHC/ES	25	NOV	66	
2. WH/C06/CI/S				
3. FA				
4. BC				
5. WH/C06/FI/TC				
6.				
7.				
8.				

C/S/catt

TO TSD 29NOV66

Only 1 cy of attachment sent to TSD 19 Dec 66 via memo.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMKNOB/LIRING/Letter from LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Reference: Mexico City 9111

1. A copy of a letter written by LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1 as set forth in reference is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. As pointed out, LIRING-1 used LIRING-3's old address as a return and when the letter was not delivered to AMKNOB-1 in Madrid it eventually was returned to LIRING-3 in Mexico City.

3. LIRING-3 mentioned the letter to Wallace B. ROWTON and later loaned it to him. Due to the relationship between LIRING-3 and ROWTON it is not possible for ROWTON to retain the letter and he will return the original to LIRING-3.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER att 29 NOV 66
See note above. To: TSD

Distribution:
2 - DCWH/C w/att
1 - C/WHD w/o att 1cc To WH/1
5 - FILES

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 22 NOV 66

RING-3

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-30583

DATE: 17 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: LIRING-3 201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NIR NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

MICROFILMED
DEC 7 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT
LIRING/OPERATIONAL/PRQ Part II on LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA 30540 of 10 November 1966

1. A PRQ Part II for LIRING-3 is being forwarded under separate cover. It is to be noted that LIRING-3 has not been recruited in the name of WOFACT, but instead is engaged in clandestine activities for Wallace B. ROWTON, who LIRING-3 believes is a Greek businessman with international connections who requires economic, political and personality information in order to conduct his business.

2. The fact that LIRING-3 is not aware of his WOFACT connection, at the present time, outweights the value which would accrue were an attempt made to make him knowledgeable. He performs clandestinely for ROWTON and he is actually attacking priority targets. In this way he works against the target with a clear conscience and his left-wing sentiments are not threatened.

3. The operation is moving, however, toward the eventual full recruitment of LIRING-3, but it is moving slowly in that direction because of the political and social beliefs of Subject. One advantage of this false flag recruitment of this individual, at the present time, is the fact that he is able to enter the target area without fear of capture and exposure as an enemy agent. Under the present plan of operation he believes his work actually is aiding the revolution which he believes in from an idealistic standpoint.

Frank C. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ II UNDER SEPARATE COVER (3 cys) BY RI/AH
Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
2 - FILES

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-79353

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30584	25 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 7 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

-57

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, b, 13b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items. If information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM
[illegible]

2. PSEUDONYM

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

[illegible] Newton first met Subject on [illegible] April, [illegible], at the Salon de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle Havre 7, Mexico City, under alias (Nicolas Harris, Greek businessman), on the pretext that he was interested in arranging for Subject to paint a mural for a night-club in New York City. The approach was cold and subject did not question Newton's bona fides either as a Greek or international businessman visiting Mexico as a tourist. This first meeting led to social contact with Subject and wife.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could easily be turned over to a friend or business associate of Newton who could pose as a (non-American) third country national, preferably a Greek, Frenchman or an Italian. If [illegible] [illegible] could be indicated at this point.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

[illegible]

CS COPY

FORM 7-59 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (4-20)

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SECTION II — MOTIVATION AND CONTROL

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use State comment such as "anti-communist.")*

Subject is now [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] reasons. He has become [illegible] for [illegible] of [illegible] com [illegible] active [illegible]

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

In his relations with the Cubans and to a [illegible] the [illegible] Subject has accepted [illegible] direction from [illegible] he knows almost nothing. He realizes that if [illegible] his close connection with [illegible] it would be [illegible]

SECTION III — COVER

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

Social [illegible] professional [illegible] Subject [illegible]

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

Social and [illegible]

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

[illegible]

SECTION IV — INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

[illegible]

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[illegible]

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

None [illegible]

SECTION V — COLLABORATION POTENTIAL

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

[illegible] countries. [illegible] China.

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SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

[illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] of interest [illegible] [illegible] to officials of [illegible] in [illegible] office [illegible] City.

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from social contacts with Cubans in Mexico City and Havana and through his wife, an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing. Subject appears to assume that Lawson retains the information for his personal use.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is being used as agent to penetrate (unwittingly) the DGI and the Tricontinental (LAAAPSO) Organization in Havana and Central America.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is also being used to pass controlled information on an unwitting basis to the Cubans in Mexico City and Havana.

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY; AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is unwitting of an Agency interest in Subject.

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SECTION IX.	**QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS**

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

Subject is [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible].

SECTION X	**COMMITMENTS**

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject has been paid on a spot [illegible] to date. It is proposed to pay Subject a regular salary of 3,000 [illegible] per month in addition [illegible].

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None. Subject is interested in travel and Houston has exploited this by indicating that he may be able to arrange interesting trips for Subject if business developed [illegible] to justify such trav-

SECTION XI	**CE AND SECURITY**

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.	4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible] of his life to [illegible] and artistic [illegible] somewhat anti-social. [illegible] [illegible]

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

[illegible] (one of [illegible]) [illegible] Subject's [illegible].

SECTION XII	**SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS**

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS: GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

[illegible] Subject does not appear to [illegible].

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SECTION XIII **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION XIV **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

[illegible] through [illegible] files.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

[illegible] problems foreseen at [illegible] time. Subject is unwitting of [illegible] interest or contact, and [illegible] has not made long-term commitments in his personal and business contacts.

SECTION XV **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W. WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

[illegible] could [illegible] subject's home. [illegible], or [illegible] [illegible] should reply: "No, but I have heard [illegible]".

SECTION XVI **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject is unwitting of [illegible] interest or connections. [illegible] has [illegible] been [illegible], [illegible] himself states, for Newton and [illegible] personal decision to [illegible] Newton's guidance in his relations [illegible] the [illegible]. Subject has never asked Newton for personal details of his (Newton's) life, including his permanent or temporary address. Subject apparently feels that through Newton he will acquire relative[illegible] financial security and be able to travel and eventually improve his art.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/LIRING/Review of LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
FYI

Attached is an operational review of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. Attention is also called to PRQ Parts I and II. Part I was sent as HMMA 30540 and part II is being prepared for pouching.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIRING-3 Review HEREWITH

Distribution:
② - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/att
3 - FILES

LIRETAIL OPS
50-6-137/3

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	HMMA-30585	16 November 1966	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/KAPOK	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 November, 1966.

Subject: Review and Assessment of LIRING Operation.

I. Background, Character and Assessment of LIRING/3:

1. Liring/3 (Subject) is a 36-year-old Mexican artist of the Diego Rivera School and an atheistic existentialist oriented toward the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, with relatively strong leftist political convictions. He has produced a fair amount of painting and had relatively good success in murals both in Cuba and Mexico, but has not succeeded in selling many of his works, despite numerous expositions, sponsored by the Mexican Government plastic arts organization (Bellas Artes). Because of his family, educational and environmental background, Subject feels that his work has not been appreciated for its intrinsic worth by the Mexican Government and tends to blame his political convictions for this lack of acceptance. Subject, however, has, as he himself asserts, no feelings of bitterness or resentment, although he frequently experiences the "anguish, forelornness and lonliness" of the existentialist, but he has not permitted himself to degenerate into a beatnik either in his personal or artistic life. Subject has confided to Rowton that he has no real friends and that he has withdrawn from society, the dictates of which he cannot accept. He enjoys the prospect of travel, especially abroad, "to develop his art" but also as an escape from the pressures and obligations of the social life he has been forced to lead in Mexico.

2. Shortly after he met Rowton, in April, 1966, Subject confessed that he felt himself at a critical point in his personal and artistic life. He indicated that he felt the paradoxes inherent in his philosophy were overwhelming and depressing him and that he welcomed friendship with Rowton, an experienced foreigner whom he felt he could trust implicitly. At one critical point, Subject quit his rather tedious job with the Ministry of Education (teaching art in a public school) with the comment that "everyone must make personal decisions and take risks, and I have decided to throw my lot in with you (Rowton) for better or worse, and so have quit the job since it was interfering with my availability". This he did without knowing any more about Rowton than his name, which technical surveillance revealed he did not accept as a true name, and with no guarantees of future financial support from Rowton. Rowton, in his conversations with Subject, has been careful not to reveal any data concerning his personal life and background, including his permanent or local address, providing Subject only with the number of a telephone answering service, and using the safehouse rented by Subject as a principal point of contact. Subject has accepted money from Rowton, at first only for previously approved expenses, and subsequently for his personal use, but has accepted Rowton's initiative in this matter, and made no demands on Rowton for remuneration for services rendered. He has been meticulous in accounting for funds and shown no reluctance to sign receipts presented to him by Rowton (with his true-name signature). Subject has confessed (and shown) an almost complete lack of experience in business and intelligence work, but has accepted Rowton's guidance, where required, without hesitation.

Att. to HMMA-20585 CS COPY 201-798301

3. Subject, in his political outlook, is left of center, with a history of revolutionary activity in Cuba from 1961 until his return to Mexico in 1964. Subject has insisted to Rowton that, because of his (existentialist) philosophy, he has never permitted himself to join any organization, including the communist party, although he has given moral and material suport to revolutionary movements both in Cuba and [illegible] Mexico. Subject has confessed his disillusionment with many of the revolutionary leaders in Cuba and with all of the Mexican leaders, remarking that sooner or later "the real" revolution will come to Mexico to eliminate the corruption and injustice that prevails throughout the country. Subject, however feels that in the meantime he must live under a more practical philosophy of daily life and is willing to make the necessary compromises to assist Rowton in his busines affairs. Subject has shown no reluctance to exploit his friends, and even his wife, to be of specific service to Rowton, and has, on numerous occasions, volunteered to do so with Rowton's approval. This appears to Rowton to be a reflection of the existentialist conviction that his philosophy gives him freedom to choose without dependency, obligation or justification.

4. Rowton is aware that Subject is currently undergoing a decisive climacteric, the future direction of which is not as yet certain. Rowton has succeeded in making Subject compromise a great deal with his past ideals particularly concerning deep involvement with other people and acceptance of financial support for purely business transactions, and for this reason has hesitated to uncover for Subject any of the mystery surrounding his own life and activites. Subject dislikes "northamericans" and considers life in the U.S., with which he is not familiar from experience, as corrupt and decadent. Rowton feels that he can eventually break down Subject's prejudice, if this proves to be necessary and worthwhile, but it would be fatal at this time for Rowton to reveal his WOLAW [redacted] and [redacted] connections. Subject is, in his own words, completely confident of Rowton's good will toward him and is, at least for the moment, totally dependent upon him for WOFACT guidance as well as financial support. Any attempt at direct recruitment for [redacted] at this point would, in Rowton's opinion be counterproductive. In his various contacts with the Cubans thus far, particularly his current visit to Havana on what appears to be an IS briefing, Subject can in all respects act naturally, without the feeling that he is concealing anything from his Cuban friends, simply because he is unwitting of Rowton's true affiliations and intentions. If he were witting, he would appear to all concerned to be suffering from a severe psychological crisis, and certainly would not be in a good position to produce useful information or inspire confidence. Subject is under some strain as a result of his current relationship with Rowton in his capacity as an international bourgeois businessman, a fact attested to by his wife to Rowton on 7 November when she expressed concern over Subject's recent moodiness and lack of interest in painting. Subject has also become involved in a love affair with one of his rich art students, a Mexican woman who is known to visit Subject at the safehouse.

5. In summation Rowton feels that Subject is excellent potential agent material, both because of his background and experience as well as his direct access to targets of interest. The problems inherent in his philosophical and psychological make-up will continue to be taken into consideration in developing Subject's full potential. The obvious disadvantages of Subject's unwitting status vis-a-vis [redacted] can be overcome by careful handling of Subject and increased control over him in the future.

WOFACT

B- Development of LIRING/3 by Rowton:

6. Rowton met Subject in April,1966, by cold approach in the art studio where Subject at the time was presenting his latest works under sponsorship of Bellas Artes. Rowton posed as a Greek businessman interested in Subject's style and his immediate objective at the time was to ascertain the address in New York City of Subject's wife's father (a Cuban of Chinese origin who had left Cuba as a refugee). Rowton, feeling that he had to present an above-average prospect to Subject to permit future meetings, alleged that he was anxious to arrange for the painting of a mural to be installed in a New York nightclub owned by a Greek friend of his (Rita Dimitri, owner and performer at the "La Chansonette"). Rowton felt that pin-pointing a "New York nihhgtclub" would have the double advantage of determining Subject's sentiments toward working in New York City and in a bourgeois environment.

7. Subject reacted very favorably to the initial approach and accepted Rowton's invitation to dinner in the company of Subject's wife the next evening. Both Subject and his wife were cautious in revealing any specific data concerning their background and personal history, but neither concealed their mutual approval of Castro's regime and dislike for the corruption in Mexico. As a result of this meeting Rowton realized that any attempt at a direct approach to either Subject or his wife, who was then employed part-time at the Cuban Consulate, would be conterproductive and that a more subtle approach would have to be developed. Rowton decided that a strong personal relationship developed bwith Subject would be productive and could eventually lead to useful production on Subject's part.

8. When, therefore, on 2 May,1966, Subject eXpressed gratification at having met Rowton and indicated that he wished to continue his friendly contacts, regardless of whether Rowton purchased his painting or arrganged for the mural, Rowton xx moved in with an offer to "hire" Subject as his business associate on an unofficial basis, so that Subject could acquire a degree of indepence financially and perhaps do some traveling for Rowton. In order to develop as much clandestinity as possible in his future contacts with Subject, Rowton explained that he was simply a tourist in Mexico and as such not permitted to engage in lucrative business activities. He would therefore have to depend on Subject's discretion in any dealings he might have with him. Subject accepted this as quite normal but pointed out to Roton his limitations xas far as business training and experience went. In reply to Rowton's query, he did confess, however, that he had excellent contacts in Havana that could be exploited for business dealings with Cuba. He volunteered to make an exploratory trip to Havana to renew his friendship with the perons concerned. Rowton accepted this offer, not only to test Subject's story but also to seize the occasion to be in a position to provide Subject with money to make the trip and thus compromise him somewhat at the outset.

9. Rowton's next move was to explain to Subject that he had a long-term interest in Cuba and hoped to do a great deal of business in the futre but first felt it was essential that both he and Subject develop the proper contacts inside to ensure success. Subject readily agreed to this and felt relieved that Rowton did not expect him to produce concrete results overnight. When Rowton, therefore suggested that Subject find and rent a safehouse for entertainment and development of prospective contacts, Subject went to work immediately without question. (Althoug Rowton's suggestion was first made on 17 June, Subject did not succeed in finding a suitable place until the end of July.) This project, however, gave Subject something specific and relatively clandestine to do for Rowton without seriously compromising any of his principles. Subject, as it developed later, was intereste in such a hide-away, unknown even to his wife, for his own purposes.

10. Inasmuch as Subject and his wife had long lived an almost ascetic life in a small sparcely furnished apartment with no apparent luxuries and dressed in the simplest and apparently most inexpensive clothing available, and furthermore apparently did not have any conscious desire to improve their living conditions, Rowton realized that financial control over Subject would be difficult to establish unless Subject and his wife could be made to lift their eyes to see a more comfortable and promising life within their reach. He therefore chose some of the best restaurants for lunch dates with Subject (prior to the renting of the safehouse), brought several relatively expensive dolls and toys for their child, arranged through the COS to have a credit account opened for Subject and his wife at Sears Roebuck Stores and was able to present Subject with a credit card that would enable Subject and his wife to make effortless purchases on credit. Rowton also persuaded Subject to open a checking account at the Banco de Londres y Mexico, ostensibly so that he could keep better track of the rent payments on the safehouse. All these bourgeois trappings were calculated to raise Subject and his family fromthe complacent proletariat standard of living into which they had sunk. Subject expressed to Rowton his appreciation for such gestures and confessed that he now realized the importance of these outward signs of respectability and as a result felt more able to step into the world of higher society. His wife also revealed in her comments of appreciation to Rowton that she welcomed the prospect of a better life for herself and her child and hoped to be able to purchase enough furniture to make her home respectable and permit her to invite guests occasionally.

11. The one adverse effect of this effort on Rowton's part has been that Subject began to use the safehouse apartment for amorous trysts with one of his art students, an apparently wealthy Mexican woman, who has now in effect become his mistress (as revealed by technical surveillance from an LP in the same building set up and run very effectively by Medbury). Subject has revealed the name and address of this woman to Rowton in connection with the establishment of a P.O. Box which could be used as a drop for communication between Subject and Rowton while the former was in Cuba; but he has not to date told Rowton of his illicit relationship with the woman. This development can, of course, serve as a potential control over Subject and can be used in any future [redacted] examination, but, on the other hand may lead to complications in Subject's personal life and create hostility on the part of his wife, should she discover the philandering of Subject. She might likewise tend to blame Rowton for Subject's conduct. For this reason Rowton has made every effort to maintain good relations with Subject's wife (she has already confided to Rowton her concern over Subject's recent moodiness,as stated above) in the hope that she will turn to Rowton for help in the event she feels her marraige in jeopardy. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of breaking up as discreetly as possible Subject's affair with the Mexican woman in the event that it becomes more serious. Technical surveillance of the trysts will continue to provide useful information in this direction.

12. With regard to the use of Subject unwittingly to elicit operational information from his Cuban friends in Mexico City as well as Havana, Rowton gradually impressed on Subject the need to acquire all possible information both political and economic on Cuban developments as a prelude to engaging in serious and lucrative business with the Castro regime. Subject accepted this line without question and did produce some useful inside information of value. The turning point, however, came in connection with the disappearance of Julian López, the Press Attaché of the Embassy in Mexico City in late September,1966. Subject reported the disappearance to Rowton with some glee, commenting that he and his wife were convinced that López had gone

off on a binge with some friends. Subject then repeated to Rowton his criticism of López' childishness and inexperience and recalled that when he himself had pointed out to López his negligence in handling his Embassy functions(in the Press and Cultural field) López had shrugged off his admonitions with the comment that there were more important things to do for the revolution. The disregard, bordering on distain, with which López as well as apparently other Cuban officials, had greeted Subject's friendly advice in the past, obviously cut Subject to the quick and fostered in him the resentment of a peasant toward his master. Taking this into consideration and in the hope of stirring up as much trouble for López and the Embassy as possible, the Station permitted Rowton to pass to Subject the highly restricted information that López had actually been arrested by the Mexican police for complicity in the arms smuggling ring that has recently been uncovered in their operations from Mexico into Guatemala. Rowton gave Subject enough details to make the story convincing and asked Subject to attribute the information to "Central American friends" and to stress that it was already inthe hands of the press. In addition Rowton suggested that Subject pass this information personally to López as a hot tip so that López could discreetly disappear before the reporters managed to question him. When Subject did as requested by Rowton, López was apparently so overwhelmed with gratitude for Subject's good intentions that he informed the Ambassador the following morning (just before his suddent departure for Havana). Events then moved swiftly. The Ambassador called in Subject and expressed his personal appreciation for Subject's interest and help in this delicate matter and agreed with Subject that the involvement of Embassy personnel in arms smuggling was placing Cuban-Mexican relations in jeopardy. Overnight this raised Subject's status in the eyes of the Embassador and his closest advisors (Curbelo and Ceneda) to that of a valued confident rather than simply a friend of the revolution. This obviously pleased Subject and made him all the more anxious to conceal the role of Rowton in the affair so that all the credit would continue to fall to him.

13. As a result Subject was subsequently called in by Curbelo and Cepeda and asked to offer his services to help the Tricontinental in its work in Central America. On Rowton's advice (which Subject sollicited) the offer was accepted on condition that the work to be done would be serious (i.e. worth the personal risks Subject would have to run) and that Subject would be permitted to work without the overt involvement of the local Embassy, These conditions were promptly accepted and Subject was invited to visit Havana again so that he could be briefed on the spot by Osmani Cienfuego and his staff.

14. Subject was thus catapulted into the level of IS activites,with Rowton maneuvered into a position of éminence grise. It remains to be seen following Subject's return from Havana (estimated at 21 November,1966) whethe Subject will be entrusted with secret requirements by the Tricontinental, but it appears certain at this point that Rowton will be able to provide full guidance to Subject and to steer the operations he might be engaged in toward targets of interest to [redacted] WOFAC.

C- Biographical Data Elicited from LIRING/3:

15. Subject was born in Mexico City in 1930 of a middle class family. Subject's grandfather was a well-known textile merchantwho served some 12 years as president of the Chamber of Commerce. At least one of Subject's aunts is currently well-to-do and the owner of several apartment houses in Mexico City. Subject has at present little or no contact with his family.

16. At the age of 15 Subject left home to join the Mexican Navy. Subject has commented to Rowton that his childhood was not particularly happy and that his mother and father separated, apparently when he was in his teens. It appears likely that Subject left home as a result of family dissension. Subject states that his desire to travel and see the world wasvery strong at the time he joined the navy.

17. Inasmuch as the legal age for enlistment was 18, Subject had to have his birth certificate altered to show that he had been born in 1927 rather than 1930. As a consequence all of Subject's official documents now show his birth-date as 1927, including his passport.

18. Subject served a three-year hitch in the navy and visited nearly all the ports of Mexico and many of Central America. Subject's speciality appears to have been in the quartermaster branch, since he learned the rudiments of navigation and ship-handling. When he left the nval service, Subject entered the University of Mexico and took courses in Archaeology and Anthropology for the next two years. Subject simultaneously developed a strong interest in painting and sculpture and over the next five or so xx years, studied under such masters as Rivera and Siquieros.

19. Subject was married in 1950 at the age of twenty years to a young Mexican woman from Leon, GTO..and during the next ten years had at at least four children by her. He divorced his wife in about 1960, just prior to his departure for Cuba, but he had not been on good terms with her for several years prior to the divorce. From about 1954 to 1960 Subject worked in the Mexican Government Social Service among the Indians in the southern states of Mexico. Subject attributes some of the tension that arose between him and his wife to this employment venture. He commented to Rowton that his first wife wanted to live a quiet normal life in Mexico City and was unwilling to share with him the hardships of social work in remote areas of tropical Mexico. During this period Subject gradually developed his own style in painting and began to establish close contacts with Mexican art circles.

20. Subject went to Cuba in about 1960 "to join the revolution",apparently as a result of his increasingly leftist political sympathies. He did a relatively large amount of painting and mural work during his four-year residence in Cuba, while at the same time working in the Ministry of Labor and Education. In about 1961 he married a Cuban woman of Chinese origin from Santiago de Cuba and the following year a (girl) child was born to them in Havana. Subject has told Rowton that he has had very little contact with his first wife since his divorce and pays no alimony. He added that his family, however, has continued to take an interest in his first wife and the children of his first marriage and has helped to support them financially. During his stay in Cuba, Subject developed close friendship with many Cuban revolutionaries, particularly Arnol Rodriquez, whose wife worked with Subject in the Ministry of Education at the time when Arnol Rodriquez was serving as Minister of Labor.

21. Subject returned to Mexico City in 1964 with his new wife and child (whom he had naturalized as a Mexican citizen). By this time Subject had become a professional artist but supplemented the rather modest income he acquired from the sale of his painting by teaching art privately and in Mexican public schools. His monthly income during 1965 and early 1966 did not exceed 3,000 pesos.

Wallace B Rowton

Wallace B Rowton

MEXI GOVT cc

14 NOV 66

SEE SCMEXI 873 FOR
INFO RE LIRING-3 VISA

issue transit visa #5120 ~~[illegible]~~ Carlos Jurado Delmar pp 135587
and Carlos Jurado Malecana pp 9755.

LIRING-3

18

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT Operational LIRING
PRQ Part I - Carlos JURADO Delmar

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed is PRQ Part I for Carlos JURADO Delmar. PRQ Part II has been prepared and will be forwarded by separate dispatch.

Frank C. Healey
for
Robert L. EASBY

MICROFILMED
NOV 17 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Enclosure:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att (4 cys)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

1 ATT

CS COPY

201-795301

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-30540

DATE
10 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS. FILE NUMBER
201-

7P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA."
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-30540

SECTION I — **GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA**

1. NAME *(First)* Carlos *(Middle)* *(Last)* Jurado *(Nee)* Delmar

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: none

3. NAME AT BIRTH *(If different than Item 1.)*: none

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME *(State time, reason for and place of use)*

201-798301

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 3 November,1927 (see #8 below)

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico City,Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS *(Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)*

No known vices. Drinks in moderation for social reasons.

8. COURT RECORD *(Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)*

Date of birth actually 3 November 1930,but birth certificate altered to show 1927 in order to qualify for entrance into Mexican Navy (age 18 in lieu of actual age 15).

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9. DESCRIPTION *(Use American standards of measurements, if possible)*

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE *(Shape)*
M X F	39	[illegible]	FT. 5 IN. [illegible]	130	[illegible]	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
dark XXX. brown	hazel	regular	slim	erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: Ears relatively large - slight indentation on tip of nose. Cheek-bones protrude slightly

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE: Neat, clean shaven, generally dresses in plain sports clothes

o. PROMINENT FEATURES: Slight build, boyish appearance,hairline receding on sides of fore-

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES: head.

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING: ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ATT TO HMMA 30540 CS COPY 201-798301 (4-20)

SECTION II — CITIZENSHIP

10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (*If different than Item 10.*)
same

12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant*)
[illegible] Mexico

13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (*If different than Item 12.*)
same

14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED

15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (*Countries, dates and purposes*)
1960-1964 Cuba (employed by Ministry of Labor and Education)
1965 - three ten-day visits.

SECTION III — OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA

16. PRESENT OCCUPATION
Artist and art teacher

17. TITLE
Art teacher

18. SALARY (*Per annum*)
100[illegible].[illegible]

19. FINANCIAL STATUS (*Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property*)
Depends almost totally on earnings from sale of paintings and salary (nominal) paid by Bellas Artes(equivalent to government [illegible]

SECTION IV — ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
none

21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS
Member ~~Socialist Party of Mexico~~ PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTO (PPS)

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
"La Esmeralda" Mexico DF	Painting&Sculpture	[illegible]	1951	none
School Anthropology, Univ of Mexico	Anthropology .	1946	1951	none

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (*List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.*)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☒ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

First married in Mexico City 1950, divorced 19[illegible]. 4-[illegible] children by this marriage. No alimony paid since Subject's family continued support ex-wife. Oldest child born 1953. No contact with ex-wife.
Married again 1961 in Havana, Cuba, to Miriam Chiclay, Cuban citizen.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

✓ 33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) [illegible] NO 21 (Middle) (Nee) WIFE [illegible] (Last) JURADO

34. DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]

35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Havana, Cuba SEX F

36. DATE OF BIRTH DOB [illegible]

37. PLACE OF BIRTH POB [illegible]

38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH CIT. [illegible]

39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS WIFE OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR (201-79730)

40. PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible] Chiclay		x	19[illegible]	Havana, Cuba	Mexican

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (*Identify child and give his, or her, present address*)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME

42. YEAR OF BIRTH

43. PLACE OF BIRTH

44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

46. OCCUPATION

47. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]lmar

49. YEAR OF BIRTH

50. PLACE OF BIRTH

51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS

53. OCCUPATION

54. PRESENT RESIDENCE

SECTION VI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES. Murals

1) Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis. 1957.
2) Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, Mexico, D.F., 1960.
3) Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (I.S.E.) La Habana, Cuba, 1963.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Art and sculpture.

SECTION VII MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Mexico	1945	1946	Navy	Seaman	Sea

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Joined Navy at age 15 by falsifying birth certificate to read born 3 November, 1927 instead of 3 November, 1930.

SECTION VIII EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

26.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1954-1960
b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government
c. ADDRESS Instituto Nacional Indigenista
d. TYPE OF WORK Social
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible]

27.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1962-1964
b. EMPLOYER Cuban Government
c. ADDRESS Ministry of Education
d. TYPE OF WORK Teaching art
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING Return Mexico

28.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1964-1966
b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government
c. ADDRESS Ministry of Education
d. TYPE OF WORK Teaching art
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,[illegible] PER Pesos per [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING [illegible] Travel of Cuba

29.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To) 1964-1966
b. EMPLOYER Mexican Government
c. ADDRESS Bellas Artes
d. TYPE OF WORK Tutor of art
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ 1,[illegible] PER Pesos per [illegible]
f. REASON FOR LEAVING still employed

30.
a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)
b. EMPLOYER
c. ADDRESS
d. TYPE OF WORK
e. SALARY OR EARNINGS $ PER
f. REASON FOR LEAVING

DATOS BIOGRAFICOS DE CARLOS JURADO.

[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] (?)

Nace el 3 de noviembre de 1927 en la ciudad de México. Estudia durante un tiempo en la Escuela de Pintura y Escultura "La Esmeralda", donde es discípulo de María Izquierdo, Rivera, etc. Permanece por seis años en medios rurales del país, trabajando con el Instituto Nacional Indigenista. En 1960 obtiene un premio en el certamen " Nuevos Valores" en el Salón de la Plástica Mexicana del Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes.

Exposiciones colectivas más importantes:

Galería 23 Escalones, México,D.F. 1953. Escuela de Artes Plásticas de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. Chis. 1956. Exposición Internacional de Grabado, Yogoeslavia, 1959. Primer Salón Nacional de Pintura, México, D.F. 1959. " Nuevos Valores " México,D.F. 1960. Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1960- Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1960. Reseña Mundial de Festivales Cinematográficos, Acapulco, Gro. 1962. Nueva Búsqueda de la Joven Pintura Mexicana, San Antonio, Texas, 1962. Retratos, Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1964. Pintura Contemporánea de México, Nueva Orleans, 1964. Salón de Pintura 1964, México,D.F. Pintura Mexicana Contemporánea, Galerías de San Carlos, México,D.F. 1964. Primer Salón de Artistas Jóvenes, Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F. 1965. Pintura Contemporánea de México, La Habana, Cuba, 1965. Salón de Pintura 1965, México,D.F. " Autorretrato y Obra" Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F.1966.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15 30

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SECRET

IG: SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
, 76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE. VR. M/AN, C/OPS, C/OA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 08 20 06Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 001366

JACK LALLY

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG Paul Ebert

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 17 June 66	CASE NO. 201- 798301
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES
			DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD
			AREA:

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below,* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
✓	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 30 June 66
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE [illegible] Jun

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval
and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
[illegible]
[illegible] Mexico City

TYPE OF REQUEST								OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
☐	POA	☐	OA	☐	CSC	☐	SI	(Date) [illegible] June [illegible]	(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	NIL FD.	[illegible]	[illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED				ATTACHMENTS					
☐	YES	☐	NO	☐	PRQ - PART I	☐	PARTIAL BIO	☐	OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE
FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

Jun 9 8 49 AM '65

FORM 8-64 693 SECRET (9) 3

Exposiciones Individuales :

Ateneo de Artes y Ciencias de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. 1957. Galerías Glantz, México, D.F. 1960. Galería de Arte, La Habana, Cuba, 1962. Casa de las Américas, la Habana, Cuba, 1963. Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1964. Salón de la Plástica Mexicana, México,D.F. 1966.

Obra Mural:

Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis.1957. Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, México,D.F. 1960. Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (I.S.E.) la Habana, Cuba, 1963.

INDEX: ☑ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, TSD6, FI, EUR8

S E C R E T 072045Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9156 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

7[illegible] 34558

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF: DIRECTOR 49518 *

INSPECTION REF ENVELOPE DISCLOSES MEXICO CITY POSTMARKS DATED 27 FEB 66. ADDITIONAL POSTMARK MADRID SHOWS IT PLACED IN GENERAL DELIVERY THERE 1 FEB 66. NO INDICATION WHEN TAKEN OUT OF MADRID GENERAL DELIVERY AND RETURNED MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

*RYBAT

BT

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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4		8	

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION DC/WH/C 5

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, ~~[illegible]~~, CI/CA, CI/IC 2

S E C R E T 251558Z CITE JMWAVE 3970

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

5 Nov 66 IN 33709

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 39408)

1. REVIEW OF FILES SHOWS THAT IN AMKNOB/1 S/W MESSAGE TWO DATED 24 MAR 66 MEXICO RECEIVED JMWAVE 28 MAR AMKNOB/1 REPORTED RAUL ASKED HIM IF HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HIM IN MADRID THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY. WHEN AMKNOB/1 ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, RAUL SAID IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND WITH THE RETURN ADDRESS USED HE WAS SURE THE LETTER WOULD BE RETURNED.

2. RE PARA 4 REF "HOUSE OF AMADEO" PROBABLY REFERS TO AMADEO MARTINEZ ZEPEDA, CUIS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY GIVEN TO AMKNOB/1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

[redacted]

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV. 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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DISSEM BY 26 PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/C5 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE C/WH6

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

CITE DIRECTOR [redacted]

31465A
061

TO

S E C R E T

CABLE SECRETARIAT

PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) PRIORITY TO JMWAVE FOR INFO FRADYER.

S E C R E T

WH/C COMMENT: REF CONCERNS COVER STORY FOR LIRING-3 BEING IN POSSESSION OF INFO IN CASE OF JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN DIPLOMAT RECENTLY ARRESTED IN MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER A WISNOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

Stewart

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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ORIG: B.CAREW
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1966

☐ RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 30/17 PER PYBAT # GALES
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/C5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2, C/TSD3, C/SB5,

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

FN 19 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 49618

TO MEXICO CITY INFO ROUTINE JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32408)*

1. REQUEST DETAILS OF EXAMINATION REF ENVELOPE FOR INDICATIONS LOCATIONS REACHED, CANCELLATIONS AND CHANNELS IT WENT TO INCLUDE DATES AND TIMES IF POSSIBLE.

2. CHECK OF AVAILABLE TRAVEL MANIFESTS REVEALS LIRING/1 DID NOT TRAVEL PRAGUE EARLY 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CICS
WH/1 JACK STEWART (DRAFT)
WH/C/MO
WH/C/FI
WH/COG/RR

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER 4-6 COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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13 00

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

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FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031606Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9[illegible]

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

3 NOV [illegible] 32408

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF HMMW 14744

1. LIRING-3 RELATED FULL STORY TO WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 31 OCT 1966:

2. WITHIN FEW DAYS PREVIOUS ABOVE MEETING LIRING-3 HAD GONE TO OLD RESIDENCE AT IDEN A TO CHECK WHETHER ANY MAIL HAD ARRIVED THERE SINCE HE DEPARTED. FOUND TWO LETTERS, ONE OF WHICH ADDRESSED AMKNOB, ADDRESS IDEN B. LETTER HAD LIRING-3 NAME AND ADDRESS FOR RETURN AND LETTER NOT FINDING ADDRESSEE HAD BEEN RETURNED TO LIRING-3.

3. LIRING-3 OPENED LETTER WHICH DATED 17 JANUARY 1966 TYPEWRITTEN ON HAMMERMILL BOND AND SIGNED QUOTE RAUL UNQUOTE. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD THOUGHT MUCH OF MYSTERY AND FINALLY REMEMBERED THAT LIRING-1, MANY MONTHS AGO, HAD FOR NO APPARENT REASON ASKED HIM FOR HIS ADDRESS. HE HAD GIVEN LIRING-1 IDEN A ADDRESS. WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE LIRING-3 CONFRONTED LIRING-1 WITH FACT HE HAD RECEIVED LETTER AND HE ASKED LIRING-1 WHAT WAS IDEA USING HIS RETURN. LIRING-1 GAVE NO REASONABLE ANSWER AND ASKED FOR LETTER

SECRET

BACK. LIRING-3 REFUSED SAYING QUOTE YOU SENT IT, IT WAS RETURNED TO ME AND I'M KEEPING IT UNQUOTE.

4. IN LETTER LIRING-1 EXPRESSES HIS HOPE OF MEETING AMKNOB IN PRAGUE WHERE LIRING-1 HAS TO GO ON BUSINESS NEXT MONTH (FEB 66). LIRING-1 THEN ASKS AMKNOB TO WRITE OR BETTER CABLE HIM QUOTE TO THE HOUSE OF AMADEO UNQUOTE SAYING WHETHER HE CAN MAKE MEETING. LIRING-1 STATED HE WOULD BE A GUEST IN HOTEL FLORA, PRAGUE, AND THAT HE WOULD ADVISE AMKNOB OF DATE HIS ARRIVAL THERE.

5. WOACRE REP INSPECTED LETTER AND ENVELOPE. NO EVIDENCE OF SW DISCLOSED. OPEN TEXT WOULD INDICATE LETTER CONTAINED NO SW. POUCHING COPY OF LETTER. DUE RELATIONSHIP ROWTON LIRING-3 IT WOULD NOT BE EASY RETAIN LETTER AND ROWTON WILL RETURN IT TO LIRING-3 WHEN LATTER RETURNS FROM FORTHCOMING TRIP PBRUMEN.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

19-6-113/3 filed

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO 201-798521

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DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 6

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FROM Dissem by 21

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031610Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9112

3 Nov 66 IN 32191

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32406)

WH/1

IDENS:

A. FRESNO202, COLONIA FLORIDA, MEXICO CITY

B. LISTA DE CORREOS PRINCIPAL, CIBELES, MADRID.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

11

NNNN

MICROFILMED
NOV 14 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RING-3

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

ORIG: Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 1 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 66/53 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY ADDP, C/FI/INT 2

INFO: VR, FILE DO/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 12 23 10 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) CITE DIRECTOR 49106

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS [redacted]

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9024 (IN 27279)

B. CARACAS 5157 (IN 28199)

1. APPRECIATE STATION VIEWS RE ATTEMPTING HAVE LITEMPO-12 ESTABLISH HIS SOURCING REF A REPORT THAT SUBJECT VEN COMMIE, CARRYING MESSAGES FROM PEDRO MEDINA SILVA AND AMERICAN DOLLARS FOR FALN, AND ON VENEZUELAN IMMIGRATION BLACKLIST. IN PARTICULAR, DID INFO COME FROM VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES WHO HQS UNDERSTANDS IN CONTACT WITH DFS OR FROM CUBAN EXILES OR BOTHX? NOTE THAT MEDINA REPORTEDLY IN VENEZUELA SINCE SEPTEMBER.

2. FYI, SEVERAL REPORTS RECEIVED ON SUBJECT AND HUSBAND WHICH CONFLICT SENSITIVE INFO FROM TWO SOURCES. IF STATION COULD ESTABLISH REASONABLE GROUNDS BELIEVE SUBJECT ACTUALLY CARRYING LARGE SUM AMERICAN DOLLARS (I.E. OVER AND ABOVE TRAVELING EXPENSES), BELIEVE IT IN OUR INTEREST ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE DFS ARREST AND SEARCH. THIS, IF ACCOMPLISHED, WOULD GIVE CHANCE ASSESS VARYING REPORTS

(CONT'D)

URING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

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ORIG:
UNIT:
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DATE:

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49106

PAGE 2

TO

AND IF SHE ACTUALLY SUBVERSIVE AGENT WOULD ACCOMPLISH IMPORTANT DISRUPTION ON OUR PART. NEEDLESS TO SAY WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED SEEING ANY MESSAGES OR MONEY FOUND. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE STATION ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS SUCH ARREST MIGHT HAVE, INCLUDING EFFECT ON ROWTON-LIRING/3 RELATIONSHIP.

[redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (in draft)
WH/3/V ______
[redacted] ______

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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[redacted]
Dissem By 2
ACTION
WH/C 8
☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, EUR 2, WH 8, FI, FI/INT 2.

S E C R E T 021114Z CITE LONDON 6474 2 Nov 66 IN 30875

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 48602

COOKE HAS BEEN IN NEW YORK FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, RETURNING LONDON 19 NOVEMBER. WILL ATTEMPT GET PROMPT REPLY AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

Jane

LIRING-3

Stewart

MEMORANDUM FOR: J Kaufman

T. Polgar would like to talk to you before sending attached. He seems to believe that its is redundant. Also said T.Flores was with him and believes same.

J Stewart

Not sent.

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)
1 AUG 54

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/1		✓
2	WH/C/MO		
3	WH/C/FI		
4	~~WH/C/CICS~~		
5	WH/FI		
6	Cable Secretariat		

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/1/J. Stewart/332 Ames/3654	3 Nov 66

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
2-61

FORM 11-65 12 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGHER PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN INTERNAL ADDRESS LINE
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND BLUE-GREEN COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. REMOVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE, X CUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES. END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER

MESSAGE FORM [redacted]

TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: J. Stewart/mhf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 3 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

[redacted] (CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY

PRIORITY

MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE FOR FRADYER

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REFS: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) ~~[illegible] REVISED [illegible]~~

1. ~~WHILE REALIZE STATION IN BEST POSITION~~ SELECT PROPER COVER STORY HQS RELUCTANT SEE ATTENTION INVITED TO ROWTON ANY MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

2. FOR JMWAVE: REQUEST FRADYER COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref concerns cover story being furnished LIRING-3 for ~~xxx~~ information he had on Cuban diplomat Julian LOPEZ Diaz being arrested by Mexicans for involvement Guatemalan arms smuggling.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

for WH/C/MO aawisnowski
~~WH/C/FI~~
~~WH/C/[illegible]~~
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

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~~FROM~~
DISSEM BY 30/M

ACTION
DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2,

relayed JMWAVE 3 Nov on [illegible]

S E C R E T 022135Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9097

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

2 NOV 66 IN 31465

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9011 (IN 27211)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 1 NOV 66 ONLY SIGNIFICENT INFORMATION REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ HAD GIVEN HIM IN WAY OF BRIEFING FOR FORTHCOMING TRIP WAS THAT LIRING-3 WOULD BE MET AT HAVA AIRPORT BY ONE HERRERA (FNU) WHO WOULD PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH PROPER PEOPLE.

2. FLIGHT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 2 NOV WAS FIRST POSTPONED TO 3 NOV THEN SET BACK TO 4 NOV. STRIKE OF MEXICANA AIRLINE EMPLOYEES MAY CAUSE FURTHER DELAY SINCE MEXICANA SERVICES CUBANA.

3. LIRING-2 AND CEPEDA MET WITH LIRING-3 26 OCT AS REPORTED REF BUT NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RESULTED. LIRING-3 SAID IT APPEARED HIM MEETING CALLED IMPRESS HIM WITH IMPORTANCE OF CEPEDA AND LIRING-2. CEPEDA DID ALL TALKING. AMBASSADOR DROPPED IN, GREETED LIRING-3 CORDIALLY BUT LEFT. CEPEDA PREFACED MEETING WITH LENGTHY LECTURE ON POSITION CUBA VIS A VIS TRI CONTINENTAL. POINT MADE WAS CUBA INDEPENDENT OF ACTIVITIES THIS ORGANIZATION BUT DIRECTLY INVOLVED SOME ASPECTS DUE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION. SECRET

4. DURING MEETING CEPEDA ASKED LIRING-3 WHO HE KNEW HAVA. LIRING-3 BRUSHED THIS OFF SAYING HE KNEW MANY PEOPLE AND COULD NOT BEGIN LIST THEM. CEPEDA THEN WENT ON IN APOLOGETIC TONE ASKING LIRING-3 AVOID TOO MUCH CONTACT WITH FRIENDS UNTIL HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THOSE INSIDE. AS RESULT MEETING LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE DEFINITELY CONCLUDED CEPEDA DSE REP MEXICO. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 COMPLY WITH CEPEDA REQUEST AND NOT CONTACT FRIENDS HAVA UNTIL HAD DISCREETLY CHECKED SUCH CONTACTS WITH PERSONS DIRECTING HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. AT 26 OCT MEETING CEPEDA SAID HE WOULD HAVE FINAL BRIEFING WITH LIRING-3 BEFORE HE DEPARTED. THIS FINAL SESSION HELD 1 NOV AND RESULTED ONLY IN CEPEDA INFORMING LIRING-3 OF NAME OF FIRST CONTACT CITED PARA ONE ABOVE.

6. ROWTON HAS BRIEFED LIRING-3 ON GENERAL SECURITY PRECAUTION AND WARNED HIM BE ALERT POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE INSIDE. ALSO IN CASE EXTREME PRESSURE APPLIED TO LEARN SOURCE LIRING-3'S INFO ON JULIAN LOPEZ HE WAS TOLD BY ROWTON TO INFORM THEM HE HAD OBTAINED FROM FRIEND (ROWTON) GIVING FICTICIOUS NAME FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL, WHO HAD OBTAINED FROM UNKNOWN GUATEMALA REPORTER WHO OBTAINED FROM NATZUL AGUIRRE COCK, GUATEMALAN PGT MEMBER. THIS EXTENT INFO GIVEN LIRING-3. ACTUALLY AGUIRRE WAS EXILED IN MEXICO AFTER FALL OR ARBENZ AND WAS

SECRET

Assumption that NAC can't be checked by Cubans through PGT? Of course friend (ROWTON) could have be deceiving L-3.

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 9297 S E C R E T

ARRESTED BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES EARLY OCT 66 FOR BEING ONE OF PRIME INSTIGATORS IN STUDENT RIOTS MORELIA RECENTLY. AGUIRRE DEPORTED TO GUATEMALA BY MEXICANS EARLY OCT 66 ALONG WITH JAIME DIAZ ROZZOTTO, FORMER PGT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER.

S E C R E T

BT

~~[illegible]~~ on Guat border + ~~[illegible]~~
beat hospital list
[illegible]
8 ~~[illegible]~~ dead!

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

SE: [redacted]

J.M.
ORIG: J. MOUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY 30/4 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE EUR8, WH8, FI, FI/INT2,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 1 20 21 52 CITE DIRECTOR 48602

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 34711

PLS ADVISE WHETHER COOKE HAS DEVELOPED ANY INFO ON REF REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO E. Chiocca (phone)
WH/1 J. Stewart (Phone)
EUR/Cuba Crawford (phone)
E/BC/UK John G. Roberts

LIRING-3

John G. Roberts
for C/EUR/BC

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

1-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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0845

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM Dissem By 24

ACTION WH/C 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, C.I, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN [illegible])

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT
LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA)
HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER,
WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN
EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING
3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE
TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP
HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS
AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED
WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA
SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TO-
GETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP
COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

Liring-1 – Abreu

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

SECRET SECRET

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

ROUTING	
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2	6
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: JACK STEWART
IT: WH/1
EXT :
DATE: 28 OCT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY 48 PER ________ # ________
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ________ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C8, DO4, DDH3, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) [redacted] (DATE AND TIME FILED) [redacted] (REFERENCE NUMBER) (ELITE) (PICA)

[redacted]

28 22 56 Z CITE DIRECTOR 47951

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF A MEXICO CITY 9311 (IN 97211)

B MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

HQS FOLLOWING LIRING-3 CASE WITH INTEREST. AGREE STATEMENT PARA 7 REF B THAT CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ. BELIEVE IT MATTER OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT L-3 BE GIVEN BEST POSSIBLE COVER STORY AND URGE STATION GIVE FULL ATTENTION THIS ASPECT OF OP IN VIEW UPCOMING TRIP L-3 TO CUBA PER REF A.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER JACK STEWART WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER JOHN A. CASTORO WH/C/CICS

RELEASING OFFICER W. CINI FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 21

SECRET

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FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION DC/WHC-5

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UNIT TIME

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

ACTION

S E C R E T 272040Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9011

27 OCT 66 IN 27211

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8977 (IN 35352)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 26 OCT 66 THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY LIRING-2 COME TO EMBASSY AT 1900 HOURS THAT NIGHT FOR MEETING WITH LIRING-2 AND REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.

2. LIRING-3 PRESSED LIRING-2 FOR GENERAL IDEA OF MEETING AGENDA. LIRING-3 REPLIED QUOTE WHEN YOU GO TO HAVANA YOU WILL BE SEEING CERTAIN CENTRAL AMERICANS AND WE WOULD LIKE TO TALK THIS OVER WITH YOU BEFORE YOU GO IN UNQUOTE.

3. LIRING-3 WILL MAKE DETAILED REPORT TO ROWTON EVENING 27 OCT WHICH WILL BE TAPED. ACCORDING PRESENT PLANS LIRING-3 WILL LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON FLIGHT SCHEDULED 1 NOV 66.

S E C R E T

BT

LiRing/3 Reported He Had Again seen LiRing/2 24 Oct

SECRET

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 22

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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Dissem by 24

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

ACTION WH/C-8

☒ RID COPY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, C.I., CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

SECRET SECRET

BT

NNNN

24 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Handling of LIRING-3 as Hostile Agent

In view of Station Mexico City's statement in paragraph 6 of MEXI 8944 (IN 23093), which presumably comes from LIRING-3's handler Wallace B. ROWTON, to the effect that LIRING-3 "still has strong anti-U.S. feelings", the time probably has come to review the LIRING-3/Op (briefly.) In the same cable the Station set forth several control elements including true name receipts and taps made in ROWTAN's safehouse of LIRING-3's amourous sessions with a young art student. What appears to be lacking is ~~not~~ considering the case as the handling of a double agent, ~~probably~~ possibly hostile, is "homework"--that is to say, that there are certain actions that should be taken in the case as follows:

a. Placing of a phone tap on L-3's telephone, if it can be determined that he has a telephone.

b. Intercept of all mail going to LIRING-3's home address.

c. Physical and photo surveillance of L-3 to determine any patterns of actions or contacts with suspicious persons, to see if L-3's contacts and actions agree with what L-3 tells ROWTON and to allow ROWTON to be prepared to cover himself in his relations with L-3.

d. To discreetly investigate L-3's sources of income, i.e., to see if his income from teaching art classes (and more recently from his wife's salary from ~~LIRING~~ Cubans) are sufficient to account for his scale of living, whatever it is.

Secret

There are indications in the file that the "homework" as outlined above has not yet been done. The Station was queried in DIR 39039 DIR 14107 and in DIR- 07441 as to and the above matters. It is noted in MEXICO CITY- 8944 that the Station said that it did not as yet have "independent checks" on this agent, beyond evidence of entry to the Cuban Embassy furnished by LIONION photo surveillance, and in fact had only his word on claimed actions and statements ~~and~~ (, in previous correspondence,) that LIENVOY and LITAINT-2 confirm that L-4, L-3's wife, is definitely employed as a secretary to LIRING-1 as claimed by L-3. The Station tended to doubt that L-3 is a Cuban plant but said that even if he were, that it was no additional risk (the Station was referring to a proposed trip by L-3 to Cuba) since L-3 would be provided with a suitable uncheckable explanation as to how L-3 obtained info on the LOPEZ case.

e. Check as suggested in DIR 07441 on status of LIRING-4's father, who is presumably a Chinese, reportedly in the United States. This is of interest in view of stringent U.S. entry requirements laid on Chinese.

Sherrod given the "word" at his TDY trip Oct 66

Secret

Zmb

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ACTION WH/C 8

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INFO

FILE RF, C/WH, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], FI, [illegible], [illegible] CA2, [illegible], [illegible]

22 OCT 63 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION.

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

27

This necessary for commercial type action

PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

How account for if he furnish?

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME.

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

rich
wife of Mexican

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 8944 SECRET SECRET

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LICNION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE WILL PROVIDE HIM ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

9. FACT LIRING-4 DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, LITAINT-2 AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/FA, FI, CA 2, CA/PROP

S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938

22 Oct 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8859 (IN 20149)

1. LIRING-~~2~~ -3 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUNCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND. HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWTON.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

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ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

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20 16 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR 15108

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3

C/WH/C/FI ______
C/WH/C/CI ______
C/WH/C/MO ______
WH/1 ______
WH/3/V ______
WH/5 ______

by
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

19-15

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO FILE, CSDO, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/SOD-3, C/CA-2, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI/PS

S E C R E T 071805Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8757

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA 7 Oct 66 12398

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8692 (IN 07422)

1. STATION PURSUING JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ ARMS SMUGGLING CASE WITH TWO OBJECTIVES:

A. "BURN" LOPEZ IN EYES HIS SERVICE AND EXPOSE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE. THIS DELICATE UNDERTAKING IN VIEW MEXICAN EFFORTS PLAY DOWN CASE AND AVOID MENTION CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

B. ELEVATE LIRING-3 IN EYES OF CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND HOPE HE MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO LOCAL CUBAN SPONSORED CLANDESTINE OPS. THIS ALREADY DISCUSSED BY ROWTON WITH L-3 WHO AGREED COOPERATE PROVIDING CUBANS USE HIM IN PROFESSIONAL MANNER PROVIDING HIM WITH GOOD SECURITY.

2. AS PROBABLE DIRECT RESULT FACING LOPEZ WITH FACTS HIS ARREST, LIRING-3 SAW AMBASSADOR JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AT LATTER'S REQUEST ON 2 OCT. PER STATION INSTRUCTIONS RELAYED BY ROWTON, L-3 MADE FOLL POINTS:

A. LOPEZ WHO TALKED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR WAS

SECRET

Jane

RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS CASE ARRESTS. ONE OF PERSONS WHO OVERHEARD HIM CONTACTED POLICE WHO SURVEILLED LOPEZ PRIOR TO RAID ON GONZALEZ HOME.

B. LOPEZ FOOLISHLY INVOLVED HIMSELF UNDER HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES BETTER UNDERTAKEN BY INDIVIDUALS READY SERVE REVOLUTION AND MUCH LESS CONSPICUOUS, SUCH AS LIRING-3.

C. WIFE AND FATHER IN LAW OF LOPEZ COULD BE OBJECT LOCAL HARASSMENT SHOULD STORY LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT BE PRINTED.

D. DETAILS OF LOPEZ ARREST OBTAINED FROM "LEFTIST CENTRAL AMERICAN FRIENDS" WHOM HE SAID HE WOULD NOT IDENTIFY FURTHER FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

from [illegible] m also from unknown [illegible] but [illegible] from [illegible] Agents [illegible]

3. ALTHOUGH APPRECIATIVE, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TRIED GIVE LOW KEY EMPHASIS TO ENTIRE ARMS AFFAIR. IN COURSE 2 OCT MEET THIS ANGERED L-3. LATTER CALLED ON AMBASSADOR NEXT EVENING TO WARN HIM THAT "STORY OF ARMS CASE SOLD IN MEXICO TO FOREIGN NEWSMAN". THIS APPEARED WORRY AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SHOWED CONCERN WHEN L-3 AGAIN POINTED TO GUILT AND FOOLISHNESS OF LOPEZ AND REITERATED HIS CONCERN FOR LOPEZ' WIFE. AMBASSADOR SAID MRS. LOPEZ DUE LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON NEXT PLANE (7 OR 8 OCT).

4. LATE 4 OCT LIRING-2 ASKED SEE L-3, OSTENSIBLY TO THANK HIM

Cubans think info from Soviets?

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 8757 S E C R E T **SECRET**

FOR HIS INTEREST IN "EMBASSY" AFFAIRS. L-3 REPEATED WHAT HE ALREADY MENTIONED TO AMBASSADOR. L-2 VISIBLY SHAKEN SAID HE HAD HARD TIME BELIEVING LOPEZ LOOSE TALK RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING. L-3 STRESSED IT INFANTILE FOR CUBANS TO BE USING DIPLOMATS FOR CLANDESTINE OPS AS SUCH EFFORTS EASY SPOT AND COULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE MEXICAN/ CUBAN RELATIONS. L-3 ADDED IT PROBABLY VERY COSTLY TO KEEP CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS AFFAIR QUIET. L-2 SAID CUBANS DID NOT HAVE TO PAY BUT L-3 REPLIED HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT AS KNEW MEXICANS ONLY TOO WELL. L-2 CURRENTLY SITTING IN OFFICE OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY. HIS MEETING WITH L-3 LEFT LATTER UNDER DEFINITE IMPRESSION L-2 ASSESSING HIM FOR POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.

5. ARMS STORY INCLUDING LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT APPEARED IN GUATEMALAN "ELIMPARCIAL" 3 OCT. AT STATION DIRECTION, LITAMIL-2 PASSING AS IRATE ANTI-COMMIE MEXICAN PHONED GUATEMALAN EMBASSY 5 OCT TO CALL ATTENTION OF EMBASSY TO "IMPARCIAL" ARTICLE WHICH APPARENTLY WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED AT EMBASSY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. ALSO EVENING 5 OCT STATION OFFICER MENTIONED "IMPARCIAL" PIECE TO FORNOFF CONTACT (WHO HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OF IT). HE SEEMED DISTRUBED AND MADE PHONE CALL TO UNKNOWN PARTY. ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPER MENTIONED

SECRET

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 6757 S E C R E T **SECRET**

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE 6 OCT WITHOUT GIVING LOPEZ IDENTITY, SIMPLY MENTIONING THAT CUBAN OFFICIAL INVOLVED "DISAPPEARED". LICOMET-1 WAS APPROACHED BY UPI STRINGER LATE 5 OCT AND ASKED VERIFY LOPEZ ARREST. AFTER CHECKING WITH STATION L-1 WILL CONFIRM LOPEZ ARRESTED WITHOUT FURTHER DETAILS. STATION HAS ARRANGED HAVE LICOMET-22 DISCREETLY PHOTOGRAPH DEPARTURE MRS. LOPEZ AT AIRPORT UNDER COVER HIS FUNCTIONS. HOPE TO BE ABLE USE PHOTOS FOR FURTHER ARTICLE IN FOREIGN PRESS. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

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S E C R E T 021630Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8699

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

2 OCT 66 IN 07879

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8692 (IN 07422)*

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BABBLINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF BRAG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

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MEXICO CITY [illegible] SECRET

3. ALSO PLANNING HAVE LIRING/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ OCTOBER WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND MAY ENDANGER IRMA TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER ISSUE. PLANNING TO HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO [illegible] GETTING IRMA AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED OCTOBER.

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* JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE [illegible]

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[illegible] C/WH 3, C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/CA 2, C/SOD 3, C/CI/SPG

[illegible] MEXICO CITY 9592

[illegible] GUATEMALA CITY

10[illegible]07422

REFERENCES: A. MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible]24)

B. MEXICO CITY [illegible]45 (IN 4643)

1. JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE AFTERNOON [illegible] CONSIDERING FACT NO EVIDENCE TO [illegible] RECRUITABLE IT DECIDED AT LEAST [illegible] LEAD INTO [illegible] LOCAL.

2. [illegible] BE PLAYING THIS ACTIVITY LOW. [illegible] APPEARED IN MEXICO CITY PRESS AS [illegible] IDENTIFICATION [illegible] LOPEZ DIAZ [illegible]

3. [illegible] WALLACE B. ROWTON CONTACTED [illegible] LIRING/3 ACKNOWLEDGED LOPEZ DIAZ [illegible] 29 SEP [illegible] MORNING OF 29 SEP AND WAS NOT AVAILABLE [illegible] LIRING/3 HE HAD LEARNED LOPEZ DIAZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMS SMUGGLING [illegible] AND HAD BEEN HELD FROM 25 SEP TO 28 SEP.

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PAGE [illegible] MEXICO CITY 6592 S E C R E T

SECRET

[illegible] AND LOPEZ WAS CARRYING $6000 IN TWENTY DOLLAR BILLS WHEN ARRESTED IN HOUSE OF GONZALEZ. LIRING/3 WAS AMAZED AT [illegible]. ROWTON THEN TOLD LIRING/3 INFO WAS IN HANDS AT LEAST ONE NEWSPAPERMAN AND MIGHT BREAK IN PRESS ANY TIME. ROWTON SAID HE HAD LEARNED THIS FROM OFFICIAL OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT [illegible] ALREADY HAD STORY. ROWTON ALLEGED HE HAD PERSUADED MEXICAN OFFICIAL TO CONVINCE NEWSPAPERMAN NOT [illegible] STORY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. ROWTON SUGGESTED LIRING/3 GO LOPEZ HOME AND TIP HIM OFF SO HE WOULD NOT BE UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONTED BY PRESS [illegible] COMING IN CASE STORY BROKE. LIRING/3 INSTRUCTED GIVE LOPEZ ALL FACTS ROWTON HAD DISCOVERED.

5. MORNING 30 SEPTEMBER ROWTON CONTACTED LIRING/3 [illegible] TO FIND OUT RESULTS OF PLOY. LIRING/3 [illegible] HE WENT LOPEZ [illegible] NIGHT BEFORE FOUND LOPEZ THERE WITH WIFE AND FATHER-IN-LAW VICTOR TRAPOTE. LIRING/3 TOLD LOPEZ HE HAD LEARNED LOPEZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED [illegible] AFTER HE HAD TURNED UP IN CONTACT WITH ARMS [illegible] AND THAT HE WAS CARRYING $6000 IN SMALL BILLS. LIRING/3 STATED HE HAD NO WAY KNOWING TRUE FACTS BUT WAS

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[illegible] MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] THAT IF TRUE LOPEZ COULD GO INTO [illegible]. ACCORDING LIRING/3 LOPEZ TURNED WHITE UPON HEARING [illegible] ADMITTED STORY COMPLETELY TRUE.

[illegible] LIRING/3 TOLD NEWTON HE HAD INFORMED LOPEZ AFFAIR [illegible] AND HE HAD LEARNED IT FROM SOME CENTRAL [illegible]. LOPEZ COMMENTED THAT THESE FRIENDS MUST [illegible] IT FROM [illegible] AND ADDED IN ANY CASE HE LEAVING [illegible]. LIRING/3 REPLIED PLANE NOT DUE UNTIL [illegible] LOPEZ LEAVE NEXT DAY. LOPEZ [illegible] BUT HE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER [illegible] OR SIMPLY SCHEDULED [illegible] FLIGHT ADVANCED [illegible]. LIRING/3 CHIDED LOPEZ BECOMING INVOLVED IN AFFAIR [illegible] LOPEZ SHOULD HAVE USED SOMEONE LIKE LIRING/3 [illegible]. THIS GOT LITTLE REACTION FROM LOPEZ WHO MERELY COMMENTED IT ALREADY [illegible] NOW.

[illegible] LIRING/3 TOLD NEWTON HE SAW NO SIGNS OF PHYSICAL [illegible] LOPEZ.

S E C R E T

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Uhlcarew
ORIG: B.CAREW:mot
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 28 SEPT 66

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☐ INDEX
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

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CITE DIRECTOR 39039

29 1313Z

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 8651 (IN 04697)*

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)**

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT ROWTON/LIRING-3 RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRING-3 AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE PLACE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AS MENTIONED REF B? HAS LITAMIL -7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY ~~[illegible]~~ LIRING/4 EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

END OF MESSAGE

* REFS ATTACHED.
**

C/WH/C/CICS	
C/WH/C/FI	T. Hazlett (draft)
WH/C/FI/TC	J. Lucey (draft)
C/WH/C/CA/PA	C. Anderson (draft)
C/WH/1	J. Fisher (draft)
WH/C/MO	R. Ottman (draft)

LIRING 3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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GROUP 1
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THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

28-23

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S E C R E T 272215Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8651

27 SEP 6[illegible] 04697

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Joe 7



15 Sept 66 WASH POST

Western Trade With Cuba Down

MIAMI, Sept. 14 (AP)—An exile organization reported today that Western world trade with Communist Cuba declined sharply last month compared with the same month in 1965.

Revolutionary Unity (UR), which claims it keeps track of ship dockings in Cuba, said only 14 ships from non-Communist countries called at Cuban ports last month. This was a drop of 63.8 per cent compared with August, 1965, the group said.

Of the vessels reported docking in Cuba last month, eight belonged to Britain, three to Greece, and one each to Lebanon, France and Italy, the report said.

Interesting, in view LIRING-3 report that Cuba needed 24 bottoms.

John

LIRING-3

[redacted]

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

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TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)
B. DIRECTOR 34711

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1 Stewart (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER 14-8

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: [illegible]OUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1966

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R FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

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SECRET 13 20 29Z CITE DIRECTOR 34711

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995) NOT SENT LONDON

1. MEXICO CITY SOURCE REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS. SHIPS POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH REPORTEDLY TO REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. FOREGOING MAY INDICATE RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID CUBA BEING CUT.

2. PLS QUERY STANLEY A. COOKE (P) TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN DISCREETLY CONFIRM CUBAN NEED FOR SHIPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA ______
WH/C/MO Ortman (draft)
WH/1 Stewart (draft)
E/BC/UK ______
EUR/Cuba Raty (phone)

LIRING-3

C/EUR

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

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DATE DISTRIBUTED
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BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-8487 (IN-91995)
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LIRING-3
Liaison *

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS DB-315/02533-66

DIST 10 SEPTEMBER 1966

10 15 22 Z

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN INTEREST IN CHARTERING MERCHANT VESSELS

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW, UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE HAS CULTURAL AND FAMILY TIES IN CUBA. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

1. ACCORDING TO WORD RECEIVED IN MEXICO FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT AT THE MOMENT IS THE CHARTERING OF 24 SHIPS, VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS "OF MEDIUM TONNAGE" AND "OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS", FOR USE IN 1967. THIS PROJECT IS BEING HELD AS SECRET INFORMATION, AND MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS DO NOT KNOW OF IT, EVEN IF THEY ARE CONCERNED WITH TRADE AND SHIPPING MATTERS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SHIPS ARE POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT THE 1967 SUGAR CROP, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WILL REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS.) (FIELD COMMENT: PERHAPS A REDUCTION IS EXPECTED IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER OF SHIPPING.)

2. AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, IS GOING TO CANADA ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER TO SEEK THE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL FOR RENTING SHIPS. HIS TRIP IS NOT BEING PUBLICIZED BECAUSE PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT CHARTERING IS MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE HER REQUIREMENTS BECOME KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

14-00000

Cua 2-430.- 19 octubre 66.

$-)./ 460.- Salida al 703009.- 1542hs. Orlando Suárez con MF -- Electa le pregunta que que estaba haciendo.- Electa que está dibujando.- Suárez: que buena ocupación.-- Electa: que donde está.- Suárez: que en la embajada. Electa: que si se cansó ayer.- Suárez: que no que tuvo que hacer un montón de cosas por la mañana.- Electa: que si vió a Leopoldo.- Suárez que sí.- Electa: que qué le dijo.- Suárez: que bueno, que así que el interés de hacer la exposición, pero que con poco entusiasmo.--- Electa: que mamá le dice que seguramente el que sí no tiene toda la colección completa de su obra, que el sí tiene una colección completa que puede ser suficiente - para hacer la exposición personal.- Suárez: que el dice que tiene muy pocas, que para hacer una exposición de unos cien o ciento cincuenta grabados que nada mas tendría la tercera parte y que el resto tendrían que ser fotografías y que a él -Suarez- no le gusta esa idea.--- Electa: que se podría conseguir -pero que eso sería averiguarlo con calma- que -- Bellas Artes prestara algunas cosas.--- Suarez: que puede ser una cosa combinada con la OPIC.-- Electa: que otra cosa, que el taller está preparando una exposición de toda su historia y piensa poner un número pequeño de cada uno de sus miembros pero va a ser grande en conjunto, que eso es lo que están preparando.--- Suárez que a él le interesa ir por el taller.--- Electa: que entonces dice mamá que que le parecería que llevaran a traves tuyo ~~esa~~ exposición después de presentarse en Bellas Artes, que fuera a Cuba así completa como la va a montar Bellas Artes, que no sabe que dificultades haya con esta gente de Bellas Artes, pero su mamá parece entusiasmada con esa idea, que entonces su mamá fijará un día para que vaya con ella al taller, que le diga cuando y que el día en que se vayan a reunir que ella le avisa para que tu estés al tanto de eso.--- Suarez que se pondran de acuerdo estos días y que cuando puedan ir allá que irán.--- Electa: que que va a hacer ahora.- Suárez que va a ver si puede ver a Carlos Jurado que vive cerca de la embajada. que comió con Siqueiros ahora en su casa.- Electa que que dice.- Suárez: que está enfrascado con su trabajo que quiere terminar para el 20 de noviembre el mural de Chapultepec; que esta noche hay una conferencia que le interesa ir, que es al Curso que se llama Teorico Problema Arte Sociedad, que va a hablar el maestro José Luis Balcarcel que

Arenal

22 Oct 66 HMMA 30397

#5-985

el lugar va a ser en el Salón 14 de la Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas de la Ciudad Universitaria a las 19 horas, que si le interesa ir.--- Electa: que hay un compromiso con los hijos.--- quedan en comunicarse para hacer cita para verse.--- 553.

558.- Salida al Hotel Insurgentes.- HD Rafael con Heriberto le dice que va a pasar con ellos.-- Heriberto de acuerdo. - - - - 577.

. . . .

Nico le diga llame al 146777 y pregunte por Juán Gonzáles.-- Nico queda de dar el recado al Dr.Roberto Pereda.- 220.-

220. Salida al 492141.-1530.-Jorrin pide a HF le diga a Juán que le tiene un paquete y HF acepta.- 224.-

224. Salida al 310106.-HD pregunta por Enrique, Olga y Sergio, y HF informa que no están.- 233.-

233. Salidas al 259100.-1601.- Curbelo se comunica a la Embajada Americana, pide la ext.343 y pregunta a la señorita .... qué noticias le tiene de la visa del .... y HF dice que estará lista a las 5. Curbelo que irá a esa hora.- 246. --

246. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 434.-

434. Entrada.-**Rolando** pregunta a Jorrin si alguién lo llamó- y ésto dice que nó, pero Carlos Jurado le dejó un recado. - Rolando Rodríguez pregunta cuál Carlos Jurado y Jorrin dice- efectivamente estaba equivocado.- 447.-

448. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación.- 693.-

693. Salida al 153273.-1700.- Jorrin se queja de que le llevaron el pedido pero sin los 6 atomizadores que pidió y HF - pide marque al 158720 y hable con la señorita Durán.- 706.-- Jorrin acepta y al enterarse de que por la mañana no habló-- con la señorita Durán, repite lo anterior a la señorita Barrera y ésta queda de enviárselos mañana.- 756.-

756. Aparato muerto y salidas ocupado y sin contestación.852.

(3.-131.- 10 Oct.66).-

14-00000

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S E C R E T 131756Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8824

13 OCT [illegible] 19737

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8608 *

1. WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN OF RAMON ROSSIE LISTED ON CUBANA MANIFEST OF OCT 66 TO MEXICO CITY, HOWEVER MANIFEST SHOWED THEY DID NOT TRAVEL. SOURCE LIFIRE.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 11 OCT 66 HE HAD HEARD CECILIA MARQUEZ FERNANDEZ DE ROSSIE AND TWO CHILDREN ARRESTED AS THEY BOARDING CUBANA FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT. SOURCE OF LIRING-3 INFO NOT DISCLOSED BUT PROBABLY CAME FROM OTHER PASSENGERS WHO MADE FLIGHT.

3. LIRING-3 ALSO TOLD ROWTON HE HAD HEARD ROSSIE NOW IN BRAZIL WHERE HE MADE DEROGATORY STATEMENTS AGAINST CUBAN REGIME. LIRING-3 SUSPECTED THIS MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSE FOR WIFE'S ARREST AT AIRPORT.

SECRET * NOT PROCESSED BY C/S AS OF 13 Oct 66 2030 HRS.

SECRET

BT

LIRING-3

104. [illegible] contestación .- 1 [illegible].-

127. Salida al 144237.-1045.- Chichay pregunta a Olga hasta qué hora [illegible] puede llevar cosas para enviar a Cuba y Olga dice que hasta las 12.- 182.-

1050 h.

182. Entrada.-La señora Susana Mitrani Moreno de Benzusa pregunta si llegó la certificación de su acta de nacimiento y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y Susana dice que en su trabajo es el 122584.- 246.-

246. Entrada 1052.-HF explica que su hijo que está en Cuba se [illegible] que [illegible] le mandó su acta de matrimonio y quisiera saber dónde pudo localizar al embajador y Abreu dice que en Relaciones Exteriores y pregunte por el Embajador [illegible].- 259.-

259. Aparato descolgado, aparato muerto y entrada equivocada. 349.-

349. Salida al 715689.-1156.- Abreu con Marcela para platicarle que ayer fué a Oaxtepec, pero prefiere el Varadero; que hoy ó en la semana irá a verla. Marcela acepta y luego habla con Chichaya a quien queda de ir a ver mañana a la embajada ó a su casa y Chichay acepta y aclara que vive a media cuadra de la embajada.- 414.-

NMMA 30173
Oct 66

Nacido Tuschi

414. Entrada 11[illegible] .- La señora ...de Toschi pregunta si llegó su pasaporte que solicitó hace un año y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y HF dice que es el 403646.-462.-

462. Entrada.-La señora Rosa María .... pregunta si llegó la prórroga de su pasaporte y Chichay indica que nó.- 499.-
(2.-LIL.-26 Sep.66).-

14-00000

5827

Embajada de Cuba.- 11-28-47.
29 septiembre 63.- 111-N18.
0910-1[illegible].-

01-49.- Entradas sin contestación.

[illegible]5.- Entrada a las 1009hs.- García de Cubana con MD le dice que está un señor que trae una carta firmada por Curbelo para unos pasajes, pero que el número de orden que dan no está correcto.- MD que para quienes son los pasajes.- García: [illegible] MUDE.- que dice que para que hagan uso de un pasaje de la orden de [illegible] con el número 1369-03558 y que ese número no existe.- MD que va a investigar con Curbelo en la embajada y que luego le llama.--- 63.-

64.- Salida al 141326.- 1007hs._ Mery de parte de Loreu por el teléfono de CAPOTE.- Jorrín que es el 35-39-64.--- 72.

96.- Salida al 141326.- MD con Jorrín le dice que si está Curbelo.- Jorrín que no está.- MD que le diga que en Cubana no pueden expedir los pasajes para Pérez González y Cepeda Hernández porque está equivocado el número de la orden de pasajes.- Jorrín que el va a llamar a Cubana.--- 110.

111.- Salida al 213689.- 1055hs.- Miriam con Marcela Olguin Hablan de asuntos personales.- Quedan en juntarse a platicar [illegible].- Marcela le proporciona su dirección: Xola 1053-3 Esquina con [illegible].- Miriam a su vez le proporciona su dirección: Calzada de Tacubaya 172-5-B.-- 171.

203.- Entrada.- MF la Sra. Mitrani con Miriam le habla sobre la [illegible] de un documento que se mandó a la Habana.- Miriam que no ha llegado, que llame el lunes.-- 257

2[illegible]3.- Entrada a las 1146hs._ MF con Mery le dice que ella

5818

[illegible] 11-12-61.
21 [illegible] 1130-1611.
1551-2001hs.

66.- Salida al 111073.-1530hs.- Jorrín con Dr Villarroel le dice que perdona su impaciencia que ya lo comprenderá.- Villarroel: que su coche ya lo mandaron traer pero que no lo [illegible] ahora, que el [illegible] que será mañana.- Jorrín: [illegible] que le gustaría que lo [illegible] Universal porque ellos [illegible] algún dato [illegible] aunque ya se hizo la entrega [illegible], pero que sería por portando el vehículo. Jorrín: [illegible] mejor que el [illegible] comunique con el cuando ten[illegible] Villarroel que entonces el lo avisa [illegible] 67.

70.- Salida al 494407.- 1600hs.- Chichay con Aurea le dice que [illegible] en la Ciudadela [illegible] a tener una exposición de [illegible] de dos [illegible] para que vayan, que [illegible] de la noche.- [illegible] que Jorge anda por Aguascalientes porque se fué de jurado para el concurso de teatro y que regresa hasta el sábado.- Chichay: que la exposición es solamente mañana en la Escuela de Artesanía, que le diga a las demás personas que vayan.--- 92.

93-195.- Salidas sin contestación, ocupado y equivocado.

215.- Entrada a las 1616hs.- Dr Alberto Domingo por Nuez.- Chichay que no está.--- Domingo: que mas tarde habla.- 26

263.- Salida al 197010.- 1540hs.- Chichay por Sonia Quiñones.- HF que no ha llegado.- Chichay: que le diga que pase a poco por una [illegible] en casa de Carlos Jurado.--- 273.

274-275.- Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.

[illegible] Rogelio Farías, pide a Chichay que cuando lleguen lo llamen al 485925. Chichay acepta.- 115.-

115. Salida.- Curbelo al enterarse de que no está Acevedo, pide que cuando llegue le digan lo llame y HP acepta.- 122.-

123. Salida sin contestación.- 135.-

135. Entrada.- HP pregunta por Curbelo y Chichay pide le hable al 143237.- 144.-

144. Salidas ocupado.- 155.-

155. Salida.- Chichay pregunta a qué número se le puede hablar a Juán Carrasco y HP dice que le hable a su mamá al 217404 y pregunte por la señora Rosa....-170.-

170. Salidas sin contestación.-184.-

184. Salida al 217404.-1058.- Chichay, la esposa de Carlos Jurado, pide a HP le diga a su amigo Juán Carrasco que le trajo una caja de tabacos de La Habana y quisiera invitarlo para hoy a las 8 de la noche a la exposición de unas caricaturas de unos cubanos en la Ciudadela, Balderas 125, Escuela de Artesanía. HP queda de dar el recado.- 210.-

210. Salidas ocupado.- 219.-

219. Salida al 480339.-1102.- Chichay pregunta el teléfono de la oficina de Carmen Fabregat y al enterarse de que HP no lo sabe, pide le diga que Carlos Jurado la invita a la exposición de caricaturas que tendrá lugar en Balderas 125 hoy a las 8 de la noche. HP: muy bien.- 237.-

(2.-L31.-22 Sep.66).-

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-28-47.
21 septiembre 66.- M18-L11.
0950-1227hs.-

16.- Entrada a las 0950hs.- MF de la embajada Checoeslova ca con Chichay le pregunta que si puede mandar al consulado a la Japonesa para su pasaporte.- Chichay que sí.--- 28.

36.- Entrada a las 1043hs.- MF Armando Martínez con Curbelo le pregunta que si puede pasar a verlo para tratarle un caso de asedio por la policía.- Curbelo que sí.- Mtz. que dentro de hora y media pasará con él.---- 68.

69.- Entrada a las 1047hs.- MF Velete -venezolana- con Abreu hablan sobre el asunto de la visa para su hijita.--- que no la necesita.--- 79.

80.- Entrada a las 1122hs.- MF Fernando Rodríguez por su visa.- Chichay: que no ha llegado.--- 101.

102.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por Curbelo.- Chichay dice que Curbelo ya no trabaja en el consulado, que llame a la embajada al 141326.--- 107.

109.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carnet.--- Abreu le dice que un momento, pero no hay información.--- 161.-

183.- Entrada.- Adolfina Carnet por su pemiso de entrada. Nory: que no ha llegado nada.--- 198.

226.- Salida al 147010.- 1223hs.- Chichay con MF que se le diga a su amiga que pase a recoger una carta a la casa de Carlos Jurado, de parte de Oscar.--- 234.

235.- Salida al 347770.- (Laboratorios Química Mexicana) 1223hs.- Chichay con MF Andres Aguirre le dice que ya tie

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S E C R E T 221252Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8608 (EASBY ACTING) 22 Sep 66 IN 01702

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6808

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 89337)

B. DIRECTOR 33487

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 19 SEP 66 THAT ON PASSING THROUGH HAVANA FROM SANTIAGO ON WAY HOME TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-4 HAD VISITED AURELIO ALONZO MUTUAL FRIEND IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE.

2. ALSONZO TOLD LIRING-4 THAT THEIR FRIEND RAMON ROSSIE HAD ABSCONDED WITH $300,000 OF MINCEX FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO HIM TO MAKE PURCHASES SYRIA. THIS HAD LED DSE, WHICH AT FIRST BELIEVED ROSSIE DEFECTED FOR POLITICAL REASONS, TO BELIEVE THAT HIS MOTIVES FOR FLIGHT WERE PURELY PERSONAL AND FOR FINANCIAL GAIN. LIRING-4 ALSO CONTACTED ROSSIE'S VENEZUELAN WIFE IN HAVANA. LATTER TOLD LIRING-4 SHE HAD BEEN OFFERED GOOD JOB BY CUBAN GOVT BUT HAD TURNED IT DOWN BECAUSE SHE DESIRED RETURN VENEZUELA WITH TWO CHILDREN.

3. ACCORDING LIRING-4 FROM ALONSO THIS REFUSAL OF WIFE CAUSED DSE REASSESS CASE AND IT NOW INCLINED BELIEVE ROSSIE SECRETLY IN TOUCH WITH WIFE AND WILL PROBABLY RETURN TO HER ONCE SHE OUT OF CUBA. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON IF WIFE COMES THROUGH MEXICO SHE WILL MOST PROBABLY CONTACT LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8625 S E C R E T

BECAUSE OF PAST FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN COUPLES.

4. RECOGNIZE THIS DOES NOT JIBE WITH REF B REPORT BUT WILL WATCH FOR WIFE AND IF CONTACT CAN BE MADE HAVE APARTMENT WHICH LIRING-3 CAN OFFER HER IN MEXICO CITY TO ASSIST HER DURING STAY.

5. ALONZO ALSO TOLD LIRING-4 HE WOULD TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY 30 SEP OR 1 OCT ON TRIP MENTIONED REF A. ALSO HOPE HOUSE HIM IN APARTMENT WHICH STATION NOW PREPARING WIRE FOR SOUND.

SECRET

*RE ROSSIE, CUBAN DEFECTOR

BT

SECRET

5701

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-26-47.
19 septiembre 65.- M18-111.
0924-1300hs.

25.- Salida al 259100 (Embajada Americana) 0924hs.- Curbelo con HF la Srita. De Laval le pregunta que si tiene una visa para [illegible] FERRER y EDUARDO CISNEROS y DORA RIVERO -- MEXICANOS.-- De Laval que el de Dora ya está pero que el de Ferrer no,-que quizas llegue en el transcurso del día la autorización.--- 53.

74.- Salida al 48664F.- 0953hs.- Miriam con HF le dice que tiene una carta para el Sr.Leopoldo Zorrilla Montiel que le trajo de la Habana, que pasen a recogerla.- HF de acuerdo.- ---- 90.

92.- Salida al 118220.- 0955hs.- Miriam con HF Graciela le dice que le trajo una carta de la Habana.- Graciela que ella pasará a recogerla.--- 107.

115.- Entrada a las 1025hs.- HF aleman con Miriam le dice que le llamo de Siemens de México,S.A., que uno de los señores de nuestra casa matríz en Alemania quiere volar a Cuba y están preguntando si ustedes aquí le pueden dar una visa y que cuanto tiempo tarda eso.- Miriam: que que es lo que va a hacer a Cuba.- HF que el va a estar en contacto con las empresas con las cuales estamos haciendo negocio, que no le dicen precisamente cuales, pero que deben ser la QUIMIMPEX, LA ALIMPEX... etc., Miriam: que llame al departamento comercial al 250914.---- 128.

Carlos

215.- Entrada.- HF con Miriam Chichay.- Miriam le llama de amor.-- HF que lo llama porque a la 1.15pm que ya habló con BCE que ya se consiguió la primera de las cosas que se va a hacer; que la va a llevar a la persona que va a encargarse de eso a [illegible]LETICA que es donde van a estar ellos a la 1.15pm que entonces llegará como al cuarto para las dos.- Miriam: que está bien.- HF que a donde lo va a esperar.- Miriam: que en la embajada porque es el primer día que está trabajando y que está sola.- HF que mejor se vaya a la casa.--- 227.

228.- Entrada a las 1159hs.- HF por la respuesta del cable 130 para renovación de pasaporte.-- Mery: que ya llegó.- 236

237.- Entrada a las 1207hs.- HF por la contestación del cable 132.- Mery: que ya llegó.--- 244.

253.- Entrada a las 1227hs.- HF Sánches Leal por Curbelo.- Mery que no está.- Sánchez que llamará mas tarde.--- 259.

260.- Entrada a las 1230hs.- HF Amado por Abreu.- Mery: que no está.-- Amado: que le diga que les hace falta la cosa del fiador que lo tenga preparado para esta tarde.--- 264.

287.- Entrada a las 1244hs.- HF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carmot.- Mery que no ha llegado.- HF que de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba aseguran que ya lo mandaron.- --- 323.

332.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Fernando Rodrigues.- Miriam que no ha llegado nada.--- 339.

347.- Entrada a las 1300hs.- HF por la certificación para la Srita.Teresa Lovaina Morales, que es certificación de segundo año de secundaria básica.- Miriam: que no ha llegado. --- 373.

374.- 460.- Entradas y salidas sin contestación.- Teléfono desconectado.-

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 55

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, SB-8, SOD-6, CI/IC-2, EUR-8

S E C R E T 031353Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

8 SEP 66 IN 91995

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8453 (IN 89338) *

B. DIRECTOR 32961 **

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 13,000 TONS AS COMING FROM AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE. LIRING-3 MADE STATEMENT SHIP POSSIBLY TO BE USED TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH HE SAID WOULD REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. NOT KNOW IF THIS STATEMENT BY ALONSO BUT HE EXPECTED THROUGH MEXICO CITY SHORTLY AND LIRING-3 WILL BE ABLE CONTACT AND POSSIBLY CAN REQUERY REASON FOR NEED. STATION COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID BEING CUT.

2. REALIZE THAT TO GIVE ASSISTANCE CHARTERING SHIPS COUNTER WOLADY POLICY, HOWEVER, IN VIEW BOOST SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD MEAN IN LIRING-3 PRESTIGE WITH PBRUMEN REQUEST HQS COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS. WALLACE B. ROWTON KNOWS GREEK SHIPPING OFFICIAL NEW YORK FORMERLY CLEARED WHO HE BELIEVES COULD ASSIST. THIS INDIVIDUAL, CAPT. GEORGE STAM OR STAMATOPOLIS, WELL ACQUAINTED INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CIRCLES AND MIGHT BE IN POSITION MEET ALONSO IN CANADA AND UNDER GUISE

SECRET

ATTEMPTING ASSIST OBTAIN CHARTERS COULD POSSIBLY LEARN MORE DETAILS CUBAN SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

3. IN FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY ROWTON ON MATTERS CONTAINED REF A, LIRING-3 STATED ARMANDO HART IS LEADING FIGURE IN CIVILIAN FACTION ALONG WITH PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA GARCIA.

S E C R E T

BT *REF: RYBAT
**Requested Source Statement Possibility Exists
Cut in Soviet Assistance.

SECRET

DISPATCH

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TO
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.
Deputy Chief WH/C and Chief of Station/JMWAVE

FROM
Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT
LIRING-1 and LIRING-2

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 6 September 1966 Station Officer Lawrence F. BARKER attended a meeting of the Consular Association, a loosely knit, rather [illegible] association used in the past primarily as a stepping stone to status by honorary consular officers. With the election of LIRING-2 as president of the group in late 1965, representatives of countries not friendly with PBRUMEN have generally boycotted the meetings. In the belief that the incumbents were willing to present their resignations so that another slate of officers might be elected, BARKER was selected to attend for LNPURE. As it turned out, the meeting drew only nine persons and no business of any consequence was transacted. [illegible] had not previously met. The purpose of this dispatch is to record certain conclusions drawn about LIRING-1 and LIRING-2. The latter "presided" over the meeting.

2. LIRING-1 impressed BARKER as being intelligent, articulate, self confident, affable and attentive. It was clear that, while LIRING-1 holds no office in the association, he intended to speak for himself and LIRING-2. He explained in a straightforward manner that he felt that the sad state of the association was due to politics; namely, that a representative of a "socialist country" (LIRING-2) had been elected president in a sparsely attended meeting. He felt that because of this most of the other consular officers were avoiding meetings and that no amount of nice diplomatic talk could gloss over this fact. (This impressed BARKER as a good estimate of the situation). LIRING-1 then said that he felt it would be best for LIRING-2 to step down so that the association could once again draw people to its meetings. He further promised that the PBRUMEN representatives would stick with the association as ordinary members and give their full support to the next slate of officers.

3. Dressed in a rather lumpy and shabby suit that appeared to have been made from old army blankets dyed dark blue, LIRING-1 made up for his appearance and slight stature by flashing a warm smile and being pleasant throughout the meeting which consisted of a sojourn at the bar followed by dinner. BARKER

CONTINUED . . . .

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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMA-29999

DATE
7 September 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-[illegible]

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-29993

attempted, apparently with success to exorcise all [illegible] slang and accent from his own speech, and LIRING-1 never inquired whether BARKER had ever been to [illegible] or had any connection with matters [illegible]. He seemed genuinely interested in a BARKER spiel on Mayan archaeology and anthropology and by the end of the meal was slapping BARKER on the back. While young and perhaps somewhat immature, LIRING-1 appears to be a tough character -- quick witted and thoroughly convinced that he stands for what is right. The overall impression is somewhat at variance with what had been expected from AMPICK-1 and, to some extent, [illegible]-1 reports. LIRING-1 is no "kid" and while he may have plenty to learn in the intelligence trade he appears to be quite capable of learning it given sufficient time. From the opposition viewpoint he should be an effective agent developer.

4. For the record, it should be noted that he has a ruddy complexion and bright blue-green eyes.

5. LIRING-2, on the other hand, appears to be a rather wishy-washy sort [illegible] of weakness. Although superior to LIRING-1 in the association and within LIRING itself, he took a back seat to LIRING-1 in the discussions. He seems to be essentially introverted. He is pleasant but one gets the impression that this is a matter of diplomatic correctness.

6. The above observations are all based on a one-time, two-hour encounter and may well be inaccurate. They are set forth, however, in an effort to assist in arriving at a correct assessment of key opposition personnel, primarily LIRING-1. He has the makings of a good operator and merits respect as well as study with a view to his eventual recruitment.

for Willard C. CURTIS

MESSAGE FORM
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[redacted]

ORIG: H. WEILER
UNIT: WH/C/RR
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6 15 18 Z CITE DIRECTOR 32961

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8458

HQS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED INFO PARA 5 REF. REQUEST SOURCE STATEMENT POSSIBILITY EXISTS CUT IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE. IS THIS STATION OR LIRING/3 COMMENT, OR WAS IT STATEMENT BY LIRING/3 CONTACT IN CUBA? IF LATTER, WHO WAS SOURCE?

SECRET

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER H WEILER WH/C/RR
COORDINATING OFFFICER H WEILER WH/C/RR
R ORTMAN WH/C/MO
?????? WH/1
T HAZLETT WH/C/FI
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
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ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS: ~~[illegible]~~
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 6 SEPT 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, clwh6, clci, clfi2, clfe3, clsas

SECRET

1441Z CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 88835)

ROSSIE OF REFERENCE, PARAGRAPH 7 WHILE VISITING BEIRUT EARLY JULY 1966 WAS RECRUITED BY WOFACT AND TRAINED BECOME ON ISLAND ASSET. ROSSIE WAS DEPART SYRIA FOR PRAGUE 14 JULY ENROUTE CUBA BUT INSTEAD STAYED SYRIA WITH NEW SYRIAN WIFE. EARLY JULY CUBAN REPRESENTATIVE BEIRUT BEGAN TRYING LOCATE ROSSIE. WE UNAWARE HIS WHEREABOUTS FROM 14 JULY UNTIL 13 AUGUST WHEN HE WALKED INTO WOFACT COVER OFFICE BARCELONA, SPAIN. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SENT MADRID WHERE STATION HAD LITTLE LUCK DEBRIEFING HIM DUE HIS AGITATION AND NERVOUSNESS. 26 AUGUST HE SIGNED QUIT CLAIM. HE AND NEW WIFE HOPE RESETTLE VENEZUELA WHERE HE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. ROSSIE DID NOT DEFECT WITH ANY CUBAN FUNDS. HE BROKE WHEN ARRIVED BARCELONA AND RELIABLE SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATED CUBANS WHEN INITIALLY BEGAN LOOKING FOR HIM WERE WORRIED BECAUSE HAD LIMITED FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER 8-5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

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CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO

PAGE TWO

DC/WH/C/CICS

C/WH/C/FI

for C/WH/C/MO

WH/1

E. C. Williams
for
WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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E. C. Williams
THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S E C R E T 031932Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8463

3 SEP 65 IN 68336

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE

BC

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 84377)

1. LIRING/3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT IN HAVANA AIRPORT 29 AUGUST AS HE ABOUT EMBARK ON CUBANA TO MEXICO CITY HE MET LINO SALAZAR FORMER EMPLOYEE CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. SALAZAR TOLD LIRING/3 HE AT AIRPORT TO ESCORT VIRGINIA A. GOMEZ CUEVAS DE LIZALDE TO PLANE AND SEE HER SAFELY ON WAY BACK TO MEXICO CITY.

2. VIRGINIA IS SISTER OF GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS ARRESTED IN NICO GALAN ROUNDUP. GOMEZ ACCORDING TO POLICE STATEMENT WAS REPORTEDLY IN CHARGE DRAWING UP PLANS ON ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN MEXICO (SEE MEXICO CITY 8241). (IN 76854)

3. LIRING/3 TALKED WITH VIRGINIA ON FLIGHT. SHE APPEARED VERY DEPRESSED OVER ARREST OF HER BROTHER AND FRIENDS IN MEXICO. SHE SAID SHE HAD BEEN UNABLE DO ANY SIGHTSEEING IN HAVANA. LIRING/3 IMPLIED FROM FACT SHE ESCORTED TO AIRPORT SHE MUST HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS HAVANA. ON RETURN FLIGHT SHE ACKNOWLEDGED HAVEING NO MONEY AND LIRING/3 PRESSED 150 MN ON HER AS FRIENDLY LOAN. LIRING/3 ALSO CONCLUDED FROM HER SAD APPEARANCE CUBAN OFFICIALS HAD GIVEN HER NO

SECRET

HOPE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THERE.

4. CUBANA MANIFESTS SHOW VIRGINIA FLEW MEXICO CITY TO HAVANA 15 JULY 1969. HER MEXICO CITY ADDRESS GIVEN ON RETURN FLIGHT MANIFEST 29 AUG. AS ALMENCENES 98 A WPRN COLONIA TLALTELOLCO, MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

FORM 4-67 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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BC/BT

S E C R E T 031858Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8458

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

3 SEP 66 IN 89335

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8313 (IN 79989)

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON AND LIRING/3 HELD BRIEF MEETINGS 2 SEPT 66 FOLLOWING LIRING/3 RETURN FROM HAVANA 29 AUG. BELOW ARE SOME OF HIGHLIGHTS LIRING/3 TEN DAY TRIP.

2. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HOLDS KEY POSITION IN MINISTRY OF SUGAR ALTHOUGH HE NOT ACTUALLY MINISTER. HE EXPECTS TRAVEL TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PROBABLY POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN NEAR FUTURE ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE PURCHASES SUGAR.

3. ON OWN INITIATIVE, RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 THAT LIRING/4 SHOULD BE EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY. APPARENTLY FACT SHE ALREADY WORKING THERE NOT KNOWN HAVANA. RODRIGUEZ SAID LIRING/4 SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC STATUS SINCE THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE HER STATUS AS WIFE LIRING/3. RATHER SHE WILL WORK OSTENSIBLY AS VOLUNTEER. LIRING/3 HAS NEVER ADMITTED TO ROWTON THAT LIRING/4 WORKING IN EMBASSY.

4. RODRIGUEZ PUT LIRING/3 IN CONTACT WITH IMPORTANT OFFICIAL OF MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR (MINCEX) WHOSE FIRST NAME IS AURELIO (LELO) BUT WHOSE LAST NAME LIRING/3 CANNOT RECALL. LIRING/3 STATES [illegible] HAS KNOWN

SECRET

AURELIO SOME TIME BUT NEVER HAD BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH HIM. AURELIO APPEARED APPOINT LIRING/3 HIS SPECIAL REP MEXICO AND SAID HE WOULD SEND LIRING/3 INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH COMMERCIAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY, SERGIO MARTINEZ BARROSO, REGARDING URGENT COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF HAVANA.

5. AURELIO CONFIDED TO LIRING/3 THAT CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT OF MOMENT WAS CHARTER OF 24 MEDIUM TONNAGE SHIPS FOR USE IN 1967. AURELIO ADDED THIS CLASSIFIED SECRET AND THAT SERGIO MARTINEZ KNEW NOTHING OF THIS AND THAT LIRING/3 SHOULD NOT MENTION IT. AURELIO STATED HE WILL TRANSIT MEXICO CITY ABOUT 15 SEPTEMBER ENROUTE CANADA AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LEADS LIRING/3 COULD GIVE AT THAT TIME RE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL RENTING SHIPS. AURELIO COMMENTED CUBA COULD NOT PUBLICIZE THIS NEED SINCE PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATED CHARTERING MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE REQUIREMENT KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. POSSIBILITY EXISTS RUSSIANS MAY HAVE CUT DOWN THEIR ASSISTANCE TRANSPORT CUBAN SUGAR FORCING CUBANS CHARTER BOTTOMS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. LIRING/3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET AMOIL-1 ON PLANE GOING INTO CUBA 19 AUG AND APPARENTLY TWO BECAME FRIENDLY. AMOIL-1 ARRANGED BY PHONE PASSAGE ON CUBANA FOR LIRING/4 TO SANTIAGO WHEN PASSAGE NOT EASY OBTAIN. EVEN OFFERED FLY HER THERE IN HIS PLANE IF NECESSARY. LIRING/3 ASKED

AMOIL/1 IF THERE WEREN'T SOMETHING HE NEEDED FROM MEXICO CITY OR IF HE COULD NOT SEND HIM GIFT. AMOIL/1 APPARENTLY HAD NO PARTICULAR WANTS BUT ASKED LIRING/3 USE CHANNEL THROUGH JORRIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY RATHER THAN POUCH IF LIRING/3 WANTED SEND SOMETHING TO AMOIL/1.

7. AURELIO OF MINCEX TOLD LIRING/3 THEIR MUTUAL FRUEND RAMON ROSIE WHO HAD BEEN SENT SYRIA BY MINCEX HAD DONE EXCELLENT JOB BUT HAD FINALLY DEFECTED AND MARRIED LOCAL SYRIAN TELEPHONE OPERATOR. ROSIE HAS WIFE AND CHILD HAVANA. AURELIO IMPLIED ROSIE HAD DEFECTED WITH CONSIDERABLE MOUNT OF CUBAN FUNDS. LIRING/3 COMMENTED TO ROWTON THAT ROSIE COULD BE USEFUL ROWTON'S BUSINESS INTERESTS BECAUSE OF HIS MANY CONTACTS MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE. LIRING/3 BELIEVES HE KNOWS ROSIE WELL ENOUGH RECRUIT HIM FOR ROWTON.

8. AS TO POLITICAL MANEUVERS LIRING/3 REPORTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD HIM MOST POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN CUBA AT PRESENT ARE RAUL CASTRO AND RAMIRO VALDEZ WHO CARRY WEIGHT OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DESPITE FACT NEITHER HAS POPULAR SUPPORT. THEIR OPPOSING FACTION HEADED BY DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA CARCIA WHO APPEAR HOLD RELATIVELY GOOD POPULAR SUPPORT. FIDEL CASTRO IS IN MIDDLE ATTEMPTING CONCILIATE TWO FACTIONS BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE.

9. ACCORDING ARNOL RODRIGUEZ LIRING/2 NO LONGER CONSUL MEXICO CITY But,

Discrepancy with SI.

SECRET

IS TO REMAIN MEXICO LONG ENOUGH CLEAN UP ADMINISTRATIVE MESS HE CREATED DURING HIS TOUR. MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS TOLD LIRING/3 IN HAVANA HE WOULD NOT BE COMING BACK TO MEXICO CITY. DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE WOULD BE REASSIGNED OR WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM MEXICO.

10. REGARDING CURRENCY RESERVES, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 CUBA HAS SUFFICIENT RESERVES MEET CURRENT COMMITMENTS. CUBA HAS RECENTLY SIGNED 52 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT WITH FRANCE TO BUILD INDUSTRY CUBA.

SECRET

SECRET

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14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

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X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

ABSTRACT

Chief of Station, Mexico City

Chief of Station, Guatemala City; San Salvador

Acting Chief, WH Division

DYVOUR/[illegible]

Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training Near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

Action Required: See Paragraph 3

References:
A. SAN SALVADOR-8382, 28 August 1966
B. HMMW-14[illegible], 27 June 1966
C. HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

1. Headquarters was interested to learn of JUSLING-1's report of Mauricio de la SELVA's claim in Reference A that..."they have a center in Tehuantepec for the training of guerrillas for Central America..." in the light of Subject Report involving the same general area and the identification of Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas by AMMUG-1 in 1964 as the Salvadoran Communist Party link with the Cuban Intelligence Service in Mexico City.

2. For the information of Stations Guatemala City and San Salvador, Reference B reported information from a Mexican ex-military physician of unknown reliability that the Cuban Consulate in Merida had established a group of Cubans in Raudales, Malpaso, where the Netzahualcoyotl Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics; and reference C reported background information on Malpaso published in the Mexican pro-Castro magazine Siempre under the byline of one Carlos NAVARRETE. It was noted that a person by the name of Carlos NAVARRETE had been reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 as a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico. It is now noted that the Siempre staff appears recently to have been taking more than usual amount of interest in the Chiapas area (which includes Tehuantepec). In addition to the NAVARRETE article on Malpaso, the 31 August 1966 issue carried no less than eleven articles and a four-page color picture spread on the area by Jose Natividad ROSALES, Horacio ESPARZA, Pedro ALVARADO Lang, Pablo MONTANES, Antonio PLIEGO, Nabor [illegible], Renato LEDUC, Jose CIRON, and Rodolfo [illegible]. One of the articles by ROSALES even noted that on the road from Tapachula, the entire Siempre team almost perished in a near-automobile accident. The same issue carries part two of an article on guerrilla activities of the

Continued.../

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, Guatemala City
1 - COS, San Salvador

Possible interest in LIRING-3 Cord

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14838

DATE
1 September 1966

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-120-13

RI
Chrono
WH/C/FI
WH/2

WH/1 Jack Stewart : mr 3654

WH/C/FI

WH/2

AC/WH/1 Fisher

53

DISPATCH

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HMMW-14533

Partido Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) by Antonio CARAM. Antonio CARAM may be identical with Antonio CARAM Hafud, a Prensa Latina employee in Mexico City who was born in Tapachula, Chiapas. CARAM was reported to be a high official of the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP) in 1963 and is believed to be identical with the Antonio CARAM who was reliably reported in May 1964 to be in contact with Oldrich [illegible] of the Czech Embassy in Mexico City. While of course none of the foregoing may have any direct connection with reports of guerrilla training in this area or with the arrest of Victor RICO Galan, the noted Spanish writer and pro-Castro activist, on 12 August 1966 for subversive activities, the information may be of background interest.

3. When [illegible]-1 is debriefed, it might be of interest to attempt to ascertain if he has any further light to throw on the Tehuantepec area with respect to guerrilla training activities and to ask him to keep an ear out for such information.

Andrew F. [illegible]

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	☐ CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 32

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
2		6	[illegible]
3	CA	7	[illegible]
4	PA	8	FI

FROM
DISSEM BY 33/3

ACTION
WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TC TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/4

S E C R E T 1922552 CITE MEXICO CITY 8310 IN 79989

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 20 AUG 66

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON MET LIRING-3 18 AUG IN LAST MEET PRIOR L-3 DEPARTURE FOR CUBA 19 AUG. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD TALKED WITH ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 18 AUG FROM WHOM HE LEARNED FOLLOWING:

A. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HAS BEEN MADE MINISTER OF SUGAR IN NEWLY ORGANIZED OR REORGANIZED SUGAR MINISTRY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD CONTACT RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FIRST UPON ARRIVAL CUBA TO CHECK HIS PRESENT POSITION AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

B. SENDING OF OLD DC-4 AIRPLANE TO MEXICO 16 AUG WAS OSTENSIBLY SPECIAL SERVICE FOR JOSEPHINE BAKER AND 16 CHILDREN TO TRANSPORT THEM TO MEXICO. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO CURBELO THIS PLANE ALSO GAVE CUBANS EXCUSE FOR NOT EVACUATING MEXICANS IMPLICATED IN RICO GALAN CASE WHO WERE PRESSING CUBAN EMBASSY FOR SANCTARY IN CUBA TO AVOID ARREST.

2. L-3 BELIEVES RICO GALAN CASE POINTS UP CONFLICT IN CUBAN EMBASSY BETWEEN SECURITY/INTEL AND FOREIGN MINISTRY GROUPS. ON 15 AUG L-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, PRESS AND CULTURAL ATTACHE WARNED L-3 NOT TAKE 16 AUG PLANE BECAUSE THERE GOING BE SEVERAL

SECRET

Jane

SECRET

MEXICANS GOING TO CUBA TO ESCAPE ARREST IN RICO GALAN CASE. AS IT TURNED OUT ONLY FIVE PERSONS FLEW IN DC-4 BACK TO CUBA 16 AUG AND NO MEXICANS AMONG THEM. L-3 STATED CURBELO ON 18 AUG INDICATED CUBANS VERY FEARFUL FOR CUBAN/MEXICAN RELATIONS DUE RICO GALAN CASE AND DID NOT WANT BE ACCUSED BY MEXICANS OF GRANTING ASYLUM TO GUILTY PARTIES. IT VERY UNUSUAL FOR CUBANA ON MEXICO TO HAVANA RUN CARRY ONLY FIVE PASSENGERS.

4. L-3 STATED HE SAW FERNANDO RICO GALAN BROTHER OF VICTOR, IN CUBANA OFFICE 12 AUG ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FLIGHT TO HAVANA. FLIGHT DID NOT COME MEXICO CITY THAT DAY AND FERNANDO ARRESTED IN ROUNDUP. L-3 ALSO SAW ON 12 AUG ONE NOEL BARRA ZENIL ATTEMPTING ARRANGE PASSAGE. BARRA DESCRIBED BY L-3 AS RABID COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND UNTIL RECENTLY A LONG RESIDENT IN HAVANA.

5. L-3 BELIEVES LOPEZ PROBABLY SECURITY OR INTEL REP IN EMBASSY SINCE HE VERY CLOSE RICO GALAN AND APPEARED FEEL MEXICANS CONNECTED WITH CASE WHO NOT YET ARRESTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PASSAGE TO CUBA. ALSO RECENTLY L-3 ASKED LOPEZ WHY HE DID NOT DO MORE IN CULTURAL PRESS WORK FOR CUBA. LOPEZ REPLIED THAT NOT IMPORTANT BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS ASSISTING REVOLUTIONARY FORCES MEXICO. L-3 COMMENTED ATTITUDE OF CURBELO APPEARED REFLECT FOREIGN MINISTRY POLICY NOT TO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 3310 SECRET

DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT UPSET CUBAN MEXICAN RELATIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

Dolores, a agregada del Departamento de Visas, con Abreu, --- quien explica que hace aproximadamente 5 días la señorita -- Lourdes González solicitó a su familia la visa, que sus padres están graves y como Lourdes es religiosa quisiera saber si - puede hacer algo por ella, ya que si no se va el viernes, ya no podrá viajar, pero la opinión del Consulado es que viaje- lo más pronto posible. Dolores que está en trámite, pero lo volverá a decir al compañero.- 870.-

870. Salida al 09.- MD pide el costo de la llamada anterior- y MF queda de llamarlo.- 880.- Lourdes González vuelve a- llamar y pide que el importe de la llamada se la pasen al -- 732962 y pregunta por la madre Angela. MF dice que fueron 9 minutos e importaron $ 112.50. Lourdes dá las gracias.962.

962. Entrada 1221.- El Lic. Mújica, de la Secretaría de la -- Presidencia, y Abreu quedan de verse mañana a las 3 de la -- tarde en la Fonda Santa Anita que está en Humbolt.- 999.-

999. Entrada 1225.- Marcela Olguín después de comunicarle a- Miriam que se va hoy ó mañana, se entera que Chichay se va - el viernes a Cuba con su esposo y su hija, pero regresarán - como dentro de 10 días para luego regresar por más tiempo. - Marcela le desea buen viaje e indica que cuando tenga tiempo irá a verla porque ya no aguanta a su esposo y quiere que lo- deporten. Miriam indica que mañana ó el sábado llega -- Carbelo y le sugiere que le hable todos los días. Marcela lo acepta.- 1074.-

HMMA-29793
18 Aug 66
LIENVOY

Jane
LIRING-3

- -

- - (5.-LII.- 15 agosto 66).-

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

ORIG: H. WEILER;gb
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT: 3561
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: 10H/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE . FI, FI/INT 2, IW, WH 8
RUR 8 CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET [illegible] CITE DIRECTOR 27103

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8189 (IN 73260)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMS FOR LIRING-3:

A. CUBAN REQUIREMENTS FOR FREE WORLD PURCHASES. MOST URGENT ITEMS. AMOUNT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AVAILABLE FROM THIS YEAR'S SUGAR CROP FOR SUCH PURCHASES. CREDIT PLANS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES POSSIBLE.

B. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE OTHER EXPORTS AUGMENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS HEDGE AGAINST CONTINUED POOR CROPS.

C. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE TRADE MEXICO, OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. CUBAN PLANS IMPROVE RELATIONS THIS AREA.

D. PRESENT POSITION, STATUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ.

2. ONLY ADDL TRACE OCHOA: EGK 40533, 23 MARCH 1966 (CATIDE) REPORTS RENE OCHOA (NATIONALITY NOT GIVEN) AND AGUSTIN P. ROMAN ATTENDANCE FIRST CONGRESS OF PUBLISHERS OF SOCIALIST PEDAGOGICS, PRAGUE, 15-30 NOV 1965.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI
WH/1 J. Stewart (in draft)

LIRING-3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

11-11

COPY NO.

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1ASS

4-68 JUIU

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

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4		8	

FROM

DISSEM BY 33/M

ACTION

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO

FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189

DIRECTOR

9 AUG 66 IN 73260

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8128 (IN 68738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN.

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,200 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG.

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

File LIRING-3

WEILER DRAFTED ROMS/CABLE. & TRACES. I COORDINATED. J

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8189 SECRET SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04248 30 APRIL 1964.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

- [illegible] OCHOA.
[illegible] OSY5 10 Aug

EGIC-40533 Cable 23 Mar 66
Subj is Agustin P. ROMAN attended 1st
Congress of Publishers of Socialist Countries
held Prague 15-20 Nov 65

~~[illegible]~~ plus from PCH [illegible] - 64148
[illegible] 64
63-4-124.2 p19

in Cuba 1962
expelled from PCH

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS:ack
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
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2		6	
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DISSEM BY 21 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C-8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH-8, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 03 18 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 25094

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/CI

C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

3-16

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

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1	[illegible]	5	[illegible]
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4	[illegible]	8	[illegible]

FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION WH/C-8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8115

2 Aug 66 IN 68647

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. IN MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 1 AUGUST 1966, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR STATED MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS HAD SHOWN HIM LENGTHY CABLE FROM HAVANA WHICH ARRIVED MEXICO CITY AFTER DEPARTURE OF ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 25 JULY WHICH SUMMARIZED LIST OF DEFICIENCIES AND INEFFICIENCIES OF CURBELO DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT MEXICO CITY.

2. CABLE SIGNED BY RAUL ROA GARCIA. CABLE CITED UNANSWERED MESSAGES REQUESTING SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND LIST OF ACTIONS NOT TAKEN. LOZANO TOLD JURADO IT UNLIKELY CURBELO WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

?? I note that Curbelo back in spite of this. Obviously not build up remonstrance — thus L-3 possibly legit.

201-798301

LIRING-3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 30

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 30/4

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, ~~WH8~~, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 022227Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3126 2 Aug 63 IN 03738

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

File

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERE WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

TOTAL COPIES 47

SECRET

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Dissem By 22

ACTION WH/C-8

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UNIT

TIME 1253

BY C

INFO FILE, VR, CSDO, DCI, DDP, CS/RE, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, OSA 3, FE 8, SAVA 2, FI/[illegible], WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3,

FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY: DCI, DDCI

23 JUL 66 IN 62489

S E C R E T 231655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8026

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7994 (IN 60697)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AFTERNOON OF 22 JULY 1966, HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER OF AIRMEN PRISONERS IN NORTH VIET NAM WITH MIGUEL LOZANO EARLIER THAT DAY. JURADO SAID LOZANO REMARKED THAT IN HIS OPINION AIRMEN WOULD NOT BE EXECUTED AND REFERERED TO RECENT REPLY OF NORTH VIET NAM PRESIDENT TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT PRISONERS WERE BEING TREATED HUMANELY. LOZANO ADDED NO SUCH THING AS EXECUTION OF PRISONERS WAS FORESEEN.

2. BELIEVE THIS BEST KNOWLEDGE CUBANS AT EMBASSY HERE HAVE OF SITUATION AND CAN ONLY CONCLUDE ORIGINAL STATEMENT BY ABELARDO CURBELO WAS UTTERED TO SPARK AN OTHERWISE ORDINARY CONVERSATION AND PERHAPS ATTEMPT GET RISE OUT OF RAMIRO ABREU AND JURADO.

S E C R E T

BT

CS Comment: *Advised that ROWTON (1) would meet Jurado and attempt to assess Cuban knowledge of NVN intentions regarding the airmen prisoners.

SECRET

Rowton ??

~~[illegible] OPS~~

~~SD-6-137/3~~

201-798301

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 83

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 47

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S E C R E T 210345Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7994 CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY DDI 20, D/DCI 2

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

IN 60657

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LIRING

REF A DIRECTOR 21425 **

B MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59538)*

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON[1] IN MEETING 20 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO DETERMINED STATEMENT REPORTED REF B RE EXECUTION OF PRISONERS MADE BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON IN PRESENCE OF RAMIRO ABREU QUINTANA AND JURADO. STATEMENT WAS MADE POSITIVELY BY CURBELO IN CONTEXT OF BRIEF DISCUSSION RE GRAVITY OF SITUATION IN VIET NAM.

2. THOUGH FACT CURBELO MADE STATEMENT RATHER THAN ABREU WHO RECENTLY RETURNED MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA, TENDS DETRACT FROM IMPACT OF STATEMENT, ROWTON[1] HAS INSTRUCTED JURADO CONTINUE CHECK OUT STATEMENT IN EMBASSY TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS 2 A AND B REF A. JURADO TOLD ROWTON[1] HE WOULD TALK WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, EMBASSY COUNSELOR, WHO, ACCORDING TO JURADO, IS MUCH MORE RELIABLE SOURCE AND MORE AWARE OF SITUATION IN HAVANA THAN EITHER CURBELO OR ABREU.

SECRET

LIRING-3

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7994 S E C R E T

3. NEXT ROWTON[1] JURADO MEETING WILL BE AFTERNOON 23 JULY.

WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

S E C R E T

BT CS COMMENT: *Jurado told ROWTON (1) that the situation in Vietnam is grave because the North Vietnamese are going to execute the U.S. Airmen recently captured.

**Hqs feels it essential for ROWTON (1) to develop fullest possible info needed to assess Cuban knowledge of VN intentions and seek answers to a number of posed questions.

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CS/DO, FE 8, SAVA 2, FI, FI/INT 2, C/OPS, C/CA, ADDP

S E C R E T 221939Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7933

20 J... 00505

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21425 *

B. MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59838)

* SEEKING TO CLARIFY STATEMENT MADE BY LIRING-1 RE EXECUTION OF AMERICAN AIRMEN

1. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH JURADO SCHEDULED FOR 2000 HOURS 20 JULY. ROWTON BELIEVES IT BEST NOT ATTEMPT SET EARLIER MEETING LEST IT RAISE QUESTIONS JURADO'S MIND RE ROWTON'S INTEREST IN REPORT. THUS FAR ALL REPORTING BY JURADO TO ROWTON HAS BEEN UNDER GUISE OF BASIC POLITICAL INFORMATION WHICH ESSENTIAL TO PLANS FOR FUTURE BUSINESS DEALS OF ROWTON.

2. AT 2000 HOUR MEETING ROWTON WILL BE ABLE ESTABLISH PARAGRAPH 2 A AND B REF A AND THIS WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. ANSWERS TO PARA 2C AND D WILL REQUIRE JURADO REINTERROGATION OF LIRING-1. ROWTON WILL REQUEST JURADO DO THIS AT MEETING BUT IT PROBABLY WILL BE 21 JULY BEFORE JURADO CAN SEE LIRING-1.

4. IT APPARENT FROM CONTEXT OF REPORT CITED REF B THAT LIRING-1 HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT POSSIBLE REPORT REGARDING AIRMEN WAS EXPRESSION MADE TO LIRING-1 BY RODRIGUEZ.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

LIRING-3

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: V. GRIFFIN
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT:
DATE: 20 July 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

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CONF: WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE ... WH8, FE8, SAVA 2, FI, FI/INT 2, IW

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 21425

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7971

1. REF OBVIOUSLY PROVOKING MUCH INTEREST HQS, PARTICULARLY DUE JURADO CLAIMED ACCESS, PLUS DEFINITENESS STATEMENT RE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTION EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN AND ATTRIBUTION TO OFFICIAL CUBAN SOURCE.

2. IT THEREFORE ESSENTIAL ROWTON PURSUE ACTION ANTICIPATED PARA 4 REF AND METICULOUSLY DEVELOP FULLEST POSSIBLE INFO NEEDED TO ASSESS CUBAN KNOWLEDGE VN INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST ROWTON SEEK ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. CAN STATEMENT BE ATTRIBUTED TO LIRING/1 WITH CERTAINTY?

B. ANY FURTHER INFO AS TO UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN WHAT CONTEXT WAS STATEMENT MADE?

LIRING-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TO

C. DID STATEMENT REFLECT OFFICIAL CUBAN ESTIMATE OR WAS IT PERSONAL SPECULATION BY LIRING/1 OR HIS MERE ECHOING OF VN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, PRESS PLAY, OR CUBAN WISHFUL THINKING?

D. IF STATEMENT REPRESENTS OFFICIAL POSITION, FROM WHAT GOC OR OTHER FUNCTIONARY DID LIRING/1 OBTAIN IT? WHAT IS POSITION AND ACCESS OF THIS FUNCTIONARY TO SUCH HARD INFORMATION RE VN INTENTIONS, E.G., VN REP CUBA.

SECRET

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER GRIFFIN/VIDAL WH/C/RR/CICS
COORDINATING OFFICER J. FISHER WH/1
RELEASING OFFICER E. WILLIAMSON FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

ET

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO FILE, VR, DCI, DDI, ADDP, CS/RF, CS/DO, WH 8, FE 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, FI/D 4, FI/SPG, IW, DO 4, DO/H 3, CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY DDI 20, DOC 2

S E C R E T 200352Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7971

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

20 JUL 66 IN 59838

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE B.[1] ROWTON IN MEETING 19 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CAME FROM LIRING-1[2] WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA 15 JULY.

2. SITUATION IN VIETNAM GRAVE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOING TO EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN RECENTLY CAPTURED.

3. ROWTON[1] ELICITED THIS STATEMENT FROM JURADO AFTER JURADO TOLD HIM LIRING-1[2] HAD BROUGHT JURADO MESSAGE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO RECENTLY WAS REPLACED AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MESSAGE TO JURADO FROM RODRIGUEZ VIA LIRING-1[2] WAS TO EFFECT HE REPLACED AND AWAITING REASSIGNMENT BUT EFFECT OF REPLACEMENT NOT SERIOUS. JURADO TOLD ROWTON[1] LIRING-1[2] HAD SAID THERE MUCH REORGANIZATION GOING ON IN CUBA NOW BUT IT NOT SERIOUS; HOWEVER, LIRING-1[2] SAID SITUATION IN VIETNAM WAS SERIOUS BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE GOING SHOOT AMERICAN AIRMEN AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THIS WOULD ESCALATE WAR THERE.

4. ROWTON[1] HAS SCHEDULED MEET WITH JURADO EVENING 20 JULY. WILL ATTEMPT LEARN MORE DETAILS AND ESTABLISH [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7971 S E C R E T
2

[illegible]-1 KNOWLEDGE THAT MATTER.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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ACTION DC/WH/C 5

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 142332Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7920

15 JUL 65 IN 56860

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF DIRECTOR 19940

1. NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR HAS BEEN ASKED SEVERAL TIMES BY WALLACE B. ROWTON IF HE HAS HEARD ANY MORE OF RODRIGUEZ' TRAVEL PLANS BUT HE ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

2. RENTAL OF APARTMENT WHICH STATION HOPES HOUSE RODRIGUEZ WHILE HE HERE EXPECTED BE COMPLETED THIS WEEK. JUARDO HAS RECEIVED AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM LANDLADY AND HAS MONEY AND FIADOR AVAILABLE. OCCUPANTS SUPPOSED BE OUT OF APARTMENT 15 JULY. WILL ADVISE.

3. CHECKING NUMBER TEST LETTERS NOW IN BOX. WILL SERVICE AS REQUESTED.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

ORIG: C.W.ANDERSON/pap
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PA
EXT: 2975 .
DATE: 14 JULY 1966

SECRET

ROUTING
1 PA
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3 CA
4 FE

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ——— BRANCH

DISSEM BY ——— PER ——— #

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] ☐ VID COPY

INFO: FILE 0/ie#2, c/c1

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 14 18 09 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 19940

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7868 (IN 54246)

B. MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

Mexi 7920
15 July 66

1. REF A SUGGESTS RETURN OF ABREU MAY PRODUCE MOVEMENT IN AMROD OP.

2. PLS CONTINUE TWO TEST LETTERS PER WEEK TO MIGUEL SCHULTZ AND SERVICE ALL BOXES 5-8 AUGUST IN USUAL MANNER.

3. ABOUT HOW MANY TEST LETTERS ARE NOW STACKED UP AT SCHULTZ?

4. MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUING REPORTS ON LIFEAT/LIENVOY REFERENCES TO LICLOVE-2. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY WINDOW INTO OVERALL AMROD OP STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS AND INFO CONTAINED IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO HANDLING OTHER ASPECTS THIS OP AND RELATED OPS.

5. ANY INDICATION REF B INSPECTION OF LIRING IS STILL SCHEDULED?

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA/PA
C/WH/C/CA
WH/1 J Lewis

③

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

10-10
1810

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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EARL J. WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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IG: SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

SECRET

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ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
76 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ NO INDEX ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ONF: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR. M/AN, C/OPS, C/OA, FI 2

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 08 20 06z May 69

(elite) (reference number) (pica)
CITE DIRECTOR 00136

JACK LALLY

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 52298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

D/C/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/CA, FI2, FI/D4

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358

SECRET 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8125 8 MAY 1969

8 MAY 69 IN 53298

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING-4

Two "no approach" cases.

M

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9832 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68

818842

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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BY: AT: Z

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION 137 WH 8 ☐ NO COPY

INFO FILE VR. Riley, ciops, ciop

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S E C R E T 121716Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 JUL 68 IN 49231

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

15 JUL 1968

SECRET

798301

118

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

SECRET 3V

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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BY 26 PER ______ # ______

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☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818642 FILE, VR. RI/AN, C/IPS, C/OA
CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 11 22 06z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. 798301

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 818642 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~SP~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY________PER________#________

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INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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17

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S E C R E T 250185Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5598 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

798301

818842

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEM

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO.

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 SECRET

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2

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S E C R E T 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

798301

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

File

17 MAY 1968

SECRET

- 798301

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DISSEM BY 30 PER

ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE. VR. WH/COG8 CI CI/OPS CI/IC2 CI/OA FI FI/INT2 DDP ADDP CSDO

S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5542

10 MAY 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

818842

1. MANUELH (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. (798301) STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

13 MAY 1968

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 Apr 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

NR

16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 (798301) BY LIRING-4 (918942). LETTER INDICATED

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

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FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5205 SECRET

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

IG: SEARS:mamd
IIT: WH/COG/OPS
T: 1255
ATE: 8 MAY 69

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

SECRET 08 20 06Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00136

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

JACK LALLY

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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358

S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0125 8 MAY 1969

DIRECTOR

8 MAY 69 IN 53298

Two "no" approval case.

M

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9830 (IN 934397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68

818842

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

SECRET

798301

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S E C R E T 121715Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 JUL 68 IN 49831

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SINCE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

15 JUL 1968

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201-798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

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☐ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818842
FILE , VR . WH/AN, CI/PS, CI/OA
CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pico) (reference number)

SECRET 11 22 06z JUL 68 CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

File

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. 798301

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 818842 SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY ~~SO~~ IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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SECRET 12 20 15 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

OVER

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UMMA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 [illegible] DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISRAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pm
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

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☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

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19 [illegible]

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

798301

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. BOWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW BOWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WE/COG/RR/OS
WE/COG/CICS
WH/COG/MO E.g. Chiocca
WH/COG/FI
WH/COG/CA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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FILE VR, WH 8, FI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, [illegible], FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 061722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE File

6 Dec 66 IN 53817

TYPIC LIRING 9 DEC 1966 JL space fh 77830 Lily

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RIWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

SECRET

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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14 DEC 1966

S E C R E T 140020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9633 File

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE 14 DEC 66 IN 58952

PBRUMEN LIRING IN 58952

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55841)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4343, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTENDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ACCESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

SECRET

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14-00000

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ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WE/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 6 December 1966

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SECRET 6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO [redacted]

File
JL 7 DEC 1966

MEXICO CITY

~~[illegible] [illegible] LIRING-3~~

VIEW [illegible] SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 (798301) MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439 File

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

JACK

8 DEC 1966

INTEL TYPIC

798301

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 Oct 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

26 OCT 1966

TYPIC LIRING

REF: ~~MEXICO~~ CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

798301

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT WR LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND WR LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

NNNN

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 3 ~~4~~

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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ACTION WH/C 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 OCT 66 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

25 OCT 1966

798301

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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DISSEM BY 28

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WH/C 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, DO4, DO/H3
CA2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 OCT 66 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

25 OCT 1966

REF DIRECTOR 39039

798301

1. LIRING-2 CALLED (LIRING-3) TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

nP

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SECRET

PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME. [illegible] already accomplished -

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 3944 S E C R E T SECRET

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LIONION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE WILL PROVIDE HIM ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

NR

9. FACT LIRING-4 DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY

NR C-83565

LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, LITAINT-2 AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, [illegible]

S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938 22 OCT 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149)

1. LIRING-2 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. 798301 LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

SECRET

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND, HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/PS

S E C R E T 021630Z CITE MEXICO CITY 6699

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

JACK 4 OCT 1966 File

2 OCT 66 IN 07879

REF: MEXICO CITY 6692 (IN 07422)*

798301

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ -Diaz MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BABBLINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF BRAG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

3. ALSO PLANNING HAVE LIRING/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ 3 OCTOBER WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND THIS MAY ENDANGER IRINA TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER 1966 ISSUE. WARNING TO HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO CHANCE GETTING IRINA AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED 3 OCTOBER.

SECRET

BT # JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE 28 SEPT.

SECRET

RNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

SECRET

ROUTING

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 20 16 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR 45103

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

798301

END OF MESSAGE

24 OCT 1966

File

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CI
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1
WH/3/V
WH/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

19-15

SECRET

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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[redacted] DISSEM BY 28

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, C/OA, FI, FI/INT2

S E C R E T 181930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8859

CARACAS INFO JMWAVE, DIRECTOR

PERUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 8824 (IN 16737) 19830 18 OCT 65 IN 20149

LIFIRES REPORTED ARRIVAL MEXICO FROM HAVANA ON 17 OCT OF ISABLE (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ, VEN PPT M38861, CARMEN (MARQUEZ) DE (ROSSIE), VEN PPT M38860 AND MIGUEL (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ VEN PPT M38862. LOCAL ADDRESS GIVEN WAS HOME OF LIRING-3.

S E C R E T

BT

19 OCT 1965

File

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: CICS
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] SEP 66

☐ RID COPY

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

13 13 Z

MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY [illegible] (IN [illegible])
B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)

79830

FROM HQS READING OF THIS CP, APPEARS THAT [illegible]/LIRING-[illegible] RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUIT[redacted]

Guess they haven't read proven traffic

REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRINGS AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE ARRANGE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AT [illegible] [illegible]? HAS LIRING-[illegible] BEEN ABLE VERIFY HER EMPLOYMENT [illegible] LIRING-?

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)
WH/C/FI/[illegible] [illegible] (draft)
C/WH/C/CA [illegible] Anderson (draft)
[illegible]
[illegible]

FI

Mr Lally:

No Record of LIRING/1, /2 + /4 as of this A.M.

Bert
28 Sep 66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 23

SECRET

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~~FROM~~ DISSEM BY 33 / 2

ACTION WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 272215Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8551

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

File

28 SEP 1966

27 Sep 6 04697

TYPIC LIRING

7-8301

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. (Cuban Ambassador (or Consul)) ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

[redacted]

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

200-120-58

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DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______
[redacted]

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ (ELITE) ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~ (PICA)

SECRET

15 12 53Z CITE DIRECTOR 35223

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

798301 15 SEP 1966

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)

B. DIRECTOR 34711

File

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/MO

WH/1 Stewart (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-8

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

C NO.: [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA
/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA.
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a [illegible], it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of [illegible] 7234, DIR [illegible]7441 and [illegible] 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 12 SEP 1966	CASE NO. 201- 798301
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	
☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES		DATE	
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA
USE			

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ LCFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST RI TRACES	☐	FILE
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 14 Nov.
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	✓	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ✓ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	OTHER
☐	POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.		
☐	*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.		

REMARKS

Final

Pls repeat my memo of 23 June 66.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

(21)

4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189 10 AUG 1966

FYI

DIRECTOR 201 798301

9 AUG 66 IN 73260

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN.

LIRING-4 ?

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,000 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG.

— He has already used [illegible] to [illegible] GCH- ZARTEZ; [illegible] — see MEXI 8126 2 Aug '66.

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLEN ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04848 30 APRIL 1964.

SECRET

SECRET

BT

7

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 6

SECRET

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS:a
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966

☒ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE · WH-8, CI/SC

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 3 18 16Z CITE DIRECTOR 25094

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 88738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

File
jk

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

for C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CI
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

3-16

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INFO
FILE, VR, WHB, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

1966

S E C R E T 022227Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8126 AUG 1966 IN 63738

DIRECTOR 748301

8 AUG 1966

TYPIC LIRING

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

use as a direct agent - requires qualifying for POA/OA.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8126 SECRET

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERAW E WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

SECRET

BT

NNNN

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE 6 June 1966 M jep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
LIRING
WH/1 ~~MEXX~~ Mexico City

SUBJECT: 201 -798301

TYPE OF REQUEST: ☒ POA ☒ OA ☐ CMC ☐ SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 15 June 1966

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

JUN 7 1 38 PM '66

USE OF SUBJECT
Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI WILL FWD.	DIVISION RR	FIELD Derog. in Bio

GREEN LIST INITIATED: ☒ YES ☐ NO

ATTACHMENTS: ☐ PRQ - PART I ☒ PARTIAL BIO ☐ OTHER

REMARKS

POA

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE 6/~~1~~/66 1 JUL 1966

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: NR SO# 798301

JUL 5 2 25 PM '66

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached __________

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS
file
6 July 66

DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET (9) 1

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE [illegible]

TO: [illegible]

C NO. [illegible]

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7354, DIR C7441 and MEXI 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

DATE: [illegible] 1966 [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO#
201#

FI traces - No Traces

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2-65 2413

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declassification

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SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE 23 JUN 1966

CASE NO. 201- 798301

☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE	
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	☐ ORSD	AREA:	

USE

☐	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐	REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ REFLUTTER REPORT
☐	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*	☐	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐	REQUEST FI TRACES	✓	FILE 201
☐	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 23 July
☐	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐	NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐	REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

In order to qualify subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, DIR 07441, and MEXI 7954.

See MEXI 8126 of 2 Aug '66.

ROWTON using subj. as directed agent to recruit & use GONZALEZ.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

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(21)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/1/Zefeece

EXTENSION: 3656

NO.

DATE: 22 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCWH/1		6/22		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. CI/OA				
6.				
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11.				
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14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

JUN 23 9 24 AM '66

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

Ltr to SO
file 9705 23 June 66

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

DATE

TO:

C NO.

FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA

/s/ Edward P. Brown

SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	PI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ________ PER ________ #

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica) (reference number)

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CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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WH 8

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S E C R E T 250105Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5590 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

798301

818842

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

SECRET

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 S E C R E T

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

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BT

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798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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S E C R E T 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 /16 May 68 IN/12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5548 (IN 08570)

798301

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

File

17 MAY 1968

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- 798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, DDP, ADDP, CSDO

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5542 10 MAY 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

215942

1. MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 3 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED P~~X~~ERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA IF SHE CAN GET TO TALK TO LIRING-3. (798301) STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

5 MAY 1968

SECRET

798301

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC/A, FI

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S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 Apr 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

WR 16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

799801 [illegible]

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

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INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5285 S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

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INFO FILE VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 062030Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5141 5 APR 68 IN 86253

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

1. ON 5 APRIL 68 STATION RECEIVED PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF GUATEMALAN PASSPORT WHICH 798301 LIRING-3 SAID FRANCISCO LARA WOULD USE TO ENTER HONDURAS FROM GUATEMALA. COPIES INDICATE THERE WAS DISCREPENCY IN NAME ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN REF AND NAME ON PASSPORT. CORRECT NAME IS JOSE MARIA OLIVA CARRANZA, ORDINARY GUATEMALAN PASSPORT NUMBER 134825 SERIES D REGISTRY NUMBER 22743 ISSUED 27 MAY 1963 IN GUATEMALA CITY. OLIVA BORN SAN FELIPE, RETALHULEU ON 9 FEB 1935.

2. OTHER DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED INCLUDE MILITARY INSCRIPTION IN GUATEMALAN ARMY, CARD NUMBER 49059, BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER 2825671, CEDULA DE VECINDAD 287165 AND ELECTIRON CARD 127817.

3. THESE DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED BY LIRING-3 WHEN THEY PASSED TO HIM BY FRANCISCO LARA TO USE IN MAKING FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO ADDRESSEES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

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SECRET 041920Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5111

4 Apr 68 IN 85161

15 APR 68

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-8822 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

798301

1. AFTERNOON 3 APRIL 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE PLANS DEPART FOR GUATEMALA CITY VIA LAND IN COMPANY GUATEMALAN CITIZEN FRANCISCO LARA CIRCA 4 APRIL 68. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION AND LARA HAS FALSE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION, THEY WILL ATTEMPT ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY.

2. IN GUATEMALA CITY, LARA PLANS INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO WOMAN WHO LOGISTICAL OFFICER FOR FAR IN GUATEMALA CITY. TRIP WILL THEN BE ARRANGED FOR LIRING-3 TO VISIT FAR SIERRA DE LAS MINAS HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE SUPPORT OF FAR FROM MEXICO CITY.

3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN GUATEMALA, LARA AND LIRING-3 WILL TRAVEL TEGUCIGALPA TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES OF SETTING UP PRINTING PRESS UNDER LIRING-3'S TRUE NAME.

4. LARA'S FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION IS IDENTITY CARD FROM SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA UNDER NAME JACINTO RANGEL CERVANTES. FOR IDENTITY CARD PHOTOGRAPH, LARA WORE GLASSES, HAIR DYED GREY AND NO MUSTACHE. LARA TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FOR TRAVEL TO TEGUCIGALPA FROM GUATEMALA CITY, HE WILL USE GUATEMALAN PASSPORT UNDER NAME

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FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5111 SECRET

MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA. LIRING-3 WILL PROBABLY USE VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF LARA AND LIRING-3 DOCUMENTATION.

5. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: LIRING-3 (IDEN) IS STATION PENETRATION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN MEXICO CITY. FRANCISCO LARA IS FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAS RESIDED IN MEXICO FOR PAST YEAR AND WHO CLAIMS TO BE FAR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

6. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND POST OFFICE BOX IN MEXICO CITY FOR STATION CONTACT, DO NOT BELIEVE STATION WILL BE ABLE SUPPLY ADDRESSEES WITH INFO ON HIS TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS UNTIL HE IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AFTER HIS RETURN TO MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

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SECRET 041918Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5112 4 Apr 68 IN 85227

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR TEGUCIGALPA

REF MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

MEXICAN CITIZEN

PROFESSION: ARTIST (PAINTER)

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798301

INFO: FILE. VR. CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, WH/COG 8,

S E C R E T 282327Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8822 29 MAR 1968

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5000 (IN 80219)

29 Mar 68 IN 80309

1. RE PARA 4 REF: DUE 28 MARCH CHANGES WITHIN GUATEMALAN ARMY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAFAEL (ARRIAGA) BOSQUE, STATUS OF "OPERATION AZTECA" UNCERTAIN. CONSEQUENTLY STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY TYPE PROTECTION FOR LIRING-3 (798301) IN CASE HE CAPTURED. ALSO NOTE THAT MEXICAN BORDER AREA BEING HEAVILY PATROLLED.

2. ESMOOSE-1 (818094) REPORTED THAT ON EARLY MORNING 28 MARCH ESMARVEL-1 (804875) ALERTED SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF GUAT ARMY (SCUGA) TO BE PREPARED FOR IMPORTANT OPERATION. HE SAID INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT GROUP OF THIRTY CASTRO CUBANS PLANNED ENTER GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND THEIR ARRIVAL TIED IN WITH WAVE OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WHICH REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE 31 MARCH. ESMARVEL-1 DID NOT INDICATE SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. HE SAID THAT REINFORCED SCUGA TEAMS WOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MARCOS AND HUEHUETENANGO ON MEXICAN BORDER, WITH A BACK-UP TEAM IN DEPARTMENT OF QUEZALTENANGO. SCUGA UNIT WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHEN WORD RECEIVED OF REMOVAL OF ARRIAGA. ESMOOSE-1 SAID AS RESULT OPERATION CANCELLED. POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SAME

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 8522 SECRET

INFO HAS BEEN PASSED TO MILITARY UNITS AT BORDER WHICH MIGHT MAKE LIRING-3'S CROSSING INTO GUATEMALAN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

3. FOR HQS: PARA 2 INFO HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMED DUE LACK OF CONFIRMATION AND SCARCITY OF DETAILS.

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TSD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, ADDP, DDP

SECRET 282120Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5000

28 MAR 68 IN 80219

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

29 MAR 1968

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4828 (IN 70689)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8551 (IN 41008)

C. MEXICO CITY 4486 (IN 50312)

798301

1. ON 27 MARCH 68 LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT GUAT FAR MEMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA IS ACTUALLY FRANCISCO LARA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, AKA CARLOS LARA (REFS B AND C). LARA INADVERTENTLY GAVE HIS TRUE NAME WHILE DISCUSSING WITH LIRING-3 THE PLANNED TRIP TO GUATEMALA.

2. AT PRESENT, LIRING-3 MAKING FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS HE TO LEAD INTO GUATEMALA. THEY PLAN TRAVEL SOMETIME BEFORE 31 MARCH. LIRING-3 TO ENTER GUATEMALA WITH GROUP IN ORDER MEET UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO IS FAR LOGISTICAL OFFICER. GROUP BELIEVES NR LIRING-2 SHOULD TALK TO HER TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPLIES HE CAN MAEK AVAILABLE TO FAR (COULD UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN BE DIAN ADELA JIMENEZ OR BRENY HOSEL CUENCA?)

3. LIRING-3 IS NOW ATTEMPTING DETERMINE TRUE NAMES OF OTHER PERSONS HE TO TAKE TO BORDER AND EXACT DEPARTURE DATE. STATION

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5000 SECRET

WAS ABLE TAKE PHOTO OF PERSON LIRING-3 IN CONTACT AND LIRING-3 IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIED THIS PERSON AS FRANCISCO LARA. STATION HAS ALSO TAKEN PHOTOS OF ADDRESS WHERE GUATS BELIEVED BE STAYING AND FILM BEING DEVELOPED. WILL PRIORITY POUCH PHOTOS AND LIRING-3 REPORTS.

4. LIRING-3 WILLING ENTER GUATEMALA WITH FAR MEMBERS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW IF OPERATION AZTECA STILL IN FORCE. IF NOT, COULD STATION GUATEMALA ARRANGE ANY TYPE OF PROTECTION FOR HIM IN CASE HE IS CAPTURED BY MILITARY OR POLICE?

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S E C R E T 141940Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4828

15 MAR 1968

GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 Mar 68 IN 70689

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8733 (IN 68951)

1. FOLLOWING CABLED IN ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 3 REF B:

A. FAR KNOWS LIRING-3 798301 HAS CAPABILITY OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTATION. LIRING-3 FOR EXAMPLE OBTAINED FALSE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND MILITARY REGISTRATION CARD FOR JACOBO PADILLA.

B. LEFTIST CONTACTS LIRING-3 INCLUDING GUATS KNOW HE FAMILIAR WITH GUAT BORDER AREA IN CHIAPAS. LIRING-3 WORKED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS IN CHIAPAS FOR MEXICAN EQUIVALENT INDIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. IT ALSO WELL KNOWN TO FAR THAT LIRING -3 HAS BUSINESS LOCATED IN BORDER AREA IN ST CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS SINCE THIS BUSINESS WAS TO BE USED AS COVER FOR ARMS SUPPLY TO GUAT REBELS.

C. AS GUAT CITY STATION WILL REMEMBER LIRING-3 WAS TAKEN BY FAR TO HIDEOUT IN GUAT WHERE HELD TALKS WITH FAR MEMBERS. LIRING-3 EVEN SUPPLIED FAR SOME MEDICINE AND COGNAC FOR WHICH INCIDENTALLY HE NEVER PAID.

D. IN LIRING-3 OPINION, FACT FAR REPS IN CUBA RECENTLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR HIS DENUNCIATION MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL IN

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4828 SECRET

SUMMER 67 AND SENT WARNING THAT FAR "PENETRATED BY WOFIRM AGENT" (SEE MEXICO CITY 4314) IN 40487 CONSTITUTES INDICATION HE STILL IN GOOD GRACES OF AT LEAST SOME OF FAR RANK AND FILE.

E. REQUEST LIRING-3 HELP FAR REPS OVER GUAT BORDER CAME FROM CARLOS (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINES, VIA CARMEN (LOZADA) DE RAMIREZ, PERSAVAL SISTER IN LAW * ANF 4$13,5 ~~8543)848,3 3.~~ MISTRESS LIRING-3. AS FAR AS STATION KNOWS PERSAVAL, MARC~~SN~~UE OR LOZADA HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO AND OTHER GUAT LEFTISTS WITH WHOM LIRING -3 PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT.

2. LIFEAT ON LIRING-3 CONFIRMED PERSAVAL SCHEDULED PHONE LIRING-3 14 MARCH TO SET UP 15 MARCH MEETING WITH TWO MALE AND ONE FEMALE GUAT REBELS LIRING-3 AGREED GUIDE OVER GUAT BORDER. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, STATION KNOWS GUATS MAY PHONE LIRING-3 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING. TO FACE SUCH POSSIBILITY LIEMBRACES STARTED SURVEILLANCE LIRING-3 MORNING 14 MARCH, WILL TRY OBSERVE MEETING WITH GUATS, TAKE PHOTOS OF THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTUAL RESIDENCE THROUGH TAILING EXERCISING UTMOST CAUTION.

3. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

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SERVICE

MEXICO CITY [illegible]8
STA & NR

1[illegible] MARCH 196[illegible]
DATE

[illegible]
IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"FERAVAL SISTER IN LAW AND RECENT MISTRESS LIRING-3"

SECRET

798301

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S E C R E T 122147ZIAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8733

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 MAR 68 IN 68951

REF MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

1. ALTHOUGH SPECULATION ONLY, POSSIBLE THAT YOUNG WBZQAN * WHO TO RETURN GUATEMALA COULD BE CLEMENCIA (PAIZ) CARCAMO (AKA "LUISA"), SISTER OF MIRNA (PAIZ) CARCAMO WHO RECENTLY RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO FEMALE INFORMANT OF GUAT ARMY, CLEMENCIA IS WIFE OF JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA (AKA "CESAR MONTES"). ALSO REPORTED THAT CLEMENCIA WAS TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO IN MID-DECEMBER 1967 TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO FAR, AND WAS POSSIBLY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY DINGRDELA (JIMENEZ) MUNOZ AND HILDA (SOSA) ALDANA. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE WOMEN TRAVELLED, BUT PRESENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. STATION DOES NOT HAVE BIO DATA OR PHOTOGRAPHS CLEMENCIA, AND ESLAIR TEAM HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE ENTRY FOR HER IN FILES OF CIVIL REGISTRY. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN FROM ESMICAS, AND WILL SEND TO MEXICO CITY IF SUCCESSFUL.

798301

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY COMMENTS ON WHY LIRING/3 APPROACHED TO OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR RETURNEES AND WHY HE MIGHT BE SELECTED

13 MAR 1968

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PAGE TWO GUATEMALA CITY 8733 SECRET

TO SERVE AS GUIDE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT MEMBERS OF PGT SUPPORT NET IN MEXICO--SUCH AS ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, MAY BE UNWILLING ASSIST FAR MEMBERS IN VIEW RUPTURE PGT/FAR RELATIONS, WOULD SEEM THAT FAR WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ENTRUST DELICATE MISSION OF THIS NATURE TO LIRING/3 WHO RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

SECRET * SERVICED

BT

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14-00000

798301

FORM 3020 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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S E C R E T 120055Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4790 12Mar68 68111

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

798301

1. ON 5 MARCH 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD DINNER WITH CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS, DIRECTOR OF THE NOW DEFUNCT MAGAZINE "POLITICA", COMMUNIST BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION. PERSAVAL ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD OBTAIN A FALSE PASSPORT FOR WIFE OF IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER IN MEXICO WHO MUST TRAVEL GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS.

2. ON 8 MARCH, PERSAVAL SAID TWO IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES HAD TO TRAVEL TO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO BY MID MARCH AND ASKED IF LIRING-3 STILL WILLING TO HELP. LIRING-3 ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THERE WAS LIMITED CHANCE OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTATION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, BRIEF THESE REVOLUTIONARIES ON GUAT/MEXI BORDER IN ORDER MAKE ILLEGAL CROSSING EASIER. IF THEY DESIRED, HE COULD PERSONALLY GUIDE THEM ACROSS BORDER.

3. ON 9 MARCH, PERSAVAL CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH LIRING-3 ON GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES WHO HAD TO TRAVEL GUATEMALA URGENTLY. HE SAID ONE OF THEM HAS LEGAL DOCUMENTATION BUT OTHER DOES NOT. HE

FORM 3020A
9-67

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4790 S E C R E T

THEREFORE DECIDED BOTH SHOULD ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY. THEY CANNOT ENTER THRU TAPACHULA, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN THERE. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED SAN CRISTOBOL AREA WHICH NOT SUBJECT TO MEXICAN OR GUATEMALAN SURVEILLANCE. THE PERSON WITHOUT DOCUMENTS IS WOMAN 20 YEARS OLD. PERSAVAL NOT WILLING GIVE LIRING-3 NAMES OF REVOLUTIONARIES BUT PROMISED ARRANGE FOR CONTACT BETWEEN THEM EVENING 15 MARCH.

4. STATION HAS NO INFO ON IDENTITIES OF MAN AND WOMAN WHO MUST RETURN GUATEMALA MID MARCH. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

S E C R E T

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EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 68269

JAN 19 23 40Z

TO MEXICO CITY

INFO: JMWAVE

PERUMEN TECHS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 67083*

POUCHING AGENT S/W SENDING SYSTEM #36 AND AGENT RECEIVING SYSTEM #32 TOGETHER WITH NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRAINING IN HMMA-16083.

END OF MESSAGE

79839

22 JAN 1958

LIRING-3 [illegible]

818842

COORD: TSD/SW Little (by phone)
C/WH/COG/CICS [illegible] Rothwell

WH COMMENT: *Hqs. selecting appropriate S/W system for use with [illegible].

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T 162325Z 16FEB 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4526 16FEB68 52038

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PERUMEN

16 FEB 1968

REF A MEXICO CITY 4371 (IN 45349)

B DIRECTOR 70922

C JMWAVE 1115 (IN 42146)

1. VIA LIRING-3 ROWTON MET XOCHITL VIVO DE LA TORRIENTE, 16 FEB 1968 DAUGHTER OF LOLA DE LA TORRIENTE MENTIONED IN REFS. XOCHITL, BORN MEXICO CA 1932 IS MEXICAN CITIZEN. SHE LIVED CUBA 1958 TO 1963 WHERE SHE ACTIVE AS BALLERINA IN MODERN DANCE GROUP OF CUBA WHICH TRAVELED MANY PLACES IN EUROPE INCLUDING MOSCOW. SHE LEFT CUBA 1963 FOR U.S. WHERE WORKED IN NEW YORK AS SHOW GIRL AND SECRETARY FOR SEVERAL YEARS. SHE SINGLE BUT NOW LIVING WITH AMERICAN AND WORKS AS THEATRICAL ARTIST.

2. XOCHITL THOROUGHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST, IS DISSATISFIED WITH HER SITUATION AND ANXIOUS DROP AMERICAN BOYFRIEND. WOULD LIKE GET IN SOME SORT OF BUSINESS GIVING HER FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE. SHE IN REGULAR MAIL CONTACT WITH MOTHER IN CUBA AND FEELS MOTHER WHO VERY MUCH WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE CUBA COMPLETELY ANTI-REGIME.

3. AFTER SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH XOCHITL, ROWTON OBTAINED HER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4526 SECRET

AGREEMENT VISIT CUBA TO DETERMINE IF MOTHER WILLING COOPERATE IN SUPPLYING INFORMATION ON GVT ACTIVITIES AND PERSONALITIES SHE IN CONTACT WITH. ROWTON HAS PASSED SELF AS BUSINESSMAN INTERESTED IN CUBA FOR EVENTUAL FINANCIAL PROFIT. WILL CONTINUE REPORT DETAILS THIS OPERATION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES FILE CHECK XOCHITL AND HQS START PROCESS POA. PRQ PART ONE BEING POUCHED.

SECRET

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 262013Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4271

26 JAN 68 IN 38363

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING-4

29 JAN 1968

File COVER

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67233

201-[illegible]942

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-4 PRODUCED FOLLOWING:

A. SHE LONG TIME FRIEND CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), NIECE PRESIDENT DORTICOS WHO WORKED AT CUBAN PRESIDENCY IN 1964 WHEN LIRING-4 LAST SAW HER. GUILFRIDO WHO BORN IN LIRING-4 HOME TOWN IN ORIENTE ABOUT 1938 IS ANTI-CASTRO. LIRING-4 FELT GUILFRIDO COULD PROBABLY HELP HER OBTAIN USEFUL JOB IF STILL IN CUBA AND MIGHT EVEN AGREE COOPERATE AGAINST REGIME. GUILFRIDO RECENTLY GOT MARRIED AND MOVED BUT LIRING-4 FELT COULD FIND HER.

B. LIRING-4 KNOWS LOLO DE LA (TORRIENTE), ELDERLY CUBAN NEWSPAPER WOMAN WHO DISAFFECTED WITH CURRENT REGIME. LIRING-3 WHO ALSO KNOWS WOMAN TOLD ROWTON THAT IN EARLY 1967 MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER RAUL (ANGUIANO) CONFIED TO HIM HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM DE LA TORRIENTE WHO CLOSE FRIEND ASKING HIM HELP HER OBTAIN MEXICAN VISA IN ORDER LEAVE CUBA SINCE SITUATION THERE "INTOLERABLE." ANGUIANO CONFESSED TO LIRING-3 HE IN QUANDARY

SECRET

AS DID NOT WANT BETRAY REVOLUTION OR DAMAGE HIS REPUTATION. AS FAR LIRING-3 KNOWS, ANGUIANO DECIDED AGAINST APPEAL FOR HELP TO [illegible] LITEMPO-8 WHO CLOSE FRIEND AND DE LA TORRIENTE APPARENTLY DROPPED MATTER. LIRING-3 ADDED DE LA TORRIENTE IS WELL KNOWN BIOGRAPHER OF DIEGO RIVERA AND CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND LUIS (WANGUEMER), DIRECTOR OF "MUNDO." LIRING -3 FELT RELATINSHIP WITH WANGUEMER MAY HAVE PROTECTED DE LA TORRIENTE FROM REPRISALS FOR ANTI-REGIME ATTITUDE. ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN "SUCESOS" IS ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 WANGUERMER'S BROTHER AND UNCLE ANDREA (GOMEZ) WITH WHOM LIRING-4 MAY STAY IN HAVANA. THIS SHOULD ENABLE HER RENEW CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH DE LA TORRIENTE.

C. LIRING-4 KNOWS CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), CURRENT HEAD OF CUBAN INSTITUTO CARCGRAFIA Y GEODESIA WHOM SHE FIRST MET AT LIRING IN AUG 67 WHEN HE ATTENDED GEODETIC CONFERENCE MEXICO CITY. CARBALLO WAS MOST HELPFUL ~~[illegible]~~ SECURING SPACE ON HAVANA SANTIAGO FLIGHT FOR LIRING-4 DURING THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO CUBA.

D. SHE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH MARGOT (MACHADO), HEAD OF THE DEPARTAMENTO JURIDICO OF MINREX WHEN SHE AND LIRING-3 LIVED IN CUBA.

E. SHE GOOD FRIEND RAQUEL (PEREZ) WHO SERVED TOUR AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO WITH HUSBAND. PEREZ WHEN LAST HEARD FROM

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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24

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S E C R E T 270045Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4277

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

27 JAN 68 IN 38440

29 JAN 1968

PERUMEN LIRING-4

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67663

C. MEXICO CITY 4271 (IN 38363)

OVER

201-818842

1. IN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH LIRING-4 ROWTON REACHED FOLLOWING TENTATIVE AGREEMENT

A. ROWTON WILL PROVIDE 600 DOLLARS FOR THREE MONTHS FOR MAINTENANCE LIRING-4 AND HER DVAUGHTER (CHILD NOW GOING WITH HXER) IN CUBA PLUS 150 ADOLLARS TO COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES.

B. LIRING-4 WILL INFORM ROWTON VIA S/W OF DEFECTABLE TARGETS AND OF PROGRESS MADE IN OBTAINING POSITION OF INTEREST IN MINREX, INTERIOR MINISTRY OR PRESIDENCY.

C. IF ROWTON INSTRUCTS HER REMAIN HAVANA BEYOND THREE MONTH PERIOD (MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME SHE ALLOWED STAY OUT OF MEXICO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HER IMMIGRANT STATUS IN THAT COUNTRY), ROWTON WILL ARRANGE REINSTATEMENT FULL TIME ALREADY ACCUMULATED IN MEXICO AND WILL DEPOSIT TO NEW YORK ACCOUNT IN LIRING-4 NAME "REASONABLE" MONTHLY COMPENSATION COMMENSURATE WITH POSITION SHE OBTAINED AND

SECRET

22 JAN 1963

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4277 SECRET SECRET

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED. ROWTON MENTIONED FIGURE BETWEEN 300 AND 500 DOLLARS A MONTH BUT MADE NO RPT NO COMMITMENT.

2. ROWTON CAN DRAW UP LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING TO BE SIGNED BY LIRING-4 IF HQS DESIRES. LIRING-4 STATED FRANKLY SHE HOPED BE ABLE PROVIDE ROWTON SUFFICIENT RECRUITMENT LEADS AND BIO INFORMATION TO BE ABLE LEAVE CUBA AFTER THREE MONTHS ALTHOUGH SE REITERATED SHE WOULD STAY LONGER IF SHE SUCCEEDED IN GAINING POSITION PROVIDING UNUSUALLY GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION DESIRED BY ROWTON.

3. AS LONG AS SHE DOES NOT ACTUALLY DIVORCE LIRING-3, LIRING-4 IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEXICAN VISA TO ALLOW HER LEAVE CUBA AND REJOIN HUSBAND EVEN IF SHE REMAINS CUBA MORE THAN THREE MONTHS. DO NOT BELIEVE CUBANS WOULD PREVENT HER FROM RETURNING MEXICO TO HUSBAND. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, BELIEVE LIRING-4 COULD GAIN REINSTATEMENT AS IMMIGRANT WITH APPROPRIATE BRIBE. LITAMIL-7 FOR EXAMPLE REGAINED IMMIGRANT STATUS WITHOUT ANY TIME PENALTY BY PAYING THOUSAND PESOS BRIBE. PLS ADVISE WHEN STATION MAY EXPECT S/W FOR LIRING-4 SO THAT FINAL PLANS CAN BE MADE FOR HER DEPARTURE. ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL OBTAIN CUBAN TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

SECDET SECRET

WAS WORKING IN MINREX.

F. LIRING-4 RECALLS HAVING MET AND DEVELOPED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A NEGRO CUBAN IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL WHO QUESTIONED HER ROUTINELY WHEN SHE LAST LANDED AT HAVANA AIRPORT. NAME OF OFFICIAL IS VINCENTE (LEYVA), DIRECCION PROV. DE INMIGRACION, VEDADO.

2. STATION FILES CHECKS ON ABOVE NAMES GAVE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), AND VINCENTE (LEYVA), NEGATIVE ~~32-93~~.

B. LYA DE LA (TORRIENTE) BRAU WAS LISTED IN 1960 AS DIRECTOR OF CULTURE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS, CUBAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, AND TRAVELED CHILE IN 1959 AND MEXICO 1960 AS DELEGATE TO LEFTIST WOMEN CONGRESSES. SHE REPORTED IN EARLY 1960 BE CLOSE FRIEND VILMA (ESPIN) DE (CASTRO), WIFE RAUL (CASTRO).

C. MARGOT (MACHADO) PADRON AND RAQUEL (PEREZ) BOTH SPENT TOUR OF DUTY WITH CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO, MACHADO AS OFFICER AND PEREZ AS SECRETARY TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR. PEREZ WAS REPORTED HAVE PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL (ROA) AS HIS SECRETARY. HER HUSBAND MIGUEL ANGEL (LOZANO) VILLALOBOS WAS REPORTED TO HAVE OCCUPIED FAIRLY HIGH POSITIONS IN MINISTRY OF

SECRET

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 4271 S E C R E T

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

D. ONLY REFERENCE TO (WANGUEMER) IS INTERCEPTED LETTER DATED MARCH 63 FROM LUIS G (WANGUEMERT) IN CUBA MENTIONING SUGAR HARVEST.

E. NUMBER OF REFERENCES LIST RAUL (ANGUIANO) AS SUCCESSFUL MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER WHO TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY AND MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH EMBASSIES COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN MEXICO CITY.

3. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

798301

ORIG: Will Korbeɾsas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 10 January 1968

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S E C R E T

JAN 10 22 10Z

CITE DIRECTOR 65492

11 JAN 1968

TO MEXICO CITY

INFO: JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 3988 (IN 22936)*

LIRING-3

201-798301

1. HQS CAN ARRANGE TO OPEN SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNT FOR SUBJECT REF USING POST OFFICE BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS. ACCOUNT WILL BE WITH FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK.

2. TO OPEN ACCOUNT IN TRUE NAME IT NECESSARY THAT SUBJECT SIGN BANK SIGNATURE CARDS WHICH HQS POUCHING. SUGGEST ROWTON HAVE SUBJECT SIGN CARDS NEXT TIME HE VISITS MEXICO.

3. WILL CONSIDER FUTURE REQUESTS FOR OPENING OF SWISS ACCOUNTS ON AN INDIVIDUAL CASE BASIS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Since opening a bank account in Switzerland appears so difficult, request advise possibility of opening account in U.S.

C/WH/COG/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

Monetary Div. Mr. Farr (by phone)
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6955
DATE: 5 JAN. 68

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INFO: FILE, VR. WH/COG-8, TSD-6, CI/OA, FI, CI, CI/DPS, FI/D-4

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

JAN 5 23 55 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 64492

18 JAN 1968

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

PBRUMEN TECHS 201-79830/ LIRING-3

File

[redacted]

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)*

1. BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE AT THIS JUNCTURE LET LIRING-4 RETURN PBRUMEN AND ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HERSELF BEFORE MAKING COMMITMENTS FOR CLANDESTINE COMMO, SALARY AND SGSWIRL. WHILE INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITIES LIRING-4 GAINING ACCESS IN ANY ONE OF POSITIONS MENTIONED REF, COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY DEGREE OF ACCESS, COMMO ARRANGEMENTS AND HER WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM. CONSIDERING FACT SHE NOT PARTY MBR AND THREE YEAR ABSENCE FROM PBRUMEN, IT APPEARS PREMATURE TO ASSUME ~~UNLIKELY SHE WILL~~ SHE WILL GET ~~LAND~~ JOB WITH SUFFIENTLY INTERESTING ACCESS. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY WE NEGATIVE ON CPS UTILIZATION IF SUCH WARRANTED BY DEVELOPMENTS.

[illegible] We have a case [illegible] in the L-3 file [illegible]

17 JAN 1968

2. IF LIRING-4 DOES OBTAIN INTERESTING POSITION CAN STATION MAKE ARRANGEMENTS NOW FOR HER TO TRAVEL MEXI AFTER

(CONTINUED..)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 64492

TO

PAGE TWO

SEVERAL MONTHS, OSTENSIBLY VISIT HUSBAND OR TO CLOSE OUT HER BUSINESS AFFAIRS AT WHICH TIME COULD ARRANGE TRAINING, SECURE COMMO AND LEVY REQUIREMENTS BASED ON ACCESS? ALSO CAN STATION NOW ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE LINK TO ROWTON THRU HUSBAND?

3. REQUESTING POA. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Coord: C/WH/COG/CI

WH COMMENT: *Requested Hqs advise re possible recruitment, SGSWIRL, Commo and salary for LIRING-4, who returning Cuba to obtain job.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE
3 JAN 1969

FILE NUMBER
798301

ECT
LIRING-4

Disc'd the POA/CA request with Will Kolbe, WH/1, today. He sees the inconsistency of requesting a POA/CA on L-4 (for which she cannot qualify) and will resubmit request for a CNC.

We agreed that ROUTON has been running her as an agent (without any approval) since May, 1966.

Kolbe sees ROUTON losing interest in L-3 (her husband, who doesn't have a POA/CA either) because of poly results, etc.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

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S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3994

4 JAN 68 IN 22908

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

Why did she leave employ of Cuban Consulate?

4 JAN 1968

TYPIC TECHS

798301

1. AS RESULT DIFFICULTIES WITH LIRING-3 AGGRAVATED BY HIS AFFAIR WITH CARMEN LOZADA, LIRING-4 DECIDED TO SEPARATE FROM LIRING/3 AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AND GO CUBA FOR THREE MONTHS. THIS IS MAXIMUM LENGTH OF TIME LIRING-4 CAN STAY OUT MEXICO WITHOUT LOSING IMMIGRANT STATUS AND POSSIBILITY BECOMING MEXICAN IN TWO MORE YEARS AFTER FIVE YEARS RESIDENCE.

NR

2. IN COURSE SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS, ROWTON, WITHOUT INFLUENCING HER DECISION GO CUBA, POINTED OUT LIRING-4 COULD HELP HIM COLLECT VALUABLE DATA ON CURRENT POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CUBA. THIS WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON HER WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY GAIN ACCESS TO IMPORTANT TARGETS. LIRING-4 ASSURED ROWTON SHE DEEPLY APPRECIATED HIS INTEREST AND HELP IN PAST AND VOLUNTEERED DO WHATEVER SHE COULD UNDER ROWTON DIRECTION TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS ASSIGNED BY HIM. LIRING-4 DID NOT QUERY ROWTON AS TO HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OR POLITICAL AFFILIATION HIS "FRIENDS" AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN HER ABILITY MAKE CONTACTS AND DEVELOP FRIENDSHIPS IN HAVANA. HER ONLY RESERVATION WAS PROCUREMENT OF SPECIFIC INFO REQUIRED BY ROWTON AS THIS WOULD DEPEND ON GAINING ACCESS TO RIGHT PERSONS AND MAKING SKILLFUL ELICITATIONS.

3. LIRING-4 PLANS LEAVE MEXICO LATE JAN, SPEND ONE WEEK

SECRET

SANTIAGO VISITING FAMILY THEN RETURN HAVANA TO TRY FIND WORK INTERIOR MINISTRY, ICAP OR FOREIGN MINISTRY. SHE AWARE GOOD JOBS IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE USUALLY RESERVED FOR COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS BUT BELIEVES SHE MAY HAVE CHANCE LAND JOB GIVING HER ACCESS TO INTERESTING INFO THROUGH SUCH FRIENDS AS LIRIH-1, JOSE ANTONIO (PORTUONDO) VALDOR AND OTHERS. LIRING-4 COULD PROBABLY LIVE IN HAVANA AS GUEST ANDREA GOMEZ, MEXICAN MURALIST WHO RESIDES NEAR MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND IS CLOSE FRIEND MASOLA OF ICAP. GOMEZ IS DAUGHTER ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN MAGAZINE SUCESOS AND NIECE (GOMEZ) WANGUEMER, DIRECTOR OF EL MUNDO IN HAVANA. ANDREA GOMEZ, NOW ON VACATION MEXICO, WILL SEE LIRING-4 PRIOR HER RETURN HAVANA.

4. LIRING-4 PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LIRING MERMBERS GREATLY IMPROVED SINCE RUMORS SHABBY TREATMENT SHE RECEIVED FROM LIRING-3 AND HER PROBABLE BREAK WITH HIM REACHED LIRING. BOTH LIRING-2 AND LIRING-13 ASSURED HER 29 DEC THEY PREPARED DO WHATEVER THEY CAN FOR HER. SHE ALSO HAD FRIENDLY CHAT WITH CHIEF LIRING. LIRING-4

HAS EQUIVALENT TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE, SPEAKS SOME ENGLISH AND SOME CANTONESE AND PREVIOUSLY WORKED AT LIRING. AT STATION REQUEST ROWTON SOUNDED HER OUT ON POSSIBILITY SHE MIGHT LAND JOB WITH CUBAN EMBASSY ABROAD AND ASKED HER ABOUT HER WILLINGNESS GO COMMUNIST CHINA. LIRING-4 SAID SHE WILLING DO ANYTHING FOR ROWTON INCLUDING LEARN MANDARIN AS POSSIBLE WAY LAND CHINA ASSIGNMENT. SHE AGREEABLE STAY CUBA BEYOND THREE MONTHS PERIOD MENTIONED ABOVE IF OBTAINS JOB JUDGED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE BY ROWTON. LIRING-4 CAN RETURN MEXICO AS LONG AS SHE STAYS MARRIED TO LIRING-3 WHO MEXICAN CITIZEN. THROUGH BRIBERY THERE GOOD POSSIBILITY SHE MAY BE REINTEGRATED AS IMMIGRANT AFTER MORE THAN THREE MONTHS ABROAD WITHOUT LOSING HER THREE YEARS MEXICO RESIDENCE. LIRING-3 HAS NO PLANS DIVORCE LIRING 4 EVEN IF LATTER REMAINS SEPARATED FROM HIM FOR LONG PERIOD. LIRING-4, WHO STILL IN LOVE WITH LIRING-3, DOES NOT WANT DIVORCE EITHER.

5. LIRING-4 AT ROWTON REQUEST PROVIDED BASIC PRQ DATA ESSENCE OF WHICH CABLING SEPARATELY. ALTHOUGH SHE WILL REMAIN UNRECRUITED FORMALLY, ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL READILY ACCEPT SGSWIRL. THUS REQUEST:

A. STEPS BE TAKEN ISSUE LIRING-4 POA FOR USE AS ON ISLAND ASSET.

SECRET

What are the Field Trace results?

B. SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR BE SCHEDULED VISIT MEXICO CITY TO TEST LIRING-4 BEFORE 31 JAN.

C. TWO WAY S/W SYSTEM BE ISSUED LIRING-4 AFTER PASSING SGSWIRL. HQS MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER OWVL IN ADDITION TO TWO WAY S/W. TRAINING COULD BE DONE BY ROWTON OR SPANISH SPEAKING TECHNICIANS. COMMO SYSTEM MUST BE GIVEN HER BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR CUBA AS WILL NOT RETURN AFTER THREE MONTHS IF ABLE LAND WORTHWHILE JOB.

D. HQS INDICATE WHAT IT WILLING PAY LIRING-4 FOR WORTHWHILE JOB IN CUBA OR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL INSTALLATION ABROAD. LIRING-4 INTENDS LIVE STRICTLY ON CUBAN SALARY WHILE WORKING FOR CUBANS. WOFIRM SALARY TO BE DEPOSITED IN ESCROW.

6. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA

S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3995

4 Jan 65 IN 22867

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)

1. FOLLOWING IS BIO DATA MIRIAM (CHICHAY) DUARDO DE JURADO:

A. BORN 17 DEC 1940 CENTRAL JOBABO, ORIENTE PROVINCE. MOTHER NELIDA DUARDO, CUBAN, LIVES CALLE AGUILERA 554, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. FATHER PORFIRIO CHICHAY, ~~CU-, 31 118,33 9486E, 3.864-535~~ BAN OF CHINESE ORIGIN EMIGRATED U.S. 1959 AND RESIDES 1506 NORTHERN BLVD MANHASSET L.I. NEW YORK.

B. THREE BROTHERS, JOAQUIN 29, PORFIRIO 25, ROGELIO 2[illegible]. ONE SISTER LILIAN 18.

C. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: TWO YEARS ORIENTE UNIVERSITY, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, NO DEGREE.

D. MARRIED TO CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR IN HAVANA 1962 (MEXICAN CITIZEN). DAUGHTER ZINZUNI (JURADO) CHICHAY BORN 1963 HAVANA, MEXICAN CITIZEN.

E. CUBAN CITIZEN BUT HAS FM-2 IMMIGRANT STUATUS IN MEXICO AS SPOUSE MEXICAN NATIONAL. HAS THREE YEARS OF MEXICO RESIDENCE.

2. POUCHING MORE COMPLETE INFO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

798301

MESSAGE FORM 24
TOTAL COPIES

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 17 AUGUST 67

SECRET

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 22 PER ______ # ______

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 28757

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2479 (IN 32323)

18 AUG 1967

Brown

REGRET HAVE BEEN UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE INTERIM HANDLER FOR LIRING-3. SUGGEST ROWTON SET UP PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT BY "TRUSTED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE WHO MAY BE COMING THROUGH AREA." WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH ROWTON DURING LATTER'S TDY HQS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST.

798301

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: ROWTON going on home leave 18 August. Station feels it most desirable keep direct contact with LIRING-3 during ROWTON's absence.

Jacob D. Esterline

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

WH/COG W. CINI (IN DRAFT)

J. H. V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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798301

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16 AUG 1967

S E C R E T 151515Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2479

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

15 Aug 67 IN 32323

PBRUMEN

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE 18 AUGUST.

201-798301

2. AFTER THROUGH REVIEW LIRING-3 OPERATION FEEL IT MOST DESIRABLE KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 (WHO LIABLE GO CUBA AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA IN NEAR FUTURE) DURING ROWTON'S ABSENCE. UNTIL SGSWIRL CAN BE GIVEN LIRING-3 BY SPANISH SPEAKING OPERATOR AS REQUESTED BY STATION, FEEL IT WISE NOT PUSH LIRING-3 TO WITTING LNHARP RECRUITMENT. THEREFORE BELIEVE LIRING-3 SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPANISH SPEAKER ABLE PASS NOTIONALLY AS EUROPEAN BUSINESS FRIEND OF ROWTON (I.E. WITHOUT GRINGO ACCENT). ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE EUROPEAN LANGUAGE NATURALLY DESIRABLE IT NOT ESSENTIAL AS PER ROWTON LIRING-3 WILL NOT QUESTION BACKGROUND HIS FRIEND OR MEET HIM IN PRESENCE OF OTHER FOREIGNER SINCE MEETINGS HELD IN SAFEHOUSE. TO AVOID SECURITY COMPLICATIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE BELIEVE LIRING-3 WOULD BEST BE HANDLED FOR THREE - FOUR WEEK PERIOD BY TDYER FROM WAVE OR HDQS WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. STATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSUME COMPLETE DIRECTION THIS OPERATION.

3. ALTERNATIVE TO HANDLING BY TDYER WOULD BE TO PLACE

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2479 SECRET

LIRING-3 "ON ICE" FOR PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE SENDING HIM OUT OF MEXICO CITY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THUS CUTTING HIM OFF TEMPORARILY FROM FURTHER CONTACTS WITH CUBANS, GUATEMALAN REBELS AND LOCAL MEXICAN LEFTIST FRIENDS. THERE NO GUARANTEE HOWEVER LIRING-3 WOULD STAY OUT OF MEXICO AND FURTHER OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT FOR FULL PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE.

4. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

798301
Brown

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, 8006, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

4 AUG 1967

S E C R E T 040003Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2372 4 Aug 67 IN 25197

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PHOTO LEONARDO (CASTILLO) HOHNSON, CHIEF SAN MARCO GUERRILLA AREA, GUATEMALA, SHOWN LIRING-3 798301 WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE. LIRING-3 STATED HOWEVER THAT MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL TOLD HIM 31 JULY THAT CASTILLO HAD BEEN KILLED. OROZCO ALSO IMPLIED DAVID (CASASOLA) MEJIA ALSO DEAD.

S E C R E T

BT

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798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 1 August 1967

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(classification) 19 09 7 CCS 3 (date and time filed) 24298 (pica)

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

PERUMEN LIRING-3

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

B. DIRECTOR 99380

C. MEXICO CITY 2105 (IN 11646)

REGRET SPANISH-SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR READIED 1 JUNE PER REFERENCE B NOW NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SEPTEMBER. CAN FURNISH ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPERATOR FROM HEADQUARTERS 4 IF ACCEPTABLE. ~~COULD ALSO HANDLE REFERENCE C CANDIDATES IF DESIRED.~~ PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. ASSUME YOU UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT HIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST ONCE SGSWIRL USED.

END OF MESSAGE

798301

WH/Comments: A. Requested SGSWIRL operator for LIRING-3/4 Aug. B. Spanish-speaking SGSWIRL operator available for LIRING-3 1 June. C. Station queries if can examine new Station contract employee and three field agents.

2 AUG 1967

WH/COG MAHONEY (TELECOORD)
OS/JRD BEONAR (TELECOORD)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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C/WH/1
W.J. Kaufman
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FILE VR. DI. CI/OPS, C/CA, CI/IC 2, FI

17 JUL

SECRET 152015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2139

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

15 JUL 67 IN 12289

REF MEXICO CITY 2115 (P06822)

12289

1. ON 14 JULY 67, DOSCHER SHOWED LIREBEL-2 (244191) COMPOSITES OF "GARCIA" MADE BY THE LIEMBRACES, LIRING-3 (748221) AND LIRING-4 (NP). LIREBEL-2 SAID THE PERSON WAS DEFINITELY NOT DAVID CASASOLA MEJIA (STATION FELT IT WAS INITIALLY) BUT THAT THE COMPOSITE HAD A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO LUIS CASTILLO RALDA. LIREBEL-2 GAVE DOSCHER CASTILLO'S ADDRESS BUT ASKED THAT CASTILLO NOT BE FOLLOWED BECAUSE HE IS VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS. HE WOULD SPOT THE SURVEILLANCE AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY SUSPECT LIREBEL-2 OF HAVING PASSED THE ADDRESS TO SOMEONE.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS, STATION HAS DECIDED USE PHOTO TRUCK TO OBTAIN RECENT PHOTOS OF CASTILLO AND THEN DETERMINE IF HE IS "GARCIA" BY SHOWING PHOTOS TO LIEMBRACES AND LIRING-3 AND 4.

3. ADDRESSEES WILL BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

201-798301

mmp

ORIG: M. PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 JULY 1967

MESSAGE FORM
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SECRET WH/COG 8 DDP ADDP FI FI/INT 2

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

17 16 33 Z

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-2111 (IN 11245)*

B. CARACAS-7262 (IN 12228)**

C. MEXICO CITY-1954 (IN 01455)***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CURRENT APPRAISAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIRING-3 (798301) AND WOULD BE BENEFACTORS OF VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AS SOON AFTER ROWTON RETURN MEXICO AS POSSIBLE.

2. CONCUR THAT ~~[illegible]~~ VALDEZ-MORENO OPERATION APPEARS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. CAN LIRING-3 DISSUADE VALDEZ FROM THIS UNDERTAKING BY POINTING OUT EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA MONITORING OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS? 2 JUNE ARREST OF ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), AMERICO MARTIN, AND 19 JUNE ARRESTS OF FELIPE NERI CARRILLO ALONG WITH SEVENTEEN OTHER DOUGLAS BRAVO ORIENTED TERRORISTS MIGHT SERVE AS CASES IN POINT.

3. SUGGEST THAT LIRING-3 MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE VALDEZ AND MORENO THAT INVOLVEMENT WITH VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AT PRESENT TIME SIMPLY NOT PRUDENT AND WASTFUL OF RESOURCES WHICH COULD BE BETTER EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

TO

4. IF LIRING-3 UNABLE DAMPEN VALDEZ ARDOR BUT RETAINS ABILITY MONITOR ACTIVITIES, SEE NO HARM IN LIRING-3'S CONTINUED CONTACT, PROVIDED MONITORING CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING IN ANY WAY TO SUCCESS THEIR EFFORTS.

5. FOR CARACAS: REQUEST TRACES ORTEGA AND COMMENTS ON PARA 1, MEXICO 2075.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *ROWTON (LIRING-3 Case Officer) will return to Mexico without stopping in Caracas to discuss LIRING-3 operation.

**Caracas requested that LIRING-3 not become operationally engaged - principally because assistance most likely being directed to BRAVO guerrilla forces and the MIR and that the tangible advantage to be derived by the extremists would outweigh the value of any intelligence produced.

***LIRING-3 has established contact with VALDEZ and MORENO, young Mexican leftists who wish to go to Caracas and set up some sort of commercial venture in order to provide assistance to Venezuelan subversives. LIRING-3 aggreed to help them as partner in Venezuelan venture.

WH/1/Mexico

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-298301

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S E C R E T 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2075

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

IN 09498

PBRUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

B CARACAS 7262 (IN 02328)

1. ACCORDING TO SERGIO VALDEZ, LATTER'S CONTACT WITH VENEZUELAN REBELS IN CARACAS IS RAMIRO ORTEGA WHOM HE ORIGINALLY MET IN MEXICO. ORTEGA INSTRUCTED VALDEZ WHEN LATTER COMES CARACAS TO INSERT AD IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER SAYING: QUOTE LA PERSONA INTERESADA EN ARTESANIA MEXICANA FAVOR COMUNICARSE CON SERGIO VALDEZ UNQUOTE FOLLOWED BY ADDRESS. EITHER ORTEGA OR OTHER MEMBER VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WILL MAKE CONTACT. VALDEZ ALSO IN CONTACT WITH VENEZUELANS IN MEXICO.

12 JUL 1957

2. STATION BELIEVES VALDEZ AND RAUL MORENO DETERMINED HELP VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WITH OR WITHOUT ADVICE OF LIRING-3. (298301) SINCE IT APPEARS DESIRABLE MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES, LIRING-3 FORMED LOOSE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION WITH THEM IN MEXICO CITY BY NAME "COLORLUZ". THIS WILL ALSO HELP LIRING-3 IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH HIS REVOLUTIONARY FRIENDS IN CUBA WHEN NEXT VISITS HAVANA (WHICH HE BEING URGED DO SOON) AS COULD POINT TO PERSONAL

SECRET

SECRET

BT

CHANNELS TO BOTH GUATEMALAN AND VENEZUELAN REBEL ELEMENTS.

3. WALLACE B. ROWTON (IDEN) WHO DIRECTS LIRING-3 OP CURRENTLY ON TDY SOUTH AMERICA AND IS SCHEDULED FLY BACK MEXICO 18 OR 19 JULY VIA CARACAS. RATHER THAN EXPLAIN LIRING-3/OP, AT THIS POINT, WHICH INVOLVED UNDERTAKING, SUGGEST ROWTON STOP CARACAS ONE DAY AND DISCUSS OP DIRECTLY WITH STATION. WILL NOTIFY ROWTON IF STATION AGREEABLE. ROWTON UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY SO THAT EVENTUAL CARACAS MEETING SHOULD BE SET UP ACCORDINGLY.

4. MEXICO /STATION TRACES RAMIRO ORTEGA NEGATIVE. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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SECRET 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2075

11 Jun 67 IN 09490

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN.

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 2075 (IN 09498)

IDEN IS MR. ROBERT DRISCOLL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 301930Z CITE CARACAS 7262

6 JUL 1967

30 JUN 67 IN 02328

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

201-File
798301

1. NO STATION TRACES.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE THAT STATION EXERCISE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COVER BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT LIRING-3 NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEXI MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT DO NOT DESIRE BECOME ENGAGED OPERATIONALLY.

3. PCV OBTAINING SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ABROAD PRESENT TIME AND STATION ABLE MONITOR THIS THROUGH EXISTING ASSETS. WHILE A CUBAN SPONSORED FUNDING MECHANISM WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT THE DOUGLAS BRAVO DISSIDENT PCV GROUP AND THE MIR, BELIEVE THAT TANGIBLE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED BY THE EXTREMISTS WOULD OUTWEIGH THE VALUE OF ANY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.

4. HAS LIRING-3 BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TESTED IN OPERATIONS VIS A VIS GUAT GUERRILLAS TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES? IS HE STILL UNWITTING AND IF SO WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF OUR CONTROL OVER HIM?

Good questions

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

201-798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

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FROM 41/50

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG8, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, SOD6

S E C R E T 300015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1954 30 JUN 67 IN 01455
CARACAS INFO JMWAVE DIRECTOR
PERUMEN

6 JUL 1967

1. MEXICO CITY STATION ASSET LIRING-3 (798301) RECENTLY HAD SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH YOUNG MEXICAN LEFTISTS SERGIO GABRIEL (VALDEZ) AND RAUL (MORENO) WONCHEE WHO INTERESTED HELP LEFTIST ELEMENTS VENEZUELA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE COMMUNIST PARTY FRAMEWORK. VALDEZ WHO WOULD TAKE CARE COMMERCIAL VENTURE USED AS COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY CURRENTLY IN CONTACT WITH MARYEDITH GARCIA MENDEZ AVENIDA LOS GERANIOS RES. MAFARA 4, LA FLORIDA, CARACAS. GARCIA WHO DIVORCED OR OBTANING DIVORCE IS WEALTHY WOMAN WHO TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY AND TOOK APT COURSE MEXICO WITH VALDEZ. SHE WILLING FINANCE DECORATIVE GLASS FACTORY RUN BY VALDEZ AND IS UNWITTING OF LATTER'S PLAN TO USE SUCH FACILITY AS COVER FOR SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. MORENO WHO CLAIMS HAVE LEFTIST CONTACTS VENEZUELA WOULD HANDLE CLANDESTINE WORK. TWO MEN WENT TO CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, FOR HELP BUT WERE GIVEN RUN AROUND AND FINALLY TOLD CONTACT LIRING-3 AS THEIR PROJECT "TOO SENSITIVE FOR CUBANS TO SUPPORT AT THIS TIME".

2. LIRING-3 WHO CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH PEPS GUAT GUERRILLA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TO MEXICO CITY 1954 S E C R E T

MEXICO AND ATTEMPTING BUILD COMMERCIAL COVER FOR ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT THESE GUERRILLAS AGREED HELP MORENO AND VALDEZ AS PARTNER IN THEIR VENEZUELA VENTURE. WILL PROVIDE IDENTITY MORENO'S SUBVERSIVE CONTACTS VENEZUELA AND HELP DESIRED BY THEM AS SOON INFO AVAILABLE. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDEES TRACES MARYEDITH GARCIA. STATION TRACES NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-288301

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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ORIG: Art Porn
UNIT: WH/2/G
EXT: 6026
DATE: 30 June 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 53 PER ______ # ______

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE , VR . WH/COG 8, C/OPS, CI, CI/OA, FI

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

1 16 50 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 16464

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

REF: MEXICO CITY 1930 (IN 00593)

1. NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR.

2. MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ PROBABLY MARCO ISIDRO VINICIO GONZALEZ Y GONZALEZ (201-817006) WHO PRESIDENT GUATEMALA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (AEU) AND KNOWN REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) MEMBER.

3. IF FURTHER L-3 CONTACT CONFIRMS SALAZAR FAR CONNECTION, AND SALAZAR CONTINUES RECEIVING COLD TREATMENT FROM CUBANS, BECOMES NATURAL RECRUITMENT CANDIDATE. THEREFORE HQS INTERESTED ANY FURTHER INFO WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED, INCLUDING CONFIRMATION BY OTHER STATION SOURCES IF CAN BE SECURELY OBTAINED.

6 JUL 1967

LIRING-3

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: LIRING-4 reported Carlos Enrique Salazar visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and requested to go to Cuba. Salazar destitute and without necessary documentation. Cuban Embassy personnel appear in no hurry to help him travel to Cuba.

798301

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

C/WH/2
WH/COG/FI
WH/FI

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

798301

38

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, SOD 6, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, [illegible], FI, FI/INT 2, [illegible], CA 2, CS/CG

SECRET 282320Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1930

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE 29 Jun 67 IN 00593

PBRUMEN

1. NR LIRING-4 WHO NOW WORKING LIRING TALKED TO CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR AT LIRING 22 JUNE. LATTER SAID:

A. HE FLED GUAT CA 7 JUNE AS CONNECTED WITH REBEL MOVEMENT AND POLICE LOOKING FOR HIM.

B. HE STAYING WITH ANGEL CAMPIARAN SANCHEZ WHO OWNS BATTERY SHOP CALLE DE AMORES 806, LETRACX, MEXICO CITY. ANGEL CAMPIRAN IS FATHER ENICE CAMPIRAN YOUNG MEXICAN STUDENT REPORTEDLY ASSASSINATED WITH HUSBAND BY POLICE IN GUAT CITY.

6 JUL 1967

C. COULD GIVE MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ, PRESIDENT "SOCIEDAD ALUMNOS UNIVERSITARIOS DE GUATEMALA" AS REF IN GUAT.

D. REBEL MOVEMENT IN GUAT CRUMBLING AS RESULT INTENSIFIED ARMY AND POLICE COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES.

2. LIRING STAFF APPARENTLY IN NO HURRY HELP GUAT REBEL WHO DESTITUTE WITHOUT PAPERS AND ANXIOUS GO PBRUMEN. WILL TRY HAVE 798301 LIRING-3 CONTACT HIM (GUAT STUDIED PAINTING IN GUADALAJARA) AND DEBRIEF RE REBEL CONTACTS IN GUAT.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1930 S E C R E T

3. NO STATION TRACES SALAZER OR GONZALEZ. STATION HAS SEVERAL REFS TO EUNICE CAMPIRAN AS ACTIVE TROTSKYITE IN MEXI 1954 WHO KILLED WITH HUSBAND DAVID AGUILAR MORA GUATEMALA SUMMER 1966.

S E C R E T

BT

268301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

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FROM 3c

ACTION WH/COG8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☑ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CA2, CA/PEG

S E C R E T 212240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1852

22 JUN 1967

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC PERUMEN

REFS A MEXICO CITY 1945*

21 JUN 67 IN 95240

B DIRECTOR 127320

1. SUBJS REF B RETURNED CUBA 19 JUNE. 798301 LIRING-3 TO WHOM THEY HANDCARRIED LETTERS FROM HAVANA FRIENDS, HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH THEM. INFO OBTAINED DURING THESE MEETINGS CABLED MEXICO CITY 1319, (IN 93428) 1842 AND 1943.** (IN 94380)

2. DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LIRING-3 SHORTLY BEFORE RETURNING CUBA, DR. JOSE AGUILERA MACEIRAS TOLD L-3 HE SENIOR VICE MINISTER AND NO. TWO IN CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. UNLIKE DR. MAX FIGUEROA ARAUJO, EDUCATION VICE MINISTER IN CHARGE HIGHER (UNIVERSITY) EDUCATION, HE MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY AND, AS SUCH CLAIMED COULD DO "FEW THINGS" FOR L-3 IF AND WHEN LATTER COMES CUBA. AGUILERA ADDED FIGUEROA TYPICAL OLD STYLE TEACHER AND STILL BOURGEOIS AT HEART WHO HAD CHANCE APPLY FOR COMMIE MEMBERSHIP BUT DID NOT TAKE IT.

3. HAVE ASKED LIRING-3 FOR ANY BIO ON VICE MINISTERS AND HIS PERSONAL ASSESSEMENT OF BOTH. IT ALREADY APPARENT HE NOT OVERLY IMPRESSED WITH PERSONALITY OF FIGUEROA WHOM HE FEELS IS OPPORTUNIST.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1851 S E C R E T SECRET

BOTH MEN HAD LIRING-4 BUY LONG LIST OF ITEMS FOR WHICH, IN THE END, THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. AGUILERA APOLOGIZED AND OFFERED REIMBURSE LIRING-3 IN CUBAN PESOS WHENEVER HE COMES HAVANA.

SECRET

BT

*POSSIBLE REF SHOULD BE 1745** 1743
(IN 87949) (IN 87938)

14-00000

22 798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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REC'D 30

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA, FI.

S E C R E T 171520Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1885 17 Jun 67 IN 92302

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

1. LIRING-4 RECEIVED PHONE CALL 14 JUNE FROM CERTAIN "DELVA" ASKING FOR LIRING-9. WHEN TOLD LIRING-9 NOT AT LIRING, "DELVA" LEFT MESSAGE HAVE L-9 CONTACT HER ROOM 989 MARIA ISABEL HOTEL. THIS INFORMATION CONFIRMED BY LIENVOY SAME DAY.

2. DISCREET CHECK MARIA ISABEL IDENTIFIED OCCUPANT ROOM 989 AS SANDRA LINDA CONTRERAS, US CITIZEN GIVING HOME ~~TWON~~ Town AS NEW YORK, NO OTHER DETAILS. CONTRERAS CHECKED OUT HOTEL EARLY AFTERNOON 14 JUNE. STATION CHECKING AIR MANIFESTS THAT DATE TO NEW YORK. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES INCLUDING LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

File in LIRING-3

19 JUN 1967

30 79830 11

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM 25/M

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, DDP, ADDP, TSD 6, FI,

S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0399

30 MAR 67 333540

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LISAMPAN LIRING-3

C-105308 NR

1. REQUEST HQS REINSTATE POAS LICAGE-1 AND LICAGE-2. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY RECONTACT FOR USE AS BASEHOUSE KEEPERS/ TRANSCRIBERS FOR LP SERVING TECH INSTALLATION AGAINST LIRING-3. LIPLUGS IN TURN WILL BE USED MAN THIRD LISAMPAN LP WHEN SUITABLE ONE LOCATED.

119350/

2. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING THIS CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

31 MAR 1967

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION

WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 2,

S E C R E T 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

Hold for LIRING/4

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

File [illegible] PTNG/3

REF DIRECTOR 07441

[illegible] 24650

24660

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

26 MAY 1966

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

201-798301

17 APR 1967

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 SECRET

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

8

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1,
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING

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DISSEM BY 28/3 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA
CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 26 Z

CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

[illegible] unable to locate [illegible] these [illegible] see attached

26 MAY 1966

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 8 TOTAL COPIES 17

33/M SECRET

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FROM
MEXICO CITY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

772

9 MAY 1966

S E C R E T 250242Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MARIAN CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXI 7234 S E C R E T

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

Soviet fm-
[illegible]
~~[illegible]~~ Bureau,
WH/1

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

☐ F ROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

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9 MAY 66 20 26z

ORIG : W.F. Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CA W/CB

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts

Hold for 772

10 MAY

NR

NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - derog info info as to connections w/Cubans?

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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998301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

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J.
G: X. Z[illegible]ce/sas
T: WH/1
: 4167/9424
TE: 12 May 1967

LE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
3 PER ____ # ____

WH 3

☑ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-815836

INFO: FILE , VR , WH/COG 8, CI/CA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 22 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01284

MEXICO CITY

REF MEXICO CITY 1361 (IN 62544)*

1. SUBJECT REF 201-815836 IS LIROSIN ONE.

2. TO FACILITATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION XE AND CRYPT RECOGNITION, LIRING CRYPT WILL BE RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LIRING PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH LIRING CRYPTS ALREADY ASSIGNED WILL BE RETAINED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT *Requested Crypt be assigned Leon CRUZ-Garcia who targetted against LIRING-3.

998201

Carded + recorded
a a g
15 May 67

Cardex'd
File

15 MAY 1967

WH/COG/FISHER AMES (TELECORD) 8

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

14-00000

798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 3

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, WH/COG 3, SEC HR 4, TSD 6

S E C R E T 230047Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1162

20 APR 67 IN 49085

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: DIRECTOR 92565

20 APR 1967

1. LICAGE-1'S FAMILY INCREASED SINCE LAST CONTACTED AND IS NOW TOO LARGE FOR LIRING-3 L/P. SAME CONDITION APPLIES LIPLUGS. REQUEST CLEARANCE LEON (CRUZ) GARCIA, DPOB 11 APRIL 40, PACHUCA HIDALGO, MEXICO, FOR USE L/P/KEEPER L-3 OP. SUBJ KNOWN TO PEUVION STATION PAST 2 YEARS AS RESPONSIBLE HARD WORKING PRO U.S. TYPE. IN VIEW URGENCY THIS OP PLUS FACT SGSWIRL OPERATOR NOW MEXICO. REQUEST PRIORITY PROCESSING.

2. PLS ADVISE.

Fantastic, but - -

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

20 APR 1967

File

11 MAY 1967

John,
I believe that we have a cov. ~~[illegible]~~
Di. file. K

Hold for #772.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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S E C R E T 122250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1086 12 APR 67 IN 43875

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRING-3

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 0399 (IN 33549) ~~cleared~~

B. HMMA 31721

13 APR 1967

STATION NOW IN RECEIPT RECEIVER NEEDED MONITOR REF B INSTALLATION IN HOME [redacted] AND LP READY AND WAITING. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING CLEARANCES REF A BASEHOUSE KEEPER CANDIDATES.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

201-814895

201-350966

14-00000

201-778301

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ORIG: J. Stewart/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 11 April 1967

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☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☒ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE, VR MPS/BG 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 33Z Brown CITE DIRECTOR 92161

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF HMMW-15396*

PROJECT LIRAVINE APPROVED 7 APRIL FOR DOLLARS 36,150 INCLUDING
C-16351 778301 (POUCHING
FUNDS FOR UMPHLET AND LIRING-3 OPS. COPY 13 APRIL. SINCE LIRANCH SERIOUSLY OVEROBLIGATED BECAUSE OF LISAMPAN, UMPHLET AND LIRING-3 CHARGES, PLEASE REOBLIGATE TO LIRAVINE WHERE APPROPRIATE AND XX DO SAME WITH LISAMPAN WHEN WRITTEN AND APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref advised that Hqs include LIRING-3 and UMPHLET under LIRAVINE Project renewal request.

13 APR 1967

WH/13+F

WH/COG

William V. Broe
William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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S E C R E T 082253Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3336

9 FEB 1967

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

96558

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 73089

1. RE QUESTIONS ASKED REF, WALLACE B. ROWTON SAW LIRING-3 OFF ON PLANE WHICH TRAVELED NON-STOP GUAT CITY FROM MEXI CITY. L-3 SAID HE STAYED AT FLORIDA HOTEL AS PLANNED AND RECEIVED PHONE CALLS THERE FROM FAR REPS. L-3 SAID HE MET SEVERAL TIMES AND HAD LUNCH WITH NICOLAS BATSAKIS, DIRECTOR OF METALOPLASTICA, AND BROUGHT BACK SAMPLES OF PLAETIC FLOWERS MADE AT FACTORY AND WHICH SEEN BY ROWTON.

795301

2. ROWTON PLANNING QUERY L-3 FOR MORE DETAILS TRIP AND DESCRIPTIONS INDIVIDUALS HE MET. NEXT ROWTON L-3 MEETING NIGHT OF 8 FEB 67. FAR REP MEXI CITY HAS NOT YET CONTACTED L-3 TO PICK UP MEDICINE, RADIO TUBES AND COGNAC.

3. HQS PLS INDEX NICOLAS BATSAKIS AND METALOPLASTICA TO MEXI STA FILE P-12729.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

File reviewed 8 March 67 by A. Ladenburg WH/1

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG : Jack Stewart/nao ☐ FILE RID
UNIT : WH/1 ☐ INDEX
EXT : 6954 ☒ NO INDEX
DATE : 7 February 1967 ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☒ RID COPY wh/cog-8, ci/ops, ci/ia

~~(CLASSIFICATION)~~ ~~(DATE AND TIME FILED)~~ (ELITE) ~~(REFERENCE NUMBER)~~ (PICA)

SECRET 7 16 41 Z CITE DIRECTOR 73089

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 8 FEB 1967

PBRUMEN LIRING

File

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 0240 (IN 93416)*

B. MEXICO CITY 0130 (IN 88362)**

PLEASE ADVISE WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN AND COULD BE TAKEN TO CONFIRM 798301 LIRING-3'S TRAVEL AND STORY OF ACTIVITIES WHILE IN GUATEMALA CITY. DID HE STAY AT HOTEL FLORIDA AS PLANNED REF B? COULD ROWTON SAFELY ELICIT DESCRIPTIONS OF YOUNG FAR REPRESENTATIVE CONTACT AT MUSEUM AND FEMALE CONTACT AT RESTAURANT? ALSO APPRECIATE DETAILS METALOPLASTICA VISIT AND ANY OTHER INFO TO ASSIST HQS FOLLOW THIS HIGHLY ~~[illegible]~~ complex CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

*Furnished details LIRING-3 trip to Guatemala City 26-29 January.
**Reported LIRING-3's departure and plans to go Guatemala City.

WH/COG Earl N Williamson

WH/2/G

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WH

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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ACTION

[illegible]

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FILE, VR [illegible]

31 JUL 67 80356

S E C R E T 312102Z CITE JMWAVE 5378 (INGHURST ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, RIO DE JANEIRO

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: CARACAS 5336 (IN 87369)*

* CAR HQS STATION [illegible] ON AMPOP-1 WIFE POLIT ORIENTATION

1. JMWAVE FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY INFO RE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF AMPOP-1 WIFE.

2. DI SERVENO, WHO DEBRIEFED AND TRAINED AMPOP-1 IN BEIRUT, REMEMBERS FAMILY WAS TOUCHY SUBJECT WITH AGENT WHO DESERTED VENEZUELAN WIFE AND CHILDREN IN CUBA TO "MARRY" SYRAIAN GIRL IN FICTITIOUS CEREMONY. BECAUSE OF THIS AND LACK OF TIME, POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF WIFE WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH AMPOP-1 AND ONLY ROUTINE PRQ PART ONE INFO WAS OBTAINED.

3. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT FOLLOWING FACTS. ACCORDING TO [illegible]-3 REPORTS, WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DETAINED AS THEY BOARDED CUBANA FLIGHT FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT 66 AND WIFE DENOUNCED CASTRO REGIME OPENLY AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL MEXICO 17 OCT 66. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY WIFE IS NOT PROREGIME, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SHE MAY HAVE AGREED SERVE CUBAN I.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR PERMISSION LEAVE CUBA WITH CHILDREN AND GET EVEN WITH AMPOP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SES: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SB8, SOD 6, CI/PS CS/SG 0, CA 2, CA/O 4, DO T

SECRET 190340Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9934 19 JAN 67 81261

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9339 (IN 72194)

1. AT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON 16 JAN 67, LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT CUBAN A13 ON 11 JAN CALLED LIRING-3 ASIDE DURING RECEPTION AT EMB AND STATED HE HAD RECEIVED CABLE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ASKING LIRING-3 RETURN CUBA FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS.

798301

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE BELIEVES THIS IS ANSWER HIS FIRST LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWING LAST TRIP TO CUBA MID DECEMBER AT WHICH RODRIGUEZ INTRODUCED HIM TO OSMANI CIENFUEGOS AND AT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED LIRING-3 PROPOSAL ASSIST TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE IN GUAT.

3. LIRING-3 AND STA BELIEVE IT BEST L-3 NOT JUMP MINUTE CUBANS CALL SO HE TELEPHONED RODRIGUEZ NIGHT 17 JAN INFORMED HIM HE WOULD GO CUBA BUT NOT UNTIL AFTER HAD MADE ANOTHER TRIP SOUTH WHICH MUST DO IN NEXT FEW DAYS. LIRING-3 PLANS GO GUAT ABOUT 27 JAN AFTER RECEIVING SUPPLIES ROWTON ORDERED WHILE AT HQS WHICH DUE ARRIVE MEXICO 25 JAN. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT RODRIGUEZ WILL ASK LIRING-3 COME CUBA PRIOR TRIP TO GUAT BUT LIRING-3 INTENDS BEG OFF IF POSSIBLE. RESULTS PHONE TALK WILL BE OBTAINED AT ROWTON LIRING-3 MEETING NIGHT 18 JAN.

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 9984 SECRET

4. DURING PAST WEEK LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARCHAEOLOGIST FRIEND CARLOS NAVARETTE CACERES, GUAT COMMIE WORKING FOR MEXI GOVT, WHO REVEALED TO LIRING-3 IN GREAT CONFIDENCE HE INFORMED BY MUTUAL FRIENDS OF LIRING-3'S RECENT TRIP TO GUAT. NAVARETTE FURTHER STATED HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO PLACE HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF LIRING-3 TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. NAVARETTE SAID HE AND JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA WERE MEMBERS OF FAR NETWORK IN MEXI. HE CAUTIONED LIRING 3 AGAINST CONTACT WITH MEXI COMMUNIST PARTY BECAUSE CERTAIN HIGH LEVEL POLICY MATTERS HAD NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED BETWEEN PCM AND FAR.

5. NAVARETTE FURTHER TOLD LIRING-3 MASSIVE SOVIET AID PAREN IN EXCESS OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARES END PAREN WAS AVAILABLE TO FAR QUOTE DIRECTLY UNQUOTE BUT WITH CERTAIN STRINGS ATTACHED WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT PLACE FAR UNDER COMPLETE SOVIET CONTROL. FAR, IN DESPARATE ATTEMPT RETAIN INDEPENDENCE, IS RAISING FUNDS ON OWN BY SUCH MEANS AS BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 RENT HOUSE IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, LEAVE SHIPMENT THERE ON WAY TO GUAT, CONTACT FAR REPS INSIDE GUAT AS ON LAST TRIP, AND EXPLAIN SHIPMENT IS AT HOUSE AND CAN BE PICKED UP WHEN THEY WISH. WILL EXPECT THEM PICK UP SHIPMENT IN SAN CRISTOBAL AND CARRY ACROSS BORDER.

* Requested op be discussed with Rostow;

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SECRET

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798301

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S E C R E T 062152Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9849

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY

6 JAN 67 IN 73020

ATTENTION DAINOLD

REFS: (A) GUATEMALA CITY 6831 (IN 61532)

(B) GUATEMALA CITY 6847 (IN 64231)

(C) GUATEMALA CITY 6881 (IN 68762)

(D) GUATEMALA CITY 6888 (IN 69317)

(E) GUATEMALA CITY 6892 (IN 70202) *

(F) HGGA 8352

OVER

1. USING REFS ABOVE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GUATEMALA CITY COS AND MEXICO CITY STATION OFFICERS ON OPERATIONS WHICH CAN BE INITIATED BY WOFACT TO AID MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS COUNTER GUERRILLA ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO INTO GUATEMALA. FOLLOWING POINTS EVOLVED:

A. MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS APPARENTLY BELIEVE MOST SMUGGLING OCCURS IN SOUTHEASTERN PORTION STATE OF CHIAPAS ON MEXICAN SIDE AND SOUTHWESTERN PORTION GUATEMALA WHERE GOOD ACCESS ROADS EXIST. MOST SMUGGLING DONE VIA TRUCKS, BUSES AND OTHER VEHICLES. BOTH GOVERNMENTS COOPERATING CLOSELY AND HAVE BEEFED UP OR HAVE PLANS TO BEEF UP MILITARY UNITS ...

SECRET

THIS BORDER AREA TO DETECT ARMS TRAFFIC. GUATEMALAN SECOND VICE MINISTER DEFENSE, COLONEL FRANCISCO SOSA AVILA, HAS INITIATED UNILATERAL OPERATION TO PENETRATE GUATEMALAN CUSTOMS HOUSES IN KEY AREAS TO DETERMINE WHO AIDING SMUGGLERS.

B. TREMENDOUS SURGE OF GOODWILL WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS WILL CERTAINLY AID IN KEEPING JOINT OPERATION OF WIPING OUT SMUGGLERS ON TRACK. TEND BELIEVE MAJOR WOFACT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGEMENT AND AID TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ADVICE, TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORTATION, MONEY AND HARD INFO ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES WHEN AVAILABLE. AS CITED IN REFS, GUATEMALA CITY STATION HAS ALREADY INITIATED SUCH MATERIAL SUPPORT TO GUATEMALAN TREASURY GUARD TO BUILD UP ITS COLLECTION CAPABILITIES.

C. REGARDING COLONEL SOSA'S UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF THE CUSTOMS HOUSES ALONG THE BORDER. MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DISCUSS SIMILAR POSSIBILITY WITH LITEMPO-8 (745332) TO SEND PERSONNEL TO PENETRATE MEXICAN CUSTOMS HOUSES. THIS MIGHT REQUIRE FINANCIAL AID FROM MEXICO CITY STATION TO PAY SLARIES OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEE/AGENTS.

2. UNILATERALLY, STATIONS PLAN:

A. EXPLOITATION OF WHATEVER POTENTIAL LIRING-3 (798301) AND NORRIS K. UMPHLET (C-16251) MAY HAVE IN PENETRATING GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND ARMS TRAFFIC RING. THESE PLANS DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE CABLES

File

9 JAN 1967

B. LIRENO-1, FORMER MEXICAN IMMIGRATION OFFICER, WILL BE QUERIED ON HIS ABILITY RECONTACT FORMER COLLEAGUES ALONG BORDER AREA WHO HAVE ACCESS INFO ON ARMS SMUGGLING FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL RECRUITMENT. THIS DIFFICULT OPERATION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF COMMO PROBLEMS CREATED BY DISTANCE FROM MEXICO CITY. ALSO, ANYONE WHO NOT FROM BORDER AREA EASILY SPOTTED BY LOCALS AND WOULD CREATE SUSPICION.

C. ON 5 OR 6 JAN 67, MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES PLAN MEET TO DISCUSS SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES AND WHAT THESE GOVERNMENTS CAN DO TO JOINTLY SMASH ARMS TRAFFIC. COS GUATEMALA WILL FIND OUT WHO ATTENDED MEETING AND WHAT WAS AGREED UPON TO GIVE MEXICO CITY STATION CLEARER IDEA OF FOLLOW UP POSSIBILITIES.

D. IN VIEW FACT LIREBEL-1 TRIP TO CUBA HAS NOT PANNED OUT TO DATE AND FACT HE COULD BE OF IMMEDIATE USE TO GUATEMALA CITY STATION IN WORKING WITH GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ON GUERRILLAS AND ARMS TRAFFIC, PLAN CANCEL CUBA TRAVEL AND HAVE HIM RE-ENTER SECRET

JAN 1967

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 9849 S E C R E T

9 JAN 1967

File

GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SEPARATE DISPATCH TO FOLLOW.

2. DESPITE LINLUCK ASSESSMENT CAPUANO WHICH SHOWED OBVIOUS PREJUDICE, STATION INTENDS REVAMP PLANS FOR CAPUANO RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT. CABLE TO FOLLOW.

3. ONE OF MAIN POINTS IN ENTIRE CASE IS HOW SERIOUS IS SMUGGLING THREAT. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF ARMS IN GUATEMALA FROM VARIOUS HISTORICAL INCIDENTS (1954 FALL OF ARBENZ REGIME; 13 NOV 1960 UPRISING WHEN LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARMS TAKEN FROM GUATEMALAN MILITARY; 1961 WHEN ARMS LEFT IN GUATEMALA TRAINING SITES AFTER BAY OF PIGS; AND CONTINUOUS INFILTRATION OF ARMS ON SMALL SCALE OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS). WOFACT GOALS OF JOINT OPERATION ARE TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND ASSIST GUATEMALAN AND MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN EFFORT REDUCE ARMS TRAFFIC AND GUERRILLA THREAT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

4. CANNOT ESITMATE COST OR DURATION OF OPERATION YET, BUT EXPECT SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUIRED TO HELP BOTH GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN BORDER AREA. THIS, OF COURSE, IS IN ADDITION TO TECHNICAL AND OTHER

SECRET

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EQUIPMENT. No Leads On Current Arms Smuggling Activities.

S E C R E T

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9310 DO4, DO/H3, CCS3, CSPS, ADDP

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 5 JAN 67

TYPIC LIRING 4 JAN 67 IN 71138

REF MEXICO CITY 9608

798301

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 22 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH SECRET

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 100 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E.G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTIBIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPESOR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER

SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 25

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION
WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR, WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6844 20 DEC 1966

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING 79830 20 DEC 66 62778

REF: MEXICO CITY-9608 (IN [illegible]) *

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANIO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 22 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANIO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ, WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) FADILLA, WHO

SECRET

INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964 LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO.

* RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

SECRET

SECRET
6T

c o Lilly

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE VR, SUSPENSE WH/COG, CDC, ADDP, CSDO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, DDP

S E C R E T 162035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9534

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

79834

16 DEC 1966

16 DEC 66 IN 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA
ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY
CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD
UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING
CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED
IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD
NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA,
NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH
ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH
SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES
ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY
UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ
TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS
HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 31

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 28

ACTION
WH8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO
FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 091757Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6913

9 JAN 1967 9 JAN 67 IN 74091

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-9839 (72194) (73330) File

B. GUATEMALA CITY-6906 (H GG-4397)

C. MEXICO CITY-9810 (71138)

198301

1. STATION GUATEMALA MOST OPTIMISTIC DEVELOPMENTS LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS HAVE EXCELLENT POTENTIAL. OPERATIONAL TAKE SHOULD PROVE EXTREMELY USEFUL. STATION AGREES WITH MEXICO CITY THAT LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES THIS OPERATION PRECLUDE PASSAGE TO LIAISON AT THIS STAGE DEVELOPMENT.

2. AS REF B REPORTED THAT TWO MEMBERS OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) NOW IN HABANA SEEKING CUBAN AID, BELIEVE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 1 OF REF A WOULD BE TIMELY AND ALMOST CERTAIN BOOST LIRING-3'S IMAGE WITH THE FAR.

C-16251

3. BELIEVE PARALLEL OPERATION USING NORIS K. UMPHLET (PARA 3 REF A) ALSO OFFERS EXCELLENT POSSIBILITIES. AS MOST KEY COMMUNISTS IN GUATEMALA NOW UNDERGROUND, INITIAL CONTACTS MIGHT PROVE PROBLEM. UMPHLET MIGHT ARRANGE CONTACTS THROUGH GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO, OR COULD BEGIN WITH SO CALLED COMMUNIST "INTELLECTUALS", SUCH AS ROLANDO COLLADO ARDON OR ALFONSO BAUER PAIZ, WHO STILL IN THE OPEN.

PAGE 2 GUATMALA CITY 6913 SECRET

GUATEMALA WILL BE HAPPY PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT.

4. RE PARA 4 REF C: STATION WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE "ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER". ALSO NOTE WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT PURCHASE CORRECT TUBES IF NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE.

SECRET

BT

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE [illegible] 1967

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER
809668 - 798301

Rec'd for my coordination an outgoing cable to MEXI, saying that PREVCHIS had been granted a Limited Contact & Assessment POA on 19 Jan '67. The next sentence said that WH/1 was asking for amendment of this contact & assessment POA so that PREVCHIS could provide cover for LIRING-3 (201-798301). [redacted] Jack Stewart, at the outset of our conversation when I mentioned L-3, said "I hope you never got mixed up in the LIRING-3 case. What a mess".

I informed Stewart I had been deeply "mixed up" in the L-3 case since 3 June '66 when Stewart himself requested a POA on L-3. I told him of the three notices over a six month period I had sent to WH/1 asking for resolution of the derog info and my invitation to discuss. CI/OA never heard a word from WH/1 in answer to its notices. Thus on 20 Dec. '66, CI/OA closed the LIRING-3 file for failure to comply. Stewart said Station was handling L-3 as a hostile, but appeared dumbfounded that the use of a such a person as a directed agent requires that that person qualify & gain a POA.

Re the requested amendment on PREVCHIS, the latter has only a limited POA because of items cited in POA granting; moreover, L-3 has never had the proper approval and was technically disapproved by the action of 30 Dec. 1966.

Stewart removed sentence telling MEXI that they WH/1 were asking for such an amendment, and I coordinated on simple notification of POA action of 19 Jan '67.

OFFICE AND TITLE
CI/OA/WH

SIGNATURE

FORM 7-62 1954

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(40)

14-00000

SECRET

CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE ______________ js

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]/1

ATTENTION : [illegible]

201- [illegible]
C- ______________

The file on [illegible] is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Case closed for failure to comply.

M/R - See M/R dtd. 20 Jan. 1967 in 201-809668.
jk

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/CA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

SECRET

FORM 3-65 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1
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(9)

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET		DATE 14 DEC 1966	CASE NO. 201- 798301
☐ SET UP FOR POA	☐ EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	☐ EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
☐ SET UP FOR OA	☐ SPECIAL INQUIRY	☐ COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

☐ ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST GREEN LIST
☐ ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
☐ EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	☐ REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM ☐ SECURITY OFFICE ☐ DIVISION
☐ FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE ☐ ATTACHMENT ☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*	☐ REVIEW AT CI/OA ☐ FBI REPORT ☐ DEFLUTTER REPORT
✓ CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(~~Reason checked below.*~~ or see remarks)*	☐ REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
☐ REQUEST RI TRACES	✓ FILE att.
☐ REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ TICKLE
☐ REQUEST FIELD TRACES	☐ NOTICE ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ FINAL
☐ REQUEST ☐ PRQ I ☐ PRQ II	☐ OTHER

☐ POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

☐ *FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Case closed for failure to comply.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

20 DEC 1966

CANCELLED
COPY TO SECURITY

____
SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(25)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM DISSEM BY 3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME

BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/CCG 8, MPS/RG 2, Cilea

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612

14 DEC 66 IN 59552

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

Sally

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

201-498301

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

File

and now, about resolution of bona fides ----

NNNN

15 DEC 1966

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG : J. [illegible]/pem
UNIT : WH/2
EXT : 3?54
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN ✓ FILE NO. 201-728301

ROUTING	
1	5
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3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 4, CI, CI/OPS,

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 15 45 Z 12 DEC 1966

CITE DIRECTOR

(REFERENCE NUMBER) 58866

TO [illegible] CITY INFO
[illegible] CITY
[illegible]

11 JAN 1967

File

,78301

~~Ole bring me this file~~
~~also w/file~~

[illegible] CITY 99?0 ([illegible])

1. [illegible] CITY TO [illegible]-5 ([illegible]) [illegible]. [illegible]-3 [illegible] STAFF AGENT, [illegible] D. [illegible], [illegible] COVER [illegible] CITY. [illegible] WITH [illegible]. [illegible]-3 HAS [illegible] 3 TRIPS TO [illegible]. IN OCTOBER 1966 [illegible]-3 [illegible] ARREST [illegible]. [illegible]-3 [illegible] GAVE [illegible].

2. [illegible] CITY 99?? AND DIRECTOR 56?03 [illegible] ABOVE [illegible]-3's SUGGESTION TO [illegible] CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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ROUTING			
1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICAL)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 58866

PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE SETTING ~~UP~~ NET-WORK FOR CUBANS.

STAGE CREATE) WC

& END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)
WH/COG/CIXECS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-796301

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS,

@ICA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 10 15 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58867

TO GUATEMALA CITY

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHECHAY, EX CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, X SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD) 8
WH/COG/CICS ____

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-796301
SEX M COB ?

201-020481
MEXI-07920
15 JUL 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. SUBJ ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

R 6608050621

Ring 3

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➡

SECRET

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (7-46)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 23 June 1966 crm
TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance Stewart	C NO. 201 - 798301
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐ PRQ I	☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐ PRQ II	☐ REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐ FIELD TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ RI TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐ OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐ REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐ RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐ REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐ GREEN LIST	☐ OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, DIR 07441 and MEXI 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

4-65 3U1U

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM Dsg. 8424 Pg 90-19

ACTION WH-8

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UNIT

TIME 1845Z

INFO FILE, VR, C/SDO, DDP, Suspense - C/WH, CDO, ADDP, WH/C-8, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/Prop, CA/CO-4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW

ACTION

S E C R E T 091642Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7855

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

9 Jul 66 52438

TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 7828 (51413) *

1. AT MEETING 1800 HRS 8 JULY 66 BETWEEN WALLACE B. ROWTON AND CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, LATTER STATED HE HAD SAT IN ON QUOTE BULL SESSION UNQUOTE THAT MORNING BETWEEN REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ AND MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS AT WHICH SUBJECT WAS FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOTH LOZANO AND CEPEDA DECLARED CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY THROUGH ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD FORMALLY UPBRAIDED FIDEL FOR HIS EXCESSES FOLLOWING GUANTANAMO INCIDENT. PARTICULARLY DISTASTEFUL TO PARTY WAS FIDEL RAGING ON RADIO IN WHICH HE CALLED U.S. HIJO DE PERRO. SHORTLY AFTER SPEECH HIJO DE PERRO SIGNS APPEARED IN HAVANA. AFTER SPEECH PARTY ALSO CONCERNED FIDEL'S ACTIONS DURING FORTHCOMING 26 JULY CELEBRATION AND THIS ANOTHER REASON PARTY BELIEVED FIDEL SHOULD TAKE REST ORDER CALM HIMSELF AND ASSURE ORDERLY DIGNIFIED CELEBRATION.

3. THROUGHOUT BULL SESSION DISCUSSION IMPLICATIONS WERE

Suspense handled by M Benchea 11 Jul
[illegible]

Jurado

LIRING-3

201-798301

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7855 S E C R E T

FIDEL'S MENTAL CONDITION SUCH HE UNACCOUNTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE IN HIS ACTIONS.

4. MUST POINT OUT ATMOSPHERE OF BULL SESSION ONE IN WHICH ALL THREE PARTICIPANTS CONFIDENT THEY SPEAKING WITH FRIENDS WHO WOULD NOT RELAY STATEMENTS MADE.

SECRET Re Rpt That Castro Drop From Scene
BT Due Operation For Hernia

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 5 TOTAL COPIES 5

SECRET

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2		6	/
3	RI	7	CI
4	MO	8	CS

FROM: Dissem BY 21 Per. 90-19

ACTION: WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT

TIME 1/RP DN

INFO: FILE, CSDO, VR, DDP, C/WH-Suspense, Addl, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O-4, WH/C-8, SB-2, D/MS-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW, EUR-2, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 062230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7328 6 JUL 66 IN 51413

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725) *

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 4 JULY 1966 HE HAD DISCUSSED CASTRO DISAPPEARANCE WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, COUNSELOR OF CUBAN EMBASSY, AND LATTER REPORTED CASTRO DROP FROM SCENE DUE OPERATION FOR DOUBLE HERNIA. LOZANO TOLD JURANDO HE LEARNED THIS FROM BRITISH CITIZEN WHO CAME OUT OF CUBA IN LAST FEW DAYS AFTER SPENDING THREE YEARS THERE ASSISTING AGRICULTURE PROGRAM. LOZANO REPORTED BRITISHER VERY CLOSE TO FIDEL.

2. JURADO ALSO TOLD ROWTON CASTRO HAD OVER EXERTED HIMSELF DURING RECENT GUATANAMO INCIDENT WHICH INDUCED HERNIA. JURADO ALSO OPINED CASTRO HAD SOMEHOW INCURRED SOVIET DISPLEASURE. ROWTON DID NOT QUESTION HIM ON WHERE HE GOT THIS IDEA BUT IT MAY ALSO HAVE COME FROM LOZANO.

(5)

S E C R E T *REF: RYBAT

BT

SECRET

Jam

LIRING-3

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

X

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez-Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See para 3 & 4 of Reference

Reference : HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

Hqs. notes that in Siempre of 22 June 1966 there appears an article on page IX of the supplemental section entitled "A Punto de Revelarse El Misterio" de la Cultura Olmeca. Los Trabajos de Arqueologia en Malpaso by one Carlos NAVARRETE. The article may be of interest to the Station in connection with subject report. A person with the same name as the author of the Siempre article was reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 to be a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico.

Andrew F. MERTON

Attachment:
HMMW-14480

Possible interest on
LIRING-3

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/o att
1 - COS, Guatemala City w/att

7 July 1966

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HMMW-14635

DATE
27 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

HQS FILE NUMBER
50-120-13

ORIGINATING

WH/1/J.Stewart/mvh

3654

RI
Chrono

COORDINATING

WH/C/CICS

WH/C/FI

RELEASING

C/WH/1

W. J. Kaufman

53

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 3

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

S E C R E T 231953Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7711 23 J[illegible] IN 43725

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

ACTION

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 14107

1. STATION PLANNING PLACE LIRING-3 UNDER SURVEILLANCE AS SOON AS TEAM FREE. TIME SPENT BY ROWTON ON L-3 THUS FAR AT MINIMUM AND IT NOT BELIEVED IT WILL INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORT. AT SAME TIME, L-3 HAS ALMOST EMPLOYEE-LIKE ACCESS TO CONSULATE, KNOWS ALL STAFFERS THERE INCLUDING AMBASSADOR AND WITH WIFE ON SCENE BELIEVE HE AT LEAST PARTIAL PENETRATION OF LIRING ESTABLISHMENT.

2. ROWTON BELIEVES ACTUAL RECRUITMENT OF L-3 WILL EVOLVE IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION. ~~WITH RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION.~~ WITH REPLACEMENT OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, CLOSE FRIEND OF L-3, ROWTON HAS GOOD OPENING PULL L-3 UP SHORT BY STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF HAVING GOOD INFORMATION ON GOINGS-ON INSIDE SO THAT HE AND L-3 WILL KNOW QUOTE BUSINESS ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE IN WHICH THEY OPERATING. SHORTLY ROWTON WILL FACE L-3 WITH BIG JUMP IN WHICH L-3 MUST DECIDE WHETHER HE WORKING FOR CUBANS OR FOR ROWTON. AS RELATIONS DEVELOP ROWTON WILL MENTION AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE DOES BUSINESS AND POSSIBILITY THAT AT TIMES BUSINESS MAY BE TO DETRIMENT OF CUBANS. ALSO PLAN SOON GIVE L-3 REQUIREMENTS OF DETAILED REPORTING ON PERSONNEL IN LIRING

201-778301

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 711 SECRET

INSTALLATION IN ORDER COMPROMISE L-3.

3. ALREADY HAVE COMPROMISING RECEIPTS SIGNED BY L-3 IN TRUE NAME AND BY GRADUALLY APPLYING PRESSURE EXPECT HIM WAKE UP ONE DAY TO FACT HE HAS BEEN IN CLANDESTINE BUSINESS WITH ROWTON FOR SOME TIME. HE HAS NOT YET ASKED FIRST QUESTIONS RE ROWTON'S BONA FIDES AND ROWTON PLAYING BIG BUSINESS ACT SO CLOSELY TO INTEL COLLECTION L-3 MAY TAKE RECRUITMENT TO WITTING BASIS IN STRIDE.

4. L-3 ALREADY DISCUSSING NEXT TRIP IN FOR ROWTON BUT COMMENTED 26 JULY NOT GOOD TIME BECAUSE OF FIESTA ATMOSPHERE. SUGGESTED TO ROWTON HE GO IN AFTER CELEBRATION WHEN MINISTRIES BACK TO NORMAL.

5. REMOVAL OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FROM POSITION AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING HOWEVER DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL AFFECT TDY VISIT OF ARNOL BROTHER ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON INSPECTION TRIP TO CONSULATE HERE. IF ALDO COMES L-3 WILL BE IN GOOD POSITION CONTACT HIM AND EFFORTS BEING MADE THROUGH L-3 TO PROVIDE ALDO WITH QUOTE PREPARED UNQUOTE APARTMENT IN WHICH TO LIVE DURING STAY HERE.

SECRET

BT

the importance of penetration
clandestine Activities of
CUIS.

NNNN

SECRET

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

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ORIG: J. [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: 3654
DATE: 20 JUNE 66

☐ FILE [illegible]
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE DC/WH/C5, C/SOD3, C/CA2, C/CA/O2, C/FI2, C/FI/INT2, C/CI

SECRET

21 20 36 Z CITE DIRECTOR

14107

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7613 (IN 37364)*

ACTIVITIES OF

1. VIEW IMPORTANCE PENETRATING CLANDESTINE SUBVERSION BY CUBANS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, HQS WELCOMES ANY LEADS INTO TRICON ARMS SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES. DIFFICULT TO COMMENT AT THIS TIME ON HOW FAR TO GO ON LEADS AS THEY UNCOVERED, AS DECISIONS WILL [illegible] HAVE TO BE MADE ON CASE BY CASE BASIS. WOULD NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED TIME-CONSUMING ARMS SMUGGLING OP UNLESS LIRING-3 RECRUITED AND CONTROLLED AND INFO FROM HIM PROVES RELIABLE. VIEW L-3 BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE AS NOTED TO DATE, CONSIDER IT NOT OUT OF REALM POSSIBILITY HE CLOSER TO CUBANS THAN APPARENT. MIGHT BE WORTH WHILE PUT COMPLETE SURVEILLANCE/COVERAGE ON HIM FOR 10-DAY PERIOD TO SEE IF PATTERN DEVELOPS OR INTERCEPTS OF INTEREST OBTAINED. WOULD WELCOME STATION COMMENT ON AMOUNT TIME ROWFON THINKS REQUIRED THIS OP SINCE DO NOT DESIRE THIS OP BE TO EXCLUSION OF TARGETING HIM AGAINST ON-ISLAND

CONTINUED.../

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SECRET PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 14107

TO

REPORTING SOURCES OR LOCAL LIRING PENETRATIONS. ALSO REQUEST COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY RECRUITING L-3 ON WITTING BASIS.

2. RE POSSIBLE SALVADORAN CONTACTS MEXI, HQS FILES REFLECT THAT AMRUG-1 WAS TO HAVE MET WITH FOLL SALVADORANS DURING VISIT MEXI MAR 64: A. JORGE ARIAS GOMEZ. B. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA. C. ALEJANDRO MONTANA GOMEZ. D. RAUL CASTELLANOS. NOTE ARIAS IDENTIFIED AS SERGIO PEREZ, HEAD SALVADORAN DELEGATION TRICON CONFERENCE JAN 65. ALSO NOTE THAT MAURICIO DE LA SELVA VENEGAS REPORTED 64 BY AMRUG-1 AS SALV CP LINK IN MEXI WITH CUBS THERE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref furnishes possible lead to Central American group authorized by TRICON committee to purchase arms and supply to LA revolutionaries.

WH/C/CICS [illegible] (DRAFT)
WH/C/FI [illegible] (DRAFT)

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
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C/WH/2
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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 17 June 1966 crm
TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance	C NO. 201 - 798301
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☒	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

No Ri traces

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

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(20)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR DC/WH/C 5, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT

S E PMR E T 141800Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7613 14 Jun 66 37364

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7558 (IN 33490)*

ACTION

1. AT LUNCH 13 JUN 66, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT FOR THEIR BUSINESS PURPOSES HE PLANNING CULTIVATE CONTACTS HE HAS IN MEXICO WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP AUTHORIZED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE PURCHASE ARMS AND SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES.

How know?

2. IN RESPONSE ROWTON QUERIES JURADO SAID HE ALMOST CERTAIN ONE OF GROUP IS SALVADORAN HE MET IN HAVANA DURING REVOLUTION. JURADO SAID THIS PERSON VISITS MEXICO MORE OR LESS REGULARLY AND HE AND JURADO HAVE MUTUAL FRIENDS HERE. JURADO INDICATED HE HOPED MAKE CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP WITHIN NEXT 60 DAYS. BECAUSE OF PRESENT JURADO - ROWTON RELATIONSHIP ROWTON DID NOT ASK FOR NAME OF SALVADORAN AT THIS MEETING BUT IS CERTAIN CAN OBTAIN IT SHORTLY.

Can we help?

3. IN PASSING, JURADO MENTIONED ANTONIO DEL CONDE PONTONES (201-728065) WHO HELPED SUPPLY FIDEL WITH GRANMA AND ARMS. COMMENTED DEL CONDE PROBABLY NOT BEING USED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE BECAUSE

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7613 SECRET

HIS WIFE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY CUBANS WHILE IN ACT SMUGGLING LARGE QUANTITY OF DOLLARS OUT OF CUBA.

4. CONSIDER IT HIGHLY POSSIBLE JURADO WILL TURN UP LEAD TO ARMS-BUYING GROUP LEADING TO THEIR IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONG METHODS, HOWEVER, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS THIS ASPECT AND GUIDANCE ON HOW FAR CAN PLAY THIS GAME. ARMS SMUGGLING SO TENUOUS AND INVOLVED THAT ROWTON OPERATIONG THROUGH JURADO SHOULD BE ABLE DEVELOP LOGICAL SOUNDING, EVEN TO JURADO, SUPPLY STORY WHICH COULD BE MADE TO FALL THROUGH ANY TIME KUBARK DESIRED PULL PLUG.

5. PLS ADVISE.

SECRET *RE FURTHER DEBRIEFING CARLOS JURADO

BT

8 June 1966

EXCERPT FROM HMMA 29157

Para 32: "ROWTON is off and running on his development of LIRINGs 3 and 4. He is doing this under false flag as a Greek businessman. Again, the ubiquitous LITAINT-2 is in a position to monitor this operation as he is close to both LIRINGS and has no connection with ROWTON. On 27 May LIRING-3, who is well connected in PBRUMEN, flew to PBRUMEN on a trip to scout out business opportunities for ROWTON. LIRING-4 continues to work at LIRING."

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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dissem by 23 ~~~

ACTION C/WH 6

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, C/SB5, C/FI, C/FI/D4, C/FI/INT, C/CA2

S E C R E T 081720Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7558
DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE
KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

8 JUN 65 IN 33490

REF: MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR BY WALLACE ROWTON PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING REGARDING JURADO TRIP CUBA 27 MAY 5 JUNE 66:

2. MILITIA FORCE WHICH CAPTURED LANDING PARTY IN LAUNCH RECENTLY WAS LEAD BY CUBAN MINISTER OF EDUCATION. JURADO STATED CUBA LITERALLY BRISTLING WITH VERY LATEST WEAPONS INCLUDING MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. IN RESPONSE TO ROWTON QUERY JURADO STATED HE ASSUMED SOVIETS CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT THAT CUBANS NOW WELL TRAINED TO USE THEM IF NECESSARY.

3. JURADO STATED EVERY CUBAN HE TALKED TO WAS SINCERELY CONVINCED INVASION IMMINENT AND THAT ONLY ALERTNESS OF MILITIA HAD PREVENTED A SUCCESSFUL LANDING. JURADO ENTERED MOVIE ONE DAY DURING WEEK SAW ONLY THREE SPECTATORS AND LEFT IN EMBARRASSMENT. SUBJ SAID IT OPINION IN CUBA THAT ABORTIVE INVASION HAD SOME DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ELECTIONS IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE ADDED HE WAS TOLD STATE OF WAR MOBILIZATION IN CUBA WOULD LAST ABOUT MONTH.

SECRET

To rpts - Brown

4. DUE NATURE ROWTON CONTROL OVER JURADO AND PARTICULAR MANEUVER BY WHICH ROWTON INDUCED SUBJ MAKE TRIP IT NOT POSSIBLE ESTABLISH GOOD SOURCING FOR ABOVE STATEMENT. JURADO SAW ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, THREE TIMES AND ONE OF THESE IN RODRIGUEZ' HOME WHERE PAIR SAT UP TALKING UNTIL 0300.

SECRET SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

2. RI FILE NO.

3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.

4. DATE

7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM

8. DATE OF INFO.

9. EVALUATION

5. ANALYST

6. DATE PROCESSED

10. DISSEMINATED IN

11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE

13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

ZURATO-Delmar, Carl | 201-798301

6 June 1966   FM: CS [illegible] John Sarcone x3556

THERE IS A RESTR [illegible] DA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

FORM 11-63 44 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS **ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)**

THERE IS A [illegible] ICTED CI/C [illegible] THE SUBJECT

OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 79 83 01

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(7-46)

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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C/WH 6

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UNIT	TIME	BY

INFO
FILE VR C/CI, C/FI2, DC/WH/C5,

S E C R E T 072305Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7549

7 JUN 66 IN 32832

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7537 (IN 32041)*

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED FOLLOWING TO WALLACE B ROWTOONN 6JUNE 66 WHICH CARLOS HAD OBTAINED 27 MAY - 3 JUNE IN HAVANA FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS:

2. A. ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS,, BROTHER OF ARNOL, WILL SOON COME TO MEXICO CITY TO INVESTIGATE AFFAIRS AT CUBAN EMBASSY. ALDO RODRIGUEZ IS WATCHLIST 65 NO. 534. FORMERLY WAS CUBAN DIP ASSIGNED MONTEVIDEO. NOW WORKING FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVANA.

B. CUBAN MOBILIZATION HAS COST GOVT 25 MILLION PESOS UP TO LAST WEEK.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

* RE RETURN OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 17

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INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/CS, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 070145Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7537

ACTION

7 JUN 66 IN 32041

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (24660)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR RETURNED MEXICO CITY 3 JUN FROM TRIP TO HAVANA SPONSORED BY WALLACE B. ROWTON. DID LITTLE PROMOTE ROWTON BUSINESS DEALS EXCEPT RECEMENT RELATIONS WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO ASKED JURADO SEND HIM SOME SPARK PLUGS FOR CAR.

2. JURADO SAID ATMOSPHERE EXTREMELY TENSE IN HAVANA BUT PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE SOLDIERS PENETRATED GUANTANAMO, WHERE SHOT AND THEN MANAGED TO GET OUT. PEOPLE GENERALLY BELIEVE THIS CUBAN PROVOCATION TO COVER SORRY ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF COUNTRY AND BOLSTER SAGGING MORALE.

3. SUBJ REPORTS CUBA CALLING ON OTHER COUNTRIES FOR VOLUNTEERS AUGMENT ARMED FORCES AND MIRIAM CHICHAY TOLD ROWTON CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO JOAQUIN ARMAS HAD ATTENDED MEETING OF OFFICIALS IN HAVANA AT WHICH CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS WAS DISCUSSED.

4. FURTHER DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON IN PROGRESS. JURADO STILL ASKING NO PRYING QUESTIONS OF ROWTON AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED IF JURADO HAD BLOWN ROWTON TO CUBANS. CHICHAY TOLD LITAINT-2 LAST WEEK JURADO IN HAVANA, NO OTHER DETAILS. LITAINT-2 TOLD STATION C/O HE THOUGHT [illegible] JURADO ON CULTURAL MISSION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

Probably dissem [illegible] WH/CA/RR

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

SECRET

ORIG: Robert O. Bussey:hl
UNIT: C/TSD/OA
EXT: 2603
DATE: 31 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: TSD-6 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH-8, WH/C-8, FI, NE-6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 31 20 30Z CITE DIRECTOR 00639

TO MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING TECHS

LIRING/3

RE: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN ~~XX~~ 24660)

1. KURIOT CAN SUPPLY REQUESTED DOCUMENTS BUT SINCE HAVE LIMITED SUPPLY BLANK ORIGINAL GREEK PASSPORTS, PROPOSE FOLLOWING: ISSUE AS MAIN IDENTITY DOCUMENT REPRODUCED GREEK INTERNATIONAL DRIVER'S LICENSE FROM ATHENS. SUPPORT THIS WITH NEW YORK DRIVER'S LICENSE, POSSIBLY MEXICAN TOURIST CARD AND GREEK POCKET LITTER. ADVISE.

2. FOR PASSPORT OR LICENSE NEED FOLLOWING: FULL NAME, INCLUDING MATRONYMIC, PARENTS' FIRST NAMES, PROFESSION, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, DISTINGUISHING MARKS, COLOR EYES AND HAIR, FULL FACE AND THREE QUARTER PROFILE WITH RIGHT EAR PHOTO NEGATIVES AND SIX SPECIMEN SIGNATURES, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, MARITAL STATUS.

MEXI 286.3B

RELEASING OFFICER

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 03639

TO

3. KURIOT CAN ARBITRARILY SELECT DATA WHICH CANNOT BE FURNISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Requested information whether TSD can supply Greek passport, New York driver's license and pocket litter for flash identification in Mexico.

Telecoordination: WH/1 - Jack Stewart (x3655)
NE/Greece - Pete Dodge (x6808)
WH/1 - Joseph H. Fisher (x2861)

Richard A. Krueger

RICHARD A. KRUEGER
ADC/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ROBERT O. BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 167696

DATE 27 May 66

TO ~~CHIEF,~~ FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER
NAME Jane F. Zerance
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1
ROOM BUILDING 332 Ames Center
EXTENSION 3656

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
☒ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
☐ ADDITIONAL DATA
☐ RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
☐ OTHER

JUN 2 31 PM '66

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Carlos JURADO-Delmar 201-788301[illegible]

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1930 in Mexico City

4. CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Artist

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Resided Cuba a considerable length of time		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Miriam Chicbay de JURADO (Chicbay is Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese maiden name)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

JUN 3 21 PM '66

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
MORE BIO DATA AND PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

14 June 1956
DATE

TO: Jane F. Zerange

FROM: 64 FI/D

A. ☐ SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. ☐ A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. ☐ WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. ☒ FI/D HAS NO ~~[illegible]~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ☐ THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:
- ☒ CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- ☐ CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
332 Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-798301

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity to furnish information on Cuban economic & military targets, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in MexCity, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

X	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Jane F. Zerance

EXTENSION: 3656

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF:

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

SECRET

SUBJECT: Carlos JURADO-Delmar

DPOB: 1930 in Mexico City

CITIZENSHIP: Mexican

OCCUPATION: Artist

SCHOOLING: Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico

RESIDENCE: Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.

MARITAL STATUS: Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

DEROGATORY TRACES
STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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FROM Dissem BY 24

ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2

MEXI

S E C R E T 270105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7467 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

AN C/FI		
PS	DEST	WH/1
ABSTRACT		INDEX

26 MAY 66 25489

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

1. LIRING-3 PURCHASED CUBANA TICKET FOR CUBA 26 MAY, WITH MONEY PROVIDED BY ROWTON. WILL DEPART 27 MAY. SIGNED TRUE NAME RECEIPT FOR FUNDS. PLANS STAY WEEK. HAS CONTACTED FRIENDS AMONG CUBAN ARTISTS WITH WHOM WILL LIVE WHILE ON ISLAND.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS IN 1960 WHILE LIRING-3 EMPLOYED WITH CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. ACTUALLY WIFE RODRIGUEZ WORKED UNDER LIRING-3 AND FRIENDLY ASSOCIATION BEGAN THROUGH WIFE. RODRIGUEZ THEN WORKING FOR MINISTRY LABOR.

3. QUICK ACTION ON LIRING-3 VISA BROUGHT QUERIES FROM CUBAN CONSUL MEXICO CITY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON AS TO WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN CUBA. CURBELO SAID EVEN FOR CUBANS IT TAKES WEEK. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE ANSWERED ONLY THAT HE HAD FRIENDS CUBA. ROWTON GAVE LIRING-3 MONEY WITH WHICH HE BUYING GIFTS MEXICO FOR RODRIGUEZ AND FAMILY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

SECRET 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

ACTION

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

26 May 65 24660

REF DIRECTOR 27441

24660

[illegible] 1300

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

Jit Lodge - 6P08

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 SECRET

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

1

8

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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4		8	

DISSEM BY 28/3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA
CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET 25 21 26Z CITE DIRECTOR 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

Thomas Polgar

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

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FROM DISSEM by 23/3

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2,

SECRET 242240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7433 24 [illegible] 23008

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO 7422 (IN 36521)

FULL NAME SUBJ REF IS CARLOS JURADO DELMAR.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

liring 3

LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION DC/WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT WH TIME 1840Z BY C

INFO FILE VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI-2, CS/DO, CS/DO

S E C R E T 241655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7422

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

24 MAY 63 IN 23654

REF: MEXICO 7234 (IN [illegible])

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAD LUNCHEON MEETING LIRING-3 22 MAY WITH RESULT THAT LIRING-3 ENTHUSIASTICALLY URGING ROWTON LET HIM MAKE TRIP CUBA LEARN WHAT ITEMS CUBANS WANT BUY FROM WESTERN FIRMS.

2. LIRING-3 BELIEVES HE DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL GREEK BUSINESSMAN WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WHO WANTS ECONOMIC RESEARCH DONE ON CUBA FOR UNNAMED CLIENTS WISHING SELL TO CUBA. LIRING-3 SAID HE HAD MANY HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS INSIDE CUBA DEVELOPED BEFORE CASTRO TAKE-OVER.

3. BEST LIRING-3 FRIEND IS (FNU) RODRIGUEZ WHO HIGH IN MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO MIGHT BE ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. WILL CHECK TO BE CERTAIN. LIRING-3 ALSO CLAIMS PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH RAUL ROA KURI AND EVEN FIDEL CASTRO.

4. LIRING-3 KNOWS ROWTON ONLY AS NICOLAS HARRIS. HAS ASKED NO QUESTIONS TO BETTER ESTABLISH ROWTON BONA FIDES. APPARENTLY ACCEPTS HIM WITHOUT QUESTION. DUE LIRING-3 CLOSE

SECRET

SECRET

CONTACTS WITH HIGH OFFICIALS ROWTON TOLD HIM FIRST THING HE SHOULD DO IS FIND OUT WHAT THESE OFFICIALS PERSONALLY NEED ON OUTSIDE. LIRING-3 ACKNOWLEDGED THIS PROBABLY SMART MOVE AS HE HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED SEEING HIGH OFFICIALS BUYING ALL TYPES WESTERN CONVENIENCES AND PRODUCTS FOR SELVES.

5. LIRING-3 HAS BEEN OFFICIALY INVITED TO 26 JULY CELEBRATION. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE APPEARED BE GOOD CANDIDATE FOR ROWTON NEEDS SINCE HE PLACED PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE AND CONFIDENCE IN THESE MATTERS ABOVE PRACTICAL OR THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE OF ECONOMICS. SUBJ COMMENTED CUBANS HAD LEARNED THEY COULD NOT BUY ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES DIRECTLY AND OPENLY ON WORLD MARKET HENCE WOULD WELCOME LIRING-3 ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY WHOM THEY COULD TRUST. ROWTON HINTED HE HAD CONTACTS IN MUNITIONS TRADE IN ITALY AND GREECE AND WOULD BE INTERESTED CUBAN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. LIRING-3 SAID HE COULD HANDLE THIS ALSO THROUGH RODRIGUEZ WITH THE CUBAN GENERAL STAFF.

6. AT END OF LUNCH LIRING-3 ASSURED ROWTON HE COULD VISIT CUBA FOR 10 DAYS OSTENSIBLY TO SEE WIFE'S FAMILY. HE ALSO ASSURED ROWTON HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO ANYONE HIS RELATIONS WITH ROWTON. NEXT MEETING SET FOR 25 MAY.

SECRET

SECRET

7. ROWTON OBTAINED INFORMATION SUBJECT BORN MEXI CITY 1930, STUDIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY AT NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AND LIVED CUBA CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME. MARRIED WIFE THERE SIX YEARS AGO.

8. REQUEST AUTHORITY PERMIT ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 CUBA ON EXPLORATORY TRIP WHICH WILL ALLOW LIRING-3 RECONTACT OLD FRIENDS LEARN WHAT ITEMS ARE CRITICAL AND WILL BE FIRST STEP INVOLVING LIRING-3 IN CLANDESTINE OPERATION ~~WITH ROWTON~~. IF, DESPITE HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WILL NOT REVEAL NICK HARRIS TO CUBANS, HE IS INDUCED GIVE NAME HIS CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY NOTHING IS LOST AS IT THUS FAR ALL IN NAME OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. IF TRIP MADE NOW IT COINCIDES WITH LIRING-3 SPRING VACATION FROM HIS ART TEACHING CLASSES.

9. RECOGNIZE THIS QUICK JUMP INTO OPERATION WITHOUT FULL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ BUT BELIEVE IT GOOD OPPORTUNITY TIE LIRING-3 TO ROWTON IN WAY WILL LATER REVEAL ITSELF TO BE COMPROMISING. DO NOT BELIEVE LIRING-3 NEEDS BE FULLY CLEARED WITTING AND RECRUITED FOR THIS OPERATION.

10. REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

EXERPT FROM HMMA-28909, 12 May 1966

Para 29: "ROWTON; posing asd Greek, made rapid progress in developing the husband of a girl now working at the PERUVIAN Consulate by expressing interest in the young man's professional work. The Subjects are LIRING-3 and LIRING-4."

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: DCWH/C

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Carlos JURADO and Miriam CHICHAY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXI 7234

1. As indicated in Reference, attached are the contact reports of Wallace B. ROWTON resulting from his recent meetings with Subject individuals.

2. Similar contact reports will continue to be forwarded to Headquarters as this operation develops.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact report a/s h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
4 - FILES

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1cc w/o att to WH/C/ES

OS COPY

201 - 798301

~~50-120-13~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-28875

DATE: 11 May 1966

GROUP 1 [illegible]

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: FFN # 12,328

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. At about 1830 on 2 May, 1966, Rowton dropped into the Salon de La Plastica Mexicana in the hope of running into Subject so that he could renew contact more or less casually.

2. Fortunately as soon as he stepped into the door he found Subject engaged in conversation with the receptionist and another person (probably a Mexican employe of the Salon). When Subject spotted Rowton he broke off his conversation and moved away to greet Rowton cordially. He said that he had himself just arrived at the Salon and was very happy to run into Rowton again. After a few briff remarks, he invited Rowton to coffee in a nearby cafe. Rowton accepted and they both left the Salon without further delay.

3. Rowton remained with Subject in conversation over coffee for about 45 minutes. Subject expressed gratification in having met Rowton and several times reassured Rowton that he enjoyed conversing with him regardless of whether he made an sale of his painting or not. Rowton reverted to the theme that he had a genuine interest in Subject's future and hoped in some way to provide Subject with the means of becoming relatively independent so that he could travel and carry on his art work freely. Rowton added that he had given much thought to the idea of using Subject to help him in his economic research, since this would justify Rowton's putting Subject on his expense account. He then questioned Subject on his possible connections in Mexico, but Subject confessed that he had only limited contacts that probably would not be useful to Rowton. Rowton then moved into the target question. He stated that most of his clients in England, France and Greece were interested in Cuban requirements and perhaps Subject was in a unique position to prepare a report on what the Cuban economy required at the moment. Subject responded without hestitation that he could do something on Cuba without too much difficulty. He explained that he knew official Cubans in Mexico City, including those in the Commercial Mission, and could travel into Cuba if necessary.

4. Rowton then stressed that he really did not need too many statistics on the Cuban economy nor contact with the Cubans but wanted somehow to justify helping Subject financially. He explained that he could easily assemble some data himself, but wanted Subject to do something concrete so that he would remain in the picture and Rowton could consider him in

201-798301

att #1 to HMMA-28875

CS COPY

a sort of stringer in reporting on economic developments. Subject replied that he understood and did not see that such a task would be too difficult.

5. Rowton then asked Subject how he was coming in locating a new aprtment/studio. Subject replied that he had found a desirable place near Chapultepec, and hoped to be able to move soon. Rowton then commented that he might have to leave for Paris in the next few days and would be away for about two weeks on business. He stated that he might be able to help Subject with the rent on his studio provided it had a phone. Rowton explained that he was at present paying 350 pesos monthly for secretarial service and could just as well pay Subject something for taking telephone messages. Subject replied that he would be glad to be of service to Rowton without compensation ("mi casa es suya")in such a matter.

6. Rowton then turned the conversation to Subject's wife and family. Subject revealed that his wife's maiden name (apellido) was the Chinese translation of "Flor de Durazno". He pronounced it in Chinese for Rowton but Rowton made no attempt to transliterate it and at this point cannot recall the phonetic pronunciation. Subject added that Chichay is a Cuban corruption of the Chinese given name. In reply to Rowton's direct query, Subject stated that his wife's ~~father~~ mother is in Cuba but her father is in New York. He added that her father did not agree with the revolution and left but the rest of the family remained. He also stated that her mother has not remarried and lives with her brothers and sisters. Subject added that his wife felt no bitterness toward her father and in fact the father writes regularly - once a week from New York. Rowton did not press for an address at the time, feeling that it would be more discreet to wait for an opening at a subsequent meeting(when he could allege that he was planning to stop over in New York).

7. Rowton took the occasion of his alleged impending departure to ask for Subject's home address so that he could write from Europe. Subject stated that since he might move it would be better for Rowton to write to him care of the Salon rather than to his present address.

8. On leaving Subject Rowton promised to pass by the Salon again before he left so that he could say goodbye to Subject.

Wallace B Rowton

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. When Rowton arrived at the entrance to the Bellas Artes Building at 1100 on 30 April, as planned, he found Subject waiting on the steps. Subject greeted Rowton cordially and suggested that they take a taxi since the Ministry of Education building was a little too far to walk to. He then hailed a taxi and instructed the driver to take them to the Secretaria de Education Publica on Calle Argentina.

2. On arrival he escorted Rowton through the court-yard of the building and explained the murals of Diego Rivera. He commented that he felt the murals were superior to those at the Prado Hotel and Cuernavaca since they had more "social meaning". He stressed the hardship under which Rivera had worked, which included some physical danger from certain elements opposed to his socialist ideas. Rowton picked up this theme in relationship to Subject's own situation in an attempt to elicit as much information as possible concerning Subject's financialstatus and position vis-a-vis the Mexican government.

3. In the course of conversation Subject stated that he had received relatively little understanding and sympathy from the government officials as a whole but did receive some support from the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes. He explained that he was able to earn enough money from teaching assignments to be relatively independent, and not depend on sales of his picutres to make a living. In reply to Rowton's comment to the effect that perhaps his wife could find some employment to help Subject, the latter replied that his wife could not work because of her status. He quickly added that he probably would not find it difficult to procure working papers for her, but he preferred not to do so at least at the present time.

4. After completing his tour of the Secretariat of Education Building, Subject invited Rowton to view the murals of the Supreme Court Building on Pino Suarez, which he described as superior even to those of Diego Rivera, especially because of their open defiance of official opinion. On the way Rowton continued to put discreet questions concerning Subject's personal life. Subject replied by revealing that

he lived with his wife and three-year-old child in a very small apartment near San Angel and shared a studio with another artist. He added that he was paying 650 pesos monthly rent which he considered very high for what he was getting. He also complained that the artist with whom he was sharing the studio was a dil ettante who was more interested in the atmosphere of the Latin Quarter than in art for its own sake. He said he found it difficult to paint with guitars playing and cocktail glasses clinking in the background. Subject then stated that he was looking for a more suitable arrangement, perhaps in a condominio and preferably in the Tacubaya area.

5. In connection with his own future hopes, Subject stated that he wanted very much to travel to gain as much experience as possible so that his style could be crystalized. He commented that he could move easily to Cuba since his wife's family lived there and he could get along with the Cuban authorities, but he felt Mexico was better for him at the moment. He expressed preference for Sweden, North Africa and Greece. In reply to Rowton's queries, he stated that he did not feel that his daughter would present a problem, since he could leave her in the care of his or his wife's relatives. He added that she was currently attending a Jardin de Niños in the mornings and doing very well despite her tender age.

6. Subject commented also that he likedtravel so much that he had joined the Mexican Navy to see the world. He added that he had been able to visit almost all the ports of the east and west coasts of North and Central America but had not succeeded in seeing Europe as he had hoped. Since Rowton was posing as a Greek, Subject expressed great interest in visiting Athens and the Middle East, and at one point asked Rowton how much money he would need to live in Athens for a month as a tourist. Subject also stated that both he and his wife were anxious to learn English and French so that they could absorb as much local culture as possible in their travels.

7. After inviting Rowton to coffee at a nearby restaurant, Subject stated that he had to meet his wife and some friend's for lunch and left Rowton at about 1335 in front of the Cathddral. He promised to telephone Rowton again so that they could get together before Rowton left the country.

Wallace B Rowton

27 April, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Mr. and Mrs.
Carlos Jurado. (from LITAWT-1)

1. Following a Station lead to the effect that Mrs. Chichay Jurado, who is employed by the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, is the daughter of a Cuban residing in New York City, Rowton visited the Salon de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle Havre 7, where Carlos Jurado's paintings were on exhibit. After several unsuccessful attempts to meet Jurado by chance at the salon, Rowton left his alias and telephone answering service number with the receptionist on 14 April, 1966, and asked that Jurado contact him for a meeting. On 18 April Rowton again visited the salon (having received no message through the answering service) and fortunately met Jurado who had dropped in to pick up messages from the receptionist.

2. Rowton explained that he was interested in Jurado's style, particularly for a mural that might go well in a New York night club owned by a friend of his. Jurado was, of course, immediately interested and commented that he was most anxious to visit New York to see the Museums. In answer to Rowton's query, he stated that he did not have any relatives in New York and had never been outside Mexico. Rowton invited Jurado and his wife to dinner the following evening so that they could discuss the proposed mural. (Rowton planned, if pressed, to use the "La Chansonette" nightclub restaurant owned by his ~~frien~~ Greek friend Rita Dimitri as the prospective client).

3. On 19 April at 1930 Rowton met Jurado at the Salon as planned. Fortunately Jurado had brought his wife Chichay along as Rowton had suggested. Rowton invited them to dinner at the Restaurante &

"El 77" at Calle Londres 77. Neither had eaten there previously and appeared delighted at the opportunity to enjoy a good dinner.

4. In the course of conversation, Jurado stated that his wife Chichay was born in Cuba and that they had a three-year old daughter. Niether he nor Chichay made any referance to her employment at the Consulate and Rowton did not feel it wise to press too hard on that subject. Rowton again asked whether Jurado had any relatives in New York in the event it might be advisable for him to travel there in connection with the mural, but neither he nor his wife responded in the affirmative.

5. Later in the evening, Jurado and his wife strolled along ~~Ntuz~~ Calle Niza and Reforma to the Hotel Hilton with Rowton. This gave Rowton an opportunity to sound them out on politics with specific reference to Cuba. Rowton pretended to be of Greek-Irish parentage and more or less neutral in his own political views with respect to Cuba. Chichay Jurado stated that she felt Cuba was doing well and that the relovution was the only answer to the corruption that had existed previously. Carlos Jurado agreed, commenting that the "Northamerican" position with regard to Cuba was unfortunately erroneous and short-sighted. Rowton placed much of the blame on the former Batista regime but lamented the fact that in the meantime the Cuban people were suffering from the mistakes of the politicians.

6. While walking along Reforma, Carlos Jurado commented that his wife's father was Chinese but did not indicate where he was then residing. Chichay Jurado stated that she had learned some Cantonese as a child, but did not consider herself proficient in Chinese.

7. Before leaving him for the evening, Carlos Jurado invited Rowton to visit some of the better murals in Mexico City on Saturday, 23 April, and promisedd to telephone Rowton to set the time and

place of the meeting. He informed Rowton that he himself could be contacted on 48 22 66, a telephone that was located near his studio in the Colonia Florida. He asked Rowton to obtain as soon as possible the measurements of the proposed mural and x photographs of of the owner so that he could make a sample painting.

Wallace B Rowton

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

SECRET

W.F. Frederick

ORIG : W.F.Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
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4		8	

9 MAY 66 23 26z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, C/CA, WH/C8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3 LIRING-4

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

201 req-d
25 May 66

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 1

33/M SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT
TIME
BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 050040Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234 5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

*Lead given to ROWTON by Station.
Believe original lead from LITAINT-2. 8

[illegible] — DO NOT [illegible]

S

Stewart

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR
ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE
FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON
HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS
FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER
AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME
CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLIT-
ERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER
PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY
MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW
LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN
STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UN-
SALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO
ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT
ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH
CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2
GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY
COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXI 7234 SECRET

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

SECRET

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62

POA LIRING

BT

Need Hq assessment

Cmnd 2052 10-0C2 [illegible]

[illegible] Peach Blossom — Chinese name of Miriam Chichay.

Ray [illegible]

HSI 1153, [illegible] family name

Hua Hara

HSCI 6892 very complex

female given name

TAO-HUA 2711 · 5363

TAO HUA

Hwa-tao

NNNN

[illegible] EX [illegible] FILE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO.
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, San Salvador

SUBJECT
J[illegible]TRACAS
Identification of Jorge ARIAS Gomez as Salvadoran Delegate to Tri-Continental Conference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. [illegible] forwarded to [illegible] a copy of the 15 February 1966 edition of Politica, a Mexican publication that contained photos of and speeches delivered by the Chiefs of the various delegations to the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January.

2. "Sergio [illegible]", described therein as the Chief of the Salvadoran delegation, was identified from his photo by the [illegible] and [illegible]-2 as Jorge ARIAS Gomez, a member of the Central Committee of the PCES. According to [illegible]-2, ARIAS is probably the #4 man in the PCES hierarchy - behind Raul CASTELLANOS Figueroa, Jorge Shafick [illegible], and Salvador Cayetano CARPIO. It is rather strange that the PCES sent ARIAS on this [illegible], [illegible] JURANT-2 and [illegible]-2 reported that, while in Cuba in 1961-62, ARIAS had an affair with a girl that resulted in her pregnancy, and the Cubans sent a strong complaint to the PCES concerning his conduct. 30?

3. A LIVACATE main intercept ([illegible]) indicated that ARIAS was expected in Moscow in January. He apparently has not yet returned to El Salvador, and thus he may also be representing the PCES at the 23rd CPSU Congress. Any available photos of Salvadorans at that affair would be appreciated.

4. R.I. please index:

Jorge ARIAS Gomez (aka Sergio [illegible])
CIT: El Salvador

In photo of chiefs of various delegations to Tri-Continent Conference in Havana in January 1966 (Politica, 15 Feb 66). "Sergio [illegible]", head of Salvadoran delegation, was identified as Jorge ARIAS Gomez.

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
1 - COS, JMWAVE
1 - COS, Mexico City

Floyd R. CURTNEY

LIRING-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HSSA-5557

DATE
1 April 66

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER
201-111046
[illegible] 63-[illegible]-117.3

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE [illegible]

FROM: Name [illegible] | OFFICE [illegible] | ROOM [illegible] | PHONE [illegible] | TUBE ADDRESS —

1. TYPE ACTION	☒ OPEN ☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE	2. FILE RESTRICTED	☐ YES ☐ NO	3. PERMANENT CHARGE	☒ YES ☐ NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [illegible] D1

5. 201 NO. [illegible] E2

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			
N2			

7. SEX F1 M ☐ F ☐

8. DATE OF BIRTH F2

9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH G1

10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH [illegible] G1

11. CITIZENSHIP [illegible] H1

12. OCCUPATION (clear text) J1

OCC. CODE J2

13. SRL K1

14. OI CODE M1

15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER K1

DATE K1

16 RESIDENCE [illegible]

17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

[illegible] N1

[illegible] P1

R1

S1

T1

U1

V1

W1

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE X1

19. ACTION DESK CODE Y1

20. SECONDARY DESK CODE Z1

21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES [illegible] B1 & C1

22. CRYPTONYM LIRING-3

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

201 NO. [illegible]

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(38-51)

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DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX

Chief, WH Division

[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez - Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

Action Required: See paragraphs 3 and 4

1. Attached is a copy of an undated employment letter to KUBARK from Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez, self-described as an ex-military physician. The letter bears the return address [illegible] 412, Villahermosa, Tabasco, Mexico and a Villahermosa postmark dated 21 (?) February 1966. In the letter, which was written in fairly good English, SOTO said among other things that the Cuban Consulate in Merida has established a group of Cubans in [illegible], Malpaso, where the Netzahualcoyotl Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics.

2. Headquarters has no traces identifiable with Armando SOTO Rodriguez or [illegible] also mentioned in the letter. The National Geographic map of Mexico and Central America dated 1953, 1:3.5 million, shows the town of Netzahualcoyotl at [illegible], [illegible], on the [illegible] River about fifty miles from the Guatemalan border.

3. [illegible] on Cuban guerrilla activity at Netzahualcoyotl. Since a sensitive source ([illegible]) did report occasional interest by the Cuban Consulate in the Tabasco area, and since the area pinpointed by source does lend itself to cross-border activities, it would be appreciated if Mexico City Station would endeavor to check out this report. [illegible]-1 especially might be able to furnish some information in this connection. A former Mexico Base staffer now stationed at Headquarters recalls that Ventura "El Tigre" [illegible], a wealthy Mexican cattleman, has extensive holdings centering around Emilio Zapata, about 25 miles from Netzahualcoyotl, and might be knowledgeable of activities in the area. Access to [illegible] would probably be gained through [illegible]-1 and Raimundo [illegible] who services [illegible]-1's and [illegible]'s airplanes in Merida. [illegible] has previously extended invitations to visit his ranch at [illegible] and might do so again if suitably approached. It is recalled that Lawrence F. BARKER has traveled or planned travel near the general area. Perhaps [illegible] could set up a trip to this area. Another possibility for background and channels might be through [illegible] who has recently been heard to say that he is visiting the Isthmus of Tehuantepec regularly. (This was overheard from an intercepted ham radio conversation). Three maps of the area are attached as of possible assistance.

Attachment:
A. Letter u. s. c.
B. 3 maps u. s. c.

Distribution: 2 - COS, Mexico City

Continued...

Possible interest in [illegible]-3 case.

5 April 1966

[illegible]

11 Apr 1966

SECRET

RI
Chrono

WH/1	J. Stewart	[illegible]	5506
WH/C/FI			
WH/2/0			
C/WH/1		W. J. Kaufman	

DISPATCH

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FILE, VR, CS/DO, OT, CI/OA, OPS FE, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 072054Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 JUL 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY (ISOLATION) INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 47001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE (ISOLATION) 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: (ISOTROPIC) SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. (ISOLATION) STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING. ALL TRAINEES COMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES: 729532

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT (ISO/ISOT) JULY 63)
AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT (ISO) FEB 64) 741331
AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT (ISO) JAN 65) 755409
AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676
AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 3[illegible]63
AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334051
AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT) AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

SECRET

BE ASSIGNED.

01

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO ISO NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP ISO WAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

S E C R E T 01

BT

2/IN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

313 ERB

DATE : 17 MAY 61

TO : BELL

FROM : RIO DE JANERIO

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH, S/C 2

ROUTING

1	CI	4	
2		5	
3		6	

MAY 18 1340Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2065

BELL WAVE MEXI INFO SAOP (BY POUCH) CITE RIOD 5366

JMZIP

1. ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS CUBAN VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS CARLOS OLIVARES NOW IN MEXI, PLANS COME BRAZIL ABOUT 20 MAY TO "PROCLAIM TRUTH ABOUT CUBAN REVOLUTION".

2. REQUEST SOONEST RESUME DEROG INFO OLIVARES TO BE PASSED HIGH LEVEL LIAISON.

3. REQUEST MEXI ADVISE RE TRAVEL.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG-1

1. I met with AMBANG-1 on 27 July 1963 in Miami. The following is a resume of the business transacted at that meeting.

a. Request for High Explosives

AMBANG-1 stated that in view of my outline of strategic targets inside Cuba during our last meeting which took place in Washington on 21 June 1963, he had decided to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant. He informed me that he has a man employed in the power plant in Havana who is capable of launching this operation. In this connection AMBANG-1 asked if we could make available twenty pounds of high explosives as well as six to eight thermite grenades. AMBANG-1 asked if it were possible to have the twenty pounds broken into smaller lots. In our further discussion of this subject, it became apparent that A-1 would be willing to receive the materiel either in San Juan or inside Cuba, but that he definitely preferred the latter if this were possible. Like in most other instances during our conversation, I advised AMBANG-1 that I would need to discuss this matter with my superiors but that I could tentatively assure him of our ability and willingness to furnish the high explosives in San Juan and possibly inside Cuba. At this point I asked AMBANG-1 if he could foresee the need for materiel of this type inside Cuba. I told him that I asked this question because if his group were prepared now or in the near future for meaningful sabotage action inside Cuba it was conceivable that we could begin the caching of needed materiel inside Cuba. AMBANG-1 assured me that they

14-00000

were in a position to sabotage the electrical plant in Havana. (I did not ask, neither did he specify which plant.) He did not promise immediate action, adding that he wanted to assure himself of the details of the planned operation and the safety-odds of the man involved. A-1 then indicated that he would certainly be in a position to accomplish this mission and others in the future and would be most grateful for any materiel we could put in place. I left the matter with him with the understanding that if it were possible we would proceed with caching the high explosives in the general area of Havana. He assured me of their capability to service and retrieve the cache.

b. Request for Contact in Guantanamo

AMBANG-1 asked me if it would be possible for us to arrange some means for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo and talk to his brother who is an employee of the Naval Base and another agent of theirs likewise employed there. The reason A-1 gave for the request was that they wished to inform Ramon Cisneros Diaz of the JURE plans to begin the implementation of their plan of resistance and overthrow of the Castro Regime. I advised A-1 that whereas I would look into this matter as I could tentatively tell him that the chances of accomplishing this were remote.

c. AMBANG-1 Political Plans

AMBANG-1 informed me that he was planning at this time to be in New York on or about 10 August and that following this trip he intended to go to Santo Domingo and Caracas. In Santo Domingo he hoped to set up a small base for operations such as a small house on a farm near the shore which could be used for boat travel to Cuba. Once he had made such arrangements he intended to talk to President Juan Bosch telling him of the plan and asking his acquiescence if not support. AMBANG-1 intends to tell Bosch that he will not embarrass him and will go about his business in a secure and professional manner adding that if he should embarrass Bosch, the latter could disclaim him and A-1 would desist from any further activity there.

So far as AMBANG-1's trip to Caracas is concerned, that will be principally devoted to orienting the JURE representation in that city. In addition, AMBANG-1 will attempt to see and talk to Venezuelan Government officials including President Betancourt.

Some time after this trip AMBANG-1 intends to visit Central America principally Costa Rica and if he can procure a visa, Mexico. The purpose of all his travel is the raising of funds, the general tightening of his organization and discussions necessary to coordinate their efforts.

d. Isolation of Cuba.

AMBANG-1 made it exceedingly clear that the lifeline to his assets inside Cuba had been severely restricted when PAA flights were suspended. Nothing could suit AMBANG-1 more than to have these flights resumed. AMBANG-1's obviously great interest in the resumption of these flights was the most eloquent statement yet of his belief that he has a network, or that he can revive a network within Cuba. At least at this stage of JURE operations, AMBANG-1 does not appear to consider the infiltration of manpower as necessary.

AMBANG-1 stated that the use of flights from Spain and Mexico to Cuba was difficult and costly whereas the Miami-Havana run had been most useful in maintaining contact within Cuba. It was AMBANG-1's opinion that the resumption of PAA flights would be an operational boom to JURE and that whereas he could see Castro making some political capital out of the flights, he believed that some appropriate statement such as "there is no political significance but only a humanitarian and compassionate reason for the reestablishment of this link," would be sufficient to negate any political advantage by Castro.

e. AMBANG-1 Phasing Out of his Employment

AMBANG-1 gave me to believe that he is closing shop and giving up his position with the Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Viviendas where he is employed as an engineer in charge of building pre-cast concrete houses. AMBANG-1 stated that during the past week Governor Munoz Marin gave final authority for the erection of a plant to produce these houses in Puerto Rica. AMBANG-1 is torn with the thought of leaving this project which he believes will be most successful, and which would assure his livelihood, but he knows that he must devote himself to the fight against Castro. It is obvious to me that AMBANG-1 will within the next two months phase out of this employment to devote full time to the liberation of Cuba.

f. A JURE Radio Link

AMBANG-1 asked me if I would be able to assist him in the establishment of a San Juan-Caracas-Miami radio link. He explained that the JURE has spent a great deal of money on telephonic communications between these points and were most anxious to set up a means of radio communication in order to economize. I guess that AMBANG-1 could tell from my reaction that I was not too sympathetic to his request for he withdrew it almost as soon as he had made it. He went on to say that this was a problem which they could overcome and I presume that he will seek to establish such radio communications without our assistance.

g. Aerial Maps of Cuba

AMBANG-1 informed me that the JURE membership had brought out of Cuba an entire series of maps showing key roads, bridges, industrial plants, et al, which they had copied by the Aero Service Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. AMBANG-1 stated that they had received most of these photos from the Aero Service Corporation but that the 101 were still missing. He gave me the numbers of those missing and asked if we could procure them. I have since informed AMBANG-1 that it would perhaps be best it he could, or his organization, do this instead but that we would pay the travel of one of his men, should this prove necessary. Attached, hereto, is a copy of the missing photos in question.

h. JURE Organization and Strength

AMBANG-1 informed me that the membership of the JURE in San Juan was now at about 500 members and that each of these individuals makes a weekly contributionto the organization.

In addition there are large JURE organizations in Caracas, Venezuela and Dallas, Texas. There are according to AMBANG-1 a total of thirty delegations in Latin America, the U. S. A. and Europe. He cited as an example the delegation in San Francisco which had recently purchased a typewriter through the collection of green stamps. He added that Rogelio Cisneros had travelled to San Francisco some time ago to communicate with that group and to tighten its organizational activities.

i. AMBANG-1 Asks About ARTIME and the Activities in Central America

AMBANG-1 raised the question of Manuel ARTIME's activities in Central America and particularly in Nicaragua. He stated that any association with Somoza would not help in creating the mistique and political coloration necessary to inspire revolution and resistance from the non-Communists elements in Cuba. Whereas, I had expected AMBANG-1 to go into a long harangue as to the positive damage that ARTIME's actions with Somoza could cause, he left the matter at about this point. I agreed that the Somozas did not have a liberal political reputation throughout Latin America, but added that whatever Cubans could do from that or any vantage point against Communism in Cuba would in my estimation be helpful, -- while I am sure AMBANG-1 did not agree with me, he did not say so. In respect to ARTIME and Miro Cardona, whose name entered into the conversation later, AMBANG-1 took a fairly objective view. He stated that Miro had arrived in San Juan and that he wished him the best as he figured he had suffered enough. Insofar as ARTIME was concerned I gathered that AMBANG-1 might feel that the association with Somoza would not do ARTIME any good in a post-Castro Cuba. As AMBANG-1 is convinced that a government after Castro must be of a progressive liberal stripe, ARTIME was not doing himself any good by identifying himself with the Somozas.

j. A List of Cuban Diplomats

As AMBANG-1 had asked for a list of Cuban Diplomats abroad while we were in Paris, I advised him that such a list had been prepared and we would make it available to him. In this connection he asked if we could include the addresses of each of the Cuban installations. Speaking of diplomats, AMBANG-1 wanted to know if Ambassador Gustavo Arcos had returned from Prague. I informed him that I did not know. AMBANG-1 was most interested to learn that Franqui's wife and children had actually come out of Cuba, and indicated that he would intensify his efforts to maintain contact with Cuban Diplomat Cabrera Infante in Brussels as a means toward the eventual recruitment of Franqui.

k. AMBANG-1 Relation with Jorge Volsky

In conjunction with questions regarding propaganda sent to Cuba, and the JURE's general plans in this field, I asked A-1 about his relation with Jorge Volsky. A-1 stated that he considered Volsky to be an extremely able, serious newspaperman. He added that whereas he saw Volsky frequently on his trips to Miami, the latter did not work for him. A-1 stated that Volsky's work was a full-time job which left him little time to do anything else.

A-1 stated that JURE propaganda was produced by a twelve - man board.

A-1 added that the JURE expected to shortly introduce a statement on its position into Cuba.

l. AMBANG-1 Asks about Two Man Underwater Craft

A-1 asked if I knew anything about a two man type craft which travels through the water. I presume A-1 was talking about the "sea-sled." I advised him that I knew little about this type craft, but in my opinion its usefulness for the type activity he had in mind was limited. AMBANG-1 would use this craft for the final phase of an infiltration effort. A-1 stated that this craft was being used at the hotel beaches in San Juan as a type of sporting activity. I will advise him that he could pursue this matter himself as all knowledge on this subject is publicly available.

m. AMBANG-1 Trained in Simple Scorch System

A WAVE technician, Culver Ladd, under the name of Mr. Lane trained A-1 to use a simple scorch system of S/W. A-1 was given some eighty pills with which he will be able to make the "ink" used in this system of S/W. A-1 was pleased with the system, especially its simplicity. He will use the system to communicate with his chief delegate in Paris and undoubtedly other persons in Cuba as well as in the other JURE delegations.

n. AMBANG-1 is Writing an Article for Cuadernos

At the request of German Arcienegas, the famed Colombian intellectual, A-1 is preparing an article which is to be published in Cuadernos. The article will deal with the problems facing Latin America and how they can be resolved. A-1 will be in select company as Arcienegas has asked a number of prominent Latin American intellectuals for their views.

o. Communication Between AMBANG-1 and Case Officer

AMBANG-1 gave me the following addresses at which he can be reached:

Corporacion de Renovacion
Urbana y Viviendas
PARADA 31
Ponce de Leon,
Hato Rey
Puerto Rico Telephone No. 723-1671

(NOTE: This is not AMBANG's office or home, but that of a friend who is always able to reach A-1.)

Also:

Mr. Jaime Mitrani
1260 W. 61 Place
Hialeah, Florida

AMBANG-1 was given the following means of contacting me:

Mr. Alfred Fernandez
P. O. Box 1104, Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. Telephone No. 737-8294

AMBANG-1 will use the name "Tony" as a signature in mail to me.

2. General Observations

I beleive AMBANG-1 is planning to return to Cuba. He indicated that he would give the matter serious thought to even go in, disguised, as a legal traveller if that road were generally open, i. e., if rather large numbers of travellers were going in via PAA flights. This line seemed a bit out of character for A-1, for it seems unrealistic and somewhat remindful of Macaulay's references to the state of mind that exiles develop. I also detected what we consider to be a somewhat unrealistic appraisal of the Cuban situation in A-1's estimate that Castro has considerably less than 40% of the Cuban people with him. A-1 may be losing more than a little touch with Cuban reality.

A-1 remains convinced that he is on the right track in working for the eventual overthrow of Castro. He is convinced, however, that two to three years is all the time left for actually destroying the Castro regime, believing that there will be a favorable turn in the Cuban economic situation by late 1965. A-1 is likewise convinced that Castro cannot add to the improvement of Cuba, to the contrary that so long as the principal decisions are made by Castro, the general trend will be confusion arising from a failure to concentrate on specific problems until they are corrected.

AMBANG-1 is likewise convinced that the JURE is building a political group and general outlook which will have an impact on Cuba for many years to come. He is especially concerned with the need to carefully consider each position of his group in order to create the lasting impression that JURE knows where it is going and that its leadership is composed of men who know how to "run" a country without the false starts, confusion and chaos identified with the Castro regime.

AMBANG-1 is likewise greatly concerned with the necessity of not creating an impression inside Cuba that the JURE will return to mete out "justice." It is essential, A-1 states, to convince the general populace that the overthrow of Castro will not result in a bloodbath, rather that the sole aim is to save the revolution that has been betrayed. He is anxious that the people inside Cuba see the JURE as a responsible, intelligent and dispassionate group which is capable of bringing to Cuba all that the revolution promised.

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

Distribution:
1 - C/SAS
1 - SAS/Bolten; Hecksher; Amori
1 - Chrono
1 - RAY File

[illegible]
SAS/[illegible]
6957
7 DEC. 63

MEXICO CITY

SIG CEN

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC

86264

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH
WH/3/MEXI ✓
C/WH/3 ✓

J. C. [illegible]
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

ANDERSON

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-2048

30 DEC 63 22

X

86520

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

PLEASE HAVE SCANTLING WRITE LETTER EMBODYING FOLLOWING IDEAS:

"EXCELENCIA

AS YOU MAY KNOW FOR SEVERAL MONTHS I HAVE BEEN ENGAGING IN PURCHASING VARIOUS COMMERCIAL ITEMS FOR MR. SIMOBAS AND MR. VEGA OF YOUR EMBASSY. FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS THESE PURCHASES WENT VERY WELL AND I BELIEVE BOTH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND I WERE SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS AND DELIVERIES.

SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF MR. SIMOBAS AND MR. VEGA, HOWEVER, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CARRY ON MY BUSINESS WITH THEM IN A NORMAL MANNER. I HAVE GONE TO MUCH TROUBLE TO GATHER ARTICLES THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AND TO DELIVER THEM AS INSTRUCTED; YET, NOW THREE WEEKS AFTER MAKING MY LAST DELIVERY I HAVE STILL NOT BEEN PAID.

I OBJECT TO THE PRESENT DELAYS IN MAKING PAYMENT TO ME AND REQUEST THAT MR. SIMOBAS OR HIS APODERADO IN THIS CITY BE INFORMED THAT I BADLY NEED THE MONEY AND CANNOT MAKE FURTHER DELIVERIES UNTIL I HAVE RECEIVED THE FULL CHECK. [illegible]

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG:
UNIT:

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

[illegible]

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

INFO

CITE DIR [redacted]

"I ALSO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE ANSWERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND I HOPE NEITHER YOUR GOVERNMENT NOR I WILL BE CAUGHT UNPREPARED IN THE EVENT THE AMERICAN NATIONS ALL BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA. I HAVE NOW AT MY WAREHOUSE A NUMBER OF ITEMS MR. SINGRAS AND MR. VEGA ORDERED AND WILL DELIVER THEM AS SOON AS THE CHECK ARRIVES AND OUR ACCOUNTS LIQUIDATED.

S S S

MARCO TULIO RODRIGUEZ"

2. PLEASE DATE AND SEND 7 DECEMBER VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO SR. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS, FRANCISCO MARQUEZ 160, COLONIA CONDESA, DF, USING OROPEZA PO BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS, IF OROPEZA BOX SERVICING 6 DECEMBER UNPRODUCTIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/MOB
WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WHD

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG: J. [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/[illegible]/PA/PROP
EXT: 6055
DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA JMWAVE
GUATEMALA

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

DEC 63 18 32z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

86694

REF: DIR 86693

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/[illegible]/PROP

WH/1

WH/3/[illegible]

[illegible] 3

A. A. [illegible]
C/SAS [illegible]

TO : [illegible]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: FE 8

INFO: DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

[illegible] 22 32

TO WAVE INFO TOKY CITE DIR 86803

SUGAR [illegible]

REF DIR 86802

1. ITEM A MR. [illegible] WATANABE.

2. ITEM B MR. [illegible] K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6594.

END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3

SECRET

ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: SR/CI/K
EXT: 6991
DATE: 10 [illegible] 63

TO: SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF [illegible], FE [illegible], WE [illegible], NE [illegible], EE 6, VR, WH 7

89383

AF	EE	FE	NE	WE	WH
ALGI	VIEN	[illegible]	KASU	[illegible]	GORG
ORAN	SBUR	CNBR	COLO	OTTA	SAGO
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	COPE	[illegible]
YAOU	FRAN	PENH	[illegible]	LOND	SJOS
ADDI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
ACCR	BONN	TAHI	[illegible]	PARI	QUIT
CNRY	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	GAYA
ABID	FROB	DJAK	[illegible]	[illegible]	GUAT
NOBI	HAMB	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
MNRV	[illegible]	TOKY	[illegible]	[illegible]	TEGU
TPLI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	KING
WHEL	STUT	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	MEXI
[illegible]	ATHE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TNAR	KAVA	KUAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CASA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	OSLO	PACY
[illegible]	GNVA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
LAGS	ZURI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	LIMA
BRAZ		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
LEOP		[illegible]	[illegible]	STOC	SALV
[illegible]		SAIG	[illegible]	[illegible]	PIED
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	PRIN
[illegible]			[illegible]	LAPA	MONT
[illegible]			[illegible]	RIOD	CARA
CAPT			[illegible]	[illegible]	
DURB			[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]			[illegible]	BRIL	
[illegible]			[illegible]	CURI	
[illegible]			CAIR	[illegible]	
[illegible]			ALEX	[illegible]	
[illegible]			[illegible]	SALV	
[illegible]			TAIZ	SAOP	
[illegible]			[illegible]		
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[illegible]					

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : SHAPOVICH:mg
UNIT : [illegible]/II
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO : BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO ALL COS, COB INFO CITE DIR

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB REZIDENTURAS AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

C/SR

C/SR/CI
SR/O/AF
SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
SR/O/FE
SR/O/WE
SR/O/WH
SR/O/NE

C/AF
C/EE
for C/FE
C/WE
C/WH
C/NE

C/SR/CI

C/SR

C/SR

SECRET

SECRET

89669

OTTA OTTA [illegible] HAGU BRUS MEXI CARA

REFS: A. CARA 8?45 (IN 77?69) (NOT SENT MEXI, HAGU, BRUS)*

B. HAGU 9136 (IN 76?9?) (NOT SENT MEXI, CARA)**

1. 40 H.P. OUTBOARD MOTOR MODEL R.D.S. SERIAL NUMBER C-367809 RPT 367809, MANUFACTURED BY JOHNSON MOTORS, PETERBOROUGH, CANADA, FOUND IN ARMS CACHE VENEZUELA COAST, ASCERTAINED FROM MANUFACTURER'S WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS, INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS TO HAVE BEEN ORDERED 25 SEPT 1963 BY MONTREAL MOTOR BOAT, 7?5 ST. [illegible], MONTREAL, DEALER OF LONG STANDING. MOTOR ONE OF FOUR 40 H.P. UNITS, OTHERS SERIAL NUMBERS C-367808, C-367830 C-367833, SHIPPED THIS DEALER TOGETHER WITH ONE 40 H.P. UNIT WITH ELECTRIC CLUTCH, SERIAL C-387450, AND ONE 28 H.P. MOTOR, SERIAL C-389561.

2. IN VIEW INFORMATION ESTABLISH BEFORE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES THAT CUBA SOURCE THIS CACHE REQUEST OTTA THROUGH LIAISON ASCERTAIN IDENTITY PURCHASER FROM MONTREAL DEALER WITH ANY AVAILABLE BACKGROUND BIO INFO. ALSO ATTEMPT TRACE MOTORS MOVEMENTS FROM HANDS PURCHASER IN EFFORT ESTABLISH DELIVERY CHANNEL CUBA.

3. FOR HAGU, BRUS: RE 12 OUTBOARDS IN REF B, WAUKEGAN HEADQUARTERS ADVISES THREE MODELS RDS 25D SHIPPED BY AMSTERDAM FACTORY 25 OCTOBER 1963 TO ALMACOA [illegible] JOHNSON BRUSSELS DISTRIBUTOR. ORDER PLACED WITH DISTRIBUTOR 24 OCT BY MR. BENECT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

J. J. [illegible] (ea)
WH/[illegible]
6637
27 FEB 1963

SECRET

PAGE TWO

89663

HOTEL PLAZA, BRUSSELS, WITH TERMS CASH AND DELIVERY F.O.B. DISTRIBUTOR'S PLACE OF BUSINESS. [illegible] HAD MOTORS TRUCKED TO BRUSSELS AIRPORT AND SHIPPED SCHIPHOL AIRPORT, AMSTERDAM, WHERE TRAIL LOST. BANK RECORDS SHOW PURCHASE FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM CANADIAN BANK ACCOUNT OF [illegible] [illegible] CO. LTD., QUEBEC. [illegible] HOME ADDRESS GIVEN AS 3019 [illegible] [illegible], ST. FOY, QUEBEC.

4. [illegible] CARACAS CHECK WHICH CONSPIRACY REPORTEDLY ORIGINATED ALSO BY CANADIAN [illegible] [illegible] GOV.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * Identified by Manufacturer's name plate outboard [illegible] from cache.

** Identified [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] background [illegible].

SECRET

14-00000

104-10290-10168 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT : WH/[illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : 17 DEC 63

SECRET

17 DEC 63 23 07z

PRIORITY

DEFERRED

ROUTING

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, VR

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778
CARA MANA WAVE [illegible]
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
MONT BOGO QUIT GAYA
RIOD SAOP SAGO LAPA
SANJ SDOM BUEN

REF: DIR 88880 *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

K
J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

William [illegible]
WH/[illegible]
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] DEC 1963

S E C R E T

BOOK MESSAGE AS BELOW

PRIORITY MUNI
ROUTINE

LNDN HAMB OSLO BEIR TEHE TUNI MANI BERN HEID PARI CAIR ACCA [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] ATHE JIDD LEOP BOGO MEXI GEVA ANKA KAMI PRET SING QUIT
BONN LISB ROME ABMA ALGI HELS OKIE FRAN LAND VIEN DHAH KHAR [illegible] [illegible]
KAGU NARO BAGH NEWD TPLI SUAL RIOD KNGS SJAN ADDI
~~SB~~
PBRAND

WORLD BRIEF

(NOFORN IN SLANTS. REMAINING INFO RELEASABLE TO LIAISON.)

1. BERLIN: THE COMMUNISTS VIEW AS "OFFICIAL" THE TALKS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN NEGOTIATORS WHICH ACHIEVED THE AGREEMENT ON CHRISTMAS PASSES AND CONSIDER THEM A BOOST TO MOSCOW'S "FREE CITY" PROPOSAL FOR WEST BERLIN. WILLY BRANDT, ON THE OTHER HAND, REGARDS THEM AS ONLY "TECHNICAL" AND AS NO SETBACK TO HIS STATURE IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS.

2. YUGOSLAVIA: //TITO IS APPARENTLY NO LONGER DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ADMINISTRATION OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS. HE HAS EXHIBITED LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND HAS BEEN DIVESTING HIMSELF OF RESPONSIBILITIES. TWO RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HIS FACULTIES HAVE DIMMED //

3. NORTH VIETNAM: HEAVY PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

SECRET

SECRET

20 DEC 63 00 47 z

DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

90407

(PAGE TWO)

SUGGESTS A GROWING CONFIDENCE IN HANOI THAT INSURGENTS CAN SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR POSITION DESPITE US BACKING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. (CONF)

4 CUBA: COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES NOW REPORTEDLY ARE PART OF THE CUBAN ARTILLERY FORCES, [redacted] CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOVIET-DOMINATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS ALSO INCREASING A SOVIET SO-1-CLASS SUBCHASER HAS ARRIVED IN CUBAN WATERS AND TWO OTHERS ARE PROBABLY EN ROUTE.

5. USSR: KHRUSHCHEV'S LONG-RANGE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY RETRENCHMENT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ECONOMY DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS. HOUSING CONSUMER SERVICES, AND SOME HEAVY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ARE TO BE AFFECTED, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A SLOWING IN THE RATE AT WHICH MILITARY EXPENDITURES HAVE INCREASED SINCE 1960

6 ITALY: DOUBTS ABOUT THE MORO GOVERNMENT'S VIABILITY HAVE SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT AS A RESULT OF STRONG VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IT RECEIVED ON 17 DEC. [illegible] AUTHORITY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY HIS [illegible] REFUSAL TO [illegible] DEAL WITH LEFTWING [illegible]

SECRET

(PAGE THREE) 904

SUPPORT ON THE CONFIDENCE VOTE. MORO'S POSITION IS FIRMER BECAUSE OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF THE VATICAN'S PRESSURE ON CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC RIGHTWINGERS NOT TO BREAK PARTY UNITY. (CONF)

7. CUBA. THE CASTRO REGIME SEEMS INTENT ON CULTIVATING AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS WAY OF LESSENING ITS ISOLATION FROM THE FREE WORLD. AN EMBASSY IN TANGANYIKA INDICATES THIS. IN ADDITION, CUBA HAS, DURING THE PAST MONTH, EXPANDED CONTACTS WITH NINE COUNTRIES SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. THERE IS ALSO REASON TO SUSPECT AFRICANS GOING TO CUBA ON SCHOLARSHIPS ARE GETTING TRAINING IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES.

8. UK: //BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE DOUGLAS-HOME GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON KEEPING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE OPEN AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY. BOTH SIR ALEC AND FOREIGN SECRETARY BUTLER ESPECIALLY DETERMINED TO KEEP EXPLORING AREAS POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW -- A POLICY WHICH PAID OFF HANDSOMELY FOR CONSERVATIVES IN ELECTIONS OF 1955 AND 1959. MAIN OBJECTIVE -- BUTLER'S RECENT VISIT, BONN WAS TO SOUND OUT GERMAN REACTION TO SUCH BRITISH INITIATIVES.//

9. BRITISH GUIANA. JAGAN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS HAVE BEEN ATTACKING

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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INFO (PAGE FOUR) 90407

THE UK AND US IN INCREASINGLY VITRIOLIC TERMS. HIS PARTY IS PARALYZED BY INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND IS UNDECIDED WHETHER TO CONTEST THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS SET FOR NEXT YEAR OR TRY TO BLOCK THEM BY RESORTING TO VIOLENCE. OPPOSITION PARTIES, MEANWHILE HAVE DONE LITTLE TO COOPERATE AGAINST JAGAN BEYOND REACHING A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT NOT TO ATTACK EACH OTHER PUBLICLY.

10. FRANCE: PARIS IS TRYING TO PROMOTE TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA BY ENCOURAGING PRIVATE FIRMS TO DEVELOP NEW MARKETS THERE. THERE ARE BUILT IN LIMITATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT FRENCH-CHINESE TRADE CAN GROW, COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS ARE FEW, AND CREDIT PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO LIMIT PURCHASES BY CHINESE WHO SEEM PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING FRENCH TECHNICAL SKILLS. PARIS INTEREST IN CHINESE TRADE AND EXPANDED CULTURAL CONTACTS WITH PEIPING HAVE STIMULATED SPECULATION THAT SOME SORT OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IS IN THE OFFING. THIS IS STOUTLY DENIED AT ALL LEVELS OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT

11. FINLAND: FOR THE SECOND TIME IN FOUR MONTHS FINLAND IS GOING THROUGH A CABINET CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE RULING COALITION OVER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. A NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

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(PAGE FIVE)

OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HEADED BY ECONOMIST REINO LEHTO, HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO SERVE UNTIL THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS RESOLVED. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS SEEM LIMITED TO AGRARIAN MINORITY GOVERNMENT, RECONSTITUTION OF AGRARIAN-DOMINATED COALITION OR AS A LAST RESORT, GENERAL ELECTIONS. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, PRESIDENT KEKKONEN DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. MOSCOW CAME OUT AGAIN DURING HIS TRIP TO THE USSR.

(CONTINUE)

12. SOUTH KOREA: PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI'S DOMINATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INAUGURATED ON 17 DEC UNDER SOUTH KOREA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME MAY TRANSFER POLITICAL INFIGHTING TO A NEW ARENA. THE CONTROVERSIAL FORMER SECURITY CHIEF KIM CHONG-PIL CONTROLS THE PARTY APPARATUS, AND HIS MANY ENEMIES ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO USE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES TO TRY TO WREST POWER FROM HIM. PRESIDENT PAK STILL BACKS KIM, HOWEVER, AND THEY AND THEIR COHORTS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJOR DECISIONS. THE CABINET HEADED BY CHOE TU-SON APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN WITH A MIND TO BALANCING FACTIONAL AND SECTIONAL INTERESTS AND FOR AN ABILITY TO CARRY OUT, RATHER THAN FORMULATE POLICY. WITH ELECTIONS OVER, THE REGIME IS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

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TO INFO CITE DIR 90407

(PAGE SIX)

LIKELY TO SPEED DECISIONS ON LONG OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. A STAGNANT ECONOMY BESET BY INFLATION IS THE MOST PRESSING ONE. DISCONTENT WITH RISING PRICES EXTENDS INTO THE ARMED FORCES. PAK IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE TEN-YEAR OLD NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. (CONF)

13. TURKEY: THE THREE-WEEK OLD CABINET CRISIS APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING A CLIMAX FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF BOTH MAJOR PARTIES TO BRING MINOR PARTIES INTO COALITION ARRANGEMENTS. ONLY A COALITION BETWEEN THESE TWO, PRIME MINISTER INONU'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, OR A "NATIONAL COALITION" OF ALL POLITICAL GROUPS, REMAINS TO BE TRIED. DESPITE THE DEEP DIFFERENCES, AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO MAY PROVE FEASIBLE, FOR THE POLITICIANS FEAR THAT EXTENDING THE CRISIS MUCH LONGER MIGHT PROVOKE MILITARY INTERVENTION. (CONF)

14. CONGO: // THE ADOULA REGIME'S POSITION REMAINS PRECARIOUS. ITS EXTREME LEFTIST OPPONENTS JOINED IN A "COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" (CNL) CONTINUE TO PLOT AGAINST IT FROM THEIR BRAZZAVILLE BASE THOUGH SOMEWHAT CRIPPLED BY LEOPOLDVILLE'S EXPULSION OF THEIR SOVIET

RELEASING OFFICER

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(PAGE SEVEN)

EMBASSY CONTACTS. THE EXILES HAVE SENT EMISSARIES ABROAD TO SEEK FUNDS AND ARMS. THEIR PLANS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE ASSASSINATION OF LEOPOLDVILLE LEADERS, AN "INVASION" OF THE CONGO, AND INSTIGATION OF A COUP BY THE CONGO ARMY. THE WEAKNESS OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE REGIME, ESPECIALLY THE QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY OF GENERAL MOBUTU'S ARMY, CLEARLY ENHANCES THE CNL PROSPECTS. LAST MONTH MOBUTU AND SURETE CHIEF NENDAKA, THE REGIME'S TWO KEYSTONES, WERE WAYLAYED BY SOLDIERS AND NEARLY KILLED. STUDENT AGITATION MAY BECOME A FACTOR IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO STUDENT GROUPS OF TWO HIGH OFFICIALS RECENTLY OUSTED -- FOREIGN MINISTER MABIKA-KALANDA AND LONDON CHARGE THOMAS KANZA. IN THE NEWEST DELIBERATIONS TOWARD WRITING A CONSTITUTION PROVINCIAL VOICES DESIRING A LOOSE ARRANGEMENT APPEAR STRONGER THAN SUPPORTERS OF ADOULA [illegible] PUSH FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. //

15. LAOS: //RIGHT-WING AND NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES, ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SUCCESSES IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN LAOS, ARE CONSIDERING [illegible] INITIATIVES. [illegible] PLANNING MOVES AIMED AT CAPTURING [illegible] BESIEGED XIENG KHOUANG [illegible] AND FURTHER SOUTH OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUPPLY ROUTES FROM NORTH VIETNAM. COMMUNISTS CONCENTRA[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

INFO CITE DIR 90407

(PAGE EIGHT)

HAVE RECAPTURED THE KEY ROAD JUNCTION OF LAK SAC, HOWEVER, AND RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE SHARP COUNTERMOVES ELSEWHERE. THE CONTINUING MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PATHET LAO AND NEUTRALIST FACTIONS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGES, BUT THE PATHET LAO HAVE EXPRESSED NEW INTEREST IN ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THEIR CHIEF PRINCE SOUPHANNOUVONG AND PREMIER SOUVVANNA PHOUMA to TO ARRANGE FOR FULL PATHET LAO PARTICIPATION IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. COUP RUMORS, MOSTLY CENTERING ON PLANS BY RIGHT-WING MILITARY ELEMENTS ALLIED WITH THE SANANIKONE CLAN, CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE IN VIENTIANE. //

[illegible] W. [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

IN 70598

LOND DUBS ABID BOGO BRIL SAOP
BUEN CARA GUAT LIMA
HABA MONT PRIN QUIT
RIOD SAGO SJOS SDOM
TEGU MEXI LAPA SALV
PACY GAYA CORG RECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. MINV NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AKANET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE ODYOKE CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR RUQSBM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AKANET. ROUTING INDICATOR RUKIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

END OF MESSAGE

OC-S -

OC-T -

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SECRET

Margaret [illegible]
[illegible]/AP
5151
16 Dec. 63

☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-[illegible]

21 DEC 63 21 37z

TOKYO MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TOKY [illegible] MEXI INFO MANI, HONG, [illegible] CITE DIR 90761

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], CIT US, PDOB CALIFORNIA 1923, JAPAN 1946-48 USARMY OCCUPATION FORCES, MEXICO CITY C. 1950-55 FREE LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER, TRAVELED JAPAN, [illegible] MANILA, HONGKONG WITH AGENCE FRANCE PRESS BETWEEN 1956-62. NO OBJECTION LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST SHOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]
WH/Mexico
FE/HongKong
FE/Manila
FE/Japan
C/[illegible]/AP
[illegible]/AA

C/FE

[illegible]/COPS

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

11 SECRET

ROUTING	
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3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

SECRET 151758Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

15 Oct 63 IN 40401

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, LITAMIL-3 HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL, MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-3 SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH DE SOUZA REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. DE SOUZA DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-3 AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-3 DESCRIBES DE SOUZA AS "A KEY MAN."

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-3 TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING DE SOUZA.

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

S E C R E T 191817Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

RYBAT PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA BENITO RUIZ CUADRILLA. DOB [illegible] JAN 1894, LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE OFELIA [illegible] RUIZ, BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. MANAGER [illegible] SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. FOUNDER AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH; RELINQUISHED CERCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. GRANDDAUGHTER MILDRED [illegible] LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. GRANDDAUGHTER JENNY LAVIN AND GRANDSON JOHN R. RUIZ LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE CUBAN DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI [illegible] 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER ASTA, PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION CONTACTS IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPECIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. SAYS HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORGING VISAS. KNOWLEDGEABLE BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

SECRET

APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE [illegible] WITH [illegible] [illegible] ANA 1959. SUBJECT APPEARS COOPERATE [illegible] COMMUNICATE VIA [illegible]. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO MAX TRACES.

SECRET

14-00000

APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED BY CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE [illegible] [illegible] A 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND COMMUNICATE VIA [illegible]. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO [illegible] TRACES.

SECRET

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TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION : WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z 23 Oct 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 6620

PERUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA, CUBAN, DOB 1927, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER. GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH, ADDRESS CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR, HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED FROM MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN AGES 5 AND 7 IN MNTY. SUBJ CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES. WORKS CLOSELY WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY INDUSTRY, ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH CEMENT PROCUREMENT. RECENTLY REPORTED BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS GUSTAVO ABASOLO, CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT CUBA ABOUT 1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO BERMUDA, LATER TO MEXICO. EMPLOYED CONTINOUSLY 22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS. NOW ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO, FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH NETHERLANDS EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGH A-2 GUSTAVO

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RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO JOAQUIN MIRABAL, COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

5. ABOVE INFO FROM GUSTAVO ABASOLO, FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST SOJOURN MEXI. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT G3/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712, MARIANAO.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
[illegible] U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] Personnel Manual Ch. [illegible]
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

RETURN TO RECORDS [illegible]
IMMEDIATELY AFTER [illegible]
JOB 75-132 BOX 26

43715

0 9 MAY [illegible]

0 7 JUN [illegible]

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[illegible]

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAP

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

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Handle With Care

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(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 Dec 72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last—First—Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (CIARDS) VOLUNTARY

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 31 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-0117 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NONOFFICIAL Cover BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER - CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 ~~10~~ 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

Supergrade Board

LAST WORKING DAY 28 Dec 73

Coordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB 27 December 1973

C/MSB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J.L. Olmstead, C/MSB

DATE SIGNED: 27 Dec 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HOOTRS. CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 10 DA 04 YR 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE 0
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: BJ, 00, 0, 0
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: [illegible]
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-27-73 JFR

02 JAN 1974

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 27 DEC 1973

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY: 01-0352

E2-2 IMPDET

(4)

3 APR 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF

OP/RAD/ROB/MWBenthall:jtb (26 March 1974)

Executive Registry
74-522

26 JAN 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
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1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
~~1 - OPF~~
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator:
Director of Personnel
23 JAN 1974

OP/RAD/ROB/MDLasnek:jat/3257 (17 January 1974)

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

TSD

29 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Distinguished Intelligence Medal for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Distinguished Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

14-00000

OFF

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry
74-196

DATE
18 December 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	1915	M	Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
DO/CMG	D	GS	17	

BE AWARDED
Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1952 - December 1973

☐ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☒ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF **Distinguished Intelligence Medal**

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding achievement with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 23 years. Serving in a series of responsible senior positions both in headquarters and abroad, Mr. Wheeler has compiled an enviable record of achievement. Demonstrating deep integrity and total dedication, his performance has been characterised by creativity, and superb leadership. Mr. Wheeler's devotion and professionalism have been evident throughout his career, reflecting the highest credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by DD/O on 10 December 1973)

APPROVED
/s/ Vernon A. Walters
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 JAN 1974
DATE

SIGNATURE (Signed) F. W. M. Janney
TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD
F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE
(signed on original)
TYPED NAME OF RECORDER
B. L. Au[illegible]n, Jr.

FORM 9-73 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (4)

14-00000

Off

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD

(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-32)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.: 060947
2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. POSITION TITLE: Ops Off/Chief
4. GRADE: GS-17
5. SD: D
6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT: DDO/CMG/NOC
7. OFFICE EXT. (Thru): 4103
8. STATION: ☒ HEADQUARTERS ☐ FIELD (Specify location)
9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): 6600 Millwood Rd., Bethesda, Md. 22034
10. HOME PHONE: 229-1973
11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED: U.S., Birth
12. RECOMMENDED AWARD: Intelligence Medal of Merit
13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT: 31 December 1973
14. POSTHUMOUS: ☐ YES ☒ NO
15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN: Adelia Wheeler
16. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code): same as above
18. HOME PHONE: same

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT ☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION:
27. INCLUSIVE DATES:
28. TIME OF DAY:
29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:
30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED:
31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☐ NO
32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☐ YES ☐ NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE ☒ YES ☐ NO
34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: Ops Officer/Chief
35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location): CMG/NOC
36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION: Chief, Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch
37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED: Sept 1952-December 1973
38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED ☐ YES ☒ NO
39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT ☒ YES ☐ NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
9-69

SECRET

(4)

(When Filled In)

OPF

SECTION D NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of Individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with the Agency in September 1952 for assignment in Tokyo. During the period from 1952-1956 he served in the capacity of Deputy Chief, FI Ops and Chief, FI Liaison. For several years he served in responsible positions at Headquarters and was promoted to GS-15 in 1957. In 1959 he returned to Tokyo as Deputy for Operations and as DCOS until 1964. He was promoted to GS-16 in August 1964. From 1964-1966 he served at Honolulu Base. In 1965 he was appointed COB, Honolulu. From 1966-68 he served in the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. In 1968 he was reassigned to the Missions and Programs Staff and in 1971 was appointed Chief, MPS and served there until January 1972 during which period he was promoted to GS-17. In 1972 he was appointed Chief of the then designated Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division (presently Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch), from which assignment he is retiring.

Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication. He is a natural leader, bright and original. He has a creative mind, is articulate and rational. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator and manager. He is a searching individual who is totally committed and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the DDO. During his tenure he has received laudatory commendations for his efforts.

Mr. Wheeler has made a valuable contribution to the Agency during his extended career and it is fitting that upon retirement after such a distinguished career, he be awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESS OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY Gordon Mason	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION Gordon Mason Chief, CMG	49. DATE 10 DEC 1972

SECTION E RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

50. HEAD OF DDO CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item # 52	DATE
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	TITLE AND SIGNATURE See Item # 52	DATE
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	TITLE AND SIGNATURE William E. Nelson William E. Nelson	DATE 11 Dec 72

SECRET

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13-2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 September 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 21 YEAR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 4221-0117/0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/Plans Staff
Career Management Group
Non Official Cover Branch

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer-Ch (17)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17/4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $36,000

18. REMARKS:

Reassigned from DDO/PS/CMG Pending Reassignment

+ ~~[illegible]~~

+ Supe blurb

SCS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Jasper L. Olmstead C/NSSB

DATE SIGNED: 9/17/73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC): 3130 PS

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGRATEE CODE

24. VET. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. LEI EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE

36. SERV. COMP. DATE

37. LONG COMP. DATE

38. CAREER CATEGORY

39. HEALTH INSURANCE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA

44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-21-73

46. O.P. APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 01 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V 4100; CF TO V 0100
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-~~2979~~ 0117 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
~~UNASSIGNED~~ Career Management Group
Pending Reassignment

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $36000

18. REMARKS
FROM: DDP/NOCA DIVISION/DEV COMP/9997

42
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668

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J. Olmstead
DATE SIGNED: 10 July 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 30
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 30139 ALPHABETIC PS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. MOSTRS CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO 14 DA 04 YR 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MP EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT. 2-10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/REST PROV/TEMP
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; CODE
HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. CORP CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-26-73
46. O.P. APPROVAL: R. A. Wheeler
DATE APPROVED: 24 Jul 73

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FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
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SECRET

31 JAN 1973

Dear Mr. Richmond,

At the direction of the Deputy Director for Plans you served from 6 November to 17 November 1972 as a member of the Clandestine Service Nonofficial Cover Board Sub-Panel convened for the purpose of evaluating GS-12 Staff and Career Agent personnel under nonofficial cover. I know that this work was particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and the diligent application of your professional experience were decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of this aspect of the Nonofficial Cover Board's missions.

I wish to commend you personally for your contribution to our evaluation procedures each phase of which helps to strengthen the Clandestine Service Career Service.

A copy of this letter will be included in your official personnel file.

Robert P. Wheeler

Robert P. Wheeler
Chairman
Nonofficial Cover Board

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 July 1972

Dear Pete,

I want to thank you personally for your fine work as a member of the GS-15 Evaluation Board which convened from 15 May to 16 June 1972. I know that this work has been particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and diligent application of your professional experience have been decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of the Board's missions. I know that your recommendations will provide a reliable base for the Clandestine Service Career Service Board and myself in arriving at a final promotion list.

Your wise and energetic participation in the evaluation process has helped to strengthen the Clandestine Service by objectively identifying those officers whose performance, qualifications and potential mark them as especially fitted for senior positions of leadership.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Robert P. Wheeler

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 February 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 09 | YEAR 72

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2231-4148

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/NOCA~~D~~ division Development Complement

I
42

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:

*0414

From MPS, Position # 0001

Concur: Karen Tillotson (telecoord)
MPS

[illegible] 3/8

DB 3/20

cc: Payroll
cc: Security

H
36

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Carl T. Taylor, C/NOCAD/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 21 Feb 72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 9 MAR 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 32

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 18

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 54977 ALPHABETIC NCAH

22. STATION CODE: 75013

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. HDQTRS. CODE: 1

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 07 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION-CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: DDR *From MPS 3.9.72

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 15 Mar. 72

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

20 MAR 1972

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 November 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2221-2886-0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions & Programs Staff
Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, DC
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch (181)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~GS~~-17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 35,801
18. REMARKS:

cc: Payroll

36
H

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:
DATE SIGNED:
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 24 Nov 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF EOD MO.	DA.	YR.
33	10	52100	MPS	15013		1	10	04	15	11	28	71	11	28	71

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CSCA 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-26-71 Wh
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 1 Dec 71

FORM 9-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

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46

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 March 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 21 YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

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7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1221-2886

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions and Programs Staff
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 6

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 32,819

18. REMARKS:

From MPS Position # 0008

cc: Security
cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED: 5 Mar 1971

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 3/8/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 16	20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10	21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 52100 — ALPHABETIC: MPS	22. STATION CODE: 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS. CODE: 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH — MO. [illegible] DA. 04 YR. [illegible]
26. DATE OF GRADE — MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI — MO. DA. YR.	28. NTE EXPIRES — MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1—CSC 2—OASDI 3—FICA 4—NONE — CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE — MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE — HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE — 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMP. — STATE CODE	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-[illegible]-71 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 8 March 71

FORM 8-70 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Subject: Completion of "The Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia

Date: MAR 4 1971

In Reply Refer To:

Nancy W. Dalton

From: Nancy W. Dalton
Registrar, Federal Executive Institute

Your Reference:

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the "Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from February 28 - March 2, 1971. One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

[illegible] COMPLETED
21998

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

CSC FORM 631
NOVEMBER 1961

SECRET

23 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Robert P. Wheeler

1. As one of the final acts in my CIA career I want to bring to your attention and add my strong concurrence and recommendation to two (2) recorded recommendations for the promotion of Robert P. Wheeler to the grade GS-17. I find it hard to imagine a more persuasive recommendation for this action than that forwarded by my predecessor in June 1969 (Attached). I can imagine Mr. Mitchell's feeling when he prepared the second recommendation in February 1970 (Attached). And yet, I find in February 1971 there has still been no action. In the year that has passed this promotion has become even more deserved, for despite the natural disappointment accompanying such a continuing lack of recognition, there has been no diminution of enthusiasm, no lowering of standards, and the CS is clearly better managed because of his continuing efforts. Were these two previous recommendations not so clear cut and descriptive, I would conclude that those in control simply do not know what this officer does and has done. Knowing what he does and how he does it should not continue to be unrewarded and, hence, I add my strongest recommendation for early and favorable action.

2. This officer has performed in a most outstanding manner, as testified in his fitness reports by my predecessor, and certainly during my tenure as Chief, MPS for the past 12 months.

Sidney A. Stein

Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

SECRET

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5 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-17.

2. Mr. Wheeler obtained a B.A. degree in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1942 and a M.A. in International Relations from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., in 1946. He entered the U.S. Navy in 1942 and after a concerted course in Japanese served the Navy until 1946 as an Intelligence Specialist, Japanese Language Officer, and the War Department, still as an Intelligence Specialist in Tokyo, from 1946 to 1952. In September 1952 he joined the Agency for duty in Tokyo; returned to Headquarters in June 1956 where he served until 1959; left for service in Japan from June 1959 to October 1964; served under non-official cover in Honolulu from August 1964 to August 1966; served at Headquarters with the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) from August 1966 until January 1969, and with MPS from the latter date to the present.

3. During his career with the Agency he has been a field Operations Officer, Liaison Officer to overseas U.S. agencies and a foreign intelligence service, a supervisor, Deputy Chief of Station (Tokyo), Chief FI for a division (FE), Chief of Base (Honolulu), Program Analyst (OPPB), and Program Analyst and Group Chief (MPS).

4. In his present position as Chief of Programs Group in the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for liaison between the CS and the OPPB on the PPB System and non-budgetary matters; installing the PPB System

within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual responses to the Program Call; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; coordinating and preparing the annual DDP report to the PFIAB, preparing the annual DDP briefing of the DCI on CS problems and progress; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In his previous assignment Mr. Wheeler was detailed to OPPB to give that office, in the preparation of Agency programs for submission to the Bureau of the Budget, a better understanding of clandestine collection and covert action, to help that office better review and integrate CS programs in Agency programs, and to give him a broad view of the PPB System and Agency management in both of which he had shown considerable interest. His performance in that office was rated "Strong," and it was on that performance and on his genuine enthusiasm and interest in management generally that his services were sought for MPS.

6. In the performance of his duties as Chief, MPS/PRG he made immediate use of his long experience in and knowledge of CS operations, the experience and knowledge gained in OPPB, his formal education in the PPB System, and a strong belief in and desire to put to work within the CS certain concepts of that system for general and specific management improvement. Given the idiosyncrasies of the CS, he recognized early that in order to make the PPB system work effectively knowledge of the "why" and "how" of that system must be possessed at every decision-making level. With limitless energy and enthusiasm he set about "preaching the gospel" from division chief to case officer. Whenever and wherever a formal group is assembled and management is a topic for discussion, the Office of Training can count on him to drop everything and hold forth on the subject, be it the Senior Management and Planning Course (whether for supergrades or below), Station Chief Conferences, the CS Senior Seminar (now in session) and the like. Acting as the DDP/TRO's right arm to encourage attendance at the Senior Management and Planning Course he has crusaded with division and staff chiefs for the attendance of certain of

their key employees. To date upwards of 100 from the CS have attended that course with many more to follow. With some of those same senior officials he has argued the benefits ultimately to accrue to their components from the temporary assignment of a senior key official for a year or two to MPS and/or OPPB and eventual return to the mother component. One such arrangement, with duty in OPPB, has just been completed. His tactful, understanding, friendly, businesslike, professional and competent handling of the chairmanship of the PRP and the reviews of the Operating Directive and country activities conducted by that Panel leaves little to be desired. Regarding the PPB System, he reads everything, pro and con, that comes to his attention, and he has spent a fair sum out of his own pocket to build a library on the subject. He has persuaded potential converts to the system to read those books, magazines, periodicals and pamphlets to the end that most of that library is on constant loan. His insatiable appetite for news on current as well as historical domestic and foreign matters, his excellent sense of humor, and his genuine friendliness are invaluable assets in his present assignment inasmuch as they have given him such a wide range of acquaintances, in and out of the CS, as to open wide the door for discussion on MPS responsibilities that are anything but sexy. He is so highly regarded by his contacts in the divisions and staffs of the CS and in OPPB that his advice and guidance are constantly sought. He gives of his time and energy willingly, regardless of the grade of the individual or the magnitude of the problem. His enthusiasm is catching and he sets an excellent example for subordinates, equals and superiors as well.

7. In view of the above, Mr. Wheeler, a broadgauged, fast moving, competent, dedicated, sincere and friendly individual who has not yet reached his full potential, whose goal is to make the Clandestine Service the best managed directorate in CIA, and who will soon have served five years in grade, is strongly recommended for promotion to GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service
Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to the grade GS-17.

2. By memorandum dated 5 June 1969 the undersigned recommended Mr. Wheeler for promotion. In that memorandum was set out the career of Mr. Wheeler from the date he completed college (1942) until June 1969, and was described his wartime (1942-1946), immediate post-war (1946-1952) and Agency (1952-to June 1969) experience, all in the field of intelligence. Since it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Board should have the benefit of all the facts stated in that memorandum and since there is no change in the contents thereof, I hereby incorporate by reference the memorandum of 5 June 1969, make it part hereof and attach it hereto as a significant part of the present memorandum.

3. The time passed since 5 June 1969 has served only to confirm my conviction in Mr. Wheeler's true value to the CS. He has continued the strong leadership of the Program Review Panel and his subordinates. His unbounded energy and incessant championing of the applicable principles of the PPB System have resulted in office chiefs or other most senior officials appearing before the last Program Review Panel apparently interested and better prepared than ever before. His obvious sincerity and friendly and intelligent approach to the job have convinced many of the need for the better management of their affairs. This is no mean accomplishment in a world where the normal human resents

even constructive criticism. Mr. Wheeler is so dedicated to making the CS the best managed component in the Agency that he continues to spend his own earnings on books and periodicals on the subject of management and to encourage interested parties to read them and pass them on to others.

4. The undersigned is aware that for the past six (6) months a private interest has dangled an impressive carrot in front of Mr. Wheeler in an attempt to induce him to retire and represent overseas the interests of that private concern. This fact is not to be considered by the Board as a sword of Damocles. It is simply to bring to the Board's attention that if a promotion at this time should serve to dissuade Mr. Wheeler from accepting the proffered job, the Board would have been instrumental in retaining for the CS in the management field one of the most dedicated, friendly, readily accepted, knowledgeable, industrious and qualified officers in the Agency.

5. In view of paragraph 3 above, the contents of the attachment hereto, and his potential for further growth, Mr. Wheeler is strongly recommended for promotion to Grade GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

Attachment: a/s

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

[illegible] 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Head of Career Service

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee at a point in service five years prior to the date of scheduled retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire in October 1975.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency will make available to you various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. In October 1970, the Agency will conduct a Retirement Information Seminar to which you will be invited. Your spouse, if you are married, may accompany you to this seminar. Following the seminar, you will be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session (or more than one, if you wish); this phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment, if appropriate. In addition to the sessions with your Retirement Counselor, you will be invited to avail yourself of selected literature on all aspects of retirement.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date, or who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are invited to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate. He is assigned from your Directorate to the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building in Rosslyn, on telephone extension 3328.

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

R. S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE O

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13 MAR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Administrative Officer, MPS

SUBJECT : Purchase of Service Credit

1. This is to advise you that your application to purchase service credit under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been processed. The amount of $437.00 will be required to purchase credit for the period 18 June 1946 through 17 June 1947 when no deductions were withheld from your salary. Under the current provisions of the CIA Retirement System, payment of the above amount will increase your annuity by approximately 2 per cent of your high-three average salary at the time of retirement. The amount due includes interest to the present date.

2. It should be explained that under the CIA Retirement and Disability System, all periods of creditable Federal civilian service during which retirement deductions were not taken from salary must be purchased by making a deposit in order for the time to be counted in the computation of the retirement annuity. Under the Civil Service Retirement System, such periods of Federal service are always creditable in the computation of annuity, but if not purchased, the annuity is reduced by 10 per cent of the amount due. For example, if a deposit of $1,000 is required to purchase credit for those periods of service during which no deductions were withheld from salary, and it is not paid, the basic annuity would be reduced by $100 per year. If the deposit of $1,000 is paid, the retiree would have to wait 10 years to recover his own deposit before profiting from the payment.

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

3. The Agency has as an aim legislatively to secure the Civil Service option, i.e., credit for periods of non-deduction service without prior payment therefor, but with reduction of the basic annuity by 10 per cent of the amount due. Therefore, you may wish to consider deferring payment. You should be aware that the interest on the amount due will continue to accumulate at the rate of 3 per cent compounded annually if you decide to defer. For example, if it would take $1,000 to purchase credit today, the amount due one year later would be $1,030.

4. After consideration of the above options, if you wish to purchase credit for the period of non-deduction service noted in paragraph 1, please make your check payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forward it to the Chief, Retirement Operations Branch, 205 Magazine Building. If you prefer, you may make installment payments or arrange for bi-weekly payroll allotments of $25.00 or multiples thereof. A receipt showing a statement of your account will be sent to you acknowledging each payment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

/s/ Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/RTConners:jat (6 March 1970)
Retyped: OP/RAD/JMG (13 March 1970)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 June 1968

H
36

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 06 DAY 12 YEAR 68

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 8121-2887

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions and Programs Staff
Programs Group

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: ~~Operations~~ Ops Officer (SG)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0008

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 23,778

18. REMARKS

Date:
Security Approval has been granted for this request.

Dist: 1 - CSPS
1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Michael J. Mitchell
DATE SIGNED: 3 June 1968

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Reed Laney
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 52150 ALPHABETIC MPS
22. STATION CODE: 7523
23. INTEGEE CODE:
24. POSITION CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 01 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR. XXXXXX
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIARDS 3 - FICA 4 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. CODE; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 2 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

E
4

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From O/PPB
06-12-68

46. O.P. APPROVAL: KB Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 10 June 68

FORM 3-62 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1966

XII

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 7 | DAY 31 | YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7114-0001

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DCI/Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting
Planning and Programming Division
Program Analysis Branch

E
4

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: IO - Program Eval

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0005

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.70

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22085

18. REMARKS:
~~2 - FRA as provided by the provisions of HR 20-17 d (c) for a period of two years.~~

C-09-55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John M. Clarke, Director/PPB
DATE SIGNED: 8/5/66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. [illegible] Head, D Career Service
DATE SIGNED: 8/5/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 02350 | ALPHABETIC OPPB
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. [illegible] CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 12 | DA. 09 | YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 02 | DA. 10 | YR. 64
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 02 | DA. 19 | YR. 65
28. DATE EXPIRES: MO. | DA. | YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSR, 2-FICA, 3-NONE): CODE 2
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 0000
34. SEX: M
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT): CODE 1
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 02 | DA. 06 | YR. 42
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. 07 | DA. 13 | YR. 62
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE C
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 | HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3-BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS): CODE 1
42. [illegible] CODE: 3
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) | CODE 0 | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS MO
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) | CODE — | NO. TAX EXEMP. — | STATE CODE —
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.P. APPROVAL: Bob Bond
DATE APPROVED: 10 Aug 66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XKB

DATE PREPARED: 1 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Gunsfeld, Robert [redacted]

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 30 YEAR 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7129-0369

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U.S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE GS-14

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22,085

18. REMARKS:

Subject is reemployable.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training

DATE SIGNED: 1 Aug 66

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 5 Aug. 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45

20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1,006091

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8/5/66

46. O.P. APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 5-8-66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

Date prepared: 9 July 1965

1. Serial Number 060947	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) Corcoran, Robert, G. [redacted]

3. Nature of Personnel Action DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. Effective Date Requested Month 08 Day 01 Year 65	5. Category of Employment REGULAR
6. Funds: V to V ☐ / CF to V ☐ / V to CF ☐ / XXX CF to CF	7. Cost Center No. Chargeable 6129-0369	8. Legal Authority (Completed by Office of Personnel) PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9. Organizational Designations DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	10. Location of Official Station HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. Position Title CHIEF OF BASE	12. Position Number 0261	13. Career Service Designation D

14. Classification Schedule (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. Occupational Series 0136.08	16. Grade and Step 16 3	17. Salary or Rate $ 20,245

18. Remarks

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1cc to OP/BSD/BCB

18A. Signature of Requesting Official Philip C. [illegible]	Date Signed 12 July 65	18B. Signature of Career Service Approving Officer	Date Signed

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. Action Code	20. Employee Code	21. Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22. Station Code	23. Integree Code	24. Hours Code	25. Date of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Date of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	27. Date of LEI Mo.	Da.	Yr.
28	10	43620	DOD	75020		2	10	04	15	08	30	64	08	30	64

EOD DATA

43. Position Control Certification
[illegible] 8/[illegible]/65

44. O.P. Approval
[illegible]

Date Approved
[illegible]

Form 1152 Use previous edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

XXB

DATE PREPARED: 29 OCTOBER 1964 ✓

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [redacted] [illegible], Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: (CAREER) EXCEPTED APPT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 25 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5329-0369

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20245 ✓

18. REMARKS:

C-09/55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia [illegible]
VIRGINIA C. [illegible], DC/DOD

DATE SIGNED: 29 oct 64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible] Collins

DATE SIGNED: 4 Nov. 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 13

20. EMPLOYEE CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC DOD

22. STATION: 7602 Oct ~~7042~~

23. INTEGREE:

24. POSITION CODE: 2

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 09 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. 08 DA. 30 YR. 64

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. 08 DA. 30 YR. 64

28. APT. EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—FICA 3—NONE CODE 1

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO: 00000

34. SEX: M

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 1 (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. 08 DA. 06 YR. 43

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. 09 DA. 28 YR. 52

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CODE 2

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1 (0—WAIVED 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE —

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO: —

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE 1
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS
3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS

42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 8

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE 0 NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS 0

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPT — STATE CODE —

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/9/64 [illegible]

46. C.P. APPROVAL: Joseph [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 5 Nov 64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF CLEARANCES

TO: DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

ATTENTION:
☐ Mobilization and Military Personnel Division
☐ Chief, Benefits and Counseling Branch, BSD
☒ Chief, Staff Agent Branch, CPD

SERIAL NO. 060747	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle) Wheeler, Robert P.	GRADE GS-16	POSITION TITLE Ops Officer
	OTHER TRUE NAMES USED WHILE IN AGENCY	COST CENTER NUMBER CHARGEABLE 5120-0269	FUNDS ☐ V ☒ CF

REASON FOR CLEARANCE
☒ SEPARATION
☐ EXTENDED LEAVE (Note reason)
☐ OTHER (Specify):

LAST WORKING DAY (Date): 23 October 1964

EFFECTIVE DATE OF SEPARATION: 24 October 1964

☐ FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, WAS FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ON 29 Oct. 64

☐ FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, IS ATTACHED TO THIS FORM.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE COMPONENTS LISTED BELOW HAVE FURNISHED POSITIVE VERIFICATION BY TELEPHONE OR CERTIFICATIONS TO THE UNDERSIGNED THAT THE SEPARATING EMPLOYEE:

- HAS RETURNED OR ACCOUNTED FOR ANY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY ISSUED TO HIM;
- SETTLED OR SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS TO THE AGENCY;
- RETURNED SPECIAL I.D. CARDS OR CREDENTIALS ISSUED TO HIM;
- RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL CLEARANCES, COVER INFORMATION, AND SECURITY BRIEFINGS;
- SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED OR CLOSED OUT ANY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO HIM.

		DATE CLEARED	CLEARED BY - NAME
✓	OFFICE OF LOGISTICS	10 Nov 64	Brown
	OFFICE OF SECURITY	19 NOV 64	John [illegible]
✓	DOCUMENT CONTROLS (Incl. RID)	10 Nov. 64	Bechy
✓	SPECIAL CLEARANCES	10 Nov. 64	[illegible]
	CENTRAL COVER STAFF 4408	18 Nov 64	[illegible] Jr
✓	MEDICAL STAFF	6 Nov. 64	BILL MICHAEL
✓	COMMO SECURITY	[illegible] Nov. 64	[illegible]

TITLE OF OPERATING COMPONENT OFFICIAL DC Personnel & Training	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE Virginia C. Lynch Virginia C. [illegible]	DATE SIGNED 16 Nov 64

REMARKS

FORM 7-63 21a

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-2)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VXF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 OCTOBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WIEHLER ROBERT F
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 31 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ | CF TO V ☐ | V TO CF ☐ | CF TO CF X

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

Dar

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20245

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, OC/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 29 Oct '64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY. CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC | ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. HOURS CODE: ~~5~~
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. MTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 1500091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/4/64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Benedetto Affilio
DATE APPROVED:

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

14-00000

NOTI 12 NOV 64

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P					
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION RESIGNATION					4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 24 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	☐	V TO V	☐	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0369 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	☐	CF TO V	☒	CF TO CF		
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS					10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER					12. POSITION NUMBER 0281	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS		15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01			16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245
18. REMARKS						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 11-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 16 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD~~#~~ US Field
U.S. STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, Hawaii

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS. OFFICER 00
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS-~~15~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 ~~15~~ 3 ~~5~~
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~18,740~~ 20,245

18. REMARKS

* Phone concurrence R Newman for FE

POSITION TITLE CHANGE

Security Approval Granted by Pers. [illegible] 10/6/64
[illegible] 10/6/64

WT

236
F.E

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DO/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 30 Sept '64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 13 Oct 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	11350	[illegible]	25020		2	10	04	15		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:
34. SEX:
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR-RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] FE 2 14 Oct 64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B J [illegible] for [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 14 Oct 64

FORM 1152 8/63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

2/5

SECRET

10 MAY 1963

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16, Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16. He has been in grade since December 1957.

2. Mr. Wheeler is serving as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo. To this post he has brought his depth of knowledge of things Japanese, gained over many years of concentration on this subject. He has also brought his operational ability and his personal capability of operating among significant Japanese leaders. He has been of major value through a most difficult period of very substantial reduction of the station's staff and the termination of many of its functions. While Mr. Wheeler may have spent much of his time on things Japanese, he has also served as Chief, FI, for FE Division in which post he demonstrated his ability to operate on non-Japanese matters with force, intelligence and dispatch.

3. For these reasons it is recommended that Mr. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16.

W E Colby

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

EYES ONLY

[illegible]

[illegible]

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16 -- Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. Mr. Wheeler stands Number Four on the Division's list of recommended promotions to GS-16. Mr. Wheeler is 47 years old and has been in grade since December 1957. Most of Mr. Wheeler's Agency career has been devoted to the Japanese scene although he served one tour most commendably as Chief FI for the FE Division. He is now Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, and is an operations officer and executive of the highest quality. In addition to bearing a very large share of the administrative burden of a big station, Mr. Wheeler has acquired a collection of Japanese friends and contacts in important governmental and business circles unequaled, I believe, by any other member of the official American community in Tokyo. Although he has exploited these contacts most effectively for Agency and U.S. Governmental purposes, it is the plan of the FE Division to give freer rein to Mr. Wheeler's operations in this field by arranging, carefully and deliberately, unofficial cover for Mr. Wheeler which will permit him to devote a greater share of his time to the exploitation of this most important section of Japanese society. We believe that his very considerable talents as an administrator can be adequately replaced but that his standing among the Japanese and his capability for operational exploitation of his advantages are unique. I believe that Mr. Wheeler can well be considered to be the prototype of the high ranking staff officer who can forego bureaucratic advancement for a purely operational career under deep cover in one area.

2. On the basis of his proven ability and past performance as well as his seniority I believe Mr. Wheeler to be fully qualified for promotion to GS-16.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 560947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF ☒

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JKD - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

9
F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Pol Asst 1st Sec
Ops Officer (DCOS)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR
GS 00

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 05 7
16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 19860
$20,245

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL

DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. [illegible]

DATE SIGNED: 5 Aug 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY. CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HOQTRS. CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 3—FICA 5—NONE / CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE / 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP / CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0—WAIVER 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE / 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [illegible] 08/28/64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry W. [illegible]

DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

FORM 5-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 560917

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JKO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (DCOS)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS 00

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: .0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $20,245

18. REMARKS:

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE

20. EMPLOY. CODE

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. HOOTERS CODE

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—FICA 3—NONE / CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE / 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP / CODE

39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0—WAIVED 1—YES / HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE / 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O P APPROVAL: /s/ Harry W. Little, Jr.

DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 SEPTEMBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR Status *

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | COB 25 | YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

9
F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~18740~~

18. REMARKS:

SUBJECT CONVERTED FROM FSR COB 25 AUGUST 1964.

* Superceded Action Promotion to GS16 3 $20295 effective 08/30/64.

[illegible] By
CSID
LLT

1 COPY PAYROLL

FOR FURTHER INFO CALL X5271

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
ROBERT L. STATEN C/FE/PERS	9/21/64	Ronald Gage	9/22/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
56	10	15370	FE	38891		3	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
W Kearney 09/24/64	Ronald Gage	9/22/64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET

DD/P 1-4672

30 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Second Tour for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, as D/COS, Tokyo

Panel "A" recommends your approval of request of second tour for Mr. Wheeler.

Al Lipp
Al Lipp
Clandestine Services
Career Service Panel
(Section A)

APPROVED:

Richard M. Bissell Jr.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

1 SEP 1961
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

V to V | V to UV
UV to V | UV to UV

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo Da Yr

1. Serial No.	
2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	Wheeler, Robert P.
3. Date Of Birth Mo Da Yr	10 04 15
4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	1
5. Sex	M
6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	
8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	
10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	
11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	
12. LCD Mo Da Yr	
13. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	DDP/FE FE/JAO - Tokyo Station Deputy for Operations Office of the Chief
Code	
15. Location Of Official Station	Tokyo, Japan
Station Code	//
16. Dept.- Field: Dept.- Usfld. ~~Field~~ Code	5
17. Position Title	Pol Asst 1ST Sec* Ops Officer
18. Position No.	3936
19. Serv.	FS GS
20. Occup. Series	0136.01
21. Grade & Step	03 15 2
22. Salary Or Rate	11660 $ ~~[illegible]~~ 12070
23. SD	DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	12 15 57
25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	12 11 60
26. Appropriation Number	0137 7351 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Reassignment
Code	56
28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	09 06 59
29. Type Of Employee	Regular
Code	01
30. Separation Date	

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	DDP/FE FE/JAO - Tokyo Station Office of the Chief
Code	5191
32. Location Of Official Station	
Station Code	37517
33. Dept.- Field: Dept.- Usfld. Field Code	5
34. Position Title	Pol Asst 1ST Sec Ops Officer (D COS)
35. Position No.	D-15 3003
36. Serv.	
37. Occup. Series	
38. Grade & Step	
39. Salary Or Rate	$
40. SD	
41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	12 15 57
42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	12 11 60
43. Appropriation Number	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): William H. Center, ACFE/JAO

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little, X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): for Desmond FitzGerald, CFE

Date Approved:

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		1959 20	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		8 [illegible]	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

Subject will replace Mr. William E. Nelson, who is returning to Hqs. PCS in August 1959.

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

7/27/59

(4)

DD/P 4:6610

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) 17 AUG 1959

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan

1. The appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan, effective on or about 15 August 1959 is recommended. Mr. Wheeler will replace Mr. William E. Nelson who is scheduled to return to Headquarters approximately 2 September 1959 for reassignment.

2. Mr. Wheeler has been an employee of the Agency since 28 September 1952 and is currently assigned as an Intelligence Officer, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

for William V. Broe
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is approved:

Richard M. Bissell 25 AUG 1959
Deputy Director (Plans) (Date)

SECRET

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

NAME : Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler

GRADE : GS-15

SERVICE DESIGNATION : DI

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH : 4 October 1915, Fitzgerald, Georgia

MARITAL STATUS : Married; six children

EDUCATION AND CAREER OUTSIDE OF AGENCY :

1934-1937, Mercer University
1941-1942, University of California
1942-1943, University of Colorado
1944-1946, George Washington University, M.A., International Relations

1941-1942, University of California, Reader in Political Science (part-time)
1942-1946, U.S. Navy, Language Officer, Intelligence Specialist, Lt.
1946-1952, War Dept., GHQ, FEC, Tokyo, Intelligence Specialist

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY : Japanese - Fair

CIA EXPERIENCE :

EOD CIA Sep 1952, Acting Chief, FI, concurrently Chief of Liaison, Tokyo Station
Jun 1956, Deputy Chief, FE/1
Mar 1957, Acting Chief, FE/1
Dec 1957, Chief, FE/PO/FI, FE Division

CIA TRAINING : Operations Course, Clandestine Methods & Techniques, Staff Indoctrination, Secret Writing, Documentation, Clandestine Services Review, CIA Review, Special Management Course, Reading Techniques

Approved by the Bureau of the Budget

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

121-250-104

☒ FS ☐ DEPTL

C0255

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 10-4-15

3. ACTION NO.: FSA-7

4. DATE: 3-26-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (Use standard terminology): Limited Appointment

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 5/8/59

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Section 522.1 PL 724 - 79th as amended

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE *Diplomatic or Consular Title*	Political Officer
	9. SCHEDULE, SERIES NO., GRADE, SALARY	FSR-3 $11,660
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS *Post*	Tokyo
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*	12. CS CATEGORY *FS Category*	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐ *Regular* ☐ *Resident* ☐ *Non-US*

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

None	5-Pt	10 Points Disab.	10 Points Other
	X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

New	Vice	I. A.	Del.	
	X			1-1011-333

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION From To 91-4019

17. RETIREMENT COVERAGE: ☒ CSR ☐ FS ☐ FICA ☐ None

18. DATE OF APPOINT. AFFIDAVITS (Accessions Only): 5/8/59

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ Claimed ☐ Proved State: D.C.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Marital Status - Married - Six

Military Reserve Status - None

Appointment limited to 5 years or need of employee's services, whichever is less.

Execute SF-61a.

R.H. TAYLOR

THROUGH APPROPRIATE OFFICER

EMPLOYEE COPY

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No. 160947	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER ROBERT P	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 04 Yr. 15	4. Vet. Pref. Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS-EOD Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52
7. SCD Mo. 08 Da. 06 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52
					13. Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE FI CI STAFF	Code 5113	15. Location Of Official Station WASH., D. C.	Station Code 75013
16. Dept.-Field Dept-USfld-Frgn- Code 2	17. Position Title I.O.FI STF CH	18. Position No. 3448	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51	21. Grade & Step 15 1	22. Salary Or Rate $ 12770 ~~[illegible]~~	23. SD 01
24. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 15 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 2 3700 20 001	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 05	28. Eff. Date Mo. 05 Da. 03 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

Confidential funds

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/FE FE/JAO Tokyo Station Office of the Chief Deputy for Ops.	Code 51	32. Location Of Official Station Tokyo, Japan	Station Code 37557
33. Dept.-Field Dept-USfld-Frgn- Code 5	34. Position Title Area Ops Off [illegible]	35. Position No. [illegible]	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series 0136.01	38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate $	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number 9-3735-55-005	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A) Requested By (Name And Title)
Edward R. Korn C/FE/JAO

B) For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Mozelle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
H. L. Stobe C/FE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	Ronald Grace		D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: Please transfer from Vouchered to Unvouchered funds on 3 May 1959.
~~[illegible]~~
2 Copies to Security.

Recorded by
CSPD

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED (Mo / Da / Yr)	
V to V / UV to V	
V to UV / UV to UV	
1. Serial No.	
2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	WHEELER, Robert P.
3. Date of Birth (Mo / Da / Yr)	10 / 4 / 15
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) / Code	
5. Sex	M
6. CS - EOD (Mo / Da / Yr)	
7. SCD (Mo / Da / Yr)	
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) / Code	
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	
10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo / Da / Yr)	
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) / Code	
12. LCD (Mo / Da / Yr)	
13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT, LCD (Yes - 1, No - 2) / Code	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	DDP/FE FE/JAO - Tokyo station ~~Tokyo Station~~ Deputy for Operations Office of the Chief
Code	
15. Location Of Official Station	Tokyo, Japan
Station Code	
16. Dept.-Field (Dept. - Unlid. From - 8) / Code	5
17. Position Title	~~Deputy for Operations~~ Ops officer
18. Position No.	3936
19. Serv.	GS
20. Occup. Series	0136.01
21. Grade & Step	15 / 1
22. Salary Or Rate	$ 12,770
23. SD	DI
24. Date Of Grade (Mo / Da / Yr)	
25. PSI Due (Mo / Da / Yr)	
26. Appropriation Number	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Integration Department of State
Code	56
28. Eff. Date (Mo / Da / Yr)	5 / 8 / 59
29. Type Of Employee	R
Code	3M
30. Separation Date	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

11

31. Organizational Designations	
Code	
32. Location Of Official Station	
Station Code	
33. Dept.-Field (Dept. - Unlid. From - X) / Code	
34. Position Title	Pol. Assistant, 1st Sec. (when)
35. Position No.	
36. Serv.	FSR
37. Occup. Series	
38. Grade & Step	3
39. Salary Or Rate	$ 11,660
40. SD	
41. Date Of Grade (Mo / Da / Yr)	10 / 5 / 57
42. PSI Due (Mo / Da / Yr)	6 / 14 / 59
43. Appropriation Number	9-3734-35-005

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): OPER/CCD/CCL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): B. Eggleston, x8106

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): B. Eggleston
Cover Officer

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		14 MAY	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: [illegible] sick and [illegible] annual leave to be transferred to Department of State.

FORM 1152a USE PREVIOUS EDIT.

SECRET

This Notice Expires 1 July 1959

N 20-190-160

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105, The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence has appointed the following persons, as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959.

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Anderson, Kenneth A.	SC	DDS/OC
Beers, Colwell E.	SA	OTR/DDS
Bielefeldt, Talbot	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Blackett, Gustav	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Bradley, Herbert C.	SA	DDS/OC
Brooks, William E.	SA	DDP/WE
Burris-Meyer, Harold	D	DDP/CI Staff
Burt, Arthur L.	IR	DDI/ORR
Cashell, John L.	SF	DDS/Compt
Channing, Hayden	IS	DDI/OSI
Crowley, Robert T.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Czajkowski, Anthony J.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Darling, James A.	DM	DDP/NEA
Dean, Warren L.	DI	DDP/WE
Donalley, Gail F.	SC	DDS/OC
Fuller, Robert, III	D	DDP/PPC
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Heney, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hewitt, Robert L.	IN	DDI/ONE
Holbrook, Newton D.	DI	DDP/SR
Heuffner, Donald C.	DI	DDP/FI
Ingersol, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Johnson, Dwight C.	IB	DDI/OBI
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaufman, Walter J., Jr.	DI	DDP/NEA
King, Henry E., Jr.	DP	DDP/PP

20-190-160

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

NAME	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Knott, William M.	SS	DDS/OS
Kolarik, George T.	SL	DDS/OL
Korn, Edward N.	DP	DDP/FE
Kriebel, Norman F., Jr.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Leach, Arthur R.	SL	DDS/OL
Lehman, Raymond D.	SC	DDS/OC
Little, Harry W., Jr.	DI	DDP/FI
Lowe, Francis D.	SL	DDS/OL
McPherson, Paul S.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Morse, Richard A.	SL	DDS/OL
Needham, William C.	DP	DDP/SE
Osborne, William A.	SS	DDS/OS
Phillips, Marvin W.	DT	DDP/TSS
Radford, William J.	C	DDI/OCR
Ragan, Joseph B.	SP	DDS/OP
Reinhardt, Nicholas W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Remsen, James K.	IR	DDI/ORR
Richardson, J. Roy	IS	DDI/OSI
Roberts, Elliott P.	ST	DDS/OTR
Roman, Howard E.	DI	DDP/EE
Ryan, Edward	DI	DDP/WE
Sawyer, William L.	SC	DDS/OC
Sells, Oscar H.	ST	DDS/OTR
Sharpe, C. F. Stewart	IB	DDI/OBI
Sheay, Robert W.	SP	DDS/OP
Swasey, Edgar, Jr.	DT	DDP/TSS
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI Staff
Thorn, John H.	C	DDI/OCR
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	I	OFF/DDI
Walsh, William B.	SM	DDS/Med
Wheeler, Robert P.	DI	DDP/FE

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. K. White
Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member of the Panel of Examiners

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

19 Nov. 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	12. LCD Mo Da Yr
13. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code					

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FE FI/CI Staff ~~Office of the Chief~~	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D.C.	Station Code
16. Dept.- Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fran.- Code	17. Position Title I.O. (FI) Stf Ch	18. Position No. 3448	19. Serv. GS
20. Occup. Series 0136.51	21. Grade & Step 14 - 5	22. Salary Or Rate $ 11,180.00	23. SD DI
24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 cH	

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Promotion	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr 15 DEC 1957	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Date

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code 5113	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
33. Dept.- Field Dept.- Ustld.- Fran.- Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series	38. Grade & Step 15	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11,610.00	40. SD
41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr [illegible]	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr [illegible]	43. Appropriation Number	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name and Title)
Ronald Gage, Chief, FE/Personnel

Gage

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.)
Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		27 Nov 57	D. Placement		27 Nov 57
B. Pos. Control		12/3/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		12/3/57

Remarks

FORM 1152a 3-57

SECRET

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

30 August 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	3. Date Of Birth Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code /	5. Sex M	6. CS - EOD Mo Da Yr	
7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes - 1 No - 2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code /	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. Mil Serv. Credit LCD Yes - 1 No - 2 Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP/FE Branch 1 - Japan Office of the Chief	Code	15. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C.	Station Code

5

16. Dept.- Field Dept - X Usfld. Fran - Code	17. Position Title Area Ops Off (Dep Br Ch)	18. Position No. ~~S~~-110	19. Serv. GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 14 ~~4~~ 5	22. Salary Or Rate 11,180 ~~$10,965.00~~ p/a	23. SD DI	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo 09 Da 22 Yr 57	26. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 GP

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action Reassignment	Code 51	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr 1 DEC 1957	29. Type Of Employee Regular	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP/FE FI/CI Staff	Code 5113	32. Location Of Official Station Washington, D. C. DI	Station Code [illegible]

1

[illegible] 11-19-57

33. Dept.- Field Dept - Usfld. Fran - Code	34. Position Title I. O. (FI) (Stf Ch)	35. Position No. 3418 ~~[illegible]~~ 01	36. Serv. GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.51

38. Grade & Step 14 ~~4~~ 5	39. Salary Or Rate 11,180 ~~$10,965.00~~ p/a	40. SD DI	41. Date Of Grade Mo 09 Da 28 Yr 57	42. PSI Due Mo 03 Da 22 Yr 59	43. Appropriation Number 8-3700-20 GP

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Ronald Gage Hardgrave, Elmer, Jr. C/FE	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title) Approved by CS Career Service Panel
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Ronald Gage, Ext. 3003	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement	[illegible]	OCT
B. Pos. Control		11/1/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shoay	OCT

Remarks

Please double slot with Robert L. Brown who is to be reassigned.

APPROVED BY FE CAREER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

FORM 3-57 1152a

u/o File

SECRET

14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

: WHEELER, ROBERT P. AGE: 4 OCT 1915 DATE: 30 AUGUST 1957

ON WASHINGTON, D. C. PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DI

JTIES: I.O.(FI)STF.CH. DD/P UNIT: FE
REASSIGNMENT

ESENT GRADE: GS-14 PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-67-15

OPOSED GRADE: GS-14

TRAINING: OPERATIONAL MGT, CSR, CLAND MET & TECH, DOC, S/W, SIC, TSS BRIEFING

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110-14

UCATION: 1934-37, MERCER UNIV; 1940-42, UNIV OF CALIF, BA IN POL SCI; 1942-1943 UNIV OF COL. JAPANESE; 1944-46, GWU, MA IN INTERNATIONAL REL.

ANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: JAPANESE - FAIR

SESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
MAY 38-OCT 38, CHAUFFEUR, AARON GOLDBERG
NOV 38-AUG 40, CLERK-DRIVER, GROCERY STORE
SEP 41-JUN 42, READER, UNIV OF CALIFORNIA
JUN 42-JUN 46, INTL OFF, TRANSLATOR, INTERPRETER, US NAVY, AUSTR. & JAPAN
JUN 46-SEP 52, INTEL CONSULTANT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
28 SEP 52, EOD, IO, GS-14, OSO/FE, TOKYO, JAPAN
28 FEB 54, REASSIGNED, IO(FI), GS-14, TOKYO, JAPAN
4 SEP 56, RETURNED TO HQS, PCS, & ASSIGNED AS D BR CH, DDP/FE/BR. 1, JAPAN
11 MAR 57, APPOINTED AS ACTING CHIEF, DDP/FE/BR. 1 JAPAN, WASH., D. C.

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR., CFE

- -

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

APPROVED BY FE C.S. [illegible] COMMITTEE
OCT 1 [illegible] 1957

FORM NO. 965 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1 MAR 57

SECRET

SECRET

2 1 AUG 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Wheeler, Robert P. -- Recommendation for Promotion from GS-14 to GS-15

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. In April, 1957 he became Acting Branch Chief and has been serving in this position in a superior manner. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in the undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15. It is planned in the near future to appoint Mr. Wheeler Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the FE division, a most responsible GS-15 position.

Alfred C Ulmer Jr

Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

5 APR 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, FI Career Service

SUBJECT: Nominations for Replacement of FE Consultants to FI Career Service

The following individuals are nominated to replace those Consultants from the FE Division to the FI Career Service, who will no longer be available for such duty:

Robert P. Wheeler vice William E. Nelson

Robert J. Jantzen vice Evan J. Parker, Jr.

Robert V. Lima vice Armand J. Vallieres

Paul B. Breitweiser vice Bernard Reichhardt

signed

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

[illegible]

[illegible]

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 20 April 1957

CSN NO. 1-104

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-104

ORGANIZATION
20 March 1957

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Announcement is made of the designation, effective 4 March 1957, of Mr. Paul B. Breitweiser as Acting Chief, FE/7.

Announcement is made of the following designations, effective 11 March 1957:

Mr. Robert J. Jantzen, Chief, FE/4

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Acting Chief, FE/1

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

FE NOTICE NO. 30-11
CHANGE 2

FINAL
7 March 1957

FAR EAST DIVISION NOTICE

SUBJECT: FE NOTICE NO. 30-11, "FE Division Approving Officers"

1. Effective 4 March 1957, paragraph 1,k of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Bernard F. Reichhardt, CFE/7 reassigned
Add Paul B. Breitweiser, A/CFE/7

2. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,f of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete William E. Nelson, CFE/1 reassigned
Add Robert F. Wheeler A, CFE/1

3. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,i of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Evan J. Parker, CFE/4 reassigned
Add Robert J. Jantzen, CFE/4

Alfred C. Ulmer Jr.
ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
FE Staffs and Branches
SSA/DDS
RI

S-E-C-R-E-T

8 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Promotion of Robert P. WHEELER

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. As of this date he has served in that capacity for a period of five months. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15.

William E. Nelson
WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 16 Oct. 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 16 Dec 56	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF-2302	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BF-110
GS-0136.51-14 $10,965. p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,965. p/a
DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Office of the Chief
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington D.C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL D

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is transferring from UNVOUCHERED to VOUCHERED funds.
Subject's W-4 and Form D-4 attached.
Subject's Personnel Data Sheet attached.

R. P. Wheeler (ans), FE/OIO
14 Nov. 56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Henry F. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Nelda P. Wicklund x-3308

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

Approved by CS Career
Service Panel
23 Nov 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	x				

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	RE

SD:DI

15. SEX M	16. APPROPRIATION FROM 7-3735-55-005 TO 7-3700-20	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		30 NOV 1956	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		23 Nov 56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY
Robert P. Wheeler FE Bearp 23 Nov '56

SECRET
(When filled in)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER AGE: 41 DATE: 16 October 1956

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington D.C.
Area Ops. Officer - Dep. Br. Chief

PRIMARY CAREER DD/P UNIT: FE/1 DESIGNATION: DI

PRESENT GRADE: GS-14
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14
CIA TRAINING: BOC, OC, SW, SIC
TSS Briefing, CSR

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-2302 GS-0136.51-14

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110 GS-0136.01-14

EDUCATION: Mercer University 1934 - 2½ yrs; Univ. of California 1940 - 2 yrs.- B.A.
George Washington University 1944 - 2 yrs. - M.A.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese - Speak - Fair; Read - poor; Write - poor.

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
June 1946 - Sept. 1952 - U.S. Dept. of Army - Tokyo, Japan - Intell Specialist
June 1942 - June 1946 - U.S. Navy - Language Officer, Intel specialist

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
EOD 28 Sept. 1952 to present - Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Japan - GS-14
Chief, Liaison Division - Japan Station, Tokyo

RECOMMENDED BY:
Philip F. Fendig
Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

SECRET

FORM NO. 965 REPLACES FORM 38-1
1 APR 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

Job Description: Will be assigned as Deputy Chief, FE/1.

Recommended by Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DI Career Service Board

DATE: 19 December 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-7751

1. Mr. Robert P. WHEELER, I.O., FI, GS-14, will complete his overseas tour (as extended) with the Japan Base, Tokyo, in June 1956. Subject will return to the U. S. for Home Leave and requests that he be permitted to return to the Japan Base for a new two year tour of duty upon completion of TDY at Headquarters for orientation and training.

2. Mr. WHEELER is Chief of Liaison for the Japan Base, Tokyo. He will resume this position upon his return to his official station (refer to Form 202 dated 9 November 1955 for subject).

3. Subject's request has the concurrence of the Chief, Japan Base, and this Division.

George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

DI Career Board

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]- 7751

5 DEC 1955

TO Chief, FE

DATE 30 November 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo ZJK.

INFO: COS/KA

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative/Personnel
SPECIFIC [redacted]

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. Attached is a rotation data sheet on [redacted].

2. As you will note [redacted] lists as his first choice return to Japan Base.

3. While it is realized that [redacted] has not had a regular tour at Headquarters, Japan Base concurs in [redacted]'s request, provided it does not hinder his career. This concurrence is based on the fact that Japan Base will be losing by next summer several of its key personnel who have contributed much to the operations of the Base. These include STAHARD, WAISLING, possibly CAPASSO and others.

4. [redacted] has a unique knowledge of the Japanese scene, speaks the language and has a continuity of service that makes his service invaluable.

5. During the next couple of years as this base gradually reduces in size, and while the Japanese are still in a receptive mood it is felt that much can be accomplished through our liaison efforts. It is therefore felt that [redacted]'s experience can be to the maximum benefit to KUBARK by his return here for another tour.

6. In order to assist this Base in its planning, an early answer will be appreciated.

s/ Harry [illegible], Jr.

Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

Attachment:
1. Rotation Data Sheet;

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Chief, FE, w/attach.
1 - COS/KA, w/o attach.

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [illegible]- 7285

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, FE

DATE 28 OCT 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo R.J.K

INFO: COS/FA
FE Support Base

SUBJECT GENERAL Administration/Personnel Robert P. Wheeler
SPECIFIC Recommendation for Promotion of [redacted]

REF JAPA-3079

1. In pursuance of recommendation submitted in Ref, it is requested that Robert P. [illegible] [redacted] be considered for promotion from the grade of GS-14 to GS-15. Subject has been in grade since 27 September 1952. He occupies a GS-15 slot.

2. Subject has been in his present position for approximately one year and has been under my supervision for 22 months.

3. Subject has made an unusual contribution to the work of the base through:

a. His outstanding leadership;
b. His almost unique knowledge of the area;
c. His ability to deal on a close personal basis with individuals on the highest levels; and
d. His quick and often brilliant assessment and solution of many of the important day-to-day problems of the base.

4. These qualities coupled with his strong devotion to duty fully warrant, in my opinion, his promotion to the grade of GS-15.

Harry W. Little Jr.

Robert P. Wheeler Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

Attachment:
1. Job Description:
18 October 1955
Distribution:
4 - Addressee, w/attach.
1 - COS/FA, w/attach.
1 - FE Support Base, w/attach.

Cancelled
per C FE
Dec 55

CLASSIFICATION

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JOB DESCRIPTION

Robert P. Wheeler

1. The position currently held by incumbent is two-fold: a. Deputy for KUFIRE and b. Chief of Liaison. These two positions will be described separately.

2. Deputy KUFIRE, Japan Base

As the title implies, incumbent is Deputy Chief, Japan Base for KUFIRE activities, a position comparable to the Deputies for Administration and KUGOWN activities. As such, incumbent is the responsible officer for the KUFIRE activities of the Japan Base, responsible to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Base. These responsibilities include the originating, planning and supervision of the execution of all Japan Base KUFIRE activities under the broad supervision of the Chief of Base, guided and directed by KUBARK KUFIRE regulations such as the SOI and the TRD. Incumbent supervises the work of approximately twenty persons ranging in grade from GS-13 to GS-5 and including such persons as the KUFIRE operations officer, the special projects officer, the chiefs of the KUFIRE sections of the Base. It is incumbent's further responsibility, generally on the initiative of the Deputy for Administration, to handle certain personnel matters for KUFIRE personnel, matters such as efficiency reports, promotion actions, disciplinary actions, etc. Incumbent also represents the Base on all KUFIRE matters, being charged, for example, with most KUFIRE relations with higher echelons, such as the Senior Representative, NA, and laterally with KUFIRE elements of adjacent Bases. As one of five Deputies, incumbent assists in setting Base policy, determination of personnel assignments, determination of work assignments, determination of Base operational priorities (again under the guidance and direction of KUBARK Headquarters), and, generally with the Chief of Base but often on his own responsibility, represents the KUFIRE aspects of the Base and of KUBARK so far as Japan is concerned to ODACID, ODIBEX and ODUNIT.

3. Deputy for Liaison, Japan Base (or Chief, Japan Base Liaison)

In this capacity incumbent is charged with basic responsibility for all Japan Base liaison activities, with all Japanese agencies or entities and other ODYOKE Agencies represented in Japan. Here incumbent is responsible to the Chief of Base for the origination, planning, supervision and frequently the actual conduct of all Base liaison, under the broad guidance of FR 52-200. Under incumbent's direct supervision are approximately twenty persons, separate from those mentioned above, who range in grade from GS-14 to GS-5, including all Base personnel in any form of liaison activity though their basic assignment may well be in one of the operating sections of the Mission. Being the Senior Liaison person of the Base, incumbent is frequently called upon to conduct liaison activities with such persons, on the one hand, as the Deputy Prime Minister of the host country, the Chiefs of major Japanese Governmental departments, high ranking officials of various branches of the host country, and, on the other, with such persons as the Senior ODACID representative in the country

SECRET

and various branch or section heads of the local ODACID establishment, senior military officers of all three services and various branch and section chiefs of the local military establishments. One segment of these activities involves [illegible] matters of high importance. One of the primary direct responsibilities of incumbent is the origination of KUBARK liaison with these agencies and of equal import is the maintenances of good liaison relationships, stepping in where there is potential trouble, where policy decisions have to be made, where new departures in liaison are necessary (such as joint operational activities with other PAXO or other ODYOKE agencies).

4. Inherent in both of the current assignments is the planning and review function which are both so necessary to effective and continued operations. This includes the initiation of PPOP's and review of those originated by personnel under the supervision of incumbent; included also is operational review and critical analysis of all KUFIRE operational and Base liaison activities.

5. In addition to the above functions and responsibilities, incumbent is also the case officer for one political KUFIRE operation.

6. Aside from the above general description of incumbent's duties and responsibilities the following seems pertinent: incumbent has been on duty in Japan, with minor interruptions, since September 1945 and in this period, seven years was spent with G-2 of the command (throughout its many changes). One result of this service has been an uninterrupted liaison relationship with many Japanese agencies and more importantly Japanese personalities, while, on the other hand, at the same time there has been a rather unique relationship with the Command and with personnel of the Command (many of the ODYOKE personnel with whom KUBARK is now in liaison are persons with whom incumbent has worked intimately at some period throughout the past ten years, making for a naturalness of relationship that has paid innumerable dividends). In addition incumbent has specialized in things Japanese for some fifteen years, being somewhat more than a neophyte in Japanese history, economics, language, and customs and traditions.

7. I certify that the above described duties are true and correct.

/s/ Robert [illegible]

/s/ Harry W. Kelly, Jr.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI Career Service Board DATE: 26 January 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER — Extension of Overseas Tour

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-3333, dated 13 January 1955

1. Subject's request for extension of overseas tour contained in the attachment is forwarded for your approval.

2. Mr. WHEELER entered on duty with the Agency in the field on 28 September 1952. He completed his two-year tour on 28 September 1954 and requests that his tour be extended to 28 September 1956.

3. The above request has the concurrence of the Chief of the Japan Mission and Chief, FE/1.

for George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

FI Career Service Board

Orig: A. Tallackson
x - 3332

SECRET

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJBA-3333

[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

13 JAN 1955

TO : Chief, FE
DATE

FROM : Chief, Japan Mission

INFO: Support Mission

SUBJECT GENERAL : Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC : Robert P. WHEELER Request for Extension of Overseas Duty

Robert P. WHEELER completed his two-year overseas tour on 28 September 1954. Subject requests an extension to 28 September 1956. The Chief of Mission concurs in this request.

Viola N. Partain
Viola N. PARTAIN
Acting Chief, Personnel Section

Distribution:
- 4 - Headquarters
- 1 - Support Mission

[illegible]
CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

[illegible]

11 June 1954

MEMORANDUM

TO : Robert P. Wheeler [redacted]

FROM : Chief of Mission

SUBJECT: Commendation

1. It gives me very great pleasure to forward herewith a personal commendation to you from Robert A. ASCHAM, Chief, KUBARK. This commendation was transmitted to the Japan Mission by Philip J. CROCKETT, the Senior Representative, North Asia, who requested that his personal appreciation be extended to you.

2. Your performance in the case which resulted in ASCHAM's commendation reflects great credit upon KUBARK in general and upon the Japan Mission in particular, as well as indicating conclusively your outstanding professional and executive capabilities in the direction and conduct of intelligence activities.

3. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my congratulations and to extend my personal thanks and appreciation.

Robert J. Kendall

Robert J. KENDALL

SECRET

MAY 1 1954

TO : [redacted] Robert P. Wheeler

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. It is a very real pleasure for me to be able to acknowledge the excellent manner in which you carried out your duties as officer in charge of the direct handling of the POCARGO case. You are to be particularly commended on the manner in which you adjusted to a type of operation with which you had never previously been directly concerned, on the personal rapport which you developed with POCARGO and the good judgment displayed in anticipating and dealing with difficult personality problems, and on your understanding of the broad policy problems implicit in this case.

2. I wish to assure you that your substantial contributions to the success of this operation, as well as the personal inconvenience caused by your precipitate and prolonged departure from your family, are fully appreciated. You are further commended on the demonstrated fact that this personal inconvenience in no way affected either your effectiveness or your contagious enthusiasm which contributed so much to this operation.

3. Copies of this letter are being forwarded for the Chief, Japan Mission and the Senior Representative, North Asia, as well as to your permanent personnel file at headquarters.

Robert A. Ascham

ROBERT A. ASCHAM

SECRET

PERSONNEL TRANSFER AND CLEARANCE SHEET

3 October 1952

TO: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief, JCU

1. Robert Prentiss WHEELER Branch: JCU

2. Detached from: Tokyo, Japan Ordered to: Washington, D. C.

   On Temporary Duty for 90 days and return to Tokyo, Japan

3. Approximate date of departure: 3 October 1952. Travel by air.

4. Monthly salary allotment in the Field: $400. Not yet effective.

   Overall base pay per annum: $9600 Marital status: Married

5. Allowances: 10% Differential. Not yet effective.

6. Per Diem: Not applicable

7. Unaccounted or unpaid advances at time of detachment:

   Travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 outstanding. Travel from Tokyo, Japan, to Washington, D.C., to be accounted for at headquarters. Travel from Washington, D.C., to Tokyo, Japan, to be accounted for at field station upon return to Japan.

8. Leave used at this station: None

   Accumulated leave to date of detachment: Unknown

Additional Remarks: Subject entered on duty in the field 28 September 1952. Transfer of leave record has not yet been accomplished. Salary and 10% differential have not been paid.

FOR THE CHIEF, JCU:

Walter D. NEHMER

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJJA-505

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FE

DATE: 30 September 1952

FROM : Chief, JCU

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administration - Personnel
SPECIFIC- WHEELER, Robert Prentiss, Completion of Personnel Forms

REFERENCE: ZJJW-108, 17 March 1952

ATTACHMENTS:
(a) Form W-4
(b) Form 61
(c) Secrecy Agreement (dup)
(d) SF 78 (in lieu of Form 88)
(e) Letter of Appointment (dup)
(f) SF 2806
(g) Form 37-79 (dup)
(h) Form 37-50
(i) Memorandum of Field Allowance dated 28 September 1952 (dup)
(j) True Signature Form (dup)
(k) Personnel Transfer and Clearance Sheet (quad)

1. Transmitted herewith are completed personnel forms for subject employee.

2. Standard Form 2808, Designation of Beneficiary, is withheld by this Unit. Designated beneficiary as indicated by Retirement Act order of preference is satisfactory to subject.

3. Reference attachment (j), Acknowledgement of Pseudonym Forms will follow.

4. Attachment (k) is submitted in accordance with Field Regulation 30-3. Subject entered on duty 28 September 1952 and estimated date of departure from Tokyo is 3 October 1952 via Pan American Airways Flight 822 at 1600 for temporary duty in headquarters for a period of 90 days. A travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 has been given employee. A field allotment of $400 per pay period will be effective beginning pay period 11 October to 8 November 1952. This allotment will accumulate at the field station and will be paid in a lump sum upon subject's return from temporary duty at headquarters. However, the period of duty from 28 September to 12 October 1952 should be paid to subject by the headquarters finance division.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, understand that by virtue of my duties in the ______________________, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the ______________________. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, (Espionage Act) as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the ______________________, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director, ______________________:

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 23rd day of September 1952.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler (Seal)

Sworn to before me this 23rd day of Sept 1952

at Tokyo, Japan.

Bonnie H. Truelove

1499

VIA: A I R (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. FJTA -

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: AUG. 28. 1953

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Senior Representative, Tokyo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative - Personnel

SPECIFIC— [redacted] Commendation of Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

Attachment (1) Dispatch No. FJJA-1279- dtd 17 August 1953 under the above subject

It is with pleasure that I endorse and forward to Headquarters the attached dispatch prepared by the Chief, JCU, commending [redacted] for performance of his duties as Chief of Staff, JCU.

Philip J. Crockett
PHILIP J. CROCKETT

24 August 1953

Distribution

- 3 - HQS - w/3 encls.
- 1 - JCU - w/o "
- 1 - Registry
- 1 - File

SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
JUL 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

DATE: 2 November 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O. (CE)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $8360
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDZ
BRANCH		C - Japan Composite Unit CE Section Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. Fisher	PERSONNEL OFFICER H. C. [illegible] 2/11/51	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

C # 1817

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: Attachments: PHS (in duplicate) w/Appendix I, Ltr. of Availability

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, CE Section Slot #1 (I.O, CE, GS-13), Personnel No. 51. Subject to be processed at basic salary of GS-13; upon receipt of 201 file from Deptar, necessary salary adjustments to be made at that time.

ICM, Requesting Waiver of OSO Reg. 20-1 attached.

Secrecy agreement to be forwarded from the Field.

FORM NO. 37-1
NOV 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

GPO 16-03206-1

(2)

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable.
This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE) Wheeler, Robert P.	AGE 37	GRADE (GS OR RANK) GS-14	DATE OF REPORT 9 December 1952
DIVISION FI FE C	PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT Tokyo, Japan		COURSE NO. 40

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	ADJECTIVAL RATINGS									
	FAILURE		POOR		SATISFACTORY		EXCELLENT		SUPERIOR	
	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.	COMP.	IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations						X	X			
2. Cover						X	X			
3. Communications						X	X			
4. Target Analysis								X	X	
5. Criteria For Agent Selection							X	X		
6. Agent Recruitment							X	X		
7. Agent Handling								X	X	
8. Agent Direction								X	X	
9. Assessment and Reassessment								X	X	
10. Special Operational Problems							X	X		

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE THE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AS WELL AS HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

1	2	3	4	5

A. Constructive Imagination (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

B. Astuteness (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	[✓ 3]	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Exhibited below average skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate judgment and perspicacity.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

C. Industry (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Did not show sufficient application of time and effort.	Applied only the minimum amount of time and effort necessary.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort necessary.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time and effort.

D. Initiative (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Consistently failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Generally exhibited a low level of enterprise but occasionally acted on his own.	Normally took steps to implement ideas without external prompting.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness in carrying out projects.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness.

E. Ability to Write (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Seemed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent, manner.

F. Facility of oral expression (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

G. Ability to Get Along With Associates. (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Frequently alienated his associates.	Failed to win social acceptance but did not actively antagonize others.	Reasonably effective in his social relations.	Displayed definite ability to achieve harmonious relationships with his associates.	Unusually effective in his ability to win acceptance from others

H. Ability to Influence His Associates (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	[✓ 5]
Withdrew from group activities to a marked degree, failing to influence the thinking and actions of others.	Normally socially retiring, opinions rarely affected his associates.	Usually participated in group activities, was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was excellent at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

I. Tact (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Markedly blunt and indiscreet.	Frequently said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet and tactful.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

J. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	[✓ 4]	5
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of enthusiasm and interest.

COMMENTS

CAB
SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING
Robert B. Shaffer

REVIEWED
SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION

FORM NO. 51-86
OCT 1951

SECRET

(OVER)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

Sections 1 through 6 will be completed by employee. Type if possible.

1. NAME (Printed) WHEELER Robert P.

LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	GS-14	$9600.

Date of assignment to present post 28 Sept. 1952
(Was in U.S. on TDY. Returned station 12 January 1953)

2. Description of duties since last efficiency report. (List most recent first. Describe concisely but fully)

Deputy Chief of Station

3. If courses of instruction were completed during period of this report, list title, location of school, length of course and date completed.

Courses while on TDY in U.S.

4. Proficiency in Foreign Language	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Japanese			x			x		x	

5. My preference for next duty after termination of current assignment is:

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Same	Same

(List one or more in order of preference)

6. Have there been any changes in personal status since original employment or last report — whichever is latest? (Answer yes or no.
Marital Status No, Number of Dependents +1 *, Emergency addresses No, legal address No. If the answer to any of the above is yes, attach a separate detailed report in duplicate hereto. In the case of marriage, the report will include names, addresses, and citizenship of spouse, Father-in-law, Mother-in-law, Brothers-in-law and Sisters-in-law.

DATE 1 June 1953

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

/s/ Robert P. Wheeler

* Child born 11 Feb. 1953
Charles Slayton [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

[illegible] through 11 to be completed by immediate supervisor

7. Period covered by this report: Date from 27 Sept. 1952 1 June 1953
Reason for report: Annual x, Reassignment of reporting officer ___, Proposed reassignment of employee reported on ___; Covering initial 90 days of employment ___

8. Is this employee qualified to perform all present duties? Yes x No ___
Is employee better qualified for other duties? Yes ___ No x
If so, what duty or duties?

Do you concur in employee's description of duties under Section 2?
Yes x No ___ If NO, explain in Section 11.
Has employee striven for professional improvement? Yes x No ___
Do you recommend employee for promotion? Yes x No ___
If so, to what grade and for what position?
To grade GS-15. However, there is no current vacancy in JCU T/O.

9. For each factor observed check the appropriate box to indicate how the employee compares with all others of the same classification whose professional abilities are known to you personally. Do not limit this comparison to the others now under your supervision. Do not hesitate to mark "Not Observed" on any quality when appropriate.

Rating Factors

	Not Observed	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Outstanding
A. Ability to work and get along with people						x	
B. Interest and enthusiasm in work						x	
C. Security consciousness						x	
D. Ability to grasp instructions and ideas					x		
[illegible]							x
[illegible]						x	
G. Ability to obtain results and get things done							x
[illegible]						x	
Initiative							x
Ability to handle and direct staff						x	
Knowledge of present duties							x
Ability to evaluate intelligence information						x	
[illegible]						x	
N. Sagacity (Non-Gullibility)					x		
O. Leadership						x	
P. Physical Stamina					x		
Q. Mental Stamina						x	

10. Indicate your attitude toward having this employee under your command or supervision. Would you: Definitely not want him ___, Prefer not to have him ___, Be satisfied to have him ___, Be pleased to have him ___, Particularly desire him x

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

11. Enter here any desired remarks pertaining to particular qualifications or lack therof which are considered pertinent to the evaluation of this employee. Outstanding assets and/or serious limitations should be stated, also reasons for and recommendations as to reassignment will be given if appropriate to this report.

Subject officer is an outstanding addition to KUBARK as a general service staff officer. He has the aggressive sense of urgency so necessary in any position of responsibility together with the necessary qualities of balance, understanding of human nature and sincerity of purpose. He would be an asset to any branch, division or staff of KUBARK home office, and would be capable of assuming almost any responsible position in an overseas post. If he has any weakness at present, it is a lack of experience in covert operations; this can be overcome before the expiration of his present tour.

(If additional space is needed, attach extra sheet.)

17 August 1953
(Date)

Walt D. Newph
(Signature of Reporting Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below.)

Walt D. Newph
(Signature of Reviewing Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION:

CONFIDENTIAL

1-12-31-15

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 26 Dec 73

FILE NO. 4908

SS NUMBER: 258-12-0844

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NOCAD

ATTN: Administrative Officer

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

OFFICIAL COVER:
- ☐ ESTABLISHED
- ☒ DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2c)

☐ SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2c)

EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

☐ SUBMIT FORM 2588 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

NA SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

NA EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X SUBMIT FORM 2588 FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK

[illegible] ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS ENTIRE PERIOD OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIAL PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT.

GSN/kns

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD OR CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SSSCO
COPY 4 - OL [illegible]
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-43)

FORM 5-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABL[illegible]MENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: MARCH 1971

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	FILE NUMBER 4908
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER 060947
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) MPS	ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: MPS/Chief Personnel Branch

REF: FORM 1322 dtd MARCH 1971

OFFICIAL COVER: X XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

UNIT: REMOVE FROM: U.S. ARMY STAFF GROUP

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF		DATE EFFECTIVE COB 28 FEB 1971
	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	X	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)		
X	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

EDF/pw

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James [illegible]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-80-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

2 April 1968

TO: (Check)	X	CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
		CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
	X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) O/PPB

FILE NUMBER: 4908

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947

ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: VERBAL REQUEST

OFFICIAL COVER: ☒ BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WHEELER, ROBERT P.

UNIT: U S ARMY STAFF GROUP

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opmemo 20-800-11)
	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ____ B. CONTINUING AS OF ~~XXX~~ EOD		DATE (as of COB)
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
~~X~~ X	ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HR 20-661-1)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)		
	CONCUR IN ISSUANCE	☐	HOSPITALIZATION CARD
		☐	HOSPITALIZATION CARD

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

Sep 52 - Jun 56 Japan/DAC
Jul 56 - Jun 59 Washington, D.C./DAC
Jul 59 - Aug 64 Japan/State integree
Aug 64 - Aug 66 Honolulu/NOC
Aug 66 - Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DOD
Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DAC

[illegible] [illegible]/nch

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - [illegible]
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - [illegible]
COPY 4 - [illegible]
COPY 5 - [illegible]
COPY 6 - [illegible]
COPY 7 - [illegible]

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 17 October 1966

TO: (Check)
- ☒ CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- ☒ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DCI/OPPB

ESTABLISHED FOR: WHEELER, Robert P.

ATTN: Chief Personnel

FILE NO.: 4908

REF: Verbal Request

ID CARD NO.:

OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED: Office, Secretary of Defense (Admin)

EMPLOYEE NO.: 060947

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

☒ Block Records: (OPMEMO 20-800-11)

a. Temporarily for ______ days, effective ______________________

b. Continuing, effective EOD.

☒ Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. (HHB 20-7)

☒ Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. (HR 20-661-1)

☒ Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. (R 240-250)

☒ Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. (R 240-250)

THIS RECORD MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

N/A Concurred in issuance

AGE ☐ Hospitalization card.
NACS ☐

COVER HISTORY

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CCS

DISTRIBUTION: Copy 1-PAB, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-D/OS, Copy 4-CI/[illegible], Copy 5-OP/DSD/[illegible], Copy 6-[illegible], Copy 7-File

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OMS? 2 JAN 74

Dorothy/P B

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	12 31 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	X V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NBCA	4221 0117 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	PL 88-643 SECT 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NONOFFICIAL COVER BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
12. POSITION NUMBER	0040
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	17 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	36000

-CH

20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK
IRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF

BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. HEALTH Code	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	10 04 15
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	0EJ0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	
37. LONG COMP DATE	
38. CAREER CATEGORY	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	
42. LEAVE CAT CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	
44. STATE TAX DATA	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-3-74
JAR

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

H-31

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
C6C947	WHEELER ROBERT P	37 135	V	

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 17	4	$36,CCC	11/28/71	GS 17	5	$36,CCC	11/25/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Gordon Macon

DATE 2 Oct. '73

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS

VERIFIED BY

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

DMS8 2 JAN 74

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEP

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 12 DA 31 YR 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶ ☒ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND FSCA: 4221 0117 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION:

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous
9-72 Edition

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	37 325	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

KHN: 12 OCT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 09 21 73	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4221 0117 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 0049	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 17 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 36000

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) 37325 PS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)	28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REG. NO.
34. SEX	35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAT, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 1 WAIVED, 2 YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 YES, 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 9-72
Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

17

RCS: 30 JULY 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 | 01 | 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221 0117 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
PENDING REASSIGNMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000
18. REMARKS:
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Heights Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	37135	PS	75013		1	10 | 04 | 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RSV PROV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NOCAD

POSTED
8-1-73

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	54 997	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

BS: 21 MAR '72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 09 72	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ☒ V TO V ☐ CF TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2231 4148 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/NOCA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 17 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 36000

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 54997	ALPHABETIC NOCA	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. [illegible] Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE; CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Computer Cancellation Data MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX		
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAT SUB CODE	39. FEGLI CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT; STATE CODE						

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM MPS

POSTED
3-22-72

FORM 1150
5-66
Mfg. 6-73

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 100	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

BBC: 30 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION			4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 11 28 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS	X V TO V	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 2221 2886 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
	CF TO V	CF TO CF			
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/MISSIONS & PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER CH			12. POSITION NUMBER 0001	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 17 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 35801	

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	52100	MPS	75013		1	10 04 15	11 28 71	11 28 71

28. FEE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO. / 34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA		44. STATE TAX DATA			

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7 DEC 1971

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

H 36

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	32 100	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$32,819	08/24/69	GS 16	7	$33,757	08/22/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE [illegible] June 71

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP
☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WITHIN-GRADE PAY SUSPENDED UNTIL 14 NOV 71
PER 2.0. 71015. EFFECTIVE DATE RETAINED
FOR DATE OF LAST EQUIVALENT INCREASE.

AUG 15 15 17 '71

CLERKS INITIALS BEK

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PRO: 13 MAR 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060917
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 03 DA 21 YR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS				
		V TO V		V TO CF
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1221 2866 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 32619
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODINGS Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Subject Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	52100	MPS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction / Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3.22.71

FORM 1150 Mar 6-70 | Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL ORGN. FUNDS GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947 52 150 CF GS 16 6	$32,619

36 H

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	52 150	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	~~$25,873~~ 28384	08/27/67	GS 16	6	~~$26,640~~ 29219	08/24/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Michael G. Mitchell

DATE 3 June 1969

☑ NO EXCESS LWOP

☑ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

POSTED BY

FORM 7-65 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL ORGN. FUNDS GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947 52 150 CF GS 16 5	$28,384

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 5	$23,778	$25,879

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JLB: 12 JUN 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 06 DA 12 YR 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 8121 2887 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF PROGRAMS GROUP	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 0008	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 5	17. SALARY OR RATE 23778

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 52150 ALPHABETIC MPS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Military Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 10 DA 04 YR 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. NTE EXPIRES MO XX DA XX YR XX	29. SPEC. SC. REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CSS 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM O/PPB

POSTED
[illegible]

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962,"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	02 350	CF	GS 16 3	$22,755	$23,778

14-00000

E-4

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. [illegible]	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	02 390	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	$22,085	08/29/65	GS 16	5	$22,755	08/27/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Gene R. Koontz

DATE 6 June 1967

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

(4-51)

FORM 7-53 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

COMPENSATION & TAX DIV

AUG 22 [illegible]

14-00000

PJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
050947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXCEPTED APPT CAREER	07 31 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7114 0001 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DCI/OFFICE OF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING DIVISION PROGRAM ANALYSIS BRANCH	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
IO PROGRAM EVAL	0005	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.70	15 4	22085

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CASE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
13	10	02350	OPPB	75013		1	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 29 65

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		2			EOD DATA	00000	M

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	08 06 42	09 28 52	C	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA
1	8		C MO	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 8 17 66

FORM 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14

FJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER
060947

2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
[redacted] Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION
RESIGNATION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE
MO. DA. YR.
07 30 66

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REGULAR

6. FUNDS

	V TO V		V TO CF
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE
7123 0369 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS
DDP/DOD
US FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE
CHIEF OF BASE

12. POSITION NUMBER
0261

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)
GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES
0136.08

16. GRADE AND STEP
16 4

17. SALARY OR RATE
22085

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
45

20. EMPLOY. CODE
10

21. OFFICE CODING
NUMERIC ALPHABETIC

22. STATION CODE

23. INTEGREE CODE

24. [illegible] Code

25. DATE OF BIRTH
MO. DA. YR.
10 04 15

26. DATE OF GRADE
MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI
MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES
MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE

30. RETIREMENT DATA
1 - CSC
2 - FICA
3 - NONE
CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
1B00091

32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.

34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE
CODE
0 - NONE
1 - 5 PT.
2 - 10 PT.

36. SERV. COMP. DATE
MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG COMP. DATE
MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY
CAT. DESG. PROV. TEMP.
CODE

39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE
CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES
HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA
CODE
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS.
3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.

42. SERVICE CAT. CODE

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
FORM EXECUTED
1 - YES
2 - NO
CODE
NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA
FORM EXECUTED
1 - YES
2 - NO
CODE NO. TAX STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 8.17.66

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

060947 [redacted]					43 620	CF				
[illegible]										
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	3	$20,245	08/30/64	GS 16	4	$20,900	08/29/65			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Harry A. Rea[illegible] DATE 15 June 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-31)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$21,653	$22,095

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] T Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$20,900	$21,653

14-00000

11 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [illegible], Robert
[redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 08 01 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6123 0369 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U. S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

POSTED
[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)
28	10	43520	000	75020		2	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 58

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	ZOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP.) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

8/6/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

JCD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): [redacted] Robert
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 25 YR. 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ · V TO CF ☐ · CF TO V ☒ · CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129 0369 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:

POSTED ON
10 29 1964

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
13	10	43620	000	75020		2	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 64

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1					00000	M1

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR - DESV, PROV - TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	08 05 42	09 28 32	C	1		

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE
1	8		0	0				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
Jgs
10/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

JCD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 10 DA. 24 YR. 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129 0369 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/DOD
U. S. FIELD
UNITED STATES STATION
HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: 20245
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Regis. Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. HTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 3 - FICA, 6 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 18D0091
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REG. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
JCD 11/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET Jcd

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

16 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 10 16 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5129 0369 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE		10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION HONOLULU, HAWAII	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER		12. POSITION NUMBER 0261	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ. Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 43620 ALPHABETIC DOD	22. STATION CODE 75020	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 2	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 3 - FICA 5 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.		EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE			40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS		44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE - 2

E. D. ECHOLS

POSTED
19 OCT 1964

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

DLB: 30 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1568 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN	
11. POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 20245

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
TO DELETE INTEGRATED INFORMATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA		44. STATE TAX DATA				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/01/64 MCG

E. J. NICHOLS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DLB: 16 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 060947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☒ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 5137 1566 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 14860 20245

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #1, SERIAL NUMBER, WHICH READ 560947, TO READ 060947.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE
20. EMPLOY. CODE
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS. CODE
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR. 10 04 15
26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVES 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/18/64 UK

FORM 11-63 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET
16 SEP 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

28 AUG 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 560947	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 08 30 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	12. POSITION NUMBER 3003	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) FSR GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0136.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 03 1 16 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 14860 20245

18. REMARKS
TOKYO, JAPAN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRET CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.	
22	10	45380	FE	37587	1	3	10 04 15	08 30 64	09 30 64	

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE NO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE	0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/15/64 JWS

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SEP 1964

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

DLD, 20 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)	WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	COB 08 25 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V; ☐ V TO CF; ☒ CF TO V; CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	5137 1566 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	TOKYO, JAPAN
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER DCOS
12. POSITION NUMBER	3003
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	15 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	18740
18. REMARKS	

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
56	10	45380	FE	37521		3	10 04 15		

28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1 - YES, 2 - NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/01/64 mck

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

91

060947	WHEELER ROBERT P					45 380	CF			
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$17,210	06/10/62	GS 15	5	$17,725	06/07/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

03

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 7/2
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 May 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	45 380	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	56380	CF	15 4	$14705	15 4	$16005

060947	WHEELER ROBERT P			55 380	11 CF						
5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7 TYPE ACTION			
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ	
GS 15	3	$14,380	12/11/60	GS 15	4	$14,705	06/10/62				

8 Remarks and Authentication

3

742

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

E. D. ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

742

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE 11	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	2	$14,055	06	14	59	GS 15	3	$14,380	12	11	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

POSTED TO 2808

WK 12/7/60

E. D. ECHOLS

OBLIGATION APPROVED

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SUPERSEDES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WHEELER ROBERT P	560947	51 71	GS-15 2	$13,070	$14,055

/S/ EMMETT D. ECHOLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BS 4 SEPT 59

1. Serial No. 560947	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WHEELER ROBERT P	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 10 Da. 04 Yr. 15	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code 1	5. Sex M 1	6. CS. EOD Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52	
7. SCD Mo. 08 Da. 06 Yr. 42	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 5171	15. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code 37587

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn. - 5 Code 5	17. Position Title POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER	18. Position No. 3936	19. Serv. FSR GS	20. Occup. Series 0136.01

21. Grade & Step 03 15 2	22. Salary Or Rate $ 11660 13070	23. SD 01	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 15 Yr. 57	25. PSI Due Mo. 06 Da. 14 Yr. 59	26. Appropriation Number 9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action REASSIGNMENT	Code 56	28. Eff. Date Mo. 09 Da. 06 Yr. 59	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code OM C4	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	Code 5171	32. Location Of Official Station TOKYO, JAPAN	Station Code 37587

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn. - 5 Code 5	34. Position Title POL ASST 1ST SEC. OPS OFF (D COS)	35. Position No. 2003	36. Serv. FSR GS	37. Occup. Series 0136.01

38. Grade & Step 03 15 2	39. Salary Or Rate $ 11660 13070	40. SD 01	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 12 Da. 15 Yr. 57	42. PSI Due Mo. 12 Da. 11 Yr. 60	43. Appropriation Number 0137 7351 3000

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

OS 742

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE -11	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	1	$12,770	12	15	57	GS 15	2	13,070	06	14	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

-3 [illegible]
742

14. AUTHENTICATION

40 19 5/2/57 TN 716 Rue 1/30/59

AH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1
ARE: ~~17~~ MAY 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.		
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15	1	M 1	09	28	52		
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
08	06	42	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	09	28	52

13. Mil. Serv. Credit. LCD Yes-1 No-2 Code: 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12	15	57	06	14	59	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05	05	03	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	AREA OPS OFF	3936	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

44. Remarks
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

J. M. STEWART

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARC: 19 MAY 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15		1	M	1	09	28	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. [illegible] Yes-1 No-2	Code
08	06	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	28	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 Ufld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	AREA OPS OFF	3936	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. [illegible] Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	D1	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	58	05	08	59	REGULAR	0H	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 Ufld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER	3936	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. [illegible] Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
03 15 1	11660 $ 12770	D1	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

44. Remarks

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12770 AND FSR SALARY OF $11660 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND 160 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

FORM NO. 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	160947	GS-15-1	$11,610	$12,770

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15		1	M 1	09	28	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Fill. Serv. Cred. Ltd. Yes-1 No-2	Code
08	06	42		1	50 USCA 403 J						09	28	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH. D. C.	75013

16. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USIId-4 Frgn-6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	I.O. FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
14 5	$ 11180	01	09	28	52	03	22	59	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
PROMOTION	30	12	15	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept-2 USIId-4 Frgn-6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 11610	01	12	15	57	06	14	59	8 3700 20

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

41077

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG

1. Serial No.: 160947
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. Date Of Birth: Mo. 10 Da. 04 Yr. 15
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M 1
6. CS - EOD: Mo. 07 Da. 28 Yr. 52
7. SCD: Mo. 08 Da. 06 Yr. 42
8. CSC Retmt. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code: 1
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority: 50 USCA 403 J
10. Appt. Affidav.: Mo. Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code:
12. LCD: Mo. 09 Da. 26 Yr. 52
13. (Yes - 1, No - 2) Code: 2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations:
DDP FE
BRANCH 1 JAPAN
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

Code:

15. Location Of Official Station: WASH. D. C.

Station Code:

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USIId - 4, Frgn - 6) Code: 2
17. Position Title: AREA OPS OF DEP BR CH
18. Position No.: 0110
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 14 5
22. Salary Or Rate: $11180
23. SD: 01
24. Date Of Grade: Mo. Da. Yr.
25. PSI Due: Mo. Da. Yr.
26. Appropriation Number: 8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: REASSIGNMENT Code: 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo. 12 Da. 09 Yr. 57
29. Type Of Employee: REGULAR Code: 01
30. Separation Data:

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations:
DDP FE
FI CI STAFF

Code: 5113

32. Location Of Official Station: WASH. D. C.

Station Code: 75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USIId - 4, Frgn - 6) Code: 2
34. Position Title: I.O. FI STF CH
35. Position No.: 3448
36. Serv.: GS
37. Occup. Series: 0136.51
38. Grade & Step: 14 5
39. Salary Or Rate: $11180
40. SD: 01
41. Date Of Grade: Mo. 09 Da. 28 Yr. 52
42. PSI Due: Mo. 03 Da. 22 Yr. 59
43. Appropriation Number: 8 3700 20
44. Remarks:

POSTED
JP 12/27/57

C M STI

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE 5	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Vernet L. Gresham	14 Aug 57	Vernet L. Gresham

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☑ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE

GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

SEP 10 [illegible]
PAYROLL BRANCH

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler 160947	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 11 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment 01	6. EFFECTIVE DATE BOB 16 Dec 1956	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO (FI) DFP-2302	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BV-110
GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,965.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 518301	DDP/FE Branch I/Japan Office of the Chief
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: 7-3735-55-005 TO: 7-3700-20 750-13	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/28/52

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

[illegible] 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

TB 12/14/56

STANDARD FORM 52

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*): Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*): Reassignment
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUN 3 1956
7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	BFF 2302		I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section		DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch
11. HEADQUARTERS			Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☒ XX FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD: DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Henry P. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*):
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shuls (wnn)
Title: FE/CMS 7 May '56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD: DIO

15. SEX
16. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible] MAY 1956 WRR

USED IN LIEU OF SF50
NOTI [illegible] OF PERSONNEL
ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WRR	[illegible]
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	5/7/56
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] per T.E. Bear, Jr 10 May '56

SECRET

16—67307-4

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION (When filled in)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-320030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period

3. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WHEELER, ROBERT P.

5. Slush No. JV

6. Slip No.

4. Grade and salary
GS-14 $10,750.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks
[illegible]

11. Appropriation(s)
FE/5

12. Prepared by
afw 1/10

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date: 25Mar56
15. Date last equivalent increase: 26Sep54
16. Old salary rate: $10,750.00
17. New salary rate: $10,965.00

18. [illegible]
SERVICE AND CONDUCT
ARE SATISFACTORY

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods)
Period(s)

☒ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised.
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

7 Mar
1/24/55

~~ARD FORM 52~~

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert P. ~~PS~~ WHEELER (Prentiss)
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 20 Dec 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JAN 16 1955
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF-459	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10 000.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10 000.00
DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary):

PURSUANT TO PSI DIRECTIVE
[illegible] 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 10750

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Avis M. Tallackson - x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. [illegible] (wmd)
Title: FI/CMO 4 Jan 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

D.D
SD ~~FI~~

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 5-3735-55-005 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: W. Va.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI [illegible]
DATE 4 Jan '55

1/24/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PCH	1/10/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY [illegible] SPPAFT
1-14-55

14-00000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 007874

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Pay roll no.

3. Dress No. UV

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary GS-14 $9800

FINANCE DIVISION

[illegible]

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s) FS-4

12. Prepared by mo 12 Aug 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date 26 Sep 54

15. Date last equivalent increase 29 Mar 53

16. Old salary rate $9800

17. New salary rate $10,000

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

(Initials of Clerk)

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126d—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951 - FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER O1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. Robert P WHEELER	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: ~~20~~ Feb 1954	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954	

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (Ops) S-7	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-459
GS-132-14 $9800.00 p/a	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $9800.00 p/a
DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Avis M. Tallackson, x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: H. C. CLINKSCALE
Title: FE Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL

CD: FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-3735-55-005 TO: SAME	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

[illegible]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jw	17 Feb 54
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	C Taylor	21 Feb 54
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
C Taylor 15 Feb 54

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

[illegible] FI 96

6/15/53

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) [illegible], Robert Prentice	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 15	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 8 May 53
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: JUN 7 1953	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. S-1	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (OPS) Slot #7
GS-14 $8800	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-14 $9800
DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit OPC Team	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief ~~[illegible]~~
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

moving

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From: JCU, OPC Team Slot #1 (cls T/O) FE-1

Subject entered on duty in the field 28 Sept 1952

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE: MAY 21 1953
J. Keith Reid

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Clarence E. Witt
Clarence E. Witt, Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Avis Tallackson, [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Doris B. Powell
Title: FI/CHO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 2735-55-005 TO: Same			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

NO. CORRS

F. APPROVED BY M. L. Shobe 5/1/53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

10—57280-2

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll

3. Block No.
U7

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WEKXLER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary
GS - 14 $9600

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:
Delay due to admin error

11. Appropriation(s)
FZ [illegible]

12. Prepared by
Sn 4/7/53

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
29 Mar 53	30 Sep 51	$9600	$9800	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1120a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—41111-2a • U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 973785

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

10/21/52

989

NAME: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

DATE: 15 July 1952

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 Sept. 52

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O.
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-14 $9600
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH		Japan Composite Unit C - OPC Team, Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan 3739

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION Thomas M. [illegible]	PERSONNEL OFFICER 8/8/52	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☒ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 23 Sept. 52

SECURITY CLEARED ON 28 July 52

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 23 Sept. 52

ENTERED ON DUTY 23 Sept. 52

DOG 07/28/52
CSEOD 07/28/52
LCD 07/28/52

Jn 22 0d 5?

Paul C. Ratchford
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, OPC Team Slot #1 (I.O., GS-14), Personnel No. 427. This action supersedes request for appointment dated 2 November 1951.

Resubmitted in accordance with JACO 0106 (IN 15330), dtd 30 Jun 52; WASH 48690 (OUT 88734), dtd 7 Jul 52; JACO 0114 (IN 17577), dtd 9 July 52.

Request that subject's security clearance be held open to permit him to EOD o/a 1 Sept 52.

132

[illegible] claims that subject is [illegible] GS.14

Allot. #3739

H.B.

FORM NO. 37-1

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

16-63193-1 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	**Robert P. Wheeler (060947)**
Date of Birth:	**10/04/15**
Sex:	**Male**
Grade:	**GS-17**
SD:	**D**
Official Position Title	**Ops Officer - Staff Chief**
Current Station:	**Headquarters**
Type of Report:	**Annual**
Reporting Period:	**1 April 1972 - 8 May 1973**

During the past reporting period Mr. Wheeler has served his first full year as Chief of the newly-created Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division. He has worked hard and long to improve and simplify the procedures through which we recruit, train, and deploy our nonofficial cover personnel. He has identified accurately the bureaucratic roadblocks that stand in the way of our efficient use of nonofficial cover and if he has not succeeded in removing these barriers he has made some progress. His enthusiasm for the job and his belief that it can be done have been invaluable during a formative period, and his performance on the whole has been a strong one.

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

I have noted this report:

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

6/20/73
Date

E 2 IMPDET
CLY 008103

5 JUL 1973

SECRET

Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Concur - a committed and effective performance -

WE Colby

3 JUL 1973
Date

W.E. Colby, Deputy Director for Operations

SECRET

30 May 1972

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name: Robert P. Wheeler (060947)

Date of birth: 10/04/15

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-17

SD: D

Official position title: Ops Officer - Staff Chief

Current station: Headquarters

Type of report: Annual

Reporting period: 21 March 1971 - 31 March 1972

During the first part of the reporting period, Mr. Wheeler served as Chief, Missions and Programs Staff, and on 17 January 1972 he assumed his new duties as Chief, Non-Official Cover Affairs Division. As Chief, MPS, Mr. Wheeler effectively supervised the important planning and budgetary functions of that office and under his leadership the Clandestine Service has considerably improved its programming presentations to the 7th floor and, due to the effective staff work and Mr. Wheeler's guidance, the area divisions have been largely relieved of the many questionnaires and interventions with which they were once plagued.

Mr. Wheeler took over his new duties as Chief, NOCAD with enthusiasm and his wide field experience and good relationships with the area divisions should in the future bring about a much more secure and imaginative employment of our non-official

6 JUN 72

SECRET

cover personnel. Unfortunately a heart attack during the past year slowed Mr. Wheeler down for a while but he has made a good recovery and his performance on the whole has been very strong.

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report:

5/30/72
Date

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

Comments of reviewing official:

Fully concur.

31 May 72
Date

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

16 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) -
Robert P. Wheeler

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 March 1970 through February 1971. It is submitted as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1971.

2. Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication to the continuing upgrading of management within the CS at all levels. By background, interest and training; by service in OPPB; by full-time participation in the Federal Executive Institute; and by his abiding determination to instill others with a similar will for perfection within the CS, he has made a valuable contribution to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS) and to the Clandestine Services.

3. As chief of the Program Review Panel he has chaired the hearings of the various divisions with a great degree of sensitivity and knowledge, and has upgraded the quality and substance of those hearings. He has been especially helpful in those instances where divisions have proposed new approaches, as well as in the development of new and effective management techniques designed to simplify control and to coordinate the activities of headquarters elements and field stations.

4. Mr. Wheeler is a natural leader, bright and original. His is a creative mind, and innovative. He is articulate, rational, and thinks and talks sequentially. He has demonstrated clearly his ability to instill enthusiasm and continuing effort on the part of his subordinate officers who, taking their cue from him, are thoughtful, energetic and hard working. His officers demonstrate very high morale and great enjoyment and satisfaction in their work.

2 5 FEB 1971

5

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler also has the gift of being able to absorb rapidly and commit to paper accurately and quickly, a characteristic and asset of his which has much to commend it.

6. He has been a superb deputy, acting in this capacity in my absence. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator, and has introduced a number of procedural changes that have increased MPS effectiveness. He has been effective in dealing with OPPB and in participation in the briefings of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) personnel. He is very cost conscious and has made several suggestions resulting in the saving of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Mr. Wheeler has always enthusiastically accepted assignments to panels designed to upgrade the quality of various trouble areas, the latest being the searching look into the nonofficial cover situation within the CS.

7. Mr. Wheeler is a searching individual who is totally committed to the Plans Directorate and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the Clandestine Services.

8. As I have previously recommended, I believe Mr. Wheeler would make an outstanding Chief of the Missions and Programs Staff.

Sidney A. Stein

Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

2/16/71
Date

Reviewing Official:

Cord Meyer Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

18 Feb 71
Date

SECRET

9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) -
Robert P. Wheeler

060747-GS16 - M/S-D

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 April 1969 to February 1970. It is submitted as a Special Fitness Report to serve as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1970.

2. As Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) of the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison, except on budgetary matters, between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual Operating Program response; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; preparing DDP responses to requests of the Executive Director-Comptroller on CS programs, etc.; and, as required, advising CS components on those requirements of the PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

3. In carrying out the above-stated functions Mr. Wheeler has continued his superb performance in the field of management. His unusual dedication and sensible approach to and great enthusiasm for the tenets of PPBS have contributed immensely to the system's installation in the Clandestine Service. His energy, logical reasoning and sincerity have infected his numerous contacts within the CS and are goals which his officer-subordinates are striving to attain. He is so strong in his determination that good management will prevail in all components of the CS that he

SECRET

has never passed up an opportunity informally to discuss PPBS, to lecture at formal courses and to assist the DDP/TRO in his exhortations for management training. He has been a strong leader as Chairman of the Program Review Panel and supervisor of his subordinates. He has been outstanding in his ability rapidly to gather facts and produce a document in response to program and management queries levied on MPS. His wide CS experience, affability, sincerity, intelligence and dedication to the missions of the Agency, all of which have continued to be in evidence during the reporting period, make Mr. Wheeler, in the opinion of the Rating Officer, one of the CS' most valuable officers.

Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler

Robert P. Wheeler

2/10/70
Date

Reviewing Official: Concur

Cord Meyer Jr.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

10 Feb 70
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
060947

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-16	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/MPS/PRG		8. CURRENT STATION Hqs	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 April 1969

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 SEE ATTACHED	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER

FORM 4-65 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET

7 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Annual) -
Robert P. Wheeler

1. In compliance with HR 20-20, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45 covering the performance of Mr. Wheeler from January 1968 to 31 March 1969.

2. In late 1967 it was determined that Mr. Wheeler would be reassigned in June 1968 from the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS). Under an arrangement with the Director of PPB, Mr. Wheeler was lent to MPS on 1 January 1968 for the purpose of preparing himself to assume the functions of Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) in MPS. Accordingly, what follows covers the period of the loan, from 1 January to 11 June 1968, and the period as Chief, PRG, from 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969.

3. From 1 January to 11 June 1968. During the period of loan to MPS, Mr. Wheeler understudied the then Chief of PRG, acquainted himself with all Group files and responsibilities, attended the Advanced Management (Planning) Seminar and performed numerous ad hoc tasks assigned him by C/MPS. He prepared himself for the new assignment and performed the ad hoc tasks assigned with such dispatch, enthusiasm and intelligence as to augur well for the future. No minor task was too menial; every major task was readily accepted as a challenge. In short, his preparation for the new position soon to be assumed left little to be desired on the part of the Rating Officer.

4. From 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969. As Chief of PRG, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison on non-budgetary matters between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program

SECRET

portions of the annual Operating Program responses; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In carrying out the functions enumerated in paragraph 4, above, Mr. Wheeler has displayed drive, initiative, enthusiasm and understanding. He has pushed within the CS on those concepts of PPBS that are considered applicable to an intelligence organization and has argued with OPPB against forcing the CS to apply those concepts which are not considered to be applicable. He has worked diligently, alone and with the assistance of the DDP/TRO, to spread throughout the CS an understanding of the why and how of PPBS. He has prepared himself well for and has exercised sound judgment and tact in the handling of the chairmanship of the Program Review Panel, on the actions of which he has brought to bear his experiences in OPPB. He has given unstintingly of his time to lecturing at Agency management courses when requested. Although he understands the need for flexibility in the CS, he has to be slowed down at times so anxious is he to make the CS the best managed directorate in the Agency. His sincere interest in good management has made him and the two senior officers he supervises cost conscious. This affable, conscientious, dedicated, highly experienced, intelligent employee, who already has given evidence of a strong performance, is a pleasure to collaborate with and a valuable asset to MPS and the CS.

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — 7 April 1969
Robert P. Wheeler — Date

Reviewing Official Concur

Cord Meyer Jr. — 8 April 69
Cord Meyer, Jr. — Date
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT (PLANNING) SEMINAR (50 hours) 3-68

Student	: Robert P. Wheeler	**Dates of Course**	: 17-22 March 1968
Year of Birth:	1915	**Office**	: MPS
Grade	: 16	**Service Designation**	D
ECD Date	: September 1952	**No. of Students**	: 36

COURSE OBJECTIVE:

Course objective is to increase individual effectiveness on-the-job by developing better understanding of planning as a managerial skill and by providing familiarization with the Agency's overall planning system.

The course seeks to meet this objective by: a) providing an overall and systematic framework for managerial planning; b) identifying and analyzing basic styles of planning; c) covering selected techniques useful in planning; d) providing an orientation on the PPB system in use in the Agency and Federal Government; and by e) permitting feedback to students on their personal planning styles as revealed during course exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Chief Instructor

28 MAR 1968
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

1 8 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB,
Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report but in view of Mr. Wheeler's transfer to the Missions and Programs Staff, DD/P, in January 1968, it covers only the period April 1967 through December 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involved: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities, principally covert action programs; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing the Covert Action Program Memorandum for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency planning, programming, and budgeting system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. During the year, Mr. Wheeler participated in a survey by the Inspector General of Agency proprietary organizations. He contributed significantly to the study. In addition, he was the Office monitor for at least two studies for the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Mr. Wheeler was the principal analyst assigned to the review of the Agency's Covert Action Program. He reviewed Directorate program plans and proposals, identified issues to be raised with the Director, and prepared a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presented Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

7 MAY 1968

5. Mr. Wheeler's long operational experience, extensive contacts throughout the Agency, and exceptional writing ability have contributed to the realistic appraisal of programs and plans and to their effective presentation to the Director and to the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency and has contributed useful suggestions for improving operations and analysis. In summary, Mr. Wheeler made a significant contribution while in the Office. In view of the similarity in functions between the two organizations, I would expect this contribution to be carried forward to his new assignment.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as Strong.

7. Mr. Wheeler had no supervisory responsibilities.

8. This report was not shown to Mr. Wheeler because of his earlier transfer to another Agency component.

Gene R. Koontz

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

I showed this report to Mr. Wheeler. He pointed out that he is still assigned to O/PPB; he has not been transferred to MPS/DDP.

Reviewed by:

Roy A Burleigh 22 April 1968
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

SECRET

11 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB,
Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report and covers the period 1 August 1966 through 31 March 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involves: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities or programs, principally in the areas of clandestine collection and covert action; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing Program Memoranda for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency PPB system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. Mr. Wheeler has many years of experience in clandestine operations and administration, both at Headquarters and in the field. This experience has proven to be of great value to this Office in assessing Agency activities. Mr. Wheeler has been quick to see the usefulness of the new planning, programming, and budgeting concept as a tool for assisting management at all levels in the Agency. He has enthusiastically supported the development of a system adapted to Agency needs and has made significant contributions toward this end.

4. Currently, Mr. Wheeler is participating in three studies of Agency activities: an Inspector General survey of Agency proprietary organizations and two studies which were requested by the Bureau of the Budget--Agency use of communications media for political-psychological programs and Agency air capabilities at two selected facilities. In addition, Mr. Wheeler is in the process of preparing a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presents Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

21 APR 1967

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency; he writes exceptionally well, has many useful ideas, and is most cooperative. His vast first-hand knowledge of operational problems permits realistic appraisal of operating plans and proposals. In summary, Mr. Wheeler has made a definite contribution during his eight months in this Office; and we expect this contribution to continue in importance.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as Strong.

7. Mr. Wheeler has no supervisory responsibilities.

Gene R. Koontz

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

Shown to employee:

Robert P. Wheeler 4/11/67
Robert P. Wheeler (date)

Reviewed by:

Roy J. Burleigh 11 April 1967
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

Concur: Mr Wheeler has provided strong support for the functions of this office and contributes materially to value judgments of covert activities

Concur: Mr. Wheeler has provided strong support to the functions of this office and contributes materially to value judgments of covert activities.

John M. Clarke
Director/PPB
12 April 1967

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name: [redacted] Whitley Robert P.

Date of Birth: 10/04/15

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-16

SD: D

Official Title: Chief of Base

Assignment: DDP/DOD/USS

Current Station: Honolulu, Hawaii

Appointment: Career

Reporting Period: 1 April 1966-15 August 1966

Report: Reassignment Supervisor
Reassignment Employee

POSTED ON
[illegible]

During the past four months Subject has been in Honolulu only a few weeks because of a TDY assignment to Headquarters, and has now been reassigned. There are no grounds for rating his performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Date:

Emerson T. LEASKIS

BY SUPERVISOR

Months under my supervision
19 months

Date: 5 - AUG 1966

COS/US

Harry Rositzke
Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

23 AUG 1966

Date: 8 August 1966

C/DO

C. Tracy Barnes
C. Tracy Barnes

[illegible]

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

26 SEP 1966

This is to advise you that WHEELER, Robert P. training request # R-17992 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Executive Orientation in Programming, Planning and Budgeting

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE: 18-19 August 1966

GRADE: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Attachments:

- __ Grade Report
- __ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- __ Certificate of Completion
- __ Roster of Participants
- __ Training Report by Institution
- X Training Report by Student
- __ None
- __ Other: ____________

GROUP I
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training
ATTN : Registrar/TR
THROUGH: Training Officer

FROM : Robert P. Wheeler
OFFICE: O/PPB
DATE : 24 August 1966

1. FACILITY ATTENDED

USCSC

2. DATES OF TRAINING

18 & 19 August 1966

3. NAME AND DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

Executive Orientation in PP&B

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES

To get a broad introduction to the concepts of PPBS and to learn what some other non-military elements of the Executive Branch are doing with the PPBS.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM (Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.)

I thought that from a broad, general standpoint the orientation was worthwhile but that far more BOB participation would have enhanced the program greatly. There was too much of "we think this is what BOB means" and too little of BOB saying "this is what we mean". I found the movie presentation of Dr. E. S. Quade's speech terrible because of inept projection, faulty audio equipment, and out-of-place music. Dr. Quade had a message and fortunately the CSC planners must have known their film was inadequate, for we were provided with the written text. Outstanding possibly because he stood out so far in comparison to the others was Mr. Peter Szanton from BOB. Dr. Adams from the University of Maryland was quite good and Mr. Greenhouse of VA was one of the few others who really seemed to know what he was talking about beyond immediate low to medium level parochial application.

6. ATTACHED ARE	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES		YES	X	NO
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION		YES	X	NO

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

P

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

CC0947

Name:	[redacted] [illegible]
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-16
SD:	D
Official Title:	Chief of Base
Assignment:	DDP/DOD/USS
Current Station:	Honolulu, Hawaii
Appointment:	Career
Reporting Period:	1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

1. During the past year it has clearly emerged that the Honolulu area offers very limited opportunities for CS operational action. The main target of a Honolulu base, as originally conceived by FE Division, was the East-West Center with its large number of Asian students. Although, during the 1964-65 academic year several prospective candidates for the WUENVOY program were assessed and one recruited, political developments in Southeast Asia prevented the arrival of any students at the Center from the priority Southeast Asian countries: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia.

2. It is against this perspective that Subject's performance during the past year should be evaluated. He approached his job with enthusiasm and vigor but soon found that there were no tangible operational activities he could devote himself or his supporting agents to. He has been frank to state officially and unofficially the absence of any targets to which an operational base could direct itself and has therefore been relatively unoccupied during this period except for an occasional item of local coordination or follow-up on a headquarters task. Subject has had under his direct supervision a long-term Staff Agent at the University of Hawaii and two Staff Agents assigned to the

11 APR 1966

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University as students for the current academic year. He has handled them well and has done his best to maintain their morale in spite of the fact that there were only a few specific targets on whom they could systematically work.

3. Subject is a mature, experienced and energetic officer with both operational and scholarly interests in Far Eastern, especially Japanese, affairs. His talents are obviously being wasted in Honolulu and arrangements have already been made to have him reassigned. The base itself will be phased down in the summer of 1966 with two of the three Staff Agents reassigned, the long-term Staff Agent kept on at the University, and a more junior officer replacing Subject as COB.

4. Subject has displayed an economical approach to the use both of funds and personnel.

5. In view of the limitations, outside his control, on operational activities in Honolulu, Subject's performance has been more than satisfactory and is rated as proficient.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

(not available for signature)

[redacted]

Date:

Mos. under my supervision
15 months

BY SUPERVISOR

Date: 30 MAR 1966

COS/US

Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

C. Tracy Barnes

Date: 8 A[illegible] 1966

C/DO

C. Tracy Barnes

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name:	Wheeler, Robert [redacted] 060947
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-16
SD:	D
Official Title:	Ops Officer
Assignment:	DDP/DO/USS
Current Station:	Honolulu, Hawaii
Appointment:	Career
Reporting Period:	27 October 1964 - 31 March 1965

POSTED ON [illegible]

Wheeler
[redacted] effectively assumed his duties as Chief of Base, DO/Honolulu in early January 1965. During the ensuing three months, he has devoted himself primarily to housing, cover, establishment of liaisons, and the orientation of his two outside people. Although he has begun to work on his operational program (directed at the recruitment of WUENVOY candidates), he has not been at work long enough to provide a basis for any evaluation of his operational performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Not Available [redacted]

Date:

Wheeler, Robert

BY SUPERVISOR

Harry Rositzke

Date: 24 MAR 1965 COS/US Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

C. Tracy Barnes

Date: 25 Mar '65 C/DO C. Tracy Barnes

[illegible]

23 MAR 1965

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

[illegible]

0667-7

SUBJECT: [redacted]

DOB: 4 October 1915
Male
GS-15
Deputy Chief of Station
Tokyo
Annual Report For the Period 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

In preparing this memorandum in lieu of submitting Fitness Report Form 45, I can only set forth my yearly reiteration that Subject is a senior, well-experienced, well-motivated, high caliber KUBARK officer who has been in his present grade, GS-15, since 1957. His high standard of contribution to the Station as its Deputy Chief of Station continues unfailingly. Tokyo Station operations encompass a broad spectrum of internal and external targets emphasizing denied area operations. To keep on top of this activity it needs a man of energy backed up by sound operational knowledge and Subject has carried this job capably and with a will. I would certainly grade him "S" in performance evaluation.

Tokyo Station is widely dispersed and I have urged Subject on several occasions to get out to the various operational elements in an attempt to get closer to and stimulate the working case officers. After one or two starts he has not kept this up on a continuing basis, remaining at his Embassy desk and invariably working through the individual branch chiefs. I am convinced more effort on his part in this field could have resulted in more yield to the Station from his long area and operations experience.

Subject actively participates in the operational review and budget preparation of the Station and has shown a definite cost consciousness.

Subject's long tenure in Japan and experience with things Japanese are well-known and the pro's and con's of the value of an officer remaining in one area for the major portion of his time with KUBARK (possibly to the detriment of his career) have been discussed to a sufficient degree as to rule out further reference in this memorandum. Subject is scheduled to leave the Japan Station and enter an assignment where his operational talents will be of great value.

In any considerations concerning Subject being conducted by any personnel board or by any official of the Agency interested in KUBARK personnel, the significant points are Subject is a deeply motivated, highly capable officer who has been in his current grade too long.

Certification:
By Employee: This memorandum was read by Subject and discussed with him in draft. He left the area on TDY and so cannot sign it.

By Supervisor: 28 April 1964

/s/ William Broe
Chief of Station

8 JUN 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: [redacted] (P)

Robert Wheeler

Comments of Reviewing Official:

FE Division is in agreement with this balanced assessment of Subject's performance in Japan. We are also hopeful that he will respond well in a new environment and broaden his operational capabilities.

Signature of Reviewing Official: Robert Jergen
DCFE

28 MAY 1964
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

READING TECHNIQUES (EXECUTIVE WORKSHOP)

Name WHEELER, Robert P.	Sex M	Dates of Course 24 Jun-19 Jul 57	No. of Students 3
Date of Birth 4 Oct 1915	EOD Date 28 Sept 1952	Grade or Rank GS-14	Office FI/FE
Projected Assignment or Present Position Chief, FE/1			

I. Objectives:

To inform senior personnel of efficient reading techniques, and to lay the groundwork for improved reading understanding, speed, and retention.

II. Specific Characteristics of Training:

This 20 hour course briefly reviews reading techniques for effective intelligence reading. The course sets forth the same principles of effective reading as Course I-7, Reading Techniques, emphasizing flexibility in reading different subjects for different purposes. Lectures, discussion, and reading exercises are used. Emphasis is on survey reading skills, since these are the skills most often required in supervisory reading.

III. Certification of Completion:

Mr. Wheeler satisfactorily completed Reading Techniques (Executive Workshop) which was conducted each morning from 0730 to 0830.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Frances [illegible]
Chief Instructor

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)
160917

LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle). (7-24)
WHELER Robert Prentiss

2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30)
MONTH: October
DAY: 4
YEAR: 1915

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)
JAPANESE 379

4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39)
MONTH: April
DAY: 24
YEAR: 1957

5. ☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.

[✓ 4.] I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.

5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.

[✓ 3.] MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.

4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444C
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(14-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 29 59
MAIL ROOM

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREE[illegible]ICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.

2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I [illegible] IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.

3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.

[✓ 4.] I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.

5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.

3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

[✓ 4.] I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.

5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.

2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.

[✓ 3.] BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 3C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 4/24/57	SIGNATURE Robert Prentice Wheeler
(46) C	(47) E

14-00000

Transmitted VIA
FJIT 10,344

SECRET

30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FOR PERIOD:

9 October 1962 - 31 March 1963

[redacted] **Robert P. Wheeler**

A review of the file reflects that [redacted] **has been constantly rated as a well-motivated, superior officer always willing to spend the "extra effort" by a variety of supervisors. During the rating period there has been no diminution in the caliber of professionalism or in the time and effort this man has contributed to the work of the Tokyo Station. He is a distinct asset. Over and above his drive and professionalism,** [redacted] **brings to the Station a full background concerning intelligence activities having been associated with such activities in Japan for the last seventeen years, either with the military or as a member of the Agency. All of this time he has been in Japan except for a period of almost three years in Washington.**

[redacted] has a proficiency in the Japanese language and due to his long tenure in Japan has contacts at a variety of levels.

In sum, the Agency has in [redacted] a superior officer with long background and continuity in Japan, who can and is making a highly significant contribution to the Agency's objectives in Japan.

The above has stressed solely [redacted]'s ability to contribute to KUBARK objectives in Japan. However, there is no doubt in the rater's mind that [redacted] could perform in a superior manner no matter to what geographical area he was assigned.

Serial Number 060947, DOB: 4 Oct 1915, GS-15, D Designee, DCOS, Tokyo Station

William V. Broe /S/
COS

Read by

Robert P. Wheeler /S/

Date: 1 May 1963

20 JUN 1963

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Chief of Station, Tokyo was requested to forward a memorandum, in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45, on Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo to cover the period April 1961 to October 1962. His comments are as stated below:

> Mr. Wheeler is a superior operations officer of wide scope, experience and imagination. He has over a period of years been highly successful in a variety of supervisory roles both operational and staff. In addition to these attributes he has unique qualifications of an extensive, continuous operational span of time in Japan, Japanese contacts at a variety of levels and proficiency in the Japanese language. Because of these latter aspects of his ability, he is able to contribute extensively to Tokyo Station and CIA operational objectives.

2. I concur with the above.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer D-COS		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
1 Apr60 to 31Mar61

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 As Deputy Chief of Station, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production X) A 12	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C. EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.
5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 1 2 52 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a superior officer in every important respect. He is intelligent, imaginative, resourceful and has balanced judgment. He understands administrative procedures and knows how to make them work. As a supervisor, he is firm and fair, and achieves the respect of his subordinates. As a subordinate, he is unfailingly loyal and helpful. He has a good overall grasp of the intelligence business and maintains a healthy attitude of common sense with respect to operations. He is especially useful in Japan, because of his great knowledge of and long experience with Japanese affairs, personalities and psychology, yet I consider he would be a superior officer and supervisor in any other context. His personal character is of the best.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Report was prepared at headquarters.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 23 MAY 1961	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C F E	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WHEELER, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Off (DCOS)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT FE/Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 May 60

11. REPORTING PERIOD From 27 Jun 59 To 31Mar 60

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 DA 12 As Deputy for Operations, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief.	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX.	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):	▨	▨					

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This is the first Fitness Report made by Rating Officer on Subject since the latter assumed duties as Deputy for Operations, Tokyo Station. He has worked out extremely well in this role. He is intelligent, energetic, hard-working and faultlessly loyal. He pays attention to detail while remaining mindful of larger considerations. He is effective as a supervisor and commands the willing allegiance of his subordinates. He has excellent judgment in both administrative and operational matters. Because of his extensive background in Japan, his knowledge of things and people Japanese and his fair-to-good command of the language, he is particularly well suited for his present position. However, he would be an asset to any station or element of Headquarters in a high supervisory position.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 27 Apr 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert P. Wheeler (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON:

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 27 Apr 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

31 JUL

V
JUL 1959 31

FITNESS REPORT

	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 160947

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler Robert P.		2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE IO (FI) (CH)		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/POS	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30/04/59

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Aug 58 31/03 59

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Division.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other components of the DDP, and agencies in general.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Directs and supervises a staff component of nine people.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is a well-seasoned, imaginative operations officer, who is extremely practical in his approach to operational situations. He is especially fine in his dealings with people whether superiors or subordinates. He did an excellent job as a member of the FE Division Staff in improving and expediting the FI and CI activities of the Division. Subject has an excellent background in all things Japanese and is extremely adept at building rapport with his Japanese counterparts.

He has the capacity to handle large volumes of work which many times leads him afield into activities that are not within his purview. His personality however allows him to do this without alienating others.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 18 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Overseas

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 22 July 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, FE Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William V. Broe WILLIAM V. BROE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 22 July 1959	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Far East Division	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Desmond FitzGerald

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wheeler (First) Robert (Middle) P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI/Hqs
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI IC (FI)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): December 1957 - August 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- ☒ THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- ☐ THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- ☒ I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- ☐ IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- ☐ I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 2 SEP 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William V. Broe WILLIAM V. BROE
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted For Control		15 SEP 1958
Reviewed by F.O.		SEP 17 1958

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE:
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, FE Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SEP 13 11 28 AM '58

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SEP 15 11 52 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

B. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing similar duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. *Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:*

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Div 6	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Conducts liaison with other components of DDP and the Agency in general	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wheeler is a sound, well experienced imaginative officer. He is especially adept in dealing with people at all levels so as to earn their respect and cooperation.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheeler Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/FI/Hqs	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Chief, FE/FI TC (I)		

7. GRADE GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) Dec 1957 - Aug 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE		

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 2 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William V. Broe William V. Broe	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 2 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred C. Ulmer	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, FE Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNE
SEP 15 11 52 AM '5
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Wheeler has displayed the operational and supervisory attributes that give every indication that he has an excellent potential to advance with this Agency.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 4 to 15 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wheeler	(First) Robert	(Middle) P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 30 January 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): March 1957 - December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
XX ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 10 Jan. 58
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Vernet L. Gresham
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		2/5/58
Reviewed by P.D.		2/10/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 10 Jan. 58
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Far East Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 4 9 07 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Acting Chief of Branch	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducting External Liaison	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Has and Uses Area Knowledge	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Coordinates with other offices	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

C. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During most of the period for which subject is rated he was acting chief of an active and important branch (Japan - Okinawa). He is currently chief of the FI group of the Division's plans and operations staff. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated employe. He has initiative and imagination and is profiting enormously from his present hq. experience. He is a very fine employe.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual...productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

After many years in the field with virtually no hq. duty, subject is now obtaining both command and staff experience. He has adapted himself splendidly and has shown remarkable versatility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, IT MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wheeler Robert P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct. 1915
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 20 January 1958
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): March 1957 - December 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED
A. THIS DATE: 10 Jan. 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Vernet L. Gresham Vernet L. Gresham
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.
A. THIS DATE: 10 Jan. 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. Alfred Ulmer Jr
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, Far East Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP [illegible] stenographers, [illegible] or professional specialists of various kinds) [illegible] (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP [illegible] (Executive level)
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
		OTHER (Specify):

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR

14 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

After many years in Japan without any hq. duty, subject is now receiving badly needed hq. experience. He has shown great adaptability and versatility in two responsible hqs. positions.

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SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject should remain at hq. at least another year in order that he may further broaden his experience.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 3 to 14 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS [illegible]	4	18. IS [illegible]	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. [illegible]

SECRET

45

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct. 1915
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/1
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Deputy Chief, FE/1
7. GRADE: GS-14
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: April 30, 1957
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 16November 1956 - 15 March 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 16 April 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William E. Nelson William E. Nelson
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
Posted Pos. Control ____ APR 1957
Reviewed by PUD ____

☐ NOTES ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 16 April 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Vernet L. Gresham
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: With additional experience on the job, his performance might be such as to warrant a 5 rating.

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APR 18 2 47 PM '57
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2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.

b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.

c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).

d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.

e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.

f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Assistn Branch Chief in Management abd supervision of Branch	RATING NUMBER 4/5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Provides operational and administrative guidance to field station.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Gen. Supervision of CE, liaison and CP ops. of Branch	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with other Agency elements and outside agencies.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

His greatest strength is a warm and engaging personality, an unabashed friendliness that secures him an immediate willingness to cooperate from the people with whom he deals. He is an extremely hard worker, an accurate and meticulous reporter, has energy and enthusiasm and is generally sound in his judgment. On occasions he demonstrates a lack of depth in his assessment of a situation which leads him to jump too quickly to conclusions based on intuition and emotion. As the facts assert themselves, however, he is ready to revise his opinions. As his knowledge of the Agency and operations continue to grow, however, this tendency should diminish.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Although he is perfectly capable of conducting his current job with distinction, he would shine in any position involving liaison with the U.S. military in which his long experience in dealing with military men and his personality could be brought to bear.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Wheelor, Robert P.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, FE/1		
7. GRADE GS-14	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP April 30, 1957	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 16 Nov. 1956 - 15 March 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

A. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR William E. Nelson William E. Nelson	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 16 April 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Vernet L. Gresh	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
2		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

When he is unsure of himself in new problems, he tends to trade on his [illegible] and his emotional feeling for a situation or a person resulting in a vacillation of attitude and an inconsistency that limits his effectiveness. Where he has had past experience he generally makes sound decisions.

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SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

He has a large family (six children) and would like to return to the field after enough Headquarters experience.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4/5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3/4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4 -	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3/4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4/5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

THROUGH: Staff Training Officer

SUBJECT: Completion of Operational Management Course for FE Personnel

1. **Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, FE/FI,** has completed a Special Management Course (Operational Management Seminar) held 7-18 January, 1957.

2. The course covered 38 hours of lectures and group discussions, together with a limited amount of reading. The course outlined the responsibilities of management at the Branch Chief level and selected problems of Headquarters management dealing with clandestine activities. The individual named completed all course assignments but received no grade, since no evaluation was made of the student's performance in this special course, or of his ability to perform a particular job assignment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Robert L. Welk
ROBERT L. WELK
Chief Instructor, Basic Management

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Fitness Report on Robert P. WHEELER

1. The attached Fitness Report should be read with the following facts in mind. The Rating Officer arrived in the Japan Station on 21 January 1956. Mr. Wheeler left Japan on or about 19 March 1956 and was in the United States on TDY until 8 May 1956. From 8 May until he left Japan PCS on 7 June 1956, Mr. Wheeler was unassigned in the Japan Station. While the Rating Officer was Chief of Operations, Japan Station, Mr. Wheeler was in his assigned position simultaneously for less than one month and it is my understanding Mr. Wheeler did not report to Mr. Heckshor, but directly to the Chief of Station.

2. I question, therefore, whether Mr. Wheeler was under the Rating Officer's direct supervision for a sufficient period of time to insure that the attached report is a completely equable one. Inasmuch as the Chief of Station reviewed this report and made no comment, I am in no position to take issue with it, but suggest that it be viewed in the context of other Fitness Reports on Mr. Wheeler.

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

Attachment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY: Robert P. WHEELER
1. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct. 1915
2. SEX: M
3. SERVICE DESIGNATION: [redacted] D1
4. GRADE: GS-14
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): Japan Station ✓
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT:
7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 1 November 1955 to 7 June 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: I.O.([redacted]) (F1)
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: April, 1954
3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Chief of Japan Station Liaison section.

BY DATE 11 JAN 1957
Posted Pos. Control
Reviewed by PUD 1-14-57

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True): Henry D. HECKSHER
2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True): W. Lloyd GEORGE
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.: 7 Dec 1956
5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES: William E. NELSON, CFF/1

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 10 10 49 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left, then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.						X								
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.								X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.						X								

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.										X				
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.							X							
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.								X						
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.									X					
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.						X								
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.									X					
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.								X						
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.									X					
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.									X					
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.										X				
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.									X					
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.							X							
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.							X							

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Intuitive adaptability to characteristics of professional contacts matched by warm human approach, facilitate easy and potentially useful rapport with Japanese officials. Good reporter of events, aided by retentive memory. Broad background of understanding of history and culture of Japan. Prone to work "off the top of his head," but assesses situations quickly. Well qualified liaison officer if properly backed and supervised.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

"Weather vane" in his attitudes, he frequently lacks discernment and consistency in his assessment of personalities and vacillates in the pursuit of objectives; this limits him in the role of supervisor and operations officer. Lacks toughness in presenting unpopular issues to Japanese liaison personnel.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Performance in Japan hamstrung by preoccupation with personal and professional status in the agency, unwarranted in terms of both personal popularity and quality of work.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JAN 13 10 49 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☒ YES. IF

Shrinks from assuming full responsibility. Fits well into a system of checks and balances.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

In view of prospective return to Japan field assignment, should keep up his knowledge of the Japanese language. Tradecraft training designed to develop a basic facility for developing personal contacts into a control relationship and for turnin

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

contacts over effectively to other ops personnel.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☒ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE 1 25 October 1956

NAME Robert Prentice WHEELER

FROM: I.O.(FI), GS-14, Tokyo

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION

☐ PROMOTION ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ OTHER (Explain)
☐ ROTATION ☐ TRAVEL

TO: Area Ops Off, GS-14, Hqs.

EOD Sept 52

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BTP, PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II	27 Oct-26 Nov 52		WAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI, PH III			CLAND. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM, I-II-III RAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
✓	CLAND. SERV. ROW	22 Sept 11 Oct 56		BASIC PHOTO	
	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOCUMENTATION	22 Oct 52
	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	8-9 Dec 52
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			BIC	1-5 Dec 52
	ORDER OF BATTLE				
	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
✓	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
	CLAND. POL. WARF.				
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAD. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	RDG. IMPROVE.				
	BASIC SUPV.				
✓	BASIC MGMT.			PRE-TEST	
	BALLOON OPS.			ASSESSMENT	

[illegible]

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION.
☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "✓". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT:
☐ SOONEST
☐ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☐ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ________ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER

HENRY P. GILBERT
STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE 14 Nov. 56

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 50-77
1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET (2-4-45)

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING REPORT

CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW NO. 14

NAME Wheeler, Robert P.	SEX Male	DATES OF COURSE 24 September-12 October 19[illegible]6		NO. OF STUDENTS 42
DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915	ECD DATE 23 September 1952		GRADE OR RANK GS-14	OFFICE FE/1
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Chief, Japan Desk/FE-1				

I. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide familiarization with 1) the Clandestine Services' functional structure, current mission, operational programs, and support facilities; 2) other Agency offices and their capacity to support the Clandestine Services. It is not intended to impart basic operational knowledge, but is designed to make the returning case officer current with recent developments.

II. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COURSE:

A description of current policy, objectives, organization, programs showing operational emphasis, methods of personnel management, fiscal administration, and existing capabilities for providing operational and intelligence support was presented by means of lectures, tours, and selected reading material. The course involved three weeks.

III. CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION:

Mr. Wheeler has attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Spencer L. Taggart
[illegible]
Chief Instructor
Clandestine Services Review

S-E-C-R-E-T

13

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY WHEELER, Robert P.	1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DI

4. GRADE: GS-14
5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current): Japan Base
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT: 30 October 1955
7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 31 October 1954 to 30 October 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION: I. O. ([redacted]) (FI)
2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION: April, May, 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

a. As Acting Chief, FI, has been responsible for supervising all FI activities of the Base, and for coordinating those activities with Chief, PP.
b. With the above duties, has been concurrently Chief of Liaison Section and thus responsible for directing all liaison activities conducted by the Base.
c. Case officer for one important project involving a Japanese agent who is an influential member of the Diet.

BY [illegible] DATE Sep 56
Posted Per Control ____
Reviewed by FUD ____

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Robert H. LINN	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 23 March 1956	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Philip F. FENDIG, ACFE/1 Philip F. Fendig

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 36 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X								
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.						X								
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.										X				
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.						X								
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.									X					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

										X				
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.											X			
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".								X						
29. TOUGH MINDED.										X				
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.										X				
32. CLEAR THINKING.											X			
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.								X						
36. DELIBERATE.											X			
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.										X				
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.											X			
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.										X				
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.											X			
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.										X				
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.														

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is highly capable in several fields: he writes well and quickly; he speaks clearly and to the point; his sense of humor and breezy charm make him the center of any social group and able to get along with people on any level. He does a prodigious amount of work with great facility and is always willing to work long hours to get a job done. He is ideal as a liaison man for contacts with high level officials.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Has a tendency to do things "off the top of his head". Some what easily upset when difficulties arise or when he has worked himself into a combination of fatigue and depression. Sometimes allows his emotions or his moods to color his reports and his evaluations of others. Has some tendency to "fall in love" with his agent.

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Versatility in dealing on a friendly and extremely effective basis with all kinds of people, particularly those in high level positions.

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APR 3 1 58 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

P&P training, and refresher course, if available, in FI ops.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*): Subject has an excellent knowledge of the area, its people, and language and is able to use this knowledge with great resultant benefits to his work.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY..WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO HAVE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☒ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:

1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 90 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted Pos. Control B7 2-15-55
DATE
3/8/55

A

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED.

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY Mr. Robert F. [illegible]	1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 Oct. 1915	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ SD-P1
4. GRADE GS-14	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Japan Mission		
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT 30 Sept. 1954	7. PERIOD COVERED 1 January 1953 to 30 October 1954 16 Nov. 1953 to 30 October 1954 (present supervisor)		

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION 10 (FI) 0136.51 Acting Depty for KUFIRE; Chief of Liaison	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION April-May 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is Acting Deputy for KUFIRE activities within the Mission. As such, he is responsible for organizing, directing, and coordinating the three sections charged with KUFIRE duties in Japan, as well as the Intelligence Staff which is in turn responsible for requirements, central intelligence files, CE carding and filing, and the preparation and dissemination of reports. Subject is also Chief of Liaison and in his capacity directs and coordinates the work of four liaison sections dealing with both U.S. and Japanese official agencies. Subject is also responsible for the development of one potentially important agent asset.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Mr. Robert H. [illegible]	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Mr. Harry [illegible] [illegible] Jr.
3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☒ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.	
4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 14 Jan 55	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES Mr. William E. [illegible], Chief, FE/1 William E. [illegible]

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FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

(4)

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(When Filled In)

FEB 9 10 31 AM '55

MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			☒											
B. PRACTICAL.										☒				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.													X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT [illegible]											X			

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(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.												X		
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.													X	
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".												X		
29. TOUGH MINDED.									X					
30. OBSERVANT.												X		
31. CAPABLE.														X
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.													X	
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.													X	
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.												X		
36. DELIBERATE.									X					
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.												X		
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.													X	
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.													X	
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.												X		
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.											X			
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.												X		
43. HAS DRIVE.													X	
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.												X		
45. VERSATILE.													X	
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.													X	
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.												X		
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.												X		
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.													X	

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject has the outstanding ability to do a remarkable number of jobs remarkably well. He performs brilliantly and rapidly, if sometimes superficially, and completes a prodigious amount of work, meeting deadlines, and at the same time, unless deeply disturbed, maintaining a humorous and kindly attitude toward his associates that makes him almost always exceptionally pleasant to deal with. He is extremely well suited for almost any phase of intelligence work.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Subject tends at times to become elated or depressed to the extent that he sometimes loses his ability to make a carefully balanced judgement. When, as happens very rarely, he runs up against what he believes to be stupidity or serious incompetence, his strongly emotional reaction sometimes hampers a necessary working relationship. He is occasionally a little too easily swayed, like a weather-vane, by the opinions of his superiors. Some of these characteristics are, however, at times actually advantageous in his work, and are far overbalanced by his outstanding strengths.

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(When Filled In)

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C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

High capacity for competant and rapid accomplishment in almost any intelligence field, particularly as based on his long residence and interest in Japan.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☐ NO ☒ YES. IF YES, WHY?

Subject has excellent balance in supervising others, but often requires guidance and direction in something in which he personally is closely concerned.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

T&P course; refresher course in KUFIRE techniques.

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

Subject makes an invaluable contribution through his knowledge of Japan, and through the continuity resulting from his willingness to remain for an indefinite period in the area.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☐ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☒ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY.. WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION.. IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS.. REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION.. BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS.. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT... HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE.. WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION.. MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION.. THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION.. BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION.. WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating.. skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY.. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE.. DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE.. HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

IMPORTANT EMPLOYEE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 4	**LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE** FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM	**IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 2**

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read page 4 carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or print in ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle) Wheeler Robert P.	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year) Oct 4, 1915	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	AGENCY LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED THIS FORM? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one.

3 By law, a person, who can be covered, automatically receives regular life insurance, unless he waives all coverage. You have the choice of waiving all coverage, increasing your life insurance coverage through additional optional insurance, or declining the additional optional insurance. So, READ CAREFULLY AND THEN

MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (DO NOT MARK MORE THAN ONE):

Mark here for BOTH OPTIONAL AND REGULAR Insurance. → ☐ A — I WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE in addition to my regular insurance. I authorize deductions to pay the full cost.

Mark here for REGULAR BUT NO OPTIONAL insurance. → ☒ B — I DO NOT WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE but I understand I still get my regular insurance. I understand I cannot get optional insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form, (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability.

Mark here for NO INSURANCE AT ALL. → ☐ C — I DO NOT WANT ANY LIFE INSURANCE NOW. I understand that I cannot get any regular insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form; (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand I cannot get the $10,000 optional insurance unless I first have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)
Subject failed to elect optional insurance during the open period.

DATE
14 Apr 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONNEL OFFICE
APR 14 10 29 AM '68
PERSONNEL [illegible]

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
MARCH 1973
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-103

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO.	NAME LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6 060947	(Print) 7-24 Wheeler	Robert	P.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
05	16	73	06	17	73		2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. NOCAD-000091-73

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 05/15/73 - 06/17/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO		
X	C & L DIVISION, CTGA.	DATE July 9/1973	SIGNATURE
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

S-E-C-R-E-T

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: Federal Executive Institute

COURSE : Follow-up Seminar

COURSE DATES : 10 December 1970 (1 day only)

GRADE (IF GIVEN) : None

TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 031297

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Robert P. Wheeler 1/5/71
SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 031297
Date 7/12/71

S-E-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES GOVE... MENT

U.S. ... VIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Memorandum

Subject: Completion of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia

Date: July 15, 1970

In Reply Refer To:

From: FRANK P. SHERWOOD
Director, Federal Executive Institute

Your Reference:

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the eight-week session of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from May 10 - July 2, 1970.

A certificate of completion has been issued to the above named person.

One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

TRA[illegible] COMPLETED
Request [illegible]
Date [illegible] 29 1970

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

CSC FORM 631
NOVEMBER 1961

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964—O-739-462

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

GS-16 D

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444f, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

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FORM 2-69 444n

14-511

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SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			APR 9 9 37 AM '63				
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 APR 1963	Robert P.

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(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
[redacted] 060947	[redacted] Coheeler	[redacted] Robert	[redacted]	[redacted] 43

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1	08	26	1964	06	12	66	Hawaii	750

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
XX	CABLE Honolulu 3499		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.
IN NR 36523A

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
13 June 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X	C & F DIVISION	7-1-66	

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-101

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For [redacted], Effective 25 October 1964

Robert [illegible] Johnson
Robert [illegible] Johnson

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr [redacted], Johnson

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $20,245.00 per annum and GS-16^3, respectively. As an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable to that status. However, procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If cover emoluments ever exceed those due you from this organization, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Federal income taxes will be withheld, reported and paid in conformance with Agency procedures designed to protect against the unauthorized revelation of your true relationship to the Government. You will be briefed thereon prior to your departure.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one-half percent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) This organization will not reimburse you for mandatory Social Security deductions if such deductions are required by virtue of your cover employment. However, when for compelling cover, security or operational reasons this organization determines that you must ostensibly participate in a fringe benefit program of a cover facility you will be reimbursed therefor by this organization in an appropriate manner. In such event any benefit received by you, your heirs or any other party as a result of your ostensible participation therein while a Government employee is the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such time and in such a manner as this organization may require.

SECRET

2. *Furnished Quarters.* If you and your dependents are furnished quarters by the Government while PCS Honolulu, Hawaii, you will be charged a reasonable rental therefor, as established under the Hawaii rental rate schedule of this organization.

3. *Secrecy.* You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

4. *Place of Assignment.* This Supplement is predicated upon an assignment in Honolulu, Hawaii, under nonofficial cover. Any deviation therefrom will require a new supplement or an amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY

Personnel Officer

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]

DIVISION: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: (See HR 10-51 and RR 10-1000.1 for guidance. Complete all items, inserting "N/A" when items are not applicable. Forward original and two copies for preparation of contract.)

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: Code 13-3040

DATE: 27 Oct. 60

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME ☒ PSEUDO ☐ TRUE
[redacted]

2A. PROJECT:

2B. PERMANENT STATION: Honolulu, Hawaii

3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 5129-0369

3A. FUNDS: ☐ V ☒ UV

4. SLOT NO.: 0261

5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: BRENDLE, Adam M.

6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. ☐ YES ☒ NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee - Sept. 5? to Present - GS-14 to GS-16

7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff Clearance

7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: ☒ OBTAINED ☐ INITIATED ☐ NOT REQ'D.

8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" ☒ YES ☐ NO

9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U. S.

12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN ☐ YES ☐ NO

13. AGE: 45

14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): October 4, 1915

15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D. C.

16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Honolulu, Hawaii

17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED

18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 47
Daughters, 15, 13, & 9
Sons, 13 & 11

19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY ☐ YES ☒ NO
RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:

21. VETERAN: Yes

22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):

23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Navy

24. RANK OR GRADE: Lt.

25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE ☐ YES ☒ NO

26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA ☐ YES ☒ NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $20,295 GS-16 Step 3

28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: 15%

29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): See below under #40

30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING

	COVER	CIA
YES	☒	☐
NO	☒	☐

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: *

32. POST: N. A.

33. OTHER: N. A.

34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
* Quarters handled locally by Honolulu Station

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: ☒ PCS ☐ DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL ☐ FOREIGN OPERATIONAL

36. WITH DEPENDENTS ☒ YES ☐ NO

37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

37A. HHE TO BE STORED ☒ YES ☐ NO

38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED ☒ YES ☐ NO

39. PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL ☐ YES ☐ NO

40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH
Same as 18 above

For #29: Cover Pay: W-2 - Proprietary - $10,000.00
1099 - 1st Devised Cover - 4,875.00
1099 - 2nd Devised Cover - 5,362.50

-- There will be a yearly adjustment for any amount due or owed by Subject.

Taxes will be withheld on the $10,000 paid through proprietary No taxes will be held on the two devised covers.

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes

43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes

44. OTHER:

45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH ☒ CIA REGULATIONS ☐ COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

FORM 10-63 204 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

CASE OFFICER: [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible]

DIVISION: [illegible]

DATE: [illegible]

OTHER BENEFITS

SECTION VIII

48. BENEFITS (See HB 20-40, HB 20-41, HB 20-7, HB 20-33, and HB 20-820-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

Same as Staff Employee

COVER ACTIVITY

SECTION IX

47. STATUS (Check): ☐ PROPOSED ☒ ESTABLISHED

48. TYPE (Check): ☒ PROPRIETARY ☐ SUBSIDIZED ☐ CULTURAL ☐ EDUCATIONAL ☒ COMMERCIAL ☐ MILITARY ☐ TOURIST ☐ OTHER

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS

☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ COMPLETE ☐ PARTIAL

OFFSET OF INCOME

SECTION X

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.)

☒ TOTAL ☐ PARTIAL ☐ NONE

TERM

SECTION XI

51. DURATION: DAYS ____ MONTHS ____ 2 YEARS

52. EFFECTIVE DATE

53. RENEWABLE ☒ YES ☐ NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION ☒ YES ☐ NO

FUNCTION

SECTION XII

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): FI

DUTIES

SECTION XIII

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

As Senior operations officer at Honolulu Base, Subject will be responsible for all administration and operational activities of the Base. He will handle recruiting of agents once they have been spotted and assessed.

QUALIFICATIONS

SECTION XIV

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been employed by the Agency since 28 September 1952 --

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained)

☐ GRADE SCHOOL ☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE ☐ COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE

☐ COLLEGE (No degree) ☐ COLLEGE DEGREE ☐ POST GRADUATE ☒ MA ☐ PHD

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK			WRITE			READ		
	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR	FLUENT	AVERAGE	POOR
Japanese		X			X			X	

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE

Japan

EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

SECTION XV

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

1941-42 - Univ. of Calif.
1942-46 - U.S. Navy
1946-52 - War Dept. Intel Specialist

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

SECTION XVI

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary)

☐ OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	Stanley J. Haines Stanley J. Haines, [illegible]	2 NOV 1954	Geo. F. Schreyer Geo. F. Schreyer, [illegible]/EX

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This document consists of 1 page,
No. 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

Executive Registry
64-5841

DD/P [illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

AUG 21 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

I am pleased to transmit Ambassador Reischauer's telegram to you in which he expresses his high opinion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, the acting Station Chief in Tokyo. In particular, the Ambassador cites Mr. Wheeler for his assistance with the recent case of the two Soviet musician defectors.

Sincerely,

George Denney

George C. Denney Jr.
Acting

Attachment:
Telegram 586, copy 2.

Mr. John A. McCone
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

SECRET

34-31 CONTROL: 13542
Action RECD: AUGUST 17, 1964
6:19 A.M.

INRD
Info FROM: TOKYO

ACTION: SECSTATE 586

RMR
DATE: AUGUST 17, 2 P.M.

ROGER CHANNEL 002

PERSONAL FOR MCCONE FROM REISCHAUER

WE WILL BE REPORTING IN ANOTHER FORM OUR ANALYSIS OF THE CASE OF THE TWO SOVIET MUSICIANS. I JUST WANT TO TELL YOU, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THE RESULTS WE DID IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR PETE WHEELER. HE WAS ON THE JOB WITHIN MINUTES AFTER THE MEN WALKED IN, GOT HIS RUSSIAN SPEAKING PEOPLE WORKING QUICKLY, AND HELPED TO HANDLE THE WHOLE AFFAIR WITH EFFICIENCY AND DISPATCH. HIS EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN AND THE CONFIDENCE WHICH THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES SHOWED IN WORKING WITH HIM WERE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE DEFINITE CHANGE WHICH TOOK PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE ON HOW TO HANDLE CASES LIKE THIS.

HIS CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN MAJOR AND THE RESULTS WILL BE LONG-LIVED. THIS IS ONLY ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE SERVICE WHEELER HAS PERFORMED HERE OVER THE YEARS. WE ARE SORRY TO SEE HIM LEAVE AND WILL MISS HIM VERY MUCH.

GP-1.

REISCHAUER

BA

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SECRET

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Robert F. Wheeler

Effective 8 May 1952

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-15 $12,770 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 8 May 1952. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-3 and salary of $11,660 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of 24 Months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

FORM 10-54 1535

SECRET

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently (months if applicable). Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half percent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

SECRET

e. A portion of your annual and all of your sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your annual leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

____

SECRET

15 OCT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Report of Gifts

REFERENCE: Memo for D/Pers from C/FE dtd 29 Sept 58,
Subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel

Referenced memorandum reports the receipt of gifts by several Agency employees from recent visitors. These gifts are determined to be of insignificant intrinsic value and may be retained by the recipients for whatever use they desire.

(Signed) Gordon M. Stewart
Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - Ex O-DD/P
1 - Recorder, EAB
1 - D/Sec
1 - D/Pers Subject File
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono
1 - Subjects' Files
Satoshi Hagase
William V. Broe
Robert H. Wheeler
William H. Canter
[illegible] C. Trabulsi

OD/Pers/[illegible] (10 Oct 58)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

4-2108

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
Attn: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from three Cabinet Research Chamber visitors during their recent visit to Washington:

	Approx. value
Satoshi Nagano	
Box of nori	$2.00
Set of chopsticks (laquered)	.75
William V. Broe	
1 woodblock print	1.50
Robert P. Wheeler	
Box of nori	2.00
William M. Center	
1 woodblock prints	3.00
Nageeb G. Trabulsi	
Woodblock print	1.50
1 jar Japanese sauce	.50

Signed Robert P. Wheeler
DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief, Far East Division

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

31 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Gift from Foreign National

REFERENCE: Memo to D/Pers from C/FE dated 22 Oct 57, subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel (DD/P 3-7838)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 22 October 1957 concerning the following gifts received by Agency personnel from FUJII Gaichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5"x8" charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., C/FE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John M. Maury, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Sherman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward H. Korn, C/FE-1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul D. Breitweiser, C/FE-6	picture
John R. Horton, C/FE-2/RO	picture
George E. Bailie, C/SR-5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/ICD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, OTR	picture
Eugene C. Tsukiashi, FE-1	pearl tie pin
Chester H. Ito, FE-1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand-painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Under the provisions of Regulation 20-112, dated 10 October 1956, it is my determination that these gifts are of such insignificant intrinsic value that they may be retained and utilized to whatever benefit desired.

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DD/P
1 - D/Sec w/basic
1 - IAD w/basic
1 - Each individual's file w/basic
1 - OP Files: Foreign Awards and Decorations
1 - D/Personnel Reader Chrono
OD/Pers/vms (30 Oct 57)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

20 [illegible] 195[illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
ATTN: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

1. The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from FUJII Goichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5' x 8' charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., CFE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John M. Maury, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Sherman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward H. Horn, CFE/1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul B. Breitweiser, CFE/6	picture
John R. Horton, CFE/2/EO	picture
George H. Bolie, C/SR/5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/IOD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, CFE	picture
Nageeb G. Trabulsi, FE/1	pearl tie pin
Chester H. Ito, FE/1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Additional gifts of small pictures were left by FUJII to be given to those people whom he did not meet but who worked behind the scenes to make his visit a pleasant one. No listing is believed necessary of these items or their recipients.

ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
2 - Director of Personnel
1 - Director of Security

SECRET

14-00000

SE T

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY — DO NOT COMPLETE

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE *(true)* Robert P. WHEELER	DATE *(from item 8-1)* 9 Nov 1955	NAME OF SUPERVISOR *(true)* Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.	DATE *(from item 8-2)* 9 Nov 1955
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.	William E. NELSON, Chief, FE/1		DATE 19 Dec 1955

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915	2. GRADE GS-14	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE Chief, Liaison
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION *(if known)* DI	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE Japan Base	ETA - 1 Sept 56
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR None		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE 1 June 1956

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY *(see special note on Transmittal Form)*:

Formerly Deputy Chief of Mission; formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, KUTUBE and Chief, Mission Liaison; currently, Chief, Liaison, Japan Base. Current assignment involves responsibility for all Base Liaison activities with all Japanese agencies and Department of Defense agencies represented in Japan. Current assignment also involves case officer responsibilities for two KUTUBE operations and one developmental KUTUBE operation. Japanese contacts, to whom I represent KUBARK, range from the Prime Minister to case officers in various Japanese security and police agencies.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION *(refer to catalog of courses, if available)*:

1. Advanced CE course
2. Operational Security course

22 Dec 55

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

Orig + 1 DI [illegible] SECRET [illegible]

(4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (*continued*)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (*for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice*) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION: See attachment.

1ST CHOICE:

2ND CHOICE:

3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

7 dependents.

Wife - 37	Daughter and son - 5
Daughter - 12	Son - 3
Daughter - 7	Daughter - 1

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 9-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Despite subject's lack of formal Headquarters assignment we feel for overriding operational reasons he should be returned to the field for another tour.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: William E. Nelson William E. NELSON	SIGNATURE:
TITLE: Chief, FE/1	DATE:

17. REMARKS (*additional comment*)

ATTACHMENT TO FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE:

Re Paragraph C - Preference for Next Assignment:

1. I would like to state that while a tour at Headquarters should be my preference I believe that for me to leave my current assignment at this time for even one year would not be in the best interests of either KUBARK or ODYOKE. Therefore, I request home leave, with approximately one month at Headquarters for requested training and refresher work and one month of leave, returning to current assignment for at least an additional two-year tour with the proviso that after the first year the situation be re-examined with the ultimate view of possibly at that point considering a two-year tour at Headquarters.

2. In my years in work on Japan, approximately ten of which have been spent consecutively in Japan, I feel that I have been able to provide a certain degree of intelligence continuity which could be spoiled by a two-year break. Realizing that career-wise I should spend at least one tour at Headquarters in the future, I believe that, despite possible reflections against my career, that two year period should be delayed until (a) KUBARK is better established in Japan and (b) the Japanese governmental and economic situations are on more stable grounds. I believe that I can play a major role in both those situations, not because I have any special talent to offer but simply because I have the continuity which KUBARK as such lacks in Japan.

3. I believe that by experience, training and inclination I can better serve KUBARK in this country in the type of work in which I am now engaged than by any other assignment currently known to me.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Personnel Action in lieu of SF-52.

Change of Service Designation from D to DI.

Effective date: 19 June 1955

	GRADE
Office of DDP	
TOD, Roy S.	15
CI	
BURKE, Paul J.	14
DOUGLASS, John F.	13
MULLIN, Edward [illegible]	13
PENDLEY, Robert L.	13
EE	
HOLTZ, Oscar W.	13
HUGHES, Frank W.	13
FE	
KITCHENS, Henry G.	13
LALLY, John F.	13
WHEELER, Robert F.	14
NEA	
ANDREWS, E. Wyllys	15
BOWLING, Robert, Jr.	13
WE	
FULLER, Benjamin, II	14
SITRA, Alphonse G.	13
VANDERVOORT, Benjamin H.	14
WALSH, Rutherford T.	13

F[illegible]

6/15/55

Robert A. Stricklin by John J. Calder 10 June 1955

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

NARRATIVE EVALUATION REPORT

Name: [redacted] GS-14 **Period Covered:** 1 June 1953 to 1 June 1954

Occasion for report: Annual X ; reassignment of reporting officer ______; proposed reassignment of employee reported on ______; covering initial 90 days of employment ______.

Employee is to be rated upon following factors:

1. **Knowledge of the job being performed.**
2. **Judgment in arriving at logical and workable solutions.**
3. **Dependability, not only in being on the job, but in accomplishment of assigned tasks within reasonable deadlines.**
4. **Stability under pressure and ability to adjust to changing conditions and circumstances.**
5. **Imagination, initiative, and originality.**
6. **Security consciousness.**
7. **Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others.**

IN FAIRNESS TO EMPLOYEES, COMPLETED NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH EMPLOYEE CONCERNED

1. Employee is well qualified in substantive fields concerning Japan and the long background of FEC intelligence activity in this area. This knowledge serves him exceedingly well in the performance of assigned duties. What knowledge he lacks concerning KUBARK policies or procedures is fast being supplied by practical field experience.

2. His judgment at arriving at logical solutions is good under normal conditions, and he generally comes up with solutions which are workable and realistic.

3. He is completely dependable and is particularly sensitive to deadlines, which he makes almost a fetish of meeting. In every sense of the word, he is a man of action in terms of treating with the recurring problems of the station.

4. Employee is somewhat excitable and emotional and, thus, at times of unusual pressure, he may require a steadying hand. This is not a serious fault and is one concerning which the employee is aware. He adjusts well to changing conditions and situations.

5. His imagination, initiative, and originality have shown time and again in his dealings with Army personalities in FEC with whom he has maintained excellent relations on behalf of this Station.

6. Security consciousness is excellent.

7. Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others is superior.

NOTE: See attached sheet for additional comments by Reviewing Officer

Date: 17 June 1954

Walt D. Newpher
Signature of Reporting Officer
Walter D. NEWPHER

Robert J. Kendall
Signature of Reviewing Officer
Robert J. KENDALL

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below)

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

1. While the Reviewing Officer concurs generally with statements made in this report, it is felt that the over-all impression does not give Subject as much credit as he deserves. In the opinion of the Reviewing Officer, Subject's faults are somewhat over-emphasized. Subject's qualities as exhibited during past months have proven to be outstanding, particularly in his excellent judgement in arriving at logical and workable solutions and in his stability under operational exigencies in which Subject has performed exceedingly well under heavy pressures of both time and responsibility.

2. Working in an area where, in the past, there has been an unfortunate number of misunderstandings between KUFIRE and KUGOWN components, and where there have been the usual difficult personality conflicts, Subject has exhibited not only superior tact and diplomacy, but has also been able to smooth out many difficulties, and modify aggressively offensive actions. He has supplied a needed cooperative spirit and sense of humor to prevent, in many cases, serious antagonisms and unnecessary vituperation so detrimental to a smooth working organization. Subject's contribution to bringing about a friendly, cooperative relationship within the mission and with outside agencies including U.S. military organizations cannot be praised too highly.

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. PJJA-1279

DATE: 17 AUG 1953

TO : Chief, FE
Through: Senior Representative, Tokyo
FROM : Chief, JCU

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC- [redacted], Commendation of
Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to make a matter of record the excellence of performance of duties demonstrated by [redacted] over the period of his first ten months of assignment to JCU.

2. During that time [redacted] has shown himself to be a valuable addition to KUBARK as a whole and a great asset to this particular station. As JCU Chief of Staff, he has performed innumerable tasks in the operational, intelligence and support fields with effectiveness and dispatch. His aggressiveness, imagination and initiative in spite of recurring frustration have been an inspiration to all members of JCU. His diligence and selflessness have set an example throughout the ranks. From the first day of his arrival in JCU, [redacted] has dedicated his every effort to improving the efficiency and broadening the capability of the station.

3. [redacted] should be especially commended for his unceasing efforts in connection with the provision of new office space for this organization. Working tactfully but aggressively through the Army hierachy here in Tokyo, he was able to accomplish many concessions of direct benefit to JCU which would have been most difficult to obtain through official channels.

4. Special mention should also be made of the excellent progress [redacted] has made in the fostering of truly cooperative and productive relationships with the various intelligence elements of the Far East Command. Capitalizing on a wide range of friends and former associates and combining a large portion of common sense and patience, [redacted] may be credited with the development of highly profitable JCU relations with military organizations in the area.

5. [redacted] has shown no task to be too large or too small to deserve his range of energy and talent. He has been a vital factor in the accomplishments of JCU to date.

15 August 1953

Walter D. NEWPHER

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
1 - Sr. Rep, Tokyo

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on OCT 1 [illegible] (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(NAME)

Robert P. Wheeler

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

(6)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

22 September 1952
(Date of entrance on duty)

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 22nd day of September, A. D. 1952

at Tokyo (City) Japan (State)

[SEAL]

(Signature of officer)

Administrative Assistant
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
Great Heights #512 Tokyo, Japan (DRS, Hq, FEC APO 500)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH
4 October 1915

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*)
Fitzgerald, Georgia

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY
Adelia Callaway Wheeler

(B) RELATIONSHIP
wife

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE
DRS, Hq, FEC
APO 500.

(D) TELEPHONE NO.
86 5303

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

(Check one)

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—61183-2

14-00000

Date 13 SEPTEMBER 1952

Name **Robert P. Wheeler**

Dear **Mr. Wheeler**:

1. This is to notify you that your employment has been accepted effective 28 SEPTEMBER 1952.

Position: **I. O. GS-14**

Base Salary: **$9600.00**

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave (only in accordance with existing rules and regulations.)

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with this Agency's regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside the Headquarters Area, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by regulations of this Agency.

3. As a condition of your employment by this Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the Headquarters Area. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by this Agency, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the Headquarters Area for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to a post outside the Headquarters Area, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first post outside the Headquarters Area, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by this Agency and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by this Agency, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of this Agency. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by existing rules and regulations.

Walter D.
Chief of Station

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by this Agency.

Robert Prentice Wheeler
Employee

23 September 1952
Date

kgt

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER (First) Robert (Middle) P.
2. DATE 29 November 1957
3. TO POSITION
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE
5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. State
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☐ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☒ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES [illegible] 1957

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY DPD

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER, (First) ROBERT (Middle) P.
2. DATE 7 Sept. 1956
3. TO POSITION I.O.
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE
5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
☐ Departmental
☐ U.S. State
☐ Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
☐ EOD
☐ Overseas
☒ Returnee
☐ Pre-Employment
☐ Annual
☐ Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (General)
☐ Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
☐ Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
☐ Disqualified

Remarks: Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties. (9/13/56)
May be re-evaluated upon request.

MEDICAL OFFICE

SECRET

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss #1

DATE: 1/5/53

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☒ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

NON-ARDUOUS O/S DUTIES.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss Ret.

DATE: XXXXXX 12/24/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION:

TITLE OF POSITION:

GRADE:

☐ DEPT. ☐ FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND ☐ FIT ☐ UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

☐ FULL DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS ☐ DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Returnee examination O.K.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-32
NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-32 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	Oct 1915	D	GS-17

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR				
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.								
2.								

APR 10 3 24 PM '72

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED *(Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)*

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, Country)*	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 7 APR [illegible]

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - - TO - -			
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-66 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-81)

72 NOV [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		MAR 22	9 43 AM '71				
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM.
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS

4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE

2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK

3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT

6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED		
			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE 17 MAR 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED		DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-65 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1.							
2.							

APR 24 2 15 PM '70
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY
☐ NAVY
☐ MARINE CORPS
☐ AIR FORCE
☐ COAST GUARD
☐ NATIONAL GUARD
☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (*active*) ☐ STANDBY (*inactive*) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (*Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian*)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	▨	
			☐	RESIDENT
			☐	AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, Country*)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE 4/23/70	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Robert P. McCabe

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wheeler, Robt P.

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO. 6-DIGITS	3. NAME MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS
<• 2	•	•

4. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	5. DATE CODED MO DA YR	
•	•	THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 3	•	•	•							

5. DATE SUBMITTED MO DA YR	6. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	
•	•	> WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS	4. CODE C-A-D	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
<• 5	• 060947	• WHE	• C	• BS96	0	0	7	0	0	3	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST MO	DA	YR	
• NO++	L	A	N	G	U	A	GE	• 09	02	69	> DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 127 LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME 3-LETTERS
<• 4	•	•

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
A - ADDITION TO RECORD
C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				
•	•					•				

FORM 10-64 1962a

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060 947	WHEELER Robert Prentiss	10/9/15

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☑ DELETE WHEELER, Rosella C.	Daughter	[illegible] [illegible]	USA	
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 1-66 444n SECRET (4-51)

9 MAY [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 22 9 12 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	PAST ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4/18/68	Robert P.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP SER NO 060947	2. NAME (Last First Middle) WHEELER ROBERT P	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH 10/04/15	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS - 16 - 04
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE IC PROGRAM EVAL	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OPPB	9. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH., D.C.	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	52/09/01	56/06/01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	PCS RR	64/08/26	66/06/12
Japan	PCS 59	59/06/15	64/05/26
USA	PCS 56	56/06/15	59/06/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 31 MAY 67
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	POLITICAL SCIENCE (GOVERNMENT), GENERAL	CAL UNIV Berkeley	40
MSTR	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GENERAL	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV DC	46

FORM

SECRET

2 JUN ENTD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X))			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan	Economic, political, cultural						
		1954-56 59-65		X	X	XXX	X

SECTION V

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Photography - fair, all phases

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR. (Do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non-fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	**MARITAL STATUS**	
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried. SPECIFY)		
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)		
3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)	
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER	
7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIPS, COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X **DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE**

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Robert Prentiss Wheeler, Jr	Son	2/15/51 Tokyo	USA	Bethesda, Maryland
Melissa C. "	Daughter	2/15/51 Tokyo	USA	" "
Charles Slayton "	Son	2/11/53 Tokyo	USA	" "
Mary S. "	Daughter	2/16/55 Tokyo	USA	" "

SECTION XI **PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3/22/67	Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

This form was completed by subject in pseudonym. We have deleted ~~xx~~ pseudo. However, if it is not acceptable ~~xxxxxx~~ as is, we will request another one from the field.

A. Tallackson
x-3332

FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

rmining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II

IT

2. DATE OF BIRTH 4 October 1915

RICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD e.)

PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT IS

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
Department of the Army Tokyo, Japan ✓	1946 1946	June 6	18 18	52 1952	Sept 9	27 27	Excepted Appointment ✓
CIA	1952	9	28				SCD: 8-6-42 Verified 9-19-52 RP

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
U. S. Navy	42	8	6	46	6	15	Inactive status

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	FROM— MONTH	FROM— DAY	TO— YEAR	TO— MONTH	TO— DAY	TOTAL YEARS	TOTAL MONTHS	TOTAL DAYS

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS?
☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

[redacted]
|S| Robert P. Wheeler
(SIGNATURE)

(DATE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ______ day of ______ (MONTH) 1952 at ______ (CITY) (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*)
☐ YES ☐ NO

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

12. TOTAL SERVICE

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS
☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

(OVER)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE
SEP

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER Robert Prentiss
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO 6-6616
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: DISTRICT of Columbia

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

SECTION II

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: WHEELER Adelia Callaway
2. RELATIONSHIP: wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): Same
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO-6-6616
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

MARITAL STATUS

SECTION III

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: No CHANGE. See last PHS for data re 1937 annulment

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First): Adelia (Middle): Belle (Maiden): Callaway (Last): WHEELER
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 19 Aug 1939
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 1045 Madison Avenue Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
7. LIVING: ☒ YES ☐ NO
8. DATE OF DEATH
9. CAUSE OF DEATH
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 17 Aug 1917
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
14. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.
16. DATE ACQUIRED: BIRTH
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, USA
18. OCCUPATION: Dental Hygienist
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): U.S. Army 1946-1947
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.

CODED
FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
DATE 4 NOV 1958

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET

FORM 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
6-57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
N.A.

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
N.A.

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
N.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
Receptionist, CIA, TOKYO, JAPAN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
Mrs. Charles A. Wheeler

2. RELATIONSHIP
Sister-in-law

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
USA

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
Australia

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
Three times in 10 years

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
~~[illegible]~~ 1956

2

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)

2. RELATIONSHIP

3. AGE

4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES

5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT

7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
Re 1 above - alien is wife of my brother, U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. C. A. Wheeler, O-5304A. I saw this person in 1945, 1953 and 1956.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Very limited dividends from mutual fund investment.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs National Bank	Conn. Ave, D.C., USA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐ LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
☐ TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
☐ OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐ BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☐ GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☒ MASTER'S DEGREE
☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
MERCER University, Macon, Ga	Science B.C.	Pre-	1934	1937			
University of California, Berkeley, Calif.	Poli Sci	Intnatl Relatns	1940	1942	A.B	1942	
University of Colorado, Boulder	JAPANESE (NAV JAP)		1942	1943	Certificate in Japanese		
GeorgeWashington Univ, Wash, D.C.	Intn'l Law & Relations		1944	1946	M.A	1946	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL HOURS
		FROM	TO	

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL WEEKS
		FROM	TO	
University of Colorado (NAV TRNG SCH JAP)	JAPANESE	June 1942	June 1943	54

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan		Sept 45 - Dec 45 June 46 - June 56	X	X	X	X
Australia		Jan - Sept 45		X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Australia - Navy duty
JAPAN - Navy duty, DEPTAR civilian employ, CIA station

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY		
			HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING

SECTION IX TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)

2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)

3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) [illegible], [illegible], etc

SECTION X SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Photography - good-all phases Tape recording
Hi-fi - handy at wiring [illegible], etc. General radio interests

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. Univ of Calif degree w/honors, same at Grad. Belonged to a Poli. Sci. Honor Society, name forgotten.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) EOD to ~~Nov '53~~ Mar '54
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Deputy Chief, Japan Composite Unit/Tokyo
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) MAR '54 June '56
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CFI/Japan Mission/Tokyo
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES FI officer for Japan Mission when it succeeded JCU. Instigator and ~~monitor~~ of Liaison Activities.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) APR '54 June '56
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE CFI & Chief Liaison, JAPAN MISSION, TOKYO
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES Continued FI duties and took more active role in liaison as Senior CIA Liaison Officer for Japan.

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) Sept '56 Sept '57
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Various but mainly CFE/1
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-) SEPT '57 —
2. GRADE 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION 12
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE C/FE/FI
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	6	2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.	1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		
Geraldine D. Wheeler	Daughter	1943		✓	USA	3616 Rittenhouse St NW Washington 15, D.C.
Rosella C. "	"	1948		✓	"	"
Robert Prentiss " Jr	Son	1951	X		"	"
Melosia C. "	Daughter	1951		✓	"	"
Charles S. "	Son	1953	X		"	"
MARY SLAYTON "	Daughter	1955		✓	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Addresses since EOD:
1953-1956 TOKYO, JAPAN
1956-present Washington, D.C.

I believe in my 15 yrs gov't service, Navy, Army Civilian and CIA, I have acquired a fair degree of competence as a manager-executive. In all three agencies I held increasingly responsible managerial positions. In my CIA experience, now more than five years, I have handled agents, developed training activities, managed a variety of offices, etc., and have reached the point where I have a Division Staff [illegible] which should call into play these experiences.

DATE COMPLETED	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10/4/57	Robert Prentiss Wheeler

SECRET

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes
(Yes or No)

1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

Date [illegible]

A. FULL NAME Mr. Robert [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS [illegible] APO [illegible]

PERMANENT ADDRESS 1045 Madison Ave [illegible] U.S.A.

B. NICKNAMES None WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? None

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU USED THESE NAMES?

[illegible]

CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Geraldine Dessau Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal

2. NAME Rosella [illegible] Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal

3. NAME Robert Prentiss Wheeler RELATIONSHIP son AGE 4 mos
Melissa Calloway Wheeler daughter 4 mos
CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal

FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Charles [illegible]

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DEATH [illegible] CAUSE [illegible]

[illegible]

MOTHER:

FULL NAME: [illegible] Hendrick [illegible]

Living

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS: 1045 Madison Ave., Huntington, West Va., USA

(No. and Street) (City) (State) (Country)

DATE OF BIRTH: 13 Aug 08 PLACE OF BIRTH: Huntington, West Va., U.S.A.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY: Not applicable

CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? See above

OCCUPATION: Housewife LAST EMPLOYER: Self

Sec. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

NAME: [illegible] (Mrs. [illegible]) [illegible] RELATIONSHIP: Sister-in-law [illegible]

[illegible]

Washington, D.C.

ADDRESS

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] San Francisco

IF DISCHARGED GIVE REASON [illegible]

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

Item 15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM June 1946 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-13

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Department of the Army

ADDRESS G-2, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, c/o PM San Francisco (Tokyo, Japan)

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence Specialist [illegible]

DUTIES [illegible]

[illegible]

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK FAIR READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ FAIR WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

B. LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU. INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

[illegible]

[illegible]

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

[illegible] WHO KNOW [illegible]

[illegible]	BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C. RES. ADD. [illegible]
[illegible]	BUS. ADD. [illegible] Dept. of [illegible] RES. ADD. [illegible] Arlington, Virginia
Capt. [illegible]	BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C. RES. ADD. [illegible] Arlington, Va. [illegible] USA
Col. [illegible]	BUS. ADD. Pentagon [illegible] Washington, D.C. RES. ADD. [illegible]
[illegible]	BUS. ADD. [illegible] Washington, D.C. RES. ADD. [illegible]

[illegible] NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES (NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

From Jan 65 to May 66 [illegible] Washington, D.C. U.S.A.

From Oct 63 to Dec 63 Tokyo, [illegible] Japan

From Jan 65 to Oct 65 Melbourne, [illegible] Australia

From Nov 64 to Dec 64 [illegible] Garland Ave Takoma Park Md., U.S.A.

From Jul 63 to May 64 [illegible] Ave Takoma Park Md., U.S.A.

From Sep 62 to Jul 63 [illegible] Broadway Boulder Colorado U.S.A.

[illegible]

RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Oct 63 to Dec 63 Tokyo, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

[illegible] 1948 [illegible]

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER [illegible] OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANI[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] 1928 [illegible] Bridgeport, Conn. [illegible] I have never mentioned this [illegible]
[illegible] never [illegible] annulled in [illegible] in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Francisco City and County, in May 1928. [illegible] this marriage was not known to anyone but the principals and the officials who performed the marriage and the annulment. Neither set of parents and few if any friends have ever known of it. Any investigation at this late date would only be the source of needless embarrassment to all concerned. Miss Taylor, as far as I know, has long since married and I have had no contact with her since Feb 1928. If there are further questions, it would be appreciated if only I am approached. There is nothing to hide or to be ashamed of, but there is a lot of unnecessary embarrassment that can so easily be avoided.

Re Sec. 5 - My father was born in Coaticook, Quebec, while his mother was visiting there, so I have always understood. Both of his parents were US Citizens and he was the 10th generation in the US. He had some military service in the Spanish-American War, but I am totally ignorant of any details.

Re Sec 12 College: University of Colorado Address: Boulder, Colo. Dates Attended: June 1942-June 1943 (NAVY JAP LAN) Certificate of Completion. College: George Washington University ADDRESS: Washington, D.C. 1945-[illegible] M.A.

Re Sec 14 - I. Under heading of duties: My work with the Army in Japan is of necessity classified but my job description of Military Intelligence Specialist [illegible] good idea of the job in general.

[illegible] Also under the heading of duties: The work in the Navy was even more classified and I am not at liberty to [illegible] information can be obtained [illegible] Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-6) 42076

REQUEST DATE (6-11) 5 Aug 66

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE) (12-28) Wheeler, Robert P.

YEAR OF BIRTH (29-30) 1915

POSITION TITLE IO- Program Eval.

POSITION NUMBER (31-36)

OCCUP. CODE (37-42)

GRADE (43-44) GS-16

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY) Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH) DCI/PPB/Planning & Prog. Div/Prog. Anal. Br.

ORGN. CODE (45-48)

TYPE OF APPLICANT ☐ REGULAR ☐ CONSULTANT ☐ CONTRACT ☐ MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION SA-SB

IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

TYPE OF APPL. (49)

NAME OF REQUESTER (OR OFFICIAL) Dov H. Luetscher, Chief/CPD

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS ☐ HQS ☐ USF ☐ FF ☐ V ☐ UV

HDQTRS. & FUND (50)

CLEARANCE REQUIRED ☐ SECRET ☐ FULL

PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP): Full Clearance

CLEARANCE (51)

ATTACHMENTS ☐ PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT ☐ PHOTOGRAPH(S) ☐ APPENDIX I ☐ APPENDIX II ☐ REQUEST FOR WAIVER ☐ REPORT OF INTERVIEW

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54)

VETERANS STATUS ☐ MALE - VETERAN ☐ MALE - NON-VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - VETERAN ☐ FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

VET. PREF. & SEX (55)

Security #: 60164

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 8 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET (MFG. 5-65) (9)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 30 July 1966

YOUR REFERENCE: 42076

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN : Jo Ann Varney

SUBJECT : WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

   ☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

   ☒ A personal interview is not necessary.

   ☐ Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a Conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L Kuhn

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 9-66 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 [illegible]

(1)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 9 November 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 15100

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [redacted]. (P)

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-16, by DDP/DCD in the capacity of Operations Officer at Honolulu, Hawaii.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne
W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

FORM 10-62 1989 CONFIDENTIAL (9-60)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5): 15100

REQUEST DATE (6-11): 5 Nov 1964

(12-36)

YEAR OF BIRTH (37-40): 10/04/15

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE): [redacted] (P)

POSITION NUMBER (31-36):

OCCUP. CODE (37-42):

GRADE (43-44): GS-16

POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

ORGN. CODE (45-48):

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/DOD/Honolulu Base

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Honolulu, Hawaii

TYPE OF APPL. (49):

TYPE OF APPLICANT: REGULAR / CONTRACT / CONSULTANT / MILITARY

CONVERSION ACTION: SE9SA

IF OTHER, SPECIFY:

HDQTRS. & FUND (50):

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS: HQS / USP / PP / V / UV

NAME OF REQUESTER: Joseph B. Ragan, Chief/CPD

CLEARANCE (51): /

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: PROVISIONAL FOR (INDICATE NAME OF POOL OR GROUP) COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE / SECRET / FULL

RECRUIT. CODE (52-54):

ATTACHMENTS: PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT / APPENDIX I / REQUEST FOR WAIVER / PHOTOGRAPH(S) / APPENDIX II / REPORT OF INTERVIEW

VET PREF. & SEX (55):

VETERANS STATUS: MALE - VETERAN / FEMALE - VETERAN / MALE - NON-VETERAN / FEMALE - NON-VETERAN

Security #: 60164

Case Officer: Bill Michael Code 11 x68060

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Margo Daish
5 E 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (MFG. 5-61) (9)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 28 May 1959

PROT 9-258

TO : FE
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 25 May 1959.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by FE, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - FE
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 3-59 1597a

Sec Ch 11hrs.

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

dism.

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 28 July 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division
Your Reference: L-5937-A

FROM: Acting Chief, Security Division
Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Not: Lynn
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
W.W. EOD'in field.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. GEISS

Pouch sent out 17 mar 52
Branch has cabled field on
change of action papers are
to be forward back.
GG
8/16/52

EOD per Cable
9/28/52

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

(5)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Covert Personnel Division

DATE: 8 May 1952

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss - 60164

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 1 May 1952 from Lloyd George, Chief, FE, which is as follows.

> "1. Full security clearance was issued 11 March 1952 for Subject's employment in the field as an I.O. (CE) assigned to the Japan Composite Unit.
>
> 2. Our field representative advises that Mr. Wheeler is still on duty with the Security Division of G-2, FEC; however, he will be available for assignment to the Japan Composite Unit on or about 15 June 1952.
>
> 3. It is therefore requested that Subject's security clearance be extended for a period of sixty days."

This is to advise that the security clearance granted 11 March 1952 is extended to 30 June 1952.

W. A. Osborne
W. A. OSBORNE

SECRET

14-00000

FD2
68
u✓

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

he

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 11 March 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division — Your Reference: L-5937

FROM: Chief, Security Division — Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Cancel per M. Jones 14 Mar.

Rec'd!

Charles P. Michelet

C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

131

RECORD OF
PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE RETURNED TO
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN
ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 OCT 1974

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

MAYCRUNK, Ernest G.

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE

INCLUSIVE DATES: 24 July 59 - 27 July 1961

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.

TO
Chief, Finance Division
Chief, AF

FROM
Chief of Station, Leopoldville

DATE
27 JULY 1961

RE: "43" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING
☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
☐ INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

SUBJECT
Finance/WIROGUE
Transfer of Accountability-Ernest O. Mayerink

ACTION REQUIRED
Credit Advance Account

REFERENCES
LEOP-1573 DIR-49325
LEOP-1588 LEOP-1599
DIR-46479 DIR-00712

1. On 7 July 1961 WIROGUE was advanced the sum of U. S.$100.00 for living expenses in Brazzaville while awaiting onward transportation to PBPRIME. (DIR-46479 requested WIROGUE return to PBPRIME). This is his only outstanding advance with Leopoldville Station. Receipt attached hereto.

2. DIR-49325 authorized Station to withhold money received from sale of personal car against outstanding advances. However, before his departure WIROGUE accounted for 11,580 BCF over what he owed the Station. The sum of 42,500 BCF from the sale of his automobile plus 11,580 BCF converted at 50/$1.00 (LEOP-1599 and DIR-49325) gave WIROGUE a credit of $1,081.60. In January 1961 WIROGUE was ordered to Thysville by the Station and was authorized $0.10 per mile for use of his personal car, therefore, 312.5 miles times $0.10 equals $31.25 leaving WIROGUE a credit of U. S. $1,112.85. (See attachment).

3. WIROGUE was paid his June salary of $500 on 26 June and also his housing for July ($250.00). (Station was notified on 1 July, DIR-46479 that WIROGUE was to return to PBPRIME). However, July rental was used in the final settlement of the lease for the usual damages claimed by local landlords and in lieu of 30 days termination notice. Receipt forwarded under Voucher: 1153.

4. Accountability in the amount of U. S. $100.00 is herewith transferred to Headquarters plus a credit of $1,112.85. As WIROGUE was specifically told he would have to account for the above $100.00 for living/traveling expenses Station did not subtract that amount from his credit.

Angela B. Desrleoto

18 July 1961

Attachments: 1. Receipt for $100, h/w
2. Thysville certification by Outhman, h/w
3. Coquilhatville estimate, h/w
4. Breakdown of advances and accountings, h/w

Distribution:
Hqs - 4, w/a a/s

(approved)
[illegible]
[illegible]

1 September 19[illegible]

Mr. Ernest G. [illegible]

Dear Mr. May[illegible]:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective 31 October 19[illegible].

bob

You are herein formally notified that said contract will be terminated by the Government as of 1 September 1961. You are reminded of the contents of paragraph eleven (11) of said contract, which reads as follows:

> "11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement."

~~[illegible]~~, You are herein authorized a one-time payment in the amount of $2,110. ~~Such amount [illegible] tax-able [illegible].~~ In full consideration for said payment and effective as of the date of its receipt, you hereby release and forever discharge the United States Government and any agency, department or instrumentality thereof, and all its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever throughout the world arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under the contract effective 31 October 19[illegible].

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY: OK
Contracting Officer

A[illegible]:

S Date: 1-9-61

Ernest G. May[illegible]

WITNESS:

APPROVED: Fields
[illegible] Officer

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT : Termination of [redacted] Ernest J. Meyerink

1. Approval is herewith requested to relocate, terminate and make a final severance payment of $2000.00 to [redacted]. In return for this [redacted] will be required to sign a Quit Claim and Secrecy agreement.

2. It is presently planned to relocate subject in Europe, with the Office of Security transporting subject via MATS as far as Frankfurt, from whence he will proceed to any Western European country of his choice and at his expense. The $2000.00 payment will constitute his only assets until he can find gainful employment.

3. There are adequate funds available in the project to cover the termination bonus and transportation to Frankfurt via MATS.

4. Approval is also requested to write off and charge to expense the [illegible] loan given [redacted] of which approximately $3200.00 is still outstanding.

William H. Dunbar
for C/AF/N/2

Approved:

Bronson Tweedy

Amount requested in paragraph one is approved for payment. Based upon cover and operational circumstances, payment is not subject to Federal Income taxes.

JBR

Special Contracting Officer

Mr. Ernest G. Maycrink

Dear Mr. Maycrink:

Effective 31 October 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

O/K

~~2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organisation to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.~~

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for authorized operational travel. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and, when authorized, while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognised that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1). If, in the performance of activities un
this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of
gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Governme
will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability be
fits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its s
discretion deems proper provided, however, that such benefits shall not
exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of acti
hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, will
misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $500
to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragrap
above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said
beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such paymen
to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to who
payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its
avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under th
agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient m
ner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an ar
mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by
United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services unde
this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title
record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, whic
property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government
you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationsh
either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever docu
may be required by this organisation to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government
under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incide
to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement
monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner.
is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment b
the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover ventu
in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture
be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing y
activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may
execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agre
ment and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or
restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by th
agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture t
Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing p
issory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an accoun
in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against
deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after
approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Governm shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative ove: seeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may ret any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearl understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement : the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed thr instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official cover capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorised representatives of this orga: zation.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulat in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and sha continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By sixty (60) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extend upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expirati of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to retura travel expenses to the United States. Termination or expiration of this agr ment will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____
Ernest G. Maycrink

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED: ____________________

[illegible] 60

8 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : WIROGUE/1 Contract (Formerly AEASPIC)

1. A review of the WIROGUE/1 file showed that subject was under contract for a period beginning 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960. Since that date until 20 October 1960, subject was under SR/DOB OOA. On 21 October 1960, the African Division picked up the case and is preparing to dispatch him on 20 November 1960.

2. It is requested that the contract be brought up to date and amended to encompass the following points:

option to renew

A. Effective date: 21 November 1960 through 20 November 1962.

5-98
D-40

B. Compensation: $500 per month, plus $3000 per annum for housing.

C. Medical: to extent it is necessary to maintain good health.

D. Insurance: $5000 payable to beneficiary.

mutually agreed upon

E. Bonus: for outstanding performance, resettlement in another country.

F. Termination: ending of all benefits and monies.

3. This contract will have to be prepared for signing prior to 18 November 1960.

4. For further information, please contact Mr. Daniel R. Niesciur, X8284.

Glenn Fields
Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

+ $4,000 operational loan - non interest bearing - to be repaid from profits

medical OK - per C.O.

Subject is on F.N. - no taxes.

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2074
20 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Contracting Officer

THROUGH: SR/SS
Attention: H. G. [illegible] ~~Madge Hobbs~~

SUBJECT: Project Termination of Ernest G. Maycrink (p) as independent contractor for SR Division

REFERENCE: SR/DOB/59-1735 dated 17 September 1959
SR/DOB/59-1660 dated 24 July 1959

1. Because of the indefinite postponment of Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual was engaged, subject has been terminated by this office on 20 October 1960.

2. Subject individual will be picked up on contract on 21 October 1960 by Africa Division. Subject was paid on 20 October 1960 by this office all monies remaining due him as per Engagement of Independent contractor agreement for Project AESENTINEL. Subject has no further remunerative claim against the U. S. Government.

Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Approved: J. Keith Reid
J. Keith Reid

Joseph B. Ragan

SR/DOB/59/ 1735

17 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

THROUGH : Special Contracting Officer

FROM : Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT : Engagement of Ernest G. MAYCRINK (p) as Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : SR/DOB/59/ 1660, dated 24 July 1959 to Finance Division re same subject

1. Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual has been engaged, was originally approved through the period 31 March 1960. A request for renewal and amendment of the project has been submitted to FI, and it is intended subject individual will be utilized under this project during 1960.

2. The following provisions will apply to subject individual during the interim period, i.e.: 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960.

3. Term and Project Charge. Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and has been extended through the period 31 March 1961, subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

4. Security Approval. The initial security clearance obtained for Subject's use, CI/OA No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959, has been suspended during the interim period. Requests have been made of the Office of Security (SSD and Alien Affairs Staff) for subject's use.

5. Citizenship. Subject is a foreign national.

6. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $400.00 per month, payable in United States currency.

7. Quarters and Subsistence. Basic quarters and subsistence costs will be borne by the Subject. Occasional incidental expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

8. Operational Expenses. No Operational Expenses are contemplated during the period covered.

9. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to maintain his physical status for his eventual use on his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. The initial provisions made for resettlement of Subject still apply.

d. Entertainment. Basic entertainment expenses will be borne by Subject. Occasional entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

10. Contingent Obligations. Although no such promise has been made the Subject, resettlement in the United States could possibly become necessary as a form of control, should this be deemed necessary from a security viewpoint.

11. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

12. At such time as Subject re-enters training for his proposed mission, about 1 July 1960, all provisions of his initial engagement will again apply.

APPROVED:

Special Contracting Officer

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Dist:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Contracting Officer

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 11.60

24 July 1959

TO: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Special Contracting Officer

FROM: Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT: Engagement of Ernest O. MAYCRINK (P) as Independent Contractor.

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract, for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one year subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type Operational Approval, No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $500.00 per month, payable in United States currency. Of this amount, he will actually receive $50.00 per month during training and the duration of the mission. All unpaid monies will accrue to his credit in an escrow account, the payment of which will be dependent upon the proper performance of his duties and be payable upon completion of mission for which engaged. Provisions also made for payment of bonus not to exceed $10,000.00.

5. Quarters and Subsistence. The Subject will be furnished quarters and subsistence. Those costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

6. Operational Expenses.

Operational travel and expenses to be paid as officially authorized.

a. Domestic travel costs will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds. Travel costs to and from the United States, and foreign travel will be charged against Project AESENTINEL.

b. Operational expenses to be borne by Project AESENTINEL. Training expenses to be carried by Station Allotment.

SECRET

SECRET

7. Other Commitments.

The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to permit him to properly perform his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. Provisions made for resettlement of Subject in a country other than that in which he was recruited. Costs of resettlement will not exceed $1,000.00, and will be chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

d. Entertainment. All normal entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

8. Contingent Obligations. The following has not be promised the individual, but may have to be met by the Government:

a. Resettlement in the United States, either as an additional bonus for the Subject or as a form of control should this become necessary from a security viewpoint.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

APPROVED: ______________
J. KEITH REID

APPROVED: [illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
PRESCRIBED BY U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM
Federal Personnel Manual
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

[redacted]

(N)

69 Feb Entd

WOODS JAMES S
502-16-6500
02/20/28

29 SEP 1969

Coded

SECRET
(When Filled In)

03 AUG 1978

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 July 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - (VOLUNTARY) CIARDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 04 YEAR 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026-3430 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Section 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $26,889
18. REMARKS:

Last Working Day: 4 August 1978

CONCUR: [illegible] 07/26/78
CNS/MSB Date

Co-ordinated with Ms. [illegible] ROB 7/31/78

Geo. [illegible]
CMS/MSB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Henry E. Walton
Henry E. Walton
C/PCS/CSS/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CM13

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. FOOTES CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR. 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIARDS 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: C, 65,000
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: ej 7/26
03 AUG 1978
46. OP APPROVAL: William [illegible]
DATE APPROVED: 8/1/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622 (4)

25 July 1978

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

I entered on duty with the CIA in April 1952 and have been in records management for my whole career, seventeen years of it overseas.

James Woods
James S. Woods

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS

[illegible] 25 May 78

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 6 MAY 1978

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	9 May 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER	010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT [redacted]
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA	8026-3430 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/~~[illegible]~~ IMS INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH AREAS UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER	CG45
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (G.S., LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE	$26,889

18. REMARKS

FROM: DDO/NE

CONCUR: John Diffley (telecord) ________ DATE
C/NE/Pers

[illegible] 05/12/78

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	Henry E. Walton C/PCS/CSS/Pers
DATE SIGNED	5/10/78
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DDO/CMS/07-12
DATE SIGNED	5/11/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	53740
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	IMS
22. STATION CODE	75013
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. ROOTRS CODE	
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)	
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA	1—CC 2—OBGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA	TYPE / MO DA. YR.
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO	
34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE	CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO. DA YR)	
37. LONG. COMP DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	
38. CAREER CATEGORY	CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE	CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA	FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	30 MAY 1978 5-12-78 From NE
46. OP APPROVAL	
DATE APPROVED	5/26/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 6 Feb 78

1 SERIAL NUMBER:)10032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH ~~02~~ 03 | DAY 12 | YEAR 78

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 3033 4800 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/NE DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION
PLANS STAFF

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF (13)

12 POSITION NUMBER: CG45

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: 26589

18. REMARKS

CONCUR:

From 12⁵

Henry Walton (telecoord)
ISS

6 Feb 78
Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John F. Drifley, CNE/PERS | DATE SIGNED: 6 Feb 78

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED: 2/8/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOOTS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	46015	NE	75013		1	02 20 28	03 12 78	03 12 78

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CS 2—OFGH 3—FICA 5—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP | CODE

39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 3-6-78 ARO 08 MAR 1978

46 O P APPROVAL | DATE APPROVED: 8 MAR 78

FORM 1152 6-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622 (4)

18 August 1978

Mr. James S. Woods
304 Meadow Hall Dr.
Rockville, MD 20851

Dear Mr. Woods:

We are enclosing the employee copy of your retirement action (Form 1150) that you requested 04 August 1978.

Sincerely,

/S/

Abraham Schwartz
Chief, Control Division

Enclosure: 1 Form

Dist.
Orig. - Adse.
1 - TRB
1 - OPF/WOODS, James S.
OP/TRB/SEAllewelt;sea(18AUG78)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

18 APR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: James S. Woods

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Commendation for Exceptional Performance

1. The Directorate of Operations Records Review Task Force has finished its work in Warrenton. I want you to know that I realize that a large measure of the success of this effort was due to the exceptional performance of the Records Management Officers who worked long and hard during the six-month period, patiently guiding the 435 Directorate personnel who served on the component teams. Many of you performed additional duties, voluntarily and cheerfully, extending beyond the ten-hour work day, which kept the task force functioning smoothly.

2. This fine team effort and your personal contribution to it is in the best tradition of the Directorate of Operations. I commend you for a job well done.

Thank you – John McMahon

John N. McMahon

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM : Kenneth Corbat
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. James S. Woods

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-13 Position: Records Management Officer
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Information Management Staff
Date Requested for Retirement: 4 August 1978
Age at that Date : 50
Years of Creditable Service : 29
Years of Agency Service : 26
Years of Qualifying Service : 9

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommend that the request be approved.

/s/ Kenneth Corbat

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved.

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

2 AUG 1978
Date

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

3589

OUB - 11/1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

7h oct REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 5 Oct 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Woods, James S. ✓

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment AND CANCELLATION of NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 11 YEAR 77

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular ✓

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8033 4801 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: ✓
DDO/NE Division
Office of the Chief, NE Division
Plans Staff

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C. ✓

11. POSITION TITLE: Records Admin Off ~~[illegible]~~ (13) ✓

12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45 ✓

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC ✓

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS ✓

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01 ✓

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4 ✓

17. SALARY OR RATE: 24070 ~~$22,405~~ ✓

18. REMARKS:
replacing Peter Serra

#11 PER SUE 10.17.77

*SAL, BLURB

Concur:

#3 PER NANCY 10.17.77

Theodore H. Bummett 10/12/77
AC/PCS/CSS/Personnel Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John [illegible] CNE/PERS

DATE SIGNED: 10-05-77

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED: 11/31/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37

20. EMPLOY CODE: 10

21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46025 ALPHABETIC NE

22. STATION CODE: 7503

23. INTEGREE CODE:

24. VET. PREF. CODE: 1 ✓

25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28

26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28. [illegible] EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CIA 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

FOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.:

34. SEX:

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37. LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR./RESV./PROV./TEMP; CODE

39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.:

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42. LEAVE CAT. CODE:

43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 01 NOV 1977
10.14.77 RSP

*FROM: CCS

46. O P APPROVAL:

DATE APPROVED: 1 NOV 77

FORM 3-72 1152 ~~USE PREVIOUS EDITION~~

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

C-NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF FAN ~~[illegible]~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 09 YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: T230 0130 0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDC/CCS REGISTRY

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: BL 44

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 4

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,321

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald E. McMahill
Donald E. McMahill, Admin Off

DATE SIGNED: 9 Aug 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 39115 ALPHABETIC CCS

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE

24 VOOTRS CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 25

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 LTD EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO

34 SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV. TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 10 AUG 1976
BW
8-9-76

46 O P APPROVAL: B Bre[illegible]

DATE APPROVED

FORM 8-73 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

P

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

(4)

C-NO MAN ABJ 7/16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 July 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment - Change of Home Base
~~CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION~~

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 13 | YEAR 76

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7 COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 230 0118 | 0008

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CCS ✓
REGISTRY ✓

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 8L 44 ✓

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC ✓

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01 ✓

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 4 ✓ ✓

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,324 ✓✓

18 REMARKS: DAC to DCC

DESIGNATION CHANGED FROM DAC TO DCC.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald F. McMahill
DonaldF. Mc Mahill, CCS/ADM

DATE SIGNED: 13 Jul 76

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

US SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37

20 EMPLOY CODE: 10

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 31 | ALPHABETIC CCS

22 STATION CODE: 75013

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 ROSTER CODE: 1

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 | DA. [illegible] | YR. [illegible]

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. | DA. | YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO | DA. | YR.

28 VET BONUS: MO | DA. | YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE | CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE | MO. | DA. | YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. NO.

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE | 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. | DA. | YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO | DA | YR

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE | 0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE | HEALTH INS CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE | 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 20 JUL 1976 bh 7.19.76

46 CS APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED: 07/19/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

CR
11-22-74 C Macy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 November 1974

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 DAY 24 YEAR 74

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: XX V to V ☐ V to CF ☐ CF to V ☐ CF to CF

7 FAN AND NSCA: 5230 0121 0002

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): 50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/CCS
~~[illegible]~~
REGISTRY

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)

12 POSITION NUMBER: 0061

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DAC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 12 3

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 19,693

H
27

18 REMARKS

CONCUR: MARGARET SCOTT (TEEECOORD)
SS/SE/?E25

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald E. McMahill
Donald E. Mc Mahill CCS/ADE

DATE SIGNED: 13 Nov 74

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

DATE SIGNED: 15 Nov 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ROUTES CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	39115	CCS	75013		1 ✓	02 20 28	11 24 74	11 24 74

28 LTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE

30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OTHER 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE

32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ. CB

34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT

36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR STAFF PROV/TEMP CODE

39 FEGLI—HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 1—WAIVED 2—REG 3—REG/OPT 4—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-15-74 JFR 25 NOV 1974

46 OP APPROVAL

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
72

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 August 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER	010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WOODS, JAMES S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT, Transfer to [illegible] Funcs, AND DELEGATION OF N.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	MONTH 09 DAY 16 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. FAN AND NSCA	4230 0121 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/CCS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE	RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0061
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	11 6
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 16,326

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: ~~[illegible]~~ SS

*CONCUR FOR CIA W-2: [illegible]
CCS/OCB/S

CONCUR: GEORGE OWENS (TELECOORD)
C/EUR/PERS

CONCUR: WILLIAM H. FLIPPEN (TELECOORD)
DDP/RECORDS MGMT OFFICER

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Erich W. Isenstead, C/CCS	8/24/73		

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
16	10	39100	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-OUGH, 3-FICA, 4-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE, MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
XX XX XX							

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED, 1-REG, 2-REG/OPT, 3-INELIGIBLE)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION		46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
8-23-73	*FF Jr. EUR		28 Aug 73

FORM 1-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY 011-0332 E2 IMPDET (4)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

NOTE TO PCS RETURNEES

Personnel processing in from a PCS foreign field assignment through Central Processing Branch are required to review the Employee Conduct Handbook and the information for PCS returnees. This information is contained in a notebook provided by the CPB receptionist.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970 and the information for returnees dated 1 February 1972.

JAMES S WOODS
NAME
(Please Print)

James S Woods
Signature

11 Sept 73
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

[illegible]

17 APR 1973

Certificate of Exceptional
Service (for Vietnam)

Terrones, Aubrey F.
Taylor, Paul F.
Tilberry, Austin S.
Tilton, John S.
Tronnes, Sue Ann

Valetich, Steven T.
Vandaveer, Robert J.

Walker, Richard L.
Walsh, Frances M.
Ward, James R.
Ward, Loretta L.
Warren, Gail
Warren, Ward W.
Watson, William Bruce
Weagraff, Ross M.
Whelan, James W.
Whistler, Leonard
White, Walter W.
Whittinghill, Robert B. (no. 2)
Wickham, Ben, Jr.
Wilcox, Rose Marie
Williams, Bruce P.
Williams, Caryl Joyce
Williams, Edward, Jr.
Wilson, Carolyn J.
Wolfe, Mayme E.
Woods, James S.

Yellin, James H.
Young, Robert C.

VIETNAM (Contract Employees)

Allen, Maxwell J.

Bauso, Philip
Baylard, Robert W.
Bias, Louis
Bivens, Edmond
Bolton, William C., Jr.
Boos, Marvin L.
Bowman, David L.
Brown, Robert D.
Buckley, William F.

Chow, Gary Y. C.
Collins, Francis A.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 January 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 04 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3136 1267 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
ITALIAN AREA
ROME STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH

A 24

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ~~ADMIN~~ ADM OF~~FICER~~ (09)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11.6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $16326
18. REMARKS:
HOME BASE: IS: CONCUR Vivian Graham
PRA HR 20-17e (1) (a) PROMOTION NTE 1 yr.
CONCUR: C/E/ ITALY W J Snider

Mr. Woods will be assigned to DDP/COS/RMU position 0061 vice Mr. Evans.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL W Cooley WILLIAM C. COOLEY, C/E/PERS	DATE SIGNED 1/31/73	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER Jay R Kenner	DATE SIGNED 2/2/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA.	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
32	10	44750	EUR	36533		3	02	20	28	02	04	73	02	04	73

28. NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—OREGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
02	03	74	81									

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO	DA	YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES 2—NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 2-2-73 mw	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED 2/2/73

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4)

FEB 1973

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

JAMES WOODS

FROM:
EUR/PERS
4B0002 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/PERS/TEDDY				
2. C/E/PERS				
3. C/E/~~BR~~ I				
4. E/PERS/JON		1/31	Jon	for concurrence
5. C/IS/PERS	1 FEB 1973	2 Feb 73		for concurrence
6.				
7. CSPS/SOB GG10		2/2/73		7. Subject will be assigned as Ch Reg. + RMO DDP/CCS upon his return to Hqs (about Aug 73), vice Evan.
8.				
9. OP/PI 5E03				Mr. Woods will be assigned to CCS/RMO position 0061 vice Mr. Michael Evan.
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 MARCH 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 05 DAY 30 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1136-1267
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
FOREIGN FIELD
ITALIAN AREA
ROME STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH

A 24

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OF (09) 9
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18. REMARKS:

X HB: EUR

1 cc: Payroll

From: DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

No Language Required
PRA HR 20-17E(1) (B) NTE Two Yrs

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 3/15/71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED: 5/5/71

A 25

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21 OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24 HQQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27 DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
20	10	44625	[illegible]	36533		3	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION, CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
05 29 73	82						

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) · 36 SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. · 37. LONG COMP. DATE MO DA. YR. · 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE · 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE · 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE
1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE
2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS)
3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)

42 LEAVE CAT. CODE

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO · CODE · NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO · CODE · NO TAX EXEMP · STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 5-7-71
46. O P APPROVAL: C Blake
DATE APPROVED: 5-10-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

P. 1

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 02 DECEMBER 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 13 YEAR 70
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V XX CF TO CF ☐
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1236-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

A 25

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,041

18. REMARKS

2cc: SECURITY & Other
cc: PAYROLL

HB EUR

FROM: DDP/EUR/FOREIGN FIELD
LONDON, ENGLAND SLOT# 0254

Security Approval Granted by Pers. 12/4/70
Pl 12/10/70

NTE: 30 June 1971
Pending Reassignment

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 3 Dec 70
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO.	DA.	YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO.	DA	YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO.	DA.	YR.
16	18	44942	EUR	75313		1	02	20	28						

A 1

28. NTE EXPIRES MO.	DA.	YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 4—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO.	DA.	YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES)	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO)	CODE	NO TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-8-70 MW
46. O P APPROVAL: W Keat
DATE APPROVED: 12/8/70

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 JANUARY 1971

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 10 YEAR 71

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF XX CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 1234-1186

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER

12 POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 7

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18 REMARKS

HQ: EUR

cc: Payroll
TO CORRECT EFFECTIVE DATE TO READ 1/10/71 VICE 12/13/70

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLIAM C. COOLEY, AC/E/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 1/21/71

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: 1/21/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 58
20 EMPLOY CODE: 18
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 44997 ALPHABETIC EUR
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HDQTRS CODE: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE 76 MO. 12 DA. 13 YR. 70
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG COMP. DATE: MO DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV PROV./TEMP. CODE
39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVER 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1-26-71 MW

46 O P APPROVAL: W Heat

DATE APPROVED: 1/26/71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

10

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 FEBRUARY 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER ✓ 010032	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) ✓ WOODS, JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED MONTH 02 DAY 18 YEAR 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR
6. FUNDS ▶ XX V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE 1236-1186	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE $ 13,821 ✓

18. REMARKS

FROM 1234-1186
cc: Payroll

KH/B/EUR

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers	DATE SIGNED 12 Feb 71	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED 17 Feb 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. EMPLOY CODE 18	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44999	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 15013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS CODE 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1—CS 2—ORGN 3—FICA 5—NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION 2-18-71	46. O P APPROVAL W.R.H.	DATE APPROVED 2-18-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

8

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
WOODS, JAMES S.	SELF	70-0961

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 6 MAY 1970.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
19 JUNE 1970	/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

14-00000

SECRET

14 May 1968 approved

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion for Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10

1. FE Vietnam Operations concurs in the field recommendation for the promotion of Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10. Following is the recommendation from the Chief, Operational Services Branch, Vietnam Station.

"Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

"As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

"Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross-training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever-increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

"Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

"Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level."

2. If promoted, Subject will occupy the position of IO General, GS-11, Slot # 4984.

John Caswell
Douglas S. Blaufarb
Chief, Vietnam Operations

SECRET

4 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion - Mr. James S. Woods

1. It is recommended that Subject be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

2. As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in a highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

3. Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

4. Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his Section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

5. Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level.

/s/John K. Smith
Chief, OSB

CONCUR /s/Vincent Lockhart
Acting Deputy Chief of Station

APPROVE: /s/Lewis J. Lapham
Chief of Station

14-00000

PRP SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED
8 Oct 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER	010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WOODS, JAMES S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	11 / 1 / 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / V TO CF ☐ / CF TO CF XX
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	9136 1214
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION LONDON STATION SUPPORT BRANCH REGISTRY SECTION
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	LONDON, ENGLAND
11. POSITION TITLE	RECORDS ADM OF (09)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0254
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	10 6
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 10,847

A
7

18. REMARKS

PRA 20-F7-D(1)(B) (B)
NTE 2 yr.
vice Imogene Letirague

CONCUR: ~~Mary Boulger~~ FE/Pers
By Phone

259a Attached

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers	7 oct 68		22 OCT 1968

F
24

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	37
20. EMPLOY. CODE	10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC	44525
21. OFFICE CODING — ALPHABETIC	EUR
22. STATION CODE	21025
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. MINUTES CODE	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
28. STE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	11 01 70
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	S.S
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—ORGN, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	
37. LONG COMP. DATE	
38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. ESSY PROV/TEMP)	
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT; STATE CODE)	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
From FE. 10-28-68 mw		

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 July 1968

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 28 | YEAR 68

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 9137 1487

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNO - VIET NAM STATION
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
COLLATION BRANCH
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION
BIOGRAPHIC UNIT

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, South Vietnam.

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF D 11

12 POSITION NUMBER: 4984

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 6

17 SALARY OR RATE: $ 10847

18 REMARKS:

RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING IO GENERAL POSITION.

19A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CFE/PERSONNEL, Mary T. Boulger

DATE SIGNED: 23 July 68

19B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert M. White

DATE SIGNED: 2 1

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 22
20 EMPLOYEE CODE: 10
21 ORGANIZATIONAL CODING: NUMERIC: 85200 ALPHABETIC: FE
22 STATION CODE: 77205
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOURS CODE: 3
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28.
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—CSCH 3—FICA 4—NONE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
ECD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION:
46 O P APPROVAL:
DATE APPROVED: 25 Jul 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 NOVEMBER

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY YEAR 66
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF ☒
7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137-1487
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE/FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
REGISTRY SECTION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF ~~GS-11~~ (11)
12 POSITION NUMBER: 4127
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 09/~~4~~ 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~9001~~ 9262

18 REMARKS
FROM: JKO/TOKYO STATION/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/
CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SECTION

18

14

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: W. T. BOULGER, CFE/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 2 Dec 66
18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER
DATE SIGNED: 2 Dec 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 37
20 EMPLOY CODE: 10
21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 45500 ALPHABETIC FE
22 STATION CODE: 77265
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 HOGTRS CODE: 5
25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 02 DA. 20 YR. 28
26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1-CSC 2-FICA 3-NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE MO. DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ. NO.
34 SEX
35 VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT
36 SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37 LONG. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38 CAREER CATEGORY: CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0-WAIVED 1-YES HEALTH INS. CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP STATE CODE
45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 1307066N
46 O P APPROVAL
DATE APPROVED: 12/1/66

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

F-14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 Nov 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOOLE, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 18 YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137-1566

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11 POSITION TITLE:

12 POSITION NUMBER:

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.):

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES:

16 GRADE AND STEP: 9

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL:

DATE SIGNED:

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:

DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE:

20 EMPLOY CODE:

21 OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC

22 STATION CODE:

23 INTEGREE CODE:

24 HOGTRS CODE:

25 DATE OF BIRTH: MO. DA. YR.

26 DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.

27 DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.

28 NTE EXPIRES: MO. DA. YR.

29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:

30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-FICA, 3-NONE): CODE 2

31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:

32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE / MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33 SECURITY REQ NO:

34 SEX:

35 VET PREFERENCE: CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)

36 SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

37 LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.

38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP): CODE

39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE (0-WAIVED, 1-YES) / HEALTH INS. CODE

40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))

42 LEAVE CAT CODE:

43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-21-66 N

46 OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 16 NOV 66

DATE APPROVED:

1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
7-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

5 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion
of Mr. James S. Woods
from GS-09 to GS-10

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. James S. Woods be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and Atsugi, Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958. He was previously recommended for promotion to GS-10 in November 1964 and June 1965.

2. In the promotion recommendation for the Tokyo Station, 9 November 1964, the [illegible] commented on Mr. Woods as follows:

"A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at [illegible] Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is located in [illegible] different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods in his area. Final action responsibility [illegible] incoming cables is rapidly and properly [illegible], dispatches and [illegible] properly routed and processed, correspondence from other local military agencies is correctly analyzed and routed. The [illegible]-day routing system is functioning effectively, and the Station [illegible] is rapidly turning out [illegible] dispatch traffic.

"B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods [illegible] Chief of this [illegible]. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that [illegible] Registry [illegible] well-functioning unit.

Not Approved
3/1/66

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

3. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "strong" manner as indicated in his recent fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Tokyo Station Registry from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 9 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who constantly strives to achieve the maximum economy in the use of his personnel and materials."

4. The Acting Chief [illegible] concurred [illegible] qualification that Mr. Woods be promoted [illegible] GS-10 [illegible] Mr. Woods be promoted to GS-10 at the [illegible]

Terry T. Shima
for Richard G. Davis
Chief, [illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Louise A. - wife	66-502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 October 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 DEC 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Wife - Louise A.	66-148

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 June 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 AUG 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 Feb 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 110032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, James S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential funds

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 DAY 19 YEAR 61

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☒ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JAO Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief
Central Registry and Records Section

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Intel Analyst - Gen 12-D

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3061

12a. PCR CONTROL NO.:

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.36

16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 6765

18. REMARKS:
FROM: FE/Office of the Chief/2461 tray 1
1cc - Security

Form 259 forwarded to Medical Staff
Departure Date: 31 March 1961
FE/CMC Approved

Security App[illegible] 2/16/61
mr 3/14/61

18a. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL
ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/FE PERSONNEL

18b. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	45
20. EMPLOY. CODE	11
21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	5130
21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	[illegible]
22. STATION CODE	
23. INTEGREE CODE	
24. [illegible] CODE	3
25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE	
27. DATE OF LEI	
28. NTE EXPIRES	
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	
30. RETIREMENT DATA	
31. SEPARATION DATA CODES	
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	
EOD DATA	
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	
34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.)	
36. SERV. COMP. DATE	
37. LONG. COMP. DATE	
38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT (1 = YES, 2 = NO)	
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 = WAIVER, 1 = YES)	
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS), 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS))	
42. [illegible] CODE	
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	
44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 = YES, 2 = NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 03/13/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL

52 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152a.

SECRET

(4)

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: **James S. Woods**

VIA : **Chief, FE**

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 16 December 1958 , you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

Wendell E. Little

WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	12	48		1	50 USCA 403 J					/	04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld- Frgn-	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	01	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Reassignment/[illegible] Vouchered [illegible]	01	3	22	59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Office of the Chief Secretariat	5112	Washington, D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld- Frgn-	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	Records Mgmt Of	2461 5A-11		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$								9 3700 20 001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Harriet Weiler, CFE/Secretariat

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): M. L. Shobe, CFE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		3-12-59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks

please transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered funds
2 Copies to Security

u/o File

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1152

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 October 1958

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52	
7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.
XX	XX	XX		1	50 USCA 403 J						04	21

12. LCD Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit. Lve Yes-1 No-2	Code	
52		2	

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 8 4	$ 5430 4795	D1	~~04~~	~~10~~	~~55~~	~~04~~	~~06~~	~~50~~	9 8 3780 55 006

75

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	11	16	58	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/PSH - Philippines Station Support Branch	5161		57557

33. Dept. - Field Dept - USfld - Frgn -	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
9 1	$ 5985		11	16	58	11	15	59	9-3780-55-006

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title) Arthur F. [illegible] /PSH	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Monelle Little 2057	H. L. Strobe, C/FE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board		11/13/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		11/14/58	E.		
C. Classification	Alex. M. Dudley	7 Oct 58	F. Approved By		11/14/58

Remarks Request for upgrading slot to GS-9 submitted to Wage & Salary Division. (Hold promotion in Career Panel until slot approved.)

Recorded by CSPD
Nov 1958

FORM NO. 1152
1 MAR 57

(4)

SECRET

COPY AIR

HMMA-A-9355
(50-1-5)

Chief, WH Division
ATTN : Chief, RI
Chief of Station, Mexico City

31 January 1958

Administrative

TDY Service - RI Team

ACTION REQUIRED: Routing copies to Personnel files of employees concerned

1. During the period of February to August 1957, Francis E. SUCY, James R. WOODS, Dorothy SPICKA, Virginia LONG, and Sarah J. BENNETT served the Mexico City Station as a Records Reorganization team. The Chief of Station, Mexico City, wishes to make it a matter of record that the RI employees listed above served efficiently and well and were a fine addition to this station during their service here.

2. Mexico City Station wishes to acknowledge at this time, not only the exemplary service rendered by these employees but also the splendid support that RI Division has given to this station.

3. The RI employees named in paragraph 1 worked hard (spending many hours more than the forty normal work hours each week) and efficiently on Mexico City Station files. In addition, they were congenial, friendly and a pleasure to have in the Station.

WINSTON SCOTT

ACF/cps

29 January 1958

Distribution:
8 - Hqs.
2 - Files

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] — FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse. ✓

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 1928		5 July 1957

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment * transfer to UV funds

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 8/1/57 [illegible]
B. APPROVED: 8 Sept 57

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Intel Analyst BV-430.12 4795 GS-0132.35-7 ~~$4660.00~~ p/a DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section Washington, D.C.	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 3161 11. HEADQUARTERS	~~Intel Analyst~~ BFF-5382 Records Ref Analyst 4795 ~~GS-0132.35-7~~ $4660.00 p/a DDP/FE GS-0306.01-7 Branch 3 - Philippines Station Administrative Section Manila, R.P
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
# Memo dtd 18 June 1957 to Mgm staff via SSA/DD/S requesting that three RI Positions (1 GS-9 and 2 GS-7s - Record Analyst) be established on the Manila T/O. Woods to be slotted against the GS-9 slot.
Please call FE/PT/III x 4009 for effective date.
(2) copies to Security.

Raymond B. Wilson
DDP/FI

Concur & Fit. Rep.
[illegible]

B. REQUESTED BY
R. A. Gage
RONALD GAGE, FE/PERSONNEL OFFICER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM 8-2309-23 TO: 8-3780-55-006 [illegible]	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS
DOC 04.10.55
PSI - 04.06.56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JJD	8/5	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	D. L. REEDY		
E.			UV, D.U. to be forwarded to payroll

F. APPROVED BY
Sue Connolly [illegible] 7/12/57 ; [illegible] 16 August 57

10—63137-8

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 Aug 1956
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
BV-430.02	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel Analyst BV-430.12
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot BV-430.02 was used for slotting purposes only—this action will eliminate double slotting.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief, RI John M. Scott
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2510
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: , FI/PO
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	R. A.	REAL.

SD: DI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM: 7-2309-23 TO: SAME
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:
20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE 16 Aug 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	LP	2/17/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		17 Aug 56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY C. Little, 17 Aug 56

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr – Miss – Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 14 June 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-CI BFF 583.05		Intel Analyst BV-430.02
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00		GS-~~0136.53-7~~ -0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	1188	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan		Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered Funds.
Vice Lenore Johnson, transferring to EE
Copies of this action have been submitted to Payroll and Security offices.

CONCUR:

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief, RI John M. Scott

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2510

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: Ex CMO 26 June 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER, 5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD: DI

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION FROM 6-3740-55-096 TO 6-2309-23
17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: DC

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

FI PASSED

26 June 56 RA

Concurrently [illegible] 21 June 56

6/29/56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	6/27/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[illegible]	10 Jul 56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

SECRET

Name: WOODS, James S.   Date: 15 June 1956

CS Designation: DI

Nature of Action: Reassignment

	FROM	TO
Pos. Title:	I. O. (CI)	Intel Analyst
Grade:	GS-7	GS-7
Division:	DDP/FE	DDP/FI
Staff:	Branch 1 - Korea Base	RI
Branch:	Records Integration	Analysis [illegible] & Operations
Section:	Personality Files	Analysis
Hdqrs:	Yokosuka, Japan	Washington

I & R Comment ____ 19 JUN 1956 ____
Date

14-00000

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. FKLA 5886

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 4 FEB 1955

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Chief, Korea Mission

INFO: Chief, Support Mission, Okinawa

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative/Personnel

SPECIFIC- Recommendation for Promotion - James S. WOODS

1. It is recommended that James S. WOODS be promoted from GS-5 to GS-7. Subject entered on duty with the Korea Mission 26 July 1954.

2. WOODS presently occupies proposed Slot No. 21 which has been recommended as a GS-9 slot. Subject has been in grade as a GS-5 since 6 June 1953 and has performed the duties of his present assignment since 10 August 1954.

3. Subject has had approximately two years of experience in the maintenance of agent records. This experience has enabled him not only to assume his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision, but also to initiate a completely new and improved system for the maintenance of the agent records of the Korea Mission. Due partially to the efficiency of the system that he has initiated and partially to the enthusiasm with which he approaches his work, FOSHAG has assumed the work load previously handled by two individuals and at the same time has managed to keep his backlog to a minimum.

4. WOODS is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours of overtime without additional compensation in order to maintain his section on a current basis. Subject individual devoted unusually long hours to reestablish himself during the recent move of this Mission to Japan. On the basis of work performance and motivation, subject is recommended as justly deserving of promotion to GS-7.

5. I certify that WOODS is performing the duties outlined in the job description attached hereto.

/s/ JOHN L. HART

1 February 1955

1 ENCL - a/s
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Chief, FE
1 - Chief, SM

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

POSITION DESCRIPTION - James S. WOODS

1. Nature and Purpose of Work:

My position is that of intelligence analyst in the Personality File section of the Records Integration Branch. I am responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files.

2. Duties:

a. To maintain all agent records. This takes a good percentage of my time as it includes the following:

(1) Make all KOMI file checks on PRQ's and file check requests, writing up the results and forwarding them to the proper agencies.

(2) Make sure that all PRQ's and file check requests have the correct classification, the proper number of copies for distribution, correct name and telecodes, and are forwarded to the proper case officer or foreign unit.

(3) See that the results of KOMI file checks received from Headquarters and CHIKI are properly carded and forwarded to the case officer concerned.

(4) Keep all agent records up-to-date with regard to cryptonyms, POC's, OC's and other additional information received.

(5) Keep files on all terminated agents and see that the proper records are filled out and forwarded when they are terminated.

b. To maintain the RI card index, assuring that all cards received in RI are properly filed and have the correct names and telecodes.

c. To analyze, card and file all documents forwarded to Personality Files; these includ **State Station** memos, MOR's, Contact Reports, COMAFE Reports, FBIC's, various intelligence summaries, etc.

3. Responsibility for the Work of Others:

N/A

4. Scope and Effect of Work:

I am responsible for making all KOMI file checks. I must see that they are made out thoroughly, quickly and accurately. My check may decide the outcome of hiring or refusing to hire a prospective agent or other employee for an operation or project.

5. Supervision and Guidance Received:

I receive no direct supervision or guidance in duties relating to the maintenance of agent records. I receive over-all policy guidance from the Chief of RI and some guidance from branch chiefs and case officers.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 Mental Demands:

a. Initiative: In order to maintain agent records properly, I must always keep alert for new ways to keep them up-to-date and meet any demands that may be made for drawing up new procedures for the maintenance of agent records.

b. Originality: To adopt new ways of maintaining agent records without losing control over the flow of daily material.

c. Judgment: I must decide what action should be taken on all KOMI file checks, regarding what information is to be sent to Headquarters and CHIMI.

7. Personal Work Contacts:

I must maintain close personal contact with all case officers and branch chiefs in order that I may maintain up-to-date agent records.

8. Other:

I must maintain files of all documents routed to Personality Files. Also I must resolve problems the branch chiefs or case officers may have in regard to agent records.

Also, I have recently established a 201 agent record system for the Mission and am responsible for its continual maintenance.

CHECK LIST FOR TRAINING

Woode James S
Name

1. Typing
2. Shorthand

3. English Usage

[✓ 4.] Office Practice
(Electric typewriter, filing, phones, Correspondence Manual, proofreading, office protocol.)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO
UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. WOODS	20 Feb 28		16 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: Sob, 25 Apr 54

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intell. Anal. BI-469.08	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO(FI) BFF 602.02-5
~~GS-132.5~~, $3410.00 p.a. GS-0132.35-5	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-~~5~~5, $3410.00 p.a.
DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Staff~~ DIV Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/TE UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ~~Intelligence~~ Division ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds.

Concur John M. Scott CHIEF, RI

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Edward F. Mitchell TE-1 X8761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT USSAB	10 POINT OTHER
	✓		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2300-20 TO: 7-3740-55-096	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Eff date okay
Spec. FC-FI
16 Apr

Conc. 26 Mar 54.
16 Apr

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jm	29 Mar 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	Taylor	29 Mar 54.	
E.			

SECRET

F. APPROVED BY
Taylor 30 Mar 54

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname*) James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 1 June 1953
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Promotion B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 7 June 53	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08
GS-~~4-132~~ 132-4 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-~~5-132~~ 132-5 $3410.00 pa
DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Subject has been in grade since ~~21 April~~ 17 aug 1952.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*) JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Edward C. McNamara
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*) 2510	Title: Ac. FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
		FROM: TO:			☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	4 June	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Orville A. Dawson 4 June 1953

Mr. James S. Woods 25 1 June 1953

Washington, D. C.
Intel. Anal. FI/RI

GS-4
GS-5

BV-469.08
GS-4

BV-469.08
GS-5

High School Graduate, 2 years of Business College

Treasury Dept., Accounting Clerk, GS-2, May 1950 to Jan. 1952
GS-3, Jan. 1952 to April 1952

OSO/RI, File Section, File Clerk, GS-3, 21 April 1952 to 17 Aug. 1952
GS-4, 17 Aug. 1952 to 16 March 1953
DDP/FI/RI, Consolidation Section, Mail & File Clerk, GS-4, 16 March 1953 to present

Chief, RI

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible]—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): James S. Woods

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 Apr 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 26 Apr 53

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM—		TO—
Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4
GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-132 $3175.00 pa
DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Position BV-364.08 has been deleted from the T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension):

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: C/ FI/OO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

15. SEX:
16. RACE:
17. APPROPRIATION 16X2100
FROM: 2319-20
TO: 2319-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	20 April
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY Orville Z Dawson 20 Apr 1953

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[illegible] — FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): James S. Woods

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928

3. REQUEST NO.:

4. DATE OF REQUEST: 2 March 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 15 Mar 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	File Clerk BV-356		Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa		GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch File Section		DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL		☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From BV-356 to BV-364.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M Scott

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension):

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY:
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT	
				DISAB.	OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L. A.	REAL

15. SEX

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO:
2309-20

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY James H. Prell - 3/6/53

14-00000

PERSONN__ ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: James S. Woods

REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Aug

NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion

WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED)

LAST WORKING DAY:

EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	File Clerk X-39.04	File Clerk X-102.22
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	RI	RI
BRANCH AND SECTION	Processing & Records Branch File Section	Analysis & Operations Branch Service & Correspondence Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

From X-39.04 to X-102.22

Subject has been in grade since 21 April 1952.

Approved: John M. Scott

31 July 52 Chief, RI

RECOMMENDED:

8 5 52
(DATE)

SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED		CLEARANCE APPROVED	
DATE	TYPE	DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE	SIGNATURE
8/13/52	Thomas M. Fisher

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION: 11X2100

ALLOTMENT: 2309-02

C. S. C. AUTHORITY: Sch. A 6.116 (8)

DATE	SIGNATURE
8-14-52	B. Leidy

PERSONNEL RELATIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS ☐ SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
7 Aug 52	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10—02462-1

Fie

21. To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are ested to furnish promptly the leave data on

From 11 May 1950 to 19 April 1952
Fiscal Acct. Clerk GS - 3 $2950.00 per annum
SUPERVISOR: Miss Ryan
U.S. Treasury Department
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
PLEASE FORWARD FILE AND LEAVE RECORD TO:

WOODS, JAMES S.
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquires should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 20a.

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

10—61956-1

22. Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

FORWARD OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER TO
R. H. J. HOPKINS,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24[illegible] E STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are reque o furnish promptly the leave data on

FROM 11 May 1950 to April 1952
Fiscal Acct. Clerk GS 3 $2950.00
U.S. Treasury Dept.
15th & Penna. Ave N.W.
Washington D.C.

James S. Woods
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquiries should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 18a.

10-61906-4 GPO

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

George E. Meloon
2430 E Street N.W.
Washington D.C.

SF 1150 was forwarded by your office in May 1952. Since this copy has been detached from our files it is requested that you forward a copy of same to the address at left.

1/15 P.S.L

14-00000

Tou

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. TO OSO FI	2. DATE 22 April 1952

Notice of Final Processing of Applicant for Entrance on Duty

3. NAME James E. Woods	4. ENTRANCE SALARY $2950.00
5. TITLE T - File Clerk	6. GRADE GS — 3

The applicant named in item 3 above meets all standards for full employment with CIA. Signed clearance for entrance on duty has been received from Inspection and Security and made a part of the personnel file of this individual. Effective this date he/she is assigned to duty with your office.

Full - 26 March 1952
Int. - 23 April at 3:00 P.M.

POSTED
APR 30 1952

Frank C. Jarema WCD
PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-114
JAN 1952

(4)

Date APR 4 1952

MR. JAMES WOODS
3505 MINN. AVE, SE
CITY

Dear MR WOODS,

Your employment has been approved by this Agency at $2950 per annum, subject to the satisfactory completion of additional processing on the day you enter on duty. It is requested that you report to the Receptionist, East End of Temporary "I" Building located at 17th and Independence Avenue, S. W., at 8:30 a.m. as soon as possible.

Please advise Mrs. Brown, 2430 "E" Street, N. W., by telephone, Executive 6115, Extension 3698 of your exact reporting date.

Sincerely yours,

EJS APR 4 - 1952
FRANK [illegible]. JAREMA
Personnel Division

Subject telephoned: 4-5-52 ; spoke with EJS
(date)

Subject will EOD 21 Apr 52 - Now w/ Treasury

SUBJECT WILL NOT EOD; Reason: Release obtained

[illegible] 4/8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 March 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
3505 Minnesota Avenue, S. E.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS-3, $ 2950 per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

FRANK C. JAKEMA
Personnel Division

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE NO ....

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 5 Mar 52	ROUTINE ☐ PRIORITY ☐ URGENT ☐
FROM: PDC	(ORIGINATING OFFICER) (PHONE EXTENSION)
TRANSMIT TO: MR. JAMES WOODS ~~2817 CONNECTICUTT AVE., N. W.~~ WASHINGTON, D. C.	re new address on route sheet (CLASSIFICATION)

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

TELEGRAM - NIGHT LETTER

EMPLOYMENT APPROVED THIS AGENCY $ 2750 PER ANNUM, SUBJECT SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ADDITIONAL PROCESSING. DESIRE REPORT SOONEST POSSIBLE RECEPTIONIST, EAST END TEMPORARY "I" BUILDING, 17TH AND INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, SOUTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 8:30 A.M. ADVISE MRS. BROWN 2430 "E" STREET NORTHWEST, BY COLLECT NIGHT LETTER OR COLLECT PHONE, EXECUTIVE 6115, EXTENSION 3698 THE EXACT REPORTING DATE.

Frank G. Jarema
FRANK G. JAREMA

Is now a GS-3 (actual PHS) won't take a GS-2.
8 March

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 35-7 JUN 1949

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 February 1952
In reply refer to ED-4

Mr. James Woods
2317 Conn. Avenue N. W.
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

If applicable, the attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

Personnel Division

Enclosure
2 SF-57
1 Append
1 PHS
Please forward three passport size photographs at your earliest convenience.

m 0

14-00000

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on APR 28 1952 (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

James S Woods
(NAME)

[illegible]

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

(6)

384

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

File
MD

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Woods., James S.

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: , File Clerk

GRADE: GS - 3

BRANCH: CSO .RI

SERVICE: DEPT.

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: EXC.

OK

[illegible]Y DACEY
[illegible] BLDG.

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME James S. WOODS	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE APR 21 1952
NATURE OF ACTION Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		File Clerk I-39.04-2
GRADE AND SALARY	F. C. 26 March 52	GS-305-3 $2950.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		RI
BRANCH AND SECTION		Processing and Records Branch File Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

(To P-39.04) JW

Approved: John M. Scott
Chief, RI
15 FEB 1952

#57

In status 4-28-52

RECOMMENDED:

15 Feb '52
(DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF, OR [illegible] OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT

DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED James H. Powell

CLEARANCE REQUESTED

DATE	TYPE

CLEARANCE APPROVED

DATE	TYPE

DATE	SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

DATE	SIGNATURE
27 Feb.	

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS

APPROPRIATION 2123900

ALLOTMENT 3009

C. S. C. AUTHORITY Sch A 6. 116 (8)

DATE SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
21 Apr. 52	Margaret C. Dacey

PERSONNEL SELECTIONS

DATE	SIGNATURE

APPROVALS

SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE	SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF
4 Mar 52	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. H-3007A

DATE [illegible]

FULL NAME (Last) WOOKS,	(First) JAMES	(Middle) [illegible]	YEAR OF BIRTH 1928
POSITION TITLE FILE CLERK		GRADE GS-3	CODE
LOCATION (OFFICE) [illegible]	CODE	DIVISION [illegible]	CODE
BRANCH [illegible]	CODE		

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE) W., D.C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☒ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY 5. ☐ OTHERS:

FUNDS ☒ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

☒ PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group) D ST. POOL

☒ SECRET

☒ FULL

☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr)	EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)	RECRUITMENT SOURCE	CODE
			01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☒ M-V 2. ☐ M-NV 3. ☐ F-V 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

SECURITY INITIATED BY [illegible]. SUPERSEDES ACTION OF 1/5/52.
CHANGE OF OFFICE, DIVISION & BRANCH.

Attachments:
PHS
Append, I ______
Photos. ______

FRANK O. [illegible]
SIGNATURE

[illegible]
DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
AUG 1951

(8)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Joanna

DATE: 8 Feb. 1952

FROM :

SUBJECT: WOODS, JAMES

In Process as GS 2 Clerk. He wants accounting clerk eventually, but there are no openings at present, & we have two other - better qualified - accounting clerks in process in reserve at present.

Possibility for microfilm trainee?

Haugland

P.O. 12-26

MP

2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.

January 12, 1952

Dear Sir:

I received your letter dated January 5, stating that I was to inform you of any changes in my present status.

I am now a grade GS 2 with an one year increase. I am now being considered for a grade GS 3 in the Treasury Dept. I assure you, this does not lesson my zeal to get in the C.I.A.

I would like to know if your Agency would transfer or consider me for appointment at a grade GS 3.

Sincerely yours,

James [illegible]

14-00000

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST NO. 1-2007

DATE 1/5/52

FULL NAME	(Last) WOODS	(First) JAMES	(Middle) [illegible]	YEAR OF BIRTH [illegible]
POSITION TITLE Clerk			GRADE GS-2	CODE
LOCATION (OFFICE) Personnel	CODE	DIVISION Personnel (O)	CODE	BRANCH Personnel Pool	CODE

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE) Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☒ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY
5. ☐ OTHER:

FUNDS
☒ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED
☒ PROVISIONAL POA (Show name of pool or group) D. Street Pool
☒ SECRET
☒ FULL
☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr)	EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)	RECRUITMENT SOURCE	CODE 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☐ M-V 3. ☐ F-V
2. ☒ M-NV 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

Morris 1-17-52

Attachments:
PHS
Append, I ___1___
Photos. ___1___

CONFIDENTIAL

JOSEPH D. RAGAN
Chief, Personnel Division
DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

SECURITY INFORMATION

(8)

5 January 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
2017 Conn. Ave. N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

You are being considered for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency at grade GS 2, salary $2750.00 per annum.

The appointment, if offered, will be temporary indefinite in nature. Processing procedures require about 30 days to complete. Unless you are notified to the contrary during this period, you may assume that you are being actively considered for employment. Upon completion of this processing, we will contact you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you will keep us advised of any changes in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Please let us know immediately if during the interim you find that you will not be able to accept employment with this organization.

Very truly yours,

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Personnel Division

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST NO.

DATE: 4 JAN. 1952

FULL NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1928

POSITION TITLE: CLERK

GRADE: GS 2

CODE:

LOCATION (OFFICE): Pool

CODE:

DIVISION:

CODE:

BRANCH:

CODE:

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE)

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. ☑ REGULAR 2. ☐ CONTACT 3. ☐ CONSULTANT 4. ☐ MILITARY
5. ☐ OTHER:

FUNDS
☑ VOUCHERED ☐ UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

☑ PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group)

☑ SECRET
☑ FULL
☐ WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr): asap

EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr):

RECRUITMENT SOURCE

CODE: 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. ☑ M-V 3. ☐ F-V
2. ☐ M-NV 4. ☐ F-NV

REMARKS:

89 to Med. Sas
1/5

Attachments:
FHS
Append, I ______
Photos. ______

CONFIDENTIAL
URITY INFORMATION

SIGNATURE

DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

(9)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 3 January 1952

FROM :

SUBJECT: James S. Woods

1. Contacted Treasury Dept. this date and Employee Relations Officer stated that subject had no efficiency ratings since he had not been there long enough before being granted military furlough and after his discharge. However, she stated that Mr. Woods had been a very satisfactory employee and there was nothing derogatory in his file.

L. E. BLAIS

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

THIS DATE: 18 Dec. 51

NAME: James Sauvie Woods

REFERRED BY:

HOME ADDRESS: 2817 Conn. Ave., N. W. Wash., D. C.

TELEPHONE: AD 8430

BUSINESS ADDRESS: Treasury

TELEPHONE: EX 6400 x2612

DATE OF BIRTH: 2:20:1928

PLACE OF BIRTH: Forest River, N. D.

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED): US

NAME OF SPOUSE: none - no expectations

DATE OF BIRTH:

PLACE OF BIRTH:

CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED):

SALARY REQUESTED: GS-2

NO. OF DEPENDENTS: none

INTERVIEWER: WM. J. BINGHAM

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

Hadlich's Bus. Sch. Diploma in jr. accounting

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

Present- Treasury Dept. I/A attached

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

Oct 3, 1946 Apr 12, 1948

Oct 19, 1950 Aug 7, 1951

Pfc (Infantry)

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-11)

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY.

Japan, Korea (US Army) No 10-9

LANGUAGE FACILITY

None

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

A CLEAN CUT, BRIGHT EYED, EAGER YOUNGSTER, VERY AMBITIOUS BUT HAS HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE. HE WOULD LIKE TO GET INTO ACCOUNTING, BUT HE HAS HAD ONLY BASIC ACCOUNTING AND HAS NEVER HAD A JOB IN ACCOUNTING TO TEST HIM. HE IS WILLING TO TAKE A CLERK JOB IF HE WILL GET A CHANCE ~~CLEARANCE~~ AT ACCOUNTING. WILL GO O/S. FEELS HE IS BLOCKED IN HIS JOB IN TREASURY DEPT. SINCE HE WILL COME AS A GS-2, I WOULD TAKE A CHANCE ON HO HIM IF HIS TESTS SHOW ANYTHING ENCOURAGING. HE EXPECTS TO ENTER STRAYERS COLLEGE OF ACCOUNTING (NIGHT) IN FEBRUARY. DOES NOT DESIRE POOL. SUGGEST MISS MC KENNEY LOOK HIM OVER. FORMS ATTACHED. HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR GS-4 CLERK-ACCT. TEST ON 20 DECEMBER.

FORMS GIVEN: ☐ PHS ☐ MEDICAL ☐ RESERVE

WILLIAM J. BINGHAM
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: Personnel Division
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street, N. W.
Washington, 25, D. C.

DEC 3 1951

SUBJECT: Availability of James S. Woods

1. This is to advise you that no objection is interposed to your consideration of the application for employment of the above-named individual who is presently employed by this office.

2. In the event this employee is accepted by your Agency, it is requested that the individual named below be contacted relative to the effective date of his ~~transferxxxxxxx~~ release.

Grubb
(Signature)

Acting Personnel Officer
(Title)

Bureau of Accounts
Treasury Department
(Agency)

Contact for further information:

Frances C. Murphy
(Name) Employee Relations Officer

Code 172, Extension 2628
(Telephone)

SECERT

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REPRODUCTION MASTERS

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BIOGRAPH

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

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NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 12 May 1975

FILE NO.: 2542

SS NUMBER: 502-16-6806

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CCS

ATTN: CHIEF ADMIN STAFF

REF: VERBAL REQUEST

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☒ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______

☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)

SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)

SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ [illegible] (HHB 20-11)

SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE [illegible] THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)

SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)

EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐

SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER-UNBLOCK RECORDS

X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD

X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)

X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 2 (HHB 20-7)

X EAA: CATEGORY I ☒ CATEGORY II ☐

X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS

X [illegible] FORM 26[illegible] CHIA [illegible] HOSPITALIZATION [illegible]

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS [illegible]

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr52-Aug54	HQS/Overt
Aug54-Nov56	Korea and Japan/DAC
Nov56-Aug57	HQS/Overt
Aug57-Feb59	Philippines/DAFC
Feb59-Mar61	HQS/DAFC
Mar61-Jan67	Japan/DAC
Jan67-Oct68	HQS/STATE-NOM
Oct68-Nov70	London/DAC
Nov70-Jun71	HQS/DAC
Jun71-Aug73	Rome-STATE-NOM
Aug73-Present	Overt

COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SR&CD
COPY 4 - OC-OO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EDF:JP

Geo. A. Chr[illegible]

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 0[illegible]622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

FILE NO.

TO: (Check)
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- ☐ CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

SS NUMBER

EMPLOYEE NUMBER

ID CARD NUMBER

ATTN: [illegible]

REF: [illegible]

OFFICIAL COVER: ☐ ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS	**CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS** **EFFECTIVE DATE:** [illegible]
☐ BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______ ☐ OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TO ______ (SPECIFY)	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
SUBMIT FORM 3254 ______ TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	EAA: CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.
EAA. CATEGORY I ☐ CATEGORY II ☐	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	
REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY [illegible]	

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SH&CD
COPY 4 - OL/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

Janice Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER; CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 8-73 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 10 May 1971

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)

X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)	EUR

ATTN: EUR/Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1413 dated 6 May 1971

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF From EOD		DATE	
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT State W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)		
	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52 - Aug 54 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 54 - Nov 56 - Korea/Japan - DAC
Nov 56 - Aug 57 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 57 - Feb 59 - Philippines - DAFC
Feb 59 - Mar 61 - Headquarters - DAFC
Mar 61 - Jan 67 - Japan - DAC
Jan 67 - Oct 68 - Headquarters - Nom State
Oct 68 - Nov 70 - London - DAC
Nov 70 - June 71 - Headquarters - DAC
June 71 - Rome - Nom State

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CO
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - OL/TELBUC
COPY 5 - RF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF:km

James [illegible] Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTA[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 1[illegible] November 1970

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 10032

ID CARD NUMBER: [illegible]AG-542

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- ☐ CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN: EUE/ Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED ☐ DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT: Records Analysis Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)	☐ CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB Aug 57	DATE (as of COB)
X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	☐ SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT Army W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	☐ RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2608 ☒ FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52-Aug 54	Hqs Overt
Aug 54-Nov 56	Korea and Japan DAC
Nov 56-Aug 57	Hqs Overt
Aug 57-Feb 59	Philippines DAPC
Feb 59-Mar 61	Hqs DAPC
Mar 61-Sep 66	Japan DAC and DAPC
Sep 66-Jan 67	Hqs State Nom
Jan 67-Oct 68	Vietnam State Nom.
Oct 68-Nov 70	England DAC
Nov 70	Hqs DAC

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
[illegible]

HC/pt

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

SECRET

6 Mar 59

File: 2542

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James Sauvie WOODS

1. Cover arrangements [illegible] have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective as 5 Mar 1959, it is requested that your records be properly blocked [illegible] to deny [illegible] Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 6 Mar 59 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608 "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Paul P. Stewart
for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET REMAIN

FILE

FORM 1580a (4-13-40)

SECRET

DEC 5 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Security Support Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : **James S. WOODS**

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a ________ day TDY trip.

2. Effective this date, it is requested that your records be properly (XXXXXXX) (re-opened) to (XXXX) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

THIS [illegible] MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

17-11-54

SECRET
(When Filled In)

unable [illegible]

EMR 080878

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 08 04 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026 3430 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SEC 233
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26889
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. Employ. Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE:
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hours Code:
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0BJ0000
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO DA YR

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ NO:
34. SEX:
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE:
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

JLS

FORM 1150
5-74 Mfg 10-74
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14-00000

053078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 04 09 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026 3430 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE
12. POSITION NUMBER: C045
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: 26889
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 53740 ALPHABETIC IMS
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction/Cancellation Data: TYPE MO DA YR
BOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV EPOV TEMP CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0 WAIVER 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NE

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

OCF B

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 12 78	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8033 4800 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/NE DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION
PLANS STAFF

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF	12. POSITION NUMBER CG45	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WO, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 13 2	17. SALARY OR RATE 26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 22	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 46075	ALPHABETIC NE	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqrs Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 03 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR 03 13 78	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR 03 13 78

28. LTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS. 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS

44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO | CODE | NO. TAX EXEMP | STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

MAR 1978 22 1978

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
010032	[illegible] S JAM S	[illegible]		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
12	6	24070 ~~$2[illegible]~~	11/23/75	12	5	24799 ~~[illegible]~~	11/20/[illegible]			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 15 Sept 1977

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4 51)

NOV 15 3 [illegible] '77

LJF 110977

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 07 11 77
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3033 4801 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/NE DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION
PLANS STAFF
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 24070
18. REMARKS: THIS ACTION REFLECTS NEW LEGISLATIVE PAY INCREASE EFFECTIVE 10/09/77.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC 46075 ALPHABETIC NE
22. STATION CODE: 75013
23. INTEGREE CODE:
24. Hdqtrs Code: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.):
27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.):
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.):
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32. Correction Cancellation Data: TYPE; MO. DA. YR.

EOD DATA

33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT. 2 - 10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.):
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR RESV PROV TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

~~FROM: CCS~~

POSTED
NOV 1977 18 019

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-74 Mfg 10-74

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

A11 L20 1C0 045

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	C010032	CCS	GS 12 4	$24,070

15848

KKK: 22 JULY 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF HOME BASE
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 07 | 13 | 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS				
X	V TO V		V TO CF	
	CF TO V		CF TO CF	

7. FAN AND NDCA: T230 0118 | 0002
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CCS REGISTRY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: BL44
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 21324
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	10	39115	CCS	75013		1	02 | 20 | 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR PROV RESV TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 0 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 0 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

AEO: 13 AUG 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 08 DA 09 YR 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA T230 0130 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS REGISTRY	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	12. POSITION NUMBER BL44	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 12 4	17. SALARY OR RATE 21324

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 39115 ALPHABETIC CCS	22. STATION CODE 75013	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vetrns Code 1	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO 02 DA 20 YR 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. FITE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 4 NONE CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Date TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
AUG 1976

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OJCS 01/31/76

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S				
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT		4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 01 23 76	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT		
6. FUNDS ▶	V TO V CF TO V	V TO CF CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 6230 0118 0002	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS			10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH			12. POSITION NUMBER 6144	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01		16. GRADE AND STEP 12	17. SALARY OR RATE	
18. REMARKS					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

30

F. W. M. JANNEY

Form 1150a
8-72 MFG 7-74

Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-37)

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
010032	WOODS JAMES S	39 115	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 12	3	20678 $~~[illegible]~~	11/24/74	GS 12	4	21324 $~~[illegible]~~	11/23/75		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

☒ I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE

DATE 12 Sept 1975

☒ NO EXCESS LWOP

☒ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 4	$22,485

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 3	$20,678

14-00000

74

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S				
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION PROMOTION			4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 24 74	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 5230 0121 0002
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDC/CCS REGISTRY			10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.		
11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN GE CH			12 POSITION NUMBER 0091	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION DAC	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01		16 GRADE AND STEP 12 3	17 SALARY OR RATE 19693	

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 22	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 35115	ALPHABETIC CCS	22 STATION CODE 75043	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR) 11 24 74	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR) 11 24 74
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 5 - NONE	CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR / RESV PROV / TEMP	CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 - WAIVED 1 - YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
DEC 3 1974

FORM 1150
9-72 Mfg 8-73

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SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

BBG: 19 SEPT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS AND DELEGATION OF NSCA	4 EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 09 10 73	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6 FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA 4230 0121 0002	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDO/CCS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	12 POSITION NUMBER 0061	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16 GRADE AND STEP 11 6	17 SALARY OR RATE 16326

18 REMARKS

W-2 INFO: CIA

HOME BASE: SS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE 16	20 Employ Code 10	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 35160 ALPHABETIC CCS	22 STATION CODE 75013	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqrs Code 1	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR XX XX XX	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA		33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36 SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR	37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE			40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO	
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS		44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE				

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: EUR

POSTED
9-20-73

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition
5-72 Mfg 11 72

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$18,061

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

WOODS JAMES S 010032 42300121

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$17,116

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$15,331

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 [illegible] EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LML: 13 FEB 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 02 DA 04 YR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 3135 1267 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION
FOREIGN FIELD
ITALIAN AREA
ROME STATION
SUPPORT BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 16326
18. REMARKS:

HOME BASE: IS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	21. OFFICE CODING ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Category Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO	DA	YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO	DA	YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO	DA	YR
22	10	44750	EUR	36533		3	02	20	28	02	04	73	02	04	73

28. NTE EXPIRES MO	DA	YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data TYPE	MO	DA	YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
02	03	74	81										

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE 1-5 PT 2-10 PT)
36. SERV COMP DATE MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED 1-YES) HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES 2-NO) CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
-14-73

FORM 1150 Use Previous
5-66 Mfg 11-71 Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

When Filled In

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$14,581

23 MAY 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 05 30 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	X V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1136 1267 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0699	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13821

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employee Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric 44525	Alphabetic EUR	22. STATION CODE 36533	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
28. SALARY 05 23 73	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 22	30.	RETIREMENT DATA CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	0 WAIVER 1 YES	HEALTH INS CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA	FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPT	STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-2-71

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FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

13

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARS: 11 MARCH 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

CCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION CHANGE OF FAN	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 02 18 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS ▶	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 1236 1166 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9957	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13621

18. REMARKS
OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
37	16	44997	EUR	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CIA 3 FICA 5 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	FOD DATA	33. SECURITY REG. NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE	HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
3-12-71

FORM 1150 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

806

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES 3	010032	44 997	V	GS 10 7	$13,821

ARS: 27 JAN 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS-CORRECTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 01 10 71	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF

7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1234 1186 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OFFICER	12. POSITION NUMBER 9997	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 7	17. SALARY OR RATE 13821

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ 12/13/70 TO READ 01/10/71.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
58	18	44997	EUR	75013		1.	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXP RES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
					16	12 13 70			

35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE / 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO DA YR
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO DA YR
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP / CODE
39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE / 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES / HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE / 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO / CODE / NO TAX EXEMP / STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-29-71

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARC: ~~1_ DEC 70~~

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER ~~TO~~ VOUCHERED FUNDS
4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR): 12 | 13 | 70
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS ▶ ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☒ CF TO V ☐ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 1236 1186 0000
8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16 GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17 SALARY OR RATE: 13041

18 REMARKS
OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE: 15
20 Employ Code: 18
21 OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 44397 — ALPHABETIC: EUR
22 STATION CODE: 75013
23 INTEGREE CODE:
24 [illegible] Code: 1
25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR): 02 | 20 | 25
26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR):
27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR):
28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR):
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE:
30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE:
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE:
32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR):
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO:
34 SEX:
35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT):
36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR):
38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP):
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; FEGLI; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE):
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO:
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)):
42 LEAVE CAT CODE:
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS):
44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE):

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
JJ 12-19-70

FORM 1150 5-66 Mfg. 6-70 Use Previous Edition

SECRET BBG

[illegible]
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
010032	WOODS JAMES S.	44 525	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 10	6	$12,679	07/28/68	GS 10	7	$13,061	07/26/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE

DATE 6/23/70

2

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

6/17

CLERK'S INITIALS

AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-81)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$12,679

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN,	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$11,942

SECRET
(When Filled In)

: 4 NOV 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR) 11 04 68	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable 9136 1214 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION LONDON STATION SUPPORT BRANCH REGISTRY SECTION	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION LONDON, ENGLAND

11. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADM OF	12. POSITION NUMBER 0254	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0344.01	16. GRADE AND STEP 10 6	17. SALARY OR RATE 10847

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 37	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 44525	ALPHABETIC EUR	22. STATION CODE 21025	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Major Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR) 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)								

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) 11 03 70	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE 83	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 CSC 2 CA 3 FICA 4 NONE	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data TYPE	MO DA YR	EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX						

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE	0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP	CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES	HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.							

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE	0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO	CODE	NO. TAX EXEMP.	STATE CODE	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FE

11-7-68 ED

FORM 5-66 1150 Mfg. 10-67 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SF

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

VD: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: MO 07 DA 28 YR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: ☐ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF
7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable: 9137 1487 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNO VIET NAM STATION
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
COLLATION BRANCH
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION
BIOGRAPHIC UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4984
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: 10847
18. REMARKS: RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING 10 GENERAL POSITION

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26 DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR	27 DATE OF LEI MO DA YR
22	10	45500	FE	77205		3	02 20 28	07 28 68	07 28 68

28 NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR
29 SPECIAL REFERENCE
30 RETIREMENT DATA: 1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE CODE
31 SEPARATION DATA CODE
32 Correction / Cancellation Data TYPE MO DA YR
EOD DATA
33 SECURITY REQ NO
34 SEX
35 VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 NONE 1 5 PT 2 10 PT
36 SERV. COMP DATE MO DA YR
37 LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR
38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR RESV PROV TEMP CODE
39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 WAIVED 1 YES HEALTH INS CODE
40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE 0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS) 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42 LEAVE CAT. CODE
43 FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44 STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 YES 2 NO CODE NO TAX EXEMP STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8/6/68

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SECRET

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(When Filled In)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 6 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,668	$10,154

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,262	$ 9,668

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/31/67

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010832

2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4 EFFECTIVE DATE: MO. 05 | DA. 21 | YR. 67

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT:

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137 1487 0000

8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE DIVISION

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11 POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF

12 POSITION NUMBER: 4965

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16 GRADE AND STEP: 09

17. SALARY OR RATE:

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

9/29/67

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

MRT: 9 DEC 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO. DA. YR. 12 18 66	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS ▶ V TO V ☐ V TO CF ☐ CF TO V ☒ CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 7137 1566 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY PL 88-643 SECT. 203	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION Saigon, South Viet Nam ~~TOKYO, JAPAN~~		
11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS
EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
28. MTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE CODE 2	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX	
35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY CAR. RES. PROV. TEMP. CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVED 1 - YES HEALTH INS. CODE		40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.		
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
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(When Filled In)

14-00000

MRT: 8 DEC 66

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(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.): 12 08 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7137 1487 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
REGISTRY SECTION

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4127
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 09 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: 9262
18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 37
20. Employ Code: 10
21. OFFICE CODING — NUMERIC: 45500 — ALPHABETIC: FE
22. STATION CODE: 77205
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. Hdqtrs. Code: 3
25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA. YR): 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR.)
27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA YR.)
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA — 1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE — CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — TYPE — MO DA. YR.
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE — CODE — 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT
36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO. DA YR)
37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)
38. CAREER CATEGORY — CAR PROV. RESV TEMP — CODE
39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — CODE — 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES — HEALTH INS CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — CODE — 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA — FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO — CODE — NO TAX EXEMP — STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

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12-12-66

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(When Filled In)

14-01

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,003	$ 9,262

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1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

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1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 3 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 3	$ 8,200	$ 8,495

13

10F

1 Serial No.	2 Name	3. Cost Center Number	4 LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5 OLD SALARY RATE				6 NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ ~~8200~~ 8495	11/10/63	GS 09	6	$ ~~XXXXX~~ 8749	11/07/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

4

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 7/12
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY EH

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 11 Oct 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4311)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/18/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO 09 DA 18 YR 64	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE- 5137 1566 0000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE DIVISION JKO TOKYO CEN REG REC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE INTEL ANALYST CH	12. POSITION NUMBER 4466	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.39	16. GRADE AND STEP 09	17. SALARY OR RATE

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
9/24/64 ROM

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

AES: 16 MARCH 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE) WOODS JAMES S		
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*	4. EFFECTIVE DATE MO DA YR 03 19 61	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT REGULAR	
6. FUNDS: V TO V ☐ / CF TO V ☐ / ☒ V TO CF / CF TO CF ☐	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE 1137 7351 1000	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USC 403 J	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SEC	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION TOKYO JAPAN		
11. POSITION TITLE INTEL ANALYST GEN	12. POSITION NUMBER 3061	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION D	
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.) GS	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES 0132.36	16. GRADE AND STEP 09 3	17. SALARY OR RATE 6765

18. REMARKS
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE 20	20. Employ Code 10	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC 56380	ALPHABETIC FE	22. STATION CODE 37587	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code 3	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR 02 20 28	26. DATE OF GRADE MO DA YR
27. DATE OF LEI MO DA YR	28. NTE EXPIRES MO DA YR	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA 1 - CSC 2 - FICA 3 - NONE / CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO DA YR	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE CODE 0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO DA YR	37. LONG COMP DATE MO DA YR	38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT/LCD 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE CODE 0 - WAIVER 1 - YES / HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.			
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS.) 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPT / STATE CODE					

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/22/61 [illegible]

Form 1150 9-60 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

[illegible] 3-16-6[illegible]

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 5	$ 7,575	$ 7,950

1. Serial No	2. Name			3 Cost Center Number				4 LWOP Hours		
010032	WOODS JAMES S			56 380 CF 11						
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	4	$ 7,350	11/12/61	GS 09	5	$ 7,575	11/10/63			

8 Remarks and Authentication

9

742

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY lb 11/7

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE. JI 11-14-63

SIGNATURE: [redacted] DATE OK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	[illegible]380	CF	09 4	$ 6930	09 4	$ 7350

14-00000

[illegible]

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA	YR
GS 09	2	$ 6,600	11	15	59	GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11	13	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☒ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a, AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
10032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE 11 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11/13/60	09	4	$ 6,930	11/12/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS

WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Obsolete Previous SECRET (4-61)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WOODS JAMES S	110032	51 12	GS-09 2	$ 6,135	$ 6,600

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	V-20	-37

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA.	YR.				MO	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,985	11	16	58	GS 9	2	$ 6,135	11	15	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G.M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8 49 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

NCH 20 MAR 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
010032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M 1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	12	48		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	D1	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	03	22	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SECRETARIAT	5112	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 2 USfld - 4 Frgn - 6	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	2	RECDS MGMT OFF	2461	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	D1	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3700 20 001

44. Remarks

LOGGED
0 APR 1959

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

[illegible]

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 14 NOV 58

1. Serial No. 510032	2. Name (Last-First-Middle) WOODS JAMES S	3. Date Of Birth Mo. 02 Da. 20 Yr. 28	4. Vet Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code 1	5. Sex M 1
6. CS - EOD Mo. 04 Da. 21 Yr. 52	7. SCD Mo. 11 Da. 12 Yr. 48	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code 1	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority 50 USCA 403 J	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. — Da. Yr.
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo. 04 Da. 21 Yr. 52	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Lco (Yes-1, No-2) Code 2		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	Code 5161	15. Location Of Official Station MANILA, R.P.	Station Code 57557
16. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code 5	17. Position Title RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	18. Position No. 3382	19. Serv. GS 20. Occup. Series 0306.01
21. Grade & Step 07 4	22. Salary Or Rate $ 5430	23. SD 01	24. Date Of Grade Mo. 04 Da. 10 Yr. 55 25. PSI Due Mo. 04 Da. 06 Yr. 58 26. Appropriation Number 8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action PROMOTION	Code 30	28. Eff. Date Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 58	29. Type Of Employee REGULAR	Code 01	30. Separation Data

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	Code 5161	32. Location Of Official Station MANILA, R.P.	Station Code 57557
33. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code 5	34. Position Title RECDS MGMT ANAL	35. Position No. 3382	36. Serv. GS 37. Occup. Series 0306.01
38. Grade & Step 09 1	39. Salary Or Rate $ 5985	40. SD 01	41. Date Of Grade Mo. 11 Da. 16 Yr. 58 42. PSI Due Mo. 11 Da. 15 Yr. 59 43. Appropriation Number 9 3780 55 006

44. Remarks

POSTED
20 NOV 1958 JB

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE
12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI
DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	510032	GS-07-4	$ 4,930	$ 5,430

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
510032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57	GS 7	4	$ 4,930	04	06	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

[illegible]
[illegible]

CF

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

[illegible]

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560a SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex		6. CS - EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M	1	04	21	52	

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Yes-1 No-2	Code
XX	XX	XX		1	50 USCA 403 J					1	04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI RECORDS INTEGRATION DIV ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS BR ANALYSIS SEC		WASH., D.C.	

16. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	2	INTEL ANALYST	430.12	GS	0132.35

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 3	$ 4795	D1							S 2309 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS	06	09	08	57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

33. Dept. - Field Dept - 1 USfld - 3 Frgn - 5	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 3	$ 4795	D1	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3780 55 006

44. Remarks
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI 29	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO	DA	YR				MO	DA.	YR.
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JOHN M. SCOTT	11 MAR 1957	

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI	V-20	2301

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE			GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE		
			MO.	DA.	YR.				MO.	DA.	YR.
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G.M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b
1 MAR. 56

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION

ATTENTION : Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Change in Allotment Account Designation - Personal Services of **WOOTE, James B.**

1. [illegible] Division requests that cost of personal services of [illegible] employee be changed effective [illegible] as follows:

FROM ALLOTMENT 6-3710-55-098

TO ALLOTMENT 6-2309-23

2. When this change is accomplished, it is requested that [illegible] copy of this request [illegible] to the [illegible] Budget Officer, with [illegible]

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

SRO

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): MR. JAMES S. WOODS 110032
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1923
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 22 August 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): REASSIGNMENT 56
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 Aug 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BV-430.02	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst BV-430.12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L 2	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE ☐ WWII ☐ OTHER ☐ 5-PT. ☒ 10 POINT (WIFE ☐ OTHER ☐) 1

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ I.A. ☐ REAL. ☐ SD-FI

15. SEX: M 1

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-2309-23 TO: Same 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 04/21/52

POSTED 8/29/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-373667

wm 8/28/56

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 21, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods 110032
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1922
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 2 Jul 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment 02
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 15 Jul 1956
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
IO (CI) EV-583.05	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst EV-430.02
GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.33-7 $4660.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 1-Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD/KK

15. SEX: M
16. APPROPRIATION W FROM: 7-3740-55-056 TO: 7-8309-25 790-13
17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED
7/19/56

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

3 END 04/21/92

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1956-373947

7/17/56

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr.–Miss–Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 5 May 56
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Reassignment B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*) Change in Title and Service Number		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED: 17 JUN 1956	7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Ops Off (CE) BFF 583.05~~3~~	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO-CI BFF 583.05~~4~~
GS-0136.52-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 4660.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.53-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 4660
DDP/FE Korea Mission Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section
Atsugi, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Yokosuka, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL SD:DI

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
H. F. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
Iris S. Wilson Ex 8761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title: FE/CMO 21 May 57

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WW II	OTHER 5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

SD:DI

15. U.A. M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3740-55-096
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

I.O. JUN 1956

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		21 May 57	
E.			

E. APPROVED BY:

SECRET

By Donald C. Leidel, 21 May 56

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-920020

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No. UV	4. Slip No.
5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate) WOODS, JAMES S.	6. Grade and salary GS-7 $4525.00		

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous accrual													
8. New accrual													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s) FE/7	12. Prepared by afw 1/10
		13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	~~18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.~~
8Apr 56	10Apr55	$4525.00	$4660.00	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In computation of end of waiting period
☐ LWOP adjusted at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION IN LIEU OF SF-52
CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

Effective Date - 22 April 1950

D to DI

Name	Grade	Name	Grade
FE		**NEA**	
ACAMPORA, Tullius	12	FRIAR, John R.	12
CILLIS, Vincent A.	12		
WATERS, Harry C., Jr.	11	**FI**	
WOODS, James S.	07		
McCOY, Leonard V.	09	BECK, Marian F.	07
		ROY, Ruth R.	07
EE			
MONTGOMERY, Hugh	12		
SR			
TRECIOKAS, Aldona V.	07		
KAPUSTA, Peter P.	11		

D to DS

WE	
LOEBS, Virginia	05

D to DP

EE	
McLAUGHLIN, Mary S.	07

by

17 April 1950

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 195– FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL CHAPTER R1

S E C R E T

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

4/7/58

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D *except 6B and 7* unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (*Mr – Miss – Mrs – One given name, initial(s), and surname*) Mr. James S. WOODS	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 21 Feb 54
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (*Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.*) Promotion		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (*Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.*)		B. APPROVED: OPS. OPR. (CO) APR 10 1955	

FROM—		TO—
IO (FI) B~~FF~~ 602.02-5 GS-0136.51-~~0~~5 $3535.00 p/a	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	583.05 ~~IO (FI)~~ FF ~~502.02~~-7 GS-0136.~~52~~-07 $4[illegible].00 p/a
DDP/FE Korea Mission ~~Intelligence Division~~ ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~ UNCONV. WARF. DIV. Atsugi, Japan	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 11. HEADQUARTERS	Same Same ~~Same~~ RECORDS INTEGRATION BR. ~~Same~~ ~~Same~~ PERSONALITY FILES SECTION
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (*Use reverse if necessary*)

Attached herewith are Job Description, Dispatch, and DD/P Personnel Data Sheet.

B. REQUESTED BY (*Name and title*)
H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (*Name and telephone extension*)
O. A. Fehlow, FE/I

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WAR	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	T.A.	REAL.

FI slot SD:D

15. SEX M	16. RACE W	17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5-3740-55-096 TO. Same	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) Yes	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
[illegible] R. 1955
[illegible] TO: 1/525
S[illegible]

[illegible]
4/11/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS.
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		3/25/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

REYNOLDS

F. APPROVED BY
R A Stricklin

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

2/24/55

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname) Mr. James S. WOODS	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST 28 Jan 55
5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.) Reassignment		6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 26 Oct 54	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)		B. APPROVED: 26 Oct 1954	

FROM—		TO—
IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5
GS-0136.51-~~1~~5 [redacted].00 p/a 3535.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-~~1~~5 [redacted].00 p/a 3535.
DDP/FE Korean Mission UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE [illegible] Division [illegible]	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Korea	11. HEADQUARTERS	Atsugi, Japan
☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject arrived PCS Japan 26 Oct 54 per FKLA-5239 of 17 Nov 1954.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer	D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: James P. Humphries (?) Title: FE/CMO 8 Feb 55
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) O. A. FEHLOW, FE/1 X3761	

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

SD B

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM 5-3740-55-096 TO. Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

2/24/55

Sec Concur for [illegible] 18 Feb 55
2/24/55

E date per
J. Martin. FE
2/24/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		2/14/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 - [illegible]

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay roll [illegible]d

3. Block No. UU

4. Line No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WOODS, James S.

6. Grade and salary: GS-5 $3410

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FB-9

12. Prepared by
jm 4/20/53

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step

ADVANCE DIVISION

14. Effective date: 6June53

15. Date last equivalent increase: 7June53

16. Old salary rate: $3410

17. New salary rate: $3535

18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.

MAY -7 AM 3:12

(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
[illegible] pay [illegible] waiting period.
[illegible] waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CH. R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC.

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 26 Mar 1954 Jan

AME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) . James S. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 16 Apr 1954

is is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

ATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) assignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE E.O.D. 25 Apr 1954	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY 50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
sal. Analyst EY 469.08	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) EPP 602.02-5
-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-5 $3410.00 per annum
/FI cords Integration Division ocessing and Records Branch nsolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Korean Mission Unconventional Warfare Division
hington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Korea
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

ETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
		XX		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

SD:D
~~CD-FI~~

16. RACE

17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2309-83
TO: 4-3770-55-096

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO) Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: D. C.

EMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

Jim Ben Mc

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

uty Assistant Director for Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

4/16/54

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb. 28
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 27 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 28 Feb. 54
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Analyst BY 469.08
GS-132-5	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum
R I Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI R I Division Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.	
				CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 4-2309-23 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

3-4-54

6. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

mkh

1. NAME (MR. — MISS — MRS. — ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 February 1928

3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:

4. DATE: 5 June 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 7 June 1953

7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Sch A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE	Same BV-469.08
GS-132-4 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-5 $3410.00 per annum
DDP/FI Records Integration Staff Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW ☐ VICE ☐ L.A. ☐ REAL. ☐

CD-FI

15. SEX: M

16. RACE: W

17. APPROPRIATION: 11X2100
FROM: 8309-20
TO: Same

18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Extension
2027

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

(SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION)

Chief, Personnel Division

6-8-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb. 28
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO:
4. DATE: 24 Apr. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 26 Apr. 53
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
~~Mail and File Clerk BV-364.08~~	8. POSITION TITLE	~~Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4~~
GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-132 Same
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION ~~1142100~~ FROM: 2309-00 TO: 2309-20
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED X STATE DC

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United [illegible] Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cancel[illegible] all requirements.



ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

[illegible] IDENTIFICATION

✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952 210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME) Mr. James B. Woods	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 28	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE 9 Mar. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY) Reassignment	6. EFFECTIVE DATE 15 Mar. 53	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
File Clerk BV-356	8. POSITION TITLE	Mail and File Clerk BV-364.08
GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	SAME SAME Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 11X2100 TO: 2309-20	yes		☒ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: DC

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

(SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION)

KPW 3-9-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-210794

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION

Page 9 of 36 pages

Used in lieu of SF-52 and/or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary: (a) Change in title (b) Change of position number (c) Reassignment within Division without series code change (d) Reassignment within Division with series code change. (Note: For action (type d) a SF-50 will be prepared for vouchered positions from information on this form.

(1) Staff or Division RI (2) Date T/O Approved 17 November 1952 (3) Effective Date of Action 7 December 1952

FROM					TO		
(4) NAME	(5) ORG. I.F. & POS. TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-Grade	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	(9) ORG. I.F. & POS. TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
Johnson, Dorothy A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-353.01
Akers, Erma D.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.
Hallinan, Martha M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.01
Gawlor, Carol A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.02
Law, Lois	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.03	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.03
Pruitt, Earl B.	File Supervisor	GS-5	X-33.	B	File Supvr.	GS-305-5	BV-355.
Service & Correspondence Section							
Woods, James	File Clerk	GS-4	X-102.22	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-3[illegible]
File Section							
Lanapace, Marie J.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-357.
Riter, Irene M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.
Lyddane, Mildred K.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.04	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.01
Ceppa, Loretta M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.01	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.02

(12) APPROVED: ______________________ (13) APPROVED: ______________________ (14) APPROVED: ______________________

Class & Wage Div. Personnel Div.

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20Feb.'28
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.:
4. DATE: 14Aug.'52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Promotion
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 17Aug.'52
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: Schedule A-6.116(h)

FROM		TO
File Clerk X-39.04	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk X-102.22
GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OSO RI Processing and Records Branch File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI Analysis and Operations Branch Service and Correspondence Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM:
TO: 11X2100 2200.00
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY): X
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
STATE: DC

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RM 8-15-52

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1950-600076

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

V.C. 26 March 1952
MCD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 1928	# 57	21 Apr. ' 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	21 Apr. 1952	Sch. A — 6.116 (B)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk GS - 3 X39.04
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS - 3 305 $2950.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI PROCESSING AND RECORDS BRANCH FILE SECTION
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT. DISAB.	10 POINT. OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
M	W	FROM: 2129900 TO: 3009	Yes	21 Apr. 1952	X STATE: D.C.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(39.04)

This appointment is subject to a satisfactory trial period of one year.

Subject to a satisfactory medical examination.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

3441

DOG - 06/07/53
EOD - 04/21/52
LCD - 04/21/52

~~Chf, Personnel Division~~

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS, James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE 12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (Ck. 1) ☒ HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY

☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 01 July 76 - 08 July 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 July 1977

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. NO

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of CCS Registry--Supervises employees in setting up and maintaining Staff files and necessary card indices; receiving, distributing and dispatching correspondence to and from the Staff; and processing requests for file traces and other information.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 CCS Records Management Officer--Responsible for overall management of CCS records management program. Monitors developments in DDO records management policies and procedures; maintains liaison with ISS and DDO Records Management Officers; seeks improvement in CCS records organization and discipline.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Works with personnel responsible for developing and launching the CCS computerized records system (CENCO) to ensure proper integration of Registry information.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

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SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods continued to perform in outstanding fashion as Chief of the CCS Registry during an extremely busy period. The figures cited in the last Fitness Report as to the workload of the CCS Registry continued to be representative of the volume and variety of Mr. Woods' responsibilities. He supervised the work of six subordinates with a successful combination of patience and firm professionalism. He continued to be the source of sound, constructive suggestions for coping with the paper "explosion" occasioned by the investigations of CIA and the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts.

Mr. Woods is a highly valuable, reliable, unobtrusively effective records manager. In moving on to new responsibilities in an area division he leaves behind a solid record of achievement and the admiration of those with whom he has served in CCS.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 24	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 August 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Arthur C. Close Arthur C. Close

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Close's evaluation of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period agrees completely with my observations and conclusions. Mr. Woods is a first-class professional records officer and supervisor who has clearly earned an overall rating of OUTSTANDING.

DATE 17 August 1977	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Central Cover Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☐ HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 18 Aug 1977	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
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FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD DAC
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (Ck. 1) X HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☒ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CONTRACT ☐ SPECIAL ☐ OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO) 1 July 1975-30 June 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 July 1976

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. NO

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section--supervises 6 employees in maintenance of Staff files and required card indices; receiving and distributing Staff correspondence; and processing requests for file checks and other information	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer--responsible for the overall CCS records management program	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER [illegible]

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SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods is a quiet, highly effective manager of a major repository of records within the DDO. The workload of his Section is staggering: over 8,000 documents filed each month, over 500 index cards prepared each month; close to 300 Freedom of Information or Privacy Act requests processed each month, etc. Mr. Woods organizes his Section well; he handles a group of six women with skill and understanding and he heads, as a result, a harmoniously working team.

Mr. Woods approaches problems with a positive attitude and brings his considerable experience and imagination to bear with appropriate initiative and follow-through. His response to the exceptionally heavy workload of the Staff over the past year of Congressional investigations and cover exposes was vital to the Staff's and the DDO's requirements for current and historical records. He volunteers ideas designed to improve the Staff's records; he works weekends and after hours to keep ahead of a growing avalanche of paper and requests for information. He is, in sum, a highly competent, knowledgable, yet flexible records manager upon whom the Staff relies heavily.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 27 July 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Arthur C. Close

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE ☐ OR HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 27 July 76	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have no difficulty in agreeing with the letter ratings and the narrative evaluation in the above report. Mr. Woods established the high level of his professional competence very soon after his assignment in CCS and has maintained this standard without interruption. I again must emphasize his abilities as supervisor in one of the toughest supervisory assignments known to me. With a Registry Chief like Mr. Woods, it is easy to come to the conclusion that running a registry of the complexity and volume as that of CCS is a cinch - at least he makes it appear that way.

DATE 29 July 1976	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE ☒ HAVE NOT ☐ ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE 29 July	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

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FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (last, first, middle) Woods, James S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD DAC

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin OF-CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REG	9. CURRENT STATION HQS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS ☐ OP

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		CONTRACT	OTHER (Spec.)		TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT		SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 January 1975 - 30 June 1975

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 July 1975

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
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S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises 7 employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUL 8 11 29 AM '75

During the 6 months under review Mr. Woods has continued to fulfill his rosponsibilities in the same excellent manner which has been documented in his last two fitness reports and which led to his promotion to GS-12. Mr. Woods surefootedness as a records officer and manager of people, together with ability to take necessary initiatives where actions are required and his maturity and sound judgement, make him an ideal chief of this very active and complex registry and records management office. I dread to think that eventual rotation will deprive me of the services of this extraordinarily competent and effective officer.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 1 year, 9 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 7 July 1975	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☐ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 7 July 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is no one in the chain of command who could act as reviewing officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 7 July 1975	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS, JAMES S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-12	6. SD D
7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF-CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	9. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS. ☐ OF		

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT

☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT X SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)
1 June 1974-31 December 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 January 1974 (Retirement of Supervisor

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. ☐

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security - through 6 October 1974.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Since his last Fitness Report, in June 1974, Mr. Woods has continued his extremely fine performance as a conscientious, hardworking and thoughtful records manager and registry supervisor. The CCS registry workload remains at about the same level as previously reported, and Mr. Woods regularly works an hour or so of uninterrupted overtime every working day personally reorganizing procedures, cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files. His enthusiastic determination in reducing the numbers of out-of-date and no longer useful files is most exemplary. Knowing the numbers of primary and supplemental files involved in this exercise, and as a retiring supervisor, I can only wish him "good luck"!

Mr. Woods also continues eager to learn and use new methods and techniques. During this reporting period, in July 1974, he took the Agency course "Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2."

Finally it gives me pleasure to note here that, effective ~~11~~ 24 November 1974, Mr. Woods will be given a well deserved promotion from GS 11/6 to GS 12/3.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 20 November 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Deputy Chief, CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carter H. Yates Carter H. Yates

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 20 Nov 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Both Mr. Yates' letter ratings and narrative comments accurately reflect the quality of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period. He is a thoroughgoing professional records officer who uses his extensive experience and his good judgement to take initiatives toward improving the Registry service and the management of records. Hand in hand with his high substantive competence goes his excellent ability as a supervisor. I can say nothing more laudable in this regard than that I have not had to deal with Registry personnel problems during the last year. He knows the job that needs to be done and so do his people. With this kind of leadership, the work gets accomplished with a high state of morale.

DATE 25 November 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE 25 Nov 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
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FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER 010032	2. NAME (Last, first, middle) WOODS, JAMES S.	3. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	4. SEX M	5. GRADE GS-11	6. SD D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF - CH	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	9. CURRENT STATION HEADQUARTERS	10. CODE (ck one) X HQS ☐ DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ CONTRACT ☐ OTHER (Spec.) ☐ TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT ☐ SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-) 1 June 1973 - 31 May 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 30 June 1974

SECTION B QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. **NO**

SECTION C PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
M—Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P—Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S—Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O—Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

After a short overlap with his predecessor, Mr. Woods assumed his responsibilities as Chief of Registry, CCS, on 3 October 1973 - roughly nine months ago. In this position he is responsible, overall, for CCS registry and records management activities, including the supervision of seven other individuals. As could be expected from even a casual reading of his past fitness reports, Mr. Woods quickly took hold, and has been performing his new responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Despite the volume and variety of files with which he was required to become familiar, early on he systematically began cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files as appropriate, reorganizing and updating the indexing system for individual and project files, and redistributing employee workloads. He also reorganized the placement of file machinery, desks, and service counter to achieve greater employee comfort and efficiency in the utilization of personnel. Although his task as Staff Security Officer is a secondary function, he also reorganized, simplified and re-wrote the security check and duty officer roster procedures.

Indicative of the work which he supervises are selected Registry statistics for May 1974: 7015 documents filed, 8200 files pulled (and re-filed) for Staff officers' use, 6642 cables processed and distributed, 9900 facility and name searches, 2353 documents logged, 833 index cards made and filed, and 200 new files opened. During his nine months with CCS, Mr. Woods not only has had to learn the CCS "system" himself,

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 mos	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 25 June 1974	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DC/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Carter H. Yates

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE ☐ HAVE ATTACHED ☒ HAVE NOT ATTACHED	DATE 25 June 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S. Woods James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In the relatively short period of his assignment to CCS, Mr. Woods has completely lived up to his advance billing as reflected in past fitness reports. Mr. Yates has provided the specifics of Mr. Woods' accomplishments and has left me only to say that Mr. Woods is a first class professional Records Officer and supervisor who fully deserves an overall rating of Strong.

DATE [illegible]	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL C/CCS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE 1 July 74	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Fitness Report   Woods, James D.   010032

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS (continued)

but has been required, due to a turnover in personnel, to train three new Records Clerks.

Courses taken since the start of his tour with CCS include Operational Records I and III, ADP I, Forms Management Seminar, and Forms Analysis and Design Workshop.

Mr. Woods has proved to be a conscientious, hard-working and thoughtful records manager and supervisor, and CCS is glad to have him aboard. I am sure that the next records inventory will provide statistical evidence of his abilities as a "housecleaner."

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-11	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDO/EUR	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☒ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 June 72 -31 May 73

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Station Records Management and Control Officer - responsible for the mediation, preparation, implementation and control of the Records Management Program.	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Chief of Registry Section - in this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch and other correspondence; serves as the cable analyst, processing and distributing all cable traffic; and serves as Top Secret Control Officer.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

9 MAY

FORM 7-69 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform with a high degree of effectiveness and accomplishment. He has concentrated on improving our records holding standards and on purging irrelevant and outdated files. In May 1972 he began a monthly series of progress reports for the Chief of Station outlining the month's accomplishments. Copies of these reports through January 1973 were sent to Hqs in OIRT-18014 and 18015, dated 9 Feb 73. These reports clearly show this officer's focus on records management activities, his ingenuity and agressiveness in launching programs of review of files and his tireless efforts in reducing Station holdings to a practical and useable minimum. His records inventory as of September 1972, reporting a total reduction in excess of 85 feet, speaks for itself. His next report also promises to show dramatic reductions.

This officer shows a sense of professional responsibility and determination in the oft neglected function of records management, deeper and more intense than any other witnessed by the rating officer in his career. He performs his other duties as Chief, Registry with an equally high degree of effectiveness. Subject officer may have been inadvertently hiding his talents under the proverbial bushel basket by having remained in the field for so long. It is the rater's hope that Hqs now has focussed on him and has discovered his potential for greater responsibilities. The records in this Station are tremendously improved for his having had a tour in Rome. We are certainly glad he came.

SECTION D **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 30 April 1973	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James B. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 23 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This officer has been remarkably effective during his tour in Rome. While we are very sorry to lose him, there is no question that his formidable talents should be used on a much broader range of records management and related problems than could be done in this Station. His next assignment in Headquarters appears to give him that additional scope. We are glad that he served in Rome and that during this tour here he received a well-deserved promotion. Rome Station's records have improved considerably as a result of this officer's tour here. I am in full agreement with the above comments and ratings.

DATE 23 May 1973	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William Acon, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/I	8. CURRENT STATION Rome		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1972

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1971 - 31 May 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U–Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M–Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P–Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S–Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O–Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and in the performance of other registry duties.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's Record Management Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Cable Analyst - Processes and distributes all incoming and outgoing cable traffic.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Top Secret Control Officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 21 AUG 1972	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer's performance over the past year has been outstanding. He is a skilled professional records manager, an indefatigable worker and a highly imaginative and efficient supervisor. Since his last Fitness Report he has directed a TDY team of records officers in a concentrated program of records reduction. He devised the program and supervised its execution with most effective results. This officer is a driver and a doer. He constantly strives to improve the Station's records management posture and follows up with procedures designed to maintain the gains achieved by his efforts. It is highly gratifying and stimulating to work with him. He sees the broad dimensions of the task at hand and focuses constantly on improving the system. This quality convinces the rater that he is capable of greater responsibilities in a position of broader scope. I recommend that Headquarters begin to plan for the utilization of this officer on the completion of his tour of duty in Rome. He should be placed in a Headquarters position in which his skills and broad experience can be fully used and in which he can achieve the professional growth of which he is both capable and deserving.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 17 July 1972	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 17 July 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer and believe the overall outstanding rating is well deserved. Subject is a first-rate Records Management officer - deeply interested in his work, conscientious in the extreme and always looking for an innovative approach that will upgrade the functioning of Registry and better serve Station needs. Without losing sight of the unending pressure to reduce and periodically reorder the Station's holdings, this officer avoids assuming attitudes that are cast in cement. He works with the Branches and individual officers in solving problems rationally. He is unfailingly pleasant and courteous and is well-liked by all. The Station is fortunate to have him.

DATE 25 July 1972	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Joseph A DiStefano

SECRET

CN duTY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. '28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/I		8. CURRENT STATION Rome	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 4 July 1971-30 September 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and other registry duties.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's record program and to give guidance and/or assist the Station officers when called upon to do so.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Cable Analyst - Process and distribute all incoming and outgoing cable traffic, this includes maintenance of the chrono files.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Top Secret Control Officer.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

21 OCT 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECRET

GROUP 1

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

I have worked with this officer just 2½ months, but this has been long enough to satisfy me that he is above average in registry work. He is a very knowledgeable registry technician, but most important, he is aggressive and imaginative in devising new procedures, or revising old ones to improve the quality of registry service to this Station. He is affable in dealing with his peers and confident and persuasive in dealing with the senior management of this Station. Shortly after his arrival he took over the analysing and distribution of the cables, and prepared a Station procedure for this purpose. Immediately following that, he devised a new procedure for handling correspondence and installed it. He had reviewed the multitudinous files at this Station and has plans to trim them back to more reasonable and appropriate dimensions. In every respect, this officer has taken charge of the function he is here to perform, and has devoted a great deal of time, thought and effort to improve it. We are indeed satisfied with his performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 October 1971	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
2½ months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Chief, Support	/s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since I have just arrived at the Station I have not had an opportunity to observe this officer's performance. However, I respect the rating officer's judgment, which in this case coincides with other favorable comments I have heard about the Subject. I therefore defer to the rating officer's evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Joseph A. Distefano

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WOODS James S	20 Feb. 1923	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Adm. Officer	DDP/EUR/Italian	Rome, Italy

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT						10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY	☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)					☐	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):					☒	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 January 1971 - 30 May 1971

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Reviewed, retired and rationalized Italian Branch Files and explained same system to Branch personnel	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

3 AUG 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER O

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods first made a survey of the Augean stable that the Italian Branch files had become over many years of shifts in personnel and changes of direction. He then reviewed, downgraded, and retired approximately 350 Top Secret documents with appropriate Project and Subject files and copies destroyed. At the completion of this there was not one Top Secret document on the Branch. He devised, gained approval from FI/D, and carried out a new procedure for the downgrading of TYLOTE material from Top Secret to Secret so that it could be retired. He retired approximately 60 Project, 25 Subject, and fifty 201 files. He surveyed the Communist Party of Italy files and discovered that there were a total of 93 of which 19 were already closed. He closed 47 of the remainder and left 25 open and arranged for RID/ARD to retire all the material in the open files prior to 1 January 1971. He closed and retired Pian files dating back to the early 1950's. All in all, out of 76 feet of safe space filled with CS material, he retired 36 feet of files leaving a catalogue of where everything is or has been sent. A remarkable record (and done with a minimum of fuss and Branch dislocation)!

What he did in such a short time speaks eloquently of how he went about his duties for which see the accompanying memorandum of recommendation for promotion. Reporting officer has known him over fourteen years and has the unvarying impression of him as a quietly competent, diligent, reliable, self-reliant individual.
/continued/

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Subject now in Rome Station	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION See above	
DATE 27 July 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR ADC/EUR/Italy	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE R. Campbell James
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL I concur in the above evaluation. Subject turned in a most impressive performance during his brief time on the Italian Branch. Largely as a result of his enthusiasm and initiative, the Branch was able to achieve what had never been accomplished before: a complete overhaul, cleaning, purging, and restructuring of its filing system. To his credit, Subject has a keen appreciation for operational requirements and all of this work was done without sacrificing the future utilization of information acquired in the past; on the contrary, the efficient use of this material has been so enhanced that it will surely be reflected in our future operations. Mr. Woods has a unique contribution to make in Rome or any other place he is assigned. The Station is fortunate to have him....his presence is sorely needed to do the same thing in Rome that he has just accomplished

DATE 27 July 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief/Italian Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Herschel F. Peake

SECRET

SECRET

You give him a job and need not worry about whether or how it will be done.

The job offered no opportunity to observe his supervisory capabilities. He is cost conscious and security conscious.

Fitness Report James S. Woods (continued)

SECTION D.3. (continued)

in Headquarters. The importance of his contribution and his personal initiative and efforts should be rewarded by a promotion.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 23	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Recs Adm Off	DDP/EUR/BCR	London

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT					
X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
XX	ANNUAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 November 1970	30 June 1970 - 18 November 1970

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of the Station Registry	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for two full-time registry assistants.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and implements review and purge of Registry and other Station files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares Station notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret Control Officer	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 7-60 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the four months he has been under my supervision, Subject has demonstrated that he merits in full measure the high opinion of him held by his previous supervisor. Conscientious, careful, fully knowledgeable of Registry procedures he has gone about his day-to-day tasks in an exceptionally proficient way without the need for constant supervision. He is prompt in his response to requests and has an excellent sense of "get the job done". He is an intelligent and concerned supervisor who has been meticulous in keeping his supervisors briefed on personnel and other problems as they have arisen in the Station Registry. He appears fully capable of assuming larger responsibilities in the records field. The rating officer regrets that Subject's family situation precludes his staying for another tour.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 Nov 1970	James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
4 months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 November 1970	DCOS	/s/ Cameron J. LaClair

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although the rating officer is newly arrived in London, he has had numerous opportunities in the past to observe Subject's work and the results he has achieved in reducing London files to manageable proportions. As a result the ratings awarded in this report are endorsed without hesitation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 November 1970	COS	/s/ Rolfe Kingsley

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Off	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/BCR	8. CURRENT STATION London		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 October 1969 - 30 June 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of station registry.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for two full-time and one part-time registry assistants.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Organizes and implements review and purge of registry and other station files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares station notices and outgoing correspondence on registry matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret Control Officer.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

1 JUL 1970

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

With about nineteen months experience managing the station registry already under his belt, his usefulness here increases. He continues to demonstrate the same quietly effective leadership and talent for sound organization in his own shop as were noted on the last fitness report.

While maintaining a high standard in the more routine day-to-day services and processes a registry is normally expected to supply, he has also been the catalyst for a thorough, carefully phased and continuing review and, where appropriate, purge of registry and other file holdings. Administering this ambitious reduction program requires sound judgment and experience in handling the detail in our existing records. Subject has these qualities and has achieved impressive results. To complete this task, he has asked to extend his tour here for one year until November 1971 and Headquarters has approved this.

He is invariably completely responsive to guidance from the DCOS, his immediate supervisor, and conscientiously seeks to achieve the work goals which are identified during our occasional accomplishment and performance consultations. The spirit of cooperation with which he deals with other station personnel is equally commendable.

No criticism can be made of his security and cover deportment.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 18 June 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 June 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David Whipple

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur entirely with this favorable assessment. Subject has been a dedicated and conscientious supervisor of his office. His achievements have been quite measurable and specific, as described in the above report. On the basis of his performance here, Subject should have excellent career prospects for further growth in his chosen field.

DATE 22 June 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/EUR/BCR		8. CURRENT STATION London	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT				
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):			

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 October 1969	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 18 November 1968-30 September 1969

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Responsible for organization and direct management of Station Registry.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 First-line supervisor for at first three, later two, full-time Registry personnel and one part-time Registry assistant.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Provides informal training and guidance to some Station officers and secretaries on records procedures.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Prepares Station Notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Top Secret control officer	RATING LETTER S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

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SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

He arrived ten months ago at this post with considerable experience in Registry work at Headquarters and at other field stations and with a thorough understanding of how a Station Registry should be organized and run. He immediately put this understanding to good use. While maintaining the overall efficiency of Registry programs already in effect when he took over, he enthusiastically began a carefully-planned and continuing effort to further reduce less than essential Registry paper holdings with results which are already impressive. His suggestions on new procedures designed to conserve space and manpower are usually imaginative and practical.

He himself is a remarkably well-organized, conscientious and cooperative person.

He has had to undertake his improvements while accommodating to the loss of one Registry slot which fell victim to a Foreign Service reductions program. Primarily due to his managerial talents, the Registry has been made to carry on almost as well with three regulars as with the previous four. Although his people are increasingly hard-worked, their morale is high. He himself appears to be a glutton for work but his Registry is obviously a happy shop.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 9 October 1969	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 9 October 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David D. Whipple

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with this very favorable assessment. Subject has a real talent for work in his chosen field and his professional accomplishments here have been impressive. Subject's career should be watched with care and there should be room for considerable advancement in the Records Management end of our business.

DATE 5 November 1969	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-10	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Of	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 5 March 1968 - 5 October 1968

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Station Registry DC 52	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of personnel under his supervision	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall Security of Registry operations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 8 OCT 1968	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is Subject's final Fitness Report as Chief, Registry at Vietnam Station. He has worked long and hard but can look with pride at the many accomplishments that he has effected during his tenure. He will depart leaving a sound and well-functioning organization. His planning has been effective and his cross-training and development of the personnel under his supervision have been fully productive.

During this period, his unit has experienced heavy increases in workload and assumed new or additional functions with no reduction in the service provided to Station components.

Subject has been responsible for many work saving innovations, procedural changes and a thorough updating and revamping of the highly important registry reference records.

The personnel under his supervision display enthusiasm and dedication in their work. Their pleasant manner is a reflection of Subject's management ability.

Subject performs his managerial and supervisory duties in a highly professional manner. He knows systems, writes lucid and concise procedures and reacts positively to situations. He is a "Doer".

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
21 Sept 1968	/s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
14	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 Sept 1968	Records Admin Officer	/s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the Rating Officer.

Subject has been most amenable and responsive to positive direction.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 Sept 1968	Ops Officer	/s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

NARRATIVE COMMENTS, Section C. (Continued)

I have enjoyed serving with Subject, wish him success at his next post and look forward to serving with him again.

Subject is cost conscious.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO		8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- X SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 16 October 67 - 21 March 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief Station Registry	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of Personnel under his supervision	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall Security of Registry operations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

20 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an excellent job in organizing the layout and arranging the work flow in the new Station Registry. As a result, his unit has been operating on a fully effective and productive basis, even during the recent emergency when certain workloads increased several hundred per cent. In operation and physical appearance the Station Registry may be considered a model registry.

He is very cooperative and works well with other offices in solving mutual problems or setting up new requirements.

Subject is industrious and dedicated and willingly works long hours to meet the daily demands of his position. He performed in an exemplary manner while working for an extended period under stress during the recent emergency.

Subject is a pleasant, dependable individual who is anxious to do the best job possible in a demanding and vital position at the Station.

He is properly cost conscious in the use of personnel, space and equipment.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 7 mos	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION Subject has not reviewed this report inasmuch as it recommends him for promotion.	
DATE 5 March 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 5 March 1968	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Vincent Lockhart

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. '28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Of	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VNO	8. CURRENT STATION Vietnam		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
10 May 1967 - 30 Sep. 1967

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Station Registry Section	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Management and training of personnel under his supervision	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Overall security of Registry operations.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 29 NOV 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	P

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject is responsible for the supervision and operation of one of the more diversified and complex field registry operations in the Organization. He is thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced in registry practices. Subject is a dedicated and hard working officer who will apply himself diligently to individual registry activities. Such diligent application occasionally causes him to overlook his overall supervisory role, the supervision and management of eleven personnel and the responsibility for providing a wide variety of services, locally and in-country. In the press of his activities, he does not always employ a high degree of tact in dealing with his subordinates. In this context it should be noted that he is performing proficiently in a position well above his present grade level.

During the past several months, the Section has undergone several changes and assumed additional functions under his guidance.

Subject is cost conscious in the use of supplies and equipment in his Section.

Subject is attending evening courses leading toward his degree to further himself professionally.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 14 Aug 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 14 Oct 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Admin Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the supervisor. In fairness to the employee, it should be noted that the supervisor is a conscientious and conservative rater.

DATE 14 Oct 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS 9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Admin Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/VSO		8. CURRENT STATION VIETNAM	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☒	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 14 Jan 67 - 9 May 67

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief, Registry with supervisory responsibility for 8 employees.	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 28 JUN 1967	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

FORM 4-69 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 12 10 44 AM '67

Although Subject has been at the Station for only a few months, he quickly established himself as a formidable leader in a very large Registry operation. He is resourceful and constantly strives to improve office procedures in order to increase efficiency and provide better service. He is an old hand in the Registry field, well indoctrinated in proper procedure and knows when and how to adjust to meet changing situations.

Subject effectively supervises 8 employees and displays cost consciousness in the management and operation of his office.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
8 May 1967	/s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
8 May 1967	Records Officer	/s/Richard Richardson

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with rating and narrative comments. Subject is employing in this position his cumulative experience as a Registry supervisor at previous posts. Subject has contributed to the improvement of Registry procedures and in-country courier system of this large and fast moving station.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 May 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Terry T. Shima

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS JAMES	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD b
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel. Analyst - CH	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Pers/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- ☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- ☐ INITIAL
- ☒ XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☐ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 Sept 65 - 1 Sept 1966

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Supervises the analysis and distribution of incoming and outgoing cables.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the operation of the Station Flexowriters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

06 SEP

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF [illegible]
SEP 1 3 30 PM '66
MAIL [illegible]

FOSHAG has continued to perform at a "Strong" level. He is a fine supervisor and thereby gets maximum performance from a staff which is too small to handle a work load which has constantly increased over the past year. He is cost conscious in funds material and also strives to stream-line and improve the functioning of the Registry and its related functions.

FOSHAG has twice been recommended for promotion. He definitely deserves it and should be assigned next to a position above his present rating.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 August 1966	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James Woods /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 14	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 16 August 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR OPS. Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Kenneth Miller /S/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in above rating.

DATE 17 August 1966	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE William E. Nelson /S/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Ch	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐ CAREER ☐ RESERVE ☐ TEMPORARY
☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
NOV 30 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 July - 30 September 1965

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
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S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyze and distribute all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervise the operation of the Station Flexowriter.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

15 DEC 1965

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SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
DEC 15 9 21 AM '65
MAIL ROOM

Woods

During the four months [redacted] has been under my supervision he has demonstrated very real supervisory ability and a talent for getting maximum performance from a small staff which handles an increasingly large volume of work. He has also shown his ability to cut the costs of his operation.

Woods

[redacted] not only runs a most efficient Registry but is also constantly seeking ways to improve and stream-line its operation. He is a man who takes such interest in his job that his ideas and plans for improvement are carefully worked out and sound.

Though I have observed his work for only four months, I believe his over-all performance is "Strong" and close to "Outstanding." He has been recommended for promotion. He deserves it.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 October 1965	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
4	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 October 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ Kenneth P. Miller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with his supervisor that Subject is unusually competent in his field and fully deserving of a "Strong" rating. Subject displays unflagging enthusiasm for his job and constantly tries to improve his operation. He has displayed a high degree of imagination and inventiveness in making changes in our over-all CRR set-up. He very definitely deserves promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 November 1965	DCOS	/s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

13711

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1923	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1964 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
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S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	RATING LETTER O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the Station Flexowriter	RATING LETTER S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

29 JUN 1955

FORM 45 8-61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

JUN 29 9 02 AM '65

As Chief of the Station Registry this employee continues to perform at an exceptionally proficient level with little supervision from his supervisor. His supervisor is being reassigned and is scheduled to be replaced by another officer who will necessarily need several months to become knowledgeable of Registry activities. However there is no concern that the flow of paper and the maintenance of accurate records will be affected due to the turnover of supervisors. This employee continues to use his native ingenuity and high standards of achievement to ensure that his office continues to be a well run and efficient unit. He continues to ensure that no government funds are wasted, even to the extent of arranging for the construction of certain modifications to the Registry office by Registry employees at little cost to the Government. This employee has been performing at a level above his present GS-09 grade. As recommended in November 1964, it is reconfirmed that this employee should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest possible opportunity.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 4 June 65	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 45	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 4 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick Handall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject takes his job seriously and performs it in strong fashion. I would say that he displays more energy, interest, and continuing attention than just about anyone else I've seen in registry-type work.

DATE 10 June 65	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~ Attachment No. _ to FJLI 22242
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 23	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO		8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo	

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- ☒ CAREER
- ☐ RESERVE
- ☐ TEMPORARY
- ☐ CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- ☐ INITIAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- ☒ ANNUAL
- ☐ REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- ☐ SPECIAL *(Specify):*

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
30 Nov 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 October 1963 - 30 September 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Supervises the Station Flexowriter	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

10 DEC 1964

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee continues to be Chief of the Station Registry. During the past year his level of performance can be properly evaluated as exceptionally proficient. He continues to welcome hard work, is not bothered by constantly changing deadlines and is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit, and keep up his own work as well. He is quite conscious of the value of Government personnel and materiel, and does everything in his power to conserve these resources. He continues to come up with new ideas on how to perform his functions in a more efficient and effective manner. This results in benefits to the entire Station. It is regretable that the position this employee fills does not allow for promotion since he has been performing at a level above his present grade for several years.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 1 Oct 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 1 Oct 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the rater's comments and sentiments. I have known this employee for a number of years during which time he has evidenced real growth in self-sufficiency and also in the handling of his responsibilities as a supervisor.

DATE 29 Oct 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ William V. Broe

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ATT TO FJTT-10860

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 10032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-09	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst Gen	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/JKO	8. CURRENT STATION Tokyo		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

XX	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 November 1963

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 Oct 62-30 Sep 63

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
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O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises six Registry employees	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

30 SEP 1963

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry, this employee has performed at a level of exceptional proficiency for the past year. He welcomes hard work, is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit and keep up his own work as well. He continues to bring up ideas for the improvement of his unit. These have been particularly welcome during the past year in view of the impending move of the Registry to a new location at Fuchu Air Station. The slight tendency to be arbitrary mentioned in the last fitness report has been eliminated during this reporting period. In view of this employees strong performance over the past year, he is being recommended for promotion to GS-10.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 Sept. 63	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 Sept. 63	Chief, Ops Support Staff	/s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this rating and add that this employee has not let the very serious personal problems thrust upon him during this period interfere in any way with his consistently dependable performance. In this key role, in any station of this size, dependability, reliability, and confidence are "musts" and while there are quite naturally small aggravating incidents of mis-routing or mis-direction of documents, I have been struck by the lack of them here, because ratee has the "must" qualities. His performance certainly warrants favorable consideration of the projected promotion action.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
11 September 63	Deputy Chief of Station	Robert Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Intel Analyst	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE	8. CURRENT STATION TOKYO		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 Oct 61 - 30 Sept 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt, analysis and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervises four Registry employees.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Supervises a courier service which distributes correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	RATING LETTER P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER P

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. _Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable._

As the Chief of the Tokyo Registry this employee has performed well. He has abundant energy and constantly comes up with ideas for the improvement of the efficiency of his unit. He welcomes hard work and is able to fill in and take over any job in his unit and keep up with his own duties as well. As a supervisor, he has a slight tendency to be arbitrary when convinced he is right. This may be due to the fact that the Registry frequently operates under conditions of pressure due to the recent reorganization, reduction, and relocation of the Station. The Station has been required to get the job done with fewer people and under more difficult working conditions.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 Oct. 1962	James S. Woods /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		Frederick Randall.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has done and continues to do well what is expected of him. In amplification of the last sentence of the rater's comments (Section C) Subject has made the adjustment to "fewer people" and "more difficult working conditions" quite well, without trouble and more importantly with no impediment to the CRR service.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Oct 1962		Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	CSPD

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) Woods, James	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 28	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION D	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT TOKYO STATION	

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☐	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD *From* *To* 15 Apr 61-30 Sep 61	SPECIAL *(Specify)*

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of local registry, supervising four persons.	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NO.

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 4

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING				
			1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE		X					
WRITES EFFECTIVELY		X					
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER *(Specify)*:							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
NOV 61
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Ratee has been in charge of station registry since 2[illegible] A[illegible]. This has been a period of dramatic change in the station and especially in our paper management. He has responded well to these changes and shows a degree of adaptability that bodes well. His handling of our recent "holdings" inventory, his unceasing efforts to reduce unnecessary holdings, and his knowledge of his business (RI) have made him a valued addition to our shrinking team. In this short rating period there has been little opportunity for me to observe his supervisory abilities, but the lack of any problem on this count coming to my attention means to me that he is doing well. Another six months should tell us more on this score.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 6 Oct 61	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE Signed

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE 6 Oct 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Wheeler, Robert P.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE 6 Oct 61	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Wheeler, Robert P.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 DEC 1960

2 FEB 1961 FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 110032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) WOODS (First) James (Middle) S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Officer		7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/FE/Secretariat

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

☐	NOT ELIGIBLE	☒	MEMBER	☐	DEFERRED
☐	PENDING	☐	DECLINED	☐	DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
☒	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P. 31 October 1960

11. REPORTING PERIOD From Sep 59 - 30 Sep 60 To

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc., re implementation of DDP records management program	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records DC 59	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Training and assistance to FE personnel in records management procedures	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Guidance to field records officers	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and development of Division vital materials program	RATING NO. 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Implementation of various records purges and records programs	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM

Subject is an excellent records officer. His interest in the subject and his perseverance in carrying out tasks connected with it have not only produced results in his own work, but have kindled enthusiasm and interest within the Division in developments in Agency records management. He has been able to improve records within the Division with a great deal of success, and at the same time avoided the usual aversion to records responsibility which too much emphasis on records creates in the case officer. His ability to get along well with others is important in his liaison function.

Mr. Woods' work on the vital materials program in the last year has resulted in a much more realistic program for the Division. The creation and ~~retention~~ up-to-date retention of vital materials has for some time been a problem for which little solution could be found. It appears that the present program will result in vital materials which will be current and usable if needed.

Subject is at present assigned to a part-time detail in MMU. This should help to broaden his knowledge of new approaches in the records field. A/EXO/DDP has expressed his complete satisfaction with the very effective work Mr. Woods is doing on this detail.

Mr. Woods' work during the last year was the basis for a commendation of the Division's records program by COP.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE 16 DEC 1960	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 20	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS

OTHER (Specify):

DATE 16 December 1960	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR C/FE/ESEC	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Harriet L. Weller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☑ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL FE/EXO	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Orrin R. Magill, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): [illegible] [illegible] J.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 February 1923
3. SEX: F
4. GRADE: GS-9
5. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Records Mgmt Officer
7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT: [illegible]/FE/Secretariat

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS			
☐ NOT ELIGIBLE	☒ MEMBER	☐ DEFERRED	
☐ PENDING	☐ DECLINED	☐ DENIED	
9. TYPE OF REPORT			
☐ INITIAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR		
☒ ANNUAL	☐ REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE		

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 21 October 1959
11. REPORTING PERIOD From To: Jul 58 - 30 Sep 59
SPECIAL (Specify):

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc, ~~re implementation of records mgt~~	RATING NO. 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records	RATING NO. 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Training and assistance for FE personnel in records mgt program procedures	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Guidance to field records officers	RATING NO. 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Planning and development of Division vital materials program	RATING NO. 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6 Guidance in all records problems	RATING NO. 5

SECTION C EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	RATING 1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM 8-58 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an excellent records officer. He is enthusiastic about his specialty and works hard at it, putting a great deal of energy into his work.

He is quick and understands records thoroughly. Because of this, he is at times inclined to jump ahead of others in records discussions and should attempt to slow down his approach to the subject to meet the level of persons who do not have the same records background.

Subject could fill any position in the records management field, and should advance quickly. He is interested in developing his capabilities and is at present enrolled in the Writing Workshop with this in mind.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the [illegible] rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE: 29 Oct 59

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James S Toole

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 7

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

☐ EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS ☐ REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 30 DAYS

☐ OTHER (Specify):

DATE: 27 October 1959

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: C/FE/ESEC

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Harriet Weiler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

☒ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.

☐ I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.

☐ I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Subject is a promising young records officer. He has demonstrated a capability for growth and for assuming greater responsibility. He is very much interested in records management and wants to make a career of it. His career development should be designed to afford him opportunities for maximum development both in terms of varied Headquarters experience and in field assignments.

DATE:

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: FE/EXO

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: Orrin R. Magill, Jr.
Orrin R. Magill, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In) FF-25

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (James B. (Middle) [redacted] Woods [redacted] xxx	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 38	3. SEX M.	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION [redacted] DT
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/ xx FE/PBH/Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Recd. Mgmt Anal ~~21 August 1958 - 4 Sept 1958~~		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 August 1958 - 4 September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR		SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	☒	For TDY Period--MELB

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Subject left station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN SECTION D. A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS		

B. THIS DATE 18 Sept 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR [redacted] Collas G. Harris	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station, Melb

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY	DATE
	3 NOV 1958
	18 Nov 58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE —	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL —	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL —

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

5
INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY, OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: This rating covers the period 21 August - 4 September 1958, while subject was in Melbourne surveying Station files and installing new RI standardized filing system.

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 24 2 14 PM '5?
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS IN PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do [illegible] supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same [illegible] at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Installing new RI Filing System	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Develops new Programs	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Surveying Station Files	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Manages Files	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Oral Briefing	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job

STRENGTHS: Ability to see another's viewpoint and to work out satisfactory compromises between the RI system and operational requirements of the Melbourne Station.

WEAKNESSES: None observed.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents ....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...I WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)   25   CWA

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR. This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) ~~SXXXXH~~ WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 8 December 1957 - September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	☒ SPECIAL (Specify) Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

Absent from Station. Will be shown upon return.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS SEE ATTACHED REPORTS	X	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify): Will upon return to Station.
☐	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 4 Sept 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ray F. Drummond	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY   DATE
L.B.
EXR 10/20/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE, CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 37 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises 2 Records Mgm. Analysts	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Processes files in accordance with Specific Records System	RATING NUMBER 6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Devises Records Systems to suit Station needs.	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Trains Station personnel in Records maintenance.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Strengths: Works hard and fast. Able to analyze problems and organize work of Records Management Team in methodical sequence.

Weakness: No notable weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb. 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT Manila	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Management Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 8 December 1957 - September 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)

☐	INITIAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR	☐	SPECIAL (Specify)
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE	x	Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Ray F. Drummond	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 4 Sept. 1958	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL George E. Aurell	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL COS

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET

Potential (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 17 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None planned nor available while on current overseas tour.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject single and willing serve geographic locations. Believe subject performs best in demanding assignments.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACES	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET ⑥ FF-35 29 SEP [illegible]

(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE		
7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 4 April - 30 June 1958	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Report prepared after subject departed this station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND ~~[illegible]~~ other SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 10 July 1958	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Orrin R. Magill, Jr.	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted for [illegible]	J.B.	11 OCT
		15/10/58

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Nicholas A. Natsios	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY, OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
Oct 14 9 32 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (*do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only*).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING
HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE
CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis of records problems and establishing records procedures	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Supervising	RATING NUMBER 6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Keeping his owns records and reporting on work progress	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject analysed difficult records problems quickly and precisely, discussed his recommendations forcefully and convincingly, and then proceeded to put them into effect with considerable energy. He not only supervised his subordinates effectively so that every minute was productive, but did a good share of the routine work himself, making certain that everything was done precisely as planned.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

29 SEP REC'D

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS James S.
2. DATE OF BIRTH:
3. SEX:
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION:
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT:
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE:
7. GRADE:
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 4 April - 30 June 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE: 10 July 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: Orrin R. Magill, Jr.
C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE:

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE: 10 July 1958
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Nicholas A. Natsios
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL:

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☒ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 11 AM
MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Three

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

From subject's performance here it appears that his potential in the records management field may be limited only by his lack of formal higher education, and I feel that even in this respect he could overcome this deficiency with some training. His forcefulness and boundless energy would unquestionably inspire any subordinate to higher performance. He has an intense interest in records work and an ability to grasp complex problems and make quick decisions.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

3

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	X	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Fil[illegible])

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS James
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 1928
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: SD: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI RI A&O
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst
7. GRADE: GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): ☐ INITIAL ☐ ANNUAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☐ HAS ☒ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Mr. Woods is on temporary duty in Mexico City, Mexico.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE: 22 July 1957
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: James L. Brogdon James I. Brogdon
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Coordinator, 201 Control Unit, RI/Analysis Section

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	JB	7/23/57
Reviewed by PUD	D. L. REEDY	10-8-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE: 22 July 1957
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: John [illegible] Murray Jr. [illegible], Jr.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

☐ INSERT RATING NUMBER

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Mr. Woods departed for temporary duty on 9 Feb 1957. His last Fitness Report was completed on 5 Feb 1957, just prior to his departure. Reports from the station indicates the he is doing a commendable job.

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(when filled in)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF

MAIL ROOM ... PERSONNEL

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will be rated as a specific duty *(do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).*
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. *Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:*

ORAL BRIEFING	*HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE*	*CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS*
GIVING LECTURES	*DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS*	*PREPARES SUMMARIES*
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	*ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS*	*TRANSLATES GERMAN*
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	*MANAGES FILES*	*DEBRIEFING SOURCES*
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	*OPERATES RADIO*	*KEEPS BOOKS*
TYPING	*COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES*	*DRIVES TRUCK*
TAKING DICTATION	*WRITES REGULATIONS*	*MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING*
SUPERVISING	*PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE*	*EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA*

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

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MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

SECTION C. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....*productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents*....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

☐ RATING NUMBER

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS James .	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL ☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR ☐ SPECIAL (Specify)
☐ ANNUAL ☒ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

☐ RATING NUMBER

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No . If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled-In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS [illegible] RATED [illegible] HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW		11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT		21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES		12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY		22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
	3. HAS INITIATIVE		13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES		23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING		14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS		24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS		15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION		25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE		16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT		26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE		17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS		27. IS VERSATILE
	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS		18. IS OBSERVANT		28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
	9. GETS THINGS DONE		19. THINKS CLEARLY		29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES		20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

19

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 21 Jan 57	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 22 January 1956 - 20 January 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT ☒ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

☐	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.	☐	IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.	☐	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
X	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR James L. Brogdon James L. Brogdon	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT:

Mr. Woods since return from foreign assignment has completed one temporary duty assignment and is preparing for another. He has applied the present headquarters work at the station registry on a standard equating with this evaluation.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control		11 FEB 1957
Reviewed by PID		2-11-57

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John J. Murray, Jr.	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/AN Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

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2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING
GIVING LECTURES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON
TYPING
TAKING DICTATION
SUPERVISING

HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS
ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS
MANAGES FILES
OPERATES RADIO
COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES
WRITES REGULATIONS
PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE

CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
PREPARES SUMMARIES
TRANSLATES GERMAN
DEBRIEFING SOURCES
KEEPS BOOKS
DRIVES TRUCK
MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Analysis - subjective analysis of CE, FI and PP material.	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Assignment Management - Organization & scheduling of work.	RATING NUMBER 5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Analysis - Quantitative	RATING NUMBER 5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Has and uses area knowledge.	RATING NUMBER 4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During the short time Mr. Woods has been assigned to this office, he has very quickly grasped the essentials of his assignment; he knows when to seek guidance and is constantly striving to increase his knowledge and understanding of his assignment. He is extremely conscientious, accepts the responsibilities of his job and performs his duties commendably.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

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FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1928	3. SEX M	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP 21 Jan 57	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 Januar 1956 - 20 January 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one)
☐ INITIAL
☒ ANNUAL
☐ REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR
☐ REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE
☐ SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR James L. Brogdon James L Brogdon	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE 5 Feb 1957	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL John J. Murray, Jr. John J Murray Jr	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? ☐ Yes ☐ No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB *(truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds)* WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT *(First line supervisor)*
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB *(Second line supervisors)*
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY *(Executive level)*
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER *(Specify)*

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) 1 NOV 55 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45a WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION
Three Months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Woods is lacking in formal education, however, he has intelligence, initiative and ability and with continued on-the-job experience is capable of developing into a good supervisor of a section in RI or in operating the Registry Section of a field installation.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Training within the established FI/RI pattern.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

Posted Pos. Control BY uhr DATE 28 MAY 1956

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY James S. Woods	1. DATE OF BIRTH 25 Feb. 1928	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI

4. GRADE GS-7	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) KOBA/Hqs
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT April 1956	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 15 April 1955 - 15 April 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Analyst - CE	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 25 September 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality File Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all KOBA file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Agnes M. Prime	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) Paul B. Breitweiser

3. THIS REPORT ☒ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 1 May '56	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES William E. Nelson William E. Nelson, CFE/1

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a REPLACES FORM 45A, 1 SEP 54,
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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SECTION IV

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This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	CATEGORIES												
		DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES														
A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.	X													
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X						
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X						
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X						
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT								X						

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26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.								X						
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	X													
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours. Subject has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

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C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weakness.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
☒ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
☒ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION
☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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FIELD FITNESS REPORT

CODED

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A

K.C.W. 6/22/55

Reviewed by FUD

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY James S. Woods	1. DATE OF BIRTH 25 Feb 1928	2. SEX M	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION ~~[illegible]~~ SD-D

4. GRADE GS-5	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current) Korea Mission Headquarters
6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 1 November 1954 - 14 April 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION Intelligence Analyst - CE 0136.52	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION 25 September 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality Files Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all Korea Mission file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True) Agnes M. Irime	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True) John L. Hart

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS. 29 April 55	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES William E. Nelson William E. Nelson

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECTION IV

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 '55
ROOM

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale for each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so wish. Read each of the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	CATEGORIES													
	NOT OB-SERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.			X											
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.					X									
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X						
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X						
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X						
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.										X				
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT								X						

SECRET
(When Filled In)

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.								X						
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.					X									
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41 DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.										X				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working, and more than willing to work long hours. He has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

SECRET

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weaknesses.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 8 43 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):*

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- ☐ 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- ☐ 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- ☐ 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- ☐ 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- ☒ 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- ☐ 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? ☒ NO ☐ YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- ☐ 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- ☐ 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- ☐ 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- ☐ 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☒ 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- ☐ 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- ☐ 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- ☐ 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- ☐ 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- ☐ 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- ☐ 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- ☐ 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- ☐ 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- ☐ 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☒ 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- ☐ 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- ☐ 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FE 9

BY DATE
Jm 24 June 54

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. GRADE GS-5	3. POSITION TITLE Intel. Anal. CD-FI

4. OFFICE DDP/FI/RI	STAFF OR DIVISION P & R Branch	BRANCH Consol Section	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 21 Apr. 53 To 20 Apr. 54

6. TYPE OF REPORT
☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special
☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As senior anaylist on the EE/FI/G/Z area my duties consist of:

(A) Consolidating personality files which entails the following: (1) Make a complete search in Index on all references pertaining to the subject, (2) gathering all references in RI/Files, (3) anaylyzing documents for inclusion in 201, (4) preparing a summary of reference sheet which notes the disposition of all the documents put in the case.

(B) Liaison with the area desk.

(c) Supervising the work of the junior anaylist.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
NONE			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Intelligence work at the desk level.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years experience in RI.

10.

12 April 1954
DATE

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods has performed his duties conscientiously and well. He possesses a great deal of energy, is extremely industrious and has maintained excellent relations in his liaison with the area desk.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over)

(4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has performed his duties most outstandingly by virtue of his formation and maintenance of excellent liaison relations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has handled his present responsibilities admirably and I am certain he would be capable of handling additional ones as the opportunity occurs.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Woods could qualify as an Intelligence Analyst in any of the appropriate section of RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

13 April 54
DATE

Harry D. Randall
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

18 May 1954
DATE

John K. Smith
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Subject transferred to FE effective 25 April 1954.

over

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) WOODS	(First) James	(Middle) S.	2. GRADE GS-4	3. POSITION TITLE File Clerk
4. OFFICE DD/P	STAFF OR DIVISION FI	BRANCH RI	☒ DEPT'L. ☐ FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-21-52 To 4-21-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT ☐ Initial ☒ Annual ☐ Special ☐ Reassignment ☐ Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Review and analize material for consolidation of 201 Personality Files. This includes making a complete impartial name check in RI/SC index and a complete search for all material pertinent to the subject in the RI/Files. Also maintain liaison with the [illegible].

After reviewing documents, make up Cross References and any Document changes as necessary. Complete a Summary of References Form listing all references reviewed and the action taken on each.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Accounting.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years of Accounting and law school.

10.

9 April 1953
DATE

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods' performance in this section has been very satisfactory. While still in a trainee position, he is learning the procedure of this section very well. He is extremely industrious and shows little inclination to waste time.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has been most outstanding by virtue of his industry.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has had little opportunity to show his ability, in this line, so far.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Due to his position as trainee, other duties cannot be considered, but I feel that he is quite capable of filling any number of jobs in RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

20 April 1953
DATE

Harry D. Randall
SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

[illegible]
DATE

John K. Smith
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (*please print or type*):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		
WOODS	James	Sauvie	FEB 20 1928	502	16	6806

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: 010032

LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code):

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW. (do NOT *mark more than one*):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance ☐ (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance ☒ (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance ☐ (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James S. Woods

DATE: 4 MAR 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONNEL OFFICE RECEIVING
MAR 20 1 47 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14 1968)
176-101

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods
Dates: 23-24 February 1978
Employee No: 010032
Office: ISS
Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
2. Understand their roles as supervisors in the Performance Evaluation part of the overall Program;
3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective FR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell
Instructor

1[illegible] MAR 1978
Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

14-00000

[illegible]

EOD: 9 Aug [illegible]

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

Name (Last-First-Middl
[illegible], James S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concern
separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

/	1. Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensat
NA	2. Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Gro Life Insurance).
NA	3. Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Empl Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
NA	4. Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
	5. Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks). [illegible]
/	6. Only applicable to Retiree - Returnee (resignee from overseas assignment) I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medic check to my health and well-being.
	7. CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Arm Forces Duty).
	8. Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee
James S [illegible]

Date Signed

Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
304 MEADOW HALL DR.
ROCKVILLE, MD. 20851

Correspondence
OVERT CORRESPONDENCE

☐ Overt ☐ Con

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods **Dates:** 23-24 February 1978

Employee No: 010032 **Office:** ISS

Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
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3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective FR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell 10 MAR 1978

Instructor Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

3 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : ISS/Training Staff

SUBJECT: Document Analysis II for Records Management Officers

1. Jim Woods -OPF has satisfactorily completed the Document Analysis II Course given for Division and Staff Records Management Officers by ISS Training Officer, JoEllen S. McCann. Classes were held daily from 0900 to 1230 hours from 29 November through 10 December 1976.

2. The topics covered in the course were records principles and processing procedures used by Data Management Section analysts for initial input of correspondence into the DDO Records System. The students also covered the official files system and indexing criteria as they currently exist and discussed some of the drawbacks and possible systems changes we might expect in the next few years. Periodic exercises were given to test the students comprehension of topics discussed.

JoEllen McCann
JoEllen McCann

20 JUL 1976

I, the undersigned, authorize the Office of Personnel to give to: CartBlanche whatever information is necessary for me to obtain a credit card.

James S Woods
James S. Woods

mg 7-21-76

CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

JAMES WOODS

SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

SUPERVISORY COUNSELING WORKSHOP

ON

26 - 27 AUGUST 1976

INFORMATION SERVICES GROUP

Peggy Hall
CHIEF, ISG TRAINING

TRAINING REPORT

OFFICE OF TRAINING

This certifies that **James S. Woods** has successfully completed the Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2 which was conducted from 24 July to 25 July 1974.

This seminar provides basic information on microphotography and explores the application of this technology in controlling overburdened and sometimes inefficient paperwork systems. Specific blocks of instruction include: Image Recording Techniques, Microfilm Formats, Viewers and Viewer-Printers, Indexing Methods, Computer Output Microfilm (COM), Micropublishing, and Development and Implementation of Agency Applications. Participants receive a portfolio of various samples of microforms, a Glossary of Micrographic Terms, and a Primer on Information Science.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Edward A. Seroskie
Course Coordinator

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
A – Superior Scholarship
B – Good Scholarship
C – Average Scholarship
D – Passing Scholarship
F(a) – Failure Academic
F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
I – Incomplete *
WX – Withdrawal during first half of term
WP – Withdrew Passing during second half of term
WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
X – Emergency excused official withdrawal

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. Student Copy

Term 1, Acad. Yr. 1971/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 111	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings. Indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc. ____________

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ____________

The student is responsible for arranging with the Instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 [illegible]

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
A – Superior Scholarship
B – Good Scholarship
C – Average Scholarship
D – Passing Scholarship
F(a) – Failure Academic
F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
I – Incomplete *
WX – Withdrawal during first half of term
WP – Withdrew Passing during second half of term
WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
X – Emergency excused official withdrawal

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. Student Copy

Term 2, Acad. Yr. 19 71/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 112	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings. Indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc. ____________

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ____________

The student is responsible for arranging with the Instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 [illegible]

[illegible]
(When Completed)

TRAINING REPORT

Americans Abroad Orientation - Japan

16 Hours 20-21 March 1961 6 Students

Student: **BOYD, James S.** Year of Birth **1928**

EOD Date: **April 1952** Grade: **GS-9** Office: **FE**

COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT OF PROGRAM

[illegible] on travel in the general area and country of destination. Included was a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and descriptions of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slides and exhibits, and selected readings for a recommended program of self-study. Employees and dependents [illegible]

This is a certificate of attendance only; [illegible] in this course.

[illegible] **25 April 1961**

/s/ KENNETH R. [illegible]

[illegible]
(When Completed)

TRAINING REPORT

Japan

16 Americans Abroad Orientation 20-21 March 1961 6

Name: WOODS, Louise (Dependent, James R.) [illegible]

Student: Year of Birth:

EOD Date: Grade: Office:

[illegible]

[illegible] for residence or travel in the general area and country of assignment. Included are a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an evaluation of the importance of the region to the United States and description of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, slide commentaries, and selected readings for the convenience of self-study. [illegible]

This is a certificate of attendance [illegible]

26 April 1961

/s/ [illegible] E. COLEMAN

WRITING WORKSHOP (INTERMEDIATE) NO. 2

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME WOODS, James S.	SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 26 October - 19 November 1959	NO. OF STUDENTS 17
DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	EOD DATE April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-9	OFFICE FE/Administration

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Records Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for 10 to 15 students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Mr. Woods added to the good improvement in mechanics of expression he had achieved in the Basic Writing Workshop. He has now developed the ability to write smooth, compact, and readable sentences. He also learned to organize topics more effectively, and with further writing experience, he can develop the ability to write analytical papers of a professional caliber.

Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

WRITING WORKSHOP (BASIC) NO. 8

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME **WOODS, James S.**	SEX **M**	DATES OF COURSE **21 Sept. - 15 Oct. 1959**	NO. OF STUDENTS **13**

DATE OF BIRTH **20 February 1920**	EOD DATE **April 1952**	GRADE OR RANK **GS-9**	OFFICE **FE/Administration**

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION
Records Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for ten to fifteen students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVMENT

Mr. Woods considerably improved the clarity of his writing during the course, by reducing sentence errors and roundabout phrasing. His written papers reflected his gains in knowledge of basic rules of English usage. His achievement in the Writing Workshop (Basic) shows that Mr. Woods can develop good writing skills, and that he and the Agency would benefit if he took the Writing Workshop (Intermediate).

Frances C. Gemmill
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT COURSE # 9

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME Woods, James S.	SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 10 - 28 May 1954	NO. OF STUDENTS 1st week-49 2nd & 3rd weeks-44
DATE OF BIRTH 21 February 1928	EOD DATE 21 April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-5	OFFICE FE/FI
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Registry Analyst			

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide the student with (1) an understanding of the inter-relationships between operating functions and administrative support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations and the organization and functions of the various clandestine components; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations, and problems peculiar to Logistics, Finance, and other areas of administrative support.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

One week of the course is devoted to lectures in the area described in category 1 on reverse of this page. The material in categories 2 and 3 is presented both by lecture and by practical exercises during the remaining two weeks of the course. Categories 4 through 9 are concerned with the application of knowledge of Agency organization, structure, procedures and regulations in practical situations.

SECTION IV: STUDENT ASSESSMENT

The ratings show how many students received [illegible] rating this student received. [illegible] students' performance in the course with no allowance made for differences in age, education, experience, etc. These ratings are defined as follows:

EXCELLENT: The student indicated exceptional ability or proficiency in meeting this goal or objective; he demonstrated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and effective manner; he demonstrated a good grasp and understanding of the material presented.

UNSATISFACTORY: The student did not achieve this goal or objective; the student's performance indicated a serious lack of knowledge concerning material presented.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

MAJOR CATEGORIES	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Orientation in basic principles of clandestine activity.	2	30 ●	[illegible]
2. Knowledge of clandestine services command structure and organization.	5 ●	14	25
3. Knowledge of Agency and clandestine services regulations and administrative procedures.	2	28 ●	14
4. (A) Preparation of advance form; travel voucher (DOMESTIC) and entertainment reimbursement (DOMESTIC).	0	17	[illegible] ●
(B) Preparation of travel voucher (FOREIGN) including computation of per diem and currency conversion.	1	15 ●	28
5. Preparation of Station Finance Reports.	3	5	[illegible] ●
6. Preparation of forms used in a detached station for property records; knowledge of responsibility for property at the station.	2	30 ●	[illegible]
7. Preparation of form required for project presentation to the Project Review Committee.	[illegible]	30 ●	13
8. Preparation of cable form used at Headquarters writing message from material given, with use of accepted digits, punctuation, and abbreviations.	[illegible]	33 ●	[illegible]
9. Preparation of Headquarters and Field dispatch form and Field pouch manifest.	0	[illegible] ●	[illegible]

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits and characteristics, with particular reference to strong or weak points of the individual or anything that might have influenced his performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Evelyn S. Bugbee
Signature of Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I; IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name Woods, James S.	**Sex** M	**Course and Beginning Date** PHASE I - ORIENTATION#9 - 19 April 54

Date of Birth 23 February 1928	**E O D** April '52	**Grade or Rank** GS-5	**Office** FE/FI

Projected Assignment or Present Position
Registry Analyst

This evaluation is based on a course of 120 hours given over a period of 3 weeks in which there were 89 students. The length of the course, number of students, nature of the course, skills and knowledge taught, and the opportunity for observing the individual student determine which sections of this report are used. These facts must also be considered in interpreting the evaluations which, therefore, *should not be used as the sole basis for personnel decisions.* THIS REPORT IS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO FURNISH INFORMATION AS TO HOW WELL THE STUDENT LEARNED THE SUBJECT MATTER OR SKILLS TAUGHT. In addition, observations of interest and importance are reported which can have significance only as they are related to other information. Unless otherwise stated, performance is evaluated in terms of standards set by instructors or in relation to the performance of others who have taken the course. For further information, consult the Training Evaluation Branch, Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training.

SECTION II: KNOWLEDGE

Subject	Hrs	Rating				
		Fail	Poor	Sat	Exc	Sup
Introduction to Intelligence	80	5	12	26*	34	12
Communism and the U S S R	40	5	17	35*	31	7

The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received.

SECTION III: SKILLS

The 'Course Instruction' column contains scores and/or ratings given by the instructional staff for skills which are specifically intended to be outcomes of the course. The 'Observation' column contains ratings by instructors and/or students concerning skills which have been observed for every student in a class but which have not been the subject of intensive instruction or practice.

Skill	Hrs.	Course Instruction		Observation	
		Objective Score	Rating or Evaluation	Av. Rating by ______ Instructors	Av. Rating by ______ Students

SECTION IV: OBSERVATIONS of ATTITUDES or OTHER PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

During the course incidents were observed which suggested that this person:

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Had difficulty in getting along with others.		X	Lacked motivation for an Agency career.		X
Interfered with instructional and classroom activities.		X	Lacked sufficient security-mindedness.		X
			Lacked interest in the course.		X

Explanations of any 'Yes' answers to items above. Frequency of occurrence and number of persons observing these attitudes or characteristics are included.

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits or characteristics, with particular reference to strong and weak points of the individual, or anything that may have influenced his performance in the course are reported here.

Chief Instructor

SECTION VI: ADJUSTED OVER-ALL EVALUATION

FOR OPTIONAL USE BY INSTRUCTORS		FOR OPTIONAL USE BY TRAINING OFFICERS	
In terms of all factors observed during the course and taking into account this student's experience in the Agency, grade, and general area of work, an 'X' in one of boxes shows the instructor's judgment of his performance in the course.		This evaluation, shown by an 'X' in one of the boxes, takes into account this training record, the student's age, grade, Agency experience, and projected assignment. It is included for the purpose of giving supervisors an estimate of the implications of the training evaluation report for the student's assignment and career potential.	
He was inadequate in his performance.	☐	☐	This is an inadequate performance.
He was barely adequate in his performance and performed acceptably only in a limited range of assignments.	☐	☐	This is a barely adequate performance and raises questions concerning his suitability for his assignment.
He performed acceptably, but was barely adequate in some respects.	☐	☐	This is an acceptable performance but discloses possible areas of weakness.
He was a typically effective student who performed in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	☑	This is a satisfactory performance revealing a typically competent person.
He performed at a high level of competence.	☐	☐	This performance reveals a high level of competence.
He performed at an extremely high level that only a few students have surpassed.	☐	☐	This is an extremely competent performance that only a few persons of his background and position have surpassed.

Training Officer's Comments

Training Officer

SECRET

15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service Personnel Staff

SUBJECT: James S. WOODS - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Subject has been in grade GS-10 since June 1968. Based on his outstanding performance as Chief of Registry in the Rome Station since June 30, 1971, he strongly merits promotion to grade GS-11 at this time. When Subject took over the responsibility for Registry a year ago, he found a system glutted with paper and bound up by a policy which discouraged getting rid of it. He found many procedures in force which were out of date, if not obsolete, and proposed streamlined procedures, which were adopted, to replace them. He asked for and was given the responsibility to analyze and distribute the cables, which had previously been a function of the Chief of Station's secretary. He recommended the discontinuance of the abstract system, which proposal had been adopted by most elements of the Station. He recommended a reduction in the retention period for cable and dispatch chronos. With the help of a TDY team here for the first half of CY 1972, he devised and instituted a program of purging the files. This program has resulted in the disposition of most of the departed Soviet files, a severe trimming of the true name files, and the review, reduction and up-dating of the project and operational files. All of this work was accompanied by appropriate name checks, entries on the index cards and selection of pertinent documents for transmittal to Headquarters. In summary, Subject performed a thorough "house-cleaning" of Station records in the full meaning of that phrase. This program is by no means finished. In fact, Subject has plans for continuing efforts along these lines which may exceed his tenure at this Station since he intends to return to Headquarters not later than May 1974. The on-going program includes a review and reorganization of the subject files, the encrypted 201's and the disposition (hopefully) of about 50 feet of microfilm. A corollary to these projects will be a significant reduction in the index cards, which at present lead to the microfilm and to other superfluous material we either have or will destroy.

2. The equally important aspect of records management, namely the introduction of procedures to lessen the likelihood

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

if not prevent the reoccurrence of this pile-up of paper is not lost on this officer. He constantly thinks in terms of procedures and controls to accomplish this end.

3. Subject is dedicated, highly motivated, conscientious, and hard working. He reports to work each day an hour before the Station opens in order to distribute the cables by opening of business. He never hesitates to respond positively to any request for help. Indeed, he solicits work which he believes can be done more easily or more simply in his unit. In all respects, Subject is a trained, professional records management officer who is thoughtful as well as enthusiastic about his work.

4. It is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to grade GS-11.

ARoosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, James Sauvie
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 502 16 6806

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

☐ SINGLE ☒ MARRIED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ ANNULLED

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Washington, D.C.
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 6 Aug 60
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE: Louise Anne
ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code): 432 College Pkwy Rockville
TELEPHONE NO.: 24-0163

NAMES OF CHILDREN: Laura Renee Woods
ADDRESS: 432 College Pkwy, Rockville, MD.
SEX: F
DATE OF BIRTH: 20/2/71

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH
MAR 15 2 27 PM '71

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian): Ross A. Woods - Deceased
ADDRESS:
TELEPHONE NO.:

NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian): Susan A. Woods
ADDRESS: Forest River, N. Dak.
TELEPHONE NO.:

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Mother & Sister (husband is [illegible])

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22 1). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): Fiala, Richard
RELATIONSHIP: Brother-in-Law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 521 Hamline St. Grand Forks, N. Dak.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 701-775-4472
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) [✓ YES] NO

IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES [✓ NO]
Union Trust Co. of D.C.

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) [✓ YES] NO

The persons named in item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

FORM 1-70 61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(When Filled In)

5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? ☒ YES ☐ NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" where is document located?)*

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?
☒ YES ☐ NO. *(If "Yes" give name(s) and address)*

In the will

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? ☐ YES ☒ NO. *(If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)*

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED *(Full Address)*	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 *(Full Address)*

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE *(See HR 22-3)*
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL *(when applicable per HR 22-3)*	DATE

SIGNED AT Hqs.	DATE 9 Mar 71	SIGNATURE

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
010032	WOODS	JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42
			11	18	70		1			ENGLAND	210

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE				CODE
25-26	27-28	29-30	31-32	33-34	35-36		37	38	39		40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☒	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		☑ REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	OCO	DATE 1/15/71	SIGNATURE
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTRS.		
☒	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

30 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, European Division

FROM : Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation - James S. Woods

Subject, who has been in grade as a GS-10 just two years, has been Chief of the Registry of the London Station for eighteen months. Subject, fresh from a Saigon assignment, brought with him a broad and varied background of field experience (Far East) and several Headquarters' assignments. He has been in one or another aspect of records management work since he started with us as a very junior clerk in 1952.

Subject's fitness reports, since he has been in London, testify to the high regard in which he is held by the Station and the excellent results he has managed to achieve. When he arrived at the Station, the start had been made on a file reduction program but an enormous amount of organized work remained to be done. Subject set about it with great enthusiasm and a high degree of professional organization. As a result, the Registry inventory today is the leanest and the most efficient the Station has seen for many a long day, if ever before. To a great extent this can be laid at Subject's own door and he personally did much of the work. At the same time, Subject surveyed and reorganized the overall workload of the Registry and was finally able to recommend to the Station management a reduction of one Registry clerk. The smaller staff has certainly required a more intensive work effort on the part of Registry personnel, which has been attained without any loss of morale; in fact, quite the reverse.

Subject, therefore, emerges as a records management officer who has thoroughly learned his business and a hard-driving, sympathetic and successful supervisor. In the opinion of the Station management, Subject is already quite capable of taking over broader and more senior responsibilities in the records management field. In this respect, however, we do not believe he will be wasting his time in London by spending, as he currently plans to do, an additional year here on the completion of his tour in November. The London Registry, reflecting the multi-faceted work of the Station, is sufficiently complex an operation to warrant

Subject's continued attention.

In view of his really excellent performance and high promise, it is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to GS-11.

/s/ Bronson Tweedy
COS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME: LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-26	MIDDLE
010032	WOODS	JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
11	15	68					1			ENGLAND	216

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (*Specify*)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 1-15-68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY RID C & L DIVISION, OTHER ✓ T & F DIVISION	REPORT ANNOTATED TO CONTROL DOCUMENT DATE 10 DEC 1968	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED SIGNATURE

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-101

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OMI 20-6 dated October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

James S Woods — 15 Nov 68
Signature — date

JAMES S. WOODS

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
010032	Woods,	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 30, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
			10	03	68		1			Vietnam	710

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☐	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
✓	OTHER (*Specify*) telepouch		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FVST 31976

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/3/68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐	WEO	✓	
☐	C & L DIVISION, CTOD.	DATE 10/15/68	SIGNATURE K. K. Lee
☐	C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

[illegible]

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO:
Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
010032	[illegible]	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		COUNTRY	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42
01	14	67					1			Vietnam	772

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S			DEPARTURE O/S			TYPE OF DATA		O/P USE ONLY		AREA(S)	
MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	38	39		CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

☐	TRAVEL VOUCHER	☐	DISPATCH
☐	CABLE	☑	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
☐	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 764

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
☐ OCC			
☐ C & L DIVISION, CTRS.		DATE 5/22/67	SIGNATURE
☑ C & T DIVISION			

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4-10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James S Woods
Signature
JAMES S. WOODS

28 NOV 66
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

19 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. James S. Woods**

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. I have determined that you meet the criteria outlined in HR 20-50 for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant was made effective 18 December 1966.

2. You are hereby notified of your right to appeal this action to the Director of Central Intelligence as specified in HR 20-50. Such appeal must be received in the Office of the Director not later than 30 calendar days from the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6				25-26
010032	Woods	James	S	45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (*One only*). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		✓ ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (*Basic*) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	09	24	66	Japan	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (*Basic*) 4 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	X	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (*Specify*)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	5/28 - 9/24/66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	C S L DIVISION	DATE		SIGNATURE
X	C S T DIVISION	10/14/66		David Ciocco

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 2 Years from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Evelyn M Flagg
Office of Personnel
Evelyn M. Flagg

James S Woods
(Employee)
James Sauvie Woods

Date: 23 Nov 66

23 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James S. Woods

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

29 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Woods

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such a recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Services.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

[illegible]

SECRET

cr-257

4 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

ATTENTION: DDP/OP

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Mr. James S. Woods.

2. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and Atsugi, Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958.

3. Mr. Woods' exceptional performance is described by the Tokyo Station as follows:

> "A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at Fuchu Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is located in five different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods to ensure that action responsibility on incoming cables is rapidly and properly assigned, dispatches are correctly routed and processed, correspondence from other local military agencies is correctly analyzed and routed, the twice-a-day courier system is functioning effectively, and the Station flexowriter is rapidly churning out priority dispatch traffic.
>
> "B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods, who is Chief of this unit. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that the Station Registry is a smooth and well-functioning unit.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

4. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "Strong" manner as indicated in his recent fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Cable Secretariat from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated, "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 9 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who constantly strives to achieve the maximum economy in the use of his personnel and materials."

5. Consideration has been given to the granting of an Honor and Merit Award to Mr. Woods, but in this particular case it appears that a Quality Step Increase is more appropriate.

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

MAR 11 1966
Secretary, CS Panel Section C

MAR 11 1966
Date

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

CONCUR:

Gerald E. Miller
DDP/OP

15 March 66
Date

APPROVED:

for John J. Caldwell
Director of Personnel

18 Mar 66
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST / FIRST / MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print) 7-24	25-26
10032	WOODS, JAMES S.	56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	JAPAN	40-42
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1	04	15	61					375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	✓	DUTY STATUS ~~OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE~~ REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT ~~DATE~~/PERIOD
—	30 MAR - 15 APR 1961

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION SKP	26 JUNE 1961	

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

3362 097814

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-5 F.P.M.
6 (AF) 3000

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball-point pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~072338~~ 070338

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): WOODS James S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 28

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): AICD APO 925 San Francisco, Calif. ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☒ NO ☐

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: Association Benefits Plan - Family
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): High
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband Louise A.	8 May 37	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☒

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan: 4 2 5

2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.) ~~7~~ 8

3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH March DAY 22 YEAR 1964

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

[illegible]
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(ALTERNATE)
SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 3-1-64

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 3-15-64

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.
1E 5010

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1, S

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6				25-26
100322	Woods,	Jones	S.	57

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		ARRIVAL			DEPARTURE			COUNTRY	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		
	1				03	19	59	Philippines	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA		DEPARTURE			RETURN			AREA(S)	OMIT
	CODE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	MONTH	DAY	YEAR		40-42
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.:

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓	FINANCE DIVISION		

FORM 8-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
5 GAO 5.00

LTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FOR 33.52

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read tions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or bal t pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~882697~~

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL) [illegible] S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) [illegible] ☐

5. SEX MALE ☑ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☑ NO ☐

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.

UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible] Plan	Low	4 2 5

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible]	[illegible] May 19[illegible]	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan. 4 2 2

2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.) 7

3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH MAR DAY 31 YEAR 1961

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

[illegible] 27 MAR 61
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 3/27/61

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 4/16/61

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

FE 11632

X-2579 [illegible]

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of Twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

James S Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Anna C. Phillips
Office of Personnel
Anna C. Phillips

Date: 21 Feb. 1961

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO [illegible]

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM 3362

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball point pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. ~~[illegible]~~ 008000

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) Woods (FIRST) James (MIDDLE INITIAL) S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 2 DAY [illegible] YEAR [illegible]

3. Are you now married? YES ☒ 1 NO ☐ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) [illegible] (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) [illegible] (STATE) Va ☐

5. SEX MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☒ NO ☐

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN [illegible]
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW) [illegible]
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER 4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible] B. Woods	[illegible]	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box)
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan. 4 2 1

2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of brochure for proper number) 2

3. Date of event which permits change MONTH Aug DAY 6 YEAR 1960

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

James S. Woods 8/11/60
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
J. L. Bischoff
HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 8/11/60

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION [illegible]/60

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.

5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY REGISTRANTS AND AGENCY.

[illegible]

116032

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO [illegible]

H[illegible]TH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FOR[illegible]

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read Instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballp[illegible] pen.)

3362

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO.
~~033078~~

PART A
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): WOODS JAMES S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 28

3. Are you now married? YES ☐ 1 NO ☒ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): FORRST RIVER NORTH DAKOTA ☐

5. SEX: MALE ☒ 1 FEMALE ☐ 2

6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES ☐ NO ☒

7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 ☐ 1
$4,000 TO $5,999 ☐ 2
$6,000 TO $9,999 ☒ 3
$10,000 OR OVER ☐ 4

PART B
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: ASSOCIATION BENEFIT PLAN
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): HIGH
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 4 2 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES ☐ NO ☐

PART C
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. ☐

3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. ☐ 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. ☐ 2
(c) Any other reason. ☐ 3

PART D
FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B

1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E
ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

14 June 60
(SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001)

PART F
TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED [illegible] OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 6/30/60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 7/10/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS
FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

FE

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

10564

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

James S Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Lorene E Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 23 aug 57

FORM NO. 911a
1 FEB 56
REPLACES FORM NO. 35-104 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1956

Korea Station wishes to express its appreciation to JAMES S. WOODS for his most diligent performance of duty during his recent TDY here, his highly cooperative attitude and above all, his extreme eagerness to get a job done well and expeditiously.

It was largely with his help that Korea Station was able to screen and process the voluminous material which needed to be handled in order to establish a coordinated and integrated record and file maintenance system.

All Korea Station personnel connected with the work of the TDY Team members were impressed and gratified by the eagerness with which they assisted with details and helped with problems that were outside the responsibilities of their assigned task. Their pleasant manner, apt suggestions, their excellent cooperation and untiring efforts to complete more than the initially estimated workload, all created a most favorable impression which reflects much credit not only on the team members themselves but on the Records Integration Branch as well.

Leland H. Carlisle

Leland H. CARLISLE
Chief, KOSTA (Rear)

CONFIDENTIAL

144 Buil NRLL –
[illegible] Board
11-3

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME	(Last) Woods	(First) James	(Middle) S.	2. THIS DATE 6 August 1952

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)
☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION
☑ UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)
☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE
☑ DREAD DISEASES *
☑ INCOME REPLACEMENT *
[illegible]

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

WDC - Tokyo - WASH - TDY

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
Air Trip	✓		2017	————	4.00
FEGLI		✓			

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY	CPD (Signature) Patton	ICD (Signature) Esther Patterson

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TARB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPD files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 23 July 1954

Dear James S. Woods

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective 25 April 1954

Position: I.O.

Base Salary: GS-5 $3535.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of ~~six~~ 12 months from date of employment. In the event

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Ralph L. Lovelace
Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

James S Woods
Employee

23 July 54
Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

2202 [illegible] PE-1 [illegible]

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) Woods (First) James (Middle) S

2. THIS DATE 10 June 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

☑ WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA) ☑ MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA

NI ☑ GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED ☑ AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

Lvg Wash. 2 July 54 To Minneapolis, Seattle, & Tokyo

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
WAEPA	✓		#2574	P/R - $8.33 - 8/04/54	$ 27.[illegible]
Air Trip Ins	✓		28354		$ 4.00

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPD: SIGNATURE I&CB: SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

(4)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

C.I.A. Washington, D.C.
(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, James S. Woods, do solemnly ~~swear (or~~ affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

April 21, 1952 James S. Woods
(Date of entrance on duty) (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of April, A. D. 1952,

at Washington D.C.
(City) (State)

[SEAL] Margaret C. Casey
(Signature of officer)
5 U.S.C. 16 & 16A
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68160-5

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*) 3505 Miss. Ave. S.E. Washington 19, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH Feb. 20, 1928

(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*) Forest River, N. Dak.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY Mr. Ross A. Hoode Forest River, N. Dak.

(B) RELATIONSHIP Father

(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE Forest River, N. Dak

(D) TELEPHONE NO. —

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED (*Check one*)	SINGLE
Miss Marilyn Hoode	3143 W 18th St. Denver, Col.	1. clerk 2. temporary 3. V.A.	sister		✓
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any; or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

14-00000

✓

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE: 050

DIVISION: RL

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES SHUVIE

BRANCH: Processing & Records

SECTION: File

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
C.I.A. ~~April 21, 52~~		21	4	1952				14	8	
Treasury Dept	15th & Penn	7 5	8 11	1951	20 19	4	1952	~~19~~	~~5~~	-
Treasury Dept.	15th & Penn	21 19	5	1950	12 19	9	1950	10 1	3 4	
Total Civilian Service								15	9	—

SCD 11/12/48
verified
10/23/51
JR

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Army	3	10	1946	12	4	1948	10	8	1
Army	10 ~~19~~	9 ~~10~~	1950	7	8	1951	17 ~~20~~	7 ~~9~~	
Total Military Service							9 ~~20~~	4 ~~5~~	2 ~~2~~

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby ~~XXXXXXX~~ swear (or affirm) that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

April 21, 1952
DATE

James S. Woods
SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

Margaret C. Lacey
50 SC 16016 R
SCD 11-8-48

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
25	1	3

as of 21 April 1952

SECRET [illegible]RITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) WOODS (first) JAMES (middle) SAUVIE	3. Office RI/FI

4. Date of Birth Feb. 20, 1928	5. Sex: ✓ male (1) ___ female (2)	Marital Status Single Nr. Dependents 1	6. Employment Date: April 1952

7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. ___ Other

8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other(specify)

Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ___________

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

- 1. Less than high school
- 2. High school graduate
- 3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
- [✓ 4.] Two years college, or less
- 5. Over two years, no degree
- 6. Bachelor degree
- 7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
- 8. Masters degree
- 9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd		Yrs Compl		Degree Recd		Sem Hrs
			From	To	Day	Night	Title	Date	
Aakers Business School - Grand Forks N. Dak.	accounting	Law	Oct Feb	48 50			Junior accounting Diploma		
Strayers College Washington D.C.	accounting	Law	Now attending						

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates			Study or Specialization
	From	To	Tot. mo's	

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From April 52 To Nov 52 Tot. mos. 7

Grade GS-4 Salary 3175 yr

Office RI/FI

Position Title: CLERK

Duty Title: General Office Work

Description of Duties: Supervise the changing of the folders from [illegible] to one single documentary autostat documents for RI. Do requests and other general office duties.

Duty Station, if overseas:

From To Tot. mos.

Grade Salary

Office

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overseas:

From To Tot. mos.

Grade Salary

Office

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overseas:

From To Tot. mos.

Grade Salary

Office

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overseas:

From To Tot. mos.

Grade Salary

Office

Position Title:

Duty Title:

Description of Duties:

Duty Station, if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From Jan 52 To April 52 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-3 Salary 2950 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Investments	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk. Description of Duties: Working with Mexican Claims Duty Station if overseas:
From May 50 To Jan 52 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-2 Salary 2750 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Disbursements	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk Description of Duties: Verified checks for correct names, addresses and money. Other 13 months of this period spent in the Army Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___U.S. Secret Service
02___Civil Police
03___Military Police
04___U.S. Border Patrol
05___U.S. Narcotics Squad
06___FBI
07___Criminal Investigation Div.
21___Office of Naval Intelligence
22___Office of War Information
23___Army G-2
20___Office of Strategic Services
24___Air Force A-2
25___Foreign Economic Admin.
26___Counter Intelligence Corps
27___Immigration & Naturalization
28___Strategic Services Unit
29___Foreign Service, State Dept.
30___Central Intelligence Group
31___Armed Forces Security Agency
32___Coordinator of Information
33___Office of Facts & Figures
34___Board of Economic Warfare
35___Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
LANGUAGE	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ____________

**Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ________

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
~~Tokyo, Ja~~		Residence	Travel	Study
Tokyo, Japan	Jan 47 - March 48	X (army)		
Korea	Dec 50 - June 51	x (army)		

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. 5%	2.	35	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2. ✓	—	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ✓ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___.

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

One in which I may be able to use my accounting experience, such as some finance work or administrative work.

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? [✓ Yes] ___ No.
If yes, indicate your present draft classification 4 A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes [✓ No].
If yes, complete the following.
1. ___ National Guard
2. ___ Air National Guard
3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

Service ARMY Grade P.F.C Serial Number ER17214704

Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ___

Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ___

Location of Service Records, if known Washington 25, D.C

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE Nov. 13, 1952 SIGNATURE James [illegible]

WEAR

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT): WOODS, James S. Acct Clk.

THIS DATE: 20 December 1951

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED BLACK LINE REPRESENTS MEAN PERCENTILE RANKINGS OF GS-4'S. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS PERCENTILE RANKINGS FOR THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT.



TYPING			SHORTHAND			
GROSS	NET	ERRORS	1	2	3	TOT. TIME
28	18	10				

EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-70C
JAN 1950

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 25 August 1976

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle): Woods, James S. 20 Dec 2X

3. POSITION TITLE: Records Admin Officer

4. GRADE: GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH: DDO/CCS/RSD

6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.: 6352

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

☐ PRE-EMPLOYMENT

☐ ENTRANCE ON DUTY

☐ TDY STANDBY

☐ SPECIAL TRAINING

☒ ANNUAL

☐ RETURN TO DUTY

☐ FITNESS FOR DUTY

☐ MEDICAL RETIREMENT

☐ HDQS/TDY

☐ OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD:

STATION:

TDY OR PCS:

TYPE OF COVER:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY:

NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED:

☐ RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA:

STATION:

NO. OF DEP.'S:

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

☐ YES

☐ NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE: Donald E. McGahill

ROOM NO. & BUILDING: [illegible] HQS

EXT.: 6344

10. COMMENTS:

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION: Annual Exam Completed.

DATE: 4 October 1976

SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF: William T. Golder, OMS/PEO

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle) WOODS, James S.	2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1928	3. GRADE GS-10
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment) DDP/EUR	5. PRESENT POSITION Records Admin Officer	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION c/o7152
7. PROPOSED STATION Rome, Italy	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade) Records Admin Officer 0699 (09)	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION SS# 502-16-6806 Nominal (Light State)	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE 31 May 1971	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY -2-

12. COMMENTS

Please evaluate for proposed assignment.

No language is required for this position

Form 58 attached

13. DATE OF REQUEST 8 March 1971	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL Floyd G. Lanter Floyd G. Lanter, E/Pers	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING 4B0002 Hq.	16. EXTENSION 7152

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

7 APR 1971

QUALIFIED FOR [illegible]

[illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 1-60 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.

Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444i, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.

If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
100.32	WOODS JAMES SAUVIE	20 FEB 28	

SECTION II EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM--TO--			
1. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND			1964-1970			48 SEM HRS
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☒ ADD ☐ DELETE	Daughter	Bethesda, MD.	American	Rockville, MD 432 College Pkwy
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n USE PREVIOUS
10-68 EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MAR 11 5 21 AM '71
MAIL ROOM

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESI-DENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGN-MENT
1.							
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG
☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
X James Sauvie Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO. 030032	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle) WOODS JAMES S	3. SEX M	4. DATE OF BIRTH 02/20/28	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP GS-09-07
6. SD D	7. POSITION TITLE RECORDS ADMIN OF	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT FE	9. LOCATION (Country, City) SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM	

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	54/08/01	56/07/01
JAPAN	TDY 56	56/08/01	56/11/01
MEXICO	TDY 56	57/02/01	57/08/01
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	PCS 56	57/09/01	59/03/19
JAPAN	PCS 45	61/04/24	66/09/24
VIETNAM	PCS 6	67/01/14	68/10/3

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 16 OCT 1968
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg 7-67

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

29 F[illegible] ENTD

(4-51)

SECRET
When Filled In

SECTION III EDUCATION (Cont'd)

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (from - to)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1	U. of MD. Tachikawa, Japan		Eng I	1966			3
2	U. of MD. Tachikawa, Japan		Bn 10	1966			3
3	U. of MD. Saigon		HIS 127	1967			3
	U of MD Saigon		ECN 31	1967			3
4	U of MD Saigon		Py 1	1967			3

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

DATE
CS.
[illegible] DATA

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV NONE GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V NONE TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)

2. SHORTHAND (WPM)

3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM:
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER: SPECIFY:

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card-punch, etc.)

SECTION VI NONE SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. Provide license registry number if known.

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

SECTION VIII AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) JAN 67 - OCT 68	2. LOCATION (Country, City) SAIGON VIETNAM	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) APR 61 - SEPT 66	2. LOCATION (Country, City) TOKYO, JAPAN	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH FE
4. TITLE OF JOB CHIEF OF REGISTRY		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS 9

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

SUPERVISED 7 EMPLOYEES IN REGISTRY WORK.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year) FEB 59 - MAR 61	2. LOCATION (Country, City) WASH. D.C.	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH FE
4. TITLE OF JOB RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB GS-9

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

ASSIST THE FE RMO IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FE RECORDS. INCLUDED CLOSE LIAISON WITH RID. ALSO INVOLVED 4 MONTHS OF HALF-DAY WORK WITH DDP/MACHINE RECORD GROUP IN SETTING UP THE APERTURE CARD SYSTEM.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): AUG 57 - FEB 59
2. LOCATION (Country, City): MANILA, P.I.
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: CHIEF OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT TEAM
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-7 & GS-9
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

CHIEF OF A TEAM OF THREE INDIVIDUALS STATIONED PCS MANILA BUT TRAVELLED THROUGHOUT THE F.E. (INCLUDING AUSTRALIA) TO SET UP RECORD SYSTEMS, INCLUDING REGISTRY, ACCORDING TO HEADQUARTERS REGULATION. THIS WAS TO ENSURE THAT FIELD SYSTEMS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH HQS PROCEDURES.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): FEB 57 - JULY 57
2. LOCATION (Country, City): MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: WH
4. TITLE OF JOB: TEAM MEMBER OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT TEAM
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-7
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

MEMBER OF A TEAM OF 4 SENT TO MEXICO TO ESTABLISH AND STREAMLINE A SYSTEM OF RECORDS. THIS INVOLVED SETTING UP A 201 SYSTEM, BETTER NAME TRACE SYSTEM, CHARGE-OUT SYSTEM FOR FILES AND THE MICROFILMING OF FBI RECORDS. MY MAIN SPECIALTY WAS 201'S.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year): AUG 54 - NOV 56
2. LOCATION (Country, City): SEOUL, KOREA + Fuchu & YOKOSUKA, JAPAN
3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH: FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: ADMIN ASSISTANT
5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-5 & GS-7
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

NAME TRACES AND OTHER REGULAR REGISTRY DUTIES.

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried - SPECIFY) MARRIED			
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) WOODS	(First) LOUISE	(Middle) ANNE	(Maiden) FALLON
3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 MAY 1937	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) BROOKLYN, NEW YORK		
5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE.	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER NA		
7. CITIZENSHIP AMERICAN	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) —		9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED —

SECTION X DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
CHRISTINE MARIE	DAU.	TOKYO, JAPAN APR 14, 1963	American	DECEASED July 63

SECTION XI NONE PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 OCT 68	James P. Woods

SECRET

1 AP

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(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

Return to
QAB
1604 Curle

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel [illegible] will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item [illegible] more complete or correct than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE

2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
2224 F. ST. N.W. WASH. D.C

3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State)
FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA

4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
~~[illegible]~~ 4791

5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE
U.S.A.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.
MR. ROSS A WOODS

2. RELATIONSHIP
FATHER

3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country).
FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA

4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE
~~[illegible]~~ FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA NA

5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER
4791

6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER
NA

7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION
NA

8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.
NA

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: ☒ SINGLE ☐ MARRIED ☐ WIDOWED ☐ SEPARATED ☐ DIVORCED ☐ ANNULLED

2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

12 SEP

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiancé.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)

4. DATE OF MARRIAGE

5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)

6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)

CODED

7. LIVING ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. DATE OF DEATH

9. CAUSE OF DEATH

10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)

10 DEC

11. DATE OF BIRTH

12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY

14. PLACE OF ENTRY

15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)

16. DATE ACQUIRED

17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)

18. OCCUPATION

19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is unemployed, last two employers)

20. EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

FORM NO. 444b USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
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1

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SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE	23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle) NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? ☒ YES ☐ NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
UNION TRUST CO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

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SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)
NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? ☐ YES ☒ NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS
NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP *(Country)*
U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE:
☒ BIRTH ☐ MARRIAGE ☐ OTHER *(Specify)*:

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS
NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION *(First papers, etc.)*
NA

SECTION VII EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

☐	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
☐	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
☒	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	☐	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
☐	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	☐	MASTER'S DEGREE ☐ DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
NA							

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
HadLicks PRIVATE BUSINESS school GRANDFORKS N.DAK.	Accounting	NOV-48 OCT-49	APR-49 FEB 50	9 month

4. MILITARY TRAINING *(Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)*

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
NA				

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE
NA

SECRET

SECTION VIII FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

CANCELLED

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED															HOW ACQUIRED			
	EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY			FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN			ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH			ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL			LIMITED KNOWLEDGE			NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
(List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK																		
	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S	R	W	S				

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD.

SECTION IX GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY			
			RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
NA						

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

NA

SECTION X TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM			
30	NA	GREGG ☐	SPEEDWRITING ☐	STENOTYPE ☐	OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

NA

SECTION XI SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

NA

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

NA

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

NA

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

NA

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) NA

6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue) NA

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(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (*Do not submit copies unless requested*). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (*Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.*)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NA

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): APR-1952-JUNE-1954
2. GRADE: 4
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FILE CLERK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Worked in FILES doing filing and other related duties. Worked in Consolidation with 201's

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): July 54 - June 56
2. GRADE: 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE/6 OVERSEAS
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: HEAD OF PERSONALITY FILE (201 FILES) SECTION FOR BASE, which included ALL Agent FILES.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): AUG 56 - NOV 56
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI TDY OVERSEAS FOR FE/6
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: RETIREMENT OF RECORDS TO Hqs FROM BASE. SET UP NEW SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR BASE

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): DEC 56 - JAN 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Worked in RI/AN 201 Section in filling out 831's

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (*From- and To-*): FEB 57 - AUG 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI TDY - MEXICO
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: SET up SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR STATION

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (*Including stepchildren and adopted children*) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (*Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.*) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX		CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
			M	F		

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Can't recall addresses but lived in the following places since Apr 1952 -

Conn. Ave. N.W. D.C.
Minnesota Ave. S.E. D.C
Colonial Terrace, Arlington, VA.
Greenbrier St, Arlington, VA.

DATE COMPLETED 10 Sept 57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE James S Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
110632	

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (23-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Woods, James S	Feb	20	1928

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
000	9	9	57	☒ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN; BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

FORM NO. 444c
1 FEB 57

SECRET

(4-45)

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED 9 Sept 57	SIGNATURE James S [illegible]
(46)	(47)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV. 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

... CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYN.

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Typewrite or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO.

ANNOUNCEMENT

1. NAME OF EXAMINATION OR KIND OF POSITION APPLIED FOR: Accountant

2. OPTION(S) (if mentioned in examination announcement):

3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT APPLIED FOR (City and State): Washington D.C.

4. DATE OF THIS APPLICATION:

5. MR. MRS. MISS (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): James Sauvie Woods

6. (A) STREET AND NUMBER OR R. D. NUMBER: 2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.

(B) CITY OR POST OFFICE (including postal zone) AND STATE: Washington 8, D.C.

7. LEGAL OR VOTING RESIDENCE (State): N. Dak.

8. (A) OFFICE PHONE: ex 8400 et 2612

(B) HOME PHONE: AD 8430

9. DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year): Feb. 20, 1928

10. ☐ MARRIED ☒ SINGLE

11. PLACE OF BIRTH (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Forest River, N. Dak.

12. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

13. (A) HEIGHT WITHOUT SHOES: 5 FEET 6 INCHES

(B) WEIGHT: 156 POUNDS

14. (A) HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? ☒ YES ☐ NO

(B) IF SO, GIVE LAST GRADE AND DATE OF LAST CHANGE IN GRADE: GS-2

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ APPRO. ☐ NON APPRO.

MATERIAL ☐ SUBMITTED ☐ RETURNED

ENTERED REGISTER.

NOTATIONS:

APP. REVIEW:

APPROVED:

OPTION	GRADE	EARNED RATING	PREFERENCE	AUGM. RATING
			☐ 5 POINTS (TENT.)	
			☐ 10 POINTS	
			☐ WIFE OR WIDOW	
			☐ DISAL.	
			☐ BEING INVESTIGATED	
INITIALS AND DATE				

15. (A) WHAT IS THE LOWEST ENTRANCE SALARY YOU WILL ACCEPT? $ 2950 PER YEAR
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.

(B) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT SHORT-TERM APPOINTMENT IF OFFERED, FOR
☐ 1 TO 3 MONTHS ☐ 4 TO 6 MONTHS ☒ 6 TO 12 MONTHS

NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*

(C) IF YOU ARE WILLING TO TRAVEL, SPECIFY
☐ OCCASIONALLY ☒ FREQUENTLY ☐ CONSTANTLY

(D) CHECK IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT, IF OFFERED:
☒ IN WASHINGTON, D. C. ☒ ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES
☒ OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(E) IF YOU WILL ACCEPT APPOINTMENT IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS ONLY, GIVE ACCEPTABLE LOCATIONS.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.

(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.

(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year): FROM May, 1950 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR PRESENT POSITION: Fiscal Accounting clerk

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal Service): GS-2

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING, $ 2450 PER year; PRESENT, $ 2830 PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Washington D.C.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mrs. Gervias

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Treasury Dept. Penn. Ave.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Division of Disbursements

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR DESIRING TO CHANGE EMPLOYMENT: Better Position

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

Working with vouchers and checks; checking them for names, dates, money, etc. Doing other clerkical duties of a general nature.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Feb, 1950 TO May, 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Clerk & Salesman

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ FINAL $ 180 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Grand Forks, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. or Mrs. Pat M. Byrne

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):
General Tobbacco & Candy Company
Grand Forks, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Wholesaler of Tobacco & Candy

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: To work for the Government

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Selling tobacco and candy. Doing office work such as taking inventorys and making out sales tickets.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct, 1949 TO Feb, 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: In school

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM April, 1949 TO Oct, 1949

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Farm Laborer

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER FINAL $ 150 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Inkster, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Zeck Thomas

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Zeck Thomas Inkster, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Farming

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: To go to school

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Doing general farm duties.

⑤ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct, 1948 TO April, [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: In School

CLASSIFICATION [illegible] (if in Federal service)

SALARY OR EARNINGS
STARTING $ PER
FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person. If Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING. In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18. EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED: Forest River High, Forest River, N. Dak.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED: English, Bookkeeping and Math

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DEGREES CONFERRED DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Hadlich's Priviate Business School Grand Forks, N. Dak.	Accounting & Tax	Oct. 48 Oct. 49	April Feb.	,49 ,50		Junior Accountancy Diploma		

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS	LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS	SEMESTER HOURS
		Accounting	
		Income Tax	

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	YEARS COMPLETED NIGHT

19. INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

	READING EXC.	READING GOOD	READING FAIR	SPEAKING EXC.	SPEAKING GOOD	SPEAKING FAIR	UNDERST'NG EXC.	UNDERST'NG GOOD	UNDERST'NG FAIR

22. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)?

☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20. IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON OR PURPOSE (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation) Jan. 1947 to March 1948 in Japan. Nov. 1950 to June 1951 in Korea.

23. GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS
(A) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested)
(B) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS
(C) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE
(D) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC.
(E) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

21. LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE, SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 35 SHORTHAND

24 REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Robert Hadlich	Box 659, Grand Forks, N. Dak.	Teacher
2. Calmer Hovland	521 Maple Ave. Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher
3. Merland W Berg	618 Cottonwood St. Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein		X
30 SINCE YOUR 18TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case*		X
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39*		X
33 HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer *prior* to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Oct. 1946 Oct. 1950	April, 1948 August, 1951
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.)	SERIAL NO. (if none, give grade or rating at time of separation)
Army	ER 17 214 704

	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM NO.		ITEM NO.	

If more space is required use paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

(Sign your name in full. Give your initial or initials, and surname. If married woman, sign your own given name as "Mrs. Mary L. Doe")

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

1008

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient space.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? YES

SECTION I PERSONAL BACKGROUND

[illegible]

EVANGELINE [illegible]

ADVANCE NAME CHECK

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] FATHER [illegible]

[illegible]

DATE OF BIRTH NA PLACE OF BIRTH NA

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., GIVE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP NA WHEN ACQUIRED WHERE

OCCUPATION NA [illegible] NA

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

[illegible]

[illegible] MILITARY SERVICE [illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON NA

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS [illegible]

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, PROFESSIONAL [illegible] OTHER GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND (INCLUDE MEMBERSHIP [illegible]) OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS [illegible] WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED

[illegible]

[illegible]

SEC. 28. MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGAN[illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] I attended [illegible] school [illegible] from the first grade to the sixth, at which time I entered Forest River school. The address of [illegible] school is Inkster, N. Dak. As I've stated I entered Forest River school in 1936.

[illegible] From June 1948 to October 1948 I worked on [illegible] Thomas Farm located at Inkster, N. Dak.

[illegible]

Aaker's School of Business

Grand Forks, North Dakota

REPORT OF PROGRESS

NAME WOODS, James S. ADDRESS Forest River, N. Dak. COURSE OF STUDY Accountancy DATE December 14, 1951

SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENT

SUBJECTS COMPLETED:

	E	D	C	B	A
Elementary Accounting					X
Advanced Accounting					X
Income Tax					X
Cost Accounting (Elem.)				X	
Typewriting				X	
Spelling					X
Business Mathematics					X
Business Law					X
Penmanship			X		
Salesmanship				X	
Business English				X	
Office Machines					X

KEY

A Superior
B Above Average
C Average
D Fair
E Slow

COMPLETED SUBJECTS

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	E	D	C	B	A
INITIATIVE					X
QUALITY OF WORK				X	
QUANTITY OF WORK				X	
ENTHUSIASM					X
PUNCTUALITY					X
COOPERATION					X
ADAPTABILITY				X	

KEY

E	D	C	B	A
Needs Supervision	Routine Worker	Fairly Progressive	Resourceful	Marked Ability
Careless	Inaccurate	Passable	Good Quality	Highest Quality
Very Low Output	Low Output	Average Output	High Output	Very High Output
Indifferent	Occasionally Enthusiastic	Average	Determined	Confident
Undependable	Improvement Needed	Occasionally Absent or Late	Seldom Late	Always Punctual
Reluctant	Passive	Usually Agreeable	Co-operative	Co-operative
Limited	Slow	Average	With Ease	Exceptional

Manager

Please keep this report for future comparison

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 26 March 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

Your Reference: N-3007A

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 61415

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sarvis

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

☒ Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

☐ Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

☐ The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

Mr. Clements
1/2: will call back:
Dol Spada called 1/2: OK:

C. V. Bradley
C. V. BRADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-131
JUL 1951

(5)

Sent to J. Kiley. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 29 Feb. 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sauvie 61415 Request No. N-3007-A

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position: File Clerk, GS-2, OSO, RI, Proc. & Rec., Washington, D. C.

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☐ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity:

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☒ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3. Cancel per [illegible] 5 Mar.

C. V. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

HR

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 25 January 1952

TO: **Chief, PersonnelDivision**

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: **WOODS, James Sauvie #61415 Request No. N-3007**

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. ☒ Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity: **D Street Pool.**

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. ☐ Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. ☐ Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

File sent to PB

FEB 13 12

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

OAF OF TERMINATED FILE BEING MICROFILMED

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: PERMINDEX CORP.
DCD DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

Permindex Corporation

F 776.9

CONF 359

PYCR CITE VA 47261

SAME FROM SUPPORT (GRANT)

CASE 31735 RPT 31765, REOUR VA 46669 RPT 45669

57769

CAN YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF WHEN AND IF WE WILL GET A D RPT D AND B RPT B REPORT ON PERMINDEX AND WORLD TRADE CENTER?

A-59621

[illegible] 59621

F 7969

Chief, New York Office

30 November 1959

Chief, Contact Division (Support)

New Case 31785

CASE 82

mes-59621

3-79677

1. Commercial Staff has requested a Dun & Bradstreet report on Permindex Ltd., a Swiss Corporation Registered in Bern, Jan 1956, and its affiliate formed in Rome, Centro Mondiale Commerciale (World Trade Center). We are advised that Dr. Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary, is president of Permindex. A-79699

2. Attached is outline of information desired on the two organizations. If the D & B report does not contain the financial information desired, would you please try to obtain this information through your bank sources.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment
LJGrant:gs
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

1C

[illegible]

REC

JA CITE NYOR 9135

SUPPORT (GRANT) FROM DADE

CASE 31785 X 31785 - PERMINDEX

CASE

65 MAY 15 III 22 33

1. SEE THESE TWO PAPERS FOR BACKGROUND

725

A) N.Y. TIMES, 31 AUGUST 1959 X 31 AUGUST 1959

B) DAILY AMERICAN, ROME X ROME, 9-15 NOV 1958 X 9-15 NOV 1958

use S-79699

2. ONE OF DIRECTORS ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO X ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO WAS RECENTLY IN US X US, EXPECTS TO BE BACK TO N.Y.C. ABOUT 17 JAN 1963 X 17 JAN 1962. HE IS ONE OF DIRECTORS AND ALSO DESCRIBED AS IN CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS.

3. ADDRESS: DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL X DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL

CAPITAL - 1 APT 1 MILLION FRENCH FRANCS

(S-79699

OFFICERS - DR. FERENC NAGY X DR. FERENC NAGY, PRESIDENT

use S-79699

FRITZ SCHURCH X FRITZ SCHURCH, V.P.

use S-79699

DR. ERNST W. INFELD X DR. ERNST W. INFELD, DELEGATE

use S-79699

DR. ERNST FEISST X DR. ERNST FEISST

11679

DR. ERNST FOLLENWEIDER. DR. ERNST FOLLENWEIDER

(HEAD OFFICE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM BERN BERN TO BASEL IN 1956 X 1956.

4. THEY PLAN TO OPEN A NYC OFFICE IN JAN 1960 JAN 1960.

5. WILL TRY TO OBTAIN MORE DETAIL LATER.
LITTLE ELSE AVAILABLE NOW.

6. SHALL WE SEND ANY REPORT NO. NO. FOR DONALD DONALD CREDITT

SOURCE: ALFRED BARTH A-116
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK A-40

(F- 79677

SECRET

Chief, DD/S-CM
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

23 December 1959

CASE 80

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79699 A-59621

Permindex, Ltd and World Trade Center

REF : Your ~~memorandum~~ dated 23 Nov 1959 - CD/OO Case 31785

1. As you were previously advised, Dun & Bradstreet had no available information on either of the subject concerned. However, a bank source of this office has provided the following preliminary information.

2. For background our source suggested that we refer to the New York Times, 31 August 1959 and the Daily American, Rome, 9-10 November 1958. One of the directors, also described as being in charge of administrative affairs, Enrico Mandel-Mantello, was recently in the US and expects to return to New York City about 17 Jan 1960. S-79699

A-79699

3. The address of Permindex is Dufourster 11, Basel (office transferred from Bern to Basel in 1956). They plan to open a New York City office in January 1960. Capital: One million French Francs. Officers: Dr. Ferenc Nagy, President; Fritz Schurch, Vice President; Dr. Ernst W. Infeli, Delegate; Dr. Ernst Feiast; Dr. Ernst Fellender. S-79699 S-79699 S-79699

4. We will forward additional information as it becomes available. We are also trying to obtain information from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers. A-5199 A-1442

5. If you have any questions please contact Lillian I. Grant, extension 2268.

K. M. ASHCRAFT

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

SECRET

F-79699

Chief, DD/S - CI
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

22 January 1960

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79699

A-59612

PERMINDEX, Ltd. and World Trade Center

REF : Your memorandum dated 23 November 1959, CD/OO Case 31785

1. Attached for your retention is a brochure on subject organizations which was received by National Association of Manufacturers about early November 1959. A-2442

2. NAM also suggested that additional information might be obtained from Lloyd McMahon, now Federal Judge of Southern District Court, New York City, who was formerly General Counsel for PERMINDEX, Ltd. If you wish our New York Office to pursue this lead, please let us know. S-67472

3. As we believe Mr. Crowley advised you, the Foreign Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce does not maintain records of individual foreign companies. C of C suggested that the World Trade Division, Dept. of Commerce might have some information which we presume you have already checked out.

4. Please advise Lillian I. Grant, CD/OO, Support Branch, extension 2268, of further wishes concerning this subject.

Z. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Not orig

Copies filed in above jackets

1 C

29 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of S/W Training and Issuance of Materials.

AGENT : AMLASH/1

PLACE : Paris, France

DATE : 17-22 August 1962

TRAINER: Richard M. Fallucci, TFW C/O.

1. AMLASH/1 was instructed in S/W techniques by the undersigned in a Paris Station safehouse on 17 and 18 August, and was given an S/W review in the final briefing session held in the hotel room of Wallace A. Growery (Madrid Station C/O) on 22 August. Instruction was given in the use of carbon writing system No. 15136 and in the use of liquid developer system No. 56638 . The "scorch" method of development was also demonstrated to A/1 as an alternate system. A total of five hours was devoted to this instruction.

2. A/1, who was recruited a short time prior to coming to Paris, was introduced to the idea of using S/W by the undersigned during discussions held in Copenhagen. Although for security considerations, he was skeptical at first about using such a means of communication, he was without undue effort convinced that any productive relationship depended upon his being able to communicate with his C/O on a regular basis through the medium of S/W letters sent through normal mail channels. It was apparent from his early questions that he was unfamiliar with the principles of S/W and clandestine communications in general. After further talks in Paris with Growery on 16 August, A/1 was fully prepared to accept the concept of S/W communications, and arrangements were made for this instruction to begin the following day.

3. The first training session on 17 August lasted a little more than two hours, and was devoted to an explanation of the S/W system of communication, including careful instruction in the preparation of a letter containing S/W. A/1 also prepared an S/W letter of his own under the supervision of the undersigned. He seemed to grasp readily the principles of the preparation of an S/W

message and experienced only a little difficulty at first in remembering all the steps in sequence necessary for the preparation of an S/W message. He was generally attentive to the instruction given. However, in keeping with his temperment, he was a little impatient during the preparation of the S/W message itself upon the cover letter. At the end of this session, he demonstrated that he remembered the basic steps in a satisfactory manner, particularly considering that it was his first day in S/W instruction.

4. The second period of instruction took place in the same safehouse, lasting about two hours. This session was devoted to a review of the S/W procedures and the preparation by A/1 of another practice S/W letter. Following this, A/1 was instructed in the development of S/W messages, using the liquid developer No. 56638 The scorch system of development was also demonstrated. A/1 was impressed by the simplicity of the liquid developer and the immediate reaction which it produced. The undersigned developed one message; then A/1 was allowed to prepare the developer from its dry pill form and to develop a second practice S/W message for himself. Following the period devoted to S/W development, a general review of S/W communications was held, the basic points apparently being well-fixed in A/1's mind.

5. During the final formal meeting with A/1 on 22 August with Growery and the undersigned participating, the latter gave A/1 a general review of all the S/W procedures which were to be used in his contact with KUBARK. He also was provided with the following items:

A. Two sheets of S/W carbon paper (No. 15136)
B. Forty-seven pills of developer (No. 56638)
C. One tablet of writing paper provided by TSD and known to be compatible with the carbon sheets.
D. 3 No. 2 pencils of French manufacture.
E. One ball-point pen with water-resistant ink.
F. Two accomodation addresses: one in Madrid for regular contact; one in New York City for rapid emergency contact (see attached S/W data sheet).
G. Appropriate indicators (see S/W data sheet)

It is noted that A/1 did not have a secure accomodation address in PBRUMEN to give us at this time. He was told, however, that it was imperative that he provide one for us by S/W letter within two weeks of his return to PBRUMEN. This he stated he would do.

6. During the last S/W review, A/1 was shown a photograph of one of his practice messages which he had prepared. He was quite interested in seeing this, which served to illustrate a number of the training points which had been covered during previous instruction.

Generally, A/1 was an interested pupil and it is believed that he will be able to carry out the instructions in a proper manner. He is quite security conscious, a factor which it is believed, will add to his attempts to seek perfection in his S/W correspondence and in the secure storage of his S/W materials when not in use. It is also known that A/1 practiced his S/W techniques in his hotel room after leaving the 22 August meeting. This is known because he had an additional question to ask us at a brief meeting on 23 August.

7. It should also be noted that the TSD technician who developed A/1's practice letters recommends that for best results, all letters from A/1 be subjected to ammonia fuming before immersion in the developer.

Richard M. Fallucci

Richard M. Fallucci

Attachments:
  Agent S/W Record
  Form #H-55900

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

29 Aug 62

REPORT OF S/W TRAINING, PARIS.

AGENT S/W RECORD Date 29 August 1962

1. Agent Cryptonym: AMLASH/1

2. SW supplies issued to the Agent (date and quantity): 2 sheets of carbon S/W paper #15136 and 48 pills of developer #56638 both issued on 22 August 1962.

3. Cover correspondence to the agent will be in Spanish and handwritten or typed; from the agent will be printed or typewritten (in Spanish).

4. Location assigned for placement of S/W text: S/W text will be placed on the face of the cover letter; agent has, however, been instructed to check both sides of letters received for S/W. Letters from the agent on face of cover text.

5. Accommodation addresses:

To be supplied by agent in first S/W letter he sends (this to be by 15 September 1962 at the latest.)

Accommodation addresses for letters from the agent:

Regular accommodation address:

Senorita Maria Dolores Gomez
Apartado 12315
Madrid, Spain

Rapid/Emergency accommodation address:

Mr. Humphrey R. Roncavil
P. O. Box 892
General Post Office
NYC 1, N. Y.

Agents letters to be signed "Ramon".

6. Re-supply arrangements:

If carbons lost: Agent writes cover letter to Madrid address in normal manner. Absence of S/W message indicates loss of carbons and Agent is to expect next letter he receives to be a re-supply of carbons (in the form of the letter itself).

If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in S/W): re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through S/W message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

7. Required indicators:
   - A. For presence of S/W on letters to the agent: All letters to agent will contain S/W.

   - B. To indicate loss of writing materials: Carbon sheets: Agent writes to Madrid, letter with no S/W. Developer: Agent writes in S/W and so indicates.

   - C. Indicate carbon re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of carbon sheets (see above), preferably the next letter sent to Agent will be a carbon sheet. In any case agent understands that any cover letter containing the word "finca" (Spanish for farm) has been written on a carbon sheet, which he is then to use for S/W correspondence as needed.

8. Optional indicators: Any letter received by Agent containing the word "hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the S/W message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch" system.

Danger or control indicators:

Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the Spanish word "FIN" at the end of the S/W message indicates agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the next S/W message to him.

14-00000

AMLASH Safety

AGENT S/W RECORD

Date 29 August 1962

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   General Post Office
   NYC 1, N. Y.

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VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. HKH-A-3418

201-32723

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana JR

DATE: 21 February 1957

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative
SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Ref: HKH-W-2092, 8 February 1957

1. With regard to the contents of reference dispatch, which were communicated to the Subject, VAIVADA has no objections and is agreeable to conversion to the career agent category as described therein.

2. VAIVADA requests, however, that the plans already proposed for acquisition of U.S. citizenship by his wife be carried through. He, and the Station, believe that this step will provide him with greater security in non-official cover assignments. In addition, such action will minimize the red tape he must cut each time he has to obtain new visas for himself and family.

3. The Station will submit a new request for VAIVADA's training several months prior to the desired new training dates.

James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3-Washington
2-Files

20 February 1957

JRP/mfm

CS COPY

201-168881
~~19-1-1-7856~~

RI COPY

FORM NO. MAR. 1949 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000
104-10298-10095 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

D3A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

(1)

Miami, Florida
April 16, 1963

RE: CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

The April 9, 1963, issue of the "Miami News" carried an article entitled, "Exiles Say Miro To Quit". This article stated that informed exile sources claim that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA would resign his post as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The article said exile sources gave two possibilities for his resignation. One faction believed that MIRO's recent trip to Washington from which he returned Sunday (April 7) was to pin down the United States Government to a statement of positive policy regarding Cuba. Another school of thought was that the Council head was retiring from his post in protest of Government curbing of hit-and-run raids on the Communist island of Cuba.

The article went on to state that Dr. MIRO's leadership in the Council, aimed at uniting all Cuban exiles, has been burdened by problems since his appointment in March 1961.

On April 10, 1963, MM T-1, a former Cuban business executive, who is employed by the Cuban Revolutionary Council and who is a close personal friend of Dr. MIRO CARDONA, who has furnished some reliable information in the past, advised that an all-night session of the Council was held beginning April 9, and ending at about 6:00 A.M., on April 10, during which time MIRO CARDONA presented his resignation but the Council refused to accept his resignation and MIRO CARDONA was persuaded to remain as President of the Council.

MM T-1 said that MIRO's resignation consisted of a 25-page statement which was in effect an indictment against the administration of President JOHN F. KENNEDY of the United States. In rejecting his resignation, the Council backed up

CS COPY

16-124-25½

MIRO but in the interest of both the United States and the Cuban exiles, decided upon a public statement which reads as follows:

"CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

"The Cuban Revolutionary Council, having studied the report of its President, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, concerning present relations with the United States Government, agrees:

"1. Not to accept the resignation of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, and declare its full support for the basic plans contained in his resignation.

"2. To affirm that there is a serious crisis, brought about by the present policy of the government of this country.

"3. To express the Council's hope of overcoming the present crisis and calling upon all of America, including the United States, for moral and material support in their fight to regain their sovereignty and independence, and the strict fulfilment of American treaties and agreements, as well as the joint resolution of the U. S. Congress, calling for effective action against Soviet intervention in America.

"4. To affirm that the Council has always insisted, and still insists, upon the necessity of Cuban participation in the process of liberating Cuba. The only procedure which the Council would accept would be coordination of forces, on a plane of complete respect for national dignity. Cuba will never renounce her legitimate right to be in the first line of combat.

"5. To reaffirm their unshakeable decision to continue the fight against the Soviet-Castro regime, under any circumstances whatsoever.

"6. In these difficult times, the Cuban Revolutionary Council urges all Cubans to close ranks to achieve the national unity needed to hasten our march towards Freedom.

"Miami, April 10, 1963.

"Movimiento Democrata Cristiano
(Christian Democratic Movement)
JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE

"Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
(Movement for Revolutionary Recovery)
CESAR BARO

"Agrupacion Montecristi
(Montecristi Group)
FRANCISCO CARRILLO

"Unidad Revolucionaria
(Revolutionary Union)
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CABADA

"Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Democratic Recovery)
RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ

"Movimiento Revolucionary 30 de Noviembre
(30th of November Revolutionary Movement)
ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ

"Accion Revolucionaria Democratica
(Democratic Revolutionary Action)
GERARDO QUESADA

"Frente Obrero Revolucionario de Cuba (FORDC)
(Revolutionary Labor Front of Cuba

"Military Section
JOSE E. MONTEAGUDO

"Sector Profesional
(Professional Section)
ENRIQUE HUERTAS

"Corporaciones Economicas
(Economic Branch)
Dr. TULIO DIAZ RIVERA
MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA
SERGIO CARBO
RICARDO LORIE
ANTONIO MACEO
ANTONIO SILIO, Secretary "

MM T-1 explained that when Dr, MIRO CARDONA returned to Miami from a trip to Washington, D. C., on Sunday, where he contacted high government officials, he came away with the feeling that:

1) The United States has no plan to free Cuba of Communism.

2) If the United States ever does formulate any plans, it will do so without consideration for the Cuban exiles in the United States.

3) The United States policy is now one of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

MM T-1 said that in his opinion, the Cuban exiles are frustrated, confused, losing faith in the United States and there is a growing feeling of abandonment of them by the United States.

The April 10, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried a headline article entitled, "Miro Resigns as Exile Chief; Raps U. S. Policy". This article stated that MIRO CARDONA resigned because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force, according to government sources. The article said that exile leaders close to MIRO said he resigned not only because of disagreement with United States policy, "but because he feels Washington does not have any concrete plans to deal with the dictator".

The April 11, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled, "Cuban Exile Council Vows to Continue the Freedom Fight". In this article it was stated that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had vowed to continue its fight against Castro-Communism whether the United States likes it or not. The article said that Dr. MIRO CARDONA denied reports from U. S. Government sources that he offered his resignation to the Council because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force. The article stated that an informed source said that MIRO decided to quit "because of the change in the U. S. - Cuban policy".

The April 16, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "JFK Accepts Demand, Fidel Says". This article by the UPI bearing a Havana dateline reported that FIDEL CASTRO told Cubans on Thursday (April 11) that the KENNEDY Administration has accepted one of his five demands for an end to tension in the Caribbean. This article stated that in a one hour and forty minute speech, CASTRO said that Washington in forbidding exiles to carry on further armed attacks on Cuba, has fulfilled one of "five points for peace" advanced by him and endorsed by the Soviet Union. The article then went on to state that FIDEL announced that there are still four conditions to be fulfilled and that acceptance of them is the only sensible thing the KENNEDY Administration can do. One of the five conditions, according to the article, is U. S. evacuation of the big Naval base at Guantanamo.

On the morning of April 15, 1963, Miami radio news broadcasts announced MIRO CARDONA would again offer his resignation to the Council on that same day.

CA 3606/2

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On April 15, 1963, MM T-1 advised that he was positive that MIRO CARDONA did not intend to again tender his resignation on Monday, April 15, 1963, but was contemplating taking that action on the following Thursday, April 18, 1963. MM T-1 said that the Council was meeting on Thursday to take a definite attitude or tough line of action and that it was entirely probable that all of the members of the Council might resign in protest to the present policy of the United States with regard to the Cuban situation. He said that the present feeling of the Council towards the United States is basically "to hell with it".

MM T-1 expressed the personal feeling that U. S. policy towards Cuba is presently in a vacuum and consequently everything is at a standstill. The Cuban exiles in the Miami area feel that the U. S. is abandoning their cause and has now adopted a course of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

On April 16, 1963, MM T-2, a Cuban exile who has furnished some reliable information in the past and who is associated with fellow Cubans who belong to several different organizations, advised that reaction among the Cuban exiles is "very bad against the United States". He explained that the Cuban exiles allege that President KENNEDY has made promises to help them in their fight against CASTRO but is now opposing them and consequently they feel that the U. S. is now committed to a policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba. The Cuban exiles are fearful as to the future, confused as to why the U. S. has changed its policy and the exiles feel that they have been abandoned in their fight.

PROPERTY OF FBI - This memorandum is loaned to you by the FBI and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

19-124-25/2

PA

19-124-25/2

458

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES MATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1630 27 MAY) ✓

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

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MAY 27 2216Z 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYROSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH BACKING GOV MONOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOININMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD1, ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO "MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE OPS AGENT DESTINED FOR ISOLATION TRAINING HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RS Filing (check one):
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RI file this copy as indicated ________
Detach copy filed as indicated ________

RS Indexing (check one):
Marked ________ ________None required________
Signature: ________

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2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S[2] STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1[3] AND PASSOVOY[4] ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ASTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

RI COPY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files [redacted]

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029

for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on [redacted] [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on [redacted] in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project [redacted] with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Description of JMWAVE Components

Support Branch

The Support Branch provided routine administrative services to JMWAVE. These included finance, logistics and records management and clerical support. The Branch had 19% of JMWAVE's staffing.

Operations Branch

The Operations Branch was divided into two sections, the FI Section and the Special Operations Section. Staffing, consisting of operations officers and clerical support, was 17% of JMWAVE's total.

The FI Section (Foreign Intelligence) was responsible for the collection of intelligence from the target country through covert HUMINT means.

The Special Operations Section was responsible for paramilitary operations.

Covert Action Branch

The Covert Action Branch was responsible for covert propaganda operations. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

External Operations Branch

The External Operations Branch was responsible for collecting HUMINT on the target country through assets in areas other than the target country. Staffing was 13% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

Reports Section

The Reports Section prepared intelligence reports for Headquarters and intelligence community consumers. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total.

Technical Services Section

The Technical Services Section provided photographic support to JMWAVE. Staffing was 6% of JMWAVE's total.

Communicators

The communicators were responsible for secure communications between JMWAVE and Hqs. Staffing was 8% of JMWAVE's total.

JMWAVE ORGANIZATION


SECRETARY
CHIEF OF STATION
SECRETARY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
COMMUNICATORS
SUPPORT BRANCH
OPERATIONS BRANCH
FI SECTION
SPECIAL OPS SECTION
CA BRANCH
EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
REPORTS SECTION
TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

4/10/98 - OKd
by DO/IRR
EW

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1963


Deputy Director for Plans
Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa Division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Special Operations Division
Technical Services Division
Domestic Operations Division
Counter-Intelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Operational Services Staff
Special Activities Staff

4/10/98 OK by DO/IR8

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1961


Deputy Director for Plans
Western Hemisphere Division
Western Europe Division
Soviet Russian Division
Eastern Europe Division
Africa division
Far East Division
Near East Division
Technical Services Division
Development Projects Division
International Organizations Division
Counterintelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Covert Action Staff
Cover and Commercial Staff
Operational Services Staff

JMWAVE
ORGANIZATION



SECRETARY — CHIEF OF STATION

SECRETARY — DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION

99
SIGNAL CENTER
4-COMMUNICATORS

SUPPORT BRANCH
- 1-Chief, Support
- 1-Secretary
- 1-Finance Officer
- 1-Finance Asst
- 1-Logistics Officer
- 1-Logistics Asst
- 1-Records Officer
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Clerk

99

OPERATIONS BRANCH

FI SECTION
- 1-Officer (Refugee Debriefings)
- 1-Officer (On Island Assets
- 1-Officer (Liaison with Local Services
- 1-Officer (FI Third Country)
- 1-External Ops Rep (AMOT)
- 2-Intel Assts (Management of On-Island Ops
- 1-Secretary Steno

99

SPECIAL OPS SECTION
- 2-Operations Officers
- 1-Training Officer
- 1-Property and Supply Assistant

99

CA BRANCH
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer (Radio)
- 1-Ops Officer (Pol Action Press and Publication)
- 1-Admin Asst
- 1-Secretary

99

EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer
- 1-Ops Officer (JMCHALK)
- 1-Ops Officer (Referent with Station FI Branch)
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Secretary Steno

99

REPORTS SECTION
- 3-Reports Officers (One of these AMOT officer to handle AMOT reporting)
- 1-Secretary Steno
- 1-Clerk Typist

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TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
- 1-Photo General
- 1-IO Tech Aide
- 1-Clerk Typist

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14/8

with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed at priority targets. Under current personnel ceilings, there is little hope of increasing the manpower available for this critical effort. Thus, both Headquarters and the station must carefully place emphasis on assignment of priorities and upon selective execution of the activities to meet those priorities.

Organization for Operations

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5. The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations. It has high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, joint operations with the host government, and Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. It has local collaborative liaison with other U.S. agencies: the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the military. To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station is organized into the Soviet Branch, Cuban Branch, Satellite Branch, Covert Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and an operational catch-all which is called the "Operational Support Branch." This latter branch is headed by a senior operations officer who has two assistants, but the branch in reality is an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, giving force and effect to that facet of the chief of station's personality as an operator. The deputy chief of station, in addition to his administrative duties, also personally handles the operations of three projects.

Cuban Operations

6. Mexico City is the only direct air link which Cuba has with the Western Hemisphere. It is the major transit point for all air travel to and from Cuba. Approximately 150 persons per week travel each way to and from Havana via Mexico City. This fact plays a prime role in shaping the station's operational activities. For example, over 70 per cent of the station's FI reporting on Cuban activities in the past year dealt with travel, both Cuban and non-Cuban, between Mexico City and Havana.

[Significant]

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7. The station has no agents reporting from in place in Cuba. Two operations have had problems in loss of communications, but have some promise of future success. One agent, a Cuban refugee

DM3

now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before
leaving Cuba but his channel of communications with them has been
severed. Another station agent is in a good position in Cuba to
obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The
station will attempt to re-establish contact with him through a
legal traveler to Cuba. The station has a number of sources with
access to Cuba in third country nationals who are debriefed each
time they return to Mexico City from Cuba. Best of these is a
Western European who was the source of some 15 disseminated intelli-
98 gence reports last year. He travels to Cuba four or five times a
year and is contacted by a station case officer after each visit.
An operation, presently under development, is aimed at exploiting
the presence of a religious order. A recruited agent will be in
the high levels of the Mission. It is expected that the Mission
will have secure communications facilities as is the case in other
countries. Primary control, however, will be maintained by Mexico
City Station through contact with the agent each time he travels
to Mexico City from Havana.

9. A major objective of station operations is the recruit-
ment of personnel in the Cuban Embassy. There are about 20 Cubans
on the embassy staff of whom six are believed to be members of the 84
Cuban Intelligence Service. 24 As with operations directed against
the Soviet Embassy, heavy reliance is placed upon surveillance
through telephone, photo, physical, and audio operations as well
as on access agents. The effort has been rewarded with some suc-
cess albeit limited. One official has been recruited, but his
value is generally low due to lack of access to information of
prime importance and to a reluctance to accept operational assign- 24
ments. A Mexican woman employee in the embassy is also a station
agent, but she has no access to classified documents and provides
only meager information. A recruitment pitch to another officer
24 was unsuccessful and he was subsequently recalled to Cuba. Through
station efforts a "hot mike" was successfully placed in a key office.
Unfortunately, the target officer moved, and his old office is now
being occupied by an officer of lesser potential, who is the super- 08
visor of the recruited officer. This audio device is at the moment
of little value except to provide an excellent check of the agent's 08
activities.

10. As might be expected, Mexico City has a constant stream
98 of refugees from Cuba, estimated at about 350 per month. Through
an American contract agent the station runs the Cuban Refugee Re-
ception and Orientation Center which screens refugees for possible

DM/B

98 operational leads and debriefs those with information of intelligence value. Heretofore this project has suffered from lack of adequate facilities and trained personnel. Only 29 positive intelligence reports were disseminated by Headquarters during the past year. It is planned to correct these deficiencies and expand capabilities to the end that the intelligence product will be improved and the operational leads increased. An experienced officer from the JMWAVE refugee center has been detailed to the station to assist in training the personnel there.

11. The station's Cuban case officers must devote a substantial effort to responding to requests for support from other stations, chiefly JMWAVE, with involvement in Cuban operations. 24 Approximately 47 per cent of the station's cable traffic is concerned with Cuban operations. This volume alone is testimony to the relative effort which must be devoted to the support of Cuban operations originating in other CIA stations. The Cuban case officers in Mexico City feel that the requirements to keep abreast of day to day activities and to handle the volume of paper left insufficient time for planning and development of an effective station operational program.

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12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are as satisfactory as may be expected in view of the target. 24 Given Mexico City's strategic location astride the only direct air link to Cuba, more success should be achieved in recruiting agents in place in Cuba. This target has been assigned as Priority 1 to many Latin American countries and, if it is to be achieved at all, it is logical to expect that it will be done in Mexico City. 24 To the extent possible, the Cuban case officers should be freed from the excessive support to other stations so they can concentrate on this target. The Chief, WH Division, should direct other stations to carefully screen Cuban requirements on Mexico City, with a view toward reduction of such requirements.

It is recommended that: No. 67

98 The Chief, WH Division:

a. Instruct the Chief of Station, Mexico City, to concentrate Cuban case officer efforts on developing agent assets resident in Cuba; and,

DM/5

evidence that the ambassador would strongly object to Agency support for IISE propaganda activities. In addition, of a total annual budget of $16,000, $6,000 goes for the salary of a U.S. businessman cutout (LIHUFF-1) while $6,000 goes to the support of MURO and $4,000 to support other activities of the IISE. This is an inordinately high sum for the services of a cutout in proportion to the total cost of the proposed project. These points, taken together, constitute a valid basis for terminating operations in connection with LIHUFF.

It is recommended that: No. 70

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The Chief, WH Division, disapprove the proposal of Chief of Station, Mexico, for Project LIHUFF and direct him to terminate operations in connection therewith.

18. The station has a highly successful project directed at the rural and peasant targets. The principal agent is a Catholic priest through whose efforts an extensive network of regional organizations have been established including youth groups, credit unions, agricultural co-ops and peasant unions. Some 26 regional centers of the Mexican Institute for Social Studies, a project mechanism, have been set up and 12,000 people were enrolled in special training courses during the year. This operation is now largely self-sufficient but the station should continue to give it support and direction. The project shows promise of expanding into Guatemala where the Archbishop of Guatemala has asked for assistance and training to set up a similar organization. In view of the present lack of Agency-sponsored peasant projects in Guatemala, every effort should be made to exploit this possibility.

It is recommended that: No. 71

The Chief, WH Division, expand Project LINOOHLE to include assistance in establishing a similar covert action project targeted on peasant groups in Guatemala.

Soviet Operations

19. Mexico is one of the four Latin American countries which maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union thereby permitting the establishment of diplomatic installations in these

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countries. Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Mexican police and security services, Soviet activities in Mexico are not subjected to the same scrutiny as they are in the U.S. by the FBI 24 and in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Soviet personnel in Mexico thus have a freedom of movement which facilitates the conduct of clandestine operations targeted not only against the U.S. but also against other Latin American countries where there is no Soviet official presence. In addition, Mexico's long border with the U.S. has only minimum guards. Travel between the U.S. and Mexico is heavy and clandestine border crossing can be relatively simple. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, therefore, assumes more than the usual interest normally attached to similar Soviet installations as targets for U.S. intelligence.

20. Soviet operations conducted by the station are directed
24 primarily at the personnel of the embassy. At the present time,
there are fifty-one officers attached to the embassy of whom thirty-
24 three have been identified as members of either the KGB or the GRU.
It may be assumed that dependents and nonintelligence personnel,
by performing various support functions, swell the total of those
engaged in intelligence assignments. In its operations against the
Soviets, the station is heavily dependent upon technical collection through telephone taps, photographic coverage of the embassy,
physical surveillance, and hidden microphones. These operations
24 produce masses of information daily on the activities of the Soviet 24
personnel, such as telephone conversations with persons outside the
embassy, complete photographic records of the coming and going of
24 all persons--Soviet and non-Soviet--at the embassy, contacts of
embassy personnel outside the embassy, etc. Because of the strict
security indoctrination of Soviet overseas personnel, the bulk of
this information is low-level and not disseminable as positive in-
24 telligence. Its chief value, aside from occasional items of intelli- 24
gence interest or operational import, derives from its compilation 24
in depth to reveal patterns of activities and contacts, indicative
of intelligence missions or associations, and to disclose behaviorial
characteristics of individual Soviets which might be symptomatic 24
of a vulnerability to recruitment. By analyzing this material over
a period of time, the station has identified Soviet officers in the
KGB and GRU, and gained an insight into their modus operandi in
executing intelligence assignments. This in itself is of value
98 from a counterintelligence point of view even though exploitation
against Soviets has been limited. Also, by collating the mass of
collected data into personality reports on persons attached to the
Embassy, the station hopes to be able to detect, foster, and eventually exploit any vulnerability to recruitment or detection--the

number one priority of Soviet operations here as elsewhere in the world.

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21. The station is seeking to supplement its collection through technical means with a program to acquire at least one access agent for each member of the Soviet Embassy staff. These access agents serve two purposes: first, they provide additional information on the activities and personalities of those with whom they are in contact; and second, they afford a channel for "getting at" a Soviet individual should it be found advantageous to bring some sort of recruitment pressure to bear on him. Consideration is now being given by the station to expanding the effort to recruit Mexican nationals who are known, through technical collection sources, to have been in touch with the Soviets on intelligence missions and to work through them to develop information on Soviet clandestine activities. Additional case officer strength will be needed if this approach is to be effective.

22. The station currently has six double-agent operations. Like most such cases they move slowly. The chief purpose in running these operations is to direct the agents into the U.S. where, in cooperation with the FBI, they might be used to identify Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received intelligence assignments from the Soviets of an as yet undefined nature in the U.S. Another appears destined for some Soviet assignment in the Philippines. Since the Soviets have no official representation in the Philippines, it is hoped that this agent may be put in touch with illegals. Still another is considered a poor double agent operation by the station, but shows some promise of developing into a penetration of the Mexican Foreign Ministry. The sixth is rated very low as a station operation, and is being continued only at the specific request of the U.S. Army. The station's technical collection assets provide a useful means for checking these double agents in their contacts with the Soviets.

24 24 24

23. To evaluate properly the Soviet operations at Mexico City, which rely heavily on expensive technical collection devices, would involve a basic assessment of the whole concept of Soviet operations, which is beyond the scope of this report. 24 Despite the exploitation of material collected by technical means for over ten years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet national has not been achieved. Although the station's knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the embassy in Mexico City has been greatly widened, it has led to little positive

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action to counter these activities as they might affect U.S. interests. While all the U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions are targets of vital importance for U.S. intelligence, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City has special significance because of its proximity to the U.S. The Mexico City Station has attacked this target with determination and imagination. The Chief, SR Division, and his principal officers have commended highly the Soviet operations in Mexico City Station. The failure thus far to achieve the major objectives is testimony more to the impregnability of the target than to a lack of resourcefulness in attacking it. Thus, we believe that until some new methods, offering greater promise of ultimate success are developed, the present mode of attack should be continued at the present level. 24 24 24

24. Probably the most significant contribution which the station's operations against the Soviets in Mexico City has made to the U.S. security has been peripheral to the Agency's mission there. The embassy has long been a magnet for disaffected Americans who want for one reason or another to establish contact with the Soviets. Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several of whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. In this respect, the station works closely with the FBI. The Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President Kennedy made reference to information collected by station assets in connection with Oswald's activities in Mexico City. 08 24 24

Satellite Operations

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25. The Satellite Branch, which is staffed by EE Division personnel, has been diverting much of its recent time from its EE targets to a Communist-Chinese presence in Mexico City. Although there is no official government representation by the Peking regime, the New China News Agency (NCNA) has several people in Mexico City. At least three of these individuals have been identified as CHICOM intelligence officers. Project STPESO is an audio operation against three rooms of their offices, and their telephone lines are tapped under the LIFEAT Project. Some of their mail has been examined through the LIKAYAK Project. The raw results of these operations have been forwarded back to Headquarters. The Mexico City Station has no capability for the translation of the material. As of the time of the inspection, the station had heard nothing from Headquarters

Im/10

responsible to control from the female operations officer who has recently been transferred to LILINK control. It is possible that this operation will be transferred to a covert action project, where some improvement is expected.

98 41. The station has a unilateral physical surveillance team, five of whom have been on the team for more than three years. Only one case of trouble has shown up in this project. One agent had to be terminated because he talked too much and tried to blackmail his case officer. The use of the polygraph has been most effective in control of this team, which has been generally effective.

Technical Operations

42. The station is heavily committed in the technical field with a large audio operation run jointly with the Mexican Government (LIENVOY), as well as a unilateral audio operation (LIFEAT). The station has been imaginative in approaches to problems and willing to examine and experiment with the unusual. An example of this is the communications link between the station and the principal agent of LILINK which will be discussed later. 24 24 24

43. The LIENVOY operation, previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago from President Lopez Mateos. After considerable discussions, the operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would include Soviet and Satellite targets, and such other communist targets as were obvious to the Mexican Government to be of concern to the United States. This project is manned by selected Mexican Army personnel, who are carefully screened and paid high incentive wages, reducing their vulnerability to bribery. Other privileges add to the high esprit de corps essential to such an operation. The unit is managed by a career agent who transmits the take regularly to the station by clandestine means. This project has been fruitful in intelligence reports and has been of value in operational leads and in CE/CI information. The project also has a visual surveillance and a photo-surveillance capability. It was this project which provided data on the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald in his famous visit to Mexico City. 24 29, 24 29 24 08 24

98 44. Obviously, the station cannot be content to have the Mexican Government knowledgeable of all its anti-communist operations. Therefore, the station has continued its unilateral audio

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27/41

c. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE information from TDCS and CS reports; and,

d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest.

Organization for Administration

56. As in his direction of operations, the chief of station maintains a close personal hold upon the administrative life of his station. Such delegation as he makes does not include the granting of usual authority to a subordinate. For example, although the deputy has been delegated authority over the Registry, which will be discussed in detail later, in reality the chief continues daily activities which have a marked effect on the Registry. The station has a small, hard-working support section, handling financial and property matters, and the usual fine communications section.

57. Morale and health were generally good, although for a city as modern as Mexico there is an unusual amount of abdominal disorder known in Mexico City as "Montezuma's Revenge." The embassy furnishes adequate medicines, and medicines are available on the open market, although not always to be trusted. One incident was recently uncovered in which sulfur was capsuled and sold as an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards. Physicians and surgeons are well trained and quite competent. Insofar as social life is concerned, morale in the station was excellent. Mexico City offers some of the finest social activities in the world, from honky-tonk to opera. There is local television, radio, and a great interest in music. There is a great deal of outdoor activity available--swimming, tennis, golf, exploration of ruins, and vast city parks. Some sports activities are comparatively expensive. Membership in country clubs is prohibitive except for persons on the diplomatic list.

58. One of the principal administrative problems facing the Chief of Station, Mexico City, is his Registry. The Registry handles the station files which are more complete than in any other station in the WH Division. There are more than 9,000 personality files and a vast accumulation of 3x5 card files (mostly biographic) which continue to increase at the rate of 23 linear inches per month. The station's present level of activity precludes any reduction in the card index file, but aperture cards

DW/1

are assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occasion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral 24 pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.

59. The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Personnel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of all, with the limited number of personnel and the great burden of work, a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it has been difficult to get people to accept an assignment to the Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry. In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers accept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We 98 further recommended that maximum discrimination be used in determining material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to time.

60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person assigned to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrading to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.

It is recommended that: No. 78

The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of Personnel to conduct a review of the function of Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to determine whether or not such a position should be established in an appropriate grade.

61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between Headquarters and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy chief of station, who primarily had supervisory responsibility over the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the workload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Headquarters' files rather than station files. We were told that on several occasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a size comparable to other stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be a concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963, when Mexico City's files brought forth detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City.

62. The nature of Mexico City's operations, particularly its
technical operations LIENVOY and LIFEAT produce voluminous files. 24
Until some system is devised for this information to be quickly 24
24 digested and retrieved in Headquarters, we believe that there is
no alternative to the present system Mexico City is employing.
However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters
for processing and retrieval of such information.
24

It is recommended that: No. 79

The Chief, WH Division, in collaboration with the Chief, Records Integration Division, devise a system for reducing the volume of files held in Mexico City, while maintaining a capability for rapid retrieval from Headquarters of information essential to present and future operations in Mexico.

98

63. Mexico City is one of the great metropolises of the world and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It is difficult to find housing which compares exactly with United States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters, large space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life. However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection of housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but such apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection, adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the

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ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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2			
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DAILY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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DAILY SUMMARY

6 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

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opposed the Second Agrarian Reform Law and is willing to use "doctrinally unwelcome" measures to increase production. (Page 3)

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The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totaling $1 million, was being negotiated. Meanwhile, a Cuban group, which had probably planned to complete negotiations on the sale, was delayed because of lack of visas. (Page 6)

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The director of a Spanish optical firm has gone to Havana to negotiate the sale of movie projectors; he is being sponsored by CILASA. (Page 7)

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A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister; the US Embassy believes this may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. (Page 7)

The Swiss ambassador believes that Frank Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the current OAS investigation of Venezuelan charges against Cuba; Emmick's preliminary hearing has been completed and the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend him. (Page 8)

The government of Trinidad gave a "chilly reception" to a visiting Cuban official and turned down a suggestion for trade talks, at least for the present. (Page 8)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

24 10

The Chilean Embassy in Havana has received information from sources in Cuba it considers reliable which supports

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Venezuelan charges that Cuba has been shipping arms to South America. (Page 8)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas in the Dominican Republic have established "six operational zones"; Cuban exiles in Miami feel that the failure of pro-Castro terrorists in Venezuela may force him to turn to terrorism in the Dominican Republic. (Page 9)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to information received by an official West German service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. (Page 9)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache, but has expressed interest in looking into other evidence of Cuban activities directed against Venezuela. The Venezuelan Government has agreed to furnish all possible evidence on its complaint. (Page 10)

On 5 December an American woman told a minister in New York that her boy friend had left that day for an unknown destination in Central America from which he planned to fly in a pro-Castro Venezuelan coup on Saturday. (Page 10)

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are 24 giving instruction in defense against chemical warfare. An unidentified military unit in Las 10 Villas Province reported the selection of two officers and four sergeants to attend a "chemical defense course." (USN-856, 2X/SL/CUM/T407-63, 6 December, SECRET SABRE)

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Moscow has given rather standard treatment to the OAS meeting which heard the Venezuelan Government charge Castro with illegal arms shipments. On 4 December, TASS correspondent Leonid Shokin reported that "the weavers of plots against revolutionary Cuba are still at it...accusing it of delivery of arms to Venezuela for 'subversive purposes'." Shokin found "certain US circles are the most interested in this, as is evident from the fact that representatives of the US State Department declared at the meeting that the United States would 'firmly support' additional economic and diplomatic sanctions by the OAS against Cuba." He thought it unexceptional that "these provocative attempts were not supported by the largest Latin American countries" and warned that "such attempts to interfere in Cuban internal affairs are fraught with extremely harmful consequences for the cause of peace." (CIA/FBIS, Moscow, 4 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Several weeks ago there were CAS reports that the storm-tossed peasants of Oriente looked on Hurricane Flora as the vengeance of God--a God, who in the tradition of the Old Testament's stern and sometimes vengeful Jehovah, had loosed his fury on a people first seduced and now impressed by an alien regime. Now a report from the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay provides yet another insight into the frame of mind of the Cuban populace. While the incidents pictured in this report do not necessarily reflect anything other than a combination of religious fervor and superstition, they are significant to the extent that they reflect the unrest--and, perhaps a growing feeling of hopelessness and despair--current among the Cubans.

In any case, there are prevalent locally tales of St. Barbara's appearing several times to prophesy a change in the regime or admonish errant youths to mend their ways. [Barbara, virgin daughter of the heathen Diosorus, was beheaded by her father near Heliopolis in 235 A.D. for embracing Christianity. A fearful thunderclap is alleged to have greeted her execution. Symbolized by a windmill-like tower with three windows, the type of fortress in which her father was wont to confine her while he was absent from home, Barbara is the patroness of artillerymen and miners.

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

[In the Church's calendar, her feast is marked on 4 December. Apart from her significance in the Christian ritual, Barbara figures prominently in a neo-pagan cult known as the Santeria. Devotees of Santeria regard themselves as Catholics and believe that the names of the Catholic saints are translations into Spanish of the Nigerian names of African gods. Catholicism is viewed as the Spanish tribal version of Santeria. The association between Catholicism and Santeria is based on a largely superficial similarity between Catholic saints and the pantheon of African spirit gods. Saint Barbara is thought to be Shango, the God of War.]

According to one of these tales, a woman dressed in martyr's red stopped a bus outside Guantanamo City on 25 November, stepped inside and berated the Castro regime. The woman is alleged to have said that the Cuban people could not live forever in such misery and to have predicted that Castro would be taken from them sometime between 4 and 7 December. A militiaman passenger told her that she would be arrested when the bus arrived in the city. When it had, she'd disappeared. Continuing on to Caimanera, the bus stopped in the town square with the same woman sitting on one of the seats inside the vehicle. The militia again was summoned and again the woman was nowhere to be seen.

On 26 November the same woman allegedly appeared outside a school in Caimanera and admonished several children not to thrown stones at a nearby shack. The children fled into the school and the woman followed. Challenged by a teacher, the woman said she was Santa Barbara and vanished. The next day neither the teacher nor the children would return to the school, though it subsequently has been reopened. (COMNAVBASE GTMO, 01731/T1/JFK/3, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Fidel Castro was "frightened, if not terrified," by the possible consequences of President Kennedy's murder, according to the 06 Portuguese ambassador in Havana. 10 Cabling his government 24 on 27 November, the Portuguese diplomat 06 described what he called "a large movement of troops" late on the afternoon of the President's death--"they were sent to take up positions around Havana and the northern coast of the island." He found it surprising that Castro "jumped into the arena to denounce insinuations which were merely from news and nongovernmental agencies," but added that "it is the general opinion in diplomatic circles 24 that the assassination will be the spring which will unleash passions and violent and blind hysteria of the American people against Cuba and Russia and provide the excuse which up to now was lacking.... There is talk again about the coincidence of rumors concerning a crisis at the end of the year...." Finally, the ambassador noted that "the assassination did not cause a great deal of consternation in counterrevolutionary circles in the interior." 06 (NSA, 3/O/POD/T1463-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

Two government soldiers were killed 24 in southern Oriente 10 Province on 3 December when members of Unit 1948 at an unidentified location within the 24 First Army area, uncovered and fired on a dice game, which apparently included personnel from their own unit. A 3 December message from military unit 1948 to South 24 Sierra Maestra Sector Headquarters stated that "when the players attempted to flee, the soldiers commenced firing without orders, causing the death of one unnamed player and the chief of organization and personnel of Unit 1948 24 The message added that the bodies and the "civilian and military prisoners" were being sent to sector headquarters. (USN 835, 2/LR1/CUM/R196-63, 5 December, SECRET KIMBO)

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Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria" of Spanish Civil War fame and secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. Ibarruri, who resides in Moscow, was invited to Cuba by Castro during his visit to the Soviet Union. (The New York Times, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." In a long talk with the British ambassador in early November, Rodriguez agreed "with surprising enthusiasm" that the two main problems facing Cuban agriculture were the lack of competent personnel to run the appropriated farms, and the lack of consumer goods which are necessary to stimulate production, especially by the remaining private farmers. Rodriguez had advised Castro that there were not sufficient agricultural experts to run the state farms which had been previously organized, and he had counseled against taking over medium-size farms (as the Second Agrarian Reform Law did) until sufficiently trained and experienced personnel were available; he commented on Soviet complaints about the low educational level of Cubans sent to the USSR for agricultural training. Rodriguez said that despite his advice, Castro had gone ahead with the Second Agrarian Reform Law for two "political" reasons: to push ahead with the progress of Cuba's Socialist economy, and to destroy the support for counterrevolutionaries which Castro believed existed among the "rural bourgeois." Rodriguez thought it ironical that US pressure on Cuba (presumably he meant aid to counterrevolutionaries) had forced Cuba to seize lands faster than it would otherwise have done. He also stated his belief that the seizure of medium-size farms would lead to a drop for several years in many branches of Cuban agriculture, particularly in market gardening and dairy farming.

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CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - cont'd

Rodriguez also agreed with the British ambassador that the second problem facing Cuban agriculture was the lack of consumer goods which were necessary to stimulate production. However, Rodriguez said that Cuba was in a vicious circle: farmers did not have incentive to produce because there were few consumer goods available, yet such goods could not be obtained until farm production had been raised. Rodriguez' main concern seemed to be the scarcity of many consumer goods; in fact, he admitted that he was willing to undertake temporary expediencies which might help raise production, even though they might be "doctrinally unwelcome." Rodriguez referred the ambassador to Lenin's New Economic Policy, and made no attempt to disguise his disagreement with Castro's insistence on "ultimate aims" instead of current "tactics." (British Embassy Havana, 13 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry. A Havana radiobroadcast reported the completion of several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River in Havana, including a pier 307 meters in length, a concrete esplanade measuring 17,000 square meters with a capacity of 24 ships, two launching ramps, and the dredging of the Almendares River in front of the pier, pending partial completion, as well as several minor jobs. It also reported that the shipyard has launched 18 Lambda-75-class ships; 14 more are expected to be launched by January. 24 According to a 29 November intercepted message, an official mission in connection 10 with the fishing industry was expected to arrive in Madrid 10 in early December. The delegation 24 was composed of Jose Lavia and Juan de la Fe 06 Flores. (CIA FBIS 03, 6 December 96 OFFICIAL USE ONLY; NSA 2X/O/CUD/T2523-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

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INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary 10 elements apparently attacked the 10 Selva Marina observation post at Cayo de Cristo on a recent undetermined date. A partially garbled message from Central Army Headquarters 24 in Santa Clara informed Havana that personnel in the observation post, 10 located on a cay 10 off Isabela de Sagua, "repelled the aggression and caused the flight of the attackers. 10. In a probe of the place by air, land, and sea, nothing more than some footprints were observed." Because of the garbles at the beginning of the message it is impossible to determine the time and nature of the attack. (USN 856, 2/SL/CUN/R297-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

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INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

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An unidentified military 10 unit informed First Army Sector E Headquarters at Mayari Arriba that a suspected counterrevolutionary had been arrested in Guantanamo. 10 The suspect, militiaman Esteban Mendez Almaquel, was arrested in the home of Genaro Moya on 3 December. Moya was identified as being implicated in the counterrevolution and as an informer. (USN 835, 2X/LR1/CUM/T675-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)
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CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

Carlos Olivares, Cuba's ambassador to the USSR, arrived by plane yesterday in Havana for what Prensa Latina described as a "short vacation." (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

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Intercepted civil aviation communications indicate that the Soviet-made AN-12 transport aircraft being ferried to Cuba from the Soviet Union is adhering to its schedule. It arrived at the Brazilian airport of Recife from Conakry on 5 December and left there the next day for Belem, Brazil. It is scheduled to leave Belem on 7 December for Havana. The intercepts also indicated that Jamaica has granted permission for the plane to use Kingston as a reserve landing point in the event of necessity. (USA-51, 2/J8/RUT/R894-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)
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SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms because Lebanese companies provided ten of the thirty-two free world ships which called at Cuba in October. The Lebanese foreign minister planned to ask the cabinet for a provisional measure whereby he would be able to demand that all ships carrying Lebanese flag must call at Lebanon periodically and report their destinations. He believed this would cut the Cuban traffic quickly by 60 percent. Because US aid to Lebanon is almost nonexistent, the US Embassy believes that this Lebanese action would be prompted by motives of principle rather than fear of losing US aid, an action which is being discussed by the US Congress. (Am Emb Beirut 520, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

A Havana Prensa Latina broadcast of 6 December announced that President Dorticos has assented to the appointment of Wang Yu-ping as Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. This is the first information indicating that Ambassador Shen Chien, who has served in Cuba since December 1960, is about to be replaced. The new Chinese Communist ambassador is a 53-year-old senior diplomat; since 1950 he has served three- to four-year terms as Communist ambassador in Rumania, Norway, and Cambodia. He is married and has two children.

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CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS - cont'd

While he is, of course, a member of the Chinese Communist party, he is not a ranking party member. He appears to be a lower ranking person than newly assigned Chinese Communist ambassadors to such countries as the UAR and Algeria. The earliest biographic references to him have him as a member of the Chinese Communist Army in 1931. He subsequently became an army political commissar and rose to the rank of general. It is not unusual, however, for Chinese Communist diplomats to be generals. He speaks Russian, but there is no information that he speaks Spanish. For the last year and a half, however, he has been stationed in Peiping and he could have learned the language then. He accompanied Chinese Communist chief of state Liu Shoa-chi on the latter's visit to Cambodia last spring. (CIA FBIS Havana, 6 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; BACKGROUND DATA: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

L.P. Kyuchukov, chief of the Engineering Directorate of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade, was to arrive in Prague from Havana yesterday and fly on to Sofia today. Kyuchukov, who is thought to have negotiated Bulgarian arms shipments to Cuba, was noted traveling between Havana and Santiago de Cuba on 21 and 23 November--the third time he has been in Cuba since November 1962. (DIRNSA, 2X/0/QOC/T2810-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

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BLOC RELATIONS:

A 4-man Soviet delegation, headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Education Serafim Nikichev, arrived in Cuba on 5 December to spend a month "working on the curriculum of Havana University's School of Social Sciences." Nikichev was accompanied by "academicians" Aleksandr Smirnov, Vassiliy Rayike, and Maria Filipova. The group was welcomed at Jose Marti airport by the Rector and Deputy Rector of the university, Juan Mier Febles and Mariano Rodriguez Solveira, and the school's protocol specialist, Professor Pedro Canas. The delegation's trip to Cuba is the first tangible result of the Soviet-Cuban educational exchange agreement signed in Moscow two months ago. That agreement provides for the loan of Soviet academicians and educational administrators to Cuban schools, the exchange of students and instructors between the two countries, and the use of Soviet texts in Cuba. (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totalling $1 million, was being negotiated. (See Daily Summary of 7 and 13 November.)

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NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - cont'd

The director of Varmi confirmed to US officials that he had been negotiating with a Spanish firm (probably CILASA) for the sale of US-origin construction equipment; after being informed that the material was destined for Cuba and having been warned of the consequences of such a sale, the director agreed on 2 December to stop negotiations. The US consul comments that it is not sure whether the knowledge of the eventual sale to Cuba or the fact of US intervention in the matter caused Varmi to stop the arrangements.

Meanwhile, a source with access to CILASA's files reported on 28 November that a Cuban comission headed by Rene Narbona of the Cuban tractor importing agency would be unable to arrive in Brussels on 30 November because of inability to obtain visas. This group had probably been scheduled to complete negotiations for the purchase of the Varmi construction equipment. (Am ConGen Antwerp 29, 3 December, CONFIDENTIAL; CIA Madrid TDCS-3/566,653, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The US Embassy in Tokyo, in receipt of a report that private Japanese companies have contracted for 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar for delivery between July 1964 and June 1965, sees little prospect of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the transaction. The Japanese Government would have difficulty intervening because of the general world sugar shortage, the unavailability of sugar from other sources at comparable prices, and the political problem which rising sugar prices is causing the Ikeda administration. (Am Emb Tokyo 1688, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The director of the Spanish firm Empresa Nacional de Optica, Vicente M. Cabanillas Gonzalez, left Madrid for Havana on a 29 November IBERIA Airlines flight. As reported earlier (see Daily Summary, 11 October), Cabanillas is negotiating through CILASA for the sale of a large quantity of movie projectors to the General Administrator of University Inspection in Havana. According to a CILASA employee with access to company files, Cabanillas' travel expenses are being paid by CILASA. Cabanillas had hoped to get a Cuban visa which would not appear in his passport, as he hoped to visit the US later. He was unable to arrange this, however, and finally had to accept the Cuban visa in his passport. (CIA, Madrid, IN 74453, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister on 2 December, according to information received by the US Embassy in Rabat. The mission was probably composed of Antonic Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez Leoches, Cuban ambassador to Morocco. (See Daily Summary of 29 November for recent Cuban-Moroccan relations.)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

Despite the Moroccan announcement of its break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Cuban ambassador is still in Rabat and attends functions he normally attended. The chancery offices are open and the Cuban flag is flying. This situation has been a source of some embarrassment to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry. However, the US Embassy believes that the reception of the Cuban delegation by the Moroccan Government may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. An officer in the Spanish Embassy in Rabat believes this is entirely possible; he believes the Soviets are using their influence to keep the Cuban Embassy in Rabat. The US Embassy also feels that the Moroccan King may not feel he received sufficient benefit to justify continuing the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Am Emb Rabat 860, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The Swiss ambassador in Cuba was informed by the deputy foreign minister that the preliminary hearing had been completed for the US citizen Frank Emmick, who reportedly will be charged with being a CIA agent. (See Daily Summary of 5 December.) The ambassador believes that Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the OAS investigation into charges by Venezuela of Cuban intervention in Venezuelan affairs. Currently, the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend Emmick. He is considering the lawyer hired by the Canadian Embassy to defend the Cuban pilots Lippert and Milne, an attorney who handles Swiss Embassy affairs, or a member of the Havana University Law School faculty. (Am Emb Bern 363, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad, Tobago gave a "very chilly" reception on 4 December to a visiting Cuban official, Robert Gerardo Sanchez, commercial officer in the Cuban Consulate in Kingston. A Foreign Ministry official informed the US Embassy that Williams was annoyed that Sanchez had presumed on a scant acquaintance with him to visit Port-of-Spain, despite advice from the government of Trinidad that such a visit would be inopportune. Reportedly, the prime minister turned down Sanchez' suggestion for trade talks, on the grounds of Cuba's involvement with Venezuela and Trinidad, Tobago's delicate and difficult relations with Caracas. He did not, however, close the door on such discussions at some appropriate time in the future. The government of Trinidad expects Sanchez to leave the country soon. (Am Emb, Port of Spain 223, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES: 24 10

In a message of 3 December, the Chilean Embassy in Havana reported to its Foreign Ministry information it had received from "reliable sources" in Cuba on Cuban efforts to ship weapons to Venezuela and other Latin American countries.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

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The embassy stated that "everything leads to the belief that" the arms recently discovered in 24 Venezuela had come from Cuba. According to one of the Chilean Embassy's sources, two ships had left Cuba at an unspecified date en route to British Guiana with "packages consigned as machinery consigned to an industrialist of known Communist tendencies whose property is adjacent to the Venezuelan border." Various of the Chilean 24 Embassy sources "accept the rumor" that the arms are of Belgian and British (sic) make and that the shipments have been made from various Cuban ports. The embassy 24 report also expressed the belief that Cuba not only sends arms to various points in South America, but also Cuban guerrilla leaders. (NSA 3/0/CLD/-T1129-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)
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Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas have established "six operational zones" in the mountains around Santiago and Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic. The Havana radiobroadcast credited the announcement to "the first communiqué issued by the command." Meanwhile, press dispatches from Miami report that most Cuban exiles feel that the Havana announcement is an attempt to cover up the failure of Castro terrorists to stop Venezuela's presidential elections last Sunday. Other exile sources predict that the announcement and the setback in Venezuela mean that the Castro regime will launch a concerted terrorist campaign against the military-installed provisional regime in Santo Domingo. Batista Falla, leader of the Cuban exile Christian Democratic Movement (MCD), said yesterday in Miami that the failure of terrorism in Venezuela "has put Castro in a difficult position and damages his chances in the rest of Latin America." He added that he expects Castro to "make desperate attempts to picture terrorism as successful, despite its miserable failure in Venezuela."

All reporting by the Dominican Government indicates that its forces are in effective control of the areas of guerrilla activity. About 40 insurgents of the outlawed pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) are said to have been captured, with only isolated bands yet to be apprehended. (UPI, Miami, A-11, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED and Background Information, SECRET)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to an official West German service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. Reportedly, the Cuban Foreign Ministry is consulting the USSR and other bloc countries to induce them to recognize this government-in-exile. The Cubans, according to the source, do not expect the USSR and other countries to agree to this; nevertheless, the attempt is being made.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Although this is the first report on the possibility of a Cuban-sponsored Venezuelan government-in-exile, the Cuban radio and press have been emphasizing the slogan that the Betancourt government does not represent the people and that the real representatives of the people are to be found in the ranks of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). According to Cuban newspapers, Pedro Duno, a former professor of the Central University of Venezuela, arrived in Havana to join the "mission" of the FALN in Havana. (CIA Munich TDCS-3/566,731, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache. The group has no intention to expand its study to cover domestic political aspects of the FALN or Communist Party activities; however, the members expressed interest in looking into such aspects as Cuban broadcasts inciting to violence, possible transfer of funds from Cuba, training of Venezuelans in Cuba in subversive techniques, and evidence of other clandestine arms shipments. In addition to examining the arms cache, the committee also voiced interest in hearing tapes of recent Cuban broadcasts, examining transcripts of interrogations and documents seized from captured terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas, talking to Venezuelan authorities responsible for combating terrorism and insurgency, and possibly interviewing some prisoners. In a meeting with the Committee, the Venezuelan foreign minister placed emphasis on verification of the Cuban origin of the arms cache, but also indicated his government would furnish all possible evidence on the Venezuelan complaint that the committee might want. (To Am Emb Caracas 485, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

An American woman told a Unitarian minister in New York on 5 December that her "boy friend," a former RAF flyer and soldier-of-fortune, has left for an unknown destination in Central America from which he will fly in a pro-Castro coup in Venezuela tomorrow. Dr. Walter Kring, minister at the All Souls Unitarian Church, told a USUN official yesterday that he had been approached by an American woman who asked him to get her story "into the proper channels." The woman stated that her friend left New York on 5 December by unknown means for an unidentified location in Central America. He told her that he would fly to Venezuela on 7 December in connection with a pro-Castro coup which she would read about in the Sunday papers.

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Dr. Kring said that he was impressed by the woman's utter sincerity and normal behavior. He believed she was convinced of the truth of her story and of the honesty of her friend. The woman had apparently, at some earlier date, contacted the FBI in connection with her friend's participation or knowledge of a coup in Honduras. She later retracted her story because she felt it seemed "too implausible and silly." (USUN, New York 2376, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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

27 December 1963

SC No. 00624/63
Copy

WEEKLY REVIEW

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST

Within a week after the central committee approved Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet traders apparently had their instructions and budget allocations and were renewing their activity in trade circles of the industrial West.

Contracts for fertilizer installations, plastics and synthetic plants, petrochemical equipment, and mining machinery are already in various stages of negotiation. Officials in Bonn report they have under consideration a proposal by a West German consortium to supply the USSR with $400 million worth of petrochemical equipment. A Soviet mission is negotiating with the British Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI), which heretofore has supplied the USSR with technical know-how. ICI reportedly has offered to deliver equipment and processes for the production of fertilizers, herbicides, rubber chemicals, and plastics. Negotiations also are under way for large numbers of Japanese chemical fertilizer plants.

Another Western consortium, involving US equipment and processes, is discussing delivery of a large oil refinery. In addition, contracts for a wide range of other machinery and equipment will probably soon be signed. These contracts apparently had been postponed until the new chemical equipment buying program was presented to the plenum and allocations for various trade corporations for next year were approved.

The Soviet need for additional credit to finance planned expanded purchases is crucial. The USSR presumably can generate sufficient funds to meet down payments on sizable orders. However, credit arrangements must be set now to spread out the heavy crush of payments which otherwise would fall due in 1965-66 when equipment contracted for next year will be delivered. Soviet ability to increase hard-currency reserves is not likely to improve in the near future. Moscow's current grain imports will reduce its gold reserves by 25 percent. If these continue beyond mid-1964, the Soviet hard-currency position will be under further strain.

Despite the bleak foreign exchange prospects for the USSR, Soviet officials appear hopeful that Western competition for Soviet orders will be adequate to foster Western governmental and banking opinion favorable to more and longer term credit. Moscow may also hope that a continuation of its relatively restrained foreign policy will be helpful in this context. While viewing the USSR as an acceptable commercial risk, the banking community has heretofore been unwilling to extend credits beyond a five-year period because of uncertainty about future political developments. (SECRET)

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR

With two weeks of their projected two-month tour of Africa completed, Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi can claim high marks for their efforts to project an aura of Afro-Asian amity and to identify Peiping with African aspirations. There is no evidence, however, that they have scored any comparable success in the political or economic fields.

The joint communiqué issued on 21 December at the conclusion of the Chinese leaders' visit to Cairo contains few surprises, and reports from Algiers suggest that discussions with Ben Bella are following predictable lines. Thus far the Chinese have attempted to minimize differences, play up past contacts, and press such themes as militant struggle against colonialism and "US imperialism."

In both Algiers and Cairo, Chou's hosts sought to demonstrate their nonalignment by actions designed to play down the impact of the Chinese leaders' arrival. Chou was greeted in Cairo with a 21-gun salute, but Nasir was not on hand. In Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand to greet his guests, but the top-level delegation he sent to the Soviet Union just before Chou's arrival is receiving more publicity than the Chinese guests.

It has become increasingly apparent that a major objective of the trip has been to undercut Soviet influence throughout the continent. Criticism of the USSR was reportedly a recurrent theme in Chou's four lengthy talks with Nasir. Nasir reportedly said that Chou talked about the USSR the way the Soviets used to talk about the US. He accused the Soviets of trying to colonize China, of breaking political and economic promises, and of becoming tools of the US, and he warned that any Afro-Asian country which became dependent on Moscow would suffer the same fate as Peiping.

In Algeria, Chou sounded a similar note. He cited China's early support for Algerian revolutionaries--support which actually pre-dated that of the USSR. He has also undoubtedly scored Soviet unreliability. The Chinese may be pressing the Algerians to use some of the $50-million credit offered in October. This offer was made to counter a $100-million Soviet credit offered earlier the same month.

Sino-Soviet rivalry for African support also flared at the UN, where Peiping outmaneuvered Moscow on the question of enlarging the representation in principal UN organs to accommodate the African bloc. Soviet delegate Fedorenko had attempted to make it appear that the Chinese were opposed to the African-sponsored expansion plan because they insisted that any change in the UN be tied to Peiping's own admission to the Security Council. The USSR found itself holding a suddenly emptied bag, however, when Peiping loudly repudiated Fedorenko's statement and accused the Soviets of using the issue as a pretext for opposing Afro-Asian demands.

Chou can be expected to capitalize on this during next week's visit to Morocco and in subsequent stops in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. No details of Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat have been made public by Peiping. Such secrecy may well be prompted by security considerations. Chinese officials were apparently seriously shaken by the abortive plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in Cambodia last spring. The Chinese envoy in Cairo reportedly told Nasir of concern for Chou's safety and asked that travel plans during the Chinese leader's visit to the UAR not be made public. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL

Reaction of East Germans to the agreement to let West Berliners visit relatives in East Berlin is hopeful but still fairly cautious, judging by reports from local party officials.

The party central headquarters, obviously concerned that the agreement might have domestic repercussions, ordered district officials to submit immediate reports and detailed follow-ups on reactions to this partial relaxation of travel curbs imposed in connection with the building of the Berlin Wall. Most of the responses state that the people are elated but are publicly voicing hope that they may be permitted to visit their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany. Many East Germans express hope that the present move will be followed by other relaxations--a reaction probably quite unpalatable to the regime.

Public comment--at least as reported by the various party headquarters--is still fairly cautious: One party member in Magdeburg said: "The reason we don't let our citizens go to West Germany is that we are afraid they will defect." But he was promptly silenced by comrades who parroted the party line on "the terror against our GDR citizens in West Germany."

Public expression of dissatisfaction with harsh travel and internal controls has been recurrent in recent months, reaching a peak prior to the 20 October parliamentary elections.

The people's reaction to the pass agreement with West Berlin points up one of the regime's major problems: how to project an image of itself as a sovereign state and of East Berlin as its capital without increasing discontent among its population, who still risk shooting if they attempt to escape to West Berlin. (SECRET KIMBO)


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HWANGJU
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SEA OF JAPAN
SINGYE
PYONGGANG
Demilitarized Zone
KOKCHONGNI
YONAN
KAESONG
Seoul
YELLOW SEA
SOUTH KOREA
TSUSHIMA
QUELPART ISLAND
SAM site
Bomber elements
Fighter defense elements
Combined command headquarters
Radar station
East coast filter center
Early warning radar coverage
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NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

North Korea has recently taken several steps which significantly strengthen its air defenses. MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, which were first detected only at Pukchang-ni airfield, now are being stationed at other airfields. Pyongyang has also apparently just acquired a large number of relatively sophisticated types of radar sets. In addition, the North Korean bomber force, which has a total of about 100 IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers, is in part now equipped with, and has been training with, an improved blind bombing and navigational system.

Testing of and flight training with the new fighters--10 to 14 of which were apparently obtained from the USSR in the fall of 1962--were first noted in communications intelligence in June 1963. Since that time the MIG-21s have been detected frequently in flight activity involving ground controlled intercept exercises.

Beginning in October, MIG-21s have been noted operating from Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. Their deployment to this airfield places supersonic fighters on both the east and west coasts of North Korea.

The North Koreans have recently expanded their radar coverage. Six new types of radar, at least one of which is believed to be exclusively of Chinese Communist manufacture, have been detected. For the present these radars will apparently supplement rather than replace North Korea's original three types--Kniferest A, SCR-270, and Token.

The identifiable new types include Kniferest B, Spoonrest A, and a new type of Chinese Communist origin which is probably a substantial modification of the SCR-270. Spoonrest A is sometimes used as the acquisition radar for surface-to-air missile sites, but it is also used in an early warning role and is probably intended for that use in North Korea. Acquisition of these new radars reflects North Korea's efforts to extend the range of its early warning detection system. To improve height-finding capability, Pyongyang has also introduced more sophisticated radars such as Rockcake and Stonecake.

Another improvement in North Korea's air capability is the equipment of about twenty IL-28s with an improved blind bombing and navigational radar system designated Shorewalk. When properly used, this system permits precision navigation and blind bombing without the use of ground communications which would betray the direction of the flight and the target designation. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING

Communist guerrilla activity increased only slightly in connection with the third anniversary, on 20 December, of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front, despite advance Communist propaganda exhortation for a major military effort. The Viet Cong continued to direct attacks and harassing activities primarily at strategic hamlets.

South Vietnam's new government is showing extreme sensitivity to discussion of a "neutralist solution" to its insurgency problem. The Communists' Liberation Front has repeatedly proposed such a settlement, and the idea is gaining new advocates as a result of Cambodia's call for an international conference. Saigon's military rulers last week closed down a newspaper which was expressing interest in neutralism. However, editorials in the vernacular press, even though attacking neutralism, have kept the debate in the public eye. On 20 December, Saigon students--possibly encouraged by the regime--demonstrated against neutralism.

On the military front, the government is beginning to take some steps to overcome the lethargy that has affected its counterinsurgency effort since the coup. A long-range pacification program has been launched in one of the most troublesome provinces in the northern part of the country, and broad command changes have been introduced in two provinces south of Saigon where security has been deteriorating.

In the political field, the government has named 60 members of the civilian advisory Council of Notables. Returned exiles apparently are not represented, and there is a dearth of direct provincial representation. Many appointees, however, are prominent political, professional and lay religious leaders who could provide effective guidance to the regime if they are given a chance.

Apathy and disenchantment over the new government are widespread among such key elements as middle-grade officers, students and politicians. Criticism centers on the lack of firm direction by the ruling generals, on repeated reshuffling of local officials deemed incompetent, corrupt or close to the Diem regime, and on the rise in Viet Cong activity. There are signs that junta members themselves are beginning to share the disillusionment of some circles with Premier Tho's provisional cabinet, which is described as ineffective and regional in outlook.

Leading generals nevertheless seem to have few effective steps in mind to rally popular support. Three generals recently complained to US officials that they were having trouble finding qualified Vietnamese to fill government positions and that press criticism of their efforts was unhelpful. General "Big" Minh, the chief of state, has indicated a personal distaste for a prominent role, and has asserted that the people would gradually come to appreciate the new government as problems were solved on a province-by province-basis. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

LAOS


CHINA
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GULF OF TONKIN
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LAOS

Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains made by rightist units in central Laos. Pathet Lao troops, reportedly supported by substantial numbers of North Vietnamese, on 19 December captured Kam Keut and the nearby airfield, three days after occupying the key route junction at Lak Sao. Right-wing messages have described a key rightist parabattalion as "completely smashed." Communist units have advanced south of Lak Sao toward neutralist positions along Route 8-A, but there have been no indications that they intend to press their advantage by a major drive on Nhommarath, which is still held by rightist forces. In other areas, there have been reports of only limited activity, involving scattered skirmishes and artillery exchanges.

Meanwhile, neutralist and Pathet Lao representatives are continuing their efforts to negotiate an easing of tensions between the two factions. At a meeting on 20 December in the Plaine des Jarres, both sides called for an "early" meeting between Premier Souvanna and Prince Souphannouvong. They also agreed, in principle, that elements of the coalition government should be transferred from Vientiane to the royal capital at Luang Prabang, which would be neutralized and placed under tripartite control. Both factions reiterated their support for the formation of a mixed police force in a neutralized Vientiane.

General Phoumi's right-wing faction, which was not represented at the meeting, remains skeptical of Pathet Lao intentions. Phoumi apparently believes that an agreement for the neutralization of Luang Prabang is unlikely, but he may join in talks on the subject. He has indicated, however, that the neutralization of Vientiane is contingent on the willingness of the Pathet Lao to allow free movement in areas of Laos now under their control. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

* * *

FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA

Armed Forces Minister Pierre Messmer's visit to Cambodia from 4-7 January is designed primarily to strengthen French influence there in the wake of Prince Sihanouk's call for an end to the US aid program. Messmer's high-level entourage, which includes the chiefs of the Foreign Ministry's Indochina and Cultural and Technical divisions, will probably recommend some increases in aid, but De Gaulle apparently has no intention of taking on any large new commitments.

French-grant aid to Cambodia since 1956 has amounted to only $15 million. Current assistance is threefold: a military training mission of at least 250 men; cultural aid in the form of a university mission and 319 teachers in Cambodian schools; and the maintenance of about 40 experts in the fields of health and public works. In addition, a number of French nationals hired by the Cambodian Government hold positions of considerable influence in the Ministry of Finance, the Treasury, and the premier's office, and are among Prince Sihanouk's advisers.

Paris has indicated it has no intention of equaling the US aid program. Any increase in military aid probably would be limited to reconditioned and obsolete equipment, such as trucks and light armored vehicles. Increased cultural and technical assistance probably would include further help for the French university mission, more teachers, and 30 or 40 additional technical experts, especially agriculturalists.

The extension of French aid will be complicated by Cambodia's claims for compensation for losses incurred as a result of the 1958 devaluation of the French franc. Since 1958 France has asserted that a large-scale aid program would be impossible until there is agreement on an exchange rate, but a compromise may now be in sight.

Sihanouk has sought French help in maintaining Cambodia's policy of neutrality, and in recent talks with the US and the UK, France has supported his call for an international conference on Cambodian neutrality, despite US objections. Indeed, De Gaulle has consistently sought to meet Sihanouk more than half way, and Paris may now encourage Sihanouk to press this issue. (CONFIDENTIAL)


ISRAEL'S JORDAN RIVER DIVERSION PROJECT
Canal or conduit, proposed or under construction
Demilitarized Zone
LEBANON
Litani
Hasbani
Dan
Banyas
SYRIA
Pumping Station (Under Construction)
Haifa
Tunnel
Reservoirs
Tunnel
Tunnel
ISRAEL
Yarmuk
Jordan
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Jordan
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ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT

The Arab states evidently do not plan any overt military action against Israel when in late January or early February the Israelis begin pumping tests for their Jordan River diversion project, but sabotage of the project's facilities may be attempted.

The Arab military chiefs who met in Cairo in mid-December apparently decided that direct military attacks are not feasible. The chiefs reportedly agreed, however, that the states bordering on Israel should mount independent and uncoordinated clandestine operations.

The Arab League Defense Council, which meets in January, probably will approve this recommendation, but its implementation is another matter. Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese officials have indicated privately that their governments have no intention of taking aggressive action of any kind against the Israeli project.

Nasir, however, told the Canadian ambassador in early December that he was worried that Syria might act unilaterally and present the other Arab states with a dilemma. Damascus will be under strong pressure to fulfill its threats against the Israeli scheme, particularly in view of the close proximity of the Syrian border to Israel's pumping station on Lake Tiberias.

Nasir's wariness about becoming involved in a war with Israel over Jordan waters was also evident in a speech he made on 23 December. He emphasized that the problem is political rather than military in nature and that the chiefs of staff cannot solve it. He called for a summit meeting of Arab presidents and kings to seek a solution.

Israel, according to the chief of Israeli military intelligence, considers there is an outside possibility that Syria might bomb or shell the pumping facility's transformer station. However, the Israelis believe the primary threat stems from former Palestinians now living in Syria, Jordan or Lebanon, who might make a dramatic effort to sabotage the project even though they probably could not cause serious damage. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

* * *

CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN

Fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which began on 21 December and was continuing on 26 December despite efforts to obtain a cease-fire, is the culmination of a steady growth of tension on the island during the past few weeks. The new tension followed President Makarios' presentation to Turkish Cypriot leaders of proposals for changing the Cyprus constitution. The proposals, which essentially involved removing the guarantees to the Turkish minority that had been written into the Cyprus settlement of 1959, were rejected by the Turkish Government even before the Turkish Cypriots had made their views known.

Most of the initial fighting appears to have been between Greek Cypriot police and the Turkish underground, and to have taken place in the Turkish areas of Nicosia.. The situation there deteriorated progressively during the week, as the police lost control to extremist groups of irregulars from both communities. A cease-fire, to be supervised by the British, had not been effective as of the morning of 26 December. Fighting had also continued at the port city of Larnaca; the rest of the island was quiet but tense.

In the face of these developments, the Turkish Government threatened to exercise its right under the 1959 agreement to intervene on Cyprus. Three Turkish jet fighters flew over Nicosia on 25 December, and Turkish naval units appeared off the island. Part of the 650-man Turkish garrison on Cyprus left its barracks to move into one of the Turkish quarters of the capital. Part of the 950-man Greek contingent then moved to protect Greek areas. The situation evidently prodded Athens and London into a more active role, and Greek, Turkish and British forces on Cyprus have been placed under a unified British-led command. Britain has announced it is sending 150 additional troops.

The violence may make leaders of both sides more cautious in pressing political demands. Soon after the outbreak, Makarios told the US ambassador he would go more slowly in pushing his constitutional revisions. Both ethnic groups, however, will be further embittered--particularly the Turkish community, which is believed to have suffered much the heavier casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

AREA NOTE

Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Faysal appears to have weathered his latest dispute with King Saud without making any concessions. The details of a new arrangement between the two are not known, but Faysal is still firmly in control of the government. Royal Guard elements which the King ordered to positions around his palace at the height of the dispute have now been withdrawn.

The dispute centered on Saud's attempt to resume personal control of the government, which he relinquished to Faysal a year ago when his health broke. The immediate issues were variously reported to have been the new budget, which cuts funds allotted to the royal family, and Faysal's refusal to give cabinet posts to two of Saud's sons.

In blocking Saud's challenge, Faysal apparently was supported by most of the important members of the royal family. Throughout the crisis the Saudi regular army remained under the orders of the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, a Faysal adherent. Some observers have reported that the King's action has actually served to strengthen Faysal's position. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

THE TARIFF DISPARITIES ISSUE

The tariff disparities issue which has plagued preparations for the Kennedy Round for many months originates in the fact that there are substantial differences between the EEC and US tariffs on individual items, even though over-all tariff levels are roughly the same. Because the EEC common external tariff was arrived at by averaging the tariffs of the member states, the EEC tariff schedule is characterized by the absence of "peaks and lows"; in the US schedule, on the other hand, the rates vary much more, and some individual tariffs remain very high in comparison with those of the EEC. Accordingly, the EEC and the French in particular have long insisted that a 50-percent cut in tariffs by both the US and the EEC would leave the US with substantial protection on certain items and deprive the EEC of bargaining power to effect their future reduction.

The disparities issue was believed to have been settled at the GATT ministerial meeting last May with a formula which provided that tariffs on industrial items would in general be reduced equally and across the board, except that "special rules" would apply "where significant adverse effects on trade would result from disparities in tariff levels." In fact, however, this formula merely shifted the argument to the problem of determining what disparities are "significant" or "meaningful in trade terms." Because the "special rules" would mean in most cases a smaller tariff reduction by the EEC than by the US, the EEC has attempted to maximize the area to which these rules would apply while the US has sought to minimize their application.

After lengthy negotiation, a GATT subcommittee reached a considerable measure of agreement last month on a formula which would identify a "significant" tariff disparity in the first instance as one in which the high rate is at least 30 percent of value and at least 10 percent above the lower rate. Because this formula would identify some 850 US items as eligible for "special treatment," the subcommittee proposed seven additional qualitative criteria which would reduce considerably the number of eligible items. The three to which the US attaches special importance would (1) require that there be substantial imports of the item concerned from the high tariff country into the low; (2) exclude items where there are substantial imports into the high tariff country; and (3) exclude items on which the low tariff country maintains quotas.

The formula approved by the EEC on 23 December would substitute for the 30/10 criterion a 2/1 formula. A disparity would be identified as one in which the high tariff is twice as high as the low one, apparently with the additional qualification that, in most cases, there would have to be a ten-point percentage spread between the two rates. This formula would provide for special treatment for far more than 850 items, including items of special US export interest. The arrangements for qualitative criteria also seem to have been modified to the US' disadvantage.

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THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS

The Common Market appears to have averted disaster for the second time in less than a year. The eleventh-hour agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 December are apparently sufficient to discourage De Gaulle from carrying out his threat to break up the community. Moreover, the Germans and Dutch succeeded in extracting limited commitments from Paris on EEC participation in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. These agreements do not cover all the outstanding issues, however, and the manner in which they were reached will leave a residue of bitterness. Nor is it certain that major US interests have fared well.

The main agricultural elements in the "package" deal are the regulations concerning intracommunity trade in beef, rice, and dairy products and the rules governing the community farm fund. Their effect is to open the large West German market to farm exports of France, Italy, and the Netherlands--generally at a substantial advantage over the exports of nonmembers. Although approval of these and the financial regulations is an important step forward, the key question of grain price unification is still unsettled. Further consideration of the formula proposed by Commissioner Mansholt has been delayed until next year.

The agreement on a Kennedy Round position is likewise an advance for the community, but from the US view not necessarily favorable. On the long-standing problem of tariff "disparities," the EEC adopted a formula which would exempt from the proposed 50-percent linear reduction in tariffs a far larger number of items than the US hoped for. The EEC position on farm products in the trade negotiations--although an improvement over the initial Mansholt proposals--also leaves much to be desired from the US view. In general, the EEC proposes that, if its levy system operates in such a way as to cause difficulties for the exports of nonmembers, then the EEC Commission will be called on to propose "appropriate," but unspecified, measures. These would not apply if it is technically impossible to determine how much protection is actually involved in the levy system.

The general relief within the community which greeted these agreements reflects both the depth of the crisis and some optimism that the Common Market's unity may have been restored. The prominent role played by the EEC's commission in achieving the compromise has in particular encouraged those who hope to strengthen the community's institutional structure.

In France the conviction was evidently widespread, however, that both Bonn and The Hague were quite prepared to see the French "leave" the Common Market, and in the event of its breakup, to seek alternative ties with the Outer Seven. Moreover, while it may prove healthy that Bonn "stood up" to De Gaulle in this instance, its motive was strongly colored by a desire to protect its inefficient farmers. Nor does it augur well for US-EEC relations that the French blame the US for much of the opposition they encountered. ~~(SECRET NO~~ FOREIGN DISSEM)

UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY

British shipping and official circles are incensed over recent US demands for information relating to rate discrimination against US exports. The British Government has advised against compliance on the grounds that this information is commercially confidential, and that the US cannot demand what the UK Government cannot obtain.

Following a recent congressional investigation into alleged rate discrimination against American exports, the US Maritime Commission asked the North Atlantic Freight Conference to explain the differentials on a long list of items, setting a 20 January deadline for compliance under penalty of heavy fines. The US position is that US exporters are being penalized because outward rates are higher on the average than the inward rates.

British and other shipping lines regard the differentials as economically justified. The tonnage of US exports is much greater than import tonnage, and shipping lines--anxious to avoid half-loaded or in-ballast westbound voyages--have traditionally charged lower rates for items imported into the US than for exports from this country.

Thus, what are seen as American efforts to regulate international shipping lines in order to improve the unfavorable US balance of payments have caused increasing rancor in Britain. Before Parliament adjourned for its Christmas recess on 20 December, some Conservative MPs called for retaliatory restrictions on US ships arriving at UK ports. Although the MPs did not specify what restrictions they had in mind, the government cannot afford in the present pre-election period to leave itself open to charges that it is not attentive enough to domestic interests.

The Douglas-Home government, while hopeful of some compromise before the 20 January deadline, is busily lining up international support. At the recently concluded conference of transport ministers of 10 European maritime nations, Britain proposed that Japan be invited to join the united front of European maritime countries in a general protest against US shipping policies, thereby aligning roughly three quarters of the world's shipping business against the US position. Japan agreed to do so, and the collective protest was filed with the State Department on 23 December. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The opening of the Berlin Wall during the holiday season and the death of Social Democratic Party (SPD) chairman Erich Ollenhauer have placed Willy Brandt once again in the center of the German political stage.

The agreement to open the Wall resulted from Brandt's unceasing efforts to ease conditions for Berliners. His willingness to reach agreement with the East Zone authorities on the pass issue is being criticized by some Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leaders and by the CDU-oriented press in West Germany. Brandt, however, is banking on the expectation that most West Germans, like the Berliners, will approve his action. He has even hinted that there may be further negotiations with the East Germans to extend the period of the passes beyond the 5 January cutoff date. There is also speculation that both East and West Germany will find the pass agreement a model for agreement on other issues.

Brandt, who was the most logical choice, was named acting chairman of the SPD immediately after Ollenhauer's death on 14 December. Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner has proposed that Brandt's position be formalized at a special party convention next month. Fritz Erler, the party's foreign and defense expert, is slated to take Brandt's place in the hierarchy as second deputy chairman. As the SPD leader, Brandt would stand to be candidate for chancellor in the 1965 general elections. If current opinion polls are any indication, the SPD will give the CDU a strong race in that contest.

Brandt, however, has not yet committed himself, since to accept the SPD chairmanship might require him to resign as mayor of Berlin and move to Bonn. In so doing he would have to operate at a distance from his political bastion.

Whatever Brandt decides, the SPD is bound to miss the conciliating influence of Ollenhauer, who was able to hold together the often highly antagonistic factions of the party. Brandt, with his ideas of greater flexibility in foreign policy, may be expected to clash more frequently with Wehner, who--despite his Communist past--has come to represent the SPD's right wing. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

AREA NOTES

NATO: The NATO ministerial meeting in Paris, which ended on 17 December, avoided serious discussion of the more contentious issues facing the alliance. There was, for instance, only passing reference to the matter of nuclear sharing. While NATO's military posture was generally recognized as still inadequate, the Force Planning exercise--which is designed to help correct this situation--was not discussed at all. The dispute over basic strategy, the chief stumbling block to the exercise, was put off until after De Gaulle's press conference sometime in January.

All but the French agreed that the alliance should explore possibilities of negotiating with the Soviets on outstanding East-West issues. The Germans, as usual, indicated some reservations because of their sensitivity regarding Berlin and German reunification. The question of restricting Western credits to the Soviet bloc was reserved for future consideration. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Iceland's near general strike was settled on 21 December when labor and management agreed to a 25-percent wage increase. The 11-day work stoppage was led by Communist-dominated unions seeking, as in the past, to force the resignation of the Conservative - Social Democratic government by discrediting its economic policies. The settlement is regarded as a political victory for Prime Minister Benediktsson's government, since the Communists were unable to maintain a solid grip on labor.

The settlement, however, will intensify inflationary pressures and will probably force Benediktsson to take extraordinary measures to maintain economic stability. For political reasons he will try to avoid another currency devaluation, but it is doubtful that the government can maintain its economic stabilization program without resorting to this measure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA

Fidel Castro is continuing his effort to reduce the influence of the veteran Communists who were leaders of the Moscow-oriented, pre-revolutionary Communist party of Cuba. Castro's campaign against them, launched in a bitter attack in March 1962, subsequently seemed to lose steam. Recent reports from knowledgeable clandestine sources, however, indicate that the old liners are again on the defensive and are likely to suffer further in government shake-ups which may be in the offing. Castro nevertheless continues to move slowly in order to avoid undue disruption within his regime.

The only major veteran Communist figure to remain in Castro's good graces is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the head of the National Agrarian Reform Institute. Rodriguez' position has actually been strengthened in recent weeks with the raising of his job to cabinet level. He has evidently convinced Castro of his personal loyalty and of his ability as an administrator. It is also possible that Rodriguez performs a useful and trusted liaison role between Castro and Soviet leaders. He returned to Havana on 22 December after a two-week trip to the USSR and several Soviet satellites where, according to press accounts, he was in contact with high-ranking Communist Party officials.

The old-line Cuban Communists remain strong, according to a recent clandestine report, in the intermediate and lower echelons of the military and party hierarchies. Wherever possible, they continue their "sectarian" efforts to secure positions for their comrades at the expense of Fidelistas. A clandestine source reported hearing "rumors" in high regime circles late last month that veteran Communists have banded together in clandestine cells to work against Castro.

Che Guevara continues to be the Cuban leader most openly critical of the Soviet Union and the most insistent on the "necessity" of accelerating the revolution in Latin America. Fidel Castro is said to agree with Guevara's position, but awareness of Cuba's own self-interest still compels him to be more cautious in pursuing policies that could be interpreted as anti-Soviet. It nevertheless remains a key regime policy to encourage Communist revolution in Latin America.

A clandestine source who is a high-level Cuban diplomat asserts that Cuban leaders privately recognize that popular discontent with the regime is widespread. He claims, however, that they are confident their unpopularity has reached its nadir, and that they are beginning to make up lost ground. They expect, for instance, that economic difficulties--a major source of discontent--will be largely overcome within three years. The strategy of the government, this source reports, is to hold on until the economy improves and until Cuban subversive efforts elsewhere in Latin America result in the establishment of one or more Communist allies in the hemisphere. Then, the regime feels, it will be secure. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES

The killing of 15 guerrillas by Dominican Army troops on 21 December apparently removes the last pocket of insurgents opposing the government. However, the incident could provoke dangerous political repercussions.

Emilio De Los Santos, head of the governing military-installed triumvirate, resigned in protest over what he regarded as the brutal and unnecessary killing of the insurgents, including the president of the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group. The army commander of the area in which the incident took place insists the deaths were the unavoidable result of a fire fight. If stories of armed forces "brutality" become widespread, however, they could provoke dangerous hostility toward the regime from rank-and-file Dominicans, who recall the repressive measures of former dictator Trujillo.

The resignation of De Los Santos precipitated frantic maneuvering within the government among civilian and military elements. Only the prompt appointment of Foreign Minister Donald Reid to the vacant post in the triumvirate appears to have helped avert a serious political crisis for the moment.

The triumvirate has asked the cabinet--which was chosen from and is responsible to six minority political parties--to resign to permit the appointment of a more independent group. This move has prompted strong protests from four of the splinter parties backing the regime, who stand to lose patronage; the outcome is unclear.

However, the National Civic Union, the only sizable party in the government, backs the cabinet reorganization. More important, the key leaders of the armed forces are providing the triumvirate with their support, which could prove crucial in a political showdown. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

BRAZIL

Further changes in the Brazilian cabinet are expected following the resignation last week of Finance Minister Carvalho Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney Galvao, was appointed Pinto's successor, but there remains a possibility that Leonel Brizola--who had been actively pushed for the post by the extreme left--may eventually receive some ministry. There is widespread belief in the army that War Minister Jair Ribeiro will also be replaced in the near future. As one responsible Brazilian commentator has remarked, with Goulart "every minister is an interim one."

Ney Galvao's appointment actually reduces the previously slight prospect that Brazil's critical financial problems would be handled effectively. Galvao's qualifications in the economic field are weak at best and his record as head of the Bank of Brazil does not command confidence within the business community. Before taking his new post, he served as minister without portfolio in charge of coordinating foreign trade policies, a job he performed without any particular distinction.

Although his views are perhaps somewhat to the right of Goulart's, Galvao can be expected to toe the adminstration line faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's appointment may be a temporary expedient designed to allay fears that Brizola would succeed Pinto. Galvao is a personal friend of Brizola and there is speculation that Brizola will, in fact, eventually move into the Finance Ministry.

The new finance minister inherits almost insurmountable economic and financial problems. Chief among these are a rampant inflation that may see the cost of living increase 80 percent this year, and a staggering foreign debt involving approximately $1 billion in payments due over the next two years.

The severity of the economic situation and Goulart's apparent intention to assume greater personal direction over financial policies increase the possibility of radical measures that might be detrimental to foreign creditors and investors. Goulart reportedly is considering nationalization of all public utilities and cancellation of mining concessions. Measures such as these could lead to further deterioration of Brazil's economic position. (SECRET)

AREA NOTE

Bolivia: The political competition between Bolivian Vice-President Juan Lechin and President Victor Paz Estenssoro is bound to intensify sharply as each maneuvers to line up support for the presidential nomination at next month's convention of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Lechin probably still hopes to pull an upset by dislodging Paz or at least to demonstrate sufficient strength to assure himself of retaining his vice-presidential post. Paz seems certain, however, to be able to control the party's convention, assure his renomination, and designate his own running mate.

If the forthcoming convention repudiates Lechin, he may well withdraw from the MNR and establish a "popular front" political party. He probably could count on the support of political groups ranging from leftist extremists to disgruntled factions within right-wing parties. It would seem unlikely, though, that these disparate groups could coalesce into an organization powerful enough to defeat Paz' well-organized machine in the elections set for June. (SECRET)

* * *

KENT EXTRACT

Mr. William M. Kent joined the Agency in December 1951. He had previously received a degree in diplomatic and public relations from the Latin American Institute, New York City and had served time in the U.S. Army from 1946 to 1948. He graduated from the Latin American Institute with the highest honors and 4 awards.

Mr. Kent was initially assigned to the Office of Special Operations as a clerk typist and, 11 after six months, in June 1952, was assigned to Panama as an intelligence officer under non-official cover. In July 1956 he returned to Headquarters where he worked as an area operations officer in the Western Hemisphere Division. After a successful stint in the Cuba 16-17 section he was assigned as an operations officer 16-17 to Caracas. After an excellently productive tour in Caracas, Mr. Kent was selected to join JMWAVE in Miami. There he really shone as attested to in the following quote from his fitness report: "He has been placed in most difficult positions, particularly in the handling of incompatible people and groups which he has managed without alienating either side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible by satisfying everyone concerned." After his tour in Miami, he headed several sections in Headquarters in the Western Hemisphere Division. In 1967 he was transferred to New Orleans and then to the Washington Base. In both places he worked under non-official cover 24 From 1970 until his retirement he served in several capacities ranging from the planning and guiding of Covert Action programs to occupying managerial positions. During these eight years he received seven strong and three outstanding overall ratings. Of special note are the various commendation and laudatory reports concerning Mr. Kent's performance during the "Chilean crisis". Because of his excellent performance during the Chilean crisis he again was asked to help the Latin American Division during several investigations. He performed admirably as reflected in a commendation written by the Deputy Chief of LA Division on 5 December 1975: "When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, but to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15 July. On the second occasion his contribution

4/N

CONFIDENTIAL

was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers were excellent and have withstood critical scrutiny."

Mr. Kent has now left the Agency after 26 years of distinguished service as an operations officer and as a manager both in the field and at Headquarters. On the occasion of his retirement, it is appropriate that Mr. Kent's career achievements be suitably recognized. It is recommended that he be awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.

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8 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Annual Fitness Report - George Joannides
Operations Officer
c8 GS-16
ESN 064818 Z3
DOB 5 July 1922
067180743

1. This Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report is prepared in accordance with HR 20-20, for the period mid-June 1978 through 12 January 1979. The occasion of the Fitness Report is the retirement of the rating official.

2. The undersigned was detailed in mid-May to serve as the Agency's Principal Coordinator for work with the House Select Committee on Assassinations. As it became apparent that the volume of the work required assignment of additional full-time personnel, the decision was made that one experienced officer was needed to handle the DDO account. A senior officer experienced in DDO work and available to serve for several months was requested. Mr. Joannides was known to the undersigned by reputation, although not personally, and arrangements were made for his detail to the work. While there is no way to outline the qualifications that one should have for this sort of work, it became quickly clear that Mr. Joannides was the perfect man for it.

3. Mr. Joannides was responsible for a new procedure in recording of exchanges with the HSCA. As it developed, the Agency's logs and records on the status of requests by the HSCA and the Agency's responses became the only reliable record; it was clear that the HSCA often did not know the status of business in this respect and time and time again had to come to this office for clarification. Beyond that early contribution to the ordering of the affairs of the office, Mr. Joannides handled day-to-day follow-ups of requirements by telephone with the DDO focal point as well as throughout the DDO. Further, the firm position that he took with the young investigators in response to aggressive harassment on some occasions was exactly what the situation called for. A person of his maturity and experience handled the job exactly as required by the situation. If the peculiar nature of the work did not call on Mr. Joannides for all the talents of his wide experience, it nonetheless was his experience and quick perceptions that ensured a superior performance. His advice and

2/mc 1/19

counselling on courses of action to cope with unique situations was always sound and responsible.

4. The work in this assignment provided little occasion for Mr. Joannides to demonstrate attitudes on either EEO matters or economy, considerations that are required by regulation for comment in Fitness Reports. As a result, no comment is made.

5. Not because of the demands on his superior talents, but because of the cool efficacy with which he handled an unusual special assignment, Mr. Joannides' work is evaluated as Outstanding.

S. D. Breckinridge

I certify that I have seen the comments in the Narrative section of this memorandum.

George Joannides

8 Jan 79
Date

KC 1/14

gm
cjr

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER [064818] 08

SECTION A GENERAL

Joannides, George

1. NAME (Last) (Middle) [redacted] [redacted]	**2. DATE OF BIRTH** 7-5-22	**3. SEX** M 99	**4. GRADE** [GS-14]	**5. SD** D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops. Officer	**7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT** DDP/S.A.S.	**8. CURRENT STATION** JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*
- SPECIAL *(Specify):*

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL *(Specify):*

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)* 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises and manages the Station's covert action branch which employs [ten] staff officers and [seven] contract employees. 24 24	**RATING LETTER** 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Serves as senior case officer for a student project which involves distribution of printed propaganda, production of radio programs, and the development of political action programs.	**RATING LETTER** 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Maintains liaison with the FI, CI and PM branch chiefs, in order to insure that the Station's covert action effort is appropriately supporting the missions of the other branches.	**RATING LETTER** 99 [P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Conducts production and security reviews on the Station's covert action operations.	**RATING LETTER** 99 [P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	**RATING LETTER**
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	**RATING LETTER**

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	**RATING LETTER** [S] 99

8 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9/mc

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 4 8 05 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a hard working, dedicated and effective officer who has proven by performance that he can accomplish assigned operational tasks in allowable time limits. The period covered by this fitness report represents Subject's initial Agency exposure to those first echelon management responsibilities which are implicit in a branch chief's assignment in a Station that has [313] employees. Subject responded to the challenge of the first echelon supervisory responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Subject managed a branch that had a yearly budget of two million four hundred thousand dollars. These funds were judiciously spent on printed propaganda, white and black radio programs, and on political action operations which were implemented via labor, student and professional groups. Subject has the knack of judiciously blending quality with quantity and in this melding effort, Subject reflected cost consciousness and effectiveness in the use of personnel, space equipment, and funds. Subject has a distinct flair for political action operations and can translate policy directives into meaningful action programs by all of his assets. Subject has the ability to delegate authority and to appropriately fix responsibility with those officers whom he supervises. In the management field, Subject's only discernible weakness is a tendency to be abrupt with subordinates. It is believed that this minor shortcoming will be overcome with the acquisition of added experience in the field of personnel management. On balance therefore, Subject's overall performance as a supervisor and as an intelligence officer warrants an 99 evaluation of "[Strong]"

(CONTINUED)

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 15 May 1964	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ [redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 22 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 15 May 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although I have had few chances to personally observe [redacted] work, I concur in the supervisor's comments and rating due to my general impression of [redacted] capabilities and performance of duty received in occasional meetings extending over a number of years.

DATE 1 June 1964	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief, WH (SA)	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE Bruce B. Cheever

SECRET

2/mc

CONTINUATION SHEET

Section C - Narrative Comments

Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Ethnic origins, foreign language fluency and experience acquired to date generally dictates a career for Subject in the general arena of Greek operations. While the major thrust of Subject's career orientation should be geared toward Greece and its related problems, it is believed that it is essential that, on a periodic basis, Subject be directed into non-Greek areas of interest, in order that the continued challenge of new horizons will stimulate Subject to develop to his full capacity. In practical terms, this means that out of any eight-year time cycle, at least two years should be spent by Subject on non-Greek or even non-European affairs. This officer has the potential to be a broad-gauged officer but he must be stimulated and led in that direction which will fully harness the totality of his potential.

The rating officer would be pleased to have Subject work with him at any other Field Station that might be entrusted to the rating officer.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 86 [064818]

SECTION A GENERAL

Joannides, George E.

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Jul 1922	3. SEX M	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

☐	CAREER	☐	RESERVE	☐	TEMPORARY
☐	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

☐	INITIAL	XX	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
☐	ANNUAL	☐	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
☐	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 January 1963 - 31 July 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects of political action and psychological warfare activity and supervising [fourteen] case officers and clerical personnel.	RATING LETTER [O]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and a hemisphere-wide apparatus.	RATING LETTER [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
17 Oct 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER [S]

17 OCT 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

6/MC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Reference is made to paragraph C of subject's previous fitness report dated 10 January 1963 which is still applicable. During the period covered by this report subject has done an excellent job in the handling of a significant student exile group which hitherto had successfully resisted any important degree of control. Under subject's direction an exile teachers' group reached a high level of effectiveness in the propaganda field and was turned over to another case officer.

Subject has effectively terminated unproductive operations in the prop field (one magazine and a news letter) and is building up Station radio capability directed at the maintarget.

His high professional standards, complete comprehension of the problems faced by the Station and strong urge to win in our struggle with the opposition make it a distinct pleasure to see him take over as Chief of the PW branch.

SECTION D — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE JUL 31 1963	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 15 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 31 July 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, PW	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL – The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's work based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, general observation of Subject during the past year and frequently reviewing his completed work. Subject is an extremely hard working, dedicated individual with an ability to develop rapport quickly with his contacts. Subject works long hours including weekends without complaining and is always available when there is a job to be done. Subject has demonstrated those qualities of management, initiative, drive and devotion to duty that are necessary to perform the many and varied tasks of a fast and continually changing situation. The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's overall evaluation of [Strong] 99

DATE SEP 24 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Deputy Chief of Station	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

1/mc

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	**NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

No change from previous report submitted 19 January 1963.

SECTION D	**CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**	
1.	**BY EMPLOYEE**	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 27 March 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)	
2.	**BY SUPERVISOR**	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 March 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, PW Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)
3.	**BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 2 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

~~SECRET~~

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

mul

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~037747~~ [064818] 08

SECTION A GENERAL

Joannides, George E.

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 July 1922	3. SEX Male 99	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE US Fuid		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT				10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT			
	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*			X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
1 January 1963 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

Annual fitness report covering the Period 1 January - 31 December 62 still current.

POSTED ON OF-[illegible] d
10 apr 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER

16 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2/IN

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Stf Agent

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
08 [064818] ~~037747~~

SECTION A Joannides, George E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) [redacted]	2. DATE OF BIRTH 5 July 1922	3. SEX Male 99	4. GRADE [GS-14]	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE OPS OFFICER	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/S.A.S.	8. CURRENT STATION JMWAVE		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
1 January 1962 - 31 December 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
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SPECIFIC DUTIES

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SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects political action and psychological warfare and supervising [fifteen] case officers and clerical personnel. 24	RATING LETTER 99 [O]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Case Officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and hemisphere-wide apparatus.	RATING LETTER 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Case Officer for teacher's organization engaged in hemisphere-wide press and radio propaganda.	RATING LETTER 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4 Case Officer on project producing news letter aimed at press outlets in Latin America.	RATING LETTER 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5 Maintains contacts with key elements of a veteran's type organization as a developmental project.	RATING LETTER 99 [S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

POSTED ON
26 Feb 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER [S] 99

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9/MC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's strengths lie in his ability to analyze a problem quickly and skillfully, to strip it of unnecessary detail and to render a decision without waste of motion. He has contributed greatly to the efficiency of the Branch by eliminating unproductive ventures, counseling the members and promoting the principles of correct tradecraft. He has been successful in resolving complicated problems involving control of an unruly group. He has a strong personality and firm convictions about the proper manner of carrying on covert operations and voices his convictions without fear. He is an excellent supervisor and is respected by the members of the branch for his forthrightness and his sober judgment and sound advice. His handling of agents and contacts on the outside both directly and indirectly mixes to a proper extent firmness and friendliness. In short he is a distinct asset to the clandestine services both administratively and operationally.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE 19 JAN 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 10 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE 19 JAN 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief/PW - JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Subject is an unusually competent officer in the field of covert action operations in that he blends a flair for this activity with sound tradecraft principles and a firm adherence to valid reporting techniques. Subject is dedicated and hard working and he has proven by performance that he is willing to work long hours in order to accomplish his operational objectives. Subject's overall performance warrants an evaluation of "strong". Subject has growth potential both as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Subject's activities come to the attention of the reviewing officer on a weekly basis.

DATE FEB 15 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

SECRET

DCI
kwr

1 October 1963

NOTES FOR MR. McCONE:

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1. [DDP has prepared for your information a summary of General Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to the U.S. Attached to this summary are the four most important papers as follows:

   a. Your position paper;
   b. CIA commitments paper;
   c. Memorandum for the record on DDP briefings;
   d. Record of conversation with the President.

   The visit is considered to have been a success and Chiang Ching-kuo returned with an understanding that any abrupt move by his government to recover the mainland with military force would not be supported by this country. Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the position paper and CIA's commitments paper, and our station is now working out cooperation on intelligence and operational activities against the mainland.]

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2. [In commenting on the proposal to send Dr. Cavanagh to Rome, Bill Harvey suggests that Cavanagh be certified to the Vatican as your personal representative, and suggests you might do this through Cardinal Cicognani or Archbishop O'Connor. Request your guidance.]

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3. [DDP has run another assessment of the reliability of the documentary material provided by Penkovskiy and see no reason to change their statement of 31 May to USIB that it was "a most serious penetration of Soviet officialdom and one that will hurt them for years to come". Helms suggests you have this assessment checked with DDI and OSI and if they concur, re-assure USIB along the above lines.]

4. Dez FitzGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs recently on his overall program against Cuba. In the discussion the main thing that emerged was General LeMay's view that the present program was far too small to

3/mc

overthrow Castro. General LeMay wondered why we did not use bombings. There was also a discussion of Navy and Air Force programs to protect raiders in international waters and in the event of hot pursuit. It was agreed that further planning would be conducted.

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5. [John Warner has reviewed the record of recent congressional debates on the test ban treaty and finds 13 senators made reference to you. No one criticized you. Senators Pastore, Humphrey, and Anderson praised you.]

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6. [John Warner has prepared a recommendation based on his reading that our standing in Congress is currently on the decline. He suggests that you meet privately with such members as Russell, Saltonstall, Vinson, and Arends to seek advice and develop a strategy for public statements by these members and other Subcommittee members.]

98

7. [Mr. Kirkpatrick has forwarded a memorandum on efforts to obtain a replacement for Colonel Grogan.]

8. Dick Helms has forwarded a memorandum of his briefing of the Bureau of Budget officials on the Agency's covert action programs. McGeorge Bundy attended and offered 2 opinions: (a) that there be a regular annual briefing of the Special Group on covert operations as a whole, and (b) that during the present period of apparent detente there might well be very good reasons for investing even greater resources in covert actions.

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9. [John Bross has forwarded a memorandum for the record on your meeting with Generals Carter, Blake, and Carroll about personnel security. Bross is presently drafting a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this subject which is being reviewed by Houston and Bannerman.]

4/mk

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10. [Mr. Gilpatric has written you a letter confirming his conversation about assigning Frank Hand as Special Assistant to General Carroll. I suggest I pass this to General Carter for Agency action.]

W. Elder

[illegible] ONLY

18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for $25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement, that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico, and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S. or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless courses of action.

24

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group. It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release of the leaflets.

JAM/mfb

6 **TOP SECRET**

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE

09143 1 of 3

ACTION: FE 1-8

TEIF034

18 Jun 64 09 18z

OO RUEPIA

A

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z

O 180627Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/SECSTATE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

BT

9-DCI
10-DDCI
11-DDP
12-ADDP
13-SOD
14-FILE
15-VR
16-RF

TS 941

18 JUN 64 IN 09143

TOPSECRET MAC SOG 5050

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS

#9

TOP SECRET

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES MUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OBTAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM, BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER. USE OF US PAPER AND INDIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PREPARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GP-1

BT

13-00000

3 April

4/14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A. All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing. I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of organization had past, we might get some better results.

98

[The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting On Wednesday, the 8th.]

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2. [Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an interim basis.

ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appropriate actions by the Department of Defense through their representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, compensation and care of these captains.]

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3. [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia. It was agreed that the field would be instructed to carefully observe operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians, the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.

ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV.]

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4. [Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined. Secretary Vance's paper was approved.]

4/MC

98

5. The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view against Laotian overflights.

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved. Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

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7. The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about the handling of funds.

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8. Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in London.

OTHER MATTERS:

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1. Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2 was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.

98

2. Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile intrusion into Cambodia and Laos. Indications were that the photography had produced no useful information for MACV.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable Carter to investigate fully.

JAM/mfb

5/mc

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

98

1. The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the 21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they should cover the entire country.

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

1/mc

medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached. Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant progress.

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3. The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.

98

4. The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.

JAM/mfb

2/mc

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

File

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.

Cyrus Vance
Cyrus R. Vance

Attachment

Mr Jessup.
Will you circulate to members &
ask UA Johnson's people to bring Mann
or have Alexis talk closely with him/
McGB

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks. Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba. In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships (such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible, it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subsequently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

COPY No. 1 of 6 COPIES

3. Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."



c) Form a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow, Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose (such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin America against whom a concentrated program of bribery, blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping, and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and political activity designed to increase internal dissension within Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition, surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.

1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1, File #7

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
	Apr 6	DCI, Fubini, Bross	Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Mr. Bross
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Brewster	Breakfast at Hqs. M/R to be prepared by Warner.
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Saltonstall Warner, Helms	M/R to be prepared by Warner.
--	Apr 8	DCI, 6, 8 [Gen. Dethleffsen C/Intel Directorate W. German Intel Serv.] 6, 8 [Dr. Klaus Ritter, Gen. Quehlin,] R. Jack Smith Bronson Tweedy	See TAPE #121
~~48~~	~~Apr 8~~	~~DCI, Harriman,~~ Helms, G. Fields	~~M/R to be prepared by Glenn Fields--Also M/R by~~ DCI ~~--~~ 6, 8 ~~[Tshombe~~ & Nyerere, Brazzaville; Equatorial Africa ~~& French; Zanzibar]~~ " " " Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	Apr 8	DCI, Dr. John Foster	Met at the Residence--
--	Apr 9	DCI, Amb Jack Hood Vaughn, Rufus Z. Smith, Herbert & Cline	See TAPE # 122
	Apr 9	DCI, Amb. Kohler	At the residence--
--	Apr 10	DCI, Wm. Manchester Chretien	Met in DCI's ofc See TAPE #123
	Apr 13	DCI - Sec Def Black Dillon .. SST	(see separate SST file)
--	Apr 14	DCI, 6 [Augustine Edwards,] 11 [Chile], FitzGerald, Herbert	See TAPE # 124 8 [(Edwards is a newspaperman in Chile)]
~~48.5~~	~~Apr 14~~	~~DCI, Hadyn Williams,~~ Russell Smith (Asia Found) Helms, Lapham, Ned Barnes	~~M/R~~ ~~to be~~ ~~prepared by~~ ~~Helms?~~ ~~Barnes?~~ Destroyed MBeard 1/28/72
--	Apr 15	DCI, Secy Vance	Lunch/meeting with Vance See TAPE #125
~~48.6~~	apr 16	DCI, Cannon Comte Warner	Briefed Cannon Comte (M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Warner See Congressional Comte File
~~49~~	~~Apr 16~~	~~DCI, Robt. Anderson~~	~~Met with Anderson in Bundy's ofc - campaign funds to~~ 11 ~~[Panama]~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	Apr 16	DCI, Ch Justice Warren, Sen Cooper Stern, Rankin, Willens	Met in DCI's office
--	Apr 18	DCI, SecDec, Black, Dillon, Lindbergh, et al	re: SST (Accompanied by Alexander) (see separate SST file)
--	Apr 21	DCI, Ted Lewis, Ch, Wash Bureau, NY Daily News Chretien	M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #
	Apr 21	DCI, Frank Wisner	
~~50~~	~~Apr 22~~	~~DCI, Pres, Rusk McNamara~~ Majority & Minority Ldrs	~~Breakfast Mtg at White House (See M/R #22 of Pres. File)~~

9/mc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
50	22 Apr	DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara, Majority & Minority Ldrs	Breakfast meeting at White House (See M/R #22 in President's File)
~~51~~	~~22 Apr~~	~~DCI, Rusk~~	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Cambodia-Laotian border, Italian SecGen of NATO~~, visit of [~~Eshkol~~, Cyprus, 11 Brazil, Barrington of Burm Italian ~~talk deal, exchange of W~~ and L.]
~~52~~	~~22 Apr~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72	~~DCI, Eisenhower~~	~~Organ. of Pres. office, Soviet Military & Economic~~ strength, Sino-Soviet Dispute, SVN, [Cyprus, 11,11 Zanziba] presidential elections (~~SEE SEPARATE FILE MARKED, "M/R #52 - Mtg w/Eisenhower - 22 Apr 6~~
~~52.5~~	~~27 Apr~~	~~DCI, Gen. Pakravan~~ (Iran), Conway, Critchfield	~~See TAPE #127 also M/R prepared by Critchfield.~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	28 Apr	DCI, David Wise & Tom Lambert of Herald Tribune & Paul Chretien	Luncheon meeting - M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #129
--	28 Apr	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 128
~~53~~	~~29 Apr~~	~~DCI, McNamara~~	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Col. Walters, problems w/satellite reconnaissance,~~
~~54~~	~~29 Apr~~	~~DCI, [Archduke Otto]~~ 6	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 [~~Baodai~~] 6 ~~and Vietnam;~~ [~~Angola, Mozambique~~] 11,11
	30 Apr	DCI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wheelon	re: types of aircraft--M/R to be prepared by Wheelo No M/R per Wheelon - see M/R of 5 May mtg attended by DDCI + Wheelon + M/R in Wheelon's ofc.
--	1 May	DCI, [Gen. Dogu (Turkish] 6,8 Intel), Phil Dibble, Bill Doyle	See TAPE # 131
	1 May	DCI, Mr. Bundy	Lunch at Bundy's ofc--
~~55~~	~~2 May~~	~~DCI, Secy McNamara~~	Destroyed MBeard 1-27-72 ~~SST, ECM equip. over Cuba, OXCART~~
--	2 May	Paragraphs 1-4 in SST File DCI M/R	PFIAB Report on NRO (see "NRO Package" in NRO File)
~~56~~	~~3 May~~	DCI, [~~Mrs. Fleur~~ Cowles Montague-Meyer] 6	[~~Harold Wilson, Labor Govt, England~~] 6,8 ~~and his relationship with the Soviet Union~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	4 May	DCI, [Sir Kenneth Strong] 6 [Alan Crick,] 6 Cline	See TAPE # 132
~~56.5~~	~~4 May~~	~~SecState, AG, Bundy~~ A. Johnson	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~re: Angola and Mozambique M/R prepared by~~ Glen Fields
~~57~~	~~5 May~~	~~DCI Memo~~	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Re: The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross~~
~~57.5~~	~~5 May~~	~~DCI, Meany, Meyer~~	~~M/R Cuba prepared by Cord Meyer~~ [~~Chile, Brit. Guia~~] 11,11 Brazil, SVN Africa etc destroyed MBeard
--	~~7 May~~	~~DCI,~~ [ex-Pres Somoza] 6,8 Col King	Re: Cuba? See TAPE # 134
~~58~~	~~11 May~~	DCI, Clyde Weed, Brinkerhof & parttime Helms, FitzGerald, Col King	~~re: Elections in Chile Also see TAPE #135~~ MBeard Destroyed 1-28-72

12/mc

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	13 May	DCI & Bundy	re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications
	14 May	DCI, Rankin (No MR expected)	Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) ~~M/R to be prepared by Mr. Helms)~~ Helms saw Commission transcript & returned it to the Comm.
--	14 May	DCI, Bundy	
~~58.1~~	~~14 May~~	~~DCI, Scotty Reston~~ Yerxa, Frankel, Szulc, Helms, Cline Chretien	Lunch at N. Y. ~~Times ofc M/R to be prepared by~~ Chretien- Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	15 May	DCI, Gov. Rockefeller Kent	Presidential candidate briefing - ~~M/R to be prepare by Dr. Kent~~
~~58.3~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, David Wise,~~ Tom Ross, Kirkpatrick Chretien	~~See TAPE # 136 re: The Invisible Govt.~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.5~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, Hedley Donovan~~ Chas Murphy, Tom Griffeth, John Steele, Geo. Hunt, Cline, Helms, Chretien, Elder	~~Working dinner at residence -- M/R to be prepare~~ by Elder Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.7~~	~~17 May~~	~~DCI, Rusk, McNamara~~ Harriman, Wm Bundy McNaughton	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Southeast Asia -- settled on cable for Lodge~~
59	18 May	DCI, Rusk, McNamara Wm & Mac Bundy	Southeast Asia --Laos & SVN; US forces to Thailand; T-28's; military action against NVN; telecon to Amb Unger
~~60~~	~~18 May~~	~~DCI, Wm. Hearst, Jr.~~ Conniff, Considine, Kaplan, Warner, Chretien	~~Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Warner or Chretien~~ Sov Policy & Mil posture; Sino-Sov Rift; Diem coup; SEA; Cuba; Bay of Pigs; Sov Economy; U-2 & All MBeard to EK to destroy - 1-28-72
--	18 May	DCI, Fubini	(Partially taped) TAPE #137
--	19 May	DCI, Sam Papich	SEE TAPE #138
--	19 May	DCI, Russell Comte	M/R to be prepared by Warner (see Congressional Comte . .)
~~61~~	~~19 May~~	~~DCI, J. J. McCloy~~	~~Dinner at residence -- re: Oswald~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	21 May k	DCI, Joe Alsop	Lunch at residence
--	21 May	DCI, Gov. Scranton	Presidential Candidate Briefing
~~62~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI, Gen. Eisenhower~~	~~Briefed at Gettysburg~~ Destroyed
	27 May	DCI, Mike Forrestal	Lunch at residence
	28 May	DCI, Mr. Greenwood	Friend from Seattle, Wash.
	28 May	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 139
~~63~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI paper~~	~~Notes on draft memo of May 25th re SVN~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72

CONTINUED IN FILE #4

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
64	1 Jun	DCI memo	2 May Repoet of President's Board on NRO
65	1 & 2 June	HONOLULU Mtgs	Oservations and Agreed Actions on SVN
--	3 June	DCI, Gov. Harriman	Lunch
	4 June	DCI, Gen. Meir Amit (Israel) 6, 11 Ephraim Levy, Helms, Angleton, Millett 3 John Hadden 3	See TAPE # ~~139~~ 140
65.2	4 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Room on Laos M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Colb
65.5	5 June	DCI, Colby	White House Mtg on SEA (M/R prepared by Colby)
	5 June	DCI, For Min Quat (Vietnam) Colby, Paragellis 3	See TAPE # 14
--	4 June	Rusk, McNamara, Bundy et al	Mtg at State Dept fr 8:30 to midnight?
66	6 June	McGeorge Bundy	Problems re getting Joint Resolution to commit troops to Laos. Problems with Clifford Report recommendations. Provisions for CIA's re-entry in active role in SVN.
66	6 June	Mike Forrestal	DCI request for research of SEATO Agreement. Also attached memo fr Forrestal re AID Rep for Saigon
	9 June	Joseph Alsop	Dinner at Alsop's residence--
67	10 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Mr re Laos & SVN (M/R to be prepared b Colby)
68	11 June	DCI Memo	Thinking paper for internal mtg on Course of Action in Laos
69	12 June	DCI, Mr & Mrs. Henry Luce	Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME No Distribution
70	15 June	DCI, Colby, Cooper	ExCom Mtg on SEA M/R prepared by Colby DCI [illegible]
	15 June	DCI, W. W. Rostow	Lunch in SDR
	15 June	DCI, Amb. Bowles, James Grant, Dep Asst Secy For NE; Meyer, Critchfield, Loch Phillips 3	See TAPE # 142
- -	16 June	DCI, Mahon Comte Houston	(See Congressional Comte file)
~~70.5~~	~~17 June~~	~~DCI, John Steele,~~ Ed Reingold, Richard Clurman, Chretien, Geo Daniels, Helms	~~Luncheon M/R to be prepared by Chretien~~ (Background papers) Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72
71	17 June	DCI, McNamara	at Pentagon--SEA; SST; NRO
	17 June	DCI, Peter Grace, Walter Donnelly, Col King, FitzGerald	at residence M/R to be prepared by FitzGerald 611-7323 - Ellen has orig.

5/MC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	18 June	DCI, House Armed Services subcomte	Briefed committee--see Congressional Comte File
--	19 June	DCI, Amb Blair et al	Luncheon--
	19 June	DCI, Dr. Fubini	See TAPE # 143
72	21 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Cyprus; SEA; briefing Harold Wilson; Congo
	22 June	DCI, Amb Gordon (Brazil) FitzGerald	See TAPE # 144
~~73~~	~~22 June~~	~~DCI,~~ [~~PM Inonu~~] 6,8	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 ~~Luncheon at White House--re: Dr. Z. Peykoe,~~ Professor of Medicine [at Turkish University] 29
	23 June	DCI, Adrian Fisher, Dr. Scoville	See TAPE # 145
73.5	23 June	DCI, Drew Pearson, Kent, R. J. Smith	M/R to be prepared by ~~Smith or Kent~~ Smith. Adds little to what has already been said in his column
74	24 June	DCI M/R	Discussions re Joint Resolution by Congress in Connection with SEA
74.5	25 June 1	DCI, Dr. Land Panel	Mtg in Conf Rm--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Wheelon re: FULCRUM Also see TAPE #146
75	25 June	DCI Memo	Re memo of 19 June to SecDef proposing changes in wording of Presidential Directive as proposed by PFIAB on NRO
76	26 June	DCI Memo McMillan, Fubini Wheelon, Maxie	Talking paper for Meeting w/Fubini, McMillan, re: FULCRUM project incorporation into NRP Also see TAPE # 147 Also M/R by Wheelon att
77	26 June	DCI, Gen. Kuehlin, Eric Eisenstadt	to say good by to Gen. Kuehlin. M/R to be prepared by Eisenstadt (discuseed Soviet agriculture)
78	28 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Laos, communication fr [Pres Segni] 6; [Sihanouk] 6 contact in Paris
79	29 June	DCI, Sulzberger, Sr. Arthur Sulzberger, C. L. Sulzberger, et al	Lunch in N. Y. -- CIA publicity, The Invisible Govt. estimates, Bay of Pigs situation, coordination - 5412 Committee, SVN/Laos
80	29 June	DCI, Secy McNamara Secy Vance	NRO
80.1	7 July	DCI, DDCI, Bross, Clark, Kirkpatrick, Wheelon	Heads of Agency Budget Preview--M/R to be prepare by Clark -Third Party COMINT, Missile & Space Intell, Advanced Tech Research, CIA commo support to NCS & State
80.2	8 July	DCI, Robert Kleiman of TIME, R. Jack Smith	Lunch--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by R. Jack Smith
	8 July	DCI, Mr. Wm. Webster	Mtg in East--
80.3	8 July	DCI, Marengo, Foster McNamara	Informal session of the Principals--nuclear vehicle freeze verification

CONTINUED IN FILE #5

4/mc

C

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such [as the recent Brazilian] intercept and report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

JAM/ji (taped)

1/mc

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.
2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.
5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio ~~xxxxxxxiatex~~ officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.
2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.
4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.
5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

John A. McCone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President
from the Secretary regarding
the problem presented by
Cuban refugee groups

The President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

Group I
Excluded from
automatic down-
grading and de-
classification

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

March 28, 1963

#2-9

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

#29

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

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TOP SECRET

#6

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation -- the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

98

In thematter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . . nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.

98

De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.

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Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically, Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.

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After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can dO so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

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[We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying half of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.]

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. [There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade] 98

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[the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it — we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.]

With regard to AID [which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance — though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.]

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Turning to the domestic scene, [we will have a deficit of about $12 of $12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.]

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I think this Tax Bill [is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.]

Furthermore, the deficit [is a reflection of the fight in the hot and 98 cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.]

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The Military [are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more]

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[This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense — and perhaps we should spend more.]

98 [One of our big jobs will be to persuade] our colleagues in Europe to [to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two 98 or three days — if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.]

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Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. [We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)]

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Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

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File WE

23 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m., 22 March, 1963

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others

The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported qualified success, indicating reservations by the German, Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent ones being:

a. Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.

A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the extent of the control of the United States versus control by European countries since it seemed to mean that control should shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no country or group of countries exclusive of the United States should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time. The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

[illegible] ONLY

With respect to submarine versus surface ships, McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without its failure being used against the United States or his administration to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the "European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no viewpoint at this meeting.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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19 December 1963

Noted by DCI.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on 19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson, General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen, Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready, Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. FitzGerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

29/23/98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W. Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

principal soft spots among free world countries appeared at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these three countries together with recommendations as to what could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the governments of these three countries as well as any others engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He appeared particularly interested in the subject of economic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban military, the President said that it did not seem to him that we had gone very far along this line and that one day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself, would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out that the program being presented was, with the exception of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and, if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the President stated that he did not feel that the present time was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong direction with respect to Cuba, i.e, increase their economic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly lower economic and psychological impact, should be conducted. He further stated that planning for such operations as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.

5. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No further discussion.

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.

8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents. Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indicating the manner in which the arms would have been used to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election. Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed by the OAS to investigate had called for additional evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of surveillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba, were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because of its effect on Latin American countries. The President strongly concurred with the Department of State position. He said that he did not propose to change or relax present regulations.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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F6

13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a. m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his responsibilities.

2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government in the Saigon community.

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3. Reviewed the Checklist. [I emphasized (a) the dangers of the hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the consequence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the Italians and possibly the French.]

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4. [Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demonstration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.]

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

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5. [I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy, drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc. for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the]

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[Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very much when they lean on the Soviets.]

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

> NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments, responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife, Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave. I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials, either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet Foreign Aid.

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6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

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[Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States.]

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[McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.]

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. [I brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods.] 98

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

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The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I would prepare for the President some special graphics which would show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

> NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include aid to satellites. His position is that since we include aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece, South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined. I do not know whether the figures are available.

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following comments:

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1. I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent information on the LASER beam.

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2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were broadcasting unfavorably against them.

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3. I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over Malaysia.

I then explained to the President the source of our information that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon. I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge. He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be

4/MC

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communication. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm

3 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 - 10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist. ✓

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2. [The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly concerned about Chenault.]

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3. [Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.]

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4. [Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.]

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government. Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group. He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.

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7. [I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to pursue the SST problem.]

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8. [I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later with the President who agreed that such distribution should be automatic except in very special circumstances in which he wished distribution held to his own personal files for reasons of his own choice. I could take no exception to this decision.]

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)

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TOP SECRET

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a number of very personal problems and asked my help and also asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes. By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Administration.

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2. [He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and myself.]

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might be a very able ambassador.

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4. [He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard for Ayub.]

2/mc

5. [He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS, Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for a replacement.]

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years." Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

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2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a. m. , November 30th, in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours

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1. Reviewed the Checklist. [The President immediately raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault. He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.]

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the policy meeting.

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4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.

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6. [The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.]

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.

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8. [Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.

> ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.]

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9. [I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.]

3/mc

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10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.]

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11. [Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General Carter and instructed him to proceed.]

JAM:mcm

(tape)

2/mc

TOP SECRET

29 November 1963

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of Oswald's activities

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1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received. Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.

2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been received.

3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request of Ambassador Mann.

4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request of the FBI.

   NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until FBI request received because FBIis in control of the investigation.

5. Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963 with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

CE

29 November 1963

Noted by DDCI & LBK

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following comments:

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a. [Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations and our activities.]

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal and any recommendations that I might have for modification of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate of what is the outlook. The President continues to be concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as to who would be a good man and who could run the American team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated that I would do this.

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[We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR, India military aid and Burma.]

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c. [The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our]

noted by
DDCI + Kirkpatrick

3/mc

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[withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal to do with his loss of office.]

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d. [I pointed out to the President that we could expect some trouble in Brazil.]

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e. [The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall and that he would lose office soon after his return.]

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f. [I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Colby.]

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g. [Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.]

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.

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3. [The President then raised the question of the deal between the Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could]

6/mc

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[serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good representative in South Vietnam.]

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill. I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

98 5. [I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for a discussion of this problem.]

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's briefing.

JAM/mfb (tape)

2/mc

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President, although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about 15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.
(DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed. Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment secretary will be a Mr. Moyers. We should get to know him.

7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally "killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/TMLee/mfb

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Messrs. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge

Nov 24th - 3PM Exec Office Bldg.

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and his intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims. Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 9/22/98

I see no basis for CIA's excision.

At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect preparations for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in completing the political organization of the government and were receiving little if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in and being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point or time give a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure that we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own devices, he would not have supported the courses of action which led to the coup.)

The President then stated he has never been happy with our operations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension and divisions within the American community and he told the Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capable administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time.

The President then said that he supported this, but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.

Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone" for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders"; and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and Ball.

JAM (tape)/mfb

References: 1. IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
2. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 November 1963

DAILY BRIEF

McCone position

Pres- approach with urgency

People question commi
Congress get out

Both Gov Pres. concern

Never happy with operation

Clean up and win - no diversions

inside [illegible]

And personally responsible

McN -
Economic aid

don't ask impossible

Pres
don't reform

Hopeful
speed up war
Feb. March
Progress

Permanent or NON

Not involved in
Coup but
put on pressure

everybody happy.
after Coup

[illegible] - put
small pressure

Papal delegate
Communications
see Pope.

Danger of
anti Christian
move

Three engaged
in persecution
including 3
Catholic priests

Can - [illegible]
Cemetery -
persecutions

Not responsible for
death of people

*South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.

While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during the week ending 18 November are a drop from the previous week's record high of 233, the number is still about 50 percent above normal for this year. The attacks continue to be on a small-scale. They are targeted primarily against strategic hamlets and outposts, with government paramilitary forces bearing the brunt.

24

Continuing high message volumes on Viet Cong military and political networks may reflect preparations for sustained guerrilla pressures.

The Saigon government apparently is proceeding with a purge of military officers holding high military, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 officers. Some of these are under arrest. The purges may be partly in response to the demands of student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against prominent figures who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

99

4A

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday,
November 24th at 10:00 a. m.

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m. Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the Checklist and I made the following points:

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1. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.]

2. I stated I felt the President should, at an early opportunity, receive a briefing on Soviet long range ~~defensive~~ offensive capability, their current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.

3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation, the condition of their economy and our operational plans against Cuba.

4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

1/mc

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd, about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and no one was present during the conversation.

2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.

3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the future as I have in recent months.

4. The President then asked of any world developments. I reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the future as we had in the past.

5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no intermediary.

6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States. Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful. He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm
(tape)

104-10306-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

1105

General Carter:

Here is your written message. I have taken no actions.

WElder

SECRET

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.

NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.

NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)

SECRET

SECRET

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SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

/s/

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb
Orig & 3cc to addressee
1cc - DCI chrono
1cc - DCI #5 file

SECRET

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

SECRET-EYES ONLY

November 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI

Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction. In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs. Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.

It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest on the part of the United States Government in securing the release of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter.

SIGNED

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

JAM:at
1 cc - DCI Chrono
✓1 cc - DCI Memoranda
1 cc - Memo for the Record

SECRET-EYES ONLY

[illegible] ONLY

14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.

McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada and that two Letters of Credit had been issued by the Bank, one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government

3/mc

connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money from the Bank of Canada. 29 Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

Copy to General Carter w/
covering memo

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

1/JMC

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)

SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.

I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21, we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.

Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more. This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establishment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S. commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is about zero.

Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three alternatives:

One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse. Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground equipment and a large number of technicians.

Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, including those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of military support than before in order to provide operational readiness, training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not mean more economic support, although I think Castro could insist upon it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.

Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives, that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be workable at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.

Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences, favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.

It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else, will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28 issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and demand our non-invasion commitment.

He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.

Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries.

This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set of conditions and commitments which will make the third case mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention should be given to the first two alternatives.

In further reference to the paper, the historical background is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.

John A. McCone

26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam

1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.

The CIA station created about a dozen training centers throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully. About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.

CIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organization, established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel. In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence apparatus within the SVN military.

In addition a variety of activities were supported designed to assist the basic objective of winning the war.

Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were coordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA took no unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has been represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSC and Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-Pearl Harbor meetings held to review progress. The activities of the station were examined by all inspection teams such as General Wheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions, Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surge of critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reported other than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreed policy.

2. CIA Reporting.

In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam. I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable. A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors of coups were received by our station and were reported to the Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhu, explored all problems relating to the situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the Ambassador. Contacts were also maintained with many groups in South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable citizens.

A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.

During this period we also analyzed the progress of the war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins were able to persuade Diem to reorient and redeploy his forces, gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.

3. Attitude of the Station and Others

In any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observers arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the difficulties involved. Furthermore Americansaccustomed to our civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual of these privileges. Finally an American community living among natives, many of whom are viciously critical of the government (and this is the case in Saigon and Hue), are bound to be influenced by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisms.

For these reasons there have been serious differences within the American community.

Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion. Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power. Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.

Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.

Many people have become highly emotional, have talked too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.

orig - used by DCI at Reston Luncheon - 9/26/63
2 cc - W. Elder

4. Situation in the last several weeks.

The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hue area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.

The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasion to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant removing the regime.

The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime and no plan for a successor regime.

At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of August 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed out that to act precipitously and without assurance of success a civil war would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and the Communists would take over.

This position was highly exasperating to those who wished to move precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action to move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support are now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency and the Station.

see page 5

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

You will note from the very brief memorandum of my discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests -- the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI memorandum on my return.

The second question was concerning clandestine channels to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not effective. Perhaps the [Taipei Station] would have some thoughts on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the [Canadian] representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official" channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.

13-6

8

Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points next week.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

Attached:
Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk

[illegible]

#5 file

2/mc

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

Thu **31**

LAST MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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DECEMBER—1959						
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NEXT MONTH

JANUARY						
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31						

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	NSC Mtg. Cancelled	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
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10:30		2:45	
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11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Out of City

Out of City

New Years Eve Party w/ the [illegible]

Fri

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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OCTOBER—1959						
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NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
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29	30					

Bush

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45	Mr. Obie Webb	1:00	
9:00	Mr. Benesch	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Visit Bldg Site
10:15		2:30	Col. White & Gates
10:30		2:45	Mr. Carmen Lloyd
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - Dr. Kistiakowsky's	3:15	3
11:15	275 EOB office	3:30	xx [Alden Chapin] (JOT)
11:30		3:45	John Hart 3
11:45		4:00	xx [Gyalo Thondup], DDP
12:00		4:15	+ Mr. Hart
12:15	Alibi Club Mtg re	4:30	
12:30	Membership	4:45	
12:45	Lunch - Alibi Club	5:00	John Case & Adm Kelly

7:3. Min. Casey - 27239

8 - Dinner w/ Min. & Mrs Casey - Aust. Bettie 2723

The Kinkaids, The Beales, Wayne Jackson

+ ill as: The Englis, McGuires, Mrs. Longworth, The Jerry Greenes, The Jack Irwins

303 **Friday, October 30, 1959** 62

2/MC

FRIDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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18

NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

Mon **19**

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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OCTOBER—1959						
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NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
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29	30					

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	The President	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Operation Alert	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	Leave for High Point	2:45	
10:45	at 10:30. All Agency Heads	3:00	
11:00	to afternoon of 10/20	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Return to Wash, DC
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

8- Dinner at the Tracy Barnes home, Inf.
3410 Volta Pl.

292 **Monday, October 19, 1959** 73

Bush

Sat-Sun 11-12

JULY—1959

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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LAST MONTH

JUNE

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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST

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A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:45		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15	6		2:30		
10:30	[de Marenches]		2:45		
10:45			3:00		Mrs. Foster
11:00			3:15		Dulles
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00	Mr. Kafka	
12:00	Sen. Hayden		4:15		
12:15	133 SOB		4:30		
12:30	Mr. Sheldon		4:45		
12:45	et al		5:00		Cocktails — Mrs. Ackerman

7:30
7/11: Dinner w/ Sen. & Mrs. Bush. (Mr. D. only)
7/12: 6 - Supper w/ Mrs. Eleanor Dulles Informal
Baltimore - Mrs. Dulles

1/m

Dinner w J.J.

Fri

LAST MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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MARCH—1959						
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20

NEXT MONTH

APRIL						
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Cherne & Gomez

A. M.

8:45
9:00
9:15
9:30 ~~Staff Mtg.~~
9:45
10:00
10:15 Gates Lloyd
10:30
10:45 3 [Robert Reynolds], Cuban Desk
11:00
11:15
11:30 xd
11:45 Kenneth Miller
12:00 Award Presentations
12:15
12:30 Justin O'Donnell
12:45

P. M.

1:00 xx Lunch - Dr. Herbert York
1:15
1:30
1:45
2:00 Ben Shute, Thorne & Meek re "Dewark"
2:15
2:30 Duggan, Timm, Fenimore, Harper
2:45 Leo Cherne & Gomez
3:00 Sir Patrick Dean, Briance, Cabell, Bissell
3:15 Sheldon, Scoville, Paul Barnes, Cram, Kent
3:30
3:45
4:00 Gen. Balmer & DDCI
4:15
4:30 Governor Harriman et al
4:45
5:00

6:30-8:30 Reception - Emb of Tunisia - 5131 Broad Branch Rd
8 Dinner w/ Mrs. Fowler for Lawrence Lowman
2903 N. Blk tie

1/mc

Tue 23

5:00
Pill
for DCI

LAST MONTH

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
MAY						
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JUNE—1959

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NEXT MONTH

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JULY						
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Sen & Mrs. Bush

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Mr. Amory	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Geo. Messersmith
10:00	Mr. Gregerson & John	2:15	3:00-4:00
10:15	Hart	~~2:30~~	Manpower Discussion
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	IG & Deputies
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	4:00
11:15		~~3:30~~	Movie (Training)
11:30		3:45	Sugg. Awards Prog.
11:45		4:00	11 Central Mr. Brundage
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	NSC Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	
		5:15	OCB Briefing

Dinner at home for the Walter Robertsons
14 Guests (The McElroys, Sen & Mrs. Bush,

The Tom Gates, The Brosio's (?)).

13-00000

Reviewed by Michelle 5/4/98

Box 10
Folder 140

1 80

LAST MONTH — JUNE—1959 — NEXT MONTH

MAY

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JUNE—1959

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JULY

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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	180-4151	1:45	
9:45	DD/P, DD/I, DD/S, Warner	2:00	
10:00	Briefing - CIA Armed	2:15	
10:15	3140 HD Services Subcom	2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg. (DDCI)	2:45	Pane & Bissell 82-2625
10:45		3:00	Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
11:00		3:15	(Arthur Jacobs)
11:15		3:30	OCB Briefing
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	~~Reception for Gen. Taylor~~
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Briefing - Rand Corp. Conf Rm.

6 - Mtg Bd of Trustees, FSEF & SAIS - 1830 - 19th - hold

8 - Dinner w/ Mrs. John Laylin, Blk tie (At farm - Vienna)

DCI mtg 181 **Tuesday, June 30, 1959** 184

FEBRUARY 1960

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28	29					

FRIDAY

5

FEBRUARY

36 9:00 General Erskine 330

10:00 Kilday Comm.

1- Lunch - John Hanes
2:30 Adml. Martell
3:15 Boy Scout Presentation
~~3:30 Mr. Parrott~~
4 - Cord Meyer

Dinner w/ Mrs. Margaret Bryan

Bush

SATURDAY

JANUARY						1960
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6

FEB. 1960

MARCH						1960
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27	28	29	30	31		

37 APPOINTMENTS 329

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. Dr. Scoville

10:30 Mr. Helms

11 A. M. Mtg - Secy Herter's off.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

1:30 Lunch - Mr. Rauhni

2723 Q

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

8:00 - Dinner - Sen. Bush - Alibi - Bl.

APRIL						1960
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FRIDAY
29
APRIL

120 246

9:30 Staff Mtg

11:30 Mr. Amir-Ibrahimi & Mr. Paul
Press. Cons. Iran Emb.
12- Mr. Parrott

3:00- Amb. Jones, Djarkarta + DDCI

4:00 Leo Cherne + DC/IO.
John Richardson, Jr.
4:30- Hans Sprecht - [Robt. Crowell] 3
6 Schuller (home)
6-8: Reception, Japanese Emb.
8:00 - Dinner - Robert Bliss in honor of
Bl. Archduke Otto - (Mr + Mrs D.)

Kmc

SATURDAY

MARCH						1960
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APR. 1960

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121 245

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

JULY						1960
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FRIDAY

22

JULY

204 9:30 Staff Mtg. 162

10:30 Joint Chiefs of Staff
11:45 Mr Parrott
12:15 Special Meeting at State
1 Chris Herter
3:00 Harvey E. Bumgardner, Debriefing
3:30 Mr. De Vosjoli
3:45 Mr. Copley
4:00 Amb Summers (Luxembourg)
Mr Robert Miller (State) + Temm
DDCI
4-30 - Kennedy Briefers

6-7: Dinner w/ Amb + Mrs. Lacy
Inf.

SATURDAY

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23

JULY 1960

AUGUST						1960
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APPOINTMENTS 161

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. Senator John Kennedy
Hyannis Port

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

JULY 1960

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WEDNESDAY

27

JULY

209 9:30 Staff Mtg
10:15 Sir Patrick Dean
11 - Mtg. Budget
11:30 Gerald Miller, DDCI, Limm
12 - Azzam Pasha & Mr. Paul
1 - OCB Luncheon
2 - Leave for Texas to brief Sen. Johnson

157

6-8: Cocktails w/ Steve Millett Anderson House
Fraser Wilkins Sen Mrs. A.

THURSDAY

JUNE						1960
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JULY 1960

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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

SEPTEMBER						1960
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MONDAY

19

SEPTEMBE

263 9:30 Sprague Comm. 103

10:45 Sen. Kennedy Briefing
3307 N

5:30

-5 Bob Kleberg
5:45 Mr. Kent - [illegible]

TUESDAY

AUGUST						1960
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SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

9:45 Mr. Bissell

SEPTEMBER						1960
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THURSDAY

22

SEPTEMBER

1R - ADCI, DDP, AD/SI, Col. Beerli
266 10:45 [Verne Gresham] C/FE 3 100
11:15 Messrs. McCoy, [McCobb] [Mitchell] 3
3 [Stan Vac] + C/FE
11:45 Medal Presentation

12:15 Special Mtg. - State
1:30 Tom Bolt luncheon home
~~2~~ 3
3 - [John H. Whitman]
3:30 - Gen. Bakhtiar, C/Iranian Sec. Service
DDCI + C/NE

4:30 Amb. Young (The Hague)
5:15 Charles Willis

5/mc

FRIDAY

AUGUST						1960
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SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

OCTOBER					1960	
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FRIDAY

7

OCTOBEI

281 Hold - BREAKFAST - Dr Wolff 85

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11.30 - Frank Holcomb, Chief War Plans Staff
(Former [C/S Buenos Aires)] 27, 21-29

12:00 Drs Cole + Tietjen
1:00 Lunch - Dr. Wolff
3:00 Secy. Gates, DDP, C/FE
4:00 Dr. Halvard Lange, C/WE
5:00 Atty Gen. Hans Fuerst
C/EE - Henry Schardt

8:00 Reception - Bakhtiar Wedding - Sheraton Hotel
7.30 - 830 Nixon - Kennedy debate -

1/mc

SATURDAY

SEPTEMBER 1960						
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OCT. 1960

NOVEMBER 1960						
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282 APPOINTMENTS 84

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

10:30 Henry Hyde

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Mr. Von Gaevernitz

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M. Soc Cir - Dinner

after dinner - French Embassy Leightons →

NOVEMBER						1960
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WEDNESDAY
16
NOVEMBER

321 45

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11- Adm. Jerauld Wright
11:30 Hugh Cunningham + C/EE
12- Mr. Proudfit, Bissell, King
12:30- OCB Briefing
1- OCB Luncheon
OCB Mtg

3:50 Messrs. [Briance]^{6} + [Oldfield]^{6}
4:15 Cuba briefing
5- NSC Briefing

2/mc

NOVEMBER						1960
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THURSDAY

17

NOVEMBER

322 44

9:00 NSC Mtg. Augusta, Ga.

To Palm Beach

THURSDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

NOVEMBER						1960
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FRIDAY

18

NOVEMBER

323 9:30 - 11:30 Brief Senator 43
Kennedy - Florida

8:00 - Dinner - David Bruce
Bl. - (Mr + Mrs D)

SATURDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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324 **APPOINTMENTS** 42

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M. {Mr Aliaen — Gen Keuklin
9:30 {Gen Dettbleffson + Mr Graaen
10 A. M. Special Mtg - State

11 A. M.
11:30 Norman Paul
12 Noon [Locke Campbell] + C/EE
3
1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

1/mc

Box 3
Folder 42

Season's Greetings
1961

Reviewed
by Michelle
5/1/98

SATURDAY

NOVEMBER 1960						
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DEC. 1960

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366 APPOINTMENTS 0

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

11:30 Mtg at W. H. "Laos"

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Mrs. Bryant

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

JANUARY			1961			
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TUESDA

3

JANUAR

3 9- Mtg - Pres. Off. (off the record) 362

Mtg of Principals at W.H.

12- Amb Burden, C/WE, C/AF

3:30 USIB Briefing

4:30 NSC Briefing - (Cannon Committee)

5:15 OCB Brf.

JANUARY 1961

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TUESD

1

JANUA

10 355

10:30 USIB Mtg

2:15 Secy McNamara
3:00 White House
3:30 [illegible]
4:00 John Steele (Time)
430 NSC Brf
5:15 OCB Brf

7:00 - Cocktails - CANUS - 61 Conf.
Ft. McNair Off. Club - Inf.
7:30 Dinner w/ Gen. & Mrs. White
Blk tie. Bolling AFB, Officers Club

JANUARY						1961
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THURS

26

JANUA

26 9 30 - Murry Main 339

1230 Lunch - Am. Bar Ass'n. Statler
2:40-4:10 Briefing - The President
5:30 Juan Carlos Quagliotti, Mr Morse & Mr Bryce

6-8: Reception - Emb of India

JANUARY 1961

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* * * * * * *

FRIDA

27

JANUA

27 9:30 Staff Mtg. 338

11:30 Mr. Critchfield
12 - Ralph V. Reid (Rex Reid)

12:30 Lunch - Alibi

2:30 Mr. Vorpatel
3:00 Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
Mr. Blee
3:30 Briefing on Cuba - DDP et al
4:30 Briefing on Vietnam - DDI et al
+ David Smith of DDP

Go to Hospital

7:00 State of the Nation Dinner Blk tie
(Reception at 6:00) Sheraton Park

SATURDAY

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JAN. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. The President - Cuba
So. Vietnam

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Chas. Murphy + Mr. Elder

2 P. M.

2:30 Gen. Latrock

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Dinner at the Gary National

JANUARY 1961

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SUNDA

29

JANUAR

29 10 Pres. Cuba - Sat.
South Vietnam -

(12-1:30 Cocktails for the Seligmans
at the Julian Eisensteins

5 - Reception at the White House
6 - 8 Walter Lippmann's
8:00 - Bl. - Dinner - British
Embassy for Sir Patrick Dean
(Mr. & Mrs. S.)

JANUARY 1961

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TUESDA

31

JANUAR

31 9:30 Staff Mtg.
10:30 USIB Mtg.

2:30 Ted Kennedy

4:00 Deane + David Heller
4:30 NSC Briefing

SATURDAY

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FEB. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 316

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. [illegible]

10:15 Mtg-White House

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

8: Reception Amb of Nepal

6 P. M. Shoreham Terr. Banquet Rm

8- Dinner w/ The Herters

MARCH						1961
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WEDNES

1

MARC

60

305

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11:30 Mr. Parrott
12 Naval Briefing
1:00 - Lunch - Gen. Clarke
DC Commissioner
Large Dining room

3:00 Saul Pett + Mr. Claussen

4-5: Nat'l Cdr. Am. Legion, Wm. R. Burke, Mr. McKneally, Mr. Hauck, Mr. Claussen
5 - Briefing for Mtg of Principals

7:30 ~~[illegible]~~ - Bl. - 4700 Chain Bridge Road ~~[illegible]~~
Dinner w/ The Atty Gen + Mrs. Kennedy

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FRIDAY

3

MARCH

62 9.00 New Zealand P. M. Holyoake 303

10:30 Speak at
Marine Corps School
Quantico, Virginia

2:45 The President

6:00 Mr. Lloyd Free - 2723 Q

Dinner w/ Mrs. Magruder for Mr. Praeger

MARCH						1961
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THURSD

9

MARC

68 297

(9:00 Briefing - Amb. Gavin (France)
C/WE. Mr. [illegible] 3

12:15 Dr Cole + Dr. Tietjen

1- Lunch, Mr. John McCone

2- Amb. A. J. Drexel Biddle (Spain)

3- ~~White House~~ Briefing - ~~Cabinet~~. DDP. C/FE
Mr Cord Meyer - briefing

5- Swearing in - Amb. Merchant
(Canada)

Y/MC

13-00000

Mrs. Dulles in Santa Fe

SATURDAY

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APPOINTMENTS 295

M.

M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. - Pres. Kennedy - Vice Pres. ~~Sen Fulbright~~
DDP - Barnes

11 A. M.

12 Noon Alibi

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Gridiron Club Dinner - White tie

13-00000

MARCH 1961

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TUESD

14

MARCH

73 9:30 M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas
10 - Paul Hoffman + Mr. [redacted]
3
10:30 USIB Mtg.

1 - Lunch, Sen. Pell

3
3 - Messrs. [redacted], Bissell,
Bell, Dudley, Pfeiffer, C/IO

4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Gen Gray
W. H. Rep. re Cuba
6:00 Mr. Parrott

8:00 - Inf. - Dinner - Dr. Kamel
UAR Emb. (Mr. Dulles alone)

2/mc

MARCH						1961
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74

WEDNESD

15

MARCH

9:30 Staff mtg.

11:30 Park Armstrong

12 Bill Webster

1 - Lunch, Ernst Mogens-Jensen
C/Danish IS

2:30 Dr. Kent

3 - Robert Abdesselam + C/WE

3
~~4 -~~ [illegible]

4 - mtg - The White House - DDCI

8 ~~30~~

Dinner at Home

1/mc

MARCH						1961
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THURSD

16

MARCI

75 9:30 Mr. Kirkpatrick 290

(~~10:30 Reception - Unification of Italy - State Dept. Auditorium~~)

10:45 Adm. Burke

12- Special Gp Mtg.

1- Lunch Mr. Bundy's Off.

2:15 DDCI, DDP, Barnes, Esterline

4- Mtg at W.H., Cabell, Bissell, Barnes

6:30-8:30 Cocktails, Brit Emb.

MARCH			1961			
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MONDA

20

MARC

79 286

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11:30 Hugh Farley, Dr. Kent, C/FE, Rady
12:15 AP Photographer + Claussen
12:3 Tex McCrary (lunch)
2:30 Briefing - Amb. Gufler (Finland)
3:00 - M. Jacque Piette - Mr [Dulles]
3
4 - John Scali.
4:30 USIB Briefing
5:30 White House
DDP + C/FE

Ymd

MARCH 1961

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TUESDA

21

MARC

80

285

10:30 USIB Mtg.

1- Lunch & Briefing - Secy Connally (Navy
to
3-
2:30 Mtg at W.H. "Laos"

5:00 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:00-7:00 - Reception - Dr. Kent - Sheraton Park

7:30 Dinner - Secy McNamara for Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson
Bl.-
(Stag) 3E880 Pentagon

MARCH 1961

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WEDNES

22

MARCH

81 284

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Ray Cline

2:00 Congressional Leaders
Secy Rusk + Vice Pres.
P-38-Capitol

3- Briefing, Amb. Macomber
4- Gen. Cabell, Col. White, Gen McClelland
4:30 Dr. Lorenz Stucki
5:00 Mr. Zuckerman, DDI + AD/SI
5:30 Mr. Sheldon

MARCH						1961
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THURSD

23

MARCH

82 10 - Dr. Karl Brandt 283

10:30 Philip Clark (State)

11 - Henry Mann

11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

12 - Special Gp mtg.

1 - Lunch - Mr. Bundy's off.

3 - Wm. Hillman

3:30 V.F.W. Rep.

4:00 Chas. Spofford

4:30 [James Kim] C/Sta. [illegible], Mili

445 Dr Kent

5:00 Col. Edwards + Mr. Harvey

1/mc

SATURDAY

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25

MAR. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 281

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

12 Noon

12:45 The President

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

3:30 Tennis, Mrs. Ackerman
The Norman Pauls

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M. 8' Reception, Greek Emb.

Dinner w/ The Hunts

(9:30 - Arr. Wash. from N.Y.

MARCH						1961
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WEDNESDAY

29

MARCH

88 10:00 NSC Mtg 27

11:30 DDCI - Col Edwards - Mr. Winters + McCord

(12:00 FOSTER COLLINS

12:45 Philip Coombs + Dr. Kent

1 - Lunch, Peyton Ford

2:30 Hugh Cumming

3:00 Amb. Henry Taylor + C/EE

4:00 Mtg at W.H., DDCI, DDP + Barnes

5:30 Mr. Papich

8:00. Bl,
Dinner w/ Mrs. Francis Biddle
per Mrs. D.

(8:30 White House

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WEDNESD

5

APRIL

95

10 - Dr. Tietjen
(11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12:00 - Mrs. Oswald Lord
12:30 Medal Presentation - Mr Van Slyck
12:45 Fredi Rheinhardt Lunch.

2:30 Amb. Frances Willis
(Ceylon)

3:30 Frederick King - DDS Chandler
DDCI

5:30 Elizabeth Von Thurn
6:00 Edw. R. Murro

8:00 - Dinner - British Emb.
Bl in honor PM Macmillan
(Mr. & Mrs. D.)

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THURSD

6

APRII

96 9.15 White House - 269

10:30 Special USIB Mtg.
12:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott
1 - Lunch, Mr. Bundy's off.
2 - Special Gp. Mtg.
DDP + C/FE
3 - Amb. Reischauer Brf. (Japan)
3:30 Whitney Shepardson
4:00 Ed Kretzman, Berne + Mr. Schardt
4:45 Gen. C. Rodney Smith + C/IO

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WEDNES

12

APRIL

102

9:30 Staff Mtg.

10:15 Mr. Bissell et al

12:30 Lunch + Briefing - Secy Goldberg

3:30 Leonard Shapiro + Jack Maury

5 Wohltat (Shoreham)

5⁴⁵ President -

6-8: Tulip Reception - Neth. Emb.

8- Dinner w/ the Coleman Jennings

Blk tie

APRIL 1961

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TUESDA

18

APRIL

108 9.00 Breakfast Blair House · Kennedy 257.

10:30 USIB Mtg.
12:00 The White House

2:30 Briefing, Amb. Loeb - Peru
3:00 Phil Emb. presenting Legion of Honor to Mr. Ackerman

3:45 Col. King + Mr. Herbert
4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Rostow King
5:30 The White House
5:15 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:30-8:30 Reception for Mr. Lochner Mr. + Mrs. Frost, Hosts
8:00 - White tie - Secy + Mrs. Rusk for P. M. Caramanlis State Dining Rooms - Dept of State

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109

WEDNESD

19

APRIL

9:30 Staff Mtg.

12:30 The President

12:45 P.M. Manley (Jamaica)

1- Lunch - P.M. Manley

2:30 Mrs. Rudolph von Ripper

3:15 Col. White

3:30 Gen Cabell, Gene Winters, et al

4:00 Mr. De Poijoli

5:30 White House -

5:45 Gen. Frontistie, C/EE + Mr.
ADCI, Milton, Erickbeck

6:45 Mr. Nixon, 4308 Forest Lane

8- Dinner w/ Sen + Mrs. Monroney
Blk Tie

APRIL 1961

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THURSDA

20

APRIL

110 255

10:30 Amb. John S. Rice, Netherlands
11:00 Cong. Cannon
12:30 Mr. Parrott
1- Lunch, Mr. Brinkhoff.
2:00 Special Gp Mtg.
2:30 Bfg, Amb MacArthur, Belgium
3- Col. Nicanor Jimenez (Manila)
C/FE
3:30 The President
4:00 Mr. Karamessines - DDCI
5:00 William Tharp - DDCI
5:15 DDP, Barnes, C/WH, Stanulis
6:30 Mr Cannon & Bradley
7:00 John Steele
7:30 Cocktails
8- Dinner for Mr. Lochnis - Met. Club
7:30 Annual Spring Dinner - Alibi

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TUESDA

16

MAY

136 229

10:00 Gen. Taylor Committee

1:00 - Pres. Kennedy + Gen. Taylor
Adm Burke
Lunch

3:30 - William Hillman - Col. Grogan
4:00 Gen. ~~Lemnitzer~~ -
4:30 - Peter Maas - "Look" (C1)
Col Grogan - Jean Evans

5:30 - Charles Bartlett + Col. Grogan
6:00 - Amb. Julius Holmes
2723 Q

8:00 - Dinner - Australian Emb
Bl. for Hon. H. H. Townley, Min. Def.

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WEDNES

24

MAY

144 221

9:15 Mr. Parrott
9:30 Staff Mtg

11:30 - Amb. Willauer
12:00 - Mr. Sam Halper (Time-Life)
Col. Grogan + Arch Bush (OC!)
12:30 Lunch - Amb. Pawley
3:00 Richard Linthicum (Cyprus)
3:30 Win Scott + C/WH
4:30 Riflian com.
5:00 Salvador de Madariaga

5:30 - Amb. Karl Rankin (Yugoslavia) + C/EE

6:00-8:00 Canadian Embassy - Queen's Birthday

8:00 - Bl -

Dinner w/ Amb + Mrs Beale for Indian Amb.

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MONDA
29
MAY

149 9:30 Staff Mtg. 216

11:00 – House App. Committee
DDCI – DD/S
Mr. Saunders – Helms
~~Mason~~ – Eiselman

3:00 Norris Darrell at Mr. Belin's

~~4:30 NSIC Briefing~~
~~5:15 Mr. Parrott~~
6:30 Messers Angleton + Hunt 2723Q

8 Bob Thayer - Dinner

(

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164

TUESD

13

JUNE

10:30 USIB Mtg.

(

1:00 - Lunch, Amb of Vietnam for Secy of State, Thuan

3:30 NSC Mtg.

5:15 Mr. Parrott - Briefing

6 - The President -

7.00 Tennis Supper Delins?

8:00 - Supper - Kermit Roosevelts Inf

JUNE						1961
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THURSD

15

JUNE

166 9:45 Sec State Thuan (Vietnam 199
DDCI + C/FE
10:30 Amb. Geo Laking, N.Z.
11:15 Harry Rositzke + DDCI
12- Ivan White + C/OPS
12:30 Gen Griffiths + DDCI
1245 Walt Rostow - Lunch

3:30 William Hillman + Grogan
4:30 The President (at the Mansion
6:15 Amb. Galbraith, DDP

7:30 Dinner w/ Mr. + Mrs. Helms
Ing

SATURDAY

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17

JUNE 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 197

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. 6

11 A. M. [J. Monnet]

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M. – Secty State –

4 P. M.

5 P. M. Tennis - Belins –

7:30 Party at the Robert Kennedy's

6 P. M.

5-8: David Dulles Engagement Party

1/mc

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MONDA

19

JUNE

170 9:3, Staff Mtg. 195

11- Amb. Radean (UAR)
11:45 USIB Brf.
12:30 NESC Brf.
1:00 Lunch - George Carey (OO)
2:30 Hey Suydam
2:00 Col. Butler
3:15 [Conrad La Gueux] c/Ltr. Rangoon
+ ELCI
4- The President
4:30

7:45 Women's Press Club Dinner
Mr. & Mrs. Dulles

1/mc

JUNE 1961

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TUESDA

27

JUNE

178 10:00 USIB Principals 187

10:30 USIB Mtg.

12:30 Lunch, Secretary Udall

3 Linc Gordon -

4 - Col. Y (Vietnam)

4:30 - The President at Mansion

5:15 - Mr Parrott

7:30 6:00 Harry Kern

Dinner - Mrs Gross -

Bl. tie

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WEDNESD.

28

JUNE

179 9:30 Staff Mtg. 186

11 - Pat Coyne

12:00 Mtg - The President

12,45 Hanson Baldwin

2:30 Brf., Amb. Philip Kaiser (Senegal)

3:30 The President

~~5 - Gen. Lederer & C/EE~~

7:45
Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

(Pres. Bd Meets

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FRIDA

30

JUNE

181 9:30 Staff Mtg. 184

11- Adm. Frost

(11:30 Adm Doyle ([illegible])

12- Blood Donation Award

1- Lunch, Amb. Harvey

3- Amb. Dearborn

4- Dr. Harold Wolff

5- Carlos Gonzales & C/WH

JULY 1961

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TUESDA

11

JULY

192 173

9:30 USIB Briefing
10:20 General Taylor
10:30 USIB Meeting

2 Atty - General -

3- Mr. Campaigne, Alfred Vanderbilt & C/IO

4:30 Mr. Schreyer Briefing

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, Naval Weapons Plant
8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub
Mt. Vernon, White Dinner Jacket
Pres. + Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts

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THURSDA

13

JULY

194 7:45 Pres. Ayub, Blair, 171
10 - AD/CI
11:30 Chad Braggiotti
12:00 Amb. Robt. McKinney
12:45 Elmer Staats + DAP
1:00 - Lunch - Elmer Staats

4 - NSC Meeting

6 - Mr. Angleton

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FRIDAY

14

JULY

195 9:30 Staff Mtg. 170

11:00 The President

12:15 Warren Rogers + Col. Grogan

2- Greet Incoming JOT Class

2:30 Mr. Elder

3:30 The Pres. Secy McNamara, Gen. Lemnitzer

5- Mr. Durkee

JULY 1961

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WEDNES

19

JULY

200 165

9:30 Staff mtg.
10:45 Bfg for Spec. Gp.
11- Briefing, Amb. Snow (Paraguay
11:30 Don Levine & Jack Maury
12:15 Amb. Zahedi (Iran)
1- Lunch Amb. Tyler
2:30 Amb. Trimble & D/FE (Cambodia)
3:00 The Pres., Sec State, Sec Def, Atty Gen
4:00- NSC (Berlin)

6- Mr. Papich

(

JULY 1961

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THURSD

20

JULY

201 164

10:00 - NSC Mtg.

(12:15 Webster Panel

12:30 Briefing for Special Gp.
1 - Luncheon - Mr. Bundy's off.
2:30 Special Gp Mtg.
Gen Taylor

5:00 - The President
Steering Committee
on Berlin

Dean - Time

JULY 1961

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MONDA

31

JULY

212 153

9:30 Staff Mtg
11:00 - Genl Lansdale
11:30 R. Jack Smith (Promotion)
11:45 Bill Harvey
12:15 Gordon Stewart
100 Lunch - White House in honor
VP & Mrs Chen, Rep. of China

2:15 2:30 } 4: Gardner Conf

4:00 Mr. Bannerman
4:30 USIB Briefing
5:30 Mr. FitzGerald

AUGUST						1961
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WEDNESD

2

AUGUS'

214 9:30 Staff Mtg. 151

11:30 Mr. Tweedy

12:30 M. de Vasjoli

2:15 Howard Hunt

2:30- Brf.-Amb. to Leopoldville
Edmund A. Gullion

3:00 Mr. Marengo (Briefing)

4:00 Secy. Rusk's office
Steering Group (Berlin)
— Mr. Maury

8:00- Bl.- Dinner - Chinese V.P.
Chen, host - Mayflower
Grand Ballroom

AUGUST 1961

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THURSD

3

AUGUS

215 150

8:00 the President - White H

10:00 Courtney Evans + Sam [illegible]
+ Mr Harvey.

11:00 - Mr. Marengo
11:30 - Gordon Stewart

12:30 Briefing - Mr. Schreyer
Home for lunch

1:30 Special Gp Mtg.

2:30 - Disarmament
Committee
Sec/State Conf. Room

←→

6:30 Blevins - Tennis + Dinner -
Mr. Walter Rostow

AUGUST						1961
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THURSDA
10
AUGUST

222 143

10:00 Cord Meyer & Mr. Blum
11:30 The President
12:30 Hall - Special Group Briefing
~~1:00 Hall - Lunch Mr. Bundy's Offi~~

2:00 Special Group
3:30 Mr. Eckhardt, Pakistan
4:00 William Hillman
4:30 Bob Donovan & Col. Gragan
5:00 Mr. Blum
6:00 Tennis - British Embassy
8:00 - Dinner at the Bissells' Inf.

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THURSDA

17

AUGUST

229 136

(9:30 Mr. Helms
11:30 Gen. Rodney

2- Special Gp Mtg.

3:15 Mr. Schreyer

4- Mtg of Prins on Disarmament
Pres. office

5:00- The President (Steering
Group-Berlin)

Advisory Comm - Woodrow Wilson School

7:00 Dinner at Princeton.

DCI will stay at Princeton Inn.

AUGUST					1961	
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FRIDAY

18

AUGUS

230

135

mtg at Princeton

2: Return from Princeton

2:30 Mr. Bill Harvey

AUGUST 1961

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SUNDA

20

AUGUS

232 133

8:15 Lv for Gettysburg
to brief Gen. Eisenhower

3.15 Lv Getty. Gen.

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MONDA

21

AUGUS

233 930 - Deputies Mtg 132

~~1030 Sen. Dodd debriefing~~

1100 Gen Taylor's Office

12:30 Bfng for 2:30 Mtg

2:00 Mr Bill Harvey

2 30 Senate Armed Services & Approp Subcommittee

7:30 Dinner - Chinese Emb - Inf.

AUGUST						1961
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FRIDA

25

AUGUS

237 128

9:15 Staff Mtg.

11 - Dr. Brown

~~11 Mtg. [illegible] (SEO)~~

12:00 Pres.

① Averell Harriman -

2:30 Osborne

330 Tom Parrott

(at home)
Dinner, Selwyn Lloyd

AUGUST						1961
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TUESDA

29

AUGUST

241 124

9:30 Joe Charyk-
11- Mtg The Pres. in SEA

2:15 Mtg - Gen Taylor, Gen Lemnitzer,
Dr. Wiesner

4:30 Mr. Pforzheimer
5:15 Spec. Gp Bfg
6 - Jack Maury & Mr. Osborn

AUGUST						1961
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WEDNESD

30

AUGUS

242 9:30 Staff Mtg. 123

Tracy Barnes 3

11- Messrs Raymond [McCafferty], [Enright] 3

4 - Gen Taylor

4:30 USIB Bfng

5:30 The Press.

Tennis & Supper - Amb Caccia at The Bohlens - 2723 Q

2/mc

AUGUST 1961

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THURSD

31

AUGUS

243 9:30 Dr. Scoville **122**
10 - mtg at the White House
10:30 USIB Mtg. (& ACI) + AD/SI
11:30 Spec. Gp Bfing
11:45 Mr. Bissell
12:30 Lunch - Secy McNamara & Secy Gilpatric

2 - Spec. Gp Mtg.

3: Mtg, Cuban Task Force - Mr. Goodwin's off. + Tracy Barnes

5 - mtg - Gen Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr Murrow

6-9: Reception - Emb of Malaya

SEPTEMBER						1961
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WEDNES

20

SEPTEMB

263 102

9:30 Staff Mtg
11:30 Mr. Wallenberg
12:30 Cord Meyer
1:00 Lunch - George McGhee
for Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
3:00 Brf. - Amb. Gordon (Brazil)
3:30 Gen. Taylor
4:00 White House
5:15 USIB Brf.

6.30 Chris Herter

5:45 Reception - Pres. of Peru
3001 Garrison St

SATURDAY

1961			
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23

SEPT. 1961

OCTOBER						1961
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APPOINTMENTS

99

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

10:45 Mr. Nardone + C/WH

11 A. M. Howard Hunt

11:30 Gordon Stewart + Dave Murphy

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

7:30 Dinner - Mrs. Lane - Inf.

Bush

6.

goes

SEPTEMBER					1961	
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TUESDAY

26

SEPTEMBER

269

96

12 - Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:15 - Genl. Bruce
2:30 Special Group Brf.
3:30 Mr. De Vosjoli
4:30 Mr. McCone

7³⁰ Bush

OCTOBER 1961

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276

TUESDA

3

OCTOBE

1 - Lunch, Harold Linder

3:00 Special Group Brf.
3:45 Gordon Stewart
4:15 - White House

OCTOBER						1961
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WEDNESDAY

4

OCTOBER

277 9:00 Gen. Eisenhower 88
9:45 Staff Mtg
11:00 Air Vice Marshal Rayza
(Pakistan) C/NE
11:30 C/IO + Dudley Bonsal
12:30 Gen. Anders - C/EE + [Paul ³
1:00 Lunch - Gen. Anders (Haynes]
2:00 M/G. George Bush
c/Jusmaty - Greece
2:30 H&IB. Brfg DDP + C/FE
4:30 Leave for New York

8:00
Dinner - Mr + Mrs John Hughes
Bl. - 63 E. 74th

1/mc

OCTOBER						1961
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WEDNESD

11

OCTOBEI

284 81

9:30 Staff Mtg
10:45 Mtg w/ the Pres (SEA
12:30 Brig. Riaz Hussain & C/NE
1 - Lunch, Cornelius, Alan Ryan, Conway
2:00 Special Gp Bfing

3
3 - [Rob'n Hedbie]

4:30 USIB Brf

7:15 Inf. - Helms -
Dinner
afterdinner - Iranian Emb.

1/mc

OCTOBER					1961	
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293

FRIDAY

20

OCTOBE

9:00 Dave Murphy
10:00 The President
11:00 DIA Organization
12:00 Tom Schreyer

2:30 Special Gr. Mtg
Situation Room
White House

5:00 - Deputies' Mtg

NOVEMBER						1961
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TUESDA

14

NOVEMBI

318 47

1030 Pres -
11:30 NSC Bfng (JIC)
1:00 Lunch - John Stennis

4:00 Special Group Brf.

5:15 Mr Amory (NSC Brf.)

8:00 - Dinner - Sec Rusk -
for Gen Park - Blair House
(Stag) Bl. tie

NOVEMBER			1961			
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TUESDAY

21

NOVEMBE

325

10:30 . USIB Brf.

1.00 White House—

2:30 Special USIB Mtg.

4- mtg at White House

5- Spec. Gp. Bfng

5:30 }
-7:00 } J E. Hoover - Italy party Sheraton-Carlton

10:00 Min. Von Lilienfeld - Crystal Rm. Inf.

8:00 - Dinner - Per Jacobbson
1925 F St. Blk tie

NOVEMBER					1961	
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MONDA

27

NOVEME

331 9:30 Staff mtg. 34

2- John Scali & Col. Grogan
~~2:30 Mr. Millett~~
~~2 55 Baird~~
3:30 Mr. Staats' office
Alexis Johnson
Edward Murrow
DCS

5:30 The President

6:00 Mr. McCone & G. Meany
2723 Q

7:30 Stag Dinner at the
Alibi for Mr. Dulles [illegible]

Tue **11**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	USIB Briefing	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Atty. Gen. Kennedy
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	
10:45		3:00	✗ Mr Campaigne & Alfred Vanderbilt & CIO
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	Cord Meyer
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, Naval Weapons Plant
8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub. Mt Vernon. White dinner jacket
Pres. & Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts.

Fri **14**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
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JULY—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Greet Incoming Class
10:00		2:15	of JOT's.
10:15		2:30	Mr. Elder
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/The Pres. Sec	3:15	
11:15	State, Sec Def, Gilpatric	3:30	The Pres. Secy McNamara
11:30	Hilsman & R K P	3:45	Gen Lemnitzer
11:45		4:00	Go to Airport ~~to see~~
12:00		4:15	~~Mel's~~ party off.
12:15	Warren Rogers & Col. Grogan	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Mr. Durkee

7:15 - Dinner - Charles Murphy

195 **Friday, July 14, 1961** 170

Wed **19**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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JULY—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr Tyler (alone)
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Gordon Stewart - "Berlin"
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Amb. Trimble (Cambodia
10:30		2:45	~~ABC~~ C/FE + Mr. Myers c/ Ctr. Phnom Penh
10:45	Mr. Bissell, Barnes, Collins	3:00	The Pres., Sec State,
11:00	Briefing-Amt. Snow (Paraguay)	3:15	Sec Def, Atty Gen,
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Don Levine + Jack Maury	3:45	
11:45		4:00	NSC mtg on Berlin
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Amb. Zahedi (Iran)	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6 - Mr. Papich

7 - Mr. Hunt

8 - Dinner - Mr. Hunt - 3200 L.

200 Wednesday, July 19, 1961 165

~~Aug Bette~~
~~Oct 10~~

Thu 20

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
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JULY—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr. Bundy's
9:00		1:15	Off.
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	NSC Mtg - Rpt of NESC	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special Gp Mtg.
10:30		2:45	300 EOB
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gen Taylor
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Webster Panel + Dr.	4:30	
12:30	DDCI Scoville	4:45	
12:45		5:00	The President - Berlin
			O'Donnell's Off.

Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

201 Thursday, July 20, 1961 164

Bush

Fri **28**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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JULY—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - F. King
9:00	Parrott	1:15	Chandler
9:15		1:30	Col. White
9:30		1:45	King + Harrison
9:45		2:00	— Gen McClelland
10:00	- Indonesian Brf.	2:15	
10:15	Economic Survey	2:30	→
10:30	Team	2:45	
10:45	6.	3:00	▲ Spencer Taggart XX
11:00	- King + [Harrison]	3:15	8443
11:15	[illegible]	3:30	John Hart Brown
11:30		3:45	TDY Rabat Tweedy
11:45	IG —	4:00	{ Promotions - Huizenga [Bennett] Bush 3
12:00	NAct	4:15	} - [Mitchell]3 + [Miller] 3
12:15		4:30	- Amb. Myron Cowen
12:30		4:45	
12:45		~~5:00~~	5:15 Lloyd George
			6:00 Mr Bissell

7:30 - Dinner - no dress - Frances Pickens Miller

Freddie King - staying at 2723 Q

2810 P ad. 6-/3231 1824 5867

4/mk

Mon **31**

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
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JULY—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr & Mrs Dulles at White House honor
9:00		1:15	VP & Mrs Chen; Rep of China
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Gardner Cox
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	67742 Gen Lansdale	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	R. Jack Smith (Supergrade	3:45	
11:45	" Wm Harvey promotion) ceremony	4:00	Bob Bannerman
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Gordon Stewart	4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5 30 Mr. FitzGerald

Dinner at Lorne - Arthur Dean and Mr McCloy

13-00000

Light lunch w/milk

61-6261

Wed

2

LAST MONTH

JULY						
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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5/4/56

Large

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Howard Hunt
10:15		2:30	Brf. Amb to
10:30		2:45	Pi Congo-Leopoldville
10:45		3:00	→ Mr. Maiengo
11:00		3:15	Brf.
11:15		3:30	
11:30	- Mr. Tweedy	3:45	- Attorney Gen.
11:45		4:00	Meeting of Steering
12:00		4:15	Group - Secy Rusk's
12:15		4:30	office
12:30	L - Mde Vasigli XX	4:45	Gordon Stewart
12:45		5:00	

3 AUG 1961

5:30 Mr. Maury

8:00 - Dinner - Bl. - Chinese V P Chen

Mayflower - Grand Ballroom

Schreyer
2044
K

Thu **3**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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8:00 The President w/ Sheldon

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch at home w/ Mrs D
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	xx Spec Group Mtg:
9:30		1:45	(Will meet there Bissell
9:45	William Harvey	2:00	Gen McClelland + Edwards)
10:00	Courtney Evans + Sam Papich	2:15	xx (Mtg. of Principals)
10:15	+ Mr Harvey	2:30	Disarmament Cmte -
10:30		2:45	Sec State Conf. Room
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mr Marengo	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Gordon Stewart + Mr Ralph Brown	3:45	
11:45	(Berlin)	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Mr Schreyer - Brief	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:30 Tennis w/ Ethel + dinner

215 **Thursday, August 3, 1961** 150

Thu 10

LAST MONTH

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
JULY						
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AUGUST—1961

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NEXT MONTH

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SEPTEMBER						
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A. M.

8:45

9:00

9:15

9:30

9:45

10:00 Bob Blum + ~~C/FE~~

10:15

10:30

10:45

11:00

11:15

11:30 Mtg w/Pres. (Mil Chg

11:45 on SEA Planning for

12:00 DDCI, DDP, C/FE [illegible]

12:15

12:30 Briefing for Special Gp

12:45 Mtg.

~~Hold~~ P. M.

1:00 ~~Lunch Mr. Bundy's~~

1:15 ~~FH~~

1:30

1:45

2:00 Special Gp Mtg.

2:15

2:30

2:45

3:00

3:15

3:30 Mr. Schardt [illegible]

3:45 Pakistan

4:00 Amb. [illegible] & Col.

4:15 Grogan

4:30 Bob [illegible] & Col Grogan

4:45 N Y [illegible]

5:00

6 - [illegible] (Rostow & Bundy)

8^{00} Dinner at Bissell's - Informal

222 Thursday, August 10, 1961 143

Fri 11

Heggen

LAST MONTH

JULY						
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AUGUST—1961						
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27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	XX Dep Dir-Gen
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr Richards
9:00		1:15	[Australian Security Intell Org.]
9:15		1:30	DDCI A host
9:30	~~Staff Mtg.~~	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Mtg w/ Pres. on Brit.	2:15	
10:15	DDP Guiana	2:30	L. N. Y.
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Tel - Meyer & Col. Edwards	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Mr. Heggen + IG	3:45	
11:45		4:00	Party for Mr. Heggen
12:00		4:15	
12:15	1:25	4:30	
12:30	Lv for N.Y.	4:45	
12:45	via Aerocommander	5:00	

29

1/mc

Fri 18

Call Thomas re notary

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
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30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	Mtg at	1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45	Princeton	2:00	Returned from
10:00		2:15	Princeton via Aero-Commander
10:15		2:30	Wm. Harvey
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	Thomas Tryford, Notary
12:45		5:00	

at home Arthur Dean (cocktail)
Mr Angleton (supper)

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Sat-Sun 19-20

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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2	3	4	5	6	7	8
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45		8:15 Lv for	1:00		
9:00		Gettysburg	1:15		
9:15		Pa. w/ the	1:30		
9:30		Atty Gen	1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15			2:30		3 15
10:30			~~2:45~~		Atty General
10:45			3:00		here
11:00	James Cosley		3:15		
11:15	from		3:30		
11:30	Cecil Hourani		3:45		
11:45	& Bronson Tweedy		4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15			4:30		
12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

Sat 8/19-Dinner at Jim Hunt's
3210 S St NW.

Mon **21**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Small D.R.
9:00		1:15	Lloyd, [illegible], Mason
9:15		1:30	[illegible], Carey, Cabell Bissell
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Bill Harvey
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Bfg of Senate Armed
10:30	~~Briefing - Gen Todd~~	2:45	Services + Appropriations [illegible]
10:45		3:00	212 Old SOB
firm 11:00	Gen Taylor's office re	3:15	180-3871
11:15	"Propaganda" Batty Gen,	3:30	
11:30	Tom Hughes, State, MR Anderson, USIA	3:45	
11:45	Rm 300 E.O.B.	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Bfg for N.S.C. Mtg.	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

1:30 Dinner at Chinese Emb - Inf. Stag. 3225
Mrs. FitzGerald will also attend. Woodley Rd

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Tue **22**

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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2	3	4	5	6	7	8
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Grp. Bfg.
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Sam Scott & John Warner
11:00		3:15	Mr. Russell
11:15		3:30	R. C. Finney
11:30		3:45	
11:45	Gen. Bradley	4:00	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Atty
12:00		4:15	Gen., Mr. Murrow, Alexis Johnson
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:30 Tennis & Supper w/British Amb. & Jack McCloy

Fri **25**

LAST MONTH						
JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH						
SEPTEMBER						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Amb. Harriman
9:00		1:15	+ Bfg ADCI/FE, ~~DDI~~
9:15		1:30	West Smith
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	Brown
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Mr. Osborn
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Dr. Brown (Med. Staff)	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Lou Barrett
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	The President	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Tue 29

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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AUGUST—1961

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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Dr. Charyk 4E886	1:45	
9:45	River ent.	2:00	
10:00		2:15	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Gen
10:15		2:30	Lemnitzer, Dr. Wiesner
10:30	Mr. Kirkpatrick	2:45	& A D/SI
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - The Pres. on SEA	3:15	
11:15	& C/FE	3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Mr. Pforzheimer
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Bfng for Spec. Gp.

5:30 Wm Hoyle, C/S, Ankara

6 - Jack Maury & Mr. Osborn

7 Tracy Barnes

7:30 Drinks at Mrs Magruder's

Wed 30

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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AUGUST—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45	x x Tracy Barnes	3:00	
11:00	Walter Raymond [Chas. 3	3:15	
11:15	Enright 3], [Arthur McCafferty]	3:30	Haircut
	(Dixon X 4853)		
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Gen Taylor
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	
		5:30	The Pres.

6 Supper + Tennis at home - Amb. Caccia + the Belins

2/mc

Thu 31

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
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16	17	18	19	20	21	22
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30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	Debriefing, Gen Bruce	1:15	
9:15	Clark, ONE	1:30	
9:30	Mr. Scoville	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Gp Mtg.
10:00	Mtg at the W. H. + AD/SI	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg (AADCI to	2:45	
10:45	take)	3:00	Mtg. Cuban Task Force
11:00		3:15	Mr. Goodwin's off.
11:15		3:30	Fitz, Woodward,
11:30	Spec. Gp Bfing	3:45	Bull, Schlesinger Tracy Barnes
11:45	Mr. Bissell	4:00	and Lt Gen Craig Rm
12:00		4:15	West Wing, W.H.
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Lunch - Secy McNamara	4:45	
12:45	+ Secy Gilpatric (Pent. 3E880, Private ent.) 11-55261	5:00	Mtg - Gen. Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr. Morrow ~~+ Mr. Herbert Little~~

6-9: Reception - Emb of Malaya - 2701 Albemarle

6:15 Ostrom & Murphy

8:15 Dinner at home - John McCloy - 27238

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Wed 20

SEPTEMBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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LAST MONTH

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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NEXT MONTH

OCTOBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Call Roy Garthoff

8:15 - John McCone - breakfast at DCI's

A. M.

8:45
9:00
9:15
9:30 [illegible] Mtg.
9:45
10:00
10:15
10:30
10:45
11:00
11:15
11:30
11:45
12:00 Cord Meyer
12:15
12:30 Bill Harvey
12:45

P. M.

1:00 Lunch - George McGhee
1:15 for Hans, Fish Armstrong
1:30 8th Flr. - Secy's Dining
1:45 Room. ((State))
2:00
2:15
2:30
2:45
3:00 Bf. Amb. Gordon
3:15 (Brazil)
3:30 Gen. Taylor
3:45
4:00 Mtg at Taylor's office
4:15 Gen. Cabell
4:30
4:45
5:00
5:15 USIB Bldg.
6:30 Gov. Herter

5:45 - Reception - Pres. of Peru - 3001 Garrison St
Mr + Mrs D

Tue **26**

Lunch
Helms

SEPTEMBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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LAST MONTH

AUGUST

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NEXT MONTH

OCTOBER

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22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		**1:00**	
9:00		**1:15**	
9:15		**1:30**	
9:30		**1:45**	
9:45		**2:00**	
10:00		**2:15**	
10:15		**2:30**	Spec. Gp. Bfg.
10:30		**2:45**	
10:45		**3:00**	
11:00		**3:15**	
11:15		**3:30**	
11:30		**3:45**	
11:45		**4:00**	John McCone
12:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury	**4:15**	
12:15	Amb. David Bruce	**4:30**	
12:30		**4:45**	
12:45		**5:00**	

6 - McCone, DCI, Col. White & Chandler to Bldg.

7:30 Dinner w/ Mr. & Mrs. Pres. Rusk & John McCone

Tue 3

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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OCTOBER—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Harold Linde
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Special Gp Bfng
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gordon Stewart
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	Mtg at White House
12:15		4:30	Cabinet Rm. (Norstad
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

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Maj. Gen. George Bush

Wed — OCTOBER—1961 — 4

LAST MONTH

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SEPTEMBER						
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NEXT MONTH

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
NOVEMBER						
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26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Gen Anders
9:00	Gen. Eisenhower, Statler	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Bfg - Maj Gen Geo Bush
10:00		2:15	C/JUSMAG, Greece
10:15		2:30	USIB Briefing
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Air Vice Marshall Roza	3:15	
11:15	+ C/NE	3:30	
11:30	Kindley Boncil + C/IO	3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Lv. for N.Y. via Aero-
12:30	Gen.3 Anders C/EE +	4:45	Commander
12:45	[Paul Haines] C/Polish Desk	5:00	
	Mr. Latomerski		

8:00 Dinner - Mr & Mrs John Hughes - Bl
63 E. 74th

Staying at Drake Hotel, Suite 1212.

1/mk

Sat-Sun 7-8

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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OCTOBER—1961						
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NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
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26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45	Mr Shelton		2:00		
10:00	Mr Amory		2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30	Gen. Miller		2:45		
10:45	Elint Staff		3:00		
11:00	+ H/OSI + HDSI		3:15		
11:15	Mr Harvey		3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15	Wm Bundy		4:30		
12:30	+ Dr Kent +		4:45		
12:45	Amory		5:00		

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Tue 10

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER

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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	x x	1:30	Adm De Florez
9:30	Col. Holland	1:45	x x
9:45		2:00	Joan Rohrer & Mr. Larocque
10:00	USIB Bfg	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special USIB Mtg.
10:30		2:45	
10:45	Dave Murphy	3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/ The Pres. on Berlin Mil. Planning	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	~~Mr. Fitzgerald~~
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Dr. Scoville

5:30-7:30 Reception - Japanese Emb.

5:30 Hon Harris

6 - Mtg of Principals NESC Secy State conf Rm

Dinner at home for the Arthur Dalters -

(Leon will help)

The Harlans regret - previous engagement

Wed 11

LAST MONTH						
SEPTEMBER						
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OCTOBER—1961						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Cornelius Ryan
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Special Gp Bfng
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	3
10:45	Mtg w/ The Pres on	3:00	[Bob Wheeler]
11:00	Pres. Off. + KDIF EA	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
✓12:00 30 P	Brig. Riaz Hussain +	4:15	
12:15	Alan Conway. C/NE	4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

7:15 Dinner - Mr. & Mrs. Helms. Inf. 3901 Fessenden, NW
Iranian Emb. after the Helms Dinner

1/mc

~~Do letters for DC~~

* see my Bulick + Dunk

Fri **20**

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A. M.

8:45
9:00 Dave Murphy
9:15
9:30
9:45
10:00 – White House
10:15 Cabinet Room
10:30
10:45
11:00
11:15
11:30
11:45
12:00 – Tom Schreyer
12:15
12:30
12:45

P. M.

1:00 – Family Dining Room
1:15
1:30 –
1:45
2:00
2:15
2:30 – Special Gr. Situation Room at White House
2:45
3:00
3:15
3:30
3:45
4:00
4:15
4:30
4:45 Deputies Mtg
5:00 ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Award Ceremony~~

~~5:30 Mr Archer~~

6:00 Mr Schreyer

Tue **14**

LAST MONTH

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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - John Starnes
9:00		1:15	Chmn - Canadian JIC
9:15		1:30	Large Dining Rm.
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	The President	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Spec. Gp Bfng & Mr. McCone
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30	NSC Bfng.	4:45	
12:45	Col. King & L.A. Survey Team	5:00	NSC Bfng

8 - Dinner - Secy Rusk for Gen Pak - Blair House
Stag. Blk tie.

Leaves city

Fri **1**

LAST MONTH

NOVEMBER						
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NEXT MONTH

JANUARY						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		**1:00**	Lt. Lunch in office
9:00		**1:15**	
9:15		**1:30**	
9:30		**1:45**	
9:45		**2:00**	
10:00	Tom Ross + David Lucal	**2:15**	
10:15		**2:30**	
10:30		**2:45**	David Murphy
10:45		**3:00**	[Geo. Merten]3
* **11:00**	[Geo. Merten]3 (has CS file)	**3:15**	(Note: D. Murphy was
11:15		**3:30**	given C.S. official file on [G. Merten]3
11:30	Frank Reynolds -	**3:45**	to review & return to MJD.)
11:45		**4:00**	
12:00		**4:15**	
12:15		**4:30**	
12:30		**4:45**	
12:45		**5:00**	

6:15 Attorney General
Rm 5115 Justice (10th St Gate

Dinner for TSD Research Bd (Alamo de Flores)
Alibi Club 7:30 - Informal

3/mc

Sat-Sun 30-31

LAST MONTH

NOVEMBER						
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NEXT MONTH

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A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
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[redacted] 12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

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12/31 - New Year's Eve. Dinner - Mrs & Mr. Walter Lippman

364 Sat., December 30, 1961 1 365 Sun., December 31, 1961 0

LAST MONTH

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JANUARY—1962

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1 Monday, January 1, 1962 364

Bush

Tue 9

LAST MONTH

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NEXT MONTH

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8:45		1:00	Lunch - T. Barnes
9:00		1:15	(Lge. Dining Rm)
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Mr Lewis Gulick AP
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Sir John Wheeler Bennett
12:30		4:45	(2723 Q)
12:45		5:00	

5:30 - Sen Prescott Bush

9 Tuesday, January 9, 1962 356

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue. (Validity of this assumption is questionable)

II. OBJECTIVES:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/ Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the (131) 24 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

ypd

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

6 IN

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the 24 (twenty) officers and crew members aboard (six) 24 Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running (12) 24 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional (20) 24 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in (Chile), (Italy), (Mexico), (The Netherlands), (England), (Uruguay), (Greece), (Spain), (France), and (Canada). No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

14/p/

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban communications. 24

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are (65) 24 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this (65) 24 the survey we have conducted indicates that 24 (23) have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these (23) 24 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of (65) 24 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

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10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del 24 Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

SPLITTING THE REGIME

B./1 Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/GYROSE
Operational Debriefings

MICROFILMED JUL 17 1962 DOC. MICRO. SER.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None. CCO → DOC. CUBA

Reference: UFGA-4088. Pr. possible use of Sub by U.S. Gov. Agency

During the month of May 1962 the following persons, processing through the CAC, were considered to be of operational importance to JMWAVE.

1. Rafael *ARRIBAS Rodriguez (A 12 895 148). Subject, a former Medical Products Salesman, had contacts with two employees of the Post Office in Cuba. The leads he provided were considered marginal and dropped for further operational exploitation.

2. Jose Francisco *AZOR Ores (A 12 911 733). Subject, a ~~rural~~ FORMER census taker for the INRA, is undergoing a thorough debriefing on OB and cartographic information by the AMOTs.

3. Manuel CABRERA Rodriguez (A 12 911 477). Subject, a former railroad worker in Camaguey and ex-Rebel Army Battalion Commander, was debriefed on positive intelligence information. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Reports for dissemination.

4. (Dr) Jaime *CARBONELL Rivero (A 12 907 852). Subject, a former night club owner in Havana, submitted two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA-4176, dated 31 May 1962. att

5. Abel Julio *COLIMORIO Vasquez (A 12 971 774). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence.

(32557) 06 FP R- Visit of Sub to U.S.

6. 06 Rafael Rinaldo *DIAZ Veira (A 12 444 465). Subject, a 06 pharmacist and co-owner of a medical testing clinic in Pinar 06 del Rio, was recruited, trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. JMWAVE plans to start a new collection network centered

(continued)

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

CS COPY

INDEX

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
25 June 62	JUL 9 1962

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-4543

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-120-33
19-120-33

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

4/RJ

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET 08	UFGA-4543

around this agent into the medical profession in Havana and Pinar del Rio. Subject had come to PBPRIME to visit his son who had been injured in an automobile accident.

7. Carlos Fernando *GALBAN Perez (A 12 895 062). Subject, a former theatre employee in Havana, was contacted by fnu 06 *LLANO a private detective in Havana who was his neighbor, just prior to his departure and asked that, when Subject arrived in Miami, he contact Freyre JORGE in the Catholic Bureau in Miami. Allegedly LLANO had information concerning airfields, pilots and radar 06 installations which he wanted to send to Freyre JORGE. Upon contacting the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Freyre JORGE was 06 unknown to them. At the request of JMWAVE, Subject wrote 06 to LLANO in order to obtain more information concerning LLANO's potential. JMWAVE is waiting for an answer to this letter. 06

8. Antonio *GOICOCHEA Cosculluela. Subject, a former member of the Legal Department of Cubana, was debriefed on positive intelligence and on the activities of AMWARM-1. The result of the intelligence portion of the debriefing is being disseminated.

06

9. Antonio *GOMEZ Hernandez (A 12 419 493). Subject, a CAC medical doctor, returned to Cuba without giving any indication of his plans to CAC, consequently JMWAVE was too late in recruiting him; however, he is scheduled to return to PBPRIME about November. It is possible that Subject will return again to Cuba at that time. If this proves to be the case, serious consideration will be given to recruiting him.

10. Ruben Arturo *HERNANDEZ Garcia (A 12 911 621). Subject was an MRAC coordinator in Santa Fe, Isle of Pines. Several leads of marginal value were provided.

11. Jose *MONTALVO Urruti (A 12 911 895). Subject, a CAC pediatrician, came to PBPRIME to visit his daughter who is in a Miami high school and to visit a patient. Subject has an invalid wife and one son currently serving in the Isle of Pines prison after he was captured at Playa Giron. Although he originally expressed an interest in working as an ODYOKE singleton in PBPRIME once he returned, he later changed his mind.

12. Tomas *OLIVERA Gandoa (A 11 266 803). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and on positive intelligence concerning the Cuban micro-wave system.

13. Valentin *PADRON (A 12 900 229). Subject, a former grocer in Las Villas, was debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence. The leads which subject provided were considered marginal for further exploitation. Subject had planned to return to Cuba legally but was prevented from doing so for family reasons.

14. Jesus Gregorio *PEREZ, CKA 183. Subject, working an independent resistance network in Cuba, specialized in exfiltration of friends and members of his group. He offered to exfiltrate any technicians and professional people. After debriefing him, Subject was turned over to the PM Branch for exploitation.

201-325597 08 FR Re possible use of sub. by U.S. [illegible] Agency

15. Federico Gaspar *SALVADOR Rodriguez. 06 Subject, a dentist from 08 Camaguey came to PBPRIME to attend the funeral of his father. He was recruited and trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. He will be used as a communications link for the AMTAUP Net.

FP

16. Gumercindo *SIMON Sanchez (A 12 911 019). Subject, a former chauffeur in Las Villas, offered to provide bona fides for contacting "Titi" MARTINEZ, 06 a communicator for Capt. Felix *TORRES, a militia commander in Remedios, Las Villas. Subject

FORM 5-60 (40) 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION		PAGE NO.
	SECRET	☒ CONTINUED	2.

10/nJ

also offered to re-infiltrate to contact (MARTINEZ) 06. Subject could not provide sufficient detailed biographic data on 06 (MARTINEZ) with which to risk using a KUBARK internal asset to contact him. An investigation was initiated through the AMOTs to determine more biographic data so serious consideration could be given for contacting (MARTINEZ) 06

17. Manuel Felix SUAREZ Pozo (A 12 903 186). Subject, a OCC lawyer and a former underground member in Havana, was debriefed further on operational leads. Letters to the more important members of his group have been written in an effort to establish communications and to exploit their operational potential.

Nt

18. Miguel Archangel *SUAREZ Valdez (A 12 895 991). Subject, a former resistance group member, was debriefed further on operational leads and is currently expecting a courier from the resistance group leader in Havana, who allegedly has agents who have access to a Soviet COMINT station. IN Cuba

19. Miguel Angel *YANES Garcia (A 12 903 525). Subject, a former employee in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the FND, was debriefed for operational leads and positive intelligence. Subject refused to reveal any FND assets in Cuba and he had only margianl intelligence to provide.

END OF DISPATCH

3/R

SECRET

MEMURANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMCANOE

Job # 65-535/28

File # 19-6-91

Dates included:

Volumes: 11

1. Description:

This project concerns U.S. contacts for a resistance group in Cuba. Support of the Unidad de Liberacion Nacional (ULN) and their plans and efforts to overthrow CASTRO. Principle players are:

AMCANOE-1	(201-0283570)	Eduardo GARCIA Molina
AMCANOE-2	(201-0726572)	Enrique Alfredo GARCIA Molina.
AMCANOE-3	(201-0727185)	Antonio Jose RAMIREZ Mendez, captured and executed in Jan 64;
AMCANOE-4	(201-0729621)	Armando SOSA Rodriguez
AMCANOE-5	(201-0727186)	Marcelino PEREZ Diez
AMCANOE-6	(201-0729610)	Orlando OROPESA Perez
AMCANOE-7	(201-0729080)	Benjamin ACOSTA Valdes, captures tried and killed by firing squad 15 Sept 63.
AMCANOE-9	(201-)	Juan AMESTOY Dominguez, killed 29 Sept 63 in a gun battle.

2. Review of these files turned up the following documents:

TDCSDB-3/654-571, dated 9 May 63: Concerns efforts of Cuban lawyer Paulino A SIERRA of Chicago to unify exiles and an offer by Chicago businessmen to support the overthrow of CASTRO.

Memo for the Record dated 3 March 1964: a friend of AMCANOE-1 who is a businessman and ship owner, with interests in a slot machine business (placing them in gambling houses), placed him in contact with elements of the underwrold, through a former St. Louis police officer. Through the police officer there was reportedly a tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The latter reportedly offered to assassinate CASTRO at a price of $150,000 dollars.

UFGA-15233, dated 15 April 1964: Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F. JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

UFGA-15954, dated 11 May 1964: CAMERON mentioned contact with unidentified group willing to assassinate selected Cuban leaders: Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. CAMERON made fairly clear that the MAFIA was involved.

Jane Zerance
Researcher

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBRUSH Organization

Job # 63-345/6

File # 19-5-6

Dated included: Apr 61 - Jan 62

Volumes: 1

1. Description:

Revolutionary Council Anti-Castro Security and Counter-Intelligence Team.

2. Findings:

No findings in relation to the terms of reference.

Of possible interest: A document dated 19 August 1961 source: AMPAL-1, hand carried to Hqs. from WAVE in August 1961. The document mentions "Cuban Communist penetration agents in all branches of importance of the U.S. Government" ... Mentions a possible "Castro penetration into the Frente (FRD - Revolutionary Democratic Front) and U.S. activities".

3. Other Agencies with Knowledge of this Activity:

Apparently, none.

03

(Barbara Boyle)
Researcher

02 [CDH comment: Check out Eugenio MARTINEZ again. (SL)IPSTREAM-1 said in 1976 that one Eugenio MARTINEZ was working for the Cubans. A Eugenio MARTINEZ was involved in the Watergate; a former JMWAVE Station agent.]

z|R

from WAVE to HQ
by Victor Wallen, Dec. 1961 Source AMPRIZ-1

2. August 19/61
Enclosed find an approximate list of expenses that (Armando Munero) 06 gave me for consideration. However, he would like to talk it over as to the rest of his stay in the U. S.

(Armando Munero) 06 enclosed a note he asked to have sent over, "La Voz d las Americas" (onda corta--short wave). This is supposed to be some sort of signal to his O. P. C. group in Cuba to get behind and cooperate with information and sabotage.---------

I did not talk to him as yet since I am awaiting word from you as t this Monday's meetings with him.-----

③ August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga, a friend from Cuba and former sugar mill owner, and father-in-law of Lino Fernandez (MRR, now in jail at the Isle Pines), told me that Dr. (Antonio Valdes Rodriguez) 06 (30th of Noviembr Movimiento) was taken to jail after returning to Cuba from Miami last time here, and not as yet released. Jacinto arrived here wi his wife and 3 grandchildren about 5 days ago. He was formerly a member of the famous old Cuban A B C group. It should be remembe that Dr. (Valdes) 06 received training in S/W, his last trip here.-----

④ August 19/61
Ben Volpe, now working at Holiday Tours, Biscayne Blvd., Miami, t me that his father, having come from Cuba a few days ago, told hi that Federico Claramont, 1100 10th St., Miami Beach (living close them), is a suspected member of Castro's G-2 and known as such si being in Cuba. He arrived in the U. S., Miami, as a political ex which is a cover for his true mission here, and status.-----

5. August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga and his relative told me that it is being rumor that since only men are taken to Opa Locka by Immigration for 48 Fidel Castro is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations here, between here and Cuba. I also heard rumored that some of these agents are sent to tie in with Communi in the U. S., various regions of the U. S. I have no other info. this as could not find out more since it was told to me as a rumc

6. August 19/61
(Armando Munero) 06 told me that he gets information from his uncle Guillermo Rojas, a long time Cuban Communist who is presently wo in the Imprenta Nacional at Havana. He helped (supposed to be on

5/N

Cont'd.6.-- the main) organize the library of the Communist throughout Cuba His uncle told him that Kruschev promised Fidel Castro that he have missles in Cuba(this was a few months ago). Also, his unc that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fide Castro, and they have already plenty of agents bel nging to the Communists in all branches of importance of the U. S. Gov't., a even in the CIA. He said that all people in Cuba that worked w the CIA were picked up through their agents and those presently working with same are being watched closely. (Munero) told me th 06 he is kind of suspicious of Eugenio, his being Cuban and because a sort of sixth sense, as he calls it.-------------

⑦ August 19/61

-Bart told me last week that Juez Garceran was the one that sent letter you received to Carlos Prio as he recognized the handwrit on both envelopes. The above judge told Bart that some have be given Salvo Conductos to Mexico and that the Italian Embassy is emptying out same. This judge is the one that made the list of people held up in the Italian Embassy, that you received from Ba

-Bart told me that he thought that Alberto Del Junco(MDC), that I in touch, with is getting aid from someone from the U. S. Gov't. Del Junco's sister saw him this past Friday night at his home an gave him $5,000.00 in U. S. Dollars(money) to send through the Po to Cuba to be given to her brother down there. She didn't want t disclose to Bart where and from whom she received the money, and only said that it was from his group(MDC) here. Bart thinks that this is not true. He sent the money down already.

-Enclosed(marked in pencil, #7) find photostatic copies of letters sent to Oscar Diaz from former F.Castro Pres. Urrutia and from a Macaroni that Bart knows. It is self explanatory in Spanish and Bart says that he knows that the air strips shown on enclosed map are truely in existence. Bart received these photostatic copies to his suggesting same to Oscar Diaz upon delivery. I couldn't t this letter to you a few nights ago as he had to deliver same in hour of the time I visited him. However, I suggested his trying t stand by when the letter was opened. Oscar Diaz liked Bart's ide making photostatic copies of same and Bart asked for one for himse

(over)

Cont'd. 3.- ②

It seems that Captain Despain wants to break up the Intell.Servi
of the Frente due to lack of funds, says Dr. F'dez. However, d
having tried to find out whether this Captain Despain was Ernest
we were not sure. Having been introduced upon our 2nd visit las
Friday, 9:30 A. M.(first visit was 2 days previously at 9:30 A.M
we were presented to Ernesto Despain, the person we were looking
some time now(due to his relations with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2) an
Josefina Socarras(Ceferino's girl friend, of whom I have been wr
about for some time now). We started to get places,with all fu
cooperation,the first time there as we spoke only to Dr. F'dez.
second time, with Despain present, we felt that we should not go
many details. Dr. F'dez. told us that Despain was planning on s
him with a delegation to Puerto Rico. I feel, as well as Frank,
this Dr. F'dez.(around 60 yrs. old) is a person that could very e
organize his office to be of very valuable service against Castro
his Communists here in the States, as well as in Latin America wh
they already have their own agents operating. It is felt that De
is trying to get Dr. F'dez. out of the way because he recognizes
importance of the planned Intelligence Service the Frente , throu
F'dez., xxx which could produce a very strong arm against Castro.
Dr. F'dez. says that they are now working on the ABC form as used
against a former president of Cuba known as Machado. Enclosed is
an idea of how this group functions and are placed into many walks
life of importance to this cause. Their work is mainly of Intell
Service and in a form of cooperating with the U.S.Gov't. in all wa
possible without trying to get monies, if possible, to function. H
presently trying to get donations to $300.00 to keep his office go
for a month. Upstairs in the same building, they have radio opera
(very well experienced) continuously monitoring all phases of impo
ance in Cuba(sugar mills, etc.). Frank Asked Despain if the file
had in his hands was for us. Despain was caught a little off bounds
as he became somewhat unnerved, but soon rallied and opened the fil
showing data on boats, but taking great pains to keep us from seein
the contents. I didn't want to press the point arousing any suspic
Dr. F'dez. introduced me as a Joe Anderson, FBI man. I had formerl
cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which h

(3)

Cont'd.8-----did anyway. I let it go at that to see the developments as it w no use to refute him again. However, when we parted, I did menti him again that he should not do so at random as I did not think i necessary nor what we had agreed upon. Dr. F'dez. did say so as introduced us to Despain as his Jefe(chief) and wanted to show hi loyalty at the same time explaining to him that he was cooperatin with us in all ways possible against Castro and Communism, which plainly seen that Despain didn't like at all. Despain sat silent no questions asked, hard, eyeing us as if waiting to see how far FBI had gotten into matters of the Frente. I did not ask the Dr. questions I wanted to and only said that I would like to be in to with him at all times. Enclosed you will find photostatic copies letters sent by Cubans here to Prague and the answers of same. Y told me to ask him how he got this information. Idid not feel th should have done so at the moment. However, I will be in touch w Dr. F'dez. again soon as I said I would. I will not go to the of of this Intell. again as I was almost seen by a Frank Paez, Pepe Aguero's friend. Pepe Aguero is Paula Grau's husband, now here. turned my head away, I think, in time. Dr. Fdez. says that he ha of more information to give me and that loads of stuff reaches hi daily, all of which he can turn over to me for study. He said th will get for me CIA files that the Frente has hidden and want to with him. I feel, if Despain, is out of the way, I could do much getting what is needed of them. I do not feel safe with him arou I may be wrong, but that is the way I feel abo ut security with h I promised to return the enclosed photostatic copies but feel tha of the files can be taken over for copy for the asking, as Dr. F' said he would cooperate to the fullest.

Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez: Office(9 to 11 A.M.):FR-1-5133
Home(from 8 P.M. to 8 A.M.):HI-4-1853
Frente(from 11:30 A.M. to 1 P.M.):
FR-4-2630-38-39

He holds a Frente Carnet No. 102, Frente Revolucionario Democratic (F.R.D.), Delegacion de: El Salvador(Rescate) and receives $200.00 monthly as a salary from the Frente.

8.

August 19/61
Frank Arias has given me the following information(about DESPAIN).

Captain(Lieutenant, known formerly as) Ernesto Despain, head of t Frente Intelligence Service at ~~159~~ 174 14th Lane, Miami, with entranc in back of building at 197 15th Street, off Brickell Ave., worked for with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2, known as) in Government Insurance(Segu Gobierno) and formerly in the now non-existent BANSECO(branch of National Bank of Cuba). Josefina Socarras worked with them also Seguro del Gobierno . I have written of Josefina before through findings of Frank, who knew them all in Cuba(not Despain directly, only his family). This Captain Despain is an intimate friend of Ceferino and Josefina(planning to go to New York soon). She has b trying to get something started here, as reported before. It is strongly urged that this Josefina be surveilled constantly as I, as well as Frank, think that she is affiliated with Castro's cland activities here in the States. She received monthly checks from t Centro Refugiado. Captain Despain is planning on going to join t U. S. Army. He is definitely strongly suspected of giving everyth of Intelligence to Castro and is tied in with the Communist and Ca groups here. He may even soon plan to disappear from the scene and should not be allowed to get off easily. He has been keeping Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez from organizing his anti-Castro and Anti-Commi files due to lack of funds(says Despain). It seems that this was ju an excuse before and was done to keep the ball functioning as shoul be. I think that this Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez is very sincere an is innocently giving everything into the hands of Despain without knowing. How Despain got into this position is not known by us yet. As far as we are concerned he is a Castro penetration into the Fren and U. S. activities.

The above is the result of being sent to see Dr. Jose Julio Fernand head of Intelligence Servence of the Frente(as told us by Former Cuban Grl. Socallanes, friend of Frank). I went with Frank to try t find out about a woman whose son(one of two of them) had taken dat and pictures for Castro of all (MOST) military and naval installations in t State of Florida.

cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

4

Cont'd.8--- Enclosed find the groups belonging to the Frente that was writt
for me by this Dr. F'dez.

Enclosed find(#8 marked)"Reporte and Informe"(2 sheets) given me
Dr. F'dez. to show what they are doing now.

Dr. D'dez. informed me of the following:

(a). A Communist militant; Alberto Iglesias, 425 Cedar Lane, E
Meadow, New York(Phones:IV-1-4368 and IV-6-4547). He is a
Resident of the U. S. for more than 20 years. He has his
business,"American Welding and Boiler Works Co.". This i
man to be watched as he even uses his business as a front.

(b). Mario Garcia, Miami Ventilated Awning Co., Inc.(works at):
presently asking Immigration permission to go to Cuba and
considered as one of Fidel Castro's heads here with a gre
many ties.

Enclosed find a break down of expenses of the Frente Intell. Offi
given me by Dr. F'dez., my asking him for same. Frank Aries is
helping the Dr. get funds for the maintenance of this office for
least another month. I think that this set up should be taken i
study. --------

9. August 21/61
Enclosed find marked #9, 2 documents, given me by Emanuel Carvaja
last night which are self-explanatory in Spanish. One is a list
exiles in their Costa Rican Embassy in Havana, and the other is a
document(copy) signed and given today to the Minister of Foreign
Relations of Cuba in Havana. It seems that there was very much
discussions concerning same amongst the foreign diplomats in Cuba
The Egyptian Embassador(RAU:Syria, etc.) went to the first meetin
the diplomats had in Habana concerning the new monetary exchanges
He first agreed strongly with the rest and promised to sign the
enclosed type document concerning the new $ exchange in Cuba. T
first meeting was held last Monday, Aug.13th, and they met again
a second time on Thursday in order to sign. He(name not known b
Carvajal) then refused to sign and did not even show up which indi
ted to the remainder of the diplomats that his money must have be
exchanged in the full amount to keep him off the list of signature
The Swiss Charge D'Affairs informed at the same meeting, to the
Diplomats, that he received information from his Government that t
Swiss Gov't. was checking all present Cuban bank accountants exist
in Switzerland and were readying themselves to act accordingly in
case the Cuban Gov't. should not reach any agreement in regards to
the exchange with the Diplomats.

Cont'd. 9-- - The Japanese Embassador said he informed his Gov't. about these difficulties as a protest against the behavior of the Cuban Gov' This he told at the Diplomatic meeting.

- About a week ago, there was a hunger strike at the Brazilian Emb by the exiles there. However, they gave up as a gesture to only obedience to the Embassador. They protested against not receivi salvo conductos and other things.
- This coming week, Monday or Tuesday, the Diplomats again are get together at a meeting to protest before the Cuban Gov't. about t lax and ~~purposefull~~ designing ways of handling this affair, and remind the Gov't. of their obligations in extending the courtesy according International agreements.
- Carvajal asked me not to mention this, but later said that he informed us about Embassador Quiros leaving Havana this Thursday as he was being recalled by the Costa Rican Gov't. for consultati Carvajal will be in charge of the Embassy for the time, but said he didn't expect the Embassador to return as he is taking his fa and house hold items.

He also told me again that Eduardo Odio, Costa Rican Consul in Havana, was a person not to be trusted by many experiences they h already had with him.

— DO NOT MENTION CROWN NOW!

06

((ARMANDO MORALES) WIFE CALLED LAST NIGHT SAYING HE ENTERED CUBA THROUGH AIRPORT WITHOUT ANY MISHAPS! HE AND SHE WERE TOLD TO INFORM ME OF SAME!)

I have money for him? if you want to give it to him

~~[illegible] mention~~

— Thurs or Sat - responsible [illegible]

ARG-MEX-CR- [illegible]

to [illegible] ARENELLA

JPW

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

EOB

ACTION: C/WE 2 (WE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1400 22 APR 63 [illegible])

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/SAS 5, S/C 2

S E C R E T 221452Z

OPIM DIR INFO PRITY HAMB FRAN CITE HAGU 3698 IN22804

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMLEG

22 APR 1963

REF DIR 33866

1. REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD. DUE INABILITY AND UNDESIRABILITY USING LIAISON AND LACK OF INDEPENDENT ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN SHIPS, ONLY POSSIBILITY IMPLEMENT REF AT THIS TIME BY USE OF AMLEGS. IF SUCCESSFUL OP MOUNTED, ASSUME FOLL POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALREADY CONSIDERED BY HQS:

A. UNLESS ACTION TAKEN ON NUMBER OF CUBAN VESSELS AT ROUGHLY SAME TIME AMLEGS USED FOR ANY SPORADIC ACTIONS ON ONLY SOME SHIPS WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT CONTINUE ACTIVITIES FOR KUBARK. IN GENERAL BELIEVE AMLEGS WILLING COOPERATE THIS EFFORT ONLY IF THEY CONVINCED IT PART OF "FINAL EFFORT" OVERTHROW CASTRO. (AMLEGS 12 AND 29 EXPRESSED GENERAL DISILLUSIONMENT OVER ODYOKE RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR ACTION BY EMIGREES IN PBPRIME AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT RECONCILE OUR REQUEST FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE THIS OP WITH APPARENT ODYOKE POLICY STOP OTHERS FROM CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ACTIVITY.)

B. IF CASTRO GOVT SUSPECTS SABOTAGE, LIKELY HE WILL ATTEMPT REPRISALS IN SIMILAR KIND AGAINST WESTERN CARRIERS, SUCH AS PAA FLIGHTS. ALSO, CUBAN G-2 LIKELY ATTEMPT MAJOR EFFORT BREAK AMLEG COMPLEX (WHICH WILL BE SUSPECTED) AND MAY TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST KUBARKERS ODACID INSTALLATIONS THEREBY IDENTIFIED.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

C. IF 11 DUTCH AUTHORITIES SUSPECT SABOTAGE OPS ORIGINATED 10 ROTTERDAM, IN SINGLE INSTANCE POSSIBILITY EXISTS CONVINCE THEM CUBAN EMIGREE GROUP AND NOT KUBARK INVOLVED, BUT AS SIMILAR ACTIONS CARRIED OUT IN FUTURE HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WOULD ACCEPT THIS PLOY. ALSO, ALMOST CERTAIN 11 DUTCH AUTHORITIES WOULD DRASTICALLY INCREASE SECURITY IN PORT AREA WHEN CUBAN VESSELS HERE, THUS MAKING FUTURE CONTACT ANY AMLEGS VERY DIFFICULT. SIMILAR SITUATION MIGHT OBTAIN 11 BELGIAN AND 11 GERMAN PORTS AS CONSEQUENCE. (DUTCH INTEL AND SECURITY SERVICES HIGHLY AWARE KUBARK KEEN INTEREST DUE 24 TO THEIR HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN TARGET.)

2. RE SPECIFIC ACTION AGAINST 99 HAVANA (#406 WHICH ARRIVED ROTTERDAM 19 APR AND DEPARTING DIRECT TO HAVA 26 APR), SABOTAGE RAISED BY WARMBOLD AND EDMENT WITH AMLEGS 12 AND 29 WITH FOLL RESULTS:

A. AMLEG 12 IS OBVIOUSLY RELUCTANT TAKE PART SABOTAGE ACTION UNLESS ASSURED MANY OTHER COUNTRYMEN CARRYING OUT SAME TYPE ACTION OTHER AREAS. HE NOT WILLING TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE DEATH ANY CREW MEMBER. HE DISTURBED BY RECENT NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS ODYOKE POLICY AND WANTS CLARIFICATION PURPOSE SABOTAGE ACTION. HE NOT INTERESTED ACTION IF IT PART OF GENERAL HARASSMENT CAMPAIGN NOT CONNECTED TO MAJOR ODYOKE PLAN OF ACTION. BELIEVE POSSIBLE HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOME INDICATIONS SUCH A PLAN OCCURRED PRIOR HIS NEXT VOYAGE.

B. AMLEG 29 APPEARED GENUINELY INTERESTED PERFORMING INTERNAL SABOTAGE ON SHIP BUT 08 AS CHIEF ENGINEER WOULD REQUIRE COLLABORATOR 24 IN ENGINE ROOM SINCE HE DOES NOT TAKE 24 REGULAR ENGINE ROOM DUTY AND HIS PRESENCE 24 THERE ALWAYS FOR SPECIFIC INSPECTION WHICH OBSERVED BY MEN WHO ARE ON DUTY. HIS MOTHER IN PBRUMEN ON VERGE NERVOUS BREAKDOWN AND ACTION HIS PART NOW WOULD REQUIRE HIS IMMEDIATE

12/PV

DEFECTION WHICH HE NOT WILLING DO BECAUSE OF MOTHER. IF ANOTHER
24
ENGINE ROOM AMLEG TRANSFERRED HIS SHIP PRIOR NEXT VOYAGE HE WOULD BE WILLING CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH COULD PLAUSIBLY BE EXPLAINED AS NATURAL ACCIDENT OR BREAKDOWN.

3. BELIEVE AMLEG 29 WOULD POSSIBLY BE WILLING TO PLANT FOUR-HOUR DELAY EXPLOSIVE "CLAM" TO ONE OF 34 DRUMS OF "TETRAHYDROFURAN" WHICH TO BE LOADED ON DECK. MANIFEST LISTS SUBSTANCE AS HAVING FLASH POINT OF MINUS 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE. CLAM WOULD BE PLANTED AFTER SHIP ARRIVES HOME PORT. HAVE NOT DISCUSSSED THIS ACTION WITH AMLEG 29 YET. PLS ADVISE OPIM PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH AMLEG 29 WHICH SCHEDULED EVENING 23 APRIL. AMLEG 9 SHIP WILL DEPART
24
FOR HAVANA 26 APRIL. 15-6

5. EDMENT REMAINING HAGU PENDING REPLY.

6. SINCE OBVIOUS UNPREDICTABLE, SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING LOCAL CONSEQUENCES CAN FLOW FROM ANY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION REF ACTION, REQUEST COMMENT RE ANY INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO CHIEF OF MISSION RE THIS MATTER OR GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED IN BRIEFING HIM BY STA PRIOR ENGAGING IN REF TYPE PROGRAM.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *APPROVAL HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR SABOTAGE OF CUBAN SHIPS.

3/17

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1
2
3

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1035, 22 APR [illegible])

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 221152Z

15-20 15-26 20-6

OPIM DIR INFO PRITY WAVE (FRAN) MADR CITE [illegible]

RYBAT TYPIC CALL

21 10

22 APR 63 IN 22657

1. AMLEO 29 MET IN ROTT BY WARMBOLD AND AMLEO 1 ON 20 APR. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT RECRUIT IDEN A AS PLANNED BECAUSE IDEN B TOLD HIM IDEN A IS NOW BEING WATCHED CLOSELY DUE HIS RECENT ATTEMPTS TO RESIGN FROM MILITARY. A 29 HAD NO FREE TIME TO SEE AND MAKE OWN ASSESSMENT IDEN A SITUATION DUE SERIOUS ILLNESS MOTHER AND HIS REQUIRED PRESENCE ABOARD SHIP DURING REPAIRS.

08

2. INFO IN REF OBTAINED BY AMLEO 29 FROM IDEN C. REQUEST TRACES. SHE IS FORMER GIRL FRIEND OF AMLEO 29 AND PARENTS ARE NEIGHBORS. SHE VERY ACTIVE IN RESISTANCE GROUP WHOSE NAME SOUNDS LIKE "FRENTE LIBERACION NACIONAL - FRENTE LIBERACION ESCAMBRAY." A 29 SEES HER IN HAVANA EACH TIME HOME ALTHOUGH SHE SPENDS CIRCA TWO OF EVERY THREE WEEKS WITH GRANDPARENT IN MATANZAS.

3. A 29 CERTAIN IDEN C WOULD ACCEPT RECRUITMENT BY HIM TO WORK WITH ODYOKE. WARMBOLD SEEING HIM AGAIN EVENING 23 APR. REQUEST OPIM PERMISSION PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH A 29 TO INSTRUCT HIM TO RECRUIT IDEN C, TRAIN AND GIVE HER SW AND ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED FOR IDEN A.

S E C R E T

SECRET GROUP 1

6/pd

13-00000

Amey 2

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1035, 22 APR LKG)

INFO : DCP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 221152Z

CPIM DIR INFO PRITY WAVE FRAN MADR CITE MAGU 3696

RYBAT TYPIC CALL 22 APR 1963 IN22624

REF MAGU 3695 (IN22657)

IDEN A: ANTONIO CONCEPCION.

IDEN B: MANUEL JUSTO RUINOS, BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ANTONIO CONCEPCION. SEE PREVIOUS INFO ON RUINOS FROM AMLEB 29.

IDEN C: NORMA FLORES, DOB CIRCA 39, RESIDES WITH MOTHER AND FATHER AT CALLE NO. 18332, ENTRE PRIMERA Y SEGUNDA, RESIDENCIAL MONTERREY, SAN MIGUEL DEL PADRON, GUANABACOA, HABANA. RESIGNED FROM JOB AS TEACHER IN UNIVERSITY OF VILLANOVA IN HAVANA IN 62. HAD PBPRIME VISA PRIOR BLOCKADE BUT BLOCKADE NULLIFIED CHANCE TO LEAVE. FATHER FORMER SERGEANT IN BATISTA ARMY NOW GARDENER. SISTER, NANCY FLORES, DOB CIRCA 36, IS OFFICE CLERK IN LA ISLA DE CUBA DEPARTMENT STORE, HAS APPLIED FOR PBPRIME VISA. GRANDFATHER AND UNCLE LIVE IN MATANZAS.

SECRET

copy

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-

SECRET

14/R/

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO
Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO
Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA, 9-12 May 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

References:

A.	BARR-1606,	dated 13 May 1964
B.	BARR-1607,	dated 13 May 1964
C.	WAVE-6458,	dated 13 May 1964
D.	WAVE-6433,	dated 13 May 1964
E.	WAVE-6463,	dated 13 May 1964
F.	BARR-1612,	dated 14 May 1964
G.	BARR-1614,	dated 14 May 1964
H.	BARR-1619,	dated 15 May 1964
I.	UFGA-15986,	dated 20 May 1964
J.	WAVE-6844,	dated 21 May 1964
K.	UFKA- 130,	dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated, and kept under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country diplomatic installation in Cuba. Since the failure of the last asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in reference I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his wife and children out of Cuba. After the failure of the asylum attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attack upon AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission successfully. Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discontinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

Continued.....

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POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Distribution:
3 | WHSA

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

DATE TYPED
25 May 1964

DATE DISPATCHED
JUN 2 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-15995

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-6-75/3
19-6-75/3

exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can carry out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely independent manner.

2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts inside Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-1 and family relatives in the U.S. attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-$5,000.00. On 5 May 1964, AMLEO-3 informed his C/O 24 that he had recently heard from his wife via the Japanese diplomatic courier channel and in her letter she had told him that she planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt from inside the island the weekend of 10 May 1964. AMLEO-3 requested the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt, and said that he expected to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964. Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the following morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O and gave him the following information:

> "The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11 adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West, Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group planned to use, nor the exact time of departure, route the boat would follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltration operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S., and not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the C/O.

3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3 claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his part to KUBARK, since KUBARK had refused to continue its effort to rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following individuals in the operation.

A. Mario REMIS, probably identical with Mario REMIS-CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB, Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small boat with five other Cuban refugees. AMLEO-3 claims he used this individual as his principal organizer in the expedition, and REMIS had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group. REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family out. REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because of other committments and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

B. Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963. Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3 wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the photograph and also listed his home address without revealing (he says the true name of his wife. (This photograph was brought back by RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's family and the family of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not supposed to exceed 15 persons.

C. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and supposedly AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG-4 was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ, his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG-4 was obviously not desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

4. AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his wife that something was to happen the weekend of 10 May 1964, and that someone would be coming to see her with bona fides from him. Mrs. AMLEO-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them. Since the abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least three times, and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence Services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA

4 May - 8 May 1964

5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons. These weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only. The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Florida.

9 May 1964

6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla for Cuba. The crew was made up of Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIG-4. The M/V ADA was enroute to Cuba during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964

7. The infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approximately ½ mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours. There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'. There were several empty trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could detect no vigilance in the area. LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to meet RODRIGUEZ' contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one 06 Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo. AMLABEL-1 states he asked the name of this contact several times, but each time LOPEZ

maintained that he did not know. AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabricated a name.)

8. LOPEZ began to count cars to while away the time. During the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of Matanzas. One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites, who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same easterly direction. LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy in both directions. RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ went back to the boat. RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ.)

9. In the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from LOPEZ, AMLEO-3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A-3 would not say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time factor it is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims the contacts were as follows:

A. A high level civilian official of the GOC, with the rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is willing to collaborate with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

A-3 claims that these officials are willing to listen to the Rebel Army exiles, but do not intend to do anything positive with them unless they demonstrate their power by eliminating AMTHUG-1, or carrying out some type of strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. AMLEO-3 stated that he would be more than willing to collaborate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration to rescue his family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964, and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the night. A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef, and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964

10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours to find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indicating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to go in anyway and investigate. When approximately 20 yards off shore, they were fired upon by automatic weapons and a spotlight came on searching for them. The boat party was not hit by the fire and retreated to the open sea.

11. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line (about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach. RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught a bus to Guanabo, and they went back to the safehouse of Paulo MARTINEZ. 06 At the safehouse he found the pickup team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had acquired as passengers. These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable to locate the homes of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3 and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, never even tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo, and arranged recognition signals. RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat, leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to the exfiltration point.

12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about 30 minutes after the appointed hour of 2300, and halted the boat about 100 meters offshore. They saw a light on top of the reef at which point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal. (When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did not know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directio of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get women and children down these steep cliffs. LOPEZ replied that the difficulties involved had not occurred to them. By the same token, they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUEZ was hit as he jumped overboard. RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the boat. LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle (FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

14. LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely conscious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward Matanzas hugging the coastline. The patrol craft (or fishing boats) had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage, and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. Their last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approximately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla. on 12 May 1964.

15. Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated throu his arm. He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

of 13 May 1964. RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida. His condition is now satisfactory.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA, various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various individuals. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964. (She was supposed to have co out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated (English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all, embrace. Your daughter.", and supposedly indicated the daughter was safe.

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated "Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

C. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while trying to leave Cuba, and that the police had let the children free, but continued to hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only one car had been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being As of 23 May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG-4, or the passengers who were at the exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA

17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba. WAVE is of the opinion that some of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine confusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity was his own personal business and had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infiltration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhol information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Mario REMIS, has been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla. Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to AMLEO-3's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.'

18. As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba, and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15595

definitely acting out of desperation, and although he does not desire to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under ou control. WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in paragraph 9 of reference J. On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to contact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMLILAC
Report on Activities of AMWORLD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : NONE.

1. AMLILAC/33 obtained the following information from IDEN A and IDEN B, former members of the AMWORLD Group. The date of the information is mid-july 1964.

a. IDEN A was an instructor in a commando section headed by IDEN C, in a camp located near IDEN D. He was given the job of instruction in the AR-15 and AR-10 rifles. Since no manuals were available he had to use the book, Small Arms of the World. The men in IDEN C's command are unhappy because they do not trust the planning judgement of IDEN C. The second in command, IDEN E, is so hated by the men that when IDEN C leaves the camp he has to take IDEN E with him.

b. The Intelligence Chief of AMWORLD is IDEN F. He maintains that the prerequisite for men in the INTEL section is personal loyalty to AMBIDDY/1. At one time a PBPRIMER, who works with AMBIDDY/1, presented IDEN F with a list of men for duty in the Intel section. IDEN F accepted the list and the men but after the PBPRIMER left he transferred the men to other sections. Recently IDEN F arrested a man in the Group and charged him as a spy for AMBANG/1. The man was physically beaten and jailed. Later IDEN F admitted he made a mistake, released the man, gave him several hundred dollars and told him to forget the incident.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
3 cys, IDENS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
3 Sept 64	SEP 10 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-17603

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
19-124-27/4

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-17603

c. The Navy section is composed of a Chief, IDEN G, Chief of Operations, IDEN H, and Assistant Chief of Operations, IDEN I. The morale of the ship's crews is low and many of them state that they will jump ship at the first port of call. A large powered barge is anchored at the Navy Base and contains all the arms, and ammunition. There is a staging base in IDEN J. A new base of ships is being set up in IDEN K along with an airstrip. Teams for operations will be flown to this base from IDEN J, go by ship on the operation, return to this base, and then fly back to IDEN J.

d. For operational briefings AMWORLD uses the same photos KUBARK uses (The men who have worked for KUBARK and AMWORLD are aware of this.).

e. AMBIDDY/1 spends most of his time flying around Central America in a light plane. He has hired IDEN L, a free lance PBRUMEN photographer, to film the camps and activities and to publicize AMWORLD.

f. IDEN M stated that AMBIDDY/1 acknowledged that he planned one operation per month for the next 3 months and then make an all out push with the guerrilla teams. IDEN M commented that if things did not improve AMWORLD would not be in existence 3 months from now.

g. AMWORLD has 3 large houses in the capital of IDEN J for recreation. Small groups are escorted to these houses from the camps. There is no limit to expenses for drinking and eating.

h. The chief engineer f[redacted]r the group is IDEN N. He is in charge of building the airstrips.

i. The infiltration team with the mission of assassinating AMTHUG/1 is headed by IDEN M. Date of the operation is unknown.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

SECRET

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:
UFGA-17603, 3 September 1964

IDEN A: Humberto CASAS
IDEN B: Tulio LEISECA
IDEN C: FNU ACEBO
IDEN D: Puerto CABEZAS
IDEN E: Reynaldo GARCIA
IDEN F: "Chino" MOLE
IDEN G: Manoline GUTIERREZ
IDEN H: Ricardo "The Mexican", ex-crewman of the BEE
IDEN I: Generoso BRINGA
IDEN J: Nicaragua
IDEN K: Dominican Republic
IDEN L: Guayo HERNANDEZ
IDEN M: Marco ULLOA
IDEN N: "Juan Jose" ABREU

SECRET

AMFAUNA 26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACC PLIS
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

MICROFILMED
JAN 20 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE AKR

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
AMFAUNA-26 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963

ACTION REQUIRED · REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference: UFGA-11700, dated 14 October 1963

Operational Developments:

1. Seven SW messages were received from AMFAUNA-26 during the period, and two were sent to her. Two SW messages written by AMFAUNA-2 no. 34 and no. 36, have not been received and it is not known what has happened to them. It has been observed that mail to and from Cienfuego is very slow and uncertain; SW message no. 10 sent to AMFAUNA-26 on 6 November did not reach her until 22 December.

2. A continuing effort was made during the period to activate AMFAUNA-26's OWVL and medium speed radio systems. OWVL transmissions were begun on 16 October with message no. 1 warning AMFAUNA-26 of the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 the week before (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963) and the fact that AMCUTLER-2 was under surveillance. AMFAUNA-26 was unable to receive this message. In her SW message no. 35 of 25 October, she reported that her radio set is calibrated in meters instead of kilocycles and she had been unable to find the correct frequency. JMWAVE then sent AMFAUNA-26 instructions for converting kilocycles to meters, and began transmitting dummy messages, giving AMFAUNA-26 a simple code for reporting by commercial telegram whether she was receiving them, and whether and with what books she was able to decipher.

3. Two sets of deciphering materials had been sent to AMFAUNA-26. One package was buried by AMGLEN-9 in Pinar del Rio Province (see WAVE-5887 of 16 October 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 was informed of its location in OWVL message no. 1 of 16 October and SW message no. 10 of 6 November. A previous set of number groups had been sent to her by SW early in

Continued............

Distribution: INDEX
3 - Hqs

F

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DATE TYPED: 9 Jan 1964

DATE DISPATCHED: JAN 15

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-50/3
19-6-50/3

October. It now appears that AMFAUNA-26 never received either of these sets of groups. As of 22 November when AMFAUNA-26's sister Olga arrived in Mexico (see paragraph 5), AMFAUNA-26 already had in her possession the letter containing the groups written in SW, but either had tried and failed to develop it, or had hesitated to try to do so, not knowing in what strength to use the reagent and erroneously thinking that this was a critical factor. As mentioned previously, AMFAUNA-26 did not receive SW message no. 10 until 22 December; on the following day she sent an open telegram to the son of AMFAUNA-32 in Miami, confirming her willingness to travel to Pinar del Rio and recover the material. It is not known whether she actually did so.

4. It had been planned, once AMFAUNA-26 was receiving OWVL and her ability to recover caches confirmed, to have AMWEE-1 cache AMFAUNA-1's radio and to inform AMFAUNA-26 of its location by OWVL. Events did not permit this.

5. AMFLORA-1 sent a telegram to his JMWAVE area accommodation address on 16 November 1963, reporting that his wife, the sister of AMFAUNA-26, was due to arrive in Mexico City on 20 November. Mexico City Station was so informed on 18 November (see WAVE-7762), but by the time confirmation arrived (MEXI-7031 of 23 November) the lady had already departed for Caracas. The oral messages which she brought from AMFAUNA-26 therefore did not reach JMWAVE until 20 December when HVCA-10780 was received. This dispatch transmitted a typewritten note from AMFLORA-1's wife containing the following information:

a. AMFAUNA-26 had run out of developer pills. (In retrospect, this does not seem to be true, because AMFAUNA-26 was evidently able to develop SW message no. 10 which she received on 22 December (see paragraph 3). What AMFAUNA-26 had probably been trying to convey was that she was running very short of pills. AMFAUNA-1 does not remember how many he gave her, but the most probable number appears to be twelve.)

b. AMFAUNA-26 had been unable to develop the SW message containing her cipher groups, because she had not been told how to mix her reagent.

c. AMCUTLER-2 was very worried by the fact that AMFAUNA-14 had been telephoning her frequently, and was afraid that AMFAUNA-14 was betraying her to the DSE.

d. AMFAUNA-26 was uneasy about being left in Cuba without a responsible leader to report to.

e. AMFAUNA-26's cover was wearing very thin, due to indiscretions by AMFAUNA-31.

6. In her SW message no. 29, which was received at JMWAVE on 21 October, AMFAUNA-26 reported that AMFAUNA-38 had been arrested on 7 September and taken to Santa Clara. At 0200 hours on the following morning, fourteen policemen came to AMFAUNA-26's house and searched it on the pretext of looking for a burglar. However, the only part of the house which they searched was the part inhabited by AMFAUNA-26.

7. In her SW message no. 30, AMFAUNA-26 reported the full names of two individuals who had approached her sub-agents AMFAUNA-29 and AMFAUNA-31, claiming to be doing underground work against CASTRO. These persons are one Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and one Raul SIMON Delgado. While neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters (DIR-78835 of 30 October 1963) had any traces on these persons, JMWAVE has a carded reference to a sensitive source document which carries the full name of Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and the implication that he enjoys the confidence of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, an error was made in typing the card, and the document is unrecoverable. In SW message no. 10, AMFAUNA-26 was told to be careful with the person.

MIS card for Bott— identified by
in Cuba
Δ Cuba 201-[illegible]
allegedly in
[illegible]

8. On 12 October 1963, AMFAUNA-26 was in Havana where she saw AMCUTLER-2. About 23 or 24 October she was again in Havana and again saw AMCUTLER-2. On both occasions the problems posed by the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 were the prime topic of discussion.

9. In outgoing SW message no. 9 of 30 September, AMFAUNA-26 had been asked to investigate a Cuban naval officer named Carlos *LOPEZ Avalos with a view to forming an opinion as to his political attitude. She reported in SW message no. 37 of 3 November that all reports on this individual were derogatory except for one given by AMLAME-5. This report reached AMFAUNA-26 via AMFAUNA-31 who got it from a man identified only as Ramon *PEREZ who said that AMLAME-5 had told him that he had a contact to the Swiss Embassy, and that LOPEZ was already connected with people outside of Cuba and had recently performed a great service for the counterrevolution. At cuba, See doc re: contact w/ 201-?1777

A cuba, Cienfuegos [illegible]

10. When the arrest ~~of AMCUTLER-2~~ became known to JMWAVE (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963), the son of AMFAUNA-32 was asked to phone his mother in Cienfuegos and instruct her to tell AMFAUNA-26 to go into hiding. On 3 January the son reported completion of the call and said that his mother had told him that AMFAUNA-26 had been arrested on 29 December and taken to the Santa Clara prison.

11. The reason for AMFAUNA-26's arrest remains obscure, or rather there are so many acceptable explanations that the problem is to select the right one. She could have been implicated by AMFAUNA-38, as would seem to be suggested by the fact that her house was searched immediately following AMFAUNA-38's arrest; if so, however, it is hard to explain why AMFAUNA-26 herself was not arrested until three and one-half months later. She could have been denounced by AMCUTLER-2 who was herself arrested two or three days before AMFAUNA-26's arrest; this seems unlikely in view of the fact that AMCUTLER-2 and AMFAUNA-26 are friends, that when AMCUTLER-2 reaches the point where she is ready to implicate other members of the AMFAUNA net she could be expected to begin with people who are not her friends, and that at least one such person (AMFAUNA-25) was known to be at liberty as recently as 4 January 1964, as were two of the cutouts between AMFAUNA-26 and AMCUTLER-2 (AMFAUNA-32 and AMFAUNA-33). AMCUTLER-2 is believed to have been under surveillance by the DSE, at least sporadically, between 12 and 24 October (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November, and December 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 could have been observed and identified when she visited AMCUTLER-2 during this period and marked for subsequent arrest and interrogation in connection with AMCUTLER-2's activities. AMFAUNA-26 could have made an attempt between 22 and 29 December to recover the cached cipher groups (see paragraph 3), and either been detected in the act or arrested while trying to contact AMCUTLER-2 on the same trip; in this case, however, it would seem that the DSE would not have transported her all the way back to Santa Clara but would have kept her in Havana for concurrent interrogation with AMCUTLER-2. The open telegram sent to the son of AMFAUNA-32 on 23 December was rather indiscreet and could have caused difficulties for the sender, but some of these difficulties ought in this case to have brushed off on AMFAUNA-32 herself, and as of 3 January 1964 she was still at liberty.

201-332765 201-349606 Luis PUIG Tabares

12. Information received from HULAKE-1 on 8 January 1964 indicates that a general roundup began in Cienfuegos on 26 December, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, and that at least seventeen persons had been taken. One of these persons appears to be AMLAME-5. To the best of JMWAVE's knowledge, neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 had been involved in any plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, but both could have been high on a general suspect list. The only known factor common to both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26 is the Ramon *PEREZ mentioned in paragraph 9. AMLAME-5 evidently was extraordinarily indiscreet when he talked with this man. AMFAUNA-31 has also spoken with him, and according to the oral message brought out by AMFAUNA-26's sister (see paragraph 5-e) AMFAUNA-31 has been habitually indiscreet. Ramon PEREZ was thus in a position to denounce both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26. If so, AMFAUNA-31 also ought to have been implicated, and it is perhaps significant in this connection that, of all of

Joaquin ROSQUETE [illegible]

AMFAUNA-26's sub-agents, AMFAUNA-31 is the only one believed to be in hiding as of 3 January (see WAVE-9940 of 4 January).

13. There has been no previous mention of Ramon PEREZ in the AMFAUNA operational reporting, and JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on him. AMFAUNA-1 was asked about him on 6 January, and produced the following information which he had obtained from Antonio Remigio *ESTRADA Diaz (born 1 October 1939, Cienfuegos), now residing at 1425 S.W. 5th St., Apt. 10, Miami, and a former collaborator of the AMFAUNA net in Cienfuegos. Ramon PEREZ is an employee of the Consolidado de Transporte, lives on Calle Arguelles in Cienfuegos between Prado and Gacel, and has a son, name unknown, who drives a taxi. Re: subject identifying Ramon Perez to 201-291230

14. On 5 and 6 January 1964, warning messages were sent to AMFAUNAs 29, 30, 31 and 33 by Antonio Remigio ESTRADA Diaz and by AMFAUNA-1 (see WAVE-0045 of 7 January 1964).

Production:

15. The following reports were made:

UFG-3918	Loading of a Ship at La Isabela with trailers Carrying 40-foot Long Covered Objects
UFG-3941	Relocation of Radar Installations & Other Activities at the Cienfuegos Surface-to-Air Missile Site, Las Villas Province
UFG-3947	Installation of an unusual Light at Cifuentes SAM Missile Assembly Base, Las Villas Province; Dress, Habits, & Expected Departure of Soviets at Cifuentes
UFG-3948	Increase in the Number of Tanks & Soviet Personnel at the Sagua la Grande SAM Missile Site; Relocation of a Sagua la Grande Soviet Headquarters
UFG-3974	Departure of Soviets from the Remedios Area; Movement of Trucks, Guns, & Soviet Personnel in Las Villas Province
UFG-3998	Military Defense Measures at Cayo Loco, Las Villas Province
UFG-4088	Arrival of Unexplained Vehicles at Las Auras, Cienfuegos & Dismantling of that Base
UFG-4141	Cuban Military Occupation of Former Soviet Camps Near Yaguaja & at Fincas La Puntilla, La Bajada, & Rojas
UFG-4180	Removal of Some Equipment & Personnel from the Soviet Base at Itabo, Las Villas Province
UFG-4266	Field Comment Only
UFG-4272	Alleged Transfer of all Cuban Militiamen to the Central Army. New Defense Measures Along the Southern Coast of Las Villas Province

Expenses:

16. Three separate remittances each of $270.00 or a total of $810.00 were sent to AMFAUNA-26 during this period. By previous agreement one quarter of the money was to be given to AMFAUNA-32 and three-quarters was to be retained by AMFAUNA-26. The first two remittances were sent to AMFAUNA-32 by her son, and each was acknowledged by telegram. The third remittance, at the telegraphed request of AMFAUNA-26, was sent to AMFLORA-1 in Caracas. Evidently his wife came to some arrangement with AMFAUNA-26 before she left Cuba.

Future Plans:

17. Communication will be maintained with AMFAUNA-33, first by telephone and later if possible by clandestine means, for the purpose of

learning the status and whereabouts of affected members of the AMFAUNA-26 group. As soon as the situation has crystallized, the whereabouts of burned agents learned, and secure communications established, an attempt will be made to exfiltrate endangered personnel.

End of Dispatch

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Requirements Briefing to FBI Informant Going to Cuba

1. In accordance with arrangements previously made with the FBI by SAS/CI/Liaison, the undersigned went to New York on 8 July to brief an FBI informant who is going to Cuba for two weeks. I had a short session at the FBI office in NYC with Dale Schwant, the case officer, and we then met with the informant for about two hours in a room at the Prince George Hotel. The informant had been told that I would be at the meeting and that I represented the Agency, but I was not introduced to him by name.

65

2. The FBI informant - Victor Thomas * Vicente - is an American-born Puerto Rican born in NYC in 1930. He has been under FBI control for nearly 3 years penetrating the three pro-Castro organizations in NYC: the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC); the Casa Cuba, and the Jose Marti Club. Through the first two years Subject was only a marginal asset, in the last six months he has become a valuable penetration for the FBI into the above 3 organizations as well as the Cuban UN delegation, having apparently won the complete confidence of the pro-Castro leaders and Cuban officials in NYC. Recently he was asked to join the CPUSA. Subject works as a 08 shipping clerk in a coffee plant in Brooklyn. He has the appearance and other attributes, according to Dale Schwant, for the role of pro-Castro revolutionary. The Cubans have expressed an interest in his moving to Cuba to work. He is willing to go but his wife is against it, but idea is still alive.

Cuban Sponsorship

10 09

3. Subject is leaving NYC for Mexico City on 13 July and he expects to go on to Cuba illegally on 15 July. The Cuban Ambassador to the UN, Raul Primellas, has arranged for a Cuban visa to be ready at the embassy in 10 Mexico City, and also passage to Habana on a Cubana flight. Subject is also

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

9/RJ

08 06

armed with a letter of introduction from the National Director of the FPCC, Vicent Theodore Lee. On 6 July the 3 pro-Castro organizations named above held a party for Subject and raised $100.00 for his trip.

Informant's Contacts in Cuba

4. Subject will contact several friends in Cuba who are milicianos, one of them in Santiago, Oriente Province. They were fellow activists in pro-Castro organizations in NYC who have returned to Cuba. He also has been given (by his Cuban friends) the address of a family whose son is the chauffeur of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Arrangements have also been made for Subject to talk to the American Communist in Habana, Robert Williams. Subject, who will be accompanied by his wife on this trip, has been instructed by his Cuban superiors to take a camera with him to take pictures of Cuba for showing at organizational meetings in NYC. Something similar had been done previously by the head of the FPCC on his trip to Cuba in December 1962. The note-taking in connection with the photos will be a device enabling Subject to record intel information difficult to remember.

5. I briefed Subject during a two hour period using as a guide the attached requirements outline, prepared with Henry Kitchens, SAS/Intel/Requirements, and Antia Potocki, SAS/CI/Sov-Sat. I had also discussed Subject's mission to Cuba with SAS/SO/Rodriguez and DC/SAS/EOB. I stressed, as did the FBI case officer, that while fully exploiting his militia and other contacts for the desired information, he must always be guided by security considerations. After an agent role for three years, Subject expressed confidence in his ability Lc to carry out his mission successfully.

6. I should add that I was very cordially received at the NYC FBI office and that Mr. Schwant was most cooperative. I referred to our memorandum to his headquarters indicating that the Agency had a world-wide program to 24 send controlled CP and front penetrations on missions to Cuba, and I expressed the hope that this might be only our first joint effort. He agreed wholeheartedly, adding that he personally would be particularly happy to cooperate if Subject informant should move permanently to Cuba and play the role of resident agent. As soon as Subject returns from Cuba Mr. Schwant will let us know and arrange for the debriefing.

Louis De Santi
SAS/CI/CP

Attachment: Herewith

3/Rs

13-00000

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMSANTA Project

Job # 65-427/38 Box 7

File # 19-6-73/3

Volumes: 5

1. Description:

Coverage of Castro Communist regime through use of existing Communist Party and front penetration assets. File was opened in December 1962.

2. Findings:

Memo for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Louis De Santi SAS/CI/CP

FBI informant 05 Victor Thomas VICENTE, 08 Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated CP's in NY City left NY for Cuba 08 via Mexico as guest of ICAP. Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to U.S. in 09 July-Aug 63. 05 VICENTE stated he had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. 05 VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in Castro inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if 05 VICENTE could be that individual.

Attachment:

LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: KGB

3. Checked 05 VICENTE 201- 23 731222.

6/Rs

SECRET

Requirements Outline

1. Details of Cuban-Soviet agreements and Castro-Khrushchev understandings re:

a. Soviet economic aid

b. Soviet military presence

c. Cuban rapprochement and posture vis-a-vis U. S.

d. Training of Cubans in Soviet bloc to man weapon systems under Soviet command; question of whether Cubans to acquire command control over these weapons systems.

e. How far and how fast is Castro to go in exporting violent revolution in Latin America.

2. Demobilization of regular militia and what relation it has (if any) to the take-over by Soviets of some internal security functions.

a. What part or percent of militia has been demobilized.

b. To what extent has civilian militia been disarmed of automatic weapons.

c. Have Soviets actually taken over control of police stations in certain cities or towns. Which cities.

d. Purposes behind demobilization and disarming of militia.

(1) To minimize resistance potential?

(2) Are Soviets telling Castro to put more people to work on the farms and they will take care of internal security?

e. Reaction of milicianos to demobilization and disarming.

3. Hard information on missiles (all types) and Soviet troops. (Differentiate between facts and propaganda for foreign and/or domestic consumption.)

4. Communism:

a. Secret existence of PSP

b. PURS - when First Congress to be held

c. Reactions of rank and file party members - and general public - toward Fidel and Soviet Union.

d. Economic conditions, popular support of regime especially in provinces and outlying areas

e. Pro-Soviet or pro-Chicom alignments of party leaders or rank and file.

5. Addresses of places where Subject is taken to attend meetings, lectures, get instructions, etc. --- also, of his contacts and Communist leaders.

6. ICAP, its role in this trip

a. Contacts and methods of arranging illegal trip in Mexico

- person in charge
- financing
- route

b. Arrival in Habana

(1) Who there to receive him

(2) Entry formalities; what papers or forms to fill out, etc.

(3) Guided tour or free to go any place on his own; lodging arrangements, etc.

c. What Soviets, Sats, or foreign Communists does he meet

d. Take note of, and bring back if possible, any materials printed in Soviet Bloc or Red China.

e. What use are Soviets/Cubans making of American defectors in Cuba; what role are they playing.

Excluded [illegible]

(VA) [illegible] - 1.
02

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION : C/SAS 3

INFO : DDP, VR

RETURN TO CIA
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S E C R E T 181909Z

18DEC63 IN 83322

DIR INFO WAVE CITE RIOD 2944

DRYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMSTRUT

06,08

1. AMSTRUT-1 VISITED 15 DECEMBER BY (MARIO ROGERIO MESTRINHO DE MELLO OFFICIAL IN BRAZILIAN EMBASY) HAVANA NOW ON LEAVE (RIOD.) 10
06 (MESTRINHO) REPORTED FOLL:

08,06

A. (BRAZILIAN EMB BASTION PINTO INTOXICATED) MORE FREQUENTLY AND FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.

B. WIDE RUMOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FIDEL CASTRO AFTER HIS T.V. APPEARANCE ON 6 DECEMBER RESULTED KILLING MAN NEXT TO HIM. CASTRO UNINJURED. WOULD-BE KILLER STILL AT LARGE.

C. RECENT BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS RESULTING DIFFICULTIES BRAZIL COMMIES DESIRING VISIT CUBA. NO DETAILS GIVEN.

5 (ALSO KEY'D [illegible])

D. WIDE RUMOR CUBAN JOSE "PEPE" GLANUZA MET LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO BEFORE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

06

E. (MESTRINHO) RETURNING CUBA LATE JANUARY 1964. AGREED TAKE PERSONAL ITEMS REQUESTED BY A-1'S FRIENDS.

06 06

2. (MESTRINHO) ALSO DELIVERED TO A-1 LETTER FROM (MARIANNA ARGUELLES) WHO WROTE:

A. COMDTE ELIGERO ALEM[illegible]IRA, FORMER CHIEF OF POLICE IN HAVANA HAS NOT YET RETURNED FROM ALGIERS WITH GROUP CUBANS WHO [illegible] THERE

SECRET

19-6-16/3

61N

FOR TRAINING MISSION.

B. 08 (HUSBAND) RAUL DIAZ ARGUELLES, WHO STILL STRONG [illegible] TROITE, WILL SOON GO WITH CLASS TO MOSCOW FOR SIX MONTHS ADDITIONAL TRAINING AFTER FINISHING COURSE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOOL ON CUBA.

C. 06 (MARIANNA) WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW SHE CAN AGAIN WRITE TO "PANCHO." COMMENT: A-1 SAYS THIS INDICATION (MARIANNA) WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH ANTI-COMMUNISTS AGAIN. 6

3. IN ANOTHER LETTER, AMSTRUT-2 WROTE A-1 FOLL:

A. SHE HAD HEARD FROM "FRIENDS" AND HAS FURNISHED REQUESTED DATA TO OBTAIN THEIR (TRAVEL) DOCUMENTATION, BUT TO DATE NO ACTION.

B. HER SITUATION VERY DIFFICULT, BUT VOICED STRONG HOPE CUBA WOULD EVENTUALLY OVERCOME ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS. SAID A-1 WAS RIGHT ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER MOTHER DIED. LETTER OTHERWISE HOLIDAY GREETING.

4. A-1 SAID (MESTRINHO) 06 WHO HAD 24 (BROUGHT LETTERS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE AMBASSADOR PINTO) DID NOT KNOW CONTENTS. NOR BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWN ORIGINATORS OTHER THAN 06 (MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA). A-1 HAS CONFIDENCE (MESTRI 24 AS BEING TRUSTED COURIER). A-1 HOWEVER ADVISED 06 (MESTRINHO) ACTED VOLUNTARILY UPON REQUEST FROM HER FRIENDS, SINCE A-1 HAS WRITTEN NO LETTERS AS PER KUBARK INSTRUCTIONS.

5. SINCE A-1 INTENDED TO PURCHASE LOCALLY SHOES, SAOP, SHAMPOO, ROLL FILM, ETC.. REQUESTED BY 06 (MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA) STATION OFFERED TO SUPPLY SAME AS FAVOR A-1

6. OTHER THAN NOTED ABOVE, DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INTEREST (MESTRINHO AS COURIER) FROM RIOD.

S E C R E T 24

10/PJ

11 OCTOBER 1964

MGE 27. RECEIVED YOUR RM 44 AND 45. WHEN WE SAID THAT JUAN MANUE FERNANDEZ (A-27) COULD NOT BE INSTRUCTED, IT WAS BECAUSE HE EXPEC TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THE SAME MGE, WE ASKED YOU THAT HE BE SEPARATED FROM THE JAGUAR GROUP. HE WANTS TO LEAVE CUBA BECAU HE THINKS THAT CUBAN COMMUNISM WILL LAST A LONG TIME BEFORE BEING ELIMINATED FROM POWER AND THAT LIFE IN CUBA IS DIFFICULT FOR ALL MEN WHO DO NOT SUBMIT TO ITS DOCTRINE. THAT'S WHAT HE TO US. WHEN WE TOLD YOU OF OUR DESIRE TO TAKE LUIS RODRIGUEZ INTO O JAGUAR GROUP, WE DID SO ASKING YOUR PERMISSION. AFTERWARD WE WI TELL HIM YOUR DECISION IN THIS CASE. WE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT HE (RODRIGUEZ) BE GIVEN NUMBER A-27 WHICH WAS ABANDONED BY FERNANDEZ. WE REMEMBER. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR AUTHORIZATION T INSTRUCT A-35 IN SW. WE KNOW OF NO CASES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE IN PRISON FOR AFFECTING THE ECONOMY. ON THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST FIDEL, WE KNOW THEY TOOK TWO CIVILIANS WOUNDED BY SHOOTING TO THE CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. MOMENTS LATER, TWO ~~XXXXX~~ SOLDIERS FROM FIDEL'S GUARDS PRESENTED THEMSELVES IN SAID HOSPITAL TAKING AWAY THE WOUNDED. WE DO NOT KNOW MORE DETAILS. IN THE LAST DAYS OF LAST MONTH, 70 TRACKED TANKS ENTERED A CAMP LOCATED BETWEEN SANTA MARIA DEL ROSARIO AND EL COTORRO. THE TA WERE TRANSPORTED ON TRAILERS FROM WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW. (A-24) THE 4TH OF OCTOBER, THE RUSSIAN SHIP "SIRHOTE ALIN" ENTERED THE MARIEL PIER COMING FROM THE USSR WITH TOTAL CARGO OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZER IN BULK. REPORT JULIO CAMBAS WHOSE SECOND last NAME IS TEXCIDO. ~~XXX~~ REPEAT. SECOND last NAME OF JULIO (TEXCIDO). A-7 = A-9.

59B
12/01128-06
LX, 1958

trace requested Nov

THE CREW OF THE SHIP IS SOVIET AND NORMAL. THE NEWS OF THE FLEEIN OF COMMANDANT "CONTRERAS", CHIEF OF THE CUARENTENARIO BASE, TOGETHER WITH A GROUP OF OFFICERS AND FRIENDS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. THERE ARE NUMEROUS PERSONS UNDER ARREST IN SAID BASE FOR NOT HAVING PREVENTED THEIR FLIGHT. ANOTHER SIMILAR GROUP FLED FROM THE GRAMMA BASE. ALL THE DESERTERS FLED IN CUBAN NAVY LAUNCHES. WE SUSPECT THAT AT THIS MOMENT, THEY ARE IN U.S. TERRIROTY. IF IT IS SO, WE ARE VERY HAPPY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT DEAL THESE REPENTANT ONES KNOW. A-7 = A-9 = A-15. TO BE CONTINUED IN 28. ALSO REPORT ON NATIONAL BANK. GREETINGS. JUAN.

END END END

SDB
101080-64
X. 1923

OUTGOING 6

SECRET

Charge: | Classification | Control: ROUTINE

Date: 11 JULY 63

DIST: 1 - SIG
1 - CHRON
1 - INDEVCUT 3 OPS
01

20-18 2010 20-11

ZURC INFO BERN CITE GNVA CN 48/

DOMARK FROM MIDDAUGH

RYBAT INDEVOUT 3 01

24

1. AS PART OF NEW G-2 COOPTED STATUS SUBJ MUST PROVIDE BOOKS ON ESPIONAGE. HE HAS SENT SUCH AS HE AND WE HAVE ACCESS TO IN LOCAL SHOPS AND HAS URGENT NEED TO SEND MORE VERY SOON. WE PLANNING ASK LONDON MAKE EXHAUSTIVE PURCHASE BUT IN MEANTIME HAVE NEED PASS HIM CIRCA TEN FOR IMMEDIATE POSTING TO G-2. 24

15-18

2. CAN YOU AT EARLY POINT RANSACK ZURC BOOKSTORES FOR ANY TYPE OF WORK ON ESPIONAGE OR COUNTER ESPIONAGE OF LITERALLY ANY COUNTRY. WORKS CAN INCLUDE HISTORIC ITEMS LIKE WORLD WAR I BLACK ROOM, WORLD WAR II LIKE BREAKING OF JAPANESE CODE, OPERATION NORTH POLE IN HOLLAND, AND WHAT HAVE YOU, AS WELL AS WORKS BY COMMUNIST DEFECTORS AND THE NEWER CROP OF ESPIONAGE STUDIES. THEY MUST BE IN ENGLISH OR FRENCH.

3. BOOKS HE HAS ALREADY SENT INCLUDE: RESEAU DE SPIONS, L'HISTOIRE DE GESTAPO, CIA, MI 5, SECRET WAR, MANUEL DE ESPIONS, HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE, TREASON IN TWENTIETH CENTURY, AND SEVERAL UNIDENTIFIED BOOKS ON FASCISM.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CALL AS SOON AS YOU KNOW HOW MANY BOOKS YOU CAN GET. MAIL BOOKS COMMERCIALLY TO MIDDAUGH PRIVATE ADDRESS.

ORIG: MIDDAUGH

SECRET
Classification

RELEASED: ELMARD

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

FORM FS 413P
3-1-55

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".

68-6-15-6

8/BR

104-10308-10208

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ ... ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/4/ExO

NO.

DATE 5 July 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/Prop				
2. (TOOMEY)03				
3. (MANEY)03				
4.				
5. PROP				
6. Alice				
7. Kay				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FILE TEMPO KHRUSHCHEV VISIT

Summary cover of [illegible] (K's) next trip

to 7 — File Guidance

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 56

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476731

2/MN

13-00000

SECRET

5 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only and does not require action.

2. An invitation by the Government of Cuba to Khrushchev to visit that country has been officially accepted, but as yet no definite time has been set. There has been speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Habana for the 26th of July celebrations, while a press report, confirming a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, predicts the arrival for August. Earlier reports had suggested December 1960 or January 1961 as possible dates.

3. It is felt that a successful visit by Khrushchev to Cuba would assist further in the establishment of a solid Soviet understanding with that country, with disturbing overtones on the possible establishment of closer Soviet relationships in other parts of Latin America. For this reason it is desirable to prevent the visit or to counteract it by a show of massive opposition by the Cuban people.

4. On 21 June the Habana Station was asked for its views on possible plans. In the exchange of cables that has followed, the Station and Headquarters are now in agreement that the best course of action lies in two operations. First, a massive church manifestation or rally to be called for some other purpose would afford the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. Second, the instigation of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger while in Cuba from a well-planned assassination attempt would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

5. Because of the need of avoiding action in Cuba in this matter that would imperil Station assets, it has been determined that such assets would be used only as a means of instigating the church to hold the rally.

6. The latest report from Habana indicates that plans are going satisfactorily. Bishop Boza Masvidal is described as enthused about the

06

06

idea. With Jose Lavastida, a prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaguey to solicit the support of the local Bishop. Lavastida 06 will seek similar support in Santiago. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

7. The Station has asked that the entire effort begin with Cuba, without initial outside support from Cuban exile groups or the sponsors of the anti-Castro programs on Station WRUL. A cable has been sent to 16-11 Bogota to have the CELAM 29 spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. WH press assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban assets when plans are firmer.

24

8. The Argentine liaison service will be asked to send one of its contacts in the field of journalism to Habana to contact officials and to visit the offices of the New China News Agency. He will be instructed to ask Communist staff members there what substance there might be to rumors he has heard that an assassination attempt on Khrushchev will take place. The same technique is being used through three Cubans living in Miami who are in constant contact with Cuba. Speculation on such attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program and in certain controlled Latin press media.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

EHHinkle:lrh
5 July 1960

Distribution:

Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/4
1 - Originator
1 - WH/4/Crono

5/1J

Mr.

[illegible]

Hawke

2 July 1960

TO : C/WH/4

Subject: Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. Background. An invitation to visit Cuba has been extended to Khrushchev by the Government of Cuba. The invitation has been accepted, but do definite time has been set. There has been some speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Havana in time for the celebrations of the 26th of July. The press has reported that he will arrive in August (a date confirmed by a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico). Other reports say the visit will not take place for several months, probably in December or January. In any event we must plan for the possibility of the July visit.

It has been stated from several sanguine quarters that we should "do the same thing to Khrushchev that the Japs did to Eisenhower". This is a completely unrealistic dream.

It is true that a successful Khrushchev visit to Cuba would be the final stone in the construction of a solid Soviet base in Cuba, with disturbing overtones for the possible construction for more Soviet ideoligical bases in all of Latin America. For that reason we are trying to do what we can to prevent the visit, or at least to show a massive opposition to it.

2. Exploitation Plans. On 21 June Hqs sent a cable to Havana asking for views on possibility of a major effort to force cancellation of the visit. A resulting series of cables shows that the station and headquarters are now in agreement that our best hope lies in

a. A massive Church manifestation or rally, which though called for some other purpose, would be to the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. And

b. from outside Cuba, instigating of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger from a well-planned assassination attempt.

3. Mr. Helms has told us that he wants CIA to undertake no action that will imperil Station assets. This injunction was placed on us while we were exchanging cables with Havana. The result is that station assets are actively instigating the church to hold the rally. A cable from Headquarters has instructed the station to continue this course of action as long as there is "safety in numbers", i.e., as long as it is a church action rather that an AMPALM one.

4. The latest cable from the field (IN 18883) 06 reports that that plans are going satisfactorily. (Bishop Boza Masvidal) is "enthused" about the idea. With (Jose Lavastida) 06 a prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaquey to solicit the support of the local Bishop. (Jose Lavastida) 06 a promient lay leader, is in Santiago to seek the help of the Santiago Bishop. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

The station has asked that the entire effort at least begin within Cuba, without ouside support from FRD or WRUL.

5. Hemisphere Plans. A cable has gone out to (CELAM) 29 (in Bogota) 16-11 asking this Church organization to spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. JMRAKE assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban meeting when plans are firmer.

On the assassination angle: (BIOGENISIS) 01 a controlled agent (in B.A) 16-29, is soon to visit high officials in Havana. He has been instructed to ask these leaders what substance there might be to the rumors he has heard that an attempt will take place.....Rivas, a friend of Rudy Gomez, is using the same technique through three Cubans living in Miami who are constant contact with Cuba.

Speculation on the assassination attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program, in AMPACA'S paper, etc.

David A. Phillips

717N

CLASSIFIED MESS

22 SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

: DIRECTOR Relay to Paris (FYM) INFO ATTN: ONTECH

FROM : HAMBURG

ACTION: C/EE 3 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1145, 30 OCT 63 OJ)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR EOB

SECRET 301202Z

30 OCT 63 IN 5047

PRIORITY DIR INFO FRAN LOND BRUS HAGU MADR WAVE CITE HAMB 3880

RYBAT TYPIC ZPWAGON 01 (CASAILOR) MHAPRON

REF HAMB 3879 (IN 50361)

IDENTITY A - 06 (ISIDRO CONTRERAS) COMMANDING OFFICER OF 08 (PINAR DEL RIO NAVAL DISTRICT WITH 08 HQS IN BAHIA HONDA.) CLASSMATE AND VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF 08 (CHIEF OF NAVAL OPS AZTERAIN) WHO APPEALED TO HIM TO TAKE PRESENT POSITION.

IDENTITY B - FNU 06 (IGNARRA MATARRAN) COMMANDING OFFICER OF 08 (EASTERN NAVAL DISTRICT (ORIENTE)).

IDENTITY C - 06 (JOSE PONCE) FORMER COMMANDER OF 08 ("ARMY OF THE CENTER") 10 WITH HQS IN SANTA CLARA. BEGAN SIX MONTH 08 (GUIDED MISSILE COURSE) IN 10 [illegible] FORTRESS JULY 63 WHICH BEING CONDUCTED BY HIGH SOVIET ARMY OFFICERS. 06 (PONCE) TOOK PART IN GRAMMA LANDING AND IS BROTHER IN LAW OF 06 (RAMIRO VALDEZ) 08 (MINISTER OF INTERIOR.)

IDENTITY D - 06 (ORLANDO FERNANDEZ) REFERRED TO AS 08 ("SABORIT") BY FRIENDS, (COMMANDER) 08 IN NAVY NOW EMPLOYED AS (EXECUTIVE) 08 IN (MAMBISAS) 08 HQS IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY E - FNU 06 (JOMARON), BORN CIRCA 31, 08 (CAPTAIN) IN NAVY EMPLOYED AS (EXECUTIVE OFFICER) 08 TO IDEN B ABOVE. WIFE, WHOSE (BROTHER) 08 KILLED WITH REBELS AT BAY OF PIGS, NOW IN US WITH TWO CHILDREN.

④

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

24/PJ

IDENTITY F - JOSE CASTANERA, BORN CIRCA 39, COMMANDER WHO HOLDS NO FIXED TITLE IN HAVANA ARMY HQS.

IDENTITY G - ROMAN ALVAREZ, MAMBISAS DIRECTOR.

IDENTITY H - ENRIQUE CAMARA, BORN CIRCA 31, CHIEF OF POLICE IN SANTA CLARA, MULATTO. MONCADO VETERAN AND LANDED WITH GRANMA.

IDENTITY I - FNU SAURET, BORN CIRCA 33, CAPTAIN IN ARMY EMPLOYED IN HAVANA POLICE HQS. FORMER MEMBER CASTRO ARMY IN SIERRA MAESTRA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY J - JOSE SUAREZ, BORN CIRCA 25, NICKNAME PEPE, NOW COMMANDER SERVING WITH WESTERN ARMY IN PINAR DEL RIO. MONCADA VETERAN. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN HAVANA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY K - ENRIQUE SANTANA, BORN CIRCA 28, CHIEF OF POLICE IN WESTERN CUBA. MONCADA VETERAN. MARRIED WITH FIVE CHILDREN IN CUBA.

IDENTITY L - FNU BENTURA, BORN CIRCA 26, MEDICAL DOCTOR EMPLOYED IN HAVANA HOSPITAL WHICH TREATS POLICEMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES EXCLUSIVELY. ALSO WORKS AS HAVANA PORT DOCTOR WHO BOARDS EACH VISITING VESSEL. WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN TO SURCE, IS ALSO MEDICAL DOCTOR IN HAVANA. HE VETERAN OF ESCAMBRAY ACTION AGAINST BATISTA.

IDENTITY M - PEPIN ARRUTI, SEE HAMB 3820.

IDENTITY N - ORLANDO MIRRET, BORN CIRCA 33, FORMER FIRST LIEUTENANT IN ARMY. FOUGHT WITH UNIDENTIFIED RESISTANCE GROUP IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES DURING FIRST HALF 63. NOW IN HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY O - FNU OJEDA, BORN CIRCA 23, FORMER LIEUTENANT IN CASTRO ARMY. FORMERLY FOUGHT AGAINST BATISTA IN SIERRA MAESTRA.

30/170

13-00000

[illegible]ITH IDEN N ABOVE FOUGHT DURING FIRST HALF 63 IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES AND NOW HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY P - FNU LLANERAS, BORN CIRCA 28, FORMER CAPTAIN OR LIEUTENANT IN CASTRO NAVY NOW UNEMPLOYED IN HAVANA. MONCADA VETERAN AND WORKED IN UNDERGROUND IN HAVANA AGAINST BATISTA. ARCHITECT BY PROFESSION.

IDENTITY Q - ROBERTO ROQUE NUNEZ, BORN CIRCA 18, LT COMMANDER IN NAVY SERVING NOW AS CHIEF OF "COMMANDOS" (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED). GRAMMA VETERAN.

IDENTITY R - PEDRO MIRET, BORN CIRCA 25, COMMANDER IN ARMY AND CHIEF OF CABANA FORTRESS. MONCADA VETERAN. FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

IDENTITY S - FAUSTINO PEREZ, BORN CIRCA 23, COMMANDER IN CASTRO ARMY IN HAVANA HQS. GRAMMA VETERAN AND FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

10

SECRET

(7/PJ

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: DDCI 1-

ROOM NO. | BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO. | BUILDING | EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO 1957—O-439445 (47)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Ex Reg
65-1502/2

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. A-45

Date 7 April 1965

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DDCI to DD/I, DD/P, and DD/S, dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support of Presidential Trips Abroad

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret Service and me, in accordance with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring Agency compliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence Staff informed of their dealings with the Secret Service. The Counter Intelligence Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of Presidential trips abroad. An additional agreement with the Secret Service, involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel abroad, is in process of development.

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

SUSPENSE DATE:

Attachment

cc: OGC
n/S
C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION)

Executive Registry
65-1507

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of information, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, because of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever action is required to counteract any threat to the person of the President posed by such individuals.

[illegible]

B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate assassination of government officials as a political weapon and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be protected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may, at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry out its protective functions in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accordance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA. Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

Dated: 27 March 1965 By ____________
Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

United States Secret Service

Dated: [illegible] By ____________
James J. Rowley
Chief

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Identification Data - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CIA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;

2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

3. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

4. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of special interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

5. Subversives, communists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

LAST MONTH

1963			OCTOBER			1963
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1963			NOVEMBER			1963
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NEXT MONTH

1963			DECEMBER			1963
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Friday 22 November

[illegible] (ask [illegible])

A.M.		P.M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	~~Intelligence Briefing~~	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	Cabin	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	General Carter returned from IS? due to death of Pres Kennedy
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA

13-00000

LAST MONTH

1963	OCTOBER					1963
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NEXT MONTH

1963	DECEMBER					1963
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Sat. - Sun. 23-24 November

A.M.		P.M.	
~~AJ~~ 8:30	w/ DCI, Helms, Cline, R. Jack		
8:45	Smith, Col. White, Dr. Wheelon, Mr. Kirkpatrick	1:00	
9:00	at EAST	1:15	
9:15	Whip, Helms, Cline, LBK – at EOB	1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		SAT 2:15	Mr. Bross, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr Elder, Mr Knoche
SAT 10:15	Met w/ Wheelon + Kirkpatrick	2:30	
10:30	at Langley. Colonel White joined for a while	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
SAT 12:30	went to White House to	4:45	
12:45	pay respects to President Kennedy w/ Mr Kirkpatrick	5:00	

MEMORANDA

SUNDAY – 8:30 meeting at East Bldg w/ DCI & Intell Briefing briefers. General Carter left at 12:00 for 12:15 meeting at DCI's house (w/ Cline, Colby, + Elder); then he was to go home

327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 *38* *328* Sun., Nov. 24, 1963 37

LAST MONTH

1963	OCTOBER					1963
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1963	NOVEMBER					1963
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NEXT MONTH

1963	DECEMBER					1963
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Monday 25 November

A.M.		P.M.	
	8:30 DCI, Karamessines & J. Smith		
8:45	Clinic — at East	1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Left to pick up Mrs Carter and Mrs. McCone to go to	2:15	
10:15	St. Matthew's	2:30	
10:30		2:45	Returned from Funeral after going to Quarters
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	3:30 Mr. Helms
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	President Kennedy's funeral at St. Matthew's	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA ~~6:30 Stag Cocktail - Dinner hosted by General Burns and Dr Montague - Army Navy Town Club (Red Room) in honor of visiting British JIC Board, Informal (DDI will stop by for a drink - or may go to another engagement)~~

Cancelled due to death of President Kennedy

329 Monday, November 25, 1963 36

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate blacklist enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two airplanes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Notes by LC
[illegible]

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of determining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a number of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting backed into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.

d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in ~~North~~ South Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions on the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and was certainly no more immune than anyone else from making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional Committee leadership had been a complete success and that he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from the people who had attended and many of them indicated it was the first time they had ever been in the White House and certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by the Administration leadership. The President said that he had received a phone call saying that he should continue this and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been promised that at least in large measure as a result of this briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday. The President then said we could do a lot better. He told Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the afternoon prior to these two dinners so they would be much fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have been better. The President said he had planned for the briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

[illegible]

4 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Johnson on 31 December 1963

1. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to Independence to see Mr. Truman.

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before 3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made comfortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch, Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr. Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90% on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have prevented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA. The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover, President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on the international situation as well as on the domestic situation and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some other agency handle the domestic situation.)

4. The President then made a number of statements which seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President. Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was concerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist -- on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the form of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long as he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more effort in the way of more money and more support of United States policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on 1 January, pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.

8. The President then said that he had been totally dissatisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that he had read recent Checklists.

10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our present policies and actions connected therewith and said that shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner and similar preparations should be made for other free world countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

11. There was then a discussion with Staats and Murphy about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA.

12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjustment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14, would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and not for the rest of the group.

13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia. This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat confused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of $60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any action on PL 480 funds.)

14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill, they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to provide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads where they would see the results of what they were doing and the purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get off the ground before the year was out and would merely result in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy. He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the runway lights, and the dam across the river.

MSC

Ranch

Airport
Pernales River -
Born - Cemetery
Cattle - Lincoln Cont.
Guns
No Secret Service
Mrs. Johnson -

President:

M/R

Erhardt - much taken - smart - articulate - appealed more than Adenauer -
Pres says he's going to stay home & think of ways to get peace -
If others want to come talk OK - but he not make trips just for trips -
He wants Peace do anything to get it but never at expense of our own Security - told Erhardt not to play off de Gaulle against US - Germany to say which way they go - put more into it or We had to fight 2 World Wars because of Germany - this Pres. wasn't going to be a party to any shilly-shallying like that - Then Erhardt was OK -

Pres. wants round-up from FBIS (CIA) and USIA on world reaction to Erhardt visit - said if didn't make money on that deal might as well give up - we get criticized as to foreign policy - build up a story - highly favorable reporting -

1 January 1964

Paragraphs for message to DCI Mr. Enright handled sending of message on 2 Jan

1. The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion. Further cuts are quite obviously in the mill. The '65 total request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense, State, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor. With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years that there has been a decrease in personnel, amounting to approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period was 7200 in 1957.

2. Major legislative proposals will be those that are left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut, etc. New programs will include a procedure for attack on poverty, new program for aid to education below college level, new program for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid bill, etc. Major emphasis on human needs continues.

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of our Cuban policy after returning to Washington. He particularly wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4. President personally wrote New Year's message to Khrushchev, released today.

5. President faced with decision on whether or not to continue $25 million aid program to Indonesia. As you know, this is primarily civic action. He wants a study of pros and cons with recommendations in writing from you, Secretary of State, and others. Also wants reaction from Senator Russell and others on Hill. Will take up when he returns.

6. Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he wrote on conversations with the Russians as to President's intentions.

7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation in South Vietnam.

9. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman, and Mr. Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not argued at Independence.

10. President much interested in foreign reaction to Erhard talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.

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TOP SECRET

2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section, Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job in organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters, and with materials training that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, sent down to him.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly important tasks for the good of the station. These were as follows:

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami, the so called 26th of July organization.

c. Preparation of biographical information on all prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three months.

e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.

f. Screening of all persons recruited for the ~~grade~~ Brigade (but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300 or 400 men had already gone to camp). This AMOT screening of the military trainees really amounted to a field check since the various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information present in Miami.

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g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of these were sent back to Cuba with instructions to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as fast as possible with the troops and identifying and seizing records and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were ~~was~~ known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve ~~in~~ intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April 1961 for eventual legal return.

4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavored to change the AMOTS into a political organization and remove the chief leaders of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of the AMOT organization had been microfilmed (see my interviews with Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver). The chief AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.

6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the foregoing with the aid of only two girls, one a GS-9 analyst. He tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer assigned, but in vain. This request was forwarded through Simmons, the CI Chief in WH/4. Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them ~~tha~~ on the ground that it would interfere with their training. Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in

three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the other sections of Miami Base.

7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future, Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; (b) more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.

R. D. Shea

R. D. Shea

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5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section, 1 June 1961

(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)

1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff, apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the WH Division Staff and his replacement will be Louis Napoli who will head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer will head the FI part, both under Napoli.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told Simmons that he had a Chilean CI officer who was available for training Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of training the AMFATS (future CI service) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve intelligence corps consisting of substantial older men. These matters are discussed in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOTS have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top men thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to microfilming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new service doesn't know the identity of the AMOTS who are presently in Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has from 18 to 22 of them of whom ~~4~~ four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had produced 1,800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.

not controlled by Cardona or Varona

3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other perfectly and there was no ~~other~~ obstacle of any sort in their collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering in CI matters.

4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly from Headquarters. He referred to the following:

a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance among the top Castro people.

b. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various countries.

c. A certain former Spanish intelligence officer, Amshad, who has been living in Havana in the home of the chief of G-2. Unfortunately, an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this operation has not proved to be of much value.

d. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office, now out of office.

5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.

Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service, late August 1960

Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961 - [illegible]

Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).

6. Relations with PM Section: Simmons' relations with the PM section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction, perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,

radio

also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for the use of freedom signals. When the absence of such signals was pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.

by Chief [illegible]

7. Simmons and his section prepared a 225-page study* of Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also some extensive studies on Cuban block wardens. They also issued CS/CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities by the Cuban services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration agent in 1960.

* This document contains the identities of 492 Castro G-2 staff officers.

8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Simmons spent half of his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e., the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before departure they would have/been warned not to go. Simmons regards this matter is of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:

a. His section was not fully staffed until October 1960, although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people. He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals thus disclosed. He sent the names thus selected to the WH/4 personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able to get a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance of such a project so that the latter will cooperate when their valuable/~~is~~ requested. After borrowing Melberg from covert training for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a further request, and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office to help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so informed his senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have received better cooperation. The result of lack of personnel was that they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case of a directed assignment to the project. As it was, he personally had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with the result that he could only spend 20 per cent of his time on operations. His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists and one secretary.

He had trained [illegible] of them [illegible] in CI [illegible]

b. Working space was also a great problem. From May through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single room.

c. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to release two JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.

10. For the future Simmons recommends:

a. That an LCFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man at times can be very urgent.

b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room. This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality and report cards, so that, for instance a CI analyst can go there and do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a "gold mine".

c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for document seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.

11. Despite difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that the results of his section's work were very good, and that one indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.

12. In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent communicating by radio was not using his safety signals, CI would help the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communications so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG. Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken off the air and Simmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

R D Shea

R. D. Shea

TOP SECRET

ca. Jun 60

JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

TAB 4

I. MISSION

To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are conducted by the U.S.S.R., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI and CA operations through analysis of their operational plans and through examination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated CI matters with the CI Staff and with staff and geographic components of WH Division.

II. REFERENCE

JMARC OPERATIONAL PLAN

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that an aggressive counterintelligence program be devised and implemented to ensure sound operational security for JMARC operations. The JMARC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMARC operational proposals and steps in light of what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical activities directed against JMARC assets and operations.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The following personnel and facilities are required for successful attainment of JMARC CI objectives.

a. **Personnel:** One senior CI officer; four operations officers; five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of "high" in reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one secretary. Initially, two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JMARC Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed below. Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain information reports. Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk typist will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations unit for the CI section at Headquarters.

b. **Facilities:** The CI section at Headquarters will require working space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equipment: eight desks and chairs; eight standard typewriters; one card safe; three four-drawer safes. Standard office supplies should be provided. The CI operations unit at the FOB will require support commensurate to its size.

V. PHASING

A. PREPARATORY PHASE

1. **Principal Objective:** To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. The Branch/4/CI officer will:

(1) Keep Chief, Branch/4 informed on CI requirements, opportunities and developments affecting his branch.

(2) Keep FI Deputy, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff, and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor Wallen, Robert Brown, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), informed on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).

(3) Direct assistance CI personnel in performance of those jobs relating to the responsibilities cited below.

(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by Chief, Branch/4.

The senior CI officer and individual section officers designated by him will accomplish the following:

(1) Familiarize themselves with selected Branch and CI Staff redord assets and with designated branch and division personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on CI operations with the appropriate persons.

(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI operations affecting Cuba which are directed by Branch/4, by CI Staff, and/or by WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility for these.

(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI Staff.

(4) Prepare draft CI requirements for FI/D analysts (accomplished). In addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/4 officers pertinent CI requirements and operational guidance papers pertinent to these officers' assigned responsibilities. (To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of Exile Groups in Clandestine Operations" to Jerry Droller.)

(5) Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations officers reviewing cases (accomplished).

(6) Prepare a defector register format card (accomplished) and organize and maintain a register of defectors.

(7) Exploit certain research and operational support assets of the Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/4 sections in the achievement of their objectives. To this end, one analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff.

(8) Examine current operations and/or programs in the FI and CA fields in order to ensure that CI opportunities are fully exploited and to identify operational security threats and to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or counter such threats.

b. CI Staff components (cited in each instance) will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(2) Deputy Chief, ICG, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries, using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen will:

   (a) Prepare and maintain a briefing notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).

   (b) Prepare a guide for screening WH/4/Reports personality cards and other record assets in order to identify suspect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activities (accomplished).

   (c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these lists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/4 sections and other Agency components with operational interest. (Initial lists have been prepared in 13 books).

   (d) Prepare or assemble CI requirements, as requested, which pertain to the maintenance of CI notebooks on the Cuban services. (Initial requirements have been drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.)

(4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Communist Party. To this end, questionnaires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist Party personnel and activities.

(5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

2 B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. WH/4/CI: During this second phase, WH/4/CI personnel will:

(1) Screen operational correspondence and cable traffic for leads to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent leads and CI information to appropriate CI Staff component and/or authorised security officers of agencies of U.S. intelligence community.

(2) In coordination with Political Action Section of WH/4, outline an organisation for a security intelligence service for the Cuban Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.

(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.

(4) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst to perform those functions necessary to the initiation and conduct of secure CI operations and CI portection activities.

b. CI Staff: The SIG, ICG, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will carry out the following activities:

(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH).

(2) Prepare organizational studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelligence and Security Services personnel, and black lists of persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in

three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by designated members of the United States intelligence community, and by authorized components of the Cuban Government-in-Exile. (OPS/WH)

(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH)

(4) Prepare special studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and on the Cuban Communist Party and other groups and organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (OPS/WH)

c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

VI. COORDINATION

Coordination on CI operations and on operational support activities which involve WH/FI, CI Staff and WH/4/CI will be effected by senior CI officer of WH/4. Communications on these matters will be by telephone and/or personal meetings. CI aspects of WH/4/FI and CA operations will be discussed by appropriate section officers and the senior CI officer or the latter's designates.

Prepared [illegible] Sept

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE

TAB B

I. MISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD, its personnel, installations, secrets and activities from sabotage, subversion and espionage.

II. REFERENCES

B

A. Project Operational Plan

B. Project Political Action Plan

C. Project Counterintelligence Plan

D. Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1961

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new Government of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file members of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members. To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.

The Agency's objectives in establishing and supporting a security service for the FRD are:

A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD; and

B. To acquire counterintelligence information through participation in FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:

A. Screening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;

B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;

C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel;

D. Maintaining physical security of FRD installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;

F. Enforcing personnel security regulations;

G. Indoctrinating FRD members on personal security;

H. Monitoring malcontents; and

I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agency:

A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of eight candidates;

B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York, Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure safehouse training site in Miami;

C. To create an organization which can fulfill assigned security functions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates to staff the organization;

E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by providing sanitised record data, special training, financial backing, and, at need, operational facilities; and

F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's day-to-day activities.

To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to select seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assessment of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and functions of the security service by a representative of the BENDER-CARR group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer who will be recommended to the FRD by the BENDER-CARR group. The training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day-to-day security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plan. The FRD security components in Mexico City, Washington and New York will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will be assigned to Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure of the FRD security service and of the Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A"; the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these structures are discussed below:

A. Facilities

1. Security office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of Security; the Office of Security will identify these sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct their use by appropriate FRD components.)

2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will recommend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

3. One four-drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of Security for use in each office site in the above-named cities.

4. Appropriate office supplies will be assembled by the FRD component in each site.

B. Foreign Personnel

1. A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited as training officer for the security service. The BENDER-CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENDER-CARR organization.

2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, to immediately select seven officers for processing and training prior to assignment in the FRD security service. Later, thirty-two additional officers will be selected for processing and training.

C. Staff Personnel

1. BENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters pertaining to the security service.

2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR representatives all advice, guidance and support to the security service and its chief.

V. PHASING

A. Preparatory Phase (25 August - 15 September):

1. Primary Objective:

To implement the plan for the security service by selecting, assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers, including chief of the proposed service.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York, by dispatch where appropriate, before 26 August, of the Agency's plan and objectives regarding an FRD security service.

b. Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate with him in processing and training for assignment to the FRD security service.

c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation from as many FRD sponsors.

d. Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through the Project security office.

e. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate training site in the Miami area which will accommodate a minimum of eight trainees and an instructor.

f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

g. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment.

h. Quarter trainer in training site.

i. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimum office supplies from list to be provided by the Project CI officer.

j. Provide trainer with a curriculum and a training schedule which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and skills.

k. Discuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, the organization and functions of the proposed security service.

l. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief of the service) and processing of others.

m. Get signed secrecy agreement and loyalty oath from each student.

n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent candidates as Agency-controlled sources.

B. Development Phase: (16 - 30 September)

1. Primary Objective:

To build the security service in a way which will enable it to perform its assigned functions.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the cities named above.

b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above or check the sites previously selected.

d. Initiate training of remaining candidates.

e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it with sanitized record data.

f. Forward physical security plan and physical security regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER.

g. Forward operational security regulations for security service to Chief, through BENDER.

h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communications among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to Chief, through BENDER.

i. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.

j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

C. Action Phase (30 September on):

1. Primary Objective:

To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists, members of the Cuban Security Services, and Orbit espionage and sabotage personnel.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Move the security apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.

b. Provide FRD security service with black lists and record data pertinent to the above objective.

c. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR group.

D. Consolidation Phase:

1. Primary Objective:

To direct the FRD security service in its efforts to maintain public security and to contain foreign services activities.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.

b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.

c. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.

VI. COORDINATION

The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of the Project.

VII. SUPPORT

See SUPPORT ANNEXES.

FOR FUTURE
(present) TAB C

C

20 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT : CI Program for JMATE Project

1. Objectives:

a. To add to our knowledge of objectives, operations and assets of the CASTRO services.

b. To bring about the defection of selected key personalities in the Castro Government and military services.

c. To plan and mount deception operations involving Agency-controlled double agents and W/T play backs. To date, four W/T operators in Cuba are deemed suspect. The fate of our two double agents, who may have accompanied the BRIGADE in its assault on Cuba, will be determined during the course of the next few days. It is anticipated that other candidates for double agent operations will be identified in the States; their exploitation will be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. To support and direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security Service in Miami in the fulfillment of agreed upon objectives.

e. To support and direct 44 AMOT officers and agents now in Cuba, in the collection of intelligence pertinent to Project needs, and in the fulfillment of such other covert action assignments which may be deemed within their competence.

f. To introduce into Cuba unilaterally-controlled counter-intelligence agents.

g. To intensify the Project's Communist Party penetration program.

h. To increase counterintelligence operations run into Cuba in conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.

i. To counter the espionage, subversive and sabotage operations directed by the Castro services against other States within the Western Hemisphere. This to be done in conjunction with the services of those countries with which we maintain liaison.

2. Assets:

   a. AMOT Security Service: The AMOT complex is made up of 97 AMOT staff and clerical personnel, 34 AMFASTS (security-counterintelligence teams) located in the Miami area, and 63 AMCHEERS (senior Cuban citizens drawn from banking, commercial and ranching circles in Cuba), also located in Miami.

   b. An Agency-controlled Communist Party penetration agent located in Havana.

   c. An Agency-controlled agent with access to leftist and Communist circles in the Western Hemisphere, now in New York City.

   d. An agent candidate with access to engineering circles in Havana, who will be available for assignment in Cuba in June of this year.

   e. A third country agent under diplomatic cover now assigned to, and in place at, Havana.

   f. Other CI assets inside Cuba:

   Through the AMOT and other clandestine channels approximately 30 individuals, the majority of whom are Army officers, had indicated a willingness to defect in place and help the opposition forces when the strike came. Although the rebellion was crushed before it could advance sufficiently for the 30 individuals to fulfill their commitment, it may be assumed that some of these people are still willing to cooperate and may be recruited for the purpose of furnishing information now denied us and possibly for performing certain operational functions such as establishing nets and recruiting agents. At the Granma Base, for example, where approximately 4,000 troops are stationed (according to AMOT-34), three captains have indicated willingness to cooperate. The Infantry commander agreed to try to take the base and the nearby cadet school. Assuming that he had that capability, it may be further assumed that he could recruit agents and informants at these bases.

   Other possible assets of this type include the chiefs of the Fourth and Fifth INRA Zones in Pinar del Rio and the Chief of Police in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province.

   In addition we have on hand a list of potential defectors who have shown disillusionment with CASTRO, and who have been approached but who have not yet declared themselves. It is possible that the turn of events may have heightened their disillusionment; may be worth trying to recruit them at this time.

4. Problems and Resolutions:

a. AMOT-KUBARK Relationship. The Agency must recognize the possibility of strained feelings because of the failure of the invasion. It is believed that the Agency representative in Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal relationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain a satisfactory working relationship.

b. Status of AMOT Agents in Cuba. The Agency must anticipate the need to exfiltrate AMOT agents now in place in Cuba in the event their positions become untenable.

c. Operational Climate. The Agency must anticipate the development of an increasingly unfavorable operational climate inside Cuba in view of the increased security measures being implemented by the Castro services.

d. Compromised Agent Assets Inside Cuba. The Agency must assume that the paramilitary assets inside Cuba have probably been compromised by Castro security counter measures taken at the time of the invasion. Each of these assets or net must be examined to determine their continued usefulness. The inclusion of trained CI officers, such as the AMOTS or [illegible], in various teams infiltrated into Cuba can serve to ferret out and neutralize identified penetrations.

Clark W. Simmons
Chief, WH/4/CI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/CI Chrono

SECRET

TAB D

29 April 1961

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, WH/4/OPS

FROM : Chief, WH/4/CI

SUBJECT : [illegible] Intelligence Assets

Reference : [illegible] Responsibilities in [illegible] (dated 28 April 1961)

[illegible] and b) a paper entitled "CI Program For JMATE Project", dated 20 April 1961. This paper was prepared at the request of Chief, WH/4 on 20 April 1961, to indicate CI capabilities in the post-strike phase.

D

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Task Force W

NO.

DATE 10 July 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director (Plans)				
2. Mr. Elder for DCI				By Hand
3.				
4. ER-file				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				EYES ONLY
10.				
11.				SECRET
12.				BY HAND
13.				
14.				
15.				180151

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

SECRET

EO 62-4791

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-regime elements. In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time personal friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3. On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until 1 July 1962. She discussed the current regime quite frankly with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel. According to Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to Cuba after discussions with "the Americans".

4. We are making the necessary arrangements with Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct recruitment. You will be kept advised of any future developments of importance in this case.

William K Harvey

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
C/TFW

SECRET

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
62-310

FROM:
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
1317 Barton Hall

NO.

DATE 10 January 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DCI DDCI 203 Admin. Building	Admin File			orig to DDCI - 1/13/62
2.				
3.				
4.				
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180085

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/P-2-0171
DD/S-62-0173

Executive Registry
62-310

10 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Project JMATE

REFERENCES : a. Recommendation approved by the President, 4 August 1961, Subject: Covert Action Program Against Cuba

b. C/WHD Memorandum to DCI, Subject: Action with respect to the Agency Reserve for Contingency held by the Bureau of the Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961

1. The references cited established the current JMATE activity and obtained funds in the amount of $5.36 millions to operate the project during the period 1 July - 31 December 1961.

2. As set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" it is intended that the financial and audit requirements of this project be regularized to the extent possible consistent with operational requirements.

3. In the Project Authority, reference "a", on 4 August 1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved covert operations including the funding of various persons, groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in our opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of JMATE. These individuals, groups, and activities are and will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able to exercise little or no control over the funds, materiel, arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable accounting from them.

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4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans) to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATE monies, materiel, arms and equipment as in his opinion may be necessary to support such persons, groups and activities. The Deputy Director (Plans) is authorized to delegate this authority to the COP/DDP, the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the Chief, WH/4, and Chief, JMWAVE, as he may desire.

5. Funds advanced in accordance with this authority shall be accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except, that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered by the Agency, such as those described in paragraph 3 above, certifications by the person passing funds to the activity may be accepted as final accounting when approved by an official designated above. Such certifications shall state the amount passed, date, and general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not practical.

6. During the Project development, writing of sub-projects as set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" will be deferred. In lieu, thereof, the project will provide you with copies of reference "a" which will be supplemented by more formal documentation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited in paragraphs three and four above, activities which in the opinion of the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization through administrative plans or fiscal annexes will be so documented.

7. This authority does not amend regulatory authorities in respect to administrative matters covering Agency personnel.

SIGNED
JOHN A. MC CONE
Director

CONCUR:

/s/
Comptroller

12 Jun 62
Date

CPC
/S/ DDCI
Date 1/6/62

CC: DDCI
DDP
DDS
Comptroller
C/Audit Staff

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
▨	ABSTRACT	
▨	MICROFILM	

TO
Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM
Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT
Operational/JMATE/AMOT
Status Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For information and files

1. Following is a brief summary of JMWAVE/KUDESK current assets in the Target Area (CUBA):

a. AMOT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Habana. We are maintaining contact via SW. Subject had a W/T set, cached it and no longer has access to it. AMBY-1 has been instructed to deliver another one to him.

b. AMOT-48: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Oriente Province. We are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. AMOT-106, 107 and 108: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide AMOT-34 with operational intelligence in Habana.

d. Rolando MANGUART Julia: Subject is an AMOT sub source in Pinar del Rio. Subject is currently reorganizing his assets in that Province.

e. Jose Manuel FERNANDEZ Quintana: Subject is an AMOT sub source in the Port of Habana.

f. Violeta MACIAS is an AMOT live drop in Habana and is still active.

g. Norberto MARTINEZ is an AMOT sub source and is active in Habana and Pinar del Rio Provinces.

2. JMWAVE/KUDESK current and future plans are to continue to support and direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in paragraph 1 above. Moreover plans are now in motion for the following:

a. Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MANGUART and MARTINEZ for further training and return to the target area

E

Distribution:
3- WHD

DATE TYPED 22 May 61	DATE DISPATCHED
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA- 1639	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-5-3	

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

b. Recruit and dispatch in the near future of at least four other agents to the target area.

c. Exfiltrate AMOT-68 for training and return to the target area. Plan is also to provide him with a trained radio operator.

3. WAVE/KUDESK is in the process of reorganizing both the AMOT and AMFAST complex as follows:

a. AMOT is being reorganized as a unilateral anti-Castro Cuban Security Service.

[redacted]

7. In support of other Base JMWAVE Sections, the KUDESK Section will sp develop and recruit assets for use in the target area. An example is making available at least twelve AMOT/AMFASTS for commando type raids on the Cuban coast and mainland.

8. WAVE/KUDESK will continue its primary mission of:

a. The detection, identification and neutralization of hostile intelligence action.

b. Provide security checks on agents, potential agents and assets, and

c. Provide, with the security section of Base JMWAVE, security checks on ODYOKE covert relationship with Cubans and Cuban organizations. In addition the KUDESK Secti will continue to develop an apparatus to be used as an Agent Corps which can be use in the rollup of Castro and Communist agents, in support of the post-Castro government. AMOTS, AMCHEERS, AMFASTS and AM will be the main source for th

CONFIDENTIAL 1

2

30 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.

Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.

Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.

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E2 IMPDET
CL BY 064737

He gave two examples of this. One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed, this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach agreed.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.

Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.

Comment

Mr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.

At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.

R. Wall
Robert G. Wall
Deputy Chief, CI/OG

cc: Chief, CI
ADDO
SA/DDO
Review Staff - Walt Elder

24 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Supplementary Information on James Earl Ray

REFERENCE: DDO Memorandum for DCI dated 23 October 1975
Subject: Background for Rather Interview - James Earl Ray

Dick Ober (then in CI) who wrote all the early Ray cables, recalls that he had numerous discussions with the FBI on the matter, and is certain that whatever we did was undertaken at the request of the FBI. Because of the fast moving situation, most of his discussions with the FBI were on the phone, and not the subject of written memoranda. The paper clipped outgoing cable in referring to Eric Galt (the man initially identified by the FBI as the assassin of Dr. King) requests "addressees make every effort determine if Galt is or has been in your area. Information para one should be passed to liaison and any other likely sources. FBI requests that any information reported be evaluated as to reliability and that as much detail as possible be provided. Cable any positive reply priority to HQS. and pass to legal attache if any in your country." There is a scribbled note in the file, presumably in Ober's hand, which reads: "4. Ray fingerprints: FBI agreed to my proposal we send to field for liaison." Ober, also logically points out that the FBI would not have provided us later with a fingerprint formula (see attached cable), a detailed physical description and photos unless they wanted this passed on to overseas liaison services. (Note that our cables did not go, for example, to Ottawa or Mexico City.)

David H. Blee
Associate Deputy Director
for Operations

Attachments

~~E2 IMPDET~~
~~CL BY 035768~~

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: IV

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY			
1		6	
2		7	
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ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY: 28 PER ORIGINATOR
CONF: C/CI ☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP
ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) SECRET
(date and time filed) 19 01 32 Z
(elite) (reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
Book

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA,
CARACAS
BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, ~~CARACAS~~, COPENHAGEN,
FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY,
GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, [illegible] HELSINKI, HONG KONG,
KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO,
NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS,
PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE,
RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO,
SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO,
STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH.

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RAY
c. Assassin
c. CSDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

13-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY________PER________#________
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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pi

TO [redacted] CITE DIRECTOR 92664

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED ~~XXX~~ COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. ~~XXXXX~~ INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY______ PER______ #______

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INFO:
FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~MX~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY ~~AT~~ IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)
E/COPS
WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)
DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

5
4
3
2 DDP Richard Ober by direction/S.H.
1

for C/NE R Ober

XCI/OP/DO Richard Ober

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 98-1333007 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/EXO INFO: CE/LGL, CE/R/IO, CE/ST, CE/STR, CE/STSWE,
CE/WUMB, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/R, CE/W,
(3/P)

98 1333007 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 012139Z MAY 98 DIRECTOR 795035

~~S E C R E T~~
STAFF 012139Z DIRECTOR 795035
TO: PRIORITY MOSCOW INFO MINSK.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/EXO INFO CE/R, CE/R/IO, DC/CE, CE/LGL,
CE/WUMB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD AND DEPT OF STATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING FSB/SVR FOR OSWALD FILE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: WOULD APPRECIATE STATION THOUGHTS ON
*BELOW PROPOSAL TO APPROACH FSB/SVR SEEKING ACCESS TO FILE ON<LEE>
*<HARVEY ((OSWALD)).>

* 2. THE<ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB), ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-526 IN OCTOBER 1992, HAS THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE TO IDENTIFY, SECURE, AND MAKE AVAILABLE ALL
*RECORDS RELATED TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> THE IDENTIFIED (DECLASSIFIED) RECORDS WILL BE HOUSED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. CE HAS HAD SOME DEALINGS WITH THE ARRB, BEGINNING WITH THEIR REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO THE RESTRICTED MOSCOW STATION HISTORY FROM THE 1960'S. THE ARRB'S PREMISE IS TO DECLASSIFY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, EVEN
*DOCUMENTS ONLY MOST TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.>

3. PL 102-526 SPECIFICALLY STATES:
"THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA AND SEEK THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF THE KOMITET GOSUDARSTVANNOY BEZOPASNOSTI (KGB) AND THE GLAVNOYE
*RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVIENIYE (GRU), RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>
*OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>AND CONTACT ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
*THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF
*<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION."

4. THE ARRB HAS REQUESTED STATE AND AGENCY HELP IN GETTING ACCESS TO THE KGB RECORDS ON OSWALD. THE RECORDS, ORIGINALLY HELD

~~SECRET~~

*IN MINSK, WERE FLOWN TO MOSCOW IN '63 FOLLOWING THE<ASSASSINATION,> THEN RETURNED TO MINSK WHERE THEY ARE STORED TODAY. WHEN APPROACHED BY STATE AND THE ARRB, THE BELARUSIANS HAVE SHOWN SAMPLES FROM THE FILE BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO COPY. THE ARRB CHARTER EXPIRES ON 30 SEPT 98 AND THE OLD KGB FILE(S) IS A MAJOR OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENT. STATE HAS MANAGED TO GET THE SUBJECT AS THE NUMBER ONE TALKING POINT ON VICE PRES GORE'S RECENT CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. THE BELARUSIAN RESPONSE WAS TO TRY IT AGAIN LOCALLY IN MINSK, OFFERING INCREASED "COPY FEES".

5. THE ARRB CHAIRMAN HAS COME BACK TO STATE TO ASK THEY CONTACT THE AGENCY ~~WITH THE FOLLOWING REQUEST: CAN THE STATION CHECK WITH THE FSB/SVR~~ TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS RETAINED *A COPY OF THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>KGB FILE IN MOSCOW? CAN WE GET ACCESS TO THE FILE AND, PRESUMABLY, OBTAIN A COPY FOR THE ARRB? WE NOTE THAT THE ARRB WILL ~~PROBABLY PUSH HARD TO DECLASSIFY THE~~ RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS AS WELL. ~~OBVIOUSLY SUCH A REQUEST COULD HAVE SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH~~ WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER, I.E., THE RUSSIANS MIGHT ASK FOR FILES OF THE ROSENBERGS OR OTHER NOTORIOUS PERSONALITIES. THE HQS CONTEXT IS THAT WE ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE ARRB ON A VARIETY OF OTHER SERIOUS DECLASSIFICATION/DISCLOSURE ISSUES AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION IF WE COULD BE SEEN AS ASSISTING THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE OSWALD FILE.

6. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN ACTION HAS TREMENDOUS IMPLICATIONS AND WE WELCOME A FULL DIALOGUE FROM ~~STATION~~ ON THIS MATTER.

REGARDS.

6. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 714549, CL REASON: 1.5(D), DECL ON: X5, DRV FROM: LIA 3-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100952954
ORIG: CE/EXO(CHENGMD,39263); AUTH: AC/CE/R (BANNERMAN); COORD: C/CE/R/IO (ZERRUSEN), C/CE/WUMB (WARD); INFO: CE/LGL (WATSON); ~~REL: DC/CE (LEVEN)~~.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 98-0748996 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP:

STAFF

ACTION: CE/WUMB (276) INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, DCCE/OPS, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CE, PCS/CAB, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/W)

98 0748996 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0748996
TOR: 061335Z MAR 98 MNSK 17622

~~S E C R E T~~ 061332Z MAR 98 STAFF

CITE MINSK 17622

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB, DCCE/OPS, DC/CE, CE/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL JYVAPOROUS

*SUBJECT: BKGB ACCESS SUPPORT TO USG<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW; TRACES ON SUBJS IN PARA 5; GUIDANCE ON ARRB-BKGB ACCESS REQUEST.

2. ON MORNING 6 MAR 98 POLECON OFFICER AND DCM MET WITH COS TO ALERT HIM TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR STATION SUPPORT TO FACILITATE FUTURE MEETING(S) WITH BKGB BY EMBASSY OR OTHER USG PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN
*FOLLOWUP INQUERIES ON BEHALF OF USG'S<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD (ARRB). ARRB IS CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AND FUNDED BODY
*LOOKING AT ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO<ASSASSINATION>OF PRESIDENT<JOHN>
*F.<KENNEDY.> OF INTEREST IN MINSK ARE RECORDS HELD BY THE BKGB
*RELATED TO<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND THE TIME HE SPENT HERE. ARRB APPARENTLY WANTS COPIES OF ALL THESE BKGB RECORDS TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR SCHOLARLY REVIEW AND RESEARCH PURPOSES.

3. PER POLECON OFFICER, THE ARRB CHAIRMAN (A RESPECTED RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGE) HAD REPORTEDLY MADE INQUERIES HERE IN OCTOBER 1996, AT WHICH TIME STATION HAD, WITH HQS CONCURRENCE, FACILITATED BKGB MEETINGS (BUT STATION WAS APPARENTLY DIRECTED BY HQS TO AVOID ALL OTHER INVOLVEMENT). BKGB TOOK REQUEST FOR COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS UNDER REVIEW, BUT NO DOCUMENTS WERE EVER PROVIDED. WHEN PRESSED, BKGB SAID THEY WOULD ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, BUT THEIR "PRIVACY LAWS" WOULD NOT LET THEM RELEASE RECORDS WHICH RELATE TO LIVING BELARUSSIANS (PER POLECON, THIS SPEFICALLY INCLUDED OSWALD'S FORMER WIFE, MARINA). ARRB PRESENTED LENGTHY LIST OF DETAILED, LEGALISTIC, AND (WHAT POLECON OFFICER, HERSELF A LAWYER, DESCRIBED AS) ONEROUS QUERIES. BKGB NEVER RESPONDED.

~~SECRET~~

4. EMBASSY UNDERSTOOD THAT LEGISLATIVE MANDATE FOR ARRB HAD EXPIRED IN FALL 1997, SO DID NOT FOLLOWUP FURTHER. HOWEVER, MANDATE WAS APPARENTLY EXTENDED TO FALL 1998, AND ARRB'S INTEREST IN BKGB INFORMATION HAS BEEN REACTIVATED. ARRB TEAM MAY WISH TO COME TO MINSK TO TRY AGAIN TO OBTAIN THESE RECORDS FROM BKGB, OR AT LEAST GET EMBASSY TO REVITALIZE EFFORTS TO DO SO.

5. FOR THE RECORD (AND HQS TRACES), AT THE TIME OF THE ARRB'S OCT 1996 MEETINGS WITH BKGB, ARRB MET PRINCIPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING BKGB OFFICIALS:

-- ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPT.

AT SOME POINT DURING MEETINGS THEY WERE JOINED BY:

-- GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)) (PHONETIC), A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, BKGB. (THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY IDEN.)

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON FOUR BKGB OFFICERS ABOVE.

6. COMPLICATING ALL THIS IS FACT THAT AT SOME POINT, AUTHOR NORMAN MAILER (APPARENTLY WITH EMBASSY ACCESS ASSISTANCE) WAS GIVEN ACCESS TO (SOME/ALL? OF) THE BKGB'S OSWALD RECORDS, WHICH MAILER REFERS TO EXTENSIVELY IN HIS BOOK "OSWALD'S TALE: AN AMERICAN MYSTERY," PUBLISHED IN 1995. AFTER THE FACT, PER POLECON OFFICER, BKGB REALIZED THAT MAILER MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROFITS FROM THIS BOOK, AND THAT THE BKGB HAD GOTTEN NOTHING FOR PROVIDING ACCESS TO THEIR RECORDS, THUS THEY REPORTEDLY FELT THEY HAD BEEN CHEATED.

7. BALL IS NOW IN STATE'S COURT, BUT THEY AND EMBASSY EXPECT THAT REQUEST WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM ARRB IN NEAR FUTURE, AND THENCE TO STATION, TO FACILITATE MEETINGS WITH BKGB ON THIS MATTER. TO BE A BIT AHEAD OF THE CURVE, REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE AND AUTHORIZATION AS APPROPRIATE.

8. FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. DECL ON: X1. CL REASON: 1.5(C). CL BY: 0702653. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 96-5388761 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

CONF: EA/J INFO: C/ORMS, DC/EA, DCEA/CI, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, EA/XO (2/P)

96 5388761 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 131946Z SEP 96 DIRECTOR 941533

S E C R E T
STAFF 131953Z DIRECTOR 941533
TO: PRIORITY TOKYO.

FROM: LIMIT EA/J INFO DC/EA, DCEA/CI, D/PAS

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: NEW STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 30260 96 5367593

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SUGGEST COS HAVE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER REFER THE UPI CORRESPONDENT TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.

2. IN DISCUSSING REF WITH THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF, PAS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TREAT UPI CORRESPONDENT AS THEY WOULD ANY OTHER REPORTER WHO SEEKS A COMMENT ON A STORY OR FACT PERTAINING TO NWBOLTON. THEREFORE, PAS RECOMMENDS THAT COS TELL THE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER TO SUGGEST THAT THE UPI CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS HIS QUESTIONS TO PAS AT (703) 482-7677 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON. BASED ON THE UPI CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTIONS, PAS MAY THEN REFER THE REPORTER TO HISTORICAL RECORDS OR OTHER OUTSIDE OFFICE.

3. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2164121, CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.
RELNO: DORELS0100513880
ORIG: EA/J(BRYSNBS,35162); AUTH: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY); REL: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY).

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 96-5367593 SENSIND:

/ / ~~SECRET~~ ~~FRP: ,2, , , , ,~~

STAFF

ACTION: EA/J (223) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, DC/EA, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, CIC/EA, EA/XO (3/W)

96 5367593 ASP PAGE 001 IN 5367593
TOR: 120802Z SEP 96 TOKY 30260

SECRET 120758Z SEP 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 30260

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT AC/EA/J INFO D/PAS, DC/EA, C/EA/CI

SLUGS: ~~WNINTEL~~

*SUBJECT: NEWS STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PROVIDE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF
*PROJECT OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION>PAPERS.

2. EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER ADVISED COS AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT THAT LOCAL UPI REPORTER IS ABOUT TO FILE A STORY BASED ON LOCAL RESEARCH AND AN INTERVIEW WITH A RETIRED MARINE OFFICER WHO CLAIMED
*TO BE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>COMMANDER IN JAPAN THAT OSWALD WAS RECRUITED BY CIA WHILE STATIONED WITH THE MARINES IN JAPAN IN THE 1950S. UPI CORRESPONDENT OFFERED PRESS OFFICER A CHANCE TO COMMENT. PRESS OFFICER DECLINED. COS SUGGESTED THAT MUCH, IF NOT ALL PAPERS ON OSWALD'S PERSONAL HISTORY HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED FOR USE BY MEDIA,
*RESEARCHERS AND<ASSASSINATION>BUFFS AS PART OF OVERALL<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION>DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAM. COS ALSO RECALLED THAT THE UPI REPORTERS STORY, IN SOME FORM, ALSO HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN. HENCE, AS A LONG SHOT AT KEEPING A CIA-RELATED STORY FROM SURFACING IN JAPAN, THEREBY PROMPTING JAPANESE JOURNALISTS TO PURSUE THE SAME INFORMATION, COS SUGGESTED TO PRESS OFFICER THAT SHE PASS NUMBER OF THE HISTORICAL OFFICE AT HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH PUBLIC QUERIES TO THE REPORTER, ADVISING THAT HIS SCOOP MAY, IN FACT, BE OLD NEWS.

3. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE NAME AND/OR NUMBER THAT UPI REPORTER COULD CALL AT HEADQUARTERS HISTORICAL OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR
*<JFK ASSASSINATION>INQUIRY DECLASSIFICATION. IF THERE IS ANOTHER OFFICE AT NATIONAL ARCHIVES OR ELSEWHERE THAT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH INQUIRIES, THAT WOULD BE FINE AS WELL. THANKS FOR THE HELP.

4. CL REASON 1.5(C); DECL X1

~~SECRET~~

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE: 1

MHFNO: 96-3123036

SENSIND: ~~RYBAT~~

~~SECRET~~

FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036

TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 COPE 94608

~~S E C R E T~~ 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLE STATING "NO TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON *<LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)).> UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION CANNOT MAKE A CASE AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL. WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE CHIEFS.

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4. FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1758303 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

/ /

~~SECRET~~ ~~FRP:~~ , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA/MCGMXB INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/MCG, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)

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95 1758303 ASO PAGE 001

TOT: 221413Z SEP 95 DIRECTOR 456844

~~S E C R E T~~

STAFF 221413Z DIRECTOR 456844

TO: IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY.

FROM: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB INFO C/LA/MCG

SLUGS: WNINTEL KDSOMBRERO KDMARTINI

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ON MEXICO CITY TELTAPS

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: STATION COMMENTS PER PARA 3.

2. IN 22 SEP 95 ISSUE, WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CIA BUGGED SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY." THE ARTICLE *IS BASED ON CIA DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. MOST OF THE DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ARE EDITED STATION CABLES FROM THE EARLY 1960'S. HQS HAD ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK THE RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENTS; REGRET THAT WE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

3. THE ARTICLE DISCUSSES SOME AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO *CITY IN TIMEFRAME OF THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, FROM A DAMAGE STANDPOINT, THE ARTICLE STATES "...THE CIA HAS TRIED TO KEEP SECRET ITS WIRETAP OPERATION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THE AGENCY HAS ARGUED THAT DISCLOSING SUCH PAST ACTIVITIES MIGHT ENDANGER SIMILAR, ONGOING OPERATIONS, IN MEXICO CITY OR ELSEWHERE." WOULD APPRECIATE STATION'S INPUT ON ANY REACTION BY LIAISON (PARTICULARLY KDSOMBRERO) OR UNILATERAL ASSETS TO THIS FURTHER DISPLAY OF THE INABILITY OF THE USG TO KEEP CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE.

4. THE ARTICLE IS BEING FAXED TO STATION.

5.. FILE: 050-002-037/3, 050-002-033/3 . DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E245787

ORIG: LA/MCGMXB(LUCEMW,39342); REL: C/LA/MCGMXB (LUCE). CL BY 0712052

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1374342 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

/ /

STAFF

ADV: CE/W/MB (1102Z)

ACTION: CE/W/MB (773) INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/W)

95 1374342 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1374342
TOR: 161102Z AUG 95 MNSK 14144

~~S E C R E T~~ 161059Z AUG 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14144 (FALANTZ ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: DIRECTOR 404798 95 1366840

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI OR COMMENT

2. STATION IS FAXING TO HQS A COPY OF BRIEFING PAPER
FOR CODEL SHELBY, REVISED IN ACCORD WITH SUGGESTIONS OF
REFERENCE. UNLESS ADDITIONAL REVISIONS ARE REQUIRED, THIS
IS THE COPY WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE TO CODEL TO READ, BUT NOT
TO CARRY AWAY.

3. APPRECIATE SUMMARY INFORMATION REGARDING
HISTORICAL CONVERSATION WITH LOCAL SERVICE ABOUT FILES ON
*<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> ACOS BELIEVES HE DID SEE THE CABLE
MENTIONED IN REF. AT TIME OF RECEIPT STATION WAS VERY BUSY
AND IN ACCORD WITH "READ AND BURN" POLICY A COPY--WAS--NOT
RETAINED. A RETRANSMISSION IS NOT NECESSARY. ALSO, IT MAY
NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HQS TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER,
SINCE SUMMARY INFORMATION WILL PROBABLY SUFFICE.
ADDITIONALLY, ACOS HAS LEARNED THAT YESTERDAY THE
AMBASSADOR SUBMITTED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER ANDREI SANIKOV WHICH IS AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR
THE FILES ON OSWALD. STATION JUDGES BY THIS THAT FBI HAS
CARRIED THE ACTION TO STATE WITH THIS RESULT. STATION
COMMENT: THERE IS BELIEF HERE THAT THE FILES WERE MADE
*AVAILABLE TO THE AUTHOR OF A RECENT BOOK ON THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.>

4. STATION WILL ADVISE HQS OF IMPRESSIONS OF CODEL
SHELBY AT CONCLUSION OF VISIT. THANKS FOR PROMPT AND
THOUGHTFUL SUPPORT IN PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT.

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1366774   SENSIND: RYBAT   PAGE: 1

/ /   ~~SECRET~~   FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB   INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/P)

95 1366774   ASO   PAGE 001
TOT: 152211Z AUG 95   DIRECTOR 404768

~~SECRET~~
STAFF   152211Z DIRECTOR 404768
TO: IMMEDIATE MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: A. MINSK 14140 95 1360178
B. DIRECTOR 398108 95 1311426

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CORRECT DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER TO REFLECT CHANGES REQUESTED IN PARA 3, BELOW.

2. RE PARA 2, REF A: THE BACKGROUND OF THE OFFER TO PROVIDE
*THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FILES WAS TRANSMITTED TO STATION ON 9 AUG VIA REF B. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO
*THE FBI BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY CONNECTED WITH THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.> WE ARE QUERYING THE FBI TO SEE WHERE THE MATTER STANDS. YOU ARE WELCOME TO PASS THIS ALONG TO THE AMBASSADOR. WE WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS THE FBI RESPONDS TO OUR REQUEST.

3. PAGES ONE AND TWO OF YOUR BRIEFING PAPER ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. PAGE THREE HOWEVER CONTAINS SOME ISSUES THAT WE REQUEST YOU DELETE AND/OR SOFTEN.

A. FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. DO NOT DISCUSS ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONS WITH THE SENATOR. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH ANY DISCUSSION OF SOURCES; IN THIS INSTANCE THE CASE IS INACTIVE AND WOULD NOT ADD TO YOUR DISCUSSION.

B. PARAGRAPH 7. PLEASE REDRAFT TO READ AS FOLLOWS: REGARDING EMBASSY SECURITY, OUR CONCERN IS THAT WITHOUT A 24 HOUR PRESENCE WE DO NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY. ELECTRONIC SECURITY DEVICES WILL ONLY TELL US THAT AN ENTRY HAS BEEN MADE, IT WILL NOT STOP AN ENTRY. SECURITY AT EMBASSY MINSK WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY CE OFFICERS WITH THE SSCI, WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT. THE FACT, OF COURSE, IS THAT STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO HAVE MARINE GUARDS AT ALL LOCK AND LEAVE EMBASSIES AND NWBOLTON APPRECIATES THAT. (FYI: THIS IS A PARTICULARLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. WE SEE NO POINT IN ALIENATING HIM BY PUTTING

~~SECRET~~

HIM ON THE SPOT WITH THE SENATOR WHEN, IN FACT, THIS MATTER IS BEING SORTED OUT IN WASHINGTON.)

C. PARAGRAPH 8. PLEASE DELETE IT. HQS HAS NOT AGREED TO ALL OF THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS YOU NOTED SO WE WOULD PREFER THAT THEY NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SENATOR.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU DID NOT RECEIVE REF B AND WE WILL RETRANSMIT. REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK!

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E224938

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB (DOWDON, 73516); AUTH: C/CE/W (WEBER); REL: C/CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1311426 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, CE/W/IS (4/P)

95 1311426 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 092204Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 398108

~~S E C R E T~~
STAFF 092204Z DIRECTOR 398108
TO: PRIORITY MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W/IS, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: MINSK 14072 95 1207999

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: INFORMATION BELOW PROVIDED AS BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

2. WE RESEARCHED THE JYVAPOROUS PROMISE TO DELIVER FILES ON *<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> WHILE NOT MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT IS REFLECTED IN THE FILES, WE DID COME UP WITH INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT THAT MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO THE FBI FOR ACTION. THE ORIGINAL OFFER WAS MADE BY JYVAPOROUS/1 (V/1) TO FORMER C/CE IN MAY 92. IN OCTOBER 1992, DC/CETF/W VISITED MINSK FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH V/1 RE THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS. THE FOLLOWING IS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE TRIP REPORT:

* "WE OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TOPIC OF THE<LEE HARVEY> *<OSWALD>FILES, TELLING V/1 THE FBI IS PREPARING A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER KEBICH, ASKING PERMISSION TO SEE THE FILE. V/1 BECAME IRRITABLE AND DEFENSIVE, SAYING THAT SINCE THE USG DID NOT DEIGN TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL MATERIAL PERTAINING TO ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF *THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>(THE WARREN REPORT), WHY SHOULD HE BE PRESSURED INTO SURRENDERING HIS FILE. WE SAID NO PRESSURE IS INVOLVED; WE ARE ONLY FOLLOWING UP ON HIS OFFER. STILL DEFENSIVE, HE STATED HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ACCESS TO THE RAW FILE, WHICH WOULD EXPOSE SOURCES AND METHODS USED TO SURVEIL AND INVESTIGATE OSWALD IN MINSK. HE OFFERED INSTEAD SUMMARIES CONTAINING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE, WHICH OSTENSIBLY WERE PREPARED AT THE TIME OF OSWALD'S STAY IN MINSK. HE WOULD ALLOW OUR "EXPERTS" (PRESUMABLY USG) TO EXAMINE THE DOCUMENTS CLOSELY AND TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND COMPLETENESS. HE HINTED THAT WE (NWBOLTAN REPRESENTATIVES) MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO LOOK A BIT INTO THE RAW FILE. WE SAID WE WOULD RELAY THIS TO OUR SUPERIORS, BUT EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT, DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY AMONG SOME AMERICANS *STEMMING FROM THEIR DISTRUST OF NWBOLTAN VIS A VIS THE<KENNEDY>

~~SECRET~~

*<ASSASSINATION,>WE COULD NOT UNILATERALLY HANDLE THE FILES -- THOUGH WE COULD HELP FACILITATE THEIR PASSAGE TO THE PROPER USG AUTHORITIES (THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT)."

3. V/1 THEN TOLD OUR C/O THAT THE FBI'S LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET VICE THE PRIME MINISTER AND WE AGREED TO SO INFORM THE FBI. THAT MEMO IS THE LAST INFORMATION WE HAVE ON THE MATTER. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE FBI DID INDEED SEND THE LETTER OR, IF IT WAS SENT, THAT THEY RECEIVED A REPLY TO IT. BECAUSE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THE FBI HAD PRIMACY IN THIS MATTER, IT IS OUR DETERMINATION THAT WE SHOULD NOT REQUERY JYVAPOROUS. WE HAVE ASKED OUR REP AT THE FBI TO CHECK (INFORMALLY) AS TO THE STATUS OF THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE JYVAPOROUS AND WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THE ANSWER. PLEASE ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE FBI THROUGH OUR CHANNELS, WE WILL BE GLAD TO DO SO. REGARDS.

FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E221787

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB(DOWDON,73516); AUTH: CE/W (FREIMANN); REL: CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 95-1207999 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/IS (513) INFO: CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, ~~CE/W/MB (4/W)~~

95 1207999 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1207999
TOR: 311003Z JUL 95 MNSK 14072

~~S E C R E T~~ 311000Z JUL 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14072 (OLEAN ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/IS INFO C/CE/W/MB, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF HQS WOULD LIKE PARA 2 QUESTION RAISED WITH JYVAPOROUS.

2. ON 29 JULY, AMBASSADOR SHOWED ACOS STATE CABLE GIVING HIM HEADS-UP ON OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE THAT *JYVAPOROUS, UNCOOPERATIVE IN SHARING ITS FILES ON<LEE> *<HARVEY OSWALD>WITH USG, MADE SOME OF THEM AVAILABLE TO NORMAN MAILER FOR HIS BOOK, AND SUGGESTING THAT IT MAY BE TIME TO ASK AGAIN. WHILE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A HEADS-UP, AND NO OFFICIAL GUIDANCE HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, HE PROMISED TO KEEP ACOS INFORMED IF SUCH A REQUEST DOES COME IN. IF HQS BELIEVES SUCH A LINE OF QUESTIONING IS APPROPRIATE, OLEAN CAN FOLLOW UP WITH JYVAPOROUS/3 IN LINE WITH PRIOR DISCUSSIONS ON LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN LIAISON RELATIONSHIP.

3. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 94-8695408 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/MCGMXB (373) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/LA, LA/TERR, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

94 8695408 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8695408
TOR: 022121Z DEC 94 MEXI 53620

~~SECRET~~ 022120Z DEC 94 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 53620 (NOWOCIN ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>ISSUES

REF: DIRECTOR 932873 94 8655988

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE.

2. AS HQS IS AWARE, STATION CONTINUES TO CONDUCT JOINT TELTAP OPERATIONS WITH MEXICAN LIAISON AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN EMBASSIES; HOWEVER, THE TAKE ON THE CUBANS IS VERY LIMITED. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A UNILATERAL TELTAP OP AGAINST THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND SEVERAL RESIDENCES. THUS, ANY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF WHERE TELTAP TAPES ON OSWALD WERE DERIVED WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON CURRENT LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. THE MEXICAN LIAISON SERVICES AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE RE THE NWBOLTON RELATIONSHIP, AND THERE ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD FORCE THE MEXICANS TO REASSESS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US AS WELL AS QUESTION OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A DISCREET AND PROTECTED RELATIONSHIP. (IT WOULD ALSO GIVE OUR DETRACTORS THE EXCUSE TO FURTHER REDUCE OR COMPLETELY BREAK OFF THE RELATIONSHIP.) GIVEN THE HIGH INTEREST OF POLICYMAKERS IN NARCOTRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO, THE PRESERVATION OF STATION LIAISON EQUITIES IS PARAMOUNT AT THIS TIME. STATION ENCOURAGES HQS TO CONTINUE TO DO WHATEVER IS

POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE LID ON THE BOX RE PREVIOUS JOINT OPS WITH THE MEXICANS.

3. RE THE NOC INVOLVED IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE TAPES,

~~SECRET~~

STATION PLANS TO DISCREETLY CHECK CONSULAR FILES TO DETERMINE IF HE IS STILL RESIDING IN MEXICO. IF NOC IS IN MEXICO WILL QUERY HIM RE HIS REACTION TO FULLER DISCLOSURE OF HIS ROLE WITH THE TAPES. INITIAL STATION REACTION RE DISCLOSURE OF NOC'S INVOLVEMENT WITH OSWALD TAPES AND IMPACT ON STATION OPERATIONS AND EQUITIES IS NEGATIVE SINCE BLOWBACK POTENTIAL COULD BE TWOFOLD: IT COULD DRAW LIAISON ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE STATION USE OF NOCS IN MEXICO, AND LIAISON WOULD PROBABLY SCREEN MUCH CLOSER U.S. BUSINESSMEN TRAVELLING AND OPERATING IN MEXICO.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

/ / ~~SECRET~~ FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: CE/R/IO (1613Z) STAFF

ACTION: CE/R/IO (479) INFO: C/ORMS, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/R, DC/CE (4/W)

93 4593421 ASP PAGE 001 IN 4593421
TOR: 191613Z NOV 93 MCOW 62359

S E ~~C R E T~~ 191610Z NOV 93 STAFF

CITE MOSCOW 62359

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ST PETERSBURG.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/IO INFO C/CE/R, DC/CE

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER NQHAYWIRE

SUBJECT: 11 NOVEMBER 1993 MEETING WITH THE SVRR

REF: A. MOSCOW 62226 93 4516923
B. MOSCOW 62260 93 4536763
C. MOSCOW 62261 93 4536806

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS FOUR AND FIVE. SEPARATE CABLE TRAFFIC CONTAINING SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ACTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO APPROPRIATE HQS ELEMENTS.

2. ON THE MORNING OF 11 NOVEMBER 1993, LEONID ((RYABCHENYA)), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN LIAISON DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SVRR) TELEPHONED TO ARRANGE AN "URGENT" MEETING WITH COS. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 1600 HOURS AT KOLPACHNIY PEREULOK. REFS CONTAIN STATION'S TRANSLATIONS OF THE ITEMS RYABCHENYA PASSED DURING THE MEETING (TEXT OF A LETTER TO THE DCI FROM PRIMAKOV CONTAINING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS; A PAPER ON AID TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS; AND A PAPER ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA, RESPECTIVELY.)

3. RYABCHENYA ALSO RAISED THE NAME OLEG ((NECHIPORENKO)), RETIRED SENIOR KGB OFFICIAL. AS WE KNOW FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS, NECHIPORENKO'S BOOK, "PASSPORT TO ASSASSINATION" WHICH PROVIDES *NECHIPORENKO'S ACCOUNT OF<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IS SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN MID-NOVEMBER. RYABCHENYA SAID THAT NECHIPORENKO IS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON BOOK PROMOTION TOUR. RYABCHENYA STATED THAT HE WAS BRINGING THE SUBJECT UP IN ORDER TO PUT ON RECORD THAT THE SVRR HAS NO CONNECTION TO THE BOOK, ITS CONTENTS, OR NECHIPORENKO'S TRAVEL. RYABCHENYA WAS ADAMANT THAT THE ENDEAVOR WAS "100 PERCENT PERSONAL."

4. NEXT RYABCHENYA INQUIRED WHETHER ANY DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE WITH REGARD TO THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE ON YUGOSLAVIA. HE RECALLED THE NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WERE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN DECEMBER 1993 IN WASHINGTON. REQUEST HQS ELEMENTS INVOLVED ADVISE INTENTIONS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE.

5. RYABCHENYA ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER PRESENTING THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE EFFORT SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER 1993. HE REMINDED COS OF OUR PROMISE TO PROVIDE A COPY (A PROMISE MADE FIRST DURING THE VISIT OF THE ETF TEAM IN JULY AND LATER REPEATED BY THE DCI DURING HIS 9 AUGUST MEETING WITH SVRR LEADERSHIP). RYABCHENYA EXPLAINED THAT THE SVRR HAS HELD SOME MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS AND IS WORKING ON A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THIS SUBJECT. AFTER THEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PAPER, THE SVRR WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD AND SCHEDULE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS. (AN EVENT MOTIVATING THE SVRR’S DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS INITIATIVE IS, OF COURSE, THE GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH.) REQUEST HQS PROVIDE A COPY OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER BY THE MOST EXPEDITIONS MEANS POSSIBLE. LENGTH PERMITTING, SUGGEST USE OF SECURE FAX TO THE STATION.

5. FILE: 74A-002-001. DECL OADR DRV LIA 1-87.
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MHFNO: 92-7827323 SENSIND:

~~SECRET~~ ERP: / / / / / /

/ /

STAFF

CONF: CIC/CEX-3 INFO: C/ORMO, CICEDC, CIDORECORD, DOCHRONO, DOOPS, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CI, FILE, C/CIC, CE/RBI, CED/CIC, CETF/W-5, CETF/W/BAL, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEI, CIC/CLFL, CIC/EOB, CIC/ISB, CIC/OG-4, CIC/PRB, CIC/TA, DC/CE, DC/CIC, DDO-2 (28/P)

92 7827323 ASR PAGE 001 TOT: 041754Z APR 92 DIRECTOR 324829

~~S E C R E T~~

STAFF 041754Z DIRECTOR 324829

TO: VILNIUS.

FROM: CIC/CEX INFO CIC/PRB, CETF/W/BAL.

SLUGS: WNINTEL TAZZACEX LWOPUS

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE RE KGB OFFER TO HOLLYWOOD

REF: A. DIRECTOR 283424 (92 7575137)
B. VILNIUS 10599 (92 7801082)
C. VILNIUS 10578 (92 7735236)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

2. FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE 27 MARCH EDITION OF THE "WASHINGTON TIMES:"

"THE KGB SPIES WHO CAME IN FOR THE GOLD

"MOSCOW: ON THE 'STREET OF TRUTH,' RETIRED KGB SECRET AGENTS CAME TO TELL ALL.

"WITH NO HINT OF SHAME, THE COLD WAR SPY MASTERS SAID THEIR MEMOIRS CAN BE HAD FOR CASH--ON EVERYTHING
* FROM<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>TO KIM PHILBY AND THE SPY RING THAT STOLE THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB FROM AMERICA.

"'THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE WHO ENGAGE IN ESPIONAGE ARE VERY RICH IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE,' SAID ANATOLY PRIVALOV, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KGB VETERANS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE, OR FIVA, AS THE RUSSIANS CALL IT.

"MR. PRIVALOV AND THREE COLLEAGUES FROM THE ELITE OF KGB ESPIONAGE CAME NOT OUT OF THE COLD BUT OUT OF THE RAIN WEDNESDAY TO THE OFFICES OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ON ULITSA PRAVDA (TRUTH STREET).

"THEY TOLD REPORTS OF THEIR PLANS TO ENTER THE CAPITALIST WORLD THAT THEY TRIED TO VERY HARD TO

~~SECRET~~

UNDERMINE DURING THEIR CLOAK-AND-DAGGER DAYS.

"FEAR OF POVERTY HAD SPURRED THE RETIRED SPIES TO SIGN UP WITH THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM ENTERTAINMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS ASSOCIATION TO PEDDLE THEIR INSIDE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR FOR FILMS, MINISERIES AND DOCUDRAMAS.

"'DUE TO THE PRESENT CONFUSION IN OUR COUNTRY, MANY OF THE VETERANS ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT (FINANCIAL) SITUATION,' MR. PRIVALOV SAID.

"OLEG NECHIPERENKO, A 25-YEAR KGB VETERAN, SAID HIS FORTHCOMING BOOK WILL GIVE DETAILS OF HIS TWO MEETINGS
* WITH<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>IN MEXICO CITY TWO MONTHS BEFORE
* OSWALD SHOT<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.>

"THE OSWALD MEETINGS TOOK PLACE SEPT. 27-28, 1963, ON THE INITIATIVE OF OSWALD, SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO, THEN KGB STATION CHIEF IN MEXICO CITY.

"'HIS MOOD WAS BAD,' SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO.

"BUT, HE TEASED, 'THE OSWALD HE MET IN MEXICO CITY WAS THE SAME ONE WHO WAS IN DALLAS.

"ANOTHER NECHIPERENKO TIDBIT: TWO OTHER KGB MEN WERE PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW AND AN OPERATIVE IN MOSCOW WAS KEPT ABREAST OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

"EXHIBITING FAMILIARITY WITH OLIVER STONE'S MOVIE
* <'JFK,'>MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID HE WOULD AGREE WITH 'SOME OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF JAMES GARRISON,' BUT ONLY BASED ON THE FORMER NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S BOOK, NOT ON ANY EVIDENCE.

"IF HE HAD THE DOCUMENTS, MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID, HE COULD GIVE A BETTER VERDICT. OF COURSE, NO TALK OF SUCH
* AN<ASSASSINATION>TOOK PLACE IN MEXICO CITY AND THERE WAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH A DEED, HE SAID.

"MR. NECHIPERENKO HAS BEEN TROTTED OUT BEFORE BY THE KGB ALONG WITH YURI MODIN, THE HANDLER OF KIM PHILBY, THE BRITISH MASTER SPY WHO WORKED FOR THE SOVIETS. PHILBY DIED IN MOSCOW IN 1988.

"THE NEW FACE SHOWN WEDNESDAY WAS ANATOLY YAZKOV, CODE-NAMED 'YAKOVLEV' IN HIS WORLD WAR II YEARS IN AMERICA WHEN HE HELPED RUN THE SPY RING THAT GAVE JOSEF STALIN THE ATOM BOMB. IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ESPIONAGE PENETRATIONS IN HISTORY.

"BUT MR. YAZKOV, BEYOND ADMITTING THAT HE WORKED OUT OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE AT 7 E. 61ST ST. IN NEW YORK CITY, ACROSS FROM THE HOTEL PIERRE, WAS SINGULARLY

RETICENT.

"ASKED IF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG, WHO WERE EXECUTED IN 1953 FOR PASSING ATOMIC SECRETS, WERE INDEED GUILTY, MR. YAZKOV SAID HE PREFERRED 'NOT TO TALK ABOUT PEOPLE WHO TOOK PART IN THIS OR MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PART IN THIS.

"IT WAS NOT THE BEST ADVERTISEMENT FOR HIS FORTHCOMING WORK.

"WHEN ASKED IF HE MISSED THE COLD WAR, MR. YAZKOV REPLIED, 'THANK GOD THAT IT IS OVER.'

"UNCONTRITE, HE INSISTED HE WAS 'NOT SPYING AGAINST AMERICA, BUT IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE TWO POWERS.'

"ABOUT 5,000 FORMER KGB OPERATIVES ARE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

"'WHEN A PERSON LEAVES HIS POST, HE IS LEFT ALL ALONE,' SAID MR. PRIVALOV, A 42-YEAR KGB VETERAN. 'SO IN ORDER THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL THEMSELVES ABANDONED, WE DECIDED TO UNITE AND TO ORGANIZE A CLUB WHERE VETERANS COULD COME TO RELAX, TO DRINK A BEER OR A WHISKEY, AS THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CIA DOES.

"INSTEAD OF FEELING SORRY FOR THEMSELVES, THE FORMER CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN WILL WORK ON A FILM ABOUT THE ATOM BOMB SPY RING; A TV MINISERIES ABOUT U.S. NAVY EMPLOYEE GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, A SOVIET SPY WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE IN MOSCOW IN 1989; AND A DOCUMENTARY ON OSWALD'S BIZARRE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB.

* "DOCUDRAMAS ON THE<ASSASSINATION>OF LEON TROTSKY AND THE CASE OF NATO OFFICIAL ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, KNOWN AS 'THE AMERICAN KIM PHILBY,' ARE ALSO PLANNED."

3. FOR THE RECORD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT SOME SIMILAR THREADS RUN THROUGH BOTH THIS ARTICLE AND THE LWOPUS CASE.

A. THE TIMING OF THE OFFER BY THE FIVA GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, 25 MARCH, FALLS DIRECTLY INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE WINDOW ESTABLISHED BY LWOPUS (24-26 MARCH). ALSO, LWOPUS NOTED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT GETTING THE MANUSCRIPT ACROSS THE LITHUANIAN BORDER, HE WOULD RESORT TO A RESERVE VARIANT BUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES, I.E., HE WOULD APPROACH SOMEONE ELSE.

B. LWOPUS SENT A SAMPLE OF HIS WORK TO US NOT FOR PUBLICATION BUT FOR A CRITICAL READING. HE STATED THAT IF A PUBLISHING HOUSE SHOWED INTEREST IN HIS MANUSCRIPT, AGREEMENT

COULD BE REACHED REGARDING JOINT ACTIONS AND MUTUAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS. ALTHOUGH MONETARY COMPENSATION IS IMPLIED, LWOPUS DOES NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC SUM, RATHER HE SUGGESTS THAT HE IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO SOME SORT OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT. THIS IS COMPATIBLE WITH WHAT THE FIVA GROUP APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING. THE FIVA GROUP STATES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY NEED MONEY.

C. IN EACH CASE THERE APPEARS TO BE A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL. LWOPUS STATED THAT UP TO NOW HE HAS PREPARED SEVEN FOLDERS ON FOURTEEN COUNTRIES AND FORESEES WRITING 22-25 SMALL BOOKS OR EPISODES ON DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THE FIVA GROUP ALSO IMPLIES THAT A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL EXISTS. LWOPUS CLAIMS THAT HIS WRITINGS WERE BASED ONLY ON DOCUMENTARY SOURCES. THE FIVA GROUP MAKES NO SUCH CLAIM, BUT IMPLIES THAT THEIR MATERIAL IS FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

D. BASED UPON THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE MATERIAL AND THE TIME SPAN IT ENCOMPASSES, WE SUSPECT THE LWOPUS MANUSCRIPT MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT. IF IT IS NOT A JOINT EFFORT, COLLECTION MUST HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG TIME BY SOMEONE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL MATERIAL. THE FIVA GROUP IS A COMMON EFFORT OF AT LEAST FOUR (AND PROBABLY MORE) RETIRED KGB OFFICERS.

E. LWOPUS NOTED THAT HE IS CONCERNED FOR HIS SAFETY AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY. HIS FAILURE TO SHOW AT THE EMBASSY IN VILNIUS DURING THE WINDOW MIGHT BE THE RESULT OF HIS CONCERN. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED THE EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE LITHUANIAN FSN IN HIS OFFICE, THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALERT FOR THE RETURN OF THE LWOPUS MESSENGER. IF LWOPUS BECAME AWARE THAT THE LITHUANIAN EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN TOLD TO WATCH FOR THE MESSENGER, HE MAY HAVE ELECTED NOT TO RETURN. IN SUCH CASE, ASSUMING THAT YURASOV IS CONNECTED WITH THE FIVA GROUP, THEIR OFFER TO THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM MAY BE AN ALTERNATE PLAN.

F. IN EACH CASE, THE MATERIAL PRESENTED WOULD HAVE APPEAL FOR THE GROUP TO WHICH IT IS OFFERED, I.E., THE OFFER TO US OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED SNIPPETS REGARDING IN-PLACE AGENTS VS THE OFFER TO THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY OF THE MORE SPECTACULAR CASES THAT WOULD APPEAL TO A MASS AUDIENCE.

G. THE NAME OF YAZKOV (TRUE NAME ANATOLIY YAKOVLEV) IS SIMILAR TO YURASOV. ALTHOUGH IT IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE IN EVERY CASE, THE FORMER SOVIETS FREQUENTLY USED COVER NAMES SIMILAR TO OR WHICH HAD THE SAME FIRST LETTER AS THEIR OWN NAME.

H. LWOPUS IS OBVIOUSLY HEDGING HIS BETS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS

TO CONTACT US. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM EITHER OF THESE ATTEMPTS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE MANUSCRIPT HE PROVIDED TO US WAS A CARBON. BASED ON THE QUALITY, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT CARBON NUMBER ONE.

4. WE ARE CURRENTLY CHECKING THE FILES OF THE FOUR FIVA OFFICERS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEIR BACKGROUNDS MIGHT OFFER THEM ACCESS TO THE SAME INFORMATION THAT LWOPUS PROVIDED. WE ALSO PLAN TO COMPARE THE MATERIAL WE RECEIVED FROM LWOPUS TO SEE IF THE FILES OF THESE FOUR OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THEY HAD CONTACTS SIMILAR TO ANY OF THOSE MENTIONED IN THE LWOPUS MATERIAL. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS OF OUR RESEARCH.

5. WELCOME VILNIUS COMMENTS.

6. FILE: 201-1478016. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: C/CIC/CEX (BORGRINK); COORD: C/CIC/CEG (ROBINSON), C/CIC/PRB (BANNERMAN), CETF/W/BAL (MILLER) ; AUTH: C/CIC/CEX (SANDERS); REL: C/CETF/W (MORRIS). CL BY 0710601.
END OF MESSAGE ~~SECRET~~

not Copy

SECRET Box 11 Fldr 11

OGC 78-3595
5-31-78

Executive Registry
78-8432/11

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978

JUN 5 10 04 AM '78

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

#05948

SECRET

[redacted]

4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period, during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

that if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED — 31 MAY 1978
General Counsel — Date

Chief, SE Division — Date

Chief, CI Staff — Date

1 JUN 1978
Director of Security — Date

/s/ Frank C. Carlucci
APPROVAL: Director of Central Intelligence — Date
Dep

DISAPPROVAL: Director of Central Intelligence — Date

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:
- Orig - Adse
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - OGC
- 1 - C/SE Div
- 1 - C/CI Staff
- 1 - SA/DO/O
- 1 - D/OS
- 1 - OLC/Subj
- 1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

13-00000

~~CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS~~
~~RELEASE IN FULL~~
~~2000~~

C/CI

11 March 1993

Jim

~~[illegible]~~ John P

John For circulation in HRG, J

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination.

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a $250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday, 3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko who said he was satisfied with how the interview was conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the individuals named. I told them that developing information in response to their questions would probably take a good deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone would be willing to undertake research on their questions, I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would be grateful for making such a person available even if

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them would be seen as a gesture of good will.

Peter Earnest

Attachment:
  As stated

______Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is available.

______No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the Nosenko information.

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:

Original	Addressee
1	ADDO
1	SA/DDO
1	DO Registry
1	D/PAI
1	D/DO/CIC
1	C/DO/NROC
1	C/DO/CE
1	C/CSI
1	C/History Staff

Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the JFK assassination:

1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov instructed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right away.

2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald--when a KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it and write a summary of it.

3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveey, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) Department, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.

4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseev and presumably he would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.

5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection, according to Nosenko. That right? What happened?

6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist matters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of Foreign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that ministry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.

8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done? !

Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?' At that point, Nosenko said he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.

9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or Chelnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, 'I remember this crazy nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.

10. Col. Gruzdev, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners there.

11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly interrogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.

Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.

!

f.6

3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/[redacted]) that the JFK collections contains a significant number of documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the documents involved. She will consult with [redacted], the lawyer on the case, and get back to me.

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold or other consideration to address, we can do so after the HRG review is complete.

Barry

13-00000

9 nov 94

Re: NOSENKO

Having Reviewed Box 45 – We note several Reports, not completely identified as to author.

(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (dtd Oct 68) (The Solie Report) – 264 pgs.
(This is in Box 45, Folder 8)
(It has been released in JFK) – JFK 62-F9
(It concludes NOSENKO is good)

(2) "Case of Yuriy I Nosenko" (835 page study) dated February 1967

(No indication that it has been released)
(Believe it was prepared in SB (perhaps by Bagley – or perhaps with CI/STAFF)
(It concludes NOSENKO is BAD

(3) "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" – TS # 197124 dated FEBRUARY 1968
(447 pages)

(This is found in ORIS Box 62 JFK – FLD 9)
(It was released except for ANNEX A which is found in Box 45 F. 23.

(It concludes NOSENKO WAS NOT Bona fide.)
(Don't Know author).

JM)

INTERNAL USE ONLY

23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination story and the files are part of the sequestered collection, HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act. When the review is complete, a list of the documents released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has protected the information provided by Nosenko on other Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and there was a large amount of information including parts of the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard copy collection. We have deleted information provided on other sources and operations not related to the JFK story. We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies. Although they contain potentially embarrassing information for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots), there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK Act.

5/94

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

o At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed to the Russian service.

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the United States, both were questionned by the Russian service about NOSENKO's activity and place and residence.

Legal position
C.I.

Mr Robert Pringle
2909 Rock Manor Court
Herndon, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.

I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowledge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968 report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 report by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach of my personal security.)

I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now been seriously damaged.

This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes. For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few journalists, and only when the Agency advised me to do so. I have never sought on my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive information to the public without speaking to me first.

Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the following:

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey, and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and Historical Review staff -- so that they are aware of what has happened.

2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from those responsible of why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which have already been released. Aside from the two reports that I already have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like to be given the Agency's written assurance that further releases will not occur without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troubled by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency for an explanation.

Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one else to turn to for assistance.

Please let me know if there is any response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

Secret

Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Dear ,

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter expressing concern that US Government declassification of material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have already been released, rest assured that I have directed officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care in reviewing information concerning you in light of your special circumstances. We will make full use of all possible exceptions exemptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required all US Government agencies to release any records related to the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern about the files on you that are related to the assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer in the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's ~~historical staff~~ Historical Review Group who are involved in the declassification program. This officer has had extensive discussions with members of the ~~Staff~~ Group and has worked closely with them to identify those portions of the files that include personal and operational information.

As a result of this effort, we have ~~postponed release of any~~ taken special care to protect all sensitive information touching on your private life or on operational information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we will present the Board with the strongest possible case for protecting information that could affect your privacy and security.

Best wishes,

Secret

17 April 1997

Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:

1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"

2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by Al Bonner in the vault.

Received   17-APRIL-97

Gary M. Brenneman

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft (or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date from the Warren Commission period, or were created in 1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection (OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is not indexed document by document).

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald. These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs, ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry

SECRET

f.16

TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: ▨Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb

NOTE FOR: *Ron L. Seckinger*
FROM: *Dennis D. Lamb*
DATE: *07/31/97 10:44:28*
SUBJECT: *The Nosenko Papers*

CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

SECRET

According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair: the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:

CC: John B. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L. MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger

MEMORANDUM

August 5, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

To: T. Jeremy Gunn

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley) who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964, to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment, Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the Sunbelt.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

6 October 1997

Note To: DO

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK sequestered collection as “not believed to be relevant” (NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a description of all NBRs to be made available to the public. Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions, call me on 31825. Thanks.

BH
Barry

Per phone call from Dennis Lamb 8 Oct 97 1:30+ p.m. CIC has no problem with attached description of Nosenko files.

BH

Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8A and B

Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services' handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Board Focal Point

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997

REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:

1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010, please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. State cover

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other components that should be consulted on this issue? Sue Burggraf was involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

CC: John Pereira @ DCI
Eileen Wukitch @ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

FAX Rec'd TODAY 10/31/97 Re NOSENKO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

SECRET

28 October 1997

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

NB

1. The Board intends to declassify and release for public consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency, even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price, in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's private life or on operational information pertaining to his debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be made to protect information that could affect his privacy and security. The question has been asked before. Should we not show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority. Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the USG would cause any potential source to think twice before placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr. Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past, entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

CL BY 0489514
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV DEF 2-82

SUBJECT:

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Resettlement Program.

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 5-82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

- (S) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per the JFK Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010 date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

- (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under "integrated State cover".

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State and copy of MOA between CIA and State). According to the ARRB staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them to me by COB Wednesday.

- Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton and/or State Cover. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents (3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. *Ramparts* Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA *Ramparts* Memorandum be declared NBR. The memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in *Ramparts* the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the *Ramparts* article. The relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232:

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (LINLUCK). The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration/appeal review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
OFFICE:
DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records

I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy Act.

I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and classification but I just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. I will not object to the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NBR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.

CC: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, Lee E. Carle-Y- @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM

13-00000

Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

****

CLASSIFIED FAX

SUBJECT: Nosenko

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson

SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060

DELIVER TO: Dennis Lamb

RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346

DATE TRANSMITTED: 10/10 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 7
(including cover sheet)

TRANSMITTED BY:

****

MESSAGE:

Classification of Material Transmitted

MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

NBR Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then current) incarceration by the CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the transcript is also included in this folder.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents in this folder have been released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment" prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress and a disciplinary problem and its resulting impact on his promotion schedule.

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his handling.

Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 22, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA sequestered collection microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files. The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to the understanding of the Nosenko story.

I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on Nosenko to be NBR.

e:\combs\nbr\nosenko.wpd
File 2.4, 4.0.2, and 4.20.5

CI-277-94
31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The documents are being reviewed for declassification and release as required by the JFK law.

2. **The Declassification Problem:** CSI's declassification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations officer--is representing the DO in the review process. Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two parts:

- Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's information about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union and his relationship with the KGB.
- A body of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material. For example:
  - -- Information on how CIA conducted operations in Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases) and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets. One US citizen the KGB developed is now a senior professor of history in California.

3. **Nosenko's Sensitivities:** I discussed with Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release of information on his personal life. I informed her of Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the release of material related to his association with CIA, and of his concern that future releases would endanger his privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great detail on Nosenko's personal life, including his problems with venereal disease and his relationships with women. Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man who has served as a CIA employee for more than three decades.

4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended that CIA move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy--strongly suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He told me in closing that later this year the Agency would have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center and said I believed we could provide the justification.

Robert Pringle

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

CONCUR:

/s/ — 2 Sept 94
John Pereira (AD/CSI) — Date

/s/ — 2 Sept 94
Barry Harrelson (CSI) — Date

/s/ — 6 Sept 94
Ellie Neiman — Date

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
1 - AD/CSI
✓1 - CSI (Harrelson)
1 - Neiman
1 - C/CIC Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Defector File

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V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964–67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly sure of the legal—I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody of the IO.

Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. KLEIN. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. KLEIN. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the spring of 1967.

Mr. KLEIN. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which Solie was a member.

Mr. KLEIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. MURPHY. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. KLEIN. OK.

Mr. MURPHY. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the Division.

Mr. KLEIN. But they would report to you?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

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Mr. KLEIN. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.

Mr. MURPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would not want to respond.

Mr. KLEIN. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as conditions and how it was changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart.

Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

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Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to possession of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the debriefing.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

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Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think, that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

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the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was—much of what he said was true.

Mr. KLEIN. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.

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Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, that they just—this is part of the first one—no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person. Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, they would be two different points. The first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic involving U-2's.

Mr. KLEIN. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. MURPHY. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a—they would talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe.

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Mr. KLEIN. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. And other things.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?

Mr. **Murphy.** I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. **Klein.** During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. **Murphy.** Probaby not.

Mr. **Klein.** Why would that have been?

Mr. **Murphy.** Because there were many other areas which posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. **Klein.** Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. **Murphy.** [CIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr. **Klein.** And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his interrogators?

Mr. **Murphy.** Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. **Klein.** As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. **Murphy.** I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. **Klein.** Two points——

Mr. **Murphy.** The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. **Klein.** But wouldn't——

Mr. **Murphy.** I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. **Klein.** Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. **Murphy.** I would certainly think so.

Mr. **Klein.** The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be——

Mr. **Murphy.** That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

one, or I am not aware of anyone
those officers concerned with this
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might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.

Mr. KLEIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. MURPHY. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean [CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that area at that time.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. MURPHY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KLEIN. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. MURPHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. KLEIN. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in April?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in 1966?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. Same thing.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his present testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

VOLUME III

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

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Washington, D.C. 20402

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I have read the foregoing pages
one through sixty-six, inclusive,
which contain a correct transcript
of the answers made by me to the
questions therein recorded. Signature
is subject to corrections.

/S/Nicholas Katzenbach

rchigiani, Notary Public in and for the
do hereby certify that I am notarizing
re for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas
th day of February 1979.

/S/Flora A. Marchiqiani
Notary Public in and for the
County of Westchester
State of New York

On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504

September 25, 1978

The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.

h my recollection and therefore would not
seem to me that in fairness to both the
hould make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

s, Esq.

Thursday, April 2, 1964

Harold Reis	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum	) Civil	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan	) Rights	9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff	) briefing	9:35 a.m.	SAW
John Douglas	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall	)	9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		11:55 a.m.	SAW
William Foley		12:27 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		1:50 p.m.	SAW
Marshal McShane		2:37 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		3:10 p.m.	SAW
William Geoghegan		3:25 p.m.	SAW
Edgar Cahn, O.L.C.		3:30 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		3:32 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		4:07 p.m.	SAW
[Lawrence Houston, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[David Murphy, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div.		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Defector Case]			
Addressed Brandeis Univ. Students (40) in AG's office		4:40 p.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum		6:45 p.m.	SAW
John Douglas		6:56 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		7:06 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		7:12 p.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan		7:15 p.m.	SAW

Friday, April 3, 1964

John Duffner (White Motor)		9:15 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum	)	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Harold Reis	) Civil	9:30 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff	) Rights	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall	) briefing	9:30 a.m	SAW
Jack Rosenthal	)	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan	)	9:30 a m.	SAW
NdeBK to Puerto Rico		10:15 a.m.	

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978

VOLUME IV

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41-373 O WASHINGTON : 1979

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Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 052-070-04906-5

have a say in what happens with respect
rtainly was involved with decisions on
to end, but I was not the controlling

re were three major agency reports that
the Nosenko case; specifically there was
by the Soviet Russia Division, another
l the Office of Security report, and then a
red to as the Hart report.
ther you are familiar with all three of

ll any longer whether I read the first two
riefed on their contents. The Hart report
the agency in early February 1973 and I
onnections with it since.
ing his defection in 1964 and upon his
tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

missed the question.
asking precisely during his defection in
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

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ntry were handled by the CIA, through
esettling period, whatever had to be done

at the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dulge me.
nly.
go, on September 20, 1978, I received a
before this committee in executive ses-
reviewing that transcript I noted that,
er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of
is an area of obvious interest to the
take this opportunity to describe my
t greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-
entral Intelligence Agency was.
a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure
e Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.
Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-
ed to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's
npanied by a claim that he could give a
ee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connec-
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-

e the significance that Yuri Nosenko's
vestigation of President Kennedy's as-
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

this information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President Kennedy's murder.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's contacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy.

If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko. Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosenko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Division; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosenko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day, April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole," which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

> statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.
>
> He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go.
>
> And then they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.
>
> And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.
>
> Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.
>
> Mr. SAYWER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.
>
> That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just read to this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April 3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

> Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

> After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone.
>
> I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memorandum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

> On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS—

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ABC NEWS

SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)

August 27, 1993

Transcript # 1337

TYPE: Show; Show

SECTION: News; Domestic

LENGTH: 8240 words

HEADLINE: Case Closed

GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr. PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent; ROBERT OSWALD, Brother

HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.

BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'm Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'

And-

SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying in your 20's or 30's?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are, the harder it is to detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in older women.

ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

'ALEX,' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of my life, I feel alive.

ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.

GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

[Commercial break]

Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event continues to haunt us all.

The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

[voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you'll want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.

1st NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph, medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

MAN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead. Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far too convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly [sp?], One bullet missed, struck the curb.

SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see - the cover-up is continuing.

SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the President.

GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy, acting alone.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they went around to prove that case.

SHERR: [voice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the next two.

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last year.

SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist - no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really, whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist, which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of its speed - fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the bullet.

SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to move back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have to fall backwards or aside.

SHERR: Because?

Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

2nd NEWSCASTER: [?] At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy sometime standing next to him.

Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car came to Parkland. Bad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the shots came from.

Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.

Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-

Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there, and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles [sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't hear any.

[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select Committee's tape?

Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot at all, even, to hear.

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings, that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.

3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly, there was a connection there.

Mr. POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the Warren Commission underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their behalf to wipe out Oswald?

Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself, a lone-gunman theory once again?

Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy theories about the assassination.

ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That S.O.B., I'll break his back'?

JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a table with some of its key henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy. They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have some reason to knock off Kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved, and there is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB? After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.

Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA's possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: [sp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted by any intelligence.

SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to the United States in 1963, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face.

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald could have shot the President for a very simple reason.

Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run, okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.

SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 16.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he usually got his game.

SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald, a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.

MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, O, S, W, A, L, D.

REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why did he kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was to be almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before Kennedy arrives in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist, but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but out experience is that people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.

SHERR: -which is where it took place-

WALTERS: Yeah.

SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERR: -than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERR: Right.

WALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses who have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more to come. Is that going to settle anything?

SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree - unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.

[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are discovering they have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After this.

[Commercial break]

It Could Happen to You

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.

TERESA ROBERSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in my family, so I was very surprised.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES

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HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY; GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:

The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."

A chapter in Posner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy's assassin, acting alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people. If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and what wasn't.

Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

Poking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."

After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation, perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was overwhelming," he said.

Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest, best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90 percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

'JFK' an 'abomination'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters, motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make bestseller lists, while the others don't.

"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy," Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' "

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie, "JFK," released in late 1991.

"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963. Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's not."

What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty, and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren Commission.

The no-longer magic bullet

Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in midair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots. More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."

Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes: "Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke, layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee Harvey Oswald." It quotes Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy theories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is "utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.' "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley, where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm, leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding in South America.

"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000 documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the 1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting, Posner said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life, culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald. But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said. "It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a patsy.

"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is disseminated again and again, becoming fact.

"Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles Cherney.

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.) See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993

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ESG 95-02
14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to maintain protection of this information.

2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record. These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets. We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees, and file numbers.

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SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO).

C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activity from different perspectives. Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect.

4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and informed that their name is being considered for release. This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations. We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie

Issue: **Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item #132 and ARRB document #31**

Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a specific document if that information is released by mistake in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex. liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher level. [response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a "new" highlighted version of the Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue: **The three documents of concern.**

GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I noted that since the document would not be included in the determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any effect on their decision.

PROENZA - Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be reduced to those words that could result in the identification of the agent.

Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM" source.

Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

"PRIVATE LINE TAP" - According the Marwell, the Board considered the issue of the "private lines" but since the paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is was hard to defend the individual released since she did not have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned Oswald but released the name in other calls which had nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part of looking at similar documents.

The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap" documents we can for special review]

Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence additional evidence since their next meeting was within the 30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to "appeal"; he would like a heads-up.

Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into the process a loop that would handle these types of situations.

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that **"STATIONS"** would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law.

September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "**STATIONS**" would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations, particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go over well. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law especially when citing harm. He specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B){copy attached} which sets a standard of "interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities".

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar themes including avoiding what he called "chicken little" arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s? "It would have been logical to have one during the Cold War."]

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

FEB 0 2 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination, Intelligence and Research, Department of State

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a joint tel-tap operation with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by the Board and requests the support of the Department of State should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of stations in Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, and Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by assurances to persons and foreign governments that information they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make those assurances in the future. (C)

CL BY 2103140
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; X5
DRV LOC 3-82
DRV LIS 3-82

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison. The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger

David N. Edger
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

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2 - ESG

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically, Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1. Jerusalem Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.

2. Open Period for Stations Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had no problem with the Sept 63-64 period and opening it up to '61 in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.

3. Substitutions for Nordic stations - Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered something less revealing like "Northern European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter option basically gives up what we want to protect.

Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC: John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO

~~SECRET~~

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goins @ DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
SUBJECT: JFK release of Tokyo station(S)

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange for a State Department person (Japan desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC: Robert D. Caudle
J. Barry Harrelson

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Barry H.

21 March 1997

JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-2"

1. References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the station, other bases, and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D. Rock)and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom had no objection to the declassification and/or release of "CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2" project / effort / activities.

J. Barry Harrelson

File: G:\HRG\JAPOL.DOC

~~SECRET~~

DD/O 95-3057

- 7 NOV 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM LOC 3-82

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program and will need to improve our relationship over the next several months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our station there would further hamper developmental relationships and eventual recruitments. (S)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Paris - No additional damage. (S)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specific damage. (S)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)

Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems support from Australia which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (S)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (S)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and Islamic extremism. (S)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.S. Government would lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

David Cohen

ER 96-0455/8

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

November 27, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE

The Honorable John M. Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Re: The Central Intelligence Agency's Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Deutch:

Since 1994, the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has been working with a number of Federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, to locate and publicly release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. These actions have been taken pursuant to The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) ("JFK Act"). We have been working with Mr. John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group and Mr. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group of CIA and have appreciated the cooperation we have received.

The purpose of this letter is to request your agency's cooperation in assisting the Review Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American people that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest reasonable extent. We want to assure the American people that the United States Government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. Indeed, one of the paramount purposes of the JFK Act is to certify to the public that the United States Government is not withholding relevant materials related to the assassination. *See, e.g., Assassination Materials Disclosure Act*, H. R. Rep. No. 102-625, Part 1, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) ("The Federal Government's failure to release official materials has contributed to numerous conspiracy theories and fueled charges of government complicity in the assassination . . . a salutary purpose is served in opening these files [relating to the JFK assassination] to allay the suspicion of government cover-up.").

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

The Review Board has recently considered how it, along with the relevant federal agencies, can best demonstrate to the American public that a thorough, good faith, and diligent effort has been made to locate and release all remaining assassination-related records within the control of the United States Government (and that the Government is not hiding any such materials from public disclosure). Pursuant to the Congressional mandate under the JFK Act to "create an enforceable, independent, and accountable process for the public disclosure of such records," 44 U.S.C. § 2107(2)(a)(3), the Review Board seeks to have the relevant federal agencies provide a complete and specific accounting of their efforts to locate and release assassination-related records, including a full explanation for any destruction of such records.

Accordingly, the Review Board requests that each relevant agency adhere to the formal compliance program (hereinafter "JFK Act Compliance Program") outlined below and devised by the Review Board pursuant to its powers under Section 7(j)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), and (F) of the JFK Act. We hereby request that you undertake the following measures by the dates provided (these dates were set in view of the fact that the Review Board's operations currently are scheduled to expire on September 30, 1997):

1. Designation of Agency Compliance Official (or officials) and statement of intent to comply with the JFK Act. We request that by December 9, 1996, your agency designate an Agency Compliance Official who ultimately will be responsible for ensuring that the agency has complied with its obligations under the JFK Act, including the identification, location, and organization of assassination records and the transmission of those records to the National Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives"). Although the Review Board assumes that Mr. John Pereira or Mr. Barry Harrelson will serve in this position, we nevertheless await your formal confirmation. If necessary, your agency may designate additional persons with knowledge of the measures that have been undertaken to locate assassination records.

   We also request that by December 9, 1996, the agency convey its agreement to adhere to the compliance procedures outlined in this letter. To the extent that any compliance procedure described below appears to be unreasonable or to present difficulties that we may not have anticipated, please explain why and make alternate suggestions to us.

2. Initial Statement of Compliance. We request that the Agency Compliance Official prepare, by January 6, 1997, an initial written statement of the

agency's compliance with the JFK Act ("Statement of Compliance"), setting forth the steps that the agency has taken to locate and process assassination records. The Review Board recognizes that many of the relevant federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have previously written letters to the Review Board apprising it of their progress at various stages of identifying and processing assassination records under the JFK Act. The Statement of Compliance, while it may include information previously reported to the Board, is to be the agency's comprehensive and final report to the American public of what it has done to locate records relating to the assassination. This Statement of Compliance shall include, to the fullest reasonable extent, the following information:

a. A complete description of all steps that your agency took to identify and locate assassination records including, but not limited to, an identification of the major record collections and files that were consulted in the agency's search, any departmental file indices consulted, the names and titles of the persons who were responsible for conducting the searches, the physical locations of the records that were searched, the off-site storage facilities (*e.g.*, Federal Records Centers) searched, the specific steps that were taken to locate and retrieve materials in archives, and any other criteria used by the agency to locate assassination records.

b. A description of the steps that the agency took in direct response to specific requests of the Review Board to locate certain additional records or information relating to the assassination. In particular, we ask that the CIA describe what specific steps it has taken to address the following requests: CIA-9, Publications and Analytical Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated March 6, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-11, Silvia Duran's Original Statement (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 3, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-12, JMWAVE Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 22, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); for HTLINGUAL records (*See* T. Jeremy Gunn Memorandum dated October 1, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson); and for Monthly Operational Reports on Cuban Exile Groups (*See* Manuel E. Legaspi Memorandum dated October 17, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson).

c. To the extent that any assassination-related records have been destroyed by the agency or any agency official, a full and specific explanation of the circumstances surrounding the destruction of such records.

d. The status of remaining work that you can now identify that needs to be completed by your agency in order to comply fully with the JFK Act, including an identification of the categories of records that must be processed and transmitted to the National Archives, a description of any additional searches for files that must be done, and the projected date(s) for completion of these tasks.

3. Review Board Interview With Agency Compliance Official (or Officials). Shortly after the submission of the agency's written Statement of Compliance, we ask that the Agency Compliance Official (as well as any persons who helped prepare the agency's initial Statement of Compliance) be made available to the Review Board for an interview regarding the location of agency assassination records. The interview will be used as an opportunity to resolve any outstanding questions regarding the agency's search, including any follow-up tasks to be completed by the agency. The Review Board anticipates that these interviews will be conducted in January 1997.

4. Submission of Final Agency Declaration of Compliance. By July 1, 1997, Federal agencies are expected to complete the process of identification, location, and declassification of its assassination records at which time they should submit to the Review Board a final declaration certifying, under oath, their compliance with the provisions of the JFK Act (the "Final Declaration of Compliance"). Because of the volume of CIA records, such a "final" statement may not be practicable at that time. However, we do expect that CIA will provide a complete status appraisal by July 1, 1997. This final declaration shall set forth all of the information initially set forth in the initial Statement of Compliance and shall also supplement the initial Statement of Compliance by detailing any further steps that were conducted by the agency in identifying and locating assassination records. The agencies' Final Declarations of Compliance will be included in our final report to Congress.

5. Compliance Depositions. Starting on or about August 1, 1997, the Review Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, may conduct depositions, under oath, of the Agency Compliance Official along with any other agency officials with responsibility for complying with the JFK Act. The decision to take a compliance deposition of an agency will be made on a case by case basis, taking into account the importance of the agency to the work of the JFK Act and the sufficiency of the agency's efforts to account fully for its compliance with the JFK Act. In the event that the Review Board decides to commence a compliance deposition of an agency, the responsible agency designee(s) will be expected to testify under oath with respect to any and all issues relating to the agency's record search, including the scope of the search, the identity of files searched, the destruction of any relevant records, and any other matters set forth in the Final Declaration of Compliance. Any person obligated to appear for a deposition under oath shall be fully entitled to obtain legal representation.

We look forward to receiving your initial response, by December 9, that designates your Agency Compliance Official and includes your statement regarding your position with respect to the provisions outlined in this letter. To the extent that you have any questions or suggestions regarding the Compliance Program, please do not hesitate to contact our General Counsel, T. Jeremy Gunn, at (202) 724-0088.

Thank you for your cooperation with our work.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

cc: The Honorable Nora Slatkin, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Michael O'Neil, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency
Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

9 December 1996

David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Marwell:

The Director of Central Intelligence has forwarded to me your 27 November 1996 letter for response. I commend the efforts of the Review Board and its staff in reviewing and releasing hundreds of thousands of United States Government documents for greater public understanding about the assassination of President Kennedy. I also confirm the Central Intelligence Agency's commitment to continue working closely with the Review Board in carrying out its statutory authorities.

With regard to the requests made in your letter, I understand the Review Board's desire to demonstrate to the public that it has carried out its duties thoroughly and diligently. You have requested that CIA appoint an Agency Compliance Official to be responsible for ensuring CIA's compliance with its obligations under the JFK Act. The DCI has full confidence in Mr. John Pereira as Chief of the Historical Review Group (HRG) and has determined that Mr. Pereira will continue to act as the CIA official responsible for ensuring full compliance with the JFK Act and will remain the Agency's focal point with the Review Board.

You have also requested that CIA provide an Initial Statement of Compliance. Mr. Pereira and Mr. Barry Harrelson, the senior review officer for HRG, as well as the rest of the HRG staff, have always been available to you without restriction. The Review Board and your staff have been provided access to any relevant documents or information you have requested. As you know, the Review Board was fully informed as to the steps CIA took to designate Agency records as part of the President Kennedy collection. HRG has also arranged for multiple briefings by senior CIA officials from a wide variety of CIA components so that the Review Board can better understand the information it is reviewing. Given the current effective relationship between HRG and your staff, should you require additional assurances of this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, I suggest that you contact Messrs. Pereira and

Harrelson directly. As usual, they will provide you with the specific information you need as quickly as possible to continue to record CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

As to your request for a complete description of the steps CIA has taken to respond to specific requests, I understand that there are several outstanding requests. HRG has assured me that these requests have been discussed with your staff and responses will be provided to you as quickly as possible. Given the number and breadth of the requests that are being made by the Review Board and the limited staff resources available to CIA to process such requests, I ask that the Review Board continue to prioritize all its requests for information or documents. With the Review Board's priorities established in this way, the Agency can immediately work on those requests that are most important to the Review Board. Of course, as CIA responds to these requests, HRG will provide any information the Review Board needs as to how the searches were conducted. I believe that this method will best meet the needs of the Review Board and will allocate CIA's limited resources in the most efficient manner possible.

Finally, as to your requests to interview CIA officials responsible for this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, Mr. Pereira has always been available to the Review Board for informal discussions as well as for giving sworn testimony including depositions. CIA has never objected to the Review Board deposing or interviewing informally any of its current or former employees and has, in fact, facilitated such interviews. You will also recall that, on 6 August 1996, Messrs. Pereira and Harrelson gave sworn testimony at an open hearing of the Review Board.

I trust that this responds to the concerns raised in your letter. Of course, if you should have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Linda C. Cipriani, an attorney in the Office of General Counsel, at (703) 874-3124.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

Michael J. O'Neil

David G. Marwell

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani/76124 (2 Dec 96)

OGC-96-53203

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

April 16, 1997

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Compliance Program and Requests for Additional Information and Records

Dear Barry:

I am writing to memorialize the Review Board's understanding of the status of CIA's responses to our formal and informal requests for additional information and records that have been requested pursuant to the Review Board's authority under Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii)of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (JFK Act).

It is important that everyone at the Agency who is responsible for providing answers to our requests for additional information and records understand that the answers will need to be incorporated by reference into the Agency's Final Compliance Statement. Essentially, CIA will need to attest, under oath, that it has made all reasonable and diligent searches and that its answers are true and correct to the extent of the best, reasonably available information. In this regard, is important to note that when the Review Board requests, for example, a 201 file, it is ***not*** asking that you identify relevant records within the Sequestered Collection. ***Rather***, it is asking to review the original 201 file in its current and most complete version.[1]

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[1] The Review Board has no basis for assuming that a 201 file as it appears in the Sequestered Collection today is necessarily complete. It is fully possible that a relevant document was not identified by CIA or the HSCA in 1978-79 and therefore is not included in the Sequestered Collection, or that a relevant document that was initially placed in the Sequestered Collection in 1978-79 may have been misplaced at some point during the subsequent twenty years. Therefore, in response to requests for files, ***it is not sufficient merely to point to places where responsive records appear in the Collection.*** On a case-by-case basis, we are very willing to hear your explanations for the possible burdensomeness of any particular search or your analysis of why a search

As we have written in our formal requests and as we have said to you orally, you should interpret our requests in the broadest reasonable sense. However, to the extent that you believe that a request poses an unreasonable burden that we may not have anticipated, or to the extent that you have suggestions to modify or to amend our requests in such a way as to better reach our goals, you should not hesitate to make suggestions or seek clarification. However, unless we specifically hear from you to the contrary, it is our presumption that CIA will respond fully to the requests as posed.

In response to your request, the ARRB staff has now identified six of our outstanding requests as high priority issues. We would appreciate your forwarding to us as much responsive material as you are reasonably able to assemble during the upcoming two weeks with regard to these six issues. We wish to obtain a reasonably complete response to these requests within one month. These six issues are identified in the text by double asterisks (**).[2]

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts involving first, the formal requests for information and records, and second, the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.[3]

I. Formal Requests.

CIA-1 Organizational Material.

> CIA has collected information responsive to this request for Review Board action. The ARRB staff has identified records that it believes will enhance the

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will not be fruitful.

[2] As identified more fully below, the six issues are: CIA-7 (Histories); CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-assassination files); personnel assigned to a designated post; QKENCHANT; the electronic take from the Mexico City Station; and files on George Stanley Brown.

[3] This memorialization follows-up, in large part, on your conversations of March 19 and 20, 1997 with Michelle Combs and on the DO and DS&T briefings to the ARRB staff on April 1, 1997.

historical understanding of the assassination by providing some background on CIA records.

CIA should now review the DO and DS&T organizational material and re-examine some of the proposed redactions. Several documents have been cleared by the directorate IRO's for either release in full or release with minor redactions.[4] The ARRB staff will consult with CIA to determine whether these records should be designated "assassination records" or whether they could be made available publicly in a manner similar to the material from the 1996 Boston trip. HRG would like to discuss this issue before the materials are formally put before the Review Board.

CIA-2 through CIA-5.

These requests have been satisfied and no further action is needed by CIA.

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[4] These are:

DCI
- –Organization of the Office of the Director 1963
- –Mission Statements for 1959, 1962, 1965 and 1966
- –some Office of the Director notices
- –OGC and IG Mission Statements for 1964, 1966, 1969, 1975, and 1976
- –OLC Mission Statement for 1975 and 1976

DI
- –Organization and Functions of the DI pre-1961
- –Organizational Charts for 1961, 1964, and 1969
- –Mission Statements for 1961, 1963, 1964, 1966, and 1970

DA
- –Mission Statements 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1974
- –Organizational Chart 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, and 1966
- –Office of Security Organizational Charts for 1956, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1975
- –Office of Security Mission Statements for 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1969, and 1975.

CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches.

The Review Board first made this request on September 11, 1995. On September 11, 1995, CIA agreed to make these materials available by December, 1995. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to make these materials available by November, 1996.

We are aware that many of the cables requested are already in the JFK files, but not all are included. Those that we have not been able to locate in the collection include: Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26-30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26-30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26-November 21, 1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26-November 21, 1963); and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26-October 20, 1963 and November 22-December 30, 1963.

**CIA-7 Histories.

The Review Board first requested access to several internal CIA histories and to indices of histories on November 8, 1995. On August 8, 1996, after reviewing a list of histories that you provided, the ARRB staff designated approximately sixty histories for which further review was sought. To date, the ARRB staff has reviewed the seven histories that CIA has made available and has made suggestions with respect to further processing of those seven histories. CIA should make the remaining sixty-plus histories available.

CIA-8 Intelligence Community Staff records.

The Review Board first requested information on the Intelligence Community Staff on March 1, 1996. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to report on the status of this request within two weeks. The Review Board has not yet received any substantive response to this request.

CIA-9 Intelligence Community publications on Cuba or USSR (November 20-30, 1963).

The LBJ Library has already identified several publications for mandatory review.[5] Michelle Combs reviewed the materials and identified some that should probably become available to the public. The DI has been tasked to locate the additional publications that have been requested.

CIA-10 Interagency Source Register.

CIA has provided a full description of the ISR, which should now be submitted as a formal response to the Review Board's request. Once the formal statement is provided, this request will be complete. (Under separate cover, the Review Board is sending to you an additional request for information and records, CIA-17, which provides a list of names that we request you check against the Interagency Source Register.)

CIA-11 Sylvia Duran materials.

CIA reports that it has exhausted its reasonable leads for pursuing additional information. CIA has agreed to provide a formal letter for the record detailing what searches were done and confirming that the responsive document currently in the JFK collection is a true copy of the original letter. Once this formal statement is provided, this request will be complete.

CIA-12 JMWAVE and David Sanchez Morales.

On May 22, 1996, the Review Board requested access to "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files" relating to five persons allegedly connected to JMWAVE. It is our understanding that, in response to this request, several months ago CIA located and made available for our review many records responsive to this request. However, it is also our understanding that all of the records provided were located in the Sequestered Collection.

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[5] They include:

Intelligence Report (11/22/63; 11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 12/11/63; 12/13/63; 12/18/63; and 12/20/63).

Intelligence Memorandum (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/25/63; 4/20/64; and 10/16/64).

President's Intelligence Checklist (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 11/28/63; and 11/30/63).

As stated in the second paragraph at the beginning of this letter, we seek to review the original files that we have requested. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-13 Mexico City Backchannel Communications.

This request, dated November 1, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-14 Mexico City Station Annual Reports.

This request, dated December 23, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-15 Win Scott files identified in Russ Holmes Files.

CIA has completed its response and no further action is needed.

**CIA-16 Oswald Pre-Assassination Files.

The HRG reportedly received a lengthy answer from the Office of Security on the LHO files and a formal response to the Review Board's request is in process. Oswald's Office of Security file has been located and will be delivered to HRG for review in April. Access to other files will require a special request from HRG to the Office of Security and should be requested by HRG for ARRB staff review.

II. Informal Requests.

All of the following informal requests have previously been made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.

**CIA-IR-01 Personnel assigned to post from 1959-64 (*see* RIF 104-10065-10199).

This request, originally made in November 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. It is our understanding that the DO believes that it is not able to answer this request. The ARRB staff does not find DO's response to be credible. We believe that with all of the resources at the Agency's disposal -- including ready contact with individuals who should be able to answer this question from memory -- this question can be answered.[6] The ARRB staff has provided suggestions as to how this information could be obtained, including suggesting the types of files and cables that could be searched.

CIA-IR-02 Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.

The cable was delivered to the Review Board on March 20, 1997. No further action by CIA is needed.

CIA-IR-03 Full computer search for list of documents in HTLINGUAL file.

CIA should undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.

CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's files.

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for *Mangold v. CIA*. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.

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[6] The ARRB staff has spoken with a retired CIA official who claims to be able to answer this question from memory, but who refused to do so.

CIA-IR-05 Possible foreign source for records on Oswald.

CIA was informally requested, more than two years ago, to use its contacts to pursue certain records related to Oswald that were orally described to CIA. The Review Board believed that, for reasons of security classification of information, it would be appropriate for CIA to make the initial inquiries rather than the Review Board. Under separate cover, we are providing documentation of the action the Review Board has taken to further this request.

**CIA-IR-06 QKENCHANT.

The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of QKENCHANT and its connection with Clay Shaw, Howard Hunt, and Monroe Sullivan.

The Review Board was initially provided some information in regard to this request that now appears to be incorrect. CIA is now seeking additional information to correct or to clarify its previous answers. The Review Board seeks an immediate, full, and accurate response to this request.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart.

The ARRB staff has reviewed all records that CIA has been able to locate to date. During the course of this review, additional questions were raised that you agreed to pursue. You also agreed to conduct additional searches to determine whether there may be additional retrievable records on Mr. Capehart.

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memoranda.

HRG will locate this item.

CIA-IR-09 George Bush computer search.

The Review Board provided CIA with a copy of an FBI document, dated November 29, 1963, prepared under the name of John Edgar Hoover, which states: "The substance of the foregoing information [on the assassination of President Kennedy] was orally furnished to Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency . . . ." We have been informed that the DO has no record of a "George Bush" being in the employ of CIA in 1963 with the exception of Mr. George William Bush who has already given a sworn affidavit that he is not the

"George Bush" in question. CIA is now checking whether the search query included George Herbert Walker Bush prior to 1970. CIA should determine whether George Herbert Walker Bush is the person to whom the memorandum refers and should provide a definitive statement regarding the scope of its search and the basis of its conclusion.

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports.

CIA will determine whether the IG's office maintains an index or inventory of its reports and determine whether the IG's office prepared a report on the handling of Oswald.

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission critics.

We are asking that CIA determine whether it possesses any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher. The Review Board is not requesting information *per se* regarding any FOIA requests by these individuals or any Public Affairs news clippings.[7]

CIA-IR-12 Contacts with journalists or publishing houses.

The Review Board seeks to determine to what extent, if any, CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. This request, originally discussed in March 1997, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO had no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-IR-13 Office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba.

The Review Board requested that CIA make a particular personnel file available. The file was made available by CIA for review. The Review Board will discuss with you whether any further steps need to be taken.

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[7] To the extent that CIA possesses FOIA files or records on any of these individuals, and to the extent that those records contain information that was not filed with the courts, such records ***are being requested for review by the Review Board.***

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge files.

CIA (OGC) will determine the disposition of the files of Scott D. Breckinridge.

**CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City Station.

The Review Board has for some time been attempting to determine whether it has had access to all of CIA's surveillance "take" from the Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination. On numerous occasions, the Review Board has asked whether there was any surveillance take in addition to what is currently in the collection.

On March 18, 1997, the Review Board provided additional leads to CIA to assist it in answering these questions. The DO has agreed to check Headquarters records for the file referenced in HMMW 12454, to search for the crypts cited in this document, and to search for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. The DS&T will query its offices for possible records on Mexico City and Cuba and for the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods.

CIA-IR-16 U-2 files.

DS&T will provide a folder title print out of U-2 materials for Review Board examination, check for records filed under Richard Bissell's name, and search for OSP files. DS&T has also contacted Lockheed for assistance.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro assassination plots.

HRG will furnish the 1967 IG Report to provide possible search query suggestions for DS&T follow-up.

CIA-IR-18 DO Office.

The Review Board has requested orally information about a particular DO office. We understand that you are collecting the relevant information.

CIA-IR-19 Computer searches.

The Review Board has requested that full computer searches be conducted on all of the following people and organizations. The results of the searches should be documented.

Name	Results/Comments
1. Spas Raikin	ARRB awaits documentation.
2. Leo Cherne	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file starts in 1988. HRG is checking on a 201. No OMS file.
3. Hunter Leake	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG is checking for a DCD file.
4. Marilyn Dutz Murret	ARRB awaits documentation.
5. John McVickar	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file. DO is checking.
6. Andy Anderson	ARRB awaits documentation.
7. Byron B. Morton, Jr.	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
8. Marie Cheatham	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
9. Paul Garbler	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file. OMS file. HRG has requested personnel file.
10. Verna Deane Brown	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file.
** 11. George Stanley Brown	ARRB awaits documentation.
12. Howard Guebler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
13. Gordon Duane Novel	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
14. Ed Butler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
15. INCA (Information Council of the Americas)	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
16. Permindex	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.

Conclusion

Please let me know if you have any supplements or corrections. We would very much like to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously. As always, we appreciate your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and
Associate Director for Research and Analysis

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

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DRV FRM: LOC 3-82

(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

-- Warren Commission, 1963-64
-- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
-- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
-- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
-- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79
* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

(AIUO) -- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO) C. Key figures
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

13-00000

DRAFT

October 16, 1997

HAND-DELIVERED

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Barry:

In connection with the work of the CIA to locate and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("JFK Act"), please submit to the Review Board the CIA's initial formal report regarding its work.

As you know, the procedures for documenting the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act were set forth in the Review Board's November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA Director. These procedures entailed the submission of an intial report by the CIA, which we referred to as an Initial Statement of Compliance. This past Spring, we informally agreed to extend the time for submission of the Initial Compliance Statement pending ongoing work of the CIA under the JFK Act.

To facilitate the completion of the CIA's work by September 1998, including the submission to Congress of a final report detailing the work accomplished by the CIA and other Federal agencies under the JFK Act, please submit the CIA's Initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board no later than November 6, 1997.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
and General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

DRAFT

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

October 17, 1997

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Completion of Review of Assassination Records

Dear John:

The Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has less than one year to complete its statutory responsibility of ensuring that all Federal records related to the assassination of President Kennedy are made publicly available at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"). Because of the importance to the Review Board of completing the review and release of Central Intelligence Agency records, I am taking this opportunity to raise with you some of our concerns and to describe our goals.

Let me first reiterate our deep appreciation for the cooperation that we have received thus far from the Agency. We are very mindful of the enormous amount of work that has been accomplished thus far. We very much hope to be able to report, at the completion of our work, that the Agency has fully complied with the letter and spirit of the JFK Act and that the Review Board is confident that all CIA assassination records have been fully processed and transferred to the National Archives. Unfortunately, it is clear at this point that the pace of review of CIA records will need to increase significantly during this final year so that the Review Board and the CIA will be able to complete our responsibilities and that the Review Board can issue the type of report that we all ideally envision.

It is our goal to have all CIA assassination records reviewed and transferred to NARA by September 1, 1998. By "all" assassination records, I include the unredacted originals as well as copies containing Board-approved postponements. (I am excluding, therefore, duplicates of those records that have been transferred to NARA.) The Review Board is prepared to take all necessary steps within its statutory authority to ensure that this work is accomplished.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

The Review Board has promised Congress that this work will be completed by September 1998. The Review Board also is obligated to keep Congress informed, on a monthly basis, of the steps it has taken to ensure completion of this goal. We now need to keep Congress informed of any difficulties that we are facing in the course of completing this work.

As you know, the JFK Act in many ways imposed difficult obligations. For example, it required the CIA (and other agencies) to complete its review and transfer of records to NARA within 300 days of the time the statute was enacted in 1993. Although this statutory deadline was not met, we would like to make it as clear as we possibly can that we intend to ensure that the goal to review and transfer all assassination records to NARA is accomplished during the lifetime of the Review Board.

We have raised with you previously our concerns about whether the Agency has allocated sufficient resources to complete its work on its assassination records by September 1, 1998. In a meeting at CIA headquarters on October 16, 1996, CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin promised members of the Review Board that the CIA would devote whatever resources are necessary to complete the task.

In order to ensure that this work is completed, the Review Board has developed a timetable for review of remaining CIA records. The CIA's Historical Review Group suggests that refinement of the timetable is necessary, but has of yet offered no specific changes.

In order to fulfill our responsibilities under the JFK Act and in order to honor our pledge to Congress, we believe that the following steps are necessary:

> *First*, we need to establish a reasonable but strict schedule for the CIA's review and release of records. The CIA must devote all of the resources necessary to review the records under this schedule. We believe that the only way to ensure that the CIA's work is completed is to adhere to such a schedule.
>
> *Second*, if the CIA has not completed its scheduled review by the proposed deadline, the Review Board will require that all CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act be transferred forthwith to the National Archives regardless of whether they have been reviewed or processed by the CIA pursuant to the Board's authority at 44 U.S.C. § 2107.7(j)(B).

> *Third,* the Board will presumptively vote to open in full all records that have not been reviewed in conformity with the schedule.

We can assure you that we have no desire whatsoever to take steps two and three. However, at this point, we see no other method for satisfying our obligation to ensure that the CIA's assassination-related records are released by September 1998, unless the CIA agrees to schedule the review in a timely, consistent, methodical, and enforceable manner. Although you should not hesitate to contact us regarding any ideas you have for streamlining or improving the accomplishment of this task, there should be no misunderstanding by the Agency regarding what we believe our goal to be and the steps that we are prepared to take to ensure the fulfillment of our statutory obligations and our promises to Congress. It is our perception that if the Agency allocates additional resources to the accomplishment of this project, we all will be able to accomplish the goals of the JFK Act.

We therefore strongly urge the Agency to allocate now whatever resources are necessary to complete its review records in an orderly and systematic manner. To the extent that the Agency is able to meet the necessary deadlines, there will be no need for us to resort to the extreme -- but potentially necessary – measures to complete our obligations to Congress and the American people.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

October 30, 1997

VIA FACSIMILE

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

I have been asked by Jeremy Gunn to take responsibility, along with Robert Skwirot and Michelle Combs, for handling the Review Board's JFK Act Compliance Program with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Gunn has informed me that you have agreed to provide us with the CIA's initial compliance statement (as it is described in our November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA) by the end of November 1997. Thereafter, we can establish a reasonable time for the CIA to prepare and submit its Final Declaration of Compliance. The CIA's Final Declaration will be submitted to Congress and the President.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

February 11, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: CIA Initial Compliance Statement To Be Submitted Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

Thank you for submitting to the Review Board the CIA's December 11, 1997 DRAFT of its initial Statement of Compliance under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act ("JFK Act"). You submitted the draft to obtain the Review Board's initial comments. We have made a preliminary review of the draft and offer the following comments.

The Statement is helpful in providing general background history regarding the measures undertaken by the CIA to assemble files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Statement also gives a good overview description of those files. At this time, we do not propose that you make any major changes that would delay the formal submission of the initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board.[1]

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[1] We note that the initial draft statement generally describes the records identified in response to specific Review Board requests. For the initial Compliance Statement, this will be sufficient. To the extent that additional records are later identified or requests completed, these can be included in the Final Declaration of Compliance. We also note that "[t]he status, results and documentation of specific [Review Board] requests" are more specifically being addressed in separate memoranda being submitted to the Review Board, and this process is ongoing. These responses are extremely helpful in articulating what the CIA has done to search for records on the JFK assassination. Therefore, the Review Board will request that these detailed responses ultimately be incorporated by reference into the Final Declaration of Compliance.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

Therefore, please submit the CIA's official initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board as soon as possible, but no later than March 16, 1998.

After formal submission of the CIA's initial Statement of Compliance, we would schedule an informal interview with you (and perhaps other members of the Historical Review Group) to ask questions regarding the Compliance Statement and regarding the sufficiency of the CIA's record searches. After addressing any outstanding issues, the CIA would thereafter submit its Final Declaration of Compliance.

I recognize that you are extremely busy processing CIA records for inclusion in the JFK Collection. However, it is essential that the CIA devote sufficient time and attention to its Final Declaration of Compliance because, as we have stated before, the Final Declaration will constitute the CIA's representation to the American public, under oath, that the CIA has diligently searched for records relating to the JFK assassination and that the CIA is not withholding any materials regarding the assassination.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.
(By facsimile)

2/13/98

BEFORE
THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DECLARATION OF BRIAN LATELL

I, Brian Latell, do hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (``CSI'') for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA or ``Agency'') and have held this position since September 1994. I also hold the position of Chairman of the Editorial Board (``Board'') for *Studies in Intelligence* (*Studies*), a publication of CSI. I have served as a foreign intelligence officer for the United States Government for over 36 years and, at CIA, I have held a variety of senior positions of management and analytical responsibility including serving as a member of the National Intelligence Council for 14 years and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America for four of those years. I hold a doctorate, masters and undergraduate degree from Georgetown University, have served as a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and presently hold an appointment to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service as an Adjunct Professor.

2. The purpose of this declaration is to provide the Assassination Records Review Board with my view of the status of *Studies* as a classified publication available within the Intelligence Community and as an unclassified publication available to the public. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

3. *Studies* is an independent, scholastic endeavor with the mission to promote scholarship in intelligence literature. Articles submitted to *Studies* are intended for educational purposes only and present solely the personal, academic views of the individual authors. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Board. Its criterion for publication is whether the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence. Articles submitted to *Studies* are not required to be coordinated through channels and, indeed, are not vetted through management by either the Board or the author. In addition to senior Agency officers, the Board also has membership representing other agencies of the Intelligence Community.

4. In the beginning of *Studies*, articles were primarily written by CIA authors. In the past decade, however, *Studies* has been enriched by an increasing number of contributions from authors from other components of the Intelligence Community, from members of the academic world in the United States and abroad, and from a few private citizens, most of whom have had some past intelligence connection. The Board welcomes this trend and looks forward to increasing contributions from non-Agency authors.

5. Once an article is submitted for consideration in *Studies* it is circulated to the members of the Board for their review. The Board then decides whether an article meets the criteria for publication and, if it does, begins the publication process. All unclassified submissions are reviewed by the Publications Review Board (PRB)[1] to ensure the unclassified nature of the article. The articles are edited, approved by the Chief of CSI, and published in the classified version of *Studies*. Most of the unclassified articles published in this version are then picked up by the unclassified version of *Studies* and with further slight editing are published. If an article has been deemed to contain classified information by its author, and it is subsequently requested to be released, it will be reviewed

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[1] PRB is the same body that reviews private writings proposed for publication by current and former Agency employees as required under Agency regulation.

by either the History Staff, the Historical Review Program, or more recently by the Publications Review Board -- pursuant to the personal manuscript standards -- to allow declassification or the creation of an unclassified version. By deeming or marking a given article as classified, we represent only that this personal writing contains some information of a proprietary (hence classified) nature to the US Government; that fact does not alter the nature of this private work or convert it into an official federal record containing official government information.

6. The independence and integrity of the Board, and its historical commitment to academic traditions, has never been questioned by Agency management. I, as well as several of my predecessors, can recall no cases of interference by Agency management with the publication decisions of the Board, no matter how sensitive the subject matter or critical of the Agency. Indeed, it is the antithesis of official information and the embodiment of personal, academic scholarship and work. The very intent is academic in the context of educational mentoring from one individual to those in succeeding generations. The Agency teaches through its institutional and official course materials; individual intelligence officers teach personally through *Studies*.

7. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that, while ``*Studies in Intelligence*'' is published under the auspices of the United States Government, it is neither an expression of official information nor an official release of official Executive Branch information, but rather a forum for the private academic expressions of the authors.

8. Executed this 13th day of February 1998 at Fairfax County, Virginia.

BRIAN LATELL

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12 february 1998

draft by marty; revisions by lss

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

19 March 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Gunn:

Re: STATEMENT CONCERNING ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

The following is a listing of the principal measures taken to date by the Agency to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (the Act). Note: it does not include the numerous informal meetings, conversations, and exchanges between ARRB and HRP staff members, many of which covered all of the measures.

INITIAL SEARCHES

a. In early 1992, even before the Act was passed, the Chief of the CIA History Staff reported to the Director that the staff had located all of the so-called "sequestered collection" (those records compiled by the Agency for the House Select Committee On Assassinations investigation) and had surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination both at Headquarters and at the Agency records center. The sequestered collection contained sixty-four record center-size boxes. In addition, the staff had located sixteen boxes of Lee Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders mainly from Mexico Station records that were collected for the Warren Commission.

b. Before the ARRB was appointed by the President, John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence, sent a memorandum dated 25 October 1993 to the Agency directorates requesting a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, the JFK assassination, and any documents related to the assassination. This effort and discussions with various Agency components and Agency Information Release Officers over the past four years resulted in more than 31 additional boxes of materials being sent for review. Included within this material were 19 boxes of JFK working files based on the sequestered collection, two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of LA Division documents and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs period. Not all of this material is related to the JFK story; and in some boxes only a few folders had anything to do with the assassination or events surrounding it. To date, the ARRB staff has designated approximately 22 boxes of this material as assassination records. In addition, about 400 pages of material from an FOIA request for minutes of the DCI's morning meetings which related to JFK were added to the collection. The search for documents is a continuing effort. Guidelines for this effort have been sent to Agency individuals and components which review documents and materials in the course of their work.

REVIEWS

c. Historical Review Group, now the Historical Review Program, reviewed boxes 1 through 63 of the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file and released most of the documents therein either in full or in sanitized form to the National Archives in August 1993. The total number of pages released by CIA prior to or during August 1993 was approximately 123,000. An additional release of approximately 30,000 pages of HSCA material from the sequestered collection was made in 1995.

d. Box 64 of the sequestered collection contained 72 reels of microfilm primarily dealing with Directorate of Operations materials and Office of Security files. In addition there were 22 reels of 201 files on 151 individuals. Following release of the main collection in August 1993, HRG staff members reviewed the microfilm files and released approximately 74,000 pages of material to the National Archives either in full or in sanitized form.

e. The status of HRP's review of additional records and re-review of the sequestered collection will be addressed in regular progress reports to the ARRB staff.

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND INFORMATION

f. The Agency maintains a rather unique and non-integrated files system which precludes a single query on a particular subject and the expected response from the files of all directorates. Following coordination with the ARRB staff, the Agency arranged for the staff to be briefed by a representative of each directorate concerning the nature of the files within the directorate -- how they are organized, maintained, searched, and how they have been searched previously for assassination-related materials. Following this effort, the ARRB staff asked for a number of additional searches by the Agency and they are in various stages of completion.

g. In addition, pursuant to requests both formal and informal from the ARRB staff, HRP has tasked various elements of the Agency to conduct special searches for other materials thought to be relevant to the assassination story. Included in this category was the Oswald security file which was found and has been examined by the ARRB staff. Although a number of the requests are still outstanding, considerable material has been provided for review by the ARRB staff some of which has been found to be relevant. These materials include the History Staff's histories on various CIA operations and Agency components; files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or HSCA investigations; and the product of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Those parts of these materials which are determined by the ARRB staff to have relevancy to the assassination story will be reviewed by HRP and released as completed.

The status, results, and documentation of specific requests are to be addressed in a separate memorandum.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

July 7, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

HAND DELIVERY

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Chief, JFK Project
Historical Review Program
Office of Information Management
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Final Search for all Original CIA Records Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Dear Barry:

This letter is in follow-up to our meeting of June 26, 1998, where we discussed the comprehensiveness of CIA's search for assassination records. As we expressed in the meeting, the Assassination Records Review Board is extremely concerned as to whether all original records held by the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly those controlled by the Directorate of Operations, have been identified in previous searches for records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board is aware that the former Chief of the Historical Review Group, John Pereira, ordered a search of all CIA records in 1993. Since that date, however, we have identified at least three examples of records clearly relevant to the assassination that have been identified through the efforts of the Review Board staff and that were subsequently located by CIA. These records were not identified through the 1993 CIA search.

In order to comply with the strictures of the JFK Act and to ensure that all original CIA records relevant to the assassination are identified, the Review Board requests the following:

1. CIA conduct a new search of all Office of Security and Directorate of Operations (including all counterintelligence components), for any documents relevant to the assassination. Particular care should be taken to examine possibly relevant documents dated shortly before and any time after the 1993 search.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

2. CIA Director George Tenet send a directive to all CIA personnel that explictly requires all offices to search their files and notify the Historical Review Program immediately if they have any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created after 1992.

3. CIA arrange for a meeting between the Review Board staff and appropriate CIA officials to discuss CIC and other counterintelligence records.

4. CIA conduct a search for updated or continued records on individuals, from a list of names to be provided by the Review Board, of subjects who were of interest to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We are particularly interested in any records that CIA acquired on these subjects since the original files were sequestered in 1978. A list will be provided to you shortly.

The Review Board appreciates your cooperation and assistance in resolving these issues. As time is growing short, we would like very much to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Assassination Records Review Board
Mr. James Oliver
Lee Strickland, Esq.

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

July 15, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

I am writing to address the completion of CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"), including submission by CIA of a Final Declaration of Compliance certifying, under the Act, its work to identify and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. As we have advised CIA previously, the Final Declaration will constitute CIA's representations, under penalty of perjury, regarding disclosure of its records relating to the Kennedy assassination.

Accordingly, set forth below is our understanding of (1) the status for completion of CIA's work under the JFK Act and (2) the form and content of CIA's Final Declaration.

A. Completion of CIA's Work Under the JFK Act

1. Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998

We confirmed with CIA that it intends to place into the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"), by September 1998, all identified assassination records except certain documents confirmed by the Review Board staff as being duplicates, which may be processed later.[1] Thus, CIA commits to placing the following assassination records into the JFK Collection by September 30, 1998:

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[1] In addition, some peripheral documents may be processed after September 1998, but only if identified beforehand to, and approved by, the Review Board.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

- Non-duplicate documents within the hardcopy set of the CIA-House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") Sequestered Collection (*i.e*, CIA files that were reviewed by the HSCA for its investigation of the JFK assassination and which were sequestered pursuant to agreement of the CIA and HSCA).[2]

- Non-duplicate documents within the microfilm version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (the microfilm version is a more expansive set of records than the hardcopy set of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection in that it contains complete underlying files, not just the specific records reviewed by the HSCA).[3]

- Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.[4] As for the microfilm copy of the Oswald 201 file (which we assume duplicates the original Oswald 201 file processed by the CIA), we request that it be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998 (after Review Board examination). Certain recently discovered documents relating to Oswald also must be added to the JFK Collection.

- Lee Harvey Oswald's Office of Security File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.

- Marina Oswald's 201 File. While Marina Oswald's 201 file has been processed for the JFK Collection (as part of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection), we request that the original file be transferred to the protected portion of the JFK

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[2] As CIA has reported, the hard copy and microfilm versions of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection were first placed into the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994. *See* CIA Initial Statement of Compliance (dated March 19, 1998), at 2. Documents from those collections are being re-processed, however, to the extent that the Review Board has mandated that such documents be opened up to a greater extent.

[3] NARA reports that it does not have the computerized version of the record identification forms ("RIFs") for documents in the microfilm Sequestered Collection. CIA explained that it must first complete the processing of non-duplicates and update the computer data before that data is transferred to NARA. CIA anticipates that this will be done sometime after October 1998.

[4] However, NARA reports that many documents do not have the proper RIFs attached. CIA will coordinate with NARA to correct this.

Collection by September 1998.

- Non-duplicate documents within Kennedy assassination working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes (19 boxes).
- Non-duplicate documents selected from 7 boxes of Latin American Division working files.
- CIA organizational materials, including the JMWAVE organizational chart specifically designated as an assassination record by the Review Board [CIA-1].[5]
- Excerpts of certain CIA histories designated by the Review Board [CIA-7].
- Excerpts of CIA's "Family Jewels" memorandum [CIA-IR-08].[6]
- Excerpts of a CIA personnel file that relate to organized crime/Cuba [CIA-IR-13].
- Excerpts of the personnel file of Mr. George E. Joannides, the case officer responsible for the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) during a period in the early 1960's [CIA-IR-21].
- CIA "A" files for Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison [CIA-IR-22].
- Designated Watch Committee Reports [CIA-IR-23].
- Oswald-related documents from the a general defector file maintained by the CIA's Office of Security [CIA-IR-24].
- Certain records from the files of former CIA Director John McCone as designated by the Review Board [CIA-IR-28].

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[5] "CIA-1" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to a formal, written request (numbered 1) from the Review Board.

[6] "CIA-IR-08" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to an informal request (numbered 8) from the Review Board.

- Designated records from security files of Jack Ruby, Walter Sheridan, Harold Weisberg, Richard Case Nagel, and Gordon Novel [CIA-IR-27].
- Excerpts from the calendar of former CIA Director Allen Dulles [CIA-IR-31].

In addition to the assassination records identified above, the Review Board currently is inspecting additional files CIA has made available in response to Review Board requests. We may designate additional assassination records from these files. They are: intelligence community reports on Cuba/Soviet Union [CIA-9]; files relating to CIA officials stationed at JMWAVE [CIA-12]; and files of various high-level CIA officials (former Deputy CIA Directors Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter, former Deputy Directors for Plans Richard Bissell and Richard Helms, former General Counsel Lawrence Houston, C. Tracy Barnes, and William Harvey) [CIA-IR-34]. Additional assassination records may be identified from other requests for additional information.

2. Mexico City Tapes [CIA-IR-15]

We also have discussed with CIA the potential processing of recordings maintained by CIA and apparently reflecting audio surveillance of certain "Soviet bloc" and Cuban facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 through early January 1964, including possible surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Because CIA has not yet listened to the full tapes, it could not yet confirm the targets or substance of this "electronic take." CIA has committed to listening first to the tapes for the period November 22-23, 1963 (approximately 18 tapes), and thereafter will discuss with the Review Board potential placement of these and later audio recordings into the JFK Collection. CIA said it will complete its review of the November 22-23 tapes in July.

3. Processing of Duplicate Documents under the JFK Act

a. The CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. Although a version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both microfilm and hardcopy) were placed in the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994, the CIA has since been forwarding more open versions of certain documents in light of Review Board decisions. All such "re-processed" documents will be placed in the JFK Collection by September 1998 except that, to the extent that there are other duplicate copies of these re-processed documents in the Sequestered Collection, such duplicates will be re-processed and placed into the JFK Collection within one year after the Review Board terminates (*i.e.*, by September 1999).

b. Russ Holmes Collection. The CIA currently has not placed the Russ Holmes

Collection (consisting of CIA officer Russ Holmes' working files relating to the Kennedy assassination) into the JFK Collection. The Review Board recognizes that many documents within the Holmes files may be duplicates of CIA documents found in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection or Oswald 201 file. Nonetheless, the Review Board considers placement of the Holmes files into the JFK Collection to be of paramount importance in view of the selection and organization of documents that was made by a CIA officer. Accordingly, the CIA has committed to placing into the JFK Collection, by September 1998, all documents from the Holmes files not found elsewhere in the CIA materials at NARA. Duplicates of documents found elsewhere in the open JFK Collection can be processed after September 1998.

Given the unique organization of the Russ Holmes files, however, the Review Board requests that CIA make every effort to process those files, in their entirety, as soon as possible. Our understanding is that CIA will attempt to place the complete set of Holmes files, including duplicates, into the JFK Collection by December 1998 but absolutely no later than September 1999.

4. Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017

We have discussed with CIA its concerns regarding physical custody of certain records whose release has been postponed, under the JFK Act, until 2017. CIA has indicated that it may want to retain physical custody of certain postponed records pending disclosure in 2017.

The Review Board believes that original, postponed records should presumptively be held by NARA in accordance with the JFK Act. *See* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(5)(e)(2) ("Each Government office shall . . . transmit to the Archivist . . . all assassination records the public disclosure of which has been postponed . . . to become part of [NARA's] protected Collection.") Accordingly, all postponed assassination records of the CIA should presumptively be transferred to the legal and physical custody of NARA by September 30, 1998. The Review Board requests that the originals of any postponed records from the Oswald 201 file, the Oswald Office of Security file, and the Marina Oswald 201 file be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998. The Review Board understands that originals of postponed records from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and the Holmes Collection would be transferred in September 1999 after duplicates have been processed.

To the extent CIA believes that certain other records, particularly those designated as NBR, must remain in CIA's physical custody until 2017, we suggest further discussions to resolve definitively how those record groups will be handled.

5. Completion of CIA Responses to Review Board Requests

We have identified certain Review Board requests for additional information (both formal and informal) for which responses are still due from CIA. We understand that some outstanding responses are in draft form or otherwise nearing completion. CIA's completion of all outstanding responses is an essential aspect of its compliance with the JFK Act. We identified the following responses due from CIA (certain priority items are listed first):

Priority Responses Due

Accounting of Pre-Assassination Files on Oswald (partial response received) [CIA-16]

Accounting of James Angleton Files [CIA-IR-04]

Accounting of Electronic "Take" from Mexico City [CIA-IR-15]

Possible Foreign Source for Oswald Records [CIA-IR-05]

Possible IG reports re Oswald [CIA-IR-10]

Files on Warren Commission Critics [CIA-IR-11]

S. Breckenridge Files [CIA-IR-14]

Other Responses Due

Intelligence Community Staff Records [CIA-8]

Interagency Source Register [CIA-10]

Computer Search for HTLINGUAL Documents [CIA-IR--03]

QKENCHANT [CIA-IR-06]

Contacts with Journalists [CIA-IR-12]

DO Office Information [CIA-IR-18]

Computer Name searches [CIA-IR-19]

Zapruder Film [CIA-IR-25]

AMWORLD [CIA-IR-32]

Search for document mentioned in RIF No. 104-10151-10206 [CIA-IR-35]

William Pawley Files [CIA-IR-37]

6. CIA Review and Declassification of Other Records

Besides CIA records, CIA is continuing to review its equities in other records, including Church Committee records and records from the Presidential libraries. In addition, the Review Board's interviews with former CIA official Ann Goodpasture must be reviewed and declassified by CIA so that the interviews can be sent to Ms. Goodpasture for her corrections and then included with the Review Board's open records.

Finally, the Library of Congress has a set of closed Rockefeller Commission records in its Manuscript Division that may require CIA review and declassification. It is our understanding that these records are closed until 2001 and can be inspected only by permission of the CIA Director. To assess what should be done regarding release of these records, the Review Board first seeks to inspect them. Accordingly, please authorize the Library's Manuscript Division to permit our inspection and let us know when this authorization has been granted.

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance will constitute its public statement, under penalty of perjury, that (1) CIA has located and disclosed all records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that it could identify through a diligent records search and (2) CIA is aware of no other assassination-related records being withheld from the public. We request that CIA submit its Final Declaration to the Review Board absolutely no later than September 1.

To demonstrate that CIA has disclosed all relevant materials, we make the following recommendations for CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance:

1. CIA Should Describe More Specifically its Searches for Assassination Records

We consider it essential that CIA describe with more specificity the searches that it conducted for records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and to the JFK assassination, including searches done by CIA in the early 1990's. *See* CIA Initial Compl. Stmt., at 1. This is important particularly in light of the fact that CIA record keeping is apparently decentralized among various components of CIA. Therefore, we ask that the Final Declaration confirm that the relevant components of CIA -- the DCI and its offices, the CIA Directorates (Operations, Intelligence, Science & Technology, and Administration), and the CIA office responsible for maintaining CIA's archives -- in some manner inventoried their holdings for the relevant time period for records relating to Oswald or the assassination. To the extent that computer database searches were run by different components of CIA, please confirm that fact and, if possible, identify the names or topics searched.[7]

For its early 1990's searches, the CIA should attach the 1993 search request issued by the Historical Review Group ("HRG") and unclassified versions of memoranda from components of CIA that describe their searches or search results. In addition, we recently requested CIA to re-undertake its searches based on the discovery of certain assassination records that were not identified by CIA's earlier searches.[8] We specifically requested that CIA Director George Tenet issue a directive to all CIA offices requiring them to search their files for assassination records. *See* July 7, 1998 J. Gunn Letter to B. Harrelson. As part of its Final Declaration, we request that CIA document the steps it took in response to our recent request, including attaching the requested search directive from CIA Director Tenet.

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[7] We understand that most CIA records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were collected and identified in 1978 for the House Select Committee on Assassinations and, therefore, currently reside within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection being processed under the JFK Act. It is not our intention to have the CIA re-do exhaustive searches done in 1978. However, we want CIA to demonstrate, in the Final Declaration, that it has searched its various components and that the searches were sufficient to identify major records on the assassination not included within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (it is our understanding that the Sequestered Collection does not encompass post-1978 records).

[8] For example, Oswald's Office of Security file was not identified through CIA's early searches. Similarly, we have identified recent documents related to Oswald.

In addition, the Final Declaration should confirm whether or not CIA has saved any 1963-64 files of the Mexico City Station (and certain files from another station). If those files have not been retained, please confirm that fact in the Final Declaration. To the extent those files have been archived, however, then please confirm that they have been examined for the purpose of determining whether they contain assassination records.

2. CIA Should Identify More Specifically the Records It Has Released Relating to Oswald and the Assassination of President Kennedy

We recommend that CIA identify more specifically the CIA files that have been, or will be, placed in the JFK Collection at NARA. Although we leave this to CIA's discretion, we recommend that, to the extent practicable, CIA attach a non-classified listing of the files encompassed within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. We believe that an identification of the files within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection will demonstrate the breadth and variety of assassination records being made public by the CIA.

3. CIA Should Specifically Account for Certain Important Record Groups, Including Any Destruction of Assassination Records

We request that CIA, in its Final Declaration, account for any important records regarding the assassination that may have been destroyed or that otherwise cannot be located.

For example, CIA has reported that the original surveillance tapes that recorded the Oswald telephone conversations with the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were destroyed, and that CIA has no copies of these audio recordings. However, CIA apparently has preserved certain recordings from Mexico City that post-date the assassination (*see* ¶ A.2 of this letter). We assume that CIA will provide a complete accounting for these records in its response to Review Board request CIA-IR-15, which relates to CIA's "electronic take" from Mexico City for the relevant time period. That response should be attached to the Final Declaration (CIA may also want to attach any formal explanation of this issue that it previously provided to the HSCA). We want to ensure that CIA explains the circumstances for the destruction of the audio recordings of the Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City, confirms that no copies of this audio surveillance has been retained by CIA, and gives a full accounting of the post-assassination Mexico City tapes.

We also request an accounting of certain records of former CIA Director John McCone. In reviewing his files, we noted that certain documents on the assassination (or dated around the time of the assassination) are identified on an index as missing or destroyed. In the Final Declaration, please explain, as best as possible, the circumstances for this.

We previously requested an accounting for the files of former Counter-Intelligence Chief James Angleton [CIA-IR-04] in view of the fact that no discrete files of Mr. Angleton had been identified under the JFK Act. Since Mr. Angleton was involved in the CIA's assistance to the Warren Commission, we request that CIA's statement regarding Mr. Angleton's files (*i.e.*, CIA's response to CIA-IR-04) be attached to the Final Declaration.

We also ask that CIA verify that all assassination-related materials from the files of Win Scott, former Chief of Station for Mexico City, are in fact in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. CIA should describe what was done to inventory the Scott files to make certain that no other assassination-related materials exist in addition to those in the Sequestered Collection.

The Final Declaration should identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files.

4. The CIA Should Identify, and Incorporate by Reference, Each of Its Written Responses to Review Board Requests for Additional Information

CIA has been cooperative in providing written responses to formal and informal requests submitted by the Review Board regarding CIA records. These responses will collectively demonstrate much of the work that CIA has done under the JFK Act. We request that CIA attach to its Final Declaration a list of CIA's written responses and identify each by subject, date of response, and the Review Board request number. The Final Declaration should state that each response is being incorporated therein by reference.

5. CIA Should State That It Is Aware of No Records on Oswald or the Assassination of President Kennedy Being Withheld from the Public

After describing its records search under the JFK Act, identifying the assassination records that it has located, and accounting for records that were destroyed, CIA should include a representation that it is aware of no other undisclosed files or records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy, including records post-dating the 1978 HSCA investigation. We want the CIA to explicitly confirm, for example, that it is not aware of any undisclosed 1980's or 1990's intelligence or records relating to Oswald or the assassination.

As part of its overall representation, we request that CIA attach to the Final Declaration its complete formal response to the Review Board's request for an accounting of all pre-assassination files that CIA had on Lee Harvey Oswald [CIA-16]. We believe that CIA's response to CIA-16 has been very valuable and therefore should be included as part of CIA's Final Declaration.

Also as part of its certification that no assassination records are being withheld, we request that CIA represent that any remaining assassination records being processed after September 1998 are, in fact, duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection (or are peripheral documents that have been identified to the Review Board for processing after September 1998). CIA should explain, in a general way, its methodology for identifying duplicates so that there is a reasonable level of assurance that unique documents are not being withheld.

6. CIA Should State Its Future Commitments With Respect to the Disclosure of Assassination Records

As we discussed with CIA, CIA will undertake certain actions, after September 1998, to continue release of duplicate records and to release postponed records in 2017. We request that CIA, in the Final Declaration, memorialize its commitment to undertake these tasks and describe what will be done (as contemplated in ¶¶ A.3 and A.4 of this letter). In addition, we ask that CIA confirm in the Final Declaration that it will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK Collection.

7. CIA Should Execute the Final Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury

CIA's Final Declaration should be made under penalty of perjury.[9] We have made this request of all agencies that have searched for records under the JFK Act. The Review Board considers it essential that CIA's representations regarding its search for, and release of, assassination records be made under penalty of perjury.

Because of the decentralized nature of CIA records, we ask that the responsible individual for certain important components of CIA execute an affidavit on behalf of that component certifying, under penalty of perjury, that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. Accordingly, we seek a separate certification from: (1) the DCI area; (2) the Directorate of Operations, including its counterintelligence components; (3) the Directorate of Intelligence; (4) the Directorate of Science & Technology; (4) the Directorate of Administration; and (5) the Office of Information and Management, which we understand to be the office responsible for maintaining CIA's archive records.

---

[9] The Final Declaration(s) would be executed under oath in the form prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Thus, the appropriate CIA official(s) would state at the conclusion of the Final Declaration(s) that "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in _______, Virginia on this __ day of ___ 1998."

Thank you for your continued cooperation in meeting the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act, responding to specific inquiries of the Review Board, and adhering to our compliance program. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, JFK Assassination Records Collection
NARA

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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In a 15 July 1998 memo to CIA General Counsel, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board outlined what it expects will be contained in CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance, due to be submitted to the Board no later than 1 September 1998. The following is a summary of all points in section B which covers the Declaration:

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

1. Specific Description of Searches

a.) Confirmation that relevant components inventoried their holdings for the relevant time periods for records on Oswald or the assassination. These relevant components are: DCI area, Directorates (DO, DA, DI, DST), and the AARC

[Input details to be provided by the IROs]

b.) Attach 1993 search request from HRG and "unclassified versions of memos from components that describe searches and results."

[Note: search request is easy; 1993 responses, however, were thin to non-existent]

Attach recent DCI directive, unclassified version of followup memo to CI, LA, CE and results of the searches. If possible, search terms and databases searched should be included.

[Input details to be provided by the above offices]

c.) 1963-64 files of Mexico City Station. If retained, confirm that they have been searched for assassination records. If not, state so.

[DO to provide information]

2. Provide an unclassified index identifying what files are in the JFK Collection at NARA. To the extent possible, attach an unclassified listing of what files are in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection.

[To be done after October 98]

3. Account for Certain Important Record Groups, include. any destruction of Ass. Records

b.) E.g. is from Mexico City tapes. Attach comment on the time and manner of destruction of any records, including information to the effect that destroyed records were first made available to the HSCA (if that is the case)

[DO/IRO to provide input]

c.) Explain missing McCone files relating to the time of the assassination.

[DCI/IRO to provide input]

d.) Attach CIA's statement on James Angleton's files, especially the fact that Angleton was involved in assisting the Warren Commission but no files have been found on this activity.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

e.) Verify that all relevant materials from Win Scott's files are in the HSCA Sequestered Collection. Describe how the Scott files were inventoried to ascertain that all assassination records were included.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

f.) Identify any other records relating to Oswald/assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA holdings.

4. Include CIA's Written Responses for ARRB Requests for Additional Information, with Cross References for each.

[HRP files]

5. Statement that CIA is Aware of No Records on Oswald/Assassination Being Withheld from the Public.

b.) Include CIA response to CIA-16

c.) State that all assassination records being processed after Sept 98 are duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection or have been identified by the ARRB as peripheral.

Explain our methodology for identifying duplicates.

[HRP will handle all answers to No 5]

6. CIA's Future Commitments to Disclosure of Newly Discovered Assassination Records

FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: Barry Harrelson

Fax #: 703-613-3063

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Search Terms

Date: July 22, 1998

Pages: 2 , including this cover sheet.

COMMENTS:

Search Terms

Lee Harvey Oswald
Harvey Lee Oswald
Marina Oswald
Jack Ruby
Exaction
Ex Action
Executive Action
Assassination
President Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
Kennedy Assassination
JFK
JFK Assassination
Presidential Threats
Threats to U.S. President
GPFLOOR
GPIDEAL
Assassination Attempts
Warren Commission
HSCA
House Select Committee on Assassinations

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cherne, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III

file

HSCA NAMES

Alferov, Ivan Gavilovich
Alpizar Perez, Evelio
Alvardo, Gilberto
Alvarez, Ramon Joseph
Alvarez Fernandez, Santiago
Alvarez Rodriguez, Santiago
Amron, Irving
Araujo Bernal, Lepoldo
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Artime Buesa, Manuel
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Bagley, Tennent H. (Pete)
Bakulin, Valentin Vasilyev
Balbuena, Luis
Barker, Bernard
Barnes, Winifred C.
Bartes Clarins, Francisco Antonio
Bartes, Frank
Bartine, Dominick E.
Batista Falla, laureano
Bentin, Sam
Blanco Fernandez, Juan Francisco
Bloc(k), Morris
Bosch Avila, Orlando
Browder, Edward, Jr.
Buetos-Videla, C.Z. (aka Charlotte L. Zehrung)
Bustamente O'Leary, Jose Angel
Cabell, Earle
Cain, Richard S.
Carballido, Emilio
Cavillo, Manuel
Cellini, Dino Vincent
Charles, Clemard Joseph
Chayes, Abram
Cherne, Leo
Christ, David L.
Cisneros Diaz, Rogelio
Citrynell, Harold

Cobb, June Viola
Coe, Virginius Frank
Conein, Lucien E.
Conte Aguero, Luis
Croizer, Ross L.
Cubela, Rolando
Cuesta Del Valle, Antonio
Dalzell, William
Davidson, Irving
Davis, Rudolph Richard, Jr.
Davis, Thomas E.
Davis, Bruce F.
De Varona, Manuel Antonio
De Torres, Bernardo
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diaz, Lanz Marcos
Diaz-Lanz, Pedro Julio
Diosdado, Cesar
Donovan, John
Du Bois, David (aka Mc Canns, David Graham)
Duque Miyar, Evelio
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Dutkaniez, Joseph
Echevarria Valdivia, Homer Samuel
Espinosa-Hernandez, Victor
Fernandez, Alberto
Ferre, Luis Albert
Ferrie, David W.
Flick Charles, E
Flores, Jose Jesus Clarck
Frank, Susan Heligman
Galan Ric, Victor
Garanin, Fedor Alexeevich
Garrison, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gibson, Richard T.
Godoy y Solis, Joaquin
Golitsyn, Anatoliy
Golub, Grigoriy Y.
Gonzales, Reinol

Guitart Camizano, Agustin
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Halperin, Maurice Hyman
Hem(m)ing, Gerald Patrick
Hernandez Sanchez, Carlos Eduardo
Hernandez Hechevarria, Alberto
Hoke, John Lindsay
Hunt, Everette Howard, Jr.
Isaacs, Harold
Itkin, Herbert
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Jones, Louis Henry
Kail, Samuel G.
Kantor, Marvin
Kara-Patnitsky, Waldemar boris
Karty, Floryan R.
Keenan, Thoman J.
Koch, Gene John
Korengold, Robert J. (Bud)
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Kutner, Louis
Laborde, Lawrencw J.
Lawson, John Howard
Leonov, Nickolay Sergeyev
Lesnick, Max
Loganov, Valentin Sergeyevich
Lopez, Gilbert Polocarpo
Lorenz, Marita
Luce, Clare Booth
Lynch, Grayson
Maheu, Robert A.
Martin, Willian Hamilton
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
Mastrocola, Bruce G. (aka Leo Cherne)
Matlak, Dorthe K. (Mrs.)
McCord, James W.
McDonald, Hugh
McLaney, Michael

McLendon, Gordon
McMillan, Prisilla Johnson
McVicker, John A
Merloa, Joseph R.
Meyer, Karl
Miller, Newton
Mirabal-Diaz, Alfredo M.
Mitchell, Bernon
Moore, J. Walton
Morales, David S.
Morales Navarette, Ricardo
Morgan, Eilliam
Morgan, William Alexander
Morua, Martin
Moss, Edward K.
Nagell, Richard Case
Newton, William J.
Nobregas, George
Nunez Portuondo Emilio
Obyedkov, Ivan Dimitriyrvich
Odio, Eunice
Otero, Rolando
O'Sullivan, Fredrick Stephen
Paneque Batista, Victor Manuel
Pawley, William D.
Pedroso Amores, Acelo
Perez Alamo, Duney
Petrulli, Nicholas
Phillips, David Atlee
Pico Ramon, Reinaldo
Pino Machado, Quintin
Pittman, John Orion
Posada, Luis Clemente
Posey, Buford Wallace
Prio Socarras, Carols
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ramirez Ortiz, Antillio
Randall, Fredrick C.
Rasco, Jose Ignacio

Ray, Manuel
Reggab, Mohammed
Ricciardelli, Libero
Rodriguez, Emilio Americo
Rodriguez y Gonzales, Armesto Napolean
Rodriguez, Tamayo, Francisco
Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio
Rorke, Alexander
Rothman, Norman
Ruby, Jack
Ruiz, Pedro
Ruiz Perez, Ortestes G.
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Seymour, William Houston
Shaw, Clay
Shaw, Robert Taylor
Sierra, Martinee Paulino
Sloboda, Vladimir
Snyder, Richard E.
Soto Vazquez, Antonio
Stoner, Jessie B.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Ulman, Vlastimil
Uzolv, Sergy
Veciana Blanch, Antonio Carlos
Veqa Rerez, Manuel
Wasserman, Jack
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III
Whitehouse Insua, Eduardo Julius
Wichtrich, Alfonso Rudolph
Wickes, Alastar
Wilson Hudson, Carlos Juan
Winston, Henry
Zambernardi, Robert M.
Zarraga Martinez, Carlos

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EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant

to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

13-00000

ut file

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

29 July 1998

Ronald Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Haron:

Congratulations on your recent appointment as General Counsel to the President John F. Kennedy Records Review Board ("Review Board"). You have my assurances that, as the Review Board enters its final stages of the review and release of records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination, you will continue to have CIA's full cooperation.

I am in receipt of the 15 July 1998 letter from former General Counsel Jeremy Gunn in which he outlines CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). While I recognize that much work needs to be done over the next few months, I am confident that J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer for CIA's Historical Review Program ("HRP"), together with the rest of the Agency team dedicated to document review under the JFK Act, will complete the outstanding obligations set forth in that letter.

With respect to the Review Board's request that CIA submit a Final Declaration of Compliance under penalty of perjury, we are in the process of identifying the appropriate CIA official to sign such a Declaration. Both HRP and my office will work closely with you to ensure the Declaration contains the recommendations made in Mr. Gunn's letter.

With respect to the suggestion that CIA execute a separate affidavit by an officer from each of the CIA's four Directorates as well as from the DCI area, the Office of Information Management, and the counterintelligence components of the Directorate of Operations, I believe that this is an unnecessarily cumbersome and confusing means by which to attest to Agency-wide record searches. Rather, I propose that the Executive Director of the CIA appoint one senior official as a Records Validation Officer ("RVO"). An RVO has the authority to locate, identify, and preserve records created or maintained by any Agency Directorate or component which are actually or potentially relevant to the subject matter of the search. An RVO also has authority to execute affidavits or to testify under oath with respect to all the record searches done by every Directorate or component of the CIA. For your information, this is the usual method by which CIA attests under oath to record searches done by more than one Directorate in criminal and civil litigation before the federal courts.

I appreciate this opportunity to assure you of CIA's continued cooperation with the Review Board. Should you have any further questions or concerns regarding this matter, you may contact Linda Cipriani of my office at (703) 874-3124.

Sincerely,

Dawn R Eilenberger

for Robert M. McNamara, Jr.

Ronald Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani:nl 76124 (27 Jul 98)

OGC-98-51950

Distribution:
  Original - Addressee
    1 - GC
    1 - LCC
    1 - Lit File - LDG00021
    1 - RDC FYI
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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

August 10, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

Thank you for your July 29 letter regarding CIA's submission of its Final Declaration of Compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). I am writing to address CIA's desire that one official certify, under oath and on behalf of the entire agency, that CIA has conducted a thorough search for records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. Your letter and concerns were brought directly to the attention of Review Board members for their consideration. We understand that CIA would prefer that each CIA Directorate not be required to certify separately that it has done an adequate search for records on the assassination, as the Review Board had requested.

The Review Board specifically considered your proposal that the certifying official be a records validation officer appointed by the CIA's Executive Director. The Review Board requests, however, that the CIA's certification be made at the highest levels of the CIA. The Review Board believes that certification by a records validation officer would be insufficient to assure, to the fullest extent possible, public confidence in the CIA's representations that it has searched for and released all relevant materials relating to President Kennedy's assassination. In view of the importance of the CIA's formal representations regarding its holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald and President Kennedy's assassination, the Review Board requests that CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance be certified, under oath, both by CIA's Executive Director and its General Counsel.

I ask that CIA confirm that it will agree to this manner of certification.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

DA/OIM/EdCohen:bkh/31352 (11 Aug 98)
share/oim/ed/oim/irg/pjt/jfk/dd draft 980812.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DCI IRO
1 - DA IRO
1 - DI IRO
1 - DO IRO
1 - DS&T IRO
1 - D/OIM
1 - C/IRG
1 - C/HRP
1 - OIM/HRP/HRO (Barry Harrelson)
1 - DA Registry
1 - OIM/Subj
1 - OIM/Chrono

25 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

(AIUO) I was requested to send the EB 02-98 (Final Document Search - JFK). The request was distributed to all of the Directorate via Lotus notes on Monday 17 August 1998, the notice was placed in the system on the 18th and received by the Directorate personnel on the 19th. Additionally, we placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

IMS/ESG/HCS Fwickham x44448:mjk (21 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
  1 - C/IMS/ESG
  1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
  1 - ESG Chrono File

27 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
Chief, Information Management Staff,
External Support Group

SUBJECT: DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

1. This memorandum is in response to the request from the staff of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). The staff requested that the CIA issue an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination Records. OIM-98-0081 dated 30 July 1998 was issued.

2. DO/Information Management Staff ran a corporate search of COMET, the DO's electronic message repository. That search generated some 128 hits. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff reviewed the search results and selected three records for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

3. The three selected documents have been sanitized with Ms. Combs' concurrence. The sanitization is more extensive than JFK guidelines because of the documents' proximity to the present and to current sources and methods.

4. The documents are not herewith attached. They are being provided separately by DO/IMS/ESG/HCS.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SUBJECT: (U) DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

IMS/ESG/HCS FWickham x44448:mjk (28 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG Chrono File

13-00000

D/01/m

SEP 4 1998

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of General Counsel

31 August 1998

Ronald G. Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Haron:

This letter responds to your 19 August 1998 request that the Central Intelligence Agency confirm, in writing, who will certify its compliance statement. This is to confirm that Edmund Cohen, the CIA's Director of Information Management, will sign.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. He is also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. He oversees classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. He manages the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serves as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. He coordinates the conduct of all special searches within the Agency and the release of any information uncovered in such searches. Finally, as Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible to conduct, on behalf of the Agency, liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, and with the Information Security Oversight Office; and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

We believe that Mr. Cohen is clearly the most knowledgeable individual within the Agency, by position and experience, to execute such a certification. Based upon our short telephone discussion, I understand that he is, in addition, at least as senior as the anticipated signatories from other agencies or departments from which the Board has requested certifications. From a practical standpoint, we at CIA make a concerted effort to assure that the most knowledgeable individuals speak on behalf of the Agency on important matters such as this. It is for this reason that we have chosen Mr. Cohen.

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please call me on (703) 874-3123.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Associate General Counsel

Mr. Ronald G. Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/RJEatinger, Jr. 76123 (31 Aug 1998)

OGC-98-52328

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SA/ExDir (Dunn) (C)
1 - PDGC
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1 - ADGC (Burke)
1 - CSI/HRG (Harrelson)
1 - C/LD
1 - RJE Signer
1 - Lit File (LDG00021)
1 - OGC Registry

D6

SEP 18 1998

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI		X	11	OPA		
2	DDCI		X	12	DDA		
3	DDCI/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADCI/MS			14	DDO		X
5	EXDIR/CIA	X		15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC			16	D/OIM		X
7	IG			17	HRP		X
8	GC	X		18			
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: 21 September 1998

DOCUMENT NO: ER 98-4210

Contact Betsy Quint-Moran (x37929) regarding suspense items.

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

EXDIR office to take lead in preparing and coordinating response with OGC.

SUMMARY:

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board has received the Agency's Final Declaration of Compliance. The Board is requesting certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or alternatively that the EXDIR and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. Absent the requested certifications, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials necessary and requests the DDO be made available ASAP, but no later than 21 September, for examination.

Date: 14 September 1998
Received in ER: 14 September 1998
Action Officer: Tracie Matecka x37932

DCI
EXEC
REG

13-00000

FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: George Tenet, DCI **Date:** 9/14/98

Fax #: 703-482-3064 **Pages:** 3, including this cover sheet.

From: John R. Tunheim, Chair

Subject: CIA Compliance with the JFK Act

COMMENTS:

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

September 14, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable George Tenet
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505"

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tenet:

We have received the CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance (dated September 2, 1998) regarding the completion of CIA's work under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). On behalf of the Board, I am writing to express the Board's disappointment that CIA has been unwilling to have the most senior officials of your agency attest to CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

The Board had first asked CIA to submit separate certifications from each directorate, as well as the office of the DCI, attesting to their searches for assassination-related records. We stressed these measures to obtain assurance that all components of the CIA had complied with the JFK Act, as well as to assure the American people that the U.S. Government had left no stone unturned in releasing records on the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA refused to submit separate certifications, insisting it was their practice for one official to speak on behalf of the entire Agency. The Board then requested that CIA's most senior officials, the Executive Director and General Counsel, certify CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance under the JFK Act. CIA refused.

In 1992, CIA Director Gates testified to Congress that he was "determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession" that related to the Kennedy assassination. *See The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 282 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992). The Board has merely asked that CIA's highest officials confirm that they are fully confident that this commitment has been fulfilled. While we recognize the substantial documentation provided by CIA to demonstrate its work under the JFK Act, we are disappointed that CIA has been uncooperative in responding

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

to this most simple of requests. For me personally and for other members of the Board, this raises significant concerns as to whether CIA's highest officials actually have confidence in the reliability of the results for which the Review Board and CIA have expended considerable effort, energy and resources over the past five years. Such concerns may be noted in our Final Report.

Therefore, the Review Board specifically requests that CIA submit certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or, in the alternative, that the Executive Director and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. We continue to believe that these more stringent certifications are needed, in part because of CIA's belated discovery of core records relating to the assassination.

Absent certification by the highest levels of CIA, as sought by the Board, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials to be absolutely necessary. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under the JFK Act, the Board requests that CIA make the Deputy Director for Operations immediately available for deposition. The Directorate of Operations has been the primary repository for records directly relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination. In fact, the Directorate of Operations only recently uncovered additional records relating to a KGB source with information relating to Lee and Marina Oswald. We ask that the Deputy Director of Operations be made available for examination as soon as possible, but no later than September 21. He will be expected to testify on behalf of the Directorate of Operations regarding its record systems, and its searches for assassination records, including searches conducted by the Counter-intelligence staff.

Thank you for your cooperation, and please inform us as soon as possible regarding CIA's compliance with this Review Board request.

Sincerely,

John R. Tunheim

John R. Tunheim
Chair

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 16, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Messrs. McNamara and Stern:

The Review Board considers it essential that certain remaining obligations of the CIA under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act") be identified and memorialized before the Board ceases operations on September 30, 1998.

I therefore am enclosing, for your agencies' consideration, a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting forth the outstanding obligations of CIA under the JFK Act. We believe that it is in the interest of the CIA, the National Archives, the Review Board, and ultimately the public to put in writing our collective understanding of the additional work that CIA must undertake and the reasonable time frames within which it should be completed. It is our intent to reduce any future ambiguity or disagreements that may potentially arise as CIA completes its work. We also believe that this MOU will facilitate the ability of the Archivist of the United States to carry out his statutory obligation to certify to the President that all assassination-related records have been released in accordance with the Act (*see* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(12)).

The terms of a Memorandum of Understanding have been discussed among the staffs of the Review Board, the National Archives, and CIA. We believe that the enclosed draft proposal is a fair accommodation of competing interests. Please review the

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **Deputy Director:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

enclosed draft MOU so that we can resolve any outstanding issues and ultimately reach an agreement on an MOU before September 30, 1998.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief,
JFK Collection, NARA

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS OF THE CIA UNDER THE JFK ACT

WHEREAS the operations of the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") cease on September 30, 1998 in accordance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act");

WHEREAS the JFK Act provides that "the provisions of this Act [as applied to Federal agencies] shall continue in effect until such time as the Archivist certifies to the President and the Congress that all assassination records have been made available to the public in accordance with [the] Act" (JFK Act § 12); and

WHEREAS the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the Review Board, and the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA") seek to ensure that the CIA completes its continuing obligations under the JFK Act in a timely fashion;

IT IS HEREBY AGREED by the CIA (including any successor intelligence agency), the Review Board, and NARA that:

1. All CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act will be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at NARA in College Park, Maryland by September 30, 1998 unless otherwise noted in this Memorandum of Understanding;

2. CIA may transmit the following assassination records to the JFK Collection after September 30, 1998:

    a. Duplicate documents within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets).[1] The CIA will ensure that, by September 30, 1999, duplicate copies of documents from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets) will be placed in the JFK Collection.

    b. Duplicate documents within the working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes. The CIA will ensure that, by December 31, 1998, duplicate copies of documents from the Russ Holmes working files will be placed in the JFK Collection.

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[1] "Duplicate documents" are exact copies of documents that are already publicly available in the JFK Collection as part of other CIA files or records.

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c. The audio tapes, and any transcriptions or summaries made by the CIA, from surveillance of certain Soviet and Cuban diplomatic facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 to January 1964. These tapes (approximately 185), and any transcriptions or summaries, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by September 30, 1999. The CIA will submit these tapes to the JFK Collection on a rolling basis, as CIA completes review of individual tapes. Any postponements shall be identified to NARA and postponed information forwarded to the "Protected Collection" (*i.e.*, the classified, postponed records within the JFK Collection) in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act.

d. Working files from the DCI area, mostly from DCI's Executive Registry, that had been compiled in anticipation of passage of the JFK Act. These working materials, which consist mostly of duplicate documents, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by Decmber 31, 1998.

e. A document containing a list of names and cryptonyms created by the HSCA staff. Given the detailed nature of information in this document (RIF No. 104-10061-10115), the Board agrees that this can be processed by December 31, 1998.

f. Any other non-duplicate assassination-related records created or discovered by the CIA after September 30, 1998.

3. The CIA will review its equities in records that have been referred to it, and the CIA will cooperate with NARA and other Federal agencies to ensure that such records are released under the standards of the JFK Act and placed into the JFK Collection. The CIA will review the following major categories of records:

a. Church Committee records identified by the Review Board in August 1998 as being assassination-related.

b. Records from the files of Robert F. Kennedy, maintained at the JFK Library, that the Library and/or Review Board has identified as either assassination records or as records that would enhance the historical unnderstanding of the assassination.

c. Records of the Rockefeller Commission, maintained by the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, to the extent that the Library of Congress identifies assassination records that are not available as part of the Ford Library set of Rockefeller Commision documents in the JFK Collection.

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d. The Army's Investigative Records Repository file on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz.

The CIA will complete its review and and recommendations for release of the major record categories listed above no later than April 30, 1999. To the extent there may be other agency documents requiring CIA review under JFK Act, the CIA will continue to undertake such review.

4. The CIA shall handle the certain original or postponed records in the following manner:

a. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection," in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act, the originals of all postponed records from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, Office of Security file, and "A" file.

b. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the hardcopy original of Marina Oswald's 201.

(Protective conditions.)

c. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all of the original microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection.

d. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all records with postponed information to the extent that such records are not available on the CIA-HSCA microfilm rolls transmitted to NARA.

D: difficult to identify: TO J[illegible] [illegible] 78 [illegible]

e. By October 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" the entire Oswald 201 file that was printed from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection microfilm (this will provide the CIA with time to make its own reference copy).

31,000 pages and linked [illegible]

D: difficult, But can do

f. By December 31, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the originals of all postponed records from the Russ Holmes working files (this will permit the CIA to process duplicate records in the Holmes Collection by that date).

NBRs?

5. The Review Board and the CIA have determined that certain materials reviewed under the JFK Act are not believed to be relevant to the Kennedy assassination (designated "NBR"), but nonetheless should ultimately be placed in the JFK

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Collection. These NBR materials are: certain files contained within the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection; certain CIA work files relating to Yuri Nosenko (but not related to the assassination);[2] certain materials within the Russ Holmes Collection; and the complete version of certain records, portions of which were designated as assassination-related by the Review Board in connection with its requests for additional records and information. These hard copy materials will be physically retained by the CIA and then forwarded to the JFK Collection for public release by October 26, 2017. Within two months of the execution of this agreement, the CIA shall provide to NARA, in writing, a list of the hardcopy files being retained until 2017 and confirm the arrangements for securing this material. NARA shall have the right to inspect and inventory this material for archival and administrative purposes before 2017, and these materials shall be made available for inspection by NARA upon its request.

6. The CIA shall cooperate and coordinate with NARA in carrying out the provisions of the JFK Act, including Section 5(g) of the JFK Act, which provides for the "periodic review" of postponed assassination records. Such review "shall address the public disclosure of additional assassination records in the Collection under the standards of the Act" (§ 5(g)(2) (A)) and "shall serve to downgrade and declassifiy security classified information" (§ 5(g)(2)(C)).

7. The CIA recognizes that, in the year 2017, "[e]ach assassination record shall be publicly disclosed in full . . . ." JFK Act § 5 (g). To the extent that records are postponed but are to be released on a date prior to 2017, NARA shall release the records on the date the Review Board set for release. If the CIA seeks continued postponement of any record in the year 2017 (or an earlier scheduled release date), it will be incumbent upon the CIA to obtain from the President "certification" that continued postponement is necessary. *See* JFK Act § 5(g)(2)(D). Within six months of the scheduled release date, the CIA shall be responsible for notifying NARA of any specifc records, including any records within the microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, for which it will seek Presidential certification of continued postponement.

With respect to the NBR material identified in paragraph 5, these NBR materials shall be physically transferred to NARA by October 26, 2017 for release. In the event CIA seeks further postponement of any NBR material, it shall identify that material to NARA and seek Presidential certification that the material needs to be postponed.

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[2] The Nosenko materials related to the assassination have been placed in the JFK Collection.

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8. With respect to the review of other agency documents referred to CIA, the review of any new assassination records, or the periodic review of postponed assassination records, the CIA shall, in good faith, continue to apply the postponement criteria of the JFK Act as previously interpreted by decisions of the Review Board.

9. This Memorandum of Understanding is intended to clarify the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act in view of the expiration of the Review Board's term on September 30, 1998. This Memorandum of Understanding shall not be interpreted to limit CIA's obligations under the JFK Act.

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

David W. Carey
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

Laura A. Denk
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

John W. Carlin
Archivist of the United States

SEP 21 1998

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

This will respond to your 14 September 1998 letter regarding Central Intelligence Agency compliance with the "JFK Act."

I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September 1998 Declaration of Compliance—signed, as you note, by CIA's Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen—confirms my judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

REFERENCE

FILE COPY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

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As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Special Assistant/EXDIR

18 September 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIO
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Cohen,

Jim Oliver called and wanted me to pass on the following message:

Talked Judge Tunheim and he is willing to release the two letters (Cohen & Tenet) and refrain from other derogatory comments if the Carey declaration is substantially like the ones Ed signed.

Michelle

He still would like you to give him call on 31805.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DECLARATION OF DAVID W. CAREY

I, DAVID W. CAREY, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Executive Director of the of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held the position of Executive Director since July of 1997 and have served with the CIA for over 29 years in a variety of operational, staff, and management positions.

2. As the Executive Director I am responsible, on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), for the overall daily management of the Central Intelligence Agency, for strategic planning and coordination, and for the development and execution of the Agency's annual program. In order to carry out these responsibilities, I have been delegated all authorities vested in the DCI and DDCI except as prohibited by law or Agency regulation or policy.

3. The purpose of this declaration is to provide an assurance that the Central Intelligence Agency: (1) has made a diligent records search to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (2) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board. I make these and the following statements (including those in the attachments by reference) based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations ("DO"), Science and Technology ("DS&T"), and Administration ("DA") and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107) and other statutes,

assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

5. There are six attachments to this declaration, which are incorporated by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released (separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration). Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in our records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. And Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

6. Based upon the foregoing and the attachments (Attachments I through VI, which are incorporated by reference) I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107).

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 23rd day of September 1998.

David W. Carey

DAVID W. CAREY

From the Desk of James R. Oliver
Chief, Historical Review Program

NOTE FOR: James R. Oliver@DA
FROM: James R. Oliver
OFFICE: OIM
DATE: 09/24/98 11:12:17 AM
SUBJECT: EXDIR Declaration Signature, 23 September 1998

Memorandum for the Record:

This is to confirm that I replaced the first page of the ExDir's signed JFK Declaration, dated 23 September, with letterhead stationery to assure that the statement was comparable to that signed by Mr. Cohen, as earlier requested by the Board Chairman. The wording of the declaration was unchanged; only the letterhead stationery was changed. I called Michelle in the EXDIR's Officer to confirm that the Executive Director would have no problem with such a change (simply replacing the first page). She called back, saying that she had asked Mr. Carey, and he had no problem with this change.

Mr. Harrelson of this office will be hand carrying the EXDIR's declaration to the Board today. At the same time, and in accordance with my agreement with Chairman Tunheim of yesterday, Mr. Harrelson will be retrieving the earlier declaration signed by Mr. Cohen, the DCI letter of 16 September, both of which are being withdrawn. The Judge Tunheim also agreed yesterday that since the EXDIR had agreed to sign the declaration that there will no longer be a need for the critical language in their report on this issue.

James R. Oliver

CC: Edmund Cohen@DA
R. Bruce Burke@DCI
Sent on 24 September 1998 at 11:12:17 AM

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

I, Edmund Cohen, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of Information Management for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held this position since February 1994; I have also held the position of Director of the Office of Information Management since October 1997. I have served with the CIA for over 30 years in a variety of intelligence, legal, staff, and management positions.

2. As Director of Information Management, I am responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. I am also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. I oversee classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. I manage the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serve as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. I coordinate the conduct of special searches within the Agency and the release of information uncovered in such searches. I am also the Agency's official liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, with the Information Security Oversight Office, and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

3. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency: (a) has made diligent records searches to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (b) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board.

5. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations (DO), Science and Technology (DS&T), and Administration (DA) and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. In addition to these certifications, I have had briefings on the principal searches conducted and have had all of my questions answered to my satisfaction. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to locate and declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, as amended, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. 2107 note, and other statutes, assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

6. There are six attachments, numbered I through VI, to this declaration, which I incorporate herein by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released. Separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration. Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in CIA's records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination-related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

7. Based upon the foregoing and Attachments I through VI, I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 2 day of September 1998.

Edmund Cohen

Attachment I

Attachment I

Universe and Scope of CIA Documents Addressed Related to the JFK Assassination

Summary. This Attachment discusses CIA material examined in order to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). It addresses the types of CIA documents found in the records of earlier investigations, including that of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and materials and files recovered in response to searches conducted in 1992 and thereafter. It discusses the process by which documents became "assassination-related records."

Discussion. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided large numbers of documents and materials over the years in support of successive reviews and investigations related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We estimate that the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages comprise the "CIA collection" of documents associated with prior assassination reviews, including duplicates. In addition, we estimate that in responses to the JFK Act, CIA has reviewed over 100,000 pages of documents from the National Archives, the Ford, Johnson, and Kennedy Presidential Libraries and miscellaneous papers from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The documentation exists in many forms, from original contemporaneous material, such as field reporting from overseas or analytic reports, to material generated specifically as an Agency response to investigation questions. The largest "CIA collection," as such, is associated with the records of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA).[1] The HSCA brought together in one place in 1978 the principal documents retrieved over the course of years from earlier investigations, including the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, and the Church Committee.

The Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964 was the first major review of the JFK Assassination. Existing records suggest that CIA provided roughly 4,000 pages of documentation to the Warren Commission review, plus testimony by Richard Helms and John McCone. The Warren Commission pursued matters related primarily to events and actions directly associated with the assassination event, including materials from CIA's Mexico City Station, which were considered relevant because of a visit to Mexico City by Lee Harvey Oswald shortly before the assassination.

The Rockefeller Commission in 1975 and Church Committee investigation in 1975 and 1976 were focused on allegations of wrongdoing by the CIA. Nonetheless, as a part of these investigations they yielded information which, to many, appeared to relate in some way to the assassination, such as an operational capability or willingness to consider assassination as an intelligence method.

From 1976 through 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) pursued additional leads, generating still further documentation. The HSCA ultimately brought together within its broad scope of investigation many of the documents from the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee. This collection ultimately became the "HSCA sequestered collection," which altogether contains an equivalent of over 300,000 pages, in paper, photographs, tapes, and microfilm media, including duplicates. Because the myriad conspiracy theories included possible Soviet, Cuban, Mafia or right-wing American involvement, the scope of the HSCA investigation included anything or anyone that might appear to support those theories, including historical institutional behavior patterns. Further, although this sequestered collection was considered to be CIA's, it contains documents from other agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and over 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material.

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[1] The HSCA sequestered collection reflects the major corpus of CIA material or information reviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (or to which they had access) during the 1976-1979 time frame. The pulling together of this collection was coordinated by the Committee and they defined what it was to include. This Collection has been physically held by CIA since 1979, although CIA was not authorized access until 1992, when permission was given by Congress to review the material in preparation for responding to the JFK Act.

The HSCA sequestered collection is contained in 64 boxes of multimedia material, including paper, photographs, and microfilm which have been loosely organized into major categories of information. Boxes 1 through 34 are mostly material collected by the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the FBI, and other Government agencies, including field reporting and handwritten notes. They also include newspaper articles, name traces performed in response to requests by the HSCA staff, and copies of other documents such as the CIA Inspector General's 1967 report on CIA plots against Castro and Richard Helms' executive session testimony before the HSCA.

Boxes 35 through 63 of this collection are largely records of CIA's Legislative Counsel, Inspector General, General Counsel, Office of Security, and Directorate of Science and Technology, as well as internal records of the HSCA staff. They consist of reports, memoranda, transcripts, cables, letters, newspaper clippings, photographs, and charts. Box 64 contains 72 reels of microfilm—the equivalent of roughly 72 more boxes of paper documents. This material includes the file which the Directorate of Operations maintained on Lee Harvey Oswald (the 201 file) as well as similar files on additional individuals. Many of the microfilm documents duplicate other documents in the other boxes.

While not a part of the sequestered collection, a separate "Oswald 201 File" has served as a CIA repository for JFK assassination-related material over the years and to a large extent material in this file is duplicative of material in the sequestered collection. Only a few documents were in the file at the time of the assassination. The bulk of the approximately 26,000 pages currently in this file consists of documents collected immediately after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation. Included are a large number of third agency documents, primarily from the FBI. Other major additions to the Oswald 201 file include relevant Mexico City Station files and material generated by various FOIA requests and investigations, such as that of New Orleans District Attorney, James Garrison.

Assassination-related materials beyond the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file which have been located since 1992 generally fall into three categories. First, there are new documents which have been generated since 1978, such as defector reports that mention rumors or perceptions of conspiracies or newspaper or other open source materials related to an individual associated with the assassination. Second, in a number of cases targeted areas of inquiry or more precise definitions of areas of interest by the JFK Board have yielded more information and added documents to the collection. And third, improved search techniques have provided better access to those files which are searchable electronically. Nonetheless, the material located since 1992 is quite small when compared to the material in the sequestered collection and the overall set of material from CIA which has been designated as "assassination records" by the JFK Board.

In accordance with the law, the Board has the authority to designate records which it considers relevant to the assassination as "Assassination Records." These documents are then subject to review for declassification or, as deemed appropriate by the Board, held for declassification in the year 2017. The Board has designated the entire sequestered collection as Assassination Records as well as selected material generated in the course of searches subsequent to 1992. The entire set of these documents is the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages, including duplicates.

Attachment II

ATTACHMENT II.

Search Methodology and Types of Searches Conducted

Summary. This Attachment discusses the methodologies used in conducting the searches, including what we know of the searches which were conducted on behalf of the earlier assassination investigations. It includes, in referenced tabs, documentation of selected taskings. It discusses the distributed nature of CIA's paper recordkeeping systems and electronic databases and the custom keyword searches that are used with electronic databases which CIA maintains.

Discussion. The collection of CIA materials contained in the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) "sequestered collection" has existed as a discrete body of records since 1978. This material resulted from highly labor intensive and systematic searches by individuals familiar with the Agency's paper files and records systems in use in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the sequestered collection comprises the great bulk of CIA-originated documents which can be associated with the JFK Assassination and related investigations.

For most of its history, the Agency has had a system of records which has been shaped by the divergent requirements of the directorates in accordance with the wide variance of focus in their missions. These basic differences in the missions of the directorates, as well as the compartmentalization-of-information procedures (the "need-to-know" concept), have resulted in each directorate keeping its own set of records in accordance with directorate-specific guidelines. This applies equally to paper records as well as to electronic databases.[2]

Since the late 1970s, the Agency has been in the process of converting to electronic databases, which allow for electronic searches for documents using keyword and other indexing tools which provide much more expedited and efficient searches. Because the most significant portion of JFK assassination-related material was generated prior to this conversion to electronic databases, searches of the sequestered collection or other contemporaneous CIA records have had to rely primarily upon labor intensive hand searches.

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[2] Even within a single database, information may--in accordance with information compartmentalization requirements based on the need-to-know principle--be stored in separate files by several offices or divisions, each with its distinct recordkeeping criteria and access requirements. In order for a search to be thorough, a search for one term or a combination of terms must be conducted across all such files.

Since 1992 and the passage of the JFK Act, CIA has, in responding to the requests of the Board, had to devise search methodologies and techniques to address both the hard copy and electronic versions of our databases. With respect to the hard copy material, Agency efforts have concentrated on those component records most likely to yield assassination-related documents. Short of a complete manual review of all documents in the Agency, the techniques used for searching hard copy materials include expert reviews of file series and folder names, including associations with known related topics, retrieving boxes of files from the Agency's Archives and Records Center, and manually reviewing those files identified as likely to contain the sought after materials.

Electronic files searches can actually be more complex than manual searches, in major part because of the number of different electronic systems in use. The Directorate of Operations' electronic databases, for instance, include most cables since 1978 and they can be searched using single or multiple search terms against the full text of these cables. The Directorate of Intelligence's automated systems include original source material used for analytic assessments as well as the products themselves and can be searched through a variety of electronic techniques. The DCI Area (considered, for this purpose a directorate) maintains the Executive Registry files which are not normally retrievable through full text search, but by index searches. The Directorate of Administration maintains a large and diverse system of databases and files on employees and contractors that includes data on security issues, medical records, training, etc. The Directorate of Science and Technology and its subordinate components maintain other electronic databases unique to individual missions. Each of these systems requires a unique set of access criteria and search commands and must be searched by information management experts of the respective directorates.

Where possible, automated systems were searched using key words such as JFK, Kennedy, assassination, executive action, Oswald, place names, and a large number of names, crypts, or pseudonyms identifying individuals known to have been associated with countries, key installations, organizations, or operations that fell within the period deemed relevant to the history of the assassination.

The following categories are examples of the guidelines for relevancy with which both manual and computerized searches were conducted. They include, but are not limited to, individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects which are considered central to the Oswald/JFK assassination history and the ensuing investigations.

A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

- Warren Commission, 1963-64
- James Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney, 1966-68
- Rockefeller Commission, 1975 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- Church Committee (Senate), 1975-76 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

B. Key Subjects:

- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, and JMWAVE Station, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.
- KGB interest in Oswald.
- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 if they involve JFK figures or subjects; most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.
- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders, and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures or subjects.
- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts) without limit on time frame.
- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames.

C. Key Figures: Material with the following terms was considered JFK assassination-relevant unless the context is clearly not related or the information is outside the appropriate time period:

- AMLASH
- AMMUG
- Maurice Bishop (any reference)
- Silvia Duran

- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee
- Howard Hunt
- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson
- Valeriy Kostikov
- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt
- Yuri Nosenko
- Michael & Ruth Paine
- David A. Phillips
- Richard Snyder
- Win Scott

Prior to enactment of the JFK Act, in early 1992, the Chief of the CIA History Staff, through various manual searches of shelf lists, located the "sequestered collection" of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (sixty-four record center size boxes). After obtaining the permission of the Congress, his staff surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination. In addition, the History Staff located sixteen boxes of Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders, mainly from Mexico City Station records that had been collected for the Warren Commission.

In October 1993, following enactment of the JFK Act but prior to the President's appointment of the Board, CIA's Historical Review Group (HRG) requested the directorates to conduct a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, JFK assassination, and any related documents (Tab 1). This request resulted in a series of meetings and discussions with various Agency components and Information Release Officers. More than thirty-one additional boxes of materials were sent to HRG for review. Included in this material were nineteen boxes of JFK working files of Mr. Russ Holmes, a CIA employee who for many years was the Agency's focal point officer with responsibility for responding to questions related to our assassinated-related records. Also included were two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of Latin America Division documents, and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs project. Out of these thirty-one additional boxes provided to the Board staff, approximately twenty-two boxes of material were designated by the Board as assassination records. The preponderant volume of these records is duplicative of documents in the sequestered collection.

In April 1995, after the Agency received the Board's first formal request, and in anticipation of "what are likely to be many requests from the Board for information..." the Agency Executive Director asked each directorate and the DCI Administrative Officer to appoint a focal point officer for the JFK Assassination review. (Tab 2)

In the spring and summer of 1997, the Agency arranged for the Board staff to receive a series of briefings by representatives of each directorate on the files kept within the records systems of each directorate. These briefings covered aspects of the records systems, such as how the records are organized, maintained, searched and retrieved, as well as how they had been previously searched for assassination-related materials.

The Board staff requested a number of additional searches, which have now been completed. These requests were both formal and informal and resulted in responses to the Board staff which included a wide range of additional material, some of which was judged relevant to the history of the assassination. This material includes the histories of various CIA operations and Agency components, files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or in HSCA investigations, and the results of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Although many requests from the Board and responses from the Agency were handled informally, the significant initial requests are listed in the table in Attachment V.

Prompted in part by the surfacing of a small number of new relevant documents, the Board staff requested CIA in the summer of 1998 to: (a) perform an additional set of searches on certain specific topics; and (b) issue an Agency-wide notice reminding CIA employees of the requirements of the JFK Act.

Specially tailored tasking was sent to the three Directorate of Operations components deemed most likely to possess records relevant to the JFK assassination of the kind of concern to the Board (See Tab 3). Among other considerations, this special tasking included a list of new or revised search terms, a request for clarification on the disposition of the James Angleton files, and the requirement to focus on potential new information from the debriefing of defectors in which any reference to Oswald or to the Kennedy assassination occurs.

DCI Tenet issued an Agency-wide Employees Bulletin on 22 July 1998 directing all CIA personnel to "consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review…" (EB OIM 98-02—See Tab 4).

Finally, and in a separate tasking, all directorates were asked to assure that searches undertaken were sufficient to enable a directorate representative to provide a certification of compliance with the JFK Act, and that the DCI's Bulletin had been forwarded to all directorate employees. (See Tab 5).

CSI-0331/93
25 October 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO
DI/IRO
DA/IRO
DS&T/IRO

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group/CSI

SUBJECT: Request to Conduct Search for
JFK Assassination Records

1. In recent testimony before the HPSCI the Director indicated that a continuing search for JFK assassination-related documents was in progress. In order to assure that there are no oversights in this regard, we are requesting the following, by directorate:

> DO & DI: A name search on Lee Harvey Oswald for the period 1980 through 1993; a subject search on JFK assassination (Kennedy assassination, etc.), same period; all appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier.
>
> DA & DS&T: All appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier; a file search when an obvious need is recognized.

2. Information responsive to this request should be forwarded to the Historical Review Group, 404 Ames Building. Questions may be directed to Frank Most, 30146.

John Pereira
John F. Pereira

14-00000

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

DO/IMS 95-0691

ER 95-8097
6 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Appointment of Directorate Focal Points for JFK Assassination Board Requests

1. I would like each of you to appoint a focal point officer for your Directorate who would be responsible for responding to requests for information from the (President Kennedy) Assassination Records Review Board. (AIUO)

2. The Agency has received the first (attached) of what are likely to be many requests from the Board for information related to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the investigations into the assassination. Up to now, the Board has focused on the "sequestered" records CIA had collected for the House Assassination Committee's investigation and documents that had been part of the Oswald 201 file. It is expected that the new requests will require records searches to be done for additional information. ~~(AIUO)~~

3. The Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), which has been the Agency's principal liaison with the JFK Board, will continue in that role. HRG will receive requests from the Board, and then forward them to the Directorate focal points for action. Responses from the Directorates will be coordinated by HRG, which will make the responses available to the Board. ~~(AIUO)~~

4. Please provide the name of your focal point officer to John Pereira, Chief, HRG [x30373-secure] by 13 April. ~~(AIUO)~~

Leo Hazlewood

Leo Hazlewood

Attachment

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

OIM 98-0081
30 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Center, DO
Chief, Latin America Division, DO
Chief, CE Division, DO

FROM: Lee Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Office of Information Management

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

REFERENCE: (~~AIUO~~) Bulletin OIM-EB No. 02-98, dated 22 July 1998

1. (U) The JFK Board has made a number of recent specific directed requests to assure that the Agency has complied fully with the requirements of the JFK Act. Among these was a request for issuance of the Reference Employee Bulletin, in which the DCI directed that employees leave "no stone unturned" in assuring that relevant documents are provided to the Commission.

2. (U) In part because relevant new documents have surfaced within the past few months, the Board has also requested specific focus on renewed searches of the Agency's "counterintelligence files." The new documents have surfaced due to a variety of reasons, including references to assassination related personalities in recent defector reports, records made available because of the break up of the Soviet Union, and advances in search capabilities due to digitization of older paper files.

CL BY: 644243
CL REASON: 1.5C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: HUM 4-82

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

3. (~~C~~) In discussions with the Board staff we have attempted to focus any new tasking on those areas in which they have expressed their greatest concern. It is imperative, however, that we satisfy the Board on these issues or the Agency will be subject to a determination by the Board that we are not in compliance with the JFK Act. Because of the impending statutory termination of the Board and their need to issue their report, there is some urgency associated with the conduct and completion of these searches. The searches must be completed by 6 August, 1998.

4. (~~S~~) Databases to be Searched. The addressees to this memorandum are requested to perform new searches—using the search terms in paragraph 5--on ANY of your files which may contain information relating in any way to the JFK assassination, including, in particular, all records systems or files containing information on:

- James J. Angleton and his files
- Debriefings of defectors in which ANY reference to Oswald or the JFK assassination occurs (Example, IJDECANTER)

5. (U) Search Terms and Time Periods. These new searches should focus on documents that might be retrievable with the following search terms over the referenced periods:

- The period 1959—1965 using the search terms Executive Action, Exaction, Ex Action.

- Post-1978 information combining the term "assassination" with President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, Kennedy, JFK, presidential threats, threats to U.S. President, attempt (or attempted), or the crypt GPIDEAL.

- Post-1978 information related to the following terms: Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations, HSCA, Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald, Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby, or GPFLOOR.

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

6. ~~(S)~~ Information is also sought on:

- The identity and current location of personnel (either the current assignment of employees or any knowledge of current location of retirees) who participated in debriefings or the preparation of reports on debriefings of [IJDECANTER.]
- The destruction of James J. Angleton's files.

Such information should be brought immediately to the attention of the Historical Review Program, OIM (Barry Harrelson, [31825, Secure]).

James R. Oliver (for)
Lee S. Strickland

4

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

5

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

Attachment III

Attachment III

Records Declassified and Released.

Summary. This Attachment discusses the process used by CIA to declassify JFK assassination-related documents, including interaction with the Board and subsequent re-reviews of materials, as well as the personnel resources engaged in this effort. It discusses the volumes of records reviewed, the volumes of records declassified, and the manner in which the material has or will be made available to the public.

Discussion. In response to the enactment of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 and in anticipation of the appointment of the Review Board, CIA, during 1992 and 1993, reviewed for declassification material which had been sequestered following the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) in 1978. As a result of this effort, CIA released as declassified to the National Archives in August 1993 some 127,000 pages of material from this collection. Since that time, additional releases have been made; approximately 74,000 pages from the microfilm part of the collection were declassified and released in August 1994 and 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material were declassified and released in 1995. We estimate that, since 1992, CIA has devoted over 100 work years to its effort to respond to the JFK Act (including experienced annuitants working as independent contractors).

The development of the declassification review methodology was, from the beginning in 1992, an iterative process that took into account both the requirements of the JFK Act to release to the public information relevant to an understanding of the assassination and the DCI's statutory mandate to protect intelligence sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.

In the years since 1992, considerable effort has been expended to balancing these two objectives. Interaction with the Board's staff was a significant factor in reaching this proper balance. The net result is that practices over this period evolved to the extent that types of material that had been redacted at the beginning of the process were, by the end, no longer considered necessary to withhold. This has, of course, required a further re-review of the material released during the earlier period to assure that consistent standards were being used for the entire collection.

Each document in the collection was read by an Historical Review Program (HRP) Reviewer -- in every case a retired officer with at least two decades of Agency experience -- who examined every word in the document with an eye toward releasing documents unless such release could be expected to cause damage to:

- Human intelligence assets or their families;
- Intelligence methodology clearly requiring continued protection;
- Intelligence operations or activities warranting continued protection, including relationships with foreign governments.

The reviewed documents were then passed to teams of officers from the components that generated the documents (in most cases the Directorate of Operations), who were responsible for determining current sensitivity. The senior HRP reviewers validated the component groups' actions prior to forwarding the materials to the Board.

Names of CIA employees who served all or most of their careers under cover posed particular problems and, while many names have been redacted, with Board concurrence for release at a later date, the current sensitivity, or lack thereof, of retired individuals' employment by CIA had to be checked in each case. Names of key players in the post-assassination scenario, as stipulated by the Board, were released as true names or with temporary and traceable substitute names. Identification by the Board of those who were considered key players was a complicated and time-consuming task. Significant review and analysis went into the decision to release true names of many Cubans connected with the Bay of Pigs.

Material from the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations, presidential libraries and PFIAB files which addressed the entire scope of CIA activities raised issues with respect to relevance to the JFK assassination. For example, Project MONGOOSE, a clandestine portion of the publicly acknowledged U.S. anti-Castro policy, was released.

Another major issue was consistency in reviewing duplicate copies of documents. In one case 47 copies of a cable were found by different reviewers in separate files over the six years of our review process. The National Archives ground rules called for release of every copy for inclusion in the NARA collection; therefore, each of these 47 copies is included as part of the total collection. As duplicate copies were found, comparison with the 1993 released version revealed not only inconsistencies but textual phrasing which, in a mosaic of related documents, made likely the identification of a protected individual or action. As a result, much re-review of the files was required and did occur.

Another time-consumer was the question of the identification of overseas station locations, traditionally not revealed--both to protect Agency individuals, activities and sources and to avoid foreign relations difficulties with foreign governments. In these cases, a window of time for acknowledgment of such facilities was negotiated, directly relevant to such actions as Oswald's travels and post-assassination requests for foreign government assistance in the U.S. investigation.

Except for redaction of names of CIA employees, true names of clandestine agents (otherwise identified with traceable cryptonyms), and currently-sensitive cooperation with specific foreign intelligence services, the final collection in the National Archives will contain very limited redactions and, in our opinion, none that would affect an historian's understanding of the Agency's information on, and relevance to, the event.

Attachment IV.

ATTACHMENT IV.

Perceived Gaps in CIA Records

Summary. This Attachment addresses the Board's requested explanation for the apparent absence of files which are known to have existed (or for which there is some evidence that they existed at one time) but cannot now be located. Specifically, the Board asked for such information on the following: Oswald files; certain files of James Angleton; DCI McCone files; William Pawley; and Win Scott. This Attachment also addresses the Board's request that the Agency's Declaration "...identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files."

Discussion.

Files on Lee Harvey Oswald

(a) The Office of Security (OS) maintained a pre-assassination subject file on Oswald. This file contained newspaper articles and reports from other government agencies. As would be expected, the number of volumes of the subject file grew following the assassination. The pre-assassination material remained in volume one and subsequent material was filed in volumes numbered II through VI. However, during a February 1997 search, no volume V was found. A second thorough search of the OS file system failed to produce any record of Volume V. A careful page-by-page review of the contents of the existing volumes revealed there is no time gap in the material. Therefore, it is believed the label on Volume VI is simply incorrect; it should have been labeled Volume V.

The OS Oswald subject file was reviewed by the HSCA in 1978; however, it was not stored with the rest of the sequestered material. There is no documentation on why this file was not incorporated into the sequestered collection held by the DO; eight boxes of non-Oswald OS files were in the collection. The Oswald Security File has been reviewed, declassified, and released to NARA.

(b) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their professional opinion is that most likely such tapes were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

James J. Angleton (Chief, CounterIntelligence Staff, 1954-1974)

As noted in a 24 August 1998 memo to the Board, the files of Mr. Angleton were incorporated within the files of the CI Staff and the Directorate of Operations. Three memoranda, dated 23 November 1976, 5 August 1977, and 29 November 1979, detail the review and incorporation into the DO Central Records System of the Angleton files as well as all the files found in CI Staff following Mr. Angleton's departure. As a result of this review and incorporation of files, there is no identifiable collection of Angleton files. The three memoranda mentioned above have been included in the Agency's JFK collection for processing and release to NARA.

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965)

Within the McCone papers are several file folders with notations that indicate documents are missing. However, each folder has an index of the documents that were originally within it. Of all the missing documents only two refer to the Kennedy assassination. One document is described as "Date of Meeting - 26 Nov; Participants - DCI &

Bundy; Subjects Covered - Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy's assassination." The second document is described as "Date of Meeting - 19 May '64; Participants - DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence - Re: Oswald. [The latter is annotated: "Destroyed 1-28-72."]

Both documents were noted as missing when the files were reviewed by the CIA History Staff in November 1986.

William Pawley (Industrialist; friend of DCI Dulles and supporter of Anti-Castro activities)

The JFK collection contains a 201 file on Mr. Pawley that ends in 1962. The Directorate of Operations determined that material through 1965 that should have been in the 201 file was filed in an operational file. Most of the material was already within the JFK collection. The Board staff reviewed all the documents within the operational file and selected additional documents for inclusion in the JFK collection. This material will be processed for release to NARA.

Win Scott (Chief of Station, Mexico City, 1956-1969)

The Agency's Retired Record Table (RRT) shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the DO Records Control Schedule in effect at that time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy upon completion of a specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987, based upon reference to Item Number 40-76 of the Records Control Schedule.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

Certain Station Files

Within the Board's guidance for CIA's compliance declaration, the Board asked that the Agency specifically address the existence, non-existence or destruction of files from two stations in its Final Compliance Statement. The two stations in question are Mexico City for the period 1963-1964, and Moscow for the period 1959-1962.

It has been long-standing practice and policy that materials that the DO keeps in the field are for immediate operational needs, and that record materials are to be returned to Headquarters for safekeeping. Limited storage space overseas as well as the risk of physical loss in the event of civil unrest or the need for evacuation are contributing factors to this policy. Once at Headquarters, these materials are normally organized by topic or subject rather than by station because this is the way that work is performed. Particularly with paper records and the passage of significant time, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to reconstruct with any confidence, a full set of documents for any particular station.

We do know that files from Mexico City Station are listed in the documents found in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file materials. This divergence from normal practice with respect to these files can be explained by the obvious high interest of the Warren Commission in the events in Mexico City surrounding the time of the assassination (as shown by the fact that they are contained in the Warren Commission materials). It would not have been normal practice at the time for the Agency to keep these records in this form. Thus, other than the materials in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file, we have been unable to identify collections of records which would represent files for the two stations for the periods requested.

HTLINGUAL

The Church and Pike Committees both expressed concern about HTLINGUAL, a mail opening project which held information on American citizens. As a result of these investigations, CIA was directed by court order to destroy all HTLINGUAL material. It is reasonable to believe that an HTLINGUAL file existed on Lee Harvey Oswald; however, along with all other files designated as HTLINGUAL files, it would have been destroyed in accordance with the court order. Within the JFK sequestered collection, there are HTLINGUAL materials on Oswald -- materials which were apparently copied from the HTLINGUAL files before they were destroyed in accordance with the court order. It is not possible, however, to say that everything on Oswald that was held in the HTLINGUAL file wound up in the JFK collection. (See Tab 2 of Attachment V for more details.)

Records Relating to Oswald or the Assassination known to have been destroyed or removed.

In November 1997, the Information Management Officer of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) advised that he had discovered a record which indicated a file that referred to the Kennedy assassination had been destroyed on "5/1/95". A search for information on this document revealed that the document had been created in 1977 and was described as "allegations regarding the Lee Harvey Oswald file." It was included with other documents grouped under the description:

> "Individual Case Files - Consists of documents accumulated in investigating complaints, suggestions, or problems of individuals which are brought to the attention of the IG. Filed numerically by case number. Potential cases filed alphabetically."

It has been confirmed that copies of the documents were made available to the HSCA and are in the sequestered collection. The OIG has reconstructed the file and will maintain it as a permanent record. Documentation is provided at Tab 1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

06 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: Barry Harrelson
OIM/HRG

FROM: Jerry Owens(C)
OIG/IMO

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

REF: (U) Telecon dated 06 January 1998

1. (U) Per your request, attached is a memorandum written to the Office of the Inspector Generals (OIG), Deputy and Associate Deputy IG for Investigations. The attached memorandum was also reviewed by OIG/Counsel. It explains in some detail the events we discussed in referenced telephone conversation.

2. (AIUO) It is understood by me, the undersigned, that no further action from the Inspector Generals office is required, and that this matter may be considered closed. The Office of Information Management/Historical Review Group (OIM/HRG) will notify the Assassination Review Board (ARB) and file a copy of this memorandum in HRG files to refer to when writing the compliance letter to the ARB.

3. (AIUO) It is also understood that original documents are not required when material is requested for or being added to the sequestered collection, and that copies of the material which were inadvertently destroyed were previously provided to the HSAC and ARB (or special task force) before their destruction in 1995.

4. (AIUO) With the assistance of HRG, the OIG/IMO has been able to reconstruct the file and will maintain it as a permanent record, also adding a copy of the attached to that file.

CL BY 0680987
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X-1
DRV fm COV 1-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

5. (AIUO) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call me on secure X77081. Thank you.

Jerry N. Owens (C)

cc: D/IG/INV w/o att
AD/IG/INV w/o att
IG/Counsel w/o att
OIG/IMO w/att
DCI/IMO w/o att

Names thru 1988
Name: LONNQUIST Gary H.
Component: DA OC
Type: 37/77 [redacted]
Complaint: Allegations [redacted]
Referred to IG by: [redacted]
Date Opened: 29 March 1977
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: / /
Date Closed: 31 May 1977
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: / /
Inspectors: Cox
Category:
Spec Cons:
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:

Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number: 80-01770R
Box: 2
Comments:

14-00000

Attachment V

Attachment V

Specific Requests From the Board

Summary. The JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 mandates a number of specific actions on behalf of all government departments and agencies. One of these is to:

> "...make available to the Review Board any additional information and records that the Review Board has reason to believe it requires for conducting a review under this Act." (Sec. 5(c)2 H.)

In the exercise of this authority under the Act, the Board made fifty-three specific requests for additional records and information in the form of sixteen (16) requests designated as "formal" and thirty-seven (37) designated as "informal." On each request, the CIA worked closely with the Board and Board staff to provide the information and/or documents requested and a written response which records such actions.

Discussion. As a part of this Final Declaration, the CIA has attached at Tab 1 a list of the fifty-three requests by number and a short description of the subject of each. At the Board's request this attachment includes at Tab 2 the specific response to the request numbered CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination File)

Beyond the fifty-three requests, the Board raised two additional matters which tend to fall within the category of special requests:

1) A request that the Agency review and declassify the Board's interviews of former CIA officer and Mexico City station employee, Anne Goodpasture; the Agency's response to that request is complete.

2) A request for Board staff access to sealed Rockefeller Commission records held by the Library of Congress; these records were given to the Library by Rockefeller via a deed of gift which requires a letter from the DCI before access can be granted. This letter will be completed by 9 September 1998.

Attachment V. Tab 1

JFK Assassinations Records Review Board Requests for Additional Information and Records
As of 1 September 1998

FORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA - 1	Information on the organization of CIA	All directorates, the Office of the Director and HRP	COMPLETE
CIA - 2	*CIA 2 through 5 were background questions on the JFK collection; these types of questions were handled informally; no written responses prepared*	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 3		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 4		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 5		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 6	Cables and dispatches	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 7	Review of 60 CIA histories	HRP, DO, DS&T	**CONTINUING 1 History pending access approval.**
CIA - 8	Intelligence Community Staff Records	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA - 9	Intelligence Community Publications on Cuba or USSR, Nov. 20-30, 1963	DI	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff**
CIA - 10	Interagency Source Register	DO	COMPLETE;
CIA - 11	Sylvia Duran Materials	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 12	Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA - 13	Mexico City Back-channel Communications	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 14	Mexico City Station annual Reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 15	Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 16	Oswald Pre-Assassination Files	DO, DA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA-IR-01	Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959 to 1964	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-02	Location of Certain Cable	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-03	Full Computer Search for HTLINGUAL files	DO	**Documents/files available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-04	Disposition of Angleton Files	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-05	Possible foreign source for records on Oswald	HRP, DO	**Board chairman has requested a DO Briefing on this matter. To be resolved by 15 September.**
CIA-IR-06	QKENCHANT - Information on purpose and connection with certain individuals	DO	COMPLETE; Classified Response Provided.
CIA-IR-07	Claude Barnes Capehart	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-08	Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memorandum	HRP, DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-09	George Bush computer search	DA, DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-10	Determination if CIA IG maintains an index of reports and determine if one was done on handling of Oswald maters.	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-11	Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics -other than press clippings?)	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-12	Contacts with journalists or publishing houses	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-13	Office/person dealing with organized crime & Cuba	HRP	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-14	Breckinridge files (focal point for HSCA investigations)	ODCI/ OCA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA-IR-15	Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes	DO	COMPLETE. The tapes from 22-23 Nov. '63 have been processed and are available to NARA. Processing the remaining 168 tapes will be done by September '99.
CIA-IR-16	U-2 Files Shelflist	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-17	DS&T records on Castro assassination plots	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-18	Information on one DO Office	DO	COMPLETE.
CIA-IR-19	Computer search on specific individuals and organizations	HRP, DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-20	"Monster Plot"	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-21	DRE monthly operational reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-22	"A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-23	Watch Committee files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-24	Defector file	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-25	Zapruder film	DS&T, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-26	Jordan James Pfuntner	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-27	Security files on five individuals	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-28	McCone files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-29	Oswald Le Winter	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-30	Cherepanov papers	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-31	Dulles calendar	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-32	AMWORLD—Information on purpose and relation to Cuban exile group	DO	COMPLETE. Classified Response

INFORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA-IR-33	FBIS-USR-92-112	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-34	Files of CIA officials/offices	DO, ODCI	**DCI Area complete; DO files being reviewed by Board staff.**
CIA-IR-35	Oswald related information provided by Source identified in RIF No 104-10151-10206	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-36	Handling of cables in 1963	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-37	William Pawley	DO	COMPLETE

2

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records
No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and
No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

22 December 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16,the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representataive of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

27 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
AIN: 0351164

1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence(HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.

2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB)research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.

3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.

DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

Attachment VI

Attachment VI

Disposition of CIA/HSCA Sequestered Collection and other Assassination Records.

Summary. This attachment discusses proposed agreements and understandings between the CIA, the Review Board and National Archives and Records Administration regarding the disposition of JFK Assassination-related records held by CIA which are not already at the National Archives, and the terms under which those records to be declassified will be dealt with.

Discussion.

1. "Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998". Per agreement with the Review Board, the declassification review of all records, unless specifically designated for post-September 1998 processing by the Review Board, in the following categories will be completed and the releasable version of the records ready for transfer to the National Archives by September 30, 1998:

- Non-duplicate documents from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, the Russ Holmes files and the LA Division working files;
- Documents designated as assassination records as a result of Review Board specific requests for additional information and records (CIA 1-16, CIA-IR 1-37);
- All documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's "A" file and post-1978 201 file; Oswald's 201 file and security file and Marina Oswald's 201 (microfilm version) have already been transferred to NARA;
- Any non-duplicate documents discovered in the recent searches undertaken to ensure full compliance with the JFK Act; any new documents on Oswald will be added to the post-1978 part of his 201 file.

2. "Processing of Duplicate Documents and Commitments for the Future Treatment of Assassination Records".

- CIA/HSCA sequestered collection duplicates to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999.

- Russ Holmes Working Files to be completed and a declassified version transferred to NARA by December 1998.

- Mexico City tapes (186) to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999. [CIA-IR-15]

- Post-September 1998 Discovery of Assassination Records.

Diligent searches have been made and we are aware of no assassination records being withheld from the Board. However, given the Agency's decentralized records systems, it is possible that assassination-related documents will be discovered in the future. A guide has been prepared for those officers whose work requires them to review Agency documents and material (Executive Order Review, FOIA, etc.) that may be subject to the JFK Act. Any assassination records that are discovered will be processed according to JFK release standards and forwarded to NARA. A copy of the guide is attached. (TAB 1)

- Referrals not complete by 30 September 1998. The CIA proposes that it complete its review and return to originating agency by April 1999 all unreviewed third agency referral documents which were received prior to 30 September 1998. To date the following referral have been identified for possible post-September 1998 review:

a. Army's Investigative Records Repository (from Review Board):

File on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz -- 151 pages

b. SSCI -- Church Committee Records -- TBD pages
(to be identified by Review Board staff)

c. JFK Presidential Library:

Records from Robert Kennedy files -- 1484 pages

These documents have not been formally designated as Assassination Records. The CIA proposes that these be handled in a manner similar to the John F. Kennedy National Security Files on Cuba that were reviewed in 1996 by a joint CIA-State-DOD-Review Board task force.

3. "Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017."

The CIA proposes that the classified versions of Lee Harvey Oswald's Security File and "A" File along with Marina Oswald's original 201 be transferred to the protected (secure) portion of the JFK Collection At NARA by 30 September 1998. The CIA will need to retain custody of the classified version of the original Oswald 201 and the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection to complete the review of duplicate documents by September 1999.

In September 1999, the classified versions of the Oswald 201 (original and microfilm from the sequestered collection) will be transferred to NARA. Due to the sensitive nature of the information in the remaining sequestered collection, particularly the NBR material, CIA proposes that the Agency and National Archives work out a joint custody arrangement that would allow these record to remain in CIA physical custody until 2017.

1

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

CL BY: 611637
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~~DRV~~ FRM: LOC 3-82

(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

-- Warren Commission, 1963-64
-- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
-- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
-- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
-- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

(AIUO)-- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO)C. Key figures
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

23 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. McNamara@DCI
Robert D. Caudle@DCI
Stephen W. DeVine@DCI

FROM: Edmund Cohen

OFFICE: OIM

SUBJECT: Re: blurb from JFK Board

REFERENCE:

Original Text of Edmund Cohen
Original Text of Edmund Cohen

TO: James R. Oliver@DA

TO: *James R. Oliver@DA*
FROM: *Edmund Cohen*
OFFICE: *OIM*
DATE: *09/23/98 08:04:16 PM*
SUBJECT: *Re: blurb from JFK Board*

After reading the note below, I spoke with the GC, who working with Bob Caudle, was seeking to have included in the Board statement the fact that the DCI had sent a letter endorsing my declaration. I suggested to the GC that even with this addition, the JFK Board comment would be most unfortunate. The whole six year effort was designed to put to rest all of the conspiracy theories and this comment would undercut the effort. In addition, it likely would result in significant additional questions, additional work for OIM, OCA, OGC and PAS, and put the Agency in a bad light. I suggested that I should ask the EXDIR to sign the declaration. The GC interposed no objection. I then spoke with the EXDIR who agreed to sign a declaration if this would satisfy the situation. I informed the GC that the EXDIR was willing to sign and the GC asked me to inform Bob Caudle, which I did. After you spoke with Judge Tunheim and got his agreement to: 1) return the Cohen declaration and the DCI letter and substitute the EXDIR declaration, and 2) eliminate the "blurb," I had the EXDIR sign the declaration.

I subsequently briefed the DDA, ADDA, and ADDA/IS. of the above.

Original Text of Robert D. Caudle
Original Text of Robert D. Caudle

This is what they are going to include in their report, according to fax I just received from Ron Haron:

"The Board has considered release of all CIA assassination records to be critical to successful implementation of the JFK Act. Accordingly, the Board requested each of CIA's directorates to certify,

under penalty of perjury, that they had conducted thorough searches and identified all relevant records. The CIA refused. The Board then, as an alternative, asked the highest officials of the Agency - - the Executive Director and General Counsel - - to certify that CIA had met its obligations under the JFK Act and that no records on Oswald or assassination were withheld. The CIA refused. Instead, the CIA designated its Director of Information Management to sign CIA's Declaration of Compliance. In the Board's view, CIA's highest officials should have been willing to certify, under oath, that the Agency has complied with all the requirements of the JFK Act. The CIA's failure to do so raises serious concerns for the Board that the CIA has in fact fully complied with the JFK Act."

CC: *Lanie P. D'Alessandro@DA, R. Bruce Burke@DCI, Lee S. Strickland@DA, Walter I. Hazlett@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI*

Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:04:16 PM

CC:

Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:09:39 PM

I, Barbara Blufer, declare and state based on my personal knowledge and the information made available to me in my official capacity that:

1. I am the Information Review Officer for (IRO) for the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 6 October 1997 and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since (1980). I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DI that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. Since assuming my present position, I have had limited contact with the ARRB. With respect to matters prior to 6 October 1997, this statement has been prepared with inputs from my predecessor, Richard J. Flynn, who occupied my current position during the DI's principal contact with the Board.

3. Mr. Flynn has reported that, to ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DI records system and search capabilities, the DI/IRO and the DI Information Management Officer, Ms. Diana Hastings, briefed the staff on 13 May 1997. Other DI participants at the meeting were Joyce Jump, Marie Menafee, and Ilse Hartman. These officers were at that time assigned to the DI Office of Information Resources. Ms. Hastings focused on the current DI records keeping system, and, as best we could, the system that existed in the 1960s. DI participants stressed that the DI records keeping system has evolved over time and that the DI is continuously striving to achieve greater consistency in our procedures. DI participants candidly informed the ARRB staff that none of them at the meeting had first hand knowledge of DI records keeping in the 1960s, and b) the system in place at that time was entirely paper-based and therefore could not be considered as accurate as the present system. Members of the ARRB said they understood this limitation.

4. Mr. Flynn further reported that based on his recollection, Mr. Flynn is aware of a limited number of records searches the DI conducted in direct response to ARRB requests. On 11 June 1997, DI personnel met with members of the ARRB. Mr. Flynn had arranged this meeting earlier to give ARRB staffers, Michelle Combs and Bob Skwirot, an even more detailed briefing of DI's document search capabilities. The topics they asked the DI to search are noted in an attached memorandum to Barry Harrelson dated 17 June 1997.. The result of further searches (CIA -9) are summarized a 19 June 1997 memorandum a member of the DI/IRO's staff prepared for Mr. Barry Harrelson, CIA's point of contact on the JFK assassination issue. This memorandum is also attached.

5. On 21 August, Mr. Harrelson contacted me for a further search of DI records, asking specifically that the DI follow up on a previously search by extending the timeframe covered in that original search. According to Mr. Harrelson, the ARRB requested a search for all documents concerning Mexico, Cuba, or the USSR for the period from 20 November 1963 to 6 December 1963. On the basis of this request, a search was conducted 32 documents not belonging to the DI were located. The materials were turned over to Mr. Harrelson.

6. All employees of the Directorate of Intelligence have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

7. I declare under penalty of perjury that foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 28th day of August 1998.

Barbara P. Blufer

Barbara Blufer
IRO for the Directorate of Intelligence

Neil Huntley —

4/ – [illegible] 6
Box

October 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions, Staffs, and Groups

SUBJECT : President Kennedy Assassination File Search.

1. We are requested to search our files for any classified material relating to the assassination of President Kennedy, specifically information on Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, Yury Ivanovich Nosenko, and the Warren Commission. Report any documents, etc. on the three individuals regardless of whether the information is related to the assassination or not.

2. The search must be completed as soon as possible. A report (even if only a progress report) must be made to John Michaels, Room 7F36, ext. 7654, no later than 1300, Tuesday, 28 October.

DOUGLAS P. MULHOLLAND
Acting Director
Current Intelligence

[illegible] [illegible] Cuban [illegible] "
Post 2 — [illegible] 1

28 Nov '75

File Searach on President Kennedy's Assassination - OCI Front Office

1. Office of D/OCI has a file labeled: 'Material regarding President Kennedy's Assassination." It contains:

a. Memo entitled: Rumours About Lee Harvey Oswald, which discusses the rumor-mongering in the world public regarding the presumed assassin. Memo is Secret and dated 23 March 1964.

b. Listing of government leaders expectdd to attend Kennedy funeral

c. Memo entitled: Fidel Castro's Speech, which contained an "objective analysis" of implications of Kennedy's assassination. Memo is Confidential and dated 25 Nov. 1963

d. FBIS study, never disseminated, entitled: The Past Soviet Propaganda Assessment of President Johnson. Study is Confidential and dated 25 November 1963

e. FIBS Daily Report - World Reaction Series - on foreign radio and press reaction of death of Kennedy and accession of Johnson. Official Use Only and dated 26 November 1963

f. Memo entitled: Castro's speech of 27 November on the President's Assassination. Speech says Oswald the innocent dupe of a complex plot. Memo is confidential and dated 29 November 1963.

g. Unclassified copy of Wash. Post article on Castro reaction to Kennedy death - November 29, 1963

h. Three copies of Memo entitled: World Reaction to the Assassination of President Kennedy. Deals with idea of possible coverup in killing of Oswald - to seal his lips and protect the extreme right, whose tool he was. Memos ~~is~~ TOP SECRET DINAR and dated 25 November 1963

are 23, 24, +

Carla Scopeletis

Copy passed to Michael
28 Oct 75

DECLARATION OF MARY LOU CUMMINGS

I, MARY LOU CUMMINGS, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer ("IRO") for the offices of the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA). I was appointed to this position on 5 January 1998, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1981. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DCI area (Offices of the Director and Deputy Director(DCI&DDCI), Community Management Staff(CMS), National Intelligence Council(NIC), Office of the Comptroller(COMPT), Office of the General Counsel(OGC), Office of Congressional Affairs(OCA), Office of the Inspector General(OIG), Office of Public Affairs(OPA), Arms Control Intelligence Staff(ACIS), and Center for the Study of Intelligence(CSI)) that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to ARRB requests.

2. By memo date 6 April 1995, the Executive Director (CIA) requested that focal points for each Directorate be appointed to be responsible for responding to requests for information from the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). Until that time the Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Studies of Intelligence (CSI) had been the principal liaison with the JFK Board. As of that date, DCI area/IRO was appointed to be the DCI area focal point. HRG would continue to receive requests from the Board forwarding them to the Directorate focal point for action. Responses from the Directorate were coordinated by HRG, which then made the responses available to the Board.

3. In an effort to understand the DCI area records systems and to ensure the conduct of thorough searches and responses, the ARRB staff requested a meeting with the DCI area/IRO and key DCI records management officers. Detailed questions were presented in advance to CIA personnel who then provided complete responses to the ARRB staff during the summer of 1997. At that time HRG instructed my predecessor to wait for formal taskings from ARRB before proceeding with additional searches.
See Attachment 1

4. Based on personal knowledge and information reflected in the records of the DCI area/IRO, I am aware that the following searches and reviews were conducted in response to Board requests for DCI area records.

CIA - 1 ORGANIZATIONAL MATERIAL

The DCI area/IRO made available to the Board the following records:

Organization of the Office of the Director, 1963;

Mission Statements for 1959,1962,1965, and 1966;

Relevant Office of Director Notices;

OGC and OIG Mission Statements for 1964,1966,1969,1975, and 1976;

OLC Mission Statements for 1975 and 1976;

Names of Personnel Responsible for Liaison with the Warren and Rockefeller Commissions, Pike and Church Committees and the HSCA.

See Attachment 2

CIA - 7 HISTORIES

Sixty-one histories were provided to the Board by CSI/HRG. The ARRB staff is continuing to review the histories to determine their relevancy to the JFK assassination.

See Attachment 3

CIA - 8 Intelligence Community Staff Records

Following the Board's request of 1 March 1996, the records systems of CMS were searched for JFK assassination related information with negative results. The Board then asked to examine CMS shelf listings for the relevant time period. A redacted copy of the shelf list was delivered to HRG in April 1998. On 12 August the Board identified 14 CMS records that they believe may be relevant. On 21 August, ARRB Staff examined the responsive folders.

See Attachment 4

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted Copy of "Family Jewels" Memoranda

The Board has identified pages of the Memoranda to be included in the JFK Collection. The Board agreed to the necessary redactions and the request was completed.

See Attachment 5

CIA-IR-09 George Bush Computer Search

The DCI area provided a response of "no record found" of any contact with Bush in the 1960-1967 time frame.

See Attachment 6

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports

On 3 August 1998, the DCI area/IRO informed HRG that OIG does not maintain an index or inventory of IG cases. All reports and material prepared by the IG on the JFK assassination were turned over to the Office of External Affairs (OEXA). There is no indication that a report on the handling of Oswald was ever prepared.

See Attachment 7

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge Files

The OIG located six documents that may be relevant to the JFK assassination. They have provided a list to HRG. OGC located five documents that they made available to the Board.

See Attachment 8

CIA-IR-23 Watch Committee Files

Following a thorough search and review of CMS files, 12 documents were turned over to the Board.

See Attachment 9

CIA-IR-28 McCone Files

The ARRB staff provided a list of McCone records that they wished to review: The DCI area/IRO, in turn, gave the ARRB staff complete access to the McCone files in March 1998. The records selected by the Board's staff are being processed for release. On 30 April 1998, the DCI area/IRO was notified that the request was complete. The DCI area was then notified on 3 August the there were missing McCone files that remained of interest to the Board. As soon as we receive a list of the missing files, we will begin an in-depth review of Executive Registry records in an effort to locate the missing file

See Attachment 10

CIA-IR-31 Dulles Calendars

The ARRB staff has completed their review of the Dulles calendars and has requested that some pages be processed for release.

See Attachment 11

CIA-IR-34 File of CIA Officials and/or Offices

On 5 March 1998, the Board requested records concerning DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter and former General Counsel Lawrence Houston. The DCI area/IRO recalled seven boxes of relevant material from Records Center. The boxes were review by ARRB staff during July 1998 and several records were selected for further processing. OGC is currently reviewing files for pertinent Houston records.

See Attachment 12

5. In addition to the formal requests, the DCI area/IRO completed the declassification review of three NIEs, documents from the Ford and Kennedy libraries, and an IG Report.

See Attachment 13

6. As this declaration demonstrates, the DCI area/IRO including predecessors, to the best of his/her ability has caused thorough searches of the DCI area systems of records for records related to the JFK assassination not included in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK collection.

7. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS 1 THROUGH 13, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in McLean, Virginia on this 28 day of August 1998.

Mary Lou Cummings

Mary Lou Cummings

~~SECRET~~

DECLARATION OF BECKY L. RANT

I, Becky L. Rant, declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Administration (DA) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 3 February 1997, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1965. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DA, Office of the Deputy Director of Administration (ODDA), Center for CIA Security (CCS-formerly the Office of Security ((OS)), Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office of Finance and Logistics (OFL), Office of Communications (OC), Office of Training and Education (OTE), Office of Facilities and Security Services (OFSS), Agency Technology Services (ATS), Center for Security Evaluation (CSE), that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. To ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DA records systems and search capabilities, the DA/IRO and DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO) briefed the staff on 17 March 1997. The briefing focused on the DA records systems that existed in the 1960s and the current records systems. Questions that were provided by the staff prior to the briefing were discussed and an individual from the Office of Communications (OC) attended to answer questions related to cable processing in the 1960s. In addition to OC participation, the Offices of Finance & Logistics (OFL), Human Resource Management (HRM), and Security (OS) provided written responses to the list of questions submitted by the staff. It was agreed that the additional questions raised by the staff during the briefing would be tasked to the directorate formally by the Agency JFK Focal Point/Historical Review Program (HRP). An outline of the records briefing and a copy of the advance questions and the answers provided appear as **Attachment 1.**

3. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in the records of the DA/IRO, I am aware of the following searches that were conducted in response to specific AARB requests for DA records:

CIA 1 - Information on Organization of CIA

The DA provided from the records of the Regulatory Services Group/ODDA copies of Agency regulations and notices pertaining to the organizational structure of the Agency during the time periods specified by the ARRB staff. DA/IRO gave approval for the cleared staff members to review the material. Subsequently the DA/IRO approved release of the following items:

31 mission statements and organization charts for the DDA (DDS) and Office of Security (full release)

2 organization charts and mission statement of the Office of Communications (OC) (sanitized)

16 Agency mission, function and organization charts (full release with concurrence of the other directorates) **(Attachment 2)**

CIA-7-Histories

The DA JFK Focal Point reviewed the index of histories produced by the CIA History Program - for release to the ARRB and approved access with certain restrictions. There is no record in the DA/IRO's office that the staff requested access to the DA histories on the list. **(Attachment 3)**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN REMOVED
FROM SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

CIA-12-JMWAVE—5 Files

The DA conducted file searches in OS and HRM for records on Theodore Shackley, Ronald Cross, Bart Henry, Doug Gupton, David Morales. We were subsequently advised by HRP that the David Morales OS file was part of the collection so the OS searched for records on the first four names only. OS identified files on Shackley, Cross and Gupton which were reviewed by the ARRB staff. HRM identified files on Morales and Shackley which were provided to HRP. Neither office surfaced records on Bart Henry. **(Attachment 4)**

CIA-16-Oswald Pre-assassination Files

The Office of Security identified a multi-volume file and provided answers to questions posed by the ARRB staff. **(Attachment 5).** The OS file was reviewed and in April 1998 was released to the National Archives. **NOTE:** The attached 17 February 1997 OS memorandum describes records holding related to HTLINGUAL and states that the files were destroyed in April 1994.

CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL File

See CIA-16 above and **Attachment 5**

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart

Capehart's Office of Security file is in the sequestered collection. The DA JFK Focal Point provided input on the question of protecting Capehart's relationship with global marine. **(Attachment 6).** In coordination with the DS&T, HRP responded to the ARRB staff.

CIA-09 George Bush Computer Search

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management reviewed the files of George Herbert Walker Bush and found no documentation indicating that Mr. Bush had an affiliation with CIA during the 1963 time period. **Attachment 7**

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission Critics

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Information Management were tasked with records searches on Edward Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg and Sylvia Meagher. No records were found on Lane and Thompson. Weisburg and Epstein security files were made available for ARRB staff review. An OS impersonal file was identified but had been destroyed in 1994. HRM found only an OSS service card on Weisberg which has been supplied to HRP. OIM identified a file on Epstein. Several FOIA and PA files also were identified. **Attachment 8.** Contains the DA response and the final HRP response letter coordinated with the DA/IRO.

CIA-IR-13 - Office/Person Dealing with Organized Crime & Cuba

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Finance & Logistics provided responses to this request. The Official Personnel File of Charles Ford was given to HRP, OS provided a description of the OS file contents and OFL provided travel and financial records. **Attachment 9**

CIA-IR-19 Computer Search on Specific Individuals and Organizations

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Medical Services, Training & Education conducted searches on the following individuals with described results:

Cherne, OPF provided to HRP; OS file made available for staff review
Leake, OPF provided to HRP, OS and OMS files made available for staff review
Garbler, OPF provided to HRP, OS, OTE, OMS files made available for staff review
Verna Deane Brown, OPF provided to HRP
John A. McVickar, OPF provided to HRP
Byron Morton, No records
Marie Cheatham, No Records

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management conducted searches on the following individuals with results noted:

Spas T. Raikin, OS File described in attachment, No HRM record
Marilyn Murret, Index card only, No HRM record
Andrew Anderson, OS File(may or may no be correct file) made available, No HRM Record
Howard Geubler, No OS or HRM records
Gordon Novel, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, No HRM Record
Edward S. Butler, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, NO HRM Record

The Office of Security found no records on INCA (Information Council of the Americas) or Permindex. **Attachment 10**

CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports

HRP requested and was provided the Official Personnel File of George Joannides

CIA-24 Defector File

The Office of Security provided a description of "Defector Files" maintained by OS in a 17 February 1997 memo **(See attachment 5)**

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder File

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Finance & Logistics searched for records on William Green of Kodak Labs. All reported negative results. HRM confirmed that Homer McMahon was an NPIC employee and provided bio information. **Attachment 11**

CIA-IR-26 Jordan James Pfuntner

The Office of Security conducted a search and reported that the OS file had been destroyed in 1980-81. **Attachment 12**

CIA-IR-27 Security Files on 5 Individuals

The Office of Security conducted a records search for files on the following individuals:

Richard C. Nagell
Gordon D. Novel
Jack L. Ruby
Walter J. Sheridan
Harold Weisberg

The Nagell, Novel and Ruby files were designated assassination records and copies were provided to HRP. The Sheridan and Weisberg files were made available and were reviewed by the ARRB Staff. **(Attachment 13)**

CIA-IR-29 Oswald LeWinter

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Facilities Security & Services conducted searches for information on Oswald Winter. HRM and OFSS reported negative results. OS found information in an impersonation/crank file. The DA/IRO coordinated with the DO on a statement that was provided to the ARRB staff. **Attachment 14**

CIA-IR-36 Handling of Cables in 1963

The DA/IRO provided coordination approval on a memorandum prepared by HRP describing cable handling procedures **Attachment 15**

List of 38 Names of Interest to the ARRB-Provided by HRP 8/5/98

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management searched records for information on 38 individuals listed in the attachment. The OS and HRM responses are attached. **Attachment 16**

4. As this declaration demonstrates, I and my predecessors to the best of our ability have caused thorough searches of all relevant DA records systems for records responsive to the JFK ARRB requests for information. In addition, the offices of the Directorate of Administration have certified to me that all employees have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK Assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 21 day of August 1998.

Becky L Rant

Becky L. Rant
Information Review Officer
Directorate of Administration

1

Directorate of Administration

Briefing for the JFK Assassination Records Review Board Staff

on

Records Management in the DA

17 March 1997

Carol M. Johnson
DA Information Management Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1205 Secure 31205

Becky Rant
DA Information Review Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1204 Secure 31204

TOPICS

- CIA Information Services Strategic Plan
- Information Management Program Segments
- Information Management Goals
- Organization of Records Management In the Agency
- DA Information Management Officer (IMO)
- DA Information Review Officer (IRO)
- Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965
- Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997
- DA Records

CIA Information Services Strategic Plan

- "Information and Records Management, including Classification Management, is a fundamental and essential business requirement for the Agency."

- "The CIA's Information Services shall...ensure that each official record is appropriate, accurate, secure and retrievable throughout its life cycle regardless of physical form or media."

~~Administrative-Internal Use Only~~

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Program Segments

- Records Management
- Classification Management
- Information Disclosure
- Information Automation

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Goals

An effective and efficient information management ensures that records are available:

- to meet day-to-day business needs
- to ensure the continuity and consistency of records
- to provide corporate memory and history
- to protect the rights and interests of the organization, the employees and the public
- to meet legal requirements

Associate Deputy Director for Administration

Information Services

Organization of Records Management in the Agency

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

D/Info Mgt *

OIT

Recruitment & Training*

Policy Research & Audit*

Archive & Preservation*

System Development*

Agency Information & Records Management Panel

* = member

DCI/IMO*

component/imos

DA/IMO*

component/imos

DI/IMO*

component/imos

DO/IMO*

component/imos

DS&T/IMO*

component/imos

DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO)

- The DA/IMO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for issues relating to records and classification management.

- The DA/IMO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statues, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the creation, maintenance and use, and disposition of information.

DA Information Review Officer (DA/IRO)

- The DA/IRO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for reviewing all DA relevant information for release to the public under FOIA, PA, EO, and other information release programs.
- The DA/IRO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statutes, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the review and release of classified information, specifically, in response to:
    - FOIA/PA/EO Requests
    - Congressional Inquiries
    - DOJ Inquiries/Litigations
    - IG Investigations
    - Special Searches & Other Release Programs

Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965

- Office of the DDS (ODDS)
- Office of Security (OS)
- Office of Personnel (OP)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Logistics (OL)
- Office of Finance (OF)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Training (OTR)

Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997

- Office of the DDA (ODDA)
- Office of Personnel Security (OPS)
- Office of Facilities & Security Services (OFSS)
- Office of Finance & Logistics (OFL)
- Human Resources Management (HRM)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Information Technology (OIT)
- Office of Training & Education (OTE)
- Center for Security Evaluation (CSE)

DA Records



- Information Management Officers
- Core functions
  - 1960s
  - 1990s
- Records Life Cycle
  - Creation
  - Maintenance & Use
  - Disposition
- File organization

DA Records



- Records Control Schedules
  - Temporary
  - Permanent
- Records Storage
  - Short term
  - Long term
- Accountability
  - Personal
  - Organization
- Search & Retrieval

DA Records



- Access
- Safeguarding
- Preservation
  - Hardcopy
  - Electronic
- OGC Retention List
- Automation

DRAFT

Types of Questions for DA Records Briefing
March 17, 1997

Budget and Finance

1. In Cold Warrior (p. 52) Mangold refers to a CI secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and never audited by the usual procedures. According to Mangold, it was this fund which allowed Angleton to run his own operations without supervision. Did the fund exist? Was this fund ever audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

2. Mangold also refers (p. 53) to an unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-1964 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI Staff from 1959-63. Do their records still exist?

3. We have seen Directorate of Operations monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960's still be retrieved?

4. What records are kept on disbursements to sources in the field? If, hypothetically, LHO had received money from the Agency, what records would exist?

Personnel

1. What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Security

1. For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

2. How are Office of Security records indexed?

3. What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

These pgs were released
in full in 104-10333-10002
JFK-M-18, F3

DRAFT

4. In the OS/SRS memo of Oct. 31, 1960, written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed: "Robert Edward Webster, EE-18854; Lee Harvey Oswald, MS-11165; Libero Ricciardelli, MS-8295; Vladimir Sloboda, MS-10565; and Joseph Dutkanicz, MS-10724." What do the "MS" and "EE" file prefixes designate? How are these designations assigned?

5. Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kinds of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained. For example, Clay Shaw was given a security clearance and had access to classified information based on his "responsibilities" as a source for the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD).

6. Where are records that would describe liaison (etc.) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

7. Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located. For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?] more info

8. How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

OC

nuts & bolts

Do we have anyone who can brief on cable process in 60-64 time period. How came in, decrypted. What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived on a desk at HQS, how disseminated.

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Budget and Finance

Question 1 - In Cold Warrior Mangold refers to a CIA secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and not audited by usual procedures. Did the fund exist? Was the fund audited? Are there any records of CI operational, expenses for the period 1959-63?

According to C/Financial Service Division (FSD/OFL) who contacted a former finance officer who was a secretary in CI in 1957-60, to the best of their recollection CI did not have their own finance officer. C/FSD also talked to another officer during that era who did not recall that CI was one of the early offices to do their own certification of expenses. It was his feeling that there very well may have been a CI fund that was not handled in the usual way however it is very unlikely to impossible that any fund was not audited/certified in some fashion (i.e. reviewed and certified decentrally and only reported on the books in some aggregate amount). He commented that he has never in discussion with finance officers heard of an account managed by staff officers that wasn't certified by someone in finance.

Question 2 - Mangold also refers to unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-64 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI staff from 1959-63? Do their records still exist?

OFL - The Career Management Officer stated that we would need the name of the B&F officer in order to identify if he/she was assigned to the CI/Staff. CMO also stated that he does have some old records during that time period pertaining to assignments but the list he has is alphabetical by name. The current procedure is that the soft file maintained in OFL contains the assignment of each officer in the biographical profile.

HRM - Has microfilm staffing complements for the 1959-63 timeframe. These staffing complements were created on a quarterly basis and are broken down by the office (location) level. With the correct directorate/office name we can visually search these microfilm records, find the correct office and produce hardcopy reports listing the employees on the rolls for a given quarter. The hardcopy report could be reviewed to break down the office listing by occupation and create a list of names associated with the occupation (i.e. B&F officers assigned to CI from 1959-63. The employee name could then be used to located current or archived HRM files. CAUTION: 1) If an individual came and left an office during the same quarter they might not appear on the staffing complement, 2) If an individual was TDY to an office they would not appear on the staffing complement of that office. 3) If an individual was being paid by their home office they would not appear on the staffing complement of the outside office they were supporting.

Question 3 - We have seen DO monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960s still be retrieved?

The DO operational fund records would contain expenditures against a certain project or operation. However, according to C/FSD the system that preceded the General Accounting System (GAS) was RCA 501 (not sure what this contained) but in all probability has been destroyed, would have this type of information also. More information may have been recorded in 201 files similar to today's automated systems.

Question 4 - What records are kept on disbursements in the field? If hypothetically LHO had received money from the Agency what records would exist?

According to the OFL Records Control Schedule station accounting containing indigenous personnel are kept for 56 years, station accounting not containing indigenous personnel are kept 20 years.

Personnel

Question 1 - What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Responsibility for records maintained on independent contract personnel was transferred to OFL o/a 1 October 1996. Staff contract personnel files continue to be maintained by HRM.

Office Contract Personnel Files contain many of the same items found in the staff Official Personnel File (OPF)--application info, actions (Staff contracts only) clearance info, secrecy agreement, etc., and also contract info (agreements, amendments, terminations, etc.) A separate payroll file was also maintained.

IC's - fee for task
Staff Contracts - hired for job--not to exceed 5 years.

Contract files can be opened/maintained/retired in true name, pseudo, alias or crypt depending upon the sensitivity of the contract.

Security

Question 1 - For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

OPS located information which describes the categories of files created during this time frame but it is impossible to state this is all inclusive:

General - Usually unsolicited correspondence of crank variety and junk.

Security Research Staff - possibly material of counterintelligence interest.

DCD contacts - persons who travel abroad and/or have specific information.

Contractor Employees - industrial contractors with collateral and/or SCI accesses

Miscellaneous - Includes publications, organizations, intelligence services, etc.

Alien - Foreign nationals who were of interest

New Building - Persons involved with construction of original Headquarters Building

Regular - Files which included staff employees, contractors, GSA/GSI, etc.

Question 2 - How are Office of Security records indexed?

Prior to 1964 all index records were maintained on 3x5 inch index cards. When the information was known, these cards included names (primary, alias, telecodes), file numbers, kin/relatives, location/residence, DPOB, citizenship, occupation, polygraph number, reference source data, information codes, remarks, SSN, sex, employer, and file retirement data. To locate a file record, the subject of interest was searched in this card system.

During mid-1964 these index cards with the exception of impersonal entities, were under conversion to a keypunch system. The impersonals (companies, publications, intelligence services, organizations, etc.) were maintained on cards until much later, possibly mid-1970s. Aside form the subject name indices, the Office of Security also indexed information of interest within a file record. This information could include associates, companies, publications, other government agency reports information, etc.

TODAY'S INDEXING PARAMETERS ARE VERY LIMITED.

Question 3 - What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counter intelligence effort throughout OS. SRS reported directly to the Director of Security.

Question 4 - In the OS/SRS memo of Oct 31, 1960 written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed. What do the MS and EE file prefixed designate? How are these designations assigned.

As noted in question 1, records were categorized according to the type and the older file numbers reflected the file category. "M" designated a miscellaneous record; "S" designated a Security Research Staff record. Therefore "MS" most likely referred to a miscellaneous record of interest to the Security Research Staff. "E" or "EE" designations covered subjects of interest to the Domestic Contacts Division for information/intelligence purposes. It appears that at least some of these alpha designations were converted to numerical values circa 1964.

Question 5 - Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kind of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained.

Security clearances per se are not processed for non-employees (sources/contacts). The Office of Security conducts appropriate national agency checks to try to determine the reliability of those individuals who are of interest for contact purposes because of their foreign travels, specific scientific information, etc. In a few instances an ad hoc clearance/validation may be requested in the event some classified information would be revealed in the course of acquiring intelligence from these sources. The validation period is normally five years, and any files created are maintained in the individual's name for a period of ten years after the validation period has expired. The DO would most likely have further information on a particular source.

Question 6 - Where are records that would describe liaison (etc) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

With the short turnaround time imposed on responding to this request no information could be readily located to provide an answer to this question. It is believed that if information of this nature does exist, it may be located in archived policy or administrative files of the Office of Security and/or Security Research Staff. Retrieval and review of this information would require an extensive research effort. Officers who may possess knowledge of this type of record were queried and it was suggested that info responsive to this question may possibly be located in DO records.

Question 7 - Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located? For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?

Records on operations and/or projects in which the Office of Security was involved in the past have most likely been destroyed, unless they are maintained because of congressional directives or the records control schedules. The Office of Personnel Security has the capability of retrieving a listing of any current records with the prefix or "project" or "operation". If the title does not include these words, retrieveal would be more difficult unless an exact name or acronym is known for a particular operation or project.

Question 8 - How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

OPS answered in CIA-16. Copy attached.

John:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in briefing the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) to be held on **Monday, 17 March, at 2:00 p.m., in 2C06 IP Bldg.** I regret the short notice. As we discussed, the ARRB has asked for information relating to the creation, transmission, and dissemination of cables and your name instantly came to mind. Their specific questions are:

1- Can you describe the cable process in place in the Agency during the 1960-1964 time period?

Prior to 1962 messages were delivered to the DPD (Development Products Division) at 1717 H Street or to the Communications Center at "L" Street. In addition there also was a Q building that received special traffic. After 1962 messages came into the CIA Headquarters and were processed in different areas depending on the types of traffic.

Imagery traffic would be sent to to a specific floor for the imagery personnel. Intercept and Special Programs would either be passed to a Special Sections Area of the Communications Center or to the Cable Secretariat.

2- How did cables come in?

Messages came in from the field via the Brandy Station State Channels or military channels.

3- How were they decrypted?

Messages were deciphered using a OTT (One Time Tape) or a OTP (One Time Pad) process.

4- What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived
on a desk at Headquarters?

Messages sent from a field site would be passed to a communicator, encrypted and transmitted via High Frequency Radio. The message received from Brandy and relayed to headquarters and then it was decrypted. The analyst of the Cable Secretariat would then read the message and match what they read against customer requirements. They then would have a typist type the dissemination on the message. The message then would be picked up from the message center by the various staffs and or divisions.

5- How were cables disseminated?
See item four.

Please let me or Becky Rant, DA/IRO, know if you have any other questions or concerns prior to the briefing.

CC: Becky L. Rant
Andrea E. Boyce
Sent on 13 March 1997 at 03:17:34 PM

14-00000

(4)
CK JF-34

~~SECRET~~

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

> Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

included in 104-10335-10014
JFK-M-19, File
part of 52 pg. doc.

Regraded Confidential
When Separated From
Secret Attachment

CL BY: 0605636
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 1-82

~~SECRET~~

and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#C351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

2

SECRET

DOCS TO ME
MARLENE
30492
GLORIA HAS ORIGS

1 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gloria Boyd, HRG/CSI

FROM: Marlene H. Rives
RSG CSC DA

THROUGH: Don Hatch, DDA IRC
Jack Wright DA Focal Point for JFK

SUBJECT: AARB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. Attached per your request is a copy of Regulatory Service Group documents responsive to the subject request for items explaining the organizational structure and division of responsibilities within CIA for the years 1958-68 and 1975-79. Some of the documents are dated outside the time frame specified but were determined to be effective during the years 1958-68 and 1975-79.

2. The Directorate of Operations and the History Staff may have additional documents. See the attached notice dated 13 March 1964.

3. If you have any questions, please call Marlene Rives on 30492 (secure).

Marlene H. Rives

ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM DOCUMENTS

SECRET

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

13 June 1995

CR OA #5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Wright @ DA

FROM: Eldon I. Hatch
Information Review Officer, ODDA

SUBJECT: Review of Organizational Structure for the year 1958-68 and 1975-79

REFERENCE: ARRB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. The attached documents relating to subject have been reviewed for release to the Assassination Records Review Board and are to be handled in accordance with the level of classification security indicated on the documents. The documents have not been reviewed for release to other than properly cleared personnel.

2. If you have any questions, please call me on 30683.

Eldon I. Hatch
Eldon I. Hatch

Attachments: a/s

Handcarried to Jack Wright

CC:

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE~~ ONLY

3

1a

2 6 FEB 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
DA Focal Point for JFK Board Requests

SUBJECT: ARRB Request for Access to Indices to CIA Histories

REFERENCE: A. JFK Board Request No. CIA-7, dtd 9 Nov 1995, Item # 6

B. CSI-0307/05, dtd 20 Feb 1996, same subject

1. Per your request, I have reviewed the list provided to me of all histories produced under the CIA History Program for release to the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). Regarding equities that concern the Office of the DA, I reviewed pages 38 through 48 and pages 51-54 and have no problem granting access to the list except for those noted on page 40, 42, 46, and 48. If this list is to be provided unclassified, then the station names as marked would need to be redacted. If this list is to be provided classified, the DA pages may be passed without sanitization.

2. Is the ARRB allowed to request access to any Agency document if unrelated to the JFK Assassination? We could be setting a precedent if we grant the ARRB access to see this entire list. Potentially, the ARRB could request access to any number of Agency documents totally unrelated to the JFK Assassination (i.e. 201 files).

3. If you have questions, I may be reached on extension 30554 secure.

Lee S. Strickland

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CL BY: 0000000
CL REASON: Section 1.5 c
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bonnie K. Hunter-Y- @ DCI

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: CIA-12 (Shackley et al)

REFERENCE: Shackley, Cross, Henry, Gupton (CIA-IR-12) DA/IRO No. 12

Bonnie:

This is with respect to your 26 February 1998 note wherein you asked that we check HRM for personnel files on Ron Cross, Bart Henry and William Morris Kent. In an effort to bring the status of this particular tasking (CIA-IR-12) up-to-date, I provide the following:

My records show that on 18 July 1997 Barry requested that we conduct file searches on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross, Bart Henry and Doug Gupton. We were advised by Barry, and as outlined in a 22 May 1996 letter from ARRB to John Pereira, that Cross, Henry and Gupton are pseudonyms used by CIA personnel who testified to the HSCA.

Notwithstanding, we tasked OPS and HRM to conduct searches on these individuals in an effort to locate files. On 22 December 1996, I advised Barry that HRM had located files on Ted Shackley and would provide them to Barry via this office once they arrived from RC. It is my understanding that Becky gave you the OPF yesterday. HRM advsied further that they had attempted to locate files on Cross, Henry and Gupton but failed to locate any files on these individuals in light of the fact that only the pseudos had been provided. We further advised that if in the future you have access to the true names, we will glady search again.

On 23 December 1997, I advised Barry that OPS had located files on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross and Doug Gupton and that the files were in OPS for review. They were unable to locate a record on Bart Henry. It is my understanding that you have not reviewed these files to date but are in the process of making arrangements to do so. Sue-Ann Pierson conducted the search back in July and I am certain that — she will be glad to you in this matter (40000).

And lastly, I have no record of ever having received a request to search on William Morris Kent. Accordingly, I will request OPS and HRM to do so.

Please let me know if I have misinterpreted the status of this request. Thank you. Frieda

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

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(4) CK JFK-24

~~SECRET~~

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

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When Separated From
Secret Attachment

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CL Reason: 1.5(c)
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DRV FROM: COV 1-82

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and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

> Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

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27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-7 For Information On Claude B. Capehart

1. The following is responsive to subject request.

2. The Agency has made a thorough search of its records for information on Claude B. Capehart and can state:

a. Mr. Capehart was never an employee of the Agency;

b. Mr. Capehart was however, an employee of a company with which the Agency had contracts;

c. The Agency has files on Mr. Capehart because of its contractual relationship with his employer.

d. All such files have been made available to and were reviewed by ARRB staff members.

3. If you require anything further in this regard, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

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~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

9 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI - JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-09 - George Bush/ARRB Request

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (attached) and our telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) review "any and all personnel files of George Herbert Walker Bush to determine whether he had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period."

2. The Office of Personnel Security and the Office of Human Resource Management have reviewed its files and have been unable to find any documentation to show that George H.W. Bush had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period.

3. This concludes DA action on this request.

Attachments

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11 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-11 - ARRB Request for Search on
Warren Commission Critics (DA/IRO No. 21)

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (Tab A) and our subsequent telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) search for files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher.

2. Based upon the limited biographic information provided on Subjects, the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM) and the office of the Publication Review Board conducted thorough searches. No records were located on Josiah Thompson or Mark Lane. As you know, OPS located a file on Harold Weisberg as a result of its search in response to CIA-IR-27 (DA/IRO No. 14). At your request, on 6 February 1998 (Tab B) we requested that OPS make arrangements to have this file reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents are Assassination Records. Accordingly, OPS did not address the Weisberg file in this CIA-IR-11 response.

3. As a result of DA's searches (Tab C) we located the following files and/or information:

Edward J. Epstein - AIN 0 488 768 (found in OPS;
File found in PRB

Harold Weisberg - computer printout (attached,
found in HRM

Sylvia Meagher - OPS advised that there was an impersonal folder regarding Subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article which were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule on 1 Janaury 1994.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

Please let me know when you want me to request the [illegible]es on Edward Epstein from OPS and PRB. Meanwhile, this concludes DA action on CIA-IR-11. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

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E CIA-IR-11
#21

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/Information Review Office

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 08/14/98 09:10:11 AM
SUBJECT: Response to CIA-IR-11

Barry & Gary:

I have reviewed the draft response to CIA-IR-11 dated 13 August 1998 and following are my comments and requested changes:

Paragraphs 1 and 2 - OK

Para 2a: **EPSTEIN,** Edward J. --The DO found no files identifiable with subject; a file was found on an individual with the same name but; with research, it was determined that the individual was not the Edward J. Epstein who is the subject of this request. DA searches found a Center for CIA Security, formerly the Office of Personnel Security, file and a Publications Review Board file on subject, as well as three "hits" to records destroyed pursuant to normal records destruction schedules. The destroyed records involved three Freedom of Information requests that mention Epstein's name in the subject line. None of the requests were for information on Epstein.

Para 2b: **LANE,** Mark
4th line - Please change Public Affairs to Privacy Act request

Para 2c: **MEAGHER, Sylvia** -- A reference to the fact subject made a Privacy Act request was found. In addition, the Center for CIA Security found that it had, at one time, a folder on subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article. Both subject's Privacy Act request file and the impersonal folder have been destroyed pursuant to normal record control schedules.

Para 2d: defer to DO

Para 2e: **WEISBERG,** Harold

11th line - Please change Office of Security to Center for CIA Security.

In so far as DA equities are concerned, I concur with draft letter once the above changes have been incorporated.

Becky

CC: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:10:11 AM

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From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
OPS/CD/IMB (40552) THIS IS A VOICE ACTIVATED COMPUTER. UPPERCASE IS FOR EFFICIENCY & IS NOT MEANT AS A BREACH OF CYBERSPACE ETIQUETTE.

NOTE FOR: Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Janet A. Ecklund
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: OPS/CD/IMB
DATE: 06/09/97 04:22:02 PM
SUBJECT: RECORD SEARCH, CHARLES D. FORD, AIN 0038497

DEAR BECKY, I CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF SUBJECT'S SECURITY FILE TO INCLUDE MICROFICHE & HARDCOPY. BELOW ARE MR. FORD'S ACTIVITIES FROM 1959 THROUGH 1964, PER YOUR REQUEST.

MICROFICHE-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

16 JAN 59-CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

AUGUST 1959-VACATION IN CANADA FOR 2 DAYS

15 MAR 61-ESTABLISHMENT OF P.O BOX LETTER ADDRESS FOR SUBJECT

30 MAR 62-MFR, SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED AN ALIAS (FISCALINI) FOR TASK FORCE " W" TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK ON 31 MAR 62 TO CONTACT AN ATTORNEY IN THAT CITY. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ROBERT KENNEDY OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO HELP SOME OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL IN CUBA. SUBJECT RECEIVED VERBAL APPROVAL FOR HIS ALIAS.

05 JUN 62-SUBJECT WAS UNAWARE OF REINVESTIGATION & WAS NOTIFIED BY SECURITY.

28 JUN 62-ANOTHER NAME WAS ADDED TO SUBJECT'S LETTER ADDRESS

03 DEC 62-SUBJECT WAS BRIEFED TO A SENSITIVE OPERATION CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY THE CI STAFF & DDS/IOS

20 FEB 63-REQUEST FOR CIA IDENTIFICATION CARD IN ALIAS

06 MAR 63-MFR REGARDING AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

10 MAY 63-REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

02 JUL 63-REASSIGNMENT PROCESSING FORM, APPROVED FOR DOMESTIC ASSIGNMENT

08 JUN 63-SUBJECT GRANTED A "Q" CLEARANCE

31 JUL 63-MFR REGARDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO BROKE INTO SUBJECT'S HOUSE & ATTEMPTED TO ASSAULT HIS 14 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER. THE ASSAILANT WAS ARRESTED, NO HARM TO DAUGHTER

HARDCOPY-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

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02 & 10 MAY 62-MEMOS REGARDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FROM U.S. ARMY

27 JUN 62-CIA BRING-UP-TO-DATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION TWX. FAVORABLE

22 MAY 63-"Q" CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT INFORMATION & 1962 FAVORABLE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

26 FEB 64 & 25 MAR 63-POLYGRAPH SCHEDULING MEMOS

BECKY, IF WE CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE, PLEASE LET US KNOW. THANKS, CURT.

CC:

Sent on 9 June 1997 at 04:22:02 PM

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CL BY: 462125
CL REASON: Section 1 5
DECL ON:
DRV FRM:

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/IRO

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 09/17/97 10:57:20 AM
SUBJECT: Travel Records

Barry: I am forwarding to you today copies of the microfilmed accounting ledgers re Charles Ford's travel. The OFL IMO worked with RCF and the copies are somewhat better than those you saw previously. This reflects the search after our visit to OFL to define search terms. I am also forwarding for your information the paperwork that approved the destruction of financial accountings after 6 years 3 months. Please call if you have any questions. Becky

CC:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CL BY: 0663879
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

[illegible]

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 03/26/97 03:14:55 PM
SUBJECT: Re: CSI access to OPFs in Helms Research

Becky - thanks for your note. I'll be sure you and Frieda are kept advised of all file requests that come to me.

I have received the file on Charles D. Ford from Record Center that Barry H. (JFK) requested and I am forwarding the file thru you for your info - I would appreciate it if Pat could handcarry the file to John Pereira as Barry instructed since he (Barry) is off all week.

Have a wonderful Easter - I will be off on Thurs and Fri (my flex). Take care.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta

Sent on 26 March 1997 at 03:14:55 PM

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6 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO No. 32)

1. This is in response to your 5 August 1998 memorandum (attached) wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) conduct searches on the following names identified in CIA-IR-19 of the 27 July 1998 ARRB memorandum (attached). Specifically, upon the DA's review of the 27 July memorandum, we advised your office that we had no record of ever having been tasked to conduct searches on these names.

   Andrew "Andy" Anderson
   Howard Guebler
   Gordon Duane Novel
   Edward Scannel Butler III, Director, Information Council of the Americas (INCA)

2. The Center for CIA Security (CCS) conducted a search (memorandum attached) in the Personnel Security Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and, based upon the information provided, was able to identify that the names of Gordon Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER are cross-referenced in Volume II of the following security file:

   "GARRISON CASE" AIN 0 601 153, Vols I-III

   No records were located in CCS on Howard Guebler or Andrew (Andy) Anderson.

3. Please let us know if you need the volume referred to above. Meanwhile, unless you advise us to the contrary, this concludes DA action on CIA IR-19

4. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments

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28 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: Priority Request from JFK Board

1. This is in response to your 3 February 1997 memorandum (copy attached) wherein you requested, on behalf of the ARRB Staff, a comprehensive file search on the individuals listed below. Specifically, the request is for access to records of possible pertinence to the JFK assassination.

A. Leo Cherne
B. Hunter Leake
C. Paul Garbler
D. Byron B. Morton, Jr.
E. Marie Cheatham
F. Verna Deane Brown
G. John A. MMcVickar

2. In response to your 3 February memorandum, the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), the Office of Medical Services (OMS), the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), and the Office of Training (OTE) conducted thorough searches and attached are copies of their response memoranda.

3. In discussions with Jeanne of HRM, it is my understanding that you still have the files that HRM located on Cherne, Leake, Garbler, Brown and McVickar. HRM was unable to locate records on Morton and Cheatham.

4. As noted in OMS' 10 February memorandum, OMS located medical charts on Leake, Garbler and George Brown which you can review if you make arrangements with OMS as noted in OMS' memorandum. Also note that if a file exists on Verna Brown, it will be included with her husband's chart. OMS was unable to locate records on Cherne, Morton, Cheatham or McVickar.

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5. As noted in OPS' memorandum, OPS was only able to locate files on Cherne, Leake and Garbler. However, after a careful review, they determined that there is no information contained in the files that links the individuals to or pertains to JFK or to the JFK assassination. They also found reference in Verna Dean Brown husband's file that she was employed by the Department of State.

6. OTE was only able to locate a record on Paul Garbler. However, the record does not pertain to the JFK assassination.

7. This concludes DA action on this request. If you have questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OF ATTACHMENTS

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From the Desk of Jeanne Kardaras
Human Resource Management/Information Coordinator

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
DATE: 12/23/96 12:25:48 PM
SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board dated 17 December 1996 (JK - JK - 127

I have completed my search of all Human Resource Management records and have not found any information on the following two individuals listed in your request:

a. Spas T. Raikin - SSN: 085-30-7690, DOB: Oct 26, 1922

b. Marilyn Dorothy Murret - DOB: July 14, 1928

The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive records.
Please advise if I can be of further assistance.

Jeanne

cl by: 0663879, cl reason: 1.5(c), decl on: X1, drv from: cov 1-82.

CC:
Gary L. Moore
Frieda P. Omasta
Lee S. Strickland
Mary V. Amoia-Y- @ DCI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board

REFERENCE: Request dated 17 December 1996

1. (C) In response to referenced request for "additional files" searches on Spas T. Raikin and Marilyn Dorothy Murret, the Office of Personnel Security conducted appropriate searches of the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). MDP/PS is the automated database of security records used by the Office of Personnel Security. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records.

2. (C) The Office of Personnel Security has a file on Spas T. Raikin (#0134669). This file reflects that in August 1957 Foreign Documents Division/OO requested a clearance on Spas T. Raikin for unclassified contract employment with Project U.S. Joint Publications Research Service in New York City on an unwitting basis. The Office of Security responded there was no information which would preclude use of Mr. Raikin. On 31 January 1967 the Office of Security again granted approval for Mr. Raikin to be used as an unwitting independent contractor with the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service.

3. (C) The Office of Personnel Security does not maintain a security file on Marilyn Dorothy Murret, but there is an index record to an media article dated 1971 from *Computers and Automation*. This article contains the statement that Marylyn Murrett is Lee Harvey Oswald's cousin and that evidence indicates she was involved in espionage activities in Russia and Asia.

4. (U) This review was prepared by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

CL BY: 0605636
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: SEC 5-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB

REFERENCE: INCA & Permindex

Gary,
As I mentioned in my note of a few minutes ago, noted below is CCS's search response re INCA & Permindex. My records show that all DA action is now complete regarding CIA IR-19 DA/IRO 32a, 32b and 32c). As you were advised in my memoranda dated 6 and 7 August 1998, the Garrison (Volume II refers to Gorder Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER) and the Andrew Clarence Anderson files are available for your review in CCS. Please contact Curt if you wish to see those files. Frieda
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: *Frieda P. Omasta@DA*
FROM: *W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE: *CCS/PS/CD/IMB*
DATE: *08/12/98 12:46:19 PM*
SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB

Frieda, per our telephone conversation CCS has no record for the organizations listed below. Thanks, Curt.
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt:
Thank you very much for your status report w/respect to your search on the 38 names and your search re INCA and Permindex.
Pursuant to a call that I received moments ago from Gary Breneman, would it be possible for you to advise as to whether you have located any information on INCA and/or Permindex. Gary is frantically trying to close out IR-19 and your response will assist him greatly. Thanks in advance for addressing these two items separately. Frieda
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

32b
done

11 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson, Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name Traces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

REFERENCE: CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32b

Barry:
Below is the HRM response w/respect to its search for files on Anderson, Guebler, Novel and Butler.

CCS is still working on CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32c w/respect to its search for records on INCA and Permindex.

Frieda
Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-
Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-
OFFICE: HRM
DATE: 08/07/98 01:25:05 PM
SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name TRaces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

Frieda,

I have completed searches for Andrew Anderson as Anderson for maximum hits, on Howard Guebler under Guebler, on Gordon Novel under Novel and Edward Butler under Butler, all last names for maximum possible hits. My searchs on these four individuals produced no hits, no records, and no indexed data on one and all.

I note the presumption "Evidently, he (Anderson) was a former employee" because he had a AIN number of 0 800211. An AIN number is an Agency Identification Number, not necessarily suggesting an "employee" relationship. An "EIN" is an Employee Identification Number, but what categories of employment fall under it, I'm not prepared to say.

Dan

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Dan,

Barry Harrelson, the JFK Project Officer, is requesting that you search once again under the name of Andrew (Andy) Anderson in light of the fact that CCS has located a file on one Andrew Clarence Anderson (AIN 0 800211). Evidently, he was a former employee. I regret that we did not have this information prior to tasking you the first time.

11

14-00000

CIA-IR-25

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONL~~Y

6 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI

FROM: Becky L. Rant

OFFICE: DA/IRO

SUBJECT: ARRB Special Request - Zapruder Film

REFERENCE:

Barry: HRM's response follows to your request for the address of "Holmer McMann". This sounds like the individual you described--spelling different. As stated, McMahon resigned in 1970 and the Agency has no current address or record of whether or not he is still alive. If you want us to pull the file to determine his address while he was an employee, let me now. That info, of course, is 28 years old. Becky

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 05/05/97 04:41:06 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request

Becky -

I have located information on a former employee named Homer Albert McMahon, DOB: 6 Jan 1928, who (first) EOD'd 22 Sept 1952 and resigned on 20 March 1953 (GS-03) - his title was photographer. He reEOD'd on 30 Oct 1960 and resigned on 11 Sept 1970 - (GS-11) - his title was photographer and he was assigned to NPIC. HRM would have no address listing for this individual. Mr. McMahon's retired official personnel file is at Record Center.

Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 5 May 1997 at 04:41:06 PM

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Teresa Wilcox @ DST

~~ADMINISTRATIVE -~~ INTERNAL USE ONLY

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson @ DCI
FROM: Thomas C. Benza
OFFICE: OFL
DATE: 12/24/97 08:37:39 AM
SUBJECT: Search Results - Bill Green and Claude Barnes Capehart

Office of Finance and Logistics has search its files for any information on Mr. William Green at Eastman Kodak. There were no responsive records. We also ran a check on Mr. Claude Barnes Capehart also with negative results.

Any question please call me on extension 58032..

CC: Frieda P. Omasta, Becky L. Rant
Sent on 24 December 1997 at 08:37:39 AM

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

TO: Frieda P. Omasta
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 07/23/97 12:55:29 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request - Green & Capehart

Frieda -

Based on information provided, I have found no information on the following individual:

Bill (William) Green at the Eastman Kodak lab

The search undertaken was reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records. Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Becky L. Rant, J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI, Thomas C. Benza, W. Curtis Chaloner
Sent on 23 July 1997 at 12:55:29 PM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

24 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Name Trace Request on William Green

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 23 July 1967

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched as requested.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, no security records were located.

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

12

TO: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/13/98 12:54:16 PM
SUBJECT: Re: JFK/ARRB Request (PRIORITY) CIA-IR-26 (DA/IRO 34)

Barry, the Center for CIA Security had a file for a PFUNTER, Jordan J., DPOB (?) 07 May 1902, Akron, Ohio. This file was destroyed circa 1980-1981 following the Records Control Schedule. Thanks, Curt.
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,
On behalf of ARRB, please conduct a search for records on Jordan James Pfunter. Please respond directly to J. Barry Harrelson with a copy to Becky and me. Thank you. Frieda

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, Frieda P. Omasta@DA, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
Sent on 13 August 1998 at 12:54:16 PM

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4,

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE~~ ONLY

13

From the Desk of Frieda P. Omasta

NOTE FOR: W. Curtis Chaloner @ DA
FROM: Frieda P. Omasta
OFFICE: ADA/IRO
DATE: 02/06/98 05:26:24 AM
SUBJECT: PRIORITY - CIA-IR-27 - ARRB Request for Security Files on 5 Individuals (DA/IRO No. 14)

Curt:

In response to CIA-IR-27, on 26 September 1997 OPS advised Barry Harrelson (JFK Project Officer) that security records are available for review by his office on the following individuals:

NAGELL, Richard C.
NOVEL, Gordon D.
RUBY, Jack L.
SHERIDAN, Walter J.
WEISBERG, Harold

Barry has just advised that the files on Nagell, Novel and Ruby have been identified as Assassination Records. Accordingly, they have requested that OPS transfer these files to DCI/CSI/HRG (J. Barry Harrelson) for inclusion in these records. Barry has further advised that a copy of the documents from each file would be acceptable if OPS prefers.

This is with respect to the files on Walter J. SHERIDAN and Harold WEISBERG. Barry has asked that arrangements be made for these files to be reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents in each of these files are Assassination Records. In light of a short deadline, it is requested that the arrangements be made early in February. Once documents have been selected, Barry will need copies of those documents as well.

Please keep Becky and me posted with respect to these requests. Thanks in advance for your assistance. Frieda

CC: Becky L. Rant @ DA
J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
Katie Nakai
Sent on 6 February 1998 at 05:26:24 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE ~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

26 September 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request for the Assassination Records Review Board

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 26 September 1997

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the following security records were located. These security records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

NAGELL, Richard C.	AIN 0 264 170
NOVEL, Gordon D.	AIN 0 526 113
RUBY, Jack L.	AIN 0 261 219
SHERIDAN, Walter J.	AIN 0 101 572
WEISBERG, Harold	AIN 0 018 281

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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17. dr

14

New Memo\Standard

26 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Request

REFERENCE: Lewinter aka Lewirter

Barry:

With Curt's response referred to below, this concludes DA action on this request. HRM and OFSS were negative. As you know, OFSS led OPS to the files as summarized by Curt. Frieda

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

From the Desk of

From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
Information Review (40552)

NOTE FOR: *J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI*
FROM: *W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE: *OPS/CD/IMB/INFORMATION REVIEW*
DATE: *11/26/97 12:24:59 PM*
SUBJECT: *Assassination Records Review Board Request*

Barry, attached is the official OPS response. Thanks, Curt.

DOC1.DOC

CC: *Janet A. Ecklund*
Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 26 November 1997 at 12:24:59 PM

CC: Becky L. Rant

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~~Y

26 November 1997

Memorandum For The Record

Subject: LeWinter, Oswald

Oswald LeWinter came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. CIA/Public Affairs advised LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six part television series being produced by the BBC based upon the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh.

LeWinter is a known fabricator and has used the following aliases; Oscar LeWinter, Ibrahimin Razin, Razin LeWinter. LeWinter is indexed to the OS crank file.

LeWinter is also known as a fabricator to the IIC.

N. Curtis Chaloner
DDA/OPS/CD IMB
Information Review

~~[illegible]~~

14-00000

101

~~[illegible]~~

December [illegible]

NOTE TO: ARRB Staff

SUBJECT: Further Clarification

REFERENCE: ARRB Request Regarding Oswald LeWinter

Clarification:

Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA*, the CIA has never had any **official** affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)

CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1991, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice." (S

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[illegible]

[redacted]

LeWinter also came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. The CIA's Public Affairs advised that LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six-part television series being produced by the BBC based on the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh. (U)

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10 March 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn, Esq.
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer, HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-36, For Information On Processing of Incoming Cables

1. The following and the attachment are responsive to subject request. The attachment is an extract of the pertinent text from a memorandum provided by the Directorate of Operations.

2. If you have any questions concerning this response, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

Att.

FOR YOUR COORDINATION:

Becky Rant *
Becky Rant, DA/IRO

16 March 1998
Date

*Re Para 3 - The Cable Secretariat was part of the Office of the Director until 1972 when it was placed in the Office of Communications. See attached [illegible]

ATTACHMENT TO 10 MARCH 1998 MEMORANDUM RE: CIA-IR-36

1. Per the Review Board staff's request the following is a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations (DO) processed cables in the 1963/1964 time-frame. As we are unable to locate any definitive records on the subject, and in all probability none ever existed, the information provided is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time.

2. Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos"; collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

Agency
Director

3. To the specific question regarding processing of cables, on a daily basis, usually six day per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariate, within the ~~Office of~~ Communications. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to pre-defined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days and then destroyed.

4. Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariate for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and then destroyed.

5. It is important to note that the cable scenario outlined here is general in nature and that throughout their existence registries and their procedures were frequently altered until the registry system as described above was eliminated in the mid-1980's.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(This notice is NOT to be filed in Agency manuals. Please destroy after reading.)

ORGANIZATION

HN 1-80
1 February 1972

~~[illegible] COPY~~

TRANSFER OF THE CABLE SECRETARIAT

Effective 1 February 1972, the Cable Secretariat is transferred from the Office of the Director to the Office of Communications, Directorate for Support.

W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

DISTRIBUTION: AB

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CABLE SEC

16

ARRB request re 7 July memo —Advance ⑯
copy
8/4/98

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cherne, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
turgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Vebster, Robert Edward
Verbell, Mitchell Livingston III

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/14/98 09:07:44 AM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB - 38 names DA/IRO 33

Frieda, thank you for the kind words, however, I do not deserve them as I was not completely thorough. The oversight was not intentional. Please see attached. Thanks, Curt.

OGCRECD.DOC

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,
Thanks so very much for your most thorough and prompt response this request. However, would you please let us know what, if any, records you may have found on four other names that are identified on the original list? Thanks Frieda

Elena Garro de Paz
Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Jack Ruby
Clay Shaw

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:07:44 AM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

14 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 13 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request. These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. RUBY, Jack and SHAW, Clay are cross-referenced to AIN 7 191 689, the Garrison File. IMB has possession of the Garrison File.

4. The Center for CIA Security has no record of a GARRO DE PAZ, Elena or GUTIERREZ MENOYO, Eloy.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

13 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 07 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request (attachment A). These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. Attachment B reflects Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific, and/or referenced to your request which were destroyed under the Records Control Schedule.

4. Attachment C reflects those individuals whom the Center for CIA Security has no record.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

ATTACHMENT A

The following Security Records are in the possession of Information Management Branch or enroute and are available for your office's review here at CCS/IMB. The Center for CIA Security defers to the Assassinations Records Review

Board regarding documents which could be considered relevant.

		Post 1978 Memoranda
CHERNE, Leo	AIN 0 053 082	UNKNOWN
CONEIN, Lucien E.	AIN 0 005 025	YES
DEMOHRENSCHILDT, George	AIN 0 000 775	NO
DIOSDADO, Cesar	AIN 0 432 469	NO

DURAN, Silvia Tirado de AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File
CCS record reflects listing as Duran, Silvia.

FERRIE, David W. AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File
Ferrie is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 546 933 (Whelan, John Edward) which was destroyed, according to the Records Control Schedule, on 30 April 1997.

FIORINI, Frank AIN 0 353 459 = Sturgis File

HALL, Loren Eugene AIN 0 348 627 YES
AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File
CCS record reflects listing and Security File (hardcopy) as Loran not Loren.

JOHNSON, Priscilla Mary Post YES
AIN 0 071 589
CCS record reflects listing under McMillan, Priscilla J..

KANTOR, Marvin AIN 0 539 326 YES
CCS record reflects listing also as Kantor, Melvin.

KOSTIKOV, Valeriy V. AIN 0 261 091 NO

MCMILLAN, Priscilla Johnson YES
AIN 0 071 589
CCS record reflects McMillan also cross-referenced to Alliluyeva, Svetlana. The Security File (hardcopy) reflects Stalina, Svetlana I.. The McMillan Security File (hardcopy) reflects Macmillan not McMillan.

ATTACHMENT A CONTINUED

MARTIN, Jack. CCS records reflect the three following individuals who may or may not be identifiable with your request.

MARTIN, Jack M. AIN 1 254 357 YES

MARTIN, Jack S. AIN 0 651 268 YES

MARTIN, Lawrence J. AIN 0 634 475 YES

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando NO
AIN 0 036 859
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer, Rolando Rojas.
Masferrer is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 780 397
(Montreuil, Raymond A.). NO

MCVICKAR, John Anthony AIN 0 269 351 YES
CCS record reflects listing as McVickar, John **A.**

NAGELL, Richard Case AIN 0 264 170 YES

ODIO, Sylvia AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File
AIN 0 351 164-6 = Oswald File

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 078 435 NO

RAIKIN, Spas AIN 0 134 669 YES

SNYDER, Richard E. AIN 0 038 984 YES

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 353 459 YES

WEBSTER, Robert Edward AIN 1 258 236 YES
CCS record reflects listing as Webster, Robert.
Webster is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 387 123
(Whittaker, Frederick). YES

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III YES
AIN 0 027 686
CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell L.

ATTACHMENT B

The following Security Records were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule.

		DESTRUCTION DATE
ARCACHA-SMITH, Sergio	AIN 0 523 948	1994
AZCUE LOPEZ, Esuebio	AIN 0 352 838	25 October 1994
CABELL, Earle	AIN 0 033 554	circa 1980-1981
COBB, June	AIN 0 216 264	1994

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GARRISON, James AIN 0 535 449 1994
HSCA list reflects Garrision, James. CCS has no record.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 592 464 circa 1980-1981
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 429 229 04 August 1995
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando
AIN 0 352 772 25 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer Rojas, Rolando Arcadio.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 350 653 24 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 346 416 20 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 121 104 circa 1980-1981

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 357 552 circa 1980-1981

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 342 000-A circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 317 003 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

ATTACHMENT B CONTINUED

SALVAT ROQUE, Juan Manuel
AIN 0 219 999 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Salvat, Juan Manuel.

SNYDER, Richard E. AIN 0 389 179 03 June 1995

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 348 309 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 349 691 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

VECIANA, Antonio Carlos Blanch
AIN 0 256 167 1994

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

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AIN 0 256 167 1994

CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell Livingston.

ATTACHMENT C

The Center for CIA Security has no record of the following individuals.

ALVARADO, Gilberto

CALDERON, Luisa

RAY, Manuel

Declaration of Teresa F. Wilcox

I, Teresa F. Wilcox, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. (AIUO) I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). I was appointed to this position in February 1996, and have held various professional positions within the Central Intelligence Agency since 1985. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DS&T, to include the Offices of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology; the Office of Technical Service (OTS); the Office of Technical Collection (OTC); the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO); the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); the Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E); the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools (AAT); the Office of Advanced Projects (OAP); and the Office of Research and Development (ORD). In addition, I am responsible for searching and reviewing certain records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

2. (AIUO) I am aware that the DS&T has searched appropriate records systems for information responsive to all requests the DS&T has received. I have obtained this knowledge through my personal experience, as well my conversations with, and my review of the records of, the former DS&T IRO Anthony R. Frasketi, and the DS&T Information Management Officer, Marsha A. Hubbs.

3. (AIUO) The following is a description of DS&T searches and review of documents undertaken in response to Board taskings the DS&T has received.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart. The DS&T made deletions to security records located by the Directorate of Administration. The DS&T Searched ODDS&T records for Capehart's medical file. The DS&T forwarded the medical file to the Board for its review.

CIA-IR-08 Family Jewels Memorandum. The DS&T reviewed a package of documents forwarded by Barry Harrelson. The DS&T advised the Board it had no objection to ARRB access.

CIA-IR-15 Electronic 'take' from Mexico City Station. This memorandum addresses the portion of the action, "In addition, the Board is still awaiting a response on the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods."

In conducting a search for the above information, the DS&T located in OTS records a file with the folder title, "Mexico City, Mexico." We forwarded the entire contents of that folder for the period 24 May 1961 to 10 June 1965, with one exception. Three Operational Monthly Reports were forwarded to the Board. The dates covered were 1-30 September 1963; 1-31 October 1963; and 1-30 November 1963. The attachment to Dispatch HMMA 20307 dated 4 December 1962 was not included. It was a poor-quality audio tape in Spanish, between two individuals talking about office procedures. No substantive information was exchanged during this conversation.

The DS&T also conducted a search of OTC records. This office would have inherited the Division D records of the Directorate of Operations (DO). We reviewed old DO Records Retirement Requests; there are no shelflists (folder-inventory) associated with these Records Retirement Requests since the Division D records were recorded initially in the DO system. We forwarded for the Board's review the six Records Retirement Request whose job numbers reflected the years 1959 to 1962. We advised the Board that Records Center records indicated the records' disposition as follows:

1. 59-S-477: Destroyed September 1977.
2. 60-S-182R: Destroyed May 1980.
3. 60-S-402: Transferred to FI/D(DDO), December 1977.
4. 61-S-157R: Four boxes transferred to FI/D (DDO), March 1972; three boxes destroyed, May 1980.
5. 62-S-885: Destroyed (no date given).
6. 62S000986R: Transferred to the Office of SIGINT Operations (DS&T).

These were the only Records Retirement Requests in the possession of OTC that are in the time frame relevant to the JFK assassination. As their descriptions indicate, they do not appear relevant to the request.

The DS&T also conducted a search of CITO records. This DS&T office inherited some files from OTC when CITO was established. We searched its records in the event some Division D records were held by CITO. These searches identified no responsive records.

Searches of OTS, OTC, and CITO records used the following keywords:

surveil*
Russian
USSR
Cuba*
audio*
electron*
embassy
Mexico*

CIA-IR-16 U-2 Files. The DS&T provided the Board a copy of the U-2 shelflist. We also searched for records filed under Richard Bissell's name. We received no follow-on request from the Board.

CIA-IR-16 FBIS-USR-92-112. The DS&T provided to the Board a translation of articles about a KGB file on Oswald.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro Assassination Plots. Records of the ODDS&T, OTC, and OTS were searched for the following keywords: Castro, Oswalt, Oswald, assas*, and KDBADGER. In addition, we searched OTS records on the following: Project ZRRIFLE, Mollusca, Cubela, Black Leaf, ballpoint pen, hypodermic syringe, Artime, silencer, gambling, aerosol, cigar, depilatory, wiretapping, Phyllis McGuire, skin diving suit, sea shell, and project AMLASH. As a result of these searches, we provided to the Board a document titled, "Handwriting Analysis - AMLASH-1," dated 7 April 1965.

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder Film. A search was conducted on records of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and Office of Imagery Analysis) using the terms Zapruder, JFK, Commission, and 1963. Hits on year 1963 did not reveal any pertinent information. We located no record of a "William Green" at NPIC in November 1963. We located no log books or indexes regarding the processing or handling of any assassination films. We also reviewed an audiotaped interview with a former NPIC employee, and made minimal deletions to the tape.

CIA-IR-33 Search of FBIS records for any files on Oswald, and request for information on how FBIS-USR92-112 was filed. No past or present files were found. An explanation on how FBIS-USR-92-112 was filed was provided.

Review of three Ford Library Documents (178-10003-10453, 178-10004-10087, 178-10002-10394. Made deletions and deferred to the DO on 178-10002-10394. Made deletions to Summary Report on CIA Investigation of MKNAOMI.

Review of two terms. The DS&T advised that the terms should not be released because of ongoing CIA activity at the location.

Review of Alias Documentation issue (104-10220-10179, -10181, and -10188). Requested that Board postpone release of specific information. A search of OTS records indicated OTS had no records on particular documents in the 1960s and 1970s.

Review of a slug in current use. Requested that the Board postpone its release because the slug is in current use.

Review of Organizational Charts of all Agency directorates for the years 1958-1968 (CIA-1). Requested deletions.

Review of the proposed release of an Agency facility. Provided information about DS&T activities at risk if this facility were acknowledged.

Review of records regarding the release of the name of Jose Marie Mankel. Provided information about the potential chilling effect on current operations.

Review of documents concerning a certain entity in the CIA Sequestered Collection which are Not Believed Relevant (NBR)to the JFK assassination. Four documents had been previously released (one was released in full, and three were sanitized); eight documents had been denied in full. The Board determined that four documents were NBR.

Review of the Board's request to review an index resulting from the CIA's History Staff's review of 61 histories for any connection to the JFK assassination. The DS&T concurred in the Board's review of the index.

4. (U) Based on this information, I have concluded that the DS&T has diligently searched and reviewed all requests for information from the Board that the DS&T has received.

5. (U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 21st day of August 1998.

T. F. Wilcox

Teresa F. Wilcox

JFK Declaration of FREDRICK C. WICKHAM, JR.

I, Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. declare and say as follows:

1. (U) I am the JFK Focal point Officer ("FPO") for the Directorate of Operations ("DO") of the United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). I have held technical positions associated with the design and implementation of computer systems, information management positions including the DO IMO, and currently manage the DO information review and release programs. I have been with the CIA since 1967 and have been associated with the JFK records review activity since 1992 and the JFK FPO since 1995.

2. (U) I have obtained the information contained in this declaration based upon my personal knowledge and experience, as well as conversations with the DO Information Review Officer, the DO Information Management Officer and individuals taking action on the specific requests.

3. (U) DO records were predominately paper with a hard copy card index in the 1960's and an electronic index in the 1970's. The indices were based upon names that meet specific collection requirements or projects that were undertaken in the performance of our mission. Searches that exceeded the capability of the indices required manual paper file searches. I am aware that the DO searched the central record system, which includes retired records, and hand searched the convenience files and specialized files located within various offices. Specialized collections are often extremely sensitive and therefore only reside within the components. During our newer searches we have not found any significant documents in the DO files dated 1978 or prior that appear to have been missed by the searches through 1978. We did locate one set of tapes which we know was made available to the Warren Commission but was not included in the HSCA sequestered collection. We also found one file that was only partially included in the HSCA sequestered collection.

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4. (S) Many of the searches performed today are not significantly different than the ones done during the period of the various commissions and committees. The searches performed since 1995 still use the index to the central record system the same as in 1978 but we have a couple of new databases that were not available in 1978. We now capture all cable traffic electronically and are able to perform text searches of that repository. That repository post-dates the HSCA so it is not useful in locating older records. Additionally, we have converted a small amount of very sensitive paper files into computer searchable form. While these specific collections are part of the DO's record system, they were not electronically searchable nor were they included within the indices to the DO's central records system. We have searched all of these records systems for information responsive to requests the DO has received. Some of the specific requests could not be satisfied by the electronic searches and we resorted to manual paper searches in an effort to locate the information.

5. (U) The DO provided several briefings to the Assassination Records Review Board and their staff, starting in 1995, to describe the records created by the DO and the record system that manages that information. We also described what is meant by the need to continue protection of sources and methods, and the impacts the revelation of information would have on the lives of individuals and current operations. The presenters included the Agency's General Counsel, Deputy Director for Operations, Chief of the Information Management Staff, and several other DO managers associated with the conduct of operations and protection of sources and methods. We also provided detailed descriptions of current operations. We provided information about specific individuals whose lives or livelihood would be threatened as examples of harm that would occur if certain information was released. Additionally, we presented a description of the operational environment that existed and the intensity under which searches were performed in the wake of the assassination.

6. (U) The CIA issued an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination records (OIM 98-0081, dated 30 July 1998). As requested by the ARRB, the DO distributed the employee bulletin via Lotus Notes on 17

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August and placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

7. (U) We have received numerous specific requests for additional information. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in our records, I am aware of the following efforts that were conducted in responding to specific ARRB requests for DO records. I have abbreviated the questions to save space:

CIA-1 - Information on the organization of CIA

(U) The March 1995 ARRB request called for the availability of "comprehensive organizational charts (or the best available substitutes)." The request contained about three pages of various requirements, including:

A. organizational charts of the Directorate of Plans (DDP); "CIA Stations . . . in Mexico City (1960-68 only), Miami, other stations that we will discuss orally;" any other offices . . . any pro-Castro groups, . . . or anti-Castro groups;

B. names and affiliations of all CIA personnel responsible for liaison with the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, . . .;

C. all manuals, handbooks, . . . guides explaining: . . . organizational structure, . . . filing systems, . . . for drafting memoranda;

D. copies of the instructions, guidelines, and other materials used by your reviewers;

(U) Over a thousand pages of material were provided in responding to this request.

(U) In May 1997 the ARRB further requested that 35 pages from CSN 5-50, 2 pages of the JMWAVE chart, and

13 pages from Regulation No. 1-130 and HR #1 be reviewed for release.

(U) Although the AARB staff had access to all of the requested material, in January 1998 the Agency answered that the various CSN 5-50 pages contained basic information regarding the mission and functions of the Office of Operations (now the Directorate of Operations (DO)) and could not be released. However, in April 1998, we agreed to provide structure charts for the DDP in 1961 and 1963, with Division and Staff titles and a JMWAVE Chart.

CIA-2 – Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) The ARRB request was dated May 1995 and was six pages of file code numbers, crypts, names, dispatch designators, and cable location designators and requested identification thereof. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June and July 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing (returned to CIA) microfilm file summary sheets, and descriptive sheets.

CIA-3 – Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated June 1995 and was three more pages of queries similar to CIA-2. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing marked (returned to CIA), microfilm file summary sheets, and handwritten notes.

CIA-4 -- Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This four-page ARRB request dated June 1995 was for "descriptions of each crypt, a brief identification of each individual . . . , and indications of whether these crypts, operations, and individuals are presently active or inactive." This request was answered orally and by informal notes.

CIA-5 -- Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated July 1995 and was for identification of some twelve crypts, names, file codes, or acronyms. This was answered by a paired listing dated July 1995 (Returned to CIA).

CIA-6 -- Request for Systematic Review of Traffic

(U) This request was dated September 1995 and was for "the CIA to assemble all of the cable traffic and dispatches for . . . September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between" . . . Mexico City and Headquarters and Mexico City and JMWAVE.

(C) The DO provided a classified response in January 1998. All cable traffic and dispatches for the period September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between: (a) the Mexico city Station and Headquarters, and (B) the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE are not available as a chronological collection. The Office of Communications (OC) only held cables long enough to ensure that they were successfully transmitted to the recipient. Because processes and resources to perform cleanup activity varies, cables were sometimes held for longer periods but not with the intention of becoming a long-term reference collection. The offices of record for the origination of cable traffic and dispatches did not create files in this manner. The desks maintained a temporary paper cable chrono. These were not usually retained for more than 90 days. There is no electronic repository for cables and dispatches from the stations. Cables were printed out and went into specific files dealing with subjects or operations. Accordingly, it is not possible to recreate as a collection all of the requested cables and dispatches.

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CIA - 7 - Review of CIA Histories

(S) ARRB staffers Jeremy Gunn and Michelle Combs have reviewed all of the requested histories except one still under pre-review by the component because of sensitive information -- we expect this to be resolved in the near future. They were granted access to identify any relevance to the assassination of President Kennedy. They selected a number of pages to be included within the materials to be declassified and released to the National Archives. The histories reviewed were as follows:

- *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba,* written by Colonel J. Hawkins, USMC, on 5 May 1961, and controlled by WH division.

- *Domestic Operations Base,* written by Perry E. Crookham, in May 1967, and controlled by SO Division. We are also aware that relevant parts of pp. 29-31 have been released in the Bay of Pigs declassification project.

- The TS history entitled *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D 1948-1965,* written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter, in April 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff.

- *The Stockholm Station, Volume I, II, and III, 1942-1967,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in November 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Oslo Station, 1943-January 1968.* This history was written by William D. O'Ryan and Elizabeth Hart, in 1967-1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *Covert Action Project Funds, FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective December 1947 - January 1964),* written by CA Staff, in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

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- *The Helsinki Station, February 1951-February 1964, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Melvin W. Jokinen and Hank Jarvinen in 1967, and controlled by EUR.

- *Domestic and Areawide Operations (WH/6) August 1963 - 30 June 1967,* written by Maurice Currie, in June 1968, and controlled by WH Division.

- *Soviet Russia Division -- Reports and Requirements 1945 - 1966, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Mrs. Elizabeth Sanford Peyton and Anthony Arnold, in June 1973, and controlled by SB.

- *Madrid Station -- Spain, Volume I and II, 1942-1966,* written by David Wright and Gardner MacPherson, in April 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Ottawa Station, 1953- 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in April 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *CIA Participation in Police Assistance Programs for Developing Countries, 1955 - October 1965,* written by Robert Bowling, Geraldine L. Jelsch, and Lyle T. Shannon, in October 1965, and controlled by CI Staff.

- *History of Lisbon Station, April 1942 - October 1965,* written by Robert Ruth and John C. Bishop, in October 1965, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Maritime Branch (MB) at Headquarters, April 1951 - 1966,* written by S. H. Chapman, in June 1968, and controlled by SO Division.

- *History of The Hague Station 1942 - 1966,* written by Marion Linde and William D. O'Ryan in 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Alaska Station (Plans for Operations Aimed at Soviet Siberia From Alaska) 1949 - 1964,* written by

George N. Belic and John Bogart in January 1971, and controlled by SB.

- *Western Europe Operations Directed at Cuba 1962 - 1964,* written by WE Division Officers in July 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 - 1966,* written by Alfred T. Cox in August 1968, and controlled by SO Division.
- *Iceland - The History of the Reykjavik Station, 1950 - 1966,* written by Rolfe A. Haatvedt in February 1967 and published in February 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *History of Station Port of Spain, August 1949 - November 1967,* written by Stannard K. Short in March 1969 and published in May 1969, and controlled by WH Division.
- *Monrovia Station -- Liberia, December 1958 - August 1969,* written by C. Frank Stone II, Lester C. Houck, and Louis B. Spaeth in October 1969 and published in January 1970, and controlled by AF Division.
- *The Algiers Station, 1947 - 1965,* written by M. S Caver in December 1972, and controlled by AF.
- *History of the Copenhagen Station, 1943 - 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan in early 1969 and published in October 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.
- The *History of Tunis Station, March 1956 - October 1968,* written by Louis B. Spaeth in October 1968 and published in December 1969, and controlled by AF Division.

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- *History of the Cyprus Station, 1950 - 1968,* written by Dean L. Dodge in June 1968 and published in July 1969, and controlled by NE Division.
- *History of the Brussels Station, 1942 - 1968, Volumes I and II,* written by William D. O'Ryan in Autumn 1968 and published in May 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.
- *History of the Rangoon Station, 1947 - July 1968, Volume II,* written by Carleson C. Ames in September 1968 and published in January 1969, and controlled by FE Division.
- *The Africa Division, 1959 - 1967,* written by W. H. Dunbar in December 1971 and published in June 1972, and controlled by AF.
- *Operations in Angola, 1942 - 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck in May 1970, and controlled by AF.
- *The Conakry Station, February 1959 - June 1968,* written by M. S. Caver in September 1971, and controlled by AF.
- *Operations in Mozambique, 1942 - 1969,* written by Lester C. Houck in September 1971, and controlled by AF.
- *The Bangkok Station, 1945 - 1965, Volume III,* written by Gerard Campagna in May 1971, and controlled by FE.
- *The Phnom Penh Station, 1953 - 1965, Volume II,* written by Allen W. Ginder. in February 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff and DDO.
- *History of the Bukavu Base, September 1963 - June 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck and Roscoe N. Sandlin, Jr. in August 1969, and controlled by Africa Division.

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- *Lagos Station, 1950 - 1967,* written by William H. Dunbar in March 1971, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Khartoum Station, November 1955 - July 1969,* written by Lawrence R. Devlin in November 1972, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Melbourne Station and Canberra Base, 1954 - 1966,* written by Ruth Hyde in June 1970, and controlled by DDP.
- *Covert Action Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1950-1968,* written by Donald M. Jameson in December 1972, and controlled by CE.
- *History of Guatemala Station, December 1960-March 1965,* written in March 1965 by Paul L. Loeb and controlled by WH.
- *History, Japan - FI/D Operations, 1950-1955*, written in June 1970 by Vyrl E. Leichliter and controlled by the successor component to FI/D.
- *The Illegal Border-Crossing Program, 1946-1959,* written by Anthony Arnold, George N. Belic, Boris Ilyin and John Basarab in July 1971 and controlled by CE.
- *Air Support of Cuban Operations 1960-1962,* written by Andrew Russo in January 1973, and controlled by History Staff.
- *Counterintelligence Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1946 - 1965, Volumes I and II,* written by Frederick Walters in August 1972, and controlled by SB.
- Memorandum for the Record on *HS-Misc 13 (file of CA material)* dated 11 April 1978, written by Eulalie Hammond.

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- *The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime Aspects, 1961,* written by Savilion H. Chapman in November 1966, and controlled by Special Operations Division.

- *The Covert Actions Project Funds FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective), December 1947 - January 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA Staff in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Funding Covert Operations, 1960 - 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA and Cover Staff Officers in September 1964, and is controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D, 1948-1965* This TOP SECRET history was written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter in April 1974, and is controlled by CIA History Staff.

- *History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1-2 November 1963, Saigon Station Log and Analysis.* This history's access is controlled by FE/VNC or its successor.

The following were very sensitive and we discussed the collections with ARRB staffers. An agreement was reached to provide access to specific sections that may contain relevant information:

- *Covert Action Project Funds:* pages preceding Tab 1, and pages 1 through 6 under Tab 1.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D:* Sections III (1952-1965) (pages 39 through 50) and IV (Division D Contributions to US National Policy) (pages 51 through 57).

CIA-10 -- Interagency Source Register

(U) This request was dated June 1996. The DO provided a classified response to the ARRB together with a copy of DOI 50-46, "The Interagency Source Register," and advised that an unclassified response was not possible.

CIA-11 -- Sylvia Duran Materials

(U) This request was dated May 1996 and was "in particular . . . [for] a 'ten-page statement' she may have given to the Mexican police." IMS/ESG "searched its main index system, its 'names' data base, and hard copy files." The Agency response, dated October 1997, indicated to the ARRB that "no such 'statement' has ever been found and we cannot confirm that it ever existed."

CIA-12 -- Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE

(U) This ARRB request was dated May 1996 for "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files related to … David Sanchez Morales … Ted Shackley … Ron Cross … Bart Henry and Doug Gupton.

(U) The DO maintains no files on former employees, such as Morales, Shackley, or Gupton (P).

(U) In a response dated August 1998, the DO responded to DA/OIM/HRP/JFK that we were unable to identify Ron Cross and Bart Henry as true names, registered aliases, or pseudonyms and, therefore, could not provide any files.

CIA - 13 - Mexico City Back-channel Communications

(U) The DO provided a classified response explaining that these types of communications are usually administrative matters, e.g., they contain sensitive personnel information and they are not placed in operational files or saved, collectively, in other databases. Unfortunately, there is no way of retrieving these cables through a reasonable search using any generic or specific term, since cables were not captured by any organized filing process.

CIA - 14 - Mexico City Station Annual Reports

(U) The DO was asked for specific annual reports from Mexico City.

(S) We informed the ARRB that we were successful in locating an official DO file which contained station "annual reports" for the years 1957 through 1973. The file included two dispatches which forwarded the RMDs from Mexico Station for the years 1960 and 1961. However, the RMDs, which were sent as separate attachments (sent in a different pouch from the covering dispatch memorandum) were not present in the file. (NOTE: Attachments which contained true names of CIA officers or assets or information that would identify operational sources with CIA were customarily sent in separate transmissions as a security measure if a pouch(es) were compromised). We also note that in a speed letter, dated 1978, written by DDO/LA/STB to OLC, that the RMDs for Mexico City Station, for the years, 1962, 1963, or 1964 could not be located.

(S) Based upon further review, we are providing an updated response to the ARRB as follow: The only report that was annually required of a station was that relating to its ability to meet its mission directives, now called "operational directives". These annual reports called the Station's "Relative Mission Directives" (RMD) were used to compose an overall annual division or staff submission to the Deputy Director for Operations, as an evaluative tool. The RMDs, themselves are a summary of station activities reported to Headquarters in other correspondence during the course of the year, were used to compile a division level evaluation--in a sense, an annual report card--on how it was doing against operational requirements. The station reporting was extracted into the larger division summary, much as it is today. The RMDs from year-to-year could and often did change with the operational requirements the Agency was expected to fulfill. As such, the RMDs for each station had value only as data to the larger examination of how the Agency performed its intelligence mission in a given year and what trends or changes this review would suggest for the ensuing year.

(U) Station reporting of the type described above would be treated as transitory information and as such meet the definition of a temporary record. It is entirely possible and quite probable that these facilitative reports were systematically destroyed. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) authorized the Agency to destroy facilitative reports in 1954 (NARA Reference: II-NNA-1057); the destruction of intelligence collection requirement files in 1962 (NARA Reference: NN-163-1), and operational management objective files at the subcomponent level (which would include reports from Stations and base) in 1977 (NARA Reference: NC1-263-77-10). The 1977 authorization remains in force today.

CIA - 15 - Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files

(U) The Retired Record Table RRT shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the Records Control Schedule in effect at the time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy on completion of specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

CIA - 16 - Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

(S) The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

(S) Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational interest file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedure that upon opening a 201, the documents from an operational interest file would be transferred to the 201.

(S) Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(S) In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

CIA-IR-01 - Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-1964

(S) The request for a listing of personnel assigned to Moscow 1959-1964 was discussed with Board

Staff. Instead of a listing, the files on individuals who were assigned to Moscow and a history of the Moscow Station were made available. In addition, the staff interviewed a former COS Moscow. The Board staff is satisfied with the response and will prepare its own documentation.

CIA-IR-03 - Full Computer Search for List of HTLINGUAL Files

(C) First, as an outcome of the Pike and Church Committees investigations, all HTLINGUAL files which were identifiable, as such, were destroyed under court order. Copies of materials from these files that may have been made prior to the destruction order and put into other files have, however, surfaced as files are reviewed. This includes material in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(C) The DO ran a search on the term "HTLINGUAL." Some records were identified as destroyed. Some were not so marked but are not locatable under the job number identified; however, given that there is no requirement to record destroyed records under the Federal statutes for disposition programs and given limited resources for noting files destroyed, this is not uncommon. The HTLINGUAL search further identified files because they had been the subject of Freedom of Information Act queries; however, these were not HTLINGUAL files *per se*, but files which contained the FOIA requester queries for HTLINGUAL information.

(U) ARRB staff member Michelle Combs has reviewed the HTLINGUAL file run and has selected some folders for review. OIM has identified that they have only redacted records for the large FOIA case that is listed. IMS/ESG/HCS is retrieving its records for unredacted copies of the records and will make them available.

CIA-IR-04 - Disposition of Angleton Files

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(U) The DO provided the following unclassified response about the Angleton Files: The files that Kalaris mentioned in Mangold's book were incorporated with the files of the CI staff. Per memorandum dated 1976-1979, the CI files were reviewed and incorporated into the DO record system. Items that were duplicates or not worthy of retention were destroyed. The memos describe the file collection and the process that was followed. Because the files that were once known as Angleton's have been dispersed within the DO records, they are no longer identifiable as a collection.

CIA-IR-06 -- QKENCHANT

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS initially provided a classified response to DA/OIM/JFK for this request in February 1998. In a follow-up response for declassification of the response, IMS/ESG/HCS worked with the providing office and then approved DA/OIM/JFK's unclassified response.

CIA-IR-07 - Claude Barnes Capehart

(U) The DO provided a classified response, which stated that we found no record when conducting a name trace for records on Capehart. Subsequently, we were advised by the CIA's Project Manager, Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, that this request was primarily being researched by the Directorate for Science & Technology.

CIA-IR-09 -- George Bush

(S) The ARRB requested information about George Bush because of a reference to "George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency" in a certain FBI document dated November 1963.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(S) IMS/FAB provided a main index search response to IMS/ESG/HCS. A 201 (that dated back only to 1977) and a DCD file were located.

(U) DA/OIM/JFK responded to the ARRB in February 1998 that the "search determined the Agency has no record of any association with George Herbert Walker Bush during the 1963 time period."

CIA-IR-11 - Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics - other than press clippings?)

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response for "any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher below. In addition to these records, our research did surface a reference to a file titled "Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination" which was opened in 1969 and closed in 1996. At the direction of the ARRB staff, no material in response to FOIA requests or news clippings in Public Affairs was included.

A. Edward J. EPSTEIN - The DO has no identifiable information on subject. Our search did surface the name Edward Epstein; however, by using additional biographic data known about subject, we were able to dismiss this name as a false "hit."

B. Josiah THOMPSON - Subject was of operational interest to the DO circa 1962; therefore, a 201 file does exist on this individual. ARRB staff member Combs reviewed this file in August 1998.

C. Mark LANE - Our search produced references to two documents: (1) An Agency dispatch from Germany dated 23 January 1970, and (2) An OGC letter dated 29 March 1977. Both of these documents are available for review. The OGC letter concerns a 1976 FOIA request -- Mark Lane was one of the individuals requesting the FOIA action -- which involves two dispatches dated 1967 and 1968. Because these two documents are the subject of a FOIA request, they are not included in this response.

D. Harold Weisberg - There is a 201 file on subject which contains very limited information. This file can be made available for review by an ARRB staff member. The DO retired records system, CARD, has a reference to an Agency dispatch (EGBA-87605, 1969) which indicates subject was in correspondence with Julius Mader. This document was in the files when it was reviewed by staff member Combs in August 1998.

E. Sylvia Meagher - We found no DO information.

CIA - IR-12 - Contacts with journalists or publishing houses

(U) The DO provided both an unclassified and classified response about contacts with journalists or publishing houses, regarding whether CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. Searches with generic terms such as "journalists," "publishers," "publishing houses," and "media" would not produce meaningful responses. This question required the research of crypts mentioned in various documents in the JFK "assassination records." These crypts referred to projects managed under the overall guidance of a staff in the DO and in all instances were projects concerning press and propaganda programs designed to promote anti-communism and to counter Soviet press and propaganda initiatives worldwide. Specifically, the various projects were developed for the following reasons (Corresponding cryptonyms to these projects were provided in a classified document, and are not included below):

A. to counter Soviet activities in international intellectual organizations, in order to unite and promote anti-Communist intellectuals.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

B. to be involved in book publishing matters and the international distribution of anti-Communist books.

C. to purchase and distribute books.

D. to cover the international mailing of American books translated into Spanish and French languages.

E. to purchase and mail books to selected addressees in Latin America and Africa.

F. to cover a worldwide news and feature story service.

G. as a Press and Propaganda Developmental and Target of Opportunity project involving Latin America.

CIA-IR-13 -- Organized Crime

(S) As part of DA/OIM/JFK's research, IMS/ESG/HCS was requested to do a trace on "Charles Ford." The trace resulted in no hits.

(S) Later, to answer CIA-IR-03 on HTLINGUAL material, a computer run was made. The list contained a citation to testimony to Congress by Charles Ford in September of 1975. A copy of Ford's testimony to a Senate Committee regarding a Mafia connection to assassination plots against Castro was provided to DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998.

(U) At the request of HRP JFK, several project Crypts were searched and results provided in connection with this request.

CIA - IR-15 - Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes

(S) The Directorate of Operations has checked Headquarters records for files referenced in HMMW 12454 and for files on the crypts cited in this document and searched for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. As previously explained, the crypts in HMMW 12454 have been researched. The dispatch was apparently written in haste and in truncated language without correct knowledge of the operational crypts for the specific operations in Mexico City. The crypts in the dispatch are the more generic crypts for teltap operations, not for the then-current operations in Mexico City, which are in question.

(U) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their professional opinion is that most likely tapes such as these were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

(U) Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

(U) In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

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(U) Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

CIA-IR-18 - Information on one DO Office

(S) The DO provided an unclassified response on the "Defector Staff" listed in CSN 5-50 revised in October 1959 and the "CIA Defector Coordinator, DDP/CDC," revised in October 1963. The "Defector and Contract Personnel Branch" had the symbol SR/OS/D. Only Soviet Bloc (formerly Warsaw Pact countries) defector cases were handled by this branch. Staffs and branches identified, among other duties, were responsible for identifying, debriefing, and resettling foreign defectors of intelligence interest.

CIA - IR-19 - Computer search on specific individuals and organizations

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB Staffs' request to review Agency files on some 38 names who were the subjects of the HSCA. All files and traces were reviewed by the ARRB staffers on 19 and 20 August.

A. Leo Cherne, (Leopold Chernetsky), a US citizen, was born in 1912, has Office of Security file #53082, has 201 file #07662 (two volumes), has an A-file #048058, and subject does have a pseudo.

B. Hunter Leake has an A-file (#105075) DCD file number, pseudo not found.

C. John McVickar. Trace results only.

D. Andy Anderson. No identifiable traces running variations of "Andy."

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

E. Byron B. Morton Jr. -- Trace resulted one document.

F. Marie Cheatham. -- Trace resulted in one document.

G. Paul A. Garbler. Our records reveal that Garbler had three pseudos assigned to him. Also, Garbler had four aliases on record.

H. Verna Deane Brown. The trace resulted in one document.

I. George Stanley Brown. Results of trace search was an A-File.

J. Howard Guebler. There was one trace result, who may or may not be iden to Subject which is an index card.

K. Gordon Duane Novel. Trace resulted in three index cards. He is the subject of 201-0834822 and has an A file (#A185210); however, the A file has been incorporated into his 201 file. No record of a pseudo on this name.

L. Ed Butler -- Trace resulted in an A file (#121440) on Edward Scannell Butler, III, the Director of INCA.

M. INCA (Information Council of the Americas). AllStar trace search on "INCA" provided the following index card(s) information that may or may not be iden to the "Information Council of the Americas, Inc."

N. Permindex. One trace result was found.

CIA-IR-20 -- Monster Plot NBR

(U) This is a large number of files from the microfilm part of the collection that Michelle Combs reviewed and then crafted a "SECRET" classified memo identifying the reels and folders of the files that were then declared "Not Believed Relevant."

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA-IR-21 -- DRE Monthly operational reports

(U) This request involved "Howard" and some extensive research for the name as a true name, pseudo, or alias for anyone out of JMWAVE and/or connected to the DRE operation.

(U) We also did extensive research for DRE monthly reports. In the JFK collection, there was a gap in the reporting between December 1962 and April 1964.

(U) This also covered the question of George Joannides' Performance Appraisal Reports and their inclusion in the collection with some redactions.

CIA-IR-22 - "A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison

(U) The DO provided this unclassified response:

> "It was the DO's understanding that there were illegible markings on pages of the copy of the "A" file on Clay Shaw. Legible copies were promised and have recently been delivered.
>
> The DO has recently provided a copy of the "A" file on Jim Garrison."

CIA-IR-26 -- Jordan James Pfunter

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS did a records search on subject name. The information is contained in a 201 file and an A file. This information was provided to the ARRB by DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998, and they were advised that other information was available from a Third Agency.

CIA-IR-29 -- Oswald LeWinter

(U) The ARRB provided the name to be traced. Apparently he is/was claiming to be an Agency employee and the Acting Assistant Director of Counter Espionage.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(S) A name trace was run. The resultant information was included in an IMS/ESG/HCS "clarification memo" for the ARRB. The text, which was classified "Secret," reads as follows:

> "Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA,* the CIA has never had any official affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)
>
> CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1990, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important [because] he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice."

CIA-IR-30 -- Cherepanov Papers

(U) This undated and undocumented request from the ARRB was derived from a passage in the book Molehunter (pp. 121-123) regarding the Cherepanov papers.

IMS/ESG/HCS located a workbook copy in English and provided access to ARRB staffer Michelle Combs. She was further offered access to the original Russian copies. Combs then wrote a memorandum dated April 1997 that identified the collection as papers that "primarily examine the habits, potential vulnerabilities, and KGB approaches made to various members of the American Embassy staff." Combs went on to say that "no information of believed relevance to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was found in these papers. No pages were designated as assassination records."

CIA-IR-32 -- AMWORLD

(C) The confidential draft of the IMS/ESG/HCS response was shown to ARRB staffer Combs in February 1998. That text follows:

> "(C) **CIA-IR-32 AMWORLD. The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of AMWORLD and its connection with the Cuban exile groups. After a thorough search of the DO records system, to include telephonic communications with various DO Latin American Division officers, we formulated the following as a definition of the purpose of the AMWORLD operation. The AMWORLD operation was a covert Agency effort to provide support to several Cuban exile groups. This was an "autonomous" operation designed to bring the exile groups under the direct control of Manuel Artime Buesa. AMWORLD's mission was to cause a popular uprising in Cuba through the use of propaganda and paramilitary forces to ultimately overthrow Fidel Castro.
>
> (C) The Agency provided direct and indirect financial aid and technical advisory support to these groups but did not participate directly in the day-to-day operations. ARTIME was responsible for recruitment of AMWORLD

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

> personnel; he obtained sites for training and deployment, and he had primary responsible for day-to-day operations. AMWORLD was based in three locations. The AMWORLD propaganda efforts were based in Costa Rico. The paramilitary efforts were run out of the Nicaragua base. The third base was located in Miami to service AMWORLD requirements including the collection of operational leads, servicing of dead drops and assisting in the vetting of AMWORLD personnel."

(C) Combs asked two follow up questions: Was part of the program to put in place a government in exile? Was there ever a government in exile? IMS/ESG/HCS put these questions to LA and DO/IRO. The DO/IRO has provided the following additional write up, classified confidential:

> ``(C) Based on file reviews and recollections from officers involved in the Cuban program, there was never a Cuban Government in Exile. During the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation it was envisioned that after the invasion site had been secured, Miro Cardona and the Cuban Revolutionary Council would be flown to the area to establish a new Cuban Government. The invasion site was never secured.
>
> (C) The AMWORLD Project, begun well after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and after the release of Manuel Artime Buesa and other Bay of Pigs veterans from Cuban prisons, was designed to support and unite several Cuban exile groups under the control of Artime in an effort to enhance the cohesion of the exiles and augment Artime's capability to launch propaganda and paramilitary attacks against the Cuban mainland. The overall mission of AMWORLD was to foment a popular uprising in Cuba which could lead to the ultimate overthrow of Fidel Castro. There is no evidence that AMWORLD's mission even remotely came close to fruition and no evidence that a projected government in exile was ever considered as a viable option.''

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA-IR-34 -- Files of CIA officials/offices

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS ran a computer search for 'OPI 40" files. This computer run was then made available to ARRB staff member Michelle Combs for review. Her review encompasses some 42 boxes from a variety of retired DDP files. The identified folders were gathered in an aggregate of seven boxes (including one that is exclusively microfilm and microfiche of so-called Registry logs).

(U) The ARRB staff member's review is about half completed. She has so far selected some 44 records totaling 123 pages to be included in the JFK collection. When the ARRB staff member's review is completed, the selected records will be copied and subjected first to a duplicate check by DA/OIM/JFK reviewers, then reviewed by those reviewers, then reviewed by HCS reviewers.

(U) We have been unable to locate any "operational diaries" by William Harvey.

CIA-IR-35 - Oswald related Information

(S) The surfacing of a report in the continuing Oswald 201 file attributed to IJDECANTER prompted the ARRB to request a review of that defector's 201 file. Certain such reporting records will be included in the JFK collection as records in Oswald's 201. A Board request for an updated search of records for Oswald related material generated some 128 hits, which were reviewed by Ms. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff. Three records, selected by Ms. Combs and sanitized with her concurrence, were selected for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

CIR-IR-36 - Handling of Cables in 1963

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB staff's request for a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations processed cables in the 1963/1964 timeframe. We are unable to locate any Agency-wide definitive records on the subject for this time frame, and the information provided below is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time and in the specific offices in which they served.

(U) Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos;" collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

(U) On a daily basis, usually six days per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariat, within the Office of Communications. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to predefined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each incoming cable was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days, and the receiving office placed a copy into an operational file based upon subject or activity.

(U) Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariat for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and the sending office placed a copy in the appropriate operational file.

(U) There was a centralized processing section for the directorate that received copies of the cables to review them and update the central index cards.

CIA-IR-37 - William Pawley

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB's request to review all files on William Pawley and any files on his possible connection with Cuban exile groups in the 1962-1963 time frame. The Agency's 201 file on Pawley consists of three volumes, the same as in the JFK sequestered collection, and November 1962 is the date of the last record indexed to his 201. However, the Agency holds operational files for the period 1963 to 1965 which related to Pawley. Those files were made available for review by the ARRB staff and they selected a number of documents for inclusion in the materials being processed for release to NARA.

Unnumbered Request -- Worldwide Query

(U) In March 1998 the ARRB asked "whether a worldwide query was sent out the day after the assassination for all case officers to query their sources for any information on the assassination and Oswald. Are or would all the answers be in the collection?"

(S) The following information has been identified:

A. A "book message," that is a message to all stations and bases, DIR 84608, dated 22 November 1963 (date/time group 222054Z) was sent. This message advised all stations and bases about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The message advised all to be "on alert." This cable is found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 3.

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

B. A "book cable," DIR 85133, dated 26 Nov. 1963 (date/time group 262319Z) was sent. This message was sent "routine" but with ten addressees on a "prior-ity basis." The ten "priority" addressees were: Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa. This cable advised all stations and bases of the identity of the alleged assassin by name of Lee Harvey Oswald. This cable can be found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 4.

C. Neither of these two cables indicates that a "routing" coding was to be used to ensure that all responses, if any, would be classified to Oswald's 201 file.

8. (U) I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 2nd day of September 1998.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
JFK FPO, Directorate of Operations

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration for the Directorate of Operations

DISTRIBUTION:
Original - JFK Official File
1 - D/OIM/DA
1 - C/JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG/ Chrono

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

April 1992

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)
(OCA 1123-92/1)
(OCA 1123-92/2)

Original - Addressee (w/enclos)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)
1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)
1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)
1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)
1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)

OCA 1123-92

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories, the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought.

no.

Not our business — are [illegible] here.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?

about 30

We believe that between 40 percent ~~and 50 percent~~ of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI.

4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act(FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

50,240,067
1,567
14,763
250
6,012
15

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved.

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DCI History Staff
316 Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Phone (703) 351-2621

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92 PAGES TRANSMITTED 8
(cover sheet included)

TRANSMITTED TO:

NAME: JOHN PEREIRA

ORGANIZATION: OGC

BLDG, ROOM

TELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 874 3208)

SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENCL) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT.) & CIA HS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE

TRANSMITTED FROM:

NAME: KEN McDONALD

BLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES

TELE/EXT: 30147 (FAX 522 9280)

MESSAGE:

John - The OCA letter (which David Pearline sent us yesterday) has many suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with State, to which the Wilcox memo refers.

Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

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Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
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Enclosure

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3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so, approximately how many?

We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's JFK assassination records, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

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CIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would he released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

20 APR 1992
ER 92-2346

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

April 14, 1992

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Dear Director Gates:

I am please to learn that you will be testifying before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12, 1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation proposes to create an independent review board to govern and coordinate the release of government information relevant to the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100 copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee and to the Congress as it considers this important legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the records and resources of your agency, the Committee would appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:

> What are the reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency has records related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What have the methods been to date for the identification and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as material related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to assess the scope of relevant documents outside of materials requested by earlier investigative or other official committees or commissions, or through the Freedom of Information Act?
>
> What is the volume of material which you might recommend be released to the public without concern for further postponement?

Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies, whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may released without agency objection?

What recommendations can you make with regard to the need for interagency working groups to identify third-agency records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the public?

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns that you have with regard to the review and release of assassination material?

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at 202-224-4751.

Sincerely,

John Glenn

John Glenn
Chairman

JHG/sk

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * * *

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

__Panel 1__:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

__Panel 2__:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

__Panel 3__:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST

* * * *

CIA HAS [illegible]
DECLAS[illegible] [illegible] OR
RELEASE OF C[illegible] INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

Panel 3:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

4/22/92

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OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION

A. **Agreement with Principles of Legislation.**

1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as is consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods.

2. Established own declassification program. Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable mechanism to declassify documents.

B. **Describe Nature and Amount of Records.**

1. Reasons for having records.

2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs to.

3. How we have identified material related to JFK assassination.

C. **How Much Material Can be Released?**

1. Give estimate of amount of material to be released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.

a. Example of Intelligence Sources and Methods that would require withholding.

b. Example of material the release of which would invade privacy.

3. Describe resources--manpower and funds-- to achieve results.

D. **Concerns with Resolutions.**

1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns. Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.

2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents should conduct initial review of material to determine whether it can be released. Material withheld from public release could then be made available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be allowed to review it for release even if that information is contained in a document prepared by another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency working group to handle coordination issues likely to arise with disclosure of third agency documents.

4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board for additional material that has a reasonable relationship to the assassination.

5. Would hope that the Board will consult with DCI before using subpoena power to compel production of material that involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to ensure that deliberative process information and identities of covert employees are protected.

E. **Conclusion:** Pledge to cooperate with whatever mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK assassination.

OCA 2034-92
1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Majority Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.

2. The hearing was well attended by the public and attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie "JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris, Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea, American National Government Specialist at the Congressional Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that "after much negotiation," the Director of Central Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work together to release the documents to the American people.

4. The general tone of the session was strongly in favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might be some materials that required postponement of disclosure, but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years, conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone thought 98 percent of the material could be released. Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church Committee counsel, suggested that most national security information should be released under the resolution, but that privacy interests posed greater concerns. Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up the bill," which is why he said that review by an independent board was so important.

5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today." Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone, describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government as part of his research process? However, there was no aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's "research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence, and also said that a closer look should be taken at an operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact, spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change embarking upon several courses that disturbed that "Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In response to a later question about various theories, Stone called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible deniability" and that it was important to look behind the Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism to "vindicate t public's right to know." (On 18 March Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite the need to make the documents publicly available, the Administration would not support the resolution and it could be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such an action would be problematic for the Administration, because much Executive branch information is contained in House records, and the House also probably considers documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to avoid a constitutional confrontation with the Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the Advisory Committee established in connection with the State Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent on general propositions like the fact that the documents ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core issues raised by H.R. 454.

Victoria L. Pepper
Assistant General Counsel
Office of Congressional Affairs

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4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

	Pages	Date	Description
NOT A PART	1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
	4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
ADDED LATER	1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
	4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
	5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
	1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
	1	"	Redacted copy of same.
	1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
	3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
	1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
	1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
	7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
	2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
	2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
	2	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
	1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
	2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
	1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
	7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
	1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
	9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
	2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
	3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
	4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
	1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
	1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
	1	"	Redacted copy of same
	14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
	1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
	4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
	1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

~~SECRET~~

1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

DUPLICATED & ADDED LATER

~~SECRET~~

OCA 2050-92
6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: JFK Testimony

1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The Committee has requested that an advance copy of your statement be provided to them by 8 May.

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Attachment:
as stated

Draft 5/6/92

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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger ~~even~~ over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that ~~the~~ CIA had anything to do with ~~participated in~~ the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. ~~[As we speak this Group has~~ already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, ~~which includes~~ including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying ~~those~~ documents ~~papers or which are~~ belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,

can we give some idea of #? Is it limited only to the 37 documents cited on the next page? If so, that's not good enough. I thought Ken said there were several "easy" boxes that could be processed quickly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which ~~are~~ specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to ~~do~~ be so.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of (copies ~~of~~ and originals of) ~~information provided to the~~ (Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations) ~~between 1977 and 1979~~, and ~~over~~ 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald, (accumulated) after President Kennedy's assassination.

add text.

how + where? What kind of documents.

rewrite

A~~t first blush, you might think that this is an enormous amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is important to recognize, however, that~~ Virtually all of these are ~~essentially "secondary"~~ documents ~~collected~~ were ~~accumulated~~ originated or came to CIA from other agencies after the assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. ~~There were~~ Some documents relevant to the investigations ~~that did~~ existed before the assassination, but they were only brought together in response to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this very point.

not clear

What's this mean? Spell out

Where's the chart?

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination The documents CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of ~~37~~ 33 documents (~~less than 150~~ approximately 160 pages)s ~~of which 28 documents consisted of material originated by the State Department, the Navy, the FBI, and newspaper clippings.~~ Only 11 of were CIA documents ~~I~~ I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have

11 - CIA

check pages.

What's that mean? Sounds like a dodge.

already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file ~~with minimal deletions of Site numbers, personal names and intelligence methods~~ ~~and provided them~~ to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities ~~in the U.S.~~ after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA ~~collected all~~ accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages in total. ~~most of which [illegible] from other agencies~~

From where?

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, ~~I should emphasize that~~ much of the material held by CIA originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. ~~My~~ Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select ~~Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm~~ other parts of the collection. The microfilms ~~which [illegible]~~ in part overlap material in ~~the 63 boxes~~. ~~[However,]~~ we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately ~~10~~ = 27 % originated from the ~~FBI, and a smaller~~ ~~and the Justice Department~~ ~~number of records, [less than 1] %, originated from the State Department or elsewhere~~ one and 24 % originated from a variety of other U.S. government agencies, ~~and~~ private organizations, and foreign and American press.

a variety of other agenc

24%?

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review. And, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary ~~review~~ survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet

Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation, and a Cuban exile activities. ~~copies of FBI reports about Oswald, and even information about Watergate~~

The CIA cannot ~~simply act to declassify or~~ release ~~some~~ a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to proceed ~~to review for declassification~~ these documents it has sequestered

Release the results of the declassification on the sequestered documents?

The House will let us declassify and release these sequestered documents?

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested ~~on~~ a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Meaning? Although ~~largely~~ irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose ~~this information~~ their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the (Meaning?) Agency will ~~be willing~~ to make redactions, and ~~substitute generic information~~ or summarize ~~the~~ that information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

~~[illegible]~~ If legislation is not passed ~~by Congress~~ requested by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and ~~[illegible]~~ that CIA ~~[illegible]~~ not held back ~~any~~ ~~relevant~~ ~~pertinent the assassination~~ information, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans to examine ~~whether~~ documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then ~~[illegible]~~ write an unclassified public ~~[illegible]~~ report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of ~~15~~ stet 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff, and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the review of the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

15 is correct

[illegible]

intent to get these papers ~~[illegible]~~ declassified and released, and to ~~[illegible]~~ open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our

~~While we are in complete agreement on the need to declassify documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, I do have certain~~ technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

~~My primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial~~ the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination ~~held by all Executive Branch agencies, including CIA,~~ can be released to the public. First, ~~V~~vesting ~~this review authority~~ in an outside body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. ~~In addition, I am concerned~~ that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a Review Board that has no ~~particular~~ expertise in ~~making~~ intelligence ~~classification determinations and is unfamiliar with the~~ assassination material ~~is~~ bound to result in delays in releasing the material. It ~~will~~ also result in a duplication of effort since originating agencies will have to review the decision of the Executive Director to release ~~particular documents~~.

I share your belief that the review of documents be done in an expeditious and efficient manner. To that end, I propose that the initial review of assassination materials be made by the

~~originating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process. Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the public or redactions, would then be reviewed by members of the Review Board, who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an agency and the Review Board over the release of a document could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents while at the same time providing an independent review of all decisions made to withhold information. It presumably would expedite the process because the amount of material still classified to be reviewed would be only a fraction of the whole.~~

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. ~~[As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I could not make classified information available to the Board until it took the necessary steps to safeguard that information.]~~

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. ~~Once again, this provision conflicts with my statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated information found in another's document should have the opportunity to review the information and raise necessary objections prior to its release to the public. An interagency working group should be established to coordinate the review and release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion.~~

~~Fourth, the joint resolution defines "assassination material" broadly to include any records that relate "in any manner or degree to the assassination." I believe we have already identified these documents as a result of previous inquiries from investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations. These investigations were thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material should be reviewed.~~

Fourth ~~Fifth,~~ the joint resolution provision for ~~provides only~~ a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information~~. This~~ may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large

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volume~~s~~ of material at one time. ~~If the initial review of documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution should be amended to provide that an agency may request a reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents may be released.~~

Fifth and ~~F~~finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, ~~may not be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects. For example, there is~~ makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. ~~I also believe that "intelligence agent" under section 6(1)(A) of the joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired undercover from an intelligence agency.~~

~~While I believe that the joint resolution can be improved, I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the CIA will cooperate with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify the assassination material. As Director of Central Intelligence and as ~~Robert Gates~~ a private citizen, I am committed to making this process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this~~

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, ~~if the~~ whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review ~~and~~ for declassification the relevant documents under its control. We will further cooperate with any ~~xx~~ mechanism established by the Congress and the

1) a number questions ?
2) Check my fixes with Gries, McDonald *OGC + OCA
3) ~~Then~~ Go ahead + circulate to OMB, DOJ + FBI.

6 May 1992

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: Neal Wolin, SA/DCI

Re: JFK Testimony

Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by OCA. ~~The~~ draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.

Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality) that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectives relating to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of material consistent with your statutory obligations.

In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your "statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the definition of "assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical" criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make (especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material declassification to death.

Neal

Neal

OCA 2149-92
19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC

FROM: David M. Pearline
Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA

SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony

1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's 15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.

2. The following specific questions require follow-up action:

a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? (p. 5)
b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection? (p. 5)
c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)
d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that you can shed some light on? (p. 5)
e. [W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald file] that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? (p. 14)
f. [W]ould the establishment of such a panel of outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)

3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate components, will take the lead on all questions except for the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the record.

David M. Pearline

Attachment

Draft: 14 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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2000

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on **House Joint Resolution 454**, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter, **just as I did before your Senate counterparts last Tuesday.**

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

FIRST PRIORITY – JFK documents

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be declassified released shortly.

— were released

change to over the coming weeks

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. **In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.**

In connection with these historical review guidelines, I have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

Chart

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (**amounting to 124** pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. **(Although I reported slightly smaller numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed these exact numbers.)** Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this is but the first installment--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the [illegible] declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

The committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be

minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
20 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide our views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have, but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, the Director recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. The Director believes that we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

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FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

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While we expect that a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

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I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent —to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

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Second, we are concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

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But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92

22 May 1992

The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

CL BY 2196777
DECL OADR
DRV FM LIA 3-87

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John Glenn

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:

> In response to a request from the US embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority Member Roth.

Sincerely,

Robert M Gates

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92/1
22 May 1992

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Roth:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

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~~SECRET~~

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

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Sincerely,

Robert M Gates

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable John Glenn
The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs

OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92

Distribution:
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13-00000

Senator
John Glenn

News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks (202) 224-5635
May 12, 1992 Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

Statement of Senator John Glenn
Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on
S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"
May 12, 1992

The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.

The legislation would require the government to release records to the American public which are "relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would establish an independent review board within 90 days of enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to release the records to the public through the National Archives and the Government Printing Office.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.

It is also important to stress that the legislation does not authorize any official investigation of the assassination. Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American public may be given the most complete access to review relevant records, and make their own observations and assessments. The Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to this purpose.

This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs, and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly improved by the release of these records.

Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive Branch national security information. Declassification schedules remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same practice. It is likely that more government documents related to the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past 12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions, have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by the FBI.

The public interest in the history of the assassination of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films, or television programs were produced on the subject between the years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250 holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports, allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas police officers who were not previously interviewed by government investigators.

The speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made available will answer many questions and provide many history lessons.

I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the process for review and release of the records is fair and appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of assassination related records that will be efficient and effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.

The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for working quickly to propose an independent and accountable mechanism to release records related to the assassination. However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.

I believe that the major issues include:

First, how will agencies and others who hold records define the universe of "relevant" Kennedy assassination materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees, but the question must be asked: Where will the search for documents end?

Second, the definition and search for "relevant assassination material" also raises important questions of human resources and costs to organize and make material available to the Review Board. How much will this cost?

Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review and release of records in an independent, accountable, and credible manner. The tension between management and public confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff. Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers necessary?

Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?

Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages of material will be released, the bill contains national security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and administrative records relating to past official inquiries.

I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress, which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and congressional officials are to release their records. If even some of the material can go out the door without further adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly thereafter.

Today we are fortunate to have several experts and authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work represents the track record on public access to Kennedy assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He will speak to the nature and limitations of current access arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We welcome all of you to the Committee.

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CIHRG #
If you have any oral comments,
Vicki Pepper is the one to call.
Dave

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6/5/92

SUGGESTED AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED IN REPORT LANGUAGE (IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)

1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which requires that records not provided to the Archivist for public disclosure be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as much information available as possible before the Review Board conducts its review of assassination materials. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to review and release assassination materials. Section 5(a)(2), which requires that all records of an official investigation for which an agency is custodian be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives for public release wherever possible. In, fact the Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch as they can provide for more expeditious release of assassination materials to the public.

2. "Third agency rule" adhered to in review of documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily provide that the agency or department that originated the information will have any input into a decision to disclose the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee understands that existing regulations within the Executive Branch require that classified information originated in one agency may not be disseminated outside another agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. The Committee expects that agencies that are custodians of records will follow this practice before providing information to the Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release pursuant to section 4.
>
> Section 5(a)(2) requires agencies that are custodians of records of official investigations to make such records available to the Review Board. The Board will then make a determination of whether the material qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth

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in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records and the originating body of the record of its determination. The Committee expects that the Review Board also will consult with the agency or department that originated the information in reaching its determination as to whether public disclosure of the material must be postponed to ensure that it is apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that information. For example, the Review Board should consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that provided information incorporated into a Congressional document before making a decision to release that document and shall inform the originating agency of a decision to release that information.

3. Identities of covert employees qualify for postponement. "Intelligence agent" is something of a term of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to protect information that would reveal the identity of covert employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The term "intelligence agent" as used in section 7(a)(1)(A) is intended to permit postponement of release of information that would reveal the identity of a domestic or foreign intelligence or counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States intelligence organization, where the identity of any of these currently requires protection.

4. Board access to "any record" of an Executive agency. In addition to adding language to section 10(1)(1) to clarify that requests for additional records must be made by the Review Board itself, report language should make clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report language:

> Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may request "any record" from an Executive agency. The Committee intends to give the Review Board wide latitude to determine what additional records may be held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee attempting to define what records should be requested, the Committee believes that this judgment is best left to the Board, which will develop expertise in assassination-related issues and documents as its work

DRAFT

proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to request any and all records of agencies without regard to their relationship to the assassination. The Committee expects that the Board will request only documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods is to be avoided.

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HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996

1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered
    - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files
    - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries
2. Pages released (227,000)
    - Percentage of pages redacted; 70 %
3. Process of declassification
    - Former senior officers in HRG review
    - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)
4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992
    - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination
    - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records
        - -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board

          E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection
            - Source or method currently utilized
            - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection
5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement
    - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees
    - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days

- Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station"
    - Also, summary of a record
- Board has access to every document in full

6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:

- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations
- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki
- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover
    - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US
- Liaison, joint operations in Mexico
- Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others
- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination

- President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information
    - --President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination
        - -- This is published in the Federal Register

Barry + Linda

8. Current appeal (now resolved)

- Issues: identification of Agency asset
  liaison relationship
  identification of station
- Potential appeal: Tokyo station

9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records

13-00000

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~ Barry's file

CSI 1997-552
10 December 1997

NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
Deputy Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from Congressman Burton to EXDIR

Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the JFK Board.

Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton's staff last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the review of documents by 1 September 1998. Gunn showed the staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers, Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the impression that Burton's strong interest will prompt him to write to the Agency.

During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him the Agency's clear commitment to declassifying all assassination records. We also explained that we have shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing down or stopping other declassification efforts.

John Pereira

John Pereira

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1- Fax'd Wickham
12/10
1 circulated JFK

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ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

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WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

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BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT
INDEPENDENT

December 16, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I have a great interest in ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee, completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this year I introduced H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the Review Board for one additional year, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Review Board was included in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.

During consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of authorization for the Review Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all federal agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order that documents may be processed and transferred to the National Archives, in compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).

The Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board nevertheless believes that the CIA is not transferring records to the Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to use its legal powers to order a transfer of records to the Board which would then vote to open the records without benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it does not wish to take this step, but that it is fully prepared to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination date.

I urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfills its obligations under the law by expeditiously reviewing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board.

Sincerely,

Dan Burton

Dan Burton
Chairman

DB:jts

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OCA 97-1969
8 January 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) processing of records related to President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board's concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure you, as I did to the Review Board's Executive Director in the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the Agency's assassination-related materials. As the Review Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board and its staff in this effort.

We share the Review Board's goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive information that might warrant continued protection can be identified to the Board. For the past several years a team of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National Archives.

The Honorable Dan Burton

I understand the importance that the Congress and the President have placed on disclosing to the American people all available information about the assassination. To this end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material and are working diligently to complete our review of the remaining records.

If you or your staff require any further information or would like a briefing on our declassification program, please have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

David W. Carey

Enclosure

The Honorable Dan Burton

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 **INTERIM**)
OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)
Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)

Distribution:
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1 - DA/OIM/IRG
1 - DA/MS
1 - D/OCA
1 - AO/OCA
1 - OCA Records **(ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)**
1 - JPMeehan Chrono

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

Make public
today the
guidelines

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains (73) 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

perhaps
including
former
distinguished
jurists

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Added comment on personal reaction at the time.
Determined personally to make available every scrap of paper

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
~~SECRET~~
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

NOT A PART

ADDED LATER

Pages	Date	Description.
1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
1	"	Redacted copy of same.
1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
2	"	Redacted copy of same
1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
1	"	Redacted copy of same
14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

~~SECRET~~

1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

DUPLICED & ADDED LATER

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Wick
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

June 14, 1966

MR. TOLSON:

Aba y. [illegible]

Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, 6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss matters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e., the Jenkins case, [redacted] boyfriend, and other items which Mr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.

(b)(6)

[illegible]

The Black case was then brought up and he was told that although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this matter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time. He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.

Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat of the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of correspondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He was told specifically of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kennedy. I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed.

Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent, had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if facts, as possessed by the FBI, concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely destroy Kennedy.

CDD:amr
(2)

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had ineptly and inadequately presented the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting. At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed around" regardless of the politics involved.

Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memoranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court.

After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.

He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that

CONTINUED.....OVER

he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.

He stated the next problem would be to find this particular man. He said he had in mind somebody like Ken Royall, former Secretary of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone like Ross Malone, former President of the American Bar Association, would be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was an immediate past President of the American Bar Association, from the State of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak. Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.

Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however, he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated he thought this could be done.

Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with the Hoffa case. I replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances

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he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the other Justices.

Justice Fortas next inquired if I had known a former Bureau employee by the name of Courtney Evans. I told him that I did know Evans. He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his "ace in the hole." I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated, "Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard. The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone coverage.

Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background. I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.

CONTINUED.....OVER

At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical of Kennedy.

Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraignment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.

Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father. I told the Justice that the Director had received information pointing out that despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr. The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.

CONTINUED.....OVER

V

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

OK. Certainly Royall would be impossible. I had enough of him when he was attorney for the saboteurs & later when as Secretary of War he was instrumental in throwing us out of S.I.S. & setting up C.I.A. The practicality of an "arbitrator" I have some doubts. It can be another "Warren Commission" & end in a fiasco. H

[Special Intelligence Service,

Central Intelligence Agency

[Hoover]

13-00000

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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

4-750 (Rev. 12-14-88)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

28 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☐ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552

☐ (b)(1)
☐ (b)(2)
☐ (b)(3)
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☐ (b)(4)
☐ (b)(5)
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☐ (b)(7)(A)
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☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)
☐ (j)(2)
☐ (k)(1)
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☐ (k)(5)
☐ (k)(6)
☐ (k)(7)

☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

☐ Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

☑ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

_____ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

_____ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): ________________

☐ For your information: ________________

☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
65-6165-25, 26

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X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
X FOR THIS PAGE X
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FBI/DOJ

Theoharis -- Appendix C

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1953

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SDSC
ON 12-27-79

In connection with a possible unauthorized leak of official Government information, it is believed desirable to institute a technical surveillance of Henry William Grunewald, a prominent figure in Washington, D. C.

I therefore recommend that you grant authority to place a technical surveillance on the residence of Grunewald, Apartment 625B, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone: Woodley 7-5700, or any other residence or office space which he might occupy in the future.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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MAR 18 1953
24

RECEIVED
MAR 16 5 03 PM '53

The Attorney General on February 13, 1953, requested that we cover the activities of Grunewald and asked that a technical surveillance be instituted on his residence. This memorandum is being submitted in accordance with the Attorney General's suggestion. (EHW/rh)

10:00 am
3/17/53

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

~~5 6 APR 1 1953~~

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson ✓

DATE: April 28, 1953

FROM : L. B. Nichols

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD
KEAN COMMITTEE

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

Executive Session testimony

I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session, [redacted] Tobin then outlined the following particulars:

1. [redacted] Tobin stated he had ascertained this was probably [redacted] b7C

2. [redacted] This was the point which Tobin stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at New York on July 20, 1951, in the investigation on [redacted] b7C

3. [redacted] Tobin outlined this was [redacted] b7C

4. Tobin stated that Grunewald had the habit of passing out ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hottel. I told Tobin if he was inferring that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have furnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director has not appreciated the manner in which Grunewald has thrown the Director's

cc: Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen

RECORDED - 58
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65-6165-147

name around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on [redacted] With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly, all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned; that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District Committee.

Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from the Bureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on [redacted] Grunewald was a fairly good investigator and it would have been a simple matter for him to find out [redacted] that with reference to the information on [redacted] told him it was my understanding [redacted] that this itself was a matter of public record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investigation of a lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and with the Grievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this. Further, I inquired whether he had any information to the effect that [redacted] assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated Grunewald stated [redacted] assisted him. I told him [redacted] undoubtedly knew [redacted] personally; that [redacted] was in the Department for many years himself and no doubt had friends in the Department. I asked whether he had any information indicating [redacted] was close to McInerney.

[redacted]

b7c

The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily concerned about [redacted] I told him the investigative reports on [redacted] went to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951; Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was furnished the AG under date of February 29th on [redacted] and [redacted] He then inquired as to why G-2 would want the information. I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the answer.

I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in November or December, 1951.

I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired regarding [redacted] and [redacted] stating he had heard there were a couple of Communists on the staff and that the evidence was supposed to be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case and it would appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we furnished no information; that there was some indication from the source that [redacted] had been helping Grunewald and [redacted] might be in contact with McInerney.

[redacted] I told him he was at liberty to do so.

I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted the information and let him know, which is being done.

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was information over in the Senate similar to that furnished by Grunewald. I asked him where in the Senate and he said it came out of Senator McCarran's Office. Inasmuch as [redacted] told me that a member of the King Committee had told the Senator about [redacted] and [redacted] I think it might be well the next time I see [redacted] to confidentially inquire as to whether she recalled what member of the Committee furnished them this information.

I, of course, see no point in talking to [redacted] any further about this matter.

b7C b7D

cc Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Malley
Mr. Pennington

b7c [redacted]

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

orig. sent to file
See 65-6165-192
Con 11/22/57 TRK

May 13, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE

①

HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON 12-27-89

The following information concerning Henry William Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known reliability on May 11, 1953.

DH

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy

MAILED 11
MAY 14 1953
COMM - FBI

b7c

INDEXED - 75

165

RECORDED

MAY 18 1953

The Attorney General

[redacted]

b7C

Complete details concerning the information developed in connection with the request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers will, of course, be furnished to him upon the completion of the investigation of these matters.

NOTE:

This is a condensed version of information received from the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable form as possible for the information of the Attorney General. It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish the Attorney General with only pertinent information which appears would be of interest to him.

b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(5) Bureau file 67-322 also reflects that, in April 1929, the Bureau conducted an investigation entitled, "William H. Vander Poel, Henry W. Grunewald, Application for Commission in Officer's Reserve Corps." It is noted that Vander Poel had served as an Agent of the Bureau of Investigation during World War I. At the time of the investigation, both were seeking to obtain a commission in the United States Army. The Bureau's investigation reflected that Grunewald was not trustworthy, possessed a bad reputation and had been indicted for violation of the National Prohibition Act, although he was not convicted of this offense. This information was furnished to the Military Intelligence Service by memoranda to the Department dated May 6, 1929, and September 10, 1929.

(6) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that at the request of Mr. Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in June and July, 1940, entitled, "Harry H. Woodring; Henry William Grunewald, also known as Henry Gruenwald, Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, and Henri Grunewald; Misconduct in Office, Espionage." Mr. Early's request was based on allegations received from [redacted]o the effect that Grunewald was believed to be "in cahoots" with Senator Gerald P. Nye and that [redacted] had told [redacted] that Grunewald, on two occasions, had given the secretary a check in the sum of $4000 for Senator Nye. It was alleged that Grunewald had intimated this money came from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in connection with War Department negotiations. On June 25, 1940, the Bureau received a memorandum from the Military Intelligence Service reflecting that Mr. Smith W. Brookhart had informed that Service that he had learned through [redacted] an alleged employee of the French-English Intelligence Service in 1917-1918 that the head of Nazi espionage in Washington, D. C., was Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, also known as Henry William Grunewald, Westchester Apartments, Washington, D. C. It is noted that McDonald at that time was also residing in the Westchester Apartments and during 1937 and a portion of 1938, Grunewald shared offices with McDonald and former Senator Arthur R. Robinson, in the Munsey Building, Washington, D. C. (1)

b7C
b7D

b7D
per
Psuing

(1) 65-6165-3

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

O.K. Certainly Royal would be impossible. I had enough of him when he was counsel for the saboteurs & later when as Secretary of War he was instrumental in throwing us out of S.I.S. [Special Intelligence Service, & setting up the C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency) The practicality of the "arbitrator" I have some doubts. It can be another "Warren Commission" & end in a fiasco. H (Hoover)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Tolson ✓ ____
Mr. E. A. Tamm ____
Mr. Clegg ____
Mr. Foxworth ____
Mr. Glavin ____
Mr. Ladd ____
Mr. Nichols ____
Mr. Rosen ____
Mr. Carson ____
Mr. Drayton ____
Mr. Quinn Tamm ____
Mr. Hendon ____
Mr. Coffey ____
Mr. [illegible] ____
Tele. Room ____
[illegible] Room ____
Mr. Nease ____
Mr. [illegible] ____
Miss Beahm ____
Miss Gandy ____

May 23, 1941

[redacted] b7C - 51018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

With further reference to Henry William Grunewald, in whom we are presently interested, I am attaching a memorandum for Mr. Carson from [redacted]

b3
b7C
per IRS

[redacted]

b3
per IRS

For your approval there is attached hereto a letter for the Attorney General's signature, to the Secretary of the Treasury, [redacted]

Respectfully, [illegible]

P. E. Foxworth

T-4 ENIT
9-11-40

65-[illegible]165-25

[illegible] 1941

The investigation in this matter, which was closed July 6, 1940, revealed that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and suspicion and not on any definite knowledge of the complainants. Neither the conditions alleged nor any irregularity on the part of Grunewald or former Secretary of War Woodring were discovered. There was no evidence developed that Grunewald was engaged in any activity for the German government. The result of the investigation in memorandum form were furnished to Mr. Early on July 9, 1940. (1)

(7) Bureau file 65-6165 also reflects that in May, 1941, the Military Intelligence Service advised the Bureau that information had been received by one of its informants that Grunewald was the pay-off man for German agents in the United States and was also contact man for various American peace and subversive organizations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant of the Military Intelligence Service was [redacted] and it was felt that the Military Intelligence Service was merely resurrecting old information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same allegations made by [redacted] However, on May 13, 1941, a technical surveillance of Grunewald was authorized and from June 4, 1941 through August 1, 1941, such surveillance was maintained on his apartment in the Westchester Apartments. No definite information was developed, indicating that Grunewald had violated any specific Federal statute. (2)

b7D per Army

(8) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that on September 15, 1942, the Omaha Office of the Bureau received a complaint from the Military Intelligence Service that Henry William Grunewald had, on the previous evening, given $110.00 in currency to two Army Privates attached to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, while Grunewald, [redacted] were drinking at a bar in the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying intelligence work, and becoming suspicious of Grunewald's apparent generosity with his money, reported the matter to the Omaha Office. They indicated that [redacted] had approximately $16,000 in her purse. This money was observed when she opened her purse in order to furnish currency to Grunewald to pass out to the crowd.

b7C
b7D

Grunewald was interviewed by two Agents of the Omaha Office on September 15, 1942, regarding the matter and he identified himself as being connected with the Alien Property Custodian's office in Washington, D. C., by exhibiting travel authority 55G, signed by James E. Markham, of the Alien Property Custodian's Office in Washington, D. C. Grunewald claimed to receive $8000 per year as salary from the Alien Property Custodian's Office. He admitted passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that he did not wish the matter reported to his superiors in Washington although he was willing to furnish information about the incident confidentially to the Bureau. He stated

(1) 65-6165-8
(2) 65-6165-22; 65-6165 Sub 1, Serial 1 to 122

Serial Removal Charge Out- [redacted]
4-874 (Rev. 7-18-73)

b7E

Subject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD

This serial, the original memorandum from the FBI to the Attorney General dated 3/16/53 , which was returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has been permanently removed for retention in the [redacted] per memorandum [redacted] to [redacted] dated 7-13-73. See 62-115687-1 for details and where maintained.

b7E

b7C

Removed By 343 Date 1/21/74

Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/82 BY sp2 [illegible]

12-27-89 spsa.4t

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERN

WPR:MJH:eo

TO : J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

DATE: April 13, 1953

SUBJECT: Request of Kean Committee for Henry W. Grunewald Files

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr. Tr
Mr. Ceg
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Win
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 7, 1953, from the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, requesting permission to inspect the Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the personnel files relating to Henry W. Grunewald including his service with the Office of Alien Property and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the Alien Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any FBI reports, in accordance with policy.

Advice would be appreciated whether the Bureau has a personnel file on Grunewald, and, if so, whether the Bureau would have any objection to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for examination by a Subcommittee representative. If the Bureau has such a file and no objection to its examination, please advise whether the Bureau would prefer to make it available for examination in one of the Bureau's offices or in this office.

cc furnished to Mr. Nichols -
T.N.

1 Enc. 23

pur [redacted] 8/14 bx

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~~EXPEDITE PROCESSING~~

65-6165-141

APR 23 1953
FBI

COPIES DESTROYED
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50 MAY 4 1953

14 May 1992

Note For: David Pearline, OCA

Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination Documents

(Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following lines)

Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the Archives previously . Is this correct ?

Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies had previously released.

Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the Oswald file that was released. Is this true ?

Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith commitment to release as many documents related to the assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible

John Pereira
x 76160

rtt-rw TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-M
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11:22 05-15

BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-MULTITAKES
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154
Time: 10 a.m.
May 15, 1992

*****

The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.

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ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454, the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.

I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his murder.

I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to accelerate the declassification of historical materials, creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified, or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old, and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.

I've asked them to take as their first priority the review for declassification a review of the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.

And I've indicated earlier this week, we've declassified the first set of these records, the pre-assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred to the National Archives for release.

It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to declassify these documents and to get them before the public as quickly as possible.

I've also made publicly available this week the agency's new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

~~In connection with these guidelines~~ I have recently commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I've described for historical declassification.

Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents and those that are often requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and the release of government or CIA records.

The chart that I've brought along with me describes the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. And I don't need I think to go into any further detail on that.

As I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show how thin it was before that time.

It was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on Oswald alone.

There has been some comment on the pre-assassination Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material we will review; merely an earnest of our intentions.

All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the archives as they are completed without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination materials that may be held by other intelligence community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.

The National Security Agency and the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.

I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.

However, we've already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification.

As I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of ~~Representatives for a resolution permitting~~ CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

I also have indicated in my statement for the record that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns, or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

And let me again take a moment to give an example of this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended ~~up~~ in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping it confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals, where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach of such a promise.

Where we cannot disclosure such information to the public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent, or the privacy of an individual.

As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week, if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified.

And they would then issue an unclassified report on their findings.

I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these documents declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental review.

It is against this background that I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result.

First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body the determination whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.

Third, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission.

Under the joint resolution documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board, without any review by the president or the executive branch.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest, and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly relating to the assassination, they would be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are technical problems, and I believe they can be solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the president to declassify this material.

That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing
May 15, 1992
MORE

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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(First Add)
*****

x x x Mr. Chairman.

REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a couple of observations.

Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? Why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the ~~CIA 14 mon~~ths after his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that that you can shed some light on?

Q's

GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those questions. But I will take them for the record and respond quickly to the committee.

A

REP. CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.

We're here against the background of history and the fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the United States, sitting president. And I thought it was exemplary of the CIA--I never thought I'd be saying this this morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think tanks around the city, one of which was included was the Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.

And I was told that there was a very candid exchange about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting. Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with them.

And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd say what I am saying today. But one of the parts of that discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has been parading around the country saying that you will not meet with him.

And as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on this subject?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I think that the agency has in many ways set a standard in terms of its willingness to release these documents, and our determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.

Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government, and to a number of people who were in office at that time from the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on down.

It is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.

REP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and understanding that you may have for the American people's confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?

GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the assassination; I have not read the many books that have been written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea of a single individual, a single irrational individual, committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value.

And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and so on in that respect.

And by the same token, and with all due respect to his memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy about the assassination of President McKinley.

And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept it at face value but rather than particularly young people who may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may not read what historians have to say that is critical about the movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must have been some sort of conspiracy.

And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see the ~~money~~ movie, and they came back and the reaction was not that they accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the suspicions that had been created.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. Mr. Schiff.

REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Director Gates, I want to thank you for appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy schedule, and I'm sure all the members of the committee do appreciate that.

I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.

I do know this, though. I do know that it's because of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the CIA. And I'm quite positive that his movie has caused all of that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for that.

Second of all, I note your observation that there is not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the government, your agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or information which for any reason are not being released with respect to the assassination of President McKinley?

GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's the central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever resolve all the questions about the assassination of President Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave reasons for that.

But the difference between the assassination of President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our country's history is, this is the one situation where the government, for whatever reason, and for whatever circumstances, still holds information which it considers to be confidential.

And that's the root of this controversy now, and that's the root of this hearing, I think.

And I made a note of items that you as director of the CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality today. And I made notes of three. If there were more, I apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the procedures, which you made observations about, and which I think you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive branch.

But three classifications of records. The first is personnel records involving, I gather, government agents, perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of all.

Second of all, the privacy issue because government files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular informant.

Before I ask you about those three, can I just ask, are there any other areas of documents that you as director of the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic category like these?

GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I think you've captured it.

REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these briefly.

On protection of personnel records, why would those have gotten--I understand what you're talking about. I think we all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would those records have gotten into the assassination records on President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?

GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this part of it: These files contain everything from the most mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified, or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.

And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through these documents is that they are not indexed; they are not catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.

So when I started asking some months ago what was in the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what kinds of records were in there.

But I assume that these kinds of things were just swept up with a lot of other material.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (first add)
May 15, 1992
MORE

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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Second Add)
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x x x other material.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other categories, and that is, where the government has given a promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that. Can't the information be released without revealing the informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired here, not necessarily the identity of who provided it.

GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should be the case in almost every instance.

REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence methods, I understand that there's a national security point there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago, approximately.

Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in 30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and collect and evaluation information would present a national security risk today if revealed?

GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to protect it.

I think here again, though, that the focus should be on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.

The only reason I would seek to protect them is in those instances in which those techniques are still being used, or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.

With respect to sources, I think that we have a much longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence business review any of that material that we had held back to see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.

REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director

Gates, is that everything that can be released should be released?

GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.

REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff.
The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.

REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming and positive testimony before this committee. I think that it is important to emphasize that we share an interest in disclosing all of the information related to the substance of this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct its business.

And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says that disclosure to the general public of assassination material or particular information in assassination material may be postponed if its release would--and there's a whole list--but among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the United States government is involved.

And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us, and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods would be revealed or compromise by the information which is released?

GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for the protection of sources and methods and that allow us ultimately the president to have the final say would provide adequate safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for intelligence-related information then are sufficient?

GATES: Yes, sir. I've indicated in my testimony we would ask the Congress to consider I think two additional categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.

Again, we think that there would be very little information that would be withheld under those circumstances, but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.

The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.

REP. THORNTON: I appreciate those suggestions. But in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the general outline contained in this resolution would not damage any current CIA operations; is that correct?

GATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in the late '50s and early '60s?

GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the documents that will be reviewed in the--

REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question as to whether those files would be included in the material.

GATES: Yes, sir.

REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make sure that all of the information that is in government possession relating to this assassination be released. Because in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy, that there were allusions to the possibility of an external conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of that time.

Would you agree with that, sir?

GATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton.

REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton.
The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.

REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to release important documents that will contribute to the better understanding of the public at large as to what exactly happened.

I also agree with my colleagues that while the conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day.

And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to the content of that movie, because what we need now is an informed basis upon which to look at it.

I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to evaluate it, as most of the people in the country. And therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely important.

Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that you indicate that some of the documents which are relevant to this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in fact documents which belong to other agencies.

Would you comment on that and clarify that particular statement in your testimony?

GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post assassination investigations, a great deal of information was shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made available for information to CIA.

About 20 percent originated with the State Department or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.

Under the third-agency rule, it is our obligation to leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same practice with us.

REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are considering now make it possible for your agency, as the custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies, be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?

GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that, Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of reviewing for declassification the documents that they originated.

We don't hold the record copies of those documents. We simply have copies of them.

REP. MINK Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they were documents that your agency had been provided by other governmental agencies?

GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file, of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies had all already been declassified. That's correct.

REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with reference to Oswald now in the public domain?

GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.

REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now available public documents?

GATES: I don't know whether that's the case or not. Only the documents that we had from them have been released as part of the file we released. They may have other documents pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.

REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald everything that you had in your possession, regardless of whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to be declassified, have all been released?

GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.

REP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you released to the archives?

GATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no student of this material. I do not know the answer to that question.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (second add)
May 15, 1992
MORE

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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Third Add)

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x x x that question.

REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your agency have an answer to that question?

GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been released, so would have represented new information.

REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new items that had not been released previously?

GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the director of our center for the study of intelligence.

DAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been previously released. About half of those that are--originated at the CIA.

Among the documents of other agencies that were in our files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been previously released.

REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? } Q.

GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you precisely which documents were new. } A.

I do know that the new ones are not of much consequence. They do not contain any information that is particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the hearing what those are.

REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October 31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did not open a file until 14 months alter?

GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.

Mink.

REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the Soviet Union?

GATES: I just don't know.

REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the agency to determine that 14-month lapse?

GATES: I don't believe so.

GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in addition, we gained no information. We don't know.

REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals, as the article says, that the materials turned over had been altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were released to the archives. Is that a true statement?

GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we had. That file contained copies of original documents. Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we had.

What might be characterized as alterations by some by us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I can assure you, nothing of any consequence.

These are Privacy Act considerations and things of that nature.

REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree to that would be inconsistent with your statutory responsibility.

I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?

GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions that provide that the president can have the final say, normally I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part of the bill that we could find a way to work around.

REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside the government to do the exact same function for your agency?

GATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to examine all of the documents that we decided could not be declassified, and then provide a report to the American people on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld documents had a bearing on the assassination.

They would not make the decision to declassify.

REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition violate the Privacy Act? } Q.

GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.] A.

REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've touched on some very important areas.

There are just two related considerations that I'd like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I bring it to your attention for your future consideration.

And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter to your attention as well.] HRG Note

GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us today.

GATES: Thank you, sir.

END GATES TESTIMONY

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (third and final add)
May 15, 1992
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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

January 30, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
2185 Rayburn House Office Building
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report, as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R. 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until September 30, 1998.

At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately 3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly 5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in the coming months.

The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner.

Since our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000 pages of records from the FBI's HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is completed in a timely manner.

As I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.

I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board's federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.

Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

file

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Statement for
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on S. 712

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee -- I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim, Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassification will be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.

I applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to reduce government secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of government secrecy has been the widely held belief that the government has known much more about the assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help alleviate the suspicion of government -- some of it being justifiable suspicion -- that has festered since the assassination of President Kennedy.

Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, I will focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial classification.

I. Background

Although the word "unique" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) ("JFK Act"), the Review Board has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments, including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and the National Security Council.

Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board deliberates and makes "formal determinations" as to whether the records should be opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately involved approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable lessons that may be of use to you as you consider S. 712.

II. The "Four Noble Truths" of Declassification

In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the "Four Noble Truths" of declassification:

first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final decision maker on declassification;

second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed, and skeptical;

third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal institutional incentives to declassify information; and

fourth, the key to successful declassification is *not* the articulation of the

List of Exhibits
Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn

Exhibit A.
Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.

This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.

Exhibit B.
Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security.

This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained foreign government information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of the information. In December 1995, the document was released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.

Exhibit C.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.

The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Exhibit D.
(a) Vietnam January-August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3. pp. 265-270.

(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii.

In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign Relations of the United States)* and part (b) includes the title pages of the full 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRB declassification session in July 1997.

Exhibit E.
Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.

The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. This document is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. The attached form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety. It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote.

Exhibit F.
NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.

The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was released with sanitizations by Board vote.

Exhibit G.
Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject: Assassination of Castro.

This document from the files of the National Security Council was originally classified "Secret" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.

categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release.

Because these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony.

During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets.

In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would "certi[fy] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States . . . ." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny.

Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that covered other topics. Finally, an official said: "I don't see why it can't be released. This is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.] Someone ask COMMO whether it cares." COMMO was subsequently asked -- and it had no objection to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.

Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service, the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently voted to open the record.

Illustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J. Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.

Illustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily redacted but provocative document pertaining to an FBI "Internal Security" inquiry into Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the information, arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign government and that the government had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and the record is now open in full.

Illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been "excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification." The Review Board staff arranged for a group of declassifiers from several military and other national-security entities to meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being completely closed to completely open.

Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign*

Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997.

Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety.

Illustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released.

Illustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally classified "Secret" and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board.

I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK Act, agencies have little internal or external incentive to take an energetic approach to declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: *once agencies come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith with the requirements established by Congress.*

III. The Mechanics of Declassification

Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification.

First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.

The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.

The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically *assumed* that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed.

Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to "direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . ." JFK Act, § 7(j)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate, and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work.

Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.

Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons learned by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.

When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it.

IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective

With regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:

First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.

Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that is essential for completing its work.

Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (*e.g.*, between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.

Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere "detailed justifications" (*see, e.g.*, S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be *more than* "justifications," they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing.

Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.

Finally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the "sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.

* * * *

I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.

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*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978, ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance from the National Security Council.

Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions; (5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and (8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.

On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.

Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:

- In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.
- Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.
- Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.
- The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more

than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency decisions to keep those same documents classified.

- Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have decreased to historic lows.
- Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased threat to our national security.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner, timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after conversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with foreign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws, and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.

These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy.

I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.

However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712.

F.A.S.

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Statement
of
Steven Aftergood
Director, Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists

before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Hearing on
S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act

March 25, 1998

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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy.

I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.

At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.

A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate **balance** between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy.

Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets.

My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest.

In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act.

BACKGROUND

I would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.

1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.

One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.

Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET."[1]

In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest."

Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues-- the JFK assassination, POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.

2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.

Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection.

This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned-- within the executive branch itself-- by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives:

> We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, *in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....*[2]

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[1] Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of secrecy" for technology with military applications. *"Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996"* by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>.

[2] Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>.

The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can.

The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, "The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible."[3] If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.

Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.

Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area.

3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.

The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has *exclusive* authority to do so.[4]

The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.

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[3] Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy ("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.

[4] "Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997.

There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:

> Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.[5]

The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that:

> Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures-- subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.[6]

And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring

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[5] Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff.

[6] 410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret."

disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.[7]

Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"[8]; S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg[9]; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act."[10] Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills-- as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself-- would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.

In short, while the executive branch is entitled to *advise* Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.

4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.

A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.

In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results.

Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.[11]

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[7] See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.

[8] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>.

[9] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>.

[10] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.

[11] 1996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html>.

So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm." Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy-- and then building on it.

THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997

The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations-- a "balancing test" and a National Declassification Center-- are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.

1. The balancing test and judicial review.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information, it shall not be classified.

From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision.

In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)

This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement *per se*, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.

This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been "properly" classified.[12] Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.

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[12] See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.

To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not *sufficiently* diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.[13]

The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are *in need of* the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:

> the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied *not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.*[14]

Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification.

Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test.

I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge "barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and *pro bono* assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.

The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most appropriate solution.[15]

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[13] "National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement," Boston College Law Review **25**: 611-643 (1984).

[14] Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, emphasis added.

2. A National Declassification Center

The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link."[16]

As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:

- The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.

- The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process.

Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously."

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[15] The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in *Security Classification of Information*, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process-- such as "beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the evidence"-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).

[16] Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.

The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,

> When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP's staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.[17]

Therefore, one straightforward "fix" that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the "missing link" of executive branch oversight.

But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:

> Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.[18]

3. What About the "Other" Classification System?

If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system-- we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.

The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system.

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[17] Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.

[18] Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.

Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer,

> information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, *there appears to be no system in place to get this information declassified*, even though the Departments involved-- Energy, Defense, and State-- acknowledge that it is innocuous.[19]

The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act's goal of "a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures."

Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one.

CONCLUSION

Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.

It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of "checks and balances."

By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information.

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[19] Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.

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H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

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HON. DAN BURTON

in the House of Representatives

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997

- Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992--Public Law 102-526--to provide 1 additional year for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. This legislation would extend the **Review Board** 's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable **Henry Waxman,** the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable **Louis Stokes,** who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553.

- The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release **records** relating to the Kennedy **assassination** at the earliest possible date. The **Assassination Records Review Board** was set up to **review** and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** have all held **assassination records** , and **records** have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of **records** compiled by official investigations of the **assassination** had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy **assassination** , and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the **Review Board** to presume that documents relating to the **assassination** should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.

- As a result of the **Review Board** 's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and **Records** Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The **Review Board** was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy **assassination**.

- The President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of **Board** members, and as a consequence the **Review Board** was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The **Review Board** subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the **review** process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the **Review Board** 's authorization.

- I support the **Assassination Records Review Board** 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The **Review Board** has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998.

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TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

on

S.J. Res. 282

"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAY 12, 1992

STATEMENT OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.S. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records?

There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records.

As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion about the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FOIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.

There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branch. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing program, CIA officials advised that the relevant program file had been destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which provided additional information about the scope of this program. During the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times, distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official Oliver North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting and authorizing "black bag jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative" matters in which case [illegible] was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from "sources illegal in nature" or from "most secretive" sources such as "Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters for reporting "facts and information " which could "cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distribut d." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos were to be maintained in "office files" of senior FBI officials (and were to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FBI headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any agency outside the Bureau."

S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all relevant Kennedy assassination records and how and where they might have been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review Board "all assassination materials" even if "uncertain if a record is assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to "inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that the Review Board "subpoena such records in the event of denial." Properly placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency's records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading of cross references in the "available" documents.

Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure, the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold categories of information when releasing FOIA-requested documents. Particularly during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to individuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination. Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984 totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but, at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure."

My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover, is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.

In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately 6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right to appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately 2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this time I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that much of the withheld information was already in the public domain and further that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory information on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent personalities the question of what use had been made of this information required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in 1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including information formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.

The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985. When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release would reveal FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach in 1966 and the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's "clear and convincing" standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World Report which devoted its "1984" issue of December 1983 to summarizing the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989, if not 1985, FBI officials were no longer williug to risk FOIA litigation challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.

My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders, notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a "contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in 1963 and then from the Warren Commission in 1964? The answers to these questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well as other FBI memos recording how the FBI dealt with these transcripts. My experience involving how the FBI has processed my requests for other FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be so redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which distinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff, and lawyers.

This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington, D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas Corcoran, and Washington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested in Grunewald's activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration, became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941 wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix B) either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departments' failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.

The heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were heavily redacted--the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)

I have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the "culture" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountability. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.

While I doubt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy," I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret

Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities" information.

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TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

May 12, 1992

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.

The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation.

We have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA

Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.

Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject.

Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.

The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not.

But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions.

As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.

This is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling.

What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board.

It may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution.

I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive, and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files.

Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the year 2029.

To date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century.

The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure.

In addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present.

In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest.

Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.

The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.

We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations.

The Justice Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654

(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct.

If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations.

Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review Board to obtain any additional records.

The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the Government, would undertake the initial screening of these records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this manner, many records could be promptly released without formal Review Board deliberations.

If the Executive Director determined that a particular record was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she would automatically be required to refer that decision to the Review Board.

The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further investigation, to the Review Board.

In deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.

The Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress.

Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.

Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying.

Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.

Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change.

With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information.

The whole point of this legislation was to create new criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence of the American people.

It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man" defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with solving the problem.

I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If Congress wants to release information it has developed, the President should not be able to stand in the way.

Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.

Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee.

1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy...." But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.

The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early 1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full review is probably appropriate.

I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the Review Board to do so promptly after it is established. Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the various records agencies and committees as to what documents should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.

2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or committee control over release of a record it originated even if that record contained information obtained from another agency or committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give agencies authority over release of their own information. However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a lengthy congressional report, may contain both information

developed by the body that created the record and information originated by an executive agency. Instead of letting either of these two "originating bodies" have veto power over the release of an entire document, we should work out language that give an agency or committee control over release of that portion of a document for which it was responsible even if other information in the document was originated elsewhere.

3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased government openness should not itself establish an exception from general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe, however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.

5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are released instead of actual records or information: "Any such

summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public."

6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution.

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure.

Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,

May 12, 1992

Ernest R. May

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

It is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill. I am a professor of history at Harvard University, where I teach both in the history department and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. While I have done research on the history of intelligence agencies and have served in Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak as an expert on the matter before the committee. My comments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation designed to unearth historical source material.

The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts about President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission had the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the public. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost within months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists.

Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this particular set of theories has found new life. Two books of this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992, and Oliver Stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit.

The bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of the people in their government."

To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.)

The bill says that members of the Board are to be "distinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder.

The Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance.

The Board's decisions are to be final unless the President himself intervenes to insist that some piece of information not be released. The bill giving the Board its powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial decision ..., or common law doctrine" that might be in conflict.

My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I question whether any legislation can achieve all that this bill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected, with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.

The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a story that all Americans will accept. Why should it? Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven. One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!

Despite more than a century of research, new theories still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be true for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so, however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large.

The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret.

In fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?

Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to leave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of "smoking guns"?

The Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind.

Some material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?

The Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson!

I forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing.

I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow.

If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a "whitewash." The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed.

There may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released.

An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or degree" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill -- agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc.

Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office.

This alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release — their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for nondisclosure, and plans for eventual release.

A Review Board could be created with a limited — and more workable — mandate.

Its first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.

The Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used.

The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.

In a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.

Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the

American Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate.

Unless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.

I believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs.

This alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of criteria for disclosure and non-disclosure.

Since the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be applied much more widely. A statute could declare that all government records more than thirty years old would become public unless the originating agency showed specific cause for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could have authority to review all such materials and to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates practice in the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting any legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to the trust of the people in their government." Inventors of conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than assemblers of evidence. The immediate result of releasing records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the theorists' mills. Even if everything were released tomorrow, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evidence that suited them. In the long run, release of documents will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed, that long run probably stretches beyond any of our lifetimes.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR

PRESIDENT

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER

ON

S.J. RES. 282

"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

May 12, 1992

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you on the legislation to require the government to release its records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center ("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation, and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.

I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have also read the letter which you received from the Department of Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically altering the standards for classifying information in the interests of national security.

The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive order on national security classification. If you support release of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.

A few illustrations from my practice will show the inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay, costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government. Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of information, with little significant information being released.

Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the results of the spectrographic tests which had been conducted on bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court, relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not in the national interest to release the results of these scientific tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA "forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.

In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests, including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request, the legal battles lasted fourteen years.

Case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release all of the records it had made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request. I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.

By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents. Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus, he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that previously had been released, or documents that were heavily redacted.

Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969 investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed, Hoch received such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-year period. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed, evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a hundred documents that month.

A few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court, the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a considerable volume of materials, mostly on grounds of national security or because disclosure allegedly would identify intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.

Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg submitted a new request for King assassination records. He specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.

During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an

FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When finally located, most of the file had been gutted.

Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted 15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

These stories that I have related are unusual only because the requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their FOIA requests against these agencies. You might be tempted to conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.

Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the National Security Agency.

I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any "smoking gun," which will "solve the case." Rather, this legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The American people want to know the details of their history, however painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.

The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses. I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes. To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release of information. The standards for postponement are critical because they determine the amount of material which may be withheld.

Before discussing the limitations on the term "assassination material" as related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy. Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a movie has been made about them, there is no justification for excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.

The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in "willful and corrupt misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence, engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's assassination should also be included in this legislation.

The term "assassination material" is broadly defined, but it falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the documents which they need in order to properly study the subject. It should include policy documents which provide the context of decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all documents obtained or created by any previous official investigation. It should include materials on those persons who have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its investigations. Finally, it should also include information records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant to the study of the assassination.

The current provision defining assassination materials contains an exemption for "personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren Commission records on this subject have been publicly available through the National Archives for many years and should not now be made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath, others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or executive branch commission or committee.

This provision would also be used to prohibit release of information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis T. Blahut, surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally. According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too. Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully available to the public.

A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official" investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent materials if the panel does not include experienced and knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.

A third and critically important area that needs refinement is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term "intelligence source" and the term "intelligence method." Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official acknowledgement, and sources who are willing to have their identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term "confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known to other hostile intelligence services.

New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air, it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to increase.

I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.

ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

on S. J. Res. 282

Sec. 3. Definitions

(2) "Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material" includes any material which any member of the Assassination Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOIA"), can plausibly contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its investigations.

The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of the Government. . . . " This language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.

The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created right of legal action by family members rather than denial or public access.

Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board

(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to serve as members of the Review Board."

Query: Is this language designed to exclude private citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only those persons who participated in official investigations or inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not likely to inspire trust.

Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."

This must be qualified. It should only apply to living, covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government. . . ."

This provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such "intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement agencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them. Research in a public library is an "intelligence method," and it, too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency thereof, it should be released.

"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it applies only to methods that are unknown to the public or to foreign intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its release would (C) reveal "any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States; and the threat to the military defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure.

The chief problem with this provision is that there is no standard for what constitutes a "public interest" of sufficient moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the substantive content of the material at issue be shown?

Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure."

This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies "whether the person is identified in the material or not." This phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption 6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely to have profound adverse impact on an individual.

Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent and a witness or a foreign government. . . ."

This provision needs to be amended to include only those promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign government--made in writing. Among the reasons for this are the fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own desire for secrecy.

This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a requirement that the foreign government officially object to each such disclosure in writing.

Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or in the legislative history, that it is not a "substantial and unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness can be concealed.

Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board

Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than litigation under the FOIA.

Subsection (h)(2) provides that the President may certify that material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to section 6, in which case release of the material shall be postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial review."

There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion of the President's term which remains.

Section 11. Rules of Construction

Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.

One problem here is that transferring all agency records to the Review Board may mean that they are no longer "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA."

A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.

A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA.

Additional Notes

It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller Commission as subject to the Act.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Judge John R. Tunheim
Chairman
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Testimony In Support of H.R. 1553, To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board until September 30, 1998.

Before the
National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee

June 4, 1997

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history, and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.

Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff, Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr. William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in

Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee and answer any of your questions.

I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local governments that were not previously available to the American public. I believe that we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.

II. Accomplishments to Date

As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States.

By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30 different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted information will have been made public by the Review Board.

III. Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination

Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has made public. They include:

* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's investigative activities following the assassination;

* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, including the controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City;

* Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and

* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most graphically demonstrated by showing you the "before" and "after" versions of one of the pre-assassination FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document (JFK Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, "October 12, 1960," that it was to the "Director, FBI," from "Legat, Paris" (the FBI representative in Paris), that the subject was "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security," and that it had to do with a "Paris letter 9/27/60." The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the provocative subject title.

The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state, the document could have meant anything that a researcher's imagination and speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.

IV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records

One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline, much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this responsibility.

I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional assassination records. Some examples:

- Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence. As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.

- Identification and Location of Additional FBI Records and Information. The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested information.

- Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information. The Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.

* Identification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and Information. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than 1,500 pages of material.

* Identification and Location of Additional Military Records and Information. The Department of Defense (including its many components and the military services) (collectively "DOD"), identified few assassination records on its own initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located, DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.

  Additional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFK Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage for accomplishing this task.

V. Release of Private and Local Records

In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files, and consistent with the Board's mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local governments, including:

* The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;

* Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the assassination;

* The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969 against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

* Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, including records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;

- Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and

- Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney Frank Ragano, as well as others.

I am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this particular chapter of the assassination story.

All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the National Archives, they will be available for research.

VI. The Need For Additional Time

Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:

- First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we have taken in fulfilling our mandate.

- Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact, many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking their compliance.

- Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.

We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job we began, and with one additional year we can.

VII. The Job Ahead

The additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year on the following:

- CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the Oswald "201 file," the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the agency's "Sequestered Collection," the large collection of files that was assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's. These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others cannot be identified.

- FBI Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two general categories. The first is the "Core and Related Files," consisting of nearly 600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its "HSCA records," is a large collection of records that were identified as being of interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the

CIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately 280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.

- The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees. Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies, including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee.

- Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.

- Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American public that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully documented in the final report.

It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an additional year.

VIII. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records

It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task. However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.

Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-consuming early phase.

At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed postponements can be released through a "consent" process. In this consent process, the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the release of the information.

In our review of the FBI's "Core and Related Files" and the CIA's "Oswald 201 File," the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?

In considering our review of the CIA and FBI "Sequestered Collections," the Board recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board's attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996 Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or "NBR"). Applying these new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant remaining records in order of priority.

These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word. These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

The fruits of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our task can be completed.

IX. Conclusion

In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that our recommendation is motivated strictly by our desire to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.

I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our final report.

Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the assassination.

I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:

> "In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect

upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination."

These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.

The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for a confident conclusion of this important task.

sion of this important task.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional information that may be required. Thank you.

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HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION
CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)
2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today, also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October 26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September 30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the statute to continue operating for one additional year.

The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total accountability to the people of this country.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to welcome
my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this area.

Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the government about that assassination.

The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access to government information. That legislation was necessary because administration after administration had failed to release documents. That should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting with our government to allow public access to government documents.

Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more.

I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished.

It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in that process, but there is much more work to be done.

Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement? If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976 to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.

And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.

REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr. Turner, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20 years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two days of public policy hearings.

Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released, would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these sealed files.

As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in keeping with the memory of this great president.

Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL 102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every agency, every court record, anywhere they existed -- that those records be released to the American people.

Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus an additional year, at the board's discretion.

We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by the Congress -- a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff, Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding executive director, David Marwell.

Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret government documents.

They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive amount of work in which they have been involved.

They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people, that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the original co-sponsors.

I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman -- or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually, three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly now?

REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one additional year that they will complete the work.

REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals of your original legislation in 1992?

REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.

REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that -- in projecting the fact that they can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.

REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you, Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?

REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort. And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the assassination of our president.

However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things. For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before we went out of existence.

And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.

REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.
The gentleman from Ohio.
REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on 1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman, and also to Congressman Stokes.
The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have, and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland, here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and this country.
Just as an example, the other day I found out -- and I don't know if you're a

lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes -- well, you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.

I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that, and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his expertise with the country.

Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony, and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public polls. And you still run into people -- as I'm sure -- I still run into people that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in Dallas.

And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait 34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some of those rumors?

REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks. But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not -- when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that one also.

But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought things to the head.

REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the Assassination Records Collection Act -- obviously, now we collect records differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy -- God forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?

REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons. Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and that will help us, I think, tremendously.

But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in their testimony -- for instance, there's a very interesting document that they will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and the name of a country -- everything was redacted. And under their work, that whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.

What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind of rumors and myths that grow up around it.

And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future -- which all of us hope would never occur -- that our agencies will realize that this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct this type of thing.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise --

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. LATOURETTE: -- and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you.

And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of service and your contributions to this body.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other issues to which you've contributed.

And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.

Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives. We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.

And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time. So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and -- (witnesses are sworn in). Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.

JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.

I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy.

The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing this hearing today and assisting in this effort.

One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.

The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995, pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material.

I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version, the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60. And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly, a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The speculation that individuals had about this was great.

Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president. Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.

And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was, indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information that has long been redacted from the public.

The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have

been released.
The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens and local governments. Just a couple of examples:
The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission, have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released.
And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st, 1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.

Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and at the FBI -- records sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you and the members have.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the testimony.

MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?

STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf -- for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.

I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be brief in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives. Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.

When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.

The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review board.

NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's authorization.

The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the assassination of President Kennedy.

I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately 3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.

For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI records.

Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by private entities are also available in the collection.

This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their own personal computer through the Internet.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30 percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.

Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size, quality or public demand witnessed today.

However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this important work can be completed.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Holland?

MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.

Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was Lincoln Murdered?" Eisenschiml claimed one of the most important events in American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.

When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.

Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least, they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.
I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made; in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board

had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ever created by the federal government.

These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries, compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance, simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and manage to do the right thing.

Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources. The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources and methods.

With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.

The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods. While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during the Cold War.

Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board, serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.

And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this afternoon.

You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to your testimony.

BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the record and I will briefly summarize.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.

My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education. My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history, American government, and international relations.

And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only as a citizen, but as an educator.

In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional research.

From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work, it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged. What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists, in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the government.

In his recent book, "The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception of events that is crucial."

Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be assembled?

It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in some small way -- or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK assassination means.

We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56 students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.

The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the public and students can relate. It touches people.

As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project. Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering 500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.

The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination.
I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not

Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and truly educational opportunity.

I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for students.

In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively involved in learning.

Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still and could not be fully appreciated.

An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?

After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford to miss.

In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said, we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.

Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year -- they could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any information in here that you find particularly interesting?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he played in the trial.

We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted him.

REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was so difficult to get this information?

MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be. Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take from people, so we have to find where they are.

Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw, and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was developed.

REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose now and which just have to wait?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the material.

The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly. Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there personal privacy considerations that are involved.

I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board made on earlier records.

REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination.

Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record. The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some continuing national security concern.

So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how many more records need to be reviewed?

MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.

Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up the records they've located.

So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the collection before this process is finished.

REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?

MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and years ahead.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board. He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially, encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.

REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin reviewing the CIA and FBI records?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a million pages of records.

What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.

In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next year, if we get the extension.

REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?

MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next year.

We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long time. We need to get the information to the American public.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that folks like yourself can have the availability for students?

MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for the government.

I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk, nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.

It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university, students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American citizens.

I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that your learned demeanor was that of a --

REP. HASTERT: Not at all.

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm glad you brought that up.

Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part of a conspiracy.

When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall semester of 1960 and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all. The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI originally appealed the decision to not--or to withdraw the redaction of this particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.

Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be appropriately publicly released?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer -- the question is, no, we're not receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process going for one additional year.

The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite well.

The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no. Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important materials.

REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should another review board setting be required in the future to review another situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the release of documents in the future?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency, to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed. There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time simply to trust the American people with access to important information about their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this process. It's a process that, while time- consuming, has worked very well for this set of records.

REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left behind for future such endeavors?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have -- virtually all of our work has been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas if the Congress so wishes.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. : Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland; were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before this commission existed, before these documents came out?
MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know, credible is in the eye of the beholder.
But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you have to -- it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did. Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about -- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been missing all this time.
REP. : So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than any questions they had remaining about the assassination.
MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being an investigation of three crimes -- the murder of President Kennedy, the assault on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding mandate.
But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with

entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great -- and the FBI had not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time. And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.

REP. : One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point. In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think, can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's still some -- can we accelerate the process?

What have we learned from this as to -- obviously this is one that particularly anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so, presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.

MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to release any of that information.

I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen approach of the past.

REP. : We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank. And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations. That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this will have silenced most critics?

MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps provoke others.

We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I think that will be a very significant development.

Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing. We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found.

REP. : I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the status of that?

MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this collection.

Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So, therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to the American public.

We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for --

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one more question, if I may.

Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be, it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by this legislation?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time. It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to completing the review of the records on a timely basis.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.

REP. : I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing -- the hearing is adjourned -- and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.

If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in favor say "Aye."

MEMBERS: Aye.

REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full

committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work.
~END~

RELEASE IN FULL
2000

24 November, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. The JFK Act

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.

For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required docmentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

II. The Process

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be

released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

III The Requests

(being drafted)

Attachment I. [incomplete draft attached]

Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DRAFT

12 December, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. Background (1992-1995)

The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation:

- testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA`s new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file).

- six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:

- it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals;

- established "a presumption of immediate disclosure" for records relating to the assassination.

For first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records:

* there were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994)of approximately 227,000 pages;

* joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefellow Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.).

Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents:

* approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions

* resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.

II. The JFK Act and the ARRB

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

III. The Process and Lessons Learned

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

(see attached draft)

Attachment I. Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

9: lrg - hrp
"reg. doc"

DRAFT: Section ~~III~~ IV, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically:

> ...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, including authority to --
>
> * * *
>
> (C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities;
>
> * * *
>
> (F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

This substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.

2. Categories of Requests:

Although each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows:

a. Requests for **access** to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over ___ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports.

b. Requests about **methodologies** which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc.

c. Requests for **subject specific** matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film.

d. Requests for **project specific** information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.

e. Requests for **individual specific** information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular "George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley.

3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s).

4~~3~~. The Agency's written responses to each request - either a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project.

5~~4~~. Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.

a. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project.

b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons -- a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer, who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.

c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/redaction/denial of materials.

ATTACHMENT #1

CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION

Oswald Files

Pre-assassination "201" file --approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.

DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA).

The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB . Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.

Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998.

DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.

Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999.

The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

The Sequestered Collection

At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff.

JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997.

JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file.

DCI Morning Meeting Minutes

This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.

Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)

Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection . He continued in this role until 1992.

As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999.

LA Division JFK Task Force Files

The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ##### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

New assassination Records -- "M" [Miscellaneous] Series

The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and Records" (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,.



JFK Assassination Records Collection Act

- Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended
- Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases"
- Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.
- Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.
- Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board's requests.
- Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.
- "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which:

Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates)

Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.

Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.

Prepared CIA's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.

Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.

The Board's report of 30 September 1998 states that "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

JFK Act -- Process

- Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.
- Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper.
- Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times).
- Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments.
- Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up.
- Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.

Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.

The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose.

When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.



JFK Lessons Learned

- Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
  - Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important
  - Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
  - Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned
- Structure and Planning
  - Good Communications with Oversight Body
  - Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
  - Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
    - Guidelines (flexible),
    - Deadlines (reasonable),
    - Responsibilities
  - Understanding of Final Product Desired:
    - Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
- Support of Senior Management

8

- Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :
  - Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.
  - Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.
  - Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
  - Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs.
  - Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs f~~or which we had no~~ that did not have the benefit of a legal mandate.
- Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:
  - We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
  - We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material.
  - We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there.
  - We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
- We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

13-00000

~~SECRET~~

OIM 99-0281
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assignments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management.

2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management - unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy.

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of "official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation.

4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.

Charles A Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

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OIM 99-0282
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK declassification law on Agency resources and information release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the "openness philosophy" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey through a series of "Cold War Declassification" projects. He noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification of the JFK collection; however, he said, "with the end of the JFK activity in sight," resources could be applied to the other projects. Six years later (actually seven since the project got underway), we are almost finished.

2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative, trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act, the DCI's authorities, as well as Executive Orders and Regulations.[1] The Act presumed release. It did allow for appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed "postponements" but only if clear and convincing evidence was presented for each requested postponement and that release would demonstrably impair the national security. The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos, methods, station locations (within specified dates), file identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had

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[1] See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B)

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

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learned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) "Standards For Review" and "Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act," with examples).

3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made.

4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA's JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.

SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION

5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the "Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents made available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called "The Holmes Collection" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called "Miscellaneous," including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI

"Dailies." Box 64 of the "Segregated Collection" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on.

6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.

7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable.

THE REVIEW PROCESS

8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.

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9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn't have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald's trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain.

10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teltaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald's trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald's presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station's unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teltap and photo operations.

11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the "postponements") occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn't. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998:

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> "A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions."

12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to the approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board.

THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE

13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie "JFK," reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant - hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning.

14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban

exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JMWAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released.

15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded "truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination" were designated "not believed relevant" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR.

INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS

16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.

17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be

released in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name.

IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS

18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods.

19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below.

20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:

- Don't cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents.

- Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team.

- Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents

- Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations.

- Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees.

- Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.

- Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity.

21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures.

22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing "the need to rationalize the classification process." A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make "significant historical information available without

damage to national security." Subsequently, a central management focal point was established in the Office of Information Management and a system that addresses part of the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification "metrics" (millions of pages of released documents), modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA is reneging on "openness."

23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for information, we were able to make case law in the courts and protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the "no comment" of the 1950s and the "answer the question only as asked" of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the government declassification arena is a very clear signal.

24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly, in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the Executive Director with "corporate" Agency focused guidance to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the credibility and resource impact levels, they should be supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.

25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer, Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO team, without whom this exercise could not have been completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an individual or group is between a rock and a hard place, as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO, and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having

been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as "the enemy." That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing.

26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling.

27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breech. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law.

28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.

Charles A. Briggs

Attachments:
- A. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards)
- B. OGC Memorandum
- C. Foreign Government Information

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

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closure-oriented than President Reagan's order. The current Executive Order applies to all Executive branch records and, unlike the JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives agencies five years—until April 2000—to declassify all *classified* information that is (1) more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the "agency head" determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated harms. The Executive Order provides for continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, *inter alia,* information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans that are still in effect, and protection of the President.[8]

We need to separate sources from methods. This could be the most lasting effect of the Board.
—Steven Garfinkle, April 14, 1998

The JFK Act guidelines that governed the disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were detailed in section 6 of the JFK Act.[9] The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone the release of assassination records only where the agencies provided clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated harms would occur if the Review Board released the record *and* that the harm outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The statute allowed protection of intelligence agents and intelligence sources and methods if the agency could show that the agent, source, or method currently required protection. The statute further allowed the Board to protect the identity of living persons who provided confidential information to the government if the agency could show that disclosure of the person's identity would pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone release of information if release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or if release would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK Act allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of government officials.

2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act

In considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the House and the Senate concluded that the FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to guarantee adequate public disclosure of assassination records.

At the time that the JFK Act became law, the largest collections of records concerning the assassination were under the control of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of these entities, and thus could not serve as the mechanism for maximum disclosure of assassination records. *First,* the FOIA exempts CIA operational files from disclosure.[10] *Second,* the FOIA provides broad-based protection for law enforcement files and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.[11] *Third,* the FOIA does not apply to unpublished Congressional records.[12] Congress found that the FOIA did not require adequate disclosure in those records that it *did* cover. Thus, Congress believed that the FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for guaranteeing disclosure of assassination records.[13]

President Clinton did not sign Executive Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two years after Congress passed the JFK Act. Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order applied to most assassination records since they were of permanent historical value *and* were over 25 years old. Even if President Clinton's Executive Order had been in effect prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the maximum disclosure accomplished by the JFK Act. The problem with the Executive Order is that it allowed "agency heads" to make the decision to exempt records from automatic declassification provided that the "agency head" expected that disclosure of the records would result in one of the nine enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review

Board found that "agency heads" tended to be quite reluctant to release their agencies' secrets. The Executive Order, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of "agency heads'" decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order's standards for declassification appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads accountable for their decisionmaking.

The JFK Act did require agencies to account for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: *first*, the JFK Act presumed that assassination records may be released; *second*, the JFK Act stated that an agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, *with clear and convincing evidence*, that disclosure would result in harm and that the expected harm would outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; *third*, the JFK Act created an *independent* agency—the Review Board—whose mandate was to ensure that agencies respected the presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the need to protect information; and *fourth*, the JFK Act required agencies to provide the Review Board with *access* to government records, even when those records would not become part of the JFK Collection. Without these accountability provisions, the JFK Act would not have accomplished its objective of maximum release of assassination records to the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act ensured that the goal would be met. The two accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—the presumption of release and the standard of proof—are discussed in detail below. The third provision discussed below is the Review Board's obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release.

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records.

The most pertinent language of the JFK Act was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, "all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a *presumption of immediate disclosure.*"[14] The statute further declared that *"only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records."*[15]

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence.

If agencies wished to withhold information in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the narrow postponement criteria.[16]

Congress selected the clear and convincing evidence standard because "less exacting standards, such as substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, were not consistent with the legislation's stated goal" of prompt and full release.[17] The legislative history of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.
—Senator John Glenn,
May 12, 1992

> There is no justification for perpetual secrecy for any class of records. ***Nor can the withholding of any individual record be justified on the basis of general confidentiality concerns applicable to an entire class.*** Every record must be judged on its own merits, and every record will ultimately be made available for public disclosure.[18]

When agencies did present to the Review Board evidence of harm that would result from disclosure, it had to consist of more than speculation.

> The [Review] Board cannot postpone release because it might cause some *conceivable or speculative harm* to national security. Rather in a democracy the *demonstrable harm* from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of release of the information to the public.[19]

The Review Board's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is covered in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

Section B includes a discussion of the "Rule of Reason" that the Review Board ultimately adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies.

c. *JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release.*

Assuming that agencies did provide clear and convincing evidence that information should be protected from disclosure, the terms of section 6 required that information not be postponed unless the threat of harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, "public interest" means "the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy."[20] The Review Board interpreted the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence of the threat of harm that would result from disclosure. However, to the extent that the JFK Act left room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review Board—not the agency that originated the document—that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review Board as a panel of independent citizens with expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in such determinations.[21]

d. *Segregability and substitute language.*

When the Review Board determined that the risk of harm *did* outweigh the public interest in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency redacted the least amount of information possible to avoid the stated harm, or "segregate" the postponed information, and (2) provide substitute language to take the place of the redaction.

3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them.

The JFK Act defines "assassination records" to include records related to the assassination of President Kennedy that were "created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of" the following groups: the Warren Commission, the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the federal government, and any state or local law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination.[22]

When it passed the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Collection to include the record groups that it identified in section 3(2), but it also intended for the Review Board to consider carefully the scope of the term "assassination record" and to issue an interpretive regulation defining this crucial term.[23] The Act requires government agencies to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of this report explains how the Review Board interpreted its responsibility to define and seek out "additional records and information." Set forth below is a description of some of the core government holdings on the assassination which were released under the standards of the Review Board.

a. *The FBI's "core and related" files.*

The FBI's "core and related" files consist of those records that the FBI gathered in response to FOIA requests that it received in the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The "core" files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI's Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination investigation file. The "related" files include FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald's wife Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald's friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the Oswalds' Dallas friends Ruth and Michael Paine. The FBI began its processing of the core and related files in 1993. The Review Board applied strict standards to its review of postponements in the core and related files.

b. CIA's Lee Harvey Oswald "201" file.

CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it has an "operational interest" in that person. The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald in December 1960 when it received a request from the Department of State on defectors. After President Kennedy's assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created during CIA's wide-ranging investigation of the assassination. Thus, the file provides the most complete record of the CIA's inquiry in the months and years immediately following the assassination.

c. The FBI's "House Select Committee on Assassinations"(HSCA) Subject Files.

During the HSCA's tenure, the Committee made a number of requests to the FBI for records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA's requests, the FBI made available to the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of the "HSCA Subject" files in 1993. The Review Board applied its "Segregated Collection" guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA subject files.

d. The CIA's "Segregated Collection" files.

HSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA's work, the CIA kept separate the files that it had made available to the HSCA and retained them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper records available to the HSCA staff. The paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various files. The 64th box of the CIA's segregated collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, cover an agent's entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assassination story.

e. FBI records on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination.

The JFK Act defined "assassination record" to include records relating to the Kennedy assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events surrounding the assassination.[24]

Before President Clinton appointed the Review Board, the FBI collected and began to process its administrative files relating to its involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the Bureau's administrative files related to topics other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records in these files that concerned topics other than the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or "NBR" as that acronym is defined *infra*) and removed them from further consideration.

f. Requests for Additional Information.

Congress included in the JFK Act a provision that allowed the Review Board to obtain additional information and records beyond those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains the requests that the Review Board made and the assassination records designated as a result of those requests.

B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

The Review Board's primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to determine whether an agency's request for postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an introductory clause, which established the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, and five subsections that set forth the criteria under which the Review Board could agree to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information.

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text of Section 6

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records *to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] clear and convincing evidence that [the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest in release.]*

a. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires an agency to submit "clear and convincing evidence" that one of the specified grounds for postponement exists.[25] The Review Board required agencies to submit specific facts in support of each postponement, according to the Review Board's guidelines for each postponement type.

b. Commentary. Although the agencies argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be satisfied by a general explanation of those agencies' positions in support of postponements, the Review Board determined that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was a document-specific one. Thus, the Board required agencies to present evidence that was tailored to individual postponements within individual documents.

> *I think today a great gulf exists between people and their elected officials. Doubts about this particular matter are a symptom of that, and so I think the purpose of this hearing is to ask some questions. Why does information need to be withheld? At this moment in time, what compelling interests are there for the holding back of information? Are there legitimate needs in this respect? Who and what is being protected? Which individuals, which agencies, which institutions are in the need of protection, and what national security interests still remain?*
> *—Senator William S. Cohen, May 12, 1992*

The JFK Act clearly required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of their postponements, but it did not establish a mechanism for when and how such evidence should be presented. The legislative history provides a clue as to Congress' intent: "[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates an understanding on each side as to the basis and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations."[26] The Review Board did consult with government offices to determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence.

The Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre- assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the Board asked the staff to present the records on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which it intended to vote on the records. The Review Board invited the FBI to present its evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be allowed to brief the members of the Review Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its position to the Board—both in an oral presentation and in a "position paper." The FBI's "position papers" summarized the FBI's general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. Third, the Review Board staff researched existing law on each of the FBI's "positions" and determined that the arguments that the FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Act standards—and not the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected the FBI's general policy preferences on the basis that the arguments did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to support a request for a postponement under section 6. The FBI did appeal the Review Board's decisions to the President, but the Review Board's document-specific interpretation of the clear and convincing evidence standard ultimately prevailed when the vote was withdrawn.

i. "Rule of Reason." Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than others. With regard to records that had a close nexus to the assassination, the Review Board strictly applied the law. For example, the Review Board voted to release in full nearly all of the information in the FBI's pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the bulk of the information in the HSCA's report on CIA activities in Mexico City—the "Lopez" report—because of the high public interest in that material. With regard to the FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review Board's decisions on the pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the Review Board, the White House Counsel's

Office, and ultimately the Department of State spent a substantial amount of time resolving the issues that arose in the appeal process, and for those important records that were at issue, the Review Board considered its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent as much time as was necessary to deliberate and decide upon those records.

The postponement-by-postponement review at each early Review Board meeting proved to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved to be a necessary educational process for the Board members. The Board members were a group of five citizens who were selected not for their familiarity with the subject of the assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through reviewing individual documents at its early meetings, the Board essentially educated itself about the assassination.

While the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the Board's pace eventually increased. In an effort to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA and FBI to work out an approach for review of records that would allow the Review Board to make informed decisions, but not require agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating evidence for and providing briefings on each postponement within an assassination record.

The first step to developing a reasonable approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and denying postponements. The Review Board's "guidance" to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules—a Review Board "common law." Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular type of postponement, the agency learned to present only those facts that the Review Board would need to make a decision. For example, with regard to FBI informants, the Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the Bureau what it considered to be "clear and convincing" evidence. Then, the Review Board worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an "Informant Postponement Evidence Form" that the FBI could use to provide evidence on an informant. (See illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in a particular document. This approach had the added benefit of providing consistency to the Review Board's decisionmaking.

A large number of records that the JFK Act defined as "assassination records" proved to be of very low public interest. The JFK Act required the Review Board to process all records that were "made available" to the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by the Commission or the committees. Many of these records, while interesting from a historian's perspective, are not closely related to the assassination. For those documents that were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways described below.

A. "NBR" Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were "not believed relevant" to the assassination. For those records that truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination, the Review Board designated the records "not believed relevant" (NBR). The "NBR" Guidelines allowed the Review Board to remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board designated "NBR" were virtually the only groups of records that the Review Board agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records "NBR" and rarely did so.

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those records that were not immediately relevant, but shed at least some light on issues that the congressional committees that investigated the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board created the "Segregated Collection Guidelines." The segregated collections records, although marginally relevant, were not appropriate for "NBR" designation, as the "NBR" Guidelines would have resulted in withholding records in full. Instead, the Board passed the "Segregated Collection" Guidelines, which ensured that the Review Board staff would review every page of the marginally relevant records, but would not require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. The regulations that the Review Board adopted on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" to include the following: (1) FBI records that were requested by the HSCA in conjunction with its investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA records including the CIA's segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes of CIA staff "working files." The Review Board adopted revised guidelines on April 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state, "...even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review." Where the Review Board's standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth below note the distinction.

Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review Board sought to be vigorous in applying the law, but, in order to complete its work, found it necessary to employ a "rule of reason."

2. Intelligence Agents

Text of Section 6(1)(A)

> *...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—*
>
> *(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection...*

a. CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board usually protected the names of CIA officers who are still active or who retired under cover and are now living in potentially risky circumstances. The Review Board usually released names of deceased CIA officers and the names of CIA officers whose connection to the CIA was public knowledge. When the Review Board postponed names, it usually substituted the phrase, "CIA Employee."

ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIA officers appeared in the CIA's assassination records. The Review Board and the CIA had to confront the challenge presented by the statute, which requires name-specific evidence, but gathering such evidence proved to be time-consuming and burdensome for the CIA and the names of CIA officers in the records were not always relevant to the assassination. The statute, of course, states that the only way that the Review Board could protect names of intelligence agents was if the CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the CIA officer's identity "currently" required protection.

The CIA initially believed that the solution to the above-referenced challenge was for the Review Board to agree with CIA that the names of all CIA officers within the JFK Collection should be postponed until the year 2017. The CIA supported its request for blanket postponements with two arguments: *first,* since many CIA employees are "under cover," CIA argued that its intelligence gathering capability depended on employees maintaining cover, and, *second,* even though the majority of CIA officer names in the Collection are names of retired CIA employees, CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement to protect the relationship. Many of these former employees objected to release of their former Agency affiliation, complaining that it violates this agreement and suggesting that such release might jeopardize business relationships or threaten personal safety.

Mindful of the JFK Act's requirement that agencies provide name-specific evidence, the Review Board would not agree to CIA's request for blanket postponements of CIA names. Instead, the Review Board requested CIA to provide evidence for each name.

The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce name-specific evidence and, on occasion, CIA failed to furnish evidence when it promised to do so. CIA's initial refusal to supply evidence on individual names was met, not with the wholesale release of names by the Board, but with a firm insistence that the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the process, but gave the Agency a number of additional opportunities to provide specific evidence on other names.

For example, in December 1995, the Review Board designated one day of their meeting "name day," and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had encountered in CIA records during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain the postponement of all CIA names. The Review Board did not want to jeopardize the personal safety of individuals and gave CIA more time to provide evidence. The Board set other "name days" in May 1996 and May 1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA agreed to release some names, but in most cases, continued to offer less than satisfactory evidence on those they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA did begin to provide supporting evidence of the postponement of individual names.

By May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired under cover or abroad, or evidence that the individual objected to the release of his or her name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer's name. Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with CIA, the Review Board would protect the name. Because the JFK Act required the Review Board to balance the potential harm from disclosure against the public interest in release, there were cases in which the Review Board determined that, even though the CIA had provided the required evidence, the Review Board believed that the individual was of sufficiently high public interest that it would require the CIA to provide additional evidence before it would consider protecting the name. In these cases, the Review Board asked CIA to provide information on the employee's current status, his or her location, and the nature of the work he or she did for the CIA.

The Review Board determined that names were of high public interest when the CIA officer at issue had a substantive connection to the assassination story or where the CIA officer's name appeared in CIA's Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had determined that where CIA officer names did not fit within one of the "high public interest" categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of its requests for postponement. Given the large number of CIA officer names in the CIA records, the Review Board determined that it had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources available to complete its own review of CIA records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high level of scrutiny that it used to review names of high public interest. Nevertheless, the Board's approach compelled the CIA to release many more names than it would have desired.

b. "John Scelso" (pseudonym).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso until May 1, 2001 or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever comes first.

ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who was head of CIA's division "Western Hemisphere 3" during the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy testified before the HSCA and the Church Committee under the "throw-away" alias John Scelso. His true name appears on hundreds of documents in the JFK collection, many of which were the product of the Agency's extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing this particular name, the Review Board's desire to satisfy the public's interest in release

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clashed with the CIA's strong evidence in support of postponement. Initially, the Board was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but the Agency argued convincingly against release. CIA provided evidence on the current status of the individual, shared correspondence sent by him, and even arranged an interview between him and a Review Board staff member. As an interim step, the Review Board inserted his prior alias "Scelso" as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release "Scelso's" true name in five years or upon his death.



CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

57

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ORIG: BIRCH O'NEAL
UNIT: C/CI/SIG
EXT: 5367
DATE: 23 NOV 63

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DEFERRED
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TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1995

84886

REF: MEXI 6453 (IN 36017)*

1. IMPORTANT YOU REVIEW ALL [1 LIENVOY TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS] SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERIAL POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SUBJECT REF.

2. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COURIER, STAFFER IF NECESSARY, [FULL TRANSCRIPTS AND ORIGINAL TAPES IF AVAILABLE] ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.

3. [ARE ORIGINAL TAPES AVAILABLE?]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976
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CS Comment: *Reported that on 1 October 63, an American male who said his name was Lee Oswald was at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Document Number 40-541
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

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23 Nov 63

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CS COPY

[SCELSO]

RELEASING OFFICER
C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

c. *Information that identifies CIA officers.*

i. Review Board guidelines. For specific information that, if released, would reveal the identity of an individual CIA officer that the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information.

ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review Board voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination records, it had to be realistic enough to realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information would reveal the individual's identity. Examples of specific identifying information include home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names of family members, and other less obvious, but equally revealing pieces of information.

d. *Names of National Security Agency employees.*

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encountered. The Review Board would have considered releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names appeared in NSA's assassination records. Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confront. NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names required protection. NSA argued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and officers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA officers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA information, the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested protection, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States

Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

> *. . . clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—*
>
> *(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or*
>
> *(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;*

a. CIA sources.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information under standards similar to the Board's decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review Board believed names held a high level of public interest, either because the name was central to the story or because assassination researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close scrutiny. The Board generally protected the identity of foreign nationals unless they were of high public interest and then the Review Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the two above-referenced harms, the Review Board released the name at issue. In addition, where the public already knew the names of individuals who were connected to the CIA, especially if the government had previously released the information, the Review Board released the information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board addressed the issue of whether to postpone or release source names at the same time that it considered CIA employee names, and encountered the same problems as it had in the review of CIA employee names. As with CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to provide name-specific evidence to the Review Board, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA's request that the Review Board redact all names.

The Review Board ultimately decided to protect the names of sources, assets, and informants in cases where the identity of the source is of reduced public interest because CIA sources live in countries other than the U.S. and were more likely to face harm if the Board disclosed their relationship with CIA. In those records where the source's identity was of possible public interest in relation to the assassination story or was important to understanding information related to the assassination, the Review Board required the CIA to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.

The Review Board should consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well known by the public (e.g. that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was bugged during the alleged visit of Lee Harvey Oswald), and whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether was the information it collected which was secret.
—Senate Report on JFK Act,
July 22, 1992

When the Review Board postponed release of source names, it did so for ten years except in cases where a foreign government might accuse the source of committing treason for assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review Board protected the source's name and identifying information until 2017.

b. CIA pseudonyms.

i. Review Board guidelines. With only a few exceptions, the Review Board released the pseudonyms of individuals. In some instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual's true name.

ii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, since pseudonyms were a sort of "throw away" identity for individuals who were under cover, the Review Board could release the pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review Board's policy to release pseudonyms. The CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it believed to be particularly sensitive, and demonstrated to the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence that release of those pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.

c. CIA crypts.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released some CIA "crypts"—code words for operations and individuals. The Review Board also generally released CIA "digraphs"—the first two letters of a crypt that link a particular crypt to a particular location. CIA often created crypts to refer to other U.S. government agencies; for example, the FBI was "ODENVY." The Review Board made a blanket decision to release all U.S. government crypts. The Review Board nearly always released CIA crypts where those crypts denoted operations or individuals relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The digraph for Mexico City was "LI," and for Cuba, it was "AM.") For all other crypts, the Review Board protected the digraph and released the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established a few exceptions, and where exceptions applied, the Board required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board had to determine whether it believed that release of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board required the CIA to provide crypt-specific clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and that CIA had not previously released the crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review Board to sustain postponements, the Board required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIA still used the individual or the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board.

As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA crypts—even "ODENVY"—the CIA's old crypt for the FBI that CIA had already released in other CIA records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was an operational method that should remain secret, even though CIA had replaced most of the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed that if the Review Board released the crypts, researchers would be able to piece together the records and determine the identity of operations and individuals. CIA further argued that the burden of locating evidence on each crypt was too heavy.

The Review Board, conversely, believed that CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the identity of an operation or an individual, and so the Review Board could release the crypts and not compromise the operation or the individual. As with CIA agent names, the Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the Review Board released a group of CIA crypts from Mexico City with the "LI" digraph. CIA eventually agreed to release its crypts and digraphs in assassination records, and the Review Board eventually agreed to protect certain sensitive crypts.

The Review Board recognized that it could not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for every CIA record that it encountered. CIA records contain hundreds of thousands of crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the Review Board decided that, for all crypts *except* the "LI," "AM," and "OD" series crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most crypts in the collection and the most relevant digraphs. The Review Board did make three exceptions to its general rule: it protected the digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt appeared next to a true name that had been released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to specific identifying information, and (c) when CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph.

d. CIA sluglines.

i. Review Board guidelines. "Sluglines" are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or more crypts, that appear above the text in CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review Board released CIA sluglines according to the same criteria it applied to crypts and digraphs.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board released CIA sluglines because the Agency never offered the Review Board any evidence to explain why the Board should not release them. An example of a CIA slugline is "RYBAT GPFLOOR." "RYBAT" is a CIA crypt that meant "secret," and GPFLOOR was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in the case of "RYBAT GPFLOOR," the CIA agreed to release the crypt "RYBAT" in two places elsewhere in the document at issue, and the CIA agreed to release the crypt GPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA told the Review Board that it could not, however, release the slugline "RYBAT GPFLOOR." CIA offered no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute's demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines.

e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIA surveillance methods where CIA provided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA's requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language "surveillance method," "operational details," or "sensitive operation."

ii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The Review Board, on the other hand, believed that it was not a secret that CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, the Review Board did not believe that its votes to release CIA surveillance methods in Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the Review Board recognized that certain CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 were already well-known to the public because the U.S. government had disclosed details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo operations, was a major element in the story of Oswald's 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See illustration.)

The Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any risk to national security and directed release of the information. However, in records that CIA proved did contain information about current operations, the Review Board voted to postpone the information.



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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1995

IMMEDIATE MEXI MANA

Slugline ⇩
RYBAT GPFLOOR
REF MANA 4617
⇧
Cable Prefix

DUP OF
230-650

Crypt
⇩
1. FEEL ERTHYROID 3 SHOULD GO MEXI EVEN THOUGH ALVARADO MAY BE IN MEXICAN HANDS. ASSUME HE CAN BE USED AS CONSULTANT AT LEAST, THAT HE WILL KNOW WHETHER HE CAN AND SHOULD CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES, AND THAT MEXI WILL CLEAR ANY ACTIVE USE WE MAKE OF HIM WITH THE ODENVY REP. ODENVY HERE KNOWS HE IS COMING TO MEXI TO HELP.

2. AT 1830 WASHINGTON TIME, WHICH IS ABOUT 1630 YOUR TIME, WE HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS OR REQUESTS. WE ARE GOING HOME BUT CAN BE BACK ON THE WIRE ON SHORT NOTICE.

Orig sent Gilberto ALVARADO
CP

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CLASSIFICATION
INCOMING

File: 1-8593

f. CIA installations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board used date "windows" within which it released the locations of CIA installations where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board released the location of CIA installations relating to Mexico City during the time period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review

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Record reviewed unilaterally by CIA in 1992.



REPRODUCTION
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~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name Lee OSWALD. It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave didn't know what he was talking about).

[redacted]

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way [redacted] ran that Station. [redacted]. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

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[redacted]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1992
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

(A1)

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D 01075

Same record after Review Board action in 1995.



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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1995

SUBJECT: Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name Lee OSWALD. It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave didn't know what he was talking about).

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the 1 October conversation would have been picked up on the morning of the 2nd of October. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on the 3rd of October. The translation would have been returned the following day (4th) at which time, the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before the 7th since the film was still in the camera on the 3rd of October and it was picked up probably on the 4th, processed and passed to the station on the next work day which would have been Monday 7 October.

REPRODUCTION

3. Later the film was taken out of the camera every day but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage - sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

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D 01075

Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that were relevant to the assassination during the time period between the date of the assassination—November 22, 1963—and the date that the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that appeared in Oswald's 201 file during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board protected all information that identified CIA installation locations.

The Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this, the Review Board divided the world into five regions: Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific, and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, "CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1" serves as a place holder for a particular installation in all CIA assassination records.

ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review Board released CIA installation locations in CIA documents relevant to Oswald's visit to Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant objections to the Review Board's release of its installations in these records.

When the Review Board began to vote to release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did not offer evidence of the harm to national security that it believed would result from disclosure of the information. The CIA threatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board's votes, but the Review Board's position was that the JFK Act required release of information where CIA did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to gather and present its evidence to support its requests for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal to the President.

Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would trust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board required to postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an effort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to protect certain installations, the Review Board decided to establish date "windows" within which it would release CIA installation locations.

The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote to the President.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report "prefixes" are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes where it voted to protect the location of the CIA installation.

The Review Board replaced the prefixes that it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: "Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1."

ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA did not disagree that the Board should release cable, dispatch and field report prefixes.

h. CIA job titles.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board voted to release CIA employees' job titles except when the Board's disclosure of the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection.

ii. Commentary. Although the Review Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed other information that the Review Board had voted to protect.

i. CIA file numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes many of its files by country and assigns "country identifiers" within particular file numbers. The Review Board released nearly all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the "country identifiers" in CIA file numbers for all other countries with the exception of country identifiers "15" and "19." The Review Board generally released all CIA "201" or "personality" file numbers where the files related to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected to the Review Board's release of its file numbers.

j. CIA domestic facilities.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released references to domestic CIA facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility. The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evidence that the facility was still in use.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely encountered the issue of whether to release the location of CIA domestic facilities in assassination records, as CIA officially acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. When the Review Board did vote to postpone the location of CIA domestic facilities, it required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIA had to keep the location of those facilities secret.

k. CIA official cover.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA "official cover" is a means by which a CIA officer can operate overseas in the guise of an employee of another government agency. In *congressional documents*, the Review Board released general information about official cover but protected specific details. With regard to *executive branch documents*, the CIA convinced the Review Board that, while Congress might reveal information about official cover, the executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA's postponements regarding official cover in executive branch documents unless the U.S. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue.

The Review Board inserted the phrase "official cover" as substitute language when it postponed such information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to be an "open secret" that was well-known to the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold such obvious information. The CIA, however, supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the harm in releasing information about official cover outweighed any additional information that assassination researchers might gain from knowing details about official cover.

l. Alias documentation.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board released information that revealed that CIA employees and agents used aliases. The Board protected specific details about how CIA documents particular aliases.

ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it currently uses alias documentation and that aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its intelligence operations. The CIA also argued that the Review Board's release of specific information about alias documentation would not be useful to assassination researchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because they agreed that the public interest in the specific details about alias documentation was low. The Review Board determined that it did not want the CIA to spend a large amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the CIA to provide evidence in support of every postponement relating to alias documentation.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA and demanded extensive evidence and multiple briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members judged that the information might add to the historical understanding of the assassination, the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the information outweighed this potential value.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board evaluated the need to postpone the identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case basis. Where the human source was a *foreign national*, the Review Board generally agreed to protect the individual's identity *unless* the individual's connection with the FBI was already known to the foreign government at issue. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials*, the Review Board sometimes released the identity of the individual if the public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens*, the Review Board tended to evaluate the release of the source's name more like other domestic informants.

ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the FBI defined "intelligence source" as "any individual who has provided or is currently providing information pertaining to national security matters, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI's intelligence and counterintelligence-gathering capabilities."

The FBI offered the following arguments in support of its request to keep intelligence sources' identities secret: (1) Review Board disclosure of intelligence sources would harm the FBI's ability to develop and maintain new and existing sources, because sources would reasonably believe that the government would reveal their identities, and (2) disclosure of intelligence sources may subject the sources, their friends, and their families to physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.

The Review Board's interpretation of the "clear and convincing" evidence standard required it to reject the FBI's general policy arguments, and instead required the FBI to present asset-specific evidence that explained the particular harm that the FBI expected the asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the Review Board usually protected the identities of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board considered whether the individual was in a position of trust with the foreign government and whether he or she might be in danger if the Review Board disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the source who was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens* was generally evaluated according to the Board's domestic informant standards.

a. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general rule, the Review Board believed that most aspects of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.

ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. The FBI's assassination records contain information that reveal many of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period. Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board considered how it could release as much information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require protection.

In spring 1996, the Review Board considered and voted on a group of FBI records relating to the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities. In response to the Review Board's requests for evidence on the foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI had provided its "position paper" on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its paper, the FBI defined "intelligence activities" as "intelligence gathering action or techniques utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined to be of national security interest." The FBI's primary argument in support of its request for continued secrecy of intelligence activities was that disclosure of specific information describing intelligence activities would reveal to hostile entities the FBI's targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to develop countermeasures.

> *In all cases where the Review Board is considering postponement, it should keep the withheld information to an absolute minimum, and ensure that the postponement is narrowly drawn for the shortest possible duration. In so doing, the Review Board should release as much information from the records as is possible.*
> *—Senate Report on JFK Act, July 22, 1992*

Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In addition, the JFK Act's legislative history instructed the Review Board to consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well-known by the public, whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether the information collected was secret.[27]

The Review Board considered the FBI's evidence and weighed it against public interest in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some foreign counterintelligence information. The Board's primary reason for releasing such records was its belief that the FBI's evidence did not enumerate specific harms that would result from disclosure.

A. The FBI's May 1996 Appeals to the President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI appealed to the President to overturn the Board's vote on 17 records relating to the FBI's surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries—the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI's overarching arguments were that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods that would compromise the national security of the United States, and that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance—the four Communist countries—would harm the foreign relations of the United States.

The FBI sought to postpone five types of source and method capabilities: tracing of funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The Review Board's response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of each issue are discussed below.

In response to the FBI's overarching argument that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods and compromise the *national security*, the Review Board responded that if the national security would be harmed by release of this information, the harm would have already occurred, since the FBI had already released both the identities of the target countries *and* the sources and methods that the FBI used in its operations.

In response to the FBI's arguments that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance would harm the *foreign relations* of the United States, the Review Board responded in three parts. *First,* the information that the FBI sought to protect is widely available in the public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of the information, then the harm has already occurred. *Second,* the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated international law or "diplomatic standards" by employing the sources or methods at issue since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that were in effect at the time that the records were created. *Third,* despite the FBI's assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had evidence that other governments *do* acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against other countries.

The Review Board believed that the FBI had not provided evidence of a "significant, demonstrable harm" to current foreign relations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board asked the President to deny the FBI's requests for postponement. The White House did not expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after several meetings involving representatives from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White House, the White House directed the FBI to provide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The White House requested the Review Board to reconsider the Bureau's specific evidence. The FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its pending appeals, including some records in which the Review Board voted to release information obtained from a technical source.

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the FBI agreed to release most information regarding its foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries as "consent releases." In those few cases where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist Bloc countries still required protection, the Bureau submitted for the Board's determination postponement-specific evidence.

To the extent that the information in the FBI's proposed redaction did not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI to postpone direct discussions of foreign counterintelligence activities against *non*-Communist Bloc countries. With regard to the FBI's "segregated collections," the Review Board stated in its segreated collection guidelines,

> It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-

B

OGC-92-53256

14 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

VIA:
W. George Jameson
Associate General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

FROM:
Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has created declassification guidelines that are to some extent different from the Historical Review Program guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the continuing review of material related to the assassination of President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be used.

2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it creates on agencies to justify continued classification of information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act, information must be declassified unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security.

3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in its Section 6 and are as follows:

> **Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.**
>
> Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that--
>
> (1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that

it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) Any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as follows.

a. The most basic change is that you must apply a balancing test before maintaining the classification of any information. You must balance continued classification against the public interest in the information. Therefore, the greater light disclosure of the information would shed on the assassination of the President, or on the government's investigation into that assassination, the more serious must be the need to continue to withhold the information for classification to be maintained.

b. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information advocating continued classification of information will bear the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security. The Act defines that burden as one of "clear and convincing evidence." Further, the Act changes "reasonably could be expected to cause" to "demonstrably." Therefore, unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security, the information must be declassified.

c. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for maintaining the classification of foreign government information, the identity of a foreign source, and intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified. Under the Act, with respect to these categories of classified information found with records related to the assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they--

(1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; and

(2) that they not have been officially disclosed; and

(3) that their disclosure would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities.

All of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

d. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and organizational information. The Act only permits the continued withholding of the identity of an "intelligence agent" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act does not permit the withholding of organizational information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would demonstrably impair the national security.

e. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine whether information warrants continued protection pursuant to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes all other statutory authority for withholding information except for a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence over 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and § 403g, as well as the Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act also makes no provision for protecting information on the basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process and attorney-client communications.

5. Certain categories of information may fall into more than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining whether to release or withhold specific information. For example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1)(A) ("intelligence agent"), (1)(B) ("intelligence source"), (2) ("living person who provided confidential information to the United States"), and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual"). At this point, we do not know how the Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for that withholding.

cf NARA software – per Harvey: won't accept author. for [illegible] redaction

6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such information may be withheld only with the personal authorization of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a statement that included the following:

> My authority to protect [executive branch deliberations, law enforcement information of the executive branch, and national security information] comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by statute. Although only the most extraordinary circumstances would require postponement of the disclosure of documents for reasons other than those recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my constitutional responsibility to take such action when necessary.

7. The Act provides individuals the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect, then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of our determinations that certain information meets the criteria for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board,

subsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA cases.

8. If you have any questions concerning the application of the Act to your review of the assassination records, please call me on secure extension 76105.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

DCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992

OGC-92-53256

Distribution:

1 - Addressee
1 - DO/IRO
1 - DI/IRO
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1 - PCS/PGG
1 - ERR
1 - DPH
1 - Lit file
1 - EC
1 - WGJ
1 - RJE Soft file
1 - OGC Chrono
1 - RJE Signer

13-00000

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OGC-94-52916
19 September 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
Deputy General Counsel

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger. Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA. ✓

3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be "postponed." The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA § 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if:

> "(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

> (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;
>
> (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or
>
> (C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States."

ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)

4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records." ARCA § 7(i)(1). Specifically, the "Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i)(2)(B).

5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it "shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made." ARCA § 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is "obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6." ARCA § 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. *Id*. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA § 9(d)(2).

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

Attachment

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect to JFK Assassination Records

OGC-94-52916

DCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76105 (19 Sept 94)

Original - Addressee (w/attach)(hand delivered)
1 - OGC Registry (w/~~attach~~)
1 - Lit File ________
1 - RBB (OGC/ILD)
1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)
1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach)
1 - RJE - Signer
1 - PDP
1 - KK -fyi
1 - PAS-fyi

C

~~SECRET~~

Attachment C

Friday, October 29, 1999

Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection

CIA's JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms:

First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and the Board agreed that substantive information could be released.

Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA's "sequestered collection" and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as "Assassination Records," subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no documentation regarding coordination with liaison.

Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act.

The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are reflected in OIM records:

Australian

1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in which reference is made to the 'Australian security service.' [The Warren Commission document (CD #97) was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the 'Australian security service.'] The Board did not accept the Agency's initial action to "deny in full" Sir Spry's letter and the Board's acceptance of substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted and retyped version of Sir Spry's letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated "this . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in releasing ASIO documents." The Board postponed release of the original until 2017.

2. (S) Helms' response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017.

3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in Item 1 were declared assassination records, but release of the cables was postponed until 2017.

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British

1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service's (BSS) interview of the spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of *privacy rights in the UK.* The BOARD agreed that the document was "not intrinsic to assassination story" and that the document could be postponed until 2017.

2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982 "KOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there." (The author EPSTEIN in *Legend* claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information.

3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the BOARD's examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign government that specifically requested not to be identified.

Canadian

(S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017.

Dutch

(S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the information from intercepted conversations on the topics of "Mr. Lee (sic)" and Richard Gibson, but redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.

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OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.

2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished "many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."

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3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.

4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban *modus vivendi*--on his terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertheless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."

6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred [redacted] who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to [redacted] trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge [redacted].

7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. [redacted]. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "solidarity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

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ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists [redacted] have been in close liaison with Cuban agents [redacted], and elsewhere. [redacted] appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported [redacted].

Last January, [redacted] traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origen.

[redacted]

2. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. [redacted] Cuban Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.

[redacted] gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. [redacted] that the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countires. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led police to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.

[redacted]

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.

[redacted] to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his Popular Mobilization Front. [redacted] to buy arms. In addition, a usually reliable [redacted] reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil [redacted].

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.

[redacted]

4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment [redacted] of GIMPEX [redacted], ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown [redacted] officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior [redacted] official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.

[redacted]

5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp."

A clandestine source [redacted] reported in February that [redacted] said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba.

[redacted]

6. Colombia

Cuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported [redacted] to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity.

Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends.

[redacted]

7. Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-government action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose.

[redacted]

8. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.

[redacted]

9. Ecuador

Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban efforts there. When the junta began to exile Communists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. [redacted] told a clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is reportedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former president Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being offered to followers of former president Arosemena.

[redacted]

10. El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications.

Havana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer.

[redacted]

11. Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestine sources reported [redacted] In addition, another source reports [redacted] Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.

12. Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire.

[redacted]

13. Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government.

[redacted]

14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source [redacted] reported [redacted] which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months.

[redacted] Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; [redacted] to Cuba from January through April of [redacted].

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.

[redacted]

16. Panama

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR).

[redacted] Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future.

[redacted] to Cuba in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part [redacted] The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and attention, ~~which is given through the Cuban embassy~~ [redacted]~~evideo~~. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

~~Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963~~. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there.

[redacted] known to have [redacted] traveled to Cuba [redacted].

19. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.

[redacted] traveled to Cuba [redacted].

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase.

The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll.

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities.

[redacted]

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963

NATIONALITY	January		February		March		April		May		June		July		August		September		October		November		December		1963	
	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From
ARGENTINA	18	27	47	34	12	21	13	14	57	12	4	5	6	0	4	0	37	0	4	9	5	3	15	1	222	126
BOLIVIA	1	7	4	3	3	5	6	0	2	5	3	2	14	0	5	3	21	5	1	17	2	1	7	0	69	48
BRAZIL	11	19	22	13	9	6	18	7	10	5	1	6	25	0	0	24	121	0	2	162	0	0	0	0	219	242
BR. GUIANA	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	1	0	0	7	10	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	26	25	51
CHILE	31	44	26	20	13	42	20	8	9	14	3	8	20	1	22	47	175	1	9	70	9	54	18	7	355	316
COLOMBIA	54	39	7	12	13	9	23	5	7	15	3	7	29	1	6	14	17	1	8	14	5	1	10	4	182	122
COSTA RICA	9	0	0	29	1	0	11	1	0	8	0	3	12	0	0	8	0	5	0	1	4	1	10	0	47	56
DOM. REPUBLIC	0	2	0	0	0	6	2	1	1	2	0	2	37	0	1	8	19	0	11	0	0	0	3	3	74	24
ECUADOR	20	0	20	5	10	1	31	1	24	1	4	6	2	0	0	2	7	0	3	4	4	0	1	0	121	20
EL SALVADOR	7	2	0	0	0	0	5	4	0	0	0	4	4	1	1	0	3	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	26	12
GUATEMALA	30	18	0	5	15	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	3	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	64	23
HAITI	0	0	4	4	0	0	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	23	22
HONDURAS	11	12	20	0	0	0	11	0	1	8	0	11	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	50	39
JAMAICA	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	33	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	38	6
MEXICO	100	81	22	0	26	38	37	18	34	54	14	42	65	28	34	63	84	36	24	71	23	27	49	72	512	530
NICARAGUA	4	7	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	12	9
PANAMA	4	1	20	0	2	1	2	3	2	0	3	0	15	0	6	0	6	13	1	3	0	0	0	3	61	24
PARAGUAY	2	3	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9
PERU	6	2	2	4	3	1	5	8	5	3	3	5	4	0	2	9	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	33	38
URUGUAY	19	19	16	14	8	8	8	0	5	12	9	0	17	15	10	16	56	6	3	27	1	0	6	13	158	130
VENEZUELA	26	9	2	3	9	9	8	0	4	4	8	0	22	0	3	0	37	0	11	10	6	0	3	0	139	35
MONTHLY TOTALS	354	296	212	150	124	149	223	88	163	144	73	103	319	47	104	214	587	64	76	380	69	99	126	132	2430	1863

The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October.

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY TO	JANUARY FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

~~SECRET~~

NATIONALITY	MARCH-APRIL		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	11	10	1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry.
BOLIVIA	8	2	3- Attending May Day Celebration.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	2	2	
CHILE	14	37	4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile.
COLOMBIA	7	0	
COSTA RICA	3	3	1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
DOM. REP.	1	7	4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
ECUADOR	5	2	
EL SALVADOR	3	8	2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba.
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	32	24	3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	2	1	
PANAMA	2	14	3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	9	0	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	14	11	
VENEZUELA	17	0	
TOTALS	130	121	

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3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*

Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*

Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*

Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
   (a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
   (b) Fulbright grantees;

- **(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;**
- **(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;**
- **(e) Employees of U.S. private detective, investigative agencies.**

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.

- (a) **Employees** of other U.S. Government agencies;
- (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
- (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
- (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
- (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
- (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):

- (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
- (b) CARE employees;
- (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
- (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
- (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
- (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
- (g) Officials of the Vatican State;
- (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
- (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
- (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
- (k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):

- (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
- (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
- (c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

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5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

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e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

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for Germans aliens only! only by

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

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d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                           201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26         POB GERM, BERLIN       TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                    OCC PHARMACIST         OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53   OCC CODE CHEM          RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                         30 NOV 70          00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

15 November 1974

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: | EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-__________. ☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier) ☐ Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to ______ (date) forwarded to IP/Files. All documents after ______ (date) retained at ________ desk.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

CL BY: 007322

FORM 6-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A

RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

SECTION B

REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________________ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   E-2, IMPDET CL BY: 007522   (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

7. A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL & CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5039/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905340			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130615			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1134/455		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091833			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-GAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/5930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	C19C22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2835/9133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5039/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		C1AC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0221162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2551/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	TAIW	
CHENG, SHU-LING /7103/2873/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0458443			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	[illegible]			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0599/		15APR10	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CMND	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0095119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	RUSS	
CHEN, SHU FEN /5975/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0313731			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0647/6639		C1PC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2717/		18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	[illegible]			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0317/	A	02FEB05				[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2895/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN05	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07DEC30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	[illegible]			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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Annex B to Chpt III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Aug 62 -

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
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15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

78-0070/18

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

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STEWAR[illegible] MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES T[illegible]ONE, NEBR.
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(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

FEB 21 1978

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Office of the Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Carpentier:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed:

1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information;

2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees;

3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries;

4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries;

5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries;

6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures;

7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist or unfriendly intelligence organizations or instrumentalities thereof;

8. Individuals who have received money or other items of value from communist or unfriendly governments or instrumentalities thereof; and

9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents or employees.

Please address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would you please specify in your response under which criteria, or combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file was considered to be mandatory during this period.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mgj

OLC #78 0070/[illegible]

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

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ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                              201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN         TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST           OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM            RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                                  30 NOV 70        00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

15 November 1974

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-__________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date)
14.				retained at __________ desk.
15.				

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021):



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ________
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________

FORM 3-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL A CHINA SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/9030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0163401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0086		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, PANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069796			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0837855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/485		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN09	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-FAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2295/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2495/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHIN /7115/2895/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0908577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAN /7115/2895/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044799			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2895/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2295/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2895/9030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179673			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0854440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHANGHAI	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /N75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2995/2737/		18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0317/	A	02FEB06				0191329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2695/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/8992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0343628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313410			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0454010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

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Annex B to Chap III
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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

15 November 1974

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

~~SECRET~~


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0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                    201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26      POB GERM, BERLIN   TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                 OCC PHARMACIST     OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53  OCC CODE CHEM    RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                              30 NOV 70          00833555
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Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

~~SECRET~~

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

7

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

15 November 1974

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.



☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:

TO:	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. IP/Files CC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-______________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date) retained at ____________ desk.
14.				
15.				

FORM 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

15 November 1974

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).



CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE BT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______
(Sign)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 3-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

7. A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its ✓ alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.



FUL 4 CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INF. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0239859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN, AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CNAT	0837855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/499		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091833			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2595/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN, HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2535/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2595/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN, PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2585/3185/		08JUL16	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN, FUKIEN		CHIN?	0054759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2585/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2855/8133		05MAY18	CHIN, FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179822			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM.	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2585/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CNAT	0830156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN, FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179673			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN, FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CNAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2585/0589/		15APR30	CHIN, CHENGHAI	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103249			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /8795/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013951			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0647/6639		CIRC75	CHIN, HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2485/2737/	-	18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0747462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/	A	02FEB06				0151329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2855/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN, PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN, FANG CHEN KU		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CNAT	0340628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB38	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313810			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0144010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location
(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)
(3) Citizenship
(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)
(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname
(b) Given name
(c) Date of birth
(d) Country of birth
(e) Citizenship
(f) OI code
(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

70-1-1
CSHB ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by
Annex B to Chap III
to CSHB 70-1-1 dat
1 Aug 62 -

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE

Signed: R. Hartman

R.O. #1 - Unit CI/R&A

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

2 DEC 63 IN 71187

DIRECTOR

: MELBOURNE

ON: C/WH 4

: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

S E C R E T 020422Z

CS COPY

DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)

~~WBAT~~ GPFLOOR

REF DIR 85690 +

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL I.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, ERHAR SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 OLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE EROG ON ABOVE.

C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDW R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS OUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY .OSE TO SOVS CNBR.

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

D: 200-5-41

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

201-289248

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

2. 2 SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG

SE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT 2 SQUARE

CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

C R E T

/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with e Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

Document Number for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE	COI	ACP	TOG	TPE	MRO	DCI		PAGE	OF	PAGES
OMF 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6-L	1		

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DEFERRBED TELEPOUCH	170106Z	WASHINGTON	914708

CONF: IPDP5 INFO: FILE

☐ INDEX DISSEM BY:
☐ NO INDEX
☐ RETURN TO PER
☐ IP FILES #

15-5

TO: (BRUSSELS).4

24

FROM: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI/X, SE/X/EU, E/(BNL)BY

SUBJECT: UNINTEL CKTOP (PD)GRAVE (NIGALE) - TRACE ON VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV {ASSIGNED 201-0943610}4

OTP

20-5

REFERENCE: (BRUSSELS) 41919 |IN 025302| |*|4

ACTION: FOR (LIAISON) LESS 201 AND FYI4

24

1. VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV {ASSIGNED 201-0943610} IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV, A GRU STAFF OFFICER {FYI: (PD)SATISFY, DOI: 67}.4

2. FYI: ACCORDING TO (PD)STORAGE, AS OF OCT 67, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV HELD THE RANK OF ENGINEER-MAJOR AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD {ANGLO-AMERICAN} DIRECTORATE AT THE GRU HEADQUARTERS IN MOSCOW. SOMETIME EARLIER IN 1967, KUZNETSOV ATTENDED THE MILITARY DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY. END FYI.4

3. FYI: SUBJECT OF (PD)STORAGE AND (PD)SATISFY INFORMATION IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV {201-0900259} WHO SERVED AS COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN JAKARTA FROM 72 TO 75. END FYI.4

IP/EDI		TRAVEL PROGRAM	
	☒	ABSTRACT	
		INDEX	
IP/CR/V		PREPARE FOR FILMING	
IP/MB		CODE NO. (2, 3)	
		REST. CODE	
		[illegible] DOCT (11)	
		[illegible] (3)	
IP/CRU		FOR FILING	

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

17 Sept 76

B 201-900259

RECORD COPY

201-943610

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
CL BY:

10/W

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING

1		4		7	
2		5		8	
3		6		9	

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

914708

CONF: INFO: FILE

0 INDEX
0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

DISSEM BY:

4. AS KUZNETSOV IS A COMMON SOVIET SURNAME, HEADQUARTERS WILL RETRACE SUBJECT REF UPON RECEIPT OF PATRONYMIC AND ADDITIONAL PERTINENT BIO DATA.Y

5. FILE: 201-0943610 AND 201-0900259. E-2 IMPDET.H

*REQUESTED TRACES ON PCS SOV

MD40617

DATE: 13 SEPT 76
ORIG: SE/BIO
UNIT: DOREEN PETERSON/KN
EXT: [redacted]X1551

03

DC

SE/CI/X P.W. [redacted]JONSSON/L. SULLIVAN
(IN DRAFT)

03

SE/X/EU M. NOSTER (IN DRAFT)

03 03 03 03

P Champlain
DC/E/BNL
RELEASING OFFICER

E/BNL/B
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/SE/BIO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 059047[illegible]

SECRET

7UN

SECRET

6 June 1960

– PROJECT LINOG COVERS HIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

03

1. 03 On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles 03 Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps). 03

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

4|PV

SECRET

7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

06
(Rene) - who has access to the centrals. He contacts the following men:

Two brothers

(Jose) - does exchange connections.
06

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:

DOI JUNE '61

CHANGED BY '63 ? YES!

a) 24 (Calero 39) - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

b) 24 (Juanacatlan 179) - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) 24 (Atlixco 47) - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) 24 (Tenanzingo) - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) 24 (Aristoteles 80) - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) 24 (Suderman & Horacio) - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) 24 (Cuautla 131) - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the Central)
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

9/17/

Page count wrong. 86 pages

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Latin America Division	EXTENSION 1431	NO.	DATE 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Russell Holmes O/EXO/CI				
2.				
3.				
4. Mr. Scott Breckinridge Principal Coordinator/HSCA				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
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14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

13 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to review with the understanding that it is a theoretical unofficial research undertaking.

Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Latin America Division

EXTENSION: 1431

NO.:

DATE: 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/EXO/CI				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

Dup

SECRET

[illegible] JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

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Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated
DDO/C/LA/STB/WSturbitts:esm (X9127) (13 Jul 78)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - O/EXO/CI w/o att
1 - C/LA w/o att
1 - C/LA/STB w/o att
1 - LA/CO/CIOS w/o att

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

SECRET

SECRET

April 1977

SUBJECT: Theory re MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich and
Unidentified Man

That Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" going into and coming out of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in October 1963. The "unidentified man" was recently identified by SLIPSTREAM as a KGB type by name of "Yuri" whom he knew in Moscow in 1964.

- According to travel records MOSKALEV was in the USSR in 1964.; in the U.S. in October 1963 .
- MOSKALEV functions officially as a Soviet scientist and often attends international conferences. He has been in contact with known GRU Soviet diplomat in the U.S.

MOSKALEV bears a striking resemblance to composite of "Saul" in book Appointment in Dallas who claims he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. "Saul" claims:

- he crossed border into U.S. illegally and was in Dallas on 20 November.
- That he had been to Mexico City, had a contact in Soviet Embassy there, in 1963, and that he knew the identity of OSWALD because he (OSWALD) had been fingered to him in Mexico City.

- that OSWALD was involved in the Kennedy assassination plot, but that he, "Saul", fired shots that killed Kennedy.

- that two hours after the assassination he, "Saul", was out of the U.S. That he used limp as a disguise.

QUESTIONS

1. Could MOSKALEV be "Saul"?
2. Could MOSKALEV, therefore, be mystery man who boarded plane in Mexico City for Havana on 22 November 1963?
3. Was assassination a Soviet comspiracy without Cuban knowledge?

RECOMMENDATION

1. Can we obtain voice tape of MOSKALEV, since he has delivered speeches at scientific conferences in U.S. and abroad?
2. If so, could we arrange to have McDonald (unwittingly) hear it, to see if he recognizes it as that of "Saul"

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

1. Can we find photo that PENKOVSKY identified of MOSKALEVSKIY.

2. May I see PENKOVSKIY's 201 file for period 61-63?

3. Get photos and check out MOISEEV and BABKOV.

4. Via CI Staff, find out if we can show photo to DERYABIN and ROSTVOROFF?

5. Could MOSKALEV be Dept 13? Could OSWALD have met with him in Mexico City clandestinely in 1963?

SECRET

26 March 1977

SUBJECT: Juriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

DOB: 23 July 1920

POB: Iguamnovo, USSR

HGT: 172 Centimeters

Hair: Brown (medium light)

Eyes: Gray

Wife: Married to Vera Nikolayevna STRELTSOVA

Children:

Education: Unknown

Misc:. Became a Communist Party member in 1951

Was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings.

Occ: As of May 1973 was with Institute of Biophysics of the Soviet Ministry of Health. (Dr. of Medical Sciences.) Prof.

1922 - Family moved to Leningrad.

48-70- Lived in Moscow

1958 - Became head of Division of Institute of Biophysics,,Soviet Ministry of Public Health

1951-53 Head of Patho physiology Lab, Inst. of Biophysics.

1952 - Last half of year, had a month's TDY at Biophysical Lab. in Moscow.

1953 - When source (Dr. Wilhelm MENKE)STIB, left as Chief of Pathphysiological Lab. at Sungol in Oct. 53, MOSKALEV took that position. He reportedly was not well qualified.

Personal Misc.

1. Very adept diplomat - finds it easy to adopt conversation to group he is with.

2. Excellent chess player, patient with both adults and children.

3. Has dasha near Moscow.

4. Reads, writes, and conprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency. Reportedly speaks it much better after few drinks. (He is careful about drinking, if he drinks at all, in relation to attending conferences.)

26 Dec 62	-	CIA=A-3.246.539 Re International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, Aust. 15-18 Oct 62. "Most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof. MOSKALEV of USSR Academy of Sciences. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When he spoke he changed the title to "Problems of Kenetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." His paper presented nothing new and can be described as elementary. He apparently spoke no English.
19 Jan 63	-	OOB 3,248,156. Information from another source on the above conference. Dr. D. J. SEMENOV and Dr. I.T. TRUGUBENKO ? were invited to attend. The Soviets sent instead, Prof. MOSKALEV. He was bright, but not individual who should have been sent representing the USSR at this meeting. Was ~~was~~ said to be his first time out of the USSR. /¯CDH comment - not so.7
9 July 63	-	DF-440 (PENKOVSKY) Source: AEDAZZLE-1 (doi 1961) identified photo(not by name, nor was name supplied) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY Air Force Col. and GRU officer in Information Directorate of GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.
21 Aug 63	-	OOB 3,271,609 MOSKALEV participated at meeting of IAEA panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, Austria 4-8 June 63.

18 Oct 63 - OOB 3,278,069

Re Symposium in Vienna, Austria from 26-31 August 63. The Soviets sent a small three or four member delegation headed by MOSKALEV "a very personable and diplomatic gentleman." At the end of the conference MOSKALEV voiced his dismay that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

3 Dec 63 - OOB 3,283,411

Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining & Milling, Vienna, Austria late Aug 63. "Due to misunderstanding in USSR, topics covered by symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology." All papers were given by Dr. L. N. BURYKINA in the absence of MOSKALEV et al.

10 Dec 63 -

30 Dec 63 - OOB 3,286,351

MOSKALEV atttended Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63.

23 Jan 64 - OOB 3,288,475

IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, N.Y. Oct 63. MOSKALEV, one of the Soviet delegates, was frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.
Sources (3 U.S. scientists) were asked if they thought MOSKALEV's objectives were motivated from anything more than genuine scientific position. They responded - "Who can say?" MOSKALEV, both from papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated he was very sharp. The paper he gave presented no new data. His paper said nothing specific.

24 Oct 66 - OOB 321,15482-66

About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third Int'l Congress of Radiation Research put in appearance. The papers were disappointing. A paper written by MOSKALEV and V.A. STRELTSOVA was not impressive.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,30340-67

MOSKALEV attended the Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67. He presented an interesting paper. He was not expected at the meeting and came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise tohear his paper. He understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual. He became very interestdd in visiting a certain U.S. facility and pursued arrangements to visit it. U.S. Gov't clearance and permission to visit were obtained, but he "backed-out" (after all had been arranged) saying it was too much trouble for U.S. persons and authorities concerned.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,27474-67

MOSKALEV participated in Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He had travelled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to Chairman of conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known MOSKALEV from previous meetings said MOSKALEV's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, he did not drink at all during this conference. He did mention that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself. A respected U.S. scientist with more experience than MOSKALEV said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. (Said this in private.) MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a report by a West German. MOSKALEV left the conference a little upset. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions he asked in private, it was obvious he understood English quite well. Considerable time was spent in arranging visit to a U.S. lab. in route to his home. He took a different route, without telling anyone of plans, and did not visit the lab.

N.B.

N.B.

1 Feb 70 -

BV

1 Jul 70 - OOB 321/17309-70

Fnu MOSKALEV and P.V. RAMZAYEV were scheduled to attend the Biology & Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conf. Sutton, U.K. 30 Apr to 1 May 70, but apparently were not permitted by the USSR to attend.

24 Aug 70 - OOB 321/20573-70

MOSKALEV was among Soviet delegation to Second Int'l Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70. MOSKALEV personally attended virtually every session and was very busy asking many questions. He asked all questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given, in English, he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter.

13 Nov 70 - OOA(S) 322/33488-70

Sept 70 MOSKALEV visited a U.S. facility devoted to research in field of nuclear medicine. "It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker." Visited Brookhaven in Oct 63; Sun Valley in 67; and Hanford Biology Symposium 69.

24 Aug 71 - U.S. Embassy Moscow Airgram

26 Sept 71 - Science Berkeley Lab. 600254

Four Soviet scientists, MOSKALEV, MOISEEV, NENOT and MASSE, participated at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during week of Sept 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day. They did not travel to the conference together. It all seemed to be coincidental. Drs. MOSKALEV and MASSE reportedly understood more English than they could speak. Dr. MOSKALEV was the USSR's rep. on ICRP internal dose committee.

23 Dec 71 - OOE 324/37776-71

Dr. Yuriy I. MOSKALEV, Inst. of Biophysics, Min. of Public Health, visited several U.S. biological and biophysical research facilities. During that time it was learned that he was chairman of the USSR equivalent to the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position Dr. Aleksey A. MOISEEV (Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow) was MOSKALEV's secretary.

25 Oct 71 - Letter to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from

BATTELLE
Pacific
Northwest
Laboratories

12 May 73 - U.S. Embassy Moscow files

Y'

Chris Hopkins

SUBJECT: Passports Used by MOSKALEV, Yuriy
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich

	PP#
1957	Unknown
1962	S-012960
1963	S-022766 S-012960
1964	S-022766
1965	S-022766
1967	O-113459
1968	T-286915
1970	O-286915 S-201222
1971	S-201222
1972	O-068765 S-201222
1974	Unknown

MOSKALEV has following birthdates:

23 July 1920

17 January 1920

21 July 1920

1930

TRAVEL

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO	
MOSKALEV, Juriy Ivanovich	-	Chem	-	Sept 57	USSR	France
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-012960	Oct 62	Aust.	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	-	Oct 62	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Biol.	S-012960	Oct 62	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Phys.	S-022766	May 63	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	30/6/63	Poland	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	8/6/63	Aust	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSLAKEV , YuriyIvanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S---------	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63	Denmark	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Medl.	S-022766	9/11/64	--	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	14/11/64	USSR	Aust.

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	15/4/65	Aust USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	10/5/65	Czech Aust
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	USSR Can
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	Cam USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	Can USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof.	--	8/9/67	USSR USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Stu	O-113459	8/9/67	Can USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	4/4/68	- UK
MOSKAEEE, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	11/4/68	UK -
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	-	-	-	1/2/70	-- UNNY
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	O-286915	2/5/70	-- UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	O-286915	16/5/70	UK -
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	- -	S-201222	11/70	USA Suis
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	15/4/71	USSR UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR XXXX USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR XXXXX USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	-	S-201222	17/10/71	USA USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR USA
MOSKALVE, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR USA

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM	TO
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	[17/10/71]	USA	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof	O-068765	[11/11/72	-	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol	S-201222	15/11/72]	UK	==
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	--	[9/ 3/74]	-	Suis



USSR CONFIDENTIAL CIA-P-312403
MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH. 1971.
INSTITUTE OF BIOPHYSICS,
MOSCOW.

CRS PHOTO

SECRET

April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Identity of the "Unidentified Man" Photographed in Mexico City in October 1963

REFERENCES: A. Photos Taken in Mexico City by Mexico City Station

B. Paperback Book "Appointment in Dallas"

C. Soft File, Headquarters Information on Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, Possible "Unidentified Man"

1. Photographs of the unidentified man were taken by our Mexico City Station on 2,3,4, and 15 October 1963, going into or coming out of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. Copies were provided to the FBI in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963. Although cropped copies have appeared in various works, including Volume XX, page 691, of the Warren Commission Report, and the book "Appointment in Dallas", to our knowledge the individual has never been identified.

2. On 17 March 1977, a former member of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) recognized photographs of the unidentified man as Yuri LNU, a KGB officer, whom he met in Moscow in 1964 while attending an intelligence course there. He said that Yuri, a fluent English and Spanish speaker, was acting as a trouble shooter for the Cuban group, about 15, attending the course. Yuri lived with

the Cuban and Bulgarian groups quartered in the same building in Moscow. Any time the Cubans had a problem, Yuri would solve it for them. Yuri was a good friend of Juan (pseudo) a KGB officer who taught the Cubans about the Agency (CIA) and the West German intelligence apparatus. Juan told the DGI member that he had served in Mexico for about 20 years and in the U.S. clandestinely for about 10 years (specific dates unknown). Yuri was entrusted with their welfare only, and did not attend classes with the Cuban group.

3. SE/X travel records were reviewed in search of an individual by the name of Yuri who possibly fit the description of the unidentified man. This lead to an individual by the name of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, a Soviet, reportedly a Doctor of Medical Sciences, who has participated in international scientific conferences for the USSR since 1962 or earlier. Although there is no official 201 file on MOSKALEV, there is a sizable dossier on him in the Central Reference Service. Many of the documents in his dossier are OO reports from U.S. scientists concerning MOSKALEV's attendance and behavior at scientific meetings. It is obvious that he has a much greater knowledge of the English language than he admits. His capability is said to improve greatly after a few drinks; however, it is noted that he rarely, if ever, drank at the scientific meetings. It is also noted that on occasions he reportedly was not qualified to represent the Soviets at a particular conference. His papers rarely, if ever, were specific, or presented new data.

Following are items of interest from selected documents in MOSKALEV's CRS dossier:

a. In 1961 PENKOVSKY identified a photo (with no name provided) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, Air Force Col. and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU.

b. [In December 1963 the FBI reported

FBI

c. In October 1963 MOSKALEV was a delegate to the IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York. Described by U.S. scientists as very sharp, MOSKALEV was a frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.

d. In October 1967 MOSKALEV participated in the Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He travelled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. Although he complained about not knowing much English, he admitted writing the English version of the paper he presented. MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a paper by a West German scientist. A respected U.S. scientist said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. MOSKALEV took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions MOSKALEV asked, it was obvious that he knew English quite well. Although considerable time was spent arranging for MOSKALEV to visit a U.S. laboratory en route to his home, he took a different route, without telling anyone of his plans, and did not visit the lab.

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STATE DEPT

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4. On 23 March 1977 several identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section of OTS/GAD compared photos of the unidentified man with photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV from the FBI, British Liaison, and CRS. It was their opinion that MOSKALEV could very likely be identifiable with the unidentified man.

5. Page 59 of the book "Appointment in Dallas," shows an Identi-Kit Model composite of an individual who told the author in London in 1972 that he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. The composite of that individual (code name "Saul"), whose real name is unknown to the author, bears a striking resemblance to the photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. According to the author "Saul"identified the picture shown in the Warren Commission Exhibit #237 as having been taken at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City, either in the foyer or just outside.

6. The author of the aforementioned book, Hugh C. McDonald, is the inventor of the Identi-Kit and at one time was under contract to CIA in regard to the Identi-Kit. McDonald claims in his book that he met "Saul" at an office in CIA Headquarters sometime after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and that a colleague of McDonald told him that "Saul" was an assassin.

7. There are striking parallels between the backgrounds of "Saul" as given in McDonald's book, and MOSKALEV. For example:

AGENCY INFO.

"Saul"	MOSKALEV
Pg. 7 - CIA allegedly knew of Saul. McDonald said he first met Saul in CIA Hqs. CIA took picture of Saul that started McDonald's investigation.	According to Office of Security, McDonald has been in touch with CIA in relation to his Identi-Kit. His FILE [redacted] states he was a cleared source of LAFO/DCS - doi September 1969. (contract agent) It is true that Mexico City Station took photos of "Saul" that McDonald claimed started his investigation.
Pg. 59 - See Identi-Kit composite of "Saul".	CDH comment: See photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. He bears striking resemblance to "Saul."
Pg. 60/61 - McDonald states it was obvious that FBI and CIA were compromised at the very top since both Agencies denied knowledge of "Saul". Noone wanted to hear anymore about him.	Helms, the DDP testified under oath that he didn't know "Saul."

Pg. 69 - McDonald began his search of "Saul" in 1970. It began, he said, with a call from an unidentified woman who arranged a meeting in London and told him she believed the Russians had a germ warfare installation in Vozrozdenya, in the Aral Sea. McDonald obtained CIA approval to make contact.	Note MOSKALEV's scientific background and travel. He was in the U.K. in 68,70, 71 and 72. Background is biophysics. MOSKALEV's (GRU) contact BUBNOV/"specialized in chemical warfare".
Pg. 70 - In Germany in 1945 McDonald knew of 12 people (Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Germans, Scandinavians, 2 Russians) who feared and hated Russia. They formed org. to observe, analyze, and report all future activities within Russia and Russia sphere of control. Most had legitimate jobs.	MOSKALEV was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Could he be a double agent?
Pg. 71 - 24 Sept 70 McDonald left for London with "Saul's" picture. McDonald said both he and Saul were contract men for CIA. Saul did dangerous jobs for private interests.	McDonald met Saul in London July 72. MOSKALEV travel shows him in London Nov 72.
Pg. 73 - McDonald learned that on Island of Vozrozdenya, Aral Sea, germ warfare was being planned against U.S. (Russians transmit germs in jet streams).	

Pg. 75 - McDonald showed photo of Saul to ? man. Man asked if McDonald's interest had to do with murder of Pres. in 1963. McDonald said no, he wanted to talk to him (Saul) on business.

Pg. 76 - By now McDonald was sure that "Saul" was reasonably well-known in highly specialized circles on the European continent.

MOSKALEV is known in international circles as scientist.

Pg. 81 - McDonald says that co-relation between activity on Vozrozdenya and new types of influenza in U.S. is disturbingly exact.

Pg. 92. - Man told McDonald in summer of 1970 on outskirts of Gormisch, that he was dying from radiation sickness. He was flown to Vozrozdenya where he was lead to believe there was hospital that specialized in cases of radiation sickness and he would be looked after by famous doctors. Was interviewed by 3 Russian specialists: Emile KROPTATE

Peter GORSACH

Marion LENTZEN

MOSKALEV was delegate to 2nd International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70.

Pg. 95 - At hospital ~~he~~ was orderly by name of Ivan. There were other young interns, orderlies, etc., there.

MOSKALEV's middle name is Ivanovich; so is BUBNOV's .

Pg. 99 - Some momths before Kennedy was killed, an inquiry was being circulated, about this man (Saul). Someone wanted to contact him. Word went out that someone needed his services.

Pg. 109 - An alleged former Agency employee (McDonald called Kimsey) said the scheme which "Saul" described /to kill the president/ could not possibly have been activated without help from very high places in this country. (U.S.)

Pg. 117 - Saul did not know he was being called Saul.

Pg. 119 - Saul told Kimsey that he often used limp as part of his disguises.

Pg. 120 - In Zurick in 1972 McDonald saw four men. Three Arabic and one who had a blunt, Slavic fact with a broad-typed nose, about 40.

Could this have been MOSKALEV?

Pg. 121 - Kimsey felt that Saul was a middle-European, so probably grew up with German as second language. "Saul" spoke English like an American.	MOSKALEV has much greater knowledge of English than he pretends or admits.
Pg. 143 - "Saul" said he came back to the U.S. for a short period one time, lived in Southern Calif. for about a month, or six weeks, then moved to Mexico. Said business was good in Mexico, and that made it easy, or easier, to try to make contact with whoever was trying to make contact with him.	
Pg. 164 - "Saul" said a contact he knew/ named Troit would have OSWALD in Mexico City 26 Sept to 3 Oct. and that OSWALD would call on both the Cuban Consul and Soviet Consul. "Saul" said he did not have a photo of OSWALD but had a contact in the Soviet Embassy would do the job (identify OSWALD) for him. Saul said OSWALD did show up in Mexico City and was fingered to him. He sat close to him in restauratns and cafeterias.	According to our records, OSWALD was in Mexico City between those dates, and was in contact with the Cuban and Soviet Consuls.

Page 167: "Saul" said he left for the U.S. in Nov 1963 but would not say how or where he crossed the border. On evening of the 20th of Nov he was in Dallas.	McDonald said that as a professional assassin with international clientel, "Saul" had to master the art of crossing borders illegally, so that no record is kept. False passports are easiest methods.
Page 177: "Saul" desccibed how he shot President Kennedy from 2nd story window of County Records Bldg.,	
Page 178: "Saul" said that he used "limp" disguise" out of bldg., and in 2 hours was out of the U.S.	Could "Saul" be mystery man who boarded plane for Havana? See DIRECTOR 36054. Flight from Mexico City reportedly delayed from 1700 to 2200 hours for passenger who arrived at 2130.
Page 182: McDonald remembers "Saul's" statement that long before the Warren Commission even existed he had been told that there was a possibility that such a bullet would be planted to tie in OSWALD's rifle positively to the shooting. It therefore appears that the mere existence of CE No. 399 tends to prove the accuracy of "Saul"s statement and the presence of a conspiracy.	

Page 185: McDonald [illegible] he believes "Saul" was telling true story.	CDH - I do too.
Page 94: McDonald finds buck passing so pervasive that he cannot escape suspicion of a continued and officially backed cover-up.	
Page 199: McDonald said he thinks Herman KIMSEY (what was true name?) was the mentor or contact for "Saul" wherever Saul worked with the Agency.	Can we identify KIMSEY? Was he really working for Agency?
Page 203: "Saul" moves from country to country, avoiding the U.S. except in extremis but keeping in touch with his contacts in Guatemala and Mexico. He calls THEM. Spends much time in Europe. Has no wife, children, or friends. Is voracious reader.	
Page 204: "Saul" went into Westbury Hotel without a tie.	
Page 205: "Saul" had recently given up smoking (1972?) but still had nicotine stains on fingers.	Does MOSKALEV smoke?

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

27 September 63: OSWALD went to Cuban Embassy, Mexico City and made appoint for visa to Cuba on way to USSR. OSWALD to Soviet Embassy to get letter of recommendation. They wouldn't give it to him because they didn't know who he was.

OSWALD went to Soviet Embassy on 27 Sept.

" then went back to Cuban Emb. on 27 Sept.

Valery KOSTIKOV talked with Sylvia Duran and said Soviet had never heard of OSWALD.

SUBJECT: Unidentified Man Seen Going into Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in Oct 1963. Photos Taken by Mexico City Station













Subject: Unidentified Man

1. A photograph of this unidentified man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The subject visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963.

2. As of October 1963, he was described as:

Apparent age: 35

Athletic build

About 6 feet tall

Blond, receding hairline with balding top

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Case 53034

FROM:
DCD/OSG/Alien Branch
[redacted]
203 Key Building

EXTENSION: 2775

NO.:

DATE: 6 Apr 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA/COG/NY Attn: [redacted] 3D 5325			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REF: LA/COG-068-77, dated 3 Mar 77

Attached copy of memo SF-137-77, dated 29 March is in response to reference. Attached also are related photographs.

[redacted]ltg

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SF-137-77

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division

ATTN : OSG/Alien [redacted]

DATE: 29 March 1977

FROM : Chief, San Francisco Office

SUBJECT: Case 53,034 - Resettlement Case

REF : ALN-71-77

1. Subject examined the photographs of the unidentified man very carefully but was unable to provide any information. We did not mention the fact that a photograph of the man had been published in the Warren Commission report until Subject said that he was unable to identify the man. Subject still could not make any comment about the identity of the man.

2. We are returning the photographs of the man as requested. We regret that Subject was unable to be of greater assistance on this matter.

for CHARLES R. CARLSEN

EBAmes:mm

Enc: Photographs

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 031686

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ I RNAL NLY ☐ CONF NTIAL SECRET SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: OTS/GAD/A/OPS 227 Central Bldg	EXTENSION 2444	NO. AB MEMO NO. 194	DATE 29 MARCH 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DC/OTS/GAB/A	29 Mar 77		✓
2.			
3. C/OTS/GAD	/	/	/
4.			
5. Deputy Chief, Latin America Div 3C2019 HQS			
6.			
7. LAD/TASK FORCE			
8. C Hopkins			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

For filing
MOSKALEV.

2 photos -
1 from FBI (State)
1 " Bur. liaison

SECRET

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

AB MEMO NO. 194
29 MARCH 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

ATTN : Chris Hopkins

FROM : Graphics and Authentication Division/Senior Operations Officer

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

REFERENCE : DDO/LA Division Memo, dated 25 March 1977

1. On 23 March, Chris Hopkins of Latin America Division handcarried photographs to OTS/GAD for identification comparison. These photos were examined by the undersigned and two identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section.

2. The results of the comparison is as follows:

A. Facial Shape - Close similarities, although there are slight differences which are probably due to subject's age differences.

B. Chin - Fair similarities-the loss of muscletone due to ageing is most apparent here.

C. Hair Line - Again good similarity with the natural ravages of time factored in.

D. Set and Proportion of Eyes and Eyebrows - Close similarities. (Comparison of eye detail is not possible due to poor photo quality)

E. Nose and Caliper Lines - Close similarities in the nose but the younger man has no sign of the distinctive caliper lines which extend from the nose to either side of the mouth on the known Soviet. This could be explained by loss of muscletone and/or differences in lighting.

F. Mouth - The shape, proportion and expression of the mouth and the whole area from the tip of the nose to the tip of the chin is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of both subjects. Here the similarities are very close.

SUBJECT: Photo Comaprison
PAGE -2-

G. The proportions of the head, check bones and the body style of the younger man tend to indicate he is of slavic origin.

3. The results of this type comparison are rarely absolute and are usually limited by poor photo quality or differences in viewing angle. With that understood it is our opinion the two subjects of the forementioned photo comparison could very likely be the same person. If additional photographs of the subjects, particularly if they are of better quality, are obtained, we would be happy to examine those as well.

Antonio J. Mendez
Senior Operations Officer,
OTS/Graphics and Authentication Division

NSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: Chris Hopkins, LAD/Task Force

ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION**

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SECRET

25 MAR 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTS/GAB

ATTENTION : Acting Chief, OTS/GAB/DIS

FROM : George V. Lauder
Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

This is the official follow-up, requested by you, of the visit to your office by Chris Hopkins on 23 March 1977 for the purpose of photo comparison. Although a preliminary analysis was given Ms. Hopkins at that time, it was understood that you would provide a written analysis for the record. Your assistance is much appreciated.

/s/ George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

DDO/LAD Task Force/CHopkins:rp(25 Mar 77) 1839

Based on: Photos of unknown man taken in front of Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City in October 1963; Photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addee
1 - LAD/Task Force Chrono
1 - Chris Hopkins
1 - DC/LA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056852

[illegible]
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

3C 2019

Source - Ramiro Perez Rodriguez

ALN-72-77
11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field Office

FROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division,
Operations Services Group, Alien Branch

SUBJECT : Case 57845

1. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.

2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.

3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.

JACKSON R. HORTON

Attachments:
As stated

FJNiemiec/ltg

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONFIDENTIAL 181600Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13919

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-06870-77

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER

REF: DCD CASE 57845
CFLA-006877

1. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT CITY. HE SAID THAT YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER, WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15, ATTENDING THE COURSE.

2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

TI SMITTAL SLIP

DA [illegible] March

TO: Chris Hopkins

ROOM NO. 3D57

BUILDING

REMARKS:

BU-4

Amber

[illegible]

[illegible]

FROM: Mailley LY / INFO

ROOM NO. 1E41	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION** 1479

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

National Library of Medicine

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PROG:

1
AU  - ~~Moskalov YI~~
AU  - Levdik TI
AU  - Lyubchanskii ER
AU  - Nifatov AP
AU  - Erokhin RA
AU  - Buldakov LA
AU  - Lemberg VK
AU  - Koshurnikova NA
AU  - Filippova LG
AU  - Ternovskii IA
TI  - Metabolism and biological effects in rodents of plutonium and
      other actinide elements.  pp. 1214-32.
SO  - In:  Nygaard OF, et al., ed.  Radiation research:  biomedical,
      chemical, and physical perspectives.  New York, Academic Press,
      1975.  W3 IN558 197r. :

SS 2 /C?
USER:
NOS
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 25 Mar 7.

TO: Chris Hopkins

ROOM NO. 3D57 BUILDING

REMARKS:

BU-4

amber

FROM: Mailley Ly/INFO

ROOM NO. 1E41 BUILDING EXTENSION 1479

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

14-00000

Soviet Personalities in Biomedicine 2 (New publication)
1974

NAME: MOSKALENKO N P
SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE
CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF CARDIOLOGY IM A L MYASNIKOV, AMS USSR, M
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "CHANGES OF THE TOTAL AND RENAL HEMODYNAMICS IN ORTHOSTATICS IN HEALTHY PERSONS AND IN ORTHOSTATIC HYPOTENSION" (CO-AU)
"COMPENSATORY CHANGES IN THE KIDNEYS IN UNILATERAL AFFECTIONS AND NEPHRECTOMY" (CO-AU)
"THE DIURETIC AND HYPOTENSIVE EFFECT OF UREGIT (ETHACRINIC ACID)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO YU D
SPECIALIZATION: CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY
CAREER POSITIONS: DIV OF VASCULAR SURGERY, INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY IM A N BAKULEV, AMS USSR, M
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "THE CLINICAL PICTURE, DIAGNOSIS AND SURGICAL TREATMENT OF CONGENITAL ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS OF PERIPHERAL VESSELS" (CO-AU)
"HEMODYNAMICS WITH ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS (ON DATA OF CARDIOGRAPHY AND SCANNING OF THE HEART CAVITIES)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO, YURIY YEVGEN'YEVICH
SPECIALIZATION: PHYSIOLOGY
CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, LAB OF REGULATION OF BLOOD CIRCULATION IN THE BRAIN, INST OF EVOLUTIONARY PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOCHEMISTRY IM I M SECHENOV, AS USSR, M
PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: INTRACRANIAL BLOOD CIRCULATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF STRESS AND WEIGHTLESSNESS, M, 1971 (CO-AU)
DYNAMICS OF BLOOD FILLING OF THE BRAIN UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS AND DURING GRAVITATIONAL LOADS, L, 1967

NAME: MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH
SPECIALIZATION: ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY
CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF BIOPHYSICS, M
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "CHANGES IN LENS OF RATS AFTER TOTAL EXTERNAL BETA-IRRADIATION" (CO-AU)
"THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPIUM-152 AND CURIUM-244" (CO-AU)
"THE DISTRIBUTION AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF CALIFORNIUM-252" (CO-AU)
"THE EFFECT OF SUB-ACUTE 241AM DOSES ON RABBITS" (CO-AU)
"EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS ON RADIOBIOLOGY IN THE USA"
"WAYS AND PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN APPLYING ANIMAL EXPERIMENTAL DATA TO MAN"
PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: THE RADIOBIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT AND MAN, M, 1969
PROBLEMS OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF PERMISSIBLE LEVELS, M, 1968 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALIK K G
SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY
CAREER POSITIONS: RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM N N PETROV, L
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "EFFECT OF ENERGY MAGNITUDE OF IMPULSE AND RHYTHM OF IRRADIATION ON THE ANTITUMOR EFFECT OF LASER RADIATION" (CO-AU)
"QUESTIONS ON THE USE OF LASERS IN ONCOLOGY" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVICH B G
SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE
CAREER POSITIONS: CLINICAL HOSPITAL IM S P BOTKIN, M
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "DEVELOPMENT OF A GRAVE FORM OF DIABETES MELLITUS AND OF HYPERGLYCEMIA IN TWO PATIENTS AFTER TAKING HYPOTHIAZIDE" (CO-AU)
"TWO CASES OF HYPEROSMOLLARY COMA DURING DIABETUS MELLITUS" (CO-AU)
PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: DIABETES MELLITUS AND DISEASES OF THE EYES, M, 1966 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVKINA O YA
SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; VIROLOGY
CAREER POSITIONS: EXPERIMENTAL TUMOR THERAPY LAB, RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM P A GERTSEN, M
PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "THE EFFECT OF A COMBINED THERAPY OF VIRAL LEUKEMIA OF MICE WITH CYCLOPHOSPHANE AND COMPLETE FREUND ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF CC57BR-BY VIRAL RETICULOSARCOMATOSIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT IN MICE" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF RAUSCHER-VIRUS-INDUCED LEUKEMOGENESIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)

EDUCATION: DR MED SCI (1967)
SPECIALIZATION: PEDIATRICS; ORTHOPEDICS AND TRAUMATOLOGY
CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, CHAIR OF PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND ORTHOPEDICS, STATE MEDICAL INST, TOMSK, RSFSR

for Chris M.

Intelligence Information Report

~~6002547~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Dupe.

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. 00-E-324/37776-71

SUBJECT Visit to US by Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev/Current Positions/Moskalev's Research Program/Personality Data

DATE DISTR. 23 DEC 71

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. October 1971

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE US/October 1971

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US biophysicist who had conversations with Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev during the visit of the two Soviets to the US in October 1971.

1. In October 1971 Dr Yu I Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Moscow and Dr Alex Moiseev, Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow, visited several US biological and biophysical research facilities. During one of these visits it was learned from Moskalev that he is the Chairman of the USSR equivalent to the US National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position, Moiseev is Moskalev's secretary.

2. Moiseev was a difficult individual to figure out. He stated that his training is in health physics and that his job in the USSR is to be informed at all times of the status of US health physics and radiation protection programs. He said that he reads the US journal "Health Physics" regularly as well as other Western radiation research journals. Although in discussions with Moiseev he appeared to be technically competent, he kept very close to Moskalev and rarely let him out of his sight. If Moiseev is Moskalev's "guardian" (as he appeared to be) he let his own guard down during a cocktail party hosted by Dr David M Taylor, Department of Biophysics, Institute of Cancer Research, Belmont, UK. During the course of the evening Moiseev consumed countless gin and tonics until he could barely articulate. Moskalev, on the other hand, sipped one or two drinks all evening.

3. Moskalev was a very adept diplomat. He finds it easy and convenient to adopt his conversation to whatever kind of group he is with. He talked at considerable length about the role of women in the Soviet economy and mentioned that his own wife is a pathologist. He was always much freer in his conversation when Moiseev was out of hearing.

4. In terms of his professional work, Moskalev stated that he has a program in the USSR of exposing dogs to various doses of radiation to learn the biomedical effects of radiation. It is a program quite similar to that at the Lovelace Foundation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The major difference being that whereas the Lovelace inhilation experiments involve only the beagle dog, the Soviets do not use a controlled breed, but rather use mongrels. Moskalev's budget, which

U	YES	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	S	YES

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he implied was sufficient, comes from the Soviet Ministry of Health. The actual Soviet work with the dogs is virtually parallel that in the US. It involves studying the low level effects of radiation from inhaled or injected materials.

5. Moskalev's work appears to be very good as far as it has gone. But he has only worked with nitrates and chlorides of plutonium, not with plutonium oxide. Oxides (solid components) should be of interest to anyone working in this field because the chemical forms of plutonium are quite useful to know about when doing accident type studies — to understand plutonium metals it is essential to know about plutonium oxide. Whether the Soviets are working only with solutions rather than oxides is not known. It is always possible, of course, that Soviet work with plutonium oxides is classified.

- end -

(600254 Keith

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Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Battelle Boulevard
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or 942-1111
Telex 36921

October 25, 1971

Mr. D. G. Williams
Manager
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Williams:

Report on Visit of USSR Citizens to Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Visitors

Professor Yuriy I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Zhivopisnaya 46, Moscow D-182, USSR.

Professor Aleksey A. Moiseev, Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies, 2 Botkinsky proezd 7, Moscow A-284, USSR.

Date

Visitors arrived in Richland at 12:35 p.m., September 27, 1971 and departed early on October 2, 1971. They stayed at the Rivershore Motor Inn.

Schedule of Visit

September 27, 1971 - 2:30 p.m. Attended Dedication ceremonies for new Life Sciences Laboratory in 300 Area.

6:30 p.m. Symposium banquet at Rivershore Motor Inn.

September 28, 29, 1971 - Attended Biology Symposium on The Biological Implications of the Transuranium Elements at the Rivershore Motor Inn. The symposium was sponsored by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Battelle-Northwest.

September 30, 1971 - Attended meeting on Transplutonium Registry organized by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Hanford Environmental Health Foundation.

October 1, 1971 - Visited Biology Department staff in Life Sciences Laboratory, 331 Building, 300 Area.

Participation in Symposium and Transuranium Registry Meeting

Five contributed papers and one invited paper by USSR scientists were included on the symposium program and were presented by Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev. These included:

1. Yu. I. Moskalov. Plutonium-239: Problems of Its Biological Effect (Invited).

2. L. A. Buldakov, Z. I. Kalmykova, A. P. Nifatov, V. N. Doshchenko, I. A. Tseveleva, G. S. Mushkacheva, N. P. Kudasheva, V. M. Pesternikov, V. I. Matveev, A. G. Surina, and V. N. Karpova. Metabolism and Biological Effects of Inhaled ^{241}Am and ^{239}Pu in Dogs.

3. N. A. Koshurnikova, V. P. Aristov, V. K. Lemberg, G. S. Mushkacheva, M. G. Poplyko, and I. A. Tseveleva. As to Mechanism of Development of Plutonium Pneumosclerosis.

4. T. I. Levdik, V. K. Lemberg, L. A. Buldakov, E. R. Lyubchanskii, and V. M. Pesternikov. As to Biological Effectiveness of Neptunium-237.

5. A. P. Nifatov, L. A. Buldakov, and V. I. Matveev. Some Late Effects After a Single Inhalation of ^{239}Pu and ^{241}Am in Dogs.

6. E. P. Ovcharenko. An Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of Transuranic Elements on Reproductive Ability.

The two visitors presented the Soviet papers in English (Dr. Moiseev speaks English quite well) and participated in the discussions of other papers. The visitors were already acquainted with many attending the Symposium so informal discussions were very common and apparently productive. Representatives from all major U. S. laboratories working on the transuranium elements and from the Atomic Energy Commission were able to meet with the Soviet visitors. The visitors related current status of their studies on biological effects of plutonium in their formal presentations and in their discussions. Their manuscripts have been received and will be published in the Symposium proceedings. During the week, they met with Dr. R. C. Thompson, Symposium Co-chairman to discuss editing of their manuscripts.

Visit to Life Sciences Laboratory

On October 1, Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev were escorted to the 331 Building by W. J. Bair. Discussions with the staff occurred during the day in the conference room with visits to various laboratory facilities occurring as necessary.

Dr. J. F. Park - Past, present, and future experiments on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in laboratory animals; therapeutic removal of inhaled plutonium, and USSR recommendations to the ICRP to lower plutonium MPC's were discussed. These Soviet scientists have completed more work on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in animals than any other research group except our own laboratory. The interchange of experimental methods, results, and concepts was valuable for planning our future research and evaluating the results of past and present research. Since they have reported biological effects of inhaled plutonium in experimental animals at extremely low exposure levels and recommended to the ICRP that limits of exposure should be lowered, the opportunity to understand and evaluate their experimental results, interpretation, and logic in making their recommendations was very useful.

Dr. V. H. Smith - Drs. Moiseev and Moskalev were reasonably well acquainted with the field of therapy for plutonium poisoning but not intimately in terms of details or recent Soviet literature; the former because his field was more on the ecological side, and the latter because he has concentrated on radiation effects and ceased active work on removal about ten years ago. Dr. Moskalev was interested in our plans to test phosphorothioic acids as removal agents and mentioned his own work on the removal of ^{144}Ce with DTPA as an example of the timing of treatment. He stated DTPA was given i.v. to humans in the USSR, not by inhalation, and that Zn-DTPA was not used or being experimented with. The latter is difficult to believe due to his former close relationship with Dr. Catsch. He was not satisfied with the lack of side effects of multiple DTPA treatments and said that some problems with bone in long-term experiments could be due to DTPA but he wasn't aware of the details. Answers to questions about other treatments than DTPA, experience in treating humans, or future plans were not obtained because presumably this was not a primary research concern of Dr. Moskalev, although he did state there was considerable research effort in this field.

Dr. C. L. Sanders discussed our low-level inhaled $^{238}PuO_2$ studies (life-span), metabolism of plutonium and cellular interaction with PuO_2 particles. The Russians were particularly informative in describing their low-level life span studies with ^{239}Pu. It was learned that Dr. Moiseev is primarily a radioecologist who worked in Siberia and is familiar with oil pipe lines and associated ecological problems such as arctic and lake pollution problems.

Dr. J. E. Ballou discussed their studies with soluble plutonium compounds, comparative metabolism and effects of DTPA, and our americium, plutonium, and cerium work. Dr. Moskalev had tried inhaled EDTA therapy many years ago to no avail. He was interested in our work with age effects on gut absorption and wanted to know why the very young absorb more plutonium. He agreed there is prolonged gut transit time and different intestinal morphology in

17. Sikov, M. R., D. D. Mahlum, T. D. Mahony, and M. F. Sullivan. 1966. Particle Size and Animal Age as Factors in Evaluating Hazards from Ingested Radionuclides. In: Gastrointestinal Radiation Injury, M. F. Sullivan, Ed., pp. 524-535.

18. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1969. Physicochemical State as a Determinant of Plutonium-238 Toxicity in the Rat. Health Physics 17, 346-347.

19. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Effect of Environmental Temperature and Potassium Consumption on Cesium-137 Metabolism in the Rat. Health Physics 15, 541-543.

20. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Distribution of Cerium-144 in the Fetal and Newborn Rat. Health Physics 14, 127-129.

21. Mahlum, D. D. 1971. Modification of the Hepatotoxic Action of Neptunium-237 in the Rat. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 18, 696-702.

Other Activities

During the week, in addition to participating in the Symposium social functions, they were guests in the homes of Dr. W. [illegible] Lotz, Director, Health and Safety Division, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richland, Drs. W. J. Bair and C. L. Sanders. These occasions were enjoyable for the hosts and, apparently, for the visitors. Dr. Moskalev is an excellent chess player and very patiently played chess with both adults and children. Dr. Moiseev was interested in current fashions and consumer products. Mrs. Bair gave him the current Sears and Roebuck Christmas catalog as an example of consumer products. He was familiar with the mail order concept but we could not determine for certain that it is common in the USSR. Both Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev have dachas near Moscow which indicate they are well up the status ladder in USSR science, but it was also obvious that Dr. Moskalev's dacha is a level above Dr. Moiseev's.

The visitors also expressed interest in our standard of living. The visits to our homes seemed to dispel some doubts they might have had about our standard of living. They seemed particularly to enjoy the opportunity to meet our children.

Comment

All those having an opportunity to meet with our Soviet guests were impressed by their congeniality, willingness to discuss their research, interest in our family life, and the spirit of good will

·RENCE BERKELEY [illegible]

REPORT ON VISIT OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 4, 1971 331

There were four guests in the group:

Dr.(Prof) Yuri I. Moskalev; Inst. of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. 6002547

Dr. Alexei A. Moiseev; Central Inst. for Advanced Medical Studies, Moscow

Dr. Jean-Claude Nénot; CEA, Centre D'Etudes Nuclaires, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France.

Dr. R. Masse,; CEA as above.

The four visitors were not traveling together, but by coincidence were participants at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during the week of Sept. 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day.

Mrs. Anne Low-Beer picked up the four guests in San Francisco and brought them to the Donner Laboratory where they were greeted by Dr. John Lawrence. Drs. Donald Van Dyke, James McRae, and Howard Parker took them on a short tour of the Anger camera facility and whole-body counting and scanning equipment. The current uses and potential in medical diagnosis were discussed. Major questions concerned the use of these instruments in monitoring and assessing the extent of persons contaminated with radionuclides in industrial accidents.

Lunch was attended by Dr. Hardin Jones, the four guests, Drs. Van Dyke and Parker, and Dr. Patricia Durbin, who acted as hostess and guide through the day. Topics discussed at lunch were centered about the Transuranium symposium. The efficacy of two new techniques to remove lung contamination by alpha-emitting isotopes was considered. The two techniques are lung lavage and aerosolized chelating agents, particularly DTPA.

A tour of Bldg. 74 followed lunch. Three of the visitors are biologists-- Drs. Moskalev and Nénot are physicians, and Dr. Masse is a veterinarian -- and all deal with animal experiments or the interpretation of the results of animal experiments. They were much interested in how one achieved and managed a "biologically clean" rodent colony, in the minimum maintenance rabbit rooms, and the cage-washing facilities. There was some discussion about the 90-Sr-injected monkeys, their exposure levels, years of follow-up, and the essential absence of biological effects at the dose levels in the study.

A two-hour general discussion between and among the four guests and Dr. Durbin followed the building tour. The chief topics discussed were how to explain the observed differences in the metabolism of the transuranic elements among species. The usefulness and verifiability of models of human Pu metabolism were considered at great length. New areas of research in internal emitters problems were considered including the influence of age on local dose and ultimate biological end-points; the usefulness of common experiments with various species particularly those with known variations in iron metabolism, bone formation rates and liver function.

Dr. Durbin proposed a collaborative effort with two of Dr. Moskalev's colleagues. They have collected data on human skeleton weights, but now do not have the time or interest to write up their material. Dr. Durbin has collected all of the 19th century and early 20th century human bone weight data and would like to add the modern Russian material to the set. Dr. Moskalev agreed to propose a joint article with his colleagues looking towards publication in an international journal. He suggested that the original data would be forwarded in any case as soon as it could be copied.

In the late afternoon the visitors toured (briefly) the Bevatron guided by Ralph Thomas; the californium separation facility guided by Francis McCarty; and the Hi-lac guided by Al Ghiorso. Dr. Moiseev, who is a physicist, was very much intrigued by the proposal to make an advanced scientific instrument by joining the Bevatron and the Hi-lac. Dr. Moskalev was not interested in how the machines worked,"physics was not his field"he said, but asked what he as a biologist might do in the nature of radiobiology experiments with such machines.

Dr. Moskalev regretted that it had not been possible to visit with Dr. Tobias. (We could probably have fit in a few minutes or made arrangements for the following day, but I had run them ragged with sight-seeing the day before, Monday was very full, and frankly they were exhausted and needed rest. pwd). They would also have liked to visit the Medical Services group. Mrs. Low-Beer tried to fill them in on the duties and routine of that group.

Comments on money, budgets, problems of communication, demands on time such as committees, etc. ran thoough all of the conversations. Dr. Nenot and Dr. Moiseev spoke English and understood it well. Dr. Moskalev and Dr. Masse understood more English than they could speak. All four are chiefly occupied with radiation protection and especially with problems raised by internal emitters. Dr. Moskalev is his country's representative on the ICRP internal dose committee. They all foresee the development of nuclear power in their countries at a fast pace. This obviously includes, as they were careful to point out, Pu fast breeders, hence the overriding interest in Pu and its transplutonium contaminants.

The Russian visitors will be guests of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine in Washington. (I feel certain we will receive good marks as hosts and as scientists. pwd).

One further point needs to be added. Although nuclear medicine is not a cuurent specialty in either country, and the use of nuclear medical techniques, especially as diagnostic tools, is very limited, the two physicians indicated thay they personally were much interested, and there was a definite trend in both countries towards more and more use of such tools. "It is coming", they said.

Patricia W. Durbin

FROM DCS/LSD/SBD 25 Nov 70

COUNTRY: USSR

DCHI 00-A(S) 322/33488-70

SUBJECT: Dr. Y. I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Moscow/Professional Interests/Personal Characteristics/Foreign Travel

13 Nov 70

1. In September 1970, Dr. Yuri Ivanovich Moskalev visited a US facility devoted to research in the field of nuclear medicine. Dr. Moskalev was born on 23 July 1920 in Igumnobo, USSR, which is near Kalinin. In 1922 his family moved to Leningrad. He has lived in Moscow since 1948. In 1958 he became the head of a division comprised of approximately 30 people at the Institute of Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. He is the best known investigator of the metabolism and toxicity of radioelements in the Soviet Union and has published a number of papers and reviews on this subject. During his visit, he outlined his as yet unpublished experiment on skin carcinogenesis in rats (dosage administered to the body surface by Sr^{90}-Y^{90} plaques on the sides of the cage) and reported two percent tumors of the skin and some mammary tumors after a 245 rad exposure. It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker.

2. Moskalev is conversant with English but not fluent, and has some difficulty in finding the correct English words; however, with a little patience, scientific communication is very satisfactory. He is genial, frank, and possesses a good sense of humor. He prefers Leningrad to Moscow, considering the former to be a more traditional and cultured city. His chief recreational diversion is his dacha, near Moscow, to which he sometimes travels by skis in winter (a distance of approximately 20 kilometers).

3. Dr. Moskalev has visited the United States on two previous occasions; once attending the Sun Valley Symposium in 1967 and again for the Annual Hanford Biology Symposium in 1969. He has traveled to other places outside the Soviet Union and was present at a meeting sponsored by the IAEA in Vienna in 1964.

- end -

Also in Oct. 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

USSR — Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

CURRENT POSITION: Institute Biophysics, Moscow since 1953.

BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE : 23 July 1920; Igumnovo, RSFSR.

EDUCATION : Doctor Medical Sciences.

PARTY MEMBERSHIP: Member CPSU since 1951.

CAREER : Member, Radiobiology Department, Nuclear Research Institute, Sungul 1951-53 (Head, Pathophysiology Laboratory 1953).

CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SCIENTIFIC SPECIALTIES : Biological effect of fast neutrons and protons of high energy; blastomogenic effect of ionizing radiation; distribution of yttrium-91, zirconium-95, and niobium-95 in rats after inhalation; distribution of radium isotope thorium-X, antimony-124, tellurium-127, tin-113, cerium-144, and strontium-89, 90; distribution of lead (thorium B) after intra-arterial and intravenous injection; dynamics of white blood cell reaction to irradiation; kinetics of excretion of Nb^{95} from organism; blastomogenic effect of 120-Mev protons; primary blood relations induced by ionizing radiation; behavior of cesium-137 in mammals; distribution and biological effect of americium-241; (1963-68).

TRAVEL : International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, October 1962; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, June 1963; Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, August 1963; visit, Poland, June 1963; Symposium on Biological Effects of Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, New York, October 1963; visit, Austria, November 1964; visit, Czechoslovakia, May 1965; Third International Conference on Radiation Research, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, June-July 1966;

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV (cont.)

TRAVEL : Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone-Seeking Radionuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, September 1967; visit, Salt Lake City, Utah, September 1967; visit, Montreal, September 1967; visit, UK, April 1968.

PERSONAL : About five feet, eight inches tall; graying, dark blond hair, with receding hairline; gregarious; reads, writes, and comprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency; wife, Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova, also works at Institute Biophysics.

HONORS : Order Lenin.

mr 21 January 1968

REMARKS : No major changes in Moskalev's career since publication of above report; a recent document refers to him as head of a laboratory at Institute Biophysics; applied for visa June 1970 for four month's stay in US for meetings of United Nations Working Group on Effects of Atomic Radiation. During 1969 published several papers (with co-authors Yu. M. Shtukkenberg, V. F. Zhuravlev, V. N. Strel'tsova, L. A. Buldakov, L. A. Kalmykova, L. A. Yerokhin, V. K. Lemberg): "Recommendations as to the Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Tritium Oxide in Industrial Environment," "Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage," "Role of the Time Factor in Separate and Combined Injury by Cerium-144 and Plutonium-239", "Accumulation-Removal Patterns of Cesium-137 in Adult Dogs; Long-Range Experiment", "Remote After-Effects of Radiation Injury".

ees 9 September 1970

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR/France/Italy

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/20573-70

SUBJECT Second International Congress on Radiation Protection/Unimpressive Soviet Contribution/Lafuma's Work With DTPA at Fontenay-aux-Roses/ General Interest in Plutonium Protection

DATE DISTR. 24 Aug 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54123
NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70
USAFAC/OTSG

DATE OF INFO. May 1970

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Brighton/Fontenay-aux-Roses - May 1970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, radiation physicist who attended the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 70.

1. The Soviet delegation to the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection arrived several days late. As a consequence, the only presentation from the USSR personally attended was a paper entitled, "Disorders in Embryonal Development of Rats after Injection of 131_I," by A M Lyaginskaya, Y D Parev and S N Sinitsyana. Since this same experiment has been conducted on the human embryo, there was really nothing new or even interesting in Lyaginskaya's presentation.

2. A Soviet delegate who was very busy asking many questions at virtually every session personally attended, was Yuriy I Moskalev. Moskalev is a well known scientist in the fields of radiobiology and radiotoxicity. He asked all of his questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given in English he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter. Moskalev indicated to a US attendee that the USSR was finally planning to request membership in the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA).

3. The most interesting work presented at the meeting from a personal point of view was that of Professor J Lafuma, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France. He is charged with the responsibility of setting the plutonium protection standards and removal techniques after exposure to plutonium for all of France. Lafuma's most impressive work involves the success he has had in removing copious amounts of plutonium and other transuranium products from humans using DTPA.

4. Lafuma explained that from his point of view he was concerned with only two primary aspects of human contact with plutonium, inhalation and wounds. His studies have shown, of course, that the earlier treatment is begun the better the results; but also he has found it easier to decontaminate an area of the body exposed to plutonium through contact or a wound than to remove it from the lungs. Lafuma has used intravenous injection exclusively for the treatment of wounds and finds that a very significant amount of the transuranium particles are discharged from the body in urine. For the treatment of inhaled particles, Lafuma has used both DTPA aerosols and injection. He find his results from injection are better than the use of aerosols, even in lung decontamination.

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DIRECTORATE OF
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY International/USSR

REPORT NO. OO-B-321/17309-70

SUBJECT Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970/Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970/Current Research and Findings

DATE DISTR. 1 Jul 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54,123
NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70

DATE OF INFO. May 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Sutton/Brighton: May 70

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; a professor and researcher in radiation biology at a US university.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with DCID 2/3.]

1. A US radiation biology researcher attended both the Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970, and the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970.

2. The nature of the Sutton meeting was such that few significant scientific positions were taken: however, in general, the quality of the papers was very high. The scheduled Soviet participants, P V Ramzayev and FNU Moskalev, were presumably not permitted by the USSR to attend; D Panov (Yugoslavia) was in the US, and D Djuric (Yugoslavia) did not attend for unknown reasons. The countries represented were UK (26), Italy (5), France (1), Sweden (2), Poland (1), South Africa (1), and the US (7).

3. To the extent that the proper "half-life for lead in man" was discussed, the consensus appeared to be that (a) the loss rate can not be represented as a single exponential; (b) the presently available data on baboons and beagle dogs does not extend for a sufficient period of time to provide a measure of the "last slow rate loss constant"; (c) it is likely that lead and radium loss rates will differ because of the selective reutilization of Pb in bone. D Barltrop (UK) and US researchers have been performing experiments which indicate that lead is not bound by red cell membranes, but at sites in the cell interior.

4. C R Hill (UK) provided a useful summary of the contribution of polonium to human radiation dose. He stipulated that the distribution of polonium will depend on whether it is administered as polonium per se or is allowed to grow in an animal as the daughter of an ingested parent. This is a significant consideration to biological researchers engaged in dose calculation work.

5. Twenty-nine countries and five international bodies were represented at the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association. W G Marley (UK) was the congress president and H J Dunster (UK) was the secretary of the scientific program committee. The congress shared the common problems and advantages of similar large meetings. Concurrent sessions inevitably brought about some conflicts in important papers, discussion was generally absent or quite limited, and there was the usual number of papers given in "broken" English by foreign scientists.

U NO

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

S YES

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14-00000

Chief, SB

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REDTOP/AEUPWARD
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ACTION: For Richard J. ULLMAN.

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Nelson C. CHIRUCK

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11-8-28

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OELA - 49339	7 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	74-120-158

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR/West Germany/France/Poland	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/27474-67
SUBJECT	Y I Moskalev's Paper on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides Disappointing/Personality Notes/Attempt to Propagandize at West German Scientist's Expense/France and Poland Fail to Participate	DATE DISTR.	16 OCT 67
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	DCS Case 49,991
DATE OF INFO.	Sep 67 and earlier		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	-- Sep 67 and earlier		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, an active researcher in the field of long-range effects of radio nuclides.

1. I was quite surprised when I arrived in Sun Valley, Idaho, to participate in the International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides to find that Dr Yuriy I Moskalev of the Institute of Physics, Moscow, had arrived two days earlier. Moskalev had traveled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to the chairman of the conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known Moskalev from earlier meetings said Moskalev's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, during this conference, he did not drink at all. He did mention, however, that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself and said he could read and write English quite well but was deficient in the spoken language.

2. Moskalev's paper concerned the results of a series of experiments utilizing an unusually large number of rats and mice. The numbers he used were far in excess of those that would be used in a western laboratory. These figures were undoubtedly meant to impress his western associates. The data he presented was primarily on Strontium 90. His findings indicated that Strontium 90 was much more toxic than had been reported anywhere in western literature and that it was more carcinogenic than has been previously reported. His technique was almost exclusively injections of radio nuclides. The control he had on his animals was not explained, but very likely was very poor. He claims to have been able to induce cancer in laboratory animals at permissible exposure levels for atomic workers in the US. The animals were not examined for radioactivity, only for the existence of cancer. A respected US scientist with much more experience than Moskalev flatly stated, in private, that he did not believe Moskalev's findings. Moskalev did not ask questions during the question periods. However, he did talk privately to several scientific reporters after their presentations.

3. Dr Heinz Spiess West Germany reported on the results of injections of Radium 224 made during World War II in a wide section of the population in Germany. At that time, there was a mistaken belief that Radium 224 had a very beneficial effect on a person's health. He reported on 242 cases in which all types of cancer were appearing. The results of his observations in human population exposures were very similar to experiments

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U YES C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification S YES

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on dog populations in this country. Moskalev made an attempt to make some propaganda of this report by asking in a small group, "Why did you do this?" almost accusing Spiez of doing it himself.

4. Moskalev left the conference a little upset. It was suggested that he might visit a US laboratory en route home, and considerable time was expended to arrange this visit. However, he apparently took a different route and made no effort to tell anyone of his plans, and he did not visit the laboratory. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he was understanding what was going on. He took many pictures with a 35mm camera. From the questions he did ask in private, it was obvious that he understood English well.

5. I understand a Polish scientist had been invited to the conference. However, when his paper was submitted, the reviewer criticized it quite severely and suggested changes. As a result, the Polish scientist apparently decided not to attend the conference.

6. Three French scientists asked to be invited when the symposium was first announced. They even gave titles to their papers and the papers were put on the program. However, they later withdrew and no French scientists attended the meeting.

/Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis in report 00-B-321/30340-67/

-end-

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COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/30340-67

SUBJECT Second International Symposium, "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho/Interesting Paper Presented by Soviet Yu I Moskalev, an Unscheduled Participant

DATE DISTR. 16 OCT 67

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 49,991
(351)

DATE OF INFO. Sept 67

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---; Sept 67

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; research scientist.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I attended the Second International Symposium on "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67.

2. An interesting paper was presented by Yuri I Moskalev, USSR on "Some Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage". Dr. Moskalev was not expected at the meeting and he came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise to hear his paper.

3. I was unaware that research such as he presented was being done in the USSR. His demonstration was a good piece of scientific work, that is, his procedures and results in pathological consequences of radioisotopes fit reasonably well with our procedures and results in the US. He did not present anything new in his paper, and it must certainly reveal that they are a few years behind the US in biology and radioisotope studies and applications. They are apparently still testing the toxicity of radio elements, which we have already established and accept, knowing the effects and using them accordingly. In other words, we are through with his reported work, feeling that it is completed; apparently they are not. Else, they don't yet know the toxicity boundaries, are still experimenting along these lines, or are experimenting to see how much more they can learn. But his paper reveals remarkable research.

4. Dr. Moskalev understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual.

5. I understand that Dr. Moskalev became very interested in visiting a certain US facility researching in his field of interest and pursued arrangements to visit there. His time schedule permitted the visit and permission to visit the facility was obtained for him from the facility and the US governmental clearances were also obtained. However, after all this was done, he "backed out", going to great extent to give the

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reason that the itinerary change was too much trouble for the US persons and authorities concerned, notwithstanding the fact that all change arrangements had already been completed, which facts he well knew. From the USSR viewpoint, he stated that no objections would exist, but I doubt that this was true. He was in Sun Valley four days; immediately after the conference he went to Salt Lake City, and then on to Montreal, Canada. His schedule allowed for several days in Canada, but he stated that he was leaving Montreal immediately for Moscow.

[Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis reported in 00-B-321/27474-67]

-end-

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KC

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COUNTRY	USSR/Yugoslavia/Poland	REPORT NO.	00-B-321/15482-66
SUBJECT	Soviets at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research/Emphasis on Study of Radiation Effects on Large Animals/David Shugar of Poland/Planning for 1967 International Symposium on Photobiology in Yugoslavia.	DATE DISTR.	24 OCT 66
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	DCS Case 47146
DATE OF INFO.	Up to 3 Jul 66		Responsive to: C-SI6-52537 Related to: FTD-5901-N
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Cortina d' Ampezzo, Italy 26 June - 3 Jul 66		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: SOURCE A. US citizen, radiologist at US university.

SOURCE B. US citizen, biologist at US university.

[illegible] 6002545

SOURCE A.

1. About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research put in an appearance. The papers I heard were disappointing. In my opinion the Soviets are confining themselves to a narrow range of interests in their radiation research. In Session 32, which was concerned with ingested or injected radioisotopes, a paper written by Yu I Moskalev and V N Streltsova of the Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Public Health, USSR, did not impress me. A very poor reading marked the presentation of the paper prepared by A Tumanyan of the Gamaleya Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The paper was given in a hurried and garbled fashion by a person who obviously was not a scientist. After the session ended, I talked to Tumanyan regarding her radiation experiments with monkeys. A woman about 45 years of age, Tumanyan had no English but spoke excellent French. She was quite enthusiastic about her work which I in turn considered commonplace.

6002547

6008566 [illegible]

2. It appears to me that the Soviets have a strong tendency toward experiments that enable them to study radiation effects on large animals. They do not seem interested in radiation response — the effect on tissue; on the other hand, they concern themselves with metabolic effects, which are important because they are related to the ability to suppress immunity mechanisms. They stress immunology and transplants.

Yu Ya Kerkis 6000332

SOURCE B.

3. Session 8, which was devoted to the discussion of radiation effects on cells, had but one Soviet paper. This was presented by J J Kerkis of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Novosibirsk. It was a poor paper.

S - NO U - NO

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4. The meeting gave me an opportunity to renew my acquaintance with David Shugar of the Warsaw Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics, Academy of Sciences of Poland. Though a highly competent scientist and a dedicated Communist, Shugar seems to be short of funds. The organizing committee of the Congress sent him money to insure his presence at Cortina d'Ampezzo. He and his wife drove by automobile from Poland to Italy. Shugar introduced me to one of his students - K L Wierzchowski. In performing the introduction Shugar declared the young man was highly capable and had a brilliant future.

5. The International Committee of Photobiology had an executive committee meeting at Cortina d'Ampezzo. It was decided to hold a photobiology symposium in the late summer of 1967 on the Island of Hvar, Yugoslavia. The symposium will emphasize photosynthesis. The general plan calls for participation by about 100 scientists, with emphasis being placed on invitations to the younger scientists in the Sov Bloc. The chief organizer of the forthcoming symposium is Maria Drakulic, Laboratory of Cellular Biochemistry, Institute "Rudjer Boskovic", Belgrade.

- end -

U. R. S. S.

The following contains photos and bio information about the delegates to the XI International Congress of Radiology, held in Rome Italy 22-28 Sep 65.

SO: 0C-E-324/18689-65 Case 46424, UNCL.

GORISONTOV, Petr D.; Prof. M.D.
Member of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR;
Two Orders of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labour;
National Delegate;
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Science,
14 Solyanka, Moscow.



IVANITSKAYA

IWANITSKAYA, Maria A.; M.D.Sc.
Head of the Roentgenological Department,
Institute of Cardio-Vascular Surgery;
National Delegate;
8 Leninskij prospect, Moscow.

KOROGODIN, Vladimir I.; Ph. D.
Institute of Medical Radiology, Obninsk;
National Delegate
Kaluga Region.



KOZLOVA, Anna; M.D.
Professor;
National Delegate;
7 Solanka, Moscow.



LAGUNOVA, Irina G.; Prof. M.D.
National Delegate;
7 Solianka, Moscow.



MOSKALEV, Yuri I.; Prof. M.D.
~~Order of Lenin;~~
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, 14 Solyanka, Moscow.



REINBERG, Sam A.; M.D.Sc.
Professor, Director of the First Chair of Medical Radiology;
Postgraduate Institute (Central) in Moscow;
Honorary President and Member of 22 Societies of Radiology;
President of the Moscow Society of Radiologists;
National Delegate;
Moscow A-55, Novoslobodskaja 57/65, K U 37.



Candidate of Medical Sciences; Chief of Division of Med. Radiology, Deputy Chief of General Department for Medical and Prophylactic Service, Ministry of Health;
National Delegate;
3 Rachmanovski pereulok, Moscow.

SEMENOV, VIKENTY A

6002597



UGRYUMOV, V M

UGRJUMOV, Benjamin; Prof. M.D.
Director of Neurosurgical Institute;
National Delegate;
12 Majakovskaja Stard, Leningrad.

min health RSFSR



ZEDGUENIDZE, Georgii; Prof.
Académicien,
Membre de l'Académie des Sciences Médicales de l'URSS;
Président de l'Association Scientifique des Radiologistes de l'URSS;
Délégué National;
14 Solianka, ASM de l'URSS, Moscow.

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URUGUAY



GORLERO ARMAS, Agustín A.; Méd. Cir. Rad.
Universidad, Facultad de Medicina de Montevideo;
Jefe de Servicio de Radiodiagnóstico;
Jefe del Servicio de Radiología del Hospital Italiano Umberto I;
1480 Calle Yí, Montevideo.

ISRAEL CRESPO, Davi; Dr. en Med. y Cir.
Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay;
Jefe de Sección de Radiodiagnóstico;
2971 Calle J. Vazquez Ledesma, Ap. 301,
Montevideo.



KASDORF, Helmut; Dr. en Med.
Profesor Agregado de Radiología de la Facultad de Medicina de Montevideo;
Jefe del Departemento de Rad. del Hospital Universitario;
1171 Calle Soriano,
Casilla Correo 950, Montevideo.

Moskalev Yu. I.

6UU2011

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR/International	REPORT NO.	00- B-3,288,475
SUBJECT	IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, NY, Oct 63: Neutron Irradiations Compared to X- and Gamma Radiations in Large Animals; the Problem of Neutron Depth-Dose Relationships in Large Animals; Problems with the term "Relative Biological Effectiveness"; Soviet Proposal for Supplanting "Rad" with Some Other Radiation Unit	DATE DISTR.	23 Jan 64
		NO. PAGES	10
		REFERENCES	CD/00 Case 41357 FTD-5462-N
DATE OF INFO.	Oct 63		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--- Oct 63		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Three US citizens. Radiobiologists at a major US radiobiological research center.

Sources participated in IAEA Sympsoium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York.

Source 1

1. Q. Did Symposium contributions include significant advancements in research on controlled thermonuclear reactions that may be useful in determining the feasibility of initiating uncontrolled thermonuclear reactions solely without the use of fissionable materials which would produce large amounts of energy, on the order of one kiloton or greater?

A. To the best of my knowledge there was no formal discussion of any nuclear reactions, as such. The great majority of the material presented had to do with biological effects, and the physicists at the Symposium were using high energy machines largely to produce the radiation that would be comparable to solar flare radiation.

2. Q. Was anything presented on effects of space radiation on the human body?

A. I can recall no Soviet references to the Vostok flights. The two Soviet speakers confined their references to purely laboratory observations. There was a number of US papers, and as I recall one from France, oriented to space flight conditions, however.

3. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I do not recall anyone's discussing drugs—Soviet or other. And I think that although research in drugs is continuing many radiobiologists are not very optimistic about their value. This is something many of us have reservations about.

4. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information.

A. I do not recall any discussion of this by anybody. Practically everyone was talking about physical measurements

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
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S-YES

U-YES

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Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. This is something on which I can speak somewhat as an expert. Although other people may claim to have this, I do not think anyone has it, including the Soviets. One can find biological criteria at low doses, and whether they have meaning beyond the limited experiment is the big question, you see.

Q. Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. Nothing.

Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Again, I can speak with some certitude. There is no conclusion about the relative biological effect of this factor. People will argue about it, but there is no conclusion. The Soviets had some things to say about it, but I was thoroughly confused about their position. There are two ways of thinking about the RBE factor. One is from the viewpoint of theoretical biology which is interested in the why of differences of biological effectiveness, and this becomes one of the parameters of experiment. The other is the question of an empirical number that one can use in handling questions of judgment about radiation exposure in man. With regard to the questions of judgment, I think that most biologists would agree that we do not have any reliable and valuable RBE factors. We have numbers that represent what we might be afraid of, more than anything else.

Q. Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. One of the Soviet delegates, [Yu.I] Moskalev, was a frequent commentator on other people's work and he made a practice of denigrating the reports of these people with respect to radiation lethality. His comment was to the effect that the studies of radiation lethality done usually in small animals were not to the point, were not germane to problems in the human case, and that to be useful these studies should be done in animals closer to man.

Q. What is your critique of his argument?

A. Well, a mass of work has been done with the smaller animals in variuos laboratories and we are beginning to get certain generalities about the nature of radiation injury, or at least certain kinds of radiation injury, and therefore I think it is worthwhile to pursue it. As you might imagine, I presented a paper on radiation lethality and was among those to whose work Moskalev objected.

Q. Do you think Moskalev's objections were motivated from anything more than a genuine scientific position?

A. Who can say? In their published work the Soviets show a lot of attention to effects in the central nervous system--they are very interested in this and US people have tended to ignore this area. So conceivably Moskalev is oriented to CNS work and physiological functions, I do not know. But quite a lot of the Soviet work has a different orientation from western work--at least their published stuff.

24. Moskalev, both from the papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated that he was very sharp, very advanced in his knowledge of the biological effects of radiation, particularly with respect to distinguishing among the effects of various energies of neutrons and the techniques for measuring these energies. I think it may be safely assumed that the Russians are using very advanced methods for detecting and measuring the various energies of neutrons--the dosimetry of neutrons. In the biological effect, I think they are way behind us. But they are much involved in the potentials of neutron irradiation and their objectives are, I am sure, the effects of space radiation on human beings.

25. Actually, [V P] Afanas'yev, who is a physicist, was even more sophisticated than Moskalev. Afanas'yev's paper was entitled "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy". His paper showed that both their production of high energy protons in the laboratory and the measurements of these protons with respect to animal work is sophisticated. They are advanced in this. I think this is the distinction to be made: they are more advanced in the technology of producing high energy radiations and the measurement of these than they are in biological effects of radiation.

26. Q. Was anything reported on effects of radiation on non-regenerative tissues such as the brain?

A. The Russians are very much involved in CNS effects of radiation, but they presented no data at the Symposium. The paper that Moskalev gave was a survey of Russian research work on biological action of neutrons and isotopes. It covered maybe twenty different pieces of work with only a few sentences for each. It presented no new data and nothing on the CNS as I recall. Afanas'yev's paper, on the other hand, presented new data on the production of dose fields with high energy protons.

27. One gets the impression that whereas Russians physics is mechanistic and quite indistinguishable from ours in that respect, Russian biology is impregnated with philosophy. Moskalev, for example, spoke of how the body "adapts" to radiation in the sense that a single animal adapts. Most biologists will reserve this word to changes in a species over a very long period. I suppose you could consider wound healing as adaptation in a sense. But western biology sees certain events occuring in an organism as the consequence of a wound which can be described without resort to notions of teleological adaptation. This philosophical tendency has been a damaging element in Russian biology, I believe.

28. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I can recall nothing on protective drugs from anybody. There was here and there a reporting of drugs used to enhance the effect of radiation with respect to tumor treatment.

29. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information?

A. I am afraid I do not understand the question.

30. Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. There is a tremendous amount of interest in such indicators everywhere. Moskalev's presentations did not say anything specific except that the Russians are working on long-term effects of small doses of radiation mostly as regards tumors. So they are interested in carcinogenesis and in fact Moskalev asked me a question following my paper on carcinogenesis. He said nothing on acute, short-term effects of low doses of radiation, so presumably they are not concerned with these.

31. People from other countries, and particularly the US, reported work having to do with low dose effects and reliable biological indicators for low ranges of dose using the chromosome aberration methods in human cells. But the Russians had nothing to say about this particular thing and seem not to be working on it as yet.

32. Q. In your opinion, what is the level of accomplishment, worldwide, in this matter of getting reliable indicators of biological damage?

A. Insofar as I know, the most sensitive and reliable biological index for damage at low dose rates involves the study of chromosome abnormalities. The approach was developed in the US and is being used extensively here and in England, and other countries are taking it up. Moreover, I think that in radiobiology in general, in almost any question you could ask, the west and particularly the US and England are very much in the forefront. From what I know of Russian radiobiology from translations and hearsay, the Russians are years behind us, but I exclude their related physical work from this judgment.

33. Q. Was there reporting from the Soviets on types of radiation detection equipment used in the Vostok flights? Did they report findings on the relative biological effectiveness factor values for neutrons, protons and cosmic ray attenuations?

A. Well, again, there was no specific mention of this, but the interest in the relative biological effectiveness factor for neutrons and cosmic radiation was a major concern of the whole Symposium: the attempt to elucidate the RBE factor and particularly the problem with respect to large animals, like humans, where in the case of neutrons you have a change in the type of radiation in the interior of the animal. You do not have this change with x- gamma rays, but you do have it with fast neutrons.

34. Q. How is this neutron change manifested in large animals?

A. The neutrons become moderated. As they proceed through the tissue, the hydrogen in the tissue reacts with the neutrons and there is a change in the energies taken up. At some point you have gammas. So, the first few layers of hydrogenous material on the outside of the animal tend to change the dose, and in the interior, where the important effects occur, you do not know what the dose is. We talk about mid-line doses, average doses, but the actual dose in the cells of the bone marrow or the gut, we do not know yet. This is one of the problems of the RBE and a very big one.

35. [A G] Searle of Harwell reported genetic effects of low dose rate neutrons in mice finding that there were as many if not more mutations with low dose rate neutrons than with high dose rate neutrons. His work is the first direct evidence of the cumulative effect of a prolonged, or fractionated, low dose of neutrons. You do not have such an effect with x- or gamma rays. If you prolong the dose with these, the effect will be very much less than it would be if you gave the same total dose in a single fast pulse.

36. Q. The neutron dose given gradually might have an even more damaging effect than if given all at once, is that it?

A. Yes. At least. But the matter is still delicate, for Searle's experiment was with mice and the question remains whether neutrons, as such, will get into cells in the interior of a large animal, such as a human being, or will be moderated and changed into gamma rays. The neutron RBE for mortality in dogs, as reported from my laboratory and Brookhaven, is around 1. For small animals like mice it is more like three or four. So there is this discrepancy, and it may be promising for large animal research. Harwell, my laboratory, and the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago are now setting up to apply low dose rate neutrons in sheep. This will be new work and should have important results.

37. Q. Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. There was nothing on this as far as I know, except for a paper from the Donner Laboratory people at the University of California, Berkeley entitled "Some Biological Effects of 730 Mev Protons". This may simulate the kind of radiation that occurs in space and this is why they are playing around with it, you see.

38. Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Well, this kind of interest is implied in work with neutrons. With neutrons there is this question of RBE and it was one of the major points of discussion at the Symposium.

39. Q. Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. All I can say is that it is logical to suppose that this is what they are after: good physical measurements of radiation of a type that might be anticipated in space.

40. Q. Was there anything said on mapping and profiles for space radiation?

A. There was nothing on this.

41. Q. What interest have the Soviets shown in development and testing of nuclear power sources for thermionic power generators? Are the Soviets now applying such generators?

A. There was nothing on this.

42. Q. Did the Soviets report progress in radiation resistant materials and components for application to long space flight electronic equipment?

A. This Symposium was all biological, so there was nothing on this.

43. Q. Was there anything from the Soviets on methods of radiation shielding?

A. It was there by implication. The fact that they were talking about the investigation of dose fields, the radiation of experimental animals with protons of high energy, implies that they would be using some kind of shielding to get the animal exposed.

44. Q. This contribution would have been in Afanas'yev's paper "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy"?

A. Yes.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,286,351
SUBJECT	Assessment of Attendees and Research at Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	30 Dec 63
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	Case--40178 Guide-316 C-SI3-81,081 CSI/ABCD MIIA FSTC/CCIA
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna, August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE. US citizen; professor of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Source, a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was his first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with paragraph 9 of DCI/D 2/3.]

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63, brought together the professional multi-discipline groups concerned with the health and safety of people exposed to nuclear materials in mining and milling and the potential problem of public health from the waste materials in these industries. To me, it pointed up the necessity of understanding the work within each of these disciplines in order to better define the exposures, dosimetry, metabolism and biological reactions in people exposed to the nuclear and chemical materials encountered in these industries.

2. Except for the historical review of the pulmonary malignancies found in the workers of the Schneeberg and St Joachimsthal mines and the epidemiological review of the Colorado Plateau with the suggestion of possible increase in pulmonary emphysema, fibrosis and cor pulmonale as well as malignancies and some dyscrasia of hair roots in these people, the meeting was devoid of any specific information with regard to health effects on humans.

3. We did not make detailed notes of the meeting and are not prepared to summarize the papers, however, there were a few points of interest to us that we will mention in the following paragraphs.

4. V A [illegible] of the USSR stated that uranium tetrafluoride was less toxic than uranyl nitrate in the same dose in animals. A P Novikova [illegible] of the USSR reported a decrease in blood cellular elements and an

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observation of an unstable non-protein [illegible] with albumin and glycosuria as the result of moderately high inhalatory doses of mixtures of the oxides of Uranium 238 and 235. He also reported from such exposures what appeared to be a reliable exponential or power type of urinary uranium excretion function and high retention of the uranium oxides in the lungs and concomitant lymph areas. These exposures also allegedly caused a deterioration of conditioned reflexes in their dogs but no pathological changes were found in the nervous system at autopsy. They did find sclerotic damage in the pulmonary perivascular, peribronchial and mediastinal lymph areas. This damage was more prominent in the dogs inhaling mixtures of oxides containing the highest per cent of Uranium 235. One dog, in [illegible] ten so studied, [illegible] with a carcinoma of the lung and another had atypical hyperplastic changes in the lung. V S [illegible] of the USSR reported that silica dust plus radon exposures in animals caused more clinical and pathological pulmonary damage than either silica or radon alone. Yu I Moskalev of the USSR reported on the body distribution and biological effects of numerous inhaled radioisotopes with acute, subacute and chronic pathological changes in the lungs, bone marrow and livers. We personally know so little about the effects of the radioisotopes of which he spoke that we don't know whether this was new knowledge or not.

5. J Lafuma from France reported finding no radon daughters in a slave dog attached by a cross blood circulation experiment with a master dog inhaling radon. Radon daughters were found in the lung of the master dog. The Yugoslavians reported confirmatory information on finding the immediate radon daughter attached to dust particles and they stressed the importance of determining radon daughters in the environment in order to calculate alpha lung doses. The Austrian, E Pohl, reported studies of people and animals exposed to radon in their spas and found a high lung retention of radon daughters and that the bismuth daughters of radon were more readily excreted by the kidneys than the lead daughters. Dr [illegible] of the [illegible] gave a fine paper on the function of mass mean diameter and chemical composition of [illegible] dust with relation to lung retention. [illegible] of Sweden gave an interesting theoretical discussion on the effects of the thickness and physiologic activity of the bronchial mucous on alpha lung doses. Cember of the US gave a theoretical discussion of the expected neighborhood alpha dose from a point source. Z Jaworowski of Poland unfortunately was not present to give or discuss his paper on the finding of radiolead in the hair and nails of uranium miners and his hypothetical evaluation of Lead 210 body burden therefrom.

6. J C Gilliland of the US reported on the secular disequilibrium of uranium daughters in uranium mill exposures and methods for determining a man's time-weighted exposure to uranium in mills with a frequency of sampling for 95% confidence exceeding or not a maximum allowable concentration. We detected no new ideas in most of the papers on environmental exposure and internal and external contamination from Japan, France and Canada.

7. E C Hyatt of the US, in a paper describing the techniques for measuring and sizing radioactive dusts, reiterated again that the particle sizing and density of radioactive dusts are extremely important in evaluating biological effects. It was generally agreed in the section on "Radiological Protection" that ventilation is most important in controlling radon and radon-daughter products in mining atmospheres and that masks have only a special limited use in temporarily uncontrolled areas of exposure. The USSR scientists, however, paid unusual attention to Mr Hyatt's paper on respirators and seemed quite concerned about the acceptability by workmen of the described respirators. The Russians apparently are using disposable masks.

8. Management of wastes appears to be a unique problem for the areas in which wastes occur. No general management of wastes was promoted.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Austria/USSR/International/Belgium/Sweden

REPORT NO. OO-B-3,2[illegible],411

SUBJECT Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling Held in Vienna 26-31 Aug 63 Under Auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization (IAEA-ILO-WHO)/USSR Research and Practice in These Subjects As Disclosed at the Symposium/Visits to Related Laboratories in Belgium and Sweden: (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie De L'Energie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden

DATE DISTR. 3 Dec 63

NO. PAGES 7

REFERENCES Case 40178 O-SI3-[illegible]

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ~~Vienna, Mol, Stockholm, Aug-Sep 63 DATE OF INFO: Aug-Sep 63~~

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US nuclear biologist.

He is head of the pharmacology operation of a major US atomic laboratory.

1. In late August 1963 I attended the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling held in Vienna, Austria. The symposium was under auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Office, and the World Health Organization. In early September 1963 I visited related laboratories as follows; (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden.

2. Due to a misunderstanding in the USSR, the topics covered by the symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology. Therefore, Soviet Delegate N Tschesnokow briefly discussed USSR uranium mine health practices which included three areas of activity: (1) Maximum efforts are taken to suppress dust at the source, and mines are well ventilated; (2) Personnel protective devices, such as respiratory masks and filters, are used, and (3) Preventive health or prophylactic procedures include assignment of mine workers to a sanitarium for one month each year. No kidney damage or other pathology apparently has been seen as a result of uranium mining activities in the USSR. There was no mention of cancer due to this activity. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters. Most Soviet studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes -- although it was brought out that the importance of inhalation as a route of entry is being recognized. The symposium brought together a world cross section of scientific disciplines for discussion of uranium mining and milling hazards. Details of all of this are given in my trip report which follows:

3. IAEA, ILO, and WHO Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, August 26-31, 1963. Visits were also made to the following laboratories:

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This is apparently due to the high acceptance of data published by the University of Rochester. It was pointed out that the possible contribution of radioactive dust composed of other than radon daughters was not actually evaluated in the case of the Schneeburg lung cancers because dust samples were not collected. Although radon is released by crushing of ores, radon and radon daughters were not considered to be a problem in uranium mills of France because of large work areas and high ventilation rates.

e. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters in general, particularly Cs^{137}, Sr^{89}, Sr^{90}, Y^{91}, Ce^{144}, Zr^{95}, Ni^{95}, Ru^{106}, and uranium and radon. Most studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes, although a few inhalation studies were described. These papers were all given by Dr L N Burykina in the absence of Drs Moskalev, Sanotsky, Novikova and Kushneva. ~~They report that 10 to~~ 18 per cent of the inhaled radioactivity was found in the lungs of rats and dogs after exposure, and that five per cent was cleared by ciliary activity. These data are difficult to evaluate since the particle sizes of the aerosols were broadly described as being between 1 and 4 μ. Translocation of the inhaled radioisotopes was similar to that reported by others.

f. Biological effects were reported only for intratracheal administration of Ce^{144} and Ru^{106}. They report degenerative inflammation of the lung and aplastic changes in the bone marrow accompanied by leukopenia in acute stages. In longer term studies they find chronic pneumonia and degenerative and proliferative changes of the bronchial epithelium and connective tissue. They also reported reduction of bone marrow hematopoiesis and degenerative changes in the liver, kidney, etc. These occurred after deposition of 1 to 19 μc Ce^{144} in rats, 0.6 to 2.6 μc Ce^{144}/gram of dog, and 0.4 μc Ru^{106}/gram of rat. No cardiovascular changes were noted, but were not specifically studied. The results of studies with uranium were similar to those reported many times, with the exception of central nervous system injury which consisted of changes in conditioned reflexes and in hibitory and excitatory processes. Due to this and relatively high burdens found in skeleton (3 to 4 per cent) they conclude that uranium toxicity is not necessarily confined to kidney damage. Kushneva's paper on synergistic effects of silica and radon reported previously published data. Silicotic rats were exposed to 8 μc radon. The radon treated silicotic rats showed more serious clinical symptoms, drop in circulating blood cells, and more extensive lung pathology than rats treated with radon or silica alone.

g. An excellent paper describing experimental work on the inhalation of Rn^{222} and its decay products was presented by Dr E Pohl from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. When Rn was inhaled in equilibrium with RaA, RaB, and RaC the concentration of daughters in lungs and other tissues were higher than when the concentrations of RaA, RaB, and RaC in the inhaled air were less than the equilibrium values. However, in the latter case the concentrations of daughter products in the lungs and other tissues were higher than would be predicted from the concentrations in the inhaled air. Further experiments are in progress to confirm and explain these results. Similar, but less extensive, studies were reported in a paper co-authored by Dr LaFuma of France and Medjidovic of Yugoslavia.

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COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,278,069
SUBJECT	Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	18 Oct 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna—August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizens; professors of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Sources, one of whom is a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was their first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[Sources are generally available for reinterview, should any further questions be generated by this report.]

[On file in CIA Library is the official program of the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling under the sponsorship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Vienna on 26-31 Aug 63. Also on file is the Provisional List of Participants as of 19 Aug 63 and the Provisional Volume of Abstracts in the language submitted by the author.] [FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY].

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, 26-31 Aug 63, did not provide much new information mainly because the US is so far ahead of the other countries represented at the symposium in its studies of these subjects. The US was actually the only country which presented original material at the conference. The Soviets sent a small three or four-member delegation headed by Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalev, a very personable and diplomatic gentleman. At the end of the conference, he voiced his dismay in all apparent sincerity, that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

2. All the Soviet papers were read by V S Kusneva, a woman physician who delivered them very dramatically. The most interesting Soviet claims, which we do not believe directly applicable to the causes claimed and which were not fully documented were:

   a. that uranium effects the central nervous system, i e, causes certain changes in the Pavlovian reflexes;

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COUNTRY	USSR/International	REPORT NO.	00- B-3,271,609
SUBJECT	Meeting of IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4-8 Jun 63	DATE DISTR.	21 Aug 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Jun 63		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna; Jun 63		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen. Medical doctor.

Source, who does cancer research at a large US institute devoted to nuclear studies, attended subject meeting.

1. I attended the meeting of the IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4 - 8 Jun 63. The purpose of the panel was to advise the IAEA on research programs in this field. The meeting was organized by Evgeniy I. Komarov (USSR) of the IAEA Division of Isotopes.

2. The following named scientists participated in the panel:

Dr. M. H. Faes, Chief
Medical Service
Nuclear Energy Center
Mol-Donk, Belgium

Dr. Arne G. A. Nelson
Research Institute of
National Defence, Dept. 1
Sudbyberg, Sweden

Dr. Krista Kostial
Institute of Medical Research
Yugoslav Academy of Science
Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Dr. P. Brinkman
Radiopathology Laboratory
University of Groningen
Groningen, Netherlands

Dr. Pierre Wenger
Institute of Radium
Geneva, Switzerland

Dr. A. R. Gopal-Ayengar
Atomic Energy Establishment
Richardson-Cruddas Building
Byculla, Bombay, India

Yuri I. C002547. [illegible]
Professor C. Moskalev
Academy of Medical Science
Moscow, USSR

Dr. Julian Liniecki
Institute of Occupational Medicine
Narutowicza 96
Lodz, Poland

Dr. Jan Muller
Radiation Safety Division
Institute of Labor Hygiene
and Occupational Disease
Prague, Czechoslovakia

Dr. Otto Hug
University of Munich
Munich, Germany

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DF - 440

9 July 1963

INFORMATION REPORT

SUBJECT : Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY

SOURCE : AEDAZZLE-1

DOI : 1961

1. Source identified a photograph of MOSKALEVSKIY [not by name, nor was the name supplied] as that of an Air Force Colonel and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.

Comment:

2. No SR/6/Bio traces.

3. Informal [redacted] traces report that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, born 17 January 1920, a radio engineer, attended a Conference on Electronics in London from 12 to 17 June 1961.

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9 July 1963

N.B. Birthdate also recorded as 23 July 1920.

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Moscalev C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 6002547

COUNTRY	USSR/Czechoslovakia/West Germany/India/France	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,248
SUBJECT	WHO/IAEA Scientific Meeting on the Diagnosis and Treatment of Radio-Active Poisoning--Assessment of Participants and Their Presentations/Biographical Information	DATE DISTR.	15 Jan 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	Guide 383
DATE OF INFO.	15-18 Oct 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna 15-18 Oct 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, doctor of medicine.

Source conducts research in the treatment of radioactive metal poisoning and is also a clinician when such cases arise at the medical center. Source speaks German and keeps abreast of all literature on the subject of radioactive poisoning. /This report was prepared by an ARMY representative assigned to the office of preparation./

1. I participated in the World Health Organization's International Atomic Energy Agency's scientific meeting on the diagnosis and treatment of radioactive poisoning, held at Vienna, Austria, 15-18 Oct 62. There were only 20 participants at this meeting; therefore each individual is considered highly qualified in this particular field otherwise he would not have been invited as a participant.

2. The two USSR doctors who were invited were Dr D J Semenov and Dr I T [illegible], a female doctor. They are both from Sverdlovsk Center. When the secretary had not heard from them, he contacted the permanent USSR representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who called Moscow to find out whether or not these two representatives would attend. He was informed that they could not come due to unforeseen circumstances. They sent instead, Prof Moscalev. He speaks only Russian. He is bright but not current on the effects of radiation, that is, the effects of radioactive metals. He was therefore not the individual that should have been representing the USSR at this meeting. This was his first time out of the USSR. He is about 5'-8" tall, weighs about 175 pounds, is around 45 years of age and has graying hair. He is generally an outgoing individual. He became very warm and friendly during the meeting and toasted my son saying that he hoped that his son and my son could climb mountains together. He was rather gay at parties but only a social drinker. He smoked an average amount. He has a family, the size of which I do not know, and is a professor in the Institute of Medicine. 2547

3. Professor V Volf, Department Ionizing Radiation, Institute of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, [illegible] 24, Prague 7, Czechoslovakia, is a well-known scientist. He is tall, slender, and athletic, in his late 30's, about 6 feet tall, speaks perfect English. He has one boy aged 5 and a girl aged 9. He lives in Prague. He publishes an annual report on the proceedings at his institute, which I receive. He is a top-notch scientist. He is an MD and sees patients in addition to conducting research. He stated

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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Moskalev

6002547

Int'ntl Conf on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning
Vienna 15-18 Oct 62

Source US national; physicist on staff of US institution of higher learning.

The most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof Yu I Moskalev of USSR Acad Sci. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When Prof Moskalev spoke, however, he changed the title to "Problems of Kinetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." During his presentation, it was suggested that the retention of multiple dosis of Sr90 in the rat could not be predicted on the basis of single injection studies. After continual questioning via translation service (he apparently spoke no English), we concluded he meant by this that the rat is a continually changing animal. In any event, his paper presented nothing new and could be described as being rather elementary.

In contrast, Prof Moskalev's questions throughout the four day meeting covered a wide range of topics, and left one with the impression that he was a competent individual. In response to questions, however, his answers were far from satisfactory. He have no specific answers to questions regarding Soviet experience with radioisotopes in man.

SO: CIA-A-3.246.539 CONFIDENTIAL Controlled/NDA/NFD
26 Dec 62

SECRET

1. NAME MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich

CASE NO. 5656719

2. VARIANTS

3. POSITION Sci Worker, Radiobiological Installation, Nuc Res Inst, Sungul, Chelyabinsk Oblast, c 53; I/w Inst. of Biophysics, AS USSR, Moscow, 51

23

4. LOCATION @ Sungul, Chelyabinsk Obl, C 53; Msocw, 51

5. OCCUPATION Nuclear Research-Radiobiology

6. FIELDS Distribution of Isotopes in Various Animal Species.

7. BIRTHDATE c1921 ✓

8. BIRTHPLACE

9. NATIONALITY USSR

10. EDUCATION

585 2750

6002547

11. HONORS

12. POL. AFFIL. CP Mbr., 51 ✓

13. CTRY. WORK. FOR

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BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION CARD

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In 1953 tests were begun by MOSCALEV concerring the distribution of isotopes in various animal species. Work of the radiobiological installation at Sungul

SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-14 64, 25 Oct. 55, Secret. jab

MOSKALEV -- assistant to Timofeyev, Head of Biological Dept, Sungul Institute. Moskalev, a nerve physiologist and party man, worked with Catsch (and subsequently succeeded him) on research on curing or preventing radiation damage. (Source is Dr Wilhelm Menke (STIB), a returned German scientist who gave information on Soviet personalities at the Nuclear Research Institutes at Sukhumi, between 1945 and 1955.) SOURCE: CIA, CS-G-82811, 1 Mar 56, SECRET/NOFORN RELEASABLE TO U.K./CONTINUED CONTROL

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich - worked as a sci. asst. in source's lab. at Sungul. Took the position of chief of the pathophysiological lab. when source left in Oct. 53. Not well qualified. Was supposedly imprisoned during the war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Became a Party member in 1951. Had one month's TDY at t the Biophysical Inst., Moscow during the last half of 52. Upon his return, he informed source that the inst. was doing intensive work on the hematological effects on dogs of radiation exposure. The inst. was also working on radiation effects on the nervous systems of dogs, similar to the conditioned reflex experiments of Pavlov. He also stated that the inst. was doing parallel work to Sungul on increasing the excretion of incorporated radioactive isotopes, using diuretic substances & hormones, particularly the parathyreotrope hormone. No special results were achieved. He was married to Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova. Age 35. Medium height. Dark blond.
SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-1550, 24 Apr. 56, Secret joe

SRI, Consol, Biblio, lme, Ju 1956

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                                           15-10
A 76A01 H    TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N    SUIS                          (BERN)                  CA SEP 76         OPEN            102
A 76A01 U    PCS REPORTS           20-10   (BERN) 7821                                09 SEP 76
F 76A02 U    NO TRACE                      WASH-914630             TELEPOUCH         14 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404617                           201-0943610
  00A00 B  KUZNETSOV                       VLADIMIR                                   T
  00A00 C   USSR                           MOSCOW                  20 SEP 26          M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 B  KUZNETSOV                       VLADIMIR                                   T
A 76A01 C   USSR                           MOSCOW                  20 SEP 26          M
A 76A01 D   USSR
A 76A01 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE                             15-5
A 76A01 M   TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N   BELG                           (BRUSSELS)              CA SEP 76          OPEN
A 76A01 U   PCS REPORTS            20-5    (BRUS)-41919                               31 AUG 76
F 76A02 U   POSS TRACE                     WASH-914708             TELEPOUCH          13 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404618                           201-0933047
  00A00 B  BELOKON                         VALENTIN                ANATOLEYEVICH      T
  00A00 C   USSR                                                   CA 30              M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE OLGA
B 76A01 B  BELOKON                         VALENTIN                ANATOLEYEVICH      T
B 76A01 C   USSR                                                   CA 30              M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE OLGA
B 76A01 G  STUDENT
B 76A01 M   UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSEL               15-5
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B 76A01 Q   FOR 1976-1977 ACADEMIC YEAR
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS 20-5          (BRUS) 41938                               02 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   TRACE REPLY                    WASH-914699             TELEPOUCH          14 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404619
  00A00 B  TRUBETSKY                       ANDREY                  GERASIMOVICH       T
  00A00 C   USSR                           KRASHINO                04 MAR 48          M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA

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B 76A01 B  TRUBETSKY                       ANDREY                  GERASIMOVICH       T
B 76A01 C   USSR                           KRASHINO                04 MAR 48          M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA
B 76A01 G  ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLER
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  00A00 D   USSR
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F 76A01 D   USSR
F 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE
F 76A01 H   SORICE INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
F 76A01 M   STANKO-FRANCE                        15-4
F 76A01 N   FRAN                           (PARIS)                 PR JUL 76
F 76A01 U                                  SX-29811                                   03 JUL 76
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  00A00 A 404622                           201-0943860
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Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

SECRET

Filed & indexed in [illegible] files

File [illegible] memo

Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

([illegible])

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, née: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project KJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

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TO
Chiefs of all Stations

INFO.

FROM
Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT
Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

DATE TYPED
23 Dec. 1964

DATE DISPATCHED
2 FEB 19[illegible]

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Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964
and Mr. A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748

S-E-C-R-E-T

ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
MAY 6, 1964

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. DULLES. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.

Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. STERN. Turning to——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.

in view of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again.

Mr. McCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy?

Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at——

Mr. McCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it.

Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably.

Mr. McCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. STERN. What is the subject?

Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI.

Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense?

Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or without payment.

Mr. STERN. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about?

Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.

Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?

Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.

I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. STERN. Are they complete?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. BELMONT. I did.

Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Well——

Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?

Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. [These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. STERN. Have you broadened——

Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir——

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to furnish this information.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in?

Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——

Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.

Mr. STERN. This liaison function.

Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of Instructions Section 83."

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.

Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date?

Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.

Mr. BELMONT. Very good.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (*c*) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (*d*) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.

Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?

Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (*d*) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.

Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (*d*) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these——

Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought.

Mr. STERN. That is right.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (*d*) to an "or".

Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.

The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?

Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. BELMONT. Correct.

Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.

Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?

The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.

We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCloy. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having.

Mr. Belmont. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCloy. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel——

Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCloy. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. Belmont. I do not know.

Mr. McCloy. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCloy. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.

Mr. McCloy. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. Belmont. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them.

Mr. McCloy. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.

This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.

Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.

Mr. MCCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you——

Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instructions.

Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.

Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a special category other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. MCCLOY. All Communists, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that correct?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. MCCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. MCCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. McCloy. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative Ford. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. Belmont. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge.

Representative Ford. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139 agents that we have made available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative Ford. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.

Representative Ford. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau.

Mr. Belmont. No. There were never any such requests before.

Mr. Stern. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men will be felt.

Representative **Ford**. 169.

Mr. **Belmont**. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.

Mr. **Stern**. 139 on 16 separate occasions.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining. We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not complaining.

Mr. **Dulles**. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont was hère, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to——

Mr. **Belmont**. At the time of the assassination?

Mr. **Dulles**. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the Secret Service.

Mr. **Belmont**. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic responsibility.

Mr. **Dulles**. And you have no auxiliary function to that——

Mr. **Belmont**. No, sir.

Mr. **Dulles**. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.

Mr. **Belmont**. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.

Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have done religiously.

After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was concerned.

Mr. **Dulles**. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassination?

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Dulles**. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office—did this order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?

Mr. **Belmont**. It was very rapid, probably within a day.

Mr. **Dulles**. I see. It wasn't immediately after.

Mr. **Belmont**. No.

Mr. **Dulles**. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.

Mr. **Belmont**. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and started the investigation.

Mr. **Dulles**. I realize that.

Mr. **Belmont**. And started the investigation and it was theirs.

Mr. **Dulles**. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by courtesy of the local authorities.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."

Mr. **Dulles**. I understand.

Mr. **Belmont**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legislation in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?

Mr. BELMONT. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Since the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any recent legislation to that effect?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research on it, and I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.

At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular point.

Mr. BELMONT. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is that it was called to our attention—I cannot pinpoint it for you—but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.

Mr. MCCLOY. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.

Mr. MCCLOY. In respect of other incidents.

The CHAIRMAN. When the emotion died down.

Mr. MCCLOY. When the emotion died down, that is true.

I have some further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have a specific record of when that information was recorded.

Mr. STERN. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some contemporaneous communication?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.

Mr. STERN. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and 67, just so the record is straight.

Mr. BELMONT. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the headquarters dateo October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.

On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELs.

Mr. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy.

Mr. MCCLOY. I have one or two questions.

Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent or an informant of the FBI?

Mr. **Belmont.** I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.

Mr. **McCloy.** In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?

Mr. **Belmont.** No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of any other country.

Mr. **McCloy.** Or any other agency of the United States?

Mr. **Belmont.** Or any other agency of the United States.

Mr. **McCloy.** You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.

Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check-ups that have not already been undertaken?

Mr. **Belmont.** No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.

Mr. **McCloy.** Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long exposure to investigation in this case.

As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a single individual?

Mr. **Belmont.** No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.

Mr. **McCloy.** Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he was the President's assassin?

Mr. **Belmont.** Yes, sir.

Mr. **McCloy.** Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or the agency—have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?

Mr. **Belmont** No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered——

Mr. **McCloy.** Bullets.

Mr. **Belmont.** And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassination itself.

Mr. **McCloy.** Until recently.

Mr. **Belmont.** No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.

Mr. **McCloy.** In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?

Mr. **Belmont.** Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.

Mr. **McCloy.** Have we got all your reports on that?

Mr. **Belmont.** Yes, sir.

Mr. **McCloy.** Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?

Mr. **Belmont.** The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there was an association between them.

Mr. **McCloy.** Maybe this is in the record, but do you—by reason of your very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question—do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find—was there any evidence in

Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.

As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.

I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.

I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your particular competence.

Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.

Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received them.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.

We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.

Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.

Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give you a——

Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention.

Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book. That is your idea, is it?

Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything about Buchanan's background?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.

Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.

Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School and Yale.

Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.

Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the street.

Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

J. EDGAR HOOVER
MAY 14, 1964

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOOVER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our purpose is?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.

Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whether Lee H. Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the name and information concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and position?

Mr. HOOVER. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. HOOVER. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years according to the newspapers?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; since 1924.

Mr. RANKIN. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information, Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time. Are those statements correct?

Mr. HOOVER. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest that you will find that that is your letter, together with your affidavit about this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to us concerning this particular subject.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. HOOVER. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of officers who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.

Mr. RANKIN. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic involved in the assassination?

Mr. **Hoover**. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the replies that have come to the Commission.

In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any foreign conspiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Representative **Ford**. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus far?

Mr. **Hoover**. That is correct, sir.

Representative **Ford**. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing its investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?

Mr. **Hoover**. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will continue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which various weird allegations are made or in which people have reported psychic vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could not have known any of the facts have made, some very strange statements. There have been publications and books written, the contents of which have been absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the years of these so-called crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some years to come.

I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be accepted by everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pronounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagree violently with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can't be said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.

Representative **Ford**. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?

Mr. **Hoover**. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.

At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about 150 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, D.C.

Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the assistant to the Director.

Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't missed anything or haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.

Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Department of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on General Walker's life.

First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded it as an entire lie—that he had never received any request of that kind. I had our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no reference in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.

Representative FORD. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies, and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Commission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some evidence might come to the surface.

Mr. HOOVER. That is, of course, possible; yes.

Representative FORD. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence regardless of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by the Bureau or any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad or of no value.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation. We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made statements. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that the statement is an entire falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or why they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that individual so it can be made a part of the record.

Representative FORD. Under your authority from the President, the authority which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on indefinitely?

Mr. HOOVER. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I have stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination. There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must, and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations or reports of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Boggs.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover—to cover any ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions. First, let me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commission.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Representative BOGGS. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.

Mr. DULLES. A book now. A book is out; yes.

Representative BOGGS. A book now. I understand they have been widely circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journalists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and so on.

Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with this sort of thing?

Mr. HOOVER. We have received a request from the Commission to review that book and to make a report upon any portions of it that can be contradicted or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background. He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have followed the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I would call "journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most of the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I have had a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make such statements without foundation.

Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not knowing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to wonder. I think you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don't know how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements. I don't think too much time should be given to these individuals who have such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an investigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission, even after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found in each particular instance.

Representative BOGGS. Now, on the other side of the fence——

Mr. DULLES. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you would add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man named Gun. He is a more reliable correspondent.

Mr. HOOVER. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.

Mr. DULLES. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met him over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.

Mr. HOOVER. That is not the same one.

Mr. DULLES. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent to the Bureau.

Mr. HOOVER. I would appreciate that.

Representative BOGGS. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's allegations are that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow's allegations are that the Communists assassinated the President. Would you care to comment? Have you read that piece?

Mr. HOOVER. I have read that piece. My comment on it is this in general: I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.

A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I have known General Eisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be a sound, level-headed man.

In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow this Government and so forth.

Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going to go for his protection and his security. I don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and it makes the security problem all the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.

There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, of the criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination.

Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information that dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subversives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that will be submitted within the next few months.

Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the Secret Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local authorities. Just recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local authorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Service and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really almost in a house arrest.

Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing, but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organizations that advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be accompanied by a police officer. That gives me great concern because in New York City alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the twilight zone of subversive fronts.

Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front organization, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it certainly shows either one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or he is a menace. That has been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Government employee who belonged to one or two, maybe in his early days. I don't believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and intent in associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20 of them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.

Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under the domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know that. They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong. Now, that is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try to use it in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest and we don't want that. We don't want a gestapo. We have to, I think, maintain an even balance.

I think it was very well expressed—

Mr. DULLES. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local authorities?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That brings me back to the question I think I heard

Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the crux of our investigation.

I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the report is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was not connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.

Mr. HOOVER. Correct.

Representative BOGGS. Do you still subscribe to that?

Mr. HOOVER. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at the time that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that it could be released to the public.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that the report of any agency of Government investigating what might be some shortcomings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor Connally.

And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association between Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.

Mr. DULLES. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?

Mr. HOOVER. Anybody else who might be——

Mr. DULLES. In connection with the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first this might be a Castro act.

Representative BOGGS. Right.

Mr. HOOVER. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I think it was $6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly. The man later retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.

As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have always held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an interpretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological contribution.

But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and who were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.

We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.

There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any association with him.

Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it wasn't any so-called "joint," to use the vernacular. It was just another nightclub. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this assassination.

Representative BOGGS. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever associated with Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. It did.

Representative BOGGS. You didn't find any indication of why anyone should even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?

slowly. It wasn't going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect opportunity to do it.

Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the President as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?

The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between his window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs, and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.

But he had given no indication of that—we had interviewed him, I think, three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently do that.

Representative Boggs. And had he been?

Mr. Hoover. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was. He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him more as a kind of a queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him too strongly.

But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk—I don't know whether it is true—and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country to become what they call a "sleeper," that is a man who will remain dormant for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.

I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't tell you if you asked them.

They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had any association with anything of that kind.

Representative Boggs. Now we have some people, including this man's mother, talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States. I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these statements publicly for money, apparently.

Mr. Hoover. Yes; she has.

Representative Boggs. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.

Mr. Hoover. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts. But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other parts of the country, always speaking for money.

Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years, who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to say something sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And they will say, "Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it."

She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the legal evidence that you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very little credence in anything that his mother said.

I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made, so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's name, which was a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going to see how much money she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.

Representative Boggs. And the allegations she has made about this man being an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?

Mr. Hoover. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA, and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants. That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment. And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or working in any capacity for the FBI.

As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some information, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant. The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant. He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination, of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was no proof of that, and we checked him carefully.

We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave any indication of any tendency to commit violence.

There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security of the country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I am particularly concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too far in restricting the citizens of our country from exercising their civil and constitutional rights. The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn't mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches, and we know them, but I don't feel that the time has come that they should be arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then, proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such cases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion ought to be handled in the American manner.

I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category, I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me, saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.

Representative BOGGS. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one. I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the House of Representatives.

Mr. HOOVER. I recall that.

Representative BOGGS. I happened to be there on the occasion and there were many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Members of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions and this, obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what you are telling us, isn't it?

Mr. HOOVER. That is the great problem. We have participated in the protection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was something we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the responsibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government, including the President, but the Queen of Greece, General de Gaulle, Emperor Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect target for someone in some window.

Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated. Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayflower, and you can't make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into a police state.

The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices. We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social occasion, all of the employees in the hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys, and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that is as far as I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters and you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function are generally invited by card or by list and that is very carefully checked at the entrance by the Secret Service.

We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In my own mind, I question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought groups into the White House gardens and walked around with people he didn't know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am concerned about it.

President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was taking unnecessary chances.

But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."

Representative BOGGS. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had the same difficulty.

Mr. HOOVER. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital. One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly opposed to the President riding in an open car.

They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time. I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is a closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other day, the President got out of the armored car which had been flown there for his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open, so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can't have the top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.

Representative FORD. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that the

FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any other way.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.

Representative FORD. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when he was before us.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of the records of the FBI in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the Bureau—we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative work and the other in charge of investigative work—we have also checked the administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made and there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents, who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.

Representative FORD. And you were not under any limitation or restriction from any other authority in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes under my chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They can't just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used as informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.

Representative FORD. There is no limitation on what you can tell us about this situation?

Mr. HOOVER. None whatsoever.

Representative FORD. No limitation; no restrictions?

Mr. HOOVER. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time going back as far as you may want to go.

Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question there? I think you have answered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself, have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you make the statement to us?

Mr. HOOVER. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to him. For that reason I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then when the allegation was made by someone—I think it was the mother of Oswald first, if I recall correctly—that he was employed by some Government agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.

Senator COOPER. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds that are made available to them.

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are examined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have no lump sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not supported by vouchers.

Senator COOPER. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left the United States and when he returned.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?

Mr. HOOVER. While he was in Russia?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation that this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return. We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone there.

Senator COOPER. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to follow his activities?

Mr. HOOVER. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelligence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is domestic. We work very closely together.

Senator COOPER. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination or the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concerning the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. HOOVER. Well——

Senator COOPER. Would that be a matter for some other agency?

Mr. HOOVER. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had returned here.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together, conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.

Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now with great cooperation on both sides.

Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities, and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him up there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If he comes back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very close liaison.

As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is to have a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45 minutes or an hour.

If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that goes on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.

The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those countries any matters that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA. Our purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines, to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to the internal security of the other country.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one other question?

Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume——

Mr. HOOVER. I think there are about 36.

Senator COOPER. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of reliability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem to you they should be given some special attention?

Mr. HOOVER. We have now———

Senator COOPER. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?

Mr. HOOVER. We have taken steps to plug that gap.

Prior to the assassination of the President, a defector, before he came back was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department or the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could be a potential intelligence agent.

Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.

There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. That includes military defectors, does it not?

Mr. HOOVER. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China, to the satellite nations and to Russia.

Senator COOPER. Just one other question, because I have to go.

In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist Party?

Mr. HOOVER. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related to the Communist Party in this country.

Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She is a rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.

As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely associated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won't answer questions. As to the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have indicated any Communist associations of any kind.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer magazine or newspaper?

Mr. HOOVER. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is the letter that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.

Mr. RANKIN. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except what you have already testified to?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very specific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter just referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in the National Enquirer?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; that is the one.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that is the letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the security of the President that you have described in your testimony.

Mr. HOOVER. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted, originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in 1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.

Mr. RANKIN. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had in regard to those matters?

Mr. HOOVER. It does.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you care to add anything to it?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Commission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them, concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had concerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service prior to the time of the President's assassination.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred in Dallas.

In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situation largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light of day, so to speak.

How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't know. But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was furnished to us.

Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not interview him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.

We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of individuals, sometimes on these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened that if he doesn't come back to this country and work for them they will expose the fact that he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.

Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred year after year for some time.

In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.

After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and if he was, where he obtained money and with whom he had dealt.

He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of danger in him.

However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the country. We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas, and that was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.

Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.

However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go to see a person and tell him now, "If you think of anything you want to tell us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was done with Mrs. Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at work.

Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative attention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information concerning Hosty's name, telephone number and license number was not included in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty's name, et cetera, appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.

After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the report. In order that there would be a complete reporting of all items in Oswald's notebook, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of our Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning this matter by the President's Commission.

There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been indicated.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at the time, he was at work—did you mean Mr. Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could interpret for her.

Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his telephone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent of the FBI, or why she did it.

But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which contained many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.

Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that would have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not furnished at the time to Secret Service.

Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened the President or Vice President.

At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition. They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what tangent they are going to take. If such a person is living in some part of the country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the Secret Service.

One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House; the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.

Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove up the marble steps of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.

People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.

We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If they don't, we may take steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.

Mr. **Dulles**. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers of names because of their limited personnel?

Mr. **Hoover**. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a very small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supplementing them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.

Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them. Frankly, I don't see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the White House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the President goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church in Washington, where he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not been cleared with the Secret Service.

Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.

We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest. I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local authorities do what they think is right.

Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is, "Well, we will resolve the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen from them." That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don't think you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelligence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and arrest people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can't arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.

Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because the other kidnappers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them. However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession and signed it so the court held that it was admissible.

The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts and we have been able to do it effectively.

I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it more difficult but I think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You are familiar with that?

Mr. Hoover. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.

Mr. Rankin. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you have just testified to?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had any contact with him.

Mr. Rankin. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.

Mr. Rankin. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any connections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups or others that might be conspiratorial?

refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would have been given out: Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week or 10 days, It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the Commission.

Representative BOGGS. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?

Mr. **Dulles**. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. **Hoover**. Oh, yes.

Representative **Ford**. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. **Hoover**. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to it.

Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be.

Representative **Boggs**. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. **Hoover**. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds, remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. **Dulles**. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some protection to protect his head?

Mr. **Hoover**. Oh, yes.

Mr. **Dulles**. Because if the armored car had been open——

Mr. **Hoover**. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recommendation.

Mr. **Dulles**. The back never comes down?

Mr. **Hoover**. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top, sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.

Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.

Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.

Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in section 1114, title 18 of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal law.

Mr. **Rankin**. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks, the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?

Mr. **Hoover**. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the

Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession under the Constitution but not below that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOOVER. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly in connection with foreign travel.

Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Washington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.

Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both the House and Senate at the present time.

The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now, there are arguments, of course——

Mr. DULLES. In a false name.

Mr. HOOVER. In a false name.

There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country. I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't be willing, if he is a law-abiding citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or other firearm.

It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.

Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some steps should be taken along that line.

Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more or less dedicated Communists.

Representative BOGGS. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director, I happen to be the author of that law.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they picket public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.

I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups, should be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times it doesn't continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right away.

Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't arrest a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike, lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.

We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the authority the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.

have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that number.

The **Chairman.** Yes; it may be.

Representative **Ford.** Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to submit.

Mr. **Rankin.** May I assign 867?

The **Chairman.** Yes.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS

MAY 14, 1964

The **Chairman.** The Commission will be in order.

Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short statement to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read it at this time.

Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.

Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. **McCone.** I do.

The **Chairman.** Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. **Rankin.** Mr. McCone, will you state your name?

Mr. **McCone.** My name is John Alex McCone.

Mr. **Rankin.** Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?

Mr. **McCone.** Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. **Rankin.** Have you been Director for some time?

Mr. **McCone.** Yes; a little over 2½ years.

Mr. **Rankin.** Where do you live, Mr. McCone?

Mr. **McCone.** I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.

Mr. **Rankin.** Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer, agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?

Mr. **McCone.** Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite naturally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.

Mr. **Rankin.** Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?

Mr. **McCone.** Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection, and I would like to read for the record——

Mr. **Rankin.** Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?

Mr. **McCone.** In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never furnished him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When I use the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.

Representative **Ford**. Does that include whether or not he was in the United States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?

Mr. **McCone**. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply the Commission in connection with our request for it?

Mr. **McCone**. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply to you.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of this record.

The **Chairman**. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. **Rankin**. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.

Mr. **Rankin**. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter, could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?

Mr. **McCone**. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?

Mr. **Rankin**. Could we have him sworn then?

The **Chairman**. Yes.

The **Chairman**. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. **Helms**. I do.

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr. McCone. Could you answer the question directly?

Mr. **Helms**. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of the individual's name, but we also usually get information of a biographical nature. We then check this individual's name against our record. At that point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. **Rankin**. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?

Mr. **Helms**. Yes; I did.

Mr. **Rankin**. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?

Mr. **Helms**. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you know at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate, but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. We have; all.

Representative FORD. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.

Representative FORD. They have had the opportunity to personally look at the entire file?

Mr. HELMS. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and actually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same opportunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was offered the same opportunity.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them, in a general way?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I can.

In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Washington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individuals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. However, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they would know exactly what the correspondence said.

Mr. RANKIN. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.

Representative FORD. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all information of every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative FORD. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have made a full disclosure?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information, though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will certainly continue to forward to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. McCone. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me to believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.

Representative Ford. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of the assassination?

Mr. McCone. We made an investigation of all developments after the assassination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an assumption.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCone. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any record we have.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?

Mr. McCone. No.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union or people connected with Cuba, did you not?

Mr. McCone. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.

Mr. Rankin. Do you also include in your statement that you found no evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?

Mr. McCone. That is correct.

Mr. Rankin. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCone. That is right.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone, include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about his activities?

Mr. McCone. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald. We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such a payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelligence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked for Soviet intelligence.

Representative Ford. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?

Mr. McCone. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands would be investigated promptly.

Mr. Helms. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in anything we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immediately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our inquiries or the picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is on a continuing basis.

Representative Ford. In other words, the case isn't closed.

Mr. Helms. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.

Mr. RANKIN. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything new that developed in the future that could be properly presented to the authorities?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the security provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?

Mr. McCONE. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I am sure this Commission will—has and will—devote a considerable amount of thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as part of its report.

Mr. RANKIN. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.

Mr. McCONE. We have a very important function in connection with the foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology of the Central Intelligence Agency's support of President Kennedy's visit to Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you please do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Director, is that a security matter?

Mr. McCONE. No. I think I can handle this for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. McCONE. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that privilege.

That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance party of the Secret Service.

We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and the Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that might be required.

These instructions were given two months before the trip.

On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces that would be called upon to protect the President.

Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their cooperation and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department, the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services.

That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the protection of the President, including current information on the size, strength and capabilities of potential troublemakers.

Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified, political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for demonstrations were specified.

On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico supported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational report and the followup activity required.

Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on the 13th of June.

On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communications facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the essence of all that had gone before.

Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that the President should make the visit as scheduled.

On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.

On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate was that the President would receive a great welcome.

The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.

From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, headquarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support of the embassy and the Secret Service.

So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest to the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the normal format of your procedures?

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When the President goes abroad?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that might involve your jurisdiction.

Mr. McCONE. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all points, both domestic and foreign, where information had been received which might have a bearing on this problem.

Mr. RANKIN. Assassination?

Mr. McCONE. Assassination.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?

Mr. McCONE. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief Justice, saw some of our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. McCONE. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to individuals. This would be helpful.

But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and therefore, we must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common responsibility.

I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.

Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and so on and so forth.

I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which some of them are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for informing when others conducted themselves in a damaging way.

Mr. DULLES. Smuggling cases?

Mr. McCONE. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done. I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassination and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be performed.

Mr. RANKIN. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be materially improved.

Mr. McCONE. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate. I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would have no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.

Mr. DULLES. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union, did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those particular subjects?

Mr. McCONE. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles. The fact is we had very little information in our files.

Mr. HELMS. It was probably minimal.

Representative FORD. Why did that happen?

Mr. HELMS. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.

Representative FORD. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's responsibility to obtain the information, or State Department's responsibility to supply it to Central Intelligence and to others.

Mr. McCONE. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the responsibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service and embassies and so forth.

For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with the FBI.

Representative FORD. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union, whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility to do that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA, I don't believe there are such regulations which exist.

Mr. HELMS. I don't believe they do, either.

Mr. McCONE. I am not sure they should.

Representative FORD. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the head of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?

Mr. DULLES. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country, shouldn't you have it?

Mr. McCONE. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to be careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.

Mr. DULLES. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course, have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.

Mr. McCONE. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.

Representative FORD. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.

I would like your comment on it.

Mr. McCONE. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight. What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State Department and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence Agency. It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that is, becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would be agents in place.

Representative FORD. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not, he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these steps, step by step, by the Department of State?

Mr. McCONE. You might answer that.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I would have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it in some time so I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense a critical comment but a statement of fact.

But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through, because we do not have responsibility in the Central Intelligence Agency for the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are abroad unless there is some special consideration applying to an individual, or someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy back to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these events were occurring.

Representative FORD. I think it could be argued, however, that the uniqueness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the developments as they transpired. This is not—and when I say this, I mean the Oswald case—is not an ordinary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about the whole situation.

Mr. McCONE. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.

Representative FORD. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations were not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done about it.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?

Mr. McCone. Such an intrusion?

Mr. Rankin. Upon their right to travel.

Mr. McCone. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however. I was just thinking of the——

Mr. Rankin. Burden?

Mr. McCone. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.

Mr. Rankin. Do you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an intrusion upon their rights?

Mr. McCone. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly, if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing the information was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their rights.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Senator Cooper. May I inquire?

The Chairman. Senator Cooper.

Senator Cooper. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.

It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States. Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or employees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?

Mr. McCone. I am not familiar with them; no.

Mr. Helms. Neither am I, sir.

Mr. McCone. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.

Senator Cooper. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?

Mr. Rankin. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.

Senator Cooper. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous question, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more comprehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. McCone. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources to gain such information.

The Chairman. Anything more? Congressman Ford?

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we did.

Representative Ford. Can you give us any information on that?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while he was there.

We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinating President Kennedy.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investigation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because information came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer's own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for the purpose of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by the informer in its entirety.

Representative Ford. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence——

Mr. McCone. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was impossible because through other, from other, information we determined that Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.

Representative Ford. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections he might have had with the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Helms. We had no information.

Mr. McCone. We had no information.

Representative Ford. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of any connections of Ruby to the Castro government?

Mr. McCone. That is right.

Representative Ford. Did you ever make a check of that?

Mr. Helms. We checked our records to see if we had information and found we did not.

Representative Ford. What would that indicate, the fact that you checked your records?

Mr. Helms. That would indicate that if we had received information from our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in something which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have it in our files. But we received no such information, and I don't, by saying this, mean that he did not. I simply say we don't have any record of this.

Representative Ford. That is all.

The Chairman. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Thursday, June 4, 1964

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHIER, LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT, AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The President's Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY

(Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)

Mr. Specter. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas J. Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, and Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning certain

JAMES J. ROWLEY, CHIEF, SECRET SERVICE
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Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be—that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you anwered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they would?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out—we haven't gotten any reaction—we asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley——

Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Representative Boggs. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times—he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.

Mr. Rowley. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security. And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual, whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or something like that.

Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn't like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?

Representative Boggs. Well, that is right.

Mr. Rowley. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start going into individuals——

Representative Boggs. And if I remember correctly, there has never been—we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the President of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Representative Boggs. That was the only question I had.

Mr. Dulles. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go around and talk about it and threaten it.

Mr. Rowley. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.

As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to themselves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim. Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.

Mr. Dulles. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be done on that.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI. And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.

Senator Cooper. I understood that was the procedure before. But my question is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you would take protective measures?

Mr. Rowley. No, no, sir; not unless we had——

Senator Cooper. Since the assassination?

Mr. Rowley. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just enunciated.

Senator Cooper. I would suggest—first, I understand there are not many defectors who have returned to the United States.

Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong convictions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about his mental processes.

I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities when he came back.

Mr. Rowley. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the investigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report. And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.

Representative Boggs. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes. There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.

Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir.

Representative Boggs. That you do guard the life of the President. And that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote. So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?

Mr. Rowley. That is correct.

Representative Boggs. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy about the methods you employ.

Mr. Rowley. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart anything we might set up.

Representative Boggs. Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. Rankin. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the President?

Mr. Rowley. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a few—we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947—I am not quite certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. Rowley. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I communicated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you" and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation, when I was at the White House, with the FBI.

Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Back on the record.

Mr. Rankin. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the person of the President?

Mr. Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Rankin. You know of that, do you?

Mr. Rowley. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that appropriation—a certain given figure—was to be used by the U.S. marshals to assist the Secret Service.

Mr. Rankin. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appropriation act for the FBI?

Mr. Rowley. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I started to say, Mr. Rankin—subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that appropriation.

Mr. Rankin. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting to; is that right?

~~SECRET~~

21 MAY 1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and served there until August 1965. He was variously described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache. During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S. Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico City.

201-289248

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR. Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa request. We have no information which indicates any relationship between these individuals other than for the purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned to the consular section and was a second secretary. It appeared that he was tasked with following the activities of the Central American communist parties and left-wing groups, and he met often with members of these groups, reportedly providing them with funds and technical guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in September 1971. Our information indicated that he was not due to leave for another three to four months, and at the time of his departure, there was some speculation that the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that he was known to Lyalin.

100-2-95

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XAF-09222
21 MAY 82

~~SECRET~~

While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in Mexico. He has been described as being without morals, education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action) (Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED



DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
E/BC
4C 20 Hqs WH

EXTENSION: 1413 7220

NO.

DATE: 3 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. CI/R+A			
2. Hausman	4 APR 1978		[illegible]
3. Russ Holmes			
4. 3D57			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.

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NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976.

RBH

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS OP-187 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2. I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

D H Jones
for G M L Blackburne-Kane

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE USA 9c

EUGENE O'NEILL PLAYWRIGHTS

EUGENE O'NEILL PLAYWRIGHTS

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL
MAR 15 1978

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL
MAR 15 1978

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL
MAR 15 1978

M. Waller ✓

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RETURN RECEIPT
REQUESTED

REGISTERED
NO. 257254

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814

MARCH 15, 1978

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR,

I WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978 TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER I ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 I WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175 I HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF U.S.S.R. SAY WHAT DID YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA, I SAID I HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,

MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, I SAID HIS NAME START ON "O" HIS NAME WAS PUBLISHED ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID IT EASY TO FIND.

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN B
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND
IMMIGRATION, ASKING YOUR EMBASSY
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I AS
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD MY RECOR
JULY 18, 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY C
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CH
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN
GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS COPY LETTER TO
ALSO I ENCLOSE YOU COPY LETTER I
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AM
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE AP
MY INCOMING MAIL IS CONTROL BY
F.B.I. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL I
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME F.B.I. SUP
MY INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME

RESPECTFULLY
Sergij Czorn

U.S. PASSPORT No. D027000

[illegible]

CITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager do or use certain people to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. - colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak, In this letter I ask you to give restrain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy midnight June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Sergyj Czornon

Legal Center
For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 • SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March 3, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Leslie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney

LK:ab



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POSTMARK OF U.S. SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL STA. FEB 15 1978
MAILING OFFICE
FROM Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th 95814
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN
Mr. James Callaghan
OFFICE OF MINISTRY
London England
LONDON ENGLAND

D027000

Extensions, amendments, limitations, and restrictions

SOFIA BULGARIA

American LEGATION
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Amended to AUG. 15 1963
THIS PASSPORT VALID
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VICE CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IMM. & NATZ. SERVICE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 14
ADMITTED
AUG 17 1963 1963
CLASS
TO

CO-2-34, 897

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh

5

February 17, 1978

COPY 10
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

This is retyped letter from hand written

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assissin. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan) Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Csornonoh
U.S. Passport 00027000

U.S House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornon
3/15/78

Holmes 5 of 6, F

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Registered letter No. 251254
March 15, 1978
Retyped letter from handwritten
of March 15, 1978, which I sent

To British Ambassador
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Phone 462-1340

Dear Sir:

I wrote letter on February 15, 1978, to Mr. James Callaghan, Prime Minister. I enclosed registerd mail No. 251067.

On July 18, 1963, I was in London, England at the airport. Immigration officer No. 175 - I had no visa - immigration place me under house arrest. Mr. Smith in police uniform, secret service, bought me steak dinner and police officer interrogated me. He asked me what the Embassy of U.S.S.R. say. What did you heard in Vienna, Austria. I said I have heard that one American Defector (Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald) to Russia and he returned to United States of America. This man he preparing to kill - to assassinate President John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Smith, police officer, asked me do you know his name. I said his name start on "O". His name was published one time in newspaper in Washington Post. Mr. Smith, police officer, said it easy to find.

I do searching for this file in British police, British intelligence and British immigration. I asking your Embassy to help to find the truth and I ask your government to forward my record of July 18, 1963, to President Jimmy Carter and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I enclose his copy letter to me. Also I enclose you copy letter I sent on February 17, 1978 to Russian Ambassador.

Your justice always will be appreciated. My incoming mail is control by the F.B.I. agents. Some of the mail I don't get. Not forward to me. F.B.I. suppress me my information and torture me by drugs. 27 years anesthesia gas and freeze me - push drug in my mouth.

My U.S. passport No. D027000.

Respectfully yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Czornonoh

MARCH 20, 1978

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FROM S. Czornonoh
1106 11 st 95814

237-902

Room 316
1106-11 TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
95814

PM
2 MAR
1978

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5c

PROCLAIM LIBERTY THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND
USA 13c

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

United States Senate
650 CAPITOL MALL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

316

PM
1978

S.I. Hayakawa
U.S.S.

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street, Room 316
Sacramento, CA 95814

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]
PROCESSING ACTION	
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NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO
Chief [redacted]

INFO.
Chief [redacted]

FROM
Chief [redacted]

SUBJECT
0 Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache [redacted]

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

[redacted]

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

201-760966

Distribution:
2 - [redacted]
2 - Chief, [redacted]

COPY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 9 May 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

1att

~~201-760466~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
[redacted]	[redacted]	30 March 1966 (59)
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	[redacted]	

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in [redacted] to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to [redacted].

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the [redacted] authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

[redacted] COPY

(59)

[redacted]

~~201-76016~~

att A/t [redacted]

att 2 [redacted]

COORDINATE ~~LAST~~ SENTENCE OF ATTACHMENT WITH FBI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

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MICROFILM

TO

INFO.

FROM

SUBJECT
Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

Distribution:

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
		30 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER 59

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. [We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.]

Att #1 to

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London

INFO.: Chief, WE

FROM: Chief of Station, Oslo

SUBJECT: 1) Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache, London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Leon S. TOZALL

201.760966

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

Distribution:
2 - COS, London w/att
2 - Chief, WE w/att

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Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 001829
date 28 Feb 1978

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CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

100-002-018

~~201-760466~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OWOA-19623

DATE: 30 March 1966 (59)

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

100-002-018

~~201-260466~~

att [illegible] 1962 3

[illegible]

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Lou Dube, DDO/PIAG		
2	1-D-4127-Hqs.		
3	HT-1		
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The first time the Bureau sent these, they combined King-Ray docs with Kennedy assassination docs. After discussion with you, they were sent back to the Bureau asking them to segregate King-Ray docs. Here they are.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Karen W. 5705	11/3

☐	UNCLASSIFIED	☐	CONFIDENTIAL	☐	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

JUN 18 2 00 PM '73

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A. B. Swider~~ Mary
O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION OPS/ITG 9415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. OPS/ITG Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		MC
2. BK		21 Jun	B
3.			H
4. PH		27/7	H
5.			
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976		VR
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5 , 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Att.

JFK –
need to
copy some 1/2
slips that
are in here as
1st pgs for some

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached memorandum
Part I & II

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749
1-75 OP-12

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLA

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (Martin Luther King, Jr.) Part I

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a three volume sensitive (unofficial) file on the Subject. We no longer maintain 201 file (201-760966); Dr. King's files and documents were closed out on 6 November 1974 and forwarded to IP files on 25 May 1976. A further check of other records in this office revealed the following information relevant to the Subject. While a large number of documents are available which mention King, the majority are dated after his death and in some way are related to world reaction to his assassination which was on 4 April 1968, prior to the implementation of the MHCHAOS program, 4 July 1968.

a. The following overt items (excerpts from books published) are considered releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Black Power/White Resistance, (EX-3283) by Fred Powledge; The Negro Revolt, (EX-3267) by Louis E. Lomax; Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation, (EX-3212) by Claude M. Lightfoot; Is Anybody Listening to Black America, (EX-3573) by C. Eric Lincoln; Martin Luther King, Jr., (EX-3670) by William Robert Miller; SNCC - The New Abolitionists, (EX-2108) by Howard Zinn; The Black Muslims in America, (EX-2109) by C. Eric Lincoln; Negro and Jew, (EX-3573) by Shloma Katz; Chronicles of Black Protest, (EX-3439) by Dr. C. Eric Lincoln; The Black Messiah, (EX-3669), by Albert B. Cleage, Jr.; Black Power and White Protestants, (EX-3211), by Joseph C. Hough, Jr.; The Negro Mood, (EX-2127) by Lerome Bennett, Jr.; Black Man's Burden, (EX-3571) by John Oliver Killens; When Negros March, (EX-3577) by

Doc's 1-23

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

Herbert Garfinkel; Black Man's America, (EX-3208) by Simeon Booker; Staff Study by The Committee on Internal Security, (EX-4866) dated 1970; Testimony of Gerald Wayne Kirk, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-7044) 1970; Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, (EX-2131) 1968; Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Investigations, (EX-2169) June 20 and 21, 1968; The New Left, Memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-3535), 9 October 1968; National Review, 3 May 1967; The Rebel (published in Exile), May-June 1967; The New World of Negro Americans, (EX-3571) by Harold R. Isaacs.

b. The following overt items which mention the Subject and/or his activities are not available in this office.

Washington Star, dated 14 August 1968
Washington Star, dated 4 February 1969
Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968
Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968
Washington Star, dated 20 January 1969
Washington Star, dated 10 November 1968
Washington Star, dated 29 March 1969
Soul Newspaper (EX-3653), 1 December 1969
New York Times, dated 13 April 1967
New York Times, dated 18 August 1968
New York Times, dated 5 October 1969
Time, dated 12 April 1968
Liberation News, dated November 1967
Committee Newsletter, dated May 1967
D.C. Catholic Standard, dated 18 July 1968
Militant (pg. 5), dated 22 November 1968
Ottawa Citizen, dated 17 December 1968
Sepia (pg. 66) (EX-3592), December 1969-destroyed
Jet Magazine (pg. 17) (EX-3594), 7 August 1967-destroyed
The Black Panther (pg. 10) dated 1969
Washington Post, dated 1 September 1967
Washington Post, dated 15 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968
Washington Post, dated 26 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 24 December 1968

~~Washington Post, dated 14 December 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 19 November 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 22 September 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 17 August 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 29 March 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 20 March 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 24 May 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 5 April 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 12 May 1968~~
~~Washington Post, dated 1 April 1968~~
Washington Post, dated 14 March 1969

c. The following overt items pertaining to the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Look, 15 April 1969; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 24 March 1969; 1 April 1969; 2 April 1969; 4 April 1969; 13 April 1969; 24 April 1969; 27 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 31 May 1969; New York Times, 10 March 1969; 7 March 1969; 8 March 1969; 14 March 1969; 16 April 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 1 June 1969; UPI-108, 3 January 1969; Washington Post, 3 January 1969; 18 January 1969; 28 January 1969; 31 January 1969; 8 February 1969; 8 March 1969; 11 March 1969; Tass International Service, 11 March 1969; Daily World, 12 March 1969; Washington Post, 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 18 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 22 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 26 March 1969; 8 April 1969; 12 April 1969; Item from News Dispatches, 1969; The Sunday Star, 16 March 1969; Item from Associated Press, 8 April 1969; Associated Press, 14 June 1969; Associated Press item, 13 May 1969; Associated Press item, 14 May 1969; Washington Post, 21 May 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969; 27 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 25 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 30 May 1969; 16 March 1969; 27 June 1969; 20 June 1969; 26 June 1969; Washington Star; 4 May 1968; Washington Star, 29 May 1968; Time, 13 September 1968; Washington Post, 19 September 1968; Chicago Daily News Service, undated; Washington Star, 18 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 September 1968; Los Angeles Times, 7 August 1968;

125-347 Docs ~~24-151~~
See separate list from OPS/ITG - above is not accurate

Washington Post, 16 August 1968; Washington Star, 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, 6 July 1968; Washington Post, 22 July 1968; Time, 26 July 1968; Washington Star, 12 April 1968; Washington Star, 13 April 1968; Washington Post, 13 April 1968; Washington Star, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 16 April 1968; Delta Democrat Times, 16 April 1968; Washington Star, 17 April 1968; Washington Star, 18 April 1968; Washington Star, 19 April 1968; undated item; undated item; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; Washington Post, 6 May 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, undated; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Associated Press, 9 July 1968; 16 July 1968; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Reuters, 9 July 1968; UPI-122, 9 July 1968; UPI-48, 10 July 1968; UPI-129, 15 July 1968; UPI-48, 12 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, 2 July 1968; UPI-30, 2 July 1968; Reuters, 8 July 1968; UPI-21A, 2 July 1968; UPI-125, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; UPI-8, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, undated, Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; London, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; London, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, undated; Associated Press, July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968.

d. The following documents are releasable in sanitized form to the requestor under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt as noted. OIRT-06733, 23 September 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); OIRT-06733, 16 October 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); CSCI-315/02051-64, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); S-19, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); S-20, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); UWCA-3510, 11 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); EX-01655, 5 November 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); JMWAVE-1417, 26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Georgetown-5024,

OS referral also

26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7 March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004, 6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); ~~Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b),~~ Ray (b)(6); ~~Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b);~~ JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~Dir-92664, 18 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~ Ray; Memo draft, dated 26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs); not records ~~FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6);~~ B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); ~~RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a);~~ not record B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726, 27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~ — not a record; Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67
3/0/QOY/T-58-68
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T413-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67
3/0/QOF/T106-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

Refer

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

Cables:

(a) Kingston-4005, dated 8 April 1968; according 63 to (RUABBE/1) a Jamaican service four groups are trying to get demonstrations going against the Amembassy, but without success; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(b) Bogota-0654, dated 10 April 1968; (GISOY/GIJAY) unit intercepted propaganda items from Cuban mail pouch. 64 Disclosure to the requestor would identify a clandestine method of the station for obtaining information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) Mexico City-5210, dated 15 April 1968; Para. 3 of this cable mentions an intercepted letter addressed to 65 President Johnson protesting the King assassination. (LITEMPO/12) a member of a Mexican service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(d) Mexico City-5249, dated 17 April 1968; the 66 Legal Attache provided composite photos of suspect in connection with King assassination and asked for check of visitors to Soviet and Cuban embassies; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(e) Bogota-0703, dated 20 April 1968 (GISOY) surveillance team followed an American National with 370 a striking resemblance to Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(f) Paris-9506, dated 22 April 1968; concerns Forman's arrival in Paris, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) Nairobi-3000, dated 14 June 1968; source (TGFLER/1) stated he had an interview with Robert F. Williams. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(h) Director-48988, dated 7 November 1968; concerns a Richard George Perrin, incidental reference to the Subject in a record pertaining to another subject and should not be considered a document responsive to the requestor; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(i) Addis Ababa-1027, dated 18 August 1971; source (JEPYX-1) entertained Hosea Williams in his home during latter's visit to Ethiopia. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

62 Dispatches: UFGT-16828, 15 Jul 66 - OS Referral b1 (OGA) b3

(a) OELA-48626, dated 19 January 1968; forwards a memorandum prepared by (Rufus F. Rodigast) which deals with MHALPHA-related individuals; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

67 (b) FJTA-53902, dated 29 January 1968; forwards a pamphlet (which also contains an article mentioning Dr. King's name) from BEHEIREN Hqs. in Tokyo, obtained by (POFRAGRANCE) a unilateral source still active and sensitive; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) OEPA-982, dated 15 March 1968; forwards a copy of recent correspondence between (QRPHONE/1) and (QRPEONY/1). Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(d) OEPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968; contains operational information submitted by the Station concerning (RODIGAST); contains an incidental mention of the name Dr. Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

? 68 (e) OEPA-1097, dated 29 April 1968; is a report by (RODIGAST) on SNCC activities in Paris in the aftermath of the Dr. King assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

69 (f) HMMA-34688, dated 20 May 1968; contains items from (LIBIGHT/LIMUD) a sensitive teletap and mail intercept operation coverage; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) FJTA-54934, dated 31 July 1968; Americans Invited to Leftist Conference in Japan. (POFRAGRANCE/1) a unilateral source still active and sensitive provided the information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Note: An extensive search has failed to locate the attachment for this document. The covering dispatch makes no mention of Dr. King or his assassination.

(h) OCOA-13493, dated 27 September 1968; is a report forwarded by (SMABOVE) a Canadian service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

70

(i) OELA-51949, dated 10 February 1970; (JAGUAR) a British service forwarded press clippings (they contained an incidental mention of the name Dr. King) by or about a Jonathan Power; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(j) FZWA-2412, dated 8 September 1970; Subject: Activities of Andrew Pulley in New Zealand; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; (MLDUST) a New Zealand servvice provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(k) ANLA-4097, dated 16 December 1970; concerns a memorandum passed to (KRHOLLY) a Nigerian security service requesting information on and watchlisting of the MHCHAOS group who were destined for Africa; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

71

(l) OCOA-17031, dated 27 June 1972; (SMABOVE) a Canadian service provided a report on the Day of African Solidarity; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

Memoranda:

(a) EX-1239, dated 22 August 1967; is a Biographic Summary on Kunstler, William Moses, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Memorandum S-13, dated 5 October 1967; Subject: Views of the Reverend Daniel Mallette on the Black Militant Situation in Chicago; incidental reference to the Subject; the information was obtained by QRPHONE/1, a sensitive unilateral source in a personal interview with Father Mallette; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) B-35, dated 8 February 1968; Black Nationalist Writers in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(d) B-75, dated 9 April 1968; Subject: Attempted Anti U.S.-Demonstrations in Kingston, according to the Special Branch of the Jamaican security service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1). 72

(e) Memorandum, dated 16 April 1968; Subject: Tentative Plans of Senator Robert Kennedy to Visit West Berlin on 1 May. Incidental referenc to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(f) EX-1623, (rewritten) dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Biographic Summary on Hayden, Thomas Emmett, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) B-88, dated 18 April 1968; FBI provided our representative in Mexico with composite photos of suspected killer; exempt under (b)(3)(a). 73

(h) B-89, dated 22 April 1968; Subject: Radio Messages for Stokely Carmichael during April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(i) B-92, dated 23 April 1968; Subject: Arrival of James Rufus Forman in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(j) B-97, dated 25 April 1968; Subject: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.; concerns a subject who did not appear to be identical with FBI's suspect; exempt under (b)(3)(a). 74

(k) EX-1183 (rewrite of 19 July 1967), dated 26 April 1968; is a Biographic Sketch of Howard Zinn; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(l) EX-1490, dated 14 June 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Mark William Rudd; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(m) EX-2148, dated 4 September 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Szymanski, Albert John Jr, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

75 (n) B-191, dated 9 October 1968; Subject: Jamaican Special Branch Report - Jamaica/ United States Black Power Ties; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

76 (o) B-308, dated 17 February 1969; Subject: Bahamas/United States Black Power Ties; report of a British service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

77 SL-134-69, 19 Feb 69 - OS referral b1, 2, 3, 6

78 Memo 28 May 69 OS referral b1, 2, 3, 6

(p) 79 B-618, dated 8 September 1969; Subject: World Council of Peace planned delegates to Paris; a sensitive reliable source revealed a Clarence Fielden Jones as being in contact with Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(q) EX-9272, dated 21 November 1972; is a summary about Ralph Henry; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(r) EX-10198, dated 29 May 1972, concerns VB#5 and miscellaneous comments by (MHRUPEE); incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

378 (s) CSCI-1763, dated 14 May 1968 (201-760966); this file has been closed. – Record on Ray

3. Thirty FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

4. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, Internationl Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: OPS/ITG

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS

Pls note which of the SI docs. mention Mrs. King only.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Is NSA the orginating agency for all of these? Yes

*On Dr. King

FROM: MFelton DDO/PIC HT-1

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION 1644

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7 March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004, 6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Dir-92664, 18 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Memo draft, dated 26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs); FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a); B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726, 27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

[illegible]

— not a record

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67*
3/0/QOY/T-58-68*
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T413-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67*
3/0/QOF/T106-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

Refer

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRT - 6733, 20 Oct 64		b1, b2, b3
DIRT - 6733, 7 Nov 64		b1, b2, b3
CSCI - 316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64		b1, b2, b3
Memo, 5 Oct 67		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Oct 67		" " "
UWCA-3510, 11 Oct 67		b1, b2, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Nov 67		b1, b3, b6
WAVE, 26 Feb 68		b1, b3
Georget. 5024, 26 Feb 68		b1, [redacted] b3, b6
Memo-895, 7 Mar 68	?	b1 (OGA), b3, b6
Kngs, 6 Apr 68		b1, b3 Marian
Mexi 7 Apr 68		b1, b3
Tokyo 10 Apr 68		b1, b3
DIR 10 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
Mexi, 10 Apr 68		b1, b3
HDCA 10 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68		b1, b2, b3
WAVE, 2 Apr 68		b1, b3
Berlin 15 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
DIR, 18 Apr 68		b1, b3, b6
~~Memo Draft, 26 Apr 68~~		
~~EA-1020 FMHT - 7 May 68~~	not record	b1, b3, b6
~~Afforded S rec 9024, 7 June 68~~	"	b1, b3, b6
Memo 19 Sep 68		b1, b3
~~Memo 13 Nov 68~~	~~" "~~	~~b1, b3~~
~~Mem~~ Buda, 19 May 71		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 21 May 71		b1, b3, b6
Memo, 28 Nov 75		b1, b3

Deny - 201

CSCI-316/01703-68, 2 May 68	b1 (liaison) b3, b6
PANA 6180	" " "

Release - 201

	UFGA-29884, 11 Apr 68	b1, b2 b3
	UFGA-29877, 11 Apr 68	" "
	HDCA 7012, 18 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
Coord w/FBI	OUOA-19623, 30 Mar 66	b1, b2, b3
	CSCI-316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
	OIRT-6783, 17 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
	OIRT-6733, 20 Oct 64	b1, b2, b3

4 Aug

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Para C:

I cannot match the documents with the list you provided. Please arrange the articles chronologically and number them lightly in pencil to correspond with numbers in a memo (see attached Memo from the DDA, 26 March 76, para b). It would be useful if you would use that format for all your memos, as the way you have done it is very hard to follow without making errors.) Also clipped documents have parts cut off of them or are almost unreadable. Can you provide better copies?

Para D:

1 First document is a report whose number should be left in. Pls provide another resanitized copy.

2 Please delete dissemination controls in your sanitizations; otherwise we just have to do them over. Also classification was left on one doucment. See XXXXX clips.

3 Please provide sanitized 1st x page of EX-895, 7 Mar X 68.

4 Please delete cite numbers from incoming cables.

Many thanks.

Mary Felton
X1644 DDO/PIC

PART II

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

JUN 18 2 00 PM '73

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM ~~A. B. Snider~~ MARY O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION OPS ITG 9415

DATE SENT 18 JUNE

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OPS/ITG — Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		MC	
2. BK		21 Jun	B	Att
3.			H	
4. PH				
5.				
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976			
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415				
10.				

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached memorandum

Part I & II

Y HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swider~~ Mari
O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION 9415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~CI Staff~~ ~~Attn: John Bender~~ 2C29	22 JUN 1976	22 JUL 1976	D
2.			
3. CI/EXO	22 JUL 1976		
4.			
5. CI/PA (Graves)	23 JUL 1976		M
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC:

Please see attached comments.

Not a Record

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/✓/ See attached ~~memorandum~~ Comments

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 1-75 OP-11 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC

Re: Martin Luther King (Request #F-76-382)

In response to this request, CI Staff has no records with the exception of one document, prepared in the Office of Security:

> Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 July 1968,
> Subject: King, Coretta Scott (#541 487).

A copy is attached for referral.

Dan Roche
Daniel L. Roche, Jr.
CI/PA

Attachment:
Referral Document,
As Above

Mrs F urge

Sue
15.7.68

1 July 1968

Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Record

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT : KING, Coretta Scott
#541 487
AKA: Mrs. Martin Luther KING
nee: Coretta SCOTT

1. Subject, without question, is the Coretta SCOTT referred to in an FBI report on Alfreda ABELL, #355 109, dated 10/29/54, which indicates that on 7 September 1951 ABELL, the Subject of a "Security Matter-C" type investigation, communicated with C. SCOTT, Route 1, Box 158, Heiberger, Alabama, which address was identified as the residence of Coretta SCOTT. According to the postmaster at Heiberger, (in 1954?), Coretta SCOTT was then attending the New England Conservatory of Music. (See attachment A) Mrs. Coretta Scott KING is said to have attended this Conservatory and while there to have met her future husband. (See attachment B)

2. Alfreda ABELL, who was a clerk in the UN Secretariat from 1947 until 6/30/52 when her employment was terminated for security reasons, was said in the New York Times on 2 January 1953 to be one of 25 former employees of the UN ousted as one believed to be a communist or under communist discipline. While employed in the UN, ABELL was reportedly active on behalf of the Pro-Communist group of the UN Staff Committee and was friendly with, and actively participated in giving a party in October 1951 to honor, four persons who had been dismissed by the UN for security reasons. (ie: Jeanne PICOU, identified as a member of the French Communist Party; Mary Jane KEENEY, a CP member active in the Communist Party underground during the late 30's-early 40's; Benedict Soloman ALPER, also reported to be a CP member; and Rajah HOWRANI, who was reportedly a Communist Party member and had received training in the Soviet Union. The individual said to be responsible for ABELL's employment in the UN, and to have been her supervisor there at one time, was Adam TARN, a Polish citizen said to be a Communist Party member. According to the FBI report on ABELL, she registered with the American Labor Party when voting in 1949 and 1952; subscribed to the National Guardian; and attended a W.E.B. DuBois testimonial dinner in February 1951, to which she took Helen KAGAN as her guest.

9 S/K.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SIG/Misc
3401

cy to Mr. R. OBER, 19.7.67
with Caveat not to be used w/o check with SIG

3. ABELL and Helen KAGAN, who also was terminated at the UN Secretariat for security reasons, were reported in October 1952 to frequently return to the UN premises where they were said to often be seen in its corridors conversing with certain Russians and alleged Communists. According to a confidential FBI informant, ABELL in March 1952 made a check payable to KAGAN in the amount of $150, and KAGAN had made checks payable to ABELL on a number of occasions. Helen KAGAN is Helen KAGAN-POZNER, AKA: Elena Aleksandrovna Wilga, etc., #348 486, who is suspected of having long engaged in Soviet intelligence activities. Her brother, Vladimir A. POZNER, is an identified KGB officer and her cousin, Vladimir Wolf POZNER, is a known member of the French Communist Party and is suspected of involvement in Soviet intelligence. Her long-time consort, Peter WILGA, a leading figure in the CPUSA, was also suspected of Soviet intelligence connections. Helen KAGAN-POZNER WILGA is of continuing interest to the FBI and to SRS.

4. At a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee hearing in New York City in late 1952, Alfreda ABELL refused on grounds of self-incrimination to say whether she was then or ever had been a communist, whether she tried to organize UN workers, or whether since leaving the UN in the Summer of 1952 she had revisited UN headquarters in the role of a communist organizer. The FBI continued to have an interest in ABELL until at least December 1961, the date of an FBI report in her file.

5. The postmaster at Heiberger, Alabama in advising regarding Coretta SCOTT, as stated above, commented that she had in the past sung on the same program with Paul ROBESON at ROBESON's personal invitation. (Louis BUDENZ has stated that prior to his, (BUDENZ), defection from the Communist Party in 1945, he knew Paul ROBESON as a secret member of the Communist Party.)

M. D. Stevens

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg	REQUEST NUMBER F-76-382
FROM: IPS Vorhis	EXTENSION 7486
DATE SENT	17 June 76
SUSPENSE DATE	24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall → HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay				Action
2.				
3. OS/IRG E. R. Duffy ~~EX 1~~				Action
4.				
5. CRS/FIO C. W. Rice ~~2E-60~~				Action
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1				
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108				FYI
8. Batch F6-161				OPS/ITG 7/8 - 52 hrs. per. P. Cochran 3 Aug 76
9. AI/DDA H. G. Bean ~~BX 1~~				FYI
10.				
11. DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler 2E-6104				FYI
12.				

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

JBP

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) B-1965

Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg B-1966

re James Earl Ray ~~B69-127 B-70-11~~

REQUEST NUMBER F-76-382

FROM: IPS Vorhis

EXTENSION 7486

DATE SENT 17 June 76

SUSPENSE DATE 24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay			
2. DCD			
3. ~~OS/IRG E. R. Duffy~~ ~~EX-1~~			
4. 6-21-76 p.m.			
5. ~~CRS/FIO C. W. Rice~~ ~~2E-60~~			
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1			
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108			
8. Batch F6-161			
9. ~~AI/DDA H. G. Bean~~ ~~BX-4~~			
10.	PM		
11. ~~DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler~~ ~~2E-6104~~	6-25-76		
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Action Attached is a copy of the only document we have which is pertinent

Action to the request. It is denied pursuant to the provisions of

Action exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)(a+b).

FYI HS

FYI Document 61

FYI

LANE 87 29 Sep

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76- 382

FROM: ~~A.B.Swider~~ MARY
O/DDO/FIO Ext. 9415

EXTENSION

DATE SENT 18 JUNE

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. OSG/OC Attn: P. Marine	18/6/76	18/6/76	
2. 2B16			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

/✓/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/_/ See attached memorandum

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-10

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) MARTIN Luther King (WEISBERG REQUEST)

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swid~~er MARr
O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION 9415

DATE SENT 18 JUNE

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FR PLANS Attn: Bob Baker	22 JUN 1976		
2. BU-6			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

/✓/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/_/ See attached memorandum

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-9

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King, Jr.

REQUEST NUMBER F 76-382

FROM: DCD/FIO/PAO
Helen Spilman
Rm 915 - Key Bldg

EXTENSION 2271

DATE SENT 25 Jun 76

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC attn: Mary Felton				
2. Rm 1D 4125 - Hqs.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr. (Harold Weisberg - Requester)	REQUEST NUMBER F 76-382

FROM: Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271 Sally Weller 6400 R 9581 IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2	EXTENSION	DATE SENT 26 July 1976	SUSPENSE DATE 31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber			
2.			
3. OPS/ITG		30/7	
4. ES-2			
5.			
6. C/OPS/ITG			
7.			
8.			
9.			
DDO/PIC HT-1			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component.

Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied.

If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component.

If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions.

If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA.

In both of the above instances please name the denying official.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. requested by Weisberg	REQUEST NUMBER F76-382

FROM: DDO/PIC M. Felton 1D4125	EXTENSION 1644	DATE SENT 5 Aug 76 SUSPENSE DATE XXXX 9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. W. Strubitts SA/LA/EICO ET-3	5 AUG 1976		8
2. JOE		6 Aug	JL
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. DDO/PIC M. FElton HT-1			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Pls cite exemptions for denials and partial denials.

Thanks.
MFelton

2 to 8:

Have sanitized the attached documents for release to Weisberg.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER
F76-382

FROM:
M. Felton
DDO/PIC
1D4125

EXTENSION
1644

DATE SENT
5 Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE
9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. H. Thompson EA/OEM/FOI BU-2	6/8	6/8	
2. AC/PIA/			W
3.			
4. EA/OEM/OS			
5. C/OEM		10/8	
6.			
7.			
8. M. Felton DDO/PIC HT_1			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

OPS/ITG proposes we pass the attached document to Weisberg in response to his FOIA request. Do you agree with this and with their sanitization? In particular, do you agree with leaving the address at the top of the attachment to the dispatch?

Thank you.
MFelton

1-2 -
I don't think we should agree. Reference to King is incidental. All other names would have to be removed.

2-4: Agree; we DO NOT WANT THE "O.J. Martin" ADDRESS Released. Attachment OF little use to Requestor anyway.

Document FHHT-6444
7 May 1968 - Hawaii Foundations for American Freedoms, Inc.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Martin Luther King, Jr., requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER
F76-382

FROM:
DDO/PIC
M. Felton
1D4125

EXTENSION
1644

DATE SENT
5 Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE
9 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	5 AUG 1976		cl
2.			
3. E/I	9/8		
4.			
5. EXO	9 AUG 1976		
6. EUR/EXO GS-6	9 AUG 1976		cl
7.			
8. DDO/PIC ATTN: Mary HT_1			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached documents for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Thanks.
MFelton

3-5+8: documents with exception of OWOA-19623 (which has no Italian connection) can be passed after excising ~~[illegible]~~ portions that have been bracketed (for source protection)
8-6 - Pls review last document.

---

6 to 8: [illegible]
last sentence of the attach. &
doc OWOA-19623 will be [illegible]

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Martin Luther King, Jr requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER
F76-382

FROM:
M. Felton
DDO/PIC
1D4125

EXTENSION 1644

DATE SENT 17 ~~16~~ Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE 1~~8~~9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA ET-3		9 Aug	Jh
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8. DDO/PIC HT-1 ATTN: Mary			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached document for release to Weisberg per his request. Cite exemptions for deletions or denial. Thank you.
MDFelton

1 to 8:
Document sanitized for release.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Harold Weisberg - Requester)

REQUEST NUMBER
F 76-382

FROM:
Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271
Sally Weiler 6400 R 9581
IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2

EXTENSION

DATE SENT
26 July 1976

SUSPENSE DATE
31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber	~~29 Jul 76~~		
2.			
3. DCD	29 Jul 76	30 Jul 76	
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/PIC			
10. 1D4127			
11. attn: Mary			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component.

Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied.

If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component.

If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions.

If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA.

In both of the above instances please name the denying official.

3 to 9: We do not know anything more about this incident. Inasmuch as it apparently did not appear in the press, I am afraid that the information in these memoranda, if put into the public domain, could jeopardize our relationship with the person who provided it to us. Therefore both documents are ebing denied pursuant to exemptions (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)(a)&(b) and (b)(6).

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

LISTING OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

(1) Memorandum from DCS, dated 28 May 1969. # 256

(2) Memorandum to Director, DCS, dated 19 February 1969. # 255

(3) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27362. — 252

(4) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27366. — 253

(5) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27367. - 254

(6) DDO dispatch, UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966. — A-62

(7) DDO biographic data on Martin Luther King, dated 5 November 1967.

3 Aug 76

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Request for copy of CIA Cable from CIA Reference File

FROM: Cable Secretariat/Reference File
Mr. Garnett U. Tate
Chief, Cable Archives
1A-53 Hqs. Tube CT-7

EXTENSION 6159

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
2.			
3.			
4. LA/SA			
5.			
6.			
7. DDO/PIC ATTN: MARY FALTON			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

The attached Form 1604, "Archives Cable Service", requests a copy of a CIA cable for which the dissemination is restricted. Would you please:

(a) Forward the attached copy to the requester (shown on Form 1604 or;

(b) Return the attached copy to Cable Archives with guidance in order that we may notify the requester of the disposition of his request.

Deny release based on liaison + sensitive sources & methods.

JL

2 cables denied

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM:
NAME OF REQUESTER: Felton, Mary D.
DATE: 3 Aug 76
DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 DDO/PIC
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________ FOIA

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☑ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE '68	SUBJECT
[illegible]	PARA 6187	April 6	[illegible]

SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM:	NAME OF REQUESTER: M D Felton DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 DDO/PIC	DATE: 9 Aug 76 EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______ (IN/DIR NUMBER) ______ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

FOIA

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

In coordination with: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

AUG 9 10 15 AM '76

☒ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☒ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

38 7

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 03635 2740	Rome 5861	May 68	RAY

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CI-7

FROM:
NAME OF REQUESTER: M.D. [illegible]
DATE: 1? Aug 7?
DIVISION/BRANCH: DDO/PIC (HT-?)
EXTENSION: 1604

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

FOIA

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ________ NAME *(type or print)* ________ EXT.

In coordination with: ________ NAME *(type or print)* ________ EXT.

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
		[illegible]	

SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 **1604** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC
CABLE REFERENCE SECTION
IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7

FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: Mary D. Felton
DIVISION/BRANCH: (HT-1) DDO/PIC
DATE: 13 Aug 76
EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______ (IN/DIR NUMBER) ______ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

FOIA

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT

In coordination with: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT

☑ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☒ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 25866 2746	COPE 7485	June 68 (9/4)	MHPASHA
	5535		

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

[illegible] 20 Aug 76

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

3 00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM:	NAME OF REQUESTER Mary D. Felton	DATE 28 Mar 7
		DIVISION/BRANCH HT-1 155/RCG	EXTENSION 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

______________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ (EXT.)

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
99685	ADDIS 2200	Apr 68	J. E. Ray

Sent to C/AF Reg for clearance

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

(47)

1976

SECRET

FELTON MARY HR-580
DDO/PIC 1D4127
EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE

IP/FI CONTROL NO. 784

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	18	6	
REQUESTER					
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52			3m
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED: 4

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

F

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: KING

GIVEN NAMES: Martin Luther Jr.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

☐	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
☐	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
☑	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
☐	THERE ARE ____ RECORDS OF WHICH ____ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGE ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

181148

1976 JUN 18 PM 1:11

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER

DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">SOURCE</th><th>DATE REQUESTED</th><th>DATE RECEIVED</th><th>SOURCE</th><th>DATE REQUESTED</th><th>DATE RECEIVED</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">DO AREA DESKS</td><td></td><td></td><td>CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">IP/ARCHIVES</td><td></td><td></td><td>CIA LIBRARY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">COMINT NAME CHECK</td><td></td><td></td><td>OFFICE OF SECURITY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">SB BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH</td><td></td><td></td><td>OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">TRAVEL PROGRAMS</td><td></td><td></td><td>DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">NAME OF BEARER FILE/OTS</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">CIA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL</td><td></td><td></td><td>DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL (WFTU)</td><td></td><td></td><td>DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF</td><td></td><td></td><td>CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">OPERATIONS STAFF</td><td>RESERVE OFFICERS FILE</td><td></td><td></td><td>FBI</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.</td><td></td><td></td><td>I & NS</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">CI OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS</td><td></td><td></td><td>DEPARTMENT OF STATE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">E/G PROGRAM</td><td></td><td></td><td>SECRET SERVICE</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">WH SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM</td><td></td><td></td><td>DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
</table>

REMARKS

JUN 23 2 43 PM '76

SECRET

```
                                   S-E-C-R-E-T

                              MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                       181148     034

RGQ NO: 181148A01    REQUESTER: HR580  FELTON MARY   DDO/PIC  1D4127  1644  HT1

NAME: KING,MARTIN LUTHER                           YOB:        SEX:   CIT:
 ORIGIN:A  DUR:    PURPOSE:FDS  PRTY:R  OTPT:D300  FNU:   SPELL:   MASK:   MAT:

CONTROL CODE 034-MHS-760618-142118-00015    142103
=====================================================================

0001 KING, MARTIN LUTHER                                       201-0024907
     SEX M                                                     DBA-0[redacted] APERTURE CA
     CIT USA                                                   23APR62
     TO BE INTERVIEWED BY PAUL KRASSNER CONTACT OF SUBJ        ~~FBI~~
     OF 201-24907.                                             P9
     FORMERLY: SS NO SOUR
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                    APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     DBA-07422                          20 JUL 62  06186240



0002 KING, MARTIN LUTHER                                       100-004-
     SEX M                                                     DFB-80124
     MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH 16TH NATIONAL CON-           P 732-0
     VENTION OF CP, USA. PAGE NO. 316.
     FORMERLY: DD NO DATE, SS NO SOUR
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
     DFB-80124                          20 SEP 72  03527255

                                                                                PAGE 0001
---CONTINUED---     HR580                                                     181148     034
                              S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

784

ACA

ORIGIN: Miami, Fla
Date: 23 Apr 62
Subj: William Worthy, Jr.
1458 Bufile: 105-20110
Field: MM-105-4750

RECORD COPY AT:
[illegible] RETURN PROMPTLY

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 6 March 57
Subj: Communist Party USA
Bufile: 100-3
Field: NY-100-4931

28/03/57
[illegible]
Sec - 11

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 19 Apr 57
Subj. Johnson Forest Group
Bufile: 100-347390.
Field. none given

ACA 15.07

```
                              S-E-C-R-E-T

0003 KING, MARTIN LUTHER /REV./                                200-009-004
                                                               DFB-82024
                                                               SER-27
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     DFB-82024                             01 JAN 58  08311751


0004 KING, M. L. /REV./                                        074-006-040
                                                               RAKA-00708
                                                               25MAY56
                                                               SER-64
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     RAKA-00708                            01 JAN 58  08049094


0005 KING, MARTIN                                              201-0170954*
     SEX M DOB 14APR24           POB USA, NJER, HOBOKEN        TYPE NAME R
     CIT USA                                                   RCD DATE 75
     RES USA. HUSB OF KING, EVA /201-0170954/
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                                           23 APR 75  09272198


                       END OF REPLY - 0005 RECORDS LISTED
```

25/04/57
Apr

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

ACK 15.07

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

SECRET

FROM
FELTON MARY
DDO/PIC
BRANCH EXT. 1644

BADGE NO.
HR-580
104127
TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE: 13 AUG 76

IP/FI CONTROL NO.: 590

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	28/7/76	
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED: 1

THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (Doc. Ref.)

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS (TO IP/IN)

P

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME: RAY

GIVEN NAMES: JAMES EARL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

201 NO. IF KNOWN: 201-

AKA, ALIASES

OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA (*Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.*): ASSASSIN OF DR. KING.

SEX

DATE OF BIRTH: 1928 (?)

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP: USA

RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
✓	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

no FNU S

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

1976 JUL 28 PM 3:22 201224

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

IGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
O AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
P/ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
OMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
B BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
RAVEL PROGRAMS			DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
AME OF BEARER FILE/OTS					
IA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
PECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL *(WFTU)*			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
OVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
PERA-TIONS STAFF: RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
PERA-TIONS STAFF: INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
I OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
/G PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
H SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM			DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		

EMARKS

AUG 13 1 06 PM '76

SECRET

13-00000

```
                         S-E-C-R-E-T

                 NAME INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE                         ***[illegible]***
RQ: 20122402   REQUESTOR: WR500  FELTON, MARY   DDO/FIC  1D112T  1044  TTL

I RAY,JAMES EARL                          YOB:       SEX:    CIT:
SIT:    OBJ:     PURPOSE:PUS   PATY:I   STRT:0500  F.0:   SPELL:   HASH:   RAT:

AGL CODE USA- S-730720-192345-00020     192515
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 RAY, JAMES EARL                                          201-0332732*
 SEX M DOB 10MAR28             POB USA, ILLINOIS          TYPE NAME T
 CIT USA                                                  RCD DATE 68
 RES USA & GALT, ERIC STARVO & GALT, ERIC STAVO &
 WILLARD, JOHN & WILLIARD, JOHN & LOWMYER, HARVEY &
 [illegible], JAMES & [illegible] & WALTON, JAMES &
 [illegible], JAMES & SNEYD, RAMON GEORGE & SNEYA, RAMON
 GEORGE
 ***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO OPS/ITG, 680704 , 1758, 19704/08
                                    23 JUL 68  00211859


 RAY, JAMES EARL                                          050-500
 SEX M DOB C28                 POB USA                    HMMW-16558
 CIT USA                                                  25APR68
 AKA GALT, ERIC STARVO, AKA LOWMYER, HARVEY, AKA
 WILLARD, JOHN SUBJ REPORTEDLY SHOT AND KILLED MARTIN
 LUTHER KING SUSPOSEDLY VISITED MEXICO
 ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - DC-52
                  APERTURE CARDS AVAILABLE
 HMMW-16558                         01 MAY 68  02723573
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

ACA
14,04
for Ops ITG
memo

```
                                                                     PAGE 0001
NTINUED---      WR500                                           281224     033
                      S-E-C-R-E-T  E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979
```

S-E-C-R-E-T

```
RAY, JAMES                                              100-002-002
SEX M DOB 00MAR20                                       316-0175368
CIT ITAL                                                14MAY68
< USA PUB LOS ANGELES TRACE REPLY TO FBI
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
316-0175368                       23 MAY 68  02131603
```

012/176 memo

[illegible]

```
RAY, JAMES                                              049-007-025
SEX M                                                   PIR-05119
OCC DIRECTOR OF COHEN ROHABECK TRAINING CO, THE         10NOV49
LATTER BEING AN AIR TRANSPORT FIRM WHICH CARRIES OUT    SEC-15
ILLEGAL CONTRABAND OPS.
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
PIR-05119                         23 NOV 72  02357421
```

END OF REPLY - 0004 RECORDS LISTED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES) H R 580	**DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST**

FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL Mary Felton	DATE OF REQUEST 27 Aug 76 1B 9:00		
	BRANCH DDO/PIC	ROOM NO. 1D4125	PHONE NO. 1644

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/FILES DT-6			
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/FILES DT-6			
4				
5				

SUBJECT (must be furnished)
KING #564

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge.

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from IP/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than IP/Index.

9

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/Files)
201-1277	DBC 29138	13 Sep 68	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

Pg 8 Incidental Reference Not a Record

FORM 2-74 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES)

FROM:
FELTON MARY
DDO/PIC
EXT. 1644
HR-580
1D4127
TUBE HT1
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.
/		

TO:		DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/FILES **DT-6**			
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/FILES **DT-6**	9055 Mimi Allen		
4				
5				

SUBJECT (must be furnished)
King / Martin

INSTRUCTIONS

1. *Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)*
2. *Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.*
3. *Indicate type of charge:*

☑ *Temporary* ☐ *Permanent*

4. *Indicate source of reference:*

☐ *Document reference from IP/Index.*

☐ *Document reference from source other than IP/Index.*

REC'D IN FILES
4:00
OUT

#701

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/Files)
	PANA 6180 W-97566	1 Apr 68	
201-811911	DBC 9700	11 Feb 68	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED FEH 8 70
~~19-5-52~~	~~DBC-23402~~	~~23 Jul 68~~	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
~~100-300-26~~	~~DBC-25546~~	~~19 Aug 68~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
~~100-120-21~~	~~DBC-41496~~	~~30 Jan 69~~	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
201-1277	DBC-29138	13 Sep 68	Temp Charge See back
100-4-113	~~DBB-47898~~	~~13 May 68~~	LOST ~~Extensive Search Throughout~~ DDO Has Failed To Locate
~~100-4-44~~	~~DBC-23614~~ THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD	~~12 Jul 68~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED
~~96-300-7~~	~~DBC-63897~~	~~30 Sep 69~~	PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
~~201-805119~~	~~DBC-64858~~	~~13 Oct 69~~	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
	~~DBC-8~~	vnc 10 3	

FORM 2-74 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

13-00000

IP/DMS

King

201/1277

Box #2

TEMPORARY CHARGE TO:

Name VINCE Dibenedetto Ext X1552

Div. Micrographics Subj

Rm GA46 Date

AUG 10 3 42 PM '76

13-00000

1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OPS/ITG - Mr. Haefner	20/8	H
2	ES-2		
3	P.C. - FOR ACTION	23/8	
4			
5	DDO/PIC M. Felton HT-1		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls fill out the attached form so we can report costs to IPS. Note we can only claim the actual search time for the records and not the time involved in reviewing and sanitizing them. Thank you.

(I talked to P. Cochran about this on the phone, but I'd like to get it in writing. Thanks)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
M. Felton	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

FOIA REQUEST MANAGEMENT INFORMATION	DATE

TITLE OF DOCUMENT(S) AND/OR SUBJECT

F[illegible]76-382

WEISBERG request on Martin LUther King and James Earl Ray

SEARCH		COST (*To be completed by IRS*)	CLASSIFICATION REVIEW		COST (*To be completed by IRS*)
GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS		GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS	
8.7.	44 searchtime		8.7	[redacted]	
				5 hrs. writeup	
TOTAL COST			TOTAL COST		

DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP RETURN TO ➡	CHIEF, INFORMATION REVIEW STAFF 7 C 28 Headquarters

WEISBERG REQUES

	NR	NAI	INFO
IP/IN			X
CCS	X		
CI/OPS			X
DCD			X
FR	X		
OPS/ITG			X
OSG/OC	X		

13-00000

July 1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/DDO/PIC		✓
2	C/SS EW-7		
3			
4			
5			
6			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

If you've no objection, would like to pry out some sort of criteria.

Andy

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
A. F. Addona, C/DDO/PIC/AL HT-1	15 July

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

FROM: Charles A. Briggs Chief, Services Staff EW-7	EXTENSION 1596	NO.	DATE 15 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OGC/FOIA FU-2				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/OPS/ITG ES-2 Attn: P. Haefner				
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15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

C/SS
to
OGC

C/SS memo to OGC
(15 Jul 76)
requesting
criteria to
release info
under FOIA as
regards family
privacy rights.

Administrative - Internal Use Only

15 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : C/FOIA/PA

SUBJECT : Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

REFERENCE : FOIA Request 76-382, copy attached

1. Mr. Weisberg has requested under the FOIA information on:

a. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

b. Earl Ray

c. Other individuals involved with the assassination of Dr. King.

2. To ensure consistency in making determinations for release under both the FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and the Privacy Act, of requests such as Mr. Weisberg's, would you please state the current legal criteria to apply to these type cases. Specifically, it would be helpful to the DDO to have a clearly enunciated legal opinion regarding what, if any, privacy rights the family of a deceased individual might have vis-a-vis the deceased individual. Further, what, if any, privacy rights does a convicted felon have.

3. We are aware that each case must be judged on its own facts. Hence, we would be grateful for your opinion regarding the criteria to apply to Mr. Weisberg's request. However, a general rule applicable to the type of request also would be very useful, would expedite the processing of such requests, and would apply some consistency in the decision-making process.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment: Reference

cc: Paul Haefner, OPS/ITG

Administrative - Internal Use Only

CONFIDENTIAL

30 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Coordinator, DDO

SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

REFERENCE: F-76-382

This office recommends following action concerning the documents referred by OS/IRG:

Ray London-5061, dated 8 June 1968 and London-5062, dated 8 June 1968; concerns Ray traveling in London; source of this information was the FBI, some of the information was received from Scotland Yard; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4) and exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

Ray Ottawa-5446, dated 8 June 1968; concerns travel of Galt; (SMABOVE/9) a Canadian service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

King UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966; concerns surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the Dade County/Florida police (Criminal Intelligence); excluded under 1900.3(g)(4).

John J Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Ray LOND 5062 OGA1
8 June 68 liaison

CONFIDENTIAL

E.2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

13-00000

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HAROLD WEISBERG FOR MARTIN LUGHTER KING AND JAMES EARL RAY DOCUMENTS

REQUEST NUMBER

FROM:

EXTENSION

DATE SENT

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Owen	4 May	4	Ao
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. Helen 1D 3125			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

These are the documents on Ray only. Please review them and let me know if there are any changes you want made on them.

OGC is currently reviewing them and writing the affadavit. Court date is 22 May.

We will have to incorporate x your changes into the affadavit.

Thanks

Helen X1313

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray)
Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Life, dated 3 May 1968; New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; UPI, dated 17 May 1968; Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; The Evening Star, dated 1 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, undated, UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Ramparts, 29 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Post, 28 June 1968; Reuters, London,

Not accurate

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058123

dated 18 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, undated; The Washington Post, 9 June 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968; The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968; St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968; Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Star, 27 June 1968; New York Times, 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 19 April 1968; New York Times, dated 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968; Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968; Washington Star, 26 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968; Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969; Reuters, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; EX-3438, dated 1969; The Strange Case of James Earl Ray; dated 1969; London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; London, 11 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968; London, 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968; Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968; Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968; Washington Post, 8 May 1968; Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto,

Not accurate

refer to DDI/FBIS

dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 30 June 1968; UPI-33, London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-26, London, dated 17 June 1968; UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968; London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; London, dated 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Examiner, dated 26-27, April 1968; Associated Press, dated 8 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969; Los Vegas Sun, 10 May 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; Reuters, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968; London, UPI-20, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-39, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-126, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-54, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; UPI-61, 17 July 1968.

Not accurate

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

348-DIR 90530, 10 Apr 68 b1, b3, Mexi 5188 349, 10 Apr 68 b1, b3

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9600 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-9556), dated 22 April 1968; ~~Director~~-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16358, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

HMMW-16358 22 Apr 68 23

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

370 (a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

371 ④ (b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

373 ⑥ (c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

368 ① (d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

Cindy

322 ⑤ (e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

374 ⑦ (f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

375 (g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1). ~~Disp, 15 Jul 68, b1, b3, (OGA)~~ b6, King

From 30 Jul 71 memo to DDO/PIC from OPS/ITG OS Referrals → 3 Cables, 8 June 68 b1 (liaison),

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1). 369 ②

Memo, 19 Feb 69; Memo, 28 May 69, b1, b2, b3, b6 (OS referrals - DCD)
379 380

376-378 3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

381-388 (a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

389 (b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

390 (c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

391 (d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

392 (e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

393 (f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

394 (g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

395 (h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

396 (i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

397 (j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

398 (k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

399 (l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

400 (m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King. liaison

401 (n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

402 (o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

403 (p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

404 (q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

405 (r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

406 (s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

407 (t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition. liaison

(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968;
408 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968;
409 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968;
410 records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the
411 FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns
412 proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey
413 Lawmyer and John Willard.

414 d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

415 e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

416 f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

417 g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

418 5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

80 6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray)
Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. 1 Life, dated 3 May 1968; 2 New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; 3 Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; 4 Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; 5 Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; 6 ~~UPI~~ Reuters, dated 17 May 1968; 7 Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; 8 Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; 9 Reuters, London, undated; 10 Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; 11 Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; 12 The Evening Star, dated 2 July 1968; 13 Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 14 ~~Reuters~~ AP, London, dated 27 June 1968; 15 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 16 Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; 17 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 18 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 19 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 20 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 21 United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; 22 London, dated 27 June 1968; 23 London, dated 27 June 1968; 24 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 25 Reuters, London, undated; 26 Reuters, London, undated; 27 UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; 28 Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; 29 Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; 30 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 31 Ramparts, 29 June 1968; 32 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 33 Reuters, London, undated; 34 Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; 35 The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 36 Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; 37 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 38 Washington Post, 28 June 1968; 39 Reuters, London,

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dated 18 June 1968;[40]Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968;[41]Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968;[42]Reuters, London, undated;[43]Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968; [44]Reuters, undated;[45]Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968;[46]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968;[47]Reuters, undated;[48]The Washington Post, 9 June 1968;[49]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968;[50]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968;[51]The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968;[52]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968;[53]St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968;[54]Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968; [55]London, dated 27 June 1968;[56]London, dated 27 June 1968; [57]Associated Press, London, undated;[58]London, dated 27 June 1968;[59]Washington Star, 27 June 1968;[60]New York Times, 18 April 1968;[61]New York Times, dated 18 April 1968;[62]New York Times, dated 19 April 1968;[63]New York Times, dated 23 April 1968;[64]Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968;[65]Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968;[66]Washington Star, 26 April 1968;[67]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968;[68]Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968;[69]Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968;[70]Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969; [71]Reuters, dated 9 June 1968;[72]Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968;[73]EX-3438, dated 1969;[74]The Strange Case of James Earl Ray;[75]dated 1969;[76]London, undated; [77]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; [78]London, dated 10 June 1968;[79]London, dated 10 June 1968;[80]UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968;[81]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968;[82]London, dated 10 June 1968;[83]London, dated 10 June 1968;[84]Reuters, London, 11 June 1968;[85]Reuters, London, undated; [86]London, 11 June 1968;[87]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968;[88]London, dated 10 June 1968; [89]Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968;[90]London, 10 June 1968;[91]London, dated 10 June 1968;[92]Reuters, London, 10 June 1968;[93]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[94]London, dated 11 June 1968;[95]Reuters, London, undated;[96]Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968;[97]Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968;[98]Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968;[99]Washington Post, 8 May 1968;[100]Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968;[101]Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968;[102]Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968;[103]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[104]Associated Press, Toronto,

dated 10 June 1968;[105]Associated Press, Toronto, dated
10 June 1968;[106]Associated Press, London, undated;[107]London,
dated 27 June 1968;[108]Associated Press, London, dated
30 June 1968;[109]UPI-33, London, undated;[110]Associated Press,
London, dated 18 June 1968;[111]UPI-26, London, dated 17
June 1968;[112]UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968;[113]London, dated
18 June 1968;[114]UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968;
115 London, dated 13 June 1968;[116]London, dated 6 July 1968;
117 Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968;[118]Washington Examiner,
dated 26-27, April 1968;[119]Associated Press, dated 8 July
1968;[120]Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968;[121]Reuters,
London, dated 3 July 1968;[122]London, dated 5 July 1968;
123 Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969;[124]Los Vegas
Sun, 10 May 1968;[125]Associated Press, London, 18 June
1968;[126]Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[127]Associated
Press, London, undated;[128]Reuters, London, 18 June 1968;
129 Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968;[130]London, UPI-20,
dated 13 June 1968;[131]Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968;
132 Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[133]London, dated
13 June 1968;[134]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June
1968;[135]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968;
136 UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968;[137]UPI-39, London,
dated 12 June 1968;[138]Associated Press, London, dated
20 June 1968;[139]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June
1968;[140]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968;
141 Reuters, London, undated;[142]Reuters, London, dated 13
June 1968;[143]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968;
144 UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968;[145]Reuters, Nashville,
dated 11 June 1968;[146]Associated Press, Toronto, dated
11 June 1968;[147]Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968;
148 Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968;[149]UPI-126,
Washington, 11 June 1968;[150]UPI-54, Nashville, dated
11 June 1968;[151]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968;
152 Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968;[153]Reuters, undated;
154 Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968;[155]UPI-61,
17 July 1968.

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9660 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-9556), dated 22 April 1968; Director-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16353, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

(a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

(g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1).

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1).

3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

(b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

(c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

(d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

(e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

(h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

(i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

(j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

(k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

(l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

(m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King.

(n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

(o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

(p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

(q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

(r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

(s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

(t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition.

(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968; Subject: JJoe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968; Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968; records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lawmyer and John Willard.

d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John J. Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

OGC
memo
(4 Oct
197
to ADDO
re.
FBI
contact
w/CIA
regard.
KING

OGC 76-5403
4 October 1976

Closed [illegible] 2

MEMORANDUM FOR : Associate Deputy Director for Administration
Attn: Chief, Security Analysis Group, OS
Director of Personnel
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology
✓Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Attn: ISS/IP/EIS
D/DCI/Intelligence Community
D/DCI/for National Intelligence Officers
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
Executive Secretary

FROM : Richard H. Lansdale
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. At the Attorney General's direction, a task force was established in May 1976 by the Office of Professional Responsibility of the Justice Department to review the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in relation to the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., his assassination and the Bureau's investigation of that murder.

2. Pursuant to the Attorney General's directive, Justice is canvassing those investigative agencies of the Government which might have been contacted by the FBI to secure or deliver information for intelligence, for investigative assistance (before or after the assassination), or for any form of counterintelligence action in relation to Dr. King.

3. It is requested that a check be made of your records to determine the extent and nature of any contacts with CIA by the FBI in regard to the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

4. DoJ has expressed some urgency in responding to their request. Therefore, please advise this Office of the results of your search at your earliest convenience, but no later than close of business, 21 October 1976.

Richard H. Lansdale
Richard H. Lansdale

IPS

resp.
to
WEISBERG

2
~~3~~ copies

[illegible]
1 copy
1 Betty

2 6 APR 1977

James H. Lesar, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This is in partial response to your request, dated 11 June 1976, made on behalf of your client, Mr. Harold Weisberg. Please refer also to our letters, dated 21 June 1976, 30 November 1976 and 13 January 1977. Per our recent telephone conversation this partial response addresses itself to that part of your letter requesting records pertaining to James Earl Ray.

The materials located thus far have been reviewed carefully, and our determinations are as follows:

Enclosed, Tab A, are copies of the following items which are being released to you in their entirety:

1. One book excerpt.

2-109. One hundred and eight (108) press items.

110-134. Twenty-five (25) UPI wire items.

135-171. Thirty-seven (37) Reuters wire items.

172-223. Fifty-two (52) AP wire items.

Enclosed also, Tab B, are segregable portions of the documents listed below. Deletions in the originals were made under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Information Act subsections which are given with each document cited.

The applicability of these exemptions has been explained to you in our earlier correspondence.

	Documents	Exemptions
224-225.	Two cables, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
226.	Cable, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
227-229.	Three cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
230-233.	Four cables, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
234-235.	Two cables, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
236-237.	Two dispatches, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
238-239.	Two cables, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
240.	Memorandum, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
241.	Cable, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
242.	Routing slip, dated 22 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
243.	Routing slip, dated 23 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The documents listed below are being withheld in their entirety under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Informaton Act subsections given with each document.

	Documents	Exemptions
244.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
245.	Memorandum, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
246.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

247. 371 ✓	Cable, dated 29 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
248.	Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
249.	Cable, dated 3 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
250.	Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
251.	Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
252-254.	Three cables, dated 8 June 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
255.	Memorandum, dated 19 February 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
256.	Memorandum, dated 28 May 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
257-264.	Eight biographic sketches.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
265.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
266-272.	Seven Cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
273.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
274.	Cable, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
275.	Cable, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
276.	Cable, dated 24 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
277-278.	Two Cables, dated 25 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
279.	Dispatch, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

280.	Cable, dated 28 April 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
281-282.	Two Cables, dated 30 April 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
283.	Memorandum, dated 2 May 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
284.	Memorandum, dated 6 May 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
285.	Memorandum, dated 13 May 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
286.	Cable, dated 24 May 1963.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The decisions cited above were made by Mr. Charles A. Briggs, DDO Information Review Officer.

As specified in the Freedom of Information Act, I am advising you of your right to appeal the above decisions, but it would seem to be more reasonable to await the complete results of our processing before you actually determine whether to do so.

We thank you for your patience and consideration.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Savige

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures
IPS/EK/cb/20 Apr 77
Orig. - Adse.
1 - DDO
① - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS F-76-382 w/cy Tab B
1 - OLC
1 - OGC
1 - Pub Aff/Hetu

7/CG

CONFIDENTIAL

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
DDO Information Review Officer

SUBJECT : FBI Referral re Harold Weisberg Request on Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REFERENCES : A. Request No. F 76-382

B. Referral, Dated 25 March 1977

C. Briggs' Memorandum to IPS dated 26 October 1976

The documents forwarded under Reference B have been reviewed by the responsible DDO components and the following determinations have been made:

a. One CIA originated document may be released in sanitized form (Tab A).

b. Five CIA originated documents are denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab B.

c. Five FBI documents containing CIA information should be denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab C.

d. Two FBI documents and one CIA document should be referred to other CIA components for determinations (see Tab D).

/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs

Attachments: a/s

cc: IPG/SCB
SA/C/LA
EUR/EXO
AF/Plans

CONFIDENTIAL

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

TAB A
(PICG 15)

CIA · Originated
Release - Sanitized

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
	[✓ Cable], Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 11 Apr 68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Ga
Mr. R
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

C.I.A.
RELEASE

RR ESV

DE ESC 050 1022137

ZNY SSSSS

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

SECRET

CIA NBR 90520

McGowan
4/18/69

Marking

SUBJECT: CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.

1. A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489, ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

16 APR 16 1968

2. ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN DEPARTED MEXICO CITY FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE

76

59APR 22 1968

TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL) REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY

GP-1

BT

NNNN

INT QSL PLS GA

EFH FBI REC NBR 50

TOR 11/2155Z KK

C.I.A.
RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

4

TELETYPE
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. G
Mr. R
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

C.I.A.
RELEASE

McGowan
4/23/69

marking

~~RR ESV~~

~~DE ESC 050 1022137~~

~~ZNY SSSSS~~

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

CIA NBR 90520

SUBJECT: ~~CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.~~

1. ~~A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489,~~ ~~ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED~~ SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

16 APR 16 1968

2. ~~ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN~~ DEPARTED ~~MEXICO CITY~~ FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL ~~OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE~~

76

59APR 22 1968

~~TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL)~~ REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE ~~IN MEXICO CITY~~

GP-1

BT

NNNN

~~INT QSL PLS GA~~
~~EFH FBI REG NBR 50~~
~~TOR 11/2155Z KK~~

C.I.A.
RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

CIA Documents Denied

TAB B
(PICG's)
FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
	~~Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch~~ ~~Other:~~ ~~Date :~~	~~(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)~~ ~~(j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1)~~ ~~Other:~~
Doc # A-73 King	L/W Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 18 Apr 68 Doc. ⑧③ of Briggs Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ ~~(b)(3)~~], (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
Treated in Initial Review	[✓ Cable], Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 25 Apr 68 ~~Based~~ on Doc. 407 #(283) of Briggs memo to IPS based on	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
KING	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 25 Apr 68 Doc ⑦④ of Briggs Memo to IPS	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
✓ Treated in Initial Review	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 2 May 68 Doc. 407 of Briggs' memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
Treated in Initial Review date: 6 May 68	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : ⑦ May 68 Doc. 408 of Briggs Memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

SECRET

Release CIA 4/11/68

18 April 68

McGowan

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr, and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

B-88117

Dec 73

61,63

EX-103

REC 11 44-38861-1371

APR 23 1968

248

133

SECRET

GROUP 1

13-00000

CIA info in FBI Documents
Deny per 27Apr77
ISS response to IPS

TAB C
(PICG's)

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
KING	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Teletype Date : 4/11/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY Doc #A	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 17 Apr 68 Based on Doc. 389 of Biggs' Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY Doc A	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 22 Apr 68 Based on Doc. 398 of Biggs Memo to IPS	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 4/28/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum], Dispatch Other: Date : 4/29/68	[✓ (b)(1)], (b)(2), [✓ (b)(3)], [✓ (b)(6)] (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

Document Description: FBI Teletype

Dated: 4/11/68

Document Located By : ____________________
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: FBI

RECOMMEND:

____	Release in full-text
X	Release in sanitized form
____	Deny in toto
____	Defer decision to ____
X	Coordination with LA/DR prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
☐	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
☒	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
☐	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
☐	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
☐	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
☐	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
☒	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
☒	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
☒	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* ☐	Other, specify:		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

Deny — All CIA info denied. 61, 63, 52

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

D. Hostegard, E/IB Mary C Hoss SA/C/LA
Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

4/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Atkinson

VIA TELETYPE
1232 PM
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REURTELS NUMBERS TWO AND FOUR DATED APRIL EIGHT LAST.

PERTINENT DATA IN RETELS WAS INCORPORATED INTO LHM AND FURNISHED WHITE HOUSE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY LETTER APRIL TEN INSTANT.

IN VIEW OF NATURE AND ENORMITY OF ALLEGATIONS MADE BY HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA CONCERNING THIS MATTER, LEGAT MUST ENDEAVOR TO VERIFY OR DISPROVE SUCH ALLEGATIONS.

PHOTOGRAPH OF ONE HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA, ALSO KNOWN AS HERNAN HENRIQUEZ URENA LORA, BORN OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR, FIFTEEN, AT SAN DIEGO, CUBA, OR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

REC-4 44-38861-498

19 APR 12 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

BUREAU FILES REVEAL ABOVE INDIVIDUAL IS DOMINICAN CITIZEN AND HIS PARENTS WERE MAX AND GUARINA HENRIQUEZ.

Delete

~~CIA ON APRIL SEVENTEEN, SIXTY TWO, ADVISED ABOVE HENRIQUEZ LORA WAS CITIZEN OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHO HAD BEEN TRAVELING ON CUBAN PASSPORT NUMBER ONE ONE TWO SEVEN DATED JANUARY TWENTY FIVE, FIFTY NINE. IN ONE NINE SIX TWO HE RESIDED AT ANTONIO MAURA, TEN~~

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (S. Carmichael)
1 - 105-437038 (Hernan Henriquez Lora)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WHA:lam (10)

TELETYPE TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO
RE: ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

~~MADRID, SPAIN. ACCORDING TO CIA, HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH PRO-CASTRO AND ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MADRID DURING PRECEDING TWO YEARS AND WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MEMBER OF CUBAN G-TWO. THIS INFORMATION WAS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CIA.~~

~~CIA ON AUGUST NINE, SIXTY SIX, ADVISED IT HAD NOT HAD ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA AND ITS FILES INDICATED HE HAS "VERY UNSAVORY REPUTATION."~~ delete

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HENRIQUEZ LORA WILL BE FORWARDED BY AIRTEL.

NOTE:

Legat in retels reported Henriquez Lora had volunteered a third party had over heard a conversation in Santo Domingo between two Dominican communists in which it was alleged that Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown advocated the death of Martin Luther King and King's assassination would benefit the cause of black violence.

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ____________

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 4/29/68

Document Located By : FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ____________

RECOMMEND:

- ____ Release in full-text
- ____ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ____ Defer decision to ____________
- ____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(X)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
~~(X)~~	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This name is subject of investigation by other USG entities.		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

4-29-68

Airtel

1 - Mr. Hudson

To: SAC, Washington Field

From: Director, FBI

MURKIN

On 4-28-68, a representative of CIA advised the Bureau that a German doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4-23-68. The individual was identified as Joe Musgaque, who is reportedly an employee of the Wilder Oil Company (address unknown).

Washington Field, check passport records for any identifying data concerning Musgaque; and also attempt to determine through the Department of State any information concerning the Wilder Oil Company, which reportedly is operating in Nigeria. If no information available in State Department records regarding the Wilder Oil Company, determine whether State Department can obtain this information from the Nigerian Embassy.

Handle immediately.

E

1 - Memphis (info)

EX-110 REC 5

1-2440

APR 30 1968

APR 30 1968

FJH:jlh
(5)

NOTE: See memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan dated 4-28-68, captioned "Murkin" JHK:brr.

3 1968

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Ch FDDIS

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 4/28/68

Document Located By : FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ________

RECOMMEND:

________ Release in full-text
________ Release in sanitized form
✓ Deny in toto
________ Defer decision to ________
________ Coordination with ________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
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(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This man is allegedly in [illegible] to other USG entities.		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ~~This~~

____
Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

: Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 4/28/68

: J. A. Sizoo

T: MURKIN

Norman Pulin, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised this date that a german doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4/23/68. Because he thought the individual looked like Galt he made an effort to get some information concerning him. He found he was registered at the hotel as Joe Musgaque, Room 403, receipt number D52138, account number 08325. The doctor did not know if Musgaque had registered at the hotel as an American. In conversation with Musgaque the doctor learned that Musgaque was employed by the Wilder Oil Company (adress unknown) and was en route to Warri Oil Field, Nigeria.

Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or the Wilder Oil Company.

Mr. Pulin, CIA, was advised that Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or Wilder Oil Company.

ACTION:

None. For information. This is being referred to the General Investigative Division.

JHK:brr (8)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Kavanagh

REC- 31

-2461

MAY 6 - 1968

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
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Casper
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Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

McGuire

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

At 6:35 pm 4/22/68, John Mapother, Clandestine Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following information to Night Supervisor James F. McGuire by telephone:

CIA sources in Panama have reported two American citizens are being detained in Panama City, Panama, at the request of the Costa Rican authorities. Allegedly, they are being detained in connection with the assassination of Martin Luther King. These individuals are identified as Tom Wolman, born 7/17/44 in New York. Wolman has Passport Number J085474, issued 1/29/68, and his permanent residence is shown as 30 Larrys Lane, Pleasantville, New York. The other individual is identified as Douglas Harry Hulbard, Passport Number 330926. Hulbard is described as a former soldier who has returned to Panama to be married. CIA did not have any further descriptive data regarding Hulbard.

These two individuals were traveling in a Chevrolet, License Number 23GH19, Motor Number 13 387 13 113711. The vehicle and license plates could not be further described by CIA. According to CIA, Wolman's passport indicates he had entered and departed El Salvador and Honduras on 4/17/68; Nicaragua on 4/18/68.

Mr. Mapother advised he has no indication why the Costa Rican authorities have requested the detention of the above-described individuals. Further, he does not know of any factual connection of these individuals with the King case. He said CIA sources were trying to develop this matter further. He also advised that CIA would send the FBI a written communication concerning this matter on 4/23/68.

At 9:10 pm 4/22/68, Norman Poulin, CIA, orally advised that a check had been made with the Costa Rican authorities and determined that Costa Rica has no information regarding the above-mentioned individuals; that Costa Rica did not request Panamanian authorities to hold these individuals, that they have no request from any American authorities to detain them; and that they have

44-38861-1685

REC-48 CONTINUED — OVER

JFM:chs (7)
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Helgeson
1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. J.F.McGuire

APR 24 1968

66 APR 30 1968

DIR 95853

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MURKIN

no knowledge of any connection between these individuals and the assassination of Martin Luther King. Poulin indicated that the entire information may be a complete hoax; however, CIA will advise FBI if any additional data comes to their attention.

ACTION:

The above information was orally furnished to Mr. Helgeson, General Investigative Division.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
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Conrad
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Rosen
Sullivan
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Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: April 17, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: MURKIN

Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on April 17, 1968:

A CIA source, characterized as being very reliable, advised that on or about April 15, 1968, an individual identifying himself as Gerald Lee Richards, a U. S. seaman, called at the Tokyo, Japan, office of the National Maritime Union and asked to be signed on a ship as soon as possible. (It should be noted that reference is being made to the office of the U.S. National Maritime Union.) He was asked to furnish his local address in Tokyo, and he refused to do so. He became very agitated and then left. So far he has not returned to the aforementioned office. CIA's source stated that Richards answers the general description of the suspect in the instant case as reported in newspapers.

Richards volunteered information indicating that he applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, on June 16, 1964, and that he registered as a member of the National Maritime Union in San Pedro on February 21, 1968. He has Social Security number 562-46-5078 and U. S. Coast Guard identifying document Z2711-782. He was born April 8, 1937, in Missouri (town not given). CIA's source described him as 5'10"; 155 pounds; brown hair, receding hairline on both sides; a scar, not prominent, about two and one half inches long across the center of his forehead. His most outstanding characteristic was his grin, described as "disconcerting and resembling a grimace."

REC 3 44-[illegible]-2404

Ober advised that this same information has been given to our Legat, Tokyo. CIA is checking through available sources in Tokyo to establish the whereabouts of Richards. If this lead washes out, CIA would like to be advised.

E 110

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Civil Rights Section of the General Investigative Division.

SJP:clb (4)

1 - Mr. McGowan (Long)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

Based on info
contained [illegible]
[illegible] CIS [illegible]

CIA info in FBI Documents
Refer to other components

TAB D
(PICG 15) ?
(FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77)

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
KING	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 9 Apr 68 Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
KING	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 10 Apr 68 Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, [✓ Memorandum,] Dispatch Other: Date : 4/17/68 Refer to OS.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
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Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 9, 1968

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MURKIN

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Martindale
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Sullivan

This is the case involving the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., 4/4/68.

One of the most promising leads developed so far is the laundry tags appearing on a T-shirt and a pair of shorts apparently abandoned by the subject with the rifle that is believed to be the murder weapon. It has been determined that these laundry marks were made by a Thermo Seal marking machine manufactured by the Textile Marking Machine Company, Syracuse, New York. The manufacturer of this machine has advised that the laundry marks in question are unusual in that they consist of five characters whereas the usual code contains six characters.

These markings are also unusual because the first two characters are in smaller type while the remaining three characters are in larger type. The normal arrangement is for the first three characters to be in smaller type and for the following characters to be in larger type. The Textile Marking Machine Company has stated only a limited number of machines have been manufactured which print laundry marks in this manner. Investigation is proceeding on an expedited basis to locate these machines for the purpose of identifying the laundry marks.

EX-115 REC. 44- 38861-1174

16 APR 12 1968

Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has furnished the Central Intelligence Agency file on Robert Ervin Kramer, M. D., Berkeley, California, whom Helms considers a suspect because of his resemblance to an artist's conception of the subject and because of the Central Intelligence Agency's experience with Kramer. The Central Intelligence Agency file states Kramer has a long arrest record and contains a Berkeley Police Department photograph, dated 1/27/66, number 22805.

Enclosure sent 4-9-68

54 APR 24 1968

WAB: yea

CONTINUED - OVER

He has been a chronic letter writer to the Central Intelligence Agency criticizing them and the Government. By letter of 12/29/67 Kramer requested the Central Intelligence Agency to pay him $100,000 monthly for six months for a paper on geopolitical economy he had previously submitted. He concluded his letter with the statement, "In the event that you fail to acknowledge my request, I can accept no responsibility for any future efforts necessary to gain the combined ends of ideal government and financial recompense."

The only record of Kramer found in Bureau files is a memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, 1/18/68, advising us of his letters to the Central Intelligence Agency. No record can be located in the Identification Division but Kramer's fingerprints are being obtained from the Berkeley police.

A. C. Hayden, Intra-Division Information Unit of the Department, advised on the evening of 4/8/68 that Beatrice Rosenberg, a secretary in the Attorney General's office, had received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as Frederick Dunstan who said he resided at Route 350, Whitefield, North Carolina. Dunstan said he was calling the Attorney General to report that a white man was in his house, was drunk, had a gun and said he had killed Martin Luther King, Jr.

There is no Whitefield, North Carolina. There is a Whiteville, North Carolina. Investigation by the Charlotte Division has failed to locate a Route 350, Box 350, or Highway 350 in the Whiteville area and no record of a Frederick Dunstan has been located. No record of Dunstan could be found in Bureau files.

A pair of duckbill pliers was found among the personal effects believed to have been abandoned by the subject. These pliers bear a trademark of the Rompage Hardware Company, Los Angeles. Employees at the hardware company believe this is one of twelve pliers purchased in October, 1966. Employees have no recollection of the sale of these pliers but an exhaustive search is being made of charge sale records.

It is noted that the rifle believed to be the murder weapon was purchased in Birmingham, Alabama, 3/30/68. Binoculars found with the rifle were purchased in Memphis, 4/4/68. A latent fingerprint found on the rifle is identical with a latent fingerprint found on the binoculars. This presents a strong probability that these fingerprints are those of the subject.

CONTINUED PAGE THREE

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
RE: MURKIN

Other major avenues of investigation include checking out white Mustang automobiles, since one was seen leaving at a high rate of speed after the shot was fired; efforts to trace a bedspread or blanket found with the gun, and the immediate processing of all suspects as soon as they are developed.

ACTION:

1. Attached is a memorandum for the White House, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General and the Civil Rights Division.

2. Investigation is continuing on an all-out basis.

OK-
H

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

FROM : C. L. McGowan

SUBJECT: MURKIN

DATE: April 10, 1968

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Long

This is the matter involving the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Liaison advised of the receipt of information from Richard Helms, Director of CIA, that one Robert Kramer was a possible suspect. According to information furnished by Howard Osborn, Director of Security of CIA, Kramer, who is a doctor, has been a source of trouble to CIA for some time. Only recently Mr. Helms received a very cryptic telegram from Kramer. In reviewing Kramer's file, they noted a photograph which bears a very strong resemblance to recent pictures of artist drawings of the killer which have appeared in local papers. The likeness was so striking that Mr. Helms thought it should be brought to the attention of the FBI immediately.

ACTION:

Senior Resident Agent Jesse Hall, Alexandria, Virginia, was telephonically contacted and instructed to obtain full details from the files of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, together with all background information on Kramer, as well as a photograph, so that this matter could be thoroughly checked out.

CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC- 31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

70 APR 1 [illegible]

Referred PCS/TC 29 Mar [illegible] Due

SECRET

Rec'd from Robt. Mooney 4/17/68 WCB

SUBJECT: STAAR, Richard Felix - PHOTOGRAPH
aka: GWIAZDOWSKI, Richard Felix

DPOB : 10 January 1923, Warsaw, Poland

Subject of FBI investigations in 1954 (Voice of America) and 1956 (USIA) - Bureau File 123-15026.

Of possible interest is similarity between his name and that of "Eric Starvo GALT." In that Richard STAAR is similar. GWIAZDA is "star" in Polish. Among STAAR's references on a 1949 PHS is Professor Stanley AULT, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

From 1959 to 1962 (latest information available) STAAR was a Professor of Political Science at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. His local residence addresses during that period are shown as 303 Vickers Drive, N. E., Atlanta, 7, and 879 Clifton Rd., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia.

X-115 EX-114

REC-19 44-38861-1549

ENCLOSURE

10 APR 23 1968

REC-31

ENCLOSURE

79 MAY 7 - 1968

SECRET



RICHARD F. STAAR
JUNE 49

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: April 10, 1968

FROM : C. L. McGowan

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Long

SUBJECT: MURKIN

This is the matter involving the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Liaison advised of the receipt of information from Richard Helms, Director of CIA, that one Robert Kramer was a possible suspect. According to information furnished by Howard Osborn, Director of Security of CIA, Kramer, who is a doctor, has been a source of trouble to CIA for some time. Only recently Mr. Helms received a very cryptic telegram from Kramer. In reviewing Kramer's file, they noted a photograph which bears a very strong resemblance to recent pictures of artist drawings of the killer which have appeared in local papers. The likeness was so striking that Mr. Helms thought it should be brought to the attention of the FBI immediately.

ACTION:

Senior Resident Agent Jesse Hall, Alexandria, Virginia, was telephonically contacted and instructed to obtain full details from the files of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, together with all background information on Kramer, as well as a photograph, so that this matter could be thoroughly checked out.

CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC-31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

70 APR 19 1968

Referred [illegible]

?

LOG AS APPEAL (F-76-382)

Doesn't he owe us money?

Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77

(Tom O., or successor

Dear Mr. Wilson,

LOG THIS AS A NEW REQUEST

The news account of your coming release of an additional 4,000 pages on what might be called mind-bending reminds me that my requests seem to me to cover this and that you have not notified me of this release. I do want these. If you interpret my prior requests as not covering them then consider this a new request. My recollection is that my initial requests cover anything and verything directly or indirectly related to this subject. That you have interpreted my requests as I have is evidence from prior correspondence notifying me of releases.

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Under the Act there is authority for the remission of all costs and fees. I believe I meet the requirements for this remission and I make the request formally. My work is restricted exclusively to what is now regarded as important historical cases, In one on which I have paid the CIA large sums without compliance, the King assassination, the previous Attorney General so held, formally, confirmed by a federal judge. I have already arranged to give all my records, not just these, to a university system. I believe at an earlier date I reserved the right to recover these fees. I have delayed a formal appeal pending a determination of a judge that there be a ruling by the Department of Justice with regard to me and on this.. The Department provided a bargain-basement response, a 60% remission that I have appealed and will if necessary litigate. I hope the CIA will act favorably on this.

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It has been a very long time since I have heard from you about a multitude of requests all long overdue by your own backlog claims. One of these is on the King assassination, In that you may recall you estimated a $1,000 search fee and asked for and received a $500 deposit. What you have sent is ludicrous. In the long time in which I have heard and received nothing further I think you have in effect refused the request after charging fees so this is also an appeal on the King/Ray records.

peal

I am asking again when I may expect to hear from you on all the other requests, including my PA request for the records on me. The appeal is several years old now. My recollection is that your last reference to this stated the processing of the appeal had not been completed. I have rights under the Act to more than copies. I want to exercise those rights. This is impossible without obtaining all copies first. As I have told you repeatedly I would prefer not to have to litigate this. What I am thus really asking you is doe s the CIA want me to suit it on a request that goes back to 1971 and on which it is not in compliance? Not even processed tye appeal?

Among the factors making it difficult to keep track of these non-compliances is your failure to respond as well as to comply. I believe I have asked this before. If I have then what follows is an appeal from a refusal. If I have not it is a new request. I would like all records relating to my requests and appeals, including their sequential relationships to other requests, under both Acts and particularly as this relates to compliance with other requests.

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Sincerely,

Harold

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

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LOG AS
APPEAL (F-76-382)

Doesn't he owe us money?

Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77

(Tom O., or successor)

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El K.

Sincerely,

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS F 76-382

FROM:
H.G. Bean
Assistant for Information, DDA
7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION
5117

DATE SENT
15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG 1 D 4125 HQ HT-1			
2.	DDO/PIC 16 AUG 1977		
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO 6 E 56 HQ BY-1			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO 2 E 6104 HQ FX-4			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks,
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

H.G. Bean

H.G. Bean

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

LOG (F)

[Acknowledgement drafted]

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

F 76-382

June 11, 1976

OS
DDO
CRS ?
OGC ?

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg of Frederick, Maryland, I request access to the following:

1. All records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. All records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

3. All records pertaining to James Earl Ray, under whatever name or alias.

4. All records on any alleged or suspected accomplice or associate in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. All collections of published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

6. All analyses, commentaries, reports, or investigations on or in any way pertaining to any published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or the authors of said materials.

7. All records, letters, cables, memorandums, routing slips, photographs, tape recordings, receipts, sketches, computer printouts or any other form of data pertaining to or in any way relevant to the foregoing requests for information, regardless of source or origin.

JUN 16 8 11 AM '76

This request is made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

James H. Lesar

21 JUN 1976

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 11 June 1976 on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

I shall arrange for a search of CIA files and shall be in further communication with you once the search has been completed and any records found reviewed for releasability under the Act.

As you may know, the heavy volume of Freedom of Information requests received by the Agency has resulted in processing backlogs. If we do not respond within the 10 working days stipulated by the Act, it is your right to construe this as a denial, subject to appeal to the CIA Information Review Committee. It would seem more reasonable, however, for us to continue processing your request and to respond as soon as feasible. Any denials of records could be appealed at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that this is agreeable to you and proceed on this basis.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of our fee schedule. If the charges seem likely to be considerable, I shall provide you with an estimate and perhaps require a partial payment in advance of processing.

Sincerely,

/s/GFW

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure: as stated
IPS/CES/cb/21 Jun 76Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
    1 - ✓IPS Chrono
    1 ✓ IPS (F-76-382)

30 NOV 1976

IPS/DGV/cr/29 Nov 76
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - OGC (Strickland)
1 - DDO/PICG
1 - OS/IRG
1 - AI/DDA
① - IPS (Weisberg,F-76-382) SPR
1 - IPS (Weisberg Correspondence)
1 - IPS Chrono

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

You will recall that our letter of 21 June 1976 acknowledged receipt of your letter on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and to those dealing with James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

We find that we are unable to respond to your request as it now stands due to legal and regulatory restrictions on the release of personal information from official records. In that light, please be advised that we can proceed no further with your request unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively. These statements should be quite specific as to what areas of personal information are and are not authorized for release by this Agency to you and your client. If all information in our records is releasable, that should be so stated; if only such information as relates to specific incidents or to specific periods of time is releasable, those caveats should be clearly stated.

Finally, we must ask that you provide a statement of willingness to pay search and duplication fees as required by this request and in line with the fee schedule enclosed. It has been estimated that such charges could approach $1000. Along with the notarized statements above, and the statement of willingness to pay all search and copying charges (or those up to an established limit), we would require a down payment of half the anticipated charges. Payment should be made to this office in the form of a check or money order payable to Treasurer of the United States.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

13-00000

F-76-382
EK

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 3, 1976

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

In response to your letter of November 30, 1976, Mr. Harold Weisberg has authorized me to state his willingess to pay search and copying charges up to the amount of $1,000 if such charges are required by his Freedom of Information Act request for records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his assassination. Because you require a down payment of half the anticipated charges, I enclose a check for $500.00.

This payment of $500.00 and any subsequent payments made in connection with this request are tendered with the express reservation that Mr. Weisberg does not waive his right to recover them.

9 11 PM '76

C.I.A. regulations provide:

> Records shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced rate whenever the Coordinator determines that waiver or reduction of the charge is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. The Coordinator also may waive or reduce the charge whenever he determines that the interest of the government would be served thereby. 32 C.F.R. §1900.25(a).

In accordance with this regulation, I call upon you to determine that it is in the public and governmental interest to waive search and copying charges incurred in connection with Mr. Weisberg's request. Enclosed herein is a copy of a letter to Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr. which makes a similar request of the Department of Justice. The reasons expressed in that letter for granting a waiver are incorporated in my request that you grant a waiver.

Should you require it, I will provide you with affidavits by myself, Mr. Weisberg, and others in support of this request for a waiver of the search and copying charges for these records. If you do wish supporting affidavits, I would appreciate it if you would inform me of this as soon as possible. I would also request that you indicate what standards, if any, you have established for determining whether or not a request for waiver should be granted.

You state that you can proceed no further with Mr. Weisberg's request "unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively." Because Mr. Weisberg's request undoubtedly comprises records which do not involve any proper claim of privacy, this cannot be true. I do enclose, however, a copy of a notarized waiver by James Earl Ray. I will immediately contact Mrs. King about a waiver by her. In the meantime, I request that you proceed to make available those records responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request which do not involve any proper claim of invasion of privacy.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

James H. Lesar

13 JAN 1977

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth St., NW
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

Thank you for your letter of 27 December. This will acknowledge receipt of the sworn waiver executed by Mr. James Earl Ray, and to advise that processing of this portion of your request has been initiated. Upon receipt of the sworn waiver from Mrs. King, as mentioned in your letter of 3 December, we will then be able to proceed with all aspects of your FOIA request. We also wish to acknowledge receipt of your check for $500.

Thank you for your assistance and continued cooperation.

This request has been assigned the case number F-76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

IPS/EK/cb/12 Jan 77
Distribution:
  Orig - Addressee
    1 - IPS Chrono
    1 ✓ IPS F-76-382
    1 - OGC

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PRIORITY HANDLING - FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about
Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS F 76-382

Copy of IPS respon to WEISBE

FROM:
H.G. Bean
Assistant for Information, DDA
7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION
5117

DATE SENT
15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG ~~1 D 4125 HQ HT-1~~			
2.			
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO ~~6 E 56 HQ BY-1~~			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO ~~2 E 6104 HQ FX-4~~			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks,
Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

H.G. Bean
H.G. Bean

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING - FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

FBI Referral to CIA

28 Sept. 77 - deleted Kennedy
assass. doc's

5 docs originated w/CIA
2 FBI docs for CIA coordination

13-00000

F 382

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

[illegible]

Date: September 28, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

(There [illegible] the [illegible] unless [illegible]

IPS REGISTRY
F77-0854

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST OF HAROLD WEISBERG

This is in reference to our referral of documents to your Agency dated August 18, 1977, and your response to that referral dated September 9, 1977.
F77-564 closed 9/9/77

We have segregated from this referral those documents which are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's FOIA request. The remaining documents which are being forwarded to your Agency are construed to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request. Should you reach a determination that some of these documents are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request, please return those documents which you so consider to the FBI. We would appreciate your processing all those documents which you consider to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request as it is necessary that we resolve the disposition of these documents and so inform the requester without further delay.

Attached are five documents from our files which originated with your Agency. Please examine these documents and if classified, determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted, or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please delete any portion to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

LL. [illegible] 100

Central Intelligence Agency

Also attached are two FBI documents which contain information received from your agency. The information is being referred for a current classification determination and releasability under the provisions of the FOIA.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact Ralph Harp, FOIPA Branch, at telephone number 324-5566.

Enclosures (8)

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
DEC 29 11 09 AM '75
DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Sr.

8. All correspondence or records of other communications pertaining to the guilty plea of James Earl Ray exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

Rev. Ralph Abernathy
Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FBI Referral re Martin Luther King, et al

REQUEST NUMBER: 75-77-322

FROM: [redacted] [redacted]
M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1

EXTENSION: 9532

DATE SENT: 8 Aug 77

SUSPENSE DATE: 15 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [redacted]			
2. [redacted]			
3. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	8 AUG 1977		cl
4. E/G	18 Aug 77		G
5.			
6. EUR/EXO			cl
7.			
8.			
9. [redacted]			
10. M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached for release to the requester.
Thanks.
MDF

~~/_/ No record of subject~~
~~/_/ No info identifiable with subject~~
~~/_/ See attached memorandum~~

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-10

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REFER TO ~~USAF~~
(our copy)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report, OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

Extracts of interest taken from the OSI Monthly Counterintelligence Report are as follows:

SYNOPSIS

Former CP member arrives in Alaska. CP member confined in Federal Jail at Anchorage for non-support. Activities of possible subversives set forth. Alaskan Labor Defender starts publication again.

1. An aircraft passenger list from the Juneau Daily Empire revealed ART [illegible] arrived in that city from Seattle, Washington on 3 March 1956 and departed for Anchorage on 5 March 1956. A later list in the same newspaper revealed [illegible] again flew to Anchorage on 29 March 1956. When interviewed by the FBI in 1951, [illegible] admitted being a member of the Ketchikan branch of the Communist Party from [illegible] to 1950.

2. Another passenger list in the Juneau Empire revealed a [illegible] D. [illegible] departed Juneau for Anchorage on 27 March 1956. Information at this office indicated [illegible] D. [illegible], a known Communist, was due to return to Alaska from the US during the latter part of March 1956. Further inquiry by this office has disclosed [illegible] D. [illegible] was confined in the Federal Jail in Anchorage and charged with non-support of his former wife. [illegible] was released on [illegible] April 1956 when he agreed to pay the stipulated amount and is reportedly planning on working as a self-employed contractor in the Anchorage area.

3. [illegible] ([illegible]) was recently reported as attorney for Anchorage Mayor, [illegible], in the latter's dispute with the City Council over a paving contract. As an indication of [illegible]'s activities, he has recently represented the following companies and/or individuals in highly controversial issues: Chugach Electrical Association, Matanuska Bus Lines, Matanuska Electric Association, Fairview Inn, Copper Valley Electric Association, and the [illegible] tax case. In connection with the [illegible] case, a local newspaper reported that a [illegible] started a fund raising activity which was termed the "[illegible] Defense Fund."

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

REPRODUCTION FROM APERTURE

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO USAF

A-82 (82)

CONFIDENTIAL

OSI COMMENT: The CHARLES PARKER mentioned above is believed to be the same individual as CHARLES LINCOLN PARKER, who resigned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve because of admitted pro-Russian sympathies. BOYKO's continual agitation, past association with Communists, and apparent association with PARKER, certainly places both individuals in a category which is, at least, highly questionable.

4. Further inquiry concerning ESTHER M. EUCKLEWSKI revealed she recently divorced WILFORD SAVOY and reportedly returned to the Homer, Alaska area.

OSI COMMENT: Liaison has been effected with another government agency in the Ninolchik area in an effort to determine the present whereabouts of SUBJECT.

5. The Alaskan Labor Defender, a monthly news publication, has recently reappeared in the Fairbanks area with its first publication dated May 1956. Previous editions of this newspaper appeared in the Fairbanks area in early 1955, but it was discontinued after publication of two editions due to the refusal of a local printing firm to print subsequent copies. Among editorials appearing in the Alaskan Labor Defender are several articles condensed from the "MILITANT," a publication of the Socialist Workers Party, which is cited by the U. S. Attorney General as subversive. One article quoted a speech made by a (Mr.) DU BOIS at a rally held at Carnegie Hall in New York on 29 March 1956 which relates, in referring to the Montgomery, Alabama bus protest, * * * "Led by clear thinking, they (the Negroes) have discovered that the race problem was at bottom an economic problem. Unwittingly they have discovered Earl Marx." * * * (In referring to EARL MARX, they were probably referring to KARL MARX, co-author of the Communist Manifesto)

Quoted below are portions of another article under the caption "It's Time to Think" written by ERNEST GRIFFIN, Independent Candidate from Fairbanks, Alaska, for the House of Representatives:

* * * * "Today there seems to be little or no attention paid to the examples made by the founders of this new nation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the Negro people as citizens of these United States." * * * * (In reference to the Constitution of the United States) * * * "Although this Constitution ranks above every other written Constitution for excellence of its scheme, its simplicity, the precision of its language, and its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle, it has become a neglected Constitution." * * *

CONFIDENTIAL

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

* * *"But we can be destroyed when we lose faith or hope and when life itself seems like a story told by a mad man, as it must seem to the members and supporters of the White Citizens Council.....

The Negro people of the South have been marking time, making excuses and accepting conditions that exist in the South. Until a few brave men in Alabama turned what seemed to be a tragedy into an opportunity by having courage enough to challenge the Jim Crow laws."* * *

Quoted below is a portion of an editorial under the caption "The Longest Picket Line in the World", also appearing in the May 1956 publication of the Alaskan Labor Defender:

* * *" 'Every union local, every worker in office, factory or workshop, must make it a personal obligation to take action now! This is no time for passing the buck! This is the time to collect it and send it to the Montgomery Improvement Association, care of the Rev M. L. King, Dexter Ave. Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama.'

The above statement was issued by Farrell Dobbs, presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, and refers to the 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama who are in a struggle against Jim Crow on the buses of that city." * * *

* * *"Actually the struggle goes deeper and wider than that. The present wave of race terror and hatred in the South is being fanned by the White Citizens Council. What is not generally known is that this terror is directed against any white workers who dare to solidarize with Negroes. The murderous White Citizens Council are not only rabidly Jim Crow but Anti-Semitic and Anti-Labor. Their aim is to preserve the system of color segregation and discrimination as the foundation upon which rests the open shop structure of the "Right to Work" South". * * *

Also appearing in this issue is an article relating that the Catholic Worker has protested the padlocking of the Daily Worker as a violation of the freedom of the press.

An article appearing under the caption "Auto Workers Take Home Pay Declines" reflects the "demand for a 30 hour week at 40 hours pay" by the UAW, Ford Local 600, and the AFL-CIO. Another article under the caption "Employment Falling Off; Productivity is Increasing", quotes JOHN CLARK, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, as stating that his union "Intends to do something" about declining employment in the metals industry. Also set forth in this issue of the Alaskan Labor Defender is the "platform" of DONALD W. BOLTON, Independent Candidate for the Senate, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE DOLLINTER, and NIILO KAPONEN, Independent Candidates for the House of Representatives. Two of the issues listed on the "platform" are "Stop the governments thought-control witch hunt which is pushing America

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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The Editorial Staff of the Alaskan Labor Defender is listed as DON HOLTON, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE COLLINTER, CARTER PAGE and EMIL HYYTUNEN. Mailing address for this newspaper is P. O. Box 1915, Fairbanks, Alaska.

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

74-6-40 2-64

13-00000

Refer USAF

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. BAKA-709

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR

DATE 25 May 1956

FROM : Chief of Station, Anchorage

SUBJECT { GENERAL REDWOOD/Operational
SPECIFIC Transmittal of Extracts taken from AAC Counterintelligence Report - April 1956

Submitted herewith for your information and retention are Extracts taken from the AAC Monthly Counterintelligence Report covering the period 1 - 30 April 1956. The information submitted is only that which deals with CE Activities in the Alaskan Theatre.

Russel T. Arne

Approved: Herbert H. Cavell

Attachment:
Extracts from Report, in dup.

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Distribution:
3-Headquarters w/attach as noted.

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1 Encl.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A

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74-6-462-64

Full text

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report, OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

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3. EDGAR PAUL BOYKO was recently reported as attorney for Anchorage Mayor, KEN HINCHEY, in the latter's dispute with the City Council over a paving contract. As an indication of BOYKO's activities, he has recently represented the following companies and/or individuals in highly controversial issues: Chugach Electrical Association, Matanuska Bus Lines, Matanuska Electric Association, Fairview PUD, Copper Valley Electric Association, and the JACK MARLER tax case. In connection with the MARLER case, a local newspaper reported that a CHARLES MARLER started a fund raising activity which was termed the "MARLER Defense Fund."

CONFIDENTIAL

74.6.11-2-64

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

74-6-40-2-64

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

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Document Located By : ____________________
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

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________ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
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(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: No objection to release of pages unmarked - but those marked X should be withheld.

____
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

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FORM 1-77 3966 (20)

13-00000

75-004
75-4927
75-4785
75-6669
76-143

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

F 77-322
EK:CT
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

F

Assign to Ed K.

Date: May 10, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DDO
L. Ziebell

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST OF MR. HAROLD WEISBERG CONCERNING
THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

Enclosed herewith are a copy of correspondence from captioned individual and two copies of each document which originated with your Agency.

Please examine these documents and if classified determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please indicate any portions to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

Two copies of each document are enclosed. One copy is to be returned in the same condition as received while the other should be used to indicate deletions directly thereon and returned to us.

While it is recognized that disposition of these documents could be made directly by you to the requester, we request their return so direct response to the requester may be made by the FBI. We have found, from past experience with requests of this magnitude, that such procedure affords a more easily managed system of accounting for released material.

To assist in accounting for this referral, it is requested that you direct your reply to Linda Morcock, FOIA Branch, telephone number 324-5550.

Enclosures (9)

MAY 24 1 00 PM '77

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
[illegible] 1975

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ Stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ Stanton Sr.

8. All correspondence or records of other communications pertaining to the guilty plea of James Earl Ray exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

Rev. Ralph Abernathy
Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

13-00000

BON-2 (Rev. 3-1-71)
3010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI ( ) DATE: 11/13/72

FROM : Legal Attache, Bonn (105-7501-1779) (RUC)

SUBJECT: BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
IS-EG
(OO:WFO)

Re - in file 62-11-7

Enclosed is one copy each of one item(s) pertaining to subject received from Bureau Source 300. For details and reporting procedures see Form BON-6 attached to enclosed.

Request enclosure(s) __________ be translated ☐ in summary ☐ verbatim and enclosure(s) and translation sent to interested field division.

FROM
BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
Law Offices
Fensterwald & Ohlhausen
905 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

TO
DR. JULIUS MADER
Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin W 66

ORIGINAL FILED IN

REMARKS:

The enclosed is a form letter directed by JULIUS MADER (Bufile 100-169674), Mauerstrasse 69, East Berlin, to subject soliciting the latter to buy MADER's book, "Yellow List: Where is the CIA?" and furnishing an order blank for this purpose.

Subject encloses the order blank, indicating he wants one copy in English of the above book, and his personal check in the amount of $2 which shows the designation "Committee to Investigate Assassination."

ENCLOSURE ~~ST-102~~ ~~REC-73~~

62-112677

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3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)
1 - XXX Foreign Liaison Desk
2 - Bonn
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ESP

A check of Bonn's indices reflected a reference to the "Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Inc.," 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., which came to attention in connection with Bonn's destroyed file regarding "Committee for 'The Investigation of the Three Assassinations': Information Concerning - Miscellaneous (FPC)" (Bufile 163-26234). Bonn indices are negative concerning subject.

FD-? (Rev. 8-15-72)

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached is one copy of a communication being sent to an East German address. This item was obtained from Bureau Source 300, which is to be described in communications prepared for dissemination as "another government agency which conducts intelligence investigations." The item is classified CONFIDENTIAL by the originating agency and bears the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved."

Permission has been received from the source to disseminate this information to United States and foreign agencies provided the information is appropriately classified and paraphrased in a manner which will fully protect the nature of the source. Verbatim quotation from the attached material and use of complete, exact, foreign addresses set out in attached material tend to indicate the nature of the source and are to be avoided when preparing communications for dissemination. Permission has been received from the source to withhold the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved" from Bureau communications containing properly paraphrased versions of Bureau Source 300 information.

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ENCLOSURE
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Dr. Julius Mader
Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin w 66

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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all data in this block

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AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF WORKS PUBLISHED
1963-1970
RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY
MARTIN LUTHER KING
ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

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“It's the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man. It works on tapes and other voice recordings”

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic*, Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

polygraph. Standard polygraphs ure four variables: pulse, blood pres- respiration and perspiration. Some neasure additional physiological vari- The more variables measured, the reliable the polygraph.

i and McQuiston discovered that the encies composing the human voice ot fixed; they shift very slightly from to fourteen times every second. But the speaker is under stress, this nor- requency modulation disappears. remains are the pure component fre- cies of the voice. And a strong indica- at the speaker is lying.

e two men developed a device to t this phenomenon and planned to use an additional "channel" on the poly- . Then they discovered that the new ole was so reliable and accurate a ure of psychological stress there was no need to measure the other poly- variables.

ed from the necessity of strapping the ct into a chair, stretching a pneumo- ic tube across his chest, gluing elec- to his palms, and clamping his arm blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved much more versatile than the poly- . Because it can work from a tele- or tape recorder, the PSE can be without the knowledge or even the cal presence of the subject.

ked Colonel Bell to tell me about some things the PSE was being used for, ially cases in which a conventional aph couldn't be used. He mentioned e police in Howard County, Maryland, een using the PSE for two years; they ad great success in establishing the ence of suspects who were afraid to t to a polygraph examination because machine's forbidding aspect.

I went on to describe some of his ion's other uses, actual or potential. and the Federal government are ex- g its use as a defense against skyjack- d telephoned bomb threats, and as ns of speeding up customs inspec- Some doctors and psychiatrists are PSEs to study patients' physical and stress. The National Committee to igate Aerial Phenomena, a private that investigates UFO reports, is sing the PSE to interview witnesses) sightings.

ked Bell if he would lend me a PSE eriment with, in order to write a piece he device. He agreed, with two con- . First, I must take Dektor's three-day in operating the instrument; second, using the PSE, I must review my etation of its output with his staff, in erest of accuracy. This seemed rea- e, so I agreed.

course was held in the meeting room oliday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. ght other students were employees tomers who had purchased the . These included a private detective in Pennsylvania, a New York chain

African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Polish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utterance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15/16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, similar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable connects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accompanies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made during actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, whenever they were present.

> "The more I read,
> the more I doubted
> the official account of
> what happened
> that day in Dallas"

That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of

the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph examination, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrelevant stress in some of his answers, and mislead the examiner. Therefore it is is necessary for the examiner to interview the subject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner, and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned concerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"

"Yes."

"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a white shirt?"

"Yes."

"Do you know who took the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a ring?"

"Yes."

"Did you take the money?"

"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were unstressed. The question about suspecting

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vearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that accompanied by such stress as I had only once or twice in the class slides. e next morning Kradz called on me. he suspect take the money, he asked. I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did spect who took the money? Yes, I ght he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did ce anything else about the interroga- Well, yes, there was this business t the ring. Perhaps the suspect had it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't the ring, but he was gay. He had anged rings with another guy. Nobody about it. The kid didn't really expect asked about it, because Kradz had over all the questions with him. Still, he ring was mentioned, he panicked. e third day of the course, I had begun some thought to what I might do e PSE. I was particularly interested fact that the device works from a tape ing. Sound-recording technology is a century old (Edison invented the graph in 1877), and an enormous t of history is stored on phonograph s, sound tracks, and tape and wire ings. I thought how many press con- es, interviews and public pronounce- are stored away in the film and tape s of the world, and how many ques- ould be settled if we knew for certain

situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't. details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-



Voice prints by the Psychological Stress Evaluator of former chief justice Earl Warren in May, 1972 indicating hard stress on the words "no evidence."

sassination Tapes

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a successful criminal lawyer and tor of the Committee, in a modern building a few blocks from the White e. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense smoker. Both men appeared to be ir forties.

fore we begin," I said. "I think I should on that I used to work for the CIA." ive run across it often, the theory that IA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd . and I don't believe it. I worked there ee years and never saw or heard any- suggesting the Agency was involved assassination. I never met anyone I thought capable of doing it. Still, learned through bitter experience of spicion which attaches to former in- ence officers. Epidemics of paranoia o accompany us through life. I thought tter get that issue out of the way.

ith and Fensterwald exchanged es and smiled. Fensterwald told me ey did not necessarily believe the CIA sin theory, and they certainly didn't talking to a former Agency employee.

ieved. I began to outline my project. d if they had heard of the PSE. Both were dimly aware of it. I described evice and started to detail the way it be used as a research tool. They im- tely understood what I was proposing vere tremendously enthusiastic. Yes, said, there were many key statements e somewhere, and they would be glad mpile specific references for me. ermore, they could, in some cases, de me with the tape. They said they be in contact when they had some- for me.

ile I was waiting, I experimented with SE. I telephoned a friend and told him the device. I asked if he was willing y a little game to test it out, and he d. He picked a number between one en. I asked him, "Is the number one?" e number two?" and so on, and he ered no each time. I recorded his nses, ran them through the PSE and him back. The number he picked, him, was five.

was dumbfounded. He had not heard PSE and had thought I might be con- g some elaborate joke at his expense. hen I called back and correctly iden- the number he had picked, he realized serious. And he was shocked.

layed the same game several times thers and did not always have similar ss. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was nly to narrow the answer down to two ers, one of which turned out to be cor-

problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation, and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and

ation aid, it has not been validated
for historical research. Even though
familiar with the machine believe
an be used in this way, my project
first attempt to do so.

s easier to demonstrate with the PSE
peaker is telling the truth than to
is lying. Stress can be caused by
other than deception; but the ab-
f stress is an extremely reliable
on of truthfulness. Of course, the
e of stress does not prove that a
nt is true, only that the speaker
it to be true.

hough I found a great deal of stress
stimony of the assassination tapes.
ngle instance can I say that the in-
was lying. I point this out not only
ct myself from libel suits but be-
am not morally certain any one indi-
vas not telling the truth.

netheless, stress in the testimony
witnesses to the same event makes
ematical probability overwhelming
east some of them were lying.

points could not be better illus-
han they were by the Jim Gar-
lay Shaw Affair.

son, it may be recalled, was the New
s District Attorney who, in 1967,
l to have solved the Kennedy assas-
. He presented an elaborate case
a local businessman, Clay Shaw,
ers, as members of an assassination
acy. In one of the hour-long pro-
CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw,
other people involved in Garrison's
ons.

interview, Garrison was hostile and
make many firm, factual statements
test with the PSE. However, he did
ere's no question about it [that he
w the assassination had been car-
] . . . we know the key individuals
d . . . there is no question about the
conspirators] were there [in Dealy
" The PSE showed good to hard
n each of these statements. I also
oncontroversial statement of Gar-
s a control: "Oswald was not killed
t the movie theater where he was
l]," and found no stress. Garrison's
nts about his case against Clay
rongly indicated deception.

ran some statements by Clay Shaw
his involvement in such a conspir-
d denying ever knowing or meeting
rvey Oswald. I also ran a control
nt. Shaw turned out to be heavily
d throughout.

vas not particularly surprising. The
d been accused of conspiring to
the President of the United States
s being interviewed about it before
n cameras. He would have to have
pretty cool customer not to show
stress, even if he were telling the
e truth.

ng that both Garrison and Shaw
stress was not an encouraging

valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

> “Deception is not proved by stress, but given enough witnesses' testimony, the PSE is able to arrive at the truth”

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of con- and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison–Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher–Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher–Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher–Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really rable stress in his statements.

atrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he d three spent bullet hulls on the floor eath the window from which the fatal ts allegedly were fired. The PSE showed d stress in his statements.

e rifle was one of the principal points d by the Warren Commission to link vald to the assassination. The PSE subtiated the testimony that Oswald owned le and that the evidence supplied to allistics expert indicated this rifle was murder weapon. However, the PSE did substantiate the controversial claims of las police regarding the discovery of evidence.

he hospital employee was apparently ng the truth when he recounted finding bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi- but many critics have charged that the et had been deliberately planted there. s is the famous "single bullet" which the rren Report says passed through the lies of both the President and Governor nally, and then lodged in Connally's st. Several researchers have tried to eat this, firing the same type of bullet the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never ained perfectly intact, as the one found he stretcher; they became twisted lumps ead and copper.

he second link between Oswald and the assination is the charge that he killed cer Tippitt. a Dallas policeman, while ing from the scene of the first shooting. umber of eyewitnesses have testified they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one hem, Domingo Benavides; was inter- ved on the CBS tapes. He was asked here was any doubt in his mind that vald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt ll." There was absolutely no stress in statement. He was telling the truth.

he killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald fueled the fires of controversy over the rren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual t when he was shot. Some witnesses e alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were n together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. y theorize that the three men were part n assassination conspiracy, and that pitt had been sent to silence Oswald, had been beaten to the draw.

he Dallas police radio dispatcher, cer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ught Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he lied, "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did kson know Oswald? "No," answered kson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed vy stress in both statements.

erhaps the greatest source of con- ersy over the Warren Report is it's claim all the shots were fired by one gunman. ne eyewitnesses claim to have heard ts and seen gunsmoke in the area of w hillock ahead and to the right of the sidential motorcade. This hillock has ne to be known as "the grassy knoll." e of these witnesses was a railroad ker named S.M. Holland, who observed

The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> Chief Justice Warren:
> "We explored both these
> theories and found
> no evidence that
> either group was involved"

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the shots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counterclaims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

nedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Govemor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

sassination Tapes

ED FROM PAGE 114

ed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu-
he made no other definite statement
the nature of the wound.

interview with Captain Humes was
nformative. Just before the interview,
7, Humes had re-examined the autop-
otographs and X-rays, and he dis-
d them at length on the CBS tapes.
grams drawn during the autopsy,
d, had not been intended to precisely
ent the location of the wounds. How-
ne now produced a sketch which, he
did represent these locations accu-

The interviewer asked, "Your re-
nation of the photographs verify that
unds were as shown here?"

s, sir," he replied. No stress.

e there any wounds other than one
base of the neck and one up in the
"No, sir, there were not." Moderate
not enough to suggest deception.

there any doubt that the wound at
ck of the President's head was an
ound? "There is absolutely no doubt,
gain stress but again moderate.

gether, how many wounds were
"There were two wounds of entrance
o of exit." At this point the stress be-
nard.

where were the entry wounds lo-
"Posteriorly, one low in the right
or scalp, and one in the base of the
n the right." Hard stress again.

d he be absolutely certain that what
d was an entry wound was, in fact,
'es, indeed we can." Hard stress.

nterview with Humes was one of the
st and most detailed on the CBS
and I charted most of it with the PSE.
clear to me that he believed much
he was saying, but the frequent flick-
of moderate stress and the occasion-
es of hard stress suggested that he
nearly as confident of his testimony
claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had
l out, sometimes it's not easy to tell
y wound from an exit wound.

nterviewer asked him one good "bot-
e" question:

you have any different conclusion,
ferent ideas, any different thoughts
er seeing [the autopsy photographs]
than you had at that time?"

' replied Captain Humes, "we think
ar up very well, and very closely,
imony before the Warren Commis-

tress was hard.

Specter, one of the Warren Commis-
rincipal investigators, also spoke on
tapes. He said that the case against
fitted together very well, and that
could one find among actual crim-

the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing, and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this, but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report, he said, "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report, what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

> "...we found no evidence
> of any kind that there was
> any conspiracy."
> There was very hard stress
> on "no evidence"

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it.

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories, one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing, the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

"... we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything," said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the

severely, but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time," he continued, "to change my view, nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell, a member of the Warren Commission, revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example, Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What, given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE, can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now ion by the PSE.

The claim that Oswald's rifle was l in the Texas School Book Depository.

The claim that bullet hulls matching ıld's-rifle were found in the same place.

The claim that one gunman was seen "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book sitory.

The claim that two gunmen were seen s window.

The claim that a gunman was seen lifferent window of that building.

Another claim that no shots came from assy knoll, and a claim by the witness saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that so *heard* a shot from that direction.

A claim by a Dallas policeman that r he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.

The claim by the pathologist—the n Commission's only source of inforn about the autopsy—that the X-rays utopsy photographs support his tes- before the Commission.

he claim by a member of the Warren iission that there was nothing fraudubout the Warren Report.

The claim by Earl Warren that the iission found no evidence of a cony; that none of the Warren Report's ever found anything the Commission issed; that he had found nothing since blication of the Report to change his and that he knew of no Commission er who had ever changed his mind their conclusions.

indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong —we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

E LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL CTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

'64 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

68 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

72 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

T is the evidence?

ire the fatal shots?

has there been such a concerted effort ithhold the facts?

as really behind the assassinations?

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AT A TWO DAY CONFERENCE

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TO BE HELD AT

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Nov. 23-24, 1973

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
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DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 - 1973

JOHN F. KENNEDY • SYLVANUS OLYMPIO • ABDUL KARIM KASSEM • MEDGAR EVERS • "NGO" DINH DIEM • JIGME DORJI • ADIB AL SHISHAKLI • PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE • HASSAN ALI MANSOUR • MALCOLM X • VIOLA LIUZZO • MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO • SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA • J.T.V. IRONSI AGUIYI • HENDRIK VERWOERD • TRAN VAN VAN • GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL • CHE GUEVARA • MARTIN LUTHER KING • ROBERT F. KENNEDY • EDUARDO MONDLANE • TOM MBOYA • A.A. SHERMARKE • GEORGE WALLACE • SALVADORE ALLENDE •

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS
1963 – 1973
PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

:00 **LATE REGISTRATION –**
Early Registrants pick up passes.

:30 **WELCOME:**
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

0:00 **CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:**
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 **UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:**
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:**
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds In Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 **BREAK FOR DINNER**

8:30 **WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –**
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 **ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:**
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:**
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 **INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –**
Question and Answer Sessions

OURCES AND METHODS INV VED

SEP 1972

Dr. Julius Mader
Author and editor
Editor of "Who's Who in CIA"

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Dr. Julius Mader

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



Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lowmyer and John Willard (Eyes drawn in by FBI artist)

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



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I. O. 4132
4-20-68

CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY
INTERSTATE FLIGHT - ROBBERY

WANTED BY FBI

JAMES EARL RAY

FBI No. 405,942 G
16 M 9 U 000 12
M 4 W 101

① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧

ALIASES: Eric Starvo Galt, W. C. Herron, Harvey Lowmyer, James McBride, James O'Conner, James Walton, James Walyon, John Willard, "Jim"



Photographs taken 1960



Photograph taken 1963
(eyes drawn by artist)



James Ray

DESCRIPTION

AGE: 40, born March 10, 1928, Alton, Illinois
HEIGHT: 5'10"
EYES: blue
WEIGHT: 163 to 174 pounds
COMPLEXION: medium
BUILD: medium
RACE: white
HAIR: brown, possibly cut short
NATIONALITY: American
OCCUPATIONS: baker, color matcher, laborer
SCARS AND MARKS: small scar on center of forehead and small scar on palm of right hand
REMARKS: noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending

CRIMINAL RECORD

Ray has been convicted of burglary, robbery, forging U. S. Postal Money Orders, armed robbery, and operating motor vehicle without owner's consent.

CAUTION

RAY IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Ray as Eric Starvo Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241). A Federal warrant was also issued on July 20, 1967, at Jefferson City, Missouri, charging Ray with Interstate Flight to Avoid Confinement for the crime of Robbery (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1073).

IF YOU HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

Identification Order 4132
April 20, 1968

J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

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

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ERIC STARVO GALT

FBI No. 405,942 G

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

Photograph taken 1968
(eyes drawn by artist)



Photograph taken 1968

DESCRIPTION

Age:	36, born July 20, 1931 (not supported by birth records)		
Height:	5'8" to 5'11"	**Eyes:**	Blue or hazel
Weight:	160 to 175 pounds	**Complexion:**	Medium
Build:	Medium	**Race:**	White
Hair:	Brown, possibly cut short		
Occupation:	Has claimed employment as seaman		
Remarks:	Noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending.		

CAUTION

GALT IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241).

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE NOTIFY ME OR CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

J. Edgar Hoover

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
TELEPHONE, NATIONAL 8-7117

Wanted Flyer 442
April 17, 1968

13-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. William A. Branigan

SUBJECT : Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973 Inc.

1. Herewith a report containing partial coverage on the events during the first session of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, together with material (which is overt) made available on the floor of the conference.

2. We would be interested in anything you develop on any of the other sessions of the conference.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

REC-64 62-112697-33

J. Angleton
EX-104 James Angleton

14 JAN 3 1974

Enclosure:
Report w/atts

CIR-316/03107-73

7-

ENC. BEHIND FILE

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Letter to CIA Rc:mjo 12/26/73

SIX

SECRET

Attachment to CIR-316/03107-73

SUBJECT: Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973

1. The Committee to Investigate Assassinations claims to have been established in 1969. The headquarters are in Washington, D. C. (at 1520 16th Street, N. W.). In the four years of its existence the Committee has done research and has become a kind of clearing house for the study of assassinations. It maintains contact with other groups engaged in similar activity, of which there seem to be at least two, one of which is located in the Boston area.

2. In addition to research, the Committee acts to help individuals interested in the investigation of assassinations. It thus files suits for private persons demanding access to classified information. It sponsors the publication of books and articles relating to the field of its interest, and sponsors the production of movies. It publishes a newsletter.

3. The conference of November 23-24, 1973, is the first of its type to be held by the Committee. The Georgetown University was helpful by placing Gaston Hall at the disposal of the Committee free of charge. By agreement with the University, the Committee will also be able to use the services of the University Library as a repository and research center.

4. The Conference opened on November 23, 1973, with a delay of about half an hour. The delay may have been due to the installation of recording equipment which literally covered the premises with a tangle of wires of every kind. The Washington Post reports an attendance exceeding 300. This is a generous estimate. After deducting official speakers, recording personnel, and press representatives, the audience probably numbered no more than 150, if that many.

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5. Beards and long hair prevailed, and others stood out like a sore thumb. There was not a single Negro in the audience, nor, that morning, on the platform. Even the speaker who spoke on the case of Martin Luther King was white.

6. Not all the speakers preannounced were present. The chairman announced the absence of Richard Sprague. Another speaker, a lawyer from Los Angeles whose name was drowned out in the noise, was also absent. They were replaced by Dr. Robert Forman and someone whose name sounded like "Ed Kirkley".

7. The chairman announced that all the speeches would be tape recorded for subsequent publication. He further invited the audience to attend movies to be shown that night. One of these, "Burn", was to be shown at the University. Others by prearrangement would be shown at local movie theaters. The latter were connected with the Kennedy assassination. The case of the President's murder was in the center of the conference and, as noted by one of the organizers (Smith), one half of the speakers were to center their attention upon the Oswald case.

8. The chairman adhered strictly to the program and every speaker mentioned in the program for the morning session of November 23 spoke as specified. Of those who spoke, Norman Mailer, Robert P. Smith and Ronald Van Doren deserve particular attention. Their speeches in summary are reviewed below.

9. A table at the back of the audience presented recommended literature. The books included H. Weissberg's Whitewash and Peter Noyes' Legacy of Doubt. For some reason there was a copy of one paper only, that of George O'Toole's "Assassination Tapes". There was also a bibliography of political assassination; the foreword to which lists the persons most actively collaborating with the Committee.

10. A publication circulated during the conference was the November, 1973 issue of Computers and Automation which is to be renamed, starting January 1, 1974, Computers and People. The publication of articles such as "Nixon and the Mafia" which concludes that Richard M. Nixon seems to be the embodiment of a prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House, seems somewhat curious in a magazine devoted to the profession of data processing and the use of computers. The magazine was established in 1951 by Berkeley Enterprises in Massachusetts. Alger Hiss is among its contributors and an abundance of articles by Richard Sprague on the subject of Watergate published in the past year.

11. Another organization which received publicity at the Conference was The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

12. A representative of Computers and Automation handed out this publication free of charge to members of the audience. He took notes with fantastic speed and apparent accuracy of everything said during the proceedings.

13. The lights gave out at one point and did not come on again during the morning session. The absence of current may have affected the tape recording.

14. The morning session, due to close at 12:30, ended after 1:30 p.m. By this time the audience was impatient to have lunch, and the resumption of the proceedings was therefore postponed to a later hour.

15. No document of any kind was issued to the persons who paid $15.00 to enter. Instead their hand was stamped with the name of the organization which gave them access to all further meetings that day and the next (the members of the audience were apparently not supposed to wash their hands during this time). Names were taken down, but no questions asked other than one's initial. No information on address, occupation, etc. was required.

16. Speech by Norman Mailer. This was beyond a doubt, the most striking presentation during the Friday morning session. Mailer spoke briefly and left the conference shortly after the speech.

17. Mailer said that political intelligence as a subject was as powerful as "peace". Interest in assassination is obsessive. The obsession arises from the fact that a solution to the problem is not found, and attention is constantly drawn back to the unanswerable question.

18. He said that we have here the most powerful nation in the world which cannot come to grips with a question which seems as amazingly simple as the Kennedy assassination. The result has been that this nation has decided to shut down investigation and has thus alienated itself from its own history. This alienation has brought apathy, a trait noticeable in the reaction to investigations which bring no wide response.

19. A nation which rejects its own history is on the path to a totalitarian regime. Facts, meanwhile, have a peculiar ability to change when they are investigated, and investigators must therefore rely upon hypothesis. The history of the last ten years has been made unendurable by the abundance of hypotheses. They range from the opinion that an assassination is an accident lacking any particular sequence to the hypothesis that secret police forces are engaging in a world conspiracy.

20. The present conference must help us to learn whether there are possibilities, and what possibilities exist, to solve these questions.

21. Speech by Robert P. Smith. Mr. Smith was described as the director of research of the Committee, but he seems to be one of the major motive forces in this organization.

22. Mr. Smith pointed out that he had spent the last three years studying the Kennedy case. Much research had been done, but nothing had changed, so far as practical action was concerned, in the last nine years.

27. Speech by Ronald Van Doren. Mr. Van Doren seems to be a follower of Governor Wallace. He began by commenting on the sad situation in a country with a judiciary where individuals have to make conjectures regarding a case as obvious as that of Bremer. There is no doubt that Bremer pulled the trigger. But one should examine the political situation at the time of his action. Wallace was by far the leading candidate in the election campaign, a threat to other candidates, and he was winning the nomination. He represented a challenge to both parties. Nothing he said could be interpreted as racist, and in the economic sense he carried wide appeal. The question which faced the other candidates was how he could be stopped from disrupting the two parties and from preventing the re-election of the President. History will show how he was stopped and why this occurred.

28. The case in defense of Wallace's civil rights was quietly dropped. No proper investigation was conducted. As usual in assassination cases there was a diary. It showed that Bremer was acting alone and was deranged. Read as a piece of literature, the diary presents Bremer as a non-person, an illiterate unable to spell. There is nothing regarding the people he worked with. Meanwhile, if one examines Bremer's background, he appears an entirely different person. Why did he travel repeatedly to Ottawa? How did he manage to carry guns on planes? What was he doing in New York? Why was he in Washington? And where did he get his funds? The apartment he rented exceeds his annual income. His mother could not afford to visit him in prison, yet he dressed well. With whom was he involved?

29. All this should be looked into. Watergate brought the electoral campaign to the fore. Why has discussion of the Bremer shooting been excluded from the investigation? Bremer was a part of the 1972 campaign, yet there is no mention of Wallace or of Bremer. Two years from now Wallace will be back.

30. Speech by Ms. Meredith Rode. Ms. Rode was very brief. She said she became interested in the killing of George Lincoln Rockwell in 1970, and that the case was built on circumstantial evidence exclusively. The case is still open, for the police believe that there was an accomplice. No funds are available for defense.

23. Although the National Archives are the repository for the Kennedy assassination documents, the FBI and the CIA are responsible for restricting research. Much of the 300 cubic feet of documents have been printed, a reclassification in 1971 has released 3,000 pages, and the CIA later released more, but none of the material released has created any sensation. The Freedom of Information Act is not as liberal on assassination material as on other matters. Some material was not even turned over to the Warren Commission. The FBI and the Justice Department are alone in knowing the results of some tests.

24. In the non-governmental area, much has been published, and the book by Peter Noyes must be singled out particularly.

25. Speech by Mr. Robert Hanson. Mr. Hanson has become the counsel for Sirhan Sirhan. He studied to become an engineer and then shifted to law. (To judge from the number of cases which he says he has lost, he should have remained an engineer instead of becoming an attorney.)

Mr. Hanson said that the Sirhan case is pretty hopeless. The trial was based on a 100 per cent belief in Sirhan's guilt. Therefore important witnesses were not called, and no attention was paid to ballistics. Scientific study, however, indicates that Sirhan Sirhan may not even have been the person who committed the crime. But even if it is proved that his gun did not kill Robert Kennedy, this discovery may have no influence upon Sirhan's case. California officials have no desire to reopen the case and funds to handle the proceedings are lacking. A book by Tiger on the case is worthy of note. Tiger claims that Sirhan Sirhan was acting under hypnotic influence.

26. Speech by James Lesar. Mr. Lesar, who spoke on the Martin Luther King assassination, declared that Ray was innocent, and that the FBI and the Justice Department were responsible for wrongly solving the crime. Ray was framed by conspirators. The persons presently involved in Watergate played a role in the Ray case investigation. No private agency - only a government agency - can solve the Ray case. All depends on whether the judiciary acts honestly or with political consideration in mind. As it stands today, we see Ray's rights having been abominably violated; we see lawyers who did not do their job; and we see nothing approaching an open hearing.

31. There was also a speech by Robert Salzman who was long-winded and technical. No useful coverage available.

32. Copies of materials which were available at the Conference are attached.

A. American Political Assassinations: A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 Related to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy. Compiled by The Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D. C., 1973.

B. "Decade of Assassinations -- 1963-1973". Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 1973.

C. "Don't Read This Out Loud!" Intelligence Report. The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

D. Announcement. The announcement states that Senator John Stennis will begin hearings on his Bill to amend the National Security Act, in regard to the clarification of the authority of the CIA.

E. Assassination Tapes by George O'Toole. Published by Penthouse International Ltd., 1973.

F. Computers and Automation (Computers and People), November, 1973, Volume 22, No 11.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, will begin hearings early in the New Year on his Bill No. S.2597 -- to amend the National Security Act -- in regard to clarification of the authority of the CIA.

The bill recently introduced by Senator Stennis resulted in part from correspondence with Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee. To some degree, these hearings were inspired by the Watergate developments.

People with knowledge in the areas which might be fruitful for investigation should be in touch with Senator Stennis' Committee. For further information, contact the Task Force For A Nuclear Test Ban, Betty Lall and Jo Pomerance, Co-Chairmen, care of the Project on Budget Priorities, 1620 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

• PUBLICATIONS

CARIC publishes a bi-weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT and a quarterly named *COUNTER-SPY* featuring various articles examining the structures and operations of U.S. Intelligence. In addition, CARIC publishes occasional pamphlets on various concepts in the craft of intelligence. CARIC also provides reprints of selected articles on intelligence which have appeared in other publications.

CARIC is preparing a guide to U.S. Intelligence which will serve as a citizen access device to the hidden world of government operations. We hope that any controversy raised by this guide or any other CARIC publication will lead to public debate and resolution of the issues involved. Our analysis is based in a firm belief that no human being should be denied life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by our government or its agents. CARIC publications aid the public effort to insure the veneration of this concept by those in our government.

• IN-FROM-THE-COLD HEARINGS

CARIC will sponsor In-From-The-Cold Hearings featuring public testimony by individuals intimately involved with U.S. Intelligence. The hearings will focus on American intervention abroad, domestic repression in this country and the effects of secrecy on the individuals' personality. Former intelligence workers and those who have been victimized by the intelligence community will publicly relate their participation in activities of our government which can no longer be ignored by good citizens.



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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Don't Read This Out Loud!

The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC)

The headlines in American newspapers have for years told of Army surveillance of civilians, U.S. spy planes being shot down over other countries, attempted coups and intrigue initiated by the CIA and unrestrained FBI wiretapping. We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon, and *why* we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even know who Big Brother *is*.

In 1955, President Eisenhower accepted the report of the Hoover Commission on U.S. Intelligence. Among other recommendations, the Commission emphasized the need for two "watchdog" committees on intelligence within the executive and legislative branches of government. Although a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) was established to serve the President, Congress by an overwhelming majority has refused to establish a committee within the legislative branch. Now, in the midst of the Watergate scandals, there is some movement within Congress to establish committees on the separate intelligence agencies. The result will be divided oversight with no assurance that Congress will be able to stop illegal and unjustified spying. With Congress abrogating its responsibilities, there is no agency of government, directly responsible to the public, monitoring the United States Intelligence Community.

Now former intelligence workers and concerned citizens have formed a national association to provide the vital information an aware public needs to know about government operations. The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) is an independent "watchdog" on the government spy apparatus. CARIC, sponsored entirely by donations from American citizens, serves as an alternative source of analysis and information on the practices, organization and objectives of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine operations are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA preparing to entangle us in another war similar to the Indochina War? What information is going into Federal, State, local and private data banks on innocent American citizens? Is the FBI becoming a "secret police force?" Whose phones are tapped in America? These are some of the questions CARIC is answering.

CARIC knows that all conscientious Americans are closely watching the events that have unfolded since the arrests made at the Watergate building. We share the hope of most Americans that the illegal espionage practices that have now been exposed will no longer be a part of American political life. However, the dismantling of one espionage network loyal to one group of politicians does not insure that this abuse of power will not be repeated by future politicians.

Who knows what future political espionage will occur under the guise of so-called "national security" or loyalty to an administration? Only time will tell, but through diligence and your help CARIC will anticipate and bring to your attention situations within the government that are likely to produce a new "Watergate."

Although CARIC does believe that a massive government spy apparatus is at work in the world, we hope to dispel some of the paranoia citizens naturally feel when there is talk of spies and wiretaps. We know that the FBI does not have agents behind every tree, but there are agents in every major community in this country who have spied on innocent private and public citizens. Only a full and undisguised look into this hidden world can displace unwarranted fears, and guide the public effort to end this illegal and unjustified espionage. ***The secrecy with which the government surrounds itself must end.***

CARIC knows that tens of thousands of American citizens from all walks of life were mobilized over the past decade to help bring an end to the government's war in Indochina – a war that has taken new forms under the direction of U.S. Intelligence agencies. CARIC hopes that these same concerned citizens will continue to oppose the policies of our government which bring this new form of *covert war* and the Watergate scandals. It is now time for thousands of Americans to mobilize to stop the spying as we stopped the dying. ***Please join us in our effort.***

THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (CARIC)

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

• CARIC ORGANIZATION

CARIC is organized to reflect the operating procedures of a typical intelligence organization. Our research process involves collecting information from a wide variety of sources both public and private. Our analysis is the collective product of CARIC participants and eliminates any compartmentalization of knowledge. The information and our analysis is then disseminated through CARIC publications and separate works by CARIC participants. In addition, CARIC provides information to other journalists and qualified researchers.

• INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTATION CENTER (IDC)

CARIC is continuously collecting information on intelligence from a variety of sources including official government publications and documents, previous investigations, public accounts and interviews conducted with hundreds of former intelligence and police agents. The information forms the data-base of the Intelligence Documentation Center maintained by CARIC. The IDC is a library of information on U.S. Intelligence available upon request to journalists, qualified researchers and members of CARIC.

• SPEAKERS BUREAU AND WORKSHOPS

CARIC maintains a listing of members available to speak before groups on a variety of subjects ranging from the foreign intelligence programs of our government to the problems of criminal justice in this country. Our speakers include former intelligence workers, police agents and informers and others familiar with American intelligence.

CARIC will periodically conduct workshops for church, labor, school or community organizations. Workshop topics include:

- OPERATION PHOENIX – CIA assassination in Vietnam
- SALEM HOUSE – Preparation for the coup in Cambodia
- The CIA in Laos
- OPERATION BOULDER – An introduction to the next American war
- Right-wing terrorism in America
- Federal Planning for civil disturbances: Riots and demonstrations
- The Internal Security apparatus and Watergate

• MULTI-MEDIA BRIEFING

CARIC will soon augment our workshops with a multi-media briefing on U.S. intelligence featuring films, video tapes, displays and recorded interviews. The exhibit will dramatically illustrate Intelligence as practiced by our government. Our hope is to creat a super-conscious realization by our audience of the concepts presented in the display.

The first element of the multi-media briefing is a slide show tracing the growth of the internal security apparatus of our government and demonstrating how this apparatus influenced the Watergate scandals. The slide show terminates with suggestions for limiting future growth of the internal security apparatus.

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November, 1973

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UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1973

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THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE APPLICATION OF COMPUTERS TO THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

by
Richard E. Sprague
Hartsdale, New York

Part 1. Introduction

Who Assassinated President Kennedy?

On November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, President John F. Kennedy, while riding in an open limousine through Dealey Plaza and waving to the surrounding crowds, was shot to death. Lee Harvey Oswald, an ex-Marine, and former visitor to the Soviet Union, was arrested that afternoon in a movie theatre in another section of Dallas; that night he was charged with shooting President Kennedy from the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository Building overlooking Dealey Plaza. This act Oswald denied steadily through two days of questioning (no record of questions and answers was ever preserved). Two days later while Oswald was being transferred from one jail to another, he was shot by Jack Ruby, a Dallas night-club owner, in the basement of the Dallas police station, while millions of Americans watched on television. The commission of investigation, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, and headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U. S. Supreme Court, published its report in September 1964, and concluded that Oswald was the sole assassin and that there was no conspiracy.

In view of the authority of the Warren Commission, that conclusion was accepted by many Americans for a long time. But the conclusion cannot be considered true by any person who carefully considers the crucial evidence — such as the physics of the shooting, the timing of a number of events, and other important and undeniable facts. In other words, Oswald was not the sole assassin, and there was a conspiracy.

This article will develop that thesis, prove it to be true on the basis of substantial, conclusive evidence, and in particular some analysis of the photographic evidence.

There was in fact a conspiracy. Oswald played a role in the conspiracy, although there is conclusive evidence that on November 22, 1963, he did no shooting at President Kennedy, and that, just as he claimed when he was in the Dallas jail, he was a "patsy." At least three gunmen (and probably four) — none of whom were in the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository building where the Warren Commission placed Oswald — fired a total of six shots at President Kennedy.

One of these shots missed entirely; one hit Governor John B. Connally, Jr. of Texas, riding with Kennedy; and four hit President Kennedy, one in his throat, one in his back, and two in his head. (The bulk of the undeniable evidence for these statements about the shots consists of: (a) the physics of the motions of Kennedy and Connally shown in some 60 frames of the famous film by Abraham Zapruder; (b) the locations of the injuries in Kennedy and in Connally; and (c) more than 100 pictures, consisting of more than 30 still photographs and more than 70 frames of movies.)

More than 50 persons were involved in the conspiracy at the time of firing the shots. These persons included members of the Dallas police force (but not all of the Dallas police — and that ac-

(continued in the May 1970 issue of ***Computers and Automation****)*

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THE PURSUIT OF IMPORTANT TRUTH

The magazine *Computers and Automation* has for more than three years followed an unusual publication policy:

- The pursuit of truth in input, output, and processing, for the benefit of people,

and an unusual belief:

- That computers are too important to be left to computer experts and must be integrated into a socially responsible profession of information engineering.

Where this policy has operated most is in publishing information, articles, and reports on subjects which a great many liberal and progressive newspapers and periodicals have left unexplored or unmentioned:

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- The connections of President Richard M. Nixon with organized crime and the Mafia
- The Watergate crimes

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Edmund C. Berkeley

Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
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In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

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The Computer Industry

8 Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers [T A]
by Michael J. Cerullo, State University of New York, Albany, N.Y.
How to plan, before operations begin, a cooperative service bureau that will provide its sponsors with all the advantages of electronic data processing, plus the advantages of greatly reduced expenses.

10 Control in Time-Sharing Systems [T A]
by Fermin Caro del Castillo, Fort Worth, Texas
How time-shared computer systems should be controlled, made secure, and protected against incursions and hazards.

14 Alienation and the Systems Analyst [T A]
by Alan E. Brill, The Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, N.Y.
How systems analysts are often looked upon as in a "computer department" and outside of the firm — and what might be done to correct this practice.

Computers and Art

18 Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation [T A]
by Grace C. Hertlein, California State University-Chico, Chico, Calif.
How computer art is ranging through variation in patterns, variations in design, and varying philosophies of art — and where it may go.

Computers and the Future

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by Marcia Ascher, Professor of Mathematics, Ithaca College, Ithaca, N.Y.
A survey of some two dozen themes of importance in the real world that are reflected in science fiction when astute writers explore the significance of computers to human beings.

6 The Understanding of Natural Language by Computers [NT E]
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Some rather convincing evidence suggests that before long some large areas of ordinary natural language will be understood by computers.

World Affairs and Social Policy

15 Strategy and Action on World Trade [NT A]
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Corrections

For changes in "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of *Computers and Automation,* see page 23 of this issue, or page 24 of the July issue.

For changes in the reprinting and the indexing of "Communication – Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" published in the July issue.

Front Cover Picture

Three eighth graders - each from a different continent - are working together to solve complex mathematics problems. They are at the new United Nations International School, and are Laurence Ling May, a Chinese-Thai American; Catharina Nilson of Stockholm, Sweden; and Arun Alagappan of India. The minicomputer system is a gift from Digital Equipment Corp. For more information, see page 43 of the July 1973 issue.

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[T] – Technical

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EDITORIAL

The Understanding of Natural Language by Computers

Proposition: Computers are making long strides towards understanding natural language as used by human beings, and will eventually understand such language as well as many human beings do.

What do we mean by: computers? understanding language? natural language? And what is the evidence for this proposition?

The word "computers" here refers to powerful computers that have appropriate programs written by human beings plus the programmed capacity to improve their programs by using experience. An example of such improvement is Dr. A. L. Samuels' famous checker-playing program, which can learn from experience, and which plays far better checkers than Dr. Samuels himself can play.

The experience may consist of the following at least:

Answers from human beings to questions posed by the computer;

Differences between computed results and *a priori* specified results;

Signals from the environment, such as instrument readings;

Information obtained by "looks" at the environment, as for example recognition of the character A, as in optical character recognition;

The interpretation of words, as with FORTRAN expressions.

Probably there are even more categories of experience which a powerful computer program can use to modify itself to become even a better program.

In regard to "understanding language", there are over 500 languages which computers have been programmed to understand, when written precisely according to stated rules: among them, BASIC, FORTRAN, COBOL, many kinds of machine language, etc.

"Natural language" is the ordinary language used by human beings, subject to the requirement that for a computer implicit understandings must be stated. For example, when a speaker exclaims "Ouch!", a great deal of the meaning comes from the listener's observations of the speaker. But a computer, like a blind man, cannot "see" the situation, and must be told more than the ordinary listener.

With some definitions taken care of, let us consider evidence for the main proposition stated above. This evidence includes the information published in several recent articles in *Computers and Automation.*

The article "'Do What I Mean' – The Programmer's Assistant", by Warren Teitelman, in the April 1972 issue, described a "programmer's assistant", called "DWIM"; this was a "front end" or preprocessor to an interactive program for operating with LISP expressions. The front end was tolerant of the programmer's mistakes in typing, in low-mistake occurred, it would inquire of the human programmer what he meant, suggesting the correctly spelled alternative, and so on. In this way the human programmer was relieved of much of the burden of expressing himself exactly and correctly the first time, and his efficiency in using the LISP interactive program greatly increased.

The three articles "Computer Programming Using Natural Language" by Edmund C. Berkeley, Andy Langer, and Casper Otten, in the June, July, and August 1973 issues, demonstrated the understanding by a computer program called GENIE of at least some sets of instructions in ordinary natural language. The vocabulary though small was free, and there was unlimited freedom in putting the words together, with about a 90% chance of complete understanding. The computer program that did this could be called 15% GENIE, because, as the authors emphasized, it was still in an early stage of development.

The article "Latest Computers See, Hear, Speak, and Sing – and May Outthink Man" by David Brand, in the October 1973 issue, enumerated many instances of computers (and robots equipped with computers) which could deal with concepts expressed in natural language. One of the programs mentioned could for example decipher natural language commands dealing with the stacking of blocks of various shapes, sizes, and colors.

The main tasks for understanding natural language appear to be the following:

Recognition of the framework of a sentence;

Recognition of the common meaning of groups of synonyms, the collection of words that "say the same thing";

Knowledge of context: the context is regularly specified to the computer, so that it does not have to deduce the context from "what is being said";

Knowledge of a limited vocabulary consisting of perhaps 300 to 500 words – knowledge in the sense that the computer program can attach meaning to the words either by themselves or in phrases, as for example it may attach the meaning of doing something three times to the numeral 3;

Capacity to accept variation in the way something is stated by a human programmer.

The three articles referred to above show instances of the achievement of all of these tasks separately. Combining all the achievements should not be too hard, especially since children as young as four years old show complete capacities to listen to many kinds of natural language, understand, and respond.

Edmund C. Berkeley

The Notebook on
COMMON SENSE, ELEMENTARY AND ADVANCED

is devoted to development, exposition, and illustration of what may be the most important of all fields of knowledge:

WHAT IS GENERALLY TRUE AND IMPORTANT =

COMMON SENSE + **WISDOM** + **JUDGEMENT AND MATURITY** + **SCIENCE IN GENERAL** + **TECHNIQUES FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS** +

TECHNIQUES FOR AVOIDING MISTAKES + **SOME PARTS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH** + **SOME PARTS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS** + **AVOIDANCE OF LOGICAL FALLACIES** + ...

PURPOSES:

- to help you avoid pitfalls
- to prevent mistakes before they happen
- to display new paths around old obstacles
- to point out new solutions to old problems
- to stimulate your resourcefulness
- to increase your accomplishments
- to improve your capacities
- to help you solve problems
- to give you more tools to think with
- . . . . .

8 REASONS TO BE INTERESTED IN THE FIELD OF COMMON SENSE, WISDOM, AND GENERAL SCIENCE

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COMMON SENSE is important –
This field includes the systematic study and development of common sense.

SCIENCE is important –
This field includes what is common to all the sciences, what is generally true and important in the sciences.

MISTAKES are costly and to be AVOIDED –
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- Forgetting
- Unforeseen Hazards
- Placidity

To Come

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- Camouflage
- Interpretation
- Distraction
- Gullibility
- Failure to Observe
- Failure to Inspect
- Prejudice
- . . . .

Topic:
SYSTEMATIC EXAMINATION OF GENERAL CONCEPTS

Already Published

The Concept of:
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- Rationalizing
- Feedback
- Model
- Black Box
- Evolution
- Niche

To Come
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- Understanding
- Teachable Moment
- Indeterminacy
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- Operational Definition
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Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers

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> *"Because of general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus."*

Computer Use

A recent study of 2,500 companies conducted by the Research Institute of America, revealed that 55% of the firms regularly use computers in conducting their business. Further breakdown of the study shows that an average of 32% own or lease their own computers, and 23% use an outside service bureau for processing data.[1]

While a majority of the companies surveyed do use computers in some form, a significant 45% of the respondents do not use any type of computerized data processing service. Those companies cited the following reasons for not using computers:[2]

	Per Cent
Operation too small	50
Too costly	35
Looked into and tabled for the present	31
Present methods satisfactory	21
Plan to install a computer within a year	8
Plan to begin using a service bureau within a year	8
Other	13
Total (multiple answers)	166%

Service Bureau Use

In addition to the non-users, another recent study revealed that most service bureau clients are not effectively using their service bureau and, as a result, are receiving few, if any, of the advantages of electronic data processing (EDP). Most of the surveyed service bureau clients were:[3]

1. Receiving routine services which do not save them money.
2. Not planning to expand into more sophisticated, higher-payoff applications.
3. Not receiving indirect benefits and savings, such as improved information for decision making.
4. Not satisfied with current services.

The study also disclosed that because of the general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus and purchase in-house computers.[4]

Cooperative Service Bureaus

Both non-users and dissatisfied service bureau clients, therefore, offer a ready market for a newer approach to obtaining the advantages of EDP — the formation of a cooperative service bureau. A cooperative service bureau consists of several sponsoring firms who jointly own a computer and share in its operating costs at a much lower expense than individual ownership of a computer. If carefully planned before operations begin, a cooperative service bureau will provide its sponsors with all the advantages of EDP plus many other advantages unique to jointly-shared facilities and personnel.

Among these additional advantages are:

1. The sponsors would purchase a computer tailored to their specific needs.
2. They would have exclusive use of the computer.
3. Their computer would be available for use at any time.
4. They could share the costs of any computer programs developed.
5. They could share the costs of any package or canned computer programs purchased.
6. They would have available for their exclusive use a staff of data processing experts and a computer — at a fraction of the cost of individual ownership.

Factors Insuring the Success of the Cooperative

The first step in forming a successful cooperative service bureau is to enroll an appropriate number of comapnies. Ideally the cooperative should be limited to five or six sponsoring firms. A larger number may create unmanageable problems involving operations, communications, control, scheduling of computer time, and so forth. A smaller number may make the venture economically unfeasible.

Lack of Interest

At the present time, widespread lack of interest in joining a cooperative is more of a problem to potential organizers than too much demand. The author contacted a number of public accounting firms about the feasibility of forming cooperatives and found that three firms who had already made such an attempt could not interest enough firms to join. Their comments were:

— We tried to organize one several years ago; the firms contacted were not interested.

— We would like to explore this possibility but we can't get anyone else interested.

— At present there appears to be a tragic lack of interest locally by other CPA firms.

Unquestionably, one reason for the lack of interest is a misunderstanding of the true nature of a cooperative. Interested companies must therefore be prepared to sell the idea to others. As more published material becomes available in the field, this problem should be alleviated.

Confidential Information

A second major reason for lack of interest is that companies fear for the control and security of their confidential or sensitive information. Such a concern is certainly legitimate and underscores the need for a cooperative that is to be successful, to devise an adequate system for quality control and security. A committee responsible for such a system should be established at the outset by the sponsoring firms.

Protection

One of its duties should be to adequately safeguard the sponsors' records and documents against fire, theft, water, and other hazards and disasters. Statistics compiled by the Safe Manufacturers National Association show that about one-half of companies whose important records and documents were destroyed through some catastrophe never resumed business or were permanently closed down within six months; an additional 13% suffered serious economic impairment and were able to remain in business only under severe operating handicaps.[5] For this reason the quality control and security committee must see that the cooperative service bureau maintains:

protective devices
fireproof vaults
a method of reconstructing any destroyed records
adequate insurance to cover loss of important client records or documents

The committee must also take measures to prevent one client's records from becoming commingled with another client's records — a not-unlikely occurrence in such an environment.

Preventing Disclosure

Finally, the committee should determine how to prevent disclosure of confidential information. For example, no member of any sponsoring company should be allowed in certain strategic parts of the computer center. Likewise, each company's records should be coded and the code number known only to key computer center personnel. In cases requiring utmost security, the actual processing of data should be monitored by a key employee of the computer center or possibly by a representative of a disinterested third party, such as a firm of independent public accountants.

Sharing of Expenses: Startup Costs

With an adequate number of sponsoring firms lined up and a sound security system worked out, the third necessity in establishing a successful cooperative is to determine methods of sharing the expenses. There are two categories of costs to consider:

1. Startup costs. These include all costs incurred prior to the time that the cooperative commences operations. Startup costs are either directly traceable to a particular firm or are joint or common to all firms. An example of a direct cost would be that of analyzing, modifying, and redesigning of systems prior to conversion to the computer. An example of a joint or common cost would be the cost of computer housing, including air conditioning, engineering supervision, false floors, ducts and pipes, tranformers or motor generators, cabling and wiring, and overhead racks and supports.

Each sponsoring firm should pay for its own direct costs. Joint costs should be shared equally or apportioned among the firms according to some equitable formula.

Operating Costs

2. Operating costs. These include the monthly hardware and software costs to operate the cooperative. Hardware costs refer to the periodic rental or purchase charge for the computer equipment. As a minimum the computer equipment consists of an input unit, a central processing unit, and an output unit. Software costs include personnel costs, programming costs, testing and debugging costs, magnetic tapes, disc packs, punched cards, paper, paper tapes, repair parts, power, telecommunication lines, and so on.

Operating costs that are directly traceable should be paid by the using firm. Joint or common costs can be shared equally or can be allocated to each firm based on the number of transactions processed or the actual computer processing time used during the period. In addition, if so desired, a sponsor could be required to pay a minimum or maximum monthly charge.

Management

Fourthly, the sponsoring companies should decide how to manage the venture. It is advisable to form a committee to oversee the management and operation of the cooperative. A decision must be made whether each member regardless of size should have one vote or whether another basis of voting should be used. This decision should assure participants that no one firm will dominate or control the cooperative.

Common Line of Business

A factor not to be overlooked when forming a cooperative, one which will avoid frustrations, complications, and extra expenses, is to see that each member is in the same industry or business category. Thus all sponsoring firms will have similar operating problems that can be simultaneously solved by the computer personnel, resulting in the allocation of smaller costs to each firm for each problem solved. Also computer programs developed or packaged programs purchased can be shared by all sponsors with minimum modifications, thus resulting in considerable programming cost savings.

(please turn to page 13)

Control in Time-Sharing Systems

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> *"A time-sharing installation (like every computer environment) is exposed to the seven major dangers: fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, equipment malfunctions, and human errors."*

Introduction

This article has as its main objective to furnish and define some methods and provisions for control and security in a computer time-sharing environment.

It is evident that computer time-sharing has become very popular during recent years. More and more confidential information is being handled by these systems, creating an urgent need for strong measures of control and security.

Description of the System

The service provided by a single computer to many telecommunications terminals has been called "computer time-sharing". With this type of service each user shares simultaneously in the processing capabilities of the central processor. This new computer facility makes this service available to small companies and/or other users who have little need for their own computer.

Computing services that may go under the heading of time-sharing include:

> Commercial computing; text editing; databank information retrieval services; application services such as colleges' records, inventory control, payrolls of small companies, and account receivables; administrative messages; switching and collection services; and more.

Among the great number of time-sharing users are hospitals (Welch Hospital, one of the biggest in Europe, has acquired the large ICL 1904S computer with 7020 terminals), banks (Gosbank, the national bank of the USSR, has ordered two large-scale Honeywell series 600 with 100 terminals), schools and colleges (British schools and colleges have started using terminals), airlines (Continental Airlines uses the Sonic 360 reservation system with 550 on-line terminals).

Trends

The growth in computer time-sharing has been phenomenal in recent years in spite of a short business recession between 1970 and 1972. Time sharing was a broker's dream in the '60s; many companies realized its potential, entered the market, and failed because of: one, strong competitive pressure, and two, because of the countless thefts and violations suffered. The highly competitive situation benefited the user in regard to pricing, but the offsetting consequence of lower profits caused a high casualty rate among these companies. As a result, the number of time-sharing firms dropped from 150 to 50 between 1969 and 1972.

A few of the companies which survived and which account for most of today's time-sharing business are Rapidata Corporation, Teletype Corporation (a subsidiary of AT&T), Tymeshare Incorporated (the largest independent firm and second only in size to IBM and Honeywell time-sharing operations), and IBM

Jerry Dreyer, executive president of ADAPSO, an association of data processing service organizations estimates that one time-sharing company out of three was profitable in 1971, two out of five in 1972, and probably three out of six in 1973. Nowadays, this computer facility is coming back to its original trend, and it is expected that the number of computers with terminals will grow from 32% at the end of 1971 to 45% at the end of 1975, with the average central processing unit driving 15 to 20 terminals.

One consultant, Creative Strategies of Palo Alto, California, predicts that time-sharing sales by 1976 will increase to 2 billion from 331 million last year. By 1975, says ADAPSO's Dreyer, time-sharing will account for 1/3 of the $4.5 billion computer services industry.

Technological Advances

Most important technological advances have been achieved recently on on-line terminals linked to central processors. Some of the improvements made include solid state keyboards, which have greater reliability and lower cost; visual display methods, which incorporate more capacity, economy, and aesthetic appeal; non-impact printing techniques, which provide faster, quieter and more reliable operations; improved lower cost memories; more powerful logic capability; and faster and more accurate modern techniques and improvements in central processor software.

This is only the beginning. It is foreseen that in the future the equipment itself will change in nature and will probably not be recognizable as terminals per se. Rather, terminals will be modular systems consisting of the required input/output functions for specific jobs, built around basic controller and communication interfaces; in many instances, terminals will become special purpose devices.

Hazards

A time-sharing installation, like every computer environment, is exposed to the seven major dangers of fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors. Fire is considered to be the greatest threat to magnetic tapes. Water does not constitute an important hazard to magnetic tapes, but it does to computer installations. Theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors are considered the most common dangers.

On-line terminals connected to central processors from remote points are more exposed to violations and thefts. The increasing popularity of time-sharing systems among large corporations and service bureaus has given rise to even more potential security breaches. Data transmitted over a communication line could be subject to wire tapping and a number of other hazards such as piggyback entry, whereby the intruder intercepts and compromises communication between a terminal and the processor while a legitimate user is inactive but still holding the line open. The intruder can even cancel the user's sign-off signal and continue operating in his name. A knowledgeable person could enter program changes from a terminal and play havoc with the system.

Need for Protection

Due to the increasing popularity of computing services, the issue of control and security protection has become more important. It is evident that time-sharing systems present few obstacles to unauthorized parties. The security problem has been made much more critical by the growing number of people trained in computers and by the fading of the computer mystique. In addition, communication by means of time-sharing systems has no more protection than telephone conversations or Morse-coded methods, since the technological skills necessary to interpret computerized data are widespread. More and more companies are appointing security monitors from their EDP staffs to centralize security matters. Trade organizations such as the American Management Association and the Bank Administration Institute, computer firms, and research firms such as Advancement Management Research, Inc. find their seminars on computer security overcrowded by data processing managers and security officers from business and government.

Target of Attacks

Computers have become an important source of information and, as a result, the target of many attacks. Some of the general information targets for industrial espionage are sales and service information, market analysis strategies, bid prices, corporate finance, stockholder information, legal negotiations, planned policy changes, expansion plans, product developments, personnel changes, payroll data, general administrative matters; and the list could be expanded even more.

Threats

The case of an 18 year-old Cincinnati youth who used long distance telephone to tap the lines of a time-sharing system firm in Louisville, Kentucky, and extracted data from its ledgers, as well as records of its customers, is representative of the type of risk to which computer installations are exposed.

Accidents can have serious consequences such as the incident in which income tax return records for [illegible] were erased by energy emitted from the radar of a nearby airport in Austin, Texas.

Safeguards

It is important to consider that too much control and too many security safeguards can become bothersome and costly. The measures to protect data from unauthorized access vary from one system to another. According to Richard F. Cross, Security Office for the Bank of New York, security systems should include each of the following segments: physical security; personnel security; procedural security; audit control; insurance; and any needed interfacing.

The quality and level of protection required depends on the sensitivity of the data handled. Nevertheless, control and security in a time-sharing environment should encompass the whole system, since it is well known that even the strongest control measures can be violated at the weakest point. These measures should be taken in the central processing unit, software, personnel, communication lines, the terminal, and its users.

Methods and Provisions — Central Processing Unit

The central processor is threatened mostly by sabotage, fire, water, theft, EDP equipment malfunctions, human accidental errors and environmental problems.

The computer center of any company is the heart of the organization, and protection of the equipment against these threats can be provided by a carefully planned computer room. Luis Scoma, President of Data Processing Security, Inc., recommends that the computer center be located out of the main traffic areas. It must be fireproof, dustfree, and waterproof and provided with temperature and humidity control and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Water lines should not run through the computer room. A separate, fireproof storage area should be provided for data files, documentation, and operating supplies. It should also have alarm devices sensitive to magnetism, humidity, heat, pressure, dust, theft, power blackout, etc. There should be strong access control including armed guards, fenced areas, TV monitors, personnel identification (visual, voice print, fingerprint, badge, passwords, etc.), well-performed maintenance service, and a number of extra provisions for protection.

Data Processing Security, Inc. has developed, for high security necessities, an electronically operated double door entry system for access control into the computer room. When a person enters the buffer zone, the door locks behind him while he is subjected to electronic search. If something is detected, the system freezes and automatically alerts the security guard. The second door can be opened only with a special badge key.

A carbon dioxide (CO_2) fire extinguishing system, such as the one installed at the Chase Manhattan Bank's New York City headquarters, has proved useful. Engineered by Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., this system uses a battery of remotely located cylinders containing the liquid gas. When activated by smoke detectors, the gas discharges and builds up an inert atmosphere in the immediately surrounding area, extinguishing the fire without damaging equipment or data files. Employees can go back to work within five minutes after the fire has been put out and the ventilation systems restarted.

Another fire-fighting system which has been developed by the Ansul Company uses Halon extinguishing agents which are discharged in the form of a colorless, odorless, and non-toxic gas. 'Since Halon agents do not work by diluting oxygen, they are well-suited for areas where humans are present.

The Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. of Worcester, Mass., has adopted another approach to fire-fighting, a system installed by Security Control Systems which detects fire, smoke and excessive temperatures and humidity fluctuations and causes a monitoring and reporting device to alert four pre-selected phone numbers for help.

Software

Protection of data files, whether in the form of punch cards, magnetic tapes, or discs, is the key element in any computer facility.

Some specific examples of software security control measures are audit trails, access regulations, strong supervision of computer operators, the use and control of programs utilizing program documentation methods, the use of a log for all significant events (such as user identification, file use and attempts of unauthorized use), regulations to prevent unauthorized personnel from browsing through the files, and the use of a semi-automatic data inventory control system.

Personnel

Physical control as to who is allowed near the computer and the files is advisable. Note that this does not mean "employees only"; it implies a careful screening of employees, repairmen, and visitors to determine which of them should be allowed this proximity to the system. Intimately involved with time-sharing installations are three types of personnel: operators, programmers, and maintenance engineers.

According to Dennis Van Tassel, mathematician and head programmer at San Jose State College, all operators must understand that there exists a protection philosophy. If personnel are expected to help enforce and to comply with this protection philosophy, it must be clearly defined and specified.

It is advisable to use the following provisions for personnel control: control of logs and monitor, division of responsibilities, rotation of duties, adequate supervision to reduce the risk of losses caused by accident or error, careful handling of data files, cleanliness regulations, control access to private files, and appropriate instruction in case of disasters.

Terminals

Some of the most common pitfalls encountered when using terminals are frequent communication interruptions, risk of communication interception, difficult access control, and noisy lines.

Among the greatest disadvantages of time-sharing services are those in connection with the communication lines which link the terminals to the central processing unit. Telephone lines are designed for voice communication rather than data communication, and the results have been that such lines are too noisy and have too many interruptions for appropriate handling of data communication.

There have been some recent developments in the improvement of data transmissions. Bell System has developed its Digital Data Service (DDS), a data transmission system which has been introduced early this year in five cities (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, and Chicago); and, by the end of 1974, twenty-four cities are expected to have it. Bell further plans to provide continuous monitoring of their DDS channels. When errors of transmission are detected, DDS will notify the customer. Decision on retransmission will be the customer's responsibility. Another development in data communication is DUV (data under voice). By late 1973 this technique will be in service between New York and Chicago; consequently, communication problems should become virtually nonexistent within the near future, and this system will become even more popular.

Telephone lines are vulnerable to three types of security problems: wire tapping, piggyback, and user's sign-off signal cancellation. These common threats may be avoided by the use of a privacy transformation method (also called scramblers or cryptographic techniques). This is a non-singular (reversible) operation which conceals the original message either by the substitution of new characters, rearrangement of the characters, or by the adding of strings of digits to the original message.

Some new techniques for encrypting data have evolved, such as high speed transmission and signal scrambling. In spite of all of these new techniques, it is still possible to intercept and tap the information. According to Tuckerman, unauthorized users (intruders) who possess only limited material and information with which to work, can readily extract the original text of enciphered messages by making use of the speed, capacity, and computational abilities of the computer.

The greater the efficiency of the privacy transformation, the more difficult it becomes for unauthorized copying of files.

Access Control

Access to the system throughout the communication lines should be controlled by the central processing unit and by the user's own procedures. This is possible by cryptographic and scramble techniques, personnel regulations, user identification, appropriate terminal location, or by ciphering and deciphering hardware.

Computer software packages have been written to cipher data transmissions. Ciphering software is an attractive technique because it can be done automatically by the program which creates the data and at a very low cost. Only programs using the matching deciphering technique are able to use this data. These special hardware cipher devices can be located at the terminal and at the computer to protect transmitted data.

Scramblers or voice privacy devices are currently being used by people who readily acknowledge the insecurity of transmitted information. Scramblers are used by large corporations such as the oil industry as well as by union representatives during contract negotiation time. (Scramble phones are currently a 20 to 30 million-dollar business, excluding law enforcement and military purchases). Scramble devices are now being built for time-sharing operations. These devices offer protection similar to encryption. Scramblers convert data into something resembling channel noise or a malfunctioning circuit.

Other features for terminals include print inhibit, security keylock, operator identification card reader, and the use of a terminal identifier. With print inhibit the terminal operator can enter data, such as security passwords, without its being physically displayed. A physical keylock can be attached to the terminal which will not allow the entry of data. The operator identification card reader reads magnetically encoded information on a magnetic strip card. The card can be used to supply the user's password and/or name.

Direct access device security features include file mask, volume detection, and write-exhibit switch. The file mask controls or allows read-only of read-write access to data sets. The volume detection switch alerts the control program when the volume is increased; this protects data from being overwritten upon. This switch provides additional protection for read-only volumes.

Insurance

If data security measures fail, the use of EDP insurance can back-up or soften the blow. Every business or person who now has an in-house computer, operates or is a user of a service bureau, or transmits data to a data center should be computer-security conscious. Insurance is one of the back-up measures if prevention fails. However, not all business can afford or even need an elaborate and expensive security system; thus, evaluation of the information becomes necessary to determine those sections of the system which require this protection.

The subject matter of ordinary insurance coverage is physical damage to tangible property. In this case, software and data are not covered. Business interruption insurance protects you in the event of fire or other interruptions to normal business but does not cover the consequences. Boiler explosion policies which also insure other heating mishaps do not cover computer operations. Theft and employee dishonesty are also insured in terms of general risk. Valuable papers and records' coverage provides protection in the event of destruction of such intangibles as notes and account receivable records but does not include such computer media as valuable papers. Public liability insures the company for its acts or omission of acts which give rise to claims by outsiders against the company.

Insurance can prevent an unfortunate event from becoming a catastrophe. When a person buys an insurance policy, he knows that he will be indemnified if a loss does occur.

Some of the insurance companies which write EDP policies are the Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Insurance Company of North America, The Home Insurance Co., and Royal Assurance of America.

Insurance premiums generally correspond to the regular fire policy rates plus an added loading factor for the additional EDP perils.

Undoubtedly any computer installation, regardless of the quality and level of its security system, cannot approach the state of no risk of loss. Security is based on a "cost-benefit" concept; in other words the cost of violating the system should be greater than the gain derived therefrom.

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Cerullo — *Continued from page 9*

Procedure for Withdrawal

Sixth, a procedure should be established for withdrawal from the cooperative. If the withdrawing firm has not been a member for a predetermined time, perhaps one or two years, a sliding scale penalty fee for withdrawal should be established.

Procedure for Admission

Finally, procedures must be determined to govern the admission of new members into the cooperative. Perhaps a unanimous affirmative vote by current members should be required to admit a new member. The current members should also decide if a newly admitted member should be required to pay a predetermined portion of the cooperative's startup costs and if the cooperative should limit membership to firms of the same approximate size as current members.

Conclusion

With due care taken in following the above steps, establishing a successful cooperative service bureau should be relatively easy. Companies would be well advised to consider the idea seriously, for cooperative service bureaus offer a viable and in many ways superior alternative to the more costly inhouse computer and the less satisfactory outside service bureau.

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Alienation and the Systems Analyst

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"Systems analysts ... must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm."

A Wall of Managerial Attitudes

In most large organizations, the systems and data processing departments are separated from the rest of the firm by a wall of managerial attitudes. While employees in most jobs are encouraged to gain a wide variety of experience in various departments as they rise through various management levels, it is rare that a systems analyst or a programmer is given an equal opportunity. The general attitude is "He's a computer man, not a manager (or a businessman, or a banker). He wouldn't fit in. Besides, he's doing a good job where he is."

As a result, the analyst has exactly no motivation to think of himself as an insurance man or a businessman, or a banker, or an accountant. He is made to feel like a consultant. He can serve the organization, but he isn't free to move within it. To make matters worse, some firms rotate the people in their management development programs through a stint in the systems department. It is little wonder that there is a high turnover in systems analysts. The company does very little to make him feel like a member of the family.

Potential Source of Talent

But beyond the problems brought about by the personnel turbulence, the firm is ignoring a potential source of fine managerial talent. Many analysts joining major corporations hold degrees as Master, Business Administration. Their educational backgrounds, when combined with their ability to objectively define problems and see solutions, and the detailed working knowledge of the company gained in the system design process, should put them in the management spotlight. Instead, the system analyst finds that he has been given the indelible label of "computer person" and that his upward mobility is limited to the systems department. As a result, systems analysts leave the firm, and often leave the systems profession.

If companies hope to attract and hold talented personnel for their systems activities, they need to offer them an equal chance to develop to their full potential. They must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm — not as consultants who are here today, but who could move on tomorrow.

Experience in Systems

As businesses come more and more to depend upon data processing to support their operations, it will be desirable for a significant number of management team members to have experience in systems. Yet, by their actions, managements have forced many talented people to avoid beginning their careers in data processing for fear of becoming stereotyped.

So it would seem that a number of the problems that businesses face in their systems activities are a result of a regrettable but widespread management attitude.

Only when systems analysts are regarded as having a potential for advancement to positions in general management, and are given an equal chance to rise in the organization, will the systems man lose his alienation and see himself as a member of the company team. ☐

Strategy and Action on World Trade

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> *"What we [the United States] have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do."*

The theme of my remarks is the intensifying controversy over the conditions that influence our well-being here in the United States — particularly the threat of another unfortunate experience with protectionism.

I am well aware that I cannot go deeply into this subject in a short space. This I know because I was privileged to serve on the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy. For over a year we studied every way in which this and other countries are affected by international trade and investment policies.

Protectionist Attitude

Let there be no doubt where I stand on the principal issue. I believe that the threat of the protectionist attitude in America is far more than an issue involving business and jobs. I sincerely believe that this issue embraces many powerful forces that will have an important bearing on whether or not all the peoples of the world make the most of their opportunities in the years to come.

I recognize that there are strong and honest differences of opinion on the proper direction of our nation's foreign trade policies. There are many persons and suppliers who have been adversely affected by foreign competition. It would be unrealistic not to acknowledge this fact of life.

Complexity

These differences of opinion, and these dislocations of people's lives, point up the complexities of the problem. Who among us can honestly say he understands all of the ramifications involved in the balance of trade? Where is there an unchallenged expert on monetary policy? What type of restraints, if any, could or should be made on the world-wide transfer of technology? What is the proper level of East-West trade relations, and are the national defense implications of yesterday still appropriate today? Should the United States government be supporting broad research and development to match the funds that foreign countries are investing in their industry? Can we preserve the rise in productivity that underlies the American miracle — which is the production of goods at low cost while wages, taxes and dividends all rise steadily?

These are just some of the questions which must be asked in the discussion now developing, particularly in the halls of Congress, but also at various other governmental and community levels.

Facing these and still other complexities, we know that Congressional hearings soon to begin could result in new laws and regulations which could be detrimental.

Action

Because this is so, it will not do for anyone with a qualified viewpoint backed by experience, to be simply an observer. I am convinced that this present controversy can be resolved positively, but it will require action.

What kind of action will be most effective? the kind of action which is in the public interest? — not special pleadings based on the experience of a single company, or a single industry, or even a single community.

It is, of course, important to gather this supporting information and be aware of all the facts that bear on our needs, our experience and the options that governments can take to effect them. But going beyond this, we must be prepared to discuss with everyone who will exert influence on our elected lawmakers the more important question — what do all these statistics and contentions mean to me?

The Concerns of U.S. Citizens

The concerns of the great body of United States citizens are how to assure and enhance their jobs and living conditions and be involved in what was once unashamedly described as "the pursuit of happiness".

Based on a talk before the Board of Governors of the Electronic Industries Association, Phoenix, Ariz., January, 1973.

Let's look at just one major concern: about 1.3 million new American families are formed every year. Approximately eight million people change their jobs every year. About 3.7 million people join the labor force and 2.1 million leave it. By 1980 full employment in the United States will require jobs for 100 million people, 18 million more than were employed at the end of 1972. These, quite clearly, are the priority considerations in the minds of millions who do not clearly understand how the enterprise system meets their needs.

If they and the representatives of large numbers of voters do not understand, how can we expect their support?

I would like to review the arguments for their support in as familiar terms as I can muster.

The Days of U.S. Preeminence are Gone

First, let's examine one portion of the real economic world we inhabit.

Of primary importance is the fact that the days of almost total U.S. preeminence since the close of World War II are gone.

We must learn to live and work in a world where forevermore we will be dependent on other portions of the globe for some of our more basic needs — and some portions will be dependent on us. The U.S. is not self-sufficient in materials, nor does it have a corner on the world's technology, the world's innovative ability, the world's marketing savvy, the world's production know-how. What we have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do.

The Energy Crisis

I hesitate, somewhat, to use the energy crisis as an example of this dependency, because I recognize that there are those who question whether the crisis really exists, or who maintain that new technology will solve the problem before it reaches crisis stage. I can say at this point that there is an energy shortage, if not a crisis; for example, the fuel oil allotment for our Minneapolis operations has been cut by 25 per cent for January and February, and similar cutbacks have been imposed on other companies, our schools, our common carriers.

Let's look at the dependency which is developing in the oil industry. In the past, the repatriated earnings of oil companies have exceeded the value of imported oil and were a favorable factor in our international balance of payments. By 1985, however, our needs for oil and natural gas could create for us a trade deficit approaching twenty billion dollars a year.

As no doubt you know, we currently import 10 to 15 per cent of both crude oil and copper, 30 per cent of our iron ore, and more than 80 per cent of our bauxite needs. We must import all or most of our tin, natural rubber, nickel and chrome.

Trade with the World

We cannot go it alone. We must trade with the world — and to trade, you give something to get something, with the hope that both traders get what they want and need. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to fully realize this goal, and much of the controversy over this nation's foreign-trade policies revolves around the best way to achieve it.

There is a strong and vocal body of opinion which believes that protectionist measures will achieve what is best for American workers and companies in the arena of world trade. One of their principal targets are companies like Honeywell — multinational companies with substantial investments, employees and sales outside the United States.

"Exporting Jobs"?

It is claimed that U.S. multinational corporations are "exporting jobs" overseas; that U.S. companies invest overseas to take advantage of lower wages; that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies cause unemployment here at home; that if U.S. companies were prevented from investing and manufacturing abroad these companies would be forced to expand their operations in the United States, creating more jobs here; that multinational companies invest abroad in order to avoid paying taxes; that American corporations are exporting U.S. technology and therefore are helping non-U.S. companies compete in our own and other countries.

The Burke-Hartke bill has been proposed as the solution to these problems; and protectionist sentiment also underlies other proposals which may emerge for the consideration of Congress.

At this point, there may be those who will accuse me of making a tactical blunder by even mentioning the allegations of our critics. But I'll go one step further. If someone could prove to me that these allegations are factual, I'd be one of the major supporters of moves to inhibit the growth of multinational companies.

The Opposite is True: Making Jobs

Thanks to various companies, government agencies and trade associations who have accumulated the facts and published them, I know otherwise.

I am convinced, thanks to these studies, and my experience with Honeywell, that multinational companies do not export jobs, but create jobs in the United States faster than other U.S. companies. I am convinced that U.S. companies invest abroad to gain participation in markets in other countries, not to take advantage of lower wages or so-called tax loopholes. I am convinced by these studies that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies have not been a major factor in U.S. unemployment.

To be more specific, I'd like to give you some information taken from a survey conducted by the Emergency Committee on American Trade, of which I am a member. This committee researched the domestic and international operations of 74 U.S. corporations representing a broad group of large multinational corporations. This survey reveals that in the years between 1960 and 1970, when these companies were increasing their overseas operations, they also provided 900,000 new jobs in the United States. They also increased their sales from American facilities — work performed in this country — from $58 billion to $113 billion — nearly doubled, in fact. Their exports from the United States nearly tripled in this period, rising from $4.3 billion to $12.2 billion. In the all-important balance of payments category, they increased their net surplus of exports over imports from $3.2 billion to $6.6 billion — more than doubled.

International Investment Activities of Multinational Companies

These figures, and other results of the survey, lead to one major conclusion: That the international investment activities of these representative multinational companies played an important role in their rapid export growth and consequently made a major positive contribution to their domestic — and I emphasize the word domestic — sales, investment and employment growth.

Double Taxation

I have tried to speak in familiar language; so I have some misgivings about discussing the issue of taxes. But the tax issue is an important one, and I'd like to cover some specific areas which are coming more and more into public discussion.

At issue is the section of U.S. tax law which allows American corporations a tax credit for the income taxes they pay to foreign countries on income earned in such countries. The purpose of this tax credit is to avoid taxing the foreign earnings of U.S. corporations twice — once in a foreign country and again when the earnings are remitted to the United States.

Opponents of this tax credit argue that since domestic firms are not allowed a federal tax credit for the state taxes they pay, the current method of taxing income from foreign sources is inconsistent with the way domestic income is taxed.

Taxation by U.S. States

A major fallacy in this argument is that it is based on the incorrect assumption that the taxation of domestic income by city, state and the federal government is analogous to the United States taxing the foreign earnings of American subsidiaries which have already been taxed by the host country.

The proper analogy is between the way states treat corporate income earned in two or more states and the way the U.S. government treats income earned in two or more countries. Every state which has a state income tax provides a method of allocating the income of a multi-state company among the various states in order to avoid duplicate taxation of the same income. As a matter of fact, the constitution requires this. Thus the current methods of taxing foreign and domestic income are consistent.

Further, where one domestic corporation in the United States has an ownership position in another domestic corporation, the federal income tax law quite properly prevents duplication of corporate income taxes. The parent company is taxed on earnings of the owned company only when such earnings are distributed as a dividend — and then at no more than a nominal rate. What logic can there be in the Burke-Hartke proposal that earnings of an overseas subsidiary — in most cases earnings already taxed in the foreign country at rates comparable to or higher than U.S. rates — should be immediately retaxed at full U.S. income tax rates?

International Competition by American Industry

Another fundamental element of the issue is the tax credit's relationship to the ability of American industry to compete internationally. According to a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, if the United States were to repeal the tax credit for foreign taxes paid and tax all foreign subsidiary income before it is paid out in dividends to the parent company, U.S. firms with foreign operations would be forced to pay an average effective tax on their foreign earnings of over 70 per cent.

Given this added tax handicap, few American firms could continue to compete with foreign-controlled companies for world markets.

You can appreciate how useful it is to have these facts for presentation where contradictory allegations are being made. Let's keep the record straight!

Also useful to the undertaking on which we must all embark is the factual story of what imports and exports do, beneficially to create jobs.

Imports Produce One Million U.S. Jobs

Labor Department figures document the finding that one million jobs in the United States are dependent on imports — jobs for food processors, ship and dock workers, truck drivers and railroaders, warehouse employees and retail clerks. And it's equally impressive to consider that every billion dollars worth of exports creates 60-to-80,000 jobs in the United States.

As we assess the situation, let us not forget the dilemma our government faced in August 1971. As Mr. Peter Peterson wrote, the New Economic Policy announced that month was not, and I quote, "a one-shot reaction to a one-time crisis. It marked the beginning of a new era of more flexible, enduring, and viable economic relationships among nations. The years behind us were by and large an era of success, but an era based upon a system which had become outgrown, outworn — and increasingly crisis-prone."

Tariffs and Free Trade

Mr. Peterson was referring to the tremendous impact that international trade and monetary factors were having on our people. We have since come to learn the difficulty of achieving universally approved corrective action. And now we must reckon with this reality: U.S. negotiators are preparing to enter economic talks next fall that could shape future international relationships for many years to come. Our government can and should strive in these talks to put an end to present attitudes and trends that point ominously to another "balkanization" of world trade.

It can and should seek agreement to reduce, and if possible end, all tariffs on industrial trade by the end of this century.

It can and should try to create far freer trade conditions for farm products.

It can and should seek the harmonization among nations of the present hodgepodge of non-tariff trade barriers and preferences.

But these objectives will remain forlorn hopes unless our negotiators can go into these hard bargaining sessions with the clear backing of the American people and their Congress. We must give them that.

Spurring Internal Transition to Successful Competitive Enterprise

Meanwhile, we face and must do something about the undeniable tolls and grievances resulting from

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Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation

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"Computer arts are still in the highly experimental stage of emergence."

In present computer art, the naive onlooker could readily misconstrue that mathematical processing of data and manipulation of design represent the total modus operandi of this new form, rather than just the initial phases of exploration. A review of the varied computer arts reveals diverse input of patterns and subsequent manipulation or transformation, creating a series of new, perceptual audio or visual images. There appears a similarity of approaches and some variation of the techniques utilized by practitioners of the cybernetic arts: graphics, sculpture, film, dance, music, textile design, weaving, poetry, and architecture.

There is a tendency to forget that the computer arts are still in the highly experimental stages of emergence, and although some attractive and very pleasing works have been accomplished, this new medium has generally not progressed much beyond its mathematical and scientific origins. At times, in viewing or hearing the output of the computer arts, one would relegate the resultant art form to the category of interesting sound or visual patterns, experimental/initial exercises, or mathematical and scientific visualization, rather than as works of art per se. (This latter statement is equally true of contemporary manual experimental art.) There is, at the present time, a tendency for the computer arts to relate to an elite coterie, made up of scientists and intellectuals, rather than the public at large. However, as this new art medium is given greater space in the mass media, this audience should enlarge greatly, as exposure acquaints the general audience with the potential of this new art form.

This article is reprinted by permission from the *Proceedings of the Invitational International Exhibit of Computer Arts,* T-5, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, June-July 1973. Grace C. Hertlein is Assistant Professor in the Computer Science Department at California State University—Chico, Chico, Calif. 95926. Her computer art has been published for many years in *Computers and Automation* and currently some of her computer art is being exhibited at an art exhibition in Bordeaux, France.

Pattern Manipulation

Manipulation of design by the computer may be deliberate, (or at times highly experimental) as change or transformation of the original pattern is achieved via a host of techniques developed within the past twelve years. However, in attempting to see precedent in manipulation of design, one observes ample evidence of a growing interest by artists and critics in combining (manually) mathematics and art. Since the turn of the century, such techniques and philosophy have been practiced and even more verbally expressed by electronic and concrete musicians. Further, the concept of pattern manipulation is as old as man's art, and one finds ample evidence of this concept throughout art history. A few such examples are: Offset X/Y patterns in Persian sculptural reliefs; repetitions of design in serial imagery from early Greek vases; reversals of pattern in the compositions of Bach; mirror images and mathematical progressions of design in the Foundation Course exercises of the Bauhaus School; juxtaposition and superposition of musical patterns throughout musical history; and randomization of musical variations via throwing of dice, as practiced by Mozart. The world was quite ready philosophically and mathematically for further explorations in such transformation of pattern, yet it was not until the speed of the computer afforded this electronic manipulation, that it became feasible to such a degree. (Alteration, change, and transformation of pattern is revealed in other technological systems that may or may not use the computer as an aid in creation: synthesized video, sound, and the film.) In other words, science and technology now afford further exploration of ideas and techniques that have been practiced by experimental artists for years.

The philosophy and practice of twentieth century music shows a very great similarity between the manipulative techniques used by musicians since the early 1900's and the present-day computer procedures. Examination of the philosophy of the Bauhaus and study of the works emanating from this revolutionary school, also reveals great similarities in the approaches to creation, and in the final works of art of this school and present-day computer arts.

The computer artist is manipulating patterns, because this is an inherent potential of the computer medium. The manual artist (or scholar), by contrast, is bound to laborious manual processing of data and pattern, and thus generally discovers to a lesser degree, further sources of innovative and perceptual changes, i.e., manipulation as practiced in the computer arts is not feasible manually. When perceptual change is accomplished manually (many of the works in Graphis afford excellent examples), such change is not only excessively time-consuming, but represents a manual tour de force. It could be more readily accomplished via the computer.

The manual artist is generally not concerned with perceptual change or alteration of the original image. On the other hand, since the computer readily affords such changes, the cybernetic artist may literally exploit component designs, taking them through what may appear to be unlimited design changes. The more abstract the component design, the more readily it lends itself to mathematical variation and processing, termed design state variation.

Design State Variation

This is a term devised by the writer, adapted from given "state" variations used in printmaking, in which one may revise a plate or stone, and alter it by additions and/or changes of pattern, resulting in a series of new works. The term denotes known variations of pattern that are possible, which may be used as sub-routines or stored on the computer library and merely called by the user, who defines the values of the given parameters of the specific algorithms being utilized. One of the most provocative concepts emerging in computer art is that of being to literally predict innumerable design state variations, in which a basal component will be visually or auditorially pleasing. The artist may use only those design states that reflect personal expression of design. (One might compare design state variations to the many kinds of chisels the sculptor may use in execution of a work of art, each giving unique effects.) Further, this library of manipulative design state variations is constantly being enlarged by experimenters in the computer arts. A brief listing follows:

- Offsets of pattern on the X, Y, X/Y (progressions in music)
- Mirror images or reversals on the X, Y, X/Y
- Scalar variations or duration of pattern in superposition of form
- Rotation, in open or closed forms
- Irregular radiation of images and forms with growing scalar values
- Redundant serial imagery in closed form
- Polygon serial imagery, with circular, square, or varied final form
- Positive and negative variations of repeated or design-related patterns
- Disintegrating variants of images and sounds in redundant or transform pattern
- Metamorphic variations of images or sounds in predetermined sequences
- Transformations of pattern, in which one design becomes another
- Alterations of design by mathematical algorithms
- Pseudo-randomizations of patterns with artist-imposed parameters
- Overlays of images and sounds in dimensional forms
- Combinations of related patterns, using any of the above design states
- Multi-media combinations, using any of the aforementioned

Prior to design state variation, the artistic idea is stated in coherent, sequential steps. It may be flow-charted before translation into a computer program. Thus the art idea is transformed into analyzed data, using synthetic machine languages, and is then subject to processing and manipulation via the computer using design state variations, revealing innumerable new, final works. Examples include:

- The warp and weft patterns in weaving
- Classical ballet positions, with designations of the head, arms, and feet
- Structural modules in sculpture and architecture
- Derivations of design from art or musical history, including the archaic, the classical, or the contemporary
- Formulae and transformations from science or mathematics
- Stylistic analysis of a given artist's style, with designation and statement of a specific set of definitions describing the style
- Artistic composition of a given musical era, with parameters of such rules

Thus the art idea is initially expressed in the manner of science, but it does not end there. The choice of the art idea or problem should express the personal philosophy of the originator, whether it is mathematical formulae, natural derivations from the environment, or analyses of prior styles of artists. The personal focus of the original idea, ensuing variation and execution cannot be too strongly stressed! The design state variations allow the artist to choose the given direction of psychic expression. Further, selection of specific computer systems and art materials affords a highly individual element within cybernetic creation. And lastly, the varying techniques of execution, which may be preplanned or participant, add a unique and personal opportunity to spontaneously participate within the formation of the work of art, or to maximize the capacities of the computer in artistic execution, using preplanned or heuristic modes.

Diverse Philosophies of Computer Art

Stylistic analysis and resultant design derivation are highly visible in the computer arts and possess decided benefits: these techniques allow one to analyze more thoroughly the subject under study, and in addition, they allow the artist to gain perceptual variations and permutations of the original source not obtainable by manual methods. (The writer and many others have often found these new departures from the design source to be as or more aesthetic than the original input source.) There is, however, a great tendency among humanists to concern themselves with past styles and subject matter, as being more "pure" aesthetically than the present. On the other hand, there is an equal tendency among scientists to exploit mathematical manipulation, disregard art totally, and to have the computer and its peripheral devices accomplish the work of art, without intervention by man. Here one finds two extremes, with beginning dogmatic statements by artists of varying capacities and philosophies. The insightful computer artist, however, seeks to unite personal philosophy and expression with the highest level of computer usage.in a statement of artistic unity. However, one is conscious of new visions emerging throughout history, which are subsequently categorized and "cast in bronze," as "the way." Computer art appears to be no exception to this great

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Computers in Science Fiction — II

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"In science fiction writing, non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use."

In "The Computer and the Poet," Norman Cousins emphasizes that the role of poets, "those who have respect for and speak to the human spirit," becomes even more important as computer usage increases (32). Science fiction writers should indeed be included as poets in our technological age. All too often in our society, problems arising from technology are left to technologists because others are too unsure of their own knowledge to question or criticize. The science fiction writings directly involving computers are one of the few places where non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use.

Emphasis on Man

Perhaps the most recurrent science fiction theme is the difference between computers and man. These raise the question of the proper role for machines versus the proper role for humans or emphasize the aspects that make man unique. In one story (Asimov, "Someday") children in a society where reading and writing are no longer needed form a secret society to learn just for the joy of it; in another (Weir, "What Happened to the Teaching Machine") where all learning is by machine, only uneducated children still know how to pose questions. A super-computer is defeated by a human because he can bluff or "lose to win" and it cannot (Caiden, The God Machine); another super-computer is robbed of its control because of a group of humans whose main desire is freedom (Pohl, Starchild); and to others (Dick, "The Variable Man"; Sheckley, "Fool's Mate") human unpredictability continues to be a problem. This distinctive aspect of man is very directly stated by the computer builder in a French science fiction story (Boulie, "The Perfect Robot"). In trying to make the computer more like man, he progressively adds to its ability to deal with data, the ability to play chess, language, concepts of love, the ability to engender new machines, concepts of good and evil, and finally what he considers to be the crucial missing element — "I have unhinged them". Mike, a super-computer capable of running an entire revolution (Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress), cannot understand why a joke is funny, and the computer AM (Ellison, "I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream") hates people because unlike them "he could not wander, he could not wonder, he could not belong, he could merely be".

Science fiction writers persist in confronting their readers with a question that receives little direct discussion but is of current concern. As expressed by the historian Bruce Mazelish (33), just as continuities were established with the material universe, the animal kingdom, and our subconscious, we are faced with transcending the 4th discontinuity — of harmonizing our existence and those of machines in a technological society. Or, as expressed by Weizenbaum ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society") the insights of science such as those provided earlier by the work of Galileo, Darwin, and Freud, and now provoked by the advent of the computer, shake man's self-esteem because, when viewed superficially, they seem to diminish man.

Mechanistic View of Man

We diminish man and in our anxiety grow more disdainful of ourselves and ambivalent towards computers if computer usage is predicated on a mechanistic view of man and this mechanistic view becomes our self-image. Too many statements made by systems analysts or computer scientists display that a computer-usable view of man is being substituted for the whole man. Keep in mind the above list of human attributes contrasted to computers by science-fiction writers as you read the following statement from the widely read and much discussed book Limits of Growth written by well-motivated systems analysts:

> Some considered the model too 'technocratic' observing that it did not include critical social factors, such as the effects of adoption of different value systems. The chairman of the Moscow meeting summed up this point when he said, 'Man is no mere biocybernetic device'. This criticism is readily admitted. The present model considers man only in his material system because valid social elements simply

> could not be devised and introduced in this first effort. Yet, despite the model's material orientation, the conclusions of the study point to the need for fundamental changes in the values of society. (34, p. 191)

Admission that the world model has a minor flaw of omitting "critical social factors" followed so blithely by conclusions about fundamental value changes surely conveys to the reader that the factors that have been dealt with are the more essential and more significant.

Again recall the human attributes as you read:

> By the same token since the thinking human being is also an information processor, it should be possible to study his processes and their organization independently of the details of the biological mechanisms — the 'hardware' that implement them. (Simon and Newell, "Information-Processing in Computers and Man", p. 256)

That the theories

> . . . are mechanistic — that they postulate only the processes capable of being effected by mechanism — is guaranteed by simulating the behavior predicated by ordinary digital computers. (ibid. p. 258)

To reemphasize the contribution of science fiction, let us trace through one well-written and popular book, Stand on Zanzibar (Brunner). In the 21st century over-populated world, there is a very advanced computer Shalmaneser owned by General Technic, a company large enough to be contemplating the subsidization, modernization, and management of a small underdeveloped country Beninia. Beninia is unique since it alone has retained peacefulness and trust and humane behavior. Computer analysis is undertaken of the feasibility of the G.T. project and for alternative plans of carrying it out. With regard to the possibility of computer analysis of what makes Beninia attractive, one sensitive character in the book says " ... when they get love down to a bunch of factors you can analyze with a computer, there'll be nothing left of whatever makes it worth being human". Shalmaneser eventually rejects the data on Beninia because it is inconsistant with reality. Mulligan, a cynical sociologist, gets the computer to process the data by adding the additional assumption that an unknown force is active in that population. Mulligan points out that the scientists who have been working toward consciousness for the super-computer have been successful because the rejection of the data was a display of its first human characteristic — "orneriness" or "bloody-mindedness". When faced with something different, it chose to reject it instead of broadening its view of the possible. Mulligan sets out to find what makes Beninia different and traces it to a genetic mutation which produces a body odour that surpresses in others the territorial-aggression reaction. Mulligan's hope is that a world-renowned biologist who is working on modification of human genetic maps can use this to better mankind. His hope is shattered when he learns that this biologist has been murdered for political reasons. The decision is that the machine will work on finding an external synthetic spray. Mulligan is led away crying for lost humanity " ... what in God's name is it worth to be human, if we have to be saved from ourselves by a machine?" The now conscious machine has the last word and the last sentence of the book "Christ, what an imagination I've got". The irony of the book is that Mulligan, who represents and speaks for those characteristics which are human, falls into another part of the prevalent mechanistic trap — aggression is in our genes; the solution to our problems will be via a specific scientific breakthrough.

Superstates and Sypersystems

A concern for the use of computers in politics and government is seen in numerous stories. Opinion polling in a political campaign is involved in The 480 (Burdick), and the writing of campaign literature in The Novel Computer (Escarpit). The prediction of elections is carried to an extreme in "Franchise" (Asimov) where only one vote is needed to determine the election, and Counterfeit World (Galouye) describes an entire synthetic society (an "electromathematical model") made up for purposes of opinion surveying. Of greater concern, however, are the super-states dependent on or replaced by supercomputer systems. Many of these stories describe the process by which men gradually gave away self-determination in exchange for material well-being, or in the belief that a larger something was needed to protect them from each other (Anderson, "Sam Hall"; Cole, The Funco File; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix; Pohl, Starchild). Often, no one really understands any longer how the system works (Cameron, Cybernia; Cole, The Funco File; Delany, The Fall of the Towers; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix). In most cases, the vast destructive power of the system is realized when, for some reason, it is no longer serving human ends. One computer overemphasizes the goal of protecting itself (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer), one gets carried away by its goal of avoiding thermo-nuclear war (Cardin, The God Machine), two become lonely and hence mad (Fairman, I, the Machine; Pohl, Starchild), another becomes psychotic because of what it learns from men's minds (Delany, The Fall of the Towers), others are under the control of selfish people (Cameron, Cybernia; Sladek, The Reproductive System). Most of these systems are destroyed by man's more flexible intelligence. However, in one story (Miller, "Dumb Waiter"), the system goes on even after there are no more people, and in another (Dick, "Autofac"), without the knowledge of the people.

Loss of Control

Some ten years ago when discussing views of computers in science fiction, I pointed out that few contemporary stories could be viewed simply as man's worries about his machines getting beyond his control. I noted that most of the stories focused on extensions of specific current uses and emphasized man's responsibilities as technology advanced (30, 31). While there are some stories in which computers turn on their makers (Dnieprov, "Siema"), the stories just cited have two significantly different characteristics. The stories do not begin with the construction of a machine motivated by curiosity or scientific naivetée, but instead, they begin with the populace agreeing to control by the machine. We read, for example, that in 1993 after a large world war, all nations agree to "subordinate themselves in a realistic manner ... to a common supranational authority ..." which is a machine so that it won't put "interest over reason, emotion over logic" (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer p. 19); or that another machine is built to control the world because with stone axes men could be free as they could do only limited damage before they were stopped but with advanced technology men could do damage so much more quickly they cannot be free to start (Pohl, Starchild). In A Tale of the Big Computer (Johannesson), a history of life until the "computer age," we learn that man is a part of the evolution leading up to computers and that the basic cause of his failure was the inability to organize a complex society. In the very enjoyable Funco File (Cole), when the question is raised, "Has it become your ruler, your god ..."?, the response is, "Well, no. Not exactly. It's more like where our technology triumphs have finally got us to. I guess you might say our real ruler was always an idea of what's normal or not. Conformity, I guess you'd call it ... I suppose the Machine — plus the F.D.I. — working together — have sort of externalized it once and for all." In the stories where there is a struggle between man and the computer, it is not a struggle to retain control but to get it back once it has knowingly been given away or unwillingly allowed to slip away.

Consequences of Bigness

The persistent theme in these stories is that of Bigness — big states and big computer systems — and its consequences. This bigness is well described in an article by Weizenbaum. This article is important because it is one of the few expository statements of this serious theme.

> These often gigantic systems are put together by teams of programmers, often working over a time span of many years. By the time the systems come into use, most of the original programmers have left or turned their attention to other pursuits. It is precisely when gigantic systems begin to be used that their inner workings can no longer be understood by any single person or by a small team of individuals. ... This situation, which is now upon us, has two consequences: first that decisions are made on the basis of rules and criteria no one knows explicitly, and second that the system of rules and criteria becomes immune to change. ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society," pp. 612-613).

What is the effect of this situation on individuals and on society? Two side effects are discussed by Weizenbaum.

> First of course, there is the psychological impact on individuals living in a society in which anonymous, hence irresponsible, forces formulate the large questions of the day and circumscribe the range of possible answers. ... But even worse, since computer-based knowledge systems become essentially unmodifiable except in that they can grow, and since they induce dependence and cannot, after a certain threshold is crossed, be abandoned, there is an enormous risk that they will be passed from one generation to another, always growing. (Ibid., p. 613)

Computers Are Not Gadgets

The reader may argue the degree to which these side effects are already present in our society, but, if he reads sicence-fiction, he cannot ignore them. While the first theme of the differences of man and machines may be the most repeated, this second theme is probably the most important. The science-fiction writers maintain their importance as poets of the "computer revolution" by redirecting our attention from the computer as "gadget" to the computer as an integral part of the modern configuration of government-academe-industry-management which shares skills, resources, techniques, personnel, and goals. Just as our image of the scientist has changed from the man standing lonely vigil over a bubbling retort to prove his scorned hypothesis, the isolated computer with a programmed quirk, asked the wrong question or fed the wrong data, is no longer hero. Frankenstein's monster, or the more recent, Karl, Emmy, and Siema, for example, are very limited creations with identifiable creators, circumscribed environments, and restricted effects. We now have instead Shalmaneser, Project 79, Vulcan 3, Allied Mastercomputer, or simply, The Machine. The new computer-hero has remote access, varied input and output devices, processes large amounts of data supplied by different agencies, works in real-time, makes policy decisions based on quasi-mathematics, commands vast resources, and affects large numbers of people.

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Binger — *Continued from page 17*

our world trade. These weights must be removed and this need must be attended to by Congress and ourselves. We must endorse, broaden and actively support the steps that adjustment assistance can take to alleviate human distress, cushion the impact of change and spur internal transition to successful competitive enterprise.

When we become more familiar with the great influence wielded by exports and the creative capabilities of companies that operate in many lands, we will do a lot more to overcome, where they exist, the penalties we pay for the benefits we enjoy. I firmly believe this.

If I have reminded you of both the pluses and minuses that world trade produces, ask yourself how much of this your family knows and understands. See how skillful you can be in finding ways to make this vital topic really interesting to your family, your neighbors, your associates and the other thinkers, teachers and decision-makers in your community.

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We intend to urge businessmen, labor leaders, and government officials to work for a system of world business that will create jobs all over the world — not in one country to the disadvantage of another. ☐

CORRECTION

In the article "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of "Computers and Automation," the following corrections should be made:

Page 7, second column, third paragraph, lines 1 and 2: replace "the Rand Corporation mathematician" by "the professional philosopher".

Page 8, the chess position for Figure 1B should be:

1b



Page 9, the graph in Figure 2 should be as follows (containing one more connecting link):





Page 1

U S POSTAL SERVICE

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SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 2 (REVERSE)

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The Evening Star and the Princess / B

Notes
Some Collections of Parables and Fables

The Fox of Mt. Etna and the Grapes

Once there was a Fox who lived on the lower slopes of Mt. Etna, the great volcano in Sicily. These slopes are extremely fertile; the grapes that grow there may well be the most delicious in the world; and of all the farmers there, Farmer Mario was probably the best. And this Fox longed and longed for some of Farmer Mario's grapes. But they grew very high on arbors, and all the arbors were inside a vineyard with high walls, and the Fox had a problem. Of course, the Fox of Mt Etna had utterly no use for his famous ancestor, who leaping for grapes that he could not reach, called them sour, and went away.

The Fox decided that what he needed was Engineering Technology. So he went to a retired Engineer who lived on the slopes of Mt. Etna, because he liked the balmy climate and the view of the Mediterranean Sea and the excitement of watching his instruments that measured the degree of sleeping or waking of Mt. Etna. The Fox put his problem before the Engineer. . . .

To be published in November 1973 by Quadrangle / The New York Times Book Co., hard cover, $6.95

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EDITORIAL *(an updated version of an editorial first printed May 1973)*

Burying Facts and Rewriting History - II

One of the efforts of this magazine is to pursue truth.

One of the ways in which truth is pursued is not to let statements of the utmost importance be buried and forgotten in the pages of daily newspapers, nor unreported and lost because they are no longer well covered in national news magazines.

Among those statements are two of permanent interest in connection with the Watergate Caper (this phrase is establishmentese for "the Watergate Crime").

- The statement by Bernard L. Barker, one of the convicted operatives, which explains his motivation and background (see November 1972, *Computers and Automation*).
- The statement by Alfred Baldwin, 3rd, ex-FBI agent, an employee of the Republican Committee to Re-elect the President, telling what he did and saw while five men burglarized the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972, about 2:30 a.m. (see December 1972, *C&A*).

In addition, we have published seven installments of reports on the Watergate Crime by our contributing editor, Richard E. Sprague (a computer professional of 25 years standing) who as an avocation has studied for many years dirty political operations in the United States, including the assassinations by conspiracies (not "lone assassins") of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Reverend Martin Luther King.

Three years ago in May 1970, when we began to publish this type of article, we could not have spoken confidently of "the assassination by conspiracies" of two Kennedys and one King. But the articles we have published — which are listed and characterized on the following pages — have together a remarkable impact.

Taken together, the information published May 1970 to October 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for people in the United States to believe. I do not assert that the establishment is a conscious organism or organization; perhaps the best description is this: a loose confederation of overt conspiracies, silent conspiracies, and biased wealthy persons, with very intelligent orchestration stemming from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Presidency, and with assists from organized crime and the Mafia.

We challenge any fairminded person to read this column may be ordered from us), and after reading them, to still believe that the assassinations are actually the actions of "lone psychopaths," instead of fitting together into a plan to install a certain kind of autocracy in the United States.

This kind of autocracy claims to be democratic, to stand up for "national security," "executive privilege," "separation of Constitutional powers," etc. It offers appearances of democracy, but it seizes the realities of money and power. It cuts programs of social benefit; but it allocates $80 billion a year to be paid to the military-industrial-Pentagon complex.

In the 1940's there was a name for this kind of autocracy. Its name was "fascism," effectively a dictatorship in the interests of big business. What is now appearing in the U.S. is "fascism" in the form of a dictatorship by the military-industrial complex.

Here in a nutshell is an example of the present uneven contest: it takes the form of two sentences in a report by E. Drake Lundell, Jr., in *Computerworld* for April 22, 1973:

> ● The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is "outmanned and outgunned" when it comes to prosecuting cases like the current action against IBM, Senate investigators were told last week.
>
> ● In addition, witnesses before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee stated that often the division cannot do its job properly because of political pressure from the White House. ...

These two statements contain a world of implications.

Essentially, the Department of the United States Government which is charged with enforcing certain U.S. laws against monopoly, can no longer properly function because of (1) the enormous power of just one business, IBM, and (2) political pressure from the White House (this phrase is establishmentese for "President Richard M. Nixon").

We must dig up facts, remember them, and write history the way it is.

We must take action to compel the persons who deceive us and lie to us to leave the government of the United States, such as Spiro Agnew, former Vice President.

Edmund C. Berkeley

The Watergate Crime

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* August 1972 to September 1973

Inventory of Titles, Authors, and Summaries

August 1972

33 **The June 1972 Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters — Part 1**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on five men who have numerous connections with the Republican Party, the White House, the Central Intelligence Agency, anti-Castro Cubans, and plans for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and who were arrested seeking to bug Democratic National Headquarters at 2:30 a.m., June 17, 1972.

October 1972

18 **The Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters (The Watergate Incident) — Part 2**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on further developments in the June 1972 raid by James McCord, Bernard Barker, and others, on National Democratic Party Headquarters, and implications affecting a number of Republican leaders and President Richard M. Nixon.

November 1972

26 **Bernard L. Barker: Portrait of a Watergate Burglar**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
How a cloak and dagger operative and right-wing activist, who was caught as a burglar in the Watergate Hotel offices of the Democratic National Headquarters, looks at himself and his line of work.

29 **Walter Sheridan — Democrats' Investigator? or Republicans' Countermeasure?**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
Walter Sheridan, recently employed by the Democratic National Committee to investigate the Watergate Incident, may actually be a "countermeasure" by the Republicans to defeat the Democratic investigation.

December 1972

24 **The Raid on Democratic Party Headquarters (The Watergate Incident) — Part 3**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on further developments in the June 1972 raid by James McCord, Bernard Barker, and others, on National Democratic Party Headquarters, and implications affecting a number of Republican leaders and President Richard M. Nixon.

26 **Martha Mitchell and the Watergate Incident**
by Martha Mitchell, the magazine *Parade*, and Richard E. Sprague
How Martha Mitchell (wife of former Attorney General John Mitchell) was molested and kept incommunicado and a prisoner — reported on by Mrs. Mitchell and the editor of *Parade* magazine.

27 **The Watergate Crime: An Eye-Witness Account**
by Alfred Baldwin, 3rd
A round-by-round account by an ex-FBI agent, an employee of the Republican Committee to Re-elect the President, of what went on while five men burglarized the Watergate offices, June 17, 2:30 a.m. Baldwin's main assignment was listening to bugged calls to the Democratic National Committee.

January 1973

33 **President Richard M. Nixon, the Bay of Pigs, and the Watergate Incident — Part 4**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
How President Nixon lied in 1960 about the plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and is suppressing in 1972 the investigations of the Watergate Incident.

March 1973

26 **The Watergate Crime and the Cover-Up Strategy — Part 5**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A report on the trial of E. Howard Hunt, James McCord, Bernard Barker, and four other persons for their raid on Democratic National Committee Headquarters in June 1972 using funds of the Republican Committee for the Re-Election of the President; and the strategies of cover-up that have been employed.

June 1973

26 **Watergate: What More is There to Hide? — Part 6**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
How investigation into the Watergate Crime is leading to ramifications and implications, and what are some more of the now hidden connections that may be revealed.

August 1973

36 **Lessons of Watergate — Part 7**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
The collection of Watergate Crimes; the anatomy of a "Really Big American Cover-Up"; other cases of "Really Big American Cover-Ups"; and the implications and ramifications.

September 1973

37 **Six Parallels of 25 Years Ago**
by Alger Hiss
How an establishment attacked Alger Hiss —

Political Assassinations in the United States

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* May 1970 to October 1973

Inventory of Titles, Authors, and Summaries

May 1970

30 **The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence**
by Richard E. Sprague
A reexamination of some of the evidence relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy – with emphasis on the possibilities and problems of computerized analysis of the photographic evidence.

July 1970

29 **The May Article, "The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" – Report No. 2:**
- 32 More About Jim Hicks
- 32 Confirmation of FBI Knowledge 12 Days Before Dallas of a Plot to Kill President Kennedy
- 35 The Second Conspiracy About the Assassination of President Kennedy

August 1970

48 **The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy:**
- 48 Preface, by Edmund C. Berkeley
- 50 Two Men With Guns Drawn at Senator Kennedy's Assassination: Statement to the Press, by Theodore Charach
- 50 Map of the Scene of the Assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy
- 51 The Pantry Where Senator Robert Kennedy was Assassinated
- 52 Bullet Hole in the Frame of a Door
- 53 Two Bullet Holes in the Center Divider of the Pantry Door

September 1970

39 **Patterns of Political Assassination: How Many Coincidences Make a Plot?**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
How the science of probability and statistics can be used as an instrument of decision to determine if a rare event is: (l) within a reasonable range; (2) unusual or strange or suspicious; or (3) the result of correlation or cause or conspiracy.

48 **Computer-Assisted Analysis of Evidence Regarding**

Progress Report
by Richard E. Sprague

October 1970

52 **The Conspiracy to Assassinate Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Second Conspiracy to Cover It Up**
by Richard E. Sprague
A summary of what researchers are uncovering in their investigation of what appears to be not one but two conspiracies relating to the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

56 **Index to "Special Unit Senator: The Investigation of the Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy"**
An index is supplied for the Random House book written by Robert A. Houghton, of the Los Angeles Police Department, about the investigation of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

November 1970

44 **Confidential and Secret Documents of the Warren Commission Deposited in the U.S. Archives**
by Neil Macdonald, Assistant Editor
A list of the subjects of over 200 documents of the Warren Commission which were classified confidential, secret, and top secret.

December 1970

39 **The Assassination of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., The Role of James Earl Ray, and the Question of Conspiracy**
by Richard E. Sprague
James Earl Ray says he was coerced into entering a plea of guilty to killing Martin Luther King . . . and contrary evidence (plus other evidence) have led to filing of legal petitions for relief.

January 1971

45 **The Death of Walter Reuther: Accidental or Planned?**
by Edmund C. Berkeley and Leonard Walden
Some significant questions about the plane crash in May 1970 in which Walter Reuther was killed.

February 1971

48 **The Report of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations**
by Bernard Fensterwald, James Lesar, and Robert

What the National Committee in Washington, D.C. is doing about computerizing files of evidence, initiating lawsuits to obtain information, etc.; and comments on two new books by District Attorney Jim Garrison and Robert Blair Kaiser.

March 1971

35 **"The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" — Comment**

35 I. Another View, by Benjamin L. Schwartz, Ph.D.
A polemical attack on "The Assassination of President Kennedy: the Application of Computers to the Photographic Evidence" by Richard E. Sprague published May 1970.

40 II. Response, by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor

45 **District Attorney Jim Garrison on the Assassination of President Kennedy: A Review of *Heritage of Stone***
by Neil Macdonald, Assistant Editor

April 1971

32 **The Right of Equal Access to Government Information**
by the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D.C.

May 1971

27 **The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Spatial Chart of Events in Dealey Plaza**
by Robert B. Cutler, Architect
The chart, first published in May 1970, is revised and brought up to date.

June 1971

41 **The Case of Secret Service Agent Abraham W. Bolden**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney, Executive Director, National Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Bolden wanted to tell the Warren Commission about a Chicago plot to kill President Kennedy, and was jailed six years on a framed-up charge for trying to do so.

July 1971

51 **The Central Intelligence Agency and *The New York Times***
by Samuel F. Thurston, Newton, Mass.
The issue of systematic suppression of questions about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and a hypothesis.

August 1971

37 **Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans Parish, vs. the Federal Government**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney, Executive Director, National Committee to Investigate Assassinations
How District Attorney Jim Garrison of New Orleans became interested in the New Orleans phase of the assassination of President Kennedy; and how the Federal government frustrated and blocked his investigation in more than a dozen ways.

September 1971

26 **The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Assassination of President Kennedy**
by Bernard Fensterwald, Attorney
How J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI withheld much pertinent information from the Warren Commission, flooded them with irrelevant information, and altered some important evidence, thus concealing Oswald's connections with the FBI.

October 1971

41 **The Assassination of President Kennedy — Declassification of Relevant Documents from the National Archives**
by Richard E. Sprague
The titles of the documents and other evidence indicate convincingly that Lee Harvey Oswald was trained in spy work by the CIA before his visit to Russia; etc. Like the Pentagon Papers, these documents should be declassified.

November 1971

24 **The Assassination of President Kennedy: The Pattern of Coup d'Etat and Public Deception**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Five significant, eye-opening events from May 1970 to October 1971, showing patterns of coup d'etat, assassination, and concealment; and some predictions.

December 1971

32 **The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: A Model for Explanation**
by Vincent J. Salandria, Attorney, Philadelphia, Pa.
A study of the reasons why a great deal of the Federal government's own evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy declared "conspiracy" — and a hypothesis, supported by considerable evidence, about why the President was assassinated and how the implications of that action were to be signaled to those who could read the signals.

6 **The Strategy of Truth-Telling**
by Edmund C. Berkeley
Editorial

January 1972

57 **Spotlight on McGeorge Bundy and the White House Situation Room**
by Robert B. Cutler, Manchester, Mass.
An argument that the "lone assassin — no conspiracy" announcement from the White House Situation Room could have resulted from information available in Dallas and Washington prior to the announcement — and thus does not actually demonstrate that someone there had a guilty foreknowledge of the shooting.

February 1972

43 **Who Shot President Kennedy? — Or Fact and Fable in History**
by Gareth Jenkins, Weston, Mass.
How the physical evidence actually published by the Warren Commission relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy shows conclusively that more than one man was responsible for the shooting — contrary to the Commission's own report.

March, April, May, June 1972

28 **Dallas: Who, How, Why? (in four parts)**
by Mikhail Sagatelyan, Moscow, USSR
A long report published in Leningrad, USSR, by an ace Soviet reporter about the circumstances of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and their significance from a Soviet point of view.

July 1972

32 **The Shooting of Presidential Candidate George C. Wallace: A Systems-Analysis Discussion**
by Thomas Stamm, Bronx, N.Y., and Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor
An analysis of the shooting of Governor Wallace of Alabama; and a discussion of systematic methods for protecting American leaders from violent attacks.

10 **The Shooting of Governor George C. Wallace, Candidate for President**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor
Editorial

September 1972

24 **The Assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy: Proofs of Conspiracy and of Two Persons Firing**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
A review and summary of the evidence showing conclusively the fact of conspiracy and the presence of two guns firing, at the time of the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

November 1972

32 **The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 1**
by James Hepburn, author of *Farewell America*
The unverified, but probably largely true, secret history of the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. — as a preliminary to its involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

December 1972

34 **The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 2**

38 **Le Francais Qui Devait Tuer Kennedy (The Frenchman Who Was To Kill Kennedy)**

January 1973

37 **The Frenchman Who Was To Kill Kennedy**
by Philippe Bernert and Camille Gilles, *L'Aurore*, Paris, France; translated by Ann K. Bradley
English translation of the French newspaper report on José Luis Romero, which was reprinted in French in the December issue.

40 **Why I Distrust the Romero Story**
by Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D.C.
The Romero report reprinted from *L'Aurore* has many earmarks indicating that it is very difficult to believe.

February 1973

26 **Analysis of the Autopsy on President John F. Kennedy, and the Impossibility of the Warren Commission's "Lone Assassin" Conclusion**
by Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., Institute of Forensic Sciences, Pittsburgh, Pa.
The coroner of Allegheny County, Pa., reports on his examination of the evidence that still remains (some of it is missing) locked up in the National Archives of the United States, not accessible to ordinary investigators.

30 **U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir — Part 1**
by *Ramparts*, Berkeley, Calif.
How the U.S. National Security Agency intercepts, decodes, and understands almost all secret and top secret electronic communications and signals of all nations all over the world.

March 1973

31 **U. S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir — Part 2**
by *Ramparts*, Berkeley, Calif.
How the National Security Agency intercepted and decoded enemy messages in order to direct bombing strikes in Viet Nam, and often failed; and how the hideousness of what the American military forces were doing in Southeast Asia finally led this interviewee to resigning and terminating.

April, May 1973

34 **The New Orleans Portion of the Conspiracy to Assassinate President John F. Kennedy — Four Articles:**
(1) by Edmund C. Berkeley, in the April issue; (2) by Jim Garrison, in the April issue; (3) by F. Irving Dymond, in the May issue; (4) by Jim Garrison, in the May issue
On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States refused to permit Jim Garrison, District Attorney, New Orleans, to prosecute Clay Shaw for perjury. On November 21, Jim Garrison issued a statement commenting on this refusal, which is Article 4 of this set; Article 1 is an introduction; Articles 2 and 3 are opening statements

F. Irving Dymond, attorney for the defendant, in the February 1969 trial of Clay Shaw in New Orleans; Clay Shaw was charged by the grand jury with "having conspired with David W. Ferrie and Lee Harvey Oswald to murder President John F. Kennedy" — in regard to which the trial jury found Clay Shaw "not guilty".

May 1973

6 **Burying Facts and Rewriting History**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
Taken together, the information published May 1970 to May 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for the people in the United States to believe.

June, July 1973

36 **The American News Media and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Accessories After the Fact** (in two parts)
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
An examination of what happened in many important American news organizations, to cover up and hide the facts about how President John F. Kennedy was actually assassinated in Dallas.

September 1973

6 **Establishments and Truth**
by Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor, *Computers and Automation*
The nature of an establishment as a system

38 **A Parallel of 1963**
by Marguerite C. Oswald, Ft. Worth, Texas
The ignoring of evidence of conspiracy regarding Lee Harvey Oswald — a parallel to the Watergate cover-up.

October 1973

21 **The Framing of Lee Harvey Oswald**
by Richard E. Sprague, Hartsdale, N.Y.
When Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested, Nov. 22, 1963, for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, he said to his captors in the Dallas jail cell, "I'm a patsy". A review of the evidence (including 18 photographs) proves that Oswald was a patsy, and that he was "framed" for the murder of President Kennedy — although "establishmentese" American history denies it.

Hertlein — *Continued from page 19*

human failing. Even the most broad-minded practitioner is bound by his or her capacities and philosophy, and it requires a deliberate and concerted effort to remain open-minded, and to appreciate varied approaches that are not in accord with one's own temporary aesthetic parameters. One discerns computer artists who prefer natural or man-made patterns and sounds, vs. those who desire only mathematics, electronic and computer sounds, sans the human touch. There are those who exploit two or three-dimensional static images, vs. the creators who prefer moving permutations in flux, declaiming that the computer is a perceptual medium, and therefore should not be imprisoned in static form, i.e., cybernetic art is "pure idea," ad infinitum. Ironically, even the newest of the arts appears destined to hardening within specific schools of thought, with separatist camps warring in "vs." expression and debate.

Summary

It is obvious that the concept of manipulation and processing via the computer is merely the first stage of cybernetic creation. Even now, far beyond the statements of the artistic problem and aesthetic, personal variation, is a vast, open territory that is being explored by questioning, hardy intellectual pioneers, as they seek to perceive the inner anatomy of art and philosophy:

What is style?
What constitutes the aesthetic? How may this be accomplished?
What is art? Music? Sculpture? Dance? Poetry?
What is science? Mathematics?
Is art purely the man-made: The sound of the human voice, or playing music upon man-made instruments? The painting and sculpting of man with hand-held tools?
Is art a part of life, embracing: The ordinary, the animal and natural sounds? The patterns carved by the winds, sands, and the water?
Is art perceptual, a mere fleeting moment or experience in time, or is it permanent, enduring?
What is the optimum role of man in a cybernetic society?
What is the role of art in a technology-oriented world?
What is the symbiosis of man-and-the-machine?
What is thinking?
What is creativity?
Is man the measure of all things?

When man uses the computer as an aid in creation, or when he attempts to create heuristic art, his mind finds new questions to explore and to answer. It appears highly possible that a renewed perception of life and the arts awaits present and future generations of man, and that this may be partially accomplished by eliminating the boundaries of compartmentalized disciplines, and by walking freely between art and science, by combining interdisciplinary practices and materials, to hopefully bring forth the ideal of an open, growing, and dimensional perception of art/life for the human race. ☐

Editor's Note: This paper is published in accordance with a new editorial policy of allowing writers freer expression, with no editing by the editors, in the hope that greater variety of expression and ideas will result for the benefit of readers.

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CORRECTION

In the July 1973 issue of Computers and Automation, a single article entitled "Communication — Three-Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" was published. Part 1 was authored by Larry B. Dendy of the Public Relations Office of the University of Georgia and Part 2 was authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld et al of the University of Georgia and the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center of Emory University.

In compliance with the authors' wishes, the two parts of that article have been reprinted as two separate articles. The first article is authored solely by Larry B. Dendy and is titled, "Communication — Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer." The second article is authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld and his colleagues from the Yerkes Primate Research Center and Georgia State University and is titled, "A Computer Mediates Communication with a Chimpanzee." Also, and in compliance with the authors' wishes, all figures and tables of the article as published in the July 1973 issue have been included in the second of these articles.

In the 1973 annual index Computers and Automation will enter the two articles in this manner, which serves to separate a regular article from a formal scientific and technical report.

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Virtue, in Spite of Erroneous Conceptions

J. P. Frankel
Dean of the Faculty
Harvey Mudd College
Claremont, Calif. 91711

"We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue (if the answer is yes) as doing-it."

In this article, I mean virtue in a much narrower sense than the theologians, and I mean erroneous conceptions in a much broader sense than planners of parenthood.

Let me first speak of virtue.

We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue as doing it. In this sense, at least in the universities, we think of scientists as knowing, the humanists as wise, and the engineers and other technicians (doctors, nurses, social workers and the like) as virtuous, that is, the do-ers.

The World is Full of Problems

Now the world is full of problems where we need to know how to do it, whether to do it, and (if the answer is yes) to do it. Each of us can make his own list of pressing social problems: pollution, arms limitation, or population growth. Fortunately we are reasonably well supplied with scientists, humanists, and technicians. To understand why we still have these urgent problems, let us turn to erroneous conceptions.

The erroneous conceptions I wish to deal with here are:

> That it is within the power of scientists and engineers to choose to work only on projects "in the public interest," and
> That the market place is where one discovers the public interest.

Choice of Projects to Work on

Critics seem to assume that scientists and engineers are free to choose their projects, and complain that they fail to consider the real public interest. Scientists may be free to choose their work, but they have no more to say about how their discoveries are used than Christopher Columbus did.

As for the engineers, they have more to say about the uses of science, since they are the ones who choose which of science's ideas will be applied, but they in turn have almost no way, at present, of identifying the public interest, and even less in determining which products or processes should be produced to serve it.

A Moratorium on Science?

We will return to this matter of choice, but first let's eliminate from the list of reasonable alternatives facing society, the silly and dangerous notion of a moratorium on science.

The key notion in the moratorium idea is that if you can't control it, you shouldn't do it. Therefore, we are urged, don't do any more science until (presumably) the humanists devise suitable controls. The trouble with this kind of conceptual contraception is two-fold. In the first place, as Paul Saltman has pointed out eloquently, you can't forbid knowing any more than you can forbid writing poetry. Science can be slowed down, of course, by driving it underground, but even if we slowed it way down, there is no evidence that we have either knowledge or wisdom enough to control its application, unless we change some of our habits.

Ignorance and Fear Lead to Irrationality

One habit that needs correction has to do with the thinking and feeling processes of the humanists — the philosophers, if you will — who presumably are to show us how to behave. Too often they are ignorant or fearful of science and engineering. What one is ignorant or fearful of, he cannot deal with in a rational way. There is no possibility that we can learn to control what we do by some non-rational process, such as satori, using mystically-fashioned playing cards, etc. Control over what we do will

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Based on remarks delivered on Joseph C. Wilson Day, November 10, 1972, at the University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.

have to be done rationally. I also believe that it will have to be done by humanists, and that before they can do it, we have somehow to lower, or at least make more permeable, the barrier that separates the Two Cultures. We will come back to this point later. Before that, let us return to the notion that engineers choose what they will work on.

The Choices of Engineers

Most engineers do not make cosmic choices. They do not decide that this product will be built and that one won't be. Practically all engineers, I suspect, work for other engineers, who work for others, who work in companies where the products are determined not by science or philosophy, but by market analysis. Now market analysis has come a long way since the days of the Edsel, and it often guesses accurately, although not always so, what the public is interested in buying. But what the public buys is not necessarily what it needs.

The Market-Place Guessing Game

We buy those things that are offered for sale that are better (in some vague way) than the alternatives available to us. Except for advertising or other ways of influencing public opinion, the basic mechanism of the market-place is a guessing game. Try this product, see if it sells. If it does, figure out what it was about it that sold, and push a little harder. If this one does not sell, retrench a little, or gamble on another change — and so on. Advertising and public opinion do play important roles — how else explain so many different labels on the same bar of soap, the same automobile? — but the decision as to how the engineers' skills will be used has, in the past, been largely determined by the instantaneous outcome of the market game.

Major Civil Problems

Now please do not misunderstand me. The market-place mechanisms are important for determining soap or automobile styles. I believe that criteria of risk-and-return of investment are elements of our decision-making processes that we could discard only at great peril to our society. What I am saying is that the major civil problems: pollution, poverty, and population density, for examples, are not likely to be defined by market analysis.

These problems, for which acceptable solutions are needed, share these characteristics:

First, they cross product classification lines, and involve more than one sector of the economy. They are not just problems of the auto industry, or the mining companies, or manufacturing-but-not-service-industries — they involve all of these. All the skills that all these sectors employ may have to be applied to these problems. The cement plants in the country and the transport companies in the city have pollution problems that differ only in detail. To expect them to do the necessary research and development separately, each with his eye on his own segment of the market, is to postpone until much too late, if not forever, solving even the smaller parts of our problems. The problems, so to speak, are too big.

These Problems are Hardly Separable

In the same way, the major civil problems are not readily separable. One can reduce the amount of air pollution caused by internal combustion engines by using electric autos, for example. If so, we may replace polluted air in the cities with polluted streams out in the country where the new massive power plants are. Or we can replace with solar energy the fissionable materials or fossil fuels we now use for power; however, at least in the near future, we would then have either much less energy or much more costly energy, and fewer jobs and more poverty. (Some among us tend to paint even blacker pictures. They point out that our society gave up slavery only when our technology developed to the point where machines were cheaper than slaves. Is it possible that we could deliberately reverse this process and end up with clean air, but with slaves?)

This characteristic of tight linkage, or inseparability of the big problems, also suggests that we cannot rely upon the ordinary market-place mechanisms to determine how we employ our technology to solve our problems.

Very Difficult Problems

The third characteristic of our problems that forces us to reconsider the mechanisms of choice, is that our problems are so very difficult. The technical solutions do not exist outside of social considerations. The social costs outweigh such usual factor costs as materials, labor, and capital. Our cities present much tougher problems than putting man on the moon. As someone smarter than but unknown to me, has said, "We couldn't have put a man on the moon if the moon had been inhabited".

World-wide and Nation-wide Problems

All these characteristics, and others that I've left out, such as geographical diversity — some problems are not local, nor even regional or national, but world-wide — suggest that the organizations needed for these new problem-solving teams differ considerably from those of even our biggest, most diversified companies, or else that we need some super-industrial team of coordinators, who are to be responsive not to the elements of the market-place, but rather to the public interest. Whether that public is regional, or national or world-wide, someone who has thought this problem further through must tell. My own thoughts, tempered by a certain sourly pragmatic view of the interactions of various national governments, suggests that the approach most likely to succeed in the near future is the national one.

The National Science Policy and Priorities Act

The essentials of a first step in a national plan are contained in the National Science Policy and Priorities Act, which, among other things, sets up procedures for contracting out to universities, companies and other organizations, the research and development necessary for solution of the major civil problems, including the design of civil science systems. Whether an agency like NASA should be set up, as the Act says, or whether an existing agency should supervise new programs, is a matter of debate. The importance to our discussion is that some federal funding agency, not the various product market-places, should establish the priorities and fund the solutions to our civil problems.

As you see, this bill or Act or plan makes a first approach to nationalizing the solution to national problems. At the same time it utilizes local collections of scientific, humanistic and engineering talent, that either already exist in the aerospace companies, universities and think tanks, or can be collected there. In essence, this bill solves one aspect of the problem. It replaces small or local or single-commodity market-places with a national market-place based on national needs. I suspect that the new agency will find that big aerospace companies usually do not have the necessary mix of talents, although they probably do have the necessary organization. The universities, on the other hand, probably do have the necessary mix of talents, but probably do not have the proper organization. It seems, however, to be a logical first step, and the sooner the bill becomes law, the sooner we can begin to solve our problems.

International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis

An example of the international approach is the recently established International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna as a joint venture of our National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy, among others. Since they will operate on about three-and-a-half million dollars a year (the Civil Science part of the National Science Policy and Priorities Act allots an average of 270 million per year for three years) it is unreasonable to expect anything more than papers for publication to come out of Vienna. The international effort will result in more knowledge and wisdom; on the proposed national budget we could become virtuous as well.

In Order to be Virtuous One Must be Wise and Knowing

One final caution. I hope you have not heard me suggest that only scientists and engineers are capable of leading us out of the thicket of difficulties we are in. I am not advocating technocracy, that totalitarian philosophy which says that only engineers can lead us. I do not believe that for one moment, nor does anyone who knows enough engineers and scientists. There is no reason to believe that they, as a class, are any more capable of leading our people than, say, the lawyers.

I would rather that you heard me say that no longer is it virtue merely to do it, but rather that in order to be virtuous one must also be wise and also knowing.

Our Leaders Must Be Part Scientist, Part Humanist, and Part Engineer

We will need new kinds of agencies and organizations to define "the public interest" and to find ways of organizing the talents that may solve some of our problems. But organizations — universities and corporations and public agencies — are built by people, led by other people. So our leaders must be part scientist, part humanist, and part engineer, and they must use what they have, not in response to some particular market-place, but in the true public interest. Not nearly enough people will be born with these characteristics. They will have to be educated.

If this sounds like a very tall order to put to an education system — it is.

But we should be encouraged to redesign our education systems to help produce such people, not only because we have to (God knows we do) if mankind is too survive — but also because we know it is possible. □

NUMBLES

Neil Macdonald
Assistant Editor
Computers and Automation

A "numble" is an arithmetical problem in which: digits have been replaced by capital letters; and there are two messages, one which can be read right away and a second one in the digit cipher. The problem is to solve for the digits.

Each capital letter in the arithmetical problem stands for just one digit 0 to 9. A digit may be represented by more than one letter. The second message, which is expressed in numerical digits, is to be translated (using the same key) into letters so that it may be read; but the spelling uses puns or is otherwise irregular, to discourage cryptanalytic methods of deciphering.

We invite our readers to send us solutions, together with human programs or computer programs which will produce the solutions.

NUMBLE 7311

```
          I F Y O U
        x   G I V E
        -----------
        Y L U Y I T
      Y O T R U O        GV = CU
    E U E U U E
  T Y C U O R
  -----------------
= C T U I O U O V T      327897972
```

Solution to Numble 7310

In Numble 7310 in the October issue, the digits O through 9 are represented by letters as follows:

O = 0
I = 1
E = 2
S = 3
H = 4
W = 5
P = 6
T = 7
R = 8
A = 9

The message is: Eat what is ripe.

Our thanks to the following individuals for submitting their solutions – to **Numble 7310:** Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J. – to **Numble 739:** Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J.; T. P. Finn, Indianapolis, Ind. – to **Numble 738:** Nihan Lloyd-Thurston, S. Nutfield, Surrey, England.

Nixon and the Mafia — Conclusion

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> *"Organized crime will put a man in the White House someday, and he won't even know it until they hand him the bill."*
>
> *— Ralph Salerno*

Part 1 of "Nixon and the Mafia" was published in the September issue of "Computers and Automation"; Part 2, in the October issue. Part 3 begins here with further information about the relation of President-to-be Richard M. Nixon with shady transactions in the Bahamas.

Shakeup in the Bahamas

By the middle Sixties there was a storm brewing. Internal friction had forced out a few people like Lou Chesler, while a wave of public investigations were blaring the role of underworld figures like Meyer Lansky. The 1967 Royal Commission of Inquiry also dredged up another familiar name — Richard Nixon.

Testimony before the Royal Commission by Max Courteney, a Lansky lieutenant, detailed a long bookmaking career and brought out the names of a large clientele, including the then ex-Vice President Richard Nixon.

Mary Carter Paint

The Royal Commission also bared a deal which implicated Richard Nixon far more deeply than passing mention by an underground bookie.

In 1967 Lyndon Pindling became the first black premier ever to serve the almost one hundred percent black citizenry of the island. Pindling was hardly a revolutionary, however, for among the people instrumental in putting him in office was a gambler close to Lansky named Mike McLaney. The Royal Commission branded McLaney a "thoroughly dangerous person" and accused him of maneuvering Pindling into at least one deal involving a questionable gambling concession.

Part of the post-election controversy was a company based in Tampa which bore the innocuous name of "Mary Carter Paint Company".

In 1965 Lansky's front-man (and former Key Biscayne landowner) Wallace Groves, filed a joint application with the Mary Carter Company to open a casino on Paradise Island in the Bahamas. The ubiquitous Sir Stafford Sands handled the legalities. Knowledgeable observers looked for the mystery man, and a Justice Department memo, dated January 18, 1966, predicted that "the atmosphere seems ripe for a Lansky skim".

After Pindling's election, Groves was forced out and the Mary Carter Paint Company had itself two new casinos. At the 1967 opening of one of them — the Nassau Bay Club — the honored guest was Richard Nixon.

The following year — 1968 — the other Mary Carter Club, the Paradise Island Casino, opened for business. The owners felt close enough to Nixon to offer him use of their facilities during the 1968 Republican Convention. Nixon felt more comfortable at Key Biscayne, but some of his staff took up the offer.

Mary Carter Becomes Resorts International

In 1969 Mary Carter — now called Resorts International — reluctantly "released" one Dino Cellini, claiming that while he "had a relatively unsavory background, he had no criminal record, no criminal associates". Cellini hopped across the water to Miami, where, according to Dade County Sheriff Intelligence Reports, he continued to work in conjunction with Paradise Island Casino. The reports allege that Cellini was an almost daily visitor to Resorts International's Miami office, where he checked credits and worked with a company booking junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

There are those who maintain that Cellini's connections with Resorts International symbolize the influence of Lansky. In a 1971 editorial, the Las Vegas Sun concluded an eleven part series on organized crime — some of which centered on Resorts International — by charging that "however cloaked and cleverly concealed by the guardians, gambling in the Bahamas is controlled by Meyer Lansky and it has been established in police intelligence reports that the fee is fifteen percent of the gross income". The now defunct Toronto Telegram reported in 1970 that "observers believe that the resourceful Lansky is still managing to get his cut from the Bahamas".

Resorts International, through its ninety-one percent owned subsidiary, Intertel, has denied all allegations of involvement with organized crime. It

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was Intertel that ITT hired in 1972 to snoop on columnist Jack Anderson.

The latest and possibly most damaging charge in the Resorts International battle came in June 1972 in an IRS inspired indictment of Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini. The indictment reads in part:

> On or about May 17, 1968, unindicted co-conspirator Vincent Teresa met with defendants Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini in Miami and had a discussion wherein defendants Lansky and Cellini gave Teresa permission to conduct gambling junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

Thus government agents allege that in 1968 Lansky maintained at least some control in running junkets to Resorts International's Paradise Island Casino. The junket racket is an integral part of the casino operation, and as recently as 1971 Lansky's cohort Eddie Cellini was reportedly still arranging junkets for the Paradise Island Casino.

Enter Nixon and Rebozo

It was in 1967 — with Lansky still okaying junkets and Cellini still running the Paradise Island Casino — that Richard Nixon and Bebe Rebozo became friends with the head of Resorts International.

It should be no surprise that James Golden, the recently (1969) hired "deputy director of security" for Resorts International is a good friend of Nixon's. As a Secret Service guard for Nixon when he was Vice President, Golden made a good enough impression to be appointed staff security chief for Nixon in 1968. Golden was also security director of Nixon's convention headquarters in Miami that year, and was security director for his subsequent inauguration. Later that year he moved to Resorts International. Golden is just one of a long string of interesting Nixon security appointees, among them Watergate indictees James McCord, Gordon Liddy, and Howard Hunt.

There are rumors, some of which have been aired in the press, that Richard Nixon owns stock in Resorts International. Former Republican Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey does own stock in the company, and, according to organized crime investigator Hank Messick among others, there are reports of Lansky buying stock as well. Nobody has proved anything one way or another about the stock connections, but that Nixon is connected to Resorts International, at least through Golden, is indisputable.

Perhaps more disquieting than rumors of Nixon stock ownership in an underworld holding company for Bahamian casinos are the reports of his meddling in Bahamian affairs. In 1969 a proposed tax increase on gambling profits to provide money for Bahamian schools was slashed in half by the Minister of Finance. The Minister refused to explain the cut, and told opposition members to "use your imagination" for an explanation.

The advice was taken literally by some Bahamian papers who speculated that pressure came from "outside sources connected with casinos". One Bahamian paper asked openly if "a telephone call from the White House was not responsible?"

Whereas our investigation into Cuban politics brought evidence to light possible violations of the Neutrality Act, we now have the possibility of an American President who has spent a significant amount of his vacation time in the Bahamas also meddling in the affairs of that country.

Richard Nixon, a man with both visible and invisible links to the underworld and politics of pre-Castro Cuba, turns up in the Bahamas with very similar links, bringing some big names along with him.

Enter William Rogers

Two men with histories both in Bahamian politics and in the finances of organized crime have made frequent use of the legal services of a firm whose most prominent partner is Richard Nixon's old friend William P. Rogers, one-time Secretary of State.

The two men are Mike McLaney, charged by the Royal Commission in 1967, and a business cohort of his named William Colusardo. McLaney and Colusardo were investigated in 1967 by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with a blueberry plantation that McLaney sold to a company controlled by Colusardo. The subsequent corporate jugglings implicated (among others) newly elected Bahamian Premier Lyndon Pindling. Among Colusardo's "favors" for Pindling were the use of his airplane during the election campaign, and a $127,000 contribution in the form of an "interest payment". The law firm that defended McLaney and Colusardo against the SEC was that of William P. Rogers. Rogers had been a close friend and political associate of Nixon's for twenty-five years. He accompanied Nixon on many of his Bahamian jaunts and also made frequent stops with him at the Key Biscayne Inn and Villas. In addition to being an "R & R" sidekick, Rogers was the man Nixon turned to for counsel amidst his personal crises in the Checkers affair and Eisenhower's serious heart attack.

Rogers served the Eisenhower/Nixon team for eight years in the Department of Justice, first as Deputy Attorney General, and then, by 1957, as Attorney General. The Justice Department's record against organized crime in the years following the Kefauver Commission was lackluster, to say the least. It was Rogers who personally rejected the recommendations of the specially constituted Wessell Committee on organized crime set up in the wake of the infamous Appalachian raid in upstate New York that revealed a Mafia summit conference. The Committee's proposals for a concentrated and coordinated war on organized crime were only implemented some years later by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

A footnote in the Justice Department files was a report by IRS Special Agent Josph Delfine, dated October 19, 1953. The IRS recommended to the Justice Department that "criminal proceedings be instituted against Meyer Lansky in the Southern Judicial District of New York for the willful attempt to defeat and evade a large portion of his income taxes for the years 1945 and 1947 under section 145b of the Internal Revenue Code". The Justice Department — with William Rogers second in command at the time — respectfully declined to prosecute.

Lums Hot Dogs

Upon leaving his post as Attorney General in 1960, Rogers became a member of the New York firm of Royal, Koegel and Wells. In 1969, with its leading partner about to become Secretary of State, Royal, etc. moved with its clients wholeheartedly into the world of gambling casinos and organized crime.

A year later Royal took on the account of the Miami-based hot dog chain, Lums Inc. What did a hot dog chain have to offer a prestigious New York law firm? The answer may lie in where the firm took its client.

In 1969 Lums purchased the Ceasar's Palace Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas for $60,000,000. A month later the Nevada state gambling authorities were looking into the hotels' "catering to twelve underworld figures from Kansas City".

A few months after the purchase the SEC filed suit charging Lums and Ceasar's Palace with "false and misleading" statements. The SEC wondered how Ceasar's managed to lose $1,000,000 in five months when the previous year (before Lums bought in) there was a $2,200,000 profit for a comparable time period.

The SEC also questioned Lums concerning the $3,500,000 Lums paid one Jerome Zarowitz, a convicted professional sports fixer who wasn't even listed as an owner of the casino. Top officials in both Ceasar's and Lums have been under investigation by IRS intelligence in Miami and by Nevada gaming authorities in cases involving organized crime ever since Rogers' firm took on the Lums account.

There is also the question of the 1971 Lums acquisition of a North Miami housing resort development called Sky Lakes. Both Sky Lakes and Ceasar's Palace have received large sums of money from the Teamsters — $12,000,000 for the Miami project and more than $16,000,000 for Ceasar's Palace.

With things going slowly, Lums announced plans for a new $22,000,000 casino next door to Ceasar's Palace. In December of 1971 the company decided that the whole restaurant idea was no longer worth the trouble. In a classic climax to a classic American success they changed their name to Ceasar's World Inc. and sold their hot dog stands.

Meanwhile the Secretary of State's old law firm reaped a bundle with their new-found involvement in the Las Vegas underworld. With such stunning successes at home, one wonders what a firm with a link to the Secretary of State could do abroad, in places like the Bahamas or Vietnam, for example.

Nor do the underworld implications of big names surrounding Nixon end with the Secretary of State. Murray Chotiner, a long-time Nixon aide and architect of his early smear campaigns, has past links to the underworld. In 1962 Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson wrote that "Chotiner ... besides representing the top gangster of Philadelphia, Marco Reginelli, represented a long and amazing list of hoods, concession peddlers, income tax violators and others needing influence in high places ..." It was Chotiner who brought Frank Vitale, "once involved in the biggest bootlegging conspiracy on the West Coast," onto Nixon's special plane to Moscow in 1959.

Nixon's recent appointment of Walter Annenberg as Ambassador to England also echoes the themes of underworld involvement. Annenberg and his father were indicted in 1939 for "aiding and abetting" in connection with their wire service operation in Chicago, an operation run with the protection of Al Capone, for which the Annenbergs paid $1,000,000. The Annenberg family was also a major contributor to Nixon's 1968 election campaign.

Further back in the Nixon saga, and closer to his southern California birthplace, lies San Diego financier, C. Arnholdt Smith and his bookmaker partner John Alessio. In 1946 Alessio and Smith introduced Nixon to another bookmaker named Lew Lipinsky. Lipinsky, who was convicted for bookmaking in 1938, served for three decades as a go-between for the Smith/Alessio interests to their syndicate connections.

Some of the dealings of the Smith/Alessio combine were brought to national prominence by a recent LIFE magazine article which accused Attorney General Richard Kleindienst of "tampering with justice" in a case involving Alessio. According to the Wall Street Journal, Smith raised $1,000,000 for Nixon's 1968 campaign. He and his wife took the first position on the receiving line behind the President at the White House inauguration.

More of the Same in California

Nixon's other favorite resting place besides Key Biscayne is the area near his birthplace in southern California. Here the underworld pattern of his Florida involvements repeats itself — in a strikingly similar pattern.

One story there involves Nixon's multi-millionaire backer, C. Arnholdt Smith, and the Del Charro Hotel in La Jolla, just north of San Diego.

The Del Charro was a favorite stopover for Nixon in the Fifties. Owned by the Murchison brothers, who also owned the nearby Del Mar race track, the hotel played host to numerous Detroit and Las Vegas gangsters. Alan Witwer, a former manager of the hotel, has alleged in statements to this reporter and others that the hotel served as a secret meeting place for politicians and assorted business interests, some of them from the underworld. Witwer specifically cited a 1954 meeting attended by Nixon and chaired by a leading member of ITT. He also claimed that there was a bookmaking operation at the hotel, but has offered no documented proof.

Mrs. C. Arnholdt Smith is a permanent resident of the Del Charro, and the hotel's visitors have included John Connally, Barry Goldwater, and J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover's $15,000-a-year bills were picked up by the stockholders of the Murchison interests.

The fact that certain of Hoover's good friends rubbed elbows, rather warmly, with Meyer Lansky, and the fact that the nation's leading crime fighting agency — the FBI — has come up almost blank in its fight against organized crime may not prove anything about Hoover. On the other hand, these facts don't make it any easier to dismiss questions which might arise about the influence of organized crime at the highest levels of government.

North of the Del Charro and thirty miles south of the San Clemente White House, lies the mammoth La Costa land resort development. The development is tied to both Smith (his daughter is a director) and to the Teamsters.

LaCosta was originally developed by Cleveland syndicate reliables Allard Roen and Moe Dalitz. The development was reorganized in 1968 to bring Teamster control more in line with their investments, which already exceeded $18,000,000. Like Sky Lakes, its Florida counterpart, La Costa attracts a whole range of figures from organized crime. La Costa visitors have included Willie "Ice Pick" Alderman, a St. Louis mob cohort Morris Shenker, and Wallace Groves and Lou Chesler of Bahamas fame.

According to eyewitnesses, when Groves' helicopter sets down, the red carpet is rolled out. It may be because Groves bought a home in La Costa, but more likely it's because, as government agents put it, "where Groves appears, Meyer Lansky will not be far behind".

Another mob frequenter of the La Costa development is Jake Arvey, an organizer of the Republic

National Bank in Miami, the bank through which Bernard Barker channeled funds for the Watergate crime.

The Teamsters Again

A recent visitor to La Costa was Frank Fitzsimmons, a key to Nixon's new-found support in organized labor. Fitzsimmons is president of the Teamsters Union. This summer he stopped in La Costa on his way to see Nixon at San Clemente. Fitzsimmons had just come from dinner in Detroit with a local Mafia figure and soon after his Detroit-La Costa-San Clemente excursion, Fitzsimmons announced his support for Nixon. One wonders whether the Teamster decision to stay on the Pay Board and to support Nixon is somehow related to what the Detroit Free Press has been hinting strongly as of late: that the administration has stopped prosecution of Frank's son Richard Fitzsimmons — the business partner of a Detroit mobster — on charges of missing union funds, in exchange for Teamster support of the Republican President.

Whatever deals Nixon and Fitzsimmons did make, the Teamsters have a long working relationship with organized crime. Their marriage goes back over twenty years, where Jimmy Hoffa was introduced to the Detroit underworld by Paul Dorfman, in exchange for some multi-million dollar insurance business. Dorfman's son, Paul, has residences at both Sky Lakes and La Costa and was recently convicted of taking kickbacks on a Teamster loan.

The Teamster tradition of labor racketeering and corruption made for a ready alliance with the mob. Early government investigations of the Teamsters, such as the Bobby Kennedy-led McClellan Permanent Committee on Investigations, centered on labor racketeering. As Attorney General, Kennedy continued his pursuit of the Teamsters and their boss, Jimmy Hoffa. At one point Kennedy had twenty-nine grand juries simultaneously investigating Hoffa's activity — one of which led to a conviction for mail fraud and jury tampering.

.In 1969, two Oakland Tribune reporters concluded a six-month investigation with the charge that "the $628,000,000 Teamsters Central States, Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund headquartered in Chicago, has become a bankroll for some of America's most sinister underground figure".

Nowhere does the relationship between this fund and the mob surface more dramatically than in Las Vegas, where Teamster trustees have approved loans between $50 and $70,000,000, some shakily secured by second mortgages and subordinated notes. A high-ranking Federal official has commented that "the Teamster fund is a sort of open bank to people well-connected in Las Vegas and well-connected to organized crime".

It was Hoffa's desire "to have [his] own bank in every city" that brought on the Teamster takeover of the Miami National Bank. The Bank in turn is just one of a long list of ventures, suchas Ceasar's Palace, Sky Lakes, La Costa, Worldwide Realty, International Airport Hotel Systems, Truesdale Estates, in which Teamster money amounting to over $60,000,000 figures prominently alongside the social and business partners of Richard M. Nixon — a line of investments that leads from Nixon's three White Houses to a Federal clemency for Jimmy Hoffa and back to organized crime.

The current head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division saw enough evidence in 1967 to say that he "knew for a moral certainty [that] in the upper echelons there is an amalgamation between the Cosa Nostra and the Teamsters Union". In 1971, when a Federal Grand Jury probing the activities of Meyer Lansky questioned Jimmy Hoffa, many wondered whether the links between the two giants were more direct than the numerous transactions between mutual friends.

A few months after his testimony, Hoffa was granted clemency after serving less than five years of his thirteen-year sentence. The freeing of Hoffa and three co-defendents of the 1963 wire fraud pension case is the latest and most crucial event in Nixon's longstanding friendship, a friendship with some clear public benefits for both. Jack Anderson documents, for example, that as early as 1960, then Vice-President Nixon and Attorney General Rogers intervened to halt an indictment against Hoffa in exchange for Hoffa's support in the 1960 election.

ANICO — More of the Same in Texas

In recent years the Teamster fund has been superseded by a giant Texas insurance company as a major source of finance for Las Vegas casinos tied to the mob. The company is the American National Insurance Company (ANICO) of Galveston, Texas. ANICO is close to the heart and pocketbook of the two ranking Texans in the Nixon administration — former Treasury Secretary John Connally and former Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson.

As well as floating more than $40,000,000 to Las Vegas casinos and $13,000,000 to premier mob attorney Morris Shanker, ANICO has made loans to two Florida companies close to Richard Nixon — $1,750,000 in 1966 to the Mary Carter Paint Company, and $3,000,000 in 1970 to a subsidiary of Worldwide Realty.

That year a group of disenchanted stockholders filed a multi-million-dollar suit, charging ANICO officials with having taken control of the company and using it as a private preserve as well as a source of funds for the mob.

The defendants in the suit hired Nixon's New York firm to handle the case. Connally's Houston law firm has also been used by ANICO. The First National Bank of Houston, of which Connally was a director and in which some of his law partners were officers, has provided an interest-free account of more than $1,000,000 for ANICO. Connally was also a director of a savings association which was purchased recently by ANICO.

Will Wilson was "general" of the Justice Department's "war" on crime from 1969-1971. He was head of the Criminal Division until October 1971, when his resignation was forced by disclosures tying him to the scandal-rocked financial empire of Texas wheeler-dealer Frank Sharp. Wilson has been charged by dissident ANICO stockholders of helping to drag ANICO into the twilight zones of finance with such deals as the 1963 absorption of a defaulted $450,000 mortgage held by Sharp. Sharp's attorney and "financial advisor" on the deal was Will Wilson.

While Attorney General of Texas, Wilson sued the foundation which controlled ANICO to bring three new trustees onto the foundation's board of directors. Wilson has no visible ties to the new trustees, whose votes were instrumental in shaping the company's new financial course. But dissident stockholders have charged that the "negotiations" that brought on the shift of control in the foundations were handled by a Galveston law firm linked to the mob. The stockholders also claim that John Connally played a role in these negotiations, albeit a "backstage" role. The ANICO case is part of a long history of Wilson's involvement with the Galveston underworld.

When he came to the Justice Department in Washington, Wilson discovered the organized crime division looking into the affairs of ANICO. Since then there have been no indictments in the case and there are reports that Wilson had the ANICO files locked safely in his personal office. One source of those reports is Stewart Hopps, a former Justice Department investigator.

Some serious conflict-of-interest charges concerning ANICO remain:

- The officers of ANICO who were later represented by Nixon's law firm, made a loan to a company whose top officers are long-time friends of Nixon.
- The criminal division of the Justice Department has been headed by a man with direct links in a company the division is supposedly investigating.
- The company also has clear ties to Nixon's former Treasury Secretary, a man mentioned for the Vice-Presidency, the national chairman of Democrats for Nixon, and a key figure in the President's re-election scheme.

Whose Justice Department?

The ANICO case takes us to a fitting endpoint to the story of Richard Nixon's involvement with the underworld — the Department of Justice. It is an old saw that criminal and criminal-chaser eventually become involved in the same business, but in Richard Nixon that old saw has become more of a reality than perhaps ever before in American history. For Richard Nixon is a man whose name has been synonymous with "law and order" in America for three decades.

Yet the four-year "war" on organized crime by the Nixon administration bears more resemblance to the "peace" in Vietnam than a sincere effort to get at the mob.

In a recent interview in U.S. News and World Report (September 11, 1972), Attorney General Richard Kleindienst hailed "about 1600" indictments of underworld figures brought by the Nixon administration in the past three and half years. The Justice Department claims that many of these indictments involve top mobsters.

Those outside the Nixon administration, however, have charged that the government's prosecution has been both partisan and selective, aimed exclusively at mobsters linked to big-city Democrats such as in Newark, and at the "little fish" who are always in abundance and who make little difference in conducting mob business. Time has reported that quotas have been established (i.e. one hundred hoodlums a month for New York City) and that arrests are "being delayed so that future quotas can be filled". The New York Times has editorialized about the ease with which petty gamblers can and have been rounded up, and wondered aloud if the Justice Department isn't conducting more a publicity war than one on organized crime. A Times report this year found the government was building up a backlog of gambling indictments, saving them for a crucial time during the election campaign.

Indeed, while the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell team has used the spectre of "CRIME" to keep the fear level high and to guarantee large budgets and expanded powers for their Justice Department, the actual "attempts" of the Nixon administration to cope with organized crime have resembled a somewhat sinister update of the Keystone Cops.

For example, up to 1,000 of Kleindienst's vaunted 1600 indictees in gambling and organized crime may have their cases thrown out for somewhat dubious "improper procedures" technicalities. A Miami attorney named James Hogan has "discovered" irregularities on signatures required for electronic surveillance authorizations. Court-approved wiretaps require written authorization by the Attorney General of a designated representative, in this case Will Wilson. Instead of being signed by John Mitchell or by Wilson, the authorizations in question were signed by aides, thus rendering thousands of wiretap authorizations — and the indictments based on them — useless.

Hogan himself is a long-time syndicate attorney and a partner of Ben Cohen, a former political boss of Miami Beach who figures prominently in the Forties' takeover of Miami by organized crime. The case in which Hogan made his discovery involved the busting of the largest heroin/cocaine ring in Miami, many of whose members were Cuban refugees. Inspection of various court papers, including wiretap authorizations, confirmed "irregularities" in the signature — Will Wilson's signature. While resembling his actual handwriting, the signatures appeared as "Wil" instead of "Will".

While it may seem strange for an aide to misspell his boss' name, it seems even stranger that Hogan took the case. His normal fees start in five figures but he has been working on behalf of his court-declared indigent client for more than two years with minimal compensation. While Hogan is known as a "very thorough" attorney, it would be interesting to find out more about the circumstances in which he discovered the "irregularities".

Even more interesting, perhaps, are the circumstances under which Richard Kleindienst was offered a bribe of $100,000 to quash several mob indictments In sworn testimony in November 1971, Kleindienst admitted to being offered the $100,000 bribe (which would be paid in the form of a contribution to Nixon's 1972 campaign) in exchange for stopping prosecution against several underworld figures caught in a stock fraud case. The bribe was offered by an aide of Senator Hiram Fong, a Republican from Hawaii. The aide had worked previously with Kelindienst through Fong's position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Kleindienst said he refused the offer but he also said he did not realize it was a bribe for an entire week!

In cross examination, the prosecutor asked Kleindienst, "If you had regarded the conversation as something regarding a bribe offer you would have immediately report it, would you not?"

"Yes sir," replied Kleindienst, "I would have."

Kleindienst admitted he reported the bribe a full week later, upon learning from J. Edgar Hoover that Federal agents were investigating the case.

One would expect the Attorney General of the United States to be more alert. But what is more troubling are reports aired in the Washington Post shortly after the indictments in the stock fraud case in question (and ten months before Kleindienst's testimony on the bribe). Those reports quoted "sources at the U.S. Attorney's office in New York" and indicated that after the meeting between Kleindienst and Fong's aide, "Kleindienst immediately contacted Justice's Criminal Division [then headed by Will Wilson] and ... an FBI agent was assigned to infiltrate the group of alleged conspirators".

Do we now believe Kleindienst's story that he "didn't realize" he had been offered a bribe, or do we believe the U.S. Attorney's office in New York? Did Will Wilson and the Justice Department hold off a week while Kleindienst "made up his mind" that he had been offered a bribe, or was the decision whether or not to take it? And did Hoover and the FBI somehow interfere?

Perhaps the answer comes in the final outcome of the actual prosecution involved. The defendants in the stock-fraud case included Meyer Lansky's son-in-law, a former director of the Bank of Miami Beach and Johnny Dio, a notorious racketeer long associated with Jimmy Hoffa. They were acquitted, while the messengers who offered the bribe were convicted. One wonders if that $100,000 did not find its way into the Republican secret treasury after all.

The Tip of the Iceberg

> "The organized criminal relies on physical terror and psychological intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery, on citizen's indifference and government acquiescence. He corrupts our governing institutions and subverts our democratic processes."
>
> — Richard Nixon, April 24, 1969

Someone should tell President Nixon that resisting the power of organized crime demands, above all, a President with a clean slate.

Nixon's life is like a complex jigsaw puzzle, the pieces of which have been shuffled so as to defy complete reconstruction. Some of the crucial pieces have been removed, so a full picture cannot be achieved. It is no accident that no other politician has been so much written about, yet so little understood.

Indeed, much has been made of the "enigma" of Richard Nixon, his tight-lipped bearing in relation to his personal life, his unwillingness to divulge what's really on his mind.

But maybe the answer to the enigma lies in his old poker-playing instincts, in the unfailing ability to keep quiet when he's sitting on cards best hidden from the table.

For there is one indisputable fact about Richard Nixon's career — his ascendancy to the pinnacle of American power has required twenty-five years of care and feeding by some very wealthy and very reactionary men, and an extraordinary number of them have maintained connections with the world of organized crime.

During Nixon's years in office the underworld empire in the United States has prospered almost unrestricted by the Federal government. From its base in the gigantic resources of heroin traffic, gambling, prostitution, "protection," and a host of other enterprises of violence against society, organized crime has moved like a bulldozer into the world of legal, "respectable" business.

Every link between Richard Nixon and organized crime, however marginal, is of significance, if for no other reason because he is President. And there are people all over America, from government intelligence agents to hotel waiters, who have Nixon stories to tell. He covers his tracks well, but not well enough.

The full extent of Nixon's involvement with organized crime is just beginning to surface. The evidence in this article is merely the top of a dirty iceberg that will slowly become visible over the coming years.

The milieu in which he has traveled for three decades, and in which so many of his friends, associates, and appointees have been related to the mob, throw a long and permanent shadow over everything Richard Nixon the "public servant" has ever said, and over everything his political life has ever meant.

For in light of his career, both past and present, Richard M. Nixon seems to be the factual embodiment of Ralph Salerno's prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House. □

The information in this article was gathered during a six-month investigation carried out in many cities, primarily Miami, New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, San Diego, Las Vegas, Dallas, Austin, Galveston, Tallahassee, and San Francisco. Sources included interviews with over a hundred people; court documents (including deeds, mortgages, etc.); research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; organized crime intelligence files (both private and government); and newspaper clippings.

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
- The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

ACROSS THE EDITOR'S DESK

Computing and Data Processing Newsletter

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APPLICATIONS

NATIONAL AMERICAN BANK INSTALLS COMPUTER-BASED SECURITY SYSTEM

Tom Burbank
National American Bank
200 Carondelet
New Orleans, La. 70130

A computer-based system designed to prevent unauthorized access to high security areas has gone into operation at National American Bank here — one of the first U.S. banks to install such a system. The IBM Controlled Access System (CAS) at National American is based on the use of magnetically encoded, wallet-sized identification cards similar to bank credit cards.

Each person authorized to enter a security area is assigned a card coded with his own security number. Employees seeking entry to an area covered by the system simply insert their cards into compact reading devices on entrance doors, and the information is transmitted to an IBM System/7 computer for identification.

Stored in the computer's memory is a list of employee numbers and building areas these numbers are designated for. If the number of the card entitles the bearer access to that area, the computer signals the door to unlock. If the person is unauthorized to enter, the door remains closed and a security guard is notified. The elapsed time is approximately one second.

If a card is lost or stolen, a new card (with a new number) is issued and the system is alerted to deny entry to the original card. If the old card is used, the guard is alerted.

As an additional safeguard, the system can automatically log all entrance activity by individual security code, door number, date and time of day. This helps track who is where and for how long. National American can now analyze the number of times an individual enters and at what time of day or night this activity occurs. The system also has built-in failsafe mechanisms which insure security in the event of a power failure.

"Unfortunately, we are doing business in a time when public and private institutions are increasingly vulnerable to lawless elements," said National American President Louie J. Roussel III. "By adding the IBM Controlled Access System to our current security procedures, we are taking a major step to insure that our customers and employees are protected. And, by controlling access to the collateral instrument storage areas, we can make it very difficult for unauthorized people to gain access to valuable assets stored in the bank."

NOVA COMPUTER CHECKS STRENGTH OF ROOF IN COAL MINE

Edgar E. Geithner
Data General Corp.
Southboro, Mass. 01772

Data General's minicomputers track hurricanes from airplanes for the U.S. Air Force; the Army has mounted them in helicopters; Scripps Oceanographic Institute has one on a ship; a scientist bounces over Canadian glaciers with one mounted in his tracked vehicle; and an oil company uses one of the computers to control an oilfield in the Libyan desert. Now engineers at the University of Texas (Austin) have a minicomputer in the bottom of a mine.

Dr. A. L. Podio, an assistant professor in the university's Department of Petroleum Engineering, and a team of researchers from the Center for Earth Sciences and Engineering, use a Nova 820 computer to detect possible weak spots in the roofs of mines. The computer system, developed for the U.S. Bureau of Mines, has been on the job on the floor of Kaiser Corporation's York Canyon coal mine in New Mexico. "One of the most frequent causes of mine accidents is roof collapse," Dr. Podio said. "This system was designed to use the principles of seismic explorations to identify failure planes and fracture zones in the rocks overlaying the mine roof. If tests show the area around a roof is weakening, it can be supported by beams or roof bolts."

In seismic exploration, a high energy explosion is set off, and sensitive instruments determine the structure and makeup of surrounding land by recording how fast the shock waves travel through the ground. The waveforms can be interpreted to pinpoint probable deposits of oil, and to describe rock formations. "Using a large energy souce like an explosion in a mine is out of the question," Dr. Podio said, "so a manually controlled impact device was designed to generate the shock waves." The impact device, which works like a BB gun, uses air pressure to shoot a round projectile at a striker plate mounted at the end of the barrel.

When the striker plate is pressed against the wall or roof of the mine and the device is triggered, shock waves are sent through the surrounding rock. The shock waves are picked up by wideband transducers, digitized by a fast transient recorder, and processed through the Nova 820 for waveform enhancement. The waveform is then displayed on an oscilloscope, with the results of velocity and depth calculations. Permanent records of the waveform can be made on paper tape, or by transmitting the data to a large scale remote computer.

"A mine could make daily checks with the system to detect changes in rock strata as the working face of the mine advances," Dr. Podio said, "or the system could be transported throughout the mine to make daily checks on the condition of roofs at predetermined key locations." Dr. Podio noted that similar systems could be used to predict the quality of rock in rapid excavation projects or could be used in nondestructive tests of large concrete structures.

PHONE BOOKS BY COMPUTER

Peter A. Cassels
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Mountain Ave.
Murray Hill, N.J. 07974

The Bell System is using computer technology to modernize production of the White Pages telephone books. A system designed to improve customer service, control costs and streamline massive recordkeeping operations is now being implemented. The system — called DIR/ECT (for DIRectory projECT) — was developed by Bell Laboratories, the research and development unit of the Bell System. Michigan Bell Telephone Company recently issued its first directory containing listings produced by the system. Michigan Bell also is using the system to produce some of its directory assistance records.

DIR/ECT is a more sophisticated outgrowth of its prototype, PHOTAC, a similar process developed by the New York Telephone Company under sponsorship of the nationwide Bell System. The first directory produced by the PHOTAC system was distributed in 1966. Since then, New York Telephone has converted some 4.5 million listings to the process. Currently the 12 major downstate White Pages directories are produced by PHOTAC.

The DIR/ECT system stores in a computer memory directory information such as the customer's name, address, telephone number — even telephone book delivery instructions. The information in the computer memory then is fed into a device called a photocomposer, which provides ready-to-print listings for White Pages. Besides the annual White Pages directories, DIR/ECT produces daily updates of new listings and monthly reprints for the telephone companies' directory assistance operators.

Although customers may see no obvious differences in the computer-produced directory, listings are easier to read and pages cleaner looking. The directories also have uniform abbreviations. The system has built-in cross-checks for consistent spelling of street names and for obvious errors in street and telephone numbers. There also is provision for massive directory listing changes, caused by renaming of streets and buildings.

Today, listings for phone directories are generally set line-by-line in metal type. Changes in listings must be reset and inserted by hand. With the new system, changes can be made quickly (because information is stored on magnetic computer tape and not metal type), the need to store tons of lead type will end, and the growing cost of publishing directories will be lessened.

EDUCATION NEWS

M.I.T. MUSIC PROJECT USES DEC COMPUTER

News Office
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has begun work on a project aimed at making the Institute a major center for the study and composition of electronic music. Barry Vercoe, assistant professor of music, working with a computer given to the Department of Humanities' music section by Digital Equipment Corp. of Maynard, is in the early stages of developing a major electronic music production facility at the Institute.

Professor Vercoe said the computer facility "will be a tool both in the hands of the teacher and the composer that will greatly aid the development of creativity. The facility also will provide an excellent tool in the teaching of musical composition for conventional instruments.

"This is definitely not a scientific project. I'm not interested in merely getting a computer to sound exactly like a trumpet. The technological application, however, will interest some students who might not approach music otherwise and some of these will be drawn into its aesthetic considerations, through the back door as it were," Professor Vercoe said.

Why compose music for a machine at all?

"I suppose someone asked that very question when man first composed music for what are now traditional instruments, instead of for the human voice alone," Professor Vercoe said. "Electronic music merely expands the forces available to the practicing composer."

The PDP-11/45 computer — coupled with music input — also will lend itself to other forms of music research, such as syntactic analysis of music structures.

Professor Vercoe is the author of the widely used Music 360 language for digital sound synthesis. He has taught at M.I.T. for two years and is director of the Experimental Music Studio. His work, "Metamorphoses for Orchestra," was given its Boston premier early this year by the M.I.T. Symphony and was performed by the orchestra on its subsequent nationwide tour. Working with Professor Vercoe on the project are Richard J. Steiger, a graduate student, and Stephen Haflich, a recent M.I.T. graduate.

COMPOSING BY COMPUTER AT ISU

Information Service
Iowa State University of Science and Technology
Ames, Iowa 50010

Music composers at Iowa State University may turn from their piano keyboards and hand-written scores to a more efficient instrument for composing music — a computer. ISU faculty members are building a computerized electronic music studio — a system that will technologically simplify composing electronic music. The studio is being designed and built by an interdisciplinary group from Iowa State's music, computer science, and electrical engineering departments, under the direction of Stefan Silverston, assistant professor of computer science, Terry Smay, professor of electrical engineering, and Gary White, associate professor of music.

Electronic music is produced by purely electronic means and the Iowa State Computerized Music System (ISMUS) will be doing just that — generating music with computer equipment. A composer will sit at the computer and write a musical composition using an electronic keyboard.

The new system, which was expected to be operable this fall, should be an easier method of modifying and editing a musical piece. The normal hand operations of changing notations on a printed score or splicing tapes of recorded music are "more time-consuming and inaccurate" processes for correcting a composition, according to Gary White.

The computer composing process begins when the composer inserts introductory instructions into a teletype machine. On an electronic keyboard he then begins to compose his piece. The computer records all musical instructions which are transformed through a digital-to-analog sound converter and loudspeaker into sound. This immediate feedback system enables the composer to hear what he is composing simultaneously. The computer also allows the composer to automatically play back and edit what he has written simply by striking another key.

The musician has now completed one "layer" of music. If he wants to add further musical instructions to the composition, he repeats the entire process again. All layers merge together to obtain the product — a completed electronic composition.

The music instructions which the composer inserts into the system are a special electronic music notation — a "computer language." The English words it uses can be compared to musical notation found on a conventional score — treble and bass clefs, notes, rests, and the like.

Electronic music has been used in commercial recordings, and as background music for television, radio and film. The Iowa State system will be sophisticated enough for use in serious compositional study, the production of background music for various media, and for the demonstration of sound properties.

The ISMUS presently being built is a protytype of a full-scale model. If the "test-system" proves satisfactory, "we will look for funding to build a full-scale model," says White. The project is presently supported by a $1,170 grant from Western Electric and a National Science Foundation institutional grant of $8,698. The prototype employs a mini-computer that is owned by Iowa State.

The studio will be used as a teaching tool for the ISU music program. Computer software, the programs (sequences of operations to be performed by the computer) written for the system, will be developed so a composer can use the studio equipment without having prior knowledge of computer programming. Students will be able to learn basic acoustical concepts and principles of electronic music synthesis and to develop sensitivity to timbre with the ISMUS. Also contributing to introductory computer science courses, the system will be a novel example of computer application in a non-scientific field.

STUDENT PROGRAMS COMPUTER FOR REMEDIAL INSTRUCTION

Edward J. Canty
Digital Equipment Corp.
Maynard, Mass. 01754

Using programs developed by a local high school student, School District 91 in Idaho Falls, has put its newly-acquired computer to work as a "super tutor" in remedial studies for disadvantaged children in this southeastern Idaho community. Designed to improve the arithmetic and language arts skills of children in grades 2 through 6, the project was introduced by director of curriculum Dr. Wallace Manning with federal Title 1 aid during the district's 1973 summer session for children largely from rural farm families. According to John A. Christensen, computer sciences coordinator, the project proved so successful in its initial application that it has been continued in the fall semester.

The student programmer is Robert Huntsman, 18, a June graduate of Idaho Falls' Skyline High School. Using the district's PDP-11/20 timesharing computer system installed last December by Digital Equipment Corporation, Huntsman developed programs for arithmetic and language drill to serve between 40 and 50 pupils on each of two teletypewriter terminals situated in local elementary schools.

In a typical arithmetic routine, the computer types a problem and waits for the pupil's response — ten seconds if the problem is a memory exercise, longer if it involves several columns for addition or several digits for multiplication. If the student's answer is correct, Huntsman's program directs the terminal to ring a bell in congratulation; if incorrect, the computer supplies a hint on where the mistake occurred and encourages him to try again.

Answers to English and social studies workbook questions have been entered in the computer memory, allowing students to do their homework at a terminal and receive immediate response. The computer keeps score of right and wrong answers to produce reports for teacher guidance. Spelling-recognition exercises are also in use and Huntsman has undertaken development of an arithmetic program involving fractions

"One of the computer's major advantages is its ability to pay attention to individual children," Christensen said. "Every child enrolled in the regular summer session was able to get experience at a terminal and benefit from these interactive programs." He said high school laboratory assistants will continue to write instructional programs for elementary and junior high levels, expanding the library begun by Huntsman. For future summer sessions, he added, the district hopes to make such computer assistance available at a nearby rural elementary school attended by children of migrant farm workers.

RESEARCH FRONTIER

"TALKING" BALLPOINT PEN UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Ronald I. Deutsch
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, Calif. 94025

A prototype model of a simple, inexpensive "talking" ballpoint pen, under development at Stanford Research Institute (SRI), could reduce massive paperwork and delay in routine business transactions. The pen is similar to an ordinary pen in size and shape except that it is wired to a computer system. The computer is programmed to receive signals generated instantaneously as a person hand-prints characters with the pen to record information.

"Such instantaneous and remote processing of data might be invaluable to large businesses engaged in daily consumer-oriented services, such as banks, insurance companies and utilities," says staff scientist Dr. Hewitt D. Crane, the inventor. For example, the pen could be used by a bank teller crediting a savings or checking account. In this case, according to Dr. Crane, the data would not have to be retranscribed from a piece of paper by another employee, or the paper itself put through expensive automatic reading equipment. Thus, costs and delays could be reduced in crediting accounts or establishing cash requirements.

In another case, a meter reader making his rounds for a utility could use the pen in combination with a cassette recorder. When he returned to his office, the cassette tape would be programmed into the system, thus eliminating the need for manual retranscription of a day's worth of data.

In the present laboratory version, the pen is hooked to an audio unit as well as a teleprinter, so that as a person writes, the characters appear on the teleprinter and are spoken by the audio unit.

SRI holds a patent on the pen and is currently seeking financial support for further development, Dr. Crane says. He estimates that the pen itself might cost about $25 to $50. A central computer unit would be extra but could serve many pens.

MISCELLANEOUS

ICCP NAMES DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Paul M. Pair, Secretary & Chairman
Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals
P.O. Box 1442
Chicago, Ill. 60690

At a meeting in late September, the incorporators of the Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals, Chicago, Ill., adopted bylaws for the newly-formed organization and named a board of directors which, in turn, held its first meeting and elected officers. The ICCP is the outgrowth of over two years of intensive preparation and study by representatives of major computing societies. Its primary focus is the enhancement of certification activities in the computing industry. It was incorporated August 13, 1973.

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THINGS THAT MATTER [illegible]
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IN FREQUENCY CONTROL PRODUCTS: Quartz Crystals, TCXO's, VCXO's, TCVCXO's, Hybrid Oscillators and Frequency Standards. DIGITAL INSTRUMENTS: [illegible] Timers, Comparators, Counters, Panel Meters, Thermometers, [illegible] and Systems Components.
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Shawnee Mission, Kansas [illegible]
TWX (910) 749-64[illegible]

Elected as officers by the board of directors were:

President — John K. Swearingen, Computer Sciences Corp., Las Vegas, Nev., representing Data Processing Management Association (DPMA).

Vice President — Fred H. Harris, University of Chicago, Association for Computing Machinery.

Treasurer — William S. Eick, Alexander Grant & Co., Chicago, Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts.

Secretary — Paul M. Pair, Control Data Institute, Chicago, Association for Educational Data Systems.

Ten professional societies participated in the organization of ICCP and are eligible for charter membership. Of these, seven have exercised their right to such membership, and are entitled to two members on the ICCP board. The seven charter members are: Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts; Society of Certified Data Processors; Association for Computing Machinery; Association for Educational Data Systems; Society of Professional Data Processors; Data Processing Management Association; and Automation 1 Association.

The other three associations eligible for charter membership are: Canadian Information Processing Society, the Computer Society of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Society of Data Educators. They are expected to act before the end of 1973.

(please turn to page 47)

NEW CONTRACTS

TO	FROM	FOR	AMOUNT
Sanders Associates, Inc., Nashua, N.H.	CAE Electronics, Montreal, Canada	Display system segment of Canadian Joint Enroute Terminal System (JETS) Program; first phase consists of seven Enroute and two Terminal Systems for air traffic control	18.6 million
ITT Creed Limited, Great Britain	British Post Office	6000 machines — teleprinters and associated equipment — to be used mainly for Telex customer-to-customer teleprinter system	$11 million
Univac Div., Sperry Rand Corp., Blue Bell, Pa.	Auto Tell Services, Inc., Villanova, Pa.	1100 Univac DCT-515 Data Communications Terminals to be used by automobile dealers who subscribe to ATS services on-line computerized services	$7 million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Computer services support to Simulator Computer System Branch at Ames Research Center, Mountain View, Calif.	$6.7 million
Honeywell, Inc., Wellesley Hills, Mass.	State of Arizona, Phoenix, Ariz.	A Honeywell Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing Service) system, for use by 13 state agencies	$5+ million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Engineering and related services to NASA's Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Va.	$5 million (approximate)
Philco-Ford Corp. Willow Grove, Pa.	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.	Improving computerized communications network, identified as '73 AEP for AUTODIN Enhancement Program, at 10 overseas AUTODIN sites, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., and Fort Detrick, Md.	$4.6 million
Raytheon Data Systems, Norwood, Mass.	Eastern Air Lines, Miami, Fla.	Data display terminals and associated equipment as part of expansion of EAL's Automated Passenger Processing and Reservation System	$2+ million
National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio	Publix Super Markets, Inc., Lakeland, Fla.	30 NCR 255 supermarket checkout systems involving a total of 357 NCR 255 terminals and 30 NCR 726 in-store minicomputers plus 120 NCR 250 free-standing electronic cash registers	$2 million (approximate)
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Analysis and programming services to Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.	$1.2 million
Interdata, Inc., Oceanport, N.J.	DATRAN (Data Transmission Co.), Vienna, Va.	Dual processor Model 55 data communications concentrators, with software and technical support, for an information network DATRAN is designed and installing on a turnkey basis for International Brotherhood of Teamsters	$1+ million
McDonnell Douglas Automation Co. (MCAUTO), St. Louis, Mo.	Buffums' Southern California	Computer processing of all company data; includes accounts payable, receivables, sales analyses, payroll, inventory control and statistics	$725,000 (approximate)
Informatics Inc., Western Div., Canoga Park, Calif.	Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Chicago, Ill.	Design and applications programming support for a new payroll/personnel system	$500,000+
Logicon, Inc., Torrance, Calif.	U.S. Air Force	Verifying and validating (V&V) critical missile flight safety (MFS) software used on western test range of Space and Missile Test Center (SAMTEC), Vandenberg AFB, Calif.	$365,000
TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, Calif.	Los Angeles County Road Department (LACRD), Calif.	Designing Integrated Information Management (IIMS); 10 subsystems cover accounting; billing; budgets; management of contracts, and projects, inventory control, production and performance, and road inventory information	$365,000
Systems Engineering Laboratories, Inc., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	Singer Simulation Products, Div. of Singer Co.	Central control and simulation element of a Nuclear Plant Simulator for Carolina Power & Light Co., Raleigh, N.C.	$330,000
Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Renton, Wash.	Manufacturing Technology Div., A.F. Materials Labs., Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio	Developing Air Force Computer Aided Manufacturing (AFCAM) master plan	$251,000
Atlantic Research Corp., Alexandria, Va.	Arkansas State Educational Television Commission	Engineering studies and detailed plans for four new ETC (Educational Television) stations, and an interconnecting microwave network	$37,000
Bunker Ramo Corp., Trumbull, Conn.	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	31 BR 2001 Universal Teller Terminals for equipping teller stations in all nine Reliance offices; terminals will be tied by highspeed communications circuits to a Univac 9480 computer	——
Collins Radio Co., Dallas, Texas	U.S. Air Force	Continuing development of systems and equipment for the U.S. Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM); eventual production awards, depending upon Air Force requirements, could total more than $125 million	——
Diablo Systems, Inc., Subsidiary of Xerox Corp. Hayward, Calif.	Wang Laboratories, Tewksbury, Mass.	Series 40 disk drives to be incorporated into Wang's new line of mini computer systems	——
MRI Systems Corp., Austin, Texas	U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. and New	Lease of SYSTEM 2000 for Farm management applications; at least nine SYSTEM 2000 data	——

NEW INSTALLATIONS

OF	AT	FOR
Burroughs B 4700 system	Computer Management Group (CMG) Ltd., North-west London, England	The first of two B4700 systems (which are included in a five-system order) to be installed at CMG's North-west London, England center (entire 5 computer system order valued at $4.3 million)
	Walter E. Heller & Co., Chicago, Ill. (2 systems)	Providing internal processing speed to keep pace with continued growth of data processing operations; system will allow expansion without reprogramming or recompiling; replaces two Burroughs B3500 systems
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 74 system	Century Research Center Corp. (CRC), Tokyo, Japan	Increasing CRC's processing capabilities to include remote batch data processing services via high speed communication line control devices, and offer a wide range of services to various types of users; system will be connected to a previously installed CDC 6600 computer (system valued at $3 million)
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 76 system	Atmospheric Environment Service of Canada, Montreal, Canada	Upgrading weather forecasting facilities throughout the country; system installed at Canadian Meteorological Center in Montreal, Canada (system valued at $6.3 million)
Control Data 3150 system	Ingalls Iron Works Co., Birmingham, Ala.	Expanding automated design activities; system will operate in conjunction with a previously installed CDC 3150 to support CONSTRUCTS, an automated engineering design software package
IBM System/370 Model 155 system	Educational Information Services (EIS), Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.	Linking with university's IBM System/360 Model 91 to significantly expand a variety of data processing services
IBM System/370 Model 168 system	Datacrown Limited, Willowdale, Ontario, Canada	The first of two systems that will more than double current batch processing capacity and increase its capability to provide for transaction-oriented terminals; replaces Model 165 currently in use (systems valued at $12 million)
Interdata Model 70 systems	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J. (2 systems)	Use in experiments involving automated tactical surveillance and target acquisition
NCR Century 101 system	Radyne Limited, Great Britain	An advanced inventory management and control system (system valued at $6.3 million)
NCR Century 200 system	Green Shield Trading Stamp Company of Edgware, Colindale, England	Expansion of automated stock control system for its gift houses and new Argos chain of catalog showrooms
NCR Century 251 system	Columbia EDP Centers, Inc., Columbia, Mo.	General data processing services to a variety of customers including several banks
Univac 1106 system	British Gas Corp., Hinckley, England	Assistance in controlling National Grid pipeline by performing forward simulations on a real-time, round-the-clock-basis; in addition, system will act as a service bureau to scientific and engineering departments within the Corporation
	University of Connecticut Medical Center, Farmington, Conn.	All aspects of Medical Center's work including patient admissions, monitoring patient care, scheduling outpatient appointments, support of library information and research statistical programs, and general accounting and payroll processing chores (system valued at $1.3 million)
Univac 1110 system	Pacific International Computing Corp., Gaithersburg, Md.	The first of two systems whose primary applications include project management, engineering and business data processing; the system will also include time-sharing capability as well as remote job entry from terminals in the field
Univac 9480 system	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	Faster customer service at any bank branch

Across the Editor's Desk — *Continued from page 45*

IFIP CONGRESS '74 TRAVEL GRANTS

P. E. Welch
U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress '74
Box 426
New Canaan, Conn. 06840

The National Science Foundation will support a travel grant program for attendance at IFIP Congress 74 to be held August 5-10, 1974, in Stockholm. The triennial IFIP (International Federation for Information Processing) Congresses have become the major international media for exchange of information among developers and users of information processing techniques and technology.

The Division of Mathematical Sciences of the National Research Council will administer the program and award grants to qualified people from the United States whose accomplishments in and potential contributions to the field of information processing are most noteworthy, regardless of the formal labels for their specialties.

Younger members of the information science community are urged to apply. William F. Atchison of the University of Maryland, Financial Support Chairman of the U.S. Committee for IFIP, said that special efforts will be made to support their attendance.

Applications may be obtained through the Math Division, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 20418. Applications must be received on or before December 31, 1973.

MONTHLY COMPUTER CENSUS

Neil Macdonald
Survey Editor
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION

The following is a summary made by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION of reports and estimates of the number of general purpose digital computers manufactured and installed, or to be manufactured and on order. These figures are mailed to individual computer manufacturers quarterly for their information and review, and for any updating or comments they may care to provide. Please note the variation in dates and reliability of the information. A few manufacturers refuse to give out, confirm, or comment on any figures.

Part 1 of the Monthly Computer Census contains reports for United States manufacturers, A to H, and is published in January, April, July, and October. Part 2 contains reports for United States manufacturers, I to Z, and is published in February, May, August, and November. Part 3 contains reports for manufacturers outside of the United States and is published in March, June, September, and December.

Our census seeks to include all digital computers manufactured anywhere. We invite all manufacturers located anywhere to submit infor- that would help make these figures as accurate and complete as possible.

The following abbreviations apply:

(A) — authoritative figures, derived essentially from information sent by the manufacturer directly to COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
C — figure is combined in a total
(D) — acknowledgment is given to DP Focus, Marlboro, Mass., for their help in estimating many of these figures
E — figure estimated by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
(N) — manufacturer refuses to give any figures on number of installations or of orders, and refuses to comment in any way on those numbers stated here
(R) — figures derived all or in part from information released indirectly by the manufacturer, or from reports by other sources likely to be informed
(S) — sale only, and sale (not rental) price is stated
X — no longer in production
- — information not obtained at press time and/or not released by manufacturer

SUMMARY AS OF OCTOBER 15, 1973

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS			NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
				In U.S.A.	Outside U.S.A.	In World	
Part 2. United States Manufacturers I-Z							
IBM	305	12/57	3.6	40	15	55	-
White Plains, N.Y.	650	10/67	4.8	50	18	68	-
(N) (D) (Oct. 1973)	1130	2/66	1.5	2580	1227	3807	-
	1401	9/60	5.4	2210	1836	4046	-
	1401-G	5/64	2.3	420	450	870	-
	1401-H	6/67	1.3	180	140	320	-
	1410	11/61	17.0	156	116	272	-
	1440	4/63	4.1	1690	1174	2864	-
	1460	10/63	10.0	194	63	257	-
	1620 I, II	9/60	4.1	285	186	471	-
	1800	1/66	5.1	416	148	564	-
	7010	10/63	26.0	67	17	84	-
	7030	5/61	160.0	4	1	5	-
	704	12/55	32.0	12	1	13	-
	7040	6/63	25.0	35	27	62	-
	7044	6/63	36.5	28	13	41	-
	705	11/55	38.0	18	3	21	-
	7020, 2	3/60	27.0	10	3	13	-
	7074	3/60	35.0	44	26	70	-
	7080	8/61	60.0	13	2	15	-
	7090	11/59	63.5	4	2	6	-
	7094-I	9/62	75.0	10	4	14	-
	7094-II	4/64	83.0	6	4	10	-
	System/3 Model 6	3/71	1.0	8	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 10	1/70	1.1	5	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 15	-	-	-	-	-	-
	System/7	11/71	0.35 and up	15	-	-	-
	360/20	12/65	2.7	7161	6075	13236	1780
	360/25	1/68	5.1	1112	759	1871	1287
	360/30	5/65	10.3	5487	2535	8022	-
	360/40	4/65	19.3	2454	1524	3978	1363
	360/44	7/66	11.8	109	57	166	39
	360/50	8/65	29.1	1135	445	1580	662
	360/65	11/65	57.2	604	144	748	562
	360/67	10/65	133.8	65	6	71	99
	360/75	2/66	66.9	50	17	67	12
	360/85	12/69	150.3	11	1	12	55
	360/90	11/67	-	5	-	-	-
	360/91	-	-	1	-	-	-
	360/190	-	-	13	2	15	-
	360/195	4/71	232.0	-	-	9	48
	370/115	-	-	-	-	-	-
	370/125	4/73	8.2-13.8	1	-	-	-
	370/135	5/72	14.4	13	-	-	-
	370/145	9/71	23.3	2	-	-	-
	370/155	2/71	48.0	2	-	-	-
	370/158	-/73	49.5-85.0	1	-	-	-
	370/165	5/71	98.7	3	-	-	-
	370/168	-/73	93.0-170.0	1	3	-	-
	370/195	6/73	190.0-270.0	-	-	-	-
Interdata	Model 1	12/70	3.7	244	75	319	-
Oceanport, N.J.	Model 3	5/67	13.1	-	-	200	X
(A) (Oct. 1973)	Model 4	8/68	8.5	274	115	389	32
	Model 5	11/70	X	70	20	90	X
	Model 7/16	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 7/32	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 15	1/69	20.0	40	24	64	X
	Model 16	5/71	X	1	6	7	X
	Model 18	6/71	X	2	7	9	X
	Model 50/55	5/72	-	75	10	85	115
	Model 70	10/71	-	466	116	582	107
	Model 74	2/73	-	41	8	49	126
	Model 80	10/72	-	15	3	18	20
	Model 85	6/73	-	1	-	-	-

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS In U.S.A.	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS Outside U.S.A.	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS In World	NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
Microdata Corp.	Micro 400/10	12/70	0.1-0.5	139	0	139	-
Irvine, Calif.	Micro 800	12/68	0.2-3.0	2927	810	3737	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	Micro 1600	12/71	0.2-3.0	914	95	1009	-
NCR	304	1/60	X	5	2	7	X
Dayton, Ohio	310	5/61	X	8	0	8	X
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	315	5/62	7.0	255	200	455	-
	315 RMC	9/65	9.0	55	35	90	-
	390	5/61	0.7	160	325	485	-
	500	10/65	1.0	1100	1750	2850	-
	251	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Century 50	2/71	1.6	580	0	580	-
	Century 100	9/68	2.6	1175	783	1958	-
	Century 101	12/72	3.7	50	1	51	-
	Century 200	6/69	7.0	575	335	910	-
	Century 300	2/72	21.0	5	5	10	-
Philco	1000	6/63	X	16	-	-	X
Willow Grove, Pa.	200-210,211	10/58	X	16	-	-	X
(N) (Jan. 1969)	2000-212	1/63	X	12	-	-	X
Raytheon Data Systems Co.	250	12/60	X	115	20	135	X
Norwood, Mass.	440	3/64	X	20	-	-	X
(A) (July 1973)	520	10/65	X	26	1	27	X
	703	10/67	12.5	(S) 179	33	212	0
	704	3/70	7.2	(S) 300	100	400	40
	706	5/69	19.0	(S) 75	17	92	1
Standard Computer Corp.	IC 4000	12/68	9.0	9	0	9	2
Los Angeles, Calif.	IC 6000-6000/E	5/67	16.0	3	0	3	-
(A) (June 1972)	IC 7000	8/70	17.0	4	0	4	1
	IC-9000	5/71	400.0	(S) 1	0	1	-
Systems Engineering Laboratories	SYSTEMS 810A/810B	6-66/9-68	1.8/2.6	382	30	412	-
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	SYSTEMS 71/72	8-72/9-71	0.9/1.0	19	5	24	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	SYSTEMS 85/86	7-72/6-70	6.0/10.0	47	3	50	-
Texas Instruments Inc.	960	6/70	X	-	-	-	X
Houston, Tex.	960A	11/71	0.2-2.7	-	-	-	-
(A) (June 1973)	980	5/68	X	-	-	-	X
	980A	8/72	0.3-2.7	-	-	-	-
UNIVAC Div. of Sperry Rand	9200	6/67	1.5	1360	616	1976	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	9300/9380	9/67	3.4	795	675	1470	-
(A) (Aug. 1973)	9400/9480	5/69	7.0	212	228	440	-
	9700	-	-	3	11	14	-
	418 III	6/63	11.0	40	77	117	-
	494	-	-	62	46	108	-
	1106	-	-	61	143	204	-
	1108	9/65	68.0	163	92	255	-
	1110	-	-	11	17	28	-
	I & II	3/51 & 11/57	X	23	-	-	X
	File Computers	8/56	X	13	-	-	X
	LARC	5/60	135.0	2	0	2	-
	1107, UIII, 490/1/2, 418II, 1004/5, 1050, SS80/90	-	X	2063	1442	3505	X
UNIVAC - Series 70	301	2/61	7.0	143	-	-	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	501	6/59	14.0-18.0	17	-	-	-
(A) (Feb. 1973)	601	11/62	14.0-35.0	0	-	-	-
	3301	7/64	17.0-35.0	74	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/15, 25	9/65	4.3	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/35	1/67	9.2	95	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/45	11/65	22.5	265	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/46	11/68	33.5	30	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/55	11/66	34.0	10	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/60	11/70	32.0	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/61	4/70	42.0	7	-	-	-
	70/2	5/71	16.0	63	-	-	-
	70/3	9/71	25.0	7	-	-	-
	70/6	9/71	25.0	24	-	-	-
	70/7	12/71	35.0	7	-	-	-
	EMR 6020	4/65	5.4	15	1	16	0
	EMR 6040	7/65	6.6	6	0	6	0
	EMR 6050	2/66	9.0	15	2	17	0
	EMR 6070	10/66	15.0	7	8	15	0
	EMR 6130	8/67	5.0	34	13	47	0
	EMR 6135	-	2.6	36	5	41	4
	EMR 6145	-	7.2	-	-	-	8
	EMR 6140	-	-	-	-	-	0
Varian Data Machines	620	11/65	X	-	-	75	X
Newport Beach, Calif.	620i	6/67	X	-	-	1300	X
(A) (Mar. 1973)	R-620i	4/69	-	-	-	80	-
	520/DC, 520i	12/69;10/68	-	-	-	500	150
	620/f	11/70	X	-	-	207	X
	620/L, 620/L-OOC	4/71;9/72	-	-	-	740	101
	620/f-100	6/72	-	-	-	100	43
	620/L-100	5/72	-	-	-	200	235
	Varian 73	11/72	-	-	-	40	39
Xerox Data Systems	XDS-92	4/65	1.5	43	4	47	-
El Segundo, Calif.	XDS-910	8/62	2.0	170	10	180	-
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	XDS-920	9/62	2.9	120	12	132	-
	XDS-930	6/64	3.4	159	14	173	-
	XDS-940	4/66	14.0	33	3	36	-
	XDS-9300	11/64	8.5	25-30	4	29-34	-
	XDS-530	8/73	7.6	-	-	-	-
	Sigma 2	12/66	1.8	163	36	199	-
	Sigma 3	12/69	2.0	21	1	22	-
	Sigma 5	8/67	6.0	32	14	46	-
	Sigma 6	6/70	12.0	3	-	-	-
	Sigma 7	12/66	12.0	31	7	38	-
	Sigma 8	2/72	-	5	-	-	-
	Sigma 9	-	35.0	7	-	-	-

CALENDAR OF COMING EVENTS

Nov. 28-30, 1973: 1st Annual Systems Engineering Conference, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Dec. 4-5, 1973: 1973 Vehicular Technology Conference, Sheraton-Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio / contact: Robert Wylie, Motorola Communications, Inc., 12955 Snow Rd., Cleveland, OH 44130

Dec. 6-8, 1973: National Symposium on Computer Applications in the Juvenile Justice System, Marriott Motor Hotel, Atlanta, Ga. / contact: Lawrence A. Boxerman, Project Dir., National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Univ. of Nevada, Box 8000, Reno, NV 89507

Dec. 9-11, 1973: Computer Architecture, Flagler Inn & Reitz Union, Gainesville, Fla. / contact: G. Jack Lipovski, 229 Larsen Hall, Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32601

Jan. 16-18, 1974: 3rd Annual AIIE-MHI Seminar, Marriott Motor Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Jan. 16-19, 1974: Internepcon/Japan '74, Harumi Convention Center, Tokyo, Japan / contact: Industrial & Scientific Conf. Mgmt., Inc., 222 W. Adams St., Chicago, IL 60606

Feb. 12-14, 1974: Computer Science Conference, Detroit Hilton, Detroit, Mich. / contact: Seymour J. Wolfson, Computer Science Section, Wayne State Univ., Detroit, MI 48202

Feb. 13-15, 1974: International Solid State Circuits Conference, Univ. of Penna., Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Virgil Johannes, Bell Labs., Room 3E331, Holmdel, NJ 07733

Feb. 19-22, 1974: 3rd Annual National Communications Week Convention, Chase-Park Plaza Hotel, St. Louis, Mo. / contact: David C. Brotemarkle, Communications Systems Management Assoc., 1102 West St., Suite 1003, Wilmington, DE 19801

Feb. 26-28, 1974: Computer Conference (COMPCON), Jack Tar Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: Jack Kuehler, IBM Corp., P 35, Bldg. 025, Monterey & Cottle Rds., San Jose, CA 95114

Mar. 25-29, 1974: IEEE International Convention (INTERCON), Coliseum & Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: J. H. Schumacher, IEEE, 345 E. 47th St., New York, NY 10017

April 3, 1974: Minicomputers — Trends and Applications, Nat'l Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Md. / contact: Harry Hayman, 738 Whitaker Ter., Silver Spring, MD 20901

April 8-11, 1974: Computer Aided Design, Int'l Conference & Exhibition, Univ. of Southampton, Southampton, England / contact: Inst. of Civil Engrs., Great George St., Westminster, London SW1, England

April 9-11, 1974: Optical Computing Symposium, Zurich, Switzerland / contact: Samuel Horvitz, Box 274, Waterford, CT 06385

April 21-24, 1974: International Circuits & Systems Symposium, Sir Francis Drake Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: L. O. Chua, Dept. of EE, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, CA 94720

April 21-24, 1974: 1974 Annual Assoc. for Systems Management Conf., Dallas Convention Center, Dallas, Tex. / contact: R. B. McCaffrey, ASM, 24587 Bagley Rd., Cleveland, OH 44138

May 5-8, 1974: Offshore Technology Conference, Astrohall, Houston, Tex. / contact: Offshore Tech. Conf., 6200 N. Central Expressway, Dallas, TX 75206

May 6-10, 1974: 1974 National Computer Conference & Exposition, McCormick Place, Chicago, Ill. / contact: Dr. Stephen S. Yau, Computer Sciences Dept., Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201

May 13-17, 1974: European Computing Congress (EUROCOMP), Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England / contact: Online, Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England

May 13-17, 1974: International Instruments, Electronic and Automation Exhibition, Olympia, London, England / contact: Industrial Exhibitions Ltd., Commonwealth House, New Oxford St., London, WC1A 1PB, England

June 24-26, 1974: Design Automation Workshop, Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, Colo. / contact: ACM, 1133 Ave. of the Americas, New York, NY 10036

June 25-28, 1974: 1974 Annual International Conference & Business Exposition, Minneapolis, Minn. / contact: Data Processing Management Assoc., 505 Busse Highway, Park Ridge, IL 60068

July 15-19, 1974: 1974 Conference on Frontiers in Education, City University, London, England / contact: Conf. Dept., Institution of Electrical Engineers, Savoy Place, London, England WC2R 0BL

July 23-26, 1974: Circuit Theory & Design, IEE, London, England / contact: IEE, Savoy Pl., London WC2R 0BL, England

Aug. 5-10, 1974: IFIP Congress 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress 74, Box 426, New Canaan, CT 06840

Aug. 5-10, 1974: Medinfo 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: Frank E. Heart, Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc., 50 Moulton St., Cambridge, MA 02138

Aug. 21-23, 1974: Engineering in the Ocean Environment International Conf., Nova Scotian Hotel, Halifax, Nova Scotia / contact: O. K. Gashus, EE Dept., Nova Scotia Tech. Coll., POB 100, Halifax, N.S., Canada

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ADVERTISING INDEX

Following is the index of advertisements. Each item contains: product / name and address of the advertiser / name of the agency, if any / page number where the advertisement appears.

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION / Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 52

ELECTRONIC RESEARCH CORP., 7618 Wedd, Overland Park, KS 66204 / ERC Advertising / page 45

INSTRUCTIONAL FACULTY OPENINGS / College of Petroleum & Minerals, c/o Saudi Arabian Educational Mission, 880 Third Ave.—17th Floor, New York, NY 10022 / page 32

THE NOTEBOOK ON COMMON SENSE, ELEMENTARY AND ADVANCED / published by *Computers and Automation,* 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 7

RIDE THE EAST WIND: Parables of Yesterday and Today, published by Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co. / Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / pages 24, 25

WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING / jointly published by Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., and Berkeley Enterprises, Inc., 815 Washington St., Newtonville, MA 02160 / page 51

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING"

EDITION 5.2 = 5th EDITION + 2 SUPPLEMENTS ALREADY ISSUED

THE MOST ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING ARE

PEOPLE

Who are they?
What do they do?
Where do they do it?

Consult

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING" jointly published by *Computers and Automation* (Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.) and Quadrangle / New York Times Book Co.

"Who's Who in Computers and Data Processing" has been changed to a periodic subscription basis as follows:

1. The latest Cumulative Edition (the 5th edition published 1971, containing over 15,000 capsule biographies, over 1,000 pages long, 3 volumes, hardbound) PLUS
2. Three Updating Supplements per period totaling over 3,000 entries

Both for $34.50 in any period when a cumulative edition is supplied . . . and $15.00 per period when a cumulative edition is not supplied.

BASED ON continual data gathering from computer professionals carried out by *Computers and Automation*

This reference is particularly useful for:

Personnel managers
Libraries
Conference planners
Directors of computer installations
Suppliers to the computer industry
Executive search organizations
Prospective authors
Prospective speakers . . .

anyone who needs to keep up with the important people in the field.

Each computer professional has a capsule biography detailing: last name; first name and middle initial (if any); occupation; year of birth; university education and degrees; year entered the computer field; main interests; job title; organization and its address; publications, honors and memberships; home address.

We are confident that you will find the subscription will repay you many times over. In fact, one day when this wealth of material gives you the inside track with someone important to you, you'll find the information PRICELESS: the most essential component in EDP is CAPABLE PEOPLE.

RETURNABLE IN 10 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND
(if not satisfactory)

(may be copied on any piece of paper)

WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING
815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

☐ YES, please enroll me as a subscriber to WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING at the following rate:

☐ $34.50 including the last cumulative edition

OR

☐ $15.00 since I already have access to the last cumulative edition

I understand that for each period of subscription I shall receive three updating supplements, totaling over 3,000 entries.

☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Please bill me.
☐ Please bill my organization

RETURNABLE IN 10 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND
(if not satisfactory)

Name
Title
Organization
Address
City State & Zip
Your Signature P.O. No. (if company order)

C.? .1101-91-33

WILL YOU HELP?

Yes, *you.* It may come as a surprise that you'd be asked . . . but as a reader of *Computers & Automation* you are in a unique position to help us.

NAMES . . . people, institutions, companies who should be interested in 1) the computer industry and/or 2) seeking truth in information are very much needed to join you as readers of *C&A.*

Will you tell us who they are? And perhaps even more, will you let us use your name in writing to them? But with or without your name (we'll only use it if you grant permission) we need to know those *you* think might be interested in also reading *C&A.*

Please give us their names and addresses on the form below or add another sheet of paper. Trim out the card with scissors and drop it in the mail. We'll gladly pay the postage to learn of possible new friends. And many thanks for your help! As a token of our appreciation we'll send you our ****Reprint.

P.S. If you like you may mail your list separately to:
R. A. Sykes, Circulation Mgr.
Computers & Automation & People
815 Washington Street
Newtonville, MA 02160

*** * * * *reprint from***
computers
and automation

Science and the Advanced Society, by C. P. Snow, Ministry of Technology, London, England (April 1966)
The Information Revolution and the Bill of Rights, by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, M.I.T. (May 1971)
Employment, Education, and the Industrial System, by Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard Univ. (Aug. 1965)
Computers and the Consumer, by Ralph Nader, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1970)

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TO: R. A. Sykes, Circulation Mgr.
Computers & Automation & People

I suggest you send information on C&A to . . . (attach list if you like)

(1) Name____________________
Address____________________
City__________ State_______ ZIP_______

(2) Name____________________
Address____________________
City__________ State_______ ZIP_______

May we use your name? ☐ YES ☐ NO

Please give us your name and address on the form below so we can send you your ****Reprint. Just cross out the subscription request — unless you also want to enter your new or renewal order.

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“

It's the first lie detector that
can be used on a dead
man. It works on tapes and
other voice recordings

”

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic*, Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

·The PSE grew from an effort to improve e polygraph. Standard polygraphs easure four variables. pulse blood pres- re, respiration and perspiration. Some so measure additional physiological var- les. The more variables measured, the ore reliable the polygraph.

Bell and McQuiston discovered that the quencies composing the human voice e not fixed; they shift very slightly from ght to fourteen times every second. But en the speaker is under stress, this nor- al frequency modulation disappears. hat remains are the pure component fre- encies of the voice. And a strong indica- n that the speaker is lying.

The two men developed a device to tect this phenomenon and planned to use as an additional "channel" on the poly- aph. Th[illegible]ey discovered that the new riable was so reliable and accurate a easure of psychological stress there was ally no need to measure the other poly- aph variables.

Freed from the necessity of strapping the bject into a chair, stretching a pneumo- aphic tube across his chest, gluing elec- des to his palms and clamping his arm h a blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved be much more versatile than the poly- aph. Because it can work from a tele- one or tape recorder, the PSE can be ed without the knowledge or even the ysical presence of the subject.

I asked Colonel Bell to tell me about some the things the PSE was being used for, pecially cases in which a conventional lygraph couldn't be used. He mentioned at the police in Howard County, Maryland, ve been using the PSE for two years; they ve had great success in establishing the nocence of suspects who were afraid to bmit to a polygraph examination because that machine's forbidding aspect.

Bell went on to describe some of his vention's other uses, actual or potential. ktor and the Federal government are ex- oring its use as a defense against skyjack- and telephoned bomb threats, and as neans of speeding up customs inspec- ns. Some doctors and psychiatrists are ing PSEs to study patients' physical and ntal stress. The National Committee to vestigate Aerial Phenomena, a private oup that investigates UFO reports, is w using the PSE to interview witnesses UFO sightings.

asked Bell if he would lend me a PSE experiment with, in order to write a piece out the device. He agreed, with two con- ions. First, I must take Dektor's three-day urse in operating the instrument; second, er using the PSE, I must review my erpretation of its output with his staff, in interest of accuracy. This seemed rea- nable, so I agreed.

he course was held in the meeting room a Holiday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. e eight other students were employees customers who had purchased the vice. These included a private detective ency in Pennsylvania, a New York chain store, and the security service of an East African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Polish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utterance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15 16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, similar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable connects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accompanies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made during actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, whenever they were present.

“
The more I read,
the more I doubted
the official account of
what happened
that day in Dallas
”

·That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of polygraph interrogation, which applies to the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph examination, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrelevant stress in some of his answers, and mislead the examiner. Therefore it is is necessary for the examiner to interview the subject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner; and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned concerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"

"Yes."

"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a white shirt?"

"Yes."

"Do you know who took the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a ring?"

"Yes."

"Did you take the money?"

"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were unstressed. The question about suspecting ɔ.took the money produced enough ɜss to indicate deception. The other ȷstion which produced stress was, "Are Wearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that ; accompanied by such stress as I had ɜn only once or twice in the class slides. he next morning Kradz called on me. ! the suspect take the money, he asked. ıid I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did suspect who took the money? Yes, I ught he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did ɔtice anything else about the interroga- ı? Well, yes, there was this business ɔut the ring. Perhaps the suspect had ıen it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't en the ring, but he was gay. He had :hanged rings with another guy. Nobody w about it. The kid didn't really expect ɔe asked about it, because Kradz had ıe over all the questions with him. Still, ɜn the ring was mentioned, he panicked.

ly the third day of the course, I had begun ʒive some thought to what I might do ı the PSE. I was particularly interested ıe fact that the device works from a tape ording. Sound-recording technology is ıost a century old (Edison invented the ɔnograph in 1877), and an enormous ɔunt of history is stored on phonograph ords, sound tracks, and tape and wire ordings. I thought how many press conences, interviews and public pronounce- ıts are stored away in the film and tape hives of the world, and how many ques- ıs could be settled if we knew for certain that the speaker had told the truth. However, since interrogation with a PSE seemed to require such an elaborate and structured situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't. I hoped that Jim Garrison would prove that he had solved the mystery. He didn't. Time passed, public interest waned, and the details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-



Voice prints by the Psychological Stress Evaluator of former chief justice Earl Warren in May, 1972 indicating hard stress on the words "no evidence."

ssassination Tapes

NUED FROM PAGE 47

ld, a successful criminal lawyer and ector of the Committee, in a modern ce building a few blocks from the White use. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man h a thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense ain smoker. Both men appeared to be their forties.

"Before we begin," I said, "I think I should ntion that I used to work for the CIA." have run across it often, the theory that CIA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd me, and I don't believe it. I worked there three years and never saw or heard any- ng suggesting the Agency was involved the assassination. I never met anyone re I thought capable of doing it. Still, ave learned through bitter experience of suspicion which attaches to former in- ligence officers. Epidemics of paranoia d to accompany us through life. I thought better get that issue out of the way.

Smith and Fensterwald exchanged nces and smiled. Fensterwald told me t they did not necessarily believe the CIA sassin theory, and they certainly didn't nd talking to a former Agency employee.

Relieved, I began to outline my project. sked if they had heard of the PSE. Both n were dimly aware of it. I described device and started to detail the way it uld be used as a research tool. They im- diately understood what I was proposing d were tremendously enthusiastic. Yes, y said, there were many key statements tape somewhere, and they would be glad compile specific references for me. rthermore, they could, in some cases, vide me with the tape. They said they uld be in contact when they had some- ng for me.

While I was waiting, I experimented with PSE. I telephoned a friend and told him out the device. I asked if he was willing play a little game to test it out, and he reed. He picked a number between one d ten. I asked him, "Is the number one?" the number two?" and so on, and he swered no each time. I recorded his sponses, ran them through the PSE and lled him back. The number he picked, old him, was five.

He was dumbfounded. He had not heard the PSE and had thought I might be con- cting some elaborate joke at his expense. t when I called back and correctly iden- ed the number he had picked, he realized was serious. And he was shocked.

I played the same game several times th others and did not always have similar ccess. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was le only to narrow the answer down to two mbers, one of which turned out to be correct. With others I have been completely unable to identify the right number. The problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's soundtrack if I would pay for the dubbing charges. I told them to go ahead.

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and s of caution.

Although the PSE is a well-established [illegible] it has not been validated ool for historical research. Even though s familiar with the machine believe it can be used in this way, my project the first attempt to do so.

It is easier to demonstrate with the PSE a speaker is telling the truth than to w he is lying. Stress can be caused by gs other than deception: but the abce of stress is an extremely reliable cation of truthfulness. Of course, the ence of stress does not prove that a ement is true, only that the speaker eves it to be true.

Although I found a great deal of stress e testimony of the assassination tapes. o single instance can I say that the individual was lying. I point this out not only protect myself from libel suits but because I am not morally certain any one individual was [illegible] telling the truth.

Nonetheless, stress in the testimony many witnesses to the same event makes mathematical probability overwhelming at least some of them were lying.

hese points could not be better illused than they were by the Jim Garn–Clay Shaw Affair.

arrison, it may be recalled, was the New eans District Attorney who, in 1967, med to have solved the Kennedy assasation. He presented an elaborate case inst a local businessman, Clay Shaw, others, as members of an assassination spiracy. In one of the hour-long proms, CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw, two other people involved in Garrison's gations.

his interview, Garrison was hostile and not make many firm, factual statements uld test with the PSE. However, he did , "There's no question about it [that he w how the assassination had been carout] . . . we know the key individuals lved . . . there is no question about the [the conspirators] were there [in Dealy za]." The PSE showed good to hard ss on each of these statements. I also a noncontroversial statement of Garn's as a control: "Oswald was not killed e [at the movie theater where he was sted]," and found no stress. Garrison's ements about his case against Clay w strongly indicated deception.

ext I ran some statements by Clay Shaw ying his involvement in such a conspir. and denying ever knowing or meeting Harvey Oswald. I also ran a control ement. Shaw turned out to be heavily ssed throughout.

his was not particularly surprising. The had been accused of conspiring to der the President of the United States was being interviewed about it before vision cameras. He would have to have n a pretty cool customer not to show t of stress, even if he were telling the plete truth.

inding that both Garrison and Shaw wed stress was not an encouraging development. Of course, *both* men could be lying. Garrison might have found some valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

> "Deception is not proved by stress, but given enough witnesses' testimony, the PSE is able to arrive at the truth"

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of contestants on the television program *To Tell The Truth*, and identified "the real Mr. So-and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison–Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher-Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher-Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really een Oswald's rifle. The PSE showed con- derable stress in his statements.

Patrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he und three spent bullet hulls on the floor eneath the window from which the fatal iots allegedly were fired. The PSE showed ird stress in his statements.

The rifle was one of the principal points sed by the Warren Commission to link swald to the assassination. The PSE sub- antiated the testimony that Oswald owned rifle and that the evidence supplied to ballistics expert indicated this rifle was e murder weapon. However, the PSE did ot substantiate the controversial claims of allas police regarding the discovery of is evidence.

The hospital employee was apparently lling the truth when he recounted finding e bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi- l, but many critics have charged that the illet had been deliberately planted there. iis is the famous "single bullet" which the arren Report says passed through the odies of both the President and Governor onnally, and then lodged in Connally's rist. Several researchers have tried to peat this, firing the same type of bullet to the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never mained perfectly intact, as the one found the stretcher; they became twisted lumps lead and cooper.

The second link between Oswald and the sassination is the charge that he killed fficer Tippitt a Dallas policeman, while eing from the scene of the first shooting. number of eyewitnesses have testified at they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one them, Domingo Benavides, was inter- ewed on the CBS tapes. He was asked there was any doubt in his mind that swald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. e replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt all." There was absolutely no stress in s statement. He was telling the truth.

The killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald is fueled the fires of controversy over the arren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual eat when he was shot. Some witnesses ive alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were een together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. ey theorize that the three men were part an assassination conspiracy, and that ppitt had been sent to silence Oswald, it had been beaten to the draw.

The Dallas police radio dispatcher, fficer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ought Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he plied. "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did ckson know Oswald? "No," answered ckson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed eavy stress in both statements.

Perhaps the greatest source of con- oversy over the Warren Report is it's claim at all the shots were fired by one gunman. ome eyewitnesses claim to have heard iots and seen gunsmoke in the area of low hillock ahead and to the right of the esidential motorcade. This hillock has me to be known as "the grassy knoll." ne of these witnesses was a railroad orker named S.M. Holland, who observed the scene from an overpass near the knoll. The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> “
>
> Chief Justice Warren:
> "We explored both these
> theories and found
> no evidence that
> either group was involved"
>
> ”

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the shots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counterclaims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

Within minutes after the shooting, Kennedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Governor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

ssassination Tapes

NTINUED FROM PAGE 114

owed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu-
tely. he made no other definite statement
out the nature of the wound.

The interview with Captain Humes was
ore informative. Just before the interview,
1967. Humes had re-examined the autop-
photographs and X-rays, and he dis-
ssed them at length on the CBS tapes.
e diagrams drawn during the autopsy,
said. had not been intended to precisely
present the location of the wounds. How-
er, he [illegible] produced a sketch which, he
d, did represent these locations accu-
ely. The interviewer asked. "Your re-
amination of the photographs verify that
wounds were as shown here?"

'Yes, sir," he replied. No stress.

Were there any wounds other than one
the base of the neck and one up in the
ill? "No, sir, there were not." Moderate
ess, not enough to suggest deception.

Vas there any doubt that the wound at
back of the President's head was an
ry wound? "There is absolutely no doubt.
" Again stress but again moderate.

ltogether, how many wounds were
re? "There were two wounds of entrance
d two of exit." At this point the stress be-
ne hard.

nd where were the entry wounds lo-
ed? "Posteriorly. one low in the right
sterior scalp. and one in the base of the
k on the right." Hard stress again.

ould he be absolutely certain that what
said was an entry wound was. in fact,
t. "Yes, indeed we can." Hard stress.

he interview with Humes was one of the
gest and most detailed on the CBS
es. and I charted most of it with the PSE.
as clear to me that he believed much
hat he was saying. but the frequent flick-
gs of moderate stress and the occasion-
lashes of hard stress suggested that he
sn't nearly as confident of his testimony
he claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had
nted out. sometimes it's not easy to tell
entry wound from an exit wound.

he interviewer asked him one good "bot-
line" question:

Do you have any different conclusion,
different ideas. any different thoughts
, after seeing [the autopsy photographs]
in, than you had at that time?"

No." replied Captain Humes. "we think
bear up very well, and very closely.
testimony before the Warren Commis-
."

he stress was hard.

len Specter. one of the Warren Commis-
's principal investigators. also spoke on
CBS tapes. He said that the case against
ald fitted together very well. and that
lom could one find among actual criminal convictions a case equally persuasive. He added that there was no foundation for the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing. and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this. but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report. he said. "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report. what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

> "...we found no evidence
> of any kind that there was
> any conspiracy."
> There was very hard stress
> on "no evidence"

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories. one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing. the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

" . . . we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything." said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the press. and I read some of the documents that have criticized the Commission very severely. but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time." he continued. "to change my view. nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970. Senator Richard B. Russell. a member of the Warren Commission. revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example. Lee Harvey Oswald. as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator. and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What. given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE. can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now

's look at the testimony that is called into
estion by the PSE:
1. The claim that Oswald's rifle was
und in the Texas School Book Depository.
2. The claim that bullet hulls matching
wald's rifle were found in the same place.
3. The claim that one gunman was seen
the "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book
pository.
4. The claim that two gunmen were seen
this window.
5. The claim that a gunman was seen
a different window of that building.
6. Another claim that no shots came from
grassy knoll, and a claim by the witness
o saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that
also *heard* a shot from that direction.
7. A claim by a Dallas policeman that
ither he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.
8. The claim by the pathologist—the
rren Commission's only source of infor-
tion about the autopsy—that the X-rays
d autopsy photographs support his tes-
ony before the Commission.
9. The claim by a member of the Warren
mmission that there was nothing fraudu-
t about the Warren Report.
10. The claim by Earl Warren that the
mmission found no evidence of a con-
iracy; that none of the Warren Report's
tics ever found anything the Commission
d missed; that he had found nothing since
publication of the Report to change his
w; and that he knew of no Commission
mber who had ever changed his mind
out their conclusions.

If we accept that each instance of stress indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

Obviously, whenever stress is found by the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong —we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

THE LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

1964 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

1968 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

1972 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

WHAT is the evidence?

WHO fire the fatal shots?

WHY has there been such a concerted effort to withhold the facts?

WHO was really behind the assassinations?

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DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

9:00 **LATE REGISTRATION –**
Early Registrants pick up passes.

9:30 **WELCOME:**
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

10:00 **CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:**
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 **UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:**
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission Report

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:**
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds in Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 **BREAK FOR DINNER**

8:30 **WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –**
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

* * *

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 **ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:**
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:**
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 **INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –**
Question and Answer Sessions

AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF WORKS PUBLISHED
1963-1970
RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF
JOHN F. KENNEDY
MARTIN LUTHER KING
ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

A. GENERAL

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FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EA/Staff A att: Ray Smith.	28 FEB 1978		
2. 5D3113			
3. CEA/JAPAN	1 - MAR 1978		✓
4.			
5. EA/STA/EXO		1 - MAR 1978	
6. AC/EA/STA	1 MAR 1978		CN
7.			
8. EA/STA/EXO	1 MAR 1978		
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DCD/Staff A: att: Ruth Elliff			
2. 913 Key Bldg.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

This should be coordinated with FBI + State. Ruth

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. (b)(3) (b)(1)

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CO   AL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER

IPS-76-382

FROM:

H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION

1595

DATE SENT

28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE

2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR 1/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1	[illegible]	✓
2. 4B-4406			
3. E/I	2/13/78		
4.			
5. E/Staff A			
6.			
7.			
8.			
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10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

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If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -

Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:

H. Stilson HT-3
1 B-4145

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal / Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
M. Stilson [illegible]-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE
~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EA/Staff/EXO att: M. Smith 5D-3115	8 - FEB 1978		
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. EA/STA/EXO	15 FEB 1978		
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:
M. Stilson
IP-3 Ext. 1595

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the delet material.

Also, please review the mate for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classificati reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been sta with the classification revi stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

[illegible]

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal /Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Wilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 16 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/AF/Staff A att: Mr. Foy			
2. 3B-17-C			
3. H. Wilson HT-3	014845		

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

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If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks,

Wilson

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will foll

The documents may not be released.

RS Addis Ababa 2200 (IN 99685), 28 April 1968 identifies the source and does not pertain to James Earl Ray or Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release it would violate the privacy of another U.S. person.

RS The information contained in paras 1 and 3 of IN 00793, 30 April 1968 was acquired from a liaison source, the Nigerian Special Branch. Paragraph 2 identifies a source of intelligence and the information therein does not pertain to James Earl Ray, Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release the information would vidate the privacy of another U.S. person.

RS CSCI 316/01685-68 may not be released since it merely repeats the information contained in the two cables above, and the exemptions applied to them are equally

(please turn over)

RETURN TO: H. Wilson

HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A. 4B·4406	8 Feb 78		cl
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
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10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 Ext. 1595

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Done
cl

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg
James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: H. Stelson
HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 17 Feb 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 20 Feb 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Ray Smith 5D 3115	17 FEB 1978		
2.			
3. DC/EA/STA	21 FEB 1978 17 FEB 1978		
4.			
5. EA/STA/EXO	21 FEB 1978		
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO: H. Stelson
HT-1

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please do a classification review (and downgrade where possible) the attached docs.

Thanks
Helen

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA/Staff/B att. Mr. F Amer	8 Feb	9	F
2. 3 C-34			
3.			
4. LA/Staff B att: Mr. F. Amer			
5. 3-C-34			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

These are The King documents

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HF-5

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. NE/Staff IA Room 6 D 3113		9 Feb	By
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Also, please review the materi for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classificati reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stam with the classification revi stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HF-5 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ~~☐~~ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1		
2. 4B-4406			
3. E/SC			
4.			
5. E/Staff A			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

Do you approve of proposed sanitation? Pls return today ASAP) 8 Mar Thanks

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. OK

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
7 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
10 February 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. D e D Room 913 Key	2 Feb	21 Feb	
2.			
3. DDO\ISS\PIAG			
4. Attn: Helen			
5. 104127			
6.			
7. Both documents have to remain			
8. CONFIDENTIAL. Sanitized			
9. per (b)(1) + (b)(3)			
10. Also (b)(6) for 19 Feb 69 name			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follo

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

10 JUL 1978

File
Weisberg appeal
(Martin Luther King
James Earl Ray

Mr. Frank Underwood
Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Branch
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Room 6958
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535:

Attention: Connie Fruitt

Gentlemen:

In responding to an FOIA litigation from Harold Weisberg (enclosure 1), we have surfaced reference to 46 documents which originated with your agency. Three of these documents are referred by listing only, and either first pages or full text copies of the remaining 43 documents are enclosed. This information is being forwarded to you for review and direct response to the requester.

We will advise the requester of this referral in our response, which we expect to complete in the near future.

Please note that the documents listed, and those of which just the first pages have been included, have not been reviewed to see if they contain CIA information. In the event that they do, we request that this material be coordinated with us before being released to the requester.

If you have any questions, please contact Karen Wolfe or Allie Falardeau, 351-5615, and refer to our request F76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated
From Enclosure

Distribution:
Orig - Addse
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS Subject (F-76-382) APPEAL w/attach DDO docs
1 1 - OGC (Launie Ziebell)
① - DDO/IMS/FPG/AL (Helen Stilson)

SECRET

P

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 MAY 1968

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Assassination of Martin Luther King

1. On 3 May 1968, an official Italian Intelligence Service provided this Agency's representative in Rome with the following information on one James RAY:

> A James RAY, born in Los Angeles on 8 March 1928 (father's name Oliver), arrived at San Gimignano, Siena, in March 1955 and registered as a student at Perugia. In 1956, RAY was confined at San Gimignano Hospital and in 1957, he was in Sant'Antonio de Fiesole Hospital. These confinements were for "osteomyelitical condition causing bone depression in the cranium, on right parietal temple region." RAY returned permanently to the United States in December 1967.

2. The Italian National Police and the Italian Intelligence Service have turned up no other information thus far. All Italian entry posts have RAY and his aliases on their watchlist.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation representative in Rome was advised of the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

CSCI 316/01763-68

REC-23 44 38861 3515

EX 109 MAY 16 1968

Jan 10, 78

This CSCI was treated as doc #250 in initial review.
BL

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Rev 5/13/68

O Murkin

16 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

McGowan

SUBJECT : Investigation in Japan of Report on Suspicious Actions of Gerald Lee Richards, Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to the report concerning the above subject made by telephone to Mr. S.J. Papich at 0930 on 17 April 1968. Following is a full account of the investigation made in this case:

A. On 16 April 1968 a United States National Maritime Union official in Yokohama reported that one Gerald Lee Richards, who bore a general physical resemblance to the description given of the suspected assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had arrived in Japan about 15 April 1968 and requested a position aboard any ship going anywhere. Richards became agitated when asked for a contact address in Japan and refused to divulge his Japanese residence. The National Maritime Union official described Richards as 5' 10" tall, 155 pounds, with brown hair, a receding hairline on both sides, and a not very prominent scar two and one-half inches long traversing the center forehead, his most outstanding characteristic being a disconcerting, idiotic grin resembling a constant grimace. According to Richards' documents and statements, he was born 8 April 1937, applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, 16 June 1964 and registered there as a United States National Maritime Union member on 21 February 1968 but never shipped out. His Social Security Number is 562-46-5078; his United States Coast Guard Number Z 2711-782.

cc defendants, etc
2258 7/16

[redacted] 44-38861-3785

REC 11

14 MAY 22 1968

③

GROUP 1
[illegible]

66 MAY 2[illegible]1968

SECRET

D addressed as
doc. # 251 during
Q. trial review

B. A subsequent check with the Japanese National Police Agency confirmed the biographic data supplied by the National Maritime Union official. A ward check indicated that Richards originally resided in Japan from 1963 to 1964 and married TAKAYAMA Michiko in 1963. Both Richards and his wife left Japan for the United States in 1964. Richards returned alone to Japan about 15 April 1968. His wife's address in the United States is listed as 160 Hosoi (phonetic) Street, Carpenteria, California, 93013.

C. A photograph of Richards obtained from the Japanese police was shown to the National Maritime Union official and identified by him as the individual in subparagraph 1A above who had applied for a seaman's berth. The photograph of Richards bears no apparent resemblance to photographs of suspected assassin James Earl Ray provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. The above information has been given to the Legal Attache of the United States Embassy in Tokyo.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

James A. Hunt
JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-316/01774-68

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

1

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.
[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78			

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in shaded areas only.
2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

2

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11	DEC	73

3

FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): CIA - James Angleton

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
		FBI		CIR-316/03107-73

5

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations

6

TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7

Recommendations:

_____ A. Release in full text
X B. Release in sanitized form
_____ C. Deny in toto
_____ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

_____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
_____ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
_____ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
	OS	

Walter J. Kowalski C/RA/1
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA
J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA
5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10

Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

_____	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
_____	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
_____	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
X	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
X	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
_____	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
_____	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
_____	17. Does not pertain to request		
_____	18. Information from another Government agency		
_____	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in shaded areas only.
2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

1

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.
[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78			

2

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
[✓ MEMO]
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
14	JAN	69

3

FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): CIA

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
				CSCI-316/00108-69

5

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination

6

TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7

Recommendations:

____ A. Release in full text
____ B. Release in sanitized form
____ C. Deny in toto
____ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
X F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version to Fensterwald
____ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS

Walter J. Kowalski CI/RA/1
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA

J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA

5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10

Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

____ 1.	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
____ 2.	Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
____ 3.	Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
____ 4.	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 5.	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 6.	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 7.	Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 8.	Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 9.	Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
____ 10.	File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 11.	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 12.	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 13.	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
____ 14.	Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 15.	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
____ 16.	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
____ 17.	Does not pertain to request		
____ 18.	Information from another Government agency		
____ 19.	Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

1

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.	NEW DOCUMENT RECORD
[✓ FPE]	75 76 77 78				Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in shaded areas only. 2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

2

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
CABLE DISPATCH [✓ MEMO] REPORT	29	Nov	73

3

FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS)	TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS)
FBI - Mr. E.S. Miller	FBI - W.A. Branigan

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
		FBI		

5

SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)

Committee To Investigate Assassinations

6

	TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7

Recommendations:

☐ A. Release in full text
☒ B. Release in sanitized form
☐ C. Deny in toto
☐ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

☐ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
☐ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
☐ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS	
	OS		Walter J. Kowalski C/RA/1

SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA
J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA
5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10

Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

☐	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
☐	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
☐	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
☐	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☒	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
☐	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
☐	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
☐	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
☐	17. Does not pertain to request		
☐	18. Information from another Government agency		
☐	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

319

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 319

Tab [illegible]-52 contains Dispatch UFGA-29877 dated 11 Apr. 1968.

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

(X) Segregable portions previously recommended for but not sent to requester by IPS released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

(X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b) (3) of FOIA.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
(X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
(X) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 01

13-00000

570

[redacted] TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - [redacted]

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - ~~QT~~ 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, [redacted]

INFO - CHIEF, [redacted] CHIEF, [redacted]

FROM - CHIEF [redacted]

SUBJECT -O SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE [redacted]

~~QM~~ 1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

~~WM~~ 2. GRANMA, ~~X~~ Y APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN /

~~EM~~ 3. GRANMA, ~~X~~ APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' //THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

[redacted]

319

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 6 Nov 78

[redacted]

4. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL EGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING MONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL QUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE EACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL RBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SCLC/.

5. ~~5M~~ GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~6M~~ GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~7M~~ GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~8M~~ GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO TRUGGLE.''

9. ~~9M~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, APRIL, ~~UWP-~~ 7:2 A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS F THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, LL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

ID THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE PRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH INDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE OUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, REP P.M. - ''STOKELY CARMICHAEL, EADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH IFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE ITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' ARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE IOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S EATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN ITIES.''

11. ~~QQM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, 5 ~~T~~ P.M. - ''HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS NCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY IOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, 5 ~~T~~ APRIL, 550 ~~TTP~~ P.M. - ''CARMICHAEL SAID URING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE N ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN HE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL E NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE EEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME OMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL AKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES ECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST HE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING FFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR EADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. -- A '' JJJUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO ICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - 'JDR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRE- IPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES GAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' '' JJ

14. ~~QTM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 U P.M. -- A '' JJTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT F THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANI- ATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE SSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE MERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS A 'JWE BEG YOU TO XPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS UR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR TRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH HOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEV- ING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE FRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A OTAL CONFRONTATION.' '' JJ

15. ~~QTM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. -- A '' JJAGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ ARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'JMAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE F THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY HEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED ITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' '' JJ

16. ~~QYM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 T APRIL, 7 U P.M. -- ~~A~~ '' JJREVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, F THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING TATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW - 'JHIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN EGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT HEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN RUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

[redacted] TELEPOUCH [redacted] PAGE FIVE

ILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' '' ~~JJ~~

11. ~~QUM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 6 ~~X~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ EDITORIAL COMMENTS RITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, AYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. '' ~~JJ~~MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT REACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT NLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

15. ~~QIM~~ RADIO HABANA, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL 68, 530 ~~TEP~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ ''JOHNSON POSTPONED IIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR ESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON ELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE ORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' '' ~~JJ~~AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE AR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' '' ~~JJ~~THE ASSASSINATION OF IARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

[redacted]

ISTRIBUTION
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3 A [redacted]
2 A [redacted]
2 A [redacted]

[redacted] TELEPOUCH [redacted] PAGE FIVE

BT

57P

TELEPOUCH

DISP NO -

FILE NO -

DATE - ~~00~~ 11 APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO -

INFO -

FROM -

SUBJECT -0 SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED

1. ~~QM~~ GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

2. ~~WM~~ GRANMA, ~~X~~ 8 APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN./

3 ~~EM~~ GRANMA, ~~X~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ~~//~~ '' THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

Previously

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date [illegible]

4. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE VIOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, BLACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT PATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE DEACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE MENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE /SCLC/.

~~IM~~ 5. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO BLAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

~~YM~~ 6. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO AND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

~~UM~~ 7. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~ ''THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

~~IM~~ 8. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO STRUGGLE.''

~~OM~~ 9. RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, 6 APRIL, ~~UWP--~~ 7:30 A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER KING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST MARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS OF THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN HAVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS, AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, REP P.M. - ~~JJ~~ "STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - ~~J~~ 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. ~~QGM~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~X~~ 5 P.M. ~~A~~ – ~~J0~~ "HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. ~~QWM~~ RADIO PROGRESO, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~XXX~~ 550 P.M. ~~A~~ – ~~JJ~~ "CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST THE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL, ~~U~~ 7 P.M. ~~X~~ – ~~XX~~ '' JUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW - \ ~~X~~DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' ~~XX~~ ''

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17. ~~QUH~~ RADIO LIBERACION, 5 ~~X~~ APRIL, 6 ~~X~~ P.M. – ~~A~~ EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. '' ~~YY~~MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

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DISP NO - UFGA-29877

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - ~~QQ~~ 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

INFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE AMOTS-

1. ~~QM~~ GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, ~~X~~ 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

2. ~~WM~~ GRANMA, ~~X~~ [illegible] APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN/

3. ~~EH~~ GRANMA, ~~X~~ [illegible] APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''/WASHINGTON, ~~U~~ 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' ''THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

TELEPOUCH

PAGE ONE

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date 3 March 1978

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0012913

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4. GRANMA, ~~1~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL EGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING IONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL QUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/, LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE EACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSOIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL RBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE SCLC/.

5. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. ~~XM~~ GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. ~~UM~~ GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ~~JJ~~''THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. ~~IM~~ GRANMA, ~~I~~ 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO TRUGGLE.''

9. ~~OM~~ RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/, APRIL, 7 [illegible] UWP- A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS F THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING, LL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

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AND THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE OPPRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HINDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.''

10. ~~QPM~~ RADIO LIBERACION, ~~7~~ 5 APRIL, REP P.M. - ~~JJ~~ ''STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - ~~J~~ 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. ~~QGM~~ RADIO HABANA, ~~7~~ 5 APRIL, ~~7~~ 5 P.M. ~~A~~ — ~~JJ~~ ''HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

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MARK F. EFFIELD

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✓) Segregable portions previously recommended for released; but not sent to requester by IPS excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

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) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

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  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
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  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

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ISP NO - [redacted]

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UBJECT -O SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN
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EFERENCE - [redacted]

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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Date 6 March 1978

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AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

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TO -

INFO -

FROM -

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YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

VIA TELEPOUCH

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

3P

ECRET TELEPOUCH
CONFIDENTIAL

ISP NO - UFGA-29884

ILE NO - NONE

11
ATE - QQ APRIL 1968

NDEXING - NONE

ICROFILM - NONE

O - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

NFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME

ROM - COS, JMWAVE

UBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IAO APRIL 1968

EFERENCE - UFGA-29877

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE ARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE OLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE AMOTS -

QM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 ROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE ISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE EATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

WM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF ARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE ONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT ON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE ANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO HE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE OSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK RE-PLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

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ECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE ONE

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date 2 Mar 1978

Mar 2, 78
007580+
012903

19-4-105

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AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

MARK F. EFFIELD

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CRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

IA TELEPOUCH

A C/WHD

A C/WH/COG

A C/WOLIME

ECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

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321

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 321

1. Tab A-71 contains Cable JMWAVE 2017 dated 12 APR 68.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

   (X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   (X) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
   (X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to Confidential

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INFO

FILE [redacted]

[redacted] 121717Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

[illegible]33304

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 14 May 1978

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

[redacted]

1. [redacted] HAS JUST REPORTED [redacted] RECEIPT [redacted] OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO 6012 HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO 24X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

[redacted] ARE ASTONISHED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN [redacted] POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

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[redacted]

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INFO

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PAGE 2 [redacted]

GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING [redacted] ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE [redacted] LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO [redacted] IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER SUCH PAMPHLET PACKAGES HAVE ARRIVED HERE. THEY ARE ALSO CONTACTING LOCAL [redacted] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

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PAGE 3 [redacted]

4. [redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL E T 121717Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2017

12 Apr 68 IN 90304

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCARBON

1. AMCARBON-3 HAS JUST REPORTED TO STATION RECEIPT BY HIS COLLEAGUE, AMCARBON-1, OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO 6412 HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO 14X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY IN THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

2. AMCARBONS ARE ASTONISHED AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN AMCARBON-1'S POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

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by authority of 0075604012913
date 15 mar 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 15 mar 78
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012913

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PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2017 SECRET

GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING LASO ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE AMCARBON-1 WAS IN BAHAMAS COVERING ELECTION FROM 9 THRU 11 APRIL AND LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO AMCARBONS 2 IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER [illegible] SUCH PAMPHLET [illegible] THEY ARE ALSO [illegible] CONTACTING LOCAL 2 [illegible] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

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FILE VR

PAGE 3 JMWAVE 2017 **CONFIDENTIAL**

4. ONLY JMWAVE TRACE ON RAMON ECHAVARRIA INDICATES USE AS A MAIL ADDRESS FOR RECEIPT AND SENDING OF CUBAN REGIME PROPAGANDA.

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

322 IN 90561
ab[illegible]-53 contains CABLE JMWAVE 2022 dated 12 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

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urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
) Location of CIA overseas installation
✓) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
X) Cryptonyms
X) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

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declassified
) desensitized
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ACTION [redacted] ☑ [redacted] COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, [redacted]

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[redacted] T 122103Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

Rpd 4 Dec 68

12 APR 68 IN 90561

m

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN [redacted] (IN 90504) SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN [redacted]

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Date 7 March 1978

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12 Apr 68 IN 90561

m

DIRECTOR

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED , SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED

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C/FI 2

CONFIDENTIAL 122103Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2022

Rpd 4 Dec 68

12 APR 68 IN 90561

m

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC ZRPERUSAL AMCARBON

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN JMWAVE 2017 (IN 90504), SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN 3/O/CUD/T.397-68.

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TAB # 323

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

IN 90377

1. Tab 76 [redacted] contains CABLE JMWAVE 2009 dated 12 Apr 68.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

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3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

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4. I RECOMMEND:

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  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.

(X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
(X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
(X) File number/name
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

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ACTION [redacted] COPY

INFO: FILE, VR. [redacted]

[redacted] 121438Z APR 68 CITE [redacted] 12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

[redacted] HAS HAD [redacted] PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF [redacted] CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS [redacted] WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED HQS DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

[redacted]

BT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 7 March 1978

[redacted]

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A-125

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12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

STATION HAS HAD AMOTS PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS UFGA-29877 AND UFGA-29884. WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED HQS DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 324 Berlin 2149

) 8-54 contains CABLE IN 91216 dated 15 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.

☒ Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ____________________.

rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________________.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________________.

☒ Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (B)(1)(b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________________ of ________.

e exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
☒ Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☒ Locations of CIA overseas installations
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
☒ File number/name
☒ Pseudonym
☒ Cryptonyms
☒ Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
☒ Privacy of other individuals
) OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. CI information that does not pertain to the scope of the Request has been deleted under (b)(6) to protect the privacy of the individuals who were the subject of reporting. All information pertaining to King/Ray has been identified & is recommended for release.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ____________
) declassified
) desensitized
☒ downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
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[redacted]

15 Apr 68 IN 91216

[redacted] 151351Z APR 68 CITE [redacted]

ECTOR INFO [redacted]

[redacted]

EF A [redacted] IN 20597

B DIRECTOR 49260

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. BERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT IR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND SING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING STANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE TIVE" RESULSTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO K WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER LDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN ICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY IONS OFFICE. [redacted]

(K) 6

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 May 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

324

13-00000

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☐ [redacted] COPY	INFO: FILE _______ VR.		

GE 2 [redacted]

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED
ETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF
OACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL
UATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM
LF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER
PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER
ENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART
ION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH
SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED
APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG
WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE
SASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER
UDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

[redacted]

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FILE, VR.

OTHER AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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4		9	
5		10	

PAGE 3 [redacted]

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

[redacted]

BT [redacted]

[redacted]

13-00000

15Apr [illegible] 216

151351Z APR 63

DIRECTOR INFO

REF A

B DIRECTOR 49250

1. [illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 19 AUG 1976

54

2. [illegible]

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 6 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

[redacted]

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

[redacted]

13-00000

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4	OLJ	9	
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PRECEDENCE

15 APR 68 IN 91216

CONFIDENTIAL 151351Z APR 68 CITE BERLIN 2149 (HIBBERT ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

RYBAT MHPASHA

REF A BERLIN 1812 (IN 70597)*

B DIRECTOR 49260 **

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. MEMBERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND PASSING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING ASSISTANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE "POSITIVE" RESULTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO TALK WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER SOLDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY ALSO CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICE. US CAMPAIGNERS KEITH CHAMBERLAIN AND PETER STANDISH WERE INVITED TO SPEAK AT 23 MARCH VIETNAM RALLY AND CHOSE AS THEME "HISTORY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM." THEY

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by authority of 001829
date 28 Feb 1978

FULL TEXT COPY -- DO NOT RELEASE

cc US Campaign [illegible]
C.I.C. [illegible] 69

54

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED BY 28 Feb 1978
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PAGE 2 BERLIN 2149 S CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATED THEIR REMARKS WITH CAMPAIGN LEADER FRANCIS FULLER AND MEMBERS DAVID HARRIS AND SAM WEBER. CHAMBERLAIN ALSO ACCOMPANIED RUDI DUTSCHKE TO PRAGUE IN LATE MARCH FOR MEETING OF THIRD CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE.

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED MEETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF APPROACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM ITSELF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER TOOK PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER EVENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART AUCTION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 6 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

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PAGE 3 BERLIN 2149 S CONFIDENTIAL

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

S E C R E T CONFIDENTIAL

BT

C/S Comment: *Reported activities of Americans in anti-Vietnam activity.

**Hqs participating in survey of international connections of anti-Vietnam war movement in U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

13-00000

TAB
#325

JFK 15
F3

13-00000

[redacted] 325

IN 91393

1. Tab [redacted] 65 contains Cable Mex City 5210 dated 15 Apr. 68

2. (✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(liaison) (b)(3), (b)(6). of FOI

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______________________ of __________.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______________________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOI
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________________.
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________________ of __________.
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________________.
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______________________ of __________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) [illegible] of __________

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________________ of __________.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

(X) maintained
( ) classified to ______________
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ______________

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C/WH-2 ☒ RID COPY	INFO FILE, VR. ADDP, C/CI-3		

EYES ONLY

E C R E T 152215Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5210 15 APR 68 IN 91392

Rec'd 9 Apr 68

D

IRECTOR

HALPHA

F: DIRECTOR-89694

1. LITEMPO-72, ON 12 APRIL 1968, PROVIDED FOLLOWING REPORTS
LATING TO REFERENCE.

2. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRO-ASIAN LATIN AMERI-
N PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION(AALAPSO) IN HAVANA, DIRECTED
RAMON ECHAVARRIA, IS SENDING TO MEXICAN COMMUNISTS LARGE "BLACK
WER" POSTERS, WITH CAPTION "RETALIATION TO CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY
LENCE," IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, SPANISH AND ARABIC. ACKNOWLEDGE-
IT OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL IS TO BE MADE TO M. OSVALDO
EDES ALVAREZ, SIBISKE NAMESTI, C-1, BUBENEC, PRAGUE, CZECHOSLO-
KIA. POUCHING COPIES OF POSTER.

3. THE INDEPENDENT PEASANTS' CENTRAL (CCI), ON 5 APRIL,
RESSED LETTER TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, PROTESTING
INST THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, ATTRIBUTING TI
HE AGGRESSIVE AND FASCIST POLICIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT. LETTER
NDS ALSO AN END TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

CRET

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 MAY 78
E2 IMPDET CL BY 009560
012913

65

SECRET

326

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 326

1. Tab B-73 contains Memo B-88 dated 18 Apr 68

2. (X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 March 1977.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (X) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   ( ) Cryptonym
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
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13-00000

[redacted]

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in [redacted] provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against [redacted]

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative [redacted] 1968 an unidentified white [redacted] the [redacted] but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies [redacted] to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. [redacted] a- [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 May 1978

[redacted]

A-73
208

[redacted]

[redacted]

201-0832732

[redacted]

BASIC : [redacted] (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

[redacted]

18 April 1968

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  2 - [redacted]
  1 -
  1 -

[redacted]

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON Feb 9, 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 095604 12913

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 095604 12913
date Feb 9, 1978

(248)

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

201-0832132

BASIC : Mexico City 5247 (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds; jb

18 April 1968

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  2 - CI/OPS/DO
  1 - WH/1/Chrono
  1 - C/WH/FI

201-0832132

327

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 327

1. Tab B-74 contains Memo B-97 dated 25 April 68.

2. (✗) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ____________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 Mar 77.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ________.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ________.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ________.

   (✗) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (✗) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (✗) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (✗) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (✗) Cryptonym
   (✗) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number.
   (✗) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ____________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (✗) downgraded to confidential

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18-00000

[redacted]

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in [redacted] had passed [redacted] of an unidentified American who visited the [redacted]

2. Forwarded herewith are [redacted] passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these [redacted] were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

201-0832932

[redacted]

327

[redacted]

BASIC : [redacted]

PROJECT: [redacted]

25 April 1968

[redacted]

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 -
2 -
1 - [redacted]

[redacted]

201-0832732

285

CONFIDENTIAL

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in Mexico City had passed copies of photographs of an unidentified American who visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

2. Forwarded herewith are copies of the photographs passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these photos were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the photographs may be used in the course of an investigation so long as it is not connected in any way with this Office, and it is not revealed that the photographs were made in Mexico.

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 09560+12913
date 9 Oct 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 9 Oct 1978
E2 IMPDET CL BY 09560+12913

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201-0832132

2857

CONFIDENTIAL

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

BASIC : HMMA-34503

PROJECT: LIONION

25 April 1968

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds;jb

Distribution:
  Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  1 - WH/1/Chrono
  2 - CI/OPS/DO
  1 - C/WH/FI

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

201-0832732

CONFIDENTIAL

285







328

IED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

Tab 328 contains Press Items for DCI dated 25 April 1968

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

(✗) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND: Release in Toto

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as Unclassified was:

(✗) maintained
( ) classified to ________
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ________

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☒ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI

Date: 25 Apr
Item: #12
Ref: #

DISTRIBUTION:

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35

KING- SUSPECT (TOPS 7)

MEXICO CITY (AP)-MEXICAN AUTHORITIES QUESTIONED TODAY A U.S. CITIZEN THEY SAID RESEMBLES THE MAN WANTAD ON A CHARGE OF SLAYING OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THEN RELEASED HIM WITHOUT PRESSING ANY CHARGES.

DANIEL DAVID KENNEDY OF BALTIMORE, WHO SAID HE WAS ON A WALKING TOUR OF THE STATE OF SONORA, DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH KING'S DEATH. AN FBI AGENT, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS MR. SMITH, SAID THERE WAS NO RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN KENNEDY AND THE SUSPECT, JAMES EARLY RAY, ACCORDING TO POLICE IN THE CITY OF HERMOSILLO.

LT. ROBERTO FLETCHER OF THE JUDICIAL POLICE IN CABORCA, SONORA, HAD TAKEN KENNEDY INTO CUSTODY FROM A CABORCA HOTEL.

IN BALTIMORE, KENNEDY'S MOTHER, PEARK E. KENNEDY,USAID, "THERE IS JUST NO CONNECTION. HE DOESN'T EVEN LOOK LIKE HIM RAY.

CZ1106AES 4/25

Comment:

[redacted]

201-0832732

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.

329

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 329

ıb [redacted]-60 contains DRAFT MEMO - NOFF dated 26 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________

✓) Segregable portions previously recommended for released; but not sent to requester by IRS excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA. *

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

ırther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

* Initial review recommended. FIRST Coordinate draft memo w/ Nat'l Foreign Intell. Board (USIB).

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

-) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.

☒) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
☒) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☒) Location of CIA overseas installation
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
) Cryptonym
) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ________
) declassified
) desensitized
☒) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☒ [illegible] [ ] [illegible] [ ] [illegible]

[redacted]

DRAFT 26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on ____________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?
2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?
3. Is there any indication that Ray had in the past travelled outside the United States other than the October - November 1967 trip to Mexico as Galt?
4. Is there any indication that Ray had been issued a U.S. passport under his true name or any of his aliases?

66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 May 1978

5. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with any foreign intelligence service? If so, please provide all possible details.

6. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with foreigners in the United States, especially Cubans and Soviets?

7. Did Ray have any Communist connections?

8. Did Ray ever express any interest in Communism?

9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

10. Does it appear that Ray had any accomplices? If so, have any been identified?

11. Has the FBI identified any/of Ray's close friends or associates?

12. Have any contacts made by Ray in Mexico during October/November 1967 been identified?

13. If any accomplices, associates, or contacts have been identified, are any of them Communists or associated with Communists, foreign officials, or foreign intelligence services?

13-00000

[redacted]

14. Does the FBI think that Ray was hired to assassinate King?

15. If so, is there any indication that Communists or a foreign power were involved?

16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs

of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

[redacted]

201-0832735

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT   26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on __________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?
2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?
3. Is there any indication that Ray had in the past travelled outside the United States other than the October - November 1967 trip to Mexico as Galt?
4. Is there any indication that Ray had been issued a U.S. passport under his true name or any of his aliases?

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 28 Feb 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

(60)

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

201-0832732

5. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with any foreign intelligence service? If so, please provide all possible details.

6. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with foreigners in the United States, especially Cubans and Soviets?

7. Did Ray have any Communist connections?

8. Did Ray ever express any interest in Communism?

9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

10. Does it appear that Ray had any accomplices? If so, have any been identified?

11. Has the FBI identified any of Ray's close friends or associates?

12. Have any contacts made by Ray in Mexico during October/November 1967 been identified?

13. If any accomplices, associates, or contacts have been identified, are any of them Communists or associated with Communists, foreign officials, or foreign intelligence services?

CONFIDENTIAL

14. Does the FBI think that Ray was hired to assassinate King?

15. If so, is there any indication that Communists or a foreign power were involved?

16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs taken in October 1967 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

201-0833[illegible]

330

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 332.

68 contains DISPATCH OEPA-1097 w/attc (2) dated 29 April 1968

☒ Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

☐ Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

☐ Located during the DDO appeals review.

☐ Referred to DDO for review by ______.

rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

☐ Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
- ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
- ☐ DROP exemption(s) ______.

☐ Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
- ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
- ☐ DROP exemption(s) ______.

☐ Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

☐ Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

☒ Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

☐ Information from a foreign liaison service
☐ Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
☒ Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
☐ Information pertaining to a source
☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
☒ Locations of CIA overseas installations
☐ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
☐ Name of CIA employee
☒ File number
☒ Pseudonyms
☒ Cryptonyms
☐ Internal organizational data
☐ Name of FBI agent
☐ FBI file number
☒ Privacy of other individuals
☐ OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Deletions in this document have been made to protect an operational activity, i.e., the gathering of information on individuals, the reporting of this information and the planning of covert activities based on the reporting.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

☐ maintained
☐ classified to ______
☐ declassified
☐ desensitized
☒ downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

14

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION
	[redacted]		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, [redacted]		XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, [redacted]; Chief, [redacted] Chief [redacted]			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, [redacted]			MICROFILM
SUBJECT [redacted]			

Rptd 9 Dec 68

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

Reference: [redacted], dated 17 April 1968

1. [redacted] reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris. [redacted] her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1) [redacted]

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre. [redacted]

Attachments: 2
  1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
  2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

[redacted]

/CONTINUED.../

(68)

Distribution:
  1 - [redacted] w/atts
  ~~2~~ [redacted] w/atts
  1 - [redacted] w/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE	[redacted]	29 April 1968
Date 20 May 1978	CLASSIFICATION [redacted]	HQS FILE NUMBER [redacted]

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO: [redacted]

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING

PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

HYMN No. 429 "For All the Saints" (vrs. 1-5) Sine Nomine

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES - The Hon. Woodruff Wallner, Chargé d'Affaire - U.S. Embassy

OLD TESTAMENT LESSONS - Canon James McNamee - American Cathedral
Psalm 90
Daniel 3:16-25

PRAYERS - Dean Sturgis Riddle - American Cathedral

MESSAGES FROM THE FRENCH CHURCHES

The Rev. Dr. Charles Westphal - Federation Protestante de France
Mgsr. Julien Gouet - Roman Catholic Diocese of Paris
Pastor Henri Vincent- Eglise Baptiste de France

NEW TESTAMENT LESSONS - The Rev. Dr. Clayton E. Williams, Pastor Emeritus - American Church
Romans 8:31-39
Matthew 10:24-39

ANTHEM - The Choir
"Psalm of Penitence" From King David by Arthur Honegger

(Mercy on me, O Lord; pity, according to thy great compassion. Wipe away my transgression; cleanse me unto the depth of my iniquity. In sin was I conceived. In evil was I born. And thou wouldst have a pure soul? I have sinned. Thou hast taught me thy wisdom, and I have failed in my weakness. Mercy on me, O Lord.")

TRIBUTE TO DR. KING - Mrs. Carline Polite - American Author

FROM AN ADDRESS BY DR. KING - Washington, D.C., Aug. 28, 1965
Read by Mr. Neville Aurelius - Actor

PRAYERS - The Rev. Martin v.B. Sargent - American Church

HYMN - "We Shall Overcome" Negro Spiritual

We shall overcome, we shall overcome,
We shall overcome some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall overcome someday.

We shall live in peace, we shall live in peace,
We shall live in peace some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall live in peace some day.

We shall brothers be, we shall brothers be,
We shall brothers be some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall brothers be some day,

RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

**** A book of condolences is in the chapel to your right for those who wish to sign it.

MEETING EN FAVEUR DU « POUVOIR NOIR » LE 29 AVRIL A LA MUTUALITÉ

Au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée lundi à Paris, M. James Foreman, ancien président du Comité de coordination des étudiants non violents (S.N.C.C.), aujourd'hui responsable des affaires internationales du S.N.C.C., a annoncé qu'un meeting en faveur du « pouvoir noir » aurait lieu à la Mutualité, le 29 avril à 20 heures. Outre M. Foreman, qui est également « ministre des affaires étrangères » du parti des Panthères noires, MM. Aimé Césaire, Daniel Guérin, Jean-Paul Sartre et Vercors participeront notamment à cette réunion au cours de laquelle deux films seront projetés : *Now*, de S. Alvarez, et *Jazz d'avant-garde*.

Au cours de sa conférence de presse, M. Foreman a évoqué le meurtre du pasteur King, « *exemple du génocide* » que commet contre les Noirs américains « *la société exploiteuse blanche raciste* », et l'adoption par le Congrès américain du projet de loi interdisant la discrimination raciale dans le logement. Ce texte de loi contient en effet un certain nombre de clauses répressives visant, selon M. Foreman, à « *liquider* » les leaders noirs. M. Foreman a également lancé un appel en faveur de plusieurs membres du parti des Panthères noires emprisonnés à Oakland (Californie), à la suite d'une fusillade avec la police le 6 avril dernier, qui a fait un mort — un jeune Noir de dix-sept ans.

330

13-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/R Y B A T

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WOLIME
Chief, WOMUSE; Chief, EUR Division;
Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: MHALPHA/MHPROBE/RODIGAST

Rqd 9 Dec 68

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: OSPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968

1. RODIGAST reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris. The young female leader of the SNCC girls in Paris flew to the U.S. several days later in order to be "where the action is." She does not plan to return but was very impressed by her stay in Paris saying that she will try to persuade other SNCC members to avail themselves of the valuable experience to be gained from working with the various revolutionary groups in Paris. As we foresaw in Reference this has left the SNCC group in the joint hands of IDENTITIES A and C of Reference. Invitations have poured in to speak at various meetings and it appears likely that IDENTITY A of Reference will represent SNCC at many of these meetings. Her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1) Needless to say, this renders all the more pressing an early decision on the proposal contained in Reference.

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre. QRPHOTO/1 told RODIGAST that there had been some

Attachments: 2
1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

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/CONTINUED.../

Distribution:
1 - C/WOLIME w/atts
2 - C/WOMUSE w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/atts
2 - COS/London w/atts

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Jul 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of
date 28 Jul 1978

68

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OSPA-1097

DATE: 29 April 1968

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~/R Y B A T

HQS FILE NUMBER: 100-6-148/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL R Y B A T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER OEPA-1097

confusion regarding Sartre's willingness to speak. He had originally accepted to speak at a culturally oriented "gala" to be held at the Theatre National Populaire and there was a question regarding his willingness to switch to this more political atmosphere. The "gala" (see earlier report, paragraph C of OEPA-918) is now being planned for some time in May.

3. IDENTITY C of Reference is reported by RODIGAST to be working with Foreman in planning for the Mutualite meeting. She is so busy that she has temporarily left her child with her mother. IDENTITY C of Reference is also said to be working on another project—possibly involving travel—which is confidential at this point.

Adrian B. MASLOTT

CONFIDENTIAL

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO:
OEPA-1097

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING
PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

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Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall brothers be some day,

RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

**** A book of condolences is in the chapel to your right for those who wish to sign it.

HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1097



MEETING EN FAVEUR DU « POUVOIR NOIR » LE 29 AVRIL À LA MUTUALITÉ

Au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée lundi à Paris, M. James Foreman, ancien président du Comité de coordination des étudiants non-violents (S.N.C.C.), aujourd'hui responsable des affaires internationales du S.N.C.C., a annoncé qu'un meeting en faveur du « pouvoir noir » aurait lieu à la Mutualité, le 29 avril à 20 heures. Outre M. Foreman, qui est également « ministre des affaires étrangères » du parti des Panthères noires, MM. Aimé Césaire, Daniel Guérin, Jean-Paul Sartre et Vercors participeront notamment à cette réunion au cours de laquelle deux films seront projetés : *Now*, de S. Alvarez, et *Jazz d'avant-garde*.

Au cours de sa conférence de presse, M. Foreman a évoqué le meurtre du pasteur King, « *exemple du génocide* » que commet contre les Noirs américains « *la société exploiteuse blanche raciste* », et l'adoption par le Congrès américain du projet de loi interdisant la discrimination raciale dans le logement. Ce texte de loi contient en effet un certain nombre de clauses répressives visant, selon M. Foreman, à « *liquider* » les leaders noirs. M. Foreman a également lancé un appel en faveur de plusieurs membres du parti des Panthères noires emprisonnés à Oakland (Californie), à la suite d'une fusillade avec la police le 6 avril dernier, qui a fait un mort — un jeune Noir de dix-sept ans.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
This

JFK15
F3

331

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 331

Tab A-69 contains DISPATCH HMMA-34688 dated 20 May 1968.
w/ 9 atts (missing)

☑ Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

☐ Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

☐ Located during the DDO appeals review.

☐ Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
Att. C. refers to KING

I RECOMMEND:

☒ Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.
  - ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
  - ☐ DROP exemption(s) ______.

☐ Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  - ☐ ADD exemption(s) ______.
  - ☐ DROP exemption(s) ______.

☐ Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

☐ Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

☐ Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

- ☒ Information from a foreign liaison service
- ☐ Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
- ☒ Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
- ☐ Information pertaining to a source
- ☒ Information pertaining to intelligence methods
- ☒ Location of CIA overseas installation
- ☐ Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
- ☐ Name of CIA employee
- ☐ File number
- ☒ Pseudonyms
- ☒ Cryptonyms
- ☒ Internal organizational data
- ☐ Name of FBI agent
- ☐ FBI file number
- ☐ Privacy of other individual
- ☐ OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. This document could be considered an incidental reference to Martin Luther King.

ring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked SECRET was:

- ☐ maintained
- ☐ classified to ______
- ☐ declassified
- ☐ desensitized
- ☒ downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

[illegible] ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET ☐ TOP SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION

X MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, WOMUSE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Margaret RANDALL de MONDRAGON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

RYBAT MHALPHA

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

Reference : HMMW-16296, 5 April 1968

1. The following items from LIBIGHT/LIMUD coverage concern contacts of Subject who are believed to be of interest:

A. Attachment A: A letter from CAW, the magazine of Students for a Democratic Society, signed by Jerry *BODANES, thanks Margaret for her poems which they are using. The magazine is scheduled to be off the press around May 10. The letter clearly indicates that the SDS was behind the student seizure of Columbia University. It says, "Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University--now named Malcolm X University--and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies. The others, faculty, deans, managers, are all scurrying and speaking pious--saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations to resist, our movement has over reached." Enclosed is a check made out against the account of the SDS in the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 2681 Broadway, New York, for the amount of $50, and signed by Robert M. *SHAPIRO.

Continued....................

Attachments:
As listed (9), h/w

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 mar 78
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CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 34688

DATE: 20 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET/RYBAT~~

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

A-69

B. Attachment B: Letter from Heiner *BASTIAN, 1415 Kearny St., San Francisco, California 94135, signed Heiner & Celine. BASTIAN has made arrangements with the editor-in-chief of AKZENTE to publish works of revolutionary poets, and he asks Margaret's help in collecting them. BASTIAN says that he is going to Berlin about 1 July, to Prague in early autumn for a "group 47 meeting," and to Cuba in early November.

C. Attachment C: Letter from Jaime *CARRERO, Art Department of the Interamerican University in San German, Puerto Rico. CARRERO has apparently sent Margaret a series of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther KING's assassination. He describes them as "poetic...but full with guts and disgust." He says there is a possibility CBS will do a program on his paintings and the work in his Art Department. CARRERO is going to Columbia University in the summer of 1968 to study and plans to distribute El Corno there.

D. Attachment D: Letter from Susan *SHERMAN, 305 E. 6th St., No. 3, New York, N. Y. (see HMMA-33837). She tells of her plans to go to StoneyBrook on 23 April to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. She tells Margaret that there are three people in Cuba she thinks would be interested in "The Hippie Book." They are Jose *BELL Lara, of Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana, who is connected with Pensimento Critico; Cuban psychologist Gustavo *TORROELLA, Ave. 3A #22, Marianao, Habana; and Lohania *ARUCA, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. ONU 516, La Habana.

E. Attachment E: Margaret got a letter from someone associated with CATERPILLAR. He is thinking of getting married to Marie *BENOIT in England this summer when he goes there to work in applied philosophy. Therefore, he tells Margaret he cannot go to Cuba as planned.

2. Attachment F: An interesting development was the fact that Margaret RANDALL received a letter from Moscow from Luis *SUARDIAZ, whose return address was given as the Cuban Embassy, Moscow, URSS. SUARDIAZ asks for Suzan SHERMAN (see paragraph 1D above). SUARDIAZ says he will be working as Cultural Counselor in the Cuban Embassy and hopes Margaret will keep in touch with him and send him things of interest (in a literary line).

3. In attachment G, Sergio MONDRAGON, Subject's husband, indicates that Margaret RANDALL is planning to travel to Venezuela from 15 to 30 June. It is suggested that Headquarters may wish to send Venezuela some background information on Margaret with suggestions for action by the Venezuela Station.

4. Attachments H and I concern a book which Margaret is hoping to write on Fidel CASTRO. According to Sergio's letter of April 18, she is planning to go to Cuba in October with a tape recorder, and then, based on these tapes, will write her book. Sergio suggests Doubleday as a publisher; however, on 25 April 1968 Paula McGuire of Pantheon Books (attachment I) wrote Margaret saying that publisher might be interested. It is suggested that WOLIME may have contacts in these two publishing houses.

Elsie I. [illegible]
for Willard C. CURTIS

HMMA-34688

Att A.



CAW (Badones)
Bx 332
Cooper Station
New York 44, (10003)

Air Mail

Margaret Randall
([illegible])
Apto Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
Mexico

Air Mail

NEW YORK, N.Y.
PM
68

U.S. POSTAGE
6c
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

CAW!
MAGAZINE OF
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Box 332, Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003
(212) 674-8310

Dear Margaret Randall,

Thank you very much for those great great poems. We are using as many of them as we can. I will let you know exactly which ones. The magazine is coming out around May 10. Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University — now named Malcolm X University — and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies — The others, faculty, Deans, Managers, are all scurrying and hatching plots — saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations, to resist, our movement has ever reached

— Jerry [illegible]

check enclosed



No. 69

MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

April 18 1968 1-12/210

Pay to the order of Margaret Randall $50.00

Exactly Fifty DOLLARS

CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY
2681 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

Robert [illegible] Shapiro

⑆0210⑈0012⑆ 073⑈00252⑈

13-00000

HMMA-34658

Att. B



Heiner Bastian
1415 Kearny St
San Francisco
Cal. 94133/USA

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
APR 10
PM
1968

LAW DAY U
FREEDOM UNDER
MAY

VIA AIR MAIL

Margaret Randall
editor in chief of EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
Apartado Postal Núm. 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
Mexico

Dear Margaret,

I would like to thank you for your letter and the two issues of "el corno". The reason for my late answer is simply that I waited for the definite decision of the editor in chief of AKZENTE about our project. His answer is a total agreement!

I am very pleased about that and I hope that you are too. I would suggest that you collect about 10 -15 revolutionary poets. You should write an introduction or whatever you like. I also suggest that you and not sergio should collect as many or less "other" poets. If you don't want to do that, please arrange something with sergio. It makes things much easier for me)mailings, translations, proofs, etc)

I need all the material in about 5 -6 weeks. If this date will put pressure on you, let me know.

We are going in about 10 weeks to Berlin, in early autumn to Prague (group 47 meeting) and will go to Cuba early november. At this time we should be able to visit you.

MAO TSE-TUNG: In the last analysis, all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: "To rebel is justified."... According to this principle, stand up and resist, struggle, build sozialism.

EVER ONWARD TO VICTORY

Love to you and your children

[illegible] & Céline

HMMA-34688

Att: e

Jaime Carrero
Departmaneto de Arte
Universidad Interamericana
San German, Puerto Rico 00753

Margaret Randall
Editor; EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
apartado postal 13-546
MEXICO DF 13

CORREO AEREO

SAN GERMAN P.R.
APR 29
PM
1968

San Germán, Puerto Rico
April 27, 1968

Dear Meg:

I've received Bhe group of Cornos #24 and 25,26. I've also eent a serie of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther King's assasination. They are poetic as usual but full with guts and disgust. The US will get no where with this killing of the best of their sons. Your work is getting there-here- where it is needed, so keep up the excellent job you are doing- since I know that you are working under a tremendous pressaure. Very soon I'll send some money. Again I want ten Cornos 24- if you have any left. These drawings are getting a lot of attention especially in our younger generation which is where it counts.
There is a possibility of CBS doing aprogram of what I am doing in painting and in our Art Department- if it comes through I'll put a word or two about el Corno. This is to happen -if- you know- in the fall.
I'm going to New York during Au june- 'till ugust-and I'll be studying at Columbia. I'll take with me some cornos to distribute. If you want to give any messages or anything that I can do in New York while there-please-let me know.
Bueno, Meg- como siempre-la familia receives my best regards and you my sincere love and efforts.

Jim   Be careful with money.

HMMA: 34658

Att D

NEW YORK, N.Y.
APR 25
PM
1968

STR[illegible] AT CANCER
E
AME[illegible]ER SOCIETY

VIA AIR MAIL

Susan Sherman
305 E. 6th St. #3
New York, N.Y. 10003
U.S.A.

Margaret Randall
c/o El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal #13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

IKON
78 E. 4
STREET
NYC, NY

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1968

(#67)

Dear Meg,

Just a note--I'm going this afternoon to StoneyBrook to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. I finally got most of my things & I have a packet of poetry that I'm sure was meant for you--it was the poems Tania meant for you--it must have gotten mixed up in my things. In any case I'm sending them in a separate envelop Air-Mail.

The Hippie Book is really great looking, thank you for it. There are two people in Cuba I think would be very interested in it if you could send them copies. One works on Pensimento Critico--Jose Bell Lara, Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana--he particularly wanted information about the Hippies. The other is a Cuban psychologist Gustavo Torroella, Ave 3A #22, Marianao, Habana, who was also extremely interested in anything concerning hipppies. Also Lohania Aruca, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. XXX ONU 516, La Habana.

It seems now as if I also have a small ulcer which showed up on last weeks X-rays. But I'm feeling much, much better now. Just have to try not to get too excited and eat right for awhile. It should go away if I'm good. (but then I dont give myself agrivation so its only partly up to me). That was what was probably causing all the trouble in Cuba. Anyway, I'm much better now. I really have to learn not to take everything so much to heart--but thats a long lesson.

I'm going to try to get the issue in shape the next few days. will give blow by blow descriptions. so you'll probably be hearing from me quite often. Its lousy cold here again, I think Spring took a look at New York and decided to go elsewhere!

Love, & more,

Susan

HMMA-31658

Att. E



CATERPILLAR
38 GREENE STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10013

N[illegible] YORK, N.Y.
APR 29
PM
1968
CHINA. ST. STA.

Meg Randall
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

AIR MAIL

28 April 1968

dear Meg,

I am sorry to have put the Japanese filmmaker on you; my misjudgement. You were right to send the thing back to me.

Some changes in my life have recently re-determined the summer, and I am doubtful tonight, really doubtful for the first time (tho I have been thinking about this for a couple of weeks, but have not written because Everything was up in the air), about the trip this summer. The thing is that a more important thing has come up, namely going to England this fall to do some very important work in an applied philosophy called Scientology (to go "clear" as they call it), and doing that I must teach all summer to make money and also to do work on the fall issue of CATERPILLAR. Marie Benoit and I are seriously considering getting married in England, and while I could put the trip off until next spring, she wants to do the thing this fall, and we both want to go clear together. So, considering all of this, I think you should scratch my name, and hope I can go to Cuba later as well as hope the Cubans will see fit to invite me later (I have heard nothing from any Cubans about the trip this summer, so I figured it is not completely set). All of the other names I sent you are still to my knowledge good.⊗ If I hear otherwise I will write you immediately.

⊗ However, if since I'm not going affects the going of others, let me know & I would contact them.

CATERPILLAR 3/4 is out, and 3 copies are on their way to you. I will mail a box of #2 and more 3/4s when I get the time. Sorry not to hv sent more, but only 3 went out to the contributors this time and I forgot about you sending some to Cuba when I mailed yours. Saw Sergio a few weeks ago. It was nice to see him. We had supper in Chinatown and I gave him a new poem.

A number of people have commented on your prose/poem in #3/4. Very impressive is the general word. I hope it looks good to you when you see the magazine. I have a great deal new work; are you open to printing more of my poetry in a forthcoming EL CORNO? I hope you are not upset my change in plans. This Sunday is the first day they have been definite. Hoping your life goes well these days,

affectionately,

HMMA-34658

Att F



ПОЧТА СССР 6 коп.

ПОЧТА СССР 10 коп.

Margaret Randall
Apartado Postal No 13-546
Revista "El Corno Emplumado"
México D.F.

México

PAR AVION

13-00000

México abril-20-68
"Año del Guerrillero Heroico"

Muy bella y querida Margaret:

Acabo de llegar. Aquí trabajaré como Consejero Cultural de Cuba (en México-URSS) aunque eventualmente viajaré a otros países. Me traje los dos últimos números de "El Corno..." (25 y 26) y tu libro de poemas. Muy bella la portada con la [illegible] de la canción protesta. Tú ¿Cómo estás? He escrito bastante últimamente, aun cuando no he publicado mucho. Trabajaré en cosas aquí, ahora que la [illegible] ya no enfría la inspiración. No dejes de escribirme y decirme si puedo serte útil en algo, así como enviarme números futuros de la revista y todo lo que te →

parezca interesante. Mi dirección es
bien sencilla: Luis Guardia
Embajada de Cuba, Moscú, URSS.

¿Qué sabes de Susan
Sherman? Saludos a los
compañeros mexicanos.

Un abrazo muy cariñoso
para ti

Leí cosas muy ingeniosas de Beltrán
Morales ¿puedes enviarme su dirección?
También gusté de Cecilia Vicuña (me
refiero únicamente a las gentes que no
conozco, por eso no abundo sobre W.C.W.,
Roque, Sergio, Cardenal, Torri, Sefeis.....)
Quiero antes leer más de Morales. Y quisiera
saber más de él. Gracias por anticipado ___

HMMA-34655

Att: 6

Mondragón
Illinois State U.
Dept. of foreign langs
Normal, Ill., 61761

NORMAL
MAY 1
AM
1968

Margaret Randall
El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal 13-546
México 13, D.F.
MEXICO

SCHEDULE B
(Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

Supplemental Schedule of Income and Retirement Income Credit

(From pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, and estates or trusts)

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1967

Name and address as shown on page 1 of Form 1040

Part I.—PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME

A.—General Rule (If you did not contribute to the cost of the pension or annuity, enter the total amount received on line 6 and omit lines 1 through 5.)

				AMOUNT
1 Investment in contract		4 Amount received this year		
2 Expected return		5 Amount excludable (line 4 multiplied by line 3)		
3 Percentage of income to be excluded (line 1 divided by line 2)	%	6 Taxable portion (excess of line 4 over line 5)		

B.—Special Rule—Where your employer has contributed part of the cost and your own contribution will be recovered tax-free within 3 years. If your cost was fully recovered in prior years, enter the total amount received on line 5 and omit lines 1 through 4.

1 Cost of annuity (amounts you paid)		4 Amount received this year		
2 Cost received tax-free in past years				
3 Remainder of cost (line 1 less line 2)		5 Taxable portion (excess, if any, of line 4 over line 3)		

Part II.—RENT AND ROYALTY INCOME

1. Kind and location of property	2. Total amount of rents	3. Total amount of royalties	4. Depreciation (explain in Part IV) or depletion (attach computation)	5. Repairs (attach itemized list)	6. Other expenses (attach itemized list)
1 Totals					

2 Net income (or loss) from rents and royalties (column 2 plus column 3 less columns 4, 5, and 6)

Part III.—INCOME (OR LOSSES) FROM PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES OR TRUSTS, ETC.

1 Partnerships (name, address, employer identification number, and nature of income)

2 Small business corporations (subchapter S—name, address, and employer identification number)

3 Estates or trusts (name, address, and employer identification number)

TOTAL OF PARTS I, II, AND III (Enter here and on page 2, Part II, line 3, Form 1040)

Part IV.—SCHEDULE FOR DEPRECIATION CLAIMED IN PART II ABOVE

—This schedule is designed for taxpayers using the alternative guidelines and administrative procedures described in Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 as well as for those taxpayers who wish to continue using practices authorized prior to these revenue procedures. Where double headings appear, use the first heading for depreciation under Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 and the second heading for other authorized practices.

1. Group and guideline class Description of property	2. Cost or other basis at beginning of year —OR— Cost or other basis	3. Asset additions in year (amount) —OR— Date acquired	4. Asset retirements in year (amount) (applicable only to Rev. Proc. 62–21)	5. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	6. Method of computing depreciation	7. Class life —OR— Rate (%) or life	8. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below)							
Total cost or other basis							

2 Total depreciation (Enter here and in Part II, column 4 above)

SUMMARY OF DEPRECIATION

	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Additional first year (section 179)	Other (specify)	Total
1 Under Rev. Proc's. 62–21 and 65–13				▨	▨		
2 Other							

Part V.—RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT

A.—General Rule

If separate return, use column B only. If joint return, use column A for wife and column B for husband→	A		B	
Did you receive earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967? (Widows or widowers see instructions, page B–3)	☐ Yes	☐ No	☐ Yes	☐ No
If answer above is "Yes" in either column, furnish all information below in that column.				
1 Retirement income for taxable year:				
(a) For taxpayers under 65 years of age: Enter only income received from pensions and annuities under public retirement systems (e.g. Fed., State Govts., etc.) included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040				
(b) For taxpayers 65 years of age or older: Enter total of pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule				
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation	$1,524	00	$1,524	00
3 Deduct:				
(a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income				
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over):				
(1) Taxpayers under 62 years of age, enter amount in excess of $900				
(2) Taxpayers 62 or over but under 72, enter amount determined as follows: If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700, enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or if over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450				
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)				
5 Balance (subtract line 4 from line 2)				
6 Line 5 or line 1, whichever is smaller				

7 (a) Total (add amounts on line 6, columns A and B). If line 7(a) is less than $2,286 and this is a joint return and both husband and wife are age 65 or over, complete the Alternative Computation in B below which may result in a larger credit.		
(b) Amount from line 7 of part B below, if applicable		
8 Tentative credit. Enter 15% of line 7(a) or 15% of line 7(b), whichever is greater		
LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT		
9 Amount of tax shown on page 1, line 12, Form 1040		
10 Less: Credits claimed for foreign taxes or tax-free covenant bonds		
11 Subtract line 10 from line 9		
12 Credit. Enter here and on page 2, Part V, line 1, Form 1040, the amount on line 11 or line 8, whichever is smaller		

B.—Alternative Computation (after completing lines 1 through 7(a) above)

This method available if:
- a. You are married and filing a joint return
- b. Both husband and wife are 65 or over, AND
- c. Either one, or both received earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967.

Furnish the information called for below for both husband and wife even if only one answered "Yes" in column A or B above.

1 Retirement income of both husband and wife from pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule						
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation					$2,286	00
3 Deduct:	A—WIFE		B—HUSBAND			
(a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income						
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over): If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700 enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or If over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450						
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)						
5 Total (add amounts on line 4, columns A and B)						
6 Balance (subtract line 5 from line 2)						
7 Enter here and on line 7(b) of part A above, the amount on line 6 or line 1, whichever is smaller						



115

SERGIO MONDRAGON
1012 SOUTH MAIN 129
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

May 1st 1968

70-1496
711

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Margaret Randall $150.00

(One hundred and fifty dollars, no/100) DOLLARS

FIRST NATIONAL BANK of normal
NORMAL, ILLINOIS

Sergio Mondragón

FOR

⑆0711⑉1496⑆ 815⑉736⑈

Querida Meg: Aquí te va este dinero para Mayo. Meg, he hecho una encuesta entre varios poetas hispanoamericanos acerca de la poesía. todos prometieron contestar las preguntas por estos días. He estado esperando esas respuestas, y por eso hoy, 1o. de Mayo, todavía no te envío mi [illegible]; pero seguro el viernes 3, te lo mando. (aunque no incluya esas respuestas de poetas). Ojalá tuvieras

②

tiempo de ponerme una carta. Cómo están ustedes? cómo fue con tus padres? Mañana voy a dar una conferencia sobre Cuba, en inglés. Espero que no haya dificultades. Yo estoy bien. Gracias por los 2 libros que me enviaste. Me gustan mucho ambos. Estoy de acuerdo en lo que dices de los Hippies. Enteramente de acuerdo. Y tus

③

poemas son muy bellos. Enhorabuena! Pareces muy activa, muy despierta, muy poeta. Parece que nos hizo bien la separación, no? Dime si vas a ir a Venezuela del 15 al 30 de junio, para hacer mis planes. Creo que llegaré allí el 15 ó 16 de junio. Saludos! Sergio

HMMA-31653

Att. #

Mondragón - Dept. of foreign languages.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

NORMAL, IL
APR 18
5 PM
1968
61761

AIR MAIL

margaret randall
el corno emplumado
apartado postal 13-546
méxico 13, d.f.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Department of Foreign Languages

Telephone: 309-438-2211

abril 18 de 1968.

querida meg:

acaban de llegarme como seis cartas tuyas juntas, con fotos, cartas de los chicos, noticias, etc. -gracias. lástima del pelo de saris. esa es una de las razones -la única razón- por lo cual nq me gusta que los chicos pasen la noche en tlalpan. por la insalubridad. estoy seguro que los piojos los toman allá muchas veces. en fin. qué mala noticia lo del coche. meg, no te parece que tus amigos -por lo menos dos amigos- están tomando ventajas de ti? primero fue rodolfo, quien desaparece con la grabadora. ya la devolvió? y ahora otro amigo te choca el coche y no te lo paga. dices que te va a costar más de mil pesos. te parece justo? a mí no.

gracias por los ocho dólares de mi nota. cobraste mis 700 pesos de educación? estuve en nueva york para las vacaciónes de pascua. me quedé con leandro y evi. fui también a montreal y visité a los bowering. recordamos muchas cosas, hablamos horas acerca de tiempos felices, cuando tú y yo éramos una pareja llena de amor. allí estaba ~~[illegible]~~ leonel kearns y otro poeta canadiense que hemos publicado y no recuerdo su nombre. dicen que tal vez vengan pronto a méxico. en n.y. vi a los petersen. me trataron muy bien. te mandan muchos saludos y es casi seguro que vengan a méxico en el verano. yo les invité a quedarse en la casa, ya sea que tú estés allí o en venezuela. siendo tan amigos tuyos creo que está bien. pero ellos alquilarán un apartamento, por lo menos la mayor parte del tiempo. vi también a sara blackburn, mujer maravillosa con quien hice mucha amistad. le entusiasmó la idea de tu libro sobre castro que vas a hacer en octubre con la grabadora , y me dijo que ella podría proponer ese mismo libro a una ediotrial grande como Doubleday o otra igual. me parece que te va a escribir. sabes que ella tiene mucha influencia en el mundo literario de la grandes compañías editoriales. quiero pedirte un favor para ella: envíale el libro de o. paz "corriente alterna" a su domicilio, 50 W. 8 st., n.y.c.,10011- cuesta como 12.00 pesos. es urgente. gracias. vi también a clayton eshelman, me invitó a comer. está muy bien, mejor que nunca y muy amistoso. conocí también a su mujer, que me pareció una mujer muy triste, aunque buena. evi y leandro están bien. todos en n.y. te qeieren muchoy te admiran y admiran al corno. la revista se agota en tres días en 8 st. bookshape. andrei codrescu me dijo que debes enviar más ejemplares. tienen en la tienda un aviso de tu libro, anunciado entre las "novedades".

felicidades por tu antología de poesía revolucionaria. y por el manuscrito que te piden en londres. parece que una compañía grande de aquí quiere que les haga una antologia de poesía hisp. -vamos a ver. qué sucedió con mi libro en el fondo? la universidad parece que no va a publicar mi libro. mala suerte la de ese aprendiz de brujo. ángela y george están muy bien. parece que se aman mucho. angela y todos, sara, clayton, etc., cuando ~~supieron~~ dije que vas a cuba en octubre, dijeron inmediatamente que tal vez vas a ser mrs. fidel castro, o al menos su amante. sara dijo que se moría de envidia. han salido más cosas del corno en los periódicos? envíame algunos recortes. bueno, ama a los chicos y cuídate. te mandé una carta hablándote de los poemas de marco antonio. también envié ya su manuscrito de regreso, y me quedé con unos poemas suyos. escríbeme. dime si crees que los niños están resientiendo mucho la separación, y en qué forma. abrazos y abrazos. Sergio

13-00000

HMMA-34658

Att I



PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

AIR MAIL

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
A DIVISION OF RANDOM HOUSE, INC.

Paula McGuire

April 25, 1968

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

Dear Miss Randell:

My former colleague Sara Blackburn (who sends her love) has told me that she recently heard through your husband about your plans for a trip to Cuba in order to write a book on Castro. I should be very interested to know more about your plans with a view towards the possibility of publishing your book and hope you'll be able to write me.

Incidentally, we are about to publish Jose Yglesias's In the Fist of the Revolution: Life in a Cuban Country Town. I thought you'd be interested to read it and have sent you a copy under separate cover.

Yours sincerely,

Paula McGuire

PM:ib

TAB
332

NO DOCS
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32

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] :333

Tab.[redacted]-55 contains MEMO B-173 W/ATT-(1) NEWSPAPER dated 19 Sept 1968.

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.

(✓) Segregable portions previously recommended for released, but not sent to requester by IPS excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ____________________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________________.

(X) Sustain initial [redacted] sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(3) of FOIA.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) (b)(1).

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ____________________ of __________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________________ of __________.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
(X) File number/name
( ) Pseudonym
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( ) Name of FBI agent
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COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. [redacted]

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( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to __________

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[redacted]

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

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PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), 9-15 May 1968

Enclosure: as stated (one) [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 March 78

[redacted]

55

Le peuple soviétique est fidèle à STALINE !

Clarté

Fondateur : Honoré WILLEMS, fusillé par les nazis, le 29 février 1944.

> BIEN QUE LA DIRECTION DU PARTI ET DE L'ETAT SOVIETIQUES SOIT A PRESENT USURPEE PAR DES REVISIONNISTES, JE CONSEILLE AUX CAMARADES D'AVOIR LA CONVICTION QUE LES LARGES MASSES DU PEUPLE SOVIETIQUE, DES MEMBRES DU PARTI ET DES CADRES SONT BONS ET VEULENT FAIRE LA REVOLUTION ; LA DOMINATION DU REVISIONNISME NE SERA PAS LONGUE.
>
> MAO TSE-TOUNG.

RÉDACTION
ADMINISTRATION
32, chaussée d'Alsemberg, 32
BRUXELLES 6
Tél. (02) 37.76.06

ORGANE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE
(MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE), DE BELGIQUE

HEBDOMADAIRE
NOUVELLE SERIE - Numéro 20
Semaine du 9 au 15 mai 1966
8 pages - 5 Francs
(Tarif d'abonnements : pages 8)

Stockely CARMICHAEL :
Notre objectif final :
Nous attaquer ax structures capitalstes des U.S.A.

Dans son numéro du Premier Mai, l'« HumanitNouvelle », organe central du Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France a pubi une interview de Stockely Carmichaël, leader du « Black Power » (Pouvoir Noir)Cette interview a été réalisée par un camarade africain lors du récent séjour de Carmichaël à Paris.

Le Black Power est un mouvement de masse de Afro-américains. Certaines de ses positions peuvent ne pas toujours coïncider aveccelles des marxistes-léninistes mais il est évident que le combat du Black Power est hroïque, courageusement anti-raciste, anti-impérialiste.

C'est cela qui est important. C'est pour cette aison que nous reproduisons ce remarquable document.

La grande vague de combativité qui déferle sur les grandes villes américaines, dressant, en un combat héroïque, les larges masses afro-américaines contre les forces réactionnaires, les violences racistes et l'ordre capitaliste établi, c'est déjà à l'intérieur de la citadelle impérialiste elle-même, l'amorce de « la lutte finale ». Elle consacre, par ailleurs, la faillite du mythe intégrationniste favorisé par la bourgeoisie américai-

STOCKELY CARMICHÆL — L'aspect principal de la situation du peuple afro-américain estcelui d'une nouvelle forme de colonialisme intérieur. Il s'agit d'une situation presque originale qui implique que notre lutte se fixe deux objectifs principaux :

— Objectif numéro 1 : éliminer l'oppression coloniale qui nous vise en tant que Noirs sur le triple plan économique, social et politique.

— Objectif numéro 2 : nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes et impérialistes des U.S.A.

Il est évident que l'objectif n°1 sera essentiellement poursuivi par les seuls afro-américains. Quant à l'objectif n°2, il concernera tous les révolutionnaires [illegible]

[illegible] l'attaque a démontré que la surveillance de l'opprimé ne saurait qu'envenimer la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples – et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais l'impérialisme, aux abois, tente dans un ultime effort, de jeter le discrédit sur la juste lutte du peuple afro-américain, en l'assimilant grossièrement à une « caravane d'incendies et de brigandages », en présentant ses leaders comme des « psychopathes, qui incitent publiquement au meurtre » (New York Times 12-1-68). Mais la mauvaise foi des capitalistes, elle aussi, a des limites. On est donc forcé de reconnaître, en une rage d'impuissance certes, « qu'aujourd'hui, la voix d'un Stokely Carmichael est entendue de plus en plus nettement dans le pays » (L'Economist du 11-1, Londres).

Que dit cette voix. De quelle lutte s'agit-il ? D'une simple lutte entre deux races ou de quelque chose d'autrement important ? Pourquoi les marxistes-léninistes et tous les progressistes doivent-ils la soutenir et la faire connaître ?

Des réponses apparaîtront dans le cours de l'exposé que Stokely Carmichael nous a fait récemment et que nous rendons public pour la première fois. Des réponses parfois na-

[illegible] problème du racisme

— le problème de l'exploitation.

J'ai indiqué plus haut que l'objectif n°2 était une œuvre d'ensemble ; simplement parce qu'il visait à résoudre un problème qui n'est pas particulier aux Noirs : le problème de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Il n'est pas nécessairement lié à la couleur de la peau.

Quant au problème du racisme, on peut dire qu'il est spécifique à l'homme noir. On peut même poser l'équation suivante : Noir = Prolétariat du monde. A cause de sa seule po[illegible]

L'Occident Blanc ne peut pas nier s'être d[illegible] sur la sueur du Noir. Prenez les Antilles françaises, holland[illegible] anglaises. La même sauce. Prenez les Etats-Unis des siècl[illegible]cédents. Prenez les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. Prenez l'Afrique. [illegible] histoire est éloquente à ce sujet.

Les Blancs de l'Occident trouvent leur ju[illegible]n d'occidental dans la négation du Noir en tant que Noir. Ils o[illegible] du Noir un être sub-humain pour rationaliser l'exploitation du Noir. Pour ne pas s'humilier en tant qu'hommes.

— Oui, bien sûr, il y a le « Code Noir » de Colbert. Mais tout de même, cette exploitation du Noir ne peut pas être simplement un fait de psychologie appliquée, car en fait, le racisme apparaît bien comme une manifestation de la lutte des classes. Il n'y a qu'à reprendre les exemples.

STOCKELY. — D'abord, il y a un problème immédiat : celui de la prise de conscience de la victime en face du bourreau. C'est en tant que Noirs que nous entendons nous battre.

Il reste qu'aux Etats-Unis, un Noir « bien placé » sur le plan économique n'échappe pas au racisme.

Il n'est que de lire la presse américaine pour s'en convaincre. Le problème du racisme ici n'est pas nécessairement lié au problème de l'exploitation.

Le racisme fait partie de l'arsenal idéologique et pratique de l'impérialisme américain. Les Noirs sont d'autant plus exposés que les Blancs occidentaux ont détruit les cultures africaines de l'homme noir, les Noirs, dans le monde, parlent la langue de leurs maîtres.

Or la culture comme dit Fanon, est une « force cohésive ». Il leur faut donc aussi résister à cette culture d'imposition (le pidgin, le petit-nègre ?).

Dans le cadre des Afro-américains cela transparaît sous la forme du christianisme. Le christianisme est une culture d'imposition, c'est-à-dire essentiellement une culture impérialiste, parce que liée à l'idée de la valeur universelle du maître. Vous devez en savoir quelque chose en Afrique, avec le cortège de conversions forcées.

En fait, la libération culturelle est une chose très importante. Elle doit viser à répéter le système d'éducation du maître (en tant que stade final de l'imposition culturelle). L'éducation capitaliste vise à

— De quel ordre est-elle ?

— Elle est nécessairement politique.

— L'une des limites objectives des dirigeants qui nous ont précédés est la suivante : ils ont fait appel aux oppresseurs et non aux opprimés. Nous, nous faisons appel aux opprimés. Nous leur disons :

« Si vous voulez être libres, il faut vous battre ! » Le président Mao Tsé-toung indique avec raison que « le pouvoir est au bout du fusil ». C'est juste. Nous opposerons nos fusils libérateurs aux fusils racistes de l'impérialisme américain, dans ses propres villes.

Nous le forcerons à se battre comme nous l'entendrons. Comme font nos camarades vietnamiens. S'il veut utiliser du napalm et des rockets sur ses propres villes, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénients, mais nous nous battrons, c'est une chose entendue.

— Vois-tu un rapport entre votre lutte et celles des camarades vietnamiens, et des autres peuples en lutte contre l'impérialisme, U.S. en tête ?

Bien évidemment, chaque fois que les bases de l'impérialisme sont minées à l'extérieur, notre lutte s'en trouve proportionnellement avantagée.

Nous voudrions bien par exemple qu'il se trouve un seul pays africain qui se développe par ses propres efforts, et non en allant mendier chez les Blancs occidentaux.

Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquière le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carmichaël à la suite

[illegible] ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en n'est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens dureront quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

- Les racistes et les impérialistes nord-américains maintiennent [illegible] Brown en prison et hier soir [illegible] assassiné Martin Luther King. Ils ont commis une grave erreur car il était le seul dirigeant qui exhortait la population noire des Etats-Unis à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne pas commettre d'actes de violence. Maintenant qu'ils ont assassiné King, aucun dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à ses frères de ne pas brûler les villes, et cela signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de s'engager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséquence de l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 25 villes, des incendies, des coups de feu, des combats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

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PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON,

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist),
9-15 May 1968
Enclosure: as stated (one)

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976
With newspaper clippings

55

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SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: CI/Ober

EXTENSION: 5847

NO. B-173

DATE: 19 Sept 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
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28 Feb 1978

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Originated by:CIOP/DO:M.Taylor
(19 Sept 68)

Based on: Clarte, Belgian
Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninist)
9-15 May 1968

Disseminated to: FBI on
19 ~~20~~ Sept 68

File: B-Memos (record copy)
PROD Brussels
cc: CARMICHAEL, Stokely
(soft) (w/enc)
PROD
cc: EYES ONLY B-173

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET 19 SEP 1968

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

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9-15 May 1968
Enclosure: as stated (one) (filed in Carmichael sens. soft)

Declassified by 060595
date 28 Feb 1978

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Fondateur : Honoré WILLEMS, fusillé par les nazis, le 29 février 1944.

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(MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE), DE BELGIQUE

HEBDOMADAIRE
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Nous attaquer ax structures capitalstes des U.S.A.

Dans son numéro du Premier Mai, l'« HumanitéNouvelle », organe central du Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France a publ une interview de Stockely Carmichaël, leader du « Black Power » (Pouvoir Noir)Cette interview a été réalisée par un camarade africain lors du récent séjour de Carmichaël à Paris.

Le Black Power est un mouvement de masse de Afro-américains. Certaines de ses positions peuvent ne pas toujours coïncider avecelles des marxistes-léninistes mais il est évident que le combat du Black Power est hroïque, courageusement anti-raciste, anti-impérialiste.

C'est cela qui est important. C'est pour cette aison que nous reproduisons ce remarquable document.

La grande vague de combativité qui déferle sur les grandes villes américaines, dressant, en un combat héroïque, les larges masses afro-américaines contre les forces réactionnaires, les violences racistes et l'ordre capitaliste établi, c'est déjà à l'intérieur de la citadelle impérialiste elle-même, l'amorce de « la lutte finale ». Elle concerne, par plusieurs, [illegible]

STOCKELY CARMICHÆL — L'aspect principal de la situation du peuple afro-américain estcelui d'une nouvelle forme de colonialisme intérieur. Il s'agit d'une situation presque originale qui implique que notre lutte se fixe deux objectifs principaux :

— Objectif numéro 1 : éliminer l'oppression coloniale qui nous vise en tant que Noirs sur le triple plan économique, social et politique.

— Objectif numéro 2 : nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes et impérialistes des U.S.A.

Il est [illegible]

Désormais, les perspectives sont claires : Memphis a démontré que la non-violence de l'opprimé ne saurait préserver de la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples - et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais l'impérialisme, aux abois, tente dans un ultime effort, de jeter le discrédit sur la juste lutte du peuple afro-américain, en l'assimilant grossièrement à une « sarabande d'incendies et de brigandage », en présentant ses leaders comme des « psychopathes, qui incitent publiquement au meurtre » (New York Times 12-1-68). Mais la mauvaise foi des capitalistes, elle aussi, a des limites. On est donc forcé de reconnaître, en une rage d'impuissance certes, « qu'aujourd'hui, la voix d'un Stokely Carmichael est entendue de plus en plus nettement dans le pays » (L'Economist du 11-1, Londres).

Que dit cette voix. De quelle lutte s'agit-il ? D'une simple lutte entre deux races ou de quelque chose d'autrement important ? Pourquoi les marxistes-léninistes et tous les progressistes doivent-ils la soutenir et la faire connaître ?

Des réponses apparaîtront dans le cours de l'exposé que Stokely Carmichael nous a fait récemment et que nous rendons public pour la première fois. Des réponses parfois [illegible]

jours [illegible]

— le problème du racisme
— le problème de l'exploitation.

J'ai indiqué plus haut que l'objectif n°2 était une œuvre d'ensemble ; simplement parce qu'il visait à résoudre un problème qui n'est pas particulier aux Noirs : le problème de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Il n'est pas nécessairement lié à la couleur de la peau.

Quant au problème du racisme, on peut dire qu'il est spécifique à l'homme noir. On peut même poser l'équatio[illegible]ivante : Noir = Prolétariat du monde. A cause de sa seule po[illegible]

L'Occident Blanc ne peut pas nier s'être d[illegible] sur la sueur du Noir. Prenez les Antilles françaises, hollan[illegible] anglaises. La même sauce. Prenez les Etats-Unis des siècl[illegible]cédents. Prenez les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. Prenez l'Afrique. [illegible] histoire est éloquente à ce sujet.

Les Blancs de l'Occident trouvent leur ju[illegible]n d'occidental dans la négation du Noir en tant que Noir. Ils o[illegible] du Noir un être sub-humain pour rationaliser l'exploitation du Noir. Pour ne pas s'humilier en tant qu'hommes.

— Oui, bien sûr, il y a le « Code Noir » de Colbert. Mais tout de même, cette exploitation du Noir ne peut pas être simplement un fait de psychologie appliquée, car en fait, le racisme apparaît bien comme une manifestation de la lutte des classes. Il n'y a qu'à reprendre les exemples.

STOCKELY. — D'abord, il y a un problème immédiat : celui de la prise de conscience de la victime en face du bourreau. C'est en tant que Noirs que nous entendons nous battre.

Il reste qu'aux Etats-Unis, un Noir « bien placé » sur le plan économique n'échappe pas au racisme.

Il n'est que de lire la presse américaine pour s'en convaincre. Le problème du racisme ici n'est pas nécessairement lié au problème de l'exploitation.

Le racisme fait partie de l'arsenal idéologique et pratique de l'impérialisme américain. Les Noirs sont d'autant plus exposés que les Blancs occidentaux ont détruit les cultures africaines de l'homme noir, les Noirs, dans le monde, parlent la langue de leurs maîtres.

Or la culture comme dit Fanon, est une « force cohésive »: Il leur faut donc aussi résister à cette culture d'imposition (le pidgin, le petit-nègre ?).

Dans le cadre des Afro-américains cela transparaît sous la forme du christianisme. Le christianisme est une culture d'imposition, c'est-à-dire essentiellement une culture impérialiste, parce que liée à l'idée de la valeur universelle du maître. Vous devez en savoir quelque chose en Afrique, avec le cortège de conversions forcées.

En fait, la libération culturelle est une chose très importante. Elle doit viser à répéter le système d'éducation du maître (en tant que stade final de l'imposition culturelle). L'éducation capitaliste vise à

— De quel ordre est-elle ?

— Elle est nécessairement politique.

— L'une des limites objectives des dirigeants qui nous ont précédés est la suivante : ils ont fait appel aux oppresseurs et non aux opprimés. Nous, nous faisons appel aux opprimés. Nous leur disons :

« Si vous voulez être libres, il faut vous battre ! » Le président Mao Tsé-toung indique avec raison que « le pouvoir est au bout du fusil ». C'est juste. Nous opposerons nos fusils libérateurs aux fusils racistes de l'impérialisme américain, dans ses propres villes.

Nous le forcerons à se battre comme nous l'entendrons. Comme font nos camarades vietnamiens. S'il veut utiliser du napalm et des rockets sur ses propres villes, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénients, mais nous nous battrons, c'est une chose entendue.

— Vois-tu un rapport entre votre lutte et celles des camarades vietnamiens, et des autres peuples en lutte contre l'impérialisme, U.S. en tête ?

Bien évidemment, chaque fois que les bases de l'impérialisme sont minées à l'extérieur, notre lutte s'en trouve proportionnellement avantagée.

Nous voudrions bien par exemple qu'il se trouve un seul pays africain qui se développe par ses propres efforts, et non en allant mendier chez les Blancs occidentaux.

Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquierre le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carmichaël à la

[illegible] ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en n'est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui, contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens durèrent quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

« Les racistes et les [illegible] nord-américains, maintenant [illegible] Brown en prison et hier soir [illegible] assassiné Martin Luther King [illegible] ont commis une grave erreur [illegible] il était le seul dirigeant qui exhortait la population noire des États-Unis à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne pas [illegible] mettre d'actes de violence. Maintenant qu'ils ont assassiné King, [illegible] dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à ses frères de ne pas brûler les villes [illegible] signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de s'engager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséquence de l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 35 villes, des incendies, des coups de feu, des combats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

JFK 15
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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 334

ab 0-75 contains MEMO B-191 dated 9 Oct 1968.

(✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(Liaison) (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

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rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) (b)(6).
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________________ of ________.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which would/[redacted] identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
(X) Names of CIA employees
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(X) Privacy of other individuals
( ) OTHER

MMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked SECRET was:

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( ) desensitized
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13-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

UBJECT: (Optional)

ROM: CI/Ober

EXTENSION: 5847

NO. B-191

DATE: 9 October 1968

O: (Officer designation, room number, and ilding)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

CI/SO Internal Use Only

EYES ONLY

Originated by: WH/7/R/PROlson
(8 October 68)

Based on: HJK-251
- a. para 405
- b. para 406
- c. para 411
- d. para 413
- e. para 417
- f. para 420

Disseminated to: FBI on 10 Oct 68

File: B-Memos (w/att) (record copy)

cc: 100-300-44

cc: PROD Kingston
PROD

EYES ONLY B-191

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

9 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jamaican Special Branch Report -
Jamaica/United States Black Power Ties

1. Pertinent items from the Jamaican Special Branch monthly report for April 1968, which contains several references to ties between Black Power groups in Jamaica and the United States, are provided, in full, below. A summary of the report, omitting portions concerning the United States or United States citizens, has been disseminated in CS-311/06459-68, a copy of which is attached.

2. The items of possible interest, omitted from the dissemination, are noted below:

a. During April 1968, four meetings of the Wilson faction of the Nation of Islam (NOI) were held. On 3 April, Percy Hayles, the boxer, said that he was impressed with the doctrine and had written to Elijah Mohammed asking for a scholarship to enable him to study in one of the Islam Universities in the United States. Errol Levy said that only a revolution could end the white man's practice of robbing the black people of everything.

b. At the meeting on 24 April, Cecil (Prince Buster) Campbell stated that the premises on 47 Charles Street in Kingston belonged to him and he was willing for it to be used for the assistance of the black race. He called for unity among black people and said that his organization was fighting to rule Jamaica. He told members that they should be prepared to meet the Reverend Sherriffe (aka Thomas View) who would soon be visiting the Island.

c. On the 5th and 8th of April, discussions were held led by George Vassel, leader of the Young Socialist

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75

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CONDUCTED ON 28 Jul 1978
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League and a member of the Jamaican (Caribbean) Workers Movement, on the possibility of holding demonstrations at the American Embassy in Kingston to protest against the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Vassel claimed that there was a United States citizen hiding in Jamaica to escape the draft who had in his possession recordings of speeches made by the late Malcolm X during 1964. One of these was entitled "The Ballot or Bullets". He stated that King's death disproved his theory of non-violence and was bringing into prominence men like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown.

d. During April, about 40 persons including Winston Monroe, Joseph Christie, Roy Jeffrey, Leonard Solomon and one Hy Survad, who is the American draft escapee referred to in Paragraph c. above, met at 23 Fourth Street, Trench Town (Dallas Corner), where Survad, identified as a Black Muslim and a member of the Black Power Movement (BPM), answered questions put to him by the gathering. It was understood that Survad was in Jamaica to solicit support for the BPM in the United States as well as to establish a branch here. The record "The Ballot or Bullets" was played by Survad and recorded by Monroe.

e. Survad accepted George Myers' invitation to attend a get-together which he was arranging in Savanna-la-Mar on 11 May, and to spend a week or two with him there. They discussed the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the BPM, and it was suggested that a local Steering Committee should be appointed to consider the formation of a group in Jamaica.

f. (Jamaica Service Comment: Survad has subsequently been identified as John Davis, aka Selvyn Grey, a member of CORE and the Black Muslims. He is in touch with Rastafarians at Kintyre, and the leaders of the Viking and Spade Gangs. He is expecting to meet one Corporal James, aka "Jimmy" of the Jamaica Defence Force, who is said to have complained that he was deprived of promotion because of his views. Arrangements were also being made for him to meet Walter Rodney of the University of the West Indies. Survad has stated that if given the chance he would, within eighteen months, stage a demonstration. He has suggested that if his colleagues can supply marijuana and find a way to export it, he could guarantee an outlet in the United States and the money thus obtained could be used to finance the local Movement. Survad was being supported by his girlfriend, Bernadine Houston, who was expected to arrive from the United States towards the end of the ensuing month. He is now in straitened circumstances.)

WH/7/R/PROlson:mbk (8 October 1968)

Distribution:
Orig - FBI w/att
3 - CI/OPS/DO
1 - WH/7/R/JATS
1 - C/WH/7/JATS
1 - C/WH/FI

Based on: HJK-251
a. - para 405
b. - para 406
c. - para 411
d. - para 413
e. - para 417
f. - para 420

13-00000

TAB #235 NOT INCLUDED

336

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

336 [redacted]

1. Tab 272 A-80881 contains Two Letter Intercepts dated Sept 17, 1969.
2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

   (X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.
3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.
   - ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
   - ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
   - ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
   - ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

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   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
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   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   ( ) Cryptonym
   ( ) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER
6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. These two letters talk about [illegible] Mr. Weisberg would Dr King in the Text. However to release them to Mr. Weisberg and the individuals writing be an invasion of Privacy of Mrs King and the [illegible] should be described as "items" to Mrs King. These documents Letter Intercepts
7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as ________ was:

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AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO:

[redacted]

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CHARLESTON SC 29403

PAR AVION

20 лет Германской

ПОЧТА СССР 6

ПОЧТА СССР 10 коп.

VIA AIR MAIL

Mrs. Martin Luther King Jr.
230 Sunset Drive N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia
U. S. A.

B

70H03B

CAG

Leningrad, Russia
U.S.S.R.

Dear Mrs. King:

While on this East European Churchmen's Study Tour, I visited a little town in East Germany, called Hernhut.

The Moravian Church (Oldest in Hernhut) officials, hosted our group during our visit there. I saw your husbands books on sale in their one good Bookstore.

A Young man who is head of the youth work in Hernhut, informed us that they are setting up a room in the Youth Center, in memory of Dr. King! He wanted your address so that he could write and let you know what they were doing and the respect they have for Dr. Kings Memory. I gave him your address, so I am writing to let you know that, if you haven't heard from him

yet, you will be receiving Communications from, Dietrich Heise, 89 Gorlitz D.D.R., Bautzener Str. 38., and you will be aware of what is happening in this small Eastern Germany town, a population of only 2,000.

Respectfully,
Bernice V. Robinson
22 Dewey Street
Charleston, S.C. 29403

Cent
Atlanta

СССР 10 коп.



Куда Mrs Martin Luther King
234 Sunset Ave
Northwest Atlanta
Кому Georgia 30314
USA

Адрес отправителя Moscow A319
Krasnoarmeyskaya 21 apt 1
Rais. Orlova

Sept 17, 1969

Mrs Martin Luther
King Jr
234 Sunset Ave
Northwest Atlanta
Georgia 30314 !

Dear Mrs King

Three weeks ago I got the book you so kindly sent me and immediately answered you. Only today — two months and a half, — came your letter with a reprint of "Playboy" article. In case my first letter will not reach you permit me to repeat — it was an honor, a joy and somehow — a new responsibility — to get a letter from you.

I am in correspondence with Martin Luther King Memorial Library, have sent them a copy of a very popular magazine for children "The Pioneer" where last year I published a little essay on the late Martin Luther King. Now I completed a

89525B

new work - Gandhi and Martin Luther King
- but I lack material - Dr King's article
in "Ebony" - "My trip to the land of
Gandhi." It would be of course marve-
lous to ~~have~~ get some articles on
the Nobel Price, - how it was...
My long essay on the "Martin
Luther King's road to the Cross" is
still at the publishers. I hope it will
be published at last and I will
have the possibility to send it to
you. If somebody in your country
will plan an international symposium
on the life, thought and meaning of
Martin Luther King, - please let me know. It
would be my deepest wish to contribute;
I hope you will not consider this
wish immodest, - it is very serious, though,
of course, I could not be the judge
of my own work.

- Thank you again, dear Mrs King,
for your letter.

Yours very sincerely
Raissa Orlova

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[redacted] 337

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

1. Tab Q-56 contains Cable Budapest 017 dated 19 May 1971.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______

   (✓) Segregable portions previously released ~~under exemption~~(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) recommended for but not sent to the requester [illegible] of FOIA Excised portions [illegible]

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ____________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ______.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ____________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ____________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ____________ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ____________ of ______

   (☒) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (☒) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (☒) Cryptonyms
   ( ) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO appeal classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

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   (☒) downgraded to confidential

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19 14 13Z MAY 71

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HEADQUARTERS

MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS/

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, [redacted] PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY PECK, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MED~~LEH~~AL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. WALKER "AN AMERICAN ~~M~~PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM DOURTHARD ~~ANG~~ AND MRS. ADDIE WYATT.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH GAGE-COLBY AND SYLVIA KUSCHER (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND ~~[illegible]~~ AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT APTHEKER AND CARLTON GOODLETT REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 March 1978

[redacted]

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191348Z MAY 71 CITE

HEADQUARTERS

CHAOS

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HEADQUARTERS

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REF: HEADQUARTERS 2789

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS: ✓

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28 Jul 1978
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ACTION

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by authority of 060525
date: 10 May 1978

338

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 338

1. Tab [redacted]-57 contains Memo 75-2628 dated 21 May 71.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________

   (X) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
   - ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
   - ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.
   - ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
   - ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

   (X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) [redacted] of FOIA.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________________ of ________.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (X) Name of CIA employee
   (X) File numbers
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   (●) Privacy of other individuals
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Names of Americans and their file #'s have been deleted + exemption (b)(6) claimed. To release the information to Mr. Weisberg that the CIA collected, reported + disseminated info regarding these individuals + their activities with the WPC would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy. The info contained in the memo were all reported in the press. Anyway, prior to the dating of this document

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ________________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

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13-00000

[redacted]

B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to [redacted] dated 14 May 1971, Subject: [redacted] ✓ [redacted] and [redacted]

Please transmit reply via [redacted] channel

Originated by: [redacted]
Based on: [redacted] 18 May 71 [redacted] and [redacted] 19 May 71 [redacted]
Source: [redacted] Hungarian Press
Distribution:
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1 - extra copy
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B-2628
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B.

C.

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Previously
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Date 19 AUG 1976

57

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

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CONDUCTED ON 1 Sept 78
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date 1 Sept 78

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(57)

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GROUP 1
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downgrading and

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

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4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to our teletype 3216, dated 14 May 1971, Subject: Ralph ✓ David ABERNATHY and Dr. Carlton GOODLETT.

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated by: CI/SO:GMKline:jm
Based on: BUDAPEST 016, 18 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW) and BUDAPEST 017, 19 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW)
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1 - KUSHNER/Sens/BW (201-878516/BW)
1 - GILMAN/Sens/BW (new)
1 - DICKERSON/Sens/BW (201-854982/BW)
1 - GARZA/Sens/BW (new)
1 - COLBY/Sens/GMK (201-053968/GK)
1 - KAHN/Sens/EC
1 - KENT, Mrs./Sens/GK (201-221724/GK)
1 - PECK/Sens/BW (201-830466/BW)
1 - KING/Sens/JD (201-760966/JD)
1 - ABERNATHY/Sens/JD (201-853022/JD)
1 - WALKER/Sens/JD
1 - DOUTHARD/Sens/BW (201-857634/BW)
1 - WYATT/Sens/BW
1 - APTHEKER/Sens/BW (201-757176/BW)
1 - GOODLETT/Sens/BW (201-742726/BW)
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

[redacted]

6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department

DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

M. D. Stevens

[redacted]

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~

re: HCSA Request of 9 March, 1978, item #2:

> "A statement, including any written regulations, which establishes the criteria utilized by the CIA in classifying its relationships with individuals with whom it has had contact...."

Attached are:

1.	DEFINITIONS OF:		AGENT, ASSET, SOURCE, COLLABORATOR, WITTING & UNWITTING
2.	Hqs Regulations	on	Management of Nonstaff Personnel
	20-53	on	Contract Personnel to define Contract Employees and Independent Contractors and
	20-54		Agents (& clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel)
3.	DOI 50-10	on	Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals (a primer on do's & don'ts)
4.	DOI (CSI) 10-5	on	Covert Approvals and Related Matters (processes required before an individual may be used in any way)

From Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary

AGENT:

1) A power that acts; a moving force; as by some human AGENT.

2) One who acts or performs an act or who has power to act; as, a free moral AGENT.

3) That which produces or will produce a certain effect; an active cause; also, esp. chem., a substance or element capable of producing a reaction.

4) A means or instrument.

5) One who acts for, or in the place of, another, by authority for him.

ASSET:

2) That which is a resource; as, character is an asset.

SOURCE:

2) The origin; the first or ultimate cause.

3) A person, book, document, etc. that supplies information.

COLLABORATOR: n.
COLLABORATE:

1) To work or act jointly, esp. to share in literary, scientific, or other intellectual production.

2) To cooperate voluntarily as a nation with another or other nations in international political or economic adjustment.

3) To comply with, cooperate with, or assist willingly the conquerors occupying one's country;--usually with an implication of traitorous dealing in distinction from passive acquiescence; also, sometimes to give to an enemy nation aid of nonmilitary kind, as by radio propaganda in enemy service.

WITTING: Done with the knowledge of the doer, or knowingly; not unintentional.

UNWITTING:

1) Not knowing; unconscious; unaware.

2) Unintentional.

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125-127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125-127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to update the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128-131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text. New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

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n. MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR AGE 118.11
o. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FUND 118.11
p. PERIOD OF SERVICE FOR ANNUITIES 118.13
q. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES 118.16
r. RECALL OF RETIRED PARTICIPANT 118.19
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4. INTELLIGENCE MEDAL OF MERIT 94.1
4a. CAREER INTELLIGENCE MEDAL 94.1
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53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

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(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits. a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

(a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;

(b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;

(c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-60b(4);

(d) approve and authenticate contracts;

(e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

(a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;

(b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;

(c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

(a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;

(b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

(a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;

(b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. AUTHORITIES

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.

(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.

(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

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b. POLICY

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(*1*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(*2*) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(*3*) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. **POLICY.** Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. **PROCEDURES**

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

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56–59. Reserved.

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

E2 IMPDET
CL By: 002230

DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5. (attached)

E-2 IMPDET

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
  (a) Members and trainees of ACTION;
  (b) Fulbright grantees;

(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

For Germans only! Seamen only

e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)
The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*
The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

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1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the ✓Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U. S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

FBI info
REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 9/22/98 dak
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

RETIRED FILE
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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	TO OFFICE	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE
1	SA/C/LAD	William C. Sturbitts	WC Sturbitts	6/30/77
2	C/LA/COG	[Frederick W. LaTrash] 3	[Frederick W LaTrash] 3	6/30/77
3	AC/LAD	George V. Lauder	George V. Lauder	30 June 76
4	ADDO	Theodore G. Shackley	T Shackley	
5	IG	Scott Breckinridge, Jr.	S. Breckinridge	13 July 77

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☐ Action
☐ Comment
☐ Concurrences
☐ Information
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☐ Recommendation
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30 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

ATTENTION : Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr.

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Operations

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Latin America Division Task Force Report of Possible Cuban Complicity in the John F. Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached is the Latin America Division report of findings relative to Cuban complicity in the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. This research which was conducted from mid-October 1976 to June 1977 at the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. Henry Knoche, reviewed all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period 1 January 1960 to 22 November 1963). We found no definitive proof that the Castro regime was implicated in the Kennedy assassination.

2. The report is comprised of the following sections:

LAD/JFK Task Force - How Research was conducted

Attachment A:	Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with a Top Secret Annex (14 pages)
Attachment B:	List of Task Force participants
Attachment C:	Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

This massive and thorough research effort with all back-up documents has been assigned the official classification number 019-604-001. This report is submitted in the format requested by Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr., Task Force Leader.

George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder

Attachments, a/s

June 1977

SUBJECT: Latin America Division/JFK Task Force How Research was Conducted

1. The LA Division Task Force to investigate records in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy was formally organized in mid-October 1976. Its purpose, basically, was to research all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period up to 22 November 1963) for any evidence that such operations might have provoked the Government of Cuba to take executive action against President Kennedy. Researchers were also alert to activities seemingly directed against the U.S./CIA.

2. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LAD Registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by ISS (Information Services Staff). It was originally thought that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus related 201 dossiers. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, both operational

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and subject , has been retired to Archives at [Warrenton, Virginia]. The remainder is held at Headquarters in IP/Files or IP/Archives. All 201 dossiers are retained at Headquarters. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LAD/JFK Task Force files (too numerous to cite herein.)

3. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material:

a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed:

1.	Operational (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings)	1,729	
2.	Subject (186 with findings and 361 with no findings)	547	
3.	Cuba Policy Files	101	
4.	C/WHD Chrono Files (TFW Chronos)	37	(13 -49)
5.	Official 201 dossiers	100	plus
	TOTAL	2,514	

b. Criteria Used in the Research:

As a guide the research group followed some 33 Terms of Reference provided by the Deputy IG, which were compiled on the basis of issues raised in Book V,

1/mc

of the Senate Select Committee Final Report on the Assassination. (Book V, and a 23 May 1967 Memorandum for the Record by the Inspector General on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, were required reading for the researchers.) In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest brought to its attention by the IG staff, on an ad hoc basis. A name trace was always run, and/or 201 dossier, if available, reviewed, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to George McGovern which dealt with individuals allegedly involved in assassination attempts against Castro.

c. Findings and Organization of the Findings:

Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the Subject of the folder (s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of the document (s) (findings) which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were Job numbers, Official File numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information. Separate, finished, memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number (s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing the gist of the document (s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document (s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LAD/JFK Task Force files under the official classification number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings.

4. Appended are the following:

A) Chronology of Findings (125 pages) with Top Secret UMBRA Annex (14 pages);

B) List of Task Force participants and their functions;

C) Outline of the complete LAD/JFK Task Force files and description of their contents.

ATTACHMENT A

CHRONOLOGY of FINDINGS (125 Pages)

with a TOP SECRET Annex (14 Pages) Code Word Material

CHRONOLOGY OF FINDINGS

Anti-Castro Activities - Cuba 19-9-9

HVCA 11020 dated 28 February 1964

A Caracas Station asset reported an operation called "Plan Judas" being constructed at that time inside Cuba. The plan reportedly involved an internal uprising with the support of certain Cuban military figures conspiring against Fidel CASTRO. Key figures reportedly included Juan ALMEIDA, Efigenio AMEIJEIRAS Delgado, Pepin NARANJO, Regino BOTTI, and two COSSIO brothers. On 24 February 1964, Francisco SUAREZ Quinones, a JURE (Revolutionary Junta) member in Caracas, told U.S. Embassy officials that JURE was then sponsoring a plan to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other high-ranking Cuban Government officials as part of an operation designed to incite an internal rebellion in Cuba. The Station reported this plan, speculating that it may be connected in some way with Plan Judas.

DBA 77673 dated 15 July 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Individuals involved included Byron CAMERON, owner of m.v. "Cayman Hope," Teofilo BABUN Franco, co-owner of Antillean Marine Shipping

Corp. and two BABUN employees, Oscar FERNANDEZ Veigo and Eliseo GOMEZ Fernandez; also, Jose "Pepin" BOSCH, Julio LOBO Olavarria and Eduardo GARCIA of the Garcia Lines, New York City. One of the ship owners allegedly had contacts with the underworld through his partner, a former police officer from St. Louis with tie-in to elements of the "Cosa Nostra."

DBA 92798 dated 7 December 1964 (FBI)

An FBI source reported an attempt to be made against Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA within Cuba during period 20 Dec 64 to 10 Jan 65 by a small elite group in La Cabana Military Base, Havana, which belonged to a security section inside of the Cuban Intelligence Service. Plans were to be carried out by Cubans in Cuba with no help from the U.S.

Anti-CASTRO PM Operations 19-9-9

DBA 43687 dated 20 June 1963 (FBI)

On 18 June 1963 an unnamed representative of Ejercito Cubano Anticomunista (Cuban Anti-Communist Army) met with a representative of Santos TRAFFICANTE, described as a former gambling czar in Cuba and presently a member of the Mafia in the U.S., in an effort to obtain rockets, high explosives, and detonators for use in raids against Cuba.

DBA 45327 dated 12 July 1963 (FBI)

Manolo AGUILAR, 829 S.W. 9th Avenue, Miami, leader of the Frente Revolucionario Anticomunista (FRAC) (Anti-Communist Revolutionary Front) obtained some 100 Beretta 7.65 caliber pistols with silencers which his organization planned to eventually use in Cuba to assassinate various Cuban leaders. AGUILAR allegedly obtained these pistols from an unidentified American who had connections with the Mafia.

DBA 45895 dated 19 July 1963 (FBI)

On 15 July 1963 the Miami News carried an article "Back Stage with Bobby" by Hal Hendrix, which related growing speculation in Miami and Washington that Attorney General Robert Kennedy was quietly backing a new anti-Castro operation with exiles Manuel ARTIME, Enrique RUIZ Williams, and Roberto and Jose SAN ROMAN. All held high posts in Brigade 2506 (Bay of Pigs). Speculation linked Kennedy's close association with these exiles to a deal with Nicaragua through ex-President Luis SOMOZA.

Anti-CASTRO PM OPERATIONS 19-9-9/1

DBA 78251 dated 18 August 1964 (FBI)

Reported plan of Cuban exile leaders to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Prices allegedly agreed upon were $100,000 to assassinate Fidel CASTRO; $20,000 for Raul CASTRO; and $20,000 for "Che" GUEVARA. This information was provided to the FBI by another Government Agency that allegedly had several meetings with one Byron CAMERON, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON allegedly was acquainted with several policemen in St. Louis with ties to the underworld. CAMERON denied involvement with policemen connected with the underworld and said he had never discussed with anyone plans to assassinate Fidel or others.

JMARC Operation - 19-120-15

DIRECTOR 36823 (OUT 90086) 25 June 1960

Cable to Mexico and Havana. Reported that five Castro agents recently left Cuba, 3 for Miami and 2 for New York,with task to abduct AMHAWK (Manuel Antonio VARONA y Loredo). Source was PELAEZ (fnu) thru BARKER's wife. Information was passed to the FBI. Suggested that VARONA be warned to take normal security precautions.

XAAZ 6269 (OUT 90031) 26 June 1960

The Agency provided the above information on proposed abduction of VARONA to the FBI, and advised that the same information was being sent to I&NS. –

JMARC - PM Operations General 19-132-2

DIRECTOR 09972 (OUT 88974) 31 Oct 1960

Cable to Guatemala giving details of training of assault force for paramilitary ops against Cuba.

GUAT 821 (IN 1688) 13 January 1961 to BELL.

FYI: Reported that Alexander ROURKE, free lance newsman from New York City in Miami, told ESOLEO-1 that Frank FIORINI and Dr. Orlando BOSCH of Miami, representing man in Cuba named DIEGO (fnu), were recruiting and equipping force in Florida to assault Cuba 18 January. The organization was receiving financial aid from an organization in New York City known as Anti-Communist International Association.

DBF 90801 dated 10 March 1961 (FBI)

New York FBI office advised that invasion of Cuba was to take place week of 6 March 1961 by members of an anti-Castro group from Nassau, Bahamas, British West Indies.

JMARC Program 19-120-15/2

MASH 1470 (IN 38669) 6 Nov 1960.

Cable to CIA Headquarters and Havana stating that RECAREY, (fnu), cousin of a Guat trainee, arrived MASH from Havana on 5 November to check bonafides of Eduardo OJEDA Camaraza. OJEDA had made contact with AMYUM/AMRUNG Havana and told details of MASH recruitment, training, names of trainees and mission in Cuba. MASH feared AMRUNG/AMYUM may try kill OJEDA as Castro penetration/provocateur if bonafides not established.

RIMM 5846 (IN 2708) 4 June 1961

Radio message #84 from agent in Cuba advised "functionary of Italian Embassy by name of MORATORI says he works for one intelligence org. of yours, says he is in contact with Martin Elena and others and that you have plans for invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel. Advise if we can confide in MORATORI."

BELL 0987 (OUT 9804) 6 June 1961

Radio message #72 to agent 'MORATORI unknown to us. Do not confide in him. MORATORI's information of pending invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel not true. Beware of rumor mongers and provocateurs."

AMBLEAK 19-6-58/3,4

UFG 2267 dated 23 January 1963

Reported on activities of Manuel Antonio VARONA of "Rescate" (Revolutionary Democratic Rescue) in Costa Rica and other Central American countries re discussing Cuban situation with foreign ministers of those countries. While in Costa Rica he negotiated with local political personalities to recruit and train an anti-Communist paramilitary force along lines then being developed in Colombia.

AMBRUSH Operation 19-5-6

Document dated 19 August 1961 (No document symbol)

Handcarried to Headquarters from JMWAVE. Document contains comments from AMPAL-1 on pro-Cuban sources in the U.S. He reported information from other sources that Fidel CASTRO is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations between U.S and Cuba. Also reported that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fidel CASTRO, and agents in all branches of the U.S. Government of importance including the CIA. Further, that all people in Cuba picked up for working for CIA are done so because of information from these agents. The source was told of suspicions of one Eugenio, a Cuban. /COMMENT: SLIPSTREAM-1 in 1976 advised that one Eugenio MARTINEZ in Miami was a Castro agent. One Eugenio Rolando MARTINEZ Careaga was a Miami Station agent involved in the Watergate breakin.[7] There was no reference to assassination in this file.

AMCANOE Operation 19-6-91

TDCSDB 3/654,571 dated 9 May 1963

Reported meeting on 7 May 63 between Paulino A. SIERRA, a Cuban lawyer from Chicago, and representatives of 43 Cuban exile groups in Miami. SIERRA claimed he had backing of wealthy Chicago business people who were willing to loan up to $30 million dollars for the purpose of overthrowing the Castro Government. SIERRA said the money could be made available to organizations having the capability of carrying out clandestine activity in Cuba.

WAVE 8743 (IN 43724) 22 May 1963

A Miami Station asset reported information from Julio GARCERAN del Vall y Souza, of the PGCC,(Pro-Constitutional Government of Cuba in Exile) who,on 9 May 63,said that Cuban exile groups were puzzled with regard to the American policy toward Cuba and the exile community. GARCERAN said that among persons who recently visited him were Enrique RUIZ Williams Alfert, a personal friend of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Jaime VARELA Canosa;also

PERULLERO (fnu). Those three reportedly represented a group of members of Brigade 2506 who had been training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. RUIZ Williams was trying to form a nucleus for an invasion force. GARCERAN had been offered use of a large ranch in Colombia for operations against Cuba but feared that use of such would create an international incident and provoke a war between Cuba and Colombia.

Memorandum for the Record by Carl Trettin 3 Mar 1964

AMCANOE-1 reported that an acquaintance of his (unidentified), a businessman and ship owner with interest in slot machine business - placing them in gambling houses - placed the man in contact with elements in the underworld primarily through his partner, a former St. Louis police officer. Through the latter, there was tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The Cosa Nostra interests alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba and offered to assassinate Castro for $150 thousand dollars.

UFGA 15233 dated 15 April 1964

Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F.

JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla. CAMERON was reported as allegedly belonging to the Mafia.

UFGA 15954 dated 11 May 1964

On 3 March 64 CAMERON held a meeting with Teofilo BABUN Franco, Oscar FERNANDEZ Viego, Eliseo GOMEZ Fernandez, Freddie GARCIA, Eddie GARCIA and Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno. CAMERON mentioned that he was in contact with an unidentified group who would be willing to assassinate select Cuban officials for cash: specifically CAMERON was interested in assassinating Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and "Che" GUEVARA. They agreed on $100 thousand for Fidel, $20 thousand for Raul and $20 thousand for "Che." CAMERON made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved.

AMCLOCK Production and Correspondence 19-6-133/4
(Currently PLSLSTEEL)
ESGW 193 dated 2 September 1960

Dispatch from Headquarters to Geneva and Bern forwarding general requirements for asset. One question was precautions taken to prevent possible assassination attempts of top Cuban officials.

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 October 1962

Reported view of Soviet diplomat on the Cuban situation. The Soviet diplomat, Minister MOLYAKOV, told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action with regard to Cuba was "an election affair." He professed to believe that Kennedy learned on an election tour that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again," and gain mass support. Further, that it worked, and Kennedy again had succeeded in being the "man of the nation." The Soviet diplomat commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. /COMMENT: This no doubt referred to the missile crisis./

TDCSDB 3/652,011 dated 1 November 1962

Reported reaction of Satellite officials to the Cuban missile developments. One remarked that Cuba was as important to the USA as to the USSR and thus conflict was inevitable. Some agreed that President Kennedy had made a tactical error in not simply invading Cuba without warning. An East European remarked that all the European nations had shown understanding of "Kennedy and his ships, and would let him play around with them until the elections, but after the elections he would have to put them away and negotiate seriously." The source commented that it was clear that the officials had no clear insight into Soviet intentions, or what the real ramifications of Cuba would be, but were talking to reinforce their faith.

GNVA 6117 (IN 00894) dated 18 January 1964

Report on Soviet Bloc officials' attitude towards U.S. internal political developments. An East European attributed the assassination of President Kennedy to the Birch Society but stated that something must have gone wrong at the last moment. He speculated that an attack on the USSR was to have followed on the heels of the assassination but had somehow been forestalled.

GNVA 4523 (IN 38202) dated 19 December 1962

Reported that Soviet offensive missiles were introduced into Cuba as part of a twofold Soviet-Cuba plan which was agreed upon "several months ago." Emplacement of Soviet defensive missiles was to constitute the first phase. For the second phase, a major Soviet fleet unit was to have been invited to visit Cuba on a cruise. This was expected to cause immediate U.S. reaction, but the presence of Soviet fleet units surrounding Cuba was considered an effective guarantee that the U.S. would not resort to immediate invasion or other armed action to eliminate missile threat. Purpose of exercise was to force a major change of U.S. policy towards Cuba. It was anticipated that U.S. reaction would be violent, and from the beginning the plan called for immediate withdrawal at the price of agreement by U.S. that it would end hostile attitude towards Cuba. The Soviets did not implement phase two. This disappointed and angered the Cubans. The Cuban leaders considered that the Soviets had besmirched its own honor and offended the pride of Cuba. KHRUSHCHEV composed a letter to President Kennedy proposing a deal concerning Soviet missile bases in Cuba and American bases in Turkey. KHRUSHCHEV reportedly later regretted the phraseology and not having consulted with Cuba prior to dispatch of the letter.

GNVA 6316 (IN 31199) dated 3 March 1964

Raul ROA said that prior to his assassination, President Kennedy "established certain contacts" with Cuba. Kennedy had sent emissaries to contact Cubans. ROA specifically cited contacts that had taken place in New York. ROA thought that Kennedy would have gone on to negotiate with Cuba, for practical reasons, which would have been to Cuba's advantage. He thought that President Johnson was unaware of Kennedy's actions.

AMCOBRA (later AMBANTY) Operation 19-132-11

WAVE 7250 (IN 57364) dated 12 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The sewage chief of Havana was executed. He was accused of having given the sewage plans to the CIA in order to install the bombs that exploded during Fidel's speech to the Defense Committees."

WAVE 7523 (IN 61119) dated 15 November 1963

Radio message from agent. "The obligatory military service makes us reduce intelligence information. I will have to decide between insurrection and departing Cuba. I have decided on insurrection. I hope you will help me with the weapons I need."

WAVE 7594 (IN 61966) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "As you agreed when you were here, there can be no insurrection in Cuba until it can take place simultaneously throughout Cuba. Such a total uprising is not possible at this time."

WAVE 7593 (IN 61967) dated 16 November 1963

Message to agent. "If you insist on precipitant action before the whole plan is ready you are going to draw all the enemy forces down upon you and the people of Pinar which will result in the complete destruction of everything you and your men have labored so hard to create. We cannot support an insurrection now. We will continue to support you and group as agreed upon."

WAVE 7707 (IN 62544) dated 17 November 1963

Message to agent. We are unable to support insurrection in Pinar now because it would be premature.

WAVE 8125 (IN 67382) dated 24 November 1963

Message from agent. "Sincere grief and condolence for loss of the greatest leader and statesman of our time, John Kennedy."

WAVE 8598 (IN 75428) dated 6 December 1963

Message to agent. "Thank you for sincere condolences on death of President Kennedy."

AMCOG Operation 19-6-63

WAVE 1465 (IN 11710) dated 4 February 1964

Agent reported that he was told that OSWALD was in Havana between 2 and 7 October 1963. A lady saw him in shirt sleeves, wearing good shoes and smoking American cigars accompanied by Clemente MORERA, an employee of Terminales Mambisas who belongs to the DSE. He (OSWALD) was seen by the sister of Comandante MIRANDA."

/COMMENT: Note document # 517-218 for FOIA Review on June 1976./

COMMANDOS MAMBISAS 19-126-45

A 4 November 1963 Miami Herald article, and 12 November 1963 Washington Post article revealed that Fidel CASTRO was extremely upset at the recent successes of the Commandos Mambisas raids targetted principally against sugar cane industry.

AMCONCERT Project - 19-6-41

The Agency began this project in March 1960. Its objective was to provide information on plans and activities of the Government of Cuba and opposition to the GOC. The principal asset was Francisco VARONA Alonso (201-234983.) VARONA was recruited in April 1959 to elicit information from contacts in Cuba. He was arrested in April 1961, released, and returned to Miami in February 1962. He was used by Miami Station as an informant and terminated February 1969 for being unproductive, unreliable, a poor security risk, and hostile to the U.S. and the U.S.G.

Control of Cuban Travelers 200-9-49

KNGS 0948 (IN 54974) dated 5 November 1963

On 15 October 63 Dominican student Carlos Manuel CABRAL Lofontaine attempted to enter Cuba via Kingston ostensibly to attend architect conference. Jamaican authorities, suspecting the trip to be a pretext, returned CABRAL to the Dom. Rep.

The First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy Ottawa, Osvaldo RELOVA, visited Kingston from 14-21 October 1963, purpose unexplained. While there he lived in the Consulate the entire stay.

HABA 12,838 dated 5 November 1963

Report concerning unofficial irregular air service established between Cuba and Brazil, for transportation of political rather than commercial travelers.

POSN 0340 (IN 54917) dated 5 November 1963

On 25 October 1963 a Russian plane arrived in Pointe-A-Pitre, Guadeloupe, with 60 passengers. 41 transferred to Panama for Rio; the remainder left on the "Russian" plane. /COMMENT: note on cable states that the Cubans were returning from architects congress./

AMCOVE Operation 19-6-93/2,3,4

WAVE 7356 (IN 58343) dated 10 November 1963

Re security crackdown in Cuba, largest since early 1961. Believed to be due to discontent among Cuban populace re economic failures, and CASTRO's fears of impact of recent raids on Cuba which would increase spontaneous sabotage inside Cuba which he may interpret as meaning U.S. Government has stepped up activities to overthrow his regime. CASTRO plans to counter these aspirations by USG with full use of police powers and repressive measures.

TDCSDB 3/658,075 dated 27 November 1963

All Cuban combat units were confined to bases effective 23 November 1963. Following news of death of President Kennedy, Defense Committee members and personnel at certain work centers in Cuba began to celebrate event.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #60 dated 24 November 1963

Reported strange activities at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana following news of President Kennedy's death 22 November 1963.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #66 dated 5 December 1963

Report giving names of travelers from Prague on 22 November 1963; travelers from Spain on 23 November 1963. Also, report that high figures of CASTRO regime were very nervous on the day of Kennedy's death. This information came from AMCOVE-11 who obtained it from a doctor friend, who obtained it from a Navy Comandante who was not a sympathizer of the regime.

AMCOVE-1 SW Message #68 dated 6 December 1963

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AMCOVE-11 [Dr. Pedro Antonio RODRIGUEZ Inigo] reported "rumors in Cuba that Lee OSWALD, assassin of Kennedy, was photographed in Varadero and Pinar del Rio, and that his (sic) sister, employed at Cuban Embassy Mexico, was a prisoner in Dallas, Texas, with personal documentation of OSWALD and $65,000 dollars. Swiss Ambassador Havana told employees that Lee OSWALD was an associate of Fidel CASTRO."

AMCROAK Operation 19-6-97

MADR 9866 (IN 74333) dated 5 December 1963

AMCROAK-1 (Dr. Bernardo MILANES Lopez) discussed an operational plan with AMOT-2 (Joaquin SANJENIS Perdomo)

1/mc

which consisted of elimination of high GOC personalities. MILANES had not mentioned the plan to the case officer. (MILANES was recruited by CIA in Madrid in December 1963. At the time of recruitment he was involved with a group planning to kill CASTRO, a completely extra- CIA affiliation.)

MADR 9928 (IN 78595 dated 11 December 1963

The above plan mentioned by MILANES concerned the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. MILANES said that seven persons were involved in the plan and that they had studied it for eight months. The case officer told MILANES that the USG did not look with approval on such activities, but he would pass the information on [to his supervisors]

DIRECTOR 88949 dated 12 December 1963

In discussions with MILANES he was to be told that a coup against CASTRO resulting in ouster of CASTRO and the Communist regime was an internal affair for which only Cubans could be responsible. That in the event of a real coup against the CASTRO regime, the U.S. Government was prepared to render full support, upon invitation.

UFGA 13793 dated 27 January 1964

When discussing the plan with MILANES, the case officer learned that Mario SALABARRIA Aguiar was one of the principal planners. When the case officer told MILANES that the US Government did not condone such actions, MILANES replied that in view of our lack of support of this undertaking, he considered it not prudent to reveal further details, but added that he actually did not know the names of any other possible participants and had only a general idea of the scheme which was to waylay CASTRO as he was leaving an apartment.

UFGA 13794 dated 28 January 1964 (JMWAVE to Hqs.)

In January 1963 Fidel CASTRO asked MILANES what he thought of President Kennedy and his relationship with Fidel. MILANES replied that Fidel probably underestimated Kennedy, that the latter by no means was illiterate or the imbecile Fidel often described him to be, and in the long run Kennedy would be Fidel's undoing. Fidel laughingly replied that he would be the one who ruined Kennedy because within eight months Fidel would have Latin America burning. Fidel made an obscene motion and said he would have Kennedy "in the air."

/COMMENT: Mario SALABARRIA, who worked closely with MILANES, reportedly drew up the assassination plans and allegedly obtained money and weapons from the U.S. MILANES and SALABARRIA were arrested in mid-1965. SALABARRIA was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. As of May 71 his name appeared on a list of prisoners of Guanajay Prison, Pinar del Rio, Cuba. MILANES, according to one of his sub-sources, served only a few years of his sentence because of collaboration with the Cuban Government. As of 1973 MILANES reportedly was living in Miami, Florida and had been singled out for elimination by members of the Cuban exile community in Miami._7

CUBANA Airline Manifests (non-CS) No File

The Cubana Airline Manifest for 27 November 1963, showing air travel from Mexico City to Havana, lists one Gilberto LOPEZ PP #310162. /See separate file on Gilberto POLICARPO Lopez, both the 201-741600, and the file set up by LAD/JFK Task Force._/

Cuban Army of Liberation 19-9-17

DBA 80042 (FBI) dated 14 July 1964

Concerns an interview of Julio LOBO in July 1964.

LOBO claimed he was contacted by Teofilo BABUN and asked to contribute $100,000.00 toward a plot to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other Cuban leaders. The assassins were described as three or four "Chicago-type Cosa Nostra" individuals who would be going to Havana, Cuba on other legitimate business.

CUBAN Developmental Operations 19-120-40

UFGA 4176 dated 31 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters Task Force W, concerning the debriefing of Dr. Jaime CARBONELL Rivero, former nightclub operator in Havana, about two proposals by him to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. Both plans were considered amateurish and not acceptable by CIA officers in Miami.

CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2

DBF 47612 (FBI) dated 27 April 1960

This document deals with Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset, and controversial personality. CONTE, in the U.S. as of April 1960, among other things associated himself with the White Rose Organization through his nephew Carlos RIVERO Collada. /COMMENT: RIVERO was one of the ransomed returnees from the Bay of Pigs, December 1962. In 197~~3~~4 he defected to Cuba, saying he had been a CASTRO agent and penetration of exile organizations in the U.S. all the while./ /COMMENT: CONTE in 1960 was attempting to be placed in charge of anti-Cuban programs of the "Voice of the Americas." Hqs. has speculated that CONTE Aguero might be iden/with Bernardo MORALES, recipient of a letter dated 29 November 1962 from a Jose MENENDEZ in Cuba concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. See LAD/JFK Task Force folder on CONTE/.

The FBI informant learned that a person by the name of Roberto had requested biographical and personal information from the Cuban Foreign Ministry on a fnu BEATON and CONTE Aguero for writing of articles concerning these persons, for the "Fact Sheet." Roberto may be iden/w Robert TABER listed in a 6 April 1960 New York Times article as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. TABER reportedly had made trips to Havana, Cuba from New York City to confer with Fidel CASTRO.

CUBAN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO 50-9-12
((Mexico City Station Teltap Operation Against
Cuban Embassy - LIENVOY) (Job #64-518/84)

FOLDER #20 (Covers Teltap Traffic 20 Aug - 2 Sept 63)

30 Aug 63 - Incoming call to Embassy. OSVALDO with JORRIN. OSVALDO says he is one of the scholarship holders and wants to speak with AZCUE.

FOLDER # 22 (Covers 24 Sept - 3 Oct. 63)
HMMA 22252 dated 4 October 1963

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1707 hours from Prensa Latina reporter to Fernandez ROA. Asks if Embassy has any statement about the supposed attempt against CASTRO. ROA says they have no declaration; it's the work of the sick mind of the pseudo-Cubans in Miami. (Item #18).

24 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 2007 hours from Raul to OSVALDO, saying Saturday they are having a party. (Item #290).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1835 hours. Luis PRIETO calling in to Luisa asks her if what they are saying about Fidel is true; he has been so alarmed that he has called everyone. Luisa says if they kill Fidel or do something it's worse yet because what remains is terrible. (Item #574).

24 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1258 hours. Woman calling in asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he knows about the attempt against CASTRO. LLAGOSTERA says he knows nothing. She asks if the news comes from Miami. He says yes. (Item #272).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1731 hours. OSVALDO calling in asks to speak with AZCUA, so that he will get the medicine for them and LLAGOSTERA. After informing OSVALDO that he isn't there, suggests that he call the Condesa Pharmacy, ask for the medicine and pass the bill to the Embassy. OSVALDO accepts. (Item #343).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1754 hours. Woman from the Condesa Pharmacy says that they made a request for Sr. Osvaldo HERNANDEZ of Chiapas 148, but as it concerns about $300 (pesos) she wants to know if she should supply it. LLAGOSTERA says he will let Srita. MECHE know if she should dispatch it. MECHE accepts. (Item #404).

25 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy from male university student to man in Embassy, to tell him that a few minutes ago they heard news that Fidel had died and they wanted to know if it were true. He says it is news from Miami going around a few days ago; that yesterday's newspaper from Havana says Dr. Fidel CASTRO is enjoying perfect health. (Item #954).

26 Sept 63 - Call from Embassy at 1721 hours. Raul in Embassy talks with Osvaldo. Osvaldo talks to him about the exams he's having all this week and next. Osvaldo asks if they are collecting tomorrow, Saturday's the party. That about the dirty thing will be left until next week.(Item 714

27 Sept 63 - Call to Embassy at 1054 hours. Silvia talks with Guillermo RUIZ (DGI). RUIZ still has not been able to speak with the Consul and that's why he hasn't called her. Silvia asks him to give her the Consul's number because there isn't any time for that. RUIZ says don't get angry; and asks if she wants to speak directly with him. Silvia says yes. RUIZ says it's 11-28-47. She says fine. (Item #191).

2 Oct 63 - Call from Embassy at 1206 hours. Teresa talks with Sra. Neus and says the Ambassador wants the History of the CIA, all the latest books, a copy of each one. Neus says they will be sent. (Item #452).

/COMMENT: The name "Osvaldo" is mentioned in several conversations. In one he gave his name as Osvaldo HERNANDEZ and resided at the same place as the Cuban Ambassador, whose last name is also HERNANDEZ. It is speculated that they might be related. Traced Osvaldo HERNANDEZ, but could not positively identify him for lack of more data./ /COMMENT: Above is the only call made by or to Silvia (DURAN) on the 27th of September the day on which Lee Harvey OSWALD reportedly came to the Cuban Embassy, according to Washington Post article dated 26 Nov 76.

FOLDER #25 (Covering teltap from 15 Nov - 30 Nov 63)

22 November 1963

ITEM 038 Page 1

1648 hours - Long Distance call from Vera Cruz.
Caller (SAMA) (Ovilio SAMA, Cuban Vice Consul in Vera Cruz).
Receiver Ambassador HERNANDEZ Armas.

HERNANDEZ: Tells SAMA that tomorrow's meeting will have to be postponed until another Saturday at the same time because he has another invitation and possibly will have to leave.

SAMA : Accepts and asks if there is any instructions regarding the recent incident.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, all is perfectly well.

SAMA : Says yes, there is some instruction concerning Kennedy's death.

HERNANDEZ: Says no, that the thing is very lamentable, but "we are here as always."

SAMA : Says that the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps will call at eight in the evening to go give their condolences, but they will not go.

HERNANDEZ: Gives him the reason, and asks that he explain to the Dean that they cannot go because of the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

ITEM 084 Page 2

Hour not specified - Call to the Embassy.

Caller (Guillermo OCHOA de Novedades), spoke with Receiver (PEREGRINA) inside the Embassy.

OCHOA : Called to say that that afternoon he went to the Embassy to see if there was an article for the newspaper regarding Kennedy's death.

PEREGRINA: Told OCHOA that the Ambassador had been invited to a dinner and that OCHOA should call back at 5 o'clock in the evening at which time she will tell him something about the matter. PEREGRINA tells OCHOA to wait a minute, then says that the Ambassador has not arrived yet and up to now has not said anything. She tells OCHOA he can call back later if he wishes.

OCHOA : Said that he would call that night.

ITEM 101 Page 2

1730 hours - Call to Embassy.

Caller (Unidentified man) calls LUISA (inside Embassy)

Caller : Asks if she knows the latest news.

LUISA : Jokingly said "yes, of course, I knew about it almost before Kennedy ."

Caller : Laughs and comments that that is very bad.

In principle they thought it was one of those reactionary extremists who was against the integration and all ... but it seems that they apprehended a man who is nothing more than the president of one of those Fair Play for Cuba Committees.

LUISA : Says she also knows that.

CALLER : As of yet nothing is confirmed but it appears that whoever did it was crazy, independently (so deranged) that he could have blamed that to Kennedy... say the international conditions and internal conditions in the United States... because...

LUISA : And more external principally.

CALLER : That's why I say international... one can see a sufficient effect and not suffer a big change, with a change of President or with a thing of this type ... above all...

LUISA : Was it a gringo (American) that killed him?

CALLER : Yes, but he said he had been in Russia, that he wanted to become a Russian citizen, but Russia didn't want to give him the citizenship.

LUISA : Surprised...said listen, how do they know those things over there?

CALLER : He knows Russian well, and moreover this fellow went with Fidel's forces into the mountains, or wanted to go, something like that. Who knows how the thing was?

LUISA : Serious.

CALLER : Asks how much more they know over there?

LUISA : Almost precisely that. They heard about it sometime ago and now they are ...

CALLER : That is very bad. He was eating with some friends and commenting on the magazine Politica which had just come out, when one arrived and gave them the news. That really surprised him and he thought they were being kidded.

LUISA : She was looking at the magazine but her friend must have accidentally taken it away.

CALLER : Said his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him (Kennedy) because he (the Mexican) realized that the United States had taken Texas from them and he killed the President for vengeance; that it was all a joke but they didn't believe him until he said that they should turn on the radio; that's when they heard about it. The last thing he heard, a little while ago, is that the fellow is someone named OSWALD. They believe he is the one but he hasn't confessed anything.

LUISA : But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to a pro-Cuba committee. They know that he wanted to be naturalized, but the man hasn't confessed.

CALLER : Says the reason may be they are trying to find out something about the man, because...

LUISA : Says wait a minute, can you tell me?

CALLER : We thought that if it had been, or appeared to the public to be one of the segregationist or those opposed to integration that had assassinated Kennedy, that there might be a civil struggle, or a Civil War in the United States. Considering the critical situation the country is going through, they will find a resolution to that man, no? Already it is more international. Are they going to find out for certain, who knows? Let's see what happens.

LUISA : Laughs and asks what will happen.

CALLER : Who knows?

LUISA : Figuratively, one, two, three, and already there are three. (She laughs). What barbarians!

CALLER : That will probably be the topic of conversation at Silvia's party today.

LUISA : It was cancelled because they couldn't go.

CALLER : Asks why.

LUISA : "So they can later say that we were celebrating Kennedy's death" (sic). /COMMENT: appears that transcriber left out negative -'can not say7. Silvia agreed to change the party to next week, but not to coincide with the funeral (laugh).

CALLER : One must take that into consideration.

LUISA : What will be after the sorrow, the mourning, and all that junk.

CALLER : Asks where she is going to stay now.

LUISA : Says that she plans to move to the doctor's house tonight.

CALLER : Asks if all is known there.

LUISA : Says yes, but she doesn't know how everything is or if they have to stay at the Embassy; however, she believes that it will not be possible today, because everyone left for the airport and there isn't a car at the Embassy. Possibly tomorrow morning, instead of going to the study group, she will move.

CALLER : Said he would talk to her tomorrow.

LUISA : Said that he should inquire at the Embassy or at the house. It she doesn't stay at the Embassy, she will go to her house, where she will be by 10.

CALLER : Concurs.

ITEM 118 Page 2

1721 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (identity unknown) wants to talk with FERNANDEZ Roa.

RECEIVER (PEREGRINA) says he is outside of Mexico and there is no one there from the news department.

CALLER : Says he is from the revolutionary newspaper and would like the opinion of Dr. Roa regarding the assassination of Kennedy.

PEREGRINA : Repeats that Roa is in Havana, and with regards to Kennedy, they can't say anything because they know nothing about it and the Ambassador isn't around at the moment.

ITEM 159 Page 3

1744 hours - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Norma) tells Bertica (in the Embassy) that at this moment the following news story is appearing on the teletype: "Interrogation of young OSWALD who assassinated President Kennedy, says that he was in the Soviet Union, married a Soviet woman, wanted Soviet citizenship but wasn't granted it. He is president of a pro-Cuban committee called PERPLEX (Fair Play) for Cuba. The note says that these committees, pro-Cuban, are committees that fight ... without sympathizers of Fidel CASTRO and make propaganda for the Cuban Government."

ITEM 205 Page 3

Hour unknown - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (female) Asks LLAGOSTERA (Cuban Embassy gardner) if he has the radio turned on.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

CALLER : Asks if LLAGOSTERA heard the news that an attempt was made on life of Kennedy.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no. He changed the conversation and said that his wife and son, Pepito, were arriving the coming month.

CALLER : Said that is good and asked LLAGOSTERA to turn on the radio at 1,000 because that's where the news was given.

LLAGOSTERA: Agrees.

ITEM 236 Page 3

1319 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (COTY) Asks LLAGOSTERA if he is listening to the the radio.

LLAGOSTERA: Says yes.

COTY : Asks if it is true that Kennedy has been killed.

LLAGOSTERA: Says no, but that an attempt was made against his life.

COTY : Says there is no radio where he is and he doesn't know what is going on. They say that he was shot three times and died. At that moment it was being given in a bulletin and that LLAGOSTERA should turn on the radio to hear the news.

LLAGOSTERA: Says he will.

ITEM 275 Page 4

Hour not given - Call to the Embassy.

CALLER (Female) Asks ROGELIO to come to see her right away because she has something very important to tell him.

ROGELIO : Asks if it is to tell him that Kennedy was killed.

CALLER : Says yes.

ROGELIO : Says he already knows it.

ITEM 294 Page 4

1340 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Alejandro) Advised LLAGOSTERA that he will be in the Foreign Relations office in case the man calls.

LLAGOSTERA : Says that's fine.

Alejandro : Said "you know that your patron died, no?"

LLAGOSTERA : Yes, very well.

Alejandro : That there was an attempt against Kennedy's life, and it seems that he died.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he did not know that. That he will call back later.

ITEM 302 Page 4

1350 hours - Call from Embassy to Tele # 35-54-12.

Jorge ROJAS : Asks his wife, Cachita, if she knew about the news.

Cachita : Said yes, that they were just giving it on the radio.

ROJAS : Said what a dreadful thing.

Cachita : Replied what imbeciles, what do they gain with terrorism.

ROJAS : Who knows what will happen now.

Cachita : Changed the subject and told her that "the airplane arrives after four" and that he is going over there right now.

Cachita : Said she will wait for him.

ITEM 317 Pages 4 & 5

1400 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (COTY) Asks LLAGOSTERA if it's confirmed.

LLAGOSTERA : Said yes, that's correct, may his soul rest in peace.

COTY : Asks if the plane arrived.

LLAGOSTERA : Said the plane will arrive at 4:15.

COTY : Said it was strange that LANDRIAN or MENA had not called him, because he had some things of theirs.

LLAGOSTERA : Said that's correct.

ITEM 339 Page 5

1402 hours - Call to Embassy

CALLER (PENA) Asks for ROGELIO.

LLAGOSTERA : Said he wasn't in.

PENA : Said he called to tell him the news.

LLAGOSTERA : Said they already know it.

PENA : Said then he is happy.

LLAGOSTERA : Said no, the only thing they desired, was to make him a ..... of flowers.

PENA : Laughed and agreed.

ITEM 347 Page 5

1405 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (CONCEPCION's wife) Tells LLAGOSTERA that when her husband, (Oscar CONCEPCION) arrives, tell him that he left some candies "here". [The CUIS had a commo drop in Mexico City referred to as Candy.]

LLAGOSTERA : Said he will, but if Oscar arrived at home first, to tell him that the airplane arrives at 4:15.

CONCEPCION's wife : Agreed and said that the problem is that she bought some candies to send to VEGA but her husband forgot them.

LLAGOSTERA : Said, today a good man died.

CONCEPCION's: Asks who.
Wife

LLAGOSTERA : Responded, Kennedy.

CONCEPCION's: Laughs.
Wife

LLAGOSTERA : Said, poor man, may God have him in glory.

CONCEPCION's: Laughs again.
Wife

ITEM 522 Page 8

1330 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Female,unidentified) Asks if LUISA knows about the news of Kennedy's death.

LUISA : Surprised, says it is a lie and asks who.

CALLER : Said in an attempt in Texas.

LUISA : Again surprised, LUISA questions if the news is official and asked when it occurred.

CALLER : It happened at 1300 hours.

LUISA : Becomes joyful and says "how great!"

CALLER : Langhs and indicates that his (Kennedy's) brother and wife were also injured.

LUISA : Laughs and says again, "how great, nevertheless, I don't believe it."

CALLER : Says turn on the radio.

LUISA : Asks for her husband whom she hasn't seen.

CALLER : Said "he was here, but he left."

LUISA : Said she has been waiting for him for a while because she has to give him a list of people to review (or revise).

CALLER : Told LLAGOSTERA that he should turn on the radio.

LUISA : Again rejoices and says how great it is.

CALLER : Became serious and asked if LUISA knows the consequences.

LUISA : Says "good."

CALLER : Said she felt sorry because he was a man and the father of a family.

LUISA : Said she felt sorry because he was a father, but he was "a degenerate, unfortunate, an aggressor."

CALLER : Apart from his politics with Cuba, she didn't believe anything had been resolved; "one must now wait to see what will happen."

LUISA : After asking her to wait, asked what more was said.

CALLER : Said they have now been given the news; he has died, was shot three times in the face.

LUISA : Said perfect. Now I'm going to come down.

CALLER : Replied, good.

ITEM 571 Page 9

1344 hours - Call to Embassy.

NICO (Called in) Asked if any calls had come for him.

LUISA : Until now, nothing.

NICO : Asked if VACILIO had called.

LUISA : Said, no, only SOLORAZANO called saying it was not possible for him to send the note because of a problem. For major reasons it was not possible that day; maybe not until Monday. If he wishes to speak with him, he will be at 21-35-70 until one in the afternoon.

NICO : Correct.

LUISA : Said that NELA just called to give her the news of Kennedy's death and the wounding of his brother; that it happened in Texas. Asked what NICO thought about it.

NICO : "can you imagine!"

LUISA : Laughs and adds that that is all for now; that the list is almost ready, she is finishing the last page.

NICO : Says okay. Asks what time the airplane will arrive.

LUISA : Says at 4 and that at 4:30 they must be at the airport.

NICO : Says okay.

ITEM 594 Page 9

Hour not given - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (YOYA) Asks LUISA if she has already heard the news.

LUISA : Says yes.

YOYA : Asks what she thinks of it.

LUISA : "Well, I don't know. I still don't know what opinion to have about it."

YOYA :"What brutes. A good shot. Direct. Listen, now they are going to say that it was from here; that it was some Cuban."

LUISA :"That is possible, then if they don't say it, they will die."

YOYA : "That is certain."

LUISA : Changed the conversation and asked how her mother is.

YOYA : Said she is better; that when she arrived at the house, she received the news and it caught her by surprise.

LUISA : That even he was caught by surprise.

YOYA :"Yes, well if he was alerted, they would have done nothing; what brutes! What is going to happen today, is that it was some Cuban."

LUISA "That it will be a problem for world politics. It is a large problem; enormous."

YOYA :"It is going to be that."

LUISA :"Now no way, it already happened, and it happened in Dallas, Texas."

FOLDER #25 -

25 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #93 Page 1

0946 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER : Asks for ROA.

RECEIVER : (JORRIN) Replied that he wasn't in.

CALLER : Identified self as John RETTY, BBC Correspondent from London. Asked receiver if he had read the report in that day's EXCELSIOR (Mexico City newspaper), about the presence in Mexico in September of the presumed assassin of Kennedy.

JORRIN : Said he hadn't read anything.

RETTY : Said that OSWALD was here in Mexico and went to the Cuban Embassy asking for a visa to go to the Soviet Union; and that he also was in the Soviet Embassy. RETTY asked if JORRIN could confirm the story.

JORRIN : Said RETTY would have to call the Consulate later on 11 28 47 -- 55.

FOLDER #25

27 NOVEMBER 1963

ITEM #26 Page 1

1026 hours - Call to Embassy.

CALLER (Male) From Ultimas Noticias says that they have had a cable from Havana stating that an employee of the Foreign Relations Office of the embassy had been badly treated with regard to finding out about OSWALD's passport; OSWALD, Kennedy's assassin. That they would like to confirm if it is true.

CHELO : Ignores him, since they had not received the cable directly from Havana.

CALLER : Said Cuba had protested against Mexico for that action.

CHELO : Said, wait a moment. The embassy has no news concerning that particular --

CALLER : Tells PEREGRINA that the cable is from Miami. A radio transmission from Havana was picked up. Minister Raul ROA announced that he had delivered a protest to Ambassador Gilberto BOSQUES of Mexico against the Mexican authorities who had arrested Silvia DURAN, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, supposedly concerning OSWALD's passport.

PEREGRINA : Said they had no news with regard to that.

CALLER : Asked if the arrest took place.

PEREGRINA : Said no, they have no news of that.

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 19-5-1

OOA 3/215,189 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service that operated out of the 13th floor of the INRA Bldg., in Havana. Appears that its mission was to infiltrate counter-revolutionary groups operating in Cuba and the U.S. Juan ORTA was head of it before he defected to the U.S.

OOA 3/215,192 dated 27 March 1962

Concerns agents of Fidel CASTRO's intelligence service. Luis TACORNAL made several trips to the U.S. on missions for Fidel. TACORNAL told Juan ORTA he was recruited by Rolando MASFERRER to form resistance unit in Havana. ORTA told TACORNAL to carry out mission to see how many counterrevolutionaries he could get to join the resistance unit.

DBA 67028 (FBI) dated 24 March 1964

Concerns interview of Harry DEAN in California on 10 December 1963. DEAN said he was connected with July 26th Movement as early as 1958; visited Havana and saw Juan ORTA personally in June 1960; and on return to Chicago joined the FPCC (Fair Play for Cuba Committee) at the instigation of Cuban Consul in Chicago. DEAN met in Cuba man by the name of Frank VEGA who spoke perfect English, and is believed to have identified himself as G-2; was disturbed that DEAN saw ORTA before seeing him (VEGA).

CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - General 19-5-1

CSCI 3/764,016 dated 20 February 1961

Jose PAZ Novas, an exile formerly with the G-2, reported that Juan ORTA worked for the Premier's group; a group of intelligence operators who worked directly under Fidel CASTRO with offices on the 18th floor of the INRA Building.

CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (CRC) 19-124-25

UFGA 3926 dated 1 May 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. Noted that the Station had major concern with regard to the extent and scope of non-CIA support, in the clandestine field, to the Cuban exiles and to the Cuban underground.

WAVE 6617 (IN 98730) dated 1 April 1963

Cable from WAVE to Headquarters, states widespread anti-Kennedy, anti-U.S. reaction to U.S. State Dept.

ban on travel of Cuban exiles outside Dade County, Fla.

DGI (GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE) Organization, Functions, Policies, Standards (Soft File)

CSCI 3/777,001 dated 10 July 1963.

Bureau "N" in the National Section of the G-2 was charged with controlling six targets including hotels, casinos and former gambling groups.

DGI - Targets and Assignments (Soft File)

Cross-reference form, 3 September 1963 (FBI doc?)

Subject of document - Alwin Artilano ODIO TAMAYO y Suarez. "Target of greatest importance was to penetrate Cuban Army of Liberation to determine date of any possible invasion of Cuba. Leaders were to be identified to be assassinated later."

DGI - Guerrilla and Miscellaneous Training of Foreigners Soft File

TDCSDB 3/657,936 dated 18 Nov 1963

Source AMTURVY-1 (Arturo Maria de Jesus VERONA Alonso), from sub-source, a militiaman: As of 17 November 1963 rumors were circulating that Fidel CASTRO may have left Cuba for China or the Soviet Union.

DSE - DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY A-13 - General

Non-Official file - No file no. - Soft File

TDCSDB 3/656,765 dated 20 September 1963

A Bogota 24 [liaison] source reported that Manuel PINEIRO said that the Cubans were aware of two CIA agents among delegation of U.S. students; also, that the CIS was aware of an assassination plot against Fidel CASTRO by a group in the GOC being directed by CIA.

DSE - Soft File

CSCI 3/779,828 dated 4 February 1964

Report on Mario GUTIERREZ, nicknamed "Mayito", a Cuban, who in February 1964 was residing in the U.S. In 1959 he was working in hotels and night clubs and acting as a penetration agent for the Cuban Intelligence Service. GUTIERREZ and Manola ALVAREZ worked for the Chief of "N" Bureau of the National Section of the G-2 Secret Aparat in Havana.

AMDOSE Project 19-6-77/2-4

OSMA 14727 Att. A. dated 2 January 1962

SW message from agent, AMDOSE-1, dated 7 December 1962, includes the statement "the majority of us hope that Kennedy finishes with Fidel before Christmas." /Seems to be

1/mc

more a statement of mood or feeling rather than fact._7

AMEMBER Operation 19-6-116/2,3,4

Memorandum to the DCI from the DDP dated 10 June 1964

Concerns plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban Government leaders. Persons, who were parties to this action, advised Agency officers of plans to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Further advised there was tie-in with elements of Cosa Nostra with on-island contacts who could do the job. Agency officers made clear that the U.S. Government would not condone such action.

AMFAUNA Project 19-6-50/3

UFGA 10,085 dated 24 July 1963

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, advised that AMFAUNA-1 reported that a friend of AMFAUNA-7 was planning to assassinate Fidel CASTRO before the 26th of July and wanted financial support.

SW Message from AMFAUNA-1 received 30 July 1963

(Mge #134 dated 15 July 1963)

AMFAUNA-7 reportedly asked AMFAUNA-1 to inform the latter's friend abroad (CIA) about A-7's plans to assassinate CASTRO and to request financial support. A-1 said he was one of the five persons who knew the identity of the person who was organizing it, but could not reveal it, even to CIA, because those Cubans believed that U.S. policy toward Cuba had been so wrong that the U.S. Government agencies must have been penetrated by traitors to democracy. A-1 said he did not believe in assassination but felt it was his duty to report it. A-1 said the conspirators didn't know him (A-1) at all, that they knew only A-7, but they did know that the above information reached CIA.

WAVE 2086 (IN 91617) dated 2 August 1963

On 23 July 1963 an unidentified individual said he was raising money for the purchase of more dynamite to use in the assassination of Fidel CASTRO. He said that he was one of six men planning to kill Fidel. RENGO (fnu), formerly an official of the CASTRO Government, was leader of the group. They planned to trigger an explosion in a sand truck when Fidel went by. If not killed by the explosion, Fidel was to have been shot by five of the group who would close in on him.

WAVE 2316 (IN 95289) dated 8 August 1963

SW Message #143 dated 1 August 1963

Reported information from a Bernardo ALVAREZ Mon, that an attempt on CASTRO's life had been prepared for 26 July banquet at the Presidential Palace. A large caliber machine gun on a tripod had been discovered behind a curtain. AMFAUNA-1 said that this had nothing to do with AMFAUNA-7's plan which was still pending.

UFGA 13428 dated 15 January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters, reported information from 01 HULAKE-1 on 8 Jan 64 indicating that there had been a general roundup in Cienfuegos, which began on 26 Dec 63, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO. At least 17 persons were arrested. One person appeared to be AMLAME-5 (Luis PUIG Tabares 201-329604). Neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 were believed to be involved in any plot against the life of Fidel, but could have been high on the general suspect list.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO 19-9-11/1

(Democratic Revolutionary Front)

UFGA 1933 dated 24 July 1961

Dispatch from JMWAVE to Headquarters, transmitting an operational plan presented to WAVE Base by Raul F. HERRERO Morales, Member of the Executive Board, Frente Revolucionario Jose A. ECHEVARRIA. HERRERO was told by a WAVE Base contact that the Agency could not help him. The plan called for the physical elimination of Fidel CASTRO, several members of the Cuban Communist

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Party, the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba, a few members of the Minister's Council and some other 2,000 persons connected with the Communist Party or Cuban Government.

FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD) 19-9-11 (General)
(Revolutionary Democratic Front)
DBF 71256 (FBI) dated 15 January 1962

On 19 January 1961 Thomas Frank MIKA and Thomas Lawrence KANE told the Chicago FBI office the following: KANE said he was recruited into the CASTRO movement in Miami in May 59, went to Cuba, became disillusioned and returned to the U.S. in December 1959. He visited the FRD office in Chicago, and was advised of a plan to assassinate the principal members of the CASTRO regime; Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, and "Che" GUEVARA. Allegedly members of the FRD sounded out KANE for participating in such an attempt. If the mission could be successfully executed, the members participating would be paid $500,000.00.

AMHIM Project 19-126-41/3,4

UFGA 15383 dated 8 May 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Headquarters. AMHIM-2 learned during a visit to San Juan, Puerto Rico in late March 1964 that Manuel RAY Rivero, leader of JURE (Cuban Revolutionary Junta), planned to infiltrate Cuba. Included in RAY's plans was a plot to kill Fidel CASTRO.

JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE)
(Cuban Revolutionary Junta)

SJAN 0884 (IN 44753) dated 4 January 1963

Manuel RAY Rivero, head of JURE, told SKDIKE-1 (San Jose Station source) that JURE was then concentrating on infiltrating Cuban militia through which he hoped ultimately to effect the assassination of the Cuban hierarchy.

WAVE 7824 (IN 05509) dated 13 June 1964

Manuel RAY Rivero on 11 June 1964 denied to AMCARBON-1 (JMWAVE Station contact) that he and JURE were receiving CIA help. He indicated, however, that he was getting non-specific help from Tad SZULC of the *New York Times*, Karl MEYER of the *Washington Post*, and Sam HALPER of *Time*.

The ZRKNICK section, because of its classification - TOP SECRET UMBRA - is included as an annex. According to Mr. King, Richard King, the Comint Control Officer for the Office of Sigint Ops, the material should retain that classification.

AMLACE Operation 19-6-62/2,3,4

3

Memorandum to Chief, TFW/FI from [F.W. Flott] dated 1 October 1962

AMLACE-1 was asked about succession in the event of CASTRO's death. He responded in October 1962 that in the event of CASTRO's death, even the gusanos (worms) say it would be useless to kill Fidel. No one thinks that his death would be useful to the counter-revolution.

AMLEG Operation 19-6-80/2,3,4

DIRECTOR 33866 dated 19 April 1963

Cable from Headquarters to the Hague, stating that approval has been granted for sabotage of Cuban ships ranging from delaying ship to putting ship out of commission.

//mc

DIRECTOR 34099 Dated 20 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to the Hamb and Fran, stating sabotage program against Cuban shipping of sufficiently high priority to require utilization any appropriate asset.

HAGU 3698 (IN 22804) Dated 22 April 1963

Proposed that AMLEG-29 place a four hour delay explosive "CLAM" to one of 34 drums of "TETRAHYDROFURAN" which to be loaded on the deck of the HAVANA.

DIRECTOR 35006 Dated 24 April 1963

Cable from Hqs. to HAGU, BRUS, HAMB, FRAN, CASB, RABA stating U.S. Govt policy calls for all feasible forms pressure on CASTRO Regime to inhibit its success and culminate in disorder leading to its downfall. Realize motivation of assets will be major key to success ops, and that difficulties will be encountered due their interpretation USG policy, Burden of positive motivation thus rests on case officers involved who must decide each case on own merits and use considerable judgement to induce cooperation.

DIRECTOR 41673 Dated 21 May 1963

Sabotage operation failed for reasons yet unclear. Prohibition on use explosives or incendiary devices has been removed. All addressees now urged consider utilization full range sabotage and harrassment techniques against Cuban ships and cargoes. Now appears AMLEG agents generally unsuited for violent sabotage.

DIRECTOR 39186 Dated 11 May 1963

Restriction on sabotage applies only to explosive and incendiary type actions such as limpets and shape charges. Wish to explore possibility of non-violent methods of sabotaging Cuban ships. Wish to minimize USG sponsorship of sabotage acts whenever possible. This program is to be held on stict need to know basis. Therefore, no briefing of State personnel without prior Hqs. approval. Request for approval in most cases will be denied. Rationale for revision is that State fully represented in approval this program and may brief their Chiefs of Mission thru own channels if they wish. /RESEARCHER COMMENT: In view of large number of persons briefed on the program in a short period of time, it appears likely that the Gov't of Cuba could have possibly learned of the program by June 1963, some four months before the assassination of President Kennedy. The State Dept. approved the operation and Ambassadors were to be informed on a strictly "need to know basis." There was a minor flap when it was learned that Amb. McArthur (Belgium) was informed of the program.7

AMLEO Operation 19-6-75/2,3,4

UFGA 15995 Dated 2 June 1964

In February 1963 AMLEO-3 (Capt. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez) Cuban defector, in debriefing claimed that he had high-level anti-Communist contacts in the GOC (whom he refused to name) who would listen to Rebel Army exiles but would take no positive action with them unless they demonstrated their power by eliminating Fidel or carrying out other strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. RABEL said that the death of Fidel would be the best way to change the Government of Cuba. /COMMENT: RABEL was used in relation to the AMTRUNK Operation. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. RESEARCHER COMMENT: Appears possible RABEL may have been CIS provocation agent whose mission was to convince the CIA or some exile group to try to undertake a plot to assassinate Fidel./

LIAISON with Department of the Army (ACSI) re Cuba 19-2-12

WAVE 1196 (IN 07492) Dated 20 June 1964

A letter from AMSHOT-1 (now SLFREE-1) on-island, dated 8 January 1964, advised that one Francisco BLANCO was arrested on 17 Oct 1963 for involvement in a planned assassination of Fidel CASTRO. BLANCO was employed by the Office of Planificacion (sic) JUCIPLAN. JMWAVE Station provided a copy of the letter to local FBI office.

LIAISON WITH OTHER U.S. AGENCIES 19-2-4

DIRECTOR 03964 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA Cabled Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security, giving text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 November 1962, concerning a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter also stated that Fidel was very anxious to know how plans were progressing. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Maimi reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero. /COMMENT: See CUBAN Foreign Relations 19-9-2, DBF 47612, 27 Apr 1960./

DIRECTOR 04013 Dated 8 December 1962

Hqs. CIA provided White House Secret Service, FBI and State Dept Security with traces on Bernardo MORALES, above, who entered the U.S. in May 62 on fraudulent visa.

DBA 28980 (FBI) Dated 12 December 1962

Advised the Agency that the FBI had no information iden/with MORALES-Rivero, intended recipient of the above letter, or Jose MENENDEZ, the sender.

UFGA 15233 Dated 20 April 1964

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff, copy of a report on Byron CAMERON which it had sent locally to the FBI. A usually reliable source reported that CAMERON said he was representing an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO.

DIRECTOR 23308 Dated 22 May 1964

Hqs. CIA sent to State Dept. EYES ONLY to CRIMMINS and BOWDLER, message which Harvey SUMM asked CAS Miami Station to transmit to Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Dept. of State. During visit to SUMM'S office 21 May, Tad SZULC mentioned conversations he had had with Manuel RAY of JURE within past few days. RAY expressed appreciation for help he had received thus far from USG, and said he could use more.

DBA 73544 (FBI) Dated 8 June 1964

Memo from FBI Newark, N.J. office. Reportedly man or men working for H.L. Hunt, Texas millionaire, discussed the possibility of doing away with Cheddi Jagan or CASTRO or both. Was on private basis; not in any way connected with U.S. Government. Reportedly the CIA knew about it though.

DIRECTOR 61320 Dated 2 November 1964

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE, stating FBI requested declassificatin of pages 1,8,10 and 11 of FBI Miami Report, 20 December 1963, File # 105-8342, Subj: Lee Harvey OSWALD, based on WAVE info. dated 7,11,12 December 1963. Material required for use Warren Commission.

AMLILAC Operation 19-132-29/1,3,4

UFGA 13775 dated January 1964

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Special Affairs Staff providing a list of sabotage and caching attempts and the results, conducted during January 1963 through January 1964. There were 7 successes out of 25 attempts; several failures; most were cancelled for one reason or another.

MEMORANDUM Dated 3 June 1964

Lists following sabotage operations (raids) run by CIA from 1 August 1963 to date of memo. Those from Aug to Nov were:

19 Aug 63 - attack on sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province; considerable fire damage.

30 Sep 63 - sabotage operation to destroy a lumber mill in Baracoa, Oriente. Heavy damage was inflicted.

21 Oct 63 - an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in La Isabela harbor, Las Villas Province. Vessel

was sunk.

15 Nov 63 - had information that Cuban defense forces were on the alert and possibily forewarned of upcoming operations.

23 Nov 63 - sabotage operation against sawmill postponed indefinitely.

AMLISP Project 19-6-59/3

SW Message #352 dated 24 January 1964, from AMLISP-1 reported an attempt on life of Fidel CASTRO that failed because one of the conspirators talked. Was to have been carried out at meal in Jagua Castle. Many persons in Cienfuegos allegedly were executed.

SW Message # 44 dated 18 March 1964 to AMLISP-1
Agency requirements were sent to asset for more details on all assassination attempts and plots against CASTRO by civilians or disaffected military.

SW Message #390 dated 14 March 1964 from AMLISP-1
Reported conversation with a Cuban military officer who said "they can prepare it (a coup d'etat) but when its ready the government will pull the string and squash it, because everything was under control." It is unknown whether this information was sent to the FBI or other agencies.

AMLOAN Operation 19-6-79/3

EGGA 3171 Dated 2 November 1964

Dispatch from Hamburg Base to Hqs. On 15 Oct 1964, after publication of the Warren Commission Report, untested source Prof. 6 5 Walter SIMON reported the following to AMLOAN-1 (Wilhelm Bernhardt 5 4 John KESSLER. 6 5 SIMON obtained the information from well-known Cuban scientist APIAGAS (fnu) in Havana on 23 November 1963. APIAGAS claimed he was at the Havana Airport, by chance, on 22 Nov 63 when at 1700 hours an aircraft with Mexican markings landed and parked at the far side of the field. Two men whom he recognized as Cuban "gangsters" (identities not given), alighted, entered the rear entrance of the administration building and disappeared without going through the normal customs procedures. APIAGAS learned that the aircraft had just arrived from Dallas, Texas via Tijuana and Mexico City. The plane had been forced to land at Tijuana due to engine trouble. By combining the date, the origin of the flight, and the known reputation of the two men, APIAGAS theorized that the two men must have been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. APIAGAS speculated that Lee Harvey OSWALD had acted in the pay of CASTRO, and that

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the two Cubans had been in Dallas to organize or oversee the operation. APIAGAS said he had been greatly distressed by what he had seen and heard.

CSCI 316/02545-64 dated 15 December 1964

Provided the foregoing information to the FBI. It did not include the name of APIAGAS (fnu) or [Prof. Δ5 Walter SIMON] but did state that follow-up was impossible because the source [(SIMON)] x5 had since passed away.

DBA 94347 dated 31 December 1964 (FBI)

The FBI responded that "in view of the geographical location of Tijuana in relation to Dallas and Mexico City, it seemed unlikely the aircraft would have landed there due to engine trouble if it was on a flight from Dallas to Mexico City. Also, that due to the distances between Dallas and Tijuana, Tijuana and Mexico City, and Mexico City and Havana, the aircraft would have had to leave Dallas a number of hours before the assassination of President Kennedy to arrive in Havana at 5 p.m." The FBI suggested that CIA may wish to determine at the airport in Tijuana whether any aircraft

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landed there from Dallas on 22 November 1963 reporting engine trouble and then proceeded on to Mexico City. The FBI advised it was making no investigation of the matter in the absence of further information from CIA.

/COMMENT: There is no name trace record of
5 APIAGAS (fnu), [Walter SIMON] or his widow. Since ~~6~~ [SIMON's] widow had been willing to provide information in the first interview, a subsequent interview after her husband's death might have yielded results. In view of vagueness of original report, its receipt a year after the assassination, and lack of CIA assets in Tijuana, Headquarters decided not to follow-up./

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MISCELLANEOUS - Cuba 19-500

DBF 54461 Dated 4 August 1960 (FBI)

Dr. and Mrs. Benjamin WARENSAJOLD advised the FBI Honolulu office on 1 August 60 that on 29 July 60 an unidentified male, said to be Cuban, whom they met at Canlis Broiler Cocktail Lounge Honolulu, said the U.S. would find its President with a bullet hole in his head and that Cuba would get even with the U.S. for what this country did to Cuba in the sugar field. Unidentified Cuban was described as: ca. 30 years old, 5'10" tall, 160 lbs., black hair, brown eyes, prominent teeth, well built, handsome and prosperous looking. Said he was in the sugar business.

DBA 72715 Dated 21 May 1964 (FBI)

On 12 May 1964 one Orlando Antonio Salomon DIAZ Canal, Cuban, appeared at Dallas, Texas FBI office; had a scrapbook which reflected he had plans to go to Cuba for the purpose of assassinating Fidel CASTRO. /COMMENT: traces show that he claimed (in 1963) to be founder of organization called "Suicide Battalion" with 200 men in U.S. and about 50 in Cuba, with purpose to assassinate CASTRO7

UFGW 4420 Dated 12 October 1964

Dispatch from Hqs. SAS to JMWAVE Station requesting WAVE Station reaction to request from FBI to declassify for release to public by Warren Commission, report believed to have been passed to FBI Miami by WAVE Station. Concerned information from a Western diplomat alleging that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a plot prepared and executed jointly by Chinese Communists and Fidel CASTRO through intermediaries. The intermediaries were alleged to be Ramon B. CORTES, Mexican-American, and FERNANDEZ Feito (fnu), a Cuban, both located in Dallas, Texas. It was also alleged that these men were financed through an unidentified bank at 14 Wall Street, New York City.

Memorandum to the FBI from CIA (SAS) Dated 7 Dec 1963

Reported the above information to the FBI. Also noted that reportedly Fidel CASTRO was extremely worried about the current probings taking place into the assassination of President Kennedy and about the possible findings. The utterances about the plot came from SAAVEDRA (fnu), allegedly a close friend of Celia SANCHEZ. It further states that there appeared to have been no Soviet participation in the plot because at that time the Soviets were too close to the Americans. We advised the FBI of no Agency traces on CORTES and FERNANDEZ, but cited a Robert NIETO then living in Miami who could give details on CORTES and FERNANDEZ. CIA advised the FBI that the Agency was taking steps to further develop the information and to identify the original source and additional data would be provided the FBI immediately.

DBA 88772 dated 23 October 1964 (FBI)

FBI Miami Office, reported that one John H. WILLINGHAM (true name Virdell WILLINGHAM) at that time lived in Charlotte, North Carolina. He had served 10 months in U.S. Penitentiary Atlanta, Georgia for mailing a letter threatening the life of the President of the U.S. WILLINGHAM wrote a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense in August 1964 stating that he would be released from prison in a few months and would like a pass so that he could go directly from the U.S. to Cuba. He added that he would try to join the Cuban military service and would not be returning from Cuba.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES A/2

American Embassy Havana Document #1347 dated 24 Mar 60

Juan ORTA and another officer in CASTRO's office made arrangements in which Cuban Col. Damasco MONTESINO was arrested March 1960 for attempting to leave Cuba. (The other officer was Alfredo GUERRA).

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR A/3 (Job #70-540 - No File Number)

DBF 95904 Dated 8 December 1961 (FBI)

Sent to Secret Service, I&NS, State Department Security, and CIA. Stated that I&NS Office in Honolulu was requested by I&NS Regional Office in San Pedro, Calif., 4 December 1961 to place lookout notice on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas. MARGOLLES was reported to be son of Chief of National Police in Cuba, and attempting to enter the U.S. to meet with CASTRO agents to assassinate President John Kennedy.

WAVE 0793 (IN 13094) Dated 18 January 1962

WAVE advised it had photos of MARGOLLES and Emilio ARAGONES (also involved in plot) and would attempt to develop further information on the assassination plot.

UFGA 3134 Dated 23 January 1962

JMWAVE Station forwarded to Hqs. photos and bio. data on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

DIRECTOR 38056 (OUT 94877) Dated 27 January 1962)

Cable to Latin American Stations and Bases concerning plot by MARGOLLES and ARAGONES. Requested any info their current whereabouts, on priority basis.

MEMO WAS 50/7 Dated 29 January 1962 to Regional Commissioner from District Director, Wash., D.C.

To Regional Intelligence Officer giving information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles. DIAZ reportedly trained in

Czech. to be head of political police of Cuba. Reportedly took refuge in Brazilian Embassy Havana which appeared to be cover-up to carry on secret activity. Attended school in U.S. for several years (believed to be military school in Georgia) and to be a graduate of the University of Havana. His father reportedly lived in Miami at this time (1962). An uncle by the same name, living in Cuba in 1962, is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. In 1962 DIAZ was head of the Department of Technical Investigation (DTI) of the Rebel Army. A known terrorist, he is said to be capable of use of explosive bombs and automatic weapons. Is believed to have directed assassinations in the past from somewhere in Mexico. A good friend of Rolando CUBELA.

MEXI 0092 (IN 26086) Dated 10 February 1962

According to [Mexico 24 immigration] records, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES arrived Mexico City by air on 27 June 1957 as political refugees from Batista regime. Both sought political asylum in Mexican Embassy Havana in mid-1957.

MEMO For The Secret Service from William McClare Dated 13 February 1962

Gives summary of information on Raul DIAZ Arguelles.

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Although DIAZ has a position of great influence in the DTI, he is poorly regarded. He is (62) reportedly working with former U.S. gangsters who were deported from the U.S. and also affiliated with the narcotics racket. Is believed to be in complete charge of "any activity as contemplated by Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES-Duenas, which involved a plot to assassinate the President of the United States."

UFGA 3302 Dated 16 February 1962

JMWAVE Station advised Hqs. of information on DIAZ, MARGOLLES and ARAGONES that it had sent to U.S. Secret Service Miami, Florida.

CICS 3/769,904 Dated 26 March 1962

CIA provided U.S. Secret Service, FBI and I&NS information on MARGOLLES and ARAGONES.

Unofficial Memo - Mr. Alfred Cox from Ernest Aragon Undated

States ARAGONES is believed to be General Coordinator of the National 26th of July Movement and National Chief of CASTRO's militia. Is one of CASTRO's right hand men and accompanies CASTRO in all public appearances. ARAGONES is coordinator of alleged plot (against President Kennedy.) Both ARAGONES and MARGOLLES have fanatical tendencies.

UFGA 15107 dated 8 April 1964

Transmitted to Headquarters Target Personality Study on Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES Duenas (201-315161).

MOVIMIENTO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO (CDM) 19-120-13

(Christian Democratic Movement)

U.S. Embassy Foreign Service Dispatch, Havana, #1614 dated 9 May 1960 (837,432/5-2460)

Reported that the Revolutionary Government has skillfully maneuvered Rolando CUBELA, the President of the FEU, and his pro-Communist cohorts into a position of power. First, on May 7, it was CUBELA who was given the task of inciting the mob and bruiting the fact that the powers-that-be disapproved of Aureliano SANCHEZ Arango. Communist "goon-squad" tactics had become so vicious that even many students who had heretofore been circumspectly apolitical are afraid to attend classes. The Vice-Secretary of the School of Agronomy asked how it was that if CUBELA leadership so deplored violence that it had remained impassive in the face of the physical violence perpetrated against his person by members of the Communist Youth from the Instituto de la Habana, who had entered the University grounds completely armed. CUBELA and Angel QUEVEDO, went about the campus carrying arms, in direct violation of the University regulations.

MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO del PUEBLO (MRP) 19-120-22

(Peoples Revolutionary Movement)

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Memo to Cleve (Dr. Cleveland C. Cram) from [M. Oldfield]

Dated 8 November 1961

Concerns a Cuban Government report published in the press which claimed that the Peoples Revolutionary Movement directed and supplied by the U.S. CIA and Department of State, planned acts of sabotage and more recently planned an attempt to assassinate Fidel CASTRO and other government leaders early in October. The attempt on Fidel allegedly was discovered the day before it was due to take place.

Moscow TASS in English to Europe 8 November 1961

Reported the information in the 8 November 1961 Memorandum, above, and cited it as new proof of American imperialism's criminal conspiracy against free Cuba.

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MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-120-18

(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)

UFGA 4948 Dated 18 July 1962 Report No. AA 134

One Juan FALCON Tamar, alleged National Coordinator of the MRR in Cuba was interviewed on Cuban "Radio Rebelde" Station 17 July 1962. He said he planned the assassination of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. He also talked about a plot to assassinate Raul CASTRO on 26 July 61, a plot he attributed to the CIA. He also mentioned the assassination of Fidel at the same time. FALCON claimed that the plot against Raul was invented by the CIA, and that the CIA provided financial support to MRR activities.[No indication FALCON worked for CIA.]

WAVE 5879 (IN 30751) Dated 18 July 1962

WAVE Station advised that FALCON's presentation appeared previously taped and poorly rehearsed. Cable is slugged AMBRONC-5 complex. [AMBRONC-5 was an Agency asset executed by the Cuban Government.]

Memo to Chief, Task Force W from COS, JMWAVE, 16 Aug 62

The Ops That Failed/MRR

Concerns interview 14 Aug 62 of Victor MARTINEZ Zambrano, a former hot-shot activist of the MRR in Havana who was an asylee in the Argentine and Brazilian Embassies and left Cuba. In Sept. 61 he organized the operation which failed, the plan to assassinate Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ. Reportedly one of the persons involved pulled the pin of the hand grenade prematurely, it exploded, one man was killed and another critically injured. MARTINEZ escaped, went into hiding, and later came to the U.S.

MOVIMIENTO de RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIO (MRR) 19-300-11
(Revolutionary Recovery Movement)
TDCSDB 3/656,595 Dated 12 September 1963

On 7 September 1963 the Movimiento Insurreccional de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MIRR-Insurrectional Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) made an abortive attempt to bomb a target in Cuba. On 8 September 1963, Jack GRIFFIN (U.S. citizen), an unidentified American, and a Cuban described only as a demolition expert and former member of Brigade 2506, bombed a sugar plant and dropped 6,000 leaflets near Moron, Camaguey Province. Five of the six bombs exploded with violent force, and started several fires in the sugar mill. There was estimated 50% destruction. This was done in the name of the MIRR. An American by the name of Bill Johnson, reportedly had full control over all MIRR operations. Money was supplied by Orlando BOSCH Avila, obtained from Chiri MENDOZA. Johnson worried for fear that their next planned raid, target of a military nature, could cause international repercussions and/or bring them under prosecution on the neutrality act. BOSCH and MENDOZA were collaborating with Jose Mario "Pepin" BOSCH Lamarque and two former sugar mill owners to back a daylight raid on a Cuban MIG base with two rocket-firing P-51's.

AMMUG Project (Cuban DGI Defector) 19-6-102

Memo for the Record dated 4 June 1964

Re Debriefing Report #119 of AMMUG-1 (Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera). He did not recognize photo of Braulio MARTINEZ Alfonso, Cuban born naturalized U.S. citizen. MARTINEZ returned to Cuba after the fall of Batista. Also known as "SUAREZ" and Francisco De RAVIRICH, he has been reported as an intelligence officer.

HHTA 3782 dated 16 June 1964

Dispatch from Tegucigalpa to Mexico City. A Tegucigalpa Station asset assigned to [monitor 24 certain Honduran ham radio operators] of interest to the Station, reported the following, most unusual,

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conversation. On 14 June Mexico came in very clear and by chance picked up a strange conversation from a ham station in Cuba. The Cuban station was talking to Mexico ham radio operator named Alfonso, call letters XRIWA. Cuban station told Alfonso to contact a famous band leader named Antonio Maria Romero and kept referring to "El Corsario Negro." The Cuban station instructed Alfonso that once he contacted Romero he should have him record "Tres Lindas Cubanas."

Memo for C/WH/PO/A from C/WH/SA/CI dated 15 Oct 1964 19-6-102/3 AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report #203.

AMMUG-1 said when President Kennedy died "Augusto" DGI Deputy Chief, Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, arranged a meeting at the National Liberation Building in Havana. He asked the National Liberation officers to urgently prepare commo system for a message to their agents to be transmitted by Radio Havana. Musical recording to accompany message was "Three (or Six) Beautiful Cubans."

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964

Dispatch that transmitted the foregoing information to Tegucigalpa from Hqs. WH/SA.

/COMMENT: The AMMUG information duplicates that recorded under ZRKNICK./

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL INSIDE CUBA 19-9-13

Memo to Chief, Contact Division, OO from Chief, Washington Field Office, 31 July 1961

Julio HUERTEMATTE, Vice-President of National Bank of Washington, told OO on 25 July 61 that a Cuban underground leader (identity unknown) who had been in prison in Cuba and recently come to Miami, told HUERTEMATTE that CIA agent Pedro CUELLAR had denounced five underground leaders to the CASTRO authorites. /COMMENT: This confirms previous information that CUELLAR was a double agent. He reportedly caused the execution of a number of counter-revolutionaries operating in Cuba. CUELLAR's dependents have been paid under Project [SLSTIPEND] since the early 1960's. In view of evidence that CUELLAR was not executed by the CASTRO Regime as publicized in the Washington Post in the early 1960's, it has been recommended to the Commercial Cover Staff that administers the [SLSTIPEND] Project, to further investigate the case and stop payments if possible.7

WAVE 7900 (IN 39024) dated 14 Sept 61; and DIRECTOR 13231 (OUR 99328) dated 20 Sept 61

Both these cables discuss CIA support to AMBLESS-1 [Alberto del JUNCO Mesa] one of the Agency's best

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controlled on-island CA asset. We provided financial and other support for on-island operations. /Comment: if brought to the attention of the GOC, such activities might have prompted the GOC to consider retaliatory action against the U.S. Government./

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE 19-126-4

Memo to C/WH/4 from Dave Phillips dated 2 July 1960

Concerns propaganda action to be taken against visit of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV to Cuba re 25th of July celebration, including rumor of attempted assassination against KHRUSHCHEV. Speculation on the assassination attempts was to be surfaced on WRUL program, in AMPACA's paper, etc.

Memo to Director of Central Intelligence from C/WHD dated 5 July 1960

In effort to prevent or counteract KHRUSCHEV's visit to Cuba, Hqs. proposed prop action to instigate a rumor or rumors that KHRUSHCHEV's life woud be in danger while in Cuba, from a well-planned assassination attempt. This would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

DIRECTOR 84642 dated 22 November 1963

Prop guidance to WAVE Station for media assets. Requested they use tape excerpts of appropriate portions of

Kennedy speech to LA newspaper conference held in Miami that week, and to note in broadcasts that President's last major address directed to LA audience concentrated on Cuban freedom. This was to be broadcast over JMHOPE with tributes and appropriate comment on 25 November, and have JMHOPE stress religious theme on Sunday 24 November.

AMOT Project (Later Became SLIGO Project) 19-5-3

TDCSDB 3/655,033 dated 12 June 1963 (UFG 3021)

Report that members of Cubanos Libres (Free Cubans) left Florida on 6 June 63 with mission to infiltrate Cuba and assassinate Fidel CASTRO Ruz. Was intercepted by Cuban boat, exchanged gunfire, and returned to Florida. Mission was unsuccessful. Manuel QUIZA Docal, leader of Cubanos Libres, a Cuban exile action group, had officially committed himself to JURE for any executive action which JURE might undertake against CASTRO's Cuba. /QUIZA was not connected with CIA./

UFG 5099 dated 4 May 1964 19-6-95/4 (AMOT Report)

Concerned a plot discovered by the DSE (Department of State Security) on 9 or 10 March 64 to assassinate CASTRO. The assassination was planned for 13 March when Castro was expected to visit the CMQ Radio and TV Studio in Havana.

DIRECTOR 31178 dated 25 June 1964

This referenced documents (UFGA 15954 and WAVE 7129 (IN 93714) having to do with plot to assassinate CASTRO. This information was dissemed to the Special Group and other key officials. The Special Group was concerned about the matter and referred it to the Dept. of Justice as a matter of law enforcement.

WAVE 9168 (IN 26320) dated 12 July 1964 Cable to Hqs.

AMWAX-1 (Oscar FERNANDEZ Viega) and [UQAMBER-2 (Miguel Guillermo TRUYOL-Gimeno)] were independently interviewed by local FBI reps. concerning plot to assassinate CASTRO. Both denied any knowledge of or participation in any plan to assassinate CASTRO. For Hqs. FYI: "Regarding AMWAX-1 and [UQAMBER-2, WAVE wishes emphasize that both sources clearly understand they have no sanctions from WAVE to directly or indirectly promote, sponsor, or support such plan or any similar plans regardless of person against whom they directed."

WAVE 5446 (IN 32990) dated 1 Dec 1964

AMOT Report DD-1206 dated 19 Nov 1964 stated that as part of plan to assassinate CASTRO, a rumor was to be floated that one of the organizations belonging to the alliance was fighting inside Cuba. The rumors were

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expected to impress U.S. Government officials who were already having talks with Manuel URRUTIA Lleo, and willing to provide financial assistance to him.

PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 100-300-12

DIRECTOR 03964 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to Secret Service, FBI and State Dept. Security forwarding text of a letter from Havana, dated 27 Nov 62, to Miami, concerning plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Letter was addressed to a Post Office Box in Miami belonging to the Radio Libertad La Voz, Anti-Comunista de America. Since the addressee was unknown to members of Radio Libertad, one of their Miami reps. passed the letter to a contact of JMWAVE Station. Addressee was Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero.

DIRECTOR 4013 dated 8 December 1962

Cable from Agency to addressees cited above. Provided traces on Bernardo Adalberto MORALES-Rivero who entered the U.S. in May 62 on a fraudulent visa.

UFGA 6884 dated 10 December 1962

Dispatch from JMWAVE Station to Hqs. Stated that letter similar to 27 Nov 62 one cited above, possibly written by same author, was in possession of Treasury Dept., Wash., D.C. by official who was in contact with CIA on the matter. JMWAVE forwarded the 29 Nov 62 letter, from Jose MENENDEZ to Bernardo MORALES in Miami, and suggested that Hqs. pass it to the Treasury Dept. for technical handling. JMWAVE was anxious to receive results of both of the letters on the grounds that they may be part of a planned G-2 PW operation in the U.S. or against U.S. targets.

DIRECTOR 04538 dated 11 December 1962

Hqs. CIA cabled to Secret Service, FBI and State Security, traces on Olga DUQUE de Heredia and Aida MAYO, Miami reps. of the org. Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Comunista de America, address to which letter to MORALES was addressed. DUQUE and MAYO turned the letter over to a contact of CIA, since MORALES was reportedly unknown to them. DUQUE was married to Humberto LOPEZ Perez, operator of Radio Libertad, Caracas, Venezuela; Aida MAYO was a close friend of Fidel CASTRO and was believed to act occasionally on behalf of the Cuban Government.

DIRECTOR 04501 dated 12 December 1962

Hqs. advised JMWAVE Station that Hqs. in disseming information did not reveal [Cesar Augusto 4 GAJATE Puig] as intermediary between WAVE and DUQUE and MAYO. Suggested WAVE advise Secret Service of [GAJATE's 4] role since Secret

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Service investigation would surface him anyway. Asked that the Secret Service protect his identity.

WAVE 2266 (IN 33425) dated 11 December 1962

WAVE cabled to Hqs. traces on DUQUE, MAYO and Radio Libertad.

Memo dated 12 December 1962 re Information from Sedret Service

Gives information from a usually reliable source on Jose MENENDEZ Ramos. MENENDEZ, born in Cuba, was a baker in Tampa, Fla., and member of Executive Committee of the FPCC. After Oct. 61 his wife defected to Cuba with the children, and Jose left to join her shortly thereafter. Jose was later seen in Cuba by people who said he had a top job there. Jose also was reported to be connected with INRA, (Agrarian Reform Institute).

PRO-GOBIERNO CONSTITUCIONAL de CUBA (PGCC) 19-9-15

UFGA 2242 dated 30 August 1961

A sub-agent of JMWAVE Station outside unit (AMOT's) reported on 22 Aug. 61 a statement by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona that Kennedy was still backing him and was going to give him immediately the sum of four million dollars for sabotage and propaganda.

WAVE 9026 (IN 18296) dated 6 November 1961

WAVE cabled Hqs. info. from independent sources following meetings between HURWITCH, PASSAVOY and MIRO Cardona. AMCLATTER-1 (Bernard Barker of Watergate fame) reported that HURWITCH and a CIA official were discussing revolutionary affairs with MIRO Cardona, and that CARDONA and his group were backed by President Kennedy. It was further reported that CARDONA had full powers from President Kennedy and was in a position to give orders to CIA which would be on a secondary level. In addition CARDONA reportedly stated that he had U.S. Government support to direct CASTRO underground activities, and that all other groups must join him to get support. Other groups not interested in joining CARDONA, because his ideology was different from their's. CARDONA had never come out strongly as anti-CASTROITE.

UFGA 3806 dated 20 April 1962

Concerned plans of Central American countries for action against Cuba. One General SOMOZA (President of Nicaragua) stated that CIA would be handling the intelligence ramifications toward organizing a Cuban military group in Central America. The dispatch deals with additional U.S. Government aid. Also, one YDIGORAS (President of Guatemala) was to be in Wash., D.C. on 28 April 62 as a guest of President Kennedy, at which time he expected to present the Cuban-in-exile plan.

UFK-16 dated 15 May 1962

Reported information from GARCERAN, leader of the Pro-Gobierno Constitucional en el Exilio (an anti-Castro organization operating out of Miami, Fla.) GARCERAN stated that lawyer Geno NEGRETI had made an appointment to see him stating that a Mr. WARBELL wanted to see him. NEGRETI made his appointment on 8 May 62. It was GARCERAN's understanding that WARBELL was the go-between for a Mr. TROUTMAN from Atlanta, Georgia, who had been the boy friend of President Kennedy's sister (the one who had died). WARBELL indicated that he wanted the appointment to see what GARCERAN's needs were and what aid and assistance GARCERAN wanted for carrying the war to Cuba.

Department of State Memo dated 14 July 1965

Had attached to it a PGCC memo to the Department. It contained a quote of Fidel CASTRO that he wanted to arm Cuba with the most modern equipment (arms, planes, etc.) capable of stopping the United States, and the Latin American countries as well, "before they discover our strategic plans. To that end I need from hundreds of thousands of light infantry arms to planes and long range artillery. Every country in the

Continent must be the target of our guns, from New York and Washington to Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires." On 2 Jan 61 CASTRO asked Latin Americans to take arms against their own governments; on 26 July 62 he demanded a continental revolutionary drive; in 1963 he predicted that Venezuela and Guatemala would surrender the said year. CASTRO's sister Juana (Juanita) arrived in Mexico City from Cuba on 20 June 64. Although she was considered a defector of the CASTRO regime, she had been an agent (CIA) for the prior two and a half years.

AMPUNCH Project 19-6-118/2,3,4

23 November 1963 open text letter from asset, in Cuba, Filed in SW Chrono June 63 -Dec.

Acknowledged the death of President Kennedy.

AMQUAR Project 19-124-28/1-4

HAMB 3879 (IN 50361) dated 30 Oct 63; HAMB 3880 (IN 50478) Identities

Concerns debriefing of [CASAILOR-25] on 24 and 25 Oct 63.

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He reported that Faustino PÉREZ, born ca. 1923, commander in CASTRO's army in Havana Hqs., Granma veteran and former minister in CASTRO's Government, told C-25 in August 1963 that CASTRO must be killed and all resistance groups organized. C-25 described PEREZ as an opportunist who would need promise of advantage in return for help.

AMRANGE Project 19-6-81/1-4

Memo for Chief TFW from DC/TFW/FI re DEGRIP Report dated 28 August 1962

Concerns one Vasco CECCHI, proprietor of the MONTECATINI Restaurant in Vedado quarter of Havana frequented by Fidel CASTRO and his entourage. Employees of the restaurant reportedly were anti-Castroites. Source of the report called attention to closet, partly under stairs used for storage, but which he believed could be used to hide man comfortably. On one of the floors above the restaurant lived a certain Lt. RAMOS who was evidently an intimate of Fidel CASTRO. CASTRO often visited him. /COMMENT: See File "Plots to Assassinate the President of the U.S."100-300-12, Memo from Secret Service dated 12 December 1962, concerning one Jose MENENDEZ Ramos who may be identifiable with Lt. RAMOS/.

13-00000

MEXI 6844 (IN 57745) dated 8 November 1963

Cable to Hqs. DEGRIP reported that CASTRO visited restaurant at least once a month and was "a sitting duck." CECCHI reported to be cowardly type."

MEXI 0880 (IN 73754) dated 14 Sept 1964

Cable to Hqs. reported that CECCHI was arrested and imprisoned in La Cabana Fortress and to be tried for plotting against life of Fidel CASTRO. Prosecutor to ask for 30 year sentence. Employees of reataurant in mid-Aug 64 told source CECCHI was arrested for illegal currency transactions. /COMMENT: No 201 file on CECCHI. Preliminary traces do not indicate connection with CIA.7

AMRAPT Project - La Voz de Cuba 19=126-10

WAVE 0662 (IN 44282) dated 13 April 1965

In April 1965 Francisco CHAO Hermida revealed to a WAVE case officer his "grand plan" for which he requested CIA support. Plan was to recruit trusted men in Miami, infiltrate Cuba, surveil CASTRO, and at opportune time, assassinate him. C/O told CHAO CIA was not interested and could not do business with him.

RESCATE (MOVIMIENTO de RESCATE CONSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRATICO) (Cuban Revolutionary Democratic Rescue Committee) 19-120-39

Anti-Castro revolutionary group; one of among groups forming FRD (Democratic Revolutionary Front) and subsequent CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council). Was controlled by Antonio de VARONA with Hqs. in Miami.

RIMM 4359 (IN 2330) dated 8 April 1961

Radio message from on-island agent. Concerns fact that Cuban by name of Hilly PATTEN, who was in exile in Miami a year previously, belonged to Rescate group and apparently would be bringing arms in from Venezuela soon. Agent said his personal opinion was that Tony VARONA wanted to produce armed action before other groups and for that reason had purchased arms on his own.

DBA 5681 dated 28 March 1962 (FBI)

Stated that Sergio APARICIO, Sec. Gen. of Rescate in New York City advised State Dept. rep. that Rescate had purchased about 30 weapons which were delivered to Miami and then by boat to the underground in Cuba. Jose F. GONZALEZ, associated with Rescate and VARONA, called APARICIO to Wash., D.C. on 2 March 62 and told him not to engage in collection of funds for purchase of any arms or munitions, because there was nothing the Cubans could do in a military way which would be capable of overthrowing the present Government of Cuba. An FBI source advised on 16 Mar 62 that APARICIO and Rescate were making arrangements to picket the White House on 14 Apr 62 for several hours to ask President Kennedy to keep his word re assisting the Cuban exiles in overthrowing the CASTRO Government. APARICIO described the 30 weapons as M-1's delivered to Miami and taken to Cuba by boat and distributed among the underground. APARICIO stated that they had been attempting to supply Osvaldo RAMIREZ, who was in the Escambray Mountains. The weapons were reportedly delivered to Cuba by Commandante AUGUSTO, war name for Ramon RUISANCHEZ, brother-in-law of Tony VARONA.

DBA 23967 dated 28 September 1962 (FBI)

Reported that a small group of Cuban exiles living in Panama was planning to assassinate highest Cuban Gov't official attending 9th Central American Games in Kingston and hoped that it would be Fidel CASTRO. Plotters were reported to be: Rene MARSELLA Garaboto, Conrado RODRIGUEZ Sanchez, Eulogio LOPEZ, Antolin SANCHEZ Govin, and Jose Julio FERNANDEZ. Garaboto planned to leave Panama for U.S. 3 Aug 62 to present plan to Manuel Antonio de VARONA, ranking member of CRC (Cuban Revolutionary Council), request financial and visa assistance and moral support. MARSELLA said that he worked actively in a clandestine manner for Rescate. VARONA did not give much encouragement to the plan; in fact, said he could not sanction or assist in assassination plan.

REVOLUTIONARY JUNTA OF NATIONAL LIBERATION 19-9-12/1

(Right-wing Anti-Castro Group in Exile)

Prensa Latina Havana Broadcast 21 July 1961

Reported that "Cuban Counterrevolutionary Council, headed by Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona, was liquidated together with the mercenary brigade of the CIA in the Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs) disaster. However, a new team has emerged which intends to form a government in exile to be supported and recognized by the U.S. New York Congressman Victor L. ANFUSO, intimate friend of former Cuban dictator Fulgensio BATISTA is principal promoter of idea, which is based on uniting all counterrevolutionary groups established inthe U.S." /COMMENT: ANFUSO planned to call a meeting in Washington in a few days to set up the new government. List of participants had not been announced, but included among those believed to be present was Guillermo ALONSO Pujol. DGI defector

SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 said that ALONSO was a Cuban Gov't agent. He had high USG contacts back then (in 60/61) and knowledge of U.S. Government/CIA cover for activities. ALONSO was used as a cut-out, or intermiediary, supposedly unwittingly, in sensitive Agency operations, in the late 60's and early 70's.]

ZRRIFLE Project Job # 69-S-551 - No File Number

ZRRIFLE/Administrative Financial Folder

OIRT 2173 dated 13 October 1960, Att. Top Secret

DEPIGRAM, Italian Interpol representative, source and spotter for Corsicans. Altman to pick his brain and pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection made, DEPIGRAM to be cut out of the operation.

Memo to C/FI from William Harvey, 27 June 1963

"As far as ZRRIFLE aspects this op, which have been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher Knight is fully familiar, except for one precautionary 'life-line', aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer be considered part of this project."

Folder entitled Personality Sketches

Tab M - Harold MELTZER

Harold MELTZER with aliases was involved in the rackets with upper echelon "hoodlums" throughout the U.S. (pg. 1 Encl. 3 dated 19 Dec 1960.) "In 1959 he furnished information to our QJWIN California office but has not since cooperated with us. N.B. He has the background and talent for the matter we discussed but it is not known whether he would be receptive."

Tab Y - Hanna YAZBECK

YAZBECK lived in Beurit and worked for QJWIN's office intermittendly during the past 10 years (dates not given - possibly 51-61). YAZBECK's chief bodyguard from 50-58 (not named) was a convicted murderer. The bodyguard was murdered. States that YAZBECK has an available pool of assassins.

JMROC Project (Travel of President Johnson to Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1967) 200-6-351/9
Memo CO-2-39,887 to Mr. James Ludlum Liaison Officer CI Staff, dated 7 March 1967

Concerns individual by name of Jose PEREZ, Colombian. Document shows undetermined association with assassinations in Guatemala.

CP-9212 dated 10 March 1967

Concerns Jaime CARDONA-Londono, Colombian, arrested in New Orleans in May 64 for trespassing. He had in his possession typewritten document which purported to be proposed constitution for new super world government with provisions to condemn to death various personages including L. Johnson, daughter of L. Johnson, and Mrs. J. Kennedy. When interviewed 12/22/64 he did not indicate any interest in the death of the President.

16-17

[CARACAS] 6104 (IN 8778) dated 25 February 1967

A usually reliable source reported to CIA that well-known

1/mc

Venezuelan terrorist, Carlos SAVELLI Maldonado, by own admission met on 30 April and 1 May 1965 with leftist extremist reps. to discuss assassination of, among others, American ambassador (presumably American ambassador to Venezuela).

AMSANTA Project 19-6-73/3

MEMO for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Lou De Santi

Concerns FBI informant Victor Thomas VICENTE, Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated Communist Parties in New York City, left New York for Cuba via Mexico as guest of ICAP (Cuban Peoples Friendship Institute). Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to the U.S. in July-Aug 63. VICENTE stated he had had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. /COMMENT: Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in CASTRO inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if VICENTE could be that individual./

AMSLOUCH Project 28-6-33

RIOD 2944 (IN 83322) dated 18 December 1963

Mario Rogerio MESTRINHO de Mello, official in Brazillian Embassy Havana, reported the following to Rio Station contact in Rio on 13 December 1963:

a) wide rumor of assassination attempt against Fidel CASTRO after his TV appearance 6 Dec resulting in killing of man next to him. CASTRO uninjured. Would be killer at large.

b) wide rumor Cuban Jose "Pepe" LLANUZA met Lee OSWALD in Mexico before Kennedy assassination.

AMSOUR Project 19-6-70

SW Message #27 from agent dated 11 October 1964

"On the assassination attempt against Fidel, we know they took two civilians wounded by shooting to the Calixto Garcia Hospital. Moments later, two soldiers from Fidel's guards presented themselves in said hospital taking away the wounded. We do not have more details."

CSDB 312/01128-64 dated 19 November 1964

In late September 1964 a Cuban soldier guarding the Algerian Embassy in Havana attempted to assassinate Premier Fidel CASTRO Ruz, who was in the embassy at the time. The soldier killed another sentry before being shot on the spot by the security forces. By early October 11 officers and men involved in the attempt on Fidel's life were apprehended while trying to escape and were executed without trial. /COMMENT: In Aug 64 there were rumors of uprising and plots against the Castro regime, some within the armed forces, which reportedly lead to summary arrests and secret executions. During this period underground sources reported that 70 Cuban Army officers had been arrested in connection with a plot to topple CASTRO's regime; the plot allegedly had been discovered by a CASTRO agent who pretended to be a participant. (Could this have been the AMTRUNK Operation.?/

AMSPELL Project - Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directory) 19-124-26 (Project) and 19-120-19 Subject File

Memorandum dated 22 May 1962 in 201-316766 (Luis FERNANDEZ-Rocha Rodriguez) File

Last para of page 2 "Jose I. LASAGA has returned from

Washington and is very depressed. He claims that JFK has decided on the co-existence line and that everything is going down the drain. He states that present American policy is to work towards an acceptance of Castro."

WAVE 9060 (IN 29221) dated 26 September 1962

FERNANDEZ has accepted bid to appear on nationwide TV networks and is leaving for NYCity morning 26 Sept. Publicity schedule included how DRE 24 Aug attack on Teatro Blanquita was planned, and adverse reaction within Cuba to President Kennedy's definition of defensive arms.

Contact Report dated 16 Nov 1962 (201-316766)

Contact with AMHINT-2 and FERNANDEZ

FERNANDEZ mentioned meeting in Wash., D.C. in which broad proposal for AMBARB funding [(Prop. project 24 to place students in universities in Latin America)] was discussed. FERNANDEZ mentioned "negotiation" underway with "three industrialists" in Texas who were sympathetic and would provide AMBARB delegates in these countries (Latin American countries?) with Agency representations for their products.

UFGW 1595 from TFW to JMWAVE dated 18 January 1963

Forwarded answer from State Dept. to the DRE letter written to President Kennedy.

1/mc

DIRECTOR 8214 to WAVE dated 2 January 1963

HURWITCH (State Dept. Cuban Coordinator) replying briefly to AMSPELL letter to President Kennedy by referring DRE organization to President Kennedy's 29 December Miami speech as latest official statement of U.S. policy.

"Using DRE 26 Dec coded broadcast over WMIE as opening wedge, NEWBY reprimanded FERNANDEZ for failure report unusual substance text. Also pointed out this flagrant violation FCC regulations thus placing CIA in embarrassing position. FERNANDEZ apologized but said it urgently necessary alert Cuba DRE to penetration danger. This was first time existence of penetration was reported by FERNANDEZ or other DRE member. To inquiry why FERNANDEZ withheld such info. from CIA, although known to DRE for months, FERNANDEZ replied DRE merely suspected penetration before but only now certain. Avoided giving specifics. [COMMENT: After four years as chief of CIA subsidized DRE group, FERNANDEZ resigned July 64 to pursue medical studies.]

UFGA 7383 from JMWAVE to Hqs. dated 28 January 1963

Stated that Jorge MEDINA Bringuier, Sec. Gen. of the DRE in Cuba, was G-2 agent. That MEDINA was in contact with FERNANDEZ while in Cuba and planned to use FERNANDEZ to establish his bona fides with CIA.

WAVE 4222 (IN 17952) dated 12 September 1963

IMMEDIATE Action: Stated that Nov 63 issue of See Magazine already on newsstands contained wanted poster of Fidel CASTRO on front cover. Poster read "wanted dead or alive, Fidel CASTRO for crimes against humanity, 10 million dollars reward." Same copy highlighted these stories with top billing given story titled "The CIA needs men - can you quality?" The wanted poster was part of a story, gist of which was DRE offers 10 million dollar reward "to person or persons who with the help of the DRE will assassinate Fidel CASTRO." Offer alleged that reward was on deposit with Banco de Santo Domingo, and was signed by Luis FERNANDEZ-ROCHA Rodriguez. /COMMENT: FERNANDEZ first came to the U.S. in May 1960. Was polygraphed Mar 62, suspected of being G-2. Clearance granted 18 Apr 62 for use in DRE; encrypted AMHINT-53. Featured on Channel 4 TV 26 Sept 62 as having been organizing DRE underground Cuba since 20 May and having directed attack 24 Aug on Teatro Blanquita./

AMSPILL Project 19-6-76/2-4

Ops Folder July 62 - May 64: SW Outgoing Mge #7, 5 Dec 62

"can you confirm or deny through contacts in medical field about assassination attempt of Lazaro PENA by (sic) on? Fidel?" [COMMENT: Message #46 from A-1 was dated 13 Sept 63. Next message in file is #56 dated 27 Dec 63. File has a gap of 10 messages which are unaccounted for. Message #58 dated 27 Dec 63 mentions interruption of contact. A-1 did not specify how long he was without contact. It may be that contact was indeed non-existent from 13 Sept to 27 Dec but the numbering system should have picked up and continued from the last number.]

PLSLSTEEL-1 Project 68-6-147

TDCSDB 3/651,885 dated 25 Oct 1962 filed 68-6-147/4

Minister MOLYAKOV told a Bloc diplomat that he thought the U.S. action [missile crisis] was an "election affair"; that President Kennedy discovered that his popularity had dropped and undertook the Cuban measure to "become the leader again."

GNVA 4357 (OUT 53779) 25 Oct 1963 filed 68-6-147/4

MOLYAKOV commented that the USSR would not let the American move go without retaliation. That with this measure he [President Kennedy] had become the "man of the nation" again, and the nation was in a state of hysteria behind him.

GNVA 4376 (OUT 53800) 27 Oct 1962 filed 201-9239

At a dinner party on 25 Oct 62 in Geneva attended by orbit officials, MOLYAKOV reportedly stated that KHRUSHCHEV was aware that Kennedy was mad, an adventurer, and must not be allowed to pull strings, meaning, to retain initiative or control pace in the current international situation.

GNVA 4470 (OUT 53909) 19Nov 62 (TDCSDB 2/652,244)
Filed 68-6-147/4

Reported the following on the probable reaction of Fidel CASTRO and his principal associates to the Soviet withdrawal of offensive missiles from Cuba and to U.S. demands re the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 aircraft and on-spot inspection: Source said that CASTRO's vanity was immense and no matter how it had been explained to him by MIKOYAN or other Soviet officials, he must have been furious at the fact that the Soviet Union had "backed down" before the U.S. and was negotiating with the U.S. on an independent basis. CASTRO must have considered himself as being in a desperate situation. Source said that CASTRO was dominated by vanity, had megalomaniacal tendencies, and possessed a compulsion for revenge which was notorious; on occasion his compulsion caused him to reach back as far as twenty years to revenge actions taken against him at that time. Source added that in the current situation CASTRO was fully capable of undertaking an act of desperation, for example the aerial bombardment of the U.S. or some gross act against the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba.

GNVA 5006 (OUT 54584) 28 Mar 1963 (TDCSDB 3/653,939) Filed 68-6-147/4

At the height of the October 62 Cuban crisis, CASTRO haranged a Soviet commander about the "impossibility" of permitting U.S. planes to photograph Cuba. The Soviet succumbed to CASTRO's persuasiveness and took action which resulted in shooting down a U-2 plane. The Soviet command was furious and the Soviet officer was returned to the USSR under arrest.

GNVA 6022 (IN 79271) 12 Dec 63 filed 68-6-147/3

Report that there was no speculation among orbit or Soviet officials re implications of Johnson's accession. There was a special alert status ordered for Cuban Missions as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy. The alert was still in effect 9 December 1963.

GNVA 6029 (OUT 65853) 12 Dec 63 (TDCSDB 3/658,469)

Filed 68-6-147/4

Report that circa 2 days after the assassination of President Kennedy, Cuban dip missions abroad began to receive a series of messages placing them on a special alert status. These messages were obviously due to apprehension by the Cuban Government that the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy might lead to hostile activity directed against the missions. They were instructed, among other things, to be certain that there were "no compromising documents on the premises."

GNVA 6313 (IN 30483) 2 March 1964 filed 201-9293

Source reported at 29 February meeting that CASTRO was concerned that Johnson would not follow Kennedy's course which might have lead to negotiations. KHRUSHCHEV was convinced that CASTRO's Caribbean Peace must be strengthened.

/COMMENT: Ref. IG Memo dated 25 April 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY, Page 112 - Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Government Meetings. HURWITCH of State, and McGeorge BUNDY, White House, among others, attended 10 Aug 62 Special Group (Augmented) meeting at Dept. of State. Bill Harvey attended with McCone for CIA. Remember Harvey's Mafia contacts. Also, keep in mind that Tad SZULC allegedly had access to Hurwitch, both President and Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy. Could he have learned or heard of the plot and let the word out? McCone recalled that liquidation of CASTRO, and other regime officials, was mentioned at JCS op room meeting 8 or 9 August 1962. It was later determined that McCone's recollection was probably faulty, that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August State meeting.]

AMSWEEP Operation 19-6-69

SW Message #45 from Agent (undated)

Expressed deepest sympathy for death of President Kennedy. Added that death of Kennedy produced great nervousness and concern in CASTRO and his close associates. Further, that there was a great mobilization of troops throughout the country.

SW Message #14 from AMSWEEP-12 dated 19 Nov 1964

Reported attempt against Fidel CASTRO's life at odontological building located at 23rd Street; one of his bodyguards was killed.

AMTRUNK Operation 19-6-84/1-4

UFGA 11375 dated 30 September 1963

AMLEO-3 (Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez) defected to the U.S. in December 1962, became a JMWAVE asset, and was used to screen names for the AMTRUNK Operation. His wife reportedly had direct contact with Fidel CASTRO on 7 September 1963 and requested permission for herself and children to join RABEL in the U.S. CASTRO reportedly expressed knowledge that RABEL phoned his wife in Cuba every day. RABEL was terminated in July 1964, reportedly due to conflict with JMWAVE Station for not having exfiltrated his wife and children. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, arrested, and set free in July or August 1967. There are two firm accusations that he was a CASTRO agent as early as July 1963. If true, he could have been providing CASTRO information on the AMTRUNK Operation.

UFGA 11829 dated 18 October 1963

Tad SZULC wrote an article on changing trends among high-level personnel within the CASTRO Government, which appeared in a major daily newspaper, and which he told a high-level U.S. Government official was sourced to Dr. MORENO, the AMTRUNK team leader. Debriefing of

MORENO produced information of considerable variance to that in the article. He admitting talking to SZULC but denied that article was based on information he provided. The article (not in files) created considerable furor in Washington, D.C. /COMMENT: If true, SZULC' article(s) could have been used as a channel for providing information to the Cuban Government, wittingly or unwittingly.7

WAVE 7300 (IN 58037) dated 9 November 1963

A radio message to the AMTRUNK's in Cuba on 9 November 1963 asked if they had developed any leads into the higher echelons of the Rebel Army, and who at higher levels appeared to be good prospects for recruitment. It cited rumors that persons in top positions of the army were dissatisfied to the point that they may have been thinking of plotting against Fidel. /COMMENT: There is no proof that this information came to the attention of CASTRO; however, if the AMTRUNK operation was penetrated, as it appears it might have been, this information could have reached him.7

WAVE 9630 (IN 87039) dated 25 December 1963

AMTRUNK-9 (Modesto OROZCO) reported in an SW Message dated 6 November 1963, that during the early part of November Fidel CASTRO, in the course of a private conversation, expressed fear of the possibility of "Commando Insurrections" which might take place on a large scale in Cuba, as the Cuban economy was such that he could not maintain a state of military alert for a long time. He indicated that any prolonged period of military alert might cause discontent among the troops, a situation which would be dangerous and create irreparable consequences. So as to negate the possibility, CASTRO was undertaking an intensive propaganda campaign to give confidence to his troops and to limit the occurrence of any internal uprising.

MEMORANDUM for the Record by Mike Maney dated 23 Jan 1961

Rufo LOPEZ Fresquet allegedly leaked confidential information re U.S. Government backing of provisional government in Cuba, following invasion, given to him by President Kennedy in strictest confidence.

/COMMENT: Tad SZULC reportedly had a standing invitation for direct contact with President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, since November 1961. SZULC reportedly kept abreast of all important AMTRUNK operational developments but took no active part in the operations. SZULC was in touch with George VOLSKY, one of the operations planners, who was in touch with Manuel PINEIRO (DGI) at the time of the missile crisis in 1962.

Aldo VERA Serafin, then in Miami, formerly with the Department of Technical Investigation (of the DIER - Department of Investigations of the Revolutionary Army), was considered for use in the AMTRUNK Operation. (VERA was assassinated in October 1976 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.) VERA reportedly was receiving financial aid from Santos TRAFFICANTE and the Mafia for arms and ammunition, but there is no indication that such activity was related to the Agency.7

AMTABBY Operation 19-132-30

Part of the net, a major PM operation consisting of numerous sabotage operations against on-island targets, was wrapped up by CASTRO in November 1962. Through captured agents, CASTRO learned that the operations were approved at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and that the major sabotage operations were approved by President Kennedy. The captured agents appeared on TV. The Cubans referred to operation CUPID (true) and to Robert Wall (CI Staff.) /We wonder how the agent knew the operational crypt. The Cubans believed Wall to be a close friend of Robert Kennedy. Mr. Wall said he had never met Kennedy, but that the agent's case officer phoned him once in the agent's presence, and referred to Wall by true name.7

AMTAUP Operation 19-132-19

SW Message #32 from Agent - Undated

Sent condolences on death of President Kennedy and added that"the traitors rejoiced with the news. The radios never turned off the happy music. When they learned through the news services the background and history of the assasin they were preoccupied and on the same Friday they placed all troops on alert and also all the doctors were alerted and kept at the hospitals."

AMTHEO Project 19-6-99

SW Message #14 from agent, undated

Reported that "relatives of neighbors of a sub-source in Santiago de Cuba were arrested for being involved in a frustrated plot to kill Fidel when a bomb was found under the floor of the house in which Fidel was to be the guest on the occasion of the celebration of 26th of July."

SW Message #28, undated

Reported that a sub-source confirmed the frustrated assassination of Fidel at the corner of 10th and 23rd Streets (Vedado) in which one of Fidel's bodyguards was killed.

THIRTIETH OF NOVEMBER GROUP (MRTN) 19-120-37

Specific document not cited

/RESEARCHER COMMENT: "Of interest is the fact that a delegation of MRTN members held a meeting in Dallas, Texas in May 63. They complained about the fact that the U.S. Government was prohibiting further hit and run raids on Cuba and stated that if within 30 days these raids were not allowed to continue, the organization would conduct a protest march to Washington, D.C. Most of the documents in the file are from the FBI.7

2506 BRIGADE 19-300-2

Memo for Attorney General Robert F.Kennedy from John A. McCone, Director, CIA 25 January 1963

Concerned interrogation of members of 2506 Brigade ransomed and returned to the U.S. in December 1962. One individual interviewed (A 13 310 184) said he was very mad at Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Kennedy, the President of the U.S. for denying needed support. (By this he meant, by air and Naval gunfire).

Memo for the Record dated 28 January 1963 by Robert MORONEY, Office of Security Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

PEREZ was to speak with HURWITCH of State Department. PEREZ had a dinner appointment with Robert Kennedy at Kennedy's Palm Beach home 26 Jan 1963. Kennedy was to explain in detail plans for future use of the Brigade which emerged from a high-level meeting Friday 25 January 1963.

WAVE 3068 (IN 45935) dated 8 January 1963

Concerned 5 January 1963 meeting between ZAMKA (Dave Morales) CIA and Manuel ARTIME for purpose of re-recruiting ARTIME, debriefing him on brigade activities, and to provide guidance. RUIZ-Williams reportedly told ARTIME that Robert Kennedy instructed RUIZ, OLIVA and Jose PEREZ, not to accept any money from the CRC or CIA; that Kennedy was setting aside $25,000 dollars from families committee funds for brigade leadership use for trips, expenses, etc. WAVE Station had no other information to confirm or deny this statement by Robt. Kennedy to RUIZ. WAVE Station commented that within the present policy framework the CRC could engage in: full spectrum of prop and political action activities; intell. collection; military training of officers and enlisted men via current DOD program; counter-insurgency training;

leadership development training, etc. Should USG policy become more aggressive re Cuba, they could also have commando raids on Cuban coast, attacks on Bloc shipping going to or from Cuba, and sabotage operations in Cuba.

WAVE 3103 (IN 46462) dated 8 January 1963

Reported that Brigade leaders asked families committee for $25,000 ops funds which they claimed Robert Kennedy indicated to RUIZ Williams and Roberto (PEREZ)/SAN ROMAN, should be made available to them through establishment of joint bank account between committee and the Brigade. The families committee turned down the Brigade request but was disturbed that the request was made.

Memo for the Record dated 24 January 1964

Subj: Roberto PEREZ San Roman (201-282287)

In his 23 January meeting with Robert Kennedy, PEREZ remarked that he had discussed Brigade problems, in general, with the writer (Office of Security) whom he apparently identified only as his Agency contact. According to PEREZ, the Attorney General asked for the writer's identity, which PEREZ, who knows the writer only as "Bob", was unable to give. (Was Robert F. Moroney).

AMWARM Operation,. 19-6-57

SW Message #45 from Agent dated 1 December 1963

Sent condolences on untimely passing of President Kennedy and speculated that CASTRO was not entirely out of the planning if Moscow had anything to do with it, although it could have been one of his (CASTRO's) unpredictable movements which is backfiring.

Radio Message #64 to Agent dated 4 April 1964

Requested any information the agent had picked up on plots against Fidel and others, and identity of those behind the plots.

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AM[WEE] Operation 19-6-68/2-4

WAVE 9577 (IN 35284) dated 6 Oct 1962

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AM[WEE-1] on Sept. visit to Miami reported that on 11 September Cuban Army trucks delivered large trunks to house [across the street from him] (Nr. [116 Calle 18 Miramar], Havana), at that time occupied by a Chilean technician. From other activities in front of house, AM[WEE-1] concluded that house was being used as LP target probably for the house of Cuban Supreme Court Chief Luis M. BUCH who lived around the corner [from A-1.]

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The Chilean technician threw out a corrugated box brought there a few days previously by an Army truck escorted by the G-2. A-1 retrieved the box and noted it contained the address Acoustic Research, Inc. Cambridge, Mass. (The Agency checked with the firm and learned that the firm dealt in manufacture of high fidelity components for home consumption. Firm official said if box found its way to Cuba it no doubt was used for second time and original contents removed).

/_In Don Heath 22 March 1977 Memo on Miami Station Action to Aid USG Investigation of Murder of John F. Kennedy, Heath said AMWEE-1 reported that on the night of the day of the Kennedy assassination A-1 saw Osmani CIENFUEGOS drive up to the house across the street at about 0100 hours; he stayed several hours. The house at that time was occupied by an American expatriate technician who built audio surveillance gear for the CUIS._7

WAVE 2171 (IN 92822) 3 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

A letter intended for Fidel CASTRO was given to AMWEE-1 in Mexico on 2 August. He was to mail it within a day or two after return to Cuba on 2 August.

WAVE 2286 (IN 95047) 7 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

AMWEE-1 was given letter on 2 August for wife of AMLEO-3, returned to Cuba that day, and was instructed

8/mc

to deliver the letter to her soonest. Included in the letter was the name of the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba given as an emergency contact for wife of AMLEO-3. [COMMENT: If AMLEO-3 was an agent of CASTRO, as suspected, this information could have fallen into the hands of CASTRO.]

WAVE 3331 (IN 06371) dated 23 Aug 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

States that DIRECTOR 63497 instructed [AMWEE-1] not to use W/T set except for urgent messages such as report on Fidel CASTRO's death and related momentous developments. We purposely did not tell [A-1] that his radio reportedly was blown.

DIRECTOR 72045 from Hqs. to WAVE 30 Sept 63 filed 19-6-68/3 Folder #2

Para 2 states "see CASTRO reference in 28 September speech to money caches."

WAVE 2329 (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 1964 filed W/T Chrono 19-6-68/3 Vol. #3

x 24

[AMWEE-1] message #2. ["My government (Italian] has intervened violently re imprisonment of Vasco CECCHI, Italian citizen who owned Montecatini Restaurant, Havana. Requests immediate release or else will take severe measures.

4/mc

WAVE 8316 (IN 70529) dated 30 Nov 1963 19-6-68/3 Folder #4

Para 1 gave translation of WAVE 8279 (IN 69695) Mge. 45 from [AMWEE-1] to Case Officer: "Our condolences on death President. MAURI (Mario MAURI, Italian diplomat) reports on 22 Nov the Cubana aircraft delayed its departure five hours from 1700 to 2200 waiting for an important passenger who arrived Mexico City Airport in private twin motor aircraft at 2130 hours Mexi time transferring directly from his plane to the Cubana plane without going through customs or immigration. Travelled in pilot's cabin. MAURI returned on same aircraft to Cuba. I shall come out 29 Nov but do not know whether I can stay. Best that you come to the airport that day. Here there is great movement of troops toward Pinar del Rio." /COMMENT: See A$\overset{M}{\text{O}}$COVE Operation Memo, AMCOVE-1 SW Mge #71, dated 10 Dec 63. [A-1] reported that Mario MAURI flew from Mexico to Havana on 23 November.

[AMWEE-1] Production Folder #6 Oct 63 thru May 65: 19-6-68/4

There is nothing between 24 Oct 63 and 4 Dec 63 (void). WAVE 8100 (IN 67217) 23 Nov 63 contains no requirements to [AMWEE-1] re assassination, nor do subsequent messages through 30 December 63.

4/mc

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[AMWEE-1] SW Chrono 14 Jan 63 thru 20 Apr 65 Folder #9

19-6-68/3

There are no messages between SW #119 dated 12 Nov 63, received Miami 20 Nov 63, and SW #124 dated 15 Apr 1964, received Miami 20 April 1964. Four messages are missing from this file.

Message to Agent (IN 04498) dated 12 June 64

Asked if agent had learned the name of the young man in peasant clothes who rides Cubana plane to Mexico and back every Friday.

Message from Agent (IN 81847) dated 26 Sept 64

States that Vasco CECCHI was arrested "some months ago" and charged with dollar dealings and being part of a plot against CASTRO.7

/
[AMWEE-1] Operational File 19-6-68/3 Vol. #4

Memo dated 4 November 1964

Shows that 8 names gleaned from the "Warren Commission documents" were checked in WH/SA/IOS (Cuba Desk) files with negative results. Reports traces attached.

2/mc

AMWORLD Operation 19-124-27

Memo for the Record by Henry Hecksher, 10 July 1963 Washington, D.C. Meeting with ARTIME (BOX 18)

ARTIME related events prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. Manuel RAY had just arrived in the U.S. from Cuba. He enjoyed strong Department of State support. It was his intent to get the U.S. to withdraw support from the FRD and to obtain control over the training camps himself. VARONA's and CARILLO's intention was to see the FRD go down. Hecksher said he masterminded RAY's defeat and RAY knew it.

Memo by Henry D. Hecksher on AMWORLD Meeting in Washington 7 to 10 Nov 1963 Subj: Dr. La Saga (BOX 18)

LaSaga was the MRR delegate in the U.S. while ARTIME was imprisoned in Cuba (following the Bay of Pigs invasion.) ARTIME demoted LaSaga. LaSaga described by Hecksher as one of the most intelligent men he had ever met. It was LaSaga's firm position that while President Kennedy was in power it would be impossible to defeat CASTRO.

WAVE 6925 (IN 89430) dated 23 May 1964

Concerns Tad SZULC' articles in the New York Times 19, 20 and 21 May which AMCARBON-1 believes were fabricated and violated newsbeat agreement he had with AMCARBON-1.

Memo for Chief, Special Affairs Staff, by Henry Hecksher dated 3 September 1963 19-124-27/3 (Box 28)

A Tad SZULC article in a special to The New York Times datelined Key West, 1 Sept(1963) quotes "the judgement of authoritative quarters in Cuba'" that Washington tolerance of small refugee groups that are identified with political factions objectionable to most Cubans, specifically the groups that apparently operate from Nicaragua and are identified with ARTIME, works against the emergence of meaningful opposition. [Hecksher comment: I wonder who is actually behind what looks to me like a concerted denigration campaign?]

DBA 42843 dated 3 June 1963 (FBI) 19-124-27 (Box 29)

From interview of Santiago ALVAREZ Rodriguez on 23 May 1963 and information from his contact in April 1963 with attorney Paulino A. SIERRA. SIERRA planned to go to Miami, from Chicago, to help establish a unity movement among Cuban political groups. SIERRA wanted ALVAREZ to meet an American arriving in Miami from Chicago (name unknown) who claimed to have $30,000,000. available to donate to Cuban exiles to establish unity and provisional government in exile. The American said the money would be given on condition that the unity would be established, and that the group he represented would be given certain concessions in Cuba in the future. The American claimed he did not represent the U.S. Government but had good contacts with the government. It was not known what he meant by the term concessions - whether that was with reference to gambling concessions, business franchises or possible business contracts with the Cuban Government. ALVAREZ concluded that the American was completely unreliable. The American was described as white, male, about 45 years old, 5 ft. 10 inches, 180 lbs., well-dressed, businessman type who spoke a little Spanish and obviously had been in Havana at one time. The American indicated that he was from Chicago.

WAVE 1013 (IN 78067) dated 11 July 1963 (Box 29)
Concerns activities of Cuban Committee for Liberation (CCL) sparked by Guillermo ALONSO Pujol 21 May 1963. (Agency learned from DGI defector SLIPSTREAM-1 in Nov 71 that ALONSO was a Cuban intelligence agent.) Cable goes on to state that Enrique RUIZ Williams had apparently been inactive, at least in Miami circles, since denying via local press on 22 May that he was hand-picked by Attorney General Kennedy to unify anti-Castro exiles.

CSDB 3/656,611 dated 13 September 1963 (Box 29)
Indicates that SIERRA's actions relating to Cuba Committee for Liberation would lead to chaos and anarchy.

At a meeting 20 Aug 1963 members of the group decided to report SIERRA's irregularities to the group's financiers in Chicago. Calls were made to Chicago to VANDERBUILT (fnu) and Dillon BRADEN.

WAVE 8562 (IN 74653) dated 5 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Reports that PRIO's declarations wherein he accused the U.S. Government of agreement with Russia to replace CASTRO with Tito-type government originated with Guillermo ALONSO Pujol in Washington. It was received by PRIO through Guillermo BELT. Pujol has friendly relations with certain members diplomatic circle Washington and thinks he is well informed although he lives in Europe. Guillermo MARQUEZ, publisher of New York weekly Ahora and Carlos MARQUEZ Sterling are both part of PRIO's plan and allegedly have become associated with Richard NIXON in accordance with Republican Party plan to bring up Cuban case before the elections.

WAVE 8563 (IN 84654) dated 6 Dec 1963 (Box 29)

Information from Francisco CHAO Hermida, who attended 10 Nov 63 meeting with Miguel A. "Cuco" LEON - involved PLAN JUDAS. LEON told CHAO that while in Wash., D.C., he met with Enrique RUIZ Williams. RUIZ informed him that he (RUIZ) was to lead new Cuban republic and had been so named by Robert Kennedy who had gone to New York to interview him. Kennedy allegedly said that RUIZ could work with any or every sector he wished but important point was that RUIZ was to be the boss.

Memo for the Record by Alfonso RODRIGUEZ dated 23 June 1964 re Telecon with Tad SZULC (Box 29)

SZULC stated that the detention of RAY was due to "double" nature of U.S. policy; meaning by that that the U.S. Government was anxious to depose Fidel CASTRO, but would not permit anyone to act against Cuba. RODRIGUEZ pointed out to SZULC that RAY as well as "all of the other fellows" have been constantly reminded that they cannot use U.S. territory as a base but apparently they have got to lose all of their assets before they realize that this is a serious policy.

AMWREN Operation 19-6-51/1-4

AMWREN-1 Report dated 5 February 1962 19-6-51/4

Report that during a speech on 4 February 1962 Fidel stopped reading the text prepared by the Communist Party and, on his own, referred to Kennedy as "impudent". He tried to separate himself from the text and continue on his own, but was brought back in line by Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ and Anibal ESCALANTE.

On 1 February 1962 AMTURVY-1 reported that Rolando CUBELA and other prominent government figures were under arrest in La Cabana Fortress and were kept separated from the other prisoners.

AMYUM Operation 19-132-32

UFGA 8466 dated 12 April 1963 19-132-32

Transmitted intelligence debriefing reports on Operation FINA exfiltrees. Debriefing of Caridad MACIAS Rodriguez. On 26 July 1961 MACIAS was involved in an action to kill Fidel CASTRO at the 26th of July ceremony at the Plaza Civic. The action was to kill Fidel CASTRO by firing a bazooka shell at the speaker's platform. This action failed because of a defective firing device on the bazooka. The G-2 had had persons involved, working in resistance, under surevillance for some time. MACIAS was connected with the MRR. A G-2 interrogator said that the Cuban security forces knew everything that was going on in the resistance movement. They permitted these resistance organizations to organize and exist until it was decided to roll up the group. She seemed to be connected with AMBRONC-5 (a CIA on-island asset) who was arrested and executed the latter part of August 1962.

ATTACHMENT B

List of Task Force Participants

LAD/JFK Task Force Participants

William Sturbitts	Task Force Supervisor
Chris Hopkins	Group leader
Jane Zerance	Researcher and Administrative back-up to Ms. Hopkins. Served from mid-Oct [redacted] 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Felipe Acevedo]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Kathleen Blevins]	Researcher and Translator Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-February 1977.
3 [Taylor (Mike) Belcher]	Researcher (Strong along CI lines) Served from mid-October 1976 to January 1977, prior to PCS assignment.
3 [Daryl Geisler]	Researcher Served from mid-October 1976 to mid-November 1976. (Part-time due to personal tragedy).
3 [Martin Miller]	Researcher Served approximately 3 weeks from January to mid-February 1977.

5/mc

3 [Barbara Boyle]	Researcher Served approximately three weeks from January to mid-February 1977.
3 [Alva King]	Researcher Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.
3 [Howard Brubaker]	Researcher Served approximately 2 weeks in February 1977.
Annie Goodpasture	Recalled from retirement by the IG Staff. Served with LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. See following paragraph on Ms. Goodpasture.

Based on her long tenure at the Mexico City Station which spanned the critical period, September to November 1963, Ms. Goodpasture was recalled by the IG Staff in February 1977 to answer numerous questions which focused primarily on Mexico City Station activities. The IG Staff has written a statement regarding Ms. Goodpasture's review of the Mexico City Station files. After assisting the IG Staff, Ms. Goodpasture then joined the LAD Task Force from mid-March to mid-May 1977. Her contribution during that period consisted primarily of the following:

a) Recall, review and translation from Spanish to English (when not provided) of microfilm of Mexico City Station

3/mc

teltap take against the Soviet Embassy during the period September through November 1963, to determine a possible Soviet link with OSWALD.

b) Preparation of report on Cubana flights and flights from Mexico City to Havana based on research and translations by other members of the Task Force.

c) Preparation of report on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez based on research and findings by other LAD Task Force members.

d) Reviewed at Headquarters and [Warrenton] 99 photo coverage of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for pictures of the "unidentified man."

e) Reviewed 8 boxes of policy material for possible findings.

TS (CODE WORD) ANNEX
TO ATTACHMENT "A"

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC-01755-77A

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

ZRKNICK Operation 200-5-38 (FBI Monitoring of Cuban Espionage Net in Miami, International in Scope)

BOX I - Non-CS Documents Filed AMAPOLA (Juan AMESTOY Folder)

On 8 April 1963 the FBI intercepted an SW message from ZRKNICK agent in Miami to CUIS Headquarters in Havana. Said Juan ARMESTOY /should read AMESTOY; was CIA agent7 told ZRKNICK agent about a trip he planned to Cuba with other Cubans. That an internal uprising was being prepared and six men, four Cubans and two foreigners, had already arrived in Cuba to assassinate Fidel. "Ricardo CABRERA told RIN last night that from now until December 63 many things are expected in Cuba and that the American Government will take advantage of the opportunity of the attack on the Russian boat to control the gusanos (worms) who work on their own and then in the work of CIA in its job of infiltration. ARMESTOY says that they always take an American with them and it is he who gives the orders and communicates by radio with the airplanes which explore the route. ARMESTOY took eleven thousand five hundred pesos to Cuba. Be careful. Regards." /COMMENT: ZRKNICK at request of CUIS Havana, continued to report on AMESTOY. AMESTOY was later arrested and killed in a gun battle or executed by the Cuban Government.7

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

CSCI 3/776,625 Dated 19 June 1963 Memo to FBI from CIA

Subject: Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo

Attached memo dated 30 April 1963 states that Ricardo CABRERA Amoedo aka "Cayo" who lived in the U.S., returned to Cuba when CASTRO assumed power in January 1959, returned to Miami in 1960 as an active G-2 member and continued to work as an informer for CUIS. During 1960 he went to Cuba and had an interview with VALDES, Fidel CASTRO, NARANJO and Juan ORTA, then secretary to Fidel. In Miami CABRERA worked for the G-2, together with PIMENTAL (fnu) and Pepe NOVA, who were chiefs of G-2 in Miami. Was a man who would sell his mother. Became an American citizen and used to brag about being a member of CIA.

VOLUME II (Box I) Summary of Relations with FBI

TOP SECRET DINAR

On 15 March 1963 the FBI's ZRKNICK supervisor met with CIA personnel for discussion of the case and promised to keep CIA Headquarters informed of all developments. The FBI provided text of SW message from AMAPOLA letter drop indicating travel of one Evaristo FERNANDEZ to Costa Rica in connection with some kind of operation. CIA sent the information immediately to Costa Rica in view of President's trip.

VOLUME II (Box I) Memo from FBI to CIA dated 12 Aug 1963

Memo attached text of intercepted message; although in code, deciphered, it said the following: "Antonio ROJAS told me the following. CIA is still recruiting people but they are warned before hand that they have to accept Huber MATOS as their leader. My friend, Luisito AQUIAR, who was second in command to Tom DIQUE, was recruited and he will soon be sent to Cuba. RID told me the following: my prison mate Ernesto SANTANA, was also recruited a few days ago and sent by CIA and transferred to another place for his preparation. Tony, no good, and I believe the attempt (on the life) of the horse would be more effective, tell us how the check-out is going."

Memorandum for Chief of Station, Mexico dated 3 Sept 1963 (Box I) TOP SECRET DINAR

Page 5 para 7 A states that AMAPOLA /crypt for CUIS/ with outstation located in the Miami area, has for its main objective the penetration of CIA and exile organizations directed against Cuba. One important agent, possibly the P/A /Jose CARBONNEL Marrero/ has been identified by the FBI and is a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cuban birth. The FBI is currently reading his S/W messages, and CIA is interrogating a WAVE asset (?) who has an unexplained connection with the agent. Another WAVE asset (name unknown) who has had contact with the agent has been interrogated and found to be clean. A third WAVE asset (identity unknown) in contact with the agent, has been turned over to the FBI for possible use against the agent."

VOLUME III (Box I) Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami, Dated 24 Nov 1963 TOP SECRET DINAR

Asked following questions:

1. Whether there is concentration of the Yankee Army.
2. Whether there is a concentration of mercenaries.
3. Whether there is an increase in pressure on those sympathetic to Cuba and the left.
4. Whether active counter-revolutionaries are disappearing.
5. To inform fully via CANDI (CUIS clandestine drop in Mexico City) the reaction of the Gusanos and the Republicans to the death of Kennedy.

VOLUME III (Box I) Memo for Chief, JMWAVE from SAS/CI Dated 11 March 1964 - TOP SECRET DINAR

Memo attached copies of ZRKNICK intercepts provided CIA by the FBI:

25 Dec 63 plain text letter (translated from Spanish to English) to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba. Para 6 states "I will tell you about Kennedy's death in the other letter when I am in New Jersey. All that is a ?."

30 Dec 63 letter from Miami to Irma in Cuba. Para 3 states "Irma, I certainly did not forget those medicines you asked me for. I was very sure that they would give them to you and that you would be able to go to Camaguey to see Pepe."

VOLUME IV - FBI Summaries TOP SECRET DINAR (Box 1)

Letter to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba from H. DIAZ in Miami, dated 17 Oct 63. Second para. of SW text states "Irma, do not bother asking Manolo GARCIA about the letters which he has sent me, since I turned them over to CONTE AGUERO and he has read them." /COMMENT: This appears to be Luis CONTE Aguero, a former JMWAVE Station asset terminated in 1969. His file indicates that he is (was) a suspected CASTRO agent. He reportedly got the Cuban vote for President-elect Carter and was in Wash., D.C. in December 1976 with the Carter transition team./.

BOX 2 - "NOE" FOLDER - TOP SECRET DINAR

25 November 1963 intercept of message from Cuba to agent in Miami. "In view of the assassination attempt in the U.S., report the reaction in that city, commentaries in government circles, right and left. Report change, accelleration, or maneuvers of any kind with regard to the aggression plan against Cuba."

SJOS 6429 (IN 68164) Dated 26 November 63 (BOX 2)

Cable from San Jose to Headquarters. "Costa Rican Deputy Julio SUNOL Leal (ZRKNICK suspect, Communist fellow traveller and pro-CASTRO propagandist) planned depart 24 Nov to attend Peace Conference in Poland. Delayed departure and now planning leave San Jose by air for Poland 26 Nov. Plans stop en route in Texas repeat Texas. Then will travel on to Poland. Station suspected SUNOL will attempt gather data in Texas for use in pro-Communist CASTRO propaganda re assassination Kennedy. SUNOL travelling with dip. passport."

MEXI 7085 (IN 68561) Dated 27 November 1963

Cable to Headquarters from Mexico City. "Subject arrived Mexico Taca Flt. 772 1600 26 Nov. Leaving KLM Flt. 684 for Amsterdam 27 Nov. Flt. stops Houston and Montreal en route."

HZPA 13,960 Dated 3 December 1963 (BOX 4)

Dispatch from Panama City to Headquarters. "At 22 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King) meeting, news was received of President Kennedy's death. This had a profound effect on H-1. Her first reaction was that it must have been done by racial extremists and she spent a considerable time extolling the virtues of President Kennedy, and what he had been trying to do. At the 27 Nov 63 Esterline-HYSAGE-1 meeting, H-1 made quite a point of saying that she was absolutely positive that Fidel CASTRO could have had nothing to do with the act.

(BOX 10) TOP SECRET DINAR - Intercepted Message from Cuba to Agent in Miami dated 27 Oct 1962

Stated "Principal objective is the physical elimination of counter-revolutionary scum and the destruction of their centers. The less important ones you can beat up and request their expulsion from the country. Keep the material secured from the Yankee Embassy in a safe place until receipt of further instructions."

(BOX 10) PAMELA Folder - Periodic Activity Report Presumably dated December 1963

PAMELA Folder (CUIS agent). "In addition to the regular bi-weekly schedules held on 10 and 24 November, a special schedule was held on 29 November, as was done in the case of AMAPOLA (CARBONNEL). Among various matters dealt with in the message transmitted on 10 November, one in particular was of high interest. This was the request for a man to be chosen to handle commo in cases of emergency inasmuch as it would be more difficult to accomplish this as "the struggle worsens." An exhaustive report on all aspects of counter-revolutionary groups and activities was also requested of the agent." On 24 Nov 63, as in the case of AMAPOLA, a special code was set up to enable "A--CH (illegible) to report by cable directly to drops in Cuba on the situation in Puerto Rico after the assassination of President Kennedy. SANTOS, the agent who actually receives all messages transmitted to PAMELA was to contact AB--N (illegible) and have him report on the development of any of the following situations:

a. if a contingent of gusano (worm) Cubans has arrived there;

b. if mobilization of resident gusano Cubans is noticed;

c. if mobilization of U.S. forces is noticed;

d. if the Cubans who arrived and those who were there before have "developed circulation;"

e. if activities of repressive organs against popular forces have increased.

A special transmission was scheduled for the following Thursday at the same time. As there were no adverse developments in the situation after the President's death, this subject was not dealt with in the special transmission made on 29 Nov (1963).

(BOX 10) SEPIO File

The "SEPIO" file contains a letter from MENENDEZ in France to Oliva LOPEZ, Mexico. /COMMENT: believe letter may have been written by the MANENDEZ who wrote letter to a Bernardo MORALES in Miami 27 Nov 62, discussing plans for assassination of President Kennedy. See MENENDEZ shadow file.7

(BOX 10) "ROBERTO Folder" Periodic Activity Report Dated (presumably) December 1963

On 25 November (63) the agent was asked to report on the reaction of the assassination of President Kennedy by governmental right-wing and left-wing circles. The agent (Roberto) was also asked to report on the status of plans of aggression against Cuba.

(BOX 10) Memo to Chief of Station, JMWAVE from C/SAS/CI Dated 6 December 1963

Cites memos of 22 and 29 November 63 attached (which are not attached to document). 22 Nov 63 memo reportedly included an intercepted SW message which mentioned one Ricardo IRURETA Goyena who worked at the Hotel Fontainebleau in Miami. The 29 November 63 memo reportedly contained an intercepted SW message, a letter addressed to Irma SUAREZ in Cuba in both open text and in secret writing, and another letter which apparently was intended for Manolo GARCIA, also both in open text and secret writing.

ZRKNICK Unnumbered Box - VOL. III

PACY 1073 (IN 48464) dated 26 October 1963

Cable from Panama City to Headquarters. "Hope you understand that PONCHAY (Jake Esterline) and Station CI group as dissatisfied with unresolved aspects HYSAGE Ops. as is Hqs. Do not, however, at this point, see spectre of Soviets or massive provocation efforts directed by Soviets and/or CASTRO in progress. /COMMENT: PONCHAY was in touch with HYSAGE-1 (Thelma King), a Panamanian left-wing politician, pro-Castro Deputy to National Assembly, and personal friend of Fidel CASTRO. Recruited by Fidel Aug 62 to perform espionage mission in Panama./

MEXI 6969 (IN 64256) Dated 19 Nov 63 (VOL. III)

Cable from Mexico to Hqs. "16 Nov. LICOOKY-1 with LINLUCK-1 visited Maj. Alfonso PRERA Sierra, employed by Francisco "Paco" AMADO at Maquinas Coloso. "Paco" still involved Guatemala guerrilla ops and receives money from Cubans to pass to Guats. "Paco's" wife says "Paco" now in U.S. but Alfonso thinks he either in Guatemala or Cuba. Alfonso's brother Enrique still firmly pro-Cuban."

DIRECTOR 84449 Dated 21 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE. "Hqs. has sensitive information indicating that Cuban Intelligence Service is targetting against person employed in State Dept. office in Miami. (Matter discussed with the FBI.)

DIRECTOR 84791 Dated 22 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Headquarters to Panama City. "HYSAGE-2 (Victor Augusto NAVAS-King) turned plane ticket over to "MEDINA" on 22 Nov. Ticket expires 7 Dec 63. Has decided remain U.S. over Xmas holidays. Wants to raise grade at

Georgetown (University). Was much affected by death of President and did not want to talk much.

DIRECTOR 85343 Dated 27 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to WAVE and Panama City. "Hqs. suspects Blanca Alicia FRANCO may be spearhead of penetration of AMOT/CIA ops on behalf ZRKNICK complex. AMOTS [JMWAVE Station Ops.] in direct contact with FRANCO. FRANCO, suspect Cuban agent, in contact with AMOT-110 (Norberto Felipe MARTINEZ Garcia).

HDCA 3405 Dated 29 November 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Santo Domingo to Hqs.concerning one Eduardo TAVARES Justo. TAVARES queried EMGLUE-1 ( ) on 2 Oct 63 about his experiences in the U.S. but did not give any indication that he was going there. On 9 Oct. five days after TAVARES departure, EMGLUE-1 reported that TAVARES had not gone to Canada as planned, but to New York. On 22 Nov 63 EMGLUE-1 reported that as of 17 Nov TAVARES was still in New York. E-1 believed TAVARES a Communist, or at least has Communist ideas.

HMMA 22632 Dated 18 December 1963 (VOL. III)

Dispatch from Mexico City to Hqs. "On 21 Nov 63 LICOOKY-1 obtained following info re Francisco AMADO. For past year AMADO has continued to receive visits from emissaries of Fidel CASTRO and to make mysterious trips. On each occasion (sic) AMADO receives money for various expenditures.

Right after receiving these visitors and the money, AMADO goes on trips. AMADO was in Cuba for a while last year. He may be working for the Govt of Cuba in intelligence work. AMADO's wife was educated in the U.S. She has friends in Washington and also at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. As of this date, AMADO has been outside Mexico for some time. His wife explains that he is in the U.S. Last year when AMADO went to Guatemala, taking funds from CASTRO for the guerrillas, he applied for membership in the Guatemalan Communist Party. He has CASTRO's confidence and performs services for the Communists."

DIRECTOR 90507 Dated 20 December 1963 VOL. III)

Cable from Hqs. to Panama City and Bern. "Appears likely someone may have used HYSAGE-1 ticket. Can Panama City identify? Was HYSAGE-1 in Panama 4-17 Dec?

DBA 57414 (FBI) Dated 21 November 1963 100-5-14 (VOL. IV)

Page 11, para 3, mentions a Manolo GARCIA who had in his possession driver's license in name Manolo RODRIGUEZ. /This Manolo RODRIGUEZ may be iden/ with one Manuel RODRIGUEZ Seoane (201-920072) Cuban DSE officer in 1964 responsible for recruiting Emilio ECHARTE Pedroso. ECHARTE's mission was to enter the U.S. for the purpose of assassinating Cuban exile, Manolo RAY. DIRECTOR 501359, 15 Jan 74/ .

ZRKNICK Continued

PACY 4074 (IN 30576) dated 17 July 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Panama City to Hqs. "Station will do everything possible to get additional answers and clarification from HYSAGE-1. If H-1 trying to divert attention from more important target or activity any of the following possibilities may be considered:

c. H-1 may be involved in or aware of impending action. Perhaps a golpe de Estado (coup d'etat) or assassination, and is trying detract attention from persons actually involved."

BOGO 4761 (IN 41774 dated 3 August 1964 (Vol. VII)

Cable from Bogota to Hqs. "On 28 July 64 a State Dept. officer received information that there was a pro-CASTRO group in the Civil Aeronautics Administration and names Alvaro REYES Nieto as a member of the group. REYES, a Colombian, is a radio technician, now in Wash., D.C. area on ODWIFE (International Corporation Administration) training grant. Hernando REYES Nieto, believed to be Alvaro's brother, reportedly travelled to Cuba via Mexico in January 1962. CSDB 3/654,557 lists him as architect in employ of the Cuban Government.

HHTW 1721 dated 15 October 1964 (Vol. VIII)

Dispatch from Hqs. to Tegucigalpa. "When President Kennedy died, Augusto (DGI) directed officers in National Liberation Bldg., to prepare radio communication using song "Three Beautiful Cubans" or "Six Beautiful Cubans," which could be transmitted by Radio Havana, Cuba and be used to send easily understood ciphered messages. AMMUG-1 (DGI defector) believed that Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (DGI) officer chose the musical recording. Augusto is believed to be iden/with Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler, Deputy to Manuel PINEIRO, Chief of the DGI.

ATTACHMENT C

Outline of the Complete LAD/JFK Task Force Files and Description of Their Contents.

LAD (Cuba) Task Force to Investigate Assassination of President Kennedy

019-604-001

Vol. I	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. II	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. III	Administrative - Background Working Papers
Vol. IV	Press Clippings
Vol. V	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VI	Interagency Memoranda
Vol. VII	Terms of Reference - Folders 1 thru 34 Cuba/Mexico
Vol. VIII	Interim Report on AMTRUNK Operation and Operation to Split Castro Regime
Vol. IX	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings A thru H
Vol. X	Memoranda (Draft) - Operational and Subject Files Negative Findings I thru Z
Vol. XI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - A and B
Vol. XII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - C
Vol. XIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - D thru J
Vol. XIV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - K
Vol. XV	Memoranda with Findings Attached - L
Vol. XVI	Memoranda with Findings Attached - M and Mc
Vol. XVII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - N thru R
Vol. XVIII	Memoranda with Findings Attached - S thru V
Vol. XIX	Memoranda with Findings Attached - W thru Z

Vol. XX	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - A thru N
Vol. XXI	Memoranda on Personalities Checked - O thru Z
Vol. XXII	Final Report - How Research was Conducted - Chronology of Findings List of Participants Outline of LAD/JFK Official Files

FILE NO.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING
1
2
3
4
5
6

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

No CS Record Value. Destroy. ☐
RI file this copy as indicated ☐
Branch copy filed as indicated ☐
RE Indexing (check one):
Marked ☐ None required ☐
Signature:

-3-

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

OUT 97713
OUT 97713

TO

INFO

CITE DIR 35831
35831

ABIJ	ACCR	ADDI	ALGI	AMMA	ANCH	ANKA	ASUN
ATHE	BAGH	[redacted]	BANG	BEIR	BELG	BRLN	BERN
BOGO	BOMB	BONN	BRAZ	BRUS	CAIR	CALC	CAPT
CARA	TRUJ	COLO	CNRY	LISB	COPE	DKAR	DAMA
DARE	DJAK	FRAN	GUAT	HAGU	HELS	HONG	HULA
ISTA	JIDD	KABU	KAMP	KAHI	KTMN	KHAR	KUAL
KUWA	LAGS	LAPA	LEOP	LIMA	LOND	[redacted]	LUXE
MADR	MANA	MANI	MELB	MEXI	MOGA	MNRV	MONT
MUNI	NOBI	NEWD	OTTA	PACY	PARI	PENH	PRIN
PRET	QUIT	RABA	RNGO	BEYK	RIOD	ROME	SAIG
SLBY	SANJ	JUAN	SAGO	SALV	SEOU	SING	STOC
TAMI	TNAR	TEGU	TEHE	TOKY	TPLI	TNIS	VIEN
VETN	WELL	YAOU					

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

FORM 1359 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

5834

[illegible] Hospital
[illegible] 25th ST. - HIALEAH, FLA.

TYPE INSURANCE OR PRE-PAYMENT
DATE ADMITTED 4-12-66 TIME 9:00 PM
DATE DISCHARGED [illegible] TIME [illegible]
DOCTOR A. VARGAS

DATE	ROOM NO.	W	RATE	NO. DAYS
4-12	105A SP		21.00	

PATIENT'S NAME & [illegible]
PEREZ, RIGOBERTO (CRUZ) 6
1700 N.W. 21 TERRACE 8
MIAMI, FLA.

8 TO
SA[redacted]
P.O. [redacted]
MIAMI, FLA.

[redacted]

			DRESSINGS	COLUMN A AMOUNT	COLUMN B		OTHER SERVICE	TOTAL CHARGES	PAYMENTS	OLD BALANCE	DATE	BALANCE
21.00								21.00 ●			APR 12'66	21.00
21.00	83.00	15.25	.25	28.00+23	LIVER SCAN							
				30.00+23	1.50+23 KIT		80.00	306.00 ●		21.00	APR 13'66	327.00
21.00	11.00	6.00	9.75	30.00+20			35.00	112.75 ●		327.00	APR 14'66	439.75
21.00			5.00									
21.00	6.00	26.50	2.00	10.00+19			35.00	171.50 ●		439.75	APR 16'66	611.25
21.00	3.00							24.00 ●		611.25	APR 17'66	635.25
21.00	13.00	3.50						37.50 ●		635.25	APR 18'66	672.75
21.00	2.00	3.25						27.25 ●		672.75	APR 19'66	700.00
.00	3.00	19.25					35.00	78.25 ●		700.00	APR 20'66	778.25
1.00			1.25	20.00+19				42.25 ●		778.25	APR 21'66	820.50
21.00		5.50										
1.00	25.00	6.00	2.00	[illegible]+19				[illegible] ●		880.50	APR 23'66	909.00
.00		3.00		[illegible]+19				34.00 ●		909.00	APR 24'66	943.00
				20.00+19								
		10.00		30.00+19				.00		943.00	APR 24'66	943.00
21.00		2.50		10.00+19								
		10.00		10.00+19				34.50 ●		943.00	APR 25'66	977.50
21.00		4.73		10.00+19				35.73 ●		977.50	APR 26'66	1,013.23
21.00		6.[illegible]		10.00+19				37.25 ●		1,013.23	APR 27'66	1,050.50
21.00	12.00	[illegible]	2.00	10.00+19				46.25 ●		1,050.50	APR 29'66	1,096.75
357.00	160.00	91.00	17.25	250.00	1.50		96.00	1096.75				

PAID
MAY 10 1966
CHECK NO. 2156

TOTAL
BALANCE FORWARD

WE DO OUR BEST TO HAVE A FINAL BILL WHEN REQUESTED. AT TIME OF DISCHARGE THIS IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE, SO MEDICINE GIVEN AND SERVICES RENDERED ON DAY OF DISCHARGE WHICH ARE NOT CHARGED WHEN PATIENT LEAVES THE HOSPITAL WILL BE BILLED LATER.

ADD INSURANCE DEDUCTIBLE
DUE FROM PATIENT
LESS PAYMENTS
BALANCE DUE

DISPOSITION OF CASE

FINAL DIAGNOSIS

OPERATION

SHOULD [illegible] BE MADE TO SUBSCRIBER? YES [illegible] NO [illegible]

YES ( ) NO ( ) YES ( ) NO ( )

BILLING

APPROVED

SPECIAL SERVICES CODE EXPLANATION

COLUMN A		COLUMN B	
16	ELECTROCARDIOGRAM	7	PATHOLOGY
18	ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM	9	X RAY THERAPY
19	PHYSICAL THERAPY	21	BLOOD & BLOOD PLASMA
20	TRANSFUSION SET UP	24	ORTHOPEDIC EQUIPMENT
23	EMERGENCY SERVICE	40	TEL & TEL.
27	RADIO ISOTOPES		

* BY: H. M. SIMON, JR., M.D.
RALPH L. PIPES, M.D.
RADIOLOGISTS

OUR BUSINESS OFFICE IS CLOSED FROM SUNSET FRIDAY TO SUNSET SATURDAY.

[illegible] BUSINESS FORMS INC. MIAMI FLA.

3/12

FORM 1309a
2-62

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 26 AUG 62

FILE:

PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
	RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	251743Z	Ø9376

TO DIR WAVE

INFO

CITE RIOD 8325
NUMBER

GYROSE AMLACE

1. AMTOAD-1 SAYS HE PERSUADED AMLACE-1'S WIFE (HEREAFTER AMLACE-2) TO SEND HIM REPORTS FROM HAVANA. BELIEVES SHE WOULD BE WILLING ACT AS COURIER FOR ANTI CASTRO REFUGEES. REPORTS TO BE SENT VIA DIP POUCH TO MARIA C. NIEMEYER (NO RECORD STATION FILES) OF BRAZIL CONSULATE MIAMI. RENARD AND HARRY V. WITHERBY, NEW GYROSE CASE OFFICER VICE ANDRIETTE, DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR INTEREST. AMTOAD-1 OF COURSE UNAWARE OUR TIE TO AMLACE-1. AMTOAD WILL PROBABLY RRRRØR REPORT AMLACE-2 OP TO AMBUD HQS AND MAY SEEK TRIP TO MIAMI TO EXPLOIT.

2. THIS MAY BE MINOR INFORMAL AGREEMENT ON WHICH AMLACE-2 DOES NOT INTEND TO ACT, ALTHO AMSTRUT-1 HAS STATED AMLACE-2 STRONGLY ANTI CASTRO AND WILLING WORK.

3. WE FEEL THIS DEVELOPMENT NO THREAT TO AMLACE-1 SECURITY. WILL TAKE NO CORRECTIVE ACTION UNLESS ADDEES INSTRUCT OTHERWISE.

END OF MESSAG

INFO
CCS
DC/OS
SO
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CI
IS
SEC
SUPP
AIR
MAIL
TR
RI

GKB

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

FORM 1302a
1-62

DISTR:

ACTION:

INFO:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: ~~XX5~~ 25 AUG 62

FILE:

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG	INCOMING NUMBER
RR ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS K	242040Z	09350

TO WAVE

INFO DIR

CITE RIOD 8317
NUMBER

GYROSE

REF RIOD 8316

IDEN - AN[illegible]NIO L. NEVES

AMERICAN EMBASSY - POL

APO 676

NEW YORK N.Y.

END OF MESSAG

ACTION INFO

COS

RI

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

INCOMING

[illegible] -1

REPORT COVER SHEET	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	REPORT NO. UFG-1759

FROM JMWAVE	DATE OF REPORT 25 October 1962
REPORTING OFFICER Alice B. CAPONONG Douglas C. NISLEY	RD NO.
REPORTS OFFICER Wilma J. MARKWALTER/dml	PROJ.
APPROVING OFFICER Andrew K. REUTEMAN	S'CE CR.

BACKGROUND DATA AND COMMENTS:

CYROSE

Source: Para 1. AMBUD-1 by letter dated 24 September from friend Melquia from Habana. Para 2. AMFAUNA-13 by SW message 11 dated 9 October, received by WAVE/Techs on 15 October. Legibility of message was somewhat impaired; the footnote stating that the vessels had discharged their cargo as signified by the (D) is confusing since the date of the message is earlier than the last expected date of arrival (19 Oct.)

Accompanying report are attached untranslated shipping documents entitled "Movement of Steamships in the Republic", for dates 5 through 16 August 1962, supplied by AMFAUNA-1, received 18 October 1962.

OPTIONAL. ENTRIES BELOW NEED NOT BE FILLED IN IF DUPLICATED IN ACCOMPANYING REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

INTRA-AGENCY	EXTRA-AGENCY
Attachment: H/W Shipping Documents 4 - Headquarters w/mat & atts 1 - OO/C 1 - File	

COUNTRY	NO. OF ENCLOSURES	NO. PAGES 2
SUBJECT	REFERENCES	
	PADA	

APPR	SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM	DOI

FORM 8-60 1467 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(20)

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

GRADING OF SOURCE A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence.) F: Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba

SUBJECT Soviet Merchant Vessels in Cuban Ports

REPORT NO. UFG-1759

DATE OF REPORT 25 October 1962

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 1 September - 19 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Cuba (24 September - 16 October 1962)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Para 1: Leading official (C) in an anti-Castro group, from a Habana resident. Para 2: Cuban businessman (F). Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. From 1 to 10 September the following Soviet merchant vessels, transporting war materiel, arrived at the port of Isabela de Sagua:

KHIRUG VISHNEVSKY	9,600 tons
BELORETSK	8,700 tons
MICHURINSK	7,532 tons
VOLGOLES	4,345 tons
DVINOGORSK	7,838 tons
USOLYE	4,500 tons

2. The following merchant vessels arrived at the ports listed on the dates indicated, with the following cargo:

Ship	Date	Port of Origin	Tons	Cargo	
MARKX	2 Oct.	Habana	424	General Cargo	(D)
PAMIT	3 Oct.	Habana	446 1,094	Cattle also General Cargo	(D) (D)
ARKHANGELSK	3 Oct.	Habana	226	Trucks	(D)
REINHOLT	3 Oct.	Habana	3,400	Gral	(D)
MATOUBA	3 Oct.	HABANA	957	Potatoes	(D)

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DISTRIBUTION

MATOULA	ID	ID	158	Grease	(D)
USOLYE	3 Oct.	Matanzas	5,000	Cement	(D)

TANKERS DUE TO ARRIVE FROM THE BLACK SEA

LISICHANSK	3 Oct.	Habana	231,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
DEUZHEA	8 Oct.	Habana	269,000 (barrels)	Petroleum	(D)
UKRAINY	9 Oct.	Habana	21,000 (barrels) also, 9,500 (barrels) also, 31,600 (barrels)	Petroleum Oil Gasoline	(D) (D) (D)
OCEAN EXPLORER	14 Oct.	Habana	170,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
BAUSKA	10 Oct.	Habana	Cargo unknown		
LONDON PRESTIGE	14 Oct.	Santaigo de Cuba	171,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
LENKORAN	7 Oct.	Habana	234,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)
ALDEBARAN	5 Oct.	Santiago de Cuba	143,000 (barrels)	Crude Oil	(D)

NOTE:

(D) Indicates that cargo was disembarked (unloaded).

DOMINGO [illegible]

HABANA	[illegible]	1090	5	1559	7479	--	Gral. D
NICARO	[illegible]	1073	2	1130	1400	--	nickel C

HABANA	[illegible]	1075	3	[illegible]	559 [illegible]	7	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	1050	5	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	arroz D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	4	Superf.	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	3	2000	[illegible]	--	Fert. C
HABANA	FUNDADOR	[illegible]	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	Fert. C

SANTIAGO	[illegible]	5	[illegible]	--	café C
HABANA	[illegible]	6	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
CIENFUEGOS	[illegible]	7	7097	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	7	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]				[illegible]
HABANA	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	9	[illegible]	--	Gral. D
SANTIAGO	CARLA	9	[illegible]	--	arroz D
NICARO	BAHIA NIPE	[illegible]	240	--	nickel C
HABANA	HABANA	[illegible]	2000	--	Gral. D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] hierro 800 conserv 500 arroz 534		Gral. D

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Lunes [illegible]

[illegible] Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

Cienfuegos [illegible] 1029 4 [illegible] 51,000 Brrls. Gal.Motor

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034 5 0700 100,000 " de P. Crudo

S. de Cuba ALDEBARAN 1042 148,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 1098 Ago. 10 240,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

Habana O. PIONEER 1015 Ago. 6 174,000 " " "

Nicaro VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. 11 49,000 " " F. Oil
[illegible] Ago. 12 122,000 " " P. Crudo
[illegible] " " " "

FRUNZE 1070

L. SPIRIT [illegible]

(Cargar)...Antilla THOMSON 1029 1,600,000 Glns. de Miel
Nuevitas " " 1,900,000 " " "

I. de Sagua JACOB 1050 1,400,000 " " "

Nuevitas " " 700,000 " " "

PARTES 6 Y 12

HABANA	JOHANN [illegible]	7 1058	0145 [illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	TROLLHOLM	11607	0132 892	--	pulpa rayón	D
HABANA	TEMIATORM	2045 y 2637	122 2500	-- --	ajo cebolla	D
CIENFUEGOS	AMOY	Ago. 8	7097	--	arroz	D
HABANA	[illegible]	Ago. 8	4437	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	CABO [illegible]	"	1120	--	mantequilla	D
HABANA	[illegible]					
SANTIAGO	CAM[illegible]	"	6252	"	arroz	D
HABANA	GLO[illegible]	"	10202	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	[illegible]	"	6955	--	Gral.	D
NICARO	BAHIA DE [illegible]	Ago. 13	245	--	nickel	D
HABANA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	SANTA [illegible]	" 13	4771	--	Gral.	D
HABANA	CAMAGUEY	" 13	245	--	ganado	D

[illegible]

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1048 2 0730 140,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1034 5 0700 100,000 " " "

Cienfuegos KRASNOVODSK 1029 5 1430 53,000 Brrls. C. Motor

Nuevitas JACOB 1058 Ago. 7 [illegible] hrs. 700,000 [illegible] Mieles
" Antilla THORSON 1019 1,[illegible]00,000 " "
" Nuevitas " " 1,500,000 " "

Habana BAUSKA 1099 Ago. 1[illegible] 122,000 Brrls. P. Crudo

Antilla VLADIMIR 1069 Ago. 11 49,000 " " Oil
551,500 [illegible] Amoniaco Liq.

L. SPIRIT 1075 Ago. 13

FRUNZE 1070 " "

Habana [illegible] 1020 Ago. 11 240,000 Brrls. de P. Crudo

S. de Cuba [illegible] 1097 Ago. 11 0000 hr. 124,000 " " " "

Habana [illegible] 1015 174,000 " " "

[illegible]

Cesión de Buques Tanques, Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol.

Habana [illegible] 9500 75,000 Brls. C. Oil

(Carga...) Nuevitas JACOB 1956 7 7300 100,000 Glns. de Mieles

S. de Cuba KARITZA 1954 7 9710 100,500 Brls. de P. Crudo

(Carga)... Antilla THOMSOY 1915 1,300,000 Glns. de Mieles
Nuevitas " 1,900,000 " " "

S. de Cuba VASSILIEV 1957 Ago. 11 124,000 Brls. de P. Crudo
Habana [illegible] [illegible] " 15 237,000 " " " "
Habana NAUSICA 1955 " 16 122,000 " " " "
Nicaro VLADIMIR 1955 " 11 149,000 " " P. Oil
551,500 Kgs. de Amoniaco Liq.
Habana C. PIONEER 1915 " 6 174,000 Brls. de P. Crudo
Habana LUGANSK 1955 " 11 240,000 " " " "
FRUNZE 1956

Lune s 8 13 62

Sección de Buques Tanques, Petroleo, Mieles y Alcohol

Port Ship

	Habana	LUGANSK	11	240,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	S. de Cuba	VASSILIKI	11	124,000 " " "
(Cabotaje)	Nuevitas	KRASNOVODSK	19	56,330.28 Brrs de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
	Nicaro	VLADIMIR	11	49,000 Brrs de Fuel Oil 551,500 Kls Amoniaco
(Cabotaje)	Cienfuegos	KRASNOVODSK	14/8/62	20,000 Brrls de Gas Oil Carga tomada en la Habana
		L. SPIRIT		
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
	Nuevitas Habana	CHERNOVCI "	18/8/62	36,000 Brrls de [illegible]
		G. GARIBALDI	22/8/62	
	S. de Cuba	TRUD	22/8/62	
	Habana	BAUSKA	16/8/62	122,000 Brrls Petróleo Crud

- -

(Cargar) "	Antilla Nuevitas	SHORSOY "		1,600.000 Glns de Mieles 1,100.000 " " 800,000 " "

Lunes 8.13 62

Sección Carga General

Matanzas	TROLLEHOLM	[illegible]	[illegible]	rayón	D
Habana	[illegible]	10	8956	Gral	D
Santiago	[illegible]	9	8500	Arroz	D
Habana	OLBRATT	12	1800 Hierro, 800 Conservas 500 arroz, 534 Gral		D
Habana	CAMAGUEY	13	245	Ganado y Correo	D
Habana	[illegible]	11	2000	Gral	D
Habana	GOLFO DI NAPOLI	12	10160	Cemento	D
Santiago	KORDUN	11	462	café	C

Habana	OLGA	10	10,161	Gral	D
Habana	LUBEN KARAVELOV	12	5,754	Gral	D
Habana	CHILEAN REEFER	13	1,731	Gral	D
Habana	SAINT JAMES	13	5,083	papel	D

Habana	GLORIA	14	10201	Gral	D
[illegible]	[illegible] MAESTRA	14	4778	Gral	D
Habana	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Gral	D
Habana	BUCCANERO	14	2000	papas	D
Habana	HELGA WITT	14	5000	Superfósfato	D
Habana	ATLANTIC GLADIATOR	15	12915	Sulfato	D
Habana	BIRTE OLDENDORFF	16	5300	Gral	D
Habana	ROTTE	17	11425	arroz	D

Martes 8-14-62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

(Cargar)	S de Cuba	N. [illegible]ICO	18/8/62			Mieles
"	Cienfuegos	" "				"
	Nuevitas	~~C[illegible]I~~ CHERNOVCI	18/8/62	36,000	Bbls de	Gasolina
	Habana			19,300	" "	Aceite de Aviación
				9,606	" "	" Vapor
	S de Cuba	[illegible]		54,000	" "	7. Crudo
	Matanzas	"				Amoniaco
	Habana	MIR	18/8/62	267,000	" "	7. Crudo
	Habana	G.GARIBALDI		209,000	"	"
	S. de Cuba	TRUD		162,000	"	"
	Habana	BAUSKA		122,000	"	"
	S. De Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23/8/62	110,000	"	"

14-00000

Jueves 6 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Cienfuegos	KRASSVODOSK	15	20,00 Tnls ~~Brrls de~~ Gas-Oil
(Cargar)	I. de Sagua	CHERNOVCI	19	7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba Cienfuegos	[illegible]		Mieles "
Antilla			

- -

Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABARUSKAYA (SU)	28	78,000 " "
S. de Cuba Guantánamo	FRUNZE "	29	54,000 " " 546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCE	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviación 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

Jueves 8 16 62

Sección de Buques Tanques: Petróleo, Mieles y Alcohol

	Cienfuegos	KRASSVODOSK	15	20,00 Tns ~~Brrls de~~ Gas-Oil

(Cargar)	I. de Sagua	CHERNOVCI	29	7,000.000 Ltrs. Alcohol

****

S. De Cuba Cienfuegos	F RINELLA D.[illegible] "	19	Mieles "
Antilla Nuevitas	THORSOY "	16	" "

- -

Habana	BAUSKA	22	122,000 Brrls de P. Crudo
Habana	MIR	18	267,000 " "
Habana	G. GARIBALDI	22	209,000 " "
Habana	PEKIN	22	196,000 " "
S. de Cuba	TRUD	22	162,000 " "
S. de Cuba	L. SPIRIT	23	110,000 " "
Habana	RABANUSKAYA([illegible])	28	
S. de Cuba Guantánamo	FRUNZE "	29	54,000 " " 546 Tons de Amoniaco
Habana	CHERNOVCI	20	19,300 Brrs Aceite Aviació 9,606 " " Vapor
Nuevitas	"	20	36,000 " Gasolina

6537

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1430 9 DEC/LMG)

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, FI/INT, WH 7, SOD 6, VR

S E C R E T 091900Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7033 9 DEC 63 IN 76536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR MARIA (VALDES) HERNANDEZ, SINGLE, D/O LUCAS AND JULIA, DPOB 22 JULY 29, MATANZAS, RESIDING MAZON NUMBER 163 HAVANA.

2. (VALDES) EMPLOYED AS STATISTICIAN MINISTRY HEALTH AND WELFARE HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 20 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER AUSPICES WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (WE AND SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT [illegible] 13 DEC 63)

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/[illegible] 2, C/[illegible] 2, CA [illegible]

S E C R E T 1319[illegible]Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7373

RYBAT TYPIC KEYWAY VASLOUCH

REF MEXI 7359 (IN 7[illegible]) DIR 83855 DIR 83858

13 Dec 63 IN 80238

C/S COMMENT: *[illegible] CABLE [illegible] SERVICED.

C/S COMMENT: **VASLOUCH-2 CALL STATION 11 DEC [illegible] DIFFICULTY WITH MEXICAN CUSTOMS ON BAGGAGE.

1. STATION OFFICER ACCOMPANIED VASLOUCH-2 AGAIN TO AIRPORT MORNING 13 DEC. AFTER ROUTINE DELAY ADMITTED TO AIR CARGO AREA. DOCTOR'S CASE INSPECTED. THIS TIME TWO BOTTOM STUDS ONLY WERE MISSING. VASLOUCH-2 HAD INSPECTED DAY PREVIOUSLY AND FOUND THREE OF FOUR MISSING. NOTE THAT FIRST INSPECTION WAS IN ANOTHER BUILDING. CONSEQUENTLY BETWEEN TIME VASLOUCH-2 SAW BAG 12 DEC AND 1030 MORNING SOMEONE HAD INSERTED ONE MISSING STUD-[illegible] VASLOUCH-2 SAYS SHE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN SHE NOT MISTAKEN CONCERNING ABOVE.

2. DOCTOR'S BAG AND OTHER FIVE PIECES REMOVED FROM CARGO AREA BUT WERE NOT PASSED BY BUILDING DOOR INSPECTOR WHO INSISTED ON OPENING ALL SIX PIECES. VASLOUCH-2 PROTESTED. CHARGE HER LOCAL EMBASSY CONTACTED AND HE SPOKE ON TELEPHONE TO CUSTOMS OFFICIAL TO NO AVAIL. VASLOUCH-2 THEN SAW CHIEF AIRPORT CUSTOMS WHO REITERATED FACT THAT PARCELS WOULD BE INSPECTED

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UNLESS LOCAL EMBASSY OBTAINED FREE ENTRY. STATED REASON WAS BAGGAGE ARRIVED "DESTINATION MEXICO" RATHER THAN "IN TRANSIT". CUSTOMS CHIEF REFUSED RECONSIDER EVEN AFTER OFFER OF BRIBE BY VASLCUCH-2.

3. BY THIS TIME PRACTICALLY EVERY CARGO AND CUSTOMS OFFICIAL AIRPORT AWARE OF SITUATION AND OF ASSISTANCE BEING GIVEN VASLCUCH-2 BY STATION OFFICER WHOSE KUBARK FACE WAS GROWING LESS AND LESS FINNISH.

4. PARCELS WERE RETURNED AIR CARGO STORAGE AREA. ALL INCLUDING DOCTOR'S BAG WERE FIRMLY BANDED. VASLCUCH-2 THEN TURNED OVER PAPERS TO LOCAL EMBASSY WHICH WILL OBTAIN FREE ENTRY AND KEEP ALL PARCELS MEXI. VASLCUCH-1 WILL TRAVEL MEXI SOON AFTER 7 JAN TO RECOVER THEM. CONSEQUENTLY STATION WILL NOT HAVE ACCESS TO DOCTOR'S BAG UNTIL THAT DATE.

5. VASLCUCH-2 TALKED TO VASLCUCH-1 AFTERNOON 12 DEC. LATTER INSISTED SHE RETURN PERUVIAN FLIGHT 13 DEC AS HER EMPLOYERS WERE PROTESTING TARDY ARRIVAL.
THIS COMBINED WITH VASLCUCH-2 FEAR THAT DOCTOR'S BAG HAS BEEN TAMPERED WITH MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE PERSUADE HER REMAIN MEXI LONGER. SHE PLANS DEPART 13 DEC IF FLIGHT LEAVES. IT NOW CONFIRMED AS DELAYED AND MAY NOT DEPART UNTIL 14 DEC.

6. LAST FIRM STATION CONTACT WITH VASLCUCH-2 IS AT 1500 LOCAL 13 DECEMBER. CANNOT PROMISE ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR GUIDANCE FROM HQS WILL REACH HER VIA STATION AFTER THAT HOUR.

7. REGRET THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND FACT THAT RS-48 WILL BE HELD (IF IT STILL IN DOCTOR'S CASE) FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FELT FURTHER STATION INVOLVEMENT AND MORE PRECIPITOUS ACTION CONSTITUTED UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISK.

S E C R E T

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DOP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 142235Z

DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384

IN 80448

KEYWAY FBRUMEN TICRYSTAL

REF DIR 84498 *

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 72, DEPT. 302, MEXICO, D.F.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR TICRYSTAL-1.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

: DIRECTOR

M : MEXICO CITY

ION: WH 8

O : CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, VR

E C R E T 171636Z

ORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416   17 Dec 63 IN 82479

F DIR 89728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG SVLUCK/1 SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 C BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE LIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

2. S/1 REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE NTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT ESS POINT.

3. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN S/1. ALL PAYMENTS RE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

4. S/1 ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF LIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA. RCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARIL ARTERED. S/1'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE DRESS WHILE MEXI.

5. NEXT OP MTG WITH S/1 SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SVLUCK/1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

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Copy No.

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

I

[illegible] MEXI [illegible] 00781

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], BORN CALIFORNIA 1923, [illegible] [illegible] OCCUPATION FORCES, MEXICO CITY C. 1950-55 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] JAPAN, [illegible] MANILA, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 1956-62 NO OBJECTION LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/3 [illegible]
[illegible] Barto
[illegible] Aiken
[illegible] Sweet
[illegible] GW Stark
C/[illegible] W P Walsh
[illegible] [illegible]

Hagel

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

880333

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S-E-C-R-E-T

63

SEE BELOW

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTING

ACOP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WE 4, NE 9, FE 6, WH 7, VR

INFO

CITE DIR

PARI BONN STOC HELSINKI COPE [illegible] ROME
[illegible] [illegible] VIEN GNVA BERN ATHE
[illegible] FRAN [illegible] SUBA TOKY ANKA TEHE
[illegible] [illegible] KARA KABU NEWD BOMB MOSC
[illegible]
LOND BRUS HAGU [illegible]
/100

60023

REF: DIR 50593

1. FOLLOWING POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS RE CURRENT USSR ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. AS NOTED REF, THESE INTENDED AS OPERATIONAL AID FOR ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION SOVIETS, AND AS MEANS SOW DOUBT RE REGIMES ABILITY DEAL WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT [illegible] ALL THESE BUT SELECT THOSE APPROPRIATE FOR OWN USE. REPORT RESULTS CONTACTS VIA OPS CHANNELS. HQS WILL SCREEN FOR VALUE [illegible].

2. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 16 NOV) REPORTED STRIKE BY WORKERS KRIVOI ROG. REASONS WERE BREAD SHORTAGE AND DEMAND FOR WAGE INCREASES MEET RISING FOOD COSTS. SINCE NO ANNOUNCEMENTS FOOD PRICE INCREASES TO DATE, ARE THEY BEING RAISED SECRETLY? WHAT ITEMS AFFECTED? BREAD PRICES BEING INCREASED? HOW MUCH? AS MUCH AS THIRTY PERCENT PLUS MEAT PRICES LAST YEAR? IF PRICES BEING RAISED, IS FAILURE MAKE THIS PUBLIC RELATED GOVERNMENT FEARS RIOTS SUCH AS LAST YEAR

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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S-E-C-R-E-T

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

PAGE TWO

INFO

CITE DIR 91660

NOVOCHERKASSK WHEN MEAT AND MILK PRICES INCREASED?

3. KHRUSHCHEV IN [illegible] SPEECH SAID GRAIN CROP TWENTY PERCENT BELOW LAST YEAR BUT MEAT SUPPLIES UP. IS LATTER RESULT EXTENSIVE DISTRESS SLAUGHTERING LIVESTOCK IN VIEW SEVERE FODDER SHORTAGE. KHRUSHCHEV ALSO SAID MILK PRODUCTION DOWN THIS YEAR. DOES THIS INDICATE EVEN MILK COWS BEING SLAUGHTERED DUE FODDER SHORTAGE?

4. IF FODDER IN SUCH SHORT SUPPLY WIDESPREAD SLAUGHTERING NECESSARY, WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOLLOW HUNGARY EXAMPLE AND BUY FEED GRAINS ABROAD, IN ADDITION WHEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION?

5. KHRUSHCHEV SAID SOVIET CITIZENS STARVED 1947 WHILE GRAIN BEING EXPORTED, PRESUMABLY TO PAY FOR IMPORTS MACHINERY AND OTHER CAPITAL GOODS. COULD SITUATION BECOME THAT SERIOUS THIS YEAR? HAS OR WILL SOVIET GOVERNMENT PUT MORATORIUM ON ALL FOOD SHIPMENTS ABROAD, OR WILL IT CONTINUE SHIP FOOD EASTERN EUROPE AND CUBA AS IN PAST YEARS WHETHER HARVEST GOOD OR BAD?

6. WESTERN PRESS (REUTERS VIENNA 10 OCT) REPORTS SOVIET DOCKWORKERS ODESSA REFUSED LOAD BUTTER FOR CUBA. HAVE SUCH SHIPMENTS BEEN STOPPED? KHRUSHCHEV SAID SUGAR SUPPLIES DOWN THIS YEAR IS [illegible]. SINCE USSR NORMALLY BUYS CUBAN

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ROUTING

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DEFERRED
ROUTINE

CITE DIR - 91660

[illegible] WILL [illegible] AS ALLIED CONTINUE FOOD SHIPMENTS CUBA IN EXCHANGE REGARDLESS [illegible] AT HOME? SINCE [illegible] USSR HAS SENT FOOD PRODUCING EQUIPMENT [illegible] CUBA. WILL THESE SHIPMENTS CONTINUE OR WILL GOODS BE DIVERTED [illegible] NEW AGRICULTURAL EFFORT?

[illegible] CHEMICAL PROGRAM WILL BE TREMENDOUS DRAIN ON SOVIET ECONOMY, [illegible] SOVIET MILITARY POWER OR SLACKENING ECONOMIC GROWTH. THEREFORE WILL NOT CONSUMPTION SECTOR BEAR BRUNT THIS INVESTMENT? SINCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM (FERTILIZER, INSECTICIDES, HERBICIDES) LARGELY [illegible] FOOD AND FIBER PRODUCTION, AND [illegible] TALKED OF INCREASING FOOD AND CLOTHING PRODUCTION THROUGH CHEMICAL PROGRAM, WILL NOT MUCH OF BURDEN INVESTMENT FALL ON HOUSING, ONLY [illegible] CONSUMPTION SECTOR REMAINING? WILL NOT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION BE CUT SHARPLY OR ALMOST HALTED? BESIDES WILL NOT HOUSING PROBLEM BE INTENSIFIED BY INFLUX WORKERS TO MAN NEW CHEMICAL FACTORIES, MANY OF WHICH [illegible] OF AREAS WHERE LITTLE HOUSING NOW AVAILABLE?

8. IS KHRUSHCHEV DEMAND FOR CREDIT FROM WEST TO FINANCE INVESTMENT PROGRAM INDICATION SOVIET GOLD RESERVES AT MINIMUM LEVELS? IS THERE EFFORT IMPROVE PRESENT MINING METHODS OR FIND NEW GOLD DEPOSITS TO PAY FOR MASSIVE IMPORTS?

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DIRECTOR

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DEFERRED

ROUTINE

CITE DIR 97660

9. IF USSR RECEIVES LONG TERM CREDITS FROM WEST FOR CHEMICAL [illegible] AND [illegible], WHAT MEASURES BE TAKEN PAY BACK LOANS? WILL [illegible] BE SOUGHT, [illegible] OTHER SOLUTION AT HAND?

10. PRIVATE PLOTS OF FARM WORKERS MOST PRODUCTIVE PART SOVIET AGRICULTURE, [illegible] ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT THEREIN WOULD RESULT LARGEST GAIN FOOD SUPPLY. WILL [illegible] FERTILIZER PRODUCED BE SOLD PEASANTS FOR USE ON PLOTS?

11. SOVIET GOVERNMENT MUST REALIZE FROM NEP PERIOD AND WESTERN EXPERIENCE, PLUS EXAMPLE OF [illegible] PRIVATE PLOTS SINCE 1930s THAT GIVING LAND TO PEASANTS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY [illegible] ENOUGH FOOD FOR SOVIET POPULATION. [illegible] POLITICAL [illegible] IS NOT ANOTHER REASON THIS NOT BEING DONE FEAR OF [illegible] [illegible] SUCH AS [illegible] DURING NEP PERIOD. [illegible] INFLATION WOULD RESULT FROM OVERPRODUCTION ON FARMS, FOR WHICH NO CONSUMERS GOODS TO EXCHANGE? IS NOT [illegible] AGRICULTURE AND POOR PEASANTRY ONE WAY HOLD DOWN DEMAND FOR CONSUMERS [illegible], WHICH [illegible] IN [illegible] SHORT SUPPLY, AND TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION WITHOUT EXCESSIVE INFLATIONARY PRESSURE? [illegible] [illegible] AGRICULTURE, WOULD SOVIET GOVERNMENT REALLY WANT PROSPEROUS PEASANTRY, [illegible] MILITARY POWER, FOREIGN AMBITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH?

[illegible] AT [illegible] [illegible] TEACHERS AND DOCTORS TOO LOW AND MUST

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SECRET

ROUTING

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE FIVE

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ROUTINE

INFO

CITE DIR 91660

BE INCREASED. AGRICULTURAL WORKERS LOWEST PAID IN SOVIET UNION. DOES NOT GOVERNMENT ALSO BELIEVE THEIR INCOMES TOO LOW AND MUST BE INCREASED?

13. CHEMICAL PROGRAM LATEST IN LONG SERIES PANACEAS, INCLUDING NEW LANDS, CORN PROGRAM, PLAN TO CATCH UP TO U. S. IN MEAT AND MILK OUTPUT, FALLOW LAND PLOW UP PROGRAM AND OTHERS, ALL OF WHICH FAILED. EACH PROMISED ASSURED ABUNDANCE IN FUTURE. WILL SOVIET PEOPLE BE WILLING WAIT AGAIN, THIS TIME TILL 1970, WHILE LATEST PANACEA TESTED, OR THEIR PATIENCE AND HOPE EXHAUSTED? DO THEY BELIEVE GOVERNMENT SERIOUS IN PUTTING FORTH PROGRAM, OR THEY THINK IT JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY REGIME GAIN TIME IN HOPE PROBLEM SOMEHOW DISAPPEAR?

14. MUCH OF SOVIET UNION TOO DRY FOR EFFECTIVE FERTILIZER UTILIZATION, ESPECIALLY GRAIN AREAS. WILL CONCOMITANT INVESTMENT IRRIGATION BE MADE SO FERTILIZER, IF AND WHEN PRODUCED, BE EFFECTIVELY USED? WHERE WILL INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR THIS COME FROM?

15. IN PLENUM SPEECH KHRUSHCHEV ONCE MORE TURNED TO LYSENKO AS EXAMPLE SCIENTIFIC PRACTITIONER. DOES THIS MEAN LYSENKO AND HIS THEORIES, COMPLETELY DISCREDITED BY AGRICULTURAL SCIENTISTS EVERYWHERE OUTSIDE BLOC, CONTINUE HAVE

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S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

DIRECTOR

PAGE SIX

GREAT INFLUENCE IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE EVEN IN TIME OF CRISIS?

11. [illegible] SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN THOSE [illegible] LIBERAL

LINE-STYLE [illegible] PLAUSIBLE [illegible] TYUTCHEV.

END OF MESSAGE

[illegible]

(C/SR/CI - Mr. Tennent Bagley
(CSR/CS - Mr. James Burson
IN DRAFT:
(C/SR/C3 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
(SR/RR - Mr. A. S. Valvada
(LE - Mr. George Allman
(FE - Mr. Orrin Magill
(WH - Mr. Paul F. Burton
(WE - Mr. Tom Thiele
(NE - Mr. Walter L. O'Brien
● [illegible]/PROP [illegible] Gallivan

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

CI/CA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 202235Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7479

20 [illegible] 85191

OXASBAY LPSHRINX

REF: MEXI 7400 (IN 85135)

IDEN IS MR. GEORGE STEERS.

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

20 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION [illegible] 8

INFO [illegible], ADDP, [illegible]/L, DDS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, [illegible] CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, [illegible] [illegible], WE 4, WH, [illegible], AD/CI 2, AD/[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 210030Z DEC 21 0142 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI [illegible]

INTEL TYPIC DUSIGNET

REF DIR [illegible]

SUPDATA SOURCE DUSIGNET FROM ITALINA AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 210035Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APPR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORT [illegible] HAS BEEN MADE [illegible] PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

RELEASING TDCS:

DATE DISTRIBUTED:

BASED ON:

LIAISON:

SECRET

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

SECRET

(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

REPORT NO. TDCS

SUBJECT

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 55247

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST, IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

RELEASING

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BIGGER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 823 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:swk
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

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☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
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TO : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS

AMLASH/1

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DC/WH/SA 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

17 APR 64 18 08z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15094

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 PROCEED GNVA.

REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARI)*

1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP/1 (IDEN) UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRTY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP/1 AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL.

2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/SA/EOB
WE/5/C R C Loeb
WE/3
WE/4
EE/SA/S
WH/SA/SO/NS

W.H.O'Brien
~~BRONSON TWEEDY~~
D C/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

12-3

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-252234

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ORIG : Mr. Wainwright:svk
UNIT : WH/SA/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 17 April 1964

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO : GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : DC/WH/SA 5
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR

17 APR 64 18 08z

SIG CEN

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO GNVA INFO BERN MADR ROME PARI CITE DIR 15093

DESENSITIZED PBRUMEN AMWHIP

REF: DIR 15094 *

IDEN IS CARLOS (TEPEDINO) GONZALEZ, AGE 38 (LOOKS 45), 5'8", 170 LBS. MOUSTACHE, ROUND, FULL, KIND-LOOKING FACE, THINNING, GRAYING BLACK HAIR COMBED STRAIGHTE BACK, BOW-LEGGED.

END OF MESSAGE

* Cable Sec: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE.

WH/SA/EOB
WE/5/C
WE/3
WE/4
EE/SA/S
WH/SA/SO/NS

BRONSON TWEEDY
DC/EE
RELEASING OFFICER

17-4

COORDINATING OFFICERS

BRUCE B. CHEEVER
DC/WH/SA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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734

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 29 NOV 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PARIS

ACTION: TFW 10

INFO : DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, WE 4, S/C 2

ROUTING			
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NOV 29 0152Z 62

ROUTINE

IN 26114

PRITY WAVE INFO DIR CITE PARI 4521 IN26114

GYROSE

RE PARI 4520 (IN 26113)

IDEN:

NORMAND POULIN

C/O U S EMBASSY

APO 230

NEW YORK, N Y

END OF MESSAGE

C/WE/3 ✓	C/IIO
DC/WE/3	PA
Reports	Labor
C/EYO ✓	FCP
Liaison	Prop
3rd Country ✓	Press
CE	Support

29 NOV 1962

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2nd December, 1963

from Harosh
[illegible]
Louie

Dear J.

Subject: Jack RUBENSTEIN
Your RJ 2995 of Nov. 29, 63
and further to our tele com.
of Dec. 1st.

The only Jack RUBENSTEIN known to have arrived in ISRAEL during 1962 stated that he is a native of POLAND, born 1905 and a resident of NEW-YORK.

He arrived on May 17 and departed on June 7, accompanied by his wife Mimi.

K.

[illegible]
[illegible]
6153
21 NOV. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. [illegible]

TO: MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, ~~RR~~, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, [illegible] 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

27 Nov 63 21 58z

SAS CEN

☒ ROUTINE

CITE DIR 65387

MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE

PERUMEN ZRPRIMA

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR
ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH)

FRAN 7 FROB BONN 5 HAMB BRLN MUNI 5 VIEN ATHE 6
BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP
MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA
QUIT GUAT SNTO HELS TOKY HONO WAVE BARC
HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG : D. FONIS:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 5153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

12-67

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

22 Nov 63 17 03z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85387

RBRUMEN ZRPRIMA

REF: DIR 22218 *

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF ZRPRIMA[1] PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK[2] EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK[2] FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK[2] SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

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14-00000

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
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3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE BE ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CABLE MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PBRUMEN[3] OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZRPRIMA[1] HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK[2] HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA[1] SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
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TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO INFO CITE 35387

SAS/EOB [illegible]
SAS/EOB [illegible]
WE/5 R C Loebe
C/WE Thomas F. Thiele
AC/EE [illegible]
C/WE/[illegible] [illegible]
C/CI [illegible]
C/FE [illegible]

1400 17

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/CI

[illegible]
[illegible]

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/CI

INFO: [illegible], CI/AN DUPPY, C/WH 2, D/DS 2, VR

☐ [illegible]

☒ ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

5974

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE DIR-

IDEN A RUREK DUDIN 201-83827.

IDEN B ARLETTE FRANCOISE HEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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Copy No.

SECRET

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/CI

INFO : ADDP, CI/OA [illegible], C/WH 2, D/CI 2, VR

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 65975

KUDESK ZROCEAN

RE MEXI 7005 (IN 66032)

1. SUBJ IS PSEUD CALVIN E RAKERRAND (IDEN A) WHO HAS COOPERATED WITH ODENVY AND KUBARK IN CONTINUING INVESTIGATION BEGUN 1960 BASIS SURFACING IN EMIGRE CHANNELS / BY KGB OF TOP SECRET ODYOKE DOCUMENT ACQUIRED THROUGH ESPIONAGE OP.

2. SUBJ CURRENTLY IN MEXI STUDYING SPANISH CONNECTION PLAN DEVELOP JOURNALIST EMPLOYMENT LATIN AMERICA. HAS WORKED AS [illegible] SCRIPT WRITER AND ANNOUNCER FOR VOA AND CURRENTLY DOING SOME SCRIPT WRITING ON PIECE WORK BASIS. BELIEVE WOMAN JOINING HIM MEXI IS MISTRESS (IDEN B) RATHER THAN WIFE WHO EMPLOYED NEW YORK CITY. NO DEROG.

3. REQUEST NO STATION ACTION. ODENVY WILL HAVE NO CONTACT MEXI.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

(Ref is trace request on subject)

C/WH

C/WH/3

DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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Copy No.

L.G. MORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5940
21 Oct 1963

MEXICO CITY

SECRET

SIG CEN

77180

TO PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

REF. DIR 77179

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY, [illegible] 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES, SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. [illegible]
CHIEF
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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J.M. WHITTEN
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JANET NIXON:10
SAS/EOB
[illegible] X
22 OCT 63 X

S E C R E T/RYBAT

200-120-30

MADRID GENEVA ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT
HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS
MEXICO CITY

220[illegible] 47Z

SIG CEN

C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD [illegible], C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3,
C/WE 2, C/WH 5, RF, VR

IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS HAGU LOND CASB
(ROUTINE) [illegible] OTTA PARI MEXI
WAVE ROME XXXXXXXX

77347

FRAN MILA

RYBAT ZRWAGON T[illegible]

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK XXX POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

END OF MESSAGE

EE/G West Parker by phone
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/4 Steve Munger by phone
WE/5 Vaughn Sherman by phone
WE/BC Joe Lynch by phone
[illegible] Arthur Maloney by phone
[illegible] Austin [illegible] by phone
AF/1 Mr. Charles Baker by phone
WE/BC/C [illegible] pho
WE/3 Mr. Pier[illegible] pho
WE/3 Mr. M[illegible] pho

Desmond FitzGerald
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

Thomas [illegible]
RICHARD P. HELMS
C/WE/X

E[illegible]
EDWARD A. [illegible]
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG : [illegible] MENGEL/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 3[illegible] SEPT 1963

S E C R E T

1 OCT 63 [illegible] 53z

TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

SIG CEN
X ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE

KAPOK KEYWAY PERUMEN

72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. DESIGNET (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PERUMEN, WILL RETURN PERUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PERUMEN 11 OCT HAS ITAL SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PERUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PERUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE DESIGNET PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* DESIGNET will travel PERUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3
C/WE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/WE 2

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

XX ROUTING

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

IDEN A GIULIO MONDELLO, BORN 26 FEB 1917 IN ITALY, ITAL CITIZEN, FORMERLY AGENT IN CUBA FOR FIAT AND OWNER TV TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B NEBIOLO (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

42

SECRET

ORIG: W. [illegible]
UNIT: SAS/EOB
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 30 SEPT 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ RETURN TO FILE NO. 201-733547
201-338838

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/SAS 5
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

1 OCT

XX

TO: WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

JOSE LUIS (ZALA) SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A., [redacted] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH JOSE LUIS (ZALA), 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *REF is RYBAT.

SAS/EOB O. Kirin
SAS/EOB ______
SAS/CI Austin Horn (in draft)
WH/3/MEXI Whitten (by phone)

for J. K. King
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

1-1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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for J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Manuel Aragon
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: [illegible]

PALP MEXI

TYPIC [illegible]

REF: DIR 74642

IDEN A ALFONSO DIBILDOX PRESIDENT CIB

END OF MESSAGE

4043

WH/CA ______________

WH/3/MEXI ______________

*CABLE SECRETARIAT PLEASE DESTROY ATTACHED CABLE

Lee Dave
for Ulbee

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible]

[illegible] G. CARL
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG D. RONIS : tw
UNIT SAS/EOB
EXT 6172
DATE 8 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78

12-62

ROUTING			
1		4	
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TO MEXICO CITY

FROM DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

8 OCT 63 2 29z

DEFERRED SIG CEN

ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY A ALFREDO DAVINS

[illegible] RONIS

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WHD

[illegible] A. [illegible]
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

ORIG : R. E. SCOTT
UNIT : WH/3/MEXICO
EXT : 3040
DATE : 6 NOVEMBER 196[illegible]

S E C R E T

TO : [illegible] MERIDA MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WH 5
INFO : [illegible], ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, [illegible]

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PERUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON HILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PERUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PERUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Rouis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

B. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: L. [illegible]
UNIT: WH/3
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] NOV 1963

TO: MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

TO MEXI FOR [illegible] INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. ENINBEING TOLD BOIZELLE HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO ARI CAMPISTA, PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION, THRU RIO TPHOODCAP OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER CNTI ELECTIONS. CAMPISTA USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OF DETAILS FROM ENINBEING AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE ENINBEING OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO HUGO GOMES DA COSTA, OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS, WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF CAMPISTA'S DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. Osgx (in draft)
WH/3/Mexico Reichhardt
WH/CA

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

LCIMPROVE

REF DIR [illegible]

8180

IDEN A - JOSEPH MONTLLOR

IDEN B - JOHN E BARBER

IDEN C - GOODWIN SHAPIRO

END OF MESSAGE

J. C. KING
C/WHD

BERNARD E. REICHHARDT
AC/WHD

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[illegible]
WH/3/CAN
[illegible]
[illegible]

S E C R E T

ROME PRIORITY

[illegible] 45z

SIG CEN

INFO: [illegible]

TO: PRIORITY ROME INFO MEXI, SALV

CITE DIR 83692

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3

WE/Italy S. Munger

WH/3/MEXI

WH/3/CAN

Thomas Thiele
C/WE
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

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106/14 OCT 63/[illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T/RYBAT

[illegible] - V. [illegible]

[illegible] ☐ INDEX

☒ NO INDEX

11 OCT [illegible] ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO: BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF, ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

11 OCT 63 22 11 Z

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND DIR 75 24

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 3460 (IN 33181)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISH EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Crouro.

SAS/[illegible] [illegible]

TSD/CAD Wally Jones by phone

WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone

WE/5 Vaughn [illegible] in draft

WE/3 Roger Pierce (By phone)

WE/BC [illegible] (P)

EE/G West [illegible] by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. [illegible]
C/SAS/[illegible]

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T/RYBAT

GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☑ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

ROUTING			
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12 OCT 63

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/FE 6
INFO : ~~ADDP~~, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

RYBAT
KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6488 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SSU CH'ENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO. LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV
28 BA, MA UNIV PENN
28 MA HARVARD
28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA
RESEARCH
31-41 RESEARCHER FELLOW, INSTITUTE/CHINESE ARCHITEC URE
32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
RESEARCH
41-43 RESEARCHER FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA
46 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING
47 HONORARY PHD YALE; VISITING PROF YALE
50-61 MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV
53-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG : [illegible]
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EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

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TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

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ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 75338

IMMEDIATE MEXI

56	ASSOC, INSTITUTE CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CPR, PEKING
DEC 58	MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE
SEP 58	MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC
APR 59	DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC
OCT 62	VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY
SEP 63	DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

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ORIG : BECKY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1962

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☐ NO INDEX
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TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

[redacted]

(CONTINUED)

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UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

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FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
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PAGE FOUR

TO: IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WHO STUDIED UNDER LIANG AT UNIV YALE OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE LIVE OUTSIDE CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG GOOD CANDIDATE FOR DEBRIEFING OR DEFECTION. DOUBTFUL DUE AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME KUBARK CONTACT BUT IS NOT TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN FRENCH WORK IN PAST. SANSEND ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL I FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2105 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANSEND. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

[illegible] KI FRANK
FE/CIOP
EXT 5661
22 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

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IN CS FILE NO.

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INFO

CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SANBEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)
DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)
CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)
DCFE(C) ✓
C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

William Co
CFE

RAFORD W. HERBERT
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: BECKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 6708
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-730701

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TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/FE 6
INFO: DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

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☐ ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 75339

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

IDEN:

Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RICHARD WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C)

C/WH/3 [illegible] (by phone)

for RAYMOND W. HERBERT
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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William Colby
C/FE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

Polly Pike
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

Mexico City

DIRECTOR

WH 8

OL 4, FI, VR

18 OCT 63 15 27z

SIG CEN

☒ ROUTINE

MEXI INFO MIDW CITE DIR 76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*
MIDW 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

MIDW ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-MS1104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3

Telecoord:
OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

Charles F. Reimer

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES F. REIMER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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~~SECRET~~

1. Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled, Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on 13 March 1978.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

~~SECRET~~

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278 281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and 357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

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Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans he occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot himself. a sensitive source [redacted] quoted [redacted] a KGB offi to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source
[redacted] is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to [redacted], NOSENKO attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.,

this
sou

(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

A sensitive source [redacted] has quoted two KGB officers [redacted] respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.

The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-1962

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. According to [redacted] a sensitive source, FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the [redacted] Soviet intelligence service.

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.

who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow, a sensitive source [redacted] identified him as "an employee of the KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to [redacted] a sensitive source.

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK

Implying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A), because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Headquarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.

Comment: A sensitive source [redacted] had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer [redacted] "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent [redacted]

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with [redacted] a KGB S&T agent[redacted] identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from [redacted].a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.

Comment: Earlier, a sensitive source [redacted] identified an [redacted] agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.

Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.

Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, [redacted] have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

The Recall Telegram

NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.

Comment: ✓ Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

[redacted]

NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:

> "On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held. [redacted]

KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among American Tourists 1962-1963

Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to

(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source [redacted] reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of [redacted] KGB [redacted]

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.

9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted]. Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

According to a sensitive source [redacted] NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] several KG It appeared quite certain to [redacted] officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] from KGB officers [redacted] The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One KGB officer [redacted] worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: [redacted]. The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom [redacted] and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

a sensitive source

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

11 February 1964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

(Annex A)

12 February 1964 (continued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.

12-13 February 1964

[redacted]

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

(Annex A)

14 February 1964 (continued)

"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs". GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

18 February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of International Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124

Copy ________

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate. [redacted] NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. A KGB officer [redacted] expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. [redacted] a KGB office [redacted] said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred [redacted] to above.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] in response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether [redacted] the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.

22 February 1964

According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel

[redacted]

stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.

[redacted]

Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.

24 February 1964

[redacted]

Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.

[redacted]

(Annex A)

24 February 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previous occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

February 1964

Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.

[redacted]

Top Secret

February-March 1964

[redacted]

According to a sensitive source:

[redacted]: A KGB commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

9 March 1964 [redacted]

According to a sensitive [redacted] source, [redacted] (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers [redacted]: NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.

(Annex A)

27 March 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] certain [redacted]: There seems to be unanimous opinion among [redacted] KGB chiefs [redacted] that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some [redacted] KGB "chiefs" [redacted] that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.

Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.

31 March 1964

KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".

(Annex A)

31 March 1964 (continued)

Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to him, who apparently is identical to SPRECHER.

March 1964

According to a sensitive source who [redacted], was briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department. Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.

Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source [redacted] has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964. NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124
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(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p. 24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

May 1964: According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers [redacted]): Two commissions have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, 4 and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.

(Annex A)

20 May 1964
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.

[redacted]

[redacted]

12 June 1964

Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.

22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from various unnamed KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]: The consensus among some KGB employees [redacted] is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.

29 June 1964

GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.

(Annex A)

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.

June 1964

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: "Just after" NOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known [redacted] to [redacted] Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly by a sensitive source stationed in New York City, was said by [redacted] to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. [redacted] Another sensitive source identified MEDVEDEV,

(Annex A)

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
[redacted] a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964

According to a sensitive source, [redacted] (from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers [redacted] [redacted]): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.

Comment: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964

According to a sensitive source: [redacted]: The first information [redacted] about NOSENKO was [redacted] from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way,,GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".

[redacted]

[redacted]

December 1964

a [redacted] source

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told [redacted] that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK source reported to [redacted] the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, [redacted] source thought the KGB might go so far

(Annex A)

December 1964 (continued)

as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. ([redacted] later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.) Source

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source
[redacted] (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers [redacted]): It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.

~~Top Secret~~

(Annex A)

8 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]): Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, [redacted] the KGB officer on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [redacted] the KGB officer attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified [redacted] the KGB officer NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (continued)

Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted]: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Early June 1965

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from conversations with KGB officers [redacted]: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".

(Annex A)

15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer [redacted] who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there. a sensitive source [redacted] described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source [redacted]): As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966
Source, a [redacted] self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. [redacted] said Source that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's
Comment: [redacted] allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.

[redacted]

[redacted]

March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
[redacted] (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to [redacted], was an important Source boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion Source of persons to whom [redacted] talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.

March 1966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like [redacted], called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. [redacted] is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Source

Source

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TS No. 197124
Copy 10

(Annex A)

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mid-1966

Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.

Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.

October 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

(Annex A)

October 1966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.

28 January 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.

Source

(Annex A)

February 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.

May 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted] The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.

5 June 1967

According to a sensitive source [redacted]: There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

ABOUT NOSENKO

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downgrading and
declassification

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ANNEX A

STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO. These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.

None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen by [redacted] who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raises a question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by SOURCE [redacted] can be given any particular weight or that it represents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.

Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO, the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are cited elsewhere, is the information from sensitive Source #1 [redacted], sensitive Source #3 [redacted] and sensitive Source #2 [redacted] and probably in that order. Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their comments were based on information from third parties or obtained through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has

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said, but under the given circumstances of how Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected. No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted that Source #2 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #1 [redacted] have furnished no information that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

It is felt that information from Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case, but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of all available information. It must be realized there is a possibility NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona fides of Source #1 [redacted], Source #3 [redacted] or Source #2 [redacted].

[redacted]

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram, according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had been received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his CIA contacts and stated he had defected.

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous statements on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained, that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he invented the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as a logical reason for his precipitate defection.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted].

Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary between information from Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] and from NOSENKO have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified. In some instances the information from Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] is adjudged to be inaccurate. The judgment is based on the hearsay nature of the reporting by Source #1 [redacted] and Source #2 [redacted] measured against the absence of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO. Examples are information from Source #1 [redacted] that NOSENKO had been affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from Source #2 [redacted] that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also certain discrepancies between information furnished by Source #2, [redacted], Source #1 and Source #3 in [redacted] and [redacted] in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO prior to 1964.

In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information from Source #1 [redacted] as to certain KGB officers whom Source #1 [redacted] understood NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had previously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explanation is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe Source #1 [redacted] had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize a name and/or photograph.

As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had never commented on the KGB telephone book which Source #1 [redacted] had reported NOSENKO, [redacted] had in his possession. During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of an FCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that there was at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each room occupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the information furnished by Source #1 [redacted] concerning the telephone directory and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical since Source #1 [redacted] could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone directory which he had never seen.

Date:09/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : DOS
RECORD NUMBER : 119-10021-10413

RECORDS SERIES :
INR FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : FBI

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM : CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUB
TO : MEMBERS OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO

TITLE :
REPORT FOR JULY - AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST S

DATE : 09/30/63
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/09/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
DOD AND CIA REVIEW

COMMENTS :
Draft subcommittee report attached.

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SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very [illegible] to have the intelligence data form part of the report and suggest that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to:
CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. [illegible] (1)
USIA - Mr. [illegible] (1)
FAA - Mr. Herr (1)
Justice - Mr. [illegible] (1)

62-108553-5

ARA:HCChandler:js
9/[illegible]/63

GROUP 1
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ENCLOSURE

SECRET

DRAFT SECRET 2 of 7 copies

GROUP 1
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1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

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e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Mosco$\overset{w}{a}$ route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curaceo and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sh scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defence

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS."

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports ~~of~~ on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2)
USIA - Mr. Vagley (1)
RAR - Mr. Hart (1)
Justice - Mr. Geoghegan (1)

ARA:WGBowdler:js
9/30/63

62-108553-5

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

4

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 73 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

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to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accelerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 22 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrano, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes [illegible], Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicatin that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/20/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
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RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-109060-3385

Document Information

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SUBJECTS :
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DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/23/64

Transmit the following in ______________________
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Via AIRTEL ~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

4-22-93 9803-RWH/dc (JFK Special)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

SECRET

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,
DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Classified by 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1
Date of Declassification Indefinite 7/5/77 RWC

10-25-93
Classified by 9803 RAA/EH
Declassify on: OADR JFK

On 6/22/64 Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. (S) This conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times (S) Information is as follows: (S)

Cuba

> "The visitor (S) after a question half of which is not heard asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER (ph and indistinct) (S) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport (S)
>
> VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job (U)
>
> RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting - (U)

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. As Bracketed 10-20-93

REC 25 62-109060-

③- Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

SECRET

18 JUN 26 1964

Approved: C. C. Wick Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

79 JUL 2 - 1964

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10062-10456
RECORD_SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 105-82555-1ST NR 5370

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
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SUBJECT: LANE, MARK, ADMIN

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5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 4/14/97

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763)

DATE: 1/5/65

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-284) (RUC) ~~CONF~~

Classified by ~~2040~~
~~Exempt from GDS Category 1~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
7/1/77
EFG/TLC

SUBJECT: MARK LANE
SM - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Lee Oswald

Re Bern letter 12/28/64.

Enclosed are 5 copies of the following:

Letterhead Memorandum dated 1/5/65

Communication dated

Information in the enclosure was received by Legat Bern on 1/4/65
Source in the memorandum or originator of communication is:

☐ Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abteilung 13 (Austrian Federal Criminal Police), Vienna, Austria (AFCP).

☐ Schweizerisches Zentralpolizeibureau (Swiss Central Police Bureau), Bern, Switzerland (SCPB).

☐ Abteilung II, Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austrian Federal Security Police), Vienna, Austria, (AFSP).

☐ Schweizerische Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland (SFP). (S)

☐ Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA), American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland (OSA). (S)

☐ Research Branch (covert CIA), American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

☒ Other: American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

ENCLOSURE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
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DATE 8-19-77 TLC

Enclosure is classified Unclassified ☐ By source ☐ See remarks

☐ Check name(s) in Bufiles.
☐ Check name(s) and/or fingerprints in Identification Division.
☐ Furnish results of requested investigation for referral to requesting agency.
☒ For information.

④ - Bureau (Encl. 5)
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(1 - New York)(100-117844)
1 - Bern

6/4/93
~~Classified by~~ 9803 RDD/GAT
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

HDG:mls
(5)

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199 JAN 18 1965

NR 5370

60 JAN 19 1965

SECRET

(JFK) 4/28/97
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)
Per CIA - JM - 4/14/97

100-4097[illegible] - 154

ORIGINAL FILED IN

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE_DATE: 01/23/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC DIRECTOR, FBI RESPONSE, TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH AND CIA LTR TO LEG, PA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~58~~ RDR
ENCLOSURE

TO : Director, FBI (62-109090) Secret DATE: 10-28-64

FROM : Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, [redacted] ~~Except Brackets~~ (K 3/10/99)

~~DeLoach~~ Dra

Ys encl

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. ~~(S)~~ (U) [S]

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 Xerox of encl. retained as tickler RDR

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
(1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

ENCLOSURE

NR Castellan [illegible] Service Staff [illegible] 11-2-64 RDR 4:18 P

REC'D DeLOACH
FBI
NOV 2 4 54 PM '64

35

Let to DL with 1 xerox of enclosures & Legat let also 1 cc of Spanish translation to DL & Paris. 11-5-64 RDR/mas

REC- 53 62-109090 - 356

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ clas. 676/at
DATE 7/23/77

EX-114

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI

11-9
~~OCT 30 1964~~

4-29-93
Classified by 9803-RDD/mk
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK Special)

FBI ANNEX
NOV 3 15 33 PM '64
RECEIVED

NOV 5 3 34 PM '64
RECEIVED
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Classified by 2040 Category 1,2
Exempt from CDS
Date of Declassification Indefinite
Reviewed By RB 6/27/77

Secret

SIX

11-10

SECRET

(S)
[CAS]-2290 (X)
20 October 1964

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT (K 3/10/97)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Norman Philcox
Legal Attache

FROM : [CAS] (S)

SUBJECT : Crank Letter Concerning Warren Commission Document

[Our office in Madrid] (S) has sent us a copy of the attached Spanish-language letter addressed to the American Ambassador to Spain, and signed by one Antilin PERIS, alleging in the first paragraph that the author has some information of interest to impart. After opening the second paragraph by saying that he had to flee Paris due to an indiscretion committed there, the author states:

France
Spain

> "There (apparently Paris), in the home of some American friends, I got hold of an authentic document about the assassination in Dallas, which they say was swiped from the Warren Commission and which is certainly prejudicial for President Johnson. I have it on good authority that they are currently trying to sell it to no less than the Director of "Paris-Match." Someone from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Paris is involved in the matter."

The author closes by suggesting that an advertisement be inserted in a Madrid newspaper if there be any interest in further details.

There are no traces from Madrid on Antilin PERIS, which according to [CAS, Madrid] (S) is almost certainly an alias. Needless to say there is no return address on the letter or envelope, which was mailed from Barcelona on 26 September 1964. [CAS, Madrid] (S) has forwarded us a copy of the letter on the off chance that we may have received similar allegations; in such case [Madrid] (S) would appreciate learning the details so that they might inform the Embassy. It was also suggested that we show you this letter.

[CAS, Paris] (S) has no traces on Antilin PERIS.

62-109060-356

cc: United States Secret Service
Attn: Mr. John Hanly

NOT RECORDED

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:	FBI
RECORD_NUMBER:	124-10115-10027
RECORD_SERIES:	DL
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER:	62-3588-29

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:	FBI
FROM:	LEG, PA
TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:	
DATE:	10/28/1964
PAGES:	1
SUBJECT:	SEE FBI 62-109090-356

DOCUMENT_TYPE:	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT		
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION:	Secret	NEW CLASSIFICATION:	
REVIEW_DATE:	09/24/1997	UPDATE_DATE:	01/23/2001
STATUS	Redact		

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

Director, FBI (62-109090) SECRET **10-28-64**

Legat, Paris (62-148) (P.)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT ~~[illegible]~~
Except Brackets (K 3/26/97)

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of a self-explanatory [Paris Embassy CAS (Controlled American Source - CIA)] memorandum along with a copy of the letter in Spanish mentioned in the memorandum. (~~S~~) (~~S~~)(U) [S]

The Paris Office has referred this matter to the High General Staff (HGS), Madrid, Spain, with a request for investigation by that service in an effort to locate and identify the sender of the letter, and to interview him for any data he may be able to supply. The results of this Paris request of the HGS will be promptly reported when available. (~~S~~)(U)

3 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
  (1 - Liaison Section)
1 - Paris
HPW:HD
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Re: ANTILIA PERIS

4-29-93 9803-RDD/mk
Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: [illegible]
(JFK special)

Classified by ~~202~~ 2040
Exempt from GDS, Category 1,2
Date of Declassification INDEFINITE
R/S. 7/23/97

62-3588-29
SEARCHED.......INDEXED [illegible]
SERIALIZED [illegible] FILED [illegible]
NOV 9 1964
FBI — DALLAS

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:	FBI
RECORD NUMBER:	124-10150-10104
RECORD SERIES:	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:	62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:	FBI
FROM:	LEG, BR
TO:	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:	
DATE:	08/21/1964
PAGES:	1
SUBJECT:	JFK, OPINION, DRAGOMIR, ANGHEL, INTERVIEW

DOCUMENT TYPE:	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT		
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION:	Secret	NEW CLASSIFICATION:	
REVIEW DATE:	06/30/1997	UPDATE DATE:	02/09/2001
STATUS	Redact		

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/21/64

REC-60

Kp 2/10/97

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. (As Sanitized) 9803 RDD/GAT 7/9/93

Transmit the following in SECRET
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Encl

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

#6454

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

Classified by SP6-Bjorlande
Declassify on: OADR 1/17/89
Per CIA letter 9/23/88.

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (Covert CIA) (S) the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S)

1cc [illegible] [illegible]

17 xerox copies made of encl [illegible]

1d 6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

REC-60 62-109060-3681

1cc of airtel & encl
25 copies sent DL
via O-1 action
8/28/64 RDR/[illegible]

NOT RECORDED
AUG 27 1964

HDG:mls
(7)

50 ENCLOSURE

SE-104

CONSOLIDATION NO ACTION

C.C. Wick

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge

Sent SECRET M Per ______

56 SEP 3 1964

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 11/18/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10158-10061

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-82555-1ST NR 5373

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, BR
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 01/08/1965
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
LANE, MARK, ACT, SURVEILLANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/10/1997

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. AS SANITIZED KP 2/11/97

FBI

Date: 1/8/65

SECRET

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763)

FROM: Legat, Bern (105-284) (P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MARK LANE
SM - C

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6)
(JFK) 12/1/97

Lee Oswald

Re Bern letter 1/5/65. U

On 1/6/65 [JOHN DIMMER, Chief, Office of Special Assistant (covert CIA)] (S) the Embassy, Bern (S) confidentially informed that he had learned that LANE was to speak in Zurich, Switzerland, some time in the next two weeks on the subject of OSWALD's innocence in the killing of President KENNEDY. LANE's talk is allegedly to be sponsored by HEINRICH BUCHBINDER, well known Swiss Trotskyite who is prominent in the Swiss Movement Against Atomic Armament (Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die Atomare Aufrüstung - SBGAA) (S)

At [DIMMER's] (S) request, he was furnished background material concerning LANE. [DIMMER] stated that he would keep (S) this office informed of further developments in this matter. [redacted]

1-8-7 4/13/93
~~Classified by 9803 RLD/CAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

1 105-82555
NOT RECORDED
199 JAN 19 1965

(5)- Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
(1 - New York) (100-117844)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(6)

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~
~~DATE 6-9-77 CG/SAH~~

Copy to New York by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 1/12/65
by

CLASSIFIED BY 2040
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2&3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
7-6-77 CEQ

EX. 112 REC 1 100-409763-155

10 JAN 21 1965

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. C. Wick

1st NR 5373

60 JAN 19 1965

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10163-10134
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-109060-3942

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/04/1964
PAGES: 6
SUBJECT: JFK, ASSISTANCE, SUSPECT, RIDDERSTRALE, KARL-ERIK, ALBRECHT, ADOLPH JAY, ABERG, CHARLOTTE, NAME CHECK
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/24/1997
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INCLUDES SEARCH SLIPS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FOI/PA # 6454
APPEAL #
CIVIL ACT. #
E.O. # 12356
DATE 1-17-89 INITIALS
Per CIA letter 9/23/88.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

REC-114

Bja 6/28/77

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Adolph Jay ALBRECHT

10/25/93
Classified by 9803 RDA/JPK
Declassify on: OADR

1. Adolph Jay ALBRECHT, born 15 June 1926 in New Jersey, is an industrial advertising copywriter currently residing in Stockholm, Sweden. The holder of U.S. passport No. D 294080, issued 18 April 1963 at New York City, Subject served with the United States Navy from about 1947 to 1955, on active duty for only two weeks, however. As of November 1963 Subject said he was employed by the Andersson and Lembke Advertising Agency, Luntmakargaten 95, Stockholm.

2. On 29 November 1963 Subject, of his own volition, visited the American Embassy in Stockholm and asked to speak with the embassy "security officer." He was interviewed by a representative of this Agency. (S) Subject said that a former girlfriend, Charlotte ABERG (Swedish citizen, born ca. 1943), told him that Karl-Erik RIDDERSTRALE (Swedish citizen, born 24 September 1922), while drunk on 15 November 1963, predicted that within two weeks President KENNEDY would be assassinated while on a trip among his own people. Following the assassination Charlotte was upset and called ALBRECHT on 27 November 1963 to inform him of RIDDERSTRALE's statement made while he was visiting Charlotte and her mother on 15 November. Charlotte described RIDDERSTRALE as normally quiet and refined and one of her mother's suitors. According to Subject, RIDDERSTRALE, though wealthy and a member of Swedish nobility, is a left winger and strong supporter of Fidel CASTRO.

Swede 35

62-109060-3942

3. Through Subject, arrangements were made for Charlotte ABERG to be interviewed at the American Embassy on 4 December 1963. Charlotte related substantially the same story as did Subject, with minor contradictions. She said RIDDERSTRALE's comments were made about ten days before the assassination and that he had not given a two-week deadline; he merely said, "soon." She said she knew nothing about RIDDERSTRALE's background. Charlotte was advised to report the foregoing to Swedish authorities. Following an interview with Swedish police officials, Charlotte returned to the American Embassy on 9 December 1963.

24 DEC 15 1964

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

No Investigation Conducted by FBI
Pertinent to your inquiry.
This is the result of a request for an
FBI file check only and is not to be
considered clearance.

cc to CIA by
Liaison, 12-22-64

Secret

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

69 JAN 5 1965

He could not explain such an expression since he could not remember having said anything like it. He knew nothing whatever beforehand about the murder of the President."

Secret

6. The files of this Agency contain no recorded identifiable traces on ALBRECHT, ABERG, or RIDDERSTRALE.

7. This office would appreciate receiving any pertinent information your Bureau's files may contain on the Subject, cleared, where possible, [for passing to an official Swedish source] (S) An early reply would be appreciated.

8. The information contained in paragraphs 1 through 3, above, was given to the Legal Attache in London during early December 1963.

CSCI-316/02509-64

Secret

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10180-10295
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-93072-4TH NR 101, 102, 1ST NR 102

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG, PA
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 12/03/1963
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONTACT, GIBSON, RICHARD, FPCC
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/23/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC CABLRGRAM, 2 MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (105-93072)

DATE: 12/17/63

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-248) (RUC)

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED. JM 7/1/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ReBulet to CIA dated 9/30/63 and Paris cable dated 12/3/63, latter captioned LEE HARVEY OSWALD, IS - CUBA.

JOHN DIMMER, [Office of Special Adviser] (S) (covert CIA), [the Embassy] (S) Bern, informed that GIBSON had been located in Paris. In view of this, this case is being RUC'D in this office. (X)

FBI RECEIVED

(JFK) 8/17/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

7-13-94
Classified by ~~SAS MDC/KSR~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

617RB

C-52

105-93072-102

14 DEC 26 1963

Classified by [illegible] Category
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/16/98

RECEIVED CIA

NAT. INT. SEC.

③ - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Legat, Paris (sent direct)
1 - Bern
HDG/hcs
(5)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

61 JAN 6 1964

180-10052

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/25/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10181-10009

RECORD SERIES : LO

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-358-42

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
SEE FBI 62-109060-3385

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/1994

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

SECRET 6/23/64

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, As Bracketed JOH 10/20/93

AIRTEL

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)

FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)

10/25/93
Classified by 9803 ROD/EH
Declassify on: OADR

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,
DALLAS, TEXAS
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

On 6/22/64 [Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London,] (S) on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information [which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. This] (S) conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. [The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times.] (S) Information is as follows:

> "The visitor (S) [after a question half of which is not heard] asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY if (?) FOSTER [(ph and indistinct)] (S) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport.
>
> VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job.
>
> RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting -"

It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information.

3 - Bureau
1 - Liaison (sent direct)
1 - London
CWB:rn
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SECRET

62-358-42

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10212-10160
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-120916-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/01/1963
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	MZF, ASSOC, B/F INT, ACA, INFT, INFO, NEG, GAMBLING
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/24/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

REC-35

3

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: MAY 1 1963

HAS NO OBJECTION TO CLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS

GMB 1-19-97

JFK SLD/KSR

8-26-94
Classified by SP8 Mac/cde
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-7052) (C)
(105-7055) (C)

#211,326 multiple sources
Classified by ~~SP8~~ /GCL
Declassify on: OADR 10/14/84

SUBJECT: LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, aka
Luis Condom
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7052)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF CIRR 88
DATE 1-4-85

ALVARO MARTIN FERNANDEZ FOX, aka
Alvaro Fernandez
IS - CUBA
(Miami File 105-7055)

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
2/28/78

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum, captioned as above, suitable for dissemination. Two copies are for the use of the Legat, Mexico, in view of the information gathered concerning activities of Cubans in Mexico.

One letterhead memorandum has been written with the dual caption inasmuch as the information gathered concerning one individual pertained to the other.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" as it contains CIA information so classified. (U)

On 3/11/63, JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative Miami, Florida, advised the the original source of the information in this case and that furnished by his office was [RAFAEL PADRON PRADO, 575 SE 9th Avenue, Hialeah, Florida] (S)

The TULIO PREITO mentioned in the enclosed letterhead memorandum is identical with TULIO INOCENCIO PREETO RUIZ, IS - CUBA, Bureau Origin, Miami file 105-5193. PRIETO is not a source of the Miami Office.

4 - Bureau (RM) (Encls. - 11)
(2 - Legat, Mexico) (RM)
2 - Miami
PJN:jkj
(6)

ENCLOSURE

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

REC-35

MCT-3

REC'D

105-120916-

8 MAY 3 1963

EX-108

Copy to: Mexico (Legathead)
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 5-22-63
by

67 MAY 31 1963

Copy to: CIA/State/~~[illegible]~~
ONI/OSI/ACSI
by routing slip for info.
Date 5-22-63 by

RS 5-22-63 to INS (Wash.) Sent locally to FLA

5/23

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF
DATE

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 105-120917

[redacted]

SECRET

MM 105-7052
MM 105-7055

LUIS ALBERTO CONDOM CAJIGAL, who furnished information set forth in the letterhead memorandum, also advised [that he worked with CIA in Havana from the beginning of 1960 to November, 1960, through EMILIO FERNANDEZ, a U.S. citizen.] (S)

CONDOM also advised that ALVARO FERNANDEZ FOX, who was also interviewed in this matter, is the nephew of MARTIN FOX, former owner of the Tropicana Nightclub in Havana, Cuba. CONDOM believes that since coming to Miami from Mexico City, ALVARO FERNANDEZ has become involved in the bolita racket inasmuch as his uncle is supposed to be a bolita racketeer in Miami. It is noted that when interviewed, ALVARO FERNANDEZ stated that he is unemployed and lives from money furnished him by his uncle, MARTIN FOX, and another uncle, PEDRO FOX, also residing in Miami at 302 Southwest Beacom Boulevard.

ALVARO FERNANDEZ, in addition to the information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum, advised that while he was in Mexico City he worked as an informant for STEVE MINAS, U.S. Customs representative, U.S. Embassy, telephone 46-94-00, Extension 373, or home phone 48-02-50. He also advised that he was to contact Customs Agent ED FICKIE in Miami at FR 7-3571, which he did; however, FERNANDEZ has not been used by FICKIE in the Miami area. FERNANDEZ advised he helped on narcotics matters.

- INFORMANTS -

The representative of MM T-1, mentioned in the letterhead memorandum, is JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA, Miami, Florida. MM T-1 is CIA, Washington, D.C. ~~(S)~~(U) ~~S~~

The following sources, all of whom have some knowledge of Cuban activities in the Miami, Florida, area were contacted with negative results:

USCS
REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 11-25-96 dak
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10212-10337
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	100-401762-2ND NR 35

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/02/1960
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	RCF, SHF, EMP, BKG, TRA, CP ACT, ADMIN, INSTR
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	INC MEMO

SECRET

1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Floyd

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets
Jm 10-6-97

100-339235
100-401762

Date: February 11, 1960

To: [Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans] ~~(S)~~ (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SUSAN HEILLIGMAN FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

RICHARD CYRIL FRANK
SECURITY MATTER - C

10/17/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GCL
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Reference is made to your letter dated February 2, 1960, concerning the captioned individuals, your file CSCI-3/758,444. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Provided the following change is made, dissemination of the data set out on page two of referenced memorandum [to the Swiss Federal Police] (S) will not interfere with the intelligence and investigative responsibilities of this Bureau. The last sentence on page two of the memorandum should be changed to read as follows:

"He is known to have received Communist literature, is believed to have made financial contributions to the Communist Party in the U.S., and there is information to indicate Communist Party membership on his part as late as 1957."

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
FEB 11
MAILED

This matter has been referred to the Legal Attaches in London, Paris, and Tokyo [to alert appropriate security services] (S) concerning possible travel of the Franks in England, France, and Japan.

100-339235-45

2 - New York (100-42479)(100-107383)(Enclosure)
1 - London (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Paris (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Tokyo (Enclosures - 3)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)
NOTE ON YELLOW, PAGE 3.
WHF:lmk

See note Legats, London, Paris, and Rome, and SAC, New York, page

53 FEB 18 1960

SECRET

11-13-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 1,6 (JFK)

ORIGINAL FILED IN
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] ~~S~~ (U)

It would be appreciated if your Agency would furnish this Bureau any pertinent information received concerning possible travel of the subjects to Communist China and concerning their presence in China. Should your Agency receive information that subjects plan to travel in England, France, or Japan, it would be appreciated if you would advise the appropriate Legal Attache in London, England; Paris, France; or Tokyo, Japan. ~~S~~ (U)

ATTENTION LEGAL ATTACHES LONDON, PARIS, AND TOKYO, AND SAC, NEW YORK:

A Photostat of referenced Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum is enclosed for all. It is possible that Paris may receive inquiries regarding the subjects through Swiss sources. In referenced memorandum CIA did not identify its [official Swiss] (S) source. This identification subsequently given to Bureau via Liaison. The Bureau approved CIA's furnishing this information [to the Swiss Federal Police inasmuch as CIA had conducted active investigation regarding subjects in Switzerland.] (S)

Also enclosed for each Legal Attache are one copy of a memorandum dated 11-26-58 concerning Richard Cyril Frank and one copy of a memorandum dated 1-26-60 concerning Susan Heiligman Frank. In view of reported plans of subjects to travel in England and France, and since it is anticipated that they may travel in the vicinity of Japan prior to their return to this country, the Legal Attaches at London, Paris, and Tokyo should [alert sources] (S) in England, France, and Japan concerning the Franks' contemplated travel in Europe and their possible plans to travel in China. [Background information concerning the subjects set forth on page two of enclosed CIA letter, as corrected in paragraph two of this letter] ~~S~~ (U) may be made available [to your sources] (S) if deemed advisable. For your additional information, both subjects are on the Security Index.

New York remain alert in this matter and submit any information received concerning the subjects in a form suitable for dissemination. If not already done, New York submit FD-122's tabbed "Out of the country."

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

RA

2 FEB 1960 mg/4-1,2

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Susan and Richard Frank

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 10-6-97
EXCEPT BRACKETS IN HAND WRITTEN NOTATION
SLD/KSR
6-16-98
(JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/94 BY
(JFK)

1. In response to your 22 December communication (File No: 100-339235, 100-401762) we wish to inform you that we have received the following from an official Swiss source:

> "Richard Frank (born 1922), U.S. citizen, film technician, resident of New York, arrived at the Hotel Savoy in Bern with his wife Susan on 10 December 1959; they stayed there until 12 December leaving for Zurich. Frank inquired for a flight ticket to Prague from Zurich. While in Bern, Frank had contact with the Chinese Communist Embassy on two occasions; he or Mrs. Frank having called at the Embassy. No information is available on the nature of these contacts, nor do we have more detailed personalia."

2. We have observed that persons desiring to travel to Communist China from Switzerland frequently fly via Prague.

3. The following summary has been drawn from material which you have provided us on Subjects (see NY 100-42479, NY 100-107383 and Bureau 100-339235). Please advise if we may pass this summary to our Swiss source, but without revealing that your organization supplied the information contained in it:

(S)["Swiss source" is Swiss Federal Police] - per conv with Mrs J Ronan, CIA
2/9/60

100-401762
NOT RECORDED
128 FEB 14 1960

100-339235-45

SECRET

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/12/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10213-10483
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-121229-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/27/1963
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	LCA, ASSOC, CUBA IN ARMS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/19/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. 00- K-3,262,509

SUBJECT Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria (FIUR)
DATE DISTR. 27 May 63

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES Guide 303-BR

DATE OF INFO. 25 Apr 63 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---/25 Apr 63 and earlier

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT the BRACKETS
KP 11-18-97
SLD/KSR
1-3-98
(JFK)

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national presently residing in the United States.]

(S) [Source was a prominent sports writer and a very active member of the Havana Yacht Club.] He is presently employed as a reporter on a large newspaper and is in close contact with Cuban exile leaders.

8

[This report was developed by an AFNIN Air Force representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

[ON FILE IN THE CIA LIBRARY is a copy, in Spanish, of the Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria - FIUR.]

1. A Cuban exile, Julio V. Leal, residing at 4823 East 8th Court, Hialeah, Florida, claims to be the US Delegate of the "Cuban Government in Arms". He also claims that he received a copy of a proclamation prepared by members of the FIUR, in Cuba, and was authorized to release it to publicity sources. He provided me with a copy of the FIUR declaration. [See On File Material.] Cuba

2. On 25 Apr 63 Leal furnished me with a copy of a document, in Spanish, which showed the appointments to executive and cabinet posts of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cuba in Arms. The names are:

    President - To be announced at a later date for reasons of security.
    Vice-President - Dr Gustavo Cuervo Rubio
    Premier - Dr Jose Manuel Gutierrez
    Secretary to the President - To be announced at a later date.
    Minister of State - Dr Carlos Prio Socarras
    Minister of Communications - Luis Conte Aguero
    Minister of Transportation - Dr Aureliano Sanchez Arango
    Minister of Commerce - Abel Mestre
    Minister of Justice - ~~Dr Ricardo Rafael Sardinas~~
    Minister of Interior - Dr Manuel Antonio de Varona
    Minister of Education - Dr Jose Ignacio Lazaga
    Minister of Public Works - Ing Manuel Ray
    Minister of Health - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
    Minister of Defense - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
    Minister of Labor - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.

CUBA

4 XEROX
JUN 4 1963

Copy to MM/NY/WFO/SJ
by routing slip for
✓ info ___ action
date 6-5-63
by URN/st

1 copies made
CW ... 105 - NEW
2/13/78
LHQ by
HSCA re 3-14 request

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC	

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/4/95 BY SP8MAC/GCL (JFK)

213-10483

Rec'd in Rec 6-6-63

MAY 28 9 03 AM '63 TION, FBI

Minister of Agriculture - Now in Cuba, name not revealed for security reasons.
Minister of Public Housing - To be announced at a later date.

The following individuals have been named Ministers without portfolio and subsecretaries:

REC-54 105-121229
ST-102
JUN 5 1963
67 JUN 13 1963

Jose Ignacio Rivero
Manuel Reyes
Jorge Castellanos
Lauraeano Batista Falla
Agusto Fernandez Conde
Juan Manuel Salvat

Humberto Medrano
Fermin Peinado
Melchor Gaston
Manuel Fernandez
Enrique Huertas

F73

Designated Ambassador to Washington - Dr Guillermo Belt D.C. CUBA

OAS Delegate - Dr Herminio Portell Vila CUBA D.C.

Rtg

3. I doubt that Leal has been designated as the US representative for FIUR, and do not believe that the documents he gave me originated in Cuba. I suspect that another group of exiled Cuban politicians wrote the document in the US, and are trying to get national publicity in order to get support. I have recently heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo has been added to the list of Cabinet appointments. I doubt very much that Gutierrez and Ray would be fully accepted by the majority of Cubans in exile. CUBA

-end-

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10221-10229
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-72630-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, SJ
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/27/1958
PAGES :	9
SUBJECTS :	PDL, ASSOC, PILOT, CASTRO, FIDEL, TRA, FLIGHT PLAN, DESTINATION, RCK
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC 6 S/S, MEMO

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/27/58

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN [illegible]SIFIED
[illegible] WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Transmit the following in AIRTEL
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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IN THIS DOCUMENT except for the brackets
MKH 2-6-98

10/16/99
~~CLASSIFIED BY: 30~~ 3acIUS
~~DECLASSIFY ON:~~ OADR

Dw

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAN JUAN (105-new)

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ;
RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ;
ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA
IS - CUBA

Rb

(R)

3-1
6-1
1-1
5-1
4-1
7-1

By communication marked "Secret" dated 8/26/58, (S) [DAVID R. McLEAN] H & R Section, [Fort Brooke (CIA)] advised that they received the following information from a usually reliable source. Information is prefaced with the following statement: "In view of the sensitive means through which we acquired it, it is requested that the FBI take no action which might compromise our source." [X]

Communication states that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, also known as PEDRO LUIS DIAZ, a Cuban born November 8, 1926 at Havana, is a pilot, courier, and possible agent for FIDEL CASTRO. DIAZ is reportedly associated with REINALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ and ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA who are Cubans and not further identified. Jamaican police believe that these three individuals operate from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. [X] (U)

DIAZ passed through Palisades Airport, Kingston, Jamaica, on May 5, 1958. On July 17, 1958, DIAZ arrived at the Palisades Airport, piloting a Cessna aircraft, #M5213D with BLANCO as a passenger. The [X] (U)

3-18-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

(JFK)

105-72630-3

REC-25

12 SEP 16
~~AUG 29~~ 19

③ - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami (RM)
4 - San Juan
(1 - 97-92)
(1 - 109-26)
JAD:aej
(9)

Approved: ____________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

NAT. INT. SEC.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10221-10231
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-72630-5

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/02/1958
PAGES :	7
SUBJECTS :	PDL, ADMIN, INSTR
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/29/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

ARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: OCT 2 - 1958

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (105-1598)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Ex copy for the bracketS MKH 2-6-98

SUBJECT: PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ;
RENALDO BLANCO HERNANDEZ;
ALBERTO EUSEBIO MOJENA
IS - CUBA
00 - Miami

Enclosed herewith is report of SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER, Miami, dated and captioned as above, and Letterhead Memorandum.

REFERENCES

San Juan airtel to Bureau, 8/27/58.
Miami tel to Bureau, 9/3/58.
Butel to Miami, 9/3/58.
Legat, Havana, telephone call to Miami 9/3/57.

10/16/ ~~CLASSIFIED BY: SG~~ ~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ADMINISTRATIVE

All information contained in instant report was provided to the United States Customs Office, Miami, on September 3,5,8, and 18, 1958, as instructed by reButel September 3, 1958.

This report is classified "Secret", inasmuch as information received from [CIA, San Juan,] was so [S] classified. This information is set forth in enclosed report under symbol number T-1.

3-18-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JLSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Date of Activity or Description of Information	Date Received	Agent to Whom Furnished	File No. (JFK) Where Located

2 - Bureau (Encl.22) (RM)
2 - San Juan (97-92) (RM) (Encl.4)
(109-26)
1 - Miami
RJD:dlp
(5)

ENCLOSURE

105-726305

REC- 72 EX. - 133

52 NOV 18 1958

SECRET EX. - 133

14 OCT 3 1958

238

SECRET

MM 105-1598

T-1 is [DAVID R. McCLAIN, (S) H&R Section, Ft. Brooke, Puerto Rico] (C/A) (S) [X]	[DIAZ BLANCO and MOJENA] [X] (u)	By rept dated [8/26/58] [X] (u)	[San Juan Office] [X] (u)	Instant report
T-2 is ONI report dated 5/14/58, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	FIGUERO	5/58	Bureau	Instant report
T-3 is Legat, Havana	Telephonic info re DIAZ and GOMEZ	9/3/58	HOWARD R. ALBAUGH	Instant report
T-4 is MM 635-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.	Instant report
"	MOJENA	9/2/58	"	"
T-5 is EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, Cuban Consul General, Miami	Aircraft N48Q	9/8,18/58	ROBERT JAMES DWYER	"
T-6 is MM 639-S	PEDRO DIAZ	9/3/58	"	"
T-7 is BETTY UPDEGRAVE, Service Representative, Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Miami.	Toll calls of RICARDO LORIE	9/18/58	LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	"

REVIEWED BY ~~FBI~~/JFK TASK FORCE NIS
ON 6/27/97 0A3/[illegible]

☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

391-10-531

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10225-10195
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-114543-1ST NR 224

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/19/1965
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	MR, CUBAN INVASION, COST, MILITARY MOBILIZATION
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ○ ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY CUBA

TDCSDB-315/00171-65

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1964 - EARLY JANUARY 1965

DISTR. 19 JANUARY 1965

SUBJECT

COST OF MOBILIZATION OF CUBAN ARMED FORCES AND EFFORT TO ECONOMIZE

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES, MIAMI (18 JANUARY 1965)

REF D-AAP-06300

IN 62296

FIELD REPORT NO. UFG-6535

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [A HIGHLY PLACED CUBAN OFFICIAL WHO HAS PROVIDED DOCUMENTARY INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN CONSIDERED RELIABLE SINCE FEBRUARY 1964.] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except for the Brackets JM 6-25-97 (SLD/NSR 8-2-97 JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-22-94 BY SP8 MAC/ICSR (JFK)

105-114543 (JURE)

1. DURING THE YEAR 1964, THE ESTIMATED COST OF MOBILIZATION PER MAN PER DAY TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT WAS $5.01 PESOS. THE 32-DAY MOBILIZATION OF 51,000 MEN IN THE SPRING OF 1964 REPORTEDLY COST THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES A MINIMUM OF $8,176,320 PESOS. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS MOBILIZATION TOOK PLACE BEFORE AND AFTER 20 MAY WHEN AN INVASION ATTEMPT BY EXILE FORCES LED BY MANUEL RAY RIVERO WAS ANTICIPATED BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT.)

105-114543-

NOT RECORDED
191 JAN 26 1965

2. DURING LATE DECEMBER 1964 AND EARLY JANUARY [illegible]IZATION OF 17,000 MEN FOR NINE DAYS RESULTED IN A MINIMUM COST OF

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XAAX USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO (FBI)

CIA/NMCC NPIC TREASURY AD/CI I&NS

58 JAN 29 1965

ORIGINAL FILED IN 113-2-210

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10237-10009
RECORD_SERIES: DL
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 89-43-4926

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/0000
PAGES: 1
SUBJECT: SEE FBI 62-109060-3681

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 04/15/1994
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

8/21/64

SECRET

SECRET

AIRTEL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Kp 4/19/97
As Sanitized.

TO : Director, FBI (62-109060)

FROM: Legat, Bern (62-43) (RUC)

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
11/22/63, DALLAS, TEXAS
MISC. - INFO CONCERNING

See Ser 4820

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ReBuairtel 8/7/64.

Enclosed for Dallas are 25 copies each of insert pages 1 and 2 with results of interview of ANGHEL DRAGOMIR. As instructed by the Bureau, this insert incorporates the translated letter from DRAGOMIR with appropriate comments concerning the matter having been referred to the Bureau for investigation.

Information on an individual by the name ANGHEL DRAGOMIR from Bureau files as included in reairtel has not been included in insert since identity has not been proven and the information is not pertinent in any case.

The other Government agency referred to in the insert is the Research Branch (covert CIA), the Embassy, Vienna, Austria. (S) (S) (S)

#6454

Classified by SP6 BJA/MDC
Declassify on: OADR 1-17-84
PER CIA letter
9-23-88

6 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)(Encl.)
(2 - Dallas)(89-43)(Encl. 50)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(7)

Insert to files for 89. copy pulled RPB

89-43-4926

SEARCHED ...... INDEXED ......
SERIALIZED ...... FILED ......
[illegible] 1964
FBI — DALLAS
RPB

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10239-10171
RECORD_SERIES: MX
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: 105-3702-464

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: TRENT, ROLAND E.
TO: LEG, MX
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1964
PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, BKG, LIAISON WITH MX AUTHORITIES

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 12/17/1998
UPDATE_DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Legat, Mexico (105-3702)

DATE: 3-13-64

(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK) 05 RmE/KSR 1-25-94 JFK

9-8-93

~~Classified by 9803 RDD/KSR~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
RV: JF-16

FROM : SA Roland E. Trent

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
IS-R-Cuba

Re: [Allegation of PEDRO GUTIERREZ VALENCIA] X(U)

On 3-13-64, MARGARITA MUNGUIA, Visa Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., made available visa file data concerning ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, holder of Cuban passport No. 26367, issued in December, 1959, with expiration date in 1964. X(U)

Addresses for this individual were given as Miguel Aleman #259, Apartment #301, XXXXXX Colonia Roma, Mexico, D.F., and Calle Arellano Esquina "C", #269, Havana, Cuba. X(U)

MITRANI's date of birth is shown as December 29, 1936, at Havana, Cuba, and he is further described as fair complexion, 5' 7"; 176 lbs.; Cuban national, no scars or marks, brown hair and green eyes. The visa file data also shows MITRANI to be of Turkish extraction. X(U)

MITRANI secured a one entry B-2 visa on 1-27-61 valid through 4-27-61, for the alleged purpose of a pleasure trip to Los Angeles, California. X(U)

The visa file card contains a photograph of ERNESTO MITRANI and this card indicated his employment as of January, 1961, as a merchant and manufacturer of plastics. X(U)

The application made by MITRANI as the U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F. in January, 1961, was for a non-immigrant visa to visit the U.S. X(U)

5/6/85
~~Classified by 3042 PWT/AHR~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

RET

~~CLASS. & EXT. BY SP 3 JFK/RH/AHR 7-5-79~~
~~REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2 3~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW 3-13-84~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

105-3702-464

SEARCHED .... INDEXED ....
SERIALIZED M FILED M
MAR 17 1964
LEGAL ATTACHE - MEXICO

Larson

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED - JBH 9/29/93
(9803 RAD/gcl 10/4/93 JFK)

SECRET

— 1 —

9/8/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/rde
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

SECRET

The following information is classified "SECRET" and not to be further disseminated without specific authority of the CIA, [Mexico City Station] ~~(S)~~

As of 7-6-61 one E. MITRANI was working in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., [and had reportedly offered to cooperate with anti-Castro persons in Mexico, D.F] (S)

The E. MITRANI, mentioned above was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI. ~~(S)~~(U)

ERNESTO MITRANI aka E. Mitrani, mentioned above, was subsequently identified as ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY, who in about December, 1959 was employed as an "Auxiliary Consular Clerk" in the Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F. [ERNESTO MITRANI LEVY had reportedly been helpful to anti-CASTRO forces in Mexico.] ~~(S)~~

JOSE ANTONIO PORTUONDO

On October 24, 1960, MITRANI received a telegram recalling him to Havana, Cuba; however, he did not want to return to Cuba, and reportedly went to the then Ambassador PORTUONDO, and explained that he planned on marrying a Mexican girl; that his father had offer~~r~~ed him employment in Mexico, and for these reasons he did not want to return to Cuba. PORTUONDO reportedly counseled ~~XXXXXX~~ MITRANI to write to the Cuban Foreign Office in Havana and explain his problem, which ~~xx~~ MITRANI reportedly did. At that time MITRANI was the holder of Cuban Diplomatic passport No. 480 and also held a regular passport. ~~(S)~~(U)

MITRANI reportedly had arrived in Mexico on December 15, 1959; he was a ba~~t~~chelor at the time of his arrival, and his father was reportedly engaged in business in Mexico. His residence in about 1960 was given as residing at the corner of Avenida Insurgentes Sur and Viaducto Miguel Aleman, Mexico, D.F., telephone No. 11-96-11. The telephone and address data was as of 10-24-60 ~~(S)~~(U)

insert

MITRANI was reportedly in contact with the USIA, U.S. Embassy, Mexico, D.F., in 1960 in regard to his desire to remain in Mexico, [and MITRANI was reportedly told that a visa to enter the U.S. would be arranged for him if he would publically denounce the Cuban regime] (S)

MITRANI reportedly never publically denounced the Cuban regime although CIA file data reflects that someone wrote to the Cuban Embassy in 1960 stating that MITRANI was a "spy" and cooperating with anti-CASTRO forces. (S)

MITRANI reportedly acting as a "cut-out" spplied one report to the CIA, Mexico City station ~~x~~ which was submitted on or about 8-13-62. (S)

The CIA, [Mexico, City Station] ~~(S)~~ has no data on file concerning MITRANI since 8-13-62. ~~(S)~~

Above CIA data secured from DAVID PHILLIPS. ~~(S)~~(U)

~~[illegible]~~

Secret

1 MC File review concerning ERNESTO MITRANI revealed the following: (U)

2 MC File 105-1713, Ser. 18, Pg. 3, and Ser. 19, (Bufile 105-89084) entitled "COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS, FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA" (S) contains letterhead memorandum dated 10-24-60, which indicates that ERNESTO MITRANI LEVI was then an Assistant Consul, Cuban Embassy, Mexico, D.F. classified "SECRET" from
8 CIA, Mexico City Station. (S) ~~[illegible]~~ [redacted] (X)

9 MC File 109-70, Ser. 850, (BUfile 109-12-210) enttiled "FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS -CUBA". Report of SA JOSEPH T. GENCO, 1-12-61, at Mexico, D.F., contains information from PSI FELIX VALDES (MC File 134-612AA that (FNU) MITRANI, an assistant in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico, D.F., was contemplating defecting and leaving his position. As of 1-5-61, according to the
15 PSI, MITRANI was reportedly still working at the Cuban Consulate. (S)(U)

Secret.

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

TO : MR. BOARDMAN DATE: January 22, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

PROJECT HUNTER - POLICY
HUNTER PROJECT POLICY

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

(S)

On January 10, 1958, Harry Stone of MI-5, Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his Service had determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated (S) that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the RCMP only.

On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.

On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.

Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, Sam Papich on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the U.S.S.R., and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New York

WAB:hmm
(5)

cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan

105-93089-1

REC-94

SECRET

FEB 20 1958

273-10070

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MDR-16

SECRET

and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year. He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI, he was passing this along for our guidance.

It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the (U.S.S.R.) each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.

ACTION:

SECRET

1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the (U.S.S.R.) We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters

SECRET

MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)

2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and (Moscow) address furnished us by the [British,] telling CIA that we want to (S) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the [British.] (S)

3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as handle communications intelligence data.

OK

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 6, 1958

~~JUNE~~

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible] 10/24/00
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from Russia. Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximately a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too numerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.

An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain in the future:

1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.

2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on Soviet citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.

3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.

105-93089-4

4) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA.

APL:DEM:mn (9)

cc - Messrs. Boardman, Belmont, Branigan, Litrento, Baumgardner, JDDonohue, Papich, Turner

REC-94

EX-135

10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

55 FEB 27 1958

SECRET

Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.

With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.

In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:

1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with U.S.S.R. This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.

2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R., which, according to information received from MI-5, is a drop utilized by Soviet illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings.) (S)

We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as Bureau Informant 200. Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.

2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the Sovme Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.

3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.

SECRET

(1) CIA ADVISED RE TYPE OF DATA OF INTEREST TO US (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO REVIEW INFO. (3) ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STOPS

4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will not be furnished to CIA

SECRET

Rev 2/13/58

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3-1
8-1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY SP2 ALM/clj

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: HUNTER Report #1

1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to Mr. Papich will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.

2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.

3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:

a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.

b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.

4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U. S. of mail from P. KROVAN whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply:

ENCLOSURE

REC- 94 105-93089-3

EX-135 10 FEB 20 1958

SECRET

SECRET

Date	Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A 57C05C3325	KROVAN, Paraskoviya	(*)	ABB	EVOSWA, Wasyl	( )	KM		

This reply has the following meaning:

"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated.

"57C05"is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.

The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.

The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR.

The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that KROVAN sent the letter.

The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of Ukrainian SSR. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the USSR. A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.

The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the USSR. In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.

The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.

The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.

The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.

5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from P. KROVAN, who is believed to be located in Moscow only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya KROVAN, located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that KROVAN may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.

6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON, who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:

Date	Name In	Ref	Loc	Name Out	Ref	Loc	Ban	Firms
A57D23U 57D18	AVRUNINA, Vera	(*)	AAA	ESTERSON, Rose		KKB	X	

The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:

"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 numbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.

7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.

8. If your first request had been for KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had

been for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON located in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed copies of the envelope and its contents.

9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request, it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not required. The same would apply to the USSR. The above should be listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known, various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject, at this address to whom the questioned communication might be addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in turn number each card as HUNTER Request No. ________.

10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch List, i.e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a possible hit is made, i.e. photograph outside only; photograph outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give us a white list of correspondents of interest to you who are not Watch List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the receipt of the letter by the addressee.

11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from any specific area in the USSR to the United States or to any specific state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed

or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[J. Angleton
James Angleton] JFK (1)(B)

Enclosures (5)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Litrento
1 - Schweppe

DATE: 4-21-58

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/21/02 BY

Bureau Informant 200 is the symbol number designated for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage of mail going to and from the USSR. This designation was approved in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review information obtained from that coverage.

CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter." Each report received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report # 19.

The reports received are reviewed in the Sovme Unit. When the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched for identifiable information. When we can locate no such information, a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of those investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet sympathies whose dealings with the Russians are of a security or intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who might present logical "hostage" possibilities which could be exploited by the Soviets and the identification of any Soviet individual in the U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.

Investigations in the field would include a check of office indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available information does not dictate against such interview and provided the interview can be conducted without compromising Bureau Informant 200.

Information from Bureau Informant 200 would be forwarded to the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar phraseology: "Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200

304
105-67845
HTS:cvg
(5)

58 MAY 8 1958

Branigan
All Supervisors
Espionage

52 REC- 11 105-93089-9

a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been in direct contact with....." The contents of the Hunter Report should then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that information obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have knowledge of his contact with a person in Russia." JFK

In those instances where an opened or closed case file on a person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the Hunter Report will be forwarded to the appropriate Section Chief or Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the Hunter Report into the subject's main file for information purposes. JFK

__RECOMMENDATION:__

In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis. Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal Security Section, and the Subversive Control Section will be advised of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 10, 1961

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Parsons
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Belmont
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: HUNTER P.
ESPIONAGE - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY

JFK (1)(B)

Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the review of mail going to the Soviet Union. CIA makes available to us results of their analysis relative to this project.

On 3-9-61 during a conference on Soviet illegal espionage activities between Special Agents Papich, Litrento, Duckett and ~~M~~ and Messrs. Angleton, Horton and Hunt of CIA, we were advised that CIA has now established a laboratory in New York in connection with this project which can examine correspondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes. He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize their laboratory, we would contact them.

JFK (1)(B)

ACTION: For information.

DEM:td (7)

ERE 3/13

another inroad!

SA S. J. Papich advised 4/19/61 that Hunter material will increase about 20% since NY Lab now established.
WDA 4/21/61

JFK (1)(B)

EX-114

REC- 22

105-93089 - 25

7 MAR 23 1961

63 MAR 28 1961

0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70)

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 10, 1972

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BY CIA COURIER

ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, [JAMES ANGLETON]

RE: [HUNTER PROJECT]

JFK

Dear Sir:

☐ 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.

☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.

☐ 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.

REC-50 [illegible]-46

☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.

☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.

☐ 6. Status of case: ☐ Completed ☐ Incomplete

10 MAR 10 1972

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

Enc.

~~[illegible]~~

Reference is made to your special notation on [Hunter Report] No. 27,226, Item 72A13AM. Attached is a list of types of traffic we would like to receive.

ENCLOSURE

97 MAR 1 1972

1

SECRET

1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - W. O. Cregar

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 10, 1972

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of interest to us:

1. Current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers and scientists.

2. Current and former Soviet official visitors.

3. Current and former Soviet nonofficial visitors whose U.S. contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the Soviets because of their access to classified data or are in a position to be of assistance to the Soviets.

4. U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have been in the USSR with American exhibitions and delegations.

5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the USSR who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program. This does not include the short-term student tours but does include individuals who are in the USSR for some time. We would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have received special invitations or special treatment from the Soviets.

6. We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers who visit the USSR on regular tours or go to see relatives. We do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents; individuals known to be of interest to the Soviets because of their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters; individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons who meet with Soviets connected with organizations known to specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding the U.S.

7. Communist Party and front organizations (such as American Russian Institute, National Council of American-Soviet Friendship and "Ukrainian News"), extremist and New Left organizations.

105-93089
M.E. Triplett:met
(4)

(105-93089-96)

Original to CIA, Att'n James Angleton by CIA courier 3-10-72.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee and Women's Strike for Peace.

9. Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen, Progressive Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. Far East

10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the U.S.

11. Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.

12. Contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, particularly those made or received by individuals.

13. Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).

14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and aliens in the U.S. with individuals attending such institutions as the Central Komsomol School and Friendship University. This would include any aliens in the U.S. who have previously been in the USSR as students.

NOTE: Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report 27,226, Item 72A13AM (105-67845-38542) reading as follows: "Your 30 October 1962 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to relatives or friends studying at Friendship University or similar institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement." Subsequent to 10-30-62 memo, there have been several oral requests for other types (Items 1,2,3,12 and 14) and "Hunter" asked us if we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on 1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the Soviets by Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad. Hunter Report 27,226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal letter was signed by James Angleton.

JFK

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss M. E. Triplett

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: February 15, 1973

1-Mr. Branigan

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200] - POLICY

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP2ALM/clj
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1,6

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

[Bureau Informant 200] is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by them as "PROJECT HUNTER."

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director of CIA, has an appointment to meet with Acting Director Gray on February 16, 1973. In this connection, at 5:50 p.m., on February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, advised that the reason for General Walters' visit is to discuss PROJECT HUNTER. Specifically, General Walters will raise the question of the Bureau taking the PROJECT over. Angleton stated that Dr. Schlesinger, Director of CIA, had instructed Walters to meet with Mr. Gray prior to his, Schlesinger's, return from overseas planned for February 19, 1973.

Commencing in January, 1958, and continuing to the present time, the Central Intelligence Agency has furnished this Bureau with the product of its highly confidential review of mail going to and coming from the USSR. Arrangements for this review were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office officials and we are not privy to the details.

It is obvious that both incoming and outgoing mail is opened and photographed. At one time in March of 1961, we were advised that CIA had established a laboratory in New York where they could examine correspondence for secret writing, microdots, and possibly codes. At that time CIA offered to make these facilities available if we needed them. During the same approximate time, CIA advised that about 500,000 items per month passed to and from the [USSR] and about 200,000 of these items are screened. Approximately 1,200 items per month received "close scrutiny."

REC-49

22 FEB 27 1973

On February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton advised that at the present time, he has 9 of his people in Washington working on PROJECT HUNTER, and there are 2 additional personnel working in New York, for a total of 11. Presumably, all or most of these people have [Russian] language ability. Angleton further

Filed in [105-93089

EX-103

WAB:hke
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

CONTINUED - OVER

SECRET

5 80a R

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

advised that the U. S. Postal Service had raised a question as to CIA's necessity to continue PROJECT HUNTER in view of possible security problems within the Postal Service. JFK (1)(B)

JFK (1)(B)

The Bureau has always handled PROJECT HUNTER material on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is screened for items of possible investigative use and retention. JFK (1)(B) Material of no interest is destroyed. HUNTER material can be only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended for dissemination outside of the Bureau. JFK (1)(B) HUNTER material that is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which would be of special interest to our needs. For example, we are currently interested in material concerning current and former Soviet exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists. (S) We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the USSR for an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with persons in the USSR.

JFK (1)(B)

We have always considered the product from PROJECT HUNTER as valuable to our investigative interests. In this connection, it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact with Soviet exchange students in the United States who offer some potential as informants regarding the Soviet students' activities. We know from highly confidential sources that a proportion of these students have already been recruited by one or the other of the major Soviet Intelligence Services. We know also that many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the United States in some official capacity. (S)

PROJECT HUNTER has identified numerous individuals from the United States and from other areas of the world in attendance at the Central Komsomol School and Friendship University. (S)

CIA has permitted us to furnish them the names of specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest, and this has been valuable in covering their activities. JFK (1)(B) The product from HUNTER has also been valuable in identifying Soviets who plan to and later visit the United States. (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200]

The [Soviet Union] is currently building up the number of trade representatives who will be assigned in various areas of the United States where we normally would not have coverage. We anticipate that PROJECT HUNTER would be valuable in providing leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S)

With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and the [USSR] the volume of correspondence has obviously increased. We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of our knowledge, CIA has maintained this PROJECT smoothly and without hitch. It would be necessary to now examine what security problems the U. S. Postal Service is experiencing.

ACTION:

The above is submitted for possible use by the Acting Director for the visit of General Walters.

EM

G 11/2-16 9:10 P

[DDK/DmR3]

CONFIRMED WITH GEN.
WALTERS FOR 2:00 P.M
TUESDAY, 2-20-73

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: January 16, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/26/00 BY

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS

C. D. Brennan
G. C. Griffith

On January 15, 1969, Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the New Left and Black Nationalist fields. Ober admitted the traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing stops on certain key personalities.

The Hunter project for which we have given the designation of Bureau Informant 200 essentially consists of specialized coverage of mail between the United States and Russia. If we have some reason to believe that one of our subject's is communicating with anybody in the Soviet Union it might be worthwhile to place a stop.

We should bear in mind that this coverage is extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules which have been established. (See Mary Triplett, extension 631, Soviet Section.)

File in 105-93089

REC 102

(105-93089 - 90)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - M. E. Triplett
1 - Liaison
1 - S. J. Papich

SJP:clb
(6)

18 FEB 5 1969

Stops not warranted on black extremists at this time
JED 1/31/69

5-Papich

52FEB13 1969

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - A. P. Litrento

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 24, 1966

FROM : M. E. Triplett

1 - S. Papich
1 - M. E. Triplett

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 Hunter Project - Policy

From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3028 Hunter Reports transmitting 6077 items were received from Bureau Informant 200. This is a slight increase (almost 3%) in number of items over the previous year.

Although items were received on a continuous basis, the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization, transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the Hunter Project at CIA which was taking place during this time.

From February, 1966, to the present, there has been a marked increase in number of items received. The average for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the average for the same period last year was 421. There has been no significant change in the type of material except that more items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source has not furnished information previously, necessitating more research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on the basis of information furnished by the source.

Approximately 580 letters were written on information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 during the past year. This is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the previous year. More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the basis of travel to the USSR and contacts of U.S. citizens, Latin Americans and Cubans in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR. Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investigations and for information. In some cases, data was extracted from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one communication under more than one caption to show relationships between various subjects.

An analysis of information received from the source during the past year is attached.

105-93087-78

EX-110 REC 5

ENCLOSURE

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

SEP 12 1966

Enclosure

Memo W. A. Branigan to Sullivan 8/24/66

10-30-62

JFK(1)(B)

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

After an extensive review of 2500 Hunter Reports since our last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation of such material.

I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:

1. Soviet-bloc immigrants desiring to repatriate to USSR. These people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.

2. Americans traveling to the USSR as such travel is permissible and several hundred people a year visit the USSR while on tour abroad as well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.

3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other. It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify himself at the same time.

II Traffic of Specific Interest:

1. All data re Cuba. This serves to identify pro-Castro followers in the U. S.

2. All data re U. S. Cubans in contact with Cubans attending Friendship University in Moscow.

3. All material emanating from Puerto Rico of an Anti-U. S. nature and pro-Soviet.

4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to Russia and while in Russia.

5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.

6. Data re [redacted]

7. Any data on [redacted]

[illegible]

RE: PROJECT HUNTER

8. Any traffic from or to U. S. Students in Moscow or to U. S. persons who were former students in Moscow.

9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current exposition or a previous exposition in the USSR.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER NT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan WCS

DATE: 6/9/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan WAB

1 - W. C. Sullivan
1 - W. A. Branigan
1 - W. D. Stewart

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

JFK(AB1 Branigan

The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a matter of interest, the increase in the volume of Hunter Reports received from CIA, the additional administrative controls instituted to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of information Bureau Informant 200 has been continually furnishing.

Bureau Informant 200 is the symbol number designated for information furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to by CIA as "Project Hunter" and the reports emanating from this project as Hunter Reports. This informant originated in 1/58 and furnished its first Hunter Report in 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received Hunter Report number 5005; many reports transmit as many as twelve items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the last seven months we have received 1680 Hunter Reports or almost 50% of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CIA advised representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a laboratory in New York City in connection with this project. This laboratory is able to process Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possibly codes. Our liaison representative advised the laboratory would probably increase the Hunter Report volume to us by 20%; however, from the above figures it appears this increase in volume is far greater than 20%.

A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped notation on the front of the Hunter Report permitting the interested supervisor to destroy contents of a Hunter Report if found to be of no value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his reason for destroying same. Approval to destroy these Hunter Reports was received from CIA which can, if necessary, at a later date reproduce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Supervisors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval for a proceedure whereby Hunter Reports would be screened for destruction by substantative desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or handling which would later be deemed ~~unnecessary if~~ report is destroyed.

(105-93089).

(WDS:slj

REC-8

(105-[illegible]-27)

JUN 14 1961

EX 101

A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current interest to us such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice Halperin was a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins are now in Russia. Pertinent information relating to individuals of current interest is passed to the field for its intelligence interest. In addition, material is received which reveals the Soviet sympathies of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the Soviets which may be considered against the best interests of the U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm information already known and it does not require in itself that the field be advised of same.

The informant furnished two specific Hunter Reports reflecting that two different individuals were sending post cards to USSR with another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R" (105-98499), the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Cawthon, the former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200 are set out below:

Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-C subjects; one namely, Martin Field (101-1019). Contacts in this country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying abroad; namely, Mary Lou Patterson (100-136466). Data relating to a contact by Bernon Ferguson Mitchell with his mother in California. As you recall, Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia. Data that one D. C. Mac Donald, Jr. of Brighton, Massachusetts, requested publishers of the Soviet paper "Pravda" to forward to him old issues of that paper so he could distribute same to Americans in various cities here to improve their language skill and to acquaint them with the USSR. Data concerning numerous individuals who sent New Years greetings to Nikita Khrushchev and expressed their sympathies toward Soviet way of life; namely, Donald A. Sawtelle (105-15570), a New York SI subject. Data revealing a contact by John Peter Grothe (62-105833) with the Minister of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the Moiseyov dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to visit USSR again in the near future. Grothe advised him that last year he worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey as a foreign relations advisor and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant to Senator Humphrey. Bufiles reveal one Victoria Ivanova Sandor (105-58070), a Russian-born alien and her husband John Sandor who is presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General, State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to Victoria Sandor that she advised her mother in USSR she expected to move to Washington where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy; and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be necessary to achieve this goal.

Information received from Bureau Informant 200 cannot be disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential source; however, the information is used to great advantage by the Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field. Investigations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then appropriately disseminate pertinent information.

ACTION:

None, above data are furnished solely for your information.

WAB

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trottor
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN DATE: 8/21/61

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

CLASSIFIED BY SP7ALM/elj 10/26/00
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan 8/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be arranged between Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and an interested CIA representative to explain to CIA specific type of "Project Hunter" material we desire. JFK CIA

On 8/17/61 Special Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart, and CIA representatives, James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers conferred at CIA concerning the "Project Hunter." The observations set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were individually discussed with the CIA representatives. They appeared very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and were also pleased with the attention afforded it. Mr. Hunt, at the conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides, similar to our afore-mentioned observations discussed, for his people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in which we have no interest and a specific interest. JFK

In order to better understand the coverage of Bureau Informant 200 the writer specifically asked the following questions and received the following answers:

1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected traffic?

Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other 300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately 1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.

2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we getting?

ENCLOSURE

Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized, we are receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly

WDS:ct (4)
Enclosure
(105-93089)

REC- 52

AUG 29 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

61 SEP 1 1961

3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e., Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich material (Kazakevich is a prolific letter writer now in USSR who was formerly a pro-Soviet economist living in the U.S.), and Intourist traffic (general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to Russia)? (S)

Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to son who is a Soviet-bloc exchange student in U.S. and sends family love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsized and are of no interest as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of traffic. Mr. Hunt advised they derived no intelligence benefit from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results. In regard to Kazakevich CIA develops a great deal of foreign intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. Mr. Hunt felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have derived nothing to date from this material as we are soley interested in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for general intelligence interest. Mr. Hunt was advised all of the informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis and the material retained is under strict control. Mr. Hunt was pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter." In regard to Intourist traffic, Mr. Hunt advised we were furnished same because one of the individuals associated with an Intourist agency was suspected of being a Soviet intelligence contact. Mr. Hunt agreed with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to the USSR being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data re an individual from State. (S)

In regard to item number three above, it was agreed we would not receive any more Hunter material re Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and Intourist traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned traffic we will not receive are set out in our blind memorandum to CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3. (S)

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY
105-93089

The matter of receipt of illegible material was also discussed and it was pointed out to Mr. Hunt no matter how important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S. addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value. It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed or written out. Mr. Hunt advised they were aware of reproduction problem and stated Xerox equipment was to be installed in the near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.

In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535 names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday morning. Mr. Hunt requested we specifically place on this list the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are presently receiving items re these persons. If their names appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage. Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals presently on the Watch List which Mr. Hunt requested. Interested supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party members now in Soviet-bloc countries will be furnished CIA via our Liaison Agent.

In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic and furnishing same to us, Mr. Hunt was requested to advise our Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate whether we would continue to receive this new type material.

Mr. Hunt desired that in regard to any correspondence with CIA wherein a reference is made to a Hunter Report or the Project Hunter in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as only a few CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and CIA does not want such letters in regular mail channels.

JFK
(4)(21

As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the need for this conference was to insure the Bureau Informant 200 Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau. It is believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material now received will be reduced approximately 50%.

SECRET

SECRET

Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY.
105-93089

At the conclusion of the conference, (Mr. Hunt) and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations requested a similar conference in approximately six months. (SA Stewart) will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting permission to attend such a conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum be furnished to CIA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the Hunter traffic in which we have an interest.

(WDB) WAB

delivered to CIA 8/23/61 WDB

SECRET

SECRET

1 - Stewart

August 21, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE...

10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

RE: [PROJECT HUNTER]

JFK (S) B1

After an extensive review of 5600 [Hunter Reports] transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following observations in the interest of economy in regard to [Project Hunter] as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.

I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:

1 - (Intourist) traffic (general data concerning arrangements for Americans traveling to (Russia). Such travel is permissible and arrangements have been previously made through State Department for a passport. (S)

2 - Personal type letters, which have been translated into English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts, stamp collectors, and their (Russian) counterparts.

3 - Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again are synopsized in English and reveal that "Mother writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the United States and sends family's love," and vice versa. (S)

4 - No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.

In regard to the above four categories, your [Agency's laboratory processes all] Hunter material for secret writing, microdots and possible codes and presently furnishes] us its observations concerning anyone of these appearing in the traffic.

II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:

A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned nondesired categories wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence significance. Numerous letters have the translator's

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram

(WDS:ct
(5))

SECRET

comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that the text of the letter indicates some type of code,, et cetera.

B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States addressee or addressor is a United States Government employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e., missile field.

C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence interest such as an open offer by an individual to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein any individual professes pro-Soviet or procommunist sympathies.

III . WE ARE SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:

1 - All traffic relating to top communists traveling abroad which we have been getting regularly and from which we have been extracting a great deal of intelligence data such as Mary Lou Patterson, the Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, et cetera.

2 - All traffic on specific individuals we place on the Watch List.

3 - All traffic on special individuals such as NSA defectors William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson Mitchell.

4 - All traffic of a clandestine type such as that in the V. Podgoretsky case.

IV

If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material

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as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from which copy is to be made is not type to give a good reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation concerning name and address of United States recipient or sender could be made from original. Frequently, information of interest is received but United States person's name on reproduction is indistinguishable and information becomes of no value.

V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 18, 1961

NAME	ADDRESS
BERLAND, MARK V.	Flat 15 Lasvinskaya St. 11 Perm 24, USSR
FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.	Apartment 6B, 1040 Nelson Avenue, Bronx, New York
HASKELL, ROY	12 Crown Street Brooklyn, New York
KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE	1302 Henno Way, Glen Ellen, California
KOVOLENKO, V. P.	General P. O., Kiev I, USSR
PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID	2161 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, California
ROBERTS, HOLLAND DEWITTE	383 Hadonia, Palo Alto, California. During Week Days - 787 Castro Street, San Francisco, California
SUCHOBECK, ALEX (NMI)	1315 Lincoln Avenue, Pacific Grove, California

SECRET

SECRET

Project Hunter

TRILUPAITIENE, ALDONA	131/14-1, Antakaenio Street Vilnius, Lithuania
TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS (also card on Leonas Algeda)	Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 11/2/62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Stewart

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - POLICY

This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives (James Hunt, John Mertz and Thomas Chalmers) at CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy of same is attached.

CIA advised that its "Hunter-Don" coverage was being operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrated coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.

The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded it by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished by Bureau Informant 200 of interest to us.

ACTION:

None. Above data furnished for your information.

WDS (WRB)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/26/00 BY

WDS:jes
(4)

105-93089

Enclosure

REC. 35

(105-93089-54)

7 NOV 5 1962

EX-118

ENCLOSURE

65 NOV 9 1962

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Bland
1 - Baumgardner
1 - Donahoe
1 - Stewart

Tolson
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Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8-25-61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200-POLICY

On 8-17-61, a conference took place between Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart) and representatives of CIA in regard to (Bureau Informant 200). As a result, CIA was recently furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire. This guide was prepared after discussion with several members of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and Internal Security Sections. In addition, CIA was furnished a current list of names previously placed on the CIA Watch List by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that, although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on, they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This Watch List is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing slip anytime to (W. D. Stewart, Room 644 RB) bearing the individual's name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is desired. A list will be compiled by (Mr. Stewart) weekly and furnished to CIA via liaison. The CIA representative further advised that very few people there have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and that any communication referring to this project or a "Hunter Report" should be forwarded to CIA via liaison and appropriately flagged for our Liaison agent's attention to avoid the communication getting into CIA's regular mail channel.

JFK

The CIA representative further advised, if any security subject travels to the (USSR) and his name is added to the Watch List, CIA will promptly afford him coverage while he is abroad.

JFK

EX-107

REC- 47 (105-93089 — 32)

RECOMMENDATION:

That the above information be discussed at the next conference held by the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish (Mr. Stewart) a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200 material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.

(WDS:ekg kg
(7)

(105-93089)

(WDS) WAB

Done at Section Chiefs Conf 9/1/61, Names will [illegible] submitted thru [illegible] chiefs.

5- (WDS)

99

10/30/62

RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200

Information indicating travel plans to the USSR of numerous Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a Soviet courier; data indicating the existence of particular Russian social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S. students to study in USSR; data indicating pro-Castro sympathies of U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former associates of Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin, recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S. military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or individuals in USSR; data revealing activities of the Maurice Hyman Halperins, now residing in Cuba and of their son David Carlos Halperin, a medical student at the University of Chicago and data indicating current whereabouts of Carl and Alice Jerome, Communist Party subjects; and data relating to the current whereabouts of James M. McMillin, Jr., a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who previously defected and married a Soviet.

Data of Special Interest:

During the present Cuban crisis, we have identified several pro-Castro sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with Cubans at Friendship University, Moscow, and have been alerted to their activity. We have learned that Russian school authorities are greatly displeased with Huldah S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject William Clark of Newark, because of her behavior. She too evidenced discontentment there. Her educational trip to USSR served as CP propaganda. We were alerted to Maurice Halperins intended return to U. S. We have been advised of Lillie Mae Teslich's intended visit to USSR. Her daughter in Moscow is suspected as being the propaganda-radio announcer "Moscow Molly." We are developing U. S. contacts of Helen Kagen-Pozner, UN employee discharged in 1950's for failure to answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through correspondence of her with relatives in Russia.

(105-93089-54)

such as Valeriy Tereshchenko. One of Tereshchenko's contacts is believed to be a target for contact by KGB and another is the son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment Viktor Kravchenko had been visiting. Kravchenko is a Soviet defector who recently committed suicide. The informant has advised of the activities and contacts of Vladislaw Krasnow, Soviet defector to Sweden in 1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that Krasnow was in the U.S.

Although much material regarding communists and the Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources, the informant continues to furnish additional details and new information regarding changes of employment and residence, travel, contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in items on Paula Garb, International Secretary, who went to the USSR to marry a Soviet if he can obtain a divorce. Items pertaining to Mary Lou Camacho (daughter of CP leader) told of the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her Cuban husband, plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a Security Index subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to be in the U.S.

Data is received regarding travel and contacts of Mary Rakoczy (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR. Information continues to be received regarding her son, Andrew Rakoczy, who was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above school for almost two years. This has included his contacts, change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his contacts now at this school has been identified as Teddie Kardash, son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that Irene Rakoczy and three unidentified individuals plan to study dancing in Kiev this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing and indoctrination) and that Bernard Francis Taylor (son of CP official), who went to the USSR with a musical and dancinggroup, remained in Kiev to attend school. Don Zurilko, son of the alien wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is attending school in Kiev. He is believed to be from the U.S. or Canada.

Additional information is received regarding persons involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations, women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with a GRU officer), racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal names of U.S. contacts with members of such Soviet propaganda organizations as the Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's Committee, Committee For Return to the Homeland and others.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
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Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) - POLICY

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Stewart
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Harrell

For approximately one month beginning in February, 1963, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had coverage of mail destined to (Cuba) which was funneled through New York City from approximately one-half of the United States. The results of this highly confidential project were furnished us under the code ("Hunter-Vince") through special arrangements made with CIA. The project has been temporarily discontinued so CIA can analyze the results and decision will be made as to its reinstitution based on the results achieved.

JFK (8)

During the period the coverage was in effect, we received 94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material. While no specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal (Cuban) agent networks has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have previously furnished CIA summaries concerning positive results achieved through its coverage of (Soviet) mail for its assistance in evaluating whether that program should be continued. It is believed we should do so in this instance.

JFK (8)

ACTION:

If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a summary of the action taken by us as a result of the (Hunter-Vince) coverage will be furnished CIA by liaison for assistance of CIA in evaluating whether the program should be continued.

JFK (8)

Enclosure

105-93089
RAM:djw
(8)

EX-102

REC-52

105-93089-66

17 APR 3 1963

Multiples

Furnished to [illegible] Hunt) CIA - 3/29/63

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

67 APR 4 - 1963

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INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM BUREAU INFORMANT 200

Data received regarding the following current and former double agents and sources has been utilized to evaluate their reliability: Luke Chia Liu Yuan; Pedro Celestino Jimenez Moreno; Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Ramirez; Julius (S) Shell; NH 445-S; Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffe; NY 2911-S; NY 3556-S; CG 6562-S; Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Oblesow. (S) The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with Soviets with the request to consider for development as sources.

Information regarding Soviet exchange students (eight are KGB agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel, types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S. Similar information is furnished regarding other Soviets in the U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the USSR as part of the exchange.

Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students shows Soviet and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in Russia. A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected espionage agent regarding Ralph Matlaw (according to Nosenko, the KGB was to attempt recruitment of Matlaw). The source has revealed former exchange student Michael Cole's travel plans and continued contacts with Soviets (one is son of an espionage agent) and Henry Huttenbach's attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a Soviet girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens who are, or have been, in Russia but are not under the exchange program. These include Sally Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin and Alexander Nikolauk. Two of the four U.S. citizens who have applied for entrance to Soviet universities have stated that they desire to become Soviet citizens. Milagros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto Rican nationalist in the USSR, is using an alias in her correspondence. Another Puerto Rican went to Cuba before he left for the USSR.

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
11/1/62
MDR-16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Material has been received regarding three employees of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee who intends to marry a Soviet girl, three individuals involved with Soviet women and two U.S. contacts of Galina Smirnova (an Intourist guide who has compromised Americans in the past).

Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the U.S. from Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti, Italy, France, Iraq and Africa with their friends in the USSR who are studying at Friendship University or other schools show that

SECRET (105-93081-78)

SECRET

they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from Haiti have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied for admittance to Friendship University and other schools in the USSR because of finances or ideology. A Nicaraguan Marxist in the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at Friendship University by forwarding mail to Bolivia. Data is furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the USSR and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been compromised before he left Russia and another brought his Soviet wife to the U.S.

Items are received regarding Soviets who have entered the U.S. as wives of Americans: Victoria Sandor (now a Federal employee); Ala Anderson; Ludmila Olsen who has advised that she was approached by Soviet Intelligence when in the USSR in 1965; Irina Horwitz; Nataliya Konigsford; and Rosita Brayton wife of an Alaskan politician and newspaperman, who has become involved with a Russian-born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of contacts, travel and study in the USSR of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, Soviet wife of former U.S. Naval Attache, who has admitted furnishing information regarding Americans to the Soviets in the 1940's.

Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens' travel plans, including those of known subversives, their Soviet relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by two tourists with Soviet authorities. Data has been received regarding Soviets and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel, to the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in questionable activities in the past. Mary Mackler, who recently returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subversives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage in the past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the USSR.

Additional information received includes: plans of seven individuals to repatriate to the USSR; U.S. contacts with current and former known and suspected Soviet agents now in the USSR (Vladimir Sossinskiy, Vladimir Pozner, Eugenia Olkhina, Leonids Rimjans, Vladimir Paramonov, Igor Melekh and others); activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected espionage agents new in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich, Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga and others); the death of Georgi Lieb (suspected of working as black market currency operator for KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of Kirill Alexeev (suspect in Umbel case) family; Soviet contacts of Gerard Piel who has been in contact with a KGB officer; Soviet contacts and travel of D. G. Brennan who, according to Federal, was to be approached by KGB; contacts of Olga Yourkevitch (widow of ship designer) with KGB agent, travel to USSR as a guest of organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness in the USSR; contact of Major Abdel Okeil of United Arab Republic who was attending the FBI National Academy with individual in the USSR; U.S. contacts of several defectors and Soviet repatriates,

SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10273-10104
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-1640

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE
TITLE:

DATE: 02/16/1967
PAGES: 102
SUBJECT: CIA, NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOC, PICKETING, DEMONSTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 10/30/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/14/2001
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

Consultation

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

JFK Act 6 (1)(C)

JFK Act 6 (4)

COMMENTS: EBF, INC 2 ADMIN PAGE, 3 T/T, 34 MEMO, 5 LTR, 2 LHM, 6 NEWS ARTIC, 8 A/T

2/18/67

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

TO: SAC, JACKSONVILLE

FROM: SAC, JACKSON (166-NEW) (P)

WENDELL R.MELQUIST;
ANTHONY LENNON;
ITAR - GAMBLING
(OO: Jackson)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Informant

On 2/16/67, (PCI LOUISE SKELTON, Biloxi, Miss.) advised on 2/7/67 above subjects registered into the Travel Inn Motel, Biloxi. PCI stated that at time of registration above subjects furnished the following information on their motel registration card:

IRAN WENDELL MELQUIST

"WENDELL R. MELQUEST MISS
260 Vernal Street
Eugene, Oregon

B. APPROX
1937-1942

"1965 Ford, Florida License 8W20164
Employed, U. S. Government"

"ANTHONY LENNON
43-24 165th Street MISS
Flushing, N. Y. DC

B. APPROX
1937-1942

"Self-employed"

PCI described MELQUEST as a white male, age 25-30, height, 5' 5", weight 150 to 160 pounds, dark hair, brown eyes, medium complexion, and subject LENNON as a white male, age 25-30, height 6', weight 175 pounds, light brown or sandy hair, fair or light complexion with freckles.

2 - Jacksonville
2 - New York
1 ② - Portland
2 - Jackson (166-NEW)
WDJ/bjk (8)

1 - Bureau 4-12-67 lw

62-80750-4522

SEARCHED.......INDEXED.......
SERIALIZED.......FILED.......
FEB 23 1967
FBI - PORTLAND

ENCLOSURE

166-94-1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/6/67

FROM : [LEGAT, HONG KONG] (~~S~~)(U) (80-2)

SUBJECT: ~~(~~RELATIONS WITH [CIA] (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
JM 6-18-97

(S)

ReBulet 2/8/67.

[Assistant Chief of Station, CIA,] Hong Kong, has (S) advised that the situation in Macau has returned to a degree of normalcy in which covert inquiries can again be handled in that colony with no more difficulty than before. (~~S~~)

This is submitted for info of Bureau supervisors handling [Chinese] investigative matters. (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

9/29/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/nde
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

~~9/25/95~~
~~Classified by 5668-SLD/nde~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

~~#2 and Bracketed info Classified per Agency ltr. dated 11/26/9~~
9803 RLD/gcl #211,326
5/14/92

(1) - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)
1 - [Hong Kong] (~~S~~)(U)
DAC/djw
(4)

REC 10 62-80750-45-(1)

EX-114

10 MAR 13 1967

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SECRET

6 MAR 21 1967

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

- Tolson
- DeLoach
- Mohr
- Wick
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

Memorandum

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
EXCEPT for the brackets
JM 6-25-97
(SLD/ILS/R 8-3-97) JFK

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: March 15, 1967

FROM : R. I. Shroder

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA
[CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)] (~~S~~)(U)
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA
KIDNAPING

[C.I.A.] (~~S~~)(U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of [a CIA employee Thomas Keogh.] No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. (S) (~~S~~)

At our suggestion, [through liaison with CIA, fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh.] (S)

Agency info classified
per CIA ltr 11/26/91.
9803-Rdd gel #211,326. 5/14/92

ACTION:

[MRS THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH SR] (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachments be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC 33

ST-114

62-80750-4563

FDT:emf
(7)

MAR 20 1967

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Fingerprints of following detached and filed in Latent Div. - [illegible]

MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TEREZA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

71 MAR 29 1967

9/25/95
Classified by SLD/ILS/R/JFK
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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9/25/95
~~Classified by 5668-SLD/mcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Holmes

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/15/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Brannigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 6-18-97

SOURCE

In connection with developments in the case captioned "NK 2264-S, (IS-R," Bureau file 134-9824, the (S) Director noted "I note more and more we are telling CIA about our domestic operations and always to our detriment. I want this trend stopped. H." (A separate memorandum is being submitted concerning a new development in the aforementioned case).

On 3/15/67, the Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, and took the opportunity to review the status of relations between FBI and CIA. It was felt that this was an opportune time to do so in view of the Director's concern as expressed above.

Helms stated that he personally was pleased with relations between the two Agencies. He stated that sometimes he is irked or disturbed when people outside and inside of the Government ask the question "How are you getting along with the FBI?" He indicated that this question is frequently asked by members of Congress. Helms stated that he religiously has followed a practice of lucidly and firmly advising such people that relations are excellent. He stated that he personally believed that this was true.

The Liaison Agent commented that working relations are good, but there was an area which might not be getting proper attention. The Agent stated that there was reason to be concerned regarding effective coordination on those cases which are of interest to both FBI and CIA because there appeared to be developing an atmosphere where people in both Agencies felt that there was now wide-open liberty to conduct operations and activities of a joint nature. The Agent stated that he wished to emphasize that such an atmosphere cannot exist and that Mr. Hoover would never condone any trend in this direction. The Agent commented that work in this area had to be very efficiently coordinated and that we in the Bureau were closely scrutinizing each situation as it develops where both Agencies had an interest. The Agent suggested that Mr. Helms might desire to alert appropriate subordinates in the Agency on this point. 62-80750-4564

CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mcl 9/29/98
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

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REC-51

CONTINUED - OVER

SJP:rab
(6)

59 MAR 24 1967

SECRET

5 MAR 20 1967

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/17/67

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Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

SLD/KSR 6-30-97 (JFK)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~65~~ 62-80750)

FROM: SAC, WFO (66-3896)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Source

On 3/15/67, (PSI EMIL R. SVEILIS, the late night desk editor, United Press International, Washington, D. C.) who has furnished reliable information in the past, said that he wished to advise this office that he overheard comments indicating that CIA had contributed at least one million dollars to the National Council of Churches. He also advised that he understood that the CIA maintains a "safe house at the Airle House, Warrenton, Virginia." He was questioned specifically about the source of the above information and indicated that he believed that he heard this information from individuals connected with the news media but he could not recall the exact identity of these individuals. He indicated that he got the impression that this information was common knowledge in the news field.

The Bureau may wish to advise CIA by appropriate channels concerning the information that the CIA had allegedly contributed money to the National Council of Churches and maintains a "safe house" at Warrenton, Virginia. This information was not put in LHM form because of its general character and because the PSI was unable to recall his source of this information or when the information came to his attention.

The PSI requested that his identity be protected.

3 - Bureau
2 - WFO
(1-134-7249 Sub A) (SVEILIS) Source

REC-35 62-80750-4565

LIAISON

CIA

PAT:mfd
(5)

WICK

MAR 17 1967

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

INT. SEC.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. J. P. MOHR DATE: 3/24/67

FROM : MR. I. W. CONRAD

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TOUR OF LABORATORY BY TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(~~S~~)(U)

[Mr. Lon Thomas, Document Examiner for] CIA, called this afternoon to inquire if a tour could be arranged through the FBI Laboratory for himself and two of his co-workers, [Mr. Joseph Hall and] [Stanley Schultz.] They have (C) no specific problems, but merely wish to visit our facilities briefly. Accordingly, tentative arrangements have been made for the requested tour at 1 p.m., March 29, 1967.

8-2-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD /KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

ACTION:

Unless advised to the contrary, the tour will be conducted as requested.

Bracketed info Classified per CIA ltr 11/26/91 Remainder is unclass. 9803-Rdd/gel #211,326 5/14/92.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
JM 6-25-97
(SLD/KSR 8-2-97 JFK)

1-Mr. Wick (Att: Tour Room)
1-Mr. W. C. Sullivan (Att: Mr. S. Papich)
1-Mr. Conrad
(4) IWC:dmg

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9/25/95
Classified by 5668 SLD/rde JFK
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC 4 62-80750-4567

18 MAR 31 1967

handled 3/29/67

CONFIDENTIAL

SEVEN

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59 APR 10 1967

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. DATE: 4/4/67

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) ALIEN INTERVIEW REQUESTS (C)

Re memorandum Cotter to Sullivan dated 3/28/67, which instructed the Liaison Agent to advise appropriate CIA representatives of the change in handling alien interview requests at the Bureau. (C)

On 3/31/67, the Liaison Agent advised Mr. Leo Dunn of the change in handling alien interview requests at FBI Headquarters. Dunn was advised that the overall coordination for handling these requests would be handled by the Bureau's Name Check Section under the coordination of Special Agent J. W. Brown.

Inasmuch as CIA occasionally makes a telephonic request when expedite matters are involved, the Liaison Agent obtained the names of Eugene Young and Becky Vaughn as the persons who would call Special Agent Brown in the event an expedite matter is involved. CIA is well aware that the use of this telephonic request should be held to a minimum and used only at times when time is of the essence and the matter is of sufficient importance to deviate from the normal request procedures. (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Classification per CIA ltr. 11/26/91. 9803-Rdd/gcl #211,326 5/14/92

ACTION:

The above is directed to the Name Check Section for their information and attention.

1 - Mr. Scatterday (J.W. Brown)
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Cregar

9/25/95
Classified by 5668 SLD/jde
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

REC-47 62-80750-457

WOC:rab
(6)

3 APR 7 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

56APR 17 1967

NAME CHECK

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10279-10018
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-221-1790

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/30/1967
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	EGD, ASSOC, ARRESTED, ROLE, ACAPULCO MURDERS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/30/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CITE TDCS-314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

Political Matters

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-95 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION] (c)

[DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] (c) HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.
AS SANITIZED
~~GMB~~
KP 1-14-98

~~MEXICO~~

REC 39 5-H

109-12-221-1790

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

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date 9-1-67
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279-10018

109-12-221

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AUG 31 11 45 AM '67
LIAISON SECTION, FBI

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

MEXICO

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10020

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-221-1792

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/30/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
EGD, CLASH, RIVAL FACTIONS, COPRA GROWERS UNION, ACAPULCO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CITE TDCS -314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

REC 18

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

Political Matters

Woodall

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

Mexico

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
(JFK) KP 1-14-98

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION] (C)

(C) [DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966. ~~(C)~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-95 BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

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REC 18 109-12-221 — 1792

18 SEP 6 1967

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date 9-1-67
by EHH

57 SEP 11 1967

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279-10020

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LIAISON SECTION FBI

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

Mexico

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10209

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-67406-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 04/09/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
PPJM, RECRUITMENT, AMERICAN CODE CLERK A/O
DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW, KGB

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

Subject advised that Nina and Ed Stevens do a lot of entertaining but he had never attended any of their parties. Subject stated that he would not trust Nina Stevens as far as he could throw an elephant. Subject stated that he had no proof but believed Nina to be a Soviet informant.

Subject advised that Aline Mosby was a newspaperwoman in Schapiro's office. Mosby, during the past year, had been in the hospital on several occasions and one didn't see too much of her. Subject also advised that Mosby stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit. Subject stated that one of the reasons Mosby was in the hospital on one occasion was the fact that she had an abortion, according to gossip.

Subject stated that another newspaperwoman in Moscow was Priscilla Johnson. Subject advised that Johnson had the reputation of being a fairly good reporter and one whom the Soviets kept on a month to month visa basis. Subject indicated that it was highly possible the Soviets had attempted to recruit Johnson as she spent a lot of time with Soviet nationals.

Subject was queried as to whether he had ever made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the Soviet Union, to which he replied that he had not disclosed classified information as such. He stated that his cover, which he had used for the period in between [State Department](S) assignments, was that he was a [consultant of the AEC, particularly to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, composed of AEC, CIA, State, NSA, Joint Chiefs, and the Armed Services.](S) Subject stated that he had indicated to individuals, when questioned, that he had done economic research and analysis in the Soviet field and that he had done this ever since he had first become a [State Department](S) employee. Subject stated that among others he had discussed this with [Ray Hutchins, his counterpart in the British Embassy.](S)

Subject was asked for his itinerary on his return trip to the United States. Subject stated that he had long planned to come home via the Far East and it was a well publicized plan. He stated that when he left Moscow he stayed over in Delhi for a week to see if there were any objections from Headquarters as to his itinerary. He stated that when he received no instructions to the contrary, he returned to the United States via his previously announced plans and the differences in fares being borne by him.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10279-10258
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-221-417

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, MX
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/10/1960
PAGES :	10
SUBJECTS :	NRO, INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, MATEOS, LOPEZ, SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP, CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION, CUBAN EXILE ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

SECRET

~~8-10-94 05-~~ ~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 2/13/78 JSG HSCA re 12/22/77 Request re Rottman
Serial
~~Classified by SP6BJN/GCL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 2/8/85

Date: 2/10/60

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico (100-743G)

Subject: MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

SYNOPSIS

LOPEZ MATEOS' SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP (cont.)(page 2): Recent South American trip of Mexican President gave emphasis to need for coordinated effort in resolving economic problems of Latin America. Talks dealt with stimulation of commerce, but for present principal importance of trip seems to have been emotional rather than materialistic. DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS (page 3): While recently in Caracas, Venezuela, SIQUEIROS made statements critical of both Mexican President and Mexican Revolution. Mexican administration and public angered by remarks. CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION (page 3): Cuba. Meeting sponsored by Society of Friends of Cuba held at Mexico City, 1/17/60, to demonstrate support for Cuban Government. Nicaragua: Report received that Cuban Government still planning to support invasion of Nicaragua with pro-Communist elements. Haiti: Political situation reported to be deteriorating. [PARTIDO COMUNISTA [U] MEXICANO - PCM (COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO)(page 6): XIII National Congress, scheduled for 2/22-26/60, again postponed to provide more time for holding of State Congresses and preparation of discussion material. POCM representatives to be invited to attend Congress. Federal District Committee to step up dues collections and general cell activity. JCM held plenum 1/11-14/60.](U) PARTIDO POPULAR - PP (POPULAR PARTY)(page 7): PP being reorganized and members being solicited to submit background and other data. PP held annual New Year's banquet on 2/6/60. PP inaugurated Pioneers, Boy Scout type organization, on 2/5/60. VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO (page 8): LOMBARDO was principal speaker at PP New Year's banquet and generally spoke favorably of government of LOPEZ MATEOS and his trip to South America. [SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES](S) (page 9): [VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN] identified as [new Soviet principal of MEX-87.](S) Latter made trip to Los Angeles in [January,] 1960, and reported [S] to Soviets.](S) pg 9

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REC 74 - 221 - 417

8 - Bureau
1 - Mexico City 3
JNS/GFM/SWP/JTG:plb
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FEB 15 1960
SEC.D (JFK)
~~CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/kdl~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON~~

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SD, Hoover & Rio
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NAT. SEC.

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Cuban Exile Activities

On January 28, 1960, PSI MIGUEL ANDRES DE LEON ROJAS reported that responsible Cuban exile groups in Mexico City and the United States, who have supported Dr. EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, are convinced that General JOSE ELEUTERIO PEDRAZA CABRERA, who commands a group of Cuban military exiles in the Dominican Republic, would not be a wise selection as the military leader of the attempt to overthrow the CASTRO government. The PSI further advised that these Cuban exile groups believe that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, would be a much better military leader. (~~S~~)(~~S~~)(U)

The PSI also advised that information received from sources within Cuba reflected that FIDEL CASTRO had prepared a decree ordering the United States to vacate the Guantanamo Naval Base. According to this information, the decree was originally prepared in late November, 1959, but had not yet been signed for issuance. (~~S~~)(~~S~~)(U)

The PSI further reported that he had heard reports in Miami, Florida, of an invasion attempt which allegedly would be made by supporters of ROLANDO MASFERRER, a Cuban exile who resides in Miami. The PSI stated that MASFERRER, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and their associates form a group which is not regarded in a favorable light by responsible Cuban exiles or by responsible elements within Cuba. The PSI stated that from the information available to him in Miami he doubted very much that MASFERRER would be able to make an attempt at invading Cuba or, if an attempt were made, that it would be successful. (~~S~~)(U)

Nicaragua

PSI DE LEON also advised on January 28 that he had received information from within Cuba that ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA has not abandoned his project to utilize pro-Communist Nicaraguan exiles and Cuban "volunteers" in an attempt to invade Nicaragua. This source advised that approximately 400 guerrillas have been trained to make up the invasion force. The PSI stated he had received no information as to the timing of such an attempt, but expressed doubt that it would occur in the immediate future in view of the concern of the Cuban Government over a possible early invasion attempt by Cuban exiles. (~~S~~)(U)

528

age and is disposed to follow an international policy that will not only benefit Mexico but its sister Latin American countries who are bound together not only by historical ties but by the same economic and social conditions and identical perspectives. In apparent reference to DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS, leading PCM figure, he stated that some people, who are unable to understand national and international politics although they expound them daily, have been critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS' trip. During the course of the President's trip SIQUEIROS made a statement to the press wherein he criticized the President for not accepting a bid to visit Cuba and stated that President LOPEZ MATEOS was merely laying the ground work for a subsequent visit by President EISENHOWER. LOMBARDO was critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS in certain respects, particularly in connection with the imprisonment of the railroad strike agitators and PCM and POCM leaders.

ACTION TAKEN: None. Will be disseminated in the next report on the PP.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (S)

LAROB (S)

Investigation conducted by this office to identify "VALENTIN," the new Soviet principal of MEX-87, pointed to VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN, a Soviet Embassy employee who arrived in Mexico City with his family on November 5, 1959 (S). As soon as a photograph of BAKULIN became available, it was (S) shown to MEX-87 who immediately and positively identified him as his principal "VALENTIN." (S)

On January 11, 1960, MEX-87 returned to Mexico City (S) from a trip to Los Angeles. He thereafter kept a prearranged meeting with BAKULIN on January 18, 1960, and turned over to (S) him a report of his activities in Los Angeles, as well as a map and newspaper clippings gathered by LA 4199-S. BAKULIN (S) instructed MEX-87 to pick up a Soviet message on January 21, (S) 1960, from the dead drop at Pilares and Pestalozzi Streets. The message was to contain questions regarding MEX-87's (S) report on his trip to Los Angeles. BAKULIN also set up a (S) personal meeting for February 15, 1960. (S)

MEX-87 retrieved Soviet Message No. 22 on January 21 (S)

1960. Contrary to the usual custom, this message was typed (S) instead of being on undeveloped 35 mm. film. The Soviets (S) inquired how and where LA 4199-S keeps the notes of his observations and the newspaper clippings, among what type of (S) people does the Los Angeles informant initiate his contacts, (S) what his expenses have been, the manner in which the data on the displacement of a ship seen by the informants was obtained, (S) the intensity of traffic noted in the vicinity of the places (S) visited, the possibility of taking photographs, the security of the objectives, how LA 4199-S explains his trips to his (S) family, and the identity of the objectives on which data can be more easily secured. (S)

MEX-87 deposited his Message No. 22 in the established (S) dead drop on January 25, 1960, and generally answered the questions posed in the prior Soviet message. (S)

Soviet Message No. 23 was retrieved by MEX-87 on (S) February 8, 1960. It changed the personal meeting between (S) BAKULIN and MEX-87 from the third Monday of the month to the (S) last Monday of the month at the same time and place. (S)

ACTION TAKEN: None, pursuant to specific Bureau instructions.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10280-10030
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-77667-21

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/29/1964
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CC, SECADES, ROLANDO L. CUBELA, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONSPR, CUBA, CASTRO, FIDEL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

4

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-77667)

DATE: July 29, 1964

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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION ~~except for brackets~~
IN THIS DOCUMENT. ~~GMB 4-4-94~~
place in 105-131629
EXCEPT FOR
BRACKETS
K 5-26-98

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (109-471) (C)

SUBJECT: ROLANDO L. CUBELA Y SECADES
IS - CUBA

Remylet 10/11/63. AR 120

It is noted that CUBELA is a Cuban Government official whose desire to defect was made known by MM 761-S in June, 1962. [Thereafter, CIA apparently made contact with CUBELA in Europe through [CARLOS TEPEDINO, 9819 64th Avenue, Rego Park, Queens, New York,] a Cuban exile and long-time friend of MM 761-S, who frequently travels in Europe.] (~~S~~)(U)

MM 761-S advised that on July 15, 1964, he was visited by [CARLOS TEPEDINO,] at which time he confided (~~S~~)(U) certain information concerning CUBELA. He cautioned the informant to say nothing concerning their conversation which would permit the information to reach CIA or any other source through which it might become public, inasmuch as to do so might result in the death of persons in Cuba, as well as [TEPEDINO himself.] (~~S~~)(U)

[TEPEDINO] thereupon confided that he has been (~~S~~)(U) acting as the contact man between CIA and CUBELA. CUBELA is also in contact with [the Cuban Ambassador in Paris named CARRILLO,] who reportedly is anti-CASTRO. [CARRILLO (S) has been assisting both CUBELA and [TEPEDINO.] (~~S~~)(U)

According to [TEPEDINO,] CUBELA has been constantly (~~S~~)(U) complaining to him that CIA refuses to furnish him with certain necessary equipment with which he could take some

~~4/12/94 Classified by 5D8 MAC/KSR Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

Ltt to mm
NNN: 8/26/98 5-27-98

105-131629

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami
(1 - 109-471)
(1 - 134-379-Sub A)
THE/neb
(4)

REC. 23

105-77667-21

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JUL 30 1964

SECRET

NAT. INT. SEC.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/4/85 BY SP6BJA/ECL~~ #211,326

SECRET

effective action in Cuba. According to TEPEDINO, CUBELA desires some sort of compact equipment with which he can possibly eliminate CASTRO; however, CIA keeps offering him only large, bulky, unserviceable material. (~~S~~)(u)

According to TEPEDINO, there is now under discussion some plan to kill FIDEL CASTRO, in which CUBELA will figure. CIA allegedly was formerly in favor of such a plan; however, inasmuch as Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY would have no part of it, it was shelved. Now the plan has allegedly been brought up again for consideration. President JOHNSON allegedly is aware of it, and has not ruled against it. If set in motion, it will be scheduled to occur sometime before the elections in November. (~~S~~)(u)

TEPEDINO told the informant he has not been able to learn much more concerning this plan, other than that CUBELA is supposed to participate, that it is to be accomplished by men in Cuba, and possibly someone from Europe. (~~S~~)(u)

The informant advised TEPEDINO did not specifically indicate how he had acquired this information; however, the informant presumed from his manner of speaking that he had obtained it from CUBELA. (~~S~~)(u)

The above is for the information of the Bureau, and is not being submitted in form suitable for dissemination since both TEPEDINO and CUBELA are apparently of operational interest to CIA. Dissemination would also lead to the disclosure of MM 761-S. Although questioned closely, MM 761-S was not able to furnish any further details. (~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

380-10036

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10281-10028

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 62-80750-4563

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SHRODER, R. I.
TO : ROSEN

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/11/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

v9.1

3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ___
DeLoach ___
Mohr ___
Wick ___
Casper ___
Callahan ___
Conrad ___
Felt ___
Gale ___
Rosen ___
Sullivan ___
Tavel ___
Trotter ___
Tele. Room ___
Holmes ___
Gandy ___

TO : Mr. Rosen

9/25/95 Classified by 5668 SLD/mlc (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

DATE: March 15, 1967

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

FROM : R. I. Shroder

SUBJECT: [COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA] (U)
(U) [CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)]
(U) [INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA]
(U) [KIDNAPING

(S) (X) (U) #211326
Classified by SPL BJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 11/6/85

[C. I. A.] (S) (X) (U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of [a CIA employee Thomas Keogh.] No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. (S) (X) (S)

At our suggestion, [through liaison with CIA,] fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished (S) [to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA] on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: [Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh] (S) (X) (S)

1934 B. 1958 B. 1957 1957

na

ACTION:

Thomas Patrick Keogh Jr (X) (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachment be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

REC 33

ST-114

62-80750-4563

64-200-22-4

U.S. / VENEZ

na

FDT:emf
(7)

Fingerprints of following detached and filed in Ident. Div. - jsd
MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TERESA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III

341

71 MAR 29 1967

MAR 20 1967

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JM 6-25-97

(S)

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(SLD/KSR 8-2-97 JFK)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10284-10155
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-210-2088

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, PA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/29/1960
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	EPE, BAYO, ALBERTO, POLIT, REVOLUTIONARY ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

SECRET

8-1-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

SECRET

Date: July 29, 1960

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (109-24)

Subject: CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

5-15-95
Classified by 5668-SLD/mdc
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ (JFK)

Re Paris letter 7/21/60.

During a visit to Bern, Switzerland, the captioned matter was discussed with [BURTON LIFSCHULTZ, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Switzerland.] (S) He advised that the Cuban Ambassador, SALAZAR-SANCHEZ, had been dismissed by the Cuban Government and his replacement has not yet arrived. [LIFSCHULTZ] (S) advised that it has been rumored that he will be replaced by one BAYO. He stated that this individual has not as yet been definitely identified and no background information is available regarding him. He stated, however, that he may be identical with the son of "General" ALBERTO BAYO who has previously been reported as a Spaniard who assisted in the CASTRO revolution and who has reportedly been active in revolutionary activities in Spain. (S)

This is furnished for the information of the Bureau. In the event further specific information is received, the Bureau will be advised.

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JM 6-25-97

P
3 - Bureau (1 Havana)
1 - Madrid (sent direct)
1 - Paris
NWP:mas
(5)

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on 10/31/77
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA per req. 9/7/77
See Bufile 62-117290
DJC: mer

REC-9 109-12-210-9088

REC'D

AUG 5 1960

Copy to Havana
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 8-10-60
by

EX 109

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50 AUG 11 1960

Political Matters Cuba

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10284-10171
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-83720-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BARRON, JOHN R.
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/31/1959
PAGES :	18
SUBJECTS :	EPE, INTV, ARVIER, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL, AKA, EMP, RES, ASSOC, POLIT, INTEL ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF INS, CIA
COMMENTS :	REFERRED TO INS

FD-263 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE MIAMI	OFFICE OF ORIGIN MIAMI	DATE 12/31/59	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 10/9 - 12/28/59	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY JOHN R. BARRON	31 8	TYPED BY ems
MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, aka Maria Mendizabal, "Nene" Mendizabal		CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA		

REFERENCES: Butel to Miami, October 9, 1959. 7-9452-13
Miami letter to Director, November 4, 1959. 7-9452-14
Miami report of SA JOHN R. BARRON, November 23, 1959, captioned: UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM, KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

1/5/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

- P* -

2 copies made of Cover pg and pg 3
9/21/77 OJC/mer
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re reg 9/7/77
see Bufile 62-117290

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7-9452-
109-283-
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LEADS

REQUEST OF BUREAU

The Bureau is requested to refer instant matter to the Department for decision regarding the subject's activities while employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ and regarding her admission that she furnished information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described in instant report, concerning information obtained during her employment. There exists a possible violation of the Registration Act, over which this Bureau has jurisdiction.

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE — DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:
11 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 7-9452)
(1 - 109-283)
3 - New York (RM)
(1 - 7-877 - info
1 - 62-11817
1 - INS, New York
No. A-11039008)
4 - Miami (2 - 97-300; 1 - 7-47;
1 - 109-39)

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JM 6-25-97
SLD/KSR 8-1-97 (JFK)

85-83720

4 JAN 6 1960

[redacted]

OCT - 2

REC- 26

EX-117

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Notations:

STATE, CIA, G2, ONI, OSI (clnfd)
HAVANA
1/12/60
BY

A.
COVER PAGE

NAT. INT. SEC.

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION

ltr AAG 1/15/60 Fed

1-MM
1-NY

SECRET

MM 97-300

SECRET

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will report the decision rendered by the Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information copies have been furnished the New York Office, inasmuch as the subject of this investigation was formerly employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, whom the New York Office is currently investigating.

This investigation is being placed in a pending inactive status, pending departmental decision concerning the subject's activities while she was employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ.

The Bureau is advised that investigation appearing in this report conducted prior to October 9, 1959, was made concerning the subject inasmuch as she was suspected of plotting against MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ to arrange his abduction, the details of which have been reported in reference Miami report dated November 23, 1959 (Bufile 7-9452).

MM T-2, utilized in the details of this report was interviewed by Special Agents JOHN R. BARRON and WILLIAM B. HOLLOMAN, [at which time she identified herself as] a CIA informant in Havana (S) [and stated that she was employed as a secretary to] (S) ALBERTO BAYO, JR. ~~(S)~~

The Bureau is advised that all informants familiar with Latin American activities were contacted, and no information was received indicating that the subject was active in Cuban intelligence activities.

B.
- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

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The interviews appearing in this report with MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, Dr. CARLOS SISO, and the subject, appear on SF 64s and FD 302s in original form in Miami case file 7-475, captioned: "UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM; KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is [CIA, Havana,] (~~X~~)(U) information contained in Butel to Miami dated October 9, 1959	7-475-9
MM T-2 is [ANA ROSA GUERRA](S) (S)[admitted] CIA informant in Havana, [who works in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR., Director, Air Fumigation, Havana](S) ~~(X)~~	Instant report, page 7.
MM T-3 is JANET SUMMERS, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami Beach, Florida (nature of information)	Instant report, page 12.

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and they were concealed only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

C*

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Copy to: 1 - INS, New York (RM)

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pg. 7 Jm 6-25-97

Report of: SA JOHN R. BARRON
Date: December 31, 1959
Office: Miami

Field Office File #: 97-300
Bureau File #: 7-9452 109-283

Title: MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER

SLD/KSR
8-1-97
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

Synopsis: Subject, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, born November 26, 1916 in Cuba; Immigration and Naturalization Service Alien Registration No. A-11039008. [While employed in Miami Beach, Florida as secretary to MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan president, reported by MM T-1 to be plant and furnishing information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-1 described BAYO as being active in intelligence matters for the Cuban government.] Subject interviewed and admitted association with BAYO. ~~(S)~~ (U)

- P* -

1/5/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

DETAILS:

This investigation is predicated on information furnished by MM T-1, a United States government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, which advised on October 9, 1959 that the subject, "Nene" MENDIZABAL, was in contact with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described by MM T-1 as being engaged in intelligence activity for the Cuban government. ~~(S)~~ (U)

SUBJECT'S IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION STATUS

On October 9 and 30, 1959, the files of the District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), New York City, were caused to be reviewed by SA WILLIAM D. MEEHAN and reflected that on November 2, 1956, one MARIA MENDIZABAL, A11-039-008, date of birth November 26, 1916, in Havana, Cuba, filed an "Application for Immigration Visa and Alien Registration" at the

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

American Embassy, Havana, Cuba.

In this application MARIA MENDIZABAL furnished her place of birth as Cieba del Agua, Havana, Cuba, and claimed that she was known by no other names. Her occupation was furnished as that of office clerk, and her last permanent address as "Avenue 19 Number 8203, e/84, Marianao, Havana, Cuba". Her destination and address in the United States were furnished care of the Latina Shipping Company, Limited, 111 Wall Street, New York City, but this was crossed through in ink, and the address 321 East 43rd Street, New York 17, New York, was marked in. She possessed Cuban Passport Number 21566, issued September 20, 1955, by the Cuban Ministry of State at Havana, Cuba, valid until September 20, 1957. She was described as follows:

Race	White (Cuban)
Sex	Female
Height	5 feet 5 inches
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Fair
Marital Status	Divorced
Minor children	Sons - PEDRO FERNANDO FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL; NELSON JOSE FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL (ages not furnished)

B. APPROX. 1942 Cuba

Cuba

B. APPROX 1948

She claimed further in this application that she had previously applied for and was granted visas to enter the United States during 1952 and 1956, but the dates of her previous sojourns to the United States were not furnished.

MARIA MENDIZABAL submitted in support of this application a copy of her Certificate of Birth, Petition for Divorce, and a document attesting that she had no arrest record in Cuba, all of which were

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in the Spanish language.

Her file also contained an affidavit submitted by one EDUARDO M. GONZALEZ, 45 Fifth Avenue, New York City, an American citizen, who was born in Havana, Cuba. It was set out that GONZALEZ was the President and sole owner of the Latina Shipping Company, 111 Wall Street, New York City, and was desirous of bringing MENDIZABAL to the United States to work for the above company. The degree of relationship existing between GONZALEZ and MENDIZABAL was not set forth.

N.Y.

MARIA MENDIZABAL was granted an O-1 Visa, Number 5686, and arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida, on February 20, 1957. This was the only arrival or departure contained in the INS, New York records.

A search of the Alien Address Report Cards maintained at INS, New York, failed to reflect any record of MENDIZABAL for the years of 1958, and 1959.

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

MM T-1, on October 9, 1959, advised that MARIA MENDIZABAL, also known as "Nene" MENDIZABAL, employed as a secretary of ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ at Miami Beach, Florida, attempted to contact ALBERTO REVUELTA in Havana, at Havana telephone 29-5233, on October 9, 1959. MM T-1 advised that ALBERTO REVUELTA is identical with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., who, according to MM T-1, is engaged in intelligence activities for the Cuban government. MM T-1 believed that the subject was a plant and was furnishing information to BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. ~~(S)~~ (U)

SPAIN
APPROX. 1924

Prior to receipt of the above information as furnished by MM T-1 on October 9, 1959, the following

SECRET

MM T-2, [on October 24, 1959,] (S) advised that ALBERTO BAYO, JR., director of Air Fumigation, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, revealed [in early August, 1959] that "Nene" (S) MENDIZABAL, subsequently identified as MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, was sent on a delicate mission to Miami, and that in fifteen days, there would be an announcement in the press about PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-2 advised that he observed the subject [in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR. on three occasions] (S)

The following information was obtained in connection with investigation concerning another matter:

On October 29, 1959, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER was interviewed at Miami, Florida, by Special Agents CHARLES W. EDMISTON and JOHN R. BARRON.

MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, 1951 Park Avenue, Apartment 11, Miami Beach, Florida, after being advised of her right to be represented by counsel, that anything she might say could be used against her in a court of law, stated that she was born on November 26, 1916, at Havana, Cuba.

MENDIZABAL stated that she arrived in the United States on August 15, 1959, aboard Cubana Airlines, which departed Havana, Cuba, at approximately 5:30 p.m. on August 15, 1959. She stated that upon her arrival at the Miami International Airport, she was met by Dr. CARLOS SISO and INES DAVILA, as well as a friend of Dr. SISO, introduced to her as CARLOS PULIDO. FLA

MENDIZABAL advised that prior to her arrival in Miami, she had received a letter from INES DAVILA in the early part of August, 1959, wherein DAVILA advised her that PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan President, was seeking the services of a reliable and competent secretary. She stated DAVILA in her letter to her asked if she would be interested in this position to which she subsequently replied that she would accept the position as secretary to PEREZ JIMENEZ, as she was heavily in debt in Cuba.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10284-10172
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-82352-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/27/1959
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	EPE, GONZALEZ, CARLOS HILARIO, SUSP, CONSPR, MURDER, VENTURA, ESTEBAN
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

(571)

FBI

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Date: 10/27/59

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-)

CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ
IS - CUBA; RA - CUBA

8-1-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

Enclosed are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning an alleged plot by the subject to kill ESTEBAN VENTURA NOVO. The source of the information in enclosed memo is [ANA ROSA GUERRA, who contacted this office on 10/24/59 and advised she works for BERNARD L. BARKER, in an undercover capacity in Cuba, where she is employed as secretary to (S) ALBERTO BAYO COSGAYA, Chief of Air Fumigation-Technical, Cuban Air Force. BAYO has been described as a key figure in the Cuban Air Force and [was described by GUERRA] (S) as definitely a Communist. BARKER advised SA JOHN R. BARRON on 10/7/59 that he works for CIA in an undercover capacity in Cuba. This memorandum is classified confidential to protect the identity [of GUERRA] (S) who apparently is a CIA source. GUERRA returned to Cuba on 10/26/59. (S)

Information concerning the alleged plot against VENTURA has been furnished to the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Department of Public Safety. ESTEBAN VENTURA will be advised that there is possibly a plot to kill him but that no protection can be given him by this Bureau.

CUBA

Encl

Lee b. delay

10/4/95
Classified by 5668 SD/GCL
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2 copies made
9/27/77 DJC/mr
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re reg 9/7/77
see bufile 62-117290

③ - Bureau (AM)(Encl-11)(RM)
4 - Miami (2 - 105- CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ)
(1 - 105-1715, Cuban Retailiation Against Batista Adherents)
(1 - 105-1720, ESTEBAN VENTURA)

WBH:sll
(7)

1 cc RAB
AGENCY State, CIA, G2-ONI (info)
REQ. REC'D OSI, INS, Havana (cc of airtel)
DATE FORW. 11-2-59
HOW FORW. RTS
BY VHN/SP

REC 7

105 - 82352 - 1

18 OCT 30 1959

ENCLOSURE

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Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

63 NOV 17 1959

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10285-10254

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 03/23/1967
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM, MEMO

~~CONFID~~ENTIAL

4/3/67

SECRET

airtel

1 - Mr. DeBuck

To: SAC, Miami [(134-1198)] (S)
REC 54

From: Director, FBI [(134-14264)] — 72] (S)

[DOLPHIN
IS - CU] (S)

EX 106

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Reurairtel and LHM both dated 3/23/67.

You are authorized to have [informant] pass to his Cuban principal] the information set forth in reLHM. (S)

HLD:brr
(4)

NOTE: [Clearance for passage] (S) was obtained by Liaison Section 3/30/67.

~~#211,326~~
~~Classified by SP8BTJ/gcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(5668 SLD/GCL - 5/10/95 - JFK)~~

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ [illegible]
~~DATE 6-05-~~[illegible]

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 2/4/98

MAILED 19
MAR 31 1967
COMM-FBI

SECRET

APR 7 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FBI

Date: March 23, 1967

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

11/21/97 CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)
JFK

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (134-14264) (S)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (134-1198) (S) (P)

RE: DOLPHIN
IS - CUBA (S)

~~Classified by SP4BTS/gel~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(SP[illegible]/GCL 4/26/84 JFK)~~

WBW dc

ReMiamilet 2/20/67.

In accordance with instructions concerning the handling of double agents, (S) there are attached hereto the original and 9 copies of a letterhead memorandum. The letterhead memorandum has been classified "SECRET," in order to protect the identity of a double agent of continuing value to the U.S. (S)

(S) As set forth in referenced letter, DOLPHIN's principal requested him to furnish information on a monthly basis concerning anti-CASTRO activities in the U.S. (S)

(S) In view of this, the Miami Office will have the informant prepare, and the Miami Office will forward a letter containing the information set out in the attached letterhead memorandum. This information will be prepared in secret writing. (S)

REC 42 134-14264-72 (S)

The Bureau is requested to advise whether or not DOLPHIN (S) will be authorized (S) to make the information available to his Cuban principal on April 7, 1967. (S)

EX-113

Limited to MM 4/3/67 HLD

3 - Bureau (Encl. - 10) (AM - RM)
1 - Miami
JEM:ems
(4)

ENCLOSURE

MAR 24 1967
4-3

LATIN AMERICAN

cc retained 622 D

61 APR 10 1967

SECRET

Approved: ____________________ Sent ______ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 23 1967

SECRET

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/MDC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)
(5668 SLD lecc 5/4/98 - JFK)

~~SECRET~~
["FISHFACE"](S)

~~Classified by SAS BTT/gcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/30/84
~~(SAS MAC/ECL 9/26/94 JFK)~~

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States ~~(S)~~

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: ~~(S)~~(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. ~~(S)~~(U)

At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information ~~(S)~~(U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 7-6-98
SLD/KSR 8-8-98 (JFK)

[Approved By USER (S)
by Jack Corbett, CIA]
Thomas Y. O'Loughlin
3/30/67
WOB

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

[64-14261 - 72](S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE

SECRET

could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States. (S)

It is requested that clearance be granted (S) for the Cuban alien to furnish this data to his Cuban principal. (S) (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)
(5668 SLO/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET
"FISHFACE" (S)

~~Classified by~~ SP8 BJT/gcl
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/30/84
~~(SP8MAC/GCL 5/26/94 JFK)~~

The above code name (S) has been assigned to a Cuban alien (S) whose activities are being directed (S) against a Cuban intelligence service (S) He was requested by his Cuban principal (S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (~~S~~)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (~~S~~) (U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (~~S~~) (U)

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SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

CONFIDENTIAL

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States](~~S~~/U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted](S) for [the Cuban alien](S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.](S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CON~~FIDEN~~TIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mjk
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET

["FISHFACE"] (S)

~~Classified by~~ SPS BJ/gcl
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/3/84
~~SPS MAC/GCL - 9/28/94 - JFK~~

The above [code name] (S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien] (S) whose activities are being [directed] (S) against a [Cuban intelligence service] (S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal] (S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. ~~(S)~~

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SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

CON~~FIDEN~~TIAL

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted](S) for [the Cuban alien](S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.](S)

This information should not be disseminated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 23 1967

11/2/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/nik
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98-JFK)
(JFK)

SECRET

~~Classified by SP8 BTT/gcd~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(SP8 MAC/GCL 9/26/94-JFK)~~

["FISHFACE"](S)

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (~~S~~)

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SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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It is requested that [clearance be granted] (S) for [the Cuban alien] (S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.] (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10236

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 97-4546-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/24/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MR, MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO, ACA, INTERNAL RESISTANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/11/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

RA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-94 BY SP8 MAC/KSR

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/490,978 (JFK)

SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 24 OCTOBER 1961

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 25 1961
CIA SJP

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. OCTOBER 1961

REFERENCES IN 11257

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-30,995

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE (5) [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT Brackets
KP 11-18-97
SLD/KSR 1-7-98
(JFK)

③

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO. HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

REC- 46 97-4546-9

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

OCT 31 1961

STATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO FBI
I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

1 PC - Miami by 0-7 (info)
10-30-61

66 NOV 3 1961

97-4546

291-10236 78

Oct 27 9 26 AM '61
REC'D
DOM INTELL DIV.

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/22/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10319

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-117262-25, 24

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, PA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 08/18/1965
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
SBE, REL, WINNER, MIRIAM FINKELMAN, AKA, PERSONAL HISTORY AND BKG

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC 2 MEMO, LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

SECRET

DATE: 10/6/65

FROM SAC, CINCINNATI (105-3048)(C)

SUBJECT: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER
IS - CUBA
(00: Cincinnati)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT except brackets
MKH 2-6-98

Re Legat, Paris, letter to Bureau 8/18/65.

Enclosed for Bureau are nine copies of letterhead memorandum with accompanying evaluation memo concerning captioned matter. It is classified Confidential because of the source from which the information emanated.

The source is identified as Liaison Section of (S) [CIA] American Embassy, Madrid Spain (S)

Cincinnati is closing its case since subject is in Spain, has never been to the U. S., and there is no reason to believe she will come to this country within the near future.

2-Bureau (Enc. 9) (RM)
1-Cincinnati

RFM:blb
(3)

ENCLOSURE

4/4/96
Classified by ~~[illegible]~~ JFK
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ JFK

5-30-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

EX-112

REC- 43

105-117262-25

1 OCT 7 1965

SECRET

cc - Miami - info
4/26/66 [illegible]

Copy to: CIA/STATE/RAO
ONI/OSI/ACSI
By routing slip for info.
Date 10/15/65 by

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER

SECRET

(U)

Sam Benton	1800 SOUTH TREASURE DRIVE MIAMI BEACH, FLA. Brother - same as above
Francis Lyons	Sister - 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	Brother - 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	Sister - Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	Niece - 57 State Road, Portland, Maine

According to [Dr. Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Winer in Santa Clara,] (S) she is currently Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said she is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas. According to the knowledge of the source, they are not married. The source could not furnish any additional information concerning Winer's activities and stated there is no indication she will leave Spain and come to the United States. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

821-1031

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GO RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/18/65

SECRET

FROM : LEGAT, PARIS (105-3551) (RUC)

Nup/ng

SUBJECT: MIRIAM FINKELMAN WINNER
IS - CUBA
(OO - Cincinnati)

(6)

WIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

FO-217

Encl

Re Cincinnati letter to Bureau 6/29/65.

There are enclosed for the Bureau and Cincinnati each one copy of a memorandum dated 8/9/65 prepared by the Liaison Section [(CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, containing background information regarding the captioned subject. (S) [redacted]

It appears that the subject is presently residing in Madrid and is employed as the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. (U)

The Consular Section has no record of an application for a United States visa from the subject. We have requested that they advise us in the event a visa application is received.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION except for brackets
IN THIS DOCUMENT. MKH 2-6-98

4 - Bureau (Encs. - 2) ENCLOSURE
(1 - Liaison Section)
(1 - Cincinnati, 105-3048)
1 - [Paris] (X)
NWP:eim
(5)

5-30-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

~~Classified by~~ 1/14/96
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ JFK

REC- 54 105-117262-24

14 AUG 26 1965

SECRET

MCT-45

UUG 53 3 38 bM ,62
DOW IИTELL DIV
BEC,D

+ Encl -
Copy to Cincinnati
by routing slip for
☐ info ☒ action
date 8-25-65
by jw/js

53 SEP 1 1965

NAT. INT. SEC.

5d1-103id

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Consular Section 9 August 1965

FROM: Liaison Section

SUBJECT: Miriam Finkleman WINNER (or WINER)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except brackets
MKH 2-6-98

SLD/IBR
5-30-98
(JFK)

According to usually reliable Cuban exile sources in Madrid, the Subject was born in Poland on 5 February 1922; she became a Cuban citizen in 1945. Subject arrived in Madrid, Spain, on 12 May 1963, bearing Cuban passport #34059 issued on 24 July 1956. Her last known address in Cuba was Ronda 17, Apt. 18, Habana.

The following is Subject's educational history:

JFK
ALL [illegible] CONTAINED
HEREIN IS [illegible]
DATE 1/14/95 BY sp7 [illegible]

1930 to 1936	- Primary school at Ludwipol, Poland
1938 to 1942	- High school-Instituto Marianao, Habana
1942 to 1947	- University of Habana (degree in Philosophy and Letters)
1958	- University of Columbia, New York (summer school studying German literature).

From 1956 to 1961, Subject was a professor of literature and languages at the Central University in Santa Clara, Las Villas. She held the same position from 1961 to 1962 at the University of Habana. She reportedly speaks English, German and Spanish fluently.

On arrival in Madrid in 1963, Subject listed the following members of her immediate family:

Ana Winner	- mother	- 1800 S. Treasure Drive, Miami Beach, Florida
Sam Benton	- brother	- same as above
Francis Lyons	- sister	- 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	- brother	- 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	- sister	- Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	- niece	- 57 State Road, Portland, Maine.

According to [Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Subject in Santa Clara,] the Subject is currently the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said Subject is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas; to Source's knowledge, they are not married. Source has no additional information concerning Subject's current activities.

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

105-117

ENCLOSURE

521-10318

C O N F I D E N T I A L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10300-10012
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-147458-52

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/14/1967
PAGES :	8
SUBJECTS :	MR, LORIE, JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO, RES, POLIT ACT, TRA, ASSOC, POLIT PRISONERS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS ON PG. 2 JM 9-3-97

FBI

Date: 7-14-67

Transmit the following in _(Type in plaintext or code)_

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL _(Priority)_

5668 SLD/md 12/16/97 (JFK)
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)(6) (JFK) 11/18/97

SLD/KSR 10-11-97 (JFK)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF [illegible] DATE 5/14/80

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

O-1 mm(2) 10/11/67 10/10/67

REC 82

~~#211,326~~
Classified by ~~SP8BTS/gcl~~
Declassify on: OADR ~~7/84~~

~~JFK~~ SP8 ~~KSR~~ 6-6-94

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-147458)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9977) (P)

SUBJECT: COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN
(CPLLC - COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION
OF THE ONE HUNDRED)
IS - CUBA

ch

place cc in 105-162207 (U) C Roblejo
(U) 105-80787 (Cuban Intelligence activities)

Re Miami airtels 7-10-67, captioned "JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE, IS - CUBA" and "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka - PSI, IS - CUBA".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 14 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above. Extra copies of this LHM are being furnished for transmittal to Legats, Ottawa (2) and Mexico City (1).

It is to be noted limited dissemination has been made concerning this matter and the enclosed LHM due to the sensitivity of the information concerning the

(page 3)

REC 82 105-147458-52

ENCLOSURE

5-Bureau (Enc. 14) (RM)
  (1-Legat, Mexico City 105-4967)
  (1-Legat, Ottawa 105-3083)
1-New York (info) (105-77103) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-San Juan (info) (105-9215) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-Washington Field (info) (105-69372) (Enc. 1) (RM)
3-Miami
  (1-105-9977)
  (1-105-12062) (Roblejo)
  (1-134-1433-Sub-A)
JDH/al
(11)

ST-103

~~ST-109~~

11 JUL 19 1967

1 copies made of serial 52 3/9/78 JSG Re: M. Raf for review at FBIHQ by HSCA RE: 12/14/77 REQUEST

(5)

1 cc airtel + 1 encl Sec Legat (info)
1 cc airtel + 2 cc encl. to Legat Ottawa (action) furnish cc to RCMP (U)

State/CIA/[redacted]/RAO/LINS
Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/[redacted]
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State
By R/S For Info
Date 7-20-67 By VHN/eh

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 105-162207 105-80787

LATIN AMERICAN

62 AUG 4 1967

SECRET

possibility of ROBLEJO being involved in possible intelligence activities.

The FBI does not actually utilize Building T90 or T94 to conduct interviews of Cuban refugees. However, CIA under the guise of U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewers interrogate these arrivals at this location (S) A supply of the FBI "aviso" and the Director's message to newly arrived Cubans are distributed at this location. (S)

It is to be recalled previous investigation has disclosed ROBLEJO has been in contact with REINALDO ABREU, (S) Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and connected with Cuban Intelligence (S)

Also on June 29, 1967, MM 1115-S (S) reported LUIS RICARDO ALONSO, former Cuban Ambassador to London, who defected in 1965, has been in correspondence with ABREU, (S) having been introduced to him by RAUL ROA, Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations, in 1964. ABREU (S) reportedly is in charge of dealing with Cuban exile groups and Cuban guerrilla groups and more specifically, has been in contact with ROBLEJO (S)(U) since he, ABREU (S) is handling the matter of Cuban political prisoners. In addition, ABREU, since he is unable to travel (S) to Miami, has requested ALONSO to come to Mexico or to (S) converse with NICOLAS RODRIGUEZ AZTARAEN, attached to the (S) Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York City in (S) connection with this matter (U). (S)

MM T-1 is SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO.

The enclosed LHM is classified SECRET to protect the identity of a potential informant of continuing value.

In the event the Bureau decides that the enclosed LHM may be disseminated, a copy of this LHM may be furnished to the RCMP inasmuch as it does not contain any information (U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10300-10024
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-162207-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/10/1967
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	[Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Class
DATE 5/10/84 [illegible]

F B I SECRET

Date: 7/10/67

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

Mr. Tolson____
Mr. DeLoach____
Mr. Mohr____
Mr. Wick____
Mr. Casper____
Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. Felt____
Mr. Gale____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Sullivan____ ✓
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Trotter____
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

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IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 9-3-97
EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
ON PG. 2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

REC 11

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-12062) (P)

SUBJECT: JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

OO: Miami

Re Miami airtel dated 6/21/67, captioned COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN (CPLLC) (COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED), IS - CUBA.

On 7/5/67, SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, 35 West 9th Street, Apartment 4, Hialeah, Florida, telephone 887-7218, voluntarily furnished the following information:

10-11-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/HSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
HLD
(JFK)

#211,326
Classified by ~~SP8 BTJ~~/gel SP8 MAE/KSL 8-23-94 (JFK)
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ 5/2/84

⑧ - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 105-147458)(CPLLC)
(2 - Legat, Mexico)(Info.)
(1 - 105-4947)(CPLLC)
(2 - Legat, Ottawa)(Info.)
(1 - 105-3083)(CPLLC)
2 - New York (Info.)(RM)
(1 - 105-77103)(CPLLC)
2 - San Juan (Info.)(RM)
(1 - 105-9215)(CPLLC)
3 - Miami
(1 - 134-New)(Betancourt Collazo)
(1 - 105-9977)(CPLLC)
JDH:jhk
(15)

2cc Ottawa + 2cc Mexico
7/17/67 mw

EX-103

REC 11

5 [illegible]

105-162207 3

Serial

JUL 20 1967

copies made
2/9/78 JSG
R M Rey
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/16/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

105-162207

C. C. Wick

SECRET

memo w/encl to Sullivan
Re: CPLLC
mw 7/12/67

airtel to MM 7/19/67
2-NY VHN:ekw
2-SJ
2-MEX

105-147458-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

BETANCOURT indicated that he had been the General Coordinator of the 30th of November anti-Castro organization in Cuba during 1959, 1960 and the first part of 1961. He arrived in the United States at Miami on June 29, 1961, via small boat. Upon his arrival in the United States, he assumed leadership of the 30th of November movement in Miami until approximately October, 1962, when he entered the U. S. Army under the Cuban recruitment program at Fort Jackson, S. C. Subsequent to this, he has been affiliated with the 30th of November movement in Chicago for approximately two years, 1963-1965, and in Miami, 1965 to date.

BETANCOURT is currently employed as a security guard for the National Patrol Detective Agency and the National Industrial Security Corporation (affiliates), 590 S. W. 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. In connection with this employment, he is a guard at the Cuban Refugee Processing Center of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) three days a week. The Processing Center is located in Buildings T-90 and T-94 which are utilized by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in processing, fingerprinting and photographing Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States. [(CIA [under the guise of INS interviewers] interrogates these arrivals [at this location).] (S) (S)

BETANCOURT related he met ROBLEJO around the first of January, 1967, when ROBLEJO reportedly returned from Mexico City where he had been attempting to seek the release of Cuban political prisoners in Cuba. He met ROBLEJO through ANGEL ESTEVEZ, a coworker of BETANCOURT at the Hotel Fontainebleau where both were employed as waiters at that time. At the request of ESTEVEZ, BETANCOURT furnished ROBLEJO a table gratis at the Frank Sinatra show at the Fontainebleau Hotel, for which ROBLEJO was apparently grateful. As a result of this, ROBLEJO sought BETANCOURT's assistance in attempting to obtain the release of political prisoners and recently BETANCOURT was made a member of the Executive Committee of the CPLLC.

In this connection, BETANCOURT accompanied ROBLEJO to San Juan, Puerto Rico, the first week of June, 1967. BETANCOURT by this time had the impression ROBLEJO was actually anti-United States and he considered ROBLEJO a "leftist-socialist." While in Puerto Rico, they met with MANOLO RAY and RUFO LOPEZ FRESQUET. ROBLEJO discussed the possibility of RAY and LOPEZ FRESQUET becoming active in seeking the release of Cuban political prisoners. However, no definite agreement or conclusion was reached.

SECRET

BETANCOURT stated that on or about June 15, 1967, he and ROBLEJO, while temporarily staying at 2930 Loiza, Santurce, Puerto Rico, were having a general conversation and ROBLEJO changed the topic to BETANCOURT's current work as a security guard at the Miami Airport where the Cuban refugees are processed. ROBLEJO asked detailed questions concerning the nature of the activities at this location, to which BETANCOURT explained that Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States are processed here, including having their photographs taken, being fingerprinted, and being interrogated. ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if the FBI was there, which BETANCOURT acknowledged in the affirmative, and ROBLEJO asked, "What do they do there?" BETANCOURT answered, "They investigate and clear all of the refugees arriving from Cuba in the United States." ROBLEJO was interested in knowing if BETANCOURT saw "those papers" and BETANCOURT stated he had seen them. (BETANCOURT indicated this was entirely fictitious, but since he did not trust ROBLEJO, he felt he might be in a position to be of possible assistance to the U. S. Government). ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if he could "photograph...take a picture of the documents or the people the FBI investigates." BETANCOURT asked ROBLEJO if he was "crazy," stating that if he did something like that, he could be put in the "electric chair." ROBLEJO indicated that with the use of a small camera, this could be accomplished very easily. Almost immediately, the topic was changed and BETANCOURT indicated to ROBLEJO he had to leave San Juan immediately because his child had just broken his collar bone. BETANCOURT also indicated to ROBLEJO that his, BETANCOURT's, wife had called and said she did not have any money in the house to buy food, etc. At this point, ROBLEJO gave BETANCOURT a check in the amount of $300.00, drawn on the First National Bank of Miami, on the account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred. ROBLEJO made out this check in BETANCOURT's presence and requested $50.00 be given to ROBLEJO's mother. Immediately, BETANCOURT cashed the check and sent a money order to his wife, ERMITAS RAMON ARIAS.

BETANCOURT stated ROBLEJO had given him $50.00 in cash prior to their departure for Puerto Rico.

BETANCOURT advised he returned to Miami from Puerto Rico on June 18, 1967, and ROBLEJO remained in San Juan until June 28, 1967. He recalled ROBLEJO attempted to have him stay in Puerto Rico and was "mad" at BETANCOURT for leaving early.

On June 30, 1967, ROBLEJO telephonically contacted BETANCOURT, during which conversation ROBLEJO indicated he

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SECRET

planned to go to Venezuela, Panama and Ottawa, Canada, and would see BETANCOURT upon his return. ROBLEJO is interested in obtaining a Mexican visa in order to go to Cuba to possibly converse with FIDEL CASTRO or other important leaders in the communist government of Cuba in connection with the possible release of Cuban political prisoners.

Local stops have been placed with INS in order to be notified of ROBLEJO's return to the United States.

Miami plans to locate and possibly monitor the bank account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred and any other accounts where ROBLEJO is the authorized signature of an account.

The Bureau is being requested in a separate communication captioned "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka "Ariel," PSI - CUBA," to grant authority to contact him in order to follow up in connection with ROBLEJO's request as mentioned above in the event ROBLEJO attempts to pursue this matter further.

The Bureau will be kept advised. **LHM incorporating pertinent data regarding subject's activities will be promptly furnished to the Bureau.**

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10311-10292

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-27799-513

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, BR
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 12/23/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
USSS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/27/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GOVER   ENT

Memorandum

TO 4: Director, FBI

DATE: 12/23/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (62-70) (RUC)

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH SECRET SERVICE
THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

ReBulet 11/19/64. 62-27799-507

Files of Legat, Bern, have been reviewed for individuals residing in Switzerland and Austria considered to be a possible threat to the President, and no one was found to fit this category.

In addition, discreet inquiry was made of the following sources, all of whom had no knowledge of individuals who might be considered threats:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Consular Section, the Embassy, Bern;
[Office of Special Assistant [(covert CIA),] (S)
the Embassy, Bern;
American Consulate General, Vienna;
[Research Branch [(covert CIA)], the Embassy,] (S)
Vienna; (S)
Security Officer, the Embassy, Vienna.

In this regard, however, Bureau attention is called to the case entitled PAUL GEORGE ANDERSON, aka, IS-X (Bufile 100-415051). ANDERSON has been reported to be of interest to the Secret Service (Legat, Paris, letter dated 10/16/64). While he does not reside in territory covered by this office, he is in rather frequent transit en route to Hungary, where he is attempting to obtain a visa for his Hungarian wife to enter the U.S.

100-415051-
62-109060-

3-14-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
2 - Bern
(1 - 105-213)

REC- 108 62-27799-513

HDG:mls
(5)

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IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except Brackets
KP 5-18-98

14 DEC 28 1964

SECRET

LIAISON

JAN 5 1965

64 JAN 6 1965

10311-105-65

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10320-10087

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-409763-79

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BR
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 05/13/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
MARK LANE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

5-126 (9-19-62)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763) DATE: 5/13/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-284) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MARK LANE
SM - C

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K 5-6-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 4/21/97

SLD/KSR 5-27-98
(JFK)

Re Bulet 4/20/64.

Security information furnished by referenced communication was disseminated to the indicated sources of this office on 5/4/64 :

☒ [Abteilung II - Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium Für Inneres (Austrian Security Police), Vienna, Austria.] (S)

☐ Security Branch, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

☐ U. S. Consulate General, Vienna, Austria.

☐ [Schweizerisches Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland.] (S)

☒ Other: [Research Branch [(covert CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Vienna.] (S)

Data furnished to the U. S. sources was classified Confidential.
Material furnished to the foreign sources will be handled as Confidential under existing security agreements.

Appropriate notations are maintained in the files of the indicated sources to insure that this office will be notified in the event subject comes to their attention.

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(4)

EX-115
100-409763-79
REC-49
6 MAY 18 1964

SUBV [illegible] FROM

SECRET

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

68 MAY 22 1964
58

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10325-10318

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-80750-4166

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 09/11/1963
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC MEMO, SUMMARY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT as Sanitized 11/9/98

SECRET

Wash DC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. J. ~~MC~~ CONE

John A.

Although Mr. McCone has indicated he will not be raising any problems or issues, the Director may find the following of assistance:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortunately we have been successful in establishing very effective working relations with several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with CIA, there were two situations during the past year which had a significant bearing on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency that he had been trained as a Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau. We lodged very vigorous protest (re: Alwin Odio Tamayo). (S) The other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the aforementioned Board should be retracted because the communication included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were predicated on information which had been given to us by two top CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also "the Director of Central Intelligence" and in

11/13/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mde
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(JFK)

62-80750-4166

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S. agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA. Set forth are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet leaders. This information has been most valuable to CIA in following developments particularly the differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced highly valuable information of use to CIA.

GIMME (S)

This is a highly sensitive penetration of the Czech Intelligence Service. His information [S] has significantly assisted CIA in obtaining a current picture of the Czech intelligence organization. [S]

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensitive Czech source, Gimme, is [S] scheduled to return to Czechoslovakia. Arrangements [S] have been made to make him available to CIA.

FEDORA

Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence operations abroad. In addition, we have given the agency data pertaining to the organization and functions of KGB.

SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country, we have identified Soviet mail drops in other areas and we have given this valuable information to CIA.

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under agreed-to restrictions we have permitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite visitors in this country for the purpose of assessing their potential as sources when they return to their native countries.

CUBAN SOURCES

We have afforded CIA the opportunity to brief Bureau sources before such sources made trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to intercepted radio communications being utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau has been far ahead of CIA in identifying agents mentioned in the communications and has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

The Bureau has been very successful in identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing techniques. We have made this knowledge available to CIA.

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

TOPHAT

CIA did an excellent job of servicing drops in Moscow in this very sensitive case. This was done at considerable risk and was productive for us. [S]

SECRET

DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

There have been a number of instances where CIA operated Soviet double agents outside of the U.S. and then made these individuals available to the Bureau for use in the U.S. In this connection it is also noted that in our development of the sensitive sources, Fedora (KGB penetration) and Gimme (penetration of Czech Intelligence Service) CIA furnished valuable assistance. (S)

VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE

Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that one of its employees had been contacted by the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we conducted investigation which led to the ouster of a Soviet official and very favorable publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE IN MEXICO (S)

Through surveillances and surreptitious entry, CIA produced valuable information in our investigation of Franz Froehlich, a GRU Agent whom we since have doubled. (S)

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

CIA has been most cooperative in making defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA has made certain documents and equipment available to the Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory, at no cost, a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we gained access to an individual who subsequently became a valuable informant in the labor rackets field (NY 3936-C).

SECRET

FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S)

SECRET

Information provided by a sensitive CIA source has been very useful in following the activities of French agents in the U. S. (S)

POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO

JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

This is the National Security Agency employee who supplied information to the Soviets and who committed suicide in July of this year. We recently received information from our sensitive source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is particularly concerned about the possibility that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets information which led to the compromise of Oleg Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case has been raising questions concerning the effectiveness of security within U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress eventually may initiate some inquiry and he already has been informed that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking into the matter. Last week Mr. McCone asked Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security. McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning our careful screening of applicants and our strong administrative controls including inspections. It was emphasized that the Bureau always resolved security problems in favor of the FBI rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone was told that the key to the situation appeared to be tight screening and control procedures and the willingness to take prompt action.

COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE U. S.

In the Spring of this year, McCone brought up this matter before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently

SECRET

SECRET

had a discussion with Mr. Belmont. Essentially, McCone is most interested in technical coverage of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc countries. He has left the impression that in his opinion such coverage could be expanded in the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence and more sources. Our coverage in this field at the present time is quite extensive. With regard to CIA, we have the understanding that if the agency desires particular technical coverage, we will give each request the necessary consideration.

FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S)

In the early part of this year, we initiated extensive investigation of the alleged French (S) agents in this country on the basis of data furnished to us by a sensitive CIA source. This source has informed CIA that De Gaulle has (S) embarked on an extensive espionage program in the U.S. primarily designed to collect scientific data which will enable France to hasten its (S) development of a nuclear capability. We have disseminated the results of our investigation to CIA and we are continuing the handling of numerous leads. The information developed by us so far has failed to disclose any evidence that the French are stealing any classified (S) secrets in the U.S. The French appear to be (S) obtaining voluminous information available to the French through normal contacts between (S) French officials and their counterparts in the (S) U. S.

TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a drop in Moscow. (S) The message included information concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany and Austria. We have given this data to CIA. In addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as June, 1963. The delay in obtaining the communication prevented us from getting into the Dunlap Case well before the subject committed suicide.

SECRET

CIA did not service the drop because our informant did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently did not use the signal in order to fully protect himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to service the drop until August because State Department adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to conduct any activity in Moscow. This position was taken by State because it felt that any operational activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. (S)

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to the U. S. under CIA control, feuded with the agency, left for England under British Intelligence control and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his return, he has met with the Attorney General and with McCone. He has been extremely critical of the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely valuable information for all U.S. agencies including the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past, Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The Director has made it very clear that he will not see Golitzyn.

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official of the Polish Security Service who defected in January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many complaints. He has communicated with the President, the Attorney General and has been in contact with a Congressman. He is slated to testify before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all failure to comply with his needs. We have had access to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of information. However, we have been most careful not to become involved in the feud between him and CIA. We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA any information received from Goleniewski which might be of assistance to the agency.

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

For your information, McCone has found this Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was established several years ago by the Eisenhower administration then continued by President Kennedy. It is designed to periodically review foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The present chairman of the committee is Clark Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne. Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as this Board looking into his operations. There is some indication that his irritation arises from personal differences with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his government that he had been working for the Soviets. Wennerstrom was in the U. S. from 1952 until 1957 and was collaborating with the Russians while he was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage report" should be prepared on this case and he expressed the opinion that this should be the responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage, he was referring to an evaluation of all information which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S. We have taken the position that we will not prepare such a damage report and if one is needed the work should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the unknown Soviet agent. We do have a suspect, [John S. [S] Barescu] who was born in Russia and who has been working for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this matter but he is very much concerned about the situation. We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent developments.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10098

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 06/10/1953
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 10, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay VPK

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

Tolson
Ladd ✓
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, is in charge of [the Special Projects] unit located in the Foreign Intelligence division of CIA. (S) [During past year he has been very cooperative and has volunteered voluminous information of interest to Bureau. At the present time he more or less falls in category of Confidential Informant. In order to handle his material in a more efficient and secure manner, it is being recommended that a control file be created. Section Chiefs are also being alerted regarding the handling of information received from Angleton.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the attached memorandum be disseminated to all Section Chiefs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which sets forth instructions concerning the handling of information transmitted to the Bureau by Angleton.

7-26-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
(JFK)

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LEE 7-8-98

2. It is recommended that a separate control file be created which will contain a copy of each ["SP"] memorandum which Angleton furnishes the Bureau. ~~(S)~~ (U) Such copies will be maintained in the file in numerical order and it will not be necessary to index the names. It is suggested that this file be entitled, "Central Intelligence Agency - James Angleton."

10/5/89
Classified by SPY EW/KFA
Declassify on: OADR C.A.#88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DETAILS:

James Angleton, a CIA official, is in charge of a section referred to as [Special Projects,] which is a part of CIA's Foreign ~~(S)~~ (U)

RECORDED-108 62- 99724
JUN 12 1953
24

SJP:lw
Attachment
1 - Mr. Medler
- Mr. Wannall

56 JUN 23 1953

SE 50

SECRET

Intelligence Division. Angleton handles special cases of a various nature and he is usually given considerable freedom and leeway in directing the operations of his unit. In general, he is responsible only to the Director of CIA. [*He has numerous foreign sources and channels for developing information. The primary source is the* [*Israeli Intelligence Service.*] (S) *In addition to this, he is in contact with* (S) [*Jay Lovestone,*] *who periodically makes available to Angleton copies of reports which* [*Lovestone*] *has received from* [*American Federation of* (S) *Labor*] *representatives throughout the world.* [*These representatives* (S) *are associated with the Free Trade Union Committee, which is subsidized by the CIA. Angleton also has independent sources in the intelligence services of France, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain. On occasion he utilizes sources in the Vatican. Some of the men under his control are on various foreign assignments in Europe and are responsible only to him. Most of them are traveling under commercial cover.*] ~~(S)~~

During the past several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau. He has volunteered voluminous information of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that is, it consists of the actual reports received from Angleton's sources. This has been of advantage because the Bureau has been in a position to better evaluate the information instead of waiting for the delay and processing through normal channels in the CIA. In addition to information regarding security matters furnished by Angleton, he has also been of valuable assistance by keeping the Liaison Agent apprised of administrative changes and reorganization within the CIA. Angleton is thoroughly informed regarding the foreign intelligence activities of his agency and he frequently clarifies matters which the CIA sometimes camouflages with some of its cloak and dagger techniques. ~~(S)~~ (u)

For your information, Angleton was instructed by General Walter Bedell Smith, while he was still Director of the CIA, [*to cooperate fully with the Liaison Agent and was told that he, Angleton, could disseminate any information he saw fit.*] *This policy has continued under Allen Dulles.* (U) ~~(S)~~

Since the volume of information received from Angleton has increased the Liaison Agent has endeavored to encourage Angleton to establish some uniformity in the dissemination of information to (U) ~~(S)~~

the Bureau, particularly with regard to that information which he receives from [the Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) Angleton is now furnishing the Liaison Agent blank memoranda which are dated, captioned, and which carry a control number; for example, "SP-1." This number will serve as a ready reference when some question comes up within the Bureau or the CIA. The Liaison Agent will make an appropriate notation on each memorandum indicating that the documents emanate from Angleton. It is believed advisable to set up a control file containing a copy of each document furnished by Angleton. This can be done in a manner similar to the arrangement effected in handling reports received from [Stott.] (S)

In view of the above, Angleton more or less falls into the category of a Confidential Informant. He furnishes information of a sensitive nature and it is, therefore, believed that when disseminating his data, he should be protected as a source. Up to date Supervisors have been handling this information in a secure manner; however, since the volume of data received from Angleton has increased, it is believed desirable to alert all Section Chiefs regarding the handling of information received from Angleton. ~~(S)~~(U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10099

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 03/09/1954
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem dum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SECRET

DATE: March 9, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10/9/89 Classified by SPYCDWKFA
Declassify on: OADR 3.A.#88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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OTHERWISE

As you know, the captioned individual has been providing the Bureau with considerable information, much of it being of a very sensitive nature. It has been noted that in transmitting communications to Angleton some memoranda have been sent to the Director of CIA, Attention: James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall.] (S) Other memoranda dealing with [Israeli Intelligence] matters have (S) been directed to James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall] (S)

In order that the Bureau would have a uniform procedure in transmitting mail to Angleton, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with Angleton on March 5, 1954. Angleton requested that in the future mail being directed to him be transmitted to the Director of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton." Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired the above method of designation in connection with correspondence dealing [with Israeli Intelligence matters.] (S) With regard to Bureau (S) reports concerning [Israeli matters,] Angleton advised that such (S) material is being retained under his personal supervision and control.

7-26-98 SLD/KSR 1,5,6 (JFK)
5668

Angleton also asked when the Bureau found it necessary to disseminate information to him and other agencies, that his identity not be revealed to the other agencies. [He explained that he is involved in several sensitive projects, such as [Israeli Intelligence,] (S) and if his identity were known to the other agencies, the security of CIA operations could be prejudiced.] (S)

ACTION:

Attached hereto for your approval is a Memorandum to all Section Chiefs.

SJP:lw

Attachment

1 - Mr. Wannall
- Reading Room

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LEE 8-7-98

RECORDED - 36
EX. - 107

LIAISON

66 MAR 19 1954

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10100
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-99724-9, 10

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BRANIGAN
TO :	BELMONT
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/30/1954
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/17/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CIA

SECRET

DATE: April 30, 1954

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

10/6/98 Classified by SP4ELW/KEA
Declassify on: [redacted]
CA #88-1826

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OTHERWISE

As you are aware, James Angleton of CIA frequently turns over to the Bureau on a highly confidential basis information which has been developed through operations headed by Angleton. In many instances the information is given to the Bureau without clearing through regular CIA channels. In almost all instances it is given to us with the clear understanding that if included in a report or other communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau the information will be so set forth that it cannot be traced back to either Angleton or CIA. In such instances where the information relates to [Israeli] (S) matters, it has been the practice of [Israeli] (S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him outside the Bureau. (S)

In taking up such a matter with Angleton last week it was determined that he objected to attributing information which he had furnished to "Confidential Informant T-2, an Agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations." He pointed out that by describing T-2 as an agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations the Bureau was revealing to outside agencies that the material did in fact come from another Government agency. Since the material related to an individual who now resides in [Israel,] Angleton stated that, (S) in his opinion, recipient agencies could logically conclude that the information had originated with CIA since such an individual would be under CIA jurisdiction insofar as investigations abroad are concerned. Angleton requested that the information merely be attributed to Confidential Informant T-2, who, in this instance, could be described as being of known reliability.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (JFK)

It is suggested that it would materially assist in the handling of information received from Angleton in the future if the Liaison Section could work out a procedure whereby Angleton might be referred to as a Bureau informant. This would permit the Supervisors receiving the Angleton material firsthand to transmit it to the field and advise the field that the information in any report should be attributed to an informant with a temporary symbol number, which informant could be evaluated as having furnished information of a reliable nature in the past. On the informant page the temporary symbol number could be identified by the regular Bureau symbol assigned to Angleton. ~~(S)~~ (U) S

WRW:mh

62-99724-9

RECORDED - 24

EX-125

12 MAY 24 1954

68 MAY 26 1954

SECRET

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10103

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-74

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 03/17/1965
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/17/65

7-24-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

FROM : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

(JFK)

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 100] (S) (U)

In 1954, a procedure was approved whereby we could attribute certain information received from James Angleton, CIA, under the symbol "Bureau Informant 100." This information, for the most part, emanated from a liaison arrangement which CIA maintained with (S) [the Israeli Intelligence Service] and from other sources under the control of Angleton. Much of the information developed by Angleton was not disseminated within CIA but he felt that the data should be passed on to the Bureau. Allen Dulles gave him authorization to handle dissemination in this matter. We continue to receive information of value on a regular basis. (S)

By SAC Letter 54-27 dated 5/25/54, we informed the field regarding Bureau Informant 100 and issued instructions that information from this source be described under an appropriate T symbol and characterization. Because of the passage of time and since some offices have had rare occasion to receive Bureau Informant 100 information, it is believed desirable to reiterate instructions to the field. This should be done since the Informant has been developing information in recent months regarding the travel of U. S. citizens (S) [to Russia via Israel.] Such travelers come from various parts of the U. S. (S)

10/28/89
Classified by SP4GL/KGA
Declassify on: OADR
CA #88-1826

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ACTION:

If approved, there is enclosed herewith a recommended SAC letter.

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LEE 8-7-98

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(10)

WCS

62-99724-75

REC 12

EX-112

10 MAR 24 1965

XEROX
MAR 24 1965

F B I

58 MAR 30 1965

SECRET

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10104

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-78

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 01/13/1967
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/13/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

Classified by SP4EPW/KFA 10/24/80
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
C.A.#88-1826

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SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

In 1953 we created a separate control file (62-99724) under the caption, "CIA - James Angleton," for the purpose of retaining copies of certain types of memoranda disseminated to us by James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA. We believe that it is no longer necessary to maintain this control file.

In the way of background, the control file was created to give us the opportunity of closely monitoring our liaison with Angleton on a variety of matters which were not reported through normal CIA channels. CIA Directors permitted Angleton to run several intelligence projects, many of them with [the Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) He was given authority by CIA to handle these projects and report only to the Director, CIA. He was given authority to disseminate to the FBI on all matters of interest to us. In 1953 we worked out an agreement where Angleton disseminated to us, and we attributed the information to Bureau Informant 100. The field was given appropriate instructions regarding the handling and reporting of the information. This procedure is still in existence and is operating satisfactorily. (S)

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
(JFK)
7-24-98

The information disseminated by Angleton is filed in the case file of an individual or an organization. The control file consists of copies of communications already recorded in separate case files. There has been little or no occasion to use the control file, and its usefullness at this point can be characterized as being obsolete.

62-99724-78

REC 32

6 JAN 18 1967

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that it no longer be necessary to place copies of [Bureau Informant 100] material in the control file. (U) The file will continue to be used for retention of mail of a policy nature.

Completed By Purge Unit.
29 Serials & Mail Destroyed.
1/23/67 LR

1-19-67 OK To Destroy Existing Copy material other than Policy matters per Mr Papich

62-99724
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

EX-115

61 JAN 24 1967

(7)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10149
RECORD SERIES :	NY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-35253-991

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	NY
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/05/1962
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/09/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

SECRET

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MAC 7-27-98

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584) APR 5 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

6-23-98
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

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ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS-CUBA

ReNYlet to Bureau dated 3/29/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall St., NYC, who is also employed by ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch, Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/30/62, that he had memoranda of his recent conversations in Washington, D.C., which he furnished the NYO. The memoranda of MALONE were written for ROBERT KLEBERG as a result of KLEBERG's meeting with Vice President LYNDON B. JOHNSON on 3/15/62.

In connection with MALONE's conversation with (u) [Mr. HERBERT of the CIA,] who was described as an assistant to Colonel KING, (u) MALONE wrote that [HERBERT] had informed (u) him that [CIA] had separated the section in [CIA] which (u) deals solely with Cuban matters. (u) MALONE wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] reported to him that he, [HERBERT,] (u) did not agree with the general opinion of Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON relative to the lack of (u) plans by President KENNEDY relative to Cuba. [HERBERT] told MALONE that he believed that President JOHN F. KENNEDY would act in the event of a crisis in Cuba and he believed that the opinion expressed by LYNDON B. JOHNSON with ROBERT KLEBERG on 3/15/62, was true as of many months ago.

(u) MALONE wrote in his memorandum to KLEBERG that [HERBERT] was of the opinion that within the next two to three months, a favorable and appropriate climate will be created inside Cuba which would be favorable to some type of activity to overthrow the CASTRO Government.

MALONE in the same memorandum wrote that [HERBERT] (u) expressed the opinion that the US Government should not loan Chile 385 million dollars as proposed by TEODORO MOSCOSO of the Alliance For Progress Program. [HERBERT] stated (u) that he is very familiar with Chile and did not believe that they were in a position to intelligently utilize such a large sum of money and expressed an opinion that at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January, 1962, Chile was against the US's

2-Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1-New York (105-35253)

FJO:kap
(3)

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105-35253-9

SECRET

NY 105-35253

position. [HERBERT] (~~S~~)(U) expressed the opinion that the US should give more encouragement to Colombia and Argentina, who have already drawn up programs for social reform within the countries.

MALONE also wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] (~~S~~)(U) expressed the opinion that MALONE and his associates should attempt to discuss the Cuban question with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY as he believes the Attorney General was a very strong minded individual and if he made a decision, would carry it out. (U)(~~S~~) [HERBERT] also stated that he believed MALONE and his associates should also talk with Senators HUMPHREY and MC CARTHY, both members of the "New Frontier", who are also individuals who can make a tremendous impression on President KENNEDY. [HERBERT] (~~S~~)(U) stated that he would furnish MALONE some ideas relative to contacting Senator HUMPHREY.

MALONE, on 3/30/62, furnished a second memo which he had written to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to his conversation with a CIA contact, [CHARLES MAECHIN] (ph). (S) MALONE wrote that [MAECHIN] had informed him that the section within [CIA] handling Cuba has been separated from the rest of [CIA] (U) and now functions as an individual unit and has its counterpart in the Departments of Defense and State.

MALONE wrote that he had discussed with [MAECHIN] (S) Vice President JOHNSON's opinion that President KENNEDY would not act in Cuba or commit US troops in Cuba, and (S) [MAECHIN] stated that he did not exactly agree with this opinion of Vice President JOHNSON's, but believed that if President KENNEDY was confronted with a situation, he would act with firmness despite possible repercussions in Berlin and Viet Nam.

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NY 105-35253

(U) ~~(S)~~ MALONE stated that [MAECHIN] (S) indicated that there was a [CIA] plan in the formative stage relative to Cuba, and that he was hopeful that they would have something to work on soon which would give [CIA] ~~(S)~~ (U) more authority on which to operate. [MAECHIN] (S) also indicated to MALONE that a military build-up can be expected in the Florida area, and that a minor one is already taking place at the present time at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, Oriente Province, Cuba. (S) [MAECHIN] stressed that out of necessity future operations against Cuba would have to take place from an off-shore area because of security of the operation. MALONE also wrote in his memo that [MAECHIN] (S) told him to tell ALBERTO FERNANDEZ of Key Biscayne, Florida, to be patient and that before long, [CIA] would fully utilize his abilities and equipment. ~~(S)~~ (U)

MALONE also furnished on 3/30/62, a copy of his memo to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to MALONE's conversation on 3/15/62, with SERAFINO ROMUALDI of the Latin American Section of the AFL-CIO. In this memo to KLEBERG, MALONE wrote that ROMUALDI stated that President KENNEDY was still being pushed and pulled by the "Intelligentia," who were identified as ARTHUR SCHLESINGER and ADLAI STEVENSON, toward following a soft line relative to Cuba. ROMUALDI told MALONE that RICHARD N. GOODWIN of the US Department of State apparently was waking up to the fact that the future of President KENNEDY depends upon a strong, firm policy and the elimination of CASTRO and Communism in Cuba immediately. ROMUALDI told MALONE that his opinion of GOODWIN's present thinking was gathered from individuals who dealt directly with GOODWIN concerning Cuba.

MALONE wrote to KLEBERG that ROMUALDI also recommended that he, MALONE, and his associates attempt to get an appointment with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY relative to Cuba as ROBERT KENNEDY is the strong influence on the President and has been pressuring the President to get rid of what he calls the "featherheads"

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10191
RECORD SERIES :	NY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-35253-987

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	NY
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/29/1962
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584) SECRET MAR 29 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKET
K 9-21-98

Re NYlet to Director, dated 3/14/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall Street, NYC, who is also employed by the King Ranch of Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/20/62, that he had accompanied ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch to Washington, DC, on 3/15/62, for KLEBERG's meeting with Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON at 4:00 p.m. on that date.

MALONE advised that he did not accompany KLEBERG to the meeting with Vice-President JOHNSON, but KLEBERG informed him that they discussed the Cuban problem and what course of action the US was going to follow in this matter. KLEBERG, according to MALONE, was advised by Vice-President JOHNSON, that President JOHN F. KENNEDY has no contemplated plans at the present time for any large scale movement against Cuba, and there are no plans for the use of US troops in Cuba.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG told him that Vice-President JOHNSON stated that President KENNEDY was much concerned about the world situation, and is devoting most of his time to the problems relative to Berlin, Laos and South Vietnam.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG stated that from his conversation with Vice-President JOHNSON, it was clear to him that the present administration has no intention of using US military force in the Cuban

2 - Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1 - Miami (105-1742) (Info.) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (105-29995) (Info.) (RM)
1 - New York (105-35253)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6-25-98

FJO:gag
(6)

2/1/63

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

SECRET 105-35253-987

SECRET

problem, and that the Cuban problem has taken 4th place in the order of importance as far as President KENNEDY is concerned.

MALONE further advised on March 20, 1962, that while in Washington, DC, he had made arrangements to contact [Mr. HERBERT, who was described as the assistant to Colonel KING of the CIA.] ~~(S)~~ (U) MALONE stated that in conversation with [HERBERT,] the question of United States ~~(S)~~ (U) action in Cuba was discussed, and [HERBERT] stated that ~~(S)~~ (U) he did not agree with the opinion expressed by Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON. [HERBERT] told ~~(S)~~ (U) MALONE that he and his associates should get together with Senators in Washington who are close to perfect agreement with the "New Frontier" such as Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY of Minnesota, and bring pressure to bear on them since these Senators exert a certain degree of influence over the President.

MALONE stated on 3/20/62 that he also had a meeting on 3/15/62 with his CIA contact, [CHARLES MARCHIN.] (S) MALONE stated that [MARCHIN] gave him the definite (S) impression that he thought that President KENNEDY and the US would at some time make a move in Cuba. (S) [MARCHIN] stated that the CIA continues to operate but not with the complete authority with which they would like to carry out their plans. [MARCHIN] suggested (S) to MALONE that MALONE and his associates attempt to see Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY and see if some pressure could not be brought to bear on the Cuban matter from Attorney General KENNEDY.

MALONE advised that from his conversations with CIA on 3/15/62, and from the conversation of ROBERT KLEBERG with Vice-President JOHNSON, he definitely was confused as to whether or not the US had any definite plans for participation in an attempt to overthrow the present Cuban regime. MALONE stated that from conversations with other individuals in Washington, he got the impression that the Cuban Revolutionary Council was falling apart, and that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA had very little influence over the Cuban exiles in the Miami area.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10332-10018
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-88025-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MM
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/04/1961
PAGES :	10
SUBJECTS :	SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	

v9.1

MM 105-2234 CONFIDENTIAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

In view of the relative inactivity of subject at this time insofar as Cuban revolutionary matters are concerned, no further investigation is being conducted, and this case is being closed. Should subject subsequently emerge as an active leader in anti-CASTRO activities, his case will be re-opened, and investigation conducted concerning his activities, and the Bureau will be advised.

On August 1, 1961, [WILLIAM HERRINGTON,] (C) CIA covert representative, Miami, Florida, informed that CIA had an operational interest in subject during the Cuban invasion in April, 1961. [HERRINGTON] (C) said that while there is no interest in subject at the present time, CIA still has an operational interest in subject's son, whom he identified as SANTIAGO ALVAREZ. (X)(~~S~~)(~~S~~)(~~X~~)

[HERRINGTON] (C) indicated that CIA did have considerable operational interest in subject's yacht, the "Alisan", but that there is no interest at the present time. (C) [HERRINGTON] indicated he would advise the FBI at Miami if CIA develops any further interest in subject. (X)(~~S~~)(~~S~~)(~~X~~)

[Miami indices contained a communication from JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative, under date of February 7, 1961, which, among other things,] identified subject as a former Cuban senator who had collaborated on matters relating to the publication from time to time called "Esbirros". [This information, according to CIA, came from a usually reliable source. Communication was classified "secret"] (U)(~~S~~)(~~X~~)

An investigation by the Miami Office of "Esbirros" disclosed it was a two or three-page mimeographed "scandal sheet" directed against the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), as well as all other groups and individuals both pro and anti-FIDEL CASTRO, according to MM 492-S. It was noted that many individuals, anti-CASTRO and anti-communist, had accused many other individuals of printing "Esbirros", which had resulted in the paper not being printed or published in January, 1961. This paper received very limited distribution, and it was not believed it had been printed in December, 1960. ~~X~~(U)

CIA INFO (Ps 2,3 AND BR. WPU) CLASSIFIED
AND REMAINDER P4 DECLASSIFIED PER
LTR. DTD 11/21/95. (SEE 190-16449-208)
SP6BSTA/GCL - 11/5/90 - 211,326

-B-

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CONFIDENTIAL

MM 105-2234

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

This report is classified confidential since data reported from (MM T-1, who is MM 726-S) would reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof. ~~C~~ (U)

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is MM 726-S, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	134-307-Sub A-98 Instant report, page 4, 5
MM T-2 is MM 492-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 5
MM T-3 is MM 724-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 6

~~C~~ (U)

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and "T" symbols have been utilized only in those instances where identity must be concealed.

-C*-

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~~SECRET~~

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10332-10047
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 2-1622-178

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MM
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/19/1962
PAGES :	19
SUBJECTS :	SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET ~~SECRET~~

MM 2-156

Copies Made:

9 - Bureau (2-1622)(RM)
1 - INS, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Customs, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Border Patrol, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - Louisville (Info)(RM)
1 - Newark (Info)(RM)
1 - New Orleans (Info)(RM)
3 - New York (RM)
(2 - 105-52912)(1 - 105-38120)
3 - Miami
(2 - 2-156)(1 - 105-5003)

* * * * * * * * *

MIAMI:

AT FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

Will attempt to locate and interview ORLANDO PIEDRA for any information concerning this matter, it being noted he has been reported to be vacationing in Florida at the present time.

Cu Requested 186

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

1. Will maintain close contact with MM 639-S and other sources and informants for any additional pertinent information concerning subject's activities. X(u)

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SECRET ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET SECRET

MM 2-156

2. Will locate and interview BATISTA's son-in-law, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, in an effort to obtain additional details concerning allegations as set forth in Bureau letter to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY dated July 31, 1962.

- ADMINISTRATIVE -

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as data received from the Department of the Army on July 25, 1962, and furnished to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY was so classified.

Not classifiable Army Letter 10/25/82 9143 [illegible]

- INFORMANTS -

Individuals contacted, as mentioned in this report, who had no knowledge of any training groups in the Florida Keys are identified as follows: X (S)

(S)

RENE A. RADOLE (NA) X (S)
CIA Covert Representative
Contacted August 7, 1962

PSI (under development) FRANK HERNANDEZ
Contacted August 16, 1962

PSI (under development) MANOLO STINCER X (X)
Contacted August 30, 1962

MM 674-C
Contacted September 5, 1962

- C -

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CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

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MM 2-156

All of the above sources were contacted by SA RALPH L. JENSEN.

Identity	Location
MM T-1 is MM 639-S, contacted by SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER.	134-238 Sub A-630 and 631.
C MM T-2 is FELIPE CATASUS PAZOS, former Vice Chief of Cuban Air Force under President BATISTA, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR. (protect, by request).	Instant report page 3. C (X)(U)
MM T-3 is MM 492-S, contacted by SAs JAMES D. HAYES and LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	Instant report page 3.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10369-10022
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-117290-ADMIN FOLDER-Y8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	JONES
TO :	WICK
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/28/1966
PAGES :	322
SUBJECTS :	HSCA ADMINISTRATIVE FOLDER, LEE HARVEY OSWALD VOLUME XII
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	02/23/1999
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC FOLDER, MEMO, A/T, TTY, LET, NOTES, LHM, PRESS RELEASES, TESTIMONY, NEWS ARTICLES, TRANSLATION

SECRET

1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Conrad

SAC, WFO [(100-18032)] (S)

11/22/66

1-Mr. Baker
1-Mr. Allen

Director, FBI [(100-357510)] (S)

[OFFICE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE
IS - R; CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION] (S)

Classified by SP6BJA/GCL
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ 12/5/84
#21,326

ReBuairtel 10/25/66 reflecting installation authorization. ~~(S)~~ (U)

This letter is for information and record purposes. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In response to your request, a new closed-circuit television system was recently installed in connection with the captioned case. The system consists of a remotely controlled video camera, zoom lens and pan-tilt head mounted in a special disguise. A 17-inch monitor is located nearby and provides a view of the pertinent scene. Monitor personnel can remotely change the focal length, focus, aperture and field of view of the lens. Certain compensation for changing light conditions can also be made at the monitoring site. (S)

Attached is a technical addendum listing the equipment installed together with special circuit and cable data to assist WFO personnel in the maintenance of the equipment. Appropriate inventory changes should be made. ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 - [80-829] (S)
CTA:ev
(10)

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures (2)

REC- 47 (S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

(S)

53 DEC 9 1966

19 NOV 30 1966

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DEC 5 1966

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

T Oswald folder

SECRET

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. 8/22/66

S. J. Papich

JOACHIM JOESTEN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

On 8/19/66, Cal Tenney, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that the Swiss Federal Police (S) received a letter from the subject, postmarked Milan, Italy, on 8/13/66, which read as follows:

"The final accounting with the Johnson gang is imminent. Each of you who continues to partake in the actions of the Johnson gang or their German officials, the Gehlen gang, or those who disrupt the plans of American patriots against the usurper regime, will shortly pay with their lives. Be it well understood, Greetings."

Tenney advised that this information has been disseminated by CIA to the White House and Secret Service.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Soviet Section.

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:rab
(4)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. JA 2/22/99
AS SANITIZED

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/gcl
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK) 2/22/99

SECRET

3P1-100-48

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90037-10081
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	100-380792-26

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BN
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/29/1959
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	MARTIN GREENDLINGER
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/07/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA

ef 2/9

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/29/59

FROM : LEGAT, BONN (100-633)

SUBJECT: MARTIN GREENDLINGER, aka
SECURITY MATTER - C

Classified by SP6BJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 8/28/85
(SP8MAC/GCL-4/15/94-JFK)

4-1

Reference New York letterhead memorandum 11/17/58, furnished by Bureau routing slip 11/24/58.

The following agencies were furnished a summary of the New York information on the subject and were requested to provide any information which might come to their attention regarding the subject's travels or activities:

G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe;
Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe;
[Office of Coordinator and Special Advisor (confidential CIA), American Embassy, Bonn, Germany;] (S)
[British Services Security Organization, British Forces in Germany;
Abteilung II (Security Police), Austrian Ministry of the Interior;
Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV - West German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)] and, (S)
Security Office, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

None of these agencies, [except the British] (S) have furnished any information to date. [The British Services Security Organization advised under date of 12/30/58, that it had no trace in its records on the subject, his (S) parents, Mr. and Mrs. DAVID GREENDLINGER, or his wife, ELENA IVANOVNA] Greendlinger
Mrs. Martin Greendlinger

RUC. LOC

100-380799-26

REC- 60

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IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS

3 - Bureau
1 - Bonn
(4) GAV:tlc

7 FEB 3 1959

EX-102 KP 10-10-97

SUBV. CONTROL

AGENCY LCC-NH
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 2-16-59
HOW FORW. R/S
BY IDH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

52 FEB 11 1959

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90041-10023
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 97-3856-13

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/26/1959
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	CRUZADA REVOLUCIONARIA ANTI COMUNISTA JOSE RASCO BERMUDA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/18/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	RPT

with his local supporters through three women who visit him periodically. He has been apprised of the activities of his followers in Miami and has requested that $20,000 be furnished to a 40-man group of his followers in Camaguey Province. The Camaguey group is the one he has charged with making a raid on La Cabaña prison and freeing him.

6. Under the orders of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro, one [PRUNA Blanco (fmu)][7] (S) has contacted one [Narciso NAVARRO][8] (S) who has a group of followers in [Pinar del Rio] (S) and has arms, ammunition, and dynamite buried on his farm in that province. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) also has a group of followers in [Pinar del Prio] (S) province which is led by [Jesus CABRERA] (S) and former sergeant [MARTINEZ (fmu)]. (S) The [CABRERA] (S) group is called [Legión Democrática Cubana (LDC, Cuban Democratic Legion).] (S) The buried arms and dynamite are to be used in sabotage and assassination attempts.

7. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) has also sent one [Bernardo PARETS Gonzalez] (S) to contact Manuel BLANCO Navarro in Miami. [PRUNA Blanco] (S) is attempting to set up an arms drop to the [LDC] (S) at a point 10 kilometers north of Los Palacios (22 36N, 83 16W). (S) [LDC] men will be waiting at this point and will signal the plane making the drop with four flashlights.[9]

8. Besides the two groups in Pinar del Rio province and the group in Camaguey, Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro also has two groups in Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces.[10]

9. On about 25 August 1959 Manuel BLANCO Navarro, in Miami, wrote a letter to one of his followers in Cuba. Enclosed with the letter were two messages which BLANCO asked be forwarded to [Orlando VELAZCO, Distribuidora de Refrescos ARENAL Y] (S) [HNO SA, Avenida No. 515 y 517, Cardenas, Matanzas, telephone 632.] (S) BLANCO also asked that [CELAZCO] (S) be informed that the letters were "from his sister [Haydee"] (S) (Sic). One of the messages reads as follows:

> Dear Brother:
>
> I am writing these lines to accompany a letter from my friend Dr. Rodriguez Couceiro , in whose house I am staying since I found out that they have arrested Leonel and that I cannot return there. As you will see in the letter, I am sending you a series of instructions to see if we can maintain the group that is presently without any leaders. Just as you have probably read in the newspapers, they have caught all the leaders in the roundup. This doesn't mean anything more than that we shall be delayed until we are reorganized again. Only about 100 were arrested, and the group numbered about 3,000.
>
> As he (my friend) informs you, I do not believe that you ought to visit Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro in La Cabaña prison. You should send someone in whom you have confidence. In the new contacts that you made do not use your own name. Use an alias so that, if anyone should talk, they will not be able to identify you. You should protect the place where you live. When you have meetings, hold them at prearranged places, never in your home. I know that you know how to do these things, but I want to warn you to be careful and use other persons to make your contacts. Don't do it personally. The principal objective is to be able to maintain yourself as the leader of the movement at least until you select chiefs if your work prevents you from leading in Habana.
>
> We have made contact here with a large group which was not caught and which is also organized from Autentico people. This group did not lose its leaders, since, as I say, it was not caught because it had joined us only a few days previously. This group is almost ready for action; so it is urgent that you reorganize our people rapidly in order

that Don Fidel may not last until the New Year. In the next letter we shall send more details and possibly give the main outlines of the business. As soon as you have anything to report, use a courier in whom you have confidence. Do not use the name of Carlos LOSADA (S) since that name is now "burned". Use the name Angel MARTINEZ, (S) and use the address which you already have for the time being. I think that we shall soon change residence, but I will send you the new address as soon as we do.

When you reply, use the name "little grandmother" (abuelita) since as you know, ~~my "na~~me" is also "burned". Many regards to all and an embrace from your sister

Haydee. (S)

10. The second message reads as follows:

Miami 21 August 1959

Orlando VELASCO (S)
Dear Friend:

As I suppose you already know, because of the treason of William Morgan [12] and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo[12], the leaders of the Organization have been arrested, and it is most necessary that our people be reorganized so that the movement is not lost. The only person who is able to do so is you. I know that the responsibility is very great, but I also know your abilities, and we are sure that you will be able to do the job.

As a first objective, it is necessary to establish contact with Captain Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro. He is the chief of our organization and will continue to be. He is in prison in La Cabaña, according to our information, but is allowed to receive visitors. He knows you, since you met each other in his office. You can introduce yourself as the brother of Haydee. (S) He will give you names of persons and instructions to follow. However, it is very important that, while he remains a prisoner, you set up a courier so that you don't have to make subsequent visits. This would be dangerous in the extreme.

With respect to the rebels, be very careful in making your contacts, since one lesson is enough. There is one safe person whom you can trust, Dr. Fran MARSHALL. He is secretary of the Union Club.[13] (S) You can see him on our behalf and on that of the "Mejicano".[11] (S) So that he will not mistrust you, you can tell him that the last time we saw him was at a dinner on the terrace of the Union Club. (S) Tell him that it rained a lot. Find out from him if Lt. PEÑA (S) can or cannot be trusted, since our information is contradictory. Be very careful with the rebels, and don't make the contacts with them directly. It is better that you designate another person for the purpose. Fran (S) is trustworthy but very easygoing.

Another group you can contact is that of Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre (S) in the Rosita de Hornedo. Tell him that you were sent by Francisco GONZALEZ, who is in Montclair, New Jersey; that here we are united; and that he should join his group to our movement. I shall send you more information on this group.

You should also see Dr. Valentin ARENAS Amiga[14] (S). His office is at Aguiar No. 556, (S) Habana. Tell him that you come on my behalf and to recall the last visit of ~~myself~~ and the "Mejicano" (S) to his office, in which ~~we were~~ speaking of CASTRO. I recently wrote him a letter from New York. He leads a group of followers of Jose Ignacio RASCO (S) Artimes (S) etc.[15] (sic) of the Agrupacion.

You should also see Señor Agustín BATISTA, Jr., (S) in the Banco Trust Company.[16] (S) He knows Fran (S) and is a cousin of Enrique LLACA.[17] (S) So that he doesn't mistrust you, tell him that you are the messenger (enviado) and tell him to recall the interview we had in the lobby of the Savoy Hilton of New York. Up to recently he had a group.

For financial matters you can see Señor BELT[18] (S) a friend of (S) Haydee, and Señor Alin SUERO Falla.[19] (S) To contact the latter, see secretary Senor Jorge MACHADO (S) and tell him that you come on my behalf and that of the word Sugar (sic.) It is very important that you get together a good finance committee to handle the money problem there. Also talk to BLANCO (S) about persons you can see about money. Another person that you can see is Julio LOBO[20] (S) with Dr. BELT. (S)

You should also see Alejandro VERGARA (S) the chancellor of the Spanish Embassy, (S) for me. He can help you a lot, above all with Valentin ARENAS (S) etc. The cousin of Rosarito (S) is Elena SOTO Martinez. (S) Her name is "Carolina" (S) and her telephone number is W-0746. (S) She lives at Galiano and Lagunas, (S) upstairs in the Tinaje (S) (?), Apartment (S) No. 7. She receives our letters and can help you. Introduce yourself as the brother of Haydee (S) No one else should see her but you, and no one should know that you see her. You must be extremely careful to protect her.

Well, I believe that this is enough for now. Be extremely careful, and reorganize our rank and file, since the thing is soon.

(signature illegible)

Field Comments

1. Previously reported as a Cuban Rebel Army captain heading a counter-revolutionary group in Cuba. BLANCO was one of the chief conspirators arrested in August 1959, when the Cuban Government smashed a plot against it.

2. Brother and father respectively, of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro.

3. Presidential candidate of the Cuban People's Party in the 1958 Cuban elections. He took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in July 1959 and was last reported in exile in Caracas on 26 July. At that time he reportedly said that he would soon leave for New York, where his family was.

4. In an open letter dated 6 June 1959 at Miami, one Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo (S) aka "El Mejicano" (S) a former Rebel Army captain, invited his former companions-in-arms to join CRAC.

5. The BLANCO group was reportedly without funds or arms as of 31 August 1959.

6. In a memorandum dated 16 September 1959 the U. S. Air Attache in Habana reported information from a wife of one of the prisoners in La Cabana that CRAC had gathered $1,000,000 to get Reinaldo BLANCO, Enrique OVARES, Gustavo de los REYES, Kuku BRINGUIER, and Dr. CAINAS Milanes out of prison. OVARES, REYES, and CAINAS are also high-level conspirators who were arrested in the roundup of August 1959.

7. According to a memorandum dated 26 August 1959, from the Protection Section of the American Embassy, Habana, an American citizen who had just been released from La Cabana prison after five months' imprisonment reported that a group of approximately 460 political prisoners and former prisoners are actively engaged in counter-revolutionary activities. Three hundred of the group were said to be at liberty in Habana, approximately 100 still held in prison, and about 70 in

S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

open rebellion in Pinar del Rio under Luis LARA Crespo, (S) a former corporal of the BATISTA army. Among the leaders of the group was one Fernando PRUNA Blanco, (S) who was said to be held in the Castillo Prison at the time. PRUNA Blanco (S) (fnu) may be a relative of or identical with Fernando PRUNA Blanco. (S)

8. Identified by Source as the brother of Angel NAVARRO, (S) previously reported as co-ordinator of a group of counter-revolutionaries in Miami.

9. On 22 September 1959 source reported that this army drop had been scheduled between 8 and 10 p.m. on 25 September 1959.

10. Source did not know the size of any of the groups.

11. This probably refers to Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro, (S) reported by a usually reliable source in July 1959 to be a leader, together with one Jose (S) Luis PUJOL, (S) of a Cuban counter-revolutionary movement. RODRIGUEZ Couceiro (S) was reported by the same source to be a first cousin of Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo, aka "El Mejicano" (the Mexican). (S) The Habana telephone directory lists a Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro, (S) a lawyer, at Pasco No. 652, (S) Habana.

12. Morgan and GUTIERREZ are two Cuban Rebel Army majors who penetrated the conspiracy that was smashed in August 1959.

13. The Habana telephone directory lists a Union Club (S) at San Lazaro No. 12, (S) Habana.

14. This is possibly a reference to Dr. Valentin ARENAS Arminan, (S) reported in July 1949 by a usually reliable source as the notary handling the purchase of the Banco Ultramar (S) for Spanish pro-Franco interests. The Banco Ultramar (S) was later absorbed by the Banco Continental Americano, (S) now known as the Banco Continental Cubano. (S)

15. The Habana telephone directory lists a Jose I. RASCO (S) at Avenida 31 No. 7406, Marianso. (S)

16. The Habana telephone directory lists a Banco Trust (S) Company of Cuba with main offices at Obispo No. 257, (S) Habana.

17. This is possibly a reference to Enrique LLACA Orbiz, (S) reported in the Habana press on 18 June 1959 as an executive (S) of the Julio LOBO (S) organization and former newspaper business (S) manager who was released by Cuban Government authorities on 16 June. LLACA (S) and his son, Dr. Enrique LLACA, Jr. (S) had been held on charges of conspiracy. A United Press report dated 24 July 1959 at Santiago, Chile, said that Enrique LLACA Orbiz, (S) a lawyer and one-time economic editor of Diario de la Marina (S) had arrived in Chile as an exile.

18. This is possibly a reference to Guillermo BELT, former Cuban Ambassador to the United States under BATISTA. (S)

19. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

20. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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Legat, Paris (163-1071) 7/12/66

125

EX-103

Director, FBI (163-15064) SECRET

2 - Orig & 1
1 - Yellow
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

LUCIEN CONEIN
FPC

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Reurlet 6/2/66.

Bufiles reveal that the name Lucien Emile Conein, born 11/29/19, appeared in a 1963 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) communication indicating Conein at that time was a staff employee of the Agency. The files of the Identification Division contain no arrest record for Lucien Conein. ~~(S)~~ (U)

(JFK)

Through Liaison channels, Bureau determined that Conein is currently a covert employee of CIA, under the cover of a [State Department] employee. (TS) He is presently in Saigon, South Vietnam, on an extremely sensitive assignment. CIA has requested that no information be furnished to the French regarding his affiliation with CIA or with regard to his present whereabouts. ~~(S)~~

For your information, Richmond determined (by a pretext telephone call) from the present occupant of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, who is presently renting this residence from Conein, that the latter is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U. S. Army and is presently working and assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Saigon.

No arrest records were located for Conein in either Arlington County or Fairfax County, Virginia. Records of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, of Washington, D. C., reveal a credit report dated 9/21/65, indicating that Lucien Conein, of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, was then married to Ebjette and divorced from Carmen (last name not shown).

In view of CIA's request, under no circumstances should any information be furnished to the French concerning subject's present affiliation with CIA or his whereabouts. You may furnish the French the results of the credit and criminal checks as noted above. If the French raise the ~~(S)~~ (U)

2 - St. Louis (Enclosure)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)
HCF:jkm
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

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JUL 13 1966
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AUG 30 1966

10/21/94
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Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

question of subject's whereabouts, you should inform them that inquiries to date reveal no information concerning his present whereabouts. You may advise the French that Conein's military service record is being reviewed for any pertinent information. ~~S~~ (U)

St. Louis should promptly locate and review Conein's military service record. According to Army sources in Washington, D. C., Conein's military service record was transferred to the U. S. Army Records Center, St. Louis, on 6/30/62. His military serial number was either 01320769 or 01322769. Furnish results in letterhead memorandum.

Enclosed for St. Louis is one copy of relet.

NOTE:

Subject was convicted by a French court in 12/47* to pay his wife (Monique Veber) a monthly sum of 8,000 francs (about $16) for the support of her and two children which resulted from the marriage. Subject has never followed the orders of the court and is currently the subject of an investigation at the request of the Investigative Magistrate in France. Information in the possession of the French indicated that Conein resided at the Ingelside address and they requested investigation by the Bureau to verify his residence and to determine his present situation with regard to employment and standard of living. Legat, Paris, requested Bureau check Bufiles, Ident files, and requested Bureau have Richmond check credit and criminal records and conduct discreet limited investigation to comply with the request of the French Police.

In view of CIA's request as indicated in this letter, it is felt that under no circumstances should we make any mention of our knowledge of subject's whereabouts. ~~S~~ (U)

* and was ordered

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163-15064-1

JFK Assassination System
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Agency Information

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FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	10/8/65	3/15 - 9/23/65	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
CHANGED ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON aka Samuel Katzman, James Olson, Bob Robertson, "Tommy"		ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN		dmk
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - R		

4-13-98
5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

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DATE OF REVIEW

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/18/98 mdc

The title of this report is marked "Changed" to add the name, BOB ROBERTSON, which THOMPSON indicated he had possibly used in the Fall of 1959 in a flight from Detroit to NYC, and the name, "TOMMY" by which name Mrs. HAROLD RETZLAFF, El Paso, Texas, knew THOMPSON.

Bureau has advised that the code name, "OXTANK", formerly used in communications other than reports and letterhead memoranda will no longer be used.

REFERENCES

NYreps of SA ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN, 3/15/65 and 5/28/65

10/7/94
Classified by
Declassify on: OADR
10/3/83

Xerox to NSA
11/16/72 TMG/dld.
Remarks: see NSA let to
Bureau; same subject

Per NSA
letter 1/27/98

ADMINISTRATIVE

Regarding the summary of THOMPSON's story in the "Saturday Evening Post" (SEP), the following information, obtained through interviews of THOMPSON and through other sources, is set forth to clarify the SEP story.

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Dissemination Record of Attached Report

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[redacted]	DIA	Hall (Justice)		
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How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

See other side

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re Wm. Harvey (this page & page N)
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 1/10/78 request. 2/10/78
(See Bufile 62-117290) DJC/ma

(U) per CIA 07/8/91 letter

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57 FEB 28 1966

53 FEB 7 1966

(R.B.)

SECRET

Copies of Index pages 241 thru 256 [illegible] to State, CIA, OSI, ONI, ACSI, DIA [illegible]tice (Hall) by liaison 11-22-65. JNF/ncls. Pls attach this index to NY report in this [illegible] dated 10/8/65 which was disseminated to [illegible] 10/26/65 by liaison

1 copy recd from NY by R/S 7-7-66 in response to Bureau R/S 6-30-66 and sent to [Legat Ottawa] (S) for delivery to (S) [RCMP] lz, by O-T- 7-13-66 (pp 1-256)

RECD DOM INTELL DIV 23 12 44 PM '6

RECD DOM INTELL DIV OCT 29 11 06 AM '65

RECD DOM INTELL DIV OCT 11 3 47 PM '65

RECD DOM INTELL DIV OCT 13 6 31 PM '65

JAN 28 1966

FEB 1 1966

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DATE 11/17/84

SECRET

[illegible]

8

SECRET

NY 65-22427

[WILLIAM K. HARVEY] ~~(S)~~ (U) Foreign

THOMPSON stated that this individual's face was somewhat familiar, and that the name definitely was familiar to him. THOMPSON identified this individual as a Captain HARVEY, whose name appeared on communications directed to OSI from the [7983rd Army Unit.] (S) Specifically, THOMPSON remembered that Captain HARVEY's name had appeared on name check requests submitted to OSI, Berlin, from the [7983rd Army Unit.] (S) THOMPSON believed that the Soviets either showed THOMPSON a picture of HARVEY or asked THOMPSON about HARVEY. THOMPSON stated that he furnished whatever available information he had about HARVEY to the Soviets, but he could not now recall the nature of this information ~~(S)~~

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Cover Page

-N-

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FD-302 (Rev. 10-11-63)

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

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p.D,F KP 1-22-98
SLD/KSB
4-14-98 (JFK)

Date

ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON
ESP - R 12/4/64

1.

ROBERT G. THOMPSON, 1693 North Gardiner Drive, Bay Shore, Long Island, New York, was interviewed on December 2, 1964. At the outset of the interview THOMPSON was advised by SA PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS that he was not under arrest, that his meeting with the Special Agents was strictly voluntary, and that he could leave at any time he wished to do so. THOMPSON was also advised that he had a right to say nothing at all, and that anything he did say might be used in a court of law against him. He was also advised that if he did say anything about a crime he had a right at any time to talk to a lawyer of his own choice or anyone else with whom he might wish to speak before saying anything.

The interviewing agents advised THOMPSON that they had in their possession a list of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) male personnel who were assigned to the Berlin Base of that agency during the period that THOMPSON was assigned to OSI, Berlin. The names on this list were then read off to THOMPSON, at which time he was askod to comment on any names that he recognized. ~~(S)~~(U)

THOMPSON made the following comments concerning the individuals listed below, whose surnames he recognized. ~~(S)~~(U)

[ROBERT A. ACKERMANN] (S)

THOMPSON stated he recalled an individual named [ACKERMANN] (S) who had some connection with Army Intelligence or CIA in Berlin while THOMPSON was with OSI, Berlin. He could recall nothing further regarding this individual nor could he recall if he furnished any information about [ACKERMANN] (S) to STEVEN. ~~(S)~~

~~S~~ Germany

On 12/2/64 at Bay Shore, LI, NY File # 65-22427

by SAS PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS & GEORGE W. O'CONNOR:emv Date dictated 12/4/64

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D — Cover Page

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[WILLIAM K. HARVEY] ~~(S)~~ (U)

THOMPSON stated that he recalled an individual by the name of HARVEY whom he believes was an officer with the [7983rd Army Unit] (S) which THOMPSON stated was a covert CIA outfit, or was an officer with an Army Intelligence Unit in Berlin. THOMPSON believed that this individual had the rank of Captain or Major, and that he was an administrative or liaison officer. THOMPSON stated that STEVEN, his Soviet principal, asked him about this individual and THOMPSON told STEVEN whatever he knew about this individual. THOMPSON advised that he thinks he, THOMPSON, might have met this individual on one occasion. ~~(S)~~

Germany

[CLARK JUNG] (S)

THOMPSON advised that he recalled an individual having the last name [JUNG] (S) who was a civilian employee of the [7983rd Army Unit] (S) THOMPSON recalled a great many details about this individual, including the fact that he was a civilian employee of CIA in Grade GS-9 or 10. THOMPSON believed that this individual was an "agent handler" and furthermore, that he had some connection with photography. THOMPSON stated that this individual may have been a "counterfeiter of documents" or he may have been a "bug" on photography ~~(S)~~

~~S~~

THOMPSON also recalled that this individual lived on Argentinische Allee or Onkel Toms Strasse in Berlin, Dahlem. ~~(S)~~ (U)

THOMPSON also recalled that the individual whose last name he believes was [JUNG] (S) had some sort of an association with two German nationals, whose release from jail in Germany, United States Intelligence had obtained in order that their talents might be utilized by the [7983rd Army Unit] (S) THOMPSON stated that one of these individuals was a counterfeiter and that the other individual was a safe-cracker. STEVEN told him this. ~~(S)~~

F

Cover Page

SECRET

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AWN:ljp/jet/mfm

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[illegible]

(S-1)(S) GOLD knew of no relatives of the KARLOWs living abroad nor was he aware of any financial interests which either of the KARLOWs held in Germany. (S-1)(U) In discussing KARLOW's associates, GOLD (S) furnished the following individuals as being KARLOW's overseas friends: (S-1)(S)

GORDON STEWART, Head of the CIA Station at Frankfurt (S)
WILLIAM K. HARVEY, CIA representative in Berlin
PETER SICHEL, CIA representative at Berlin
WALTER JESSELL, CIA official in Germany. GER (S-1)(S)

(S-1)(S) GOLD (S) characterized KARLOW as being primarily interested in associating with "front office personnel; that when KARLOW did mingle with the co-workers, it was more or less an act of condescendence." (S-1)(U)

(S) GOLD advised that because of the wide area that TAD was servicing in behalf of CIA, it was necessary that a number of TAD personnel be constantly travelling. (S) GOLD remarked that he was travelling steadily and that KARLOW was a frequent traveler in behalf of TAD. (S) GOLD could recall no specific dates of trips by KARLOW during the period 1950 to 1953, but furnished the following in this regard: (S-1)(S)

Vienna (S-1)(S)(U)

(S) GOLD estimated that KARLOW probably made 12 to 15 trips to Vienna during this period for Agency purposes. He recalled that the Agency was servicing a number of requests from Vienna; that at one time, "We had a riotous operation going there and ED FOSTER (S) needed some help." (S) GOLD believed that FOSTER could furnish substantial information regarding KARLOW's activities in Vienna. (S-1)(S)

AUSTRIA

(S) GOLD recalled that during this particular period there were no travel restrictions on American personnel in and around Vienna; that frequently one was not aware he was even in a Soviet zone. (S) GOLD could not recall how long KARLOW remained in Vienna on his trips there. (S-1)(S) was not sure of the date. He mentioned HOUCK was still [Chief of Base at Berlin] (S) and said he saw HOUCK. KARLOW explained that military orders were necessary for any travel into Berlin, including flight by Pan American Airways, which also operated under military control. He stated the orders for travel by train were the most formal, since a check by the Soviets was involved. (5X1)(S)

51 / 33 / 1 GER

KARLOW related one of his men from TAD, [DANIEL C. NIESCHIUR] (S) was stationed in [Berlin] (S) under the name of DANIEL O'NEILL. He thought this was in 1951 or after 1951. He also stated that other men from TAD had temporary duty in [Berlin] (S) and recalled vaguely the photography men had set up some new equipment and dark room there, [JOHN KOPERA] (S) had visited Berlin in connection with some Polish matter, WESLEY PARCELLS on some German "things," and (S) [JOUBLANC] the chemist, in connection with some case. (5X1)(S)

KARLOW said he could not say whether he was in Berlin in August, 1951, but recalled he was there on at least one occasion in the summer because he clearly remembered how early the sun rose in the morning. (5X1)(S)(U) [HARRY H. ROSITZKE]

32 / 33 / 1 4 GER

KARLOW stated he rarely became involved in operations and was usually occupied in making arrangements and setting things up for use of the facilities of TAD. He recalled, however, he was involved in an operation with [JOHN PARKER] (S) and HARRY ROSITZKE of the SR (Soviet Russia) Division and flew to Berlin in 1952 in this connection. KARLOW explained the operation involved a planned attempt to steal the latest model MIG fighter plane and great preparation had been made but at the last minute the adventure was called off because of possible political and diplomatic repercussions. (5X1) [JOHN WILLIAMS PARKER] (S)

KARLOW first said he was unable to recall visiting Berlin in 1953 but later said he recalled seeing WILLIAM K. HARVEY, Chief of Station, (December, 1952, to August, 1959) on more than one occasion so he supposes he did make such visits. When informed that it was understood that KARLOW had been to Berlin ten to fifteen times in the period 1950 - 1953, KARLOW offered no objection and said it was possible that this was true. With reference to his later assignment in Munich from November, 1953, to the end of 1955, KARLOW stated he was fairly certain he had not visited Berlin during this period. (5X1)(S)(U)

[illegible]

SECRET

KARLOW stated he had stayed with Agency associates on some visits to Berlin and on one or more occasions he stayed at the Harnach House, an Army guest house for the Berlin command. (S-1)(S) (U)

KARLOW further advised that before his marriage he and his mother had visited Italy and Corsica, and also the Austrian spa town of Bad Gastein and thought that may have been during the Summer of 1951. He said on a second trip to those areas he was accompanied by his mother and his wife. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW also stated that after his marriage he and his wife had gone to Corsica on two occasions, and to Rome, and had spent New Years Eve 1952 - 1953 at a small town in Austria. These were purely personal trips. He said he did not recall having taken a trip to Berlin for purely personal purposes. (S-1)(S) (U)

KARLOW stated that before their marriage "LIBBY" RAUSCH had gone to Berlin and stayed at the residence of WILLIAM K. HARVEY. KARLOW said he had not visited Berlin with "LIBBY" before marriage but recalled he had done so on one occasion after marriage and he recollected he had become ill on the train from some oysters he had eaten. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW explained in early February, 1950, he proceeded to [Frankfurt] (S) and took over as Chief of TAD which was located in the [Frankfurt] (S) suburb of [Hoechst at Feldbergstrasse 44,] (S) and had mail address APO 709. KARLOW resided in an apartment located in an adjoining building. KARLOW advised when he assumed charge of TAD the unit consisted of only about nine persons. From recollection KARLOW identified TAD personnel as follows: (S-1)(S)

DG GEL Major ROBERT HARRIS, the previous Chief of TAD and a former officer of National Security Agency, (NSA); (S-1)(S)(U)

Captain GUY DRENNAN, also formerly with NSA, and currently night Duty Officer with the Intelligence Branch of the Department of State; and (S-1)(S)(U)

(S) [EARL ALLEN GOLD,] a civilian scientist-chemist, who became deputy of KARLOW and had a small laboratory with several technicians and operated what KARLOW described as a postal censorship; and (S-1)(S)

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SECRET

today is closely similar to that of his appearance 15 years ago. He said he has never worn glasses and his weight has increased only ten pounds since he was in college and it has never varied more than that at any time. He said he has never worn a mustache. (X1)(S)(U)

Late in the interview, DULIN (S) said upon further recollection he remembers contacting a Professor HAROLD MOSELEY, who was Head of Soviet Studies at Columbia University in New York City, when DULIN (S) was recruiting employees. DULIN (S) said that upon thoughtful consideration of his activities at that time he recalled that there was a CIA interest in obtaining a well-qualified man for a position in Moscow. He said efforts were being made to find a man who was to have a cover in the Embassy in Moscow. (S) This person to be hired was supposed to have a fluent command of the Russian language and he had to be of Anglo-Saxon descent. He said CIA gave instructions that the man to be placed in the position in Moscow could not be of Slovak descent (S) DULIN said it is possible that HAROLD MOSELEY referred ROBERTS (S) to DULIN (S) as a prospective employee for the position in Moscow but at this time he has no recollection of either the name or the face of ROBERTS. (S) He said he could definitely state he had never taken any recruit to Admiral HILLENKOTTER to discuss employment. (S) DULIN said he does not know and does not believe he has ever known the identity of any CIA employee in Moscow, Russia. (X1)(S)

[illegible] PAGE IS CLASSIFIED [illegible]

DULIN (S) said he is unable to explain why ROBERTS (S) would have addressed any correspondence relating to his CIA employment to an individual using the name of DULIN. (S) He further said he cannot understand why correspondence would have been addressed to SPENCER ROBERTS (S) in New York City with an address on the bottom of the letter "c/o R. E. DULIN, (S) 2001 16th (S) Street, (S) N. W., Washington, D. C." (S) DULIN said he had never authorized HARRY ROSITZKE or WILLIAM HARVEY to use his name and address as a cover in correspondence relating to recruitment of employees. (X1)(S)

DULIN (S) said he is acquainted with HARRY A. ROSITZKE, who is also employed with CIA. (S) DULIN said his association with ROSITZKE is not now and has never been close. He said he is unable to recall exactly when he became acquainted with ROSITZKE but he associates their meeting with a period shortly following World War II. He is unable to state how they became acquainted because they have never been assigned to the same work. They have never lunched together and they (X1)(S)

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ALL INFORMATION [illegible] THIS FILE IS CLASSIFIED [illegible] UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10070

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

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FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 04/10/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

NOTE:

(S) [Subject is a commercial representative from Yugoslavia. Information was received from CIA that an individual with the same last name was a member of Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS). However, another source of CIA advised subject was not a member of YIS. CIA has learned that an individual believed to be the subject is being recalled to Yugoslavia, but this individual wishes to remain in the U. S. [CIA desires verification of this information because if it is true [CIA may wish to consider contacting subject in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia under control of CIA.] (S) Subject is supposed to return to Yugoslavia at end of April, 1963. Approach to subject by FBI is not recommended because New York informants said in March, 1963, subject is not engaged in intelligence activities and because State recently denied clearance for approach in similar case.

SECRET

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Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

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TO :	HQ
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PAGES :	1
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DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [Franco PECAR] (S)(U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-26-98
SLD/KSR 5-30-98 (JFK)

1. Reference is made to our memorandum number CSCI-3/773,057, subject as above, dated 10 October 1962.

2. Joseph MEROLA, 2018 North Bay Road, Miami Beach, Florida, has advised representatives of another office of this Agency that he learned from contacts in New York that (fnu) PECAR, a Yugoslav trade official in the U. S., is being recalled to Yugoslavia and wishes to remain in the U. S. According to MEROLA, PECAR will visit Miami from 12 to 19 April 1963.

3. While MEROLA has an unsavory background, the representative who spoke with him is inclined to believe that he was telling the truth in this instance. MEROLA claimed that he has also informed the U. S. District Attorney of the above development.

4. It seems probable that (fnu) PECAR is identical with the subject of referenced memorandum, who was assigned to New York in late 1962 as in INTERTRADE representative.

5. We would appreciate receiving any information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's alleged desire to remain in the U. S.

6. If the above information is true, this Agency may wish to consider [the desirability of contacting PECAR in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia at our behest.] (S)

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James A. Angleton
JAMES ANGLETON

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8MAC/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

CSCI-3/775,509

REC- 74 [105-114623- 6] (U)

(FBI INFO)
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/ndc EX-III
ON 5/28/98
(JFK)

APR 5 1963

NAT. INT. SEC.

SECRET

GROUP 1
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2-
VER:
4-16-63

JFK Assassination System
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Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10072

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-7

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/09/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED IN
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9 APR 1963

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KP 5-26-98

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : [Franc PECAR] (~~S~~)(U)

1. Reference is made to our memoranda CSCI-3/775,509, dated 29 March 1963, CSCI-3/775,572, dated 2 April 1963, and CSCI-3/775,622, dated 4 April 1963, all with the subject as above.

2. Another office of this Agency has provided the following additional information from Joseph MEROLA concerning Subject.

a. Subject arrived in Miami, Florida, on 4 April and resided with Joseph MEROLA until 6 April 1963 when he was scheduled to return to New York. Subject planned to return to Miami for the period of 12-19 April following which he would go to Vienna for a short visit, returning to the United States about the end of April. Subject's family will remain in the United States.

b. According to MEROLA, Subject met Assistant Attorney General William Kenny in Miami, but MEROLA had no further details on their conversation except that PECAR appeared most eager to make arrangements to stay in the United States. Subject showed MEROLA and Kenny voluminous documentation.

3. [This office is considering contacting Subject during his visit to Vienna for the purpose of attempting recruitment to return to Yugoslavia.] (S) An early reply regarding information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's activities in the United States would be appreciated.

6 page statement of Pecar furnished CIA by Bulet dated 4/18/63

Copy to N.Y. Miami
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 4-19-63
by HCF

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

J. Angleton
JAMES ANGLETON

(~~S~~)(U)

CSCI-3/775,718

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8MAC/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

1 copies made 2-26-78
re: J. Merola
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 2-26-78 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1 Xerox copy made 4-18-63 HCF

EX-1 REC 31 105-114623-7
14
APR 15 1963

FBI INFO
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ON 5-30-98 (JFK)

GROUP 1
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56 APR 29 1963

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10083

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-89923-184

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/13/1961
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CLIP
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : TT

FD-4-41 (Rev. 1-25-61)

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
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☐ **Radio** ☒ **Teletype**

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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT MARKED ON PG. 2
DONAHOE
KP 5-26-98

Classified by ~~[illegible]~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
1/21/96

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5-30-98
(JFK)

URGENT 4-13-61 4-17 PM SK

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

(U) INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

CLIP. ~~IS-CUBA~~. BUFILES 105-89923, 137-6257, 87-58729. ON APRIL 3 LAST MM 722 C FURNISHED FOLLOWING RE JOSEPH R. MEROLA, FORMER CI*, NOW SUSPECT IN "UNSUBS (TWO) ARMED ROBBERY OF APPROXIMATELY $117,200 IN JEWELRY AND CASH, RESIDENCE OF EDITH AND FRITZ DORIGO, HALLANDALE, FLORIDA, MARCH 20, 1961, ITSP**, MAJOR THEFT, OO MIAMI." MEROLA RECENTLY TOLD CI HE IS CONNECTED WITH CIA IN SOME CAPACITY IN WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL FORMS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION, BEING FURNISHED BY CIA TO SOME ANTI CASTRO GROUP. MEROLA CLAIMED CIA SENDS THIS EQUIPMENT TO MEROLAS HOME WHERE IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY PICKED UP BY BOAT FROM REAR MEROLA RESIDENCE. CLAIMED HE IS REQUIRED HAVE CUBANS WHO OBTAIN GUNS SIGN RECEIPT FOR SAME. OPERATION TAKES PLACE UNDER COVER DARKNESS. CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN FROM EQUIPMENT SEVERAL AUTOMATICS EQUIPPED WITH SILENCERS. INFORMANT CLAIMS MEROLA IS "ARMING THE OUTFIT" AND IS FURNISHING THESE WEAPONS TO VARIOUS HOODLUM ACQUAINTANCES FOR SUM $500 EACH. MEROLA EXHIBITED ONE SUCH AUTOMATIC TO CI AND DEMONSTRATED BY FIRING SHOT INTO AIR. CI "COULD NOT HEAR A THING." ON APRIL 5 JOHN NOBLE, COVERT CIA AGENT WORKING OPERATIONAL LEVEL, ADVISED DID NOT BELIEVE CIA HAD OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA BUT WOULD CHECK. ON APRIL 6 HE ADVISED CIA HAD NOT OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA. ON APRIL 7 JUSTIN

Brazil
ELA.
137-6257-
87-58729-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC- 92

Tel to Miami Re CLIP (U) 4/14/61 md
EX-139
Liaison C.I.A. 4/18/61 md
Re CLIP (U) 105-89923-184

*CRIMINAL INFORMANT
**INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

XEROX
APR 24 1961

26 APR ~~19~~ 1961

63 APR 26 1961

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
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Conrad
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Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

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☐ Radio ☒ Teletype

SECRET

PAGE TWO: FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

GLEICHAUF, OVERT CIA REPRESENTATIVE, MIAMI, ADVISED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO HE WENT TO MEROLAS HOME AFTER MEROLA PESTERED HIM WITH PHONE CALLS OFFERING RENT PLANE OR HELICOPTER TO CIA FOR USE BY FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, ANTI CASTRO ORGANIZATION UTILIZED BY CLIP. MEROLA SHOWED GLEICHAUF BOAT "TERRY KNAUT" DOCKED BEHIND HIS HOME AND IMPLIED THIS WAS HIS BOAT AND IT HAD ALREADY BEEN USED BY FRENTE. MEROLA SEEMED EAGER GET OUT OF U. S. AND SUGGESTED CIA USE HIM ON SOME MISSION TO BRAZIL WHERE MEROLA PLANNED WORK OUT DEAL TO SHIP WHISKEY TO BRAZIL DUTY FREE THROUGH BRAZILIAN POLITICIAN. GLEICHAUF TOLD MEROLA HE WAS NOT INTERESTED. AFTER FURTHER CHECK, GLEICHAUF ADVISED MIAMI THIS BOAT HAS BEEN USED ON ONE OR MORE OPERATIONS BY FRENTE, BUT NOT LIKELY BE USED AGAIN BECAUSE IN BAD SHAPE. BOAT 63 FEET, BEARS REGISTRATION NUMBER 270404. GLEICHAUF STATED MEROLA NOT WORKING FOR CIA OR FRENTE SO FAR AS CAN DETERMINE. ON APRIL 5 [DAVID GLASS,] (S) COVERT CIA AGENT, FURNISHED MIAMI LIST BOATS BEING USED IN VARIOUS OPERATIONS IN WHICH CIA HAS INTEREST. "TERRY KNOTT" ON THIS LIST. AFTER SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT VARONA PERSONALLY, ON APRIL 13 JORGE MORAN, SECRETARY TO MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA LOREDO, GENERAL COORDINATOR OF FRENTE, CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED MEROLA IS WORKING ON THE BOAT "TERRY KNOTT" OWNED BY MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION DE LA REVOLUCION, MRR, WHICH IS MEMBER ORGANIZATION OF FRENTE. MORAN STATED BOAT WAS OPERATED BY SANTIAGO BABUM APRIL 8 AND JOSE "PEPE" ARRIOLA WAS IN CHARGE OF "TERRY KNOTT"

No locality

SECRET

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/4/2015

Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 97-3224-NR

Document Information

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FROM :	MX
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/11/1962
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	MANUEL FUEGO MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/12/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

It is pointed out that CIA in both Managua, Nicaragua, and Guatemala City, Guatemala, is investigating this matter and the U.S. Army ~~(S)~~ (U) Attache, Guatemala City, has also done some investigation through his close contact with Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIS AGUILAR DE LEON, who is the confidential source abroad mentioned in the accompanying report. ~~(S)~~ (U) 2nd set of brackets declass per Army on 2-26-98

SCOTT HOLLOWAY (S) head of the CIA Station, American Embassy (S) Managua, Nicaragua, advised on 9-5-62 that NOEL PALLAIS, who is T-1 in the accompanying report, (S) runs the financial enterprises of General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua. HOLLOWAY (S) stated that PALLAIS has been in close contact with the CIA Office in regard to this case. (S) He was made available for contact by HOLLOWAY (S) and was subsequently interviewed at the CIA office (S) in Managua. HOLLOWAY (S) stated he personally has encouraged General SOMOZA (S) not to have anything to do with WERBELL, SMITH and associates. He stated he feels the offer to sell arms and ammunition and provide mercenaries which was made to the Guatemalan Government was only of secondary interest. ~~(S)~~

MICHAEL F. TAYLOR (S) of the CIA Station, (S) American Embassy, Guatemala City, advised on September 10, 1962, that it was ascertained that the woman who accompanied WERBELL to Managua is LUCY LUCHIEN, who owns the Duplex Building in Guatemala City. She returned to Guatemala City on September 1, 2 or 3, 1962. ~~(S)~~

(S) TAYLOR advised that when ARTHUR L. SMITH left Guatemala City on September 3, 1962, he left as a forwarding address 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 405, Washington, D.C. According to TAYLOR (S) WERBELL told the manager of the Maya Excelsior Hotel that he had the clearance of CIA. ~~(S)~~

(S) TAYLOR stated that MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, son of the President of Guatemala, advised that neither WERBELL nor SMITH had made personal contact with him. At the request of MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, the Judicial ~~(S)~~

Police put a surveillance on WERBELL and SMITH, which apparently was rather obvious. The police also monitored their telephone conversations. Subsequently, [the Judicial Police] (S) advised CIA that SMITH had made one telephone call to MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington, D.C., and another to a man by the name of DIGGS or BRIGGS in Washington, D.C. He also made a telephone call to Handy of Jones and Handy, Marine Architects, Miami, Florida. SMITH received a telephone call which was reported as having been from ARNOLD in Washington but (S) [TAYLOR] stated that CIA believes it was from FRANK AUSTIN, who he said is connected with MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington. ~~(S)~~

WERBELL tried to make telephonic contact with FRANK MARSHALL, Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In telephone calls made just prior to 8-20-62 mention was made of meeting someone referred to only as "the general" at the Hotel El Salvador, San Salvador, El Salvador. According to [TAYLOR] (S) CIA does not believe the meeting took place in San Salvador as planned. (S) [TAYLOR] had previously mentioned on 8-13-62 that when WERBELL and SMITH first contacted MIGUELITO YDIGORAS during early August, 1962, they stated they were waiting for PINEIRO and seemed to think PINEIRO was someone YDIGORAS would know. They stated they would contact him as soon as PINEIRO arrived. [TAYLOR] (S) advised on 9-10-62 that it had been ascertained that Colonel JOSE PINEIRO PAEZ was apparently the one they were expecting. ~~(S)~~

(S) [TAYLOR] stated that the telephone conversation between SMITH, WERBELL and the individuals they were talking to were apparently rather cryptic and [the Judicial Police] (S) obtained little more than the identities of the individuals making the calls. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

SECRET

SOURCES

The confidential source abroad is Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIZ AGUILAR LEON, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, National Police, Guatemala City, Guatemala. (X) [S] T-1 is NOEL PALLAIS, first cousin of President LUIS SOMOZA, and General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua, who handles financial enterprises of General SOMOZA. X Located in instant report. Source concealed as he is a contact of CIA, (S) Managua, Nicaragua. (X)

CLASSIFICATION

Enclosed report is classified "Confidential" as it contains information from an official of a foreign [S] government and from an individual who has close connections with a second foreign government. Both (X) [S] requested the information be regarded as confidential.

STATUS

While this case and also the case on MANUEL FUEGO, RA - Central America, are being placed in an RUC status, they will be reopened if any pertinent information is received.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES :	HQ
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Document Information

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DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
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OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	AT

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

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FBI

Date: 7-16-65

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Via Airtel ______________ (Priority)

Classified by SP8 ~~MAC~~/KSR 2-18-95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 5-11-98 EXCEPT BRACKETS

6-9-98 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Santo Domingo (134-31) (RUC)

Subject: ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO - PSI
IS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

REC-133

Reference Buairtel dated June 28, 1965. Reference also Santo Domingo teletype number 163, dated June 23, 1965, captioned, "MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WARBELL, III, PSI."

Information received from [the local office of] CIA (S) (Central Intelligence Agency) on May 30, 1965, revealed that subject, born in Havana, Cuba; 52 years; height 5'11"; weight 190 pounds; gray hair; brown eyes; married with no children; is employed by the Cia. Dominicana de Seguros, a subsidiary of AMADEO BARLETTA's Enterprises in Santo Domingo. The report indicated that RIVERO had worked in the General Motors set-up in Havana, Cuba, under BARLETTA. When CASTRO moved into Cuba, RIVERO exiled himself to Miami. BARLETTA then offered RIVERO a job in Santo Domingo and placed him in charge of the Division of Insurance of BARLETTA's General Motors set-up. RIVERO was described as a boisterious, gregarious type, who hits every bar in town and who is extremely loud mouthed. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Files of the Dominican Immigration Service checked on July 13, 1965, revealed that ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO has permanent Dominican Resident Visa 10349, issued to him for the year 1965. He has had permanent resident status in the Dominican Republic since 1962..

The file further indicated that he entered the Dominican Republic at Santo Domingo on February 2, 1962, from Miami, Florida. He was described as follows:

SECRET

4 - Bureau
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Santo Domingo

AAC:wlg (5)

REC-133 134-13856-2

195

1 of serial copies made 2-5-78 756914 Re: Mitchell L. Werbell

For review at FBIHQ by HSCA request of 2-16-77 (See Bufile #62-117290)

JUL 20 1965

C C Wick JUL 27 1965

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

SECRET

DOB:	July 15, 1911
RACE:	White
COMPLEXION:	Light
WEIGHT:	175 lbs
HEIGHT:	5' 11"
EYES:	Brown
HAIR:	Gray
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
RESIDENCE:	Arzobispo Marino Number 30, Santo Domingo

JOHN CASSERLY (protect identity), correspondent for the American Broadcasting System who is known to this office, advised on July 11, 1965, that RIVERO is currently living with MITCHELL WARBELL. Dominican Republic

This source advised that RIVERO is notoriously known as a "wheeler dealer." He has a number of different businesses all concerned with automobiles and automobile insurance. He has associated with BARLETTA who had the General Motors franchise in Havana, Cuba, for many years.

Rivero Cuba

Source stated that RIVERO has a pleasant personality but described him as a heavy drinker and stated that RIVERO would do anything for money. He advised that RIVERO's wife is one EVANGELINA HERNANDEZ, a Cuban national. He further stated HERNANDEZ has relatives in Miami, Florida, and makes frequent trips to Miami. He advised RIVERO allegedly was mixed up in gambling enterprises but added that he had no proof of this.

Inasmuch as RIVERO is reported to be extremely loud mouthed and inasmuch as he is currently reported to be living with MITCHELL WARBELL, [who at one time was reported to be employed by CIA and who is currently characterized by CIA as a "wild man,"] ~~(S)~~(U) no further action is being taken with reference to developing this individual as a PSI.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90130-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-88731-32

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 07/09/1960
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ TAMAYO
PAN AMERICA CONFEDERATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

MM 105-2643

11354-0

FD-302 reflecting identities of CYpress telephone numbers in Key West, Florida, was furnished by Mrs. POLLY ANDREW, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Coral Gables, Florida, who furnished same to SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.

INFORMANTS

Identity	Location of Original Information
MM T-1 is GILBERT BARRERAS, PSI, an American citizen, who has a wide acquaintanceship with Cubans in the Miami area.	134-409 Sub A
MM T-2 is RAY O'MERA, CIA, Miami (S)	Instant report, page 143

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report and "T" symbols were utilized only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

- D * -

COVER PAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90135-10074
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-82298-164

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/18/1963
PAGES :	28
SUBJECTS :	ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/19/1999
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	SUMMARY

SECRET

CORRELATION SUMMARY

Main File No: 105-82298

Date: **January 18, 1963**

Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Kiko Pernas*
One Gutierrez**
One Martinez***

Date Searched: 10/26/62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

All logical variations of subject's name and aliases were searched and identical references found as:

Summary

Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez
Eloy Guitierrez
Eloy Guterrez
Eloy Gutierez
Eloy Gutierres
Ely Gutierres
Elog Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez
Eloy Manoyo Gutierrez
Eloyo Gutierrez
Ely Gutierrez
Gallego Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez Manoyo
Lazaro Martinez
Lazaro O. Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez Mendez
Lazaro Martinez Mendez
Lazaro O. Martinez Mendez
Ely Gutierrez Menjoya
Eloy Gutierrez Menoy
Gutierrez Menoya

23

Eloy Gutierrez Menoya
One Menoyo
Eloy Menoyo
Elog Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guitierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guterrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierres Menoyo
Eloy Gutiirrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutterrez Menoyo
Eloyo Gutierrez Menoyo
Ely Gutierres Menoyo
Ely Gutierrez Menoyo
Gallego Gutierrez Menoyo
Guterriez Menoyo
Gutierre Menoyo
Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez Menoyo
Eloy Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoya
Floy Gutierrez Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoyo

22

7/25/94 05RMBGA
Classified by SP8 BLJ/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 2/13/8
(JF

Also searched as One Gallego, see page 27 of summary.

(continued on next page)

THIS SUMMARY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR USE AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.

105-82298-164

REC 12

ENC. BEHIND FILE

Analyst	Coordinator	Approved
James F. Kline	Mary H. Elgin	Norman F. Stultz

JFK:jeb

*Gutierrez was alleged to have used the nickname Kiko Pernas. See serials 72 and 95 of main file (105-82298). See also 105-98002-1.
** Not searched, see page 56 of search slip.
***Not completely searched, see page 56 of search slip.

62 JAN 29 1963

~~SECRET~~

organization rather than through file on GUTIERREZ MENOYO as an individual. Accordingly, Miami file 105-2102 (Bufile 105-82298) is being closed at this time and all leads regarding the II Front or GUTIERREZ MENOYO will be handled in 105-5948. For this reason a report was prepared at this time instead of the letterhead memorandum as requested in referenced Bureau letter.

- INFORMANTS -

Identity	Location
MM T-1 is MM 639-S	134-238 Sub A-479 and 134-238 Sub A-478 ~~S~~ (U)

- C* -
- COVER PAGE -

~~SECRET~~

Hector Peter Ordetx, 1802 Lamar St., Tampa, Fla., furnished on 1/26/62, a quantity of miscellaneous papers, some of which bore the name of Roberto De Los Rios (100-431672) and appeared to be correspondence between him and members of his family in Cuba. One of these papers was a carbon copy of a typewritten letter in Spanish to "Dear Father", dated 4/7/59, at Tampa, with no signature. The writer said that Nelson had written him asking for declarations of the committee in regard to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and his insidious declarations. No further information.

100-431672-27 p.16,17
(3,36)

Correlator's Note: It was noted that Roberto De Los Rios had a brother named Nelson.

Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas (100-344127) advised on 4/29/59, that he had heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Morgan, former leaders in Sierra del Escambray, Second Front, were dissatisfied with the situation in Cuba.

100-344127-18 p.19
(3)

CIA Information Report, dated 5/19/59, revealed that Temistocles Fuentes Rivera (105-62455) stated that when Ernesto "Che" Guevara arrived in Las Villas Province, Cuba, during the revolution, he was in the zone of the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray which was headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Gutierrez and an armed troop met Guevara with drawn guns, accused him of being a communist and demanded that he and his men leave their area of operations. (~~S~~)(U)

105-62455-10 p.1
(3,36)

MM-635-S, employed by the Cuban Air Force, advised that on 5/20/59, Major Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Major Pernas, and Major Armando Fleitas, all leaders of the Second Front of the Escambray, came to consult with Major Marcos Diaz Lanz, chief of the Revolutionary Air Force in Cuba. Gutierrez told Marcos Diaz that they had 400 men who were unemployed and whom they would like to put to work in order to keep them out of trouble. (~~S~~)(U)

*[109-599-6 Encl.p.1
(13,47)]* (~~S~~)(U)

On 3/18/59, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, at a press conference, stated that his organization* supported the Castro Government "as long as it lives up to the principles for which we fought", and that if it should deviate "we will take whatever steps circumstances dictate". He further stated that his group was 100% anti-communist.

On 4/20/59, Gutierrez left Havana to visit Miami at the invitation of Miami's Mayor, (source not clear).

Paul Bethel, Press Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, Cuba (protect identity), advised that Tony Beacon was appointed Gutierrez's press secretary on the above mentioned trip and Beacon was paid by Nick Bartone, an American who was attempting to sell C-74's (Globemaster I) to Cuba.

"The Havana Post ",dated 5/27/59, carried an article to the effect that the Second National Front of the Escambray (105-78831) had issued a statement which endorsed the Agrarian Reform Program of the Cuban Government. The statement was signed by Gutierrez, National Chief, and Armando Fleitas, Secretary General of the organization.

Add. info. according to PSI Hugo Gonzalez Lajonchere (protect identity). (~~S~~)(U)

105-78831-1 p.1,2
(5/38)

A Foreign Service Dispatch from the Department of State, dated 5/28/59, revealed that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo had told the Embassy in Cuba that the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (105-78831) was strongly anti-communist and would take action if necessary should the Government come under communist control or domination. (~~S~~) (U)

State also advised that a source, who had spent a month with the Segundo Frente under the command of Gutierrez, advised that the group was non-political and definitely not communist. Gutierrez felt that Fidel Castro had a number of communists among his advisors and he believed one of these was "Che" Guevara. Guevara had been joined by some of the members of the Segundo Frente, with Gutierrez's approval, but Guevara's followers had not been allowed to take arms with the Segundo Frente. (~~S~~)(U)

105-78831-3 p.2,3,4
(5/38)

¶'s 6 & 7
is NOW DECLASS
per DEPT. OF
State Ltr. DTD
3-19-98
SLD/ICSR
5-13-98
(JFK)

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* Second National Front of the Escambray.

Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro, 6424 S.W. 38th St., Miami, Fla., advised that the Crusade of Revolutionaries Against Communism (CRAC) had planned an invasion of the Isle of Pines, Cuba. In June, 1959, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Alexander Morgan, Commanders in the Cuban Army, were in contact with the Movimento Revolucionario Democrata in Havana, and this was known to the CRAC in Miami. Rodriguez had advised the group in Cuba and the anti-Castro movement in the Dominican Republic, not to trust either Morgan or Gutierrez because he considered them both to be loyal to Castro, and their cooperation with the group was for the purpose of entrapment.

Add. info. according to Rodriguez.

105-81502-7 p.20
(6,38)

A teletype from San Juan, dated 6/5/59, concerning Nicaraguan revolutionary activities, set out the following: "Second Front Escambray Forces under Commandant Ely Gutierrez Menjoya requested immediate dissolution from Government. Message conjectures that this may mean a breakaway from policies of July 26 and could mean participation in other revolutions." Not further clarified. X(U)

[109-12-222-503
(26)] X(U)

[MM 685-S*] (S) advised on 6/26/59, that Paul Hughes, an American pilot, flew for Commander Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo during the Cuban Revolution. Hughes was suspected of taking guns that were stored at Miami International Airport and which belonged to the Cuban Government. Hughes had come to Miami from Cuba on a mission for Gutierrez. (X)

On 7/2/59, Sergio Diaz Brull, former advisor to the former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, advised that Gutierrez was sympathetic with the anti-Fidel Castro Movement and was waiting in the mountains of Cuba with approximately 2,000 men for instructions when to attack the forces of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

105-79528-2 p.B, Encl.p.7
(5,38)

Department of the Army advised that in an interview with Florencio Pernas Lorenzo (105-98002) on 2/14/61, Pernas advised that from January to March, 1959, all he did was attend social and official gatherings in Cuba. During this period he made a trip to Miami, Fla. with Comandante Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. In about July, 1959, he was requested by Gutierrez to participate in an action against Trujillo and Batista followers who were to attack Cuba. From 12/20-23/59, Pernas made a trip to Tampa, Fla., accompanied by Gutierrez to collect toys for needy children of the Escambray. ~~(S)~~(U) PP's 1 & 2 IS NOW DECLASS PER ARMY LET. DTD. 4-16-98 SLD/KSR 5/13/98 (JFK)

Pernas entered the U.S. with Gutierrez* and planned to go to Miami and wait for orders of Gutierrez as to his future actions. ~~(S)~~(U)

Add. info. according to Fernando Prio Hernandez, 1330 Southwest 12th Ave., Miami, Francisco Prio Socarras, 2200 Southwest 2nd Ave., Miami, Antonio Prio Socarras, 1001 Southwest 22nd St., Coral Gables, Fla., and duplicate informant.

105-98002-11 p.4-6,8-10
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-2 p.2,3
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-9 p.3,4,6-8
(8,41) Add. info.

*Entered U.S. January, 1961

CIA advised that a meeting composed of anti-Franco elements and communists took place on 2/4/61, at the camp of the Spanish Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion de Espana-ELE) on the Isle of Pines near Havana. Abderraman Muley More and his aide, Manuel Perez, leaders of DRIL (Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation) who had taken charge of ELE since the departure in late January, 1961, of Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, were threatened with expulsion from Cuba for resisting communist efforts to take over ELE. ~~(S)~~(U)

109-587-47
(13,47)

Miguel Antonio Sanchez Ramos, who was interviewed in Room 615, Roger Williams Hotel, 28 East 31st St., NYC (not further identified) (Protect identity), and who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 1/27/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, who was involved in the "double cross" of the Dominican Republic's attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in August, 1959, had a price of $100,000 on his head, put there by Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. ~~(S)~~(U)

105-93789-39 Encl.p.7
(7,40)

SECRET

On 2/23/61, Cirita Lopez Cejas, residence, Miami, Fla., and a messenger for Manuel Ray and the underground, advised that Manuel Ray had helped Gutierrez Menoyo and the group who came with him, to escape from Cuba on 1/27/61. Lopez stated that she assisted in the arrangements for the defection and had hidden 5 or 6 of the revolutionaries in her home in Havana. She advised that Ray recognized that Gutierrez pulled a considerable amount of support and following as a former leader of the Escambray. He was considered a good campaigner and knew the Sierra Escambray Mountains extremely well.

[113-7-210-252 Encl.p.7,8
(51)] ~~(S)~~(U)

The 2/1/61, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "Economic Crises Won't Topple Castro-Prio" in which Carlos Prio Socarras (109-430) stated his views on Cuba and Castro. Prio also expressed concern that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, the rebel commandante who had sought asylum in Miami, was still being detained by U.S. authorities: Guiterrez was an anti-communist, according to Prio.

109-430-2390 Encl.p.3
(23)
SI 109-430-2395 p.10
(23)

CIA Information Report, dated 2/10/61, revealed that a source who belonged to a group which assisted defectors to escape from Cuba, had been trying to get Humberto Sori Marin (105-93839) out of Cuba. The source visited Miami to determine whether the means of escape from Cuba had been compromised by Gutierrez Menoyo and his companions. He also wanted to determine if Sori would be interned as was Gutierrez, and how Gutierrez had learned about this escape route and how he was able to highjack the boats. ~~(S)~~(U)

105-93839-2
(29)

CIA furnished on 3/6/61, a memorandum captioned "DRIL Plans For Action In the Iberian Peninsula" , which stated that the Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation (DRIL) planned to infiltrate a group from Portugal into the Sierra Morena mountain range. According to the secretary of DRIL leader Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, DRIL had a clandestine printing shop in Madrid. Field Comment: According to a 2/14/61 report from [an official Spanish service, Gutierrez's secretary] (C) in Havana, said that DRIL leader Abderraman Muley More had commented that his plan had been to charter a boat to be used for clandestine landing in Spain or Portugal. ~~(S)~~

109-587-48 p.3
(13, 47)

On 6/30/61, Ralph Huguet, former officer in the Cuban Rebel Air Force, advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Max Edgardo Lesnick Menendez (105-64869) resided with him at the Blue Bay Motel, Normandy Isle, Miami Beach, Fla. Gutierrez desired to come to the Miami Office for an interview. Huguet advised that to his knowledge, neither Lesnick nor Gutierrez were involved in any acitvity or in any way connected with the current Cuban government. (S)(U)

105-64869-11
(4,36)
SI 105-64869-12 p.1-3
(4,36) Add. info.

MM 639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a recently defected military commander of the Cuban Revolutionary Army, and closely associated with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, a leading anti-Castro organization, planned to attend, as an observer, military demonstrations with maneuvers that were to be held at an abandoned airport at Davie, Fla., on 7/1/61. These demonstrations were held by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-3 Encl.p.2
(1,34)

MM 639-S advised on 7/2/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, did not attend the demonstration held on 7/2/61, at Davie Airport, Davie, Fla., by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-7 Encl.p.2
(1,34)
SI 2-1693-31 p.11
(2,35) (Add. info according to
Gerald Patrick Hemming, 1936 Southwest
3rd St., Miami, Fla.)
SI 2-1499-78 p.11
(1,34)

Miami report, dated 10/4/61, revealed that MM-639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo's father and brother were both known communists in Cuba and Eloy himself fought on the side of the communists in Spain in the 1930's. Eloy was further accused of being responsible for over 200 innocent people being put in jail in Cuba and having participated in the William Alexander Morgan affair at Trinidad, Cuba, in August, 1959. He was not well considered by Cuban nationals in Miami, had a bad reputation and was not generally trusted. (~~S~~)(U)

Add. info.

2-1693-39 p.1,3-7,11
(2,35)

Roger Redondo Gonzalez, 730 W. 11th Ave., Miami, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that a captain Antonico (LNU), who furnished the transportation for a group of Cuban exiles to infiltrate Cuba in August, 1961, was in charge of contacting the Cuban underground for Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. (~~S~~)(U)

Rafael Huguet Del Valle, Blue Bay Motel, 2070 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that Antonico (LNU) was a fishing boat captain from Cayo Guillermo, Cuba, who was a member of the revolutionary movement of Gutierrez and who had contact with the underground section of this movement in Cuba. (~~S~~)(U)

Add. info. according to Huguet and duplicate informants. (~~S~~)(U)

2-1693-50 p.1-4,6
(2,35)

(S)
(NY 2965-S*) advised that on 12/22/61, Herbert Matthews ("NY Times" correspondent) contacted Mario Garcia Inchaustegui (105-99238), Cuban Ambassador to the UN. Garcia asked Matthews if there was any news of the "invasion of my country". Matthews replied that there was nothing new, only "the ravings of that 'jerk' Gutierrez (probably Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo) and Miro Cardona" (anti-Castro Cuban revolutionary leaders). (~~S~~)

[105-99238-26 p.1
(8,41)] (S)

Gerardo Gabriel Antonio Hernandez Perez (105-113456), residence, Miami, Fla., advised on 8/3/62, that he and many other Cubans had a poor opinion of Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Manuel Ray Rivero, former member of the council, and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, because they were once with the Castro regime and probably would have stayed if there had been sufficient opportunity for them to advance politically and financially. Ray was considered the most anti-American of any of the exiled leaders. (U)

105-113456-1 Encl.p.7
(9/42)

On 9/12/62, Rene Dechard, 1174 S.W. 12th St., Miami, Fla., advised that Max Garcia (97-4345) had made phone calls to his home at various times in the past in attempts to locate Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo.

97-4345-35 p.1,2
(3/36)

CIA Information Report, dated 9/18/62, revealed that General Generoso Campos Marquetti, President of the Alliance For the Liberty of Cuba (105-114160), stated that the Alliance sought a unification of all elements, except those of the Castroite bloc whose "hands are stained with blood". Campos was adamant in refusing to accept anyone of the ilk of Gutierrez Menoyo (FNU). (X) (U)

Headquarters Comment: This probably refers to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Commandant of the former anti-Batista Second National Front of the Escambray, who took exile in the U.S. in January, 1961.

105-114160-2 p.3,4
(9/42)

MM 639-S advised that on 9/28/62, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Tony Cuesta and about 4 others attended a meeting in Miami, Fla., which was considered a meeting of Operation Alpha 66 (105-112098). Cuesta had lived at 2753 N.W. 13th St., Miami, and had been in contact with Gutierrez and a number of American soldiers of fortune and mercenaries. Gutierrez was last known to reside at 1126 S.W. 12th Ave., Miami, and it was not known if he was a member of Operation Alpha 66. (X) (U)

105-112098-40 Encl.p.5
(9/42)

REFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY

The following references on One Gallego, located in files maintained in the Special File Room of the Files and Communications Division, Records Branch, were not reviewed: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-330-237-1545	(62) ✓
64-330-239-825	(62) ✓

(S)

The following reference on One Gallego was not available during the time this summary was being prepared: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-1200-1063	(62) ✓

See the search slip filed behind file for other references on this subject which contain the same information (SI) that is set out in the main file. Differences in source and additional nonpertinent information will be noted on the search slip.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10067
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/14/1960
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL PETROS MOUTSOS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. L'Allier L

DATE: September 14, 1960

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: PETROS MOUTSOS
INTERNAL SECURITY - GREECE AND CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
~~KP 11-17-97~~
JM 6-23-98

(S) The subject was [utilized by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime (S) Organization, OENO.] (S) His past activities have been the subject of correspondence between us and CIA. During the past year, [his usefulness to CIA had practically expired, primarily because of] (S) subject's desire to remove himself from the OENO atmosphere.] (S)

On September 13, 1960, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS Radnor, which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutos and] is (S) now endeavoring to work out an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and can serve as a source of information in that country.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutos to jump ship at New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval] (S) (S) [of Immigration and Naturalization Service. CIA] will then hold conferences with Moutos and subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutos will endeavor to have contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who is well known to us and who has a communist background. His marriage to Boyer [was actually promoted in order to improve his position in OENO.] (S) He has been separated from his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated that she desires to live with him again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of relations between the two will help (S) Moutos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S)

(S)

SJP:bas
(4)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

8/9/93
~~Classified by 9803 RDD/GCL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 211,336
(5668 SLD/GCL - 3/24/95 - JFK)

EX-105

REC- 5 105-30972-68

7 SEP 27 1960

12-10-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
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(JFK)

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LET: New Orleans
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1 - Baltimore 1 - NY

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OTHERWISE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10230

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : NO

TITLE :

DATE : 09/23/1960
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PETROS MOUTSOS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

1 - Mr. Nasca

SAC, New Orleans SECRET 9/23/60

Director, FBI REC-5 (105-30972) -68

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except Brackets
~~KP 11-17-97~~
JM 6-23-98

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EX-105

PETROS MOUTSOS
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION CONCERNING
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

The captioned individual was [utilized by CIA as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime Organization, (S) OENO. During the past year [his usefulness to CIA has practically expired, primarily because of] the subject's desire to remove (S) himself from the OENO atmosphere. (S)

On September 13, 1960, CIA advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS "Radnor," which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutsos and] is endeavoring to work out (S) an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and serve as a source of information.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutsos to jump ship in New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval of INS. CIA] will then hold (S) conferences with Moutsos and the subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutsos will endeavor to establish contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who has a communist background. This marriage [was actually promoted in order to improve subject's position in the OENO.] The subject has been separated from (S) his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated she desires to live with the subject again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of (S) relations between the two will help Moutsos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S) (S)

This is being furnished for your information and under no circumstances should any of this data be furnished to anyone outside the Bureau. Any pertinent information received concerning the subject should, of course, be promptly furnished to the Bureau.

1 - New York (105-15613)
1 - Baltimore (134-571)

12-10-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6 (JFK)

Tolson
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Parsons 1 - 100-398547 (Angela Boyer)
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach VHN:wmt:kac
Malone (7)
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

58 SEP 29 1960

MAILED 25
SEP 23 1960
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

8/9/93
~~Classified by 9803 rdd/gcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 211,326~~
(5668 SLD/GCL-3/29/95-JFK)

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10284
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-78890-27

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/05/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL LEVI LAUB
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: July 5, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: LEVI LAUB
UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL TO CUBA

Bland

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) letter dated April 18, 1963, captioned "U. S. Nationals in Cuba." The Liaison Agent was instructed to obtain more specific information concerning subject's reported travel to Cuba. The following was furnished to the Liaison Agent on July 3, 1963, by A. P. Flynn, CIA: (U) ~~(S)~~

Information received by CIA indicated that the subject was in Cuba during the period February 22-March 11, 1963. CIA received this information from [the British Intelligence Service (MI-6). The British] (S) obtained the data from [Gavin Young, a British newspaperman] (S) who was in Cuba during the same period described above. [MI-6] has (S) advised CIA that [Young] (S) is currently traveling to San Francisco. [The British MI-6 representative in Washington, D. C.] (S) plans to contact [Young] (S) and work out arrangements whereby [Young] (S) can be made available to the Bureau for interview. ~~(S)~~

Calif Eng

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Subversive Control Section.

105-78890

1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Haack
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:gp (5)

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KP 3-19-98

~~Classified by 5668 SLD/GAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
4/14/98 (JFK)

REC- 69 105-78890- 27

JUL 9 1963

EX-108

4-1-98

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

62 JUL 15 1963

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10355
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	08/28/1961
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

Liaison Section
Mr. Donahoe
Mr. Little
1 - Mr. Meier

REC- 9 105-24642 -4 (S)

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---------- RE ---------------------
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ---------
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290) (U)

5668 SLD/GCL
4/18/95 (JFK)

Date: August 28, 1961

EX-112

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1-11-94
~~Classified by 9803RDD/ly~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
211326

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: EDUARDO ESPINOSA Y PRIETO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - MEXICO (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Reference is made to your letter dated August 21, 1961, your reference CSCI-3/766,810 ~~(S)~~ (U)

A review of this Bureau's file on subject fails to reveal that he wrote bank drafts to active communist workers with the possible exception of Alicia Merino Fuentes. (S) With regard to her, the only allegation that she was an active communist worker was made in February, 1941, by a person whose reliability was unknown to the United States Embassy in Mexico City, D. F. Our investigation failed to substantiate this allegation and you were so advised by letter under above caption dated September 24, 1959. Furthermore, at the time subject's bank draft to her was written (February 10, 1958), subject and Merino Fuentes were both connected with the Mexican (S) Mission to the United Nations, a fact which tends to reduce the (S) intelligence significance of this payment. (S)

Based on information in the files of this Bureau, it appears inadvisable to include in your summary to the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany, that subject wrote bank (S) drafts to active communist workers or to suggest that he "was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." (S)

ACM:bja
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

BY COURIER SVC.
46 AUG 29
COMM - FBI

SBJ/kll

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RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-18-98

11/7/97

5668 SLD/KSR
7-4-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mde (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

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Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Malone ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Ingram ____
Gandy ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Director
Central Intelligence Agency (~~S~~)(U)

NOTE: This letter is classified "Secret" because it contains information so classified by CIA (~~S~~)(U)

CIA seeks to pass a summary of information concerning subject to the BfV in Germany and has requested permission to (S) include the following in this summary, stating it comes from our files: (~~S~~)

"During his New York City tenure, he was known to write bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." (~~S~~)(U)

CIA stated above conclusion "was apparently based on numerous Bureau reports written during 1957 and 1958." CIA refers specifically to only one bank draft, it having been written by subject to Alicia Merino Fuentes and states that our (S) report dated 10/12/56 contained information that she was an active communist. This report was in the case on Merino Fuentes (S) and the only allegation that she was an active communist was the 1941 allegation made to the Embassy in Mexico. Bureau has developed no information indicating payees of other bank drafts written by subject had subversive associations or sympathies. (~~S~~)(~~U~~)(U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10357
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	DOS
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	08/16/1963
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL HENRYK IGNACY JANIKOWSKI
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for brackets KP 5-18-98

16 AUG 1963

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

5-9-95 5668 SLD/EH (JFK)
Classified by 9803RDD
Declassify on: OADR
9BI Adm markings

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: JANIKOWSKI, Henryk Ignacy
DOB: 4 Sept. 1921
POB: Wiele, Bydogoszcz, Poland

105-7-25026
28626

1. Reference is made to the name check request, dated 18 June 1963, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain the following information concerning Subject.

2. According to a report dated 23 March 1961 [from an official West German service,] (S) the Bremer Bank in Bremen, Germany, reported that they had received a check for one thousand dollars from one Eduardo Espinosa y PRIETO of the Mexican Embassy in Moscow, USSR, to be deposited to the account of one Erik SCHOTT, an architect residing at Ginsterweg 1, Bremen Munthe, West Germany.

3. On the basis of this information, SCHOTT was interrogated [by the West German service] (S) on 21 November 1961 for possible intelligence involvement. During the interrogation, SCHOTT provided the following information concerning Subject: SCHOTT first became acquainted with Subject in 1940 when he resided in Subject's home in Germany. Subject, who had moved to Poland, wrote to SCHOTT in 1957 and asked him to buy used cars and ship them to him. Subject transmitted to SCHOTT dollars and dollar checks for purchasing the cars via an unknown Polish sailor. Subject told SCHOTT that he had obtained the money on the black market and from exhibitors at the Poznan Fair. SCHOTT believed that Subject obtained the money from Poles who had relatives in the United States. During a visit to Belgium in 1957, Subject purchased several second-hand taxis and cars for shipment to Poland. Subject visited SCHOTT in late 1957 and purchased a Renault to take back with him to Poland. For the purpose of avoiding the customs duty on the car, SCHOTT gave Subject a statement to the effect that he was a relative.

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105-36449-2

105-24642 (S)
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NOT RECORDED
79 SEP 3 1963

FBI info 7-4-98
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SEP 4 1963

In 1959 SCHOTT visited Subject in Gdansk, Poland. Subject told SCHOTT that he could obtain dollars from "an employee of an embassy" which he would send to SCHOTT for desposit in his account at the Bremer Bank. Subject obtained the dollars for zlotys at the black market exchange rate. SCHOTT's wife, who was also interrogated, stated that checks arrived by mail from an employee of the Mexican Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, which her husband deposited in Subject's account. Among documents obtained [officially] from the Bremer Bank was (S) a letter from [Mexican Ambassador in Warsaw, Eduardo ESPINOSA y PRIETO,] accompanying a check for one thousand dollars for (S) deposit to the account of Erich SCHOTT. Subject told SCHOTT that in 1950 his maid had reported to the Polish authorities that he had dollars in his house. As far as SCHOTT knew, Subject was investigated but was never sentenced. On 24 June 1961, Subject again visited SCHOTT and from Germany went to Zelzate, Belgium, to settle a debt from automobile buying operations in 1957. Subject visited his sister in Paris, France, and returned with her to Bremen in a new Peugot which he had bought in Holland in his sister's name. Subject then shipped the car to Poland.

4. According to [the West German service,] (S) no evidence was uncovered that would indicate SCHOTT was involved in intelligence activities.

CSCI-3/777,473

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10467
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/26/1961
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL JORGE BELIARD
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. L'Allier DATE: June 26, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [JORGE BELIARD](C)
[PSI](C)
IS - CUBA

(5668 SLD/GCL 4/18/95 - JFK)

12/10/93
Classified by 9803RDD/BCL
Declassify on: OADR
211,326

Donahoe

The captioned individual is a [station manager of] (C) the Cubana Airlines, Idlewild International Airport, New York City. Recently Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) submitted a name check request concerning [Beliard.] Liaison was requested to determine the purpose of this request (C)

On June 23, 1961, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that a Cuban source had suggested to CIA that (C)[Beliard] possibly could be of some use to the Agency in connection with its operations in Cuba. Mrs. Roman stated that essentially CIA's interest would be to obtain assistance from (C)[Beliard][in arranging courier routes between Cuba and the United States.](C) CIA is of the opinion that [Beliard](C) through his contacts in the Cubana Airlines and because of his possible association with individuals who travel regularly between the two countries, could arrange for CIA [to communicate with clandestine sources inside Cuba.](C) The Liaison Agent requested CIA not to establish any contact with [Beliard] pending further word from the Bureau. ~~(S)~~ (C)

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KP 5-11-98
(JFK) SLD/KSC 6-14-98
(U)

7-20-98
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section for appropriate review. We can either (1) inform CIA that no contact whatsoever should be made by CIA with [Beliard] in view of current Bureau operational (C) interest, or (2) we can permit CIA to maintain contact with [Beliard] (C) for exploration of its interests as described above, or (3) we can talk to [Beliard] (C) concerning the [potential for establishing courier routes] (C) and serve as the intermediary if [Beliard] is in a position (C) to be of assistance in this regard. Replies to CIA should be handled via Liaison. ~~(S)~~

SJP:ban
(5) ban

CONFIDENTIAL

REC-85 [105-89457-9] ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SECRET

EX-112

10 JUL 5 1961

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
10 RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

7/30/61 N.Y. FCJ: ej

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10468

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : NY

TITLE :

DATE : 06/30/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
JORGE BELIARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Confidential
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

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1 [illegible]pich
1 - James

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12/10/93
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~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 211,326
(5668 SLD/GCL 9/18/95 - JFK)

To: SAC, New York [(134-5609)](C)

From: Director, FBI [(105-89457)](U)

[NY 3186-PSI](C)

REC- 85

CIA, by liaison, advised Bureau of desire to contact captioned [PSI] in connection with its Cuban operations.(C) CIA of opinion [PSI] is in position [to assist in the (C) establishment of courier routes between U.S. and its contacts in Cuba.](C) Contact of [PSI] by CIA being held in (C) abeyance pending Bureau's approval. (S)

Bureau's position in this matter flexible. We can refuse CIA authority to contact [PSI] or we can let (C) CIA operate [PSI] on its own. We can also serve as inter- (C) mediary between [the PSI] and CIA. (S) (C)

Promptly contact [PSI] and discreetly ascertain if he is in position and willing [to assist in establishing courier routes.](C) Do not advise [PSI] of CIA's connection at (C) this time. For information, CIA believes [PSI] able to (C) (C) [establish such a system] because of his employment with Cubana Airlines in New York City, and fact he is in contact with persons regularly traveling to Cuba. Furnish Bureau results of your contact with [PSI.](C) In event [PSI] is in position (C) to [assist in the establishment of a courier system and] (C) willing to do so, you should furnish your observations concerning [PSI's] proposed use in this matter. (S) (C)

KP 5-12-98

MAILED 2
JUN 30 1961
COMM-FBI

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SLD/KSR
6-14-98
(JFK)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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(5)

NOTE: [PSI] (C) is [Station Manager of] (C) Cubana Airlines at Idlewild Airport in New York City. He has been [under development] by New York Office since November, 1960, (C) and has [furnished data concerning operations] (C) of Cubana Airlines and personnel employed by Cubana. In addition (S)

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE ON PAGE TWO

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CONFIDENTIAL

50 JUL 11 1961

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~~SECRET~~

1 To SAC, w York
Re: NY 3186-PSI (c)

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE:

CONFIDENTIAL

(c)

he has made available copies of incoming and outgoing manifests of Cubana flights between New York and Havana. New York has pointed out that PSI has not furnished data of unusual value; but because of his position, has a good potential. CIA advised Liaison Agent Papich it would not contact PSI until it had received authority to do so from Bureau. Before allowing CIA to make contact with PSI, it (c) is believed it would be best for our interests to determine if PSI can actually assist CIA. If he is in position to (c) assist that Agency, we will then consider what stand to take in this matter. (u)

CONFIDENTIAL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10488

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 07/27/1961
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FBI INFO 7-10-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (JFK)

27 JUL 1961

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 28 1961
CIA SJP

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, born 24 January 1909 in Mexico City, Mexico (S)

~~Classified by 9803RDD~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
FBI adm. matters and info

~~FBI INFO~~
~~Classified by 5668 SLD/GCL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR (JFK)~~
4/17/95

1. This Agency was queried recently by the BfV (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) Germany for information on Subject. A German citizen in Bremen, suspected of Polish Intelligence Service activities, received a $1,000.00 deposit in his account from Espinosa. (S)

2. Your permission is requested to pass the following information, some of which was obtained from your files, to the German authorities: (S)

Eduardo Espinosa (S)
born 24 January 1909, Mexico City, Mexico, appointed Mexican Ambassador to Warsaw during the summer of 1960. August 1957 to summer 1960 accredited to the United Nations Headquarters in New York City with the rank of Ambassador as an Alternate Permanent Delegate. During his New York City tenure, he was known to write bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities. (U) He appears to be a Soviet contact, and that his wife, one

Possibly Alicia Moreno Fuentes - 100-155-11

Tamara Espinosa, nee Pechkurova, native Russian (S)
was reported to have been an agent of the Soviet security services. She was admitted to Mexico in September 1947. When Espinosa y Prieto was in Mexico, he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy and expedited visas for Soviet delegations. The couple were particularly friendly with Soviet Ambassador Kapustin during 1953. Mrs. Espinosa's brother died in a Soviet prison in 1953, and her mother still resides in the USSR. (S)

(U) (CIA)

Venezuela, China, Colombia

These facts might indicate a Soviet hold over Espinosa. (S) Various opinions collected from persons who knew Espinosa, when he served in Shanghai, Bogota, Mexico, Caracas, Togoland, and the U.S., vary from "basically friendly to the U.S" to the following: That he had been a penetration agent in the Axis group (in Shanghai) on behalf of the

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KP 5-18-98 (U)

REC- 52
EX- 129

105-24642-45 (S)

22 AUG 3 1961

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105-24642 (S)

Sect CIA
[illegible] 8/2/61

FORM NO. 626
1 NOV 55

(23)

(U) (CIA) USSR, that he was 100% pro-Communist and most dangerous, that he has been an eagerly cooperative contact of the Soviets in Mexico for several years, and so on. The bulk of opinions are derogatory in nature. Petrov identified [Mrs. Espinosa] as an MVD agent. (S)

CSCI-3/766,521

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10004

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-67173-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : BRENNAN

TITLE :

DATE : 10/15/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 10/15/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

m'4-
Wannall

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that her agency finally has been able [to place a man in Cuba] (S) who might be able to develop information in answer to the Bureau lead transmitted to CIA. She explained that the source's capability to be productive will depend upon his resourcefulness to get into the appropriate areas. (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(5) chs

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
KP 3-19-98

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

REC- 20

65-67173-20

OCT 21 1963

4/9/95
Classified by 5668 dld/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

EX-114

5-D

SECRET

68 OCT 28 1963

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90138-10007
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-63987-210-370

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/02/1963
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency ~~(S)~~ (U) SECRET

12328

He is willing to write a letter to Vergara and instruct him to deliver the papers to a person who would be designated in his letter. He would make such a letter available to the FBI for delivery to Vergara. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Garcia advised that he has had no contact with Vergara since his departure from Cuba.

If feasible, it is requested that your Agency take the necessary steps, possibly through the Spanish Government (S) or through the Swiss Embassy in Havana, to obtain Garcia's (S) papers since they could conceivably contain intelligence and/or propaganda data of interest to the United States Government. If you desire, we would be glad to have Garcia write a personal letter to Vergara which would be made available to your Agency. If Garcia's papers are obtained, they will be reviewed by our Miami Office and pertinent data contained therein will be made available to interested agencies of the United States Government. ~~(S)~~

NOTE FOR SAC, MIAMI:

On 9/26/63 State Department advised that it preferred (S) that we handle this matter through CIA. Above for your information.

NOTE:

We previously directed a letter to State Department asking that they handle the above matter. Contact with State Department on 9/26/63 was made by SA O. H. Bartlett with Mr. John MacDonald of State.

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10066

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 64-200-210-2325

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : FROHBOSE

TITLE :

DATE : 12/02/1959
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
PAUL HICKMAN
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

DATE: 12-2-59

SECRET

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: PAUL HICKMAN
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Communist Party - Cuba

CLASSIFIED BY
REASON:
(DCI) CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets
KP 1-23-98
(JFK)

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

Tolson
Belmont
DeLoach
McGuire
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The following information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on 12-1-59 by Mrs. Jane Roman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ~~S~~(U)

Swiss police recently located Hickman in Zurich, Switzerland. Information was developed by the Swiss indicating that subject allegedly was involved in business dealings relating to the sale of arms to the Castro Government. [With the collaboration of Swiss authorities, a CIA representative] (S) interviewed subject on 11-27 and 28-59. The subject has been characterized as a confidence operator and very unreliable. He claimed that he already had volunteered information concerning his knowledge of activities in Cuba to "friends of Senator Smathers." Hickman claimed that he had been in contact with a Soviet Embassy representative, Bern, Switzerland, in connection with a sale of Cuban sugar to Russia. Hickman claimed that the Soviet had given him considerable encouragement and indicated that the transaction would go through. The Soviet then suddenly told him that the deal was off. (S)

Mrs. Roman stated that CIA does not plan to cover subject's activities in the absence of a specific request from the Bureau. ~~S~~(U)

ACTION:

This information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP/nmn
(5)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. James
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

See serials -
64-211-210-533
64-211-210-540
64-211-210-543
64-211-210-
Conforming
CIA is sending letter ~~S~~(U)

~~8/3/93~~
~~Classified by 9803 rdd/jcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 211326~~

EX-135

64-200-210-2325

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(JFK)
5668 SLD/ISL
3-13-98

SECRET

12/14/59

15 DEC 7 1959

5/15/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mk JR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6-6-78 BY
RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

64-200-210

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90138-10073
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 64-211-210-830

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/21/1960
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL SOVIET EMBASSY HAVANA, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mullins

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY SSS RE Soviet -Cuba FOR REVIEW [illegible] AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA [illegible] DATED 4-28 (SEE BU[illegible]) BY LIAISON

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT ¶1 on pg. 2
KP 11-19-97
SLD/KSR 12-9-97 (JFK)

64-211-210 — 830

CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mlb
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

REC- 88

Date: November 21, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Mr. S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, Counterintelligence Staff (S) (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SOVIET EMBASSY
HAVANA, CUBA (S) (U)
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

8/29/95 5668 dld/GAT
8/17/93
Classified by 9803 rdl/sd
Declassify on: OADR 21,326 (JFK)

NOV 21 3 30 PM '60
READING ROOM

We have received information that a Soviet official in the United States has ordered ten safes from the (S) Mosler Safe Company for shipment to the Soviet Embassy, (S) Havana, Cuba. They are to be shipped by Export Order (S) Number E 12344, but the exact shipment date is unknown. (S)

The safes are identified as follows: (S)

Model Number (S)	Serial Number (S)	Combination (S)	Dial Key Number (S)
2016CL	14387-11	5-70-40	H-669B
2016CL	14387-81	5-70-40	H-602B
2016CL	14387-55	5-70-40	H-794B
3016CL	14155-54	5-70-40	H-660B
3016CL	14155-19	5-70-40	H-667B
3016CL	14213-13	5-70-40	H-732B
3016CL	14213-60	5-70-40	H-784B (S)
4216CL	13905-39	5-70-40	H-749B
4216CL	13905-29	5-70-40	H-800B
4833CL	14483-21	31-75-26	H-679B (S)

NOV 18 3 21 PM '60

The model numbers designate the inside dimensions (S) of the safes. For example, Model Number 2016CL has inside (S) dimensions of twenty inches by sixteen inches. Each safe is (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

BY COURIER SVC.
CC [illegible]
5 9 NOV 2 3
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

RAM:jwh
(6)

ENCLOSURE

(SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

SECRET

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

57 DEC 1 1960

.....COPIES MADE, DATE..........BY
.... RE ....
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ....
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

Director
Central Intelligence Agency (S)

equipped with a key locking dial and each has two inside (S) compartments. (S)

Enclosed for the Central Intelligence Agency are a set of dial keys, appropriately labeled, and a set of (S) keys for the inside compartments of the safes. (S)

Information concerning the existence of this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this Bureau.

Enclosures - 18

1 - Mr. John W. Hanes
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since nature of information requires that handling be limited and since disclosure could seriously jeopardize a most delicate source. Information concerning a purchase of the safes was developed by Washington Field and (S) the keys and combinations were obtained by Cincinnati from an (S) established source at the company's factory. The set of keys (S) for the inside compartments consists of total of 8 keys and (S) they apparently are interchangeable to some extent. (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10002

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : BRENNAN

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 10/10/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 10/10/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [MANUEL PINEIRO] (S)
IS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Wannall

We previously have been informed that the subject is a high-ranking official in the [Cuban G-2 organization] in Havana. On (S) 10/8/63, Mrs. Anita Potocki, a CIA analyst who has been working on [intercepted Cuban communications intelligence traffic] (S) advised the Liaison Agent that her Agency has come to the tentative conclusion that [Pineiro] (S) is identical with ["Petronio,"] (S) who has been mentioned in messages made available to the Bureau and CIA. We have noted that messages sent to the unidentified Cuban Agent in Panama referred to as ["Roberto"] (S) have been signed by ["Petronio."] (S) ~~(S)~~

Mrs. Potocki gave the following explanation which led to CIA's deduction. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Messages emanating from Havana indicated that one of the recipients was probably located in a small town in Colombia near the Venezuelan Border. CIA developed a suspect and instituted coverage. Recently, this individual transmitted a letter to Havana which communication was intercepted by CIA. The person had apparently violated instructions by including some sensitive data in the communication. Havana then [transmitted a radio message] (S) castigating the Cuban Agent in Colombia. An examination of [the radio message and] (S) the intercepted communication sent by the Agent has led CIA to believe that ["Petronio"] (S) is identical with [Pineiro.] (S)

W

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT for the brackets
KP 3-19-98

Bufile [105-78656] (S)

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - [65-67843 ("Roberto")] (S)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(6)

chs 4/24/95

Classified by ~~5668~~ SAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

REC- 12

[105-78656-10] (S)

EX-114

11 OCT 17 1963

4-1-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/LLSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN [65-67843] (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10050

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : LALLIER

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/17/1961
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. L'ALLIER

DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : S.J. PAPICH

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-11-98

SUBJECT: ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
(134-9775)

The captioned individual is the comptroller of Cubana Airlines, New York City, and has been utilized as a source of information by the Bureau. On 8-16-61, David Hanlon, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that on occasion his Agency has utilized Rodriguez [as a courier for transmitting material between the U.S. and Cuba.] This material has dealt with CIA operations in Cuba. ~~(S)~~ (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

8-16-95
~~Classified by 5668 SLD/mk~~
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SJP:jad (5)
jad

1-Donahoe
1-Nasca
1-Liaison
1-Papich

2-16-94
~~Classified by 9813 RDD/lj~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
211326

LET TO NY
VHN:dcr
8-22-61

REC- 87
6-14-98

134-9775-6

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR AUG 25 1961
DECLASSIFY ON: [illegible] (JFK)

EX-112

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DIA
REC'D

AUG 18 10 32 AM '61

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-7-78 BY
JR RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10070
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/11/1961
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL HERBERT LEVY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Mullins

17619

REC-34 11 - 2 - 210 - 445

CIA HAS [illegible] IN THIS [illegible] EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS KP 5-11-98

Date: December 11, 1961

To: [Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans] ~~(S)~~ (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: HERBERT LEVY
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Nationalities Intelligence)

12/1/83

~~300,300~~/sel

124326

7-2-98 5668 SLD/mr

(JFK)

CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
DECLASSIFY ON: [illegible]

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated November 28, 1961, at Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning Cuban economic matters. Copies of the memorandum have been furnished to the Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce, and to other interested agencies.

The source of the information contained in the memorandum is Mr. Herbert Levy, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. He resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, and his home telephone number is HUnter 4-6424.

According to Mr. Levy, he resided at Houston, Texas, approximately five years ago and was contacted there on several occasions by [a representative of your Agency.] (S) Mr. Levy indicated he was then traveling abroad on occasions and was able to furnish (S) [your representative] information of interest concerning [India.] (S) He indicated he recently telephoned your headquarters in Washington, D. C., but was unable to obtain any information concerning the identity of your representative in his section of the United States. He said he had no objection to his identity being furnished to your Agency but does not desire that his identity be revealed to any other agency. He also requested that no action be taken which would reveal his identity to the business firm mentioned in the memorandum or to any other commercial firm.

We contemplate no further action in this matter.

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans

Enclosure
DEC 15 1961

1 - Salt Lake City

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

SEE NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY PAGE TWO

12 DEC 13 1961

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] (S)(u)

17620

NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY:

Reurlet 11/28/61 captioned "Large Quantities of Jute Bags and Hessian Cloth Sought by Cuban Government by Purchase or Barter Through International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, and Other Unknown Concerns November, 1961."

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Secret" since we refer to [CIA's use of Levy abroad.] (S) He furnished information concerning possible violation of export regulations regarding shipments to Cuba by International Ore and Fertilizer Company, a large and reputable firm. Copies of memo have been furnished separately to Commerce, the military agencies and State Department. Separate letter also sent Salt Lake City concerning proper caption for reporting similar data.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10071
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SU
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/28/1961
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL ECONOMIC MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI SECRET DATE: 11/28/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (62-0) -C- Economic Matters Cuba

SUBJECT: "LARGE QUANTITIES OF JUTE BAGS AND HESSIAN CLOTH SOUGHT BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT BY PURCHASE OR BARTER THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORE AND FERTILIZER COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, AND OTHER UNKNOWN CONCERNS NOVEMBER, 1961."
MISCELLANEOUS (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

12/13/93
~~Classified by 9803 [illegible]/scl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 311,326

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS KP 5-11-98
K 8-20-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)
7-2-98

Enclosed herewith to the Bureau are the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as above. Also enclosed are photostats of two teletypes (total of four pages) purporting to be copies of teletypes from International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, to St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The photostats and information set forth in the letterhead memorandum were furnished to SA JOHN R. PHILIPS, Jr., by a man identifying himself as HERBERT LEVY, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. Mr. LEVY said he resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, residence telephone HUnter 4-6424. Mr. LEVY stated he resided at Houston, Texas, about five years ago, and at that time, he traveled abroad, mostly in [India,](S) for his company, St. Regis Paper Company. While living in Houston, Texas, [a representative of Central Intelligence Agency,] name and telephone number (S) not now recalled, contacted LEVY on several occasions and requested him to obtain various types of information on his trips to [India.](S) The type of information requested and obtained by LEVY was mainly of an [economic nature, or with respect to some company or individual in India.](S)

EXP. PROC.

REC- 34 110-6210-445

ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (Enc. 8)
1 - Salt Lake City

Bil. State, ~~[illegible]~~
051-ONI-6-2
DATE FORW. 12-7-61
HOW FORW. w
BY Ramizer

15 DEC 1 1961

JRP:ps
(3)

(S)(U)

Let - Salt Lake City
12-11-61
RAM:bw

Let to [CIA] (encl)
12-11-61
Ram:bw

SECRET

NAT. [illegible]

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10138

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-210-4315

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/10/1965
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

#4.

[redacted] [redacted] SECRET [redacted] 1 - Newpher

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6/26/78 BY
LJC RE PAPICH
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ______
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

May 10, 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT
KP 5-26-98 BRACKETS

Classified by 5665 SLD/ar 4/26/95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

A highly confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that [on about February 20, 1963,] (S) Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, commented that the Sino - Indian conflict continually bothers Cuba and this conflict worked in the favor of the United States in the Fall of 1962.

Roa's evaluation of the situation in Cuba was highly pessimistic. Roa stated that the situation has deteriorated; that this was the only thing that could have happened because talks at the United Nations, New York, did not find an answer to the problem. Roa also observed that conditions as of February, 1963, were similar to those just before the crisis in the Fall of 1962, mentioning pirate boat activities, a campaign in the United States and a statement by President Kennedy which Roa described as meaningless.

Roa commented that the United States was the only nation which benefited from the crisis. The informant understood that it was Roa's contention that by excluding the Security Council of the United Nations from considering the Cuban situation and permitting the Organization of American States (OAS) to take up the matter freely, the United States is now enjoying a very favorable position in the OAS, the best it has enjoyed at any time in the Organization. In still referring to what the informant believed was the OAS, Roa said that the report of the Antisubversive Committee, now under study by the OAS, contains some definite proposals, such as a collective breakoff and a breakoff in relations with Cuba including postal contacts. Roa said it is known officially that Mexico will accept such resolutions with reservations; Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay will accept everything; and it is believed that only Brazil will oppose such resolutions. Cuba, according to Roa, believes that talks between President Kennedy and President Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela, will establish the action by the OAS.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

EX-115

[redacted] SECRET

Tolson ______
Belmont ______
Mohr ______
Casper ______
Callahan ______
Conrad ______
DeLoach ______
Evans ______
Gale ______
Rosen ______
Sullivan ______
Tavel ______
Trotter ______
Tele. Room ______
Holmes ______
Gandy ______

JON:rmc
(7)

109-12-210
50 MAY 16 1963
1 - [101644 (PRIME)] (S)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

REC 38

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

4315

17 MAY 13 1963

To CIA & State
by liaison 5/10/63

~~TOP~~ SECRET

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Roa also commented that it would have been much better if the Cuban situation had been handled by the United Nations Security Council. Among other things, this would have limited the ability of the OAS. When it was suggested that time was working in Cuba's favor, Roa agreed, saying it permitted internal consolidation, and economic and organizational endeavors. He also mentioned the differences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the hope for settlement of differences in the Soviet Bloc and prospects for general relaxing of strained relations between all countries.

Although Roa did not mention the Soviet Union at any time, it appeared that he does not now agree with the Soviet Union's placing missiles in Cuba in 1962. Roa's comments during the entire conversation left one with the feeling that he was pessimistic, according to the informant.

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top~~ Secret" because unauthorized disclosure would reveal a high-level intelligence operation involving ["PRIME,"] our (S) extremely sensitive source at the [Polish UN Delegation.] (S)

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~~TOP~~ SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90140-10004
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/13/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY PVH RE ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4/28 (SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

SECRET

REC-140 (SC) 100-398547 - 6

- Liaison
1 - Mr. Floyd

EX-112

Date: March 13, 1963

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

(~~S~~)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
SECURITY MATTER - C

3-4-94
Classified by ~~9803 RDD/cty~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
2113220
(5668 SLD/ECL 3/31/95-JFK)

Reference is made to prior communications concerning the captioned individual.

It would be appreciated [if you would advise this Bureau of any information which has come to your attention indicating continued residence by the captioned individual in Cuba. Any additional information which you may have received concerning her activities in that country would also be appreciated.] (~~S~~)(U)

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KB 10-17-97

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2 - New York (100-112920)(See note)

ATTENTION SAC, NEW YORK:

12-15-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

Reurlet 3/1/63.

You will be advised concerning the results of the above inquiry.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Subject is in SI. She traveled to Cuba in December, 1960, to join her husband, Pedros Moutsos, [who, in the past, has acted as CIA informant. (S) New York requested contact with CIA for information of subject's current residence in Cuba and her activities (S)]

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Holmes
Gandy

1963

WHF:cad
(7)

BY COURIER SVC.
28 MAR 14
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

(3) SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90140-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/01/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

NOT PSC 3/7

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-398547) DATE: MAR 1 - 1963

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-112920)(P)

SUBJECT: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS aka
SM - C

(OO: NEW YORK)

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KP 10-17-97

Rerep of SA JOHN H. SHEEHAN, dated 6/29/62, at NY.

Subject, who is on the SI of the NYO, departed from NY, 12/31/60, for Havana, Cuba. At that time she indicated she was to join her husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, in Cuba and remain there for two years. It is noted that the subject's husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, (Bufile 105-30972), was (S)[a source utilized by the CIA] as of June, 1960 (S)

The Bureau is requested to [alert CIA sources for any information concerning subject's activities and residence in Cuba] (S)(U)

3-4-94
Classified by 9803RDD/ctj
Declassify on: OADR
21324

(5668 SLD/gcl 3/31/98 JFK)

COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

12-15-97
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

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REC- 52

100-398547-60

MAR 4 1963

EX-115

2-Bureau (100-398547)(RM)
1-New York (100-112920)

JJL:rtd
(3)

1d [2-CIA] (S)(U)
3/13/63
WHF:cal
2-NY

SUB CONTROL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90140-10012
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 100-439769-302

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/03/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GC T

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Evans
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Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: September 3, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA
IS - C

Baumgardner
Wannall

Austin Horn, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent on August 30, 1963, that a reliable CIA source in Madrid, Spain, had been in contact with [Mark Tischman,] (S) one of the American students who accompanied the group which recently visited Cuba. (S) This contact took place on August 27, 1963, at which time [Tischman] (S) volunteered the following information to the CIA source: ~~(S)~~

(S) [Tischman] identified the following students as "fellow travelers": Joseph Rex, Elena B. Fleming, John Milton, Don Ranmann, and Alberti Maher. ~~(S)~~ (U)

(S) [Tischman] referred to Levi Laub as a "communist in ideology" but not a Party member. He stated that Phillip A. Luce is "a person of Marxist-Leninist tendencies"; that Michael Brown is a Trotskyite; that John W. Thomas is a decided partisan of the policy of Mao Tse Tung; that Eric D. Johnston is "of communist ideology though not a Party member"; that Clinton M. Jenks is "the son of the number three ranking communist in California"; and that the only student in the group who is actually a member of the Party is Allan Sheffield. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Sympathizer

C.P. Suspect

U.S.

Cuba U.S.

ACTION: Possible C.P. Member

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security and Nationalities Intelligence Sections.

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Simpson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC 46 100-439769-302

5/15/95
Classified by ~~5668~~ GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SJP:gp (6)

11 SEP 5 1963

EX-104

Teletype SEP 10 1963
NY, SF, NK, HO
9-6-63
RDS

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KP 3-19-98

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90155-10008
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-68530-116

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	WMFO
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/07/1964
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	NOSENKO 1964 REPORTINGS YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	11/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	AT

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

FBI

Date: 4/7/64

SECRET S/D

Transmit the following in ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

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CIA ADDRESSED ONLY pgs. 1, 2, 3 + 6 See addendum 180-709-103 KL

Classified by [illegible]

Miss Candy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

FROM: SAC, [WFO] [(134-5437 Sub A)] (S) (U) 8

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
[ESP - R (KGB)
(OO:WFO)] (S) (U)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP DATE

Class [illegible] 5/12/82

ReWFOairtel 3/6/64. (S) (U)

NOSENKO was interviewed 4/2/64, by SAs DONALD E. WALTER, ALEKSO POPTANICH, and MAURICE A. TAYLOR. A number of cases which originated with source were discussed with him for additional data and photographs of Soviet Nationals were displayed to him. Topics covered included the following: (C) (S) (U)

[VAN KRAKOV YUGOV], (S) POSSIBLY [YUGOV VAN KRAKOV] (S) (C) (S) (U)

[HUGO JOSEPH VON KRAKAU,] (S) suspect for the above individual was discussed with source who was unable to furnish additional information or make any conclusion although he observed it was significant that [KRAKAU] is approximately the same age as subject described by him and has part German background. Source advised that the contacts with [LAWRENCE] (S) [ALOYAN] (S) in Russia were made by Armenian Officers of KGB and none of the officers of the Seventh Department (tourist) were in contact with [ALOYAN] (S) (C) (S) (U)

[BERNARD FERGUSON MITCHELL
WILLIAM HAMILTON MARTIN] (S) (U)

not nec. to place cc's. since will be available for files by WFO [illegible]

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF
DATE 2/11/78

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY [illegible] 6/4/82 [illegible]
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 6/17/84 (U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

[3-Bureau
1-New York (RM)
1-WFO] (S) (U)

[MAT:mal
(5)] (S) (U)

[cc Lee] (S) (U)

C. C. Wick

memo Brannigan to Sullivan 4-13 [illegible]

REC [illegible]

65-68530-176

7-11-98

APR 16 1964

5668 SLD/KSR

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRTEL

SECRET

Approved: Thomas [illegible] Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

[UNSUB; AMERICAN TOURIST TO RUSSIA FROM SOUTH OF SAN DIEGO OF INTEREST TO 13TH DEPARTMENT, KGB] X (u)

Source was questioned in this matter in effort to obtain identifying data. He was unable to recall any additional info of value and explained that his recollection was based on brief examination of a paper which came across his desk with many others. Source repeated there is a possibility that captioned case is identical with the case involving an American whose occupation ~~which~~ was repairing pipes, and stated his recollections concerning this was also very vague. Source could not recall the case officer from the Seventh Department who handled captioned case. X (u)

[UNSUB; CODE CLERK ALLEGEDLY RECRUITED BY KGB MOSCOW, SPRING, 1960] X (u)

Photograph of Sergeant [CHARLES BRYANT] (S) was displayed to source who advised the face was familiar especially the characteristic, twisting of the mouth to one side, but advised he could not recall any circumstances which made his recollection of the picture possible. In view of the current status of NOSENKO he was not furnished with the facts in this case at this time. X

[AMERICAN PRIESTS IN MOSCOW - STUDIED BY KGB] X (u)

Source advised that prior his departure from Moscow GENNADIY GRYAZNOV, the KGB official, who was then Chief of Section, had told him that two American priests in Moscow were being studied and that one was under consideration for approach on the basis of blackmail. GRYAZNOV told source that a Russian girl who is employed at American House is on very friendly relations with this priest and KGB has knowledge that he has carressed and fondled her and anticipates they may succeed in catching him having intimate relations with this girl in which case a recruitment approach will be made. X (u)

[UNSUB; KGB AGENT ANDREY] X (u)

SEC

SECRET

[WFO [134-5437 Sub A]X X (U)

Source advised that [REINER] (S) is the Head of [Cosmos Tours,] (S) New York City, and described him as a very shrewd and foxy individual. He said he was known to VLADIMIR D. CHELNOKOV, who was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department (tourist), however, subject was not recruited by the Seventh Department and no effort was made to recruit him. Source described [REINER] (S) as talkative and foxy and said he was suspected of being connected with American intelligence (FBI). Source stated [REINER] (S) knew many important people, but he believed work on him was wasted. He recalled [REINER's] (S) firm was the first to book a tour to Mongolia. He had negotiated with the Mongolian Republic for additional tours, but did not know whether he was successful. X

[SERGEANT JAMES MC MILLAN] X (U)

Source advised he was aware of the MC MILLAN case and stated although he did not know any details he understood MC MILLAN had assisted KGB and furnished everything he knew while at the American Embassy. He advised VADIM V. KOSOLAPOV visits him regularly and gives KGB funds in the sum of 500 rubles for a month. Source advised MC MILLAN is still married to the agent who assisted in his recruitment. Source identified this woman as VERA (LNU) and described her as a shy and decent girl. He said she had one son by MC MILLAN and also a child by a previous marriage. Source mentioned it was the task of the First Section (American Embassy), First Department (American), Second Directorate, to take care of defectors such as MC MILLAN. X (U)

X

[ANNABELLE BUCAR] X (U)

Source advised he also was somewhat familiar with the case of BUCAR who was recruited on the basis of ideology and a love affair with KONSTANTIN LAPSHEIN, an actor agent of the First Department, whom she subsequently married. Source stated BUCAR has not been happy in her private life since her husband is a heavy drinker and has weakness for girls, but she is satisfied otherwise with her life in Moscow where she works for the Radio Committee as an editor handling foreign broadcasts and also does translations receiving good money. X (U)

Photographs of members of the Bolshoi Ballet which visited the U.S. in 1962 were displayed to NOSENKO who identified three individuals, namely: X (U)

SECRET

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10056

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO : THE PRESIDENT

TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION

DATE : 06/10/61
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
CIA
COVERT ACTION
PARAMILITARY WARFARE
CUBA
POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 244
Folder 7
Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort [redacted]

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

(1)(B)
(1)(C)
4 NOV 93

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☐ ~~Retain class'n~~ Release ☐ Change/classify to ______
☐ With concurrence of ______
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
~~EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a)~~ (1) (C)
FPC/HDR by ______ 12-16-1992

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

~~9. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. [CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover]~~

(1)(B)
4 NOV 93

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Sec 3

JFK ACT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ______
☐ With concurrence of ______
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EO 12356, ~~Sec. 1.3 (a)~~ (1)(2)
FPC/HDR by 12-6-93

(1)(B)
4 NOV 93

[the other 2260 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover).] Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." None-theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

(1)(B)
(1)(C)
4 NOV 93

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. [redacted] On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration [redacted] officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period [redacted]) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In [the Paris] Embassy today, there are [123] CIA people. CIA [in Paris] has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section [redacted]. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain [redacted] political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of [redacted] Embassy, a fact well known locally; and in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Delete Sec 3 ☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ____
☐ With concurrence of ____
~~☐ Declassify~~ ~~☐ In~~ part and excise as shown (1)(C)
~~EO 12356, Sec 1.3(a)~~
FPC/HDR by ~~12-16-93~~

SECRET

Delete Sec 3

JFK ACT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to 9.
☐ With concurrence of
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
~~EO 12356~~, Sec. 1.3 (1)(C)
FPC/HDR by 12 6 93

8c (1)(B) 4 NOV 93

~~the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)~~

~~CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.~~

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

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Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
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BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
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counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in the Department for Plans, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as Chief of Station for the CIA?

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin Tunnel.

Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel operation and then move on?

Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that Frank Rollett (W) and I conceived some time before I went to Berlin.

Senator Tower. You and who?

Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett (W), who for many years was one of the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the cryptologic group.

And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to mount this operation.

In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground, across the sector boundary, and tapping into three main telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.

I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these, which were, among other things, the main circuit s between the Zossen-Wunsdorf command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow.

We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in ~~Unter den Frund~~ and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not really readable.

Senator Tower. Were not what?

Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not correct -- that you not only conceived the program but [redacted]

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division D?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which is responsible for [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.

Mr. Schwarz. But part --

Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may, Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services, which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two things: [redacted].

We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of research and analysis use which was handled in [redacted] what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director Intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibilities [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the security risk, and also in the direct procurement through operational means abroad, but not in this country.

Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. [redacted] that type of thing. [redacted] would be covered as well.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call [redacted] work for you in Staff D?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.

Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did [redacted] recount to you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Harvey. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?

Mr. Harvey. Briefly, [redacted] came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

He Plans in Fall 1960?

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversation with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had requested [redacted] to undertake such an operation?

of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment, this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly, of self-protection.

I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions. In the field of political assassination, although I cannot document this by evidence, I have no question but what the Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps three classes.

One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous agents of third countries.And thirdly, the recognized official staff officers of other intelligence services.

During the seven years that I spent [redacted], which was the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other nationalities.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean Russians who were working with the United States?

Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB to assassinate me [redacted] than it would have been for me to assassinate my opposite number [redacted], in the Soviet Embassy [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish between political assassination, direct agents of the United States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but emigres and Soviet nationals.

Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected or doubled?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country enemies of the United States?

Mr. Harvey. No.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary documentation for the authority which was later signed off on by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.

Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story, not the real story, the objectives --

Mr. Harvey. It is both.

Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, [illegible] assassination or assassination capability.

Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code and cypher materials.

Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover story except that if this project had gone so far as to the actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the targeting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of communications intelligence outside the U.S.

So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.

Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.

Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN an agent who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection with the Executive Action program?

Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I personally know, were ever used.

Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one purpose the possible use in assassination?

Mr. Harvey. Only in the sense that had we ever been saddled with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination. I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibilities.

But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to~~ -- is actually approached, there ~~is a~~ should be long period of assessment, crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.

I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation,

Follow

and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do with assassination.

I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment, pages that were written by [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the same writing as these first three pages.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by you?

Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.

I would also like to point out that from page 4 that -- that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I would guess were probably [redacted]'s notes and probably based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me, and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.

Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. And at the bottom of page 8, does that indicate that you had a conversation with [redacted] on January 26th?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?

Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver.

Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them, classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save them. There is no relationship between the material that appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just before the 26/1-AS, , and the material which appears above it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.

Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?

Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.

Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --

Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a discussion on a number of other things that were of particular and specific interest to the communications intelligence field and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the clandestine services.

Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to assassination?

Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination. That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions -- it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in the words that are here, I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that make up the examples of 3?

Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume that the logical candidates at that point would have been Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets for assassination, but that these were sort of the three people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this, these are three to be considered.

tape 2b

But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of Sid's job. ELINT R&D - Memo." Ludford is the name of ~~the~~ staff officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

This "translating machine" was an experimental device, done under -- hoped for development by GE that I was most interested in, because of the serious translation problem that we had and particularly in communications intelligence.

So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination as a general problem.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had with [redacted] and it is his notes about that conversation, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth. I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers, because [redacted] was under specific instructions not to discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing it with me first.

Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth, and that reflects the conversation you had with [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page 4?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows -- two sentences, which I should read into the record, three sentences.

"Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

crossed in this document.

Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS. That is Arnold Silver, I take it?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver.

Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI matter. What does that mean?

Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context. Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to throw up my hands. I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI in the notes means?

Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified at this point?

Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the members have questions.

Scd I — 25/1 — Exec Actions

— "The Magic button"



8

Narcotics Büro

"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover

Cautions — Bankruptcy — no Star eyes — Jim A.

not a TSD Problem



Contradistinct from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor — assumptions —



Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]

[redacted] Memo.

[redacted]

[redacted] Fear

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Anathesia —

26/1 — [redacted] Fanfani - DCI - Matter -

no fib Review - [redacted]

1. Select proper ofum to run —
2. [redacted] Mayor 2
3. Security Rules B-WKH-AS-^{3}
4. Guide lines [redacted] - Review.
Resort - Brakes - Substitute - Who

9

6. No [redacted]
7. no projects or papers except for cover.
8. Principal agent - QJ ([redacted])? - [redacted] Project Chief LCH - Audit 1500 - from NB. Mark spot agent - clear [redacted] project - via Bisho
9. Disposal -
10. Targets who & where - Must know before we can spot -

—

11. Case officering
12. [redacted]
13- [redacted]

Fd J list - Remember

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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MAFIA
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6/25/75
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SECRET

C

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~pos~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~will~~ ~~prob~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is [redacted] in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, [redacted]. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

~~3. Background:~~

needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements [redacted], Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements [redacted] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted], could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ sporadically [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~Septem~~ October 1960,

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3

QJwin annual salary:	$7,200
Travel + ops expenses for QJwin + other agents & agent candidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrrifle activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience ([redacted]) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/KGB ([redacted]) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does [redacted] now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own~~er~~ (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search), or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

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f. No use of ~~anybo~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., [redacted] in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: [redacted] search; this established (e.g. [redacted]);
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "tegu" until ready to go if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization [redacted] criminals, those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. [redacted]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. [redacted]

Keeping of files.

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freed^m to travel

Legal, operational + ethical → moral problems. [redacted] case.

[redacted] not secure enough.

1) Maximum security ± within Kubark only (e.g., how much does [redacted] now know?). Limitation on number [redacted]

[redacted]. Guise of [redacted] objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of ~~5)~~ case officers who can pass as foreigners – and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) [redacted] recommended. [redacted] [redacted]

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) [redacted] + stable in [redacted]

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sele~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Too~~ Danger of standbys.

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scd G — 25/1 — Exec Action

[redacted] — "The Magic Button"



8

Narcotics Büro

"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover

Caution — Bankruptcy — No Stars

eyes — Jim A.



Contradistinct from U-2

not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor → assumptions —

Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]

[redacted] Memo.

[redacted]

[redacted] Fear

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Anathesia —

26/1 — [redacted] — Fanfani DCI - Matter —

No file Review — [redacted]

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. [redacted] Max of 2/3
3. Security Rules B-WHH-AS-
4. Must leave [redacted] - Reserv.

Last Resort - Brakes - Substitute -

9

6. no [redacted]

7. no projects or papers
except for cover.

8. Principal Agent - £ ([redacted]?) -
[redacted] Project Chief LCH -
ticket 1500 - from MB -
Mark spot regm. staff at
project - see Eliako

9. Disposal —

10. Targets who & where —
Must know before
we can spot —
—

11. Case officering

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

FdI list — Remember

REC[illegible] FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Rubenstein?

Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your time on?

Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican Republic as Chief of Station.

Mr. Schwarz. And then --

Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1967.

And after that I returned to Washington and became the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

In 1970 I went to Rio de Janiero as Station Chief. And in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.

In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station. And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of the then Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually assassinate some one.

Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency talk that way?

Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were bumped off or something.

But I have never heard two officers sit down and seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line and say almost anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifically a Major Marshall, reported to the CIA that they intended to assassinate Allende?

Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall, Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert, whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could accomplish it, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.

mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to help accomplish the kidnapping?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Valenzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them specifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was -- the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin America.

And they said something about, their own arms could be identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified. I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we establish what I called a false flag base of people that would go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that he asked for it after I came over.

Mr. Treverton. It is not.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is relatively simple.

This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970, and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the purposes of setting up the false flag office --

Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

"Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian would be vital, and we have candidates."

And you did that.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any Chilean."

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr.Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall, that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II activities?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have candidates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence officers." You did that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would be blamed if something went wrong.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me, because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian foreign service officer. However, that was it. It was a devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying, why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets, is not true.

But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that was the idea.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go to their death swearing they were [redacted] or whatever?

Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic, Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And I briefed them, and I think what I said to them was, this is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.

And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help you.

So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the [redacted] that you were sending someone down to pose as a [redacted], and his instructions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?

Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest dreams to do that.

Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between continuing intelligence services were things that were very important to preserve, and that we had very close and delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I thought that was better than letting the world know that was a U.S. Citizen down there.

Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27 to say this:

"Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely."

So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services -- not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the Soviets, from us, or from the Brazilians.

So, it is not an unusual practice.

Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was Chile.

And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs of Station course, which is a training course for people who are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there as the Chief of Station. And I just wasn't sure that I wanted to be associated with something like that. But I decided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go along.

Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassinations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could understand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32 years beforehe was elected.

Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ardent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that we had a visit from a man who had the code name of [redacted] he was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send 22,000 rather than 400.

So, I can understand why they thought this was going, in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our interests. But that is an assumption.

It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The difference was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are going to have to use violence.

I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said, activities?

Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was [redacted] called back in 1970 for six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

Senator MOndale. Now, in that position you familiarized yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on, and tried to become as expert as you could in the political forces and so on?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator, one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he was pursuing, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but he indeed acted that way.

Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pursuing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with the population support under constitutional system?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection assignment by the President and by the White House?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game. The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the word.

And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

I call your attention in our briefing books to what is Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author of that cable?

Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating officer, yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know the situation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess is what I am after.

Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is the one that accepts the responsibility.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the following sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes on the stars.

What does that mean in Agency talk?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye, however.

Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed a joint venture, I can promise that that was Dino Poinzio's contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I am not sure what it means even now.

SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the assassination of Schneider was something which presented the opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have done.

Do you agree with me?

Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finishe Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred, Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as Marshall, immediately said,this is it, that is enough. There was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America that would have been the signal for further action, weakness, and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the business.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activities which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that one of the assignments that Colonel Wimert had?

Mr. Phillips. [redacted] Yes, I believe it was [redacted] that was in touch with that group.

Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem, didn't they?

Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?

Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team [redacted]

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have been some central direction from the office or from headquarters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had the slightest idea that [redacted] was working with us. And I don't believe that [redacted] -- I don't know that [redacted] knew about them.

So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of direction from the Station.

Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand the Viaux group?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here, counsel?

Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interruptible.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one of the Valenzuela group's plan?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically. Obviously when the guns were passed [redacted] and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we read the press reports that General Schneider died from handgun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly the Valenzuela group using those guns.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to abduct General Schneider?

Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have been, but I am not real sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which is the relationship [redacted]. If there are any questions on the relationship between the two groups.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with [redacted] and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be carried out on October 19. [redacted] witting of the above plan, has promised to keep the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly involved."

What do you think "not directly involved" refers to? Why not just not involved?

Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin that works with some group type of thing.

And I believe that it must refer to that.

Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual cable in the Senator's books?

Mr. Inderfurther. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that paragraph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

"General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week."

Now, I can't read that language any way other than meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved. And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that way.

Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more than just the statement?

Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --

Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was [redacted]

Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

As for the narrow part of your question, by all means it is a bad way to do business.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the document Tab A.

It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 September, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

Incidentally, what was the code name for this project? Was it FU Belt?

Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.

Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular?

Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would be a lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt means Chile. Belt means nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these names?

Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated. And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes out in those things.

Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call it pixie-like.

Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonums mean absolutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good ones.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

"The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the defense attache system down there?

Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army and then there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there was a boss?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?

Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was the fact that Colonel Wimert had been around Latin America, spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he developed really marvelous relationships with the military of officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take advantage of the one man in Chile that they liked the most, trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural for him to spend his weekends with these people.

Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset. But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and lay that question against the instruction from President Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did you accomplish it?

Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book that has been signed by General Philpott which was a message to [redacted] saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott , I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

Mr. Phillips. I never did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr. Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Philpott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our building.I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

Mr. Phillips. It is.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

Did you make that change?

Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said Bennett. I think the signature on the original document was from Philpott. But that is my change there.

Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page -- the sentence reads:

"Do not allow Colonel Wimert to retain copy of this message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that General Bennett is out of the country".

Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make those changes?

Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed something that is written out, and there is no secretary, and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that. On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask the communicators to send that, and youwill then later write for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable. I am not sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Bennett's name and not General Philpott's name?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had been the case that not only would the change have been made, but there would have been some sort of note on the side or something. So, I believe that the original must have said Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the first page used Bennett's name, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the "suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.

Mr. PHillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct [redacted] to work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence Agency further brought into the operation which we have been calling Track II?

Mr. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document since then that indicates that someone else was talked to later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message.But until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have said, I think that Philpott was the man.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on that one occasion?

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Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion. But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little room with windows, and so there were other people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer Willia Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated October 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA. And it says:

"Please deliver the following message ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett."

Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message which purports to be to Colonel Wimert from Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again there was a document that was handed to me and I was told, send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there, and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on. If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority to authenticate, and I didn't necesarily turn to them and say, hey --

Mr Schwarz. Prove that --

Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated document headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett to Colonel Wimert "Eyes only".

(The document referred to was Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett [redacted], and has the text in it which you sent on [redacted].

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to who handed you that document?

Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that. There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the office and say, here is something to send. There were others which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow forwarding slip on it. There are times,I am sure, when I would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the way, send this.

I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which someone handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying less attention to those things, because I was in effect the postman for people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all about this document?

Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on that document?

Mr. PHillips. Well, it certainly looks like the signature which was on the other document which was said to be Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently it would appear that theremight be something here where they are going to bring in more people, as is known to several persons, it says down here.

And itmay have been because there was an attempt there not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk to you about something we are doing that we have kind of already done. That is theonly thing I can come up with. I can't give you a better explanation than that.

Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling and strange document?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating officer.

And second, this is not simply taking some other message and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling, and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory. I can't remember the rationale for this.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will confuse [redacted]".

It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would have confused him.

"Background for his information: both Generals Bennett and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

Who told you that?

Mr. PHillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume this must have been Bill Broe.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling you that?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I -- I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words, that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing. This cable I think must have originated either with a discussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word, write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say, do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone else that was working in my shop, Mr. Pionzio, or someone else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing something else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said, here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things. So I really can't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes out?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at night.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

Mr. Phillips. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the only explanation I can give.

Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new interested parties and the several persons referred to in the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority than Bennett and Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just -- this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem logical to me that they would start going outside and down, I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I only assume that.

Mr.Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. I understand.

Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using Wimert, and knew some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an interest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing the work for the CIA through Colonel Wimert.

Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety daily events, were they?

Mr. Phillips. They were not.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it was necessarily because General Philpott would have been embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

But this rather unusual step was made because of the talents of the military men, to bring him into a program that you weren't even talking with the State Department about. And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things that I obviously had something to do with.

But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job, and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when someone would come in and say, we want something to go down to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott, I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had been one of our operations.

Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2 there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse Colonel Wimert. Background for his information".

Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine background.

The other is that it is a story to be given Wimert for his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way doyou read it if you do not know what the facts are?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent of falsehood in putting something down like that.

So, I assume that it is really for his background of what happened.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got the information which you provided in this cable?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation "that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when Wimert shown" the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

Did you advise General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't know that it was.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply from Wimert is located? Is it K?

Mr. Treverton. K, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant General Bennett from Colonel Wimert".

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come from Colonel Wimert and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an info copy and this, that and the other.

The action on this cable would have certainly have gone at least to Mr.Broe, and possibly higher, because it says, this is his message to the head of another government service. And so it would have gone to that level.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a cable will come in and there will be more than one copy. And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and then you get the information copy, and so forth.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable whether there would have been more than one copy?

Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went to.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the"eyes only"have any significance to you in the third line?

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what Colonel Wimert was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Department, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else other than General Bennett.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying, give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes through a communications channel, it means that they are going to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying, will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
1/12/94

Mr. Schwarz. This message states:

"Please deliver the following message, ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

What are MAP and FMS.

Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not, repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date of situation".

Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to do with that, do they?

Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett to Wimert, to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the whole business, all of these different options were being looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with military things because it looks like Allende is going to get in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for Colonel Wimert to give him some rationale behind it when he was down there running away trying to foment the coup, saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this government?

I am speculating. But this was another one of those messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?

Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved, and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me or how it arrived.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be another document which contains the purported message from

Mr. Fenn. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally, was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I realize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that the approach we are making to this?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach. He has denied any knowledge of this.

Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand why. Because the messages went from Philpott [redacted] And [redacted] said, I am with you 100 percent, and from that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy on his part about doing what he was doing.

And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's side, not having been involved with him.

From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that someone is using that business that I referred to in dispatches, General Bennett says, when they are really talking about what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that is conceivable.

But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see a motive?

Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

I can't see the motive for fooling [redacted], because [redacted] had already started working when he received the instructions from the number two man in his Agency, which is indeed pretty high up.

So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful is that I, too, am confused.

Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.

Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --

Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday. We have talked to him.He accepts at least one message. There are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not sure if he accepted two.

Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while, as we said previously, things had fallen into place according to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very, very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few of us, probably myself and Mr. Pionzio and Mr. Broe and Mr. Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but I do remember thatmeeting going up there and saying, if there ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that meeting.

what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool, and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days to die.

Miss Culbreth. You had served [redacted] in the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in this position on the Track II party?

Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement. U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly nation", relations were very bad.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do that now.

Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize his death as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing around his car he drew his gun.

Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

I would like to direct your attention to this cable that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated September27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by 10 October".

And you were questioned about this part: "These officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any Chilean. An example: We have a Canadian who can pose as Brazilian intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

In the second paragraph which was not read earlier, I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

"Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely".

To me this second paragraph indicates that these false flag officers were people that had experience in this very kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me personally and had worked for me.

Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity as a false flag officer?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Miss Culbreth. So,this was not some unique and unusual, devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this instance?

Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, especially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the immediate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on, that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what are you talking about, this, that and the other.

As a matter of fact, as I recall, [redacted] was terribly upset, because he is a sort of an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words, to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the station that we had been given this job to do and that we at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to accomplish the job that they had been given with the least possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that sort of thing.

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Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind as principal operating officer here in the states that there was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really regard them as separate groups?

Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else. But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

And then we had the other group which seemed to be more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping operations when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up on these.

With regard to the information that was given to you, the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the Chief of Station and were directed to Colonel Wimert, who can

Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How large was the room you were operating out of? You described it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there -- no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries, there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing. There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. [redacted] six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much [redacted] and myself, as the real action officers. And then there were two junior officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that

Date:06/08/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10095

RECORDS SERIES :
REPORT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

DATE : 03/17/64
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN PLOT TO ASSASSANATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA
PANAMA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/09/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DDA 05763

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New Orleans, Louisiana
March 17, 1964

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
GMB 4 FEB 94

① **ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA**

At 4:55 PM, March 17, 1964, Orlando Piedra, formerly connected with Federal Police in Cuba and presently residing New Orleans, Louisiana, advised that about one week ago he received information from a source in Cuba whom he considers reliable that Castro is not satisfied with the way things are going in Panama and for that reason plans to have the President of Panama assassinated to create additional uprisings in that country. Piedra advised that he furnished the above information by letter to Colonel Bolivar Vallarino, Chief of the National Guard of Panama whom he has known for years. Piedra declines to identify the source and has no additional information to report.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This will confirm information orally furnished Mr. J. J. Kelly, State Department, and [redacted] *Central Intelligence Agency on March 17, 1964, by A. J. Decker of this Bureau. This will also confirm data furnished orally to Colonel Graham E. Schmid, Department of the Army; Major William Boyd, Department of the Air Force; and Mr. Don Gorhan, Department of the Navy, on March 19, 1964, by G. A. Day of this Bureau.*

1A
per
CDA

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5-28-76. CHM

200-300-5

Date:07/14/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10144

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12 MARCH 1964

DATE : 03/12/64
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CIA MEETING WITH WARREN COMMISSION
HELMS, RICHARD
ROCCA, RAYMOND
WARREN COMMISSION
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/14/94

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COMMENTS :

302-3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investigation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned. Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Commission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle interviews with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station would be under State Department cover and that it would be proper to advise the Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details with the CIA Chief of Station.

8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November 1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the materials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination. Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did not release actual copies of our messages because they contained codewords and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission who might come to visit him at Langley.

9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements. Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone intercepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any information affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive and that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very carefully protected.

10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assisting, to air manifest checks in Mexico. These would be carried out he said.

11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemination. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affecting internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always understandable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but

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Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10270

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU

DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
OFFICE OF SECURITY
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

C-10

SUBJECT: Robert Maheu - Foreign Head of State

1. In connection with the official State visit of a foreign Head of State in 1959, the Office of Security was requested to render special support during the Los Angeles and New York phases of the tour. According to FEA personnel, the foreign official was especially desirous of female companionship during his Los Angeles visit and it was requested that appropriate arrangements be made through a controlled source of the Office in order to assure a satisfied visit.

2. On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robert Maheu, a cleared Office of Security contact, was asked to arrange a party for the foreign official at Los Angeles, California. This was done by Mr. Maheu through Mr. Gregson Bautzer. Mr. Bautzer is a prominent Los Angeles attorney and Hollywood figure previously granted a covert security approval for use by FE Division. By pre-arrangement, during the course of this party the foreign official was introduced to a part-time screen and stage actress. For the duration of the foreign official's stay in Los Angeles, 3 through 7 April 1959, he and the actress became intimate friends. It was indicated by a CIA employee who was integrated into the State party, that the foreign official desired to continue his friendship with the actress and that he wished to meet with her during his stay in New York City from 14 through 18 April 1959.

3. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the home of an Office of Security source, at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 through 13 April 1959. The home was to be used as a confidential meeting place for the actress and the foreign official. At the same time the actress was registered at the Hotel Barclay, 111 East 48th Street, New York City, under an assumed name. The publicity touching on the relationship had become more pointed since some publicity mention had been made of the Jewish background of the actress. On 14 April 1959 a CIA employee and the actress were transported to the home on Long Island which was taken over as

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM (1)(A) (1)(B)
3-2-94 AS SANITIZED

01469

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[redacted] the foreign official and the actress. [redacted] the foreign official. [redacted] the actress [redacted] the foreign official [redacted]

4. [redacted] the actress [redacted] the foreign official [redacted] companion for the foreign official [redacted] the foreign official and [redacted]

5. All personal contacts by Security representatives in this case were under alias [redacted]. There is no record or indication in any of the files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name or reference. It is believed that Mr. Maheu was never introduced to the actress, and as far as can be determined [redacted] "fronted" for all arrangements. Office of Security investigation conducted variously from 25 May through 17 September 1959 of the actress reflected no substantive derogatory information regarding [redacted]

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Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10280

RECORDS SERIES :
CABLE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU'S TRANSPORTATION OF PROSTITUTES

DATE : 10/10/57
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROBERT A. MAHEU AND ASSOCIATES (RAMA)
PROSTITUTES
FOREIGN LEADERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

C-IV-4

Clean Copy of IN 20362

10 October 1957

DIRECTOR

IN 20362

[redacted]

CITE [redacted]

RE: [redacted]

1. CIA source called [redacted] urgently 9 Oct and turned over two documents charging that Robert M. Maheu violated Mann Act in procuring and transporting prostitutes for a foreign leader during state visit U. S. 1956, that this done with tacit approval State. Also charge Maheu with wire tapping OPS against Onassis Shipping Co in 55, that this done with tacit approval U. S. Government and known to CIA, State and FBI.

2. [redacted] expressed low interest info but agreed pouch to CIA.

3. On 8 Oct [redacted] gave identical documents to DCM who pouched same 9 Oct to State for action AMB Farland. Told DCM a high foreign official desires wide distribution U. S. Government agencies.

4. CIA source believes only possible source above documents is John Joseph Frank who formerly close to Maheu.

5. FC: [redacted] objective possibly blackmail U. S. Government, kill Frank Trial.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO KAPOK CABLES.

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K 2/23/98

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CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED
27-7-94
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

01450

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SECRET

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10141

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.
FROM : BELIN, DAVID W.
TO : HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

TITLE :
LETTER/ENCLOSURES

DATE : 05/01/75
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
INTERVIEW WITH REGARD TO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 435-3

Sent to NSC 11/22/93

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bx 34

H: Would you make that please -- Do you mind my interrupting?

B: Sure - go ahead.

H: Make that Soviet Intelligence Branch.

B: -- and he was in charge of the Soviet Intelligence Branch of the Agency --

H: --which is a lesser position than the other reads like.

B: All right. He went to Berlin in the Fall of 1952 [redacted] until 1959. He came back to Washington in the Fall of 1959 where he stayed until June of 1963, except for possible short periods of temporary duty --

H: -- except for several periods of temporary duty.

B: -- except for several periods of temporary duty abroad. He went to Rome in June 1963 [redacted] until 1966. He came back to the Agency in Washington in 1966 and he retired from the Agency in 1967 on December 31. Now, Mr. Harvey, does that summarize basically part of your background, at least that we discussed?

H: That is correct. I would like to add one thing, if I may. During both the Berlin and Rome periods and for a considerabl period of time in Washington after I returned from Berlin I was on the roles of the [redacted] which raises a ~~little~~ question of propriety. But I want you to know that in the handling of this.

B: All right. I first asked you with regard to any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots within the Agency concerning Patrice Lumumba and you might indicate what your response was to that, Mr. Harvey.

H: I have no personal knowledge of any such plan or operation within or on the part of the Agency.

B: I also asked you apart from the question of Fidel Castro whether or not you had any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots in the Agency that involved any other foreign leader.

01771

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10011-10048
RECORD SERIES :	TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MAHEU
DATE :	07/30/1975
PAGES :	95
SUBJECTS :	ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL: GALANE, MORTON R. GIANCANA, SAM WIRETAPS MAHEU, ROBERT ROSELLI, JOHNNY MAFIA CONNECTION
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; 1A; 1B; 1C; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/19/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	SSCI Box 252, Folder 5

157-10011-

10048

tape 1b

am not too far off in what I am about to tell you. The contract was structured in such a way that as the bottoms of other companies became obsolete, they could only be replaced with Onassis' tankers. Even ARAMCO had to, by attrition, within a period of four-and-a-half to five-and-a-half years, would have, if their tankers became obsolete, they could only be replaced by Onassis tankers.

Our statistics, after having studied the contract and making what we considered to be proper projections, indicated that at the completion of approximately five-and-a-half years, Mr. Onassis would control more dead weight tonnage than the United States controlled in its entirety, that he would control on the high seas annually more oil by tens of thousands of gallons more than were used by all of the Allied nations during the most severe year of the Korean War, that in the first year his profit would be approximately $17 million dollars, that after five-and-a-half years his annual profit would be in the area of $200 million.

While this analysis is going on, we also found that a million dollar pay-off had been made to one of the top ministers in Saudi Arabia and we had the evidence [redacted].

We then prepared our inputs and presented them to the

National Security Council --

Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?

Mr. Maheu. -- of the United States, and within a matter, I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we presented to the National Security Council verbally but not in writing.

Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?

Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?

Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement and that same evening we were told that two [redacted] officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of Carl Twitchell by virtue of reading about the country, because I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by

National Security Council --

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Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of ~~Carl Twitchell~~ by virtue of reading about the country, because I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name of ~~Carl Twitchell~~ who was living in Connecticut who turned out to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by old King Saud. [redacted] had spent time in the country as a mining engineer to help them in the exploitation of mines. It was in fact to [redacted] that the old king gave the power of attorney to come to the United States government or come back to the United States and try to form a consortium for the exploitation of oil from which emanated ARAMCO.

[redacted] was the type of man who was only reimbursed for his expenses. I think his total expenses were slightly in excess of $8,000. He didn't even keep the banking and percentage for himself, or a piece of the action, so to speak, and he was highly, highly loved by the Saudis and although the old king was then gone and King Saud, the son, was in power, [redacted] had the same respect and reverence from the present leaders as he did from the father and I convinced [redacted] that -- he already had a clearance, a satisfactory clearance, and I convinced him to precede me to Saudi Arabia to try to lay the groundwork.

Senator Schweiker. What year was this, roughly?

Mr. Maheu. This, I believe, was in '54 or '55, yes.

Anyway, I finally ended up going to Saudi Arabia, having a meeting with the King's confidential assistant, presenting all of this evidence, frankly at the time not knowing if the King himself had a piece of the action --

Senator Huddleston. Had some of this evidence come from the wiretap?

Mr. Maheu. That tap was entirely unproductive, entirely unproductive.

Senator Schweiker. What happened then at your meeting?

Mr. Maheu. Well, it's very interesting, if we could take a little time, I mean, I was scheduled to have the meeting "with the King," but he doesn't show, he stays somewhere else and the confidential assistant shows up and one trusted minister that he had with [redacted] present.

And my meeting was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. one night, and this happaned to be the last day that the King was supposed to be in Jidda, he was then leaving for the capital further inland, Jidda being the only major port in Saudi where he spends his summers, and they were having a big parade for him, and from the balcony of the hotel, I'm watching the parade go by, and finally the King's car comes and he is arm and arm with the man on whom I'm going to give the evidence that night, and I frankly was not too comfortable, particularly in view of the fact that in those days -- and I don't know whether it has changed, but in Saudi, the same document did not give you permission to enter and leave; you had to make application for an exit visa after you arrived, and I was in constant contact with the then-United States Ambassador. He made it very clear that the government approved of everything I was doing, but if something went wrong they could not come to my rescue, I would have to be the fall guy, and I was prepared to do it. That was

Saudi Arabian government would have its flag flying the high seas, and at the time that all of this is going on they are building what then, upon completion of production, had been the biggest tanker in the world at that time, a ship named after the old King, a tanker which was scheduled to go and take a maiden flight and take off, and it turned out the biggest problem that we had was to find a save-face gimmick. But finally the whole thing was accomplished, and it took two and a half years to do it.

Senator Schweiker. I didn't mean to get you off the track.

Mr. Maheu. Well, I'm sorry I am so verbose.

Senator Huddleston. You said you bought a paper in Athens? You mean by that you actually bought the paper or just paid them to run the story?

Mr. Maheu. We bought a newspaper.

You'll have to understand, Senator, that in Rome, in those days, there were fifty newspapers. I mean, the big circulation in those days, big circulation in Rome was 20,000. It's hard for us to visualize that.

Senator Huddleston. The CIA supplied the money to buy the newspaper?

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Can we go off the record?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Mr. Liebengood. Was this listening post that you referred to, was that a project that was related to work for the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Maheu. I don't believe it was.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any New York assignments other than Onassis that you gave to Frank?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember any.

Mr. Madigan. How about [redacted] I may have asked you that yesterday. Do you recall whether he had any relationship with your company during the 1950's?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember a [redacted] [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. A CIA employee.

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall his name.

Mr. Madigan. I got sidetracked off of my question of whether you recall a prosecution or an investigation of the Onassis wiretap. You may have already have answered that.

Mr. Maheu. I think I did, yes.

Mr. Madigan. What did you say?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I appeared before a Grand Jury that was investigating Mr. Frank on another matter.

Mr. Madigan. On another matter, but you had no recollection of any investigation of that particular tap?

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. Either an investigation of you or Frank or Leone or anyone?

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. No interviews by the FBI?

Mr. Maheu. It's conceivable, but I don't remember it.

Mr. Madigan. You don't remember it?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

tape 2a

Mr. Madigan. Did there come a time when you were asked by the Central Intelligence Agency to be involved in a project which would involve sending a woman by the name of Florence Horn over to a foreign country?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.

Mr. Madigan. And what were you asked to do with regard to that?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I was asked to find a woman, preferably from Los Angeles, who would agree to go to a foreign country and under some pretext try to meet the leader of the country and hopefully change his basic philosophies which at the time were thought to be detrimental to the United States, and that they were very, as a result, very seriously jeopardizing the national security of the government of the United States.

Mr. Madigan. Did you find such a woman?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I do not have any recollection.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Now can you date that assignment as sometime in 1956 or '57, does that sound about right, or do you have any recollection of what year it was?

Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection. It was before

1960.

Mr. Madigan. It was sometime after you had begun in '54 with your Agency operation?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Or your sponsorship?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Subsequently, did this Leader "A" come to the United States to your knowledge after this?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall whether he came subsequently or prior to.

Mr. Madigan. When the same leader did come to the United States, were you involved in any assignment for the CIA with regard to his presence in the country?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I was.

Mr. Madigan. And what was that assignment?

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Who was the Agency representative that gave you this assignment? Did you go through Mr. O'Connell, or was it someone different?

Mr. Maheu. This request emanated from, directly from the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. Who in the State Department?

Mr. Maheu. Mr. Scott McCloud, who was then Director of the Office of Security and Consular Affairs.

Mr. Madigan. Was it coordinated with the CIA, or was this strictly between yourself and the State Department?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the CIA was kept apprised, however that the coordination was with the State Department, in connection with the security that was being provided for this leader during his visit to the United States.

Mr. Madigan. Did you meet with the State Department or CIA people or both in New York City when the leader arrived there?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I met with Security Personnel of the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. What did you do in New York for this assignment?

(Pause)

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. And did you meet with the New York police with regard to the assignment?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. Did you travel from New York to any other city with this leader?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I did.

Mr. Madigan. What occurred when you arrived at the other cities?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I contacted the security representatives of the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. And after you contacted the security representatives, what were you supposed to do in these other cities?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I, through local Police Department officials or law enforcement officials [redacted] not be a security risk insofar as the national security of our government was concerned.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't know what you mean [redacted] Mr. Madigan.

Mr. Madigan. You indicated in our discussion yesterday that the women that were allowed access, as you put it, to this leader "A" were to be women that the police would have some control over so that they would not be a possibility of a later blackmail problem with the United States government, is that not correct?

Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you participate in sending these women or providing these women over to the hotel where the leader was staying?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you did?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday when I asked you whether someone had travelled from city to city, you indicated that you thought maybe one did, but you weren't sure about how many others.

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. How many cities did you visit during the trip that this Leader "A" made?

Mr. Maheu. Several cities.

Mr. Madigan. Now were the women that were provided known to you or represented to you as prostitutes in any of these cities?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that they were?

Mr. Maheu. Do you recall yesterday identifying the leader?

Mr. Madigan. I do.

Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Madigan. According to your understanding, Mr. Maheu, of the project that you were involved in with the State Department in providing the women to this foreign leader in the various cities starting from New York and going through the other cities he stayed at, do you believe the women that were sent over to his hotel were prostitutes?

Mr. Maheu. That they may have been, yes.

Mr. Madigan. And you did participate under instructions of the government, to send these women over to his hotel or to make them available to him at his hotel, not knowing what happened after they got to the hotel?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. And that occurred in New York and the other cities that he stayed at while he was in the United States?

Mr.Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. And as far as these women travelling with you from city to city, your recollection is that one may have --

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. But you did not bring a crowd of six or seven.

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that [redacted] travelled with me, may have travelled independently, but I have no recollection of being on the same plane with any of these people.

Mr. Madigan. You think may have traveled from city to city, or four or five?

Mr. Maheu. One may have gone to one further city. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Is that the theory of the project?

Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. Do you remember when that assignment was in terms of whether it was before or after this visit to the United States?

Mr. Maheu. Subsequent to his visit to the United States he made a trip to Russia. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. As a result of that, what assignment did you receive, if any, from the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

Mr.Maheu. [redacted]

[redacted]t.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection. I can't believe that where you would find [redacted], I don't believe so no.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Was that Bautzer?

Mr. Maheu. No, sir.

Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

Mr. Maheu. First I discussed the matter with Howard Hughes and he recommended that I contact Mr. Larry Crosby, which I did.

Mr. Madigan. Did Hughes have to approve your being involved in this?

Mr. Maheu. I am not sure he had to approve. I was just seeking his advice.

Mr. Madigan. You were more or less just telling him about it?

Mr. Maheu. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Madigan. You were just telling him about it?

Mr. Maheu. No, Mr. Hughes had been in the industry, he had been in movie studios, I thought he could be helpful to this contract.

Mr. Madigan. Did you deal with O'Connell with regard to this contract or with somebody else?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I dealt with Mr. O'Connell and Colonel Edwards.

Mr. Madigan. Colonel Edwards?

Who was this person, the female who was known to --

Mr. Maheu. I really don't remember. The one and only time I have seen her in my life.

Mr. Madigan. Could this film have been described as a pornographic film, or was it something less than that?

Mr. Maheu. By today's technology, I would say definitely no.

Mr. Madigan. You say this woman was known to the law enforcement authorities. Was she suspected by yourself to be a prostitute?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. Not at all?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. She was just an actress of some kind?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall, but my recollection is she was highly respected by the law enforcement authorities. Whether she was an informant for them or what the relationship was, I don't know.

Mr. Madigan. So you produced one film? One film cannister as a result of this, movie film?

Mr. Maheu. Very short.

Mr. Madigan. Did you make any still photographs or anything like that?

Mr. Maheu. No, I did not.

Mr. Madigan. And then you turned the film over to the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. And thereafter do you know what happened to it?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. Were you told what was going to be done with it?

Mr. Maheu. I was told that the stills would be distributed in the country of the leader in an attempt to embarrass him and hopefully as a result remove what was considered to be a very serious threat to the national security of our country.

Mr. Madigan. Were you ever familiar with the project names that were attached to these assignments by the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. Not that I recollect, no.

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever hear of project Happy Days?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Or Project Harp Star?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Or Project Norfok?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.

Mr. Madigan. What was your assignment in that regard?

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. And who did you contact with regard to that?

Mr. Maheu. I contacted Mr. Gregson Bautzer.

Mr. Madigan. Is that B-a-u-t-z-e-r?

Mr. Maheu. B-a-u-t-z-e-r, a Hollywood attorney.

Mr. Madigan. And did he hold the [redacted] that you refer to?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, he did.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the intent was to have young movie starlets present at the party, but I do not have any recollection of receiving any instructions stating that, for instance, one specific person was to be his date, if that's what you're --

Mr. Madigan. So your understanding was to have a number available at the party, that's all. Not to have anyone --

Mr. Maheu. To have the party, period.

Mr. Madigan. Not to introduce one to him?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

I did not go to the party. I do not know who all was there. I do recall that there were quite a few people present and again, my recollection is that since this particular leader was enthralled with Hollywood that the intent was to have present people who -- with whom he would have an opportunity to converse concerning his interests in the movie industry, and the making of movies, and talk to not only starlets, but I believe that some male stars were also invited to the party.

Mr. Madigan. As a result of the party, did the leader associate himself with one particular female?

Mr. Maheu. I was subsequently told that as a result of the -- having met a young starlet at the party, that he subsequently invited her to spend time with him in his country.

Mr. Madigan. Were you ever asked to be involved in providing a house in Long Island for him to stay at with this particular female?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I was asked.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know who that person was?

Mr. Maheu. I do not recall the name.

Mr. Madigan. You indicated that your recollection was that there was some embarrassment later on with regard to this female?

Mr. Maheu. I was subsequently told that at a subsequent date after he had taken this person with him to his country there was some embarrassment because it turned out that the leader was from an Arabic country and that the young starlet was of Jewish extraction.

Mr. Madigan. Was your assignment in that regard solely to set up the one party, was that the end of it?

Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection of it, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with regard to that Leader "B"?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with regard to Leader "A"?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

Mr. Madigan. Did you undertake any other Agency assignments with regard to any other leader of any other country?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

Mr. Madigan. Does the name Susan Cabot mean anything to you with regard to that assignment in Los Angeles?

Mr. Maheu. That name is familiar, yes, now that you mention it.

Mr. Madigan. Do you think [redacted] might have been the person?

Mr. Maheu. I think [redacted] might have been, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you contact Howard Hughes with regard to that assignment?

Mr. Maheu. No, I did not. However, Mr. Bautzer was, in those days, Mr. Hughes' personal attorney.

Mr. Madigan. Would you date that [redacted] assignment as being around 1959?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. It was before 1960, but that would sound approximately right.

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever have your office in Washington used for cover purposes by the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I have.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know on how many occasions?

Mr. Maheu. On several occasions.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know what the purpose of the agent that would be using it for cover was?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that my role was limited simply to fund their income. In other words, they would be on the payroll of Robert A. Maheu Associates and that I would be reimbursed the exact amount of their payroll.

As to the specific assignments, I have no recollection.

Mr. Madigan. What types of duties would they have for an employee who was working in Ecuador at some point in their career?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, we did.

Mr. Madigan. Would you recall that to be around 1968, or do you have a specific recollection?

Mr. Maheu. It would be about that time.

Mr. Madigan. About that time.

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Mr. Madigan. And did you ever hear of the name Peletier with regard to that cover arrangement? P-e-l-e-t-i-e-r?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. My recollection is that the guy's name was Mike Marrage or Milrage, but I don't recall the name Peletier. Perhaps he was placed on the payroll as Peletier, but I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. You did not address him as Peletier?

Mr. Maheu. No, not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. What was he supposed to be doing in Ecuador, do you know?

Mr. Maheu. Covertly or overtly?

Mr. Madigan. Both.

Let's start with covertly.

Mr. Maheu. Covertly he was -- he had an assignment from the Agency which I don't know. Overtly he was an employee of Robert A. Maheu Associates trying to exploit the possibility of business ventures in the country of Ecuador.

Mr. Madigan. You have no inclination or no feeling at all for what his assignment was?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. In covert terms whether it was an espionage assignment or whether it was a PR kind of assignment? No idea?

Mr. Maheu. I don't know.

Mr. Madigan. Was there ever an island involved with that assignment to your knowledge?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge or recollection.

Mr. Madigan. You never heard of an island called [redacted] have you?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. During the 1960's did you employ a fellow by the name of Jack Buckley? We may have discussed this before.

Mr. Maheu. I believe that from time to time a Jack Buckley did work for Robert A. Maheu Associates. I don't believe he was an employee.

Mr. Madigan. Would he be on a kind of an intermittent contract basis like Frank was? You would use him every once in awhile?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that he did some work for Robert A. Maheu Associates and, as I say, not an employee.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know what types of assignments he did?

Mr. Liebengood. Mr. Mort Jackson?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember his name.

Mr. Madigan. Mort Jackson being an attorney --

Mr. Liebengood. -- in Los Angeles.

Mr. Al Long of the Secret Service?

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. [redacted] formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency, a resident of Florida.

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. James McCord?

Mr. Maheu. Only what I saw in the newspapers.

Mr. Liebengood. But you had no dealings with him while you were in Washington?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Just briefly, in that regard, we discussed yesterday whether you had any recollection of Mr. McCord being involved -- or at least I think we discussed it -- in any either sweeping of your office or electronic equipment or using of your office as a listening post or anything like that?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember.

Mr. Madigan. And your indication was you didn't have any recollection?

Mr. Maheu. No.

payroll, and for the second time I was turned down by Mr. Hughes. I believe it was in September of 1969 that I finally called Mr. Meier in and requested his resignation and then I informed Mr. Hughes that he had resigned.

After the departure of Mr. Meier, while going through his files, Mr. Ellson ran into some documents that indicated some very serious double escrows on mining properties and we recommended to Mr. Hughes that all the information be made available to the authorities and let the chips fall where they may.

Mr. Liebengood. Do you know why Mr. Hughes was not inclined to follow your recommendations with regards to Meier's termination at earlier dates?

Mr. Maheu. He was afraid that Meier would embarrass him. At least, that is what he told me.

Mr. Liebengood. You are aware of no CIA interest in Meier?

Mr. Maheu. The only thing I know is that Meier was cut in on the cover o[redacted] and was aware of that operation.

Mr. Liebengood. How did that come about? How was he cut in on that?

Mr. Maheu. Because it was he who initially had worked on a deal for a venture in Mexico on the part of Hughes Aircraft for cable television and subsequent to -- well, when that collapsed, the person who was to be the partner of Hughes Aircraft in that particular venture threatened to sue Howard Hughes and all of the Hughes interest for non-fulfillment of contract, and I made a recommendation to that person whose name slips my mind, but I believe his last name was Jamie, J-a-m-i-e or something like that, I don't recall. But to try to discourage him from filing such a lawsuit I suggested that he and I put up $10,000 in [redacted] and check into the possibility of developing business there.

I put up my ten, he never put his up, and Meier was the one who was involved. But when the Agency needed a cover for an assignment in [redacted] Meier was made privy of this by the Agency.

tape 3b

Mr. Liebengood. Just to be certain I understand, this was because of Meier's role in reestablishing the operation in [redacted] Is that correct?

Mr. Maheu. Well, of trying to save the lawsuit, yes. That's right.

Mr. Liebengood. And you think the name of this would-be partner was Jamie?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember whether that was the first name or last name.

Mr. Liebengood. How did [redacted] whatever way do you spell his last name, do you recall?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Liebengood. Do you know who accompanied Meier and F. Donald Nixon on this trip to the Dominican Republic, the celebrated trip?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Liebengood. As far as you know, they had nothing to do with any Agency interest in that?

Mr. Maheu. No, sir, not as far as I know.

As a matter of fact, it's my recollection I found out about this afterwards.

Mr. Liebengood. Who else was witting of the cover arrangements that you had with the Agency through Robert A. Maheu Associates? You mentioned Meier and this particular one. Did you have other employees who were witting of the cover?

Mr. Maheu. I believe Bill Staton was aware of some of it.

Mr. Liebengood. And did he keep your books?

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Mr. Liebengood. And outside of the [redacted] Meier was not witting of any other cover arrangements, I take it?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Liebengood. Do you recall who the other personnel were through the years that obtained Robert A. Maheu Associates cover for the Agency?

Mr. Maheu. I don't.

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OF

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Langley, Virginia

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

P R O C E E D I N G S

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was [redacted]

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think [redacted] was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say [redacted] was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, [redacted] Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was [redacted]

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, [redacted]

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. [redacted] went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgeral in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some [redacted] rifles and

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q. All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

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Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the [redacted] base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, [redacted]

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and [redacted]?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. [redacted] I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. [redacted] I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

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Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen, in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operation

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, [redacted] this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, [redacted]

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock [redacted]

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold [redacted]

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dilion?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturer well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down [redacted] some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. [redacted]

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connecti with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cuttin this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants, basically.

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a [redacted] firm, [redacted] who was buying [redacted] output of the Nicaro mines. And this [redacted] firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these [redacted] exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the [redacted] provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, [redacted] found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. [redacted] We simply went to the [redacted] people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was [redacted] compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down [redacted] we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q [redacted] would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as operations. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and [redacted] people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from [redacted]

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage [redacted] other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys?

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have [redacted] bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a sta employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located [redacted]

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located [redacted] It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. [redacted] We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. [redacted]

Q [redacted] What was the cover?

A It was [redacted] It was called -- [redacted]

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could [redacted] last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- [redacted]

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, [redacted] The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the [redacted] had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO [redacted]. When the [redacted] people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillan on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q. Were there many activities of that type?

A. Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world. . .

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the [redacted]

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. [redacted] Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under [redacted] -- I just don't recall what it was. [redacted]

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

A. That is right.

Q And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the [redacted] conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because [redacted]

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were debriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the [redacted] over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of [redacted] do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the [redacted] and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. [redacted]

Q. We can call them [redacted] for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment [redacted]

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human source

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. [illegible], there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment, we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

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purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

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You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The [redacted] are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the [redacted] have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of [redacted] that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in [redacted]

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, [redacted]

Q. This is Southeast of [redacted]

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they [redacted]

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to [redacted] such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. [redacted]

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what [redacted] has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the [redacted] it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the [redacted] exclusively foreign [redacted]?

A. Exclusively foreign [redacted]

Q. Were they [redacted] one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the [redacted] has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The [redacted] Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. [redacted] What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared[redacted]?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

activities of the [redacted].

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

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MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities during the 1959 to '61 period?

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all durin the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or wh [illegible] you might have of some of these organizations in order

to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. [redacted]

Q. [redacted]

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is [redacted] with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know wheiter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took place in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me..

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was [redacted] for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I am sorry for the interruption but over the long haul I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were interrupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ought to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship with some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly the Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q. What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things that might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

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Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with [redacted] but can you think of any other functions performed by [redacted] that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to [redacted]?

A [redacted] were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- [redacted] are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the [redacted] or -- these are the [redacted]

Q And [redacted] are [redacted]?

A The [redacted] are [redacted].

Q [redacted]

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So [redacted] and [redacted] --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. [redacted].

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

[redacted] engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q [redacted]

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed [redacted] various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami area now [redacted]?

A There are no domestic activities at all [redacted] All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The [redacted] now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does [redacted] -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

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A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The [redacted] is under [redacted].

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between [redacted] and [redacted].

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

- - -

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10109

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-15

Document Information

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ZRRIFLE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10109
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OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BOX 418

MEETING 25 JUNE 75

No. 418-17

TOP SECRET

AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

INVENTORIED:
ON MAR 24 1976
BY

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Biographical

1940-47	Counterespionage work as FBI agent
1947	Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
1948	Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP)
1952	Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
1959	Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries)

1960

August 16	DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)

1961

Late January (approx.)	EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24)
February (approx.)	BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)
	HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38)
	Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

---

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

1961 (cont'd)

Early Feb.	According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)
Late Feb.	Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)
March-Early April	O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)
Mid-April	Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee.
November 15	Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39)
November 29	MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962

February	EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)
February 7	EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)
February 19	HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)
April 8-9	HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)
April 14	HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)
April 18-19	Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd)

April 21	HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)
Late April	HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)
Throughout May	Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50)
May 7	EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*
May 14	Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65) HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)
June 21	ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)
August 10	Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.
August 13	General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders".

---

* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

1962 (cont'd)

August 14	HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.
September	Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)
October	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963

February	HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)
June	HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)
August 16	Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

TOP SECRET

Edwards Ex 1
5/30/75
1 pg.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

14 May 1962

INVENTORIED:
ON MAR 2 1977
BY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: John Rosselli

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

not true

Sheffield Edwards
Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

EYES ONLY
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Alternate Course B

INVENTORIED MAR 21 1977

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [illegible]), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1530 EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING
OSD Rcy No. 1

43

This document contains 2 pages.
Copy No. ______ of ______ copies, Series ______

D-43410

Helms Ex 2
6/13/75

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

14 August 1962

[illegible] MAR 21 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

R371 1

[illegible]
ON MAR 2 1977
BY

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

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JUN 24 1975
CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

Classified by 007789
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960,

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QJWIN annual salary:	$ 7,200
Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory.

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DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency. Training by opposition would ________.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4) Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

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e. Staffers ________-selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Use ~~Nobody~~ nobody who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

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Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

~~Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.~~

~~1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.~~

~~2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.~~

~~3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.~~

~~4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners -- and limited official reference.~~

~~5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.~~

~~6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.~~

~~7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.~~

~~8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. 4 above essential.~~

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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CIA

~~10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.~~

~~11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)~~

~~12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.~~

~~13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.~~

~~14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.~~

~~15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.~~

~~16) Danger of Standbys.~~

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Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Bureau

"for a living" RIS 201 cover

caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes - Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2
Not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor -- assumptions
Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford
Ehut R&D - memo.

"Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project.
pherious - (V with CB)

comment - Gear

Anathesia --

26/1 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter
No file

Never mentions word assassination.

1. Select proper oern to run --
2. Place a cover
3. Security Rules
4. Guide leves
5. Last Resort - Brakes -
6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers except per cover.
8. Principal agent - (Mankel) ?
   AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.
   Mask spat rqm. stall AF project - cler Dbieke

Max as ~~3~~ 2
B - WKH - AS -
Sid - Reserv.
Substitute - What next

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9. Disposal --
10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --
11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create to provide RIS or xkbxtobel it. - non Sov
13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed -
Fd J list - Remember

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JFK Assassination System
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Date: 7/7/2015

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

N.Y. Daily

SUNDAY NEWS, A[illegible], 1975

ECRETS OF THE CIA

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

Its clandestine operations now undergoing a sometimes painful official scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Agency maintains, as always, a tight lip. But from interviews with the agents who hired out to do the CIA's clock-and-dagger work, News reporter Paul Meskil tells here for the first time of the intrigue that surfaced in the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that pushed the U.S. to the brink of war with the Soviet Union. First of a series.

By PAUL MESKIL

Marie Lorenz: spied on Fidel.

A BEAUTIFUL German-American girl scored an intelligence coup for the CIA by stealing secret papers from the Havana hotel suite she had shared with Fidel Castro.

Among the papers, she told The News, were maps showing the sites selected for Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

Curvy, black-haired Marie Lorenz, who lives quietly in New York, was the Mata Hari of the Caribbean cold war. She was one of the most glamorous members of a spy ring recruited for the Central Intelligence Agency by Frank Fiorini, a onetime triple agent who later became known to the American public as Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis.

Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other former espionage agents, Caribbean conspirators, and Cuban freedom fighters were interviewed for this series on CIA operations in the Caribbean and the Americas. Some of their clandestine activities are told here for the first time, and some are being investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Vice President Rockefeller's Commission on CIA Activities.

According to sources, the CIA was, to one degree or another, involved in:

- Efforts to assassinate foreign heads of state, including Castro of Cuba, Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.
- Smashing a Castroite attempt to invade Panama and sabotage the Panama Canal.
- The explosion of a munitions ship in Havana harbor.
- A fantastic scheme to seize a Soviet ship and use it to obtain the release of the captured American spy ship Pueblo.
- Secret deals with American mobsters who had lost their multimillion-dollar Cuban gambling casinos.
- Armed raids on Cuba and many shipments of guerrilla fighters, weapons, explosives and other war materials to the island before and after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Marie Lorenz played a small but important role in the labyrinth of Caribbean conspiracies.

Her Cuban adventures began on a balmy evening in February 1959, when a launch flying the Cuban revolutionary flag pulled alongside the gleaming white luxury liner Berlin, anchored in Havana harbor on the next-to-last stop of a Caribbean cruise.

In the launch were 20 or so heavily armed Cubans, all wearing beards and rumpled olive-green fatigues. The liner's accommodation ladder was

(Continued on page [illegible])

Box 441

[illegible]ican Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

(Continued from page 2)

lowered and the barbudos (bearded ones) swarmed aboard like pirates, grenades dangling from their belts and machine guns swinging from their shoulders.

Women in evening gowns screamed and ran for cover with their dinner-jacketed husbands believing the ship was being raided by bandits. But other American tourists recognized the leader of the sinister-looking band as Fidel Castro, the new prime minister of Cuba, and they crowded around him for autographs.

"I'm a friend," he shouted, obviously enjoying the commotion he had caused. "I like Americans."

The Berlin's skipper, former German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, invited the barbudos to stay for cocktails and dinner, and he introduced Castro to his vivacious 18-year-old daughter, Marie.

"My father spoke Spanish and he got along well with Castro," Marie told this reporter. "He took Castro and his men on a tour of the ship, then asked them to please leave their guns outside the dining room before they sat down for dinner.

"Castro said they didn't feel safe without guns, so my father allowed them to keep their pistols, but he made them leave the machine guns, automatic rifles and grenades in the smoking room."

Castro sat at the captain's table, between Lorenz and Marie. During the meal, he smiled frequently at Marie, and she was as impressed as any normal teenage girl would be by compliments from the flamboyant hero of the Cuban revolution.

She spoke German and English, which she had learned from her American mother. Castro said he needed a secretary who could write letters in these languages. Before the meal was over, he offered the job to Marie.

Took Offer As Joke

"He asked me to stay in Havana and work for him," she said. "My father and I both laughed. My father said I was going back to Germany to finish my education."

Castro promised to write to her, so she gave him two addresses—her parents' home in Bremen, Germany, and her brother's apartment in New York, where she planned to stay when the Caribbean cruise ended. She never expected to see or hear from Fidel again.

About two weeks later, two Cuban officers called on Marie in New York. They carried a message from Castro, saying he was in desperate need of an English-German translator. He had sent a Cubana Airlines plane to bring her back to Havana.

"I made a big mistake," Marie said. "I got on that plane."

During the flight to Havana, she tried to imagine her life in Castroland. She thought she would have a desk in the premier's secretarial pool and a small apartment of her own. She may even have dreamed of a romance with the tall, charismatic dictator. But her airborne illusions were shattered soon after the plane landed.

"I was very idealistic then," she said. "I was going on an adventure and to my first job. I was going to help the new government. Instead, I became Castro's plaything.

"I was driven from the airport to the Havana Hilton, where Fidel had taken over the 24th floor. For the next four months, I hardly ever got out of the Hilton. When I did get out, I was under guard. If I wanted to go down to the pool or coffee shop, two barbudos would go with me."

'I Was His Prisoner'

Asked to define her relationship with Castro during this period, Marie said: "I was his prisoner. I was trapped."

"Were you ever in love with Fidel?"

"No; never. How can you be in love when you're afraid, when you're treated like a piece of furniture, when you're sleeping with a live bazooka under the bed, when you're living in a room with guns on every table and cigar butts all over the floor?"

"My way of thinking was German," she continued. "Everything in my life had been very orderly, very neat and clean. I never realized anyone, especially a prime minister, could be so disorganized. I thought he would have several offices, with desks, chairs and telephones. All he had, at this point, was a suite of rooms at the Hilton, where he lived and worked. I was kept in one of the rooms. The door to the hall was locked from the outside. Barbudos and visitors were in the next room, but the door between the rooms was kept locked.

"All I could do was read books, study Spanish, walk back and forth, listen to the radio or go on the balcony and look out over Havana. I was miserable. My father tried to find out what had happened to me. He contacted the American Embassy in Havana (Marie was born an American citizen) but nothing happened.

"The only clothes I had were what I brought with me from New York. I couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel had me measured for a uniform so I would look like a member of the 26th of July Movement. An olive-green uniform with a lieutenant's star.

"That way, when I was allowed out under guard, he thought people would think I was of his officers. But almost every Havana housewife heard rumors that Castro was keeping a foreigner, an American girl, at the Hilton. I was becoming a problem to him.

"One day two barbudos came to the room while Fidel was out. They said they were there to help me. They took me on a 20-minute plane ride to the Isle of Pines. They showed me the beautiful black sand beach there and then drove me by jeep to this huge prison complex. They showed me a cell where dictator Fulgencio Batista had imprisoned Fidel and Raul (Fidel's brother) years before. I went into the cell to look at a bronze plaque on the wall. They shut the door and locked me in the cell. Then they went away.



A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her father brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro together. It began a liaison destined to have international repercussions.

She Wasn't Pampered

"I spent a week there, eating the same food as the other prisoners—blacks beans, rice, stale bread and coffee. As far as I know, I was the only woman there.

"Every morning we would hear the firing squads. As soon as it got light, the birds would start singing. Then the guns would go off. Then marching and quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks. The guards would check to see if you'd hanged yourself during the night or if you'd done something wrong in there where there was hardly room to turn around. It was horrible.

"After seven days, I was taken out and flown back to Havana."

Marie was never told why she was jailed. She now believes Castro had her locked up to make sure she didn't escape while he was out of the country visiting the United States and South America.

One night she was with Castro and his bodyguards in the lobby of the Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wavy-haired man approached her. He wore the olive-green rebel uniform and the insignia of a captain in the Cuban air force.

While Castro was conferring with his aides on the other side of the lobby, the captain mingled with the barbudos around Marie and whispered to her in English: "I know about you."

"Can you help me?" she responded. "Can you get me out of here?"

"Yes. I'm with the American Embassy. I'll get you out."

This was her introduction to Commandante Frank Fiorini (later known as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant and hired agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Agrees to Spy on Fidel

For the next few weeks Frank kept in contact with her in person and through Castro officers who were working for him. Marie agreed to spy on Castro. She filched secret documents and reported Castro's conversations with important visitors overheard through the hotel walls. By now, she could read and speak Spanish fairly well.

"The suite was full of guns and papers," she said. "Fidel had papers strewn all over the tables, the floor, the bed, the dresser. He had one filing cabinet that was never locked. It was full of money, papers, documents, maps. I took papers out and slipped them to Frank. Fidel never missed them.

"Frank said, 'Get all the data you can,' and I did. I was a regular Mata Hari."

Then Marie became sick, and Frank arranged her escape. Two Cuban officers took her out of the hotel while Castro was away and put her on a Cubana Airlines flight to New York.

About that time, Frank also set up the escapes of two top Cuban air force officers, a project that forced him to leave Cuba. He moved his base of operations to Miami, but he kept in touch with his agents on the island and his CIA contacts in Havana and Washington.

When she recovered from her illness, Marie joined him in Florida and volunteered for a mission that meant certain death if she were caught.

Early in 1960, Castro went to



Sturgis says Sal Garcia
Source of Tarabocci
memo



Discovery of missile sites in Cuba provoked a cold-war showdown between then President John F. Kennedy and then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a confrontation that had the world holding its breath.

CIA Sent Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

By PAUL MESKIL

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The Central Intelligence Agency sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in 1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.

Details of this case were uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligence Committee investigator who learned that a mystery woman had been involved in an assassination plot against the Cuban dictator.

It was the first of several CIA-sponsored attempts to execute Castro.

The mystery woman has now been identified by the committee and The News as Marie Lorenz, an attractive German-American brunette who shared Castro's Havana hotel suite for several months in 1959. When a committee investigator confronted her with evidence linking her to the assassination plot, she admitted that she had been recruited for the attempted hit.

Exclusive Account

Then, last week, she gave this reporter an exclusive account of a mission so secret that she never mentioned it to anyone for 16 years.

Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in New York, is the daughter of the late German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz and his American wife. After World War II, Lorenz became skipper of the luxury liner Berlin. He took Marie along on a Caribbean cruise in February 1959, a month after Castro took over the Cuban government.

Castro boarded the Berlin in Havana harbor and dined with the captain and his vivacious teenage daughter. He later persuaded Marie to return to Havana to work as his personal interpreter. When she arrived she was installed in Castro's 24th-floor suite at the Havana Hilton. She soon realized she was a virtual prisoner.

Quizzed by FBI

Frank Fiorini, an American who had become a Cuban Revolutionary Army officer and a CIA agent, contacted her and persuaded her to photograph Castro's secret papers. He later helped her escape.

She left Havana in January

The Memo That Started It

On Dec. 11, 1959, Col. J. C. King, head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to CIA Director Allen Dulles, according to a Senate committee report. Noting that the "far left" regime in Cuba might encourage other Latin American countries to take action against U.S. interests he recommended that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion, Che Guevara, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the present government."

Dulles and Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell approved the recommendation and the CIA launched an assassination campaign against Castro that lasted at least five years. This is the exclusive story of the first try.

CIA Sent a Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

(Continued from page 3)

[illegible] York and entered [illegible] Hospital for treatment of a serious illness. [illegible] FBI agents questioned her about conditions in Cuba. She later took part in various CIA-backed operations with [illegible] and Alex Rorke, a soldier-adventurer who worked for both the CIA and the FBI.

On one of these missions she returned to Havana and stole secret papers and documents from Castro's suite while he was away. About two months later, Rorke told her he had an important assignment that would enable her to do a tremendous service for this country."

He took her to the FBI offices at 201 E. 69th St. for a conference with the two agents who had questioned her previously, and a CIA official.

"I was asked about my attitude toward Castro," she said, "and whether I was willing to work since I could get in and out (of Castro's suite). I said, 'What kind of work?'"

Thought It Was a Joke

"Alex said, 'You could knock him off.' It would save everybody a lot of trouble.' I thought he was kidding, but they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious.

"Alex said, 'Why don't you kill him?' I said, 'I don't know how, with all those men around him, and I don't know if it's in me to kill him.'

"Once, out of jealousy, I pointed a gun at him and Fidel didn't even blink. He said, 'You can't kill me.' I said, 'I'm not planning to. I'm just cleaning the gun.'"

Ms. Lorenz said there were several more meetings at which various ways of killing Castro were discussed.

"Finally they decided on poison. They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink. I said, 'What are you trying to tell me? To go down and kill him?'

"Alex said, 'It would change history.' I said, "Well, I don't want to die."

"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Fiorini gave her two capsules full of poison powder. She was told to sprinkle the powder in Castro's coffee.

"I guess the company (CIA) supplied them. Frank said it was a company operation."

Packing the olive-drab uniform that Castro had given her, designating her a lieutenant in the Revolutionary Army, Ms. Lorenz flew back to Havana on Cubana Airlines. Believing she might be searched at the airport, she hid the capsules in a jar of cold cream in her purse. When she arrived in Havana she checked into a tourist hotel, changed into her Fidelista uniform and went to the Hilton.

Cold-Cream Caper

"The lobby was full of reporters and other people trying to see Castro, but he wasn't there. One of his aides recognized me and took me up to Fidel's suite.

Entering the two-room suite, she saw that nothing had changed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

She waited nervously in Castro's private room until he came in a few hours later. As soon as he smiled and hugged her, she knew he didn't suspect she had visited the suite a few months previously and stolen his secrets. And he certainly didn't suspect she had come back to kill him.

Do Not Disturb

"He asked why I left him and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home. He started talking about Cuba and the problems, the lack of money, the shortages. He talked a long time. He said he was expecting an important phone call, but he took the receiver off the hook and he shouted to the barbudos (bearded ones) in the next room: 'No me moleste (Don't bother me)'

"Finally he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed, in his fatigues and with a cigar in his mouth. I had no confidence left, but I knew this was the chance to do it.

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

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A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Rorke for a meeting with Fiorini, who "said he had a way to do it."

She said she spent three weeks in a CIA "safe house" in Miami, seeing no one but Fiorini and Rorke. "They kept talking me into it. They said, 'You can do it. You're the only one who can do it.'"

Asked if she now believes she was brainwashed, she replied: "I guess so." She said they appealed to her patriotism and told her she "would get thousands, enough to retire," if she succeeded.

When she finally agreed to accept the assignment, she said, ed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

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"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

"It was like an omen.

"I couldn't just dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and I watched him sleeping. Finally I lay down on the bed beside him.

"I thought, 'To hell with it. Let history take its course.'

"Stupid, Stupid"

Frank and Alex met me when I flew to Miami next morning. They asked me what happened and I said the capsules melted. Frank was very upset. He said, 'Stupid, stupid, stupid. Why did you put them in the cold cream?' I said, 'Where else? It was the only place to think of where no one would find them.'"

Ms. Lorenz was not asked to try again.

"Would you have killed him if the capsules hadn't melted" the interviewer asked. "No," she replied. "Probably not."

Alex Rorke later disappeared on a mystery flight to Nicaragua. Frank Fiorini, now known as Frank Sturgis, continued to perform odd jobs for the CIA until his arrest in 1972 as one of the Watergate burglars.

Informed of Ms. Lorenz' account of the assassination attempt, he verified her story.

Soon after her murder mission failed, the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters — including John Roselli of Las Vegas, Sam Giancana of Chicago and Santo Trafficante of Tampa, Fla. — to kill Castro. But they were no more successful than the sexy Mata Hari.

Aria Floors Opera Singer

London, June 12 (UPI) — Don Giovanni reached for a high note at the Royal Opera House in London last night and fell through the floor.

He stuck there, in the person of singer Ruggero Raimondi, trapped to his waist and singing for dear life. Sir Geraint Evans and his other co-performers, still singing, tugged and pulled. Eventually Raimondi climbed out, unhurt but shaken with his word bent into a curve.

"They were magnificent," said critic Hilton Tims, who was in the audience. "They carried on without letting the incident upset their vocal equilibrium."

[illegible] EDITION

[illegible] WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER

SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

2

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

"Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

Related Story Page A5

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsyl[illegible]

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CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Lovien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.



Marie Lorenz says she was told that maps she took from Castro's headquarters were factor in locating and photographing missile sites (above). Under pressure from U.S., Khrushchev ordered missiles removed and shipped back to Soviet Union (right).

Cienaga de Zapata, a vast swamp that he intended to convert to rice fields. As soon as he left Havana with his usual entourage, Marie received orders to return to the Cuban capital immediately. She boarded a regular Cubana Airlines flight, posing as an American tourist and carrying her Castro uniform and a loaded revolver in her overnight bag.

She arrived in Havana a few hours after Castro left town. Americans were still welcome there in those days, and Cuban customs officers seldom searched tourists' luggage.

"There was no trouble at the airport," Marie said. "I checked into a sleazy little hotel in downtown Havana, changed into my lieutenant's uniform and went direct to the Havana Hilton. By this time, Castro had a home on the outskirts of Havana, Casa Cojimar, but it was more convenient for him to keep his papers at the Hilton.

"He had Suite 2408 and the adjoining suites. I had the key to 2408. Nobody recognized me when I came into the hotel. I had changed my hair style and made my complexion darker than it is naturally. And I wore dark glasses. They (Castro's people) all wore dark glasses, even at night.

"A lot of people were loitering in the lobby, *barbudos* and everything. I just walked right through. Passing the desk was the main thing that bothered me because the desk clerks knew me. I had a snub-nosed .38 caliber Detective Special clipped to the inside of my waistband. Nobody seemed to notice me. I walked to the elevators and went up to the 24th floor.

Saw Her Opportunity

"Nobody was around. When Fidel left, they all left with him: his bodyguards, his advisers, whatever. When I had lived there, I was either all alone and everything was dead quiet, or else Fidel was there and there was a lot of noise and cigar smoke.

"I unlocked the door to Suite 2408, went inside and double-locked the door behind me. I felt pretty confident because I knew Fidel was at Cienaga de Zapata. When he left the suite, no one was to go in. Those were the orders.

"As usual, the suite was littered with papers and the filing cabinet was open. I couldn't grab everything. I took as much as I could and stuffed papers and maps into my uniform pockets and th[illegible] ten, went back to the other hotel, changed into a dress and caught the next flight to Miami.

"Frank met me at the airport and I gave him all the papers. I never knew exactly what information they contained. I was told the stuff was good, it was fantastic, 'the United States government is very happy.' "

Among the papers were topographical maps of Cuba on which several sections of undeveloped land, miles away from any population center, had been marked with hand-drawn circles. The maps also had handwritten notations that Marie couldn't read because "they were in a foreign language— Czech, I think."

Her Find Was Valuable

Three years later, another intelligence agent told her the maps were "the original groundwork plans" for Soviet missile sites. The circled areas were the spots where Soviet missile bases were built in 1962, setting off the historic showdown between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

From information supplied by agents inside Cuba and Cuban refugees, and from aerial photos snapped from U-2 spy planes, the CIA was able to pinpoint all the missile bases on the island. But Marie believes her solo mission to Castro's lair gave the CIA its first inkling of what the Russians were plotting. She also believes Castro suspected she was the burglar who swiped his secrets. (The CIA has declined to comment on Marie's involvement.)

In March 1960, soon after she had completed this dangerous assignment, Marie received a mysterious telegram from Havana. Delivered to her brother's apartment at 311 W. 84th St., it said, "CALL 28607 (Castro's private number) LATE AT NIGHT. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT."

It was signed "Yanez," meaning Capt. Jesus Yanez Pelletier, one of Castro's closest aides. Marie's first impulse was to ignore the message, but curiosity overcame common sense. Without mentioning the telegram to her brother, she left the apartment around midnight to place a collect call to Havana from a phone booth on the corner.

As she stepped into the small vestibule between the outer and inner front doors to the apartment house, two men grabbed her. One of them was Yanez.

"[illegible] had guns," Marie recalled. "They were going to take me back to Cuba. Yanez said a plane was waiting at Idlewild Airport. They hit me in the face and tried to drag me out to a car.

"A person who lived in the building opened the door and saw me screaming and fighting. This person ran down toward Riverside Drive. The interruption distracted the Cubans enough so that I broke loose and ran. I heard one of them yell, 'Shoot! Shoot!' but they didn't. I ran up to Broadway and found a cop there.

"The Cubans took off. My face was all bloody. Thank God for that cop. He took me to the [illegible] and I told the detectives an [illegible] story of intrigue and fear. I told them who Yanez was and I gave them the name of a West Side hotel where Castro people stayed when they were in New York. The detectives went there and found Yanez, but they couldn't arrest him because he had diplomatic immunity. He had a diplomatic passport saying he was with the prime minister's office. They told him to get on his plane and go back to Cuba."

When Yanez returned to Havana without Marie, Castro did what the New York cops couldn't do. Fidel sent him to prison.

Discussed Killing Castro

Asked if she and other members of Frank's spy ring had ever discussed killing Castro, Marie replied: "Sure. We all did. We were going to bomb him during one of his speeches. We were going to fly over and drop it right on top of him.

"We had the bomb, the plane. I was going to go along. Hit and run. We were all set, but it was called off. Somebody stopped it. That's all I know."

Marie said two American agents went to Cuba to assassinate Castro shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"I met them at a little white house we rented in the Cuban colony in Miami. I think it was on Flagler St. We would never stay in one place too long. We'd rent a house and move on. Anyway, it was at one of our meetings that they talked real heavy about going in and killing him.

"The two Americans went in, but they didn't get out. They grew beards, dressed like Castro soldiers. I heard they came very, very close to killing

Marie said she made three boat trips to Cuba, delivering guns and supplies to anti-Castro guerrillas. She worked with Frank and Alex Rorke, both of whom were contract employes of the CIA, meaning they were not listed on any federal payroll.

"There's really no contract," she explained. "Nothing is put down on paper. You just say you're doing this for the good of your country. I didn't handle the money end of it. We were given what we needed."

'Eduardo' Supplied Cash

When cash was needed, it came from a CIA man she knew only as Eduardo. He would meet Frank and Alex from time to time at a "safe house" in Miami.

"Eduardo was financing our thing," Marie said. "When we went to pick up the money, I waited in the car. I saw him when he opened the door of this little white house we used."

Years later, while reading about the Watergate break-in, Marie saw a newspaper photo of former CIA man E. Howard Hunt and immediately recognized him as the elusive "Eduardo." She also recognized a picture of Sturgis, whom she had known as Frank Fiorini.

Sturgis was one of the five burglars caught in Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Four of the five—Sturgis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Rolando Martinez and James W. McCord, then security chief for the Nixon reelection campaign committee—were former CIA employes.

Sturgis, Barker and Martinez had been active in preparations for the Bay of Pigs landing. So was Hunt, the fiction-writing mastermind of the Watergate burglary. And he referred to Sturgis, Barker and Martinez in court testimony as "some of my old CIA contacts."

Sturgis returned to Washington this month, nearly three years after his arrest there, to testify at secret staff sessions of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities. He won't discuss his testimony, but other sources said he was asked about CIA operations ranging from domestic spying to political murders.

(Tomorrow: Frank Fiorini Sturgis,

How an Invasion of the Canal Zone Was Foiled

By PAUL MESKIL

Third of a series

The Central Intelligence Agency once investigated Fidel Castro, ballerina Margot Fonteyn and actors John Wayne and Errol Flynn in connection with a bizarre invasion of Panama.

The colorful cast of this comic-opera conspiracy included three American adventurers, two of whom were working for the CIA. William Morgan and Alex Rorke, both former U.S. Army paratroopers, were on opposite sides of the Panama plot. And Frank Sturgis, a former Marine Raider, was in the middle.

Sturgis, born Frank Fiorini, was a gun runner and troop-trainer for Castro. Then he became security and intelligence chief of the Cuban Air Force, meanwhile serving as a secret agent of the CIA.

Morgan was a freelance conspirator, more interested in money than politics. A native of Toledo, Ohio, he went to Cuba in 1958 and became second in command of an independent rebel army in the Escambray Mountains. This non-Communist force helped Castro's guerrillas overthrow the Batista dictatorship and Castro made Morgan a major, highest rank in the revolutionary army.

The upset victory over Batista, and the spoils that went with it, encouraged Morgan to consider extending the revolution to other Latin lands. A few weeks after the Castro takeover in Havana, Morgan called at Capt. Frank Fiorini's office in Cuban Air Force headquarters.

Refused second spot

"Major Morgan spoke to me confidentially," Sturgis told The News. "He said he was preparing an invasion of Panama and the Canal Zone. He wanted me to be second-in-command of the expedition. I told him I was interested, but not in a leadership position.

"I said, 'Bill, you've got to be crazy.' The American government's got a military force there. You're willing to go against your own country?' He said, 'Well, the U.S. never did anything for me.'"

The American military strength in the Canal Zone at that time in 1959 totaled about 1,000 men, compared to 65,000 in World War II. Morgan figured a surprise attack by a few hundred Cubans, assisted by Panamanian leftists staging riots and other disorders, would be sufficient to capture or at least sabotage the vital canal.

"The conspirators planned to overthrow the Panamanian government and grab the Canal for propaganda and extortion reasons," Sturgis said.

"They were going to send a ship, loaded with explosives, through the canal locks. They were going to blow up and sink the ship somewhere near the locks, so that the gates and locks would be damaged and ship traffic would be stopped in both directions.

"Morgan figured it would tie up the canal for at least two months. He was all set to go. He had the men, guns, ships, planes, everything.

Showed planes, named names

"I contacted the American Embassy in Havana and notified the (CIA) agent in charge. I took Col. Nichols (Erickson Nichols, air attache at the embassy) to the air base and showed him the camouflaged planes that were to be used for the invasion, and I named all the people who were involved in the conspiracy."

Those names reportedly included Margot Fonteyn, superstar of London's Royal Ballet and dame commander of the Order of the British Empire (the equivalent of knighthood), and her rich, aristocratic husband, Roberto Arias, former Panamanian ambassador to Britain and son of a former president of Panama.

Dame Margot and her husband were in Cuba at the time. So was Ruben Miro, head of the Panamanian revolutionary movement. They allegedly conferred with Morgan at Cienfuegos, where he was military commander.

According to intelligence reports, the invasion was to take place while Castro was visiting the United States and Canada. A spearhead force of Cubans and Panamanians would land on the Caribbean coast of Panama. A second force of Panamanians would strike inland from the Pacific coast. Then the main invasion army would sail in from Cuba.

Police and National Guard posts were to be attacked. Rebel bands were to come [illegible]



In Panama, part of the invasion team is quickly seized.

Photo by Rogelio Caparros

march on the Canal Zone and riot in Panama City to keep Panamanian police and U.S. troops occupied.

But Frank's reports to the CIA provided sufficient advance warning.

Castro left Cuba on April 14. Then Arias and his wife flew to Panama and rented the 42-foot motor launch Nola for $75 a day, saying they were going fishing. Five tough looking men accompanied them.

Cache of arms

They reportedly sailed directly to a spot where a cache of arms — semi-automatic rifles, revolvers, machine guns, grenades and ammunition in waterproof containers — had been dropped in the Pacific Ocean, 15 miles outside the Panama Canal entrance. The shrimp boat Elaine had been standing by for the arms drop. It retrieved the weapons from the water and later transferred them to the Nola.

The "fishermen" aboard the Nola came ashore on the Pacific coast, near Santa Clara, and buried the guns and ammo on the beach. Dame Margot and her husband then resumed their cruise.

On April 18, after receiving a CIA report that an invasion ship had sailed from the Cuban port of Batabano (part of Morgan's military district in Las Villas Province), the Panamanian government ordered Arias' arrest. He heard the news on the Nola's radio, returned to the Santa Clara area and went into hiding on his family's ranch.

Before dawn next day, the Nola slipped into the Panama Canal with only the skipper and Dame Margot aboard. She went to the home of her sister-in-law, Senora Chela Arias. A few hours later, she was arrested. After 24 hours in jail, the prima ballerina was booted back to Britain. Meanwhile, Arias had taken refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Panama City. He was later allowed to leave the country.

National guardsmen found the arms buried in the beach at Santa Clara. A second arms cache was discovered near a cottage owned by an American friend of the Arias family.

Late Friday night, April 24, a Cuban ship landed at Puerto Coronado on the Caribbean coast of Panama about 60 miles northeast of the capital. In it were 85 armed men, Cubans and Panamanians, and a woman nurse.

Spearhead blunted

Three of the men drowned in the surf as they tried to beach the boat. The rest were quickly captured by Panama's National Guard. Three more Cuban ships had left the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos and Batabano with the main invasion force of about 400 men, mostly Cubans who had fought under Morgan. When Raul Castro learned that the spearhead had failed to penetrate Panama he called off the invasion and ordered the three follow-up ships back to Cuba.

Meanwhile, Panamanian officers discovered a blue canvas bag left behind by Dame Margot. Among the interesting items in it were a notebook containing a list of arms to be used in the two-pronged invasion, maps of Panama, a tide table and several letters which Panamanian authorities said proved Margot's involvement in the plot.

There was also a letter from film star John Wayne signed "Duke." It noted that Arias had received $5[illegible],000 from Wayne's account between Nov. 19, 1957, and April 5, 1959.

Questioned by American agents, Wayne explained that he and Arias were partners in a hemp exporting [illegible] "I don't deal in politics," he [illegible] he knew nothing about the Panama plot.

Errol Flynn also was asked about his friendship with Arias. They had been seen together in Cuba, where Flynn was making a movie based on the Castro revolution. The screen swashbuckler said Arias wanted to hire Flynn's yacht, the ocean-going Zaca, for a trip to Panama. Suspecting what he had in mind, Flynn refused.

Some CIA agents believe Morgan would not have attempted the Panama invasion without Castro's consent. But Fidel insisted: "I had nothing to do with it."

When the spearhead force splashed ashore on a San Blas Indian reservation, the CIA had a man at the scene. He was Alexander Rorke Jr., a freelance journalist, photographer and intelligence agent.

Double doublecross

Son of a New York judge, Alex served as a paratrooper and intelligence specialist in World War II. In 1952, he married actress Jacqueline Billingsley, daughter of Stork Club owner Sherman Billingsley.

Frank Nelson, an American businessman in Cuba, was involved with Sturgis, Morgan and Rorke in various plots, including a double doublecross. Nelson, who now lives in New York and has just finished writing a book entitled "For a Million Dollars," told The News:

"I started the counter-revolution against Castro in 1959 because he arrested a close friend of mine. I went to see Frank Sturgis in Havana and asked if there was anything he could do to get my friend out of jail. He sent me to Morgan who was very close to Castro, but Morgan wasn't interested in anything but money.

"I found out that Castro was going to invade the Dominican Republic, so I went there and told Trujillo (Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo) about the invasion plans. I said he should beat Castro to the punch and invade Cuba, with Morgan's help.

"I told Trujillo, 'I think you can buy Morgan for a million dollars. Let him take his army back to the mountains and establish a base. Then you come in with your army and in a few days Castro is finished.'"

Trujillo approved the million dollar deal and put up the cash to get it started. Nelson said he paid Morgan $400,000 down, plus $100,000 "for expenses." The remaining $500,000 was to be paid when the invasion of Cuba began.

Sturgis soon learned the details of this new plot and informed the CIA. When the agency pulled Sturgis out of Cuba in the summer of 1959, it sent Rorke in to find out what was happening.

Decoyed by Raul's wife

Nelson arranged a meeting between Rorke and Morgan. Soon after Rorke arrived in Havana, he phoned Morgan's home. A woman answered, identified herself as "Mrs. Morgan" and told Rorke to come on over. When he got there, he was arrested. The woman who answered the phone was Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife.

By this time, Morgan had told Fidel about the invasion plot. Without mentioning the million dollars, he said he had pretended to go along with Trujillo in order to set a trap.

In mid August, Morgan sent an urgent radio message to the chief of Dominican military intelligence. He said he had seized Trinidad, on the south coast of Cuba, as an invasion beachhead. When a planeload of Dominican soldiers

SECRETS OF THE CIA

it was surrounded by 1,000 Cuban troops led by Fidel Castro himself.

The Dominicans were paraded before TV cameras on their way to jail. Castro denounced Trujillo and praised Morgan as a hero. Less than two years later, Morgan was executed by a Castro firing squad for a much less profitable plot.

What became of the $500,000 is not known. Neither Morgan's Cuban wife nor his American family ever saw a cent of it. Nor did Castro.

As soon as the Trujillo invasion collapsed, Alex Rorke was released from jail and deported from Cuba. But he returned many times by air and sea. For these clandestine trips, he used a twin engine Beechcraft plane, a B-25 bomber and a 36-foot speedboat, the Violynn III. Sturgis accompanied him on many mysterious missions.

Assassins failed

On one occasion, Rorke reportedly landed an execution squad that tried but failed to kill Castro. Early in 1963, the Violynn III was detained in the Bahamas when it stopped to refuel on a run between the U.S. and Cuba. British intelligence agents questioned Rorke and the 17 Cuban raiders who were with him. Rorke told them the CIA had financed many trips of the Violynn III and "the United States government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had advance knowledge of these trips."

Former CIA agents told The News this statement was true.

On April 25, 1963, Rorke and three other CIA contract agents flew over Havana in the Beechcraft and tried to bomb two oil refineries. The bombs missed their targets and caused little damage.

Five months later, Rorke went on his last mission. The 36-year-old adventurer and his partner, Geoffrey Sullivan, 28, of Waterbury, Conn., took off from Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., in a rented twin engine Beechcraft on Sept. 24, 1963. Two Cubans accompanied them.

Rorke and Sullivan filed a flight plan indicating they were bound for Nicaragua, where they planned to start an air freight service. They made two fuel stops — at Cozumel Island off Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula and at Belize, British Honduras. When they left Belize, the plane disappeared.

That night, Sturgis received a report that the plane was overdue in Nicaragua. Frank immediately called the commander of naval intelligence in Miami. An air-sea search was launched by the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force. A private search party was organized later by Rorke's Miami lawyer and personal friend, Ellis Rubin. But no trace of the missing Americans or their plane was ever found.

Forced onto boat

Some investigators believe the plane was sabotaged by Castro agents. Frank Nelson has another theory.

"When they stopped to refuel at Stanley Field near Belize, Alex spoke to an American commercial pilot, Floyd Park of Nocona, Texas. Alex said they were headed for Tegucigalpa (capital of the Republic of Honduras). They took off in the direction of Tegucigalpa, but they never got there.

"Several months later, Park received information from a couple of Hondurans that two Americans answering the description of Rorke and Sullivan were forced to board a Cuban fishing boat that had pulled into shore in Honduras two weeks earlier with engine trouble. The fishing boat left immediately after the two Americans were put on board."

If these men were indeed Rorke and Sullivan, they never reached Cuba. Investigators are certain of that. The two Cubans who left Florida with Rorke and Sullivan were still with them when they made the two fuel stops. According to reports received by both Nelson and Sturgis, one of those men was [illegible] Molina, a Cuban officer who supposedly turned against Castro and fled to the United States.

"Molina was seen in Havana a few months after he disappeared with Rorke and Sullivan in Central America," Nelson said. He believes Molina may have forced the Americans to land somewhere in Honduras, where they were delivered to Castro agents who kidnaped and killed them.

Our Havana Triple Spy Helped & Hurt Castro

By PAUL MESKIL

Second of a series

SECRETS OF THE CIA

"I was a spy," Frank Sturgis admits.

"I was involved in assassination plots and conspiracies to overthrow several foreign governments, including Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

"I smuggled arms and men into Cuba — for Castro and against Castro. I broke into the intelligence files of the Cuban Army and Air Force. I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents.

"That's what spies do.

"I also broke into foreign consulates and business offices in Cuba, for the purpose of obtaining information, and into a import-export office in Caracas, Venezuela, that was a front for the KGB (Soviet Secret Service)."

Sturgis was a hired operative of the Central Intelligence Agency for at least a decade. Maybe he still is, though his cover was blown forever by the notoriety he received as a Watergate burglar. He constructed and controlled an espionage network in Cuba that is still functioning despite frantic efforts by Castro security forces and the KGB to destroy it.

Though [illegible] bit [illegible] in the Watergate drama, Sturgis is a real-life James Bond whose exploits rival those of any fictional spy. Interviewed at the office of his Miami lawyer, Ellis Rubin, and at other places in New York and Florida, he candidly revealed many details of his colorful career as a war hero, secrets-stealer, gun-runner, guerrilla fighter and professional plotter.

Changed the subject

Asked if he had also been an assassin, he politely changed the subject. Some things he will not talk about.

A stocky, iron-jawed man who looks much younger than his 50 years, he was born Frank Angelo Fiorini in Norfolk, Va. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at the start of World War II and fought through the Pacific with the famed First Raider Battalion. After the war, he served in the Air Force, Army and Navy Reserve.

He had the perfect training for a secret agent. The Marine Corps taught him judo, knife-fighting and jungle warfare techniques. The Air Force taught him to fly a plane and the Navy Reserve trained him to handle small, fast ships.

The Army completed this education. During a hitch in Germany, he [illegible] signed to a security unit that handled top-secret reports from Allied intelligence agents all over Europe. This was his introduction to the dark world of espionage and intrigue.

In Berlin during the chilliest part of the cold war, he met his first real spy. She was a beautiful actress who also was an agent of Haganah, the secret army formed to defend the new state of Israel.

When he returned to civilian life, Frank became a Haganah courier — perhaps the only Roman Catholic in this group. In the 1950s, he went to Miami to visit an uncle who had married a Cuban exile. Her family was close to Carlos Prio, the Cuban president who was ousted in 1952 by a military coup led by Fulgencio Batista. Frank met Prio and other wealthy Cubans whose Miami mansions were hotbeds of anti-Batista intrigue. Some of them supplied financial support for a fiery young rebel, Fidel Castro, who was then living in Mexico.

In 1957, Prio asked Frank to "go to Cuba, join Castro's army and let me know what he's doing." Frank accepted

(Continued on page 14)



OUR TRIPLE-AGENT IN HAVANA



Frank Sturgis in Cuba: "I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents."

(Continued from page 3)

A bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis was a real-life James Bond when he did his big jobs for the CIA

the assignment. He flew to Havana and with the help of a Cuban priest, he quickly located Castro's camp in the Sierra Maestra Mountains and volunteered his services.

"Fidel remembered me," he said. "We could understand each other. I spoke Italian, which is similar to Spanish, and he spoke some English. I offered to help train his troops, but he said, 'Frank, what I need is guns.'"

So Frank became a gun runner. With money supplied by the Castro underground in Florida, he purchased thousand of rifles and other weapons from International Armament Corp. (Interarmco) of Alexandria, Va., the world's largest dealer in surplus arms. He then set up an elaborate land-sea-air smuggling network to get the guns and ammunition into Cuba.

He Became Triple Agent

After several months as a double agent, working for Prio and Castro, Frank became a triple agent. This time, he was recruited for the game of intelligence by a major league scout, Park F. Woolam, the State Department official then in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Santiago de Cuba.

"We met at the Casa Grande Hotel in Santiago," Frank recalls. "Woolam knew who I was and what I was doing. He approached me or someone introduced us. We had several other meetings and he discussed my patriotism and so forth. I agreed to work with him.

"Later, when the revolution was over, I received orders to go to Havana. Woolam told me who to contact in the American Embassy there." His new contacts, Frank said, were CIA agents, one of whom was the embassy's military attache.

Castro immediately placed his most trusted officers in command of the Cuban military services. Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, a close friend of Frank's, became commander in chief of the Air Force and his brother, Marcos Diaz Lanz, became inspector general of that service.

Frank helped the Diaz Lanz brothers reorganize the Air Force and they made him their security and intelligence chief. He also became the officer in charge of inspecting and supervising all Cuban gambling casinos, which were owned and operated by American mobsters.

Frank said his CIA advisers "asked me to recruit reliable [illegible] the [illegible] in the military, in the presidential palace, in with Fidel. I recruited everyone I could, Americans and Cubans, to be undercover agents."

Max Gorman-Gonzales, a Miami businessman who took part in cloak-and-dagger operations against both Batista and Castro, has known and worked with Sturgis for many years. He says Sturgis was a CIA employee from 1959 to 1968. The CIA asked him to participate in assassination plots in Cuba and elsewhere. Sturgis introduced top Cuban military and political leaders to American agents at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. During these visits, a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders developed.

"Two attempts against Castro's life were made in the early part of 1959. Both failed. The assassins then waited for a green light from Frank Fiorini Sturgis. A third attempt was made in 1960."

This reporter asked Sturgis when the agency first began thinking about assassinating Castro.

"The first discussion of assassination with my (CIA) contacts was in February 1959," he replied. "I was making reports on all the communist activity in the military. I suggested that this would be a good time to assassinate Fidel. I said I would organize it and follow it through.

"I would arrange an important conference at Campo Libertad (Camp Liberty, the combined army air force base and headquarters formerly known as Camp Columbia). All the top commanders would come to the base in their jeeps and cars. I was going to station gunners on the roofs, set up a cross-fire. I would have wiped out Fidel, his brother Raul and all the top (pro-communist) military commanders in 30 seconds.

"I asked my contact in the Embassy to get a green light (official approval) on this. Whether this would have to come from the top level in Washington or a lower level, I don't know."

While they waited for [illegible]

Sturgis and his CIA contacts devised two alternate plots. One was to execute Castro in the second floor conference room at Air Force headquarters. As he and the other officers would not arrive at exactly the same time, it might be more practical to wait until they were all assembled around the conference table.

"The whole idea was to kill all of them at once. Unfortunately, if some of the anti-Communist officers were in there at the same time, they would have to go too. The lives of some of the anti-Communist commanders would have to be sacrificed in order to get Castro and his crew."

The third scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. "I had access to the prime minister's office," Sturgis said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy. I planned to go to Fidel's office with a briefcase full of explosives which I would leave there. When Fidel entered the office, a signal would be given and the bomb would be set off by an electronic device across the street."

The plotters waited several months for the green light from Washington, but it never came. "They couldn't make up their minds," Frank said of the unseen, unknown decision makers. "They couldn't decide what to do."

Asked for Green Light

But, according to former intelligence agents, the CIA later approved and bankrolled other plots to wipe out Castro. American adventurers, Cuban exiles, Mafia dons and high ranking Cuban officials played prominent parts in these conspiracies.

In June, 1959, Castro fired 25 top Air Force officers suspected of disloyalty, including the Diaz Lanz brothers. Pedro Diaz Lanz then resigned from the Air Force and denounced Castro as a [illegible]

Almeida, ordered Pedro's arrest and the Diaz Lanz brothers went underground.

At this point, Frank was pulled out of Cuba. "I left Havana on June 30 and came to Miami to arrange the escapes of the Diaz Lanz brothers and their families. Pedro and his wife got out by sailboat; Marcos was picked up by a plane."

The brothers fled to Florida, told all they knew about the Castro regime and went to work for the CIA.

A few weeks after Frank's abrupt departure from Havana, he received word that Castro was sending an assassination team after him. Frank's informant supplied full descriptions of the three assassins, who were Mexican communists. The FBI posted a round-the-clock guard on Frank's Miami home and federal agents followed him wherever he went.

Tailed to Florida

Customs and Immigration officers were alerted. The Mexican gunmen were spotted when they crossed the border and were tailed to Florida, where they were arrested. Their car was confiscated and they were booted back to Mexico.

On Oct. 25, 1959, an American B-25 bomber swooped over Havana and dropped thousands of anti-Castro leaflets. Castro called this "bombing" raid a Cuban Pearl Harbor.

"Pedro Diaz Lanz was the pilot," Sturgis told the News. "I was the co-pilot. Marcos Diaz Lanz and another Cuban were with us. Cuban Air Force fighters came after us but they missed us and almost shot their own planes down. The big guns at the Navy station and the Cabana fortress opened up but the angle of the guns was such that they were firing from the heights into the city. At least 36 people were killed and wounded."

The leaflet bombardment was the first of many CIA-sponsored missions Sturgis made to Cuba by air and sea. "I made at least 125 air operations into Cuba," he said, "with the green light and without the green light (with and without official approval). And I made some 60 boat missions.

"I had four boats. They were financed by the agency. One was a converted Coast Guard cutter, 83 feet long, with twin 600 horsepower engines. It has a maximum speed of 20 knots. Another boat, the Cuso, was about the same size. I also had two 36-foot fiberglass boats with radar and other sophisticated equipment. They could carry 30 people and do 50 miles an hour.

-A Mission to Cuba: Tale of the Doomed Raiders

By PAUL MESKIL 4/24/75

Fifth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to form a guerrilla army of Cuban refugees and invade Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the CIA dispatched agent Frank Sturgis to Guatemala to confer with President Miguel Ydigoras about setting up training bases in that country.

This "secret" mission was quickly discovered and reported by the Guatemalan news media.

"I had planned to break into the Cuban Embassy while I was in Guatemala City," Sturgis told this reporter recently, "but the president suggested I leave the country because of all the publicity. The newspapers and TV reported I was a CIA agent and was trying to obtain bases for the Cuban invasion."

Over the next year, the CIA trained Cuban recruits in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and the United States. Sturgis, a marine combat veteran of World War II, trained about 50 Cubans in the Florida Everglades.

Sturgis was part of the agency's super-secret Operation 40, an infiltration and intelligence-gathering group that was to go into Cuba before the Bay of Pigs assault.

Some former CIA agents describe Operation 40 as an "assassination squad." Sturgis won't go that far.

"It was a top CIA project," he says. "Most of the men in it were Cubans who had been trained by the U.S. Army. I am not saying that Operation 40 had an assassination squad. There are reports that there was one, but I'm not saying so.

To Infiltrate

"The prime purpose was infiltration, not assassination. They (group members) were to infiltrate Cuba and contact anti-Castro military leaders, political leaders and underground people. And they could kill—if they had to, if it was really necessary."

Chief of Operation 40 was Jose Joaquin Sanjenis, a former Castro aide who defected and became a CIA agent. Two of his cousins also worked for the agency.

Early in 1961, the CIA learned that a group of Cuban military officers was plotting to overthrow Castro. The leader of this plot was Major Humberto Sori Marin, a former Havana lawyer who drafted the Castro penal code which made firing squad executions legal. Sori Marin had been adjutant general of Castro's army, presiding judge at the 1959 "war crimes" trials that sent hundreds of Batista loyalists to the firing squads, and Castro's first minister of agriculture. But by 1961 he had turned against the Castro regime.

His partners in the anti-Castro conspiracy included other Cuban army, navy and air force commanders, the chief of Castro's secret police, the deputy finance minister and the head of the Cuban Sugar Institute. They planned a military uprising during which Castro and his Communist advisers would be killed.

As soon as the CIA learned what they were up to, Operation 40 went into action. Agents slipped into Cuba, contacted the conspirators and asked them to time the military revolt to coincide with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A month before the coordinated revolt-invasion was to start, a militia patrol was sent to the Miramar section of Havana to arrest a [illegible] had been overheard complaining about food shortages. As the militia jeep pulled up to her house, she ran out the [illegible] and

(Continued on page 66)



News photo by [illegible]

Nelson: a veteran conspirator.

TALE OF THE DOOMED RAIDERS

News photo

In one CIA plot to kill Castro, the rifle failed to fire.

Super-secret Operation 40 was stymied so many times by the alert Cubans that it began to sound like Catch 22

(Continued from page 6)

fled to the nearby home of a retired engineer and his wife.

The militiamen charged after her, entered the engineer's house and burst into a room where ten leaders of the military conspiracy were seated around a table littered with Havana street maps pinpointing the locations of key installations that were to be seized.

The militiamen were outranked and outnumbered. They hesitated, not sure what to do. Then informed sources said Sori Marin pulled his pistol. A short burst from a Czech-made submachine gun wounded him in the leg and persuaded him and his co-conspirators to surrender. They were hauled off to La Cabana Fortress for questioning.

Around this time, in March 1961, a noisy party was held in a small white bungalow in Miami's Cuban section. The bungalow was a CIA "safe house" and the party was a sendoff celebration for an Operation 40 squad—five Cubans and an American—that was about to invade Cuba.

Contact underground

The squad's mission was to contact the anti-Castro underground and create a diversion on the north coast, to make Castro think a guerrilla force was landing there. The diversionary action was to begin shortly before the real invasion on the south coast.

Most of the people at the Miami party were Cuban refugees. Among the Americans there were Frank Nelson, a former Havana businessman and a veteran Caribbean conspirator, and CIA contractors Frank Sturgis and Alex Rorke.

Nelson fell into conversation with young Angus McNair, lone American member of the Cuba-bound squad. Asked why he was going on such a dangerous mission, McNair replied: "Because Castro killed an American soldier, Bill Morgan."

(Morgan, a former U.S. Army paratrooper who attained the rank of major in Castro's army, was executed by a Castro firing squad on March 11, 1961.)

"About 20 people were at the party," Nelson recalled recently. "I asked McNair 'Aren't you afraid of a leak, with all these people knowing about your mission?' He said they were all friends and relatives of the Cubans who were going with him. He trusted them all. That was a fatal mistake."

The CIA raiders set off the following night from the Florida Keys in the 42-foot motor launch Mercury, loaded with automatic rifles, tommyguns, pistols, grenades and boxes of ammo. Their destination was an inlet of Cabanas Bay in Pinar del Rio Province, about 50 miles from Havana.

Reputed CIA agent

McNair, 25, of Coral Gables, Fla., was working for Sturgis. His orders were to contact Howard Anderson, 41, a reputed CIA agent who owned a chain of gas stations in Havana and commanded the American Legion post there.

Anderson had been in close touch with the Cuban military officers who were plotting an anti-Castro coup. After they were captured, he was instructed to determine if other Cuban officers were in on the plot and if they would attempt to carry it out. He was also to advise the CIA of the progress of the diversionary action to be launched by Operation 40 in Pinar del Rio.

Shortly after midnight on March 19, the Mercury scraped the sandy bottom of a small, palm fringed cove. McNair and five Cubans sat perfectly still, listening for possible danger. Hearing none, they jumped into the waist-deep water and started to unload the boat.

Searchlights were turned on, blinding the invaders. Armed men spilled onto the beach and surrounded them. More than 100 soldiers and militiamen had been waiting for them to land. Someone, perhaps a Castro agent who was a guest at their going-away party, had talked.

Anderson was arrested the same night on his way to rendezvous with McNair. The two Americans died at dawn before a firing squad on April 19, two days after the Bay of Pigs invasion began.

Seven Cubans were executed with them, including Gilberto Betancourt, one of the leaders of a spearhead force sent from Cuba to invade Panama in 1959. A former Castro aide, he defected after the Panama fiasco and went to work for the CIA.

Twelve more anti-Castro plotters were executed next day, April 20. Seven of them were shot in the bullet-pocked moat of La Cabana Fortress. Among them were Humberto Sori Marin, the man who legalized firing squads, and a mysterious American citizen who called himself Rafael Diaz Bencom and was employed by CIA. He reportedly served as liaison between Sori Marin's group and the agency.

Although the Bay of Pigs adventure was a disaster, the CIA plots continued and many invasion veterans continued to work for the agency. Some of them were assigned to the "spook ship" Rex, a 175-foot converted U.S. Navy patrol boat that made hundreds of clandestine voyages to Cuba.

Flying the Nicaraguan flag, the Rex operated out of West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. It carried the latest radar and sonar equipment, five cannons, several .30-caliber machine-guns and two 20-foot speedboats.

Its skipper reportedly was Eugenio Rolando Martinez, a Miami real estate salesman and CIA agent who made more than 300 nocturnal runs to Cuba. (He was taken off the official CIA payroll in 1972, the day after he was caught in the Watergate break-in.)

On the night of July 21, 1963, one of the Rex speedboats deposited six men on a small island off Las Villas province. The invaders reportedly had been sent to kill Castro at a July 26 rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, but they never got there. They were picked up by a military patrol soon after they landed.

Men captured

On the night of Oct. 21, 1963, the Rex sent its twin speedboats ashore at the western tip of Cuba. The landing was observed by a militia patrol and the six men in the first boat were captured as soon as they hit the beach. The second launch was sunk by a Cuban gunboat as it raced back to the Rex.

Cannon fire from the Rex drove off the Cuban vessel. The men in the water were hauled aboard the spy ship. Next morning, a U.S. Navy submarine surfaced near the Rex off the Bahamas. Five Cubans—four dead, one wounded—reportedly were transferred to the sub, which then submerged and headed for Florida.

One month after this incident, President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who had visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City shortly before the murder and had joined the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee. President Johnson later told an aide, Leo Janos, that he thought the Kennedy assassination might have been a "retaliation" for the CIA-backed efforts to kill Castro.

These efforts continued after Kennedy's death.

Leader of students

In the fall of 1964, CIA agents in Paris made contact with Cuban Army Major Rolando Cubelas, a hero of the Castro revolution and a leader of the Cuban student organization. Two Cuban-born CIA employees, Luis Enrique Trasanco and Carlos Tepedino spoke with Cubelas and put him in touch with CIA agents working out of the American Embassy in Paris. The discussions continued a few days later in Madrid, where Cubelas met four more CIA agents. Cubelas had become disenchanted with the Castro regime and he eventually agreed to kill his former idol. On his return to Havana, he was given a high-powered sight.

Other plotters rented an apartment overlooking the building where the prime minister's office was located. Cubelas reportedly drew a bead on Castro one day in 1965. He lined up the cross hairs and squeezed the trigger, but the rifle failed to fire. Castro's secret police later got wind of the assassination attempt and arrested Cubelas and seven other plotters, all of whom were saved from the firing squad by a clemency appeal from Castro.

This may have been the last CIA-sponsored attempt to eliminate Castro. But other CIA activities kept the Caribbean cauldron boiling.

Next: The plot to free the U.S.S. Pueblo

How U.S. Made Unholy Alliance With the Mafia

By PAUL MESKIL 4/23/75

Fourth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

When Fidel Castro threw the American gangsters out of Cuba, they vowed to return—over his dead body.

Their determination to get rid of Castro was shared by many high-placed American officials and this common cause led eventually to an unholy alliance between the CIA and the mob. The strange story of CIA agents and Mafia mobsters plotting together against Castro was pieced together from interviews with police, federal agents, ex-agents and underworld sources.

Meyer Lansky, the crime syndicate's financial genius, and Santo Trafficante, Mafia boss of West Florida and Havana, got out of Cuba immediately after the hasty exit of their benefactor, dictator Fulgencio Batista. The overseers of their gambling casinos remained on the island, nervously waiting for the axe to fall.

"I was in touch with all the casino owners and operators in Havana," said Frank Sturgis, who was Castro's casino inspector during this period. "Fidel ordered me to close all the casinos for 10 days. The owners got the hint. They knew he was preparing to shut them down permanently, which he did.

"They were very, very mad. Those casinos were worth $100 million a year to the American crime syndicate. Every important mob boss in the United States had points (percentages) in the Cuban casinos. Each point was worth $30,000 to $100,000.

"Lansky and Trafficante were the top men in Cuban gambling. Lansky had direct business dealings with Batista. Trafficante had several casinos, including the Sans Souci."

Sans Souci partners

His Sans Souci partners included Norman Rothman of Miami Beach and the notorious Mannarino brothers, Gabriel and Sam, Mafia chiefs in Pittsburgh. Rothman and the Mannarinos tried to stop the Castro steamroller in 1958 by smuggling a planeload of arms — stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio — to anti-Castro forces in Cuba.

According to police and federal sources, Rothman was high up in the Cuban crime syndicate and shared his rackets profits with Batista's brother-in-law, Gen. Robert Fernandez Miranda.

Rothman returned to Florida soon after the Castro coup and, with his Cuban partners, bought the [illegible] Hotel in Miami Beach, the [illegible]

The hotel's most elegant suite, on the top floor overlooking the ocean, was made ready for Batista, but he chose the cooler climes of the Dominican Republic, Portugal and Madeira.

Sturgis was on friendly terms with several gambling racketeers, including Hyman Levine, a Lansky mobster who ran Havana's Comodoro casino. One evening, during a casual conversation, Levine observed that it "would be worth a million" to the syndicate to get rid of Castro. Sturgis didn't rise to this bait and Levine changed the subject.

It popped up again a few weeks later while Castro was in New York during a whirlwind tour of North and South America.

Fidel and his entourage stayed at the Statler-Hilton, where Sturgis registered under his real name and Cuban military rank, Capt. Frank Fiorini.

Frank was in his room one evening when he received a phone call from a detective captain on duty in the lobby as part of a heavy security detail. No

(Continued on page 62)



AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CIA AND THE MOB



Surrounded by his soldiers, Castro enters Havana in triumph after ousting the Batista government.

UPI Photo

Deprived of its Havana casinos, U.S. mob joined CIA in series of plots to kill Castro, using everything from poison to dynamite

(Continued from page 6)

visitors were allowed on the Castro floor without special permission.

"There's a guy here to see you," the cop reported. "He says he's your uncle."

"Send him up," Frank replied.

The short, pot-bellied man who arrived a few minutes later looked more like a godfather than an uncle. Frank recognized him as a member of the Havana gambling mob. Coming straight to the point, the hood offered Frank $100,000 to kill Castro.

"I'm not for hire," Frank said, ending the conversation.

When he returned to Havana a few days later, he reported the offer to his CIA contacts at the American Embassy.

Sturgis had no further contact with the gangster who approached him in New York, but someone in the intelligence hierarchy decided that the CIA and the syndicate should join forces against Castro. The go-between picked for this project reportedly was Norman Rothman.

"Rothman was in touch with several CIA agents," a former agent told The News. "They had many meetings concerning assassination plots against Castro."

Rothman, in turn, discussed the matter with his peers. Among those who took part in these secret parleys, reliable sources said, were Santo Trafficante of Tampa; Sam Mannarino of Pittsburgh; Salvatore (Sally Burns) Granello and Charles (Charlie the Blade) Tourine, both of New York, and John (Don Giovanni) Roselli of Las Vegas.

Granello, a member of the Vito Genovese crime family, had run casinos in Cuba and bossed a major bookmaking operation on Manhattan's East Side. Tourine, an associate of New Jersey mob chieftains Ruggerio (Richie the Boot) Boiardo and Gerardo (Jerry) Catena, also had operated Havana casinos.

Several suggestions were made for Castro's demise. One was to send for Gaspare Magaddino, a one-man Murder Inc., who killed more than 50 people in various parts of the world before he was blown away by a shotgun blast in Brooklyn in 1970. A Sicilian Mafioso, Magaddino had lived in South America and [illegible] for Trafficante prior to the Castro coup. He knew Havana well and was a perfect choice for the assassination assignment, but he either declined or wasn't offered the contract.

The mob and the CIA finally gave it to Roselli, reputed Mafia boss of Las Vegas, federal sources said.

A dapper, gray-haired man who calls himself a Hollywood movie producer and is a benevolent patron of Vegas showgirls, Roselli reportedly was introduced to CIA agents in 1960 by a Howard Hughes executive who formerly worked for the FBI. Then, federal sources said, Roselli agreed to recruit a death squad to go to Cuba hunting Castro.

Money from CIA

The CIA was to supply money, weapons, and transportation.

Roselli flew to Miami in March, 1961, and held separate conferences with CIA agents and Trafficante on the Castro project.

Roselli volunteered to accompany CIA financed missions to Cuba, the federal sources said. One of these expeditions reportedly landed an execution squad that attempted but failed to hit Castro. On another occasion, the crew of Roselli's launch fought a running gunfight with a Cuban patrol boat.

Columnist Jack Anderson reported that CIA agents gave Roselli some poison capsules which he passed along to a Cuban who was related to Castro's chef. The chef was to put the poison in Castro's food. The sources interviewed by the News confirmed that at least one attempt was made to poison Castro.

An American who was active in the anti-Castro underground in Cuba at the time said "enough poison to kill 10 people" was dumped in a glass of malted milk sent to Castro's suite in the Havana Hilton in 1961.

"Castro ordered a chocolate malt every afternoon and the same waiter always brought it to his room," he said. "When the waiter came in with the poisoned malt, he was looking so [illegible] he almost dropped the tray.

"Castro said, '[illegible] you?' The waiter said, 'I don't know; maybe I got a fever.' Castro had him arrested and had the drink analyzed. Chemists found the poison right away."

In early 1961, a more elaborate assassination attempt was directed by a well-financed American who arrived in Havana soon after the Castro takeover and lived there until security police accused him of working for the CIA and plotting to murder Castro.

Working with anti-Castro Cuban military officers the American planted several sticks of dynamite under the garage floor of a 20-story apartment building where a number of Castro aides and Communist-bloc diplomats lived with their families.

"Castro came to the apartment house every two weeks to see one of his adjutants," one of the plotters said. "He always arrived in the afternoon, on the same day of the week.

"He would drive in with his bodyguards and park his car in the space reserved for him. We timed his visits. It always took at least five minutes for him to get into the garage, out of the car and into the freight elevator that took him upstairs where he wanted to go.

"We had a line of four men. One would signal from a nearby roof when Castro's car started into the garage. The signal would be passed on. Then a couple of guys would hit the plunger of an electronic detonating device. The detonator was in a hotel near the apartment house.

"We would have blown him to dust.

"The night before it was to happen, the guys (the Cuban plotters) had a final meeting to go over the details. Nobody outside our group knew about the dynamite, but a friend of theirs in G-2 (Castro's intelligence service) found out about the meeting and reported it. The G-2 came looking for them.

"They were in an apartment miles away from the place where the dynamite was. The G-2 raided the meeting and everybody started [illegible]

One of the plotters, a young military officer named Jesus Casas, shot it out with the raiders and killed two of them before he was slain by a motorcycle cop. Three other conspirators, all rebel officers who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra, were captured and taken to G-2 headquarters. They escaped a few hours later, with the help of friends in the intelligence service, and found refuge in the Uruguayan Embassy.

"Castro never found out about the dynamite," said the source who disclosed the plot to The News. "It's probably still there, under the garage floor."

Intelligence sources told this reporter that the CIA sent an execution squad into Oriente Province in November 1962 to ambush Castro near Santiago de Cuba as he drove to a memorial service for his fallen guerrillas.

Snipers hid along road

Snipers hid among trees and bushes lining the road to the cemetery where the service was to be held. On the morning of the scheduled ceremony, a motorcade of five jeeps approached the graveyard. The first jeep was full of soldiers. In the second jeep, a tall, bearded man sat next to the driver. He was wearing sunglasses and his fatigue cap was pulled down to his eyes.

Machineguns and rifles sprayed the second jeep with bullets, killing the driver and his passenger, who turned out to be Castro's [illegible] bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo [illegible]. The assassins escaped. So did Fidel, who had prudently taken another route to the cemetery.

The CIA plots against Castro began in 1960, during the Eisenhower administration and continued through the Kennedy and Johnson years, causing President Johnson to [illegible] to an aide that "we're running a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."

In 1967, the Immigration and Naturalization Service began deportation proceedings against Don Giovanni Roselli, claiming he was brought to the country illegally from Italy.

In 1969, soon after President Nixon took office, government lawyers argued in court that Roselli should not be deported because he had performed unspecified "valuable services to the national security." Roselli was not deported.

'Frogmen' Blew Up a French Ship in Havana

By **PAUL MESKIL**

Last of 6 series

SECRETS OF THE CIA

At 3:10 p.m. on March 4, 1960, a French munitions ship blew up in Havana harbor, killing at least 75 people and injuring more than 200.

The vessel, Le Couvre, exploded during the unloading of 76 tons of ammunition and grenades intended for Fidel Castro's military and police forces. Castro suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. The United States denied any involvement in the incident.

A former CIA agent told The News recently that Le Couvre was sabotaged by "CIA frogmen." He said an underwater demolition team slipped into the water at night and attached a bomb to the ship's hull, under the waterline. The bomb, a detonator and a timing device were in a waterproof container, he said.

The ex-agent added that the frogmen were Cubans working for the CIA. "It was definitely a CIA-connected thing," he said.

Another source said the bomb was supposed to go off around 3 a.m., when the waterfront was deserted, but something went wrong with the timer and the blast came 12 hours later, when the area was crowded with dock workers and harbor traffic.

Still another source, formerly connected with the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the Caribbean area, blamed the big blast on Gen. Rafael Trujillo, then dictator of the Dominican Republic.

Trujillo and his sinister intelligence chief, Johnny Abbes, had many conferences with CIA officials and secret agents. On one occasion in 1960, Trujillo offered CIA agents Frank Fiorgis and Pedro Diaz Lanz, former chief of Castro's Air Force, $1 million to lead an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. Diaz Lanz declined, telling his CIA bosses that he didn't want to work for another dictator.

Plotting to kill Trujillo

While in the Dominican Republic to confer with Trujillo in 1961, Sturgis also contacted Dominican military officers who were plotting to kill Trujillo. The CIA agreed to give the plotters guns and ammunition.

"The guns arrived in boxes sent to a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo (the Dominican capital, now called Santo Domingo)," said Frank Nelson, an American who worked with Trujillo in a plot to overthrow Castro. "The Dominican officers didn't need the guns. They already had enough stuff for a [illegible]. They needed the moral support of the U.S. government, and this was represented by the arms shipments."

The rebel officers assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. [illegible] used the CIA guns has not been disclosed. But similar weapons figured in subsequent attempts to exterminate Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, the voodoo Hitler of Haiti.

On the night of Aug. 26, 1963, a converted B-25 bomber left Florida with an arms shipment for Gen. Leon Cantava, a former Haitian Army commander who was planning to invade his homeland from the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. The CIA plane swooped over a flare-lit field near the Dominican military airport of Dajabon.

Wooden crates rained down on parachutes. They contained mortars, bazookas, M-1 rifles, .30-caliber machine guns, M-3 Tommy guns, .45-caliber pistols, grenades and ammunition.

The weapons were distributed among 210 Haitian exiles who comprised Cantava's invasion army. They crossed Massacre River, borderline between Dominican Republic and Haiti, on night of Sept. 22. Late the following day, after a bloody battle with Haitian troops, Cantava led the remnants

(Continued on page 54)



Duvalier [illegible] CIA

PLOT TO RELEASE THE PUEBLO

(Continued from page 4)

of [illegible] and back across the river to the Dominican sanctuary.

A week later, a small group of Haitian refugees entered a U.S. Army Special Forces camp in North Carolina for training in guerrilla warfare. Most of the Haitians were in their early 20s and had attended college in the United States after serving in the U.S. Army or Air Force. All of them lived in New York City.

They had been hand picked by the CIA for what became one of the bravest and most pitiful invasions in the history of Caribbean carnage.

The invasion force consisted of only 13 men, eight of whom had been trained by the Green Berets. They belonged to an anti-Duvalier group called Jeune Haiti (Young Haiti). Nearly all of the unlucky 13 were the sons of Haitian military officers or officials who had been killed by Duvalier's thugs.

The leader, Gusle Villedrouin, was a former U.S. airman whose father, Haitian Army Col. Roger Villedrouin, was clubbed to death by Papa Doc's Tonton Macoutes.

They chartered a boat in Florida and landed in Haiti on Aug. 5, 1964, carrying a variety of weapons supplied by CIA agents. Although the invasion was doomed to failure before it began, the 13 young New Yorkers managed to hold off hundreds of Duvalier soldiers, militiamen and Tonton Macoutes.

They were killed one by one, and those who were left kept fighting. The last three invaders ran out of ammunition on Oct. 26, then threw stones at the troops who gunned them down. The heads of all 13 were cut off and sent to the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince.

Drops two gasoline drums

On May [illegible] 1969, a B-25 flew over Duvalier's palace and dropped two gasoline drums, one of which blew a hole in the street outside the Haitian White House. The other did not explode. The plane was piloted by an American who reportedly had done contract jobs for the CIA.

A much more imaginative, though no [illegible], CIA plot was simmering on another burner at this time. Its aim was the release of the USS Pueblo and her crew, captured by Communist North Korea in January 1968.

CIA [illegible] named the Pueblo [illegible] Operation Sword, but those who took part refer to it as "the Mexican [illegible]." It went from the planning stage to the recruiting stage in the summer of 1968, when a classified ad appeared in a Fort Lauderdale newspaper offering "adventure" and "high pay" to qualified applicants.

The ad was placed by Ray Sandstrom, a Fort Lauderdale lawyer who allegedly had served the CIA as a [illegible]. About 60 men answered the ad, and [illegible] letters to Sturgis, who was in charge of the operation.

Sturgis [illegible] appointed Max Gorman Gonzales, who had worked with him on previous missions, as security chief [illegible]. From the letters and personal interviews, Frank eventually [illegible] volunteers.

[illegible] had been in military service [illegible]. "Three had been in World War II, two others served in Korea and Vietnam. Most were young, but one was in his late 40s and had a [illegible]. He said he had never accomplished much in life and had always wanted to go on some kind of an adventure, so Frank said, 'Well, if you stay sober, we'll take you along.'

The men were offered $10,000 for a completed assignment. They were told it was to be a commando raid into Cuba to free political prisoners from Castro's concentration camps."

To lend credence to this story, Sturgis displayed a map showing the locations of Cuban prisons and prison camps. He also had a list of prisoners who supposedly were to be freed.

None of the men, not even Gonzales, w[illegible]

The operation was planned months



Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, offered $1 million for a Cuban invasion.

In the Caribbean, the CIA got involved in dozens of schemes, including blowing up a French ship and killing Trujillo

in advance," Sturgis said. "The CIA station in Miami was aware of it. So were several other federal agencies, including the FBI and Customs.

"The objective was not to raid Cuba but to rendezvous with another ship off the coast of Mexico and, with the assistance of this ship, seize a Russian vessel. We were to meet a Cuban vessel. I assume it was a Naval vessel, commanded by Cuban Navy officers who were disenchanted with Castro.

"The orders (for completing the operation) were aboard the Cuban ship. The captain also had a sailing schedule listing arrivals and departures of all Soviet and Communist bloc vessels in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. We hoped to grab a Soviet 'fishing trawler' that was actually a spy ship.

stopped by the Cuban vessel. The skipper of the Soviet ship probably would not be suspicious of a boarding party wearing Cuban Navy uniforms.

"We would then capture the ship. We were to take it to a point off the coast of Venezuela. The orders were not to go into any port but to stay off the coast. Certain officials in the Venezuelan government were aware of the plan. They would participate in negotiations for the release of the captive ship and its crew. A statement would be issued to the effect that we wanted to exchange the ship and crew for certain political prisoners in Cuba.

"But this was a ruse. Then we would go into the second phase of the operation, to dicker with the [illegible] and

U.S.S. Pueblo, its captain and crew, who were still in confinement at this time.

"We were going to threaten to sink the Communist ship and kill all the hostages if any ship of any country came close. It was supposed to look like a pirate operation, organized by American mercenaries and anti-Castro Cubans."

In preparation for the trip to Mexico, guns, camping equipment, medicine, bandages, uniforms and other supplies were hidden in door panels, seats and a false trunk of a 1963 Falcon that was outfitted by the mechanics of a Miami garage owned by two CIA employes.

The volunteers were to provide their own transportation to Mexico and their own weapons and camping gear.

"The men had to get to the meeting place, Guadalajara, at their own expense," Gonzales said. "The contract didn't go into effect until they got there. How they got there was their business."

Running out of money

One of the recruits, Robert Curtis, later testified in a court case resulting from the operation: "When we got to Guadalajara, the hotel we were supposed to go to was torn down. We went across the street to Los Americanos (another hotel). We left the car parked out front where he (Sturgis) could see it. We waited three weeks, and we were running out of money . . so we went to a gun shop and sold my Japanese Nambu (automatic pistol) for about $30."

Frank and the rest of the gang eventually arrived and proceeded to a training camp Gonzales had set up in the mountains near the Guatemala border. It rained much of the time they were there, and they called their base Camp Mud.

After two weeks there, they moved to Camp Sand on the beach near the Yucatan fishing village of Progreso. They chartered the fishing boat Amigo, smuggled guns and ammo aboard, and set off to meet the Cuban vessel. But the charts they had obtained to guide them through the Gulf and Caribbean were 10 years old and, therefore, not completely accurate.

They cruised south along the Yucatan coast for four days, entered Central American waters and then ran aground on a reef two miles off Belize, capital of British Honduras.

"We threw a lot of gear over the side," Gonzales said. "We waited until the tide came in. Then everybody jumped into the water to help get her off the reef although there were sharks around. We didn't intend to go into Belize, but the propeller and shaft were bent, and there was a small leak. We were taking on water and needed repairs."

When the Amigo limped into port, flying no flag, police and customs officers boarded her. British Honduran authorities at first thought it was an invasion from Guatemala. Sturgis and his dirty dozen were questioned by British intelligence agents. Then Sturgis spoke to the American consul, and, after a few phone calls to Mexico City and Washington, the consul told him not to worry. The Americans were released and flown back to Miami.

"We was supposed to get $1,500 a month plus a $10,000 bonus (on completion of the mission)," Curtis said later. "Well, all I seen was 40 or 50 bucks to get back home (from Miami)."

"Whatever it was, it was definitely a CIA operation," said Max Gonzales, a native New Yorker who is now in business in Miami. "Frank Sturgis was a CIA agent at the time and still may be. He was in contact with other CIA agents in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Frank never told me what our real mission [illegible]

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

Cuban Extremists in U.S.

A GROWING TERROR THREAT

HOW NEW TAX LAW HITS BUSINESSMEN

SPECIAL REPORT

Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



Out from Miami spreads a wave of violence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this dream. But the acts of a few zealots create trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.

Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON

Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of American leaders.

The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.

In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama—even across the South Atlantic to Argentina.

They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several killings.

A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activities and their leaders.

Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconciliation with Castro.

Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at assassinating members of the Carter Administration.

"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins in the world today," says one U.S. official.

Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the days when this country was trying to overthrow Castro, or kill him.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimony from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist squad of the Dade County public-safety department in Miami, where Cuban refugees are concentrated:

"The overwhelming majority of the Cubans in Miami are strongly anti-Castro. That's why they came to Miami in the first place. They are also law-abiding citizens who, with minor exceptions, manifest their opposition to Castro in legal ways.

"However, there are a small number of individuals whose hatred of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Communism has led them to engage in extralegal actions and to violate the laws of the country which gave them sanctuary. These individuals use Dade County as a base for international terrorism . . . against governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terrorist-type attacks. . . .

"Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terrorist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban population and diverting the collected funding for their own purposes."

Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro leader, is accused in plane bombing fatal to 73.

Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.

The number of hard-core terrorists is small, officially estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this year alone they have either bragged about or been accused of such acts as:

- Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels from Cuba and other Communist nations.
- Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States, Latin America and Portugal.
- Planting a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of 73 lives.
- Possible involvement in the still-unsolved bomb death of

EXILES vs. CASTRO—

A Relentless Pursuit

On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the U.S. have become extremists.

Highlights of events in those 18 years, some involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the extremists—

1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nicaragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south shore. The invasion was a failure.

1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ransom in drugs, food, medical equipment and other supplies from "private contributions." President John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a liberated Cuba.

U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"—a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks generally failed.

1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Guevara addressed the General Assembly.

1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.

1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, terrorized other exiles to keep them in line.

1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelligence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later testified that they thought it would help their anti-Castro campaign.

1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships at sea.

1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than 100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting offices of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami police department.

Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consulates of governments that have diplomatic relations with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.

Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches manned by exile extremists.

Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage of a Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers and crew last October 6 near Barbados. Police seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspicion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro canceled U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement.

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on September 21.

- Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
- Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.

Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about what they may do in the future?

To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of the *U.S. News & World Report* staff dug deeply into the records, interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes though not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.

BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM

After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state, 800,000 Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of them live in the Miami area.

The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the virus of violence can grow.

"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions, hatreds—and their hopes of going back to their homeland. And they know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So they dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in other places in the United States seems very possible in the atmosphere in Miami."

In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable. It was U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the CIA. The invaders were not given the air cover necessary for a successful attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only 180 of about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The Cubans felt betrayed.

Then came other American moves against Castro. There was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro from obtaining sorely needed supplies and equipment from abroad. Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret operations not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts of Latin America—and even in Africa.

To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Communism became a way of life.

Since then, however, American policy has failed to match in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more militant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the U.S. Senate have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an agreement with the United States to curb the airplane hijackers who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were moves on both sides toward normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.

As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed, some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own. The box on this page gives the chronology of developments.

TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS

Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active terrorists have organized themselves into many groups. Slogans of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana" have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha 66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible; FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragmatistas, which means what it sounds like—pragmatists.

A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons on the list soon died violent deaths.

Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to terrorists in the last two years:

- Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broadcaster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his car apart.
- On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquarters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again in a State court.
- A number of bombs have been exploded in New York. One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
- On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the *Dzhordano Bruno*, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machine-gun fire. No one was injured.
- On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked and a fisherman was killed.
- On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb exploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially nsolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret olice of the present anti-Communist Government in Chile.

NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY

Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one n has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch, ediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish p in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years rison.

r. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he rtedly returned to the movement. He is now under st in Venezuela, charged along with three other men in ection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is ribed as the leader of the group calling itself Accion na.

June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his activists together in the Dominican Republic. They sharply divided on policy and strategy. e wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the l States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro e this country. Others held out for continuing their ies both here and abroad.

a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities, a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolutionary Organizations in English.

Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.

American law-enforcement officials say that members of CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.

Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama. Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.

On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida, Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.

The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6, when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing 73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing team.

In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the crash of the plane.

Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents apparently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.

The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press International on November 19, said the four men held by the Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, if they are convicted, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion flights to Havana.

Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers," Carballo said.

CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS

Since last spring, there has been a sharp reduction in terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agencies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.

Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organized

VS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 6, 1976

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

includes representatives from Dade County and Miami police, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force, its agents work closely with it.

With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of suspects. Police also have learned enough about other suspects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to prosecute them.

A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might have some knowledge of terror operations.

Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terrorist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who had never met him before, called him by name and told him what section he worked in and what his duties were."

Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Government. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S. Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."

A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as *agents provocateurs*, instigating terrorist acts designed to discredit the refugees and influence American policy.

The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year, for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was named in Senate committee testimony as having been involved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana. In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had provided him with the explosives.

In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully informed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equipment and instructions he has received."

Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA . . . can carry out these acts?" Castro asked.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S. involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible."

The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism. Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from domestic law-enforcement activities.

Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or to export arms without a license.

Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S. officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for the FBI to enter that case.

With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say they can look forward to only limited success against the terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from within the Cuban refugee community—and investigators state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to cases of violence committed outside the U.S.

WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?

As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign: The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro into renouncing the antihijacking treaty, thus discouraging efforts toward a diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Cuba.

Despite all the terrorist plots and attacks, Castro remains firmly seated as head of a Communist regime in Cuba. And it appears to the refugees almost inevitable that the movement toward some kind of accommodation with Castro will be resumed by American policy makers. Throughout "Little Havana," the fear is widespread that Jimmy Carter, when he becomes President, will give new impetus to this movement, and that their homeland will never be liberated from Communist rule.

To both officials and Cuban refugee leaders, it seems inevitable that the terrorists will continue their attempts to keep the two countries apart by the only method they know—further acts of violence.

TERRORISTS' ARSENAL: PLANES TO CANNONS

One measure of the military equipment that is available to Cuban terrorists is provided by this partial inventory compiled by authorities:

- 10 or more high-speed motor launches about 30 feet long, with special fuel tanks for extra range
- A number of small, spotter aircraft
- Large-caliber recoilless rifles
- Missile-antitank weapons
- Wide assortment of smaller weapons
- Large quantities of C-4 explosives developed by the U.S. Army

A further measure comes from this tally of extremists' weapons confiscated by Miami law-enforcement officers so far in 1975-76:

- 1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of explosive ammunition
- 498 submachine guns, 480 of them with silencers
- 82 explosive devices
- 3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
- 4 boxes of napalm
- 6 rifles
- 20 handguns
- Thousands of rounds of ammunition

11

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Nelson Bunker Hunt
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MEMORANDUM

TO: RECORD

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION OF JANUARY 19, 1977

I called Larry Callahan at 2:00 p.m. to advise him that the Commiteee desired to interview Mr. Gene A. Boren, of the IRS, at the earliest available opportunity and requested his advice and assistance to accomplish this. Callahan was nervous about the Committee's eagerness to proceed in response to the memorandum for fear that we would be interfering with an on-going criminal investigation. He noted the FBI was looking into this and he would have to check with the Bureau to ascertain the feasibility of proceeding unilaterally. I told Callahan we did not want to interfere with a criminal investigation and that I did not feel that our interview of the IRS employee would fall into that category. Callahan referred to a possible obstruction of justice on the part of that employee in that the information had been withheld for approximately five years.

At 2:30 p.m. I received a telephone call from Paul Daly urging Committee restraint in unilaterally investigating subject matter. Daly noted the Bureau had just received this information and was intending to interview the IRS employee and other individuals in question today or tomorrow. Daly noted that he was disturbed that Callahan had brought the memo to the Committee's attention so promptly, as the Bureau had intended to brief the Committee at the conclusion of their investigation. Daly seemed most concerned that the IRS delay in bringing the matter to the Bureau's attention and assured us that the Bureau was desirous of cooperating fully. He noted the information had been furnished by Justice absent a specific inquiry from the Committee and that we were being unreasonable if we desired to pursue the matter further at this time. I asked Daly what information was available at the Bureau on Brading and Hunt. He said there was a large quantity of information available on both and that he felt he could pull that material which related to the assassination quickly, but would be reluctant to produce the information in its entirety. I told him to ascertain this afternoon what information could be produced immediately and he said that he would.

At 2:45 p.m. I talked again with Callahan who indicated that Daly would be calling. Callahan said he thought the Bureau was eager to redeem itself in this area and we should give them that opportunity. I told Callahan that I was concerned about the ~~utilization~~ mutilation of ~~leaks~~ books, a position which Callahan thinks is ridiculous. Callahan, however, did state that this information was not as old as it looks at the Bureau, to-wit: While the Justice received the IRS memo on December 30, 1976, considerable time went by before Attorney General Levi could address the issue of whether or not to entrust this matter to the Bureau. Approximately one week ago, Justice went to Jim Adams of the FBI with the request to look into the allegation and was surprised to find that Adams was already apprised of the situation and investigating, i.e., general indexes. Apparently, Adams had been in receipt of similar information in recent days.

Yesterday, in response to the Attorney General's request for information, Paul Daly hand carried to Callahan the Bureau's response (which is dated January 14) and today Callahan hand carried the package to us over Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann;s signature. Callahan advised that Daly was upset that the Committee had been so promptly advised for fear that we would interupt the Bureau's inquiry. Callahan apologized for the lack of responsiveness on the part of Justice and the Bureau but things are in disarray with Levi about to depart. I assured Callahan we did not desire to interfere in the investigation but desired to be promptly informed of any developments and that we would stay in touch with Paul Daly in that regard . Callahan promised to expedite any Committee requests as made.

Paul Daly called at 3:10 p.m. to advise that "the powers that be" at the Bureau were upset with the possibility that the Committee was considering going to Dallas and interfering with the investigation. He specifically that the Director be given an opportunity to talk with Inouye prior to any such action. I told Daly that it was merely the Committee's desire to go to Texas; I had heard no discussion of going regardless of the Bureau's position. Daly promised to pull together without the need for a written request, all available information on Brading for Committee review this afternoon, if at all possible.

CRS MAIN FILE COPY
JUL 23 1975 p.33

HE NEW YORK TIMES,

Hunt Sons Charge C.I.A. Used Agents To Embezzle Funds

F CI100 Hunt

DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)—Two sons of H. L. Hunt, the late billionaire contending they were discriminated against because of their conservative views, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the family oil empire and used secret agents to help embezzle more than $50-million from them.

The brothers, Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, said new Federal charges that they had tried to cover up a family wiretapping scheme were a further result of an attempt by the C.I.A. to discredit the Hunt oil empire. They said they held the C.I.A. responsible for earlier Federal charges that they had spied on aides of their father.

They said their refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use their overseas Hunt Oil Company affiliate for espionge had led to the Federal charges against them.

"After turning down the C.I.A., a massive embezzlement scheme involving loses of over $50-million from the Hunt Oil Company were uncovered," the brothers said in a news release. "An investigation disclosed that some of the Hunt employes involved in the scheme were secret Government agents."

who?
why?

A spokesman at C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington said, "Since it appears such a complicated matter, the agency's legal people would like time to find out what it is all about."

Does CIA ever deny?

A Federal grand jury yesterday charged the Hunt brothers, Percy Foreman of Houston, a criminal lawyer, three other attorneys and a retired Texas industrialist with obstruction of justice for allegedly trying to thwart the wiretap investigation.

1975 № 265-75 22 1975

U.S. Accused of Refusing to Investigate 50-Million 'Theft' at H. L. Hunt Concern

Sep. 22 51:1

By MARTIN WALDRON

Special to The New York Times

LUBBOCK, Tex., Sept. 21 — A member of the Hunt oil family says that its widely advertised H. L. H. food company lost $50-million to $60-million between 1960 and 1970 because of "stealing" by key company employes and that the Justice Department has refused for five years to investigate.

Thomas M. Hunt, a nephew of H. L. Hunt, the eccentric late oil billionaire, who used the radio program "Life Line" to advertise his food and drug products, said that the Justice Department was under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency not to investigate the alleged thefts, and to prosecute two members of the Hunt family for wiretapping.

Thomas Hunt is production manager for H.L.H.'s parent company, the Hunt Oil Company, which is family owned. Mr. Hunt is a cousin of Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, who are on trial in Federal District Court here on wiretapping charges. Testimony in the case begins tomorrow.

Bunker Hunt has said his refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use his Middle-Eastern oil operations as a cover is the possible reason behind the Government's insistence on trying him and his brother on six-year-old wiretapping charges.

Refused Request

A C.I.A. memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1965, indicated that Bunker Hunt would be asked to allow the agency to use his company as a cover in the Middle East. The Hunts had an oil concession in Libya. Bunker Hunt said such a request was made to him in 1966 by the C.I.A., but that he refused to allow it because he did not want to alienate the Libyans.

The intelligence agency has declined to allow the Hunts to see nine of 12 items it has in its files on Bunker Hunt, saying in a letter dated April 3, 1975, that to release these items would imperil "intelligence sources and methods."

One of these items if revealed, the C.I.A. said, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the individual volunteering information.

Thomas Hunt said that the family believed that this individual was one of the H.L.H. employes who organized the system under which the food company was stripped of huge sums of money.

The Justice Department refused to comment on the Hunt contentions.

However, department officials have signed affidavits that none of the evidence being presented in the wiretap trial came from the C.I.A.

Checking Losses

The Hunts say that the wiretap charges grew out of efforts by Herbert and Bunker Hunt to find out why H.L.H. was losing so much money. Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. losses in 1968 had reached $8-million a year, when a company projection had shown they should be making a profit.

Thomas Hunt's phone was one of those tapped by three private detectives hired by his cousins in November, 1969. The other phones were those of H. L. Hunt's private secretary, a Hunt oil company vice president and three lesser company officials.

Losses of H.L.H. were getting so massive in 1968 and 1969 that the Hunt Oil Company, which had been absorbing the losses, "was getting into a cash bind," Thomas Hunt said.

The wiretaps were discovered in January, 1970, and three private detectives were later convicted and sent to prison for short terms. The detectives, after being released, told a grand jury, under threats of contempt citations, that the Hunt brothers hired them, and the Hunts were indicted in February, 1973.

Thomas Hunt said that before his cousins resorted to hiring private detectives, they had become convinced that the company officials who ordinarily would have investigated thefts "were the chief thieves." An independent audit later proved this surmise to be correct, he said.

Every Operations

The thefts, he said, stretched from coast to coast and involved almost every operation of H.L.H.—purchases, sales and operations. Company payrolls were loaded with nonexistent employes and company officials got kickbacks on purchases and commissions on sales through dummy food brokerage companies, he said.

Thomas Whitaker, a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who now is chief security officer for the Hunt

Sep. 22 51:2

Oil Company, said that more than $5-million in thefts had been documented and many more were being investigated.

He and Thomas Hunt gave as an example of a typical operation the sale of an H.L.H. pecan crop from company groves near Tyler, Tex., and the subsequent purchase of a pecan processing plant at the same city.

"We had sold a pecan crop to a company in El Paso," Mr. Hunt said. "The we were told by one of the thieves that he had not realized that pecans were selling for so much and had agreed to sell them to somebody else for two cents a pound less."

Reports Commitment

Mr. Whitaker said that the same former employe negotiated the purchase of the pecan processing plant, committing H.L.H. to paying $180,000 for it.

"The plant had been shut down by the Food and Drug Administration, it was all rusty and has not been operated to this day," Mr. Whitaker said.

The previous owner of the pecan plant gave a deposition to Hunt Oil officials saying that he had paid cash kickbacks of more than $80,000 to three H.L.H. employes.

But the biggest source of income at H.L.H. expense, he said, was at least five dummy food brokerage corporations that were set up by H.L.H. employes to receive 3 per cent commissions on all H.L.H. sales.

After auditors had established the duplicity of H.L.H. executives in early 1970, "the whole scheme was laid out" to the F.B.I., Mr. Whitaker said.

In July, 1970, a claim of $442,873.19 was filed with the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York by Hunt Oil, detailing allegations of thefts by employes whose honesty had been insured by Fidelity.

Sought Eastland Aid

After the private detectives were indicted in 1970, the Hunts made efforts to have the prosecution dropped through political connections, asking Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to intercede with the Justice Department.

One Hunt attorney said that the Hunts had been led to believe that if they would drop damage suits against former employes and settle the company's claim against the bonding company for $100,000, the case "would blow over." The suits were dropped and the settlement made with the bonding company.

If such an agreement was reached in Washington, it did not hold.

The three detectives were convicted and sent to prison, and after they testified before a special grand jury in 1973 in Dallas, the Hunts were indicted on the wiretapping charge in February of that year.

After the Hunts were charged, one of their attorneys, Philip Hirschkop of Alexandria, Va., asked the Federal courts to require the Justice Department to investigate the thefts from H.L.H.

Warned of Dismissal

In response to a statement from Federal District Judge H. O. Woodward in 1973 that he would dismiss cases against the Hunts "if some agency does not investigate," Hunt officials "once again laid out the whole situation to the F.B.I." and other Justice Department officials, Mr. Whitaker said.

Two former employes of H.L.H., John Curington and John H. Brown, were later indicted and were convicted last year for using the mails to defraud H.L.H. They were fined and placed on probation. A third former employe, Paul M. Rothermel, who had been chief of security for Hunt Oil Company, was given immunity from prosecution by the Government, but he was never called to testify at any trial.

The three men said that H. L. Hunt had given them permission to act as food brokers to sell H. L. H. products, a statement denied by the late billionaire.

Sep. 22 51:2

In an effort to show that the Hunts were being prosecuted because they refused to cooperate with the C.I.A., Mr. Hirschkop asked both the agency and the F.B.I. for any C.I.A. information they had on his clients.

Three Items

The three of 13 items that the C.I.A. would release to Mr. Hirschkop were a biography of Bunker Hunt, a copy of a memorandum that recommended that Bunker Hunt be asked to be "operational" and copies of attacks made on Bunker Hunt by Tripoli Radio.

Bunker Hunt said that in 1966, the C.I.A. asked him to

Sep. 22 51:3

allow [illegible] his Libyan oil operations as a cover for C.I.A. agents in the Middle East, but that he refused.

The December, 1966, memorandum on Bunker Hunt said that the C.I.A. had "had good cooperation . . . on our routine requests but have no way of judging possible reaction to operational requests. Our estimate is that we see no reason we should not make a cautious approach."

In pretrial hearings, the Hunts asked Judge Woodward to order the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to furnish information on the Hunts and on Mr. Curington, Mr. Rothermel and Mr. Brown.

Found No Relevance

Judge Woodward examined reports from the C.I.A. on Mr. Rothermel and on all three men from the National Security Council but ruled that they had no relevance to the wiretap case and he would not allow the Hunts to see the documents.

Thomas Hunt said that the State Department also had become involved, urging Bunker Hunt to pay $43-million still owed to the Libyan Government on the 1972 taxes. These taxes were withheld after Libya seized Mr. Hunt's oil interests in that nation in 1973.

Mr. Hunt said that this advice had been rejected.

Tripoli Radio said in June, 1973, that Bunker Hunt's half-share in an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil in a desert field in Libya had been seized because Mr. Hunt was "an adventurer and broker seeking gains and profits without carrying out any activity or bearing any risk."

"He did not even have a positive attitude toward the wishes of the people," the broadcast said.

Thomas Hunt said that the Hunt oil interests had been paying about $180-million in taxes to the Libyan Government before Mr. Hunt was ousted from the country.

Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. Food Products Division of Hunt Oil Company had been reorganized and was now showing a profit.

Sep. 22 24:5

Saigon Students Tested On Ideas From Hanoi

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sept. 21 (Agence France-Presse)—The first group of high school students to take final examinations since the Communists took over here had a choice yesterday of writing papers analyzing the thoughts of either Ho Chi Minh, the late North Vietnamese leader, or the current Premier, Pham Van Dong.

The first choice was an excerpt from Ho Chi Minh's "Call to the Nation" of July 17, 1966, when American bombers started attacking North Vietnam.

The other was a passage from Mr. Dong's speech when he presented his Government to the latest session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly.

osts down, deal with labor problems." amar's low-keyed personal style Steadman says Lamar has never given im a direct order in the 15 years of heir association) tends to make some eople think of him as a sort of a Mr. eepers with a yen to be a jock. "Actually," says Maxfield, "he's Clark ent. He is a mild-mannered, meek, veryday guy. But when money needs o be committed, he goes into that little hone booth and comes out with an 'S' n his shirt."

lucky 11 trusts

The bedrock of Lamar's personal forune is the trust that his father set up or him in 1935 as part of a tax trategy planned with the aid of veteran Hunt attorney J. B. McEntire. At hat time, a trust was established for ach of the Hunt children. In 1958, the attern was repeated when the elder unt established trusts for each of the econd Mrs. Hunt's children, calling hem Loyal Trusts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except or Hunt Oil Co., which went entirely Mrs. Hunt, H. L. Hunt left the bulk f his personal holdings to the Loyal rusts, whose beneficiaries are Ray unt, Ruth Jane Hunt, Mrs. Randall (Helen LaKelley) Kreiling, and Mrs. ark A. (Swanee Grace) Meeks.

The size of these trusts is nknown, but one of the roblems facing the Hunt amily is how to commingle 1 separate fortunes (those f the 10 children plus the uth Ray Hunt Trust) to aximum advantage. Dallas riends of son-in-law Randy" Kreiling say the uestion is being debated armly within the family. lthough Kreiling's role in e Great Western United keover was relatively mior, it did demonstrate a illingness between the two bling groups to cooperate.

Lamar Hunt observes at, since the bulk of H. L. unt's estate was left to rs. Hunt, "it was a natural ing for Ray to be the person who looks after it." Laar adds: "It does not mean at Ray will run the busiess. He will be making an rderly transition, a change o whatever happens. He will ave the responsibility of aking decisions in relationhip to Dad's property, but ad's operation was much mpler."

There will be no move to take Hunt Oil public, Lamar says. "Our philosophy is not one of promotion of stock and promotion to the public," he says. "Each of us has his own interests. All of us operate in the oil business, sometimes together, sometimes as an independent oil operator. Hunt Oil, which was my Dad's company, will be run basically by employees of the company. We all will continue to operate out of the Hunt Oil office."

Maxfield, who has been observing the Hunts for nine years as Lamar's partner, believes that Hunt Oil and Placid Oil will carry on the monolithic base of the family fortune. "It's like a tree trunk, with each brother having his own branch," he says. "Oil is not an expression of the personality of the sons as it was of the old man. The expression of the brothers will be in the branches—Ray in real estate; Lamar sports; Bunker horses, commodities, and agriculture; Herbert in real estate, residential development, and commodities." And while the brothers are branching out, Maxfield believes, "they will run the oil companies collectively with a professional staff."

Stormy weather closes in

Meanwhile, a threatening cloud looms on the family's horizon. Not only is an oft-delayed trial ahead for Bunker and Herbert Hunt on the wiretapping charges, but there is also the threat of more indictments against them by a federal grand jury that has been sitting in Dallas for more than a year. The Hunts claim their wiretapping activities were aimed at uncovering suspected embezzlements from their father's food concern. In their only statement on the matter, over a year ago, they cited "extensive, unexplained losses" suffered by the company. "We only sought to protect our father and his property, as any others would have done," they said.

But one of the wiretappers, Jon Joseph Kelly, says that the tapping was prompted by Bunker's and Herbert's suspicions that someone was trying to influence H. L. Hunt to leave the bulk of his estate to the second Mrs. Hunt and her children. Three of the wiretap victims back up Kelly's version.

Just two weeks ago, in their syndicated column, Jack Anderson and Les Whitten aired a recurring Dallas rumor that the grand jury is looking into an alleged "$50,000 to $60,000 payoff" from Bunker to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James O. Eastland of Mississippi, in return for Eastland's assistance in getting a parole for the other wiretapper, Houston private eye Patrick W. McCann III. Eastland wrote a letter on McCann's behalf, but Bunker has denied that there was any payoff.

The Dallas grand jury is said to be mulling the Eastland connection, as well as the circumstances surrounding the three-year lapse between the wiretappers' arrest and the indictment of Herbert and Bunker on Feb. 28, 1973. A Hunt family lawyer told *Dallas Morning News* investigative reporter Earl Golz that Bunker managed to strike a bargain with the Justice Dept. in which "there would be no prosecution of the Hunts if they performed certain actions; they performed the actions, but there was an indictment anyway."

The actions, reportedly made after 1972 meetings with former President Richard M. Nixon and former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, included Bunker's providing Justice with a list of Al Fatah agents in the U. S. He had secured the list privately because he feared he was on the Al Fatah death list because of his Libyan holdings.

For the Hunts, the wiretapping episode has proved disastrous. Bunker and Herbert could receive prison sentences. And, more than anything else in the family's history, it has torn the tightly woven curtain of secrecy behind which the family has lived and worked for more than four decades. ■

Shelly Katz

Ray Hunt (right) looks over his Dallas development.

1975 № 203-75- 03 1975

Film: Holmes Nostalgia

Jul 22 6 23:1

'Hound' on Bill With First-Rate Keaton

By RICHARD EDER

The first bit in a program of Sherlock Holmes nostalgia at the D. W. Griffith Theater is an old filmed interview with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Stout, mustached and affable, the 68-year-old author made it clear what some people had always suspected: it was Watson who invented Holmes. In any case, Sir Arthur was mainly interested in talking about psychic research.

People wanted to know what happened to the generation of young Englishmen who died in World War II, he said. "Are they dissipated into nothing," he inquired, patting his dog, "or are they still the grand fellows we used to know?"

It wasn't Sir Arthur's ghosts that made a success of haunting: it was his stories. "Sherlock Holmes" is on Broadway, tourists still go on forlorn searches up Baker Street, Gene Wilder is filming Holmes's younger brother in London and Lord Olivier will tackle Moriarty this fall.

The centerpiece of the Holmes's film program is the 1939 Darryl F. Zanuck production of "The Hound of the Baskervilles." It isn't a great picture. It isn't even a great mediocre picture, but it is a good mediocre picture, and perhaps they made better mediocre pictures in those days than they do now.

Dartmoor, the funereal setting for "The Hound," may be partly painted backdrop but they roll in enough studio fog to do "Wuthering Heights twice. Basil Rathbone and Nigel Bruce play Holmes and Watson with comic exaggeration. It is a serious kind of comic exaggeration. It lets you watch it. It doesn't spoof itself: it doesn't wink at you and tell you that it's really just as sophisticated as you are and knows it is making a fool of itself down there on the screen.

The hound is just a large ugly dog, but it manages to be quite as frightening as the mechanical floor waxer in a white shark suit that plays the lead in "Jaws," and a lot less gory.

And then there are the phrases. "Mr. Holmes, you're the only man in all England who can help me." "I'm in mortal fear Sir Henry's life will be snuffed out." "They were the footprints of a gigantic Hound." "Watson, keep your eye on that hansom." "That's what I hate about his moor, there's always something strange." And, of course: "Oh Watson, the needle."

It's like the tunes—singable with a life of their own—that pop out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

Some of the audiences leaves after "The Hound," and the usher urges them back to their seats. He's right: the last picture in the program is a 45-minute Buster Keaton classic.

"Sherlock Junior" is not really a Sherlock Holmes picture. It is about a movie projectionist (Keaton) who wants to be a detective, courts a girl, is thrown out after a rival steals her father's watch and lays the blame on him, falls asleep while projecting a picture and dreams himself into the picture. There he becomes Sherlock Holmes, frustrates the scoundrels and wins the girl.

If it's not quite the masterpiece that "The General" or "The Navigator" is, it is still first-rate Keaton. That is, it is both disciplined and wild. The major part of the picture, where in his dream he literally walks down the aisle, climbs into the screen and joins the plot as Holmes, is full of marvelous chases, escapes and battles with exploding billiard balls.

But the quieter bits are even better. For example, he sweeps out the theater and finds in the debris two or three dollar bills that will allow him to buy candy for his girl. The customers return one by one to claim them. One is an old woman who comes up weeping. With agony he yields up the dollar bill to her. She takes it and yields her handkerchief to him.

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The Casts

THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES, directed by Sidney Lanfield; screenplay by Ernest Pascal, based on the story by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle; a 20th Century-Fox production; distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, 59th Street and Second Avenue. Running time: 80 minutes.

Sir Henry Baskerville .... Richard Greene
Sherlock Holmes .... Basil Rathbone
Beryl Stapleton .... Wendy Barrie
Dr. Watson .... Nigel Bruce
Dr. James Mortimer .... Lionel Atwill
Barryman .... John Carradine
John Stapleton .... Morton Lowry

and

SHERLOCK JR., directed by Buster Keaton; written by Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell and Clyde Bruckman. Produced by Metro Pictures. Distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, Second Avenue and 59th Street. Running time: 45 minutes. With: Mr. Keaton, Kathryn McGuire, Ward Crane, Joseph Keaton, Horace Morgan, Jane Connelly, Erwin Connelly, Ford West, George Davis, John Patrick and Ruth Holley.

'Invasion' of Island Is Laid to France; She Denies Charge

Jul. 22 0 24

KAMPALA, Uganda, July 21 (AP) — A spokesman for the Organization of African Unity said today that French troops were invading the Indian Ocean island of Mayotte that the 46-nation group recognizes as part of the newly independent Comoro Republic.

[In Paris, an official spokesman issued a denial, saying, according to Reuters, that "there are no French troop movements or naval movements around Mayotte, which in any case is French."]

Peter Onu of Nigeria, who is assistant secretary general of the African Unity group, said at a news conference here that French warships had surrounded the Comoro island of Mayotte, where "troops are landing."

On July 6, the Comoro leadership declared the entire island group including Mayotte independent of France on the basis of a referendum last December in which 95 per cent voted for an end to colonial rule. On Mayotte, however, a two-thirds majority voted to retain a link to France, and residents there appealed to Paris to be allowed to break away from the other islands.

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2 HUNTS INDICTED WITH 5 IN DALLAS

Jul. 22 W 21:1

Foreman Among 7 Charged in Wiretap Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

DALLAS, July 21 — Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, sons of the late oil billionaire H. L. Hunt, the Houston lawyer Percy Foreman and four other men were indicted by a Federal grand jury tonight on charges of obstructing justice and impeding an investigation into a wiretape case involving the Hunts.

An 18-member grand jury handed up the nine-count indictment in the court of Federal District Judge Robert W. Porter, ending an 18-month investigation. No one named in the indictment was present.

Named along with the Hunts and Mr. Foreman were Ralph Shank, the Hunt family's personal attorney; B. H. Timmins Jr., a former assistant United States Attorney here who is now in private practice; Edward J. Hudson, a Houston oilfield machinery company owner and close friend of the Hunts, and Charles Tessmer, a Dallas criminal lawyer.

Obstruction Charged

All seven men were alleged to have conspired to obstruct the investigation of the wiretapping case and the Hunt indictments. The investigation subsequently resulted in the indictment of the Hunt brothers for violations of Federal wiretapping laws. The indictment said the group attempted to influence potential witnesses in the earlier case through bribes and veiled threats of physical harm and death.

The Hunts were named in all but two of the counts, while Mr. Foreman was named in three of the counts.

The wiretapping case stems from the 1970 arrests of two Houston men, Jon Kelly and Patrick McCann, in Richardson, a Dallas suburb, and seizure of wiretapping equipment from their car.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department entered the investigation and Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann, along with a third man, W. J. Everett, were indicted for wiretap violations. Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann were tried and found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison in 1972 for wiretapping the home phones of three Hunt employees. Mr. Everett pleaded nolo contendere and was placed on probation.

Trial in September

The Hunts were indicted last summer for their part in the wiretap case, and their trial is slated for September in Lubbock, Tex., where it was moved on a change of venue.

The indictments handed up today allege that the Hunts promised Mr. Kelly, Mr. McCann and Mr. Everett amounts ranging from $800 to $1,280 per month while in prison if they did not testify before a grand jury concerning the Hunts' involvement in the wiretapping.

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Two of the counts charge that Mr. Foreman accepted $100,000 in two $50,000 payments from Mr. Hudson to represent Mr. Kelly and Mr. Everett and to guarantee that neither man would testify before the Federal grand jury in Dallas in 1972.

Mr. Shank, the Hunt family attorney, was indicted on seven counts concerning the alleged bribes. Mr. Tessmer, a well-known Dallas lawyer, was indicted on four counts, including lying to the grand jury in August, 1974, and October, 1974, concerning the offer of a bribe to Mr. Kelly and whether or not he had ever been employed as a counsel for the Hunts. Mr. Hudson was named in three counts and Mr. Timmins in two counts, all involving transmittal of the bribe offers.

Judge Porter did not set any trial date, nor did he set any bail for any of the defendants.

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20 Cambodians Gone From U.S. Navy Center

Jul. 22 A 13:1

NEWPORT, R.I., July 21 (AP) — Twenty Cambodian naval officers, who received political asylum in the United States when their Government fell this spring, have left the naval training center here to start new lives.

Most have found work in Rhode Island even though the state has a 16 per cent unemployment rate. Others have left the state to stay with relatives or try to return to Cambodia.

The 20 officers graduated in a private ceremony at the naval training center on May 19, several weeks after Khmer Rouge insurgents toppled the regime of President Lon Nol.

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

---

have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B"Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

– Michael Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

30 March 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 NW. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

We have received your request under the Freedom of Information Act for information pertaining to you. This is to advise you that as of 27 September 1975 the Privacy Act of 1974 took effect. This act and pertinent CIA regulations established requirements and procedures for access by individuals to information pertaining to them. CIA Regulations were published in the Federal Register on 28 August 1975 and may be found in Title 32 C.F.R. 1901.

Since the Privacy Act requires federal agencies to ensure that improper disclosure of personally identifiable information will not be made and further provides criminal penalties for improper disclosure, CIA Privacy Regulations, section 1901.13, sets forth the following requirements for identification of individuals making requests.

> An individual seeking access to or notification of the existence of records about himself shall provide in the letter of request his full name, address, date and place of birth together with a notarized statement swearing to or affirming his identity...If such individual is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, his or her alien registration number must be also provided.

Before we may begin processing your request, we must receive from you a notarized statement as explained above. The statement should verify that you are a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence. It is also requested that you provide any additional information concerning yourself which might facilitate our search of records. Unless you identify specific records you may be looking for, we will conduct a search of all Agency records that might contain information that pertains to you.

Sincerely,

Gene Wilson

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976

Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies of any and all available (in accordance with the declassification processes stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974) files of records and documents, both computerized and manual apposite of me and my activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.

As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of consideration. The first of them is that, given the proper access codes, the execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision as to the cost of services.

In compliance with your request for identity verification (pursuant to provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d) I hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship. Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Yours truly,
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A.Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell

code names: Federini
Barbarossa
Samson

born 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.

United States of American citizenship

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Uedene Wicks

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENTS OF: Frank Sturgis

present address:
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

also known as:
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino

1924, Dec. 9	born in Norfolk, Va.
1930-1942	resided at 510 High Street , Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa.
1942-1945	U.S.Marine Corps Reserve (Paris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
1945	honorable discharge -Klamouth Falls, Ore.
1945	Miami, Florida
c.1945-1948	Norfolk, Va. adrs: Bank St., etc. joined Norfolk Police Dept. attended William and Mary College also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia Tavern on East Main Street c.1949-employed as owner and manager of The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
c.1948	enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
c.1949	honorable discharge
c.1949-1950	U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and from Europe
c. 1950-1952	U.S. Army - stationed in Germany
c. 1952	honorable discharge
c. 1952-1954	owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in Virginia, Beach, Va.
c. 1956-1961	Cuba(Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida; Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is. 1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate-Santiago, Cuba 1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy-Havana,Cuba 1959: contact with FBI HQ - Washington,DC 1961-1970: Bay of Pigs CIA control officer Sam Jenis

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH - cont'd

1963	contact with FBI and CIA
1968	travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and Honduras
1968-1972	mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American Aluminum Corp. 185th St., Miami, Florida
June 17, 1972	adventure: Watergate Office Building
June-July 1972	moved to Washington, D.C. jail
January 8, 1973	Watergate trial: U.S. v. G. Gordon Liddy et al.
January 15, 1973	plea of guilty entered
c. May 1973	moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn. then moved to Eglin Air Force Base thence moved to Dade County Jail
January 1974	released on appeal bond
1974	salesman for Heavy Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida
1975	salesmanager for Continental Egg Corp., Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Miami Book Mfg. Company 4460 N.W. 37th Avenue Miami, Florida

Thank you,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

My commission expires____________________________

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 6 MAY 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter, dated 7 May, requesting access under the Privacy Act for information pertaining to you. There is no charge for processing Privacy Act requests.

We are therefore processing your request and will provide you with the results under the Privacy Act as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 12, 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 Northwest 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This is to acknowledge receipt by the FBI on March 23, 1976, of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request dated March 13, 1976.

Based on the limited information you provided, it is not possible to make an accurate search of our records. To insure an accurate search of our records, please furnish your complete name, date and place of birth, prior addresses, employments and any specific data that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.

An exceedingly heavy volume of FOIPA requests has been received these past few months. Additionally, court deadlines involving certain historical cases of considerable scope have been imposed upon the FBI. Despite successive expansions of our staff responsible for FOIPA matters, substantial delays in processing requests continue.

Since January 1, 1975, the FBI has received a total of 17,204 FOIPA requests. Of these, our present backlog is 6,782. In an effort to deal fairly with any request requiring the retrieval, processing and duplication of documents, each request is being handled in chronological order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured that your request is being handled as equitably as possible and that all documents which can be released will be made available at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Frank Sturgis

Prior to the processing or release of any documents which may pertain to you, it will be necessary for you to submit your notarized signature. This procedure is designed to insure that information concerning an individual is released only to that person.

Your patience and cooperation will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

CMKelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

FRANK STURGIS
2515 N.W. 122 STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33167

May 3, 1976

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Office of the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you requested more specific information to help in the search, collection and duplication of records indicated in my recent freedom of information request. I am sending a chronological sketch of my residences and employments prefaced by a list of names under which I have been known. I hope this profile will aid the Bureau in its search for my records. Notarization of this letter and the sketch will attest to the verification of my identity.

Considering the voluminous quantity of material that may have to be read and screened, I would be pleased in the interest of fairness to afford the Justice Department whatever reasonable extension of time is needed to comply with my freedom of information request.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis
Encl/
FS:s

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared FRANK STURGIS to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day of May, A.D., 1976.

Udine Wilke
Notary Public
State of Florida at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

MEMORANDUM October 29, 1976

TO : Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood, ✓ Mike Epstein

FROM : Rick Inderfurth

In case you missed the attached article on Russell Bufalino . . .

Attachment

The Washington Post

October 28, 1976

Reputed Crime Chief Accused of Extortion In Collecting a Debt

Associated Press

Russell Bufalino, a reputed organized crime leader, has been indicted on federal charges of conspiracy and extortion for using threats of violence in trying to collect a debt, the Justice Department announced yesterday.

Bufalino and three other men were named defendants in a sealed indictment returned by a federal grand jury in New York City Tuesday and unsealed yesterday.

Bufalino, 71, of Kingston, Pa., was identified by federal officials in 1973 as the head of one of five Cosa Nostra families operating in Pennsylvania. The Immigration Service has attempted for nearly 20 years to deport Bufalino to Sicily, saying he was born there and brought to the United States as an infant. He says he was born in this country.

Liebengood

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI
RE: RAPHAEL GENER

October 26, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #R 5080

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Attorney General Levi:

As you know, the Intelligence Committee has taken testimony with regard to John Rosselli and the assassination plots directed against Fidel Castro. As part of the Committee's inquiry in this area, testimony has been received regarding an individual by the name of Raphael Gener. Committee staff have participated in a review of this testimony with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are requesting that, upon the completion of this review of testimony, the Committee be provided access to all FBI materials relating to Mr. Gener.

We are hopeful that Committee staff and your representatives will be able to work out access to the appropriate files and materials in the same manner as we have in the past. We continue to appreciate your assistance in these matters.

Aloha,

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice Chairman

MJM:mlh

Veciana/FBI notes
12/20/76 ①

Memo SAC San Juan to Director 10/25/73
Informants on 4 occasions betw. ~~So~~ Aug and Oct, 73 advise SA Jerry Sellers AV severed Alpha 66 rel. several years earlier & was member of PRP but severed summer 1973 because lacked "revol. zeal."

Memo SAC Miami to Director 9/27/73 reference 3 infor. for LHM of 9/27/73 re the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) from Miami, Fla.

Veciana: DR planning terrorist activities in Paris in name of phony group "Accion Cuba". Jose Antonio Calatayud Rivera is Sec. Gen. - DR.

Aldo Serafin, Cristobal Mayo, Eulalia Armenta resigned from DR Sept 16, 1973

Primivito Rodriguez-Rodriguez said attack on Paris Embassy initiated in office of Lesnik (Replica) + financed by Bosch + AV.

Alfred Soler Soler moving to Vz to plan kidnapping of Cuban officials for DR
in import export business.

LHM Aug 30, 1973 re Barres

Barres advises FBI that AV and Serafin planned + executed Paris bombing that killed Juan Felipe De La Cruz in Aug 2, 1973.

②

In July, 73, AV advised Barres that he obtained 300 lbs of C-1 explosives in Texas (having been unable to obtain C-4) and tested it in the Everglades. AV said he had sent a man to Spain, France, Argentina & Peru to cause explosion at Cuban Embassies & create a "Black Sept." type organization

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Spanish Trans. sent to Madrid to Miami (Aug 30, 73) "Moralitos"

Ricardo Morales Navarette - Asked by Bureau to Bosch. Accused of death of Cubans in U.S. Participated in terrorist attacks. Bosch group has sentenced to death

Miami SAC to Director Memo (8/2/73)

AV presented 15 Bolivian & Venezuelan passports belonging to numerous individuals of interest to (Third Ag.)

7/16/73 SAC Miami to Director Memo

Acknowledges FBI contact w/ AV in Miami & thru Legat in Caracas & La Paz. FBI in contact because AV in PRP. Rec. an opportunist w/ delusions of grandeur. Wants to be in limelight regardless of cause

Correlation
Veciana Summary - 3/15/73

③

Francisco Vinicento Gonzalez Tuero says he ~~and AV robbed the~~ robbed the Banco ~~Financiero~~ Financerio in Cuba in March, 61. AV planned the robbery. AV then sent message to Zenaida (LNU) 1174 SW 12th St. Miami requesting rifle grenades.

12/27/61 Conf. source advised FBI that AV planned most recent attempt on Castro's life.

1/7/63 Craig T. Sheldon raising money for AV + Alpha 66.

AV heavily funded by Julio Lobo.

1/30/64 AV advised? he had no personal knowledge of ~~John Robert~~ Klinner, who was investigated re JFK assassination. Klinner is James Edgar Wethington - with long criminal record. Claimed association w/ Cuban Freedom Fighters. (See reports # 62-109060 and # 62-109060-3083, p. G, 655.)

1/30/64 Veciana substantiated report of Eusebio Ojeda, Chief of Personnel SFNE

(4)

Veciana in Dallas in May 64 to visit Dallas SFNE Chapter

Vec. in contact w/ Somosa who promised him training bases in Nic.

The CIA advised that James G. Cogswell, who reportedly had high level contacts in society and US Navy in April, 1966, intro. AV to CIA reps. AV wanted 50,000 to organize group to assassinate CASTRO - CIA declined -

Veciana treasurer, administrator + spokesman for the unity group of Alpha 66, SFNE & MRP.

2/24/69 AV signed doc. presented this date to Nixon to free Orlando Bosch.

Veciana lived at Savoy Hotel in Caracas,

Quitterez Silva was detained questioned and released after trying to enter Soviet Embassy in in LaPaz. Silva had AV's wife's name + address in his book.

GRIMALDI

AV established liaison w/ Legat in Bolivia thru the minerals attache at the US Embassy. AV furnished info. from Bolivian National Police files

⑤

Apr 30, 68 info from Augusto Pineda Gonzalez - Pineda came over on boat w/ AV. AV visited Pineda in June 68 and asked Pineda to receive 3 57mm recoilless rifles in Flor. somewhere outside Miami + deliver them to unspecified SFNE people in Miami. Would be used to attack Soviet ships. AV disgusted w/ US policy. AV tried Pineda to organize demonstrations and armed attacks to annoy US + create probs. AV convinced US protecting Castro.
AV would fund Pineda @ $3,000 to $5,000 per mo. Pineda to call Sara when organized. She would provide the $.

Co-Ordinator of Cuban Affairs of the Dept of State - G. HARRY ~~Shum~~ Shuma furnished FBI info. on Veciani ~~[illegible]~~ based on his "~~personal~~ contacts w/ him" ~~this info [illegible] convinced it. that AV no longer involved in anti~~-Cas ~~activite~~

Vasquez + Ray active in 1967 w/ Vecian

⑥

1974 - Enrique Nunez Alvarez and Elvio Rivera Limonta active in FLNC terrorist activities / Both in P. Rico.

MM 105-22094 at TAB Bufile #105-261797

NISO Charleston, SC
111th M.I. Group, Miami } receiving dissemination re PPP.

AV on 11/27/72 ~~had~~ reportedly told source that the US Embassy in La Paz helped him organize the Costa R. convention

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MRS. Frances R. Grant
~~Frances~~ - Spec. invitee on C. Rica Convention

Tony Santiago - on initiating Committee for C. Rica convention

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Felipe Pazos - headed Banco Nacional in Cuba under Prio.

⑦

Israel Romero was Union City, N.J. repr. of MIRR during pd. Bosch involved in bombing activitess. Romero once close to Bosch.

Arturo Villar - wealthy, San Juan, active

Ramon Font furnished explosive for French expl. Aug 2, 73 Hotel Oasis Avrainville, Fr.

Lesnick - longstanding Marxist.
Attacked Batista in radio broadcasts
Continued Broadcasts after Castro - invented "Cuba-Si-Yanqui NO"

For a #? years in contact w/ hoodlum elements during Batista regime. Took part in various assaults in Havanna during Batista. Left Havanna year or two after Castro took power. Exile in Miami. Despite fact - close friend of Fidel's in college.

AV funded "Replica".

LIEBENGOOD ROUTH NOTES FROM U. S. V. VECIANA, ET AL

DATE: December 1, 1976

Veciana was represented by Barry L. Garber, 1040 City National Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130 (305-377-4963)

Veciana became implicated as the result of a drug bust of one Augustine Barres, a/k/a/ Emidigio Augustine Barres Fangul ("Gus Barres"). The bust resulted from an search warrant of 23 July 73 for Barres' attache case at the Taft Hotel in New York. The police were acting on an informant tip to an under-cover agent who arranged for a buy from Barres of seven kilograms of Cocaine at the Taft. The police understood that Barres was to be with a "female" courier. Barres advised DEA task force representative, Eugene W. Flynn, a detective sgt. with the NYPD, that he purchased the seven kilos from Antonio Veciana in Miami on July 21, 1973.

Barres owns a home in Puerto Rico and travels to New York every two weeks on business.

A co-defendant of Veciana's in the case was Ariel Pomares who is the President of Occidental Investment, a real estate firm owned by Barres, located at 1186 J. T. Pinero Avenue, Miami. Pomares is also involved with FRECA Imports in Puerto Rico. This is also a Barres enterprise.

The DEA Miami regional office cables that Veciana is the subject of INS File No. A12-490987 and that he claims to be a public accountant.

According to the Miami Herald of July 25, 1973, Barres was Assistant Secretary of Communications under Castro and later the general manager of the Havana Health Department. He fled Cuba in 1961 for asylum in Puerto Rico. He became a United States citizen in 1970.

A cable from Ivan Wurms, the Chief Investigator of the DEA Task Force to Durkin at DEA headquarters, Washington, states that Veciana was arrested without incident on 7/24/73 and signed a "consent to search" form. Miscellaneous papers and numerous

Liebengood Rough No~~e~~tes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al con't.

foreign passports belonging to several subjects were seized. Swiss bank account deposit slips were seized and are to be followed by IRS. Veciana claims to be an anti-Castro fund raiser. FBI confirms this.

A July, 1973 TWIX from DEA in New York to DEA headquarters Washington (attention: Daniel P. Casey, Acting Chief) referenced as subject: G1-73-X093 (presumably Veciana) and states "during debriefing of the defendant in New York on July 25, 1973, it was learned that Antonio Carlos Veciana, 811 North Southwest 30th Court, Miami is a member of an anti-Castro group which he has stated intends to blow up a number of Cuban properties and/or embassies in foreign nations, i.e., Spain, Mexico, Peru and France. Bombings originally scheduled for July now delayed until August."

Subpoena of August 14, 1973 exists for a telegram billed to Veciana at 649-1226 and sent to Barcelona, Spain on 5/26/73.

Barres implicates a Paraguyan diplomat formerly assigned to LaPaz, Bolivia and reassigned to Spain in the drug traffic. DEA is discretely checking his identity. A follow-up cable from DEA indicates that they have failed to identify the Paraguyan diplomat sent to Spain but do indicate that a Pedro P. Medina, a Paraguyan assigned to LaPaz, is believed to be involved in Cocaine smuggling.

Barres admitted that he was responsible for bringing Pomares, an employee of his, into illegal drug activity.

Veciana claimed to be without funds and destitute and was not fined. The U. S. Attorney was concerned that he posted a $100,000 bail immediately. However, after initial concern being shown in the file by the U. S. Attorney, the U. S. Attorney later writes the Judge that $80,000 of the $100,000 bond was furnished by Veciana's cousin, Dr. P~~ue~~ablo Zalduendo, a phycian from Detroit, Michigan. The remainder of the bail money was furnished by Veciana's uncle and other family members and friends who cashed insurance policies, closed children's savings accounts, etc. U. S. Attorney concluded that Veciana was possibly telling the truth when he advised the Court that he was destitute.

One ~~Hosea~~ Jose Lopez is a character reference for Barres on appeal.

Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

Barres says he requested the government to give immunity to Veciana in order to destroy the traffic of Cocaine from Bolivia.

Barres studied at Columbia Military Academy in Columbia, Tennessee in 1951.

A taped transcript of Barres' debriefing by detectives Flynn and Scamardella on July 25, 1973 reveals the following: Barres got involved in drugs through his friend Veciana who was an officer of the International Development Bank in the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. Some people think Veciana is with the CIA but Barres does not know. Barres dealt with Veciana regarding an attempt to kill Castro in Chile. He says Veciana did a good job of transferring everything into Chile (1970-1971). Barres gave Veciana $2,000 in support of this assassination effort. About this time Veciana said that drugs could be smuggled out of Bolivia through diplomatic pouch. Barres thought this was how Veciana had sent weapons into Chile. Barres advised that the head of Interpol in Bolivia gets a cut of drug money for protection on the Bolivian end and that a Secret Service Agent and two Paraguyan diplomats were also involved. They handled the transfer to Veciana in Miami Beach of the drugs from Bolivia.

Barres thought that the individual he was selling the drugs to in New York was a mafia type. It appears this is the individual who informed the police. He is known only as Tony in the transcript. The police were aware of his identity but did not desire Barres to discuss it.

Pomares' counsel, Gustavo Del Toro, urged the DEA in San Juan at the time of the arrest of Pomares to consider immunity for Pomares because Pomares possessed valuable information regarding international narcotic trafficing, including the implication of diplomats in places such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

The file contains cancelled Veciana checks drawn on the account of Antonio Sira Veciana at the Fidelity National Bank, 5880 Byrd Road, Miami, Florida, in May and June, 1972, for $1,000 each, payable to the Swiss Bank Corporation for account EF558230. These checks were obtained through subpoena on Catherine Hune, Vice President and Cashier of the Fidelity National Bank in Miami.

Liebengood Rough Notes on U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

In Veciana's appellate brief he references transfers of drugs through the government's "APO System". He indicates that the first transaction he was involved in took place in April, 1972.

Also involved is someone known as "the midget".

To Veciana file

MEMORANDUM TO: File

RE: Antonio Veciana

FROM: Tom Moore

DATE: Jan. 3, 1977

Telephoned Veciana to ask if he recalled any attempts on his life in late 1962 or 1963. He answered that there were three attempts on his life, but none in 1962 or 1963. The first attempt, he said, occurred in a stadium in Puerto Rico in 1967 when a bomb exploded approximately 20 meters away. He said he believed Puerto Rican communists were responsible for this attempt. The second attempt occurred in Bolivia in approximately 1970 when some men with weapons appeared at a home where he was supposed to be. He said a woman who owned the home called him to warn him. He said he thought this attempt was related to a revolution which was taking place at that time. The third attempt, he said, occurred in Caracas, Venezuela in 1971. He added that he had received information within the past three months that Castro wanted to kidnap him.

The only relevant incident in late 1962 or 1963 was that an Isobel Zarate began making inquiries about him in Miami. He said many people in the Cuban community informed the FBI she was a Castro spy and that she subsequently escaped to Cuba via Mexico.

[redacted] [redacted]

Maheu	[redacted] CASTRO	KENNEDYS
Rosselli	[redacted] Karamessines	ROWAN
HARVEY	Helms	HOOVER
O'Connell	Hunt	LBJ

Warren Commission
- Commission knew
name contacts

Lines of Inquiry
- What Castro doing in retaliatory vein.
- what was Castro intelligence capability.

CI

- Cuba anti-Castro community - who replaced & co-ord. CIA in funding & why?
- Addit Mafia relationships w/ Exiles -
- pressure on mafia from Kennedy's Justice Department

CIA Evaluation of McGovern Information

Conf. Tom Moore

Ed Gr. - MM. - HL. - RI. (ME)

Need full picture on Hunt

Cuban - Bahamas switch by [illegible] after Castro ([illegible])

December

Miami Trip → [illegible]
Sturgis

Get Hunt, Sturgis, Barker, Martinez material
miami police < organized crime section
Cuban exile section

Organizing our material → Castro-Kennedy Assassination

district

[illegible] computer related material - New Register + file system
formalize files

Name. Card Index - name + reference →

Omit all but Impt. References

MAHEU
ROSSELLI
HARVEY
O'Connell
CASTRO
KARAMESSINES
HELMS
HUNT
KENNEDY
ROWAN
HOOVER
LBJ
~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
ALL ADMN. OFFICIALS
KENNEDYS
HUNT

- Hughes
- Watergate material
-

~~Summer~~
~~Acquaintances~~
~~[illegible]~~
~~Briefing - [illegible]~~
~~Paradise~~

Marita

~~Mark Smedi 431 — Kennedy office 4:00 PM~~

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~

Johnson City — Ramsey Coleman
February — ~~Justice Dept. Inst.~~ — 10 weeks
~~E. Tenn. State~~
~~BS - Cr. Justice~~
Masters - Sociology.

Perez Jiminez
— Kill Kennedy.

El Gato despises Frank Sturgis

Allen Altman - Lawyer
$ 2,600 — wants
150 BROADWAY

— represents Hank Mesick

MARITA GAVE TO MESICK

"The Cat"
"EL GATO" — Code name
- Pretense buying Nazi book.
- Assassinated Castro's double.
- 39-40 years old.
[Tall / Blonde — German Soldier of Fortune] (very wealthy collector antiques)
Told Fonzi.

Rolando Masferrer
Orlando Bosch
Rolando Martinez

Last person
Mickey Rosselli — alive.

Shelly ~~[illegible]~~ Abend [in bus. in N.Y. He brought El Gato to Marita
theatrical agency cover

Son - 4 wks ago after Faq. threat
hospitalized

> no longer wants

> Father - double Nazi for US (FBI) — married Delaware mother
(Submarine)

> Derry Davis = State Dept.
or
Dept. Justice

> Gerstein bugged.

> Sturgis - HK theory

> - FBI down on Marita because of publication of citation by Meskill.

Soviets didn't react adversely to

plane tickets to Germany

CIA Super Spy – Frank Sturgis
STAR
Sept 7, 1976

2 Israeli's targeted
Uncle Al - 1970

Lists

FBI
Mnt.

> Eduardo —

A Situational Report
on Surveillance + Control
in Modern Democratic
Society —
— Robert Yaffee —

Univ. of Waterloo Student Mag
June 16, 1972

— anti-personnel radar. fled to Canada.

(Lynn Kirkpatrick)

accused of being agent

Mike Ackerman — CIA / Miami > lecturing.

CRC — Artime

Frank
Alex R. } $ from EHH
white house.

60-61 - Miami
✓
Frank assigned to General.

pb! { Frank O'Brien
Frank Lundquist } with Alex R.
and
F. St.
when proposed
Castro
kill.

David W. Walters – Miami lawyer for
Perez Jiminez
– Marita

Has the $.

$50,800.00
to JFK
in cash

Sturgis call 12/3/76

Hank Mesnik - writer

won't

Marita Lorenz.

Atty: Allan Altman, Esq.
150 Broadway
NYC, NYC.

Has materiel

Tapes & documents - Louis Somosa.
KGB
- Bobby Baker
- Hoffa
- Sapied - threatens Killing Kennedy

Jiminez -

gave him everything

Call Marita

Pepe Alleman

trouble — Trafficante.

I. Carry-over from Church report

A. Relationship between agencies and Warren Commission

1. Warren Comm. staff has never been interviewed in depth. Many have not been interviewed at all. The Commission had particular staff assigned to (a) Cuba and (b) organized crime. They, especially, should be fully debriefed about everything that happened in their contacts with the agencies, their frustrations, unfulfilled leads, inability to get access, questionmarks, and what they knew, heard, or suspected about contacts at high-level between Commission members and top agency officials. This would include leads to additional documents, memoranda and people, and is especially important in the time-frame just before the Commission issued its report, i.e. as final drafts being written, when staff learned for the first time about Castro's threat. (Willens, staff director, said there were staff pushing hard to re-open this subject, but pressure of getting the report out prevailed.)

2. Look for all other memoranda of contacts between McCone and CIA re how to structure questions, etc.

3. We now know that Ruby was contacted svereal times by FBI to inform on ~~organized crime in Dallas area~~ "criminal element" in Dallas area. All we've seen is the cummary memo in which Warren Commission was so informed. Get each memorandum of contact between FBI agents and Ruby, i.e. underlying materials which "support" the summary memo.

B. The inter-agency committee which met to develop contineqncy plans in the wake of Castro's threat.

1. Numerous documents were sought from FBI, CIA, Defense, State, etc., but never received by Church Committee before our final report was issued. Must follow-through, and then go deeper into it.

2. What else was known besides Castro's retaliation threat? What facts went into the assessment that Castro might retaliate against U.S. leaders in Latin America, but not U.S. leaders in the U.S.? Precisely what accounted for the original inclusion of a concern about retaliation in the U.S., but the subsequent deletion of that prospect? Who was responsible for the deletion, and what impact, if any, did that have on the later ~~of~~ withholding of info from the Warren Commission and on the agencies' failure to investigate retaliation?

3. We must find out exactly who was on this Committee at each meeting, get all back-up materials, and interview.

C. FBI involvement in Bay of Pigs, Lansdale planning, etc.

1. As Church report was being completed, we were just beginning to learn about how deeply the FBI was apparently involved in U.S. anti-Castro action. Possibility here that this could provide another clue in re FBI's original reluctance to investigate retaliation more fully. For instance we now know that FBI had learned about CIA's interest in using organized crime to kill Castro long before RFK told Hoover about it (Hoover had professed surprise in 1963, but there's some indication he may have already known). One FBI witness even told us that a high FBI official had even proposed the plot idea "in jest". At a minimum, the paper record shows FBI was informed about idea of using org. crime figures to provide Cuban intelligence and that, according to the paper record, FBI recommended against it. Trafficante has now claimed that FBI agents came to him seeking Cuban intelligence. This must be followed up, agents interviewed, and FBI memo's, etc., examined.

D. CIA files

I always had the impression that Jim Johnston felt there were more CIA documents which he hadn't seen. We must go over the itmes, one by one, with Johnston, to find out just where we stand on the question of whether or not we've seen everything. Do any of us really fully understand the entire CIA filing system so as to know whether we've been shown everything, or indeed , whether they have even g-ne looking for everything.? And how about the field office files, i.e. JMWAVE files in Miami, New Orleans and Mexico City files, DC local CIA station files, and FBI field office files?

II. Rosselli-organized crime-Trafficante-Cuba

A. Organized crime files

1. A full assessment of all travel, contacts, relationships, etc. of all major organized crime figures in and around the time of the assassination of JFK. This would include a review (with appropriate system for pritecting privacy interests) of all microphone surveillance logs on organized crime figures during key months in 1963, e.g. Fred Black. Trafficante, Rosselli, Giancana, Las Vegas casinos, etc. (Rosselli was very defensive in his testimony about some comment he says he made on the phone to someone upon first learning that JFK had been killed; he indicated that he had been "coming out of a deep sleep and said someting about communists did it." Of course he now knows that that call may have been tapped and is trying to explain. No one had ever asked for

that log.

2. A new analysis of all the long distance toll calls of Jack Ruby in the days around Nov. 22. Warren Comm. records show he made calls to Chicago O.C. figure Barney Baker, and Teamster heavy Dusty Miller, plus others. Does the explanation for these calls really wash (i.e. Ruby's union troubles in re his nightclub). Has this whole ~~sb~~ subject been exhausted by Warren Comm. or not. Is there more (interviews, etc.) that should be done here?

3. Someone should literally live in Miami area for a month, immerse in the community, get to know the whole scorecard, (maybe hire a local Spanish-speaking cop with good local contacts). More fully debrief Trafficante for his version of events and people. Follow up with contacts with all the Cubans involved. Has Miami pulled all the significant toll records for period of time around Rosselli's death (Cubans, O.C. figures, garage owner, etc.) and followed up.

4. A full tracking of what happened when Church reports were released, reactions, contacts, concerns, who were the key figures who actually got the reports and who did they speak to about the ~~xxxxxxx~~ contents. Review our own mailing records, if exist, showing who asked for reports. Local ~~xxxx~~ news ~~xxxx~~ media for leads in re reactions of the community. Travel records of O.C. and Cuban leaders in and around that time, as well as in and around time of Rosselli's death.

5. McWillie. Trafficante associate who invited Ruby to Cuba in 1959. McWillie later manages Las Vegas casino's & his contact with Ruby continues. Warren Comm. investigate inadequate on this subject.

5986

Marita file

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose *if* we have time to listen to her.

H —

I think we should
set up an interview
at a time which
won't conflict w/
hearings — may
until later
not be now.
M

HSL/dr

5986

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

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Howard: I have no objections to her coming down, but would be personally hesitant to invest any more of my own time unless she can provide at least a specific adjenda of new information she will discuss.

One possible tactic is to tell her that we are extremely pressed for time and cannot subpena her until late February unless she give us specific areas that would allow us to show "our superiors" that talking to her should be given a higher priority over other committee business.

HSL/dr

Tom

5986

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DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

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HSL/dr

MEMORANDUM

To: Mike Madigan

From: Ed Greissing

Date: Sept. 16, 1976

Subject: Review of CIA documents presented the SCI by Jack Anderson

The documents recently received by this Committee, from Jack Anderson, had previously been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The documents appear to be a few of those requested for FOIA review by David Belin. It is my understanding, after these documents were declassified, David Belin furnished copies to both David Martin(AP) and Jack Anderson.

The Church Committee was permitted to review the entire Oswald 201 file, the AMLASH file, Garrison files and selected Office of Security files. The Committee primarily concerned itself with the early period of the investigation(November 1963 - October 1964), as it believed the information to be received from this time period to be more relevant in evaluating the performance of the intelligence agencies with respect to their investigation.

Dan Niescher, the Church Committee contact at the CIA,was the individual responsible for the declassification of documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. During this declassification process, Dan Niescher consulted the Committee staff to make sure that we were aware of certain documents.In addition, Mr. Kaleras had given the staff unlimited access to all files we believed necessary to conduct our investigation.

Yet, the possibility still remains that the staff was not shown everything. The CIA has maintained throughout that the Oswald 201 file was a complete compilation of the material related to the assassination of President Kennedy. However, information relating to who Lee Harvey Oswald was, and what he was doing are not included.in their files. The Oswald 201 does not attempt to question Oswald's connection with both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups or any of the AMLASH information. The most notable subject missing was information relating to CIA/U.S. Government attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Dot to Rosselli file

H. L. Johnson w/
LaBrecque
12/22/76

. . . .

No, I can't either confirm or deny it. We are prohibited at staff level from discussing any Committee business. I apologize for not being able to help you. You know the ground rules and they haven't changed. Right.

. . . .

I can't say. I don't know. You indicated that you . . .

. . . .

Are you still working Rosselli? You getting anywhere?

. . . .

You got a pretty good source on that? On the fact that they were having dinner together on many occasions before he was murdered?

. . . .

I just can't help you because of the ground rules. I'd like to have a copy of your piece, or two, for me and Inderfurth here. Just drop a copy in the mail and I'll appreciate it.

. . . .

You mean people like . . . Well, I think . . . people like Trafficante?

. . . .

Well, I can't discuss whether or not such a meeting took place. I can't tell you whether you're right or wrong.

. . . .

Now when you talk about Trafficante you don't need to be cautioned. You know them as well as I do.

. . . .

Well, as far as our rules are concerned, it wouldn't make any difference if Trafficante was here. It wouldn't make any difference in our ability to confirm or deny that.

. . . .

Miami Herald Dec. 24

Trafficante Made Secret Appearance At Senate Investigation, Sources Say

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Florida's reputed organized crime boss, Santos Trafficante of Tampa and Miami, made a secret, four-hour October appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee to answer questions about his role in a CIA assassination plot, investigation sources have disclosed.

Trafficante, 62, had not previously been questioned by the committee or its staff in the two-year-old investigation of CIA activities.

Of the three Mafia figures involved in the early 1960s plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, only Trafficante is still alive. Both Sam Giancana and John Rosselli were murdered within the last 16 months.

The murders are unsolved.

John Rosselli
... dined with Trafficante

INVESTIGATORS ALSO said that Trafficante had dinner with Rosselli at The Landings, a Fort Lauderdale restaurant, in mid-July, less than two weeks before Rosselli disappeared. Rosselli's body, stuffed in an oil drum, floated to the surface of Dumfoundling Bay the first week of August.

Trafficante reportedly has told police that the July dinner with Rosselli — as well as several other meetings previously at the Cordoba Restaurant in Miami, formerly owned by the husband of Rosselli's niece, according to police — were "friendly, social events with no business."

Investigators in recent weeks have centered their efforts on tracing the whereabouts of Trafficante's associates at the time of Rosselli's disappearance, a source said.

Trafficante, who for about four years has maintained a home at 740 NE 155th St. in North Dade, could not be reached for comment.

Trafficante was identified as the head of a South Florida Mafia family in testimony in 1963 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee.

HIS ATTORNEY, Henry Gonzalez of Tampa, who accompanied Trafficante when he went to Washington, according to sources, would not comment on either the Senate appearance or Trafficante's past activities. When first asked about the Senate appearance, he said, "You realize you're treading on dangerous ground."

A committee source said that Trafficante had not been questioned previously by the committee because his role in the plot had been considered "secondary."

Interest was renewed in the plot after Rosselli's death. Investigators sought to determine whether the murders of the two men were connected in any way with their testimony or potential testimony before the committee.

GIANCANA, WHO was a Mafia boss in Chicago for many years, was killed in June 1975, at the same time Senate investigators were preparing to contact him. The gun used to kill Giancana, found discarded on a roadside several miles from Giancana's house a month after the murder, was traced to a Miami gunshop, but the trail stopped there.

Investigators said the gun was part of a shipment purchased in 1965 by the Tamiami Gun Shop, but there are no records to indicate where it went from there, according to investigators and gunshop owners.

Rosselli, whose most powerful Mafia days were reportedly in the 1950s and early 1960s in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, did appear before the committee at least three times in the 12 months before his death.

In Washington, the committee has kept a tight clamp on comment about the investigation, and only one member, Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.), acknowledged the Trafficante session, saying "I was not present when the witness you speak of was in front of the committee."

Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), the committee chairman who, along with Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) pressured for Justice Department and FBI involvement in the Rosselli murder case, said "I have never met Mr. Trafficante. That's as far as I'll go."

A PRIME interest of the committee has been possible links between the CIA Castro plotting and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Revelations of the Senate committee were a key factor in the creation of the new House of Representative investigation, which is taking a new look at the JFK murder.

Trafficante reportedly has told investigators that he first met Rosselli about 1956. It was in the early 1950s that Florida law- enforcement officials estimated that a Bolita opertion run by Trafficante and his brother netted $2 million annually.

Trafficante was a major gambling figure in pre-Castro Havana, where he ran a casino. In 1959, it was estimated that $1 million or $2 million was bet nightly in all the Mafia-run casinos in Havana. The gambling stopped when Castro took over in 1959.

Rosselli was the first of the three Mafia figures to be recruited by the CIA in 1960 in its plot to assassinate Castro.

IN A CIA memo quoted in an interim report of the committee a year ago, it was said that Trafficante's role was to "serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there."

Rosselli told his CIA liaison that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination." An internal CIA investigation in 1967 "suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing 'gambling, prostitution and dope monopolies' in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro."

Roselli's Body Found in Floating Drum

[illegible] — The body of [illegible], a key figure with [illegible] mobster [illegible] in a CIA [illegible] to assassinate Fidel Castro, [illegible] found in [illegible] drum floating in [illegible] of Biscayne Bay.

[illegible] County officials said [illegible] had been asphyxiated.

[illegible] Wright, chief [illegible] examiner would not say if Roselli died before or after his body was stuffed into the [illegible] gallon drum.

[illegible] Roselli, whose body [illegible] found Sunday and identified yesterday, had been [illegible]. Wright would only confirm that there was "a circular [illegible] on the lower abdomen."

Wright said Roselli, 71, had probably been dead since July [illegible] the day he reportedly left [illegible] home in nearby Broward County to play golf.

He said Roselli's killers tried hard to keep the disappearance [illegible].

"[illegible] incredible amount of [illegible] trying to make sure the body [illegible] never found," Wright said. "The lengths to which they went to insure that the body would not be found clearly earmarks this as a true gangland-style killing."

Roselli testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and Giancana had been recruited in 1961 by the CIA [illegible] a plot to [illegible] Castro. [illegible]

[illegible] Fla., [illegible]. [illegible] Giancana were [illegible] then, paid $150,000, according to the Senate report on the scheme. Roselli was the [illegible] man between Giancana and Cuban dissidents who [illegible] to carry out the [illegible].

Giancana [illegible] also [illegible] 1975, several days [illegible] his scheduled appearance [illegible] someone pumped [illegible] bullets into him in what [illegible] said was [illegible]

THE ACTUAL contact man for the Castro operation turned out to be Robert Maheu, onetime top aide to the late industrialist Howard Hughes, who served as a liaison between the CIA and the mobsters. Maheu, who has partially acknowledged his role in the affair, had split with Hughes long before the latter [illegible] earlier this year.

Roselli and [illegible] were also reported to have been linked with Judith Campbell Exner, who said last year she had "a relationship" with the late President John F. Kennedy. The [illegible] of Roselli and [illegible] FBI re[illegible] Exner's [illegible] her [illegible] Mrs. Exner [illegible] in cash [illegible].

[illegible], Roselli's Washington attorney, Tom Wadden, became concerned about his client's life and contacted Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. in an effort to secure more investigation of the case.

Baker was a member of the committee before which Roselli testified.

Wadden told Baker he felt certain Roselli had met with [illegible]

IN TURN, [illegible] to what Wadden told [illegible], Baker telephoned Committee Chairman Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, and [illegible] Clarence Kelley and urged that Roselli's disappearance be investigated.

Baker could not be reached for comment last night on the conversations with the attorney.

Two fishermen found the drum floating in Dumbfounding Bay, an arm of Biscayne Bay between North Miami and Miami Beach. Police said the fishermen, not publicly identified, called them after they spotted human limbs through the holes chopped in the barrel.

Authorities said that because of the currents, it was not known where the drum was thrown in the bay.

[illegible] the [illegible] had been chopped in the [illegible]

[illegible] weights [illegible] would [illegible]

In Washington, [illegible] Inouye, chairman of the [illegible] Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that it would be premature to decide on a congressional investigation until more facts of the killing are known.

"As soon as [illegible] the facts available, I will [illegible] to decide whether to investigate," he said.

ROSELLI WAS reported missing by his sister, with whom he had recently been living in Plantation, north of Miami. She said she last saw [illegible]

[illegible] in Washington said the [illegible]

[illegible] the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Roselli was sent to Las Vegas, Nev., in the 1950s to operate the mob's interests there but stayed under the control of the Chicago organization.

HE WENT to Los Angeles in the early 1960s and was [illegible]

[illegible] Castro [illegible]

[illegible] has told reporters [illegible] recruited Roselli and Giancana at the request of CIA official James O'Connell. He said the two were chosen because of contacts they had made in Cuba during the pre-Castro years.

MAHEU SAID the plot was timed to coincide with the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and was "always subject to a 'go' signal which, to my knowledge, never came."

Roselli told the Senate committee that he made several trips to Cuba in high-powered boats furnished by the CIA. He said the scheme included various plans to try to kill Castro by sniper fire, explosives and poison capsules.

Washington sources said last year that the CIA offered as much as $150,000 for the job. Roselli told the Senate panel that he turned any payment down for [illegible], the [illegible] said.

[illegible] 8/9/76, Page 1

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

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1975 Jack Anderson news release

Four and a half years ago, I broke a story that now is belatedly rocking Washington. I reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited two Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

I tracked down Roselli and questioned him about the story. He had nothing to say. He promised me, however, that he would give me his exclusive story if he should ever be free to talk.

Yesterday, John Roselli told his story -- first, to the Senate Intelligence Committee in secret session, then to me as he had promised four and a half years ago.

Roselli is a dapper, hawk-faced man with a thatch of white hair. He has been disciplined all his life to keep his mouth shut. His Mafia partner, Sam Giancana, was slain before Senate investigators could serve him with a subpoena.

So it was obviously painful for Roselli to talk. I promised I would make clear that he revealed no names, except for the CIA contacts whose identities the Senate already knew.

So here is Roselli's own account of a real-life "Mission Impossible" -- the attempt to kill Castro. It is a story of cash payments, poison pellets, high-powered rifles and powerboat dashes to Cuba.

The plot against Castro, Roselli said, began in 1960 -- when Dwight Eisenhower was President, Richard Nixon was Vice President and Allen Dulles was the CIA chief.

Roselli was recruited in Los Angeles, he said, by Robert Maheu, then an aide to billionaire Howard Hughes. Previously, Maheu had operated a CIA front in Washington.

According to Roselli, the murdered mobster, Sam Giancana, never became involved in the assassination plot. He knew about it; he may even have suggested a Cuban contact; nothing more.

Roselli identified the CIA project officer, in charge of the Castro assassination, as "Big Jim" O'Connell. Maheu put Roselli in contact with O'Connell, as Roselli remembers it, in New York City on September 14, 1960.

Thereafter, Roselli flew to Miami and recruited the assassination squads. At first, they plotted to poison Castro. Poison pellets were supplied by the CIA. They were delivered to the plotters in a Miami hotel room, according to Roselli, by Maheu. He dramatically opened his briefcase, revealing $10,000 in cash and the fatal pellets.

The money was distributed tothe Cuban plotters. Roselli swore he never took any money from the CIA, except for some incidental expenses. He paid the big expenses, he said, out of his own pocket.

The poison pills were supposed to take three days to work. Supposedly, this would give the poison time to work its way out of Castro's system before he died, and his death would be attributed to natural causes.

Roselli never found out what happened to the plotters or the pellets. But they tried again later with a stronger dose of poison. Not long afterward, reports reached them that Castro was desperately ill. Roselli doesn't know whether the illness was caused by the poison or a virus. But Castro survived, and the plotters apparently did not.

Toselli said he also picked up intelligence, which he submitted to the CIA both during the Bay of Pigs planning and the later Cuban missile crisis. After the Bay of Pigs, Roselli said, Maheu was cut out of the plot. Thereafter, Roselli reported to a CIA agent named William Harvey.

There were four more assassination attempts, the plotters were smuggled into Cuba with high-powered rifles. The last assassination squad, Roselli heard, made it to a Havana rooftop before they were caught.

This was around March 1, 1963. Then the project was abandoned. Roselli saw Harvey for the last time in June, 1963. Five months later, Lee Harvey Oswa gunned down President Kennedy in Dallas. Oswald had been active in the pro-Castro movement. Shortly before that dreadful day in Dallas, Oswald had made a mysterious trip to Mexico where he visited the Cuban embassy. The Warren Commission found no evidence, however, that Oswald was in the hire of Havana.

Yesterday, Roselli made no apology for his CIA role. U.S. authorities call him a mobster. He regards himself as a patriot.

THE WASHINGTON POST
L 1 Sunday, September 12, 1976

Roselli file

The Calculated Rise And Abrupt Descent Of Johnny Roselli

By Rudy Maxa

Until last month, Johnny Roselli lived comfortably with his sister and brother-in-law in a Miami suburb. A friend estimated he earned about $25,000 annually from a gift shop he owned in the lobby of Las Vegas' Frontier Hotel.

He shrugged last year when his attorney suggested he hire a bodyguard, after the murder of Chicago mobster Sam Giancana, his partner in CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro. If anybody wants to kill me at my age, the 71-year-old Roselli said, what difference does it make? So he played golf several times a week, sipped white wine with dinner, and—until somebody decided Johnny Roselli should wind up in an oil barrel in Miami's Dumfoundling Bay—considered employment in the new gambling casinos beginning to open in the oil-rich Middle East.

In the late 1920s Al Capone and his friends chose Miami as the chic spot for organized crime figures to buy a winter home. Just across a strip of ocean was Cuba, a gambling and vice mecca. The mobsters from the north were treated like visiting celebrities by Florida press and society, while some members of the local police force began developing a taste for the finer things in life.

In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000. One of the sheriff's deputies said he collected $50,000 in bribes in nine months spent as a bagman for Miami Beach gambling concessions. In 1948 a bookmaker's operation in Miami grossed $26 million. It was the kind of place that made a racketeer feel at home.

For the last two years, Johnny Roselli felt at home in Plantation, a bedroom suburb north of Miami that Roselli made his retirement haven because he had family there. His brother-in-law, a government missile expert, lives in a sprawling white home tha at first glance, resembles every othe house in the neighborhood.

But it is different: the carefully cur tained windows, the extra lock on th front door, and spotlights on all side of the house give it the look of a subu ban fortress. Inside, the furniture i pale blue Mediterranean, the carpet i thick white.

Roselli's killers did not ambush th house; Roselli went to them. He lef Plantation at 1 p.m. on July 28 wearin a golf shirt, his golf clubs in his ca trunk. He told his sister he would b home for dinner. That afternoon o evening he was killed, probably by su focation, perhaps after being torture —early reports said his legs were br ken. Heavily chained, Roselli wa stuffed in a 55-gallon oildrum an dumped into the ocean.

His brother-in-law found Roselli's si ver-colored 1975 Chevrolet Impala se eral days later, parked at the Miami I ternational Airport.

Ten days after Roselli's disappea ance something went wrong. The o drum that was meant to keep his dea a secret floated to the surface of Dun foundling Bay, buoyed by the gases Roselli's decaying body.

The holes in the side of the dru and the placing of his Chevrolet at th airport convinced investigators h corpse was meant never to be disco ered; history was supposed to recor that dapper Johnny Roselli, facing d portation proceedings that the gover ment had threatened off and on f years, decided to disappear on an ai plane flight to who-knows-where.

"Cutting up and disposing of bodi is not necessarily new to our depa ment," says the man who is directi the search for Roselli's killers. Lt. Ga Minnium, head of the Dade Coun homicide squad, is a well-muscled m with an aquiline nose that separates pair of hard blue eyes. On the pa green wall of his bare office is a sm card that reads "DYNAMITE—DON SHAKE ME UP."

He and another police officer count the solving of some of Da County's more brutal murders wi

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ROSELLI, From L1

the enthusiasm of two football players recalling their favorite bowl games. The headless, handless body that floated into a Miami canal last month reminded Minnium of that other, similarly mutilated body that turned up last December. And who can forget the man who got angry with his roommate, sliced him up and tossed the parts along a highway?

As it turned out, Roselli's wasn't the first body to float into the annals of Miami crime in a drum, Minnium says. Ten years ago a lovers' quarrel resulted in a man stuffing his girl friend into a drum, filling it with cement and Aqua Velva shave lotion. The drum was found resting against a dike and justice was eventually done.

Minnium is not pleased by such violent antics.

"We don't appreciate people committing murder and dumping a body in our county, regardless of who the people are, but especially if it's organized crime," Minnium says.

His department handled 168 homicides last year and boasted an 85 per cent "clearance record." As of July, 1976, the percentage was even higher, standing at about 92 per cent.

If Charles Zatrepalek and Julio Ojeda have anything to say about it, Roselli's killing is not going to diminish those percentages. Both men are 28-year-old homicide detectives who vow with a schoolboy's sincerity tha they won't rest until Roselli's murde is solved. In the last four weeks, with the help of Washington agencies, Zatrepalek and Ojeda have reconstructed Roselli's life in hopes of understanding his death. For the third time in eight years of marriage, Zatrepalek worked out of town on his wedding anniversary; because of the "awesomeness" of this case, Ojeda spent his Labor Day holiday at work.

"Maybe 10 years from now," Ojeda says, "I want someone to look at my file and say, 'Hey, he talked to everybody.' And maybe he'll hear something and BANG! that's the arrest!"

That Johnny Roselli was destined to walk on the dark side of life never seemed in doubt. As a teen-ager in Boston, when his name was Filippo Sacco, Roselli was a runner for the numbers racket. He helped his stepfather burn down his home for the insurance money. He was arrested at age 22 for stealing about $25 from someone. Then he changed his name and left for Chicago.

It would be 40 years until, in the late 1960s, Johnny Roselli would see his mother again, though he sent money to his family through an intermediary in Chicago so his sisters could attend college.

By the late 1920s Al Capone was well established in Chicago. Newspapermen, politicians and cops were on the Capone payroll and a young man with Roselli's street savvy had little trouble finding suitable employment; he hired on as a rumrunner with the Capone gang. At age 26 Roselli was arrested for selling morphine to an undercover agent. He was acquitted because, after Roselli's arrest, no one could seem to find the arresting officer or informant in the case. They still haven't been found.

In the mid-1930s Roselli, by now a mature and charming man, lucky with

after a
work-a-day,
a velvety
junior jump! $58

A be-devilling shimmer-glimmer you, set for champagne or a great beat! One-piece cotton velveteen, ready to layer black or brown, 5-13. Come in, write or phone.

(3)

> *"In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000."*

women, friendly with men of money, moved to Los Angeles. He wore hand-tailored suits and, by all accounts, was easygoing, mild-mannered. He was married for a time to an actress, but they had no children. He became a close friend of Harry Cohn, the legendary head of Columbia Pictures. The two men sometimes vacationed together and Roselli always seemed to know how to place a bet should Cohn care to wager on a horse.

According to Bob Thomas' biography of Cohn, "King Cohn," the movie mogul once offered Roselli a job as a producer. (In his book, Thomas disguised Roselli's identity at Roselli's request.)

"What would you pay me?" Roselli asked Cohn.

"Five hundred dollars a week," Cohn said.

"I get that much from waitresses who take bets for me," Roselli is said to have replied.

Besides being a handy man with the placing of bets, Roselli purchased a 26 per cent interest in a Tijuana race-track with $25,000 Cohn loaned him. Roselli paid him back promptly and included a check for 6 per cent interest; Cohn magnanimously tore up the interest check.

Roselli bought twin star rubies, had them set in rings and gave one to Cohn, who considered it a good luck charm until his death. Once, when Chicago mobster Willie Bioff moved to Hollywood and began making life miserable for movie studios by shaking down executives in return for labor peace, Roselli stepped in and saved Cohn from a lengthy strike.

When Cohn refused to pay tribute to Bioff and his union, Bioff tried to halt production at Columbia by calling a sudden strike. Desperate, Cohn called Roselli who marched into Bioff's office and confronted the hoodlum who sat behind his desk wearing a hat and coat, chomping on a cigar, a gun resting on the desk in front of him.

"Listen, Willie, I don't know what you're trying to prove but it isn't going to work," Roselli told him. "This is a spite thing and you're not going to get away with it. You meet with Cohn and get it settled."

Bioff backed down and called off his pickets. After he was sent to jail for extortion, Bioff cut a deal with the government and named Roselli as a Chicago mobster who had helped him shake down movie studios. Cohn testified on Roselli's behalf, but in 1943 Roselli was sentenced to 10 years in prison. When he got out he returned to Hollywood to make pictures of prison and gangster life. But publicity about a secret appearance before the Kefauver crime committee ruined his relationship with most studios. Even Cohn refused to hire him—"The stockholders would scalp me," Cohn told a bitter Roselli.

It was during his years in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas that Roselli met the man who would make him a household name later in life. Robert Maheu, the ex-FBI agent who parlayed a Washington private eye business into a stormy career as Howard Hughes' man in Las Vegas, approached Roselli on behalf of the CIA in 1960.

(Another person Roselli met in that era who would later surface to talk of Roselli, Giancana and John F. Kennedy was a young party girl named Judith Campbell.)

Maheu and Roselli would later tell Frank Church's Senate Intelligence Committee the details of their plots to kill Castro. Maheu told investigators he had known Roselli since the late 1950s and, while he didn't know of his underworld connections, "it was certainly evident to me that (Roselli) was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention."

Over dinner at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills 16 years ago, Maheu explained to Roselli that his government needed his services. Roselli, who was born on July 4, 1905, was nothing if not patriotic. (Sam Giancana once said, "Just wave a flag and Johnny'll follow you to any canal.") Maheu recalled that

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

Johnny Roselli 1975. upper ri and. countercl wise from upper Fidel Castro in Sam Giancana in President John Kennedy in Dade County Po Lt. Gary Minni and the Flor home where Ro lived before death.

Photos by The Washington P The Chicago Daily News. AP.

pealed to Harvey for help and Harvey recommended to the CIA that it try to prevent prosecution, but Roselli was convicted of violating interstate gambling laws. He went to jail, returning in 1974 to Plantation to do battle against government efforts to deport him.

In 1971 the CIA asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with the CIA" that might occur if deportation proceedings were pursued. The INS agreed to keep the CIA informed, but at his death, Roselli and his lawyers were still fighting deportation.

"Bob Maheu must be running scared—I thought about that just the other day: 'Jesus, what's Maheu thinking?' " said another of Roselli's brothers-in-law, Peter Cardillo of New Jersey.

The public doesn't know what Maheu is thinking, whether he worries if pro-Castro Cubans are exacting retribution for sins of 16 years ago. Maheu's secretary in Las Vegas says she doesn't know where her boss is or when he'll be returning to his office. He reportedly has some business interest in Egypt, a part of the world that seems to hold some fascination for the Castro plotters; Giancana kept an apartment in Beirut and, just before his death, told a friend he had some sort of deal brewing there. And Roselli longingly eyed the opening of gambling casinos in the land of the new oil millionaires.

In Tampa, Santos Trafficante, another of the original Maheu group, also refuses to talk with the press. But unlike the others, he did not testify before the Church committee so the public has no inkling of his thoughts on the Castro assassination attempts.

Whether Roselli's killing was one of retribution for a public or a private matter, Johnny Roselli was a testament to an era that has passed. His life, which would have remained largely unnoticed save for the Senate's CIA hearings, seemed straight from the pages of a Mafia novel: allegedly brought into the United States illegally at the turn of the century, Roselli clawed his way from the mean streets of Boston and Chicago to the relative glamor of Hollywood, Las Vegas and, finally, Miami. Along the way, a simple strain of patriotism—which impressed the CIA enough to mention it to the Church committee—put him in a ropedancer's position of sometimes receiving, sometimes taking advantage of his knowledge of the darkest side of government.

While some have speculated that he was killed for talking too much to government investigators, Roselli was hardly a loudmouth in the league of a Joe Valachi, who sang for televised Senate hearings on the Mafia in 1963. Fourteen years ago Roselli confided in his lawyer, Washington attorney Edward Morgan, that he had been told by Cuban sources in Miami that John Kennedy's killing was ordered and arranged by Castro, but he lived with his secret.

The day after Roselli's body was scooped from its crude coffin, his brother-in-law in New Jersey, Peter Cardillo, told me: "Down deep, in a way, I probably hope it was connected with (the Castro affair). At least then Johnny, he would have died for a cause."

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee."

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service, a [illegible]

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no "evidence" indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose."

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication ... he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader, Sam (Momo) Giancana, Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a ta time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

CHICAGO-AREA investigators concluded that Giancana's death was part of an internal gangland struggle.

Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

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us from moving beyond speculation."

Madigan said the widespread reports after Giancana's death that his appearance before the committee was imminent were not true. That further indicates, he agreed, that Giancana's death was not directly related to his past CIA association.

"WE FINALLY got Giancana's home number the day he was killed," Madigan said Friday. "We had some difficulty tracking him down in Houston (where Giancana had been in the hospital). It had been decided that I was going to interview him to see whether it would be worth it to call him as a witness. He had not been contacted yet and he had not been subpenaed," Madigan said.

Roselli, who had been subpenaed, did testify for the first time four days after Giancana was shot.

That committee was headed by Sen. Frank Church and has since been replaced by a newly formed committee headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii) and Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.). In its final report, that former committee strongly urged the new committee to continue the investigation of covert CIA activity as well as connections between the Castro assassination plot and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

Committee investigators said Friday they have found no link between Roselli and Eugene M. Carrafa, a Rockville, Md., antique auto dealer with reported organized crime connections who died under circumstances mysteriously coincidental to Roselli's death.

Carrafa, 37, was reported missing by his wife on July 28, the same day Roselli was last seen by his sister in Plantation with whom he had lived for three years.

Caraffa's body floated to the surface of New York Harbor off Staten Island on Aug. 4, his body wrapped in a padlocked chain and weighted by two 15-pound boat anchors. Police said he had been strangled. Roselli had been asphyxiated, possibly by strangling, according to investigators here.

New York City detectives said that Caraffa "knew Giancana" but they have not been able to pin down a motive in his death.

The Washington Star, quoting an unidentified FBI source, reported that Caraffa had met with Roselli in Chicago about two months ago.

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Visits Local Officials

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Roselli, who had been subpenaed, did testify for the first time four days after Giancana was shot.

That committee was headed by Sen. Frank Church and has since been replaced by a newly formed committee headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii) and Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.). In its final report, that former committee strongly urged the new committee to continue the investigation of covert CIA activity as well as connections between the Castro assassination plot and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

Committee investigators said Friday they have found no link between Roselli and Eugene M. Carrafa, a Rockville, Md., antique auto dealer with reported organized crime connections who died under circumstances mysteriously coincidental to Roselli's death.

Carrafa, 37, was reported missing by his wife on July 28, the same day Roselli was last seen by his sister in Plantation with whom he had lived for three years.

Caraffa's body floated to the surface of New York Harbor off Staten Island on Aug. 4, his body wrapped in a padlocked chain and weighted by two 15-pound boat anchors. Police said he had been strangled. Roselli had been asphyxiated, possibly by strangling, according to investigators here.

New York City detectives said that Caraffa "knew Giancana" but they have not been able to pin down a motive in his death.

The Washington Star, quoting an unidentified FBI source, reported that Caraffa had met with Roselli in Chicago about two months ago.

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee."

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no evidence indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said, "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose."

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

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THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader Sam (Momo) Giancana. Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a ta time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

CHICAGO-AREA investigators concluded that Giancana's death was part of an internal gangland struggle.

Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

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Visits Local Officials

FROM PAGE 1B

us from moving beyond speculation."

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Michael Madigan

August 13, 1976

I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli's testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity. During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion, stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana's death), refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos Trafficante by name. In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.

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MEMORANDUM

To: Rick Inderfurth
From: Mike Madigan
Date: August 13, 1976
Re: Miami Interviews

I spoke with Senator Hart today about setting up interviews in Miami for Friday, August 20, in the Rosselli matter. He will be calling you about these arrangements.

I will try to have a subpoena for Santos Trafficante signed by Senator Baker before he leaves for the convention. We, however must obtain the approval of all or a majority of the members of the Committee (under the Rules) to issue the subpoena. Therefore, I have asked Martha to poll members on two questions:

(1) Authority to issue a subpoena for Trafficante;

(2) Authority for Senator Hart to disclose to the Miami police investigators in the Rosselli case those portions of the classified Rosselli related transcripts which he deems relevant to the murder investigation.

In case we miss connections, the relevant people involved are:

(1) Bill Lynch -- head of the Justice Organized Crime Section, telephone number 739-3516 (he should help us locate Trafficante and perhaps have a

suggestion as to how best to serve him with a subpoena);

(2) Detectives Wolf and Zatrepallek -- Dade County Sheriff's Office, telephone number 305-547-7456 (they are the detectives investigating the Rosselli murder for the locals). (I have been putting them off about whether they can have access to the transcripts -- you need to talk to Bill Miller and Gary about this);

(3) Paul Daly -- you may have to go through him if we need the FBI to locate Trafficante.

By the time you return I will have taken preparatory steps to set up interviews with the Miami police people as well as begun an effort to locate Trafficante. After talking with Gary you will need to follow up and confirm all these next week as I will be in Kansas City from Monday through Thursday. I will be flying from Kansas City to Miami on Thursday night for the interviews on Friday. You can reach me through the numbers that either Bill Miller or Marie has. We need to talk at some point next week to confirm all this.

WX POST 8/12/76

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Who Killed John Roselli?

WE'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now. Once there was a President who was murdered. His brother was murdered too. A long time after they died some very strange facts came to light. It turned out that while they were running the government, the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters to arrange the murder of someone else—the head of a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that one brother—the one who was President—apparently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of criminals the President's brother was trying to put in jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is complicated, and the complications in this case got even more so. For when a committee of the Congress wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them something about all this, only one of them—the one named Johnny— came. The other one, Momo, was murdered in his house a week before they wanted him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one committee in the Congress and then came back—quietly—to tell some more things to another committee which was in fact looking into the murder of the President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one could find him. Then some fishermen found him. Dead. In an oil drum.

But we haven't told you the strangest part of all yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is that when the great national political community of solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther, of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."

Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need to be put forward in stark outline for their magnitude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnections between all these facts and to wonder why they are not the object of intense press and government scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime—i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a gangland slaying." Those are the good old "earmarks" we only hear about when it is next to certain, that we shall hear nothing more.

The supposition of course is that the Gang which runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie outside the proper realm of public concern because they amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first place and 2) tends only to punish those who have committed what the rest of us would regard as heinous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people say—they're things people can be expected to assume. But we think in this case the assumptions have even less validity than they would have on a clear day, which isn't much. And that is because if we know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had become intertwined with the operations of the United States government. Never mind that the decisions of the early 1960s which made this so may rank among the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S. government. The plain fact is that, given the provocative and suggestive history of the two men, it is not possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.

After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Committee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting with him had figured in his murder. The FBI reported that it had no evidence to this effect. The then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the murder—and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to which these were meant to be the answers, had been raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's death. We think the Department should comply and that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the Attorney General's personal attention. Such attention is needed because of the elaborate and not entirely reassuring history of relationships between the FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any agency of government—or even any of those agency's fringe retainers —were the murderers. We are suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially embarrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep an awful lot of people from wanting to have this thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Congress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see how the public in general and the political establishment in particular can turn their attention away until we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has been made by the government—which means both the Executive Branch and the Congress—to discover what elements were at play in this series of appalling crimes and scandals.

The Data From M

DR. HAROLD KLEIN one of the scientists work- and our best theories

ROSSELLI CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1955 Meets Maheu at insurance friend's home.

1960 Late July/early August. Maheu calls. Working for government. Recruit Rosselli only. Meet Brown Derby, L.A., for lunch. Long talk about project in Cuba. Rosselli wants verification.

2nd meeting, L.A., discuss further details, no discussion of specific techniques. Plan to meet in N.Y. for verification.

Sept. 14, 1960. First meeting in N.Y. at old Plaza Hotel. Rosselli introduced by Maheu to O'Connell. Rosselli "knew" O'Connell worked for the CIA. Rosselli agrees to work on Cuban project.

Sept. 25, 1960. Maheu and Rosselli travel to Miami to begin making contact with Cubans to be recruited for mission.

(Between Sept. 25 and the Bay of Pigs, a series of recruitments, meetings, and arrangements were made. The following is an outline of events that is not necessarily in chronological order.)

- -- Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Trafficant[illegible]. Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Giancana. Giancana was, according to Rosselli, to only be a "back up man." Rosselli states Giancana had nothing to do with the actual operation. Trafficant[illegible] was used, according to Rosselli, as a translator.
- -- Meeting with O'Connell, Maheu, Rosselli, [redacted] discuss the Cuban project.
- -- Rosselli, in his contact with the Cubans, "invents" the cover story that he represents some Wall Street business interests who want to see Castro eliminated. Rosselli trusts Cubans he has recruited because they are part of the Bay of Pigs operation.
- -- 1st attempt at assassination involved the use of pills. Maheu and Rosselli met with Cuban #1 and #2 (?). Maheu opened up his briefcase and gave the pills with instructions for their use to Cuban #1. Maheu also had $10,000 he gave the Cubans for doing the project. Rosselli did not know of the money. Rosselli states he received no remuneration for his work on the project, in fact, he paid out $800 for gas for a speed boat to deliver two or three man parties for guerrilla raids into Cuba.
- -- Prior to Bay of Pigs there was no discussion of using guns to assassinate Castro.
- -- Rosselli's cover name was "John Ralston."

-- At different times, Cuban #1, #2, or #3 would propose different projects. These would range from using plastic explosives to booby trapping Castro's desk. Rosselli would relay these on to Maheu, who, in turn, would contact the CIA. Most projects were vetoed, but the CIA did supply a short wave radio to the Cubans in Florida, to try and make contact with their people in Havana.

-- Eventually, Rosselli felt the project had failed. There was no specific point when it was announced. But, at sometime Rosselli assumed the project, for whatever reason, had not succeeded.

CHRONOLOGY

(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have been ~~p~~lanned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc,supra
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no".	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1966	CIA poisoning plot ag'l Haitian Pres. Duvalier; bombing palace in '68	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, supra.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Anders referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story,supra
1968	CIA bombing Haitian palace	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition,sup
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	[redacted] Maheu (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone l
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

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1961 After the Bay of Pigs (April 1961)

Rosselli felt "sorry for the poor bastards left on the beach." ~~Rosselli felt indirectly responsible for their deaths since he had encouraged many of them to participate in the invasion.~~ Two or three weeks after the invasion, Rosselli was contacted in Los Angeles by O'Connell, a meeting was arranged for at the airport hotel in Miami. Rosselli went there and was introduced to Harvey. O'Connell said Harvey was now in charge of the Cuban project. Harvey told Rosselli he was to cease all contact with Maheu and Giancana. Further, Harvey stated that the government was still interested in using Rosselli for intelligence-gathering operations. Rosselli would report information from the Cubans to Harvey about personalities and events in Cuba. Rosselli would also relay on to his Cuban contacts requests for specific information from the CIA.

Sometime between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey gave Rosselli six poison capsules. Rosselli, in turn, gave them to his Cuban contacts who were to take them to Cuba, where another Cuban or Cubans would use them to assassinate Castro. Rosselli never learned the details of what happened, but the project obviously failed. At one point, Rosselli remembers hearing over the radio that Castro was very ill. A short time later, he recovered.

Sometime before the missile crisis, Rosselli arranged, pursuant to Cuban #1 request, for a van loaded with rifles and ammunition to be delivered in Florida. O'Connell and Rosselli watched the Cuban contact pick up the van and return it empty. Rosselli assumed that these guns were going to be used by the two or three-man raiding parties in Cuba to assassinate Castro and overthrow the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

Rowan Tap

Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that Maheu was afraid that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were mad that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet and transfer the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers. Rosselli knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

Howard
See me

MEMORANDUM

To: Gary
From: Rick
Date: August 10, 1976
Subject: Roselli

First, some background information. Yesterday, August 9, Senators Inouye and Baker met with Directors Kelley and Bush to discuss Roselli's death. The FBI doesn't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole. At the meeting, Jim Adams told Inouye and Baker that the FBI had been told by Justice (Richard Thornburg) that it had no jurisdiction in this case. Levi had, apparently, not been consulted. Senators Baker and Inouye (especially Baker) requested Kelley to take this up directly with Levi. Today, a letter was sent to Levi, signed by Baker and Inouye, urging Justice to authorize FBI involvement. A copy of that letter is attached.

One other point about the meeting. George Bush was extremely upset about this case and the allegations that the CIA was involved in Roselli's death. He said that he would personally contact Levi to request that the Department grant jurisdiction to the FBI to investigate.

For your information, Roselli appeared before the Committee on four separate occasions to testify on three matters. He appeared on June 25 to discuss the plots against Castro; on September 20 and 22 to discuss the Campbell affair; and on April 25 to discuss the retaliation theory.

Now for current events. First, the two detectives in Miami handling the Roselli case are Detectives Zatrefralek and Wolf. They are with Dade County Homicide. Their numbers are 305-547-7456 and 547-7923. Madigan has already talked with Detective Wolf. Second, in light of the Inouye/Baker letter to Levi I did not ask the FBI about the current whereabouts of Santo Trafficante. I did, however, ask CIA. They have no information. Third, Baker and Liebengood are putting together a packet of information on Roselli, which will include CIA and Select Committee information and will get this to you tomorrow.

I think you already know this, but Senator Baker does want to launch an informal investigation into this matter. Roselli told him, when he appeared before the Committee, that he thought his life was in danger for testifying. Baker feels a moral obligation, therefore, to look into this.

I have attached the most recent articles on the Roselli death for you.

P.S. A couple of grizzly facts: Over the past few years there have been quite a few anti-Castro deaths in the Miami area. Car bombs and shootings have been the usual means of death. Second, we received a report today that another body was pulled up in the Hudson River. Another gangland slaying, complete with cement and chains.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: TO THE FILES

FROM: PATRICK SHEA AND MICHAEL MADIGAN

DATE: JUNE 21, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF A MEE~~T~~TING WITH MR. JOHN ROSSELLI
BEGAN AT ~~1~~11:35 a.m., JUNE 21, 1975, IN ROOM 711 of the WATERGATE HOTEL

PRESENT AT THE SESSION: MR. MICHAEL MADIGAN, MR. PATRICK SHEA OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, MR. ROSSELLI, MR. THOMAS WADDEN, MR. JAMES CANTILLON, MR. LESLIE SCHERR.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Madigan asked Mr. Rosselli if he felt a need for any protection. He stated, emphatically, "No," that he was able to take care of himself. and staff ~~Mr.~~ Madigan made it clear that the Senate Select Committee could provide U.S. Marshalls for Mr. Rosselli during his stay in Washington. This offer was rejected.

Mr. Rosselli stated that Giancan~~n~~a had no involvement, to his knowledge, with any of the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro. Maheu did deal with higher authorities in government but stated that Rosselli was only the contact, Giancana has a backup man. Rosselli was very concerned about the adverse publicity in recent times, about the CIA and he thought it was unfortunate from the Agency's point of view that the Giancana name had been linked to the Agency.

Rosselli was upset by the harassment he had been under by the FBI. He pointed to the 1966 Frier Club incident as an example. He said in 1966 he had been approached by the FBI to provide information on inside basis about organized crime and when he had refused 18 months later he was indicted. Again, the first week in June of 1970, the FBI had offered him cooperation but he refused.

Rosselli first met Maheu twenty years ago. He was introduced through a life long friend who is dead now, named Spitzle, who was in the insurance business. This first meeting happened in Los Angeles, in 1955. Maheu, at the time, was running Maheu Associates in Washington, D.C. The meeting was only a social gathering. There was nothing specifically discussed about activities of the CIA.

At the meeting ✓ In July or August, (1960) Maheu called Rosselli and stated that he was working for the government and had been specifically asked to recruit Rosselli. Maheu ~~xxx~~ stressed that it was to be Rosselli and no one else. They agreed to meet for lunch at the Brown Derby in Los Angeles. Maheu described the project as an intelligence operation involving Cuba. Maheu mentioned specifically Castro, Che Guevara, and Raoul Castro. It was Rosselli's feeling that Maheu had recruited him because of his known Cuban connections in Florida. These connections were unrelated to gambling. There was no money mentioned by Maheu to Rosselli for payment for services. ✓

The alleged support of Wall Street business men had not been mentioned and was a cover invented by Rosselli later. At the end of their first meeting, they agreed to meet again at which time Maheu would verify to Rosselli that he was working for the government. This verification would be by introducing a government official of ~~higher authority~~ to Rosselli.

1st Phase ↓ Pre-Bay of Pigs ↓

The second meeting ~~xxx~~ occurred a week or ten days later. At this point, Rosselli was instructed to proceed to New York for an introduction to the government official. ~~He~~ At both the first and second meetings Maheu + Ros talked ~~asked~~ for an hour or more about ~~and~~ various aspects of the proposed ~~aspects of~~ projects, ~~were discussed but nothing was~~ mention~~ed~~ of specific techniques.

There was no Rosselli ~~second~~ went to NYC.

Rosselli remembered his arrival in New York: ~~citing~~ coinciding with a visit ~~x~~ by Eisenhower, Castro, Nasser, and perhaps Krushev. [Khrushchev] He said it was noteworthy because New York was crawling with officials from all over the world. Rosselli paid his own fare from Los Angeles to New York and stayed at the old Plaza Hotel on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. He was given the cover name, John Ralston.

The meeting in New York took place in a hotel room. In attendance were Maheu, Rosselli and "big" Jim O'Connell, and two or three other people who did not explain why they were there. Jim O'Connell was introduced as a CIA official. Rosselli was unclear as to whether this was stated explicitly or whether through the whole context of discussions it became clear that he worked for the CIA. At this point, Rosselli was satisfied that Maheu was working for the government and, therefore, agreed to work ~~at~~ on the Cuban mission described at their first meeting. Rosselli was not sure as to the length of his stay in New York at this time. He did remember going to lunch with Maheu a number of times and talking about the particular projects. ?

After his stay in New York, he traveled to either Washington, D. C. or Florida. He was uncertain as to the exact location but he did remember there were series of meetings between himself and Maheu to discuss further plans ~~xx~~ about the attempted assassination. There was only one further meeting with O'Connell, involving these preliminary stages. At this point, he only discussed techniques of assassination with Maheu. Rosselli remembered staying in Maheu's Falls Church home(it had a tennis court)during his stays in Washington. // There still had been no discussion of the cover story(that Rosselli was a private citizen representing a group of private businessmen from ~~the~~ New York.)

When Rosselli reached Florida, he made his contacts with the Cubans and then arranged for the Cubans to meet with Maheu. He trusted the Cubans he came in contact with because they, according to themselves, were working on the Bay of Pigs operation, which had not occurred as of yet. There were times when they would ① stay at Arthur Godfrey's hotel, the Kenilworth Hotel, in Florida. At times he registered under the name Rollins. This was to allow him to maintain his cover while Maheu, still working for Hughes, was able to register under his own name, so that Hughes believed that he was doing his work. The operation went on in terms of Rosselli arranging meetings with his Cuban contacts and then having further discussions about specifics with Maheu. At times, O'Connell, from the CIA, would visit with Maheu and Rosselli. One time, before the 1960 election, ?? O'Connell brought with him two Admirals, one of whom, Rosselli thinks, was retired. ✓

At this point, Rosselli ~~also~~ was telling his Cuban contacts the cover story, namely that he represented private business interests in New York who were interested in seeing Castro done away with. The Cubans, at this point, had not met with Jim O'Connell, but had met with Maheu. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Maheu left and Rosselli only met once more with O'Connell. Then he also left for the West Coast. ~~The~~

The two attempts at assassination, both involved the use of pills. One attempt was before the Bay of Pigs and the other was sometime after. The first means was to use a capsule filled with a special poison that could be spilled into the food of Castro and cause him to die of poisoning that was not traceable and made his death look like a heart attack or by natural causes. Rosselli contacted a little Cuban whose relative was a chef for Castro. At this time, Cubans could still travel between Florida and Cuba. It was agreed that the CIA would manufacture the poison capsule. It would be turned over to O'Connell, to Maheu, to Rosselli, and ~~from Rosselli~~ then to the Cubans. ¶ Maheu brought the capsule to Florida to the Fontainebleu Hotel. The Cubans came ~~up~~ to the room, Maheu opened ~~up his brief~~ case, with Rosselli and the Cubans present, and gave them capsule, plus $10,000 dollars. The money had come from the CIA and was considered partial payment for the job of assassinating Castro. At this meeting, Maheu described the method of using these capsules, making sure the Cubans understood ~~the Cubans understood~~ they could not be put in food that was boiled. ~~or other aspects of using these pills.~~ There was no discussions with the Cubans, at this meeting, about $250,000 dollars. That figure was used by Maheu after his first meeting with the Cubans, to ~~described~~ describe what the ~~x~~ CIA might put up to help the families of men injured or killed in this project should it fail ~~attempted assassination.~~ Rosselli thinks that the meeting with the money and capsules was after the election. ¶ The number one Cuban contact that Rosselli had would from time to time, make requests of Rosselli to be relayed on to the CIA for equipment. The CIA did provide, for instance, a short wave radio, which was supposed to be used by the Cubans in Florida to contact Cubans in Cuba about the success or failure of the poison pill mission. Rosselli was sure that the pills were sent to Cuba but he has received no explanation as to what happened.

#1

how many pills →

✓

Another project was for the Cubans to receive plastic explosives from the CIA and give them to frogmen on their side that in turn would place them on ships in Havana harbor and blow them up. The CIA refused to do this because of the ease with which plastic explosives could be traced back to the government agencies such as the CIA. Maheu did ~~xxxxxxx~~ discuss the use of cigars that would make Castro's hair drop off. ¶ According to Rosselli, Maheu thought this would have Castro lose his ability to govern the country. Another proposal was that there be a booby trapped desk. Each of these latter two projects were proposed by Cuban refugees who said they had people in positions vis a vis Castro who could achieve the assassination.

#2

✓ Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there was no discussion of guns. Rosselli claimed to have a better idea than Maheu, namely that with far fewer men than were involved in the Bay of Pigs, perhaps a hundred, they could land in Cuba and do the job successfully. Rosselli's Cuban contact at the time was traveling to New York and New Orleans for meetings. Rosselli was not sure about what the meetings were about but said that ✓ they were related to the overthrow of Castro. Another proposal put forward was to purchase a speed boat and use some ~~type of exploding seashell to kill Castro.~~

NO

The night before the Bay of Pigs Rosselli went to his number one Cuban's house and spoke with him. The Cuban contact said, "See you in Havana." Rosselli expressed serious reservation about the possibility of success for the operation. Rosselli left Florida right after the Bay of Pigs. His total time on this particular attempt at assassination in Florida was three or four months.

Post-Bay of Pigs ↓

Rosselli felt sorry for "the poor bastards left on the beach." He felt indirectly responsible for having encouraged ~~them~~ many of them to participate in the operation. He went home and stayed in Las Vegas and Los Angeles for awhile. || A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Rosselli was contacted by Maheu or O'Connell, he's not sure. He did meet with Jim O'Connell in Florida a few weeks later. They had arranged to have rooms at the Airport Hotel. Rosselli was not sure as to ~~what his name,~~ what name he registered under, but at this meeting in Florida he met a new CIA man, named Harvey. The first time he ~~xxxxxx~~ met Harvey, Rosselli was told

2d Phone ↓

✓ Harvey wanted to know all that Rosselli knew about Cuba ~~in~~ on an intelligence line. Harvey told him at ~~thextime~~ this meeting to have no further contact with~~xxx~~ Maheu and that he should not talk further with Giancana. He also said that he, Harvey, was in charge of the operation and ~~that Maheu should take, or~~ that Rosselli should take his orders from Harvey. At this point ✓ the original project, using pills, was considered defunct.

After this first meeting with Harvey, Rosselli again contacted his Cuban people. ~~He made several trips, that is,~~ Rosselli made several trips with Harvey in Florida, some down in the Keys to see what type of operations were continuing. One of the projects Harvey had Rosselli doing was verifying CIA reports by using Rosselli's own people who were in frequent contact with Cuba. The intelligence reports dealt both with personalities/~~in~~ with the Cuban hierarchy, as well as differentongoing operations. Rosselli paid his own bills ~~xxx~~ before the Bay of Pigs but after, Harvey would usually pick up the tab.

Harvey approached Rosselli with the proposed mission to try ~~it~~ for a second time to assassinate Castro. ~~Cuba~~[S] ✓ Harvey said that the new ~~x~~pills would really work and were much stronger. Harvey gave Rosselli six pills, then Rosselli gave those six pills to his Cuban contact. There were no special instructions on how to handle the pills and his Cuban contact said that they would be passed into Cuba and used.

re-inforce →

At this time, Rosselli had no ongoing contact with Maheu, but may have run into him in Los Angeles. Maheu knew that Rosselli was still working on the Cuban project and that he, Maheu, was out. Rosselli never got any report back on what happened to the six pills but he assumed that they had been unsuccessful. He did hear a ~~xxxxx~~ report over a radio or TV station, that Fidel Castro was deathly ill, but then, shortly thereafter, he recovered.

but

// Rosselli arranged for the CIA to supply a panel truck loaded with carbines for use by his Cuban contacts to make two or three-man~~ned~~ party raids into Cuba, hopefully assassinating Castro and overturning the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. // After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

OK w/ '67 Rept

The only money that Rosselli ever put up was $800 to buy gas for the speedboat that would deliver the two or three-man teams to Cuba to do guerrilla operations. He stressed throughout the interview that he had never received any money and that besides this $800 he had never given any money for. His last contact with Harvey was in June of~~196~~ 1963 ~~or shortly there before,~~ when Rosselli found out that Harvey was being transfered to Rome and he made a special trip to Washington to say goodby to him.

Date of last trip

April ?
June ?) details

The Rowan tap; Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first ① was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the ②cond was that there was a real intelligence value in that ~~he was~~. Maheu was afraid, that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubos or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were pissed off that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Mr. Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet with "Mr. Doakes" for a transfer of the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers and he knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

before or after the tap-details?

During his early contacts with Maheu in 1959 and '60, in setting up the Cuban operation, Maheu was setting up a guard system for different Hughes' operations, such as Hughes Aircraft or other corporate interests.

Rosselli can't remember whether he ever introduced Giancana as Mr. Sam Gold. He claims to have no business relationship with Giancana. Rosselli's only business interests was the ice machines in Las Vegas. He ran those by himself and had no contact with Giancana. When asked about Joe Santa Trafficanto, Rosselli stated that he used him only as an interpreter but not as a contact for recruiting other Cubans for his mission.

Mr. Thomas Wadden, stated that he was receiving no fees ~~for his counsel,~~ for his representing Rosselli, now. The status of Mr. Cantillon or Mr. Scherr was not clear. There was discussion as to the Committee paying the expenses of Mr. Rosselli's transportation from Los Angeles and there was discussion as to the limits, if any, to be placed on the Committee's inquiry of Mr. Rosselli's contacts with the Cubans, how they had been developed, and what other operations did go on.

The informant was told that his offer is outside our jurisdiction, which he acknowledged. No commitments were made to him. At this time, we do not plan to further pursue the matter. Our relationship with him has been most carefully guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any recontact of him concerning this matter if such is desired.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

RECEIVED FROM
MAY [illegible] 1976
DOJ

Book V, p. 12-13

The cast of characters surrounding the seizure of anti-Castro hardware as outlined on these pages is particularly interesting. The raw material cited in the footnote is attached. Note reference to Briniuer and Oswald. Below that McLaney brothers and Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis. Not attached is a critical New Orleans field office memo to FBI headquarters linking Briniuer to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

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sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos, don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the objective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on the tape last night over at the television station too.

Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4——

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.] This is the spy who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy, Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my organization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.

Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which——

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in Spanish.

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIEBELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had infiltrated the training camp in Louisiana?

Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is—what? Pro-Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a commando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader for the Christian Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing, because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-Castro organization. And my feeling—and this is the question that I am asking myself—in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is where the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me is—because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in New Orleans where it is not publicly known that there was something going on at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to Mexico too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernandez letter was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said, "Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H. Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963——

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have initialed it. Would you initial it?

[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter in which Fernandez said that we—meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices on August 5, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training of Cubans?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New Orleans——

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the possibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, because Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New Orleans.

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernan
aware of approximately the time
fore, indicated to Lechuga that
discovered as an attempted infiltr

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand
lates to the fact that Fernandez
will be in danger,"—up until ab
anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I th
on August 5 Oswald came to me
same period of time. Somethin
Orleans, that there was a secret
of the Fair Play for Cuba Com
New Orleans. Those are the fac
not sure about. I just want to s
connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't see
handing out literature in the str
to infiltrate the anti-Castro move

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that
after I told him that I don't ha
that here there is nothing, and th
went openly to do that before
he went openly to do that after he

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of
in the pro-Castro movement and
information to Oswald—conducted

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have
as a result of your anti-Castro a
person as this, do you think you

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardo

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were su
Castro movement who had been
would have had access to that i
find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is
have a lot of persons. There ar
who are anti-Castro. Even amo
agents here in the city and you

But there is something else: Th
is located in 117 Decatur Street,
the owner of the Havana Bar is
over there, gave the information
before—that Oswald went to the
lemonade. He was with one Mexi
drinking the lemonade, he start t
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Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, therefore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, relates to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we will be in danger,"—up until about August 8. Now does that statement have anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp; he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of information to Oswald—conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such a person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar—the Havana Bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store—the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban, and he and one of the employees over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination—not before—that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade. He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment—he had some vomits and he went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not before, because before I did not found any connection. They did not told nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, because he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans, one of them the one who had been with Oswald in the bar, and he told me

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful occasion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6–24, 1963,[316] Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Orleans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[317] He first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the vicinity of the U.S.S. *Wasp*, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.[318] He distributed literature in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August 16, 1963.[319] Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.[320] On August 17, 1963, he appeared briefly on a radio program [321] and on August 21, 1963, he debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on August 9.[322] Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was associated.[323]

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above, his "organization" was a product of his imagination.[324] The imaginary president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,[325] the name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon.[326] Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel," [327] to her husband's membership card in the New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if she did not do so.[328] The chapter had never been chartered by the national FPCC organization.[329] It appears to have been a solitary operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present at meetings which were held once a month.[330]

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and sometime untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1, 1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to have rented for FPCC activities had been "promply closed 3 days later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they said something about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand." [331] He wrote that "thousands of circulars were distrubed" [332] and that he continued to receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored "to keep answering to the best of my ability." [333] In his letter to V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban

[redacted]

exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone."[334]

In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to uncover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident mentioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above letter to V. T. Lee.[335] Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such incident.[336] Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.[337] Furthermore, the general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he supported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges made against him and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, suggests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least greatly exaggerated.[338] While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, although it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962.[339] The Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald had rented an office in New Orleans. In view of the limited amount of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands" of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000 and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence that he received any substantial amount of materials from the national headquarters.[340]

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch."[341] WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin American Focus."[342] Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August 17, 1963.[343] It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn more about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in New Orleans.[344]

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States. The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar-

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A

HANDS OFF CUBA!
Join the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
NEW ORLEANS CHARTER MEMBER BRANCH
Free Literature, Lectures
LOCATION:
EVERYONE WELCOME!
CUBA

GARNER DE

TO: NAME

1. Mr. [illegible] Crane [illegible]

2.

3.

4.

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ APPROVAL
☐ SEE ME
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE ______
☐ PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF ______

☐ COMMENT
☐ NECESSARY ACTION
☐ NOTE AND RETURN
☐ CALL ME

☐ PER CONVERSATION
☐ AS REQUESTED
☐ NOTE AND FILE
☐ YOUR INFORMATION

REMARKS

Can you help us identify these loose pgs 35-37, pls.

Thank You

FROM: NAME	BUILDING, ROOM, EXT.	DATE
Geo. Racey for B D Bennett	6330 Main Justice	

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10/3/63
Robt J. Dwyer
Report

information concerning the Comandos Mambises or their spokesman, RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who made a statement in Guatemala claiming credit for the August 17, 1963 attack.

BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other attacks in the future, as opportunities and availability of equipment permit, without compromising the United States.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

On June 14, 1963, information was received that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.

On June 19, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA, VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along with American SAM BENTON, were involved and detained, but not arrested, by United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosives for this operation. MC LANEY is well known as a former gambling concession operator in Havana, Cuba, and presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a

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search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY, brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana, Cuba.

Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUCHLI for VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June 14, 1963 seizures at Miami. ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in this bomb plot were CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.

MM T-3, who is personally acquainted with SAM BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAM BENTON has been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM T-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in Miami, Florida in a Ford station wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers and mercenaries, GERALD PATRICK HEMMING, JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, took LAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American mercenary BILL CARMAN, two automatic rifles and two French guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous other equipment to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in Miami in June of 1963, his station wagon contained .50 caliber

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machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and a number of foreign-made weapons. LAUCHLI sold nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.

MM T-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the present Government in Cuba.

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Book V, P. 5

There was no indication that the Castro assassination plots were brought to the Warren Commission's attention in anyway. "The subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaison with the Warren Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts."

Book V, p. 5-6	The CIA investigation of the assassination did not divulge the AMLASH operation although these investigators, in retrospect, think this knowledge vital. "There is also evidence that CIA investigators requested name traces which should have made them aware of the AMLASH operation, but for some reason, they did not learn of that operation."

Book V, p. 10	FBI informant during missile crisis suggested that Castro could be assassinated through underworld channels inside Cuba and that the informant would fund this if U.S. government would assure such endeavor would not adversely effect the national security. See attached Hoover memo. We need to identify and interview informant.

TO : The Attorney General DATE: October 29, 1962

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1962

We have an informant who furnishes data concerning criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and gambling elements throughout the United States. He is most concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes known, he will be killed immediately.

On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky, in the past have had close connections in Cuba whereby they were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be successfully arranged.

[redacted] COULD IDENTIFY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

He said that, in the event the United States Government is interested in having the attempt made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security. He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without any additional contact with Government representatives and with a minimum of contacts with private individuals.

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Book V, p. 13	Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting series of meetings among major leaders of anti-Castro movement. Such a report is attached. Attention to the cast of characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza, Carlos Prio.

On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS, Intelligence Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTIME, advised that the MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group. BORJAS said that through his contacts in the latter organization, he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's organization landed in Cuba at the time of the June 20, 1963 invasion hoax.

BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO MACEO and CARLOS BANDIN resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both helped to create.

II. THE SOMOZA PLAN

On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL GARCIA, in charge of public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA, former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in Miami, Florida.

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban exile political and action group leaders attended. At these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the Presidents of the Central American Republics, and these Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form of training camps, military equipment, and bases of operation from which to attack the present government of Cuba. SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the

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Presidents of the several Central American Republics and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in Miami, New York and Washington, were known to have the sanction of the United States Government. On July 16, 1963, SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained an article stating that there is growing speculation in Miami that Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly backing certain Cuban exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME BUESA and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It is noted that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASTRO organization.

On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the below-listed persons are some of the better-known Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC)

ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRR

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

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MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle of July, 1963. ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA was acting as an intermediary between the United States Government and the Cuban exiles.

On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now not clear what SOMOZA is offering, or what the United States Government's position or attitude is in this matter. ALVAREZ said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan Government, to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will have to have the backing and support of the United States Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that about a week ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the MDC Headquarters, and in the name of SOMOZA, offered camps, military equipment and bases in Nicaragua. This individual also offered to pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a "wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the United States Government would take concerning this matter.

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On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL, Executive Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised that when SOMOZA was in the United States during July of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA, head of the Rescate Democratico Revolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA in Miami and New York. At the invitation of SOMOZA, VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer with SOMOZA, and is expected to return to Miami in about a week.

On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing definite had been established as a result of VARONA's visit to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, military leader of the MDC, advised that he had recently returned from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with SOMOZA, who made no commitments or indicated any definite plan existed. SOMOZA showed great interest in the Cuban problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the way of arms or training camps.

BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same time, conferred with SOMOZA, but did not receive any offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic (DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of the DR, had been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to obtain any military bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-CASTRO

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organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations (UN), that he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG) ROBERT KENNEDY.

AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban exiles. SOMOZA recommended that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At this meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of Nicaraguan support for the Cuban exile anti-CASTRO movement, but first the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as their leader. There was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile leaders attending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ, former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba, advised he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training camps in Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the proposed aid and backing has progressed no further than the talking stage. SIERRA said it seems to him that everyone is waiting for the United States Government to give the "green light".

On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly all top political leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA Plan is too big for

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SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into effect without United States military and political support.

MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet obtained a positive commitment from the United States Government, because after two and a half months of conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military training camps in Central America, and the SOMOZA Plan has not progressed beyond the talking stage.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups. It is headed by SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT. The organization maintains no office as such, but continues to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida, to collect money donations.

On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised the organization has had no military activity since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the organization to increase membership, establish different sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section, and committees to raise funds. The organization recently put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and purposes of the organization, along with information concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the Miami River, which will be used in the future for military

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Book V, p. 25 Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Book V, p. 25	On November 23, 1963, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico Station to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this was because CIA feared Cuba responsible for assassination.
p. 29	Headquarters equally concerned with Duran on November 27 and warned Mexico City station chief that U.S. Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too hard.

Book V, p. 27	AMLASH's case officer omitted reference to the poison pen in his November 25 contact report of his November 22 AMLASH meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

Book V, p. 28 "D" tells his story in Mexico City on November 25. On November 26, Mexico City cables details of "D" interrogation to CIA Headquarters. On December 1, CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that the White House has been told that D's story is a fabrication.

Book V, p. 30 On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a sensitive source ( ) has advised that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana was delayed in Mexico City on November 22 to pick up a passenger who rode in the cockpit without going through customs. This cable was found in Mexico City file with no CIA headquarters record of follow-up being found.

Book V, p. 35	In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the President that stated that no evidence had been developed which would indicate Oswald's assassination was inspired or directed by Pro Castro organizations or by any foreign country.

Book V, p. 40-41	FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled FBI Headquarters on November 24 that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans participated in assassination effort. "Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in US in effort to confirm or refute this theory." FBI Headquarter's supervisor determined this was not desirable and would only promote rumors.

Book V, P. 58 The CIA investigation reflected a Soviet orientation, with exhaustive studies of Oswald's activities in re Soviet Union. There is no corresponding CIA analysis of Oswald's contacts with pro and anti Castro groups in U.S.

Book V, p. 61-63

In December, 1963, the CIA learned that a Cuban American had crossed the border from Texas into Mexico, on November 23 and arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on the flight. In March, 1964 the Agency received a report from a source which alleged that the same Cuban American had received a permit to enter Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source said the Cuban American was somehow involved in the assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this report other than to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban American's activities. The FBI did investigate the reported unusual travel but did not fully report the results of their investigation to their Warren Commission. Their investigation showed that this individual had lived in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro. He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962 and had a brother in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was the same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that Oswald had possibly contacted in May of 1963.

Book V, p. 63-64	In March of 1964, the Warren Commission requested from Director Hoover information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations which were active in the U.S. including the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Alpha 66, among others. The Bureau furnished less than a full and satisfactory response and did not disclose the fact that the CIA had operational interests in certain of the entities inquired about.

Book V, p. 65	The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished the Warren Commission noted the attack on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963 but did not detail that group's continued activity in planning and carrying out their military operations against Cuba. The FBI reports did not show that Alpha 66 had been involved with the New Orleans anti-Castro training camp.

Book V, p. 65	It is known that the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with which Oswald was associated. According to Bureau documents, the Agency advised the Bureau that they were considering the use of disinformation that might embarass the Committee in areas where the Committee had support.

Book V, p. 72 In late July 1964, an FBI informant reported that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating Castro. Informant also reported that AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan but that the plan had not been completely put to rest. This information was not disseminated outside the Bureau at the request of the informant. But the Bureau notations indicate that the Bureau was looking into an underworld plot against Castro that might be coincidental with the AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in October 1963. That information did not indicate assassination involvement.

Book V, p. 74-75	The AMLASH operation was insecure prior to the Fitzgerald meeting with AMLASH, a meeting that Fitzgerald was urged not to undertake by several in the Agency.

AMLASH

Book V, pp. 77-78	Individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation, and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine contact with Cuban intelligence (Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters, 3/18/65).

Book V, p. 78 Victor Espinosa, a Cuban exile, involved in the transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963, contacted INS with information about the AMLASH operation. This information was turned over to the FBI which informed the CIA. Both agencies interrogated Espinosa in June of 1965 and found that he knew that AMLASH and others were planning a coup which involved the assassination of Castro and that the CIA had been involved with AMLASH and others in the planning.

Espinosa and AMLASH were life-long friends but during the interrogation he gave no indication that he was aware of the 1963 AMLASH-CIA meetings. Espinosa's information noted in the 1967 IG Report suggests a link between the AMLASH operation and the CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. Therefore, Espinosa's information raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the Harvey plots may have been aware of the AMLASH operation. CIA reaction to this interrogation was to terminate the operation immediately.

Book V, p. 79	CIA had FBI files on Espinosa detailing his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and underworld figures who were operating the guerrilla training camps in New Orleans in July 1963.

Book V, p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler, who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers; Teledino stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.

Book V, p. 79 The FBI made the connection between Espinosa's 1963 activities and the fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate Castro. However, there is no evidence that either the CIA or FBI investigated this connection until 1967.

Book V, p. 79 Although the CIA had received information that AMLASH was a provocation there is no evidence that the CIA investigated the possibility of a connection between its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy.

Book V, P. 80	A client of Morgan's had informed him that the United States had attempted to assassinate Castro in the early 1960's and that Castro had decided to retaliate. This information was passed to Drew Pearson who in turn attempted to have Chief Justice Warren look into it but he declined.

Book V, P. 81	Supervisory personnel assigned to the assassination investigation have uniformly testified they do not recall ever discussing or reviewing memoranda which touch upon Cuban involvement in the assassination or of Cuban retaliation for the CIA assassination plots.

Book V, p. 81	According to Secretary of State Rusk in his testimony before the Warren Commission, 6/10/64, he stated there was "very considerable concern" in Cuba immediately following the assassination as to whether Cuba would be held responsible for the assassination and what effect the assassination might have on Cuba's position and security.

Book V, p. 84 On March 21, 1967, WFO send Headquarters 10 copies of a blind memorandum which stated Castro employed assassination teams for the purpose of removing President Kennedy. Morgan's clients were also aware of the identity of individuals sent to the United States for that purpose. He understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey. The transmittal slip is attached to this memorandum.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General ordered a follow-up investigation after receiving this memo.

Book V, p. 92 In October, 1963, Soviet experts at FBI Headquarters were informed that Oswald had met with Vice Counsel Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Kostikov was a member of the KGB and believed to be with the KGB department that carried out assassinations and sabotage.

I, Frank Sturgis, have today personally delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the following materials:

1 Envelope - 2 cassettes

1 lg. manila envelope - secret codes

Date: 9-3-76

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

RECEIVED:

Pamela Crupi

For the Committee

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No,That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when, did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know," FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were ________ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything, put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington,D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up,Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you realize what a bomb this is? This top KGB spy wants you?" And I said, "Well", I say "he's not really my type.", I said but again, the best interests of the country, but how far do you want me to go? And he said "all the way". I said what is all the way? He said, "You start with a Christmas card." Well the Christmas card was answered by Oleg going to Louis and saying, "I got Ilonka's Christmas card. Where is she living, Louis?" You know, so John talked me into calling the mission. I call up the mission, across from 19th precinct, and I said, "Oleg, this is Ilonka Marischa. Hello darling", you know, and this, this and this. And I said oh boy everything is wired and everything from the mission anyway. But he's top dog there. He is top dog in the mission. He has the say. He's a very important person in the Soviet mission. Anyway, John okays a telephone coil pickup that I have on my phone to a Soni tape recorder. We make a tape of this because John Kotter is sitting on pins and needles waiting for me to replay that tape on what Oleg tells me, you know? Oleg doubletalks but we get a message that we want to meet, you know? So they had some kind of a security council and we made a date and it was postponed. Oleg called up and apologized which I also have on tape. And each time the Bureau was very happy. We're gonna start a blossoming relationship here, you know, and end up with photographs and better something, which I don't think I would have gone all the way. But that's what their idea was so they can exchange at a later date.

FS: Blackmail?

ML: Well...

FS: Blackmail him / into giving them information (unintelligible).

ML: Say like they get one of our, one of our pilots, right? And if we don't get our pilot back they expose Oleg, right? Or make him...

FS: Be a double agent. Blackmail him...

ML: Be a double...

FS: into being a double agent.

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you, and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

Transcript of tapes provided the Select Committee on Intelligence by Frank Sturgis on September 3, 1976

Marita Lorenze (ML) -- Interviewed by Frank Sturgis on 9/2/76

Frank Sturgis (FS)

ML: Marita Lorenze

FS: You an American citizen?

ML: Yes.

FS: Were you born here?

ML: Born in Braemen, Germany on August 18, 1939 and my mother registered me at birth with the Consulate because she was stuck in the war over there, but I am an American citizen, not naturalized or anything. I was registered as an American citizen.

FS: How old were you when you came to the United States?

ML: I was about 12, came over on the U.S.S. Henry Gibbons, American troop transport, because my mother worked for the United States Army.

FS: Okay, now we're going to go ahead and jump. You went to Cuba what month and what year and on what ship?

ML: I met, I went, I took several trips with my father who was Commander of the oceanliner Berlin. I met Fidel...

FS: What was your father's full name?

ML: Commander Heinrich Frederick Lorenz.

FS: And how old was he?

ML: Approximately 50-something, 55, when I first, I went on several trips to Cuba before I met Fidel with, but I was a little girl.

FS: When's the first time you went to Cuba after Fidel took over the government on January 1, 1959?

ML: I met Fidel February 28, 1959, on one of my father's cruises where Fidel came aboard with several of his men. He said he saw the oceanliner from the Havana Hilton balcony and he took a launch with his Chief of the Navy, what's his name, I forgot, Castagna...

FS: Forget it, forget about it, we can go ahead. Who else was there besides the chief of the Cuban navy.

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco
and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No,That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly / towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know," FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were _______ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just,the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything, put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington, D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you, and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
442 Russell Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Inouye:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter from this office to Senator Mansfield expressing our concern over the rush of the Central Intelligence Agency to destroy large quantities of secret government documents. We believe the Select Committee on Intelligence should review with CIA Director Bush what specifically the Agency intends to destroy before doing so. It is likely that there are numerous memoranda and other documents which are of extreme importance to the committee, which are central to the committee's executing the Senate's mandate of comprehensive and complete oversight of executive intelligence agencies.

We urge that the Senators serving on the Intelligence Committee take whatever steps necessary to stop the destruction of materials by the Central Intelligence Agency until such time as the Committee can review the content and importance of that data.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

GC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

22 June 1976

JUN 23 11 26 AM '76

Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending you a copy of my letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott extending the moratorium on the destruction of certain records until 10 December 1976. I do hope that this action and the procedures outlined in my letters are fully responsive to the interests of your Committee.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

orig → WGM for Chair + return to files
✓ cy → MJM + return to Research for files
cy → Blue/index
cy → Chron

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

June 7, 1976

Honorable Michael J. Mansfield
United States Senate
133 Russell Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

George Bush's letter to Senator Hugh Scott, with a copy to you, of the 2nd of June is disturbingly ambiguous. In stating that the CIA now believes itself relieved of the responsibility of maintaining data "which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee," the Agency failed to make any effort to identify what materials were targeted for destruction and which weren't. Further, the next to last sentence of Mr. Bush's letter, "I trust you (Senator Scott) agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding," has led some observers in the Senate to conclude no destruction will take place until such confirmation has been given. This does not appear to be true. Neither the press office nor the legislative ~~consultant~~ counsel would confirm that destruction of data has not already occurred, or would not occur without acquisence from the Senate leadership. To the contrary, the legislative counsel's office informed this group that the "process" of destruction has already begun.

The action of the Central Intelligence Agency is wrong. The new Select Committee on Intelligence should have been consulted prior to the destruction of any materials which might be vital to the proper functioning of that committee and which in any case are within the legislative and oversight domain of that committee. Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Baker, along with the membership of the Intelligence Committee should have the opportunity to review the data selected for destruction and to determine, in conjunction with the CIA, thepropriety of destroying or maintaining such data.

We urge you, Senator Mansfield, to take whatever steps necessary to immediately halt the unilateral act undertaken by the CIA of destroying possibly critical and irreplaceable government documents.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

Copy for Senator Baker ✓

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have received a letter from the Honorable George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relative to the destruction of papers and material which he has held for sometime relative to our request. Our action was taken to facilitate the inquiry being undertaken by your predecessor committee under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church.

In view of the fact, as we assume, that all of Senator Church's committee records have been turned over to your permanent Select Committee, we would appreciate your advising us as to whether or not you want our original letter to stand and the papers and other materials to still be held. Could you give us the judgment of you and your Committee on this matter?

With best wishes, we are

Hugh Scott
HUGH SCOTT
REPUBLICAN LEADER

Mike Mansfield
MIKE MANSFIELD
MAJORITY LEADER

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 June 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

On 27 January 1975, following adoption of S. Res. 21 creating the Select Committee on Intelligence, you and Senator Hugh Scott requested that the Central Intelligence Agency "not destroy, remove from [its] possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21."

In response to this request, the Agency placed in effect a complete moratorium on the destruction of records, including normal administrative records scheduled for routine destruction.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that it is our intention to proceed with destruction of records, now that the Select Committee has completed its investigation and issued its final report. We have so advised Senator Church.

Along with the backlog of routine administrative records, the Agency will destroy records which were collected and maintained by the Agency and which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee. The Agency is required to destroy much of this latter material by the Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579) and by Executive Order 11905. Of course, all records destruction will be fully consistent with other applicable laws, Presidential directives, and the requirements of pending litigation and Justice Department investigations.

I trust you agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

I am sending a duplicate of this letter to Senator Hugh Scott.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing a copy for your information.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Pfeiffer

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

Long → Miller
Cy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

January 8, 1976

Senator Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

Thank you for your letter of December 15th in which you state that you would contact Mr. Miller and ask him to respond to my request. I am sorry to bother you again but I have had no word from Mr. Miller. As you know, I feel that the matter is of sufficient importance that it deserves a reply or at least an acknowledgement of a receipt of my letter from Mr. Miller.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:kcm

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment

SEL COMM
File: ______________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

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COPY

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

bc: Senator Mike Mansfield

WM:mm

check w/ Ted Ralston

4. (- JMM) Met with Senator Frank Church regarding a letter he had written to Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana, stating that Senator Church had reliable information that Air America was responsible for defoliation operations in Cambodia. A copy of Senator Church's letter had been sent to the Director for comment by Professor Arthur H. Westing, Windham College in Vermont. I explained to the Senator we were much concerned over this allegation and the Director authorized me to deny it categorically. I added that while we were not prying into the identity of the Senator's source, we were curious as to whether this source's allegations were based on honest mistake or malice. If the former, I suggested the Senator might wish to straighten him out. Senator Church said he couldn't remember off hand where he learned this information but would check his files. He said he fully accepted our denial.

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Missoula [illegible]

(406) [illegible]

[illegible] 1975

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SEL COMM
File:

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

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I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Kall

Review Staff: 76-0229/2
27 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to requests about Agency involvement in Cambodia, the attached statement is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
Denial of CIA involvement in the resistance and dissident activities which occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to Communists

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 27 1976
CIA

UNCLASSIFIED

The Central Intelligence Agency has not been involved in any way in the resistance and dissident activities which have occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to the Communists.

REC [illegible]
FEB 27 1976
CIA

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Ralston

Review Staff: 76-0229/1
23 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to your recent request about allegations of Agency involvement in Cambodia, please be advised that Mr. Ralston was given a copy of a 1971 letter from Senator Church to Professor Pfeiffer and a copy of a memorandum for the record reflecting a conversation between Senator Church and our Legislative Counsel about the specific allegation concerning the use of herbicides in Cambodia in 1969.

These memoranda were furnished Professor Pfeiffer in response to his FOIA request.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 24 1976
CIA

SEL COMM
File: ________________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

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Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:bcm

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

DMC

orig → Miller
✓ cy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment

United States Senate

Washington, D. C., December 15, *19*75

Respectfully referred to

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
U. S. Senate

Correspondence from Professor E. W. Pfeiffer

I would appreciate your replying to Professor Pfeiffer directly.

Mike Mansfield *U. S. S.*

Form No. 3 16—45102-3 GPO

MISSOULIAN

THE MISSOULIAN P. O. BOX 1535 500 N. HIGGINS AVE. MISSOULA, MONTANA 59801 TEL. (406) 542-0311

Oct. 23, 1975

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 607, Capitol Hill Hotel
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Recently I discussed with Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, University of Montana zoologist, an incident in which he has had an abiding concern: the herbicide attack that occurred in eastern Cambodia in the spring of 1969.

As I understand it, from my talks with Dr. Pfeiffer and from my review of the correspondence he has received from various agencies, there is no doubt that the attack actually occurred, that it was large and significant, and that the nature of the chemicals and aircraft involved indicate that the U.S. had a direct role in carrying it out.

Yet it seems the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the "private" CIA-affiliate Air America have all denied in one way or another that they conducted the attack.

The obvious question is who did make the attack? Who ordered it, why was it ordered and under what authority? Dr. Pfeiffer has indicated your committee is looking into this matter and that the affair may ultimately be discussed in the course of Select Committee hearings at some point.

Is it possible for you to tell me the status of your inquiry? Would it be appropriate at this time for our newspaper to interview Dr. Pfeiffer and write a news story on the documents he has received, or would such a study benefit from new information your committee efforts may resurrect within the near future?

Thanks in advance for your interest. We have followed with great interest the Select Committee efforts to date.

orig → For TF
cy → Blue
cy → Chron

Sincerely,

Xref Pfeiffer

Don Schwennesen

Don Schwennesen
Environmental Writer

E

Western Montana's Leading Newspaper

100% Recycled Paper

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

1975 OCT 30 PM 2 22
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Oct. 27, 1975

Mr. William Miller
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Rm G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, we met some weeks ago to discuss certain problems related to possible CIA activity in Cambodia. As you know, I am particularly interested in why the CIA cannot or will not find out who carried out the massive herbicide attack against Cambodia in the spring of 1969. The CIA has under the Freedom of Information Act provided me with some documents from my file which bear directly upon this strange episode and Senator Church's efforts to find out information for me. When we met you indicated that CIA activities in Indochina were to be investigated by the Select Committee. I would greatly appreciate knowing about when you think this subject will come up. I would also very much like to submit some of the documents I have received from the CIA and my personal testimony to the Committee. I believe that Professor A. Westing and myself were the last official guests of the Sihanouk regime before it was temporarily deposed.

I look forward to hearing from you on these matters.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor

orig → WGM
cy → blue
cy → Cl Chun
cy → For T F [illegible] Cambodia expert

E

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

Aug. 6, 1975

Mr. Paul Wallach
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G 308 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Wallach:

As decided in our phone conversation today, I am writing to you about a conversation I had last week in Paris with an official of the Royal Government of Cambodia. He informed me that CIA-directed activities hostile to his government are presently occurring in his country, and that these activities are being launched from bases in Thailand. I would greatly appreciate your assistance in finding out for me whether any agency of the U.S. Government is presently carrying out activities against the Royal Government of Cambodia.

I greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with you in person recently, and thank you for your interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology

orig → Wallach
cy → Blue Chron

EM

[illegible]
[illegible], IDAHO
[illegible], ARIZ.
[illegible], WYO.
MARK O. HATFIELD, OREG.
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.
[illegible], STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 26, 1971

E. W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive my delay in replying to your last letter of March 29, 1971. Although the Department of State has offered to make the Seventh Air Force Study available to me at the Department, I frankly have not had the chance to get down and study it.

I have been told, however, that Air America was responsible for the Cambodian defoliation. My source was not the State Department, but rather an individual who is in a position to know the facts in this matter.

It would be most useful to have a full study of the extent and the effects of our defoliation program in Southeast Asia. Perhaps you and Arthur Westing and others could get together to make a proposal for a study of this nature.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

Memorandum

MM 2/14/74

To: Terry Lenzner

From : Jim Moore

Subject: Robert Maheu - John Roselli -

Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli-Maheu connection.

Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in 1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden owners in the Friar's Club case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with him. However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source of those stories, saying that his information came from many people, including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P. Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent,. Nissen remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt to assasinate Castro.

Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding Cuba, but he couldn't remember any of the specifics.

When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it two columns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan. The government successfully resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court in Los Angeles, and they have sent the motion for reduction of sentence, and attached papers to us. The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les Whitten vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.

Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.

FRONTIER CASE

Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in lieu of the Grand Jury appearance. Nissen did not try the Frontier case, because he had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised that he had never heard of such a meeting. He gave me the names of three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not yet returned my phone call. The third, Tom Kotoski, actually tried the case. He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me as soon as possible.

One final note - Nissen said that the Roselli file in the Justice Department contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about a file kept on Maheu himself.

Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles, is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about Maheu and Roselli, as well as about Dalitz coming back to the Desert Inn. He should call me this evening or tomorrow morning. Also, Mike DeFeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force, will be in town tomorrow and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes. In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike force man from Kansas City as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department. I spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting time before he leaves town.



NAME : Sam GIANCANA

ALIASES : Sam Mooney, Sam Malone

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-16-08, Chicago, Ill.; 5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes, dark chestnut hair, fair complexion and medium build.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave. Oak Park, Ill. Frequents the Army Lounge, Norwood House, Villa Venice, all of Chicago, Illinois.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine. Mother deceased, father is Tony Giancana, and sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria. Sam's consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #58437, Chicago PD #E-27465. Subject has record of 13 arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such charges as murder, grand larceny, auto theft, burglary and liquor law violations with two felony convictions.

BUSINESS : Owns the Forest Lounge, the R & S Liquor Co., the Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling interests and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of Ill. and a director of the organization's activities in Chicago and vicinity

NAME : Giovanni ROSELLI

ALIASES : John Roselli, John Russelli, John Kasselle, John Passelli

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-4-04 Chicago, Ill, 5'8", 171 lbs, brown-grey hair, blue eyes.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides 1251 No. Crescent Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Frequents gambling casinos at Las Vegas where he has room at Tropicana Hotel. Travels frequently all parts U.S.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Divorced from movie actress June Lang; father: Vincenzo; mother: Maria Russo (both deceased); cousin: Joseph Evangelista.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Dragna family, Philip Kastel, Harold Meltzer, Francisco Costiglia, Charles Fischetti, Louis Piscopo.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #3339986. L.A. Sheriff's Office #51247. Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.

BUSINESS : Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and varied other interests.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Active in labor racketeering and control of gambling.

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C., CHAIRMAN
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

SAMUEL DASH
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
FRED D. THOMPSON
MINORITY COUNSEL
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
DEPUTY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 60, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Senator Ervin

From: Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz

Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's testimony about his CIA activities

Summary:

John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a CIA-financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. The objection is based upon national security grounds as well as an assertion by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to our inquiry under S. Res. 60.

Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.

Facts:

During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. Among the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and John Rosselli. Maheu had a public relations business at the time, and Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime figures (e.g. Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot continued into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, but it failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.

Only a few officials in the government knew of the existence of the plot at that time.

Justice Department officials stumbled across this information about the plot as a result of their investigation into an illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.

gedly handsome gambler with contacts

Roselli, Harvey said he had a high —B

The sensitive information was brought to the attention of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and either he or then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order not to compromise national security considerations.

The information about the alleged assassination plot then lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early 1969, when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file was returned to Central Files shortly after it was taken out.

Assistant Attorney General Wilson next requested the secret Justice file in early 1971 in connection with his interview of Robert Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19, 1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)

However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18, 1971, was that on the same day, Haldeman requested Dean to find out what he could about the Hughes - Maheu - O'Brien relationship.

In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."

In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971, and discussed with him the political implications of the information. Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971, by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rosselli. Maheu was not forthcoming with information about the plot at that time. Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do so.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot

gedly handsome gambler with contacts Roselli, Harvey said he had a high to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats that O'Brien might possess from Maheu. And these concerns could have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972, especially since their directions were to photograph any documents relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972 Democratic campaign.

It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rosselli about the nature and scope of his activities with Robert Maheu in the early 1960's.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a rug- gedly handsome gambler with contacts

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Thanksgiving, 1970	Hughes leaves Las Vegas.
December 4, 1970	Maheu is fired.
January 18, 1971	Jack Anderson column published linking Ma and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.
January 18, 1971	Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting i mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relations
January 19, 1971	Jack Anderson column appears with more det on Maheu's involvement in plot to assassin Castro.
January 19, 1971	Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert Maheu in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked
January 25, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo discussing Danner relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationsh with Maheu, and request for investigation i CIA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a "counter-scandal."
January 25, 1971	John Rosselli enters prison.
January 26, 1971	Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-Hughes relationship
January 27, 1971	Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bil Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" i Las Vegas.
January 27, 1971	A.A.G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahe privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi
February 1, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo noting that Maheu w involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in early 1960's.
February 12, 1971	Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban un-

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high regard for him.

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of "inc

(VERIFICATION — 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF } ss.

I am the ____________________

____

in the above entitled action; I have read the foregoing ____________________

____

and know the contents thereof; and I certify that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true.

____

____

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on ____________ *(date)* *at* ____________ *(place)*, *California*

____
Signature

(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -- 1013a, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF Los Angeles } ss.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:

9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210

On June 25, *19*71, *I served the within* Notice of Motion For Reduction of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in Support Thereof

on the Plaintiff

in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Beverly Hills, California

addressed as follows:

DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring St.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on June 25, 1971 *(date)* *at* Beverly Hills *(place)*, *California*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
25th day of June, 1971.

Myrna J. Weinstein
Signature

OFFICIAL SEAL
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Expires August 29, 1972

KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

*Both the verification and proof of service by mail forms, being signed under penalty of perjury, do not require notarization.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

National Archives and Records Service

To all to [illegible]om these presents shall come, Greeting:

By v[illegible]tu[illegible] of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I certify o[illegible] his behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration, that the [illegible]ach[illegible] reproduction(s) is a true and correct copy of documents in his custody.

SIGNATURE
Gilbert Dorame

NAME
GILBERT DORAME

DATE
FEB 12 1974

TITLE
Center Manager

NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY
General Services Administration (9NC-L)
Federal Records Center, NARS
4747 Eastern Avenue
Bell, CA 90201

GSA [illegible] 68-13478

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1200 U. S. Courthouse Building
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: 688-2406

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

FILED
FEB 17 4 46 PM '71
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI,
Defendant.

No. 1175-PH-CD

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and records in the case and the attached Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney

David R. Nissen
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

DRN:jt

MEMORANDUM

John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905, in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.

Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917. By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the five children moved into the residence of Liberato Cianciulli and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Cianciulli were married.

In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the criminal element in East Boston and was engaged in narcotic traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square. On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large sale from his "source" and was present and under agent surveillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29, 1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and two days later he was released on bail. While awaiting trial in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and was released on bail on July 2, 1923.

In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government sources believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from testifying. Because of his fugitive status, both indictments against Sacco were dropped.

After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli." Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking during this period and police records show he was frequently arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons, and suspicion of robbery.

After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In 1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information service used by bookmakers across the country.

After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios. As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna, Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers and a labor union. Also indicted were union officials Browne and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna, Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea, Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"

Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.

In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor. There were indications that their release had been secured by bribery but admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not obtained. In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his continued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned until November 1948, when his parole was reinstated. Shortly after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a key Government witness at the extortion trial was murdered by the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while they were on parole he would hold them responsible.) Two other co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.

Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles and again associated himself with a movie studio. Reliable sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld. Sacco immediately became a powerful figure in Las Vegas. He travels back and forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and associates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.

Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Committee investigating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his association with underworld figures and even his own personal background.

During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel, and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The

Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, whereupon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount paid for the lease.

During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity and he sold his interest. Following his ouster from the Tropicana, Sacco sold ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels at prices far in excess of prices on the open market. Sacco has also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.

In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.

In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that trial, it was shown that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.

Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:

Al Capone - head of the Chicago underworld gang;

Charles F. Fischetti - a Capone lieutenant;

Micky Cohen - gambler and racketeer;

Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles, now deceased;

Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel - member of Murder, Inc., murdered June 20, 1947;

Allen Smiley - gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;
Tony Accardo - ranking Cosa Nostra figure;
Momo Adams - ranking Cosa Nostra figure; and
Frank Costello - ranking Cosa Nostra figure.

Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investigations concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.

In the Friars Club trial, it was apparent that a number of witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate Sacco, including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.

Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities. He was also convicted of making a false statement in his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years in prison.

In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and, in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, JUNE S. TOKUYAMA, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made; that on February 17, 1971, I deposited in the United States mails in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO REDUCE SENTENCE

addressed to
Adrian Marshall, Esq.
Attorney at Law
9601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

at his last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail.

This Certificate is executed on February 17, 1971, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June S. Tokuyama
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA

USA-12c-240
(Rev. 10/19/67)

Memorandum

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden, 888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any informatio about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's involvement with Maheu in ½960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to interview Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)

John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantiv discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

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John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

This is cover page of a 25 count indictment arising from ∆'s use of the FRIAR'S Club in Beverly Hills for illegal gambling activities..

FILED

DEC 21 1967

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN;
MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS);
VICTOR G. LANDS;
T. WARNER RICHARDSON,
FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI);
BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM,
Defendants.

NO. 1432

INDICTMENT

[18 U.S.C. §371: Conspiracy; 18 U.S.C. §1952: Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314: Interstate Transportation of Funds Obtained by Fraud; 47 U.S.C. §502: Operating Uncertified Communication Device; 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1) Subscribing False Tax Return.]

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 USC §371]

Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN, MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS, T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI), BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S. Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses against the United States as follows:

(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use facilities

DRN:mlm:mt

FPI-LPC-8-67-150M-3124

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272-9211

Attorneys for Defendant
Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli

FILED

JUN 28 9 31 AM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7-6-71
2PM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known as
JOHN ROSSELLI, et al,
Defendants

NO. 1432 - Criminal (WPG)

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
(RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, United States Attorneys Office, Los Angeles, California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacco, also known as John Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this case. Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing, and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.

Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).

Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00 on Count One, two years to run consecutively to Count One and a fine of $10,000.00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10,000.00 for each of Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000.00 for Count Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was $55,000.00.

On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles. The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.

The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down by the Court in this case.

Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability of defendant to pay the fine of $55,000.00 as well as the condition of defendant's health.

/ / / / / /

/ / / / / /

/ / / / / /

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.

DATED: June 25, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall
ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant,
Filippo Sacco, also known
as John Rosselli

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing under my own by-line. For many years prior to the death of Mr. Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf of the United States Government.

3. The information contained in said articles was made available to me by persons employed by the United States Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and truthful information as pertains to other subjects.

4. After receiving said basic information, my staff and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A, which were performed at the behest of Agents of the United States Government.

5. The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr. Rosselli's activities as described therein.

JACK ANDERSON

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Irene P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I worked on certain articles relating to John Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal Government.

3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William K. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of Indianapolis.

4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a formidable service for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story . . . I don't think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not true that he had a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he earnestly replied.

5. In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been published widely in the United States. He declined to comment. But

he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf and he expressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.

6. Based on my part of the investigation, I am satisfied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affidavit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's activities on behalf of the United States.

Leslie Whitten
LESLIE WHITTEN

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Jane P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says: that he is the

in the above entitled action; that he has read the foregoing

and knows the contents thereof; and that the same is true of own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated upon information or belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of ______________, *19*____

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

◆

Received copy of the within Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof. 12th day of February 1971

Attorney for Plaintiff

RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT
THIS 12th DAY OF Feb. 1971
U. S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BY E. Goma

Received copy of the within ______ day of ______ 19__

Attorney for

◆

(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL — 1013a, C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA }
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

being first duly sworn says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; that affiant is over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to the within above entitled action; that affiant's business residence address is:

that on the ______ *day of* ______, *19*____, *affiant served the within*

on the ______ *in said action, by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the attorney___ of record for said* ______ *at the residence office address of said attorney___, as follows: **

and by then sealing said envelope and depositing the same, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at the city where is located the office of the attorney___ for the person___ by and for whom said service was made.

*That there is a delivery service by United States mail at the place so addressed or ** there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of ______________, *19*____

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

**Here quote from envelope name and address of addressee.*
***When the letter is addressed to a post office other than where mailed from, strike out "and"; when addressed to the same city where mailed from, strike out "or."*

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272 9211

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

vs.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, Defendant.

NO. 1175- PH

MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys, ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:

1. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and 1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts 2 through 6, all to run concurrently.

2. On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971, for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.

3. On January 18 and 19, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an

assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A and B are Xerox copies of said publications.

4. At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.

5. At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.

6. On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.

Dated: February 12, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall

ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant.

Security Clearance information on Allen Spence

Date of application: 8/24/76
(10 working day delay —)
Date submitted to the Bureau: 9/8/76

5 people – none yet cleared

Expect Summary
Report this week
(will be told by
Dick Taylor this p.m.)

Tyler Abee has custody of Personnel records

in alien listing
only Clf int rus
use of pills
unknown source 4 mo. before
New Orleans.
p67

Bob Miller
Physical Measurements
V

R4297

June 24, 197~~6~~5 Testimony of John Rosselli before Committee
Senator Church presiding

Los Angeles

p. 7-8 Rosselli first met Maheu in approximately July, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from Maheu. At their first meeting, Maheu told Rosselli that a high government official had requested that Maheu recruit Rosselli to "fight Communism 90 miles away from Florida" -- to recruit Cubans to assassinate Castro.

New York

p. 10-11 Rosselli had second meeting with Maheu and went to New York in September under the alias of John Rawlston [Castro was in New York at this time]. Rosselli met Jim O'Connell of CIA, plus "three others."

Florida

p. 12-15 O'Connell, Maheu and Rosselli met in Florida hotel approximately one week after New York. Rosselli introduced Giancana to Maheu. Also introduced X (Trafficante) to Maheu. Obtained permission from Maheu to bring Giancanainto project.

p. 17 Rosselli recruits Cuban #1, Rosselli's cover was as Wall Street businessman. Rosselli and Maheu agree on a $250,000 price tag for the job.

p. 20 O'Connell never met Cubans. Trafficante, Cubans and Maheu met. Maheu brought $10,000 and poison capsules.

p. 26 Rosselli told Giancana about CIA involvement to keep his mouth shut. Rosselli only had one discussion with Giancana.

p. 27 O'Connell called Rosselli after Bay of Pigs. Met in Florida not long after Bay of Pigs with William Harvey, O'Connell and Rosselli. Harvey told Rosselli that he wanted Rosselli to have nothing to do with Maheu and not to use Giancana connections.

p. 35 Rosselli indicates that pro-Castro people in Florida probably had inkling of assassination attempts.

p. 44 During Missle Crisis, Harvey asked Rosselli to see if "they" had any intelligence on us, on the missiles.

TOP SECRET

p. 68-70	FBI agents Hill and Dodge met with Rosselli and his lawyer, Cantillon. At this time Dodge informed Rosselli that the FBI was aware that he was not a U.S. citizen. Dodge indicated something about Nevada and some other secret organizations.
p. 71-75	Rosselli met with Sheffield Edwards in 1966 for some drinks and discussed his problems with the FBI.
p. 76-78	Rosselli received a telephone call from an FBI agent, Jack Barron in June of 1970. The agent informed Rosselli that his appeals can be reversed. He was told that his lawyers and friends can't do anything for him in Washington.
p. 79-80	Rosselli talked with Bill Harvey prior to his testimony before the Select Committee to see if Harvey had objections and Harvey only suggested that Rosselli protect those people whose lives and whose families might be jeopardized by his testimony.
p. 81	Rosselli stated he did not know the five so-called Watergate burglars -- Hunt, McCord, Barker, Martinez or Sturgis.
p. 82	Roselli had no doubt that the Cuban operation was on behalf of the CIA and not Mr. Hughes.
p. 84	Rosselli stated that his Cuban contacts were never informed that this was a CIA project, but that he represented a Wall Street business. In the period 1967-1968, Rosselli failed to register as an alien and faced criminal charges.
p. 85-87	Rosselli describes how he is brought into the operation -- Maheu's contact and O'Connell's satisfying him that they were government representatives.
p. 88	Rosselli stated that Sheffield Edwards was not overly concerned with the FBI's contacting Rosselli.
p. 89	Rossell's reason for not informing his sources that it was a CIA operation was because he believed he would be more successful doing what he was doing by representing big business.
p. 90	When the FBI contacted Rosselli in both 1966 and 1970 they hinted that they wanted Rosselli to provide information about United States gambling interests.

TOP SECRET

p. 44	After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the whole operation came to a halt and Rosselli said he was never in contact with the Cubans again.
p. 45-46	Rosselli met Harvey at Dulles Airport in Washington after the Missile Crisis, in June 1963, and had dinner with him in Washington that night.
p. 47	Rosselli mentions FBI had him under surveillance for several years.
p. 47	Roselli has two stories re Rowan wiretap from Maheu. Maheu told him he wanted Rosselli to get some bail money for two guys in Las Vegas who were in trouble and he had placed some taps in Rowan's room because 1) Maheu was doing Giancana a favor, and 2) Maheu had the authority to see if Giancana was leaking to his girlfriend.
p. 52	Rosselli arranged bail money for the two men who were caught tapping Rowan's room.
p. 52	Giancana laughed when Rosselli discussed tapping incident with him, but gave no clues to the reason for the tap.
p. 54-55	Rosselli met in New York with O'Connell and Harvey in April 1962.
p. 58	Rosselli states to the Committee that he felt the CIA came to him because he has contacts in Cuba.
p. 59	Rosselli states he took on "project" because it was the government; he was patriotic.
p. 61	Rosselli knew Trafficante before "operation" started.
p. 62	Rosselli maintained some contact with Maheu after Harvey took over.
p. 64	Rosselli still is social friends with Harvey.
p. 66	In April or May of 1966, Rosselli was stopped in the street by two FBI agents with note saying to meet him later. Rosselli referred them to his attorney, Mr. Cantillon

TOP SECRET

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Howard--

In re your "battle plan" memo to Hart and Garn, I think you should consider possible wisdom of our Committee making some kind of very low-key anouncement that we're doing something. Purpose would be two-fold--to prevent getting wholly co-opted by new House Committee (and agencies making a claim that since House is doing it, they can ignore us---also to put House on notice there is specific area we have carved and will continue to carve out for ourselves). Most important, we must do something affirmative to insure that the sources out there come to us. If we say nothing, potentials which just go to House under assumption that that's the only thing going on.

Attached is the type of low-key someone could say in response to an inquiry (which I assume Spencer gets lots of).

Mike

JFK assassination study

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is also ~~seeking to determine~~ continuing to explore the question of whether or Mr. Roselli's murder was related in any way to his ~~testimony~~ appearances before the church Committee.

Items Interest re Review of R 4881 documents (requested by Rick)

> Need unsanitized copy 8 May 74 memo re Records Search by Logistics & access to all 24 items forwarded to the IG.

> Why did Houston tell Lyle Miller (per Miller's 14 Mar 74 memo) that only himself, Edw, Osb, Angleton & Rocca aware of details of Maheu, Giancana matter

SECRET ①

-1 ________ file

SECRET - Cable 24 July 74

Response to Memo identifying Maheu as a CIA official w/ Las Vegas Sun in July 1974

while not directly involved + admittedly unaware of all facts + ramifications ref a exposure Atlanta base of opinion / termination at this stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have adverse effect on his loyalty to CIA. He might resent termination by CIA for something he not respons. for.

March '76 OS memos to IG on Maheu + Hughes

June-1974
Security Office Special Staff Projects asked OS to check records on James R. Phelan + Wallace Turner, both of interest in connection w/ a sensitive SPS activity. OS records show Phelan to be a witness in Clay Shaw trial. Phelan wrote several articles re Maheu's defamation suit w/ Hughes. Maheu thought to be source. Duckett recalled 2 receiving call from RAM in Dec. 1970 complaining that CIA embarked on a new Hughes project + had not gone thru him.

(Maheu - Hughes fight reason for termin) w/ RAMA

Non Off/Sec. Doc's in Maheu OS File

1 Feb 71 Memo from Eric I to DDP - discusses efforts to work out a satis. plan to terminate RAM from RAMA cover in a manner that avoids the need for a meeting w/ RAMA officers

X

Non OIS Docs in RAM file SECRET (2)

21 June 66 Houston to DDCI re Long Subcommittee and RAM: John Leon testifies before Long Subcom. on Onassis case + subcom. staff undoubtedly knows Maheu used audio device.

Lyle Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974

par. 8 Notes contact w/ L. Houston re Maheu/Giancana. Houston said "the only Agency officials "aware" of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and himself."

Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 73

re meeting w/ Scott Armst. re his interview of 3 10/3/73 + interest in RAM assoc. w/ CIA.

"New Years Eve Party" - Wilkinson report critical of CIA.

8 page PELTIER memo 11/18/68 re "OBservations on Cover Company Personnel + Activities" (RAMA).

4 page 2 Apr 71 MFR of O'Connell + ?

(CCS/LPGLOBE) meeting w/ Ed Mullen (Intertel) re RAMA/MM/CIA. (Juan Duran) [J. Duran Arias] $10,000 withdrawal

Rodbart cont. 7 SECRET ⑤

-Maheu/Intertel

14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET Edwards MFR - Re Balletti.

memo prepared for RFK following oral briefing.

"Rosselli and Maheu spent consid. time in Miami talking with the Courier. Giancana also present. Giancana put them in touch w/ a "Courier" who went back & forth to Havana. Courier said opn feasible

Edw. put in quotes

Jan 71 — All CIA contact w/ RAM cut off. because Hughes battle + unfav. publ. However — Osb. notes that Helms had directed termin. of Maheu relat. as early as 1966. "flags" ignored

O'Connell MFR 1/5/71 - re: RAM

On 17 Nov. 70 - Maheu called O'Connell to say that Rosselli's lawyer advised that unless someone interceded on his behalf re deportation - Ros. was going to make complete expose of his activities w/ CIA'

4 Jan 71 - Maheu advised O'C - that his past Affilia. w/ CIA had no bearing on Hughes power struggle situation.

SECRET ④

Review STAFF FILE - Ed Proctor

2/15/72 OS memo to Colby re Rosselli

DCI ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking calcul. risk as to exposure. [Sanitizes CIA officer's name for unknown reason]

X 5 June 75 — Subm. to Schwarz from Knoche - Elder for

Typewriter - fragmentary resume - Cuba.

SECRET ⑤

Bill Angeloni - used for dirty work - Surveil. by Maheu

Maheu file "Gaps".

Vol. 1 Nov63 - Dec. 73 - CCS 12419
3 June 71

Eric I to Sam Halpern

"The attached 2 memoranda contain the latest development in the Robert A. Maheu Associates (RAMA) "thriller". The second memorandum is self explanatory except you should know that Robert ~~A. Ma~~ Mullen Assoc. is a longtime cooperator in the Cover field, and Howard Hunt is now one of its Vice Presidents."

(No Attach.)

13 Apr 71 MFR by 5 (CCS / CPGLOBE)
re / meeting - / wondering how his name came up in Hughes Tool investig. of RAMA.
Heinonen meeting w/ Mullen of interest to det. Hunt

poisoned than it would have been had that decision been left to those who were profiting personally, psychologically and politically from the Watergate [illegible].

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

HON. DAWSON MATHIS

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1976

Mr. MATHIS. Mr. Speaker, I note with great interest the news reports concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination material which my colleague from Virginia, Mr. DOWNING, made public yesterday. I ask unanimous consent that this article from this morning's Washington Post be inserted at this point in the RECORD. I agree fully with my colleague from Virginia that this information should be investigated properly, by a select committee of the House. If certain Cuban elements were in any way responsible for President Kennedy's death, let us determine that. If former President Nixon had been associated with such groups, and if the "White House tapes" do, in fact, refer to such an association, let us determine that. If the material released yesterday is not true, let us determine that.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to settle these and many other disturbing questions about the Kennedy assassination. We have waited long enough. I am confident a majority of my colleagues would support the resolution to establish an investigating committee, if it came to the floor for a vote. I strongly urge the Committee on Rules to allow the House that opportunity.

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

Rep. Thomas Downing (D-Va.) released sworn statements yesterday quoting an anti-Castro Cuban exile leader as claiming he had an agreement with then-Vice President Nixon in 1960 for "elimination" of leftist Cuban exiles after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Downing said he had no way of validating the information and was in no position to vouch for its authenticity.

He said he released the statements only because they are sworn and part of a package of documents raising the possibility that President Kennedy was assassinated by right-wing Cuban exiles who felt betrayed because promises that they thought they had from Nixon had not been kept in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The two sworn statements were made this month by Mario Kohly Jr., son of the late Cuban leader who claimed the agreement with Nixon, and Robert Morrow, an author who says he was a Central Intelligence Agency contract employee.

Morrow's statement says that the elder Kohly said the agreement was made on his pledge to have his 42,000 underground forces inside Cuba, as well as 300 to 400 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains, support an invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles.

Kohly Jr. says in his sworn statement: "I was told that Vice President Nixon had agreed to the elimination of the leftist approved Cuban Revolutionary Front leaders at a time when the island would be invaded by the exile troops trained under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency."

Exiles [illegible] U.S. air cover [illegible] the Bay of Pigs invasion [illegible] foil, Kennedy stood in the way of a plan [illegible] Castro Cuban leaders were prepared [illegible] full of aid for [illegible] said.

DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

HON.

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Cast char.

MOB

CIA

FBI

Cuban Exiles & Soldiers of Fortune

Hughes

Chap Plots

#1 | #2 | AMLASH | mob |

Ruby Connection >

Oswald Connection >

Allegations – catalogue

LBJ/JFK Library

1. Inventory – Review = Tom/Ed.
2. Ingesting
3. Timing & Nature of Public Statement
4. House areas of Interest

hot leads

instant interviews

– someone to work

– file system

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to ill the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that ilthough he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely ended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of he President. This shows how garrulous McCone is. H

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a igment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, he source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we re still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either ins[illegible]e or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this. When will we learn? H

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of he Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he hought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and traighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all neans he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain onfidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. le has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" nd has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

CTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford. *SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 JcS: HRT.

RL

Well handled

FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 12, 1963

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

Presidents Commission

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford (R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined with Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that he (Boggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63. In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority of one that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)

This is my viewpoint too.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Jones

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

REC 55

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FEB 16 1976

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XEROX
DEC 30 1963

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*SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 JCS : HRT.

RL

Well handled

FBI

- 2 -

My Turn

Donald E. Schulz



Kennedy and the Cuban Connection

Conspiracy theories are fashionable, sometimes even fruitful, as in the case of Watergate. So it is not surprising that recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee have resurrected an old question: what connection, if any, did the Castro government have with the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban dictator, having learned of CIA plots against his life, decided to strike back, returning violence for violence, with consequences that are now history. Indeed, the recent report of the Schweiker-Hart task force, while finding no hard evidence to support this theory, did uncover some interesting new leads. More than that, it established that a CIA-FBI "cover-up" had deprived the Warren commission of vital information that prevented it from seriously exploring the possibility of Castro's involvement and that consequently—there is no longer any reason to have faith in its picture of the Kennedy assassination."

And so we may well have a reopening of the investigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to examine the record of the period. A small but interesting body of published testimony and reminiscences describes and amply documents a little-known campaign of accommodation launched by Washington and Havana in the weeks preceding that fateful day in November 1963. Actually, the origins of this tentative and ultimately ill-fated rapprochement may be traced to the previous spring, when Castro, increasingly dependent on his Soviet sponsors, found himself obliged to embrace the banner of "peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain economic and military agreements needed to assure the continued development of his revolution. In practical terms, this meant the normalization of relations with the United States.

A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, however, that this campaign began to show results. At that time, William Attwood, an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told his superiors he had word that Castro wanted an accommodation. John Kennedy got the message and approved a "discreet contact" with the Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Lechuga. Subsequently, communications were established and meetings held to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

By early November, Kennedy had decided to push toward an opening with Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the Soviet fold and erasing the memory of the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a meeting to draw up an agenda for later discussions. On Nov. 18, this message was transmitted to Havana. Shortly thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.

Even as these developments were unfolding, a second dialogue was taking place through an unofficial envoy—the French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct. 24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the White House. The President, it seems, had learned of the Frenchman's forthcoming visit to Cuba and had decided to seize the occasion to send Castro a message. The essence of this communication was a strong hint that the United States would be willing to normalize relations *providing* certain conditions were met. What were those conditions? One, clearly, was an end to Castroite subversion. The U.S. had a special responsibility to contain Communist expansionism. As long as Havana continued to export revolution, the economic "blockade" of the island would remain in effect.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Beyond this, not much was definite. The American negotiating position had not yet been worked out. Even so, hints of possible Cuban participation in the Alliance for Progress and of the desire of the United States to see a decline in Soviet influence on the island suggested further avenues for discussion.

Bearing this message and an invitation to revisit the White House upon his return, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he found a remarkably receptive Fidel Castro. Indeed, during the course of a six-hour interview the *líder máximo* found occasion to praise the American President for his sincerity, realism and "good ideas": Kennedy might yet understand that there could be "coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas." Castro was convinced that normal relations could be restored "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty." His country needed peace in order to concentrate on the socio-economic tasks of the revolution. The issue of subversion would not be an obstacle. Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity" with their revolutionary brethren in other lands. But ultimately, each nation would have to determine its own destiny, and "if they choose regimes other than ours, this is not our business."

This was two days prior to President Kennedy's death.

I mention these developments because they provide an important—and perhaps crucial—frame of reference for Congressional investigators and the public alike. They are not, of course, proof of innocence. But they are suggestive: would Castro have been so intent on coming to terms with a man he was conspiring to kill? One may seriously doubt it. In point of fact, the assassination would bring a quick end to Washington's interest in accommodation.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Still, this is not to rule out the possibility of a "Cuban connection." Governments often behave in inconsistent and self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the Kennedy Administration was taking these first covert steps toward rapprochement, the CIA was engaged in an attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack of political control and a prevailing atmosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S agents could be conducting such activities in direct conflict with Presidential policy, it is not difficult to imagine similar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly denounced U.S.-sponsored assassinations and even threatened retaliation. Might not some overzealous security officials have taken this for tacit authority to set up a "program of elimination"?

But all this remains speculation. It is possible to envision any number of scenarios that *might* have led to the fatal events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evidence, however, it seems only fair to give Castro the same benefit of the doubt that Kennedy has been accorded—namely, that he be considered innocent until proved guilty. It is hoped that the investigations to come will proceed on the basis of that assumption.

Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, is writing a book on the Cuban revolution.

Fonzi Mtg. Notes
9/20/76

Gaudet on [illegible]
305-861-7651

photos

Al Tarabochia memo | Ltr. Ruby-Castro
FBI got quest.

Ruby 62/63 in Havana to see antique dealer

manolo Ray: Cubela — Artime someone in Artime circle tipped on Cubela

Crile — Alleman/Trafficante -

CUSA — Conservatism
Black bordered ads

DEA
Sturgis/Jerry B. involved in case against Bernstein.

Larry Craford — lived Carousel — "How Hollywood makes movies" Myers lends $50
Ruby called when got people out of movies

Hemming too. (Keya operation)

Marita Lorenz — puts Hunt w/ Sturgis early. Shortly after she got here. Knew Hunt as Eduardo.

Bernstein
Werbell
(Baird) Flood/Cuba

DEA

Paul Meskill — NY Daily News — 1975 — Series of Sturgis Lorenz pieces

Gibson
Traffic

Sylvia Odio — sure it was Oswald in Dallas late Sept when supposed to be in Mex.
Thereby Duran — asset.

imposter

(McQuiley Strawman)

Norman Rothman - Ruby's Rabbi

Oswald Ferrie Shaw - Lawrence Myers - Ruby) Sturgis or McCleary Hemming ←

Ruby Mob

vol 19 p. 477

Lorenz –

Sam Benton – offered Crown deal to assinate Castro at Jumming house. Alex Roark / Sturgis /

– mining –

Naval Intell

Shamma –

Artime
Trafficante

Org. Cr. Source

Norady Quality Foods

Gaillot – Cocaine
Mel Kessler – Atty

Gill [Trossi]
Lee Shannon Jewelry

Eduard Batan

TRICE Co. Realtors
(Rebozo)

Eduardo Buttari – Cuban fa

Artime:

× Carlos Martin →

Dr Modesto Mora → Gerstein protect

McQuilley working for Rothman when Ruby in contact.

Trafficante

Sam Mannarino
Norm Rothman } Stolen Bonds

Norman Rothman – first approached Fiorini on assass.

[illegible]

Rolando Martinez – Joe Merola ~~Merola~~ (Gun runner)
[illegible] boat

1 1965 - Hunt straightening out Cubela compromise in Spain.

~~[illegible] Jack Whitten~~

-Lonsky-

2. McLaney

3. Fitz. alias

4. Nosenko.

> Jack Whitten

Sanchez → transcript.

AMLASH file

5. - Alvarrado.

> 6. sensitive/reliable source

To Assassination file

CONFIDENTIAL

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparently has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparantly welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

Braden was then commuting between New Orleans and Beverly Hills, with the approval of his Parole Board. Braden was working as a representative of his Mafia friend Roger Bauman, the oil speculator. Braden worked out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate, Victor Main, Jr., an oil geologist. This was just a short way down the hall from David Ferrie in Room 1707.

Interestingly, in one visit to his Parole Office, Braden "mistakenly" told his Parole Officer that he was working out of Room 1706 - which would have been the room next door to Ferrie - instead of Room 1701.

Thus a possible Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks just before the assassination does indeed arise in addition to the possible Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections definitely do seem to fall outside of or beyond the area which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance, or circumstance.

Beyond several sets of information which tend to indicate that David Ferrie had some contact with Lee Oswald at various times, the critics of the Warren Commission have particularly focused on Ferrie's ties to Carlos Marcello and the Marcello Mafia empire.

In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and Secret Service after the assassination, Ferrie claimed that he was with Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie stated that he was in court with Marcello on the afternoon of November 22, which does appear to be true.

Carlos Marcello, along with Meyer Lansky, had become the central targets of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Division in the early 1960's, under the vigorous direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Marcello, known as "The Little Man," became one of Attorney General Kennedy's most fierce enemies during that period. Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders of Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department.

Ed Reid, author of The Greenfelt Jungle and widely recognized as one of the most respected experts on the Mafia in the nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

(Braden is now living in Atlanta)

– Mike Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
RE: JKF ASSASSINATION

January 21, 1977

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R 6250

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Thornburgh:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of Investigation material relating to Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jim Braden.

Your assistance and cooperation with the Select Committee is most appreciated.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman

HSL/dr

cc: 1 - author file
1 - subject matter file
1 - William G. Miller
1 - Michael J. Madigan

DONALD F. MASSEY
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

December 8, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#5785

Mr. Donald F. Massey
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select Committee has expressed an interest in recent press accounts suggesting the existence of transcripts of Lee Harvey Oswald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts and their availability for review by the Senate Select Committee.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
Minority Staff Director

HSL:dr

cc: 1 - Author File
1 - Subject File
1 - Minority Counsel
1 - Staff Director

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Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission, to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

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

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post


YOU SAY YOU HAVE RECURRING FANTASIES OF SPACE FLIGHT...
NOT PARTICULARLY...
-DO YOU DESIRE TO EXPERIENCE INTERPLANETARY TRAVEL?
JUST THE WEIGHTLESSNESS.

GASOLINE ALLEY

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

Howard [illegible]

THE WASHINGTON POST

September 12, 1976

Alton Frye

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be reopened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban factor in the murder.

Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commission investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for supporting the work of the Warren Commission. As a result, there was no special effort to explore the possible involvement of either the Cuban government or Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plausible—and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared—even eager —to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an adequate prop for their predilections. The commission did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a ranking Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and recently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the murder of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French reporter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Castro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the White House on Oct. 24, persuading Castro that Kennedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and movement on either track could have provoked violent response by one or another Cuban faction.

Perceptions inside the Cuban government responded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA eventually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "insecure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these facts are significant or merely coincidental, one cannot tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AMLASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cuban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an unexpected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban policy as it was then evolving.

For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he was interested in an opening to Washington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Kennedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early September the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and comments as hinting of American interest in a possible accommodation, much as they were later to interpret the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Kennedy has been a compound of political antipathy and personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate regard for the President's courage and realism. They

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The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials speculate that the real origin of the assassination lies in anti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the previous Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "counter-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American relations, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representatives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. " . . . they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli . . . surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee, all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power, according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

Oswald 201 — 57 file folders - chron. arranged.
Ballen for access.

→ Ck. CIA files on John Wilson - Hudson.

CIA's first case officer allegedly compromised
by "the Cuban girl" — Williamson (in 1967 IG report on assass.)

Steve Hunt — not in Security report which Rocca
requested in 1967 when Rocca requested the
Espinosa file, as result of Garrison investig.

June 65 - Swenson to Spain.

1961 — Fred Stewart — (1967 IG Report) first recruited
AMLASH in Mexico City.

FBI, Paul Dailey, says the FBI informant who
told them of AMLASH plot was not
Tepedino. Bureau refuses to say who
their source was. CIA says the
informant was Tepedino.

Espinoso tied into dynamite via Sturgis
New Orleans / Miami.

Apr 6, 1965
→ first date
AMLASH compromised
per knowl. of CIA

Questions to Be Answered + notes of future From Reading 1967 IG Report —

1) Who is QJWIN? what does he do? What are names of other principal agents and sub-agents required for ZRRifle activities?

- Dr. Edward "Manny Gunn" involved in Technical aspects of Operational planning. (Asked to treat cigars w/ lethal material).

- Jake Esterline was head of Cuba task force in pre Bay of Pigs days.

Cornelius Roosevelt - Chief, TSD, during early plots.

Giancana nixed gangland slaying because use of weapons rendered escape and survival negligible.

The disaffected Cuban official Trafficante in touch w/ was Juan Orta, who had access to Castro.

Sid Gottlieb involved as Special Asst. to DDP ~~as TSD~~ during relevant time frame.

Orta lost position in Cuban govt. on 26 Jan. 1961 + took refuge in Venezuelan embassy on April 11, 1961 and became the responsibility of the Mexican Embassy when Venz. broke relations w/ Cuba in Nov. 1961. Castro refused a safe conduct pass until Oct. 1964 when allowed him to go to Mexico City. Orta arrived in Miami in Feb. 1965 (Coincid. fall from favor r/t cold feet killed first gangster attempt)

Orta suggested a successor - who made several unsuccessful attempts.

2) Who was successor?

Trafficante - suggested Tony Varona (high in exile movement) head of Democratic Revolutionary Front group → supported by CIA as part of larger Cuban opn.

Varona not satisfied w/ degree of CIA assistance.

21 Dec 60 - FBI gave CIA a memo on racketeers efforts to finance anti-castro activities.
18 Jan 61 - Varona associated w/ above scheme. Hired Edw. Moss, D.C. public relations man as fund raiser and public relations advisor. Moss's mistress Julia Cellini, whose brothers owned 2 large Havana gambling casinos, Moss had been given Covert Security Clearance by CIA.
3.) Where are the orig. FBI report?
4.) Edward K. Moss file

Esterline supposedly took "ineffective steps" to thwart Varona's involv. in mobster plan as he was one of five key figures in the Revolutionary Front & heavily involved in the approaching BofP plan.

5.) Who were other 4 leaders? What steps take taken? Why ineffective?

Pill delivery: Roselli → O'Connell → Varona → ?

p.35 6). Who is Varona's son-in-law - closely involved w/ him during relevant time frame?

ZRRifle was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).
7) Names of those in FI/D involved w/ ZRRifle.
QJWIN terminated by Luxembourg station - Apr. 1964

46 Gunn delivered poison pills to Harvey

47 Harvey says Rosselli in touch w/ Varona when Harvey arrived in Fla. O'Connell does not remember when Varona was re-activated for phase 2 efforts.

48 Giancana and Trafficante apparently not involved in phase 2. Rosselli dealing w/ a Cuban who spoke Italian named MACEO who went by the names Garcia-Gomez + Godoy / Varona + Varona's son-in-law.

50 – Shackley was never told who pills deliv. to or why. Only told surveillance in support of a HQ opn.

49 Harvey and Shackley deliv. arms + equip. to Rosselli for Varona.

52 Jan 63 – Rosselli agreed w/ Harvey that not much ~~would~~ was going to happen

52. Feb 63. Harvey left word for MACEO that it looked like the effort was over. Rosselli met w. Harvey in LA and agreed to close opn off "but that it would be unwise to attempt to precipitate a break between Rosselli + Varona" with Rosselli agreeing to reduce frequency of contact until there was none.

53 June 63 – Roselli visited Harvey in DC + went out to dinner – While dining Papich called Harvey + asked if he knew who his dinner guest was. Roselli under intensive surveillance. Papich said have to tell Hoover

p65 – Why did Edwds. Agency tell RFK that opns ceased w/ mob when in fact they still underway w/ mob at that moment

70 FBI interviewed Ed Morgan

72 Maheu met at least once w/ Vice-Pres. Nixon in effort to aid Niarchos vis-a-vis Onassis.

73 Maheu hired someone to do tech. surveil. on Onassis

73 Gen. Cusl w/ Maheu's counsel, Ed Morgan, persuaded Sen. Long not to call him.

73 Sam Halpern was in on the contaminated diving suit scheme after Des Fitzgerald took over Cuban Task Force from Harvey in Jan. 63. Gottlieb of course also involved.

TMB A no CI files reviewed by IG in preparing report

78 March 61 - Jack Stewart met w/ Cubela in Mexico City. Stew. assigned to Mex. City knew Cubela casually from Havana days. Tepedino (AMWHIP-1), long time friend Cubela, arranged meeting to sound Cubela out on his views on Cuban situation. This meeting though inconclusive led to AMLASH.

80 March 61 - Miami asset reported that Cubela and Juan Orta (gangster's man in Cuba) wanted to defect.
CIA found 3 name links betw. Cubela and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodes — All nebulous

81 Aug. 61 Cubela sent message to Tepedino that Cubela wanted to talk with friend of Stewart's in Paris if possible. Sent thru Cubela's girl friend - airline hostess. Paris given OK to approach — no indic. he was ever contacted.

82 June 62 - Tepedino told FBI of Cubela's desire to defect. Bureau said would refer Cubela to CIA in Paris if he contacted Bureau's legal attache.

Tepedino contacted FBI because he upset w/ way CIA handled Cubela's "defection" attempt in Paris in 1961.

p 83 Aug '62 Wainwright from HQ met w/ Tep. + went to Helsinki for series of meetings w/ Cubela where defection plan turned to recruiting Cubela in place.

84 Aug 62 - Cubela met w/ Spanish speaking case officer in Paris later in Aug. after meeting in Stockholm on Aug 7-9. In Paris it was learned that Cubela told 4 Cuban assoc. of his meeting in Helsinki.

85 14-23 Aug 62 - Earle Williamson, Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid, met in Paris w Cubela, Tep., + Wainwright. On 18 Aug. HQ. strongly agreed Cubela not to be given physical elimination mission.

Sept 63 Sanchez from HQ joins Wainwright, Tep. + Cubela in Brazil + becomes Cubela's case officer

16 Sept 63 Cubela (Paris) writes Tep. (NY) don't intend to see ~~Sanchez~~ your friend again

3 Oct 63 Sanchez arrives in Paris ANYWAY. Learned that French keeping Cubela under surveillance.

11 Oct 63 - Sanchez cables Cubela insistent on meeting senior US official, pref. RFK, for assurances.

29 Oct 63 Des using James Clark alias meets Cubela in Paris at home of Red Stent. Sanchez interp. Fitz said U.S. wanted no part in attempt on Castro's life.

14 Nov 63 Wainwright meets Tepedino in NY - Says Cubela pleased w/ Des meeting from policy standpoint but very unhappy at not being given tech. assistance.

19 Nov 63 Des approved telling Cubela he would be furnished cache inside Cuba.

p91-92 Docs of record in AMLASH file ~~and [illegible]~~ has gap here

Sam Halpern + ~~Gunn~~ Sanchez asked Gunn for assist. re ~~in high~~ means of assassination that would allow Cubela escape ~~powered rifle~~

20 Nov. Halp + Sanchez asked Gunn to rig poison pen for Sanchez next day.
Done

22 Nov Sanchez arrives Paris + mets Cubela late AM. Cubela accepts pen but doesn't think much of device.

Fitz called Sanchez after JFK ass. saying everything off.
The cable not in file.

30 Aug 64 – Artime rec. info thru Madrid that dissidents in Castro regime wanted direct Artime contact

Why ✱ On 7 Oct 64 an Artime assoc. went to France to serve as intermediary w/ diss^dent^ group.

1964 – Agency conspiring to put Cubela + Artime together w/o each other knowing it.

Cubela ↓ wants weapon

Artime ↓ wants man inside Cuba

~~27~~ Dec 64 – Artime meets Cubela in Madrid

Feb 65 – Cubela gets silenced weapon from Artime's Secty in Madrid

March 65 – Madrid cable that lawyer Garcia-Bango arrived in Madrid w/ news that he was in contact w/ Cubela, long a close friend. G-B was jailed in 1962 for defending Santos Trafficante.

June
May/65 Espinosa reported full knowledge of Cubela plans and of CIA complicity.

106 June 23 65 HQ sent cable to all stations directing termin. of contact w/ Cubela group.

March 66. Cubela arrested for counterrevol. activ. involving CIA. Cubela trial brought out
p108 - contact w/ James Noel in Madrid.

p115 - July/Aug 1964 - CIA memos refer to a gangland effort to pay 150,000 to kill Castro & refer to FBI interv. of partic.

p120 - O'Connell met w/ Maheu post Drew P. article. He reported:

Roselli steered to Morgan (separately from Maheu) by Greenspun.

Jim Garrison, Morgan & Roselli & perhaps Greenspun in touch w/ each other in Las Veg. in March.

p121 Ref to a Puerto Rican in Phillipine custody who says he participated in Castro inspired assas. plot in Dallas. Bureau expected to wring him dry.

Varona became very embittered by
128 B of P failure. Among most critical. Agency failure to support his exile group led to loss of income

Last known to be living hand to mouth as part time auto salesman.

130 "Maheu has good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative clt., Howd. Hughes."

7 Mar 66 - Cable to Rusk - Lies about ass. invol

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 12-10-64

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

1-Mr. Sullivan
(O.H. Bartlett)
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Malley
1-Mr. Shroder
1-Mr. Rogge

PURPOSE:

To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when testifying before the President's Commission, denied making certain statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the Commission.

DETAILS:

In Volume II of the hearings before the President's Commission commencing on page 61 there appears the testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Assistant Special Agent*, White House Detail, U. S. Secret Service on 3-9-64. *In Charge

Under questioning by a Commission member, Kellerman was asked about certain statements reportedly made by him on 11-22-63, to SA's Francis X. O Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert, of our Baltimore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph 4). SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observers during the autopsy of President Kennedy at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, which commenced on the evening of 11-22-63, to be of assistance to the Secret Service, and to look after the Bureau's interests.

Our Agents, in conversation with Kellerman, sometime during the evening of 11-22-63, learned of certain information, portions of which were reported as follows:

> "He advised he heard a shot and immediately turned around, looking past Governor Connally, who was seated directly in back of him, to the President. He observed the President slumped forward and heard him say, 'Get me to a hospital.' Mr. Kellerman then heard Mrs. Kennedy say, 'Oh, no!', as the President leaned towards her. He immediately advised the driver to take the President to the nearest hospital."

REC

FEB 20 1976

FBI

PERS. REC. UNIT

RDR:tmt
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say these things and had never told our Agents that he had. In part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they got those quotes."

OBSERVATIONS:

Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate accounts of a conversation with him. It is to be remembered that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in the President's car and more than likely was upset and feeling remorse over the days episode. In his testimony before the Commission he endeavored to give the impression that he acted calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions after the President was hit. The conversation reported by our Agents made it appear Kellerman reacted normally to the tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony, as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the President had so directed.

It is felt our Agents reported accurately what Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that Kellerman's testimony $3\frac{1}{2}$ months later is the result of considered deliberation, on his part, to paint the most favorable picture possible, under the circumstances, for the Secret Service.

Consideration has been given to discussing this matter with Chief Rowley of Secret Service, however, since it is the word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good purpose would be served by this course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert and O'Neill attesting to the accuracy of their report and refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and did something about it.

[illegible]

OK

1976

FBI

[illegible] 16

Research

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0298/1
11 March 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Johnston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request dated 9 March 1976 about the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
As stated

Attachment to:
Review Staff: 76-0070/1

1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom are now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR 86054 on 30 November 1963:

Originator: Mr. Louis Armstrong

Coordinators: Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling

Authenticator: Mr. William B. Tyng ("for" Desmond FitzGerald)

Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("for" J. C. King)

2. We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria Antonieta MAURI. We have been unable to determine who transmitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we have not been able to locate any documents relating to this matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.

3. We have been unable to locate any documents which would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from Mexico City.

4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the originating Headquarters component should have initiated follow-up action if a response was not received.

5. We have been unable to find any further information relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 5 1976
CIA

6. We do not have a copy of the Cubana manifest for the 22 November 1963 flight from Mexico City to Havana, but we have determined that the following persons were on that flight:

NAME	NATIONALITY	OCCUPATION
Jakob ETT	Swiss	Diplomat
Hector LEMIEUX	Canadian	Unknown
Joseph POULIOT	Canadian	Unknown
Donald George CAMERON	Canadian	Unknown
William POULIS	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas Clark OSULD	Canadian	Unknown
Dungan MCPHERSON	Canadian	Unknown
Leo John DEST	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas MURPHY	Canadian	Unknown
Arthur EDMONDS	British	Unknown
James DISINOP	British	Unknown
Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde	Spanish	Unknown
Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha	Spanish	Unknown
David FLOR Lechago	Spanish	Unknown
Maria Antonieta MAURI	Italian	Unknown
Mario MAURI	Italian	Diplomat
Maarten Van DERPLAAT	Dutch	Diplomat

REC ROM
FEB 5 1976
CIA

Attachment F

TO: FBI
U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

[illegible]

27 Nov 63

85471

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: REARREST OF SILVIA DURAN

THIS AGENCY'S STATION IN MEXICO WAS ADVISED ON 27 NOVEMBER THAT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES HAD REARRESTED SILVIA DURAN, MEXICAN NATIONAL EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO, WHO HAD TALKED TO LEE OSWALD AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1963. THE REASON FOR THE REARREST WAS THAT SILVIA DURAN WAS TRYING TO LEAVE MEXICO FOR CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON

Document Number 134-595
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

See follow documents in [redacted] on this subject.

I don't know what FBI did in Nov 63, but the [redacted] have been talking about this for a long time & she is said to be extremely bright.

~~Legal Attache~~

~~1. LA Memo said they checked info [redacted] and found it unsubstantiated.~~

~~2. [redacted] asked me to send this cable.~~

~~3. We will try to confirm or refute [redacted] info and follow up.~~

She is Also Hunts

Document Number 12-528

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

5

Opposition Communists not mentioned in press reports of Warren Commission investigation

RECORD COPY

October 5, 1964

Mexican Communists who had contact with Oswald,
as has not appeared in Warren Commission write-ups in pres

[redacted] sat around recalling detail
of their having been in a group with Oswald here last fall
during the daysthat he was in Mexico.- The write-ups of the
Warren Commission report in the newspapers sparked this
discussion, and they apparently had never really sat around
determind to piece it all together, although all three were
deeply affected by Kennedy's assassination, seemed literally
to adore the Kennedy family image, still follow Robert Kenned
career with great interest and admiration.

The main points:

[redacted] Horacio is the husband of
SYLVIA DURAN, the Mexican girl who was arrested for questioni
about Oswald because she had been in touch with him at the Cu
embassy when he went there looking for a visa. (She is or w
also a ringleader at the Cuban-Mexican Institute on Tokio, I
remember).

While Oswald was here last fall the Duran cousins invited the
SOURCE [redacted] to a "twist party" at the
home of Ruben Duran mid-week. A few Communists they knew
[redacted] and a number of people who struck th
as very peculiar at the time, were there. AND OSWALD WASTHERE
WITH TWO OTHERS BEATNIK LOOKING BOYS, ONE OF ~~THEM~~ WHOM WAS
VERY TALL AND ALL THREE OF WHOM THEY REMEMBER QUITE WELL.
When they began asking questions about the Americans, who
were standing together all eveningand didn't dance at all,
they were shifted to another room. [redacted] . However
they were intrigued because [redacted] said he didn't know
who they were, except that Sylvia Duran had brought them, and
none of the other guests made any attempt to approach them.
Also, when the [redacted] SOURCE WAS so insistent about meeting them,
~~[illegible]~~ the Durans replied that the boys were leaving town
early the next morning. The next day, well along in the day,
SOURCE [redacted] , saw all thr
boys together on Insurgentes. In other words, they had not l
town. At the time, they remarked about ~~[illegible]~~ it.

As soon as Oswald's picture was printed in the newspapers
SOURCE [redacted] clearly remembered him. And of course the arrest of
Sylvia Duran almost immediately afterward, underlined their
certainty.

They were so sickened [redacted] that they broke off their relations with theDurans. [redacted]

Source [redacted] says that Lynn Duran and one of the Duran boys have made trips to Texas. And that most conspicuously they have all prospered this last year. Always poor before, they now have an expansive car each.

Horacio Duran works at El Dia newspaper.

His employment, finally

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER [illegible]

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CS COPY

CONF:

INFO:

XXX

3 | 6

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO FLASH INFO CITE DIR 84915

1. ARREST OF SILIVA DURAN IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD PREJUDICE U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION ON ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN RESPONSIBILITY. WITH FULL REGARD FOR MEXICAN INTERESTS, REQUEST YOU ENSURE THAT HER ARREST IS KEPT ABSOLUTELY SECRET, THAT NO INFORMATION FROM HER IS PUBLISHED OR LEAKED, THAT ALL SUCH INFO IS CABLED TO US, AND THAT FACT OF HER ARREST AND HER STATEMENTS ARE NOT SPREAD TO LEFTIST OR DISLOYAL CIRCLES IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WE ARE TRYING TO GET MORE INFO ON OSWALD FROM FBI AND WILL ADVISE DIRECT OR THROUGH FBI MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Document Number 37-[redacted]-529

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

23 Nov 63

CS COPY

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ NO INDEX

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DATE 27 NOV. 1963

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

2 5

3 6

27 Nov 63 20 12z

CS COPY

☐ DEFERRED

☐ ROUTINE

FLASH

TO FLASH

CITE DIR 85318

RE: (IN-69048)

1. THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH\ AND\

2. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT NECESSARY CLARIFY OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED YOUR CABLES LAST 48 HOURS. YOU MAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERROGATORS BUT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH HER.

Document Number 158-610

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

3. ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting to leave Mexico for Cuba.

CS COPY

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 [illegible] 1963

2		5	
3		6	

27 NOV 63 21 59 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 85371

FURTHER TO DIR- 85318.* TO BE CERTAIN THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT NEITHER SILVIA DURAN NOR CUBANS GET IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised. MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hqs. does not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her

Document Number 177-618

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Copy No.

7 - APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT : Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation passed to the Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the attachments to my memoranda dated 31 January 1964 and 21 February 1964, both of which report information on Silvia DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Information on the actions of Silvia DURAN on her return to work at the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, following her first interrogation by the Mexican authorities, is attached to this memorandum. This item may be useful to the Commission in the evaluation of Mrs. DURAN's story.

2. The information contained in this attachment was obtained from sensitive sources. It therefore bears an appropriate sensitivity indicator.

(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Document Number 643-273

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 64

Attachment

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN, Mexican Citizen Employed by the Cuban Consulate, Following Her First Interrogation by the Mexican Authorities

1. A reliable and sensitive source, well informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, had stated that on her return to the Cuban Consulate on 23 November 1963, Silvia DURAN told her colleagues essentially the same story about her official acquaintance with Lee Harvey OSWALD that was published in the Mexico City press. This information, which seems to have been surreptitiously given to the press by certain Mexican authorities, indicated that according to DURAN, OSWALD had visited the Cuban and Soviet Consulates to obtain visas in order to visit these countries, and she had handled his case at the Cuban Consulate.

2. The only new item in the account that Silvia DURAN gave her colleagues was her claim that the Mexican police had threatened to extradite her to the United States for a confrontation with OSWALD. According to the source, Silvia DURAN, an intelligent and quick-witted woman, did not fear such a confrontation.

3. It should be noted that CIA does not know the precise origin of the suggested confrontation. The idea originated, in all probability, with the Mexican authorities involved in the interrogation of DURAN.

4. According to the same source, immediately after and since the assassination the personnel of the Cuban Embassy was shocked and puzzled - no expressions of pleasure at the assassination were heard, and there was little discussion of it. The gossip and official conversations in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate tend to confirm the impression that OSWALD visited the Embassy only to get a visa to visit or to transit the country.

Original & -3 - Addressee
2 - DDP
1
1
1
1

7 April 1964

Based on DIR 85670 dated 29 November 1963

Attachment D

ACTION

☐ AMEND ☐ CLOSE

block letters.

luding maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the iden-
state form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable

SECTION III:

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. / 1.	SOURCE DOCUMENT, /

NAME (Last) OSWALD, (First) LEE (Middle) HENRY (Title) SEX M ✓

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

N.B.: HARVEY!

23/11/75

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION
YES ✓ NO	D 18 M 10 Y 39	USA	New Orleans, La.	1. AGY 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION Radar operator, U.S. Marine Corps, ex 1960 (D)

OCC/POS. CODE NAVY

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.
USSR		/	

Document Number 1-1B
for FOIA Review on APR

COMMENTS: cit; ?

Defected to the USSR in October 1959

CS Copy

201-

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES ✓ NO	✓ YES	

FORM 831a
C-57

RECORD COPY

(38)

OSWALD, LEE HENRY 201

SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39
NEW ORLEANS, LA., USA
CIT ?
REF:
Δ USSR
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS OF 60.
DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 59.

Document Number 2-524
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

10 Oct 1963

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : [redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CS COPY

CONF :

INFO :

XX

1		4
2		5
3		6

0 OCT 63 2

R. ROUTINE

TO INFO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[redacted]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CITE DIR 748

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

(See [illegible] description of this individual in his [illegible] Aug affidavit — not Oswald)

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR

(CIA) Review on

(CONTINUED)

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10 Oct 63

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

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INFO

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ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO

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CITE DIR

CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATI RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATI IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON (IN 36017)

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ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 7483

REF: (IN 36017)*

1. LEE OSWALD who contacted Soviet Embassy 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL LEE HENRY OSWALD BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR, BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW, INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT

(CONTINUED)

10 Oct

Document Number 2-2 for FOIA Review on APR 1976

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CITE DIR 7483

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS [redacted] REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING [redacted] STATE HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

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ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO [redacted] INFO [redacted]

CITE DIR 748

4. [redacted] SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE [redacted] LOCALLY. INFO PARAS TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH [redacted]

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED [redacted] PLS KEEP HDQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

CMT: According to [redacted] REF ON 1 Oct, an American male [redacted] name Lee Oswald stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

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16 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Ambassador

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT : Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy

°Ambassador notified

1. The following information was received [redacted] On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received.

Document Number 9-5

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Orig - The Ambassador
The Minister
Counselor for Political Affairs
Regional Security Officer
cc - Legal Attache
cc - Naval Attache
cc - I & N S

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: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

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: [illegible] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ONF:

IFO :

XX

~~24 OCT 63~~ 1910Z
24 Oct 63

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ROUTINE

date change - 23 Oct on run
should be 24 Oct

INFO

CITE DIR 77978

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

REFERENCE IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELETYPE NO. 74673, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1963, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SUBJECT IN MEXICO CITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJECT. WE WILL FORWARD THEM TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: (IN 40357)

24 Oct 63

Document Number 10-6

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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6 Copies of photo of Oswald
Reproduced for use of Legal
Attache with Mexican police

Document Number 11-64

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

We made fifty (50)
copies of each of these
(which we got from
Legal Attache) for Leg.
Attache to use with
Mexican Police —

RECORD COPY



Lee Harvey Oswald

Race White
Sex Male
DOB 18 October 1939
POB New Orleans, Louisiana
Height 5'.9"
Weight 140 Pounds
Hair Medium Brown
Eyes Blue Gray

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 9, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Your letter of June 1, 1964, requesting summaries of FBI reports with regard to ten named persons and certain information regarding the contact by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn with Jack L. Ruby on March 11, 1959, is herewith acknowledged.

As you were advised by my letter of February 27, 1964, Jack Ruby was contacted by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn of the Dallas Office on March 11, 1959, in view of his position as a night club operator who might have knowledge of the criminal element in Dallas. The purpose of this contact was to determine whether or not Ruby did have such knowledge, and if so, if he would be willing to furnish information to this Bureau. Ruby was advised of the FBI's jurisdiction in criminal matters, and he expressed a willingness to furnish information. A personal description of Ruby was obtained by Special Agent Flynn on the occasion of this contact on March 11, 1959, but no information or other results were obtained. Between March 11, 1959, and October 2, 1959, Ruby was contacted on eight other occasions, but he furnished no information whatever and further contacts with him were discontinued.

The personal description of Ruby as obtained by Special Agent Flynn on March 11, 1959, did not in itself contain the remark "known Dallas criminal." This remark was added to the description by Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at the time when he was assisting in the preparation of the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963. Enclosed herewith is the affidavit of Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at Little Rock, Arkansas, dated June 4, 1964, setting forth his basis for adding the remark "known Dallas area criminal" to the description of Ruby as it appears in the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963, and in the enclosure to my letter to you of April 7, 1964.

The summaries concerning the ten named individuals in your letter of June 1, 1964, are currently being prepared and will be forwarded to you promptly upon completion.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

Little Rock, Arkansas
June 4, 1964

I, Louis M. Kelley, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, after being duly sworn, depose as follows:

I arrived at Dallas, Texas, November 23, 1963, to assist in the investigation of the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and related matters. On or about November 24, 1963, I was assigned to review all previously existing files and current information as to Jack L. Ruby and to prepare an insert based on such file review for inclusion in an investigative report. This insert was to include such physical description and biographical data as were available from the file review and from information developed on November 24, 1963. I had before me at the time I dictated the insert information which had been obtained on November 24, 1963, by other Special Agents of the FBI and from the Identification Division files of the Dallas Police Department. The Dallas Police Department records, under Dallas Police Department No. 22255, included information concerning arrests of Ruby dating from February 4, 1949, to March 14, 1963.

In dictating the physical description and biographical data concerning Ruby, I possibly included under the heading "Remarks," "Known Dallas area criminal," based on the fact I had before me Ruby's identification record from the Dallas Police Department, which listed several arrests in the Dallas area. This would have been the only thing on which such an observation could have been based.

Louis M. Kelley
LOUIS M. KELLEY

Sworn and subscribed to before me
this — day of June 1964.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 22, 1965

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

FBI Withheld Data on JFK Slaying

By Jack Anderson

and Les Whitten

W POST 10/27 P. C26

The FBI withheld from the Warren Commission hundreds of documents about the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are raw FBI files, which the commission requested but never received. They contain no startling information that will overturn the commission's verdict, but they reveal intimately how the FBI handled its most important case.

In the margins of some suppressed memos, the late FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover, scribbled caustic comments in blue ink. He was critical of almost everyone involved in the investigation, from Dallas police chief Jesse Curry to President Lyndon Johnson.

Confidential notes kept by one top FBI official, for example, quote Hoover as warning: "Johnson may become very dictatorial. We must keep our guard up."

Sources familiar with the suppressed documents say the contents were summarized and submitted to the Warren Commission. But there were some subtle, perhaps deliberate, omissions.

The documents show that Hoover brought pressure on his subordinates to rush out a preliminary report on the FBI investigation before the murdered President's brother, Robert F. Kennedy, returned to his desk as Attorney General.

The confidential notes quote Hoover as instructing his subordinates to get the report out of the Justice Department "before Bobby gets back."

Apparently, the FBI chief also feared Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach might tamper with the report before forwarding it to the Warren Commission. Hoover told his aides to alert President Johnson's major-domo, Walter Jenkins.

"Let Jenkins know after report is out of our hands," Hoover directed. "Let Jenkins know what Katzenbach is doing. Might cause long delay. Must not consider any alteration."

Thirteen days after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Hoover delivered a detailed report to Katzenbach naming Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin. Katzenbach kept it four days before submitting it to the commission.

The crusty old G-man was furious at the Dallas police chief, meanwhile, for leaking the story that the FBI had investigated Oswald but had failed to alert the Secret Service.

"This is the lowest level in history of Bureau since I have been director," Hoover lamented, according to the confidential notes.

He contended that Oswald had never been seen with firearms, had written no hate letters against U.S. leaders. As a former defector, he also knew he was a marked man whom the FBI was watching.

"With that background," grumbled Hoover, "how could he be security risk? No indication of violence so far as our records show . . . Oswald could have hollered false arrest if we had arrested him."

The FBI chief commented that Chief Justice Earl Warren, who headed the commission, "would have been first one to holler" about Oswald's rights. Citing the criticism of the FBI, Hoover commented: "This is one of the rough ones."

He felt, therefore, that President Johnson should have endorsed the FBI report. "President should have backed up report," complained Hoover, "based on evidence gathered by the FBI."

In private remarks that were never intended to be repeated outside his inner circle, he made deprecating remarks not only about President Johnson but about Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was then preparing to run against LBJ for the presidency.

"Goldwater has no sound advisers around him," Hoover noted. But his comment on Johnson was more deadly: "LBJ's speeches are dull."

The Warren Commission adopted a resolution, meanwhile, calling for "the raw materials upon which any reports given to the commission are based, together with all raw materials and reports relating to the work of the commission since the date of any and all earlier reports."

J. Lee Rankin, the general counsel, followed up with a "Dear Edgar" letter to the FBI chief requesting the full files "as promptly as possible." But they were never delivered.

A commission lawyer, remembering those days more than a decade ago, told us: "Nobody ever got the FBI's own files." In 1963-64, another staff member pointed out, the FBI "could do no wrong," so no one pressed too hard for their internal records.

Now 12 years after the Kennedy assassination, a fascinating story is still locked in FBI files awaiting a public reopening. We will tell part of the story in future columns. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), chairman of the Senate intelligence subcommittee investigating the assassination, is seeking the full story from the FBI.

Footnote: FBI spokesmen stoutly defended the FBI's findings and the thoroughness of the investigation. They conceded that "informative" and "deliberative" memos were not given to the commission. But "everything they needed was given them. They had all they wanted to make their findings."

(1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.)

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Oswald-Agent Contact Covered Up

W Post 10/288

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The late J. Edgar Hoover, in his zeal to protect his beloved FBI, engineered a cover-up 12 years ago to keep the Warren Commission from learning about the ties between FBI agent James Hosty and assassin Lee Harvey Oswald.

The formidable Hoover, whose bulldog visage had become a national symbol of law and order, intervened personally when the Warren Commission began to zero in on Hosty.

Now, 12 years later, Hosty has admitted destroying a threatening note, which Oswald delivered to the FBI office in Dallas a few days before shooting President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963. The note threatened to blow up the FBI office and Dallas police headquarters if Hosty didn't stop bothering his wife.

The FBI should have notified the Secret Service that Oswald, a misfit who had threatened violence, was in the Dallas area. The Secret Service routinely would have checked his whereabouts during the presidential visit. This might have saved President Kennedy's life.

When the FBI learned that a suspect named Lee Harvey Oswald had been picked up, Hosty reminded his boss, Gordon Shanklin, that he had been handling the Oswald case. Shanklin telephoned the Dallas police and asked whether Hosty could participate in the interrogation.

Hosty later questioned Oswald at police headquarters. Oswald, who had been outwardly calm, suddenly became agitated. "I know you!" he shouted. "I know you! You're the one who accosted my wife twice!"

The incident passed, however, without any mention of the threatening letter. Hosty also confided to a friend on the Dallas police force, Lt. Jack Revill, that the FBI had a file on Oswald. Revill repeated the conversation to a superior who ordered him to put it in writing.

"Special Agent Hosty related to this officer..." Revill wrote, "that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was aware of the subject (Oswald) and that they had information that this subject was capable of committing the assassination of President Kennedy."

Hoover was furious when he learned of Hosty's loose talk. According to confidential notes taken at the time, the grizzled FBI chief complained that Hosty had "diarrhea of words." But the old man, nevertheless, sought to cover up the FBI's embarrassment.

On Dec. 23, 1963, the FBI gave the Warren Comnission a summary of Oswald's notebook. The summary conveniently omitted the fact that Hosty's name, telephone and license tag had been in the notebook.

The commission found out about the omission and demanded an explanation. On Jan. 27, 1964, Hoover acknowledged that Hosty's name had been in the notebook.

The G-man also gave what purported to be a full account of the FBI's contacts with Oswald. The last contact, he reported, had been on Aug. 10, 1963. "We did not interview Oswald in Dallas, Texas, or in Irving, Texas, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy," Hoover added.

Interestingly, he used the word "our" to describe the last contact with the FBI. But on Feb. 6, in a sworn affidavit, Hoover changed the wording in a curious way. He swore that Oswald had no contact with FBI "agents" after Aug. 10, 1963.

It is now known, of course, that Oswald appeared at the FBI office in Dallas a few days before the assassination. At that time, just as Hoover said, he did not speak with any FBI "agents." But he spoke with an FBI receptionist, who passed on his threatening note to the agents.

It is imposisible to know whether the late FBI chief subtly switched the word "our" to "agents" in order to hide his knowledge of Oswald's violent threat.

But in a later letter to the Warren Commission, dated April 6, 1964, Hoover stated categorically: "I wish to emphasize that the facts available to the FBI concerning Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination did not indicate in any way that he was or would be a threat to President Kennedy."

The truth is, of course, that the FBI had received dramatic evidence less than a week before the assassination that Oswald was violence-prone.

On April 24, the Dallas Morning News reported Hosty had told the Dallas police lieutenant, Jack Revill, that the FBI knew Oswald was "capable" of assassinating the President.

Hoover immediately sent word to the Warren Commission that the story was "false" and followed up three days later with a personal letter delivered by courier.

"Special Agent Hosty unequivocally denies ever having made the statement as quoted in this article..." declared the FBI director.

"Special Agent Hosty points out that prior to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he never had any information indicating potential violence on the part of Lee Harvey Oswald."

There's more to Hoover's great cover-up, which we'll report in a future column.

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Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON — President Johnson is sitting on a political H-bomb — an unconfirmed report that Sen. Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., may have approved an assassination plot which then possibly backfired s his late brother.

Top officials, queried by this lumn, agreed that a plot to ssassinate Cuban dictator del Castro was considered the highest levels of the ntral Intelligence Agency at e time Bobby was riding rd on the agency. The icials disagreed, however, er whether the plan was proved and implemented.

ne version claims that rworld figures actually re recruited to carry out plot. Another rumor has it three hired assassins re caught in Havana where [illegible] is still posed to be languishing in on. These stories have [illegible] investigated and dis- by the FBI.

et the rumor persists, spered by people in a tion to know, that Castro became aware of an rican plot upon his life decided to retaliate nst President Kennedy.

is report may have start- New Orleans's flamboyant rict Attorney Jim Garri- on his investigation of the edy assassination, but rs believe he is following wrong trails.

For weeks after the tragedy, this column was told, Bobby was morose and refused to see people. Could he have been plagued by the terrible thought that he had helped put into motion forces that indirectly may have brought about his brother's martyrdom? Some insiders think so.

Blow for Blow

Note: Those who may be shocked that the CIA would consider stooping to a political assassination should be reminded of the ugly nature of what Secretary of State Dean Rusk has called "the back-alley struggle."

He has described it as "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world ... a never ending war ... no quarter asked and none given ... It's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side."

The blunt truth is that the subterranean world of espionage is harsh almost beyond belief. There have been times that the CIA has been forced to resort to the most extreme measures to protect the national security.

Some of the CIA's best operatives also have suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. No word will be heard of them for months, then a few grim details will leak out.

"We will learn that these people have been subjected to the most skillful, most fiendish tortures that man can possibly devise and that they have been reduced to animals or vegetables," Clark Clifford, head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Committee, told this column. "When they no longer can really be called [illegible] information has [illegible] ed from them, th [illegible] disposed of. It is [illegible] picture, but that [illegible] the game is played."

We also play rough. The New York Times, in an exhaustive report on the CIA, quoted "one of the best-informed men in Washington on this subject" as saying: "When we catch one of them (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes accus[illegible] everything out [illegible] we do it wi[illegible] barred."

This much can be verified:

1. President Kennedy was [illegible] disillusioned with the [illegible] after the Bay of Pigs [illegible] that he swore to [illegible] would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the [illegible]" He ordered a [illegible] tion by a [illegible] Gen. Maxwell [illegible] President's [illegible] his brother [illegible] up calling the [illegible] CIA.

c.

2. During [illegible] the CIA [illegible] Castro [illegible] the [illegible] insiders, [illegible] with the [illegible] Bobby, eager to avenge the Bay of Pigs fiasco, played a key role in the [illegible] Whether the assassination plot was ever actually put into effect is disputed.

d.

Castro Reacts

3. Some insiders are convinced Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. With characteristic fury, he is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

e.

4. Shortly after Kennedy was gunned down, the FBI handed President Johnson a memo reporting that Cuban leaders had hoped for Kennedy's death. The President showed it to Kennedy's top aide, Ted Sorensen, who thought the details were so ambiguous that he called the memo "meaningless."

f.

5. It is also known, of course, that Lee Oswald, the assassin, was active in the pro-Castro movement and traveled to Mexico seeking a Cuban visa a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

g.

Some sources consider Robert Kennedy's behavior after the assassination to be significant. He seemed to be tormented, they say, by more than the natural grief over the murder of his brother.

Author William Manchester, who got his information chiefly from Kennedy-controlled sources, portrays Bobby as a character of granite during those tragic days. But others had a different impression.

McGeorge Bundy, then a top White House [illegible]

00779

Jack Anderson

W Post 7/27

Did the Castro Plot Backfire?

The late Robert Kennedy was tormented by the terrible thought, according to intimates, that he may have helped trigger the assassination of his brother.

We raised this possibility in January 1971, when we first revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us 4½ years to get the rest of the story.

Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, rushing to defend his memory, have sworn that he knew nothing about the assassination attempts and, contradictorily, that he put a stop to them. Both accounts are incorrect, according to sources with an intimate knowledge of the events.

Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother.

> *"Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert Kennedy was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother."*

The preparations to knock off Castro began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs planning. President Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco, swore to friends afterward that he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Instead, he appointed his brother, Robert, to oversee the CIA, with instructions to shake it up. Characteristically, Robert began investigating the undercover operations from top to bottom. His purpose was to prevent another Bay of Pigs.

He became fascinated, say our sources, with the CIA's covert activities. Eagerly, he pursued the details down through the lower-levels. As one source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed schoolboy."

In the process, he learned about the continuing effort to eliminate Castro, an operation known inside the CIA as the "executive action plan." In fact, Robert took a special interest in the activities against Castro. One insider, former Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, told us the focus "on the Cuban situation" was intensified in 1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence."

The President eventually put Robert in charge of a counter-insurgency committee, called the Special Group, which concentrated upon harassing Castro. One member, former CIA chief John McCone, acknowledged that the group had "directed mischievous things against Castro like infiltrating saboteurs, blowing up bridges and carrying on general confusion."

McCone insisted, however, that "the group at no time gave any consideration to any assassination plot." We have established that the "executive action plan" was directed by William Harvey, the CIA operative whom we linked to the assassination plot in our original 1971 story. We have also learned that he reported to the late Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquarters. We have been unable, however, to identify the next link in the chain of command.

Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources insist that Robert Kennedy knew about the plot against Castro and did nothing to stop it. The intended target, Fidel Castro, also knew about it. One assassination squad reportedly was apprehended on a Havana roof top, within range of Castro's movements, about March 1, 1963.

The Cuban premier, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker the following September, warned that U.S. leaders would find themselves in danger if they attempted to do away with Cuban leaders.

"United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe," Castro told Harker.

Two months later, President Kennedy was shot down in the streets of Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy a few weeks earlier.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA director John McCone, who remained alone with Robert at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours. All others, including Robert's priest, were turned away. But McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the agonizing three hours.

Other sources say that Robert, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion for the next few days. Although he bottled up his feelings, they knew him and understood the circumstances well enough to realize he blamed himself for his brother's death. There was little doubt, they say, that he believed the CIA's attempts against Castro put into motion the forces that brought about his brother's martyrdom.

On January 18, 1971, we reported: "Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy."

It has now been disclosed that the Warren Commission was told nothing about the CIA's plot to kill Castro even though the late Allen Dulles, the CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on the commission.

According to the final report, the commission investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and the Cuban government" but found no substance to any of them.

The Cuban premier himself, in an interview with Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, emphatically denied having anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

"It is . . . very interesting that this man Oswald, who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit," said Castro.

"But I ask myself why would a man who commits such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I am under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States and that it was all a result of a conspiracy . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries."

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The Washington Post, 9/9/76

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot. ??

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his backed-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

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DROPOUTS

By Howard Post


I SEE YOU'RE ENLARGING YOUR HUT, CHIEF... EXPANDING FAMILY?
NO, ALF...
Reg U S Pat Off—All rights reserved © 1976 by United Feature Syndicate, Inc
9-7
- EXPANDING WAISTLINES.
POST

GASOLINE ALLEY

By Moores


Where's the truck the boss
The man got it started, Sarge!
Good! That saves me a trip to the city dump!
I brought your iced tea, Mr. Turnip!
Thank you so much!

THE WASHINGTON POST *Friday, August 27, 1976*

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case

It was a grisly end for John Rosselli, the dapper, debonair mobster about town, who had been a familiar figure in the glittering night spots of Hollywood, Las Vegas and Havana.

His killers shot or stabbed him in the stomach. The autopsy indicates they may have shot him and then dug out the bullet with a knife. Then they brutally hacked off his legs. It is possible that he was still alive when they stuffed his body into a 55-gallon drum.

They wrapped chains around the drum to weight it down and tossed it into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy suggests he may have died of asphyxiation inside the drum before it hit the water. The gases from the decomposing body floated the heavy container to the surface. It was discovered, with its nightmarish contents, 10 days after Rosselli had disappeared from his sister's home in Plantation, Fla.

The police withheld the gruesome details of his death while they searched for his killers. We began our own investigation, meanwhile, after an appeal from his associates.

We first encountered Johnny Rosselli more than five years ago. We were investigating his role in the Central Intelligence Agency's plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

The CIA case officer, William Harvey, told us that Rosselli had been the hero of the abortive adventure. Harvey broke his oath of secrecy because he thought it might help Rosselli, who was in trouble with the law. The CIA agent had nothing but praise for Rosselli's daring.

In the strictest of confidence, Rosselli himself confirmed that he had directed six assassination attempts against Castro. We protected his confidence, so he came to trust us. We were the only reporters he would talk to.

So when he vanished last month his associates came to us for help. We were suspicious, of course, that his disappearance was linked to the Castro caper. But our investigation has now produced evidence to the contrary.

We have learned, for example, that Rosselli was not the amiable, retired old duffer he pretended to be. He began in the big time as a bookkeeper for Chicago's notorious Al Capone and became a specialist in white-collar crimes. It's a profession, apparently, that he never gave up.

Competent sources say that, between rounds on the Florida golf courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen securities and financial swindles. His operations reportedly were resented by Santo Trafficante, who has been identified in Senate testimony as the Mafia chief in Florida.

Rosselli came to Florida from Las Vegas, where he allegedly represented the Chicago mob. Our sources say that he handled millions in illegal gambling money, which he forwarded to the Chicago underworld. There are reports that Chicago crime lord Tony Accardo felt he had been short-changed by Rosselli.

Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in the slammer, first, for extortion and, later, for a card swindle. Those who know him say he had developed a taste for the good life. He dressed in the latest styles, dined at the best restaurants and dated beautiful women. The thought of going back to prison, friends say, horrified him.

To avoid prison, he began to talk to the government as early as 1970. He gave information, according to our sources, which resulted in a grand jury confrontation for Tony Accardo. The surly mobster took the fifth. But Accardo grumbled to associates that he would pay back Rosselli some day.

Rosselli was also blamed for passing information to the government, which led to the conviction of Detroit mobster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving a four-year sentence at Sandstone federal penitentiary for racketeering.

Perhaps the last straw was Rosselli's testimony in the Castro case. He identified two mobsters, the late Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, as being involved in the assassination attempts. It's no secret in the underworld that Trafficante detests publicity.

Our sources believe that the Mafia bosses finally became fed up with Rosselli. His execution would have required the approval of the top leaders, our sources say, because it was almost certain to bring the federal government into the case.

Who were the vicious killers? The only clue is a smudge spot on the window of Rosselli's car. One of his assailants probably had used a greasy hair pomade.

LRS - MAIN FILE COPY

astro Stalker Worked for the CIA

Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. As part of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chef to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crackdown on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell is still on the CIA payroll. Both admitted to us a friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities. Harvey said he had a "high regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "bum rap." Said Harvey: "The Friar's Club indictment is phony. Roselli had no more to do with that than I had."

Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get clemency for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

Firearms Fiasco

Under pressure from the firearms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce a vital section of the 1968 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

For the two years that the law has been in force, the Treasury Department has ignored this key provision. The gun industry has complained it would be a bookkeeping nightmare.

The federal government, which would have to compile all the sales data, has also been reluctant to spend the $100 million it would cost for computers and staff to maintain the firearms files.

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PN US B

Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

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PN 4 S.B

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

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3/16/75

BY JACK ANDERSON
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON—Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

Anderson

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli represented himself as an oil man seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life thereafter, using assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. Roselli personally made midnight powerboat dashes to deliver the teams at secret landing spots on the Cuban coast.

The assassination teams never got a shot at Castro, although the CIA learned that the last group reached a rooftop within range. This occurred around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had paid a mysterious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mexico City a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy can't shake a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro may have become aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore, may have recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, March 10, 1975

CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

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The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island. Without the charismatic Castro, it was thought, the defenders would become demoralized and disorganized.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli's CIA contacts were William Harvey and James O'Connell, who accompanied him on hush-hush trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams. No one else was told, however, of the CIA's role in the murder mission.

Roselli represented himself as an oilman seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings. The assassination weapons were also carefully selected from foreign makes, mostly Belgian, to prevent any link to the United States.

Each attempt to kill Castro was meticulously planned, like an episode from the TV drama "Mission Impossible." For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food.

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Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again. Therefore, the CIA, unsure whether the plotters had failed or the poison hadn't been strong enough, decided to try again with a more powerful dose.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

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The assassination never got a shot at Castr though the CIA learned th. last group reached a ro within range. This occ around the last of Februa first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, Pres. Kennedy was gunned dow Dallas by Lee Harvey Osv a fanatic who had been acti the pro-Castro movement had paid a mysterious call the Cuban Embassy in Me City a few weeks before dreadful day in Dallas

Sources familiar with the conspiracy can't shake a ging suspicion—unsupporte the Warren Commission's f ings—that Castro may have come aware of the U.S. upon his life and, theref may have recruited Oswal retaliate against President K nedy.

Footnote: Sources fam with the secret review of CIA's activities have now knowledged that Castro, as reported four years ago, marked for assassination by CIA. A CIA spokesman refu to comment.

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8/24/76
N. York
Times

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

By Russell Baker

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

This raises the question whether "gangland-style" murders might possibly be catching among people who don't come from gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found in the customary barrel, with the customary weights, in the customary water. It bears the customary bullet holes. Roselli's publicized standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and-shut case, which the police will quietly shut as soon as possible.

If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been consistently undertipping for years?

If that waiter wanted to take his revenge and get away with it, is it not logical that he would do it "gangland-style," so the police could forget it, rather than by scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen of lobster bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving Roselli's waiters the third degree, but merely to point out that gangland can have no monopoly on "gangland-style killing." Anybody with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse of water can engage in it, just as readily as your corner greasy spoon can engage in "home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a victim who is a bona fide citizen of gangland. Obviously, a philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of 40 years "gangland-style" and expect the police not to lift an eyebrow. Unless the subject is the real gangland thing, it won't work.

The corollary of this fact is that gangland people are peculiarly vulnerable to "gangland-style" murder by devious non-ganglanders, who have no right to get away with it.

This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that you are an eminent statesman of gangland, and the vexation becomes manifest. You are entirely prepared to be sent off "gangland-style" by your colleagues. Those are the rules of the land.

Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the police who did it, even if you could. That would violate the rules of the sportsmanship governing gangland. In gangland, good sports don't tell.

But to have some alien from the outer world—some straight-Jake cousin who wants his share of your will prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns—to have somebody like this do the job on you and get away with it because it's done "gangland-style"—Ah, my friend, that must seem a cruel injustice.

OBSERVER

Such a bad egg as that you would surely betray to the cops. How infuriating it would be if they looked at the barrel, the concrete, the water, the bullet holes and closed the case with a quietly murmured, "Just another gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not only of murder, but also of discrimination, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents the police from extending themselves to bring your persecutor to justice.

I do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing gangland members "gangland-style," but my hunch is that they take a sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks it is not the kind of thing decent people ought to be doing.

I know very well that gangland folks don't approve of it, and to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, what's more, I've never been any good with concrete.

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8/24/76
N. York
Times

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New York Times
8/23/76

Terrorist Activities Charged to Cubans By Police in Miami

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI) —Militant pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to testimony given before a Senate subcommittee and released today.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security headed by Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi. It said that as many as 50 Cuban groups of various shadings had been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County Public Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz, of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

Lieutenant Lyons said most Cubans in the area were hard-working and industrious; but some individuals "use Dade County as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lieutenant Lyons said, there have been four homicides "with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Mr. Diaz said that some Castro groups had infiltrated exile organizations and that there were plans to assassinate Latin-American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lieutenant Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service were notified, he said. A well-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and American gangsters to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of an underworld figure, John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Mr. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Select Committee on Intellegence Activities that he and a Chicago gangster, Sam Giancana, were hired by the C.I.A. to recruit Cubans to kill Mr. Castro. Mr. Giancana was shot and killed by unknown persons last year just before he was testify before the Washington panel.

The Boston Globe Monday, August 23, 1976 19

JACK ANDERSON

Plot to kill Kissinger blocked

WASHINGTON — A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was supposed to be carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the Secretary's life was expected, according to underground reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assassin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days before Kissinger got to town.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story two years later after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 12, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination ... against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a ... thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about) the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro l
ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders pron
ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch already had b
convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a
zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Fede
parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, pr
tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to t
reports, of his "money, friends and protection."

Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be
cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellen
ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's
terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ... We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

8/22/76
Washington
1 of 3

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

See ROSSELLI, A8, Col. 1

ROSSELLI, From A1

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

8/27/76 Washington Post

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principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate Intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsiility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

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a pure invention, a serious risk established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots—Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 24, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to certain material and delivery of other material maintained by the FBI.

Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we currently have one abstract covering the areas of inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by approved personnel of the Committee.

Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City. We are, however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype dated November 27, 1963, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments. The teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which were obtained from a highly sensitive source.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in response to the latter part of request item 18 asking for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963, and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 26 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓orig + attls → Admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue → Chron

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41
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FILE RID RET. TO BRANCH ☐ SECRET

ROUTING			
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8 . (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1535 25 NOV CJ)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

MICROFILMED
FEB 3 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

25 Nov 63 IN 67682

S E C R E T 251954Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7050

REDCAP

CJO 092

REF MEXI 6868 (IN 60046)*

ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOV VIA CUBANA 465, RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY, THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. ANANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED SOVEMB 23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. COMMENT: THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE CALL FROM NEW YORK.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONOMAREV, SOV DIP COURIERS ARRIVED MEXI 10 NOV.

D-201-291579 (cc filed)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	M
RID/MIS	MW
RID/PS	DJ
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12-62

ROUTING

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3		6	

ORIG: IDEN 4
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5040
DATE : 26 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-3-5

29 Nov 63 15 23z

SIG CEN

ROUTINE

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF: WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR 85678

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE OF 8 NOVEMBER 1963 CONCERNING THE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS VALENTI GERMANOVICH PONOMAREV AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOV.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, PONOMAREV AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465 AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA.

3. A USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE COURIERS WERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CI

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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12-62

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TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

See Sanitized File Number 14 4[illegible]
For sterile copy of this document.

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85676

4. "ANANYEV" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH ANANYEV OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: MEXI 7060 (IN 67682)

SR/CI/K IDEN 58 [redacted]

C/WH/3 IDEN 4 [redacted]

RE IDEN 13 ROM [redacted]
JAN 23 1976
CI/LIA

IDEN 14 [redacted]
C/WH/R

RELEASING OFFICER CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

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but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

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Tab 4

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker

FROM: Jim Johnston
Dan Dwyer
Ed Greissing

DATE: January 27, 1976

SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation of JFK Assassination

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26.

Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruction in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Amlash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198* to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was "reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR of 7 September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

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* DIRs are messages sent from Langley.

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At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intelligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

> "Mary: I don't want to imagine things but this thing of Amlash.
>
> Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter (unreadable) then the word "treason" or "reason").
>
> Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsibility for Amlash at this time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris 0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)." "With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash considerably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.'"

---

* The files do not accurately identify these case officers. [redacted] and [redacted], however, were the principal case officers.

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 November. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastinate. Amlash talked about going to the French terrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken . . . or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which could be true rallying point."

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In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morning of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.**

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a typewriter with an old ribbon. It made no mention of the passing of a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source complained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a concealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as one of these visitors.

---

* Desmond Fitzgerald

** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found.

On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision."

JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher authority but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be delayed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirmation needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Headquarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets."

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's (Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM."

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report information received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intelligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important operations. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one report rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash, and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA files to determine what other operations Castro might have been referring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

Scenario for B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan

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arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

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7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.

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Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Probably feasible within OAS.	a. Does not attack principal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America.
b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level.	b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.
	c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers.
	d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment.	a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups.
b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used.	b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway.
	c. Some noise level.

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled.	a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement.

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b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.	b. Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.	a. General ineffectiveness against targets. b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil. c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery, Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel only.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.	a. High risk of capture and exposure.
b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.	b. High noise level.
	c. Possibility of some Soviet response.

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2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.	a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.
b. U.S. obviously "doing something about Castro."	b. Loss of trade.
	c. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teams.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improved operations and greater economic damage.	a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.
	b. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Much more effective operations and real economic damage.	a. No deniability.
	b. Very high noise level.
	c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.

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5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.	a. Will probably not catch contraband.
	b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response.
	c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.	a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America.
	b. Not fatal to Fidel.

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.	Must be followed by some form of effective action.

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8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.	a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.
b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.	b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.
	c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subversion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Proper basis for future actions.	a. Difficulty of clear proof.
b. Possible deterrence of Castro.	b. Possible Soviet reactions.
c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.	

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

Advantages	Disadvantages
The most effective method of bringing down Castro.	Possible Soviet reactions.

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11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will bring down Castro.	a. Possible Soviet reaction.
	b. Probable heavy casualties on both sides.
	c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.

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FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

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to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A good typewriter is essential and above all people that will carry out the million and one mechanical functions necessary to make it a going operation.

(Note: when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope. You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people will respond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curious postment. These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that we ha gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country an have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience.

Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to you as we get more information.

We hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and are looking forward to a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this matter quite thoroughly with me.

Fraternally,

V. T. Lee

V. T. Lee,
National Director.

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT NO. 3—Continued

4

21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.

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Advantages	Disadvantages
If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.	a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.
	b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages	Disadvantages
As in 1. above.	a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.
	b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.

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Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

Advantages	Disadvantages
We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.	a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community. b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives).

Advantages	Disadvantages
A carefully targetted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.	We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.

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FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE
799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

Exhibit No. 3 to
deposition of V.T. Lee
4/17/64 at New York,
N.Y. (Substituted
for copy on 5/14/64)
W.J.L.

May 29, 1963

Lee H. Oswald
4907 L/C Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along with our thanks and welcome.

Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratefully received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have a better picture of what this entails.

For one thing, I am enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for all Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy for an organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate according to the local requirements. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be met. (All Chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at the retail price and use the proceeds for further Chapter activities.) Credit is extended and payment is not required with the order. We do expect payment within a reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.

It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana seems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined responsibility of concrete organizational work.

We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable we could readily issue a charter for

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT NO. 3

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FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE
799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

a New Orleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about. We feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which I originally organized before coming up to work in the National Office.

I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from experience that it is quite a problem and requires some sacrifice on the part of those involved.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office here in New York is the only one in the country today and the New York City Chapter uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have discovered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O. Box for all mailings and public notices. ((A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individual should move or drop out.)) We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.

We will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up to the local Chapters to handle their own affairs. You shaould have at least access

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Fiscal Year	Support[a]	Covert[b] Collection	Covert Action[c]			Total
			PA/Prop[d]	Paramilitary[e]	Post-Invasion[f] Brigade Support	
1960	$319,534	$131,063	$1,677,161	$318,409	-	$2,446,167
1961	6,293,580	457,633	5,168,584	30,164,698	$1,627,824	43,712,319
1962	3,599,274	793,824[g]	6,444,098	2,975,635	4,176,000	17,988,831
1963	5,343,973	1,738,977[g]	5,786,797	5,038,880	3,899,830	21,808,457
1964 (est.)	5,030,000	1,767,500	3,520,000	9,317,500[h]	565,000	20,200,000
Total	20,586,361	4,888,997	22,596,640	47,815,122	10,268,654	106,155,774

[a] Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of administrative equipment and supplies, rental of administrative properties and facilities, etc.

[b] Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

[c] Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.

[d] PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

[e] Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

[f] Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.

[g] Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

[h] Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

15 December 1963

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About 1/25/64

See page 117.12

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological

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lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchevassurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear.

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

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These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to

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economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

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B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Outside Cuba:

a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

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C. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

D. The collection of intelligence

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

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By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measureable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

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CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.

3. Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.

4. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe

that the

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that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

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Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.[1] All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

The lack

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[1] Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.

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The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months

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ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarra had indicated concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announcement of the raids, the average man on the street seemed apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 1964 that the 23 December Siguanea raid which destroyed a P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Havana has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight continues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very successful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanea had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered which depress the people, they are anxious for something to happen."

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The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 36 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Piratas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate

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Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S/Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

As this

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As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

VI

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VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

B. OAS ACTION

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B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

   The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

   Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

   Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

4.

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4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such one was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a *pro forma* action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

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In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be

guaranteed

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guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

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~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Annex I

The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.

2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.

3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maravi, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.

4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabela, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.

5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 13 others injured in the explosion.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

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tive." Second question: What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague – an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview – and to the editor of *The New Republic.* Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

Night Session

TAB M

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farmers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors – but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my interview with the President. We went up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government *had decided it would not tolerate it any longer*; he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] *Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary*, which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous information, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the *definite conviction* that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: *do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union*. And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discussions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolution (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me – and I believe him – that Stalin would never have emplaced missiles in Cuba.

"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers' standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn't really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were ~~not~~ gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in ~~itself~~ constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning – did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there . . . well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it's not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy – not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon – has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going on in their country? Do you think we don't have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to educate our young *compañeros*. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, *it still remains true that you have chosen Communism,* that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the *fifth anniversary* of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men--nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to coexistence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

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TOP SECRET

January 19, 1964

MEMO to Boonstra, cc to COS from LEGAT; Subject: OSWALD - It is to be noted that the White House was in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassination of Pres. Kennedy" written by Jose I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla. This speculative paper attempted to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of Pres K was Fidel CASTRO or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Mexi between 27 Sept and 2 Oct 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview with the Cuban Amb in Mexi whom he met in a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurant they both later left in the Amb's car for a talk without being overheard./ Source of this latter info was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. This individual was interviewed at Miami. He stated that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the International Federation of Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the newspaper Excelsior on the night of 25 Nov 63. There he learned through the Mexi press that the Mexi gov had arrested one Silvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSWALD as a guest in her house during his visit to Mexi; and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of the Cub Emb in Mexi. / DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he was ~~a~~ told by Dr. BORRELL Navarros, an exiled Cuban newspaperman employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the day following OSWALD's arrival in Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Caballo Bayo where they met an official of the Cub Emb. DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows nothing about OSWALD and the Cub official leaving the restaurant together in a car. / It was ascertained that Dr. Eduardo BORRELL Navarro, a former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occasion writes feature articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently resides at 1303 Homero St., Apart 501, Mexi. BORRELL Navarro was interviewed on 11 Jan at which time he furnished the following info; Salvador DIAZ Verson was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD with BORRELL and other Cuban exiles. DIAZ Verson also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home. / BORRELL did not tell the story credited to him by DIAZ Verson concerning the visit to a Mexi City restaurant by OSWALD and Silvia DURAN. BORRELL had never heard this story or any similar story before. / BORRELL knew of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other than the meetings which occurred at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mexi. / BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It is to be noted that DURAN was questioned by Mexi authorities on 23 Nov 63. At that time she confirmed that OSWALD visited the Cub Emb in Mexi during the time he was in Mexi from 27 Sept to 2 Oct. She alleged that the purpose of his visits to the Cuban Emb was to obtain a Cuban visa. She stated she had given him a telephone number to use in calling her concerning the visa, but denied that he had ever visited in her home. / On 17 Jan 64 a source... advised that he had been unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant in Mexi, but stated there is a Caballo Bayo restaurant located on outskirts of Mexi. Source went to restaurant, showed photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, who was in charge of Cub Con at the time of OSWALD's visit there, of Cub Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive interviews of these employees. He was unable to find anyone among the employees who could recall any of the persons as having been at restaurant.

CIA

From CIA prepared chronology

TOP SECRET

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

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MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS, WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project - General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba:

> "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime."
> (emphasis added)

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File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED] [According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

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> "I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963

Nothing Relevant

File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

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(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

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File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

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File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

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(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

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File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

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*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

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The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

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BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

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BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

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01519 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

When Castro Heard the News

TAB H

Havana

It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: *"Como? Un atentado?"* ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice *"Herido? Muy gravemente"* ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: *"Es una mala noticia."* ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 19.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a rebroadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly, otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four. This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a *granja de pueblo* (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the *granja de pueblo*, where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President Dorticós. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. . . ." I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

Jean Daniel

ROMANS

> *"Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, 'nothing is true except as a man or men adhere to it – to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it.' We need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements."*
>
> – John F. Kennedy, November 18, 1963

By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and gave over to a succession of photographs of the columns and the windows and the corners of the White House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head in Springfield and to a voice reciting "Oh, Captain, My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the ship has not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is not Abraham Lincoln; not because he is more or less, but because he is a remembered physical presence and Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic arts. One's own time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be before many of us will want to read a book about the day Mr. Kennedy was shot?

The news of the President's assassination was given by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel on Arlington Street in Boston. They turned right around and hurried back inside to attend to their investments. Packed with students and businessmen a shuttle plane from Boston to Washington waited for permission to take off when the captain came on the intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been listening to the news and the President is dead." There was only time to hear one woman say, "How dreadful" before three men went back to discussing plan specifications. A college student reading *Agamemnon* paid no visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-in-[illegible]e." The plane took off, the stewardess collected the money and started to serve drinks. Then the captain was back again. They had been listening to more news, that is trying to listen to news because their real job was to hear flight control. There had been a gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police had taken a man in a movie theater. Vice President Johnson was now the President. The talk of business went on through this, and stopped only when the captain again interrupted to say that the new President had been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.

They ask too much of us when they ask us to act up to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent people. And yet some of us always complained that Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally committed enough. But now someone remembered with special affection a moment late in the 1960 campaign. Mr. Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic governor who was with him said how wonderful it was to feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr. Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace in him that he used only the real in emotion and abstained from fabricating the expected. He had too much respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much truer to him might we have been if we had come down in scale and if the many of us who must have remembered the lines from *Cymbeline* had thought them proper to speak

"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious winter's rages,
Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home art thou

Flash from Dallas

Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news—sketchy as it was at first—to the world. United Press International's Merriman Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32–33 his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result of Smith's first efforts—the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world.



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DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY "ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIFF-
CASE) FOR SOMETHING."
   THE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100
BILLS, THE WITNESS SAID.  THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD PRODUCE THAT
PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD  NOT  LISTED IT AS ONE "OF THE SEVEN
LINKS."  THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S
DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE BLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE
RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED         MOREDA1234PCS
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At 12:34 the Teletype was supplying copy on a Minneapolis murder trial.

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UPI A7N DA
            PRECEDE KENNEDY
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
                                         JT1234PCS..
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The Dallas bureau, alerted by Smith over radiotelephone from the press car as it careered toward the hospital, sends out the first sparse news.

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UPI A8N HX
2ND ADD 2ND LEAD  THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST
BUOS HO
UPHOLD
DA IT YRS  NX
```

Minneapolis starts to add more details on the murder trial. The New York bureau, knowing that ace reporter Smith is covering the President's trip, tells all bureaus to "uphold"—get off the wire. "Dallas, it's yours."

```
UPI A8N AJ
DAY
   CORRECTE
BUOS UPHOLD--NX
```

Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is quickly squelched by the New York bureau.

```
UPI A8N DA
             URGENT
   1ST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS (A7N) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
   NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.
   THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN
STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE
THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MA

                        FLASH
```

The Dallas operator begins sending the rest of Smith's account from the press car.

```
FLASH

     KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
                                   PERHAPS SERIOUSLY
   PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET
                                        JT1239PCS
```

At the hospital, Smith sees the President's limp body in the car and races to a telephone. At 12:39, nine minutes after the shooting, the grave news flashes over the wire.

```
UPI 9N
BULLETIN
   1ST LEAD SHOOTING
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY
OF TEXAS WERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED
DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.
                                               MOREJT1241PCS
```

Now reporter Smith is dictating a story ready for printing.

```
UPI A10N DA
          1ST ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (9N DALLAS XX TODAY.
   THE PRESIDENT, HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS
RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL.  THE GOVERNOR ALSO WAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND.
   CLINT HILL, A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID
HE'S DEAD," AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE
TOURING CAR, THE FAMOUS "BUBBLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS RUSHED
TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.
   OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE
HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.
   THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A
PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
   REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEAR
MORE 144PES
```

Smith rolls on, swiftly and fluently, adding fresh details as "pandemonium" breaks out in the corridor outside his telephone niche.

```
UPI A11N DA
          2ND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9N DALLAS) XXX DALLAS.
   REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF GUNFIRE.
   SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY UNLIMBERED THEIR
AUTOMATIC RIFLES.
   THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.
   THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.
   THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE
DOWN.  CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.
   IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT
MORE 145PES
```

Searching his mind for impressions of the shooting, Smith adds all he can remember to the story. The shaken wire operator stumbles in the second line.

```
UPI A12N DA

   IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT, BUT BULLET
WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE
MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.
   THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS.
   DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED
FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.

    MORE 146PES


UPIA13N DA
```

As yet nothing is known of the sniper, what kind of weapon he used, or where the shots came from.

Ambassador Hernandez Armas apologizes ~~with~~ [illegible] Dorticos for having been late in calling him, but because of an interruption [illegible] the line, he has not done so until now. He adds that "I spoke with this [illegible] did not add anything important to what I have already informed and which I [illegible] formally. And with respect to the concrete point which you asked me about, [illegible] there was no offer of any kind". Dorticos: "no...I wasn't asking about an offer". Hernandez Armas: "ah, I had understood that with the confusion of the..." Dorticos: "no, I was refeering as to whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had ~~xxx~~ given money to the man...that American...understand?" Hernandez Armas: "ah, no, no, no, no, not at any moment". Dorticos: "nothing of that?" Hernandez Armas: "No, no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...rather they (enderezar - straightened out?) the interrogation...." Dorticos: "then we can go along the ~~xxx~~ version of ~~that~~ your information?" Hernandez Armas: "yes, Sr. Presidente, of course". Dorticos: "then nothing more of importance?" Hernandez Armas: "No, nothing important...~~xx~~ anyway, I am going to submit soon a draft of all the details, because there are other details of minor importance, and others of none at all, but contained in the statement.... and I have asked her to make me a ~~xxxxx~~ draft as prolific as possible and to submit it at the first opportunity".

COPIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE TRANSCRIPTS AND SOME ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES

Any carbon
Burned —
Copies to Clark
Ext 281

11/26/63
1839

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 27, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

John F

Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a. m. He said he had just completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not be running the investigation.

As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investigative duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were any pertinent developments he be orally briefed.

I have done so & will continue. Ev. K

With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson, Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswald and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that this question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most important.

In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place any reliance on anything the Soviets said.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

REC-78 62-109060-1493

After conferring with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:vap (8)

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XEROX FEB 27 1976

DEC 10 1963

25 DEC 9 1963

following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points raised by Mr. Katzenbach:

1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government, we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable to them. The United States will have to accept this, since it is in response to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The State Department has responsibility here and we should not dictate the position they are to take, but our views should be stated.

2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is recommended Katzenbach be informed that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign governments and in getting investigative results and intelligence coverage abroad; that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico, the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised. — Done 2:25 pm
S. 11/27/63

5:20

O.K. The Ambassador in Mexico is acting like a Sherlock Holmes as indicated in the wires received this morning.

H

FEB 27 1976
FBI

~~SECRET~~

HARVEY EX 1 R371
6/25/75
9Kg

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~[illegible]~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~[illegible] [illegible]~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~of~~ code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as ~~3. Background:~~ needed.

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JUN 24 1975
CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

Classified by 007789
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

~~SECRET~~

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

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3

QJwin annual salary : $7,200

Travel + ops expenses for
QJwin + other agents & agent candidates: 2,000

Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates: 2,000

Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zrrifle activity: 2,500

Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses: 1,000

$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own~~e~~ (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of ~~anyho~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Mankel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

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pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome). j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person, singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals, e.g., Sicilians, those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged + backdated. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

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freed.n to travel 6

Legal, operational + ethical→moral problems. Khokhlov case.

1) Maximum security + within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). [single cable not secure enough] Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Guise of Lunicle objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of

5) case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Ofenin) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne + stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sub~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~For~~ Danger of standbys.

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ed G — 25/1 — Eyes Caution

8

(— "The Magic button"

arcotics Büro



"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover.

Caution — Bankruptcy — no Stars

eyes — Jim A.

not a TSD problem



/ Contradistinct from U-2 /

) Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor → assumptions —



Examples 3 "wrong"

ramework of Sid's job: Heppard

Elint R+D — Memo ·

Translating machines" — FLE

basic sounds project. —

phonems — (4 months CB)

Commit — Fear

Anathesia —

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26/1 — AS — Fanfani-DCI- Matter —

No file Review —

~~[illegible]~~ never mention word assassination

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. Places & cover — Mary 2
3. Security Rules — B-WKH-AS-3
4. Finish lines — Sid - Review.
5 Last Resort - Brakes — Substitute — who next

9

6. No other agencies (
7. No projects or papers
   except for cover.
8. Principal agent — QJ (Mankel)? —
   AF — Project chief LCH —
   Nickel 1500 — from RB —
   Mark spot reqm. — staff AF
   project — dr. [illegible]
9. Disposal —
10. Targets who & where —
    Must know before
    we can spot —

    —

11. Case officering
12. Cover file — create it from
    RIS or [illegible]. — nonsec
13. Nat. dangers of RIS counter
    action & monitor if they
    are blamed —
    FdJ list — Remember

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January 28, 1976

The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman
House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Pike:

Congratulations on your Committee's great service to the American electorate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic covert operations and funding of the CIA. Secrecy protected counterproductive and indefensible covert operations for twenty-seven years. The light of exposure and cleansing is now enhancing our country's security. The publishing of your excellent report over CIA and White House objections is an act of courage the electorate will soon appreciate.

Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on handouts from the CIA itself, is like an investigative reporter compiling his story from government press releases. Neither is doing the job its employer paid it to do.

Finding the hidden CIA budgets for three or four times the billions of dollars admitted to the electorate is a commendable achievement. But what would your investigators have achieved if a law was already in force imposing criminal penalties upon CIA employees who leaked information to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blackmail weapon.

Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. It enjoys no effective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non-CIA departments and agencies. If it surrenders to the doctrine of secrecy it is powerless indeed. To strengthen Congress' power I offer you my own counterintelligence service in place. The sources have been carefully tested and accumulated since 1949.

The problem is not leaking intelligence out of Committee; it is leaking independent intelligence into it. Starting exactly one year ago today I launched penetration efforts with a 19 page report addressed to "Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligence Operations. I hand delivered this report to every committee member's office. My wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person delivered to.

On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receipted for 103 pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This represented a distillation of a quarter century of intelligence gathering. CIA control of the Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation of my penetration of their secrets is covered. The application to the U.S. Attorney and three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigation and prosecution of murder of American citizens within the U.S.A. is in your files. Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recognition or investigation within the executive departments or your Committee.

On July 30, 1975 Emily Sheketoff of your staff receipted for a one page notification distributed to chairman and members that Anne P. Commanduras, an employee of CIA's domestic assassination office, had been murdered in her apartment house swimming pool by CIA assassin Eugene Hale Brading.

I now enjoy the additional intelligence that Commanduras was executed with a CIA dart gun such as that displayed to news cameras by a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The intelligence weapon fires a sliver coated with shellfish toxin that kills within seconds, dissolves and leaves no mark. The CIA preserved their shellfish toxin supply in direct contravention of an order of the President. Your Committee filed this report without action along with over 200 additional counterintelligence. Is this secrecy that protects national security?

Congressman Pike, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly hidden in another budget. Will you go for more? Then examine the State Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, White House and Congress appropriations. All of these support personnel accepting orders for covert domestic operations from CIA.

You have uncovered CIA operations in the media. Investigate police departments throughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to CIA orders. In the Fairfax County, Virginia, police department alone a CIA assassin has twice employed the badge of the department as cover to gain entrance to domiciles to perform executions.

I again commend your Committee for resisting the pressure for secrecy in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking of intelligence into your Committee. The latter confines your Committee's intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of the CIA. Please concede that there are other citizens as concerned for the security of America as you are.

I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike, or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Searle Field. I want to assist your Committee in recommending remedial legislation based upon 27 years of defining the problem.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to Senator
Abraham Ribicoff and to
Senator Frank Church.

REQUEST TO TESTIFY ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CIA — PENETRATION OF NON-INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF GOV'T AND COUNTER-PENETRATION BY SOVIET KGB. — Ref

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
LEE METCALF, MONT.
JAMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
BILL BROCK, TENN.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 8, 1976

Mr. Amos E. Heacock
~~4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708~~
~~Hyattsville, Maryland 20781~~
2334 Hill Rd.
Falls Church, Va. 22043
TEL. (703) 534-3975

Dear Mr. Heacock:

Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you have discussed these questions at length with members of the Committee staff.

On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The legislation which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA itself. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Furthermore, we were under instructions from the Senate to report out a formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.

I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the new committee created by the legislation we are considering, once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the resources to explore the kind of issues which you raise.

I assure you that the entirety of the information you have submitted to my committee will be made available to the new Congressional oversight committee.

I am sure you understand the constraints on the Government Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res. 400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.

Sincerely,

Abe Ribicoff

Abe Ribicoff

Enclosures (2)

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Ribicoff:

Destiny has chosen you the second time in seven years to chair a committee with capability of establishing legislative remedies to prevent domestic and foreign assassinations, huge corruption within military supply streams, multi billion dollar currency manipulation and massive intervention of the CIA in domestic covert operations.

On or about March 6, 1969 you were the acting chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee that heard Cornelius Hawkridge, my witness, describe a multi billion dollar currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam. Carmine Bellino, staff investigator, prevented Hawkridge from also testifying about truck convoys of stolen military arms and supplies that he observed heading toward the Cambodia border. The "fence" for these stolen arms was the fabulous Soviet KGB agent Jacques Yang, described by staff in your hearings to be a mere Vietnamese commissary clerk. The organized crime vendors of the stolen goods reached into your Committee in Carmine Bellino to protect their lucrative racket. Hawkridge later wrote you a letter covering this deficiency in testimony. He pointed out the sale of arms generated funds used in currency manipulation.

I aided the crippled Hawkridge aboard his flight at Seattle. Your Committee provided an ambulance to meet him for it was less than two months since he survived an assassination attempt that killed his wife. The Soviet KGB let a contract with organized crime's CIA assassination facilities to kill them. The KGB considered Hawkridge a defector. William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, CIA alias William Harvey and double agent for KGB fingered Hawkridge and his wife Angela, a "baby sitter" agent for West German and CIA intelligence. In the contrived truck-car "accident" Hawkridge was crippled for life.

I met with CIA's Harvey as Boxley in November, 1968, in New Orleans pursuant to my counterintelligence investigations. Harvey, witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee, has admitted his role as organizer of the ZR/RIFLE Executive Action assassination capability and his contacts with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana of organized crime to implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclusion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative source of much of my accurate counterintelligence on KGB.

Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury official. The official prevailed upon Senator John McClellan, then

Chairman of your Committee, to conduct it. He first exposed the famous "Prysumeen" account in a New York bank. It was used to convert South Vietnamese piasters to dollars, most of which ended up in three banks in the shiekdom of Dubai on the Persian Gulf.

My further investigation beyond the Committee probe, sabotaged by Bellino, established the dollars were used to requisition gold ingots from the U. S. Treasury at $35 per ounce. These were remelted to convenient "taels" or wafers of gold for black market trading for Indochina currencies again at huge discounts. The conspirators enjoyed government facilities for converting piasters to dollars at fantastically unrealistic official exchange rates. The exchange provided huge profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Treasury.

This inflation machine is still at work, though at a reduced rate since the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The entrepreneurs seek greener pastures where new wars destabilize currencies. Perhaps Angola? Hawkridge's real name is Cornel Solyom. His intelligence activities for a decade were traced in a 64 page report in the possession of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and your Committee.

Senator Ribicoff, had the activities of CIA-Crime double agent Carmine Bellino and Hawkridge's testimony been exposed in the public record in 1969, the trauma for you, for your Committee, for the Congress and for the American electorate would have been mercifully softened. Bellino went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee. He covered up the sources of $1,050,000 of so-called political donor funds I have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Alexander Butterfield in the White House to reveal the existence of the President's tapes, thereby insuring his downfall.

A file of my letters to Senator Henry Jackson in 1969 were sent by him to your Committee. The intelligence was suppressed by Bellino. Although your Committee published eight volumes of hearings in this investigation, Hawkridge's vital testimony was deleted. My intelligence was disregarded.

The legislative remedies now being proposed to counter corruption of our intelligence services can only be made adequate by exposing to public view the depth of the problem of secrecy. I am alarmed at demands for secrecy to support CIA covert operations such as those that led our country into the most counterproductive covert operation in our nation's history -- the war in Vietnam. Did the secrecy imposed by Bellino within your Committee advance the security of the United States? Or did it insure the greatest humiliation of our foreign policy and our armed forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?

I am alarmed that criminal penalties are being proposed for public servants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of irresponsible actions of men infected with the arrogance of power. I

January 28, 1976

Ref: My letter 11/20/74
& encl. to Sen. Weiker
forwarded & acknowledged
your letter 4/7/75; your
acknowledgement data
5/5/75; my letter 7/11/75.

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate,
Russell Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I commend the diligent efforts of you, the members and the staff in producing and especially in publishing the Committee's report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."

Nevertheless, I must advise you that over 200 pages of counterintelligence on domestic and foreign assassinations of the CIA I have provided or made available to staff and members has been disregarded or deliberately withheld from members.

Consequently, as members are preparing to sign a final report, it is timely to list some of the disastrous errors of the interim report. The errors are the result of intentional misrepresentation and deceit of the Congress and the American electorate by the CIA, its directors and employees.

(1) The ZR/RIFLE Executive Action program begun in 1960, headed by William Harvey, was designed as a domestic assassination capability.

(2) Under the direct planning and implementation of Harvey, a number of domestic and foreign assassinations were executed.

(3) Harvey's real name is William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, alias W. J. Wood. His assassinations in USA I have already reported.

(4) Among foreign assassinations with participation by Wood's domestic team members on foreign duty are those of Lumumba and Trujillo.

(5) Orders passed by CIA for execution, rather than exiling or kidnapping, caused the deaths of Ngo Diem, Ngo Nhu and Rene Schneider.

(6) CIA gave the code name WJ/WIN to the organized crime assassination consultant employed to insure the killing of Patrice Lumumba. His real name is Michael Genovese, alias Victor Resignio, son of Vito Genovese, boss of bosses of the Mafia in Atlanta federal prison until he died. Genovese enjoyed assassination authority independent of CIA directors delegated by Meyer Lansky, boss of the American international crime syndicate then. Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy conferred assassination authority upon CIA.

(7) Genovese, as Victor Resignio, directed an arms and supplies diversion and currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam in 1966-67 that cost the Treasury $51.8 billion, Executive Departments' total, not mine.

(8) Wood's crime team member that aided Genovese to assure Lumumba's death was code named WI/ROGUE. He is Frank Sturgis, Watergate burglar.

(9) Sheffield Edwards, witness produced by CIA as its Director of Security, was a spurious substitution to deceive the Committee and the American electorate. Recruited from organized crime, CIA coached him to appear as the Edwards or Colonel Edwards who directed the early alleged attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

The real Edwards who collaborated with organized crime's hit man John Rosselli, his boss Sam Giancana and Robert Maheu, agent of Howard Hughes, oil tool billionaire, was E. Howard Hunt, Watergate burglar. Edwards was Hunt's CIA name. The CIA poisoned Sheffield Edwards after his appearance to prevent his recall and possible exposure as a fraud.

(10) John Rosselli accepted assassination orders from mob leader Giancana who accepted orders in turn from Meyer Lansky.

(11) Committee witness Rosselli was the hit man who shot Giancana with a special assassination weapon developed by CIA. He led the kidnapping and execution of James Hoffa, one time Teamsters' president -- even as your hearings progressed.

(12) Witness Robert Mahue executed the orders of Howard Hughes in contacting Rosselli to implement a domestic assassination capability through organized crime. Hughes issued orders to assassinate Premier Ngo Diem through Richard G. Danner, alias Gil Danner.

Danner precipitated the Hughes order to bug Laurence O'Brien's telephone in the Watergate complex by being caught forwarding a $100,000 payment on President Nixon's San Clemente and Key Biscayne homes for Hughes to the President's friend, Bebe Rebozo. Hughes suspected a plot by defector Maheu and O'Brien to blow the election for Nixon. "Gil" Danner was manager of the International Club in Saigon, owned by the U. S. Embassy. He represented Hughes' interest in the $51.8 billion racket managed by Michael Genovese.

(13) CIA in 1949 established a Domestic Intelligence Division for covert action within the White House, the Executive Departments, Congress, political parties and the media.

(14) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was used as authorization for CIA to implement domestic covert actions through funding and personnel of domestic agencies of government. The Intelligence Directorate of CIA is cover for domestic covert actions in the agency itself.

I am sure you will agree that had your staff investigated and confirmed my counterintelligence during the year it has been available to you, the legislative remedies recommended by your preliminary report would have been found unacceptably weak by Committee, Congress and the American electorate. Please permit me to meet and serve you with counterintelligence input.

Respectfully submitted, Amos E. Heacock

Encl: Letters to Sen. Ribicoff & Rep. Pike

Amos E. Heacock, 1410 Oglethorpe, Hyattsville, 20781, telephone 864-5353.

am alarmed that no witness has pointed a finger of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA's Domestic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA's restriction to foreign operations intended by Congress to prevent a police state.

The 1949 act authorized CIA to conceal huge portions of its budget and personnel within the budgets and personnel roster of domestic agencies of government. These especially include employees on Capitol Hill, in the White House, in the Department of Justice, in the Federal Aviation Administration and in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Until the act is repealed Congress will remain part of the problem, not part of the solution.

When Cornelius and Angela Hawkridge were hit by the CIA's domestic assassins on January 10, 1969 my anger overrode my caution. I wrote all fifteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 23, 1969. I demanded that Hawkridge be heard by the Senate. Although I received no replies, this forced Carmine Bellino's hand and Hawkridge was subpoenaed. The recipients referred some letters to your Committee.

Six months earlier my letter of August 14, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the Industrial State." It concluded with the startling premise I am now prepared to prove to the Senate:

> "It is my firm prediction that when the Foreign Relations Committees get to the bottom of the CIA's conspiracy to usurp Congress' foreign policy authority they will also have solved the conspiracies behind the continuing assassinations of the industrial state."

I rely upon your fairness for opportunity to refute the claims of William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify and to aid your Committee to draft legislation that will effectively prevent abuses of power by the government's intelligence agencies.

As an Air Force officer before, during and after World War II, I am concerned, as I know you are, that our country's security will be protected. I will testify for more effective legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence services. Perhaps the most effective testimony I can give is that which will establish that the CIA has been thoroughly infiltrated and corrupted by double agents who owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet KGB.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Encl: Letters to
Senator Frank Church
and Congressman
Otis Pike.

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

2/4/64 Memo King to Sanchez: Requirements for Amlash

① Latin Americans in guerilla training in Cuba?

② Number of training schools in Cuba?

③ Are they training Africans, and if so, where?

④ Training for officers in charge?

⑤ Direction ~~for~~ of the training session

⑥ Do they instruct foreigners and are the foreigners doing the training?

⑦ Under whose auspices do they operate? how are they selected? What funds are used for the operations and how are they developed?

Staff Notes

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- C O P Y -

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~~S E C R E T~~

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

SUBJECT: Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico Solved

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

REPORT NO. HKH-1385

DATE OF INFO: 28-29 November 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 29 November 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (B)
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Montmartre nightclub. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS Aranguren,[1] instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Servia and Rolando CUBELAS Secades[2] had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-machine gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.

2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,[3] mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's participation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but succeeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irenaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TABERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.

3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable, dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARBO and CUBELAS fled to the United States by ship, since both possessed visas to the United States which were still valid.[4] CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami at the present time.

FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

~~S E C R E T~~

- C O P Y -

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4. SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new developments is not known. Further action by the Cuban authorities is complicated by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious reliability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.

Field Comments:

1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hoy (defunct newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans, scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.

2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA, chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1956 and 1 April 1956. CARBO was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.

3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES. Habana newspapers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by SIM.

4. Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS received a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.

FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

5. Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins, naming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and reportedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM and the police have been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing. It is

possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.

6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were suspected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a student at the University of Habana, was accused of having participated in an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, according to office files.

7. Avance, Habana afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subsequently. It contained substantially the same information as reported above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.

RECEIVED FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

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24

18 March 1965

8

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Exploit L-1 and Jose Rebellon in AN Operation

1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with U-25 we pass a message as follows:

> "A big comandante or capitan who used to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) account in Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my successor). He was traveling in Europe at that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965. The deposit was in the amount of $10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both L-1 and Jose Rebellon. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

Where?

L-1:

a. ~~The record:~~ The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then, L-1 has threatened to eliminate CASTRO, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person ~~with such~~ traits could resonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

recd 28 Aug 65

~~SECRET~~ Smc

b. · Favorable factors (from OPS standpoint): In the summer of 1962 L-1 gave W-1 $500 in Helsinki to be deposited for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961 L-1 showed great sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: While it cannot be discounted that L-1 may be a Castro agent, it may be that he has been sincere in his dealings with CIA Resolution of doubts through an POLYGRAPH interview has been impossible since L-1 hit the ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA'S interest in L-1 is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CASTRO The above proposal may actually stimulate the desired action. If L-1 is questioned by the regime in connection with this charge, and should the investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantness, he might well reach the conclusion that the time to take matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years) has at last arrived.

and how is he going to get out of jail to do so?

If L-1 is a Castro agent and Castro should be aware of L-1 's relationship with CIA Castro might conclude that L-1 received the money from CIA banked it without reporting it, and was in fact working with CIA against Castro. (At the recent meetings in Paris L-1 asked us for $10,000. We did not give him this sum, though W-1 gave him $7,000.)

which we had once told him he could have

If for any reason the regime should do away with L-1 , his alleged sympathizers in the Armed Forces might feel they must react at once to save their own skins. Given the tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly this proposal could split the regime more.

L-1 himself told B-1 that the last thing any of his friends would do would be to [illegible] him on this contract

FROM

CIA

~~SECRET~~

Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1, and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the $80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1, any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

10 February 1976

REC[illegible] [illegible]ROM

FEB 11 1976

CIA

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Elder

VIA: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: SSC Request

REFERENCE: RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)

1. Re question number 1 of reference: Attachment "A" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.

2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. The parent organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolutionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla movement which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime. The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.

3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.

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CL BY 009360

These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have been worded, "according AMSPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53, a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI Staff.

4. Re question number 3(b) of reference: We have been unable to determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments:
A & B as stated

REC ROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA

26/11/63
05:24

Hernandez Armas: "Listen, I have your confidential (report) 125, about the Sra. Duran case; and I want to ask you for some declarations on this; you can tell me in detail". He adds "listen...that's true...of blackmail, what you say here in the confidential (report), the Federals of that country wanted Sra. Silvia Duran to say something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the American? (Oswald). Hernandez Armas replied that "no, no, nothing about money, no". Dorticos continued speaking, "and they tried to detain her, to oblige her to make a statement". Hernandez says that "she was detained, and was questioned with respect to this visit and the request for a visa, and then she said that she had requested the visa, had filled out the documents and the reply of our government had been negative, no granting the visa". Dorticos asked if "you spoke with her". Hernandez said that yes, "I could talk to her yesterday and I immediately sent the report". Dorticos: "understand? if all this is true,) better that it be known; if she is being DETAINED by those people, better too." Hernandez: I was saying that she was detained Saturday afternoon, and freed in the early morning, and yesterday was when I found her and could talk with her, she referred me (? me refirió) and I took advantage of the fact that a plane was about to leave with our mail. Dorticos: yes, yes, you sent that, I already know what you sent...do you know what happened? that the paper that I have here, and don't tell me that that is what happened? Hernandez: What I have just told you besides the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it that they asked you? Hernandez: They asked her concretely about whether she knew

[redacted]

[redacted]

this individual; if she had gone to the Consulate; if she had personal relations, and even if she had intimate relations with him...she denied all that, only....Dorticos: intimate relations with ~~her~~ him? Hernandez: Yes; she denied all that and said that it was a case like any other, of the many of the hundreds of cases that come to request visas at the Consulate, and if she remembered in detail of this case it was because this man had an incident with our Consul...he had an incident ~~[illegible]~~ in which our Consul AZCUE, rebuked him and practially threw him out of the Consulate. Dorticos: and why does she have BRUISES (hematomas), ~~[illegible] for bruises~~, did they treat her badly? Hernandez: well, yes, yes. Dorticos: what did they do to her? Hernandez: She has a few ~~[illegible]~~ BRUISES on the arms, because she says they squeezed her arms during the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it...as she told you about what was done. Hernandez: In this way, (Presidente): they went to her house and took her to the station, to the office of Federal Police and interrogated her to the extreme

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

I was telling you about. Dorticos: and the maltreatment, how was it? Hernandez: At the time of interrogation, trying to impress her so that she would tell all she had to say, that she knew, and then was when they took her by the arms and shook her. Dorticos: listen, Joaquin and did they aske her some other question about money? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely, it seems....Dorticos: did they try to get a statement from her? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely from what she told me, they limited themselves principally to ~~[illegible]~~try to find out what relations she had had and her husband with this individual. Dorticos: and they spoke of money? Hernandez: no, no, she has not told me anything about money, they did not talk to her about that, that is, she has not told me that they spoke to her about that. Dorticos: Mirabal ~~passed~~ SAID to a friend something about that. Hernandez: eeh? well, I asked her if there had been some interest, if they had questioned her ~~[illegible]~~ on other points, if there had been something else, and she did not speak about that. Dorticos: At any rate, question her some more, investigate more and ~~x~~ call me here. Hernandez: Good, Presidente, I will call you immediately.

FIDEL CASTRO SAYS HE KNEW OF OSWALD THREAT TO KILL JFK

PRIME MINISTER of Cuba, Fidel Castro, was addressing admiring crowd when ENQUIRER reporter drew surprising statements from him in unexpected rapid-fire interview.

By COMER CLARK

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to — but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time — I was told — he wanted to work for us.

Although millions of words have been written claiming that Fidel Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination, no newsman has been able to secure a personal interview with the Cuban prime minister for his views on the slaying of the U.S. President.

To shed more light on the most dramatic event of the 20th Century, The ENQUIRER sent Comer Clark to Havana for a face-to-face meeting with Castro.

And here, for readers of The ENQUIRER, is the exclusive story of the dramatic interview with Castro.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someo[illegible] ought to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said — and this was exactly how it was reported to me — 'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated.

"The two visits occurred close together," Prime Minister Castro told me. "I didn't take them seriously."

My hard-won interview took place in the middle of a cheering, jostling mob on the sidewalk of La Rampa, the main "show street" of Cuba's capital, Havana.

Castro had arrived unexpectedly to inspect progress on the building of a Cuban pavilion, erected with those of other Communist countries to mark the July 26 celebration of Castro's rebellion against the Batista regime.

And also to mark the meeting in Havana of Castro's rebel Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) conference, due to open on July 31.

I had applied to the Cuban embassy in London during April-May for permission to go to Cuba to interview the island's prime minister.

Although a British subject does not need a visa to enter Cuba, approval by the Cubans for the entr[illegible] necessary.

Otherwise, the incoming visitor risks being turned away at Havana airport. The approval came at the end of June and was telephoned to me by Santiago Diaz, of the Cuban consulate in London, who deals with entry inquiries. Diaz told me that permission to visit Cuba had been "cleared" (though I was unable to learn what specific checks on my eligibility had been made).

REPORTER: Comer Clark's questions netted new facts.

There are only three legal ways to enter Cuba by air. From Mexico City, from Prague, Czechoslovakia, or from Madrid, Spain. So I flew to Madrid and entered Cuba by airliner on July 9.

In Havana, I immediately applied to the Ministry of External Relations for an appointment to see Prime Minister Castro.

In London, I'd been assured an interview would not be too difficult to obtain. But Senor Laurencio Cordoso, who dealt with foreign press queries was not quite as optimistic as that.

"You know, there are the annual celebrations of the rising against Batista," he said. "And then the meeting of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity.

"The Prime Minister is bound to be very busy. You will have to be patient."

While waiting for permission to interview the prime minister, I was taken on official visits to Cienfuegos Bay to watch the construction of a massive sugar processing and storage plant. And then I went to Trinidad, one of the oldest towns in Cuba.

I noticed that the windows of many Trinidad shops were barren of goods.

For example, in the former Woolworth store on the main street, the entire window facing the street was empty.

The only things that filled many otherwise empty windows were pictures and photographs of Fidel Castro and propaganda posters. Many shops are simply shut, because of a shortage of consumer goods.

Soviet help in construction schemes was obvious — particularly at Cienfuegos Bay. Some old American machines were still in use, but much of the new construction equipment was either Russian or Japanese.

Inspection tours, however, weren't what I had come for. I kept asking about the Castro interview — and kept being told I'd have to be patient.

Many early-bird delegates to the OLAS conference started to arrive now. Waiters, public servants and others began pinning on OLAS buttons. With all this activity, I began to feel my waiting and hoping

(Continued on next page)

Oct. 15, 1967

... It's Possible That I Could Have Saved Him, Says Fidel

restaurant on La Rampa, and was there on the evening of July 15 when there sudden sound of cheers in the street.

Many people hurried from the restaurant, and I in the general direction of the crowd.

There were shouts of "Fidel! Fidel!"

Castro had, indeed, arrived.

Many of Castro's public appearances are made without warning. Partly, this seems to be for security. But, also, because it is regarded as "in accordance with the spirit of the rebellion." Sudden, dramatic — spurning protocol.

I pushed into the cheering crowd as in his familiar "fatigue" uniform of green and a sweat-cap, acknowledged cheers and looked admiringly at the pavilion.

He spoke several times rapidly in Spanish. pushed through the mob toward him, gripped me.

I had my Press card in my hand and it, saying (in English) that I'd like to the prime minister when he could spare to see me. I hoped some nearby offi- would be able to translate my request Castro.

But apparently Castro himself heard my voice above the background of mob noise.

The bearded prime minister — who and understands English well — turned around flamboyantly and, raising his called to me in a friendly way: "Where do you come from, senor? Don't you we're having a great celebration?"

I called out that I was a British newspaperman and had been trying to get an appointment to see him. Again, I waved my card.

"What's wrong with right now?" he asked good humor and plainly happy to putting on a show for the crowd.

"Prime Minister," I said, "it's been suggested several times that there was some involvement or link with the assassination of American President Kennedy.

"Could you tell me if there is any truth at all that?"

Castro looked straight at me, thought for a few and then made the dramatic statement, at the start of article, that he'd reports of Lee Oswald's visits to Cuba's City embassy hadn't believed the serious.

"How did you form view?" I asked.

Castro replied: "Well, were two calls in weeks. I later learned he stayed at the embassy about 15 minutes time. He gave the Lee Oswald each

The calls were re- to Havana, as a of course, under the authority of our ambassador in Mexico, Senor Joaquim Hernandez."

LEE OSWALD
NOW LINKED TO CUBA

I asked: "Did the ambassador himself see Os-

Castro replied: "No, he was seen by an aide. an aide."

He went on: "Let me be clear. I just didn't be- that he (Oswald) meant this. I thought that he have been some sort of wild man. Or maybe after money.

It seemed that to kill the head of a state stupid. Just pointless. As far as Cuba was con- the policy of the American government go on, anyway."

I asked Castro, frankly: "Did you have any of warning the American government Oswald?"

Castro replied, spreading his hands: "We don't — have any relations with the American ment, anyway.

If I'd taken it seriously, I might have informed United Nations or some other official agency But who would have believed me? People have said Oswald was just mad. Or that I'd mad."

suddenly asked: "What is your name, any- I told him.

"Well, Mr. Clark," said the Prime Minister,



HIT CUBA HARD: President John F. Kennedy is shown in November 1962 as he told newsmen that Russia had agreed to remove weapons from Cuba.

"I thought the visits might be something to do with the American CIA — whether anything eventually happened or not."

Cries from the crowd began to divert Castro's attention from me. I desperately asked if by "anything happened" he meant an assassination of President Kennedy.

"Well, it crossed my mind. But I didn't give much thought to it," he said.

"Then, too, after such a plot had been found out, we would be blamed — for something we had nothing to do with.

"It could have been used as an excuse for another invasion try. In any case, people would have tried to put it at my door."

Castro started to make his way to the edge of the sidewalk.

As he did so, he added: "I was not responsible for Kennedy's death. I will tell you that.

"I think he was killed by U.S. Fascists — right wing elements who disagreed with him."

Then he started speaking again in Spanish with those immediately around him, turned and said goodbye to the crowd, climbed into his car and was driven away.

It had been an unexpected and shocking interview under odd and difficult circumstances. If he could be taken at his word, Castro had shed new light on the Kennedy assassination mystery. I hoped to learn even more at the formal interview, which was still pending.

DIDN'T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard of the assassination threat but gave vague reasons for not reporting it to the United Nations.

On July 17 I was telephoned at my hotel by Senor Cordoso, who had tried to arrange the formal interview.

Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance of meeting the Prime Minister. You were very fortunate."

I agreed and asked when my longer interview would be granted.

But Cordoso explained he'd been told by the Prime Minister's office that Castro would be heavily engaged with the anniversary celebrations and meetings with OLAS visitors.

"He has a lot of pressing engagements — those and other things," Cordoso said. "I can't see any chance of another personal interview at all in the near future."

This was the final decision, and I decided to make arrangements to leave Cuba. I flew to Mexico City, where I called at the high-walled Cuban embassy to see if I could learn more about Oswald's two visits there.

The grilled double gates were opened by a gatekeeper to allow in some official-looking diplomatic car.

I quickly showed him my Press credentials, and asked if I could see anyone of authority inside the embassy.

But the gatekeeper replied in halting English: "No, no Press. It is impossible."

The wall of silence had been lowered on the Oswald situation, except for that one revealing moment with Castro himself on the sidewalk in Havana.



INTRIGUE: Cuban Embassy in Mexico City was visited twice by Oswald before assassination.

RUSSIAN

mbassy of the USSR
S. A., Washington
Section
Reznichenko

wald, M. N.

nce and, therefore, by this
f replies (sic) to my appeals
the USSR and residence in
the expediting of this matter

fully,

O d

—Continued



FROM: LEE H. OSWALD, P.O. BOX 6225, DALLAS, TEXAS
MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, SOVIET CITIZEN

TO: CONSULAR DIVISION
EMBASSY U.S.S.R.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOV. 9, 1963

6125
20.XI.63

Dear sirs;

This is to inform you of recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy Of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.

I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinily because of my mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.

I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.

Of corse the Soviet embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced.

The Federal Bureu of Investigation is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organization "Fair Play For Cuba Committee", of which I was secretary in New Orleans (state Louisiana) since I no longer reside in that state. However, the F.B.I. has visted us here in Dallas, Texas, on November 1st. Agent James P. Hasty warned me that if I engaged in F.P.C.C. activities in Texas the F.B.I. will again take an "interrest" in me.

This agent also "suggested" to Marina Nichilayeva that she could remain in the United States under F.B.I. "protection", that is, she could defect from the Soviet Union, of couse, I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious F.B.I.

Please inform us of the arrival of our Soviet entrance visa's as soon as they come.

Also, this is to inform you of the birth, on October 20, 1963 of a DAUGHTER, AUDREY MARINA OSWALD in DALLAS, TEXAS, to my wife.

Respectfully,
L H Oswald

[illegible]

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 15

R2125 R

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Johnston, Paul Wallach

FROM: Dan Dwyer

DATE: January 21, 1976

SUBJ: CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald

Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case, Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and 13, 1975. Some of Rocco's comments merit consideration in light of our present knowledge of the case.

1. Opening of 201

Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.

2. Status of 201, 11/22/63

Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated via the 201.

3. Oswald's Defection to USSR

With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the case. Rocca could not cite any example of a U.S. citizen defecting on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.

With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certificate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it. Rocca suggested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique of using birth certificates for illegals -- Larry McWilliams, Brannigan or Cregar -- would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI, should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.

In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments by the KGB.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and conducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S. defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treatment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relationship with the KGB should be clarified.

Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that the CIA developed this information after the assassination.

Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white Russian area.

Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Embassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing in Russia."

Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca admitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality of Oswald's written material, Oswalds' mentality seemed conducive to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.

4. Alleged Debriefing of Oswald

Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing report existed, it would have been distributed in 00 series (overt operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no ties with the CIA.

5. Oswald and Mexico City

Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David Phillips organized the technical surveillance.

Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September 28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.

Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were the responsibility of the FBI.

6. Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections

Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels. He described these areas as "open and relevant."

Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in 1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.

Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's"impromptu "comments to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963. Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders and said it was a "very important signpost," Rocca added that the Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's attention on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?)

In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from "Des to Paris." He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and said "man never heard from again." Rocca should be asked to clarify these references.

Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s. he described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "preliminary relationship." Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports, vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning" of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.

Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee, national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that (fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two DGI agents. Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate DGI-FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who was handled by WH Division.

7. Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case

Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an interview that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965. Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for thePresident's assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)

Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute fabrication." Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a contact of the DCD until 1956.

Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962 or 1963 about a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes that the CIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evidence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a drop in Mexico City.

8. GPFLOOR Period

GPFLOOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation conducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.) The Mexico City aspect of GPFLOOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King, Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who would then inform McCone.

9. End of GPFLOOR: Warren Commission

With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOOR period ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of interest to the WC -- mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman. Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for exploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman researched DeMohrenschildt's relationship to the Oswalds.

Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.

Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in Soviet R&A.

10. Rockefeller Commission Inquiry

Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not clued in on Cuban emigreeissues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca developed the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but only at the conclusion of the WC.)

Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald and the President's assassination.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 24 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓ orig + att → admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue → Chron

VI-C-5-D31

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI files.

Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975. Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.

I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said that -- Chase, I think his name was, Peter Chase, one of his assistants -- is the person to be in touch with, and to keep him apprised of all developments.

I later again got a word from Jean Daniel, the French correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed ripe for a conversation. So this also came from another source, a Greek town planner named Doxiati,, who said that Castro was very much interested in some kind of normalization relation, but that Che Guevera and Raul were opposed.

October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking me what was new. I said, well the ball is now, in the Cuban's court.

On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.

The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these developments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.

I then briefed Bundy on this on the 5th of November Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department, the idea being -- well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal.

Chase then said Bundy wanted a chronological memo about the entire thing. I might say I have forgotten one point. When I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he said -- he still offered to take it up with the White House.

Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to Havanna with Valao. We never could get through the bad connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and he had suggested that I come to Marianao from Key West and talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid going through Havanna.

Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in Cuba and told me to tell Valao this. I finally reached Valao on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message about his coming here. He said -- and that we wanted to discuss agenda.

He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he would -- or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they should discuss an agenda with me. He was very cordial on the telephone.

Atwood
7/10/75

TAB K p.9

t

we referred to our talk in '59 and he said another talk might be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real indication. At this point, I said I'm no longer a private citizen but a government official and we agreed that the current situation was different, at the same time, things were a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing of their assets.

The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney General. His position was -- I showed him the memoranda, which I had prepared on what had happened up to that point. He said that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something. Anyway, it might be a problem. But he did think the matter was worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.

At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech in reply. On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.

I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November -- by the way, my call to Valao was the 18th -- he said that after their agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days before the assassination.

On the 29th of November, LaChuga had seen Miss Howard and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently that we would continue our conversation.

On the 2nd of December he confirmed getting a letter from Valao and he wanted to know if things had changed again. He said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.

I called the White House, Chase in this case, to say that the ball was now in our court.

On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN, said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.

He said the decision would take some time now because all our policies were under review.

This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door isn't closed, I just don't know.

On the 17th of December the President, this time President Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at

Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington. Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the holidays.

Well, that ended my diary in '63. I then went to Kenya as Ambassador in February of '64. However I do recall that some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well, if this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep it in mind but that it was a dead issue.

The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investigation is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening, although it could conceivably have happened.

The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of is an explanation.

I think your testimony is helpful. Certain inferences can at least be drawn. But it is very helpful.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Research

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attachment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Steven Blackhurst

STEVEN BLACKHURST
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RECEIVED FROM
MAR 9 1976
FBI

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

CE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12, 1976, which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in the "Official and Confidential Files" (O & C) and which was made available for access on February 12, 1976, to an SSC Staff Member.

A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, is attached in compliance with the above request. One excision has been made by reason of privacy.

Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel, and Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr. Blackhurst to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported that during the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances that should the SSC decide to use the attached memorandum or any portions thereof, the material used will not be identified as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.

In addition to the above, referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in the O & C files pertaining to a number of specifically identified items relating to the Warren Commission and to this Bureau's investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination of President Kennedy. A thorough review of the special indices relating to material contained in the O & C files failed to indicate that any documents contained in these O & C files, other than the attached memorandum, would be responsive to the items listed in referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Original

Page one

Document Routing Sheet

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confidential	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr. to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/attach. 1 pg re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to:	Date	Filed:
Research	3/2	VI-C

Document Routing Sheet

Date Received	**Received From**	**Classification**	**R #**
3/11/76	CIA	Confid	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/ pg attach. re: Oswald file

Copies to:	**Date**		**Date**

Original to: Research

Date 3/12

Filed:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen ✓
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 25, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: JACK RUBY;
LEE HARVEY OSWALD - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual identifying himself only as Mr. Miller, 1125 14th Street, Northwest, contacted the Bureau and advised that he was a close friend of Ruby. In addition he identified Clint Murchison and Tommy Webb as being friends of Ruby. Miller declined to furnish additional information but agreed to interview. Washington Field Office was immediately advised and an Agent dispatched in order to get full details concerning the above.

Press vigorously. I would surmise it is Clint Murchison, Jr. not Sr.
H.

1 - Mr. DeLoach

HAS:cfs
(7)

REC- 25 44-24016-117

EX-114

22 NOV 29 1963

1978

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

9 DEC 4 - 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-23

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked "#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated the following items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to March 1, 1963.

2. IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified information she had obtained from Giancana.

3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S. Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.

4. Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962. (We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC:clb

~~TOP SECRET~~

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02372

5. Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap Case - Sam Giancana - This memo recommends prosecution in this case would be against national interest. It contains no mention of assassination.

6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.

7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961, relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically outlined facts of the Balletti matter.

8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12, 1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.

9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961 of participants in the Las Vegas incident.

10. Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22, 1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an interview with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject: "Arthur James Balletti, et al."]

11. FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu. It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.

12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.

13. Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI, Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This report contains the details of the arrest. (This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

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14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investigative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information. (Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he undertook for CIA.)

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[redacted] [redacted]

to eliminate a break for big investors.

pected to improve the measure's image in the eyes of House liberals, who have been fearful that the committee might report out a "rich man's bill."

The crucial vote in the hairbreadth decision was understood to have been cast by Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.), who was absent when the committee deadlocked 12 to 12.

Youngsters stand in front of the newly completed James W. Johnson School at 1420 S. Albany and watch as the last of [illegible] mobile classrooms is moved away. Portable schoolrooms were moved to Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Supt. Benjamin C. Willis defended the flexibility of the mobile units, saying they are being requested in some areas in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and Lowe. Stories and other pictures on Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)

Chicago Sun-Times
16 August 1963

Helms #1

CIA Sought Giancana Help For Cuba Spying

By Sandy Smith

Sun-Times Correspondent

Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Bahamas while U.S. fliers watch helplessly, Page 2.

WASHINGTON—A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times.

It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government officials said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959.

What the CIA accomplished—if anything—by negotiating with the 53-year-old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter.

One thing, however, is certain:

EXCLUSIVE

F several months in late 1959 and early 1960, Giancana, a big shot on gangland's "Commission" and in its La Cosa Nostra murder-and-terror society, became what his fellow gangsters abhor and would act swiftly to exterminate—an agent for the U.S. government.

The CIA wasn't talking about the case here on Thursday.

But Justice Department sources expressed belief that Giancana never did any spying at all for the CIA.

Giancana, according to these sources, merely pretended to go along with the CIA in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed—or at least affected—by his ruse of co-operation with another government agency.

If this was Giancana's motive, his scheme was a failure. For a probe by the Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation of Giancana's crime syndicate in Chicago led directly to the exposure of the La Cosa Nostra ("our cause") brotherhood and the Commission.

With his connections in Cuba, Giancana declared he would be able to sneak intelligence out of the island for the CIA.

A high government source gave The Sun-Times this account of how Giancana stepped into the role of a government agent:

The CIA made its first contact with Giancana in 1959.

The Chicago gang boss then was embittered because the Commission, in traditional gang bipartisanship, had dollars backing both sides in the Cuban revolt.

The Commission was said to have given financial backing to Castro—only to have him shut down the gambling casinos.

And the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, reportedly fled Cuba with millions he received from Commission hoodlums.

In his dickering with the CIA, Giancana reputedly boasted that he had contacts with

Turn to Page 2

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PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF
02376

Reveal CIA Sought Giancana's Aid

Continued from Page 1

anti-Castro factions and was ready to use his contacts for the CIA.

Justice Department officials say now that Giancana was just talking. He might have had some "contacts," but he never produced anything of value for the CIA, the officials said.

The CIA was said to have dumped Giancana as a possible source of Cuban intelligence some time in 1960, long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

An equally bizarre episode months later gave the Justice Department its first clue to Giancana's negotiations with the CIA.

The figures in this incident were a male night-club entertainer and Giancana's girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters.

At the time, in Giancana's opinion, the entertainer was overly attentive to Miss McGuire.

At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertainer's hotel suite. For hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms.

Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, according to federal authorities, led to an admission by the prowler that he was on the payroll of a private detective agency in Florida.

Florida authorities sought an explanation of the incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operator refused to discuss the matter. Finally, however, he told investigators to get in touch with the CIA.

The inquiry then shifted from Florida to Washington and revealed Giancana's negotiations with CIA, it was disclosed.

Government sources reported Thursday that the private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas suite of the entertainer was another riddle of Giancana's caper with the CIA. Neither the CIA nor the Florida detective agency ever has offered an explanation of what the investigator was doing in the hotel suite, the sources said.

Sign First Trade Pact

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanganyika (AP) — Tanganyika and the Soviet Union have signed their first trade agreement. The African nation will exchange sisal, cotton, hides, skins, tobacco and coffee for Soviet metal, tools, vehicles, road equipment, cameras, fishing boats, planes and other things.

Fifth Buddhist Burns Self

HUE, South Viet Nam (AP) —A 71-year-old Buddhist monk burned himself to death in his ceremonial robes inside Hue's biggest pagoda early Friday.

He was the fifth to burn to death in the mounting Buddhist campaign against the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic.

His self-immolation in the courtyard of the Tu Dam pagoda brought immediate martial law to Hue, which lies 40 miles north of Saigon and is the ancient capital of Viet Nam.

He was the third to burn this week. A 17-year-old novice monk committed suicide Tuesday and a middle-age nun took her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday.

Reliable informants said the nun, Dieu Hien, set fire to herself in the market place of Ninh Hoa, a coastal village 200 miles northeast of Saigon. She was the first woman fire-suicide.

Informants at Ninh Hoa said government authorities had taken the nun's body in a move aimed at preventing a mass demonstration at her funeral.

They followed the same tactic with the body of a novice monk who immolated himself early Tuesday near the central Vietnamese religious center of Hue.

It had an opposite effect,

Tar-Feathers 'Torture' Bared As Hoax

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A woman tarred and feathered and apparently left to die in a flaming house told a bizarre story Thursday that her "torture" actually was part of a hoax to stir up a racial incident.

owner of the house which was set afire, Henry Lewis, attempted to inspire a racial incident that would pressure his neighbors in a right-of-way dispute.

Office said Mrs. Harwell and the Lewises were arrested

Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, admitted setting fire to the house, authorities said. She and the Lewis couple faced charges of arson and conspiracy, detectives said.

According to Mrs. Harwell,

INDEX TO

Milburn Akers
Astro-Guide
Business News 54-58

JOB #____

Selected

See

C-XI-1

x # 6 of 10

iscellaneous John McCone Papers

hai Pilots

ateral used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63

rge envelop of miscellaneous papers

riefing Memoranda-1962

esident Briefing 22 Dec 1964

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~~see~~ No

JOB #__ No

x 4 of 10

otes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-Dec 1963

riefing Memoranda 1962

tate Cables for DCI Raborn 1966

ask Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65

ol. I, II, III & IV of Annexes to Report to the PFIAB on Intelligence Community
ctivities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.

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02299

Job 72-B-431
Copies #9+10

ok

2-8-72

Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.

opy #1	retained in Executive Registry.
opy #2	Retained in O/IG. -RITTER 11-15-72
opy #3 thru #7	Records Center
opy #8	DDP retained.
opy #9	PPB Retained.
opy #10	D/DCI/NIPE retained.
opy #11	Records Center
opy #12	DDS&T retained.
opy #13 thru #16	Records Center
p: 17	PPB retained.
opy #18 thru#26	Records Center.

all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.
so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee
eeting minutes.
r. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.

David L. Bye
David L. Bye
Chief, Executive Registry

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02300

Job #___

OK

ox # 8 of 10

8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62	#1
8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62	#2
Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63	#1
Memoranda on Meetings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63	#2
Meetings with the President 1 July 63 - 12 Nov 63	#3
Meetings with President Johnson 23 Nov 63 - 31 Dec 63	
Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964	#1
Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May	#2
Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64	#3
Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64	#4
eetings with the President Jan-28 April 65	#1

All

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JOB # 72-B-431

OK

c # 1 of 10

All

3 Committee	January-December 1963 - ✓
3 Committee	January-December 1964 ✓
unter-Insurgency	July-December 1962
unter-Insurgency	January-June 1962 -
ecial Group CI-1965	
ecial Group CI - 1964	
rono	1962

Checked generally - nothing relating to Cuba

Spot checked.

✓

PROPERTY OF
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02302

Job #___

OK

M

#2 of 10

Complete

Memoranda for Record:

March-28 April 65

anuary-28 Feb 1965

November-31 Dec 64

11 Sept-31 Oct 64

April 64-8 July 64

July-11 Aug 64

12 Aug - 10 Sept 64

Jan-11 Feb 64

27 Nov-31 Dec 63

23 July 63-26 Nov 63

June 63-20 July 63

15 April - 4 June 63

Jan 63-9 Feb 63

Sept - 31 Dec 62

7 April 62-21 Aug 62

29 Nov 61-5 April 62

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JOB #____

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N/ M

ox # 3 of 10

Vietnam	August 1963
Vietnam	September 1963
Vietnam	October 1963
Vietnam	November 1963
Vietnam	December 1963
anuary	January 1964
Vietnam	February 1964
Vietnam	March 1964
Vietnam	April 1964
Vietnam	May 1964
Vietnam nama (2	June 1964
Vietnam	July 1964
Vietnam	August 1964
Vietnam	September 1964
Vietnam	November 1964
Vietnam	January 1965
Vietnam	February 1965
Vietnam	March 1965

LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June

DELTA Trip

NODIS---LOR----McCone Eyes Only

DEFOLIATION

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JOB #_____

x # 7 of 10

Selected see OK

NRO 1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 ltr to DCI frmDefense re Management of NRO)

CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964

Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization of USIB; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of CIA.

Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference-Panama(29 Jan-1 Feb 1962)

White House-1962 & 1963(containes correspondence to, from and of interest to the White House.)Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo Bundy.

Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)

Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17 thru 29 Sept 1964

moranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964

Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.

Memos for the Reocrd EA/DCI for 1964 & 65

DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip

Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)

DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Trip-1962

DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964 also containes some background papers on trip.

Envelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963

DCI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964

CUBA-Background Material-1962

02305

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to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation

Job #____

x #_5_ of _10_

Selected ✓ See

can Republic-1965

uba Package 7

xecutive Registry File "John McCone 1962

ommittee of Principals

aos 1962

uba 1964)

ook-Bay of Pigs

uclear Papers

cCone Speeches 7 June 63 - 25 May 64.

cCone Speeches 8 June 64 - 11 March 65

uba 1962)

ub Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62

ate Eyes only Cables

xecutive Registry DCI File 1963

epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964

02306

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-22

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassination, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971. According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several entries in these files respecting allegations by people who claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination. One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2, 1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance magazine writer.

MC:clb

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C2356

that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks," he should carefully examine his own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.

Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.

He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief Counsel of the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.

Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate to the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington inasmuch as Carr was running for office next year. I told Katzenbach I knew this, however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter. Katzenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however, Carr was quite persistent.

ACTION:

In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down and discussing facts concerning our report.

If he calls I will see him. H

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 13 1976
FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

~~SECRET~~

R. CUBA

CT 1. ATTEMPTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT COMMUNIST PLANS TO CONTROL ~~CUBAN~~ GOVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW CASTRO.

F MARCH 1962

Q. UNITED STATES (23 APRIL 1962)
AL 3

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/550,097

DATE DISTR. 2 MAY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 23109

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ARMY COMMANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE E OUSTER OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE ON 26 MARCH 1962 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMMUNISTS RE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED BY STRO WERE ROLANDO CUBELA, JOSE MARIA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA MATOS, JUAN IRI, JORGE SERGUERA RIVERI, PEDRO MIRET PRIETO. CASTRO ASKED THEM TO BACK HIM UP, S HE INTENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREED.

CUBA

2. AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALSO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF A MMUNIST LEADER IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE IN ORIENTE OVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).

3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX TORRES, COMMUNIST LEADER LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. CASTRO TOLD THE ARMY COMMANDERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	LA	[illegible]

INS CINCLANT EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

D FROM
UG 15 1975
CIA

~~SECRET~~

201-252234

"IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TORRES SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA".

4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT DEVIATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS ROCA, AND OTHER COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT BE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP.

5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO BACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL, RAUL CASTRO, AND CHE [illegible]VARA AT SOME PROPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. THESE MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARMY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: SOURCE SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP OF ARMY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA [illegible]ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

FROM CIA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATE MENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmon
1 - Mr. Rose
1 - Mr. Malle
1 - Mr. Rogge
1 - Mr. McGow
1 - Mr. Hines

1 - Mohr
1 - De Loach

Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 26, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

D. W. Moore

Branigan

While at the offices of the President's Commission on other matters, J. Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office. Mr. Rankin advised that he desired to make it known that the Bureau had been of tremendous help to the President's Commission, that an extremely large volume of work had been produced by the Bureau and that the Bureau had been most cooperative in handling all requests which had been made by the President's Commission.

He commented that recently there had been quite an increase in the number of requests and there was a possibility that there would be many more additional requests. Mr. Rankin stated this was not intended as a criticism of the Bureau's work but instead was the following through of the Commission's desire to complete the Commission's record and leave no unanswered questions.

In this regard, Mr. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in conducting its investigation, had an extremely difficult and enormous task to perform and that he as well as other members of the Commission staff had been amazed at the amount of detailed information which had been developed by the Bureau in its investigation. He commented that the Commission in performing its tasks was of necessity making a most minute study of the Bureau's work as well as that of other Government agencies with the idea of picking the investigation to pieces to the extreme degree so that wherever it was possible to clarify any item, this could be handled while the Commission was in existence.

Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an explanation concerning information relative to Special Agent James P. Hosty's name being omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas Office (report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), he wanted the Bureau to know the following:

Enclosure sent 2-27-64

REC- 53

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Lenihan

1 - 62-109060
1 - 105-82555
1 - 44-24016

XEROX

62-109090 - 11

1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAR 13 1964

JRM:KUL:msd
(14)

Memorandum A. Rosen to A. H. Belmont
Re: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The Commission had noted in reviewing the notebook in question that Agent Hosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone number and a license number. It had been noted that this information did not appear in the Dallas investigative report and members of the Commission wondered why this item did not appear. Mr. Rankin stated that prior to any question being raised concerning this item, the Bureau in one of its letters to the Commission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name in the Oswald notebook. As a result of this information being furnished by the Bureau, the members of the Commission were fully aware that there had been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to make this information available. Mr. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Commission would show the exact circumstances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons why Agent Hosty's name was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63. We are enclosing for the Commission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling and John T. Kesler wherein they set forth their explanations in handling the Hosty entry in Oswald's address book. Both affidavits are excellent and should satisfy the Commission that our handling of the Hosty entry was sound.

Rel

WCS

If there had been proper supervision here much of the correspondence from Commission re-questing clarification & additional investigation would have been avoided. Notwithstanding Rankin's statements the overall record is not one reflecting any credit to the Bureau but rather discrediting. H

REC
FEB 1
FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0412
13 May 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. E. Greissing

Dear Mr. Miller:

As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith is a copy of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Case Figures". This document was recently released by the Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sincerely,

Seymour Bolten

Seymour R. Bolten
Chief, Review Staff

Attachment:
As Stated

RECEIVED [illegible]
MAY 14 1976

COS

T.:

ST? COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-8593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	XX OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

: COS

T.:

STR COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029 NUMBER

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

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CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

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ST? COMMO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

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4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

[illegible] END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

COS

T.:

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-8593
Silvia DURAN P-
~~LITEMPO/Prod~~

STR COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.
ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

NUMBER

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029
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4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

END OF MSG

[illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that suddenly he had realized that the United States had taken [illegible] and one [illegible] killed [illegible] and that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs) HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 28 1976

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that suddenly he had realized that the United States had taken [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs) HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

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JAN 28 1976

HF: Okay; he asks where she is going to stay now, and LUISA comments that now she plans to move tonight to the house of the doctor (female). HF asks if they know everything now, and LUISA says yes, but doesn't know how the thing is, or if they will have to stay in the embassy, however believes that today it will not be possible, because everyone has gone to the airport and the embassy has no car, however, possibly tomorrow morning instead of going to the study circle, she will move. HF: Then he will call her tomorrow. LUISA: To try the embassy or at the house, since if they will not stay at the embassy, she will go home where she will be at about 10. HF accepts.

Soviet Embassy.- 15-60-55.-
27 Sept 63.-

L34-M8.-T128-
0900-2114 hrs.

395- (1605) IN.- OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an American here who has requested a transit visa for Cuba because he is going to the USSR. OV. - Wants to know with whom he (American) spoke at the Soviet Embassy becuase she (OV) had sent him over to them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans would give him one without anymore processing - only advising the Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (American) spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there were no problems. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. 404— 410 OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so he can call her. SILVIA gives it to him along with the tel, num. 11-28-47.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and that she has not advised about her change of address and will not receive the Bulletin and she can advise them now. IV. asks that she call KOUKHARENKO in order to change the address, and then asks for the name of the Cultural Attache. SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--

EMBAJADA RUSA.- 15-60-55.-
27 septiembre 63.-
1605 14A

395- Entrada.- MF del Consulado de Cuba, dice que esta allí

.. un ciudadano Americano que fue a solicitar una visa para C
en Tránsito porque va para la URSS y entonces quiere saber co
quien habia hablado porque ella lo mandó con ellos de la Emba
da rusa diciendole que si ellos le hacian o aceptaban la visa
que entonces ellos los cubanos tambien se la daban sin mas -
tramites nadamas avisando a Emigración en Cuba, y quiere sabe
con quien habló porque el dice que no sabe tampoco con que -
persona y que le dijeron que si que no tenia problema. HD le
pide espere un momento. 40[illegible]-- 410-- MF es SILVIA DURAN del
Consulado de Cuba y explica lo mismo a otro HD. Este le dice
que le deje su telefono y su nombre para que despues le llame
SILVIA se lo proporciona así como el telefono 11-28-47.- Y que
aprovecha como cosa personal de que ella se cambio de domicili
y no ha podido avisar para que le envien el boletin y que aho
se la puede dar. HD le pide que llame a KOUKHARENKO para que
de su cambio, y pide le de el nombre de la Consejero o Agrega
Cultual. SILVIA dice que se llama TERESA PROENZA y le llaman
al 14-13-26. HD que gracias.-- 435--

Attachment b:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1605 hours on 27 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy saying there was an Americ citizen at the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban visa in transit to the USSR. She was asked to leave her telephone number (11-28-47).

27 Sept

IV - inside voice.

OV - outside voice.

I

288- Out to 14-13-26.- (1625 hrs.)- (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the number of the Cuban Consul. OV. - It's --11-28-47.--- 294--

295- Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs)- IV asks SILVIA if the American has been there. SILIVA: says yes, he is here now. IV.- According to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in Washington he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have not received the answer from Washington concerning his problem and considering the processing it will take 4 to 5 months. Without that permission of the USSR they have to request. and better still the visa can't be given here without asking Washington But according to this man, he belongs to an organization in favor of Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa without the Russian visa and I don't know what to do with him. I have to wait for the answer from Washington. SILVIA - We have to wait also because his problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a visa in these conditions. He expected to process the visa. He knew it would take long to process the Russian visa and would wait for it in Cuba and leave from there for the USSR. IV. - The thing is that if his wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for returing to Russia. She will receive the visa in Washington and having the visa she can sent it to any place for example here or any other place but right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give him a letter of recommendation because we don't know if his visa will be approved. IV. - We will only give the visa according to indications (intructions) SILVIA. - Then that is what I will put in my plans. IV.- We can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuase we don't know him. Please pardon the bother. SILVIA .- No bother and thank you very much.--
--331--

EMBAJADA [illegible]
27 Septiem[illegible]

295-

27 Sept 1963
1626 hrs

[illegible] preguntа a [illegible] que
[illegible] que si, que alli [illegible]
si ha ido alli ese americano [illegible] del consulado en -
ID que según las cartas que [illegible] para estar allá mucho tiempo
Washington el quiere ir a la [illegible] recibido la
con su esposa que es rusa, pero todavia no se ha recibido la
contestación de Washington [illegible] a su problema, pero eso
según los trámites ocupan un [illegible] cuatro o cinco meses pero sin
tener eso permiso de la URSS deben de preguntar y mas bien no
se lo puede depachar aquí el visado sin preguntarlo a Washington
pero según este señor le mostró una carta en que es un miembro
de una organización en favor de Cuba y ha dicho que ellos los
Cubanos no pueden darle el visado sin el visado ruso y ahora, .
ID no sabe que hacer con el, porque deben de esperar la contes-
tación de Washington. SILVIA que ellos tambien, porque el pro-
blema de el, es que el no conoce a nadie en Cuba y entonces si
es asi es muy dificil que le den la visa, porque el pensaba
tramitar su visa, porque como el ya sabia que se iba a tardar
mucho en esperar el visado ruso en Cuba y ya de allá irse a
la URSS. ID que la cosa es que si su esposa está ahorita en
Washington va a recibir ahorita el visado o el permiso de la
URSS para regresar a la patria, ella va a recibir su visado en
Washington pero teniendo ese visado ella podrian comunicarle
a cualquier lugar ese permiso por ejemplo aqui o en cualquier
otra parte lo puede recibir, pero ahorita no las tienen. SILVIA
que claro y que tampoco se le puede dar una carta porque no
saben si su visa será aprovada. ID que ellos solo daran el visa-
do según las indicaciones. SILVIA que entonces eso pondrá en su
planilla. ID que tampoco se le puede dar ninguna carta de - . .
recomendación porque no se lo conoce y que perdone por la . . .

. . molestia. SILVIA que no hay cuidado y que muchas gracias.---

--331--

Attachment c:

A telephone call to the Cuban Embassy made at
1626 [illegible] on 27 September 1963 by an unidentified

28 Sept 1963

208- IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate - says that there is an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Soviet Embassy. IV. Wait a minute. 213-- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and takes down the number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (them) of the American and says she will call.-- 232--235-- OV.- speaks in Russian. IV.- speaks in English.-- BOTH CONTINUE IN ENGLISH.--244 --1151 hrs.-

208- X

Lienvoy

26 SET. 1963

15 60 55

Entrada.- HF del consulado de Cuba, quien dice que alli en su consulado esta un [illegible] norteamericano que estuvo alli en la Embajada Rusa. HM que espere un momento. 233-- HF es SILVIA DURAN y habla INGLES con alguna persona Ruso-- y come en español que le pusieron telefono a APARICIO y lo apunta que es el 14-12-99--- 231-- SILVIA le dice sobre el ciudadadano norteamericano y que les va a hablar.--- 232--- 235-- HF habla RUSO. HD le habla en INGLES.--- SIGUEN LOS DOS EN INGLES.---244 --- 1151 hrs.-

208. /Please see the Spanish transcription/. MO while waiting speaks in English/to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak Russian? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russia I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

Lib: [illegible]

50-5-10

[illegible] dice que alli

206- [illegible] que estuvo alli

en su consul[illegible] [illegible] 23-- [illegible] -

en la [illegible] [illegible] persona fuera-- y comenta

SILVIA DUR[illegible] [illegible] a [illegible] y lo apunta que

en español que [illegible] [illegible] sobre el ciudadano

8 SEP [illegible] es el 14-12-99---- [illegible] 232-- 235-- MF habla

56055 norteamericano [illegible] [illegible] LOS DOS EN INGLES.--244--

RUSO. MO lo habla [illegible] INGLES.--

-- 1151 hrs.--

208. /Please see [illegible] Spanish [illegible] translation/. MO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak English? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russian/ I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want?

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Attachment d:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1151 hours on [illegible] September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy who puts on an unidentified norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he was just at their Embassy and wants to give them his address. The Soviet tells him to return to the embassy with the address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57
1 October 63
L26-M26-T129
1031 - 2002

hours → man outside

man outside ?

45. In at 1031, MO talks to MI, in broken Russian.

MO: Hellow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-[illegible]

1 October 63

45. In at 1031. MO talks to MI, in broken Russian.

MO: Hollow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

Attachment a:

A telephone call to the Soviet Military Attache at 1031 hours on 1 October 1963 by an unidentified man speaking broken Russian who asked about a telegram which they were to send to Washington. Unidentified man said he was at the Soviet Embassy "last Saturday". Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.

128. Out to 15-12-64 at 0955? OBYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.

OBY: VOLODYA, come here as fast as you can.

OBR: Alright.

135. (previously transcribed)

140. (previously transcribed)

man outside

151. D hrs In at ~~148~~ (?) MO / the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your plac last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washimgton, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the nam of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they havenåt received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothin has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

249. (previously transcribed)

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, 15-60-55

1 October 63

In at 1035 hours MO/the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

Attachment f:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy at 1035 hours on 1 October 1963 by the same man who called previously (28 September 63) and spoke broken Russian. He said his name was Lee OSWALD and wanted to know if they had heard anything. Soviet said no.

TAB J

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *

TAB L

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference Room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House. The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, [redacted] make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khrushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had *made up his mind* not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidely the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of *Newsweek*] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this 'will to independence' around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

"I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufactured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is one of the most, if not *the most*, important problems in American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, and has become international – that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not a sociologist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his fault – either his 'will to independence', his madness or Communism – the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it." A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Communist subversion. They won't get there by going from economic oppression to a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced a few years ago. The United States now has the possibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we alone have this power – on the essential condition that Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two quick questions. The first: Could the United States tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: "What about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito three days ago; and our discussions were most posi-

Mike Madigan
Chron File

January 29, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may recall, in June of last year alleged organized crime leader Sam Giancana was killed. At that time, this Committee had taken steps to contact Mr. Giancana for the purpose of obtaining his testimony on our assassinations inquiry then under way. However, we had not yet succeeded in contacting Mr. Giancana or anyone on his behalf.

Shortly after Mr. Giancana's death, Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff met with Mr. William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, and members of Mr. Lynch's staff to inform them of the Committee's actions taken to contact Mr. Giancana, and its interest with respect to determining whether there was any relationship between the Committee's desire to examine Mr. Giancana and his murder. Mr. Lynch informed Mr. Epstein at that time that there was no indication of any such relationship and assured him that in the event any such indication was discovered, the Committee would be immediately informed.

The Committee has received no further information from the Department about this matter since last June. For the purposes of completing our record on this subject, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Committee whether the Department has received any additional information about this subject since the above-described meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

MM/do

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 30, 1975

Subj: Committee Contact with Sam Giancana

To my knowledge the Committee's first contact with Sam Giancana occurred on June 9, 1974, when Patrick Shea of the Committee staff received a telephone communication from Robert Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, Texas. It is my information from talking to Mr. Shea that Mr. Bennett called the Committee to advise that Sam Giancana was admitted to the Methodist Hospital, which was located at 6515 Bertner Street in Houston, Texas. Mr. Bennett's information was that Giancana was admitted to Room 402 of the Hospital under the care of a Dr. Debakey. Mr. Bennett also advised that Giancana was there for a gall bladder removal operation. I believe, although I am not positive, that Bennett also advised that Giancana was then under surveillance. My recollection at this time is not clear as to whether Bennett advised as to which agency or organization had Giancana under surveillance, but my impression is that it was not the F.B.I.

At about the time of this communication from Bennett, I, as Committee Counsel, had been attempting to locate Mr. Giancana.

I had discussed his possible testimony before the Committee with Chief Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, and Staff Director, William Miller. It is my recollection that we agreed that I should attempt to contact Giancana for the purposes of interviewing him in order to determine whether he would have sufficient information to warrant an appearance before the Committee as a whole. It is my memory that we did decide that he was of sufficient importance to be interviewed by the Staff, i.e., for me to interview him.

During this same period of time, I discussed with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller whether we should consider issuing a subpoena for Mr. Giancana while he was in the hospital. I made this suggestion because of an impression I had that Giancana was difficult to locate. I should add that I see absolutely nothing prejudicial or improper or discourteous in the issuing of a subpoena, but rather regard a subpoena as a valid method of obtaining testimony before a Congressional Committee. In any event, my discussion with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller resulted in a decision to have me contact Mr. Giancana over the telephone and offer him an opportunity to appear before the Committee voluntarily and to have me interview him if he so agreed. If he did not agree, we would then take it before the Committee as to whether a subpoena should be issued for Mr. Giancana. Because of the events that followed we never reached the point of bringing before the Committee the question of whether Giancana should be subpoenaed to testify.

After the initial phone call from Bennett to Shea, I telephoned Bennett on two different occasions. My telephone contact with Bennett was for the purpose of our locating Giancana and a telephone number at which I could reach him. Bennett initially indicated to me, as described earlier in this memorandum, that Giancana was in the hospital. My recollection is that on my second telephone call with Bennett, he informed me that Giancana was now out of the hospital and staying at the Warwick Hotel. Finally, I recall calling the Methodist Hospital in Houston and asking to speak to Mr. Giancana. I recall that the hospital authorities indicated that they had no such person by that name in the hospital. I do not recall the precise date of this telephone communication to the hospital. It is my recollection that the name used by Giancana was Doc Brown. I am uncertain whether Bennett told me Giancana was using "Doc Brown" at both the hospital and the hotel, but I believe he said that the alias was used at the hospital. Bennett advised that Giancana had been visited by several relatives and gave me the names of a couple of persons who he thought were Giancana's sons-in-law. The only name I remember is that of Tisci.

In either the second or possibly a third conversation with Bennett, he told me that Giancana had now checked out of the hotel and was either on his way back to his home in Oak Park, Illinois, or with his daughter in California. He provided me with the telephone number of the daughter in California and suggested I obtain Giancana's home number from the information directory in Illinois.

The telephone conversations with Bennett occurred, to the best of my recollection, during the week of June 16, 1975. It is possible, however, that the first conversation occurred later in the week of June 9. It is my recollection that my second telephone conversation with Bennett occurred on Thursday June 19. In any event, I am certain that I attempted to contact Giancana by telephone on Thursday, June 19. I was unable to get anyone to answer the telephone in California and did not have an opportunity to attempt to obtain the Illinois number. I learned Friday, June 20 that Giancana had been shot and killed in his home in Oak Park, Illinois on the evening of June 19.

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counter-espionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

[illegible]
COUNTY'S WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
EDITION
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion started. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

Related Story Page A5

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Lovien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there.

"The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.

MEMORANDUM

TO: FRITZ AND BILL

FROM: MIKE EPSTEIN

DATE: JUNE 20, 1975

SUBJECT: GIANCANA

I expect that no one will write off the alleged Giancana murder as a "third-rate homicide," and that it will grow and grow and grow. It is clearly the most volatile media issue of the season.

Given the barest outlines of what allegedly happened, and taking them at face value, we have a responsibility to take action under 18 U.S. Code, Section 1505:

> Whoever ... by ... force ... endeavors to ... impede any witness ... in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by ... any committee of either House ... or
>
> Whoever ... by ... force ... obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to ... obstruct, or impede ... the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by ... any committee of either House ...
>
> Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

In short, if Giancana was a "witness" (which status he might have achieved by mere location contacts made by staff) and he was killed to prevent his appearance; or indeed even if he wasn't yet a "witness" but this was a "message" to all witnesses to keep quiet (e.g. Roselli and Maheu), there is a violation of law which we might have the responsibility to investigate.

Beyond what our responsibility is, it seems clear to me that most extreme possibilities of what might actually have happened dictate that we come up with a well-reasoned position and plan -- after careful, deliberate, intensive consideration of all avenues of approach, pitfalls, suspected motives, etc. Most important of all, it seems to me, is our acceptance of the fact that maybe we don't even have anyone on our staff with sufficient experience, sophistication, background, and investigative maturity to deal with this situation.

As a first step, I urge your decision to convene a planning session to decide what the second step will be.

I can't emphasize enough the need for well-thought-out planning here. Who knows where this will lead? And at a minimum, some months from now, Senator Church may be asked, "What did you do the day after you learned that Giancana had been killed?"

My stream of consciousness on kinds of things to consider would include: What our public statement on this should or should not be, security for other witnesses, immediate contact with other key witnesses (to reassure them), secrecy of witness lists and immunity applications, secrecy of place, time and even fact of interview, meetings with Justice organized crime section, Chicago strike force, local law enforcement people in Oak Park and Illinois, obtaining all FBI investigative reports (they're in it per tonight's Star), getting background on all law enforcement officials in Illinois who will be involved (whom do you trust?), is this a diversion which we're being sucked into, how do we avoid that (hire someone just for this), how do we show we care so other witnesses (known or unknown) won't dry up, etc. etc. etc.

NOTE: Mike can be reached after 6:45 tonight at (802) 863-2652.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mike Madigan
FROM: Ed Greissing
DATE: August 13, 1976
SUBJECT: Mention of Carlos Marcello in the 4/23/76 transcript of John Rosselli.

On April 23, 1976 during Mr. Rosselli's appearance before the Schweiker-Hart Subcommittee, we took the opportunity to question him about any information he might possess regarding the New Orleans Mafia Chieftan, Carlos Marcello.

Our interest in Marcello developed from 1) the allegation that Marcello was tangentially involved with both Clay Shaw and David Ferrie; the fact that Marcello was deported by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and that the assassination of President Kennedy was a possible retaliation,

In my telephone conversation with Jim Johnston, 8/13/76, he could think of no other reasons why we questioned Rosselli about Marcello. If you would like to talk to Jim about this matter, his telephone number is 780-6203.

Ref to Troff. as X

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 23, 1975

Subj: Additional Roselli Questions

Inquire when in the discussions between Roselli and the CIA did any suggestion appear with regard to both Che Guevera and Rauol Castro, in addition to the discussions involving Fidel only.

Query whether Roselli has heard the term "ZRRIFLE" --- note Helms to Harvey memorandum of 12 February 1962, giving approval for use of unvouchered funds.

Harvey – after how long Boyd/Page

I.G. Report references first delivery of the pills in early 1961. Second delivery of the pills in early 1962 -- inquire re: Roselli's date recollection.

Jake Esterline had possession of the cigars already treated with poison in March through August 1960 in Florida. Esterline apparently destroyed them before he left in June of 1961 -- Roselli's knowledge of Esterline or the cigars?

Roselli's knowledge of thallium salts operation to put in Castro's shoes when left outside hotel room on trip?

I.G. Report indicates First Phase from August 1960 through April 1961 and Second Phase from April 1962 through February 1963.

ok but no break

Q to R — H

Inspector General's Report states that Maheu was instructed to tell Roselli that Maheu represented businesses (Wall Street) who had interests in Cuba and who wanted to eliminate Castro and were willing to pay $150,000.

Roselli -- Trafficante's gambling interests in Cuba -- interest in killing Castro?

I.G. Report indicates "first meeting" to be 14 September 1960 in New York City, with Maheu, Roselli and O'Connell present.

R

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and that Giancana was to arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba -- meeting for Roselli/Maheu/Giancana meeting in Fountainbleu Hotel in Florida week of 25 September 1960. I. G. Report indicates that Giancana told Maheu that he had a man (Trafficante) to serve as a courier going back and forth between Miami and Cuba.

R

I.G. Report indicates conversation in Roselli's presence wherein Giancana tells Maheu that Giancana is opposed to the use of guns -- no chance of escape?

R

Roselli named inside man in Cuba as Juan Orta -- then in Prime Minister's office in Havana.

I.G. Report indicates Dr. Gunn's notation of delivery of the first batch of pills to be 10 February 1961? Roselli timing?

R vs before Bay of Pigs?
— how far

R

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli's man, Orta, had "easy access" to Castro, and that he was involved in a "rake-off on gambling profits."

I.G. Report has Roselli giving the pills to Trafficante, rather than directly to the Cuban? NO

Did Harvey actually tell Roselli to cut off the project slowly so as to avoid creating hard feelings on the part of the Cubans in the latter part of 1962? NO

R
[illegible]?

I.G. Report in "Second Phase" indicates Roselli telling O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who could take over the job from Orta. Report indicates this man's name is Varona, and that Trafficante probably knew Varona in his efforts to take over gambling once Castro was out.

Does Roselli know Edward Moss and the Cellini's offer of money to Varona to be used against Castro?

I.G. Report indicates that Trafficante told Varona that he (Trafficante) had clients who would pay big money to get rid of Castro -- Roselli's knowledge of this -- time frame March/April 1961 -- figures mentioned from various witnesses are (1) $50,000 (2) $25,000 (3) $10,00 plus $1,000 worth of communications equipment. NOTE: O'Connell's testimony of $50,000 being taken to Florida and put in a safe deposit box to be paid C.O.D. upon accomplishment of Castro mission.

I.G. Report has Harvey taking over in February 1961 but only of the "executive action capability." The Report indicates 15 November 1961 as date Harvey says Bissell told him to include Cuba in ZRRIFLE program, and to take over syndicate connection --- Roselli's knowledge of either of these dates? NOTE: Are ZRRIFLE and Castro assassination plans synonymous?

true w/o problem – date [illegible]

I.G. Report gives 8 and 9 April 1962 in New York City as the meeting place for the first introduction of Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli. NOTE: O'Connell feels that Harvey met Roselli prior to this meeting -- meeting took place at -- Savoy Plaza/Savoy Hilton Hotel where Roselli stayed -- dinner at the Elk Room -- drinks at the Copacabana -- table across from Phyllis MacGuire with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace performing -- seats changed so that Roselli would not be seen by MacGuire -- Roselli's recollection?

R

well after first intro?

June of 1963 Harvey left for Rome.

April 18, 1962 -- Dr. Treichler's records showing delivery of four pills to "OC."

September 1961, last casino in Havana closed.

I.G. Report references Roselli's having a man known as "Maceo" or "Garcia - Gomez" and "Goday". The report describes him as a Cuban who spoke Italian -- Roselli's recollection? -- time frame?

3d man?

[illegible]

The I.G. Report has April 1962 as the time period for the delivery of the rental truck with the rifles, etc. -- Roselli's recollection of what was inside? -- Rifles with telescopic sites for assassination purposes? Communications equipment -- what type? NOTE: Roselli's recollection regarding joint surveillance by Harvey and Shackley in one car and O'Connell and Roselli in another car?

May 1962 I.G. Report indicates that Roselli reports to Harvey that the pills are in Cuba -- references to all calls to Roselli going to the Friars Club and Roselli's calls going to Harvey's home number -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1962 -- I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that Varona had sent a three-man team into Cuba and that the pills were "inside."

September 1962 -- I.G. Report references Roselli meeting Harvey in Miami on 7 and 11 September. Roselli tells Harvey that a second three-man team was sent in by Varona -- a team of militia to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard -- that the first team is already inside and safe? --- Roselli's recollection of facts?

January 1963. I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that "militia team" prepared for take-off -- and that they never did? -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1963. I.G. Report reference last meeting between Roselli and Harvey -- Roselli met by Harvey at Dulles Airport -- Roselli stayed at home of friend of Harvey's -- Harvey's home closed up per overseas trip -- Harvey called by FBI having seen Roselli/Harvey at restaurant -- FBI had Roselli under surveillance -- Roselli's recollection of facts? -- Time period?

I.G. Report indicates that Maheu put in contact with Giancana for tap through Roselli -- Roselli's advance knowledge?

* * *

O'Connell's Testimony

O'Connell's recollection is that Orta's man would not go through with it and that the pills were returned to O'Connell by Roselli. O'Connell's recollection then is that the second plan was a call from Roselli and Maheu indicating the use of a chef. The pills were sent down and again returned when this plot failed.

O'Connell is unclear which of the aforementioned schemes took place before the Bay of Pigs. He indicates, however, the use of Varona to be after the Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell has the first introduction of Roselli and Harvey as being in the Miami airport.

O'Connell's testimony is that he received a call from Maheu who said that Giancana was upset about Phyllis MacGuire seeing

Dan Rowan. Maheu said that he had been requested to place a tap for Giancana and that Giancana might "stop helping" on the assassination plot if this tap was not placed. O'Connell checked with Edwards and received the go-ahead. O'Connell indicates that Maheu was authorized to pay for DuBois out of the month given him on the assassination plan.

O'Connell states that he recalls November 1960 as the time period of the delivery of the pills for Roselli through Trafficante?

O'Connell recollection that "chef" incident after Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell states that Varona's price was $50,000 -- $10,000 worth of communications equipment in addition.

O'Connell introduced by Roselli to Varona as "Mr. Olds."

* * *

Harvey Testimony

Harvey places the fall of 1961 as the time period in which ZRRIFLE was to be applied to Cuba.

Harvey reference to pressure from the Kennedys to topple the Castro regime clandestinely and not by means of any attack. Roselli's hearsay knowledge of this?

Harvey states that he recalls firearms in the truck, possibly "sniper-scope rifles."

Harvey states that as soon as the missile crisis was over, i.e., late 1962, he indicated to Roselli that he wanted the project cut off, although gradually so as not to create hard feelings.

Roselli's knowledge of Greenspun's safe -- break-in in 1971 -- 1967 meeting between Greenspun, Garrison, Roselli, etc.?

I.G. Report reference to "air contamination" in early 1960 efforts -- Roselli hearsay knowledge?

E. B. Williams' knowledge re Maheu/Roselli/Greenspun meetings in 1967?

Roselli knowledge re Angell Luis Castillo (U.S. in 1968) and Jerry Henning (training of Cuban teams)?

Roselli knowledge of explosives along with guns valued at $5,000 -- U-Haul truck delivery -- surveillance by Chief JMWAVE?

Late 1962-Early 1963 -- Roselli knowledge of skin-diving suit implemented with poisons?

##

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing you today on behalf of the Select Committee about the recent death of Samuel Giancana. As you are no doubt aware, his name has been raised in the context of allegations concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's possible involvement in so-called political assassinations.

Based on information available to the Committee, it was obvious that he might be knowledgeable about the political assassination matter. Although Mr. Giancana had not actually been subpoenaed to testify by this Committee, he had been approached by members of the staff for a possible interview. Since this might involve violation of federal statutes pertaining to obstruction of a Congressional Committee investigation, the Select Committee is requesting that you instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep it fully informed of all information coming to the Bureau's attention pertaining to Mr. Giancana's death. In making this request, the Committee is not conceding its right to conduct its own investigation of this matter. However, it is acting in the spirit of cooperation on a question of mutual concern to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.

specify?

?

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. Therefore, we request 24-hour-a-day protection by the United States Marshall Service for the following witnesses which the Committee has subpoenaed, intends to subpoena, has interviewed, or intends to interview:

(Alternative paragraph:

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. We would like to discuss with members of your staff the necessity for special arrangements by the United States Marshall Service to ensure the safety of witnesses who have or might have to contact with the Committee pertaining to these matters.)



THE MAFIA ORGANIZATIO
TAMPA, FLORIDA AREA

NEW YORK

VINCENZO MANGANO
(MISSING SINCE 1951)

ALFONSO DIECIDUE
(DECEASED)
1947

NEW YORK

JOSEPH PROFACI
(DECEASED 1962)

SANTO TRAFFICANTE, SR.
(DECEASED 1954)

ELDER
2 SALVATORE SCAGLIONE
@ "SAM"
A 11 C
B 3,15 D 13

ELDER
3 GAETANO
@ "JOE
FBI # 10633
A
B 2,15

TOP MAN

[redacted]
A C
B D
1

4 FRANK DIECIDUE
FBI # 764739 B
A C 9
B D 2,5

7 ANGELO BEDAMI
FBI # 1849088
A 8,9,19 C
B D 2,9

6 AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA
TAMPA P.D. # 41671
A C 8
B 1,4,5,7 D 10, 18

8 CIRO BEDAMI
FBI # 865273 A
A 7,9,19 C
B 6,9 D 2,11

9 JOE BEDAMI
FBI # 82699 A
A 7,8,19 C 4
B 8 D 2,11

10 PHILIP PIAZZA
FBI # 276875 C

COSTA LONGO
MMY"
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C
D 2,18

18 DOMENICK FURCI
@ "NICK"
FBI # 318519 B
A C
B 6 D 11

15 ANGIELO LO SC
@ "FANO"
FBI # 355475 B
A C 10
B 2,8 D 18

NON MEMBER ASSOCIA

Exhibit No.

N THE

LEGEND

- A INTER-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- B CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- C COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- D CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
  - 2 GAMBLING
  - 3 SHYLOCKING
  - 4 LABOR RACKETEERING
  - 5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
  - 6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
  - 7 COUNTERFEITING
  - 8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
  - 9 BOOTLEGGING
  - 10 BRIBERY
  - 11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
  - 12 TAX EVASION
  - 13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
  - 14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
  - 15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
  - 16 HIJACKING
  - 17 CONTEMPT
  - 18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- 00 CHART REFERENCE NUMBER



SAM CACCIATORE TRAFFICANTE
@"TOTO"
FBI #492471B
A 1 ,13;21 C
B 20, 19 D
12
NICK SCAGLIONE
FBI #2586844
A 17 C 1
B 17 D 2
13
HENRY TRAFFICANTE
FBI # 625515 B
A 1 ,5, 21 C
B 1 9 D 2,10
CENTRAL & EAST
COSTAL AR
STEFANO SCAGLIONE
@"STEVE"
FBI #285845 C
A 2 C 16
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17
ALFONSO SCAGLIONE
@"AL"
FBI #4091276
A 12 C 12
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19
SALVATORE JOE LORENZO
@"SINGING SAM"
FBI #5136887
A 7,8,9 C
B 13, 1 D 2,17,11,12,18
20
JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI #2924250
A C
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SAMUEL CACCIATORE
@"SAM"
A 1 ,5,13 C
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AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATES
HARLAN BLACKBURN
Rudy Mach
Don Mach
Dan Fussel
Buddy Parron
Glen Brechen
Tommy Berry
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
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Vasco Joyner
Mathew Smith
Macon Tribue
Julio Ciphon
Hoy Anderson
Kat Bradshaw
Joe Wheeler
Max Reid
Mary Cardan
Phil Riffe
Cecil Merritt
Clayton Thomas
"Sonny" Brown
George Solomon
Ralph Strawder
Benny White
Wm. Harrell
Elvin Carroll

[illegible]

ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 17, 88TH CONGRESS

PART 2

OCTOBER 10, 11, 15, AND 16, 1963

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Very well. And then Sergeant de la Llana, will you identify yourself, please, sir?

Mr. de la Llana. Jack de la Llana, Tampa Police Department. I have been with the police department for 9 years, and attached to the homicide division for 4 years before starting the criminal intelligence unit of the Tampa Police Department.

The Chairman. Have you had previous police service?

Mr. de la Llana. My first experience was 9 years ago, when I started first with the force.

The Chairman. Chief Brown, do you have a statement, a prepared statement?

Mr. Brown. Yes, I do, Senator.

The Chairman. I have a copy of it before me, and I see it has several pages. Do you wish to read all of it?

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir; I would like to read it to the committee.

The Chairman. Very well, then, you may proceed.

Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Neil G. Brown, chief of the Police Department of the city of Tampa, Fla.

I have been a member of the Tampa Police Department for the past 16 years, and I have been chief of the department for the past 4 years. Prior to my appointment as chief, I served as inspector of detectives. I am a graduate of the National Police Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a member of the Tampa Bay Area Chiefs of Police Association and of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

With me here today is Sgt. Jack de la Llana who, at my direction, formed our department's first criminal intelligence unit in February of 1962, and has been its director since that time. Sergeant de la Llana also holds the important post of chairman of the Florida Intelligence Unit, a statewide agency which coordinates information amongst intelligence units in cities throughout the State of Florida.

In addition to Sergeant de la Llana, whose diligent work and knowledge of criminal operations has provided much of the foundation for my statement to you, I feel fortunate in being accompanied also by Sgt. William Branch of the intelligence division of the Orlando Police Department. Sergeant Branch is presently attending the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been a member of the Orlando Police Department since 1951, and a detective sergeant since 1956. He is particularly familiar with organized gambling operations in the central Florida area, and I believe his presentation of that situation will be of material value to this inquiry.

I feel privileged to be able to testify before you today. I believe that the facts I can present here about organized crime operations in Tampa will help you and the American public realize the seriousness of this problem, and our Nation's emergent need for further Federal legislation to combat an evil that has clearly expanded beyond the powers of municipal law enforcement to contain, suppress and eliminate it.

Tampa has a large and respected Italian population, who are considered in all respects to be an asset to our community. Unfortunately, a small percentage of this group of citizens have achieved

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a notoriety greatly disproportionate to their numbers, because of their continuous activity in criminal and racketeering enterprises. The people of our city refer to this group as "the Sicilian underworld" or "the Mafia."

Our growing concern with this criminal group was crystallized in 1956 when a Hillsborough County grand jury was empaneled in Tampa to investigate and determine the truth of allegations that the Mafia was then operating in Tampa. The pertinent part of that grand jury's report stated:

> * * * there are some individuals who believe that a Mafia or Black Hand exists and operates in this community, but they are in the minority. * * * The evidence presented, the volume of written material examined, and witnesses interviews point to the existence in this community of an organized crime element whose methods of operation are similar to the pattern of the Sicilian Mafia as we understand it. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, let me ask you, prior to this development before the grand jury, before the grand jury made this finding, were you the law enforcement officials or in the police department?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you suspicious that such an organization existed in your city?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes; law enforcement has been aware that this has been there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was something, you felt confident, but you were unable to bring it out in concrete proof; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had been trying to combat it without being able to get it out in the open?

Mr. BROWN. That is exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. BROWN (reading):

> * * * our records indicate that the vast majority of our unsolved crimes stem from underworld activity involving persons of Sicilian or Italian ancestry * * *

The CHAIRMAN. We had some startling information here the other day from the Chicago chief of police with respect to some 976 murders, gangland style, that had been committed over a period of years, and only 2 of them had been solved. That is, officially solved by court determination or court action.

Mr. BROWN. That is typical.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ratio in your community, if you can give us some idea about it?

Mr. BROWN. I will bring that out in my statement, but it is just like Chicago.

The CHAIRMAN. Something along that line?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck me as one of the most frightening developments of information that I have heard regarding crime. I just couldn't believe that 976 murders, and apparently just murder in the first-degree fashion, could be committed in an area like Metropolitan Chicago over a period of years, and only 2 of them could be solved. It thoroughly demonstrates to me the great menace and the danger of organized mobs committing crime.

You say: "Well, they probably killed each other pretty much." That may be true, but they kill each other because of the extortionate operations that they are engaged in, to the detriment of the public at large, and to the detriment of innocent people who can't help themselves. It focuses and emphasizes how serious this menace is.

Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Notwithstanding these findings, the grand jury concluded that there was no national or local Mafia in Tampa. I would like to submit as exhibit 1 a certified copy of the report of the grand jury dated March 30, 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, this report of the grand jury will be received and it may be made exhibit No. 44, and exhibit 1 to this witness' testimony.

I may later direct it be printed, but as of now we will just let it be filed as an exhibit for reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BROWN. It seems likely to me that the grand jury failed to acknowledge without qualification the presence of the Mafia in Tampa because it sought a pattern of Mafia operations similar to the historical Sicilian tradition of primitive and direct extortion, rather than the sophisticated and polished control of rackets that now characterize that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it from that last statement that you feel that they have considerably improved their technique.

Mr. BROWN. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Of crime operations.

Mr. BROWN. Very much.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question, Chief, there?

As I understand what you have just testified relative to the grand jury's report, they acknowledged that there was some evidence of the existence of Sicilian Mafia in the community, but apparently felt that evidence was not conclusive; is that a correct summary?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, Senator. The Tampa Police Department, however, has long been aware that many criminals in our area have local reputations as Mafiosi. My staff and I have made a careful evaluation of those reputations, based upon personal knowledge, criminal records, surveillance reports, personal histories, familial relationships, statistical analyses, reports from confidential informants, information from Federal and local law-enforcement agencies, and other customary police intelligence sources.

It is our considered conclusion that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that it controls most illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and that its members have interstate and international ties to other Mafia groups.

The organization of the Mafia in the Tampa area is best understood from a chart we have formulated which I submit to this subcommittee as our exhibit No. 2.

Senator MUSKIE. Before we get to that, Chief, may I ask another question? The grand jury to which you referred sat in 1956, am I correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. That is 7 years ago. Do you think you have accumulated additional evidence as to the existence of the Mafia in Tampa which would justify a new reference to the grand jury?

Mr. BROWN. Yes; I believe so.



Senator MUSKIE. Are you planning that?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This chart may be received as exhibit No. 45 and we will direct it be printed in the record if it can be, as far as it can be. The title of it is "The Mafia Organization in the Tampa, Fla., Area."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" for reference and faces this page.)

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the operations of this organized group are not confined just to the city limits of Tampa, but they are in the area?

Mr. BROWN. By all means; the entire area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This chart is now a part of the record and, if you wish to comment about it, we will proceed with your statement.

Mr. BROWN. The chart is keyed to show only the criminal, business, and familial interrelationships and activities of the persons named, although other criteria figured in our categorization of these persons. Of course, this chart cannot be considered as a definitive "table of organization" of the Tampa Mafia, because it is but a simplified representation of an organization that is in a constant state of flux, and about which we know we still have many things to learn.

However, I believe it is completely accurate in showing that Santo Trafficante is the boss of this criminal group. Indeed, it is to Santo Trafficante that Tampa owes the dubious distinction of having been represented at the notorious crime convention at Apalachin, N.Y., in November 1957.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you designate or refer to this group as the Mafia. Would you say that it is the same group that has been referred to by the famous witness, Joe Valachi?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he calls it Cosa Nostra or the Mafia makes no difference. This is the organized crime group to which you referred?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Senator; this is the group.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question there?

Under this group, there is another group which you describe as nonmember associates and employees. Is that intended to suggest that the people who are so described know nothing about the identity of their employers and the organization of which they are a part?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, that is a part of the insulation of the group. They have many employees, and as we go into the statement, to show how in this gambling operation the seller is non-Sicilian in most cases, and he reports to another member up the ladder, and so on up. Many of these people are nonmembers of the Mafia as it is.

Senator MUSKIE. Do they know they are engaged in criminal activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. They know they are a part of a criminal organization?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. But they are not members?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What do they need to do to become members in the Tampa area?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think I can clarify that later on in the statement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born in Tampa on November 14, 1914. He was one of five brothers. He maintains residence today in Tampa and in Miami. He previously lived in Havana, Cuba, where he owned and operated gambling casinos under the Battista regime. When Fidel Castro took over, Trafficante's gambling operations were stopped. He was expelled from Cuba and returned to the United States. He inherited the control of the numbers racket in central Florida which his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., who died in 1954, and he continues to head this operation.

Testimony in the 1958 hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field identified Santo Trafficante, Jr., in the operation of the Sans Souci gambling casino in Havana. That testimony stated that Trafficante took over the Sans Souci from the Mannarino brothers in Pittsburgh, Pa. Gabriel Mannarino was a fellow delegate with Santo Trafficante, Jr., to the Apalachin crime convention in 1957.

Additional testimony named Trafficante, Jr., as the key figure in the Mafia in Tampa, stating, as the Tampa police had long known, that he succeeded his father as the major racketeer in the city.

Other information substantiated by our files reveals that Trafficante is an associate of such notorious criminals as Meyer Lansky, Joseph Bonanno, Sam Giancana, Aniello Dellacroce, Joseph Stassi, Sam Mannarino, Joseph Arcuri, and of Joseph Riccobono, also known as Staten Island Joe, who had been closely allied with the elder Trafficante, and was also discovered at the Apalachin meeting.

When Joseph Profaci's daughter Carmella married Anthony Tocco, son of Detroit mobster William "Black Bill" Tocco, in Brooklyn on June 4, 1955, one of the guests at the reception in the Hotel Commodore in New York was Santo Trafficante, Jr. Among those who also attended were 13 other persons who later attended the Apalachin conference, as well as other notorious Mafia figures, such as Frank Livorsi, Thomas and John Dioguardi, Tony and Albert Anastasia, and Thomas "Three Finger Brown" Lucchese.

There have been at least two known attempts on the life of Santo Trafficante: On January 2, 1953, he was shotgunned in a car on the streets of Tampa, receiving wounds in the arm. Later, in Cuba, four American mobsters who intended to kill Trafficante were told by Cuban police that they would have to do it on American soil.

Trafficante has been arrested in Tampa several times for investigation, because of our knowledge that he was deeply involved in gambling, even though we have not yet been able to obtain the quantum of proof necessary to a successful prosecution. He has also been picked up by the police for questioning about the gangland slayings of Rene Nunez, Angelo Giglio, and Joe Antinori.

Trafficante was a suspect in the Albert Anastasia murder on October 25, 1957, in New York because he had appeared in New York just before the murder. He was considered a likely suspect because there had been reports that Anastasia was then attempting to move

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in on Trafficante's gambling operations in Cuba. Trafficante, using the alias "B. Hill," stayed with Anastasia in the latter's hotel suite, on the night of October 24, 1957, and moved out approximately 1 hour after Anastasia's murder in a nearby barber shop.

The Department's evaluation of Trafficante as the boss of the Mafia organization in Tampa was confirmed, of course, by the positive identification of the "Louis Santos of Havana, Cuba," apprehended at the Apalachin conference in November of 1957, as Santo Trafficante, Jr., of Tampa, Fla.

Furthermore, we have witnessed and documented many visits of out-of-town racketeers with Santo Trafficante and his fellow hoodlums of the Tampa area. These visitors give further indications that Trafficante is associated with Mafia members in other cities. For example, Louis Coticchia of Chicago, also known as Lou Brady, has been frequently seen visiting Trafficante and on one occasion they were seen boarding a plane together, heading for Miami.

Other known outside racketeers who have visited in Tampa with Trafficante gang members are John Joseph Vitale, Salvatore Lopiccolo, and Anthony Giardano, all known racketeers from St. Louis, Mo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I think at the present time, in interest of continuity, so that the record will read properly, Sergeant de la Llana has a statement with regard to a courier operation within the Mafia. In the interest of time, I am not going to ask him to read it, but I would like to have it introduced in the record.

Do you have that?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, I do.

Mr. O'DONNELL. How many pages does it consist of?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is five pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Give a better description of it and tell us what it is.

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is with reference to Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, and his visits to Tampa on various occasions, which first came to our attention on April 13, 1962. This subject has a long criminal record. I have an FBI record which I will also submit into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the FBI record be received and made exhibit No. 46 for reference.

(Document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 46" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement, is that a summary statement that you have made and prepared for the record?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received and printed in the record, either at this point or immediately following the prepared statement of the witness now testifying.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF SGT. JACK DE LA LLANA

One of the clear ties of the Trafficante organization with other criminal groups is reflected by the contacts with Trafficante made by a man who appears to act as a courier for the Mafia. Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, FBI No. 1427493, first came to the attention of our Department on April 13, 1962, when we observed him, in Tampa, in the company of Augustine Primo Lazzara and Frank Diecidue, two of the men on our Mafia chart. Because of this and other contacts made by Coticchia, our intelligent unit developed the following information about him which I think is of interest to this committee in giving a profile of a hoodlum who is entrusted by the Mafia to act as a courier for them between the various groups.

Coticchia was born on February 25, 1920, in Cincinnati, Ohio. When he was arrested a couple of years ago, he gave as his occupation "industrial financier." He is presently reported to be interested in the operation of a company offering wired music in the Chicago area known as Symphonaire Sound Systems, Inc.

His criminal record shows that he was first arrested in 1936 in Ohio for robbery. In 1937 he was arrested in Miami, Fla., for investigation of a "shakedown." He was held for 4 days and released without charges. He was arrested again in Hot Springs, Ark., in 1938 for investigation and released with the understanding that he would leave the city.

In 1938, in Cleveland, Coticchia was arrested and charged with assault with intent to commit rape. He was convicted and received 1 to 15 years, of which he served 4 years, being released in 1941. He was arrested in 1942 in Los Angeles, Calif., on a warrant issued in Baltimore for grand theft. He was tried in Baltimore for receiving stolen goods and received 5 years in prison.

Coticchia was again arrested in Dallas, Tex., in 1961, by the U.S. marshals for violation of and for conspiring to violate the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, which case is still pending in the Southern District Court of New York. His last arrest known to us was on January 4, 1963, when he was arrested in Tampa for investigation of grand larceny. He was released due to insufficient evidence.

Coticchia worked as a "pit boss" in gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nev., and Havana, Cuba. He was involved in a scandal in 1960 in which mobsters attempted to take over a nationwide bail bond business.

Coticchia has been in and out of Tampa since our first observation of him and on every occasion he is in direct contact with Trafficante and Diecidue. On December 31, 1962, he purchased a new automobile in Tampa, paying the dealer $3,625.95 in cash. He then registered the car under the name of Jane Campbell. He remained in Tampa several days and was in constant contact with Trafficante and Diecidue.

On January 4, 1963, Coticchia was arrested in Tampa on suspicion of grand larceny and at the time of his arrest he had $1,775 in cash on his person. He had papers on him that showed he had resided previously at the Aloha Motel in Miami under the name Luiz Paulino Bailey from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He also had a paper with a list of gambling equipment and the name "Empress Lines, Ltd., Nassau—via *Wappen Von Hamburg*—German boat loading pier No. 3."

An investigation revealed this equipment had been shipped airfreight from Las Vegas to Nassau and placed in a German vessel, the *Wappen Von Hamburg*, which sails between Nassau and Miami. This equipment included 50 one-arm bandits, or slot machines, and was valued in excess of $65,000. The information received was that this vessel was to travel between Miami and Nassau as a floating gambling casino.

After Coticchia's arrest in Tampa, the telephone calls were checked at the motel. It showed that he had made several calls to Trafficante, Diecidue, and other associates of Trafficante. He had also made a long-distance call to Sonny's Restaurant in Miami Beach, which is owned by Thomas Altamura, FBI No. 511563, a Mafia member and another associate of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

I would like to submit for the record Coticchia's FBI record, and a photograph of him taken by my department when he was arrested in Tampa on January 4, 1963.

Another example of the Trafficante group's connections with Mafia figures in other parts of the Nation is: John Joseph Vitale, FBI No. 793259, of St. Louis, Mo. Vitale is well known to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and is reputed to be the Mafia leader in that area. He has a record of 13 arrests and a conviction for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act for which he received a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment. He has been arrested as a fence and is believed to deal in anything in which there is a large percentage of profit.

Police authorities consider him among the most dangerous of Mafia principals in the St. Louis area, and he is known to have underworld connections throughout the country. He appeared twice before the Senate Rackets Committee (August 19, 1958, and February 11, 1959) and each time refused to answer any questions, invoking the fifth amendment.

On April 17, 1963, Vitale flew from St. Louis to Tampa, using the name "Jack Howard." He visited the Diecidues for 4 hours and then flew back to St. Louis

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using the same alias. We alerted the St. Louis police and upon Vitale's arrival there, he was interviewed by detectives of that city. He declared that he had traveled to Tampa to settle a debt of the Lombardo Produce Co., of St. Louis, Mo., to the Diecidue Bros. of Tampa.

To me it does not seem probable that Vitale would go to the expense and trouble of flying to Tampa and returning the same day in order to settle a debt between two produce companies with which he has no known connections. More significantly, his use of an alias to run this errand, too, points out his own doubts that he was engaged in a legitimate errand.

These two examples, Coticchia's and Vitale's, indicate to us the interstate connections of the Trafficante organization, and point up the need for attacking the Mafia group on a national basis.

Mr. O'DONNELL. All right, we will continue.

Mr. BROWN. Some of Trafficante's men shown here on our chart gave sworn testimony before the Hillsborough County solicitor in 1953 concerning gambling in Tampa. They admitted that they had long been engaged in illegal gambling activities. They were forced to testify or face jail terms for contempt of court, because they had been granted immunity from prosecution for such crimes. Among those who testified were Frank Diecidue, Augustine Primo Lazzara, Nick Scaglione, Henry Trafficante, and James C. Longo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Are any of these individuals on the chart that you have introduced as exhibit 2?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, they are all on the chart.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante has himself been caught up in a typical Mafia technique of seeking to preserve and protect its illegal enterprises by the corruption of law enforcement and other public officials. This incident substantiated our intelligence that Trafficante was deeply involved in gambling operations, and it showed that he had major interests in gambling outside the city of Tampa.

The case was initiated in 1954 by a veteran St. Petersburg police officer, Detective Sgt. Harry Dietrich, who had obtained evidence of the operation of the Trafficante bolita ring. Bolita is a numbers racket of considerable importance in Florida, involving weekly payoffs based upon information taken from radio reports of the weekly Cuban lottery.

An attempt was made to bribe Sergeant Dietrich to ignore the operation of the ring. He was given a new car, a television set, some suits of clothing, and cash. Sergeant Dietrich accepted the bribes with the full knowledge and orders of his superiors, to whom he had immediately reported the initial bribery attempt.

As a result of his work, Santo Trafficante and his brother Henry were arrested. Both were charged with bribery and were convicted.

convicted

The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?

Mr. BROWN. This was in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same man that is now operating, and he is the boss?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

criminal rec. ?

Each received a prison sentence of 5 years. Santo Trafficante's conviction was later reversed in a higher court. His brother served his term and was recently released. Both brothers were subsequently indicted by the Federal Government for tax law violations.

We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property, real or personal. His house, automobile, and all his other possessions are held in the names of others. However, we do not believe him to be destitute, for his control of gambling in the central Florida area alone must net him huge amounts of money. His operations there show, also, a characteristic Mafia method of utilizing non-Sicilian associates where it serves its criminal objectives.

Sergeant Branch, who has for the past 7 years been investigating gambling and other organized criminal activities in the Orlando area, will describe the Mafia's control, through the Harlan Blackburn organization, of lottery operations in central Florida. We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Branch is here with you?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

On the lower right-hand side of our chart we have depicted that group of Trafficante associates.

Sergeant Branch will here testify about the Blackburn group.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRANCH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BRANCH

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. BRANCH. I am a sergeant with the Orlando Police Department attached to the intelligence division, and I have been with them since 1951. I have been working in this type of work since 1956, with the cooperation of the Federal and State agencies in our area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It appears to be four or five pages. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

In the central Florida area the main gambling activity is known as bolita or Cuba. Bolita is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn daily. Cuba is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn weekly. Bettors can place bets on any number from 1 to 100 and receive a 60-to-1 return if they win. The Cuba winning number is the last two digits from the Cuban national lottery number which is five digits and is broadcast over a Havana radio station each Saturday shortly after 2 p.m.

The public is contacted by "peddlers" or "sellers," who receive a commission of 15 percent of their sales. "Pickup" men, who take the bets from the sellers to the "checkup houses," receive 20 percent of what they collect. Employees such as checkup men, adding machine operators, and supervisors above this position usually receive salaries for their duties.

Lottery operations in central Florida prior to 1948 were dominated first by Charlie Wall of Tampa and then by Sam Warren, an Orlando native. In that year Harlan Blackburn, FBI No. 1026922, a convicted felon, came into Orlando and began taking over bolita and Cuba gambling.

This man is on the chart also.

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Blackburn was born in Sand Lake, Fla., on April 13, 1919. In 1935, he was convicted of forging a U.S. Government check, for which he served 4½ years in prison. In 1943, he was sentenced to 2 years in the Florida State prison for cattle theft. He was again arrested in March 1956 for operating a lottery in Polk County, Fla., and received a 5-year prison sentence, but was released in 1959.

Senator MUSKIE. Did you say Mr. Blackburn was on the chart?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir. He is listed in the lower right-hand corner.

Senator MUSKIE. It is not on this chart?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; not on that one.

Senator MUSKIE. Blackburn is not a member of the Mafia, as such?

Mr. BRANCH. He is a subordinate that works under their direction; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he the same as Sam Warren?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; he is not. Sam Warren is dead.

He was then incarcerated for 60 days in Polk County for an earlier conviction of conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of Florida. He was most recently arrested on November 5, 1962, for failure to buy a Federal wagering tax stamp. He is presently out on bail awaiting trial.

Blackburn supervises the five lottery bankers who control central Florida gambling. These bankers are Rudy Mach, Joe Wheeler, Clyde F. Lee, Cecil Merritt, and Ralph Strawder. Mach has in his operation Don Mach, Dan Fussell, Buddy Parron, Glen Brechen, Tommy Berry, and Clifford Bell; Joe Wheeler has Max Reid, Mary Carden, and Phil Riffe; Clyde F. Lee has Jesse Joyner, Vasco Joyner, Mathew Smith, Macon Tribue, Julia Ciphon, Hoy Anderson, and Katherine Bradshaw; Cecil Merritt has Clayton Thomas, Sonny Brown, and George Solomon; and Ralph Strawder has Benny White, William Harrell, and Elvin Carroll.

With the exception of Carden, Riffe, Harrell, White, and Ciphon, all of these persons have criminal records and arrests for gambling and other crimes.

I have here copies of their FBI records and submit them for the subcommittee's record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be received in bulk as exhibit No. 47 for reference only.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BRANCH. These five exceptions have been connected with this operation for a number of years, however, and their names and amounts of gross and net collections appear in much of the evidence that we have secured from checkup houses. We have also sworn testimony from witnesses that these persons have been engaged in illegal gambling.

Senator MUSKIE. What is the size of their take?

Mr. BRANCH. I have that further along in my statement, sir.

The lottery operation of the Blackburn group extends from Orange County into all of central Florida and into the southern State of Georgia.

From 1948 until the latter part of 1953, our department established that Santo Trafficante, Jr., and his brother, Henry, personally were visiting Orlando and supervising the checkup houses that were conducting the lottery.

It has also been obvious to us that the Trafficante organization has controlled the Blackburn operation for at least the last 10 years. From our examination of seized records, and from the fact that in all raids on the checkup houses we have arrested persons having close family ties with the Trafficante organization who were acting as auditors for his interests. In addition, there has been heavy telephone toll traffic between the Trafficantes in Tampa and the Blackburn group in Orlando.

When Blackburn was arrested in 1953, a memorandum was found containing telephone numbers of Augustine Primo Lazzara, Salvatore J. Lorenzo, J. M. Cacciatore—uncle of Santo Trafficante, Jr.—and Santo Trafficante, Jr., and of the Nebraska and Flamingo Bars, both owned by the Trafficante family.

In 1957 a search of a gambling house in Orange County by a State officer, with the assistance of the Orlando Police, resulted in the arrest of several persons. One of these was Lorenzo and another person by the name of Leto, from Tampa. They both gave sworn statements at that time to the county solicitor that they were working for Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In November 1961, another raid was conducted by agents of the Internal Revenue Service in conjunction with the Orlando Police Department on a house in Orange County. There were six persons arrested, and among those were Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore. These two were cousins of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In July 1963, a raid on a gambling house in Sanford, Fla., by the IRS agents, with the assistance of the Orlando Police Department, established that it was another operation of Harlan Blackburn's, supervised by Clyde Lee. In the records seized there was the phone number of Trafficante's cousin, John Favata Cacciatore, and the phone number of the printing establishment employing Stefano Scaglione, who is also on the chart.

During the past 12 years that we know of at least three murders that have been due to fights for control of lottery operations in the Orlando area.

The fantastic amount of money taken in by these lottery operations has been repeatedly established by our raids of these gambling houses. For example, the raid in 1957 in Orange County, where Frank Ferreri and Sam Lorenzo were arrested, disclosed that the house was doing a gross business of $100,000 per week.

Senator MUSKIE. What were they paying out?

Mr. BRANCH. The profit on this operation runs about 50 percent. The November 1961 raid in Orange County where Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore, cousins of Santo Trafficante, were arrested revealed that operation was doing a conservatively estimated gross of $160,000 per week.

The CHAIRMAN. With the same ratio of half applying there?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. When you say "net profit," this means after deductions of the commission which totaled 35 percent?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. And the prizes.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

The commission and also the prizes and what other operating expenses they may have such as automobiles, rent, telephone bills.

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The latest raid, in July of this year, indicated a gross revenue of $250,000 per week.

From those figures——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that raid?

Mr. BRANCH. That was in Sanford, Fla., just 17 miles north of Orlando. These figures are established by the Internal Revenue agents and auditors.

From these figures, it is easy to see why the Mafia has moved so heavily into lottery gambling in central Florida and why gambling revenues are universally acknowledged to be the "lifeblood" of organized crime.

Any additional legislation that this subcommittee can promote to further restrict and inhibit gambling will, in our opinion, be a substantial blow to organized crime.

Senator MUSKIE. Did they actually pay off on those lotteries or was it dishonest in that respect, too?

Mr. BRANCH. Usually they pay off.

They don't pay off when we pull a raid on them or arrest them. They stop at that. But they are in operation the next week.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not pay off for that day?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; they don't.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unfortunate for the fellow that won, who cannot get his winnings.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If the law enforcement is pretty vigilant, I would be afraid to place a bet under those circumstances.

All right, Chief, if you will, you may proceed.

Stand by, Sergeant, as we may want to ask you some questions.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF NEIL G. BROWN—Resumed

Mr. BROWN. To understand the crime network Trafficante operates it is necessary to examine the modern era of crime in Tampa, which dates from the early 1920's. Its most violent episodes were between 1937 and 1945, when the Sicilian underworld was attempting to move in on all illegal gambling in Tampa. This period in the history of our city was referred to as "the era of blood."

Senator MUSKIE. Who coined that phrase, the gang or the newspapers?

Mr. BROWN. I think it was the newspapers, Senator.

During the 1920's, before the Sicilian underworld moved into the rackets to any great extent, one of our most notorious residents, Charles M. Wall, started his rise to become the acknowledged boss of most of the illegal gambling in the Tampa and central area of the State of Florida. He styled himself "dean of the underworld," and in 1953 he admitted to a Hillsborough County solicitor that he had made his living from illegal gambling. During 1945, Wall forfeited his leadership by entering into a partnership with Santo Trafficante, Sr.

The elder Trafficante was born in Sicily in 1886. He came to Tampa in 1904 and became a naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1950, he was one of the missing witnesses in the Kefauver crime hearings held in Tampa. He died on August 11, 1954. Police records do not show any arrest for Santo Trafficante, Sr.

In 1952, Wall declared that he was retiring, although he did not state what he was retiring from. In April 1955, Wall's body was found in his home. He had been brutally beaten and his throat had been slashed. We have never discovered who the murderers were, nor have we determined their motive. Perhaps Wall was murdered because the killers learned he had admitted that he was Trafficante's partner in illegal gambling, and that he disclosed confidential facts about the Mafia.

In 1960, Sergeant de la Llana obtained—from a confidential source of known reliability—an astounding report about the Mafia and its operation in Tampa. The report had been obtained from Charles Wall in 1945, approximately 6 months after Trafficante, Senior, had made himself a partner in Walls' gambling enterprises.

Wall declared that from 1920 through 1945 he controlled gambling in Tampa and in the Florida counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Polk, and Orange. His rival for control of the gambling rackets was the local Mafia organization. This was headed, he said, by Santo Trafficante, Sr., the Diecidue brothers, James Lumia, Ignacio Antinori and Salvatore Italiano. Antinori was murdered on October 22, 1940; Lumia was murdered on June 5, 1950; and Italiano fled to Mexico in 1951.

Wall admitted that he had good reasons for going along with Trafficante, Senior, in 1945; previously the Mafia group had made three attempts on his life: the first was in 1937 as Wall was leaving a bank on the main street in Tampa; the second try occurred as Wall was leaving the garage behind his house; the third, in 1940, happened a few blocks from his house. In the third attempt, a truck passed the automobile in which Wall was riding and then stopped abruptly in front of the car. James DeSimone and Nicola Impostato, FBI No. 2716692, each armed with a shotgun, stepped from the truck and fired at Wall and his chauffeur. Both escaped with slight injuries. DeSimone and Impostato were known Mafia killers from Kansas City, Mo. They were staying with the Antinori family at the time.

The Chairman. Is Wall still living?

Mr. Brown. No, sir; he was killed.

The Chairman. Later killed?

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. These three attempts failed but later he was killed?

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

Wall declared that the Mafia tried to make the public believe that the organization no longer existed in this country and that Mafia members pointed to the end of terrorism among Italian groups as evidence that the Mafia was gone from the underworld scene. Wall believed, however, that the organization had merely changed its type of operation. He said that other racketeers had once used the Mafia to monopolize rackets in major American cities. They had educated the Mafia so well in the process that the Sicilians had taken over the rackets themselves. Wall stated that the Mafia learned to consider extortion from Italian businessmen a "nickel-and-dime" business. They had discovered that public officials could be corrupted by bribery and that they could organize to take over the major rackets in the United States.

Wall declared that the Mafia was not dying out, but "was bigger and better than ever." He said that his partner, the elder Trafficante, had told him that there were some 10,000 active Mafia members in the United States. Wall stated that the Mafia leader in Tampa was

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Santo Trafficante, Sr., and that he was well informed on the activities of the organization in the United States, in Sicily, and in other countries of the world. Trafficante had told him, Wall said, that the Mafia in the United States was directed by a local board in every city having a sizable Sicilian population. There was a national board, headed by Joseph Profaci in New York City, which was composed of the heads of the major local boards. Trafficante is reported to have said that Frank Costello, Vincent Mangano, and Joe Massie were influential members of the national board, and that Frank Nitti and Lucky Luciano were former members.

According to Wall's account, the Mafia was composed of two distinct groups, an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The general rule was that only natives of Sicily were admitted to the "inner circle," while American-born Italians were recruited into the "outer circle." Wall was told it was possible for a member to be transferred from "outer" to "inner" status when he performed an act of special merit, even though he had been born in the United States. The restrictions were not due to lack of trust by native Italians toward those of American birth, but because the "inner circle" usually took the major part of the proceeds of the Mafia's illegal activities and, therefore, preferred to keep the membership of the "inner circle" as small as possible.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you say that this chart represents the inner circle, Chief?

Mr. BROWN. At the very top portion, Senator, would be the inner circle.

Below that——

Senator MUSKIE. By the "top portion," do you mean——

Mr. BROWN. I would include in that that the three top men would be in the inner circle and those below that would be in the outer circle.

The CHAIRMAN. Those would only be in the inner circle so far as the Tampa area is concerned?

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the inner circle overall?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; this is just in the inner circle in the Tampa area.

The CHAIRMAN. But that gives an indication of how the overall organization is set up.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have it in here, but I may have missed it, but who was Wall talking to when he gave all this information?

Mr. BROWN. That was a confidential informant.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Very well.

(At this point Senator Javits entered the hearing room.)

Mr. BROWN. Wall believed the influential Mafia members in Tampa from 1930 through 1945 were: Santo Trafficante, Sr., Salvatore Italiano, James Lumia, and the Diecidue family—Alfonso, Antonio, Thomas, and Frank. The Diecidues and their in-laws opposed the leadership of Trafficante in the Tampa organization. Trafficante told Wall that Vincent Mangano, of the national board, supported the Diecidues but that he, Trafficante, was able to stay in power because he had Joseph Profaci's friendship.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question here?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. You refer to the national board. I do not recall any point in this hearing where there was this kind of a direct reference to a national organization in the Mafia. Was it referred to as such?

Mr. BROWN. This is the information as Wall has reported that it consisted of a national board.

Senator MUSKIE. Do you know who he identified as members of the national board?

Mr. BROWN. Well, Joe Profaci and Vincent Mangano were two of the members of the national board.

The CHAIRMAN. They are shown to be leaders of families, both of them.

Senator MUSKIE. But those same people are leaders of families in New York as testified by Valachi.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is your impression that the heads of the New York families made up a national board that had jurisdiction over Tampa, among other places?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, sir.

Wall declared that there were approximately 40 members of the Mafia living in the Tampa area and he believed that Trafficante's share of proceeds of their gambling operation was being divided with other members of the Mafia.

Information in our files from another confidential source confirms Wall's statement. In addition it reveals that Antonio Diecidue made annual trips to Miami for the purpose of renting a house for Vincent Mangano, who came down from New York every year to spend 2 or 3 months in Miami. This source stated that many important members of the Mafia visited Mangano in Florida, but that Trafficante never appeared.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask another question on the national board? Was it your impression that the national board members shared in the proceeds of the criminal activities in Tampa?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; they had a percentage.

Senator MUSKIE. Have you any idea what that percentage was?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; I have no idea.

The gray shadings on our chart depict the influence of each of these men. To me, it appears to be no small coincidence that in Tampa the Diecidue family lost stature from at least the early 1950's when Vincent Mangano disappeared; nor that Trafficante, Jr., the Profaci man, was in the immediate vicinity, when Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957.

Sergeant de la Llana's intelligence unit has prepared summaries of the men in Trafficante's organization, along with a commentary of relevant facts about each of them. So that our information may be available not only to the subcommittee, but to all police units to whom your reports are so valuable, I wish to submit these summaries and commentary for the record, as our exhibit 3a through t; and exhibit 4.

The CHAIRMAN. The summary to which you have referred may be received as exhibit 48——

Mr. O'DONNELL. Chief, as I understand it, these are summations, very brief summations, of the 19 individuals that are on the chart insofar as their criminal activity, their mode of business, their criminal history, et cetera; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 48.

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(The documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 48" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You make reference to another exhibit. What is it?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you explain the other exhibit? Go into a little detail as to the various murders that you have on your exhibit 4, which will be a different exhibit in our hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair get this straight first.

The summary that he referred to has been made exhibit 48.

That is what you referred to as "our exhibit 3a"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say "through t; and exhibit 4." What is exhibit 4, your exhibit 4?

Mr. BROWN. Exhibit 4 is a brief summation on each of the subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your exhibit 3?

Mr. BROWN. They are arrest records of each of the individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Exhibit 48 is the arrest records.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your exhibit 4 is a brief summary of each person on the chart?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of his records and activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 49 for reference.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 49" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now the record is straight.

You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Our department has always found it a most difficult task to obtain evidence sufficient for successful prosecution of Mafia members, because the witnesses who might offer such evidence have always been reluctant to do so. The paramount reason, of course, is their fear of Mafia reprisals, since it is common knowledge in Tampa that the Mafia does not hesitate to use murder for such reprisals and the relative infrequency with which such professional murders are successfully prosecuted.

We have categorized certain homicides in the Tampa area, from 1928 to the present, as "gangland slayings." An examination of the circumstances of some of these murders emphasizes how the Mafia uses murder to discipline its membership, to revenge itself against violators of its code and to otherwise eliminate opposition to its criminal activities and goals. Of the 23 homicides on the list, only 1 has been solved. A ratio of less than 5 percent of solution—and that particular murder was cleared up because it apparently resulted from an argument, although it is possible that the slayer deliberately provoked the argument. It was not, therefore, a typical gangland slaying, although the killer and the victim were both underworld figures.

In startling contrast to the number of unsolved gangland slayings, an examination of all other Tampa homicides from 1958 through 1962 shows that we have had 145 murders and that only 4 are presently unsolved, a solution ratio of better than 97 percent. From 1960 through 1962, all 83 homicides in our city were solved.

The CHAIRMAN. What period is covered by the 23 gangland slayings that you make reference to?

Mr. BROWN. From 1928 through the present day.

The CHAIRMAN. In a period of about 30 years.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you identify them as gangland slayings as distinguished from the usual homicide cases that you have?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On those, according to your testimony, it has been impossible—or you have been unsuccessful, at least, in solving any of them except the one that appeared so obvious, and it would not possibly come within the category of "gangland slayings"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have included it as being the only one that was solved.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What are the characteristics of the gangland slayings that makes it so difficult to solve them as contrasted with your excellent record in other homicides?

Mr. BROWN. Of course, primarily it is because of witnesses who are reluctant to give the law enforcement any information whatsoever. In some of our killings—I recall one where we had nine witnesses in the room and nobody actually saw the murder or knew anything was going on.

Senator MUSKIE. So this fact has a direct bearing upon the question of immunity statutes, for example.

Mr. BROWN. That is right. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This, in other words, emphasizes the rigid discipline, the code of underworld law, that cannot be violated without suffering the penalty of death.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the nine who were in the room when the murder was committed, possibly every one of them knew what happened.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I would doubt that somebody did not know it. But, anyway, they know that the penalty for them talking would be death.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if they were inclined to, and I do not mean to say they were inclined to, even if one of them were inclined to talk, he knows what the penalty would be. And that makes it difficult. That is why you have the trouble in the gangland slayings, the silence, the threat, the intimidation of a death sentence, of their being executed by their underworld government if they talk.

Mr. BROWN. That is true.

Senator MUSKIE. Then, Chief, just to nail that point down, they seem to be more than concerned and clearly are more concerned for themselves and for their allies than they are about immunity against prosecution.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is true. They are afraid for their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

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Mr. BROWN. I have had these gangland slayings listed, with a few pertinent comments about each, and submit to the subcommittee this list as our exhibit 5.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received and be made exhibit No. 50.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 50" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

(At this point Senator Javits withdrew from the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. With few exceptions, those murders well reflect Joseph Valachi's testimony that Mafia members do live by violence and die by violence.

At least two of the unsolved murders on our list—that of Gus Perez in 1936 and of Joe "Pelusa" Diaz in 1958—were, in my opinion, directly attributable to the Mafia's knowledge or belief that the victims had given to legal authorities evidence incriminating Mafia members. A third murder—of Carl Carramusa, in 1945—taking place in Chicago, involved some Tampa Mafiosi, and is of particular interest in illustrating the Mafia zeal for vengeance against a member who violates its rules. It is of further significance, too, in demonstrating the difficulty of protecting witnesses against the Mafia—and is underlining Attorney General Kennedy's request for additional funds for that purpose, which request I strongly endorse.

The Carramusa case developed in Kansas City, Mo., with certain aspects related to the Mafia organization in Tampa. The principal figure in the case was Carl Carramusa, known as a minor member of the Mafia and a front man for the Mafia's narcotics traffic operation in Kansas City.

Carramusa was indicted in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Federal narcotic laws. His codefendants were Joseph DeLuca, Nicola Impastato, Paul Antinori, Joe Antinori, Charles Gerrgimina, Louis Ventola, Patsy Ventola, Charles Tiabi, Samuel Pernice, and Fellipo Fernice. Tampa's Mafia organization was one of the sources of supply for the Kansas City group, and at that time the narcotics trade in Tampa was headed by Paul Antinori and Joseph Antinori, who had inherited the narcotics leadership from their father, Ignazio Antinori. The elder Antinori had been murdered a few years before in a narcotics deal. All of the defendants in the Kansas City case were prosecuted successfully, primarily because Carramusa violated the cardinal Mafia code of l'omerta, or silence, testifying openly against them at their trial. After the trial, Carramusa went into hiding in Chicago with his wife and family, changing his name and beginning a new life under new circumstances.

Three years later, in June of 1945, while he was seated in his automobile, Carramusa's head was blown off by a shotgun blast. James Lumia, an associate of the Antinoris, was a suspect in this killing, but was himself murdered at Tampa in June of 1950. A prime suspect was the same Nicola Impastato, who had some years before attempted to kill Charles Wall.

In Tampa we have suffered also the frustration I know that many of my police colleagues in other cities have experienced—the deliberate recanting at trial of the original statements of complaining or key witnesses, because of their fear of Mafia reprisal. A clear instance of this frustration of law enforcement effort involved three of the ranking members of the Tampa Mafia.

One day in 1953, one Joe Castellano went to the Italian Club in Tampa to play cards with a group of friends. During the course of the evening, he talked to Salvatore Scaglione privately. Scaglione asked Castellano if he wanted to make a profit on a "hot load" of whisky. Castellano said he was interested, and they agreed to meet later that night.

At the meeting, Scaglione was accompanied by Joe Mistretta and Angelo LoScalzo. Castellano got into the front seat of a car provided by the others, and the four men drove to a thickly wooded area outside of Tampa city limits. Castellano was then attacked with a hammer, being hit repeatedly on the head. He managed to get out of the car, although he was badly hurt. He broke loose from his elderly assailants and ran away. He stumbled into a nearby house and asked to be taken to the constable's house, where he gave a statement about the incident, naming the three as his assailants. He swore to the county solicitor that he had no idea why he was beaten. Scaglione, Mistretta, and LoScalzo were arrested and charged with assault with intent to murder.

Joe Castellano disappeared for a period of time. After he was found, the case went to trial. Castellano changed his story completely and testified that he had injured himself while hunting on the night of the attack. The predictable result, of course, was a verdict for the defendants of "not guilty."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO FIGHT ORGANIZED CRIME

I believe firmly that it is almost impossible for the Police Department of the City of Tampa, or any other municipality, to cope effectively with the activities of a national or international crime syndicate such as these hearings show exists in the United States. One of the main problems is that the most dedicated, well-trained, and well-staffed police force is almost always limited legally and financially to the territorial boundaries of its municipality. For example, the Tampa Police Department is obviously interested in and informed about the activities of Santo Trafficante. However, in the past the department was unable to do anything about Trafficante's operations in pre-Castro Cuba; it has no jurisdiction or control of his illegal affairs in Miami and elsewhere in central Florida. The department could only record that he attended the Apalachin meeting in November of 1957, but it could do nothing about this obvious evidence that he was a high-ranking member of a national crime syndicate.

In the light of our experience with the Mafia in our own city's underworld, I submit for this subcommittee's consideration some suggestions for Federal legislation which I believe would certainly help local law enforcement agencies to fight organized crime more effectively.

1. More ample funds must be obtained by local agencies to recruit high caliber police personnel and to retain superior personnel having the experience and capabilities to understand, investigate, and prosecute organized criminal conspiracies. Because of the demonstrated interstate nature of organized crime, Federal legislation similar to

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

?

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

Nevada

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power; according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

SECRET

[redacted] delivered $10000 to O'C in Fla

— Richard Scully Cain
AKA / Richard Scalzetti) CIA says no rel.

used [illegible] under "contact clearance" since '63

Giancana driver?

— Jan '59 full of gambling
casinos

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1st Meet. [redacted]

I surprised to be approached by CIA

1 person in Cuba
business interests

Order whatever to see him

- how
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Giancana file

(Meyer Lansky's gambling czar in Havana

Trafficante

- gaming casinos under Batista
- father died in 54 - inherited rackets
- intimate of Carlos Marcello
- T introduced in circa Sept 60 as "Joe"
- 1st attempt T delivered poison pills to "agent who had access to Castro" = failure
- T suggested another candidate
- Sam nominated Juan Orta - Cuban receiving kickbacks from gambling interests still had access to Castro

T gave pills to

- Dr Anthony Varona Cuban exile

SECRET

Atlanta Briefing

T — met w/ Roselli ~ July of this year

Talks he made — contacts — travels etc

Rptr — desc. — ~~lead~~ int — told about ? → concern over rpt in Fla?

followup interview after Roselli i.e. Roselli talking — T know etc

Dick — CIA memo — Bill Lynch

Who ar pulled after T got his call etc

T travels LA / Chicago etc —
Name of LA guy

perjury involving alleged contribution to political organization in return for impairment of Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and judicial proceedings were not entitled to continuance or change of venue on ground that, though pretrial publicity was nationwide, exposure varied in certain sections of the country. U. S. v. Mitchell, D.C.N.Y.1973, 372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal dismissed 485 F.2d 1290.

§ 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement

(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if—

(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy;

(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and

(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which—

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member, or employee of such organization, except as compensation for actual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

(d) Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title VIII, § 802(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 936.

References in Text. Paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 501(c)(3) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Congressional Statement of Findings. Section 801 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "The Congress finds that illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof."

Priority of State Laws. Section 811 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: "No provision of this title [enacting this section and section 1955 of this title, amending section 2516 of this title and enacting material set out as notes under this section and section 1955 of this title] indicates an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of a State or possession, or a political subdivision of a State or possession, on the same subject matter, or to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State or possession, or political subdivision of a State or possession."

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 91-452, see 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4007.

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Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, c. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, c. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology. 80th Congress House Report No. 304.

References in Text. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in the text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

1962 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see 1962 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2567.

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Obstructing Justice ⟹7, 21.
C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 5, 22.

1. Constitutionality

Former section 241a of this title [now this section] providing that whoever "corruptly" endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness in proceeding, etc. was not unconstitutional for failure to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt contrary to U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and 6. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

2. Generally

This section covers any activity which would influence or intimidate witness who might be called to testify and is not limited to witness who has been called to testify with defendant's knowledge. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

3. Proceedings within section

The submission to the Naturalization Service of an application to file a petition for naturalization cannot, in a legal sense, have pendency throughout the entire United States within meaning of this section creating a criminal offense against one who corruptly attempts to obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of law, under which such a proceeding is had before a department or agency of the United States. Tarau v. U. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede due and proper administration of law in relation to a naturalization proceeding allegedly pending before Immigration Service, based on a false statement allegedly made in defendant's application for pardon regarding other arrests and convictions against him, naturalization proceeding was not pending in 1951 before the Service when the defendant made the application for pardon, nor when pardon was obtained by him, so as to authorize conviction, where at the time of charged offense the Service had no application in its hands, in that it regarded the naturalization application as not having been entitled to be submitted and returned it to defendant, and defendant subsequently submitted a new application in 1955 having no relation to what was done in 1951. Id.

"Proceeding" within this section includes any investigation which is directed by formal order of Securities and Exchange Commission and at which designated officer takes testimony under oath. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

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corruptly en
and impede

ision Notes

2 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 sub-
ted the catchline "Obstruction of
edings before departments, agen-
and committees" for "Influencing or
ing witness before agencies and
nittees" and punished the willful re-
l, concealment, destruction, mutila-
alteration or falsification of docu-
s which were the subject of a de-
d under the Antitrust Civil Process
if done with the intent to prevent
liance with a civil investigative de-
d.

gislative History: For legislative his-
and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see
U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.

sions

e. have pendency throughout the en-
United States within meaning of this
on creating a criminal offense
nst one who corruptly attempts to
ruct or impede the due and proper
inistration of law, under which such
oceeding is had before a department
gency of the United States. Taran
. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

prosecution for corruptly endeavor-
to influence and impede due and
er administration of law in relation
naturalization proceeding allegedly
ling before Immigration Service
d on a false statement allegedly
e in defendant's application for par-
regarding other arrests and convic-
s against him, naturalization pro-
ing was not pending in 1951 before
Service when the defendant made
application for pardon, nor when
on was obtained by him, so as to
orize conviction, where at the time
harged offense the Service had no ap-
ation in its hands, in that it regard-
he naturalization application as not
ng been entitled to be submitted and
rned it to defendant, and defendant
sequently submitted a new applica-
in 1955 having no relation to what
done in 1951. Id.

Proceeding" within this section in-
des any investigation which is directed
formal order of Securities and Ex-
nge Commission and at which desig-
ed officer takes testimony under oath.
S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp.
certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380
912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied
S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

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4. Witness within section

One whom defendant knew was probable witness before Senate Committee and who intended to testify was a "witness" though not under subpoena when defendant gave him false story to tell when and if he testified, for purposes of prosecutions for subornation of perjury and corruptly influencing witness to give false and perjurious information to Senate Committee investigators. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal.1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

5. Indictment or information

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, sufficiently charged an offense under this section dealing with influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees. U. S. v. Presser, D.C.Ohio 1960, 187 F.Supp. 64.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground that doctrine of res judicata applied because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee. Id.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground of double jeopardy, because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee, since same facts would not prove each case. Id.

An indictment for conspiracy to violate criminal code by subornation of perjury in proceeding before the Federal Petroleum Board was not subject to criticism that it was too vague, contradictory, duplicitous, uncertain and indefinite. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

6. Evidence

The "two witness rule" was not applicable in showing that defendant violated this section proscribing obstruction of justice by influencing witness to give false testimony and information to Senate Committee and its investigators, and testimony of one person alone was sufficient to convict. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal. 1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

Testimony of one person alone is sufficient to convict defendant for obstructing justice in influencing witness to give false testimony to Senate Committee and to give false and perjurious information to committee investigators. Id.

Evidence sustained convictions under counts charging corruptly inducing witness to testify falsely and corruptly influencing him to give false and perjurious information to investigators of Senate Committee. Id.

7. Questions for jury

Whether defendant charged with obstruction of justice in Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation by inducing person to testify falsely that he had purchased certain securities through firm of which defendant was head and had resold securities to that firm knew that witness would be asked to testify under oath was jury question. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

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Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

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Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

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§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

Legislative History

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This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

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Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

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Cross References

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

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This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

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Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

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JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

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RECORD NUMBER :	176-10011-10152
RECORD SERIES :	NSF
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SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK [illegible]

SECRET - EYES ONLY

6/22/61
Recd from
Mr. Bundy

8 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 June 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which proscribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

2. Review of Political Action Projects

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group

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suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.

4. STPOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.

7. TACKLE

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to be made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reservations of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Gilpatric supported the need for current information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Chinat crews, in his opinion, would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.

8. Nicaragua

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment remaining at Puerto Cabezas and of the need for negotiating with Somoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza. Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.

9. Cuba

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependents of the strike force and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Carrion and submit a formal proposal to an early meeting of the Special Group.

10. Minutes of Special Group Meetings

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and retention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship between his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes. Mr. Dulles suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records and because some of the references contained therein involved the use of pseudonyms, the need of the Group might be satisfied by having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediately at hand to answer any questions put to them by higher authority.

THOMAS P. SCHREYER

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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June 30, 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate, and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

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*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 1954).

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

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For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

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II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

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There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

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Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

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III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

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CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

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2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

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*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

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It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

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(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

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In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolise contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

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Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support: and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

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5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

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All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be

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enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

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IV. Operations and intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

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The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, *for example*, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

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Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

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SECRET

CIA

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

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*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6, 13, 1954).

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conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred *not* to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a *fait accompli*; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its principles.

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassements when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassement to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

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*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

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Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support; and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organisation of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

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The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

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CIA INFORMATION REPORT

PAGE 1

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Congo

COUNTRY UNITED NATIONS/CONGO

SUBJECT WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS FROM THE CONGO

DOI AUGUST 1963

PADA NEW YORK, 7 AUGUST 1963

APPR 3

SOURCE MEDIUM LEVEL LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIAL /F/ WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

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DEFINITE PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN THE CONGO AT THE END OF 1963 DESPITE CONGOLESE PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA,S PLEAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE ONLY WAY OF COUNTERACTING THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE TO FIND A NEW METHOD OF FINANCING THE CONGO OPERATION. UNDER SUCH A PLAN, THE IDEAL WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF 40-50 PERCENT STRENGTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT OF FUNDING METHODS, THE ABILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACCEPT SUCH OUTSIDE FUNDS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEBATE.

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OCI No. 1427/63 (NLK-73-198)

23 April 1963

ARRB 7/96

Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers

1. The initial report on Fidel Castro's forthcoming visit to Moscow came from a usually reliable source with excellent contacts in Cuban government circles who obtained the information from a Cuban government official who has been an intimate acquaintance for many years and who has excellent high-level contacts throughout the Cuban leadership. The usually reliable source obtained the information on 25 March. The report was disseminated to the intelligence community on 27 March and reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin dated 29 March.

2. The substance of the report was that, despite his strong criticism of the Soviet Union, particularly concerning its actions during the missile crisis, Fidel Castro is not blinded to the need for Cuba to maintain good diplomatic relations with the entire "socialist camp." Castro was planning, according to the report, to go to Moscow for the May Day celebrations. He was planning, however, to remain in Moscow only three days. It was his intention, according to the report, to tell Khrushchev, in effect, that the USSR must assist Cuba but must at the same time understand that Castro does not intend to be a "docile satellite."

3. Information from the same source and sub-source was disseminated to the intelligence community on 30 March indicating that Castro was intending to visit Algeria on the same trip that took him to Moscow. This was reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 1 April.

4. The substance of the second report was that Castro "plans to visit Algeria in connection with" the visit to Moscow and that Algeria and the USSR are the only two countries he was planning to visit on that trip. The Algerian visit was planned in view of the "special relationship" that is said to exist between Castro and Ben Bella and also between Castro and Algerian Defense Minister Boumedienne.

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuban exiles

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA NICARAGUA
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/556,052

SUBJECT POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUBAN EXILE BASE IN NICARAGUA
DATE DISTR. 10 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 JULY 1963
REFERENCES IN 97132
TDCS-3/555,529

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (9 AUGUST 1963)

APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35,970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL-KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING ROMANI."

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1. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 24 JULY '63, SALVADOR ROMANI, REPRESENTATIVE IN VENEZUELA OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION COMANDO UNIFICADO DE LA LIBERACION EN CUBA (UNITED COMMAND OF CUBAN LIBERATION - CULC), CLAIMED THAT A SMALL NUMBER CUBAN EXILES HAD ALREADY MOVED FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. IN EXILE CIRCLES IT IS BELIEVED THIS ACTION REFLECTS A PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA AND MANUEL ARTIME, SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXILE GROUP MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY - MRR). ROMANI DID NOT KNOW DETAILS OF AGREEMENT. IF IT ENTAILS ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE EXILE MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA,

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EXO

STATE/DIR FBI TREASURY I&NS COAST GUARD

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES BEFORE DECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION.

2. NUCLEUS/OF SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND EXILES WHO, ACCORDING TO ROMANI, HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED MILATARY TRAINING FROM MEMBERS/OF U.S. ARMED FORCES. ROMANI CLAIMED U.S. POLICY IS TO FERMENT INTERNAL RESISTANCE IN CUBA AND/TO STRENGTHEN THE RESISTANCE BY INFILTRATION OF TRAINED COMMANDO GROUPS OF EXILES. FOR THIS REASON THE U.S. CONTINUES/TO GIVE TACIT SUPPORT FOR TRAINING OF EXILE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

3. ROMANI MADE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL EXILE PARTIES:

(A) CULC IS CONCENTRATING ON DISSEMINATION/OF ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN CUBA TO PREPARE GROUND FOR INSURRECTION. IT FAVORS INFILTRATION/OF SMALL MILITARY GROUPS BUT REJECTS A GENERAL INVASION.

(B) JURE (JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA), LED BY MANUEL RAY, CONSIDERS THE PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT IS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS IN CUBAN MILITIA AND ARMED FORCES.

(C) ALLIANCE OF MRP (MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR), SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS ON CUBAN MAINLAND IN ORDER/TO MAINTAIN MORALE OF RESISTANCE FORCES IN CUBA.

(D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS), CLC (COMANDOS LIBRES DE CUBA) AND A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY A GENERAL INVASION WILL OVERTHROW THE CUBAN REGIME.

(E) FUR (FRENTE UNIDO REVOLUCIONARIO), LED BY AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO, IS WORKING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVTS FOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
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RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Cuban-Exile

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

_BUNDY-SMITH
~~BELK~~
✓CHASE
_DINGEMAN
_DUNGAN
_FELDMAN
_FORRESTAL
_HIRSCH
_JOHNSON
_KAYSEN
_KILDUFF
_KLEIN
_KOMER
IN 69083
_[illegible]
_SAUNDERS
_SCHLESINGER
_SMITH
_WIESNER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA

SUBJECT CUBAN EXILE PLANS

DATE OF INFO. MID-JUNE 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (27 JUNE 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/551,866

DATE DISTR. 28 JUNE 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 3566

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING THE PERSONS MENTIONED".

1. AMAURY FRAGINALS ALONSO, ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR (POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT - MRP), THE SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, CLAIMED IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION DURING A VISIT TO VENEZUELA IN MID JUNE 63 THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE CUBAN MAINLAND. AT THE SAME TIME, PLANS ARE GOING AHEAD TO LAUNCH PLAN OMEGA. FRAGINALS SAID THAT PLAN OMEGA HAS THREE STAGES: (A) REORGANIZATION AND ARMING OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THROUGHOUT CUBA WHICH WILL BE LED BY LOCAL MEN WHO KNOW THEIR AREA;

(B) INCESSANT GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN BASES, THE CUBAN

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR	FBI	I&NS	TREASURY														

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

ARMY AND THE MILITIA. THE PURPOSE OF THESE WILL BE TO CAUSE MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND RAISE THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PREPARATION FOR AN INSURRECTION; (C) COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF A GENERAL INSURRECTION.

2. FRAGINALS REMARKED THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF GUERRILLA GROUPS IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY BUT THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS. HE REVEALED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS RECEIVING BLUE-PRINTS, FROM INSIDE CUBA, OF MAJOR PLANTS. THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FUNCTIONS, SHIFTS, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF GUARDS. THE BLUE PRINTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY COURIER OR LETTER AND WILL BE USED FOR PLAN OMEGA.

3. FRAGINALS DESCRIBED THE LATEST ADHERENT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE FRENTE ANTI-COMMUNISTA DE LIBERACION (ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION FRONT - FAL), AS A CLANDESTINE GROUP WITHIN THE CUBAN ARMY. HE REFUSED TO GIVE FIGURES BUT ALLEGED THAT THE GROUP WAS EXPANDING AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE "FORTHCOMING WAR" IN CUBA. HE CONFIRMED THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO WAGE WAR ON FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TO : Director, CIA
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NLK-01-051-7-4-5

(4)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EYES ONLY

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Activities of Cuban-Trained Peruvian Guerrillas

1. The information in this memorandum comes from an extremely sensitive source who is currently a member of a group of Cuban-trained Peruvian guerrillas. No other dissemination has been made of the reports he has provided, in order to protect him and to insure that a channel is kept open to him. The information is being forwarded in this restricted manner at this time to furnish an insight into the extent of Cuban efforts to assist Latin American revolutionary movements. The Agency directed asset is working inside a network which is now assisting Cuban-trained Latin Americans to re-enter their own countries illegally, and to join with leftist revolutionary groups to overthrow the established governments.

2. The Agency asset was a member of a group of more than 70 Peruvians trained in Cuba from June until December 1962. His contingent traveled in small groups by way of Mexico. He received his first special assignment when he was appointed to stay behind in Mexico temporarily and to act as a clandestine contact with a Cuban Embassy official there. The Cuban gave him instructions and funds, and he directed the later groups which transited Mexico.

3. The Peruvian group was ostensibly in Cuba only to attend the July celebrations. According to our agent, some of the members themselves did not know in advance they were to be given training. The Cubans set the Peruvians up as self-contained units in secret training sites in Habana, where they were given political indoctrination and weapons. Later they were moved to rural hill areas for guerrilla training. The agent has described in detail these secret training sites, giving address of the houses and the locations of the guerrilla areas.

4. The agent was removed from his group for several weeks to undergo special training in secret communications techniques, in preparation for his current assignment.

5. At present, the agent acts as coordinator, helping the Peruvians to return illegally to Peru. He is in correspondence with

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persons in numerous points of entry in Latin America and with contacts in several European capitals who assist the group on their clandestine return. Although many left Peru openly on valid papers, they are coming back illegally. Some have false documentation from other countries, primarily from Colombia; some have Peruvian passports issued in the names of persons now deceased; some are crossing the borders from neighboring countries clandestinely without showing any papers; and some go by small boats to isolated areas.

6. The agent is a member of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) of Peru which now plans to join with other leftist revolutionary groups to bring about a coup before the elections scheduled for June 1963. The agent knows of some 200 Peruvians who have received Cuban training, only a small percentage of whom are actually Communist Party members.

7. Approximately 300 persons have been named by the agent as being connected with the ring helping the Peruvians to reinfiltrate secretly. Attempts are being made to learn whether some of these, particularly those used as "Co-ordinators" or "Correspondence points" in Europe and the United States, are also connected with the illegal return of Cuban-trained guerrillas to other countries.

8. Paris has emerged as the center of the network. Groups of ten arrive weekly from Cuba to be sent on to various Latin American countries for eventual re-entry into Peru. The man in charge of the Peruvians is headquartered in Paris. From there, he has been directing the travel, sending instructions to his scattered subordinates, and receiving reports and information from contacts throughout the world, and handling funds.

9. Correspondence between members of the group is by cable and by letter. The security of communications is protected by several alternate systems of code and secret writing. Each of the trainees has been assigned a number, and letter and number designations are given to hotels and pensions. In cable correspondence, the ring uses these numbers to indicate which persons are traveling and where they may be reached. The content of the messages appears to relate to business matters, covering shipment dates and invoice numbers for example. Letter correspondence contains secret writing with relatively sophiscated systems, interspaced between lines of innocuous friendly or business letters. A dictionary is used for coded messages in either cables or letters, with page and word number referring to clandestine key words.

10. The ring takes great precautions to prevent tracing of the addressees. One of the important links is a woman whose Paris home has entrances on two different streets. She and her husband use the principal street address for their normal lives, but the back street address for the receipt of clandestine correspondence.

11. In this Cuban-sponsored subversive operation, routes of travel are planned to escape easy detection of the fact that a person has left his home, been trained, and has returned to his country. Most of the travel has been by way of Mexico and thence to Cuba, since it was possible to escape detection of the travel. The Cubans issued loose leaf inserts for the travelers' passports, rather than stamping a record of the travel in the document itself. The Mexican Government has recently begun measures to control this travel, but a large number have managed to enter and leave Cuba for Mexico without detection. Some of the travel to Cuba is by way of the Dutch and British West Indies.

12. Many of the returning trainees go through Paris and Prague. From Paris, the travelers fan out to a number of different Latin American countries, from which they attempt clandestine re-entry into Peru. Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil have been used extensively as Latin American entry points as the travelers leave Paris.

13. The agent reports that money for this extensive travel program has been deposited in Swiss banks by the Chinese Communists, via Cuba. MIR trainees were told not to ask for aid from the Soviets to avoid straining relations with China, "since it is backing them". Our asset was responsible for the safekeeping of approximately $15,000 when he arrived in Paris. The money had been parceled out among a number of trainees during the trip, and they handed it to the Paris coordinator there. Our asset was given $1,000 when he left Paris, which he was to use for documentation when he was ready to re-enter Peru. He reported that the cost of the travel of his group from Peru to Cuba was approximately $25,000, and that this money was brought to a local leader from Paris by courier before the trip.

14. The MIR plans to establish a cover importing company representing a French firm which exports cheap agricultural equipment. The branch in Peru will serve as a cover for activities involving the travel of MIR members and the transfer of funds. It will also be a clearing house for information and instructions. When the current group of trainees is back in Peru, another group will be sent out, and funded through the cover firm. The agent reports that

the next group will number approximately 100 men and that they will receive instructions in Algeria, North Vietnam, Laos, and China. The top leader of the Peruvian group has told his lieutenants that he will soon go to Algeria to start arrangements for this training.

15. The MIR has planned four fronts in Peru in its proposed revolution. One is in the south with headquarters in Cusco, another is in the central region in the Sierra, a third is in Lima, and the fourth is in northern Peru. The agent has named the leaders in charge of each of the four fronts.

16. Our asset makes frequent reference to internal disputes in the MIR between the old line Communists and those referred to as Trotskyites. The MIR leaders in Cuba felt that some of their own groups had joined with the Trotskyites and they discussed this problem with Fidel Castro. Castro promised not to let the so-called Trotskyites return to Peru until the others were already in place and in command of the several fronts. Some of the avowed Trotskyites were among the first to be sent back, however, and the MIR leaders are highly incensed. The leaders fear that the Trotskyites will endanger the movement, and they have been especially disturbed to find that two Cuban officers, who are known to be Trotskyites, had accompanied them from Cuba.

17. The Agency asset had first estimated that it would take at least two months for all of the Peruvians to return. The re-entry program had fallen approximately a month behind schedule because of unexpected problems of transferring funds and obtaining documents. Moreover, a Communist group in one of the neighboring countries which was to help them began to charge exorbitant amounts for its assistance. The Peruvians were obliged to wait until additional money was brought to them by courier.

18. The agent also estimated that at least another month or two would be required to complete plans for the revolution after all of the trainees were back. The leaders of the trainees complained that the MIR had not made adequate plans to receive the groups and had not developed its revolutionary plans soundly.

19. Recently, however, the operation has been increasing in tempo. The leaders of the MIR have been putting additional pressures on our asset and on others in the chain to speed up re-entry. A number of the trainees have spread out to small neighboring towns, ready to cross the border into Peru clandestinely. False documentation of these nearby countries is also being procured to assist others to cross into Peru "legally".

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY :	NARA
RECORD NUMBER :	176-10036-10065
RECORD SERIES :	National Security Files
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COMMENTS :	National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion, 2/18/1963. Box 1

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy ~~to ascertain and hard to~~ document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

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arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

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E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know

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that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
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ORIGINATOR :
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TO : Rostow
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-6/30/1961. Box 1

Sanitized
NLK-75-26
NLK 02-31c, 1/03

June 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

Intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested, should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.)

It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just inside Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam. (South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.) The following table on operations for May was also presented.

	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Deserted
Viet Cong	824	30	37	none
GVN	240	158	none	41

The Local Currency Costs Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering three alternatives in descending order of preference:

a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency costs from its own resources.

b. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85 million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of the additional 20,000 men.

c. If neither of the above proposals proves acceptable, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster cost for 1961.

As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the U. S. of our offer under a above. On the basis of this offer, he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to initiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way toward solution.

The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet Nam

A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force containing his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but his proposal runs along the following lines.

Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming. The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos. Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary. Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should prove necessary.

Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions to the paper. There was a rather surprising degree of agreement that something along this line must be done or it will be virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at the time except Cottrell himself.) The ICA member and the representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than military action in Laos.

I made the following points about the proposal: First, I observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at the highest levels of government. I indicated that I would be unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I expressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that, unless we undertake military action in Laos, it would be virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agreed to take account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some agreement in the Task Force).

I ~~[illegible]~~ understand some of the feeling of frustration which has prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S. military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable that his objective could be achieved without such intervention. The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not think that this would be a good idea.

I think that there is a serious question as to whether the situation in Laos is not deteriorating so ~~seriously~~ that any likely political solution will ~~not~~ leave it as a serious source of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection, I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- i. e., a clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged indefinitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing. I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the Laos situation?

Other Matters

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.)

I also raised the question of whether food supplies were being cut off by the Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a Vietnamese.) I was told that the only current evidence of Viet Cong action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice exports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange ~~revenues~~ reserves.

There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be desirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to permit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.

(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course. It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice had been surprisingly well maintained.)

Finally, I raised the question of what planning was being done to internationalize the border problem. In response Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the situation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries in the area sometime in July at which the border problem, among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy, whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means to involve the international community in the border question. Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives seem very much interested. Have you ever discussed this question with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)

Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a 100,000 man increase and also to make sure that our military activities in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was undesirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea. The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about the situation.

Robert H. Johnson

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10078
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Opposition in Khanh Hoa Province
DATE : 9/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

[illegible] 1/15 [illegible] 116

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FILE

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,229

SUBJECT 1. OPPOSITION IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE TO ARMING MOUNTAIN TRIBESMEN AND TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
2. CONFLICT AMONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

DATE DISTR. 13 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. LATE AUGUST 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7923

✓ ~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
_KILDUFF
_PETERSEN
_SCHLESINGER
_TAYLOR
_BELK
_FORRESTAL
_JOHNSON
_KLEIN
_KOMER
_RASKIN
_SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR.

1. ON 29 AUGUST 1962 BUI BO, GENERAL SECRETARY, KHANH HOA PROVINCE COUNCIL, GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR (CVTC), AND MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE, REPORTED TO CVTC HEADQUARTERS THAT KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ECONOMIC AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS FOR THE TRIBAL PEOPLE. THESE AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT THE TRIBESMEN MAY INDISCRIMATELY KILL INNOCENT VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MINGLE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE.

2. BO ALSO SAID THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCE ARE OPPOSED TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

PROVIDE TOO MUCH WORK, MATERIAL, AND MONEY. THIS OPPOSITION HAS BECOME SO STRONG THAT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS FORBIDDING ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR LABOR, MATERIAL, OR CASH.

3. BO REPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE, WHICH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, MAJOR LE TAP, IS UNABLE TO HANDLE. THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, BA (FNU), A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, IS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN TAP. TRUONG DINH CAC, WHO HOLDS THE POSITION OF DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS, A POSITION NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS THE REAL POWER IN THE PROVINCE. CAC WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE BY NGO DINH CAN, BROTHER OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND POLITICAL LEADER OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALL MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONTROL OF CAN AND HIS FACTION IN THE CAN LAO PARTY. BO DESCRIBED THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION, YANG (FNU), AS A GOOD MAN BUT COMPLETELY LACKING IN AUTHORITY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10079
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Possible severence of Cambodian
DATE : 9/17/1962
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FILE

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CAMBODIA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,837

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SEVERANCE OF CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. MID-SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7943

~~SMITH BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
[illegible] 29561
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A SENIOR OFFICIAL (B) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR

1. LE VAN DONG, FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, SAID ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1962 THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY A RELIABLE SOURCE IN CAMBODIA THAT THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT /RKG/ IS PLANNING TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DECISION IS TO BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING ON EITHER 19 OR 20 SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE RKG MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WILL REQUEST THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10085
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnamese Communist Analysis of Efforts
DATE : 6/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

~~SMITH~~.BUN
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGE
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,760

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 13 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 5 MAY 1962

REFERENCES FILE IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (20 MAY 1962)

APPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THIS IS AN ACCURATE TRANSLATION OF A GENUINE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7504

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL (C) IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS HEAD OF AN INTELLIGENCE NET REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Bundy

1. SET FORTH BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AS VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). THE AUTHOR OF THE ANALYSIS, WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN EARLY MAY 1962, IS A VC COMPANY COMMANDER IN BA XUYEN PROVINCE.

2. THE REVOLUTION IN SVN IS PASSING NOW INTO THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE IT (SVN) AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S UNION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAS POSTPONED THAT PHASE. THE US' HALF SUCCESS IS DUE TO USE OF COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, BUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT BECAUSE (INDISCRIMINATE) KILLINGS WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN THE FUTURE THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SVN, WITH

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA
VTF													EXO		

ITS HIGH-SACRIFICE SPIRIT AND ITS HATE-AMERICA IDEALS, WILL GET 90 PERCENT SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE US HAS USED ULTRA-MODERN MECHANIZED WEAPONS TO DESTROY ARMED UNITS BY TACTICS OF AREA PACIFICATION. THUS HARRASSED, THE VC ARE NEVER SECURE. THEIR POLICIES MUST NOW AIM AT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND AT UPHOLDING THE HARDSHIP-BEARING SPIRIT. MEANWHILE, VC ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT YET EXIST, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF THE PARTY. ECONOMICALLY, VC AGRARIAN REFORMS HAVE SOLVED THE LAND PROBLEM FOR THE PEASANTS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE FOOD SOURCE FOR THE TROOPS AND CADRES. (SOURCE COMMENT. "VC AGRARIAN REFORMS" REFER TO THE DE FACTO LAND EXPROPRIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE VIET MINH DURING THE 1945-54 WAR.) FOREST AND SEA RESOURCES ARE STILL SECONDARY AND BRING IN ONLY SOME SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TAXES. THE VC ARE MEETING GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT THE SVN PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL MILITARY MEASURES, I.E. STRONG ATTACKS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE SOLUTION THROUGH "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" REFERS TO THE BELIEF THAT, IF THE VC CAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT RELATIVE STALEMATE LONG ENOUGH, THE US WILL TIRE OF THE STRUGGLE AND SEEK SOME KIND OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION.)

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10086
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Views...Possible Coup D'Etat
DATE : 6/15/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

✓ ~~SMITH BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
KOMER
RASKIN

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,973

SUBJECT VIEWS OF COLONEL TON THAT XUNG ON POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 15 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

RETAIN OR DESTROY

DATE OF INFO. EARLY JUNE 1962

REFERENCES FILE IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 JUNE 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7484

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM COLONEL TON THAT XUNG.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT XUNG HOLDS THE VIEWS STATED; HOWEVER, THE CONTENTS OF THE STATEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY TRUE.

1. COLONEL TON THAT XUNG, COMMANDER OF THE RANGER COMMAND, DURING A 3 JUNE 1962 LUNCHEON MEETING WITH TON THAT CHU, CHIEF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WERE GETTING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT SOME ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN TO CHANGE IT. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE PLANS WERE NOT GOING TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE AMERICANS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES, A BASICALLY LAW-ABIDING NATION, IS OPPOSED TO UNLAWFUL ACTS. SINCE A COUP D'ETAT IS CONSIDERED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TO BE AN UNLAWFUL PROCESS, THE US IS FORCED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH ACTIONS, AND THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OF ANY FUTURE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO UPSET THE CURRENT REGIME UNTIL THE ACTION IS ACCOMPLISHED.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	AID

VTF

EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10087
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnam Communist Activities
DATE : 8/23/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 8/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS-3/520,365
SUBJECT	VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SAIGON AREA	**DATE DISTR.**	23 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	JUNE-JULY 1962	**REFERENCES**	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 AUGUST 1962)		
APPRAISAL	3	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FVS-7843

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THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MILITARY SERVICE WHICH RECEIVED THE ITEMS SEPARATELY FROM OTHER OFFICIAL SERVICES.

~~SMITH~~-BUNI
~~DUNGAN~~
~~[illegible]~~
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGE
IN-10297 ~~[illegible]~~
BELK
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

1. DURING THE LATTER HALF OF JUNE 1962 MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED UNARMED VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) ENTERED THE SAIGON AREA AND WERE LIVING IN THE HOMES OF FELLOW VC IN THE FOURTH AND EIGHT DISTRICTS OF SAIGON. (FIELD COMMENT. THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF FVS-7681 (TDCS-3/517,156) WHICH REPORTED THAT BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE HUNDRED VC TERRORISTS AND SABOTAGE AGENTS HAD BEEN INFILTRATED INTO THE CAPITAL AREA.)

2. THE VC DISTRICT COMMITTEE FOR GO VAP (N 10-49, E 106-40) SENT AN ARMED PLATOON TO THE CITY TO OPERATE AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS CELLS.

3. A VC CADRE, AFTER TAKING A TRAINING COURSE IN LOC THUAN, TAY NINH PROVINCE, WAS SENT TO SAIGON TO SET UP A BASE AMONG LABORERS

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EX

AID

TO BE USED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

4. FORTY VC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN 14 AND 16 YEARS OF AGE HAD COME TO SAIGON TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE AND KIDNAPPINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND U.S. PERSONNEL.

5. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG DINH HAD BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY IN ORDER TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DURING THE VC FALL AND WINTER CAMPAIGN. (FIELD COMMENT. POSSIBLY MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG VINH, DEPUTY OF NGHE AN PROVINCE TO THE SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM, IS MEANT.)

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY	: NARA
RECORD NUMBER	: 176-10036-10088
RECORD SERIES	: National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	:

ORIGINATOR	: CIA
FROM	:
TO	:
TITLE	: Indication of Planning
DATE	: 11/20/1962
PAGES	: 2
SUBJECTS	:
DOCUMENT TYPE	:
CLASSIFICATION	:
RESTRICTIONS	:
CURRENT STATUS	:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA	:
COMMENTS	: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 11/62. Box 2

[illegible] 1/15 [illegible] 177.1.2.2 9

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/528,813 FILE
SUBJECT	INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	20 NOVEMBER 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	LATE OCTOBER 1962	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 NOVEMBER 1962)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8188

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) IN THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INFORMATION; FROM A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F) IN THE MINISTRY FOR CIVIC ACTION.

1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1962 MINISTER FOR CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU TOLD THREE OF HIS ASSISTANTS THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO ASSIST IN PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE PLANNING WOULD PROGRESS THROUGH MANY STAGES, BUT THE THREE ASSISTANTS WERE FIRST TO DRAFT A QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS TO BE FILLED OUT BY SELECTED PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO THIS FORM, PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY LIVED IN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL ACQUAINTANCES STILL KNOWN TO BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS LATTER SUBMITTED TO HIEU.

2. FIELD COMMENT. FVS-8137, TDCS-3/527,406, REPORTED, IN PARAGRAPH 3, NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENT AT THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MUST BECOME PART OF A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

REARMED POPULACE, WHICH WOULD CARRY THE BATTLE FORWARD INTO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NORTH VIETNAM. FVS-7934, TDCS-3/522,275, REPORTED THAT NHU, COMMENTING ON HIS 17 AUGUST REMARKS AT QUI NHON ABOUT A "MARCH TO THE NORTH" ASSERTED THAT THIS DID NOT IMPLY A MILITARY MARCH, BUT WAS HIS CONCEPT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE AN ATTRACTION FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH AND WOULD GRADUALLY UNDERMINE THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP THERE. PARAGRAPH 4 OF FVS-7867, CS-3/522,559, REPORTING A NEW VERSION OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY TO TIE IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE FROM THE HIGH PLATEAU OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, STATED THAT THE THIRD EPOCH OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY WAS OCCURRING, AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE NOW RETURNING TOWARD THE NORTH THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10094
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Ngo Dinh Nhu's Statement on Withdrawal of
DATE : 4/20/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,531
SUBJECT NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID
DATE DISTR. 20 APRIL 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO. LATE MARCH-EARLY APRIL 1963
REFERENCES IN 21850
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AND 12 APRIL 1963)
APPRAISAL SEE PARAGRAPH 7
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8804

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARAS 1 & 3: AMEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.
PARAS 2 &4: A FIELD GRADE OFFICER (F) OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

1. AT THE 5 APRIL MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS, NGO DINH NHU MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS CONCERNING AMERICAN FOREIGN AID:

A. THE AMERICANS HAVE STATED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO REVISE THEIR POLICY ON FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM; WE WILL REVISE OUR POLICY ON RECEIVING SUCH AID. WE MUST MARCH TOWARD THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF TERMINATING AMERICAN AID AND THE PEOPLE SHOULD LEARN TO DO WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE.

B. AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE FOLLOWING CATE-

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GORIES OF PRIORITY. FIRST, AID WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INDEFINITELY, SPECIFICALLY THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION; WE WILL NOT SEEK A REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY, NOR WILL WE REQUEST AN INCREASE. SECOND AID WHICH CAN BE EVENTUALLY PHASED OUT. THIRD, AID WHICH CAN BE TEMINATED IMMEDIATELY.

C. ALL SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE ABOVE LIST OF PRIORITIES BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT INTENDED TO BE ANTIFOREIGN. FOREIGN AID WILL PROVIDE WITH THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION SO THAT WE CAN EVENTUALLY DO WITHOUT CONSUMER GOODS ASSISTANCE. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, FOREIGN AID WILL CEASE SOONER OR LATER, AND SO WE MUST STRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT. MEANWHILE WE MUST MAKE PROPER USE OF THE AID WE RECEIVE.

2. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1963 THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON ORDERS FROM NHU, ISSUED TO ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS INSTRUCTIONS TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO START PRODUCING WEAPONS, LAND MINES AND AMMUNITION IN HOME WORK SHOPS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING A DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

3. ON ABOUT 5 APRIL PHAM DUC TIEN, CHIEF OF CIVIC ACTION IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, ATTENDED A CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS IN BINH TUY PROVINCE AT WHICH NGO DINH NHU SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY AMERICAN ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT BOTH THE NUMBER OF THESE ADVISORS AND THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE REDUCED.

4. AT A MEETING OF VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS ON 10

APRIL 1963, VNAF COMMANDER COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN SAID THAT NHU HAD INSTRUCTED HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS AT A 5 APRIL MEETING TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID; NHU SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING AID AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING THE GVN AND WAS IMPINGING ON GVN SOVEREIGNTY. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF AMERICAN AID TO PRESSURE A RECIPIENT COUNTRY, HIEN CITED THE CUTOFF OF DELIVERIES OF GASOLINE TO THE ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE WHEN THE THAI GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO AGREE TO SOME (UNSPECIFIED) POINT; HIEN SAID THAT THE DELIVERY OF GASOLINE RECOMMENCED ONLY AFTER STRONG THAI GOVERNMENT PROTESTATIONS. (FIELD COMMENT. PRESUMABLY HIEN REFERS TO THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL TERMINATION BY THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1965 OF U.S. SUPPORT OF MILITARY AID PROGRAM POL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT.)

5. AFTER THE MEETING SEVERAL VNAF OFFICERS, INCLUDING MAJOR DANG DINH LINH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MATERIAL, MAJOR TRAN DO CUNG, ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND CAPTAIN HA DUONG DOAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BUDGET AND FINANCE, AGREED THAT THE VNAF WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITHOUT AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THAT, IN FACT, ANY WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT WOULD RESULT IN COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME.

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FIELD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

7. APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2. IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES USING AID TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE TOLD GVN OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID. THE REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO HIEN'S VERSION OF NHU'S STATEMENTS IS PROBABLY TRUE.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10095
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 4/22/1963
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCSDB-3/654,285
SUBJECT	INDICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PLAN TO REQUEST REDUCTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	22 APRIL 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-APRIL 1963	REFERENCES	IN 22329
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 APRIL 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8806

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSET OVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OVER THE LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. BY MID-APRIL 1963 A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY. MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT AS THE MAIN IRRITANT. DIEM IS ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER BLUNDERS AND, AFTER BUILDING UP A STRONG CASE, HE PLANS TO CONFRONT AMBASSADOR NOLTING AND USMACV CHIEF GENERAL HARKINS WITH IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITY, DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF U.S.

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXXX	XXXX
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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

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PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE FORCE IS TOO LARGE AND UNMANAGEABLE.

2. SOME VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMERICANS WERE BEING QUESTIONED IN DETAIL BY PRESIDENCY STAFF MEMBERS AS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS QUESTIONED HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENCY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY, AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY WELL MOTIVATED, DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH APPROPRIATE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), MAAG (GENERAL TIMMES), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10097
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

S. Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/544,961
SUBJECT	VIET CONG CONCENTRATION ON TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY IN THE CAPITAL AREA	DATE DISTR.	25 APRIL 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY APRIL 1963	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 APRIL 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8792

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; FROM SOURCES DESCRIBED AS VIET CONG PENETRATIONS.

— 1. IN EARLY APRIL 1963, WARD-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE VIET CONG (VC) SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE WERE INFORMED THAT TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THE AREA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD OPERATE UNDER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMITTEE. EVERY DISTRICT MUST DEVELOP ONE OR TWO TERRORIST GROUPS CONSISTING OF THREE CELLS EACH. OPERATIONS OF THESE GROUPS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN DISTRICTS BUT COULD BE EXPANDED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE, AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. AMERICANS WERE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF ALL OPERATIONS.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

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2. VC COUNTERPROPAGANDA PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY AND AWAIT TRANSFER ORDERS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT MANY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED INTO MILITARY SUBVERSION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV AID MAAG USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10098
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3. Vietnam

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT PLANS FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED VNQDD
DATE OF INFO. EARLY MAY 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 MAY 1963)

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,672
DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
REFERENCES IN 41761
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8959

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE VNQDD IS BEING REFORMED; ITS CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL VIETNAM CANNOT BE JUDGED.

1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IN HUE, NGUYEN VAN LUC RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM THOAT XAC PHONG TRAO (TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT.. TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY INTO ENGLISH. THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT IN MIND AND SPIRIT; XAC MEANS BODY, I.E., PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATION; A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VNQDD.) THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE 1958 FROM THE VIETNAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY), PARTICULARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,

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GROUP 1
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK-01-197-6-10-8

THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE ITS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS THE OLDER LEADERS OF THE VNQDD, THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING A REVITALIZED REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC IS THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN VAN CU, ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.)

2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN AND QUANG`NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM'S TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL OVER CENTRAL VIIETNAM , THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM

AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE REGIME IN SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

3. LUC SENT A TRUSTED FOLLOWER, ONE VIET, TO SAIGON TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT. VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE, WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD IMMEDIATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS FOLLOWED LUC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET THOUGHT THAT LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
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RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS-3/547,646
SUBJECT	APPREHENSIONS OF VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN SINGAPORE REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN VIETNAM	**DATE DISTR.**	18 MAY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	17 MAY 1963	**REFERENCES**	IN 41548
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	SINGAPORE (17 MAY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FSS 12881

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG. APPR: CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG HAS BEEN AN ARDENT AND DEVOTED SUPPORTER OF THE PRESIDENTAND OF NGO DINH NHU'S CAN LAO PARTY. HE IS A CATHOLIC AND A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF DR. TUYEN. THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE FELT TO BE REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS SINCERE.

1. SUMMARY. VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG CONSIDERS THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT NGU DINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE OFFICE OF EXCHANGES FROM HIS POSITION OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN FACTION OF THE CAN LAO (REVOLUTIONARY WORKER'S) PARTY; THE DENIGRATION AND REMOVAL FROM POWER AND AUTHORITY OF DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, DIRECTOR OF SEPES:; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HUE INCIDENT ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY 8 MAY IN WHICH BUDDHIST PARADERS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK-01-197-6-9-0

WERE KILLED BY THE CIVIL GUARD. EACH OF THESE SEPARATE ACTS HAS SERVED TO WEAKEN THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE AND TO FURTHER NARROW , POSSIBLY TO A FATAL DEGREE, THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.

2. CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG FEARED THAT TUYEN'S DISMISSAL IN PARTICULAR WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSECURITY AMONG LOYAL SUPPORTERS AND PUBLIC SERVANTS OF THE REGIME WHO KNOW DR. TUYEN'S RECORD OF LOYAL SERVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS BROTHER, PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR NGO DINH NHU. THESE OFFICIALS CAN CERTAINLY QUESTION WHETHER ANYONE'S POSITION IN THE REGIME IS SAFE IF TUYEN COULD FALL FROM FAVOR. PHUONG STATED THAT SEVERAL FRIENDS OF HIS WITH LONG RECORDS OF SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND TO THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO HIM DESPONDENTLY ALONG THESE LINES. TUYEN HAD A BAD REPUTATION WITH MANY OFFICERS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND BUREAUCRACY AS THE HATCHETMAN AND TROUBLESHOOTER FOR NGO DINH NHU BUT NO ONE DOUBTED HIS DEVOTION TO NHU. YET NHU HAS STRIPPED HIM OF ALL REAL AUTHORITY SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF A SILLY WOMEN'S TIFF BETWEEN MADAME NHU AND MADAME TUYEN. ANY OBJECTIVE GVN OFFICIAL MIGHT QUESTION THE FRIVOLITY, INGRATITUDE AND LACK OF PERSPECTIVE OF A REGIME THAT ACTS THUS.

3. FURTHERMORE TUYEN WAS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING GVN OFFICIALS IN HIGH POSITION RESPECTED BY OPPOSITION LEADERS AND VIETNAMESE

INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. THOSE WHO DID NOT LIKE HIM AT LEAST TRUSTED HIS FAIRNESS AND BASIC EMPATHY WHEREAS THEY NEITHER TRUSTED NOR LIKED NHU EVEN THOUGH NHU HIMSELF WAS AN INTELLECTUAL.

4. WITHIN THE CAN LAO PARTY, WHICH IS STILL ONE OF THE SECRET MAINSPRINGS OF SUPPORT IN VIETNAM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NGO FAMILY, THE PARALLEL REMOVAL FROM AUTHORITY OF HUYNH VAN LANG HAS OCCASIONED SIMILAR DOUBTS AMONG THE PARTY'S RANK -AND-FILE. AS IN TUYEN'S CASE, CAN LAO MEMBERS CAN QUESTION WHAT VALUE IS LOYALTY AND SERVICE IF A MAN LIKE LANG CAN LOSE HIS POST.

5. THE EVEN MORE SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH MAY NARROW THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GVN TO A FATAL DEGREE WAS THE SHOOTING OF BUDDHIST PARADERS AT HUE ON THE OCCASION OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. THE HUE REGIME OF CENTRAL VIETNAM COUNSELOR NGO DINH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM'S EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS FEAR THAT THE GVN'S INCREASING PRO-CATHOLIC BENT WILL BE HARMFUL TO THE CHURCH AS WELL AS TO THE REGIME. CERTAINLY THE STUPID SUPPRESSION OF BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS FLAGS AT HUE ON 8 MAY (ON PRETEXT THAT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS CONNECTED TO VC COMMEMORATION OF THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY)

AND CONSEQUENT FATALITIES WILL AROUSE THE ANTAGONISM OF PREDOMINANTLY

BUDDHIST VIETNAM AGAINST BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CATHOLICS.

6. FROM REPORTS REACHING HIM PHUONG FOUND IT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN CENTRAL VIETNAM AUTHORITIES ORDERED POLICE TO EXECUTE THE DIRECTIVE BANNING FLAGS, INITIALY THE POLICE MERELY RESTATED THE ORDER BUT WOULD NOT RIP DOWN ANY BUDDHIST FLAGS. FINALLY SEVERAL CATHOLIC POLICE DID SO, BUT SOME BUDDHIST POLICEMEN REFUSED, SAYING THAT BUDDHIST FLAGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED JUST AS CATHOLIC FLAGS ARE FLOWN ON SAINTS DAYS. SUCH DEFIANCE OF ORDERS AT HUE IS QUITE RARE, PHUONG SAID.

7. THE CROWNING INSULT TO BUDDHISTS WHICH WILL FURTHER ENFLAME THEM AND ALSO REVIVE THE OUTCRY AGAINST NGO FAMILY RULE WAS THE NEWS OF HUE ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC'S PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT ASK BUDDHIST ASSOCIATIONS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM TO CONDEMN THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DISORDER OF THE HUE BUDDHISTS. ARCHBISHOP THUC REPORTEDLY WENT TO SAIGON TO DEMAND THIS. THE VC COULD NOT HAVE A BETTER PROPAGANDA WEAPON IF THEY HAD LAUNCHED THE INCIDENT AND DIRECTED THUC'S REACTION THEMSELVES.

8. BY SUCH ACTS THE REGIME IS DESTROYING CONFIDENCE AND LOYAL MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, INTELLECTUALS, PARTY SUPPORTERS, AND THE MASS OF NON-CATHOLIC PEASANTRY IN ITS MOST CRUCIAL TIME. IF THIS CONTINUES ONLY SYCOPHANTS AND XENOPHOBES WILL PREDOMINATE IN THE GVN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS PEOPLE, BUREAU-

CRACY, ARMY AND FRIENDLY ALLIES WILL DETERIORATE IN A WELTER OF PETTY JEALOUSIES, FEUDS, AND PREJUDICES.

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CONGEN ONLY) CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10102
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN)

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863

FILE

SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST CHINA

DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 4-9 MARCH 1963

REFERENCES IN 89258

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, A CHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND A MEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND POSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.

1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT. THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THE FACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ADVISORS OF EITHER PARTICIPANT.

2. CHEN DELAYED HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 24 HOURS TO PERMIT HIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
STATE/DIR																	

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK·01·197·5·5·5

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE TIME WAS DEVOTED TO PRIVATE TALKS. MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY INDICATION AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

3. MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS. CHEN IS ALSO THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM, WHICH IS CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT, I.E., DEMONSTRATIONS BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE CHINAT EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIRFIELD AND COASTAL BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA. OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN WERE THE CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL IS A LACKEY OF

PEIPING. CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATION WAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.

4. ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION, WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE TO THE AIRPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE DEPARTED. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/541,020
SUBJECT	THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME	DATE DISTR.	20 MARCH 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-MARCH 1963	REFERENCES	IN 89614
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MARCH 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8662

FILE

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C), WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR THIS REPORT IS TYPICAL OF VIEWS HELD BY CERTAIN OPPOSITIONISTS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE FELLOW-TRAVELLING CATEGORY. COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY GOVERNMENT PROVOKERS SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REACTION. THE LINE THAT DIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT, IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS SOME SEGMENTS OF THE LEFT. THE ESTIMATE CONTAINED HEREIN ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THE APPRAISAL THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OR TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, IS NOT ACCEPTED.

1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME, ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF A COMMITTEE OF NATIONALIST ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN MID-MARCH 1963, IN THE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), WHO MAY ALSO BE A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN A STUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. ALTHOUGH SEPES' CHIEF TRAN KIM TUYEN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION, HE HAS PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM TIME TO TIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

SANITIZED NLK-01-197-5-7-3

THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS 8654, TDCS-3/540,447, REPORTED AN EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THESE INDIVIDUALS.)

2. ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS, THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HAO AND THE CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM.

3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER

UNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ARE HEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSE PRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUE COURSE. THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND IS COMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS A SUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCE IS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.

4. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL. THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME THE VC WITHIN THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL GO INTO ACTION.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY :	NARA
RECORD NUMBER :	176-10036-10104
RECORD SERIES :	National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	9/10/2000
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Viet - Nam

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS - 3/550,953

SUBJECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WHITE PAPER ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE AND AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 19 JUNE 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 12-17 JUNE 1963

REFERENCES IN 62883

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JUNE 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9171

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

1. ON 17 JUNE 1963 GENE GREGORY OF THE TIMES OF VIETNAM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RETUNED FROM DALAT WHERE HE HAD SPENT FIVE DAYS WORKING ON A WHITE PAPER SETTING FORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM POSITON NOT ONLY ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE BUT ALSO ON THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. GREGORY SAID THAT MADAME NGO DINH NHU HAD ASKED HIM TO PREPARE THE PAPER AND, IN FACT, HE LIVED IN THE NHU VILLA IN DALAT WHILE HE WORKED ON IT.

2. GREGORY SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MADAME

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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(33)

NHU SUGGESTED BE INCLUDED IN THE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED, THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD AFTER ALL.

3. GREGORY STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, BUT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE UNITED STATES BUT POSSIBLY ALSO FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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S. Vietnam 50

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-81-269; NLK-89-15+
DOWNGRADED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,517
SUBJECT COUP D'ETAT PLAN OF NGO DINH NHU
DATE DISTR. 12 JULY 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO. 11-12 JULY 1963
REFERENCES IN 78592
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 JULY 1963)
APPRAISAL SEE BELOW
FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9305

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A GENERAL OFFICER (B) WHO EITHER ATTENDED THE MEETING OR WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

APPRAISAL: NGO DINH NHU IS PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP; HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN.

1. (SUMMARY: NGO DINH NHU PROPOSED TO ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THEY STAGE A COUP D'ETAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THE ARMY SHOULD TURN OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANS ON THE NEXT DAY.)

2. NGO DINH NHU TOLD A GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST PROVIDE THE ACTION REQUIRED. THE GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE AND IN ORDER TO REGAIN POPULAR RESPECT THEY MUST ENGINEER A COUP D'ETAT.

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~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC			OCI	ONE	OCR			EXO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA (PROD WO)
STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES)
JCS
CNO (OP 922 Y 1)

AFSSO
DIA/CIIC
NIC
DFI/ACSI

WHITE HOUSE
SIT ROOM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

(13) 50

NHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.

3. NHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL. ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION. ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, IN FACT, HAS HE HAD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION, I.E., DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

4. NHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES AND THAT FAST ACTION WAS NECESSARY; IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IF THE COUP IS TO OCCUR. THIS WAS THE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE-MAKERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT MUST BE QUELLED. NHU QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE BUT THE FIVE RINGLEADERS, WHO WERE TO BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD USED THEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.

5. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIAN CONTROL. IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LE, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED

MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.

6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE NHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (SOURCE COMMENT. ALL OF THE NHU CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)

8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.

9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE.

(13)
50

BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY. VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, III CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS; BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS. VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACING VICE PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

20

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY :	NARA
RECORD NUMBER :	176-10036-10115
RECORD SERIES :	National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	CIA Information Telegram
DATE :	7/16/1963
PAGES :	2
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DOCUMENT TYPE :	
CLASSIFICATION :	
RESTRICTIONS :	
CURRENT STATUS :	
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	9/10/2000
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NLK-82-74 + NLK-87-15 + DOWNGRADED

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr. Bundy

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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCSDB-3/655,558
SUBJECT	STATUS OF COUP D'ETAT PLANS OF TRAN KIM TUYEN'S GROUP	DATE DISTR.	16 JULY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	15 JULY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 80366
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 9309

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

1. ON 15 JULY 1963 AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUP D'ETAT GROUP HEADED BY DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, CURRENTLY AN ADVISOR AT THE PRESIDENCY, SAID THAT THEIR NATIONALIST, ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP WOULD OCCUR "SOON." HOWEVER, AS THE VIET CONG WERE REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, THE COUP WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT DATE. THE COUP WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST PRESIDENT DIEM AS WELL AS THE NGO DINH NHUS AND THE GROUP PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA [illegible] USIA OCI ONE OCR [illegible] EXO

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20

SANITIZED NLK. 89.15

57 (16)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCSDB-3/655,558

IN 80366

REGIME BEHIND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9286 (TDCSDB-3/655,471), FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, REPORTED DETAILS OF TUYEN'S PLAN AND THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE BEFORE THE END OF JULY.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10116
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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ORIGINATOR : CIA
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RESTRICTIONS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

NLK-82-74 + NLK-89-15

61

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam (17)

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/553,724

SUBJECT POSSIBLE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATE DISTR. 17 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. MID-JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 80437

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9314

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

APPR IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS RECALLED SOME OF ITS FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES; HOWEVER, WHETHER THE REASON IS TO DEFINE A NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S APPOINTMENT IS UNKNOWN. SEE HEADQUARTERS COMMENT, PARAGRAPH 2.

1. BY MID-JULY 1963 PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM WAS CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED OVER THE DESIGNATION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). THE APPOINTMENT SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO WIELD A "BIG STICK," AND THE GVN RECALLED A NUMBER OF ITS DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULTATION. AMONG THEM WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE, NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, RANGOON, AND SENEGAL AND SEVERAL OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE RECALLED OSTENSIBLY SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND A SEMINAR ON THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PROGRAM ABROAD; HOWEVER, THE GVN ACTUALLY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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FORM 8-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

WANTED TO DISCUSS ITS POSITION IN REGARD TO THE BUDDHIST SITUATION AND TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A NEW GVN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LODGE APPOINTMENT.

2. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. TDCS-3/552,830 REPORTED THAT BUU HOI, GVN AMBASSADOR TO THE IVORY COAST, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, UPPER VOLTA, AND SENEGAL WAS EXPECTED IN SAIGON ON 15 JULY. CS-3/533,307 REPORTED THAT NGO DINH NHU HAD STATED AT AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS' MEETING THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD FAILED TO ENROLL HIS PERSONNEL IN THE COURSE AT THE THI NGHE STRATEGIC HAMLET CENTER, AND THAT IF NECESSARY, THE MINISTER SHOULD RECALL HIS PERSONNEL FROM EMBASSIES ABROAD IN ORDER TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10117
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
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SEE SANITIZED VERSION + DOWNGRADED NLK-84-15 (18) 65

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,605

SUBJECT MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ON THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 18 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 13-16 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 82003

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9322

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM A UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD-GRADE OFFICER; FROM GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.

APPR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH PROBABLY HOLDS THESE VIEWS AND MADE THESE STATEMENTS. HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISGRUNTLED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM SINCE 1960, AND EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NOT SO EXPRESSED HIMSELF PREVIOUSLY TO SOURCE (SEE PARA. 2.B).

1. SUMMARY. ON 16 JULY 1963 MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT DIEM, CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT, SAID THAT HE LACKED THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND ADVOCATED A CHANGE IN THE REGIME, BUT ASSERTED THAT NGO DINH NHU COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WOULD REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST DIVISION.

2. GENERAL MINH MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. PRESIDENT DIEM HAS CHANGED SO COMPLETELY THAT IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO REASON WITH HIM. IN THE EARLY DAYS HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND WAS VERY POPULAR THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

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GROUP 1
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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER AT THAT TIME TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANTS FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEN HE BEGAN SCREENING HIMSELF IN AND BY 1959 HE HAD LOST COMPLETE TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME TO HAVE CHANGED THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER 1960 DIEM CHANGED COMPLETELY, BECOMING CONVINCED THAT HE WAS OPERATING UNDER A MANDATE FROM HEAVEN. THIS WAS APPARENT IN HIS REMARKS ON 7 JULY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE COUNTRY WAS GUIDED BY "INTUITIVE WISDOM."

B. THE BUDDHIST ISSUE IS AN ILLUSTRATION OF DIEM'S IRRATIONAL ATTITUDE. DIEM TOLD MINH ON 13 JULY THAT THE BINH XUYEN, THE HOA HAO, AND THE CAO DAI WERE ALL STRONGER THAN THE BUDDHISTS. THEY HAD REGULAR ARMED TROOPS BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL ABLE TO DEFEAT THEM, SO WHY CANNOT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO DEFEAT THE MONKS, WHO HAVE NEITHER ARMS NOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION? MINH WAS UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SITUATIONS WERE NOT THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE RIGID STAND DIEM HAS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO THE BUDDHISTS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME MINH HAS MADE SUCH STRONG STATEMENTS AGAINST DIEM.)

C. THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM IS FAR FROM SETTLED. IT IS BECOMING WORSE AND UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CHANGES ITS POLICY THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL BUDDHIST SELF-IMMOLATIONS.

D. THERE MUST BE A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT. SOUTH VIETNAM

IS LIKE A YOUNG TREE; IT HAS FIRM ROOTS AND IS GROWING BUT IT MUST HAVE A PROPER ATMOSPHERE SO THAT ITS LEAVES, I.E., THE PEOPLE, CAN BREATHE. THIS IS LACKING IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

E. NGO DINH NHU CAN NEVER TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT; SHOULD HE SUCCEED, IT WOULD PROVE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) ARE RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE VC ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO REALLY FIGHT FOR THE PEOPLE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY, AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN KIM, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARE MINH'S CLOSE FRIENDS.)

F. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD MINH ON 15 JULY THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE SELF PRIDE OF CERTAIN KEY INDIVIDUALS, I.E., THE NHUS AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC, HAD BECOME INVOLVED. THO HAS BEEN WANTING TO RESIGN BUT WAS NOT EVEN PERMITTED TO SUBMIT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION; HE STILL INTENDS TO GO THROUGH WITH IT, HOWEVER. (FIELD COMMENT: FVS-9243, (TDCS-3/552,503,) REPORTED THAT DIEM HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THO'S WRITTEN RESIGNATION, SUBMITTED ON [illegible] JULY. FVS-9256, TDCS-3/552,565, REPORTED THO'S STATEMENT THAT HE WANTED TO RESIGN BUT WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO THE TIMING.)

G. IF THE MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE VC CAN BE CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE FOR A YEAR, THE ARMY CAN DISRUPT THE VC ARMED

INSURGENTS. THE WINNING OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VC IS NOT SIMPLY A MILITARY PROBLEM, HOWEVER, BUT ONE THAT REQUIRES THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND THIS IS LACKING.

H. NO TROUBLE IS ANTICIPATED FROM THE VC ON THE 20 JULY ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, BUT THE STUDENTS MIGHT CAUSE TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE OF OPPOSITIONIST NGUYEN TUONG TAM.

I. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE TIME BEING AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN NGHIEM WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF I CORPS, WHICH PLACES NGHIEM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AS THE TWO MEN DO NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH EACH OTHER. TRI'S PROMOTION WAS DESERVED BECAUSE HE IS A VERY STRONG FIGHTER. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9302, TDCSDB-3/655,512, REPORTED NHU'S STATEMENT THAT TRI HAD BEEN PROMOTED AND NAMED COMMANDER OF I CORPS. FVS-9267, TDCS-3/552,485, REPORTED NGHIEM'S STATEMNT OF HIS DESIRE TO RESIGN FROM THE ARMY.)

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10131
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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VERSION NLK-82-60
NLK-02-32c,1/03 6(E)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS DB-3/656,739
SUBJECT	GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH PLANS TO MAKE HIS FINAL DECISION SOON ON ANY ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME	**DATE DISTR.**	19 SEPTEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	15 - 16 SEPTEMBER 1963	**REFERENCES**	IN 22714
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FVS - 9660

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER (F) ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH.

APPR KHANH MAY STILL BE THINKING ABOUT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION, BUT WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SUPPORT, HE WILL PROBABLY NOT INITIATE ANY ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MOUNTING A COUP D'ETAT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED SINCE AN INDIVIDUAL CONNECTED WITH THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP HAS SAID THAT KHANH MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, AND SINCE KHANH'S NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY DISSIDENT GENERALS.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1963 BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, II CORPS COMMANDER, SAID THAT HE WOULD DECIDE IN A DAY OR TWO WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. (FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS-9634, TDCSDB-3/656,637, FOR PREVIOUS REPORT ON KHANH'S PLANNING.) HE REMARKED THAT IF HIS DECISION WERE NEGATIVE, HE WOULD CEASE ALL PLANNING AND NOT REVIVE THE PROJECT. ON 16 SEPTEMBER KHANH SAID THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WOULD MULL OVER THE SITUATION FOR ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL DECISION. KHANH PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE II CORPS AREA ON 18

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GROUP 1
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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXXXXXXXXXX	
STATE/DIR													EXO	

FORM 4-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SEPTEMBER.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY :	NARA
RECORD NUMBER :	176-10036-10134
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,771

SUBJECT PHAM NGOC THAO AND TUYEN GROUP READY TO LAUNCH COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 21 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

REFERENCES IN 24185

DATE OF INFO. 18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9674

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL CIRCLES WITH PARAGRAPH 1 FROM DUONG AND WITH PARAGRAPH 2 FROM LINH.

APPRAISAL: PLANS BY THE TUYEN GROUP TO LAUNCH A COUP D'ETAT ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING, BUT THE PRECISE TIMING AND CAPABILITY ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE.

1. THE MOVE TO OUST THE NGO FAMILY FROM POWER WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE WEEK BEGINNING 22 SEPTEMBER 1963, ACCORDING TO NGUYEN HUU DUONG, GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY IN THE SAIGON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND MEMBER OF THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP. DUONG SAID ON 19 SEPTEMBER THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU AND MEMBER OF BOTH THE TUYEN GROUP AND THE GROUP LED BY HUYNH VAN LANG, ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, HAD GIVEN HIM THIS INFORMATION. THAO HAD ALSO TOLD DUONG THAT GENERALS DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, AND LE VAN KIM OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WERE INVOLVED IN THE PLANS.

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GROUP 1
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, WOULD MOVE ON HUE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THAO LAUNCHED HIS MOVE IN SAIGON, ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT NGUYEN NGOC LINH, KHANH'S AIDE, ON 18 SEPTEMBER. LINH ALSO SAID THAT THAO WAS READY TO MOVE WITHIN A WEEK TO OVERTHROW DIEM.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/560,871

SUBJECT PLANNED SUICIDE OF AMBASSADOR BUU HOI'S MOTHER, DIEU HUE

DATE DISTR. 4 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 3 OCTOBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 32958

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9731

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG BUDDHISTS.

APPR: EARLIER ALLEGED INTENTIONS OF DIEU HUE TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN SUPPORT OF THE BUDDHIST CAUSE WERE WIDELY PUBLICIZED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SHE MIGHT DO SO.

1. BY 3 OCTOBER 1963 THE BUDDHIST NUN, DIEU HUE, MOTHER OF BUU HOI, VIETNAMESE SCIENTIST, AMBASSADOR TO SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND CURRENTLY THE GOVERNMNT OF VITNAM (GVN) OBSERVER AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), AD DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE, PROBABLY ON 5 OCTOBER. THREATWAS TIMED FOR IMPACT ON THE UN BUT WAS NOT TO BE BY BURNING.

2. DIEU HUE HAD PREPARED A LETTER DENOUNCING HER SON AND CLIMING THAT BUDDHISM WAS STILL BEING PERSECUTED IN VIETNAM, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FORIEGN PRESS AND TO THE "CLANDESTINE" OPPOSITION BY HER COMPANION AND ATTENDANT, A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI)(FOR HUGHES: PLS PASS TO MR. HILSMAN)

(2)

YOUNGER NUN.

3. JUST PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE, THE COMPANION PLANNED TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE U. S. EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND TO SEEK ASYLUM THERE. SHE BELIVED HER LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AS THE GVN WOULD KNOW THAT ONLY SHE COULD HAVE DISTRIBUTED THE LETTER.

4. THICH THIEN HOA, PRESIDENT OF THE PRO-GVN UNION COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PURE BUDDHISM AND MOST OF THE OTHER MONKS AND NUNS AT THE AN QUANG PAGODA, WHERE DIEU HUE AND HER COMPANION RESIDE, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SUICIDE PLAN.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10137
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 10/8/1963
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SUBJECTS :
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CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-82-55 + 24(c)1,6

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,133
SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 5 OCTOBER 1963
DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.
REFERENCES IN 33775
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 OCTOBER 1963)
APPRAISAL COMMENTARY
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE STAFF OFFICERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION.

1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF 29 SEPTEMBER-5 OCTOBER 1963 HAS BEEN A GREATER DEPTH OF REPORTING ON COUP PLOTTING, PROVIDING INFORMATION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AS TO THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED AND THEIR ALLOTTED ROLES. STILL LACKING, HOWEVER, IS SOLID INFORMATION AS TO THE COHESIVENESS OF VARIOUS GROUPS REPORTED READY TO LAUNCH A COUP AND TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[illegible]	[illegible]	OCI	ONE	OCR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
STATE/DIR																

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FORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ENJOY FIRM LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH WE ARE STILL GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES.

3. THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, THE LIST OF DEMANDS ARE QUITE EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY MEN TO THE POSTS OF MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, CIVIC ACTION AND EDUCATION. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR CONTROL OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON POLICE AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER A PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNORSHIP. DON SAYS THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW GENERAL OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT DIEM TO ACCEDE TO THIS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD INDEED AMOUNT TO A VIRTUAL SURRENDER ON THE PART OF DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU. THE LATTER WILL PROBABLY GO PART WAY, HOWEVER, IN MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE MILITARY IN AN EFFORT TO DETER THE LATTER FROM ATTEMPTING AN EARLY COUP. THEIR TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF SEEKING TO ENMESH THE GENERALS IN TIME-CONSUMING NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE PROSPECTIVE REVAMPING OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION OF THE RETURN TO NORMALITY THAT IS BEING FOSTERED BY THE REGIME, THE ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON CONTINUES TO BE PERVADED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY. ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING, AS WELL AS

SEARCHES OF PRIVATE HOMES BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

5. THERE ARE SCATTERED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) IS PLANNING TO SPRING SOME SURPRISES ON THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS. NHU, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE GENERALS THAT IN A FEW WEEKS HE WOULD UNDERTAKE AN UNSPECIFIED ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NATURE WHICH NEITHER "THE WEALTHY NOR THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE." WE ALSO HAVE A REPORT THAT SWEEPING CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND CIVIL INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX WILL OCCUR. MORE FRIVOLOUS BUT PERHAPS SUGGESTIVE OF THE DESIRE BY THE REGIME TO EASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON ARE THE RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED. NATIONAL DAY WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDED THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN BE COMPLETED IN TIME.

6. A STRIKING THING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT OFF VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT, EITHER IN SAIGON OR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) INTENDED DISRUPTION AS A COMPANION TACTIC TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CALL FOR THE BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTIONS. NEITHER DURING THE ELECTIONS, NOR DURING THE PRECEDING BUDDHIST CRISIS, DID THE COMMUNISTS SEEM ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES. ESPECIALLY LACKING WAS THE EXERCISE OF THEIR MUCH VAUNTED CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM, RAISING SOME QUESTION IN OUR MINDS AS TO WHETHER VC ABILITY TO USE TERRORISM IN CITIES WAS AS GREAT AS WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF THE VC BOYCOTT APPEAL SINCE THE GVN IN MANY AREAS MORE OR LESS FORCED THE ELECTORATE TO VOTE AND IN AREAS WHERE ITS CONTROL WAS NOT THAT STRONG, THE REGIME ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSIFIED THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE.

7. ONE INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT IT HAS THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL IS THE FACT THAT COLONEL TUNG HAS RELEASED TWO COMPANIES OF SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

8. ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GVN SECURITY CONTROLS, THE STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ARE DEVELOPING PLANS FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DIVISION OF OPINION AMONG THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE BUDDHIST CRISIS AND SOME HAVE SINCE EMERGED. REPORTING RECEIVED TO DATE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT YET MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY IF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STUDENTS AND THE GVN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THE STUDENTS ARE FLEEING TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO JOIN THE VC ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTEDLY DID LEAVE SAIGON AND HUE TO AVOID ARREST DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN.

9. A REPORT FROM A VIETNAMESE TRADE UNION OFFICIAL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NHU-MANELI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE GVN-DRV RAPPROCHEMENT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE SOURCE FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER, HO CHI MINH HAD AT ONE TIME INDICATED TO A FORMER FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTH VIETNAM HIS DISCOURAGEMENT OVER CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, HIS DISTASTE FOR THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE DRV, AND HIS RESTIVENESS OVER SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF AN UNSPECIFIED NATURE. LALOUETTE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO NHU WHO,

ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, LEAKED IT TO JOSEPH ALSOP, THUS BETRAYING THE CONFIDENTIAL FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH HO. THE FRENCH ALLEGEDLY FEEL THIS PUT LALOUETTE IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION; HENCE, HIS FAILURE TO RETURN TO SAIGON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH REALLY CONSIDER NHU'S "INDISCRETION" AS SERIOUS, AS THEY LET ON. SOURCE CLAIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANELI TOLD NHU PRRCTICALLY THE SAME STORY ABOUT HO'S PREOCCUPATIONS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR, DCM), USMACV (HARKINS), CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10138
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
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TITLE :
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—KLEIN
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—SCHLESINGER
—PRESS OFFICE
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO SIDDEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT PLANS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, OTHER HIGH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AND THICH TRI QUANG, AND BURN THE CHANCERY

DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8OCTOBER 1963)

APPRISAL SEE BELOW

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,149

DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

RIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9753

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

ITS REPRESENTATIVES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EITHER GVN-SPONSORED OR INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, MAY TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS REPORT ARE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN DUY BACH, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), SAID THAT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUGHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO ALLOW A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY UNDER COVER OF WHICH ABOUT 100 GVN AGENTS WOULD ATTACK THE EMBASSY AND ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING EMBASSY OFFICIALS AFTER WHICH THE CHANCERY WOULD BE SET AFIRE.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 BACH SAID THAT EARLIER ON THE SAME DAY A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WERE ORGANIZING A DEMONSTRATION WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY WITHIN "THE NEXT FEW DAYS" DURING OFFICE HOURS AND PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. THE STUDENTS PLANNED TO PRESENT A STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE PROTESTING THE REPRESSION OF STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BY THE GVN. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9749, (NOT YET RECEIVED), FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, REPORTED THE ARREST OF 130 SAIGON STUDENTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER BY SPECIAL POLICE.) THE STUDENTS ALSO TOLD BACK (AND BACH SAID THAT HE HAD CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES) THAT NGO DINH NHU, MINISTER OF CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU, AND COMMANDER

OF EMBASSY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MELVIN L. MANFULL, AND SPECIAL ASSISTANTS MESSRS. FREDERICK W. FLOTT AND JOHN M. DUNN, AS WELL AS THICH TRI QUANG, BUDDHIST LEADER CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE CHANCERY. THE GVN AGENTSWOULD THEN BURN THE CHANCERY.

3. BACH REMARKED THAT NORMALLY THE GVN PERMITTED NO DEMONSTRATIONS BUT, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNED INFILTRATION OF GVN AGENTS, THE GVN WOULD ALLOW THIS PARTICULAR (PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED)(X) DEMONSTRATION BUT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. (FIELD COMMENT. AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED ON 8 OCTOBER THAT A NUMBER OF POLICE WERE GOING TO MASQUERADE AS STUDENTS AND DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE BUILDING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

6. (X) HEADQUARTERS COMMENTAC MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

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1963 OCT 9 11 34

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10139
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
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ORIGINATOR : CIA
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Sanitized via b2M KLS 1/15 (15)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Bundy

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/562,014
SUBJECT	RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT NHU BE MADE PRIME MINISTER	DATE DISTR.	15 OCTOBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY OCTOBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 39851
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-9764

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CIRCLES, FROM CUONG.

APPRAISAL: THE CABINET OFFICERS MAY HAVE MADE SUCH A RECOMMENDATION.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN HOANG CUONG, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SAID THAT ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

2. ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT THO TOLD CUONG THAT IN EARLY OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TO

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	~~OBI~~	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 4-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

(13)

DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER CUONG SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10142
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : CIA Information Report
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

✓ Bundy

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SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,830

SUBJECT HUYNH VAN LANG COUP MOVE TIMING

DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 25834

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9691

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF HUYNH VAN LANG, FROM LANG.

APPRAISAL: THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS INDICATING THAT A COUP IS BEING PLANNED AND SOME OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN AGREES WITH THAT IN OTHER REPORTS. CLAIMS OF SUPPORT INDICATED HEREIN CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED AT THIS TIME, NOR CAN THE ACTUAL TIMING OF THE COUP.

1. SUMMARY. HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, SAID ON 24 AUGUST 1963 THAT HIS COUP GROUP WAS GOING TO LAUNCH A COUP BEFORE 5 OCTOBER AND PROBABLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER BECAUSE TROOPS WILL BE IN SAIGON AT THAT TIME. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES GENERALS TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL OF II CORPS, AND DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED. LANG CLAIMS TO HAVE SIX DIVISIONS

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	EXO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

PLUS AIRBORNE, MARINE, AND ARMOR ELEMENTS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUP. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI IS ALSO WORKING WITH THE GROUP.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF THE COUP:

A. IT IS TO BE INITIATED BEFORE 5 OCTOBER, POSSIBLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER. TROOPS WILL BE BROUGHT INTO SAIGON ON 26 SEPTEMBER FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. MILITARY UNITS WILL REHEARSE ON 28 SEPTEMBER FOR THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY PARADE, AND THESE TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. GENERAL KHIEM WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE THAT THE TROOPS BROUGHT TO SAIGON WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULD SUPPORT A COUP.

B. NO COUP HAS BEEN INITIATED AS YET BECAUSE EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT IT BE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS. LONE ATTEMPT WAS CANCELLED AT THE POINT OF EXECUTION BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED.

C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TO BLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE. THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR, IS THE VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAME THROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE.

D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALS KHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOIN

THE COUP ATTEMPT. COLONEL BUI DINH DAM, SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER, IS BELIEVED READY TO SUPPORT THE COUP BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED. COLONEL NGUYEN HUU HANH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IV CORPS, WHO IS A COUP GROUP MEMBER, BELIEVES THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER, WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP BUT OTHER GROUP MEMBERS ARE NOT CONVINCED.

E. GENERAL KHIEM WILL COMMAND THE COUP FORCES. MAJOR LAM TRANG THO, FORMER SECOND ARMOR SQUADRON COMMANDER AND NOW WITH THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, WILL COMMAND ARMOR UNITS, INCLUDING SOME ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD SQUADRON PLUS THE FIRST TANK COMPANY AND THE FIFTH MECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY OF THE FIRST ARMOR SQUADRON.

F. THREE BATTALIONS OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE UNDER A MAJOR WILL JOIN ARMOR UNITS IN THE SHOCK FORCE.

G. THE THIRD MARINE BATTALION UNDER CAPTAIN MAHVIET BANG WILL SERVE AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

H. LIEUTENANT COLONAL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU, WILL NOT COMMAND THE SHOCK TROOPS BUT WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY FUNCTION DURING THE COUP.

I. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN DINH PHAT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE CHIEF, WILL COME TO SAIGON AND ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE.

J. MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH REGIMENT, FIFTH DIVISION, WILL SUPPORT THE COUP WITH HIS FORCES. ALSO INVOLVED IS THE FIFTH RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE FIFTH DIVISION.

K. GENERAL KHANH WILL COMMAND SIX DIVISIONS, ASSISTED BY GENERAL TRI. THESE DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-FIFTH, TWENTY-THIRD, AND THE NINTH. ACCORDING TO KHANH, COLONEL BUI DZINH, NINTH DIVISION COMMANBER, IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM BUT WILL SUPPORT HIM IN THE COUP.

L. TIMING FOR THE COUP WILL PROBABLY BE 1000 HOURS, 1400 HOURS, OR 0500 HOURS, SO THAT FAVORABLE UNITS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WILL BE ON DUTY. THESE HOURS ALSO FALL BETWEEN THE NORMAL HOURS FOR CHANGING THE GUARD.

M. ARRIVAL OF HIGH-LEVEL UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCOURAGED THE COUP GROUP WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH THEM PRESENT IN SAIGON. THE GROUP HAS EVEN SPECULATED THE ARRIVAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING A COUP OF ITS OWN; ARTICLES IN THE VIETNAM PRESS WERE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10143
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TITLE : CIA Information Report
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CURRENT STATUS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,842

SUBJECT 1. NGO DINH NHU INTENTION TO DEAL WITH VC
2. ATTEMPTS OF PHAM NGOC THAO TO ARRANGE AIR FORCE SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9-20 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 26062

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9684

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A FIELD GRADE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICER (F).

APPR: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THAO HAS PLANNED A COUP AND HAS SOUGHT VNAF SUPPORT AS REPORTED. THE SUBSTANCE OG THAO'S TALKS WITH DIEM AND NHU CONCERNING NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG AND NHU'S PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGED. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT NHU WOULD MAKE A DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH THAO IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT NHU IS CONSIDERING SUCH ACTION. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE TALKED WITH THAO

1. SUMMARY. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSPECTOR FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENT DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU ABOUT NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THAT NHU HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WAS "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT NHU WAS PLANNING MAJOR CHANGES TO MAKE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST NATIONS. THAO HAS SOLICITED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

C.I.B.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

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THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLANS TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

2. THAO SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK 9-15 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT DIEM SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DIEM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE. THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY POPULAR BUT THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKED NHU BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT NHU WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE VC. THAO SAID THAT DIEM WAS ANGERED AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THAO THIS INFORMATION. THAO REPLIED THAT THIS OPINION WAS COMMONLY HELD BY CIVIL SERVANTS, THE GENERAL PUBLIC, AND THE AMERICANS.

3. ON 16 SEPTEMBER NHU SUMMONED THAO AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VC. THAO BELIEVED THAT NHU HIMSELF HAD TOLD AMERICAN AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THAT LODGE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAO. NHU CALMED DOWN AND LATER IN THE INTERVIEW ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT HE TOLD NHU THAT NHU DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE WOULD BE PLAYING A DANGEROUS GAME IN DEALING WITH THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. AMBASSADOR LODGE HAS NEVER MET THAO.)

4. THAO SAID THAT NHU PLANNED TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, WHICH THAO SAID, WOULD MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. (FIELD

COMMENT. THAO DID NOT STATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING NHU'S PLANS.) ACCORDING TO THAO, NHU'S CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS WAS VIA THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

5. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 THAO SPOKE TO A RANKING VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICER CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VNAF SUPPORTING A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID THAT:

A. THE VNAF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY FIGHTING BECAUSE RESISTANCE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE OVERCOME IN THREE HOURS.

B. THE COUP LEADERS WANTED THE VNAF TO HINDER OR STOP THE FORCES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER FROM ASSISTING FORCES LOYAL TO THE DIEM REGIME.

6. THAO WANTED VNAF SUPPORT TO STOP CAO ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED THAT CAO MIGHT NOT NOW SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AS STRONGLY AS IN THE PAST. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR THIS JUDGEMENT:

A. CAO DID NOT ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW IN THE IV CORPS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING MARTIAL LAW IN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON 21 AUGUST.

B. RECENTLY, CAO HAS KEPT HIS TROOPS HEAVILY COMMITTED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

C. CAO APPEARED TO BE REMAINING ALOOF FROM EVENTS IN SAIGON.

D. CAO HAS MADE REPEATED REQUESTS TO THAO TO VISIT HIM AND

(5) 5

HAS OFFERED HIS PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO THAO FOR SUCH A VISIT.

7. THE VNAF OFFICER WHOM THAO APPROACHED REPLIED THAT COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, WAS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE REGIME AND, PARTICULARLY, TO NGO DINH NHU. HE ALSO TOLD THAO THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT ACTION VNAF OFFICERS WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT OF A COUP. THAO REPLIED THAT IF HIEN FAILED TO COOPERATE, HE COULD EASILY BE KILLED.

8. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,031

SUBJECT FURTHER PLANNING OF LANG COUP GROUP

DATE DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 31379

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (30 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9725

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF LANG, FROM LANG.

APPR: LANG MAY BE MAKING COUP PLANS AS REPORTEDBUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER INDIVIDUALS NAMED MAY BE INVOLVED CANNOT BE JUDGED. GENERAL TY PROBABLY HAS SUPPORTED THE GENERALS' DEMANDS ON PRESIDENT DIEM. THE MEETING OF DIEM WITH THE TROOP COMMANDERS POSSIBLY TOOK PLACE AS REPORTED. LANG PROBABLY HOLDS THE VIEWS CITED.

1. SUMMARY. ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1963 HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY SAID THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, CHIEF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS), HAD REINFORCED THE GENERALS' DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS BUT THAT SOME GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE COUP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIEM INITIATES REFORMS. BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JGS, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON. HE AND OTHER GENERALS WANTED TO BE ASSURED OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT A COUP SUCCEEDED. COLONEL DO MAU, CHIEF, MILITARY SECURITY

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CIB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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SERVICE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS TO ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT DIEM'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY OFFICERS DURING WHICH THE LATTER RECEIVED GIFTS OF MONEY. LANG'S PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE COUP HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND HE HAS STARTED SELECTING MEMBERS OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT. LANG HAS ADVISED POSTPONING THE COUP UNTIL HIS GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

A. LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES, MET WITH OTHER GENERALS ON 26 OR 27 SEPTEMBER AND THEN SAW PRESIDENT DIEM TO URGE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS, INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERALS TO THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR.

B. GENERAL KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS WERE BECOMING CONVINCED THAT REFORMS ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT THE ENTIRE NGO FAMILY HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE.

C. KHIEM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON AND THE COUP PLOTTERS FEARED POSSIBLE VC EXPLOITATION OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT.

D. KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS DID NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT A COUP UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT THEM IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED.

E. COLONEL DO MAU, WORKING THROUGH LIEUTENANT COLONELS NGUYEN CAO KY, 1ST TRANSPORT GROUP COMMANDER AND DO KHAC MAI, VNAF CHIEF OF STAFF, HAS INDEPENDENTLY ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VNAF OFFICERS TO MOUNT A COUP AND ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. LANG'S GROUP BELIEVED THAT MAU WAS TOO INDISCREET BUT PLANNED TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SITUATION IF THE VNAF DID BEGIN A COUP. (FIELD COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAI AND MAU WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE REGIME.)

F. GENERAL KHIEM CLAIMED THAT HELICOPTER UNITS WERE INCLUDED IN THE LANG COUP GROUP.

G. PRESIDENT DIEM RECENTLY SUMMONED MILITARY OFFICERS, WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND ABOVE, WHO COMMANDED TROOP UNITS IN AND NEAR SAIGON AND GAVE THEM SUMS OF MONEY RANGING FROM 30,000 TO 100,000 PIASTERS. THE MONEY OSTENSIBLY WAS SEIZED FROM THE VC. COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THIEN, VIETNAMESE ARMOR COMMANDER, RECEIVED 100,000 PIASTERS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED HIM TO RENEW HIS ALLEGIANCE TO DIEM. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT THE COUP HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT OTHERS WERE NOT AND HAVE JOINED THE COUP GROUP.

(FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS 9712 (TDCS-3/560,375) FOR THAO'S STATEMENT T THAT NHU HAD GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO MILITARY OFFICRS.)

H. DIEM HAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER. ACCORIDNG TO GENERAL KHIEM, DIEM HAS GIVEN HIEN ORDERS TO USE THE VNAF FOR COUNTERCOUP ACTION AND FOR EVACUATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF NECESSARY.

I. DIEM OFFERED LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, INSPECTOR OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS, THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE WHILE NHU OFFERED HIM COMMAND OF THE SPECIAL FORCES. THAO, HOWEVER, HAS NOT WAVERED IN HIS SUPPORT OF THE COUP.

3. LANG SAID THAT HE HAS URGED DELAY IN MOUNTING THE COUP UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VOID FOR THE VC TO EXPLOIT. HE SAID THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE HIS IDEAS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LANG'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WOULD REPLACE PRESIDENT DIEM. THE TERM MINISTER WOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULD BE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD NOT DIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF A SHADOW CABINET:

A. GENERAL KHIEM, MINISTER OF SECURITY

B. VO VAN HIEN, CURRENTLY A SAIGON LAWYER, MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

C. LANG, EITHER MINISTER OF ECONOMY OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR FINANCE.

D. NGUYEN TON HOAN, PROMIENT OPPOSITION LEADER IN EXILE, MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

E. NGUYEN THAI, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE UNITED STATES, EITHER MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR CIVIC ACTION.

F. MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR DEFENSE.

G. NGUYEN HUY NGHIA, GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR INTERIOR.

H. NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER DIEM CURRENTLY IN EXILE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I. AU TRUONG THANH, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIST, DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

J. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE.

LANG HAS CONTACTED ALL OF THE ABOVE EXCEPT NGHIA, CHAU AND HOA. HE HAS SENT A CATHOLIC PRIEST TO PARIS TO CONTACT CHAU AND WAS PLANNING TO CONTACT THE OTHERS EVENTUALLY.

4. LANG SAID THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE INCLUSION OF TRAN KIM TUYEN, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS GVN CONSUL GENERAL TO CAIRO, IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THAO HAS ASSURED TUYEN'S SUPPORTERS IN SAIGON THAT TUYEN WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE COUP.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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106 10a

CAS 79407

October 30, 1963

SEE SANITIZED
VERSION NLK-03-330
+ DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET

~~TOP~~ SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

FROM McG. Bundy, White House

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are

better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.

~~if generals request it and~~

~~4. With respect to money for coup group you are authorized to [illegible] make such clandestine disbursements as you consider secure and effective from available CAS piasters.~~

4 ~~5~~. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5. ~~6~~ To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team. Our only modification of existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instructions should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution, when time permits.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 7. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U. S. -controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U. S. Government that it should succeed.

7. We have your message about return to Washington and ~~if announcement has not already been made,~~ we suggest that ~~it~~ all public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TO :
TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia
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1a

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-81-235

[illegible]

SECRET

STATUS REPORT

ON

SOUTHEAST ASIA

JULY 11, 1962

PREPARED BY:

TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

VIET-NAM

Current Overall Evaluation

The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing to improve its military, and to a limited extent, its political and economic position. Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories and none appear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses.

On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued well. Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however, in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion). This may be due to reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes. The GVN took several good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and several rural social and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consumer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries continued good.

Fearing that the prospective Laos settlement will facilitate Viet Cong activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam itself, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself. There is no response as yet.

Progress on Action Program

1. VC Activity

Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27 June and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July 4. The lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mobility and performance of the GVN forces. Observing that this appears to be a period of VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV reports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate platoons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce. MACV J-2 estimates infiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June, but this information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltration since.

In spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included some main force personnel. For the period 20-27 June the VC suffered a reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC and 141 friendly forces.

Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies. Unconfirmed reports raise the possibility that the VC are attaining an anti-aircraft capability.

(Following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of July 3)

2. Strengthen popular support. The GVN took several steps to generate more popular support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 release of 794 prisoners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven" holiday (anniversary of Diem's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GVN officials, and a Presidentially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his participation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Diem in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National Assembly.

Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and for the people in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres. Ngo dinh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the strategic hamlet program) is concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the election of hamlet officials by secret ballot instead of by customary show of hands. This is now being done in some hamlets.

4. Seek International Support

(a) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16, but did not apologize or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions were taken to avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that in spite of these precautions the frontier may have been violated, points out that any such inadvertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border control committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border cooperation.

Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed coastal islands, was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further trouble between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.

(b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country representatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings, Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership on the ICC. The Belgians, French, Italians and the UK have not yet responded.

Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being worked out with Wellington and Saigon.

10. Military Civic Action

The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple. In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet were also air dropped.

12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plans

Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction. Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as the military move into VC territory.

Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for what is theoretically a full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set up there. The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in advance of the move establishment of military control over the area so that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a very short period for the physical move)

Montagnards. Latest information developed as a result of joint surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more a long term problem than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Montagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably continue, particularly if the GVN provides adequate food and security.

Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and receiving minimum food, shelter and security.

The Embassy comments that while this information somewhat reduces the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed, national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Vietnamese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC pressures and more may do so.

Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for 490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.

Future Plans. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the pacification of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be presented to the Embassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly developing plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.

15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.

Village Radios. As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village radios were installed and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains were started.

Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops because of the effect on Asian opinion. Decision and action will be delayed until the Governor's return from Geneva.

20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Effort.

Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for agricultural efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon. One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.

Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned hospital surgical suites began on schedule.

Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.

25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.

Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating no difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspapers.

28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.

The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and physical arrangements are underway.

1a

THAILAND

Current Situation Evaluation

The RTG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RTG has not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO Council of Representatives in mid-July.

On July 2 the US began the redeployment of 1,000 Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over this move was lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).

On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and one in Lampang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Communist propaganda ring operating out of Northeastern Burma.

Progress on Action Program

1. Improved Logistic Facilities

We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield improvement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military engineeringequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right-of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.

2. Internal Security Plan

We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to cable summaries of those portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic components of the entire plan during Secretary McNamara's forthcoming trip to Honolulu.

1a

LAOS

Current Situation Evaluation

The principal remaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including SEATO, having been resolved, it is anticipated that the new Accords may be signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible refusal of the GVN to sign. The GVN's position stems from its belief that so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of SVN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Laos and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN.

Progress on Action Program

There has been little progress on our action program. We are concentrating at present on the following problems:

1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing Souvanna with the material assistance he requires by enlisting contributions from other Free World nations.

2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with respect to the GVN, GRC, Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the interim we are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.

3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to the essential heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.

4. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out their undertaking.

1a

BURMA

Current Situation Evaluation

The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted by incidents on July 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army. These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian political supporters.

Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate, though not dramatically. A special Government amnesty offer expired June 30 without producing significant response from the insurgents.

Progress on Action Program

1. Political

It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary Council will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.

2. Economic (AID)

No new developments.

3. Military

a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military "sales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2 carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency operations. This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit for the United States.

b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program. 117 prospective students have been processed for the coming year.

CAMBODIA

Current Situation Evaluation

Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia. Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, and it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia and Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietnamese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam. Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting in Bangkok has developed.

Progress on Action Program

1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's protest against the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.

2. Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of disappointment that military budget support was not included.

3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T-28 aircraft, first increment of sixteen, have arrived in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of Ambassador Sprouse.

4. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out, and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10120
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 12/00/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 430: Kennedy, Reactions to Death Miscellaneous, 11/22/63-6/18/64. Box 5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET *(When Filled In)*

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC / YUGOSLAVIA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/566,658

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF YUGOSLAV AND BLOC DIPLOMATS ON THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF KENNEDY ASSASSINATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 6 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 74578

DATE OF INFO. 25-29 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. GREECE, ATHENS (28 NOVEMBER, 2 DECEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL 2 (THAT STATEMENTS ARE ACCURATELY REPORTED)

FIELD REPORT NO. EKA 4230

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A GREEK POLITICAL OBSERVER (B) WITH CONTACTS AMONG BLOC DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS, FROM THE DIPLOMATS MENTIONED BELOW.

[illegible]
__ALEXANDER
__BELK
__BRUBECK
__CHASE
__DINGEMAN
__DUNGAN
__ECKEL
__FORRESTAL
__JOHNSON
__[illegible]
__KLEIN
__[illegible]
__SCHLESINGER
__SMITH, WM. Y.

Kennedy admin

FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED)* BEING TAKEN BY SOVBLOC AND YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATS IN GREEK CIRCLES:

1. ON 25 NOVEMBER 63, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO GREECE PEKO DAPCEVIC EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY WOULD NOT CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, ADDING THAT HE IS CERTAIN SOVIET UNION IS WELL DISPOSED TO CONTINUE FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH WEST. DAPCEVIC SAID THERE HAS BEEN "A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE" ON PART OF SOVIET PEOPLE IN PAST FEW YEARS FROM EARLIER ATTITUDE THAT ALL AMERICANS AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE WAR MONGERS TO CURRENT THINKING THAT AMERICANS, LIKE SOVIETS,

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EX
STATE/DIR																	

DEC - 6 1963

REALLY WANT PEACE. ZENITH OF THIS CHANGE CAME WHEN UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED IT WAS WILLING TO SELL WHEAT TO SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO DAPCEVIC, THIS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR FEELING IS NOW SO FAVORABLE TOWARD AMERICANS THAT EVEN IF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WANTED TO REVERSE THIS FEELING, IT COULD NOT EASILY DO SO.

2. ON 26 NOVEMBER, CZECH FIRST SECRETARY VAKLAV SVESTKA STATED THAT CZECH EMBASSY IN ATHENS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REACTION OF PRAGUE TO THE ASSASSINATION, BUT FEELING OF CZECH EMBASSY PEOPLE IN ATHENS WAS THAT U S POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE MATERIALLY. SVESTKA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ASSASSINATION WILL HAVE DELAYING ACTION ON IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS; UNDER KENNEDY THINGS WERE MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING, AND CHANGE OF PRESIDENT NOW WILL OF NECESSITY SLOW DOWN THE COURSE OF EVENTS BECAUSE "PERSONAL FACTOR" IS NOW MISSING. KENNEDY HAD DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ACHIEVED ACCEPTANCE OF SOVBLOC (PORTION GARBLED)*POPULATIONS AS PEACE LOVING MAN; JOHNSON HAS TO ESTABLISH THIS FOR HIMSELF NOW, AND IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME.

3. ON 29 NOVEMBER, SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY VITALIY NOVIKOV STATED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE WITH ONLY ONE YEAR BEFORE ELECTIONS JOHNSON AS NON-ELECTED PRESIDENT IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BASIC KENNEDY

POLICIES. SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, OVER FUTURE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ASSASSINATION CLEARLY SHOWS RADICAL RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS ARE STRONG, HAVE SUPPORTERS IN LOCAL POLICE AND POLITICAL CIRCLES AND ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEIR IDEALS. IT ALSO REVEALS, NOVIKOV SAID, STRENGTH OF REACTION IN AMERICA TO KENNEDY POLICIES SOVIET PEOPLE FEAR THAT RIGHT-WING WILL BE DOMINANT.

4. ON 29 NOVEMBER, RUMANIAN AMBASSADOR MIRCEA BALANESCU SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BLOC POLICY VIS-A-VIS WEST AND ANY INCREASE IN TENSION WOULD BE RESULT OF CHANGED AMERICAN POLICY.

5. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCNELM CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL).

6. *HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTIONS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF THEY MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10440
RECORD SERIES : Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re:
DATE : 9/3/1961
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Cuba, Meetings on Refugees, Box 4. Box 7.

NLK · 77 · 004 · 10 · 2 · 2

2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY BRAZIL CHINA CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/485,732

SUBJECT OFFER OF SUPPLIES AND MEN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND CUBA

DATE DISTR. 3 SEPTEMBER 1961

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. WEEK OF 27 AUGUST 1961

REFERENCES IN 23204

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO (2 SEPTEMBER 1961)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HBR 2529

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A BRAZILIAN PROFESSOR (C) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADERS.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 27 AUGUST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA BOTH OFFERED MATERIAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING QUOTE VOLUNTEERS UNQUOTE, TO LEONEL BRIZOLA, GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL, WHO WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE IN BRAZIL TO ASSURE THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF VICE PRESIDENT JOAO GOULART UPON THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS. BRIZOLA DID NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE MORAL SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO QUOTE CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR UNQUOTE OF BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CRISIS. (FIELD COMMENT: BRIZOLA OBVIOUSLY WAS AFRAID THAT IF THE OFFERS WERE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERVENE. THE OFFER OF AID BY CASTRO LEAKED

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO THE PRESS; THAT OF MAO DID NOT).

2. 2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCARIB. CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10452
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/1/1962
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

EXEMPT NLK-75-17, [illegible] 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/650,938

SUBJECT WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

DATE DISTR. 1 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

REFERENCES

IN

~~SMITH BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

DATE OF INFO. 1 AUGUST 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS ~~TENTATIVE~~.

SOURCE PARAS. 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU.
PARAS. 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG.
PARA. 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.

2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	~~USIA~~	OCI	ONE	~~OCR~~	~~ORR~~	~~OO~~	DIA	CIB
VTF															EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IN

WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

7. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

8. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

9. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

10. FIELD COMMENT. CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

12. FIELD COMMENT. /AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.

13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10453
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/14/1962
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SUBJECTS :
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CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FILE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RETAIN OR DES

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/651,039

SUBJECT VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. EARLY AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES IN 43629

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7782

~~SMITH-BUN~~
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
_KILDUFF
_PETERSEN
_SCHLESING
~~_TAYLOR~~
_BELK
~~_FORRESTAL~~
_JOHNSON
_EN
_KOMER

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS, FROM ANOTHER VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST.

APPR ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT WERE MADE AS INDICATED, IT IS CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER ACTUALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST ON 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLES AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH, THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS BELIEF THAT A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS, AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM. HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IS A NEUTRALIST COALITION SIMILAR TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTS, INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHERE ROBERTS ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE JOURNALIST AND AMBASSADOR HOHLER. THE JOURNALIST HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOME TIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ROBERTS HAD ARRANGED THE MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH HIM.

3. NEITHER THE JOURNALIST NOR ROBERTS HAD MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THEIR VIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE JOURNALIST ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT, FAR FROM BEING NEUTRALIST MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION SINCE HE BELIEVES NEUTRALISM TO BE NO MORE THAN A MAJOR STEP TOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVER AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNISTS. ROBERTS POINTEDLY DISAGREED WITH AMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORT UNDER WAY AND THE GAINS ALREADY APPARENT. ROBERTS DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM CAT [illegible] NGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONS.

ROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLY EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE AMERICANS.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER MAY HAVE BEEN ONE DATELINED SAIGON, 29 JUNE 1962, APPEARING IN AN EARLY JULY ISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED "INTRA-PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM - MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?" THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT AND MISINTERPRETED VARIOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED, WHICH LED HIM TO CONSIDER THE JOURNALIST A NEUTRALIST. THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED INVOLVED, WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE AS FOLLOWS: "STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM HERE WERE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING - BY THE PRO-SOVIET GROUP, WILL EXERT A TEMPERATE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS. UNLESS THE SCALES ARE TURNED BY PEIPING IN FAVOR OF ITS PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH IN ON THE RED DISPUTE, THE CHANCES WERE NOT DISMISSED OF A LONGER TRUCE IN TOTTERING LAOS, AND EVEN OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM."

5. (FIELD COMMENT: IN A LATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, R.A. BURROWS, ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT

THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED. IN CRITICIZING THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME, BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD FAIL TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE, MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY JUNTA, POSSIBLY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.)

6. (FIELD COMMENT. US AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, FREDERICK E. NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAS NEVER GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HE HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR NOLTING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. AMBASSADOR NOLTING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE, AND WITH THE POSSIBLILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER

ON 8 AUGUST THAT, WHILE HE CONSIDERS FRENCH POLICY BOTH IN PARIS AND IN SAIGON TO HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE FEELS THAT THE BRITISH HAVE A CONTRARY POLICY MORE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE US. NHU SAID THAT HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT CAUSE HIM CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE BRITISH ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND INITIATED THE COMMENT THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAD SAID TO HIM RECENTLY THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAM OR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS "UNTHINKABLE.")

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10454
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report
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SUBJECTS :
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RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 9/22/62-9/27/62. Box 6.

Upheld via RAC 1/15 13

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS -3/523,453
SUBJECT	PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST-SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS	**DATE DISTR.**	25 SEPTEMBER 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID SEPTEMBER 1962	**REFERENCES**	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962)		
APPRAISAL	2	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FVS 7977

✓ ~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
_KILDUFF
_PETERSEN
_SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
_BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
_KOMER
_RASKIN
_SAUNDERS

IN 20325

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SAIGON, WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON, THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/NATIONALIST CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS.

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL, AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10460
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Task Force Status Report
DATE : 0/00/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 332 R & S, Southeast Asia Task Force Reports 4/11-6/13/63. Box 6.

[illegible] 77C

SECRET

COPY 1 OF 10

STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS

CAMBODIA

A CIA source in the Chinese Nationalist diplomatic mission in Saigon has reported GRC plans to assist dissident Cambodian leader Son Ngoc Thanh in a political action campaign against the Sihanouk government. The GRC is also exploring Thanh's capability for penetrating the Cambodian government and the feasibility of assassinating Sihanouk.

NORTH VIETNAM

Over 700,000 CIA-designed leaflets were dropped into the Haiphong/Lay Kay areas in April. The objective of this operation, in addition to familiarizing the DRV population with the anti-communism symbol on the leaflets, is to create a diversion within North Vietnam proper which may dissipate DRV security strengths in response to psywar and deception activities, and thus lessen DRV capability for action in South Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAM

A two-month Civic Action Ministry training course for 229 montagnard cadres was completed in April. The first priority of these graduates, in direct satisfaction of requirements levied by General Rosson during his visit, is formation of fixed teams for use at Special Forces camps. Included in the course were 45 Vietnamese civic action cadre, all tribal dialect speakers, who will serve as team chiefs.

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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SECRET

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10491
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
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TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Appeal to President Kennedy
DATE : 1/24/1962
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DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL FILE

COUNTRY	CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/499,631
SUBJECT	APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS IN PHNOM PENH	DATE DISTR.	24 JANUARY 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	20 JANUARY 1962	REFERENCES	IN -15274
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (20 JANUARY 1962)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	FDP 1560

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU. [redacted]

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN PROTECTIVE CUSTORY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER COLONEL NGUYEN CHANH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	~~AID~~ DI

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

LANGUAGE VERSION.

2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES" WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE CS-3/486,609 AND FDP 1168/TDCS-3/473,682 IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10493
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Comments
DATE : 1/28/1962
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
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COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

EXEMPT NLK-81-213

46 29

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FILE

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/500,097

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 25 JANUARY 1962

REFERENCES IN 18750

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7006

~~BUNDY~~
TAYLOR
KAYSEN
BELK
R. JOHNSON
DUNGAN

RETAIN OR DESTROY

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER (C) WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.

1. ON 25 JANUARY 1962, TRAN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. (FIELD COMMENT. (TDCS-3/500,042) FVS-6999 BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITICAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL NGHIEM.) SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

2. LY SAID THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. LY WAS AWARE THAT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT

CONFIDENTIAL   CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS   **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EXO

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. LY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT. TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-5908 (cs-3/474,755) HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIEM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED THAT, WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT DIEM.)

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND OF ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets
DATE : 2/20/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.

[illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Hillsman asked that this be called to your attention
Bics

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/502,553

SUBJECT STRATEGIC HAMLETS

DATE DISTR. 20 FEBRUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

FILE

DATE OF INFO. MID-FEBRUARY 1962

FIELD NO. FVS-7075 IN 30145

RETAIN OR DESTROY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG CORRECTLY REPEATED NHU'S STATEMENTS.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B), WITH PARAS. 1-3 FROM NGO DINH NHU, AND PARA. 4 FROM BUI VAN LUONG.

1. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, STATED ON 14 FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SO ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD BE PLACED IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA

VTF

ADDED: EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

SMITH-BUN
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN
PETERSEN
SCHLESINC
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
FORRESTAL
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

2. THE PROGRAM AS PLANNED BY NHU HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.

A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE POPULATION.

B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE VIETNAMESE LIFE. NHU STATED THAT IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. NHU COMPARED THE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTO THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF ASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL POWER. NHU STATED THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONG THIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING BICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE OF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET, HE REITERATED, WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT, NHU SAID, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. HE DEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED THAT AT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS IN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULL APPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD BROUGHT OUT IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD DEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, AFFORD A BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY, E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH MOVEMENTS, ETC.

3. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS WITH A GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL POINT TO THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-7034, TDCS-3/501,110 GAVE AN ACCOUNT, FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AT THE MEETING.) HE STATED THAT HE

WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE. THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. NHU SAID THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START AGAIN.

4. MINISTER OF INTERIOR BUI VAN LUONG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION ON 13 FEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT NHU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE PROGRAM. NHU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10032
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Embtel 660 (Saigon) Re: Task Force on Vietnam
DATE : 11/16/1961
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 11/16/61-11/17/61, box 195. Box 8

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NLK-75-92
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Control: 9439
Rec'd: NOV. 16, 1961
3:50 a.m.

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FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 660, INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 268

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

TASK FORCE VN

REF: EMBTEL 627

1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF NEW MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE (COLONEL NGUYEN VAN Y VICE GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA) FALL INTO TWO GENERAL FIELDS, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL POLICE. BOTH CAS AND USOM HAVE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIME BEEN STYMIED BUT WITH CHANGE BELIEVE REAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. THIS WILL REQUIRE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED PROGRAMS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, TRAINING, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL U.S. PERSONNEL FOR NECESSARY LIAISON AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT.

2. CAS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED TO ITS HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION SERVICE, TO SERVE AS "SPECIAL BRANCH" OF SURETE, WHOSE CHARTER AT PRESENT COVERS BOTH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ORDINARY INVESTIGATIONS. THIS "SPECIAL BRANCH" WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT PROVINCE LEVELS AND BE MANAGED THROUGH REGIONAL DIRECTORATES. AT EACH REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, CAS WOULD PROPOSE ASSIGN AT LEAST ONE CAS OFFICER TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON AND COLLABORATION. CONCEPT WOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION HIS EFFORT INTO VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE FOLLOWING CAS COMMITMENT:

A. CAS OFFICERS FOR DIRECTORATES AT HUE, NHA TRANG, BAN ME THUOT, BIEN HOA, SAIGON/CHOLON, AND CAN THO, AS WELL AS ALREADY

SECRET

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EXISTING PERSONNEL FOR LIAISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PERSONNEL WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY INTERPRETERS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

B. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION TRAINING TO VIETNAMESE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF NEW SPECIAL BRANCH, TAKEN FROM EXPERIENCED SURETE OFFICERS.

C. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO GIVE PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICERS FUNDS TO OPERATE AGENT NETWORKS IN PROVINCES. EXACT SUM NOT YET DETERMINED BUT WILL BE SEEN TO BE SUBSTANTIAL BY MULTIPLYING NUMBER OF PROVINCES (38) BY REASONABLE MONTHLY SUM FOR EACH PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ENABLE HIM HIRE AGENTS AND PAY OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

3. USOM EQUALLY DETERMINED PROSECUTE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER COLLABORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE WITH REGULAR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS OF SURETE, TO PROVIDE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ON EFFECTIVE NATIONAL BASIS TO BOLSTER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO CONTRBUTION CRIME -- DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC. THIS WOULD COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE, SURETE AND RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE:

A. CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR.

B. A DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE SEPARATE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES.

C. THE ADOPTION OF A REALISTIC TRAINING PROGRAM, GEARED TO AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM OF COMMODITY PROCUREMENT.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE. USOM ENVISIONS DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND UPON RECIPIENTS'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INTRODUCTION OF NEW CONCEPTS.

4. THIS BEING MADE TASK FORCE MATTER DUE MY CONVICTION IT IS SUBSTANTIAL WE MOVE FORWARD IN BOTH ABOVE FIELDS TO MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHAT APPARENTLY

IS REAL NEW BREAK IN SITUATION. URGE FULLEST SUPPORT FROM TASK FORCE LEVEL AND ABOVE OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY BY CAS AND USOM, AND SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR NECESSARY PERSONNEL AND BUDGET ADDITIONS WHICH MAY BE INVOLVED.

NOLTING

MM

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10001-10060
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. I, BOX 32
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

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TO :	
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RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/02/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #158

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

158

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/658,582

SUBJECT CUBAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION

DATE DISTR. 18 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 82930

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 16 DECEMBER 1963

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAS BEEN A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

1. FIDEL CASTRO WAS VERY UPSET OVER THE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. THE TOP CUBAN LEADERSHIP WAS SURE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION FOR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST CUBA WOULD NOT OVERTHROW THE RÉGIME.

2. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE CUBAN GOVT., ON ORDERS FROM CASTRO, IS NOT TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PUBLIC OR DO ANYTHING TO IRRITATE HIM. ACCORDING TO CUBAN GOVT. LEADERS, CASTRO WANTS TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAYS AND DOES ABOUT CUBA,

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	XXX FBI

STATE/DIR REPCINCLANT I&NS TREASURY

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

AND GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE, IF HE FEELS SO INCLINED, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10061

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/1963
PAGES : 2

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CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #170

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

170

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/658,469
SUBJECT	ALERT STATUS OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AS RESULT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY	DATE DISTR.	13 DECEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	9 DECEMBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 79459
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	9 DECEMBER 1963		
APPRAISAL		FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A SENIOR CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO IS AN ASTUTE OBSERVER AND HAS DEMONSTRATED MATURITY, DISCERNMENT, AND RELIABILITY IN HIS PAST REPORTING.

1. ABOUT 2 DAYS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD BEGAN TO RECEIVE A SERIES OF MESSAGES PLACING THEM ON A SPECIAL ALERT STATUS. THESE MESSAGES WERE OBVIOUSLY DUE TO APPREHENSION BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST THE MISSIONS. THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WERE EXHORTED TO EXERCISE EXTREME VIGILANCE, TO MOUNT A NIGHT-AND-DAY WATCH OF MISSION PREMISES, TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE WERE "NO COMPROMISING

—BUNDY-SMITH
—ALEXANDER
—BELK
—~~BRUBECK~~
—CHASE
—DINGEMAN
—DUNGAN
—[illegible]
—FORRESTAL
—JOHNSON
—KILDUFF
—KLEIN
—KOMER
—SAUNDERS
—SCHLESINGER
—SMITH, WM. Y.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	FBI
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

DOCUMENTS ON THE PREMISES," AND TO BE ON GUARD AGAINST HOSTILE PROVOCATIONS.

2. ONE CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO, FOLLOWING HIS USUAL PRACTICE, REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE PERMISSION TO ACCEPT A LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO CUBA, WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST FORMALLY SUBMIT HIS REQUEST BY CABLE. HE DID SO ON 29 NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL 6 DECEMBER THAT HE RECEIVED THE AUTHORITY TO QUIT HIS POST.

3. AS OF 9 DECEMBER THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION FROM HAVANA THAT THE ALERT ORDER WAS TO BE CONSIDERED REVOKED.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10001-10063
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

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DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/13/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #188

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

188

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY URUGUAY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,829

SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 24 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67186

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (23 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2414

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B).

DY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
~~BRUBECK~~
CHASE
DINGEMAN
~~DUNCAN~~
~~ECKEL~~
FORRESTAL
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KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

1. RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/ (CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING TO STONE THE EMBASSY. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES. KENNEDYS ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME).

2. THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDEO HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE 3000 PERSONS MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

190

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,826

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF CUBAN OFFICIALS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 23 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CHILE, SANTIAGO (22 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

_BUNDY-SMITH
_ALEXANDER
_BELK
~~_BRUBECK~~
~~_CHASE~~ 147
_DINGEMAN
~~_DUNGAN~~
~~_ECKEL~~
_FORRESTAL
_JOHNSON
_KILDUFF
_KLEIN
_KOMER
_SAUNDERS
_SCHLESINGER
_SMITH, WM. Y.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CHILEAN WHO HAS A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO ACQUIRED THROUGH PROLONGED ASSOCIATION WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE EMBASSY. HE IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE REPORTER.

PPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE AS REPORTED.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

A. ON 22 NOVEMBER JOSE TOHA, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CHILEAN CUBAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE AND DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-CASTRO LEFTIST PRESS ULTIMA HORA, INFORMED PEDRO MARTINEZ PIREZ, CHARGE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO, THAT KENNEDY HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED. TOHA SAID "ESTE ASUNTO DE KENNEDY SE ESTA PONIENDO COLOR DE HORMIGAS" (POSSIBLY MEANS ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY LOOKS LIKE IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS). MARTINEZ COMMENTED THAT HE HEARD THAT THE PERSON ARRESTED WAS PRESIDENT OF A FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE AND THAT IF THE YANKEES OR CIA ASSASSINATED KENNEDY TO RESUME THE ASSAULT ON CUBA, THEN A THIRD WORLD WAR

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

TATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR ~~OBI~~ OO FBI
TATE/DIR
I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT Exd

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ORM -62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WOULD START. HE SAID THINGS ARE VERY CLEAR AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED HIM, THE CONTRADICTIONS ARE WELL DEFINED AND THE MOMENT WAS VERY SPECIAL, LIKE THAT OF THE MAINE. MARTINEZ SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOW IN THE MOST DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IN LATIN AMERICA, THE WORLD, GOULART, ARGENTINE PETROLEUM, PERUVIAN LANDS, CHILEAN MINES AND IN GENERAL ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA. TOHA SAID HE WAS VERY WORRIED AFTER READING THE CABLE TRAFFIC. MARTINEZ ADDED THAT IF THE USA IS THINKING OF INVADING CUBA THEN THEY MUST HAVE EVERYTHING ALL PREPARED AND ALL THE STRATEGY READY AND THEREFORE THE ALARM MUST BE GIVEN SO THAT CUBA CAN BE PREPARED.

B. THE CUBAN CONSUL AT VALPARAISO CALLED THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO TO DETERMINE POLICY IN THE MATTER OF FLYING THE FLAG AT HALF MAST. THE REPLY WAS THAT THERE ARE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA AND THAT NO OFFICIAL WORD HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM CUBA, SO THEREFORE NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS AGAINST PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECREED OFFICIAL MOURNING INCLUDING FLYING FLAGS AT HALF MAST.)

C. MARTINEZ REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER STATEMENTS PREFERRING TO WAIT FOR OFFICIAL WORD FROM HABANA. SEVERAL TIMES HE DENIED THAT THE ASSASSIN WAS INVOLVED IN THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE INSISTING THAT THIS PERSON IS ONLY A SUSPECT AND THAT EXTREME RIGHTISTS OR SEGREGATIONISTS ARE TO BLAME. MARTINEZ SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO PUT THE BLAME ON CUBA.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

CUBAN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

27 March 1963

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

27 March 1963

CUBAN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

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OCI No. 0515/63

27 March 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Training of Latin American Subversives

SUMMARY

1. We estimate that at least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received guerrilla training or political indoctrination in Cuba.

2. We have recorded the travel of 5,059 Latin Americans to Cuba in 1962, and reporting to date indicates that at least another 417 went during the first two months of 1963.

3. Field replies to a survey estimate that there were about 11,000 arrests in Latin America during the past 15 months for terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla activity, or other subversive activity. Only a small percentage of those arrested, however, were brought to trial; almost all were released after varying periods of detention.

4. Current efforts to improve and exploit reporting on travel to Cuba had not made themselves felt during the reporting period. The security services of Latin American countries accordingly were unable, with isolated individual exceptions, to establish Cuban direction, instigation or training of arrested subversives.

5. Incidence of guerrilla, terrorist, and sabotage activity at present is highest in Venezuela, Peru, and--in the form of largely non-political banditry--Colombia. There is sporadic guerrilla activity in and around Nicaragua and Guatemala, and a guerrilla potential in Ecuador and Brazil.

DISCUSSION

A. Recruitment of Trainees

1. Candidates for subversive training in Cuba are selected by the leftist organizations sponsoring such activity in their homeland. These organizations are not always Communist, particularly in countries where the regular Communist leadership is less militant than other extremist groups. One training group of Argentines included Peronists, Trotskyites, and Vanguard Socialists. A Peruvian group has sent to Cuba for extended guerrilla training youths who are not members of any organizations but have expressed leftist ideas.

2. In countries where there is Cuban diplomatic representation, candidates are screened by the embassy's G-2 officer. We have no information on how approval is granted in countries which have no diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Travel

1. There is a concerted effort to conceal or obscure the amount of travel to Cuba, the identities of the travelers, and the length of their stay. Documents are falsified and such devices as detachable visas, circuitous travel, and some surreptitious border crossing are used.

2. Since the October crisis, the only Western Hemisphere access to Cuba by scheduled airline has been through Mexico. Throughout the reporting period Mexican authorities have been photographing passports of travelers arriving from or leaving for Cuba, and relaying the information to interested OAS members. In some cases the travelers themselves have been photographed.

3. Cuban embassies, however, have been issuing visas on separate sheets of paper to avoid any record of Cuban travel in the passport. In addition, since some passports are fraudulent, the Mexican report of Cuban travel may neither reach the correct country nor permit identification. At this agency's suggestion, Mexican travel control authorities late in February began stamping passports to show arrival from or departure for Cuba. While this effectively counters the device of the detachable visa in the

case of legitimate passports, most Latin American countries have inadequate personnel and administrative machinery to scrutinize the passports of returning travelers.

4. Travel control in Mexico City logged 4,912 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, and 969 in the first two months of 1963. (These figures do not cover access by other routes prior to the quarantine in 1962, and include Cubans as well as all other nationalities. Accordingly they do not correlate with totals for legal and illegal travel to Cuba derived from available reporting in the individual Latin American countries. It should also be noted that a "legal" traveler in Mexican reporting may be listed as an illegal traveler by his homeland, either because he had no authorization to visit Cuba, or because of fraudulent documentation.)

5. Anniversary celebrations, goodwill tours, and international conferences afford pretexts for travel to Cuba ostensibly unconnected with subversive training. Identities of trainees are usually protected by pseudonyms, at least during actual training, and the guerrilla candidate may return to his Havana hotel every few days to maintain a fiction of sightseeing. There have also been reports that trainees have for cover purposes attributed extended stays in Cuba to detention by Cuban police.

6. Prior to the October crisis, there was some direct travel to Cuba from Central American countries, and occasional Cubana charter flights, but the main jump-off points were Mexico City, Curacao, and Trinidad. A Canadian non-scheduled airline has operated a few flights between Canada and Havana, carrying both personnel and cargo. Cuban freighters call fairly regularly at Mexican ports, and some Latin American trainees could reach Cuba aboard Cuban ships picking up rice in British Guiana. There is small ship traffic, of unknown but limited extent, between Cuba and neighboring islands.

7. Soviet and Czech airlines continue transatlantic service to Cuba, and Iberian airlines on 11 February announced resumption of a schedule of two flights a month to Havana via the Azores. Aeroflot has occasionally sought and received permission

to land at Recife, Brazil, en route to Havana, and may have picked up some passengers

8. Controlled sources who have undergone guerrilla training, and a comparison of inbound and outbound travelers identified by travel controls make it clear that at least in the case of guerrilla trainees one leg of the travel is often by way of bloc countries and Western Europe. We know of Latin Americans given Cuban training who appear on no travel controls, suggesting that travel in both directions was either by way of the bloc or completely surreptitious.

9. A center providing funds and forged passports for travel to Cuba is known to exist in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Cubans are known to provide forged passports for some of the returning trainees. One group of Argentines returning through Prague and Western Europe was furnished with both Cuban and Ecuadorean passports, to be surrendered in Montevideo prior to re-entering Argentina.

C. Numbers of Trainees

1. Our estimate that 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received subversive training in Cuba is derived from a combination of travel information, debriefing of controlled sources who have taken training, penetrations of sponsoring organizations, and in a few cases from the records of cooperating Latin American security services.

2. Monitoring of travel into Cuba gives some indication of how many have stayed long enough to receive training, but does not permit differentiation between military training and political indoctrination. We cannot establish a hard total or be certain about length of visit because of travel via the bloc. Forged documentation obscures an accurate nationality breakdown of the travelers.

3. The hardest figures on guerrilla trainees by nationality are obtained from established and reliable sources who have access to such information through sponsoring organizations and in a number of cases have themselves taken such training in Cuba. We do not, however, have enough such sources to provide independently a comprehensive total of Latin America. Only a few of the local Latin American security services have adequate assets for contributing such information.

D. Training

1. The scope of training varies with the time available. One agent who participated in a four-week course in mid-1961 received basic training covering cross-country movement of guerrillas, use and maintenance of weapons, and basic guerrilla tactics. Another clandestine source who spent nearly six months in Cuba in 1962 devoted more than 10 weeks of training to weaponry, communications, the fortification of defense positions, combat tactics, general strategy, map-reading, security, and sabotage. Both men reported considerable time devoted to political indoctrination and physical conditioning.

2. One controlled agent reported that his entire group was required to fill out an extensive questionnaire aimed at developing targets in the homeland for sabotage, subversion of military and police, illegal entry and movement, operation of dummy business concerns to cover clandestine operations, and possible zones for air-drops.

3. Extensive use is made of Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare. The trainees also use a handbook by Alberto Bayo, former colonel in the Spanish Republican air force who trained the original guerrilla group with which Castro invaded the Sierra Maestra. Thousands of copies of these books, in Spanish or in Portuguese, have been printed or mimeographed and are circulating in Latin America. Some have been specifically revised for individual countries.

4. We also have reports of related courses of instruction, lasting as much as six to eight months, in such fields as espionage, psychological warfare, political action, agent communications, and military medicine. Some of the trainees are women.

5. Most of the instructors of the guerrilla warfare courses are Cuban. There are some reports of Spanish instructors. Del Bayo himself is too old to participate actively, but apparently has an "emeritus" connection. General Enrique Lister has been reported to be associated with guerrilla training. There have been a number of reports, without hard confirmation, that Soviet and satellite instructors handle some of the more sophisticated training in such matters as sabotage and espionage.

6. Reports of trainees indicate that weapons training is confined to weapons they will be able to obtain, maintain, and replenish in their own countries. We have reliable and corroborative reports that trainees and sponsoring leaders alike have been told Cuba does not intend to supply appreciable quantities of weapons because a guerrilla must be self-sustaining. It should be noted that while Cuba does supply some funds, guerrilla handbooks also suggest that bank robberies make guerrillas self-sufficient in this respect. Leftist militants have in fact resorted to robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina

E. Subsequent Employment and Countermeasures

1. Clandestine reporting has established a number of incidents of sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla activity and other subversive action in which individuals known to have received training in Cuba have participated. The clearest cases involved the establishment of local guerrilla training camps by Ecuadoreans and Brazilians returning from training in Cuba. In each case, however, our evidence of the guerrilla training in Cuba comes from clandestine sources, there is no legal evidence of such Cuban instruction, and there has been no move to prosecute. All 48 arrested in Ecuador were released after short detention. Two individuals arrested in connection with the Peasant League training activities in Brazil are still known to be detained.

2. The records maintained by Latin American security services are inadequate and far from standardized, so that it has been difficult to establish a statistical approach to arrests for all types of subversive activities. Available reporting indicates at least 11,000 such arrests since 1 January 1962, but a survey shows that most of these arrests amounted to little more than detention and some interrogation. There were relatively few trials and convictions, probably not exceeding five per cent of arrests.

3. Some of those arrested were released for lack of evidence. In other cases, for example in Ecuador, Brazil, and in Peru until last January, there has been little evidence of any inclination on the part of the government to prosecute. In cases where trials have taken place, the local security services have frequently

been unable to establish any Cuban connection, as in the case of the 139 guerrillas tried in Venezuela last fall.

4. In the absence of a comprehensive statistical approach, information on arrests, trials, and the involvement of Cuban trainees in subversive activities is given in the individual country reports attached to this memorandum.

F. Purpose and Propaganda

1. Fidel Castro stated in July 1960: "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been taking the line in public that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance need be exported. In private, they have been offering training and financial and technical assistance to Latin American revolutionaries. While Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR restrains a wholehearted endorsement of the more militant Peiping attitude, Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart insist both in public speeches and in private remarks to visiting Communists that "Socialism" can be brought about in Latin America only by force.

2. Direction and support by propaganda is on a massive scale. The work of Radio Havana and of the Prensa Latina news service is backed up by bulk mail and even air freight shipments. Postal and customs authorities in Panama, for instance, are destroying a monthly average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda which is entering or being sent through Panama. Costa Rica averaged 10 tons in 1962.

3. Radio Havana's international service, started in May 1961, now leads all Latin American international services in program hours. It broadcasts a weekly total of 188 hours of propaganda in languages including Spanish, Portuguese, Haitian Creole, English, French, and Arabic. This includes 108-1/2 hours in Spanish to the Americas, 7 hours in Portuguese, 7 hours in Haitian, and 17-1/2 hours in English to the Western Hemisphere. It also originates black broadcasts on occasions such as the disorders in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, and makes transmitters available to Latin American exile groups.

Attached annexes discuss Cuban training of Latin American subversives on a country-by-country basis.

27 March 1963

ARGENTINA

1. About 500 Argentines are estimated to have traveled illegally to Cuba for training in subversive activities. One training group alone, given guerrilla warfare training over a six-month period in 1962, varied in number from 34 to 50. For the past four months departures from Argentina for Cuba have averaged 35-40 a month. Argentine intelligence says 80 of the 500 are known to have received guerrilla training; the number is probably considerably higher.

2. The federal district around Buenos Aires records no arrests for guerrilla activity. There were 155 arrests and three convictions for sabotage in 1962, and 14 arrests, but no convictions, to date in 1963. Records on terrorist activity show 468 cases, 60 arrests, and 27 convictions in 1962; 121 cases, two arrests and two convictions in 1963. Argentine police also list 628 arrests in 1962 and 1963 on the broader charge of "subversive activity."

3. Altogether police files show 1,285 incidents of sabotage or terrorism, of which 425 were committed by unknown persons. Police have no evidence that any of those arrested or convicted are known to have received training in Cuba.

4. None of the individuals known to have received extensive Cuban training hold influential positions, but the following individuals in position of influence have traveled to Cuba and may have received some training:

Fanny Edelman, former secretary-general of the Argentine Communist women's organization UMA, presently assigned to foreign liaison of the Argentine Communist Party.

Maria Josefa de Mastroberti, prominent member of the Cuban Solidarity Committee for Argentina.

Osaias Leon Schujman, director of the Federation of Communist Youth, national deputy for the Argentine

Communist Party, reportedly a supplier of false passports for travel to Cuba.

Jorge Francisco Timossi, former Argentine representative for Prensa Latina.

Hector Villalon, prominent Peronist close to Peron.

5. Argentine guerrilla training units in Cuba have been mixed, including Peronists, Communists, and Vanguard Socialists. There are indications that the most active recruitment is carried on by the Argentine Communist Party and by the Communist-influenced left wing of the Peronist movement, under the direction of John William Cooke in Cuba. His wife, Alicia Cooke, lives in Montevideo, Uruguay, which is the principal center providing funds and forged documentation for the recruits.

6. An Argentine taking a six-month course received training in weapons, marksmanship, explosives, ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, sanitation, closed and open order drill, and construction of defenses. Weapons used included Mauser and Garand rifles, Brownings, Thompson submachineguns, bazookas, 81-mm mortars, and a 57-mm recoilless cannon.

27 March 1963

BOLIVIA

1. About 500 Bolivians traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and 25 in the first two months of 1963. There have been no arrests of pro-Cuban agitators for sabotage, terrorist, guerrilla, or other subversive activities in Bolivia to date.

2. We can identify by name 214 of the travelers to Cuba. The individuals who killed a number of anti-Communists during a pro-Cuban demonstration on 26 October 1962 were identified as having visited Cuba. Six of these agitators were indicted but released when government investigators placed the blame for the incident on anti-Communists.

3. Otherwise there have been no known incidents which might be attributed to Cuban training.

4. Zenon Barrientos Manani, a national deputy belonging to the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), since his return from Cuba has been reported without confirmation to be organizing guerrilla forces among Bolivian peasants. The same untested source said Barrientos was active in supplying weapons to Peruvian guerrillas and had aided Peruvian guerrilla leader Hugo Blanco during a reported Bolivian visit by Blanco.

5. Other Bolivians in positions of influence who have been in Cuba long enough to receive training include:

Daniel Saravia Quiroz, secretary-general of the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB). (Saravia, however, is reported to have changed his beliefs since his travel to England.)

Baldomero Castel, COB leader.

Oscar Salas, mine leader.

Oscar Sanjines, leader of the Cochabamba Labor Federation.

Ofelia Altamirano de Sabrabi, factory workers' leader.

Student and youth leaders Andres Soliz Rada, Dulfredo Rua, Walter Quisbert Barrios, and Alberto de la Barra.

PCB leading members Mario Manje and Hilario Claure.

Alcides Monasterios, national deputy of the left-wing sector of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

6. In January 1963, there were 60 Bolivian scholarship students in Cuba who had attended compulsory 20-day courses of military instruction. The Cuban charge in Bolivia reportedly said last month that Cuba expected to give more than 80 scholarships to Bolivians in 1963.

7. The Bolivian government in June 1961, published documents purporting to prove that left extremists had been corresponding with the Cuban Embassy in an effort to obtain arms and instruction for pro-Castro "combat groups." While Bolivia has had extensive paramilitary formations ever since the MNR defeated the armed forces and seized control, and while the extreme left of the MNR in particular has strong militia units, we know of no paramilitary formations linked directly with Cuban subversion.

8. We assume, however, that some proportion of the 500 legal travelers received indoctrination while in Cuba.

27 March 1963

BRAZIL

1. Approximately 400 Brazilian nationals traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and another 24 the first two months of 1963. A total of about 50 Brazilians are believed to have received specific guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, starting with a contigent of 12 men in July-August 1961. We know of 19 Brazilian specifically. A defecting Cuban army officer who claims to have run a base for guerrilla training reports that 37 Brazilians took courses there at a time which does not coincide with the 19 cases in our records.

2. At least four of the guerrilla trainees in the original contingent of 12 were connected with the guerrilla training camps of the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, exposed by the Varig air crash documents. At least six such camps were established, and each was to have 30 men and at least one leader trained in Cuba. Only one of the Cuban trainees is known to have been arrested. Altogether there were only three arrests, although 24 additional warrants were issued.

3. All of the Brazilians we can identify as guerrilla trainees have come from the regular or the dissident Communist party or the Marxist-oriented Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Trainees sent by the Leagues were in some cases also members of the regular Communist party.

4. Brazilians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Clodomir dos Santos Morais, number two man in the Peasant Leagues, and principal agent in setting up the training camps; still in custody.

Joaquim Ferreira, Pedro Motta Barros, Rivadiva Braz de Oliveira, and Amaro Luiz de Carvalho, Peasant League leaders. (Ferreira, a lawyer, is a former economist for SUDENE, development agency for the impoverished northeast. Barros and de Oliveira are also student leaders, and Barros is a Communist Party youth leader.)

Florentino Alcantara de Moraes, Pernambuco state leader of the regular Communist Party of Brazil.

Carlos Danielli, Angel Arroyo, Mauricio Grabois, and Joao Amazonas, leaders of the dissident Communist Party.

27 March 1963

CHILE

1. There were 551 legal travelers from Chile to Cuba in 1962, and another 110 in the first two months of 1963. (Anniversary celebrations tend to make travel in January higher than the monthly average.) In addition, field reports show about 400 illegal travelers in 1962, under a definition which lists nationals of one country who obtain their Cuban visas in a third country as "illegal."

2. We have no hard clandestine evidence of Chilean guerrilla trainees. A defecting Cuban army lieutenant has told reporters that a base he commanded gave 19 Chileans guerrilla training in late 1961. Since neither travel to Cuba nor the large Communist party is illegal in Chile, a Chilean national has little reason, other than the intention to take subversive training, to conceal travel to Cuba. On this basis it would appear to be a safe assumption that more than half of the illegal travelers probably received military or political indoctrination.

3. The only known arrests in the past 15 months for subversive activity took place in October 1962, when five members of the Progressive Socialist Movement (MSP) were arrested following an explosion while they were assembling bombs in a downtown Santiago apartment. Four of the five were released after three days; the fifth, whose hand had been blown off, was given a jail sentence. The bombs were to have been used against the U.S. embassy.

4. Julio Stuardo, leader of the MSP and one of those arrested, had traveled to Cuba, but is not known to have received any particular training. He had been photographed prior to the bombing incident with Cuban embassy officials believed to be intelligence officers.

5. There are no Chileans in positions of influence who are known to have received training in Cuba. However leftist Senator Salvador Allende, the probable FRAP candidate in the next presidential election, has made numerous visits to Cuba.

27 March 1963

COLOMBIA

1. We have record of about 400 Colombians who traveled to Cuba legally during the past year, and no record of any illegal travel. Approximately 100 appear on manifests via Curacao, and 65 via Mexico City. Travel information on the remaining 235 is based on agent reports and liaison.

2. Of these 400, 37 are reported to have received training in guerrilla warfare, one in counterintelligence, and one attended a staff or cadre school.

3. Most of those selected for training are members of either the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) or the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). Both are made up of revolutionaries, dissident Communists, and recruits from the ranks of labor, students, and the unemployed lower classes. Both receive Cuban financial support, and are attempting--without appreciable success to date--to coordinate operations with the bandit gangs terrorizing the violence areas of Colombia.

4. Two guerrilla leaders imprisoned in 1961--Eddie Aristizabal of MOEC and Tulio Bayer--and one killed in 1961--Antonio Larotta of MOEC--were reported to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Larotta's training was in 1959.

5. Colombian army statistics (which the U.S. army attaché considers on the high side because of the statistical procedures used) list 2,582 rural bandits captured and 1,029 individuals detained on suspicion of involvement in rural banditry in 1962, and 300 captured and 134 detained in the first two months of 1963. The Colombian army has no statistics on subsequent trials, but on the basis of past experience it is estimated that about two percent of all those arrested and detained--i.e., about 80 persons--were convicted and sentenced. The bandits are not considered guerrillas in a political sense, although some Cuban propaganda has been found on dead bandits. There were 388 bandits killed in rural areas in 1962, and 89 in 1963.

6. According to official records, there were 13 terrorist attempts in Colombia during 1962, in the course of which nine terrorists were captured, and one was killed. Three of those captured--all members of FUAR--were convicted. One of the three, Alvaro Santiago Paz of Cali, is known to have traveled to Cuba. To date in 1963 there have been 15 terrorist attempts, including eight in Bogota. There have been 16 captured and one killed in Bogota preparing or attempting terrorist acts. One terrorist, identified as a FUAR member, was convicted in Cali. One terrorist, not yet identified, was captured in Medellin.

7. Santiago is the only captured subversive known to have been in Cuba. Three leading members of MOEC--Aristizabal, mentioned above; Pedro Abella; and Fabio Molino--are known to have received training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

COSTA RICA

1. A total of 216 Costa Ricans visited Cuba in 1962. As many as 30 probably received paramilitary training.

2. In February, 1963, 21 Costa Ricans returned from visits of four to six months. It has been reliably established that nine of them were trained as instructors in guerrilla warfare, and one was trained as an organizer and instructor for militia training. The length of stay suggests that the remaining 11 also received paramilitary instruction. Three other Costa Ricans, including one woman, known to have gone to Cuba for such training are not yet reported to have returned to Costa Rica.

3. Two Costa Rican Communist leaders are reported independently by fairly reliable sources to have stated that guerrilla warfare training camps are to be established in Costa Rica. The purely Costa Rican aspect makes this a new development; guerrilla activity in Costa Rica hitherto has centered in the relatively wild and lightly policed northeastern frontier area, and has been targeted against Nicaragua.

4. There have been no arrests for sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla activity in Costa Rica. About 50 have been temporarily detained for subversive activity, and one individual was arrested and jailed for one year. (This does not include about 30 suspected subversives detained during President Kennedy's visit.)

5. Nineteen of the 30 Costa Ricans believed to have received guerrilla training in Cuba are known by name. Of the 19, the only ones in positions of influence are Oscar Morera Madrigal, San Jose physician, and Modesto Ruiz Ruiz, leader of the Communist labor union in the banana zone.

27 March 1963

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. The Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1963 arrested 120 persons for sabotage, terrorism, or other subversive activity. Of these, 45 were held for an appreciable time, tried, or sentenced. This includes 33 who were deported. Of these, three are known or believed to have received training in Cuba.

2. There were 15 incidents in all, five of which are considered to have been inspired by Cuban trainees. The remainder were caused by people not believed to have had any Cuban training.

3. There is no hard evidence of legal or illegal travel from the Dominican Republic to Cuba since 1 January 1962, although some of the deportees may have returned from Europe to Cuba. The best available estimate is that about 25 Dominicans may have gone to Cuba illegally. We have an unconfirmed report that three Dominicans went to Cuba for guerrilla training, and 12 others are believed to have stayed long enough for appreciable training or indoctrination.

4. Individuals in positions of influence, known or believed to have received training in Cuba, include:

Juan Ducoudray Mansfield of the Dominican Communist party.

Rafael Faxas Canto of the leftist 14th of June group.

Gustavo Machado Baez, director of the Agrarian Reform Institute (rumored to have been trained in Cuba, but we have no previous traces.)

Labor leaders Jose Estrella and Jacobo Armach.

Student leader Luis Gomex Perez.

Tomas Parmenio Erickson Alvarez, a leader of the pro-Communist MPD party.

Andres Ramos Peguero, MPD, recently sentenced to 30 years in prison

27 March 1963

ECUADOR

1. In 1962 there were an estimated 208 legal travelers from Ecuador to Cuba, including 50 who went for sports events. As of December, about 80 members of Communist and Communist-front youth groups had been in Cuba since June undergoing guerrilla training.

2. Travel reports showed 40 to 60 Ecuadoreans entering Cuba through Mexico in the first two months of 1963.

3. At least 15 Ecuadoreans trained in Cuba are known to have engaged in paramilitary activities of a training nature following their return.

4. Army forces in April 1962 rounded up 48 members of URJE, a Communist-front youth group, at a training camp 50 miles west of Quito. Seven of those arrested had been trained in Cuba. None of the 48 was tried, and none was held for more than six weeks. This was the group whose leaders the Communists subsequently expelled from URJE amid published charges that they had wasted $44,000 in Cuban funds.

5. Including the 48 URJE guerrillas, there have been an estimated 75 arrests in 1962 and 1963 for guerrilla and terrorist activity, distribution of Communist propaganda, and painting of Communist slogans on walls. All of the propagandists were released after several days of detention.

6. There have been three known terrorist attempts, including the bombing of a theater and a radio station. Most of the participants are identified in clandestine reporting. They include several who have probably had training in Cuba.

7. Ecuadoreans in positions of influence who have had training in Cuba include URJE leaders Mario Vera Arrata, Jefferson Quevedo, Enrique Medina, Carlos Alvardo Loor, and Milton Mejia; and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, secretary-general of the Ecuadorean Communist Youth (JCE) and JCE leader Ketty Romoleroux.

8. We estimate that there are at present about 200 men in paramilitary units. Four corroborative reports establish that the regular Communist Party of Ecuador is forming a paramilitary command of 10 squads of 10 men each scattered throughout the country.

9. Cuban travel does not show in Ecuadorean passports, and is primarily by way of Mexico. There are seven recorded cases of travel via Prague, and two via Paris.

27 March 1963

EL SALVADOR

1. Approximately 100 Salvadorans traveled to Cuba in 1962, and eight more have gone in 1963. Most of them attended party meetings or celebrations for one or two weeks. About 20 continued to Bloc countries. There is no evidence that any received guerrilla training or extensive political indoctrination.

2. Since passage of a new law in September, 1962, Salvadoran authorities have been arresting returning Salvadorans suspected of having gone to Cuba. Several now are in jail awaiting trial. Almost all Salvadoran travel to Cuba is through Mexico with detachable Cuban visa. A number of Salvadorans have remained in Cuba because of the police crackdown in El Salvador.

3. There are no known paramilitary units or related activity.

4. There have been 196 recorded arrests since the beginning of 1962 for terrorist or subversive activities. None of those arrested has been convicted or even tried, but 66 were held for an appreciable time--about 15 for as long as nine months. We believe that three of those arrested had had some type of training in Cuba. There is no record of any arrests for guerrilla or sabotage activity.

5. Records show a total of 25 subversion incidents: eight by unknown persons; three involving individuals believed to have received training in Cuba; and 14 involving persons not believed or known to have had any Cuban training.

6. Other than two prominent Communist labor leaders, Luis Felipe Cativo and Jose Delfino Perez, Cuban trainees are not known to have any positions of influence in El Salvador.

27 March 1963

GUATEMALA

1. There were about 80 illegal travelers from Guatemala to Cuba in 1962, of whom we believe 20 to 30 received training in guerrilla and sabotage techniques. Identified trainees have remained in hiding since their return. Guatemalan Communists have contingency plans for paramilitary operations, but have been waiting for other elements to create a favorable opportunity for such action.

2. Cuba in the past has furnished funds for illicit purchase of weapons by non-Communist elements, such as the "13 November" movement of ex-Lieutenant Yon Sosa, which has sporadically undertaken unsuccessful military operations against Guatemalan army garrisons. The Cubans have cited the greater militancy of non-Communist groups in explaining such funding operations to the Guatemalan Communists.

3. Cuba gives asylum to former Guatemalan President Arbenz and other leading members of his regime, and affords them propaganda facilities.

4. Arrest statistics in Guatemala are inconclusive because of the waves of detentions during periods of tension. During nearly daily disturbances in January-March 1962 in which an estimated 40 were killed, for example, about 1,000 were arrested under state of siege. A few were exiled to El Salvador, but most of those arrested were released after several days.

5. Similarly, there were a number of arrests on charges of terrorism or subversion during the first half of 1962, but no trials. Communists inspired and controlled most of the street disturbances, but the mobs were made up of all anti-regime elements, and no known incidents can be attributed to the individuals trained in Cuba. Numerous copies of Che Guevara's handbook for guerrillas were passed out early in 1962 to serve as a "do-it-yourself" handbook on sabotage and terrorism.

6. There have been an estimated 60 incidents, ranging from the almost daily explosion of homemade bombs in some periods to the assassination of the judicial police chief, dynamiting of a water reservoir, and sabotage of a gasoline storage tank. The government has attributed almost all such acts to "Castro-Communists." Cuban trainees were very probably involved, but there is no good evidence of identity.

7. On 12 March 1962 Guatemalan troops encountered a group of 20 Communist guerrillas near Salama, and killed 18. Members of this group may possibly have been trained in Cuba. On 27 March 1962 the army captured 10 guerrillas infiltrated from Mexico, where they had been organized and supplied by Guatemalan Communist exiles with the knowledge of the Cuban embassy. This group was held for military court martial, and there has been no further word of disposition.

8. Five Communists arrested in early December in the act of posting propaganda were released after several days of detention. On 14 February 1963, 13 Communists, including two members of the central committee, were arrested on charges of subversion and planning an insurrection, and are still held. Several of these had traveled to Cuba, but there is no evidence of any training.

9. The reported leader of the Guatemalans known to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, returned to Guatemala alone on 17 April 1962 and went underground. He was most recently reported scouting the Salama area for possible arms cache sites. The Guatemalan Communists recently formed a "military commission," divided into secret cells, to direct insurrectional activity, possibly due to begin in June or July.

27 March 1963

HAITI

1. There is no firm evidence on legal or illegal travel from Haiti to Cuba. The traffic, if any, is probably small. We believe there is clandestine movement by small boat between the two countries.

2. More than 50,000 Haitians live in eastern Cuba, concentrated around Santiago. Most are employed as cane field laborers.

3. Exile sources claim that 400 of these workers have been trained for subversive activities and that some of the trainees have already returned to Haiti. We have no supporting evidence, however, have detected no returning trainees, and know of no pro-Castro paramilitary groups in Haiti.

4. There are two clandestine Communist parties in Haiti, The leader of one of them, Rene Depestre, is in Cuba and reportedly works on Cuban propaganda beamed at Haiti.

5. The only known incident involving Communists was an attempted demonstration at the U.S. Embassy on 31 October. Advance warning from a clandestine source within the Communist party, who said the instructions for the demonstration came from Cuba, enabled police to forestall the incident. Several of the youths involved may have been detained briefly by the police.

6. No Haitian occupying any position of influence is known to have received any training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

HONDURAS

1. There were 92 legal travelers from Honduras to Cuba in 1962 and 21 to date in 1963. Twelve travelers continued to Soviet bloc countries. Most of the travel to Cuba was for one or two weeks, precluding any extensive paramilitary training, but a definite correlation can be established between the return of Hondurans from Cuban visits and the intensity of propaganda and labor agitation. Honduran exiles in Cuba carry on a virulent propaganda campaign over Radio Havana, calling for revolution.

2. There are no known Honduran paramilitary formations, and other Central American Communists are known to have criticized the Honduran Communist Party for lack of militancy. The PCH obtained a series of 16 different military manuals in October, 1962, including manuals on the use of the carbine, explosives, and demolition techniques.

3. As in the case of Costa Rica, there are guerrilla units of Nicaraguan exiles based in thinly patrolled Honduran frontier areas, receiving support from Cuba and raiding sporadically into Nicaragua in the hope of sparking a mass uprising. One group under Carlos Fonseca Amador has about 40 men.

4. Since 1 January 1962, there have been only two arrests for subversive activity in Honduras. Neither man is known to have received training in Cuba, and both were released after short detention without trail. Three other individuals have been charged with subversive activity but no action was taken.

5. Hondurans in leading organizational positions known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Labor: Manuel Noe Rodriguez Reyes, Floresmila Castro, Luis Banegas Izaguirre, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Jesus Otavio Hernandez, Darios Hector Toledo, Regina de Lainez, Anibal Moradelo, Felex Vanencia, Ramon Sabillon Orellana, and Guadalupe Reyes.

Students: Randolfo Espinsosa Mourra, Rolando Orellano Cruz, Oscar Duron, Ulises Ekonomo Torres, Carlos Falck Contreras, Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaquez, Leonidas Velasquez Funes, and Rodil Rivera Rodil.

Communist Party: Dionisio Bejarano Ramos, Luis Manuel Zuniga, Agapito Robledo Castro, Rigoberto Padilla Rush, Feliciano Protillo Lara, Gustavo Andara Bulnes, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Longino Becerra, Mario Sosa Navarro, Luis Andres Pineda Villalabos, and Rodolfo Aguiluz Berlioz.

Women: Antonia Suazo Bulnes, Gladas Tablada Ortiz, Rosa Suarez de Moncada, Diana Maria Gomez, and Constanza HH. Caballero.

Education: Medardo Mejia Paniagua and Mariano Mendez Avila.

27 March 1963

MEXICO

1. Mexican nationals traveling to Cuba totaled 238 in 1962 and 157 in the first two months of 1963.

2. A fairly reliable source reported in mid-1962 that about 150 Mexicans were receiving guerrilla training at Minas del Frio, Cuba. A defecting Cuban Army lieutenant told the press in Brazil that 70 Mexicans were trained at his base at San Julian in late 1961. These reports are regarded with reserve, however, particularly in the light of our knowledge that Cuba does not wish to damage its relations with Mexico as long as Mexico City is the principal Cuban "window" to Latin America.

3. Arrests for subversive activities have not been numerous. In the most recent case, six professors and two students at the University of Morelia were arrested for participation in Fidelista protests over the dismissal of the University's Communist rector. One teacher, a Guatemalan Communist militant who visited Havana for 17 days in 1961, is still imprisoned and will probably be deported. Another professor had probably visited Cuba.

4. A Nicaraguan Communist was deported in January and an Argentine Communist newsman in November 1962 for pro-Castro activities. Two Cubans were arrested on arrival in February 1962 and deported as agitators.

5. Mexican government agents on 24 May 1962 killed Ruben Jaramillo, Mexican Communist and guerrilla fighter, at Morelos, and subsequently arrested one of his guerrilla associates, Jorge Martinez Rosillo, who had been a friend of Raul Castro since the Castros' training period in Mexico. Jaramillo had been invited to Cuba in 1961, but there is no record of his travel; Martinez Rosillo was in Havana for 20 days in 1961.

6. Communist factions have touched off numerous disturbances at the national university in Mexico City and provincial universities. Anti-Communist

students charge that direction, material, and financial support for these disturbances is channeled through students who have received training in agitation while visiting Cuba as "athletes." More than 50 Mexican students attended the Latin American University Games in Cuba last October.

7. Mexican authorities continue to confiscate large amounts of propaganda from travelers returning from Cuba. For example, three students at Morelia attempted to bring 100 kilograms of propaganda material into Mexico on 31 August 1962.

8. Mexicans who have visited Cuba and probably received training or directives include more than 30 prominent writers, teachers, and leftist party leaders.

27 March 1963

NICARAGUA

1. About 75 Nicaraguans have traveled to Cuba during the past 18 months. Nicaraguan security authorities list 22 as known to have received guerrilla warfare training there.

2. Of the 22, eight were arreated when they returned to Nicaragua to carry on anti-Somoza activities. Two have been sentenced to prison and the other six were released after interrogation.

3. Cuba has dealt with, financed, and supported a succession of Nicaraguan exile movements, but Guevara recently told visiting Central American Communists that none of these had developed a satisfactory level of popular support. Nicaraguan exiles maintain small guerrilla bands across the borders in both Costa Rica and Honduras, making sporadic incurions, but to date they have evoked no internal support and have been effectively rounded up or driven back by the Nicaraguan National Guard.

4. Eight Nicaraguans were tried in June, 1962, for conducting terrorist training. They were caught while studying the manufacture of bombs under an instructor trained in Cuba. Nicaraguan authorities seized arms, ammunition, explosives, and 700 pounds of propaganda. A Nicaraguan found with an arms cache in April 1962 reportedly told interrogators the arms had come from Cuba. A Nicaraguan who had gone to Cuba in mid-1962, ostensibly for a surgical operation, was caught shortly after his return with supplies of explosives intended for terrorist bombings.

5. Altogether there have been five major subversive incidents in Nicaragua since 1 January 1962, four of which involved individuals known or believed to have received training in Cuba. Perpetrators of the fifth incident are unknown. A total of 41 persons were arrested. Nineteen were held for an appreciable time, and 14 were tried and sentenced. Seven of the total 41 are known or believed to have been trained in Cuba.

6. A number of minor incursions into Nicaragua, mainly from the Honduran border, have been mounted by the Cuban-supported, Communist-dominated National Liberation Front (FLN). At least nine of the FLN members engaged in these raids are known or believed to have had Cuban training.

7. Influential Nicaraguans known to believed to have received indoctrination and training in Cuba include:

Carlos Adan Perez Bermudez, Eligio Alvarez Montalvan, and Reinaldo Viquez Ruiz, leaders of both the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PSN) and the Communist-front Republican Mobilization (MR).

Francisco Rolando Alvarado Lopez, (PSN) leader of the Communist labor front. (In custody)

Ricardo Francisco Osejo Zeledon, Orlando Quinones Torres, and Guillermo Andres Baltodano Serrano, youth front leaders influential among students.

Juan Jose Lorio Garcia, PSN central committee member.

Adrian Sanchez Sancho, Communist labor leader (still in Cuba.)

Abdul Sirker Urroz, PSN leader (believed still in Cuba.)

FLN leaders Marco Antonio Melendez Delgado (in custody,) Socrates Noel Flores Vivas, Ivan Sanchez Arguello, Orlando Quant Quintana, and German Pomares Ordonez.

8. Agapito Fernandez Garcia, a federal deputy of the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, was in Cuba for 10 days during the January anniversary celebration and may have received some form or instruction or indoctrination.

27 March 1963

PANAMA

1. Panama lists 56 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962 and two thus far in 1963. Altogether, however, 64 Panamanians are identified, on the basis of their political backgrounds and known length of stay in Cuba, as probably having gone to Cuba for either political indoctrination or guerrilla training. Of these 64, 38 almost certainly received guerrilla training.

2. Eighteen guerrilla trainees returned to Panama in February, 1963, after stays of four to six months. Six were detained briefly by the Panamanian security service, and the 12 others who returned a few days later were not arrested.

3. Training for Panamanians apparently started at least as far back as 1961. A guerrilla trainee from another country, attending a course with five Panamanians in July, 1961, was told by Cuban instructors that the Panamanians were being given more rigorous training than other nationals because they had special sabotage assignments in the Canal Zone.

4. We have, however, no indication of any paramilitary groups, activity, or training in Panama.

5. Panamanian security authorities maintain no statistics on subversive incidents, and many are not reported to central authority. There have been a considerable number of minor incidents, mainly by unknown perpetrators. Other than continuing sabotage activity against the United Fruit Company installations in Chirique Province, the most spectacular incident was the brief declaration of revolt last August by Manuel Jose Hurtado, a former Panamanian major, and 16 adherents. Hurtado, a strong anti-Communist, was motivated by personal problems.

6. Since 1 January 1962, there have been about 67 individuals arrested, some of them repeatedly, for subversive activities. Of this group, eight are known

to have received training in Cuba. Some of the arrests were made to forestall subversive activity.

7. Panamanians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Narcisco Cubas Perez and Cesar Jose Dubois, leaders of the Vanguardia de Accion Nacional (VAN) which hopes to take part in 1964 elections.

Peasant leaders Leovilgildo Barrias de Garcia and Leonidas Alveo.

Leftist student activists Rolando Ernesto Carrasquilla, Jose Modesto Herrera, and Herminio Garrido.

Eliseo de la Hoz, Communist student leader.

Labor leaders Lacides Ceballos, Andres Galvan, Inocencio Garibaldi, Victor Manuel Lombardo, Jack White, and Jose del Carmen Serracin, the latter a leader of Chiriqui Province banana workers.

Jorge Pena and Felix Gonzalez, Communist leaders among the San Blas Indians.

Ezequiel Rios, municipal leader of La Chorrera.

8. In addition, the following are believed to have received training or guidance in Cuba:

Thelma King, national assembly deputy, who boasts of close personal friendship with Fidel Castro and has visited Cuba five times in the past year.

Senior VAN leader Jorge Enrique Turner Morales.

Miguel Porcell and Ruperto Luther Thomas, Communist leaders at the national level.

Alvaro Menendez Franco, member of the municipal council of Panama.

27 March 1963

PARAGUAY

1. About 60 Paraguayan nationals traveled to Cuba in 1962. It is estimated that over the past two years as many as 120 have been in Cuba long enough to receive appreciable political or military training. The preponderance of Paraguayan nationals visiting Cuba are political exiles living in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil.

2. The Paraguayan Government forbids its nationals to visit Cuba, but cannot control travelers who visit neighboring countries which have Cuban missions and then proceed illegally to Cuba.

3. There are no reports that paramilitary trainees are active inside Paraguay. There is considerable evidence that some returnees have joined exile formations waiting on the Paraguayan border for a favorable occasion for incursions.

4. Since January, 1962, at least 1,000 persons have been arrested for guerrilla, sabotage, terrorist or other subversive activity, but only an estimated 140 were held for any appreciable length of time. We know of only one scheduled for trial, and none of those arrested is known to have received training in Cuba.

5. Most of the arrests have stemmed from about 10 major incidents, of which two involved sabotage and terrorism, one guerrilla activity, and the remainder subversion. There is a rumor that the unknown individual who placed a bomb in an Incarnacion bank had been trained in Cuba. Perpetrators of the other incidents have been identified, and none is known or believed to have received any training in Cuba.

6. Federico Tatter and Anibal Garcete were reported to have returned from Cuba in late 1962, Tatter to take over military direction of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), and Garcete to organize cane workers. We know of no other Cuban trainees who may be in positions of influence among Paraguayans.

27 March 1963

PERU

1. At least 181 Peruvians visited Cuba in 1962 on visits long enough to permit indoctrination, and according to an agent who participated, more than 150 of them were given guerrilla training. Following the training, 90 of these were designated by Peruvian leftist militant leaders as members of the "Peruvian National Liberation Army."

2. Over the past two years more than 235 Peruvians have been identified as travelers to Cuba. Last December two top Peruvian Communists said that over the past year the militant Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) had sent 200 to 300 Peruvians to Cuba, in groups of 12 to 15, for guerrilla training.

3. An estimated total of some 5,000 persons have taken part in acts of sabotage, terrorism, assaults on police outposts, bank robberies, land invasions, destruction of haciendas, strike violence, and riots. The ruling junta in January launched a major round-up and arrested 729 Communists and leftists, of whom we estimate that 50 to 100 may have been trained in Cuba. There are still 209 in jail, of whom only one is a known Cuban guerrilla trainee. The junta has announced a series of mass trials to be held in Lima and provincial centers, charging the violence was part of a Soviet-Cuban conspiracy to make Peru a Communist state. In the course of the violence there have been 18 killed, including four police, and 165 wounded.

4. Out of a total of 137 recorded acts of violence, 49 were clearly sponsored or controlled by Communist elements. Three Cuban nationals and four Peruvians trained in Cuba were identified among leaders of the striking miners who caused damage estimated at $4,000,000 to the Cerro de Pasco smelter at La Oroya in December. The Cubans have not been apprehended.

5. The violence in the Quillabamba-Cuzco-Puno area is attributed to the Indian and peasant guerrillas of Hugo Blanco. Local officials estimate Blanco's force at 2,000, but this is probably an exaggeration. Blanco and his lieutenants are not known to be Cuban-trained or Cuban-supplied.

6. Some of the 158 guerrillas known to have been trained in Cuba have been in hiding and inactive ever since the January round-up, and others are known to be waiting outside the country. The MIR leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda, was believed to be in Cuba and now is in Europe.

7. Guerrilla groups have sporadically attacked police stations for weapons, and robbed banks for funds. MIR members teamed with common criminals in April 1962 in a $100,000 bank robbery in a suburb of Lima, dividing the proceeds 50-50. Part of the loot is believed to have reached Hugo Blanco. MIR has brought in from Cuba a reported 5,000 copies of a special miniature edition of Alberto Bayo's guerrilla handbook. There is also a manual on guerrilla operations based on Bayo's and Guevara's books but written specifically for Peru.

8. Peruvian police in March 1962 broke up a small guerrilla training operation and determined that among those arrested, one was a former resident of Cuba, another had received Cuban training in clandestine operations, and a third, caught with radio equipment, admitted having used it to communicate with Cuba. The local guerrilla candidates were issued kits including rifles of Czech manufacture. All of those arrested were soon released, but some were re-arrested in the January round-up.

9. Prominent Peruvians who may have received indoctrination on visits to Cuba include nine student and youth leaders including two presidents of student organizations; seven leading journalists; three labor union leaders; and nine former members of parliament.

27 March 1963

URUGUAY

1. There were about 115 legal travelers to Cuba from Uruguay in 1962, and an additional 20-25 in January 1963. About 25, mainly Paraguayan exiles resident in Uruguay, are believed to have traveled illegally.

2. Probably no significant portion of the Uruguayan travelers went for guerrilla warfare training. Cuba apparently wants to preserve Montevideo, which is host to the most extensive Communist diplomatic missions in all South America, as a gateway and base of operations, as in the case of Mexico.

3. Cuban subversion activity oriented toward Uruguay appears to consist largely of developing and maintaining enough political action and propaganda assets to counter any Uruguayan inclination to oust or restrict the activities of Cuban and Bloc missions.

4. The only arrests for sabotage occurred during the recent electricity and telephone strike, which arose from worker grievances and had no Cuban connection. All of those arrested were released within a week.

27 March 1963

VENEZUELA

1. We have no acceptable figure on Venezuelan travel to Cuba. Liaison services maintain no records, and have no such capability.

2. Reports from travel control points show 128 Venezuelan nationals traveling to Cuba, but only 48 returning. The names of most of those returning do not appear on the lists of those who went to Cuba. In the few cases where round-trip travel can be established, the stay was generally short. We must conclude that Venezuelans who went to Cuba for training traveled at least one way, and in some known instances both, clandestinely.

3. On the basis of usually reliable agent reports, we believe that more than 200 Venezuelans received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1962. Castro has made it plain that he assigns the first priority for revolution to Venezuela.

4. At present there are probably about 100 men involved in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) paramilitary command attempting to terrorize the Federal District of Caracas. Sources in both the PCV and the Government of Venezuela estimate there are another 300 guerrillas in the field, although we know of no more than 150, in small units of about 20 men, who are under coordinated PCV command. Including terrorist groups of university students and paramilitary party formations in Maracaibo and other large cities, the total number involved in violence probably does not exceed 600. Only seven known to be engaged in these operational are known to have been in Cuba long enough for training.

5. The PCV, however, in the first months of 1963 has proven itself capable of implementing the terrorist and sabotage operations which last October it could only plan. Organization and coordination have improved, and sabotage has reached a level of sophistication in technique and materials which implies either the presence of outside experts or else a highly advanced stage of training.

6. The guerrillas committed themselves to field operations prematurely in 1962 and, denied support or sympathy by the peasantry who are strongly pro-Betancourt, were rounded up or dispersed. A total of 139 were tried by special military courts last fall following the Puerto Cabello and Carupano revolts. More than 110 were given substantial prison sentences. Four at the most are believed to have been in Cuba long enough to receive training.

7. Altogether there have been an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 arrests since the beginning of 1962, but there have been no trials or jail sentences other than those of the guerrillas mentioned above. All others were held for varying lengths of time, most of them for less than 90 days. Most of those arrested have been released either for lack of evidence, or by civil judges who are generally either inefficient or open to corruption. Possibly 50 of those arrested may have received some training in Cuba, but government interrogators have so far been unable to obtain any admission of Cuban training, and no travel records are maintained which would give leads for such interrogation.

8. The number of incidents leading to arrests are estimated at 250. The principal incidents have been the uprisings of the Puerto Cabello and Carupano garrisons; the October/November sabotage of the Lake Maracaibo oilfields; the hijacking of the freighter Anzoategui in February and the earlier theft of five French paintings from the Museum of Fine Arts; burning of the Sears-Roebuck warehouse and dynamiting of highway bridges in February; pipeline sabotage in March; the recent capture of two PCV paramilitary groups; a bank robbery in February by men wearing the armband of the Communist "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN); and the indiscriminate shooting in Caracas in January and February in the wave of terrorism designed to deter Betancourt's visit to Washington.

9. The majority of the Communist-directed incidents have been carried out by members of the PCV paramilitary groups who in general have not themselves had Cuban training, but are trained and directed by instructors who have in turn been trained in Cuba and in some cases in Communist China.

10. Voice radio transmitters in Caracas and in outlying cities have been heard in conversation with a voice transmitter in Cuba.

11. Principal personalities known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Members of the PCV central committee: Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Rafael E. Martinez, Radames Larrazabal, Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, Douglas Bravo, German Lairet, and Joaquin Araujo Ortega.

Other political leaders: Simon Saiez Merida, Americo Martin, Romulo Henriquez, Jr., and Domingo Alberto Rangel of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); Fabricio Ojeda, Jose Vincente Rangel, and Victor Jose Ochoa of the URD.

Labor leaders: Cesar Millan, Horacio Scott Power, Hector Marcano Coello, Laureno Torrealba, Helo Cruz Villegas, and Vicente Pinate.

Student leaders: Alfredo Maneiro, Freddy Munoz, Jose Rafael Tenorio, Alcides Villalba, Jose Linares, Hector Rodriguez Bauz, and Julio Escalona.

Educators: Hector Mujica, Fruto Vivas, Humberto Cuenca, and Jose Vincente Scorza.

27 March 1963

OTHERS

1. There have been about 40 legal travelers from British Guiana to Cuba. Some Latin American travelers could be carried without much chance of detection on Cuban freighters hauling rice. Local papers and opposition parties have charged that some of the students sent to Cuba did not have proper academic qualifications for their studies, implying their travel, was for other purposes. There are no reliable reports, however, that any Guianese have received subversive training in Cuba. Any Cuban training for British Guianese would presumably be designed to support rather than subvert the government of Premier Cheddi Jagan. There have been no arrests for subversive activity, and no incidents of terrorism, sabotage, or subversion. There have been riots, but not Cuban-connnected.

2. Jamaica sent 593 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, probably accounted for largely by the 20-25,000 Jamaicans resident in Cuba. There is no evidence of guerrilla training for any Jamaicans, and there have been no arrests for guerrilla, sabotage, or terrorist activity. Subversion is confined largely to public oratory defying the Jamaican authorities. A British Guianese Communist studying in Jamaica, who is believed to have received training in Cuba, instigated a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in October, 1962, by six members of the "Friends of Cuba Committee;" one Communist was arrested, fined, and released as a result for "obstructing traffic." Two university instructors and two other teachers are believed to have received indoctrination in Cuba.

3. Surinam and Trinidad report no subversive incidents, no arrests, and no evidence of Cuban subversive training for any of their nationals. Trinidad listed two legal travelers in Cuba in 1962.

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Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
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RECORD SERIES : NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX 1

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

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FROM : MCCONE, JOHN
TO :

TITLE :

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10

12

SECRET-EYES ONLY

20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 - Alone

1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him he was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I should make my own arrangements.

2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials. This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief, Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and looked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.

3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I hoped this was true - that we certainly were taking advantage of everything that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.

4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.

SECRET-EYES ONLY

I told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods. The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him about it next week.

ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade with Cuba.

5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine. The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.

JAM/mfb

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Date: 8/26/201

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DOCUMENT TYPE :	DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
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OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

File
Cuba

2

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introductory Statement

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat stems less from the subversive efforts of traditional Communist movements than from Cuban support of any and all active revolutionary and terrorist movements.

B. These distinctions are not precise. In some countries, Castro's original success has spurred the established Communist movement to action, and he supports it. In others, the old-time Communists may even oppose radical action at this time, and Castro works with more active and more militant revolutionists.

C. In any event, we know of only two countries--Mexico and Uruguay--where Castro appears inclined for the time being to forego inciting violence, and this only because he wants a favorable climate for his operations into other countries.

II. Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities.

A. Cuban support takes many different forms. We have occasional evidence of direct participation by Cuban nationals, as in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. While we have not been able to come up with the kind of airtight proof a court would require that weapons move directly from Cuba to these same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most logically would come from Cuba.

B. But by and large, our evidence shows that Cuba is not now attempting a large program of physical support for Latin American revolutionaries. It is, rather, concentrating on supplying the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance they require.

C. In essence, Castro tells would-be revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

D. So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it will flourish.

III. Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban subversion in Latin America, I should note that Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution.

A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women.

1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January.

2. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran party member and leader of the FALN)), says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

B. This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist group in Venezuela, the MIR. The result has been the creation of the FALN, or Armed Forces of National Liberation.

1. The FALN is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These have also been designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington.

2. I do not wish to minimize the violence in Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of

experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out after ten at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion of both our people and the embassy that this is not a threat to government control. It is one thing for a group of young men to race down a dark street firing a machinegun from a speeding car. It is quite a different matter to stand up to the armed forces, or seize and hold government buildings.

3. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. I shall explain in more detail later how we arrive at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our best estimate now is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962.

   a. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration.

b. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

JFK Assassination System Date: 8/26/201

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OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

6

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

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TO : THE PRESIDENT

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999

9

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Lopez Mateos visit

Bundy

Orig to Dungan

SECRET

FEB 1 8 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos

We do not expect to make any major political decisions but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations which exist between Mexico and the United States. These relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same relationship exists with you but want to be reassured. A warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that relationship.

We want to stress the identity of interests of our two countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit of El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.

Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the United States.

Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government and no important decision is made without his approval. He has followed an "independent" foreign policy but knows that good relations with us, especially in the economic sphere, are essential to his country. At times his foreign policy has been too independent--for example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural relations with Communist China.

But

SECRET

GROUP 2
Exempted from

But when fundamental issues are at stake we have usually found him understanding and willing to be helpful--controlling travel of Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offering help on Panama.

Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after elections in July. Power is therefore drifting toward Diaz Ordaz.

Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed Lopez Mateos will raise.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on points to be
raised at the meeting

MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES

1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations

We desire to continue close working relations with Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.

We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political and geographic position to help control Castro/Communism. Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican control measures.

Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within an OAS context.

2. Red China

The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in March has prompted speculation that these two countries are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we should let him know we are aware of his assurances.

3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress

Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-ECOSOC and has named the Director General of the Bank of Mexico as its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated with us in providing extensive training facilities for Latin American technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to make a greater

contribution

contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts to promote private enterprise and we also want to encourage Mexico along this line. We should continue to cooperate with Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting economic development.

4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the International Boundary and Water Commission study these problems and recommend a solution.

5. Control of Narcotics

Mexico and the United States are cooperating in controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.

6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana

An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if Mexico desires and will share the cost.

MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE

1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado

The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of President Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time" of the salinity problem. We can agree but should avoid any commitment on timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem of the

groundwater

groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that the Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned about saline drainage discharged into the river by Mexico and want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early solution to this problem.

2. Bracero Program

The Mexican Government is privately seriously disturbed about the termination of this program. Congressional opposition to it is strong and we cannot commit ourselves to continue the program. We are looking into the problem to see if anything can be done to help Mexico. One possibility is an expanded community development program in Mexico through private channels (P.L.480 foodstuffs through U. S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is interested.

3. Mexico's Concern about U. S. Trade Policies

Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and meat and other products and United States cotton policies which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world market. We recognize that we are natural markets for each other. We desire to expand trade, promote competition and develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the present level of access to each other's market but we would not be able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our market in each commodity or a share in increased consumption.

4. Chamizal Settlement

Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. He wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-Ciudad Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal settlement. We should only agree to consult later in the year on an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.

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60

SECRET
JLM - PBM/1
February 18, 1964

10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
by: Robert M. Sayre

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Dean Rusk

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Paper on points to be
raised at meeting.

SECRET

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SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert M Sayre (MEX)

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SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert M. Sayre ([illegible])

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SECRET

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
ARA:MEX:RMSayre	ARA - Mr. Mann Interior - Mr. Carr Mr. Lanning Labor - Mr. Goodwin Treasury - Mr. Giordano E - Mr. Johnson FE - Mr. Green L - Mr. Kearney

S/S-S Hawthorne Mills, Room 7239A, Ext. 6958

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ROUTING			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
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☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS

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CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-082/93 B]

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Cia - Codeword Mat.

11|26 28
2

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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GROUP 1
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TOP SECRET

BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR ASSESSES JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

FR WASHINGTON: BRAZILIAN EMBASSY 26 NOV 63
TO RIO DE JANEIRO: FOREIGN MINISTRY URGENT 825
(TWO-PART MESSAGE COMPLETE)
NR. 825.
CONFIDENTIAL.

THE PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, AS WELL AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BROUGHT HIM TO POWER, SEEM TO INDICATE THAT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WILL PROBABLY ADHERE TO THE FOLLOWING BASIC DIRECTIVES:

1. IN THE SHORT RUN, AS A NATURAL RESULT OF THE MOMENTUM OF A STRONG ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS THAT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, NO PROFOUND CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY (PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALREADY STATED THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY):

2. IN THE LONGER RUN, HOWEVER, ONE CAN FORESEE:

A) IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVER THE WHITE HOUSE "STAFF" (WHICH REFLECTED THE STRONG

PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS MARKED INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY), THERE PROBABLY WILL BE:

I) NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FROM THE KENNEDY LINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL TEND TOWARD A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE;

II) IN THE FIELD OF RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, OR MORE PRECISELY WITH FRANCE, A LESS RIGID ATTITUDE AND ONE OF GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRENCH POSITION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING A UNITED WESTERN FRONT VIS-A-VIS THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY THE KREMLIN:

III) IN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, THE INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CERTAINLY BE MORE ENLIGHTENING THAN ANY PREDICTION MADE AT THIS TIME;

B) IN THE FIELD OF DOMESTIC POLICY, THERE WILL POSSIBLY BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE WITHIN THE LINE OF "COMPROMISE"; THE NEW PRESIDENT, MUCH MORE THE CONSERVATIVE THAN THE INNOVATOR, WITH INTIMATE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONGRESS, AND A SOUTHERNER, WILL HAVE MORE FACILITY IN GAINING APPROVAL OF THE

BIG BILLS ("CIVIL RIGHTS," "FISCAL REFORM," "MEDICAL AID," "AID TO THE AGED," ETC.) PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WILL ACCEPT MORE CONSERVATIVE FORMULAS OF COMPROMISE; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL ALSO TEND TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE WITH REGARD TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY; HOWEVER, RADICAL CHANGES CANNOT BE EXPECTED, SINCE JOHNSON WILL ALSO FACE THE PRESSURE OF THE MORE LIBERAL WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND ANY MORE PRONOUNCED SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY WOULD BE FATAL TO THE HOPES FOR VICTORY IN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION.

ROBERTO CAMPOS

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

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(Security Classification)

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	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
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3

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist forces kept up their high post-coup level of activity over the weekend.

b. The most significant action was an attack early yesterday morning against a US special forces training camp some 30 miles from Saigon.

c. When the smoke cleared after a sharp fight, four US soldiers were missing and at least 35 South Vietnamese were dead.

d. Late yesterday morning, the Viet Cong shot down two aircraft supporting a government operation in the extreme south, and damaged twelve more. Two more Americans are missing in this action.

e. Back in Saigon, the new regime's troubles with the ambitious General Ton That Dinh continue.

f. He is still angling to get control of the important strategic hamlet program and has yet to give up command of the Third Corps, which the generals assigned to another of their number earlier in the month. This corps is of particular significance in that it surrounds Saigon.


BURMA
CAMBODIA
South Vietnam
South China Sea
Manila
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
Sabah
Sarawak
MALAYSIA
Celebes Sea
Kuala Lumpur
SINGAPORE
RIAU ISLANDS
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
INDONESIA
Java Sea
Djakarta
Banda Sea
JAVA
INDIAN OCEAN
TIMOR
AUSTRALIA
0
MILES
1000
631124
34176

MALAYSIA

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Indonesia-Malaysia

a. Sukarno is beefing up the subversive aspects of his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.

b. Intercepted Indonesian messages indicate that regular army units will shortly begin infiltration operations across the border into Sarawak and Sabah.

c. Seven thousand regular army troops in Indonesian Borneo, the messages show, are getting an intensified course in guerrilla tactics. This training is to be completed next month.

d. Other messages speak of the arrival, beginning today, of a battalion of regulars from West Java. (INTERCERPTS throughout)

3. Venezuela

a. The weekend was marred only by sporadic and minor acts of terrorism in several cities. Government security forces have the situation generally under control.

b. The Venezuelan Air Force is stepping up its efforts to track down and destroy intruder aircraft. The Venezuelans are convinced that planes have been ferrying supplies to pro-Castro guerrillas in the mountains of the northwest.

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
630919 5
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BR. GUIANA
BRAZIL
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Guanare
Barquisimeto
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
Caracas
Los Teques
San Juan de los Morros
San Carlos
El Calvario
San Fernando de Apure
Cúcuta
Puerto Ayacucho
Barcelona
Puerto La Cruz
Cumaná
Carúpano
La Asunción
Maturín
Caripito
Tucupita
El Tigre
Puerto Ordaz
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

c. The Betancourt government has scheduled a press conference tomorrow to break the story that a three-ton cache of Cuban arms has been unearthed. A formal accusation against Cuba is to be made before the Organization of American States a week from today.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Iraq

a. The air of tension in Baghdad dissipated somewhat after the government lifted the curfew and once again permitted private vehicles on the streets.

b. Neither the city nor its new rulers are, however, at ease. Troops are still very much in evidence.

c. The new regime apparently is not convinced that the hard core of the Baath Party and its paramilitary supporters have been put down for good.

5. Syria

a. We have information that a showdown between the moderate and extremist factions of the ruling Baath Party in Syria is fast approaching.

(Cont'd)

b. A clandestine source identifies Prime Minister Hafiz as the leading figure on the side of moderation. General Umran heads the doctrinaire extremists.

c. It was a split along the same lines that brought about the Baath Party's fall from power in Iraq.

6. Italy

a. Premier-designate Moro expects that the program for a "center-left" coalition government will be approved today by the four parties involved.

b. Details of the foreign policy planks are not yet available, but they were drafted with the thought that the death of President Kennedy makes it more important for Italy to play an active role within the Western alliance.

c. After the program has been approved, the final selection of a cabinet can be undertaken. This could take the rest of the week.


JORDAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
CAIRO
U A R (EGYPT)
Aswan
Ras Banas
Yenbo
Medina
RIYADH
SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
RED SEA
Khamis Mushait
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Boundary undefined
SANA
Marib
Al Hudaydah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
GULF OF ADEN
STATUTE MILES
0
400
630801 3
SAUDI ARABIA
Abha
Zahran
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Major road
Other road or track
STATUTE MILES
0
100
UNCLASSIFIED
Harad
Maydi
Wadi al Jawf
Abs
Hajjah
Umran
KAMARAN (U.K.)
Raudha
Marib
SANA
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
Al Hudaydah
RED SEA
Ibb
Qatabah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
Ad Dali
Mocha
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ETHIOPIA
FRENCH SOMALILAND
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN

YEMEN

7. UAR-Yemen-Egypt

a. The Saudis told our embassy in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi village near the Yemeni border was attacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft.

b. It was the second time this month that Yemeni-based Egyptian aircraft have struck across the border into Saudi Arabia.

c. As in the previous cases, the Saudis have lodged a formal complaint with the UN Observation Mission.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NOTES

A. Oswald Press stories to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald recently visited Mexico City are true, according to our information. Oswald visited both the Cuban and the Soviet embassies on 28 September. He was trying, we are told, to arrange for visas so that he could travel to the USSR via Havana. He returned to the US on 3 October.

B. Brazil A new round of military promotions and reassignments will be made public today. The present instability of the Brazilian political scene is reflected in the numerous reports of coup plots which this event has precipitated.

C. USSR At last report the three Soviet range instrumentation ships were dead in the water 500 miles south of Johnston Island, roughly the same position they occupied for last year's extended range ICBM shots. No announcement closing this area of the Pacific to shipping has been made and there is no activity as yet at the Tyuratam missile test center, but we look for some action in the next few days. (INTERCEPTS)

D. Algeria We have a report from a good clandestine source that a group of army officers is plotting with Defense Minister Boumedienne to overthrow Ben Bella. A growing estrangement between the two has been apparent for some time, but this is the first good indication that Boumedienne is making common cause with those who wish to turn Ben Bella out of office.

(Cont'd)

E. Australia - Communist China Peiping has signed contracts for just over one million tons of Australian grain to be delivered early next year. We had been expecting the Chinese Communists to enter the market, since they had another mediocre grain crop this year. Peiping has been buying close to five million tons of grain for the past several years.

F. Congo We hear that the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville had booked 75 places on a flight to Brussels last Saturday. There is still no information on whether any Soviet Embassy officials have actually departed, however.

G. Berlin There was no new harassment of Allied access routes to Berlin over the weekend. A total of 16 flares were fired last evening near Tempelhof Airfield, but we connect these with Communist efforts to prevent escapes from East Berlin. East German police were observed stringing barbed wire in the same area a short time later.

H. Laos The neutralists claim to have made significant gains in their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng area. They have not, however, been able to dislodge the Pathet Lao from positions within artillery range of the town's airport.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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Agency Information

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THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq-Syria

a. The shaky new accommodation between the two countries following the recent coup in Iraq has been threatened by Syria's action in granting asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the exiled leader of the extremist wing of the Iraqi Baath.

b. Saadi had arrived in Syria unannounced following a brief stay in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a message asking Syria to expel him on grounds that sheltering him was a breach of agreement.

c. Both regimes continue to be troubled with internal dissension with affairs in one deeply tangled with those in the other.

d. In Syria, as we mentioned yesterday, the Baathist regime is split between moderates who desire a broadening of the government's power base, and a doctrinaire faction which wants to keep all control of the government in Baathist hands.

e. In Iraq, the pull is more away from the Baathists. Two ministers have threatened to resign unless the government adopts an openly pro-Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the government feels secure enough to ease up on curfew and transport restrictions imposed since the coup.

(Cont'd)


MEKONG
Luang Prabang
Nam Khan
13
Muong Khao
Muong Kheung
Ban Ban
Ban Song Hoc
Lat Bouak
7
PLATEAU DU TRAN NINH
Muong Soui
Nong Pet
7
Phou Keng
Khang Khay
Phong Savan
Nong Het
Phou Khoun
Muong Phanh
PLAINE DES JARRES
Dong Danh
Lat Houang
Xieng Khouang
NORTH VIETNAM
4
Muong Kassy
Ban Ta Viang
Tha Thom
Vang Vieng
Nam Ngum
L A O S
Ban Namone
Nam Nhiep
Nam Lik
Ban Hin Heup
Pak Sane
13
13
THAILAND
Nam Ngum
SECRET
LAOS
Area of main map
MEKONG
MEKONG
Road
Track or trail
VIENTIANE
THAILAND
Nong Khai
0 10 20 30 40
STATUTE MILES
34247
631.1 25 2

f. Iraq has announced that the military union with Syria remains in force, and that a new commander of the joint armies will be announced soon.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Laos

a. Intercepted neutralist messages on Sunday reported that government forces had finally secured Vang Vieng and its airfield, long held by the Pathet Lao. They also told of the capture of Ban Namone farther south on Route 13.

b. The neutralist, rightist Lao Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces hope to sustain their coordinated clearing action until remaining Pathet Lao pockets in this area north of Vientiane are cleared.

c. Such operations in Laos have often been followed by a Communist riposte. We have a few indicators that something could be up on the Communist side, but these are so far very tenuous indeed.

d. One such indicator is a stand down in the last two weeks on the Hanoi-controlled military communications net in Laos which could

(Cont'd)

point to a change in the disposition or strength of Communist forces. Other enemy nets are normal.

e. There are also unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the Plaine des Jarres.
(INTERCEPTS)

3. South Vietnam

a. According to press reports, Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped out two of the government's strategic hamlets in the central highlands about 250 miles north of Saigon.

b. More than 1,000 inhabitants in the hamlets--who are minority tribesmen--are missing and possibly have fled into the mountains. They abandoned a significant quantity of weapons to the Viet Cong.

c. These attacks not only suggest continued erosion of the government's programs to win over tribal support, but also signal that stepped-up Viet Cong pressure against the new regime is spreading to the north.

(Cont'd)

22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK


PLESETSK
ICBM IMPACT AREA
TYURATAM ICBM TEST RANGEHEAD
U S S R
TOP SECRET DINAR
631027
MOSCOW
Archangel
Vorkuta
Dikson
Norilsk
Verkhoyansk
Magadan
Yakutsk
Lake Baikal
MONGOLIA
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
TURKEY
BLACK SEA
ARAL SEA
Lake Balkhash
BARENTS SEA
KARA SEA
LAPTEV SEA
EAST SIBERIAN SEA
BERING SEA
Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government
NAUTICAL MILES

32609 8-63

d. This Communist effort is aimed at discrediting the post-Diem regime before the new leadership is able to get its feet on the ground and capture the loyalty and respect of people in the provinces.

e. Although the Viet Cong still continues to draw its main strength from local recruiting, a steady stream of cadre and training personnel continues to make its way to the south from North Vietnam along the Laotian border.

f. We are now reasonably sure that at least 784 persons infiltrated from the north during 1963 and the actual total may be much higher.

4. USSR

a. There have been no further developments in Soviet preparations for a series of extended range ICBM shots to the Pacific.

b. We probably should have had by now an announcement closing an area roughly 500 miles south of Johnston Island to shipping. We suspect the Soviets may have delayed it in order not to appear to be rattling rockets immediately after President Kennedy's death.

(Cont'd)

c. The USSR may repeat last year's performance of multiple firings from a prototype operational complex at Tyuratam. Three such launchings were attempted at five-minute intervals in May 1963; two succeeded.

d. We also do not rule out the possibility of firings from operational sites as opposed to the test center at Tyuratam. We observed the first such firing on 22 October from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400 miles northeast of Moscow. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

5. USSR-Berlin

a. Embassy Bonn feels that the Soviet Union may be seeking at least a temporary modus vivendi on the autobahn without prejudicing its juridical position, which can be used to cause difficulties there in the future.

b. The embassy bases this on the Soviet replies to the Western notification to the USSR on 29 October regarding harmonized convoy procedures--two oral statements on 16 November and a note of 21 November.

(Cont'd)

c. The Soviet note was designed to make a record, showing that the USSR exercises "control" of the autobahn and that the recent incidents resulted from US refusal to comply with "existing procedures."

d. On the other hand, the Soviet procedures described in the oral replies seem to reflect actual Allied practices, though there is enough ambiguity to afford the USSR flexibility in any future actions.

6. Brazil

a. The danger of an immediate coup against the Goulart regime has receded with the reported decision of Second Army Commander General Bevilaqua not to join the coup plotters.

b. Bevilaqua, who has been something of a storm center, may have been asked to hand over his command today as part of a series of reassignments made by President Goulart to keep the military off balance.

c. On the other side of the coin, there is widespread belief that Goulart himself will at some time resort to a coup to establish an authoritarian regime.

(Cont'd)

d. As one example Raneiri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies and next in line for the presidency, told Ambassador Gordon on Saturday that he profoundly mistrusts Goulart's intentions and intends to maintain the strictest congressional vigilance.

e. Our station in Brazil believes that Goulart is living in a dream world. He seems either out of touch with reality or very poorly informed. Public opinion is not with him and the tradition that political power should only be transferred constitutionally is very strong in the army, coup reports notwithstanding.

f. The biggest danger from this quarter is that the opposition may resort to some illegal act, giving Goulart the excuse to take over.

NOTES

A. Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian contingent from the UN force in the Congo.

B. Communist China - Africa The Guinean ambassador in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some Afro-Asian countries. He is to stop first in Egypt and then visit several other African countries including Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Chou would be the highest ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa. (INTERCEPTS)

C. Indonesia-Philippines Two good sources have reported that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal. No reasons have been advanced for the visit. Our chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head off Philippine recognition of Malaysia.

D. Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz. The elections are still on for Sunday, and we look for a maximum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization.

E. Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels. They are expected to book onward passage for Moscow. It is reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet property.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
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COMMENTS :	DOC. #5

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
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3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

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TOP SECRET
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CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-085/93 B]

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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

5

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


SECRET
HAVANA
ISLE OF PINES
CUBA
Nipe Bay
U.S. Naval Base
● SAM SITE
0
100
NAUTICAL MILES
63 11 26 6

1. Cuba

a. Cuban tents are now beginning to appear at a number of the SAM sites--further evidence that training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment has begun as scheduled.

b. High-altitude photography taken this past weekend shows these tents at six SAM sites in western Cuba. These sites are in addition to those at which we noted the presence of Cuban interpreters as we reported on Saturday.

c. This training should be completed by next May or June.

d. Just before the training started, we noted a series of moves involving the relocation of eight of the SAM sites.

e. The purpose, it appears, was to shift the mission of the system from an area defense of the island as a whole to point defense of specific targets, particularly Havana. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Syria-Iraq

a. Syrian leaders have acceded to pressure from Iraq and have expelled Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali Saadi. He has gone to Athens



PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS
(by % of total vote)

b. This is an earnest of the desire of moderate Baathist leaders in Damascus to preserve workable relations with Iraq, partly as a counterbalance to Cairo and partly to preserve what remains of Baathist influence in Baghdad.

c. Intercepts show at least some Syrian troops will remain in Iraq at the request of Iraqi officials.

d. Preparations had been under way for these forces to withdraw; retention of at least some in Iraq is another sign that both regimes hope to preserve something of the relations they once had. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Turkey

a. Prime Minister Inonu's coalition government is about to collapse.

b. It has long been shaky. Last week it was dealt a severe setback when the opposition Justice Party, heir of the Menderes regime, emerged from local elections as the country's majority party.

(Cont'd)

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE



631021 2A

SOVIET GRAIN PRODUCTION

(million metric tons)

	ALL GRAINS		WHEAT ALONE	
	Soviet Official	US Estimate	Soviet Official	US Estimate
1958	141	125	77	63
1959	126	100	69	55
1960	134	100	64	46
1961	137	115	67	55
1962	148	115	71	57
1963	---	100-110	--	42-46

631021 2B

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Now the Peasant Party, one of the three in the coalition, has voted to pull out, and probably will do so as soon as Inonu gets back from Washington. Another partner, the Turkey Party, has wanted to pull out, and apparently has stayed in only because of pressure from the military.

d. A new coalition is at least a theoretical possibility, with a number of independents taking the place of the Peasant Party, but Inonu probably would not be prime minister.

e. The military are working for an all-party coalition. This way, they feel, they could keep tabs on the Justice Party, but the Justice Party is not likely to buy this arrangement.

f. As matters now stand, the military would take over the government itself before it would let the Justice Party form one.

4. **USSR** wheat

a. Soviet President Brezhnev has told the Iranian prime minister that the decision to buy wheat abroad was taken to avoid lowering reserves, which he has described as ample for one or two years. We think the situation is more serious than that.

(Cont'd)

b. This year's harvest was clearly very bad. The weight of evidence suggests that Soviet grain stockpiles have been far drawn down this year and are not sufficient to protect the country from another poor harvest.

c. Our estimate is that total grain production each year since 1958 has been well below that year's level of 125 million tons, while the population has continued to grow.

d. We have seen from intercepts signs of extensive slaughtering in anticipation of fodder shortages during the winter. This runs counter to Khrushchev's oft-stated plan to build up the livestock industry.

e. We have also noted that the extensive wheat purchases weaken the USSR's gold reserves at a time when it hopes to expand its imports of machinery for a huge chemical fertilizer program.

f. In addition, we have seen signs of stringent measures to protect the grain supply, accompanied by public discontent in some areas over the absence of bread.

(Cont'd)

5. Communist China - Argentina

a. Peiping last week contracted for some 300,000 tons of wheat (cost about $20,000,000) from Argentina.

b. This adds to the 1,000,000 tons just contracted for with Australia, but is still far below the 5,000,000 tons the Chinese have normally imported in recent years. Additional suppliers will be hard to find.

c. A large sale, apparently involving some $56,000,000 worth of meat, is apparently also being arranged. This is interesting, not only for the sizeable foreign exchange outlay, but also for the concern it shows for improving the diet of the mainland's urban population.

d. The same caloric value could be obtained from grains at a fraction of this cost. (INTERCEPTS throughout)

6. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President and party boss Novotny has gone to Moscow, evidently for economic talks, judging by the composition of his delegation.

b. Novotny's background of Stalinist excesses have put him on the wrong side of Khrushchev. They also have given rise to control problems, particularly in the fractious Slovak party where pressures for liberalization have made their mark.

c. Party problems and Novotny's leadership may thus also come under review.

d. A curious sign of the times is the fact that, although President Novotny is in Moscow, the presidential flag has remained up at the official residence. It might simply have been an oversight, but the symbolism will not be lost to the people in Prague.

7. Cambodia

a. Cambodia, as expected, has asked the Geneva co-chairman to call the Geneva conference participants together (in Djakarta) to discuss measures "to ensure the internationally guaranteed and controlled neutralization of Cambodia."

(Cont'd)



Khamis Mushait
SAUDI ARABIA
Majonna
W. Hobauna
Husainiya
Qab
Salwa
Dhahran
W. Najran
Rijlat
Masliya
Qoz
Sabya
Abu Arish
Qizan
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Saddah
Suq Anan
Al Muwassam
Maydi
Washha
Sharan Kharab
Malaha
Hamir
Rayda
Zuhrah
Hajjah
Qidan
Kamaran (U.K.)
Salif
Rawdah
San'a
SANA
Marib
Sirwah
Jihannah
Jum'ah
Harib
Bayhan
Manakha
Y E M E N
RED SEA
Al Hudaydah
Bal Faqih
Zabid
Dhamar
Qa'tabah
Beihan al Qasab
Musa
Mocha
Rijah
Lahj
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOM.
0 25 50 MILES
13 SEPTEMBER 1963
SYRIA
LEB.
JORDAN
IRAQ
Cairo
U.A.R. (EGYPT)
Ras Banas
Red Sea
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
SAUDI
ARABIA
Riyadh
SUDAN
Khartoum
Sana
YEMEN
ADEN P.
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa

33905

b. Last year when this came up, the French were inclined to go along with some such idea.

c. They have indicated to us that they still feel Sihanouk should not be turned down, and Sihanouk is obviously hopeful that they will exert pressure on us and the British.

d. Sihanouk seems to be hoping for at least a rump session attended by conferees who are willing to do his bidding.

8. Egypt-Yemen

a. An Egyptain military message reporting to Cairo on operations in Yemen this past weekend indicated that poison gas (referred to as "ghurab" in Egyptian military traffic) was used against royalist tribesmen in the northwest.

b. This is the first time we have noted its employment since last summer, although another intercept shows that the Egyptian command has continued to authorize its use.

(Cont'd)

c. It is basically a tear gas, but in such highly concentrated form that it has caused the death of a number of Yemenis.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

9. Congo

a. Opposition leftist Congolese exiles, operating from Brazzaville across the river, are reported to be plotting to assassinate Congolese Premier Adoula and some of his ministers.

b. It is supposed to happen sometime after 8 December.

c. Meanwhile, agents are being infiltrated with money to buy off opposition to a takeover immediately thereafter by radical nationalist Gbenye.

d. Adoula's government already knows that this group of left-wing subversives, which now numbers about 50, is being helped by the Communist bloc.

e. It operates fairly freely in the loose circumstances which now obtain in Brazzaville. Its activities may soon become a serious source of friction between the two countries.

NOTES

A. South Korea With 85 percent of the vote in, Pak Chong-hui's Democratic Republican Party has already won an absolute majority in the National Assembly elections held yesterday.

B. Venezuela The country's three major presidential candidates were the targets of unsuccessful assassination attempts yesterday as Communist-led terrorists moved into the final week of desperate attempt to wreck next Sunday's elections. A US Embassy official was also the intended recipient of a "Christmas package" containing a bomb. Yesterday a US rubber warehouse was set afire and destroyed by terrorists.

C. Indonesia-Philippines We have what is about as sure a sign as we can get that Sukarno will be going to Manila as reported yesterday. A reliable source tells us Sukarno has sent advance word to two of his favorite Philippine girl friends that he will be arriving on 28 November.

D. Indonesia-Malaysia Indonesian-inspired press reports yesterday claimed a British military plane was shot down near the North Borneo border. British Intelligence tells us the story is concocted; no aircraft are reported missing.

E. Cuba The alert in the Cuban military which we noted immediately after President Kennedy's death has been lifted. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

F. Cambodia Cambodia is cutting its diplomatic representation abroad to a bare minimum as an austerity measure following curtailment of US aid. Sihanouk announced last week that this would be done, saying that missions in Communist countries would not be affected since those countries "protect" Cambodia. Curiously enough, among the missions being closed down are those in New Delhi and Rangoon. (Includes (INTERCEPTS)

G. USSR-US Pravda this morning reports on Gromyko's talks with President Johnson, giving top play to Senator Fulbright's remarks about the desirability of a meeting between the President and Khrushchev.

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

I. De Gaulle on NATO strategy.

II. Common Market official appraises President Johnson. (Sensitive INTERCEPT)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
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RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
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COMMENTS :	DOC. #6

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
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4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
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6

✓

President
Read
during briefing
by McCone
BKS

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
34168 10-63
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
Amuay
Coro
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
COLOMBIA
Maracaibo
Cabimas
Ule
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
ZULIA
CARACAS
La Guaira
Valencia
Maracay
Carupano
Mene Grande
Quiriquire
Maturin
Tucupita
Ciudad Bolivar
Cucuta
Rio Orinoco
Rio Apure
Rio Arauca
Rio Meta
Rio Caura
Rio Caroni
Rio Negro
Rio Uraricoera
Rio Branco
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BR. GUIANA
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

1. Venezuela

a. The country's six presidential candidates have swung into the home stretch of their campaigns. So have the terrorists, who are still trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's vote.

b. There is little doubt that the terrorist effort has all-out Cuban support. Castro looks on Venezuela as his prime target in Latin America and would do everything in his power to prevent President Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have tried to intimidate the candidates by harassing political rallies, bombing their party headquarters in various cities, and threatening them with assassination. They have tried to scare voters from the polls by creating a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Kidnappings, like the one yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault, are part of the pattern.

d. The government counterattack is under the personal direction of Betancourt, who is as determined to finish out his term and turn over power to a freely-elected successor as Castro is to prevent this.

(Cont'd)

e. Yesterday it was announced that the carrying of firearms by anyone outside the security forces was forbidden until the elections are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have been called up to protect the polls. Leaves are being cancelled and all security forces are maintaining a high state of alert.

2. South Vietnam

a. We now have a fuller account from official US sources of the Viet Cong attack on two mountain villages mentioned in Tuesday's Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear that the earlier press versions, which spoke of 1,000 missing villagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information is that the attack, in company strength, was successfully repulsed. The Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties; government losses were six killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

(Cont'd)

d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the higher level of military activity they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has called for more attacks in an effort to destroy strategic hamlets and "develop" Viet Cong forces. In support of this, Viet Cong communications traffic has been unusually heavy and has involved a large volume of high priority traffic and special alert patterns.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Israel

a. We have some reason to believe that the Israelis are developing a surface-to-surface missile of their own.

b. A reliable clandestine source says that an Israeli representative is trying to buy US stable platforms for the inertial guidance system of a missile with a range of 300-350 miles. He wanted delivery in six to twelve months. There have been several earlier reports that

(Cont'd)

Israel is buying missile components in the US and England.

c. We think this missile program is independent of another Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's contract with a French firm, Marcel Dassault, for the development of a system which will be able to deliver a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles.

4. USSR-India

a. Moscow has promised the Indians to ship the equipment for one surface-to-air (SAM) training site early next month.

b. The Soviets had agreed to provide eight SAM sites. The rest will probably not be sent until the Indians have learned to handle the equipment about a year from now.

c. As we noted last Sunday, there are some Indians who have doubts about the Soviet willingness to live up to the letter of their military aid agreements with New Delhi.

(Cont'd)

d. They call into question especially the contract for the Soviets to set up in India a facility to assemble MIG fighters--an enterprise which has appeared somewhat impractical from the beginning.

e. We do note, however, that Soviet aircraft specialists working on the project were still in New Delhi in early November. (INTERCEPTS)

5. Burma

a. Ne Win has followed up his action in breaking off talks with the Burmese Communists by arresting over 700 of their number.

b. Ne Win had been trying to lure the faction-ridden Communists into a "national front." However, he found the demands of the Communist negotiators, some of whom had only just returned from long exile in Peiping, to be impossible.

c. This will probably lead to renewed fighting between the army and Communist guerrillas in the hills.

d. More trouble can also be expected from the rebellious ethnic minorities like the Karens and the

(Cont'd)


South Vietnam
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Mekong
PHNOM PENH
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
Quang Ngai
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
Phuoc Vinh
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
My Tho
Vung Tau
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
0 STATUTE MILES 150
34235

Kachins, whose demands for greater autonomy have been rejected in Rangoon.

e. US officials on the spot doubt that the army, hobbled by poor leadership and its many political responsibilities, will be any more effective in dealing with the problem this time than in past anti-insurgency campaigns.

6. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk has signed an accord setting up regular air service between Cambodia and Communist China. A similar agreement with Hanoi is in the works.

b. These lines are significant largely as gestures by Peiping and Hanoi to bolster Sihanouk's sense of importance. Neither would be a paying proposition commercially and both could flounder before the first paying passenger enplanes unless rights to overfly Laos can be obtained. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

7. Greece

a. It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.

(Cont'd)

b. His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis' party on the right or from the Communists. The military has apparently been pressing Karamanlis to withhold that support. He does not need much urging.

c. The military has also let it be known that it would consider Papandreou's acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.

d. In addition to this military string-pulling, the royal family is also meddling--not for the first time. Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intends to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.

e. This would then open the way, the palace calculates, for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.

8. Brazil

a. President Goulart and his opponents are keeping political tensions in Brazil high.

(Cont'd)

b. Comments by Goulart, that "social disaster" is sure if his program is not passed soon, have drawn sharp rejoinders from moderate and conservative figures and have fed rightist coup plotting.

c. Strains are also growing in the military following the arrest of a young officer who refused last month to execute an order to arrest Governor Lacerda, a leading conservative spokesman and likely presidential candidate.

NOTES

A. USSR Simultaneous activity this morning on the Tyuratam missile test range, satellite tracking nets and Soviet space support ships in the Atlantic probably represented an attempt to launch an unmanned earth satellite. The launch apparently failed on the pad or was cancelled at the last moment. It may be tried again soon. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree.

C. Turkey The New Turkey Party has followed the Peasant Party in withdrawing from the present three-party coalition government. This means that the coalition has to all intents and purposes collapsed, even though no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this weekend.

D. Thailand The Thai doctors attending Sarit now admit for the first time that the Prime Minister is in critical condition. Our doctor agrees with this prognosis. US officials in Bangkok believe that the most likely successor would be Thanom Kittikachorn, now deputy prime minister and minister of defense. Thanom is not likely to last long, however, since he is neither a strong personality nor a figure of great weight in the military hierarchy.

(Cont'd)


MELILLA
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
SPANISH SAHARA
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
GAMBIA
SENEGAL
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA
UPPER VOLTA
DAHOMEY
TOGO
SIERRA LEONE
IVORY COAST
GHANA
LIBERIA
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ETHIOPIA
FR. SOMAL.
SOMALI REPUBLIC
UGANDA
KENYA
RUDOLF
VICTORIA
RIO MUNI
GABON
CONGO
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
RWANDA
BURUNDI
RWANDA BURUNDI
ZANZIBAR
TANGANYIKA
L. TANGANYIKA
CABINDA
ANGOLA
NYASA
FED. OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND

E. Indonesia-Philippines A Philippine foreign office man states that everything was set, as we noted yesterday, for Sukarno to visit Manila today. This official says, however, that the visit was postponed as a result of Macapagal's decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral.

F. Indonesia Djakarta is giving every indication that it will hold up final action on the long-pending oil contracts with US companies in an attempt to smoke us out on the question of US aid policy toward Indonesia.

G. Rwanda-Burundi Tribal refugees from Rwanda, now in Burundi, seem bent on making trouble between the two countries. Some 3,000 of their number were reported yesterday to be moving toward the frontier. They have little military capability, but blood could flow and require UN intervention.

H. USSR-Congo As a further token of the withdrawal of Soviet diplomats we have noted that the Soviet diplomatic communications link between Moscow and Leopoldville was shut down last Saturday. (INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

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TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

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TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
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Ret'd from
Mrs Roberts
12/10/63

8

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Venezuela

a. Election campaigning ended at midnight, but boosters for the several candidates continued to mill about streets of Caracas in defiance of terrorist threats to shoot anyone who ventured out for the next three days.

b. The terrorists, it seems, were all but drowned out by the carnival air.

c. The FALN, meanwhile, is trying to bargain off Colonel Chenault for as high a price as it can, demanding variously release of all its comrades, of all women detained by the government, and of the six hijackers who have been returned from Trinidad to custody in Venezuela.

2. Sino-Soviet dispute

a. The Chinese Communists will have nothing to do with the idea of bilateral talks with the Soviets under present circumstances.

b. Chinese party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the select few in Peiping's ruling circle, recently told a group of visiting Latin Americans that such a meeting could accomplish nothing.

(Cont'd)

c. Teng put the issue of another meeting of world Communist parties even deeper into limbo by saying that Peiping would be in favor only when assured of the support of a majority of the world parties.

d. Moscow, for its part, has apparently stopped thinking about another gathering of world Communist party representatives.

e. The feelers it put out after the conclusion of the test-ban treaty were received coldly by some of the fraternal parties. They felt such a meeting could only make matters worse with the Chinese.

f. Indeed, Peiping saw this to be Moscow's purpose, and when the idea failed to take hold, the Chinese took it to be a setback for Khrushchev personally.

g. Their reaction to Khrushchev's subsequent call for a cessation of open argument was to press the offensive, and this they have been doing in roundly abusive terms since.

(Cont'd)


TOP SECRET DINAR
6 SEPTEMBER 1963
33881
Area of Main Map
USSR
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Komsomolsk
CHINA
Vladivostok
JAPAN
KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
Klyuchi Impact Area
BERING SEA
250 NM Second Track
Launch Position 8 April
KOMANDORSKIYE IS.
285 NM First Track
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Impact Point
Petropavlovsk
Ballistic Missile Submarines in the Petropavlovsk area
6 "G" Class
3 "Z" Conversions
Approximate Launch Positions 27 June & 27 August
56
52
60
152
156
160
164
168

Submarine Ballistic Missile Launches in the Soviet Far East



"G"-Class Submarine

h. The forthcoming Afro-Asian visits by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have awakened suspicions that the Chinese are in hot pursuit of a second Bandung-type conference--a more rewarding enterprise from their point of view.

3. USSR

a. Yesterday and on Thursday, we detected what we believe to have been operational training launches of standard 350 nautical mile submarine-based ballistic missiles.

b. Two and possibly four missiles were fired from submarines based in the Petropavlovsk area to the impact area at Klyuchi.

c. Seven similar instances have been detected previously this year, and there may have been others. (INTERCEPTS)

4. Kenya - Communist Bloc

a. The Soviet Bloc will soon gain an important propaganda outlet in Nairobi, communications hub for East Africa.

b. Plans are for a state-controlled news agency to be set up by the Kenyan government when it

(Cont'd)

achieves independence on 12 December. This will fall under the jurisdiction of communications minister Oneko, who has well developed contacts within the Soviet Bloc.

c. TASS has already agreed to equip the new agency, and Kenyan requests for further financial and techincal help are being discussed in Prague and Moscow.

d. Kenyan journalists have been training in Prague and, on return, will find ready employment in the new agency.

5. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President Novotny returned from Moscow on Thursday after signing a renewal (for another 20 years) of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

b. He apparently got little else out of Khrushchev. The final communique was conspicuously cool.

c. There were no Soviet concessions, nor were there the usual references to Czech "progress" or to public support for Novotny's leadership.

6.	South Vietnam	a. The first suicide by burning to occur under the new regime was witnessed today by bystanders at a crowded intersection in Saigon where a young girl went up in flames. b. A note she left behind said she was protesting the war of Vietnamese against Vietnamese. At the intersection are three villas which house the ICC delegations. c. There were no Buddhist overtones. d. Some think the Viet Cong encouraged her, but if they did, they did not write her script. They would have said it is the Americans who are fighting the Vietnamese.


South Vietnam
ARMY CORPS BOUNDARIES
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
NORTH VIETNAM
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
I Corps
LAOS
THAILAND
Quang Ngai
II Corps
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
III Corps
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
Phuoc Vinh
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
Phan Thiet
SAIGON
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
Capital Military District
My Tho
Vung Tau
IV Corps
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
SECRET
0 STATUTE MILES 150
33752

NOTES

A. South Vietnam Plans are now afoot to shuffle South Vietnam's Corps commanders so that General Khanh, considered by General Harkins to be the best of the lot, will take over in the crucial delta (IV Corps) area. General Dinh, the ambitious Minister of Security, is still resisting pressure to relinquish command of the III Corps area, and is not involved in the current shuffle.

B. Cuba-USSR There are about 8,000 Soviets in Cuba, 5,000 of these military, according to a bloc official in close touch with Soviets in Havana. The figures are close to our own estimate of 4,000 to 7,000. Some withdrawals continue.

C. Cambodia-Vietnam Sihanouk seems to feel that cutting off his nose to spite his face was not enough. Now he says he will formally recognize North Vietnam if the US does not silence the Khmer Serei radio. South Vietnam will cut Cambodia's primary access to international markets via the Mekong river if he does. (INTERCEPT)

D. Indonesia-Cambodia Sukarno apparently plans to go to Cambodia on an official visit following his trip to Manila. The Cambodian ambassador in Djakarta has advised Phnom Penh that Sukarno plans to leave for Manila on 6 December and directly from there for Phnom Penh on the 10th. He will stay three days. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

E. Coal and Steel Community Coal and Steel community members at their next meeting on Monday will probably vote to raise community steel tariffs by an average of nine percent. This would bring the tariffs of each member into line with Italy's, the highest in the community. Only the Dutch oppose the idea.

F. British Guiana - Cuba GIMPEX, trading arm and source of funds for Jagan's party, has worked out a deal to supply the country's major electric utility next year with fuel oil from Cuba. Texaco and Esso have been the traditional suppliers.

G. Brazil-US A press report from Rio cites "well informed sources" to the effect that Goulart plans soon to invite Mrs. Kennedy to visit Brazil so that Brazil can pay her the honors which it had planned to render the late President.

H. Cuba-Morocco A three-man Cuban delegation is on its way to Morocco to try to patch up relations broken by Morocco because of Cuba's assistance to the Algerians in their border war. (INTERCEPTS)

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

The effect in France of the President's death.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

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TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
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TOP SECRET
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4			

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	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

1

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist efforts to discredit the new Saigon regime stayed in high gear this week.

b. The number of armed attacks was off from the high of the previous week but still some 50% above the year's weekly average.

c. These attacks have been, for the most part, small-scale efforts directed against the government's paramilitary forces in the villages. They have been designed more for their psychological impact than for immediate military gain.

d. A high volume of messages on Viet Cong military and political communications nets indicates a probable continuation of this effort.

e. The new government is responding by stepping up its own military operations. It is also setting about the hard job of revamping the Diem government apparatus and harnessing broader popular support for the war effort.

f. The generals have been dealing fairly effectively with

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
630730
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port-of-Spain
COLOMBIA
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Guanare
Barquisimeto
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
CARACAS
Los Teques
San Carlos
San Juan de los Morros
El Calvario
Barcelona
Cumaná
Carúpano
La Asunción
Caripito
Maturín
El Tigre
Tucupita
Puerto Ordaz
Río Orinoco
Cúcuta
Río Apure
San Fernando de Apure
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Puerto Ayacucho
Río Caura
Río Caroní
BRITISH GUIANA
Río Uraricoera
BRAZIL
BR. GUIANA
Río Negro
Río Branco
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

their new responsibilities. There are, however, a few signs of dissension within this group and between it and civilian politicians.

g. One of the more ambitious and troublesome figures is the able but opportunistic General Ton That Dinh, the new Minister of Security. He has been travelling about the country spreading the idea that the coup was largely his doing and seems bent on developing his own independent base of power. He is a man to watch.

h. The new regime has also embarked on a purge of high military officers who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis and failed to get on the right side soon enough. (INTERCEPTS)

2. Venezuela

a. The death toll from the terrorist outburst in Caracas last Tuesday and Wednesday now stands at about 30.

b. This is the high water mark thus far in the campaign of the Castro-supported Communist extremists to disrupt the national elections a week from tomorrow.

(Cont'd)

c. The Betancourt government has struck back hard. Its new unified command over the security forces, set up at US urging, passed this initial test with flying colors.

d. At least 500 extremists were arrested and the round-up is still going on. Their removal will hamper the Communist drive against elections in major cities like Caracas.

e. We now expect the elections to be held on schedule, a considerable achievement under the circumstances. The elections will be followed, however, by a Communist effort to prevent the March inauguration of the victor.

f. The rub here is that none of the presidential candidates commands President Betancourt's considerable assets for dealing successfully with the harsh realities of Venezuelan politics. The constitution prevents Betancourt from succeeding himself.

g. In the background, as always, looms the military, which could intervene if the president-elect shows signs of being soft on communism.


CUBA
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites
HAVANA
HAVANA EAST
Mariel
Artemisa
Santiago de las Vegas
Remedios
SAN JULIAN
(Training site)
Isle of Pines
Holguin
Santiago de Cuba
U.S. Naval Base
▲ New site
● Unchanged site
Estimated range
0
50
100
NAUTICAL MILES
34095
11 OCTOBER 1963
SECRET

3. USSR-Cuba

a. In the past week we intercepted Cuban military messages which show that Cuban interpreters are now posted at several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites on the island.

b. We think this means that on-site training of Cubans has begun on schedule. Field training is to last six months, after which the SAM system may be turned over to Castro.

c. In the past month some 1,500 Soviets arrived in Cuba. Most of these were probably SAM experts, sent to monitor the training.

d. Prior to their coming, we had detected no more than a few hundred Soviet military personnel entering Cuba since the October crisis last year.

e. We estimate that at least 15,000, and probably closer to 18,000, have been withdrawn in the intervening 13 months, leaving, very roughly, 4,000 to 7,000. Those remaining are for the most part advisors whose main functions are to train and supervise Cubans in the use of weapons turned over to them.

(Cont'd)



COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN

Kiel
Stralsund
Hamburg
Buechen
Schwanheide
Lauenburg
Horst
Bremen
Prenzlau
Neuruppin
SOVIET
ZONE
POLAND
Wittenberge
Liebenwalde
Havel
Wriezen
Limit of Polish Administration
Stendal
Rathenow
WEST BERLIN
EAST BERLIN
Mittelland Canal
Vorsfelde
Oebisfelde
Hannover
Helmstedt
Marienborn
Magdeburg
Jueterbog
Cottbus
Dessau
Elbe
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Walkenried
Ellrich
Halle
Kassel
Herleshausen
Wartha
Hoenebach
Gerstungen
Probstzella
Juchhoeh
Ludwigstadt
Gutenfuerst
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Toepen
Hof
Frankfurt
Main
Railroad
Autobahn
Road
Canal
Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
▲ Soviet
▲ Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
△ East
△ West
STATUTE MILES
0
KILOMETERS
100

UNCLASSIFIED

Boundaries are not necessarily those

32166

f. All Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba last year have been withdrawn or turned over to the Cubans. The only significant exception is the SAM system.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Berlin

a. We have had an indication that Soviet harassment of Allied access routes to West Berlin will shift this weekend to the air corridors.

b. The Soviet man at the Berlin air traffic control center told the Allied representatives yesterday that Soviet transports would be using the air corridors for brief flights during the next five weekends.

c. Moscow has tried on a number of past occasions to assert its right to restrict Allied use of the air corridors. In early 1962, the Soviets attempted to reserve "blocks" of air space for their own use. They have since demanded that Western flights stay between stipulated altitudes, that we file flight plans in advance and provide prior notice of border-crossing times.

(Cont'd)

d. This sort of harassment stopped in the spring of 1962 when Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was interested in a serious discussion of a Berlin settlement. Moscow may hope that the threat of more of this sort of harassment will jog the US into talks on Berlin.

5. Iraq-Syria-UAR

a. It now appears that President Arif's role in last Monday's coup in Baghdad may have been virtually that of a bystander.

b. According to our latest information, Arif was wakened early that morning and given five minutes to join up. Tahir Yahya, now prime minister, was reportedly the organizer.

c. Whatever Arif's role may have been, the coup was primarily an effort by the Iraqi Army to curtail the activities of the extreme wing of the Baath Party. The Baath is an Arab nationalist political organization, active throughout the Arab world, which has been ruling Iraq and Syria.

(Cont'd)

d. The coup group has not thrown all Baathists out of the government; there are party members in the new cabinet.

e. Syrian Baathists have welcomed this retention of their Iraqi brothers. Their attitude springs from the recognition that the Baath in Syria cannot stay afloat without support from Iraq. Even so, we hear talk of coup plotting in Damascus.

f. The reaction of Nasir's Egypt, which passionately desires to see the Baath go under, has been exactly the opposite. Cairo has been backing off its all-out support for the coup ever since the new cabinet was announced.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS


TYURATAM
USSR
ARCTIC OCEAN
CANADA
UNITED STATES
MONGOLIA
CHINA
VLADIVOSTOK
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Petropavlovsk
BERING SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA
TSUSHIMA STRAIT
JAPAN
APPROX. 4900 NM
APPROX. 6500 NM
NORTHERN IMPACT AREA
Midway Islands
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Johnston Island
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTHERN IMPACT AREA
AUSTRALIA
60
40
20
0
20
160
180
160
140
120

TOP SECRET
DINAR

33741

NOTES

A. USSR New activity involving Soviet range instrumentation ships in the Pacific appears to be forthcoming. Three instrumentation ships left Petropavlovsk 12 days ago and are apparently headed for the more distant Pacific impact area, 6,500 miles from Tyuratam. We are looking for extended range ICBM tests but we do not exclude a space event. There has so far been no announcement closing the area. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Congo-USSR Soviet embassy personnel have not yet left Leopoldville, but their departure is expected momentarily. They were ordered out of the country after the Congolese turned up good documentary evidence of their complicity in anti-government plots. One of the items taken off a Soviet diplomat the other day was a letter from an anti-Adoula leader now in Brazzaville asking for funds and arms to overthrow the Leopoldville government.

C. Britain The Labor Party scored again in the Dundee West by-election Thursday, increasing its 1959 majority of 719 to a thumping 4,955. Heartened by this, Labor is now pushing for general elections at once. Prime Minister Home is not likely to accede.

D. Ecuador The military junta which has run Ecuador since July may be about to come unstuck. We have a report that one of the less savory members of the group, air force Colonel Freiles, will try to take over full control this weekend. We are not sure of the reliability of this report, but Freiles is known to have been making motions in this direction.

(Cont'd)

SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLES - COSMOS SERIES

1962 - 1963

SECRET

1962

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 1 (Sputnik 13)	12:00:00 (EST.) 16 Mar '62	Kapustin Yar	96.35	529	117	49°	Decayed 25 May '62
Cosmos 2 (Sputnik 14)	1715:18 6 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	102.5	842	115	49°	Decayed 19-20 Aug '63
Cosmos 3 (Sputnik 15)	0400:12 24 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	93.8	389	124	49°	Decayed 17 Oct.'62
Cosmos 4 * (Sputnik 16)	1002:56 26 Apr '62	Tyuratam	90.6	178	161	65°	Recovered 29 Apr 62
Cosmos 5 (Sputnik 17)	0259:49 28 May '62	Kapustin Yar	102.75	865	110	49°	Decayed 2 May '63
Cosmos 6 (Sputnik 18)	1600:00 (EST.) 30 June '62	Kapustin Yar	90.6	194	148	49°	Decayed 8 Sept '62
Cosmos 7 * (Sputnik 19)	0918:30 28 July '62	Tyuratam	90.1	199	113	65°	Recovered 1 Aug '62
Cosmos 8 (Sputnik 22)	0500:00 (EST.) 18 Aug '62	Kapustin Yar	92.93	326	138	49°	Decayed 17 Aug '63
Cosmos 9 * (Sputnik 26)	0940:00 27 Sept '62	Tyuratam	90.9	191	163	65°	Recovered 1 Oct '62
Cosmos 10 (Sputnik 27)	0900:01 (EST.) 17 Oct '62	Tyuratam	90.2	205	113	65°	Recovered 21 Oct '62
Cosmos 11 (Sputnik 28)	0655:00 (EST.) 20 Oct '62	Kapustin Yar	96.1	497	132	49°	Decayed 6 June '63
Cosmos 12 (Sputnik 32)	0924:40 22 Dec '62	Tyuratam	90.45	243	114	65°	Recovered 30 Dec '62

1963

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 13 (Sputnik 34)	0830:00 21 Mar '63	Tyuratam	89.77	182	111	64° 58"	Recovered 29 Mar '63
Cosmos 14 (Sputnik 36)	1059:59 13 Apr '63	Kapustin Yar	92.1	276	143	48° 57"	Decayed 29 Aug '63
Cosmos 15 * (Sputnik 37)	0829:58 22 Apr '63	Tyuratam	89.77	200	93	65°	Recovered 27 April '63
Cosmos 16 (Sputnik 38)	0850:00 (EST.) 28 Apr. '63	Tyuratam	90.4	218	112	65° 01"	Recovered 5 May '63
Cosmos 17 (Sputnik 39)	0300:00 (EST.) 22 May '63	Kapustin Yar	94.8	425	140	49°	In orbit, silent since 31 May'63
Cosmos 18 (Sputnik 40)	1034:07 24 May '63	Tyuratam	89.44	163	113	65° 01"	Recovered 2 June '63
Cosmos 19 (Sputnik 43)	0600:00 (EST.) 6 Aug '63	Kapustin Yar	92.2	280	146	49°	In orbit, transmitting
Cosmos 20 (Sputnik 44)	0929:58 18 Oct '63	Tyuratam	89.55	168	111	65°	Recovered 26 Oct '63
Failure	24 Oct '63	Kapustin Yar	-	-	-	-	-
Cosmos 21 (Sputnik 46)	0623:39 11 Nov '63	Tyuratam	88.5	124	105	64° 50"	Decayed 14 Nov '63
Cosmos 22 (Sputnik 47)	1034:25 16 Nov '63	Tyuratam	90.3	211	111	64°56"	Recovered 22 Nov '63

E. Thailand Prime Minister Sarit, who suffers from an incurable liver disease, is failing. Doctors attending him, including one of our own, give him no more than six months more. Sarit has attempted to arrange for an orderly succession when he does go. The chances of this are not good; Thai politicians and military figures are already jostling one another for position.

F. USSR Cosmos 22, launched a week ago, was recovered yesterday. It is the eleventh unmanned satellite to be recovered. All recoverable satellites have been launched from Tyuratam, the main Soviet missile test center, and recovered after three to ten days aloft. A series of non-recoverable satellites has been fired from Kapustin Yar.
(See Chart)
(INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/31/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10002-10091
RECORD SERIES :	SCHWARZER-MANFREDI FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	S-M (IV-W)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM C. STURBITTS
DATE :	04/16/1975
PAGES :	113
SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS CIA CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS CUBAN EXILES FERRIE, DAVID STURGIS, FRANK HUNT, E. HOWARD MIAMI NEW ORLEANS SHAW, CLAY STURBITTS, WILLIAM C. GARRISON, JIM
DOCUMENT TYPE :	DEPOSITION
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	02/13/2001
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Unknown whether name is releasable.

CONTENTS

Deposition of	Examination by Counsel For the Commission
William C. Sturbitts	2
(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)	
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)	58

178-10002-10091

178-10002-10215

178-10002-10279

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia
Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,
ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

PROCEEDINGS

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

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your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

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Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

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Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

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Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

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There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

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a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

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heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

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part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

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MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

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Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

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Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

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I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

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activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

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A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

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Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

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Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

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type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

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A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

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executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

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the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

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Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

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our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

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when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

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A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

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Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

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Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

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real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

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A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

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of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

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A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

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country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

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they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

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Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

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outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

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be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

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A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

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it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

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frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

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tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

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a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

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all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

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Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

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Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

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Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

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Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

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on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

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directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

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couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

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Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

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Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of ~~thing~~. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

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Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

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It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

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activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

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Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

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A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions,and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

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A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

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Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

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Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

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Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

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or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

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A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

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course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

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purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

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You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

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information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

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A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

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agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

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I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

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would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

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Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

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A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

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activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

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MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DDP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

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Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

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published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

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Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

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Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

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Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

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to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

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A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

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A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

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Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

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A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

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day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

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Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

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Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

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A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

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Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

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A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

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Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

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A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

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Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

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Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

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A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

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support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

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A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

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the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

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Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

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A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

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A   Not to my knowledge.

Q   Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A   Yes.

Q   Did you have some role in drafting that?

A   You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q   Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A   Yes.

Q   You wrote it?

A   Yes.

Q   It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A   Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the sell-out of Juanita Castro.

Q   Yes, I am familiar with that.

A   You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q   She was doing --

A   Propaganda.

Q   -- propaganda broadcasts.

A   Yes.

Q   Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

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area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

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A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

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Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

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A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

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CUBAN EXILES
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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

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PROCEEDINGS

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

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your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

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Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

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Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

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A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

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Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

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There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

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a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

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heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

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part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

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MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

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Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

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Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

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I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

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activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

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A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

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Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

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Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

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type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

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A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

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executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

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the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

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Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

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our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

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when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

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A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

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Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

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Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

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real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants, basically.

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A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

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of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

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A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

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country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet,such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us,which

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they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

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Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

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be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of paramilitary activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And ~~some~~ CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

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A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

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it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

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frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

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tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

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a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

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all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

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Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

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Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

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Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

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Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

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on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

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directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

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couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

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Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

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Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

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Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

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It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

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activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

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AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

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Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

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A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

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A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

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Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were debriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

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Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

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Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

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or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

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A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

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course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment, we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

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purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

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You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

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information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

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A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

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agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

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I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

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would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

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Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

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A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

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activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

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MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

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Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

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published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

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Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

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Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

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to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

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A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

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A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

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Q. That is Fiedl Castrc?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

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A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

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day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

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Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully

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Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

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A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

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Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

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A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

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Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

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A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

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Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

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Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

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A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

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support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

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A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this,which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

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Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

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A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

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A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the hell out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

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area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

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A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

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Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

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A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

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your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

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Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

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Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

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A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

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Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

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There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

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a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

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heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

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MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

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Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

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Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

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I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

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activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

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A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

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Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

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Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

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type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

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A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

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executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

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the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

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Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

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our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

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when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

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A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

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Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

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Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

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real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants, basically.

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A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

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of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in ~~which~~ organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

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A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

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they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

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Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

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outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

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be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

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A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

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it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

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frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

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a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

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all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

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Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

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Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

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Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

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Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

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on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

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directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

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couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

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Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

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Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

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Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

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It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

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Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

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A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

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A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

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Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

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Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

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Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

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or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

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A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

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course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment, we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

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purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

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You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

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information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

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A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

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agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

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I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence. interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

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would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

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Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

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A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

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activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

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MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

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Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

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published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

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Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

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Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

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Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

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to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

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A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

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A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

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Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

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A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

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day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

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Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully

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Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

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A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

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BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q. What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

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Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

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A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

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Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

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A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

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Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

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Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

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A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

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A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

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Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

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A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

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A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the hell-out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

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area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

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A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

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Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

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A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING OF

20 SEPTEMBER 1962

There was discussion of FIRE FLY. Its use over Kamchatka was disapproved. General Carter raised the possibility of using it against Cuba, and State appeared enthusiastic. (General Carter does not feel that any operations which DD/R has been considering have been prejudiced by this discussion.)

There was some discussion of the balloon operation over Cuba, but action was deferred until next week. In the meantime, State is most anxious that it be arranged for the exiles to do this and that they not come running back to Miami immediately. The question was also raised as to whether the exiles could still obtain helium.

The next ambassadorial counter-insurgency team will go to Africa. The chairman will be Carl Hummelsine. We are to drum up a candidate.

In presenting the North Vietnam plan next week, CIA is to include the requirement for an overflight to gather radar information. In connection with the whole North Vietnam operation, State seems determined to have no overflights over Laos and no involvement of Chinese Nationalist aircraft or personnel except possibly Chinese pilots in sterile aircraft with South Vietnam credentials. State plans to balance very carefully the risks versus the potential gains. DD/I is to prepare the same sort of assessment on the North Vietnam operation as on Tibet.

The Air Libya item was approved as presented.

The support to [redacted] approved as presented.

On Tibet, to be acted on next week, Secretary Rusk is absolutely firm on getting the Indians cranked in.

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General Carter briefed the meeting on the provision of the security advice to the President of Colombia.

General Carter read the CIA memo on CINCARIB communications problems. The meeting expressed delighted surprise at our capability. We are now a full-fledged member of the State-Defense group which is considering this problem.

On Nicaragua, a memo is to be prepared for the Acting DCI describing the degree of Cuban involvement, particularly in the shipment of arms to Nicaragua by way of Honduras. This memo will also cover Communist infiltration of student and labor and a discription of CIA activities in these same fields.

There was a long discussion of the role of USIB in recommending countries to be placed on the counter-insurgency list. Full account to be gotten from Tom Parrott.

There was discussion of the Southeast Asia status report, concentrating on strategic hamlets, the Montagnards, and the bad press situation in Saigon.

General Carter called attention to the memoranda on the North Vietnam presence in Laos. The question came up as to whether there was an SNIE in the works on this. This subject is to be kept current, especially in view of the 6 October deadline.

State and Defense announced that they had now sent the counter-insurgency doctrine papers to everyone in the field.

There was a suggestion that it was time for a progress report on the South Vietnam intelligence capability.

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Document Information

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FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962
DATE :	12/10/1962
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SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PFIAB OPERATION MONGOOSE MC CONE, JOHN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
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178-10004-10053

10 December 1962

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

[illegible] page 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 1962

1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2.16 at 60,000 feet. There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.

2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.

SCI

BYE 3750-6.

~~[illegible]~~

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3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordination. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with Secretary McNamara. Dr. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only 10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending $3,844,000,000 on intelligence and CIA only $363,000,000. This was an increase from $2,250,000,000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnaissance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.

4. Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50,000,000 less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000,000 versus $405,000,000. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381,000,000 and taken $20,000,000 for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point

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Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the MONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussion with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention some of the activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days, and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. Langer asked if it might not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so because our military forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much trouble.

5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement. He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of Congress to whom we were responsible. He noted that CIA could handle the project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding $140,000,000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance the money. The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-

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JFK Assassination System
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Agency Information

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RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10054

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

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ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
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TO : RECORD

TITLE : MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.

DATE : 12/28/1962
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB
MC CONE, JOHN
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES

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Dec
27 28
1962

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		December 27th
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Review of Board's Draft Interim Report to the President
3.	10:00 - 12:45	Review of Draft Report on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI on December 26, 1962)
4.	12:45	Depart for Lunch
5.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - The Hay-Adams Hotel (Guests of Dr. Langer)
6.	2:30 - 3:30	Review of the World Situation ~~Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA~~ [illegible]
7.	3:30 - End of Day	Resume Review of Report on Cuban Arms Buildup
8.	7:30 p.m.	Dinner at Residence of Mr. John McCone (3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.) (attended by all Bd. members except Land, Baker, Clifford)
		December 28th
9.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
10.	9:30 - 1:00	Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup with the Following Key Intelligence Community Officials:
		a. 9:30-10:30 ✓ Mr. John McCone
		b. 10:30-11:00 ✓ Lt. General M. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA
		c. 11:00-~~11:30~~ 11:15 / 12:00 ✓ Lt. General G. Blake, Director, NSA
		d. ~~11:30-12:00~~ 12:00 / 12:35 ✓ Mr. Thomas Hughes, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of Stat
		e. ~~12:00-1:00~~ 12:35-1:30 ✓ Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director, DIA

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(December 28th - Continued)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	1:00 - 2:30 2:30 — (3:45)	Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building McGeorge Bundy + Tom Parrott
12.	2:30 - 3:30	~~Status of Implementation of Prior-Board Recommendations~~ ~~Mr. Russell Ash~~
13.	3:30 - END	Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President.

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document contains information
[illegible] IDEALIST, CORONA
OXCART

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962

The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.

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* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling.

On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access). ✓

As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.

Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One other matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was taking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur, it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.

X

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules. [redacted]

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions there

Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/20/20

Agency Information

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RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES
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[With Danny get exact documented visits + phonecalls.]

Edwin J Lopez
prepared by Dan Hardway

SCENARIO
CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963 Thursday	azcue ①	A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. The visit probably occurs around one o'clock. "Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair, sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. He was said to look very cold with a hard face and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you. "Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba on his way to Russia. He displayed documents that showed his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the American Communist Party. He was told that he would have to first obtain a visa to Russia before he could be issued an intransit visa. He is also told that he should return to the Cuban Embassy with his passport and a copy of a photograph in order to fill out the visa application.
September 27, 1963 Friday		
Circa 10:30 A.M.	Teltap a	"Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA) with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa. The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald" asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves them.
10:37 A.M.	Teltap b	"Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that the Consul is not in. He is told that he can call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.
circa 11:30 A.M.	Tel tap at 4:26 ②	"Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he once again exhibits the documents he has already shown the Cubans as well as other documents such as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" discusses his situation with someone at the Embassy and comes away with the understanding that everything would be expeditiously handled.
circa 12:15 P.M.	Not here Azcue –	Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald" has told him, and tells him that they have to get authorization from Moscow to grant him a visa and that it will probably take four months.
circa 12:45 A.M.	③	"Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the

9/27/63
12:45 (cont'd)

Azque

Silvia say
5:00

Duran

photo and completes the visa application, stating that he would like to leave in three days. He asks Azcue about how long it will take to get the visa. Azcue explains his misconception to him, an argument results and Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic to Oswald, gives him ~~her address~~ w/C and promises to help in any ~~way she can.~~ She feels that Oswald should have been granted the visa with no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong.

1:25 P.M.

c

Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to find out what has gone wrong with the arraingment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out and that he can be contacted between four and five on Mondays and Fridays. [This call may have been from Duran's phone.] If it was he then told her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had his deal with and would she be kind enough to talk to him. She said that she would and to come back at four o'clock. If the call was not made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock call were made.

4:05 P.M.

— 4, ?
Tel Tap

Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She tells them the American citizen, the one who wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba. She tells the official she is speaking with that the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom he spoke because he had been assured that there would be no problem. The man at the Soviet Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia goes through it again. He tells her that her call will be returned.

4:26 P.M.

Tel Tap

A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes that she cannot give him a visa because of the delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting? In light of subsequent events it was probably something that would keep his hopes up.

Night

?

Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with Silvia and two American friends. This may have been, more likely was, the night of the 26th. He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the night with Silvia.

September 28, 1963 Saturday		
circa 11:00 A.M.	⑤	Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging them to expedite his visa. They send him back to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.
11:51	6) d	Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald on the phone. He tells them that he is returning to the Soviet Embassy with the address.
circa 12:00	7,	Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is assured that a telegram will be sent and that it will be handled as quickly as possible.
afternoon		Oswald decides that he needs more help and tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban group on the campus of the University of Mexico. Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who will say they know him in Cuba. In any case, he seeks some sort of assistance from these Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.
September 29, 1963 Sunday Morning		Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.
Sunday Afternoon/ evening and night		?
September 30, 1963 Monday		? Note: the association with the Cuban group could have been anytime between the afternoon of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day with him.
October 1, 1963 10:31 A.M. Tuesday	e	Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache inquiring about a telegram. He is refered to the Consulate.
10:45 A.M.	f	Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry and learns that the telegram has been sent but no reply has been received. He is discouraged. Obyedkov hangs up on him.
later or earlier	g	Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his "arrangement" and discusses the assistance that was promised him. He is dangled and the man eventually hangs up on him.
later or on the 2nd. Wednesday		Oswald leaves Mexico.

On or about	this may have happened
9/30/63 Monday	MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia Duran discusses an American and his problem with a Soviet Co~~u~~ns~~e~~ul. Win Scott writes "Can we identify?" on transcript. Goodpasture notifies Flick that an American is apparently trying to get a visa and that the COS would like to ID. The Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to notify Flick of any conversation involving an american, or in English. ETC, HOWEVER.
10/1/63 Goodpasture ties in 9/28 Soviet conversation re: address.	Flick is notified by a monitor that there is an English conversation on the Soviet tap. Flick listens and hears the man ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape and marks it "urgent" and notifies Goodpasture that they have an ID on an American. The tape is delivered to Tarasoff for immediate transcription. It is recieved late this day or early on the second by Goodpasture. Disposition of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes have been routinely retained for longer period? Goodpasture now has ID but does not know for sure that it is the one that Scott has asked about. The guy in the 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting but there is nothing in this conversation, OR 9/2 that clearly connects. She discusses reporting it with Manell. There is some disagreement over whose responsiblity it is to report. Either decision is made, or conflict continues until photos is checked.
10/7/63	Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?) are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.
10/8/63	B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture adds paragraph 2.
10/10/63	(in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved. Descriptions don't match. Controversy in station on whether Oswald's same. 9/27 + 9/28 conversation tied DEFINATELY in to LHO during this week. by similarity of subtantive content OF CABLE AND CONVERSATION AND VOICE COMPARISON.
10/16/63	Oswald "P" file opened.
10/18/63	by this time photo of MMM recieved at Station. Goodpasture picks up on it. This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.

10/21/63

10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents by this time. What response? MCS cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO. For what purpose? Was it just to compare to surveillance photos? Were they planning on showing to penatration agents? why? note: quite a few people say interest level was high--so what actions were taken?

24 August 1978

011042

HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to 4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during his employment with the CIA. He was asked if he remembered and understood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again. Mr. Phillips stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to see the letter again.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from 1961 to 1963. Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his propoganda shop in Mexico City. He said that it was manned only by himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents. He stated that he himself handled "very very few" agents. "Usually I met with someone who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents." Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even though he was not handling them on a day to day basis. He stated that at all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico. Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to work in Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his prior tour of duty in Havana. Mr. Phillips said that such assets were usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks." He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent. When asked to explain that division Mr. Phillips stated:

> Kent reported to my shop in Washington. He had day to day contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people involved in Radio Swan.

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company. He did say that he was in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan. He said that he felt uncomfortable naming than agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity.

Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went to see the people he knew from Havana, including those he was running as agents himself. He would also, on occassion, meet with agents whom

Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he would like a little weight." Sometimes he went down to Miami on a "trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial radio station the Agency was funding.

Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr. Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee. He did state that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he received a call from Mr. Kent. He said that Mr. Kent said that he was setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as referring people for specific skilled jobs. They did not discuss the HSCA at all, according to Phillips.

Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personnally ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identify the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions, duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr. Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his, Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic surveillance operations and that they had two penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work." He said that his name must be on many papers.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no formal program." He said, however, that "I never really understood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern during their entire careers but that he was not one of them. He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He also said that it would have been normal routine for Mr. Swenson to have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said that the Legat got "drop copies" what? of most reports. He said that it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination would have definately been routine and that this liaison relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other than just reporting the information that had come to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case. In those instances it was possible that other actions would be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch, on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station could, and often did, take actions/ other than just reporting in regard to Americans in Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e., they often took investigative and operational action on their own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of Station in Mexico.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison with the Bureau on the surveillance operations.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in the Station but that it may ~~of~~ have been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde, flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and that someone from one of those two places would have regularly come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lachuga and their interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of her affair with Lachuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said "No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible that she was not pitched because the station could not identify any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that

~~all th~~at would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde, blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted and that the station's interest was substantial and that the weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out, however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be "very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw Lachuga only three times after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last encounter Phillips said that he knew Lachuga was going to be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the

Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott and his secretary would have been the only people who had access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of what Scott kept in his safe. He said that when he personally was chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela, he kept ~~really~~ "very sensitive" material in his safe in his office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr. Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would note that for the record ~~in~~ and keep it in the private safe. He guessed that the material in the safe would have been material Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book concerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the name of that person, but says he took some literary license because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction," he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers:
Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";
Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI;
Luisa Calderon--"familiar";
Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar";
Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar";
Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context." He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset. He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents. I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that "there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June 1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but does not remember it specifically. He said that the name

Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he could not recall the true names. He said that he did not know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Headquarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section" and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo. He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that he would not have known about it. He said that he had on occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #'s 3665 and 3662 which are reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall that much about Calderon other than to make him think that she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had never known or heard that such was the case.

Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon call. (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before... when we were reviewing things after the assassination." He was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on that conversation. He said that he could not recall that anything was done other than forwarding the conversation to Headquarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead. He said that he did not know if this conversation was given to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought the report may have been written by a person used by the station that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may

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have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why she would be termed dangerous."

Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding the firing of Teresa Proenza (CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips stated that he dos not know why Teresa Proenza was fired. He said that he did recognize the cryptonym AMROD. He said that it was a disinformation operation and that it may have been aimed, in part, at Teresa Proenza. He said that the person in his book that he refers to as a cultural attache with a penchant for antique jewelry was not Teresa Proenza. He said that he remembers that the person he refers to in that story was definately a man. Phillips stuck adamantly to this contention.

Phillips stated that he does not recall that the Mexico City Station ever developed any information that Oswald was in contact with anyone else at the Cuban Embassy other than Azcue and Duran. Mr. Phillips was shown the FBI report of an interview with Ms. Proenza's brother. Mr. Phillips stated that it did not ring any bells and he could not recall ever having heard of such a thing. Mr. Phillips was also informed of the FBI report from a CIA source that indicated that Oswald had had contact with Proenza. He said that he had never heard of it. Mr. Phillips then stated that some things were coming back to him. He asked if Proenza was a lesbian but he didn't recall if that was a fact or part of the disinformation campaign aimed at her.

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

The timing of the departures of Calderon and Proenza was pointed out to Mr. Phillips as well as the indications that they had met Oswald, had prior knowledge of the assassination, the nominal reason regarding Proenza over the Raul Roa note. He was asked if he knew if their recalls were connected and if they were connected with the assassination. He said that he did not know, maybe Calderon and Proenza had been lovers, but that may have been part of the disinformation, he just could not remember which, fact or fiction.

Mr. Phillips stated that it was very possible that HQ or JMWAVE could have recruited and run Cuban agents in Mexico without the knowledge of the Mexico Station. Phillips said: "I suppose it would have been possible for an agent in Mexico City to be run out of JMWAVE station in Miami without my knowledge, but I would have been furious if I found out about it:. He said that this may have even been "probable" in the case of a "sensitive operation," but he pointed out that anyone doing that took the risk of crossing Win Scott who was close to both the DCI and DDP. This lead Mr. Phillips to say that if that was the case then the DDP, at least, would probably have approved the WAVE use of an agent in Mexico. We took Mr. Phillips through the documents on Ms. Calderon again and asked him if this could have been an instance such as that we were talking about. He said that it very well could have been but that he had no knowledge that would indicate that that was the case. He said that this was the kind of thing "they might have asked Barney Hidalgo to do." Phillips agreed that

CIA #3665 indicates that a pitch to Calderon was to be made by someone outside of Mexico. "If it was someone from the CIA there would be something in her 201 files... but possibly it could have been run out of a soft file." He said that her file should be substantial. He said he could not explain why the Calderon conversation would not have been in her 201 while it was in Oswald's.

Mr. Phillips was informed of the testing of the impulse camera beginning on September 27, 1963. He stated that he had "no recollection" of the disposition of the photographs obtained during that testing.

Mr. Phillips stated that if another cable (a third) was sent to HQ regarding Oswald prior to the assassination that he did not know about it.

Mr. Phillips was asked if there was a way for HQ and a Station to communicate without the commo becoming part of the permanent record. He stated that there was at least one way that he knew of in addition to telephone and personal courier. He said that it was technically possible to set up a "telcom" system by persuading the cable operators to set it up on a "back channel". He stated that such a system would work on a question and answer sheme. He said "It has been done on occassion but I don't recall it ever having been done in Mexico." Mr. Phillips also stated that he did not believe that there had been any telephone communications concerning the assassination. Refuting documents were not shown.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest. He also said that he would not be surprised if other catagories of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA files. Mr. Phillips was asked what factors would make him suspicious of a file. He said that missing references, pages that had half of them torn off, things like that would arouse his suspicion. He also listed a missing report from a sequentially numbered series of reports as one thing that would arouse his suspicion. In response to a direct question, Mr. Phillips said that, if what we had told him about Ms. Duran's file was true, then we could be fairly certain that her file had been "manipulated."

Mr. Phillips was asked about James Angleton. He said: "He didn't tell me anything about his operations. He kept promising to tell me, but he never did." He said that Angleton held his operation very tightly to his vest. Phillips said it is possible that J.C. King mignt have had some operations outside of the JMARC structure but that they could not have been funded without someone knowing about them. A division chief does have access to operational and developmental funds but, Phillips said, he has never heard of a discretionary fund available to Division Chiefs. He said that the developmental fund usually had a lot of money in it but that it eventually had to be accounted for. "I can't remember having such a fund that I didn't account for through the DDP."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not participate, nor was he aware of, in any campaign after the assassination to spread misinformation about the death of Kennedy. He could not explain why the misinformation that came from the Cuban groups and individuals that tended to point to Castro involvement were predominantly from assets that he had handled personally as opposed to ones that had been ran out of the Miami station. He said that he agreed that it was strange that the one peice of evidence that tended to show at least DGI foreknowledge was not pursued by his shop while disinformation from his former assets occupied the attentions of investigators in that area. Mr. Phillips stated that he did not know of any hard evidence that existed in 1963 that pointed to Castro's involvement.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his operations in Havana, specifically the names of the operations he was involved in, when he worked there as a covert operative from 1958 to 1961. He said he went to Cuba in the summer of 1958 after he had retired from the Agency. He said the Agency heard he was setting up his own public relations business there and asked him to continue working for them, not on a staff status but on a contract basis. Most of his work, he said, involved propaganda operations for Latin American coundtries and not Cuba. He did do what he termed "ad hoc" stuff as it came along and he did develop propaganda news stories and editorial material that was sent out to the provincial newspapers. He also specifically recalled attending a meeting of a group of businessmen who began talking about developing anti-Castro activity, but that group never got off the ground because there was an informant in the group and most of the participants were shortly afterwards arrested.

When asked about his relationsip with Julio Lobo, he became a bit upset and said he thought he had covered that adequately in his deposition. He sa~~ys~~id as far as he ~~can~~ could recall he met Lobo only one time, perhaps it was even in Madrid and not Havana, he doesn't recall, and he had no substantial dealings with him. He wanted to know if Veciana's story about Bishop is still being considered and if any decision about his being Bishop had been conclusively arrived at. He said he doesn't like living under the fear and tension of possibly being called before the television cameras and having Veciana suddenly stand up and point his finger at him and say that he is Bishop and that he saw him with Oswald. Phillips was told by the interviewers that they had no authority to disclose anything of substance about our investigation to him. He asked that the interviewers seek permission to let him know what was going on. He was told that his request would be brought to high-level attention but that a response of any kind at all could not be assured.

Phillips stated that he did not know Paul Bethel very well. but it was not Bethel who introduced him to Lopez-Fresquet. He said that that introduction was made by Bethel's boss, Dick Cushing.

Phillips said that he had no additional recollections on Jack Cogswell other than he remembered that he was an

American businessman in Havana.

Mr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names. He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher people. "I was fairly socially active at the time and the name of the company is familiar to me."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations clients during that time. He could recall only the man who owned Ambar Motors and the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although he can not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did in return.

Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.

He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a big guy because they were in a little theatre group together and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.

Phillips said that he did not know Roberto Vale.

Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of the country on covert operations. He said he always traveled out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He would have other documentation on him for use with his alias when he arrived in the country. He said that's the way it was always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a "very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.

"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added that he had never had a phoney passport.

Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon) once when~~t~~ they were in college. He said that he had not seen him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall, he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.

Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober. He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban Aid Relief operation in Miami.

Phillips said that the debriefing centers in Miami were under the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those centers.

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TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, June 20, 1978

- - -

U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:20 o'clock p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Burke, Fithian, Devine and Sawyer.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, M. Goldsmith, R. Morrison, E. Berning, M. Jackson, J. Smith, K. Klein and S. Brady.

- - -

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

At this time the Committee will resume its sitting. We are still in executive session by virtue of the resolution adopted by the Committee this past evening.

At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Off the record.

TOP SECRET

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Anything further?

Bring the witness in.

Let the record reflect that the Committee has resumed its sitting and at this time the witness, Yuri Nosenko, is back before the Committee once again.

Mr. Nosenko, I admonish you that you are still under the oath that you took last night.

TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And at this time, then, the Committee will recognize the counsel for the Committee, Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good evening.

Mr. Nosenko. Good evening, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that after the assassination you had an opportunity to be present when Oswald's file was brought from Minsk, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read the entire file at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. How much of the file did you read?

Mr. Nosenko. It was simply looking, page by page, first part of the first volume.

Mr. Klein. You went through the first part of the first volume, page by page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you go through any of the other volumes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that an officer named Matveev took the file away to prepare a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who wrote that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. The summary was written by the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who, in particular?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not know.

Mr. Klein. And did you ever have an opportunity to read the summary that the First Department prepared?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; I didn't see it.

Mr. Klein. The Russian word "spravka", does that mean --

Mr. Nosenko. Is summary, right.

Mr. Klein. And why were you not able to read the summary that they wrote?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, the file was taken in the First Department. I was working in the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to read it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Was it at all unusual that with all your involvement in the case you did not have an opportunity to read that file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was the decision of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, given big importance to this question, that a resume will be prepared by the most prestigious department, American Department, and that is why we couldn't even ask.

Mr. Klein. You didn't even ask to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. So it was not unusual that you were not allowed to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was not unusual.

Mr. Klein. You have testified before this Committee that the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you ~~decided~~ he was not interesting without speaking to him.

Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. 1959.

Mr. Klein. In 1959, approximately how many Americans wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. There was a defectionist, I remember, one of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to organize the American Exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.

Mr. Klein. Without giving particular names, how many Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?

What would the number be?

Mr. Nosenko. These two were known to me -- Oswald and Webster.

Mr. Klein. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I heard, there I think was one only.

Mr. Klein. One other, meaning three altogether.

Mr. Nosenko. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I know.

Mr. Klein. Three?

Mr. Nosenko. Three.

Mr. Klein. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know any other defector who was ever turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves, how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can give them certain information which is valuable.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall telling this Committee yesterday that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting left and right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. And that you recruited a woman in Utah who was --

Mr. Nosenko. I simply had given example of this recruitment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was recruitng and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will be for them valuable or not.

Mr. Klein. And that KGB officers were getting bonus and promotions when they induced people to recruit?

Mr.Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in '59, a very big amount of them in '59 very interesting, much, much more interesting -- professors and teachers -- and even was a co-op from CIA we had quite a few recruitments, and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.

Mr. Klein. Would the KGB have any interest in an American student?

Mr. Nosenko. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in students, but particularly those students who are studying the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.

Mr. Klein. And would they have any interest in an American who had strong anti-American views and who was a professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that kind of person?

Mr. Nosenko. Here were are coming to a very interesting and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of members of the Communist Party of the West.

Mr. Klein. I am not asking about a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Nosenko. Your question is, and if he is some type of Marxist here, the question maybe he is possibly a member of Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.

Mr. Klein. Would they ask him if he is a member of the Communist Party?

Would they check it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would not ask him.

Mr. Klein. They wouldn't ask him?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?

Mr. Nosenko. It depends. If he was corporal, private, is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be interested.

Mr. Klein. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; it is not enough because they had sources.

Mr. Klein. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where U-2s took off and landed?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir; it would be very interested.

Mr. Klein. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had --

Mr. Nosenio. Students? I never heard that he was a student.

Mr. Klein. -- who had been a radar operator and had worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2s flights. That is one thing.

And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important for KGB to know about such base -- that base. We knew it in '50's when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, '51, '52. We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi Base, and we knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.

Mr. Klein. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of information about that when he wanted to defect, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. And you told us that one reason that no one was working on Oswald was because all of your people were concentrating on the American Exhibition in 1959, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Not only American Exhibition, there were other tourists and among them were interesting targets, very interesting targets.

Mr. Klein. You told us yesterday that things didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. I can explain you why, because an American Exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had, I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it was suspected quite a number of people from American intelligence community who were working on American Exhibition in Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets, it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved on each case, because it is very serious target.

Mr. Klein. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not.

Mr.Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. Without objection.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-2 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Did counsel want to identify for the record how the document has been marked?

The Clerk. JFK-F-2.

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document, does it say on the top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you recognize that type of document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes. It is from Department of giving Visas and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate of Internal Affairs of Moswcow City.

Mr. Klein. And does this appear to be an authentic document, an authentic copy of the document?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Looking at Number 8, does it say what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first time?

Mr. Nosenko. October, 1959.

Mr. Klein. October what?

Mr. Nosenko. October 16, 1959.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Without objection.

Would the clerk indicate for the record?

The Clerk. JFK-F-3, Mr. Chairman.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-3 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on the right hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet Jammed at Close," do you see that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And what is the date of that story?

Mr. Nosenko. The date is September 4.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that the American Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when Americans who were working for this Exhibition left Moscow.

Mr. Klein. I will ask you another question.

Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, till they were leave the Soviet Union. No. They are the same targets. Okay, you are right, it is closed September 4th, but does it change the importance of these people against whom KGB was working? They were still in Moscow.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did things in your department get back to normal once the fair ended, and do you recall saying yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans when they left, and they were staying quite a long time after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.

Mr. Klein. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home. You told us that he slashed his wrists and two psychiatrists examined him and both found him mentally unstable.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. What was the point of having the two psychiatrists examine him?

Mr. Nosenko. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.

Mr. Klein. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill himself it will bereaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.

Mr. Klein. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.

Mr. Klein. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. It is a very sensitive question. He can jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.

Mr. Klein. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any such action.

Mr. Klein. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo, not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist Party.

Mr. Klein. Going by the facts as you have told them to this Committee --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the Chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.

Mr. Klein. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?

Mr. Nosenko. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.

Mr. Klein. Instead they elected to allow him to stay indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet government allowed.

Mr. Klein. The facts as you have testified to them are that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where he had access to a gun.

Can you think of any other cases in all the time you worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was treated in thiskind of manner?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you I do not know any other cases of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him. And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does it mean, KGB allow him to marry?

Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by degree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of

Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any way try not to give, not to make it possible, but this is in cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket industry production, was in process of any place of his working seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive from the point of view of Soviet security.

Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving mad; it is mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that not only was Oswald not spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also tetified to the extensive resources that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved, the facilities involved?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you find great contradiction --

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- in the fact that, on the one hand, you put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to see who he talked to and what he does and, on the other hand, you don't even have a person go and talk to him and ask him, "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."

Is there any contradiction?

Mr. Nosenko. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there, no.

Mr. Klein. They don't talk to people there?

Mr. Nosenko. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I don't see contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched and on ~~him will~~ be put this same type of work that was put on Oswald, not less.

Mr. Klein. You talk about their society is different than ours. Is it unusual that they allow an American to defect and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he is an intelligence agent?

Mr. Nosenko. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him? Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He will show by his behavior, by his action.

Mr. Klein. They purposely don't speak to him; is that your testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. In this case they didn't speak with him because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because he was mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that you read the reports of two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You said both found him mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us in great detail how this decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.

I would ask that this document be marked for identification.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. It will be JFK-F-4.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-4 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Have you ever seen that document before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the Soviet Government provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document in front of you --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. -- is that a hospital record?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.

Mr. Klein. And whose hospital record? Does it have a name on it?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.

Mr. Klein. Whose name is it?

Mr. Nosenko. Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Does it say what date he was admitted?

Mr. Nosenko. Discharged, admitted 23rd, discharged 28th.

Mr. Klein. What year is that?

Mr. Nosenko. October of 1959.

Mr. Klein. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis, why he was in the hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Incised wound of one-third of the left forearm.

Mr. Klein. And that date, October of 1959, is that when Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. You have in front of you the other document which told -- Number 8 -- what date he came to the Soviet Union. Is that still there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. This is admittance to the hospital and dischargement.

Mr. Klein. Number 8?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrival, October 16.

Mr. Klein. And the date on the hospital admittance is what date?

Mr. Nosenko. Twenty-third of October.

Mr. Klein. And would you turn to the hospital admittance form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says "History of Present Illness"?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I don't see.

Mr. Klein. On the third page?

Mr. Nosenko. I have the third page.

Mr. Klein. It has Number 6 on the top of the page, but it's the third page on the document.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, Number 6, History of Present Illness. Yes. Just a second.

Mr. Klein. Would you glance through that and would you tell us if this is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to Botkin Hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the right hand side.

Do you see that page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr.Klein. The next to the last page.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read what is said under that?

Mr. Nosenko. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief PHysicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is transferred to the Seventh Ward."

Mr. Klein. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see.

Mr. Klein. Does that report indicate that he was normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see what I have seen. But this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong, Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. And that document, according to you, is that not an authentic copy?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB can prepare you any document. Take the material, or ask the doctors who are cooperating with KGB and they will prepare you any document.

Mr. Klein. I -am not asking you what they can do. Are you testifying that this document is not authentic, it is not the document?

Mr. Nosenko. This document never was in the file of the KGB.

Mr. Klein. So --

Mr. Nosenko. This I testify.

Mr. Klein. -- it is your tetimony that the KGB sent us a phony document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You testified before this Committee that there was periodic physical surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And you testified in detail about that, and you told us how the physical surveillance consisted of following Oswald for a month or month and a half at a time, and there were a number of people that would be involved, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. It was a big operation?

Mr. Nosenko. Big operation? No, it's not a big operation.

Mr. Klein. There were a number of people involved, weren't there?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not a big operation. It is routine. In KGB it is a routine, nothing serious. It's not an operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an operation.

Mr. Klein. And have you ever stated that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and associates and review of his mail? Have you ever stated that was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. I stated before, and I stated it to you yesterday, and I state now, that the order was given, and I have seen it -- to cover him by surveillance periodical, to cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places he is working, control over his correspondence and control of his telephone conversations.

Mr. Klein. My question is, have you ever stated that the only coverage was checking at his places of employment and his neighbors and associates, and not say anything about periodic, physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I cannot tell you what I stated. I was for quite a big period of time, quite a few years, interrogated, by hours, and in different types of conditions, including hostile conditions.

Mr. Klein. That was by the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Where they asked questions in such form which later my answer will be interpreted in any way, however they want to interrogate us.

Mr. Klein. That was by CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I cannot remember dates. You must understand, it's hundreds of interrogations, hundreds.

Mr. Klein. This period that you are telling us about, you were questioned by the CIA during that period, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

Mr. Klein. Were you questioned during that period by FBI?

Mr. Nosenko. I questioned by FBI in February, yes.

Mr. Klein. At this time I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will indicate for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. Exhibit JFK-F-5.

(The document referred to was marked
as JFK Exhibit No. F-5 for

identification.)

Mr. Klein. These hostile interrogations you just alluded to, did they lead you to state other than the truth to these interrogators?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering questions which were put to me.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever not tell the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I was telling the truth.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Just a moment. Before you you have a Federal Bureau of Investigation report, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Iwould direct your attention to page 29 of that report.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. The last paragraph, beginning with, "Nosenko stated" -- it's underlined. Would you please read that paragraph to us?

Mr. NOsenko. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction from the KGB Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks of his places of employment, inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his mail."

Mr. Klein. Did you make that statement?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?

Mr. Klein. Does that statement say anything about physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it didn't.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget to tell them about the physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put; I do not know.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich and Gheesling on March 3rd and 4th, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date, no. I remember I was speaking with agents from FBI.

Mr. Klein. When you spoke to them, did you recall that they spoke to you at that time, March 3rd and 4th, about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you,they were speaking with me about Oswald, but I cannot tell you the date whem.

Mr. Klein. Was it in March 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. They were speaking with me -- February and the beginning of March of 1964.

Mr. Klein. And did they tape the conversations?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, they were taping all conversations.

Mr. Klein. Did the agents make notes when you were talking?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did they ever show you those notes?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the statements you were making to them were going to be written down in to a report?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the report?

Mr. Nosenko. No. The only one which was sent to the Warren Commission, this I have seen.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the report would be put in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that report would be shown to a committee such as this investigating the assassination?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't know that it would be created, the Committee, because it was 1964.

Mr. Klein. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Did you know that this Committee -- in 1964 -- will be existing in '78, '77?

Mr. Klein. And were you telling them the truth when you told them that the only coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and not telling them about the physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald; it was ordered, passive type of work , it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive.

Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approachments, recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical surveillance which you told this Committee about yesterday?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe. I didn't mention but I was telling them about surveillance.

Mr. Klein. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you, "Was there physical surveillance?" --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I will answer yes, it was.

Mr. Klein. -- you would have answered yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also testified before this Committee that in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped his phone and they would record it and make copies of it and gave it to a certain person.

Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same paragraph, does that say anything about the technical surveillance that you told us about?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget?

Mr. Nosenko. But, if you ask, even an agent of FBI, I doubt it, no. In KGB control of correspondence, control of telephone, it's not big deal. It's giving order to control a telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate, and not speaking to receive a warrant from the judge. Control of correspondence can be signed, permission to put control over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of Section even.

Do you understnd what I want to tell you, it is absolutely considered, KGB, nothing important.

Mr. Klein. Is it a big deal to check periodically at someone's place of employment and talk to their neighbors? Is that a big deal?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. But you told them about that, didn't you?

Mr. Nosenko. I tried simply to describe them what kind of, not to take active -- what does it mean, passive type of coverage of the target?

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you was there any technical surveillance, then would you have told them?

Mr. Nosenko. I would have said they were told, even word for word, in this document said not the technical surveillance. They have a certain terminology. Let's say surveillance, it's called to lead the measurement N/N, and to control telephone to lead the measurement M.

Mr. Klein. If they would have said, "Was there any technical surveillance of Oswald?" would you have said "yes"?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. You also testified to this Committee that the KGB would have had to have known about Marina Oswald, you said, by the end of the month they would have a batch of papers?

Mr. Nosenko. You told me, if she had seen him, you something metnioned, 15, 13.

Mr. Klein. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would have had to pick her up?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when he was seeing her or not. You said assume that he met her 16 and 13, and it became known to KGB through surveillance. I said by the end of month that at least something will have on her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where she work.

Mr. Klein. They would know that through the surveillance on Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. The fact will be known through surveillance; then through other outfits of KGB they will find whatever possible on her.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Question: Why wouldn't she -- referring to Marina -- have been investigated when she first met Oswald?

"Answer: They did not know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marraige. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Were you ever asked that question and did you give that answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and answers.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, please, and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. JFK-F-6.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-6 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document, have you ever seen it before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You have never seen that before?

Mr. Nosenko. I never have seen it before.

Mr. Klein. And is that a report that says on the cover, "Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Followup Report on the Oswald Case; Source: AEDONOR." Was AEDONOR your code name at one time?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Klein. "Date of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it say that on the cover?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And turning to the very last page, page 18.--

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Does it say, "Thomas A. Ryan"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. "SR/CI/KGB"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever hear of a man named Thomas A. Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know a man Thomas A. Ryan.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to a man named Thomas Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?"

"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I this answered.

Mr. Klein. Was that the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what type of interrogations were going on.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. -- when you spoke about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was this question relating to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering what I could.

Mr. Klein. Is that the truth, that they didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see, again, why wouldn't she have been investigated. Here must be question was in this form. The investigation, not the checkup of her, but, let's say, invitation for conversation, something of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on both parts, that would be mine and interrogator.

Mr. Klein. It is an inaccurate transcript?

Mr. Nosenko. I consider many, many things are inaccurate.

Mr. Klein. Is that transcribed accurately?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Klein. That answer, do you think it is transcribed accurately, that that's your answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I can only explain only one thing. Let's say there was KGB found out that he had an acquaintance, Marina Prusakova, They were not married. They didn't know -- they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first will be investigation? Checkup in archives of KGB of Byelorussia, and on the basis whatever kind of material on her will be found. Let's say, if she was ever on trial by militia, under arrest. If militia had any material, they can expand further. They can also send checkup in the place of her -- one, it's in one order, to give us the picture of the character of the target, check on him in place of his work and check in place of his living, in one order.

But more, farther investigation, the true investigation -- this is called checkup -- will be studied and they will start when they see something, let's say, suspicious in behavior of Oswald and this his connection.

In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going to marry, sure, they will be more, farther investigation, thorough invetigation; but before it will only be checkup. From thispoint of view I was answering this question.

Mr. Klein. Let me make it simple.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. If the question was asked exactly as it appears here, "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?" would this be your answer? Is that a correct answer as it appears here?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember. Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen --

Mr. Klein. Was this true? This says "There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her" -- is that right or wrong?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered, yes. It is right. It is written here.

Mr. Klein. You remember answering that?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. How do you know you answered that?

Mr. Nosenko. You are giving me official document.

Mr. Klein. You have no recollection of answering this?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not have any recollection of interrogations.

Mr. Klein. If you answered that, were you telling the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This is how I answered question.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that the KGB decided to have Lee Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists. You told us about how it was decided, who decided it, where it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald to be mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Have you ever been asked the following questions and given the following answers:

"Question: Did the KGB make a psychological assessment of Oswald?

"Answer: No, nothing, but at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he is not normal.

"Question: Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?

"Answer: I don't think so. There was no report like this."

Mr. Nosenko. No, I told that there was opinion of psychiatrists that hewas mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. Is what I read to you correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or wrong. I am answering you what I know.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever make a statement like that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember statements for five years, interrogation.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to the Ryan Report.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Page 7.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Would you read for us the first and second questions and answers, please.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the KGB make psychological assessment of Oswald?"

"No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he was not normal, mentally unstable."

Mr. Klein. Please keep reading.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?"

"I don't think so. There was no report like this.

"What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality, what kind of man did they think he was?"

"KGB throught he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he is not normal, that he should leave the country."

Mr. Klein. Did you say anything in there about two psychiatrists examining Oswald and about reading their reports which said he was mentally unstable? Did you say anything about that there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them; but I would like you to find out the conditions in which interrgations were done, how it was done, by what procedures, when two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names -- they never announced me names -- one playing part of bad guy and other good guy, and it starting slapping then, not physically but I mean, psychologically and in conversation, turning question upside down, however they would like, then this leave, another one will start in softer way.

Mr. Klein. When did this --

Mr. Nosenko. And I would not trust any of their documents in those periods of time. Up to 1967 when we started from the beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie. That is the one thing. Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in '64. I didn't understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr. Deryabin, knew Russian language and Mr. Deryabin was asking me only questions concerning my biography and this type of question, but nonoperative questions.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questions and giving the answers that you just read to us?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."

Mr. Klein. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do these give responsive answers?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not trust this document prepared by people in those years.

Mr.Klein. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and answers?

Mr. Nosenko. My opinion -- I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.

Mr. Klein. You testified --

Mr. Nosenko. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.

Mr. Klein. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did it begin?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrested me 4th of April, 1964, started interrogate me in two days. They interrupted -- I don't know - interrogate a month, two, made break; then again, then again period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to 24 hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.

Mr. Klein. And this was all after April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

That is why I will not take as a document anything what concerns interrogations in hostile, absolutely hostile, situation.

Mr. Klein. You testified in detail yesterday about the cable which you saw which was sent from Mexico City to the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you testified that you actually read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in Mexico City and he wanted permission for visa to come to the Soviet Union.

Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for us in detail, how long it was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald went to Minsk, the next time you heard of him was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of your department by M.I. Turalin.

Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of Oswald's application?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember. I am telling you what I have seen, cable, what was told through Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI report in front of you.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

(Pause)

Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. On the top of page 30, read for us the underlined section on the top, beginning "The next time" --

Mr. Nosenko. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by Turalin, Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign Countries, First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir Alexseev, Chief of Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they recommended that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied. Nosenko couldn't recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with visa application."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I said it, it's here in document.

Mr. Klein. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. Did you say that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be; I said this in this way.

Mr. Klein. And did you tell us that not only did you know how they advised them by cable but that you read the cable?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I recollection.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell them the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I was trying to tell what I remembered.

Mr. Klein. And this FBI report which you just read from, would you look back on the first page and would you tell us the date of thatreport?

Mr. Nosenko. Fifth of March, 1964.

Mr. Klein. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes,sir.

Mr. Klein. That was before any hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And at that time you said that you did not know anything about the cable, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.

Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what psychological turmoil a person passing who defected, do you understand that it is necessary time, time to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.

Mr. Klein. You testified to us today that you didn't know how wrote the summary of Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedroseve and Matveev, F-e-d-r-o-s-e-v-e and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the file and wrote a second "spravka", which you told us was a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedroseve -- Fedroseve was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedroseve who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief of First American Department. His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov ordered and Fedroseve giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedroseve and Matveev were participated in the preparation of documents.

They are responsible for First American Department.

Mr. Klein. So you have an idea of who would have written, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. American Department, no doubts that this two will be participating or correcting.

Mr. Klein. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember reading the summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection of reading it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I haven't seen summary.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive that you didn't see that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive you didn't see the summary written by the First Department after they took the file away?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember seeing. As I told you, I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. You testified that Oswald was considered normal prior to the time he cut his wrist, and even told us that you were surprised, you had no indication he would do something like that.

Were you ever asked the following question, and did you give the following answer:

"In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from cases of other American defectors?"

"Answer: The main difference is that he was not to be allowed to stay. He was considered to be not normal."

Mr. Nosenko. This is what cases I know, who were staying.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal, referring to the period before he tried to commit suicide?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's not right becuase we didn't know that he was normal or not normal. Up until the moment of he cut his wrist we started to suspect.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. Well, if you would have said it, would it have been correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it would not be correct, because he cannot be considered abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he cut the wrist.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that you were present at a meeting with the Chief of the Seventh Department Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin, at that meeting, it was decided that Oswald should not be given permission to defect. You told us where the meeting took place, told us who was there.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the

Seventh Department at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov appeared a little later.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of your evaluation of Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through Intourist interpreter that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa?

Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it was wrong, not right, because Krupnov started participation only in this case when Oswald was allowed to stay. In the moment when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union, when he went in hospital, Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department. He very soon appeared later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was wrong.

Mr. Klein. Directing your attention to the FBI report in front of you, I would like to draw your attention to page 28.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Beginning with the underlined section beginning with the first "On the basis" in the second paragraph, would you read this?

Mr. Nosenko. "Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal."

Mr. Klein. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis of" --

Mr. Nosenko. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald, he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through the Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember saying this. It can be that simply misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not transcription from the tape. It is, I will say a summary, and I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not right because Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.

Mr. Klein. Also it says --

Mr. Nosenko. It was participation of Rastrusin.

Mr. Klein. Also is it correct when it says in there that you made the decision and --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't make decision, being Deputy Chief of Section.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there --

Mr. Nosenko. I could say my opinion, yes.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there about a meeting to determine what to do, or does it say that on basis of your evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?

Mr. Nosenko. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov appeared later. This period, what we are discussing here, was Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be done on my own, being Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even being [illegible] Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it must be on the level of Chief of Department.

Mr. Klein. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?

Mr. Nosenko. It is incorrect, and Krupnov -- I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. You told us, when I questioned you about the fact that you didn't tell the FBI that there was physical surveillance, the last question I asked you, if they would have asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you have told them, and you said yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure. I will say.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to Minsk, and you answered "No, there was none"?

Mr. Nosenko. It was not right, because it was order given and he was under periodical surveillance.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA document in front of you, Memorandum for the Record.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

Mr. Klein. The Ryan Report. I draw your attention to page 9.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read the first question and the first answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Was he physically surveilled?"

"No, there was none."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever give that answer to that question?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; it's not right, the answer.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this tape, which is marked 3 July '64, Reel No. 66, be deemed marked for identification.

The Chairman. Indicate for the record the marking.

The Clerk. JFK-F-7.

(The item referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-7 for identification.)

The Chairman. We will recess for about five minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. The Committee is back in session.

During the recess the witness made a request of the Chair that he be permitted to make a brief statement prior to counsel for the Committee resuming interrogation.

The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize the witness at this time for such statement as he would like to make.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the United States in 1964, 12th of February. I felt something was going wrong because the attitude on the part of the officers from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by a number of remarks, their behavior. Besides, I was in a psychological process. It's a very big thing, when you are coming to live in a new country. I left the country where I was born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very serious thing.

A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on checkup for the doctor, and this checkup turned to be arrest. Arrested was in very rude form, nobody beat my physically , no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person, of human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was smoking from 14 years old, never quitted. Iwas rejected to smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read anything. I was sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and that is all.

I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because how I tried not to think about food. I was thinking about food because all the time I want to eat. I was receiving very small amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind of attic; it was hot, no air conditioning, cannot breathe; windows -- no windows, closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week, to take showers once a week.

From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions were really inhuman, conditions in this place; and later transferred in another place, which is now I know where it was, the second place, Camp Perry, where certain house and the same very, very Spartan conditions; three and a half years. Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs and sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know, and don't want to know.

What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally, without due process of law, without -- in violation of Constitution, which was found by Rockefeller Commission. It wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who was over three years in extremely Spartan conditions.

Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me an hour to sleep. Interrogations were in very hostile manner. Simply, what I would say were rejected. How long I will be, why it is without due process, no warrants; "You will be eternally, 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why I consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns this period of time are illegal, and I am not recognizing them and don't want to see them. And I am asking you not to ask questions based on this interrogations, including trying to play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult to return back. I passed through hell. I started new life in

'69 only because I was true defector. I never raised this question with correspondents. I never went in press, because I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't wanted to hurt the country.

I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA. I didn't consider the whole CIA was responslbe. Were responsible several people, for this. Thank God they are not working there anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I would be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only the agencies, the intelligence service of the U.S., I will hurt the interests of the U.S. Who would like to defect, reading in what conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.

Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started humane relations with me, which was started at the end of '67. I still was under arrest but I was transferred from the extremely Spartan conditions, and with me started to work Mr. Bruce Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases, through everything. People who were talking with me before were coming with what they were told, how to approach to me, how to treat me. They have come with made opinion, before whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it is all unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done by anyone in CIA up until the end of '67.

The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

(Pages 53 thru 78, being Committee business only, are excerpted.)

Mr. Blakey. Shall I inform the witness?

The Chairman. In light of the time situation and our original intention of trying to wind up by 10:00 p.m., the Chair thinks perhaps we ought to try and invoke a five minute rule so that everybody gets a fair opportunity rather than to proceed informally and extend this matter over a long period of time.

Anyone have any objection?

All right, bring the witness in.

(Whereupon, at 8:43 o'clock p.m., the witness returned to the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Let the record reflect the fact the witness has again returned to the witness table and, Mr. Nosenko, at this time counsel for the Committee has concluded his questions to you and at thispoint in time the members of the Committee would like to be able to pose questions to you with reference to your testimony here yesterday and this evening. Is that agreeable to you, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

The Chair at this point would invoke the five minute rule. The Chair will begin the questions.

Mr. Nosenko, you are now a citizen of the United States, you are now an employee of the CIA, I understand as a consultant, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. On private contract. I am not an employee of the CIA. I am on a private contract, used as a consultant on counterintelligence of the Soviet KGB.

The Chairman. And in that capacity, sir, are you paid an annual salary?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am paid an annual salary.

The Chairman. And what is that salary?

Mr. Nosenko. $35,000.

The Chairman. And --

Mr. Nosenko. It is the last year, because it was cost of living.

The Chairman. I see. In that capacity, do you contract out also to other persons or other organizations?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

The Chairman. This is your sole income?

Mr. Nosenko. Only one sole income.

The Chairman. Has the CIA given you anything else of value other than a salary, that is, a home, anything of that sort?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. And in the book published, written by Epstein was mentioned CIA bought me home. No, sir, I bought home on my money, nobody bought me a home, no.

The Chairman. You also now are remarried and you have --

Mr.Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am married. I am American citizen, I have five stepchildren and six grandchildren.

The Chairman. You now have a passport? Do you have a passport as a --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I have a passport, which I once used being sent by the Agency in 1975, in England, for week where I was talking with British Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, concerning my knowledge of the Second Chief Directorate, KGB in general.

The Chairman. Is that the only country to which you have traveled since your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I have traveled on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency also for the last four years. I was in eleven countries. And I never received or demanded or asking any special fees for consultations with all friendly intelligence services, never.

The Chairman. Have you ever returned to Soviet Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Never once in Soviet Union from 1964 and hope will never see it again.

The Chairman. And how long have you now been a consultant for CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I was from 1969, from April 1969, when I was released from detention arrest.

The Chairman. Now, will you clarify for us when you first were placed under arrest?

Mr. Nosenko. Fourth of April, 1964.

The Chairman. And on what date had you defected?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected 4th of February of 1964 in Geneva, Switzerland.

The Chairman. And when you were placed under arrest, where were you placed in detention?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know, it was somewhere around Washington, close to Washington, where I was '64 and beginning '65, approximately. I don't hear any radio, I didn't see any newspaper, I do not know, didn't know anything what happen in the world for many years.

I know that it was by car from Virginia where I was staying from 12 of February '64, I was taken by car for visit to doctor, and it was 30, 40 minute drive, it was in this area, but then in approximately after a year and maybe 13 months, a year and one month, roughly, I was transferred in very peculiar conditions, was put under shackles and handcuffs, blindfolded, put in the car, and don't know where I was going, only I heard, passing through city, I couldn't understand, I couldn't see anything, then I heard airplanes, I understood that I was somewhere in airport, and once I was scared to death, I think I was thinking they were returning me to the Russians. Well, they put me in airplane --

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, my time has expired. I want to recognize --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know the place, sir. I know I only now found out reading the book of Daniel Schorr that I was in Camp Perry up to the end of '67. That is what I found out from the book.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, one thing that comes through very strongly in your testimony is that it is a hard life to be a defector. I think to the average mentality we think it would be good for a country to welcome a defector, but to the intelligence mentality apparently a defector is immediately suspect, and you have recounted your treatment here, and apparently Lee Harvey Oswald, from your testimony, was greeted somewhat like this in the U.S.S.R. His treatment was much different from yours.

One thing he was not an intelligence agent, of course. But you have indicated that he was kept at arms' length by the KGB. The impression I get was the mere fact of being a defector caused the KGB to be less interested in him than if it was someone they had recruited?

Mr. Nosenko . Right.

Mr. Preyer. Although he was kept at arms' length by the KGB, in the sense that he was not contacted, it does appear that he lived very well there, relatively speaking. He certainly lived much better than you lived in your early years. That he was given a job in Minsk, he was given a pension, which is something that seems extraordinary in this country, from the Red Cross, and apparently pretty good housing conditions in Minsk.

Is that typical way that a defector would be treated in Russia, is at arm's length?

Mr. Nosenko. Every defector will be watched but, sir, when you mentioned what he received being in Russia, it is very little. I can give you only one example. When defectors Martin and Mitchell, employees of NSA, who cooperated with KGB abroad, and then they defected to Soviet Union, they received extraordinary help. It is not like Oswald. Oswald is nothing.

Mr. Preyer. The amount of money?

Mr. Nosenko. The amount of money and other things, extroardinary.

Mr. Preyer. For Oswald were not extraordinary?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the other three defectors that you had known of. What sort of treatment did they receive?

Mr. Nosenko. I will tell you what Martin and Mitchell --

Mr. Preyer. Were they two of the other three?

Mr. Nosenko. These two, for example. I can mention others, what I heard, I never work with them, what I heard. Martin and Mitchell, by decision of Soviet Government was given them, to each one, $100,000 on their account, was given apartment, not like Oswald received, but real good apartment, so-called classless society, living high class. Each one was given car, each one received life pension a month of 5000 Soviet rubles up to death. And each one was helped with work. Both were assigned with some type of research work where they had given position, let's say Martin was given position of researcher. But amount of pay of his was analogical to the amount of pay of the Director of this Institute, besides what he is receiving of pension. This is the treatment of those defectors whom they want, who had given them valuable information.

In case of -- excuse me -- was Annabella Bucar defected something early '50s. She was working in American Embassy in Press Department. She also received, in spite of the fact was making very good money in the Soviet Union, she was working for Moscow Radio, she was receiving life pension of big amount, amount approximately what in Soviet Union is received by Deputy of Minister, of Ministry, of this or that industry.

Mr. Preyer. But the defector who was not giving information?

Mr. Nosenko. Now, he will be given a little bit something, pension like was Oswald, to Oswald given pension. I don't know what was given to Webster, a worker, who was defected in '59 and by the way, in very short period of time he decided he doesn't like the life in the so-called Soviet paradise. He wanted to return back home, but if he received it will be analogical to what Oswald received, not more.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Were you solicited to be a defector?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. Why did you defect?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected because I for years of my life has come to number of conclusions that the whole society, the whole system, is dictatorial system, nondemocratic system, the true police state system, and especially working the KGB opened eyes for me. My defection was strictly on ideological basis.

Mr. Devine. Had you been out of the Soviet Union prior to your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Other than to Geneva?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I was in England twice, then I was passing through a number of countries, staying day, two, France, Belgium, HOlland. I was in 1960 in Cuba.

Mr. Devine. You were a married man in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. Had a child?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, two daughters.

Mr. Devine. Were you having some domestic difficulties?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I tried in 1960-'61, I tried to arrange to go to work abroad with my family, and in the last moment it fell down, and I understood I cannot go abroad with family, and that is why when I contacted CIA in '62, I -- psychologically I was ready, ideologically was ready and psychologically ready to defect, but the question of family was bothering me.

Mr. Devine. But not enough to keep you there?

Mr. Nosenko. Not enough to keep me there. And in '64 I has come knowing that I will never return.

Mr. Devine. You were willing to abandon your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because I didn't see possibility to take family out. I was living the last four or five years as a man with two souls, splitted personality, one I must show and was showing, as good KGB officer, as a good Communist, as a patriot of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union, and the other part of me, the true part I am not believing in what I am telling, I am not believing in the system, I do not like it, I do not want it, and I consider what phony things are going on because I was working in KGB, I knew it. I simply couldn't more tolerate to be with this double splitted personality.

Mr. Devine. How did you dispose of your children and your wife in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. The thing was psychologically, my had, had in my mind. help me. My mother was rather rich, after death of father, she was very rich woman and she had a lot that will be enough not only for my children but their children and grandchildren. From the point of view of material they will never suffer.

Mr. Devine. Yes,but as a defector would there not be reprisals taken by the Soviet Union against your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, before the death of Stalin it could be taken drastic measures against the family, but after the death of Stalin, from middle 1950s, quite a little changes took place in the Soviet Union, and the family will not suffer.

Another thing, oh sure, will be certain things which they cannot achieve. Let's say my brother who studied later in the same Institute what I finish, Institute of International Relations, he will never have possibility to go abroad, but he will never be put in jail, can never be exiled from Moscow, the same, nothing happened with family.

Mr. Devine. The fact that you were a KGB man didn't your defection cause some irritation among those in power over there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Devine. Did they want to get you back, didn't they want to get even with you?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, and they are looking for me.

Mr. Devine. But they took no reprisals against your family.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. How do you know that?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I do not know exactly, but you see, there were some defections before. The family didn't suffer like it was, let's say, in '40s and maybe up to death of Stalin.

Mr. Devine. Were those KGB defections?

Mr. Nosenko. Even from KGB.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. Well, I would like to go back a little bit after you decided to defect. I think you had a number of conversations with the American Embassy, was it, or was it CIA, during those ten days that you were in touch, where you negotiated whether or not you would in fact defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I contacted CIA in 1962 and --

Mrs. Burke. In '64?

Mr. Nosenko. In '64, when I arrived in Geneva, on second day I mailed a cable, and I knew -- a prearranged addressed, and I knew that in two days somebody in appropriate place and appropriate time will meet me from CIA.

Mrs. Burke. And they met you --

Mr. Nosenko. They met me and I was meeting them every day, visiting, and when I had free time, visited secret address in Geneva.

Mrs. Burke. All right, during those times you were meeti them, did you negotiate in terms of what your situation would be here in the United States if you defected, or where you wo go?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I put a question that what amount o salary I want, that will find for me job. This I negotiate

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss whether or not you wou be imprisoned?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it never come to my mind that they would imprison me.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that -- I think you told us you had some information you would well to them for a certain amount of money.

Mr. Nosenko. It's in '62.

Mrs. Burke. In '62 you said that. In '64 you didn't discuss any sale of any information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, on the contrary, for the period of '62 -'64, I tried to get as much as possible information, not only to come what I knew where I participated in the department where I worked but to find out as much as possible what can be valuable to the American intelligence and I had come with some luggage.

Mrs. Burke. All right, well, during the time that you were talking to them about what your salary would be, the circumstances of your defection, and I assume you told them what your rank was, some of the things you worked on --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- did you tell them you worked on the Oswald file?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, I can mention. I do not remember, honestly.

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss Oswald at all with them during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. I must, sure, mentioned this fact because, no, it happened such a thing. I must mention. But I do not remember. I cannot tell you what questions were, what my answers were.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that the Soviet Union thought that Oswald may have been a United States agent?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I certainly -- it would be -- anyone treated. Oswald, or anyone from the United States who come to live on his own decided to defect, or they contacted him before, they will still will be suspected in a possibility that he is an agent of American intelligence, and also this fact.

Mrs. Burke. And is this the reason that you gave him why he was not allowed to remain in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. The reason was that they didn't want him to stay because, KGB, because they didn't consider him an interesting target, an interesting person who has valuable information.

Mrs. Burke. I know that. In fact, I remember you saying something about a person would only be interesting under certain circumstances, one of which would be if they came in as a tourist and they applied a very short time before they arrived.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh no.

Mrs. Burke. And they were an add on to, for instance, the tour.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. Right.

Mrs. Burke. Now, from what that report shows, it shows that

Oswald received his visa in two days to come to the Soviet Union. So he would be automatically suspect, and he would be automatically what you would call an interesting person.

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no. In this case, you see, Oswald even didn't receive a visa in United States; he received it passing through Europe.

Mrs. Burke. Through Helsinki?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, in Finland, where it's process was easier than it will be in the United States. He simply bought a tour and he received, managed to receive visa.

Mrs. Burke. Let me just ask one other thing.

Did you tell them any of your, aside from the ideological, why you wanted to defect? For instance, did you tell them anything about this promotion you thought you had when you went to, was it, Gorki?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. But then you --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I didn't tell them. I simply said that my position, because with me, it was documented, I lied. I said my position was Lieutenant Colonel. It wasn't true. It was false statement. The same false statement was concerning recall telegram when I wanted to push the defection process.

Mrs. Burke. My time is up. May I just ask one question? Were you upset when you didn't get your promotion after they had --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no ma'am. I still didn't receive it. It was sent on signature. You see, they are signing, not immediately when they are received. Personnel Directorate gather in from all over the Soviet Union, from all KGBs and comment on signature to the Chairman, twice, three times a year. They were simply gathering in and didn't get enough materials. I do not know. Maybe it was signed in January. But up to my leaving, nobody informed me that it was signed. I didn't -- wasn't rejected.

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if you might let me ask you -- let me start back here, very quickly. One of the very first questions you were asked last night by Mr. Klein, was the way Mr. Klein worded the question, and I will ask you to expound on it if it is a correct recall on my part.

Mr. Klein asked you or stated that you arranged for your transfer to the American section of the KGB. He used the words you arranged for your transfer to that section. Is that an accurate statement? Did you want to be in that section? Did you specifically ask to be in that section?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it wasn't accurate, it wasn't right. Arrangement was done in work form. I was working after finishing Institute in GRU, Navy Intelligence, and being in 1952 New Year, in Moscow on New Year on a short leave, I was in company where it was one of my friends with whom I studied at the Institute. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But his father-in-law was high ranked General of MGB, in those years was called KGB, and he asked me what I am doing, this General.

I said that I am working for the Navy Intelligence, GRU.

Do you like this work?

I said no, because I am not using what I received education.

Would you like to work in MGB?

I said, if it will be with the use of my disciplines which I studied at the Institute, why not? That is all. And in March after death of Stalin this general was appointed the First Deputy Minister of MGB of Beria. He remembered this conversation and several days after death of Stalin I was recalled to MGB which was called MVD in this period of time, in March of '53, and was assigned to Second Chief Directorate. This is what true statement.

Mr. Dodd. When you sent to the safe house or whatever it was in Geneva, in 1964, by your own admission you lied to the agent there in that you stated you had received a telegram issuing your recall back to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Therefore, it was that important that they accept you immediately.

Did you show anyone a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir. There wasn't any telegram.

Mr. Dodd. Did they ask for a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, but, sir, what happened, I started to meet them in January, had passed three, four, five, six, seven days. I am afraid of that any moment my Chief of the Second Chief Directorate will be returning from France.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you that, Mr. Nosenko. My question to you is, were you asked whether or not you had a copy of the telegram that you had received from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. And I -- if I was even asked I couldn't give them because I cannot take it. It would be secret cable.

Mr. Dodd. You have answered my question.

You stated last night that -- and this might have been a supposition on your part, but I am curious about it -- you stated that it was your feeling that the intelligence community in this country considered you a dispatched agent in 1962. Is that something that you felt in 1962?

Mr. Nosenko. No. It's --

Mr. Dodd. A reflection back?

Mr. Nosenko. A reflection back. No, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You, by your own statement, again have received some very rough treatment, inhuman treatment, to use your words, living under spartan conditions, and I am sort of brushing over this very quickly, between 1964 and 1969. Certainly you couldn't have been very pleased with the way you were being treated by a country that you had defected to and offered to give information to. So for a period of that '64, to '69, five years, you went through a rather rough period in your life?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. Why did you go to work for somebody who treated you like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I, even was five year there, I didn't consider that it was decision of the whole CIA. I didn't consider that -- I didn't blame the whole CIA because it wasn't the question decided by the whole Agency. It was decided question by several persons who were I consider simply in this period of time sick, mentally sick, not ill, but were simply in fear, in scare, in mania as if KGB penetrated everything.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your statement to me that for five years, while you were incarcerated in almost solitary confinement, that you thought that this was the individual acts of a couple of employees of this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not employees.

Mr. Dod. Without the approval of the very highest authority in this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I have seen Chief of Soviet Russia Division, Mr. David Murphy. He was a high ranking man. It was his decision, decision of Mr. Angleton, decision of Mr. Murphy, and when they are coming to Director, and I know, from my life, they can report in the way how they will report it, and the Director will accept because they are responsible people, they are sitting in this place. He is not going into details, he is not going and studying, he is not going himself visiting.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. First, have you received any compensation for the period during which you were held in jail?

Mr. Nosenko. I received in several years later, I put the question, I want to be paid for every year which I was unlawfully arrest, the amount of money which we have agreed, with taken taxes and whatever American citizens are paying.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you get that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, and on this sum of money I bought the house.

Mr. Sawyer. I see.

I will tell you what bothers me about your testimony, very frankly. You stated that they would be very interested in a member of the American intelligence community that they could even compel to defect. Here you had a willing defector, a guy who said that undoubtedly that he didn't like America, and that he did like Russia, and he wants to defect, and nobody even interrogates him, according to you, as to what exposure or experience he had. He might have worked in the missile silos, he might have done anything, but nobody asked him, and that he lives there for a period of, a long period of time. Here is a guy that is totally willing to talk. It is not like approaching somebody who doesn't want to talk to you or that might not want to talk to you. And here is a fellow who was a radar operator, experienced to some degree, and I don't know to what degree, but apparently the Russians don't know to what degree either, because nobody asked him, in a highly secret air base in Japan, but they didn't ask him even about that, and it is very rare to have one come.

I have listened to Radio Free Cuba, where they air all kinds of propaganda, and this guy would have been certainly good for propaganda when he loved Russia and hated the United States. And I just, with those circumstances, I very frankly find it almost impossible to believe that they did not thoroughly interrogate him at least.

Mr. Nosenko. They never considered him an interesting target. It was known that he served in Marine Corps.

Mr. Sawyer. What I am getting at, how did they know whether he was an interesting target when they never even asked.

Mr. Nosenko. They judging by what they know about him what in questionnaire he filled and plus what they found out from interpreter on him. He said to interpreter, he served in Marine Corps, he finished his years of service.

Mr. Sawyer. But he might have been a cryptographer in the Marine Corps. He might have been as an enlisted man, he might have been a cryptographer and know all our codes and code methodology that might help break codes and that sort of thing, but nobody ever asked him. That is what I don't understand. And I can't believe it, very frankly.

Mr. Nosenko. I understand, sir, but I am telling you he wasn't considered interesting target, and --

Mr. Sawyer. But they didn't have any facts to know whether he was interesting, and here is a guy that wants to talk to them.

Mr. Nosenko. But the judgment made on each person to work actively against him on the basis of his questionnaire. If in questionnaire will be said he is, let's say, professor, teacher, let's say he is working for the government, any department, but for the Federal Government, or he is an officer, sure, on him will be paid attention.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, all right, we can drop that for a minute.

But now, he got a visa in two days in Finland. I happen to have been in Finland four years ago and wanted to get a visa, a sort of a last minute decision, to go to Leningrad, and I was told there is a minimum of 30 days before you can get a visa. Now, to issue him a visa in two days for Russia, that is very unusual, apparently, so they must have had some interest in getting him there.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, what I know, there wasn't any interest to get him. He managed to get this visa.

Mr. Sawyer. All right.

The other thing I am curious about is when they interrogated you so carefully here, why someone like Oswald, a known defector and who could well have been now a Russian intelligence agent, comes back to the country, apparently CIA or FBI, or nobody paid a bit of attention to him, and let him wander around the country with a Russian wife at will.

I have used up my time.

The Chairman. Okay. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nosenko, as I piece it together, there are four possibilities for this Committee to believe. Let me sketch out what those possibilities are.

One, that you told the truth in 1964, but you are now misleading this Committee.

Two, that you told an untruth in 1964, basically your statements in 1964 were not true, but you are telling the truth now.

Three, that in fact you were dispatched here by the KGB, or the Soviet Government, because of apparent but unreal connections between the Soviets and Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. Obviously the USSR would need this for obvious reasons. They would badly need this for all sorts of international reasons.

And finally, the fourth option is that you were dispatched here by the Soviet Government and the KGB because there was an actual connection between the KGB and the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are the items which I have picked up in the last two days that would tend to lead some people to believe the last of the four, or at least the third to the last of the four, either that the KGB dispatched you here because they needed it for political reasons, though they were not involved, or they dispatched you here because in fact they did collaborate with Oswald.

First, Oswald goes to Russia. You say he is rejected, but they grant him a pension, however small.

Second, they grant him the pleasures of a hunting club, even though you said earlier he was mentally unbalanced, and you are allowing him to use a gun.

Three, they allowed him to marry in Russia.

Four, they gave him a job.

Now, in -- not talking about the time when you were under stress and incarcerated, but just talking about the two months prior to that -- the FBI questioning, and the prearrest story makes no sense.

The rejection of Oswald's offer to defect makes absolutely no sense to me.

Mr. Sawyer has just pursued that momentarily. I think that can be rejected by us, by reasonable people, prima facie. I see no reason to accept that part of your story whatsoever.

The exposition, taking you off to worry about the exposition, and so forth, was demonstrated a fraud.

No reprisals against your family. Nobody was working against Oswald, you said, yet later on you said you had seven to eight large files, you only read the first portion of one file. You said no KGB ever talked to Oswald regarding letting him defect. The reason you gave us for that was that he slashed his wrists and you concluded he was unstable. Yet prior to that discovery of his instability, you granted him a visa in two days and he asked to be permitted to defect prior to slashing his wrists, and therefore you had to make the decision prior to slashing his writs, prior to knowing that he slashed his wrist, that you were going to reject him. That doesn't hold water either.

Finally, you said in your testimony American defection was very rare. All the more reason, if it only happens once every year or a couple of times a year, or three times between '56 and '59, it is totally incredible to me that he would not have been interrogated. No reasonable person can believe that story.

You said he was not interesting, you were not interested in him, the KGB rejected him. Despite that, you were "recruiting right and left all kinds of people to assist in the espionage operation."

Now, all of these things, Mr. Nosenko, leads me to be very, very disturbed by your story because it simply just on the face of what you told us last night and tonight, can't possibly be true.

In the first place, you remember too much now. You remember too much in the way of details after 15 years. Therefore, I have great difficulty accepting any of your story.

We as a Committee of the United States Congress are charged with trying to assess what actually happened in the assassination of President Kennedy. That is the central story. You have not helped us very much. You have confused the issue. In fact, by your testimony you have led at least this member to wonder whether or not you are still working with the KGB.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I will permit the witness to answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman said his opinion. Do you ask me any question?

Mr. Fithian. I would just like to have you tell me why I shouldn't believe that you were dispatched here by the KGB, in the light of just the points I am making, in the light of the enormous differences, not in the CIA interrogation under duress, but in the earlier period when you were not under that kind of duress. It doesn't wash with me.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if you want me to defend myself, I can say only one thing. I never done from the first day in the United States anything directed against this country. I tried before I has come, when I contacted '62 the CIA, and has come in '64, I tried to get as much as possible information. I am the source who told concerning existence of microphones in American embassy in Moscow. I am the man who have given, I don't know , 300 cases --

Mr. Fithian. We are only concerned --

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is very hard to follow Mr. Fithian's comments because I would like to shift gears a little bit. BUt you indicated to our Chairman that you now act as a consultant to the CIA.

Is that your only job?

Mr. Nosenko. It is the only job.

Mr. Edgar. In the course of acting as consultant to the CIA, do you have access to talking with CIA employees from time to time who contact you and who assist you and protect you and give you some of the direction for your consulting?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. Have you ever been in a conversation with any of the agents of the CIA about who might have been responsible for having you detained on April 4th,--[illegible]

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. -- 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. You indicated earlier you thought it was a man by the name of Murphy.

Mr. Nosenko. Murphy, Chief of Soviet, former Chief of Suviet Russian Division, and Chief of Counterintelligence, former Chief of Counterintelligence of the CIA Mr. Angleton because it cannot without him be decided.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know of any other KGB agents or other defectors who were held in those very same conditions?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know.

Mr. Edgar. Were there any other prisoners held nearby that you could hear or --

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I was in solitary absolutely confinement, no prisoner, nobody I could see.

Mr. Edgar. Yet you are still willing to be a consultant to the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I am -- no. Sir, I am consultant only on the base, on my knowledge what I know about counterintelligence work of the KGB.

Mr. Edgar. Well, you have suggested to the Committee that your statements given to the CIA in 1964 cannot be considered reliable because the statements were given under duress, and prior to our recess a few moments ago you indicated that you felt that the tapes and the FBI and the CIA interrogations of '64, '65, and '66 should not be considered as reliable statements.

Is that not correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, because I considered the whole arrest was unlawful, without due process of law, illegal arrest, what was the finding as unlawful by Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

You were held under those spartan conditions and you indicated that those statements would have to be unreliable.

Now, I have three specific questions, then, to ask you.

Have you ever told the CIA that these statements could not be considered reliable?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, when we started, they change the situation, they moved me from spartan conditions, started to talk with me as a human being, to treat me as a human being.

Mr. Edgar. Did you go on a point by point correction of any of those statements you previously made?

Mr. Nosenko. It wasn't in the form of simply returning to document, it was case by case, whatever concerns me, my biography, my work, whatever cases I knew, whatever cases I was involved, all questions were raised by 20, 30 times each case, when it was reevaluation of all information given by me.

Mr. Edgar. And it is your testimony that after 1967, '68, when those interrogations took place, you gave accurate, truthful statements?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, whatever and how good I recollect, at the best.

Mr. Edgar. And those statements of '67-'68 should be considered by this Committee as the absolute truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Edgar. And nothing but the truth.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. And it is clear to you that all the questions that were raised about Oswald were also raised in 1967 and '68?

Mr. Nosenko. Everything was raised in this period.

Mr. Edgar. If, then, this Committee discovers inconsistencies in your statements that you made in 1967 and '68, after your incarceration and the illegal period that you talk about, if we find inconsistencies between that statement and the statements you gave us last night and tonight, which should we believe?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if -- you must believe -- not you must -- it is up to you what you believe. But, sir, let's say was read to me by Mr. Klein a question, that I said when I said concerning Oswald, I did not mention physical surveillance. It is a big operation. It is nothing big in the KGB to put under surveillance Soviet or foreigner, or to control telephone conversations or correspondence. I could maybe something miss, you see, when I mentioning. I do not have such a brilliant, brilliant mind that immediately like photographic memory, immediately return word and word. I simply was describing that it wasn't active work, that there wasn't planned recruitment, there wasn't planned approachment, contact. There was type of passive work which is called in KGB to watch him and what is it, agents, control of correspondence, and explaining this, I simply, I could miss that he was under surveillance.

You can return to this and tell me, uh-huh, you told in '67 you didn't mention that he was under surveillance. It is not a contradiction.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko, in reply to Mr. Sawyer's question, you indicated you were paid for the period of time that you were under arrest, that it was a lump sum payment I suppose?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What amount of money was that?

Mr. Nosenko. Something about, oh, about $80,000.

The Chairman. About $80,000?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

The Chairman. Any other sum in addition to that were you paid?

Mr. Nosenko. I think I received about $15,000 or $20,000 when I started on my own to live, to buy furniture. I received, yes, in the beginning, in '69, in April. But this lump I received in '70, '71. '71.

The Chairman. So that the record is clear, you received $80,000 for the period of time you were under arrest.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. In order to get started again, you were given an additional $15,000, and that was in 1969.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Since 1969, to the present time, you have received $35,000 --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

The Chairman. Would you --

Mr. Nosenko. They started, when they released me they started to pay me in the beginning $16,000. Then they raised each year, $2000, two and a half thousand were raises. I only received $35,000 this year, '78, from October of '77, approximately.

The Chairman. From October '77 to the present time you received $35,000.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Can you give us some indication of how many days you have worked during 1978?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I am working at home besides coming here when they needme, at least twice a month, and spending a week, approximately, besides traveling when they are sending me the last few years abroad to talk with friendly intelligence services. I am also working at home on my own. I am studying Soviet periodicals, Soviet magazines, Soviet newspapers. I am making certain researches, I am trying not to lose what is going on, what changes taking place in policy.

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that you sort of set your time and that no one else sets your time?

Mr. Nosenko. When I am out of this area, yes, at home, I am myself setting time.

The Chairman. And during the last year, how many weeks would you say you have spent here at the Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not at the Agency. They are meeting me in other places. I am very rare visiting this place, only if they invite me for a lecture or about KGB counterintelligence. But I am meeting them when I am in this area, under certain conditions, in certain places where they need me.

Well, one month, twice I am coming. Let's say I am spending about 12, 13 days a month here, it can be in some cases seven, eight days a month, but in main the last period of time I am coming, the last years, I am coming almost twice a month.

The Chairman. For how long?

Mr. Nosenko. For a week, five, six days.

The Chairamn. My time has expired.

Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, your testimony has been considered a major piece of evidence, and was so considered by the Warren Commission as rebutting any Russian connection with the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald, and I think the key part of your testimony that we are concerned with, not so much the question about any inconsistencies in it, but are you right on the big question, namely, was Lee Harvey Oswald a KGB agent?

I want to mention, I have been a little surprised by your testimony, bythe gaps in your knowledge of Oswald, and really how little you knew about him. For example, when he went to Minsk, he was tranferred out of your oversight, I take it, and as I understood you, you did not know he was married until later on, and did not know he had gone back to the United States.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman, if I was staying and working '60 and '61 period in the same Seventh Department which sent file on Oswald in Minsk, I would know, but I was working in First American Department.

Mr. Preyer. Right. Now, I am not questioning you about that. The question I wonder, that that brings to my mind is, if Oswald had been a KGB agent, are you certain you would have known it? In other words, if you didn't even know he was married, didn't even know he had gone to the United States, couldn't he have been a KGB agent in that period without your knowledge, or are you certain --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't, you are absolutely right, I couldn't know. But in '63 when happened assassination of the President, when it was mentioned that Oswald shot the President, when it start, demanded the file back from Minsk, when started conversation with Minsk, started in KGB investigation, detailed approach. This is what --

Mr. Preyer. So you convinced that seeing the first section--

Mr. Nosenko. Seeing the first section in which the most important material in the whole file will be this in first section of the first volume.

Mr. Preyer. Were the rest of the sections of that file, incidentally, wire -- telephone taps?

Mr. Nosenko. It will be information from agents in second part. In third part will be from telephone conversations, from surveillance. In fourth part, photocopies of letters, different mail, when they checking Soviet connections, Soviet friends of Oswald.

Mr. Preyer. Well, on this question of your knowledge of Oswald and being in position to know about him, you knew about the cablegram from Mexico yet you did not know he had gone back to the United States. Is that because you had moved to--

Mr. Nosenko. Again, I returned in Seventh Department and I was working '62, '63, up to '64 in Seventh Department and the cablegram has come in Seventh Department. Seventh Department was started against Oswald in '59.

Mr. Preyer. Have you read a lot about the Oswald case in recent years?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I read several books, what appeared. I only didn't read the last book which was written about Marina Oswald by Mrs. Priscilla Johnson. Why? Because I knew that I would appear here, that the staff of your -- your staff will be talking with me. I didn't wanted something to get -- I can, you know, mix what I knew and something to use what I got from the book.

Mr. Preyer. I just wondered if you had read about the Mexican cable, and perhaps through the years may have been --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I never have seen that it was mentioned Mexican cable. I have seen that he visited Mexico, in Mexico visited Soviet and Cuban embassies. This I have seen in books, this fact.

Mr. Preyer. If I have got one more moment, Mr. Chairman, to change the subject, one of the things that struck me is that when you defected, as Mrs. Burke mentioned, in Geneva, in 1964, very shortly after the Kennedy Assassination, I get the impression that the CIA or American forces to whom you defected, did not have much to say about the assassination or was not --

Mr. Nosenko. They are -- I mentioned must be Oswald, the asked. But they were asking different, whatever cases I can immediately give them, names, when recruited, his position, from what country, this they were interested, as much as possible to take this type of information. They asked me about Oswald. I told them what I knew.

The Chairman The ;time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I don't want to know where you live, but do you reside in the general area of the nation's capital?

Mr. Nosenko. I was living in this area up to 19 -- middle of 1973, but FBI gentlemen -- I didn't mention , I also meeting FBI people when I am here, not only CIA, but they are not paying me anything. FBI people inform me that they have information that KGB trying to locate me. Then it happened in the area where I was living in Maryland up to 1973, I was in a shopping center, and on me was coming a Soviet from KGB. I knew his face, and this whole -- I immediately reported this and we decided that for me better to move from the area where Soviet diplomats, KGB officer working under cover of diplomats are freely traveling and can spot me.

Mr. Devine. That person didn't recognize you?

Mr. Nosenko. I immediately turned and went, turned my back and went in another direction.

Mr. Devine. Have you been contacted or in touch with anyone from the Soviet Embassy here in Washignton?

Mr. Nosenko. Only in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in Washington demanded to see me after defection.

Mr. Devine. Did you see them?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, in the State Department, in presence of American diplomats, I have seen for five, say seven minutes, Consul from Soviet Embassy and interpreter, another diplomat.

Mr. Devine. What did they want with you?

Mr. Nosenko. They ask me how could I do it, and do I understand the importance of this thing, that I defected from the country, and I said, gentlemen, nobody pushed me on this question, it is absolutely my own decision, and decision of free will, which I made long ago, and without any return. Then they told me now we know how to treat you, and what do you think about your Soviet citizenship.

I said, it's automatically, I am rejecting it. I do not need. And on this I finished conversation.

Mr. Devine. They made no threats of reprisals against your family back there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no. They later only, Mr. Congressman, they later sent two letters, one from wife and another from my mother. These letters were delivered by them. They visited American embassy in Moscow and had left these two letters. These letters were sent by American embassy in Moscow to State Department, State Department had given to CIA, CIA had given me these letters. I answered one short note that my decision is final, decision ideological and in spite of all my love to the family, and in spite of my respect to the memory of the father, I can repeat that if he was alive I would also would do the same, that is all.

Mr. Devine. Getting back to one of Mr. Stoke's questions about the amount of money paid to you for your years of incarceration, the fact that they gave you $15,000 or $20,000 which you used for furniture and so forth, were there any strings tied to either of those funds, the $80,000 or the subsequent amount?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no.

Mr. Devine. That you would not contact the press or anybody else about this?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it never was mentioned, never.

Mr. Devine. No strings attached?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. Finally, do you have any knowledge of any connection with Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. From your connections in the KGB at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Whatever I said, nothing more. I do not know anything.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke.

Mrs. Burke. I have just a few random questions. You mentioned Priscilla Johnson's book. Did you by any chance while you were working in the American tourist area, did you have any occasion to investigate her coming to Russia or did she come during any of that time as a student?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson?

Mrs. Burke. Yes.

Mr. Nosenko. Why, yes, her name, she was a correspondent in Moscow working, and KGB didn't like her dispatches and they made very, very rude operations against her. They --

Mrs. Burke. What did they do.

Mr. Nosenko. Huh?

Mrs. Burke. What did they do to her?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, they wanted to get rid of her from the Soviet Union. They didn't see possibility to recruit her. They didn't see any possibility to find or to create compromising situation. They didn't like her dispatches which they were anti-Soviet. Then they decided to get rid of her, and they made such an operation in restaurant where she had dinner in evening. They put drugs in her liquor, which she was drinking, wine or vodka or whatever it would be, and she was absolutely drunk. And she was delivered in local regional, one of the regional little -- it's not clinic, it is where they deliver drunks to spend night. And they put her there and made photo pictures of her being drunk and other women drunk laying there and published an article and put even a picture. And surely she was immediately recalled by her agency or her newspapers for which she was working.

Mrs. Burke. Do you think that is the wrong Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Edgar. If the gentlewoman would yield, are you sure that you are talking about the same person?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson, yes, this correspondent, yes.

Mrs.Burke. Let me ask you one other question.

When she was there, did she interview Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I know it is now reading here the books. I didn't know that she interviewed. I only found out it with living in the United States, with reading books.

Mrs. Burke. That she interviewed him. That didn't show in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't read her book -- this is what in some other books mentioned that she had interviewed him.

Mrs. Burke. Let me ask again about Oswald in Minsk, and first of all, can American tourists go to Minsk easily?

Mr. Nosenko. Minsk is open city, yes.

Mrs. Burke. It is an open city now. Was it an open city then?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. And when he was there, of course, I realize that you don't know and you did not keep up with what he was doing there, but in reading that file, in the first few pages or anything, did you notice anything in terms of his contacts with Americans, or did you notice anything at all that was extrardoinary about him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, there wasn't. For the whole his period of time there wasn't found any indication on suspicion, suspicious meetings or anything suspicion concerning his contacts with Americans.

Mrs. Burke. Let me -- As I understand it, it was fairly routine that everyone's phone would be tapped, so that that was not --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- your information that that would be nothing unusual.

You know, there is one thing that is bothering me, and that is the inconsistency and the greater detail that is present today than in your earlier statements.

Could you give us an explanation of why there is more detail today?

For instance, in your earlier statements I noticed you refer to the interpreter as a tourist, the tourist guide, as just a tourist guide or an interpreter? Today you referred by name to that person. And again, the two psychiatrists --

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know even now name of this interpreter. I do not remember name.

Mrs. Burke. I see. I thought --

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter, I never mentioned.

Mrs. Burke. You never mentioned the interpreter?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I do not remember her name.

Mrs. Burke. It was just this officer Rastrusin?

Mr. Nosenko. Officer, yes.

Mrs. Burke. He was -- but he was the one that found -- wasn't he the one that found Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the officer who reported about him.

Mrs. Burke. He reported it, but he didn't find him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, interpreter found him with administration of the hotel where Oswald was staying.

Mrs. Burke. Oh, I see.

Mr. Nosenko. You see, interpreter has come in the morning to take him or has come to take him to city, to show him, as interpreter on a guide, on a tour. And she was waiting about 20, 25, 30 minutes and was concerned.

The Chairman. Time is up. One more.

Mrs. Burke. All right, just one more question.

When Oswald arrived, then, he didn't speak very much Russian, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Ididn't hear that he spoke in Russian.

Mrs. Burke. I see. Were there any notations at all in the file -- what is your understanding of his fluency in Russian during the time of his stay?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, during time of his stay surely he started a little bit to talk, but it wasn't very, it wasn't good Russian. It wasn't even --

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mrs. Burke. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to just pick up on that line of questioning, if I could, with you, Mr. Nosenko.

Correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, Oswald, you were aware of Oswald's desire to defect. There was a decision, and in fact he was informed through his Intourist guide that his request had been rejected.

Is that correct so far?

Mr. Nosenko. Is in general, but it wasn't in this ways told to him. It was in so-called, you know, soft manner. It was explained to him by through Intourist --

Mr. Dodd. That he would have to go through his embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, that Intourist not dealing with this question. He must go through this, this, this procedures.

Mr. Dodd. Okay.

Now, you, at the time of this, of Oswald's request, you were working in the Seventh Department of the Second Directorate which was involved with tourism?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Okay. Could you tell me what would be the normal operating procedures within the Soviet Union if a tourist were involved, say, in a car accident with an Intourist guide. Say a Frenchman was involved in a car accident. Assuming it was not his fault, someone hit him, what happens? Do they notify immediately the French Embassy, what steps do they take in order to deal with that individual?

Mr. Nosenko. I would assume, sir, that he will be, sure, he immediately will be taken in polyclinic, will be informed his embassy.

Mr. Dodd. Those kind of steps.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. If you had made a decision that Oswald should not be accepted in the Soviet Union, and if you find him in his room with his wrist slit, why don't you then contact the American Embassy and notify them that you have an American on your hands who just tried to kill himself?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, he wasn't an employee of American embassy.

Mr. Dodd. He was a tourist, though.

Mr.Nosenko. A tourist.

Mr. Dodd. And I just asked you about a Frenchman who might be a tourist and get in a car accident, and you said you would take him to the hospital, you would notify the embassy. Why don't you take Mr. Oswald to the hospital and notify the American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Nobody knew that he would cut wrist.

Mr. Dodd. No, but you found him with his wrist cut.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. He was delivered in hospital .

Mr. Dodd. Why didn't you notify the American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. He wasn't dying, he wasn't serious, they made transfusion and put stitches. It is -- I am telling what I think why it was.

Mr. Dodd. You understand my problem here. You have got someone who you don't want to accept him. You have already made a decision that he shouldn't be allowed to defect. You walk into his room and find him with his wrist slit, it would seem to me that this guy has already indicated just by that act alone that he is not playing with a full deck of cards, and you decide then that you are going to accept him because you are worried that it might cause some embarrassment after Camp David.

Mr. Nosenko. No. But the question to inform the Embassy, it must be passing through such stage. Intourist itself cannot contact the American Embassy.

Mr. Dodd. No, obviously.

Mr. Nosenko. No. They must contact their Minister of Foreign Trade which in its turn putting question to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet

Union can contact the embassy.

Mr. Dodd. LEt me jump onto something else quickly in the time we've got.

You knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was a Marine?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. You knew by your answer to Mrs. Burke's question a minute ago that Oswald had a student's knowledge of Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. When he was living in Minsk, not before, before he has come. No.

Mr. Dodd. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No, when he was living in Minsk, when he was in daily contact with Soviets working at the plant and having friends.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had been a student of Marxism?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had given the U.S. embassy his notice to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I know that he visited embassy and after was, he was told that he will be allowed to stay, after this.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware at that time that he contacted through Intourist and eventually your office and made it known that he intended to defect or wanted to defect, you were not aware or your department was not aware that he had already notified the American embassy that he intended to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware of that.

Mr. Nosenko. No. He wasn't under surveillance. We didn't know. When he was going alone without interpter, we didn't know.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you how you know. I just asked you whether or not -- he didn't tell you that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Nobody from KGB talked with him.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. When Congressman Devine asked you how you knew your family was okay or that they hadn't invoked any reprisals, I didn't get the answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I asked Mr. Solie in '69, '70, once I asked, anything about my family?

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. who?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Bruce Solie, CIA officer who was in contact with me, '69, '70. He answered me that they are all right, everything okay. But he didn't went in any detail and I never returned more to this question. But there is another point, sir. Besides the father's position, after he died, she was receiving, she received pension, and besides that, for the years --

Mr. Sawyer. How did you know she died?

Mr. Nosenko. Father died, I said. Father died in 1956. After father's death she received a pension.

Mr. Sawyer. I understand. You went through that before. I noticed here though, when he slashed his wrist, the psychiatric examination report here by the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian, so he must have spoken Russian, you know, to whatever degree, when he went there. I thought you said you were always interested in someone who can speak Russian or has studied anything Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Who specializes in any field of Russia, who will be working for the United States government.

Mr. Sawyer. But here is a guy at that time, when he first came there, within a matter of days after, the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir --

Mr. Sawyer. That would have keyed interest right there, wouldn't it?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if we knew that he studied in Columbia University, in Yale University --

Mr. Sawyer. Well, it says right --

Mr. Nosenko. In Russian Institute.

Mr. Sawyer. It says on the report, this was on the 21st or the 23rd or 25th of October, a week after he arrived, it says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian. So you knew he spoke Russian at that time. And yet that was one of your criteria.

Mr. Nosenko. Well, sir --

Mr. Sawyer. Something else I am a little curious about. Apparently, coming here, wanting to defect, wanting to leave America, wanting Russia, here is a guy that if he didn't know anything would be apparently capable of going back to the United States at the behest of KGB in areas of the country that Russian diplomats and so forth, KGB people weren't allowed to go and dig up information for them and come back. Here is a guy you didn't have to threaten, he volunteers. And it seems strange you wouldn't talk to him or be interested in him just from that point of view.

And how -- and another thing that greatly bothers me, how did you know that he, being in the Marines, you knew that, but how did you know he wasn't a cryptographer or how did you know he wasn't stationed in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guard or as a messenger or a clerk, or that he worked with U-2s, which apparently he did. Why would the KGB not at least find these things out, with a guy that wants to go to Russia, wants to be a Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I only can repeat you, when on him was received the first information about his arrival, checkup was made on him. There wasn't any existing material in KGB, any knowledge about him. He never was before in the Soviet Union.

In judging by the question --

Mr. Sawyer. Why weren't they asking, why wouldn't they ask, that's the question. Why wouldn't they ask?

Mr. Nosenko. They are not --

Mr. Sawyer. Apparently they knew he could speak Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. -- asking Americans approaching.

Judging by the questionnaire, they decided, the KGB decided, Seventh Department, he is not an interesting target.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, why would a person like this not even be interesting for something like the Tokyo Rose, on some kind of propaganda program where he could say how bad things were in the United States, and why he didn't want to stay there anymore and how great they were in Russia, like these propagandists do?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I am telling you why it was decided, and how KGB was thinking about him.

Mr. Sawyer. I yield back the balance of my time.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I just now got this report. I wonder if I could let Mr.Edgar go ahead of me?

The Chairman. The Chair will recognize Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a series of questions which I hope most of which will be yes and no kinds of questions.

Did you conduct in the KGB a program to compromise and recruit journalists?

Mr. Nosenko. I was working, when I started to work in the KGB in 1953, the first year I was working against American correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But the KGB, not you personally, but the KGB did have a policy of going against journalists and trying to compromise them, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Trying to recruit or compromise them.

Mr. Edgar. Did they censor all the journalists' notes that they could gather from the journalists? Did they censor the notes before they allowed the story to go out?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Priscilla Johnson interviewed Oswald on the 15th of November, 1959. Would the KGB have looked at her notes from that interview?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, they are censored not by the KGB, but there is special -- it is government organization was censoring this. Some materials are coming to the KGB, some are not coming.

Mr. Edgar. Well, she reveals in her article that he was a Marxist, that Oswald was a Marxist and a Marine Corps radar man. It would seem to me the KGB would have discovered that in November of 1959.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I didn't know this in those days.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know a correspondent by the name of Arlene Mosby?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I heard such a name, Mosby, a woman who was a correspondent.

Mr. Edgar. In the earlier questioning of Congresswoman Burke, you were not confusing Arlene Mosby with the treatment of Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Nosenko. I think it was Priscilla Johnson, the case which I described, I think so. I think so, it was Priscilla Johnson.

Mr. Edgar. How do you know?

Mr. Nosenko. What I heard from colleagues who were in KGB, who were working against correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely clear?

Mr. Nosenko. And then there was an article in --

Mr. Edgar. You are not absolutely --

Mr. Nosenko. In literary newspaper, I think it was, not in Pravad, Izvestia, but in Literary Gazette.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely certain?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I think it was Priscilla JOhnson, as I said.

Mr. Edgar. But it could have been someone else.

Mr. Nosenko. An American correspondent, woman.

Mr. Edgar. Are you certain that after 1967 you sat down with the CIA and corrected your earlier statements about Oswald, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. We have only a few pages of written testimony, some three pages that you gave, and in fact, in the beginning part of that testimony, you indicate that you don't want to go through it again because your earlier testimony will stand for itself. I am paraphrasing what you said.

Were the notes and the recordsings of those corrections made and kept by the CIA?

Mr. NOsenko. Sir, Mr. Bruce Solie talking with me every day for a period from the end of '67, the whole '68, 1968, '69, every conversation he was recording. But he never has come and showed his notes, transcriptions or anything. He was returning to every case, to every aspect by 20, 25, 30 times.

Mr. Edgar. But specifically on the Oswald case, would it be correct in our assuming that it was more than three pages of notes on specifically Lee Harvey Oswald after 1967?

Mr. Nosenko. If he was raising questions concerning also Lee Harvey Oswald.

MR. Edgar. We have some information that Bruce Solie --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Mr. Solie.

Mr. Edgar. Stated in a deposition that there is nothing on Oswald other than the three pages.

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot say how many pages. I know that he was passing through all cases, all questions, with me for the period almost two years.

Mr. Edgar. Who other than Bruce Solie did you talk to about correcting your earlier statements?

Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't correcting them. They were correcting; they were talking returning back to every case.

Mr. Edgar. One final question.

Mr. Nosenko. And also besides Mr. Solie, were people coming from FBI with cases in which were interested for them.

Mr. Edgar. One final question. You stopped our hearing about an hour ago and were concerned about our playing the tape and bringing up old memories, and I respect the fact that you are very patriotic in coming before this Committee and helping us.

Would you be willing to sit down with our staff and go through a series of written questions which outline specifically for you the contradictions of your 1964, '65, '66 and early '67 timeframe, with the statements that you made in '67, '68 and '78, and indicate in a yes-no manner which statement, laid side by side, is true and which statement is false?

Mr. Nosenko. If it is the wish of the Committee, sure.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian?

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Nosenko, do you remember when it was that the FBI first interviewed you concerning Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember dates, but --

Mr. Fithian. It was between February and April?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, right.

Mr. Fithian. The information we have is that it was early March, the first week in March. Is that about right?

Now, have you talked to the FBI about that testimony at any time since then?

Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, on many, many times I have seen FBI, many, many questions raised. I cannot -- about this testimony, no, no.

Mr. Fithian. About the Oswald testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. About Oswald were asked questions, but not about this testimony . I do not remember about this testimony.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, there is a written transcript summary of your testimony to the FBI taken on March 5th, 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, have you at any time since then visisted with the FBI about this testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Now, next, when -- what is your understanding as to when Oswald first offered to defect, when you first knew, when the KGB first knew he was interested in defecting?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot give you a date.

Mr. Fithian. All right.

Well, he filled out an application --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no application, in oral form. He told the interpreter in oral form.

Mr. Fithian. This was the Intourist?

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter of the Intourist.

Mr. Fithian. And then the Intourist came to the KGB?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, and it immediately was informed to KGB that this American applies, wants to stay, said to interpreter.

Mr. Fithian. And then you reviewed the file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was several pieces of pages what we had on him. It wasn't even file.

Mr. Fithian. But you reviewed whatever applications --

Mr. Nosenko. Right. No it wasn't application to stay. He in oral form told the interpreter that he wants to stay Soviet Union.

Mr. Fithian. You reviewed the pages that he had filled out for the visa and any other sheets that you had?

Mr. Nosenko. He didn't -- yes, these documents, yes, for the visa, questionnaire and --

Mr. Fithian. Yes. What I am trying to get at is what did you have in front of you physically, knowledgeably about Oswald?

Mr. NOsenko. What I remember, it was it was several pages only, was questionnaire, was form of document from Intourist received how long his tour and how many days. There was checks of Oswald in archives of KGB to forms. There was information from Intourist who work with Oswald and --

Mr. Fithian. All right. Let me just stop you here.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. The forms in there by the KGB were filled out based on what information?

Mr. Nosenko. On his name, what he supplied, who he is, when he was asking visa.

Mr. Fithian. But they conducted no check, no search?

Mr. Nosenko. It is in the archives of KGB, if he ever was in Soviet Union, on him there will be something. If he wasn't in Soviet Union but he was known to intelligence service --

Mr. Fithian. But you didn't have any record on that.

Mr. Nosenko. Nothing.

Mr. Fithian. And so the final question is that the only thing that you had to judge -that he was an uninteresting subject was what he had told the Intourist guide?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. That is the only substantive thing?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, and his questionnaire for who he is, his name, whatever he filled about himself. That's all.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair has one additional request from one member, for one additional question.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. I just have one additional question, and that is the $80,000 you got for compensation and the $15,000 or $20,000

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you got later, that was net money after whatever taxes or whatever it was --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, after all taxes were taken.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. I just wondered for the record, I wondered if, Mr. Nosenko, you could tell us when you arrived in this country on February 12th, 1964, between February 12th, 1964 and April 4th, 1964, where were you in this country?

Mr. Nosenko. February 12 of 1964 and April 4th, I was staying in house in Virginia. I do not know address.

Mr. Dodd. Did you go -- did you travel at all?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Dodd. No vacation?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, I went in March on week to Hawaii I was.

Mr. Dodd. Were you on your own?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, with guards.

Mr. Dodd. It was a relaxed period for you and just a chance to rest?

Mr. Nosenko. Chance to get a little bit rest.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that this is the normal way that defectors are treated when they come to this country?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Dodd. Just one last point, Mr. Chairman, and that is with regard to the American exhibit, as a result of a statement by Mr. Klein which I understand you did not disagree with, the American exhibit ended on Sepgember 4th, 1959? That's when the termination of the exhibit was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, he showed me an article.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that employees thatworked during the exhibit stayed on for a period of time after that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, to it will be disassembled, this is the whole process is going on. It is closed for visitors to visit, to look.

Mr. Dodd. How long a period would that have been, a week?

Mr. Nosenko. No, more.

Mr. Dodd. More?

Mr. Nosenko. More, sure.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, with reference to your earlier comments this evening regarding what transpired during your period of isolation, which you described as extreme spartan conditions, I would like to make this request of you. I think the record ought to in a very graphic way portray those conditions under which you were subjected during that period of time, and while you are complying with Mr. Edgar's request and working with the staff in terms of the contradictory data, would you also agree to work with the staff in terms of seeing that the record has a complete and accurate description --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. --of all the conditions which you underwent during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Did you have some?

Mr. Cornwell. Following up on the question that Congressman Dodd just asked you, the staff, in an attempt to determine how long it took to disassemble the exhibition, checked with a knowledgeable employee who was involved in that process in the State Department and were informed by that person that the exhibition was disassembled and the persons who were operating it had left by October the 4th, approximately 30 days after the exhibition was terminated.

Would you disagree with that information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I cannot disagree. I do not remember. I do not know, even, when they left, no, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Anything further from the Committee?

Now, Mr. Devine, do you have anything?

Mr. Devine. No. He is under continuing subpoena.

The Chairman. Under the rules of the Committee, Mr. Nosenko, any witness appearing before our Committee is entitled at the conclusion of his testimony to address the Committee for a period of five minutes for the purpose of clarifying anything for the record or making any statement he so desires, and I want to at this time afford you that five minute period to make such a statement, if you so desire.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I consider my appearance, invitation to appear at Committee, as I told also the same applies before, my meetings with the staff of the Committee, I consider it honor, great honor for me. I will try to answer whatever I remember, whatever I know as only truth, and but the truth. And you would like to see me appear at any time, I am at your disposal and I will try to give you the only things what I know.

The Chairman. Thank you.

That is the completion of your statement, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, on behalf of the Committee and the United States Congress, I want to express our appreciation to you for having appeared here and having given this Committee the benefit of your testimony. At this time I would remind you of the terms of your agreement to work with our staff and provide further information to the Committee, that you will continue under the oath administered to you by this Committee.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your appearance here.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. You are excused.

At this time, there being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting is adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 10:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

180-10143-10100 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

0002450

meticulous files.

memo to Legat at same time as cable.

SECRET

Goldsmith
3/21/?

Notes re Hardway summary of M.C. tapes, transcripts, + cables. - Preassassination

SECRET

2 1. transcriptions generally are summaries rather than verbatim.

2. "previously transcribed" materials are not in the materials that Hardway examined.

0002451

3. marginal notations are common

4. Spanish transcripts are of poor quality. - Why would there even be any Spanish transcripts.

5. transcripts for 9/15 + 9/16/63 are missing. Holmes' explanation is that [intercept] activity ~~was~~ may have been shut down on weekends.

translated from Spanish transcription

6. 9/27/63
1. M.O. seeking visa to Odessa
2. same person calls back at 10:37 a.m.
3. another call 1:25

LHO 4:05 pm 4. Duran to Soviet emb. - conversation in Spanish re LHO, who was then at Cuban emb. - apparent that LHO had been at emb earlier

LHO 4:26 pm 5. Sov. emb → Duran re LHO; (LHO still at emb)

Win Scott sought to id ~~person~~ LHO; parts underlined in red; ①
also applies to 9/28

7. 9/28/63
LHO 1. Duran → Sov. emb; LHO talks to S.O.
(LHO to go to Sov. emb)

8. 10/1/63 Apparent that LHO had been at Sov emb earlier
? 1. 10:31 a.m. - possibly LHO calling mil attaché for info re teleg. from Wash.
LHO 2 10:45 - LHO to guard in reference to teleg. - LHO identifies himself
[1+2 previously transcribed]

SECRET

0002452

9. 10/3/63
- call to Sov emb re visa
[previously transcribed]

10. 10/1/63 #6344 re Phillips
10/8/63 6384 - missing - Obtain
DIR 72527 - re Phillips

11. Correct dates of photos 10/1 + 10/2 or 10/2 + 10/4.

12. 10/8/63 cable 6453 MCS → HQ
repts LHO visit.
absence of routing slip on cable

Accurate [illegible]

10/10/63 DIR 74830 → MCS re background on LHO + instructed MCS - re LHO + passing info to 3d agencies locally.
10/10/63 DIR dissemination - cable contained erroneous description.

13. What ~~was~~ [~~Tarasoff's~~] pseudonym or crypt?

14 Scott's suggestion of a P file on LHO.

15. ~~14.~~ 10/10/63 - HQ dissemination to other agencies re LHO
#74673

16. 10/15/63 MCS 6534 requesting pouched photo of LHO.
- No response to this cable.
Obtain

17. 10/16/63 Scott memo to ~~East~~ Mann re LHO; no mention of visa aspect.

~~18. Oswald?~~ P file - all data re LHO

Obtain Soviet contacts file - MCS file
Absence of routing slips on some of cables

SECRET

0002453

15th + 16th PARAPHRASE? — MARGINAL NOTES + P.T.

[LIAISON] routing - transcrip, etc/time

[unilateral] operation

[PENETRATION] AGENTS.

first trans. + action (consult?)

Post ASS'N:

NATURE of checks. - DIR 84886

Mexi 7023 ERASURE/date correc.
"not recorded this date"

7024 - All info reported
(prior to 27th calls etc)
by [H.M.]

(Hunt
Bishop.
P.T.
Importance

SECRET

SECRET

7025 - report of 9/28 + 10/1 conv. by A.G.

0082454

7028 - ~~cat~~ [Mexican] pick-up of 9/28

when first realized photos ≠ LHO

7033 reports all calls.

7034 recheck of all photos.

SECRET

SECRET

I General.
   A. duties
   B. typical day.
II People.
   list
III the surveillance ops.

2/14/78

SECRET

0002456

DDO Briefing on 201's.

Bill Donley - former op off.
Mike Levy
[Lee Coyle]
Virginia Jones.

---

basis for opening
1. operational interest -
  a. recruitment (access) (trace)
  b. tracking
  c. CIS (threat)

generally - amassed material in indexes brought together into 201. - actual process of opening only takes an hour or so.

---

* When MC report came in in 10/9 there was a response - ~~wa~~ is there a document re this trace?

---

opened by:
A. case officer.

Mick secenario - judgement call by officer - there may not be a 201 opened even though a reliable source suggest counter-intelligence threat type problem.

most 201's are on people who are being considered for recruitment.

SECRET

C002457

MH: ~ necessarily open 201 but would go into an index. Info would be disseminated.

— There are criteria for opening high level commies. } HANDBOOK recruitees. usually opened by operations (desk) officer.

— re~~a~~search
↓ 2 days?
desk (decision)

— There are ops run from HQ in which case the CO is the desk officer.

— the 201 is indigenous to DDO.

— PRQ part I → automatic 201. — required for clearance.
Part II — extended @ assessments, detail bkgnd analysis, operational projections.
OS has no need for Part II. which is kept in 201.

— Agee essentially correct on bifurcated files — central card reference between them. Index check should lead to both. RULE

MAINLY IN FIELD.

201 — true name — PRQ I + reference to second.
seperete file PRQ II

SECRET

201 mainly bio — try hard not to run operations out of 201's.

reason for opening — necessarily in it. would be a reference to a cable or document.

201 assigned chronologically as the name comes in.

would have his picture if ~~he~~ one could be gotten — not required. — would go right in.

↔ there should be a table of contents list on a 201 — computerized.

green list — info on subject compiled as a result of signal/communications intelligence.

[State cover can go from "fig leaf" to fully integrated.]

project files — ~~p~~ Policy Coordination Staff — coord. w other agencies — may also be a project file on desk if serious agency involvement

graphics file. — do obtain a great deal of photos of things like ships. — DDI if positive

SECRET

0002459

intelligence value + may be disseminated.

might be photos of individuals of prominence.

graphics file not in DDO

biographics registry in DDI

OCR - Office of Central Reference

P&L - part of compartmentation system refers to cable traffic opened by one of top 3 officers in DDO.

---

crypt can't be assigned a 201.

---

if got into a debriefing of handling a defector to us then that is automatic criteria for opening.

A report of fact of defection alone wouldn't be enough.

547A form / 1896 form.

Classification: SECRET

1 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN
AUGUST 17, 1978
AMERICAN EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE

By Surell Brady

Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived in Paris in September, 1962.

24

He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned [defense cover] as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section 6.

Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he never made written contact with the station.

Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division; he characterized that work as classical espionage work against the USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionage and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the fields of science and political science. He stated that the section was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only 20-25 persons.

Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command of the Armed Forces. He explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target. The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.

He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage. The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.

Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the

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10143-10227

military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clandestine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military operations.

Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B. Stanley, Army head.

Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational support for his base. It consisted of providing [24 cover] for persons running operations against the Soviets.

Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the military was using American military personnel in any of its operations. He said, however, that there ~~was~~ were occasional rumors that an American serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases. He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American contact with the Soviets.

Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral and that his last name began with the letter "O." Harry Little succeeded that person in 1957.

Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Command at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.

Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsibility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such smaller units usually did not.

Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First

Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience with displaced persons from the communist bloc.

Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking precluded such programs.

Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.

I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo. I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.

3 Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was [William Rober Sinclair] he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's contacts in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in 3 command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was [James Flint] was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.

Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.

Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations; the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operatio against Soviets outside of the USSR.

Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence

2/mc

staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice. However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterintelligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his geographical target.

Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch. But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch. He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and the Inter-Branch.

Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the United States. But the Contacts Division (OO) did have a domestic mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin said he believed the agency also got information on Americans in the Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the press.

Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could probably remember the names of the others in the section.

I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962 when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald took place the first week of July, 1962.

Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not attempt to debrief Oswald.

Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember, 1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong year in the memo.

Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American. He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Department dispatches about Oswald.

He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.

Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10 American defectors came to their attention from the State Department and the military.

Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers program. It involved using persons to give information about the Soviet Union who had a "very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union, such as scientists, etc.

Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen the information in that form.

Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Oswald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.

I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.

Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation, nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he is confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security facility. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in Minsk.

Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Sokaloff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child. He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length for security reasons by the agency.

The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the proposed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited, what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short-term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved. He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by the contact.

I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.

Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including the Warren Commission, about the memo.

He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.

Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said he doesn't recall any such check.

Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were Balaban, a man named Richard, last name possibly [Wink] and [Charles Cox,] who was the liaison with the Technical Supports Division (i.e., concealment devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in 1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help in remebering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is married to Rudolf Balaban.

Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said he doesn't know ~~that~~ actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the persen actually being developed as an asset.

Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military base at Atsugi.

Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo. He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him (Oswald)."

I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the 201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the notations on the form.

Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for. I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that. He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not have an interest in the Oswald file.

I asked how he would have come across the State Department communications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circulated for information and then routed back to registry where they would be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Oswald.

Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions within the agency might have in this way:



He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.

Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented, he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Oswald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot preclude that possibility.

I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believe we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the country.

I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal military secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he would have been of interest for security.

I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald. He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write memos about such leads which were discussed and not followed-up. He does not remember preparing any such memo.

Date : 02/09/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10030
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC643360W - PAGES 15-16

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE : CIA INFORMATION REPORT
DATE : 01/04/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : PFUNTNER, JORDAN J.

UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA.
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted] / [redacted]
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/532,860
SUBJECT UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA
DATE DISTR. 4 JANUARY 1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO. DECEMBER 1962
REFERENCES RD-W-2107
IN 44195
PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963)
APPRAISAL 3
FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-34,413

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA."

1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES, THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM, AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER.

2. LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS. THIS CONTROVERSY IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE INDEPENDENT AND FELXIBLE POLICIES. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND AGAINST POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE ."

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
9.22.97

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted] / [redacted]

~~GROUP 1~~

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	~~AID~~ XX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	INS
STATE/DIR												FBI			EXO		

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

DA IN 4722

15

[redacted]

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

0000
(15-20)

USAOSD/8354

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted]
[redacted]

TDCS -3/532,860

IN 44195

3. BRITISH COMMENTS.

A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. To WHOM?! British

B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE, REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 4722

16

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

0000

Date : 05/20/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : USA
RECORD NUMBER : 197-10002-10190
RECORDS SERIES : HEADQUARTERS FILES, PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA TDCS-3/566,305
DATE : 00/00/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : WEST GERMANY: SOVIET MILITARY ALERT FOLLOWING KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / /
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ELEGRAM **INFORMATION REPORT** TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY USSR/EAST GERMANY/EASTERN EUROPE

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/566,305

SUBJECT HIGHLIGHTS OF MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 48

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

5/14/97

DATE OF INFO. 20-26 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. GERMANY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER 1963/ IN TEXT.

APPRAISAL 3, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/

FIELD REPORT NO. EGK-27396

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SERVICE FROM INFORMANTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY.

FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GERMAN SERVICE MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO 48/63, COVERING THE PERIOD OF 20-26 NOVEMBER 63.

1. DURING THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF PREPARATION FOR ATTACK BY SOVIET BLOC FORCES.

2 PART A. GENERAL.

LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET BLOC ARMED FORCES WERE NORMAL AND WERE THUS IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL PACE OF TRAINING AT THIS TIME OF YEAR.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES REACTED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOV 22ND, WITH PRE-CAUTIONARY MEASURES OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH MAY BE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXXXXXX	DDX
STATE/DIR															

TELEGRAM **INFORMATION REPORT** TELEGRAM

DA IN 157472

SECRET

INTERPRETED AS A REACTION TO CORRESPONDING STAND-BY MEASURES OF THE U.S. FORCES.

IT IS EXPECTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION SOVIET TACTICS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.

3. PART B. ARMED FORCES.

A. USSR/EAST GERMAN.

1/ ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERT MEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG GARRISON FOR NVA UNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS /SEVERAL B/F-3/. GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT APPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO THE BERLIN AREA.

B. EAST GERMAN.

1/ SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLED HINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO 1 KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS. /SEVERAL F-3/.

4. PART C. GROUND FORCES.

A. SOVIET.

1/ SUMMARY GERMAN COMMENT ON TRAINING /[illegible]/.

TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND NUMEROUS DRIVING SCHOOLS IS INDICATIVE OF RECRUIT TRAINING. FROM 16 TO 18 NOVEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY CONDUCTED

EXERCISES, PRESUMABLY AT REGIMENTAL LEVEL, AT THE LETZLINGER HEIDE AND ALTENGRABOW TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS.

SINCE 24 NOVEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONS OF ACTIVITY OUTSIDE GARRISONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 34TH ARTILLERY DIV. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AS YET INDICATIVE OF EXERCISES WITH FULL UNITS PARTICIPATING.

5. PART D. AIR FORCES. NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

6. PART E. NAVY.

A. SOVIET.

1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUT PT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. /B-2/

7. PART F. LOGISTICS, AND PART G. PSYCHOLOGICAL - NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOM

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 157472

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1963
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :
EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

JFK Assassination Records

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority__________
☐ Refer To__________
Review Date 12/8/2015 By K. E. Stoner

NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
1	CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 (SECRET-NOFORN)	17 Jan 63
2	Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)	22 Jan 63
3	Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe)	23 Jan 63
4	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
5	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	23 Jan 63
6	DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
7	Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63 (TOP SECRET)	24 Jan 63
8	National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Closed) (TOP SECRET)	Undtd
9	Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	4 Feb 63

3

February 4, 1963

TO : ARA - Mr. Cottrell

FROM : S/P - John W. Ford

Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work had been done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee are as follows:

1. The National Security Action Memoranda emanating from the White House.

2. The Actions of the National Security Council.

3. The Basic National Security Policy of the U.S. (now awaiting final stages of formal clearance before presentation to National Security Council).

4. The Records

4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council as they pertain to Cuba.

5. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM - during the Cuban Crisis.

6. The Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the Punta del Este Conference.

7. Public Statements of Government Officials, in Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy of September 13, 1962.

8. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministers of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.

9. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and Objectives as Drawn Up by the Interdepartmental Committee of Cuban Affairs.

10. Cuban Guidelines Paper.
    (A guidelines paper as such does not exist on Cuba as is the case in a majority of other countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with Cuba, particularly that generated during the recent October crisis. This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particular reports which may be of value to the members of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated those National Security Council decisions and National Security Action Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in the files of the Department of State. Where action on a particular NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXCOM, action responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review

to date,

to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances action responsibility on an NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexis Johnson).

Attachment:
  List of Pending and Closed
  NSC and NASAM decisions
  concerning Cuba.

8

[redacted] SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)

[redacted] SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	Agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro regime.	(Pending) According to files, out of this NSC directive grew a policy paper, to be handled differently from regular guidelines papers on each country. As of 9/4/62, White House was informed that action on this NSC directive would be reported in compliance with NSAM 181 which transferred certain NSC & NASAM actions to special group (Alexis Johnson).
483 NSC 2422d 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to obtaining adequate intelligence on Cuban military capabilities.	(Pending) Action to be reported in compliance with NASAM 181 (Johnson channel)
483 NSC 2422e 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to publication in free world press of terrorist actions of Castro regime, etc. and to possible political action to end current terror.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422g 5/5/61	Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council should be improved.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422i 5/5/61	Cuban refugees to be given refugee status; refugees in Miami to be relocated; refugees to be eligible to apply for travel privileges.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422k 5/5/61	Initiation of negotiations to enlarge willingness of other American states to join in action against Castro.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422m 5/5/61	USIA will expand L.A. program, but not initiate electronic warfare against Castro; means of propaganda should be madeavailable to non-US groups.	(Pending) Action transferred to Johnson channel Per NASAM #181.
483 NSC 2422n 5/5/61	US military officers under general guidance to be prepared by Dept of State, would discuss Castro threat to all L.A. with L.A. officers.	(Closed) completed action as of 11/28/61.
483 NSC 2422o 5/5/61	Dept of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.	(Closed) S/P paper "possible new Basis for Anti-Communist Action" 7/24/61
483 NSC 2422p 5/5/61	Robert Woodward's assumption of responsibility of Task Force on Cuba on announcement of appointment.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422b 5/5/61	No US military intervention now. Do nothing which would foreclose possibility military intervention in future.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422c 5/5/61	No naval blockade or airwar against Cuba.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422f 5/5/61	Detailed study to be made by CIA with other Departments of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in elements which control Cuba.	Closed. Bissell memo to Achilles 11/21/61 re: "Situation and Prospects in Cuba"by Sherman Kent 11/3/61.

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted] SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422h 5/5/61	No separate Cuban military forces should be organized in U.S. Cuban nationals would be encouraged enlist in US Armed Forces.	Closed. DEF recommended to Pres. draft program be terminated 6/30/62 due to modest results.
483 NSC 2422j 5/5/61	No immediate trade embargo on Cuba.	Closed, with President's action of 2/3/62 declaring total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.
483 NSC 2422l 5/5/61	Alliance for Progress to be strengthened.	Closed. Weekly report now from AID to White House.
NASAM 194 10/2/62	Policy Toward non-bloc ships in Cuban trade (Action US Government proposes to take with regard to shipping to Cuba.)	Pending. Action transferred to EXCOM.
NASAM 100 10/5/61	Contingency Planning for Cuba.	Pending Action transferred to Johnson channel.
CUBA NASAM #31 3/11/61	US Government must have ready a White Paper on Cuba and be ready to give assistance to Cuban Patriots in similar effort.	Closed. Paper prepared and translated: "The Castro Regime in Cuba" 9/61
CUBA NASAM #181 8/24/62	Eyes only - Limited Distribution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USecy Johnson (understand this authorized response on certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel)	Closed.

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
CUBA NASAM 196 10/22/62	Establishment of NSC Executive Committee	Closed.
CUBA NASAM 208 12/6/62 EYES ONLY	Cuba Overflights. (This Presidential directive approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumption it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.)	Report Submitted.
CUBA NASAM 213 1/8/63	Interdepartmental Organization of Cuban Affairs - with responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.	Closed.

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TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States" and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

As stated.
Copy No.____.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

    a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

    b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

    c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

   b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

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TOP SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m. The revision consists essentially of what is now denominated as "ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supplemented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This supplemental material is derived from portions of the text of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to include the supplemental material referred to above. He, in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me know by noon tomorrow where you and he stand with regard to the revised paper.

Enclosure

SIGNED
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

cc: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky

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DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

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2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

[illegible]

DoD supporting addition

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

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TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

~~SENSITIVE~~

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Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy.

Recommendation

I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the United States policy toward Cuba.

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

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2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

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In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

Soviet

Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in [redacted] support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

4

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. The Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and

and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose.

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
    b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who wo own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

   a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

   b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. ←In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Su

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. [illegible] ultimate objective [illegible] the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the United States [illegible] the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; reduce its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through [illegible] feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

Soviet

Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent possible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

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[illegible] keeping the Castro forces on the [illegible] retaliatory basis, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; [illegible]; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually becomes impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

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[redacted] SECRET Draft 23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other ~~OAS~~ Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8.

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

degrees

opportunities

until the regime ~~be~~ is overthrown

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

    a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

    b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOW, THE ~~Await~~ results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners SHOULD FIRST BE ASCERTAINED. ~~Any of the actions listed below~~, If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations, they could jeopardize the~~ir~~ release of the Americans

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. ...

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ~~all~~ ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are no~~w~~ inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

[redacted] SECRET Draft 23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the meeting of ~~Thursday~~, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m).

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other ~~OAS~~ Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost ~~to~~ the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8.

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

    a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

    b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

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a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Any of the actions listed below, if taken before the conclusion of the negotiations could jeopardize their release.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b.

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are no~~t~~w inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

(WITH REVISIONS)

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

COPIES TO : All Members of the NSC Executive Committee

SUBJECT : CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of Recommendations of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 24.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

[redacted] SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

[redacted] SECRET

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

   c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM

To determine the future course of
action which the U.S. should seek
in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

Discussion

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. At that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken.

COURSES

SECRET

COURSES OF ACTION

(1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances.

(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insurrection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemisphere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to the Soviet Union.

(3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este (Which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

Taken

Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons)

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accompanied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such additional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OCto sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for this.

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be maintained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

These

These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unanimous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

(11)

(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be necessary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveillance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, insufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This could be done:

(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB;

(b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or

(c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be difficult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action.

As

As to (c), member governments could take this course on an individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except (10) and (12).

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suspension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.

(d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions.

Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradually, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides up to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U. S.

DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whater "mystique" the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U. S .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers". Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of $2,500 per person per year would be about $2.5 million.

Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U. S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a U. S. citizen. X
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan. -Prep to mtg
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. X
9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

This document consists of 4 pages
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ~~AGENCY~~ No. 1 of 10 Copies, Series B

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S-E-C-R-E-T
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COUNTRY Cuba
REPORT NO. CS DB-3/652,924
SUBJECT Analysis of the Cuban Situation by the Italian Embassy in Habana
DATE DISTR. 17 January 1963
NO. PAGES 4
REFERENCES RD-W-2088 RD-W-2107 605
DATE OF INFO. 6 December 1962
PLACE & DATE ACQ. Italy, Rome (21 December 1962)
FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of Content: 2, that the document is genuine.

The following is a translation of a report dated 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the considerations regarding the consequences which the recent crisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been reported by some members of our representations.

1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce that Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection). Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me that /China/ can furnish more than it has furnished to date, which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, /China/ is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined as pro-Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in such a way that he cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations, he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations."

Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a grave blow particularly in Latin America.

2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a "Titoist" regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing everything possible to provoke it. It is also possible that some Cubans share these sentiments. But, in my opinion, it is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model. Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this possibility seems very remote.

3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so.

It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The countries which could do it do not have the necessary material means. A partial solution would worsen the situation and a definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. I think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by material strength can obtain results in Cuba.

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United States. It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example for other Latin American countries. This would not take into account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly their chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another path. As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the Daily Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United States in which the most possible damage must be done to the adversary."

Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November, Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this descent will last no one can say today. The only certain thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every day and therefore the revolutionary regime needs the assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who heads the most important institution of the country - the Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits, to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will certainly be the most difficult year.

But economic assistance can permit this country to survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solution it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the machines which they have. Agricultural production, principally sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary which should last ten years are unusable after two years?

It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But for another year they will find a way to get by.

Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent policy followed by the United States in the recent months is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger of strategic weapons has been eliminated, the wisest measure is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will present some more "headaches" to the United States; but the atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro which would force the solution of the problem - one can hope for a perhaps not too distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the Cubans insist on the known five points and the United States refuses any guarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to feed Castro to permit his survival, the less uncomfortable position appears to me to be that of the Government in Washington.

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TO : MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS

TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION

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JFK Assassination Records Review

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Lt Col Haig/78029/8 Jan 64/md

10 JAN 1964

OSA 353-CUBA 1/10/64

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 December 1963-1 January 1964. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

FW 1/30/63

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 3051-D FILE

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STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 DEC 63 - 1 JAN 64

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. General A. P. O'Meara, USA, Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, met with Vice Admiral Ray C. Needham, USN, Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and members of their respective staffs during the period 11 to 15 December 1963. Discussions encompassed methods of improving the existing surveillance/ intercept system throughout the Caribbean. Existing US plans were reviewed, continuance of the ship visit program instituted in November 1963 was agreed upon, and combined exercises to test country capabilities to intercept simulated intruding ships were planned for early execution. Discussions by General O'Meara were continued with the Secretary of the Army and with representatives of the State Department, CIA and the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commander Mine Division 44 with minesweepers USS STURDY and USS SWERVE completed visits to Central American ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Deficiencies in the capabilities of all three countries to counter subversive infiltration were reported. Additional visits, designed to assist in correcting deficiencies, are planned. USCINCSO also plans, through Commanders of US Military Groups, to assist in developing existing capabilities.

c. Based upon information from CAS Panama representative on 8 November, USCINCSO directed US operations to find a small boat which reportedly left the Colon Free Zone with a cargo of arms destined for the vicinity of the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Daylight visual aerial surveillance flights were instituted immediately, with radar-equipped aircraft taking over surveillance during hours of darkness. Colombian and Venezuelan authorities were notified through US diplomatic channels, but no direct communications between US surveillance aircraft and Colombian forces in the vicinity of the probable landing area were established before termination on 14 November. This effort, though not successful, has evoked considerable effort by US State Department, Defense Department and CIA activities to improve capabilities and procedures.

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d. Action was commenced in the Colon area to provide means to keep track of ships and boats entering or leaving the Colon Free Zone in order to monitor the movements of those suspected of carrying contraband. Assistance to USCINCSO was provided from the continental United States in carrying out surveys as to equipment required on as secretive a basis as possible, and special optical equipment to include probable night television was approved by the Secretary of the Army for expedited delivery to USCINCSO.

e. A joint survey and mobile training team from USCINCSO continued assistance to Venezuelan authorities in improving indigenous capabilities for surveillance and interception of intruders.

f. A US Southern Command Operations Plan 50-63 was developed to provide for three levels of operational assistance to Venezuela in surveillance and intercept operations. Representatives of the US Strike Command and the Air Defense Command visited USCINCSO to assist in developing detailed supporting plans.

g. Information was obtained by USCINCSO concerning in-country communications capabilities of Colombia and Venezuela to receive and disseminate surveillance information provided by US forces.

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. US Army training included the following: 13 students from 6 countries completed CI operations course in the Canal Zone; 8 students from 5 countries completed CI orientation course in the Canal Zone; 24 students from 8 countries completed Military Intelligence course in the Canal Zone; 11 Chilean students completed special Military Intelligence orientation course; three Canal Zone-based CI Mobile Training Teams (MTT) carried out training programs in Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela; and one Canal Zone-based CI MTT commenced a training program of Panamanian National Guardsmen.

b. US Navy training included the following:

(1) The Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) completed training the third class of Central American nationals, bringing to 63 the total number of students trained since May 1963.

(2) The semiannual maintenance check of two Panamanian 40 foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) was commenced on 16 December by an on-the-job training (OJT) program. Work should be completed by 10 January 1964.

(3) Work was temporarily suspended on two 40 foot CGUBs in Costa Rica due to the lack of critical spare parts. It is anticipated work will be completed by 15 January 1964.

c. Increases in the stock levels of the Canal Zone stockpile of riot control equipment were directed on 20 December 1963. Increases will enable USCINCSO to respond to urgent requests from Latin American governments. Buildup concerned primarily tear gas grenades, gas masks, carbines and shotgun ammunition.

d. Final arrangements were made with the Bertram Boat Company of Miami for delivery of 10 outboard-inboard fiber glass boats to Cabamis, Venezuela for use in the Lake Maracaibo area. Boats, spares and an MTT will be delivered to destination by 14 January 1964.

e. Action has been taken to expedite the shipment of radio-electronic gear to Jamaica for use in the joint surveillance program designed to combat Castro-inspired insurgency in the Caribbean area. Equipment should arrive in Jamaica within the next few weeks.

f. A US Air Force Air Commando MTT demonstrated in Asuncion, Paraguay.

8. Other Special Actions.

a. Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Ground-to-Air facilities in Ecuador have been completed.

b. Authority to proceed with the LAMCS in Honduras was received from the US State Department on 17 December 1963. This facility should be completed within 120 days.

c. Emergency power units to improve reliability of US Army and Air Force Mission radio stations in Colombia and Venezuela, shipped from the United States, arrived in Bogota and Caracas respectively.

A S G O S A	353 CUBA SECRET	091.411	020 Staff	031.2 JCS	201 Reynolds, John

1-2-63

From: John Reynolds, KCS
To: C/Staff
Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Comte of Cuban Affairs: Rpt on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

rw Incl: None
Dis: Col. Haig 1-3-64
FW 1-30-63

OSA 3004

OSA 353 Cuba 1-2-63 FW 1-30-63

OSA FORM 3
31 MAY 49

THIS PAPER BELONGS TO:
Administrative Support Group Division, Office of the Secretary of the Army

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—683865

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SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

OSA 353 CUBA

December 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WADE ROBERT
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

12-18-63

SUBJECT: State Paper Entitled "Terrorism in the Latin American Countries on the Critical Insurgency List"

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee at the Department of State (Mr. William Bowdler, 182-3736) for use by the Department of State representative at the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting on December 19, 1963. The paper was provided to this office by State on December 18 with the request that Department of Defense comments, particularly on the basic memorandum, be obtained. Although this office is very much concerned with the aspects of the paper which deal with the problem of Castro-inspired subversion, the broader implications of the paper pertain to the Latin American area and the military assistance programs related thereto. These are, of course, matters of primary concern to your office. Therefore, the attached paper is forwarded to you for appropriate action with the request that your comments, if any, be coordinated with this office so that they can be correlated to actions currently under the purview of this office.

FW 1-30-63

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA

for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

OSA, OSG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

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SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

December 18, 1963

OSA 353 CUBA

12-18-63

FW 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs (ICCOCA) has recently considered a CIA proposal to provide guidance to US firms in Latin America confronted with Castro-communist inspired sabotage of their facilities and assets. CIA has contracted for the preparation of a report which will consolidate the experiences of several US firms in Latin America in combatting sabotage. After consideration by the ICCOCA this report will be furnished through our country teams in Latin America to local US firms to assist them in instituting appropriate anti-sabotage programs.

I would be most grateful if you would prepare a brief report designed to supplement the CIA project which would include enumeration of general guidelines which might be adopted by US firms in the Latin American area in combatting sabotage. In particular, an enumeration of known appropriate anti-sabotage devices available on the commercial market together with the manufacturer's names would be most helpful.

A member of my staff has discussed this project with Mr. Phelps of your staff, who has indicated that DDR&E might be of assistance in this matter based on a recent field trip to Venezuela where problems peculiar to that area were studied at the request of the US Ambassador. It is also possible that commercial devices developed for South Vietnam would have applicability in Latin America. Because this project is designed for distribution to several Latin American countries, it is requested that where possible guidelines be developed which might have general application throughout Latin America, but with emphasis on key subversive target areas. Present plans anticipate finalization of this project by December 23, 1963.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

OSA, ASG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

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17 DEC 1963

OSA 353 CUBA 12-17-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 November-1 December 1963. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

FW 1-30-63

1-30-63

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

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OFFICE

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OSA, ASG Control No. 2915-E

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. On 9 November 1963 the Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of reports concerning suspected subversive arms smuggling into Venezuela or Colombia from the Colon Free Zone, Panama. USCINCSO initiated surveillance at first light on 9 November 1963 to detect and track surface vessels which might be engaged in the subversive traffic. The JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) to commence surveillance with radar equipped aircraft and to keep USCINCSO advised of all information. Suspected craft were not positively identified or intercepted; however, there were indications that an unidentified surface vessel off the Rio Hacha area of Colombia and in Colombian waters was probably in contact with small boats operating from the Colombian coastline at night.

b. As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCSO developed a plan under which the United States could provide assistance to Venezuelan forces, on three levels of participation, designed to prevent the surreptitious movement of Castro-Communist arms and personnel into Venezuela. To be fully effective, the plan calls for US elements operating from Venezuelan territory which is not considered a likely subject for approval by the Government of Venezuela at the present time.

c. A joint survey and mobile training team of eleven men was provided by USCINCSO to Venezuela on 22 November 1963, upon approval of the concept by the Government of Venezuela. The purpose of the team is to train Venezuelan military personnel in organizing and operating a joint operations center; in improving capabilities in the plotting and coordination of intelligence data, and aerial photography; and in coordinating all Venezuelan military and paramilitary organizations involved in surveillance and intercept operations.

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5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. Two minesweepers from the US Atlantic Command, USS STURDY and USS SWERVE with Commander Mine Division 44 embarked, commenced a schedule of visits to Caribbean ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Visits are intended to assist each country in improving its coastal and off-shore surveillance effort, to improve intercept capabilities with respect to the prevention of infiltration of arms and subversive personnel through the countries' territorial waters, and to establish procedures which would provide for US assistance in final interception when requested. Visits in November, under the supervision of USCINCSO, covered Puerto Limon, Costa Rica; Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua; and Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.

b. Seventy-eight Latin American officers, previously enrolled, were in attendance during November at courses stressing counterinsurgency conducted by the US Army Canal Zone school. Two officers graduated from the US Army Counterinsurgency Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 12 November 1963 and two additional officers are now in attendance.

c. Seven US Army Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams based in the Canal Zone, consisting of twenty officers and thirty-five enlisted men, provided training in seven Latin American countries during November.

d. Nine enlisted men from Chile were in attendance at Marine Corps schools at Camp Pendleton, California in November.

e. US Coast Guard training in small boat operations was provided in the Canal Zone for fifteen students from five Caribbean countries in the operation and maintenance of forty-foot Coast Guard utility boats. A Coast Guard mobile training team of one officer and two enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training in Costa Rica for the reconditioning of Coast Guard utility boats. Five members of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil are receiving on-the-job training in connection with reconditioning of the boats.

f. A US Air Force counterinsurgency team of five officers and eight enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training for Ecuadorian Air Force personnel in Ecuador.

g. At the request of USCINSO, and with the enthusiastic support of the Venezuelan Government, a small boat program has been initiated to provide security for the Lake Maracaibo region. Arrangements have been made through the US Navy under Military Credit Sales agreement for the manufacture of six (6) 25-foot and four (4) 31-foot inboard-outboard, fiberglass hull boats by Bertram Boat Company, Miami, for delivery in December 1963 or early January 1964. A SEAL-trained Mobile Training Team (MTT) of one officer and five enlisted men will be provided by the Navy and will report to the equipment supplier in time to become fully acquainted with the boats by 15 December. The MTT will accompany the boats to Venezuela and will remain up to two months in country to provide necessary familiarization training.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Surveillance.

a. Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to suspected arms smuggling from the Canal Free Zone, Panama into Colombia or Venezuela, the USCINCSO relayed this information to Colombia and Venezuela by the Military Alerting System. The US Ambassador to Colombia conveyed the information to the Government of Colombia. Colombian Navy and Air Force elements were assigned increased surveillance missions in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia by Colombian military authorities and results of their surveillance activities were provided to USCINCSO by the US Military Group Commander in Colombia. The results of US air surveillance of the expected route and landing area, undertaken by US Air Force and Naval air elements were transmitted to the US Military Group Commander in Colombia for passage to the Colombian military authorities.

b. The motor vessel BLUE STAR, of Panamanian registry, was apprehended by Ecuadorian authorities in November 1963 as it was attempting the clandestine introduction of contraband articles into Ecuador. Ship movement information had been provided to the US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the Fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent involvement of Cuban arms or Cuban trained personnel in this instance.

7. Other Special Actions.

a. Construction is now in progress on the Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Quito, Ecuador; the terminal station is expected to be completed in December 1963. The station in Nicaragua is expected to be completed in early December 1963.

b. In response to a request by USCINCSO, action was taken on 15 November 1963 to expedite delivery of communications equipment required to implement a Jamaican integrated coastal surveillance system. The system was originally approved as part of the $500 thousand one-time grant of Military Assistance material directed by the President in April 1963, but world-wide shortages of specific items threatened to delay shipment in some cases until FY 1965. In view of the urgency of this requirement, priorities were adjusted to provide delivery by 1 January 1964. The items include:

12	AN/GRC radios and installation kits
3	AN/ARC 3 radios
1	AN/PSM 6
1	Wattmeter

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Public Safety, State-AID, are studying the possibility of increasing the stock level of certain items of Riot Control Equipment in the Canal Zone, in order to meet rapidly and effectively multiple contingencies that may occur in Latin America. In the past, the size of some requests have necessitated shipment of certain items directly from the United States, with resultant increase in cost and time. USCINCSO has been asked for his recommendations on stock levels.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

2 DEC 1963

In reply refer to:
I-28596/63

OSA 353 Cuba 12-2-63 f/w 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions to Counter Subversion (U)

The enclosure to your Memorandum No. 81, subject as above, dated 26 November 1963, has been received. The report appears to be complete and appropriate for submission to the President.

SIGNED

Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Asg - Mr Califano

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OFFICE

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26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

OSA 353 Cuba 11-26-63 f/w 1-30-63

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

FILE

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DRAFT
11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE
on CUBAN SUBVERSION

ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 2207 F

DRAFT
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and from

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued Inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counteract

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three H-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. ~~Guantanamo~~ Guatemala City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysés on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of A America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in

the

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allits Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazilassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athelete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguayan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector will/be brought to light.

OSA 353 CUBA

29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

10-29-63

1. (U) The following information is submitted in response to Memorandum No. 64, General Counsel, dated 19 September 1963.

2. (S) Reference Topic 5 (Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities):

a. Canal Zone -

(1) Fifteen students from six Latin American countries are attendees in the ten weeks Counterinsurgency Operations Course of the U. S. Army School of the Americas which began 30 September 1963.

FW 1-30-63

(2) There are 24 students from eight Latin American countries attending the 16 weeks Military Intelligence Course which began 23 August 1963.

b. CONUS -

(1) Three students from three Latin American countries are attending the Special Warfare Course at Fort Bragg, N. C.

(2) One Peruvian student is attending the Civil Affairs Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

c. In the month of October 1963, eight Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams (MTT) (14 Off-48 EM) were deployed in six countries to conduct counterinsurgency training.

d. A U. S. Army officer is attending the Command and General Staff School of the Uruguayan Army and upon completion of this course in December 1963, will be assigned to the OUSARMA, Uruguay. He will perform intelligence advisory functions as an additional duty.

e. An additional officer has been assigned as assistant USARMA in Guatemala, increasing the capability for intelligence assistance in that country.

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2505A FILE file (m)

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OPS SW OP
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

3. (S) Reference Topic 6 (Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion):

a. The number of intelligence exchange agreements between the U. S. Army and local military services in Latin America has been increased to 13.

b. The additional officer assigned as Assistant USARMA, Guatemala, raises the collection potential in that nation and may develop information which can be exchanged with Latin American countries.

J. D. ALGER
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations
for Special Operations

G. S. BLANCHARD
Colonel, GS
Director of Special Warfare
ODCSOPS

SECRET

Lt Col Haig/78029/29Oct63/md

October 29, 1963

OSA 353-CUBA 10/29/63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Revision of the Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

At a meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion on October 10, 1963, the Department of Defense (DOD) Representative was requested to review and up-date the DOD portions of pages 4, 5 and 6 of subject report. Enclosed herewith is a line in line out revision of the report. A revision has also been made to page 7, which is designed to make the DOD portions of the report current.

FW 1/30/63

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

sent Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY OFFICE
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OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2494C file (m) FILE

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OFFICE OF THE ARMY

SECRET

DOD Revision to Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

3. Military Assistance Programs

At the ~~present time~~ end of FY 63, ~~2,277~~ 1791 Latin American military students ~~are~~ were receiving, or ~~are programmed to receive~~ have received training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. Courses vary in length from two-week orientation tours to 83-week flying training courses. However, the majority of instruction is for periods of less than six months, and is distributed in fields as follows:

Flying Instruction (8-83 weeks)	~~172~~	154
Command, Staff and Operational (direction and control of armed forces, 4-23 weeks)	~~748~~	638
Communications/Electronics (6-29 weeks)	~~66~~	36
Equipment Maintenance and Repair (5-28 weeks)	~~336~~	232
Logistics (2-14 weeks)	~~46~~	33
Administration (4-40 weeks)	~~8~~	7
Professional Specialized (Engineering, Medical, Legal etc., 4-20 weeks)	~~306~~	193
Orientation (2-3 weeks)	~~596~~	498

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2494 C

7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available Military Quotas in the United States

The failure of Latin American countries to take full advantage of military quotas offered has been a persistent problem. In 1962, for example, 15 per cent of the quotas offered were unfilled. This unfavorable situation derives from many causes. ~~During the current fiscal year 18 per cent of unfilled Army quotas have been due to inability to meet course pre-requisites; 22 per cent because of lack of sufficient funds; and 33 per cent because of political upheavals.~~ The armed forces of the average Latin American country are small, and the availability of qualified candidates who can be spared for extended periods of obligated service and the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps also tends to discourage the training of enlisted men in United States schools, since large sums from limited budgets to train enlisted men who will remain in service only a brief time. Another significant deterrent is the per diem rates required by law to be paid by some countries to service personnel sent outside their homeland. In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay the legal rates for personnel serving abroad are too high to be supportable by defense budgets; while in other countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard rates are too late to provide a reasonable living for students.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 74 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, USMC

sent

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report of Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion

Circulated herewith for information is a report of the October 10, 1963 meeting of subject subcommittee.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD) - sent

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG
retained in Gen Counsel

OSA 353 CUBA 10-19-63 F.W.: 1-30-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion, October 10, 1963

Outlined below is a summary of deliberations of subject subcommittee during the meeting of October 10 at 1430 hours in Room 6273, New State. Agenda is at Tab A.

Agenda Item 1

The Final Subcommittee Report for the months of July and August was circulated. The report has been circulated to points of contact by separate correspondence.

Agenda Item 2

The Subcommittee discussed the SCCS letter which referred to the recent trip of US students to Cuba. (Attached to enclosure 1) It was apparent to all that criticism of the US could be implied from this letter. The Chairman stated he would provide the SCCS with the substance of State's telegram 647, which outlines actions undertaken by the US Government against the students.

Agenda Item 3

a. CIA, in coordination with the Esso Corporation's Chief of Industrial Security, will prepare guidance data for distribution to Latin America which could be utilized by US commercial firms for the protection of their facilities against sabotage. The DOD representative was requested to ascertain whether ARPA had available some commercial protection devices which might be applicable for use in Latin America against sabotage attacks. The CIA representative stated he believed ARPA had developed some devices for this purpose.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. State will prepare a circular telegram to all Latin American Ambassadors requesting that an immediate review of Country Team Emergency and Evacuation Plans be conducted to insure that plans were adequate to meet a stepped-up campaign of Castro-inspired sabotage.

Agenda Item 4

In lieu of a written report on the Honduran guerrilla problem, the DOD representative proposed a firsthand report to the Subcommittee. Colonel Walter Hutchins, who has recently returned from assignment as US Military Attache to Honduras, presented a review of the subversion situation in that country and then answered questions from the Subcommittee. The general thrust of Colonel Hutchins' remarks confirmed that there has been considerable Castro subversive activity in Honduras. The most serious inroads are achieved through communist radio and press and communist educators. Colonel Hutchins commented that recent guerrilla activity along the Nicaraguan border was probably limited to groups totaling between 100 and 200 men. He emphasized that Cuban-trained Honduran guerrillas are successfully transiting by air through Grand Cayman Island and British Honduras with some transiting Havana to Jamaica via Belgrade. In response to a query from a State representative, Colonel Hutchins pointed out that he believed that both Honduran military and commercial interests were genuinely concerned with Castro subversion and that some of their leaders were perfectly capable of discerning the true nature of the communist threat to Honduras.

Agenda Item 5

The Chairman stated that the paper for training Latin Americans in the United States (included in the "Krulak Report"*) was too broad in scope for implementation by the Subcommittee and proposed that it be rewritten under narrower parameters. In this regard, the Defense representative was requested to review pages 4, 5 and 6 of the paper on training contained in the report with the view toward bringing the Defense portion up-to-date.

Miscellaneous

The Chairman stated that preparatory actions on the Isthmian meeting at San Salvador tentatively scheduled for the second half of November would be held in abeyance pending further developments in the Honduran situation.

A. M. Haig, Lt Colonel, GS

*Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion containing a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin America.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion.

SUBJECT: Meeting of October 10.

You are invited to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs to be held on Thursday, October 10, at 2:30 P.M. in Room 6263, State Department (ARA Conference Room).

AGENDA

1. Consideration of draft of monthly report for September.
2. Discussion of letter (copy attached) from SCCS of Pan American Union.
3. Status of papers on contingency planning.
4. Report by DOD on Honduran guerrilla problem.
5. Consideration of the paper on training of Latin Americans in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
COMISIÓN ESPECIAL DE CONSULTA SOBRE SEGURIDAD
COMISSÃO CONSULTIVA ESPECIAL DE SEGURANÇA
COMMISSION SPÉCIALE DE CONSULTATION SUR LA SÉCURITÉ

PAN AMERICAN UNION
Washington 6, D.C., U.S.A.
Cable address: PAU WASH DC

October 1st., 1963

Sir:

As you know, the Special Consultative Committee on Security is presently holding the first of its regular meetings, in accordance with the statutes approved by the Council of the Organization on April 23 of this year.

For the better fulfillment of its work, and in accordance with Article 13 of these statutes, the Committee intends to request of the governments of the member states of the Organization any information that they may have regarding specific activities of international communism in this hemisphere.

Among the important activities of this kind are the trips that many individuals make to Cuba for well-know ulterior purposes. In this connection, I should greatly appreciate it if you would furnish the Committee with whatever information your government may deem it advisable to present regarding the trip that a large group of U.S. citizens recently made to Cuba at the invitation of that country's government, about which the Committee has learned through newspaper reports that have recently appeared in this country and in Latin America. This information would be treated with the confidence that your government deemed appropiate.

Thank you in advance for your valuable assistance in this matter.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez
Chairman
Special Consultative Committee
on Security

Mr. Ward P. Allen
Alternate Representative of the United States
Council of the Organization of American States
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OSA 353-CUBA

14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

10/14/63

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

FW 1/30/63

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

fil. (M)

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H FILE

SECRET REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

SECRET

This document consists of 18 pages
No 14 of 44 Copies, Series A

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963

IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
TOTALS	319	47	

Annex E

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST TO	AUGUST FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
TOTALS	104	214	

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10 APR 1962

CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

4 - 11 April 1962

OPERATIONAL

1. An internal leader of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) who was infiltrated into Cuba on 29 December 1961, and exfiltrated on 29 March 1962, said at a debriefing on 7 April that he considers only five clandestine resistance [redacted] organizations in Cuba of national importance: The Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (DRE), Movimiento Democrat~~a~~ica Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR), and the 30th of November [redacted] unit. Only these groups have the necessary motivation and discipline to [redacted] establish coordination among themselves. There are a large number of other underground revolutionary [redacted] units which claim to be of national importance but which ~~have~~ consist of no more than two or three dozen men at most and can be found only in the area where they were established. Most of the small [redacted] organizations appear to have been established by self-named leaders for personal reasons, financial gain through the sale of "bonds," or for future political opportunity [redacted] when Fidel Castro is overthrown. Although the small groups are relatively inactive, their claims to importance have attracted numerous dissidents who could be more useful if they were members of the few larger and more effective organizations. Because

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of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the geographic dispersion of the units, however, these small groups could never be effectively merged into a centrally directed larger ~~[illegible]~~ organization. To use them effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership ~~to~~ into controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harrassment while the larger groups work toward the major goals.

2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting on our objectives in Cuba. He is now in Havana from where he plans to travel to other areas in Cuba of interest to us.

3. The Chief of the Danish Intelligence Service has agreed to cooperate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified several sources aboard ships transitting Cuban ports and has arranged for their periodic briefing and debriefing.

4. The Norwegian Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperate with us in establishing case officer "centers" in Norway and Kiel, Germany, to handle Norwegian Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.

5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now in operation and results of the first interrogations are ~~[illegible]~~ being reviewed

for dissemination. The most interesting and informative refugee thus far is the brother of Amando Hart, the Cuban Minister of Education and member of the twenty-five man ORI Central Committee. The center is also collecting travel and personal documents which may be used for agent operations.

6. We received valuable data on Cuban trade from the debriefing of a former official of the Ministry of Commerce who defected in Canada at the end of March. We were informed in ~~had been advised during~~ February by CIA sources that this official was disaffected and wished to work against Castro. We contacted him and attempted unsuccessfully to induce him to return to Cuba as our agent. We have since expedited his travel to Miami where he is being interrogated.

7. We are in contact with Eva Matos, the sister of Huber Matos, former associate of Fidel Castro, who broke with Fidel and has been in jail on the Isle of Pines since 1960. Although there is no practical method of effecting the escape or release of Huber at present, we will continue contact with his sister, who maintains correspondence with Huber through his father and his wife who are in Cuba.

✓ A.G. good show overall on these per Bill H

CAC INFORMATION REPORTS

Following are highlights from selected interrogations of Cuban refugees processed through theCaribbean Admission Center (CAC) at

Opa-locka, Florida. This information is secured entirely from untrained observers and is presented partly as original unconfirmed data and partly as a supplement to intelligence already received from controlled reliable sources. All CAC information is screened for use in the daily and weekly Cuban summaries. During the past week [redacted] 1309 Cuban refugees were processed through Miami, ~~prepared~~ 263 preliminary interrogation reports were prepared and disseminated 135 information reports were

8. Numerous reports confirm that all towns have been partitioned into "blocks" infiltrated by communist informants under the direction of block chiefs of the "Comite de Defensa." Th~~e~~is informant system also [redacted] utilizes [redacted] data procured from the telephone monitoring switchboards established in the telephone centrals of every town. One refugee from the Cuban Telephone Company described a switchboard panel in the "Principe plant" in Havana which was monitoring "20 or 30 positions." These informants, their chiefs, members of the militia, G-2, "chivatos" (provocation agents), and other Castro supporters are now generally labeled by the populace as communists rather than Castroists.

9. While the network of informants protects the home front, officials of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) are increasingly occupied with the export of Castroist-communism to the Western Hemisphere. Flight manifests of Cubana Airlines show that "hundreds of Latin Americans are being brought to

Cuba for training and indoctrination." In addition to regular commercial transportation, charter flights to service these persons are being run thrice monthly throughout South America. In order to avoid Cuban visas and entry-exit stamps in their passports, these persons are given visas on a separate sheet of paper. In Cuba all arrangements are made for them by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).

10. Soviet military equipment has been reported in increasingly larger quantities and wider disbursement. One refugee said that he saw "20 or 25 wheel-mounted Soviet 100 mm field guns M-55 (identified from photographs) at a militia camp at Miranda near Camaguey.

11. Shortages of certain essential food items have resulted in widespread protests and, in a few instances, to open action by those directly affected. A group of "13 to 15 women" reportedly waylaid a milk truck, overpowered the driver, and each carried off two liters of milk.

12. Refugees described the existence of three resistance organizations, allegedly widespread in membership but limited in action. One, the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario Militar (MRRM) is a group which has broken away from the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR). Reportedly, its objective is to apprehend key Castro leaders "when the time is appropriate." MRRM is organized in all provinces except Matanzas and Camaguey where the movement has

now begun to develop a following. The second organization, the Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), is described as oriented along traditional Christian democratic lines. It is said to have a "national coordinator, a national executive, provincial, military and political coordinators, and resistance chiefs." They claim that military and counter-revolutionary activities have been limited because of lack of equipment. A third organization, the Unidad Revolucionario (UR), is reported to be carrying out the sabotage of sugar fields by burning, using a small incendiary device made of gelatin, match heads, potassium permanganate tablets, and glycerine.

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ARMS SHIPMENTS - TO
AND FROM CUBA

ARMS SHIPMENT

General: Arms smuggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin America and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many years. Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since shortly after his seizure of power early in 1959. None of these reports has ever been proven. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc arms in 1961, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace and made it a crime punishable by death to have possession of weapons of U.S. manufacture. The U.S. arms furnished under the MAP to former Cuban governments together with those collected by Castro provide the Castro government with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive groups in other countries. Identification of these arms with Cuba would be extremely difficult.

TAB

1 Reports of Method of Operation

This Tab contains five items: (1) Two reports alledging arms smuggling by fishermen and by means of food products shipped to Latin America; (2) A report which indicates that a Cuban arms cache discovered in Brazil is not of Cuban origin; and (3) Two reports concerning a Cuban arsenal purportedly being used to supply arms for an invasion of some Caribbean country or an invasion of South America.

2 Reports of Arms Smuggling

This Tab contains a number of items reporting arms smuggling to Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil. Note particularly the top item in which the British indicate the numerous reports on arms smuggling to British

Guiana are without foundation and the second item which refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article of 8 February.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Exporting Revolution

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,152

SUBJECT POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE 1962

REFERENCES IN 62553
35871

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 6

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER, FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.

1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.) AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR														REPCINCLANT		INS	EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL HAD BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED FROM CUBA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the Ligas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the Brazilian state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to be of Brazilian rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilian newspaper suggestion that they were Cuban. There were also discovered about 125 copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known treatise on "Guerrilla Warfare". The training center was described as organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries added that "members of the center want to be the Brazilian equivalent of those who fought in the Sierra Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities, but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL, and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Export of Rev.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

WH PW

COUNTRY	Cuba/USSR/Latin America
SUBJECT	1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats to Transport Arms to Latin America 2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana
DATE OF INFO.	Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; Para. 3: August 1962
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris; Para. 3: Spain, Madrid Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962; Para. 3: 12 October 1962

REPORT NO.	CS-3/530,898
DATE DISTR.	11 December 1962
NO. PAGES	1
REFERENCES	RD -W-2107 RD-ACQ-01258
FIELD REPORT NO.	38957

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1 & 2: An official French service; Para. 3: CC-1197, Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters, are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities. On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda and pamphlets containing military instructions, the same type of material being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.

2. A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm, has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an anti-Castro group in Habana.

3. In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that on several occasions he had been forced by the Government to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final destination of the men and arms.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #		COAST GUARD X										I&NS X				

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Export of Rev.

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CIA INFORMATION REPORT CS-3/532,138

COUNTRY: CUBA 26 December 1962

SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962

SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE XXXX SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.

THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE XXXX VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Stockpile of War Materiel for Latin America (C)

19 January 1962

1 of 1

None

Early January 1962

Habana, c/a 7 January 62
C-6
DUJ 316/36-6-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-43-62

1. Source reports an arsenal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca, a Habana District, northeast shore of Habana Bay, Habana Province.

2. Source has heard this materiel is targeted for an invasion of South America.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
INTERVALS NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms Cache

The Venezuelan Government -- in a raid on a small village near Caracas on 5 January -- uncovered a large cache of arms and equipment which it claims belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several tons of explosives and large quantities of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well as a nearby clandestine Communist radio transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS

ARMS SHIPMENTS

12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government and to the British authorities in British Guiana indicates that there is no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without foundation."

(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI).

SECRET

12 February 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Reported Arms Shipment from Cuba on 14 Jan 63

1. The 8 February 1963 edition of LIFE contains a story on Cuba with the following caption under the photo of a Russian freighter:

> "But refugees aboard the SHIRLEY LYKES said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana."

2. A debrief report of a Cuban national who arrived at Port Everglades on 25 January 1963 contained the following statement:

> "I was told by an assistant ship inspector for the Port of Havana that on 14 January 1963 two launches captained by a man with what appeared to be an Italian accent had departed from the La Coubre wharf (Havana). Manifest on ship indicated the destination was British Guiana. However, the ship inspector had been told by the stevedores at the wharf that two launches were loaded with arms and the true destination was Venezuela."

TD/00-K-3249336 DTG 281805Z

3. The following information may refer to this arms shipment. An untested CIA course, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali, has stated that during a conversation on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P.I. Plata, a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker - Student - Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Colombia and Venezuela, Plata said that the MOEC is not a local movement but rather a part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. (Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.)

CIA Report CS-3/5[illegible], dated 10 Jan 63 Ref RD-N-2107

5. Another report may also refer to this arms shipment. According to information dated 1 February 1963 from a CIA source and appraised by the CIA preparing office as possible true, Pedro MATOS, who together with the three-member regional command committee of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) in the state of Zulia is responsible for PCV arms matters in that state, said recently that the party is awaiting a shipment of arms from Cuba and Panama but that the exact date of arrival is still unknown.

CIA Report TDCS-3/536,942, dtd 9 Feb 63 Ref IN 64876

6. Replies to DIA SICR's on this subject from NSA and CNO do not indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 January bound for British Guiana, nor do State Department queries to Georgetown, British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arms. No reports have been received from service attaches in Venezuela or from sources in Panama concerning this particular matter.

Project Officer:
CDR Barton

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuba

s material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA / HONDURAS / COSTA RICA / CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/534,035

SUBJECT PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM CUBA IN HONDURAS

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

Export 2 Rev

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 50511

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HNM-729

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL (F) IN SAN JOSE, FROM CESAR AUGOSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS

ACTION COPY
OPERATIONS AREA

1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL COME FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIA.

2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES. GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.

3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 8112

FORM 5-62 1Kq OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL

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NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND DR. HERNAN SILVA ARGUELLO WHERE THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UNKNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.)

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 8112

END OF MESSAGE

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET 1963 FEB 9 11 41
(When Filled In)

WORKING COPY

NTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942

DIAAP-3

JECT POSSIBLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA

DATE DISTR. 9 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 64876

E OF
O. 1 FEBRUARY 1963

CE &
DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651

PRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

URCE A MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.

1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS
IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF
ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL
UNKNOWN. SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN
ONLY TO MATOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
AREA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ, TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
AND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO,
ARE SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

GROUP
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

AAP-3

FORM 1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WORKING COPY

OMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY 3 '63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC, CONAD, AFSC, MATS (per req Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) K/eld

ACTION: CIN-17 (18)

A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15
OSD/SDLU-1, STATE-15, CIA-11, NSA-7
XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (112) (Rlsd by Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

RC 41/24 FEB 62
RQ/RQ/RQ
PRIORITY
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FM USAIRA MEXICO CITY
TO CSAF WASH DC
1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA //PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT

CONFIDENTIAL XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS PARA MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED EITHER SANTIAGO DE CUBA OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH SEVEN FIVE DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE TO ONE SEVEN FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH THREE

BT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR. 5200.10

ACTION: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, ORD
DA IN 205836

AFHQ FORM NOV 50 0-309a
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington and the Governor of British Guiana that two alleged US citizens, John Allram Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson, were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TANAMA destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17 cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be "very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship in Santiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of US citizens' leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/British Guiana	REPORT NO.	00- K-3,210,102
SUBJECT	Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana	DATE DISTR.	21 Feb 62
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE OF INFO.	Dec 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--; Dec 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962. Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 02147

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FEB 6 10 16 AM '63

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Origin
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ACTION: Amembassy GEORGETOWN 286

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING
TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER
WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO

The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following caption under photo of Russian freighter:

QUOTE

But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE

Would appreciate any available comment.

END

RUSK

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS
DA IN 827722

Drafted by: EUR:BNA:RTepper:cjk 2/5/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ~~BNA - Mr. Knox~~

Clearances:

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FORM 8-61 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

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Control: 4682
Rec'd: February 7, 1963
12:57 PM

FROM: Georgetown

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 245, February 7, NOON

Reference: Department's 286 February 6.

Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having received any notice recently. Governor also reports negative results his inquiries.

CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI 18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press) Department can give.

MELBY

TEK/18

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PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E

(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED. A SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

7 FEB 749P FG/OP

04289

Cuba

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ C GE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 9 11 17 AM '63

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ACTION: AmConGen GEORGETOWN 293

1963 FEB 11 14 04

DIA-3

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Info:
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UrTel 245

Washington ~~investigation~~ intelligence agencies have no information to confirm alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.

~~Sux~~ Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG. O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.

If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have no information but are making inquiries.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EUR:BNA:RJTepper:ldd 2/8/63	EUR/BNA - M. Gordon Knox

Clearances:
INR - Mr. Packman
EUR/P - Mr. McGowan
INR/CS - Mr. Simmons
~~ARAxxMrxxSmee~~
CCA - Mr. Follestad

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FORM 8-61 DS-322

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY British Guiana/Cuba

REPORT NO. 00-B-3,247,344

SUBJECT Jagan's Political-Economic Viewpoints/Expropriation of Foreign Properties Linked to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagan's 5-Year Plan/Peoples Progressive Party Infiltration of United Front/Arms Smuggling from Cuba/Filariasis Disease Common in Guiana Back Country.

DATE DISTR. 11 Jan 63

NO. PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. Thru Oct 62

PLACE & DATE ACQ. British Guiana/Thru Oct 62

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, executive in a US aluminum company.

Source has frequently traveled to and within British Guiana in connection with geological surveys for his company. He has known Jagan for about nine years, and on his latest trip had several conversations with Jagan.

1. On the basis of many conversations with Cheddi Jagan (mostly concerning possible investments by my company in British Guiana), I am convinced that he is not a Communist. In fact, Jagan does not know what he is. He is simply looking for anything new that will help to pull up his people quickly. In this context he sees Soviet and Chinese Communism as the two principal Twentieth Century economic experiments -- and as economic experiments he is willing to try them.

2. In talking with me, Jagan has made clear that he is not a "Castro Type." He wants help from anybody. The one thing that might in the future seriously hinder his getting economic aid from the USSR is that he demands that aid be without strings.

3. Both Jagan and his Trade Minister, Frank Hubbard, have told me that Jagan would hesitate to do anything (such as confiscating foreign properties in an attempt to increase revenues) which would offend the US or the UN for fear of ruining any future chances of obtaining US or UN aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that he is still under the UK and that it is therefore unconstitutional for him to expropriate anything. After British Guiana achieves independence, I am confident Jagan would not expropriate anything if he is getting aid from the US or the UN -- that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence) Jagan is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this somewhat depressing estimate of Jagan by commenting that in 1953 when he entered office, he was something of a wild-eyed fanatic without direction. Since then he has matured considerably.

W Hennes

4. The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of British Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiscriminately wants all kinds of factories. His "Five Year Plan" is no plan at all. In his eagerness to do something for British Guiana, Jagan thinks he ought to build any kind of factory that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he just tells a subordinate to add it to the Plan. But there is no one in the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing research, etc., which is necessary for any such investment.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

CONTROLLED NO DISSEM ABROAD NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5. In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party (UFP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular that democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact that the UFP membership was "growing," it was "obvious" that Jagan was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Guianese who were working for Jagan.

6. I was in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip. Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that arms were being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He did not go into any detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought arms into their home, kept them for a while, and then disposed of them. The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.

7. Malaria is not a factor now. Even well into the interior there is less than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the daytime were harmless but mosquito bites at night would infect with filariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him. The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not exactly encouraging. I never did understand why, but my doctor said that to be effective in detecting the disease a blood test must be made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.), and analyzed quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual prowess can be saved. We found that the disease is very common throughout the country.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/British Guiana	REPORT NO.	00- K-3,210,102
SUBJECT	Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana	DATE DISTR.	21 Feb 62
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE OF INFO.	Dec 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--; Dec 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.

Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

There is little information available on the Castro/Communist communication network with Latin America. Over the past years there are numerous reports indicating that communications are carried by visitors to and from Cuba, that Cuban Embassies serve as communication points for Castro/Communist subversive groups in various countries, and that directions to subversive groups are transmitted by clandestine radio transmitters in Cuba. Preceding items on radio propaganda and propaganda shipments, arms shipments, and the training of personnel in Cuba are closely related to communications. Information on Communist organizations and the Communist apparatus also are related to the question of communication.

There have been some references to instructions from Cuba; however, such evidence is not available and copies of those documents made available in the past would not withstand scrutiny.

TAB

1 Electronic Communications

This Tab contains three items: (1) A general comment on electrical communications; (2) An item indicating the use of amateur radio stations for communications; and (3) A report of a clandestine receiving station in the Dominican Republic.

2 Documents

This Tab contains an item referring to documents obtained from the plane crash in Peru. Initially, the Peruvian press and Peruvian officials indicated these documents proved Castro/Communist sponsorship of a revolution in Brazil; however, the Brazilian Government has not taken public note of the document.

3 Couriers

This Tab contains illustrative reports of travellers to and from Cuba who may act as couriers. This item is closely related to information on individuals and groups travelling to Cuba for training or propaganda.

1

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

There are numerous reports of a highly classified nature concerning electronics communications between Cuba and the Bloc, within Cuba, and between Cuba and Latin America. Some reports infer that Prensa Latina facilities may be used for other than news purposes and there are frequent reports of clandestine radio instructions to Latin America from Cuba and between clandestine stations in Latin America.

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Central "Ham" Radio Transmitting Station,
Rancho Boyeros Airport, Habana Province (C)

30 January 1962

1 of 1

None

19-20 January 1962

Rancho Boyeros, Jan 62
C-3
DUJ 316/37-1-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-39-62

1. Sub-Source reports that the Government of Cuba had planned to inaugurate a in amateur radio transmitting station at the Rancho Boyeros Airport, south of Habana City, on the 19th or 20th of January 1962.

2. The purpose of the station was to be communication between Cuba and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on the 9077 frequency.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
INTERVALS NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

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OPNS BRANCH

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Dominican Republic/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/535,788
SUBJECT	Clandestine Radio Receiving Station in Santo Domingo	DATE DISTR.	1 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	22 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo 22 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HDC-553

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.

One of the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle Espaillat 56. The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician's repair shop there.

Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu) is probably identifiable with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Communist member of the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS-3/511,814, of 24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from an official British service, which reports on a clandestine group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo..

2

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The CIA station in Rio de Janeiro has reported that some efforts may be made to put pressure on President Goulart to publicly take some note of the Cuban intervention in Brazil's internal affairs, allegedly shown by some 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the Varig plane crash which carried a Cuban delegation to their deaths in November. The documents are considered by a Brazilian source who made them available to the CIA station to be "explosive, since they prove the Cubans are sponsoring revolution in Brazil." Paraphrases of these documents have appeared in the Lima press; but it is unlikely that President Goulart will give any support to publicizing them. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, 2 January, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

3

2-1123

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Paraguay/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,454
SUBJECT	Paraguayan Travelers to and From Cuba	DATE DISTR.	7 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	December 1962 - 20 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paraguay, Asuncion (24 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HYA-833

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of the Paraguayan Communist Party (C). Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partido Comunista Paraguayo (PCP - Paraguayan Communist Party) in Paraguay,[1] met with five rural leaders of the PCP from the areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, and Guarambare. These leaders received political instructions from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive military and political training in rural organization. Lopez (fnu)[2] is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Acosta[3] is the leader from Tebycuarymi.

2. Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy, entered Paraguay from Cuba in the first half of December to assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacion Nacional (FULNA - United Front for National Liberation).

3. Anibal Garcete[4] has returned to Paraguay from Cuba to organize the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading as a member of the Colorado Party.

1. Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a person whose true name is unknown.

Source Comments

2. Lopez was born about 1937.

3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time member of the PCP.

5
4

[illegible] Comment. Wigberto Acosta was reported in June 1960 [illegible] have been a PCP member active in the labor dispute in the Tabycuarymi area involving the sugar cane worker's demand for higher salaries.

4. Source Comment. [illegible] was mentioned in confidential PCP correspondence [illegible] which time he was an officer in the Federation of Sugar Cane Workers.

On 4 December Brazilian President Goulart telephoned General Alves, commander of the First Army with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and the highest ranking extreme leftist in the Brazilian armed forces. He told Alves to choose four or five junior officers of his absolute confidence to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba via Bolivia. Goulart said the people were coming with "much material." (CIA, Sao Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SECRET NOFORN)

Eight Dominican pro-Castro leaders were aboard the Czech airlines flight to Cuba which transited Shannon Airport on 14 December, according to an official Irish service. The Dominicans included Maximo Lopez Molina, Tomas Parmenio Erickson, and Gustavo Ricart, leaders of the outlawed Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), one of the most active pro-Communist groups in the Dominican Republic. The eight Dominicans were among the ten who were deported from the Dominican Republic to France earlier this year. Another source reported last November that the Cuban ambassador in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dominican deportees to discuss helping them travel to Cuba without passports. (CIA Dublin, TDCS-3/531,991, 21 December, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Premier Castro is to deliver the closing speech at the Congress of Women of the Americas on 15 January in Havana. Havana Radio announced that the congress, scheduled to begin 11 January, will be attended by more than 200 delegates from Latin America, the U. S., and Canada, as well as by guests from many other non-American countries. Delegations from Communist China, Albania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 January. (FBIS 03 and 51, 10 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

SABOTAGE

SABOTAGE

A number of acts of sabotage have been committed in various Latin American states. There is no conclusive evidence available to link these acts of sabotage with the Castro/Communist apparatus.

Portions on training indicate that sabotage is being taught to trainees in Cuba.

TAB

1 Reports of Sabotage

This Tab contains four items: (1) A report that Cuba is training personnel for sabotage missions in the U.S.; (2) A report that Dominicans are leaving Cuba to sabotage cane fields in the Dominican Republic; (3) A report on the controversial sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela. (Not substantiated by evidence available to the U.S.); and (4) Report of an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a bridge in Venezuela.

2 Terrorist Activities

This Tab contains an item reporting Castro/Communist inspired terrorist activities in Venezuela linked to the Maracaibo sabotage.

1

An expert Cuban electrical technician in the Borjita sugar mill has told a former close associate who is now a regular clandestine source that Cuba is training personnel in the techniques of using explosives prior to sending them to the United States on sabotage missions. It is intended that such persons will go in the guise of anti-Communist refugees, and the sabotage will be so arranged that in some cases it will be taken to be merely accidents. The electrical technician added that there is a large Communist espionage ring operating with a ring in the United States across the border, with several plans already under way. (CIA DDP IN 29517, 4 December, SECRET NOFORN)

A Dominican exile in Cuba reportedly told a source who was there about mid-December that Dominican Communists are leaving Cuba for the Dominican Republic to sabotage the cane fields there. (CIA, Panama City, IN 48599, 11 January, SECRET NOFORN)

COMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

42-41 [illegible] 45 CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 1171
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
11:29 P.M.

Action
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Info
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[illegible]

FROM: CARACAS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.

NIACT

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT

FOREIGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS ME HE WILL ARRIVE WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.

HE WILL PRESENT INTERCEPTED CABLE TO VENEZUELAN STUDENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH HE HOPES OBTAIN FROM INTERIOR MINISTRY. HE ASKS IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE HIM SUNDAY AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WITH TRANSCRIPT RAUL CASTRO'S STATEMENT AFTER MARACAIBO SABOTAGE IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS INTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.

FALCON'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAILABLE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES. HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.

STEWART

SMD

NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT 11/4/62.
MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
12:10 A.M., 11/4/62 TEM.

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,176

SUBJECT CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

DATE DISTR. 13 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 8 AND 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67419

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2655

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD; PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY.

1. ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PROTECTING THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE ENTRANCE TO TUNNEL NUMBER 1 WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY TURNPIKE BRIDGE NUMBER 1. FIRE WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER A BOX CONTAINING ABOUT 100 POUNDS OF DYNAMITE WAS FOUND BELOW THE BRIDGE.

2. TWO CAR LOADS OF GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS AT DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY, IN THE PARAGUANA PENINSULA AND LAKE MARACAIBO, STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA, ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 100 SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE GUERILLAS ESCAPED.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

DA IN 16985

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)
5-63

3. (FIELD COMMENT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN VENEZUELA. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY POSSESION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE LOS ALTOS, ABOUT 20 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE POLICEMEN ON GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED THE WALLS WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS. ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED IN A WELL-TO-DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING ROAD BLOCKS AND SENDING TROOPS AND POLICE INTO THE AREA. ON THE MORNING OF 9 FEB AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION GARBLED WILL FWD) * WHERE OFFICES WERE SET ON FIRE AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED, AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY MEMBERS OF THE FALN. THREE BRIDGES ON THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE DAMAGED BY BOMBS ON 12 FEB AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON THAT DAY TO BLOW UP A CREOLE OIL LINE IN CATIA LA MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES).

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

* 5. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOPS
000
DA IN 16985

2

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of northwestern Venezuela.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
FOR LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Information on the Communist apparatus for Latin America and its relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc is largely derived from highly classified intelligence which is provided separately. From the reports contained in this section, it may be concluded that the organizational links vary from country to country depending upon, among other factors, the legal status of the Communist party, whether diplomatic representation is located in a country, the relative strength of Communist alliances with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of current government leadership in these countries. Next attached is an unclassified report prepared in October for release as a White Paper. Although this paper was not released due to the missile crisis, it represents an agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communist apparatus in Latin America. The report contains briefs on Communist activities in each of the Latin American countries.

The reports vary with respect to the country priority for Castro/Communist action in Latin America. Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guiana are mentioned most frequently as the likely priority targets. There are also conflicting reports on the relative independence of Castro from the Soviet Union and indications that the publicized Sino Soviet disagreements are reflected in local Communist organizations throughout Latin America.

TAB 1 Cuban Relationships and Policies Toward Latin America

This tab contains relevant excerpts from the draft NIE now under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this item and the most current agreed positions will be made available to you in the event there is any significant change.) Also included at this tab are a number of significant reports indicating the probable orientation of Castro/Communist actions directed toward Latin America. The last item at this tab summarizes the unsuccessful armed incursions of 1959 (Panama, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic).

TAB 2 Soviet Activities and Conflicts

This tab contains a number of items indicating possible Cuban-Soviet conflicts as reflected in Latin America. The last two items reflect the concern attached to the possible establishment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba.

TAB 3 Situation in Latin America

This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent background reports on various Latin American countries in the following order: Central America, Panama and Mexico; Bolivia; Brazil (4); Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico; Panama; Peru (4); and Venezuela (3).

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Subversion in Other Latin American Countries

I. General Summary

1. The Castro regime denies that material support is being given any anti-regime group outside Cuba. Castro claims that such assistance is unnecessary since the people of these countries, thanks to Cuba's example, are becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. The publicly stated position of the Cuban leaders is that their country, "the first socialist state in America," has become the example, the "beacon". In fact, however, Cuba's moral and material support to Communist and Communist-influenced groups has been felt in varying degrees in every one of the 19 other Latin American republics. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet effort to weaken and eventually destroy democratic political institutions in Latin America.

2. Cuban subversion has become more subtle since 1959, when a Cuban-mounted expeditionary force was launched against the Dominican Republic and smaller "invasion forces" left Cuba for abortive attacks on the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Now Cuban subversive efforts generally fall in three categories:

a. The indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba;

b. The intensive propaganda beamed at Latin America by Cuban radio stations and circulated through printed material and the Cuban-subsidized international "news" agency, and;

c. The covert material support given subversive groups in other countries.

II. Cuban Subversive Programs

A. Training of Latin Americans in Cuba:

3. Fidel Castro announced on 9 June 1961 that his government would grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. Hundreds of young Latin Americans have been subjected to Communist indoctrination. In addition to whatever formal training they receive in Cuba, many of them receive training in guerrilla warfare and other techniques of revolution.

4. Cuban refugees who have arrived recently in the United States have provided detailed information on the training programs offered to some of these young Latin Americans.

a. One refugee, a deserter from Castro's army, reported from personal knowledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students from Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil living in a Havana suburb who regularly attended classes in Marxism-Leninism, propaganda techniques, and other subjects to prepare them for active revolutionary roles in their homelands. He reported that those male students who were between 16 and 20 years of age were sent as part of their training to the Minas del Frio training center in Oriente province. During this phase of their training they received familiarization in the use of small arms and hiked to the top of Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino, in the Sierra Maestra, the locale of Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista dictatorship.

b. Another refugee, who lived in Oriente province, learned from conversations with militia-men in the area and from Latin Americans training there that continuous training of students from other Latin American countries is going on at Las Arenas, Oriente. The trainees receive instruction in military tactics, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and Communist ideology. The refugee did not know how many Latin Americans were involved, but believed the duration of each course was about eight weeks, after which another group replaced the one that had been training.

5. Much of the travel of Latin American students to Cuba for training and indoctrination is handled by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP - Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples).

6. Cuba is also a major takeoff point for Latin Americans traveling to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Over 400 Latin Americans returned from last July's Communist-sponsored Youth Festival in Helsinki aboard a Soviet passenger vessel with the 400-man Cuban delegation. They disembarked in Havana and stayed in Cuba some weeks before some of them began returning to their home countries. Others may well be remaining in Cuba for some time.

B. Cuban Propaganda:

7. International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all of Latin America. The general theme of all these broadcasts is that "the Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them.

8. There are regular programs beamed by Havana radio to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Honduras. They are all subversive in content and frequently incite to rebellion. These programs to specific countries are apparently directed and produced with the guidance of exiles from the countries concerned resident in Cuba.

9. The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is announced as the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program is entitled Patria Libre. At present, Radio Havana beams the 20 minute Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays. Just prior to the program, the Radio Havana announcer explains that the station is making its facilities available to the MLD for its program. There are some areas in the Dominican Republic where, due to the absence of local radio stations, the Cuban broadcasts are the only ones heard. Last July, the subversive content of these broadcasts to the Dominican Republic led the Dominican government to protest to the Organization of American States.

10. The content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals of the "Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the program which is regularly beamed by Radio Havana to Nicaragua. On 31 August this program celebrated its first anniversary by repeating its original statement of its purposes:

> "The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua has set itself the goal of contributing to pointing out the real way to Nicaragua's liberation from the dominion of Yankee imperialism and the Somoza tyranny. Elections (scheduled for next February to choose President Somoza's successor) with the Somozas in power, and under the State Department's economic and political control of Nicaragua, will be a farce. Without. . a prior revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza tyranny there can be no free elections in Nicaragua nor can a popular government be established. This program will be at the service of the revolutionaries and against the electioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua will defend the Cuban revolution because it is an important part of the Latin American people's liberating revolution."

11. Cuban propaganda is also disseminated through the offices of Presna Latina, the Cuban-subsidized international "news agency" which has close working relations with TASS, the New China News Agency, and other propaganda media for the Sino-Soviet bloc.

12. Cuban printed material is circulated throughout the hemisphere; Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare has received wide distribution. Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, has been obliged to confiscate large quantities of propanganda materials from Latin Americans passing through that country enroute from Cuba to their homelands.

C. Cuban covert support for subversive groups:

13. Cuban covert support for Communist or pro-Communist groups in other Latin American countries is provided in a number of ways. In the five Latin American countries where Cuban diplomatic missions are still resident (Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), these missions have often been the channel. The Cuban embassy in Mexico is known to have provided

frequent assistance to exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other Central American countries living in Mexico. In other instances, assistance is provided through travelers coming from Cuba and through Prensa Latina representatives.

14. The assistance is usually financial. The Cubans appear to have been careful since 1959 to avoid being caught in a blatant act of subversion that could be used to justify concerted inter-American action. Financial assistance is often just as useful and much less risky than actual weapons deliveries. In a number of American countries, small arms and other weapons are available for a price. Unscrupulous or careless arms dealers in the US have also contributed to the arms traffic from which pro-Castro groups have benefitted, directly or indirectly.

15. As the following country-by-country rundown indicates, Cuban support for subversive activity has affected in varying degrees every one of the 19 other Latin American countries.

a. Argentina: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine by birth, has retained his deep interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May, the Argentine national holiday, he addressed the group of Argentine citizens resident in Cuba and told them that he hoped that next year they would be celebrating in Argentina under "the flag of socialism." At another point in this address he said: "Our revolution is one which needs to expand its ideas...and other people are helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere get angry and take up arms or seize power and aid us in this task which is the task of the entire hemisphere and of humanity."

The Argentine community in Cuba last April organized the "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" with headquarters in Havana. One of the leaders is John William Cooke, who was for a time chief of former Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke continues active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action with the Argentine Communists. Cooke maintains regular contact with sympathizers inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife, Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently has regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. Argentine citizens have been recruited through this channel to go to Cuba for training. There are also strong indications that terrorist activities by Argentine Peronists and Communists have been encouraged and perhaps assisted through this channel.

Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba last February, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance to anti-government groups there. An Argentine journalist who has contacts in the Communist party there reported last December, for instance, that the Argentine Communist party had received the sum of 50,000 pesos from the Cuban embassy as a contribution to the railway workers who were then on strike in the province of Cordoba.

Though the Cuban embassy is no longer in Buenos Aires, Cuban clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist groups continues. On 19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Aires reported the unearthing of a center of Communist and Peronist activities in the capital. Two Buenos Aires policemen were shot and killed at a surburban warehouse in June. Investigations revealed that a quantity of explosives and propaganda were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of one Jose Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and one Mario Massi, owner of the firm which owned the warehouse. It was revealed that Massi had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with John William Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated with the Cuban embassy in Uruguay who was probably Alicia Eguren de Cooke referred to above. According to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citizens had been sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in guerrilla warfare. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used in planned activities in the provinces of Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and the wooded areas of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were apprehended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity revealed in these investigations.

b. Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuban attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "scholarships" in Cuba this year--between 130 and 150-- appears disproportionately high. The Bolivian government felt obliged to request the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Garcia Trians in 1961 for blatant intervention in internal Bolivian affairs, including support for Bolivian Communists and attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR party to leave the party. In June 1961, the Bolivian government published a series of documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy, gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support from the Cuban embassy. This evidence was used to justify the request for the Cuban charge's recall.

The present Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, has also been active though perhaps a bit more discreet than his predecessors. He has been particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos. The peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia has been reported to be the recipient of Cuban financial assistance.

c. Brazil: During the past two years the Castro regime has developed increasingly close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in the troubled northeast region of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cuba, has traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank-and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cuba for agricultural training which is undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination. Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cuba has been provided by Cubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Juliao has received financial assistance for his movement from the Cuban government. Brazilian Communist leaders have privately stated, in fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but also shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communist leaders also said that the reason Juliao sent his family to Cuba was his fear that they might be endangered in the civil war he expects to erupt shortly in Brazil.

The Cuban government has also during the past year cultivated particularly close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who had visited Cuba last May told a friend of a long conversation he had had with Fidel Castro in late May. Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian Communists and criticized the regular Communist party for its failure "to take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the 22nd party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Castro approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil "as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only to increase popular discontent in Brazil and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing as wide a base as possible among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.

The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro, like Cuban embassies elsewhere in Latin America, has been a source of assistance to Communist and pro-Communist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported discussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed by Cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are reported to have expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.

d. Chile: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated popular front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba.

The Cuban embassy in Santiago is the source of propaganda support for pro-Communist groups, mostly those associated with Allende, who are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution. Orlando Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban embassy, is known to be supervising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in the home of Julio Bocanegra, who also prints propaganda for the Chilean Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long ago as August, 1961, Chilean officials investigating political agitation and resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the area by a Cuban diplomat the previous month, pro-Cuban propaganda was being distributed in the area, and Communists and pro-Communists there were saying "The mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra."

Last March, when Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference he took with him several sacks of propaganda.

e. Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), organized early this year by Colombian extremists, is believed to have received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of creating a guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Colombian citizen who has contacts among FUAR members reported last June that Fidel Castro had just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader and the daughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in 1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time personal friend of Fidel Castro. He has visited Cuba frequently and probably returns to Colombia with specific advice and assistance from the Cuban government. The FUAR has succeeded in drawing members from the extremist wing of the regular Colombian Communist party who are dissatisfied with that party's reluctance to engage in ipen revolutionary action.

f. Costa Rica: The small Costa Rican Communist party, the Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the selection of young men to be trained in Cuba. Riboberto Carmona and Jose Murillo, PVP members, left Costa Rica last June for training under this program, and PVP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla training programs in Costa Rica under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training in Cuba.

g. The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State, which is preparing the country for its first free elections this December in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuban subversion. A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine contact is probably maintained with sympathizers inside the Donimican Republic. Broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo. The fact that broadcasts from Cuba have on occasion referred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly suggests the presence of clandestine radio contacts between the two countries.

h. Ecuador: The Communist party of Ecuador has formed the nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was involved in a two-day battle with government forces last April. The leader of the April affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in subversive activities, has received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader told a friend last June that this organization has so far in 1962 received $22,000 in financial aid from the Cuban government.

Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Communist China, appears to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban government for his efforts, according to a private statement by the URJE leader.

i. El Salvador: On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran government broke relations with the Castro regime after it had received evidence of conversation between the Cuban charge, Roberto Lassalle, and leading Salvadoran Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity.

j. Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuban arrived in Mexico with a message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Communist-influenced

13 November group, which had recently engaged in guerrilla activity in Guatemala. The Cuban gave him $4,000 which he said was the first installment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilla front in Guatemala. On 8 March, Castro's emissary gave the Guatemalans the balance of the $10,000 and told one of the 13 November leaders that the decision to provide them with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro, he said, had sent instructions that the group did not have to account for how the money was spent, that no strings were attached, and that he hopes they are successful so he can provide them with additional assistance.. Later the Cuban emissary met with leaders in Mexico of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist party. These Guatemalan Communists had apparently complained that the Cuban money was not going to them. They were told that Castro wanted the money to go to the 13 November group because this group had demonstrated its capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, a capacity which the Guatemalan Communists had not shown. The Cuban said: "It is not a matter of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place--- We should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism. Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against imperialism anywhere."

Cuban propaganda media have sought through publicizing the activities of the 13 November group to increase its prestige and chances for success. A Prensa Latina reporter published an alleged interview with 13 November leader Yon Sosa.

k. Haiti: A cadre of Haitian Communists led by Rene Depestre is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are now being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.

l. Honduras: Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of Honduras. Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" program.

m. Mexico: The Cuban embassy in Mexico City, the consulate in Merida, and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have all g engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-communist cause in Mexico, particularly the Communist-influenced National Liberation Movement (MLN). Former Cuban ambassador in Mexico Portuondo is reported by people in close contact with MLN leaders to have concluded an agreement whereby some of the money sent by Havana to cover the expense of the embassy is earmarked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican authorities have periodically impounded quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through Mexico to other Latin American countries. The most important aspect of Mexico in Cuban propaganda and subversive operations in Latin America is its use by the Cubans as a way station or jumping off place between Cuba itself and the rest of Latin America.

n. Nicaragua: A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba. Contact between them and pro-Castro Nicaraguans in Nicaragua and in exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is maintained at least on a sporadic basis. A number of Nicaraguans periodically have traveled to Cuba and some have received training there in guerrilla tactics. Reliable reports indicate that some of these Cuba-trained Nicaraguans have been among the small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua across the largely unguarded Hondruan border. The Nicaraguan government is the target of a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as the program of "free Nicaraguans."

o. Panama: Cuban financial assistance is believed to be channeled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama. One of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is a frequent traveler to Cuba and claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.

p. Paraguay: Paraguayan exiles in Uruguay and Brazil have received Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), a Communist Paraguayan exile group in Uruguay, receive the equivalent of $230 monthly each from the Cuban embassy in Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro activities in Uruguay, according to a Paraguayan exile in Uruguay who is in close touch with FULNA.

q. Peru: At least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba by way of Mexico last June to receive training and indoctrination in that country. Other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long been in Cuba and a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program is beamed to Peru.

r. Uruguay: The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been engaged in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan government was obliged to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for intervening in internal Uruguayan affairs.

s. Venezuela: The Castro regime has been extremely vitriolic in its propaganda blasts against the Betancourt administration in Venezuela. Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant opposition Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which is attempting to develop a guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the aid of its ally, the regular Venezuelan Communist party. While there is little evidence to indicate direct Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the leading figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, are known to have traveled to Cuba, where they probably received financial and other assistance in addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities.

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SECRET

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

Policies Toward Latin America

42. Here Castro has more capability for independent action than in any other field except the internal politics of Cuba. Castro is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that a successful revolution in another Latin American country would give great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also consolidate his own regime in Cuba. In trying to foment insurrections, he apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct military assistance to them, nor does he seem to consider it important whether he has or has not Soviet support. For the Soviets, however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confrontation with the US.

SECRET

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

18. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a scale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

31. The decline of his prestige has at least for the moment reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and moving them into action against their own governments and against US interests. Local *fidelistas* have encountered greater difficulty in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations on other than local issues.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

32. Nonetheless, Castro continues his appeal for revolution in Latin America on the Cuban model. Those Latin Americans who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. Communist agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas, as they have done in Peru recently. In addition, there has been an increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists, of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet designed to provoke drastic countermeasures by governments and to increase popular anti-government sentiment. These widespread activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communists to engage in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castro-s prestige or upon their opinion of his doctrines and policies.

Che Guevara's mother, who lives in Argentina, told a clandestine source in mid-December that during her recent visit to Cuba her son told her that Cuban leaders now feel they will have to rely more and more on their own efforts to promote Communist penetration in South America. Guerrillas will be used on a large scale after they have received training in Cuba, Guevara said. He explained to his mother that this is necessary since both he and Castro feel Khrushchev "let them down" and has no further interest in spreading Communism in South America. Guevara added that he and Castro believe they and the Chinese are better Communists than Khrushchev. (CIA DD/P Buenos Aires, 19 December, SECRET)

Comment: This report is consistent with recent public speeches by Guevara which have emphasized the important role of Cuba with respect to the "anti-imperialist revolution" in Latin America. (SECRET)

CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome

Translation of report dated 6 Dec 62 from Italian Embassy Havana to Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that/he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so."

SECRET (NOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)

A relative of a leading Communist in Cuba (who has previously given reliable advance information of important developments) expressed the opinion on 30 November that there will be revolts in Caribbean countries which will masquerade as "national revolutions" so as to negate the accusation of Cuban complicity. In fact, however, these revolutions will be directed from Cuba through revolutionaries from various countries who are now being trained in Cuba. (CIA DD/P IN 48717, 12 January, SECRET)

Comment: This points up what is probably the most effective means of Cuban subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Latin Americans in Cuba. (SECRET)

The recent spate of public addresses by leading Cuban officials on the subject of insurrection in other Latin American countries reflects a more aggressive stance than prior to the "missile crisis" and suggests that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive groups in other Latin American countries may be under discussion within the inner circle of Cuban leaders.

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart have been in the forefront since late November in publicly expressing the view that the only road to the "liberation" of the Latin American peoples is the road of insurrection. Fidel Castro's earlier public line had been to deny the necessity for Cuba to "export" its revolution; Cuba's "example" was sufficient. This line is given only perfunctory attention in the recent Guevara and Hart speeches. The line emerging in these speeches appears even stronger than that espoused in the "Second Declaration of Havana" promulgated last February which suggested that in certain circumstances Communist-dominated coalitions could come to power by peaceful means. The whole tenor of the recent speeches suggests that Cuba intends to provide every assistance within its means to Latin American insurgents. The attention given in the Cuban press to developments in Venezuela in recent weeks strongly suggests a more than academic interest in developments there.

Canadian Ambassador Kidd, speculating on the "Trotsky-like dedication to permanent revolution" apparent in a 21 November speech by Armando Hart, commented that Cuban leaders may be attempting to counter "the humiliation of the withdrawal of the Russian missiles" by making renewed efforts to "light revolutionary fires in neighboring countries." (Comment on: Canadian Embassy, Havana, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SUPPLEMENT

THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA

Despite diminished prestige, especially among government leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide subversive activities throughout Latin America.

The degree to which Cuba is involved in current hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and Communists of various Latin American countries, however, have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to 1,500 are believed to have received intensive education and training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Significant representation has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups, but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial support are reliably reported to have been furnished.

Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency for open rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca, Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are among those calling for revolutionary violence. The "Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high priority. The use of the Prensa Latina organization and the agent network already in existence makes it virtually sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities.

Latin American governments are generally now more alert to Castro's threat. Inadequate security forces and widespread poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain that Cuban-supported insurgency will have an effect out of proportion to the number of people involved.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuban Developments

Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban speakers are emphasizing the same theme. Che Guevara told a group of Central American delegates in Havana recently that they must prepare for simultaneous revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution. Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January, praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban support for the struggle of the people against the Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge of Communist activity there.

(EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED AUG 1960)

1. Armed Incursions.

No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of the Dominican Republic, following closely upon one another in the spring and summer of 1959 are still fresh. Support of Cuban officials for military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the American Republics that international tensions in the Caribbean area, to which Cuba had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States was necessary.

The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 concluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion, organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuban Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would take the necessary preventive measures.

In connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in June, 1959, and the individuals organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence which came to light demonstrated Cuban officials support in the form of arms and financial contributions.

Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.

Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile, a report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Haitian Government after the Santiago meeting expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the 1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban

Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attaches, in the attempt to overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in Cuba and all but one of the participants were Cubans, conveniently disavowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.

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EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

33. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro-s policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which are committed to a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has shown himself willing to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the latter resent such tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against Castro. It seems likely that the question of relations with other Latin American Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics, is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

29. ... Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion has tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and *fidelistas.*

Panamanian Communist Party (PDP) leader Ruperto Thomas' recent trip to Cuba was evidently an effort to persuade Castro to support the PDP rather than the more activist Panamanian pro-Communist VAN group. When he returned to Panama on 14 December, Thomas reportedly said that Jorge Turner, who also went to Havana in September and has not returned, and other VAN leaders are still campaigning against the PDP in Cuba. However, the Cubans claim to have told VAN leaders they must cooperate with the PDP to get Castro support.

The Castro government seems consistently to favor the VAN with funds and international trips. The Cubans may distrust the PDP's poor organization and believe VAN charges that the PDP is infiltrated. However, the VAN is a rather unstable group and the Cubans are probably trying to keep on good terms with both. Thomas said he received no military training but was taught a few things like how to dismantle a machine gun.

Thomas commented that no particular group seemed to be in command in Cuba, resulting in such disorder that it was a wonder the revolution had survived. He believes the ORI is merely a mechanism.

Mexico would not issue Thomas a visa, so he returned to Panama via Prague where he talked with Czech Communist officials and may have pleaded the PDP case against VAN with them. (CIA Panama City TDCS-3/531,754, 20 Dec, SECRET)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY VENEZUELA EAST GERMANY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,107

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 65920

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1 & 7 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2652

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLOW CELL MEMBER WHO WORKS IN THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
PARA 2: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO MARQUEZ.

1. JESUS FARIA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA), AND OLGA LUZARDO FINOL, SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCV, WERE TWO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN '63. THEY RETURNED TO VENEZUELA WITH A LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.

2. POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV, ON 1 FEB SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 16376

SECRET

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE USSR. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT THE CONGRESS CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN USING GUERRILLA FORCES.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP, DIA
DA IN 16376

END OF MESSAGE

Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)

The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air formations. The most significant display was that of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles.

Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western Army, units of the National Militia, and other infantry units in a "new parade step" resembling the goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and AA artillery. Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.

The air formations included helicopters, propeller-type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.

Soviet participation in the parade has not been established, although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of the aircraft.

Premier Castro's speech following the parade brought no surprises aside from its unusual brevity. He made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air defense system, including the SA-2's, and, in a probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said there could be an incident "at any time". end here

Castro reiterated the five demands he first made after the announcement that the Soviets would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He included his usual anti-US statements and slurs at President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for "unity" within the Communist Bloc. He called for revolution in Latin America, with special emphasis on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task . . . of serving as an example" for that revolution.

In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would "never leave Revolutionary Cuba alone in distress." (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: VARIOUS

reportedly continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but well organized and effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

(REVERSE BLANK)

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

(REVERSE BLANK)

Construction of the fishing port in the Bay of Havana, whose announcement as a Soviet undertaking caused so much concern last fall, will be directed by a team of Soviet technicians and Cuban engineers and will start in February - according to a Havana radio announcement. The port is to be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 million pesos, which will be met by a loan from the Soviet Union, to be amortized over 10 years. The port is expected to serve 130 vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuban fleet. It will have installations such as freezer plants for 10,000 tons of fish, factories for processing sea products, machinery for making no less than 80 tons of ice a day, a floating dock to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and well-equipped repair shops. The announcement emphasized that the port is to be operated by and will be the "absolute property of the Cuban state."

It has also been announced that Poland has now formulated plans for building the shipyard envisaged in the port of Mariel. The installation will be managed by Cuban technicians who are presently receiving training in Polish shipyards on the Baltic. Ship construction will reportedly reach a level of 70,000 tons per year. (FBIS 58, 17 January, and Daily Report, 16 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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PASSED TO
GEN. CARROLL ☐
GEN. QUINN ☐
GEN. HALL ☐
COL. GILLIS ☐

Control: 7384
Rec'd: February 11, 1963
9:11 p.m.

FROM: Kingston

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 567, February 11, 6 p.m.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Ref by msg number in unclassified reply prohibited.

Exporting Revolution

Permanent Secretary External Affairs Ministry told Embassy today that GOJ concerned over reports it had received that USSR furnishing Cubans not only fishing vessels, but also torpedo boats and submarine chasers. He foresaw Soviet-supplied ships as having potential adverse effect on Jamaican fishing industry as well as presenting possible security problem. He asked whether US could provide more detailed information on these ships which would operate from Soviet-built "fishing base" in Cuba.

In view of reports, he planned to urge Cabinet to take early action on deciding and publicizing limits of Jamaican territorial waters in order to avoid incidents with Soviets and Cubans. He is considering recommending to Cabinet that Jamaica claim territorial waters of six-and-six miles. Jamaica now apparently claims three-mile limit.

Although GOJ obviously counting on receipt US military equipment, seems unlikely that this expression GOJ concern motivated primarily by desire to speed up delivery. Embassy inclined to view Jamaican approach as healthsome indication GOJ at technical level beginning to appreciate ramifications of Cuban problem.

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS, USDEL IADB
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CONFIDENTIAL

AAP-3

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3

SUPPLEMENT

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO

Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19 March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is threatened; and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem throughout the area.

During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integration of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives of the Alliance for Progress Program -- will undoubtedly be emphasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integration, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by 1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.

On 3 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective opposition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party -- Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN), whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-Communist elements, militant conservatives and others may attempt to create disorders before or during the elections, but the Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of controlling any troubles short of a general uprising or well-coordinated rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.

Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registrations and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza puppet, opposition suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of General Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.

Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air Force revolt have not been too serious. Although plotting [illegible] continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

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(REVERSE BLANK)

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(SECRET)

Campesino Strike Scheduled in Bolivia

A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today could lead to violence if it occurs. The Government reportedly plans to block all entrances into La Paz, and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling and arming to counter the strikers who are led by pro-Communist Torribio Salas. A government spokesman claims that the Cuban and Czechoslovak Embassies are financing the strike and that the Cubans are training campesino militia in other areas as well.

President Paz has reportedly said he will do everything to prevent the strike but will call on loyal campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict develops between the two groups of campesinos, the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in. President Paz might also have to take action against trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to avoid.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)

(REVERSE BLANK)

SECRET [redacted] DISSEM

Three top Brazilian Communist Party officials, including Luis Carlos Prestes, are reported leaving for Cuba via Prague prior to 15 January to discuss certain political problems with the Cuban Communists responsible for pro-Cuban activities in the different Latin American countries. Before leaving they planned to be briefed by a Brazilian Communist Party member who has just returned from a visit to party leaders in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia to get their opinions about holding the "Latin American Congress in Support of Cuba," now rescheduled for March, in Rio or Sao Paulo. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 42868, 31 December, SECRET NOFORN)

[redacted]

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The National Executive Commission of Brazil's orthodox Communist Party (PCB) reportedly planned to meet on 7 January to discuss the party position in relation to Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant-League leader who has been closer to Brazil's dissident hard-line Communist Party than to its orthodox group (CPB). The PCB leaders planned to consider the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to Cuba to confer with Fidel Castro, not only to improve relations but to protest a report that Castrol is supporting Juliao. (CIA Sao Paulo, TDCS-3533404, 9 January, SECRET)

Comment: Cuba has for some time had a divisive influence on Brazilian Communist affairs. The dissident Communist Party formed in late 1961 has - like Juliao - favored a more revolutionary line and has apparently received considerably more support from Cuba than has the orthodox party. Another indication of the divisive influence of Cuba is the report that Francisco Leivas Otero, PCB leader responsible for matters pertaining to Cuba, attacked party subservience to the CPSU at a national PCB conference on 29 November. Leivas maintained that the PCB should discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with complete independence, rather than maintain silence on it as it had been doing. (SECRET)

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY MEXICO/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,187

SUBJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS; REASONS FOR LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67594

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7016

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA (PPS - POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY) CONFERRED WITH HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW ABOUT HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR RIO DE JANEIRO ON 13 FEBRUARY, AND EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN MEXICO CITY ON 23 FEBRUARY. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WOULD CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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FORM 1K 6-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.

2. LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS OF THE CONGRESS ARE:

A. TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA.

B. TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA.

3. LOMBARDO SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE, APART FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND SEPARATE COMMITTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE THE SAME, AND THAT A SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE ASKED ME TO GO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE IN THE MATTER, TO TRY TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARATIONS FOR THE HOLDING OF THE CONGRESS IN ORDER TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS." LOMBARDO SAID "THE COMRADES IN EUROPE" SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENTINE, A CHILEAN, A URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING HIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY.

4. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO THAT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD IN MARCH AS

SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND I AM NOT ONE OF THOSE." ROMERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK. LOMBARDO SAID,"I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT IS MY MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN ATTEND."

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17084

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
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OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

(25)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

CSM 9-6 BRAZ

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-234
NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr. [illegible]
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcongen, SAO PAULO DATE: February 6, 1963

SUBJECT : Sample survey of worker sentiment shows receptivity toward communism; São Paulo business leaders reported by one observer as generally unconcerned over Communist danger.

REF :

Two straws in the wind that have come recently to my attention indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism on the part of at least some segments of São Paulo's working and managerial classes. Further indications in support of or in refutation of these signs will be submitted as they are noted.

On January 31, I was visited by the two top American executives of a Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation.§ They said that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ago of periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was so shockingly different from that of earlier pulse-taking that these executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty percent of the workers approached had indicated that while they did not pretend to know much about communism, they thought they would be better off under a communist regime than they are at present. Among the reasons most commonly given were that things were so bad in Brazil that any change would be for the ~~best~~ better and that communism would put an end to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent. The other twenty percent thought that communism would be bad for the country.

§ Names withheld at their request.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: DMBraddock:tmn 2-6-63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Sao Paulo
A-234

The company executives attributed the pro-communist sentiment as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties experienced by low-income families as a result of the rampant inflation. They said their labor relations were good, that while their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries, some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of their knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work among their employees.

Not long before this visit I was lunching one day at the Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker and pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal democratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures of São Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, "Apart from the two of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil."

No conclusions, obviously, should be drawn from such slender indications. It has been my observation, however, that most Brazilians either believe that a communist take-over would be impossible in Brazil, or believe that even if it occurred, it would take a relatively mild form with which they could live. The Brazilian's boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances a virtue, could in the present state of affairs be the cause of his undoing.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Colombia/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,069
SUBJECT	Cuban Support of Guerrillas in Colombia	DATE DISTR.	4 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	October 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Germany, Munich (14 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia.[1] Gruber, a Polish Jew, was formerly a commissar in Spain. His wife is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia, Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic passport identifying him as "traveling inspector of the Bolivian Foreign Ministry."

2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One of his liaison officers to the Communist Party of Colombia is Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952.

[1] Headquarters Comment. An official British service reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality unknown, was training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area; Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a Cuban passport in the name of Jose Blanco and might have had other passports of different nationalities.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Costa Rica/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/534,724
SUBJECT	Departure of Costa Rican Communist to Live in Cuba	DATE DISTR.	22 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	November 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Costa Rica, San José (23 November 62)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HRS-3006

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Communist Party circles. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on 14 November, on his way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America

REPORT NO. CS-3/535,791

SUBJECT Request by Cuban Diplomat in Chile to Member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth for Information on Leftist Activity in Ecuador

DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD-W-2107

DATE OF INFO. Mid-January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HEG-2108

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his expulsion from URJE during its National Convention held in early January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in which he asks Vera to send a person to Chile to inform him on current leftist activity in Ecuador. Vera plans to send Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can be raised for the trip.

Field Comment. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive activities in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY CUBA/HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,274

SUBJECT PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 8 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67457

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (28 JANUARY, 8 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF NEWS DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; FROM A COLLEAGUE OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL.

1. PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, IS PLANNING TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY COUP. MAGLOIRE CLAIMS TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY. THE DATE OF THE COUP IS EXPECTED TO BE SET AT A SECRET MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 20 FEBRUARY.

2. MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWER FROM CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL, FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, IS LINING UP CUBAN EXILE SUPPORT. RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, THEY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 17056 SECRET

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

MIGHT BE GIVEN A BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO IN THE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN PUERTO PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS NAMED AMBASSADOR TO HAITI BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

IN LATE 1959 RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO ESCAPE ASSASSINATION).

3. EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA EN EXILIO (CTCE-CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) IS ASSISTING RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE.

4. FIELD DISSEM:STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17056

END OF MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

[illegible] REPORT NO. [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible] DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

REFERENCES

[illegible] 20 FEBRUARY 196[illegible]

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[illegible] WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS [illegible] STUDENTS [illegible]

[illegible] AGITATORS: ALL MEMBERS OF THE VANGUARD [illegible]

[illegible] (VANGUARD) OF THE [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH [illegible] INSTITUTE) INCLUDING [illegible]

[illegible] ALEJANDRO [illegible] LAMAR [illegible]

[illegible] BELONGING TO THE [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH AND [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH [illegible]

[illegible] MEXICO [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] THE [illegible]

[illegible]

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[redacted] INFORMATION REPORT [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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TDCS - [illegible]

IN [illegible]

PAGE [illegible]

MEXICO. THEY CONSIDER HIM UNWELCOME BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA.

3. [illegible] PADILLA GUTIERREZ, A LEADING MEMBER OF THE [illegible], IS ALSO TRYING TO ORGANIZE AND INCITE THE MEXICAN WORKERS AND FARMERS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST BETANCOURT'S VISIT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCARIB.

[illegible] ORR ARMY, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

GROUP 1 [illegible]

[illegible] 17435

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PANAMA/CUBA

IN : 9477 (13 Feb 63) R/bE

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/537,022

SUBJECT CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 17 DECEMBER 1962

REFERENCES IN 38943

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (21 DEC 62)

APPRAISAL 2 - THAT THOMAS IS ACCURATELY QUOTED

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE REGIONAL OFFICER (B) OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO, FROM THOMAS WHO IS A PERSONAL FRIEND.

17 OCT 1963

CTION:
IN-9

NFO:
IA-30
IA-CTIC-2
(41)

1. ON 17 DECEMBER 1962, RUPERTO LUTHER THOMAS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF PROPAGANDA OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST), SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN CUBA HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CUBANS, WHO PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH AN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA, TARGETED AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE, TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE PDP. THOMAS SAID THE CUBANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY SHIPS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL, AND THAT THEY TOLD HIM THAT THE NET WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN, ONE A RADIO TECHNICIAN, THE OTHER A CODE EXPERT. THOMAS WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER A RADIO TRANSMITTER COULD BE BOUGHT IN PANAMA.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

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/EXO/ REPCINCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET IN 16496

COMMITTEE (CEN) OF THE PDP ON 16 DECEMBER BUT THAT HE HAD NOT TOLD THE CEN THAT HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. THOMAS WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE MATTER BECAUSE AT THE 16 DECEMBER MEETING MIGUEL PORCELL, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PDP, HAD OPPOSED THE IDEA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PDP SHOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY AND SAID THAT IF THE CUBANS WANTED THIS KIND OF INFORMATION THEY SHOULD GET IT THEMSELVES. RUBEN SOUZA, NATIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDP, DISAGREED WITH PORCELL, SAYING THAT SO LONG AS THE PDP COULD USE THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY SUCH AN OPERATION HE BELIEVED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE SUBJECT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE CEN MEETING SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 18 DECEMBER 1962. (FIELD COMMENT: THOMAS WENT TO CUBA 14 SEPTEMBER AND RETURNED TO PANAMA, VIA ZURICH, 14 DECEMBER. TDCS 3/531,754 GIVES FURTHER DETAILS OF THOMAS' EUROPEAN TRAVEL.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOPS
DA IN 16496

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PERU

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,185

SUBJECT 1. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE COMMUNISTS
2. COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER IN GUARDIA CIVIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67560

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PERU, LIMA (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HPL 2756

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B).

1. MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO TRIAL. HE INTENDS TO RELEASE THEM ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE GOVERNING JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HINOSTROZA'S APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT COLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE WITH GOOD

SECRET
DA IN 17081

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY IS PLEASED THAT DIEZ CANSECO IN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PARTY IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES. PARTY RECORDS FURNISHED BY THE POLICE IN 1950 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS A PARTY MEMBER).

2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVICIO DE INTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNISTS. JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE SECURITY DIVISION OF THE POLICIA DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSIONS, ON WHICH TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17081

END OF MESSAGE

Three Cuban nationals have been identified, according to a usually reliable and competent source, among the leaders of the 17 December strike violence at the US-owned Cerro de Pasco mine in La Oroya, Peru. One of the three Cubans has also been active in promoting the seizure of ranchland in the Peruvian highlands by Andean Indians. Communist-led Indians were said to have planned to synchronize a major new seizure campaign with the violence against Cerro de Pasco. No such incidents have been reported yet. (SECRET)

Peruvian Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities

Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting aside their differences and moving toward closer co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction, believed to be leading the recent outbreak of disorders. The groups are reportedly co-ordinating previously random plans to carry out extensive destruction of industrial and agricultural installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and other Latin American nationals as well as Havana and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be instrumental in this latest development.

Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed serious concern over the internal situation and hinted that they favor strong action. Although constitutional guarantees have been suspended in a fourth department, and several Army units have been moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has taken no further action. It has requested riot control equipment from the US and says it is ready to embark on an anti-Communist program upon assurance that the equipment is forthcoming. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); AIRA LIMA C-1 (C)

Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move

Continued Communist-incited disorders and an alleged Havana-Moscow plan to take over the government prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state of siege early on 5 January. Military commanders assumed political control in their respective zones, and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro-Communist subversives have been arrested. The Lima headquarters of several Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as their publications, have been closed.

According to the Communist plan, subversive activity was to have been intensified between 15 and 20 January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on banking and commercial institutions, military garrisons, vital communications facilities, and universities. A clandestine radio station operating on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct and co-ordinate this activity.

The junta has regarded members of the leftist but non-Communist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the Communists and originally tended to blame them for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA has been involved in anything but legititmate strike activity. Suspension of constitutional guarantees would enable the junta to strike at APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled elections next June. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)

SUPPLEMENT

THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION

A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of the year have publicly called for revolution in other Latin American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country with top priority.

Coinciding with these appeals have been reports that the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part of this campaign.

Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The FALN, although purporting to represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV with its main strength in the Caracas area.

Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with air support, have been used in a recent campaign against these guerrillas.

The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining internal security and of defending the nation's borders against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports constitutionality and is loyal to the Betancourt government. The armed forces would not hesitate, however, to take over the government in order to maintain order or to forestall a Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has overcome much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of the government is greater now than it was six months ago.

The officer corps is generally free of Communist penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcón area of northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: VARIOUS

SECRET

SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Venezuelan Communists Plan to Increase Violence

As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth anniversary of Betancourt's presidency on 13 February by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other Communists are to see to it that the capital is flooded with propaganda that day. According to unconfirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have charged the Castro government with ordering the recent terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity in both countries. Colombian military authorities have reportedly drawn up a plan to prevent terrorism in Colombia's cities.
(SECRET)

SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)

14 Feb 63

IX.B.2

Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/frc

SUBJECT: Alternative US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America

1. Although our public posture on subversion in Latin America may be too firmly established for instant and radical revision, the following analysis is offered on the assumption that some change in emphasis is both possible and desirable, now or at some time in the future.

2. Given the existence of a Communist state, of either major persuasion, what is the likelihood that it will engage in subversion toward neighboring states?

a. Total. All experience of the past forty years demonstrates that a Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanates heat.

b. But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion are involved:

(1) Hardware-centered - that is, funds, guns, tools of sabotage.

(2) Egalitarian and libertarian ideals.

3. How much does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the probability of Communism spreading to target countries?

a. Subversion is never a sufficient condition - and frequently not a necessary one.

b. If subversion is really dangerous to a target state, there is per se something seriously wrong in that state. (France's "Nasser Fallacy" of 1956: France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption that if Nasser were disposed of, the trouble in Algeria would magically disappear. Although the game was not played out, few would dispute the conclusion that France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter, that France would have been in an even deeper morass if her military forces had managed with the British to occupy Cairo.)

4. How feasible is it to control subversion at the source without destroying the Communist State?

Usually it is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive.

For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which could prevent the export both of hardware-oriented and idea subversion, would be very high, even if the activity were accepted by Cuba and the Soviet Union. This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every traveler, forcing planes down for inspection, etc. We submit (a) that ideas would still be exported and (b) that by so doing we would magnify the importance of Cuba beyond imagination. It would become a kind of forbidden fruit. The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to mind. This course involves an increment of prestige and lure to Cuba which would be likely to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution in the export of trained subversives and associated hardware. Furthermore, given the success of such an effort, the obvious Soviet counter would be to use other channels which we could not surveil without major East-West confrontation. The Cuban subversion export organization might well move to Moscow, Prague and/or even Peiping. Therefore, to take a public stance opposed to Cuban subversion without having resolved on invasion is to be committed to a policy bound to demonstrate US impotence.

5. If we want to control subversion at the source by destroying the Communist State, Cuba, how useful is it for us publicly to emphasize hardware-centered subversion as the reason?

a. For many people outside of the US, even the export of subversion by force and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, as well as funds, arms, and other equipment. (We, for example, are not ashamed of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.)

b. Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on attitudes toward thetarget. (Example: acts against Jiminez, Trujillo did not offend US/ most of Latin America/ most of the world; the parallel today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser). We run the danger of falling into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion directed against the Dutch government would outrage not only all Americans, but also all non-Communist Europeans; its legitimacy is total. But the same can not be said for most LA governments. The difference is decisive and perhaps sometimes neglected.

c. Most people generally recognize that when violent subversion is powerful, it is because it taps fundamental sources of discontent.

d. We in the US tend to look at subversion in Latin America from the point-of-view of hardware. But a great deal of the subversion in Latin America is or at least appears as idea-centered, not hardware-centered. The export of "armed aggression" by dedicated revolutionaries is only a part of the process. Another part, which is at least as important, and probably more so, is the export of propaganda. This, however, to much of the world, including Latin America outside of the oligarchies, will appear as an export of ideas and ideals (perhaps wrong, but nevertheless ideas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the

Latino viewpoints. We are very close to putting ourselves into the position of the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against the power of ideas. The trap is that we may seem thereby to be acknowledging the decline and imminent fall of our own ideas.

e. One consequence of this line of reasoning would be that, if we ever find it necessary to invade Cuba, we should do so "to stop the firing squads," "to guarantee free elections," -- but not to save Somoza.

6. How feasible is it for us to control both kinds of subversion at the target rather than at the source?

a. It is often feasible. This is how we have in fact successfully controlled subversion except in the dubious case of S. Vietnam. Even in the difficult case of Greece, we succeeded by a combination of military and economic measures.

b. The point is not that this is always a feasible way of handling the problem; rather it is often practicable and also often the most desirable way.

7. Suppose that we decided to invade Cuba to control subversion with the result (three cases):

a. That we restored the status quo ante Castro.

b. That for reasons of expediency we try to maintain Castro's "reforms" -- i.e., what many Latinoes would regard as "socialism."

c. That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no matter what ensued.

How would the prospects for Communism in the Western Hemisphere be affected?

Case A: Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the prospects for Communism.

Case B: There would be strong popular Latin American support, some governmental outrage, but the prospects for Communism would be diminished.

Case C: Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued, because most Latin Americans do not trust the US (and particularly would be skeptical of "free elections" if US soldiers were present).

CONCLUSIONS

1. Conditions in most parts of Latin America are such that subversion (Cuban or Bloc or both) is really dangerous.

2. Since this is so, the US public posture should not recognize this; and we should abstain from public pronouncements that subversion is conceivably a casus belli.

3. The point-of-view set forth in this paper, insofar as it can be made operative, may tend to bring a fundamental alignment between the US public posture and LA opinion.

4. The US course of action towards any LA country has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, in any given case at any given time, of subversion control (a) at source or (b) at point of impact.

5. The same principles would apply if another Communist-oriented government were to come to power in any part of Latin America.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

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Document Information

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS AND ARMS
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/09/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder 6. Draft report concerning control of access to and surveillance of Cuba.

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority
☐ Refer To
Review Date 12AUG15 By

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY [illegible] DATE 01/14/16

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazil AN GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew its scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

f. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government/during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligence Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

S. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports [illegible] on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

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Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10021

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ICCCA
FROM : CHMN, SUBCMMT ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
TO : MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

TITLE : REPORT FOR JULY-AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

DATE : 09/30/1963
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :

ENHANCEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES
CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERILLAS AND ARMS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion to the members of the Committee re: Report for July-August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 8/12/2015 By KCS

#6
File

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2) — #6, #7
USIA - Mr. Wagley (1)
RAR - Mr. Hart (1)
Justice - Mr. Geogheghan (1)

2 Oct 63

M/R Called
Bob Folstead advised etc - Staffed w/
J-3 - Air Staff & Army - Haig

ARA:WGBowdler:jg
9/30/63

GROUP 1
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declassification

SECRET

DRAFT

SECRET

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GROUP 1
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declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

SECRET

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Mosco$\overset{w}{a}$ route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ BrazilIAN GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubans as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sk scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a _Cubana_ charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate _Cubana_ approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for _Cubana_ planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organisations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

3. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

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United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports [illegible] on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

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to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

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July 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 53 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

References:
a. SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees, dated 15 Mar 63.
b. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Approved by The President, dated 20 Mar 63.
c. Spec Asst to Sec Army memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Actions Approved by the President, dated 29 Apr 63.
d. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion, 27 Jun 63.

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During the April-June Period in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 22 July 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions furnished in response to reference d.

OSA, ASG Control No. 16734

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DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Future Subcommittee Progress Reports will be prepared on a monthly basis for the previous month's activities and will follow the format utilized in the attached draft. It is requested that appropriate points of contact provide this office (Room 2E-614) by 1600 hours on 1 August 1963 and each month thereafter, a report, in duplicate, on the status of those actions approved by the President and assigned to their respective organizations. Additionally, this report should include any other actions taken to counter Castro subversion.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

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REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION ON PROGRESS MADE DURING APRIL-JUNE PERIOD IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

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USA, ASG Control No. 1673C

1. The Department of State:

A. Participated in the preparations for and the holding of the Managua meeting on subversion, which was held April 3-4.

B. Headed an inter-departmental team which visited the Isthmian countries to encourage implementation of the recommendations for curbing subversion which were agreed on at the Managua meeting.

C. Prepared a report on the inter-departmental team's suvery of the Central American countries, containing recommendations for further action in this field, and advised affected U. S. agencies and foreign service posts of the guidelines for operation of the military alerting system.

D. Worked in the OAS in drafting a report containing practical recommendations to counteract Castro/communist subversion in the fields of the movement of travel, propaganda and funds, and prepared the ground for a COAS decision to transmit the report to member Governments urging them to implement the recommendations contained therein.

E. Drew official and public attention in Latin American countries to the capture of Peruvians who were returning from Habana by an overland route through Bolivia, and urged the Peruvian Government to make details of this case known to the OAS.

F. Helped publicize the capture of an Ecuadoran subversive who was returning to Ecuador from Cuba by way of Prague with $25,000 in cash on his person, and requested the Ecuadoran Government to make an official report of this matter to the OAS.

G. Sent a U.S. Consul to Gran Cayman to investigate Cuban flights to that island, and secured the cooperation of the Costa Rican Government in preventing the use of LACSA aircraft to transport subversives to San Jose off-landed in Gran Cayman.

H. Approached the British Government various times to seek its cooperation in preventing the use of Gran

Cayman and its other Caribbean possessions as traffic refueling or transit stops for planes flying to and from Cuba.

I. Continued pressure on the Dutch Government and KLM airline officials not to resume KLM flights to Cuba, thus limiting the access to Cuba by Free World airlines.

J. Obtained the cooperation of CMA airline (Mexico) to keep its mail and cargo flights to Cuba on an unscheduled basis and to avoid carrying passengers on the Habana-Mexico City leg of its service.

K. Continued efforts with the Canadian and Mexican Governments to secure their cooperation in preventing Cubans from introducing Russian IL-18's on flights between Habana and their countries.

L. Urged the Brazilian Government not to grant landing rights for Soviet Bloc or Cuban planes servicing Cuba, and continued efforts to keep Brazil from signing a civil air agreement with Cuba.

M. Sought cooperation of various African Governments in preventing the use of African airports as transit points for regular USSR-Cuba air service with TU-114's or as refueling stops for ferrying IL-18's to Cuba.

N. Initiated action to request US-owned and controlled oil companies in the Caribbean and Latin America to refuse bunkers voluntarily to vessels and aircraft in the Cuba trade.

O. Requested the Spanish Government to limit or eliminate service to Cuba by Iberia airlines and Spanish shipping companies.

P. Blocked initiation of an ocean ferry service between Habana and Florida by employing various delaying and obstructing tactics.

Q. Ordered, as of April 1, that all U.S. passports be marked not valid for travel to Cuba to insure that ban on travel to Cuba would be more effectively enforced.

R. Informed the Mexican Government that Americans were not permitted to travel to Cuba without authorization and requested their assistance in preventing U.S. citizens from transiting Mexico en route to Cuba.

S. Instructed posts in Latin America to encourage host governments to take appropriate measures to discourage participation of their nationals in Cuba's May Day celebrations, and to prevent charter flights from their country to Cuba for the celebration.

T. Informed affected governments of the names of their nationals who had returned from Cuba on the Cuban plane which flew the new Cuban Ambassador and his party to Brazil, and suggested that they take this matter up with Brazil. Also called this Cuban action to the attention of the Brazilian Government.

U. Worked through Chilean Government and university circles to block the holding of the Communist-inspired II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for Santiago, Chile in August 1963.

V. Encouraged the President of Honduras to have his immigration officials request clearance from our Embassy in Tegucigalpa before granting visas to Cubans wishing to enter Honduras from Cuba.

W. Encouraged the Benelux and Italian Governments to maintain visa requirements for Cubans travelling to their countries despite Cuba's having done away with visa requirements for their nationals who visit Cuba.

2. The Department of Defense:

A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions in Haiti.

B. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Due to noncommunication difficulties, the multi-channel radio station scheduled for installation at Managua, Nicaragua by 1 July 1963 will be completed on or about 27 July 1963. Entry negotiations have been completed with Honduras, with the military radio facilities installation scheduled for completion on or about 10 October 1963. Negotiations are continuing in Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities.

C. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U. S. forces, reporting as before, to U. S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of subversive movement, obtained by U.S. surveillance have been made available for immediate transmittal through U. S. military alerting system.

D. Reached agreement with CIA on steps to be taken to prevent duplication of effort in operating a U.S. military alerting system and furnished guidance on this matter to USCINCSO and CINCLANT. After clarification of the role of the U. S. Military Groups by USCINCSO the military alerting system was again placed in operation effective 15 June 1963.

E. Maintained U. S. forces, for the most part from within the Atlantic Command, available to respond to assist in the final interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, upon the request of the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned by the United Commander involved to meet the singular problem encountered. In somewhat similar circumstances, U. S. forces of Atlantic Command have responded to this requirement in the cases of the Venezuelan ship ANZOATEGUI and the Italian ship CANNA REGIA.

F. Had the U. S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) report for duty in the Canal Zone on 15 May 1963 to perform as a Small

Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT). Members of the SCIATT accompanied by a representative from the staff of Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) have completed an in-country evaluation of 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) in five Central American countries and a detailed program through mid-November has been prepared for improving the material readiness and handling of the CGUBs provided by MAP. Action is underway to expedite delivery of spare parts required for maintenance of the boats.

COMUSNAVSO has now initiated a request to establish SCIATT billets with permanent personnel for an initial period of three years in order to fully develop the Central American CGUB program. The success of this program would be a major contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System. U. S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) has recommended approval of COMUSNAVSO's request to CNO and action is being coordinated with OSD/ISA, JCS and USCG to obtain approval and appropriate funding for permanent billets.

The 40-foot CGUB permanently assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone, for use by the SCIATT has been delivered and is in the process of being activated.

G. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

H. Continued, through its intelligence agencies, work on studies concerning Castro/Communist subversion directed against Latin America.

I. Increased to 12 the number of Latin American countries in which there are intelligence exchange arrangements between U. S. and local military services.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency:

A. Completed efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These facilities, known as Joint Communications Centers, are now being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000 groups handled in March 1963.

B. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A summary of actions by country follows:

1. Argentina - Station, in conjunction with the Embassy, has continued to press the Argentine government to enact effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is being furnished to the Argentine government by the station. Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and are being assessed by the station. Information from three recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings. Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls, all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now via Prague. The Argentine Security Service has informed the station that mail censorship and customs controls at the docks and airports are 95% effective in preventing the entrance of Cuban propaganda through these channels. Local dissemination of propaganda is regulated by an Argentine inter-agency committee, which reviews any new propaganda items and takes action to stop dissemination of any item judged to be pro-Cuban or pro-Communist. During May the Argentine government issued a new decree which restricts Communist activities within Argentina. The station has continued to press the Security Service to urge regulation of travel to Cuba, but the adoption of such measures has been delayed pending government receipt on an official basis of the OAS recommendations. Through several assets the station is working on leads which it is hoped will reveal the basic sources of illegal arms sales in Argentina.

2. Bolivia - Station has been urging Bolivian government to adopt stricter travel controls, without apparent results so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far, no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian government on the strength of such information. Station comments that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting Bolivia to do something about it. The station has also furnished considerable information, including some surreptitiously acquired documents, to the Ambassador for his use in urging Bolivian government action against Cuba. Considerable information is also being obtained through the interrogation of Peruvian guerrillas captured attempting to cross into Peru early in June.

3. Brazil - Information on Brazilians who have received subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the National Security Council through CIA liaison with the NSC's Security Service. While the Brazilians have stated that the information is "of interest," there is no firm indication to date that they have the capability or desire to really follow up on the information furnished.

An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances where the station is able to tip him off regarding their destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate information to him promptly. The station has indicated that in spite of its increased efforts, there are no indications of any basic change in the Brazilian attitude toward Cuba, and it is unlikely that the Brazilian government will take adequate steps to combat Cuban subversion.

4. Chile - Chilean internal security authorities, at urging of station, are trying to impede and harass travellers to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced in recent weeks. Station and Embassy are continuing pressure on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations

against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non grata during April for using false identity documents, and the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his own government. Two new sources have recently been recruited by the station who are in a position to furnish valuable information concerning not only certain aspects of the situation within Cuba, but details concerning travel to and from Cuba by both legal and illegal means. The station is now in the process of debriefing an asset who recently returned to Santiago after spending one month in Cuba as a trainee. Efforts are being made to have other station assets included in future training programs.

5. Colombia - Chief of Customs has indicated to station his willingness to institute an improved travel control system. Station believes it has identified a courier operating between Colombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to uncover his Colombian contacts. One station asset is now in Cuba attending guerrilla warfare training, another is being debriefed after his recent return from Cuba, and a third expects to depart soon for two months training in Cuba. The station is continuing to develop leads provided by one recent returnee, and thus far this investigation has involved members of both the Colombian Congress and the Bogota municipal government. A Colombian Civic Action Group, composed of influential local businessmen, which is subsidized and directed by the station, has established an anti-Castro propaganda unit. This group is actively collecting evidence of Cuban subversion in Colombia to support its propaganda campaign.

6. Costa Rica - Local authorities appear to be inclined to cooperate in a program of harassing travellers to Cuba. A station asset in the Costa Rican Security Service has been confiscating the passports of persons returning from Cuba and has cooperated in other ways. One station asset is expected to travel to Cuba soon for training. The "Kennedy Groups," which were organized at the time of the President's visit to Costa Rica, are being encouraged to collect information of all sorts concerning Cuban subversive activities, and to participate in propaganda activities aimed at Cuban subversion. Other station propaganda assets have kept up a

steady campaign against Cuban activities, and the Costa Rican Security Service, at the urging of the CIA station, has destroyed tons of propaganda brought into the country from Cuba.

7. Dominican Republic - Efforts to get Juan Bosch to take active steps against Communists and travellers to and from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts to establish a new and effective internal security organization in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for the service are continuing.

8. Ecuador - Station reports that, largely as a result of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S. agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government, however, is no more inclined to take action than before. The National Director of Immigration has stated that he personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals against citizens who return from Cuba. He has checked a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not one name or passport number corresponds with official Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of fabrication of passports by Cuba.

A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for terrorist activity in Ecuador.

The station chief has accompanied the American Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed subversion.

Approximately 7,000 pounds of Communist propaganda are being destroyed monthly as a result of a unilateral operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.

There have been at least two recent cases of Ecuadoran returnees from Cuba being arrested upon their arrival, one of them having been found in possession of a large sum of U.S. dollars, and another allegedly having a plan of revolutionary action found on his person. In both cases the Ecuadoran authorities had been informed of the pending arrivals of these individuals by the CIA station.

9. El Salvador - The station has called to the attention of the Chief of the Salvadoran Security Service the fact that the stamping of passports "not valid for travel to Cuba" is not being done on a regular basis, and received assurance that the Foreign Office and Immigration Police would be reminded of their obligation to do this. The station is embarking on an expanded program of assistance to Department 2 of the Ministry of Defense, which is in fact the Salvadoran Clandestine Internal Security Service. That service has indicated a willingness and desire to combat Cuban subversion, but so far it has lacked both know-how and equipment to do so.

10. Guatemala - The CIA station in Guatemala City has found its efforts in this field hampered considerably by the apathy and disorganization of the Guatemalan government. Early this year the only effective Internal Security Service in Guatemala was disbanded by President Ydigoras, and no adequate organization has been established since the Peralta government came into power. Through unilateral assets the station has been able to keep itself reasonably well informed concerning guerrilla activities and travel to and from Cuba. However, it has been unable to bring about any effective counter Cuban activity on the part of the Guatemalan government.

11. Jamaica - New and more stringent regulations concerning travel to Cuba were adopted by the Jamaican government during May, partially as a result of the urging of the CIA station. The Jamaican Internal Security authorities have shown a willingness to do everything they can to control such travel, and have indicated a high degree of cooperation with the CIA station.

12. Haiti - Because of the continued political crisis in Haiti, the CIA station activities there with regard to Cuban activities have been severely limited and have consisted primarily of checks made by unilateral station

assets who have reported from Cape Haitien, Port de Paix and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands that they were unable to uncover any evidence of travel to or from Cuba. No cooperation between the station and Haitian authorities can be expected under the present political circumstances.

13. Honduras - The CIA station in Tegucigalpa has persistently prodded security elements of the Honduran government in an effort to persuade that government to undertake the actions agreed to at Managua. The government has now begun stamping most new passports "invalid for travel to Cuba." However, revalidated passports are not being so stamped. Station assets have succeeded in publicizing some Cuban subversive activities, including the return of eight leftist labor leaders from a trip to Cuba and the sabotage of a fishing vessel which was being used by anti-Castro Cuban exiles to surveil the northern coast of Honduras. Several alleged Cuban agents are now being held in jail pending legal proceedings against them.

14. Mexico - A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy has continued to issue visas on pieces of paper separate from the passport, but the government's practice of stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico, whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas. This is not true of other nationalities, who need no visa if in transit. The government continues to confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at the airport. The government recently refused visas to five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled to Cuba for intelligence purposes. Through unilateral penetrations of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, the CIA station continues to acquire information on types of Cuban visas granted to travellers, as well as some advance travel data.

15. Panama - At the urging of station, the Guardia Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them from establishing an effective organization. Several recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are

expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training. CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel control functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three-man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel controls.

16. Nicaragua - The Nicaraguan Security Services with whom the CIA station is in liaison have been cooperative in their efforts to take suitable action based on the Managua resolutions. Cuban activity in Nicaragua appears to be at a minimum, and the government has the will and ability to control it.

17. Peru - Through the cooperation of a Peruvian intelligence organization, CIA officers have been able to participate in the interrogation of several Cuba-trained guerrillas who were recently captured when they attempted to enter Peru near Puerto Maldonado. The interrogation should provide additional data on guerrilla training, Soviet activities in Cuba, and particularly on Cuban support to guerrilla activities in Peru. Further information has been obtained through a unilateral asset of the station who is active in guerrilla activities of the MIR. An investigation of small arms manufacture in a machine shop in Lima is underway at the urging of the station. The station has furnished additional technical equipment to the Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service to increase its capability to intercept clandestine radio communications from Cuba, and partly as a result of CIA station urging, that organization has been able to obtain 12 investigators assigned by another Peruvian internal security service to assist in the investigation of subversive activities in the port areas of Peru. A Communist penetration agent, who is being run jointly by the Peruvian Internal Security Service and the CIA station, has been offered an opportunity to go to Cuba for training. Considerable information concerning the Peruvian MIR plans for financing the acquisition of arms, communications equipment and other information concerning MIR guerrilla activities has been acquired through a unilateral asset of the station.

18. Uruguay - Station has made arrangements with local service to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good conduct certificates - which are needed to secure passports, and must be renewed every six months - in cases where information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans'

own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba. Pertinent information from CIA unilateral operations is being passed regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station, was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National Council of Government.

19. Venezuela - Travel information from the Caracas Airport is now being received on a daily basis by the CIA station. Venezuelan internal security officials have indicated a strong disposition to take all possible steps to repress Cuban subversive activities. The station has been passing pertinent information from unilateral sources to appropriate Venezuelan officials and, in some instances, action has been taken in accordance with the stations's request. Four Venezuelan officials have been trained in covert mail intercept techniques by a CIA technician and one additional Venezuelan security official is now undergoing training in the United States in the field of police administration, clandestine operations and audio surveillance. Venezuelan student teams, operating under the control of the CIA station, are intensifying their efforts to spot and recruit members of extremist youth groups who are likely to be sent to Cuba for training purposes.

4. The U.S. Information Agency:

A. Issued a detailed information policy guidance to all its Washington media divisions on March 28 setting forth the basic themes to be followed and types of materials to be developed in exposing Castro-Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere. This was followed on April 3 by a circular instruction (USIA CA-2819) to all USIS field posts in Latin America urging each to stimulate local press and radio attention to evidence of Cuban-based subversion and to report promptly local developments, official comment, and editorials, for cross-play to other countries.

B. Broadcast over Voice of America a total of 26 features and commentaries on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in its Spanish-language transmissions to Latin America during the three month period. This was in addition to regular reporting of developments on the subject in the Voice's hourly newscasts. Prominent attention was given to the Managua Ministers Meeting, the OAS reports of the Special Consultative Committee on Security and the Lavalle Committee, the capture in Bolivia and Peru of Cuban-trained guerrillas, the discovery of a subversive plot in Ecuador, and terrorism and counter-measures in Venezuela. Special features included editorial round-ups from the Latin American press on subversion, a dramatization of an incident in Ecuador, a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a history of subversion. In the usual Voice of America practice, these features and commentaries were sent to USIS field posts in tape recordings after short-wave broadcast for placement on the hundreds of local medium-wave stations in the area.

C. Transmitted by teletype through its press service a total of 33 articles on Cuban-based subversion during the three-month period to USIS posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local press. These included news stories, commentaries, and backgrounders on essentially the same developments which were treated by the Voice of America. The Agency's Information Officers in each country were provided with copies of the OAS reports for use in their personal contacts with press and radio personnel. A pamphlet based on the letters from the Guatemalan ex-communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer to Castro and Khrushchev in which he revealed communist subversive tactics was developed by the Agency's publications center in Mexico for reproduction and distribution throughout the area. Work was completed also on a cartoon book, The Despoilers, the story of two young Cubans who tour the communist bloc encountering oppression and food shortages and return home to find the same conditions developing in their own country. The cartoon book is being distributed in over a million copies throughout Latin America.

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25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcasting in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated 15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter contained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be separately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

a. Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears not to be feasible.

b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations.

c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S. propaganda efforts.

d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions, an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy guidance to the field.

e. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland, a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques for their use; and to continue research and development of other unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.

3. Chief of Operations,

3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a. above.

4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning and supporting broadcasting operations.

/s/ C. Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological
Warfare

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution
DD/P - 1
ADCO - 1
Chiefs, All Areas - 1 ea.
Chiefs, Senior Staffs - 1 ea.
C/TC - 1
PP/C/OPS - 1
PP/CPY - 1
PP/C/PAD - 1
PP/Mr. Egner - 2
RI - 1

15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections:

1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD WAR. It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from Communism are doing the least to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our current and planned activities against them.

4. Section 4, Page 4, deals with the principal PROBLEMS peculiar to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953, entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86889.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953, TS 88465.)

(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

Attachment, as stated.

PP/CLE:ha

15 May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psychological warfare.

b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.

c. This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much, if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broadcasts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor any restrictions on listening to them.

d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BBC and Canada together broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

e. In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking nations of the free world.

f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine stations, broadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles from Communist dominated areas.

g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94 to 12, Greece 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

h. The one-sided

h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison of the broadcast output of the USSR alone, without the satellites, against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio propaganda battle with the Orbit.

2. Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a. Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

* * * * * * *

b. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or "captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with broadcasts of friendly countries.

* * * * * * *

c. Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist, religious broadcasts. * * *

d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) strengthening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influencing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problems concerning

problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well. We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this study indicates it may be feasible.

* * * * * * * * * * *

e. Use of purchased or free time through covert channels on existing radio systems in friendly countries. * * *

f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts. /Example--the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II./ This technique is discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.

g. To exploit the amateur /"ham"/ broadcasters, large numbers of whom exist in Russia. * * * A project is being drafted to explore the possibilities of this technique.

h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited audience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also presents special security problems. It is not recommended, except for possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or satellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but should, we believe, be explored.

3. Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy of present Projects

a. USSR.--Radio is the only consistent medium for piercing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approximately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are

in the hands of

in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three wave bands for some time to come. One indication of this is the fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people. Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience, including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to some extent, also, on shortwave. * * *

* * * * * * * * * * *

c. European Satellites.--The preponderance of CIA broadcasting efforts are centered on this area. * * *

d. The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * * (See Para. 2.d.)

4. Problems of Covert Broadcasting

a. Cover

(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although the non-technical listening public can be and often is deceived. Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security and management problems. /These difficulties could, however, be minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget control, and high professional standards./ See Chart, Annex II.

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover headaches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.

(3) The best cover

(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR, etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possibilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Bases

(1) Because governments object to providing bases for aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control, it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. However, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance, which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but, antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintennance are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transportation and other logistics have been provided. The present management of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA. In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems. If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.

c. Information Support

(1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material

upon intelligence

upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, interesting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VOA, and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, produced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated, could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt PW effort targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

d. To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transmission at all hours.

For future planning purposes, however, these factors seem clear:

(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and on the increase.

(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be related to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areas--low-powered local jammers.

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques

(3) What techniques are available to meet this requirement?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out" on a power basis only.

(b) Jamming evasion through the device of varying the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of laying down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting. These must, therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies, must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.

Our broadcasts using this technique have so far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjustments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting base in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in between.

(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting

techniques for

techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field which has been neglected thus far.

Some possibilities in this area are described in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to be within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being developed by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his own home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be capable of invention and development, and the scientific and practical potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting techniques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly developed and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the process of perfection and those which might be invented might even be

the means of

the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We, therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capacities in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.

To recapitulate, it would seem desirable for CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings should provide:

1 A maximum transmitter power of 100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

2 Built in jamming evasion capabilities; and

3 Built in unconventional broadcasting capabilities.

4 Bases in secure and protected areas which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without interference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is now being made by this office.

e. Lead Time

(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes 12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter. Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotiation for bases, the staffing problem, etc.

(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio stations or systems likewise require time for development .

(2) All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabilities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

f. Control and Management

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required

to operate

to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Likewise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same facilities they should be compartmented from each other.* * * *

(See Para. 4.a.(1))

g. Evaluation

(1) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting (25 February 1953--TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with particular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has initiated this much-needed undertaking.

h. Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any plans for new radio projects.

(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.

5. Recommendations

Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other overt media.

b. That any contemplated operation follow strict concepts for clandestine operations, including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both management and policy.

(2) Strict security requirements including compartmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

(3) Maintenance of

(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country government.

c. That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task undertaken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipulation and/or control of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio facilities.

Our foremost objective should be to exploit the broadcasting systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally is possible in two ways:

(1) To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestic services of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western cause.

Within this frame of reference we made the following recommendations:

(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to use indigenous radio systems in friendly and neutral nations with the objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and inhibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance of pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.

These missions should be undertaken in closest collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be accomplished overtly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.

(3) In cooperation with State, develop a positive program for information support of all propaganda activities through maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.

(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements and the exploitation of targets of opportunity. A mature staff officer experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed propaganda lines, (b) expedite P.W. support (c) coordinate with USIS

and (d) generally

and (d) generally backstop the operation.

(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance, coverage, impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to electronically intrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to have these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible use in the cold war--Not to have them available at the outbreak of hot war would be a tragic mistake.

* * * * * * * * * * *

/Note: Recommendations with respect to specific targets have been transmitted to the appropriate divisions./

(10) A small staff element should be created to supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting. This staff should be instructed to expedite the implementation of the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA Policy and Program for the use of this Media.

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

15 May 1953

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14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

[illegible] 2386G

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REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:
ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963
IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 23866

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
TOTALS	319	47	

Annex C

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
TOTALS	104	214	

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26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

OSA, ASG Control No. 2707H

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11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE
on CUBAN SUBVERSION
ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 2207 H

SECRET

DRAFT
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and

From

SECRET

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counter act

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three H-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Guantanamo City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence Agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analyses on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of

A America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in the

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allits Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazilassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athelete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguyan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector willbe brought to light.

JFK Assassination System
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JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
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CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
1.	Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC	Undated
2.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis	7 Jan 63
3.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	11 Feb 63
4.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	12 Feb 63
5.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	13 Feb 63
6.	SecNav testimony before HASC	18 Feb 63
7.	Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject of communist subversion of the hemisphere	19 Feb 63
8.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A. M.)	19 Feb 63
9.	SecNav testimony before HASC	19 Feb 63
10.	Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell D. Taylor, ChJCS	20 Feb 63
11.	Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC	20 Feb 63
12.	SecDef testimony before SASC	21 Feb 63
13.	Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC	21 Feb 63
14.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba)	22 Feb 63
15.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA)	26 Feb 63 (Transmittal Slip)
16.	Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations - U.S. Senate	13 March 63

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
17.	Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments	8 Mar 63
18.	Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def	Undated
19.	Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd	29 Mar 63
20.	Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Sub Comm of the Comm on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)	Undtd

RANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 26 Feb 6

TO: Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance

ROOM NO. 3E985 **BUILDING** Pentagon

REMARKS:

OFFICE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

10 00 AM '63

FROM: CIA - William A. Tidwell

ROOM NO. **BUILDING** Code143 **EXTENSION** 6614

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957—O-439445 (47)

35

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STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OSA, ASG Control No. 519

25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional tradecraft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 questions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and includes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland.

III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the

Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti	- 7 hr
Arabic to the Mediterranean area	- 5 hr 15 min
English to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
English to the Western Hemisphere	- 17 hr 30 min
French to Europe	- 9 hr 20 min
French to Canada	- 3 hr 20 min
French to Mediterranean	- 3 hr 30 min
Portuguese to Brazil	- 7 hr
Spanish to Europe	- 16 hr 55 min
Spanish to the Americas	- 108 hr 30 min

In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direction finder bearings and other technical clues indicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.

ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such subjects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as headquarters for terrorists working with both the Peronists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla training.

Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a police patrol stopped to investigate, they found he was carrying a number of rifles in his car.

In the last week of January, another of the original batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, was arrested by national security police at an airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammunition for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced he would tell his whole story. So far, according to the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it.

ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authorities when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial delegation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on 27 November.

The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cuban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cuban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even before the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become impossible for the Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that the documents might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposê, Brazilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir

ANNEX C - CHILE

On 28 October 1962, at the height of the missile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence officers. The Chilean police told the press that the group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in Latin America.

ANNEX D - ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name.

ANNEX E - PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indictment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-spaced pages. The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organization for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment conforms with reports our agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a result, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials.

An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills.

ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt regime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.

It would appear from the meager evidence available in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic campaign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban involvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explosives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is directly charged with the mission for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with advanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto

Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.

Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Communist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reaching Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba.

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revolutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramilitary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had promised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. However, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez' men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these funds.

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Mr Califano

INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE

Of The

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of

S. Res. 75

(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)

On

THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
May , 1963.

Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report.

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed.

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive hearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force.

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however, include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.

4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were necessarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces.

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to

October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies.

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence

confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equipment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000 to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any

internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.

14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500

Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type. Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelligence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased.

Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which contained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.

IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment

In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other information that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confirmation of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed.

Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim, physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "personnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba.

3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962.

4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex.

Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evidence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a reanalysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.

The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantially complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.

In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascertained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our forces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 to October 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here.

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful.

Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 14.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flights should be flown.

The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whic was flown on October 14th was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reasonable and proper.

It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been outlined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiat until October 23, the day following the President's message.

During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society.

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.

Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources.

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligence judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missiles complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected targets.

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces.

C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers

To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible tha despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for speculation.

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic reconnaissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits.

A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate thei operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficien depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt to evade detection.

B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba

1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, machine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cuba.

The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are apparently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motorized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple launchers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles, which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN.

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approximately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to suppress an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organization which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiaircraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real air cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intelligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contingent in Cuba.

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some

4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present considerably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combination of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed.

4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn.

C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba

Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba [redacted] presents to the Americas is as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR.

4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities based on Cuba.

5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originating from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Union.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques.

11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.

A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the

Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces.

VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall natinn by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples.

This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be achieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere.

The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date.

Mr. Califano
Col Patchell ?

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

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Joseph F Carroll

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 27, 1963

10:40 am
3/28/63
phoned Col. "Tiny" Moore & he'll have DIA look at it & report to me

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

GC 2490

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr Califano

TO : CCA - Mr. Hurwitch

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : RPA - William G. Bowdler WGB

SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report To Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962.

UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly as possible as the report is now overdue?

ARA/RPA:WGBowdler:jjv

Mr. Califano

March 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

DRAFT PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1962

SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

Soviet Buildup

On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put on the alert.

The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this nation and hemisphere," and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both

/publicly and

publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

U.S. Objective

This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States had set out, the President concluded, "but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing." On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to apply the quarantine. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the

/Guantanamo naval

Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put 5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a training exercise. Following the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of 10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest, took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.

From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks. The first and most proximate task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile and deception to emplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N. supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not to abandon this goal.

From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the hemisphere was solidly committed. From the start, too, it was clear that

/the United Nations

the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications. The United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N.

O.A.S. Action

In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (C.O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent when "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American States should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

/The O.A.S.

The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat to this hemisphere and the countermeasures which the United States considered it essential for the inter-American system to take. He stated that "the Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American Governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation, without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recommend ... that the member states of the Organization of American States take the necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere."

The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member

/to refrain

to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst."

Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.). Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere.

The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon. Debate centered on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist this most dangerous threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. A few delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force,

/which they

which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense "shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed." Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or

/regulations

regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense.

In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5, the C.O.A.S./O.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an efficient and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the Combined Quarantine Force.

Security Council Consideration

Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council -- that month the Soviet Representative -- to call an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America." "The United States," he wrote, "now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves."

/The establishment

The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded, "to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world."

Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution. The resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when the above terms were complied with and recommended that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat."

The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the discussion of the matter before the Security Council.

/Ambassador

Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some members "seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super powers." "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil war -- a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world -- a contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity." "The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere" by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase, armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the "Soviet diplomacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. "If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its power, and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new

/phase of

phase of aggression." He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week:

(1) The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat to this hemisphere and to the whole world.

(2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the Organization of American States.

(3) The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and

/report in

report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and report thereon to the Security Council.

Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war" and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist" measures. The Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.N. observers should be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba "will not accept any kind of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction."

The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba. He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous act of aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had "set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments." He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs

/Andrei Gromyko

Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962) that "any sober-minded man knows that Cuba is not ... building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States ... or else a threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere."

Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warning to the United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do "everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condemning the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war." The Soviet resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into negotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing the threat of war."

At the request of the Representative of Ghana the meeting was adjourned to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other delegations outside the Council.

The Next Morning: October 24

The next morning, the Security Council heard the Representative of Venezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.A.S. resolution. He noted

/that "it has

that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that, apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in the countries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the world into the holocaust of nuclear war." He described the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States and declared that he was speaking for the entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled.

Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of 2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Assembly the previous month. "While the Soviet Government were acting their lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?" The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted properly by coming to the Security Council at the first possible moment. Now the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence

/in the Western

in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council.

The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upon with the massive assistance of the Soviet Union." He could not understand "why the Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived some common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations.

The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed.

At this meeting the Council heard statements by those members who had not yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China, the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab

/Republic-Ghana

Republic-Ghana "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil....cannot be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a new war front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Liu, for the Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution.

Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution. He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," he said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea. At such a decisive moment as this, we believe Cuba should trust the methods of the United Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peace. One such method could be to ensure the United Nations presence in a zone of conflict .... We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such a procedure."

/The United Arab

The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, declared that his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to international law and likely to increase world tension. He recalled that Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the weapons Cuba had acquired were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization" of relations between Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain from tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Ghanian Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;" and called on the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance to the Secretary-General, and "to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General, but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification.

U Thant Proposal of October 24

At the close of the meeting, the Secretary-General revealed that he had

/just addressed

just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba." Thant believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties to "meet and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform."

In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to address an urgent appeal to the President and Premier of Cuba, declaring that "it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba would be suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties concerned" to enter into negotiations immediately, "even this night," irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention were his offer to make himself available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for whatever services" he might perform and the concrete suggestion for "suspension" of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and development of major military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine.

The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General that the threat "was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President noted that the Secretary-General had "made certain suggestions and...invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured" and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly

/these

these arrangements with you." Premier Khrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's initiative and characterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling for the immediate intervention by the United Nations."

When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the previous day to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine and the report that Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba."

Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that "we are here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts." Already the Communists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess," the U.S. Representative continued, "that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Council say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 - 2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would

/gladly

gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges.

One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had mentioned, the fact was that there were such missiles with the forces of only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey -- and that these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957 "which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere nations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth" of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet Union "to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli." If the United States had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis." The one action in the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevenson noted, because it wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine."

When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup, a dramatic encounter occurred between

/Stevenson and

Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt.

STEVENSON: Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States....

Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?

ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.

/STEVENSON:

STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course.

Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment, "in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidence.

The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized" of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the Secretary-General.

/Weekend Negotiations:

Weekend Negotiations: The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters

That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba to the unrelated issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree to carry this out and made a pledge in the United Nations. Your representative will made a declaration to the effect that the United States of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course. he added, "the authorisation of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents." In addition, Khrushchev proposed that the United States and the USSR give pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers of these countries.

This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

/The proposal

The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat was ended.

President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day (October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

"As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows:

"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

Assuming work ceased on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

On Sunday, October 28 -- Chairman Khrushchev broadcast the text of his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict."

/Chairman

Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable you to familiarize yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and which will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the same time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."

President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28 even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

> "The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."
>
> "I agree with you," the President concluded, "that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a

/nuclear test ban.

nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere."

A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean area."

Weekend Negotiations in New York

Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine.

The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at sea. What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement." He therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement." The next day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with

/Soviet ships

Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an outward incident." He expressed the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible.

Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend." President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepts and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussions "you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area.

Screening Shipments

As the White House statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of weapons to Cuba must cease--all under effective international verification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and to institute adequate safeguards against their reintroduction.

/The immediate

The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task. In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event, realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments of offensive weapons.

Havana Talks

The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant

/wrote Prime Minister

wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castro) direct that "the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now underway."

Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged acceptance. He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note: "...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis."

U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists from threats...against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the coming week -- and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem." To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to

/Havana.

Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean."

The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions" issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of the following measures:"

1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against Cuba;
2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support of invasions;
3. End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico;
4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States;
5. United States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its "return to Cuba."

This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General Rikhye and a small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N. supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28.

/Although general

Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N. inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28 statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubans, and no agreement was reached.

The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day, where, it was understood, talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban representatives would continue. Premier Castro, however, did state that he would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles are "not ours", he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of UN inspection. On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastal I. Mikoyan arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime.

Surveillance and Dismantling Continued

When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula, President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the

/President reported

President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected." He also said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross could be "an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection.

New York Negotiations: Verification and IL-28s

Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues. Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satisfactory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12 to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed "an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons

/had in fact

had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial surveillance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN system of inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The US naval vessels would come "alongside" departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons were not reintroduced.

On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.

The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they

/were included as

were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28. The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time.

Partial Settlement: November 20

On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished to remove the bombers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28s would be withdrawn. U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers payed the way for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just four weeks to accomplish.

At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." The President then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurance against invasion of Cuba." Evidence to date indicated that all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to

/verify whether all

verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification of Cuba." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced."

Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political, economic, and other efforts to hald subversion from Cuba nor its purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. "But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations

Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose

/naval units had

naval units had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine force -- i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States -- notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and solidarity.

As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.O.A.S./O.C. fully informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./O.C. in the meantime withheld taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were completed.

Continued Negotiations

The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York.

By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No

/adequate,

adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been achieved. The U. S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive acts against the Western Hemisphere.

Soviet Troops

The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in due course. The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963.

Security Council Consideration Concluded

The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill rather than a final settlement. The two governments agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its members. The text of the letter read:

> "On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.
>
> "While it has not been possible for our governments to

/resolve all the

> resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.
>
> "The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war."

The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "does not consider as effective any agreement other than one which would include consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his declaration of 28 October, 1962...."

As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban item, the situation remained as follows:

1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles, its bombers, and some of its military personnel. The United States and participating American Republics had lifted the quarantine.

2. The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under United Nations auspices.

3. In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of surveillance of military

/activities in

activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security.

4. The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts continued with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed.

5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics.

6. The United States position with regard to assurance against invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, as outlined above.

7. With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter, responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation in its hemispheric context.

Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy

The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for interaction of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.S. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments directly involved. The O.A.S. system successfully met the test of

/workability by

workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republics when their security is endangered. The rapid, decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in negotiating with the Soviets.

The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice, to provide inspection and verification services.

(1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of 109 nations and through communications media directly to world public opinion. Ambassador Stevenson's speeches of October 23 and 25 in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.

(2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact, notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General's intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and development of military installations in exchange for suspension of

/the quarantine

the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of inspection in rapid order.

Both the United Nations and the Organization of American States proved their utility and vigor -- and emerged stronger from the ordeal.

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Cuba

As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15, 1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee transcripts.

Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21, the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet begun its hearings.

As transcripts become available, I will send the requested items to you.

SIGNED

David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)

11 Attachments
- 4 HASC Transcript excerpts
- 3 DoD SC, HApps Transcripts excerpts
- 4 SASC Transcript excerpts

5644 (2)

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

cc: (S/Attachments included) -
Mr. McNaughton, GC
Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
Mr. Lennartson, PA
Mr. Califano, OSA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS U. S. SENATE

13 March 1963

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an airplane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more dependable both in training missions and in actual combat.

The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:

- The least expensive, time-consuming research and development effort before production.
- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft.

- The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods.
- The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 -- 1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considerations entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record.

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to:

1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.

Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly increased.

Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.

In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have commonly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons for such overruns have been:

1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet performance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded.

4. We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting insufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production of similar weapons.

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost.

Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organizations as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.

At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs, and operations.

The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months.

Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed.

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter.

A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division.

To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft carriers.

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me.

Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General

Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group.

The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evaluation Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements.

b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, since not even a prototype existed at the time.

c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates.

The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time.

The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overshadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorsements transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified, concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally selected."

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft, resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined. Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasizing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent in a joint program.

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recommended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments and structures.

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962, explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were:

"1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design.

"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the inherent savings of a joint program.

"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system."

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions.

The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.

In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel

Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuverability at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost" area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.

In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all.

It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs. It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.

When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions. On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical parts in the General Dynamics design -- a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.

It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic purpose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions."

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become complicated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum divergence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.

lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk, who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, discussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging development and production programs, it became clear to me that the General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable. There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on supersonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commercial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made. This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early operational date for the TFX.

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evaluation Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust reverser design and development.

Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically proven and offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to undertake this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant installation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately, and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through" installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems. The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.

The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details, especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but additional costs would be incurred.

In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.

These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped General Electric engine for its initial submission.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in supersonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact, complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the Boeing proposal.

I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic cost estimates in the Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable to TFX estimating.

I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was deficient.

The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but not nearly so much so as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors.

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons.

In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two proposals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.

Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.

It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expenditure is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well as the contractor.

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this production program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research and development contracts, the price of the production program, which for all practical purposes would be committed to the development contractor, would probably be affected.

When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense. This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters, and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and producer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer to our needs.

I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of obtaining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within the dollars programmed.

Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in

November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently, coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the development of the TFX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award. Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts again before we arrived at a final decision.

Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.

There remains one more important aspect of this case which I believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment is what is at issue.

In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion, this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation, but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is, I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations on the task to be achieved.

I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed. In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my decision were:

- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs met stated military requirements and would provide significant improvements in combat capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force.
- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings

and increased dependability inherent in a joint program.

- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more realistic understanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the decision was mine.

Date : 08/04/98
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No object = ✓

(248)

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EYES ONLY

TAB 'A'

SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

A. TASKS

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

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Reviewed on 6/30/98 mpn
Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1 (c and b)
Supp. 2, 5, 6, 8

1. Task 1, p.5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p.5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p.5 The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information

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obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p.5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. [An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica.] A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

State Excising 6.1(c)

CIA

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p.5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way.

6. Task 6, p.5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on

cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO

officials have been donducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. / Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice.

CIA

1, 2, 4, 5

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to

State concurs

CIA

CIA
13 March

assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

CIA

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14 Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

1, 2, 4

16 Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon

1,2,4

19. Section F. p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

1,2,4

20. Section H, p [illegible] One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated

1,2,4

21. Section K, p. 4[illegible] Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.

State Queries
6.1 (B)

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SUBJECTS : ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

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COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government.

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DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

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OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED w/CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

31 December 1963

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AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway]; from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 6(1)(A) 6(1)(C)

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C)

MAR 2016

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Gen Wheeler, c/s

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BY JOINT STAFF
EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

MAR 2016
6(1)(c)

COMMENT: [A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT.] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

9123/3100 (8 JAN 63) w/JCS 2304/204-1

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OCOFSA 721/68

purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

6(1)(C)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

MAR 2016

COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

6(1)(C)

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT.

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacnrymating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

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circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another.

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane.

MAR 2016

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

6(1)(C)

MAR 2016

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"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to US governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the

6(1)(C)

✓

interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

[redacted]

31 December 1963

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OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

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(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C)

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EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

September 21, 1963

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Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

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"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: [redacted] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

6(1)(c)

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

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COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

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COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. [redacted]

6(1)(C)

[redacted]

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

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6(1)(c)

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COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

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6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

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6(1)(c)

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6(1)(C)

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6(1)(C)

[redacted]

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3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.